Qass. Book. ^S7 WORKS PUBLISHED BY RICHAED GUIFFIN & COMPANY, A TREATISE ON THE INTELLECTTJAL POWERS OF THE HXTHAN MIND. BY THOMAS EEID, D. D., Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Crown 8vo, 5s. cloth. A MANUAL OF ROMAN ANTiaUITIES. BY WILLIAM EAMSAY, M.A., Professor of Humanity in the University of Glasgow. Third Edition, crown 8vo, 8s. 6d. cloth. A CYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES. BY JOHN PEINGLE NICHOL, LL.D., Professor of Practical Astronomy in the University of Glasgow . , One large volume, Svo, 18s. cloth. THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. BY WILLIAM FLEMING, D.D., Professor of Moral Pliilosophy in the University of Glasgow. Foolscap Svo, 7s. 6d. cloth. AIRY'S TREATISE ON TRIGONOMETRY. EDITED BY HUGH BLACKBURN, M.A., Professor of Mathematics in the University of Glasgow. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d. cloth. A MANUAL OF CHEMICAL ANALYSIS. BY THOMAS ANDERSON, M.D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Glasgow. In preparation. THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. " A^;^»j r^s TToti'hlva'icaS vi reov ovo/lcoctmv zria'ai'^ts.'' — " Nomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerura." " He has been at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps. ! they have lived long in the alms-hasket of words." Love's Labours Lost, Act v., Sc. 1. " If we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be very much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand for."— Locke. " In a language like ours, so many words of which are derived from other lan- guages, there are few modes of instruction more useful or more amusing than that of accustoming young people to seek the etymology or primary meaning of the words they use. There are cases in which more knowledge, of more value, may be conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign."— Co^mcf^e's Aids to Reflection, Aplior. 12. " In words contemplated singly, there are boundless stores of moral and historic truth." — Trench on Study of Words, 12mo, Lond., 1853. " Jock Ashler, the stane-mason that ca's himsell an arkiteck— there's nae living for new words in this new warld neither, and that's anither vex to auld folks such as me." — Quoth Meg Dods {St. Ronan's Well, chap. 2). " A good dictionary is the best metaphysical treatise.' " Etymology, in a moderate degree, is not only useful, as assisting the memory, but highly instructive and pleasing. But if pushed so far as to refer all words to a few primary elements, it loses all its value. It is like pursuing heraldry up to the first pair of mankind." — Copleston's Remains, p. 101. THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY MENTAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL; QUOTATIONS AND REFERENCES; FOE THE USE OF STUDENTS, WILLIAM FLEMING, D.D, PROFESSOR OF jMOR\L PHILOSOPHY IN THE DNIYERSITY OF GLASGOW. LONDON AND GLASGOW: RICHARD GRIFFIN AND COMPANY, PUBLISHERS TO THE U^flVERSITY OF GLASGOW. 1857. ^^\ y^.^ ,?^' Brown University aUL 1 7 1934 BELL AND BAIN, PRINTERS, GLASGOW. PREFACE. The aim of tlie follo-sving work, as its title indicates, is humble. It is not proposed to attempt an adequate illustration of the difficult and important topics denoted I or suggested by the several vocables which are succes- sively explained. All that is intended is, to assist the student towards a right understanding of the language of philosophy, and a right apprehension of the questions in discussing which that language has been employed. In- stead of affixing a positive or precise signification to the vocables and phrases, it has been thought better to furnish the student with the means of doing so for himself — by showing whence they are derived, or of what they are compounded, and how they have been employed. In like manner, the qu.otations and references have not been selected ^vith the view of supporting any particular system of philosophy, but rather with the view of leading to free inquiry, extended reading, and careful reflection, as the surest means of arriving at true and sound conclusions. In our Scottish Universities, the study of pliilosophy is entered upon by those who, in respect of maturity of VI PREFACE. years and intellect^ and in respect of previous prepara- tion and attainment, differ widely from one another. To many, a help like the present may not be necessary. To others, the author has reason to think it may be use- ful. Indeed, it was the felt want of some such help, in the discharge of professional duty, which prompted the attempt to supply it. The labour has been greater than the result can indicate or measure. But should the YocABULAKY assist the yoLing student by directing him what to read, and how to understand what he reads, in philosophy, the labourer shall have received the hire for which he A^TOught. The College, Glasgow, Nov., 1856. THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ABIIilTY and INAB 11. IT Y— (NATURAL and MoRAl). Ability (Nat.) is power to do certain acts, in consequence of being possessed of the requisite means, and being unre- strained in their exercise ; thus we say ability to walk, the power of seeing, &c. Inability (JVat.) is the opposite of this ; as when we say of a blind man, he cannot or is unable to see ; or when an object is too distant, we say we are unable to see it. Ability (Mor.) is the disposition to use rightly the powers and opportunities which God has given, as when it is written, '' It is a joy to the just to do judgment. " Inability (iflor.) is the want of a right disposition, as in those of whom it is written, '' They have eyes full of adul- tery, and cannot cease from sin." *' If there is ami:hing besides want of inclination which prevents a man from per- forming a particular act, he is said to be naturally unable to do it. If unwillingness is the only obstacle in the way, he is said to be morally unable. That which prevents a man from doing as lie will^ is natural inability. That which prevents him from doing as he ouglit^ is moral inability. '* — Day, On the Will, pp. 96, 97. This distinction is much insisted on by theologians. Natural inability, according to some, excuses from moral obligation. Moral inability is the ground of condemnation. 2 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ABIIilTY— - Thus, tlie heatlieii cannot hear the gospel, for no preacher has been sent to them ; and their not hearing is not sin. But to the Jews our Lord said, '•'- Why cannot ye hear my speech ? Even because ye cannot hear my word." See this distinction upheld by Baxter {Catli, Theol.^ book i. and book iii., and MetJi.^ pars iii., c. 25), and impugned by Tappan {Doctrine of the Will^ applied to Moral Agency^ chap, iii., sect. 5 ; Doctrine of the Will as determined hy Consciousness^ chap, yii., sect. 3). ABSOIiUTX: (Ahsolutum^ from ah and solvere^ to free or loose from) — signifies what is free from restriction or limit. "We must know what is to be meant by absolute or cibsoluteness ; whereof I find two main significations. First, absolute signifieth j^e/yec^, and absoluteness^ perfection ; hence we have in Latin this expression — Perfectum est omnibus numeris absolutum. And in our vulgar language we say a thing is absolutely good when it is perfectly good. jS^ext, absolute signifieth free from tie or hond^ which in Greek is ^'roA?Af^gj/o!/." — Knox, Hist, of Reform.^ pref. "I fear My soul hath her content so absolute That not another comfort like to this Succeeds in unknown fate." — Othello, 1. As meaning what is complete or perfect in itself, as a man, a tree, it is opposed to what is relative. 2. As meaning what is free from restriction, it is opposed to what exists secundum quid. The soid of man is im- . mortal absolutely; man is immortal only as to his soul. 8. As meaning what is underived, it denotes self-exist- ence, and is predicable only of the First Cause. 4. It signifies not only what is free from external cause, but also free from condition, "0! pass not, Lord, an absolute decree, Or bind thy sentence unconditional! But in thy sentence our remorse foresee, And in that foresight this thy doom recall." Dry den, Annus Mirahilis. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHy. 6 ABSOLiUTE— '' He means an infallibility ahsolute^ antecedent, un- conditionate^ sucli as will not permit the churcli to err." — Jeremy Taylor, Dissuasive from Popery^ part 2, introd. According to Sir William Hamilton (Discussions^ p. 13), ''The unconditioned denotes the genus of which the infinite and the absolute are the species." As to our knowledge or conception of the absolute^ there are different opinions. 1. According to Sir William Hamilton, ''The mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the limited, and the conditionally limited. The unconditionally un- limited^ or the infinite^ the unconditionally limited^ or the absolute^ cannot positively be construed to the mind ; they can be conceived at all only by thinking away, or abstraction of those very conditions under which thought itself is realized ; consequently the notion of the unconditioned is only negative — negative of the conceivable itself." 2. According to Kant, the absolute or unconditioned is not an object of knowledge ; but its notion as a regu- lative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned. 3. According to Schelling, it is cognizable, but not con- ceivable ; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the Absolute, but is incomprehensible by conscious- ness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different. 4. According to Cousin, it is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality. Instead of saying that God is absolute and infinite^ Krause, and his admu'er, Tiberghien (Essai des Con- naissances Humaines^ pp. 738, 745), ascribe to Him Seite (selbheit) and Totality. Totahty or the Infinite manifests itself everywhere in nature. Nature is made up of wholes, and aU these constitute one whole. In spirit everjthing 4 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ABSOI.UTE— manifests itself under tlie character of spontaneity or seite. Spirit always is what it is by its own individual efforts. All philosophy aims at a knowledge of the absolute under different phases. In psychology, the fundamental question is, have we ideas that are a priori and absolute? — in logic, is human knowledge absolute? — in ethics is the moral law absolute rectitude? — and in metaphysics, what is the ultimate ground of all existence or absolute being? See Edinburgh Review for October, 1829 ; Sir WiUiam Hamilton (Discussions) ; Tiberghien (Essai des Connais- sances Humaines) ; Whately (Logic ^ book ii., chapter 5, sect. 1). — F. Infinite, Unconditioned. ABSTIIVEIVCE (ahs teuere^ to hold from or off,) — '' is whereby a man refraineth from anything which he may lawfulK- take." — Elyot, Governour^ b. iii., c. 16, Abstinence is voluntarily refraining from things whicli nature, and especially physical nature, needs or delights in, for a moral or religious end. It corresponds to the A^nxov of the precept of Epictetus, Kuix^^ ^^' uttsxov ; Sustine et cibstine. The Stoics inculcated abstinence in order to make the soul more independent of the body and the things belonging to the body. — Christian abstinence is founded in humility and self-mortification. — F. Asceticism. ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTION (Ahstractio^ from aJ)s trahere, to draw away from; in Greek oi(pccips7is, is also called separatio and resolutio). Abstraction is leaving some things out of consideration and attending to others. — S. Bailey, Letters on Phil, of Human Mind, p. 87. Dobrisch observes that the term abstraction is used sometimes in a psychological, sometimes in a logical sense. In the former, we are said to abstract the attention from certain distinctive features of objects presented (abstrahere [mentem'] a differentiis). In the latter, we are said to abstract certain portions of a given concept from the remainder (abstrahere differentias), — ManseU, Prolego- mena Log., note, p. 2G. VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 5 ABSTRACTION— Abstraction (Psychological), says Mr. Stewart (^Elements of the Philosophy of Human Mind^ chap, iv.), '4s the power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest ; or, as I would rather choose to define it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it." Perhaps it may be more correctly regarded as a process rather than a poioer — as a function rather than a faculty. Dr. Keid has called it (Intell. Powers^ essay v., chap. 3) ''an operation of the understanding. It consists in the resolving or analyzing a subject (object) into its known attributes, and giving a name to each attribute, which shall signify that attribute and nothing more." Attributes are not presented to us singly in nature, but in the concrete or growing together, and it is by abstraction that we consider them separately. In looking at a tree we may perceive simultaneously its trunk, and its branches, and its leaves, and its fruit ; or we may contemplate any one of these to the exclusion of all the rest ; and when we do so it is by the operation of mind which has been called abstraction. It implies an exercise of will as well as of understanding ; for there must be the determination and effort to fix the energy of the mind on the attribute specially contemplated. The chemist really separates into their elements those bodies which are submitted to his analysis. The psycho- logist does the same thing mentally. Hence abstraction has been distinguished as real and mental. But as the object presented to the psychologist may be an object of sense or a.n object of thought, the process of abstraction may be either reaZ or mental. He may pluck off a branch from a tree, or a leaf from a branch, in order to consider the sensation or perception which is occasioned in him. And in contemplating mind, he may think of its capacity of feeling without thinking of its power of activity, or of the faculty of memory apart from any or all of the other facul- ties with which it is allied. " VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ABSTRACTION— Abstraction (r.ogical), " As we have described it," says Mr. Thomson {Outline of the Laws of Thought^ p. 107), ''would include three separate acts : first, an act of comparison^ which brings several intuitions together ; next, one of reflection^ which seeks for some marks which they all possess, and by which they may be combined into one group ; and last, one of generalization, which forms the new general notion or conception. Kant, however, con- fines the name of abstraction to the last of the three ; others apply it to the second. It is not of much conse- quence whether we enlarge or narrow the meaning of the word, so long as we see the various steps of the process. The word means a drawing away of the common marks from all the distinctive marks which the single objects have." "The process," says Dr. Whately (Logic^ book i., sect. 6), "by¥/hich the mind arrives at the notions expressed by ' common ' (or in popular language, ' general ') terms is properly called ' generalization,' though it is usually (and truly) said to be the business of abstraction ; for general- ization is one of the purposes to which abstraction is applied. When we draw off and contemplate separately any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to abstract that part of it. Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eye or his mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, form, &c. ; and thus, even though it were the only rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of abstraction ; but if, in contem- plating several objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agree- ment, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement, — i. e., a common name, as ' rose ;' or, again, if we give a name to some attribute wherein they agree, as 'fragrance,' or 'redness,' we are then said to ' generalize.' Abstraction^ therefore, does not necessarily VOCABULARY OF PHLLOSOPHY. 7 ABSTRACTION— imply generalization^ tliougli generalization implies ah- stractiony *' A person who had never seen but one rose," says Mr. Stewart (Addenda to vol. i.yPhil. of Hum. Mind)., "might yet have been able to consider its colour apart from its other quahties; and, therefore, there may be such a thing as an idea which is at once abstract and particular. After having perceived this quality as belonging to a variety of individuals, we can consider it without reference to any of them, and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness in general, which may be called a general abstract idea. The words abstract and general., therefore, when applied to ideas, are as completely distinct from each other as any two words to be found in the language. It is indeed true, that the formation of every general notion presupposes abstraction., but it is surely improper, on this account, to call a general term an abstract term, or a general idea an abstract idea." Mr. John S. Mill also censures severely {Logic ^ vol. i., 2d edition, p. 35) the practice of applying the expres- sion " abstract name" to all names which are the result of abstraction or generalization, and consequently to all general names, instead of confining it to the names of attributes. He uses the term abstract as opposed to concrete. By an abstract name he means the name of an attribute — by a concrete name the name of an object. The sea is a concrete name. Saltness is an abstract name. Some abstract names are general names, such as colour; but rose-colour, a name obtained by abstraction, is not a general name. "By abstract terms, which should be carefully distin- guished from general names, I mean those which do not designate any object or event, or any class of objects or events, but an attribute or quality belonging to them, and which are capable of standing grammatically detached, without being joined to other terms : such as, the words roundness, swiftness, length, innocence, equity, health, 8 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. ABSTRACTION— whiteness. "—S. Bailey, Letters on Phil. Human Mind, p. 195. ''When tlie notion derived from tlie view taken of any object," says Dr. Whately (Logic, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 1), "is expressed with a reference to, or as in con- junction with, the object that furnished the notion, it is expressed by 2i concrete term; as 'foolish' or 'fool;' when without any such reference by an abstract term, as 'folly.'" And he adds in a note, "It is unfortunate that, some writers have introduced the fashion of calling all common terms abstract terms." A French philosopher has expressed himself on this point to the following effect : — " In every class, genus or species, there are two things which may be conceived distinctly, the objects united in the class, and the char- acters which serve to unite them. Hence it follows, that under every term which represents that ideal whole which we Q2^genus^ under the term ' bird,' for example, there are two different ideas, — the idea of the number of the objects united, and the idea of the common characters ; this is what is called the extension and the comprehension of general terms. Sometimes there is a word to denote the extension, and another word to denote the comprehension ; as ' mortals ' ' and mortality.' And this has led some philosophers to say that there are general ideas which are concrete, and general ideas which are abstract — the latter referring only to the qualities which are common, and the former to the qualities and to the objects which possess them." "The mind," says Mr. Locke (Essay on Hum. Under., book ii., chap. 11, sect. 9), "makes particular ideas received from particular objects to become general, which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind; and VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 9 ABSTRACTION— their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas." — See also book iv., chap. 7, sect. 9. In reference to this, Bishop Berkeley has said (Principles of Hum. Know,., introd., sect. 10), "I own myself able to abstract ideas, in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately those qualities which it is impossible should exist separately ; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars, as aforesaid, which two last are the proper acceptation of abstraction.'''' ''It seems to me," says Mr. Hume (Essays., p. 371, n. c. edit., 1758), "not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions" (see his Essay on Sceptical Philosophy)^ "if it be admitted that there are no such things as abstract in general ideas, properly speaking, but that all general ideas are in reality particular ones attached to a general term which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones that resemble in certam circumstances the idea present to the mind. Thus, when the term 'horse' is pronounced, we immediately figure to om^selves the idea of a black or white animal of a particular size or figure ; but as that term is also used to be applied to animals of other colours, figures, and sizes, their ideas, though not actually present to the imagination, are easily recalled, and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way as if they were actually present." In reference to the views of Berkeley and Hume, which are supported by S. Bailey in Letters on Phil. Hum. Mind, see Dr. Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers., Essay v., chap. 6). The Eev. Sidney Smith (Lectures on Mor. Phil.^ lect. iii.) mentions an essay on Abstraction by Dumarsais, and 10 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ABSTRACTION— calls it an admirable abridgment of Locke's Essay, — V. Common, Concrete, Generalization. AbstractiTe (K.ii»wledge) and IntMltire. The knowledge of the Deity has been distinguished into abstractive and intuitive^ or knowledge of simple intelli- gence and knowledge of vision^ or immediate beholding. By the former mode of knowing, God knows all things possible, whether they are actually to happen or not. By the latter He knows things future as if they were actually beheld or envisaged by him, — Baronius, Metaphys.^ sect, xii., disput. 2. ABSUK1> (ah surdo^ a reply from a deaf man who has not heard what he replies to, or that which should be heard with deaf ears) — properly means that which is logically contradictory ; as, a triangle with four sides. What is contrary to experience merely cannot be called absurd^ for experience extends only to facts and laws which we know ; but there may be facts and laws which we have not observed and do not know, and facts and laws not actually mani- fested may yet be possible. Absurduiu (Keductio ad) — A mode of reasoning which was so called by Aristotle. In those sciences which depend upon definition and demonstration, as geometry, there is nothing intermediate between what is true and what can be shown to be self-contradictory or absurd. Hence it is that in geometry this mode of reasoning is much employed, by which, instead of demonstrating what is asserted, every- thing which contradicts that assertion is shown to be absurd. For if everything which contradicts a proposition be absurd or unthinkable, the proposition itself must be accepted as true. In other sciences, however, which do not depend upon definition, nor proceed by demonstration, the sup- posable and the false find a place between what is true and what is absurd. ACADEMICS. — '' There -are some philosophers who have made den}dng their profession, and who have even estabhshed on VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 11 ACAl>E]n[ICS— that foundation the whole of their philosophy ; and amongst these philosophers, some are satisfied with denying certainty, admitting at the same time probability, and these are the new academics] the others, who are the pyrronliists^ have denied even this probability, and have maintained that all things are equally certain and uncertain." — Port Roy. Logic, part iv., chap. 1. The name is derived from the garden of Academus, in which Plato taught. The Academic school embraces a period of four ages, from Plato to Antiochus. Some admit three academies — first, that of Plato, 388 B.C. ; middle, that of Arcesilas, 244 B.C. ; new, that of Carneades and Clitomachus, 160 B.C. To these some add a fourth, that of Philon and Charmides, and a fifth, that of Antiochus. But Plato and his true disciples, Speusippus and Xenocrates, should not be classed with these semi-sceptics, whose characteristic doctrine was TO 'TTidocuov^ or the probable. See Foucher (Dissertatio de Pliil. Academic.^ 12, Paris, 1692) ; Gerlach (^Commentatio Exhibens de Prohahilitate Disputationes 4, Goett.) ACATAIiEPSY (a, privative; and KccTxTivixpig^ comprehension incomprehensibility) — is the term employed by Bacon (Adv. of Learning , Moffet's Trans., p. 140) to denote the doctrine held by the ancient academics and sceptics that human knowledge never amounts to certainty, but only to pro- bability. '' Their chief error," says Bacon, "lay in this, that they falsely charged the perceptions of the senses ; by doing Y/hich they tore up the sciences by the roots. But the senses, though they may often either deceive or fail us, yet can afford a sufficient basis for real science." Hence he says {Novum Organum^ b. i., aphor. 126), ''We do not meditate or propose acatalepsy^ but eucatalepsy^ for we do not derogate from sense, but help it, and we do not despise the understandmg, but direct it." Arcesilas, chief of the second Academy, taught that • we know nothing with certainty, in opposition to the dogmatism of the Stoics, 12 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ACATAIiEPSY— who taught x,oiru7iY}xJ/iSi or the possibility of seizing the truth. All Sceptics and Pyrrhonians were called Acata- leptics. — 7. Academics. ACCIDENT (accidere^ to happen; in Greek, av^^iflriKog^ contingent) — is a modification or quality which does not essentially belong to a thing, nor form one of its con- stituent and invariable attributes ; as motion in relation to matter, or heat to iron. The scholastic definition of it is ens entis^ or ens in alio^ while substance was defined to be ens per se. Aristotle (Metapliys.^ lib. vi.) says, '' Suppose that in digging a trench to plant a tree you found a treasure, that is accident^ for the one is neither the effect nor the conse- quent of the other ; and it is not ordinarily that in planting a tree you find a treasure. If, then, a thing happen to any being, even with the circumstances of place and time, but which has no cause to determine its being, either actually, or in such a place, that thing is an accident. An accident^ then, has no cause determinate, but only fortuitous ; but a fortuitous cause is undetermined. Accident is also that which exists in an object without being one of the charac- ters distinctive of its essence ; such is the property of a triangle that its three angles are equal* to two right angles. Such accidents may be eternal ; accidents properly so called are not." A phenomenon may be constant, inherent in the nature of things, and in that sense essential, as the sparkling of the diamond in light, or the sinking of a stone in the water ; but an accident^ according to Aristotle, is that which neither occurs necessarily nor ordinarily. '-'•Accident^ in its widest technical sense (equivalent to attribute)^ is anything that is attributed to another, and can only be conceived as belonging to some substance (in which sense it is opposed to substance) ; in its narrower and * You do not define a triangle as a figure whose three angles are equal to two right angles; this is shown by demonstration. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 13 ACCIDENT— more properly logical sense, it is a predicable whicli may be present or absent, the essence of the species remaining- the same ; as for a man to be ' walking,' or ' a native of Paris.' Of these two examples, the former is what logicians call a separable accident, because it may be separated from the individual (e. g.^ he may sit down) ; the latter is an inseparable accident, being not separable from the individual {i. e., he who is a native of Paris can never be otherwise) ; from the individual^ I say. because every accident must be separable from the species^ else it would be a property." — Whately, Logic, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 4, and mdex. — V- Substance, Phenomenon. ACROAMATICAr. (fr'om ccx,^oua9cci, to hear). — '' Aristotle was wont to di^dde his lectures and readings into Acroarna- tical and Exoterical: some of them contained only choice matter, and they were read privately to a select auditory ; others contained but ordinary stuff, and were promiscu- ously and in public, exposed to the hearing of all that would." — Hales, Golden Remains (on John xviii. 36). — V. Exoteric. ''In the life of Aristotle, by Mr. Blakesley " (published in the Encyclop, Metrop.)^ '' it has been shown, we think most satisfactorily, that the acroamatic treatises of Aristotle differed from the exoteric^ not in the abstruseness or mysteriousness of their subject-matter, but in this, that the one formed part of a coiu'se or system, while the other were casual discussions or lectures on a particular thesis." — Mor. and Met, Pliil.^ by Maurice, note, p. 165. Some of the early Fathers adopted a similar distinction, in giving instructions to the Catechumens, beginners {KctroL yiyogt accorduig to sound — viva voce instruction), and the Teleioi (finished, or thoroughly instructed, from rs'hogy an end). This corresponds to the difference between the written law and the traditions of the elders. Plutarch (in Alexand.) and Aulus Gellius (1. xx., c. 4) 14 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ACROAMATICAI.— maintaia that the acroamatic works had natural philosophy and logic for their subjects, whereas the exoteric treated of rhetoric, ethics, and pohtics. Strabo (1. 13, p. 608), Cicero {ad Aiticum^lS^ 19), and Ammonius Herm. (adCate- gor. Aristot.)^ maintain that they were distinguished, not by difference of subject, but of form ; the acroamatic being discourses, the exoteric dialogues. Simplicius (ad Cate- gor, in Proem.) thus characterizes the acroamatic in contra- distinction to the exoteric works, " distinguished by preg- nant brevity, closeness of thought, and quickness of tran- sitions," from his more expanded, more perspicuous, and more popular productions. Aristotle's lectures were of two kinds : scientific and popular ; acroamatic or acroatic^ and exoteric. The former were for the more advanced students and those who were capable of pursuing scientific subjects ; he delivered these in the morning. The latter were afternoon lectures to a much larger class, and treated of popular sub- jects, rhetoric, politics, and sophistics. — Lewes, Biograph. PJiiL, vol. ii., p. 107. . Buhle has a Commentatio de Libris- Arist.^ Exot. et Acroam.,inhis edit, of the works of Aristotle, 5 vols., 8vo, Deux Fonts, 1791, pp. 142, 143. ACT. — An act is Immanent or Transient. An immanent act has no efiect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is an immanent act of the senses, cognition of the intellect. A transient act produces an operation or result out of and beyond the agent. The act of writing and of building are transient acts — they begin with the agent, but produce results which may affect others. An act of the will is Elicit or Imperate. An elicit act of will is an act produced immediately by the will, and contained within it, as velle and nolle^ to determine to do or not to do. An elicit act of will is either volition^ which has reference to an end or ultimate object, or election^ which has reference to means. — V. Volition, Election. VOCABULARY OF THLLOSOPHY. 15 ACT— An imperate act of icill is a moYement of body or mind following on a determination of will, as running after or running away, attending or not attending. Also an act done by others, when we order or forbid them to do, encourage or dissuade, assist or prevent. Act in Metaphysics and in Logic is opposed to power. Power is simply a faculty or property of an\-thing, as gravity of bodies. Act is the exercise or manifestation of a power or property, the realization of a fact, as the falling of a heav}' body. We cannot conclude from power to act^ a posse ad actum^ but from act to power the conclusion is good. Actions in Morals are distinguished, according to the manner of theu^ being called forth, into spontaneous or instinc- tive, voluntary or reflective, and free or dehberate ; according to the faculty from which they proceed, into physical, intellectual, and moral ; and according to the nature of the action and character of the agent, into right and wrong, virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blameworthy. Acts are perfect^ when done for themselves without respect to some other act, and imperfect^ when directed to another act. Action. — " The word action is properly applied to those exer- tions which are consequent on volition, whether the exertion be made on external objects, or be confined to our mental operations. Thus we say the mind is active when engaged m study." — Stewart, Outlines^ ]S"o. 111. Leibnitz (Nouv. Essais^ liv. ii., sect. 72) says, ''Tliere are only two kinds of' action of which we have any idea, \iz., movement and thinking." Action and Act are not spion^Tiious. 1. Act does not neces- sarily imply an external result, action does. We may speak of repentance as an act^ we could not call it an action. 2. An act must be individual; we may speak of a course of action. Lastly, act^ when qualified, is oftener, though not universally coupled with another substantive : 16 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY, ACT— action always by an adjective preceding it. We say a kind action^ but an act of kindness. A kind act might be admissible, though not usual, but an action of kindness is not used, though an action of great kindness might be. Deed is synonymous with act. An action was considered by Aristotle (Ethic. Nicom.^ lib. vii., c. 3) as a practical syllogism: — ^' As for instance, a person knows that dry food is good for every man, and that this is a man, or that such and such a thing is dry ; but as to whether this is such and such a thing either he does not possess the knowledge, or does not use it." In Morals, conscience gives the law ; this action is or is not conform to it — then comes the conclusion. Active. — That which causes change is active ; that which is changed is passive. — Taylor, Elements of Thought, Activity.— F. Will. Actual (jquod est in actu — to ov kcat' sus^ysia^u) — is opposed to potential. Before a thing is, it has a capacity of be- coming. A rough stone is a statue potentially^ when chiselled actually. Actual is also opposed to virtual. The oak is shut up in the acorn virtually. Actual is also opposed to real. My will, though really existing as a faculty, only begins to have an actual exist- ence from the time that I will anything. Actus Primus (in scholastic philosophy) — est rei esse. Actu^ secundus^ est rei operari^ or actus quidditativus^ and actus entitativus. A]>A0E: {ad agendum aptus) — a practical saying, fit for use, a rule of action. On the disagreement and similitude between adagies^ apophthegms^ and moral Vuaficii., see Erasmus, in his Prolegomena to his Adagia. ADJURATION (from ad-jurare^ to put upon oath.) — " Our Saviour, when the high priest adjured him by the living God, made no scruple of repljHbig upon that adjuration.''^ — Clarke, Works^ vol. ii., ser. 125. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 17 AI>:?IIRATION. — ^'•^ye shall find that admiration is as superior to surprise and wonder, simply considered, as knowledge is superior to ignorance ; for its appropriate sionifieation is that act of the mind bv which we discover, appiove, and enjoy some unusual species of excellence." — Cogan, On tlie Passions^ part i., c. 2. AI>SClTlTlOUS (from ad-sciscere, to seek after) — that which is added or assumed. ''You apply to your h^-po- thesis of an adscititious spirit^ what he (Philo) says concerning this Trvivf/.ot htov. divine spirit or soul, in- fiised into man by God's breathing." — Clarke. Letter to Dodwell AESTHETICS {ciiuhoU-i perception or feeling.) — "That science which refers the first principles in the arts to sensation and sentiment, as distiaguished from mere m- struction and utility." The science of the beautiful and the philosophy of the fine arts. Various theories have been eutertauied as to the idea of the beautifiil. by Plato, Plothius, and Augus- tine. In modem times, the term cestlietics was first used in a scientific sense by A, Baumgarten, a disciple of Christian Wolf. In his jEstlietica^ 2 vols., 8vo, Frankf., 1750-8, he considered the idea of the beautiful as an Ludistinct perception or feeling accompaming the moral ideas. Mendelsshon and others identified the idea of the beautifril with the idea of the good. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson regarded the two ideas as intimately con- nected. At the close of the eighteenth century, cestlietics was scientifically developed in Germany by Kant, and has been zealously prosecuted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Besides the writings of these philosophers, consult Cours d^Esthetique puhlie 2')ar Ph. Damiron, 8vo, Paris, 1842. The Philosophy of the Beautiful^ by John G. MacYicar, D.D., Edin., 1855. Eeid's IntelL Powers^ essay viii., lib. 4. — V. Beauty, Ideal (Beau). AFFECTION. — '^ There are various principles of action ui man which have persons for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, oiu: being well or ill afiected to 18 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. AFFECTION— some person^ or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall call by the general name of affections^ wbetber they dispose us to do good or hurt to others." — Reid, Act. Pow.^ essay iii., part 2, chap. 3-6. They are usually distinguished into benevolent^ as esteem, gratitude, friendship ; and malevolent^ as hatred, envy, jealousy, revenge. This term is applied to all the modes of the sensibility, or to all states of mind in which we are purely passive. By Descartes {Traite des Passions^ art. 83) it is employed to denote some degree of love. — F. Love, Sensibility. AFFINITY is a relation contracted by or resulting from mar- riage ; in contradistinction to consanguinity^ or relation by blood. — V. Consanguinity. AFFIRMCATION {)tc&ra,poe,aig) — is the attributing of one thing to another, or the admitting simply that something exists. A mental affirmation is a judgment, when expressed it becomes a proposition. — V. Judgment, Peoposition. In Law, affirmation is opposed to oatK There are certain separatists, who, from having scruples as to the lawfulness of oath-taking, are allowed to make a solemn affirmation that what they say is true ; and if they make a false affirmation they are liable to the penalties of perjury. A FORTIORI. — An expression used in arguing from the greater to the less. ''He who hath given us His only begotten Son, will He not with Him also freely give us all things?" "If when we were enemies we were reconciled by the blood of the cross, how much more being reconciled shall we have peace with God ? " "In reasoning from analogy or comparison, if the case to be proved appears to be stronger even than the case with which it is compared, the analogy is called by schol- astic logicians an argumentum a fortiori. This kind of argument is often denoted in Scripture by the words ' How,' ' How much more,' ' How much rather.' " — Logic for the Million, *' K ye being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 19 A FORTIORI— in heaven give good things to them that ask him." (Matt, vii. 11.) "If God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe yon, O ye of little faith?" (Matt. vi. 30.) ACrENT {agens^ agere^ to act) — one who, that which, acts. '' Nor can I think that anybody has such an idea of chance as to make it an agent^ or really existing and acting cause of anything, and much less sure of all things." — ^AVollaston, Relig, of Nat,, 8, 5. Ai^iiEGORY.— F. Myth. AUIRITION (from amUre, to go about seeking place or power) — is the desire of power, which is regarded as one of the primary or natural desires of human nature. See Reid, Active Powers, essay iii., part 2, chap. 2. Stewart, Active Poivers, book i., chap, ii., sect. 4. ABIPHlBOIiOOY (ocu(pilSo'hicc, ambiguity) — denotes a propo- sition which presents not an obscure, but a doubtful or double sense. It is enumerated among the sophisms by Aris- totle, who distinguishes it from equivocatio, 6f^co!Jv,uicc, by which he understands ambiguity in terms taken separately. Amphiboly is applied by Kant to that Idnd of amphibo- logy which is natural, and consists in confounding pure notions of the understanding with objects of experi- ence, and attributing to the one characters and qualities which belong to the other ; as when we make identity, which is a notion a priori, a real quality of phenomena, or objects which experience makes known to us. ANAIiOO'V {oLvoLKoyioLy olvol and T^oyog) — has been defined, ''The similarity of ratios or relations." "But in popular language we extend the word to resemblances of thmgs as well as relations. Employed as an argument, analogy depends upon the canon, the same attributes may be assigned to distinct, but similiar things, provided they can be shown to accompany the points of resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference." — Thomson, 0?//- line of Laws of Thought, p. 363, 1st edit. 20 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ANAIiOOY— '^ Analogy does not mean the similarity of two things^ but the similarity, or sameness, of two relations. There must be more than two things to give rise to two relations ; there must be at least tliree^ and in most cases there are four. Thus A may be like B, but there is no analogy between A and B : it is an abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much confusion of thought. If A has the same relation to B which C has to D, then there is an analogy. If the first relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known ; and the transfer of name from one of the terms in the relation best known to its corresponding term in the other, causes no confusion, but on the contrary, tends to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations, and so assists the mind instead of misleading it." — Coplestone, Four Discourses^ p. 122, 8vo, London, 1821. '-'• Analogy implies a difference in sort, and not merely in degree ', and it is the sameness of the end with the differ- ence of the means which constitutes analogy. No one could say the lungs of a man were analogous to the lungs of a monkey, but any one might say that the gills of fish and the spiracula of insects are analogous to lungs." — Coleridge, Physiology of Life ^ p. 64. Between one man and another, as belonging to the same genus, there is identity. Between a flint and a flower, as belonging to diflerent genera, there is diversity. Between the seasons of the year and the periods of human life, or between the repose of an animal and the sleep of a plant, when we think wherein they agree, without forgetting wherein they differ, there is analogy. "When some course of events seems to foUow the same order with another, so that we may imagine them to be influenced by similar causes, we say there is an analogy between them. And when we infer that a certain event will take place in some other case of a similar nature, we are said to reason from analogy ; as when we suppose that the stars, like the sun, are surrounded with planets, which VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 21 ANAIiOOY— derive from them light and heat. The word analogy is employed with strict propriety only in those cases where there is supposed to be a sameness in the causes of similar effects. When there is a mere similarity in effects or appearances, the word resemblance should be used. Re- semblances may be well adduced in illustration of an argument ; but then they should be proposed merely as similes, or metaphors, not as analogies^ — Taylor, Elements of Thought, "The meaning of analogy is resemblance (?), and hence all reasoning from one case to others resembling it might be termed analogical ; but the word is usually confined to cases where the resemblance is of a slight or indirect kind. We do not say that a man reasons from analogy when he infers that a stone projected into the air will fall to the ground. The circumstances are so essentially similar to those which have been experienced a thousand times, that we call the cases identical^ not analogical. But when Sir Isaac Newton, reflecting on the tendency of bodies at the surface of the earth to the centre, inferred that the moon had the same tendency, his reasoning, in the first instance, was analogical. "By some writers the term has been restricted to the resemblance of relations ; thus knowledge is said to bear the same relation to the mind as light to the eye — to enlighten it. But although the term is very properly applied to this class of resemblances, I think it is not generally confined to them ; it is commonly used with more latitude, except, indeed, in mathematics, when it is employed to designate the identity of ratios." — Sam. Bailey, Discourses^ p. 181, 8vo, London, 1852. "As ana /o^?/ is the resemblance of ratios (or relations), two things may be connected by analogy,, though they have in themselves no resemblance; thus, as a sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and hence the same word, ' sweet,' is applied to both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself To bear 22 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. tliis in niind would serve to guard us against two very common errors in the interpretation of the analogical language of Scripture. — 1. The error of supposing the things themselves to be similar, from their bearing similar relation to other things. 2. The still more common error of supposing the analogy to extend farther than it does, or to be more complete than it really is, from not con- sidering in ivhat the analogy in each case consists." — Whately. '-''Analogy is a Greek word used by mathematicians to signify a similitude of proportions. For instance, when we observe that two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude or equality of proportion is termed analogy. And although proportion strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one quantity to another, yet, in a looser and translated sense, it hath been applied to signif)^ every other habitude, and consequently the term analogy all similitude of relations or habitudes whatsoever. Hence the schoolmen tell us there is analogy between intellect and sight ; forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body : and that he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being to the state as a pilot is to his vessel.* For the further clearing of this point, it is to be observed, that a twofold analogy is distinguished by the schoolmen, metaphorical and proper. Of the first kind there are frequent instances in Holy Scripture, attributing human parts and passions to God. When He is represented as having a finger, an eye, or an ear ; when He is said to repent, to be angry, or grieved, every one sees the analogy is merely metaphorical ; because these parts and passions, taken in the proper signification, must in every degree necessarily, and from the formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, therefore, it is said the finger of God appears in this or that event, men of common sense mean no more, but that it is as truly ascribed to God as the works wrought by human fingers * Vide Cajetaii, de Norn, Analog. > c. iii. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 23 AIVAIiOOY— are to man ; and so of the rest. But the case is different when wisdom and knowledge are attributed to God. Passions and senses, as such, imply defect ; but in know- ledge simpl}', or as such, there is no defect. Ivnowledge, therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the word^ may be attributed to God proportionally, that is, preservmg a proportion to the infinite nature of God. We ma}' say, therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of man, and this is what Cajetan calls analogia proprie facta. — And after this same analogy we must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity, which in themselves simply, and as such, denote perfection." — Berkeley, Min, Philosophy ^ dialog, -i. Analos^y aud ITIetaphor. — '"Analogy is the substituting the idea or conception of one thing to stand for and represent another on account of a true resemblance and con^espon- dent reahty in the very nature of the things compared. It is defined by Aristotle — Iooty]; th "Koy^ — an equality or parity of reason ; though, in strictness and truth, the parity of reasoning is rather biult on the similitude and analogy^ and consequent to them, than the same thing with them." '' Metaphor is a substitution of the idea or conception of one thing T\dth the t«rm belonging to it, to stand for another thing, on accoimt of an appearing similitude only, without any real resemblance and true correspondency between the things compared ; as when the Psalmist describes the verdm-e and fruitfulness of valleys by laughing and singing." — Cumberland, Enquiry^ prolegom., p. 29. "I am not of the mind of those speculators who seem assured that all states have the same period of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude that are found in individuals. Parallels of this sort rather fin*nish similitudes to illustrate or to adorn, than supply analogies from whence to reason. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an analogy are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings— conunouwealths are not 24 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOFHY, ANAI^OOY— physical, but moral essences." — Burke, Letters on Regicide. Peace^ b. 4. Many fallacies become current tlirough false metaphorical analogies. See an example of false analogy (Butler, Analogy^ part i., chap, i.,) in the supposed likeness between the decay of vegetables and of living creatures. Analogy and Example. — Analogy is not unfrequently used to mean mere similarity. But its specific meaning is similarity of relations^ and in this consists the difference between the argument by example and that by analogy^ — ^that in the one we argue from mere similarity^ from similarity of relations in the other. In the one we argue from Pisistratus to Dionysius, who resembles him ; in the other, from the relation of induction to demonstration, to the corresponding relation of the example to the enthy- meme. — Karslake, Aids to Logic^ vol. ii., p. 74. Analog and ElxpeHence* — ''''Experience is not the mere collection of observations ; it is the methodical reduction of them to their principles ^ t? a to^?/ supposes this, but it goes a step farther. Experience is mere analysis. Analogy involves also a spithesis. It is applied to cases in which some difference of circumstances is supposed ; as for instance, in arguing from the formation of particular parts of one class of animals to the correspondence in another, the different nature, habits, circumstances, of the one class, are considered and allowed for, in extending the given observation." — Hampden, Introd, Mor. Pliil,^ lect. 5. In the schools^ what was termed the analogy of faith (see Bom. xii. 6), was showing that the truth of one scripture is not repugnant to the truth of another, or of the whole. '' Analogia vero est, cum Veritas unius scripturae ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare." — Thorn.. Aquinas, Summ, Theolog.^ pars, prima, qu. i., art. 10. In Logic^ an analogous noun has only one signification, but admits of being applied in a modified or subordinate sense to objects which bear no more than an analogy or similarity to its original signification ; as the noun sting ^ of TOCABUL-IP.Y OF PHILOSOPHT. 25 AAJlLOOX— an :iTi^n-:i'. 01 conscience, of an epigram. --A term is -r; :;.;;. V vrhose single signidcation applies with equal prvpi-ictv ::■ mrre than one object — as the kg of the table, the .V: 01 ihe cr^imiiL'' — AMiately, Logic, book iii., s. 10. In L: ::'.\ :lirce _: les of reasoning are called analogical. 1. Fr in eiieci to aiiLse, or from cause to effect. 2. From means to ends, or from ends to means. 3. From mere reseniblaiice or concomitance. Condillac {Art de i? c r h: s 5 2:^^31 how these modes of reasoning all ^'o:r. :he human beings aroimd us, who :;:e ::rmr:l Im; : v-v>'es (anahav of resemblance), who act as we ao: ho have the same organs (:•'■• r':: - . ^ ... Ic in all respects like ODTselves . - : :.:ies. Analogy and In duct iou. — • There are two requisites in order : > evei^r : o hm : - :v:_.Timent: — 1. That the two or seyeral r :: vr oned in the argument should be known to i»gicc iii iv^.c v: Ilc point ; for otherwise they could not be referable to any one class, and there would consequently be no ba^ to the subsequent inference drawn in the conclusion. 2. That the condimon must be modified by a reference to the circumstances of the particular to which we argue. For herein consists the essentiardisf Inchon heticeen an aualog^ical and an inductim argument.^'^ — Hampden, Essay on PML Erid. of Christianity J pp. 60-64. Locke^ On Hum. Understand. j bookiy.. chap. 16. sect. 12 : Beattie's Ess-:"-; on Truth j part i., chap. 2, sect. 7 ; Stewart's Z": :;:t:^, yol. ii., chap. 4, sect. 4; Stewjurt^s A> AXYJiISi and !SiV>' THESIS i^xstsc "Kvoi^ trvv rt&mfAi, resolutio. — £ .r ?sition and recomposition. Objects of sensc ..light are presented to us in a complex state, bv.: :nly, or at least best luiderstand what is sunple. A : , :he yaried objects of a landscape I behold :i tree. I > :e it from the other objects, I examine ent parts — ^trunk, branches, leayes, &c., .v.... .-.^^ \.o.i.: Oiiir them into one whole I form a notion 26 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ANALYSIS— of the tree. The first part of this process is arialysis^ the second is synthesis. If this must be done with an individual it is more necessary with the infinitude of objects which surround us, to evolve the one out of many, to recall the multitude to unity. We compare objects with one another to see wherein they agree ; we next, by a synthetical process, infer a general law, or generalize the coincident qualij^es, and perform an act of induction which is purely a synthe- tical process, though commonly called analytical. Thus, from our experience that bodies attract within certain limits, we infer that all bodies gravitate towards each other. The antecedent here only says that certain bodies gravitate, the consequent says all bodies gravitate. They are brought together by the mental insertion of a third proposition, which is, '' that nature is uniform." This is not the product of induction, but antecedent to all induction. The state- ment fully expressed is, this and that body which we know gravitate, but nature is uniform, this and that body repre- sent all bodies — all bodies gravitate. It is the mind which connects these things, and the process is synthetical. This is the one universal method in all philosophy, and different schools have differed only in the way of employing it. Method is the following of one thing through another. Order is the following of one thing after another. Analysis is real., as when a chemist separates two substances. Logical^ as when we consider the properties of the sides and angles of a triangle separately, though we cannot think of a triangle without sides and angles. Analysis and synthesis., abstraction and generalization., induction and deduction. In demonstrations which consist of a series of reasonings there is both analysis and synthesis. For an explanation of the processes of analysis and synthesis., see Stewart, Phil.., part ii., chap. 4. The instruments of analysis are ohservation and experi- ment ; of synthesis^ definition and classification. Take down a watch, ancdysis ; put it up, {synthesis. — Lord Brougham, Prelimin. Discourse^ part i., sect. 7. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 27 *' Hac analysi licebit, ex rebus compositis ratiocinatione coUigere simplices ; ex motibus, vires moventes ; et in universum, ex effectis causas ; ex eausisque particularibus generales ; donee ad generalissimas tandem sit deventum." — ^Xewton, Optices^ 2d edit., p. 413. Analysis is decomposing what is compound to detect its elements. Objects may be compound, as consisting of several distinct parts united, or of several properties equally distinct. In the former view, analysis will divide the object into its parts, and present them to us succes- sively, and then the relations by which they are united. In the second case, analysis will separate the distinct pro- perties, and show the relations of every kind which may be between them. — Cardaillac, Etudes Element.^ torn. 1, pp.8, 9. Analysis is the resolving into its constituent elements of a compound heterogeneous substance. Thus, water can be analyzed into oxygen and hydrogen, atmospheric air into these and azote. — Peemans, Introd. ad Philosoph.^ p. 75, 12mo, Lovan., 1840. Abstraction is analysis^ since it is decomposition, but what distinguishes it is that it is exercised upon qualities which b}' themselves have no real existence. Classification is syri- tJiesis. Induction rests upon analysis. Deduction is a synthetical process. Demonstration includes both. ANAIiYTlCS (t56 uuoe.'KvTix.»~)—\s the title which m the second century was given, and which has since continued to be applied to a portion of the Organ on or Logic of Aristotle, This portion consists of two distinct parts ; the First Analytics^ which teaches how to reduce the syllogism to its divers figures and most simple elements, and the Posterior Analytics^ which lays down the rules and conditions of demonstration in general. It was m imitation of this title that Kant gave the name of Transcendental Analytic to that part of the criticism of Pure Reason which reduces the faculty of knowing to its elements. ANIMA MUN1>I (soul of the world). — Animism is the doctrine 82 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ANimA M[UNI>I— of the anima mundi as lield by Stalil. The lij^otliesis of a force, immaterial, but inseparable from matter, and giving to matter its form and movement, is coeval with the birth of philosophy. Pythagoras obscurely acknowledged such a force, but held that there was an infinitely perfect being above it. From Pythagoras it passed into the system of Plato, who could not conceive how pure spirit, the seat of eternal ideas, could act directly upon matter. He thought also that the world would be more perfect if endowed with life. The soul of the world was the source of all life, sensibility, and movement. The school of Alexandria adhered to the views of Plato, and recognized intelligence and Deity as above the anima mundi^ which in the system of the Stoics usurped the place of God, and even His name ; while Straton of Lampsacus called it nature. The hypothesis of the anima mundi was not entertained by the scholastic philosophers. But it reappeared under the name of the Archceus^ in the systems of CorneHus Agrippa, Paracelsus, and Van Helmont ; while Henry More recognized a prin- cijjium hylarchicum, and Cudworth a plastic nature., as the universal agent of physical phenomena, the cause of all forms of organization, and the spring of all the movements of matter. About the same time, some German divines, as Amos Comenius, and John Bayer, attempted to rest a similar opinion on Genesis i. 2, and maintained that the spirit which moved on the face of the waters still gives life to all nature. — Buddeus, Elem. Phil.., pars. 3, cap. 6, sect. 11, 12, et seq. The doctiine of the anima mundi., as held by the Stoics and Stratonicians, is closely allied to pantheism ; while according to others this soul of the universe is altogether intermediate between the Creator and His works. See Timceus of Plato., 29 d. — 30 c. rou Koa/i^ov ^cdov Schellmg, De VAme de Monde., 8vo, Hamb., 1809. ANTECEDENT (antecedere., to go before). — "And the antecedent shall you fynde as true when you rede over my YOCABULAliY OF PHILOSOPHY. 29 AI¥TECE1>JENT— letter as himself can not say nay, but that the consecusyou is formal." — Sir T. Move's Works ^ p. 1115. In a relation, whether logical or metaphysical, the first term is the antecedent^ the second the consequent. Thus in the relation of causality — the cause is the antecedent^ and the effect the consequent. In Logic, antecedent is the former of two propositions, in a species of reasoning, which, without the intervention of any middle proposition, leads directly to a fair con- clusion ; and tliis conclusion is termed the consequent. Thus, I reflect, therefore I exist. I reflect, is the antece- dent — therefore I exist, is the consequent. — Euler, Letters to German Princess, ANTKROPOIiOO-lf (cci/doco7rog and Tioyog., the science of man) — Among naturalists it means the natural history of the human species. According to Dr. Latham (Nat. Hist, of Varieties of Man^ Lond., 1830), anthropology determines the relations of man to the other mammalia ; ethnology., the relations of the different varieties of mankind to each other, (p. 559). The German philosophers since the time of Kant have used it to designate all the sciences which in any point of view relate to man — soul and body — individual and species — ^facts of history and phenomena of conscious- ness — the absolute rules of morality as well as interests material, and changing ; so that works under the general title of anthropology treat of very different topics. ''• Anthropology is the science of man in aU his natural variations. It deals with the mental peculiarities which belong specifically to different races, ages, sexes, and temperaments, together vAth. the results which follow im- mediately from them in their application to human life. Under psychology., on the other hand, we include nothing but what is common to all mankind., and forms an essen- tial part of human nature. The one, accordingly, may be termed the science of mental variahles; the other, the science of mental constants.''^ — Morell, Psychology., pp. 1, 2. 30 ' VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. ANTHTBOPOMORPHISM {uv6^Q7rag^ man; f^ooCpn^ form) — " It was tlie opinion of the Anthropomorphites that God had all the parts of a man, and that we are, in this sense, made according to His image." — ^More, Def. of Cabhala^ c. 1. Melito, of Sardis, was the first Christian writer who ascribed body to Deity. The ascribing of bodily parts or members to Deity is too gross a delusion to call for refutation. But there is a spiritual anthropomorphism^ sometimes also called anthropopathy^ which ascribes to Him the acts, passions, sentiments, and proceedings of human nature. Among the early Christians there was a sect called Anthropomorphists, '' We ought not to imagine that God is clothed with a human body, as the Anthropomorphites asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any." — Malebranche, Search after Truth^ book iii,, chap. 9. Hume applies the name to those who think the mind of God is like the mind of man. ''When it is asked, what cause produces order m the ideas of the Supreme Being, can any other reason be assigned by you Anthropomorphites^ than that it is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of Deity?" — Dialogues on Nat, Relig.^ parts 4, 5. ANTICIPATION (Anticipation T^dhvi-^ig) — is a term which was first used hy Epicurus to denote a general notion which enables us to conceive beforehand of an object which had not yet come under the cognizance of the senses. But these general notions being formed by abstraction from a multitude of particular notions, were all originally owing to sensation, or mere generalizations a posteriori. Buhle {Hist, de la Phil. Mod.^ tom. i., pp. 87, 88) gives the following account: — "The impressions which objects make on the senses, leave in the mind traces which enable us to recognize these objects when they present themselves anew, or to compare them with others, or to distinguish them. When we see an animal for the first VOCABULAPwY OF PHILOSOPHY. 31 ANTICIPATION — time, the impression made on tlie senses leaves a trace which serves as a type. If we afterwards see the same animal, we refer the impression to the type abeady existing in the mind. This type and the relation of the new impres- sion to it, constituted what Epicm'us called the anticipa- tion of an idea. It was by this anticipation that we could determine the identity, the resemblance or the difference of objects actually before us, and those formerly observ^ed.'' The language of Cicero {De Nat. Deor..^ lib. i., cap. 16) seems to indicate that by Epicurus the term tt^o- T^n-^ig was extended to what is supersensual, and included what is now called knowledge a priori, " Quae est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat, sine doctrina, anticipationem quandam Deorum? quam appellat 7rQo?,y}\p{v Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nee intelligi quidquam, nee quarri, nee disputari potest." And according to Diogenes Laertius (lib. 7, sect. 51, 53, 54), the Stoics defined cr^oX>i'4//f to mean ''a natural conception of the universal." It would appear, however, that this definition was not adopted by aU. And Sir William Hamilton has said (Reid/s Worlcs, note A, p. 774) : ''It is not to be supposed that the koiuoci ivvoioit., (pv(jix.oit ^Qo7^n\pstg.f of the Stoics, far less of the Epicureans, were more than generalizations a posteriori. Yet this is a mistake, into which, among many others, Lipsius and Leibnitz have fallen in regard to the former." See Manuductio ad Stoicam Pldl.., lib. ii., dissert. 11. And Leibnitz, Noitveaiix Essais., pref. See also Kernius. Dissert, in Epicuri 'Tr^oTi'/rspig^ &c., Goett., 1736. Anticipation of Nainre is a phrase employed by Lord Bacon to denote a hasty and illicit generalization, as opposed to a due and gradual generalization, which he called an inter- pretation of Nature. — Pref to Nov, Organ. UVTINOMY (ar/T/, against ; uo^uog^ law) — the opposition of law or rule to another law or rule. ^'K He once willed adultery should be sinful, aU His omnipotence will not allow Him to will the allowance that 32 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ANTINOMY— His holiest people miglit, as it were, by His own antinomy or counter statute, live unreproved in the same fact as He Himself esteemed it, according to our common explainers." — Milton, Doct. and Dis. of Div.^ b. ii., c. 3. According to Kant, it means that natural contradiction which results from the law of reason, when, passing the limits of experience, we seek to know the absolute. Then we do not attain the idea of the absolute, or we overstep the limits of our faculties which reach only to phenomena. Then we may maintain by arguments equally valid, that the world is eternal and infinite, or that it had a beginning in time and is limited to space. That above all phenomena there is a cause absolutely free, or that all things are ruled by blind laws of nature. That there is a necessarily existing Being, or that all things are phenomenal and contingent. These are the antinomies of the pure reasoji. The antinomy of the practical reason is, that virtue ought to be happy, but cannot be so here. This is answered by the doctrine of a future state, which is a postulate of the practical reason. ANTIPATHY (jzuTi 'Trx&og., feeling against). — ^' There are many ancient and received traditions and observations touching the sympathy and antipathy of plants ; for that some will thrive best growing near others, which they impute to sympathy, and some worse, which they impute to antipathy.^'' — Bacon, Nat, Hist., sect. 479. According to Sylvester Rattray, M.D. {Aditus Novus ad Occultas Sympathice et Antipathice causas invenie7idas^ 12mo, Glasg., 1658,) there is antipathy and sympathy not only between plants, but also between minerals and animals. A blind and instinctive movement, which, without any appreciable reason, makes us averse to the company or character of some persons at first sight. An involuntary dislike or aversion entertained by an animate being to some sensible object. A man may have an antipathy to parti- cular smells or tastes, a turkey cock or bull to the colour red, a horse to the smell of raw flesh. Some are natural. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 33 ANTIPATHY— others are acquired, as a surfeit of any food gives antipathy. Some are founded on sensation, others on sentiment. — Locke, On Hum, Understand.,, book ii., chap. 33, sect. 7, 8. — F. Sympathy. PARTE ANTE, and A PARTE POST. — These two ex- pressions, borrowed from the scholastic philosophy, refer to eternity ; of which man can only conceive as consisting of two parts ; the one without limits in the past, a parte ante ; and the other without limits in the future, a j^arte post. Both are predicable of Deity ; only the latter of the human soul. — F. Eternity. APATHY (oft, privative ; and -ra^o^, passion). — The absence of passion. ''T^Hiat is called by the Stoics apathy^ or dis- passion ; by the Sceptics indistm'bance, otrot^cc^ioc ; by the Molinists, quietism ; by common men, peace of conscience : seem all to mean but great tranquillity of mind." — Sir W. Temple, Of Gardening. As the passions are the springs of most of om^ actions, a state of apathy has come to signify a sort of moral inertia — the absence of all activity or energy. According to the Stoics apathy meant the extinction of the passions by the ascendency of reason. Niemeierus (Joh. Barth.), Dissert, de Stoicorum ofTrudsiu, &c. 4to, Helmst., 1679. Becnius, Dispp.^ libb. 3, uTiroihioc Sapientis Stoici. 4to, Copenhag., 1693. Fischerus (John Hen.), Diss, de Stoicis ccTrocduxg /also suspectis, 4:to, Leips., 1716. Quadius, Disputatio tritum illud Stoicorum paradoxon crggf Tng ocTTocdstocg expendens. 4to, Sedini, 1720. Meiners, Melanges,, tom. 2, p. 130. APHORISITI, determinate position, from o6(po^/^£/;/, to bound, or limit ; whence our horizon. — Coleridge, Aids to Reflec- tion,, vol. i., p. 16, edit. 1848: "In order to get the fiill sense of a word, we should first present to our minds the visual image that forms its primary meaning. Draw lines of different colours round the different counties of England, D 34 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. AI»MOKISM— and tlien cut out eacli separately, as in the common play- maps tliat children take to pieces and put together, so that each district can be contemplated apart from the rest, as a whole in itself. This twofold act of circumscribing and detaching, when it is exerted by the mind on subjects of reflection and reason, is to aphorize, and the result an aphorism,'^'' A precise, sententious saying — e, g.^ ''It is always safe to learn from our enemies, seldom safe to instruct even our friends." Like Hippocrates, Boerhaave has written a book entitled Apliorisms^ containing medical maxims, not treated argu- mentatively, but laid down as certain truths. In civil law apJio7nsms are also used. The three ancient commentators upon Hippocrates, viz., Theophilus, Meletius, and Stephanus, have given the same definition of an apliorism^ i. e., ''a succinct saying, comprehending a complete statement," or a saying poor in expression, but rich in sentiment. The first aphorism of Hippocrates is, "Life is short, and the art is long ; the occasion fleeting ; experience falla- cious, and judgment difflcult. The physician must not only be prepared to do what is right himself, but also to make the patient, the attendants, and externals, co- operate." "The first and most ancient inquirers into truth were wont to throw their knowledge into apliorisms^ or short, scattered, unmethodical sentences." — Nov. Organ.., book i., sect. 86. And the Novum Organum itself is written in apliorisms, Heraclitus is known by his aphorisms^ which are among the most brilliant of those " Jewels, five words long, That on the stretched fore-finger of all time, Sparkle for ever." Among the most famous are, — War is father of all things, i. e., all things are evolved by antagonistic force. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 35 APHORIS:?!— Xo man can bathe twice in the same stream, i. e., all things are in perpetual flux. APOJttEICTIC, AI»OI>EfCTICAI. (dTTO and hiKwa^cci^ to show). — '•'' The argumentation is from a similitude, therefore not apodicticJc^ or of evident demonstration." — Eobinson, Eucloxa^ p. 23. This term was borrowed by Kant from Aristotle {Analyt. Prior. ^ lib. i., cap. 1). He made a distinction between propositions which admitted of contradiction or dialectic discussion, and such as were the basis or result of demonstration. Kant wished to introduce an analogous distinction between our judgments, and to give the name of apodeictic to such as were above all contradiction. APOliOOfJE {wTToT^oyog, fcibula) — '' a novel story, contrived to teach some moral truth." — Johnson. "It would be a high relief to hear an apologue or fable well told, and with such humour as to need no sententious moral at the end to make the application." — (Shaftesbury, vol. iii., miscell. 4, c. 1.) It is essential to an apologue that the circumstances told in it should be fictitious. The difference between a jmrahle and an apologue is, that the former being drawn from hujnan life requires probabihty in the narration ; whereas the apologue being taken from inanimate things or the inferior animals, is not confined strictly to probability. The fables of ^sop are apologues. For an admirable instance of the Tioyo; or apologue^ see Coleridge's Friend^ where the case of the seizure of the Danish fleet by the English is represented in this form. APOliOG-Y (otTToXoy/flf, a defence made in a court of justice). — We have a work of Xenophon, entitled the Apology of Socrates^ and another with the same title by Plato. The term was adopted by the Christian fiithers, and applied to their writings in defence of Christianity, and in answer to its opponents. Tertullian addressed his Apologetic to the magistrates of Rome, the emperor Severus being theji absent. APOPHTIIEOM {u'TTO (p^iyycffdcci, cloqw\ to speak out). — A 36 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. short and pitliy speech or saying of some celebrated man ; as that of Augustus, Festina lente, ''In a numerous collection of our Saviour's apophthegms^ there is not to be found one example of sophistry." — Paley, Evidences^ part ii., c. 2. '' "We ask advice, but we mean approbation." — Lacon. The Lacedaemonians used much this mode of speaking. Plutarch has a collection entitled the Apophthegms of Kings and Generals^ many of which are anecdotes ; and also another entitled Laconica. '•'- Of Blackmore's (Sir Richard) attainments in the ancient tongues, it may be sufficient to say that in his prose, he has confounded an aphorism with an apophthegm.^''- Macaulay, On Addison^ p. 11. In Guesses at Truth (2d series, 1848), the saying of Demosthenes, that '' action was the first, second, and third essential of eloquence," is called an apophthegm, APPERCEPTION (self- consciousness). — " By apperception he (Leibnitz) understands that degree of perception which reflects as it were upon itself; by which we are conscious of our own existence, and conscious of our perceptions, by which we can reflect upon the operation of our own minds, and can comprehend abstract truths." — Eeid, Intell. Powers.^ essay ii., c. 15. ''By apperception the Leibnitzio-Wolfians meant the act by which the mind is conscious immediately of the representative object, and through it, mediately of the remote object represented." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works ^ note D*, sect. 1. '' Cousin maintains that the soul possesses a mode of spontaneous thought, into which volition and reflection, and therefore personality, do not enter, and which gives her an intuition of the absolute. For this he has appropriated the name apperception^ explaining it also as a true in- spiration, and holding, therefore, that inspirations come to man, not by the special volitions of God, as commonly believed, but fall to reason in its own right, thus consti- VOCABUL-\KY OF PHILOSOFHY. 37 APPERCEPTION— nirmo- a 5cion::r:c organon of discoyery." — Macwar, E V?fMre, 8vo, Edin., 1858. Pp. 216. • c\.,.A. v : :e? a states apperception an act of the ego; and fron - . ne the siiperioritj of the latter is appareuT."— 31 ivl.ioliu. Translation of the Pure Eeason, note, p, "1. APPETITE. — '• The word appttttus, ti'om which that of appe- tite is derived, is applied by the Eomans and the Latinists to e sires in general, whether they primarily relate to the oody or not^ and with obyious propriety; for the piimi- tiTe signification is the seeking after whatever may conduce either to gratification or happiness. Thus Cicero observes, • Motns animorum diiplices stmt ; alteri^ cogitationis ; alteri, appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exqiiirendo maxime versatur; appetitiis impelht ad agendum.' By two powers of action being thus placed in contrast with each other, and the one apphed to thought simply, it is obvious that the other com- prehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or corporeal natiu'e. Metaphysicians also, who have written in the Latin language, use the word appetitu.s in the same latitude." — Cogan, On the Passions. voL i.. p. 15. In modem use, appetites refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its compendent desire. But desne proper refers to mental objects- ••The word cppcti'^. in common language, often means -i-V-C-s hguratively any strong desii'e," — 13. :.:... . . " ■^'' i,. e. 1. As 0". \ •:;.', which are common to lis with :ne ; rues : ana ;,' *• r/k7/, which are proper to us as rational beings — so appetite is sensitive and rational. The st;nsitive appetite was distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible. — Eeid, Actice Potrers. essay iii. ; Stewart. Active and Moral Powers, vol. i.. p. 14. Appetite and Instinct. — "Appetites have been called in- stinctive, because they seek then* own gratification with- out the aid of reason, and often in spite of it. They are common to man with the brute : but thev difier at least in 38 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. APPETITE— oDe important respect from those instincts of the lower animals which are usually contrasted with human reason. The objects towards which they are directed are prized for their own sake ; they are sought as ends^ while instinct teaches brutes to do many things which are needed only as means for the attainment of some ulterior purpose. Thus instinct enables a spider to entrap his prey, while appetite only leads him to devour it when in his possession. '•'•Instinct is an impulse conceived without instruction, and prior to all experience, to perform certani acts, which are not needed for the immediate gratification of the agent, which in fact are often opposed to it, and are useful only as means for the accomplishment of some ulterior object ; and this object is usually one of pre-eminent utility or necessity, either for the preservation of the animal's own life, or for the continuance of its species. The former quality separates it from intelligence, properly so called, which proceeds only by experience or instruction ; and the latter is its pecuhar trait as distinguished from appetite^ which, in strictness, uses no means at all, but looks only to ends."— Bowen, Lowell Led., 1849, p. 228. ''All the actions of man, which have been loosely con- sidered or described as instinctive, may be referred either to the power of organic life, that is, to mechanical forces, or to the teaching of experience, or to the class of appe- tites. Human nature shows no trace whatever of that mar- vellous power vmich governs the bee in the construction of its cell, and guides the migrating bird to its winter home. But man is the only being who is not under its in- fluence ; every other animal, from the noblest quadruped to the humblest insect, gives frequent indications of its presence and control." — Bowen, Lowell Led., 1849, p. 241. APPKEMEIVSION (appreJiendere, to lay hold of). — "By the apprehensive power, we perceive the species of sensible things, present or absent, and retain them as wax doth the print of a seal." — Burton, Anat. of Melancholy, p. 21. VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 39 APPREHENSION— Here it includes not only conception or imagination, but also memory or retention. '•'' How can lie but be moved willingly to serve God, who liatli an apprehension of God's merciful design to save liim ! " —Barrow, Serm. 42. ''It maybe true, perhaps, that the generality of the negro slaves are extremely dull of apprehension and slow of understanding." — ^Porteous, On Civilization of Slaves. Apprehension in Logic, is that act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object ; and which is analogous to the perception of the senses. Incomplex apprehension regm^ds one object, or several, without any relation being perceived between them, as a man, a card, &;c. Complex apprehension regards several objects with such a relation, as a man on horseback, a pack of cards, &c. — Whately, Logic, b. ii., ch. 1, v. 1. ''^Apprehension is the Kantian word for perception, in the largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus which includes under it, as species, perception proper and sensation proper." — Meiklejohn, Translat. of Pure Reason^ note, p. 127. APPREHENSION awd COMPREHENSION. Apprehend asid Comprelieiid, — " We apprehend many truths which we do not comprehend. The great mysteries of our faith, the doctrine, for instance, of the Holy Trinity — we lay hold upon it (ad prehendo)., we hang upon it, our souls live by it ; but we do not take it all m, we do not compre- hend it ; for it is a necessary attribute of God that He is incomprehensible ; if He were not so He would not be God, or the bemg that comprehended Him would be God also. But it also belongs to the idea of God that He may be ' apprehended,' though not ' comprehended ' by His reasonable creatures ; He has made them to know Him, though not to know Him all, to ' apprehend ' though not to ' comprehend ' Him." — Trench, On Study of Words., p. 110, 12mo, Lond., 1851. A PRIORI, and A POSTERIORI, — "There are two 40 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. A PRIORI— general ways of reasoning^ termed arguments a priori and a posteriori^ or according to what is usually styled the synthetic and analytic method ; the one lays down some previous, self-evident principles; and in the next place, descends^ to the several consequences that may be deduced from them ; the other begins with a view of the pheno- mena themselves, traces them up to their original, and by developing the properties of these phenomena, arrives at the knowledge of the cause." — Ejng, Essay ^ pref, p. 9. By an a priori argument a conclusion is drawn from an antecedent fact, whether the consequence be in the order of time or in the necessary relation of cause and effect. By the argument a posteriori we reason from what is conse- quent in the order of time to what is antecedent, or from effect to cause. An individual may fall under suspicion of murder for two reasons : he may have coveted the de- ceased's property, or he may be found with it in his posses- sion ; the former is an a priori^ the latter an a posteriori argument against him. — ^Aristot., MetapJiys.^ lib, v., cap. 11. — V. Demonstration. ^' Of demonstrations there are two sorts ; demonstrations a priori^ when we argue from the cause to the effect ; and a posteriori^ when we argue from the effect to the cause. Thus when we argue from the ideas we have of immensity, eternity, necessary existence, and the like, that such perfec- tions can reside but in one being, and thence conclude that there can be but one supreme God, who is the cause and author of all things, and that therefore it is contradictory to this to suppose that there can be two necessary indepen- dent principles, the one the cause of all the good, and the other the cause of all the evil that is in the world ; this is an argument a priori. Again, when the Manicheans and Paulicians, from what they observe in things and facts, from the many natural evils which they see in the world, and the many moral wickednesses which are committed by men, conclude that there must be two different causes or principles from whence each of these proceed ; this is VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 41 A PRIORI— arguing a posteriori.''^ — Dr. John Clark, Enquirg into Evil, pp. 31-2. ''The term a priori, by the influence of Kant and his school, is now very generally employed to charac- terize those elements of knowledge which are not ob- tained a posteriori — are not evolved out of factitious generalizations ; but which as native to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of experience, on occasion of which (as constitutmg its subjective condi- tion) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. Previously to Kant the terms a priori and a posteriori were, in a sense which descended from Aristotle, properly and usually employed — the former to denote a reasoning from cause to effect — ^the latter a reasoning from effect to cause. The term a priori came, however, in modern times, to be extended to any abstract reasoning from a given notion to the conditions which such notion involved ; hence, for example, the title a priori bestowed on the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of the Deity. The latter of these, in fact, starts from experience — from the observed contmgency of the world, in order to con- struct the supposed notion on which it founds. Clarke's cosmological demonstration called a priori, is therefore, so far, properly an argument a posteriori^ — Su' W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 762. " By knowledge a prior i,"*^ says Kant (^Criticism of Pure Reason, Introd., sect. 1), ''we shall in the sequel under- stand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure know- ledge a priori is that with which no empmcal element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, ' Every change has a cause,' is a proposition a priori, but impure because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience." 42 VOCABXJLAHY OF PHILOSOPHY. " We have ordinarily more consideration for the demon- stration called propter quid or a priori^ than for that which we call quia or a posteriori ; because the former proceeds from universals to particulars, from causes to effects, while the latter proceeds in a manner wholly contrary. We must nevertheless see whether we have a right to do this ; since no demonstration a priori can have credence, or be received, without supposing the demonstration a posteriori^ by which it must be proved. For how is it, for example, that having to prove that man feels^ from this proposition, every animal feels — ^how, I say, will you establish the truth of this position, should some one hesitate to grant it, except by making induction of the individual animals, of whom there is not one that does not feel?" — Bernier, Ahridgment of Gassendi '-'- De F Entendement^^'' vol. vi., pp. 340-1. ''If there are any truths which the mmd possesses, whether consciously or unconsciously, before and independent of experience, they may be called a priori truths, as belonging to it prior to all that it acquires from the world around. On the other hand, truths which are acquired by observa- tion and experience, are called a posteriori truths, because they come to the mind after it has become acquainted with external facts. How far a priori truths or ideas are pos- sible, is the great campus pliilosopliorum^ the great contro- verted question of mental philosophy." — Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought^ 2d edit., pp. 68-9. ARCMiEUS — is the name given by Paracelsus to the vital principle which presides over the growth and continuation of living beings. He called it body ; but an astral lody^ that is an emanation from the substance of the stars, which defends us against the external agents of destruction till the inevitable term of life arrives. The hypothesis was extended by Van Helmont to the active principle which presides not only over every body, but over every particle of organized body to v/hich it gives its proper form. The word is used by More (^Antidote to Atheism^ pt. i., c. 11,) as synonymous with/orm. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 43 AKCIIEIiOOY (Aoyog Tre^l TOiv u^x^^^ treats of principles, and should not be confounded with ArcJiceology (T^oyog Tg^i rav o(.^xmav) which treats of antiquities or things old. — See Alstedius (J. H.,) Scientiarum Omnium Encyclopcedia. — F. Peinciple. AK€HETYff»E (oc^xv]^ first or chief; and rvrog^ form) — a model or first form. — ''There were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal, immutable, which they called in- telhgible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds or souls." — Cudworth, J?i^e//. Syst.^ p. 387. '' The first mind is, according to this hypothesis, an arche- typal world which contains intelligibly all that is contained sensibly in our world." — Bolhigbroke, Essay iv., sect. 28. Cornelius Agrippa, in accordance with the philosophy of Plato, gave the name of Archetype to God, considered as the absolute model of all being. In the philosophy of Locke, the archetypes of our ideas are the things really existing out of us. " By real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature ; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes.'''' — On Hum. Underst., b. ii., c. 30. ARGUMENT (arguere., from ot^yog^ clear, manifest — to show, reason, or prove) — is an explanation of that which is doubtful, by that which is known. '' Whoever will examine any correct argument, by reducing it to its syllogistic form, will find either, — Fh^st, That the premises are nothing but a simpler and commoner statement of the truth announced in the conclusion ; or, Secondly, That they are a mere analytical statement of it ; or, ThiixUy, That they are a synthetical (or generalized) statement, from which a par- ticular truth may be inferred in the conclusion." — Irons, Final Causes^ p. 112. The term argument in ordmary discourse, has several meanings. — 1. It is used for the premises in contradis- tinction to the conclusion, e. g.^ ''the conclusion which this argument is intended to establish is," &c. 2. It 44 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. AROUMENT— denotes wliat is a course or series of arguments^ as when it is applied to an entire dissertation. 3. Sometimes a disputation or ^?/;o trains of argument opposed to each other. 4. Lastly, the various forms of stating an argu- ment are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of argu- ment^ as if the same argument were not capable of being stated in various ways. — Whately, Logic^ Appendix i. In strictly logical sense, the third operation of mind, reasoning, discussion, expressed in words, is argument. -—Whately. ''In technical propriety argument cannot be used for argumentation., as Dr. Whately thinks, but exclusively for its middle term. In this meaning, the word (though not with uniform consistency) was employed by Cicero, Quin- tilian, Boethius, &c. ; it was thus subsequently used by the Latin Aristotelians, from whom it passed even to the Eamists; and this is the meaning which the expression always first, and most naturally, suggests to a logician." — Sir W. Hamil- ton, Discussions., p. 147. AROUMENTATION is opposed to intuition and consciousness, and used as synonymous with deduction by Dr. Price (Review., chap. 5). Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of mind whereby we infer one proposition from two or more pro- positions premised. — Watts, Logic, Introd. Argumentation must not be confounded with reasoning. Reasoning may be natural or artificial ; argumentation is always artificial. An advocate reasons and argues; a Hottentot reasons., but does not argue. Reasoning is occu- pied with ideas and their relations, legitimate or illegiti- mate ; argumentation has to do with forms and their regu- larity or irregularity. One reasons often with one's self; you cannot argue but with two. A thesis is set down — you attack, I defend it ; you insist, I reply ; you deny, I prove ; you distinguish, I destroy your distinction ; your objections and my replies balance or overturn one another. Such is argumentation. It supposes that there are two VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 45 sides, and that both agree to the same rules. — Diet des Sciences Philosoph, ART (Latin ars^ from Greek apsry}^ strength or skill ; or from »pa, apto^ to fit, join, or make agree). Ars est ratio recta aliqiiorum operum faciendorum. — Thomas Aquinas. Ars est habitus cum recta ratione effectivus ; quia per precepta sua dirigit effectionem seu productionem operis extemi sensibilis. Differt autem a natura, quod natiu-a operatur in eo in quo est ; ars vero nunquam operatur in eo in quo est ; nisi per accidens, puta cum medicus seipsum sanat. — Derodon, Pliys.^ p. 21. Ars est methodus aliquid juxta regulas determinatas operandi. — Bouyier. Ars est recta ratio factihilium^ atque in eo differt a pru- dentia^ quas est recta ratio agihilium. — Peemans, Introd. ad Pliilosopli.^ p. 31. ''We speak of art as distiQguished from nature; but art itself is natural to man. ... If we admit that man is susceptible of improvement, and has in himself a principle of progression and a desire of perfection, it appears im- proper to say that he has quitted the state of his naturcy when he has begun to proceed ; or that he finds a station for which he was not intended, while, like other animals, he only follows the disposition and employs the powers that nature has given. The latest efforts of human invention are but a continuation of certain devices which were prac- tised in the earliest ages of the world, and in the rudest state of mankind." — Ferguson, Essay on Hist, of Civ. 5oc., pp. 10-13. Art is defined by Lord Bacon to be '' a proper disposal of the things of nature by human thought and experience, so as to make them answer the designs and uses of man- kiad." It may be defined more concisely to be the adjust- ment of means to accomplish a desired end. — Stewart, Works., vol ii., p. 36, last edition. ^'^ Art has in general preceded science. There were 46 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ART— bleacMng, and dyeing, and tanning, and artificers in copper and iron, before there was chemistry to explain tlie pro- cesses used. Men made wine before there was any theory of fermentation ; and glass and porcelain were manufactured before the nature of alkalis and earths had been determined. The pyramids of ISTubia and Egypt, the palaces and sculp- tured slabs of Mneveh, the Cyclopean walls of Italy and Greece, the obelisks and temples of India, the cromlechs and druidical circles of countries formerly Celtic, all pre- ceded the sciences of mechanics and architecture. There was music before there was a science of acoustics ; and painting while as yet there was no theory of colours and perspective." — M'Cosh, On I)iv. Govern.^ p. 151. On the other hand, Cicero has said (JDe Oratore^ i., 41), "Mhil est enim, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ilie prius qui ilia tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habet illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quorum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit." And Mr. Harris (Phil. Arrangements^ chap. 15) has argued — ' ' If there were no theorems of science to guide the operations of ar^, there would be no art ; but if there were no operations of art^ there might still be theorems of science. Therefore science is prior to art.^^ '^The principles which art 'mvolves^ science evolves. The truths on which art depends lurk in the artist's mind undeveloped, guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of enunciated propositions. Art in its earlier stages is anterior to science, it may afterwards borrow aid from it." — Whewell, PJiil. of Induct. Sciences.^ vol. ii., pp. 275-6. If the knowledge used be merely accumulated experience, the art is called empirical ; but if it be experience reasoned upon and brought under general principles, it assumes a higher character and becomes a scientijic art. The difference between art and science is regarded as merely verbal by Sir WilHam Hamilton in Edin. Eev., N'o. 115. VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 47 ART— On the other side, see Preflice of St. Ililaii-e's Transla- tion of ti'.e Orno.non. p. 12 : TThewelL Pl'.il. of Induct. Sciences, part ii., book ii., chap. 8. *' The distmction between science and art is. that a science is a body of principles and deductions, to explam the nature of some object matter. An art is a body of precepts with practical skill lor the completion of some work. A science teaches us to know, an art to do : the former declares that something exists, with the laws and causes which belong to its existence, the latter teaches how something may be produced.'* — Thomson, Outline of Laics of Thought, p. 16. 2d edit. '' The object of science is knowledge : the objects of art are works. In art^ truth is a means to an end : in science it is the only end. Hence the practical arts are not to be classed among the sciences." — ^^\TieweU, Phil, of Induct. Sciences, aph. 2b. ^^ Science gives principles, art gives rules. Science is fixed, and its object is intellectual: art is contingent and its object sensible.'" — Hanis. Dialogue on Art. ASCETICI^JI (cc7y.siu. to exercise : or cc7Kr,<7i:. exercise). — The exercise of severe vii'tue among the P^i-thagoreans and Stoics was so called. It consisted in chastity, poverty. watching, fasting, and retii'ement. •• The ascetics renoiuiced the business and the pleasiu-es of the age; abjm-ed the use of wine, of liesh. and of marriage. chastised the body, mortified them aftections. and embraced a life of misery, as the price of eternal happiness.'' — Gibbon, Hist., c. 37. See Zimmerman on Solitude. This name may be applied to every system which teaches man not to govern his wants by subordinating them to reason and the law of duty, but to stifle them entirely, or at least to resist them as much as we can ; and these are not only the wants of the body, but still more those of the heart, the imagination and the mind ; for society, the fannly, most of the sciences and arts of ci^-ilization are pro- 48 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ASCETICISIW[— scribed, sometimes as rigorously as physical pleasures. The care of the soul and the contemplation of the Deity are the only employments. Asceticism may be distinguished as religious^ which is founded on the doctrine of expia- tion, and seeks to appease the Divine wrath by voluntary sufferings, and pliilosopliical^ which aims at accomplish- ing the destiny of the soul, developing its faculties, and freeing it from the servitude of sense. — Diet, des Sciences Phil. The principle of asceticism is described by Bentham (Introd. to Prin. of Mar. and Legislation^ ch. ii.) as ''that principle which approves of actions in proportion as they tend to diminish human happiness, and conversely dis- approves of them as they tend to augment it." But this is not a fair representation of asceticism in any of its forms. The only true and rational asceticism is temperance or moderation in all things. '' The Budhists believe that it is possible, by the perform- ance of certain ceremonies, and the observance of a pre- scribed course of moral action, to arrive at the posses- sion of supernatural powers." — Hardy, Easteim Monachism.^ p. 225. ASSENT (ad sentire — to think the same — to be of the same mind or opinion). — " Subscription to articles of religion, though no more than a declaration of the subscriber's assent^ may properly enough be considered in connection with the subject of oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpretation." — Paley, Mor. Phil.., b. iii., c. 22. Assent is that act of the mind by which we accept as true a proposition, a perception, or an idea. It is a necessary part of judgment ; for, if you take away from judgment, affirmation or denial, nothing remains but a simple concep- tion without logical value, or a proposition which must be examined before it can be admitted. It is also implied in perception, which would otherwise be a mere phenomenon which the mind had not accepted as true. Assent is free when it is not the unavoidable result of evidence, necessary VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 49 ASSENT— when I cannot withliold it without contradicting myself. The Stoics, while they admitted that most of our ideas came from without, thought that images purely sensible could not be converted into real cognitions without a spontaneous act of the mind, which is just assent or belief, avyKaTot&ifjig. — Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. — V. Belief, Consent. " Assent of the mind to truth is, hi all cases, the work not of the understanding, but of the reason. Men are not con- \dnced by syllogisms ; but when they beheye a principle, or wish to believe, then syllogisms are brought in to prove it."— Sewell, Christ. Mor., chap. 21. ASSEIRTORIT (ad serere, to knit or join). — " But whether each of them be according to the kinds of oaths divided by the schoolmen, one assertory., the other promissory., to which some add a third, comminatory, is to me unknown." — Fuller, Worthies, Cornwall. Judgments have also been distinguished into the problem- atic, assertory, which imply no necessity, and the apodeictic, — V. Judgment, Oath. In Logic, assertion is the affirmation or denial of some- thing. — ^Whately, Logic, b. ii., ch. 2, sect. 1. ASSOCIATION (acZ sociare, to accompany). — -''Ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds, that it is very hard to separate them ; they always keep company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding but its associate appears with it." — Locke, On Hum, Understand., b. ii., c. 33, sect. 5. — V. Suggestion, Train of Thought. *•' If several thoughts, or ideas, or feelings, have been in the mind at the same time, afterwards, if one of these thoughts return to the mind, some, or all of the others, will frequently return with it ; this is called the association of ideas.^'' — Taylor, Elements of Thought. ''By the laio of continuity, the mind, when the chord has once been struck, continues, as Hume describes it, to repeat of itself the same note again and again, till it finally dies away. Bj association it falls naturally into the same 50 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ASSOCIATIOI^— train of consecutive ideas, to whicli it lias been before accustomed. Imagine a glass so constructed that when the face placed before it was withdrawn, the image should still continue reflected on it for a certain time, becoming fainter and fainter until it finally disappeared. This would represent the law of continuity . Imagine that when a book and a man had been once placed before it together, it should be able, when the book was next brought alone, to recall the image of the man also. This would be the law of association. On these two laws depends the spontaneous activity of the mind."* — Sewell, Christ. Mor., ch. 14. "The law of association is this, — That empirical ideas which often follow each other, create a habit in the mind, whenever the one is produced, for the other always to follow." — Kant, Anthropology^ p. 182. "I employ the word association to express the effect which an object derives from ideas, or from feelings which it does not necessarily suggest, but which it uniformly re- calls to the mind, in consequence of early and long con- tinued habits." — Stewart, Works^ vol. ii., p. 449, '"'• Litelligitur per associaiionem idearum non qucevis natu- ralis et necessaria earundem conjunction sed quce fortuita est., aut per consuetudinem vel affectum producitur^ qua idece^ quce nullum naturalem inter se haheut nexum, ita copulantur^ ut recurrente una., tota earum catena se conspiciendum intellectui prceheat.''^ — Bruckerus, De Ideis. Locke, Essay., book ii., chap. 23 ; Hume, Essays., essay iii. ; Hartley, Observat. on Man ; Keid, Intellect. Powers^ essay iv. ; Stewart, Elements^ vol. ii., chap. 5 ; Brown, Lectures^ lect. xxxiii. ''The influence of association upon morals opens an ample field of inquiry. It is from this principle that we explain the reformation from theft and drunken- ness in servants which we sometimes see produced by a draught of spirits in which tartar emetic had been secretly * See the use whicli Butler has made of these in his Analogy, ch. i. and ch. V. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 51 ASSOCIATION— dissolved. The recollection of the pain and sickness ex- cited by the emetic, naturally associates itself with the spirits, so as to render them both equally the objects of aversion. It is by calling in this principle only that we can account for the conduct of Moses in grinding the golden calf mto a powder, and afterwards dissolving it (probably by means of liepar sulphuris), in water, and com- pelling the children of Israel to drink of it as a punishment for their idolatry. This mixture is bitter and nauseous in the highest degree. An inclination to idolatry, therefore, could not be felt without being associated with the remembrance of this disagreeable mixture, and of course being rejected with equal abhorrence." — Medical En- quiries^ by Benj. Eush, M.D., vol. ii., 8vo, Philadelphia, 1793, p. 42. ASSUIflPTIOlV (assumere^ to take to). — "The unities of time and place arise evidently from false assumptions."— John- son, Proposals for ^ Sfc.^ Shakspeare. Of enunciations or prsemisses, that which is taken uni- versally is called the proposition^ that which is less universal and comes into the mind secondarily is called the assump- tion, — Trendlenburg, Notes in Aristot. Assumption^ in Logic, is the minor or second proposition in a categorical syllogism. ATHEISM (c«, priv. ; and hog^ God). — The doctrine that there is no God. '' We shall now make diligent search and inquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers who atheized before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of atheism they entertained." — Cudworth, Intell. Syst.^ p. 111. The name Atheist is said to have been first apphed to Diagoras of Melos (or Delos), a follower of Democritus, who explained all things by motion and matter, or the movement of material atoms. The other form of atheism in ancient times was that of Thales, Anaximenes and Heraclitus, who accounted for all things by the different transformations of the one element of water. Straton of 52 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ATHEISM— Lampsacus rejected the purely mechanical system of Demo- critus, and ascribed to matter a power of organization which gave to all beings their forms and faculties. Epicu- rus was the cotemporary of Straton, but the follower of Democritus, on whose system he grafted the morality which is suited to it. And the materialism of Hobbes and others in modern times has, in like manner, led to atheism. It is a fine observation of Plato in his Laws — that atheism is a disease of the soul before it becomes an error of the understanding. Leclerc, Hist, des Systemes des Anciens Athees. In Bihlio- theque Choisie. " To beheve nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor any cause, measure, or rule of things but chance, so that in nature neither the interest of the whole^ nor of any particulars^ can be said to be in the least designed, pursued or aimed at, is to be a perfect atheist,'''* — Shaftesbury, Inquiry Concerning Virtue^ book i., part 1, sect. 2. Hi soli sunt athei, qui m.undum rectoris sapientis consilio negant in initio constitutum fuisse atque in omni tempore acZmmzsiran.—Hutcheson, Metaphys.^ pars 3, c. 1. Atheists are confounded with Pantheists ; such as Xeno- phanes among the ancients, or Spinoza and Schelling among the modems, who, instead of denying God, absorb everything into Him. Atheism has been distinguished fi:'om Anti-theism ; and the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recogni- tion of God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is founded on the difference between unhe- lief and disbelief (Chalmers, Nat. Theol.^ i., 58), and its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between sceptical and dogmatic atheism. — Buchanan, Faith in God^ vol. i., p. 396. '' The verdict of the atheist on the doctrine of a God, is only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is but an atheist. He is not an anti-theist.'''' — (Chalmers, ut supra). VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 53 ATOM, ATOMISM (oc, priv. ; and ts,uusiu, to cut, that which cannot be cut or divided is an atom). " ]^ow, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted th(^ corporeal world to be made of atoms^ yet notwithstanding, held an incorporeal deity, distinct from the same as the first principle of activity in it, so in like manner did all other ancient atomists generally before Democritus join theology aiid incorporealism with their atomical physiology." — Cud- worth, Intell Syst^ p. 2Q. '' Leucippus considered the basis of all bodies to consist of extremely fine particles, differing in form and nature, which he supposed to be dispersed throughout space, and to which the followers of Epicurus first gave the name of atoms. To these atoms he attributed a rectilinear motion, in consequence of which, such as are homogeneous united, whilst the lighter were dispersed throughout space." The doctrine of atomism did not take its rise in Greece, but in the East. It is found in the Indian philosophy. Kanada, the author of the system, admitted an infinite intelligence distinct from the world. But he could not beheve matter to be infinitely divisible, as in this case a grain of sand would be equal to a mountain, both being- infinite. Matter consists, then, of ultimate indivisible atoms ^ which are indestructible and eternal. Empedocles and Anaxagoras did not exclude mind or spirit fi[*om the universe. Leucippus and Democritus did. Epicurus added nothing to their doctrine. Lucretius gave it the graces of poetry. In all its forms, explaining the universe by chance or necessity, it tends to materialism or atheism, although Gassendi has attempted to reconcile it with a belief in God. — Stewart, Active Powers^ vol. ii., last edit., 369. — V. Mole- cule. ATTENTION {ad tendere, to apply the mind to an object). '' The natural reason of this rule is plain, for two differ- ent independent acts distract the attention and concernment of the audience." — Dryden, Pref. to Troilus and Cressida. '' When we see, hear, or think of anythhig, and feel a 54. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOrHY. ATTENTION— desire to know more of it, we keep the mind fixed upon the object ; tMs effort of tlie mind, produced by tlae desire of knowledge, is called attention.''^ — Taylor, Elements of Thought. Attention is the voluntary directing of the energy of the mind towards an object or an act. It has been said by Dr. Holland (Mental Physiol.^ p. 14), that ''The phrase of direction of consciousness might often be advantageously substituted for it." It implies Will as distinct from Intelli- gence and Sensibility. It is the voluntary direction of the intelligence and activity. Condillac confounded it with a sensation of which we were passively conscious, all other sensations being as if they were not. Laromiguiere re- garded it as a faculty, and as the primary faculty of the understanding, which gives birth to all the rest. But we may do an act with attention as well as contemplate an object with attention. And we may attend to a feeling as well as to a cognition. According to De Tracy (Ideologie^ c. 11), it is a state of mind rather than a faculty. It is to be acquired and improved by habit. We may learn to be attentive as we learn to walk and to write. According to Dr. Reid, '' Attention is a voluntary act ; it requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it ; and it may be continued as long as we will ; but consciousness is involuntary, and of no continuance, changing with every thought." — Essays on Intellect. Powers ., p. 60. Attention to external things is ohservation. Attention to the subjects of our own consciousness is reflection. Attention and abstraction are the same process, it has been said, viewed in different relations. They are the positive and negative poles of the same act. The one evolves the other. Attention is the abstraction of the mind from all things else, and fixing it upon one object ; and abstraction is the fixing the mind upon one object to the exclusion of others. Attention and Thought. — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, vol. i., p. 4, edit. 1848. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 55 ATTENTION— '' By thougJit is here meant the voluntary' reproduction in our minds of those states of consciousness, to which, as to his best and most authentic documents, the teacher of moral or religious truth refers us. In attention^ we keep the mind passive ; in thought^ we rouse it into activity. In the former, we submit to an impression — we keep the mind steady, in order to receive the stamp. In the latter, we seek to imitate the artist, while we ourselves make a copy or duplicate of his work. We may learn arithmetic or the elements of geometry, by continued attention alone; but self-knowledge, or an insight into the laws and consti- tution of the human mind, and the grounds of religion and true morality, in addition to the effort of attention^ requires the energ}^ of thought. ATTRIBUTE (ad tribuere^ to apportion, to ascribe) is any- thing that can be predicated of another. "Heaven delights To pardon erring man ; sweet mercy seems Its darling attribute, which limits justice." Dryden, All for Love.^ Attributes (logical), refer not to a substance or real being, but to a subject. Consequently, attributes of this kind may express something different from qualities, if only they do not include a pure negation. Thus, in the famous proposition of Pascal : Man is neither an angel nor a beast, —the words which hold the place of the attribute represent neither a quality nor a positive idea . '' Attributes are usually distributed under the three heads of quality, quantity, and relation." — Mill, Logic. 2d edit., vol. i., p. 83. In the schools, the definition, the genus, the proprium, and the accident, were called dialectic attributes ; because, according to Aristotle (Topic^ lib. i., c. 6), these were the four points of view in which any subject of philosophical discussion should be viewed. '' A predicate, the exact limits of which are not deter- mined, cannot be used to define and determine a subject. 56 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ATTfilBUTE — It may be called an attribute^ and conveys not the whole nature of the subject, but some one quality belonging to it. ^Metals are heavy,' 'Some snakes are venomous,' are judgments in which this kind of predicable occurs." — Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought^ 2d edit., p. 161. Attributes (real or metaphysical) are always real quali- ties, essential and inherent, not only in the nature, but even in the substance of things. '' By this word attribute^'''' said Descartes (in his letter to Regius), '' is meant something which is immovable and inseparable from the essence of its subject, as that which constitutes it, and which is thus opposed to mode,^'' Thus unity, identity, and activity, are attributes of the soul ; for I cannot deny them, without, at the same time, denying the existence of the soul itself. Sensibility, liberty, and intelligence, are but faculties. la God there is nothing but attributes^ because, in God every- thing is absolute, involved in the substance and unity of the necessary being. In Deo nan proprie modos aut quali- iates^ sed attributa tantum dicimus esse. — Descartes, Princip. Philosoph.^ i., n. 56. Attributes are belonging to the existence of the being to which they are ascribed. Marks or characters^ by being in some and not in others, mark or distinguish. Qualities are an answer to quale sit ens. Properties are when a being has some properties more than other beings. Modes or modifications are when a being, remaining essentially the same, acquires. or loses some marks. In man the essential mark is reason — attribute, capacity of learning — mode.^ actual learning — quality^ relatively to another more or less learned. — F. Quality, Mode. — Peemans, Introd. ad Philosoph.^ p. 6. AUTHENTIC — ''I oppose the word authentic to supposititious (or apocryphal), the word genuine to vitiated. I call a book authentic which was truly the work of the person whose name it bears. I call a book genuine^ which remains, VOCABULARY OF PHLLOSOPHY. 57 AUTHENTIC— in all material points, the same as when it proceeded from the author."— Dr. Hill, Lectures^ vol. i., p. 17, (3d edit.) Dr. Dick appears just to reverse this definition. — Lectures^ vol. i., p. 52. In jurisprudence, those laws or acts are called authentic which are promulgated by the proper public officer, and accompanied with the conditions requisite to give them faith and force. AUTHORITY (The principle of). — " The principle of adopting the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, without refer- ence to the particular grounds on which the behef may rest." — Lewis, Oii Authority in Matters of Opinion^ p. 6.— F. Consent. Authority (The argument from). — It is an argument for the truth of an opinion that it has been embraced by all men, in all ages, and in all nations. Quod semper^ iibique et ah omnibus^ are the marks of universality, according to Yincentius Lirinensis. "This word is sometimes employed in its primary sense, when we refer to any one's example, testimony, or judgment ; as when, e. g.^ we speak of correct- ing a reading hi some book on the authority of an ancient MS., or giving a statement of some fact on the authority of such and such historians, &c. In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the Latin auctoritas. It is a clahn to deference. '' Sometimes, again, it is employed as equivalent to potestas^ power, as when we speak of the authority of a magistrate. This is a claim to ohedience.^^ — Whately, Logic ^ appendix 1. U?ia in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturce putanda est. — Cicero, I., Tuscul. Multum dare solemus prcesumptioni omnium hominum : Apud nos veritatis argumentum est., aliquid omnibus videri. — Seneca, epist. 117. ^^UTOCRASY (oivTog., self; and k^octsiv., to have power). — " Tlie divine will is absolute, it is its own reason, it is both the producer and the ground of all its acts. It moves not by 58 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. AUTOCRASY— the external impulse or inclination of objects, but deter- mines itself by an absolute autocrasy y — South, vol. vii., ser. X. " God extends his dominion even to man's will, that great seat of freedom, that with a kind of autocrasy and supre- macy within itself, commands its own actions, laughs at all compulsion, scorns restraint, and defies the bondage of human laws or external obligations." — South, vol. i., ser. vii. — F. Autonomy. AUTOMATON (oivro/Lccirov^ that which moves of itself.) Automatic. — "The difference between an animal and automatic statue consists in this, that in the animal we trace the mechan- ism to a certain point, and then we are stopped, either the mechanism becoming too subtile for our discernment, or something .else beside the known laws of mechanism taking place ; whereas, in the automaton^ for the compara- tively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout." — Paley, Nat, Theol.^ c. 3. ''^ Automatic motions are those muscular actions which are not dependent on the mind, and which are either per- sistent, or take place periodically with a regular rhythm, and are dependent on normal causes seated in the nerves or cen- tral organs ol the nervous system." " Movements influ- enced simply by sensation, and not at all by the will, are automatic^ — Morell, Psychology^ p. 99. Leibnitz, tom. i., p. 156, has said, " anima humana est spirituals quoddam automaton^ In a note on this passage, Bilfinger is quoted as saving that automaton is derived from otvToc and f^cccd or f^cirzoi. to seek or desire. The soul is a being desiring of itself, whose changes are desired by itself; whereas the common interpretation of the word is self-moving. The soul, in strict propriety, may be called self- desiring, or desiring changes of itself, as having the principle of change in itself; whereas machines are impro- perly called self-moving, or self-desiring, or willing. " By the compound word ot.vrof/.oiroy {orctv avro f/^oirriv y5i/>7T^/) Aristotle expresses nature effecting either more VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 59 AUTOMATON— or less than tlie specific ends or purposes to which her respective operations invariably tend." — Nat. Auseult.^ lib. ii., cap. 6 ; Gilhes, Analysis of Aristotle's Works ^ chap. 2. note. Xature operating kcctcc avf^lS:i3rr. — '' I make use of all the hrocardics^ or rules of interpreters ; tliat is, not only what is established regularly, in law, but what is concluded wise and reasonable by the best interpreters." — Jeremy Taylor, Preface to Ductor Dubitantium, '' To the Stoics and not to the Stagirite, are we to refer the first announcement of the hrocard. In intellectu nihil est^ quod non prius fuerit in sensu^ — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works^ note A, p. 772. CAPACITY- "If heaven to men such mighty thoughts would give, What breast hut thine capacious to receive The vast infusion? " — Cowley,, ^^e Davideis, h. 4. " Is it for that such outward ornament Was lavish'd on their sex, that inward gifts Were left for haste unfinish'd, judgment scant, Capacity not raised to apprehend, Or value, what is best In choice, hut oftest to affect the wi'ong."— Milton, Samson Agonistes, -''The original power which the mind possesses of being taught, we call natural capacity; and this in some degree is common to all men. The superior facility of being taught, which some possess above the rest, we call genius. The first transition or advances firom natural power, we call proficiency; and the end or completion of proficiency, we call habit. If such habit be conversant about matter purely speculative, it is then called science ; if it descend from speculation to practice, it is then called art ; and if such practice be conversant in regulating the passions and affections, it is then called moral virtue.'''' — Harris, Philo- soph. Arrange.^ chap. 8. '' From habit, necessarily results power or capacity (in Greek Ivuocj^i;), Avhich Aristotle has distinguished into two VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 69 CAPACITY— kinds. The first is the mere capacity of becoming anything. The second is the power or faculty of energizing^ according to the habit when it is formed and acquired ; or, in other words, after the thing is become and actually exists, which at first was only in the capacity of existing. This, Aristotle illustrates by the example of a child, who is then only a general in power (sv ^vvuf/.n)., that is, has the power of becoming a general. But when he is grown up and has become a general, then he has the power of the second kind, that is, the power of performing the oflice of a gene- ral." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ b. i., chap. 4. "There are powers which are acquired by use, exercise, or study, which are called habits. There must be some- thing in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire habits,^ and this is commonly called capacity.^'' — E-eid, Intell. Pow.^ essay i., chap. 1. Dr. Keid did not recognize the distinction of power as active or passive. But capacity is a passive power, or natural receptivity. A faculty is a power which we are conscious we can direct towards an end. A capacity is rather a disposition or aptitude to receive certain modifi- cations of our consciousness, in receiving which we are passive. But an original capacity^ though at first passive, may be brought under the influence of will and attention, and when so exercised it corresponds to a mental power, and is no longer a pure receptivity. In sensation, we are in the first instance passive, but our capacity of receivuig sensations may be employed in various ways under the direction of will and attention, or personal activity. CARDlNAXi (The) Virtues, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, were so called from cardo^ sl hinge ; because they were the hinges on which other wtues turned. Each one of them was a fons et principium^ from which other virtues took their rise. The four cardinal virtues are rather the necessary and essential conditions of virtue, than each individually a virtue. For no one can by itself be manifested as a \irtue. 70 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CARDINAIi— without the other three. — Thurot, De V Entendement^ torn, i., page 162. This division of the virtues is as old as moral philosophy. It is found in the teaching of Socrates as recorded by Xenophon, with this difference, that evas/Se^cc or regard to the Deity holds the place of prudence or knowledge, which, united to virtue, forms true wisdom. Plato notices tem- perance, fortitude, and prudence, and in connection with or arising out of these justice, which he considered not as the single virtue of giving all their due, but as the perfec- tion of human nature and of human society. The term justice had been employed in the same large sense by Pythagoras, and the corresponding term righteousness, is used in Scripture to signify not one virtue, but all the virtues. The four cardinal virtues are alluded to in the Apocrypha, Wisdom^ viii., 7. The theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity ; which being added to the cardinal^ make the number seven. '•'' Justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, the old heads of the family of virtues, give us a division which fails altogether ; since the parts are not distinct, and the whole is not complete. The portions of morality so laid out, both over-lap one another, or are undistinguishable ; and also, leave parts of the subject which do not appear in the distribution at all." — Whewell, Sysiemat, Mor.^ lect. iv. Clodius, De Virtutihus quas Cardinales Appellant. 