q^oa A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR COMPILED AND WRITTEN BY IRWIN SCOFIELD GUERNSEY, M.A. WITH A PREFACE BY FRANK MOORE COLBY EDITOR OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA NUMEROUS MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS NEW YORK DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY Copyright, 1920, by DoDD, Mead and Company, Inc. y PREFACE This volume has been prepared in order to meet the ever increasing de- mand for a reliable authentic history of the war in all its phases in one volume. Almost all the histories of the war that have been published to date have been written on specific aspects of the tremendous struggle. Those that cover the entire subject have been set before the public in many volumes, and, as a con- sequence, demand a large amount of time on the part of the reader. After the armistice was signed and the Peace Conference finished, the publishers of this volume determined to offer the reading public a compact history of the war in a single volume. This has been done with the result. that a compre- hensive but not detailed history of the war has been produced. It is nar- rated in an entertaining, scholarly style. The various chapter headings. War in Brief, Underlying Causes of the War, Military Operations, Naval Opera- tions, Aerial Operations, Destruction of Art and Architecture, Alleged Atroci- ties, Peace Terms and War Aims, Neutral Nations, Economic and Financial Aspects, Peace Conference and Peace Treaties, etc., will show at a glance the scope of the volume. An index and bibliography of the most accessible books on the war have also been included. The material for the history of the war was gathered from the most reliable contemporary sources, and was edited from time to time in order to include new facts that were unearthed or to delete material that had been assumed true at the time it was incorporated but later proved contrary to fact. The basic material presented for the first two years was contributed by several members of the staff of the New In- ternational Encyclopaedia, namely. Colonel Cornells De Witt Wilcox, U. S. A. ; Professor F. H. Hankins ; Professor Nelson P. Mead ; Captain Lewis Sayre Van Duzer, U. S. N. ; Mr. Herbert T. Wade; and Mr. Irwin Scofield Guernsey. The bulk of the work has been done by Mr. Irwin Scofield Guernsey. Frank Moore Colby, Editor-in-Chief, New International Encyclopaedia. CONTENTS The War in Brief II. Underlying Causes of the War 5 National Antagonisms; Pan-German- 1 VII. Alleged Atrocities . . 219 Belgium; Armenia; Poland; Serbia; France. ism; Military Causes. Alliances; Economic III. IV. V. VI. Outbreak of the War . . 18 Austria's Demands; the Serbian Re- ply; Germany and Russia; Ger- many and France; Great Britain and Germany; Question of Belgian Neutrality; Italy's Position; Ja- pan's Position; The Balkan States, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania; Por- tugal; Czecho-Slovakia. Military Operations . . 39 Mobilization and Concentration; Gen- eral Strategy and Resources; Equipment of the Armies; West- ern Theatre; American Expedition- ary Force; Eastern Theatre; Rus- ^ sian Revolution; The Bolsheviki; Southern Theatre; Southeastern Theatre ; Colonies. Naval Operations . . . 177 Operations in the North Sea and the Waters about Great Britain; Oper- ations in the Mediterranean; Opera- tions in the Black Sea and Darda- nelles; Cruiser Operations in the At- lantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans; Naval Strategy of the War; Some Naval Lessons of the War. Aerial Operations . . . 207 Estimated Participants and Casual- ties. VIII. Destruction of Art and Architecture . . 225 IX. Neutral Nations at Beginning OF War .... 227 United States; Scandinavian Coun- tries; Netherlands; Switzerland; South American Countries; Other Countries. X. Peace Proposals and State- ments OF War Aims 273 XI. Relief Measures . . . 2S8 Commission for Relief in Belgium; Belgium Relief Fund; Jewish Re- lief; Other Funds; Red Cross. XII. Financial and Economic As- pects 304 International Exchange and Banking Problems; Currency; Employment and Wages; American Foreign Trade; World Trade; Foreign Credits; Prices and Food Supplies; Cost of the War. XIII. Peace Conference and Treaties of Peace 331 XIV. Bibliography .... 386 Historical Background; Military Operations; Naval Operations; Aerial Operations; Economic As- pects; Finances. A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR I. THE WAR IN BRIEF On June 28, 1914, the Austrian heir- apparent. Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife were assassinated at Sara- jevo, the capital of Bosnia. Accusing Serbia of complicity in the crime and alleging that the anti-Austrian machi- nations of Serbian patriots menaced the integrity of the Hapsburg Em- pire, Austria-Hungary on July 23, 1914, delivered an ultimatum contain- ing demands with which the Serbian government would only partially com- ply. Despite the diplomatic remon- strances of other powers, Austria- Hungary refused to submit the mat- ter to peaceful arbitration and declar- ed war on Serbia, July 28, 1914. The Russian government, frankly sympa- thetic with Serbia, ordered the mobili- zation of the Russian army and de- clined to countermand the order, whereupon the German government de- clared what it considered to be a de- fensive war against Russia, August 1, 1914. Two days later Germany de- clared war against Russia's ally, France. Preparatory to an invasion of France, German troops had al- ready occupied Luxemburg, August 2, and begun to invade Belgium, August 4, notwithstanding Belgium's opposi- tion. Tlie British government con- strued the German violation of Bel- gian neutrality as a casus belli and declared war against Germany, August 4. Serbia and the "Allies," or En- tente Powers — Russia, France, and Great Britain — were subsequently joined by Montenegro (August 7, 1914), Japan (August 23, 1914), Italy (May 23, 1915), San Marino (May 24, 1915), Portugal (March 9, 1916), Rumania (August 27, 1916), United States (April 6, 1917), Pana- ma and Cuba (April 7, 1917), Greece (July 2, 1917), Siam (July 21, 1917), Liberia (August 4, 1917), China (Au- gust 14, 1917), Brazil (October 26, 1917), Guatemala (April 22, 1918), Costa Rica (May 23, 1918), Nicara- gua (May 24, 1918), Haiti (July 15, 1918), and Honduras (July 19, 1918). The "Teutonic" or Central Powers — Austria-Hungary and Germany — on the other hand, while they failed to re- ceive the support of their former ally, Italy, succeeded in enlisting the aid of Turkey ("state of war" with Rus- sia, October 30; attacked by Great Britain and France, November 5, 1914) and Bulgaria (October 14, 1915). From the outset the Allied na\'ies controlled the seas, putting an end to Gennan overseas commerce and com- pelling the German battleships for the A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR most part to remain in home waters under the protection of coast defenses and mines, although the main German battle fleet ventured out to fight an indecisive battle, off Jutland, May 31, 1916, and swift German battle cruisers repeatedly raided the British coast. The naval engagements in the Bight of Heligoland (August 24, 1914), off Coronel (November 1, 1914), near Dogger Bank (January 24, 1915), and in the Gulf of Riga (October, 1917) were of secondary importance. A few daring German commerce raiders and the surprisingly effective. German sub- marines were able to inflict consider- able damage upon the Allied and neu- tral merchant marines, but not to break the virtual blockade by means of which Great Britain hoped to starve out her principal enemy. By the terms of the armistice which ended the war the greater part of the battle fleets and submarines of the Central Powers had to be turned over to the Allies (November, 1918). The military operations may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) In the Franco-Belgian theatre, the gallant defense of Liege (August 4-5, 1914), the stand at the Mons-Namur-Char- leroi (August 21-24, 1914), and a counter invasion of Alsace-Lorraine (August, 1914) failed to stop the on- ward sweep of the German armies through Belgium, Luxemburg, and Lorraine toward Paris. The high tide of the German invasion was reached in the Battle of the Marne (Septem- ber 6-10, 1914), after which the Ger- man right wing fell back upon the Aisne River and extended itself north- ward through Picardy, Artois, and Flanders to the Belgian coast. From October, 1914, to July, 1918, the long intrenched battleline from the coast to Switzerland remained almost sta- tionary, although terrific attempts to break through were made by the Ger- mans in Flanders (October-November, 1914), again at Ypres (April-May, 1915), in the Argonne (July, 1915), at Verdun (February- July, 1916), be- tween St. Quentin and La Fere toward Amiens (March, 1918), in the Ypres sector (April, 1918), at the Chemin des Dames (May-June, 1918), be- tween Rheims and Soissons (June- July, 1918), and at the Marne (July, 1918) ; as well by the Allies at Neuve Chapelle (March 10, 1915), in the region just north of Arras (May- June, 1915), in Champagne (September-Oc- tober, 1915), in Artois, near Lens (September-October, 1915), in the Valley of the Somme (July, 1916- March, 1917), near Arras (April- June, 1917), on the Aisne (April-No- vember, 1917), in Flanders (July-De- cember, 1917). After the failure of the five great German attempts be- tween March and July, 1918, the Al- lies found themselves in a position to take the offensive. They did not de- pend upon the customary single huge blow but struck a series of smaller blows which set the whole line rocking from the sea to the Swiss border. The second Marne was won in July, the third Somme in August and by Sep- tember the whole German line from Rheims to Ypres was in a backward movement. In September the St. Mihiel salient was wiped out and an advance on both sides of the Argonne forest begun. Toward the end of the same month Foch struck in Flanders and so on. By the end of the month the Germans were back to the starting place of March 21. In October the Allies smashed the Hindenburg line, cleared the Belgian coast, and ad- vanced along the Meuse, threatening all communications, and compelling the Photograph by Paul Thompson, N. Y. CROWN PRINCE FRANCIS FERDINAND ASSASSINATED JUNE 28. 