4to, Leips., 1815. Plethon, De Quatuor Virtutihus Cardinali- hus. 8vo, BasL, 1552. CASUISTRY is a department of ethics—" the great object of which is to lay down rules or canons for directing us how to act, wherever there is any room for doubt or hesitation." — Stewart, Active Powers^ b. iv., chap. 5, sect. 4. To casuistry^ as ethical or moral, belongs the decision of what are called cases of conscience — that is, cases in which we are under obligation, but cases which from the special circumstances attending give rise to doubt whether or how far the obligation may be relaxed or dissolved— such as VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 71 CASUISTRY— the obligation to keep a promise obtained by fraud, or extorted by force. CATAliEPSY, — " The speculations of Berkeley and Boscovich on the non-existence of matter, and of Kant and others on the arbitrariness of all our notions, are interested in, for they appear to be confuted by, the intuitions of cata- leptics. The cataleptic apprehends or perceives directly the objects around her ; but they are the same as when realized through her senses. She notices no difference ; size, form, colour, distance, are elements as real to her now as before. In respect again to the future, she sees it, but not in the sense of the a,nnihilation of time ; she fore- sees it ; it is the future present to her ; time she measures, present and future, with strange precision — strange, yet an approximation, instead of this certainty, would have been more puzzling. '' So that it appears that our notions of matter, force, and the like, and of the conditions of space and time, apart from which we can conceive nothing, are not figments to suit our human and temporary being, but elements of eternal truth." — Mayo, On Popular Superstitions^ p. 125. 8vo, 3d edit., Edin., 1851. How far is the argument in the foregoing passage affected by the fact, that in sleep and in dreams we have sensations and perceptions in reference to objects which are not within the reach of the senses ? The paradox of Berkeley may be confuted in two ways : — First, by a Reductio ad absurdum ; second, no single ex- istence can effect any change or event, and a change or event of some kind there must be, in order to create those sensations or states of mind in which consciousness consists. There must, therefore, be something in existence foreign to ourselves, for no change, in other words, nothing which stands in the relation of cause and effect, is conceivable, but what is the result of two existences acting upon each other. See Sir Gilbert Blane on Muscular Motion^ p. 258, note. 72 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CATEOOHY (KciTcc izysi^Biy^ to bring together, or, xccTocyc- ^2/1/, to accuse, to attribute). " So again, tbe distribution of things into certain tribes^ wMch we call categories or predicaments^ are but cautions against tlie confusion of definitions and divisions." — Bacon.. Adv. of Learning., b. ii. The categories are the highest classes to which all the objects of knowledge can be reduced, and in which they can be arranged in subordination and system. Philosophy seeks to know all things. But it is impossible to know all things individually. They are, therefore, arranged in classes, according to properties which are common to them. And when we know the definition of a class, we attain to a formal knowledge of all the individual objects of knowledge contained in that class. Every individual man we cannot know ; but if we know the definition of man, we know the nature of man, of which every individual of the species participates ; and in this sense we may be said to know all men. This attempt to render knowledge in some sense universal, has been made in all ages of philosophy, and ha& given rise to the categories which have appeared in various forms. They are to be found in the philosophy of Eastern nations, as a classification of things and of ideas. The categories of the followers of Pythagoras have been pre- served by Aristotle in the first book of his Metaphysics, Those ascribed to Archytas are now regarded as apocryphal^ and as having been fabricated about the beginning of the Christian era, to lower the reputation of Aristotle, whose categories are well known. They are ten in number, viz., — ovaioi-., substance ; 'ttogov., quantity : 'Traiou^ quality ; Troog Ti^ relation ; -^rojy, place ; ^org, time ; %,sio^c&i^ situation ; sx,stu^ possession, or manner of holding ; Trosiu., action ; and 'TTOLax^iv-t sufiering. The Mnemonic verses which contain them, are : — Arbor sex servos ardore refrigerat ustos Cras rure stabo, sed tunicatus ero. * * A humorous illustration of the categories is given by Cornelius to his pupil ^lartinus Scriblerus. Calling up the coachman, he asked him what he had s«en at VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 73 CATEOORY— The categories of Aristotle are both logical and meta- physical, and apply to things as well as to words. Regarded logically, they are reducible to two, suhstance and attribute. Regarded metaphysically, they are reducible to heing and accident The Stoics reduced them to four, viz., sub- stance, quality, manner of being, and relation. Plotinus attempted a new system. But the categories of Aristotle were acquiesced in till the time of Bacon, who recom- mended observation rather than classification. Descartes arranged all things under two great categories^ the absolute and the relative. In the Port Royal Logic ^ seven cate- gories are established. In more modern times the catego- ries of Kant are weU known. They are quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But they are purely subjective, and give merely a classification of the conceptions or judg- ments of the understanding. In the history of philosophy, the categories have been successively a classification univer- sal of things, of words, of ideas, or of forms of thought. And a complete theory of classification, or a complete system of categories is still a desideratum. — Monboddo, Origin of Lang.^ vol. i., p. 520, and Ancient Metaphys., b. iii., chap. 1. — V. Predicament, Universal. Mr. Mill (System of Logic ^ I. iii., ult.), gives the follow- ing classification of all nameable things. 1. Feelings or states of consciousness. 2. The minds which experience these feelings. 3. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of these feelings, together with the power or properties whereby they excite them. 4. The successions and co-existences, the likenesses and unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness. tlie bear-garden ? The man answered he had seen t^YO men fight for a prize ; one v/as afair man, a sergeant in the Guards; the other blaclv, a butcher; the sergeant had red breeches, the butcher blue; they fought upon a stage about four o'clock, and the sergeant wounded the butcher in the leg. Mark (quoth Cornelius) how the fellow runs through the predicaments— men (substantia) — two (quantitas)—Mv and black (qualitas)— sergeant and butcher (relatio)— wounded the other (actio et pussio —fighting (situs)— stage (ubi)— four o'clock (quando)—'h\\ie and red breeches (habiiKs). 74 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CATEOORY— A categorical proposition is one wMcli affirms or denies a predicate of a subject, absolutely, and without any hypo- tbesis. — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., cbap. 2, sect. 4. A categorical answer is an express and pertinent reply to a question proposed. CAUSAIilTY, CAUSATION, CAUSE. CAUSE.— "He knew the cause of every maladie, Were it of cold, or hot, or moist, or drie." Chaucer, Prologue, v. 421. " The general idea of cause is, that without which another thing called the effect, cannot be ; and it is divided by Aristotle {Metaphys.^ lib. 5, cap. 2), into four kinds, known by the name of the material^ the formal^ the efficient^ and the Jinal. The first is that of which any thing is made. Thus brass or marble are the material causes of a statue ; earth, air, fire, and water, of all natural bodies. The formal cause is the form, idea, archetype, or pattern of a thing ; for all these words Aristotle uses to express it. Thus the idea of the artist is the formal cause of the statue ; and of all natural substances, if we do not suppose them the work of chance, the formal cause are the ideas of the divine mind ; and this form concurring with the matter, produces every work, whether of nature or art. The efficient cause is the principle of change or motion which produces the thing. In this sense the statuary is the cause of the statue, and the God of nature the cause of all the works of nature. And lastly, the final cause is that for the sake of which any thing is done. Thus the statuary makes the statue for pleasure or for profit ; and the works of nature are all for some good end." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys,^ b. i., chap. 4. In Metaphys.^ lib. i., cap. 3, Aristotle says we may dis- tinguish four kinds of causes. The first is the form pro- per to each thing. To r/ nv uvoci. This is the quidditas of the schoolmen, the causa for malis. The second is the mat- ter and the subject. Tj^ v>vyi jcqci to vTroKHf^iuov^ causa VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 70 CAUSAIilTY materialis. The third is the principle of movement which produced the thing. A^x"^ '^^s fciYiaiO)^^ causa efficiens. The fourth is the reason and good of all things ; for the end of all phenomena and of all movement is good. To 6u euiKcc x.(x,l rocyctQou^ causa finalis. The sufficient reason of Leibnitz, which he, like Aristotle, thought to be essentially good. In Metaphys.^ lib. iii., cap. 2, Aristotle says, '' It is pos- sible that one object may combine all the kinds of causes. Thus, in a house, the principle of movement is the art and the workman, the final cause is the work, the matter the earth and stones, and the plan is the /or/Ti." See also Nat. Auseult.^ Hb. ii., cap. 3, quoted by Harris concerning Art. p. 24:. In addition to these four causes, Dr. Gillies (^Analysis of AristotWs Works^ chap, ii., note, p. 100), says, '' The model or exemplar was considered as a cause by the Pytha- goreans and Platonists ; the former of whom maintained that all perceptible things were imitations of numbers ; and the latter, that they owed their existence to the participa- tion of ideas ; but wherein either this imitation or this par- ticipation consisted, these philosophers, Aristotle observes, omitted to show." Seneca, in Epist. ^^ and 67, explaius the common and Platonic divisions of causes ; and arraigns both, because he conceived that space, time, and motion, ought to be in- cluded. Sir W. Hamilton (Reid^s Works^ p. 690, note), says, *' The exemplary cause was introduced by Plato ; and was not adopted by the schoolmen as a fifth cause in addition to Aristotle's fom\" It is noticed by Suarez and others. According to Derodon (De Prcedicamentis^ p. 114), material and formal causes are internal^ and constitute the essence of a thing ; efficient, final, and exemplary causes are external^ that is, out from or of the essence of a thing. The material cause is that, ex quo^ any thing is, or becomes. The formal cause is that, />er quod. The efficient cause is 76 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CAUSAIilTY— that, a quo. The final cause is that, propter quod. And the exemplary cause is that, ad cujus imitationem res Jit. When the word cause is used without an adjective, it commonly means, active power, that which produces change, or efficient cause. Suarez, Rivius, and others, define a cause thus : — Cau- sam esse principium per se influens esse in aliud. '' A cause is that which, of itself, makes any thing begin to be." — Irons, Final Causes., p. 74. We conceive of a cause a;S existing and operating before the efiect which is produced. But, to the production of an effect, more causes than one may be necessary. Hence it has been said by Mr. Karslake {Aids to the Study of Logic, vol. ii., p. 43), "The cause of a thing is that antecedent (or aggregate of antecedents), which is seen to have an intimate connection with the effect, viewed, if it be not itself a self- determining agent, in reference to a self-acting power, whose agency it exhibits." And some, instead of the word cause., would prefer in many cases to use the word concauses. '' Though the antecedent is most strictly the cause of a tiling being ^ as, e. g.^ the passage of the moon between the earth and the sun is the cause of an eclipse, yet the effect is that which commonly presents itself to us as the cause of our knowing it to he. Hence, by what seems to us a strange inversion of cause and effect, effect was said to he a cause^ a causa cognoscendi., as distinguished from a causa essendi^ the strict cause.'''' — Karslake, Aids to Study of Logic ^ vol. ii., p. 38. CAUSAIilTY and CAUSATION. " Now, if there be no spirit, matter must of necessity move itself, where you cannot imagine any activity or causality^ but the bare essence of the matter, from whence the motion comes." — H. More, Immortality of the Soul^ book i., chap. 6. " Now, always God's word hath a causation with it. He said to him. Sit, that is, he made him sit, or, as it is here VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 77 CAUSAIilTY— expressed, he made him sit with a mighty power." — Good- win, Works^ vol. i., part 1, p. 406. Causality^ in actu primo^ is the energ}^ or power in the cause* by which it produces its effect ; as heat in the fire. Causality^ in actu secundo^ is causation or the operation of the power by which the cause is actually producing its effect. It is, influxus ille^ a quo causa influit esse in effec- tum quce distinguitur a parte rei^ tam a principio. quam a termino^ sive ah effectu^ ad quem tendit. " The changes of which I am conscious in the state of my own mind, and those which I perceive in the external universe, impress me T\dth a coniiction that some cause must have operated to produce them. There is an intuitive judgment involving the simple idea of causation.''^ — Stewart, Philosoph. Essays^ i., chap. 3. From the explanation of these terms, it appears that a cause is something which not only precedes^ but has power to produce the effect. And when the effect has been pro- duced, we say it is in consequence of the power in the cause ha^dng operated. The belief that every effect implies a cause, or that every change is produced by the operation of some power, is regarded by some as a primitive belief, and has been denominated by the phrase, thef principle of causality. Hume, and others, however, have contended that we have no proper idea of cause as implpng power to produce, nor of any necessary connection between the operation of this power and the production of the effect. All that we see or know is mere succession, antecedent and * Tlie idea of the reason is not to be confounded with that of causality. It is a more elevated idea, hecause it applies to all orders of things, while causality extends only to things in time. It is tme we speak sometimes of the eternal cause ; but thus thp idea of cause is sjTionymous with that of the reason. This idea of the reason expresses the relation of a being or thing to what is contained within it ; in other words, the reason expresses the rapport du contewnU au contenu, or the reason is that whose essence encloses the essence and existence of another thing. We thus arrive at the conception of all being contained in God, who is th supreme reason. — Ahrens, Cours de Psychol, torn, ii.— F. Eeason. t Lord Bacon {Nov. Organ., book ii., sect. 14), says, " Tliere are some things ultimate and incausable." 78 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CAUSAIilTY— consequent ; but having seen things in this relation, we asso- ciate them together, and imagining that there is some vincu- lum or connection between them, we call the one the cause, and the other the effect. Dr. Thomas Brown adopts this view with the modification that it is in cases where the ante- cedence and consequence is invariable that we attain to the idea of cause. Experience, however, can only testify that the succession of one thing to another has, in so far as it has been observed, been unvaried^ not that in the nature of things it is invariable. Mr. Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 21 and 26), ascribes the origin of our idea of cause to our experience of the sensible changes which one body pro- duces on another, as fire upon wax. Our belief in an exter- nal world rests partly on the principle of causality. Our sen- sations are referred to external objects as their causes. Yet, the idea of power which is involved in that of cause, he traces to the consciousness of our possessing power in our- selves. This is the view taken of the origin of our idea of cause by Dr. Reid. '' In the strict philosophical sense, I take a cause to be that which has the relation to the effect which I have to my voluntary and deliberate actions ; for I take this notion of a cause to be derived from the power I feel in myself to produce certain effects. In this sense we say that the Deity is the cause of the universe." — Corre- spondence of Dr. Reid^ p. 77. And at p. 81 he has said, " I see not how mankind could ever have acquired the concep- tion of a cause, or of any relation beyond a mere conjunc- tion in time and place between it and its effects, if they were not conscious of active exertions in themselves, by which effects are produced. This seems to me to be the, origin of the idea, or conception of production." By origin, however. Dr. Reid must have meant occasion., At least he held that the principle of causality, or the belief that every change implies the operation of a cause, is a natural judgment, or a priori conviction, necessary and universal. But if the idea of a cause be empirical and grounded on experience, it may be difficult to show how a VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 7^ CAL'SAIilTi:— higher origin can be claimed for the principle of causality, !Mr. Stewart has expressed himself in language equivalent to that of Dr. Eeid. And Maine de Biran (Xouvelles Con- siderat. sur le Rapport du Physique et du Moral de Vhomme^ 8vo, Par., 1834, pp. 274, 290, 363, 402), thinks that the true origia of our idea of cause is to be found in the activity of the will, or m the consciousness that we are causes, or have in ourselves the power of producing change. Having found the idea of power within the sphere of consciousness, we, by a process which he calls natiu-al induction, project this idea into the external world, and ascribe power to that which we call cause. According to Kant we have the idea of cause, and also the belief that every commencing pheno- menon implies the operation of a cause. But these are merely forms of our understanding, subjective conditions of human thought. In conformity with a pre-existing law of our intelligence, we arrange phenomena according to the relation of cause and effect. But we know not whether, independently of our form of thought, there be any reality corresponding to our idea of cause, or of productive power. The view that the idea of cause is furnished by the fact of our being conscious of possessing power, meets the idealism of Kant, for what gTeater reality can be conceived than a fact of consciousness ? But if experience of external pheno- mena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occa- sion) of our notion of change, and if consciousness of internal phenomena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of power to produce change, the idea of a necessaiy and universal connection between change and the power which produces it, in other words, a behef in the principle of causality, can only be referred to the reason, the faculty which apprehends, not what is contingent and passing, but what is permanent and absolute. '^ Cousin's theory- concerning the origin of idea o1l caus- ality is, that the mind, when it perceives that the agent and the change vary in cases of personal agency (though here 80 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. lie is not very explicit), several times repeated : while the relation between them, viz., the strict idea of personal causation, never varies, but is necessary, that the mind abstracts the invariable and necessary element from the variable and contingent elements of the fact, and thus arrives at the idea of causality.''^ — Essay on Causality^ by an Undergraduate, 1854, p. 3. ^^ Causation is not an object of sense. The only experi- ence we can have of it, is in the consciousness we have of exerting some power in ordering our thoughts and actions. But this experience is surely too narrow a foundation for a general conclusion, that all things that have had or shall have a beginning, must have a cause. This is to be admit- ted as a first or self-evident principle." — E,eid, Intell. Pow,^ essay vi., chap. 6. But Locke has said (Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 21, sect. 4), '' The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by iviUing it., barely by a thought of the mind., we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest." See Cousin, (Euvres Prem. Ser.^ tom. i., cours. 1817, and Hist, de Philosoph. Mod.., sect, 19. See also on the various theories as to the origin of our judgment of cause and eifect, Sir Will. Hamilton, Discussions., app. 1. CAUSES (Final, ]>octriiae of). — When we see means indepen- dent of each other conspiring to accomplish certain ends, we naturally conclude that the ends have been contem- plated, and the means arranged by an intelligent agent ; and, from the nature of the ends and of the means, we infer the character or design of the agent. Thus, from the ends answered in creation being wise and good, we infer not only the existence of an Intelligent Creator, but also that He is a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness. This is commonly called the argument fi^om design or from, final causes. It was used by Socrates (see Xenophon, Memora- bilia), and found a place in the scholastic philosophy. But YOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 81 CAUSES— Lord Bacon has said (JDe Aug. Scient^ lib. iii., cap. 5), that the inquiry into^naZ causes is sterile. And Descartes maintained that we cannot know the designs of God in creating the universe, unless he reveal them to us. But Leibnitz, in maintaining the principle of sufficient reason, upheld the doctrine of Jinal causes, and thought it equally applicable in physics and in metaphysics. It is true that in physical science we should prosecute our inquiries with- out any preconceived opinion as to the ends to be answered, and observe the phenomena as they occur, without forcing them into the service of an hypothesis. And it is against this error that the language of Bacon was directed. But when our contemplations of nature reveal to us innumer- able adjustments and arrangements working out ends that are wise and good, it is natural to conclude that they have been designed by a cause sovereignly wise and good. IsTot- withstanding the doubts as to the logical validity of this argument, which have been started by Kant, Coleridge, and others, it continues to be regarded as the most popu- lar and impressive mode of proving the being and perfec- tions of God. And the validity of it is implied in the universally admitted axiom of modern physiology, that there is no organ without its function. We say of some things ia nature that they are useless. All we can truly say is, that we have not yet discovered their use. Every thing has an end to the attaiament or accomplish- ment of which it contiaually tends. This is the form in which the doctriae of Jinal causes was advocated by Aris- totle. With him it was not so much an argument from design, as an argument against chance. But if things do not attain their ends by chance it must be by design. Aristotle, it is true, was satisfied that ends were answered by tendencies in nature. But whence or why these ten- dencies in nature, but from an Litelligent Author of nature ? ''K we are to judge from the explanations of the prin- ciple given by Aristotle, the notion of a Jiiial cause, as G 82 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CAUSES— originally conceived, did not necessarily imply design. The theological sense to which it is now commonly re- stricted, has been derived from the place assigned to it in the scholastic philosophy; though, indeed, the principle had been long before beautifully applied by Socrates and by the Stoics to establish the truth of a Divine Providence. Whenever, indeed, we observe the adjustment of means to an end, we seem irresistibly impelled to conclude that the whole is the effect of design. The present acceptation, therefore, of the doctrine of final causes^ is undoubtedly a natural one. Still it is not a necessary construction of the doctrine. With Aristotle, accordingly, it is simply an in- quiry into tendencies — an investigation of any object or phenomenon, from considering the ' iV2x.ot tov^ the reason of it in something else which follows it, and to which it naturally leads. His theory of final causes is immediately opposed to a doctrine of chance, or spontaneous coincidence ; and must be regarded as the denial of that, rather than as a positive assertion of design. He expressly distinguishes, indeed, between thought and nature. He ascribes to nature the same working in order to ends, which is commonly re- garded as the attribute of thought alone. He insists that there is no reason to suppose deliberation necessary in these workings of nature, since it is '' as if the art of ship- building were in the timber, or just as if a person should act as his own physician." — Hampden, Introd. to Mor, Phil.., lect. iv., p. 113. ''The argument frovQ. final causes^'''' says Dr. Reid (IntelL Powers^ essay vi., chap. 6), "when reduced to a syllogism, has these two premises : — First, that design and intelhgence in the cause may, with certainty, be inferred from marks or signs of it in the effect. This we may call the major proposition of the argument. The second, which we call the minor proposition, is, that there are in fact the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature ; and the conclusion is, that the works of nature are the effects ► VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 83 CAUSES— of a wise and intelligent cause. One must either assent to the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises." Hampden, Introd. to Mor, Phil.., p. 110-113 ; Irons, Doctrine of Final Causes^ 8vo, Lond., 1856. The argu- ment from design is prosecuted by Paley, in Nat. Theology: Bridgewater Treatises; Burnett Prize Essays^ &c. Causes (Occasional, Doctrine of). — This phrase has been em- ployed by the Cartesians to explain the commerce or mode of communicating between mind and matter. The soul being a thinking substance, and extension being the essence of body, no intercourse can take place between them without the intervention of the First Cause. It is Deity himself, therefore, who, on the occasion of certain modifications in our mind, excites the corresponding movements of body; and, on the occasion of certain changes in our body, awakens the corresponding feelings in the mind. This theor}', which is involved in the philosophy of Descartes, was fully developed by Malebranche, Eegis, and Geulinx. Laforge limited the theory to involuntary movements, and thus reconciled it in some degree to experience and com- mon sense. Malebranche's doctrine is commonly called the '' vision of all things in God" — who is the "hght of all our seeing." According to this theory, the admirable structure of the body and its organs is useless ; as a dull mass would have answered the pm-pose equally well. CERTAINTY, CERTITUDE (Certum (from cerno)^ propria idem sit., quod deer etiim ac proinde firmum. Yossius). ''This way of certainty by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little farther than bare imagination ; and I believe it will appear that aU the certainty of general truths a man has, lies in nothing else." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.., book iii., chap. 4. " Certain., in its primary sense, is applied (according to its etymolog}' from cerno)^ to the state of a person's mind; denoting any one's full and complete conviction; and generally^ though not always, imph-ing that there is sufli- 84 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CERTAINTY-^ cient ground for such conviction. It was thence easily transferred metonymically to the truths or events^ respecting which this conviction is rationally entertained. And un- certain (as well as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjectives), follows the same rule. Thus we say, ''It is certain, &c., meaning that we are sure ; whereas the fact may be uncertain and certain to different indivi- duals. From not attending to this, the words uncertain and contingent have been considered as denoting some quality in the things themselves — and chance has been regarded as a real agent." — ^Whatley, Logic^ appendix 1. '' Certainty is truth brought methodically to the human intellect, that is, conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is evident in itself. It is the relation of truth to knowledge, of God to man, of ontology to psychology." Tiberghien, Essai des Connais, Hum.^ p. 35. " In accurate reasoning, the word certain ought never to be used as merely synonymous with necessary. Physical events we call necessary^ because of their depending on fixed causes., not on known causes ; when they depend also on knoivn causes, they may be called certain. The vari- ations of the weather arise from 7iecessary Sind fixed causes., but they are proverbially uncertaia." — Coplestone, Re- mains., 8vo, Lond., 1854, p. 98. When we affirm, without any doubt, the existence or non-existence of a being or phenomenon, the truth or falsity of a proposition, the state in which our mind is we call certainty — and we say of the object of knowledge that it is evident or certain. According to the mode in which it is attained, certainty is immediate by sense and intuition, and mediate by reasoning and demonstration. According to the grounds on which it rests it is called metaphysical., when we firmly adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise. Such as the first principles of natural law, or the difference between right and wrong. Physical., when we adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise, according to the laws of nature, but which may be by miracle ; as, fire will certainly VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 85 CERTAINTY— burn — although it did not burn the Hebrew youths (Dan., chap, iii.) Morale when we adhere to truth which is in accordance with the common order of things, and the common judgment of men — although it may be otherwise without a miracle. Moral certainty may amount to the highest degree of probability^ and to all practical purposes may be as influ- ential as certainty. For it should be observed that pro- bability and certainty are two states of mind, and not two modes of the reality. The reality is one and the same, but our knowledge of it may be probable or certain. Pro- bability has more or less of doubt and admits of degrees. Certainty excludes doubt and admits neither of increase nor diminution. Certainty supposes an object to be known, a mind to know, and the result of a communication or relation being established between them which is knowledge ; and certain knowledge or certainty is the confidence with which the mind reposes in the information of its faculties. Self-con- sciousness reveals with certainty the different states and operations of our own minds. We cannot doubt the reality of what our senses clearly testify. The operations of me- mory may give us certainty as to the past. Eeason reveals to us first truths with intuitive certainty. And by demonstration we ascend with certainty fi:om one truth to another. For to use the words of Thomas Aquinas (De Veritate)^ " Tunc conclusiones^ pro certe^ sciuntur^ quando resolviintur in prin- cipia^ et ideo^ quod aliquod per certitudinem sciatur^ est ex lumine rationis divinitus interius indito^ quo in nobis loquitur Deus^ non autem ab homine exterius docente^ nisi quatenus conclusiones in principia resolvit^ nos docens, ex quo tamen nos certitudinem non acciperemus^ nisi in nobis esset certitude principiorum^ in quce conclusiones resolvuntury " The criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked for any where abroad without our own minds, neither in the height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our knowledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of 86 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CERTAINTY— all theoretical truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, and whatever is clearly conceived, is an entity and a truth ; but that which is false, Divine power itself cannot make it to be clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood is a non-entity, and a clear conception is an entity; and Omnipotence itself cannot make a non-entity to be an entity." — Cudworth, Eternal and Immutable Mor,^ book iv., chap. 5. ''The theories of certitude may be reduced to three classes. The Jirst places the ground of certitude in reason ; the second in authority ; the third in evidence ; including, under that term, both the external manifestations of truth, and the internal principles or laws of thought by which we are determined in forming our judgments in regard to them."— Buchanan, Faith in God^ vol. ii., p. 304. '' De veritatis criterio frustra labor antur quidam : quum non alia reperienda sit prceter ipsam rationis facultatem^ aut menti congenitam intelligendi vim,''"' — Hutcheson, Metaphys.y pars, i., cap. 2. Protagoras and Epicurus in ancient times, and Hobbes and the modem sensationalists, have made sense the measure and ground of certainty, Descartes and his fol- lowers founded it on self-consciousness, Cogito ergo sum^ while others have received as certain only what is homolo- gated by human reason in general. But certainty is not the peculiar characteristic of knowledge furnished by any one faculty, but is the common inheritance of any or all of our intellectual faculties when legitimately exercised within their respective spheres. When so exercised we cannot but accept the result as true and certain. But if we are thus naturally and necessarily determined to accept the knowledge furnished by our faculties, that knowledge, according to Kant, cannot be proved to be absolute, or a knowledge of things in themselves, and as they must appear to all intelligent beings, but is merely relative, or a knowledge of things as they appear to us. Xow, it is true that we cannot, as Kant has expressed it, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 87 CERTAINTY— objectify the subjective. Without rising out of human nature to the possession of a higher, we cannot sit in judg- ment on the faculties of that nature. But in admitting that our knowledge is relative^ we are merely saying it is human. It is according to the measure of a man. It is attained by human faculties, and must be relative, or bear proportion to the faculties by which it is attained. In like manner, the knowledge of angels may be called angelic, but this is not to call it uncertain. We may not know all that can be known of the objects of our knowledge, but still, what we do know, we may know with certainty. Human knowledge may admit of increase without being liable to be contra- dicted or overturned. We come to it by degrees, but the higher degree of knowledge to which we may ultimately attain, does not invalidate the lower degree of knowledge. It rests upon it and rises out of it, and the ground and encouragement of all inquiry is, that there is a truth and reality in things which our faculties are fitted to apprehend. Then' testimony we rejoice to believe. Faith in their trust- worthiness is spontaneous. Doubt concerning it is an after- thought. And scepticism as a creed is self-destructive. He who doubts is certain that he doubts. Omnis^ qui utrum sit Veritas^ dubitat^ in se ipso habet verum^ unde non dabitet. — Augustin, De vera Religione. Etiam qui negate veritatem esse^ concedit veritatem esse; si enira Veritas non est., verum est., veritatem non esse. Thomas Aquin., Sum. TheoL ; Savary, sur la Certitude., 8vo, Paris, 1847. — V. Evidence, Criterion. CHANCE. — Aristotle defines chance to be a '' cause not mani- fest to human reasoning." Ao^g/, /lcsu^ cciricc v] rvxri, ulrMv OS ocu&^a7:iUYi Oiotifoicc. — Phys.^ ii., 4. '' Many things happen, besides what man intends or pmposes ; and also some things happen different from what is aimed at by nature. We cannot call them natural things, or from nature, neither can we say that they are from human intention. They are what we call fortuitous events, iiud the cause which produces them is called chance. But 88 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CHAIVCE— they have all respect to some end intended by nature or by man. So that nothing can be more true than what Aris- totle says {PJiys.^ lib. ii.), that if there were no end intended, there could be no chance. '•'- A man digs a piece of ground, to sow or plant it ; but, in digging, he finds a treasure. This is beside his inten- tion, and therefore it is said to be by chance. ''When a hanging wall falls upon a passenger and crushes him, the destination of nature was only, that the stones of the wall being no longer kept together by the cement, should fall to the ground, according to their natural movement ; so that the crushing " of the man was something beside the purpose of nature, or 'ttx^cc (pvatv.''' — Monboddo, Ancient. Metaphys^ book ii., chap. 20. As to Aristotle's views of fortune and chance^ see Picco- lomineus, Philosoph. de Moribus^ 1583, p. 713. Chance is opposed to law in this sense, viz., that what happens according to law may be predicted, and counted on. But everything has its own law and its proper cause ; and chance merely denotes that we know not the proper cause, nor the law according to which a phenomenon occurs. An event or series of events which seems to be the result neither of a necessity inherent in the nature of things, nor of a plan conceived by intelligence, is said to happen by chance. '' It is not, I say, merely in a pious manner of expression, that the Scripture ascribes every event to the providence of God ; but it is strictly and philosophically true in nature and reason, that there is no such thing as chance or acci- dent ; it being evident that these words do not signify any- thing that is truly an agent or the cause of any event ; but they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and imme- diate cause." — Clarke, vol. i., sermon xcviii. '^ If a die be thrown, we say it depends upon chance what side may turn up ; and, if we draw a prize in a lot- tery, we ascribe our success to chance. We do not, how- ever, mean that these effects were produced by no cause, VOCABULAPcY OF PHILOSOPHY. ^9 CHANCE— but only that we are ignorant of the cause that produced them.** — Arthiu', Discourses, p. 17. CHARITY (ccyxTrr^, as One of the theological i-irtues, is a principle of prevailing love to God, prompting to seek his glory and the good of our fellow-men. Sometimes it is used as synommious with brotherly love. or that piinciple of benevolence which leads us to promote, in all possible ways, the happiness of others. In a more resmcted sense it means almsgiving, or rehev- mg the wants of others by communication of oiu* means and substance. CHASTITY is the duty of restraining and governing the appe- tite of sex. It includes pinity of thought, speech, and behaviom'. Lascivious imaginings, and obscene conversa- tion, as well as incontment conduct, are contrary to the duty of cJiastitij. CHOICE. "The necessity of contiaually choosing one of the two, either to act or to forbear acting, is not inconsistent with or an argiunent against liberty, but is itself the ver}' essence of hberty." — Clarke, Attributes^ prop. 10. For the principle of deliberate choice^ Aristotle thought that the rational and irrational shoidd conciu', producing '•orectic intellect." or •• dianoetic appetite," of which he emphatically says. — ** And this principle is man.'* — Catholic Philosophy, p. 4:6. O f/^i'j r,ov; ov (pccivsroa Kivav ccusv o^s^zcog. — Aristotle. Voluntas est quce quid cum ratione desiderat, — Cicero. ]Mr. Locke says. *• The will signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose." And in another passage he says. •• The word preferring seems best to express the act of vohtion ; yet it does not precisely, for though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it?" — By Jonathan Edwards {Essay on Freedom of WilL sect. 1), choice and volition are completely identified. But, in popular language choosing or preferring may mean, 1, A conclusion of the understanding ; as when I say — I prefer 90 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. / CHOICE— or choose peaches rather than plums ; i. 6., I reckon them a better and safer fruit. 2. A state of inclination or sensibility . as — I prefer or choose plums rather than pears ; that is, I like them better ; or, 3. A determination of will : as — I prefer or choose pears, meaning, that with the offer of other fruits, I take this. It is only in the latter sense that choice and volition are the same. '' Choice or preference^ in the proper sense, is an act of the understanding ; but sometimes it is improperly put for volition, or the determination of the will in things where there is no judgment or preference ; thus, a man who owes me a shilling, lays down three or four equally good, and bids me take which I choose. I take one without any judgment or belief that there is any ground of preference ; this is merely an act of will, that is, a volition." — Corres- pondence of Dr, Reid^ p. 79. CHREMATISTICS (x^vi/^oi^ substance) is the science of wealth, or as it is more commonly called, Political Economy, or that department of social science which treats of the resources of a country, and of the best means of increasing them, and of diffusing them most beneficially among the inhabitants, regarded as individuals, or as con- stituting a community. CIVII.ITY or COUKTEOUSNESS belongs to what has been called the lesser moralities. It springs from benevolence or brotherly love, and manifests itself by kindness and con- sideration in manner and conversation towards others. It is distinguished into natural and conventional. It is opposed to rudeness. Dr. Ferguson says civility avoids giving offence by our conversation or manner. Politeness seeks to please. — Knox, Essays^ No. 95. CliASSlFlCATION {yCkviaLq^ classis^ from x.ol'Kuv., to call, a multitude called together). '' Montesquieu observed very justly, that in their classifi- cation of the citizens, the great legislators of antiquity I VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 91 CliASSIFICATIOlV— made the greatest display of their powers, and even soared above themselves." — Bxirke, On the French Revolution. '' A class consists of several things coming under a com- mon description." — Whately, Logic^ book i., sect. 3. '' The sorting of a multitude of things into parcels, for the sake of knowing them better, and remembering them more easily, is classification. When we attempt to classify a multitude of things, we first observe some respects in which they differ from each other ; for we could not classify things that are entirely alike ; as, for instance, a bushel of peas ; we then separate things that are alike, and bring together things that are similar." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. A methodical arrangement of the divisions and sub-divi- sions of any whole is called classification. Classification is the arrangement of things in genera and species. " In every act of classification^ two steps must be taken ; certain marks are to be selected, the possession of which is to be the* title to admission into the class, and then all the objects that possess them are to be ascertained. When the marks selected are really important and connected closely with the nature and functions of the thing, the classification is said to be natural; where they are such as do not affect the nature of the objects materially, and belong in common to things the most different in their main properties, it is artificial.''^ — Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 2d edit., p. 377. The condition common to both modes of classification^ is to comprehend everything and to suppose nothing. But the rules for a natural classification are more strict than * Abstraction, generalization, and definition, precede classification ; for if we wish to reduce to regularity the ohservations we have made, we must compare them, in order to unite them by their essential resemblances, and express their essence with all possible precision. We might classify a library by dividing the hooks into his- tory and philosop?ii/. History into ancient and modern; ancient, according to the people to whom it referred, and modern into general, particular, and individual, or memoirs. These divisions and subdivisions might be called a classification. 92 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CliASSIFICATION— for an artificial or arbitrary one. We may classify objects arbitrarily in any point of view in which we are pleased to regard them. But a natural classification can only proceed according to the real nature and qualities of the objects. The advantages of classification are to give a convenient form to our acquirements, and to enlarge our knowledge of the relations in which different objects stand to one another. A good classification should — 1st, Rest on one principle or analogous principles. 2d, The principle or principles should be of a constant and permanent character. 3d, It should be natural, that is, even when artificial, it should not be violent or forced. 4th, It should clearly and easily apply to all the objects classified. The principles on which classification rests are these : — 1st, of generalization ; 2d, of specification ; and 3d, of con- tinuity, — q. V. Classification proceeds upon observed resemblances. Generalization rests upon the principle, that the same or similar causes will produce similar effects. COIililOATION OF FACTS in Induction, is a phrase em- ployed by Dr. WheweU to denote the binding together groups of facts by means of some suitable conception. The conception must be capable of explanation or defini- tion, not indeed of adequate definition, since we shall have to alter our description of it fi:'om time to time with the advance of knowledge, but still capable of a precise and clear explanation Conceptions not wholly correct may serve for a time for the colligation of/acts^ and may guide us in researches which shall end in a more exact colligation As soon as facts occur which a conception is inadequate to explain, we unite it or replace it by a new one. — Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 2d edit., p. 353. COMBINATION and CONNECTION of IDFAS are phrases to be found in book ii., chap. 33 of Locke's Essay ^ in which he treats of what is more commonly called association of ideas, — q. v. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 93 co:tibiivations of ideas— Combinations of Ideas. — The phrase association of ideas seems to have been introduced by Locke. It stands as the title to one of the chapters in his Essay on the Human Under- standing. But in the body of the chapter he uses the phrase combination of ideas. These two phrases have reference to the two \iews which may be taken of the train of tlwugJit in the mind. Li both, under ideas are compre- hended all the various modes of consciousness. In treating of the association of ideas, the inquin' is as to the laws which regulate the succession or order according to which one thought follows another. But, it has been observed, that the various modes of consciousness not only succeed in some kind of order, but that they incorporate themselves with one another so as to fonn permanent and almost in- dissoluble combinations. Suppose, that, in eating an apple we had made use of a fruit knife ; a connection comes to be established in our minds between an apple and a fruit knife ; so that when the idea of the one is present, the idea of the other also will appear ' and these two ideas are said to be associated in the way o^ combination. Or. the s-ame kind of connection may be established between two feelings, or between a cognition and a feeling, or between a feeling and a volition, — between any two or more mental movements. In cutting an apple, we may have woimded our finger ; and, afterwards, the sight of an apple will raise a sense or feeling of the woimd. Having eaten of honey, we have afterwards suffered pain ; and, when honey is again pre- sented, there will be a feeling of dislike, and a purpose to abstain from it. The association^ which thus takes place between different mental movements, is more than mere juxta-position of separate things. It amoimts to a perfect combination or fusion. And, as in matter, compoimds have properties which are not manifested by any of the component parts, in their separate state, so it in is mind : the result of various 94 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. COMBINATIONS OF IDEAS— thoughts and feehngs being fused into one whole, may be to produce a new principle, with properties diiFering from the separate influence of each individual thought and feeling. In this way, many secondary and factitious principles of action are formed. COMMON SENSE is a phrase employed to denote that degree of intelligence, sagacity, and prudence, which is common to all men. , '' There is a certain degree of sense which is necessary to our being subjects of law and government, capable of managing our own affairs and answerable for our conduct to others. This is called common sense^ because it is com- mon to all men with whom we can transact business. ''The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting with common prudence in life, makes him capable of discerning what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehendi." — Eeid, Intell. Powers. ''It is by the help of an innate power of distinction that we recognize the differences of things, as it is by a contrary power of composition that we recognize their identities. These powers, in some degree, are common to all minds ; and as they are the basis of our whole knowledge (which is, of necessity, either affirmative or negative), they may be said to constitute what we call common sense,'''' — Harris, Philosoph, Arrange.^ chap. 9. COMMON SENSE (The Philosophy of) is that philosophy which accepts the testimony of our faculties as trustworthy vnthin their respective spheres, and rests all human know- ledge on certain first truths or primitive beliefs, which are the constitutive elements or fundamental forms of our rational nature, and the regulating principles of our conduct. " As every ear not absolutely depraved is able to make some general distinctions of sound ; and, in like manner, every eye, with respect to objects of vision ; and as this general use of these faculties by being diflused through all VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 95 COJttrriON SENSE— individuals, may be called common hearing and common vision, as opposed to those more accurate energies, peculiar only to artists ; so fares it with respect to the intellect. There are truths or universals of so obvious a kind, that every mind or intellect not absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The recognition of these, or at least the abihty to recognize them, is called uovg Kotuog common sense^ as being a sense common to all except lunatics and idiots. ^•Further, as this power is called x,oivog uovg, so the several propositions which are its proper objects, are called '7:(io7' --neiini the act of comprehending or tiilly .::: IcrsT-ir.!: ._ : / :"::iect or idea. For the sense in which i: - ■.:^..: Vy 'V.;- L:,i^-i;--. I". Exi-vsiox. COXCEIVIXG and APPREBLE3fI>I3f€;, or UXDER- !^TAJV1>I>'0. — Iv, r : . jins his essay on Conception by i v::::^. ' ~. : :^-:nding^ and under' ,: , re common words i^r - of the understandinsr t :: ^ ^ - ked by Mr. Mansell ;7 . 1- i^/.iii^i: vi must be distin- ^ V la mere i as irom a mere : ning ol worLii.* Combinations of _ 1 i :5iible, may be expressed m kn- - inteiiig: 7 vie is no difficulty in _ he ineai i:_ : :-r phrase bilinear figure ^ T _ _ is intelligible, though the On the other hand, though all : : . : — :_ rlnation, yet all imagination does i: : ::./ > ; : .r :i :: I: ::;^^^ ; oonception of a horse. I L-iM-: :::: :::_ c ; - :j.: :^^ ::::;_; :f the several attributes constitutiz. : :i:e animal, but I must also be able to c:: :. -ir^c :\,urio\:ii»^$,\ji a representative image, that Ls. : r.lize them. This, however, is not mere ■ :- \ : _' :ively to a concept. I - 5 \ f Tvith the mind's eye. .: : : ■ . ^ : ^ _-: ssing the attributes k1 ^. r " V- - ^ - -i ^y :lic name expressive of them. B i: ; i -i_-:i is possible without ^^^ relation. My iniiid ii::iy recall a sensible impression on whose constinienr feat ivs I have never reflected, and re- latively I ::ever formed a concept or applied a name, i , : ild be possible in a being without any power of distinguishing or comparing his presentations ; ^ These hxwe been confionnded hx Aldrich, and Reid, and others^ H 98 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONCEIVINCJ— it is compatible with our ignorance or forget fulness of tlie existence of any presentations, save the one represented by the image. Conception, in its lowest degree, implies at least a comparison and distinction of this from that. Con- ception proper, thus holds an intermediate place between the intuitive and symbolical knowledge of Leibnitz^ being a yeriiication of the latter by reference to the former." "The words conception^ concept^ notion^ should be limited to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagi- nation, as the thought suggested by a general term. The Leibnitzians call this symbolical^ in contrast to intuitive knowledge. This is the sense in which conceptio and con- ceptus have been usually and correctly employed." — Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works ^ p. 360, note. CONCEPT, A, " Is a collection of attributes, united by a sign, and representmg a possible object of intuition." — ^Mansell, Prolegom^ Log., p. 60. It was used, or conceit as synonymous with it, by the older English writers. See Baynes, Essay on Analytic of Log. Forms., 8vo, Edin., 1850, pp. 5, 6; Sir Will. Hamil- ton, Reid's Works., p. 393. Kant and his followers, while they reserve the word idea to denote the absolute products of the reason, and intuition to denote the particular notions which we derive from the senses, have applied the word concept (begriff) to notions which are general without being absolute. They say they are of three kinds, — 1. Pure concepts^ which borrow nothing from experience ; as the notions of cause, time, and space. 2. Empirical concepts., which are altogether derived from experience ; as the notion of colour or pleasure. 3. Mixed concepts., composed of elements furnished partly by experi- ence, and partly by the pure understanding. See Schmid, Dictionnaire pour servir aux ecrits de Kant., 12mo, Jena, 1798. A concept is clear., when its object, as a whole, can be distinguished from any other ; it is distinct., when its several, constituent parts can be distinguished from each other. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 99 CONCEPT— The merit of first pointing out these characteristics of tht- logical perfection of thought is ascribed to Leibnitz. See Meditationes de Cognitione^ Veritate et Ideis. CONCEPT, CONCEPTION (conceptus^ conceptio = to notio or notion). — '' Conception consists in a conscious act of the understanding, bringing any given object or impression into the same class with any number of other objects or impres- sions, by means of some character or characters common to them all. Concipimus^ idest^ capimus hoc cum illo — v/e take hold of both at once, we comprehend a thing, when we have learnt to comprise it in a known class." — Coleridge, Church and State^ Prelimin. Kem.. p. 4. '^ Conception is the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will. It is distinguished from sensation and perception^ produced by an object pre- sent to the senses : and from imagination^ which is the joining together of ideas in new ways ; it is distinguished from memory^ by not having the feeling of past time con- nected with the idea." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. According to IMr. Stewart {Elements of Philosoph. of Hum. Mind^ vol. i., chap. 3), conception is "that faculty, the business of which is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived," or that faculty, whose province it is "to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations or of the objects of sense which we have formerly perceived." But what Mr. Stewart would thus assign to the faculty of conception belongs to imagination in its reproductive frmction. Hence, Sir Will. Hamilton has said {Discussions^ p. 276), "Mr. Stewart has bestowed on the reproductive imaguiation the term conception ; happily, we do not think ; as both in gram- matical propriety and by the older and correcter usage of philosophers, this term (or rather the product of this ope- ration, concept) is convertible with general notion^ or more correctly, notion simply, and in this sense is admu-ably ren- dered by the Begriff (which is, grasped up) of the Germans." "A concept or notion" is defined to be "the cognition 100 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONCEPT— or idea of the general attribute or attributes in whicli a plurality of objects coincide." This involves the percep- tion of a number of objects, the comparing of them, the recognition of their points of similarity, and their subjective union by this common attribute. See Baynes, Essay on the Analytic of Logical Forms^ 8vo, Edin., 1853, pp. 5, 6. CONCEPTION sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, sometimes the thing conceived, which is the object of that act. — Reid, WorJcs^ p. 393. This last should be called concept^ which was a term in use with the old English philosophers. CONCEPTION and IMAGINATION. — ''Properly and strictly to conceive is an act more purely intellectual than imagining^ proceedmg from a faculty superior to those of sense and fancy, or imagination, which are limited to corporeal things, and those determined^ as all particulars must be, to this or that, place, time, manner, &c. When as that higher power in man, which we may call the mind^ can form apprehensions of what is not material (viz., of spirits and the affections of bodies which fall not under sense), and also can frame general ideas or notions, or consider of things in a general way without attending to their par- ticular limited circumstances, as when we think of length in a road, without observing its determinate measure." — Oldfield, Essay on Eeason^ p. 11. "It is one thing to imagine and another thing to con- j ceive. For do we conceive anything more clearly than our thought when we think? And yet it is impossible to m- I agine a thought, or to paint any image of it in the brain." \ — Port Roy. Logic, part 1, chap. 1. '' The distinction between conception and imagination is real, though it be too often overlooked and the words taken to be synonymous. I can conceive a thing that is impossible, but 1 cannot distinctly imagine a thing that is impossible. I can conceive a proposition or a demonstra- tion, but I cannot imagine either. I can conceive under- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 101 CONCEPTION— standing and will, virtue and vice, and other attributes of mind, but I cannot imagine them. In like manner, I can distinctly conceive universals, but I cannot imagine them." — Eeid. Imagination has to do only with objects of sense, con- ception with objects of pure thought. The things which we imagine are represented by the mind as individuals, as some particular man, or some particular horse. The things of which we conceive are such as may be denoted by general terms, as man, horse. ^'The notions" (or conceptions) which the "mind forms from things offered to it, are either of single objects, as of * this pain, that man, Westminster Abbey ;' or of many objects taken together, as ' pain, man, abbey.' " Notions of single objects are called intuitions^ as being such as the mind receives when it simply attends to or inspects (in- tuetur) the object. Notions formed from several objects are called conceptions^ as being formed by the power which the mind has of taking things together (concipere^ i. e., caper e hoc cum illo). " On inspecting two or more objects of the same class, we begin to compare them with one another, and with those which are already reposited in our memory ; and we discover that they have some points of resemblance. All the houses, for example, which come in our way, however they may differ in height, length, position, convenience, duration, have some common points ; they are all covered buildings, and fit for the habitation of men. By attending to these points only, and abstracting them from all the rest, we arrive at a general notion of a house, that it is a covered building fit for human habitation ; and to this notion we attach a particular name, house, to remind us of the process we have gone through, and to record its results for use. The general notion so formed we call a concep- tion; the common points we observed in the various ob- jects are called marks or notes ; and the process of observ- ing them and forming one entire notion from them is 102 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONCEPTION— termed abstraction,'^ — Thomson, Outline of Laws of TJiougJit, p. 105. CONCEPTION and Il>EA. — By conception is meant the simple view we have of the objects which are presented to our mind ; as when, for instance, we think of the sun^ the earthy a tree^ sl circle^ a square^ thought^ heing^ without forming any determinate judgment concerning them ; and the form through which we consider these things is called an idea.^^ — Port Roy. Logic, " The having an idea of a thing is, in common lan- guage, used in the same sense (as conceiving)^ chiefly, I think," says Dr. Reid, "since Mr. Locke's time." '' A conception is something derived from observation ; not so ideas^ which meet with nothing exactly answering to them within the range of our experience. Thus ideas are a priori^ conceptions are a posteriori ; and it is only by means of the former that the latter are really possible. For the bare fact, taken by itself, falls short of the conception which may be described as the synthesis of the fact and the idea. Thus we have an idea of the universe, under which its different phenomena fall into place, and from which they take their meaning ; we have an idea of God as creator, from which we derive the power of conceiving that the im- pressions produced upon our minds, through the senses, result from really existing things ; we have an idea of the soul, which enables us to realize our own personal identity, by suggesting that a feeling, conceiving, thinking subject, exists as a substratum of every sensation, conception^ thought." — Chretien, Essay on Log, Meth,^ p. 137. ''Every conceptions^'' said Coleridge (Notes on English Divines^ 12mo, 1853, vol. i., p. 27), ''has its sole reality in its being referable to a thing or class of things, of which, or of the common characters of which, it is a reflection. An idea is a power, ^vyccf/,ig i/os^oc^ which constitutes its own reality, and is, in order of thought, necessarily ante- cedent to the things in which it is more or less adequately realized, while a conception is as necessarily posterior." VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 103 CONCEPTION— Conception is used to signify — 1. The power or faculty of conceiving, as when Mr. Stewart says, *' Under the article of conception I shall confine mysehf to that faculty whose province it is to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations, or of the objects of sense that we have formerly perceived." 2. The act or operation of this power or faculty, " Con- ception^'''' says Sir John Stoddart {Univ. Gram. mEncyclop. Metropol.^^ '' which is derived from con and capw, expresses the action by which I take up together a portion of our sen- sations, as it were water, in some vessel adapted to contain a certain quantity." '' Conception is the act by which we comprehend by means of a general notion, as distinguished both from the perception of a present^ and the imagination of an absent individual.^'' — North Brit. Rev.., Xo. 27, p. 45. 3. The result of the operation of this power or faculty ; as when Dr. 'Whewell says {Pref. to the Philosoph. of the Induct. Sciences^ p. 13), '' our conceptions are that, in the mind, which we denote by our general terms, as a triangle, a square number, a force." This last signification, however, is more correctly and conveniently given by the word concept^ i. e., conceptum^ or id quod conceptum est. CONCEPTUAIiISM is a doctrine in some sense intermediate between realism and nominalism., q. v. Have genera and species a real independent existence ? The realist answers that they exist independently ; thai: besides individual objects and the general notion from them in the mind there exist certain ideas ^ the pattern after which the single objects are fashioned ; and that the general notion m our mind is the counterpart of the idea without it. The nominalist says that nothing exists but things, and names of things ; and that universals are mere names, y7«/;/6" venti. The conceptualists assign to universals an existence which may be called logical or psychological, that is, independent of single objects, but dependent upon the mind of tlie 101 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONCEPTUAMSM— thinking subject, in whicli they are as notions or concep- tions. — Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought^ 2d edit., p^ 112. Dr. Brown, while his views approach those of the concep- tualists^ would prefer to call himself a relationalist. — See Physiol, of Hum. Mind^ p. 295. Cousin, Introd. Aux Ouvrages Inedits d''Ahelard^ 4t07 Par., 1836, p. 181. Reid, Intellect. Povjers^ essay v., chap. 6, with Sir W. Hamilton^'s note, p. 412. CONCliUSION. — ^When something is simply affirmed to be true, it is called a proposition ; after it has been found to be true, by several reasons or arguments, it is called a con- clusion. ''Sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want," this is a proposition; after all the arguments have been mentioned which prove this to be true, we say, '•'• there- fore sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want ; " this is now the conclusion. — Taylor, Elements of Thought. That proposition which is inferred from the premises of an argument is called the conclusion. — Whately, Logic ^ h, ii., ch. 3, sect. 1. CONCRETE (con-crescere^ to grow together), is opposed to abstract. A concrete notion of an object is the notion of an object as possessed of all its qualities, and such as it exists in nature. An abstract notion may be the notion of any particular quality viewed separately from its object. The notion of a tree as consisting of trunk, branches, and leaves, as it naturally exists, is a concrete notion. The notion of the trunk regarded separately, or of the leaves, or of the colour of the leaves, is an abstract notion. A concrete notion is the notion of an object as it exists in nature, invested with all its qualities. An abstract notion, on the contrary, is the notion of some quahty or attribute separated from the object to which it belongs, and deprived of all the specialties with which experience invests it ; or it may be the notion of a sub- stance stripped of all its qualities. In this way concrete VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 105 CONCKETE— comes to be synonymous with particular^ and abstract with general. The names of classes are abstract, those of individual.'? concrete; and from concrete adjectives are made abstract substantives. — V. Abstract. A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing, as this table. An abstract name is a name which stands for an attri- bute of a thing ; as, This table is square. — Mill, Logic. CONDITION — {Conditio., fere sumitur pro qualitate qua quid condi^ id est fieri. — Yossius. Or it may be from con or co-dare., i. e., something given or going along with a cause). A condition is that which is pre-requisite in order that something may be, and especially in order that a cause may operate. A condition does not operate, but, by removing some impediment, as opening the eyes to see ; or by apply- ing one's strength in conjunction with another, when two men are required to Hft or carry a weight, it being a condi- tion of their doing so that their strength be exerted at the same time. A condition is prior to the production of an effect ; but it does not produce it. It is fire that burns ; but before it burns it is a condition that there be an ap- proximation of the fire to the fuel, or the matter that is burned. Where there is no wood the fire goeth out. The cause of burning is the element of fire, fuel is a con-cause, and the condition is the approximation of the one to the other. The impression on the wax is the effect — the seal is the cause ; the pressure of the one substance upon the other, and the softness or fluidity of the wax are conditions. '' By a condition,^'' says Mr. Karslake (Aids to Logic. vol. ii., p. 43), '4s meant something more negative, whereas a cause is regarded as something more positive. We seem to think of a condition rather as that whose absence would have prevented a thing from taking place ; of a cause, rather as that whose presence produced it. Thus we apply, per- haps, the word cause rather to that between which and the result we can see a more immediate connection. If so, then 106 VOCABULARY OF nilLOSOPHY. CONOTTION— in this way, also, every cause will be a condition^ or ante- cedent, but not every antecedent will be a cause. The fact of a city being built of wood will be a condition of its being burnt down : some inflammable material having caught fire will be the cause." A conditional proposition is one which asserts the depen- dence of one categorical proposition on another ; as. If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they are entitled to respect. A conditional syllogism is one in which the reasoning de- pends on such a proposition. — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 4, sects. 3 and 6. CONJUOATE. — Words of the same stock or kindred, as wise^ to he wise^ wisely^ are called conjugate or paronymous words. CONNOTATlVJE, A, or attributive term is one which, when applied to some object, is such as to imply in its significa- tion some attribute belonging to that object. It connotes^ i. e., notes along with the object (or implies), something considered as inherent therein; as "The capital of France," "The founder of Home." The founding of Rome is, by that appellation, attributed to the person to whom it is applied. A term which merely c?enotes an object, without implying any attribute of that object, is called absolute or non-conno- tative ; as Paris, Romulus. The last terms denote respec- tively the same objects as the former, but do not, like them, connote (imply in their signification) any attribute of those individuals. — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 5., sect. 1. CONSANOUIJVITY (co-sanguis^ of the same blood) is defined to be, vinculum personarum ah eodem stipite descendentium^ the relation of persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor. It is either lineal or collateral. Lineal consanguinity is that which subsists between persons of whom one is descended in a direct line from the other ; as son, grandson, great grandson, &c. Collateral relations agree with the lineal in this, that they descend from the same stock or ancestor ; but differ in this, that they do not descend the one from the other. John has two sons, who VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 107 rOlVSAlVOUIIVITY— have each a numerous issue ; both these issues are linea Uy descended from John, or their common ancestor ; and the}' are collateral kinsmen to each other, because all descended from this common ancestor, and all have a portion of his blood in their veins, which denominates them consan- guineous. — V. Affinity. COIVSCIENCE (con-scientia^ joint or double knowledge) means knowledge of conduct in reference to the law of right and wrong. According to some, conscience takes cognizance merely of our own conduct. Thus Bishop Butler has said (sermon i., On Hum, Nature): ''The principle in man by which he approves or disapproves of his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience — for this is the strict sense of the word, though it is sometimes used so as to take in more." Dr. Rush (Inquiry into the Influence of Physical Causes upon the Moral Faculty, p. 3), has said : '' The moral faculty exercises itself upon the actions of others. It ap- proves, even in books, of the virtues of a Trajan, and disapproves of the vices of a Marius, while conscience con- fines its operations to our own actions." ''The word ^consciences does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agTceably or contrary to its directions." — Smith, Theory of Mor, Sent.^ pt. 7, sect. 3. " Conscience coincides exactly with the moral facult}', with this difference only, that the former refers to om^ own conduct alone, whereas the latter is meant to express also the power by which we approve or disapprove of the conduct of others." — Stewart, Active and Moral Powers^ pt. 1, ch. 2. — See also PaAiie, Elements of Mor. Science^ 1845, p. 283. By these writers conscience is represented as being the function of the moral faciJty in reference to oiu' own con- duct, and as giving us a consciousness of self-approbatitni or of self-condemnation. 108 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONSCIENCE— By a further limitation of the term, conscience has been regarded by some as merely retrospective in its exercise ; and by a still further limitation as only, or chiefly, punitive in its exercise, and implying the consciousness of our having acted wrong. But of late years, and by the best writers, the term conscience^ and the phrases moral faculty, moral judgment, faculty of moral perception, moral sense, susceptibility of moral emotion, have all been applied to that faculty, or combination of faculties, by which we have ideas of right and wrong in reference to actions, and correspondent feel- ings of approbation and disapprobation. This faculty, or combination of faculties, is called into exercise not merely in reference to our own conduct, but also in reference to the conduct of others. It is not only reflective but pro- spective in its operations. It is antecedent as well as subse- quent to action in its exercise ; and is occupied de faciendo as well as de facto. — See B;eid, Active Powers^ essay iii., pt. 3, ch. 8. In short, conscience constitutes itself a witness of the past and of the future, and judges of actions reported as if pre- sent when they were actually done. It takes cognizance not merely of the individual man, but of human nature, and pronounces concerning actions as right or wrong not merely in reference to one person, or one time, or one place, but absolutely and universally. With reference to their views as to the nature of conscience and the constitution of the moral faculty, modern philo- sophers may be arranged in two great schools or sects. The diflerence between them rests on the prominence and precedence which they assign to reason and to feehng in the exercise of the moral faculty ; and their respective theories may be distinctively designated the intellectual theory and the sentimental theory. A brief view of the principal arguments in support of each may be found in Hume's In- quiry concerning the Principles of Morals^ sect. 5. CONSCIOUSNESS (con-scire^ con-scientia^ joint knowledge, a VOCAEUL-^.Y OF PHILOSOPHY. 109 roNSCiorsNESs— knowledge of one thing in connection or relation with another). Sir William Hamilton has remarked (Discussions^ p. 110, note,) that " the Greek has no word for conscious7i€ss,^' imd that '-TertnllLan is the only ancient vi-ho uses the word conscientia in a psychological sense, corresponding with our consciousness,''^ — Reicfs Worlds, p. 775. The meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by means of the word opposed to it. Unconsciousness, that is, the want or absence of consciousness, denotes the suspen- sion of all our faculties. Consciousness, then, is the state in which we are when all or any of oiu* faculties are in exercise. It is the condition or accompaniment of every mental operation. The Scholastic definition was, perceptio qua mens de presenti suo statu admonetur. " Consciousness is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts ot causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is the common, universal, and spontaneous consciousntss.'^ . . . -'By consc^iousness more nicely and accm*ately defined. we mean the power and act of self-recognition : not if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions : but the mind knowing itself in these.'* — Tappan, Doctrine of the Will hy an Appeal to Consciousness, chap. 2, sect 1. ••Sensation, remembrance, simple apprehension, and con- ception, with ever}' other actiuil energy- or passion of the mind, is accompanied by an inward feeling or perception of that energy- or passion, and that feeling or perception is consciousness." — Encyclop. Brit., art. Metaphysics. ^Ir. Locke has said (Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., ch. 1), ••It is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that an}-thing thinks without being conscious of it. or perceivmg that it does so. 110 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. m\ CONSCIOUSNESS— Si They who talk in this way, may, with as much reason, say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks !" ''We not only feel^ but we know that we feel; we not only act^ but we know that we act ; we not only think^ but we know that we think ; to think, without knowing that we think, is as if we should not think ; and the peculiar quality, the fundamental attribute of thought, is to have a conscious- ness of itself. Consciousness is this interior light which illuminates everji^hing that takes place in the soul ; conscious- ness is the accompaniment of all our faculties ; and is, so to speak, their echo."— Cousin, ffis^. of Mod. Philosophy vol. i., pp. 274-5. On consciousness as the necessary form of thought, see lecture v. of the same volume. That consciousness is not a particular faculty of the mind, but the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental form of all the modes of our thinking activity, and not a special mode of that activity, is strenuously maintained by Amadee Jacques, in the Manuel de Philosophies Partie Psycho- logique ; and also by two American writers, Mr. Bowen in his Critical Essays^ p. 131, and Mr. Tappan. This view is in accordance with the saying of Aristotle, ovx, iajiv AioHoig octaQnaiag — there is not a feeling of a feeling. And that of the schoolmen — " Non sentimus^ nisi sentiamus nos sentire — non intelligimus nisi intelligamus nos intelligerey " No man,'" said Dr. Reid, ''can perceive an object without being con- scious that he perceives it. No man can think without being conscious that he thinks. " And as on the one hand we cannot think or feel without being conscious, so on the other hand we cannot be conscious without thinking or feeling. This would be, if possible, to be conscious of nothing, to have a con- sciousness vfWioh was no consciousness, or consciousness Yrith- out an object. " Annihilate the object of any mental operation and you annihilate the operation ; annihilate the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. Ill i CONSCIOUSNESS— ,! consciousness of the object, and you anniliilate the ope- ! ration." This yiew of consciousness^ as the common condition 11 under which all our faculties are brought into operation, or I of considering these faculties and their operations as so I many modifications of consciousness^ has of late been gene- I rally adopted ; so much so that psychology, or the science li of mind, has been denominated an inquiry into the facts of consciousness. All that we can truly learn of mind must be learned by attending to the various ways in which it becomes conscious. None of the phenomena of conscious- ness can be called in question. They may be more or less clear ; more or less complete ; but they either are or are not. In the Diet, des Sciences PMlosoph.^ art. Conscience^ it is maintained that consciousness is a separate faculty, having self^ or the ego^ for its object. Instead of regarding consciousness as the common con- dition or accompaniment of every mental operation, E-oyer Collard among the French, and Reid and Stewart among the Scotch philosophers, have been represented as holding the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty, having for its objects the operations of our other faculties. " Consciousness ^^^ says Dr. Reid (Jntell. Pow.^ essay i., chap. 1 ; see also essay vL, chap. 5), "is a word used by phil- osophers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe that consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done, in popular discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be observed that consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, ' I am conscious of the table which is before me.' I perceive it, I see it, but do not say I am conscious of it. As that con- 112 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONSCIOUSNESS— sciousness by which we have a knowledge of the operations of onr own minds, is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects, and as these different powers have different names in our language, and, I believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction and never confound things so different in their nature." In this passage Dr. Eeid speaks of consciousness properly so called as that consciousness which is distinct from the consciousness by which we perceive external objects — as if perception was another kind or mode of consciousness. Whether all his language be quite consis- tent with the opinion that all our faculties are just so many different modes of our becoming conscious, may be doubted. But there is no doubt that by consciousness he meant especially attention to the operations of our own minds, or reflection; while by observation he meant attention to external things. This language has been interpreted as favourable to the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty. Yet he has not distinctly separated it from reflec- tion except by sajdng that consciousness accompanies all the operations of mind. Now reflection does not. It is a voluntary act — an energetic attention to the facts of consciousness. But consciousness may be either spontaneous or reflective. '•'• This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of all its present operations." — Outlines of Mor. Pliilosoph.^ part 1, sect. 1. Mr. Stewart, in his Outlines,, has enumerated consciousness as one of our intellectual powers, co-ordinate with percep- tion, memory, judgment, &c. But consciousness is not confined to the operation of the intellectual powers. It accompanies the development of the feelings and the de- terminations of the will. And the opinion that conscious- ness is a separate faculty is not only founded on a false analysis, but an opinion, which if prosecuted to its results would overturn the doctrine of immediate knowledge in VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 113 CONSCIOUSNESS— perception — a doctrine which Stewart and Eeid upheld as the true and only barrier against the scepticism of Hume. '^ Once admit that, after I have perceived an object, I need another power termed consciousness^ by which I become cognizant of the perception, and by the medium of which the knowledge involved in perception is made clear to the thinking self, and the plea of common sense against scep- ticism is cut off. .... I am conscious of self and of notself; my knowledge of both in the act of percep- tion is equally direct and immediate. On the other hand, to make consciousness a peculiar faculty, by which we are simply cognizant of our own mental operations, is virtually to deny the immediatecy of our knowledge of an external world." — Morell, Hist, of Spec. Pliilosoi^li.., vol. ii., p. 13. See Fearn, Essay on Consciousness, CONSENT. — *' Believing in the prophets and evangelists with a calm and settled faith, with that consent of the will, and heart, and understanding, which constitutes religious behef, I find in them the clear annunciation of the kingdom of God upon earth." — Southey, Progress of Society ., colloquy 2, — F. Assent. Assent is the consequence of a conviction of the under- standing. Consent arises from the state of the disposition and the will. The one accepts what is true; the other embraces it as true and good, and worthy of all accepta- tion. CONSENT (Argument from UniTersal). — F. AUTHORITY. Eeid applies this argument to establish first prmciples. — Intell. Powers., essay i., chap. 2. He uses it against the views of Berkeley and Hume. — Essay ii., chap. 19. Cicero {De Officiis., lib. i., cap. 41,) says. Major enim jxtrs eofere deferri solet quo a natura deducitur. It is used to prove the existence of the gods. Be quo autem omnium natura eonsentit.) id verum esse necesse est. Esse igitur deos^ con- Jitendum est. {De Nat. Deorum^ lib. i., cap. 17,) Cottn argues against it, cap. 23. The argument is also used (Tk 114 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONSENT— Nat. Deor.., lib. ii., 2 ; and TuscuL Qucest., lib. i., 18), when we read, Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium lex naturce putanda est. Bacon is against this argument in preface to Instauratio Magna^ and also Aphorism 77, and in Cogitata et Visa. "These things are to be regarded as first truths., the credit of which is not derived from other truths, but is in- herent in themselves. As for jjrohable truths, they are such as are admitted by all men, or by the generality of men, or by wise men ; and among these last, either by all the wise, or by the generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the highest authority."-— Aristotle, Topic. ^ 1, 1. ''What seems true to most wise men is very probable ; what most men, both wise and unwise, assent to, doth still more resemble truth ; but what men generally consent in hath the highest probability, and approaches demonstra- tion so near, that it may pass for ridiculous arrogance, or for intolerable obstinacy and perverseness to deny it. A man may assume what seems true to the wise, if it do not contradict the common opinion of mankind." — Aristotle, Topic. ^ i., 8, or 10. Multum dare solemus prsesumptioni omnium hominum, Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri. —Seneca, Epist.^ evil, a cxvii. €ONSEC|UENT. — V. ANTECEDENT, NECESSITY. CONSllilENCE of INSJUCTIONS takes place when an in- duction obtained from one class of facts coincides with an induction obtained from a different class. This consilience is a test of the truth of the theory in which it occurs. — Whewell, Philosoph. Induct. Sciences^ aphorism 14. Paley's Horrn Paulince^ which consists of gathering to- gether undesigned coincidences, is an example of the consilience of inductions. The law of gravitation may be proved by a consilience of inductions. CONTEmPliATION.-— The next faculty of the mind (i. e., to VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 115 CONTE:MPr.ATION— perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call retention^ or the keeping of these simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways ; first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view, which is called contemplation. — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.., book ii., chap. 10. When an object of sense or thought has attracted our admiration or love we dwell upon it ; not so much to know it better, as to enjoy it more and longer. This is contem- plation., and differs from reflection. The latter seeks know- ledge, and our intellect is active. In the former, we think we have found the knowledge which reflection seeks, and luxmiate in the enjoyment of it. Mystics have exaggerated the benefits of contemplation., and have directed it exclu- sively to God, and to the cherishing of love to Him. CONTINENCE {continere., to restrain), is the virtue which con- sists in governing the appetite of sex. It is most usually applied to men, as chastity is to women. Chastity may be the result of natural disposition or temperament — continence carries with it the idea of struggle and victory. CONTINCJ-ENT (con-tingere., to touch two points). — '' Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth that some agents should ^. work without deliberation (which his lordship calls neces- ■ sary agentsj, and some agents with deliberation (and those ■ both he and I call free agents), and that some agents ^ should work, and we know not how (and their effects we call contingents^.''^ — Hobbes, Liberty and Necessity. '' When any event takes place which seems to us to have no cause, why it shovdd happen in one way, rather than another, it is called a contingent event ; as, for example, the falling of a leaf on a certain spot., or the turning up of any : particular number when the dice are thrown." — Ta}ior. Elements of Thought. k The contingent is that which does not exist necessarily, I and which we can think as non-existing without contradic- ;' tion. Everything which had a beginning, or will have an 116 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONTING-ENT— end, or which changes, is contingent. The necessary^ on the contrary, is that of which we cannot conceive as non-exist- ing — that which has always been, which will always be, and which does not change its manner of being. '•'- Contingent is that which does not happen constantly and regularly. Of this kind ancient philosophy has distin- guished three different opinions ; for either the event hap- pens more frequently one way than another, and then it is said to be 's-r/ ro 'koKv ; of this kind are the regular pro- ductions of nature, and the ordinary actions of men. Or it happens more rarely, such as the birth of monsters, or other extraordinary productions of nature, and many accidents that happen to man. Or, lastly, it is betwixt the two, and happens as often the one way as the other ; or, as they ex- press it in Greek, 'o9rgT£^ sry;^*?. Of this kind are some things in nature, such as the birth of a male or female child ; a good or bad day in some climates of the earth ; and many things among men, such as good or bad luck at play. All these last-mentioned events are in reality as necessary as the falling of heavy bodies, &c. But as they do not happen constantly and uniformly, and as we cannot account for their happening sometimes one way and sometimes another, we say they are contingent^'' — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ vol. i., p. 295. The contingent is known empirically — the necessary by the reason. There are but two modes of being, the necessary and the contingent. But the contingent has degrees : 1. Simple facts which appear and disappear, or, in the lan- guage of the schools, accidents. 2. Qualities or properties inherent in a substance, which constitute its specific char- acter. 3. The substance itself considered as a particular and finite existence. A thing may be contingent in three ways : — 1. (Equaliter^ when the thing or its opposite may equally be, from the determination of a free will. 2. Utplurimum^ as when a man is born with five digits, thouo'h sometimes with more or less. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 117 COXTIXGEXT— 3. Baro, as Tvhen it happens seldom; physically^ as when a tile falls on a man's head : or voluntarily^ as when a man cleaving wood womids the bystander. — See Chauvin, Lexicon Philosoph.. An event, the opposite of which is possible^ is contingent. An event, the opposite of which is impossihle^ is necessary. An event is impossihle when the opposite of it is nece^.sar?/. An event is possible when the opposite of it is contingent. CONTIA'FITY (l^aw of). — "The supposition of bodies /^er- fectly hard, having been shown to be inconsistent with two of the leading doctrines of Leibnitz, tTtat of the constant main- tenance of the same quantity of force in the imiverse, and that of the proportionality of forces to the squares of the velocities — he found himself reduced to the necessity of maintaining that all changes are produced by insensible gradations, so as to render it impossible for a body to have its state changed from motion to rest, or from rest to motion, without passing through all the intermediate states of velocity. From this assumption he argued with much ingenuity, that the existence of atoms, or of perfectly hard bodies, is impossible : because, if two of them should meet -^-ith equal and opposite motions, they would necessarily stop at once, in violation of the law of continuity." — Stewart, Dissert.^ part 2, p. 275. "I speak." said John Bemouilli (D/.^coz^/'^^e on Motion^ 1727). •• of that immovable and perpetual order established since the creation of the universe, which may be called the lav: of continuity ^ in virtue of which ever^-thing that is done, is done by degrees infinitely small. It seems to be the dictate of good sense that no change is made per sal- turn: natura non operatur per saltum ; and nothing can pass from one extreme to another, without passing through aU the mtermediate degrees." The law of continuity, though originally applied to con- tinuity of motion, was extended by Charles Bonnet to con- tinuity of being. He held that all the various beings which compose the universe, fonn a scale descending downwards 118 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONTINUITY— without any cliasm or saltus^ from the Deity to the siniplest forms of unorganized matter. A similar view had been held by Locke and others {Spectator^ N'o. 519). The re- searches of Cuvier have shown that it can only be held with limitations and exceptions, even when confined to the comparative anatomy of animals. — F. Association. CONTRACT (con-traliere^ to draw together). — A contract is an agreement or pact in which one party comes under ob- ligation to do one thing, and the other party to do some other thing. Paley calls it a mutual promise. Contracts originate in the insufficiency of man to supply all his needs. One wants what another has abundance of and to spare ; while that other may want something which his neighbour has. They are drawn more closely together by their individual insufficiency, and they enter into an agreement each to give what the other needs or desires. Contracts being so necessary and important for the wel- fare of society, the framing and fulfilling of them have in all countries been made the object of positive law. Viewed ethically, the obligation to fulfil them is the same with that to fulfil a promise. The consideration of contracts^ and of the various kinds and conditions of them belongs to Juris- prudence. While all contracts are pacts^ all pacts are not contracts. In the Roman law, a distinction was taken between pacts or agTeements entered into without any cause or consider- ation antecedent, present or future, and pacts which were entered into for a cause or consideration, that is, containing a synallagraa or bargain, or as it may be popularly ex- pressed, a quid pro quo — in which one party came under obligation to give or do something, on account of some- thing being done or given by the other party. Agree- ments of the latter kind were properly contracts^ while those of the former were called hare jjacts, A pactum nudum^ or hare pact^ was so called because it was not clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage, and was not a valid agreement in the eye of the Roman law. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 119 CONTRACT— Nuda pactio ohligationem non facit. It is the same in the English law, in which a contract is defined : " An agree- ment of two or more persons, upon sufficient consideration^ to do or not to do a particular thing," — and the consider- ation is necessary to the validity of the contract, CONTKAl>lCTlON, l»rinciple of (contra dicere^ to speak against). — It is usually expressed thus : A thing cannot be and not be at the same time, or a thing must either be or not be, or the same attribute cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the same subject. — Pierron and Zevost, Introd. a la Metapliys. d Aristote^ 2 torn. Paris, 1840. — V. Identity. Aristotle laid down this principle as the basis of all Logic and of all Metaphysic. Leibnitz thought it insufficient as the basis of all truth and reasoning, and added the prmciple of the sufficient reason^ q, v. Kant thought this principle good only for those judgments of which the attribute is the consequence of the subject, or, as he called them, analytic judgments ; as when we say, all body has extension. The idea of extension being enclosed in that of body, it is a sufficient warrant of the truth of such a judgment, that it implies no contradiction. But in synthetic judgments, we rest either on a belief of the reason or the testunony of experience, according as they are a priori or a posteriori. — Aristot., Metapliys.^ lib. iii., cap. 3 ; lib. ix., cap. 7 ; lib. x., cap, 5. Kant, Critique de la Raison Pure. '' The principle of sufficient reason deals with facts, and the principle of contradiction with indemonstrable truths. Apparently these two principles are distmct when con- sidered in reference to two different species of thought, yet the one is derived from the other. The necessity of a sufficient reason for every thing which exists, is itself a necessary or fundamental truth in all reasonings, because the negative of it cannot be conceived. Ultimately, there- fore, the principle of contradiction is the sole and common 120 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CONTRADICTION— root from wMch all scientific truth springs." — Blakey, Hist. of Logic, p. 249. '''• The dictum de omni et nullo is the same with the principle of contradiction. If the propositions A is B, and A is not B, could stand together, there could be no reasoning. Hence, all sceptics attacked it in various ways. Heraclitus said all things are in a perpetual flux, so that nothing is in the same state for two successive moments.* From this it would follow, that neither of two contradictories could be predicated with truth of any subject. Anaxagoras held that the ultimate elements could never be entirely separ- ated ; that nothing in nature was pure or simple, or ex- cluded opposite elements, but received its denomination according to the predominance of particular ingredients. It follows that neither of two contradictories can be predi- cated absolutely of any subject. He maintained also, that whatever seems is true, an assertion similar to that of Pro- tagoras, who taught that man is the measure of reality, which meant that opinion is the criterion of truth ; and, as the same objects produce different sensations and opinions in different men, it was inferred that truth may be self-con- tradictory.'''' — Poste, Trans, of Poster. AnalyU^ appendix A. CONTRARIES. — Aristotle {De Ariima^ lib. iii., cap. 3), says — " There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same science, with respect to things contrary." This, by Themistius, in his Paraplirase^ is thus illustrated: — " Of things contrary there is one science and one ignorance. For thus, he who knows good to be something beneficial, knows evil at the same time to be something pernicious ; and he who is deceived with respect to one of these, is de- ceived also with respect to the other." '' There is an essential difference between opposite and contrary. Opposite powers are always of the same kind, and tend to union either by equipoise or by a common product. Thus the + and the — poles of the magnet, thus * To avoid the consequences of the doctrine of Heraclitus, Plato, who came from this school, maintained the existence of immutable Ideas. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 121 CONTR AMIE S— positive and negative electricity, are opposites. Sweet and sour are opposites; sweet and litter are contraries. The feminine character is opposed to the masculine; but the effeminate is its contrary.'''' — Coleridge, Church and State., note, p. 18. We should say opposite sides of the street ; not contrary. ''Among the ancient philosophers, some held the prin- ciples of things to be hot and cold ; others, to be moist and dry; others, to be dense and rare; others, in a more ab- stracted way, to be excess and defect ; even and odd ; friendship and strife. Among the moderns, we know the stress laid on action and re- action ; attraction and repul- sion ; expansion and condensation ; centripetal and centri- fugal ; to which may be added these two principles, held by many ancients as well as moderns, the principles of atoms and a void, which two stand opposed nearly as heing and non-being.^'' — Harris, Philosoph. Arrange.^ chap. iii. Aristotle generally enumerates four kinds of opposition, viz.: contradiction^' otuTiCpoiffig; cojitrariety^ rxvotunoc'^ rela- tion^ TO, 'TT^og Ti ; privation and habit^ arsQYiaig xoct s^ig, Aristotle defines contrary., " that which in the same genus differs most ;" as in colour, white and black ; in sensation, pleasure and pain ; in morals, good and evil. Contraries never co-exist, but they may succeed in the same subject. They are of two kinds, one admitting a middle term, participating at once in the nature of the things opposed. Thus, between being absolute and nonentity, there may be contingent being. In others no middle term is possible. There are contraries of which the one belongs necessarily to a subject, or is a simple privation, as health and sickness ; light and darkness ; sight and bhndness. Contraries which admit of no middle term are contradic- tories; and form, when united, a contradiction. On this rests all logic; and Aristotle wished to make wtue a middle term, between two extremes. — Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. COSMEOOONY («o«7,d^05-, world ; yiuog, birth). — ''It was a most 122 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. COSMOOONY— ancient, and, in a manner, universally received tradition among the Pagans, that the cosmogonia^ or generation of the world, took its first beginning from a chaos (the divine cos- mogonists agreeing herein with the atheistic ones) : this tradi- tion having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus (among the Greeks) by Hesiod and Homer, and others." — Cudworth, IntelL Syst.^ p. 248. The different theories as to the origin of the world may be comprehended under three classes : — 1. Those which represent the world, in its present form, as having existed from eternity. — Aristotle. 2. Those which represent the matter but not the form of the world to be from eternity. — Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus. 3. Those which assign both the matter and form of the world to the direct agency of a spiritual cause. €©§lTIOIiO€JY, Motional. — F. METAPHYSICS. CMANior^oc^Y.— V. Phrenology. CRANioscopY.— F. Phrenology, Organ, Organology. CKEATION — is the act by which God produced out of nothing all things that now exist. Unless we deny alto- gether the existence of God, we must either believe in creation or accept one or other of the two hypotheses, which may be called theological dualism or pantheism. According to the former, there are two necessary and eternal beings, God and matter. According to the latter, all beings are but modes or manifestations of one eternal and necessary being. A belief in creation admits only the existence of one neces- sary and eternal being, who is at once substance and cause, intelligence and power, absolutely free and infinitely good. — God and the universe are essentially distinct. — God has self- consciousness, the universe has not and cannot have. — Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. CREIJUIilTY, or a disposition to believe what others tell us, is set down by Dr. Eeid as an original principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being. And as the counterpart of this he reckons veracity or a propensity to speak truth VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 123 and to use language so as to convey our real sentiments, to be also an original principle of human nature. — Keid, Inquiry^ chap. 6, sect. 24; and also Eeid, Active Poic, essay iii., pt. 1, chap. 2 ; Stewart, Active Pow.^ vol. ii., p. 344 ; Priestley, Examin.^ p. 86 ; Brown, lect. Ixxxiv. CRITERION (K^irsQiou^ from the Greek verb kpivhv^ to judge), denotes in general, all means proper to judge. It has been distinguished into the criterion a quo^ per quod^ and secundum quad — or the being who judges, as man ; the organ or faculty by which he judges, and the rule according to which he judges. Unless utter scepticism be maintained, man must be admitted capable of knowing what is true. "With regard to the criterion (says Edw. Poste, M.A., Introd., p. 14, to Trans, of Poster. Analyt. of Aristotle)^ or organ of truth among the ancient philosophers, some ad- vocated a simple, and others a mixed criterion. The ad- vocates of the former were divided into Sensationalists or Rationalists, as they advocated sense or reason ; the advocates of the latter advocated both sense and reason. Democritus and Leucippus were Sensationalists ; Parmenides and the Pythagoreans were Rationalists ; Plato and Aris- totle belonged to the mixed school. Among those who advocated reason as a criterion^ there was an important difference : some advocating the common reason, as Hera- clitus and Anaxagoras ; others, the scientific reason, or the reason as cultivated and developed by education, as Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. In the Republic (7, sect. 9), Plato prescribes a training calcu- lated to prepare the reason for the perception of the higher truths. Aristotle requires education for the moral reason. The older Greeks used the word measure, instead of criterion ; and Protagoras had said, that man was the measure of all truth. This Aristotle interprets to mean that sense and reason are the organs of truth (Aletaphys., x. 2 ; xi. 6), and he accepts the doctrine, if limited to these faculties in a healthy and perfect condition. Those 124 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CRITERION— names, then, cannot properly be ranked among tlie common sense philosophers, where they are placed by Sir William Hamilton. '•'• When reason is said to be an organ of truth, we must include, besides the intuitive, the syllogistic faculty. This is the instrument of the mediate or indirect apprehension of truth, as the other of immediate. The examination of these instruments, in order to discover their capabilities and right use, is Logic. This appears to be the reason why Aristotle gave the title of Organon to his Logic. So Epicurus called his the canon or criterion. The contro- versy on the criterion is to be found at length in Sextus Empiricus, Hypotopos.^ lib. ii., cap. 5-7. Criterion is now used chiefly to denote the character which distinguishes truth from falsity. In this sense it corresponds with the ground of certitude. — V, Certi- tude. CUIWUIiATIVE (The Argument ). — '' The proof of a Divine agency is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls ; but it is an argument separately supplied by every separate example. An error in stating an example affects only that example. The argument is cumulative in the fullest sense of that term. The eye proves it without the ear, the ear without the eye. The proof in each example is complete ; for when the design of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that design is shown, the mind may set itself at rest ; no future consideration can detract anything from the force of the example" — Paley, Nat, Theol^ chap. 6. CUSTOM. — '' Let custom^^'' says Locke, " from the very child- hood, have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity." — Essay on Hum. Understand.., book ii., chap. 33, 17 ; and book i., chap. 4, 16. Mundus regitur opinionihus. VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 125 CUSTOM— Custom is the queen of the world. " Such precedents are numberless ; we draw Our right from custom ; custom is a law As high as heaven, as wide as seas or land." Lansdown, Beauty and Law. A custom is not necessarily a usage. A custom is merely that which is often repeated ; a usage must be often repeated and of long standing. Hence we may speak of a " new custom^^^ but not of a "' new usage.'''' Custom had probably the same origin as "accost," to come near, and thence to be habitual. The root is the Latin costa^ the side or rib. — See Kames, Elements of Criticism., chap. 14, Cornwall Lewis, On Politics., chap. 20, sect- 9. '^ An aggregate of habits, either successive or cotempor- aneous, in different individuals, is denoted by the words custom., usage., or practice.^ When many persons — either i% class of society, or the inhabitants of a district, or an entire nation — agree in a certain habit, they are said to have a custom or usage to that effect. '' Customs may be of two kinds : — First., There may be voluntary customs — customs which are adopted spontan- eously by the people, and originate from their independen choice, such as the modes of salutation, dress, eating, travelling, &c., prevalent in any country, and most of the items which constitute the manners of a people. — Secondly^ There are the customs which are the result of laws — customs which have grown up in consequence of the action of the government upon the people. Thus, when successive judges in a court of justice have laid down certain rules of proce- dure, and the advocates pleading before the court have observed these rules, such is called the established practice of the court. The sum of the habits of the successive judges and practitioners constitute the practice of the court. The same may be said of a deliberative assembly, or an} other body, renewed by a perpetual succession of its mem- * A similar distinction .between mos and consuetudo is made by Macrobius, Saturn iii., 8, commenting on Virgil, ^neid, G, 601. He quotes Varro as stating that mos is the unit, and consuetude the resulting aggregate. 126 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. CUSTOM— bers. In cliurclies the equivalent name is rites and cere- monies,'''' CYNIC. — After the death of Socrates, some of his disciples, under Antisthenes, were accustomed to meet in the Cynos- argos, one of the gymnasia of Athens, — and hence they were called Cynics. According to others, the designation comes from kvov or Kvuog^ a dog, because like the dog they were destitute of al] modesty. Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates, were the first heads of the sect. Zeno, by checking and moderating their doctrines, gave birth to the sect of Stoics. Richterus, Dissertatio de Cynicis^ Leips., 1701 ; Diogenes Laertius, lib. vi., c. 103. JO^MONIST. — "To believe the governing mind, or minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confined to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere will or fancy, is to be a DcBmonisty — Shaftesbury, Inquiry con- cerning Virtue^ book i., pt. 1, sect. 2. a>ATA (the plural of Datum — given or granted). — "Those facts from which an inference is drawn, are called data ; for example, it has always been found that the inhabitants of temperate climates have excelled those of very hot or very cold climates in stature, strength, and intelhgence : these facts are the data^ from which it is inferred that excellence of body and mind depend, in some measure, upon the temperature of the climate." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. ©EDUCTION (from de ducere^ to draw from, to cause to come out of) — is the mental operation which consists in drawing a particular truth from a general principle antece- dently known. It is opposed to induction^ which consists in rising from particular truths to the determination of a general principle. Let it be proposed to prove that Peter is mortal ; I know that Peter is a man, and this VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 127 DEDUCTION— enables me to say that all men are mortal ; from which affirmation I deduce that Peter is mortal. The syllogism is the form of deduction. Aristotle (Prior. Analyt., lib. i., cap. 1), has defined it to be '' an enunciation in which certain assertions bemg made, by their being true, it follows necessarily, that another assertion different from the first is true also." Before we can deduce a particular truth we must be in possession of the general truth. This may be acquired intuitively^ as every change implies a cause ; or inductively, as the volume of gas is in the inverse ratio of the pressure. Deduction, when it uses the former kind of truths, is demonstration or science. Truths drawn from the latter kind are contingent and relative, and admit of correction by increasing knowledge. The principle of deduction is, that things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. The principle of induction is, that in the same circumstances, and in the same substances, fr^om the same causes the same effects will follow. The mathematical and metaphysical sciences are founded on deduction, the physical sciences rest on induction. For the different ^iews of deduction and induction, see Whewell, Pliilosopli, of Induct. Sciences, book i., chap. 6; Mill, Logic, book ii., chap. 5 ; Quarterly Rev., vol. ^d>, art. on Whew ell. DEFINITION (de Jinire, to mark out limits). — Est definitio, earum rerum, quae sunt ejus rei propriae, quam definire volumus, brevis et circumscripta qui^dam explicatio. — Cicero, De Orat., lib. i., c. 42. "' The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is, a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word." — Mill, Logic, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 182. Definition signifies ''laying down a boundary;" and is used m logic to signify '' an expression which explams any term so as to separate it from everything else, as a boundary separates fields. Logicians distinguish definitions into cssen- I 128 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. DEFINITION— tial and accidental An essential definition states what are regarded as the constituent parts of the essence of that which is to be defined ; and an accidental definition (or description) lays down what are regarded as circumstances belonging to it, viz., properties or accidents, such as causes, effects, &c. '' Essential definition is divided into physical (natural), and logical (metaphysical) : the physical definition being made by an enumeration of such parts as are actually separable; such as are the hull, masts, &c., of a 'ship;' the root, trunk, branches, bark, &c., of a ' tree.' The logical definition consists of the genus and difference, which are called by some the metaphysical (ideal) parts ; as being not two real parts into which an individual object can (as in the former case), be actually divided, but only different views taken (notions formed) of a class of objects, by one mind. Thus a magnet would be defined logically^ ' an iron ore having attraction for iron.'" — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 5, sect. 6. The rules of a good definition are : — 1. That it be clearer than the thing defined. 2. That it be brief— weg'we ahsit quidquam nee super sit. 3. That it agree toti definito et soli definito; that is, that it be proper and universal. That which is complex can be defined, not that which is simple. I can define man — ^not being. Individuals cannot be defined, as James and John, for they have the same essence, and are only distinguished by accidents. Accidental or descriptive definition, may be — 1. Causal ; as when man is defined as made after the image of God, and for his glory. 2. Accidental ; as when he is defined to be animal hipes implume, 3. Genetic; as when the means by which it is made are indicated — as, if a straight line fixed at one end be drawn round by the other end so as to return to itself, a circle will be described. Or, 4. Per oppositum ; as when virtue is said to be the flying from vice. '^Definitions are called nominal^ which explain merely VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 129 DEFINITION— the meaning of the term; and real^ wMch explain the nature of tlie thing signified by that term. Logic is concerned with nominal definitions alone." — Whately, nt svpra, '' By a real^ in contrast to a verbal or nominal definition. the logicians do not intend ' the giving an adequate con- ception of the nature and essence of a thing ;' that is, of a thing considered in itself, and apart fi.'om the conceptions of it already possessed. By verbal definition is meant the more accurate determination of the signification of a word ; by real the more accurate determination of the contents of a notion. The one clears up the relation of icords to notions ; the other of notions to things. The substitution of notional for real would, perhaps, remove the ambiguity. But if we retain the term real., the aim of a verbal definition being tc specify the thought denoted by the word., such definition ought to be called notiono.1^ on the principle on which the defini- tion of a notion is called real ; for this definition is the ex- position of what things are comprehended in a thought." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ p. 691, note. " In the sense in which nominal and real definitions were distinguished by the scholastic logicians, logic is concerned with reaZ, i. e., notional definitions only; to explain the meaning of words belongs to dictionaries or gTammars." — Mansell, Prolegom. Log.^ p. 189. '' There is a real distinction between definitions of names and what are erroneously called definitions of things ; but it is that the latter, along with the meaning of a name, covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion is not a definition., but a postulate. The definition is a mere identical proposition, which gives information only about the use of language, and from which no conclusions re- specting matters of fact can possibly be drawn. The accompanying postulate, on the other hand, affirms a fact which may lead to consequences of every degree of impor- tance. It afHrms the real existence of things, possessing the combination of attributes set forth in the definition, and K 130 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. DEFINITION— this, if true, may be foundation sufficient to build a whole fabric of scientific truth." — Mill, Logic^ p. 197. Aristotle, Poster. Analyt.^ lib. ii. ; Topic,., lib. vi. Logic of Port Royal., part 1, chap. 12, 13, 14; part 2, chap. 16. Locke, Essay on Hum, Understand.., book iii., c. 3 and 4. Leibnitz, Noveaux Essais., liv. iii., cap. 3 et 4. "Reid, Account of Aristotle's Logic, chap. 2, sect. 4. BE 1ST. — There are different kinds of deists noticed by Dr. Sam. Clarke, vol. ii., p. 12. 1. Those who believe in an Eternal and Intelligent Being, but deny a Providence, either conserving or governing. 2. Those who believe in God and in Providence, but deny moral distinctions and moral government. 3. Those who believe in God and his moral perfections, but deny a future state. 4. Those who believe in God and his moral government, here and hereafter, in so far as the light of nature goes ; but doubt or deny the doctrines of revelation. Kant has distinguished between a tJieist and a deist — the former acknowledging a God, free and intelligent, the creator and preserver of all things; the latter believing that the first principle of all things is an Infinite Force, which is inherent in matter, and the blind cause of all the phenomena of nature. Deism., in this sense, is mere materialism. But deism is generally employed to denote a belief in God, without implying a belief in revelation. '^ That modern species of infidelity, called deism., or natural religion., as contradistinguished from revealed.'''' — Van Mil- dert, Bampton Lect.., sermon 9. '' Tindal appears to have been the first who assumed for himself, and bestowed on his coadjutors, the denomination of Christian deists., though it implied no less than an absolute contradiction in terms." — Van Mildert, Bampton Lecture., sermon 10. See Leland, Answer to Deistical Writers. — F. Theist. l>EIIIIURCiE (In^iov^yog^ workman, architect). — Socrates and VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 131 DExlIlUROE— Plato represented God as the architect of the universe. Plotinus confounded the demiurge with the soul of the world, and represented it as inferior to the supreme intelligence. The Gnostics represented it as an emanation from the supreme di\^nity, and having a separate existence. The difficulty of reconciling our idea of an infinite cause to the variable and contingent effects observable in the universe has given rise to the hypotheses of a demiurge^ and of a plastic nature ; but they do not alleviate the difficulty. This term is applied to God, Heb. xi. 10. JttEmONSTBATION (demoitstrare^ d-olu'ii;^ from oi7:ohix,uvui, to point out, to cause to see). — In old English writers this word was used to signify the pointing out^ the connection between a conclusion and its premises, or that of a pheno- menon with its asserted cause. It now denotes a necessary consequence, and is spionymous with proof from ffi'st prin- ciples. To draw out a particular truth from a general truth in which it is enclosed, is deduction ; from a necessary and universal truth to draw consequences which necessarily follow, is demonstration. To connect a truth with a first principle, to show that it is this principle applied or realized in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The result is science, knowledge, certainty. Those general truths arrived at by induction in the sciences of observation, are certain knowledo'e. But it is knowledo-e which is not definite or complete. It may admit of increase or modification, by new discoveries ; but the knowledge which demonstration gives is fixed and unalterable. A demonstration is a reasoniag consisting of one or more arguments, by which some proposition brought into ques- tion is evidently shown to be contained in some other pro- position assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident and acknowledged, the proposition in question must also be admitted as certain. Demonstration is dii^ect or indirect. Direct demonstration is descending — when starting from a general truth we come to a particular conclusion, which we must affirm or deny; 132 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. or ascending —when starting from the subject and its attri- butes, we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with which we connect the proposition in question. Both these are deductive, because they connect a particular truth with a general principle. Indirect demonstratio is when we admit hypothetically a proposition contradictory of that which we wish to demonstrate and show that this admission leads to absurdity ; that is, an impossibility or a contradic- tion. This is demonstratio per impossibile^ or reductio ad absurdum. It should only be employed when direct de- monstration is unattainable. '' Demonstration was divided by ancient writers into two kinds : one kind they called demonstration on ; the other demonstration oion. ''The demonstration B/or/, or argument from cause to effect, is most commonly employed in anticipating future events. When, e. g.^ we argue that at a certain time the tides will be unusually high, because of its being the day following the new or the full moon, it is because we know that that condition of the moon is in some way connected as a cause with an unusually high rising of the tides as its effect, and can argue, therefore, that it will produce what is called spring tide* '' On the other hand, the demonstration ori^ or argument from effect to cause, is more applicable, naturally, to past events, and to the explanation of the phenomena which they exhibit as effects. Thus the presence of poison in the bodies of those whose death has been unaccountably sudden, is frequently proved in this way by the phenomena which such bodies present, and which involve the presence of poison as their cause." — Karslake, Aids to Logic^ vol. ii., p. 46. The theory of demonstration is to be found in the Organon of Aristotle, " since whose time," said Kant, " Logic, as to its foundation, has gained nothing." DENOMINATION, External. — V. MOBE. I>EONTOIiOOY (^To 0201/^ what is due, or binding ; T^oyog^ dis- course). VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 133 I>E©NTOI.©OY— " Deontology^ or that wMcli is proper, lias been chosen as a fitter term than any other y/hich could be found, to repre- sent in the field of morals, the principle of utilitarianism^ or that which is useful." — Bentham, Deontology^ or the Science of Morality^ vol. i., p. 34. *' The term deontology expresses moral science, and ex- presses it well, precisely because it signifies the science of duty, and contains no reference to utility." — Whewell, Pre- face to Mackintosh'' s Prelim, Dissert.,, p. 20. Deontology involves the being bound or being under ob- ligation ; the very idea which it was selected to avoid, and which utility does not give. ''• The ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be "E|;? Tov ^eovTog (that is, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding j, the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the most unexceptionable which is yet to be found in any system of philosophy." — Stewart, Active and Mor. Powers^ vol. ii., p. 446. And Sir W. Hamilton (Reid''s Works ^ p. 540, note), has observed that ethics are well denominated deontology. l>ESlCrN. — '' The atomic atheists further allege, that though there be many things in the world which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow that therefore they were made intentionally and designedly for those uses." — Cudworth, Intell Syst, p. 670. ^' What is done, neither by accident, nor simply for its own sake, but with a view to some efiect that is to follow, is said to be the result of design. Xone but intelligent beings act with design ; because it requires knowledge of the connection of causes and effects, and the power of com- paring ideas, to conceive of some end or object to be pro- duced, and to devise the means proper to produce the effect. Therefore, whenever we see a thing which not only may be applied to some use, but which is evidently made for the sake of the effect which it produces, we feel sure that it is the work of a being capable of thought." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 134 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. DESIGN— '•'• When we find in nature the adaptation of means to an end, we infer design and a designer; because the only circumstances in which we can trace the origination of adaptation, are those in which human mind is implicated." — Theory of Hum. Progression^ p. 482. '' The words design and ivisdom are by no means synony- mous ; and it is possible that a philosopher may grant that there are marks of design in the universe, who thinks but meanly of the wisdom displayed in its formation. This was the case with King Alphonso when he ventured to censure the planetary system (according to the conceptions which astronomers then entertained of it), as a contrivance which admitted of important improvements. Distinct, however, as these two inquiries are, they have often been confounded by sceptical writers, who imagined that every little criticism they were able to make on the course of events, either in the physical or moral world, furnished an argument in favour of atheism." — Stewart, Active and Mor. Powers., vol. ii., p. 34. "I cannot help remarking, on the other hand, that the same distinction between design and wisdom has been over- looked by many of the excellent writers who have employed their genius in defending and illustrating the truths of natural religion. Of those who have speculated on the subject of final causes, the greater number seem plainly to have considered every new conjecture they were able to form concerning the ends and uses of the different objects comprising the universe, and of the general laws by which its phenomena are regulated, as an additional proof that it is not the work of chance or of necessity; and to have imagined that the greater the number of such ends and uses they were able to trace, the more irresistible they rendered the evidence of design and intelligence The proper use of such speculations is not to refute the atheist, but to illustrate the wisdom and unity of design displayed in the material and moral worlds, or rather, to enlighten and exalt our own understanding, by tracing with humility and VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 135 DESIOIV— reverence the operations of a msdoui which is infinite and divine." — Ibid. — V. Cause (Final). On the argument for the being of God from the evidences of design^ or the adaptation of means to ends in the uni- verse, see Xenophon, Memorabilia of Socrates^ book i., chap. 4. Buffier, Treatise on First Truths^ part 2, chap. 16. Pteid, Active Powers^ essay vi., chap. 6. Stewart, Active and Mor. Powers^ book iii-, chap. 2. Paley, Xat. Theology. Bridgewater Treatises. Burnett Prize Essays, ]>£SIR£. — According to Dr. Hutcheson {Essay on the Passions^ sect. 1), ''''desires arise in our mind from the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable sensation when the object or event is good ; or to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil.'' But, while desires imply intelligence, they are not the mere efflux, or product of that intelhgence ; and, while the objects of our desires are known, it is not, solely, in consequence of knowing them, that we desire them ; but, rather, because we have a capacity of desiring. There is a tendency, on om^ part, towards certain ends or objects, and there is a fitness in them to give us pleasure, when they are attained. Our desires of such ends or objects are natural a.nd primary. Natural^ hut not instinctive^ for they im-plj intelligence ; primary., and not factitious., for they result from the constitution of things, and the constitution of the human mind, antecedent to experience and education. It has been maintained, however, that there are no ori- ginal principles in our nature, carrying us towards particu- lar objects, but that, in the com^se of experience, we learn what gives us pleasure or pain — what does us good or ill : that we flee from the one class of objects, and follow after the other ; that, in this way, likings and dislikings — incli- nation and aversion spring up within us : and. that all tlu^ 136 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. various passions and pursuits of human life are produced and prompted by sensibility to pleasure and pain, and a knowledge of wbat affects that sensibility; and, thus, all our desires may be resolved into one general desire of happiness or well-being. There is room for difference of opinion as to the number of those desires which are original ; but there is Httle room for doubting, that there are some which may be so desig- nated. Every being has a nature. Every thing is what it is, by having such a nature. Man has a nature, and his nature has an end. This end is indicated by certain ten- dencies. He feels inclination or desire towards certain objects, which are suited to his faculties and fitted to improve them. The attainment of these objects gives pleasure, the absence of them is a source of uneasiness. Man seeks them by a natural and spontaneous effort. In seeking them, he comes to knov/ them better and desire them more eagerly. But the intelligence which is grad- ually developed, and the development which it may give to the desires^ should not lead us to overlook the fact, that the desires primarily existed, as inherent tendencies of our nature, aiming at their correspondent objects ^ spontane- ously, it may be, in the first instance, but gradually gaining clearness and strength, by the aid and concurrence of our intellectual and rational powers. ©ETEliMlNlSM. — This name is applied by Sir W. Hamilton (Reid^s Works^ p. 601, note) to the doctrine of Hobbes, as contradistinguished from the ancient doctrine of fatalism. The principle of the sufficient reason is likewise called by Leibnitz the principle of the determining reason. In the Diet, des Sciences Philosophy., nothing is given undei determinism., but a reference made to fatalism.'^ And fatalism is explained as the doctrine which denies liberty to man.— F. ISTecessity, Fatalism, Liberty. * But in the article Liherte, determinism is applied to tlie doctrine that motive^-' invincibly determine the will, and is opposed to liberty of indiiference, which is described as the doctrine that man can determine himself without motives. TCCASUXAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 137 BESTlirr (destinatum^^ed) — ^isthe necessary and unalterable connection of events ; of wMcli the heathens made a divine power, superior to all their deities. The idea of an irre- sistible destiny, against which man strives in vain, pervades the whole of Greek tragedy. — V, Fatausm. l>t4l.ECTICS (otccX/ix^TiKr, tsx^ti). — -'The Greek verb oict- Azysat'xi, m its widest signification, — 1. Includes the use both of reason and speech as proper to man. Hence, dialectics may mean Logic, as includiag the right use of reason and language. 2. It is also used as synon\TQOus with the Latin word disserere^ to discuss or dispute ; hence, dialectics has been used to denote the Logic of proba- bilities, as opposed to the doctriQe of demonstration and scientific induction. 3. It is also used lq popular language to denote Logic properly so called. But dialectics, Hke science, is not Logic, but the subject matter of Logic. Dialectics is handled, anatomized, and its conditions deter- mined by Logic ; but. for all that, it is not Logic, any more than the animal kingdom is Zoology, or the vegetable kingdom is Botany." — Poste, Introd. to Aristotle's Poster Analyt.^ p. 16. 12mo, London, 1850. In the philosophy of Kant, dialectic means what is pro- bable. He opposes dialectic arguments to apodeictic or demonstrative arguments. ••Xenophon teUs us (Mem. iv., 5. 11). that Socrates said, • That dialectic (to oiscAzyefj^c&i) was so called because it is an inquire' pursued by persons who take cotmsel together, separating the subjects considered accordiQg to their kinds {oix^.zyo'jTcc^). He held accordingly that men should try to be well prepared for such a process, and should pursue it with diligence. By this means he thought they would become good men, fitted for responsible offices of command, and tnily dialecticaV Qnc&'kzx.Tix.cdrcc'kGvg), And this is, I conceive, the answer to ^Ir. Grote's interrogator}- excla- mation (vol. viii., p. 577). ^Surely the et^TQolog}* here given by Xenophon or Socrates of the word (oix7.iyiadat), cannot be considered as satisfactory.' The two notions, of investigatory dialogue and distribution of notions according 138 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. l>IAi:iECTICS— to their kinds, which are thus asserted to be connected in etymology, were, among the followers of Socrates, con- nected in fact ; the dialectic dialogue was supposed to involve of course the dialectic division of the subject." — Dr. Whewell, On Plato's Notion of Dialectic^ Trans, of Carab. PJiilosoph. Soc.^ vol. ix., part 4. i>ia]\oiojloc;y— F. Noology. - 1>ICTUM I>E OMNI ET I>E NUIiliO— an axiom from Aristotle, which is the fundamental principle of reasoning. It maybe explained to mean ''whatever is predicated (i. e., affirmed, or denied) universally of any class of things, may be predicated in like manner (viz., affirmed, or denied) of any thing comprehended in that class." DIFFERENCE (liocOo^o&, differentia) . — When two objects are compared they may have qualities which are common to both, or the one may have qualities which the other has not. The first constitutes their resemblance^ the second their difference. If the qualities constituting their resem- blance be essential qualities, and the qualities constituting their difference be merely accidental^ the objects are only said to be distinct ; but if the qualities constituting their difference be essential qualities, then the objects are differ- ent.* One man is distinct from another man, or one piece of silver from another ; but a man is different from a horse, and gold is different from silver. Those accidental differ- ences which distinguish objects whose essence is common, belong only to individuals, and are called individual or numerical differences. Those differences^ which cause ob- jects to have a different nature, constitute species, and are called specific differences. The former are passing and variable ; but the latter are permanent and form the ob- jects of science, and furnish the grounds of all classification^ division^ and definition^ — q. v. '' Difference or differentia^ in Logic, means the formal or distinguishing part of the essence of a species." When * Derodon, De Universalihus, seems to use differentia and distinctio indiscrimi- nately. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 139 DIFFERENCE— I say that the differentia of a magnet is '4ts attracting iron," and that its property is "polarity," these are called respectively, a specific difference and 'property; because magnet is (I have supposed) an infima species (i. e., only a species). When I say that the differentia of iron ore is ''its containing iron," and its property ''being attracted by the magnet," these are called respectively, a generic difference and property^ because " iron ore" is a subaltern species or genus ; being both the genus of magnet, and the species of mineral." — Whately, Logic^ book ii., chap. 5, sect. 4. The English word divers expresses difference only, but diverse expresses difference icith opposition. The Evange- lists narrate the same events in " divers manners," but not in " diverse manners.^'' Porphyry, Introd. to Categor. Aristotle, Topic. ^ lib. vii., c. 1, 2. — F. Distinction. DIi:iEM]n;A (^tg T^Yif^^ci) — is an argument consisting of two or more contradictory propositions which lead to the same conclusion — as, The wicked either perish utterly at death, or their souls are immortal. If they perish utterly at death, there is no hope for them. If their souls are immortal, they will be punished for their wickedness i>iSCOVERY.— F. Invention. IJISCURSUS. — "If the mind do not perceive intuitively the connection betwixt the prsedicate and subject, as in the case of axioms, or self-evident propositions, it can do so no otherwise than by the intervention of other ideas, or by the use of middle terms, as they are called, in the language of Aristotle. And this application of the middle term, first to one of the terms of a proposition, and then to the other, is performed by that exercise of the intellect which is very properly called in Greek liotvota.^ because the intellect hi this operation goes betwixt the two terms, as it were, and passes from the one to the other. In Latin, as there is not 140 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. I>ISCURSUS— the same facility of composition, it is expressed by two words, disciirsus mentis^ mens being the same thing in Latin as Nof J in Greek ; and the Latin expression is rendered into English by discourse of reasoning^ or as it is commonly called, reasoning." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ book v., ch. 4. " Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of proceeding from certain judgments to another founded on them (or the result of them.)" — Whately, Logic^ book ii., ch. 1, sect. 2. I>ISTINCTI®N (hidl^iuii) — is wider in signification than difference ; for all things that are different are also distinct ; but all things that are distinct are not also different. One drop of water does not specif cally differ from another ; but they are individually distinct. Distinction is a kind of alietas or otherness. Those things are said to be distinct of which one is not the other. Thus Peter., precisely because he is not Paul., is said to be distinct from Paul. Union is not opposed to distinction ; for things may be so united that the one shall not be con- founded with the other. Thus the soul is united to the body. Indeed union implies distinction; it is when two things which are mutually distinct., become, as it were, one. Distinction is real and mental., a parte rei and per in- tellectum. Real distinction is founded in the nature of the thing, and amounts to difference. It is threefold: — 1. Object from object — as God from man. 2. Mode from mode — as blue from black. 3. Mode from thing — as body from motion. Mental distinction is made by the mind — as when we distinguish between light and heat, which are naturally united, or between the length and breadth of a body. It amounts to abstraction. — Bossuet, Logique., liv. i., c. 25 ; Eeid, Account of AristotWs Logic^ ch. 2, sect. 3. DISTRIBUTION — "Is the placing particular things in the places or compartments which have already been prepared to receive them." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. "In Logic, a term is said to be distributed when it is VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 141 l>ISTRIBUTION~ employed in its full extent, so as to comprehend all its significates— everything to which it is applicable.— Whately, Logic ^ b. ii., ch. 8, sect. 2. ''A term is said to be ' distributed^'' when an assertion is made or implied respecting every memher of the class which the term denotes. Of every universal proposition, there- fore, the subject is distributed; e. g.^ all men are mortal ; ISTo rational being is irresponsible ; Whatsoever things were written aforetime were vmtten for our learning. When an assertion is made or implied respecting some member or members of a class, but not necessarily respecting all, the term is said to be ' undistributed ; ' as, for example, the subjects of the following propositions :— Some men are benevolent ; There are some standing here that shall not die ; Not every one that invokes the sacred name shall enter into the heavenly kingdom."— Kidd, Principles of Reasoning^ ch. 4, sect. 3, p. 179. MTHEISM. — " As for that fore- mentioned ditheism^ or opinion of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident that its original sprung from nothing else, but from a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of Deity, &c." — Cudworth, Inte.ll. Sijstem^ p. 213. — V. Dualism. l>IVl@lON — ''Is the separating things of the same kind into parcels ; analysis is the separating of things that are of different kinds ; we divide a stick by cutting it into two, or into twenty pieces ; we analyze it by separating the bark, the wood, and the pith — a division may be made at plea- sure, an analysis must be made according to the nature of the object." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. ' ' Division (Logical) is the distinct enumeration of several things signified by one common name. It is so called from its being analogous to the real division of a whole into its parts." — Whately, Logic ^ book ii., ch. 5, sect. 5. Division is either division proper or partition. Partition is the distribution of some substance into its parts ; as of the globe into Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. Division proper is the distribution of genus and species into wliat is 142 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ©IVISIOIV— under them ; as when substance is divided into spiritual and material. The members which arise from division retam the name of their whole ; but not those from partition, " Division is the separation of a whole into its parts. " But as there are two kinds of wholes^ there are also two kinds of division. There is a whole composed of parts really distinct, called in Latin, totum, and whose parts are called integral parts. The division of this whole is called properly partition; as when we divide a house into its apartments, a tovm into its wards, a kingdom or state into its provinces, man into body and soul^ the body into its members. The sole rule of their division is, to make the enumeration of particulars very exact, and that there be nothing wanting to them. ''The other whole is called, in Latin, omne^ and its parts subjected or inferior parts^ inasmuch as the whole is a common term^ and its parts are the terms comprising its extension. The word animal is a whole of this nature, of which the inferiors, as man and beast, which are compre- hended under its extension, are subjected parts. This division obtains properly the name of division^ and there are four kinds of division which may be noticed. ''The^r5^ is, when we divide the genus by its species; every substance is body or mind, every animal is man or beast. The second is, when we divide the genus by its differences; every animal is rational or irrational, every number is even or uneven. The third is, when we divide a common subject into the opposite accidents of which it is susceptible, these being according to its different inferiors, or in relation to different times ; as, every star is luminous by itself, or by reflection only ; every body is in motion or at rest, &c. The fourth is, that of an accident into its different subjects^ as division of goods into those of mind and body." — Port Roy, Logic, part 2, chap. 15. The rules of a good division are : — 1st. That it be adequate, i. e., that the parts taken to- ojether contain the whole. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 143 DIVISION— 2d. That it be distinct, so that the members do not coin- cide, but exclude one another. 3d. That there be nothing superfluous or redundant. Seneca {Epist. 89) said, Idem villi Jiahet nimia quod nulla divisio ; simile confuso est quicquid usque in j^ulverem sectum est. Aristotle, Poster. Analyt., lib. ii., c. 13. Reid, Account of AristotWs Logic, chap, ii., sect. 2. — V. Whole. DOOMATISM (Boy^flf, from Iokhv^ to see or seem).—" Philoso- phers," said Lord Bacon, '^ may be divided into two classes, the empirics and the dogmatists. The empiric, like the ant, is content to amass, and then consume his provisions. The dogmatist., like the spider, spins webs of which the materials are extracted from his own substance, admirable for the delicacy of their workmanship, but without sohdity or use. The bee keeps a middle course — she draws her matter from flowers and gardens ; then, by art peculiar to her, she labours and digests it. True philosophy does something like this." '^He who is certain or presumes to say he knows., is, whether he be mistaken or in the right, a dogmatist.''' — Shaftesbury, Miscell. Reflect.., Miscell. ii., c. 2. Kant defined dogmatism., ''the presumption that we are able to attain a pure knowledge based on ideas, according to principles w^hich the reason has long had in use, without any inquiry into the manner or into the right by which it has attained them." — Morell, Elements of PsycJiologij^ p. 236, note. "By dogmatism we understand, in general, both aU pro- pounding and all receiving of tenets, merely from habit, without thought or examination, or, in other words, upon the authority of others ; in short, the very opposite of critical investigation. All assertion for which no proof is oflered is dogmatical.'^'' — Chalybaeus, Specid. Philosoph.. P-4. To maintain that man cannot attain to knowled^'e of the 144 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. truth, is scepticism. To maintain that lie can do so only bv renouncing his reason, which is naturally defective, and surrendering himself to an internal inspiration or superior intuition, by which he is absorbed into God, and loses all personal existence, is mysticism. Dogmatism is to maintain that knowledge may be attained by the right use of our faculties, each within its proper sphere, and employed in a right method. This is the natur^il creed of the human race. Scepticism and mysticism are after thoughts. Dogmatism^ or faith in the results of the due exercise of our faculties, is to be commended. But dogmatism in the method of prosecuting our inquiries is to be condemned. Instead of laying dovfn dogmatically truths which are not proven, we should proceed rather by observation and doubt. - The scholastic philosophers did much harm by their dog- matic method. It is not to be mistaken for the synthetic method. There can be no synthesis without a preceding analysis. But they started from positions which had not been proved, and deduced consequences which were of no value. — Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. l>OUliT (duditare^ duitare^ i. e., in duo iiare^ to go two ways). — Man knows some things, and is ignorant of many things, while he is in douht as to other things. Doubt is that state of mind in which we hesitate as to two contradictory conclusions — havmg no preponderance of evidence in favour of either. Philosophical douht has been distinguished as provisional or definitive. Definitive douht is scepticism. Provisional^ or methodical douht is a voluntary suspending of our judgment for a time, in order to come to a more clear and sure con- clusion. This was first given as a rule in philosophical method by Descartes, who teUs us that he began by doubt- ing everything, discharging his mind of all preconceived ideas, and admitting none as clear and true tiU he had subjected them to a rigorous examination. ^' Douht is some degree of belief, along with the conscious- ness of ignorance, in regard to a proposition. Absolute disbelief implies knowledge : it is the knowledge that such VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 145 I>OUBT— or such a thing is not true. If the mind admits a proposi- tion without any desire for knowledge concerning it, this is credulity. If it is open to receive the proposition, but feels io-norance concerning it, this is doiibt. In proportion as knowledge increases, doubt diminishes, and behef or dis- belief strengthens." — Taylor, Elements of Thought, — V. Certainty, Scepticism. ]>R.e: AMINO — The phenomena of sleep and dreaming^ are treated by almost all Avriters on psycholog}'. Dreams very often take their rise and character from something in the preceding state of body or mind. '' Through the multitude of business cometh a dream.^^^ said Solomon ; and Aristotle regarded dreams as the vibrations of our waking feelings. — Ethic, ^ lib. i., cap. 13. According to these views, dreams^ instead of being pros- pective or prophetic, are retrospective and resultant. The former opinion, however, has prevailed in all ages and among all nations ; and hence, oneiromancy or prophesying by dreams^ that is, interpreting them as presages of coming- events. DUAIilSl^I, DUAIilTY.-— ''P>i;hagoras talked, it is said, of an immaterial unity, and a material duality^ by which he pretended to signii}', perhaps, the first prmciples of all things, the efficient and material causes." — Bolingbroke. Hum. Reason^ essay ii. Dualism is the doctrine that the universe was created and is preserved by the concurrence of two principles, equally necessary, eternal, and independent. Mythological dualism was held by Zoroaster and the Magi, who maintained the existence of a good principle and an evil principle ; and thus explained the mixed state of things which prevails. It would appear, however, accord- ing to Zoroaster, that both Ormuzd and Ahrimanes were subordinate to Akerenes, or the Supreme Deity ; and that it was only a sect of the Magi who held the doctrine of dualism in its naked form. Their views were re^-ived in the second century by the Gnostics, and in the third cen- L 146 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. tury were supported by Manes, whose followers were called Manicliaeans. Many of tlie ancient philosophers regarded the universe as constituted by two principles, the one active, the other passive, the one mind, the other matter, the one soul, the other body. But the supposition of two infinites, or of two first causes, is self- contradictory, and is now abandoned. The term dualism also finds a place in the theory of per- ception^ — q, V. DURATION. — ''After some thought has entirely disappeared from the mind it will often return, joined with the belief that it has been in the mind before ; this is called memory. Memory and the consciousness of succession give us the notion signified by the word duration,^'* — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 15. According to Kant, duration or time, and also space, are necessary forms of the human mind, which cannot think of bodies but as existing in space, nor of events but as occurring in time. — V. Time. 1>UTY. — That which we ouglit to do — that which we are under obligation to do. In seeing a thing to be right we see at the same time that it is our duty to do it. There is a complete synthesis between rectitude and obligation. Price has used ougJitness as synonymous with rigJitness. — F. Obligation. Duty and right are relative terms. If it be the duty of one party to do some thing, it is the right of some other party to expect or exact the doing of it. — V. Right, Rectitude. See Wordsworth, Ode to Duty. l>YNAl»llsrW[ — the doctrine of Leibnitz, that all substance involves force, — V. Matter. ECIiECTICIsm (l;tXgyg/v, to select, to choose out). — The Alexandrian philosophers, or Neo-platonicians, who arose at Alexandria about the time of Pertinax and Severus, and continued to flourish to the end of the reign of Justinian, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 147 ECIiECTICISm— professed to gather and unite into one body, what was true in all systems of philosophy. To their method of philo- sophizing, the name eclecticism was first applied. Clemens Alexandrinus (Stromm.^ lib. i., p. 288) said, '^By philo- sophy I mean neither the Stoic, nor the Platonic, nor the Epicurean, nor the Aristotelian ; but whatever things have been properly said by each of these sects, inculcating jus- tice and devout knowledge, — this whole selection I call philo- sophy.^'' Diogenes Laertius tells us (1, sect. 21), that Potamos of Alexandria introduced k^'hsKTiKYiu uipsaif. But the method had been adopted by Plato and Aristotle before, and has been followed by many in all ages of philo- sophy. Leibnitz said that truth was more widely diffused than was commonly thought; but it was often burdened and weakened, mutilated and corrupted by additions which spoiled it and made it less useful. In the philosophy of the ancients, or those who had gone before, he thought there was perennis quoedam philosophia — if it could only be dis- intricated from error and disinterred from the rubbish which overwhelmed it. In modern times the great advo- cate of eclecticism is Mons. Cousin. But its legitimacy as a mode of philosophizing has been challenged. '' I follow the liberty of the old Christians, who did not pin their faith to any sect of philosophers, not that they agreed with those who say that nothing can be known ; than which nothing is more foolish ; but that they thought that there was no sect which had seen the whole of the truth, and none which had not seen some part of the truth. They therefore aimed at collecting the truth which was diffused among individual philosophers, and among sects, into one body : and they thought that this result would be nothing else but the true Christian religion." — Grotius, De Jure Belli ^ &c.. Prolegomena, sec. 42. '*The sense in which this term is used by Clemens" (of Alexandria), says Mr. Maurice (Mor. and Metaphys. Phil.^ p. 53), '4s obvious enough. He did not care for Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, as such ; far less did he care for the 148 VOCAEULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. ECI.ECTICISM— opinions and conflicts of the schools which bore their names ; he found in each hints of precious truths of which he desired to avail himself; he would gather the flowers without asking in what garden they grew, the prickles he would leave for those who had a fancy for them. Eclecticism^ in this sense, seemed only like another name for cathohc wis- dom. A man, conscious that everything in nature and in art was given for his learning, had a right to suck honey wherever it was to be found ; he would find sweetness in it if it was hanging wild on trees and shrubs, he could admire the elaborate architecture of the cells in which it was stored. The Author of all good to man had scattered the gifts, had imparted the skill ; to receive them thankfully was an act of homage to Him. But once lose the feeling of devotion and gratitude^ which belonged so remarkably to Clemens — once let it be fancied that the philosopher was not a mere receiver of treasures which had been provided for him, but an ingenious chemist and compounder of various naturally unsociable ingredients, and the eclectical doctrine would lead to more self-conceit, would be more unreal and heartless than any one of the sectarian elements out of which it was fashioned. It would want the behef and conviction which dwell, with whatever unsuitable companions, even in the narrowest theory. Many of the most vital characteris- tics of the original dogmas would be effaced under pretence of taking off their rough edges and fitting them into each other. In general the superficialities and formahties of each creed would be preserved in the new system; its original and essential characteristics sacrificed." '' In philosophy Cicero was never more than an Eclectic^ that is, in point of fact, no philosopher at all. For the very essence of the philosophical mind hes in this, that it is con- strained by an irresistible impulse to ascend to primary, necessary principles, and cannot halt until it reaches the living, streaming sources of truth ; whereas the eclectic wiU stop short where he likes, at any maxim to which he chooses to ascribe the authority of a principle. The philosophical VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 149 £CI.ECTI€IS:TI— mind must be systematic, ever seeking to behold all things in their connection, as parts or members of a great organic Tvhole. and impregnating them all with the electric spiiit of order : while the eclectic is content if he can string together a number of generalizations. A philosopher incorporates and animates : an eclectic heaps and ties up. The philo- sopher combines multiplicity into unity: the eclectic leaves unity stragghug about in multiplicity. The former opens the arteries of truth, the latter its veins. Cicero's legal habits peer out from under his philosophical cloak, in his constant appeal to precedent, his ready deference to autho- rity. For in law, as in other things, the practitioner does not go beyond maxims, that is, secondary or tertiarr- prin- ciples, taking his stand upon the mounds which his prede- cessors have erected." — Second Series of Guesses at Truth. edition 1848, p. 238. See Cousin, Fragmens PMlosophiques. 8vo. Paris, 1826. Jouffi-oy, Melanges PJiilosopJiiques. 8vo, Paris, 1833. Damiron, Essal sur THistoire de la Philosophie au dix- neuvieme siecle, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris. 1834. ECONOmcS (oiico; !/ou>og — the law of the house). — Treatises under this title were written by Xenophon, Aristotle, and Cicero. They seem to have treated of the best means of managing and increasing the comfort and resources of a household. Only fragments of them remain. But in modem times justice or social duty has been distinguished by Henry More into etJdcal^ economical, and political. And economics has been employed to denote those duties which spring from the relations which exist in a family or house- hold. These are the duties — 1. Of husband and wife. 2. Of parent and child. 3. Of master and servant. ECSTASY {^zx,7roL>7i:. standing out)— a transport of the soul by which it seems as if out of the body. This word does not occur in philosophy before the time of Philo and the Alexandrians. Plotinus and Porphyry 150 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ECSTASY— pretended to have ecstasies in which they were united to God. Among Christian writers, Bonaventura {Itinerarium Mentis in Deum)^ Gerson (Theologia Mystica)^Sind Francis de Sales, recommend those contemplations which may lead to ecstasy. But there is danger of their leading to delusion, and to confound the visions of a heated imagination mth higher and nearer views of spmtual things. Baader, Traite sur VExtase^ 1817. EDUCATION {educere^ to draw out) — means the development of the bodily and mental powers. The human being is born and lives amidst scenes and circumstances which have a tendency to call forth and strengthen his powers of body and mind. And this may be called the education of nature. But by education is generally meant the using those means of development which one man or one generation of men may employ in favour of another. These means are chiefly instruction^ or the communication of knowledge to enlighten and strengthen the mind, and discipline^ or the formation of manners and habits. Instruction and discipline may be physical or moral, that is, may refer to the body or to the mind. Both, when employed in all their extent, go to make up education^ which is the aid given to assist the develop- ment, and advance the progress of the human being, as an individual, and as a member of a family, of a community, and a race. ''The business of education is to educe or bring out that which is within, not merely or mainly to instruct or impose a form from without. Only we are not framed to be self-sufficient, but to derive our nourishment, intellectual and spiritual, as well as bodily, from without, through the ministration of others ; and hence instruction must ever be a chief element of education. Hence too we obtain a criterion to determine what sort of instruction is right and beneficial — that which ministers to education.^ which tends to bring out, to nourish and cultivate the faculties of the mhid, not that which merely piles a mass of information upon them. Moreover, since nature, if left to herself, is VOCABUXAEY OF PHZLOSOPHT. 151 E3>r€AT10X— ever prone to ran wild, and since there are hurtful and pernicious elements around us, as well as nourisiiing and salutary^ pruning and sheltering, correcting and protecting are also among the principal offices of education^ — Second SOTisir Gwisses at Truthj ISttS, p. 14:5. HEkon, 0-^ E''>r'/^'-'.^.'^':'n. Locke. On Education. Guizot, M: !>Y0, Paris, 1852. Conseils d'n'/t Fdn mr V Education. EFTECT. — ^That which is produced bv the operation of a iise. — F. Cause. EG-<:> I"* ^^ Supposing it proved that my thoughts and mv lioi yosness must have a subject, and consequently that I exLsi. how do I know that all that train and succession of thoughts which I remember belong to one subject, and ' iix, the I of this moment is the very individual / of yester- --. ind of time past ? " — ^Reid, Inquiry, introd, sect. 3. " '^niiam Hamilton's note upon this passage is as — •• Ir. English, we cannot say the /and the not I. _ ._ -„7 Trench le moi and le non-moi^ or even the LT^-maii J jj i_'/i and das nicht Ic7i. The ambiguity arising from identity of sound between the / and the eye. would :':elf preclude the ordinary employment of the former. ~ir '^;''' iii-i the non-ego are the best terms we can use: 1 -T 7.: .Tiiions are scientific, it is perhaps no loss " " ---rir tecnnioal precision l5 guarded by their non- 'arity,'^ 1: „ -^t: - : -t {Reid/s Works^ note B. sect. 1, p. 806.) _ - . - -7 . — ' The ego as the subject of thought and •: 7 .7 15 now commonly styled by philosophers the :. :. :^,^■l subjective is a familiar expression for what Jtaios to the mind or thinking principle. In contrast jjid correlation to these, the terms object and objective are. in like manner, now in general use to denote the non-ego. its aflfections and properties, and in general, the really existent as opposed to the ideally known.'' ^ EGOISM. ECrOl^T.—^'' Those Cartesians who in the progress of their doubts ended in absolute egoism.'^ 152 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. EGOISIfl— " A few bold thinkers, distinguislied by the name of egoists^ had pushed their scepticism to such a length as to doubt of everything but their own existence. According to tliese^ the proposition Cogito^ ergo sum, is the only truth which can be regarded as absolutely certain." — Stewart, Dissert., part 2, p. 161, and p. 175. Dr. Keid says (IntelL Powers, essay ii., chap. 8), that some of Descartes' disciples who doubted of everything but their own existence, and the existence of the operations and ideas of their own mind, remained at this stage of his system and got the name of egoists. But Sir William Hamilton, in a note on the passage, says " He is doubtful about the existence of this supposed sect of egoists.''^ The first sense and aspect of egoism may seem to be selfishness. But this is contradicted by the following epitaph. In the churchyard of Homersfield (St. Mary, Southelm- ham), Suffolk, was the gravestone of Robert Crytoft, who died ISTov. 17th, 1810, aged ninety, bearing the following epitaph : — "MYSELF. " As I walk'd by myself, I talk'd to myself, And thus myself said to me, Look to thyself, and take care of thyself, For nobody cares for thee. " So I turned to myself and I answered myself, In the self-same reverie, Look to myself, or look not to myself, The self-same thing will it be. " EliECTION (eligere, to choose) — is an elicit act of wiU, by which, after deliberation of several means to an end pro- posed by the imderstanding, the will elects one rather than any other. Volition has reference to the end, election is of the means. According to others, no distinction should be taken between election and volition ; as to will an end is the same act as to choose the means. But an end may be accomplished by different means — of one or other of which there is election. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 153 EL.ECTIOX— Aristotle {Ethics, book iii.. chap. 3. 4) says ••moral pre- ference. '^poxiDzai:. then, relates to those thmgs only which may be accomplished by oiu' own exenions: it is appetite or affection, combined with and modified by reason : and, conversant not about tuds. but about the best means by which they may be attained. VoUu^ju. on the contrary, is conversant onlv about t?ids : which consist, according to some, m real, and according to others in seeming good." EJLE:?1E>'T (^Tcr/jio'^). — The Stoic definition of an tlement is, "that out of wluch. as theii^ fii'st principle, things generated are made, and into which, as theii' last remains, they are resolved."" — Diog. Laert.. vli.. 176. '* The word eUmtnt designates the case in which one thing is the primitive matter which constitutes another thing." — Ai'ist., MetajjJu/s.. lib. x.. c. 1. •• We call that elementary which in a composition cannot be di^fided into heterogeneous parts — thus the dements of sound constitute soimd. and the last parts into which you divide it — pai*ts which you cannot di^dde into other sounds of a difi:erent kind. The last parts into which bodies can be divided — parts whicli cannot be divided into parts of a difierent kind, are the thyrrrin^s of bodies. The d-iiKnts oi every being are its constitutive principle." — Arist.. 2L:ta- pl. — Ends are of two kinds, according to Aristotle {Eth., 158 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. lib. i., cap. 1), eus^ysioci, operations, k^yx, productions. An svsQysioc is the end^ when the object of a man's acting is the pleasure or advantage in being so employed, as in music, dancing, contemplation, &c., which produce nothing, generally speaking, beyond the pleasure which the act affords. An s^you is something which is produced beyond the operation or energy; thus, the shoe is the sQyou pro- duced by the hs^ysioi. of shoe-making. — Paul, Analysis of Arist.^ p. 2. This corresponds to Adam Smith's distinction of labour as productive or unproductive, according as it gives or does not give a material product. An end is that for the sake of which an action is done. Hence it has been said to be, principium in intentione et terminus in executione. When one end has been gained, it may be the means of gaining some other end. Hence it is that ends have been distinguished, as supreme and ultimate^ or subordinate and intermediate. That which is sought for its own sake, is the supreme and ultimate end of those actions which are done with a view to it. That which is sought for the sake of some other end, is a subordinate and intermediate end. Ends are ultimate, are distinguished into the end simpli- citer ultimus^ and ends which are ultimate secundum quid. An end which is the last that is successively aimed at, in a series of actions, is called ultimate secundum quid. But that which is aimed at, exclusively for its own sake, and is never regarded as a means to any other end^ is an ultimate end, simply and absolutely. See Edwards, Dissertation concerning the End for ivMch God created the World. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. ENS is either ens reale or ens rationis. Ens Rationis. — That which has no existence but in the idea which the mind forms of it ; as a golden mountain. Eii8 Reale, m philosophical language, is taken late et stricte^ and means anything that exists or may exist ; and is distin- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 159 ENS— guished as ens potentiale^ or that which may exist, and ens actuate^ or that which does exist. It is sometimes taken as the concrete of essentia^ and signifies what has essence and may exist — as a rose in winter.. Sometimes as the parti- ciple of esse^ and then it signifies what actually exists. Ens without intellect is re^, a thing. ENTEIiECBEl^ {ivn'kiX^Lu,^ from brsAg^, perfect, l%iLv^ to have, and Tihoq^ an end, in \j^\avl 'perfectilfiahid). — ''In one of the books of the Pythagoreans, viz.. Ocellus Lucanus, m^ni rov TToti^Tog^ the word avurs'Asioc is used in the same sense. Hence it has been thought that this was borrowed from the Pythagoreans." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ b. i., ch. 3, p. 16.— :N'ote. Cicero (Tuscul. Qucest.^ lib. i., quaest. 1) interprets it to mean quandam quasi continuatam motionem et perennem. Melancthon {Opera^ tom. xiii., pp. 12-14, edit. 1846) gives two interpretations of Endelechy, as he writes it. He says that hhTiSxiS signifies continuus, and iulsT^sxsioc continuitas. According to him, Aristotle used it as syno- nymous with hs^ysia,. Hence Cicero translated it by continuous movement or agitation. Argyropolus blames Cicero for this, and explains it as meaning ''interior per- fection," as if it were to surog tsT^siovu, But Melancthon thinks Cicero's explanation in accordance with the philo- sophy of Aristotle. According to Leibnitz, entelecheia is derived apparently from the Greek word which signifies perfect^ and therefore the celebrated Hermolaus Barbarus expressed it in Latin, word for word, by perfectiliabia^ for act is the accomplish- ment of power ; and he needed not to have consulted the devil, as he did, they say, to tell him this much. — Leibnitz, Theodicee, partie i., sect. 87. "You may give the name of entelecMes to all simple substances or created monads, for they have in them a certain perfection (iyc^vai to brsAg^), they have a suffi- ciency (UvTot^Kitot) which makes them the source of their internal actions, and so to say incorporeal automatons." 160 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ENTEIiECHY— — Monadologie^ sect. 18. He calls a monad an autarchic automaton, or first entelecJiie — having life and force in itself '-'- Entelechy is the opposite to potentiality, yet would be ill translated by that which we often oppose to potentiality, actuality, 'E/^og- expresses the substance of each thing viewed in repose — its form or constitution ; svspysut sit substance, considered as active and generative ; evTs'^ex^toc seems to be the synthesis or harmony of these two ideas. The effectio of Cicero, therefore, represents the most im- portant side of it, but not the whole." — Maurice, Mor. and Metaphys. PM., note, p. 191, 'l^vTi7^s-)ciioc ce qui a en soi sa fin, qui par consequent ne releve que de soi meme, et constitue une unite indivisible. — Cousin, note to Translat. of Aristotle's Metaphysics^ book xii., p. 212. ''Z ^EntelecJiie est oppose a la simple puissance, comme la forme a la matiere, I'etre au possible. C'est elle qui, par la vertu de la Gn^ constitue I'essence meme des choses, et im- prime le mouvement a la matiere aveugle ; et c'est en ce sens qu' Aristote a pu donner de I'ame cette celebre de- finition, qu'elle est I'entelechie ou forme premiere de tout corps naturel qui possede la vie en puissance." — Diet, des Sciences Philosoph, Aristotle defines the soul of man to be an entelechy ; a definition of which Dr. Eeid said he could make no sense. — F. Soul. ENTHUSIASM (o 9iog iv vif^iv) — "is almost a synonym of genius ; the moral life in the intellectual light, the will in the reason ; and without it, says Seneca, nothing truly great was ever achieved." — Coleridge, Notes on Eng. Div.^ vol. i., p. 338. The word occurs both in Plato and Aristotle. According to its composition it should signify " divine inspiration." But it is applied in general to any extraordinary excitement or exaltation of mind. The raptures of the poet, the deep meditations of the philosopher, the heroism of the warrior. the devotedness of the martyr, and the ardour of the patriot, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 161 ENTHUSIASM— are so many different phases of enthusiasm* "According to Plutarch, there be five kinds of enthusiasm : — Divinatory. Bacchic al (or corybantical), Poetical (under which he com- prehends musical also), Martial and Erotical^ or Amatoriey A Treatise concerning enthusiasm by Meric Casaubon, D.D., chap. 1. See also Natural Hist of Enthusiasm^ by Isaac Taylor ; Madame de Stael, Germany ; Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book iv., chap. 19. ENTHYMEME Q'J 6vuco^ in the mind) — is an irregular syllo- gism in which one of the premisses is not expressed, but kept in mind; as every animal is a substance, therefore every man is a substance, in which the premiss, '' man is an animal," is suppressed. The famous expression of Des- cartes, Cogito ergo sum^ is, as to form, an enthymeme. It was not put, however, as a proof of existence, but as meaning that the fact of existing is enclosed in the con- sciousness of thinking. ENTITY (entitas) — in the scholastic philosophy was s}Tion}-- mous with essence or form. To all individuals of a species there is something in common — a natm^e which transiently invests all, but belongs exclusively to none. This essence, taken by itself and viewed apart from any individual, was what the scholastics called an entity. Animals had their entity^ which was called animality. Men had their entity.^ which was called humanity. It denoted the common nature of the individuals of a species or genus. It was the idea or model according to which we conceived of them. The question whether there was a reality corresponding to this idea, divided philosophers into nominalists and realists., — q. v. It is used to denote any thing that exists, as an object of sense or of thought. — V, Ens. ENUNCIATION, in Logic, included the doctrme of proposi- tions. EQUANIMITY.— F. Magnanimity. EQUITY (i-TTietKiiet., or to laov^ as distinguished from tc voiLiiPcot/) — is described by Ai-istotle {Ethics^ book v., chap. M 162 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. EQUITY— 10), as tliat kind of justice which corrects the irregularities or rigours of strict legal justice. All written laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and must leave parti- cular cases to the discretion of the parties. An equitable man will not press the letter of the law in his own favour, when, by doing so, he may do injustice to his neighbour. The ancients, in measuring rusticated building, in which the stones alternately projected and receded, used a leaden rule. Equity^ like this leaden rule, bends to the spe- ciahties of every case, when the iron rule of legal justice cannot do so. ''''Equity contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the law of nature ; and justice contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the law of society. Equity treats of our dues as equals ; justice treats of our dues as fellow- subjects. The purpose of equity is respect for humanity ; the purpose of justice is respect for property. Equity withstands oppression ; justice withstands injury." — Taylor, Synonyms. — V. Justice. EQUlVOCAli words have different significations, as hull^ the animal, the Pope's letter, a blunder. Gallus, in Latin, a cock, or a Frenchman. Canis^ a dog, or the dog-star. They originate in the multiplicity of things and the poverty of language. Words signifying different things may be used, — First, By accident; or, second. With intention. 1st. It has happened, that sandwich is the name of a peer — of a town — of a cluster of islands, and of a slice of bread and meat. 2d. There are four ways in which a word may come to be used equivocally with knowledge or intention : — 1. On account of the resemblance of the things signi- fied, as when a statue or picture is called a man. 2. On account of proportion, as when a point is called a principle in respect to a line, and unity a principle in respect to number. 3. On account of common derivation — thus, a ; VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 16.3 EQUIVOCAIi— man, a medical book, a medical instrument, are all derived from medicine. 4. On account of common reduction or reference — thus, a healthful medicine, healthful pulse, healthful herb, all referring to human health. Some of these are intermediate between equivocal and analogous terms, particularly No. 4. An Equivocal noun, in Logic, has more than one signifi- cation, each of its significations being equalhj applicable to several objects, as hull.^ the animal, the Pope's letter, a blunder. '' Strictly spealdng, there is hardly a word in any language which may not be regarded as in this sense equivo- cal : but the title is usually applied only in any case when a word is employed equivocally ; e. g.^ when the middle term is used in different senses in the two premises, or where a proposition is liable to be understood in differ- ent senses, according to the various meaning of one of its terms." — Whately, Logic^ b. iii., sect. 10. EQUIVOCATION (ceque vocare^ to use one word in different senses). — "How absolute the knave is! We must speak by the card, or equivocation will undo us." — Hamlet^ act v.. scene 1. In morals, to equivocate is to offend against the truth by using language of double meaning, in one sense, with the intention of its being understood in another — or in either sense according to circumstances. The ancient oracles gave responses of ambiguous meaning. Aio^ te^ JSacide^ Romanos posse vincere — may mean either; '*I say that thou, O descendant of ^acus, canst conquer the Romans ;" or, ''I say that the Eomans can conquer thee, O descen- dant of ^acus." Latronem Petrum occidisse^ may mean, " a robber slew Peter ;" or, " Peter slew a robber." There may be equivocation in sound as well as in sense. It is told that the queen of George III. asked one of the dignitaries of the church, if ladies might knot on Sunday? His reply was, ladies may not; which, in so far as sound goes, is equivocal. 164 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. EQUIVOCATION— '' Eyes saw Peter to-day," sounds the same as '' I saw Peter to-day." — V. Eeservation. ERROR. — Knowledge being to be had only of visible certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that v^hich is not true. — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ b. iv., c. 20. "The true," said Bossuet, after Augustine, "is that which is, the false is that which is not." To err is to fail of attaining to the true, which we do when we think that to be which is not — or think that not to be which is. Error is not in things themselves, but in the mind of him who errSj or judges not according to the truth. Our faculties, when employed within their proper sphere, are fitted to give us the knowledge of truth. We err by a wrong use of them. The causes of error are partly in the objects of knowledge, and partly in ourselves. As it is only the true and real which exists, it is only the true and real which can reveal itself But it may not reveal itself fully — and man, mistaking a part for the whole, or partial evidence for complete evidence, falls into error. Hence it is, that in all error there is some truth. To discover the relation which this partial truth bears to the whole truth, is to discover the origin of the error. The causes in ourselves which lead to error^ arise from wrong views of our faculties, and of the conditions under which they operate. Indolence, precipitation, passion, custom, authority, and education, may also contribute to lead us into error, — F. Falsity. Bacon, Novum Organum, lib. i. Malebranche, Recherche de la Verite. Descartes, On Method, Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ b. vi., c. 20. ESOTERIC and EXOTERIC (saahv^ within ; Ig^j, without). — "The philosophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the other sects, was divided into the exoteric and the esoteric ; the open, taught to all ; and the secret, taught to a select number." — Warburton, Div. Leg.., book ii., note bb. V^OCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 165 ESOTERIC— According to Origen, Aulus Gellius, Porphyry, and Jam- blichus, the distinction of esoteric and exoteric among the Pythagoreans was applied to the disciples — according to the degree of initiation to which they had attained, beinc' fully admitted into the society, or being merely postulants. — Eitter, Hist, de Philosophies torn, i., p. 298, of 'Franch translation. Plato is said to have had doctrines which he taught pubhcly to all — and other doctrines which he taught only to a few, in secret. There is no allusion to such a distinc- tion of doctrines in the writings of Plato, Aristotle (Phys,. lib. iv., c. 2), speaks of opinions of Plato which were not written. But it does not follow that these were secret — ^Ey Toig 'hiyo^.ivoig dypot^poi^ 6oy[/.otaiv, They may have been oral. Aristotle himself frequently speaks of some of his writings as exoteric; and others as acroamatic, or esoteric. The former treat of the same subjects as the latter, but in a popular and elementary way ; while the esoteric are more scientific in their form and matter. Eavaisson, Essai sur la Metaphysique d^Aristote^ tom i., c. 1 . Tucker, Light of Nature Pursued^ vol. ii., chap. 2. — V. ACEOAMATIC. ESSENCE (essentia^ from essens^ the old participle of esse^ to be — introduced into the Latin tongue by Cicero). '' Sicut ab eo quod est sapere^ vocatur sapientia; sic ab eo quod est 6556, vocatur essentia.'''' — August., De Civit., lib. xii., c. 11. "Totum illud per quod res est, et est id quod est." — Chauvin, Lexicon Philosoph. ''Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Under - stand.., book iii., chap. 3, sect. 15. "The essence of things is made up of that common nature wherein it is founded, and of that distinctive nature by which it is formed. This latter is commonly understood when we speak of the formality or formalis ratio (the formal con- 166 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ESSENCE— sideration) of things ; and it is looked upon as being more peculiarly the essence of things, though 'tis certain that a triangle is as truly made up in part of figure, its common nature, as of the three lines and angles, which are distinctive and peculiar to it. '' The essence of a thing most properly and strictly is, what does first and fundamentally constitute that thing, and that only Is strictly essential which is either the whole or some part of the constituent essence ; as in man to be a living creature, or to be capable of religion ; his being capable of celestial happiness, may be called essential in the way of consequence, or consecutively, not constituently." — Oldfield, Essay on Reason^ p. 184. '•'- Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly called its essence. Self-consciousness, therefore, is the essence of the mind, because it is in virtue of self- conscious- ness that the mind is the mind — the man himself." — Ferrier, Instit of MetapJiys.^ p. 245. ''AU those properties or qualities, without which a thing could not exist, or without which it would be entirely altered, make up what is called the essence of a thing. Three lines joining are the essence of a triangle ; if one is removed, what remains is no longer a triangle." — ^Taylor, Elements of Thought. The essential attributes, faciunt esse entia^ cause things to be what they are. The Greeks had but one word for essence and substance, viz., ovffioc. The word vTroaruaig was latterly introduced. By Aristotle ovaict was applied — 1. To the form^ or those qualities which constitute the specific nature of every being, 2. To the matter., in which those qualities manifest them- selves to us — the substratum or subject {yiroytn^ivav). 8. To the concrete or individual being (aui/o'Aou)^ constituted by the union of the two preceding. In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be established between essence and substance. Substance was applied to the abstract notion of matter — the undetermined VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 167 ESSENCE— subject or substratum of all possible forms, to v7:okbii^suou. Essence to the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those ideas which represent the genus and species. Descartes defined substance as ''that which exists so that it needs nothing but itself to exist" — {Princip. Philosoph.^ 4 pars, sect. 1) — a definition applicable to deity only. Essence he stripped of its logical signification, and made it the foun- dation of all those qualities and modes which we perceive in matter. Among the attributes of every substance there is one only which deserves the name of essence^ and on which the others depend as modifications — as extension, in matter, and thought, in mind. He thus identified essence and substance. But extension supposes something extended, and thought something that thinks. With Leibnitz essence and substance were the same, \'iz., force or power. Essence is analogically applied to things having no real existence ; and then it retains its logical sense and expresses the quahties or ideas which should enter into the definition ; as when we speak of the essence of an equilateral triangle being three equal sides and three equal angles. This is the only sense in which Kant recognizes the word. In popular language essence is used to denote the nature of a thing. ETERNITY is a negative idea expressed by a positive term. It supposes a present existence, and denies a beginning or an end of that existence. Hence the schoolmen spoke of eternity^ a parte ante^ and a parte post. The Scotists main- tained that eternity is made up of successive parts, which drop, so to speak, one from another. The Tliomists held that it is simple duration, excluding the past and the future. Plato said, time is the moving shadow of eternity. The common symbol of eternity is a circle. It may be doubted how far it is competent to the human mind to compass in thought the idea of absolute beginning, or the idea of absolute ending. On man's conception of eternity^ see an Examination of Mr. Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time. By ]SIr. IMansell. 168 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ETERNITIT— " What is eternity ? can anglit Paint its duration to the thought ? Tell all the sand the ocean laves, Tell all its changes, all its waves. Or, tell with more lahorious pains, The drops its mighty mass contains ; Be this astonishing account Augmented with the full amount Of all the drops that clouds have shed, Where'er their wat'ry fleeces spread, Through all time's long protracted tour. From Adam to the present hour; — Still short the sum, nor can it vie With the more numerous years that lie Embosomed in eternity. Attend, man, with awe divine. For this eternity is thine."— Gibhons. ETERNITIT (®F €^Ol>). — The Eternal is that which is above all variation. The Eternal is not time infinite, duration without limits. The Eternal is above and without time and duration ; it is the condition of time itself. God is eternal by his infinite essence, absolute, always the same, identical, immovable ; He is eternal in the fundamental properties which constitute the ground of his essence. He is by his eternity^ the source of all those laws^ eternal, immutable, necessary, which govern all the domains of existence, the world physical and spiritual. Eternity is the reason even of necessity. For we call that necessary which cannot be but in one manner, which admits no alternative, and permits no choice, which is immovable. The Being eternal and immovable is also the Being necessary. God cannot not be, or be other than he is in his eternal nature. All his essence, all his attributes are necessarily given in his being and by his being. God is all which can be in his eternal nature, in the absolute organism of his existence, by one single power immovable and necessary; he is absolute power, he is the Being in regard to which there is neither present, nor past, nor future. — Tiberghien, Essai de Con- naiss. Hum,., p. 741. Deus non est duratio vel spatium., sed durat et adest. This scholium of Sir Isaac Newton contains the germ of Dr. VOCABULARY OF PHLLOSOPHY. 169 JETERXITY (OF OOI>)— Clarke's Demonstration of the Being of God. Time and space are qualities, and imply a substance. Tlie ideas of time and space necessaiily force themselves upon our minds. T\'e cannot think of them as not existmg. And as we think of them as infinite, they are the infinite qualities of an in- finite substance, that is. of God. necessarily existing. ETHICS "extend to the investigation of those principles by which 77wral men are governed ; they explore the nature and excellence of virtue, the natm^e o^ moral obligation, on what it i5 foimded. and what are the proper motives of practice : morality in the more common acceptation, though not exclusively, relates to the practical and obligatoiy part of ethics. Ethics prmcipally regard the theory of morals/' — Cogan. Ethic. Treat, on Passions, introd. Aristotle (Eth.. lib. 2), says that '/;^c, which signifies moral wtue. is derived trom sVo^, custom: since it is by repeated acts that virtue, which is a moral habit, is acqiured. Cicero (De Eaio. cap. 1). says. Quia pertinet ad mores, quod r^^og illi vacant^ nos earn partem pJiilosopJiice, De morihus., appellare solemus: sed decet augentem lingxiam Latinam nominare Moralem. Ethics is thus made synony- mous with morals or moral philosophy, q. v. Ethics taken in its widest signification, as including the moral sciences or natural jm^isprudence. may be divided into : — 1. Moral Philosophy, or the science of the relations. rights, and duties, by which men are tmder obligation to- wards God. themselves, and then- fellow-creattu:es. '2. The Law of Nations, or the science of those laws by which all nations, as constituting the imiversal society of the human race, are boimd in their mutual relations to one another. 3. Public or Pohtical Law, or the science of the relations between the difierent ranks in society. 4. Civil Law, or the science of those laws, rights, and duties, by which individuals in civil society are bound, — as commercial, cruninal, judicial, Koman or modern. 170 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 5. History, Profane, Civil, and Political. — Peemans, Introd. ad PMlosopli,^ p. 96. ETHNOORAPIIY (ihog y^xCpy^^ and ETIIN01.0GY bear the same relation almost to one another as geology and geography. While ethnography contents herself with the mere description and classification of the races of man, ethnology^ or the science of races, "investigates the mental and physical differences of mankind, and the organic laws upon which they depend ; seeks to deduce from these in- vestigations principles of human guidance, in all the im- portant relations of social and national existence.'* Ethnological Journal^ June 1, 1848. Edin, Rev., Oct., 1844. ETKOIiOCM^ (y}6og, or I'^o^-, and T^oyog) — is a word coming to be used in philosophy. Sir William Hamilton has said that Aristotle's Rhetoric is the best ethology extant, mean- ing that it contains the best account of the passions and feelings of the human heart, and of the means of awaken- ing and interesting them so as to produce persuasion or action. CUDXIMONISM Qvldtftouid, happiness) — is a term applied by German philosophers to that system of morality which places the foundation of virtue in the production of happi- ness. — Whewell, Pref. to Mackintosh'' s Dissert., p. 20. This name, or rather Hedonism, may be applied to the system of Chrysippus and Epicurus. EVnOENCE (e-videre, to see, to make see). — " Evidence signi- fies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or the other." — Blackstone, Comment., b. iii., c. 23. Evidence is the ground or reason of knowledge. It is the light by which the mind apprehends things presented to it. Fulgor quidam mentis assensum rapiens. In an act of knowledge there is the object or thing known, and the subject or person knowing. Between the faculties of the person knowing and the qualities of the thing known, there is some proportion or relation. The qualities mani- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 171 fest themselves to the faculties, and the result is knowledge ; or the thing is made evident — that is, it not only exists, but is revealed as existing. There are as many kinds or sources of evidence as there are powers or faculties by which we attain to truth and reaUty. Sense, consciousness, and memory are som^ces of evidence. Reason, as giving necessary and universal truth, and reasoning, by which we ascend from the particular to the general, or by which we descend fr'om the general to the particular, are so many sources of evidence. And the testimony of others as to things which have not come under the cognizance of our OAvn faculties, may also fornish evi- dence^ or a gi^ound of knowledge. ''The demonstrations of algebra possess equal certainty with those of geometry, but cannot lay claim to the same evidence. Certainty is ipositixe; evidence^ ve\siti\e'^ the for- mer, strictly taken, insusceptible of more or less, the latter capable of existing in many different degTees.'' — Coleridge, Xoies on English Divines, vol. i., p. 33. Evidence is of different degrees. The evidence of sense and consciousness as to matters of fact, and the evidence of reason as to first truths or truths demonstrated by means of them, is of the highest degree, and begets certainty or knowledge properly so called. When things do not frilly manifest themselves to our faculties, or when our faculties do not clearly nor fully apprehend them, but when we, not- withstanduig, form some judgment concerning them, the evidence is probable. And when there is merely the possi- bility of the object of our apprehension existing as it is apprehended by us, we have not knowledge or opinion, even, but may rather be said to be in doubt. Evidence of sense and consciousness, and also of the truths of reason, is such as to give knowledge ^vithout any effort upon oiu- parts. But in reasoning, although the result may be equally clear and certain, we do not attain it without attention and intellectual effort. We are not, on this account, to think that we make or give the evidence 172 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. to what is true. Truth and reality exist independent!}- of us. Many things are most certain which are not evident^ not only in matters of faith but of sense ; as the motion trans- mitted from one body to another. The rules as to the various kinds and degrees of evidence can only be found in writers on the several departments of inquiry to which that evidence belongs. On evidence in general, see Glassford, Essay on the Principles of Evidence^ part 1, 8vo, Edin., 1820. Smedley, Moral Evidence^ 8vo, Lond., 1850, EVlli is the negation or contrary of good. — ''That which hath in it a fitness to promote its own preservation or well-being, is called good. And, on the contrary, that which is apt to hinder it, is called eviV — ^Wilkins, Nat. Eelig,^ book i. "Every man calleth that which joleaseth^ and is delight- ful to himself, good ; and that evil which displeaseth him." — Hobbes, Hum. Nat.., chap 7. Pleasure is fit for, or agreeable to, the nature of a sen- sible being, or a natural good; pain is unfits or is a natural evil. "The voluntary application of this natural good and evil to any rational being, or the production of it by a rational being, is moral good and eviU^ — King, Essay on Origin of Evil., translated by Law, chap. 1, sect. 3, notes, p. 38, fifth edit. ^''Metaphysical evil consists simply in imperfection, 79/^1/- sical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin." — Leibnitz, On Goodness of God., part 1, sect. 21. '-'•Evil does not proceed from ^principle of evil. Cold does not proceed from a principle of coldness., nor darkness from a principle of darkness. Evil is mere privation." — part 2, sect. 153. " Evil does not exist in itself as a substance; there is not an element of evil ; nothing is evil considered in itself, but it may be vitiated in its relations with other things. Evil., then, expresses the false relations (^faux rapports)., in which VOC-lIiULAP.Y OF PHILO::OPHY. 173 EVIL— several things good in themselves may he placed^ in the physical or moral world. "VMience it foUows, that evil is neither a principle^ in the sense of dualism, since all things are good in so far as they manifest the diyine essence in the world, nor a simple negation^ in the sense of pantheism, since evil exists effectively and really in the false relations, or in the false combinations established among things. These false relations from which evil results, denote evi- dently an individual being, a finite being, who, at the same time that he is capable of ascending to absolute unity and harmony, in which things find themselves in their true relations, can also, in so far as finite, embrace things in their isolation, in their particularity, and establish between them relations contrary to the general harmony of beings. Evil^ then, has its origin in the individuality, in xh^ finite- ness of beings who are not sufficient for themselves, and who can, in virtue of their spontaneity and liberty, break the absolute relations which exist among things. Spontaneity and liberty are not imperfect in themselves, but they may become so, by the bad use made of them, and may be the cause of imperfections and evils without niunber. And, as individuality is an eternal principle, it is also an eternal cause of evil; the evil is given with the finite nature of beings and endiu-es with it — ^if not in reality at least in possibility, in all states and conditions in which individual beings can be found. Evil is an eternal element of the life of finite beings, and as such, it is also necessary and independent of the Divine will." — Tiber ghien, Essai des Connais. Hum., p. 736. ^'The Being infinite and absolute, who is selt- sufficient. independent, in possession of all the conditions to accom- plish good and to embrace all things in their just relations, is not capable of evil or error. But as individual beings have the reason of their existence in God, evil also has its last reason in the being of all reality The divine nature gave the possibility of evil^ in giving individual and finite beings who transfer it into reality. That which is 174 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. EVIIi— possible in finite beings, by reason of their eternal and divine origin, they render real, effective in time, by the use of their spontaneity. Evil may be said to exist in God, not in act, but in power. He does not will it as such, but admits it as the possible result of the nature of finite beings who have their eternal cause in himself ; in other words, he pennits evil. ''''Evil has also its origin in human nature in so far as it is finite, but it may be avoided and combated by that part of his nature which is the expression of the infinite and abso- lute. Evil is the occasion for man to show what is divine in him, by rising above the finite and contingent events of this life, and striving to be perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect." — Ihid., p. 758. A power to do good, is ex necessitate rei^ a power to do evil. '' Almighty power itself cannot create an intelligent moral agent, and place it beyond all liability to sin. If it could not sin, there would be no merit, no virtue in its obedience. That is to say, it would not be a moral agent at all, but a machine merely. The power to do wrong, as well as to do right, is included in the very idea of a moral and accountable agent, and no such agent can possibly exist without being invested with such a power." — Bledsoe, Theodicy., p. 195, and p. 353. Dr. Young (Mystery.^ p. 203) says, — "The abuse of moral power, in other words, the rebellion of the created will, must have been impreventible, else it had been pre- vented. All that was possible to be done must have been done ; but to prevent the abuse of moral power, that is, to necessitate the created will, was an impossibility." And in a note he says, this is the view of Julius Miiller, "Moral evil is an evil that has its origin in a will. An evil common to all, must have a ground common to all. But the actual existence of moral evil^ we are bound in conscience to admit ; and that there is an evil common to all is a fact ; and this evil must therefore have a common VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 17^ EVIIi— ground. Now, this evil ground cannot originate in the Divine will; it must therefore be referred to the will of man." — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ pp. 158, 174. The question concerning the origin of evil has been answered by — 1. The doctrine of pre -existence, or that the evils we are here suffering are^the punishments or expi- ations of moral delinquencies in a former state of existence. 2. The doctrine of the Manicheans which supposes two co- eternal and independent agencies, the one the author of good, and the other of evil. 8. The doctrine of optimism, or, that evil is part of a system conducted by Almighty power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and good- ness. — Stewart, Active and Mor, Poivers^ b. iii., c. 3, sect. 1, On the origin of evil^ its nature, extent, uses, &c., see Plato, Cicero, and Seneca, Malebranche and Fenelon, Clarke and Leibnitz, Bledsoe, Theodicy; Young, Mystery. EXISTENCE (ex sister e^ to stand out). — ^'The metaphysicians look upon existence as the formal and actual part of a being." — H. More, Antid. agt. Atheism^ app., c. 44. It has been called the actus entitativus^ or that by which anything has its essence actually constituted in the nature of things. Essence pertains to the question Quid est .^ Existence pertains to the question An est f Essence formal^ combined with essence substantial^ gives existence ; for existence is essence clothed with form. — Tiber- ghien, Essai des Connaiss. Hum..^ p. 739, note. Existence is the actuality of essence. It is the act by which the essences of things are actually in rerum natura — beyond their causes. Before things are produced by their causes, they are said to be in the objective power of their causes ; but when produced they are beyond their causes, and are actually in rerum natura — as maggots before they are warmed into life by heat of the sun. '' Existentia est unio realis, sive actualis conjunctio partium sive attributorum quibus ens constat Existentia dicitur quasi rei extra causas etnihilum sistentia.^^ 176 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. EXISTENCE— — Peemans, Introd, ad Pliilosoph.^ 12mo, Lovan., 1840, p. 45. Existence and Essence. — Incaute sibi finxerunt quidam, '•'- Essentias quasdam easque eternas, fuisse sine existentia;''^ siquando autem subnascatur E,es istiusmodi ideae similis, tunc censent existentiam essentia supervenientem, veram rem efficere, sive ens reale. Atque Line, essentiam et existen- tiam dixerunt essendi principia, sive entis constitutiva. Quicquid vero essentiam babet yeram, eodem tempore habet existentiam^ eodem sensu quo habet essentiam^ aut quo est ens, aut aliquid." — Hutcbeson, Metaphys.^ p. 4. '^ Essence^ in relation to God, must involve a necessary existence ; for we cannot in any measure duly conceive what he is^ without conceiving that he is^ and, indeed, cannot but be. The name he takes to himself is I am (or I will be). This is the contraction of that larger name, I am what I am (or I will be what I will be), which may seem closely to conjoin God's unquestionable necessary existence with his unsearchable, boundless essence.^"" — Oldfield, Essay on Rea- son^ p. 48. See art. Existence^ in French Encyclopoedia^ by Mons. Turgot. EXOTERIC— F. Esoteric. EXPEDIENCE (©octffine of). — Paley has said, "Whatever is expedient is right."— F. Utility (Doctrine of). EXPERIENCE Q^TTSi^icc^ experientia). — Aristotle hmited ex- perience to the results of sensation and perception. "Ex /^tu ocvTov yii/of/^eu'/ig if^Tiru^ioi. — Analyt. Poster.^ ii., 19. Wolf used experience as co-extensive with the contents of consciousness, to include all of which the mind is conscious, as agent or patient, all that it does from within, as well as all that it suffers from without. " Experiri dicimur, quic- quid ad perceptiones nostras attenti cognoscimus. Sokm lucere^ cognoscimus ad ea attenti, quse visu percipimus. Similiter ad nosmet ipsos attenti cognoscimus, nos non posse assensum proebere contradictoriis, v. g. non posse sumere VC)CABirLAP.Y OF PHIL060PHT. 177 ZXPERIII^CE— tin jiini veran^ qaod sbmil plnat et non plnat."^ — PMLo- :, quibus omnino confici non potest. — Cicero, De Invent.^ Hb. ii., 40. Facultas est quselibet vis activa, sen virtus, seu potcvi ;'J\ Solet etiam vocari potentia, verum tunc intelligenda e>- potentia activa, seu habilitas ad agendum, — Chainin, Lexicon Philosoph. '' The word faculty is most properly applied to t host- powers of the mind which are original and natura-; and which make part of the constitution of the mind."— -Epld, Intell. Powers, essay i., chap. 1. A faculty is the natural power by which phen^Mne^^i are produced by a person that is an agent, who can direct and concentrate the power which he possesses. — ^Jo^iTroy^ Melanges, Bruxell, 1834, p. 249. Bodies have the property of being put in motion, or being melted. The magnet has an attractive poiver. Plants have a medical virtue. But instead of blind and fatal activity, let the being who has power be conscious of It^ and be able to exercise and regulate it ; this is what is rneunt by faculty. It implies intelligence and fi:-eedom. It is personality which gives the character of faculties to thor natural powers which belong to us. — Did. des Sci-'i^Ci- Philosoph. ''The faculties of the mind and its powers,^'' say<; Dw Beid, '' are often used as synonymous expressions. But/' continues he, " as most synonyms have some minut*^ dis- tinction that deserves notice, I apprehend that the word faculty is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make part TOa^JBULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 185 FACrJLTY— of the constitution of the mind. There are other powers which are acquii-ed by use, exercise, or study, which are not called faculties^ but habits. There must be something in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire liabits^ and this is commonly called capacity.^" Such are the distinct meanings which Dr. Keid would assign to these words ; and these meanings are in accord- ance both with their philosophical and more familiar use. The distinction between J90i6'er and faculty is, that faculty is more properly applied to what is natm^al and original, in opposition or contrast to what is acquired. We say the faculty of judging, but th^ power of habit. But, as all our faculties are powers, we can apply the latter term equally to what is original and to what is acquired. And we can say, with equal propriety, the poicer of judging and the power of habit. The acquiring of habits is pecuhar to man : at least the ulterior animals do so to a ver^' limited extent. There must, therefore, be somethiog in the constitution of the human mind upon which the acquhiag of habits de- pends. This, says Dr. Reid, is called a capacity. The capacity is natural, the habit is acquired. Dr. Reid did not recognize the distinction between active and passive power. But a capacity is a passive power. The term is appHed to those manifestations of mind m which it is generally regarded as passive, or as affected or acted on by somethiag external to itself Thus, we say a man is capable of gratitude, or love, or grief, or joy. We speak also of the capacity of acquiring knowledge. Xow, in these forms of expression, the miad is considered as the passive recipient of certain affections or impressions coming upon it. Taking into accoimt the distiaction of powers as active and passive, ^^ these terms,'' says Sir Will. Hamilton {BeifTs Works^ p. 221), '' stand in the following relations. Powers are active and passive, natural and acquired. Powers natiu^l and active are called faculties. Powers natural and passive, capacities or receptivities. Powers acquired are habits, and habit is used both in an active and passive sense. The 186 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. FACUXTY— power, again, of acquiring a habit is called a disposition." This is quite in accordance with the explanations of Dr. Eeid, only that instead of disposition he employs the term capacity, to denote that on which the acquiring of habits is founded. Disposition is employed by Dr. Reid to denote one of the active principles of our nature. One great end and aim of philosophy is to reduce facts and phenomena to general heads and laws. The philosophy of mind, therefore, endeavours to arrange and classify the operations of mind according to the general circumstances under which they are observed. Thus we find that the mind frequently exerts itself in acquiring a knowledge of the objects around it by means of the bodily senses. These operations vary according to the sense employed, and according to the object presented. But in smelling, tasting, and touching, and in all its operations by means of the senses, the mind comes to the knowledge of some object different from itself. This general fact is denoted by the term perception ; and we say that the mind, as manifested in these operations, has the power or faculty of perception. The knowledge which the mind thus acquires can be recalled or reproduced, and this is an operation which the mind delights to perform, both from the pleasure which it feels in reviving objects of former knowledge, and the^ benefit which results from reflectmg upon them. But the recalling or reproducing objects of former knowledge is an act altogether different from the act of originally obtaining it. It implies the possession of a peculiar power to per- form it. And hence we ascribe to the mind a power of recollection or dt, faculty of memory. A perception is quite distinct from a recollection. In the one we acquire know- ledge which is new to us — in the other we reproduce knowledge which we already possess. In the operations of recollection or memory it is often necessary that the mind exert itself to exclude some ob- jects which present themselves, and to introduce others which do not at first appear. In such case- the mind doe-^ VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 187 FACUIiTY— SO by an act of resolving or determining, by a volition, ISTow, a volition is altogether different from a cognition. To know is one thing, to will is quite another thing. Hence it is that we assign these different acts to different powers, and say that the mind has a power of understanding, and also a power of willing. The power of understanding may exert itself in different ways, and although the end and result of all its operations be knowledge, the different ways in which knowledge is acquired or improved may be assigned, as we have seen they are, to different powers or faculties — but these are all considered as powers of under- standing. In like manner the power of willing or deter- mining may be exerted under different conditions, and, for the sake of distinctness, these may be denoted by different terms ; but still they are all included in one class, and called powers of the will. Before the will is exerted we are in a state of pleasure or pain, and the act of will has for its end to continue that state or to terminate it. The pleasures and the pains of which we are susceptible are numerous and varied, but the power or capacity of being affected by them is denoted by the term sensibility or feeling. And we are said not only to have powers of understanding and will, but powers of sensibility. When we speak, therefore, of a power or faculty of the mind, we mean that certain operations of mind have been observed, and classified according to the conditions and circumstances under which they manifest themselves, and that distinct names have been given to these classes of phenomena, to mark what is pecuhar in the act or operation, and consequently in the power or faculty to which they are referred. But when we thus classify the operations of the mind, and assign them to different powers, we are not to ^ suppose that we divide the mind into different compart- ments, of which each has a different energy. The euerg}- is the same in one and all of the operations. It is the same mind actin«f accordino- to different conditions and laws. 188 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. FACUIiTY— The energy is one and indivisible. It is only the manifesta- tions of it that we arrange and classify. This is well put by the famous Alcuin, who was the friend and adviser of Charlemagne, in the following passage, which is translated from his work De Ratione Animce : — ''The soul bears divers names according to the nature of its operations ; inasmuch as it lives and makes live, it is the soul {animd) ; inasmuch as it contemplates, it is the spirit (spiritus) ; inasmuch as it feels, it is sentiment (sensus) ; since it reflects, it is thought (animus) ; as it comprehends, intelligence (mens) ; inasmuch as it discerns, reason (ratio) ; as it consents, will (voluntas) ; as it recol- lects, memory (memoria). But these things are not divided in substance as in name, for all this is the soul, and one soul only." ^Faculties of the iwiind.— The faculties of the human mind were formerly distinguished as gnostic or cognitive, and orectic or appetent. They have also been regarded as belonging to the understanding or to the will, and have been desig- nated as intellectual or active. A threefold classification of them is now generally adopted, and they are reduced to the heads of intellect or cognition, of sensitivity or feeling, and of activity or will. Under each of these heads, again, it is common to speak of several subordinate faculties, " This way of speaking of faculties has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did com- mand, obey, and perform several actions, as so many dis- tinct beings : which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 21, sect. 17, 20. Dr. Brown, instead of ascribing so many distinct faculties to the mind, which is one, would speak of it as in different states^ or under different affections. — Lecture xvi. "Les divers facultes que I'on considere dans I'ame, ne sont point des choses distinctes reellement, mais le meme VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 189 FACinLTY— etre clifferemment consldere." — Amaud, Des Vrais et des Fausses Idees^ ch. 27. •• Quoique nous donnions a ces facultes des noms differents, par rapport a leiir diverses operations, cela ne nous oblige pas a les regarder comme des choses differentes, car I'en- tendement n'est autre chose que Tame, en tant qu'elle retient et se ressouvient ; la volonte n'est autre chose que Tame, en tant qu'elle veut et que'lle choisit De sorte qu'on pent entendre que toutes ces facidtes ne sent, au fond, que le meme ame. qui recoit divers noms, a cause de ses difterentes operations." — Bossuet, Connaissance de Dieu. ch. 1, art. 20. •• Man is sometimes in a predominant state of intelligence^ sometimes in a predominant state of feeling ^ and sometimes in a predominant state of action and determination. To call these, however, separate faculties, is altogether beside the mark. Xo act of intelligence can be performed without the will, no act of determination without the intellect, and no act either of the one or the other without some amount of feeling being mingled in the process. Thus, whilst thev each have then' own distinctive characteristics, yet there is a perfect unity at the root." — Morell, Psychology^ p. 61. "I feel that there is no more reason for believing my mind to be made up of distinct entities, or attributes, or faculties^ than that my foot is made up of walking and rtmning. My mind, I firmly believe, thinks, and wills, and remembers, just as simply as my body walks, and rims. and rests." — Irons, Final Causes^ p. 93. •• It woidd be well if, instead of speaking of ' the powers (ov faculties) of the mind ' (which causes misunderstanding), we adhered to the designation of the several ' operations of one muid;' which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget." — Feuchtersleben, Medical Psychol^ 8vo, 18^7, p. 120. ^•The judgn^ent is often spoken of as if it were a dis- tinct power or faculty of the soul, differing from the imagmation, the memory, &c., as the heart differs from the 190 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. FACUIiTY— lungs, or the brain from the stomach. All that ought to be understood by these modes of expression is, that the mind sometimes compares objects or notions ; sometimes joins together images ; sometimes has the feeling of past time with an idea now present, &c." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. '' ^N'otwithstanding we divide the soul into several powers and faculties^ there is no such division in the soul itself, since it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, wills, or imagines. Our manner of considering the memory, understanding, will, imagination, and the like faculties^ is for the better enabling us to express ourselves in such abstracted subjects of speculation, not that there is any such division in the soul itself" — Spectator^ No. 600. "The expression, ' man perceives, and remembers, and imagines, and reasons,' denotes all that is conveyed by the longer phrase, ' the mind of man has the faculties of per- ception, and memory, and imagination, and reasoning.' " — S. Bailey, Letters on Philosoph. of Hum. Mind^ p. 13. '' Herbart rejects the whole theory of mental inherent faculties as chimerical, and has, in consequence, aimed some severe blows at the psychology of Kant. But, in fact, it is only the rational psychology which Kant exploded, which is open to this attack. It may be that in mental, as in physical mechanics, we know force only from its effects ; but the consciousness of distinct effects will thus form the real basis of psychology. The faculties may then be retained as a convenient method of classification, provided the lan- guage is properly explained, and no more is attributed to them than is warranted by consciousness. The same con- sciousness which tells me that seeing is distinct from hearing, tells me also that volition is distinct from both ; and to speak of the faculty of will does not necessarily imply more than the consciousness of a distinct class of mental pheno- mena." — ^Mansell, Prolegem. Log.^ p. 34, note. FAIiSE, FAIiSITY — ^The false^ in one sense, applies to things ; and there is falsity either when things really are VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 191 FAL.SE-— not, or when it is impossible they can be ; as when it Ls said that the proportion of the diagonal to the side of a square is commensurable, or that you sit — the one is abso- lutely false ^ the other accidentally — for in the one case and the other the fact affirmed is not. The false is also predicated of things which really exist, but which appear other than they are, or what they are not : a portrait, or a dream. They have a kind of reality, but they really are not what they represent. Thus, we say that things Sirefalse^ either because they do not absolutely exist, or because they are but appearances and not reali- ties. — Arist., Metaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 30. Falsity is opposed to verity or trut?i. — q, v. To transcendental truth, or truth of being ^ the opposite Ls nonentity^ rather than falsity. A thing that really is, is what it is. A thing that is not is a nonentity. Falsity^ then, is twofold — objective and formal. Objective falsity is when a thing resembles a thing which it really is not, or when a sign or proposition seems to represent or enunciate what it does not. Formal falsity belongs to the intellect when it fails to discover objective falsify ^ and judges according to appearances rather than the reahty and truth of things. Formal falsity is error ; which is opposed to logical truth. To moral truth, the opposite is falsehood or lying. FANCY ((pciyrctGicc). — ''Imagination or phantasy^ in its most extensive meaning, is the faculty representative of the phenomena both of the internal and external worlds." — Sir W. Hamilton, Eeid's Works^ note B, sect. 1. " In the soul Are many lesser faculties, that serve Reason as chief; among them fancy next Her oflBce Ltolds : of all external things Which the five watchful senses represent She forms Imaginations, air>' shapes." :>Iilton. Paradise Lost, book v. * Aristotle says {Metaphys.. lib. ix., cap. 10), -'Being is above all true— nonentity false.'' 192 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. FANCY— " Where fantasi/, near handmaid to the mind, Sits and beholds, and doth discern them all ; Compounds in one things different in their kind. Compares the black and white, the great and small." Sir John Davies, Immortality. " When nature rests, Oft in her absence mimic fancy wakes To imitate her, but, misjoining shapes, Wild work produces oft, but most in dreams." " Tell me where is fancy bred, Or in the heart, or in the head? How begot, how nourished ? Merch. of Venice, act iii., scene 2. *' Break, Phantsie, from thy cave of cloud. And wave thy purple wings, Now all thy figures are allowed, And various shapes of things. Create of airy forms a stream ; It must have blood and naught of phlegm ; And though it be a waking dream. Yet let it like an odour rise To all the senses here. And fall like sleep upon their eyes, Or music on their ear."— Ben Jonson. " How various soever the pictures of fancy ^ the mate- rials, according to some, are all derived from sense ; so that the maxim — Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu — though not true of the intellect, holds with regard to the phantasy.'''' — ^Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ b. ii., ch. 7. Addison said {Spectator, No. 411), that he used the words imagination and fancy indiscriminately. Mr. Stewart ssld (Philosoph, Hum. Mind^ chap, v.), '^It is obvious that a creative imagination, when a person possesses it so habitually that it may be regarded as form- ing one characteristic of his genius, implies a power of summoning up at pleasure a particular class of ideas ; and of ideas related to each other in a particular manner ; which power can be the result only of certain habits of association, which the individual has acquired. It is to this power of the mind which is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common priuciples of our nature," that Mr. Stewart would appropriate the name VOCABULAHY OF PHILOSOPHY. 193 FAIVCY— fancy. '' The office of this power is to collect materials for the imagination ; and therefore, the latter power pre- supposes the former, while the former does not necessarily suppose the latter. A man v/hose habits of association present to him, for illustrating or embellishing a subject, a number of resembling or analogous ideas, we call a man o^ fancy; but for an effort of imagination, various other powers are necessary, particularly the powers of taste and judgment ; without which, we can hope to produce nothing that will be a source of pleasure to others. It is the power of fancy which supplies the poet with metaphorical lan- guage, and with all the analogies which are the founda- tion of his allusions ; but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious characters he delineates. To fancy we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant ; to imagination, those of beautiful or sublime." Fancy was called by Coleridge ''the aggregative and associative power." But Wordsworth says, "To aggre- gate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to imagination as to fancy. But fancy does not re- quire that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution from her touch ; and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Du^ecth' the reverse of these are the desires and demands of the imagination. She recoils from every thmg but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite." — Wordsworth, Preface to Works, vol. i., 12mo. Lond., 1836. — K Imagination. FATAIiISM, FATE. — '''• Fatum is derived from /a?'z ; that is, to pronounce, to decree ; and in its right sense, it signifies the decree of Providence." — Leibnitz, Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke. '•^ Fate derived from the Latin fari., to speak, must denote the word spoken by some intelligent being who has power to make his words good." — Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. ii., part 2, chap. 26. Among all nations it has been common to speak of fate o 194 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. or destiny as a power superior to gods and men — swaying all tilings irresistibly. This may be called the fate of poets and mytJiologists. Philosophical fate is the sum of the laws of the universe, the product of eternal intelligence, and the blind properties of matter. Theological fate represents Deity as above the laws of natuie, and ordaining all things according to his will — the expression of that will being the law. Leibnitz (Fifth Paper to Dr. Samuel Clarke) says :— ^^ There is a Fatum Mahomet anum^ a Fatum Sioicum, and a Fatum Christianum, The Turkish fate will have an effect to happen, even though its cause should be avoided ; as if there was an absolute necessity. The Stoical /a ^c will have a man to be quiet, because he must have patience whether he will or not, since 'tis impossible to resist the course of things. But 'tis agreed that there is Fatum Christianum^ a certain destiny of every thing, regulated by the fore-knowledge and providence of God." '' Fatalists that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads — First, such as, asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us ; which kind of fate^ though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world ; from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is so done in it : which fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves neces- sary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno, and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow. And lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all thingc without a Deity; which /a^6 Epicurus calls rviv TOiv (PvaiKcou it[/.u^y.ivYiv^ the fate of the naturahsts, that is, indeed, the atheists, the assertors whereof may be called VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 195 FATAIiISM— also the democritical fatalists,'''' — Cudworth, Intell. Syst-. book i., chap. 1. Cicero, De Fato, Pkitarchus, De Fato. Grotius, Philosophorum Sententice De Fato. F£AR is one of the passions. It arises on the conception or contemplation of something evil coming upon us. FEElilNO. — "This word has two meanings. -FzV^^, it signi- fies the perceptions we have of eternal objects, by the sense of touch. When we sjDcak of feeling a body to be hard or soft, or rough or smooth, hot or cold, to feel these things is to perceive them by touch. They are external things, and that act of the mind by which we feel them is easil}' distinguished from the objects felt. Secondly^ the word feeling is used to signify the same thing as sensation ; and in this sense, it has no object ; the feeling and the thing felt are one and the same. ''Perhaps betwixt /ee/zr?^, taken in this last sense, and sensation^ there may be this small difference, that sensation is most commonly used to signify those feelings which we have by our external senses and bodily appetites, and all our bodily pains and pleasures. But t\i&cQ 2ccq feelings oi a nobler nature accompanying our affections, our moral judgments, and our determinations in matters of taste, to which the word sensation is less properly applied."* — Reid, IntelL Powers^ essay i., chap. 1. '^ Feeling^ beside denoting one of the external senses, is a general term, signifying that internal act by which we are made conscious of our pleasures and our pains ; for it is not limited, as sensation is, to any one sort. Thus, feeling being the genus of which sensation is a species, their mean- ing is the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense ; and accordingly we say indifferently, ' I feel pleasure from heat, and pain from cold ; ' or, ^ I * The French use of sensation — as when we say such an occurrence excited a ^a'eat sensation, that is, feeling of surprise, or indignation, or satisfaction, is be- coming more common. 196 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. have a sensation of pleasure from heat and of pain from cold.' But the meaning of feeling^ as is said, is much more extensive. It is proper to say, I feel pleasure in a sumptuous building, in love, in friendship ; and pain in losing a child, in revenge, in envy; sensation is not pro- perly applied to any of these. " The term, feeling is frequently used in a less proper sense, to signify what we feel or are conscious of; and in that sense it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains." — Kames, Elements of Criticism^ appendix. '' Pressing my hand with force against the table, I feel pain and I feel the table to be hard. The pain is a sensa- tion of the mind, and there is nothing that resembles it in the table. The hardness is in the table, nor is there any- thing resembling it in the mind. Feeling is applied to both, but in a different sense ; being a word common to the act of sensation, and to that of perceiving by the sense of touch." — Eeid, IntelL Powers^ essay ii., chap. 16. All sensations are feelings; but all feelings are not sensa- tions. Sensations are those feelings which arise immediately and solely from a state or affection of the bodily organism. But we have feelings which are connected not with our animal, but with our intellectual, and rational, and moral nature; such as feelings of the sublime and beautiful, of esteem and gratitude, of approbation and disapproba- tion. Those higher feelings it has been proposed to call sentiments. From its most restricted sense of the perceiving by the sense of touch, feeling has been extended to signify imme- diate perceiving or knowing in general. It is applied in this sense to the immediate knowledge which we have of first truths or the principles of common sense. "By external or internal perception, I apprehend a phenomenon of mind or matter as existing ; I therefore affirm it to be. Now, if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I apprehend as a mode of mind, may not, in reality, be a VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 197 FEElilNO— mode of mind; I can only say, using the simplest language, ' I know it to be true, because I feel^ and cannot but feel^ or '- because I 'believe, and cannot but helieve^^ it so to be. And if further interrogated how I know, or am assured that I thus feel or thus believe^ I can make no better answer than, in the one case, 'because I believe that I/eeZ;' in the other, ' because I feel that I believe.^ It thus appears, that when pushed to our last resort, we must retire either n-p on feeling or belief or upon both indifferently. And, accordingly, among philosophers, we find that a great many employ one or other of these terms by which to indicate the nature of the ultimate ground to which our cognitions are reducible ; while some employ both, even though they may award a preference to one In this application of it we must discharge that signification of the word by which we denote the phenomena of pain and pleasure." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reicfs Works^ note A, sect. 5. — V. Belief. FETICHISM is supposed to have been the first form of the theological philosophy; and is described as consisting in the ascription of life and intelligence essentially analogous to our own, to every existing object, of whatever kind, whether organic or morganic, natural or artificial. — (Comte, Pkilosoph. Positive^ i., 3.) The Portuguese call the objects worshipped by the negroes of Africa fetisso — bewitched or possessed by fairies. Such are the grisgris of Africa, the manitous and the ockis of America, and the burklians of Siberia — good and evil genii inhabiting the objects of nature which they worship. The priests of this worship are called griots in Africa, jongleurs or jugglers in America, and chamanes in Central Asia. FITNESS and UNFITNESS— '' most frequently denote the congruity or incongruity, aptitude or maptitude, of an}' means to accomplish an end. But when applied to actions, they generally signify the same with i^ight and icrong ; nor is it often hard to determine in which of these senses these words are to be understood. It is worth observing that fitness in the former sense is equally undefinable with fitness 198 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. FITNESS— in the latter ; or, that it is as impossible to express in any other than synonymous words, what we mean when we say of certain objects, ' that they have Sijitness to one another ; or are Jit to answer certain purposes,' as when we say, ' reverencing the Deity is Jit^ or beneficence is Jit to be practised.' In the first of these instances, none can avoid owning the absurdity of making an arbitrary sense the source of the idea of Jitness^ and of concluding that it signifies nothing real in objects, and that no one thing can be properly the means of another. In both cases the term Jit signifies a simple perception of the understanding." — Price, Review^ chap. 6. According to Dr. Samuel Clarke, virtue consists in acting in conformity to the nature and Jitness of things. In this theory the term Jitness does not mean the adapta- tion of an action, as a means towards some en-d designed by the agent ; but a congruity, proportion, or suitableness between an action and the relations, in which, as a moral being, the agent* stands. Dr. Clarke has been misunder- stood on this point by Dr. Brown (lect. Ixxvi.) and others. See Wardlaw, Christ, Ethics^ note E. FORCE is any energy or power which has a tendency to move a body at rest, or to afiect or stop the progress of a body already in motion. This is sometimes termed active force^ in contradistinction to that which merely resists or retards the motion of a body, but is itself apparently inactive. But according to Leibnitz, by whom the term force was introduced into modern philosophy, no substance is alto- gether passive. Force^ or a continual tendency to activity, was originally communicated hf the Creator to all sub- stances,, whether material or Spiritual. Every force is a substance^ and every substance is a force. The two notions are inseparable ; for you cannot think of action without a being, nor of a being without activity. A substance entirely passive is a contradictory idea. See Leibnitz, De primes PhilosophicE emendatione^ et de notione s^ihstanlice, — F. Monad. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 199 FORCE— In like manner Bosco^ich maintained that the ultimate particles of matter are indivisible and miextended points, endowed Tsrith the forces of attraction and repidsion. — Dissertationes diice cle viribus vivis^ 4to, 1745. See aLso Stewart, Pliilosopliical Essays, essay ii., chap. 1. According to the d^Tiamic theory of Kant, and the atomic theory of Leiicippus, the phenomena of matter were explained by attraction and repulsion. '' La force^ proprement elite ^ c'est ce qui regit les actes^ sans regler les voIont£s.''' If this definition of force^ which is given by Mons. Comte, be adopted, it would make a distinction between force and power. Power extends to volitions as well as to operations^ to mind as well as matter. •^We talk of mechanical forces. ^Miere are they? Apart fi'om will, what have we but weights ? All motion and power in mechanism result from the power of man. Lever, pulley, wedge, and wheel, are all helpless as dust till the human spirit gives them power. The huge things that spin, and hammer, and run for us, are but artificial limbs, — outhing physical instruments, whereby the spirit within us does heav}' work, never meant for the gentle frame which everywhere attends it.-' — Crystal Palace, an essay, p. xx., reprinted from Quarterly Review. 1855. FORITX — '' is that of which matter is the receptacle," says Lord Monboddo (Ancient Metaphys.^ book ii., chap. 2). A trumpet may be said to consist of two parts ; the matter or brass of which it is made, and the form which the maker gives to it. The latter is essential, but not the former : since although the matter were silver, it would still be a trumpet; but without the form, it would not. Now, although there can be no form without matter, yet as it is the form which makes the thing what it is, the word form came to signi^^ essence or natiu^e. '•'•Form is the essence of the thing, from which result not only its figure and shape, but all its other quahties." — ]Monboddo, ut supra. Matter void of form, but ready to receive it, was called, 200 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. FORM— in metaphysics, materia prima^ or elementary; in allusion to wliich Butler has made Hudibras say, that he Professed He had first matter seen undressed, And found it naked and alone, Before one rag oi form was on. Form was defined by Aristotle 7.oyog Tvig ovniecg^ and as ovGice. signifies, equally, substance and essence, hence came the question whether form should be called substantial or essential ; the Peripatetics espousing the former epithet, and the Cartesians the latter. According to the Peripatetics, in any natural com- posite body, there were — 1. The matter. 2. Quantity, which followed the matter. 3. The substantial form. 4. The qualities which followed the form. According to others, there were only, — 1. Matter. 2. Essential /orm ; as quantity is identified with matter., and qualities with matter or form., or the compound of them. According to the Peripatetics, form was a subtle sub- stance, penetrating matter., and the cause of all acts of the compound ; in conformity with the saying, formoB est agere^ materice vero pati. According to others, form is the union of material parts, as atoms, or elements, &c., to which some added a certain motion and position of the parts. — Derodon, Pliys.., pars prima, pp. 11, 12. He who gives form to matter, must, before he do so, have in his mind some idea of the particular /or/T? which he is about to give. And hence the word form is used to signify an idea. Idea and Law are the same thing, seen from opposite points. '' That which contemplated ohjectively (that is, as existing externally to the mind), we call a law ; the same contemplated subjectively (that is, as existing in a subject or mind), is an idea. Hence Plato often names ideas laws ; and Lord Bacon, the British Plato (?), describes the laws of the material universe as ideas in nature. Quod in natura naturata lex^ in natura naturante idea dicitur." — Coleridge, \ OCABULAP.Y OF PHILOSOPHY. 201 FORM— Church and State, p. 12. And in Xoi\ Organ. ^ iL, 17, Bacon says: "" "Wlien we speiik of forms, we imderstimd nothing more than the /«?/-•:? and modes of action which regelate and constitnte any simple nature, stich as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of matter susceptible of them ; so that the farm of heat, or the form of light, and the law of heat, and the laifj of light, are the same thing.'' Again he sajs : " Since the form of a thing is the Terr thing itself, and the thing no otherwise diiiers from the form, than as the apparent diflfers firom the existent, the outward from the inward, or that which is considered in relation to man from that which is considered in relation to the universe, it foUows clearly that no nature can be taken for the true f&rm^ unless it CTer decreases when the nature itself de- creases, and in like manner is always increased when the nature is increased.' ' — Nov. Organ. ^ 2, 13. As the word form denotes the law, so it may also denote the class of cases brouo^ht toother and united by the law. " Thus to speak of the forvi of animals might mean, first, the law or definition of animal in general : second, the part of any given animal by which it comes under the law, and is what it is ; and last, the class of animals in general formed by the law." — ^Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought^ p. 33, 2d edit. *'The sense attached at the present day to the words form and matter, is son ■ rent from, though closely related to, theie. Tlir hat the mind impresses upon its percc ^ ^ re the matter; form therefore means / :.: / c . / ^ uojee is that are presented to the mind. AVhen the attention is directed to any object, we do not ser :t itself, but contemplate it in the light of om- r conceptions. A rich man. for example, is regarded by the poor and ignorant imder the form of a very fortunate person, able to purchase luxuries which are above their own reach; by the religious mind under the form of a person with more than ordiaary tempta- tions to contend with; by the poKtical economist, imderthat 202 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. FORM— of an example of the unequal distribution of wealth; by the tradesman, under that of one whose patronage is valuable. ISTow, the object is really the same to all these observers ; the same rich man has been represented under all these different forms. And the reason that the observers a^e able to find many in one,, is that they connect him severally with their own prior conceptions. The form^ thfiJn, in this view, is mode of knowing; and the matter is the perception^ or ohject we have to know." — Ihid^ p. 34, Sir W. Hamilton calls the theory of substantial forms^ "the theory of qualities viewed as entities conjoinjed with, and not as mere dispositions or modifications of matter." — Reid's Works, p. 827, note. Aristotle, Metaphys., lib. 7 et 8. Miclielet, Examen Critique de la MetapJiysiqne d''Aristote, 8vo, Paris, 1836, p. 164 et p. 287. E^vaisson, JEssai sur la MetapJiysiqne d'Aristote^ 8vo, Pafis, 1837, tom. i., p. 149.— F. Law. FORMAiiiiY.— 7. Really, Virtually. FORTITUDE is one of the virtues called cardinal. It may display itself actively by resolution or constancy, which consists in adhering to duty in the face of danger and difficulty which cannot be avoided, or by intrepidity or courage, which consists in maintaining firmness and presence of mind in the midst of perils from which there may be escape. The displays oi fortitude passively considered may be comprehended under the term patience, including huiaiility, meekness, submission, resignation, &c. FREE i¥iiiii.— F. Liberty, I^ecessity, Will. FRIE]V1>SIIIP is the mutual affection cherished by two petsons of congenial minds. It springs from the social nature of man, and rests on the esteem which each enter- tains for the good qualities of the other. The resemblance in disposition and character between friends may some- times be the occasion of their contracting friendship ; but it may also be the effect of imitation and frequent and familiar intercourse. And the interchange of kind offices VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 20 O FRIENDSHIP— which takes place between friends is not the cause of their friendship, but its natural result. FamiHarities founded on views of interest or pleasure are not to be dignified by the name of friendship. Dr. Brown (lect. Ixxxix.) has classified the duties of friendship as they regard the commencement of it, the con- tinuance of it, and its close. In the choice of a friend there is room for discretion and prudence: The cultivation of friendship calls for confi- dence, kindness, and encouragement. Shoul(J it become necessary, fr'om a change of circumstances, or fr^om a neglect or violation of its duties, to break o^ friendship^ it should be done not abruptly, but gTadually, and more in sorrow than in anger. Should friendship last till it be dis- solved by the death of one of the parties, then it becomes the duty of the sur\'ivor to eherish the memory of his de- parted friend, to defend his character, and to continue to imitate his excellences. See the various questions connected mth friendship treated by Aristotle, in Ethics^ books vui. and ix., and by Cicero, in his treatise De Amicitia. OENERAlilZATlON.— '^The mind makes its utmost endea- vours to generalize its ideas, begins early with such as are most famihar, comes in time to those that are less so, and is never at rest till it has found means of concei^ang, as well as it can, its ideas collectively, and of signifying them in that manner to others." — Bolingbroke, Essay on Hum. Knowl.^ s. 5. '' Generalization is the act of comprehending, under a common name, several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract fi-om each of them, and wliich that common name serves to indicate." '' When we are contemplating several individuals which resemble each other in some part of theii' natm-e, we can (by attending to that part alone^ and not to those points 204 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OENERAIilZATION— wherein they differ) assign them one common name^ which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all agree; and which, of course, will be applicable to all or any of them (which process is called genei^alization) ; and each of these names is called a common term, from its be- longing to them all alike ; or a predicaMe^ because it may be predicated affirmatively of them or any of them." — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 5, sect. 3. '' On sensation," says Aristotle (Poster. Analyt.^ chap. 16), "ensues memory ; and on many memories of the same fact experience ; for many similar memories are one ex- perience : on experience, or the whole unchanging univer- sal that has settled in the mind, the all penetrating one beside the many, ensues the beginning of art and science ; of art, if the end is production, of science, if the end is truth." Experience can only give truths which are parti- cular, but science aims at truths which are general. Now these general truths are involved in particular cases or instances ; and the mental process by which we disengage the general from the particular and look on it separately from any individual case, is the process of generalization^ while the general truths derived from particular observa- tions constitute science. Generalization is of two kinds — classification and gene- ralization properly so called. When we observe facts accompanied by diverse circum- stances, and reduce these circumstances to such as are essential and common, we obtain a law. "V\nien we observe individual objects and arrange them according to their common characters, we obtain a class. When the characters selected are such as belong essentially to the nature of the objects, the class corresponds with the law. When the character selected is not natural the classification is artificial. If we were to class animals into white and red, we would have a classification which had no reference to the laws of their nature. But if we classify them as vertebrate or invertebrate, we have a classification VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 205 OENERAI.IZATIOIV— founded on their organization. Artificial classification is of no value in science, it is a mere aid to the memory. jSTatural classification is the foundation of all science. This is sometimes called generalization. It is more properly classification, — F. Classification. The law of gravitation is exemplified in the fall of a single stone to the ground. But many stones and other heavy bodies must have been observed to fall before the fact was generalized, and the law stated. And in this process of generalizing there is involved a priuciple which experience does not furnish. Experience, how extensive so- ever it may be, can only give the particular, yet from the particular we rise to the general, and affirm not only that all hea^y bodies which have been observed, but that all heavy bodies whether they have been observed or not, gravitate. In this is implied a belief that there is order in natm^e, that under the same circumstances the same substances will present the same phenomena. This is a principle fiu-nished by reason, the process founded on it embodies elements furnished by experience. — V, Induction. The results of generalization are general notions expres- sed by general terms. Objects are classed according to certain properties which they have in common, into genera and species. Hence arose the question which caused cen- turies of acrimonious discussion. Have genera and species a real, independent existence, or are they only to be found in the mind? — V. Realism, Nominalism, Conceptu- ALiSM. — Reid, /??^eZ?. Powers^ essay v., chap. 6; Stewart, Philosopli. Hum. Mind, chap. 4. '^ General ideas or general notions are of two kinds, i^ssentially different from each other ; those which are general merely from the vagueness and imperfection of our information ; and those which have been methodically generalized, in consequence of an abstraction founded on the careful study of particulars." — Stewart, PMosopli. of Hum, Mind, part ii., ch. 2, sect. 4. 206 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOI'HY. OENERAIilZATION— The principle of geneixdization is, that beings howsoever different agree or are homogeneous in some respect. GENXIRAIi TERMS.— F. TermS. CrENIUS (from geno^ the old form of the verb gigno^ to pro- duce) . This word was in ancient times applied to the tutelary God or spirit appointed to watch over every individual from his birth to his death. As the character and capaci- ties of men were supposed to vary according to the higher or lower nature of their genius^ the word came to signify the natural powers and abilities of men, and more particu- larly their natural inclination or disposition. But the peculiar and restricted use of the term is to denote that high degree of mental power which produces or invents. '•'- Genius^'''' says Dr. Blair {Lectures on Rhetoric^ lect. iii.), ''always imports something inventive or creative." ''It produces," says another, "what has never been accomplished, and which all in all ages are constrained to admire. Its chief elements are the reason and the imagination, which are alone inventive and productive. According as one or other predominates, genius becomes scientific or artistic. In the former case, it seizes at once those hidden affinities which otherwise do not reveal themselves, except to the most patient and vigorous application ; and as it were intuitively recognizing in phenomena the unalterable and eternal, it produces truth. In the latter, seeking to exhibit its own ideas in due and appropriate forms, it realizes the infinite under finite types, and so creates the beautiful." To possess the powers of common sense in a more eminent degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the same ; this it is that constitutes what we call genius^ that power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another." — Harris, Philosophy Arrange.^ chap. 9. "IsTature gives men a bias to their respective pursuits, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 207 GENIUS— and that strong propensity, I suppose, is what we mean by geniusy — Coiiper. Dryden has said, — " What the child admired, The youth endeavoured, and the man acquired/' He read Polybius, with a notion of his historic exact- ness, before he was ten years old. Pope, at twelve, feasted his eyes in the picture galleries of Spenser. Murillo filled the margin of his schoolbooks with drawings. Le Brun, in the beginning of childhood, di^ew with a piece of char- coal on the walls of the house. — Pleasures^ ^-c, of Litera- ture^ 12mo, Lond., 1851, pp. 27, 28. Sharp, Dissertation on Genius. Lond., 1755. Duff, Essays on Original Genius. Lond., 1767. Gerard, Essay on Genius. Lond., 1774. Lcelius and Hortensia^ or Thoughts on the Nature and Objects of Taste and Genius. Edin., 1782. Beattie, Dissertations. Of Imagination^ chap. 3, -Ito, Lond., 1783. OENUINJE.— F. Authentic. OENUS is "a predicable which is considered as the material part of the species of which it is affirmed." — Whately, Logic ^ b. ii., ch. 5, sect 3. It is either summum or subalternum, that is, having no genus above it, as heing^ or having an- other genus above it, as quadruped ; proximum or remotum^ when nothing intervenes between it and the species, as animal in respect of man, or when something intervenes, as animal in respect of a crow, for between it and crow, hrute and bird mtervene. A genus physicum is part of the species, as animal in respect of man, who has an animal body and a rational soul. A genus metaphysicum is iden- tified adequately with the species and distinguished from it extrinsically, as animalm respect of brute, colour in respect of blackness in ink. Logically the genus contains the species ; whereas metaphysically the species contains the genus; e. ^., we di\4de logically the geyius man into Euro- pean, Asiatic, &c., but each of the species, European, &c., 208 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OENUS— contains tlie idea of man, together with the characteristic difference. In modern classification, genus signifies '' a distinct but subordinate group, which gives its name as a prefix to that of all the species of which it is composed." 00]>9 in Anglo-Saxon, means good. One of the names of the Supreme Being. The corre- sponding terms in Latin (Deus) and in Greek (Jdsog) were applied to natures superior to the human nature. With us, God always refers to the Supreme Being. That department of knowledge which treats of the being, perfections, and government of God^ is theology, q, v. " The true and genuine idea of God in general, is this — a perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things." — Cudworth, Intell. Syst.^ b. i., ch. 4, sect. 4. " The true and proper idea of God^ in its most contracted form, is this — a being absolutely perfect ; for this is that alone to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable." — Ihid, sect. 8. ''I define God thus — mi essence or heing^ fully and absolutely perfect, I say fully and absolutely perfect, in contradistinction to such perfection as is not full and abso- lute, but the perfection of this or that species or kind of finite beings, suppose a lion, horse, or tree. But to be fully and absolutely perfect, is to be, at least, as perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive without a contra- diction." — H. More, Antidote against Atheism^ ch. 2. CrOO]> (The Chief). — An inquiry into the chief good, or the summum honum, is an inquiry into what constitutes the perfection of human nature and the happiness of the human condition. This has been the aim of all religion and philo- sophy. The answers given to the question have been many. Yarro enumerated 288 ; August., De Civit.,]ih. 19, cap. 1. But they may easily be reduced to a few. The ends aimed at by human action, how various soever they may seem, may all be reduced to three, viz., pleasure, in- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 209 oooo— terest, and duty. Wliat conduces to these ends we call good, and seek after ; what is contrary to these ends we call evil, and shun. But the highest of these ends is duty, and the chief good of man lies in the discharge of duty. By doing so he perfects his nature, and may at the same time enjoy the highest happiness. "Semitacerte Tranquilly per virtutem patet unica vitse." Juvenal, lib. iv., sat. 10. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, L'Abbe Anselme, Sur le Souverain Men des anciens, Mem. d, VAcad. des Inscript.^ et Belles Lettres^ 1 ser., torn. 5. — Jouffroy, MiscelL — V, Bonum (Summum). C^RAHIRIAB (Universal). — This word grammar comes to us from the Greeks, who included under rs-)c^Yi ynufA.(A.a,Tia- Tty.Yi the art of writing and reading letters. But '•'-grammar,^' says B. Johnson (the English Grammar., c. 1), "is the art of true and well speaking a language ; the writing is but an accident." Language is the expression of thought — thought is the operation of mind, and hence language may be studied as a help to psychology. — Beid, Intell. Powers, essay i., chap. 5. Thought assumes the form of ideas or of judgments, that is, the object of thought is either simply apprehended or conceived of, or something is affirmed concerning it. Ideas are expressed in words, judgments by propositions ; so that as ideas are the elements of judgments, words are the elements of propositions. Every judgment involves the idea of a substance., of which some quality is affirmed or denied — so that language must have the substantive or noun, the adjective or quality., and the verb connecting or disconnecting. If the objects of our thoughts existed or were contem- plated singly, these parts of speech would be sufficient. But the relations between objects and the connection be- tween propositions, render other parts of speech necessary. It is because we have ideas that are general, and ideas p 210 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPPIY. ORAMMAR— tliat are individual, tliat we have also nouns common and proper ; and it is because we have ideas of unity and plu- rality, that we have numbers^ singular^ dual^ and plural. Tenses and moods arise from dividing duration, and viewing things as conditional or positive. Even the order or con- struction of language is to be traced to the calm or im- passioned state of mind from which it proceeds. In confirmation of the connection thus indicated between grammar and psychology, it may be noticed that those who have done much for the one have also improved the other. Plato has given his views of language in the Cratylus^ and Aristotle, in his Interpretation and Analytics^ has laid the foundations of general grammar. And so in later times the most successful cultivators of mental philosophy have also been attentive to the theory of language. In Greek, the same word (T^oyog) means reason and language. And in Latin, reasoning is called discursus—SL meaning which is made English by our great poet when he speaks of '' large discourse of reason." In all this the connection between the powers of the mind and language is recognized. Montemont, Grammaire General ou Philosophie des Langues^ 12 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1845. Beattie, Dissertations^ Theory of Language^ part 2. 4to, Lond., 1783. Monboddo, On the Origin and Progress of Language^ 3 Yoh. ORA]V]>x:UR. — " The emotion raised by grand objects is awful, solemn, and serious." " Of all objects of contemplation, the Supreme Being is the most grand The emotion which this grandest of all objects raises in the mind is what we call devotion — a serious recollected temper, which inspires magnanimity, and disposes to the most heroic acts of virtue. *' The emotion produced by other objects which may be called grand^ though, in an inferior degree, is, in its nature and in its effects, similar to that of devotion. It disposes to seriousness, elevates the mind above its usual state to a VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 211 GRANDEUR— kind of enthusiasm, and inspires magnanimity, and a con- tempt of what is mean ''To me grandeur in objects seems nothing else but such a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits our admiration." — Keid, Intell. Poicers^ essay viii., chap. 3. — F. Sublimity, Beauty", .Esthetics. GRATITUDE is one of the affections which have been desig- nated benevolent. It implies a sense of kindness done or intended, and a desire to return it. It is sometimes also characterized as a moral affection, because the party cherishing it has the idea that he who did or intended kindness to him has done right and deserves a return ; just as the party who has received an injury has not merely a sense or feeling of the wrong done, but a sense of in- justice in the doing of it, and the feeling or conviction that he who did it deserves punishment. See Chalmers, Sketches of Mental and Moral Philosophy^ chap. viii. Shaftesbury, Moralists^ pt. 3, lect. ii. OYIWENOSOPHIST (yv^uvo^^ naked; ao(l)og^ wise). — "Among the Indians, be certain philosophers, whom they call gymiw- sophists^ who from sun rising to the setting thereof are able to endure aU the day long, looking full against the sun, without winking or once moving their eyes." — Holland, Pliny f b. vii., c. 2. The Brahmins, although their religion and philosophy were but little known to the ancients, are alluded to by Cicero. Tuscul.^ lib. v., cap. 27 ; Arrian, Exped. Alexand., lib. vii., cap. 1. Colebrooke and others in modern times have explained the Indian philosophy. HAJBIT {}^ig^ habitus). — Hahit^ or state, is a constitution, frame, or disposition of parts, by which everything is fitted to act or suffer in a certain way. — ]Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ chap. 4. By Aristotle e^ig is defined (Metaphys.^ 212 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MAJKIT— lib. 5, cap. 20) to be, in one sense, the same with hiochatg^ or disposition. His commentators make a distinction, and say s^ig is more permanent. There is the same distinction in English between liaUt and disposition. Habits have been distinguished into natural and super- natural, or acquired and infused. Natural lialnts are those acquired by custom or repetition. Supernatural habits are such as are infused at once. They correspond to gifts or graces, and the consideration of them belongs to theology. Acquired habits are distinguished into intellectual and moral. From habit results power or virtue, and the intellectual habits or virtues are intellect, wisdom, prudence, science, and art. '^ These may be subservient to quite contrary purposes, and those who have them may exercise them spontaneously and agreeably in producing directly contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different habits of the body, are determined by their nature to one specific operation. Thus, a man in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his healthy state of body, and never otherwise, when his motions are natural and volun- tary ; and in the same manner the habits of justice or temperance uniformly determine those adorned by them to act justly and temperately." — Aristotle, Ethic. ^ lib. v., cap. 1. Habits have been distinguished as active or passive. The determinations of the will, efforts of attention, and the use of our bodily organs, give birth to active habits ; the acts of the memory and the affections of the sensibility, to passive habits, Aristotle (Ethic. ^ lib. iii.) proves that our habits are voluntary, as being created by a series of voluntary actions. '' But, it may be asked, does it depend merely on our own will to correct and reform our bad habits? It certainly does not ; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has despised the advice of a physician, to recover that health which has been lost by profligacy. When we have thrown a stone we cannot restrain its flight ; but it depended entirely on ourselves whether we should throw it or not." VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 213 HABIT— Actions, according to Aristotle, are voluntary throughout : habits only as to their beginnings. Thurot {De VEntendement^ torn, i., p. 138) calls ^'-Jialit the memory of the organs, or that which gives memorv^ to the organs." Maine de Biran, U Influence de Hahitude. Dutrochet, Theorie de r Hahitude. M. F. Eavaisson, De VHahitude, Butler, Analogy^ part 1, ch. 5. Reid, Active Poivers^ essay iii., pt. 1, ch. 3. Reid, Intellectual Poivers., essay iv., ch. 4. — V. Custom. Habit and Custom* "That opinion of Aristotle* seems to me to savour of narrowness and carelessness of view, when he asserts that hahit has no power over such actions as are natural ; taking as an illustration that, if a stone be thrown a thousand times into the aii', it acquires not the slightest tendency to ascend of its own accord ; moreover, that we see and hear no better by often seeing and hearing. For though this may hold in some cases, where nature is absolute, yet it is far otherwise in those cases where nature, with a certain degree of latitude, admits of intension and remission. He might surely have observed that a glove a little too tight is rendered looser by often putting it on the hand ; that a staff, by use and time, is bent quite in the opposite of its natural shape, and continues for a while in that state ; that the voice, by exercise, is rendered stronger and more dis- tinct ; that custom enables us to endure cold and heat : and several other things of the same kind. And these two latter instances are more analogous to the subject than those adduced by him. Nevertheless, the more truth there is in the remark that virtues and vices consist in Imhit., the more he should have endeavoured to lay down rules whereby * "None of these things, Avhich are what they are by nature, can he altered by being accustomed. Tlius a stone, which by nature is carried dowmvard, can never be accustomed to mount upward, no, not though anyone should ten thousand times attempt it, by throwing the stone upward. The same may be said of accustominc lire to move downward.' —^^^tc, lib. ii., c. 1. 214 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. HABIT— hahits of this kind migiit be acquired or got rid of; for several precepts can be given for the wise regulation of the exercises of the mind as well as of the body. We shall enumerate a few of them. ''The first is, that we should, from the very commence- ment, be on our guard against tasks of too difficult or too easy a nature ; for, if too great a burden be imposed, in the diffident temper you will check the buoyancy of hope, in the self-confident temper you will excite an opinion whereby it will promise itself more than it can accomplish, the con- sequence of which will be sloth. But in both dispositions it will happen that the trial will not answer the expectation, a circumstance which always depresses and confounds the mind. But if the tasks be of too trivial a kind there will be a serious loss on the total progress. ''The second is, that in order to the exercise of any faculty for the acquirement of Tiahit^ two particular times should be carefully observed : the one when the mind is best disposed, the other, when worst disposed to the matter ; so that, by the former, we may make most progress on our way ; by the latter we may, by laborious effi^rt, wear out the knots and obstructions of the mind, by which means the inter- mediate times shaU pass on easily and smoothly. " The third precept is that of which Aristotle makes inci- dental mention : — ' That we should, ivith all our strength (yet not running into a faulty excess), struggle to the opposite of that to which we are by nature most inclined ;' as when we row against the current, or bend into an oppo- site direction a crooked stafi*, in order to straighten it. " The fourth precept depends on a general law, of un- doubted truth, namely, that the mind is led on to anything more successfully and agreeably, if that at which we aim be not the chief object in the agent's design, but is accom- plished, as it were, by doing something else ; since the bias of our nature is such, that it usually dislikes constraint and rigorous authority. There are several other rules which may be given with advantage on the government of liaMt ; VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 215 IS ABIT— for liabit^ if wisely and skilfully formed, becomes truly a second nature (as the common saying is) ; but unskilfully and unmethodically directed, it will be, as it were, tlie ape of nature, which imitates nothing to the life, but only clumsily and awkwardly." Bacon, On[Advancement of Learning.^ book vli., translated in MofFet's Selections^ Dubl, 1847. MAPPINESS — '4s not, I think, the most appropriate term for a state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all hap, that is, chance. "Felicity in its proper sense, is but another word for for- tunateness, or happiness ; and I can see no advantage in the improper use of words, when proper terms are to be found, but on the contrary, much mischief." — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., pp. 31-2. The Greeks called the sum total of the pleasure which is allotted or happens to a man evrvxioc^ that is, good hap; or, more religiously, svloti/^covioc^ that is, favourable providence. —Ibid. To live well and to act well is s}Tionynious with being happy. — Aristotle-, Ethic, ^ lib. i., c. 4. Happiness is never d ^sired but for its own sake only. Honour, pleasure, intelligence, and every virtue are desir- able on their own account, but they are also desirable as means towards happiness. But happiness is never desired as a means, because it is complete and all-sufficient in itself. '' Happiness is the object of human action in its most general form, as including all other objects, and approved by reason. As pleasure is the aim of mere desire, and interest the aim of prudence, so happiness is the aim of wisdom. Happiness is conceived as necessarily an ultimate object of action. To be happy, includes or supersedes all other gratifications. If we are happy, we do not miss that which we have not ; if we are not happy, we want some- thing more, whatever we have. The desire of happiness is the supreme desire. All other desires of pleasure, wealth, power, fame, are included in this, and are subor- 2^6 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. HAPPINESS— dinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate objects ; but we can do so only by identifying them with this. Happiness is our being's end and aim. '^ Since happiness is necessarily the supreme object of our desires, and duty the supreme rule of our actions, there can be no harmony in our being, except our happiness coincide with our duty. That which we contemplate as the ultimate and universal object of desire, must be identical with that which we contemplate as the ultimate and supreme guide of our intentions. As moral beings, our happiness must be found in our moral progTCss, and in the consequences of our moral progress we must be happy by being virtuous." — Whewell, Morality^ ISTos. 544, 545. See Aristotle, Ethic. ^ lib. i. Harris, Dialogue on Happiness, — V. Good (Chief). HARinONY (Pre-established)— When an impression is made on a bodily organ by an external object, the mind becomes percipient. When a volition is framed by the will, the bodily organs are ready to execute it. How is this brought about? The doctrine of a pre- established harmony has reference to this question, and may be thus stated. Before creating the mind and the body of man, God had a perfect knowledge of all possible minds and of all possible bodies. Among this infinite variety of minds and bodies, it was impossible but that there should come together a mind the sequence of whose ideas and volitions should correspond with the movements of some body : for, in an infinite number of possible minds and possible bodies, every combination or union was possible. Let us, then, suppose a mind, the order and succession of whose modifi- cations corresponded with the series of movements to take place In some body, God would unite the two and make of them a living soul, a man. Here, then, Is the most perfect harmony between the two parts of which man is composed. There is no commerce nor communication, no action and reaction. The mind is an independent force, which passes from one volition or perception to another, In conformity VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 217 HARITIOIVY— with its own nature ; and would have done so although the body had not existed. The body, in hke manner, by yirtue of its own inherent force, and by the single unpression of external objects, goes through a series of moyements ; and would have done so although it had not been united to a rational soul. But the moTements of the body and the modifications of the mind correspond to each other. In short, the mind is a spiritual automaton, and the body is a material automaton. Like two pieces of clock-work, they are so regulated as to mark the same time ; but the spring which moves the one is not the spring which moves the other : yet they go exactly together. The harmony be- tween them existed before the mind was imited to the body. Hence this is called the doctrine oi pre-established fiarmony. It may be called correspondence or parallelism^ but not harmony between mind and body — for there is no unity superior to both, and containing both, which is the cause of theh^ mutual penetration. In decomposing human per- sonahty into two substances,* from eternity abandoned each to its proper impulse, which acknowledges no superior law in man to direct and control them, liberty is destroyed. — Tiberghien, Essai des Connais. Hum.^ p. 394. The doctrine of pre-estahlished harmony differs from that of occasional causes "only in this respect, that by the former the accordance of the mental and the bodily pheno- mena was supposed to be pre-arranged, once for aU, by the Divine Power, while by the latter their harmony was sup- posed to be brought about by His constant interposition.'' — V. Causes (Occasional). This doctrine was first advocated by Leibnitz in his Theodicee and Monadologie. Wolfius, Psycologia Rationalis^ sect. 614-15-17, &c. HAR:?I0NY (of the Spheres). — The ancient philosophers sup- posed that the regular movements of the heavenly bodie> throughout space formed a kind of harmony^ which they called the harmony of the spheres. * Soul and body, however, constitute one suppoiiiam or person. 218 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOrHY. HATREO.— F. Love. lIx:i>ONlSlfI (ilouY}^ pleasure) — is the doctrine that the chief good of man lies in the pursuit of pleasure. This was the doctrine of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school. MERPriETIC PHIIiOSOPHY.— A system of mystical philo- sophy ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus or Mercury, and contained in a book or books ascribed to him. — Plato, PMllhus. Hor., ode 10, lib. i. Hesiod, TJieog.^ v. q. 37. Lenglet du Fresnoy, HisL de la Philosoph. Hermetique^ 3 torn., 12mo, Paris, 1742. HYI.0Z01SM (" i> A >7, matter; and ^6^/), life). — The doctrine that life and matter are inseparable. This doctrine has been held under different forms. Straton of Lampsacus held that the ultimate particles of matter were each and all of them possessed of life. The Stoics, on the other hand, while they did not accord activity or life to every distinct particle of matter, held that the universe, as a whole, was a being animated by a principle which gave to it motion, form, and life. This doctrine appeared among the followers of Plotinus, who held that the soul of the universe animated the least particle of matter. Spinoza asserted that all things were alive in different degrees. Omnia quamvis diversis gradihus animata tamen sunt. Under all these forms of the doctrine there is a confound- ing of life with force. Matter, according to Leibnitz and Boscovich, and others, is always endowed with force. Even the vis inertice ascribed to it is a force. Attraction and repulsion, and chemical affinity, all indicate activity in matter ; but life is a force always connected with organiza- tion, which much of matter wants. Spontaneous motion, growth, nutrition, separation of parts, generation, are phenomena which indicate the presence of life ; which is obviously not co- extensive with matter. HYPOSTASIS.— F. SUBSISTENTIA. MYPOTMESIS (^'vTro^sffig^ suppositio, supposition). — In Logic Aristotle gave the name dsatg to every proposition which, without being an axiom, served as the basis of VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 219 HYPOTHESIS— demonstration, and did not require to be demonstrated itself. He distinguished two kinds of thesis, the one which expressed the essence of a thing, and the other which ex- pressed its existence or non-existence. The first is the opiai^og or definition — the second, the v'lro&eutg. ''What is capable of proof, but assumed without proof, il believed by the learner, is, relatively to the learner, though not abso- lutely, an hypothesis ; if the learner has no behef or a dis- belief, it is a petition or postulate." — Poster. Analyt.^ lib. ii., cap. 10. ^Vhen a phenomenon that is new to us cannot be explained by any known cause, we are uneasy and try to reconcile it to unity by assigning it ad interim to some cause which may appear to explain it. Before framing an hypothesis^ we must see first that the phenomenon reaUy exists. Prove ghosts before explaining them. Put the question an sit ? before cur sit ? Second^ that the pheno- menon cannot be explained by any known cause. When the necessity of an hypothesis has been admitted, a good hypothesis — First.^ should contain nothing contradictory be- tween its own constituent parts or other established truths. The Wernerians suppose water once to have held in solu- tion bodies which it cannot now dissolve. The Huttonians ascribe no effect to fire but what it can now produce. Second^ it should fully explain the phenomenon. The Coper- nican system is more satisfactory than that of Tycho Brahe. Third., it should simply explain the phenomenon, that is, should not depend upon any other hypothesis to help it out. The Copernican system is more simple. It needs only gravitation to carry it out — that of Tycho Brahe depends on several things. This word is not used by Aristotle in the sense which is now assigned to it. With him, vTroQsaig is a proposition, the truth of which is affirmed, and which serves as the basis of science ; a basis not arbitrary, but legitimate, not imaginary, but real. Hypothesis and definition are the two phases under which the diaig presents itself. The thesis is 220 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. HYPOTHESIS— the principle proper to each particular science. — Aristotle's Metaphysics^ by Pierron and Zevost, torn, i., p. 200, note. By hypothesis is now understood the supposing of some- thing, the existence of which is not proved, as a cause to explain phenomena which have been observed. It thus differs in signification from theory, which explains pheno- mena by causes which are known to exist and to operate. '* Hypothesis^'''' says Dr. Gregory (Lectures on Duties and Qualifications of a Physician)^ '4s commonly confounded with theory ; but a hypothesis properly means the supposition of a principle, of whose existence there is no proof from experi- ence, but which may be rendered more or less probable by facts which are neither numerous enough nor adequate to infer its existence." '' In some instances," says Boscovich {De Solis ac Lunce Defectibus, Lond., 1776, pp. 211, 212), '' observations and experiments at once reveal to us all we know. In other cases, we avail ourselves of the aid of hypothesis ; by which word^ however^ is to he understood^ not fictions altogether arbitrary^ hut suppositions conformahle to experience or analogy. '''' ''This," says Dr. Brown, "is the right use of hypothesis — not to supersede, but to direct investigation — not as telling us what we are to believe, but as pointing out to us what we are to ascertain." And it has been said {Pursuit of Knowledge., vol. ii., p. 255, weekly vol., No. 31), that "the history of all discoveries that have been arrived at, by what can with any propriety be called philo- sophical investigation and induction, attests the necessity of the experimenter proceeding in the institution and man- agement of his experiments upon a previous idea of the truth to be evolved. This previous idea is what is properly called an hypothesis., which means something placed under as a foundation or platform on which to institute and carry on the process of investigation." DilFerent opinions have been held as to the use of hypo- theses in philosophy. The sum of the matter seems to be, that hypotheses are admissible and may be useful as a means VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 221 H YPOTHE SIS— of stimulating, extending, and directing inquiry. But they ought not to be hastily framed, nor fondly upheld in the absence of support from facts. They are not to be set up as barriers or stopping places in the path of knowledge, but as way-posts to guide us in the road of observation, and to cheer us with the prospect of speedily arriving at a resting place — at another stage in our journey towards truth. They are to be given only as provisional explana- tions of the phenomena, and are to be cheerfully abandoned the moment that a more full and satisfactory explanation presents itself. — Eeid, Intell. Powers^ essay i., chap. 3. I.— F. Ego, Subject. I[I>]EA (Jlio.^ hlog^ forma^ species^ image). — "Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this — that all things consist of matter and form ; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form ; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter ; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. " In the Platonic sense, then, ideas were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the phenomenal or ectypal world." — Sir William Hamilton. The word is used in this sense by Milton when he says, — " God saw his works were good, Answering his fair idea.'" And by Spenser in the following passage : — ' What time this world's great workmaister did cast, To make all things such as we now behold, It seems that He before his eyes had plast A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould He fashioned them as comely as he could. That now so fair and seemly they appear, As naught may be amended anywhere. That wondrous pattcrae, wheresoe'er it be, Whether in earth, laid up in secret store, Or else in heaven, that no man may it see With sinful eyes, for fear it to deflore, Is perfect beauty." 222 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IDEA— We are accustomed to say tliat an artificer contemplat- ing the idea of anything, as of a chair or bed, makes a chair or bed. But he does not make the idea of them. ^' These forms of things," said Cicero {Orat.^ c. 3), ''Plato called ideas^ and denied that they were born, but were always contained in reason and intelligence." — Heusde, Init. Philosoph. Platon.^ torn, ii., pars, 3. '' Idea is a bodiless substance, which of itself hath no subsistence, but giveth form and figure to shapeless matter, and becometh the cause that bringeth them into show and evidence. Socrates and Plato supposed that these be sub- stances separate and distinct fi:'om matter, howbeit subsist- ing in the thoughts and imagination of God, that is to say, of mind and understanding. Aristotle admitteth verily these forms and ideas ^ howbeit not separate from matter, as being patterns of all that God hath made. The Stoics, such at least as were of the school of Zeno, have delivered that our thoughts and conceits are the ideas ^ — Plutarch, Opinions of PhilosopJiers^ ch. 10, fol. 666 of the translation by Holland. ^^ Idece sunt principales form^ qu^dam, vel rationes rerum stabiles, atque incommutabiles, quge ips« formatse non sunt, ac per hoc geternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur : et cum ipsae neque oriantur, neque intereant ; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur, quicquid oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit." — Augustine, lib. Ixxxiii., 99, 46. "Tu cnncta superno Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulclierimus ipse Mundum mente gerens, similique imagine formans." — Boeth., De Con sol., 9. Tiberghien (Essai des Connaiss. Hum.., p, 207), has said, — " Seneca considered ideas., according to Plato, as the eternal exemplars of things, Cicero as their form., Diogenes Laertius as their cause and principle., Aris- totle as substances; and in the middle ages and in our day they are general notions^ in opposition to particular or individual notions. The ideas of Plato embrace all VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 'I'lV) these meanings. The terms which he employs are /'oga and li}iog to designate the Divine image, the ideal model or type {rvTroq) of all things and beings. He also calls them nra^ot^iLy^a.roL^ oitTioti, u^x^h ^0 denote that these eternal exemplars are the principle and cause of the existence and development of all that is in nature. They are also the thoughts of God (^voYif/.ocTot)^ who has produced all things according to the type of these ideas. And the terms iuocoig, fcovulsg^ indicate the affinity between the theory of Plato and the numbers of Pythagoras." In another passage {Essai des Connais. Hum.^ pp. 33, 34) ^the same author has said, that, '' according to the Platonic sense, adopted by Kant and Cousin, ideas are as it were the essence and matter of our intelligence. They are not as such, a product or result of intelligence, they are its primitive elements, and at the same time the immediate object of its activity. . . . They are the primary anticipations which the mind brings to all its cognitions, the principles and laws by reason of which it conceives of beings and things. The mind does not create ideas^ it creates by means of ideas. . . . There are two great classes of ideas — 1. Those which are related in some sense to experience ; as the principles of mathematics, notions of figure, magTiitude, extension, number, time, and space. 2. Those which are completely independent of all sensible representation, as the ideas of good and evil, just and unjust, true or false, fair or deformed." — p. 208. — F. l^OTION. According to Plato, ideas were the only objects of science or true knowledge. Things created being in a state of continual flux, there can be no real knowledge with respect to them. But the divine ideas bemg eternal and unchangeable, are objects of science properly so called. According to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, knowledge, instead of originating or consisting in the contemplation of the eternal ideas^ types, or forms, according to which all things were created, originated, and consisted in the con- / 224 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. I1>EA— templation of the things created, and in the thoughts and the operations of mind to which that contemplation gives rise. But as external things cannot themselves be in the mind, they are made known to it by means of species^ images^ or phantasms (q. v.) ; so that, in perception, we are not directly cognizant of the object, but only of a representation of it. In like manner, in imagination, memory, and the operations of intellect, what is directly present to the mind is not the ^^^real object of thought, but a representation of it. /'' Instead of employing the various terms image^ species, phantasm^ &c., of the Peripatetic philosophy, Descartes adopted the term idea^ which till his time had been all but exclusively employed in its Platonic sense. ^ By Descartes and subsequent philosophers the term idea was employed to signify all our mental representations, all the notions which the mind frames of things. And this, in contradistinction to the Platonic, may be called the modem use of the word. ]\Ir, Locke, for example, who uses the word idea so frequently, as to think it necessary to make i an apology for doing so, says — '' It is the term which, I I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of I the understanding, when a man thinks : I have used it to I express whatever is meant by phantasm^ notion^ species^ or 5^r... \ whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in % thinking." Against this modern use of the word idea^ more espe- cially in reference to the doctrine of perception (q. v.), Dr. Eeid most vehemently protested. — ' '- Modern philosophers, '' ' said he (IntelL Powers^ essay i., ch. 1), '' as weU as the Peri- I patetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived that external I objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thoughts : I that there must be some image of them in the mind itself; 1 in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name I idea^ in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the Idea^ or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. >^.) I]>EA— object, without wHch we would have no perception, no remembrance, no conception of the mediate object. '• When, therefore, in common language, we speak of having an idea of anything, we mean no more by that ex- pression than thinking of it. The vulgar allow that this expression implies a mind that thinks, an act of that mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But besides these three, the philosopher conceives that there is a fourth; to wit, the idea which is the imme- diate object. The idea is in the mind itself, and can have no existence but in a mind that thinks ; but the remote or mediate object may be something external, as the sun or moon ; it may be somethiug past or future ; it may be something which never existed. This is the philosophical meaniug of the word idea : and we may observe that this meaniag of the word is btiilt upon a philosophical opioion : for if philosophers had not believed that there are such inmiediate objects of all our thoughts in the mind, they would never have used the word idea to express them. '•' I shall only add that, although I may have occasion to use the word idea in this philosophical sense in explaiuing the opiuions of others, I shall have no occasion to use it m expressing my own, because I believe ideas^ taken iu this sense, to be a mere fiction of philosophers. And in the popular meaning of the word, there is the less occasion to use it, because the English words thought^ notion^ appre- hension, answer the purpose as well as the Greek word idea : with this advantage, that they are less ambiguous." Xow it may be doubted whether ui this passage Dr. Eeid has correctly understood and explained the meaning of the word idea as employed by all modem philosophers, from the time of Descartes. Dr. Reid takes idea to mean something iaterposed be- tween the mind and the object of its thought — a tertium quid, or a quartum qtiid^ an independent entity different irom the mind and from the object thought of. Xow this has been the opinion both of ancient and modem philosc- Q 226 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. II>EA— phers ; but it is not the opinion of all. There are many, especially among modern philosophers, who, by the idea of a tiling^ mean the thing itself in the mind as an object of thought. Even when the object thought of is represented to the mind, the representation is a modification of the mind itself, and the act of representing and the act of knowing the object thought of, are one and the same ; the representation and cognition are indivisible. But Dr. Reid does not admit that any of our knowledge is repre- sentative. He had such a horror of the doctrine of ideas^ as meaning something interposed between the mind and the objects of its knowledge, that he calls all our know- ledge immediate. Thus he speaks of an immediate know- ledge of things past, and of an immediate knowledge of things future. Now all knowledge is present knowledge, that is, it is only knowledge when we have it. But all knowledge is not immediate knowledge. Things that are past are not actually present to the mind when we remem- ber them. Things that are future are not actually present when we anticipate them, for they have as yet no actual existence. But the mind frames to itself a representation of these things as they have been, or as they will be, and in thus representing them has knowledge of them. This knowledge, however, cannot be called immediate. In memory there is the faculty, and there is the object of the faculty or the thing remembered. But the object or the thing remembered is not actually present to the faculty. It is reproduced or represented, and in representing the object to the faculty we have knowledge of it as a past reality. Memory, therefore, may be called a representa- tive faculty. ISTow, in perception, where the object of the faculty is also present, it may not be necessary for the mind to frame to itself any representation or image of the external reality. The faculty and its object are in direct contact, and the knowledge or perception is the immediate result. This is the doctrine of Dr. Reid, and if he had acknowledged the distinction, he might have called per- I VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 227 IDEA— ception a presentative faculty, as memory is a representative faculty.* According to other philosophers, however, there is a representation even in perception. The external reality is not in the mind. The mind merely frames to itself a representation or image of what the external reality is, and in this way has knowledge of it. But this represen- tation or image is not something interposed or different from the mind and the external object. It is a modification of the mind itself. It is the external object in the mind as an object of thought. It is the idea of the external reality. This is a theory of perception which Dr. Reid did not clearly distinguish ; but it is at variance with his own, and, if he had distinctly apprehended it, he would have condemned it. In like manner he would have condemned the use of the word idea to denote a representative image, even although that representation was held to be merely a modification of mmd. But this is the sense in which the term idea is used by Descartes, and other philosophers, in reference to the doctrine of perception. In a general sense it means an}i:liing present to the mind, whether reaUy or representatively, as an object of thought, f Ideas^ regarded according to the nature and diversity of their objects, are sensible^ intellectual^ or moral; according to the essential characters of these objects, they are neces- sary and absolute^ or contingent and relative ; according to the aspect in which they represent things, they are simple or compound^ abstract or concrete^ individual or general, partitive or collective ; according to their origin or forma- tion, they are adventitious^ factitious^ or innate ; according to their quality or fidehty, they are true or false^ real or * See ReicTs Works, edited by Sir WiU. Hamilton; Note B, Of Presentative and Representative Knowledge; and Note C, Of the Various Theories of External Per- ception. t Dr. Currie once, upon being bored by a foolish blue, to tell her the precise meaning of the word idea (which she said she had been reading about in some metaphysical work, but could not understand), answered, at last, angrily, ''Idea, madam, is the feminine of idioty and means a female fool."— Moore, Diary, vol. iv., p. 38. 228 VOCABULAHY OF PHILOSOPHY. IDEA— imaginary^ clear or obscure, distinct or confused, complete or incomplete, adequate or inadequate. As to the origin of our ideas, the opinions of metaphy- sicians may be divided into three classes. 1. Those who deny the senses to be anything more than instruments con- veying objects to the mind, perception being active, (Plato and others). 2. Those who attribute all our ideas to sense, (Hobbes, Gassendi, Condillac, the ancient Sophists). 3. Those who admit that the earliest notions proceed from the senses, yet maintain that they are not adequate to pro- duce the whole knowledge possessed by the human under- standing, (Aristotle, Locke). — Dr. Mill, Essays, 314, 321. — V, Innate. See Trendlenburg, De Ideis Platonis. Richter, De Ideis Platonis. Sir William Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy. Eeid^s Works, edited by Sir William Hamilton. Dugald Stewart, Philosoph, Essays, appendix ii. Adam Smith, Essays on Philosoph. Subjects, p. 119, note. II>x:AIi. — ''Though ideas are widely separated from sensible reality, there is something, if possible, still more widely separated, and that is the ideal. A few examples will enable you to comprehend the difference between ideas and the ideal : Perfection is an idea ; humanity in all its perfection is an ideal; human virtue and wisdom in all their purity are ideas ; the wisdom of the Stoics is an ideal. The ideal, then, is the intellectual existence of a thing which has no other characters than those determined by the idea itself. The idea, thus individualized, so to speak, serves as the rule of our actions ; it is a model, which we may approach in a greater or lesser degree, but from which we are nevertheless infinitely distant. We compare, for example, our conduct with the dictates of the monitor, that exists within us. We all judge and correct ourselves with reference to this ideal, without the power of ever attaining to its perfection. These ideas, though destitute of any objective reality, cannot be regarded as purely VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 229 cMmencal. They furnish a unit of measure to the reason, which requires a conception of what is perfect in each kind, in order to appreciate and measure the various degrees of imperfection. But would you realize the ideal in experi- ence as the hero of a romance ? It is impossible, and is, besides, a senseless and useless enterprise ; for the imper- fection of our nature, which ever belies the perfection of the idea, renders all illusion impossible, and makes the good itself, as contemplated in the idea, resemble a fiction." — Henderson, The Philosopliy of Kant^ p. 119. '' We call attention" says Cousin (Ow the Beautiful)^ ''to two words which continually recur in this discussion — they are, on the one hand, nature or experience ; on the other, ideal. Experience is individual or collective ; but the col- lective is resolved into the individual ; the ideal is opposed to the individual and to collectiveness : it appears as an origi- nal conception of the mind. Nature or experience gives me the occasion for conceiving the ideal^ but the ideal is something entirely different from experience or nature ; so that, if we apply it to natural, or even to artificial figures, they cannot fiU up the condition of the ideal conception, and we are obliged to imagine them exact. The word ideal corresponds to an absolute and independent idea, and not to a collective one." " By ideal I understand the idea, not in concreto but in individuo^ as an individual thing, determinable or determined hj the idea alone. What I have termed an ideal, was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the divine mind — an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archet}^e of aU phenomenal existences." — Meiklejohn, Translation of Kanfs Criticism of Pure Reason^ p. 351. ''I should dread to disfigure the beautiful ideal of the memories of illustrious persons with incongruous featiu-es, and to sully the imaginative purity of classical works Tvdth gross and trivial recollections." — Wordsworth, Letter on Burns, 230 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. When the word ideal is used as a noun and qualified by the adjective heau^ its sense is critical or aesthetic, and has reference to the fine arts, especially to statuary and paint- ing. '^ The common notion of the ideal as exemplified more especially in the painting of the last century, de- grades it into a mere abstraction. It was assumed that to raise an object into an ideal^ you must get rid of every- thing individual about it. Whereas the true ideal is the individual freed from everything that is not individual in it, with all its parts pervaded, and animated, and harmon- ized by the spirit of life which flows from the centre." — Guesses at Truth^ second series, p. 218. The ideal is to be attained by selecting and assembling in one whole the beauties and perfections which are usually seen in different individuals, excluding everything defec- tive or unseemly, so as to form a type or model of the species. Thus, the Apollo Belvedere is the ideal of the beauty and proportion of the human frame ; the Farnese Hercules is the type of manly strength. The ideal can only be attained by following nature. There must be no elements nor combinations but such as nature exhibits ; but the elements of beauty and perfection must be disen- gaged from individuals, and embodied in one faultless whole. This is the empirical account of the ideal. According to Cicero (Orator.^ c. 2, 3), there is nothing of any kind so fair that there may not be a fairer conceived by the mind. "We can conceive of statues more perfect than those of Phidias. Nor did that artist, when he made the statue of Jupiter or Minerva, contemplate any one in- dividual from which to take a likeness ; but there was in his mind a form of beauty, gazing on which he guided his hand and skill in imitation of it." In the philosophy of Plato this form was called 'Trxpochiy/u.cc. Seneca (Eplst.^ Iviii., sect. 15-18) takes the distinction between ilix and '^ |/^Qf? thus : — when a painter paints a likeness, the original is his /^£ot— the likeness is the iihog or image. The iiho$ is in the work — the Hi ex. is out of the work and before the VOCABXn.ARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 231 I1>EAI.— work. This distinction is commended by Hensde (^Init. PJiilo- soph. Platon.^ vol. 2, pars 3, p. 105). And he refers to Cicero {De Invent.^ ii., 1), who states that Zeuxis had five of the most beautiful women of Crotona, as models, from which to make up his picture of a perfect beauty, as illustrating the Platonic sense of nzoLo^^nyu.oL or the ideal. According to this view, the tean ideal is a t^-pe of h^-pothetical perfection contemplated by the mind, but which may never have been realized, how nearly soever it may have been approached in the shape of an actual specimen. iDEAliiSJl is the doctrine that in external perceptions the objects immediately known are ideas. It has been held under various forms. — See Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note C ; Berkeley, Works; Sir W. Drummond, Academic Questions; Reid, Inquiry. Some of the phases of modern idealism among the Ger- mans, may be seen in the following passage from Lewes, Biograpli. Hist, of Pfdlosopli.. vol. iv., p. 209 : — '* I see a tree. The common psychologists tell me that there are three things implied in this one fact of vision, viz. : a tree, an image of that tree, and a mind which apprehends that image. Fichte tells me that it is I alone who exist. The tree and the image of it are one thing, and that is a modi- fication of my mind. This is sithjective idealism. Schelling tells me that both the tree andmy ego (or self), are exis- tences equally real or ideal ; but they are nothing less than manifestations of the absolute, the infinite, or unconditioned. This is objective idealism. But Hegel tells me that all these explanations are false. The only thiiig really existing (in this one fact of vision) is the idea, the relation. The ego and the tree are but two terms of the relation, and owe their reality to it. This is absolute idealism. According to this there is neither mind nor matter, heaven nor earth. God nor man. — V, Xihilism. The only real existences are certain ideas or relations. Ever%-thing else that has name or being derives its name and being from its consti- tuting one or other of the two related terms, subject and 232 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. object; but tbe only tbing tbat is true or real is tbe identity of tbeir contradiction, tbat is, tbe relation itself." Tbe doctrine opposed to idealism is realism^ q. v. See also Perception. II>x:AlilST. — " In England, tbe word idealist is most commonly restricted to sucb as (witb Berkeley) reject tbe existence of a material world. Of late its meaning bas been sometimes ex- tended (particularly since tbe publication of Reid) to all tbose wbo retain tbe tbeory of Descartes and Locke, concerning tbe immediate objects of our perceptions and tbougbts, wbetber tbey admit or reject tbe consequences deduced from tbis tbeory by tbe Berkeleian. In tbe present state of tbe science, it would contribute mucb to tbe distinctness of our reasonings were it to be used in tbis last sense exclu- siyely." — Stewart, Dissert.^ part ii., 166, note. rDENTlCAli PROPOSITION.— ''It is Locke, I believe, wbo introduced, or at least gave currency to tbe expression identical proposition^ in pbilosopbic language. It signifies a judgment, a proposition, in wbicb an idea is affirmed by itself, or in wbicb we affirm of a tbing wbat we already know of it." — Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Philosoph.., lect. xxiv, Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book iv., cbap. 8, sect. 3. A proposition is called identical wbenever tbe attribute is contained in tbe subject, so tbat tbe subject cannot be conceived as not containing tbe attribute. Tbus, wben you say body is solid, I say tbat you make an identical proposi- tion.^ because it is impossible to bave tbe idea of body witbout tbat of solidity. II>ENTlSTri or IDENTITY (idem^ tbe same) — or tbe doctrine of absolute identity, teacbes tbat tbe two elements of tbougbt, objective and subjective, are absolutely one ; tbat matter and mind are opposite poles of tbe same infinite substance ; and tbat creation and tbe Creator are one. Tbis is tbe pbilosopby of Scbelling. It coincides ultimately witb Pantheism.^ q. v. " If tbe doctrine of identity means anytbing, it means I TOCAEULAEY OF PHIJLOSOPHY. 233 ihiii rh.uiiht and being are essentiaQy one : tliat the process of thinking is Yirtuallj the same as the process of creating: that in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do Tirtoallj the same thing as Deitj accomplished in de- ^ eloping himself in all the forms and regions of creation : :iiat everY man's reason, therefore, is really God ; in line, that Deity is the whole siun of consciousness immanent in theworkU' — Morell. Hi.st. of Philosoph.^ yoI. ii., p. 127. iDEXTlTY lie - - :: vness. Unity is opposed to division, ■ ■ - ' - 1 r:::: ::: vii. A thing is one when it is not divided i:;: : tl- A :hing is the .:?am^ when it is not distingiiish- : ; : : r - l::aer it be divided from them or not. - : r ii^ibleness of a thing in itself. Identitg / -- . — : a thing from itself, or from that ./._ _..._ i: 1^ s„:a :: be the same. It is unity with per- sistence and continuity ; unity perceived even in plurality: in multiplicity and succession, ui diversity and change. It is the essential characteristic of all substance or being, that it is one and endmres. Unorganized matter may be said to have identity in the persistence of the parts or molecides of which it consists. Organized bodies have identity so long as organization and lite remain. An oak, which from a small plant becomes a great tree, is still the same tree. — Locke, Essay on Hum. Cndtrstand., book ii., ch. 27, sect. 3. IDE-VTITF (Per§oiial). — '* WTiat is called J3er50« a? identity^ is oiir beiug the same persons from the commencement to the end ot life : while the matter of the body, the dispositions, habits, and thoughts of the mind, are continually changing. We feel and know that we are the same. This notion or persuasion of personal identity results from memory. It' a man loses all recollection of his early lite, he continues, -evertheless, actually the same person." — ^Taylor, Elements (./' Thought. Dr. Brown (lecture xi.) changes the phrase personal identity into mental identity. Locke says {Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., ch. 27) — "To hnd wherein personal 234 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IDENTITY— identity consists we must consider wliat person stands for ; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places." This looks Hke confining personal identity to the mind. But Leibnitz (in his Theodicee^ p. 172) called it a " meta- physical communication by which soul and body make up one suppositum, which we call a person." In a Review of the Doctrine of Personal Identity^ p. 73, 8vo, London, 1827, it has been proposed to define it as ^'the continuation of the same organization of animal life in a human creature possessing an intelligent mind, that is, one endowed with the ordinary faculties of reason and memory, without refer- ence to the original formation or constitution of that mind, whether it be material or immaterial, or whether it survives or perishes with the body. Or, more shortly, it may be said personal identity consists in the same thinking intelli- gent substance united to the same human body. By the same human body, however, is not meant of the same particles of matter, but of the same human structure and form." — F. Personality. Locke makes personal identity consist in consciousness. '' Consciousness is inseparable from thinking; and since it is so, and is that which makes every one to be what he calls self and thereby distinguishes himself from all other think- ing beings, in this alone consists personal identity^ i, 6., the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this conscious- ness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person." — Essay on Hum, Understand.^ book ii., ch. 27. But it has been remarked that " Consciousness, without any regard to a sameness of the thinking intelligent sub- stance, cannot constitute personal identity. For, then, a disordered imagination might make one man become two^ or even twenty persons^ whose actions he should imagine himself to have performed. And if a man forgets and loses all consciousness of having done certain actions, he will then VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 235 IDENTITY— not be the same person who did them." — Whitehead, On Materialism^ p. 79. Consciousness merely ascertains or indicates personal identity^ but does not constitute it. Consciousness pre- supposes personal identity as knowledge presupposes truth. See Butler, Dissertation on Personal Identity. Eeid, Intellect. Powers., essay iii., ch. 6, with note. Stewart, PJiilosopJi. of Hum. Mind., part ii., ch. 1, sect. 2. IDENTITY (Principle of). — It is usually expressed thus— a thing is what it is, and not another. So that it amounts to the same as the principle of contradiction., q. v. In Logic it is expressed thus — conceptions which agree can be iQ thought united, or af&rmed of the same subject at the same time. IDEOIiOOY or IDEAXOOY.— The analysis of the human mind by Destutt de Tracy, published about the end of last century, was entitled '' Elemens d^Idealogie,^'' and the word has come to be applied to the philosophy of the sensational school, or the followers of CondiUac — as Cabanis, Garat, and Yolney. Of this school, De Tracy is the meta- physician ; Cabanis (Rapports du Physique et de Moral de r Homme) is the physiologist ; and Yolney (Catechism du Citoyen Francais) is the moralist. The followers of this school were leading members of the Academic des Sciences Morales et Politiques., and also took an active share in political assemblies. Their doctrines and movements were contrary to the views of Napoleon, who showed his dislike by suppressing the Academic des Sciences Morales et Poli- tiques. But the members of the school kept up their doctrines and their meetings, and it was on the motion of De Tracy that the Senate decreed the abdication of the emperor in 1814. — Damiron, Hist, de Philosoph. en France aw 19 siecle. " For Locke and his whole school, the study of the under- standing is the study of ideas ; hence the recent and cele- brated expression ideology., to designate the science of the human understanding. The source of this expression is in the Essay on the Hum. Understanding., and the ideological 236 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IDEOIiOOY— school is the natural offspring of Locke." — Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Philosopli.^ lect. 16. '' By a double blunder in philosophy and Greek, ideologic (for idealogie)^ a word which could only properly suggest an a priori scheme, deducing our knowledge from the in- tellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinc- tive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from sensation." — Sir W. Hamilton, Edin. Rev., Octr., 1830, p. 182. '' Destutt de Tracy has distinguished Condillac by the title of the father of ideology.''^ — Stewsirt^Philosoph.Essays^esssijin. IDIOSYNCRASY (f O/o?, proprius^ and avu kocaui;, com-mixtio) — means a peculiar temperament of mind or of body. '' The soul in its first and pure nature hath no idiosyncrasies,, that is, hath no proper natural inclinations^ which are not com- petent to others of the same kind and condition." Glanville, Pre-existence of Souls, c. 10. It is seen, however, that different persons of the same kind and condition may soon manifest different inclinations — which if not natural are partly so, and are traced to some peculiarity in their tem- perament, as well as to the effect of circumstances. Sir Thomas Brown (Vulgar Errors, book iii., chap. 28), asks, " Whether quails from any idiosyncrasy or peculiarity of constitution do invariably feed upon hellebore, or rather sometimes but medically use the same ?" In like manner some men are violently affected by honey and coffee, which have no such effects on others. This is bodily idiosyncrasy. Sympathy, and antipathy, q. v., when peculiar, may be traced to idiosyncrasy, Mr. Stewart in the conclusion of part second of his Philosoph. of Hum. Mind, says he uses temperament as synonymous with idiosyncrasy. — V. Temperament. II>OIi (iioo)'kov, from 'iihog, an image). — Something set up in place of the true and the real. Hence Lord Bacon (De Augment. Scient., lib. iv., cap. 5) calls those false appear- ances by which men are led into error, idols. "I do find, therefore, in this enchanted glass four idols, or false appear- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 237 ances, of several distinct sorts, eveiy sort compreliending many subdivisions : tlie first sort I call idols of the nation or tribe ; tlie second, idols of the den or cave ; the third, idols of the forum : and the fourth, idols of the theatre.'' — De Interpretatione Xaturce^ sect. 39. Reid, IntelL Powers^ essay vi., chap. 8. — F. Prejudice. iCrNORAlVCE, in morals and jurisprudence, may respect the law or the action, and is distinguished into ignorantia juris ^ and ignorantia factl. In respect of the action, ignorance is called efficacious or concomitant^ according as the removal* of it would, or TTOidd not, prevent the action from being done. In re- spect of the agent, ignorance is said to be vincible or invin- cible^ according as it can, or cannot, be removed, by the use of accessible means of knowledge. Vincible ignorance is distinguished into affected or wilful ; by which the means of knowuig are perversely rejected ; and supine or crass ; by which the means of knowing are indolently or stupidly neglected. Ignorance is said to be invincible in two ways — in itself^ and also in its cause; as when a man knows not what he does, through disease of body or of mind. In itself^ but not in its cause ; as when a man knows not what he does, through hitoxication or passion. lL.IiATlOIV Qllatum^ from inferre, to bring ui) — or '^inference consists m nothuig but the perception of the connection there is between the ideas in each step of the deduction, whereby the muid comes to see either the certaia agree- ment or disagreement of any two ideas^ as ia demonstration, in which it arrives at knowledge ; or their probable con- nection on which it withholds its assent, as m opinion." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ b. iv., c. 17. — F. In- ference, Induction. * Aristotle {Ethic, lib. iii., cap. 1) takes a difference between an action done through ignorance (J/« Scy^^oKnv), and an action done ignorantly {a.yvou)v). In the former ca: finite and the unseen, and gives us thoughts which wander through eternity. High art is highly metaphysical, and whether it be in poetry or music, in painting or in sculp- ture, the triumph of the artist lies not in presenting us VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 241 IJTIAOINATION— with an exact transcript of things that may be seen, or heard, or handled in the world around us, but in carrying us across the gulf which separates the phenomenal from the real, and placing us in the presence of the truly beautiful, and surrounding us with an atmosphere more pure than that which the sun enhghtens. IITIAGINATION and CONCJEPTIOI^. — ''The business of con- ception,^^ says IVIr. Stewart (PTiilosoph. of Hum. Mind, chap. 3), '4s to present us with an exact transcriptof what we have felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modi- fying our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own crea- tion. I shall employ the word imagination to express this power, and I apprehend that this is the proper sense of the word ; if imagination be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a simple faculty of the mind. It presupposes abstraction to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction ; and also judgment and taste to direct us in forming the combinations." And he adds (chap. 6), " The operations of imagination are by no means confined to the materials which conception fiir- nishes, but may be equally employed about all the subjects of our knowledge." — F. Conception, Fancy. See Hunt, Imagination and Fancy, Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads. Edin. Review for April, 1842, article on Moore's Poems, Akenside, Pleasures of Imagination, IIWEITATIOIV (Latin, imitor, quasi mimitor, from the Greek ^if/^ov^ut, the initial [^ omitted, Vossius.) — "is afacultie to expresse livelie and perfitelie that example, which ye go about to folow." — Ascham, The Scliulemaster, b. ii. As a social and improveable being, man has been endowed with a propensity to do as he sees others do. This pro- pensity manifests itself in the fii'st instance spontaneously or instinctively. Children try to follow the gestures and movements of others, before their muscles are ready to R 242 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IMITATION— obey, and imitate sounds whieli they hear, before their voice is able to do so. Mr. Stewart has made a distinc- tion {PMlosopJi. of Hum. Mind^ vol. iii., chap. 2) between the propensity and the power of imitation. Both are pecu- liarly strong and lively in children, and answer the most important purposes. But the propensity to imitate what others do and the manner of doing it continues throughout life, and requires to be carefully watched and properly directed. And man not only imitates his fellow-creatures, but tries to copy nature in all her departments. In the fine arts he imitates the forms which strike and please him. And the germ of some of the highest discoveries in science has been found in attempts to copy the movements and pro- cesses of nature. — Beid, Act. Powers., essay iii., part 1, chap. 2. IMMANENT (from in manere^ to remain in) — means that which does not pass out of a certain subject or certain limits. '-'' Logicians distinguish two kinds of operations of the mind; the first kind produces no efifect without the mind, the last does. The first they call immanent acts ; the second transitive. All intellectual operations belong to the first class ; they produce no effect upon any external object."— Beid, Intell. Powers^ essay ii., chap. 14. '' Even some voluntary acts, as attention, deliberation, purpose, are also immanent.'''' — Correspondence of Dr. Reid^ p. 81. '' Conceiving, as well as projecting or resolving, are what the schoolmen called immanent acts of the mind, which produce nothing beyond themselves. But painting is a transitive act, which produces an effect distinct from the operation, and this effect is the picture*" — Beid, Intell. Powers^ essay iv., chap. 1. The logical sense assigned to this word by Kant, is somewhat different. According to him we make an im- manent and valid use of the forms of the understanding, and conceive of the matter, furnished by the senses, accord- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 243 IMMANENT— ing to our notions, of time and space. But wlien we try to lift ourselves above experience and phenomena, and to conceive of things as they are in themselves, we are making a transcendent and illegitimate use of our faculties. With moralists an immanent act is one which has no effect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is an im- manent act of the senses — cognition of the intellect. A transient act produces an effect or result out of, and beyond the agent ; as the act of writing, or of building. Theologians say, God the Father generated the Son by an immanent act, but he created the world by a transient act. The doctrine of Spinoza {Ethic. ^ pars, 1, pref. 18) is, Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens^ non vero transiens^ — that is, all that exists, exists in God ; and there is no difference in substance between the universe and God. Acts of the will are distinguished as elicit and imper- ate., — q. v, '' We are deceived, when, judging the infinite essence by our narrow selves, we ascribe intellections^ volitions^ decrees^ purposes^! and such like immanent actions to that nature which hath nothing in common with us, as being infinitely above us." — Glanville, Vanity of Dogmatising., edit. 1661, p. 101. lltlMATERIAlilSlVI is the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley, that there is no material substance, and that all being may be reduced to mind, and ideas in a mind. Swift, in a letter to Lord Carteret, of date 3d September, 1724, speaking of Berkeley, says, '-'- Going to England very young, about thirteen years ago, he became founder of a sect there, called the immaterialists^ by the force of a very curious book upon that subject." *' In the early part of his own life, he (Dr. Reid) informs us that he was actually a convert to the scheme of imma - terialism ; a scheme which he probably considered as of a perfectly inoffensive tendency, so long as he conceived the existence of the material world to be the only point in dispute." This passage is quoted by llichardson in his 244 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. imiflATERIAXISM— Diet, as ocurring in Stewart's PhilosopJi, of Hum, Mind^ c. 1, s. 3. Dr. Reid's acknowledging that he once believed the doctrine of ideas is in Intell. Powers^ essay ii., chap. 10. A work published a few years ago in defence of Ber- keley's doctrine, was entitled Immaterialism ; and a prize offered to any one who would refute the reasoning of it. liniMLATSRiAlilTir is predicated of mind, to denote that as a substance it is different from matter. Spirituality is the positive expression of the same idea. Simplicity is also used in the same sense. Matter is made up of parts into which it can be resolved. Mind is simple and has no parts, and so cannot be dissolved. The materiality of the soul was maintained by Tertullian, Arnobius, and others, during the three first centuries. At the end of the fourth, the imma- teriality of the soul was professed by Augustin, Nemesius, and Mamertius Claudienus. — Guizot, Hist, of Civilizat.^ vol. i., p. 394. IIWMORT AX.it Y (OF THE SOUIL.)— is one of the doctrines of natural religion. At death the body dies, and is dissolved into its elements. The soul being distinct from the body, is not afiected by the dissolution of the body. How long, or in what state it may survive after the death of the body, is not intimated by the term immortality. But the arguments to prove that the soul survives the body, all go to favour the belief that it will live for ever. See Plato, Phcedon; Porteous, Sermons; Sherlock, On the Immortality of the Soid ; Watson, Intimations of a Future State ; Bakewell, Evidence of a Future State ; Autenrieth, On Man., and his Hope of Immortality^ Tubingen, 1815. IirmiUTABMilTY is the absence or impossibility of change. It is applied to the Supreme Being to denote that there can be no inconstancy in his character or government. It was argued for by the heathens. See Bishop Wilkins, Natural Religion. lOTPENETRABIIilTY is one of the primary qualities of matter, in virtue of which the same portion of space cannot at the same time be occupied by more than one portion of VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 245 IMlPENETRABIIilTY— matter. It is extension, or the quality of occupying space. A nail driven into a board does not penetrate the wood ; it merely separates and displaces the particles. Things are penetrable^ when two or more can exist in the same space — as two angels ; impenetralle^ when not — as two stones. 1I7IPEBATE.— F. Elicit. IMPERATIVE (CATEOORICAIi, THE) — is the phrase em- ployed by Kant, to denote that the moral law is absolute and obhgatory. The practical reason speaks to us in the catego- rical imperative^ — that is, in seeing an action to be right, we see, at the same time, that we ought to do it. And this sense of obligation springs from no \dew of the consequences of the action, as likely to be beneficial, but is a primitive and absolute idea of the reason ; involving, according to Kant, the power to obey, or not to obey. We are under obliga- tion, therefore we are free. Moral obligation implies freedom . IMPOSSlBIiE (the) — or that which cannot be, has been distinguished as the metapliysically or absolutely impossible^ or that which implies a contradiction, as to make a square circle, or two straight lines to enclose a space ; tJie physi- cally impossible — the miraculous, or that which cannot be brought about by merely physical causes, or in accordance with the laws of nature, as the death of the soul ; and the ethically impossible^ or that which cannot be done without going against the dictates of right reason, or the enactments of law, or the feelings of propriety. That which is morally impossible^ is that against the occiuTence of which there is the highest probable evidence — as that the dice should turn up the same number a hundred successive times. — ^Vhately, Logic^ append, i. "It maybe as really impossible for a person in his senses, and without any motive urging him to it, to drink poison, as it is for him to prevent the effects of it after drinking it ; but who sees not these impossibilities to be totally differ- ent in their foundation and meaning ? or what good reason can there be ''against calling the one a moral and the other a natural impossibility?" — Price, Review^ chap. 10, p. 431. 246 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IMPRESSION (in premere^ to press in, or on) — is the term employed to denote the change on the nervous system arising from a communication between an external object and a bodily organ. It is obviously borrowed from the effect which one piece of matter which is hard has, if pressed upon another piece of matter which is softer ; as the seal leaving its impression or configuration upon the wax. It is not intended, however, to convey any affirmation as to the nature of the change which is effected in the nervous system, or as to the nature of sensation ; and still less to confound this preliminary change with the sensation itself. The term impression^ is also apphed to the effects produced upon the higher sensibility, or our sentiments. Thus, we speak of moral impressions^ religious impressions^ impres- sions of sublimity and beauty. Hume divided all modifications of mind into impressions and ideas. Ideas were impressions when first received ; and became ideas when remembered and reflected on. See Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay i., chap. 1. "Mr. StewsLvt (Philosoph. of Hum, iW/zc?, vol. iii., addenda to vol. i., p. 43), seems to think that the word impression was first introduced as a technical term, into the philosophy of mind, by Hume. This is not altogether correct ; for, besides the instances which Mr. Stewart himself adduces, of the illustration attempted, of the phenomena of memory from the analogy of an impress and a trace,, words corre- sponding to impression were among the ancients f^piiliarly applied to the processes of external perception, imagina- tion, &c., in the Atomistic, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Stoical philosophies ; while, among modem psycho- logists (as Descartes and Gassendi), the term was likewise in common use." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ p. 294, note. Dr. Reid (Intell. Powers^ essay ii.), distinguishes the im- pressions made on the organs of sense into mediate and immediate. The impressions made on the sense of touch are immediate^ the external body and the organ being in contact. The impressions made on the ear by sounding I VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 247 litlPRESSION— bodies are mediate^ requiring the air and the vibrations of the air to give the sensation of hearing, It may be questioned whether this distinction is well or deeply founded. See Dr. Young, Intell. Philosoph.^ p. 71. Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 104. iMPUliSE: and iMPUliSlVE (in-pellere, to drive on)— are used in contradistinction to reason and rational, to denote the influence of appetite and passion as differing from the authority of reason and conscience. " It may happen, that when appetite draws one way, it may be opposed, not by any appetite or passion, but by some cool principle of action, which has authority without any impulsive force. — Reid, Act. Powers^ essay iii., pt. 2, chap. 1. ^' Passion often gives a violent impulse to the will, and makes a man do what he knows he shall repent as long as he lives." — Ibid, chap. 6. INCIilNATION (in-clinare, to lean towards) — is a form or degree of natural desire. It is synonymous with propen- sity or with the penchant of the French. It is more allied to affection than to appetite. *'It does not appear that in things so intimately connected with the happiness of life, as marriage and the choice of an employment, parents have any right to force the inclinations of their children. " — Beattie, Mar. Science^ vol. ii., part 2. — V. Disposition, Tendency. IWDKFIIVITE (in or non-definitum^ that which is not limited) — means that, the limits of which are not determined, or at least not so determined as to be apprehended by us. The definite is that of which the form and limits are deter- mined and apprehended by us. That of which we know not the limits comes to be regarded as having none : and hence indefinite has been confounded with the infinite. But they ought to be carefully distinguished. The infinite is absolute ; it is that of which we not only know not the limits, but which has and can have no limit. The indefinite is that of which there is no limit fixed. You can suppose it enlarged or diminished, but still it is finite. — T". Infinite. 248 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IIVIJEFINITE— Leibnitz, Discours de la Conformite de la Foi et de la Raison^ sect. 70. Descartes, Princip. PhilosojyJi, 1 pars, c. 26 et 27. IIVDIFFERENCE (liiberty of)— is that state of mind in which the will is not influenced or moved to choose or to refuse an object, but is equally ready to do either. It is also called liberty of contrariety. It should rather be called liberty of indetermination, or that state in which the mind is when it has not determined to do one of two or more things. — F. Liberty, Will. INDIFFERENT. — An action in morals is said to be indiffer- ent^ that is, neither right nor wrong, when, considered in itself or in specie^ it is neither contrary nor conformable to any moral law or rule ; as, to bow the head. Such an action becomes right or wrong, when the end for which it is done, or the circumstances in which it is done are con- sidered. It is then regarded in individuo; as, to bow the head, in token of respect, or in a temple^ in token of adora- tion. IN1>IFFERENTIS]« or IDENTISM, q. v., is sometimes em- ployed to denote the philosophy of Schelling, according to which there is no difference between the real and the ideal, or the idea and the reality, or rather that the idea is the reality. INI>IVII>UAIi, INI>IVI»UAr.ISI?I, INDIVIDUAI.ITY, INI>IVI1>UATI0N (from in or non and dividere^ to divide). Individual was defined by Porphyry — Id cujus proprietates alteri simul convenire non possunt. '-'- An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, one, and cannot be logically divided, is called individual.'''' — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 5, sect. 5. An individual is not absolutely indivisible, but that which cannot be divided without losing its name and distinctive qualities, that which cannot be parted into several other things of the same nature as the individual whole. A stone or a piece of metal may be separated into parts, each of which shall continue to have the same qualities as the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 249 INDITrDUAIi— whole. But a plant or an animal when separated into parts loses its individuality; which is not retained by any of the parts. We do not ascribe individuality to brute matter. But what is that which distinguishes one organ- ized being, or one living being, or one thinking being from all others ? This is the question so much agitated by the schoolmen, concerning the principle of individuation. In their barbarous Latin it was called Hcecceietas, that is, that in virtue of which we say this and not that ; or Ecceietas^ that of which we say, lo ! here, and not anywhere else. Peter, as an individual^ possesses many properties which are quid- dative^ or common to him with others, such as sulstan- iialitas^ corporeietas^ animalitas^ humanitas. But he has also a reahty, which may be called Petreietas or Peterness^ which marks all the others with a difference, and consti- tutes him Peter. It is the Hcecceietas which constitutes the principle of individuation. It was divided into the extrinsic and intrinsic. The number of properties which constituted an indi- viduum extrinsecum^ are enumerated in the following versicle : — Forma^ figura^ locus, tempus, cum nomine, sanguis, Patria, sunt septem, quce non Jidbet unum et alter. You may call Socrates a philosopher, bald, big-bellied, the son of Sophroniscus, an Athenian, the husband of Xan- tippe, &c., any one of which properties might belong to another man ; but the congeries of all these is not to be found but in Socrates. The intrinsic principle of individuation, was the ultimate reality of the being — ipsa rei entitas. In physical sub- stances, the intrinsic principle of individuation is ipsa materia et forma cum unione. Hutcheson has said (Metaphys., pars 1, chap, iii.), ^' Si quasratur de causa cur res sit una, aut de Individuationis principio in re ipsa ; non aliud assignandum, quam ipsa rei natura existens. Quoecunque enim causa rem quam- 250 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. INI>IVI1>UAJL.— libet fecerat aut creaverat, earn unam etiam fecerat, aut individuam, quo sensu volunt Metaphysici." Leibnitz has a dissertation, De principio Indivlduationis^ which has been thought to favour nominalism. Yet he maintained that individual substances have a real positive existence, independent of any thinking subject. IndiTiduality, like personal identity, belongs properly to in- telligent and responsible beings. Consciousness reveals it to us that no being can be put in our place, nor confounded with us, nor we with others. We are one and indivisible. '' Individuality is scarcely to be found among the inferior animals. When it is, it has been acquired or taught. Individuality is not individualism. The latter refers every- thing to self, and sees nothing but self in all things. Individuality consists only in willing to be self, in order to be something." — Yinet, Essais de Philosoph.^ Mor, Par., 1847, p. 142. But in the Elements of Individualism^ by William Mac- call, 8vo, Lond., 1847, the word individualism is used in the sense assigned above to individuality, INDUCTION (iTIethod or Process of) (iTTocyayYi^ inductio). — " It has been said that Aristotle attributed the discovery of induction to Socrates, deriving the word ii^oiyuyn from the Socratic accumulation of instances serving as antecedents to establish the requisite conclusion." — Devey, Logic, p. 151, note. ''Inductio est argumentum quo ex plurium singularium recensione aliquid universale concluditur." — Le Grand, Instil, PMlosoph.,^ p. 57, edit. 1675. Inductio est argumentum quo probatur quid verum esse de quopiam generali, ex eo quod verum sit de particu- laribus omnibus, saltem de tot ut sit credibile. — Wallis, Instit, Log.^ p. 198, 4th edit. Induction is a kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more individuals of that class. — Whately, Logic ^ book ii., chap. 5, sect. 5. VOCAB FLAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 251 IXDrCTIOX— " Wlien from the obsf^rvation of a number of individual in- stances, we ascend to a general proposition, or when, by com- bining a number of general propositions, we conclude from them another proposition still more general, the process which is substantiaUv the same in both instances, is called induction, . . . When the conclusion is more general than the largest of the premisses, the argument is called induction ; when less general or equally general, it is ratio- cination.' ' — ^lill, Logic, 2d edit., vol. i., pp. 223, 224i. "■ Induction is that operation of mind bv which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true iu all cases which resemble the former in cer- tain assignable respects. In other words, induction is the process bj which we conclude that what is true of certain indiyiduals of a class, is true of the whole chiss, or that what is true at certaia times will be true under similar circumstances at all times."' — ]Mill, Logic, ui., ii., i. '^ Induction is usuaHv defined to be the process of drawing a general rule from a sufficient number of particular cases ; deduction is the converse process of proving that some pro- perty belongs to the particular case from the consideration that it belongs to the whole class in which the case is found. Xhat aU bodies tend to fall towards the earth is a truth which we have obtained from examining a number of bodies coming under our notice, by induction : if from this general principle we argue that the stone we throw from our hand will show the same tendency, we adopt the deductive method. . . . More exactly, we may define the inductive method as the process of discovering laws and rules from facts, and causes from efiects ; and the deductive^ as the method of deriving facts from laws and effects from their causes." — ^Thomson, Outline of the Laws of Thought, 2d edit., pp. 321, 323. In the process of induction, Bacon recommends the con- struction of — 1. Tahulce prasenticE, that is, we should extend observation and enumerate the circumstances in which a phenomenon has taken place, so as to separate the 252 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IIVOUCTION— accidental from the essential. 2. Tabulce ahsentice^ that is, cases in which the phenomenon has not taken place, and thus ascend from the particular to the general conditions under which it occurs. 3. Tahulce comparationis^ that is, comparative tables in which the determining causes are ascertained and compared, and perhaps reduced to a higher cause or law. According to Sir William Hamilton (^Discussions on Philosopliy^ &c., p. 156), ^''Induction has been employed to designate three very different operations — 1. The objective process of investigating particular facts, as preparatory to induction^ which is not a process of reasoning of any kind. 2. A material illation of a universal from a singular, as warranted either by the general analogy of nature, or the special presumptions afforded by the object matter of any real science. 3. A formal illation of a universal from the individual, as legitimated solely by the laws of thought, and abstracted from the conditions of any 'particular matter.' The second of these is the inductive method of Bacon, which proceeds by way of rejections and conclu- sions, so as to arrive at those axioms or general laws from which we infer by way of synthesis other particulars un- known to us, and perhaps placed beyond reach of direct examination. Aristotle's definition coincides with the third, and ' induction is an inference drawn from all the particulars' (Prior Analyt.^ ii., c. 23). The second and third have been confounded. But the second is not a logical process at all, since the conclusion is not necessarily inferrible from the premiss, for the some of the antecedent does not necessarily legitimate the all of the conclusion, notwithstanding that the procedure may be warranted by the material problem of the science or the fundamental principles of the human understanding. The third alone is properly an induction of Logic ; for Logic does not con- sider things, but the general forms of thought under which the mind conceives them ; and the logical inference is not determined by any relation of causality between the pre- VOCABULABY OF PHILOSOPHY. 253 INDUCTION— miss and the conclusion, but by the subjective relation of reason and consequence as involved in the thought." On the diiFerence between induction as known and prac- tised by Aristotle and as recommended by Lord Bacon, see Stewart, PhilosopJi. of Hum, Mind, part 2, chap, iv., sect. 2. INDUCTION (Principle of) By the principle of induction is meant the ground or warrant on which we conclude that what has happened in certain cases, which have been observed, will also happen in other cases, which have not been observed. This principle is involved in the words of the wise man, Eccles. i. 9. ''The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be : and that which is done is that which shall be done." In nature there is nothing insulated. All things exist in consequence of a sufficient reason, all events occur according to the efficacy of proper causes. In the language of Xewton, Effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis ecedem sunt causce. The same causes produce the same effects. The principle of induction is an application of the principle of causality. Phenomena have their proper causes and these causes operate according to a fixed law. This law has been expressed by saving, substance is persistent. Our belief in the estabhshed order of nature is a primitive judgment, according to Dr. Reid and others, and the ground of all the knowledge we derive from ex- perience. According to others this belief is a result or inference derived from experience. On the different views as to this point compare Mill's Logic, vol. ii., chap. 5, mth WheweU's Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, book i., ch. 6. Also, the Quarterly Review, vol. 68. On the subject of induction in general, see Reid, Intell. Powers, essay vi., ch. 5. Keid, Inquiry, chap, vi., sect. 24. Stewart, Philosoph. of Hum. Mind,Yo\, i., ch. iv., sect. 5. Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, p. 74. Eoyer Collard, CEuvres de Reid. Par Mons. Jouffi:oy, tom. iv., p. 277. 254 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. INERTIA. — That property of matter by wHcli it would always continue in the same state of rest or motion in which it was put, unless changed by some external force. Resist- ance to change of state. The quantity of matter in a body is determined by its quantity of inertia ; and this is esti- mated by the quantity of force required to put it in motion at a given rate. Kepler conceiving the disposition of a body to maintain its state of motion as indicating an exer- tion of power, prefixed the word vis to inertia. Leibnitz maintained that matter manifests force in maintaining its state of rest. "The vis insita^ or innate force of matter, is a power of resistiQg by which every body, as much as in it lies, endea- vours to persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a straight line. This force is ever proportional to the body whose force it is ; and differs nothing from the inactivity of the mass but in our manner of conceiving it. A body, from the in- activity of matter, is not without difficulty put out of its state of rest or motion Upon which account this vis insita may, by a most significant name, be called vis inertice, or force of inactivity." — Newton, Princip,^ defin. 3. IN ESSE ; IN POSSE. — Things that are not, but which may be, are said to be in posse; things actually existing are said to be in esse. INFERENCE (in ferre^ to bear, or bring in) — is of the same derivation as illation and induction^ q. v, ''To infer is nothing but by virtue of one proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as true ; i. 6., to see or suppose such a connection of the two ideas of the in- ferred proposition." — Locke, Essay on Hum, Understand.^ b. iv., c. 17. " An inference is a proposition which is perceived to be true, because of its connection with some known fact. There are many things and events which are always found together ; or which constantly follow each other : there- fore, when we observe one of these things or events, we infer that the other also exists, or has existed, or will soon VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 255 INFEKENCE— take place. If we see the prints of human feet on the sands of an unknown coast, we infer that the country is inhabited ; if these prints appear to be fresh, and also below the level of high water, we infer that the inhabitants are at no great distance ; if the prints are those of naked feet, we infer that these inhabitants are savages ; or if they are the prints of shoes, we infer that they are, in some degree, civilized." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. INFERENCE and PROOF. — ^' Reasoning comprehends in- ferring and proving ; which are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in two different points ofvievj; like the road from London to York, and the road from jjg York to London. He who infers^ proves ; and he who 1 proves.^ infers ; but the word infer fixes the mind first on the premiss and then on the conclusion ; the word prove^ on the contrary, leads the mind fiom the conclusion to the premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these words respectively, are often used to express that which, on each occasion, is last in the mind ; inference being often used to signify the conclusion (^. 6., proposition inferred^) and proof the premiss. To infer^ is the business of the philosopher ; to prove^ of the advocate.''^ — Whately, Logic, b. iv., ch. 3, sect. 1. Proving is the assigning a reason (or argument) for the support of a given proposition ; inferring is the deduction of a conclusion from given premisses." — Whately, ibid. '' When the grounds for believing anj^thing are slight, we term the mental act or state induced a conjecture ; when they are strong, we term it an inference or conclusion. Increase the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a con- clusion ; diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a conjecture." — S. Bailey, Theory of Reasoning., pp. 31, 32, 8vo, Lond., 1851.— F. Fact. Infinite {in or non finitum., unlimited or rather limitless). — In geometry, infinite is applied to quantity which is greater than any assignable magnitude. But strictly speak- ing it means that which is not only without determinate 256 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. INFINITE— bounds, but wMcli cannot possibly admit of bound or limit. ''The infinite expresses the entire absence of all limita- tion, and is applicable to the one infinite being in all his attributes. The absolute expresses perfect independence, both in being and in action. The unconditioned indicates entire freedom from every necessary relation. The whole three unite in expressing the entire absence of all restric- tion. But let this be particularly observed, they do not imply that the one infinite being cannot exist in a necessary relation^ that is, if He exist in relation, that relation cannot be a necessary condition of his existence." — Calderwood, Fhilosoph. of the Infinite^ p. 37. — F. Absolute, Uncon- ditioned. As to our idea of the infinite there are two opposite opinions. According to some, the idea is purely negative, and springs up when we contemplate the ocean or the sky, or some object of vast extent to which we can assign no limits. Or, if the idea has anything positive in it, that is furnished by the imagiaation, which goes on enlarging the finite without limit. On the other hand it is said that the enlarging of the finite can never furnish the idea of the infinite^ but only of the indefinite. The indefinite is merely the confused apprehension of what may or may not exist. But the idea of the infinite is the idea of an objective reality, and is im- plied as a necessary condition of every other idea. We cannot think of body but as existing in space, nor of an event but as occurring in time ; and space and duration are necessarily thought of as infinite. But have we or can we have knowledge of the infinite .^ Boethius {In Proed.., p. 113, edit. Bas.) is quoted as saying, " Infinitorum nulla cognitio est; infinita namque animo com- prehendi nequeunt ; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiae fine concluditur: quare in- finitorum scientia nulla est." VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 257 IIVFIIVITE— On the other hand, Cudworth has said (Intell, System^ p. 449), — "Since infinitely the same with a&^oZw^e/z/ perfect. we having a notion or idea of the latter must needs have \ of the former." Bi^t while we cannot comprehend the infinite we mav apprehend it in contrast or relation with the finite. And this is what the common sense of men leads them to rest satisfied with, and without attempting the metaphysical ) '^ difficulty of reconciling the existence of the irifinite with I v^ that of the finite to admit the existence of both. I f " Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the I y^ same with it, but have a lower participation only of the m- \ f tellectual nature, and are rather apprelienders t han co mpre- \ Renders thereof This is indeed one badge of our creaturely /"""^ state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive know- / ledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the • essence of things." — Cudworth. xincillon, Essai sur VIdee et le Sentiment de VInfini, Cousin, Cours de Philosoph.^ et Hist, de la Philosoph. Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy^ &c. There is a Dissertatio de Finito et Infinito^ appended to the Dissertatio de principiis Justi et Decori^ 12mo, Amst.. 1651. See also Descartes, Meditations. INFJLUX (Physical) (in fiuere^ to flow in) — is one of the theories as to our perception of external objects. — '' The advocates of this scheme maintained that real things are the efficient causes of our perceptions, the word efficient being employed to signify that the things by means of some posi- tive power or inherent virtue which they possess, were com- petent to transmit to the mind a knowledge of themselves. .... External objects were supposed to operate on the nervous system by the transmission of some kind of influ- ence, the nervous system was supposed to carry on the process by the transmission of certain images or re- presentations, and thus our knowledge of external things was supposed to be brought about. The representa- tions alone came before the mind ; the things by which 258 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. INFliUX— they were caused remained occult and unknown." — ^Ferrier, Instit. of Metaphys.^^. 472. — V. Causes, (Occasional.) INJURY (in-juria^ from in and jus^ neglect or violation of right)— in morals and jurisprudence is the intentional doing of wrong. We may bring harm or evil upon others with- out intending it. But injury implies intention and awakens a sense of injustice and indignation, when it is done. It is on this difference in the meaning of harm and injury that Bishop Butler founds the distinction of resentment into sudden and deliberate, — Butler, Sermons yiii. and 9. INNATE (II>EAS). — Ideas, as to their origin, have been distinguished into adventitious^ or such as we receive from the objects of external nature, as the idea or notion of a mountain, or a tree ; factitious^ or such as we frame out of ideas already acquired, as of a golden mountain, or of a tree with golden fruit ; and innate^ or such as are inborn and belong to the mind from its birth, as the idea of God or of immortality. Cicero, in various passages of his treatise De Natura Deorum, speaks of the idea of God and of immortality as being inserted^ or engraven^ or inborn in the mind. "■ Intelligi necesse est^ esse deos^ quoniam insitas eorum, velpotius innatas cognitiones habemus^ — Lib. i., sect. 17. In like manner, Origen {Adv, Celsum^Yih. i., cap. 4) has said, " That men would not be guilty if they did not carry in their mind common notions of morality, innate and written in divine letters. '' It was in this form that Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand,, book i.,) attacked and refuted the doctrine of innate ideas. It hasbeen questioned, however, whether the doctrine, as represented by Locke, was really held by the ancient philosophers. And Dr. Hutcheson (Oratio Inaugiiralis^ De Naturali hominum Societate) has the following passage : — '"'' Omnes autem ideas, apprehensiones, et judicia, quge de rebus, duce nature formamus, quocunque demum tempore hoc fiat, sive quae naturse nostrse viribus quibuscunque,* necessario fere, atque ^ We have here, in 1730, the two marks oi necessity ar.d universality which subse- quently were so much insisted on hy Kant and others as characterizing all our a ■priori cognitions. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 259 INNATE— universaliter recipiuntur, innata, quantum memini, dixe- runt antiqui." Among modern philosophers it would be difficult to name any who held the doctrine in the form in which it has been attacked by Locke. In calling some of our ideas innate they seem merely to have used this word as synonymous with natural^ and applied it, as Hutcheson thinks the ancients did, to certam ideas which men, as human or rational beings, necessarily and uni- versally entertain.— See Natural as distinguished from Innate. *' There are three senses in which an idea may be sup- posed to be innate ; one, if it be something originally super- added to our mental constitution, either as an idea in the first instance fully developed ; or as one undeveloped, but having the power of self- development : another, if the idea is a subjective condition of any other ideas, which we receive independently of the previous acquisition of this idea, and is thus proved to be in some way embodied in or interwoven with the powers by which the mind receives those ideas : a third, if, without being a subjective condition of other ideas, there be any faculty or faculties of mind, the exercise of which would suffice, independently of any knowledge acquired from without, spontaneously to pro- duce the idea. In the first case, the idea is given us at our first creation, without its bearing any special relation to our other faculties ; in the second case, it is given us as a form, either of thought generally or of some particular species of thought, and is therefore embodied in mental powers by which we are enabled to receive the thought : in the third case, it is, as in the second, interwoven in the original constitution of some mental power or powers : not, however, as in the preceding case, simply as a pre- requisite to their exercise, but by their being so formed as by exercise spontaneously to produce the idea." — Dr. Alliot, PsycJwlogy and Theology^ p. 93, 12mo, Lond. 1855. The first of these three is the form in vrhlch the doctrine 260 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. INNATE— of inFiate ideas is commonly understood. This doctrine was at one time thought essential to support the principles of natural religion and morality. But Locke saw that these principles were safe from the attacks of the sceptic, although a belief in God and immortality and a sense of the difference between right and wrong were not implanted or inserted in the mind ; if it could be shown that men neces- sarily and universally came to them by the ordinary use of their faculties. He took a distinction between an innate lav7 and a laio of nature {Essay on Hum. Understand,^ book i., ch. 3) ; and while he did not admit that there was a law '' imprinted on our minds in their very original," contended '' that there is a law knowable by the light of nature." In like manner, Bishop Law said (King's Essay on Origin of Evil., P' 79, note), ''It will really come to the same thing with regard to the usual attributes of God, and the nature of virtue and vice, whether the Deity has implanted these instincts and affections in us, or has framed and disposed us in such a manner — has given us such powers and placed us in such circumstances, that we must necessarily acquu^e them." — V. Nature (Law of.) '' Though it appears not that we have any innate ideas or formed notions or principles laid in by nature, ante- cedently to the exercise of our senses and understandings ; yet it must be granted, that we were born with the natural faculty, whereby we actually discern the agreement or dis- agreement of some notions, so soon as we have the notions themselves ; as, that we can or do think, that therefore we ourselves are ; that one and two make three, that gold is not silver, nor ice formally water ; that the whole is greater than its part, &c., and if we should set ourselves to do it, we cannot deliberately and seriously doubt of its being so. This we may call intuitive knowledge, or natural certainty wrought into our very make and constitution." — Oldfield, Essay on Reason^ p. 5, 8vo, Lond., 1707. " Some writers have imagined, that no conclusions can be drawn from the state of the passions for or against the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 261 IIVNATK— Divine Benevolence, because they are not innate but acquii-ed. This is frivolous. If we are so framed and placed in such circumstances, that all these various passions must be acquired ; it is just the same thing as if they had been planted in us originally.'' — Balguy, Divine Benevolence^ p. 100, note. '• Xi nos idees, ni nos sentiments, ne sent innes, mais ils sont naturels, fondes sur la constitution de notre esprit et de notre ame, et sm* nos rapports avec tout ce qui nous environne." G^uvres de Turgot, torn. iv.. p. 308 ; quoted by Cousin, (Eavres^ 1 serie, tom. iv., p. 202. The doctrine of innate ideas is handled by Locke in his Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book i., and by most authors who treat of intellectual philosophy. — See also Ellis, Knowledge of Divine Things, pp. 59-86. Sherlock. On the Immortality of the Soul., chap. 2. INSTINCT Qv or iuTo; and dri^ni'^ intus pungere) — signifies an internal stimulus. In its Avidest signification, it has been applied to plants as well as to animals; and may be defined to be "the power or energy by which all organized forms ai'e pre- served in the individual, or continued in the species.'' It is more common, however, to consider instinct as belonging to animals. And in this view of it Dr. Eeid (^Active Powers^ essay iii., part 1, chap. 2) has said: — "By instinct I mean a natural blind impulse to certam actions without having any end in ^iew. without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do." An instinct says Paley (Nat. Theoh, chap. 18), '• is a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction." ''An instinct," says Dr. Whately {Tract on Instinct^ p. 21), "is a blind tendency to some mode of action inde- pendt'nt of any consideration on the part of the agent, of the end to which the action leads." There are two classes of actions, which, in the inferior animals, have been refeiTcd to instinct as their sprmg. 1. Tliose which have reference to the preservation of mdivi- 262 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. INSTINCT— duals — as the seeking and discerning the food which is convenient for them, and the using their natural organs of locomotion, and their natural means of defence and attack. 2. Those which have reference to the continuation of the species — as the bringing forth and bringing up of their young. The theories which have been proposed to explain the instinctive operations of the inferior animals may be arranged in three classes. I. According to the pliysical theories, the operations of imtinct are all provided for in the structure and organiza- tion of the inferior animals, and do not imply any mind or soul. The principle of life may be developed — 1. By the mechanical play of bodily organs. See Des- cartes, Epistles ; Polignac, Anti- Lucretius^ book vi. ; Norris, Essay towards the Theory of an Ideal World^ part 2, ch. 2. 2. By Irritability : Badham, Insect Life ; Mason Good, Booh of Nature^ vol. ii., p. 132; Yirey, De la Physiologic dans ses rapports avec la Philosophies p. 394. 3. By Sensation : Bushnan, Philosophy of Instinct and Reason^ p. 178 ; Barlow, Connection between Physiology and Intellectual Philosophy ; Kirby, Bridgewater Treatise^ vol. ii., p. 255. II. According to the psychical theories, the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are the results of mental powers or faculties possessed by them, analogous to those of understanding in man. 1. Mr. Coleridge calls instinct " the power of selecting and adapting means to a proximate end." But he thinks '' that when instinct adapts itself, as it sometimes does, to varying circumstances, there is manifested by the inferior animals, an instinctive intelligence, which is not different in kind from understanding, or the faculty which judges according to sense in man." — Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., p. 193, 6th edit. ; Green, Vital Dynamics^ app. F., p. 88, or Coleridge's Works^ vol. ii., app, B., p. 5. 2. Dr. Darwin contends {Zoonomia^Yol. i., 4to, pp. 256-7), VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 263 INSTINCT— that what have been called the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are to be referred to experience and reasoning, as well as those of our own species; ''though their reasoning is from fewer ideas, is busied about fewer objects, and is exerted with less energy." 3. Mr. Smellie {Philosopliy of Nat. Hist.., vol. i., 4to, p. 155), instead of regarding the instinctive actions of the inferior animals as the results of reasoning, regards the power of reasoning as itself an zns^mct He holds that "all animals are, in some measure, rational beings ; and that the dignity and superiority of the human intellect are necessary results of the great variety of instincts which nature has been pleased to confer on the species." — p. 159. III. According to the theories which may be called liyperpsycMcal.^ th^ phenomena of instinct are the results of an intelligence, different from the human, which emanates upon the inferior animals from the supreme spiiit or some subordinate spirit. This doctrine is wrapped up in the ancient fable, that the gods, when pursued by the Titans, fled into Eg^'pt, and took refuge under the form of animals of different kinds. Father Bougeant, in a work entitled, A PMlosopliical Amusement on the Language of Beasts, contends that the bodies of the inferior animals are inhabited by fallen and reprobate spirits. Mr. French {Zoological Journal., ISTo. 1) holds that the actions of the inferior animals are produced by good and evil spirits ; the former being the cause of the henevolent^ and the latter oi tho, ferocious instincts. Others have referred the operations of instinct to the direct agency of the Creator on the inferior animals. — See ISTewton, Optics^ book iii., xx., query subjoined ; Spectator.^ 1^0. 120 ; Hancock, Essay on Instinct. Dr. Reid has maintained {Active Powers., essay iii., pt. 1, chap. 2) that in the human being many actions, such as sucking and swallowing, are done by instinct; while Dr. 264 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IIVSTINCT— Priestley {Examinat. of Reid^ &c , p. 70) regards them as automatic or acquired. And tlie interpretation of natural signs and other acts which Dr. Reid considers to be instinc- tive, Dr. Priestley refers to association and experience. INTEliIiECT (inter -leg ere^ to choose between, to perceive a difference). — Intellect^ sensitivity^ and will^ are the three heads under which the powers and capacities of the human mind are now generally arranged. In this use of it, the term intellect includes all those powers by which we acquire, retain, and extend our knowledge, as perception, memory, imagination, judgment, &c. *'It is by those powers and faculties which compose that part of his nature commonly called his intellect or understanding that man acquires his knowledge of external objects ; that he investi- gates truth in the sciences ; that he combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view ; and that he imparts to his fellow -creatures the acquisitions he has made." — Stewart, Active and Moral Powers^ introd. The intellectual powers are commonly distinguished from the moral powers ; inasmuch as it is admitted that the moral powers partake partly of the intellect and partly of the sensitivity^ and imply not only knowledge but feeling. And when the moral powers are designated active, it is not meant to assert that in exercising the intellectual powers the mind is altogether passive, but only to intimate that while the function of the intellectual powers is to give knowledge, the function of the active and moral powers is to prompt and regulate actions. Lord Monboddo {Ancient Metaphysics^ book ii., chap. 7) reduces the gnostic powers to two, viz. — sense and intellect. Under sense he includes the phantasy and also the compar- ing faculty, and that by which we apprehend ideas, either single or in combination. This he considers to be partly rational, and shared by us with the brutes. But intellect or uovg^ he considers peculiar to man — it is the faculty by which we generalize and have ideas altogether independent of sense. He quotes Hierocles on the golden verses of Pytha- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 265 INTEI.I.ECT— goras (p. 160, edit. Xeedham), as representing the Tioyogor '4yvx-ri y^oyiK-/}, as holding a middle place betwixt the irra- tional or lowest part of our nature and intellect, which is the highest. '' The term intellect is derived from a verb (intelligere), which signifies to understand: but the term itself is usually so applied as to imply a faculty which recognizes principles explicitly as well as implicitly ; and abstract as well as applied ; and therefore agrees with the reason rather than the understanding ; and the same extent of signification belongs to the adjective intellectual."— ^Yhewell, Elements of Morality^ introd. 12. Intellect and InteUection. — '' The mind of man is, by its native faculty, able to discern universal propositions, in the same manner as the sense does particular ones — that is, as the truth of these propositions — Socrates exists, An eagle flies, Bucephalus runs, is immediately perceived and judged of by the sense ; so these contradictory propositions cannot be both true ; TMiat begins to exist has its rise from another ; Action argues that a thing exists (or as it is vulgarly expressed, a thing that is not. acts not), and such-like pro- positions, which the mind directly contemplates and finds to be true by its native force, without any previous notion or applied reasoning ; which method of attaining truth is by a peculiar name styled intellection^ and the faculty of attaining it the intellect.'' — Barrow, Mathemat. Lectures, 1734:, p. 72. InteUect and Intelligence. — *' By Aristotle, uovg is used to denote — '' 1. Our higher faculties of thought and knowledge. '• 2. The faculty, habit, or place of principles, that is of self-e^-ident and self- evidencing notions and judgments. '^ The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by intellectus and intelligentia ; and some of them appropriated the former of these terms to its first or general signification, the latter to its second or special.'' — Sir Will. Hamilton, ReicVs Work's^ note A, sect. 5. 2Q6 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. Intellect and intelligence are commonly used as synony- mous. But Trusler has said, "It seems to me that intel- lectus ought to describe art or power ^ and intelligentia ought to describe use or liahit of the understanding ; such being the tendency of the inflections in which the words terminate. In this case intellect or understanding power is a gift of nature ; and intelligence^ or understanding habit, an accu- mulation of time. So discrimmated, intellect is inspired, intelligence is acquired. The Supreme Intellect^ when we are speaking of the Wisdom, the Supreme Intelligence when we are speaking of the Knowledge of God. Every man is endowed with understanding ; but it requires reading to become a man of intelligence^ — V. Keason, Under- standing. Sntellectus Patieiis and Intellectus Agens. — Aristotle dis- tinguished between the intellectus p aliens and the intellectus agens. The former, perishing with the body (De Anima^ cap. 5), by means of the senses, imagination and memory, furnished the matter of knowledge ; the latter, separable from the body and eternal, gave that knowledge form. Under the impressions of the senses the mind is passive ; but while external things rapidly pass, imagination does not allow them altogether to escape, but the knowledge of them is retained by the memory. But this knowledge, being the knowledge of singulars, cannot give universal notions, but merely generalized ones. The intellectus agens, however, proceeding upon the information furnished by the senses, actually evolves the idea which the intellectus patiens potentially possessed. His illustration is, — as light makes colours existing potentially, actually to be, so the intellectus agens converts into actuality, and brings, as it were, to a new life, whatever was discovered or collected by the intellectus patiens. As the senses receive the forms of things expressed in matter, the intellect comprehends the universal form, which, free from the changes of matter, is really prior to it and underlies the production of it as cause. The common illustration of Aristotle is that the senses per- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 267 IIVTEIiliECT— ceive the form of tilings as it is to ai^uou or a height, the intellect has knowledge of it as resembling to xoAElVCE— and accidental circumstances and peculiarities by wliich these systems respectively are distinguished from one another. Particular jurisprudence treats of the laws of particular states ; which laws are, or at least profess to be, the rules and principles of universal jurisprudence itself, specifically developed and applied." There is a close connection between ji^risprudence and morality^ so close that it is difficult to determine precisely the respective limits of each. Both rest upon the great law of right and wrong as made known by the light of nature. But while morality enjoins obedience to that law in all its extent, jurisprudence exacts obedience to it only in so far as the law of nature has been recognized in the law of nations or the positive institutions of society. Morality is, therefore, more extensive than jurisprudence. Morality has equal reference to the whole of human duty. Jurisprudence has special reference to social duty. All social duty as enjoined by the light of nature —whether included under justice or benevolence — belongs to morality. Jurispru- dence treats chiefly or almost exclusively of duties of justice, which have been made the subject of positive law ; which duties of benevolence cannot well be. The rules of morality as such, are enforced merely by the law within ; but in so far as they have been adopted by jurisprudence^ they can be enforced by external law. The moralist appeals to our sense of duty, the jurist to a sense of authority or law. ^^ As the sense of duty is the sense of moral necessity simply, and excluding the sense of physical (or external) compulsion, so the sense of law is the sense of the same necessity, in combination with the notion of physical (or external) compulsion in aid of its requirements." — ^Foster, Elements of Jurisprudence^ p. 39. The difference between morality dixidi jurisprudence as to extent of range, may be illustrated by the difference of signification between the word right^ when used as an adjective, and when used as a substantive. Morality con- templates all that is right in action and in disposition. I VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 277 3 «JKISPRtJI>EN€E— Jwrisprudence contemplates only that which one man has a right to from another. '' The adjective right^^^ says Dr. Whewell (Elements of Morality, No. 84), ''has a much wider signification than the substantive right. Everything is right which is conformable to the supreme rule of human action; but that only is a right which ^ being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society, and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say, that, a poor man has no right to relief; but it is right he should have it. A rich man has a ricjht to destroy the harvest of his fields ; but to do so would not he ricjUy So that the sphere o^ morality is wider than that oi jurisprudence,— th^ former embracing all that is right, the latter only particular rights realized or vested in particular persons. Morality and jurisprudence differ also in the immediate ground of obligation. Morality enjoins us to do what is right, because it is right. Jurisprudence enjoins us to give to others their right, with ultimate reference, no doubt, to the truth made known to us by the light of nature, that we are morally bound to do so ; but, appealing more directly to the fact, that our doing so can be demanded by our neighbour, and that his demand will be enforced by the authority of positive law. And this difference between the immediate ground of obligation in matters of morality and matters of jurisj^rudence, gives rise to a difference of mean- ing in the use of some words which are generally employed as synonymous. For example, if regard be had to the difference between morality and jurisprudence, duty is a word of wider signification than ohligation ; just as right, the adjective, is of wider signification than right, the sub- stantive. It is my duty to do what is right. I am under ohligation to give another man his 7'ight. A similar shade of difference in meaning may be noticed in reference to the words ought and obliged. I ought to do my duty ; I am obliged to give a man his right. I am not obliged to relieve a distressed person, but I ought to do so. 278 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. These distinctions are sometimes explained by saying, that what is enjoined by jurisprudence is of perfect ohligation^ and what is enjoined only by morality is of imperfect obli- gation^ — that is, that we may or may not do what our conscience dictates, but that we can be compelled to do what positive law demands. But these phrases of perfect and imperfect obligation are objectionable in so far as they tend to represent the obligations of morality as inferior to those of jurisprudence — the dictates of conscience as of less authority than the enactments of law — whereas the latter rest upon the former, and the law of nations derives its binding force from the law of natm^e. Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pais. Puffendorff, De Officio Hominis et Civis, Leibnitz, Jurisprudentia. Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws. Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Law. Eutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, Mackintosh, Discourse of the Law of Nature and of Nations. Lerminier, Sur le Droit. JUSTICE QiKUiOdvuv}^ justitia) — ^is one of the four cardinal vir- tues. It consists, according to Cicero (De Finihus^ lib. v., cap. 23), in suo cuique tribuendo^ in according to every one his right. By the Pythagoreans, and also by Plato, it was regarded as including all human virtue or duty. And Cicero has also used it in this sense when he said, Pietas est justitia ergo Deos. The word righteousness is used in our translation of the Scripture in a like extensive signi- fication. As opposed to equity, justice (to uo^uikov) means doing merely what positive law requires, while equity (ro hou) means doing what is fair and right in the circum- stances of every particular case. Justice is not founded in law, as Hobbes and others hold, but in our idea of what is right. And laws are just or unjust in so far as they do or do not conform to that idea. '' To say that there is nothing just nor unjust but what is VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 279 JUSTICE— commanded or prohibited by positive laws," remarks Mon- tesquieu {Spirit of Laws ^ book L, chap. 1), "is like saying that the radii of a circle were not equal till you had drawn the circumference." Justice may be distinguished as ethical, economical, and political. The first consists in doing justice between man and man as men ; the second, in doing justice between the members of a family or household ; and the third, in domg justice between the members of a community or common- wealth. These distinctions are taken by More in his En- chiridion Etliicum^ and are adopted by Grove m his Moral Philosopliy . Plato's Republic contains a delineation oi justice. — Arist., Ethic.., lib. V. ; Cicero, Be Finibus, Horace gives the idea of a just or good man. — Epist.^ lib. i., 16, 40. — V, Right, Duty, Equity. KNOWIiEDOS: (yucoaig^ cognitio), .... "Learning dwells In heads replete with thoughts of other men, Knowledge in minds attentive to their own." ''• Knowledges (or cognitions) — ^in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers, till after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unnoticed by any Enghsh lexicographer." — Sir William Hamilton, Reid's Works ^ note A, sect. 5, p. 763. '•''Knowledge is the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. Where this perception is, there is knoivledge ; and where it is not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or beheve, yet we always come short of hiowledge.