1914 Photograph by Paul Thompson, N. Y. FRANCIS JOSEPH EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY THE WAR IN BRIEF Germans to ask for an armistice which was granted on November 11, 1918. (2) In the East the initial Russian of- fensive in East Prussia was shattered by Hindenburg at Tannenberg (Au- gust 26-31, 1914) ; an Austro-German counter-invasion of Russian Poland was checked before Warsaw (Febru- ary, 1915) ; the Russian armies invad- ing Galicia attained the passes of the Carpathians early in 1915, but were completely expelled from Austrian ter- ritory by "Mackensen's Drive" (May- June) ; and an Austro-German inva- sion of Russia under the masterly di- rection of Hindenburg, after conquer- ing Warsaw (August 4, 1915), Brest- Litovsk (August 25), and Vilna (Sep- tember 18, 1915) was halted only by the swamps before Riga, the lakes around Dwinsk, and the Pripet marshes. The Russians returning to the attack in 1916 (June-August) re- captured the Volhynian fortresses of Lutsk and Dubno, conquered the Bukowina, and penetrated up the Dniester River as far as Halicz. The Russian revolution brought opera- tions on the East Front to a stand- still, the only outstanding feature be- ing the unsuccessful Russian offensive (July) and the fall of Riga. (Septem- ber-October, 1917). Ater the Bolshe- viki came into power they evinced a strong desire to make peace and ulti- mately signed the treaty of Brest- Litovsk (March, 1918). The Allies determined to save Russia from herself and from Germany and sent an army into Siberia, (to aid the Czecho-Slo- vaks) and landed two small forces at Archangel and Murman (July, 1918). They hoped by these means to re-es- tablish an Eastern Front. After vary- ing success the fighting in Russia was still continuing after all the Central Powers had signed an armistice. (3) After two important Austro-Hungar- ian attempts to "punish Serbia" had failed (in August and December, 1914), a new Austro-German inva- sion of Serbia was undertaken in Oc- tober, 1915, with the aid of Bulgaria, and by December 5, 1915, Serbia was completely conquered. Anglo-French forces endeavoring to succor Serbia were defeated in the battle of the Var- dar (December, 1915), and driven back on their base at Saloniki, in Greek territory. Montenegro and northern Albania were overrun by Austrian and Bulgar armies (Janu- ary-February, 1916). In the summer of 1916, the Allied army at Saloniki assumed the offensive and wrested the iSerbian town of Monastir from the Bulgarians (November 19), but were unable to advance very much beyond that point in 1917, owing to the com- plete downfall of Russia and Rumania. During July, 1918, after initial suc- cesses an Allied offensive in Albania failed. During the succeeding months after careful preparation, the Allies broke the Bulgarian defenses and aft- er a series of remarkable victories com- pelled them to accept an armistice (September, 1918), which amounted to an unconditional surrender. (4-) Rumania, entering the war on August 27, 1916, too rashly sent her armies to "emancipate" Transylvania, leaving the Dobrudja undefended against Mackensen; the Rumanian in- vaders of Transylvania were thrown back by Falkenhayn; and all of Ru- mania, excepting a small part of Mol- davia, was conquered by the Central Powers. Disclosures made by the Rus- sian revolutionists show that Rumania was betrayed by the Germanophile Russian premier, Stiirmer, who failed to send the promised army to protect Rumania's flank. She was compelled 4 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR to sign a humiliating peace with the Central Powers in March, 1918. (5) Turkish armies held the Dardanelles against Anglo-French attacks (Febru- ary, 1915, to January 8, 1916) ; de- livered futile attacks upon the Suez Canal; captured a British army under Gen. Townshend in Mesopotamia (April 28, 1916) ; and expelled the Russians from Kermanshah (July 5, 1916) and Hamadan (August 10, 1916), but were unable to defend the important Armenian cities of Erzerum (February 16, 1916), Trebizond (April 18), and Erzingan (July 25) against Grand Duke Nicholas's ad- vance. Assuming the offensive in 1917 the Allies took Kut-el-Amara (Febru- ary 24), Bagdad (March 10) and Jerusalem (December 10). During 1918 the Allies continued their offen- sive against the Turko-German forces in Asia Minor and succeeded in prac- tically wiping them out. The capitu- lation of Bulgaria placed Turkey in a precarious position and compelled her to sue for an armistice (October, 1918). The conditions granted her also amounted to an unconditional sur- render. (6) The Italians, having pain- fully penetrated into the Trentino a few miles, were rudely repulsed in May, 1916; towards Trieste the Italians made slow progress and finally cap- tured Gorizia, August 9, 1916. Strik- ing out on the Carso and Bainsizza plateaus in the summer of 1917, the Italians were making substantial prog- ress towards Laibach and Trieste, when they were again rudely repulsed by a German-Austro force and hurled back to the Piave River (October- December, 1917). Contrary to expec- tations the Central Powers did not at- tempt to force the Piave when the fighting season of 1918 opened. The attempt was not made until June and then it was severely checked. Assum- ing the offensive in August and Sep- tember, 1918, the Allies completely broke through the enemy lines and threw them back in a disorderly rout. Austria-Hungary sued for an armis- tice and received terms amounting to unconditional surrender (N.ovember, 1918). (7) All of the German colon- ies were taken: Kiaochow (in China) by the Japanese (November 6, 1914) ; the German island possessions in the Pacific by British and Japanese expeditions ; Togoland (August, 1914), Kamerun (February, 1916), German Southwest Africa (July, 1916), and German East Africa (November, 1918). II. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR In July, 1914, the murder of Fran- cis Ferdinand, a member of the Aus- trian royal family, set in motion a train of events which culminated in the terrible catastrophe of a great European war. It was clear, however, that this crime was not the real cause of the tremendous struggle which many of the statesmen and diplomats of Europe had anticipated and all had feared for many years. The under- lying causes of this great War of the Nations reach far back into the past and cannot be reduced to any simple formula. Some knowledge of the im- portant political and economic forces which have shaped the history of Europe during the past century is nec- essary for an adequate appreciation of the causes of the great cataclysm. Among the many and complex influ- ences which have been suggested as causes of the war, there are three forces which appear to have contrib- uted most directly in bringing about the critical situation in Europe in 1914. These were (1) the clashing of national interests and ideals, (2) the maintenance of a system of military alliances, and (3) the economic rivalry among the nations of Europe. National Antagonisms. Viewed broad- ly, the political history of Europe in the nineteenth century centres about two movements which were the in- heritance of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, (1) the growth of democracy and (2) the realization of national liberty. When the diplomats of the Great Powers met at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 5 to readjust the map of Europe, many expressed the hope that the Congress would be guided in its work by these two principles. There was much talk of "the reconstruction of the moral order," "the regeneration of the po- litical system of Europe," of the es- tablishment "of an enduring peace founded on a just distribution of po- litical forces," and of the fonnation of an effective and permanent in- ternational tribunal. Unfortunately these fair promises were not realized and the Congress, instead of establish- ing a new era, did its utmost to re- store the old one. The principles of popular freedom and national liberty were ignored wherever it was neces- sary to do so to satisfy the dynastic and personal influences which domi- nated the Congress. In the first place, as an inheritance of the French Revolution these prin- ciples were anathema to the reaction- aries and, in the second place. Met- ternich,* the reactionary Austrian Chancellor who dominated the Con- gress, realized that encouragement of * Metterkich, Clemens Wekzel Nepomuk LoTHAR, Prince (1773-1859). A noted Austrian diplomat, born at Coblenz. Educated at Uni- versity of Strassburg and studied law at Mainz. Diplomatic career commenced at Congress of Rastadt (1797-1799). Became Austrian Am- bassador at Dresden (1801). Two years later became ambassador to Prussia where he nego- tiated treaty of alliance between Austria, Prussia and Russia against France in 1805. Went to Paris in 1806 as ambassador. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1809. Opposed dismember- ment of France for fear Russia and Prussia would become too powerful. Presiding oflScer of Congress of Vienna. Inspiring genius of reactionarjr policy of Restoration period. Aus- trian Chancellor, 1821. Aimed to restore old order as far as possible. 6 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR the nationalist principle would endan- ger the heterogeneous Austrian domin- ions. Consequently the work of the Congress of Vienna was an effort to establish the status quo ante helium. The consummation of this aim caused numerous violations of the principle of natioaality. The history of the nineteenth century shows a number of revolutionary periods such as 1830, 1848, 1866, and 1870 which were caus- ed by the determined efforts of the liberals and radicals of Europe to put into effect the three cardinal prin- ciples of the French Revolution, lib- erty, equality, and fraternity. The last term is practically synonymous with the term nationality. Some of the cruder violations of the principle were done away with in the course of the century. For example, Belgium was separated from Holland and Ve- netia and other Italian-speaking sec- tions were taken away from Austria and joined to the newly created Ital- ian kingdom. There remained, how- ever, at the close of the nineteenth cen- tury, a number of situations which clearly violated the principle of na- tional sovereignty. The completion of German unity in 1871 was accom- panied by the violation of the prin- ciple of French nationality in the an- nexation of the territories of Alsace and Lorraine after the Franco-Prus- sian War. The reasons for the an- nexations of these territories were partially economic and partially po- litical. The Germans wished to wipe out the memories of French aggression after the Battle of Jena during the Napoleonic period. They also wished to obtain the extremely valuable coal and iron mines which were in these territories. It was an ever present challenge to the French people to at- tempt to regain these lost provinces and a constant reminder of the hu- miliation which they had suffered at the hands of Germany. On the other hand it was used by Bismarck * and the Prussian military party to justify their programme of huge military armaments in Germany. Nowhere else in Europe was the problem of nationality so acute dur- ing the nineteenth century as in Aus- tria-Hungary. The very existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been a constant challenge to the prin- ciple of nationality. Logically car- ried out this principle would mean the disappearance of Austria-Hungary and the distribution of its territory among the surrounding nations. The appreciation of this fact by the Aus- trian authorities made them apprehen- sive of all nationalist movements, and especially that of the southern Slavs. As will be seen it was the outgrowth of one of these movements which pre- cipitated the crisis which led to the outbreak of the war. The Balkan states presented a pe- culiarly vexing problem in the realiza- tion of the principle of nationality. The intricate mixture of racial groups in this region made it an almost hope- * BiSMARCK-SCHONHAUSEN, KaRL OtTO Eduard Leopold vok, Prince (1815-98). A famous Prussian diplomat and statesman, born in the district of Magdeburg, Prussia. From 183x?-33 he was a student of jurisprudence and political science. Entered First General Diet of Prussia (1847). Champion of ultra-con- servative measures. Advocated increased pow- ers of monarchy in Erfurt Parliament (1850). As Prussian Ambassador to Germanic Diet at Frankfort adopted policy of hostility to Aus- tria. Head of Prussian cabinet and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1862). Governed without a budget and parliamentary majority. To unify Germany under Prussia adopted ruth- less policy, "mighty problems of age to be solved by blood and iron." Forced out Austria and in 1871 Germanic states formed an empire with Prussian King as Emperor. Introduced state socialism as a means of fighting social- ism. He was a bitter opponent of the Roman Catholic church, being the author of the famous "May Laws," of 1873-74-75. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR less task to arrange geographical boundaries to correspond with na- tional lines. The problem was com- plicated, moreover, by the clashing of the interests of the great European Powers, especially Austria and Rus- sia, in this territory. The condition of chronic disorder and strife in this region during the nineteenth century was a source of almost constant con- cern to the diplomats of the great European states. While the triumph of the ideal of nationality has done much to advance European civilization, it has not been an unmixed blessing. Too often na- tional patriotism became a fetish. Love of one's country meant a lack of ap- preciation of or a contempt for the people of other countries ; a feeling that the "kultur" of one's country was not only different from but distinctly superior to that of any other country. From this it naturally followed that it was a laudable ambition to wish to im- pose one's superior civilization upon an inferior people. "If it were possible," says Prince Bernhard von Biilow * in his book on Imperial Germany, "for members of different nationalities, with different language and customs, and an intel- lectual life of a different kind, to live side by side in one and the same state, without succumbing to the temp- tation of each trying to force his own * BiJLow, Bernhakd, Prince vok. A former German Chancellor, born (1849) at Klein- Flottbeck, Holstein. Studied at Lausanne, Leipsic, and Berlin. Served in Franco-Prus- sian War and entered German Foreign Office in 1874. Served as secretary of legations at various capitals and also ambassador. Ap- pointed Foreign Secretary in 1897 and Chancel- lor of the German Empire and Prime Minister of Prussia in 1900. His diplomacy shaped by emperor. Against ambition of France in Mo- rocco and led to Algeciras conference (1906). Able to control majority in Reichstag until 1909 when failure of budget led to resigna- tion. nationality on the other, things on earth would look a good deal more peaceful. But it is a law of life and development in history that where two national civilizations meet they fight for ascendancy. In the struggle be- tween nationalities, one nation is the hammer and the other the anvil; one is the victor and the other the van- quished." Prince von Billow's words really go to the root of the whole trouble in European politics. They show clearly that exaggerated idea of the inevitable antagonism of national interests which dominated European politics during the nineteenth cen- tury. In its extreme form this national spirit has found expression in move- ments to unite various related ethnic and racial groups into one political group. Such movements have been more or less prominent in Germany, Russia, and the Balkan states under the names Pan-Germanism, Panslav- ism, Pan-Serbianism, etc. It is doubt- ful whether any of these movements had passed beyond the state of vague aspirations held by a comparatively small group of people. As a con- tributing cause of the war the Pan- slavic and Pan-Serbian movements were of some importance. The growth of such propaganda was a source of concern to Austria-Hungary, with its large Slavic population. Pan-Germanism. — The Pan-German movement was an outgrowth of Ger- man imperialism and of the exag- gerated race consciousness of the Ger- mans. Roughly stated, this movement conceives the German people wherever located as forming one great nation- ality. Some Pan-Germanists deny any political or territorial ambitions and assert that they wish merely to spread the knowledge of German culture 8 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR throughout the world. Others, mor^ radical, proclaimed the ultimate domi- nation of the world by the German race. The German authorities re- peatedly stated that the Pan-German movement had no official sanction and that it was the work of only a very small part of the German people. How- ever, what the movement has lacked in numbers it has made up in activity. Prominent historians, scientists, and other writers expounded its views, while numerous societies had been formed to advance German ideas of culture and civilization throughout the civilized world. One or two quotations will serve to show the attitude of some of the lead- ers of the Pan-German movement. Von Bernhardi said on one occasion: "Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with im- portance in the world's history. 'World power or downfall!' will be our rallying cry. "Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confi- dent intention of conquering and with the iron resolve to persevere to the end, come what may." The French Yellow Book quotes from an official secret report the fol- lowing: "Neither ridiculous shriek- ings for revenge by French chauvin- ists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutschtum (German influence) all the world over." The Kaiser said in the course of a speech in July, 1900: "Germany's greatness makes it impossible for her to do without the ocean, but the ocean also proves that even in the distance, and on its farther side, without Ger- many and the German Emperor no great decision dare henceforth be taken. "I do not believe that thirty years ago our German people, under the leadership of their princes, bled and conquered in order that they might be shoved aside when great decisions are to be made in foreign politics. If that could happen, the idea that the Ger- man people are to be considered a world power would be dead and done for, and it is not my will that this would happen. To this end it is only my duty and my finest privilege to use the proper and, if need be, the most drastic means without fear of conse- quences. I am convinced that in this course I have the German princes and the German people firmly behind me.'* In another speech in October, 1900, the Kaiser said: "Our German Fath- erland, (to) which I hope will be granted, through the harmonious co- operation of princes and peoples, of its armies and its citizens, to become in the future as closely united, as power- ful, and as authoritative as once the Roman world-empire was, and that, just as in the old times they said 'Civis romanus sum,' hereafter, at some time in the future, they will say 'I am a German citizen.' " Military Alliances. The obsession of national jealousy led inevitably to the view that it was necessary to de- fend nationalism with huge armaments. The remarkable success of Bismarck in uniting Germany by a policy of blood and iron was used as an object lesson by the militarists of Germany and oth- er nations. War was glorified as an institution in itself, not simply as a means to an end. Says Bernhardi,* * Friedrich von Bernhardi, born (1849) at St. Petersburg, son of a German diplomat; served in Franco-Prussian War; general of cavalry and commander of the Seventh Army UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR one of the leading exponents of this school, "War is in itself a good thing. It is a biological necessity of the first importance." And again, "The in- evitableness, the idealism, the blessing of war as an indispensable and stimu- lating law of development must be re- peatedly emphasized." John Adam Cramb,* an English historian, pre- dicted a war between Gei'many and England and warned England to pre- pare for it. Everywhere the doctrine of military preparedness was advocat- ed and it bore fruit in the tremendous standing armies and huge navies of the different European countries. It led also to the grouping of the great European Powers into two hostile mili- tary alliances. When the representatives of the European Powers met at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, there was organized the so-called Concert of Europe, by which it was hoped that the problems of European politics would be adjust- ed. For some years congresses rep- resenting the Great Powers were held at which international questions were considered and efforts made to main- tain the balance of power in Europe. After the middle of the nineteenth cen- tury, however, the influence of this Corps (1908); retired (1909), but in 1915, dur- ing the European War, assigned to field com- mand at his own request. His writings, for which he is known internationally, are con- cerned with German military progress and with an expected war for the advancement of Pan- Germanism and expansion. In English have appeared: Cavalry in War and Peace (1910); On War of To-Day, Britain as Germany's Vas- sal, and Germany and the Next War (all 1914); The Xeto Bcrnhardi: "World Power or Doicnfall" (1915), a collection of articles writ- ten during the European War. *John Adam Cramb (1862-1913), educated at Glasgow and Bonn ; from 1893 to his death professor of modern history at Queen's College, London; also lectured at other institutions and gave private courses; author of Germany and England (1914) and The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain and Nineteenth, Century Europe (1915). Concert was materially weakened. A political transformation of Europe occurred in the decade between 1860 and 1870, culminating in the creation of two new European states, Germany and Italy. The appearance of these two states in the family of European nations seriously disturbed the old political