^^ — Locke. Essay on Hum. Understand.., book iv., chap. 1. And in chap. 14, he says, ''The mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood. First., knowledge, Avhereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, judg- 280 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. menty which, is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind^ when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but pre- sumed to be so." Knowledge is here opposed to opinion. But judgment is the faculty by which we attain to cer- tainty, as well as opinion. '-'- And," says Dr. Keid (IntelL Powers^ essay iv., chap. 3), ''I know no authority, besides that of Mr. Locke, for calling knowledge a faculty, any more than for calling opinion a faculty." ^''Knowledge implies three things ; — 1st, Firm Belief ; 2d, Of what is true ; 3d, On sufficient grounds. If any one, e. g. , is in doiibt respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to know the proposition proved by it ; if, again, he is fully convinced of anything that is not true^ he is mistaken in supposing himself to know it; lastly, if two persons are Qd^oh fully confident ; one, that the moon is inhabited ; and the other, that it is not (though one of these opinions must be true), neither of them could pro- perly be said to know the truth, since he cannot have sufficient proof of it." — Whately, Logic^ book iv., chap. 2, sect. 2, note. Knowledge supposes three terms : a heing who knows, an ohject known, and a relation determined between the know- ing being and the known object. This relation properly constitutes knowledge. But this relation may not be exact, in conformity with the nature of things ; knowledge is not truth. Knowledge is a subjective conception — a relative state of the human mind ; it resides in the relation, essentially ideal, of our thought and its object. Truth., on the contrary, is the reality itself, the reality ontological and absolute, con- sidered in. their absolute relations with intelligence, and independent of our personal conceptions. Truth has its source in God ; knowledge proceeds from man. Knowledge is true and perfect from the moment that our conception is really conformable to that which is — from the moment that our thought has seized the reality. And, in this view, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 281 truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thouglit with the nature of its object. But truth is not yet certitude. It may exist in itself without being acquired by the human mind, without exist- ing actually for us. It does not become certain to us till we have acquired it by the employment of method. Certi- tude is thus truth brought methodically to the human intelligence, — that is, conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is evident of itself. If such a point exist, it is plain that we can attain to all the truths which attach themselves to it directly or indirectly; and that we may have of these truths, howsoever remote, a certainty as com- plete as that of the point of departure. Certitude^ then, in its last analysis, is the relation of truth to Tcnoivledge^ the relation of man to God, of ontology to psychology. When the human intelligence, making its spring, has seized divine truth, in identifying itself with the reality, it ought then, in order to finish its work, to return upon itself, to individualize the truth in us ; and from this individualization resutlts the certitude which becomes, in some sort, personal, as knowledge ; all the while preser^dng the impersonal nature of truth. Certitude then reposes upon two points of support, the one subjective^ man or the human consciousness, the other objective and absolute, the Supreme Being. God and consciousness are the two arbiters of certitude. — Tiberghien, Essai des Connaiss, Hum., p. 34. ''The schoolmen divided all human knowledge into two species, cognitio intuitiva^ and cognitio ahstractiva. By intuitive knowledge they signified that which we gain by an immediate presentation of the real individual object ; by abstractive, that which we gain and hold through the me- dium of a general term ; the one being, in modern language, a/)ercep^io?i, the other a concept." — Morell, Psychology,^, 158. KuoTFledge as Immediate and Preseutati^e or IntnitiTe — and as lUediate and Kepresentatirc or Remote. " A thing is known immediately or proximately, when 282 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. we cognize it in itself ; mediately or remotely^ when we cognize it in or through something numerically different from itself Immediate cognition, tlius tlie knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the fact of its existence ; mediate cogni- tion, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through some- thing not itself, involves only the possibility of its existence. '' An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing- known is itself presented to observation, may be called a presentative ; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by the mind face to face^ may be called an intuitive cognition. A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be called a representative cognition. '''• A thing known is called an object of knowledge. ''In a presentative or immediate cognition there is one sole object; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being one and the same. In a representative or mediate cognition there may be discriminated two objects ; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being numerically different. ''A thing known in itself is the (sole) presentative or irduitive object of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a pre- sentative or intuitive knowledge, A thing known in arid through something else is the primary, mediate, remote, real, existent, or represented object of (mediate) knowledge — objec- turn quod; and a thing through ivhich something else is knoivn is the secondary, immediate, proximate, ideal, vicarious, or representative object of (mediate) knowledge — objectum quo or per quod. The former may likewise be styled — objectum enti- tativumy — Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works, note B, sect. 1. Knowledge in respect of the mode in which it is obtained is intuitive or discursive. Intuitive when things are seen in themselves by the mind, or when objects are so clearly exhibited that there is no need of reasoning to perceive them — as, a whole is greater than any of its parts. Dis- cursive when objects are perceived by means of reasoning, as, the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 283 KNOWI.EDOE— angles. In respect of its strength knowledge is certain or probable. If we attend to the degrees or ends of know- ledge, it is either science^ or art^ or experience^ or opinion^ or beliefs — q. v. ^' Knowledge is not a couch whereon to rest a searching and reckless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit or sale; but a rich store-house for the glory of the Creator, and the relief of man's estate." — Bacon. F. Certainty, Truth, Wisdom. liANGUAG-E is natural or artificial- Natural language ex- presses itself by features of the countenance, tones of the voice, and gestures and attitudes of the body. — See Reid, Inquiry., ch. 4, sect. 2. Artificial language expresses itself by words or signs which are conventionally under- stood. — F. Signs. liAUOHTER is the act of expressing our sense of the ridicu- lous. This act, or rather the sense of the ridiculous which prompts it, has been thought peculiar to man, as that which distinguishes him from the inferior animals.* — Dr. Hutcheson, Essay on Laughter; Dr. Beattie, Essay on Laugliter and Ludicrous Composition; Akenside, Pleasures of Lnaginat.^ book iii.. Spectator, Nos. 47 and 249. liAW comes from the Anglo-Saxon verb signifying ^' to lay down." '' All things that are have some operation not violent or casual. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that wliich doth appoint the form and measure of worldng, the same we term a law.'''' — Hooker, Eccles. Pol.., book i., sect. 2. * The ludicrous pranks of the puppy and the kitten make this doubtful ; and Montaigne said he was not sure whether his favourite cat might not sometimes be laughing as much at him as with him. 284 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ILAW— " Laws in their most extended signification aretlie neces- sary relations arising from the nature of things ; and, in this sense, all beings have their laws, the Deity has his laws, the material world has its laws, superior intelligences have their laws, the beasts have their laws, and man has his laws." — Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws ^ book i., ch. 1. Thus understood, the word comprehends the laws of the physical, metaphysical, and moral universe. Its primary signification was that of a command or a prohibition, addressed by one having authority to those who had power to do or not to do. There are in this sense laivs of society, laws of morality, and laws of religion — each resting upon their proper authority. But the word has been transferred into the whole philosophy of being and knowing. And when a fact frequently observed recurs invariably under the same circumstances, we compare it to an act which has been prescribed, to an order which has been estabhshed — and say it recurs according to a law. On the analogy between political laws or laws proper, and those which are called metaphorically laws of nature, see Lindley, Intro- duction to Jurisprudence^ app., p. 1. Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined^ p. 186. SjSlw and Cause. The word law expresses the constant and regular order according to which an energy or agent operates. It may thus be distinguished from cause — the latter denoting efficiency^ the former denoting the mode according to which efficiency is developed. '^ It is a perversion of language," says Paley (Nat. Theol.^ ch. 1), '^to assign any law, as the efficient, operative cause of anything. A law pre-supposes an agent ; this is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds ; it implies a power ; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing." To the same purpose Dr. Reid has said, ''The laws of nature are the rules accord- ing to which effects are produced; but there must be a VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 285 cause which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation never steered a ship, nor the law of gravity never moved a planet." '* Those who go about to attribute the origination of mankind (or any other effect) to a bare order or law of nature, as the primitive effecter thereof, speak that which is perfectly irrational and unintelligible ; for although a law or rule is the method and order by which an intelligent being may act, yet a laio^ or rule, or order, is a dead, unactive, uneffective, thing of itself, without an agent that useth it, and exerciseth it as his rule and method of action. What would a law signify in a kingdom or state, unless there were some person or society of men that did exercise and execute, and judge, and determine, and act by it, or according to it?" — Hales, Prim. Origin.^ chap. 7, sect. 4. To maintain that the world is governed by laws^ with- out ascending to the superior reason of these laws — not to recognize that every law implies a legislator and executor, an agent to put it in force, is to stop half-way ; it is to hypostatise these laws^ to make beings of them, and to imagine fabulous divinities in ignoring the only God who is the source of all laws^ and who governs by them all that lives in the universe. — See Tiberghien, Essai des Connaiss. Hum.^ p. 743 *' A law supposes an agent and a power ; for it is the mode, according to which the agent proceeds, the order according to which the power acts. Without the presence of such an agent, of such a power, conscious of the rela- tions on which the law depends, producing the effects which the law prescribes, the lata can have no efficacy, no existence. Hence we infer, that the intelligence by which the law is ordained, the power by which it is put into action, must be present at all times and in all places, where the effects of the law occur ; that thus the knowledge and the agency of the Divine Being pervade every portion of the universe, producing all action and passion, all per- manence and change. The laws of matter are the laws 286 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. wliicli lie, in his wisdom, prescribes to liis own acts ; his universal presence is the necessary condition of any course of events ; his universal agency, the only organ of any efficient force." — Whewell, Astronomy^ p. 361. liaTF, Physical, l^ental, Moral, Political. Laws may acquire different names from the difference in the agents or energies which operate according to them. A stone when thrown up into the air rises to a height pro- portional to tiie force with which it is thrown, and then falls to the ground by its own gravity. This takes place according to physical laws^ or what are commonly called laws of nature. '•'• Those principles and faculties are the general laws of our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind that the general laws we investigate in physics hold in that branch of science." — Stewart, Philosoph. of Hum. Mind.^ part 1, introd. When an impression has been made upon a bodily organ a state of sensation follows in the mind. And when a state of sensation has been long continued or often repeated it comes to be less sensibly felt. These are mental laws. We have a faculty of memory by which the objects of former consciousness are recalled ; and this faculty operates according to the laws of association. Moral laws are derived from the nature and will of God, and the character and condition of man, and may be under- stood and adopted by man, as a being endowed with intelligence and will, to be the rules by which to regulate his actions. It is right to speak the truth. Gratitude should be cherished. These things are in accordance witli the nature and condition of man, and with the will of God — that is, they are in accordance with the moral law of conscience and of revelation. Political laws are prohibitions or injunctions promulgated by those having authority to do so, and may be obeyed or disobeyed ; but the disobedience of them implies punish- ment. '^ The i7itent or purpose of a law is wholly different from TOCABCLAIiY OF PHLLOSOPHY. 287 LAW— the motives or grounds of the law. The former is its practical end or effect ; the hitter, the pre-existing circum- stances which suggested and caused its enactment.* For example, the existence of a famine in a coimtr}', mav tend to the enactment of a poor law. In this case the famine is the motive or groimd of the law ; and the relief of the poor its intent or purpose. The one is its positive cause, the latter its desired effect.'' — Lewis. Method of Ohservat. in Politics J eh. 12, sect. 6. In reference to the moral lawj Hobbes and his followers have overlooked the difference between a law and the principle of the law. An action is not right merely in consequence of a law declaring it to be so. But the dechiration of the law proceeds upon the antecedent lightness of the action. Law and Form, — "though correlative terms, must not, in strict accuracy, be used as SATiomTnous. The former is used properly with reference to an operation: the latter with reference to its product. Conceiving^ judging^ reason- ingy are subject to certain laws: concepts^ judgments^ syllogisms, exhibit certain forms,'' — ManseU, Prole gom. Log., p. 240. I.EJ13IJL (from >.cc^u,Sccvsi'j, sumere, to take for granted, to assume). — This term is used to denote a preliminary pro- position, which, while it has no direct relation to the point to be proved, yet serves to pave the way for the proof. In Logic, a premiss taken for granted is sometimes called a lemma. To prove some proposition in mechanics, some of the propositions ia geometry may be taken as lemmata. LIBERT ARI.a:¥.— "I believe he (Dr. Crombie, that is) may claim the merit of adding the word Libertarian to the * Suarez {De Legibu&, iiL, 20, sect. 2) says, " Sine dubio in aninio legislatoris IxSC duo distincta sunt, scilicet voluntas sen intentio ejus, secundum quam vult pr^ecipere. et ratio, ob quam movetur." Hie ratio Ic'jis and the mens J^ig-is ar« distinguished by Grotius (J. B. et P., ii.. 16, sect. S^ with BarbejTac's notes; and by Puifendorff (v., 12, sect. 10). The purpose of a law and its motive have often been confounded under the general term fxitio k'jis.—See Savigny. System des RechtSy voL L, pp. 216-224. 288 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IjIBERTARIAN— English language, as Priestley added that of Necessarian^ — Correspondence of Dr. Reid^ p. 88. Both words have reference to the questions concerning liberty and necessity, in moral agency. IjIBEBTIT of the TI^IJLIi or lilBSlRTY of a MORAIi AOENT. '-'' The idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand..^ b. ii., ch. 21, sect. 8. " By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a power over the determinations of his own will. If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of some- thing in his external circumstances, he is not free ; he has not what I call the liberty of a moral agent, but is subject to necessity." — Eeid, Active Powers, essay iv., ch. 1. It has been common to distinguish liberty into freedom from co-action.^ smd freedom from necessity. Freedom from co-action imphes, on the one hand, the absence of all impediment or restraint, and, on the other hand, the absence of all compulsion or violence. If we are prevented from doing what is in our power, when we desire and will to do it, or, if we are compelled to do it, when we desire and will not to do it, we are not free from co-action. This general explanation of freedom agrees equally with bodily freedom, mental freedom, and moral freedom. Indeed, although it is common to make a distinction between these, there is no difference, except what is denoted by the different epithets introduced. We have bodily freedom, when our body is not subjected to restraint or compulsion — mental freedom, when no impediment or violence prevents us from duly exercising our powers of mind — and moral freedom, when our moral principles and feelings are allowed VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 289 I^IBERTY— to operate within the sphere which has been assigned to them. Xow it is with freedom regarded as moral that wt- have here to do — it is with freedom as the attribute of a being who possesses a moral nature, and who exerts the active power which belongs to him, in the Hght of reason, and under a sense of responsibility. Liberty of this kind L- called freedom from necessity. Freedom from necessity is also called liberty of election, or power to choose, and implies freedom from anything inyincibly determining a moral agent. It has been distin- guished into liberty of contrariety^ or the power of deter- mining to do either of two actions which are contraiy, a.-^ right or wrong, good or evil; and liberty of contradiction, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contradictory, as to walk or to sit still, to walk in one direction or in another. Freedom from necessity is sometimes also called liberty of indifference^ because, before he makes his election, the agent has not determined in favour of one action more than another. Liberty of indifference^ however, does not mean, as some would have it, liberty of equihbrium, or that the agent has no more inclination towards one action or one mode of action than towards another ; for although he may have motives prompting more urgently to one action or course of action, he still has liberty of election^ if he has the power of determining in favour of another action or another course of action. Still less can the phrase liberty of indif- ference be understood as denoting a power to determine in opposition to all motives, or in absence of any motive. A being with liberty of indiftrence in the former of these sense.- would not be a reasonable being ; and an action done with- out a motive is an action done without an end in view, that is, without intention or design, and, in that respect, could not be called a moral action, though done by a moral agent. Liberty of will may be viewed, 1st, in respect of the object^ and 2d, in respect of the action. In both respects it maybe liberty of. 1st. contrariety^ or 2d, of contradiction. u 290 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. lilBERTY— Liberty of contrariety in respect of the object is when the will is indifferent to any object and to its opposite or contrary — as when a man is free, for the sake of health, to take hot water or cold water. Liberty of contradiction is when the will is indifferent to any object, and to its opposite or contradictory — as walking and not walking. In respect of the act of loill^ there is liberty of contrariety when the will is indifferent as to contrary actions concerning the same particular object, — as to choose or reject some particular good. There is liberty of contradiction when the will is free not to contrary action, but to act or not to act, that is, to will or not to will, to exercise or suspend volition. Liberty has also been distinguished into, 1st, liberty of specification^ and 2d, liberty of exercise. The former may be said to coincide with liberty of contrariety, and the latter with liberty of contradiction. — Baronius, Metaphys,^ p. 96. IjIFE belongs to organized bodies, that is, animals and vege- tables. Birth and development, decay and death, are peculiar to living bodies. Is there a vital principle, distinct on the one hand from matter and its forces, and on the other, from mind and its energies ? According to Descartes, Borelli, Boerhaave, and others, the phenomena of living bodies may be explained by the mechanical and chemical forces belonging to matter. According to Bichat, there is nothing in common — but rather an antagonism — ^between the forces of dead matter and the phenomena of life, which he defines to be ''the sum of functions which resist death." Bichat and his followers are called Organicists. Barthez and others hold that there is a vital principle distinct from the organization of living bodies, which directs all their acts and functions which are only vital, that is, without feehng or thought. Their doctrine is Vitalism. The older doctrine of Stahl was called Animism^ according to which the soul, or anima mundi^ presides not only over the functions of the sensibility and thought, but over all the functions and actions of the hving economy. TOC-UBrLAP.y OF PHILOSuPHY. 291 Ai'e life and sensihiUty two things essentially distinct, or two things t^ssentiallv united ■.-' IrritabiUt;! and Excitability are terms applied to the sensibility which vegetables manifest to external influences. such as light, heat, &c. Biehat ascribed the functions of absorption, secretion, cii'culation, &c., which are not accom- panied with feeling, to what he called organic sensibility. The characteristics of the several kingdoms of natiu'e .ivrii ": ■ Lini:}.;^ are the following: — Lapides crescunt : vegetabiiia c;-..-.: ;;' et vivunt : aiiinialia crescunt vicunt et sentiunt. The the : lies oi life and its connection with the pheno- mena of mind are thus chissiiied by Morell, Psychology. p. 77. note : — 1 . T:: : " ' ; ' theory. This was represented by Sylvius in the s oentmy. who reduced all the phenomena -1 organization to chemical processes. 2. ?ry . This tails to the time when Harvey 01 the blood, and Boerhaave : .. ^ :. i^c as one great hydraulic machine. J I ; theory. Here we have the phenomena :f mi.: f ; f :: id- dawn closely together. The writings : ^- d" V ;^^^d;wthis point of view. He regarded ing the product of certain organic _ - 1 the various manifestations of human Ide. dv'm the L^ttc^: vdv^i;:.! processes to the highest intel- Ic t ad -X. Tde if. :i i [;■ ■'Action. This we find more -: -;i :d; m :: _r: :dr Tirnod r nysiologists, such as Biehat. fl d::;de. and others, who regard lite as being the product . f a mere organism, acted on by physical stimuli ti'om the world without. 5. The theory of evolution, Schultz and others oi ^' '.;.,,. ^ •- .,^ ^^ ^j^^ same school, regard lite as a reated by opposing powers in the universe oi existence, ii'om the lowest forms of the vital functions to the highest spiheres of thought and activity. To these speculators natm*e is not a fixed reality, but a relation. It is perpetual movement, an unceasing becoming. 292 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. lilFE— a passing from death to life, and from life to death. And just as physical life consists in the tension of the lower powers of nature, so does mental life consist in that of its higher powers. 6. The theory of the Divine ideal Here, Carus, prompted by Schelling's philosophy, has seized the ideal side of nature, as well as the real^ and united them together in his theory of the genesis of the soul, and thus connected the whole dynamics of nature with their Divine original. Plato, TimcBUS. Aristotle, De Anima^ lib. ii., cap. 10. Descartes, CEuvres^ par Cousin, torn. iv. Barthez, Bichat, Cabanis, and Berard. Coleridge, Posthumous Essay: Hints towards the Forma- tion of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life — a plagiarism from a ivork of Schellingh^ in which Life is defined to be '''•the Principle of Individuation.''^ liOOIC (TioyiKV}^ Tioyogf reason, reasoning, language). — The word logica was early used in Latin ; while ^ T^oyim and to 7 are the two generic or mother passions or affections of mind, from which all the others take their rise. The former is awakened by the contemplation of something which is regarded as good ; and the latter by the contemplation of something which is regarded as evil. Hence springs a desire to seek the one, and a desire to shun the other ; and desire under its various forms and VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 295 JLOVE— modifications may be found as an element in all the mani- festations of the sensitivity. :TIACR0C0SM and MICROCOSRI (^cex^oV, large, (^ix-oo;, small, and aoaf^og^ world). '^As for Paracelsus, certainly he is injurious to man, if (as some eminent chemists expound him) he calls a man a microcosm^ because his body is really made up of all the several kinds of creatures the macrocosm or greater world consists of, and so is but a model or epitome of the uni- verse." — Boyle, Works^ vol. ii., p. 54. Many ancient philosophers regarded the world as an animal, consisting like man of a soul and a body. This opinion, exaggerated by the mystics, became the theory of the macrocosm and the microcosm^ according to which man was an epitome of creation, and the universe was man on a grand scale. The same principles and powers which were perceived in the one were attributed to the other, and while man was believed to have a supernatural power over the laws of the universe, the phenomena of the universe had an influence on the actions and destiny of man. Hence arose Alchemy and Astrology, which were united in the Hermetic medicine. Such views are fundamentally pan- theistic, leading to the belief that there is only one substance, manifesting itself in the universe by an infinite variety, and concentred in man as in an epitome. Van Helmont, Paracelsus, Robert Fludd, and others held some of these views. Dr. Reid has said (^Active Powers^ essay iii., part 1, chap. 1), ''Man has, not without reason, been called an epitome of the universe. His body, by which his mind is greatly aflTected, being a part of the material system, is subject to all the laws of inanimate matter. During some part of his existence, his state is very like that of a vegetable. He rises, by imperceptible degrees, to the animal, and, at last, to the rational life, and has the principles that belong to all. " 296 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ITIACROCOSM— "Man is not only a microcosm^ in the structure of his body, but in the system, too, of his impulses, including all of them within him, from the basest to the most subHme." — Harris, PJiilosoph. Arrange.^ cap. 17. '' Man is a living synthesis of the universe." — Tiberghien. Mons. Cousin (Introd. aux CEuvres Inedites d^Ahelard^ p. 127,) has given an analysis of a MS. work by Bernard de Chartres, entitled Megacosmns et Microcosmus, MAGNANIMITY and EQUANIMITY (greatness of mind and evenness of mind) — are two words which were much used by Cicero and other ancient ethical writers. Magnanimity was described as lifting us above the good and evil of this Hfe — so that while the former was not necessary to our happiness, the latter could not make us miserable. The favourite example of magnanimity among the Komans was Fabius Maximus, who, amidst the provocation of the enemy and the impatience of his countrymen, delayed to give battle till he saw how he could do so successfully. Equanimity supposes change of state or fortune, and means the preservation of an even mind in the midst of vicissitude — neither elated unduly by prosperity nor depressed unduly by adversity. Equanimity springs from Magnanimity. Indeed both these words denote frames or states of mind from which special acts of virtue spring — rather than any particular virtue. They correspond to the active and ])SiSsiYe fortitude of modern moralists. MANICMEISM (so called from Manes, a Persian philosopher, who flourished about the beginning of the third century) — ^is the doctrine that there are two eternal principles or powers, the one good and the other evil, to which the happiness and misery of all beings may be traced. It has been questioned whether this doctrine was ever maintained to the extent of denying the Divine unity, or that the system of things had not an ultimate tendency to good. It is said that the Persians, before Manes, maintained dualism so as to give the supremacy to the good principle. And that Manes maintained both to be equally eternal and absolute. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 297 MANICHEISITI— The doctrine of manic'heism was ingrafted upon Chris- tianity about the middle of the third century. The Cathari or Albigenses who appeared in the twelfth century are said also to have held the doctrine of dualism or dithe- ism. — q. V. To refute it we have only to say that if the two opposing principles were equal, they would neutralize each other — if they were unequal, the stronger would preyail, so that there would be nothing but eyil or nothing but good in the world : which is contrary to fact. Matter, Hist. Critiq. dii Gnosticisme^ 3 torn., Paris, 1843. Beausobre, Hist, du Maniclieisme. I?IATERlAlils:tl. — '-The materialists maintain that man con- sists of one uniform substance, the object of the senses ; and that perception, with its modes, is the result, necessary or otherwise, of the organization of the brain." — Belsham, Moral Philosophy^ chap, xi., sect. 1. The doctrine opposed to this is spiritualism^ or the doctrine that there is a spirit in man, and that he has a soul as well as a body. In like manner, he who maintains that there is but one substance (;unisuhstancisme)^ and that that substance is matter, is a materialist. And he who holds that above and beyond the material frame of the universe there is a spirit sustaining and directing it is a spiritualist. The philosopher who admits that there is a spirit in man, and a spirit in the universe, is a perfect spiritualist. He who denies spirit in man or in the universe is a perfect materialist. But some have been inconsistent enough to admit a spirit in man and deny the existence of God, while others have admitted the existence of God and denied the soul of man to be spiritual. — V, Immateriality. Baxter and Drew have both written on the immateri- aUty of the soul. Belsham and Priestley have defended materialism without denying the existence of God. Priestley, Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit. Priestley, T?iree Dissertations on the Doctrine of Materi- alism and Philosophical Necessity. 298 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MATERttAIilSlWE— Price, Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity. MATTER, as opposed to mind or spirit (q. v.), is that which occupies space, and with which we become acquainted by means of our bodily senses or organs. Everything of which we have any knowledge is either matter or mind., i. e., spirit. Mind is that which knows and thinks. Matter is that which makes itself known by means of the bodily senses. " The first form which matter assumes is extension, or length, breadth, and thickness — it then becomes body. If body were infinite there could be no figure., which is body bounded. But body is not physical body, unless it par- take of or is constituted of one or more of the elements, fire, air, earth, or water." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ b. ii., c. 2. According to Descartes the essence of mind is thought^ and the essence of matter is extension. He said. Give me extension and motion, and I shall make the world. Leib- nitz said the essence of all being, whether mind or matter., is force. Matter is an assemblage of simple forces or monads. His system of physics may be called dynamical^ in opposition to that of I^^ewton, which may be called mechanical; because Leibnitz held that the monads pos- sessed a vital or living energy. We may explain the phenomena of matter by the movements of ether, by gravity and electricity ; but the ultimate reason of all movement is a force primitively communicated at creation, a force which is everywhere, but which while it is present in all bodies is differently limited ; and this force, this virtue or power of action is inherent in all substances material and spiritual. Created substances received from the creative substance not only the faculty to act, but also to exercise their activ- ity each after its own manner. See Leibnitz, De Primw Philosophice Emendatione et de Notione Suhstantice, or Nou- veau Systeme de la Nature et de la Communication des Sub- stances^ in the Journal des Savans^ 1695. On the various hypotheses to explain the activity of matter, see Stewart, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 299 MATTER— Outlines^ part 2, ch. 2, sect. 1, and Active and Mor, Powers^ last edit., vol. ii., note A. The properties which have been predicated as essential to matter are impenetrability, extension, divisibility, inertia, weight. To the senses it manifests colour, sound, smell, taste, heat, and motion ; and by observation it is discovered to possess elasticity, electricity, magnetism, &c. Metaphysicians have distinguished the qualities of matter into primary and secondary, and have said that our know- ledge of the former, as of impenetrability and extension, is clear and absolute — while our knowledge of the latter, as of sound and smell, is obscure and relative. This dis- tinction taken by Descartes, adopted by Locke and also by Eeid and Stewart, was rejected by Kant, according to whom, indeed, all our knowledge is relative. And others who do not doubt the objective reality of matter^ hold that our knowledge of all its qualities is the same in kind. See the distinctions precisely stated and strenuously up- held by Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note D ; and ingeniously controverted by Mons. Emile Saisset, in Diet. des Sciences PMlosopJi., art. Matiere. Matter and Form. Matter as opposed to form (q. v.) is that elementary constituent in composite substances, which appertains in common to them all without distinguishing them from one another. Everything generated or made, whether by nature or art, is generated or made out of something else ; and this something else is called its subject or matter. Such is iron to the boat, such is timber to the boat. Matter void of form was called "yAyj 7r()cjTyi^ or, prima materia — Q'vT^Yi^ means wood. — V. Hylozoism). Form when united to matter makes it determinate and constitutes body (q. v.) '' The term matter is usually applied to whatever is given to the artist, and consequently, as given, does not come within the province of the art itself to supply. The form is that which is given in and through the proper operation of the art. In sculpture, the matter is the marble in its 300 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MATTER— rough state as given to tlie sculptor ; the form is that which the sculptor in the exercise of his art communicates to it. The distinction between mailer and form in any mental operation is analogous to this. The former in- cludes all that is given io^ the latter all that is given hy, the operation. In the division of notions, for example, the generic notion is that given to be divided ; the addi- tion of the difference in the art of division constitutes the species. And accordingly, Genus is frequently designated by Logicians the material^ Difference, the formal part of the species." — Mansell, Prolegom. Log.^ p. 226. Harris, Philosoph, Arrange.^ chap. iv. Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ book ii., chap. 1. Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay ii., ch. 19. MAXIM, (maxima ijroposilio^ a proposition of the greatest weight) — is used by Boethius as synonymous with axiom^ or a self-evident truth. — Sir W. Hamilton, Reidfs Works^ note A, sect. 5. It is used in the same way by Locke, Essay on Hum, Understand.^ book iv., chap. 7. ''There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of maxims and axioms., have passed for principles of science." '' By Kant, maxim was employed to designate a subjective prin- ciple, theoretical or practical, i. e., one not of objective validity, being exclusively relative to some interest of the subject. Maxim and regulative principle are, in the criti- cal philosophy, opposed to law and constitutive principle." In Morals, we have Rochefoucauld's Maxims. In Theology, Fenelon wrote Maxims of the Saints^ and EoUin made a collection of Maxims drawn from holy writ. MEMOKir (from memini^ preterite of the obsolete form meneo or meno^ from the Greek f/Jusiv^ manere.^ to stay or remain. From the contracted form f^vc&cd comes f^vnf^Yi^ the memory, in which things remain). — " The great Keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been." — Bishop Hall, Righteous Mammon. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 301 MLEMORY— Consciousness testifies that when a thought has once been present to the mind, it may again become present to it, with the additional consciousness that it has formerly been present to it. When this takes place we are said to re- member^ and the faculty of which remembrance ib the act is memory. Memory implies, — 1. A mode of consciousness experi- enced. 2. The retaining or remaining of that mode of consciousness so that it may subsequently be revived without the presence of its object. 3. The actual revival of that mode of consciousness; and 4. The recognizing that mode of consciousness as having formerly been expe- rienced. ''The word memory is not employed uniformly in the same precise sense ; but it always expresses some modifica- tion of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire ; a faculty which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty implies tw^o things ; a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The word memory is sometimes em- ployed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. When we speak of a retentive memory^ we use it in the former sense ; when of a ready memory^ in the latter." — Stewart, Philosoph. of Hum. Mind, ch. 6. Memory has, and must have, an object ; for he that remembers must remember something, and that which he remembers is the object of memory. It is neither a decay- ing sense, as Hobbes would make it, nor a transformed sensation, as Condillac would have it to be ; but a distinct and original faculty, the phenomena of which cannot be included under those of any other power. The objects of memory may be things external to us, or internal states and modes of consciousness ; and we may remember what we have seen, touched, or tasted ; or we may remember a 302 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ITI EMORY— feeling of joy or sorrow whicli we formerly experienced, or a resolution or purpose which we previously formed. Hobbes would confine memory to objects of sense. He says (Human Nature^ ch. 3, sect. 6), ''By the senses, which are numbered according to the organs to be five, we " — -tako notice of the objects vdthout us, and that notice is our conception thereof: but we take notice also, some way or other, of our conception, for when the conception of the same thing cometh again, we take notice that it is again, that is to say, that we have had the same conception before, which is as much as to imagine a thing past, which is impossible to the sense which is only of things present ; this, therefore, may be accounted a sixth sense, but internal ; not external as the rest, and is commonly called remembrance.''^ Mr. Stewart holds that memory involves ''a power of recognizing, as former objects of attention, the thoughts that from time to time occur to us : a power which is not implied in that law of our nature which is called the associa- tion of ideas." But the distinction thus taken between memory and association is not very consistent with a further distinction which he takes between the memory of things and the memory of events. (JPhilosopJi. of Hum. Mind^ chap. 6). " In the former case, thoughts which have been previously in the mind, may recur to us without suggesting the idea of the past, or of any modification of time whatever ; as when I repeat over a poem which I have got by heart, or when I think of the features of an absent friend. In this last instance, indeed, philosophers distinguish the act of the mind by the name of conception ; but in ordinary discourse, and frequently even in philosophical writing, it is considered as an exertion of memory. In these and similar cases, it is obvious that the operations of this faculty do not necessarily involve the idea of the past. The case is difierent with respect to the memory of events. When I think of these, I not only recall to the mind the former objects of its thoughts, but I refer the event to a particular point of time ; so that, of every such act of memory., the idea of the past is a neces- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 303 sary concomitant." Mr. Stewart therefore supposes "that the remembrance of a past event ^*s not a simple act of the mind ; but that the mind first forms a conception of the event, and then judges from circumstances, of the period of time to which it is to be referred." But the remembrance of a thing is not a simple act of the mind, any more than the remembrance of an event. The truth seems to be that things and events recur to the mind equally unclothed or unconnected with the notion of pastness. (See Young, Intellect. Philosoph.^ lect. xvi.) And it is not till they are recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can be said to be remembered. But the recognition is the act of the judging faculty. Thoughts which have formerly been present to the mind may again become present to it with- out being recognized, l^ay, they may be entertained for a time as new thoughts, but it is not till they have been recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can be regarded as remembered thoughts,* so that an act of memory., whether of thmgs or events, is by no means a simple act of the mind. Indeed, it may be doubted whether in any mental operation we can detect any smgle faculty acting independently of others. What we mean by calling them distinct faculties is, that each has a separate or peculiar function ; not that that function is exercised independently of other faculties. — See Faculty. Mr. Locke (book ii., chap. 10,) treats of retention, " The next faculty of the mind (after perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call retention., or the keeping of those simple ideas, which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways : 'first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view; which is called contem- plation. The other way o^ retention., is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, * Aristotle {De Memoria et Reminisceniia, cap. 1,) has said that memory is always accompanied with the notion of time, and that only those animals that have the notion of time have memory. 304 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight ; and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, — the object being removed. This is memory^ v^hich is as it were the store-house of our ideas." — V. Retention. The circumstances which have a tendency to facilitate or insure the retention or the recurrence of anything by the memory^ are chiefly — Vividness^ Repetition^ and Attention. When an object affects us in a pleasant or in a disagreeable manner — when it is frequently or familiarly observed — or when it is examined with attention and interest, it is more easily and surely remembered. "The things which are best preserved by the memory.,'' said Lord Herbert {De Veritate^ p. 156), " are the things which please or terrify — which are great or neiv — ^to which much attention has been paid — or which have been oft re- peated., — which are apt to the circumstances — or which have many things related to them.^'' The qualities of a good memory are, susceptibility, reten- tiveness, and readiness. The common saying that memory and judgment are not often found in the same individual, in a high degree, must be received with qualification. Memory in all its manifestations is very much influenced and guided by what have been called the laws of associa- tion, — q. V, In its first manifestations, memory operates spontaneously, and thoughts are allowed to come and go through the mind without direction or control. But it comes subsequently to be exercised with intention and will ; some thoughts being sought and invited, and others being shunned and as far as possible excluded. Spontaneous memory is remem- brance. Litentional memory is recollection or reminiscence. The former in Greek is Mf/jyy/i and the latter Avu^f^vnuig. In both forms, but especially in the latter, we are sensible of the influence which association has in regulating the exercise of this faculty. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 805 By memory J we not only retain and recall former know- ledge, but we also acquire new knowledge. It is by means of memory that we haye tlie notion of continued existence or duration : and also the persuasion of our personal identity, amidst all the changes of our bodily frame, and all the alterations of our temper and habits. Memory^ ia its spontaneous or passive manifestation, is common to man with the inferior animals. But Aristotle denied that they are capable of recollection or reminiscence. which is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. And Dr< Reid has remarked that the inferior animals do not measure time nor possess any distinct knowledge of intervals of time. In man memory is the condition of all experience, and consecpientlv of all progress. Memory in its exercise is yer\' dependent upon bodily organs, particularly the brain. In persons under lever, or in danger of drowning, the brain is pretematurallv excited : and in such cases it has been observed that memory be- comes more remote and far-reaching in its exercise than under ordinary and healthy circumstances. Several au- thentic cases of this kind are on record. (See Coleridge, BiograpMa Liter aria; Confessions of an English Opium Eater; and the AutohiograpJiy of Sir John Barroit\ p. 398). And hence the question has been suggested, whether thought be not absolutely imperishable— or whether every object of former consciousness may not, imder peculiar cir- cumstances, be liable to be recalled ? On Memory^ see Aristotle, De Memoria et Eeminiscentla. Beattie, Dissertations. Reid, Intell. Powers, essay iii. Stewart, Philosoph, of Hum, Mind, ch. 6. .^lE-^IORIA TECHNICA, or MNEITIOXICS.— These terms are applied to artificial methods which have been devised to assist the memory-. They all rest on the association of ideas. The relations by which ideas are most ensilv and X 306 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MEMORIA— firmly associated are those of contiguity in place and re- semblance. On these two relations the principal methods of assisting the memory have been founded. The methods of localization or local memory associate the object which it is wished to remember with some place or building, all the parts of which are well known. The methods of re- semhlance or symholization^ establish some resemblance either between the things or the words which it is wished to remember, and some object more familiar to the mind. Rhythm and rhyme giving aid to the memory, technical verses have been framed for that purpose in various de- partments of study. The topical or local memory has been traced back to Simonides, who lived in the sixth century, B.C. Cicero (JDe Orator e^ ii., 86) describes a local memory or gives a Topology. Quintilian (xi., 2) and Pliny the naturalist (vii., 24) also describe this art. In modern times, may be mentioned Grey, Memoria Technica^ 1730 ; and Feinagle, New Art of Memory^ 1812. MENTAI. l»llli:.OSOPlIY — The adjective mental comes to us from the Latin mens^ or from the Greek f^ivog^ or these may be referred to the German meinen, to mean, to mark. If the adjective mental be regarded as coming from the Latin mens^ then mental philosophy will be the philosophy of the human mind, and will correspond with psychology. If the adjective mental be regarded as coming from the German meinen^ to mean or to mark, then the phrase men- tal pliilosophy may be restricted to the philosophy of the mind in its intellectual energies, or those faculties by which it marks or knows^ as distinguished from those faculties by which it feels and vnlls. It would appear that it is often used in this restricted signification to denote the philo- sophy of the intellect, or of the intellectual powers as contradistinguished from the active powers, exclusive of the phenomena of the sensitivity and the will. See Chalmers, Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy^ chap. 1. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. oU7 MERIT (jmritum^ from f^ioog^ a part or portion, of labour or reward) — means good desert ; having done something worthy of praise or reward. Fear not the auger of the wise to raise Those best can bear reproof, who merit praise. Pope, Essay on Criticism. In seeing a thing to be right, Ave see at the same time that we ought to do it ; and when we have done it we ex- perience a feeling of conscious satisfaction or self- appro- bation. We thus come by the idea of merit or good desert. The approbation of our own mind is an indication that God approves of our conduct ; and the religious sentiment strengthens the moral one. We have the same sentiments towards others. When we see another do what is right we applaud him. When we see him do what is right in the midst of temptation and difficulty, we say he has much merit. Such conduct appears to be deserAing of reward. Virtue and happiness ought to go together. Vie are satisfied that under the government of God they will do so. The idea of merit then is a primary and natural idea to the mind of man. It is not an after thought to praise the doing of what is right from seeing that it is beneficial, but a spontaneous sentiment indissolubly connected with our idea of what is right, a sentiment guaranteed as to its truthfulness by the structure of the human mmd and the character of God. See Price, Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Theological Avriters make a distinction between merit of congruity and merit of condignity. Only Popish winters admit merit in the latter sense. — V. Virtue. METAPHOR.— ''A metaphor is the transferring of a word from its usual meaning to an analogous meaning, and then the employing it agreeably to such transfer." Arist., Poet.., cap. 21. For example: the usual meaning of even- ing is the conclusion of the day. But age too is a conclu- sion, the conclusion of human life. Now there being an analogy in all conclusions, we aiTange in order the 308 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. METAPHOR— two we have alleged, and say, that '^ as evening is to tlie day, SO is age to human life." Hence by an easy per- mutation (which furnishes at once two metapliors) we say alternately, that '' evening is the age of the day," and that *' age is the evening of life." — Harris, PJiilosopli, Arrange.^ p. 441. '-'- Sweet is primarily and properly applied to tastes ; secondarily and improperly (^. e., by analogy) to sounds. When the secondary meaning of a y\ ord is founded on some fanciful analogy, and especially when it is introduced for ornament's sake, we call this a metaphor, as when we speak of a ship's ploughing the deep ; the turning up of the surface being essential indeed to the plough, but accidental only to the ship." — Whately, Logic^ b. iii., sect. 10. — F. Analogy. METAPHYSICS. — This word is commonly said to have originated in the fact that Tyrannion or Andronicus, the collectors and conservers of the works of Aristotle, inscribed upon a portion of them the words Toe f^sroc tu, (pvGi>cu, But a late French critic, Mons. Ravaisson {Essai sur la Metaphysique, torn, i., p. 40), says he has found earlier traces of this phrase, and thinks it pro- bable that, although not employed by Aristotle him- self, it was applied to this portion of his writings by some of his immediate disciples. Whether the phrase was intended merely to indicate that this portion should standi or that it should be studied after the physics, in the collected works of Aristotle, are the two views which have been taken. In point of fact, this portion does usually stand after the physics. But, in the order of science or study, Aristotle said, that after physics should come mathematics. And Derodon (Proem. Metaphys.) has given reasons why metaphysics should be studied after logic and before physics and other parts of philosophy. But the truth is that the preposition ^gTct means along with as well as after^ and might even be translated alove. In Latin metaphysica is synonymous with sup ernatur alia. And in English Shake- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 309 JTIETAPHYSICS— speare has used metapliysical as synonymous with super- natural, , . . Fate and metaphysical aid doth seem To have thee crowned, Macbeth, Act i., scene 3. In common usage liyperphysical^ or that which is above and beyond nature, is the meaning attached to metaphysical. And Aristotle has said (Metapliys.^ lib. iii., cap. 3) that there is a science above physics. "Ean yotp stti rov (pvuDcov ri olucoTs^ov. But if ^sToft bc interpreted, as it may, to mean along witli^ then metaphysics or metaphysical philosophy will be that philosophy which we should take along icith us uito physics, and into every other philosophy — that knowledge of causes and principles which we should carry with us into every department of inquiry. Aristotle called it the governing philosophy, which gives laws to all, but receives laws from none {Metaphys,^ Hb. i., cap. 2). Lord Bacon has hmited its sphere, when he says, "The one part (of philosophy) which is physics enquh^eth and handleth the material and efficient causes ; and the other which is meta- physic handleth the formal Sind Ji?ial cause." — {Advancement of Learning^ book ii.)* But all causes are considered by Aristotle in his writings which have heenentitledmetaphysics. The inquiry into causes was called by him the first philo- sophy — science of truth, science of being. It has for its object — not those things which are seen and temporal — phenomenal and passing, but things not seen and eternal, things supersensuous and stable. It investigates the first * In another passage, however, Bacon admits the advantage if not the validity of a higher metaphysic than this. " Because the distributions and partitions of know- ledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch hut in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs ; therefore, it is good to erect and constitute one universal science by the name of ^philosophia prima,' primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way, before ^ve come where the ways part and divide themselves ; which science, whether I should report delicient or no, I stand doubtful." Except in so far as it proceeded by observation rather than by specula- tion aprw?% even this science would have been but lightly esteemed by Bacon. 310 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. METAPHYSICS— principles of nature and of thought, the ultimate Causes of existence and of knowledge. It considers things in their essence, independently of the particular properties or de- termined modes which make a difference between one thing and another. In short, it is ontology or the science of being as being — "ETnarYi^uy} rov ovrog v} ourog {Metaphys.^ lib. iv.), that is, not the science of any particular being or beings, such as animals or vegetables, lines or numbers, but the science of being in its general and common attributes. There is a science of matter and there is a science of mind. But Metaphysics is the science of being as common to both. Aristotle spoke of it as (pi'hoao(pioc 'Tr^um^ first or univer- sal philosophy, and called it hiorot,T'/i y.oti n/^icdTccrri^ the most honourable and divine science (Metaphys.^ lib. i.^ cap. 1, and lib. vi., cap. 1). '' The subject of Metaphysics is the whole of things. This cannot be other ways known than in its principles and causes. Now these must necessarily be what is most gene- ral in nature ; for it is from generals that particulars are derived, which cannot exist without the generals ; whereas the generals may exist without the particulars. Thus, the species, man^ cannot exist without the genus, animal; but animal may be without man. And this holds univer- sally of all genuses and specieses. The subject therefore of metaphysics^ is what is principal in nature, and first, if not in priority of time, in dignity and excellence, and in order likewise, as being the causes of everything in the universe. Leaving, therefore, particular subjects, and their several properties, to particular sciences, this universal science compares these subjects together ; considers where- in they differ and wherein they agree : and that which they have in common, but belongs not, in particular to any one science, is the proper object of metaphysics." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ book iii., chap. 4. Metaphysics is the knowledge of the one and the real in opposition to the many and the apparent (Arist., Meta- phys., lib. iii., c. 2). Matter^ as perceived by the senses, VOCABULARY OF PPIILOSOPHY. 311 JWIETAPHYSICS— is a combination of distinct and heterogeneous qualities, discernible, some by sight, some by smell, &c. What is the tiling itself^ the subject and owner of these several qualities, and yet not identical with any one of them? What is it by vu^tue of which those several attributes con- stitute or belong to one and the same thing? Mind^ pre- sents to consciousness so many distinct states and opera- tions and feelings. What is the nature of that one mind, of which all these are so many modifications ? The in- quiry may be carried higher still. Can we attain to any single conception of being in general, to which both mind and matter are subordinate, and from which the essence of both may be deduced? — Wolf, PMlosopli, Ration, Disc, Prelim.,, sect. 73. Mansell, Prolegom. Log.,, p. 277. Metaphysics was formerly distinguished into general and sjyeciaL The former was called ontology — {q. f.), or the science of being in general, whether infinite or finite, spiritual or material ; and explained therefore the most uni- versal notions and attributes common to all beings — such as entity, nonentity, essence, existence, unity, identity, diversity, &c. This is metaphysics properly so called. Special metaphysics was sometimes called Pneumatology — (g. i;.), and included — 1. Natural Theology or Theodicy, ">, Rational Cosmology,, or the science of the origin and order of the world ; and 3. Rational Psychology,, which treated of the nature, faculties, and destiny of the human mind. The three objects of special metaphysics^ \dz., God, the world, and the human mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas of the pure reason. According to him, a systematic exposition of those notions and truths, the knowledge of which is altogether independent of experience, constitutes the science of metaphysics. ''Time was," says Kant (preface to the first edition of the Criticism of Pare Reason)^ "when metaphysics was the queen of all the sciences ; and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high im- 312 VOCABUU^RY OF PHILOSOPHY. METAPHYSICS— portance of her object matter, tMs title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken ^ like Hecuba — ModOy maxima remm. Tot generis, natisque potens, Nunc trahor exuT, inops. According to D'Alembert {Melanges^ torn, iv., p. 143). the aim of metaphysics is to examine the generation of our ideas and to show that they all come from sensations. This is the ideology of Condillae and De Tracy. Mr. Stewart (Dissert., part 2, p. 475) has said that ^^Metaphysics was a word formerly appropriated to the ontology and pneumatology of the schools, but now under- stood as equally applicable to all those inquiries which have for their object, to trace the various branches of human knowledge to their first principles in the constitution of the human mind." And in the preface to the Dissert., he has said that by metaphysics he understands "the inductive philosophy of the human mind." In this sense the word is now popularly employed to denote, not the rational psycho- logy of the schools, but psychology^ or the philosophy of the human mind prosecuted according to the inductive method. In consequence of the subtle and insoluble questions prose- cuted by the schoolmen, under the head of metaphysics, the word and the inquiries which it includes have been exposed to ridicule.* * The word metaphysics was handled hy Rev. Sydney Smith {Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy, chap. 1, p. 3,) with as much caution as if it had heen a hand- grenade. " There is a word/' he exclaimed, when lecturing with his deep, sonorous^ warn- ing voice, '* of dire sound and horrible import, which I would fain have kept con- cealed if I possibly could, hut as this is not feasible, I shall even meet the danger at once, and get out of it as well as I can. The word to which I allude is that very tremendous one of ^ metaphysics^^ yiliioh in a lecture on moral philosophy, seems likely to produce as much alarm as the cry of 'fire' in a crowded playhouse; when Belvidera is left to cry by herself, and every one saves himself in the best manner he can. I must beg of my audience, however, to sit quiet, and in the meantime to make use of the language which the manager would probably adopt on s.uch an VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 313 METAPHYSICS— But there is and must be a science of heing^ otherwise there is and can be no science of knowing, ''If by metapliysics we mean those truths of the pure reason which always transcend, and not seldom appear to contradict the understanding, or (in the words of the great apostle) spiritual verities which can only be spiritually dis- cerned, and this is the true and legitimate meaning of meta- pliysics^ ueroc TOL <^voiytct^ then I affirm, that this very con- troversy between the Arminians and the Calvinists (as to grace), in which both are partially right in what they affirm, and both wholly wrong in what they deny, is a proof that without metaphysics there can be no light of faith/' — Coleridge, Notes on Eng. Div.^ vol. i., p. 340. In French the word metapliysique is used as s}'Tionymous with pJiilosopJiie^ to denote the first principles, or an inquiry into the first principles of any science. La Metapliysique du Droit, La Metapliysique du Moral, &c. It is the same in German. IflETEITIPSYCMOSIS (^£r«, beyond, ^w^vx,^^ I animate) — is the transmigration or passage of the soul from one body to another. "We read in Plato, that from the opinion of metempsychosis^ or transmigration of the souls of men into the bodies of beasts most suitable unto their human condi- tion, after his death, Orpheus the musician became a swan.** — Browne, Vulgar Errors^ b. iii., c. 27. This doctrine implies a belief in the pre-existence and immortality of the soul. And, according to Herodotus (lib. ii., sect. 123), the Egj-ptians were the first to espouse both doctrines. They believed that the soul at death entered into some animal created at the moment ; and that occasion : I can assure ladies and gentlemen, there is not the smallest degree of danger." The blacksmith of Glamis' description of metaphysics was—" Twa folk disputin' thegither ; he that's listenin ' disna ken what he that's speakin' means, and he that's speakin' disna ken what he means himsel'— that's metuphysics.'' Another said, "God forbid that I should say a word against metaphysics, only if a man should try to see down his own throat with a lighted candle in liis hand, let him take care lest he set his head on fire." 814 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. METEMPSYCHOSIS— after having inhabited the forms of all animals on earth, in the water, or in the air, it returned at the end of three thousand years into a human body, to begin anew a similar course of transmigration. (Among the inhabitants of India the transmigration of the soul was more nearly allied to the doctrine of emanation^ — q, ?;.) The common opinion is, that the doctrine of transmigration passed from Egypt into Greece. But before any communication between the two countries, it had a place in the Orphic mysteries. Pytha- goras may have given more precision to the doctrine. It was adopted by Plato and his followers, and was secretly taught among the early Christians, according to one of St. Jerome's letters. The doctrine, when believed, should lead to abstaining from flesh, fish, or fowl, and this, accordingly, was one of the fundamental injunctions in the religion of Brahma, and in the philosophy of Pythagoras. METII01> (^/^idolog, ^sroc and ooog) — means the way or path by which we proceed to the attainment of some object or aim. In its widest acceptation, it denotes the means employed to obtain some end. Every art and every handicraft has its method. Cicero translates f/>i&o^o; by via^ and couples it with ars. {Brutus^ c. 12. Compare De Finihus^ ii., 1, and also De Orat.^ i., 19). Scientific or philosophical method is the march which the mind follows in ascertaining or communicating truth. It is the putting of our thoughts in a certain order with a view to improve our knowledge or to convey it to others. Method may be called, in general, the art of disposing well a series of many thoughts^ either for the discovering truth when we are ignorant of it^ or for proving it to others when it is already known. Thus there are two kinds of method., one for discovering truth, which is called analysis., or the method of resolution., and which may also be called the method of invention ; and the other for explaining it to others when we have found it, which is called synthesis^ or the method of composition^ and which may also be called the method af doctrine. — Fort Roy. Logic, part 4, ch. 2. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 315 '* Method^ which is usuallv described as the fourth part of Logic, is rather a complete practical Logic. It is rather a power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that it does, than its tangible product." — Thomson. Outline of Laws of Thought, sect. 119. Everj^ department of Philosophy has its own proper method; but there is a universal method or science of method. This was caUed by Plato, dialectic : and represented as leading to the true and the real. (Repuh.. lib. vii.) It has been said that the word ^t/J^o^oc, as it occurs in Aristotle's Ethics, should be translated "system,'' rather than ••method." — (Paul, Analysis of Aristotle'' s Ethics, p. 1.) But the construction of a system implies method. And no one was more thoroughly aware of the importance of a right method thsji Ai-istotle. He has said (Metophys., Kb. ii.), " that we ought to see well what demonstration (or proof) suits each particular subject : for it would be absurd to mix together the research of science and that of method: two things, the acquisition of which offers great difficulty." The Deductive method of philosophy came at once finished from his hand. And the Inductive method was more extensively and successfully followed out by him than has been generally thought. James Acontius, or Concio, as he is sometimes called, was born at Trent, and came to England iu 1567. He published a work, De Methodo^ of which Mons. Degerando {Hist. Compar. des Systemes de Philosophie, part 2. tom. ii., p. 3) has given an analysis. According to him. aU know- ledge deduced from a process of reasoning pre -supposes some primitive truths, founded in the nature of man. and admitted as soon as announced : and the great aim of method should be to bring these primitive truths to Hght, that by their light we may have more light. Truths obtaiued bv the senses, and by repeated experience, become at length positive and certain knowledge. Descartes has a discourse on Method. He has reduced it to four general rules. I. To admit nothins: as true of which we have not a clear 316 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. METHOD— and distinct idea. We have a clear and distinct idea of our own existence. And in proportion as our idea of anything else approaches to, or recedes from, the clearness of this idea, it ought to be received or rejected. II. To divide every object inquired into as much as possible into its parts. Nothing is more simple than the ego, or self- consciousness. In proportion as the object of inquiry is simplified^ the evidence comes to be nearer that of self-consciousness. III. To ascend from simple ideas or cognitions to those that are more complex. The real is often complex : and to arrive at the knowledge of it as a reality, we must by synthesis reunite the parts which were previously separated. lY. By careful and repeated enumeration to see that all the parts are reunited. For the synthesis will be deceitful and incomplete if it do not reunite the whole, and thus give the reality. This method begins with provisory doubt, proceeds by analysis and synthesis, and ends by accepting evidence in proportion as it resembles the evidence of self-consciousness. These rules are useful in all departments of philosophy. But different sciences have different methods suited to their objects and to the end in view. In prosecuting science with the view of extending our knowledge of it, or the limits of it, we are said to follow the method of investigation or inquiry, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of analysis. But in communicating what is already known, we follow the method of exposition or doctrine, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of synthesis. In some sciences the principles or laws are given, and the object of the science is to discover the possible application of them. In these sciences the method is deductive, as in geometry. In other sciences, the facts or phenomena are given, and the object of science is to discover the principles or laws. In these sciences the proper method is inductive, proceeding by observation or experiment, as in psychology VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 317 3TIE THOD— and physics. The method opposed to this, and which was long followed, was the constructive method; which, instead of discovering causes by induction, imagined or assigned them a priori^ or ex hypothesis and afterwards tried to verify them. This method is seductive and bold, but dangerous and insecure, and should be resorted to with great caution. — V. Hypothesis. The use of method^ both in obtaining and applying know- ledge for ourselves, and in conveying and communicating it to others, is great and obvious. " Currenti extra viara, quo habilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aberrationem." — Nov, Org,^ i., 61. " Une bonne methode donne a I'esprit une telle puissance qu'elle pent en quelque sorte remplacer le talent. C'est un levier qui donne a I'homme faible, qui Temploye, une force que ne sauvait posseder Thomme le plus fort qui serait prive d'un semblable meyen." — Comte, Traite de V Legislation ^ lib. i., c. 1. La Place has said, — " La connaissance de la methode qui a guide I'homme de genie, n'est pas moins utile au progres de la science, et meme a sa propre gloire, que ses decouvertes." " Marshal thy notions into a handsome method. One will carry twice as much weight, trussed and packed up in bundles, than when it lies untoward, flapping and hanging about his shoulders." — Pleasures of Liter atiire^ 12mo, Lond., 1851, p. 104. See Descartes, On Method. Coleridge, On Method^ Litrod. to Encydop. Metropol, Coleridge, Friend^ vol. iii. — V. System. METONYMY. — V. TntENTIOX. MICROCOSM. — V. ]\L^CI10C0SM. MINI> is that which moves, body is that which is moved. — Monboddo, Ancient Metophys.., book ii., chap. 3. See his remarks on the definition of Plato and Aristotle, chap. 4. "By mind we mean something which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do ; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agi'eeably to which ideas those works are fashioned." — Harris, Hermes^ p. 227. 318 VOCABULARY OF, PHILOSOPHY. " Mind^ that wHcli perceives, feels, thinks, and wills." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. " Among metaphysicians, mind is becoming a generic, and soul an individual designation. Mind is opposed to matter; soul to body. Mind is soul without regard to personality ; soul is the appropriate mind of the being under notice. Et}Tiiologically, mind is the principle of volition, and soul the principle of animation. ^'I mean to go" was originally ^'I mind to go." Soul^ at first identical with self is from sellan, to say, the faculty of speech being its characteristic. Dumb, and without a soul, beside such beauty He has no mind to marry. — Taylor, Synonyms. — F. Soul. MNEMONICS.-— F. MeMORIA TeCHNICA. 1»I02>AIL.ITY is the term employed to denote the most general points of view under which the different objects of thought present themselves to our mind. ^KTow all that we think of we think of as possible^ or contingent^ or impossible^ or necessary. The possible is that which may equally be or not be, which is not yet, but which may be ; the contingent is that which already is, but which might not have been ; the necessary is that which always is ; and the impossible is that which never is. These are the modalities of being, which necessarily find a place in thought, and in the expres- sion of it in judgments and in propositions. Hence arise the four modal propositions which Aristotle has defined and opposed (Yl^pi kpy.:i>2iocg^ c. 12-14.) He did not use the term modality^ but it is to be found among his commen- tators and the scholastic philosophers. In the philosophy of Kant, our judgments are reduced under the four heads of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In reference to modality thej Sire either problematic, or assertory, or apodeictical. And hence the category of modality includes possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity or contingency. But existence and non-existence should have no place, the contingent and the necessary are I not different from being. — Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. VOCABULARY OF t»HILOSOPHY. 319 ]!IXO]>£* — ''The manner in whicli a thing exists is called a mode or affection ; shape and colour are modes of matter, memory and joy are modes of mind." — Taylor, Elements of TlioughL " Modes^ I call such complex ideas, which, however com- pounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of substances." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Under- stand,^ b. ii., chap. 12, sec. 4. " There are some modes which may be called internal,, because they are conceived to be in the substance, as round, square ; and others which may be called external,, because they are taken from something which is not in the substance, as loved, seen, desired, which are names taken from the action of another ; and this is what is called in the schools an external denomination^ — Port Roy. Logic, part 1, chap. 2. " Modes or modifications of mind,, in the Cartesian school, mean merely what some recent philosophers express by states of mind ; and include both the active and passive phenomena of the conscious subject. The terms were used by Descartes as well as by his disciples." — Sir William Hamilton, Pieid^s Works,, p. 295, note. Mode is the manner in w^hich a substance exists ; thus wax may be round or square, solid or fluid. Modes are secondary or subsidiary, as they could not be without substance, which exists by itself. Substances are not con- fined to any mode,, but must exist in some. Modes are all variable conditions, and though some one is necessary to every substance, the particular ones are all accidental. Modification is properly the bringing of a thing into a mode,, but is sometimes used to denote the mode of existence itself. State is a nearly synonymous but a more extended term than mode. A mode is a variable and determinate affection of a sub- stance, a quality which it may have or not without affect- ing its essence or existence. A body may be at rest or in motion, a mind may affn^m or deny, without ceasing to be. They are not accidents because they arise directly from 320 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MOI>ES— the nature of tlie substance which experiences them. Nor should they be called phenomena which may have or not have their cause in the object which exhibits them. But modes arise from the nature of the substance affected by them. It is true that one substance modifies another, and in this view modes may sometimes be the effect of causes out of the substance in which they appear. They are then called modifications. Fire melts wax, the liquidity of wax in this view is a modijication. All beings which constitute the universe modify one another ; but a soul endowed with liberty is the only being that modifies itself, or which can be altogether and in the same mode^ cause and substance, active and passive. — • Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. That quahty which distinguishes one genus, one species, or even one individual, from another, is termed a modifica- tion ; then the same particular that is termed a property or quality., when considered as belonging to an individual, or a class of individuals, is termed a modification when con- sidered as distinguishing the individual or the class from another ; a black skin and soft curled hair, are properties of a negro ; the same circumstances considered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of a different species, are denominated modifications.''^ — Kames, Elements of Cri- ticism., app. MOliECUliE (molecula, a little mass) — ^is the smallest portion of matter cognizable by any of our senses. It is something real, and thus differs from atom., which is not joerceived but co72ceived. It is the smallest portion of matter which we can reach by our means of dividing, while atom is the last possible term of all division. When molecules are of simple homogeneous elements, as of gold or silver, they are called integrant — when they are of compound or heterogeneous elements, as salts and acids, they are called constituent. M01VAJ>, MONAI>OI.OOY, {^ovoLg, unity, one). — According to Leibnitz, the elementary particles of matter are vital forces not acting mechanically, but from an internal prin- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 321 Itt:ONAI>— ciple. They are incorporeal or spiritual atoms, inaccessible to all change from without, but subject to internal move- ment. This h}^othesis he explains in a treatise entitled Monadologie- He thought inert matter insufficient to explain the phenomena of body, and had recourse to the entelechies of Aristotle, or the substantial forms of the scho- lastic philosophy, conceiving of them as primitive forces, constituting the substance of matter, atoms of substance but not of matter, real and absolute unities, metaphysical points, full of vitality, exact as mathematical points, and reaZ as phy- sical points. These substantial unities which constitute matter are of a nature inferior to spirit and soul, but they are imperishable, although they may undergo transformation, '' Monadology rests upon this axiom — Every substance is at the same time a cause, and every substance being a cause, has therefore in itself the principle of its own development : such is thoi monad; it is a simple force. Each 7?— of whicli consists in /orce), separating it, however, from the various abuses to which it is liable." mONOOAMY {jJLovoi yct^of , one marriage) — is the doctrine that one man should have only one wife. It has also been inter- preted to mean that a man should not marry more than once. — F. Polygamy. MONOTHElsm {f^Qvog hog^ one God) — is the belief in one God only. ''The general propensity to the worship of idols was totally subdued, and the Jews became monotheists^ in the strictest sense of the term." — Cogan, Discourse on Jewish Dispensation.^ c. 2, s. 7. V. Theism, Polytheism. IVIORAlLi (moralis^ mos, manner) — is used in several senses in philosophy. In reasoning, the word moral is opposed to demonstrative., and means prohahle. Sometimes it is opposed to material., and in this sense it means mental or that the object to which it is applied belongs to mind and not to matter. Thus we speak o^ moral science as distinguished from. physical science. It is also opposed to intellectual and to what is cesthetic. Thus we distinguish between a moral Tiahit and an intel- lectual hahit^ between that which is morally becoming and that which pleases the powers of taste. Moral is opposed to positive, '•'• Moral precepts are pre- cepts, the reasons of which we see ; positive precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we do not see. Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case itself prior to external command ; positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command ; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command received from him whose creatures and subjects we are." — Butler, Analogy., part 2, ch. 1. '' A j> 052 ^zY'e precept concerns a thing that is right because commanded ; a moral precept respects a thing commanded because it is right. A Jew, for instance, was bound both to honour his parents, and also to worship at Jerusalem ; VOCABULAPv'^ OF PHILOSOPHY. 323 but the former was commanded because it was right, and the latter was right because it was commanded." — Whately, Lessons on Morals, mORAIi FACUIiTY.— F. CONSCIENCE. IWOBAIilTY. — " To lay down, in their universal form, the laws according to which the conduct of a free agent ought to be regulated, and to apply them to the different situa- tions of human life, is the end of morality ^ ^'•A body of moral truths^ definitely expressed^ and arranged according to their rational connections'^'' is the definition of a ''system of morality ^^ by Dr. Whewell, On Systematic Morality^ lect. i. '' The doctrine which treats of actions as right or wrong is morality y — Whewell, Morality^ sect. 76. ''There are in the world two classes of objects, persons and things. And these are mutually related to each other. There are relations between persons and persons, and between things and things. And the peculiar distinctions of moral actions, moral characters, moral principles, moral habits, as contrasted with the intellect and other parts of man's nature, lies in this, that they always imply a relation between two persons^ not between two things." — Sewell, Christ. Morals^ p. 339. " Morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred distinction between thing and person. On this distinction all law, human and divine, is grounded." — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., p. 265. "What the duties of morality are, the apostle instructs the believer in full, comprising them under the two heads of negative and positive ; negative, to keep himself pure from the world ; and positive, beneficence from lo^dng-kindness, that is, love of his fellow-men (his kind) as himself. Last and highest come the spiritual, comprising all the truths, acts, and duties, that have an especial reference to the timeless, the permanent, the eternal, to the sincere love of the true as truth, of the good as good, and of God as both in one. It comprehends the whole ascent from upright- 324 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MORAIilTY— ness (morality, yirtue, inward rectitude) to godlikeness, with all the acts, exercises, and disciplines of mind, will, and affections, that are requisite or conducive to the great design of our redemption from the form of the evil one, and of our second creation or birth in the divine image. "It may be an additional aid to reflection, to distinguish the three kinds severally, according to the faculty to which each corresponds, the part of our human nature which is more particularly its organ. Thus, the prudential corre- sponds to the sense and the understanding ; the moral, to the heart and the conscience ; the spiritual, to the will and the reason, that is, to the finite will reduced to harmony with, and in subordination to, the reason, as a ray from that true light which is both reason and will, universal reason and will absolute," How nearly this scriptural division coincides with the Platonic, see Prudence. — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., pp. 22, 23. MORAJli PHlIiOSOPHY is the science of human duty. The knowledge of human duty implies a knowledge of human nature. To understand what man ought to do, it is necessary to know what man is. ISTot that the moral philosopher, before entering upon those inquiries which peculiarly belong to him, must go over the science of human nature in all its extent. But it is necessary to examine those elements of human nature which have a direct bearing upon human conduct. A full course of moral philosophy should consist, therefore, of two parts — the first, containing an analysis and illustration of those powers and principles by which man is prompted to act, and by the possession of which, he is capable of acting under a sense of duty ; the second, containing an arrange- ment and exposition of the duties incumbent upon him as the possessor of an active and moral nature. As exhibiting the facts and phenomena presented by an examination of the active and moral nature of man, the first part may be characterized as psychological ; and as laying down the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 325 duties arising from the various relations in which man, as a moral agent, has been placed, the second part may be designated as deontological. — V. Ethics. inORAi. SENSE. — V, Sense Keflex. MOTION {x,ivYi(Tig) — is the continued change of place of a body, or of any ^a?' ^5 of a body ; for in the cases of a globe turning on its axis and of a wheel revolving on a pivot, the parts of these bodies change their places, while the bodies them- selves remain stationary. Motion is either physical, that is, obvious to the senses, or not physical, that is, knowable by the rational faculty. Aristotle has noticed several kinds of physical motion. Change of place, as when a body moves from one place to another, remaining the same. Alteration or aliation, as when a body from being round, becomes square. Aug- mentation or diminution, as when a body becomes larger or smaller. All these are changes from one attribute to another, while the substance remains the same. But body only moves because it is moved. And Aris- totle traced all motion to impulses in the nature of things, rising from the spontaneous impulse of life, appetite, and desire, up to the intelligent contemplation of what is good. As Heraclitus held that all things are continually chang- ing, so Parmenides. and Zeno denied the possibility of motion. The best reply to their subtle sophisms, was that given by Diogenes the Cynic, who walked into the presence of Zeno in refutation of them. The notion of movement or motion, like that of exten- sion, is acquired in connection with the exercise of the senses of sight and touch. MOTIVE* — ^' The deliberate preference by which we are moved to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act is the principle of action ; and desire and reason, which is for the sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference." — Aristotle, Ethic, lib. vi., cap. 2. Kant distinguishes between the subjective principle of appetition which he calls the mobile or spring (die Trieb- 326 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MOTIVE — feder)^ and the objective principle of the will, which he calls motive or determining reason (heweggrund) ; hence the difference between subjective ends to which we are pushed by natural disposition, and objective ends^ which are common to us with all beings endowed with reason. — Willm, Hist, de la Philosoph, Allemande^ torn, i., p. 357. This seems to be the difference expressed in French between mobile and motif, '-'• A motive is an object so operating upon the mind as to produce either desire or aversion." — ^Lord Karnes, Essay on Liberty and Necessity. "By motive^'''' said Edwards (Inquiry^ part i., sect. 2), " I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites, the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may con- cur and unite their strength to induce the mind ; and when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex motive. .... Whatever is a motive^ in this sense, must be some- thing that is extant in the view or apprehension of the under- standing^ or perceiving faculty. N^othing can induce or invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than it is perceived, or is in some way or other in the mind's view ; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all." Hence it has been common to distinguish motives as external or objective^ and as internal or subjective. Re- garded objectively^ motives are those external objects or circumstances, which, when contemplated, give rise to views or feelings which prompt or influence the will. Regarded subjectively^ motives are those internal views or feelings which arise on the contemplation of external objects or circumstances. In common language, the term motive is applied indifferently to the external object, and to the state of mind, to which the apprehension or contemplation of it may give rise. The explanation of Edwards includes both. Dr. Reid said, that he "understood a motive^ when apphed to a human being, to be that for the sake of which VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 327 IWEOTITE — he acts, and therefore that what he never was conscious of, can no more be a motive to determine his will, than it can be an argument to determine his judgment."* ( Corre- spondence prefixed to Ms Works^ p. 87). In his Essays on the Active Powers (essay iv., chap, 4), he said, ^' Every- thing that can be called a motive is addressed either to the animal or to the rational part of our nature.'*' Here the word motive is applied objectively to those external things, which, when contemplated, affect our intelligence or our sensitivity. But, in the very next sentence, he has said, ^' motives of the former kind are common to us with the brutes." Here the word motive is applied subjectively to those internal principles of our nature, such as appetite, desire, passion, &e., which are excited by the contem- plation of external objects, adapted and addressed to them. But, in order to a more precise use of the term motive^ let it be noted, that, in regard to it, there are three things clearly distinguishable, although it may not be common, nor easy, always to speak of them distinctively. These are, the external object, the internal principle, and the state or affection of mind resulting from the one being addressed to the other. For example, bread or food of any kind, is the external object, which is adapted to an internal prin- ciple which is called appetite, and hunger or the desire of food is the internal feeling, which is excited or allayed, as the circumstances may be, by the presentment of the ex- ternal object to the internal principle. In popular lan- guage, the term motive might be applied to any one of these three ; and, it might be said, that the motive for such an action was bread^ or appetite^ or hunger. But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the motive ; it was that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The * "This is Aristotle's definition (to ivixoc ou) of end oi\final cause: and as a synonym for end or final cause the term motive had been long exclusively em- ployed-" — Sir Will. Hamilton. 328 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, MOTIVE— same may be said of motives of eveiy kind. In every case there may be observed the external object, the internal principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind ; and the term motive may be applied, separately and succes- sively, to any one of them ; but speaking strictly, it should be applied to the terminating state or affection of mind which arises from a principle of human nature having been addressed by an object adapted to it ; because, it is this state or affection of mind which prompts to action. The motive of an agent, in some particular action, may be said to have been injury^ or resentment, or on^er— meaning by the first of these words, the wrongous behaviour of another ; by the second, the principle in human nature affected by such be- haviour ; and by the third, the resultant state of mind in the agent. When it is said that a man acted prudently, it may intimate, that his conduct v/as in accordance with the rules of propriety and prudence ; or, that he adopted it, after careful consideration and forethought, or, from a sense of the benefit and advantage to be derived from it. In like manner, when it is said that a man acted conscien- tiously y it may mean, that the particular action was regarded not as a matter of interest, but of duty^ or, that his moral faculty approved of it as right, or, that he felt himself under a sense of obligation to do it. In all these cases, the term motive is strictly applicable to the terminating state or affection of mind, which immediately precedes the volition or determination to act. To the question, therefore, whether motive means some- thing in the mind or out of it, it is replied, that what moves the will is something in the preceding state of mind. The state of mind may have reference to something out of the mind. But what is out of the mind must be apprehended or contemplated — must be brought within the view of the mind, before it can in any way affect it. It is only in a secondary or remote sense, therefore, that ex- ternal objects or circumstances can be called motives^ or be said to move the will. Motives are^ strictly speaking, suh^ TOCAB CLARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ' 829 MOTITE— jective — as they are internal states or affections of mind in the agent. And motives may be called siibjective, not only in contra- distinction to the external objects and circumstances which may be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the different effect which the same objects and circumstances may have, not only upon different individuals, but even upon the same individuals, at different times. A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive the value or importance of an object when presented to him, or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct that may be pointed out to him, so clearly or so quickly as a man of large and vigorous intellect. The consequence will be, that with the same motives (objectively considered) presented to them, the one may remain indifferent and in- dolent in reference to the advantage held out, while the other will at once apprehend and pursue it. A man of cold and dull affections will contemplate a spectacle of pain or want, without feeling any desire or making any exertion to relieve it ; while he whose sensibilities are more acute and lively, will instantly be moved to the most active and generous efforts. An injury done to one man will rouse him at once to a phrenzy of indignation, which will prompt him to the most extravagant measures of retaliation or revenge ; while, in another man, it will only give rise to a moderate feeling of resentment. An action which will be contem- plated with horror by a man of a tender conscience, will be done without compunction by him whose moral sense has not been sufficiently exercised to discern between good and evil. In short, an}i:hmg external to the mind will be modified in its effect, according to the constitution and training of the different minds within the view of which it may be brought. And not only may the same objects differently affect different minds, but also the same minds, at different times, or under different circumstances. He who is suffering the pam of hunger may be tempted to steal, in order to satisfy 330 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. * MOTIVE-— ^ his hunger ; but he who has bread enough and to spare, is under no such temptation. A sum of money which might be sufficient to bribe one man, would be no trial to the honesty of another. Under the impulse of any violent passion, considerations of prudence and propriety have not the same weight as in calmer moments. The young are not so cautious, in circumstances of danger and difficulty, as those who have attained to greater age and experience. Objects appear to us in very different colours, in health and in sickness, in prosperity and in adversity, in society and in solitude, in prospect and in possession. It would thus appear, that motives are in their nature subjective^ in their influence individual^ and in their issue variaMe. MYSTICISM and MYSTERY have been derived from fivstu^ to shut up ; hence f^mTng^ one who shuts up. " The epithet sublime is strongly and happily descrip- tive of the feelings inspired by the genius of Plato, by" the lofty mysticism of his philosophy, and even by the remote origin of the theological fables which are said to have descended to him from Orpheus." — Stewart, Philosoph, Essays^ ii., chap. 5. Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be known face to face, without anything intermediate. It is a yielding to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the infinite, and a running up of all knowledge and all duty to the contemplation and love of Him. — Cousin, Hist, de la Philosoph Mod.^ 1st series, tom. ii., le9on 9, 10. Mysticism despairs of the regular process of science ; it believes that we may attain directly, without the aid of the senses or reason, and by an immediate intuition, the real and absolute principle of all truth, God. It finds God either in nature, and hence a physical and naturalistic mysticism ; or in the soul, and hence a moral and meta- physical mysticism. It has also its historical views ; and in history it considers especially that which represents mysti- cism in full, and under its most regular form, that is reli- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 331 MtirSTICISIWE— gious : and it is not to the letter of religions, but to their spirit, that it clings ; hence an allegorical and symbolical mysticism. Van Helmont, Ames, and Pordage, are natu- ralistic mystics; Poiret is morale and Bourignon and Fene- lon are Divine mystics. Swedenborg's mysticism includes them all. The Germans have two words for mysticism; mystik and mysticismus. The former they use in a favourable, the latter in an unfavourable sense. Just as we sslj piety and jnetism^ or rationality and rationalism ; keeping the first of each pair for use, the second for abuse. — Yaughan, Hours ivith the Mystics^ vol. i., p. 23. Cousin, Hist, of Mod, PhilosopJi., vol. ii., pp. 9^-7. Schmidt (Car.), Essai siir les Mystiques du quatorzieme siecle, Strasbm^g, 1836. .^lYTH and MYTHOI^OOY (^vhg^ a fable ; Xgys/i/, to tell). — " I use this term (myth) as s}TiomTQOus with 'invention,' • having no historical basis." — Pococke, India in Greece^ p. 2, note. The early history and the early religion of all nations are full of fables. Hence it is that myths have been divided into the traditional and the theological^ or the historical and the religious,"^ A mijth is a narrative framed for the piu'pose of express- ing some general truth, a law of natm-e, a moral pheno- menon, or a religious idea, the diiferent phases of which correspond to the turn of the narrative. An allegory agrees with it in expressing some general idea, but differs from it in this, — that in the allegory the idea was developed before the form,, which was invented and adapted to it. The allegory is a reflective and artificial process, the myth springs up spontaneously and by a kind of inspu'ation. A symbol is a silent myth^ which impresses the truths which it con- * Among the early nations, eveiy truth a little remote from common apprehen- sion, -svas embodied in their religious creed; so that this second class -would contain myths concerning Deity, morals, physics, astronomy, and metaphysics. These last are properly csdled philoscphemes. 332 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MYTH— veys not by successive stages, but at once (aw ^ot,'h>.iiy) throws together significant images of some truth. Plato has introduced the myth into some of his writings in a subordinate way, as in the Gorgias^ the Republic^ and the Timceus. Huttner, De Mytliis Platonis^ 4to, Leipsic, 1788. Bacon, On the Wisdom of the Ancients, Muller, Mythology. Translated by Leitch, 1844. On the philosophic value of myths^ see Cousin, Cours^ 1828; 1 and 15 lemons, and the Argument of his Transla- tion of Plato. Some good remarks on the difference between the parable^ the fable^ the myth.^ &c., will be found in Trench, introduction to his work On the Parables. On the different views taken of Greek mythology^ see Creuzer and Godfrey Hermann. See an Essay on Comparative Mythology^ in the Oxford Essays for 1856. iVATURAli, as distinguished from Supernatural or Miraculous. — " The only distinct meaning of the word natural is stated., fixed., or settled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is super- natural or miraculous does to effect it for once." — Butler, Analogy., part 1, chap. 1. Natural, as distinguished from Innate or Instinctive. '' There is a great deal of difference," said Mr. Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand.., book i., ch. 3), '' between an innate law., and a law of Nature ; between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and some- thing that we being ignorant of, may attain to the know- ledge of by the use and application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law., or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature., without the help of positive revelation." VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 333 NATURAI.— '' Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there are some which nature seems both to have planted and reared, so as to have left nothing to human industry. Such are the powers which we have in common with the brutes, and which are necessary to the preservation of the indivi- dual, or to the continuance of the kind. There are other powers, of which nature hath only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture.* It is by the proper culture of these that we are capable of all those improvements in intellectuals, in taste, and in morals, which exalt and dignify human nature ; while on the other hand, the neglect or perversion of them makes its degeneracy and corruption." — Eeid, Inquiry^ ch. 1, sect. 2. '^ Whatever ideas, whatever principles we are necessarily led to acquire by the circumstances in which we are placed, and by the exercise of those faculties which are essential to our preservation, are to be considered as parts of human nature, no less than those which are implanted in the mind at its first formation." — Stewart, Active and Moral Powers^ vol. i., p. 351. '^ Acquired perceptions and sentiments may be termed natural^ as much as those which are commonly so called, if they are as rarely found wanting." — Mackintosh, Prelimin. Dissert.^ p. 67. NATURAIiiSM is the name given to those systems of the philosophy of nature which explain the phenomena by a blind force acting necessarily. This doctrine is to be found in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura^ and was held by Leucippus and Epicurus. The Systeme de la Nature of D'Holbach, the Traite de la Nature of Robinet, and the Philosophie de la Nature of Delisle de Sales, also contain it. Naturalism in the fine arts is opposed to idealism. Of Albert Durer it is said that '^ he united to the brilliant deli- cacies of Flemish naturalism the most elevated and varied of Italian idealism.^ ^ — Labarte, Handbook oftlie Middle Ages. * Yet Dr. Reid, when speaking of natural rights {Active Potcers, essay v., ch. 5) uses innate as synonymous witli natural. 334 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. NATURE (natum^ nascor^ to be born, to be). — According to its derivation, nature should mean that which is produced or bom ; but it also means that which produces or causes to be born. The word has been used with various shades of meaning, but they may all be brought under two heads, Natura Naturans^ and Natura Naturata, I. Natura Naturans. — a. The Author of nature^ the uncreated Being who gave birth to everything that is. h. The plastic nature or energ^^ subordinate to that of the Deity, by which all things are conserved and directed to their ends and uses. c. The course of nature^ or the established order according to which the universe is regu- lated. Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine Ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios ; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tanquam via progredientem. — Cicero, De Nat. Deorum^ lib. ii. n. Natura Naturata, — a, 1. The works of 72a^i«re, both mind and matter. 2. The visible or material creation, as distinct from God and the soul, which are the objects of natural science. " The term nature is used sometimes in a wider, some- times in a narrower extension. When employed in its most extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. When employed in its more restricted signification, it is a synonym for the latter only, and is then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek philosophy, the word (pvaig was general in its meaning ; and the great branch of philosophy, styled '-physical or physio- logical^'' included under it not only the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term nature is more vaguely extensive than the terms physics., physical., physi- ology., physiological., or even than the adjective, natural; whereas in the philosophy of Germany, natur and its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin derivation, are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast to the world of intelhgence." — Sir William Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 216, note. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 335 NATURE — &. Nature as opposed to art^ all physical causes, all the forces which belong to physical beings, organic or inor- ganic, c. The nature or essence of any particular being or class of beings, that which makes it what it is. Aristotle (JMetaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 4), after noticing vari- ous significations of (^vaig^ says, '-'- Nature^ properly so called, is the essence of beings, which have in themselves and by themselves the principle of their movement." And he says (^In Physic. Auseult.}^ '' Things which exist natu- rally, have all in themselves the principle of motion or rest ; some that of motion in space, others that of growth and decay; and others that of change. On the contrary, a litter, a dress, all that is the product of art, carries no principle of change in itself ; and it is because these things are of stone, or earth, or a mixture of elements ; it is this accidental cause which is for them the principle of motion or rest. Nature is thus a principle, a cause which im- presses motion and rest, a cause inherent in the essence of the object, not a cause accidental." '' Nature^ then (according to the opinion of Aristotle), is the beginning of motion and rest, in that thing wherein it is properly and principally, not by accident ; for all things to be seen (which are done neither by fortune nor by necessity, and are not divine, nor have any such efficient cause), are called natural, as having a proper and pecuhar nature of their own." — Holland, Plutarch., p. 659. " The word nature has been used in two senses, — viz., actively and passively; energetic (^= forma for mans)., and material (^= forma formatd). In the first it signifies the inward principle of whatever is requisite for the reality of a thing as existent ; while the essence., or essential property, signifies the inner prmciple of all that appertains to the possibility of a thing. Hence, in accurate language, we say the essence of a mathematical circle or geometrical figure, not the nature., because in the conception of forms, purely geometrical, there is no expression or implication of their real existence. In the second or material sense of 336 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. NATURE— the word nature^ we mean by it the sum total of all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently of possible experience — the aggregate of phenomena, whether existing for our outer senses, or for our inner sense. The doctrine concerning nature^ would therefore (the word physiology being both ambiguous in itself, and already otherwise appropriated) be more properly entitled phenomenology, distinguished into its two grand divisions, somatology* and psychology." — Coleridge, Friend^ p. 410. NATURE (Course or Power of) — '' There is no such thing as what men commonly call the course of nature^ or the power of nature. The course of nature^ truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uni- form manner; which course or manner of acting, being in every movement perfectly arbitrary^ is as easy to be altered at any time as to be preserved. And if (as seems most probable), this continual acting upon matter be per- formed by the subserviency of created intelligences ap- pointed to that purpose by the Supreme Creator, then it is easy for any of them, and as much within their natural power (by the permission of God), to alter the course of nature at any time, or in any respect, as it is to preserve or continue it." — Clarke, Evidences of Nat, and Revealed Religion,^ p. 300, 4th edit. '' Nature^"^ said Dr. E,eid {Active Powers,, essay i., ch. 5), ''is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumer- able effects which fall daily under observation. But if it be asked what nature is? whether the first universal cause f or a subordinate one? whether one or many? whether intelligent or unintelligent? — upon these points we find various conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon which we can rest. And I apprehend the wisest men are * Both these are included in the title of a work which appeared more than thirty years ago,— viz., Somatopsychonologia, t Natura est principium et causa efficiens omnium remm naturaliura, quo sensu a veterihus philosophis cum Deo confundehatur. — Cicero, De Nat. Dea.., lib. i., c. 8, and lilb. ii., c. 22^ 32. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 667 NATURE— they who are sensible that they know nothing of the matter." The Hon. Kobert Boyle wrote an Enquiry into the vul- garly received notion of Nature^ in which he attempted to show the absurdity of interposing any subordinate energy between the Creator and His works, 12mo, Lond., 1785. Nature ov Force (Plastic) (ttAoc^^o, formare) — was the name given by ancient physiologists to a power to which they attributed the formation of the germs and tissues of organized and living beings. In opposition to the doctrine of Democritus, who explained all the phenomena of nature by means of matter and motion, and in opposition to the doctrine of Strato, who taught that matter was the onh' substance, but in itself a living and active force, Cudworth maintained that there is a plastic nature^ sl spiritual energ}' intermediate between the Creator and His works, by which the phenomena of nature are produced. To ascribe these phenomena to the immediate agency of Deity would be, he thought, to make the course of nature miraculous ; and he could not suppose the agency of the Deity to be exerted directly and yet monstrosities and defects to be found in the works of nature. How far the facts warrant such an hypothesis, or how far such an hypothesis explains the facts, may be doubted. But the hypothesis is not much different from that of the anima mundi^ or soul of matter, which had the countenance of Pythagoras and Plato, as well as of the school of Alexandria, and later philosophers. — F. Anima Mundi. Nature (Philosophy of). — The philosophy of nature includes all the attempts which have been made to account for the origin and on-goings of the physical universe. Some of these have been noticed under Matter^ q. v. And for an account of the various philosophies of nature^ see T. H. Martin, Philosoph. Spiritualiste de la Nature^ 2 torn., Paris, 1849; J. B. Stallo, A.M., General Principles of Philosoph. of Nature, Lond., 1848. NATURE (liaw of). — By the law of Nature is meant that law z 838 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. NATURE— of justice and benevolence which is written on the heart ot every man, and which teaches him to do to others as he would wish that they should do unto him. It was long called the law of nature and of nations^ because it is natural to men of all nations. But by the phrase law of nations is now meant international law, and by the law of nature^ natural law. It is not meant by the phrase that there is a regular system or code of laws made known by the light of nature in which all men everywhere acquiesce, but that there are certain great priaciples universally acknowledged, and in accordance with which men feel themselves bound to regulate their conduct. <-'- Why seek the law or rule in the world? What would you answer when it is alleged to be within you, if you would only listen to it ? You are like a dishonest debtor who asks for the bill against him when he has it himself. Quod petis intus habes. All the tables of the law — the two tables of Moses, the twelve tables of the Romans, and all the good laws in the world, are but copies and extracts, which ^vill be produced in judgment against thee who hidest the original and pretendest not to know what it is, stifling as much as possible that light which shines within thee, but which would never have been without and humanly pub- lished but that that which was within, all celestial and divine, had been contemned and forgotten." — Charron, De la Sagesse^ liv. 2, chap. 3, N'o. 4. According to Grotius, "Jus naturale est dictatum rectss rationis, indicans, actui ahcui, ex ejus convenientia, vel disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem ; et consequentur ab authore naturae, ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari aut prsecipi." " Jw5 gentium is used to denote, not international law, but positive or instituted law, so far as it is common to all nations. When the Romans spoke of international law, they termed it Jus Feciale^ the law of heralds, or interna- tional envoys." — Whewell, Morality^ No. 1139. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 339 NATURE— Selden, De Jure Naturally lib, 1, c. 3. Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis^ Prolegom.^ sect. 5-6, lib. T, cap. 1, sect. 10. PuffendorfF, De Officio Hominis et Civis^ lib. 3, c. 3. Sanderson, De Ohlig. Conscientice^ Prselect. Quarta. sect. 20-24. Culverwell, Discourse of the Light of Nature. NATURE (Human). — As to the different senses in whicl: nature may be understood, and tlie proper meaning of the maxim, follow nature^ — see Butler, Three Sermons on Hum. Nature, NECESSITY (ne and cesso^ that which cannot cease). — ''I have one thing to observe of the several kinds of necessity.. that the idea of some sort of firm connection runs through them all : and that is the proper general import of the name necessity. Connection of mental or verbal proposi- tions, or of their respective parts, makes up the idea of logical necessity^ — connection of end and means makes up the idea of moral necessity^ — connection of causes and effects is physical necessity^ and connection of existence and essence is metaphysical necessity. ^^ — Waterland, WorJcs^ vol. iv., p. 432. Logical necessity is that which, according to the terms of the proposition, cannot but be. Thus it is necessary that man be a rational animal, because these are the terms in which he is defined. Moral necessity is that without which the effect cannot well be, although absolutely speaking it may. A man whc is lame is under a moral necessity to use some help, but absolutely he may not. " The phrase moral necessity is used variously ; sometimes it is used for necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under necessity^ when he is under bonds of duty and conscience from which he cannot be discharged. Sometimes l^y moral necessity is meant that sm^e connection of things that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this senst moral necessity signifies much the same as that high degrci of probability, which is ordinarily sufiicient to satisfy \\\i\n 340 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. NECESSITY— kind in their conduct and behaviour in the world. Some- times by moral necessity is meant that necessity of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between them, and such certain vohtions and actions. It is in this sense that I use the phrase moral necessity in the following discourse." — Edwards. Works ^ vol. i., p. 116. ''By natural (or physical) necessity^ as appHed to men, I mean such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by necessity; they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects placed before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened : so they assent to the truths of certain proposi- tions as soon as the terms are understood ; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another ; so by a natural (a physi- cal) necessity men's bodies move downwards when there is nothmg to support them." — Edwards, Works^ vol. i., p. 146. Necessity is characteristic of ideas and of actions, A necessary idea is one the contrary of which cannot be entertained by the human mind ; as every change implies a cause. Necessity and universality are the marks of certain ideas which are native to the human mind, and not derived from experience. A necessary action is one the contrary of which is impossible. Necessity is opposed to freedom, or to free-will. — V. Liberty. " There are two schemes of necessity^ — the necessitation by efficient — the necessitation hj final causes. The former is brute or blind fate ; the latter rational determinism. Though their practical results be the same, they ought to be carefully distinguished." — Sir W. Hamilton, Eeid's Works,^ p. 87, note. Physical necessity is when a thing is necessary according to physical causes, as, an eclipse of the sun is necessary when the moon is interposed, or a stone when not upheld VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. o41 NECESSITY— necessarily falls to the ground. Metaphysical necessity is when the contrary cannot be conceded, as that a whole is greater than a part. Leibnitz in his Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, p. 157, distin- guishes between — 1. Hypothetical necessity^ as opposed to absolute neces- sity^ as that which the supposition or hypothesis of God's foresight and preordination lays upon future contingents. 2. Logical^ metaphysical or mathematical necessity^ which takes place because the opposite implies a contra- diction, and 3. Moral necessity^ whereby a wise being chooses the best, and every mind follows the strongest inclination. Dr. Clarke replies, p. 287, '''-Necessity^ in philosophical questions, always signifies absolute necessity. Hypothetical necessity and moral necessity are only figurative ways of speaking, and in philosophical strictness of truth, are no necessity at all. The question is not, whether a thing must be, when it is supposed that it is^ or that it is to he (which is hypothetical necessity). Neither is it the question whether it be true, that a good being, continuing to be good, can- not do evil ; or a wise being, continuing to be wise, cannot act unwisely; or a veracious person, continuing to be vera- cious^ cannot tell a lie (which is moral necessity). But the true and only question in philosophy concerning liberty, is, whether the immediate physical cause., ot principle of action be indeed in him whom we call the agent ; or whether it be some other reason., which is the real cause by operating upon the agent, and making him to be not indeed an agent. but a mere patient.'''' The scholastic philosophers have denominated one species of necessity — necessitas consequeniice., and another necessitas consequentis. The former is an ideal or formal necessity; the inevitable dependence of one thought upon another, by reason of our intelligent nature. The latter is a real or material necessity; the inevitable dependence of one thing upon another because of its own nature. The former is a 342 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. NECESSITY— logical necessity^ commoii to all legitimate consequence, whatever be tlie material modality of its objects. The latter is an extra-logical necessity^ over and above the syllo- gistic inference, and wholly dependent upon the modality of the consequent. This ancient distinction modern philo- sophers have not only overlooked but confounded. See contrasted the doctrines of the Aphrodisian, and of Mr. Dugald Stewart, in Dissertations upon Reid, p. 701, note. — Sir William Hamilton, Discussions^ p. 144. ^EIxATlON (negare^ to deny) — is the absence of that which does not naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or necessity, to be pre- sent with it ; as when we say — A stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; or when we say — A carpenter or fisherman is unlearned ; these are mere negations. — Watts, Logic ^ part i., chap. 2, sect. 6. In simple apprehension there is no affirmation or denial, so that, strictly speaking, there are no negative ideas, notions, or conceptions. In truth, some that are so called represent the most positive realities ; as infinity, immensity, immortality, &c. But in some ideas, as in that of blindness, deafness, insensibility, there is, as it were, a taking away of something from the object of which these ideas are entertained. But this is privation {aTspYiaig) rather than negation (ajVo(p«ff/f). And in general it may be said that ^legation implies some anterior conception of the object of which the negation is made. Absolute negation is impos- sible. We have no idea of nothing. It is but a word. — Diet, des Sciences PMlosopli. NlHIlilSM {nihil., nihilum^ nothing) — is scepticism carried to the denial of all existence. ''The sum total," says Fichte, "is this. There is abso- lutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own, I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images (Bilder-) there are ; VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 343 NIHILiISI?!— they constitute all tliat apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images ; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition ; that consist in fact of the images of im- ages, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images ; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is con- verted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream ; into a dream made up only of a dream itself Perception is a dream ; thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I ima- gine to myself of my existence, of my power, of my desti- nation — is tho dream of that dream." — Sir Will. Hamilton, ReicTs Works^ p. 129, note. ' - "~. - - -*. ' - - = In like manner, Mr. Hume resolved the phenomena of consciousness into impressions and ideas. And as accord- ing to Berkeley, sensitive impressions were no proof of -external realities, so according to Hume, ideas do not prove the existence of mind — so that there is neither matter nor mind, for anything that we can prove. HIIIII.UM or NOTHIIV« — '4s that of which everything can truly be denied, and nothing can be truly affirmed. So that the idea of nothing (if I may so speak) is absolutely the negation of all ideas. The idea, therefore, either of a finite or infinite nothing^ is a contradiction in terms." — Clarke^ Aiiswer to Itli Letter^ note. Nothing^ taken positively^ is what does not but may exist, as a river of milk —taken negatively^ it is that which does not and cannot exist, as a square circle, a mountain without a valley. Nothing positively is ens potentiate. Nothing negatively is non ens, NOifllNAliiSM (iiomen^ a name)— is the doctrine that general notions, such as the notion of a tree, have no realities corresponding to them, and have no existence but as names or words. The doctrine directly opposed to it is realism. To the intermediate doctrine of conceptuallsm^ nominalism is closely alb'ed. It may be called the envelope of concep- 344 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. NOlWEINAIilSm— tualism^ while conceptualism is the letter or substance oi nominalism. '' If nominalism sets out from conceptualism^ conceptualism should terminate in nominalism^'''' says Mons. Cousin, Introduction Aux Ouvrages Inedits d^Ahailaird^ 4to, Paris, 1836, p. 181. Universalia ante rem^ is the watchword of the Realists ; Universalia in re, of the Concepttualists ; Universalia post rem^ of the Nominalists, The Nominalists were called Terminists about the time of the Reformation. — ^Ballantyne, Examin. of Hum, Mind^ chap. 8, sect. 4. NOOGONIE {uQvg^mmd] ygz/of, birth, or generation). — '' Leib- nitz has intellectualized sensations, Locke has sensualized notions, in that system which I might call a noogonie^ in place of admitting two different sources of our represen- tations, which are objectively valid only in their connection." — Kant, Crit. de la Raison Pure, pp. 826, 327. NOOIiOOY (voy?, mind ; 'hoyog^ discourse) — is a term proposed by Mons. Paffe {^Sur la Sensihilite^ p. 30), to denote the science of intellectual facts, or the facts of intellect ; and pathology (psycJiological)^ to denote the science ofthepheno" menes affectifs^ or feeling, or sensibility. The use of the term is noticed by Sir W. Hamilton, (Reid^s Works^ note A, sect. 5, p. 770) as the title given to Treatises on the doctrine of First Principles, by Calovius, in 1651 ; Mejerus, in 1662 ; Wagnerus, in 1670 ; and Zeidlerus, in 1680 — and he has said, ""The correlatives noetic and dianoetic would afford the best philosophical designations, the former for an intuitive principle, or truth at first hand ; the latter for a demonstrative proposition, or truth at second hand. Noology or noological, dianoi- alogy and dianoialogical^ would be also technical terms of much convenience in various departments of philosophy," Mons. Ampere proposed to designate the sciences which treat of the human mind Les sciences Noologiques, '-^ If, instead of considering the objects of our knowledge, we tjonsider its origin^ it may be said that it is either derived from experience alone, or from reason alone ; VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 345 NOOIiOOY— hence empirical philosophers and those which Kant calls noologists: at their head are Aristotle and Plato among the ancients, and Locke and Leibnitz among the modems." — Henderson, PJiilosoph. of Kant ^ p. 172. NOTION (noscere^ to know). — Bolingbroke says (essay i., On Human Knowledge^ sect. 2), ''I distinguish here between ideas and notions^ for it seems to me, that, as we compound simple into complex ideas, so the composition we make of simple and complex ideas may be called, more properly, and with less confusion and ambiguity, notions y Mr. Locke says (^Essay on Hum. Under staiid.^ hook ii.j ch. 22), '^ The mind being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex ideas^ without examining whether they exist so together in nature, and hence I think it is that these ideas are called notions^ as they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reahty of things." '' The distinction of ideas^ strictly so called, and notions., is one of the most common and important in the philo- sophy of mind. Nor do we owe it, as has been asserted, to Berkeley. It was virtually taken by Descartes and the Cartesians, in their discrimination of ideas of imagination, and ideas of intelligence ; it was in terms vindicated against Locke, by Serjeant, Stillingfleet, ISTorris, Z. Mayne, Bishop Brown, and others. Bonnet signalized it ; and under the contrast of Anschauangen and Begriffe^ it has long been an established and classical discrimination with the philo- sophers of Germany. l!^ay, Reid himself suggests it in the distinction he requires between imagination and con- ception., — a distinction which he unfortunately did not carry out, and which Mr. Stewart still more unhappily perverted. The terms notion and conception (or more correctly concept in this sense), should be reserved to express what we com- prehend but cannot picture in imagination., — such as a relation, a general term, &c. The word idea^ as one prosti- tuted to all meanings, it were better to discard. As for 346 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. NOTION— the representations of imagination or phantasy, I would employ the term image or phantasm^ it being distinctly understood that these terms are applied to denote the representations not of our visible perceptions merely, as the term taken literally would indicate, but of our sensible perceptions in general." — Sir Will. Hamilton, ReicTs Works^ p. 291, note. Notion is more general in its signification than idea. Idea is merely a conception.