relations. Bismarck, who had been largely instrumental in the creation of the German Empire, adopted as his guiding principle a sys- tem of firm alliances rather than de- pendence upon the more looscl}'^ consti- tuted European Concert. In an effort to isolate France, he first strove to unite Russia, Germany, and Austria in a defensive alliance. When Russia with- drew from this alliance on account of antagonism to Austria, Bismarck de- voted his efforts to binding together more closely the two Teutonic Pow- ers. Italy later (1882) joined with the Central Powers to form the Triple Alliance. Italy's alliance with the Teutonic Powers was largely a result of her re- sentment against France because of the latter's acquisition of Tunis in 1881. Checkmated by France, Italy turned to the Germanic Powers and joined an unnatural alliance. It was unnatural because Austria had con- sistently opposed Italian unity as well as on account of clashes of economic interests in the Balkan peninsula. This organization of the states of central Europe into a strong military alliance was an invitation to the other states of Europe to create an oppos- ing alliance in order to maintain the balance of power. First France and Russia, drawn together b}^ mutual hos- tility to Germany, formed a Dual Al- liance (1895) and finally Great Brit- ain, aroused by the threatening naval policy of Germany, abandoned her pol- 10 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR icy of "splendid isolation," and joined with France and Russia to form a sec- ond diplomatic group known as the Triple Entente. England was com- pelled to smooth over difficulties which existed between herself and her two allies. She clashed with France in Northern Africa, in Siam, and over the Newfoundland fisheries. She was opposed to the extension of Russian influence in the Balkans as well as to the advance towards India in Asia. Due largely to the efforts of Sir Ed- ward Grey, these misunderstandings were cleared up and a "diplomatic group" was established. The precise nature of this understanding was in- definite, there being no treaty agree- ment specifying its scope. The for- mation of these two rival military groups created a situation in Europe where every disturbance of the po- litical or diplomatic status quo brought on a crisis. Since 1905 Europe has passed through several such crises, each one increasing the tension among the Great Powers and each making the maintenance of peace more difficult. The first of these crises came in 1905 in a dispute over Morocco. A part of the understanding reached be- tween England and France in 1904 provided that France should have a free hand in Morocco, while England was given a free hand in Egypt. Ger- many, which had abandoned Bis- marck's policy of opposition to co- lonial expansion, was looking about for such stray portions of undeveloped land as had not been appropriated by England and France. Germany had to choose between two courses. Eith- er she could frankly recognize the in- evitable consequences of her geograph- ical position and her late entrance in- to the field as a colonial power, which handicapped her development as a world state, or she might determine to challenge the more fortunately sit- uated and longer established world powers and create for herself a larger "place in the sun." She chose the lat- ter alternative. With a rapidly in- creasing population, it became a ques- tion whether even her remarkable in- dustrial development would accommo- date the added millions of population. It is true that at this time Germany imported unskilled agricultural labor from Russia, and that there was no alarming emigration from Germany. But the future held out the prospect of a large emigration of Germans to other countries, and the Germans re- sented the loss of this good German stock to the Fatherland. Colonies where Germans might be kept under German control were felt to be the great need. Germany therefore deter- mined not to stand quietly by and al- low further colonial acquisitions by the other great European Powers with- out making an effort to share in the spoils. The Russo-Japanese War (1904- 1905) had revealed the military weak- ness and inefficiency of Russia. This situation made Russia's support of France much less valuable and Ger- many felt that it was an opportune time to assert her position in regard to Morocco. On March 21, 1905, the German Emperor, while on a voyage to Constantinople, disembarked at Tangier and encouraged the Sultan to reject the scheme of reforms pro- posed by France. He, moreover, suc- ceeded in forcing France to submit the whole Moroccan question to a con- ference of the Powers held at Algeciras in January, 1906. England firmly supported France and let it be known that any interference with France's UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 11 predominant position in Morocco would be resisted by her. Italy, more- over, refused to support her ally, with the result that France scored a dis- tinct diplomatic victory. One phase of Germany's policy of colonial and commercial expansion contemplated the extension of Teu- tonic commercial and political inter- ests in the Balkans and Turkey. In tliis "Drang nach Osten" Germany, in conjunction with Austria, hoped to create a great economic, if not politi- cal, sphere of influence extending through the Balkans to Constantino- ple and thence through Turkey in Asia to the Persian Gulf. German engineers and German capitalists began to de- velop Turkish resources. German mili- tary officials trained the Turkish forces. As an example of the importance that the Pan-Germanist element placed upon the movement toward the south- east, the following quotation is given from a book entitled, Asia, by Fried- rich Naumann (1900): "All weaken- ing of German national energy by pacifist associations or analogous ac- tivities reinforces the formidably in- creasing power of those who rule to- day from the Cape to Cairo, from Ceylon to the Polar Sea. . . . No truce with England. Let our policy be a national policy. "This must be the mainspring of our action in the eastern question. This is the fundamental reason which ne- cessitates our political indifference to the sufferings of Christians in the Turkish Empire, painful as these must be to our private feelings. If Turkey were disintegrated to-day, the frag- ments of her empire would become the sport of the great powers, and we would be left with nothing, as has happened so often in the past. We must retard the catastrophe. Let Turkey have any constitution she likes, so long as she can keep herself afloat a while longer. "Bismarck taught us to make a dis- tinction between our foreign policy and our domestic policy. The same thing applies to the Christian mis- sions. As Christians we desire the propagation of the faith by which we were saved. But it is not the task of our policy to concern itself with Chris- tian missions. "The truth here, as elsewhere, is that we must find out which is the greatest and morally the most impor- tant task. When the choice has been made, there must be no tergiversation. William II has made his choice ; he is the friend of the Padishah, because he believes in a greater Germany. . . . "Imagine a few firm, rigid, incor- ruptible officials at the head of a ter- ritory like Palestine scouring the coun- try on horseback with European promptitude. They would be as much abused as Satan, but as useful as angels. . . . "A sort of amicable dictatorship would be set up, which would often address Turkey as the bird of the proverb was addressed, 'Eat or die.' . . . Meanwhile Germans would be set- tling upon all the shores of the Medi- terranean. Good luck to you, my brethren. Work hard. Bestir your- selves. The old sea will yet behold many things. You hold in your hands a morsel of Germany's future life." In July, 1908, a revolution, led by the Young Turks, broke out in Con- stantinople. Taking advantage of this situation Bulgaria annexed eastern Rumelia and declared her complete in- dependence of Turkey. Austria felt the time opportune to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been 12 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR placed under her administration in 1878 by the Congress of Berlin, main- ly through the efforts of Bismarck. This action of Austria irritated Italy and aroused Serbia, which latter had hoped to bring these provinces, closely related to her in blood, into a Greater Serbia. Russia protested against Aus- tria's violation of the Treaty of Ber- lin, but Germany stood by her ally, and Russia, unprepared for war, was forced to submit. The Teutonic al- lies had scored a distinct diplomatic success and another European crisis was passed. Once again in 1911, the Moroccan question brought Europe to the verge of war. Germany had not accepted with good grace her diplomatic defeat at Algeciras, and watched with an in- creasing irritation the extension of French influence and control in Mo- rocco. Germany complained that France was not observing the policy of equal commercial opportunity for all nations and on July 1, 1911, the German cruiser Panther appeared off Agadir with the avowed purpose of protecting German interests. Both England and France likewise sent ships there, and for several months European peace hung in the balance. A compromise was finally reached whereby Germany recognized France's predominant position in Morocco while in return Germany received 100,000 square miles of the French Congo. Hardly had this second Moroccan crisis been passed when the delicate balance in European politics was dis- turbed by the Turco-Italian War. Dis- appointed in her desire to obtain Tunis, Italy turned her attentions to the neighboring Turkish province of Tripoli and gradually extended her economic interests there. Friction de- veloped with the corrupt and inefficient Turkish authorities and in September, 1911, the Italian government demand- ed that Turkey place the provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica under Italian control. Upon Turkey's refusal Italy declared war and after a long cam- paign succeeded in occupying the ter- ritory. Germany was placed in the difficult position of seeing her protege Turkey despoiled by her ally Italy. She was, however, powerless to prevent Italy from carrying through her de- signs for fear that the latter might desert the Triple Alliance and join the Entente. The Turco-Italian War was a pre- lude to a much more serious and far- reaching upheaval in the Turkish do- minions. The policy of the Young Turks after the revolution of 1908, in attempting to build up a strong, uni- fied Ottoman nation, stirred the smol- dering embers of the rival nationalities in the Balkans. The Greeks, Bulgar- ians, Serbs, and Montenegrins resented the attempt to Ottomanize their fellow nationals in Macedonia and Albania. Putting aside for the moment their own rivalries these four Powers