^ or at most a necessary and universal conception. Notion implies all this and more, — a judgment or series of judgments, and a certain degree of knowledge of the object. Thus we speak of having no notion or knowledge of a thing, and of having some notion or knowledge. It began to be used by Descartes in his Eegulce ad Directionein Ingenii., and soon came into current use among French philosophers. It enables us to steer clear of the ideas of Plato, of the species of the scholastics, and of the images of the empirical school. Hence Dr. Eeid tells us that he used it in preference. — Diet, des Sciences PJiilosopli. Des Maistre (^Soirees de St. PetershourgJi., p. 164), uses the French word notion as synonymous with pure idea, or innate idea, underived from sense. Chalybseus, in a Letter to Mr. Eddersheim (the translator of his work), says, '' In English as in French, the word idea.) idee., is applied, without distinction, to a representa- tion, to a notion., m short to every mental conception ; while in German, in scientific language, a very careful distinction is made between sensuous '' vorstellung^'' (re- presentation), abstract ^' verstandesdegriff^'' (intellectual notion), and '-'- ideen.^''"' (ideas) of reason. Notions or concepts are clear and distinct., or obscure and indistinct, " A concept is said to be clear when the degree of consciousness is such as enables us to distinguish it as a whole from others, and obscure when the degree of con- sciousness is insufi&cient to accomplish this. A concept is said to be distinct when the amount of consciousness is such VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 347 NOTION— as enables us to discriminate from each other the several characters or constituent parts of which the concept is the sum, and indistinct or confused when the amount of con- sciousness requisite for this is wanting." In the darkness of night there is no perception of objects, this is obscurity. As light dawns we begin to see objects, this is indistinctness. As morning advances we make a distinction between trees and houses, and fields, and rivers, as wholes differing from one another, this is clearness. At length when day ap- proaches noon, we see the parts which make up the wholes, and have a distinct view of everything before us. We have a clear notion of colours, smells, and tastes ; for we can discriminate red from white, bitter from sweet. But we have not a distinct notion of them, for we are not acquainted with the qualities which form the difference ; neither can we describe them to such as cannot see, smell, and taste. We have a clear notion of a triangle when we discriminate it from other figures. We have a distinct notion of it when we think of it as a portion of space bounded by three straight lines, as a figure whose three angles taken together are equal to two right angles. First Notions and Second Notions. The distinction (which we owe to the Arabians) o^ first and second notions (notiones^ conceptus, intentiones^ intellecta prima et secunda) is a highly philosophical determination.* .... A. first notion is the concept of a thing as it exists of itself and independent of any operation of thought ; as man, John, animal, &c. A second notion is the concept, not of an object as it is in reality, but of the mode under which it is thought hy the mind ; as individual, species, genus, &c. The former is the concept of a thing^ real^ immediate, direct: the latter the concept of a concept^ formal^ mediate, reflex.''^ — Sir WilUam Hamilton, Discussions, p. 137. '''• Notions are of two kinds; they either have regard to * The Americans call a cargo of fashionable goods, trinkets, &c., being "laden with notions" and on being hailed by our ships, a fellow (without an idea perhaps in his head) will answer through a speaking trumpet that he is "laden with notions."' —Moore, Diary^ p. 249. 348 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. NOTION— tilings as they are^ as horse, ship, tree, and are called first notions ; or to things as they are understood^ as notions of genus, species, attribute, subject, and in this respect are called second notions^ which, however, are based upon the first, and cannot be conceived without them. Now logic is not so much employed upon first notions of things as upon second ; that is, it is not occupied so much with things as they exist in nature, but with the way in which the mind conceives them. A logician has nothing to do with ascer- taining whether a horse, or a ship, or a tree exists, but whether one of these things can be regarded as a genus or species, whether it can be called a subject or an attribute, whether from the conjunction of many second notions a proposition, a definition, or a syllogism can be formed. The first intention of every word is its real meaning ; the second intention^ its logical value according to the function of thought to which it belongs."* — Thomson, Outline of the Laws of Thought^ 2d ed., pp. 39, 40. Notions, Intuitive and Symbolical. Leibnitz was the first to employ intuitive and intuition to denote our direct ostensive cognitions of an individual object either in sense or imagination, and in opposition to our indirect and symbolical cognitions acquired through the use of signs or language in the understanding. ''When our notion of any object or objects consists of a clear insight into all its attributes, or at least the essential ones, he would call it intuitive. But where the notion is complex and its properties numerous, we do not commonly realize all that it conveys ; the powers of thinking would be needlessly retarded by such a review. We think more compendiously by putting a symbol in the place of all the properties of our notion,, and this naturally is the term by * *' See Buhle (Aristot, 1, p. 432), whose words I have followed. See also Cracan- thorp {Logic. Proem.), and Sir W. Hamilton {Edin. Rev., No. 115, p. 210). There is no authority whatever for Aldrich's view, which makes second intention mean, apparently, 'a term defined for scientific use;' though with the tenacious vitality of error it still lingers in some quarters, after wounds that should have been mortal." —V. Intention. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 349 NOTION— which we are accustomed to convej^ the notion to others. A name, then, employed in thought is called a symbolical cognition; and the names we employ in speech are not always symbols to another of what is explicitly understood by us, but quite as often are symbols both to speaker and hearer, the full and exact meaning of which neither of them stop to unfold, any more than they regularly reflect that every sovereign which passes through their hands is equivalent to 240 pence. Such words as the State, Happiness, Liberty, Creation, are too pregnant with meaning for us to suppose that we realize their full sense every time we read or pro- nounce them. If we attend to the working of our minds, we shall find that each word may be used, and in its proper place and sense, though perhaps few or none of its attributes are present to us at the moment. A very simple notion is always intuitive ; we cannot make our notion of brown or red simpler than it is by any symbol. On the other hand a highly complex notion, like those named above, is seldom fully realized — seldom other than symbolical.^'' — Thomson, Outline of the Laws of Thought^ p. 47. NOTIONES COmi^UNES, also called prcenotiones^ anticipa- tiones^ communes notitice, tt^oT^yi-^h;, tcoiuui hvotca—frst truths^ natural judgments^ principles of common sense, are phrasCv^^ employed to denote certain notions or cognitions which are native to the human mind, which are intuitively discerned, being clear and manifest in their own light, and needing no proof, but forming the ground of proof and evidence as to other truths. — V. Anticipation, Truths (First). NOUMENON, in the philosophy of Kant (an object as con- ceived by the understanding, or thought of by the reason, uovg), is opposed to phenomenon (an object such as we re- present it to ourselves by the impression which it makes on our senses). Noumenon is an object in itself, not relatively to us. But we have, according to Kant, no such knowledge of things in themselves. For besides the impressions which things make on us, there is nothing in us but the forms of the sensibility and the categories of the understanding, according to which, and not according 350 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. NOUIW[ENOJ¥— to the nature of things in themselves, it may be, are our conceptions of them. Things sensible considered as in themselves and not as they appear to us, Kant calls negative noumena ; and reserves the designation o^ positive noumena^ to intelligibles properly so called, which are the objects of an intuition purely intellectual. — Willm, Hist, de la Philosophy Alle- mande, tom. i., p. 200. The two kinds of noumena taken together are opposed to phenomena^ and form the intelligible world. This world we admit as possible, but unknown. Kantism thus trends towards scepticism. '' The word phenomenon has no meaning except as opposed to something intelligible — to a noumenon^ as Kant says. Now, either we understand by the latter word a thing which cannot be the object of a sensuous intuition, without determining the mode in which it is perceived, and in this case we take it in a negative sense ; or we under- stand it as the object of a real intuition, though not a sensuous one, an intellectual one, and then we take it in a positive sense. Which of these two is the truth ? It cannot unquestionably be affirmed a priori that the only possible manner of perception is sensuous intuition, and it implies no contradiction to suppose that an object may be known to us otherwise than by the senses. But, says Kant, this is only a possibility. To justify us in affirming that there really is any other mode of perception than sensuous intuition, any intellectual intuition, it must come within the range of our knowledge ; and in fact we have no idea of any such faculty. We, therefore, cannot adopt the word noumenon in any positive sense ; it expresses but an indeterminate object, not of an intuition, but of a con- ception — in other words a hypothesis of the understanding. '^ — Henderson, Philosophy of Kant^ p. 76. NOVEIiTY (novus^ new) — " is not merely a sensation in the mind of him to whom the thing is new ; it is a real relation which the thing has to his knowledge at that time. But we are so constituted, that what is new to us commonly VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY- 351 NOVEIiTY— gives pleasure upon that account, if it be not in itself disagreeable. It rouses our attention, and occasions an agreeable exertion of our faculties Curiosity is a capital principle in the human constitution, and its food must be what is in some respect new Into this part of the human constitution, I think, we may resolve the pleasure we have from novelty in objects." — Eeid, IntelL Powers, essay viii., chap. 2. Any new or strange object, whether in nature or in art, when contemplated gives rise to feelings of a pleasing kind, the consideration of which belongs to Esthetics — or that de- partment of philosophy which treats of the Powers of Taste. NUMBEK was held by Pythagoras to be the ultimate principle of being. His views were adopted to a certain extent by Plato, and attacked by Aristotle. In the Middle Ages, numbers and the proportions subsisting between them, were employed in the systems of the alchemists and cabalists. But in proportion as the true spirit of philosophy prevailed, numbers were banished from metaphysics, and the considera- tion of them was allotted to a separate science — arithmetic and algebra. OATM. — An oath is a solemn appeal to God, as the author of all that is true and right, and a solemn promise to speak the truth and to do what is right ; renouncing the divine favour and imprecating the divine vengeance, should we fail to do so. Oaths have been distinguished as — 1. The assertory^ or oath of evidence, and 2. The promissory^ or oath of office — the former referring to the past, and the latter to the future. But both refer to the future, inas- much as both are confirmatory of a promise to give true evidence or to do faithful service. — F. Affirmation. OBJECTIVE (objicere^ to throw against) — is now used to describe the absolute independent state of a thing ; but b}- the elder metaphysicians it was applied to the aspect of things as objects of sense or understanding. So Berkeley, ^' Natural phenomena are only natural appe^arances. They 352 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OBJECTIVE— are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, therefore, one and the same." Siris^ sect. 292, where real and objective are expressly distinguished. The modern nomenclature appears to me very inconvenient." — Fitzgerald, Notes to Aristotle^ p. 191. With Aristotle ^' viroKii^%mv signified the subject of a proposition, and also substance. The Latins translated it subjectum. In Greek object is ocvTiytitf/^ivov^ translated oppositum. In the Middle Ages mbject meant substance^ and has this sense in Descartes and Spinoza ; sometimes also in Reid. Subjective is used by Will. Occam to denote that which exists independent of mind, objective that which the mind feigned. This shows what is meant by realitas objectiva in Descartes {Med. 3). Kant and Fichte have inverted the meanings : subject is the mind which knows — object that which is known. Subjective the varying condi- tions of the knowing mind — objective that which is in the constant nature of the thing known. — Trendlenburg, Notes to AristotWs Logic. By objective reality Descartes meant the reality of the object in so far as represented by the idea or thought of it — by formal., or actual reality the reality of the object as conform to our idea of it. Thus the sun was objectively in our thought or idea of it — actually or formally in the heavens. He had also a third form of reality which he called eminent — that is an existence superior at once to the idea and the object., and which contained in posse what both these had in esse, — Response aux Seconde Objection. '•'• In philosophical language, it were to be wished that the word subject should be reserved for the subject of in- hesion — the materia in qua ; and the term object exclu- sively applied to the subject of operation — the materia circa quam. If this be not done, the grand distinction of sub- jective and objective^ in philosophy, is confounded. But if the employment of subject for object is to be deprecated, the employment of object for purpose or final cause (in the French and English languages) is to be absolutely con- demned, as a recent and irrational confusion of notions which VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 353 OBJECTIVE— should be carefully distinguished." — Sir W. Hamilton, ReicTs Works, p. 97, note, and App., note B. — V. Subject. OBIilCrATION (ph'ligare^ to bind) — is legal or moral. " Obligation^ as used in moral inquiry, is derived from the doctrine of justification in the scholastic ages. In conse- quence of original sin man comes into the world a debtor to Divine justice. He is under an obligation to punishment, on account of his deficiency from that form of original justice in which he rendered to God all that service of love which the great goodness of God demanded. Hence our terms due and duty^ to express right conduct." — Hamp- den, Bampton Lect.^ vi., p. 296. Obligation (Moral) — has been distinguished as internal and external; according as the reason for acting arises in the mind of the agent, or from the will of another. In seeing a thing to be right we are under obligation to do it. This is internal obligation^ or that reason for actmg which arises in the mind of the agent, along with the per- ception of the rightness of the action. It is also called rational obligation. Dr. Adams (^Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue) has said, '' Rigid implies duty in its idea. To perceive that an action is right., is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations whatever. Now, this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very essence of obligation ; that which commands the approbation of choice, and binds the conscience of every rational being." And Mr. Stewart {Active and Moral Powers., vol. ii., p. 294) has said, '' The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation,'^'' External obligation is a reason for acting which arises from the will of another, having authority to impose a law. It is also called authoritative obligation. Bishop Warburton {Div. Legat,^ book i., sect. 4) has contended that all oi//^a- tion necessarily implies an obliger different from the party obliged ; and moral obligation^ being the obligation of a free agent, implies a law ; and a law implies a lawgiver. 2 A 354 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OBltlOATION— The will of God, therefore, is the true ground of all ohliga- tion^ strictly and properly so called. The perception of the difference between right and wrong can be said to oblige only as an indication of the will of God. There is no incompatibility between these two grounds of obligation. — See Whewell, Sermons on the Foundation of Morals^ pp. 26-76. And Dr. Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatise^ vol. i., p. 78. By some philosophers, however, this stream of living waters has been parted. They have grounded obligation altogether on the will of God, and have overlooked or made light of the oUigation which arises from our perception of rectitude. Language to this effect has been ascribed to Mr. Locke. (Life ly Lord King^ vol. ii., p. 129.) And both Warburton and Horseley, as well as Paley and his followers, have given too much, if not an exclusive, pro- minence to the rewards and punishments of a future life, as prompting to the practice of virtue. But, although God, in accommodation to the weakness of our nature and the perils of our condition, has condescended to quicken us, in the discharge of our duty, by appealing to our hopes and fears, both in regard to the life that now is and that which is to come, it does not follow that self-love, or a concern for our own happiness, should be the only, or even the chief, spring of our obedience. On the contrary, obedience to the divine will may spring from veneration and love to the divine character, arising from the most thorough con- viction of the rectitude, wisdom, and goodness of the divine arrangements. And that this, more than a regard to the rewards of everlasting life, is the proper spring of virtuous conduct, is as plain as it is important to remark. To do what is right, even for the sake of everlasting life, is evidently acting from a motive far inferior, in purity and power, to love and veneration for the character and com- mands of Him who is just and good, in a sense and to an extent to which our most elevated conceptions are inade- quate. That which should bind us to the throne of the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 355 OBI.IOATION— Eternal is not the iron chain of selfishness, but the golden links of a love to all that is right ; and our aspirations to the realms of bliss should be breathings after the preyalence of universal purity, rather than desires of our own indi- vidual happiness. Self and its little circle is too narrow to hold the heart of man, when it is touched with a sense of its true dignity, and enlightened with the knowledge of its lofty destination. It swells with generous admiration of all that is right and good ; and expands with a love which refuses to acknowledge any limits but the limits of life and the capacities of enjo}Tnent. In the nature and will of Him from whom all being and all happiness proceed, it acknowledges the only proper object of its adoration and submission ; and in surrendering itself to His authority is purified from all the dross of selfishness, and cheered by the light of a calm and unquenchable love to all that is right and good. See Sanderson, De Juramenti Otligatione^ praelec. i., sect. 11. Sanderson, De Ohligatione Conscientke^ prgelec. v. ^^Tiewell, Mo7'ality^ book i., chap. 4, pp. 84-89. King, Essay on Evil^ Prelim. Dissertat., sect. 2. — V. Right. OBSERVATION. — "The difference between experiment and observation^ consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accomplish their discoveries ; or rather in the comparative command we possess over them, as instru- ments for the investigation of truth." — Stewart, Pliilosopli. Essays^ Prelim. Diss., chap. 2. Mr. Stewart {Pliilosopli. Hum, Mind., vol. i., p. 106, note) has said that according to Dr. Reid, '' Attention to external things is observation., and attention to the subjects of our own consciousness is reflection. Yet Dr. Reid (Intell. Poivers., essayed., chap. 1) has said that ''reflection in its proper and common meaning, is equally applicable to objects of sense and to objects of consciousness — and has censured Locke for restricting it to that reflection which is employed 356 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OBSERVATION— about the operations of our minds. In like manner we may observe tlie operations of our own minds as well as external phenomena. Observation is better charactei*ized by Sir John Herschell as passive experience. — V. Experience. It is the great instrument of discovery in mind and matter. According to some (Edin, Eev.^ vol. iii., p. 269), experiment can be applied to matter, but only observation to mind. But to a certain extent the study of mind admits experiment. — See Hampden, Introd, to Mor, Phil., sect, ii., p. 51 ; and Mr. Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, Prelim. Dissert., chap. 2. ''Instead of contrasting observation and experiment, we should contrast spontaneous and experimental phenomena as alike subjects of observation. Facts furnished by artificial contrivances require to be observed just in the same way as those which are presented by nature without our inter- ference ; and yet philosophers are nearly unanimous in confining observation to the latter phenomena, and speaking of it as of something which ceases where experiment begins ; while in simple truth, the business of experiment is to extend the sphere of observation, and not to take up a sub- ject where observation lays it down." — S. Bailey, Theory o/ Reasoning, pp. 114-15, 8vo, Lond., 1851. All men are apt to notice likenesses in the facts that come before them, and to group similar facts together. The faculty by which such similarities are apprehended is called observation ; the act of grouping them together under a general statement, as when we say, ''All seeds grow — all bodies fall," has been described 2i^ generalization, — V. Generalization. According to M. Comte (^Cours de Philosoph, Positive, tom. ii., p. 19), there are three modes of observation : — 1. Observation, properly so called, or the direct exami- nation of the phenomenon as it presents itself naturally. 2. Experiment, or the contemplation of the phenomenon, so modified more or less by artificial circumstances intro- duced intentionally by ourselves, with a view to its more VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 857 OBSERVATION— complete investigation. 3. Comparison^ or the successive consideration of a series of analogous cases, in which the phenomenon becomes more and more simple. The third head (as to which see tom. iii., p. 343) seems not so much a species of observation, as a mode of arranging observations^ with a view to a proper investigation of the phenomena. — Lewis, Methods of Observat. in Politics^ chap. 5, note. According to Humboldt (Cosmos^ vol. ii., p. 212) there are three stages of the investigation of nature — passive observation^ active observation^ and experiment. The difference between active and passive observation is marked in Bacon (^Nov. Org.., 1, Aphor. 100). The former is when, Experientia lege certa procedit., seriatim et continenter^ ^' This word experiment alhiis the defect of not appearing to comprehend the knowledge which flows from observa- don^ as well as that which is obtained by experiment. The Crerman word empirical is applied to all the information which experience affords ; but it is in our language degraded hj another application. I therefore must use experimental In a larger sense than its etymology warrants." — Sir J. Mackintosh, On Bacon and Locke^ Works^ vol. i., p. 333. ExperientialhsiS been proposed as equivalent to empirical. — F. Experience. OCCASION. — Cicero (1, De Inventione) says : — Occasio est pars temporis^ Jiabens in se alicujus rei idoneam faciendi opportunitatem, {De Offic, lib. i.) Tempus autem actionis opportunum^ Graece, evKUioicc ; Latine, appellatur occasio. The watchman falling asleep gives occasion to thieves to break into the house and steal. *' There is much difference between an occasion and a proper cause: these two are heedfully to be distinguished. Critical and exact historians, as Polybius and Tacitus, distinguish betwixt the oc(i')cr. and the oiirioc, the beginning occasions and the real causes, of a war."— Flavell, Dis- course of the Occasions.^ Causes., Nature^ Rise., Growth, and Remedies of Mental Errors., 20. Observat. 358 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OCCASIONAIi CAUSES (Doctrine of).— V, CauSE. OCCUI.T QUAlLiITIES. — V. QUALITY. ONEIROHIANCY.— V, DREAMING, ONTOXiOO^K" (o!/ ovTog and ^.oyog^ the science of being). — '^ Ontology is a discourse of being in general, and the various or most universal modes or affections, as well as the several kinds or divisions of it. The word heing here includes not only whatsoever actually is, but whatsoever can be." — Watts, On Ontology^ c. 1. — See also Smith, Wealth of Nations^ book v., c. 1. Ontology is the same as metaphysics. !N^either the one name nor the other was used by Aristotle, He called the science now designated by them pMlosopMa prima ^ and defined it as 'iTriGTYif^n tov ovrog ^ ourog — Scientia Entis Quantenus Entis ^ that is, the science of the essence of things ; the science of the attributes and conditions of being in general, not of being in any given circumstances, not as physical or mathematical, but as being. The name onto- logy seems to have been first made current in philosophy by Wolf. He divided metaphysics into four parts — onto- logy., psychology, rational cosmology, and theology. It was chiefly occupied with abstract inquiries into possibility, necessity, and contingency, substance, accident, cause, &c., without reference to the laws of our intellect by which we are constrained to believe in them. Kant denied that we had any knowledge of substance or cause as really existing. But there is a science of principles and causes, of the prin- ciples of being and knowing. In this view of it, ontology corresponds with metaphysics, — q. v. '' Ontology may be treated of in two different methods, according as its exponent is a believer in to oV, or in Tot oi/T5«, in one or in many fundamental principles of things. In the former, all objects whatever are regarded as pheno- menal modifications of one and the same substance, or as self-determined effects of one and the same cause. The necessary result of this method is to reduce all metaphy- sical philosophy to a Rational Theology, the one Substance or Cause, being identified with the Absolute or the Deity. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 359 ONTOI.OOY— According to the latter method, which professes to treat of different classes of beings independently, metaphysics will contain three co-ordinate branches of inquiry, Eational Cosmology, Eational Psychology, and Rational Theology. The first aims at a knowledge of the real essence, as dis- tinguished from the phenomena of the material world ; the second discusses the nature and origin, as distinguished from the faculties and affections of the human soul and of other finite spirits ; the third aspires to comprehend God himself, as cognizable a priori in his essential nature, apart from the indirect and relative indications furnished by his works, as in Nat. Theology, or by his word, as in Revealed Religion. ''These three objects of metaphysical inquiry, God, the World, the Mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas of the Pure Reason ; and the object of his Critique is to show that in relation to all these, the attainment of a system of specu- lative philosophy is impossible." — Mansell, Prolegom. Log., p. 277» ''The science of ontology comprehends investigations of every real existence, either beyond the sphere of the pre- sent world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced im- mediately from the possession of certain feelings or prin- ciples and faculties of the human soul." — Archer Butler, Lectures on Ancient Philosophy. OPERATIONS (of the Mind) "By the operations of the mind;'^ says Dr. Reid {Intellect. Powers, essay i., chap 1), "we understand every mode of thinking of which we are conscious. " It deserves our notice, that the various modes of think- ing have always and in all languages, as far as we know, been called by the name of operations of the mind, or by names of the same import. To body, we ascribe various proper- ties, but not operations, properly so called : it is ex- * Operation, act, and energy, are nearly convertible terms ; and are opposed to faculty, as the actual to t\\Q potential.~^iv Will. Hamilton. 860 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OPERATIONS— tended, divisible, moveable, inert ; it continues in any state in which it is put ; every change of its state is the effect of some force impressed upon it, and is exactly pro- portional to the force impressed, and in the precise direc- tion of that force. These are the general properties of matter, and these are not operations; on the contrary, they all imply its being a dead, inactive thing, which moves only as it is moved, and acts only by being acted upon. But the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy ; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are called is operations^ is that in all, or in most of them, it is not merely passive as body is, but is really and properly active." — F. States of Mind. OPINION (0/6^, I think, hence otviust^ opinion). — ''The essen- tial idea of opinion seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. . . . Any pro- position, the contrary of which can be maintained with probability, is matter of opinion." — Lewis, Essay on Opinion^ p. i., iv. According to the last of these definitions, matter of opinion is opposed not to matter oifact^ but to matter of certainty. Thus, the death of Charles I. is a fact — his authorship of Icon Basilike^ an opinion. It is also used, however, to denote knowledge acquired by inference, as opposed to that acquired by perception. Thus, that the moon gives light, is matter oi fact ; that it is inhabited or uninhabited, is matter o^ opinion. It has been proposed {Edin. Eev.^ April 1850, p. 511) to discard from philosophical use these ambiguous expres- sions, and to divide knowledge, according to its sources, into matter of perception and matter of inference ; and, as a cross division as to our conviction, into matter of cer- tainty and matter of douht. Holding for true ^ or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, ob- TOCABI'LARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 361 OPINION— jectiyely valid), has the three following degrees : — opinion, beliefs and knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectiyely as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objec- tively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed con- viction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed cer- tainty (for all). — Meiklejohn, Translat. of Critique of Pure Reason, p. 498. — V. Belief, Knowledge, Certae^ty, Fact. OPPOSE©, OPPOSITION (to cc'jriKS{f4.zuou, that which lies over against). — Aristotle has said (In Categor.^ 9), that ' • one thing may be opposed to another in four ways ; by relation, by contrariety, or as privation is to possession, affirmation to negation. Thus, there is the opposition of relation between the double and the half; of contrariety between good and evil ; blindness and seeing are opposed in the way of privation and possession : the propositions he sits, and he does not sit, in the way of negation and affir- mation." — F. Contrary, Privation. OPTI:uis:ti (optimum, the superlative of honum. good) — is the doctrine, that the universe, being the work of an iiffin- itely perfect being, is the best that could be created. This doctrine under various forms appeared in all the great philosophical schools of antiquity. Duiiag the ^Middle Ages it was advocated by St. Anselm and St. Thomas. In times comparatively modern, it was embraced by Descartes and Malebranche. But the doctrine has been developed in its highest form by Leibnitz. According to him, God being infinitely perfect, could neither will nor produce evil. And as a less good com- pared with a greater is evil, the creation of God must not only be good, but the best that could possibly be. Before creation, all beings and all possible conditions of things were present to the divine mind in idea, and composed an mfinite number of worlds, from among which infinite wis- dom chose the best. Creation was the frivinij existence to 362 VOCABULARY OF THILOSOPHY. OPTIMCIftlU— the most perfect state of things which had been ideally contemplated by the Divine Mind. The optimism of Leibnitz has been misunderstood and misrepresented by Yoltaire and others. But the doctrine which Leibnitz advocated is not that the present state of things is the best possible in reference to individuals, nor to classes of beings, nor even to this world as a whole, but in reference to all worlds, or to the universe as a whole — and not even to the universe in its present state, but in reference to that indefinite progress of which it may con- tain the germs. — Leibnitz, Essais de Theodicee. Malebranche, Entretiens MetapJiysiques. According to Mr. Stewart {Active and Mor. Pow., b. iii., ch. 3, sect. 1), under the title of optimists, are compre- hended, those who admit and those who deny the freedom of human actions and the accountableness of man as a moral agent. OROSK means rank, series means succession ; hence there is in order something of voluntary arrangement, and in series something of unconscious catenation. The order of a pro- cession. The series of ages. A series of figures in uniform — soldiers in order of battle. — ^Taylor, Synonyms, Order is the intelligent arrangement of means to accom- plish an end, the harmonious relation established between the parts for the good of the whole. The primitive belief that there is order in nature, is the ground of all experi- ence. In this belief we confidently anticipate that the same causes, operating in the same circumstances, will produce the same effects. This may be resolved into a higher belief in the wisdom of an infinitely perfect being, who orders all things. Order has been regarded as the higher idea into which moral rectitude may be resolved. Every being has an end to answer, and every being attains its perfection in accom- plishing that end. But while other beings tend blindly towards it, man knows the end of his being, and the place he holds in the scheme of the universe, and can freely and VOCABrL^^vT OF PHILOSOPHY. 363 ORDER— intelligently endeavour to realize that universal order of which he is an element or constituent. In doing so he does what is right. Such is the theory of Malebranche, and more recently of Joulfi'oy. In like manner, science, in all its discoveries, tends to the discovery of universal order. And art, in its highest attainments, is only realizing the truth of natinre ; so that the ti-ne. the beautiliil, and the good, ultimately resolve themselves into the idea of order. The following just strictures upon the delusion which finds a worthier object of admiration in the extraordi- naiy than in the ordinary operations of natiu-e, are made by Seneca i^Xatur. QutEst.^ vii., 1) : — • • Sol spectatorem, nisi qiinm deficit non habet. Xemo observat limam nisi laborantem. Time iu*bes conclamant, tunc pro se qiiisqiie superstitione vana trepidat. Quanto ilia majora simt. quod sol totidem, ut ita dicam, gradus, c[uot dies habet. et annmn cii'cuitu suo claudit : quod a solstitio ad minuendos dies vertitur, quod a solstitio statum in- clinat, et dat spatium noctibns ; c[uod sidera abscondit : quod terras, Cjuum tanto major sit illis. non lu-it, sed calorem suimi intensionibus et remissionibus temperando fovet : quod limam nimqnam implet, nisi adversam sibi, nee obsciirat. Hcee tamen non annotamus, quamdiu ordo ser- vatur. Si quid tm-batum est, aut pr^eter consuetudinem emicuit, spectamus, interrogamus, ostendimus. Adeo natu- rale est magis nova, quam magna, mirari." ORGA^r. — An 07'gan is a part of the body fitted to perform a particular action, which, or rather the performance of which action is denominated its flmction. •• By the term orgatiy'' says GaU (vol. i., p. 2:^8), ^'I mean the material condition which renders possible the manitestation of a faculty. The muscles and the bones are the material condition of movement, but are not the facult}' which causes movement : the whole organization of the eye is the material condition of sight, but it is not the tacidty of seeing. By the term ' organ of the soul,' I mean a 864 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OKOAN— material condition wliich renders possible the manifesta- tion of a moral quality, or an intellectual faculty. I say tliat man in this life thinks and wills by means of the brain ; but if one concludes that the brain is the thing that thinks and wills, it is as if one should say that the muscles are the faculty of moving ; that the organ of sight and the faculty of seeing are the same thing. In each case it would be to confound the faculty with the organ^ and the organ with the faculty.'''' " An organ of sense is an instrument composed of a peculiar arrangement of organized matter, by which it is adapted to receive from specific agents definite impres- sions. Between the agent that produces and the organ that receives the impressions, the adaptation is such, that the result of their mutual action is, in the first place, the production of sensation ; and, in the second place, of pleasure." — Dr. Southwood Smith. According to phrenological writers, particular parts of the brain are fitted to serve as instruments for particular faculties of the mind. This is organology. It is farther maintained, that the figure and extent of these parts of the brain can be discerned externally. This is organ- oscopy. Some who beheve in the former, do not believe in the latter. ORCrANON or OROANum is the name often applied to a collection of Aristotle's treatises on logic ; because, by the Peripatetics, logic was regarded as the instrument of science rather than a science or part of science in itself. In the sixth century, Ammonius and Simplicius arranged the works of Aristotle in classes, one of which they called logical or organical. But it was not till the fifteenth century that the name Organum came into common use (Bartholemy St. Hilaire, De la Logiqiie (T Aristote^ tom. i., p. 19). Bacon gave the name of Novum Organum to the second part of his Instauratio Magna. And the German philosopher, Lambert, in 1763, published a logical work under the title, Das Neue Organon. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 365 OROANON— Poste, in bis translation of the Posterior Analytics^ gives a sketch of the Organum of Aristotle, which he divides into four parts, — viz.. General Logic^ the Logic of Deduc- tion^ the Logic of Lndiiction^ and the Logic of Opinion ; the third, indeed, not sufficiently articulated and' disengaged from the fourth, and hence the necessity of a Novum Organum, " The Organon of Aristotle, and the Organon of Bacon, stand in relation, but the relation of contrariety ; the one considers the laws under which the subject thinks, the other the laws under which the object is to be known. To compare them together, is therefore to compare together qualities of different species. Each proposes a different end ; both, in different ways, are useful ; and both ought to be assiduously studied." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works^ p. 712, note. ORIOINATE, ORlCrlNATlON. — These words and their con- jugates are coming to be used in the question concerning liberty and necessity. Does man originate his own actions? Is man a principle of origination ? are forms of expression equivalent to the question, Is man a free agent ? '' To deny all originating power of the will, must be to place the primordial and necessary causes of all things in the Di^dne nature Whether as a matter of fact an originating power reside in man^ may be matter of inquiry ; but to maintain it to be an impossibility, is to deny the possibility of creation." — Thompson, Christ. Theism^ book i., chap. 6. See also. Cairns, On Moral Freedom. OUOBITNESS. — F. Duty. OUTiVESS. — '' The word outness^ which has been of late revived by some of Kant's admirers in this country, T\ps long ago used by Berkeley in his Principles of Human Knowledge (sect. 43) ; and at a still earlier period of his life, in his Essay towards a Neiv Theory of Vision (sect. 46). I mention this as I have more than once heard the term spoken of as a fortunate innovation." — Stewart, Philosoph, Essays.) part 1, essay 2. — V, Exi ernality. 366 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PACT. — F. Contract, Promise. PANTHEISM (ttocu hog, all is God, or God is all). — '' It supposes God and nature, or God and tlie whole universe, to be one and the same substance — one universal being ; insomuch that men's souls are only modifications of the Divine substance." — Waterland, Works, vol. viii., p. 81. Pantlieistce qui contendunt unicam esse substantiam cujus partes sunt omnia entia quse existunt. — Lacoudre, Instit, Pliilosopli., tom. ii., p. 120. Pantheism, when explained to mean the absorption of the infinite in the finite — of God in nature — is atheism ; and the doctrine of Spinoza has been so regarded by many. When explained to mean the absorption of nature in God — of the finite in the infinite — it amounts to an exaggera- tion of theism. But pantheism, strictly speaking, is the doctrine of the necessary and eternal co-existence of the finite and the infinite — of the absolute consubstantiahty of God and nature — considered as two different but insepar- able aspects of universal existence ; and the confutation of it is to be found in the consciousness which every one has of his personality and responsibility, ^Yh\ch. pantheism destroys. PARABIiS: (^TTotQot/So'hY}, from ica^ou^aWnv, to put forth one thing before or beside another) — has been defined to be a '' fictitious but probable narrative taken from the afiairs of ordinary life to illustrate some higher and less known truth." " It differs from the Fable, moving, as it does, in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the actual order of things natural ; from the Myth, there being in the latter an unconscious blending of the deeper meaning with the outward symbol, the two remaining separate, and separ- able in the parable; from the Proverb, inasmuch as it is ^ longer carried out, and not merely accidentally and occa- sionally, but necessarily figurative ; from the Allegory, com- paring, as it does, one thing with another, at the same time preserving them apart as an inner and an outer, not trans- ferring, as does the Allegory, the properties, and qualities, and relations of one to the other." — Trench, On the Par- ables, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 367 PARA]>OX (ttocpos, Io^ol, beyond, or contrary to appearance) — is a proposition which seems not to be true, but which turns out to be true ; so that to deny it would be to main- tain an absurdity. Cicero wrote '-'- Paradoxa^"" and the Hon. Eobert Boyle published, in 1666, Hydrostatical Paradoxes^ made out by new experiments. PARCIlflONY (liaw of) (parcimonia^ sparingness). — " That substances are not to be multiplied without necessity ;" in other words, '^ that a plurality of principles are not to be assumed, when the phsenomena can possibly be explained by one." This regulative principle may be called the law or maxim of parcimony. — Sir Will. Hamilton, itezcZ'5 Works^ p. 751, note A. Entta non sunt multplicanda prceter necessitatem. Frustra Jit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora. These are expressions of this prmciple. PARONYMOUS.— F. CONJUGATE. PART {jA^ipog^ pars^ part, or portion). — " Part^ in one sense, is applied to anything divisible in quantity. For that which you take from a quantity, in so far as it is quantity, is a part of that quantity. Thus two is a part of three. In another sense, you only give the name of part to what is an exact measure of quantity ; so that, in one point of view, two will be a part of three, in another not. That into which you can divide a genus, animal, for example, otherwise than by quantity, is still a part of the genus. In this sense species are parts of the genus. Part is also applied to that into which an object can be divided, whether matter or form. Iron is part of a globe, or cube of iron ; it is the matter which receives the form. An angle is also a part. Lastly, the elements of the definition of every par- ticular being are parts of the whole ; so that, in this point of view, the genus may be considered as part of the species ; in another, on the contrary, the species is part of the genus.'' — Aristotle, Metapliys.^ lib. v., cap. 2b. '' Of things which exist hj parts ^ there are three kinds. The first is of things, the parts of which are not co-existent^ 368 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PART— but successive; such as time or motion^ no two parts of which can exist together. '^ The next kind of things consisting of parts, is such where parts are co-existent and contiguous. Things of this kind are said to be extended; for extension is nothing else but co-existence and junction of parts. " The third kind of things existing hy parts is, when the parts are co- existent, yet not contiguous or joined, but separate and disjoined. Of this kind is number^ the parts of which are separated by nature.^ and only united by the operation of the mind." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., book ii., chap. 13. PASSIOiX (passio^ '7rotdy}^ TTocax^iu, to suffer) — is the contrary of action. '^ A passive state is the state of a thing while it is operated upon by some cause. Every thing and every being but God, is liable to be in this state. He is pure energy — always active, but never acted upon ; while every- thing else is liable to suffer change." — See Harris, Dialogue concerning Happiness^ p. 86, note, for the meaning of Passion. "PASSIONS (The). — This phrase is sometimes employed in a wide sense to denote all the states or manifestations of the sensibility — every form and degree of feehng. In a more restricted psychological sense, it is confined to those states of the sensibility which are turbulent, and weaken our power of self-command. This is also the popular use of the phrase, in which passion is opposed to reason. Plato arranged the passions in two classes, — the con- cupiscible and irascible, trndv^^Kx. and h^og ; the former springing from the body and perishing with it, the latter connected with the rational and immortal part of our nature, and stimulating to the pursuit of good and the avoiding of excess and evil. Aristotle included all our active principles under one general designation of orectic, and distinguishing them into the appetite irascible, the appetite concupiscible, which VCCABULARy OF PHILOSOPHY. 369 I»ASSIOIVS— had their origin in the body ; and the appetite rational ' (/3oyA)5<7;^), which is the will, under the guidance of reason. Descartes and Ma^lebranche have each given a theor}- and classification of the passions; also, Dr. Isaac Watts. Dr. Cdgan, and Dr. Hutcheson. S^ERCEPTlOiV (capere^ to take or lay hold, per, by means of, — that is, to apprehend by means of the organs of sense). Descartes (Princip. Philosoph.^ pars 1, sect. 32), says. *' Omnes modi cogitandi, quos in nobis experimur, ad duos generales referri possunt : quorum unus est perception sive operatic intellectus ; alius vero, volitio^ sive operatio volun- tatis. Nam sentire^ imaginari^ et pure intelligere^ sunt tan- tum diversi modi percipiendi ; ut et cupere, aversari, affir- mare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi volendi." Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand. ^ book ii., chap. 6), says, '^ The two principal actions of the mind are these two : perception or thijiking, and volition or willing. The power of thinking is called the understanding ^ and the power of volition the will ; and these two powers or abilities of the mind, are called faculties." Dr. Reid thought that ^' perception is most properly applied to the evidence which we have of external objects hj our senses." He says {Intell. Powers., essay i., chap. 1), ^' The perception of external objects by our senses, is an operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name appropriated to it. It has so in all languages. And, in English, I know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than perception. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching or feeling, are words that express the operations proper to each sense ; perceiving expresses that which is common to them all." The restriction thus imposed upon the word by Eeid. i^ to be found in the philosophy of Kant ; and, as conveni- ent, has been generally acquiesced in. In note D* to Reid's Works, p. 876, Sir Will. HamHton notices the following meanings o^ perception, as applied to different faculties, acts, and objects : — 2 B 370 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PERCEPTION— 1. Perception in its primary pliilosopMcal signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to comprehensiou, notion, cognition in general. 2. An apprehension, a becoming aware of, consciousness. Perception^ the Cartesians really identified with idea^ and allowed them only a logical distinction ; the same repre- sentative act being called idea^ inasmuch as we regard it as a representation ; and perceptioii^ inasmuch as we re- gard it as a consciousness of such representation. 8. Perception is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. This limitation was first formally imposed by Eeid, and thereafter by Kant. 4. A still more restricted meaning, through the authority of Reid, is perception (proper), in contrast to sensation (proper). He defines sensitive perception^ or perception simply, as that act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body. a. Certain special affections, whereof, as an animated organism, it is contingently susceptible ; and h. Those general relations of extension, under which, as a material organism, it necessarily exists. Of these perceptions, the former, which is thus con- versant about a suhject-ohject, is sensation proper; the latter, which is thus conversant about an object-object, is percep- tion proper, PERCEPTIONS (Obscure) — or latent modifications of mind. Every moment the light reflected from innumerable objects, smells and sounds of every kind, and contact of different bodies are affecting us. But we pay no heed to them. These are what Leibnitz {Avant Propos de ses Nouv. Essais) calls obscure perceptions —diudi what Thurot (Z)e V Entendement^ &c., tom. i., p. 11) proposes to call impres- sions. But this word is already appropriated to the changes produced by communication between an external object and a bodily organ. The sum of these obscure perceptions and latent feelings, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 371 PERCEPTIONS— which never come clearly into the field of consciousness, is what makes us at any time well or ill at ease. And as the amount in general is agreeable it forms the charm which attaches us to life— even when our vaore denned perceptions and feelings are painful. The following account of Leibnitz's philosophy as to {obscure) perceptions is translated from Tiberghien, Essai des Connaiss. Hum., p. 566. '^ We have perceptions and ideas, sense, and reason. •* Perceptions are the internal representation of what passes without. They are either clear or confused. But both have this in common that they cannot attain to absolute truth, but have always reference to facts and things con- tingent. They are also closely connected with one another by the law of continuity^ which does not allow nature to proceed 796r saltum^ so that we can acquire a clear percep- tion without passing through the lower degrees of percep- tion. '''' Clear perceptions are accompanied with consciousness, and engrave themselves on the memory. But howsoever distinct, they cannot engender certainty, because the external world in which they are placed, is all tied together, and every thing has its reason in all other things. Percep- tion always involves what is infinite ; it cannot be exhaus- tively analyzed. All that we can do as to what is infinite is to know distinctly that it is. It belongs only to the Supreme Eeason, whom nothing escapes, to comprehend what is infinite, all the reasons and all the consequences of things. '^ Confused or insensible perceptions are without conscious- ness or memory. It is difficult enough to seize them in themselves, but they must be, because the mind always thinks. A substance cannot be without action, a bod}' without movement, a mind without thought. There are a thousand marks which make us judge that there is, every moment, in us an infinity of perceptions ; but the habit in which we are of perceiving them, by depriving them of the 372 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. I»JERCEPTI01VS— attraction of novelty, turns away our attention and prevents them from fixing themselves in our memory. How could Yv^e form a clear perception without the insensible perceptions which constitute it ? To hear the noise of the sea, for example, it is necessary that we hear the parts which com- pose the whole, that is, the noise of each wave, though each of these little noises does not make itself known but in the confused assemblage of all the others together with it, A hundred thousand nothings cannot make anything. And sleep, on the other hand, is never so sound that we have not some feeble and confused feeling ; one would not be v/akened by the greatest noise in the world, if one had not some perception of its commencement, which is small. ''It is important to remark how Leibnitz attaches the greatest questions of philosophy to these insensible percep- tions^ in so far as they imply the law of continuity , It is by means of these we can say that the present ' is full of the past and big with the future,' and that -in the least of substances may be read the whole consequences of the things of the universe. They often determine us without our knowing it, and they deceive the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of equilibrium. They supply the action of substances upon one another, and explain the pre-established harmony of soul and body. It is in virtue of these insensible variations that no two things can ever be perfectly alike (the principle of indiscernibles), and that their difference is always more than numerical, which destroys the doctrine of the tablets of the mind being empty, of a soul without thought, a substance without action, a vacuum in space, and the atoms of matter. There is another consequence — that souls, being simple sub- stances, are always united to a body, and that there is no soul entirely separated from one. This dogma resolves all the difficulties as to the immortality of souls, the difference of their states being never anything but that of more or less perfect, which renders their state past or future as ex- plicable as their present. It also supplies the means of VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 373 PERCEPTIOXS— recovering memory, by the periodic clevelopments which may one day aiiive." PERFECT, PERFECTION {per-fac€re^ perfectunu^ made out, completed — To be perfect is to want nothing. Perfection is relative or absolute. A being possessed of all the qualities belonging to its species in the highest degree may be called perfect in a relative sense. But absolute perfection can only be ascribed to the Supreme Being. "We have the idea of a Being inlimtely/^e/Ttc^ — and from this Descartes reasoned that such a being really exists. The perfections of God are those qualities which he has commimicated to his rational creatm-es, and which are in Him in an m^mxely perfect degree. They have been dis- tinguished as natural and moral —the former belonging to Deity as the great fii'st cause — such as independent and necessary existence — the latter as manifested in the creation and government of the imiverse — such as goodness, justice, ^c. But they are all natiu-al in the sense of being essential. It has been proposed to call the former attributes, and the latter perfections. But this distinctive use of the terms has not prevailed : indeed it is not well-founded. In God there are nothing hut attributes — ^because in him every- thing is absolute and involved in the substance and unity of a perfect being. PERFECTIBILITY (The I>ocb*iue of) — is — that men as individuals, and as communities have not attained to that hiippiness and development of which their nature and con- dition are capable, but that they are in a contuiual progress to a state of perfection, even ui this life. That men as a race are capable of progress and improvement is a fact attested by experience and history. But that this improve- ment may be carried into his whole nature — and to an indefinite extent —that all the evils which affect the body or the mind may be removed — cannot be maintained. Bacon had faith in the intellectual progress of man when he entitled his work '* Of the Advancement of Learnmg.'' Pascal has articulately expressed this laith in a preface 374 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PERFECTIBIJLITY— to his "Treatise of a Vacuum." ''Not only individual men advance from day to day in knowledge, but men as a race make continual progress in proportion as the world grows older, because the same thing happens in a succes- sion of men as in the different periods of the life of an individual ; so that the succession of men during a course of so many ages, ought to be considered as the same man always living and always learning. From this may be seen the injustice of the reverence paid to antiquity in philo- sophy : for as old age is the period of life most distant from infancy, who does not see that the old age of the universal man is not to be sought for in the period nearest his birth, but in that most remote from it." Malebranche {Search after Truths book ii., part 2, chap. 4) expressed a similar opinion ; and the saying of a great modem reformer is well known — ''If you talk of the wisdom of the ancients— we are the ancients." It cannot be denied that in arts and sciences, and the accommodations of social life, and the extension of social freedom, the administration of justice, the abolition of slavery, and many other respects, men have improved, and are improving, and may long continue to improve. But human nature has limits beyond which it cannot be carried. Its life here cannot be indefinitely pro- longed — its liability to pain cannot be removed — ^its reason cannot be made superior to error, and all the arrange- ments for its happiness are liable to go wrong. Leibnitz, in accordance with his doctrine that the universe is composed of monads essentially active, thought it possible that the human race might reach a perfection of which we cannot well conceive. Charles Bonnet advocated the doctrine of a palingenesia^ or transformation of all things into a better state. In the last century the great advocates of social progress are Fontenelle, and Turgot, and Condorcet, in France; Lessing, Kant, and Schiller, in Germany; Price and Priestley, in England. Owen's views are also well known. — Mercier, De la Perfectibilite Humaine^ 8vo, Paris, 1842. VOCABULAKY OF PniLOSOPIIY. O/O PERIPATETIC (^£^/9r«THT;xo5-, ambulator ^ from Ts^i'Trursi:^. t; walk about) — is applied to Aristotle and his followers, whr. seem to have carried on their philosophical discussions while walking about in the halls or promenades of the Lyceum. PERSON, PERSOIVAIilTY, — Persona^ in Latin, meant the mask worn by an actor on the stage, within which the sounds of the voice were concentrated, and through which {personuit) he made himself heard by the immense audi- ence. From being applied to the mask it came next to be applied to the actor, then to the character acted, then to any assumed character, and lastly, to any one having any character or station. Martinius gives as its composition — per se una^ an individual. ''Person," says Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 27), '' stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places ; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it : it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive." "" We attribute personality^^'' says Mons. Ahrens (^Cours de Paycliologie^ tom. ii., p. 272), "to every being which exists, not solely for others, but which is in the relation of unity with itself in existing, or for itself. Thus we refuse personality to a mineral or a stone, because these things exist for others, but not for themselves. An animal, on the contrary, which exists for itself, and stands in relation to itself, possesses a degree of personality . But man exists for him- self in all his essence, in a manner more intimate and more extensive ; that which he is, he is for himself, he has con- sciousness of it. But God alone exists for himself in a manner infinite and absolute. Grod is entirely in relation to himself; for there are no beings out of him to whom he could have relation. His whole essence is for himself, and this relation is altogether internal : and it is this intimate and entire relation of God to himself in all his essence, which constitutes the di\4ne personality.''^ *' The seat of intellect," says Faley, ''is ajjtrson.''' 376 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PERSON— A being intelligent and free, everj spiritual and moral agent, eyery cause wMcli is in possession of responsibility and consciousness, is a person. In this sense, God con- sidered as a creating cause, distinct from the universe, is a person. Personality is that character or quality in virtue of which any being deserves to be called a person. The divine per- sonality has been disputed. Human personality after death has been disputed. Reason has been called impersonal. '' The intimate relation of God, as Being, to all His attri- butes and to all His essence, constitutes the divine personal- ity., which for God is His entire being. God only exists for Himself in a manner infinite and absolute. God has relation entirely to Himself; for there is no being out of Him, to which He can have relation. His whole essence is for Himself, and this relation is altogether internal. The divine consciousness or divine personality embraces all that is in God, aJl of which He is the reason. '' All is present to God, and He is present to all things." — ^Tiberghien, Essai des Connaiss. Hum.., p. 140. According to Boethius, Persona est rationalis naturae ' individua substantia. ''Whatever derives its powers of motion from without, from some other being, is a tiling. Whatever possesses a spontaneous action within itself, is a person,, or, as Aris- totle (Nicom. Eth.., lib. iii.) defines it, an oLo-^n Trpu^m.g.''^ — Sewell, ClrisL Mor., p. 152. '' Personality is individuality existing in itself, but with a nature as its ground." — Coleridge, Notes on Eng, Div.y vol. i., p. 4B. "If the substance be unintelligent in which the quality exists, we call it a thing or substance, but if it be intelli- gent, we call it a person., meaning by the word person to distinguish ^ thing or substance that is intelligent, from a thing or substance that is not intelligent. By the word person,, we therefore mean a thing or substance that is in- telligentj or a conscious being ; including in the word, tho TOCABULAr.T OF PHILOSOPHY. Ot t PERSON— idea hotli of the substance and its properties together." — Henry Taylor. A,::' . -" B: . M /-/.v,:'. letter!., p. 85. "A -u'-i^ting -u:.-:ancc or >;_ ^: .>:::.. '/^ endued with r: an is. that is. capable of religion, is a person,'' — ^^ r:::s-'^, p. 319. - ::> Deity, expresses the definite and /: . iha: Gl'O is a living being, and not a dead 11: r::'v. TMicther spoken of the Creator or the 1 . : ::. : : : . v^ay sigTiify either the unknown but abi'biiig -i;b-ruiiCc ''A' the attributes by which he is known to lis : or the imity of these attributes considered m them- selves." — R. A. Thompson. Christian Theism, book ii., chap. 7. — T'. Ii>extityPeeso>'-al. Eeasox. Subsiste:stia. P-.^ :".'.. in jurisprudence, denotes the capacity of ligb:- :.uA obligations which btlong to an intelligent will. — Jouffi'oy. Droit. Xat. p. 19. PETITIO PRIAXIPII (^7c •:; xcv-r cci7-i'j9xi x,cii ?.5i.a>5d«>f/:'. or begging the question") — is one of the seven paralogisms or talse reasonings which A:Ar::-0 r;-f;.Tes in the fifth chapter of his So^~\h:i:c.i i?;-. o :.\ •^, It consists in assuming or taking for gTanted in some way the point which is really in dispute. Xow. in all reasoning, that which is employed as proof should be more clear and better known than that which it is employed to prove. To infer the actual occurrence of ecHpses. recorded in Chinese annals, from an assumpri::: ^f the authenticity of these annals, is an example oi ^ ■::':'.? ^■•ivicipii, PSAXTAsi?!.— T". Idea. Peeceptiox. PHE>0?IE>OEOQY. — T'. XatIEE. PWEXO-^IEXON (r5i.>s'..,af.:;-. fi'om Xar.zuxi. to appear)— is tha: ' 'A ' - vcd. It is generally appHed to some ^t'-:r . - . uie occurience in the course of nature. But in mental philosophy it is appHed to the various and changing states of mmd. •• How pitiliil and ridiculous are the gi'oimds upon which such men pretend to account for the very lowest and Qomm.o\ieiX pfienomena of nature, without re- cuning to a God and Providence 1'' — South, vol. iv., sei*m. Lx. 378 VOCABULAHY OF PHILOSOPHY. '•^ Among the various phenomena which the human mind presents to our view, there is none more calculated to ex- cite our curiosity and our wonder, than the communication which is carried on between the sentient, thinking, and active principle within us, and the material objects with which we are surrounded." — Stewart, Pliilosopli. of Hum, Mind^ c. 1, sect. 1. In the philosophy of Kant, phenomeno7i means an object such as we represent it to ourselves or conceive of it, in opposition to noumenon^ or a thing as it is in itself. The definition of phenomenon is, " that which can be known only along with something else." — Ferrier, Instit, of Metaphys,^ p. 319. — F. Noumenon. JPHIIiANTHROPY (cpiT^ocud^coTrioc^ from 0i?.siu^ to love, and <>li/dpa)7ro;^ a man) — is a love of mankind. '^ They thought themselves not much concerned to acquire that God-like excellency, a philanthropy and love to all mankind." — Bp. Taylor, vol. iii., serm. i. This state or affection of mind does not differ essentially from charity or brotherly love. Both spring from bene- volence or a desire for the well-being of others. When our benevolence is purified and directed by the doctrines and precepts of religion, it becomes charity or brotherly love. When sustained by large and sound views of human nature and the human condition, it seeks to mitigate social evils and increase and multiply social comforts, it takes the name of philanthropy. But there is no incompatibility between the two. It is only when philanthropy proceeds on false views of human nature and wrong views of human happiness, that it can be at variance with true charity or brotherly love. Philanthropy or a vague desire and speculation as to improving the condition of the whole human race is some- times opposed to nationality or patriotism. But true charity or benevolence, while it begins with loving and benefiting those nearest to us by various relations, will expand according to the means and opportunities afforded VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. O < 9 PfHrAXTHROPY— of doing good. And wliile we are duly attentive to the sti'onger claims of intimate connection, as the waves on the bosom of the waters s|:)read wider and wider, so we are to extend our regards beyond the distinctions of fiiendsldp. of family, and of society, and grasp in one benevolent em- brace the mii verse of hrnnan beings. God hath made of one blood all nations of men that dwell upon the face of the earth : and. althougli the s^-mpathies of fi-iendship and the charities of patriotism demand a more early and warm acknowledgment, we are never to forget those gTeat and general relations which bind together the kindi'eds of mankind — who ai'e all childi'en of one common parent, heii's of the same frail nattu-e. and shai'ei*s in the same tmbotmded goodness : — '• FrieiiGS, paients, neighbours, first it nill embrace. Our country next, and next all hmnani race. "Wide and more wide, the o'erflowing of the mind. Takes every creatare in of every krnd. Earth smiles aronnd, in boundless beauty dressed. And heaven reiiecrs its image in her breast, —Pcy e. PHILOSOPinr (<^M]y, mind ; Aoyo^, discourse). — This word ought to mean Psychology, or mental philosophy, but has been appropriated by Craniologists, on accoimt of the light which theii' observations of the convolutions of the brain and corresponding elevations of the skull are supposed to throw on the nature and province of our different faculties. According to Dr. Gall, the foimder of Craniolog}-, '' its end is to determine the fimctions of the brain in general, and of its difierent parts in particular, and to prove that you may recognize different dispositions and inclinations by the pro- tuberances and depressions to be fotmd on the cranium. The cranium being exactly moulded upon the mass of bram, every portion of its stu'fiice will present dimensions and developments according to the corresponding portion of the ])rain. But indi\iduals in whom such or such a portion of the craniimi is largely developed, have been observed by 382 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PHRENOIiOOY— plirenologists to be remarkable for sucb or sucli a faculty, talent, or virtue, or vice ; and the conclusion is, that the portion of brain corresponding to that development of the cranium is the seat of that faculty, or virtue, or vice — is its special organ.'''' — See writings of Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe. ''If it be true that the multitudinous cerebral fibres act always in the same specific fasciculi, or in the same combi- nation of specific fasciculi, in order to produce the same faculty in the same process of ratiocination, then phrenology is so far true ; and if the action of these fasciculi has the effect of elongating them, so as to produce pressure on the corresponding internal surface of the cranium, and if the bony case make a corresponding concession of space to the elongation of these specific fasciculi, then cranioscopy is true also ; but there are so many arbitrary assumptions in arriving at such a result, that a vastly gTcater mass of evidence must be brought forward before phrenologists and cranioscopists have a right to claim general assent to their doctrine." — Wigan, on Duality of Mind ^ p. 162. The British Association, established several years ago, refused to admit phrenology as a section of their society. PHYSIOONOMY {(pvatg^ nature ; yi/af^^au^ an index, from ytyvauica^ I know)— is defined by Lavater to be the ''art of discovering the interior of man from his exterior^ In common language, it signifies the judging of disposition and character by the features of the face. In the Middle Ages, physiognomy meant the knowledge of the internal properties of any corporeal existence from external appearances. They found, i' ihQ physiognomies Of the planets, all men's destinies.— ^Mc?/&r«5. It does not appear that among the ancients physiognomy was extended beyond man^ or at least beyond animated nature. Aristotle has formally treated of it. And all men in the ordinary business of life seem to be influenced by the belief that the disposition and character may in some YOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 383 t PHYSIOONOIWCY— measure be indicated by the form of the body, and espe- cially by the features of the face. See Lavater, Spurzheim. J. Cross, Attampt to estaUish Pliysiognomy upon Scientific Principles^ Glasg., 1817. PHYSIOI^OOY and PHYSICS were formerly used as syno- nymous. The former now denotes the laws of organized bodies, the latter of unorganized. The former is distin- guished into animal and vegetable. Both imply the neces- sity of nature as opposed to liberty of intelligence^ and nei- ther can be appropriately applied to mind. Dr. Brown, however, entitled the first part of one of his works, the Physiology of mind. — V. Psychology. Physiology determines the matter and the form of living beings. It describes their structure and operations, and then ascends from phenomena to laws ; from the knowledge of organs and their actions it concludes their function and their end or purpose ; and from among the various mani- festations it seeks to seize that mysterious principle which animates the matter of their organization, which maintains the nearly constant form of the compound by the continual renewal of the component molecules, and which at death, leaving this matter, surrenders it to the common laws, from the empire of which it was for a season withdraT\Ti. . . . The facts which belong to it are such as we can touch and see — matter and its modifications. — Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. PICTURESQUE — ''properly means what is done in the style and with the spirit of a painter, and it was thus, if I am not much mistaken, that the word was commonly em- ployed when it was first adopted in England. . . . But it has been frequently employed to denote those combina- tions or groups or attitudes of objects that are fitted for the purposes of the painter." — Stewart, Philosoph. Essays^ part 1, chap. 5. ''''Picturesque is a word applied to every object, and every kind of scenery, which has been or might be repre- sented with good eifect in painting — just as the word 384 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PICTURE SQUE — beautiful^ when we speak of visible nature, is applied to every object and every kind of scenery that in any way give pleasure to the eye — and these seem to be the signifi- cations of both words, taken in their most extended and popular sense." — Sir Uvedale Price, On the Picturesque^ c. 3. " The two qualities of roughness and of sudden variation^ joined to that of irregularity ^ are the most efficient causes of the picturesque.^^* — Ibid. '* Beauty and picturesqueness are founded on opposite qualities ; the one on smoothness, the other on roughness ; the one on grandeur, the other on sudden variation ; the one on ideas of youth and freshness, the other on those of age and even of decay." — Chap. 4. PNEUMATICS is now applied to physical science, and means that department of it which treats of the mechanical pro- perties of air and other elastic fluids. It was formerly used as synonymous with pneumatology, PNEUlTIATOIiOOY Q7rviV{A0i, spirit; T^oyog., discourse). — The branch of philosophy which treats of the nature and operations of mind, has by some, been called pneumatology. Philosophy gives ground for belief in the existence of our own mind and of the Supreme mind, but furnishes no evi- dence for the existence of orders of minds intermediate. Popular opinion is in favour of the belief. But philosophy has sometimes admitted and sometimes rejected it. It has found a place, however, in all rehgions. There may thus be said to be a religious pneumatology^ and a philosophical pneumatology. In religious pneumatology y in the East, there is the doctrine of two antagonist and equal spirits of good and evil. In the doctrines of Christianity there is acknowledged the existence of spirits intermediate between God and man, some of whom have fallen into a state of evil, while others have kept their first estate. * " A picturesque object may be defined as that which, from the greater facihties wliich it possesses for readily and more effectually enabling an artist to display his art, is, as it were, a provocation to painting."— Sir Thos, L. Dick, Note to above chap. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 385 PNEU:«ATOJLOOY— Philosophy in its early stages is partly religious. Socra- tes had communication with a demon or spirit. Plato did not discountenance the doctrine, and the Xeo-Platonicians of Alexandria carried pneumatology to a great length, and adopted the cabalistic traditions of the Jews. In the scho- lastic ages, the belief in return from the dead, apparitions and spirits, was universal. And Jacob Boehm, in Saxon}-, Emanuel Swedenborg, in Sweden, and in France, Martinez Pasqualis and his disciple St. Martin, have all given accoimts of orders of spiritual beings who held communication with the living. And in the present day a behef in spirit rapping is prevalent in America. Bp. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge^ sect. 81, and throughout, admits the existence of orders of spirits. Considered as the science of mind or spirit, pneumatology consisted of three parts treating of the Divine mind, Theo- logy — the angelic mind, Angelolog}', and the human mind. This last is now called Psychology, "a term to which no competent objection can be made, and which affords us, what the various clumsy periphrases in use do not, a con- venient adjective — psychological.'''' — Sir W. Hamilton, Beid's Works^ p. 219, note. POiii.iciTATiO]V. — V. Promise. POI^YCrA:Tlir (^o?.yc, many ; yu^uo;^ mamage) — means a plu- rality of wives or husbands. It has prevailed under various forms in all ages of the world. It can be shown, however, to be contrary to the hght of nature ; and has been con- demned and punished by the laws of many nations. About the middle of the sixteenth centur}-, Beraardus Ochinus, general of the order of Capuchins, and afterwards a Pro- testant, published Dialogues in favour of polygamy^ to which Theodore Beza wrote a reply. In 1682, a work entitled Polygamia TriumpJiatrix appeared under the name of Theophilus Aletheus. The true name of the author was Lyserus, a native of Saxony. In 1780, Martin Madan published ThelyphtJiora^ or a Treatise on Female Ruin^ in which he defended polygamy^ on the part of the mal»\ 2c 386 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. See some sensible remarks on this subject in Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy. POIiYTBLEISM (^oXy^, many ; ^so^, god).^ — '-'• To believe no one supreme designing principle or mind, but rather two, three, or more (though in their nature good) is to be 2i polytheist^ — Shaftesbury., b. i., pt. 1, sect. 2. Three forms of polytheism may be distinguished. 1. Idolatry., or the worship of idols and false gods, which pre- vailed in Greece and Rome. 2. Sahaism^ or the worship of the stars and of fire, which prevailed in Arabia and in Chaldea. 3. Fetichism^ or the worship of anything that strikes the imagination and gives the notion of great power, which prevails in Africa and among savage nations in general. POSITIVISM, — '' One man affirms that to him the principle of all certitude is the testimony of the senses; this is: positivism^ — Morell, Philosoph. Tenden.., p. 15. Of late years the name positivism has been appropriated to the peculiar principles advocated by M. Auguste Comte, in his Cours de Philosophie Positive. This philosophy is thus described by an admirer (G. H. Lewes, Comte's Philosoph. of Sciences., 1853, sect. 1)]: — ''This is the mission of positivism., to generalize science, and to systematize sociality ; in other words, it aims at creating a philosophy of the sciences, as a basis for a new social faith. A social doctrine is the aim of positivism., a scientific doctrine the means; just as in a man, intelligence is the minister and interpreter of life. '' The leading conception of M. Comte is : — There are but three phases of intellectual evolution — the theological (supernatural), the metaphysical., and XhQ positive. In the supernatural phase, the mind seeks causes., unusual pheno- mena are interpreted as the signs of the pleasure or dis- pleasure of some god. In the metaphysical phase, the supernatural agents are set aside for abstract forces inherent in substances. In the positive phase, the mind restricts itself to the discovery of the laws of phenomena." TOCABUULRY OF PHILOSOPHY. 387 f*0I€ABIiX:, and PR^DICAmXINT, are all derived from prcedicare., to affirm. A prcedicate is that which is actually affirmed of any one, as wisdom of Peter. A prcedicahle is that which may be affirmed of many, as sun may be affirmed of other suns besides that of our system. A prcedicament is a series, order, or arrange- ment of predicates and predicaMes in some summum genus,- as substance, or quality. Prscdicables. — ''Whatever term can be affirmed of several things, must express either their whole essence^ which is called the species; or a part of their essence (viz., either the material -psirt, which is called the genus^ or ihe formal and distinguishing part, which is called differentia.^ or in common discourse, characteristic)., or something joined to the essence ; whether necessarily (i. ICATE — Every PraBclicable expresses either The whole essence of its ^ . ... p™^,^^ Or something joined subject. Yiz., Species. ^^ P'^^^ ^\ ^^^ essence, ^^ .^^ essence. r Genus, differentia. HTTTN rniversal but Peculiar but Universal and^ t ,^^,,,ki^ c^^o^.-ki« not Peculiar, not Univei-sal. PecuUar. Inseparable, beparable, Prtedicables. — *' Genus, species, diiferentia, proprimn, acci- dens, might, with more propriety perhaps, have been called the five classes of predicates ; but use has determined them to be called the^i-g predicahles.''^ — Keid, Account of Aris- totle's Lofjic. Prapdicament. — These most comprehensive signs of things (the categories) are called in Latin the prcedicaments. because they can be said or predicated in the same sense of all other terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them, whereas no other term can be correctly said of them, because no other is employed to express the full extent of their mean- ing.'' — Gillies, Analysis of Aristotle^ c. 2. Praedicate. — AVhat is affirmed or denied is called the predicate ; and that of which it is affirmed or denied is called the suhject. — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., vol. v., p. 152.— F. AXTPIBUTE, CaTEGORT, UNIVERSAL. PraB-prspdicaaienia and Post-pr^edicamenta. — "The Greek Logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three sections, calling the first section to tco tcdv xotrryooiwj : the second, rd 'tzsdi Hv-c^-j xa,Tr,yooiau; the third, to uirx Totg KOLTnyooiotg. — Ammon. in PrcediCj p. 14:6. The Latins, adhering to the same division, coin new names : ante- prcedicamenta. or prce-prcedicamenta, prcedic amenta and j905/- prcedicamenta'' — Sanderson, pp. 22, 51, 55, ed. Oxon., 1672. PREJinoiCE (prcE'jtidicare, to judge before inquiry-). — A prejudice is a pre-judging, that is forming or adopting an opinion concerning an\i:hing, before the grounds of it have been faii-ly or fully considered. The opiraon may be true 394 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. or false, but in so far as the grounds of it have not been examined, it is erroneous or without proper evidence. "In most cases prejudices are opinions which, on some account, men are pleased with, independently of any con- viction of their truth ; and which, therefore, they are afraid to examine, lest they should find them to be false. Prejudices^ then, are unreasonable judgments, formed or held under the influence of some other motive than the love of truth. They may therefore be classed according to the nature of the motives from which they result. These motives are either, 1, Pleasurable, innocent, and social; or, 2, They are malignant." — ^Taylor, Elements of Thought. Dr. Reid (Intell Powers^ essay vi., chap. 8) has treated of prejudices or the causes of error, according to the classi- fication given of them by Lord Bacon, under the name of idols (v. Idol). Mr. Locke has treated of the causes of error (Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book iv., chap. 20). And some excellent observations on the prejudices peculiar to men of study, may be seen in Malebranche, Search after Truth, book ii., part 2. PREIWISS (propositiones prcEmissce^ propositions which go before the conclusion, and from which it is inferred.) — A regular syllogism consists of two premisses and a conclusion. The two premisses are sometimes called the antecedent, and the conclusion the consequent. IPRESCIENCE (prm-scire^ to know before it happens). — " The prescience of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehen- sion of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, that this knowledge is most exquisite and perfect, accurately representing the natures, powers, and properties of the thing it does fore-know." — More, Immortality of Soul., b. ii., c. 4. The prescience of God may be argued from the perfection of his nature. It is difficult or rather impossible for us to conceive of it, because we have no analogous faculty. Our obscure and inferential knowledge of what is future, is not VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 395 PRESCIENCE— to be likened to his clear and direct* beholding of all things. Many attempts have been made to reconcile the prescience of God with the liberty of man. Each truth must rest upon its own proper evidence. — St. Augustin, On the Spirit and the Letter; Bossuet, Traite du Libre Arhitre; Leibnitz, Theodicee ; Fenelon, Existence de Dieu. PRIMARY (primus^ first) — is opposed to secondary. ''Those qualities, or properties, without which we cannot even imagine a thing to exist, are called primary qualities. Extension and solidity are called primary qualities of matter — colour, taste, smell, are called secondary qualities of matter." — Taylor, Elements of Thought, Descartes. Locke. Reid. Stewart, Phil. Essays^ ii., chap. 2. Su' W. Hamilton, Reid's Works^ note D. PRINCIPIA ESSENDI or PRINCIPI.ES OF REINO are distinguished into the principle of origination and the prin- ciple of dependence. The only proper principle of origination is God, who gives essence and existence to all beings. The principle of dependence is distinguished into that of causality and that of inherence^ or effective dependence^ as the effect depends upon its cause, and suhjective depen- dence^ as the quality inheres or depends on its subject or substance. PRlNClpiiE (principium^ oipx'^t ^ beginning). — ''A principle is that which being derived from nothing, can hold of no- thing. 'Principio autem nulla est origo,' said Cicero, 'nam * When the late Sir James Mackintosh was visiting the school for the deaf and dumb at Paris, then under the care of the Ahhe Sicard, he is said to have addressed this question in Avriting, to one of the pupils,—" Doth God reason ? " The pupil for a short time appeared to he distressed and confused, but presently wrote on his slate, the following answer:— "To reason is to hesitate, to doubt, to inquire, it is the highest attribute of a limited intelligence. God sees all things, fore-sees all things, knows all things; therefore God doth not reason."— Gurney, on Ilabit and Discip- line, p. 138. 396 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ex principio oriuntur omnia : ipsum autem nulla ex re ; nee enim id esset principium quod gigneretur aliunde.' " — Sir Will. Drummond, Acad. Quest. ^ p. 5. Aristotle {Metapliys.^ lib. v., cap. 1) has noticed several meanings of oi^x^i which is translated principle., and has added — '' What is common to all principles is that they are the primary source from which anything is^ becomes., or is known.'''' The word is applied equally to thought and to being ; and hence principles have been divided into those of being and those of knowledge, or principia essendi and principia cognoscendif or according to the language of German philo- sophers, principles formal and principles real. Principia essendi may also be principia cognoscendi., for the fact that things exist is the ground or reason of their being known. But the converse does not hold ; for the existence of things is in no way dependent upon our knowledge of them. Ancient philosophy was almost exclusively occupied with principles of heing., investigating the origin and elements of all things, while, on the other hand, modern philosophy has been chiefly devoted to principles of knowledge., ascer- taining the laws and elements of thought, and determining their validity in reference to the knowledge which they give. jPRIiVCIPIiES OF KNOWliEDOE are those truths by means of which other truths are known. They have been distin- guished into simple and complex., that is, they may be found in the form of ideas, as substance, cause — or in the form of propositions, as in the affirmation, that every change implies the operation of a cause, or in the negation, that qualities do not exist without a substance. Complex principles have been arranged in three classes, viz., hypotheses, definitions, and axioms. Hypotheses and definitions have been called ^£T/x^, that is, conventional principles or truths assumed or agreed on for the purpose of disputation or teaching, and are confined to the department of knowledge to which they peculiarly belong. Axioms are principles true in themselves and extending to all departments of knowledge. VOCABULAPvY OF PHILOSOPHY. 397 principi.es— These were called (^vgikoo or ?^{??:^t«, and are such as the mind of man natm^ally and at once accepts as true. They correspond with the first truths, primitive beliefs, or prin- ciples of common sense of the Scottish philosophy. — V. Common^ Sense, Axiom. '' The word principle^'''' says Mr. Stewart (Philosoph, Hum, Mind^ vol. i., chap. 1, sect. 2), "in its proper accep- tation, seems to me to denote an assumption (whether resting on fact or on hypothesis), upon which, as a datum^ a train of reasoning proceeds ; and for the falsity or incor- rectness of which no logical rigour in the subsequent pro- cess can compensate. Thus the gravity and the elasticity of the air are pririciples of reasoning^ in our speculations about the barometer. The equality of the angles of inci- dence and reflection ; the proportionality of the sines of incidence and refraction ; are principles of reasoning in catoptrics and in dioptrics. In a sense perfectly analogous to this, the definitions of geometry (all of which are merely hypothetical) are the first principles of reasoning in the subsequent demonstration, and the basis on which the whole fabric of the science rests." Lord Herbert, De Veritate. Buffier, Treatise of First Truths. Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay vi. Principles as Express or as Operative correspond to principles of knowing and of heing. An express prin- ciple asserts a proposition ; as, truth is to be spoken. An operative principle prompts to action or produces change, as when a man takes food to satisfy hunger. An express principle asserts an original law and is regulative. An operative principle is an original element and is consti- tutive. PRINCIPJLES OF ACTION may either mean those express principles which regulate or ought to regulate human action, or those operating or motive principles which prompt human action. The latter, which is the common applica- tion or phrase, is its psychological meaning. 398 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PRINCIPIiES— When applied to human action psychologically, the word principle is used in the sense of the principle of dependence ; and to denote that the action depends upon the agent for its being produced. It may signify the dependence of causality^ that is, that the action depends for its production on the agent, as its efficient cause ; or it may signify the dependence of inherence^ that is, that the action depends for its production on some power or energy which inheres in the agent as its subject. Hence it has been said that a principle of action is twofold — -the principium qiiod^ and the principium quo. Thus, man as an active being, is the principium quod or efficient cause of an action being pro- duced ; his will, or the power by which he determines to act, is the principium quo. But the will itself is stimulated or moved to exert itself ; and in this view may be regarded as the principium quod^ while that which moves or stimulates it, may be regarded as the principium quo. Before we act, we deliberate, that is, we contemplate the action in its nature and conse- quences ; we then resolve or determine to do it or not to do it, and the performance or omission follows. Volition, then, or an exercise of will is the immediate antecedent of action. But the will is called into exercise by certain in- fluences which are brought to bear upon it. Some object of sense or of thought is contemplated. We are affected with pleasure or pain. Feelings of complacency or dis- placency, of liking or dislildng, of satisfaction or disgust, are awakened. Sentiments of approbation or disappro- bation are exp erienced. We pronounce some things to be good, and others to be evil, and feel corresponding inclin- ation or aversion ; and under the influence of these states and aflections of mind, the will is moved to activity. The forms which these feelings of pleasure or pain, of inclination or tendency, to or from an object, may assume, are many and various ; arising partly from the nature of the objects contemplated, and partly from the original constitution and acquired habits of the mind contemplating. But they VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. S09 PRINCIPIiES— are all denominated, in a general way, principles of action, PRIVATION (aTi^mig^ privatio). — " A privation is tlie absence of what does naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which ought to be present with it ; as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physi- cian or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations-''^ — Watts, Logic ^ part 1, c. 2. Aristotle (MetapJiys.^ lib. v., cap. 22) says : — ''There is privation when a being wants some quality which is not natural to it — as when we say a plant wants eyes, or when the quality is natural to the being — as when we say a man is blind. There is also privation when a beiag has not yet attained to a quality which belongs to its nature — as when we say a puppy does not see. The principles of all natural bodies are matter and form. "To these Aristotle has added a third which he calls o-rg^- Yiffig or privation^ an addition that he has thought proper to make to the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, in order to give his system the appearance of novelty; but without any necessity, as I apprehend ; for it is not a cause, as he himself admits, such as matter and/b?'/?!, but is only that without which the first matter could not receive the impression of any/o7'm; for it must be clear of eyery form, which is what he calls privation, before it can admit of any. " Now, this is necessarily implied in the notion of matter ; for as it has the capacity of all /or???, so it has the privation of all form. In this way, Aristotle himself has explained the nature of matter (^Physic, lib. i., cap. 8). And Plato, in the Timceus, has very much insisted upon this quality of matter as absolutely necessary, in order to fit it to receive all forms ; and he illustrates his meaning by a comparison : — Those, says he, who make unguents or perfumes, prepare the liquid so, to which they are to give the perfume, that it may have no odour of its own. And, in like manner, those who take off an impression of anything upon any soft matter, clear that matter of every other impression, making 400 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PKIVATION— it as smooth as possible, in order that it may better receive the figure or image intended. In like manner, he says, matter^ in order to receive the specieses of all things, must in itself have the species of nothing." — ^Llonboddo, Ancient Metapliys.^ book ii., chap. 2. YIqtlcq privation was defined — Negatio formcB in subjecto apto ad habendam talemformam. According to Plato, privation^ in the sense of limitation, imperfection, is the inherent condition of all finite existence, and the necessary cause of evil. — Leibnitz, after Augustin, Aquinas, and others, held similar views (Causa Dei^ sect. 69, 72). Essais Sur la Bonte de Dieu^ 1, partie, sect. 29, 31 ; 3, partie, sect. 378. PROBASliE: (jprohahilis^ proveable). — That which does not admit of demonstration and does not involve absurdity or contradiction, is probable or admits of proof. '' As demon- stration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one with another ; so probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions, is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between probability and cer- tainty^ faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of know- ledge there is intuition ; each immediate idea, each step, has its visible and certain connection ; in belief, not so. That which makes us believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe ; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration. VOCABULARY OF PHILC SOPHY. 401 PROBABLE-^ '^The grounds of probability are first, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experi- ence. Second, the testimony of others, touching their observation and experience." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book iv., chap. 15. Keid, Intell. Powers., essay vii., chap. 3. ^'The word probable,'' says Mr. Stewart (PMlosoph. of Hum, Mind., part 2, chap. 2, sect. 4), " does not imply any deficiency in the proof, but only marks the particular nature of that proof, as contradistinguished from another species of evidence. It is opposed not to what is certain, but to what admits of being demonstrated after the manner of the mathematicians. This differs widely from the mean- ing annexed to the same word in popular discourse ; according to which, whatever event is said to be probable, is understood to be expected with some degree of doubt. .... But although, in philosophical language, the epithet probable be applied to events which are acknow- ledged to be certain, it is also applied to events which are called probable by the vulgar. The philosophical meaning of the word, therefore, is more comprehensive than the popular ; the former denoting that particular species of evidence of which contingent truths admit ; the latter being confined to such degrees of this evidence as fall short of the highest. These different degrees of probability the philosopher considers as a series^ beginning with bare possi- bility, and terminating in that apprehended infallibility, with which the phrase moral certainty is synonymous. To this last term of the series, the word jjrobable is, in its ordi- nary acceptation, plainly inapplicable." PROBIiEl^ (7r()OiSXY}/iioc, from Trpo (loc^'Kiiv, proponere, to throw down, to put in question). — Any point attended wntli doubt or difficulty, any proposition which may be attacked or defended by probable arguments, may be called a problem. Every department of inquiry has questions, the answers to which are problematical. So that, according to the branch of knowledge to which they belong, problems may be called 402 VOCABUL/.HY OF PHILOSOPHY. „PK©BIL.EM— Physical, Metaphysical, Logical, Moral, Matliematicai, Historical, Literary, &c. In his Topic, (lib. i., cap. 9), Aristotle distinguishes three classes,— the morale or practical which may influence our conduct ; as, whether pleasure is the chief good: the speculative or scientific^ which merely add to our knowledge ; as, whether the world is eternal : and the auxiliai^y^ or those questions which we seek to solve with a view to other questions. PROCURESS. — F. Perfectibility'. S»Ii0MISE and I»01.i:.I€ITATI©N. Promittimus rogati — pollicemur vitro. — K pollicitation is a spontaneous expression of our intention to do something in favour of another. It does not necessarily imply the presence of the party in reference to whom it is made ; and it does not confer upon him a right to exact its performance. But in so far as it has become known to him, and has awakened expectations of its being performed, we may be brought under a moral obligation to perform it, especially if its performance is seen to be highly beneficial to him, and in no way prejudicial to ourselves. A promise is made in consequence of a request preferred to us. It implies the presence of the party preferring the re- quest, or of some one for him, and confers upon him a perfect moral right to have it fulfilled, and brings us under a moral obligation to fulfil it. In order to constitute a promise^ three things are necessary. 1. The voluntary consent or intention of the promiser. 2. The expression or outward signification of that intention. 3. The acceptance of the promise by the party to whom it is made. A promise implies tv/o parties at least — the promiser and the promisee. A pact implies two or more. In this it agrees with a contract^ — q. v. It is a dictate of the law of nature, that promises should be fulfilled, — not because it is expedient to do so, but because it is right to do so. The various questions concerning the parties competent to give a valid promise^ the interpretation of the terms in VOaiBULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 403 PRO:^IISE— Trhich it may be given, and the cases in whicli the obliga- tion to fulfil it may be relaxed or dissolved, belong to what maybe called the Casuistry of Ethics^ imd Natural Juris- prudence. — T". Contract. PROOF. — '-To conform our language more to common use. we ought to di\ide arguments into demonstrations, proofs. and probabilities. By proofs^ meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition." — Hume, On the Understanding^ sect. 6, note. AVhately says that proving may be defined ''the assigning of a reason or argument for the support of a given proposition,** and it f er- ring ''the deduction of a conclusion from given premises. In the one case our conclusion is given, and we have to seek for arguments; in the other our premises are given^ and we have to seek for a conclusion. Proving may be compared to the act of putting away any article into the proper recep- tacle of goods of that description, wferring to that of bringing out the article when needed." — See Evidence. Inference. PROPERTi: may be distinguished from quality or attribute, and also from faculty. QuaHties are primary or secondary, essential or non- essential. The former are called attributes^ and the latter properties. Extension is the attribute of matter, taste and smell are properties of body. Faculty implies understanding and wiU. and so is appli- cable only to mind. AVe speak of the properties of bodies, but not of their faculties. Of mind we may say will is a faculty ov property : so that while alltaculties a.Ye properties, all properties are not faculties. PROPOSITION. — A judgment of the mind expressed in words is a proposition. ''A pj'oposition, according to Aristotle, is a speech wherein one thing is aftirmed or denied of another. Hence it is easy to distmguish the thing afiii'med or denied, whicli is called the predicate^ from the thing of which it is athrmed or denied, which is Cvilled the subject; and these two are 404 VOOABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. PROPOSITION— called tlie terms of the proposition. Hence, likewise, It appears that propositions are either affirmative or negative ; and this is called their quality, " When the subject of Si propositioii is a general term, the predicate is affirmed or denied either of the whole, or of a part. Hence propositions are distinguished into universal and particular. '- All men are mortal,' is an universal pro- position. ' Some men are learned,' is a particular ; and this is called the quantity of a proposition."" — Reid, Account of Aristotle'' s Logic ^ chap. 2, sect. 6. As to relation — Propositions are distinguished as catego- rical^ hypothetical^ Sind figurative^ according as the relation between the predicate and the subject is that of phenomenon to substance, or of effect to cause, or that of reciprocal action between the two terms. In reference to modality^ — as viewed with regard to the validity of the connection between subject and predicate, according as it is barely possible^ or contingent^ or necessary., propositions have been so called ; or by Kant problematic, assertory, and apodeictic. ^' Propositions are divided according to their matter into true and/aZ^e." — Port Roy. Log.., part 2, chap. 3. As to matter., propositions have also been distinguished into contingent and necessary^ according as the terms agree in part and disagree in part, or agree essentially and in- variably. — V. Judgment. PROPRIETY {to tt^sttou., that which is fit or congruous to the agent and the relations in which he is placed). — This, according to some, is that which characterizes an action as right, and an agent as virtuous "According to Plato, to Aristotle, and to Zeno, virtue consists in the propriety of conduct, or in the suitableness of the affection from which we act, to the object which excites it." Adam Smith {Theory of Moral Sentiments., part 7, lect. ii., chap. 1) treats of those systems which make virtue consist in propriety. PROPRIum (The) or Property is a predicable which denotes VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 405 PROPRIUITI— something essentially conjoined to the essence of the species. — Whately, Logic^ book ii., chap. 5, sect. 3. Proprium is applied, — 1. To what belongs to some one but not to all, as to be a philosopher in respect of man. 2, To what belongs to a species, but not to it only, as black- ness in respect of a crow. 3. To what belongs to all of the species, and to that only, but not always, as to grow hoary in respect of man. 4. To what belongs to species, to all of it, to it only, and always, as laughter in respect of man. This last is truly the proprium. 'Quod speciei toti^ soli et semper convenit. — Derodon, Xo^., p. 37. '' There is a proprium which belongs to the ichole species, but not to the sole species, as sleeping belongs to man. There is a proprium which belongs to the sole species, but not to the whole species, as to be a magistrate. There is a proprium which belongs to the whole species, and to the sole species, but not always., as laughing ; and there is a proprium which always belongs to it, as to be risible, that is, to have the faculty of laughing. Can one forbear laugh- ing when he represents to himself these poor things, uttered with a mouth made venerable by a long beard, or repeated by a trembling and respectful disciple?" — Crousaz, Art of Thinking^ part 1, sect. 3, chap. 5. PROVERB. — "Not to detain the reader with any long dis- course concerning the nature, definition, and use of pi^overhs^ my notion of a proverb in brief is this ; a short sentence or phrase in common use, containing some trope, figure, homonymy, rhyme, or other novity of expression."— Eay, Preface to Proverbs. The Editor of the fourth edition of Ray's Proverbs says, ''A Proverb is usually defined, an instructive sentence, or common and pithy saying, in which more is generally designed than expressed ; famous for its peculiarity and elegance, and therefore adopted by the learned as well as the vulgar, by which it is distinguished from counterfeits, which want such authority." Proverbs embody the current and practical })hiIosophy of 406 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. an age or nation. Collections of tliem have been made from the earliest times. The book of Scripture called the Proverbs of Solomon, contains more than one collection. They have always been common in the East. Burckhardt made a collection of Arabian proverbs^ which was pub- lished at London in 1830. Seller published at Augsburgh, in 1816, The Wisdom of the Streets^ or, the Meaning arid Use of German Proverbs. Ray's Proverbs^ Allan Ramsay's Proverbs^ Henderson's Proverbs^ have been published among ourselves. F:KtJl>ENCE (prudentia^ contracted for prcevidentia^ foresight or forethought) — is one of the virtues which were called cardinal by the ancient ethical writers. It may be de- scribed as the habit of acting at all times v^rith deliberation and forethought. It is equally removed from rashness on the one hand, and timidity or irresolution on the other. It consists in choosing the best ends, and prosecuting them by the most suitable means. It is not only a virtue in itself, but necessary to give lustre to all the other virtues. ''The rules of prudence in general, like the laws of the stone tables, are for the most part prohibitive. Thou shalt not is their characteristic formula : and it is an espe- cial part of Christian prudence that it should be so. Nor would it be difficult to bring under this head all the social obligations that arise out of the relations of the present life, which the sensual understanding (ro Q:'(}ovvi^oc Trig uccpy.og^ Rom. viii. 6) is of itself able to discover, and the performance of which, under favourable circumstances, the merest worldly self-interest, without love or faith, is suffi- cient to enforce ; but which Christian prudence enlivens by a higher principle and renders symbolic and sacramental (Ephes. V. 32)." '' Morality maybe compared to the consonant ; prudence to the vowel. The former cannot be uttered (reduced to practice) but by means of the latter. ''The Platonic division of the duties of morality com - inences with the prudential or the habit of act and purpose VOCABFL-Un- OF PHILOSOPHY. 407 proceeding ^-om eniiglitened self-interest (qui animi im- perio, corporis servitio, rerum auxilio, in proprium sui com- modiim et sibi pi*OA-idiis utitiir, hiinc esse pnidentem statiii- miis) ascends to the moral, that is, to the purifsing and remedial A-iitues ; and seeks its summit in the imitation of the diyine natrnv. In this last division, answering to that which we have called the spiritual, Plato includes all those inward acts and aspirati(His, waitings, and watchings, which have a growth in godHkeness tor their immediate purpose, and the union of the human soul with the supreme good as their ultimate object." — Coleridge, Aids to Be fleet ion, TOl. i., pp. 13, 21, '2'2. — V. AIORALITT. PSXCHlsm (from -if^vxit ^oul) — is the word chosen by Mons. Quesne (Lettres sur le PsycMsiiu, Svo, Paris, 1852) to denote the doctrine that there is a limd, ditfused through- out all nature, animating equally all K^^ng and organized beings, and that the diiFerence which appears in their ^^ctions comes of their particidar organization. The Huid is general, the organization is individual. This opinion differs from that of Pythagoras, who held that the soul of a man passed individually into the body of a brute. He (Mons. Qnesae) holds that while the body dies the soul does not ; the organization peiishes, but not psv'chal or psychical liuid. I»!$XCllor,OOi: (y «/%«», the soul: A:yor. i^liseom-se). — Thenamv may be new, but the study is old. It is recommended in the saving ascribed to Socrates — Know thyself. The recom- mendation is renewed ui the Co^uto trgo sum of Descartes; and in the wi-itiags of Malebranche, Amaidd, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hiune, psychological inquiries held a prominent place. StiU further prominence was given to them by the followers of Kant and Reid, and }\rqper, and others improper That properly is quantity which is 7neasured by its own kind ; or which, of its own nature, is capable of being doubled or tripled, without taking in any quantity of a different kind as a measure of it. Improper quantity is that which cannot be measured by its own kind ; but to which we assign a measure by the means of some proper quantity^ that is related to it. Thus velocity of motion, when we consider it by itself, cannot be measured." We measure it by the space passed in a given time. — E,eid, Essay on Quantity. "The reason why quantity^ whether continuous or discrete, though it be but an accident or property of substance, is a subject of science, is, that each kind of it furnishes a stan- dard or measure for itself. Thus extension^ which is quan- VOCABULAr.Y OF PHILOSOPHY. 4:15 QUANTITY— tity continuous, can be measured by any part of itself ; and, in like manner, number^ which is quantity discrete, can be measured by number or by unit; whereas qualities^ such as hot and cold^ black and white^ hard and soft ^ &c., have no common measure, and therefore cannot be scientifically compared together; for which reason, as Aristotle has observed in the chap, of his Categories concerning quahty, it is only of quantity that we say. That it is equal or unequal, whereas, to qualities we can only apply the terms more or less. For the same reason, he might have said, there can be no ratios or proportions of qualities ; for we cannot say of them, as we can say of quantities, that the one is a half or a third of the other." — ]Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ book ii., chap. 26, note. Quantity (Discrete and Continuous). — " In magnitude and multitude we behold the two primary, the two grand and comprehensive species, into which the genus of quantity is divided ; magnitude, from its union, being called quantity continuous ; multitude, from its separation, quantity dis- crete. Of the continuous kind is every solid ; also the bound of every sohd, that is, a superficies ; and the bound of every superficies, that is, a line ; to which may be added those two concomitants of every body, namely, time and place. Of the discrete kind are fleets and armies, herds, flocks, the syllables of sounds articulate, &c." — Hams, Philosoph. Arrange.^ chap. 9. ^' Discrete quantity is that of which the parts have no continuity, as in number. The number, e. g.^ of inches in a foot rule, is the same whether the solid inches remain continuous, or are cut asunder and flimg about the world ; but they do not constitute a foot length (which is a con- tinuous quantity)^ unless they are so joined together that the bounding lines of one coincide with those of another. Of continuous quantities there are two kinds ; one, of which the parts are co-existent, as in extension ; another, in which the parts are successive, as In duration. Discrete and con- tinuous quantities are sometimes called niuUitude and magni- 416 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. QUAIVTITY— tudey — Fitzgerald, Notes to Aristotle's Ethics^ 8vo, Dublin, 1850, p. 151.— See Aristotle in Categor.^ c. 6. According to Derodon (JPhys,^ pars 1, cap. 5), quantity is either — 1. Permanent^ when its parts are together ; or 2. Successive^ when they exist some after others. Time and motion are quantity successive. Permanent quantity is — 1. Continuous^ as a /me which is length — superficies^ which is length and breadth, and mathematical hody^ which is length, breadth, and depth ; 2. Discrete^ as number and speec?t. Hutcheson notices magnitude, time, and number, as three genera of quantity. — Metaphys.^ part 1, cap. 5. Quantity is called discrete when the parts are not con- nected, as number ; continuous^ when they are connected, and then it is either successive^ as time, motion ; or per- manent^ which is what is otherwise called space or exten- sion, in length, breadth, and depth ; length alone consti- tutes lines ; length and breadth, surfaces ; and the three together, solids. — Port Roy. Logic, part 1, ch. 2. QtJII>l>ITY or QUII>ITir (quiditas^ from quid^ what). — This term was employed in scholastic philosophy as equivalent to the TO Ti 7}u uuoci of Aristotle, and denotes what was subsequently called the substantial form. It is the answer to the question. What is it ? quid est f It is that which distinguishes a thing from other things, and makes it what it is and not another. It is synonymous with essence, and com- prehends both the substance and qualities. For quahties belong to substance, and by qualities substance manifests itself. It is the known essence of a thing ; or the comple- ment of all that makes us conceive of anything as we con- ceive of it, as different from any or every other thing. QUIETISITI (quies^ rest) — '4s the doctrine that the highest character of virtue consists in the perpetual contemplation and love of supreme excellence." — Sumner, Records of Cre- ation^ vol. ii., p. 239. The two following propositions from Fenelon's Maxims of the Saints^ were condemned by Innocent XII. in 1699. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 417 QUIETISI^— 1. There is attainable in this life a state of perfection ui which the expectation of reward, and the fear of punish- ment have no place. 2. Souls may be so inflamed with love to God, and so resigned to his will, that if they believed that God had condemned them to eternal pain, they would absolutely sacrifice their salvation. Madame Guyon thought she had learned a method by which souls might be carried to such a state of perfection that a continual act of contemplation and love might be substituted for all other acts of religion. A controversy was carried on by Fenelon and Bossuet on the subject. See a dissertation by M. Bonnel, De la Con- troverse de Bossuet et Fenelon^ sur le Quietisme, 8vo, Macon. 1850. Upham, Life of Madame Guyon, RACE— F. Species. RATIO. — When two subjects admit of comparison with reference to some quality which they possess in common, and which may be measured, this measure is their ratio^ or the rate in which the one exceeds the other. With this term is connected that of proportion^ which denotes the portions^ or parts of one magnitude which are contained in another. In mathematics, the term ratio is used for pro- portion ; thus, instead of the proportion which one thing bears to another, we say, the ratio which one bears to the other, meaning its comparative magnitude. In the following passage ratio is used for reason or cause. ''In this consists the ratio and essential ground of the gospel doctrine." — Waterland, Works^ vol. ix., serm. 1. — V. Eeason. RATIOCINATION. — ''The conjunction of images mth aflir- mations and negations, which make up propositions, and the conjunction of propositions one to another, and illation of conclusions upon them, is ratiocination or discourse. " Some consecutions are so intimately and evidently cou- 2e 418 TOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. RATIOCIWATION— nexed to, or found in, the premises, tlaat tlie conclusion is attained quasi per saltum^ and without anything of ratio- cinative process, and as the eye sees its objects immediately and without any previous discourse." — Hale, Origin, of Mankind, pp. 50, 51. '^The schoolmen make a third act of the mind which they call ratiocination, and we may style it the genera- tion of a judgment from others actually in our under- standing.'^ — Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. i., part 1, c. 11, sect. 13. '^When from a general proposition, by combining it with other propositions, we infer a proposition of the same degree of generality with itself, or a less general proposi- tion, or a proposition merely individual, the process is ratiocination (or syllogism)." — Mill, Log., 2d edit,, vol. i., p. 223.— F. Kea^oning. MATIONAliE. — -"The chairs of theology and philosophy (dur- ing the scholastic ages), were the oracular seats, from which the doctrines of Aristotle were expounded, as the rationale of theological and moral truth." — Hampden, On Scholastic Philosophy, lect. i,, p. 9. ^^ There cannot be a body of rules mthout a rationale^ and this rationale constitutes the science. There were poets before there were rules of poetical composition ; but before Aristotle, or Horace, or Boileau, or Pope could write their arts of poetry and criticism, they had considered the reasons on which their precepts rested, they had con- ceived in their own minds a theory of the art. In like manner there were navigators before there was an art of navigation ; but before the art of navigation could teach the methods of finding the ship's place by observations of the heavenly bodies, the science of astronomy must have explained the system of the world." — Sir Gr. Cornewall Lewis, Method of Observat, in Politics, chap. 19, sect. 2. Anthony Sparrow, bishop of Exeter, is the author of a work entitled, A Rationale upon the Book of Common Prayer, 12mo, Lond., 1668. — V. Science, Akt. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 419 RATIONAIilSin, in philosophy, is opposed to sensualism^ sensuism^ or sensism^ according to all which, all our know- ledge is derived from sense. It is also opposed to empiri- cism^ which refers all our knowledge to sensation, and reflection, or experience. According to rationalism^ reason furnishes certain elements, without which, experience is not possible. The philosophy of Condillac is of the former kind, — that of Roger Collard of the latter. The philosophy of Locke and Reid have been contrasted in the same manner, but not quite correctly. — V. Sensism, Sensuism, Sen- sualism. Rationalism, in religion, as opposed to supernaturalism^ means the adoption of reason as our sufficient and only guide, exclusive of tradition and revelation. Spinoza, in his Tractatus Tlieologico-PoliticuSy tried to explain all that is supernatural in religion by reason. And Strauss and others in modern Germany have carried this line of specu- lation much farther. RATIONAlilSTS. — "The empmcaZ philosophers are like pis- mires ; they only lay up and use then- store. The rational- ists are like the spiders ; they spin all out of their own bowels. But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, hath a middle faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is gathered by his own virtue." — Bacon, Apoplitliegms, RHAIi (Tiie). — " There is no arguing from ideal to real exis- tence, unless it could first be shown, that such ideas must have their objective realities^ and cannot be accounted for, as they pass within, except it be by supposing such and such real existences, ad extra^ to answer them." — Waterland, Works ^ vol. iv., p. 435. The term real always imports the existent. It is used — 1. As denoting the existent^ as opposed to the non-exis- tent, something, as opposed to nothing. 2. As opposed to the nominal or verbal, the thing to the name. 3. As synonymous with actual, and thus opposed — 1. To potential, and 2. To possible, existence. 420 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. REAIi— 4. As denoting tlie absolute in opposition to the pheno- menal^ things in themselves in opposition to things as they appear to us, relatively to our faculties. 5. As indicating a subsistence in nature in opposition to a representation in thought, ens reale as opposed to ens rationis. 6. As opposed to logical or rational^ a thing which in itself or really^ re, is one, may logically, ratione^ be con- sidered as diverse or plural, and vice versa. — Sir William Hamilton, ReicTs WorJcs^ note 13. — F. Virtual. HEAI^ISM, as opposed to idealism^ is the doctrine that in per- ception there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object, while according to idealism our knowledge of an external world is mediate and representative, i. e., by means of ideas. — F. Idea and Idealism. — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works ^ note C. Edin. Rev., vol. lii., pp. 175-181. Realism, as opposed to nojuinalism, is the doctrine that genus and species are 7'eal things, existing independently of our conceptions and expressions ; and that as in the case of singular terms, there is some real individual corre- sponding to each, so, in common terms also, there is some- thing corresponding to each ; which is the object of our thoughts, when we employ the term." — Whately, Logic j book iv., ch. 5, sect. 1. Cousin has said that the Middle Age is but a development of a phrase of Porphj^ry; which has been thus translated by Boethius — Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant, sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistantia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum j separata a sensibihbus an in sensibilibus posita et citra j hgec consistentia, dicere recusabo. — F. Conceptualism, ISTOMINALISM. KEASON (Ratio, ratus, from reor, I think). — ''The word reason in the English language has difierent significations : sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles, some- times for clear and fair deductions from these principles VOCABULATir OF PHILOSOPHY. 421 KEASON— and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these ; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts,* and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book iv., chap. 17. "All the operations of the mind v/hen it thinks of the qualities of things separately from the things to which they belong ; or when it forms general notions, and employs general terms ; or when it judges of the agreement or dis- agreement of different things ; or when it draws inferences ; are comprehended under the term reason. Reason seems chiefly to consist in the power to keep such or such thoughts in the mind ; and to change them at pleasure ; instead of their flowing through the mind as in dreams ; also in the power to see the difference between one thought and another, and so compare, separate, or join them to- gether afresh. Though animals seem to have some little power to perform these operations, man has so much more of it, that he alone is said to be endowed with reason.''"' — Taylor, Elements of Thought. ''This word is used to signify — 1. All the intellectual powers collectively. 2. Those intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs from brutes. 3. The faculty of carry- ing on the operation of reasoning. 4. The premiss or pre- mises of an argument, especially the minor premiss ; and it is from reason in this sense that the word reasoning is derived. 5. A cause, as when we say that the reason of an eclipse of the sun is,t that the moon is interposed between it and the earth." — Whately, Logic ^ appendix i. * La Raison, dans sa definition la plus simple, est la faculte do comprendre, qui'l ne faut pas a confondre avec la faculte de connaitre. En eifet les animanx connaissent, ils ne paraissent pas comprendre, et c'est la qui les distingue de riiomme.— Jouffroy, Droit. Nat, torn, i., p. 38. t Tlie idea of the reason is higher than that of cause. The ground or reason of all existence, actual or possible, is the existence of God. Had He not existed, nothing could ever have existed. But God is the cause only of sucli tilings as He has created in time; while he is the ground or reason of everything possible. ^1 422 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. REASON-. ''In common and popular discourse, reason denotes that power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong ; and by which we are enabled to com- bine means for the attainment of particular ends." — Stewart, Philosopli. of Hum. Mind, vol. ii., chap. 1. " Reason is used sometimes to express the whole of those powers which elevate man above the brutes, and constitute his rational nature, more especially, perhaps, his intellec- tual powers ; sometimes to express the power of deduction or argumentation." — Stewart, Outlines^ part 2, c. 1, sect. 6. Considering it as a word denoting a faculty or complement of faculties. Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note A, sect. 5, says, '' Reason has been employed to denote ''1. Our intelligent nature in general, as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, and memory ; and in contrast to the feelings and desires, including — 1. Conception; 2. Judgment; 3. Eeasoning ; 4. Intelligence ; i^ovg. '' 2. The right and regular use of our rational faculties. ''3. The dianoetic and noetic functions oi reason^ as by Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay vi., chap. 2. ''4. The dianoetic function or ratiocination, as by Reid in his Inquiry^ introd., sect. 3, chap. 2, sect. 5 and 7. ''5. The noetic function or common sense. And by Kant and others opposed to the understanding as comprehending the other functions of thought." Reason (Spontaneity of). — "I call spontaneity of reason^ the development of reason anterior to reflection, the power which reason has to seize at first upon truth, to compre- hend it and to admit it, without demanding and rendering to itself an account of it." — Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Philosoph., vol. i., p. 113. Reason and llnderstanding — " Pure reason or intuition holds a similar relation to the understanding that percep- tion holds to sensation. As sensation reveals only suhjec- tive facts, while perception involves a direct intuition of the objective world around us ; so with regard to higher VOCABULARY Or PKILOSOPIlY. 4:^:.) REASOX— truths and laws, the understanding furnishes merely the subjective forms, in which they may be logically stated, while intuition brings us face to face with the actual matter, or reality of truth itself."' — Morell, Pldlnsopli. of Relig., p. 19. *'The faculty of thought manifests itself both as under- standing and reason. By the understanding we inquh'e after and investigate the grounds, causes, and conditions of our representations, feelings, and desires, and of those objects standing in immediate connection with them ; by reason we inquire after ultimate grounds, causes, and con- ditions. By the understanding we evolve rules for the regu- lation of our desiring faculty; by reason we subordinate these rules to a higher law, to a law which determines the unconditioned form, the highest end of acting. Through the power of thought, therefore, our knowledge, both theo- retical and practical, is comprehended in unity, connection, and in being..'' — Tenneman, Grundriss^ sect. 41. ^'By the understanding^ I mean the faculty of thinking and forming judgments on the notices furnished by the sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules constitute its distmct nature. By the pure reason^ I mean the power by which we become possessed of principles (the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes) and of ideas (w, &., not images) as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in mathematics : and of justice, holiness, free-will, &c., in morals. Hence in works of pure science, the definitions of necessity precede the reasoning ; in other w^orks they more aptly form the conclusion." — Coleridge, Friend^ pp. 150, 151.' "The definition and proper character of man — that, namely, which should contradistinguish him from other animals, is to be taken from his reason rather than his understanding ; in regard that in other creatures there may be something of understanding^ but there is nothing of reason."' — Harrington, quoted in Aids to Rejiection^ vol L, p. 162. 424: VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. REASON— In the plillosopliy of Kant tlie understanding is distin- guished from the reason- — 1. By the sphere of their action. The sphere of the 7mder standing is coincident with the sensible world and cannot transcend it ; but the reason ascends to the snper- sensuoiis. 2. By the ohjects and results of their exercise. The understanding deals with conceptions^ the reason with ideas. The knowledge obtained by the understanding is particular and contingent, the product of the reason is necessary and universal knowledge or truth. Criticism of Pure Reason^ see English translat., pp. 7, 20, 57, 268, 7, 277, Prolegomena^ sect. 59. See also Morell, Philosophy of Belig.^ chap. 2 ; and Pkilosoph. Tendencies j p. 71. Coleridge, Aids to Reflection. ''The faculty which combines the simple perceptions, and so gives the knowledge of the complex objects, has been called the under standiiig. It is an energy of the mind as intelligent. It is an ultimate fact of knowledge, that the mind is conscious of itself as unity, of the world as diversity. The outward world is seen as diverse through the various sensations, but is bound in certain relations — those of space — which are independent of the perceiving subject. The mind requires a cause external to itself, of the constant representation of unity in diversity, no less than of the representation of different qualities. The reason^ therefore, in virtue of its causal principle refers these relations to the object. Precisely as the intelligence refers the single perception to an external cause, so it refers the combination of perceptions to one object. The under- standing is thus the same faculty with the reason^ but in certain particular applications." — R. A. Thompson, Chris- tian Theism^ book i., chap. 3. " The assertion of a faculty of the mind by which it appre- hends truth, which faculty is higher than the discursive reason^ as the truth apprehended by it is higher than mere VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 425 REASON— demonstrative truth, agrees witb the doctrine tanght and insisted on by the Lite Samuel Taylor Coleridge. And so far as he was the means of inculcating this doctrine, which is the doctrine of Plato, and I might add, of Aristotle, and of many other philosophers, let him have due honour. But in his desu'e to impress the doctrine upon men's minds, he combined it with several other tenets, which will not bear examination. He held that the two faculties by which these two kinds of truth are apprehended, and which our philosophical writers call the intuitive reason ^ and the discursive reason^ may be called, and ought to be called respectively, the reason and the understanding ; and that the second of these is of the nature of the instinct of ani- mals, so as to be something intermediate between reason and instinct. These opinions, I may venture to say, are altogether erroneous. The intuitive reason and the dis- cursive reason are not, by any English writers, called the reason and the understanding ; and accordingly, Coleridge has had to alter all the passages, \iz., those taken from Leighton, Harrington, and Bacon, from which his exposi- tion proceeds. The understanding is so far from being especially the discursive or reasoning faculty, that it is, in universal usage, and by our best writers, opposed to the discursive or reasoning faculty. Thus this is expressly declared by Sir John Davies in his poem '- On the Immor- tality of the Sold.' He says of the soul : — ' When she rates thinc^s, and moves from ground to ground, The name of reason {ratio) she acquires from this ; But Avhen hy reason she the truth hath found, And standeth fixt, she understanding is,- *^ Instead of the reason being fixed, and the understanding discursive, as ]Mr. Coleridge says, the reason is distinctively discursive ; that is, it obtains conclusions by running from one point to another. This is what is meant by discursus ; or, taking the full term, discursus ration is^ discourse of reason. Understanding is fixed, that is, it dwells upon one \aew of a subject, and not upon the steps by which that. 426 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. REASON— view is obtained. The verb to reason^ implies the sub- stantive, tbe reason, though it is not co- extensive with it ; for, as I have said, there is the intuitive reason as well as the discursive reason. But it is by the faculty of reason that we are capable of reasoning ; though undoubtedly the practice or the pretence of reasoning may be carried so far as to seem at variance with reason in the more familiar sense of the term ; as is the case also in French. Moliere's Crisale says (in the Femmes Savantes) — * Raisonner est Vemploi de toute ma maison Et le raisonnement en l)annit la Ruison.' "If Mr. Coleridge's assertion were true, that the under- standing is the discursive and the reason the fixed faculty, we should be justified in saying that the understanding is the faculty by which we reason., and the reason is the faculty by which we understand. But this is not so. . . . '•'' Mr. Coleridge's object in his speculations is nearly the same as Plato's, viz., to declare that there is a truth of a higher kind than can be obtained by mere reasoning ; and also to claim, as portions of this higher truth, certain funda- mental doctrines of morality. Among these, Mr. Coleridge places the authority of conscience, and Plato, the supreme good. Mr. Coleridge also holds, as Plato held, that the reason of man in its highest and most comprehensive form, is a portion of a supreme and universal reason ; and leads to truth, not in virtue of its special attributes in each person, but by its own nature. " The view thus given of that higher kind of knowledge which Plato and Aristotle place above ordinary science, as being the knowledge of and faculty of learning first prin- ciples, will enable us to explain some expressions which might otherwise be misunderstood. Socrates, in the con- cluding part of the Sixth Book of the Republic, says, that this kind of knowledge is 'that of which the reason (T^oyog) takes hold,* in virtue of its power of reasoning.'' Here we * 77] 7011 ^loiXsyiirdoct ^uvccfjcu. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 427 REASON— are plainly not to understand tliat we arrive at first prin- ciples by reasoning ; for the very opposite is true, and is here taught, viz., that first principles are not Tvhat we reason to^ but what we reason from. The meaning of this passage plainly is, that first principles are those of which the reason takes hold in virUie of its power of reasoning ; they are the conditions which must exist in order to make any reasoning possible ; they are the propositions which the reason must involve implicitly, in order that we may reason explicitly ; they are the intuitive roots of the dialectical power. ' ' Plato's views mav be thus exhibited : — Intelligible World, yc^rcv. Visible World, ooccrov. i Object, .. Ideas. Conceptions. Thinjrs. Images. Process, .. Intuition. Demonstration. Belief. rio-ris. Conjecture, i Faculties, . Intuitive Eeason. Discursive Reason ?.oyoc. Sensation. From a paper by Dr. Whewell, On tlie Intellectual Powers according to Flato^ in the Cambridge Pliilosoph, Trans. ^ 1855. — V, Understanding. Reason (Impersonal). — Reason^ according to Cousin and other French philosophers, is the faculty by which we have knowledge of the infinite and the absolute, and is imper- sonal. '* Licet enim intellectus mens sit individuus et separatus ab intellectu tuo, tamen secundum quod est individuus non habet universale in ipso, et ideo non individuatur id quod est in intellectu ... Sic igitur universale ut universale est ubique et semper idem omnmo et idem in animabus omnium, non recipiens individuationem ab anima." These words are quoted from AveiThcies, by ]\Ions. Hau- reau, in his Examen de la Philosopli. Scolastique, torn. i.,p. 09, 428 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. MEASON— who exclaims, " Yoila la these de I'mtelligence ou de la raison impersonelle T^ But the truth is, that the root and germ of this doctrine may be found in the doctrine of Plato, that human reason is a ray of the divine reason, "He, the great Father! kindled at one flame The world as rational— one spirit pour'd From spirit's awfal fountain, poured himself Through all their souls, but not in equal stream : Profuse or frugal of the inspiring God, As his wise plan demanded ; and when past Their various trials in their commcm spheres (If they continue rational as made) Resqrhs them all into himself again, His throne their centre, and his smile their crown." — Young. "In truth," observes Fenelon, "my reason is in myself, for it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon myself in order to find it ; but the higher reason which corrects me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my own, it does not specially make a part of myself. Thus, that which may seem most our own, and to be the founda- tion of our being, I mean our reason^ is that which we are to believe most borrowed. We receive at every moment a reason superior to our own, just as we breathe an air which is not ourselves. There is an internal school, where man receives what he can neither acquire outwardly for himself, nor learn of other men who live by alms like himself." — Existence of God^ chap, iv., sect. 3. "While we reflect on our own idea of reason^ we know that our souls are not it, but only partake of it ; and that we have it x,oiToc ^g^gj/z/, and not koctsc ovgiyiu. ISTeither can it be called a faculty, but far rather a light, which we enjoy, but the source of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly by any individual to be denominated miney — John Smith, Posthumous Tracts, 1660. See Coleridge, Liter, Rem.^ vol. iii., p. 464. " Reason is impersonal in its nature," says Cousin (Exposit. of Eclecticism^ translated by Ripley, p. 69), "it is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual, that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of indivi- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 429 REASON— duality, viz., universality and necessity ; since it is to reason that we owe tlie knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey and cannot but obey."" .... " It descends from God and approaches man ; it makes its appearance in the consciousness as a guest who brings intelligence of an unknown world, of which it at once presents the idea and awakens the want. If reason were personal it would have no value, no authority beyond the limits of the individual subject Reason is a revela- tion, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world. Reason is the necessary mediator between God and man, the T^oyog of Pythagoras and Plato, tlie Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God, and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time. It is not, indeed, the absolute God in his majestic individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth : it is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the human race." — Ibid, p. 79. '' Reason or intelligence is not individual, is not ours, is not even human ; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us is our free and voluntary activity ; what is not fi^ee and not voluntary is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant part of his individuality. Intelli- gence is conversant with truth ; truth as necessary and universal is not the creature of my volition ; and reason^ which, as the subject of truth is also universal and neces- sary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by a light which is not ours ; and reason is a revelation of God in man. The ideas of which we are conscious belong not to us, but to absolute intelligence." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Bi.^- cussions^ &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 8, giving the vie^vs of Cousin. This doctrine of the impersonal reason is regarded by BouiUier (Theorie de la Raison Impersonelle^ 8vo, Paris, 1846) and others as the true ground of all certainty. Admit the personality of reason and man becomes the 430 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. REASON— measure of all tMngs — truth is individual. But the truths of reason are universal. No one, says Malebranche, can feel the pain which I feel ; but any one or every one may contemplate the truth which I know. The scepticism of Kant as to the relative nature of knowledge is thus demo- lished. Reason (determining or Sufficient). — "There are two great principles of reasoning : the one is the principle of contra- diction^ which means that of two contradictory propositions, the one is true, the other false : the other is the principle of raison deter mi nante^ which is, that nothing happens without a cause, or at least a reason determining, that is, some- thing which may serve to render a reason a priori^ why that thing is as it is rather than otherwise." — Leibnitz, Theodicee^ partie 1, sect. 44. **Xothing is done without a sufficient rea.s'0?2, that is, nothing happens without its being possible to him who knew things sufficiently to render a reason which is sufficient to deter- mine why it is so, and not otherwise." — Leibnitz, Principes de la Nat. et de la Grace^ sect. 7. — V. Sufficie:nt Reasois". REASONINO, — "in one of its acceptations, means syllogising, or the mode of inference which may be called concluding from generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to infer any assertion, from assertions already admitted : and in this sense induction is as much entitled to be called reasoning as the demonstrations of geometry. Writers on Logic have generally preferred the former acceptation of the term ; the latter and more exten- sive signification is that in which I mean to use it." — Mill, Logic, 2d edit., vol. i, p. 3. " Reasoning is that operation of the mind through which it forms one judgment from many others ; as when, for instance, having judged that true virtue ought to be referred to God, and that the virtue of the heathens was not referred to him, we thence conclude that the virtue of the heathens was not true virtue." — Port Roy. Logic. " Some appear to include under the title of reasoning VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 431 REASONIXO— every case in which a person believes one thing in conse- quence of his believing another thing, however far he may be from having any gi'ounds to warrant the inference : and they accordingly include those processes which take place in the minds of infants and of brutes ; which are apt to associate \vith the appearance of an object before them the remembered impression of something that formerly accom- panied it. Such a process is attended to in the familiar proverbs that ' a burnt child dreads the fire ;' or as it is ex- pressed in another form ^the scalded cat fears cold water;' or again in the Hebrew proverb, ' he who has been bitten by a serpent is afraid of a rope.' Most logical ^vriters, however, have confined the name of reasoning to valid argument ; which cannot exist without a universal premiss, implied, if not expressed.'' — "Whately, Logic^ (Introd. 4). Mr. Stewart says that to adapt means to a proximate end is to reason, RECTITri>JE. — ''Rectitude of conduct is intended to express the term Kocroo^aaig^ which Cicero translates recta effectio : Kceroo^auot he translates rectum factum^ De Fin.^ lib. iii.. cap. 4. Xow the definition of y.oLTooSaf/.cc was voy.ov -TT^oarccyy.cc, 'A thing commanded by law' (that is, by the Iciw of nature, the imiversal law). Antoninus, speaking of the reasoning faculty, how, without looking farther, it rests contented in its own energies, adds, ' for which reason are all actions of this species called rectitudes {koltoo^-gsi:, kutc^ oo^of, right onwards), as denoting the dii'ectness of their progression right onwards.'" — Harris, Dialogue on Happi- ness, p. 73, note. '' Goodness in actions is like unto straiglitness ; wherefore that which is done well we term rigJit^ for as the straight way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because hy it he Cometh soonest to his journey's end : so in action, that which doth lye the evenest between us and the end we desire, must needs be the fittest for our use." — Hooker, Eccles. Pol, b. i., s. 8. J£ a term is to be selected to denote that, in action and 432 V0CA13ULAIIY OF PHILOSOPHY. KECTITIJI^E— in disposition, of whicli the Moral Faculty approves, per- haps the most precise and appropriate is rectitude or riglit- ness. Dr. Adams has remarked, (Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue)^ '' The man who acts virtuously is said to act rightly. This appears more proper than to say that he acts according to truth ; and more clear and distinct than to say that he acts according to the nature and reason of things ; the meaning of which will, in all cases, be found to be only this — that he acts according to what reason, in the present circumstances of the agent, and the relation he stands in to the objects before him, pronounces to be right." In like manner. Dr. Eeid has said (Active Powers^ essay v., chap. 5), '' Prudence is a virtue, benevolence is a virtue; but the essence and formal nature of virtue must lie in something that is common to all these, and to every other virtue. And this, I conceive, can be nothing else but the Rectitude of such conduct and Turpitude of the contrary., which is discerned by a good man. And so far only he is virtuous as he pursues the former and avoids the latter." Rectitude., then, is that, in action and in disposition, of which the moral faculty approves. The contrary of what is right is wrong. Rightness and wrongness., then, are the charac- teristics of action and disposition, as contemplated by the moralist. So that the foundation of morals., the ground upon v/hich moral distinctions are taken, is in the essential difference between what is right and what is wrong. But what is rectitude or rightness as the characteristic of an action? According to Price and others, this term denotes a simple and primitive idea, and cannot be ex- plained. It might as well be asked, what is truth., as the characteristic of a proposition? It is a capacity of our rational nature to see and acknowledge truth ; but we cannot explain what truth is. We call it the conformity of our thoughts with the reality of things. But it may be doubted how far this explanation makes the nature of truth more intelligible. In like manner, some explain rectitude by saying, that it consists in a congruity between VOCABI3XARY OF PHILOSOPHT. 433 BECTITIJDE— an aodon and the relations of the agent. It is the idea we tbrm of an action, when it is, in eTery way, conformable to the relations of the agent and the eircmnstances in which he is placed. On contemplating such an action, we approve of it, and feel that if we were placed in snch circumstances, and in snch relations, we should be mider an obligation to perform it. Xow, the circnmstances and relations in which man is placed arise from his nature and from the mitmre of thing s in general : And hence it has been said, that recti- tude is founded in the nature and JiiTness of things; that is, an action is right when it is fit or suitable to aU the relations and circumstances of the agent ; and of this fitness con- sdence or reason is the judge. Conscience or reason does not constitote the relations; these must arise from the nature of man and the nature of thiugs : but conscience or reason judges and determines as to the conformity of actions to those relations ; and those relations arising necessarily from the very nature of things, the conformity with them which constitutes rectitude^ is said to be eternal and immu- taMr:. — T' Bight. REFLECTION (jre-flectere^ to bend back). — "By reflection I would be midei^tood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them : by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. Those two, viz., — external material things, as the objects of sensation ; and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of rejieciionj are to me the only originals fr*om whence all our ideas take their begin- nings. The term operations here I use in a hirge sense, as comprehendiog not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes fi*om them, such as ui the satisfiiction or uneasiness arising from any thought." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iL, chap. 1. ^*WTien we make our own thoughts and passions, and the various operations of our minds, the objects of our attention, eithpT* ^^"^" ^^ - ,, , \ -^ ^ - ^^^^ 434 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. REF1L.ECTION— recent and fresh in our memory, this act of the mind is called reflection,^'' — Reid, IrdelL Powers^ essay i., chap. 2, Also chap. 5, and essay vi. Reid gives a more extensive (but less proper) significa- tion to reflection. — Intell. Powers,^ essay iii., chap. 5. Also essay vi., chap. 1. Attention is the energy of the mind directed towards things present. Reflection has to do with things past and the ideas of them. Attention may employ the organs of the body. Reflection is purely a mental operation. It is not a simple act. In reflection we may analyze and compound, abstract and generalize. These operations of mind so arranged as to gain some end constitute a method. And a method is just the act of reflecting or properly employing the energies of the mind on the objects of its knowledge. '' Reflection creates nothing, — can create nothing ; every- thing exists previous to reflection in the consciousness, but everything pre-exists there in confusion and obscurity ; it is the work of reflectio7t in adding itself to consciousness, to illuminate that which was obscure, to develop that which was enveloped. Reflection is for consciousness what the microscope and the telescope are for the natural sight : neither of these instruments makes or changes the objects ; but in examining them on every side, in penetrating to their centre, these instruments illuminate them, and dis- cover to us their characters and their laws." — Cousin, Hist. of Mod. Phil, vol. i., p. 275. — V. Observation. l^EFliEX SENSES— F. Sense and Idea. MEEATION {re-ferre, relatum.^ to bear back). — '-'- When the mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other, this is, as the words import, relation and re- sped ; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated, to some- thmg distinct from it, are what we call relatives ; and the VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. ioo REIiATION— things so brought together, related. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius ; v. g.^ when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species man. So, likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person ; and when I give him the name whiter. I intimate some other thing ; in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration." — Locke, Essay on Human Understand.^ book ii., chap. 25. The two things thus brought into consideration are called relatives or correlates, as father and son, husband and wife. ''In all relation there must be a subject whence it com- mences, as snoic ; another where it terminates, as a swan : the relation itself, similitude ; and lastly, the source of that relation^ whiteness; the swan is related to the snow by both of them being wliite.'^^ — Harris, Plnlosopli. Arrange.., chap. 10. This is called predicamental relation.^ and forms one of the categories (^^o^ ri) of Aristotle. ''Any sort of connection which is perceived or imagined between two or more things ; or any comparison which is made by the mind, is a relation. When we look at these two lines we do not merely think of them separately, as this straight line, and tliat straight line ; but they are immediately connected together by a comparison which takes place in the mind as soon as they meet the eye. We perceive that these two lines are alike ; they are both straight ; and we call the notion that is formed by the comparison, the relation of sameness. We may then think of them as the same in length ; this comparison gives us the notion which we call the relation of equality. We think of them again as equally distant from each other, from end to end, and then we say they are parallel lines : 436 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. REIiATION— this word parallel represents notliing existing in the lines themselves, but only the notion formed by measuring the distance between them. All these notions spring up in the mind from the comparison of the two objects ; they belong entirely to the mind^ and do not exist in the things themselves." — Taylor, Elements of Thouglit. Although relations are not real entities, but merely men- tal modes of viewing things, let it be observed that our ideas of relation are not vague nor arbitrary, but are deter- mined by the known qualities of the related objects. We cannot at will see relations for which there is no foundation in the nature of the related objects. Of all relations^ the relations of number are the clearest and most accurately appreciated. " Another way," says Dr. Reid (Intell. Pov)ers^ essay vi., chap. 2), in which we get the notion of relations (which seems not to have occurred to Mr. Locke), is when, by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or judge that it must, from its nature, have a certain relation to something else, which before, perhaps, we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate and of a certain relation between them. Thus, when I attend to colour, figure, weight, I cannot help judging these to be qualities which cannot exist without a substance ; that is, something which is coloured, figured, heavy. If I had not perceived such things to be qualities, I should never have had any notion of their subject, or of their relation to it. By attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge that there must be something which thinks, re- members, and reasons, which we call the mind. When we attend to any change that happens in nature, judgment in- forms us that there must be a cause of this change which had power to produce it ; and thus we get the notions of cause and effect, and of the relation between them. When we attend to body, we perceive that it cannot exist without space ; hence we get the notion of space (which is neither VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 437 REIiATION— an object of sense nor of consciousness), and of the relation which bodies have to a certain portion of unlimited space, as their place." — See also Eeid, Inquiry^ chap. 1, sect. 7. Buffier calls relation^ in this view, Occasio quam prcehet ohjectmn cogitandi de alio. — V. Suggestion. BEI.ATIVE is opposed to absolute, q. v. A thing is called relative when the conception of it im- plies the conception of some other thing to which it has reference. A master implies a servant. A thing is called absolute when the conception of it does not imply the con- ception of any other thing to which it is referred, as sub- stance, man. An absolute term is that which can be applied to a thing without imph-ing comparison with any other thing : as whiteness may be predicated of one body without compar- ing it with any other body. A relative term is that which is applied in consequence of the collation of two or more things : as equality, which implies that one body has been compared to another in quantity. REIilOlON {re-lego^ re-Ugo, re-eligo). — This word according to Cicero {De Xat. Deoriim, ii., 28) is derived from, or rather compounded of, re-legere^ to read over again, to reflect upon or to stndy the sacred books in which religion is delivered. According to Lactantius (D/r. Instit.^ -1) it comes from re-ligare. to bind back — because religion is that which furnishes the true ground of obligation. St. Augustine (De Vera Relig.. c. 55) gives the same deriva- tion of the word. But he gives another origin of it {De Civit. Dei^ lib. x., c. 3), where he says, *' Deum, qui tons est nostrse beatitudinis, et omnis desiderii nostri finis, eli- gentes, immo potius religentes^ amiseramus enim negU- gentes : huuc, inquam, religentes^ unde et religio dicta est, ad eum elilectione tendamus, ut perveniendo quiescamus.*' Muller, Professor of Theology at Bale, published a Dissertation on this word in 1834:. Religion is distinguished into natural and revealed, or 4:38 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. that knowledge of God and of our duty which is derived from the light of nature or reason — and that knowledge of God and our duty which comes to us from positive revelation. The epithet natural (or physical) has been objected to as applied to religion^ inasmuch as all knowledge of God is super-sensuous. — F. Theology. In all forms of religion there is one part, which may be called the doctrine or dogma, which is to be received by faith ; and the cultus^ or worship, which is the outward expression or mode of manifesting the religious sentiment. KEMEMBRANCE, REMINISCENCE, RECOIiEECTION (re-coUigere^ to gather together again ; rursus menisci^ or re-minisci^ to remember). — " The perception which actu- ally accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the body, made by an external object, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation ; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the under- standing by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance ; if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again into view, it is recollection; if it be held there long under attentive consideraiton, it is contemplation.'''' — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand..^ book ii., chap. 19. ^'In other cases, the various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are recalled in consequence of an effort of our will. This latter operation, too, is often called by the same name (memory), but is more properly distin- guished by the word recollection.'''' — Stewart, Philosoph. of Hum. Mind., chap. 6, sect. 1. '-^Reminiscence is the act of recovering, ^n^ recollection the act of combining remembrances. Those eminences to which we attach the subordinate parts of an object come first into reminiscence ; when the intervening portions pre- sent themselves in order, the recollection is complete."— Taylor, Synonyms, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 439 REMINISCEJ^CE (reminisci^ to remember). — Memory is know- ledge of some former consciousness. Reminiscence is the act by which we endeavour to recall and reunite former states of consciousness. It is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. It is peculiar to man, while memory, as spontaneous, is shared by the brutes. " When we have a reminiscence^''^ said Aristotle (JDe Mem. et Reminiscentia^ c. 2), "we reason to the effect that we formerly experienced some impression of such or such a kind, and the mind makes a search after it. But an effort of this kind is not possible, except to animals who are endowed mth will ; and to will is a kind of reasoning or syllo- gism." ''There is yet another kind of discussion, beginning with the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the present backward, from thought of the place where we miss at, to the thought of the place from whence we came last ; and from the thought of that to the thought of a place before, till we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss : and this is called reminiscence.^' — Hobbes, Hum. Nat.., chap. 4. — F. Coxtemplation, Memory, Eetention. Reminiscence according to Plato. ''Plato imagined, after more ancient philosophers, that every man is born with a certain reminiscence^ and that when we seem to be taught we are only put in mind of what we knew in a former state." — Bolingbroke, essay ii., Pre- sumption of Philosophers. The term employed by Plato was dvotf^vmi;, which may be translated " knowing up." He did not apply it to ever\- kind or degree of knowledge, but to that spontaneous movement of the mind by which it ascended from mere opinion (ho^oL) to science (sTTiar'/j^uYi). On such occasions the appearances of truth and beauty suggested or evolved the ideas of the true and the beautiful ; which seemed to belong to the soul and to have been formerly known. 440 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. There was a stirring up or calling into act what was in the soul potentially. That they had been known in that former state of existence which Plato, in a myth, represented the soul to have enjoyed, and were now merely recalled or re- membered, is the view commonly given (Cicero, Tuscul.^ i. , 24) . But what Plato meant more specially to intimate by the use of this word was, that all science or certainty is in- tuitive, and belongs to the reason which gives knowledge in the last and highest degree. Conjecture (iiKotaioc)^ belief (^iriGTig)^ which, when conjoined, give opinion (^6^ci\ and reasoning (liocvotoc)^ which are the other degrees of know- ledge, according to Plato, being unable to give ground for science or certainty. — Heusde, Init. Philosoph. Platon.^ 8vo, 1827, tom. i., pp. 33, 34. Olympiodorus in a MS. Commentary on the Phcedo of Plato, quoted by Harris {Hermes^ p. 232) says : — '' Inas- much as the soul, by containing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar ; when it is roused by objects of sense it recollects those principles which it contains within, and brings them forth." '' Plato, it is believed, proposed his theory of reminis- cence as a sort of allegory, signifying the power which the mind has to draw from itself, on occasion of perceptions, universal ideas, and the manner in which it rises to them resembling the manner in which is awakened all at once within us the remembrance of what we have dreamed." — Manuel de Pliilosopliie^ 8vo, Paris, 1846, p. 139. It was in the same sense that Socrates called himself a midwife of the mind. He assisted in bringing to the birth truths with which the mind was big and in labour. He unfolded what was infolded. Boethius, De Consolat.^ says, the mind by teaching is only excited to know. And Aquinas, De Magistro^ says, '^ Omnis disciplina fit ex pre-existenti cognitione. Ex homine docente certitudinem sciential non acciperemus, nisi inesset nobis certitudo principiorum." VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 441 REMIJ^ISCEIVCE According to Mons. Cliastel (Les Piationallstes et les Tra- ditionalistes^ 12mo, Paris, 1850, p. 150), Thomas Aquinas in liis Treatise, De Magistro^ maintains tbe following points : — 1. To the acquisition of science you must admit as pre- existent in us the knowledge of general principles, e\4dent of themselves, and all those notions which the mind frames immediately to itself, by the aid of the first sensations ; for all teaching supposes in him who learns some anterior knowledge. 2. But these first truths, conditions pre-requisite for all teaching, these general principles, these principles which are native and not taught, are known to us by that light of reason which God hath put in us, as the image of that un- created truth which is reflected in our mind. They are given to us by nature as the germ of all the cognitions to which we ultimately attain. There are certain notions of which it is impossible for a man to be ignorant. 3. It is from these principles, known in advance, that he who teaches should set out with us, to teach us other truths connected with these. His teaching consists in showing us this connection. Properly speaking, it is the knowledge of these principles and not teaching which gives us secondary knowledge, although teaching is the mediate cause. It would be impossible for us to learn of a man the knowledge which he wishes to teach us, if there were not in us beforehand those principles to which he connects his knowledge ; and all the certainty of that knowledge comes to us from the certainty of those principles, and ultimately from God who has given us the light of reason to know them. 4. Thus the knowledge of first principles is not from teaching, although teaching may give secondary truths connected with them. 5. But these secondary truths we receive or reject according to their conformity with the truth that is in us. 442 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. REMINISCENCE— 6. Of these secondary truths which teaching gives, there are many which the mind may discover by its own force, as there are many diseases which cure themselves. Augustine also has a treatise, De Magistro, in which, from a different point of view, he comes to conclusions sub- stantially the same. '' The certainty of science comes to us from God who hath given to us the light of reason. For it is by this light that we know principles, and it is from principles that we derive the certainty of science. And yet it is true, in a certain sense, that man produces in us knowledge. The pupil, if interrogated before teaching, could answer as to those principles by aid of which all teaching proceeds; but he could not answer upon those things which are taught, which are the consequences of those principles. So that he does not learn principles but only the consequences of them." D'Alembert, as quoted by Mr. Stewart (vol. ii., p. 23), says, '-'• It should seem that everything we learn from a good metaphysical book is only a sort of reminiscence of what the mind previously knew." On the Reminiscence of Plato, see Piccolomineus, PJiilo- soph. De Morihus^ Francof , 1583, p. 450. RESERVATION or RESTRICTION (as it is called by casuists) — has reference to the duty of speaking what is true; and is distinguished as real and mental. Real Restriction takes place when the words used are not true if strictly interpreted, but there is no deviation from truth if the circumstances be considered. One man asks another. Have you dined? and the answer given is, No. The party giving this answer has dined, times without number. But his answer is restricted by the circumstances to to-day ; and in that sense is true. Mental Restriction or Reservation consists in saying SO far what is true, and to be believed, but adding mentally some qualification which makes it not to be true. A debtor asked by his creditor for payment of his debt says, — ''I will certainly pay you to-morrow" — adding to himself — "in VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 443 RESERVATION-^ part," — whereas the words audibly uttered referred to the whole amount. There was published in 12mo, Lond., 1851, A Treatise of Equivocation^ from a MS. in the Bodleian Library, written about 1600. It was referred to in the trials on the Gunpowder Plot. The following occurs at p. 17 : — '^A farmer hath come to sell corn. He selleth all that he can seU, because he re- serveth the rest for his own necessary use. Then cometh one and desireth to buy corn. He may truly say, and swear (if it be needful) that he hath none ; for the circum- stance of the person interpreteth the meaning to be that he hath none to sell." — This is Reservation or Restriction^ rather than Equivocation, At p. 29 : — " If I be asked whether such a one be in my house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin, ' Non est hie,' meaning he doth not eat in my house." — This is Equi- vocation. — q. V. RETENTION (re-tenere^ to keep hold of). '^ The power of reproduction (into consciousness) supposes a power of retention (out of consciousness). To this con- servative power I confine exclusively the term Memory." — Sii' Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 912. " There seems good reason for confining the appellation of memory to the simple power of retention., which undoubtedly must be considered as an original aptitude of mind, irre- solvable into any other. The power of recalling the pre- served impressions seems on the other hand rightly held to be only a modified exercise of the suggestive or reproduc- tive faculty." — Dr. Tulloch, Theism., p. 206. — F. Memory. KIOMT. — -^^ Right and d?^ti/ are things very different, and have even a kind of opposition ; yet they are so related that the one cannot even be conceived without the other ; and he that understands the one must understand the other. They have the same relation which credit has to debt. As all credit supposes an equivalent debt, so all right supposes a eoiTesponding duty. There can be no credit in one party 444 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. RIOHT— witliout an equivalent debt in another party ; and there can be no right in one party, without a corresponding duty in another party. The sum of credit shows the sum of debt ; and the sum of men's rights shows, in like manner, the sum of their diity to one another. '•'• The word iHght has a very different meaning, according as it is applied to actions or to persons. A right action (rectum) is an action agreeable to our duty. But when we speak of the rights of men (jus)^ the word has a very differ- ent, and a more artificial meaning. It is a term of art in law, and signifies all that a man may lawfully do, all that he may lawfully possess and use, and all that he may lawfully claim of any other person. "We can be at no loss to perceive the duties corresponding to the several kinds of rights. What I have a right to do, it is the duty of all men not to hinder me from doing. What is my property or real right^ no man ought to take from me ; or to molest me in the use and enjoyment of it. And what I have a right to demand of any man, it is his duty to perform. Between the right on the one hand, and the duty on the other, there is not only a necessary connection, but, in reality, they are only different expressions of the same meaning ; just as it is the same thing to say, I am your debtor, and to say, you are my creditor ; or as it is the same thing to say I am your father, and to say, you are my son." ''As there is a strict notion of justice, in which it is dis- tinguished from humanity and charity, so there is a more extensive signification of it, in which it includes those vir- tues. The ancient moralists, both Greek and Koman, under the cardinal virtue of Justice, included Beneficence ; and in this extensive sense, it is often used in common language. The like may be said of rights which in a sense not un- common, is extended to every proper claim of humanity and charity, as well as to the claims of strict justice. But, as it is proper to distinguish these two kinds of claims by different names, writers in natural jurisprudence have given VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 445 RIGHT — the name oi perfect rights to the claims of strict justice, and that of imperfect rights to the claims of charity and human- ity. Thus all the duties of humanity have imperfect rights corresponding to them, as those of strict justice have perfect rights.^' — Eeid, Active Powers^ essay v., chap. 3. " 84. The adjective right has a much wider signification than the substantive right. Ever^'thing is right which is conformable to the supreme rule of human action ; but that only is a rigid which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor man has no right to relief, but it is right he should have it. A rich man has a right to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be right, ** 85. To a right., on one side, corresponds an obligation on the other. If a man has a right to my horse, I have an ohligation to let him have it. If a man has a right to the fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are under an obli- gation to abstain from appropriating it. Men are oMiged to respect each others' rights. *' 86. My ohligation is to give another man his right ; my duty is to do what is right. Hence duty is a wider term than obhgation ; just as right^ the adjective, is wider than right the substantive. *'• 88. Duty has no correlative, as obligation has the corre- lative right. What it is our duty to do, we must do, because it is rights not because any one can demand it of us. We may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefited by the discharge of our ditties, as having a moral claim upon us. A distressed man has a moral claim to be relieved, in cases in which it is our duty to relieve him. ''89. The distinctions just explained are sometimes ex- pressed by using the terms perfect obligation and imperftct obligation., for obligation .and duty respectively : and the terms perfect right and imperfect right for right and moral claim respectively. But these phrases have the incon- venience of makinsc it seem as if our duties arose from the 446 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. RIOHT— rights of others ; and as if duties were only legal obliga- tions, with an inferior degree of binding force." — Whewell, Elements of Morality^ book i. — V. Jurispkudence, Rec- titude. RUliC — ''Rectitude is a law^ as well as a rule to us; it not only directs^ but hinds all, as far as it is perceived." — Price, Rev. of Morals^ chap. 6. A rule prescribes means to attain some end. But the end may not be one which all men are to aim at ; and the rule may not be followed by all. A law enjoins something to be done, and is binding upon all to whom it is made known. ''A rule^ in its proper signification, is an instrument, by means of which we draw the shortest line from one point to another, which for this very reason is called a straight line. " In a figurative and moral sense, a rule imports nothing else but a principle or maxim, which furnishes man with a sure and concise method of attaining to the end he proposes." Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. Laiv^ part 1, chap. 5. SABAlSlwr (from «i!?, signifying a host, or from tsaha^ in Syriac, to adore ; or from Saha the son of Cush, and grandson of Seth) — means the worship of the stars, or host of heaven, which prevailed from an early period in the East, especially in Syria, Arabia, Chaldea, and Persia The Sabseans are not mentioned by the Greek or Roman writers, and by the Arabian authors they are called JSTabatheans, as if descen- dants from ISTebaioth, son of Ishmael. Their doctrines are ' expounded by Moses Maimonides in the third part of his work, De More NevocMm. There v/as a popular and a philosophic creed with them. According to the former the stars were worshipped ; and the sun, as supreme God, ruled over heaven and earth, and the other heavenly bodies were but the ministers of his will. According to the philosophic creed, the stars consisted of mat^ter and mind. God is not VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 447 tlie matter of the universe, but the spiiit which animates it. But both are eternal, and will eteraally exist, for the one cannot pass into, or absorb the other. Pocock. Specimen Hist. Aral., 4to, Oxf., 1649, p. 138. Hyde. Vtterum Persaram Hidoria. 8vo, Oxf.. 17G6. Spencer, Be Legibus Hebrceoriim^ 2 vols.. fob, Camb., 1727. ^A.TIE, in its primary sense, denotes identity. — q. v. In a secondary sense it denotes great similar ittj^ and in popular usage admits of degrees, as when we speak of two things being ntarly the same. To this ambiguity, ^Vhately refers much of the error of realism; of Plato's theory of ideas: of the personihcation and deification in poetical, mythology, &c. — Whately, Logic, app. i. SANCTION {sancire^ to ratify or confirm). — ''I shall declare the sanction of this law of natm'e. viz.. those rewards which God hath ordained for the observation of it. and those punishments He hath appointed for its breach or trans- gression." — Tyrell, On tlie Law of Nature., p. 125. The consequences which natm-ally attend virtue and ^ice are the sanction of duty, or of doing what is right, as they are mtended to encom\age us to the discharge of it, and to deter us from the breach or neglect of it. And these natiu'al consequences of virtue and ^dce are also a declar- ation, on the part of God, that He is in favoui' of the one and against the other, and are intimations, that His love of the one and His hatred of the other may be more fidly manifested hereafter. By Locke, Paley, and Bentham, the term sanction, or enforcement of obedience is appHed to reward as well as to pimishment. But Mr. Austin (Pro- vince of Juri.^priid. Determined, p. 10) confines it to the latter, perhaps, because human laws only pimish, and do not reward. SAVAOE and BARBAROUS.— Ferguson (Essay on Hist, of Civ. Soc, part 2, sect. 2) states that the history of man- kind, in their rudest state, may be considered under two heads, viz., that of the savage^ who is not yet acquainted with property, and that of the barbarian, to whom it is. 448 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of care and desire. The distinction here made between the savage and the barbarous states of society, resolves itself into the absence or presence of political government ; for without political government, property cannot exist. The distinction is an important one ; and it would be convenient to apply the term savage to communities which are permanently in a state of anarchy, which ordinarily exist without govern- ment, and to apply the term barbarous to communities which, though in a rude state as regards the arts of life, are nevertheless subject to a government. In this sense, the N. American Indians would be in a savage^ while the Arab tribes, and most of the Asiatic nations, would be in a barbarous state. Montesquieu's distinction between savages and barbarians (Esprit des Lois^ xviii., 11), is different in form, but in substance it is founded on the same principle. Hugh Murray {Enquiries respecting the Character of Nations^ and the Progress of Society^ Edin., 1808) lays it down (p. 230) that the savage form of society is without government. According to many ancient and modern philosophers, the savage state was the primitive state of the human race. But others, especially Bonald and De Maistre, have main- tained that the nations now found in a savage state have accidentally degenerated from the primitive state, which was a state of knowledge and civilization. SCEFTICISH: {ayJ^rrsiu^ to look, to seek) — is used as synony- mous with doubt, — q. v. But doubt may be removed by evidence, and give way to conviction or belief. The char- acteristic of scepticism is to come to no conclusion for or against — STroxyi-, holding off, and consequent tranquillity — olrocQoc^iot. Absolute objective certainty being unattain- able, scepticism holds that in the contradictions of the reason, truth is as much on one side as on the other — ovhi/ f^othT^ou. It was first taught by Pyrrho, who flourished in Greece about 340, B.C. Hence it is sometimes called VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 449 SCEPTICISM— Pyrrhonism. The word is generally used in a bad sense, as equivalent to infidelity or unbelief. But in the follow- ing passages it means, more correctly, the absence of determination. " We shall not ourselves venture, to determine anything, in so great a point ; but sceptically leave it undecided." — Cudworth, Intellect. Syst.^ p. 806. " That all his arguments (Bp. Berkeley's) are, in reahty, merely sceptical^ appears from this; that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement, and irresolution, and confusion, which is the result o^ scepticism y — Hxvone^^ Essay s., note, p. 369, 4to edit. Scepticism is opposed to dogmatism. — q. v. '* The writings of the best authors among the ancients being fall and solid, tempt and carry me which way almost they will. He that I am reading seems always to have the most force ; and I find that every one in tm^n has reason, though they contradict one another." This is said by Montaigne, book ii., chap. 12, in the true spirit of scepticism. Lord Byron said, — "I doubt if doubt itself be doubting." Glanvil (Joseph) has a work which he entitled. Scepsis Scientijica^ or the Folly of Dogmatising. Staudlin wrote the History and Spirit of Scepticism^ 2 vols., Leipsic, 1794-5. Sanchez (Fr.) or Sanctius wrote a Tractatus de Multum nohili et prima universali scientia^ quod niJiil scitur^ 4to, Lyons, 1581. Crousaz has Examen du PyrrJionism Ancien et Moderne. ^CHOIiJiSTlC. — Scholasticus^ as a Latin word, was first used by Petronius. Quintilian subsequently applied it to the rhetoricians in his day : and we read in Jerome, that Serapion, having acquired great fame, received a^ a title 2g 450 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, SCHOI.ASTIC— of honour the surname Scolasticus. When the schools of the Middle Ages were opened, it was applied to those charged with the education of youth. ''We see the original sense of the word scholastic^'''' says Dr. Hampden (Bampton Led,, i., p. 7), ''in the following passage : — Omnes enim in scriptis suis causas tantum ege- runt suas ; et propriis magis laudibus quam aliorum utili- tatibus consulentes, non id facere adnisi sunt ut salubres et salutiferi, sed ut scholastici ac diserti haberentur." — Salvi-^ anus, De Gubernat. Dei^ Prcefat. Scholastic Philosophy.— This phrase denotes a period rather than a system of philosophy. It is the philosophy that was taught in the schools during the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages extend from the commencement of the ninth to the sixteenth century. What has been called the Classic Age of the scholastic philosophy, includes the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It begins when the metaphysics of Aristotle were introduced into France by Latin trans- lations, and terminates with the Council of Florence and the taking of Constantinople. The only philosophy that was taught during that period, was taught by the clergy ; and was therefore very much mixed up with theology. The only way of teaching was by lectures or dictates ; and hence the phrase, leg ere in philosophia. There was no one system uniformly taught ; but different and conflicting opinions were held and promulgated by different doctors. The method was that of interpretation. Grammar was taught by prgelections on Donatus and Priscian^ and rhe- toric, by prgelections on some parts of Cicero or Boethius. But Logic shared most of their attention, and was taught by preelections on such of the works of Aristotle as were best known. The Timoeus of Plato also occupied much of their attention ; and they laboured to reconcile the doc- trines of the one philosopher with those of the other. Mr. Morell says (Philosoph. of Religion^ p. 369), " It has been usual to divide the whole scholastic periods into three VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 451 SCHOliASTIC— eras.* — 1. That which was marked by the absolute subordi- nation of philosophy to theology, that is, authority. 2. That which is marked by the friendly alliance of philosophy with dogmatic theology. 3. The commencement of a separ- ation between the two, or the dawn of the entire indepen- dence of philosophy. The first years of scholastic pliilosopTiy were marked by authority. In the ninth century, Joannes Scotus Erigenii attempted to assert the claims of reason. Two hundred years after, the first era was brought to a close by Abe- lard. The second is marked by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. Raymond Lully, Eoger Bacon, followed by Occam and the Nominalists, represent the third and declining era. The taking of Constantinople by the Turks, the inven- tion of printing, and the progress of the Eeformation, put an end to the scholastic philosophy. Philosophy was no longer confined to the schools and to praelections. The press became a most extensive lecturer, and many embraced the opportunities oftered of extending knowledge. In addition to general histories of philosophy, see Rousselot, Etudes sur la Philosophic dans le Moyen Age, 3 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1840-2. Haureau, De let Philosophic Scholastique^ 2 tom., 8vo. Paris, 1850. Cousin, Fragmens Philosophiques^ tom. iii., Paris, 1840. !8ICIENCE {scientia^ iaKo or I/cx^j, an old verb, signifying to cleave) — means knowledge emphatically so called, that is, knowledge of principles and causes. '-''Science (i'TriaTYif^yi) has its name fi:'om bringing us {stti (jTuaiv) to some stop and boundary of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of parti- culars ; for it is conversant about subjects that are general and invariable." This etymology given by Blemmides, and * Teniieman makes four periods of scholastic philosophy, according to tlic prcN lence of Realism or Nominalism. 452 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SCIENCE — long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came origin- ally from Plato, as may be seen in bis Cratylus. '•''Absolute science as distinct from the sophists' acciden- tal science, is, according to the common conception, know- ledge of the necessity and reason of a law It is certain there is such a thing as demonstrative knowledge : demonstration means scientific proof; and the possession of scientific proof is science.'^'' Poster. Analyt.^ lib. i., cap. 2. And in Ethic. ^ lib. vi., cap. 3, Aristotle says — "In matters of opinion we are liable to be deceived ; not so in matters of science. The former relates to things variable in their nature, of whose very existence we may doubt, un- less when they are actually perceived ; the latter is con- versant about things unalterable, necessary and eternal, incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption ; the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between total ignorance and absolute certainty." "' Or; scientice fundamentum est^ Itonfastigium,^^ — Trend- lenburg, Elementa Log. Arist.^ p. 76. '^ Sir Will. Hamilton, in his Lectures on Logic.) defined science as a ' complement of cognitions, having in point of form the character of logical perfection, and in point of matter, the character of real truth.' " — Dove, Political Science., p. 76. Science is knowledge certain and evident in itself, or by the principle from which it is deduced, or with which it is certainly connected. It is subjective as existing in a mind — objective^ as embodied in truths — speculative., as resting in attainment of truths, as in physical science — practical., as leading to do something, as in ethical science. Science, art, and empiricism, are defined by Sopater, On Hermogenes, apud Khet. Gr., vol. v., pp. 3-5, ed. Walz, as follows : — Science consists in an infallible and unchanging know- ledge of phenomena. Art is a system formed from observation and directed to a useful end. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 453 SCIENCE— Empiricism is an unreasoning and instinctive imitation of previous practice. Art is of three kinds — theoretic, practical, and mixed. ''No art, however, is purely theoretic or contemplative. The examples given are of science^ not art. It is a part of grammatical science to say that all words with a certain termination have a certain accent. When this is converted into a rule, it becomes part of an art." — Lewis, On Methods of Ohservat. in Politics^ chap. 19, sect. 2. ''''J.n science^ scimus ut sciamus; in art, scimus utproducamus. And, therefore, science and art may be said to be investiga- tions of truth:* but one, science^ inquires for the sake of knowledge ; the other, art, for the sake of production : f and hence science is more concerned with the higher truths, art with the lower : and science never is engaged as art is in productive application. J And the most perfect state of science^ therefore, will be the most high and accurate in- quiry ; the perfection of art will be the most apt and effi- cient system of rules : Art always throwing itself into the form of rules. "§ — Karslake, Aids to Logic^ b. i., p. 24. — V. Art, Demonstration. SCIENTIA (Media). — " According to Mohna, the objects of the divine knowledge are the possible^ the actual^ and the condi- tional. The knowledge of the possible is simple intelligence ; of the actual^ scientia visionis ; and of the conditional^ scientia media^ intermediate between that of intelligence and vision. An example of scientia media is that of David asking the oracle if the inhabitants of the city of Keilah, in which he meant to take refuge, would deliver it up to Saul if he laid siege to it. The answer was in the affirmative, whereupon David took a different course." — Leibnitz, Sur la Bonte de Dieu^ par tie 1, sect. 40. In La Cause de Dieu^ &c., sec. 17, Leibnitz has said. * This is, speaking logically, *'the Genus," of the two. t These are tlieir differentia^ or distinctive characteristics. X Tliese are their specific properties. § This distinction of Science and Art is given in Aristotle.— See Poster. Anali/t., i., 191, ii., 13. 454 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SCIENTIA- '-'' scientia media might rather be understood to mean the science not only of future conditionals but universally of all future contingents. Then science of simple intelli- gence would be restricted to the knowledge of truths pos- sible and necessary ; scientia visionis to that of truths con- tingent and actual. Scientia media would thus have it in common with the first that it concerned truths possible; and with the second, that it applied to truths contingent.^'' — See Reid, Active Poioers^ essay iv., chap. 11. SClOtilST (sciolus^ one who thinks he knows much and knows but little). — '' Some have the hap to be termed learned men, though they have gathered up but the scraps of knowledge here and there, though they be but smatterers and mere sciolists.^'' — Howell, Letters^ b. 3, let. 8. SCIOMACMY (ffKtoi^ a shadow ; and /^c^^cyi^ a fight). — "But pray, countryman, to avoid this sciomacJiy^ or imaginary combat, with words, let me know, sir, what you mean by the name of tyrant." — Cowley, On the Government of Oliver Cromwell. SEILdFlSHNESS — " consists not in the indulging of this or that particular propensity, but in disregarding for the sake of any kind of personal gratification or advantage, the rights or the feelings of other men. It is, therefore, a negative quality ; that is, it consists in not considering what is due to one's neighbours, through a deficiency of justice or benevolence. And selfishness^ accordingly, will show itself in as many different shapes as there are different dis- positions in men. " You may see these differences even in very young chil- dren. One selfish child, who is greedy, will seek to keep all the cakes and sweetmeats to himself; another, who is idle, will not care what trouble he causes to others, so he can save his own ; another, who is vain, will seek to obtain the credit which is due to others ; one who is covetous, will seek to gain at another's expense, &c. In short, each person ' has a self of his own.' And, consequently, though you may be of a character very unlike that of some selfish person, you may yet be, in your own way, quite as selfish VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 455 SEIiFISHEN E SS— as he. And it is possible to be selfish in the highest de- gree, without being at all too much actuated by self-love, but unduly neglectful of others when your own gratifica- tion, of whatever kind, is concerned." — Whately, Lessons on Morals^ p. 143. .^EliF-liOVE— is sometimes used in a general sense to denote all those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek our own good, just as those principles which lead us to seek the good of others are all comprehended under the name of benevolence. All our desires tend towards the attainment of some good or the averting of some evil — having reference either to ourselves or others, and may therefore be brought under the two heads of benevolence and self-love. But besides this general sense of the word to denote all those desires which have a regard to our own gratification or good, self-love is more strictly used to signify '' the de- sire for our own welfare, as such." In this sense, "it is quite distinct from all our other desires and propensities." says Dr. T\Tiately {Lessons on Morals^ p. 142), '•'- though it may often tend in the same direction with some of them. One person, for instance, may drink some water because he is thirsty; and another may, without thirst, drink — suppose from a mineral spring, because he believes it will be good for his health. This latter is impelled by self-love., but not the other. '' So again, one person may pursue some course of study, in order to qualify himself for s>oviiQ profession by which he may advance in life, and another, from having a taste for that study, and a desire for that branch of knowledge. This latter, though he may perhaps be, in fact, promoting his own welfare, is not acting from self-love. For as the ob- ject of thirst is not happiness, but drink, so the object of curi- osity is not happiness, but knowledge. And so of the rest.'" Self-love may, like any other of our tendencies, be cher- ished and indulged to excess, or it may be ill-directed. But Avithin due bounds it is allowable and riiiht. and b^ uu 456 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SEIiF-I.OTE— means incompatible "witli benevolence, or a desire to pro- mote tlie happiness of others. And Dr. Hutcbeson, who maintains that kind affection is what constitutes an agent virtuous, has said, that he who cherishes kind affection to- wards all, may also love himself; may love himself as a part of the whole system of rational and sentient beings ; may promote his own happiness in preference to that of another who is not more deserving of his love ; and may be innocently solicitous about himself, while he is wisely benevolent towards all. — Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil^ sect. 3. The error of Hobbes, and the school of philosophers who maintained that in doing good to others our ultimate aim is to do good to ourselves, lay in supposing that there is any antagonism between benevolence and self-love. So long as self-love does not degenerate into selfishness ^ it is quite compatible with true benevolence. In opposition to the views of Hobbes and the selfish school of philosophers, see Butler, Sermons^ On Hum. Nat.., On Compassion., &c. Turnbull, Nature and Origin of Laws., vol. ii., p. 258. Hume, On General Principles of Morals^ sect. 2. Hutcheson, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil^ sect. 2. Hazlitt, Essay on Principles of Hum, Action., p. 239. Mackintosh, View of Ethical Philosophy^ p. 192. SEMATOl.OOY (ariiucc, a sign; and Aoyo?, discourse) — the doc- trine of signs. — q. v. SENSATlOrv. — " The earliest sign by which the Ego becomes perceptible is corporeal sensation. '^ Without this general innate sensation we should not possess the certainty that our body is our body ; for it is as much an object for the other senses as anything else that we can see, hear, taste, or feel. This original general innate sensation is necessary to the existence of all other particular sensations, and may exist independently of the nervous system. Polypi, animals of the simplest structure, tocabuxjlrx of philosophy. 457 —■.-':. ' :. iicXToiis sj^Tslem disdnct from the rest of the or- A5S, show traces of innate settsalwm. The light bj- V see^ acts not onlj on the Tisoal nerres, i? of the eye, and the sm^tkms of dglit rjndnre of the eye. This smnZnK^, ^ : fa necessanr attribute of animated eTen pain is i^ : '-at the place where it esisis. Eqoall J obsenre is the notion which it entertains of an ol^edL Thoo^ Brach, therefore^ is light in ascribing something oljediTe, eiren to the general semsaikm^ since condilions cannot: communicate themselTes, without com- mnnicaling (thon^ erer so obscorely) something of that which prodnces the condition — nay, strictly speaking, as eTen in the idea " sabject," that of an '^ object^ is ioTohred, yet it is adxisable to abide by the distinction fennded by fijant, according to which, by innate saisalioii, we e^peciaUy perceive onr own personality (subject), and by the senses we specmlbf peroere oljects, and thi^ in the ascending hne, Feefing, Taste, SmeD, Hearing, and i^^t. * The nest stq^firom this obscnreori^nal innate 9&msaikm is particnlar setisatkm throng Om medium of the nerrons sipstem, whidi, in its more pro&mnd, and yet more obscure ^here^ prodnces common smsatiam (Cesire of). — '' God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society.''^ — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.., book iii., chap. 1. That the desire of society is natural to man, is argued by Plato in the Second Book of his Republic. It is also hinted at in his dialogue entitled Protagoras. The argument is unfolded by Harris in his Dialogue concerning Happiness^ sect. 12. Aristotle has said at the beginning of his VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 469 SOCIETY— Politics^ — ''The tendency to the social state is in all men by nature." The argument in favour of society from our being possessed of speech, is insisted on by him, Politic.^ lib. i., cap. 2. Also by Cicero, De Legihus^ lib. i., cap. 9 ; De Officiis^ lib. i., cap. 16 ; De Nat. Deorum^ lib. ii., cap. 59. In modern times, Hobbes argued that man is naturally an enemy to his fellow-men, and that society is a device to defend men from the evils which they would bring on one another. Hutcheson wrote his inaugural oration when admitted Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, in opposition to Hobbes, De Naturali Hominum Socialitate, 4:to, Glasg., T}^is Academ., 1730. Man is a social animal^ according to Seneca (De Clem., i., 3). Lactantius says that he is a social animal by nature (^Div, Inst.., vi., 10), in which he follows Cicero (De Offic, i., 14). ''Mankind have always wandered or settled, agreed or quarrelled, in troops and companies. — Ferguson, Essay on Hist, of Civ. Soc, p. 26. See also Lord Karnes, Hist, of Man., book ii., sketch 1 ; Filangieri, Scienza delta Legislazione. lib. i., c. 1. " La nature de I'homme le porte a vivre en societe. Quelle qu'on soit la cause, le fait se manifesto en toute occasion. Partout ou Ton a rencontre des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en hordes, en corps de nation. Peut-etre est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour leur surete commune ; peut-etre afin de pourvoir plus aisement a leur besoins ; toujours il est \Tai qu'il est dans la nature de I'homme de se reunir en societe, comme font les abeilles €t plusiers especes d' animaux ; on remarque des traits communs dans toutes ces reunions d'hommes, en quelque parti dumonde qu'ils habitent." — Say, Cours cTEcon. Poli- tiq.., torn. vi. Compare Comte, ibid, torn, iv., p. 54. This gregarious propensity is different from the political capacity, which has been laid down as the characteristic of man. Society (Political, Capacity of).— Command and obedience, which arc essential to government, are peculiar to man- 470 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SOCIETY— kind. Man is singular in commanding not only tlie in- ferior animals, but his own species. Hence men alone form a political community. It lias been laid down by Aristotle and others, tbat tbis difference is owing to tbe exclusive possession of reason and speech by man, and to his power of discriminating between justice and injustice (Polit.^ i., 2). Animals, says Cicero, are unfitted for poli- tical society, as being ''rationis et orationis expertes." De Offic, i., 16. Separat haec nos a grege mutorum. Juve- nal, XV., 142-158. SOMATOl^OOY.— F. ISTatuRE. SOPHIS]W[, SOPHISTER, SOPHISTICAI. (;2o(pi(if/.oL, from GoCpioi, wisdom). — "They were called sopJiisters, as who would say. Counterfeit wise men." — N'orth, Plutarch, p. 96. 'Tor lyke wyse as though a ^S'o^^^^er woulde with a fonde argumente, prove unto a symple soule, that two egges were three, because that ther is one, and that ther be twayne, and one and twayne make three ; yt symple unlearned man, though he lacke learnying to soyle hys fonde argument, hath yet wit ynough to laugh thereat, and to eat the two egges himself, and byd the Sophyster tak and eat the thyrde."— Sir T. More, Works, p. 475. '' Sophism is a false argument. This word is not usually applied to mere errors in reasoning ; but only to those erroneous reasonings of the fallacy of which the person who maintained them is, in some degree, conscious ; and which he endeavours to conceal from examination by subtilty and by some ambiguity, or other unfairness in the use of words." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. According to Aristotle, the sophism is a syllogismus con- tentiosus, a syllogism framed not for enouncing or proving the truth, but for disputation. It is constructed so as to seem to warrant the conclusion but does not, and is faulty either in form or argument. — Trendlenburg, Lineamenta Log. Aristot., sect. 33, 8vo, Berol., 1842. See Reid, Account cf AristotWs Log., chap, v., sect. 3. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 471 SOPHISJWL— On the difference of meaning between (pt\oao(pog and (7o(piaTYis, see Sheppard, Characters of Theophrastus, 8vo. Lend., 1852, p. 81, and p. 269. See also Grote, Hist, of Greece^ vol. viii., pp. 434-486, and the Cambridge Journal of Philosophy^ No. 2. l§ORlTl£^ (from (76j^oV, a heap)— is an argument composed of an indeterminate number of propositions, so arranged that the predicate of the first becomes the subject of the second, the predicate of the second the subject of the third, and so on till you come to a conclusion which unites the subject of the first with the predicate of the last. j^OUfi (■^v^v}', anima, soul). This word had formerly a wider signification than now. In the Second Book of his Treatise UspI -^vx^i Aristotle has given two definitions of it. In the first of these he calls it '' the Entelechy or first form of an organized body which has potential life." The word 'EyTHA£;^H/ot, which Dr. Reid begged to be excused from translating, because he did not know the meaning of it, is compounded of fr/rgAs-, perfect ; 'ix^iv<, to have ; and nT^og^ an end. Its use was revived by Leibnitz, who designated by it that which pos- sesses in itself the principle of its own activity, and tends towards its end. According to his philosophy, the universe is made up of monads or forces, each active in itself, and tending by its activity to accomplish its proper end. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the word Entelechy or first form had a similar meaning, and denoted that which in virtue of an end constituted the essence of things, and gave movement to matter. When the soul then is called the entelechy of an organized body having potential life, the meaning is, that it is that force or power by which life de- velops itself in bodies destined to receive it. Aristotle distinguished several forms of soul., viz., the nutri- tive or vegetative soul, by which plants and animals had growth and reproduction. The sensitive., which was the cause of sensation and feeling. The motive., of locomotion. The appetitive.^ which was the source of desire and will ; and the 472 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. rational or reasonable^ whicli was the seat of reason or in- tellect. These powers or energies of soul exist all in some beings ; some of them only in other beings ; and in some beings only one of them. That is to say, man possesses all ; brutes possess some ; plants one only. In the scho- lastic philosophy, desire and locomotion were not regarded as simple powers or energies — and only the nutritive or vegetative soul^ the sensitive or animal, and the rational or human were recognized. In the system of Plato, three forms or energies of soul were assigned to man. The rational^ which had its seat in the head and survived the dissolution of the body — the irascible^ which had its seat in the heart and was the spring of activity and movement, and the appetitive or concu- piscible^ which was the source of the grosser passions and physical instincts, and which died with the bodily organs with which it was united. A similar distinction between the forms or energies of the soul has been ascribed to Pythagoras, and traces of it are to be found in several of the philosophical systems of the East. Among modern philosophers in Germany, a distinction is taken between -ipvxvi (Seele) and 'Truivf^oc (Geist), or soul and spirit. According to G. H. Schubert, professor at Munich, and a follower of Schelling, the soul is the inferior part of our intellectual nature — that which shows itself in the phenomena of dreaming and which is connected with the state of the brain. The spirit is that part of our nature which tends to the purely rational, the lofty, and divine. The doctrine of the natural and the spiritual man, which we find in the writings of St. Paul, may, it has been thought, have formed the basis upon which this mental dualism has been founded. Indeed it has been main- tained that the dualism of the thinking principle is dis- tinctly indicated by the apostle when he says of the Word of God that it is able to '' divide asunder soul and spirit y The words in the original are '4/vx'^ and 'Tivivf^sc, and it is contended that by the former is meant YOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 473 SOUI.— the sentient or animal soiil^ and by the latter the higher or rational soiiL A similar distinction has been traced in the language of the Old Testament Scriptures, where one word is employed to denote the life that is common to man with the inferior animals, nil, and another word, HQ-a?:? to denote that inspiration of the Almighty which giveth him understanding, and makes of him a rational soul. It may be doubted, however, whether this distinc- tion is uniformly observed, either in the Scriptures of the Old or of the New Testament. And it may be better for us instead of attempting to define the soul a priori by its essence, to define it rather a posteriori by its operations. This also has been done by Aristotle, in a definition which has been generally adopted. He says, ''The soul is that by which we live, feel, or perceive [will], move, and under- stand." This is a full enumeration of all the energies which Aristotle assigned to the soul., and they are all manifested by the soul as it exists in man. Two of them, however, the energies of growth and motion, are usually treated of by the physiologist, rather than by the ps^xho- logist. At the same time, life and movement are not pro- perties of matter ; and therefore they were enumerated b}- Aristotle as the properties of soul — the soul nutritive., to ^QSTTTi/cou^ and the soul motive^ ro x.ivovv or to KiyviTDcpv. "The animating form of a natural body is neither its organization, nor its figure, nor any other of those inferior forms which make up the system of its visible qualities ; but it is the power which, not being that organization, nor that figure nor those qualities, is yet able to produce, to pre- serve, and to employ them." — Harris, Pliilosoph. Arrange.., p. 279. This is what is now called the principle of life, and the consideration of it belongs to the physiologist — for, although in the human being life and soul are united, it is thought they may still be separate entities. In like manner some philosophers have contended that all movement im- plies the existence of a soul^ and hence it is that the various phenomena of nature have been referred to an anlma mnndi^ 474 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. Souli- er soul of the universe. A modern philosopher of great name (Jouffi-oy, in his Cours Professe a la Faculte des Lettres in 1837), enumerated among the energies of the human soul a special faculty of locomotion, and the power of originating movement or change is ascribed to it when we call it active. Still, life and locomotion are not usually treated of as belonging to the soal^ but rather as belonging to the bodies in which they are manifested. Hence it is that Dr. Reid, in his definition of the human soul^ does not enumerate the special energies by which we live and move, but calls it that by which we think. '' By the mind of a . man," says he {Intell. Powers^ essay i., chap. 1), " we under- stand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills. . We are conscious that we think, and that we have a variety of thoughts of different kinds — such as seeing, hearing, remembering, deliberating, resolving, loving, hat- ing, and many other kinds of thought — all which we are taught by nature to attribute to one internal principle ; and tMs principle of thought we call the mind or soul of man."^ It will be observed that Dr. Reid uses the word soul as synonymous with mind. And, perhaps, no very clear nor important distinction can be taken between them. The plainest and most common distinction taken in the use of these words is, that in speaking of the mind of man we refer more to the various powers which it possesses, or the vari- ous operations which it performs ; and in speaking of the soul of man we refer rather to the nature and destiny of the human being. Thus we say the immortality of the soul^ * Dr. Reid's is the psychological definition. But the soul is something different from the ego,— from any of its faculties, and from the sum of them all. Some have placed its essence in thought, as the Cartesians— in sensation, as Locke and Condillac —or in the will or activity, like Maine de Biran. A cause distinguished from its acts, distinguished from its modes or different degrees of activity, is what we call a force. The soul then is a force, one and identical. It is, as defined by Plato (De Leg., lib. 10), a self-moving force. Understanding this to mean bodily or local motion, Aris- totle has argued against this definition.— 2)e Ardma, lib. i., cap. 3. But Plato, pro- bably, meant self-active to be the epithet characteristic of the mind or souL—xivrio-i? VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 475 SOUIi— and the powers of the mind.^ A difference of meaning is more observable in our language between the terms spirit and mind than between soul and mind. Both the latter terms may be and are applied indifferently to the mental principle as living and moving in connection with a bodily organism. But the term spirit properly denotes a being without a body. A being that never had a body is a pure spirit. A human soul when it has left the body is a disem- bodied spirit. Body is animated matter. Mind or soul is incorporated spirit. Into these verbal criticisms, however, it is not necessary to enter very minutely, because in psychological inquiries the term mind is commonly employed to denote that by which we feel, know, will, and reason — or in one word the principle of thought. We know this inward principle as manifested through a system of bodily organization with which it is united, and by which it is in many ways affected. But "we are taught by nature," says Dr. Reid, or it is a primitive belief, that the thinking principle is something different from the bodily organism, and when we wish to signalize its peculiar nature and destiny, we call it soul or spirit. Spirit, ITIind, and Soul. — '' The Jirst denoting the animating faculty, the breath of intelligence, the inspiring principle, the spring of energy and the prompter of exertion ; the second is the recording power, the preserver of impres- sions, the storer of deductions, the nurse of knowledge, and the parent of thought ; the last is the disembodied, ethereal, self-conscious being, concentrating in itself all the purest and most refined of human excellences, every generous affection, every benevolent disposition, every in- tellectual attainment, every ennobling virtue, and every * Mind and the Latin mens were probably both from a root which is now lost in Europe, but is preser\'ed in the Sanscrit inena, to know. The Greek toc$ or vov^, from the verb voico, is of similar origin and import. Mind is more Timited than soiil. Soul, besides the rational principle, includes the living principle, and may be applied to animals and vegetables. Voluntary motion should not be denied to mind, as is very generally done. 476 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SOUIi— exalting aspiration." — The Purpose of Existence^ 12mo, 1850, p. 79. '' Animus^ Anima, '^vsv/y.oc and -ij/vx'^ are participles. Anima est ab Animus. Animus vero est a Graeco kvi^og^ quod dici volunt quasi Ag^t^o?, ab ku sive Ag^/, quod est '?:vio) ; et Latinis a Spirando, Spiritus. Immo et •^vx'h est •^v-^u quod Hesychius exponit ^yg6)." — ^Yossius — quoted from Home Tooke in Stewart's PMiosopli. Essays — essay v. Indulsit mundi communis conditor illis Tantum animas; nobis Animum quoque.— /i^t?. Sat.., 9, v. 134. Anima., which is common to man and brutes, is that by which we live, move, and are invigorated ; whilst Animus is that which is peculiar to mankind, and by which we reason. The triple division of man into vovg., -^^vx'^-, oofx^u., occurs frequently in ancient authors. Plato, Timceus^ Aristotle, Pol. 1. The Hellenist Jews seemed to have used the term TTusvfccc to denote what the Greeks called vovg^ with an allu- sion to Gen. ii. 7. Josephus' Ant. Jud.^ i., c. 2. Thence in the New Test, we have 1 Thess. v. 23, 'Kviv^^x,, '^vx^i-, aof^M. — Heb. iv. 12, and Grotius' Note on Matthew^ xxvL 41. — Fitzgerald's Notes on AristotWs Ethics^ p. 197. '^vx% soul, when considered separately, signifies the principle of life ; Noi^^, mind, the principle of intelligence. Or, according to Plutarch, soul is the cause and beginning of motion, and mind of order and harmony with respect to motion. Together they signify an intelligent soul {iuuovg -ipvx'A) which is sometimes called a rational soul Q'pvx'y] "hayiKyi). Hence, when the nature of the soul is not in ques- tion, the word -^vx'h is used to express both. Thus in the Phcedo the soul (^^v^'h) is said sometimes to use the body for the examination of things ; at vfhich times, according to Plato, it forms confused and imperfect notions of things, and is involved in error. But, when it examines things by itself, it arrives at what is pure and always existing, and immortal, and uniform, and is free from error. Here the highest operations of uovg "mind" are indisputably attri- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 4 m sout— buted to tJ/v;c'/9, '' soiil." Aristotle describing 4'^'/^'^ (^6 Anima^ lib. i., cap. 1), says that during anger, confidence, desire, &c., it participates with the body; but that the act of understanding belongs peculiarly to itself.— Morgan, 0)1 Trinity of Plato, p. 54. sour. OF THE \^^ORr.I>. — AXIMA MUNDI, q. V. SPACE (Spatiuvi). — '' Space, taken in the most general sense, comprehends whateyer is extended, and may be measured by the three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. In this sense it is the same with extension. Xow, space, in this large signification, is either occupied by hody, or it is not. If it be not, but is yoid of all matter, and contaias nothing, then it is space in the strictest signification of the word, and as it is commonly used in Enghsh philosophical language, being the same vaih what is called a vacuum. "^^ — Monboddo, Ancient Met, b. iy., ch. 2. Mr. Locke has attempted to show that we acqmi'e the idea of space by sensation, especially by the senses of touch and sight — book ii., ch. 4. But according to Dr. Keid, '-^ space is not so properly an object of sense as a necessary concomitant of the objects of sight and touch." — Intell. Powers, essay ii., ch. 19. It is when we see or touch body that we get the idea of space ; but the idea is not fur- nished by sense — it is a conception, a priori, of the reason. Experience furnishes the occasion, but the mind rises to the conception by its natiye energy. This riew has been supported by Cousin, Cours tTHistoire de la Philosophic au xviii., Sicele, 2 tom., 17 le^on ; and by Eoyer Collard, in Jouffroy's (Euvres du Reid, tom. ui., fragmeu 4, p. 424 : tom. iy., fragmen 9, p. 338. "In the philosophy of Kant space and time are mere forms of the sensibility. By means of the external sense we represent to ourselyes eyer}i:hmg as in space; and by the internal sense all is represented in the relationship of time." — Analysis of Kant's Critic, of Pure Etason, 8yo, Lond., 1844, p. 9. According to Kant, space is a subjectiyc condition of the 478 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SPACE— sensibility, the form of all external phenomena ; and as the sensibility is necessarily anterior in the subject to all real intuition, it follows that the form of all these phenomena is in the mind a priori. There can, then, be no question about space or extension but in a human or subjective point of view. It may well be said of all things, in so far as they appear existing without us, that they are enclosed in space ; but not that space encloses things absolutely, seen or not seen, and by any subject whatsoever. The idea of space has no objective validity, it is real only relatively to phenomena, to things, in so far as they appear out of us ; it is purely ideal in so far as things are taken in them- selves, and considered independently of the forms of the sensibility. — Willm, Hist, de la Philosoph. AUemande^ tom. i., p. 142. "According to Leibnitz, space is nothing but the order of things CO -existing, as time is the order of things successive — and he maintained, ' that, supposing the whole system of the visible world to be moved out of the place which it presently occupies, into some other portion of space^ beyond the limits of this universe, still it would be in the same space^ provided the order and arrangement of the bodies, with respect to one another, was continued the same.' ]^ow, it is true, that bodies placed in any kind of order, must necessarily be in space ; but the order in which bodies are placed, and the space in which they are placed, must necessarily be distinct. "-^Monboddo, Ancient Metaphysics, book iv., chap. 1. Letters of Clarke and Leibnitz. "1. Space is not pure nothing, for nothing has no capa- city ; but space has the capacity of receiving body. "2. It is not an ens rationis, for it was occupied by heaven and earth before the birth of man. " 3. It is not an accident inhering in a subject, i. 6., body, for body changes its place, but space is not moved with it. ''4. It is not the superficies of one body surrounding another, because superficies is an accident; and as super- ficies is a quantity it should occupy space; but space can- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 479 SPACE— not occupy space. Besides, the remotest heaven occupies space^ and has no superficies surrounding it. '' 5. It is not the relation or order with reference to certain fixed points, as east, west, north, and south. For if the whole world were round, bodies would change place and not their order, or they may change their order and not their place, if the sky, with the fixed points, were moved by itself. '^ 6. and 7. It is not body, nor spirit. '-'• 8. It may be said with probability that space cannot be distinguished from the divine immensity, and therefore from God. It is infinite and eternal, which God only is. He is the place of all being, for no being is out of Him. And although different beings are in different places exter- nally, they are all virtually in the divine immensity." — Derodon, Physic.^ pars. 1, ch. 6. Bardili argued for the reality of time and space from the fact that the inferior animals perceive or have notions of them. Yet their minds, if they can be said to have minds, are not subject to the forms or laws of the human mind. But if space be something to the mind, which has the idea of it, and to the bodies which exist in it, what is it ? '' Perhaps," says Dr. Reid (ut suprd)^ '' we may apply to it what the Peripatetics said of their first matter, that what- ever it is, it is potentially only, not actually." This, accord- ingly, is the view taken of it by a great admirer of the Peripatetic philosophy. *' Space^^^ says Lord Monboddo {Ancient Metaphys.^ book iv., chap. 2), '' is but a relative ; and it is relative to body, and to hody only, and this in three respects, firsts as to its capacity of receiving body ; secondly, as to its connecting or limiting body ; and lastly^ as to its being the distance between bodies that are separated. . . Place is space occupied by body. It is different from body as that which contains is different from that which is con- tained. . . Space^ then, is place^ 'hvvuf^ei^ or potentially : and when it is filled with body, then it is place actually^ or gi/g^y««." Space., as containing all things, was b\' l*hilo iuid others 480 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SPACE — identified with the Infinite. And the text (Acts xvii. 28) which says that '' in God we live, and move, and have our being," was interpreted to mean that space is an affection or property of the Deity. Sir Isaac Newton maintained that God by existing constitutes time and space. " JSTon est duratlo vel spatium sed durat et adest, et existendo semper et ubique, spatium et durationem constituit." Clarke main- tained that space is an attribute or property of the Infinite Deity. Keid and Stewart, as well as Cousin and Eoyer Collard, while they regard space as something real and more than a relation, have not positively said what it is. As space is a necessary conception of the human mind, as it is conceived of as infinite, and as an infinite quality. Dr. Clarke thought that from these views we may argue the existence of an infinite substance, to which this quality be- longs. — See liis Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God^ with Butler's Letters to him and the Answers. Stewart, Active and Moral Powers. Pownall, Intellectual Physics. Brougham, Nat. Theology, SPECIES (fi?om the old verb, specio^ to see) — is a word of different signification, in difierent departments of philo- sophy. In Logic, species was defined to be, "Id quod prsedicatur de pluribus numero difierentibus, in qusestione quid est ?" And genus was defined to be, " Id quod predicatur de pluri- bus differentibus specie^ in qusestione quid est ?" According to Derodon (Log.., p. 293), the adequate definition of genus is, '^ Kes similes eodem nomine substantivo donatse, et identificatse cum omnibus inferioribus diverso nomine substantivo donatis, et proprietate quadam incommunicabili distinctis." And of species., '^Ees similes eodem nomine substantivo donatse, et identificatse cum omnibus inferiori- bus diverso nomine substantivo donatis, et omnes propri- etates ita similes habentibus, ut quodlibet possit habere attributa aliorum, nullum tamen habeat actu idem sed tantum simile." A'OCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 181 SiPECIES— In the process of classification ( of Democritus, images or sensible forms which represent external objects by the conformity which they have with them. So the mind was supposed to be able to know spiritual beings only through the medium of intelligible species. Occam destroyed these chimeras, and maintained that there is nothing real but spiritual or material beings, and the mind of man, which directly conceives them. Gabriel Biel, a pupil of Occam (born at Spire, and died 1495), exhibited with much sagacity and clearness the theory of his master. Occam renewed, without knowing it, the warfare of Arcesilaus against the Stoics ; and he is in modern Europe the fore- runner of Reid and of the Scotch school." — Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Phil.., vol. ii., p. 2Q. Mons. Haureau (Examinat. de Fliilosoph. Scolast^ torn, i., p. 416) says of Durandus de St. Pourcain that he not only rejected intelligible species^ but that he would not admit sensible species. To feel, to think, said he, are simple acts which result from the commerce of mind with an external object ; and this commerce takes place directly without anything intermediate. SPECIFICATION (The Priaiciple of) is — that beings the most like or homogeneous, disagree or are heterogeneous in some respect. SFECUI^ATION (speculare, to regard attentively). — '' To speculate is, from premisses given or assumed, but con- sidered unquestionable, as the constituted point of obser- vation, to look abroad upon the whole field of intellectual vision, and thence to decide upon the true form and di- mension of ail which meets the view." — ^JMarsh, Prelim. Essay to Aids to Reflection, p. 13. It is that part of philosophy which is neither practical nor experimental. The sjjeculaiive part of philosophy is metaphysics. The specidative part of mathematics is that which has no application to the arts. SPHilTUAlilSlll (spiritus, spirit) — is not any particular system of philosophy, but the doctrine, whether grounded VOCABULAllY OF PHILOSOPHY. 485 on reason, sentiment, or faith, that there are substances or beings which are not cognizable by the senses, and which do not reveal themselves to us by any of the qualities of matter, and y^hich we therefore call immaterial or spirituaL Materialism denies this. But spiritualism does not deny the existence of matter, and, placing itself above materi- alism, admits both body and spirit. Hence it is called dualism as opposed to the denial of the existence of matter. The idealism of Berkeley and Malebranclie may be said to reduce material existences to mere phenomena of the mind. Mysticism, whether religious or philosophical, ends with resolving mind and matter into the Divine substance. Mysticism and idealism tend to pantheism, materialism to atheism. Spiritualism^ grounded upon consciousness, preserves equally, God, the human person, and external nature, without confounding them and without isolating the one from the other. — Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. SPONTANEITY. — Leibnitz (Opera^ torn, i., p. 459) explains ^'•spontaneity to mean the true and real dependence of our actions on ourselves." Heineccius calls it " the facult}- of directing one's aim to a certain end." — TurnbuU, lYans.. vol. i., p. 35. SPONTANEOUS is opposed to Reflective. Those operations of mind which are continually going on ydthout any effort or intention on our part are spontaneous. When we exercise a volition, and make an effort of attention to direct our mental energy in any particular way, or towards any parti- cular object, we are said to reflect^ or to observe. |§TAN1>A11]> OF vaRTUE Standard is that by which other things are rated or valued. "Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real stan- dard by which commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared." — Smith, Wealth of Nat.., b. i., c. 5. A standard is something set up by which to measure the quantity or quality of some other thing. Now Rectitude is the foundation of Vii-tue. The standard of Virtue is some law or rule by w^hich Rectitude can be measured. To the 486 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. STANDARD— law of God, and to the testimony of an enlightened con- science, if they agree not, it is because there is no truth nor Tightness in them. !N^ow the will of God, as declared by the constitution and course of nature, or as revealed by His word, is a standard by which we may measure the amount of Rectitude, in action or disposition. According as they agree, in a greater or less degi^ee, with the indications of the divme will, in the same proportion are they right, or in accordance with Rectitude. The standard of Virtue, then, is the will of God, as declared in His AVord, or some law or rule deduced from the constitution of nature and the course of Providence. The Foundation of Virtue is the ground or reason on which the law or rule rests. — V. Criterion. STATE (States of ITIiiid). — '' The reason why madness, idiotism, &c., are called states'^ of mind, while its acts and operations are not, is because mankind have always conceived the mind to be passive in the former and active in the latter." — Reid's Correspondence, p. 85. Such were the views of Dr. Reid. But since his day, a change has passed over the language of Scottish Psycholog}^ Xo change of phraseolog}', because no change of doctrine, is to be found in the wiitings of Mr. Stewart. But in those of Dr. Brown the difference is manifest. Instead of speak- ing of the mind as operating^ or as acting^ or as energizing^ he delights rather to speak of it as exhibiting phenomena, and as passing through, or existing in, different states. This phraseolog}' has been by many accepted and applauded. It is thought that by adopting it, we neither affirm nor deny the activity of the mind, and thus proceed to consider its manifestations, unembarrassed by any questions as to the way in which these manifestations are brought about. But it may be doubted if this phraseology leaves the question as to the activity of the mind entire and untouched. If Dr. Brown had not challenged the common opinion, he * ''The term st >ie lias, more especially oflate year?, and principally "by Xecessitarian pliilosophers, been applied to all modifications of mind indifferently." — Sir "Will. Hamilton. VOCACULAPvY OF PIIILOSOPIIV. 487 STATE — woiild not. probably, have disturbed the language that was preTiously in common use ; although it must be admitted that he was by no means averse to novel phrases. At all events, the tendency of his philosophy is to represent the mind in all its manifestations as passive— the mere recipient of changes, made upon it from without. Indeed, his system of philosophy, which is sensational in its principles, may be said to take the bones and sinews out of the mind, and to leave only a soft and fielding mass, to be magnetized by the palmistry of matter. That the mind in some of its manifes- tations is passive, rather than active, is admitted ; and in reference to these, there can be no objection to speak of it as existing in certain states, or passing into these states. But in adopting to some extent this phi-aseolog}', we must not let go the testimony which is given in favour of the activity- of mind, by the use and structure of language. Language is not the invention of philosophers. It is the natural expression of the human mind, and the exponent of those views which are natural to it. Xow, the phrase operations of mind., ]>eing in common use, indicates a com- mon opinion that mind is naturally active. That opinion may be erroneous, and it is open to philosophers to show if they can, that it is so. But the observation of Dr. Eeid is, that '*imtil it is proved that the mind is not active in thinking, but merely passive, the conunon language with regard to its operations ought to be used, and ought not to give place to a phraseolog}' invented by philosophers, whioh implies its being merely passive.'' And in another place (^Intell. Powers, essay i., chap. 1). he says, '• There may be distinctions that have a real foun- dation, and which may be necessary in philosophy, which are not made in common language, because not necessar^- in the common business of life. But I believe no instance will be found of a distinction made in aU languages, which has not a just foundation in nature." If any change of phraseology were expedient, the phrase *^ manifestations of mind^' would touch less upon the ques- 488 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. STATE— tlon of its activity. But in the language of Dr. Reid — ''Tlie mind is from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy ; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are called its operations, is, that in all or in most of them, it is not merely passive, as body is, but is really and properly active. In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinkiag have been expressed by words of active signification, such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, will- ing, and the like. It seems, therefore, to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various vfays of thinking ; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs. It may be made a question, what regard is to be paid to this natural judgment? May it not be a vulgar error? Philosophers who think so, have, no doubt, a right to be heard. But until it is proved that the mind is not active in thinking, but merely passive, the common language /with regard to its operations ought to be used, and ought not to give place to a phraseology invented by philosophers, which implies its being merely passive." One proof of the mind being active in some of its opera- tions is, that these operations are accompanied with effort, and followed by languor. In attention, we are conscious of effort ; and the result of long continued attention is languor and exhaustion. This could not be the case if the mind was altogether passive— the mere recipient of impressions made — of ideas introduced. — V. Operations of Mind. STATISTICS. — '' The observation, registration, and arrange- ment of those facts in politics which admit of being reduced to a numerical expression has been, of late years, made the subject of a distinct science, and comprehended under the designation of Statistics. Both the name and the separate treatment of the subject were due to Achenwall,* who died * Godefroy Achenwall was born at Elbingen, in Prussia, in 1719, studied at Jena, Halle, and Leipsic, established himself at Marbourg in 1746, and in 1748, where he sOon afterwards obtained a chair. He was distinguished as Professor of History and Statistics. But he also published several works on the Law of Nature and of Nations. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 489 STATISTICS— ill 1772. Upon the nature and proyince of the science of statMcs, see the Introduction to the Journal of the London Statistical Society^ yoI. i., 1839. This science, it is there remarked, does not discuss causes, nor reason upon pro- bable effects : it seeks only to coUect, arrange, and compare, that class of facts which alone (?) can form the basis of correct conclusions Avith respect to social and poHtical gOYernment. ... Its peculiarity is, that it proceeds whoUy by the accumulation and comparison of facts, and does not admit of any kind of speculation. . . . The statist commonly prefers to employ figures and tabidar exhibitions/' — Sir G. C. Lewis. Method of Observat. in Politics^ chap. 5, sect. 10. STOICS (from a TO cc. a porch). — "From the Tnscidan Questions,^^ says Bentham, *• I learnt that pain is no cyH. Yirtue is of itself sufficient to confer happiness on any man who is dis- posed to possess it on these terms. . . . **This was the sort of trash which a set of men used to amuse themselyes with talking, while parading backwards and forwards in colonnades, called porches : that is to say, the Stoics^ so called from aroce.^ the Greek name for a porch. In regard to these, the general notion has been, that com- pared with our cotemporaries iu the same ranks, they were, generally speaking, a good sort of men ; and assuredly, m all tunes, good sort of men, talking all their liyes long nonsense, in an endless Yariety of shapes, noYcr haye been wanting : but that, from talking nonsense in this or any other shape, they or their successors haye, in any way or degree, been the better, this is what does not foUow." — DeontoL^ yoI. i., p. 302. Their philosophy of mind may be judged of by the motto assigned to them — Nihil est in intelkcta nisi prius fucrit in sensu. Yet, along vnXh. this, they held that the mind had the power of framing general ideas, but these were deriyed from experience. Zeno compared the hand open to Sensation ; half closed upon some object to Judgment ; fully closed upon it to (^oLi/raalx xaTaX;;;rT/x>:,comprehensiYe Judgment, 490 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. STOICS— or Synthesis of Judgment. And when the one hand grasped the other, to enable it to hold more firmly, this was universal and definitive synthesis or science. In physics they said all things were made of Cause and Matter. In morals their maxim was '' to live agreeably to nature." Mind ought to govern matter. And the gTeat struggle of life was, to lift the soul above the body, and the evils incident to it. Their two great rules were ui/ex^v and a'lrixov — sustine^ dbstine. — Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. Heinsius (Dan.), PhilosopJi. Stoica^ 4:to, Leyd., 1627. Lipsius (Justus), Manuductio ad Stoicam Fhilosoph,^ 4to, Antw., 1664. Gataker (Thomas), Dissertatio de Disciplina Stoica^ pre- fixed to his edition of Ail toninus^ 4to, Camb., 1643. SUBJECT, OBJECT, SUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE.— "We frequently meet,'' says Dr. Keid, "with a distinction between things in the mind and things external to the mind. The powers, faculties, and operations of the mind, are things in the mind. Everything is said to be in the mind, of which the mind is the subject Excepting the mind itself and things in the mind, all other things are said to be external." By the term subject Dr. Reid meant substance, that to which powers belong or in which qualities reside or inhere. The distinction therefore which he takes between things in the mind and things external to the mind, is equivalent to that which is expressed among continental writers by the ego and the no7i ego^ or self smd not self. The mind and things in the mind constitute the ego. " All other things," says Dr. Reid, " are said to be external." They constitute the 7ion ego. Aristotle expressed this distinction by the phrases to. yj/i^iu^ things in us — and riz (pvasi^ things in nature. In connection with these modes of expression, it may be proper to notice the correlative terms subject and object^ which are frequently employed in mental science. "In the philosophy of mind, subjective denotes what is to be referred to the thinking subject, the ego ; objective.^ VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 491 SUBJECT— what belongs to the object of thought, the non egoy — Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions^ 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 5, note. '' The subject is properly, id in quo ; the object^ id circa quod. Hence, m psychological language, the subject abso- lutely, is the inincl that knows or thinks, i. e., the mind considered as the subject of knowledge or thought — the object^ that which is known or thought about. The adjec- tives subjective and objective are convenient, if not indis- pensable expressions." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Worl's, p. 221, note. In note B to ReicVs Worlcs^ p. 108, Sir ^"\'ill. Hamilton explains how these terms should have come into common use in Mental Philosophy. '* All knowledge is a relation, a relation between that which knows (in scholastic language, the subject in which knowledge inheres) and that which is known (in scholastic language, the object about which knowledge is conversant), and the contents of every act of knowledge are made up of elements, and regulated by laws, proceeding partly from its object and partly from its subject. ISTow, philosophy proper is principally and primarily the science of know- ledge — its first and most important problem being to deter- mine, "What can we know ? that is, what are the condition? of our knowing, whether these lie in the nature of the object, or in the nature of the subject of knowledge. ^'But philosophy being the science of knowledge : and the science of knowledge supposing, in its most funda- mental and thorough going analysis, the distinction of the subject and object of knowledge ; it is evident that to philo- sophy the subject of knowledge would be by pre-eminence the subject, and the object of knowledge., the object. It was therefore natural that the object and objective., the subject and subjective^ should be employed by philosophers as simple terms, compendiously to denote the grand discri- mination, about which philosophy was constantly em])loyed, and which no others could be found so precisely and promptly to express." 492 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SUBJECT— For a disquisition on subject^ see Tappan, Logic^ sect. 4. — F. Objective. SUBJECTIVISM is the doctrine of Kant, that all human knowledge is merely relative ; or rather that we cannot prove it to be absolute. According to him, we cannot ohjectify the subjective ; that is, we cannot prove that what appears true to us must appear true to all intelligent beings; or that with different faculties what now appears, true to us might not appear true. But to call our knowledge relative is merely calling it human or proportioned to the faculties of a man ; just as the knowledge of angels may be called angelic. Our knowledge may be admitted to be relative to our faculties of apprehending it ; but that does not make it less certain. SUBlilME (The). — '' In reflecting on the circumstances by which sublimity in its primitive sense is specifically distin- guished, the first thing that strikes us is, that it carries the thoughts in a direction opposite to that in which the great and universal law of terrestrial gravitation operates." — Stewart, Philosoph. Essays^ Essay on Sublime. A sense of grandeur and sublimity has been recognized as one of the reflex senses belonoinof to man. It is differ- ent from the sense of the beautiful, though closely allied to it. Beauty charms, sublimity moves us, and is often accompanied with a feeling resembling fear, while beaut}' rather attracts and draws us towards it. There is a sublime in nature^ as in the ocean or the thunder — ^in moral action, as in deeds of daring and self- denial — and in art. as in statuary and painting, by whicli what is sublime in nature and in moral character is repre- sented and idealized. Kant has accurately analyzed our feelings of sublimity and beauty in his Critique du Judgment. Cousin, Sur le Beau., le Vrai^ et le Bon, Burke, On Sublime and Beautiful Addison, Spectator., vol. vi. SUBSISTENTIA is a substantial mode added to a singular A^OCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 493 SUBSISTENTIA— nature, and constituting a suppositum along with it. It means, 1. The thing itself, the suppositum; hence we call the three persons of the Trinity three Tiypostases or subsist- ences. % The mode added to the singukr nature to com- plete its existence ; this is the metaphysical sense. 3. Tlie act of existing iper se. ^^ Suhsistentia est ^ substantia3 completio;' qua carent rerum naturalium partes a reliquis divulsse. Suhsistens dicitur suppositum aut hypostasis. Persona est suppositum ratione pr^editum." — Hutcheson, Metaphys.^ pars. 1, cap. 5. SUBSTAIVCE is ''that which is and abides." It may be derived from suhsistens {ens per se suhsistens)., that which subsists of or by itself; or from suhstans (id quod suhstat)^ that which Hes under qualities — the vTrox&iy.si/ov of the Greeks. But in Greek substance is denoted by ovaix — so that which truly is, or essence, seems to be the proper meaning of suhstance. It is opposed to accident; of which Aristotle has said (Metaphjs., lib. vii.) that you can scarcely predicate of it that it is anything. So also Augustine (Z)e Trinitate^ lib. vii., c. 4) derives suhstance from suhsistendo rather than from suhstando. " Sicut ab eo quod est esse, appellatur essentia ; ita ab eo quod est subsistere^ suhstan- tiam dicimus." But Locke prefers the derivation from suhstando. He says (Essay on Hum, Understand., book ii., ch. 23), ""The idea, then, we have, to Vv^hich we give the name of suhstance^ being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of these qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re suhsiante^ without some- thing to support them, we call that support substantia ; which, according to the true import of the word is, in plain English, standing under or upholdmg." Dr. Hampden (Banipton Lect.^ vii., p. 337), has said, '' Substance., in its logical and metaphysical sense, is that nature of a thing which may be conceived to remain when every other nature is removed or abstracted from it — the ultimate point in analyzing the complex idea of any object. Accident denotes all those ideas which the analysis excludes 494 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SUBSTANCE— as not belonging to tlie mere being or nature of the object." Stihstance bas been defined, ens per se exisiens ; and acci- dent^ ens existens non in se sed in alio. Our first idea of substance is probably derived from the consciousness of self — the conviction that, while our sensa- tions^ thoughts, and purposes are changing, we continue the same. We see bodies also remaining the same as to quantity or extension, while their colour and figure, their state of motion or of rest may be changed. Substances^ it has been said, are either p^'^^i^'f-Ci'^y') that is, singular, individual substances ; or secondary,^ that is genera and species of substance. Substances have also been divided into complete and incomplete^ fiiite and infinite^ &c. But these are rather divisions of being. Substance may, however, be properly divided into matter and spirit, or that which is extended and that which thinks. — V. Essence. Substance (The Principle of) denotes that law of the human mind by which every quality or mode of being is referred to a substance. In everything which we perceive or can imagine as existing, we distinguish two parts, qualities variable and multiplied, and a being one and identical ; and these two are so united that we cannot separate them in our intelligence, nor think of qualities without a sub- stance. Memory recalls to us the many modes of our mind ; but amidst all these modes we believe ourselves to be the same individual being. So in the world around us the phenomena are continually varying ; but we believe that these phenomena are produced by causes which remain as substances the same- And as we know ourselves to be the causes of our own acts, and to be able to change the modes of our own mind, so we believe the changes of matter to be produced by causes which belong to the substance of it. And underlying all causes, vfhether of finite mind or matter. * Hanreau (PhilosopJi. Scdast.^ tom. i., p, 60), says that what has been called second substance is just one of its modes or a species. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 495 SUBSTANCE— we conceive of one universal and absolute cause, one sub- stance^ in itself persistent and upholding all things. SUBSUMPTION (suh^ under; sumere^ to take). — ''When we are able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief of the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of consciousness, but a suhsumption under the cognition or belief which affords its reason." — Sir Will. Hamilton, BeicVs Works^ note A. SUCCESSION.— " By reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another in our understanding, we get the notion of succession,^ ^ — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.., b. ii., ch. 14. He traces our notion of duration or time to the same origin ; or rather he confounds succession and duration., the measure with the thing measured. According to Cousin and others, the notion of time is logically ante- cedent and necessary to the notion of succession. Events take place in time, as bodies exist in space. In the philo- sophy of Kant, time is not an empirical notion, but like space, a form of the sensibility. — F- Duration, Time. SUFFICIENT REASON (Boctrine of). — " Of the principle of the sufficient reason., the following account is given b}^ Leibnitz himself, in his Controversial Correspondence witli Dr. Clarke : — " The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of contradiction or identity ; that is, that a propo- sition cannot be true and false at the same time. But, in order to proceed from Mathematics to Natural Philosophy, another principle is requisite (as I have observed in my Theodiccea)^ I mean, the principle of the Sufficient Reason; or, in other words, that nothing happens without a reason why it should be so, rather than otherwise. And, accord- ingly, Archimedes was obliged, in his book De Equilihrio^ to take for granted, that if there be a balance, in which everything is alike on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole will be at rest. It is because no reason can be given why one side should weigh down rather than the other. Now by this single principle of the Sufficient Reason., may be demon- 496 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SUFFICIENT REASON— strated the being of a God, and all tlie other parts of Meta- physics or ]L!»Tatural Theology ; and even, in some measure, those physical truths that are independent of mathematics, such as the Dynamical Principles, or the Principles of Forces." — See Eeid, Active Powers^ essay iv., chap. 9. — F. Reason (Determining). SUCrOESTlON (suh-gerere^ to bear or place under, to prompt). "It is the received doctrine of philosophers, that our notions of relations can only be got by comparing the related ideas : but it is not by having first the notions of mind and sensation, and then comparing them together, that we perceive the one to have the relation of a subject or substratum, and the other that of an act or operation : on the contrary, one of the related things, viz., sensation, suggests to us both the correlate and the relation. '' I beg leave to make use of the word Suggestion^ because I know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philo- sophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief." — Reid, Enquiry^ ch. 2, s. 7. To this power Dr. Reid refers our natural judgments or principles of common sense. Mr. Stewart has expressed surprise that Reid should have apologized for introducing a word which had already been employed by Berkeley, to denote those intimations which are the results of experience and habit (Dissert.^ p. 167, second ed). And Sir W. Hamilton has shown that in the more extensive sense of Reid the word had been used by Tertullian ; who, speaking of the universal belief of the soul's immortality, has said (J)e Anima^ c. 2). ^'ISTatura pleraque suggeruntur^ quasi de^w&- lico sensu quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est." — Reid's WorJcs^ p. 3, note. The word suggestion is much used in the philosophy of Dr. Thomas Brown, in a sense nearly the same as that assigned to Association, by other philosophers. He calls Judgment, relative suggestion, Hutcheson (Logicce Compend.^ cap. 1), VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 497 SUOOESTION— says, '' Sensus est internus qui suggerlt proecipue intellec- tiones puras ; quag Conscientia, aut reflectendi vis dicitur.'* It is not so properly Consciousness or Reflection whicli gives the new ideas, but rather the occasion on which these ideas are suggested. It is when we are conscious and reflect on one thing, some other thing related to it, but not antece- dently thought, is suggested. SUICFDE {ccvToyjiPia., sid-ccedes^ self-murder) — is the volun- tary taking away of one's own life. The Stoics thought it was not wrong to do so, when the pains and inconveniences of our lot exceeded its enjoyments and advantages. But the command, Thou shalt not kill, forbids suicide as well as homicide. It is contrary to one of the strongest instincts of our nature, that of self-preservation — and at variance with the submission which we owe to God and the duties in- cumbent upon us towards om" fellow-creatures. All the apologies that can be oflered for it are futile. Aristotle, Etliic.^ lib. iii., cap. 7 ; lib. v., cap. 11. Herman, Disputatio de Autocheiria et pJiilosopMce et ex legibus Romanis considerata^ 4to, Leips., 1809. Madame de Stael, Reflexions sur le Suicide. Stoeudlin, Hist, des Opinions et des Doctrines sur le Suicide. 8vo, Goetting., 1824. Tissot, Manie du Suicide. Adams, On Self-murder. Donne, Biathanotos. SUPRA-NATURAl.ls:il {supra-naturam^ above nature) — is the doctrine that in nature there are more than physical causes in operation, and that in religion we have the guid- ance not merely of reason but of revelation. It is thus opposed to Naturalism and to Rationalism. — q. v. In Ger- many, where the word originated, the principal Supra - naturalists are Tholuck, Hengstenberg, Guericke, &c. SYLiIiOOlS:?! (ffi^XAoy/o-^.oV, a putting together of judgments, or propositions, or reasonings ; from aw and T^oyi^stv^ colli- gere^ to gather together). This word occurs in the wntiugs of Tlato, in the sense 2 K 498 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. of judging or reasoning ; but not in the teclinical sense assigned to it by Aristotle. According to Aristotle {Prior. Analyt.