or- ganized the Balkan League, and sub- mitted to Turkey a demand for far- reaching reforms in Macedonia. The European Powers quickly saw the dan- ger of a European war if the Balkan situation was disturbed and they served notice on the Allies that under no conditions would they allow a modi- fication of the territorial status quo in the Balkans. Undeterred b}' this threat of European intervention the Allies declared war on Turkey in Oc- tober, 1912, and after a series of bril- liant campaigns, completely routed the Turks and drove them to the gates of Constantinople. As the Allies had an- ticipated, the European Powers did not make sfood their threat to restore UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 13 the status quo. When it came to a di- vision of the spoils the old rivalries among the Allies once more appeared. Serbia had been thwarted in her de- sire to obtain Albania by the opposi- tion of Italy and Austria. This led to a demand by Serbia for a modifica- tion of the agreement for the divisions of the territory made by the Allies before the war. To this Bulgaria would not consent and Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro combined against their former ally. Rumania and Tur- key also joined Bulgaria's enemies with the result that Bulgaria's forces were quickly overwhelmed. The strug- gle closed in August, 1913, and Bul- garia was forced to give up a large part of the conquered Turkish terri- tory. As a result of interference by the great Powers of Europe an autonom- ous Albania was established under the kingship of William Frederick of Wied, a German mediatized prince. This effectively thwarted Serbia's de- sire for a seaport on the Adriatic. The outcome of the Balkan wars was a bitter disappointment to Ger- many and Austria. Not only had their protege Turkey been practically driven from Europe, but the creation of a greater Serbia and the strength- ening of Greece and Bulgaria checked the plans of Austria to reach the ^gean Sea at Saloniki. Russian in- fluence, too, had been greatly in- creased in the Balkans by the strengthening of the Slavic states. That Germany appreciated the seri- ous blow which had been dealt to Teu- tonic influence in the Balkans was in- dicated by the introduction in Febru- ary, 1918, of a new army bill. This was defended on the ground that the outcome of the l^alkan wars had seri- ously disturbed the balance of power in central Europe to the detriment of Austria and Germany. To the peace footing of the German army were added 117,000 men and 19,000 officers, bringing the total strength of the peace army, including auxiliary services, up to 870,000. Im- mediately the Superior Council of War in France replied to the German chal- lenge by proposing March 4, that the term of military service be increased from 2 to 3 years, in order to aug- ment the strength and improve the or- ganization of the French army. It should be noted that the German in- crease was proposed first, that it was approved by the Bundesrath on March 28, and that it was finally passed by the Reichstag on June 30, 1913, three weeks before the French Three-Year Law was passed by the Chamber of Deputies, July 19. Russia, the ally of France, and Austria-Hungary, the ally of Germany, likewise made war- like preparations. In July the Duma authorized a new army budget and the lengthening of military service from 3 to 3^/^ years ; General JofFre, the French commander-in-chief, vis- ited Russia in August, 1913, to con- fer on the reorganization of the Rus- sian army. Austria-Hungary intro- duced a new scheme whereby her peace army was increased from 463,000 to 560,000 ; and enormous sums were ap- propriated for the provision of artil- lery. Even the smaller states of the Balkan, Iberian, and Scandinavian peninsulas caught the contagion of the army fever. The most ominous fea- ture of all this military preparation was the fear and hatred it inspired. France introduced three-year service because she feared the German army, with its corps at Metz, Saarbriicken, and Strassburg. When little Belgium introduced universal military service 14 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR and planned to create a field army of 150,000 in addition to garrisons of 130,000 men, the explanation was frankly made that the recent construc- tion of German railways leading to the Belgian frontier, without obvious eco- nomic purpose, signified that Germany was preparing to transport troops in- to and through Belgium in case of a Franco-German war. Similarly Ger- many was alarmed by the projected construction of new Russian railways, which would facilitate Russian mobili- zation against Germany. And in the spring of 1914 a veritable panic was created in the German and Austro- Hungarian press, by articles in the Cologne Gazette, Germania, the Post, and the Berliner Tagehlatt, comment- ing on the Russian preparations, which would be perfected in a year or two. Bernhardi, in the Post, warned Germany to be ready for a war in the near future. On the other hand, the St. Petersburg (Petrograd) Bir- shewija Wjedomosti on June 13, 1914, declared that, "France and Russia do not desire war, but Russia is pre- pared, and hopes that France will likewise be prepared." Thus national militarism created the situation out of which grew the War of the Nations — the nations of Europe armed to the teeth, regarding each other with in- sane fear, awaiting the inevitable con- flict. Economic Causes. Some advocates of the economic interpretation of his- tory seek to place all historical facts on an economic basis. To this school of historical writers this war is ex- plained almost entirely on economic grounds. While it is quite possible to exaggerate this economic motive, there is no question that economic consid- erations played an important part in bringing about the situation which precipitated the European crisis. Some of these economic influences may be briefly stated. At the close of the eighteenth cen- tury there occurred in Europe a com- plete transformation of industrial con- ditions known as the industrial revolu- tion. The invention of improved methods of spinning and weaving, the application of steam power, the sub- stitution of the factory system for the former method of cottage industry, and the appearance of distinct cap- italist and laboring classes were the most striking features of this revolu- tion in industrial life. England was the first country to feel the eff*ects of this change. Fac- tories began to turn out large quan- tities of manufactured commodities, more than enough to supply the home market. For a time England had a practical monopoly of the field, and had no difficulty in disposing of her surplus products in the markets of the world. But the industrial revolution in time reached other countries ; France in the period after 1830, the United States in the period following the Civil War, and Germany in the period after 1880. The great indus- trial interests in these countries began to compete with those of England for the control of the markets of the world. England had the advantage of having vast colonial possessions which might serve both as a market for her manufactured products and as a field for the investment of surplus capital in the development of their natural resources. France and the United States, in a lesser degree, also enjoyed this advantage. Germany, on the other hand, because of her late ap- pearance as a great power, was prac- tically without colonial possessions of any potential value. She felt that her UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 15 industrial development was being ham- pered through no fault of her own, but simply because the best parts of the world had been appropriated by other countries. It has been argued, with consider- able force, that a nation does not bene- fit commercially by the control of col- onies or weak states. The case of Ger- many is cited to show how marvel- ously a state may expand commercial- ly without colonies. But there is no doubt that certain economic interests within a nation do gain by national control of undeveloped parts of the world. There are government con- tracts to be let, franchises to be given, concessions to be granted, and pos- sibly preferential tariffs to be estab- lished. The financial interests in close touch with the governmental author- ities of a great power undoubtedly have a great advantage. In the German apologies for the war. Great Britain is bitterly accused of envying German prosperity and of welcoming the war as an opportunity to crush German commercial and in- dustrial competition. The strenuous efforts of British business men during the war to capture German trade are cited as proof. The British apologists reply that Great Britain entered the war only after extreme hesitation, aft- er warning Germany not to violate Belgian neutrality; that Great Britain had not welcomed the war, far less caused it ; and that the war on Ger- man trade was a result rather than the purpose of the armed conflict. On the other side, Germany is ac- cused of waging war for economic ag- grandizement. In explanation, let us refer to the origin of the German Em- pire. Besides a sentimental yearning for na-tional unity, two factors worked together to weld the many petty Ger- man States into a united nation. The spectacular part was played by the Prussian army, under the control of domineering, landowning aristocrats, like Prince Bismarck. Equally impor- tant, if less striking, was the work of the industrial capitalists. They had built railways binding the Germanies together with bands of steel; they had economically federated the Germanies in the Tariff League (ZoUverem), preparing the way for political union. After the formation of the German Empire (1871), the influence of the two elements, the landed aristocracy of army officers and the business aris- tocracy of wealth, was manifested in the demand for a protective tariff. The former demanded a high tariff on imported foodstuffs to raise the price of their own farm products ; the latter required a tariff wall to keep foreign manufacturers from entering into com- petition with German articles in the home market. Bismarck adopted the protective tariff policy in 1879. It is easy to see how such a policy might endanger peace. For example, consid- er Russo-German relations. In 1904 Russia and Germany signed a commer- cial treaty whereby each country made certain reductions in its tariff duties on imports from the other country. The Russians felt that Germany had the best of the bargain. In 1914, as the date approached for the renewal or modification of the treaty, fear was expressed in the German press lest Russia's improved army would enable her to demand more favorable terms. In this fashion the desire of each na- tion to tax foreign imports and at the same time to obtain free admission of its own products into foreign coun- tries, stimulated