^ lib. i., chap. 1, sect. 8), ''a syllogism is a speech (or enunciation) (T^oyog) in which certain things (the premises) being supposed, something different from what is supposed (the conclusion) follows of necessity; and this solely in virtue of the sup- positions themselves." "A syllogism is a combination of two judgments necessi- tating a third judgment as the consequence of their mutual relation.'' — Mansel, Prolegom, Log.^ p. 61. Euler likened the syllogism to three concentric circles, of which the first contained the second, which in its turn contained the third. Thus, if A be predicable of all B, and B of all C, it follows necessarily that A is also predicable of C. In a syllogism^ the first two propositions are called the premises; because they are the things premised or put before ; they are also called the antecedents : the first of them is called the major and the second the minor. The third proposition, which contains the thing to be proved, is called the conclusion or consequent; and the particle which unites the conclusion v/ith the premises is called the consequentia or consequence. "^ In a syllogism., '' the conclusion having two terms, a sub- ject and a predicate, its predicate is called the major term^ and its subject the minor term. In order to prove the *Thus: — " Every virtue is laudable, Diligence is a virtue ; Wlierefore diligence is laudable. "The two former propositions are t\vQ premises or antecedents, the last is the con- clusion or consequent, and the particle wherefore is the consequentia or consequence. " The consequent may he true and the consequence false. " What has parts is divisible, The human soul has parts ; Wherefore the human soul is divisible. '' The consequent may be true although the consequence is false. " Antichrist will be powerful, Therefore he will be impious. " His impiety will not flow from his power." VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 499 conclusion, each of its terms is, in the premises, compared with the third term, called the middle term. By this means one of the premises will have for its two terms the major term and the middle term ; and this premise is called the major premise^ or the major proposition of the syllogism. The other premise must have for its two terms the minor term and the middle term ; and it is called the minor pro- position. Thus the syllogism consists of three propositions, distinguished by the names of the major., the minor., and the conclusion ; and although each of these has two terms, a subject and a predicate, yet there are only three different terms in all. The major term is always the predicate of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the major proposition. The minor term is always the subject of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the minor proposition. The middle term never enters into the conclusion, but stands in both pre- mises, either in the position of subject or of predicate." — Eeid, Account of Aristotle's Logic^ chap. 3, sect. 2. According to the various positions which the middle term may have in the premises, syllogisms are said to be of various figures. And as all the possible positions of the middle term are only four, the regular figures of the syllo- gism are also four ; and a syllogism is said to be drawn in the first, second, third, or fourth figure, according to the position of its middle term. There is another division of syllogisms according to their modes. The mode of a syllogism is determined by the quality and quantity of the propositions of which it con- sists. There are sixty-four modes possible in every figure. And the theory of the syllogism requires that we show what are the particular modes in each figure, which do or do not form a just and conclusive syllogism. The legiti- mate modes of the first figure are demonstrated from the axiom called Dictum de omni et de nidlo. The legitimate modes of the other figures are proved by reducing them to some mode of the first. — Christian Wolf, Sinaller Logic, ch. (). 500 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SYIiliOOISin— Locke, Essay on Hum, Understand.^ b. iv., chap. 17. Aldrich, Wallis, Watts, and otlier authors on Logic. SYMBOli.— F. Myth. SYMPATHY (ovccTToihioc^ fellow-feeling). " This mutual affection which the Greeks call sympathy^ tendeth to the use and benefit of man alone."— Holland ^ Pliny ^ b. xx., Proem. ''Sensibus refiexis annumerandus est etiam ille, qui com- munis dicitur ; qui ex alterius rebus prosperis gaudium, ex adversis tristitiam colligit, ubi nulla simultas, odium, inimicitia, aut turpitudinis causa detestatiointervenerat." — Hutcheson, Metaphys.^ part 2, c. 1. " Ut ridentibus arrident, ita tientibus adfient Humani vultus." '^ These sensitive cogitations are not pure actions spring- ing from the soul itself, but compassion (sympathy) with the body."— "Cudworth, Immut. Moral., book iii^, chap. 1, p. 18. "Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy., though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any other passion whatever. — Smith, Theory of More Sentim..^ part 1, sect. 1. Sympathy with sorrow or suffering is compassion; sympathy with joy or prosperity is congratidation. — V. Antipathy. SYNCRETISM {ovu7tpTiTiGf4.og., from GVUTc^TiTi^iiv^ according to Plutarch, De Fraterno amore^ to unite, like the Cretans, when all the rival towns of the island united against the common foe)— is opposed to eclecticism in philosophy. Eclecticism (q. v.), while it takes from various systems, does soon the principle that the parts so taken, when brought together, have a kind of congruity and consistency with one another. Syncretism is the jumbling together of different systems or parts of systems, without due regard to their being consistent with one another. It is told of a Roman consul that, when he arrived in Greece he called before him YOCABULArwY OF PIIILOSOrHY. 501 SYNCRETISM— the philosophers of the different schools, and generousl}- offered to act as moderator between them, in order to bring about an agreement. Something of the same kind Avas proposed by Charles V.* in reference to the differences be- tween Protestants and Papists ; as if philosophy, and theo- logy, which is the highest philosophy, instead of bemg a search after truth, were a mere matter of diplomacy or compromise — a playing at protocols. But Syncretism does not necessarily aim at the reconciling of the doctrines which it brings together; it merely places them in juxta- position. Philo of Alexandria gave the first example of syncretism, in trying to unite the Oriental philosophy with that of the Greeks. The Gnostics tried the same thing with the doc- trines of the Christian religion. About the beginning of the seventeenth century, George Calixtus, a German theo- logian, attempted to set down in one common creed the behef of the Papists and the Protestants ; but succeeded only in irritating both. To him and his partizans the name Syncretist seems to have been first applied. — See Walch's Introduction to Controversies of LutJieran Church. Similar efforts were made to unite the metaphysics of Aristotle with those of Descartes. And the attempts which have fi:'e- quently been made to reconcile the discoveries of geology with the cosmogony of Moses deserve no name but that of syncretism^ in the sense of its being '' a mixing together of things which ought to be kept distinct." On the evils of syncretism, see Sewell, (^Christ Morals., chap. 9), who quotes as against it the text, Deut xxii. 9, " Tlio^i shall not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds.,'''' &c. SITNDERESIS (aw lioiipsa^ to divide, to tear asunder) — was used to denote the state of conviction or remorse in which the mind was when comparing what it had done with what * After his retiring from the toils of empire, Charles V. employed his leisure in constructing time-pieces, and on experiencing the difficulty of making their move- ments synclironous, he is said to have exclaimed, in reference to tlie attempt to re- concile Protestants and Papists, "How could I dream of making two gi'eat bodies of men think alike, when I cannot make two clocks to go alike!" 502 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. SYNI>ERESIS— it ouglit to have done. — Aquinas, Summce Theolog.^ pars prima, qusest. 79, articulus 12. Aquinas, Opera^ torn, i., p. 1126. SYNEII>ESIS {avv hooi^ to know one thing in relation to another, joint knowledge). — Conscience, as giving know- ledge of an action in reference to the law of right and wrong, was called the Witness who accused or excused. The operations of conscience were represented by the three members of a syllogism ; of which the first contained the law, the second the testimony of the witness, and the third the decision of the judge. But conscience not only pro- nounces sentence ; it carries its sentence into effect. — F. Synderesis. He who has transgressed any of the rules of which con- science is the repository, is punished by the reproaches of his own mind. He who has obeyed these rules, is acquitted and rewarded by feelings of complacency and self-appro- bation. — F. Synteresis. ^YNTEliESiS (GwrTipYKJig-, ovv mpYjO)^ to keep together, the conservatory). — Conscience, considered as the repository of those rules, or general maxims, which are regarded as first principles in morals, was called by this name among the early Christian moralists ; and was spoken of as the law or lawgiver. SYNTHESIS ((jvu haig^ a putting together, composition) — "consists in assuming the causes discovered and established as principles, and by them explaining the phenomena pro- ceeding from them and proving the explanation." — Newton, Optics. Every synthesis which has not started with a complete analysis ends at a result which, in Greek, is called hypo- thesis ; instead of which, if synthesis has been preceded by a sufficient analysis, the synthesis founded upon that analysis leads to a result which in Greek is called system. The legi- timacy of every synthesis is directly owing to the exactness of analysis ; every system which is merely an hypothesis is a vain system *, every synthesis which has not been preceded VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 503 SYNTHESIS— by analysis is a pure imagination : but at the same time every analysis which does not aspire to a synthesis which may be equal to it, is an analysis which halts on the vra}-. On the one hand, synthesis without analysis giyes a false science; on the other hand, analysis without synthesis gives an incomplete science. An incomplete science is a hundred times more valuable than a false science ; but neither a false science nor an incomplete science is the ideal of science. The ideal of science, the ideal of philosophy, can be realized only by a method which combines the two processes of analysis and synthesis. — Cousin, Hist. Mod. Phil.^ vol. i.. pp. 277, 8. — V. A]s'Ai.Ysis, ^Iethod, System. SYSTe:W[ {ovGrriuoL, avu 'ioTOLG^xi^ to place together) — is a f^-ill and connected view of all the truths of some department of knowledge. An organized body of truth, or truths arranged under one and the same idea, which idea is as the life or soul which assimilates all those truths. Xo truth is altogether isolated. Every truth has relation to some other. And we should try to unite the facts of our know- ledge so as to see them in their several bearings. This we do when we frame them into a system. To do so legiti- mately we must begin by analysis and end with synthesis. But system applies not only to our knowledge, but to the objects of our knowledge. Thus we speak of the planetary- system., the muscular system., the nervous system. TTe believe that the order to which we would reduce our ideas has a foimdation in the nature of things. And it is this behef that encourages us to reduce our knowledge of things into systematic order. The doing so is attended with many advantages. At the same time a spirit of systematizing may be carried too far. It is only in so far as it is in accordance with the order of nature that it can be useful or sound. Condillac has a Trait e des Systemes^ in which he traces their causes and their dangerous con- sequences. — V. Method. 504 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TASTE (PO\¥JERS OR PRINCIPIiES OF). " His tasteful mind enjoys Alike the complicated charms, which glow Thro' the wide landscape." Cowper, Power of Harmony^ b. ii. " That power of the mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing the beauties of Nature, and whatever is excellent in the fine arts is called Taste. . . . Like the taste of the palate, it relishes some things, is disgusted with others ; with regard to many, is indifferent or dubious ; and is considerably influenced by habit, by associations, and by opinion. . . . '' By the objects of Taste^ I mean those qualities and attri- butes of things which are, by Nature, adapted to please a good taste. Mr. Addison {Spectator^ vol. vi.) and Dr. Aken- side (Pleasures of Imagination) after him, has reduced them to three — to wit, Novelty ^ Grandeur^ and Beauty.'''' — q. v. — Reid, IntelL Powers^ essay viii., chap. 1 and 2. The best definition of Taste was given by the earliest editor of Spenser who proved himself to possess any (Mr. Hughes), when he called it a kind of extempore judgment. Burke explained it to be an instinct which immediately awakes the emotions of pleasure or dislike. Akenside is clear as he is poetical in the question : — " What, then, is Taste hut those internal powers. Active, and strong, and feelingly alive To each fine impulse ? a discerning sense Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust From things deformed, or disarranged, or gross. In species ? This nor gems, nor stores of gold Nor purple state, nor culture, can bestow. But God alone, when first his sacred hand Imprints the secret bias of the soul.'' Pleasures oflmagin., b. iii., 1. 523. ^^ We may consider Ta^^e, therefore, to be a settled habit of discerning faults and excellences in a moment — the mind's independent expression of approval or aversion. It is that faculty by which we discover and enjoy the beautiful, the picturesque, and the sublime in literature, art, and nature." VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 505 TASTE— — Pleasures^ ^t., of Literature^ 12mo, Loudon. 1851, pp. 65, 66. The objects of Taste have also been classed as the Beau- tiful, the Suhlime^ and the Picturesque. — q. v. The question is whether these objects possess certain inherent qualities which may be so called, or whether they awaken pleasing emotions by suggesting or recalhng certain pleasing feelings formerly experienced in connection or association with these objects. The latter view has been maintained by Mr. Ahson in his Essay on Tasie^ and by Lord Jefirey in the article Beauty in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Lord Jeffi^ey has said, '* It appears to us, then, that objects are sublime or beautiful — first, when they are the natural signs and perpetual concomitants of pleasurable sen- sations, as the sound of thimder, or laughter, or, at any rate, of some lively feeling or emotion in ourselves, or in some other sentient beings ; or secondly, when they are the ai'bitrary or accidental concomitants of such feelings, as ideas of female beauty ; or thii'dly, when they bear some analogy or fancied resemblance to things with which these emotions are necessarily connected.*' AU poetry is founded on this last — as silence and tranquillity — gTadual ascent and ambi- tion — gradual descent and decay. ^Ir. Stewart has observed that ''association of ideas can never account for a new notion or a pleasure essentiallv different from all others." — PTiilosvph. of Hum Mind, ch. 5, part 2, p. 361, 4to. Gerard, Essay on Taste. Sii' Joshua Reynolds, Discourses before Royal Society. Burke, On Sublime and Beautiful. Pa}Tie Knight, Enquiry into Principles of Taste. Hume, Essay on Standard of Taste. Brown, Lectures, 77. Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, part 2, Relative to Taste. Sir T. L. Dick, Essay on Taste, prefixed to Price on the Picturesque, 8vo, 18-42. — V. ^Esthetics. T£Ii£OIiO€;Y {Ti?^og, an end ; Ac'yoc, discourse) — is the doctrine 506 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TEIiEOliOOY— of Final Causes. — q. v. It does not constitute a particular department of pliilosopliy ; as the end or perfection of every being belongs to the consideration of that branch of philo- sophy in which it is included. But Teleology is the philoso- phical consideration of final causes, generally. TEMPEKAlflENT (temperare., to moderate, to season). — "There are only two species of Temperament. The four well-known varieties, and the millions which are less known, are merely modifications of two species, and com- binations of their modifications. These are the active and the passive forms ; and every other variety may be conve- niently arranged under them."* '' As character comprises the entire sphere of the educated will, so temperament is nothing else than the sum of our natural inclinations and tendencies. Inclination is the material of the will, developing itself when controlled^ into character, and when controlling^ into passions. Temperament is, therefore, the root of our passions ; and the latter, like the former, may be distinguished into two principal classes. Intelligent psychologists and physicians have always recog- nized this fact ; the former dividing temperaments into active and passive, the latter classifjdng the passions as exciting and depressing. " We would apply the same statement to the affections or emotions. The temperament commonly denominated san- guine or choleric is the same as our active species ; and that known as the phlegmatic, or melancholy, is the same as our passive one."— Feuchtersleben, Dietetics of the Soul., 12mo, Lon., 1852, p. 85. Bodily endowments, as affecting the prevailing bias of the mind, have been called Temperaments ; and have been dis- tinguished into the Sanguine, the Choleric, the Melancholic, and the Phlegmatic To these has been added another, * Lavater, Zimmerman, and Von Hildebrandt adopt a similar classification. The author of the treatise on "Diet," included among the works of Hippocrates, take^ the same view of temperaments; as likewise the Brunonian school, which maintained two antagonist, sthenic and asthenic^ states. VOCABUX-AJIY OF PHLLOSOPHT. 607 TE?1PERA?IE>T— ::-- !:::> A' ;-- J,; ;:. According as the bodily i mdiyiduals can be characterized by one or ^c^_. .. c^^-e epithets, a corresponding difference will be found in the general state or Disposition of the mind : and there will be a bias, or tendency to be moved by certain principles of action rather than by others. ^Imd is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a constitution and as containing certain primary elements : and, according as these elements ai*e combined and balanced, there may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just as there are differences of bodily Temperaments; and these differences may give rise to a Disposition or bias, in the one case, more directly than in the other. According as Intellect, or Sensitivity, or Will, prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspon- dent bias resulting. But, it is in reference to original differences in the Pri- mary Desires^ that differences of Disposition are most observable. Any desire, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies of the mind to its side ; gives a colour to the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they do 50. except by the result. There is an under-current of ieeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests i:^ If by the direction in which it carries him. This consti- tutes his temper.* Disposition is the sum of a man's desires and feelings. In the works of Galen (torn, iv., Leips., 1822), is an essay to show Quod ardmi mores corporis iemperamenta sequuntur. See also Feuchtersleben, Medical Psychology, TEiXPERA3fCJE (ao^oouvjYi^ temperantia) — ^is moderation as to pleasure. Aristotle {Ethic.^ lib. iii., cap. 10) confined it chiefly to the pleasures of touch, and of taste in a slight degree. Hence, perhaps, Ponkh wiiters in treating of the » The balance of our anima] principles. I think, constimtes what we call a man-s natural temper — Reid, Actire Powers^ essay iiL, part 2, chap. S. 508 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TEiaPERANCE— vices of intemperance or luxury, dwell much on those con- nected with the senses of touch and taste. By Cicero the Latin word temperantia was used to denote the duty of self- government in general. Temperantia est quce ut in rehus expetendis aut fugiendis rationem sequamur monet. Temperance was enumerated as one of the four cardinal virtues. It may be manifested in the government and regu- lation of all our natural appetites, desires, passions, and affections, and may thus give birth to many virtues and restrain from many vices. As distinguished from Fortitude, it may be said to consist in guarding against the tempta- tions to pleasure and self-indulgence ; while Fortitude consists in bearing up against the evils and dangers of human life. TENDENCY (tendere^ to stretch towards). — '' He freely moves and acts according to his most natural tendence and inclina- tion." — Scott, Christ, Life^ pt. 1, c. 1. " But if at first the appetites and necessities, and tenden- cies of the body, did tempt the soul, much more will this be done when the body is miserable and afflicted." — Taylor, Of Repent., c. vii., § 1. — F. Ls^clination. TERM {o^og, terminus, a Hmit). — As lines terminate a plane and constitute figure, so its terms are the limits of a propo- sition. A proposition consists of two terms ; that which is spoken of is called the subject ; that which is said of it the predicate; and these are called the terms (or extremes), because logically the subject is placed ^r5^ and the predicate last. In the middle is the copula, which indicates the act of judgment, as by it the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. — Whately. — V. Proposition, Syllogism. TESTIMONY (testis, a witness) — "is the declaration of one who professes to know the truth of that which he affirms." " The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary cour^ of nature, or with one another." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv., chap. 16. If testimony were not a source of evidence, we must lose all VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 509 TESTOIOTVlL — benefit of the experience and observ\ation of others. Much of human knoTvleclge rests on the authority of testimony. According to Dr. Reid, the validity of this authority is resolvable into the constitution of the human mind. He maintains (^Inquiry, ch. 6, sect. 24) that we have a natural principle of Veracity, which has its counterpart in a natural principle of Credulity — that is, while we are naturally dis- posed to speak the truth, we are naturally disposed to believe what is spoken by others. But says Mr. Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand.., book iv., ch. 15, 16), ** Testimony may be fallacious. He who declares a thing, 1. May be mistaken, or imposed upon. 2. He may be an impostor and intend to deceive." The evidence of testimony is, therefore, only probable and requires to be carefuUy examined. The natm-e of the thing testified to — whether it be a matter of science or of common life — the character of the person testifving — whether the testimony be that of one or of many — whether it be given voluntarily or compulsorily. hastily or deliberately, are some of the circumstances to be attended to. Testimony may be oral or written. The coin, the monu- ment, and other material proofs have also been called Testi- mony. So that testimony includes Tradition and History. ^Ir. Hiune maintained that no amount of testimony can be sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. See reply to him by Dr. Adams,* in his Essay on Miracles.) and Dr. Campbell on Miracles., and Dr. Douglas on Miracles. It was maintained by Craig, a celebrated Enghsh Geo- metrician, and by Petersen, that the value of testimony decreases by the lapse of time. And Laplace, in some measure, favoured this view. But if the matter of fact be '' Hume told Caddell the bookseller, that he had a great desire to he introduced to as many of the persons \vho had written against him as could he collected; and requested Caddell to bring him and them together. Accordingly, Dr. Douglas, Dr. Adams, etc., were invited by Caddell to dine at his house in order to meet Hume. They came ; and Dr. Price, who was of the party, assm'ed me that they were all delighted with David.''— Tadfe Talk of Samuel Rogers. 510 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TESTIMONY— well authenticated in the first instance, lapse of time and continued belief in it may add to the validity of the evidence. — V, Evidence. THEIsm (020^, Deus^ God)— is opppsed to atheism. It is not absolutely opposed, by its derivation, to Pantheism, or the belief that the universe is God ; nor to Polytheism^ or the belief that there are many Gods ; nor to Ditheism^ or the belief that there are two Divine principles, one of Good and another of Evil. But usage, penes quern est arhitrium et norma loquendi^ has restricted this word to the belief in one intelligent and free spirit separate from his works. " To believe that everything is governed, ordered, or regulated for the hest^ by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect Theist,''^ — Shaftes- bury, Inquiry^ book i., pt. 1, sect. 2. " These are they who are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm that a perfectly conscious understanding, being, or mind, existing from eternity, was the cause of all other things *, and they, on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious understanding being, self- existent or unmade, are those that are properly called Atheists,''^ — Cudworth, IntelL Syst.^ book i., ch. 4, sect. 4. ''Though in a strict and proper sense, they be only Theists who acknowledge one (xod perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of anything else ; yet it seems reasonable that such con- sideration should be had of the infirmity of human under- standings, as to extend the word further, that it may com- prehend within it those also who assert one intellectual self- existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter ; and that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things." — Ibid, sect. 7. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 511 THEISM— TJieist and Deist both signify simply one who believes in God ; and about the beginning of last century both were employed to denote one who believes in God independently of revelation. '' Averse as I am to the cause of Theism or name of Deist, when taken in a sense exclusive of revela- tion, I consider still that, in strictness, the root of all is Theism ; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a good Theisty — Shaftesbury, The Moralists, part 1, sect. 2. But from about the time of Shaftesbury, the term Deist has generally been applied to such as are indifferent or hostile to the claims of revelation. Balguy's First Letter to a Deist was against Lord Shaftesbury. His Second Letter to a Deist was against Tindal. All the Deistical writers noticed by Leland were unfriendly to revelation. •' The words Deist and Theist are, strictly speaking, per- haps synonymous ; but yet it is generally to be observed that the former is used in a had, and the latter in a good sense. Custom has appropriated the term Deist to the enemies of revelation and of Christianity in particular ; while the word Theist is considered applicable to all who believe in one God." — Irons, On Final Causes, app., p. 207. '' TheistCB generatim vocantur, qui Deum esse tenent, sive recte sive prave caeteroquin de Deo sentiant. Deistce voca- bantm* prsesertim sseculo proxime elapso philosophi, qui Deum quidem esse affirmabant, providentiam vero, revela- tionem, miracula, uno verbo, quidquid supernaturale audit, tollebant." — Ubaghs, Theodicece Elementa, p. 11. THEOCRACY (Qsog y.pacTog, rule of God). — Government under the Mosaic dispensation is called theocracy. '•'' It will easily appear," says Lowman (On Civil Govern- ment of the Hebrews, chap. 7), *'that the general union of the tribes as one body may be conceived after this manner — that the congregation of Israel, or the whole people enacted by themselves or their representatives ; that the great council advised, consulted, proposed ; that the judge presided in their councils, and had the chief hand iu 512 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. THEOCRACY— executing what was resolved in tbem ; and that Jehovah, by the oracle, was to absent to and approve what was resolved, and authorize the execution of it in matters of the greatest importance to the whole state, so that the general union of the whole nation may not improperly be thus expressed. It was by the command of the people and advice of the senate, the judge presiding and the oracle approving." Egypt, down to a certain period, was governed by priests in the name of their gods, and Peru by Incas, who were regarded as the children of the sun, Mahomet, speaking in the name of God, exercised a theocratic sway, and that of the Grand Lama in Thibet is similar. ''In the Contrnt Social of Rousseau, the sovereignty of number, of the numerical majority, is the fundamental principle of the work. For a long time he follows out the consequences of it with inflexible rigour ; a time arrives, however, when he abandons them, and abandons them with great effect ; he wishes to give his fundamental laws, his constitution, to the rising society ; his high intellect warned him that such a work could not proceed from universal suffrage, from the numerical majority, from the multitude : 'A God,' said he, 'must give laws to men.' It is not magistracy, it is not sovereignty. . . . It is a particular and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire." — Guizot, Hist, of Civilization^ vol. i., p. 387. Contrat Social^ b. ii., ch. 8. The term theocracy has been applied to the power wielded by the Pope during the Middle Ages ; and Count De Maistre, in his work Dii Pape^ has argued strenuously in support of the supreme power, temporal and spiritual, of the sovereign pontiff. But the celibacy of the Pomish priests is an obstacle to their theocratical organization. " Look at Asia, Egypt ; all the great theocracies are the work of a clergy, which is a complete society within itself, which suffices for its own wants, and borrows nothing from with- out." — Guizot, Hist, of Civilization^ vol. i., p. 182. TIIE:oi>icy (0.oV, God; ^ikyi^ a pleading or justification) —a VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 513 THJEODICY— vindication of the ways of God, — This word was employed by Leibnitz, who in his Essais de Theodicee^ sur la honte de Dieii, la liberie de Vhomme et Vorigine du mal^ published in 1710, maintained that the existence of moral evil has its origin in the free will of the creature, while metaphysical evil is nothing but the limitation which is involved in the essence of finite beings, and that out of this both physical and moral evil naturally flow. But these finite beings are designed to attain the utmost felicity they are capable of enjoying, while each, as a part, contributes to the perfection of the whole, which of the many worlds that were possible is the very best. On this account it has been called the theory of optimism. — q. v. In Manuals of Philosophy the term theodicy is applied to that part which treats of the heing^ perfections., and govern- ment of God, and the immortality of the soul. In the Manuel de Philosophic^ a V usage des Colleges^ 8vo, Paris, 1846, Theodicee^ which is written by Emille Saisset, is called Pational Theology, or the Theology of Peason, independent of Pevelation. '' It proposes to establish the existence of a being infinitely perfect, and to determine his attributes and essential relations to the world." It treats of the existence, attributes, and providence of God, and the immortality of the soul — which were formerly included under metaphysics. According to Kant, the objections which a theodicy should meet are: 1. The existence of moral evil, as contrary to the holiness of God. 2. Of physical evil, as contrary to his goodness. 3. The disproportion between the crimes and the punishments of this life as repugnant to his justice. He approves of the vindication adopted by Job against his fi:'iends, founded on our imperfect knowledge of God's ways. *' When the Jewish mind began to philosophize, and en- deavoured to produce dialectic proofs, its theodicean philo- sophy, or justification of God., stopped, in the book of Job, at the avowal of the incomprehensibility of the destinies of mankind." — Bunsen, Hippolytus^ vol. ii., p. 7. 2l 514 VOCABULARY OK PHILOSOPHY. THLEOCrONY (0goV yovri^ the generation of the Gods) — is that part of Pagan theology which treats of the genealogy and filiation of their deities. It is the title of a celebrated Greek poem by Hesiod, which has been commented on by M. J. D. Guigniaut {De la Theogonie dPHesiode^ Paris, 1835). The Works^ and Days^ and Theogomj of Hesiod were translated from the Greek, with remarks by Thomas Cooke, 2 vols., 4to, Lond., 1728. THEOliOOY (0£oV, God; T^oyog^ discourse). — '^ Theology^ what is it but the science of things divine ? What science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason?" — Hooker, Eccles. Pol.^ b. iii., sect. 8. " I mean theology^ which, containing the knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to Him and to our fellow- creatures, and a view of our present and future state, is the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true end, i. e., the honour and veneration of the Creator, and * the happiness of mankind. This is that noble study which is every man's duty, and every one that is a rational creature is capable of." — Locke, On the Cond. of the Understand.^ sect. 22. The word theology as now used, without any qualifying epithet, denotes that knowledge of God and of our duty to him which we derive from express revelation. In this re- stricted sense it is opposed to philosophy, and is divided into speculative or dogmatic — and moral or practical, according as it is occupied with the doctrines or the pre- cepts which have been revealed for our belief and guidance. But the Greeks gave the name of (hoTioyoi) to those who, like Hesiod and Orpheus, with no higher inspiration than that of the poet, sang of the nature of the gods and the origin of all things. Aristotle (Metaphys,^ lib. xi., ch. 6) said that of the three speculative sciences, physics, mathe- matics, and theology — the last was the highest, as treating of the most elevated of beings. Among the Romans, from the time of Numa Pompilius to that of the emperors, the knowledge and worship of the gods was made subservient to the interests of the state. So that, according to Augustin VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 515 THEOIiOOY— {De Civitate^ lib. vi., c. 1), there were three kinds of t?ieo- logy — the poetical, or that of the poets — the physical, or that of the philosophers — and the political, or that of the legislator. Among the Greeks and Romans, there being no divine revelation, the distinction between faith and reason was not taken. Christians were long unwilling to admit that any satisfactory knowledge of God and his attributes, and of the relations between Him and his creatures could be had independently of revelation. And it was not till after Descartes that the distinction of theology, as natural and positive, or revealed, was commonly taken. The distinction is rather obscured in the Essais de Theodicee of Leibnitz, but clearly expressed by Wolf in the title of his work, Theologia Naturalis Methodo Scientifica Pertractata, 2 vols., 4to, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1736-37. He thinks it is de- monstrative, and calls it {Prolegom., sect. 4) '^The science which has for its object the existence of God and his attri- butes, and the consequences of these attributes in relation to other beings, with the refutation of all errors contrary to the true idea of God;" in short, all that is now com- monly included under natural theology or theodicy, or both. IVatural Theology. — This phrase has been very commonly employed, bat it has been challenged. ''The name natural theology, which ever and anon we still hear applied to the philosophical cognition of the Divine Being and his existence, ought carefully to be avoided. Such a designation is based on a thorough mis- conception and total inversion of ideas. Every system of theology that is not supernatural, or at least that does not profess to be so, but pretends to understand naturally the idea of God, and regards the knowledge of the divine essence as a branch of natural science, or derives the idea simply from nature, is even on that account false. Missing and entirely mistaking its proper object, it must, in short, prove absolutely null and void. Properly, indeed, this inquiry needs no peculiar word, nor special division, and 516 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. THEOIiOGX— scientific designation. The name generally of philosophy, or specially of a philosophy of God, is perfectly sufficient to designate the investigation into science and faith, and their reciprocal relation — their abiding discord, or its harmonious reconciliation and intrinsic concord." — Schlegel, PMlosoph. of Life ^ &c., Bohn's edit., p. 194. In Coleridge's Aids to Reflection^ natural is opposed to spiritual^ as sensuous to super -sensuous or super -natural. This objection might be obviated by calling that know- ledge of God and of his attributes and administration which the light of reason furnishes, Rational Theology. But this phrase has been of late years employed in a different sense, especially in Germany. Natural Theology confines itself exclusively to that knowledge of God which the light of nature furnishes, and does not intermeddle with the dis- coveries or the doctrines of positive or revealed theology. It prosecutes its inquiries by the unassisted strength of reason within its own sphere. But rational theology carries the torch or light of reason into the domain of revelation. It criticizes and compares texts — analyzes doctrines — examines traditions — and brings all the instruments of philosophy to bear upon things divine and spiritual in order to reduce them to harmony with things human and rational. — V. Eationalism. THTEOPATHLY (0£oV and -rflt^j^, feeling of Deity) — a word used by Dr. Hartley as synonymous yf\ih.piety,, or a sense of Deity. THEORY (dicj^ix^ contemplation, speculation ; Gsafinv,, to see). — Theory and theoretical are properly opposed to practice and practical. Theory is mere knowledge ; practice is the application of it. Though distinct, they are dependent, and there is no opposition between them. TJieory is the knowledge of the principles by which practice accomplishes its end. Hypothetical and theoretical are sometimes used as synonymous with conjectural. But this is unphilosophical in so far as theoretical is concerned. Theory always implies knowledge — knowledge of a thing in its principles or causes. '^ Theory is a general collection of inferences drawn from VOCABULARY <'F PHILOSOPHY. 517 THEORY— facts and compressed into principles." — Farr, Sequel to a Printed Paper. " With Plato, dzcipii'j is applied to a deep contemplation of the truth. By Aristotle it is always opposed to 'Troxmi-j, and to 'TTonrj^ so that he makes philosophy theoretical^ prac- tical^ and artistical {7rQinTix.nv). The Latins and Boethius rendered kc^onv by speculare. With us it means a learned discoiu^e of philosophers of speculative use." — Trendlen- bui'g, Elementa Log. Aristot., p. 76. •'Theory denotes the most general laws to which certain facts can be reduced." — Mackintosh, Prel. Diss.^ p. 61, Whewell's edit. : and at p. 367, the distinctions between hypothesis and theory are thus stated: — 1. The principles employed in the explanation (of the phenomena) should be knoT\^l really to exist ; in which consists the main distinction between hypothesis and theory. Gravity is a principle universally known to exist ; ether and a nervous lluid are mere suppositions. 2. These principles should be known to produce eitects like those which are ascribed to them in the theory. This is a further distinction between hypothesis and theory; for there are an infinite number of degrees of likeness., from the faint resemblances which have led some to fancy that the functions of the nerves depend on electricity, to the remarkable coincidences between the appearances of projectiles on earth, and the movements of the heavenly bodies, which constitute the Newtonian system ; a theory now perfect, though exclu- sively founded on analogy, and in which one of the classes of phenomena brought together by it is not the subject of direct experience. 3. It should correspond, if not with all the facts to be explained, at least with so great a majority of them as to render it highly probable that means will in time be foimd of reconciling it to all. It is only on this gi'ound that the Newtonian system justly claimed the title of a legitimate theory dm*ing that long period when it was unable to explain many celestial appearances, before the kboui's of a century and the genius of Laplace at length 518 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. THEORir— completed the theory^ by adapting it to all the phenomena. A theory may be just before it is complete. '-'- Theory and hypothesis may be distinguished thus : an hypothesis is a guess or supposition, made concerning the cause of some particular fact, with the view of trying experi- ments or making observations to discover the truth. A theory is a complete system of suppositions put together for the purpose of explaining all the facts that belong to some one science. For example — astronomers have suggested many hypotheses^ in order to account for the luminous stream which follows comets. They have also formed many theories of the heavens ; or in other words, complete ex- planations of all the appearances of the heavenly bodies and their movements. When a theory has been generally received by men of science, it is called a system; as the Ptolemaic system ; the Copernican system ; the Newtonian system^ — Taylor, Elements of Thought. See a paper on Theory in BlackwoocTs Mag. for August, 1830.— F. Hypothesis. TBIEO^OPnrsifl or THSOSOPHir (0soV and aoC^U, know- ledge of God). " The Theosophists^ neither contented with the natural light of human reason, nor with the simple doctrines of Scripture understood in their literal sense, have recourse to an internal supernatural light, superior to all other illumi- nations, from which they profess to derive a mysterious and divine philosophy, manifested only to the chosen favourites of heaven." — Enfield, Hist, of Phil. ^ vol. ii. See Tholuck (F. A. D.), Sufsmus^ sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica. 8vo, Berlin, 1821. App., 1838. The Theosophists are a school of philosophers who would mix enthusiasm with observation, alchemy with theology, metaphysics with medicine, and clothe the whole with a form of mystery and inspiration. It began with Paracelsus at the opening of the sixteenth century, and has survived in St. Martin to the end of the eighteenth. Paracelsus, Jacob Boehm, and St. Martin, may be called popular, while VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 519 THEOSOPHIS:n— Cornelius Agrlppa, Valentine Weigelius, Robert Fludd, and Van Helmont, are more philosophical in their doc- trines. But they all hold different doctrines ; so that they cannot be reduced to a system. •'The theosophist is one who giyes you a theory' of God, or of the works of God, w^hich has not reason, but an inspi- ration of his own for its basis." — Yaughan, Hours with Mystics, vol. i., p. 45. ^' Both the politics and the theosophy of Coleridge were at the mercy of a discursiye genius, intellectually bold, but educationally timid, which, anxious, or rather willing, to bring con\'iction and speculation together, mooting all points as it went, and throwing the subtlest glancing lights on many, ended in satisfying nobody, and concluding nothing. Charles Lamb said of him that he had ' the art of making the unintelligible appear intelligible.'" — Hunt. Imagination and Fancy^ 12mo, 1844, p. 276. TH1E:8IS (^Ti^rif^i^ to lay down) — is a position or proposition, the truth of which is not plain from the terms, but requires e^-idence, or explanation, or proof In the schools it was especially appUed to those propositions in Theology, Philo- sophy, Law, and Medicine, which the candidates for degrees were required to defend. THOUGHT AIVD THliVKlNO — " are used in a more, and in a less restricted signification. In the former meaning, they are hmited to the discursive energies alone ; in the latter, they are co-extensiye with consciousness." — Su* Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works, p. 222, note. Thinking is employed by Sir \M11. Hamilton (Discus- siojis^ &c., append, i., p. 578) as comprehending all our cognitiye energies. By Descartes, cogitatio^ pensee^ is used to denote or com- prehend '' all that in us of which we are immediately conscious. Thus all the operations of the Will, of the Imagination and Senses, are thoughts^ — Resp. ad Sec. Obj., p. 85, Ed., 1G63. Again, in reply to the question, what is a thing which thinks ? he says, '^ It is a thing which doubts, 520 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. THOUOHT— understands, conceives, affirms, desires, wills, and does not will, which imagines also and feels." — MediL ii., p. 11. '' Though thinking be supposed ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinJcing^ always in action." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., ch. 1. " Thought proper, as distinguished from other facts of consciousness, may be adequately described as the act of knowing or judging of things by means of concepts.''^ — Mansel, Prolegom. Log.^ p. 22. — V. Train of Thought. TIME (tempus). — Continuation of existence is duration; dura- tion unlimited is eternity ; duration limited is time. '•' By Aristotle," time was defined to be '' the measure of motion, secundum prius et posterius. We get the idea of time on the occasion when v/e observe first and last, that is, succession. Duration without succession would be timeless, immeasurable. But how are we to fix what is first and last in the motion of any body ? By men in all ages the motions of the heavenly bodies have been made the measure of duration. So that the full definition of time is — ' It is the measure of the duration of things that exist in succes- sion, by the motion of the heavenly bodies.' " — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ book iv., ch. 1. ^^ As our conception of space originates in that of body, and our conception of motion in that of space, so our con- ception of time originates in that of motion ; and particularly in those regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect similarity to each other, are correct measures of the continuous and successive quantity called Time^ with which they are con- ceived to co-exist. Time^ therefore, may be defined the perceived number of successive movements ; for as number- ascertains iha greater or lesser quantity of things numbered, so time ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of motion performed." — Gillies, Analysis of Aristotle., chap. 2. According to Mr. Locke {Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii., ch. 14). " Reflection upon the train of ideas, which VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 521 TIME— appear one after another in our minds, is that which fur- nishes us Tvith the idea of succession ; and the distance between any two parts of that succession, is that we call duration." Xow by attending to the train of ideas in our minds we may have the idea of succession — but this pre- supposes the idea of duration in which the succession takes place. '^ We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet, but the notion or idea of diu-ation must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is antece- dent to its bemg measured." — Eeid, Infell. Powers, essay iii., chap. 5. See also Cousin (on Locke) Coiirs de Pliilosophi., lecons 17, 18. Stewart, Philosophical Essays^ essay ii., ch. 2. See also the Fragmeids of Koyer Collard, at the end of tom. iv. of (Euvres de Beid. Dr. Reid (ut supra) says, '• I know of no ideas or notions that have a better claim to be accounted simple and origi- nal than those of Space and Time. . . . The sense of seeing, by itself, gives us the conception and belief of only two dimensions of Extension, but the sense of touch discovers three ; and Reason^ from the contemplation of finite extended things, leads us necessarily to the belief of an Immensity that contains them^ '' In like manner, memor}' gives us the conception and belief of finite intervals of duration. From the contem- plation of these., Reason leads us necessarily to the belief of an Eternity which comprehends all things that have a begin- ning and an end,^'' In another passage of the same essay, chap. 3, he says, ^' AVe are at a loss to what category or class of things we ought to refer them. They are not beings, but rather the receptacles of every created being, without which it could not have had the possibility of existence. Philosophers have endeavoured to reduce all the objects of human thought to these three classes, of Substances, Modes, and Relations. To which of them shall we refer 622 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TIME— Time^ Space, and Kumber, the most common objects of thought?" In the philosophy of Kant, *' Time is a necessary repre- sentation which lies at the foundation of all intuition. Time is given, a priori— \t is the form of the internal sense, and the formal condition, a priori^ of phenomena in general. Hence it will be seen that all intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena ; that the things we see or envisage are not in themselves what they are taken for ; that if we did away with ourselves, that is to say, the subject or subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality that we discover in time and space^ and even time and space themselves would disappear. What objects may be in them- selves, separated from the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us." — Analysis of Kant's Criticism of Pure Reason, By the Translator, 8vo, Lond., 18-14, p. 10. '* One of the commonest errors is to regard Time as an agent But in reality Time does nothing, and is nothing. We use it as a compendious expression for all those causes which operate slowly and imperceptibly ; but unless some positive cause is in action, no change takes place in the lapse of 1,000 years : 6. (/., a drop of water encased in a cavity of silex." — Coplestone, Remains^ p. 123. — F. Space. TOPOliOQlf. — F. Memoria Technica. TRADlTlorv. — (tradere^ to hand down) — '-'- is anyway of deli- vering a thing or word to another." — Bp. Taylor, Dissuasive from Popery. "Tradition is the Mercury (messenger) of the human race." — Tiberghien, Essai des Conriaiss, Hu- maines^ p. 50. "Tradition ! oh tradition ! thou of the seraph tongue, The ark that links two ages, the ancient and the young." Adam Mickiewitz. Nescire quid antea quam natus sis accident, id est semper esse puerum. — Cicero, Orator.^ cap. 14. When we believe the testimony of others not given by themselves directly but by others, this is tradition. It is testimony not written by the witness, nor dictated by him VOCABULARY OF PHrLOSOPHY. 523 TRADITION— to be written, but handed down memoriter, from generation to generation •• According to the principle of Tradition (as the ground of certainty), it is supposed that God himself first imparted truth to the world, pure and unmixed from heaven. In the paradisiacal state, and during the whole period from the first man down to the Christian era, it is said by these philoso- phers there was a channel of divine commimication almost perpetually open between the mind of man and God- Here accordingly, it is thought we lay hold upon a kind of truth which is not subject to the infirmity of human reason, and which coming down to us by verbal or documental tradition from the mind of Deity itself, affords us at once a solid basis for all truth, and a final appeal against all error/' — Morell, PhilosopJi. Tenden., p. 17. See Molitor (J. F.), PhilosopMe de la Tradition^ 8vo, Paris, 1837. On the necessity of Tradition^ see Irertceiis i., 10. TRAIN OF THOUGHT. — **The subject of the Association of Ideas," says Mr. Stewart {PhiL Hum. Mind, vol. i., chap. 5). '^ naturally divides itself into two parts. The Jirst relates to the influence of association in regidating the succession of our thoughts ; the second, to its influence on the intellectual powers, and on the moral character, by the more indissol- uble combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and early youth." — T'. Combination of Ideas. While we are awake a constant succession of thoughts is passing through the mind. Hobbes calls it the con-sequence or train of imaginations, the train of tJio'/glits and mental discourse. He says it is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant. The second is more con- stant, as being regulated by some desire and design. That is, it is spontaneous or intentional. In the Train of Thought^ or the succession of the various modes of consciousness, it has been observed that they suc- ceed in some kind of order. " Xot every thought to every thought succeeds indifierentlv." savs Hobbes. And it ha^ 524 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TKAIN OF THOUOHT-- long been matter of inquiry among philosophers to detect the law or laws according to which the train or succession of thought is determined. According to Aristotle, the consecution of thoughts is either necessary or Jiahitual. By the necessary consecution of thoughts, it is probable that he meant that connection or dependence subsisting between notions, one of which cannot be thought without our thinking the other ; as cause and effect, means and end, quality and substance, body and space. This consecution or connection of thoughts admits of no further explanation, than to say, that such is the con- stitution of the human mind. The habitual consecution of thoughts differs in different individuals : but, the general laws, according to which it is regulated, are chiefly three, viz. : —The law of similars^ the law of contraries^ and the law of co-adjacents. From the time of Aristotle, these laws have been noticed and illus- trated by all writers on the subject. But, it has been thought, that these may be reduced to one supreme and universal law ; and Sir James Mackintosh expresses his sur- prise (Dissert. ^Y^, 348, Edit. Whewell), that Dr. Brown should have spoken of this as a discovery of his own, when the same thing had been hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid down by Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and Condillac. The brief and obscure text of Aristotle, in his Treatise on Memory and Reminiscence., has been explained as contain- ing the universal law as to the consecution of thoughts. (Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works., p. 897). It is pro- posed to call this the law of Redintegration, "Thoughts which have, at any time, recent or remote, stood to each other in the relation of co-existence, or immediate consecu- tion, do, when severally reproduced, tend to reproduce each other." In other words ; " The parts of any total thought, when subsequently called into consciousness, are apt to sug- gest, immediately, the parts to which they were proximately related, and mediately, the whole of which they were co- constituent." VOCABULARY OF PIIILOSOPHT, 525 TRAIIV OF THOUOHT— Hobbes, Leviathan, part 1, chap. 8. Human Nat., p. 17. Keid, Intellectual Powers, essay iv. TRANSCENDENT, TRANSCENI>ENTAr. {trauscendere, to go beyond, to surpass, to be supreme). "To be impenetrable, discerptlble, and unactive, is the nature of all body and matter, as such ; and the properties of a spirit are the direct contrary, to be penetrable, indis- cerptible, and self-motive ; yea, so different they are in all \ ; things, that they seem to have nothing but heing and the transcendental attributes of that in common." — Glanvill, essay i. Transcendental is that which is above the praedica- mental. Being is transcendental. The prcedicamental is what belongs to a certain category of being ; as the ten summa genera. As being cannot be included under any genus but transcends them all, so the properties or affec- tions of being have also been called transcendental. The three properties of being commonly enumerated are unum, verum, and honiim. To these some add aliquid and res: and these, with ens, make the six transcendentals. But res and aliquid mean only the same as ens. The first three are properly called transcendentals, as these only are passions or affections of being, as being. — F. Unity, Truth, Good. '' In the schools, transcendentalis and transcendens were convertible expressions employed to mark a term or notion which transcended, that is, which rose above, and thus con- tained under it, the categories or summa genera of Aris- totle. Such, for example, is being, of which the ten cate- gories are only subdivisions. Kant, according to his wont, twisted these old terms into a new signification. First of all, he distinguished them from each other. Transcendent (transcendens) he employed to denote what is wholly be- yond experience, being neither given as an a posteriori nor a priori element of cognition — what therefore transcends every category of thought. Transcendental (tronscenden- talis) he applied to signify the a priori or necessary cog- 526 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TBANSCENOEIVT— nitions which, though manifested in, as affording the con- ditions of, experience, transcend the sphere of that contba- gent or adventitious knowledge which we acquire by experience. Transcendental is not therefore what trans- cends, but what in fact constitutes a category of thought. This term, though probably from another quarter, has found favour with Mr. Stewart, who proposes to exchange the expression principles of common sense^ for, among other names, that of transcendental truths.^' — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note A, sect. 5. In the philosophy of Kant all those principles of know- ledge which are original and primary, and which are determined a priori are called transcendental. They in- volve necessary and universal truths, and thus transcend all truth derived from experience which must always be contingent and particular. The principles of knowledge, which are pure and transcendental^ form the ground of all knowledge that is empirical or determined a posteriori. In this sense transcendental is opposed to empirical. " There is a. pMlosopJiic (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an artificial) consciousness which lies beneath, or (as it were) behind the spontaneous con- sciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Komans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis- Alpine and Trans- Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness ; citra et trans conscientiam communem. The latter is exclusively the domain of pure philosophy, which is, therefore, pro- perly entitled transcendental^ in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and representation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation, which, abandoned by all distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our in- tellectual faculties, are justly condemned as transcendent. '''' — Coleridge, Biograph. Liter. ^ p. 143. transference: and TRANSLATION are terms employed VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 527 TRANSFERENCE— by the author of the Light of Nature Pursued^ to denote the fact that our desires are often transferred from primary objects to those which are secondary or subservient ; as from the desire of greatness or honour may arise, in a secon- dary way, the desire of wealth as a means of greatness or power. — Tucker, Liglit of Nature ; chapter on Trans- ference or Translation. — V. Desire. TRANSMIGRATION. — V, METEMPSYCHOSIS. TRIVIUIWI. — The seven Liberal Arts (so called because prac- tised only by free persons) were Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music. Lingua, Tropus, Ratio, Numerus, Tonus, Angulus, Astra. Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, constituted the Trivium — ires vice in umim, because they all refer to words or lan- guage, A rithmetic^ Geometry ^^ Miisic^ and Astronomy^ con- stituted the Quadrivium — quatuor vice in unum^ because they all refer to quantity. "Gramm. loquitur, Bia. verba docet, Rhet. verba colorat; Mus. canit, Ar. numerat, Geo. ponderat, Ast. eolit astra." The mechanical arts were the different trades and handi- crafts, as weaving, sewing, baking, &c. TRUTH has been distinguished by most metaphysical writers, according as it respects being, knowledge, and speech, into Veritas entis^ cognitlonis^ et signi. By others, truth has been distinguished as entitative^ objective^ and formal, the tmth of signs being included under the last. Veritas Entis— Transcendental or Ifletaphysical Truth. The pillar and ground of all ti'iith is in truth of being — that truth by which a thing is what it is, by which it has its own nature and properties, and has not merely the appearance but reality of being. Thus gold has truth of being, i. e., is real gold, when it has not only the appearance, but all the properties belonging to that metal. Philosophy is the knowledge of being, and if there were no real being, that is, if ti'uth could not be predicated of things, there could be no knowledge. But things exist independently of being 528 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TRUTH— known. They do not exist because tliey are known, nor as they are known. But they are known because they are, and as they are, when known fully. Teritas Cognitionls. Truth^ as predicated of knowledge, is the conformity of our knowledge with the reality of the object known — for, as knowledge is the knowledge of something, when a thing is known as it is, that knowledge is formally true. To know that fire is hot, is true knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of the thing or object known with true knowledge. But there seems to be little difference whether we say that truth consists in the conformity of the formal conception to the thing known or conceived of, or in the conformity of the thing as it is to true know- ledge. f eritas Sign!. The trutli of the sign consists in its adequateness or con- formity to the thing signified. If falsity in those things which imitate another consists not in so far as they imitate, but in so far as they cannot imitate it or represent it ade- quately or fully, so the trutli of a representation or sign consists in its being adequate to the thing signified. The trutli and adequacy of signs belongs to enunciation in Logic. '* Independent of the truth which consists in the con- formity of thoughts to things, called scientific — and of that which lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts, called moral trutli — there is a truth called logical^ depend- ing on the self- consistency of thoughts themselves Thought is valueless except in so far as it leads to correct knowledge of things ; a higher truth than the merely logi- cal, in subservience to which alone the logical is desirable. The reason that we sedulously avoid the purely logical error of holding two contradictory propositions is, that we believe one of them to be a fair representation of facts, so that in adopting the other we should admit a falsehood, wliich is always abhorrent to the mind. If we call the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 529 TRUTH— logical truths subjective^ as consisting in the due direction of the thinking subject, we may call this higher metaphy- sical truth^ objective^ because it depends on our thoughts fairly representing the objects that give rise to them." — Thomson, Outline of Laws o/TJiougJit^ sect. 81, 82. '^ Veritas est adagquatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est." — Aquinas, Contra. Gent.^ i., 49. Truths in the strict logical sense, applies to propositions and to nothing else ; and consists in the conformity of the declaration made to the actual state of the case ; agreeably to Aldrich's definition of a "true" proposition — vera est, qucB quod res est dicit. In its etymological sense, truth signifies that which the speaker "trows," or believes to be the fact. The etymo- loory of the word d'hrikg seems to be similar ; denoting non -concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a lie ; and may be called morale as the other may be called logical truth. " Truth is not unfrequently applied, in loose and inaccu- rate language, to arguments ; when the proper expression would be ' correctness,' ' conclusiveness,' or ' validity.' " " Truth again, is often used in the sense of reality., tc 6u, People speak of the truth ot falsity of facts ; properly speaking, they are either real or fictitious : \t\s the state- ment that is ' true' or ' false.' The ' true' cause of anything, is a common expression ; ' meaning that which may with truth be assigned as the cause.' The senses of /a/^e/ioot/ correspond." — Whately, Logic, appendix i. " Necessary truths are such as are known independently of inductive proof They are, therefore, either self-evident propositions, or deduced from self-evident propositions." — Kidd, Principles of Reasoning.^ chap. 7. Necessary truths are those in which we not only leam that the proposition is true, but see that it must be true ; in which the negation is not only fiilse, but impossible; in which we cannot, even bv an effort of the imagination, or 530 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TRUTH— in a supposition, conceive tlie reverse of what is asserted. The relations of number are the examples of such truths. Two and three make five. We cannot conceive it to be otherwise. Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence to reason, we may conceive to be otherwise. If I say, '' Grass is green," " Socrates was a philosopher," I assert propositions which are true, but need not have been so. It might have pleased the Creator to make grass blue — and Socrates might never have lived. ''There are truths oi reasoning (reason) and truths oifact. Truths of reason are necessary, and their contradictory is impossible — those oifact are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary you can find the reason by analysis, resolving it into ideas and truths more simple, till you come to what is primitive." — Leibnitz, Nou- veaux Essais^ iv., 2 ; Monadologie^ sect. 33. ''Though the primary truths of fact and the primary truths of intelligence (the contingent and necessary truths of Eeid) form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of our consciousness, there appears no suffi- cient ground to regard their sources as different, and there- fore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret that I am unable to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his Elements^ vol. ii., ch. 1, and his Account of Eeid, supra, p, 27, b." — Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note A, p. 743. " Truth implies something really existing. An assertion respecting the future may be probable or improbable, it may be honest or deceitful, it may be prudent or impru- dent, it may have any relation we please to the mind of the person who makes it, or of him who hears it, but it can have no relation at all to a thing which is not. The Stoics said, Cicero will either be consul or not. One of these is true, therefore the event is certain. But truth cannot be predicated of that which is not." — Coplestone, Enquiry into Necessity^ preface, p. 15. VOC-^JBULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. 531 TRUTH— •' Truvi impKes a report of something that is ; reality denotes the existence of a thing, whether affirmed and reported of or not. The thing reported either is or is not ; the report is either true or false. The things themselves are sometimes called truths^ instead of facts or realities. And assertions concerning matters of fact are called facts. Thus we hear of false facts, a thing literally impossible and absurd.'' — Coplestone, Rtmains. p. 105. — V. Falsity, Reality. TRUTHS (First) are such as do not depend on any prior truth. They cany eyidence in themselves. They are assented to as soon as they are understood. The assent given to them is so full, that while experience may confirm or familiarize it. it can scarcely be said to increase it, and so clear that no proposition contradicting them can be admitted as more cleai*. That a whole is greater than any of its parts ; that a change imphes the operation of a cause ; that qualities do not exist without a substance ; that there are other beings m the world besides ourselves ; may be given as examples of first truths. These truths are and must be assented to by every rational beiug, as soon as the terms expressing them are understood. They have been caUed KOf^oci huoiui. communes notitice^ natural judgments, primitive behefs, fun- damental laws of the human mind, priaciples of common -ense. principles of reason, principles of reasoning, &c. . . . "To determine how great is the number of these propositions is impossible ; for they are not in the soul as propositions ; but it is an undoubted truth that a mind awaking out of nothing into beiug, and presented T\*ith particular objects, would not fail at once to judge concern- ing them according to, and by the force of, some such innatt principles as these, or just as a man would judge who had learnt these explicit propositions : which indeed are so nearly allied to its own natiu-e. that they may be cidled almost a pait of itself. .... Therefore I take the mind or soul of man not to be so perfectly indifferent to receive all impressions as a rasa tabula, or white paper. 532 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. TRUTHS— . . . '' Hence there may be some practical principles also innate, in the foregoing sense, though not in the form of propositions." — Watts, Pliilosopli. Essays^ sect. 4 and 3. ''From the earliest records of time, and following the course of history, we everywhere find the principles of common sense, as universal elements of human thought and action. No violence can suppress, no sophisms obscure them. They steadily and unerringly guide us through the revolutions and destruction of nations and empires. The eye pierces with rapid glance through the long vista of ages amid the sanguinary conflicts, the territorial aggrandize- ments, and chequered features of states and kingdoms ; and from the wreck of all that is debasing, glorious, or powerful, we still recognize the great and universal truths of humanity. One generation passes away after another, but they remain for ever the same. They are the life-blood of human nature ; the intellectual air we breathe. Without them society could not for a single hour subsist; governments, laws, institu- tions, religion, the manners and customs of men, bear the indelible imprint of their universality and indestructibility. They are revealed in the daily and hourly actions, thoughts, and speech of all men ; and must ever form the basis of all systems of philosophy ; for without them it can only be a phantom, a delusion, an unmeaning assemblage of words.'' — ^Yan de Weyer. On the nature, origin, and validity of first truths^ th. following authors may be consulted. Lord Herbert, De Veritate. Buffier, Treatise of First Truths. Eeid, Inquiry and Essays on Intell. Powers. Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works., Appendix, note A.- V. Common Sense, Eemlniscence. TYPE QrvTrog., typus^ from rvTrTSiu, to strike). " Great father of the ^ods, when for our crimes Thou send'st some heavy judgment on the times, — Some tyrant king, the terror of his age, The type and true vicegerent of thy rage ! Thus punish him."— Dryden, Persius, sat. 3. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 533 TYPE— ''So St. Hierome offered wine, not water, in the type of his blood." — Bishop Taylor, Of Real Presence^ sect. 6. Among the Greeks the first model which statuaries made in clay of their projected work was called rvirog. Type means the first rude form or fioure of anvthino^ — an adum- bration or shadowing forth. The thing fashioned according to it was the ectype^ and the type in contrast the protype. But arclietype was appHed to the original idea, model, or exemplar, not copied, but of which other things were copies. '' A type is an example of any class, for instance, a species of a genus, which is considered as eminently possessing the characters of the class." — Whewell, Inductive Sciences^ viii., ii., 10. For the meaning of a type in the arts of design, see Sir Edmund Head, Hist, of Painting^ preface, p. 39. UBIETY (uhi^ where) — is the presence of one thmg to another, or the presence of a thing in place. The schoolmen dis- tinguished ubiety as, 1. Circumscriptive^ by which a body is so in one place that its parts are answerable to the parts of space in which it is, and exclude every other body. 2. Definitive^ as when a human spirit is limited or de- fined in its presence to the same place as a human body. 3. Eepletive, as when the Infinite Spirit is present through every portion of space. This last is sometimes called ubiquity^ and means the Divine Omnipresence. — Leibnitz, Nouv. Essais^ liv. ii., ch. 23, sect. 21. i;iVCOlVl>lTlO]VEl>. — "This term has been employed m a twofold signification, as denoting either the entire absence of all restriction^ or more widely, the entire absence of all relation. The former we regard as its only legitimate apphcation." — Calderwood, Philosoph. of the Infinite^ p. 36. — F. Absolute, I^^finite. Ul¥l>£RSTAN]>INO. — '' Perhaps the safer use of the term, for 534 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. fJNI>ERSTANI>INCJ— - general purposes, is to take it as tlie mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a concipient as well as a perci- pient being, and reason as a power supervening." — Cole- ridge, Statesman!' s Manual^ App. B, p. 264. ''In its wider acceptation, understanding is the entire power of perceiving and conceiving, exclusive of the sensi- bility ; the power of dealing with the impressions of sense, and composing them into wholes according to a law of unity ; and in its most comprehensive meaning it includes even simple apprehension. Thus taken at large it is the whole spontaneity of the representing mind ; that which puts together the multifarious materials supplied by the passive faculty of sense, or pure receptivity. But we may consider the understanding in another point of view, not as the simple faculty of thought, which produces intuitions and conceptions spontaneously, and comes into play as the mere tool or organ of the spiritual mind ; but as a power that is exercised on objects which it supplies to itself, which does not simply think and reflect, but which examines its thoughts, arranges and compares them ; and this for scien- tific, not for directly practical, purposes. To intellectualize upon religion, and to receive it by means of the under- standing are two different things, and the common exertion of this faculty should of course be distinguished from that special use of it, in which one man differs from another, by reason of stronger original powers of mind, or greater improvement of them by exercise." — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ vol. ii., p. 38. '-'- The understanding is the medial faculty, or faculty of means, as reason on the other hand is the source of ideas or ultimate ends. By reason we determine the ultimate end ; by the understanding we are enabled to select and adopt the appropriate means for the attainment of or ap- proximation to, this end, according to circumstances. But an ultimate end must of necessity be an idea, that is, that which is not representable by the senses, and has no cor- respondent in nature, or the world of the senses. . . . VOCABULAKr OF rHILOSOPIIY. 535 uxi>ersta:vi>ixg-- C/akrstanding aud sense constitute the natural mind of man. mind of the tlesh, ^oryj/^ua jcccko;^ as likewise v^t/^/*^ avvtuig. the intellectual power of the living or animal soul, which St. Paul everywhere contradistinguishes from the spirit, that is. the power resulting li'om the miion ajid co-inliuence of the will and reason — {70,^/iac or wisdom." — Coleridge, Xotes on English Dir., vol ii., p. 338. •• The reason and the understanding have not been steadily distinguished by EngUsh writers To under- stand an}i:hing is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules : we do not include in the meaning of the word an examination of the gToimd of the ideas and niles by reference to which we understand the thuig. We understand a language, when we apprehend what is said, according to the established vocabulaiy and grammar of the language : without inquu*ing how the words came to have then- meaning, or what is the gi'oimd of the gi'amma- tical rules. AVe understand the sense without reasoning about the etymology- and s^-ntax. "Eeasoning may be requisite to understanding. TTe may have to reason about the syntax in order to understand the sense. But understanding leaves still room for reasoning. Also we may understand vrhnx is not conformable to reason; as when we understand a man's arguments, and think them imfounded in reason. •* We reason in order to deduce rules from hi'st principles, or from one another. But the rules and principles which must be expressed when we reason, may be only ioipUed when we understand. We may understand the sense of a speech without thinldng of rules of grammar. ** The reason is employed both in understanding and in reasoning ; but the principles which are expUcitly asserted in reasoning, are only imphcitly applied in ujiderstanding. The reason inchides both the faculty of seeing first prin- ciples, and the reasoning lacidty by which we obtahi other prmciples. The understanding is the faculty of applymg 536 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. UNI>ERSTANI>INCJ— principles, however obtained." — ^Vhewell, Elements of Morality^ Introd., sect. 11. Anselm considered tlie facts of consciousness under the fourfold arrangement of Sensibility, Will, Reason, and In- telligence ; and showed that the two last are not identical. — Matter, Hist, de la Philosoph. dans ses Rapports avec Religion^ p. 148. Paris, 1851. ''There is one faculty," says Aristotle (EtTi.^ lib. 6), ''by which man comprehends and embodies in his belief first principles which cannot be proved, which he must receive from some authority ; there is another by which, when a new fact is laid before him, he can show that it is in con- formity with some principle possessed before. One process resembles the collection of materials for building — the other their orderly arrangement. One is intuition, — the other logic. One vov;^ the other hnaryiy.y}.^'' Or to use a modern distinction, one is reason in its highest sense, the other understanding.^^ — Sewell, Christ. Mor.^ chap. 21. " I use the term understanding., not for the noetic faculty, intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the dianoetic, or discursive faculty, in its widest signification, for the faculty of relations or comparisons ; and thus in the mean- ing in which ver stand is now employed by the Germans." — Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions^ &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 4, note. — F. Reason, Intellect. UNIFICATION is the act of so uniting ourselves with another as to form one being. Unification with God was the final aim of the Xeo-platonicians. And unification with God is also one of the beliefs of the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tseu. UNITARIAN (A) is a believer in one God. It is the same in meaning as Monotlieist. In this large sense it is applicable to all Christians, for they all believe in the unity of the Divine nature ; and also to Jews and Mohammedans. It may even include Deists, or those who believe in God on grounds of reason alone. But the name is commonly op- posed to Trinitarian, and is applied to those who, accept- VOCABULARY 6f PHILOSOPHY. 537 UNIFACTION— ing the Christian Revelation, believe in God as existing in one person, and acknowledge Jesus Christ as his Messenger to men. UTVITY or OJVEIVESS (to gy, iiniim, one)— is a property of be- ing. If anything is, it is one and not many. Omne ens est unum. Unity is defined to be that property, qua ens est indivisum in se et divisam ah omni alio. Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand,^ b. ii., ch. 16) makes unity synonymous with number. But Aristotle (Metapliys.^ lib. v., cap. 6., lib. x., cap. 1), more correctly makes unity the element of number, and says that uyiity is indivisible- ness. That which is indivisible and has no position is a monad. That which is indivisible, but has a position, is a point. That which is divisible only in one sense is a line. That which is divisible in two senses is a plane. And that which is divisible in three senses is a lody in respect of quantity. According to Aristotle (Metaphys.^ lib. x., cap. 1), the modes of unity are reducible to four, that of continuity, especially natural continuity, which is not the result of con- tact or tie — that of a whole naturally, which has figure and form, and not like things united by violence — ^that of an individual or that which is numerically indivisible — and that of a universal, which is indivisible in form and in respect of science. Unity has been divided into transcendental or entitative, by which a being is indivisible in itself — logical^ by which things like each other are classed together for the purposes of science — and morale by which many are embodied as one for the purposes of life, as many citizens make one society, many soldiers one army. Unity is opposed to plurality^ which is nothing hnt plures entitates aut imitates. Unity is specific or numericcd. The former may rather be called similitude,, and the latter identity. — Hutcheson, Metapliys.^ pars. 1, cap. 3. 538 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. UJ^ITY or ONENESS— " The essential diversity of the ideas unity and sameness^ was among the elementary principles of the old logicians ; and the sophisms grounded on the confusion of these terms have been ably exposed by Leibnitz in his critique on Wiss- owatius." — Coleridge, Second Lay Sermon^ p. 367. See also Aids to Reflection^ p. 157. — F. Distinction, Identity. tJNiVERSAliS. — '' The same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a repre- sentative of all of that kind, and having given it the name of whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined or met with, and thus universals^ whether ideas or terms, are made." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., ch. 11. Universal terms may denote, 1. A mathematical univer- sality, as all circles (no exception) have a centre and cir- cumference. 2. A physical universality, as all men use words to express their thoughts (though the dumb cannot). 3. A moral universality, as all men are governed by affec- tion rather than by reason. Universal (unum versus alia) — means, according to its compo- sition, one towards many. It is defined by Aristotle (Lib. de Interpret.^ cap. 5), "that which by its nature is fit to be predicated of many." And (Metaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 13) '' that which by its nature has a fitness or capacity to be in many." It implies unity with community, or unity shared in by many. Universals have been divided into, 1. Metaphysical^ or universalia ante rem. 2. Physical^ or universalia in re. 3. Logical^ or universalia post rem. By the first are meant those archetypal forms, according to which all things were created. As existing in the divine mind and furnishing the pattern for the divine working, these may be said to correspond with the ideas of Plato. By universals in the second sense are meant certain com- mon natures, which, one in themselves, are diffused over or shared in by many — as rationality by all men. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 539 By universals in tlie third sense are meant general notion? fi-amed by the human intellect, and predicated of mam- things, on the gToimd of then' possessing common proper- ties — as animal^ which may be predicated of man, lion, horse, &c. Realists give prominence to universals in the first and second signification. Nominalists hold that the true mean- ing o^ universals is that assigned in the third sense. While conceptualists hold an intermediate view. — Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay v., chap. 6. Thomson, Outline of Laivs of TJiought^ 2d edit., sect. 23. In ancient philosophy the universals Tvere called prcedic- ahles (q. v.), and were arranged in five classes, genus^ species^ differentia^ proprium^ and accidens. It is argued that there can be neither more nor fewer. For, whatever is predicated of many is predicated essentially or accidentally ; if essentially^ either of the whole essence, and then it is a species ; of a common part of the essence, and then it is a genus ; or of a proper part of the essence, and then it is the differentia essentialis ; if accidentally^ it either flows from the essence of the subject, and is its proprium^ or does not flow from its essence, and is its accidens. Or it may be argued thus — universality is a fitness of being predicated of many, which implies identity or same- ness, or at least resemblance. There will therefore be as many classes of universals as there are kinds of identity. Xow, when one thing is said to be the same with another, it is so either essentially or accidentally ; if essentially, it is so either completely or incompletely ; if completely, it gives a species ; ]£ incompletely, it is so mform, and gives the differ- entia, or in matter and gives the genus ; if accidentally, it is the same either necessarily and inseparably, and constitutes the proprium — or contingently and separably, and is the accidens. — Tellez, Summa, pars. 1, dis. v., sect. 1. But the fivefold classification of universals is censured by Dero- don, Log., pars. 2, cap. 6. See also Thomson, Outline of iKiivs of Thought, sect. 37. 540 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. IJNIVOCAI4 WORDS (una vox^ one word or meaning) — ''are such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of thing ; the words book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may be called univocal words^ for I know not that they signify anything else but those ideas to which they are generally affixed." — Watts, Logic^ b. i., c. 4. '' I think it is a good division in Aristotle, that the same word may be applied to different things in three ways : univocally^ analogically^ and equivocally. Univocally^ when the things are species of the same genus ; arialogically^ when the things are related by some similitude or analogy ; equi- vocally^ when they have no relation but a common name." — Reid, Correspondence^ p. 75. In logic, a common term is called univocal in respect of those things or persons to which it is applicable in the same signification, as the term ''man." Whately observes that the " usual divisions of nouns into univocal^ equivo- cal and analogous., and into nouns of the first and second intention^ are not, strictly speaking, divisions of words, but divisions of the manner of employing them ; the same word may be employed either univocally., equivocally.) or analo- gously ; either in the first intention or the second." — Whately, Logic, b. ii., ch. 5, § 1. F. Analogous, Equivocal, Intention. UTIIilTY, said Kant (MetapJiys. des Moeurs., p. 15), "is nothing scarcely but a frame or case which may serve to facilitate the sale of a picture, or draw to it the attention of those who are not connoisseurs, but cannot recommend it to true lovers of the art, or determine its price." "What is useful only has no value in itself; but derives all its merit from the end for which it is useful." — Reid, Active Pouters., essay v., ch. 5. " Utility is an idea essentially relative, which supposes a higher term." — Manuel de Philosoph.., p. 344. The doctrine of utility in morals is, that actions are right because they are useful. It has been held under various forms. Some who maintain that utility or beneficial ten- dency is what makes an action right, hold that a virtuous VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 541 UTII.ITY— agent may be prompted by self-love (as Paley), or by benevolence (as Rutlierfortb), or partly by both (as Hume). And the beneficial tendency of actions has by some been viewed solely in reference to this life (as Hume and Ben- tham), while by others it has been extended to a future state (as Paley), and the obligation to do such actions has been represented as arising from the rewards and punish- ments of that future state, as made known by the light of nature and by revelation (as Dwight^. The finidamental objection to the doctrine of utility in all its modifications, is that taken by Dr. Reid {Active Powers, essay v., ch. 5), viz., ''that agreeableness and utility are not moral conceptions, nor have they any connection with morality. What a man does, merely because it is agreeable, is not virtue. Therefore the Epicurean system was justly thought by Cicero, and the best moralists among the ancients, to subvert morality, and to substitute another principle in its room ; and this system is liable to the same censure." " Honestum^ igitur^ id iiitelligimns^ quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitate^ sine idlis premiis fructihusve^ per seipsum jure possit laudariy — De Finihus^ ii., 14. VEIiliElTY (velle^ to will)— is an indolent or inactive wish or inclination towards a thing, which leads to no energetic effort to obtain it, as when it is said, " The cat likes fish but will not touch the water." " The wishing of a thing is not properly the willing it, but it is that which is called by the schools an imperfect velleity^ and imports no more than an idle inoperative complacency in, and desire of the end, without any consideration of the means." — South. V. YOLITION. VERACITY is the duty of preserving the truth in our conver- sation. It is natural for us to speak as we think, and to believe that others do the same. So much so that Dr. 542 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. VERACITY— Reid enumerates an instinct of veracity and a corresponding instinct of credulity as principles of human nature. Chil- dren do not distrust nor deceive. It is not till interest or passion prompts men, that they conceal or disguise the truth. The means employed for this purpose are either saying what is false^ or equivocation and reservation. — q, v. TERBAli is opposed to Real (q. v.), 1. As name is opposed to thing; and 2. As insincere is opposed to sincere. ^' Great acclamations and verbal praises and acknowledgments, Avithout an honest and sincere endeavour to please and obey him, are but pieces of mockery and hypocritical com- pliment." — Hale, Cent, of Afflictions. '' Sometimes the question turns on the meaning and extent of the terms employed ; sometimes on the things signified by them. If it be made to appear, therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain question may be held by parties not differing in their opinion of the matter in hand^ then that question may be pronounced verbal; or depending on the different senses in which they employ the terms. If, on the contrary, it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the question is rgaZ— that they differ as to the opinions they hold of the things or questions." — Whately. ViRTUAli is opposed to actual. — "It is not, in this sense, the foundation of Christian doctrine, but it contains it all ; not only in general, but in special ; not only virtual^ but actual; not mediate, but immediate ; for a few lines would have served for a foundation general, virtual^ and mediate." — Bp. Taylor, Dissuas. from Popery.^ sect. 3. A thing has a virtual existence when it has all the con- ditions necessary to its actual existence. The statue exists virtually in the brass or iron, the oak in the acorn. The cause virtually contains the effect. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the distinction between ^vuoif/^ig., and 'ivTihsx^^^i or euspysiot^ i. e., potentia or virtus^ and actus is frequent and fundamental. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 543 VIRTUAL— '' A letter of credit does not in reality contain the sum which it represents : that sum is only really in the coffer of the banker. Yet the letter contains the sum in a certain sense, since it holds its place. This sum is in still another sense contained ; it is virtually in the credit of the banker who subscribes the letter. To express these differences in the language of Descartes, the sum is contained /or ma?/?/ in the coffer of the banker, objectively^ in the letter which he subscribed, and eminently^ in the credit which enabled him to subscribe ; and thus the coffer contains the reality formal of the sum, the letter the reality objective^ and the credit of the banker the reality eminent.''' — Rover CoUard, (Euvres de Reid^ tom. ii., p. 356. VIRTUE. — "For if virtue be an election annexed unto our nature, and consisteth in a mean, which is determined by reason, and that mean is the very myddes of two things vicious, the one is surplusage, the other in lacke," &c. — Sir T. Elyot, The Governour^ b. ii., c. 10. Virtus., in Latin, from vir., a man, and oL^erri in Greek, from "A^)7;, Mars.) give us the primar^^ idea of manly strength. Virtue then implies opposition or struggle. In man, the struggle is between reason and passion — between right and wrong. To hold by the former is virtue.^ to yield to the latter is vice. According to Aristotle, virtue is a practical habit acquired by doing virtuous acts. He called those virtues intellectual., by which the intellect was strengthened, and moral., by which the life was regidated. Another ancient di^asion was that of the cardinal virtues — which correspond to the moral virtues. The theological virtues ^ere faith., hope., and charity. The opposite of virtue is vice. Aristotle is quoted by Bacon in Seventh Book Of the Advancement of Learning., as saying, "As beasts cannot be said to have vice or virtue, so neither can the gods ; for as the condition of the latter is something more elevated than virtue^ so that of the former is something different from vice." — Moffet, Trans., p. 200. 544 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. VIRTUE— As virtue implies trial or difficulty, it cannot be predi- cated of God. He is Holy. Kant frequently insists upon the distinction between virtue and holiness. In a holy being the will is uniformly and without struggle in accordance with the moral law. In a virtuous being the will is liable to the solicitations of the sensibility, in opposition or resistance to the dictates of reason. This is the only state of which man is capable in this life. But he ought to aim and aspire to the attain- ment of the higher or holy state, in which the will without struggle is always in accordance with reason. The Stoics thought the heau ideal of virtue, or the complete subjection of sense and appetite to reason, attainable in this life. F. Duty, Meeit, Obligation, Eectitude, Stan- dard. VOIilTlON (velle., to will) — '4s an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action."— Locke, Essay on Hum. Under- stand. ., book ii., chap. 21, sect. 15. '' There is an error vfhich lies under the word volition. Under that word you include hoXh the final perception of the understanding which is passive, and also the^r^^ ope- ration or exertion of the active faculty or self-motive power. These two you think to be necessarily connected. I think there is no connection at all between them ; and that in their not being connected lies the difference be- tween action and passion ; which difference is the essence of liberty." — Dr. Sam. Clarke, Second Letter to a Gentle- man., p. 410. Things are sought as ends or as means. The schoolmen distinguished three acts of will, circa finem.^ Velleity., Intention., and Fruition. Gen. iii. 6 : — When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise (this is velleity)^ she took thereof (this is intention) and did eat (this is fruition). There are also VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 545 VOIilTlON— three acts, circa media, viz., consent^ approving of means — election^ or choosing the most fit, and application, use, or employing of them.— F. — Election, Will. WJEIili-BEINO. — ''This is beyond all doubt, and indisput- able," says Lelghton in his Theological Lectures, "that all men wish well to themselves ; nor can the mind of man divest itself of this propensity, without divesting itself of its being. This is what the schoolmen mean when in their manner of expression they say that ' the will' (voluntas, not arhitrium) is carried towards happiness, not simply as will, but as nature.' 'I^o man hateth his own flesh.' " '' One conclusion follows inevitably from the preceding position," says Coleridge (Aids to Reflection, vol. i., p. 20, Edin., 1848), ''namely, that this propensity can never be legitimately made the principle of morality, even because it is no part or appurtenance of the moral vv^iU : and be- cause the proper object of the moral principle is to limit and control this propensity, and to determine in what it may be, and in what it ought to be, gTatified ; while it is the business of philosophy to instruct the understanding, and the office of religion to convince the whole man, that otherwise than as a regulated, and of course therefore a subordinate, end, this propensity, innate and inalienable though it be, can never be realized or fulfilled." — V. Happiness. inHOliE.— " There are ivJioles of different kinds ; for, in the Jii^st place, there is an extended whole, of which the parts lie contiguous, such as hody and space. Secondly, There is a whole, of which the parts are separated or discrete, such as number, which, from thence, is called quantity dis- crete. Thirdly, There is a whole, of which the parts do not exist together, but only by succession, such as time, consisting of minutes^ hours, and days, or as many more parts as we please, but which all exist successively, or not together. Fourthly, There is what mav be called a logical 2n 546 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. whole^ of which the several specieses are parts. Animal, for example, is a whole, in this sense, and man, dog, horse, &c., are the several parts of it. And Fifthly, The different qualities of the same substance, may be said to be parts of that substance." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., book ii., chap. 12. '' Whole'' (oAoj/), says Aristotle (Metaphys., lib. v., cap. 26), "is applied to what is wanting in none of the parts which constitute it naturally a whole ; or to what embraces other beings if they constitute a unity, and to the beings embraced if they form a unity." Under this last point of view, two cases present themselves — either when each of the beings embraced is a unity, or when unity is the result of their union {ensemble). Thus the universal (for the universal receives the name of whole, when designating an ensemhle) is universal, because it embraces several beings, to each of which it applies, and all these particular beings form a common unity, as man, horse, God, because they are all living beings. In the second case, the continuous determined is called a whole or ensemhle, because it is a unity resulting from many integrant parts — above all, be- cause these parts are in potentia and sometimes also in actu, " Quantities having a beginning, a middle, and an end, things to which position brings no change, are called wholes ; those which suffer change by position are called ensemhle QTracv), Those which can unite the two characters are at once ensemhle and whole {y.cci oAa x,a,i 'ttolv). Such are those whose nature remains the same in the displace- ment of their parts, but whose form varies ; as wax, a dress. We apply to these objects the expression de tout et d* ensemhle; for they have these two characters. But water, liquid bodies, numbers, receive only the denomi- nation de tout. The word ensemble does not apply to numbers, nor to water, unless it be by metaphor. The expression 'ttciutcx, applies to those bodies which you would call whole, considering them in unity ; if you consider them VOCABULAHY OF PHILOSOPHT. 547 as divided, you speak in the plural. All this number — ail these monads.'' — Did. Des Sciences Philosoph, A ichole is either divisible or indivisible. Ever)' whole as a whole is one and imdivided. But though not divided, a ichole may be divisible in thought, by being reduced to its elements mentally, or it may be altogether indivisible even in thought. This latter is what metaphysi- cians call Totum perfectionale^ and is only appKcable to Deity, who is wholly in the universe, and wholly in ever)' part of it. A divisible whole is distinguished as potential^ or that which is divisible into parts by which it is not constituted, as animal may be diiided into man and brute, but is not constituted by them ; and actual^ or that which is divisible into parts by which it is constituted, as man may be divided into soul and body. An actual ichole is either physical or metaphysical. A physical whole is constituted by physical composition, and is integral when composed of the integrant parts of matter, or essential when composed of matter and form. A metaphy- sical whole is constituted by metaphysical composition, which Ls fourfold : 1. A whole made up of genus and differentia is an essentiaV specific whole — as man, in so far as he is a species of animal, is made up of the genus (animal) and the differentia (rational). 2. A ichole made up of the specific nature and the individual differentia, is an essential numeri- cal whole. 3. A whole of existence contains a singular essence and existence added. 4. A whole of subsistence has subsistence added to existence. — Baronius, Metaphys. Gen- eralise sect. 15. According to Derodon {Log.^ 3 pars., p. 70), an essential whole is that from which if any part be taken the being perishes — as man in respect of his body and soul. An inte- gral whole is that from which, if any part be taken, the being is not entire but mutilated. Man with aU his mem- bers is an integral whole ; cut off a limb, he is not iin inte- gral^ but still an essential whole. 548 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. WHOIiE— " A loliole is composed of distinct parts. Composition may be physical^ metaphysical^ or logical. '•'- A. physical whole is made up of parts distinct and sepa- rate and is natural^ as a tree, artificial^ as a house, morale or conventional^ as a family, a city, &c. ''A metaphysical ivhole arises from metaphysical composi- tion, as potence and act, essence and existence, &c. ''^ A. logical ivhole is composed by genus and differentia, and is called a higher notion^ which can be resolved into notions under it, as genus into species, species into lower species. Thus, animal is divided into rational and irrational^ know- ledge into science, art, experience, opinion, belief. " Of the parts into which a whole is divisible, some are essential^ so that if one is wanting the bemg ceases, as the head or heart in man ; others are integrant., of which if one or more be wanting the being is not entire, as in man, an eye or arms ; others are constituent., such as concur to form the substance of the thing, as oxygen and hydrogen in water." — Peemans, Litrod. ad Philosoph.., p. 72, WHY? — As an interrogative, this word is employed in three senses, viz., — '' By what proof (or reason) ?" '' From what cause?" "For what purpose?" This last is commonly called the '•'final cause.,'''' — e. ^., '' Why is this prisoner guilty of the crime?" '' Why does a stone fall to the earth?" Why did you go to London?" Much confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different inquiries. — Whately, Logic, appendix 1. l?rir.li. — Some modern philosophers, especially among the French, have employed the term activity as synonymous with will. But the former is of wider signification than the latter. Activity is the power of producing change, what- ever the change may be. Will is the power of producing acts of willing. — F. Volition. "Everyman is conscious of a power to determine," says Dr. Keid (Active Powers., essay ii., ch. 1), " in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of wilV VOCABriARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 649 '• TI7// is an ambiguous word, being sometimes put for the faculty of willing ; sometimes for the act^ of that faculty, besides other meanings. But volition always signifies the act of willing^ and nothing else. Willingness, I think, is opposed to unwillingness or aversion. A man is willing to do what he has no aversion to do, or what he has some desire to do, though perhaps he has not the opportunity : and I think this is never called volition." — Correspondence of Dr. Eeid^ p. 79. ''By the term will I do not mean to express a more or less highly developed faculty of desiring ; but that innate intellectual energy which, unfolding itself from all the other forces of the mind, Kke a llower from its petals, radiates through the whole sphere of om' activity — a taoulty which we are better able to feel than to define, and which we might, perhaps, most appropriately designate as the purely practical faculty of man.-" — Feuchtersleben, Dietetics of tJie Soul *' Appetite is the 2ciirs solicitor, and the ivill is appetite's controller ; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject." — Hooker. Eccles. Pah, book i. On the diiference between desiring and willing^ see Locke. Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., ch. 21. Dr. Reid, Active Powers., essay ii., ch. 2. Mr. Stewart, Active and Moral Powers^ append., p. 471. By some philosophers this difiference ha^ been overlooked, and they have completely identified desire and volition. '' AYliat is desii'e,-' says Dr. Priestley (Philosoph. Necess.. p. 35), '• besides a -svish to obtain some apprehended good ? And is not every wish a vohtion ? Every volition is nothing more than a desire, viz., a desire to accomplish some end, which end may be considered as the object of the passion or affection." '' Yolition," says Mr. Belsham, ''is a modification of the passion of desire." Mr. James Mill, in his Analysis of the Hum. Mind, holds that the will is nothing but the desire that is most powerful at the time. Dr. Tliomas Brown, 550 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. in his Lectures on Mor. Philosophy^ lias not spoken of the faculty of will or of acts of volition as separate from our desires. And in his Essay on Cause and Effect^ sect. 3, he has said, '' Those brief feelings which the body immediately obeys are commonly termed volitions, while the more lasting wishes are simply denominated desires." The view opposed to this is strongly asserted in the follow- ing passage: — ''We regard it as of great moment that the will should be looked on as a distinct power or energy of the mind. Not that we mean to represent it as exercised apart from all other faculties ; on the contrary, it blends itself with every other power. It associates itself with our intellectual decisions on the one hand, and our emotional attachments on the other, but contains an important element which cannot be resolved into either the one or the other, or into both combined. The other powers, such as the sensibility, the reason, the conscience, may influence the will, but they cannot constitute it, nor yield its peculiar workings. We have only by consciousness to look into our souls, as the will is working, to discover a power, which, though inti- mately connected with the other attributes of mind, even as they are closely related to each other, does yet stand out distinctly from them, with its peculiar functions and its own province. We hold that there cannot be an undertaking more perilous to the best interests of philo- sophy and humanity, than the attempt to resolve the will into anything inferior to itself. In particular it may be, and should be distinguished from that with which it has been so often confounded, the emotional part of man's natnre." According to Ritter (Hist, of Anc. Philosoph.^ vol. iii., p. 555), ''it was a principle with the Stoics that will and desire are one with thought, and may be resolved into it." Hence their saying, Omne actum est in intellectu. And hence they maintained that passion was just an erroneous judgment. But this is to confound faculties which are distinct. By the intellect we know or understand, by the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 551 Wllili— sensitivity we feel or desire, and by the will we determine to do or not to do, to do this or to do that. Intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto. — Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol.^ ii., 1, qusest. 83. Ea quae sunt in Intellectu sunt principia eorum quae sunt in affectu, in quantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet affectum. — Ibidem^ ii., 2, quaest. 7, art. 2. In what sense the understanding moves the loill is shown by Aquinas. — Sum. TJieol.^ ii., 1, qusest. 9, art. 1. " Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infalli- bly command and draw after it the acts of the will, this is certain, it does of necessity precede them, and no man can fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports it to the will as amiable." — South, Sermon on Matlh. x., 37. On the question, whether the connection between the intellect and the will be direct or indirect ? see Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ b. i., ch. 21 ; Jonathan Edwards, Inquiry ., part i., sect. 2 ; Dr. TurnbuU, Christ. PhilosopJi.^ p. 196. Will (Freedom of). — '' This is the essential attribute of a will^ and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines the will acquires this power from a previous determination of the will itself. The will is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a will under the law of perfect freedom, but a nature under the mechanism of cause and effect." — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., p. 227. " We need only to reflect on our own experience to be convinced that the man makes the motive, and not the motive the man. What is a strong motive to one man, is no motive at all to another. If, then, the man determines the motive, what determines the man to a good and worthy act, we will say, or a vu'tuous course of con- duct ? The intelligent will^ or the self- determining power? True, in part it is ; and therefore the will is pre-eminently, the spiritual constituent in our being. But will any man admit, that his own will is the only and sufficient deter- 552 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. minant of all lie is, and all he does? Is nothing to be attributed to the harmony of the system to which it be- longs, and to the pre-established fitness of the objects and agents, known and unknown, that surround him, as acting on the will^ though, doubtless, with it likewise ? a process which the co -instantaneous yet reciprocal action of the air and the vital energy of the lungs in breathing, may help to render intelligible." — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., p. 44. '' It is very true that in willing an act, or in any act of self-determination, I am or may be induced by a variety of motives or impulses — my will may be moved ; but this does not exclude the power of origination, for the consent even to the outward inducement or stimulus, still requires this unique act of self-determination in order to the energy re- quisite to the fulfilment of the deed. That it is so, who shall doubt who is conscious of the power ; or if he believe that he has not this consciousness he belies his own nature. The actuation of the individual will not only does not ex- clude self-determination, but implies it — implies that, though actuated, but actuated only because already self-operant, it is not compelled or acting under the law of outward causation. How often do we not see that a stern resolve has produced a series of actions, which, sustained by the inward energy of the man, has ended in its complete achievement. Contrast this with the life and conduct of the wayward, the fickle and the unsteady, and it is impos- sible not to find the inward conviction strengthened and confirmed, that the will is the inward and enduring essence of man's being." — Green, Mental Dynamics^ p. 54. ''The central point of our consciousness — that which makes each man what he is in distinction from every other man — that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind, apart from its regulated laws and formal processes, is the will. Will expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting independently and for ourselves." — Morell, Philo- sopK of Relig.^ p. 3. '•'• Will may be defined to be the faculty which is appro- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 553 hendecl in the consciousness, as the originating power of the personal self. ISTot that it can be seen to be an absolute power of self-origination, it is possible that it may always be determined by subtile forces which do not fall within the sphere of consciousness. But so far as apprehension can reach, the phenomena of the ivill appear to have their origin in an activity of the personal self." — Thompson, Christ, Theism^ book i., ch. 3. — V, JS^ature, Feee-will, Liberty, Necessity. WISI>0]fI, says Sir W. Temple, '' is that which makes man judge what are the best ends, and what the best means to attain them." ''True wisdom^'''' says Lord Shaftesbury, ''comes more from the heart than from the head." Wisdom is the right use or exercise of knowledge, and differs from knowledge, as the use which is made of a power or faculty differs from the power or faculty itself. The word corresponding to icisdom was used among the Greeks to designate philosophy. And in our translation of the Scriptures, the word wisdom frequently denotes the religious sentiment, or the fear and love of God. INDEX. Page Page Ability (Nat. and Mor.), 1 Antinomy, 31 Absolute, 2 Antipathy, 32 Abstinence, 4 A Parte Ante, A Parte Post, . 33 Abstract, Abstraction, 4 Apathy, 33 Abstractive and Intuitive . 10 Aphorism, 33 Absurd, Ad Absurdum E eductio, 1 Apodeictic, . 35 Academics, . 10 Apologue, . 35 Acatalepsy, 11 Apology, . 55 Accident, . 12 Apophthegm, . 35 Acroamatical, . 13 Apperception, 36 Act and Action, . 14 Appetite, . 37 Active, 16 Apprehension, 38 Actual, . 16 Apprehension and Comprehen- Adage, . 16 sion, . . . . 39 Adjuration, 16 A Priori, A Posteriori, . 3'9 Admiration, . 17 Archaeus, . 42 Adscititious, . 17 Archelogy, . 43 Esthetics, . 17 Archetype, 43 Affection, 17 Argument, 43 Affinity, . 18 Argumentation, . 44 Affirmation, . . 18 Art, .... 45 A Fortiori, . 18 Asceticism, 47 Agent, . 19 Assent, . 48 Allegory, v. Myth, . 331 Assertory, . 49 Ambition, . 19 Association, . 49 Amphibology, . 19 Assumption, . . 61 Amphiboly, . 19 Atheism, 51 Analogy, . 19 Atom and Atomism, 53 Analogy and Metaphor, . 23 Attention, 53 Analogy and Example, . 24 Attribute, 55 Analogy and Experience, . 24 Authentic, , 56 Analogy and Induction, . 25 Authority (Principle of), 57 Analysis and Synthesis, . 25 Autocrasy, 57 Analytics, , 27 Automaton and Automatic, . 58 Anima Mundi, . 27 Automatism, 59 Animism, . 27 Autonomy, . . 69 Antecedent, . 29 Autotheists, . 59 Anthropology, . 29 Axiom, . 59 Anthropomorphism, . 30 Anticipation, . 30 Beauty, . 61 INDEX. Page Being, 62 Consent, . . . . Belief, 63 Consent, Universal Benevolence, 64 Consequent, v. Antecedent, Blasphemy, . . . . 65 Consilience of Inductions, Body, 66 Contemplation, Bonuni, . . . . 66 Continence, . . . . Bonum, Morale, . 67 Contingent, . . . . Bonum, Suramiim, 67 Continuity, Law of Brocard, 68 Contract, . . . . Contradiction (Principle of), . Capacity, 68 Contraries, . . . . Cardinal Virtues, . 69 Cosmogony, . Casuistry, . 70 Cosmology, v. Metaphysics, . Catalepsy, ... 71 Craniology, v. Phrenology, Category, . . 72 Cranioscopy, v. Organ, . Cause, ... . 74 Creation, . . . . Causality, . 76 Credulity, . . . . Causation, . 80 Criterion, . . . . Causes, Final, . 80 Cumulative (The Argument), Causes, Occasional, 83 Custom, . . . . Certainty, Certitude, . 83 Cynic, . . . . Chance, 87 Charity, . 89 Daemonist, . . . . Chastity, . . 89 Data, Choice, . 89 Deduction, . . , , Chrematistics, . 90 Definition, . . . . Civility, Courteousness, . . 90 Deist, Classification, . 90 Demiurge, . . . . Coenosthesis, v. Sensation, &c. 457 Demonstration, Colligation of Facts, . 92 Denomination, External, v. Combinations of Ideas, . . 93 Mode, . . . . Common Sense, . . 94 Deontology, Common Sense (Philosophy of ), 94 Design, . . . . Common Term, . 96 Desire, . . . . Comparison, . 96 Destiny, . . . . Compassion, v. Sympathy, . 500 Determinism, Complex, . 96 Dialectics, . . . . Comprehension, . 97 Dianoiolog}^, v. Noology, Conceiving and Apprehending , 97 Dictum de Omni et Nullo, Concept, . 98 Difference, . . . . Conception, . . 99 Dilemma, . . . . Conceptualism, . 103 Discovery, v. Invention, Conclusion, . . 104 Discursus, . . . . Concrete, . 104 Disposition, v. Temperament, . Condition, . 105 Distinction, . . . . Conjugate, . . 106 Distribution, Connotative, . 106 Ditheism, Consanguinity, . 106 Division, . . . . Conscience, . . 107 Dogmatism Consciousness, . 108 Doubt, . . . . 555 556 INDEX. Page Page Dreaming, . c . . 145 Fable, v. Apologue, . 35 Dualism, Duality, 145 Fact, . . 183 Duration, . . . . 146 Factitious, . . 183 I>"ty, 146 Faculty, . 184 Dynamism, . . . . 146 Faculties of the Mind, . 188 Eclecticism, 146 False, Falsity, . 190 Economics, . . . . 149 Fancy, . 191 Ecstasy, . . . . 149 Fatalism, Fate, . . 193 Ectype, . . . 633 Fear, . . 195 Education, . . . . 150 Feeling, . 195 Effect, . . . . 151 Fetichism, . 197 Ego, 151 Fitness and Unfitness, . 197 Egoism, Egoist, . 151 Force, . . 198 Election, . . . . 152 Form, . . 199 Element, . . . . 153 Formally, v. Virtual, . 643 Elicit, 154 Fortitude, . 202 Elimination, 154 Free Will, . . 202 Emanation, . . . . 154 Friendship, . . 202 Eminently, v. Virtual, . 543 Emotion, . . . . 155 Generalization, . 203 Empiric, Empiricism, 156 General Terms, . . 203 Emulation, . . . . 157 Genius, . 203 End, 157 Genuine, v. Authentic, . 56 Ens, . . . . . 158 Genus, . 207 Entelechy, . . . . 159 God, . . 208 Enthusiasm, 160 Good (The Chief), . 208 Enthymeme, 161 Grammar, . 209 Entity, . . . . 161 Grandeur, . 210 Enunciation, 161 Gratitude, . . 211 Equanimity, v. Magnanimity, 296 Gymnosophist, . 211 Equity, . . . . 161 Equivocal, . . . . 162 Habit, . 211 Equivocation, 163 Happiness, . . 215 Error, 164 Harmony, Pre-establish( 3d, . 216 Esoteric and Exoteric, . 164 Harmony of the Spheres , . 217 Essence, . . . . 165 Hatred, v. Love, . . 294 Eternity, . . . . 167 Hedonism, . . 218 Eternity of God, . 168 Hermetic Philosophy, . 218 Ethics, . . . . 169 Hylozoism, . . 218 Ethnography and Ethnology, 170 Hypostasis, v. Subsisten tia, . 493 Ethology, . . . " . 170 Hypothesis, . . 218 Eudemonism, 170 Evidence, . . . . 170 I, . . . . 221 Evil, 172 Idea, , . 221 Existence, . . . . 175 Ideal, . . 228 Expediency, 176 Idealism, . 231 Experience, . . . . 176 Idealist, . 232 Experimentum Crucis, . 180 Identical Proposition, . 232 Extension, . . . . 181 Identism or Identity, . 232 Externality or Outness, 182 Identity, . 233 INDEX. 657 Page Page Identity (Personal), 233 Intuition, . 269 Identity (Principle of), . 235 Invention, . . 272 Ideology or Idealogy, . 235 Idiosyncrasy, 236 Judgment, . . 273 Idol, . '. 236 Jurisprudence, . 275 Ignorance, . . . . 237 Justice, . 278 Illation, . . . . Imagination, 237 238 Knowledge, . . 279 Imagination and Fancy, 239 Language, . . 283 Imagination and Conception, . 241 Laughter, . 283 Imitation, . , . 241 Law, . . 283 Immanent, 242 Lemma, . 287 Immaterialism, 243 Libertarian, . . 287 Immateriality, 244 Liberty of Will, . 288 Immortality of the Soul, 244 Life, . . 290 Immutability, 244 Logic, . . 292 Impenetrability, . 244 Love and Hatred, . 294 ImperateAct, 14 Imperatiye Categorical, . 245 Macrocosm and Microcosm, . 295 Impossible, . . . . 245 Magnanimity and Equanimity, 296 Impression, . . . . 246 Manicheism, . 296 Impulse and Impulsiye, . 247 Materialism, . 297 Inclination, . . . . 247 Matter, . 298 Indefinite, . . . . 247 Matter and Form, . 299 Indifference (Liberty of). 248 Maxim, . 300 Indifferent Action, 248 Memory, . 300 Indifferentisra or Identism, 248 Memoria Technica or Mnemon- Indiscernibles, v. Perceptions ics, . 305 Obscure, . . . . 372 Mental Philosophy . 306 Indiyidual, . . . . 248 Merit, . , 307 Individuality, 250 Metaphor, . 307 Individuation, 250 Metaphysics, . 308 Individualism, 250 Metempsychosis, . 313 Induction (Process of), . 250 Method, . 314 Induction (Principle of), 253 Metonomy, v. Intention, . 268 Inertia, .... 254 Microcosm, v. Macrocosm, . 295 In Esse, In Posse, 254 Mind, . . 317 Inference, .... 254 Mnemonics, v. Memoria Tech- Inference and Proof, 255 nica, . 305 Infinite, .... 255 Modality, . 318 Influx (Physical), 257 Mode, . 319 Injury, . . . . 258 Molecule, . 320 Innate Ideas, 258 Monad, . 320 Instinct, .... 261 Monadology, . 321 Intellect, .... 264 Monogamy, . . 322 Intellection, <•,... 265 Monotheism, . 322 Intelligence, 265 floral, . 322 Intellectus, Patiens, A gens, . 266 Moral Faculty, v. ( Conscience, 107 Intent or Intention, 267 iSIorality, . 323 Intention, First and Second, . 268 Moral Philosophy, . 324 558 INDEX. Moral Sense, v. Senses Re- Page Pact, V. Contract, Page 118 flex, .... 460 Pantheism, . . . . 366 Motion, . . . 325 Parable, . . . . 366 Motive, . . . . 325 Paradox, . . . . 367 Mysticism, . . . . 330 Parcimony (Law of). 367 Mystery, . . . . 330 Paronymous, v. Conjugate, . 106 Myth, . . . . 331 Part, 367 Mythology, . . . . 331 Passion, . . . . Passions (The), . 368 368 Natural, , . 332 Perception, . . . . 369 Naturalism, 333 Perceptions (Obscure), . 370 Nature, . , . . 334 Perfection, . . . . 373 Nature (Course of), 336 Perfectibility, 373 Nature (Plastic), . 337 Peripatetic, . . . . 375 Nature (Philosophy of), 337 Person, Personality, 375 Nature (Law of). 337 Petitio Principii, . 377 Nature (Human), 339 Phantasm, v. Idea, 226 Necessity, .... 339 Phenomenology, v. Nature, . 336 Negation, . . . 342 Phenomenon, 377 Nihilism, . . . . 342 Philanthropy, 378 Nihilum, or Nothing, 343 Philosophy, .... 379 Nominalism, 343 Phrenology, . . . . 381 Noogonie, . . . . 344 Physiognomy, 382 Noology, .... 344 Physiology and Physics, 383 Notion, . . . . 345 Picturesque, 383 Notiones Communes, 349 Pneumatics, 384 Noumenon, . . . . 349 Pneumatology, 384 Novelty, .... 350 Pollicitation, v. Promise, 402 Number, . . . . 351 Polygamy, . . . . 385 Polytheism, . . . • 386 Oath, . . . . 351 Positivism, . . . • 386 Object, V. Subject, 490 Possible, . . . • 387 Objective, , . . . 351 Postulate, . . . . 388 Obligation, . . . 353 Power, .... 389 Observation, 355 Prsedicate, .... 392 Occasion, .... 357 Prsedicable, .... 392 Occasional Causes, v. Causes, 83 Prasdicament, 393 Occult Qualities, v. Quality, . 412 Prse- Pr aedicamenta. 393 Oneiromancy, v. Dreaming, . 145 Prejudice, . . . . 393 Ontology, .... 358 Premiss, . . . 394 Operations of Mind, 359 Prescience, .... 394 Opinion, .... 360 Primary, . . . . 395 Opposed, Opposition, 361 Principia Essendi, 395 Optimism, .... 361 Principle, .... 395 Order, .... 362 Principles of Knowledge, 396 Organ, .... 363 Principles Express or Opera- Organon, .... 364 tive, .... 397 Origination, 365 Principles of Action, 397 Oughtness, v. Duty, 146 Privation, . . . . 399 Outness, .... 365 Probable, . . . . 400 INDEX. 659 Page Problem, . . 401 Progress, v, '. Perfectibility, . 373 Promise, . 402 Proof, . . 403 Property, . 403 Proposition, . 403 Propriety, . 404 Proprium, . 404 Protype, . 533 Proverb, . 405 Prudence, . 406 Psychism, . 407 Psychology, > 407 Psychopann} xhism. . 410 Pyrrhonism, V. Academics, . 10 Scepticism , . 448 Quadrivium, V. Trivium, . 527 Quality, . . 410 Quality (Occult), . . 412 Quantity, . . 413 Quantity, Discrete, &c., . 415 Quiddity, . . 416 Quietism, . 416 Race, V. Species, . . .481 Ratio, .... 417 Ratiocination, . , .417 Rationale, . . . .418 Rationalism, . . .419 Rationalists, . . .419 Real, 419 Realism, . . . .420 Reason, . . . .420 Reason (Spontaneity of), . 422 Reason and Understanding, . 422 Reason (Impersonal), . .427 Reason (Determining), . .430 Reasoning, . . . .430 Rectitude, .... 431 Reflection, . . . .433 Reflex Senses, • Senses (Reflex), 460 Relation, .... 434 Relative, . . . .437 Religion, . . . .437 Remembrance, . . .438 Reminiscence, . . .439 Reservation or Restriction, . 442 Retention, . . . . 443 Right, .... 443 Rule, .... 446 Sabaism, Same, . Sanction, Savage, Scepticism, . Scholastic, . Scholastic Philosophy, Science, Scientia (Media), Sciolist, Sciomachy, . Selfishness, . Self-love, Sematology, Sensation, Sensation and Perception, Sense, . Senses (Reflex), Sensibility or Sensitivity, Sensibles, Common and Proper, Sensism, Sensualism, Sensuism, Sensorium, . Sensus Communis, Sentiment, . Sentiment and Opinion, Sign, . Singular Term, Socialism, Society (Desire of) , Society (Capacity of). Somatology, v. Nature, Sophism, Sophister, Sophistical, Sorites, Soul, Soul, Spirit, Mind, Soul of the World, v, Anima Mundi, Space, Species, Species in Perception, Specification (Principle of), Speculation, Spirit, Spiritualism, Spontaneity, Spontaneous, Standard of Virtue, States of Mind, . Statistics, Stoics, 560 INDEX. Page Subject, Subjective, 490 Topology, V. Memoria Technica, Subjectivism, 492 Tradition, . . . . Sublime (The), . . 492 Train of Thought, Subsistentia, 492 Transcendent, Substance, . 493 Transcendental, Substance (Principle of j. 494 Transference, Translation, Subsumption, 495 Transmigration v. Metempsy- Succession, . 495 chosis, .... Sufficient Reason, 495 Trivium, .... Suggestion, . 496 Truth, .... Suicide, 497 Truth (Necessary), Supra-naturalism, 497 Truth (Contingent), Syllogism, . 497 Truths (First), Symbol, v. Myth, . . 331 Type, Sympathy, . 500 Syncretism, . . 500 Ubiety, .... Synderesis, , 501 Unconditioned, Syneidesis, . 502 Understanding, Synteresis, . . 602 Unfitness, v. Fitness, Synthesis, 502 Unification, .... System, 503 Unitarian, .... Unity or Oneness, Taste, . . 504 Universals, .... Teleology, . 505 Uni vocal Words, Temperament, 506 Utility, .... Temperance, 507 Tendency, 508 Velleity, .... Term, , . . [ 508 Veracity, .... Testimony, . 508 Verbal, .... Theism, 510 Veritas Entis, Theocracy, . 511 Veritas Cognitionis, Theodicy, 512 Veritas Signi, Theogony, . . 514 Virtual, .... Theology, . 514 Virtue, .... Theology, Natural, 515 Volition, • . . • Theopathy, . . 516 Theory, "... . 516 Well-being, .... Theosophism, Theosophy, . 518 Whole, . . . - Thesis, . 519 Whv, .... Thought, Thinking, . 519 Will, . . . . Time, .... . 520 Wisdom, .... si BELL AND BAIN, PfilNTEKS, GLASGOW.