militarism and pro- voked warlike sentiments among the Powers. The United Kingdom, it 16 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR should be observed, adhered to its free trade pohcy, and, with few exceptions, admitted the products of all lands on an equal footing. The British self- governing colonies, however, had adopted protection. Whether it was due to the protec- tion of the tariff wall, or to the Ger- man genius for applying natural science to industry, or to German thoroughness, or to aggressive com- mercial methods, the business inter- ests prospered mightily under the aegis of the German Empire. Mills and mines multiplied wealth. Titanic ocean steamships carried German wares to the ends of the earth. By 1912, British excelled German foreign commerce by about $1,300,000,000; but German commerce had trebled it- self since 1883, while British commerce had not quite doubled. The German government derived rich revenues from the customs duties on an expanding commerce, and viewed with satisfac- tion the prodigious increase in wealth and population (population increased from 41 to 66 millions between 1871 and 1912) which furnished men and money for an ever-growing army. And on the other hand, the industrial and landowning classes considered the army as protection and insurance for their interests. In one respect, how- ever, the German business community was dissatisfied. The German mer- chant marine, although it had rapidly expanded, was still four times out- weighed by British shipping. Great Britain's superiority was ascribed to her earlier economic development, to the fact that Germany had very little Atlantic sea-coast, to the superiority of the British navy. Germany, there- fore, set herself to overcome these handicaps. And without imputing ag- gressive motives to the German gov- ernment, the historian may and should affirm that certain German business men consciously hoped for the over- throw of British naval power and for the annexation of an Atlantic port by Germany. The open confession of such desires by German journalists like Maximilian Harden and by Ger- man shipping magnates like Herr Bal- lin, explains why the Belgians feared the loss of Antwerp and Ostend, and the British the loss of the sea. In parenthesis, it may be observed that similar desires for advantageous sea- ports were urging Russia on to Con- stantinople and to the Southern Bal- tic, Serbia on to the Adriatic, and Austria-Hungary on to Saloniki. In a third resjject the economic am- bitions of Germany conflicted with those of other nations. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century cer- tain groups of business men awoke to the opportunities which the vast un- civilized areas of Africa and Oceanica offered for the sale of cheap cotton goods, cheap liquors, and other manu- factures, for the highly remunerative investment of money in the construc- tion of railways, the development of mines, and the traffic in rubber, ivory, and oil. King Leopold of Belgium, one of the first to realize the oppor- tunity, acquired control of the Congo region in the heart of Africa. France carved out a mighty colonial empire, and Great Britain added to hers. Ger- many, a belated arrival in the field, was permitted, even encouraged by the British government, to acquire ter- ritories in Africa. But when Ger- many, becoming aggressive in world politics, and demanding an ever larg- er "place in the sun," challenged the French in Morocco and appeared en- vious of the British and French pos- sessions, the prospect of a war for UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 17 world-empire began to fill Europe with uneasy forebodings. Concessions as well as colonies were contended for by Germans as against British and French capitalists. For example, when in 1914 Bulgaria ar- ranged in return for a loan to concede to German capitalists valuable railway and mining privileges in Bulgaria, a rival bid was unsuccessfully made by the French. The financing of the Bagdad railway occasioned consider- able rivalry between France and Ger- many, until an agreement was reached. In 1914 the envious cry was raised in Germany that German interests were being outstripped by the other Pow- ers ; that the English were greedily helping themselves to the oil product of Persia and striving to secure the oil fields of Latin America ; that the French capitalists were securing new railway contracts in China, in Russia, and in Greece. Of all the economic interests inimic- al to peace, the most dangerous was the arms-manufacturing business. It is commonly known that in 1913 Karl Liebknecht * horrified the German Reichstag by alleging that the Krupps, the world-famous makers of guns and armor, systematically * Liebknecht, Karl (Paul August Ferdin- and) (1871-1919). Born at Leipsic, where he studied law. Became practicing attorney in Berlin. Chosen Selectman of City of Berlin (1902); member Prussian House of Deputies (1908), and elected to Reichstag (1912) and soon recognized as a leader among Socialist deputies. In 1913 made charges leading to reve- lation of Krupp scandals and in 1914 only member to vote against war credits. His work Militarismns unci Antimilitarismus (1907) for- bidden circulation and led to charge of high treason, for which he was convicted. Despite protests, mustered into army (1915). Arrested (1916) for making a speech at May Day dem- onstration. On signing of armistice and flight of Emperor became leader of extreme Socialist group known as Spartacides. Killed (Janu- ary 15, 1919) by military officers while under arrest. stirred up hostility between France and Germany in order to obtain larger orders for arms. Every Army Bill, every dreadnought, every war, meant profits for the armament firms. The Balkan Wars were fought with weap- ons forged in Germany and France. As the Krupps had made the Turkish guns, the defeat of Turkey meant di- minished prestige and smaller sales for Krupp wares, unless another war should reestablish the fame of can- non "made in Germany.'* English firms — Armstrong & Vickers, and Wit- worth — were engaged to build an ord- nance factory in Russia, and to con- struct battleships for Spain, for Bra- zil, for Turkey. For Krupps, as well as for their rivals, the War of the Nations was a golden opportunity. The Belgian armament manufacturers at Liege alone were unfortunate, for Liege was captured by German troops. Finally, a word may be added re- garding the banking interests and the war. Articles have appeared in sup- port of the argument that the panic and consternation in financial circles at the outbreak of the war proved con- clusively that "capital" did not want the war. While there is doubtless much truth in this reasoning, the fact must not be overlooked that in panics large fortunes are won as well as for- tunes lost. The huge war loans, more- over, offered unexampled opportuni- ties for financial speculation. The statement is also made that the cap- italists welcomed the war as a relief from the intolerable burden of mili- tarism ; for by means of income-, prop- erty-, and inheritance-taxes, Socialist- ically-inclined legislators were shifting the burden of militarism so as to bear more and more heavily on the wealth- ier classes. III. OUTBREAK OF THE WAR On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand,* nephew of Em- peror Francis Joseph and heir to the Hapsburg throne, and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg, were assassinated by Serbian sympathizers while on an official visit to the town of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. It was generally believed in Austria that the crime was instigated by Pan-Ser- bian agitators, who had maintained a persistent propaganda for the ac- quisition of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina ever since they had been annexed by Austria in 1908. These provinces had once formed part of the old Serbian Empire, and about half of the population was related to the Serbs in race and speech. Despite the fact that Serbia had agreed in 1909 to recognize the annexation of these provinces by Austria as a fait accompli, the Pan-Serbian movement was allowed to continue in Serbia, un- hampered by the government author- ities. In Austria this movement was re- sented for two reasons. In the first place, Serbia had emerged from the second Balkan war doubled in size, and any further strengthening of this country ran counter to Austria's com- mercial interests in the Balkans. As it was, Serbia stood in the way of Austria's realizing her ambition of * Francis Ferdinand (1863-1914). Arch- duke of Austria-Este. Born at Graz. On death of Crown Prince Rudolph (1889) and his own father, became heir apparent to crowns of Austria and Hungary. Assassinated with his wife at Serajevo, Bosnia (June 28, 1914), as result of political plot due to absorption of Bosnia into Austro-Hungarian Empire (1908). reaching the ^gean Sea at Saloniki as well as obstructing the Berlin to Bagdad route. In the second place, the Pan-Serbian movement was a posi- tive danger to the integrity of the Austrian Empire. If successful, it might encourage other racial groups within the Empire to disrupt com- pletely the Hapsburg dominions. Aus- tria had therefore good reasons for regarding the Pan-Serbian propagan- da with fear and resentment. Inves- tigations carried on by the Austrian officials at Serajevo led to the conclu- sion that the assassination of the Archduke had been planned by the conspirators at Belgrade and that the pistols and bombs used had been smuggled into Bosnia from Serbia with the connivance of Serbian officials. Having established these alleged facts, the Austrian government felt justified in proceeding in the most summary manner to crush once and for all the Pan-Serbian movement. With this in view there was presented to Serbia, by Austria, on July 23, 1914, an ulti- matum couched in the most vigorous language. Count Berchtold * was the Austrian Foreign Minister. The note began by recalling the dec- laration made by Serbia on the 31st of March, 1909, wherein Serbia recog- nized the fait accompli regarding Bos- nia and agreed to renounce any atti- * Berchtold, Leopold Anthony Johann SiGMUND, Count von. Born (1863) in Vienna. Entered diplomatic service at early age, and in 1895 appointed secretary of Austrian Em- bassy in Paris. In 1899 appointed counselor of Embassy in London and in 1903 same position in St. Petersburg. 1912 became Foreign Minis- ter of Dual Monarchy. 18 OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 19 tude of protest or opposition to the annexation of Bosnia by Austria. The Austrian note then went on to com- plain that Serbia had not lived up to this undertaking, and had made it nec- essary for Austria to take action to protect herself against the Pan-Ser- bian propaganda. Austria insisted that Serbia should make an official and pubfic condemnation of this propa- ganda and express regret at its conse- quences. The note then submitted ten specific demands and required an answer from Serbia by six o'clock on Saturday evening, July 25, within 48 hours of its presentation. These demands required that Serbia should suppress every publication which excited hatred of the Dual Mon- archy; that the Serbian government dissolve certain societies accused of fomenting the propaganda hostile to Austria; that teachers guilty of insti- gating hatred of Austria be dismissed and that objectionable matter in the textbooks be eliminated ; that Serbia dismiss from her army and govern- mental employ all officers and officials found taking part in the propaganda ; that Serbia accept the collaboration of agents of the Austro-Hungarian government in suppression of the sub- versive movement against Austria ; that Austro-Hungarian representa- tives be allowed to take part in the in- vestigation of persons in Serbia ac- cused of complicity in the murder of the Archduke; that Serbia take action against two specified officials, who were accused of complicity in the crime at Serajevo; that Serbia take eff'ective measures to stop the smuggling of arms and ammunition across her bor- der; and finally that Serbia give ex- planation of the expressions of hos- tility toward Austria-Hungary on the part of certain high Serbian officials. The publication of this note imme- diately aroused great apprehension in the chancelleries of the European Pow- ers. It was clear that Europe was confronted with another serious crisis. It is a striking fact that each of the Powers of the Triple Entente was con- fronted by serious internal difficulties at this most critical time. Great Brit- ain was threatened by serious disturb- ances in Ireland resulting from the passage of the Home Rule Bill ; St. Petersburg was involved in a great strike; in France the Caillaux aff'air had aflPected seriously the prestige of the government and the Minister of War declared that the army was in a deplorable state of unpreparedness. The first move of Sir Edward Grey,* the British Foreign Secretary, was to urge upon Austria-Hungary the necessity of extending the time lim- it of the ultimatum. In this he was strongly supported by M. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister. Ger- many, however, was not inclined to bring pressure upon her ally in this matter and Austria flatly refused any extension of time. Failing in this move, the British and Russian Ministers turned their eff'orts to persuading Serbia to accept, as far as possible, the demands made by Aus- tria. In this they were largely suc- cessful. The Serbian Reply. Serbia's reply * Grey, Sir Edward. Born (1862) in North- umberland. Educated at Winchester and Bal- liol College, Oxford. Entered Parliament, 1885. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1892-95. Made "Privy Councillor 1902. In 1905 became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and soon became most commanding figure in European diplomacy. Consummated Triple Entente, uniting Great Britain, France, and Russia. Opposed German expansion in North Africa. In Balkan crisis of 1912 brought about conference in London and presided over its deliberations. Unable to prevent the great world war, despite strenuous efforts. 20 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR to the Austrian ultimatum was handed to the Austrian Minister at Belgrade on July 25, only two minutes before the expiration of the time limit. The reply began by stating that the Ser- bian government was not aware of any official action since 1909 protesting against the political status of Bosnia- Herzegovina, and that the only rep- resentation made by Austria, that con- cerning a school book, had been ex- plained to the satisfaction of the Aus- trian government. To this the Aus- trian government replied in an of- ficial rejoinder that it was not sufficient to indicate that there had been no of- ficial action against Austria. It was the failure of Serbia to use energetic measures to suppress unofficial agita- tion directed against the territorial in- tegrity of Austria of which complaint was made. The Serbian reply further stated that the Serbian government did not consider that they could be held re- sponsible for the opinions expressed by private individuals, such as articles appearing in the press and the peace- ful proceedings of societies. Serbia agreed, however, to amend her consti- tution to permit the enactment of leg- islation to suppress such publications. Most of the other demands were agreed to by Serbia with slight verbal changes. There were two points, however, with which Serbia did not comply. In the first place, to the demand that Serbia accept the colla- boration of agents of the Austrian government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy, Serbia replied that she did not understand exactly the meaning of the demand, but that she was ready to accept such collaboration as should conform to the principles of interna- tional law and criminal procedure. The Austrian rejoinder stated that it was not a question of international law but of the exercise of police powers which could be settled by agreement between the parties concerned. In the second place the demand made by Austria that Austrian officials be permitted to take part in the investigation relating to the judicial proceedings in Serbia against persons involved in the Sera- jevo crime, the Serbian government would not concede on the ground that such action would violate the Serbian constitution. The Austrian rejoinder accused the Serbian government of de- liberately misrepresenting the Aus- trian demand, which contemplated sim- ply a participation in the preliminary investigation to the judicial proceed- ings. Finally the Serbian government agreed, in case the Austrian govern- ment should find the reply unsatisfac- tory, to submit the disputed questions to The Hague Tribunal or the Great Powers for decision. The representatives of the Entente Powers were satisfied that Serbia's re- ply was a substantial agreement to the Austrian demands. Austria, however, claimed to find the reply wholly unsat- isfactory and in this view she was ap- parently supported by Germany, which countr}^ adopted the view that she could not infringe on Austria's sov- ereignty. From the time of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, it was rec- ognized on all sides that the great dan- ger was that any move on the part of Austria would precipitate a general European war. The delicate balance of interests in the Balkans could not be disturbed without involving serious consequences. Russia in particular felt that she was deeply interested in the fate of the small Slav nations in OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 21 the Balkan Peninsula. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna stated on July 24 that "any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent." (B.W.P. No. 7.) At Berlin, too, it was clearly recog- nized that Austria's action would prob- ably involve Russia. The German memorandum states that Germany was fully aware that "warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Ser- bia, would bring Russia into the ques- tion and might draw Germany into a war in accordance with her duty as Austria's ally." (G.W.B. p. 4.) * Despite Austria's assurance that she had no intention of annexing Serbian territory or disturbing the balance of power in the Balkans, Russia felt that, apart from the acquisition of territory, the crushing of Serbia would reduce her to a vassal state of Austria, and that this would imperil the balance of power in the Balkans. In view of this situation the Russian Foreign Minister stated that Russia would mobilize against Austria on the day that the Austrian army crossed the Serbian frontier. (B.W.P. No. 72.) This determined attitude of Russia made any efforts which the Powers might make to localize the struggle futile. The next question of vital in- terest was the attitude which Germany would take. How far was she prepared to support her ally Austria in her un- compromising position towards Serbia? In defining its position the German gov- ernment declared "The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation car- ried on by the Pan-Slavs in Austria- * In referring to the official documents, the following abbreviations are used: British White Paper, B.W.P.; German White Book, G.W.B. ; Austrian Red Book, A.R.B.; Russian Orange Book, R.O.B.; French Yellow Book, F.Y.B.; Belgian Gray Book, B.G.B.; Italian Green Book, I.G.B. Hungary has for its goal the destruc- tion of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy, which carries with it the shat- tering or weakening of the Triple Al- liance and, in consequence, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our nearest interests, therefore, summon us to the support of Austria-Hungary." (G.W.B. exhibit 2.) And further "A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, such as we must have, in view of the increasingly menacing attitudes of our neighbors on the east and west." (G. W.B. memo. p. 5.) It is clear there- fore that Germany felt that her inter- ests as well as those of Austria were vitally affected. It was generally be- lieved, and openly stated, that Ger- many knew the nature of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was sent and had urged Austria to precipitate a crisis by presenting demands which Serbia would not accept. This was categorically denied by the German au- thorities. (B.W.P. No. 25.) Never- tlieless Germany thoroughly approved of the Austrian demands and insisted that the quarrel should be considered simply as an affair between Austria and Serbia. Obviously it was of the utmost im- portance to prevent, or at least delay, the first hostile move by Austria against Serbia. On July 26, Sir Ed- ward Grey suggested a conference of the representatives of the four Powers, England, France, Germany, and Italy, for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications be- tween Austria and Russia. (B.W.P. No. 36.) To this suggestion France and Italy agreed. Germany, however, declined to fall in with this plan. The German Foreign Minister stated that 22 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR "a conference such as Sir Edward Grey suggested would amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia" (B.W.P. No. 43) ; and furthermore that "he did not think it [the confer- ence] would be effective, because such a conference would in his opinion have had the appearance of an Areopagus consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two re- maining Powers." (B.W.P. No. 71; G.W.B. memo. p. 8.) Direct negotiations between Russia and Austria were unsuccessful, Austria refusing to consider a modification of the terms of her ultimatum to Serbia. (B.W.P. No. 93; R.O.B. No. 45.) Fur- ther efforts on the part of England to have Germany propose some formula which would be acceptable proved un- availing (B.W.P. No. Ill), and on July 28, 1914, Austria declared war on Serbia. This action on the part of Austria appears explicable on one of two grounds. Either she was con- vinced that Russia was bluffing and would back down as she did in 1908, or else that Austria was prepared de- liberately to precipitate a European war. Germany and Russia. The Russian government had very definitely declared that Russia could not remain indiffer- ent to the fate of Serbia. It was gen- erally believed in Russia that Austria's action was directed against her quite as much as against Serbia. (R.O.B. No. 75.) Consequently on July 29, 1914, Russia declared partial mobili- zation against Austria-Hungary. At the same time the Russian Foreign Minister stated that this action was in no way directed against Germany. (R. O.B. No. 49.) These military prepa- rations stimulated the diplomats in their final efforts to find some solution which would prevent a European con- flagration. Various formulas were sug- gested but none was acceptable. On July 29, Sir Edward Grey urged that "the German government should sug- gest any method by which the influ- ence of the four Powers could be used to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed. Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediat- ing influence was ready to be put in operation by any method that Ger-- many thought possible, if only Ger- many would press the button in the interests of peace." (B.W.P. No. 84.) Germany did press the button to the extent of urging Austria to renew ne- gotiations with Russia. At the same time Russia was requested to prepare a formula which would be satisfactory to her. M. Sazonov accordingly sub- mitted the following suggestion: "If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, de- clares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the principle of the sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations." This formula was whol- ly unsatisfactory to Germany and Aus- tria, and at the suggestion of Sir Ed- ward Grey the Russian formula was modified to read: "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory ; if, recog- nizing the fact that the dispute be- tween Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hun- garian government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 23 One final effort was made by Eng- land and Germany to prevent a break between Austria and Russia. Sir Ed- ward Grey, on July 31, said that if Germany would suggest any reason- able proposal which would preserve peace, and if France and Russia re- jected such a proposal. Great Britain would not support them, but on the other hand if no such proposal were made and France became involved, Great Britain would be drawn in. (B. W.P. No. 111.) Germany, on her part, brought pressure on Austria to agree to discuss with Russia the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, and at the last moment, on July 31, Austria agreed to do so. (A.R.B. Nos. 49-50.) This slim chance of preventing a break at the eleventh hour was nullified by the demand made by Germany that Russia should cease her military prepa- rations and demobilize her army. At midnight on July 31, 1914, the Ger- man Ambassador delivered an ultima- tum to Russia demanding that she de- mobilize her forces not only against Germany but also against Austria- Hungary. (R.O.B. No. 70.) As Rus- sia returned no reply to this demand the German Ambassador was ordered on August 1, at 5 p.m., to notify the Russian government that Germany considered that a state of war existed between the two countries. (G.W.B. exhibit 26; R.O.B. No. 76.) Germany and France. At the same time that Germany presented the ulti- matum to Russia, a communication was sent to France informing her of Ger- many's action and asking what atti- tude France would take in the event of war between Germany and Russia. An answer was demanded within 18 hours. (F.Y.B. No. 116; G.W.B. ex- hibit 25.) To this demand the French Premier replied on August 1, that "France would take such action as her interests might require." (G.W.B. ex- hibit 27.) Despite this unsatisfactory answer the German Ambassador did not leave Paris until August 3. In the meantime charges and countercharges were made by the French and German authorities that warlike moves had been made on the frontier. A document which was purported to be instructions from the Imperial Ger- man government to its ambassador at Paris was published about the middle of 1918 in the French press at the in- stance of the government. The Ger- man Ambassador was to ask the French Government if it would remain neutral in case of war between Rus- sia and Germany. If the answer was "Yes," the German Ambassador was to demand the surrender of Verdun, Nancy, Toul, and Belfort and other strategic points as a guarantee that France would keep her word and re- main neutral. Inasmuch as this would be a severe infringement upon the sov- ereignty of France and would likely be met by a flat refusal, the inference is drawn that Germany did not want France to remain neutral, but wished to draw her into a world conflict. Great Britain and Germany. From the first it was evident that the ques- tion of England's attitude in the face of the great European crisis was of the most vital importance. In that most critical week following the presen- tation of the Austrian ultimatum. Sir Edward Grey worked early and late to arrive at some peaceful solution of the difficulty. From the very begin- ning France and Russia had urged Great Britain to come out with a def- inite statement that if war was pre- cipitated she would support them, pointing out that such a stand by Great Britain would deter Germany 24 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR from entering the war. M. Sazonov,- the Russian Foreign Minister, said "he did not beheve that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was de- cided by England's. If she took her stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war." (B.W.P. No. 17.) The President of France, M. Poincare,* went so far as to appeal directly to King George stating "I am profoundly convinced that at the pres- ent moment the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible it will be to count upon the preservation of peace." Sir Edward Grey did not accept their suggestions. It was his view that Great Britain could work most effectively for peace by playing the part of mediator. At the same time he made it clear to the German Ambassador that if Germany and France became involved "the issue might be so great that it would in- volve European interests and he did not wish him to be misled into think- ing that Great Britain would stand aside." (B.W.P. No. 89.) Germany fully appreciated the importance of keeping Great Britain neutral, if pos- sible. With this end in view the Ger- man Chancellor proposed that if Great Britain would remain neutral Germany PoixcARE, Raymond. Born (1860) in Bar- le-Duc, Lorraine. Educated early at lycees of Bar-le-Duc and Louis-le-Grand. Later made brilliant record as law student in Paris. Prac- ticed law for short time. At age of 27 elected to Chamber of Deputies. Opposed separation of church and state. Made Minister of Public Instruction (1893); Minister of Finance (1894). Held various ministries. Elected to Senate (1903). Prime Minister (1912) and took portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Vigorous supporter of alliance with Russia and of the entente with England. Elected President (1913). Believed" President should not be figurehead and made himself influential. Fa- vored three-year military service bill. Admit- ted to French Academy (1909), Author of several books. would guarantee that no territorial ac- quisitions would be made at the ex- pense of France. He was unwilling, however, to make a similar undertak- ing in regard to the French colonies. (B.W.P. No. 85.) This suggestion was declined by Great Britain on the ground that France might be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power, without having territory taken from her. Furthermore that other contingencies might arise which would justify Great Britain's entrance into the war. (B.W.P. No. 101.) A further request from Germany that Sir Edward Grey formulate conditions on which Great Britain would remain neu- tral was declined. He stated that "he could only say that they must keep their hands free." (B.W.P. No. 123.) The British government, therefore, up to the very last day of European peace refused either to bind herself to come to the aid of France and Russia or to remain neutral. Question of Belgian Neutrality. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 turned over the Austrian Netherlands, or Bel- gium, to Holland in compensation for certain Dutch colonial possessions re- tained by Great Britain. This union was opposed by the Belgians and at the first favorable opportunity (1830) they revolted. France was anxious to annex the provinces but Great Britain, following her traditional policy, op- posed their union with any great pow- er. This opposition was due to the proximity of the Belgian coast to her shores and also because of the impor- tant commercial interests of Great Britain in these rich provinces, which might suffer if they passed into the hands of some great European power. Great Britain's interests would be best served by erecting Belgium into an in- dependent state and by guaranteeing GENERAL PETAIN In Supreme Command of tlie French Armies JOSEPH CAILLAUX EORGES CLEMENCEAU Premier ALEXANDRE RIBOT Appointed Premier, March 19, 1917 FOUR MEN PROMINENT IN FRANCE DURING 1917 OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 25 the permanence of this independent status by making the country perpet- ually neutral. Accordingly in 1831 the principal European Powers, Great Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia, joined in guaranteeing the indepen- dence and perpetual neutrality of Bel- gium. This treaty was replaced by treaties signed in 1839 after Holland had agreed to recognize Belgian inde- pendence. When in 1870, at the out- break of the Franco-Prussian War, it seemed possible that one or both of the combatants might violate the neutral- ity of Belgium, a separate treaty was signed between Great Britain and each of the belligerents, by which Great Britain agreed that if either belliger- ent should violate Belgian neutrality the other could rely upon England as an ally in defense of the treaty of 1839. When on July 31, 1914, the out- break of a European war seemed un- avoidable, Sir Edward Grey tele- graphed the British ambassadors at Paris and Berlin to request the French and German governments to state whether they were prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violated it. To this the French authorities returned an affir- mative answer. The German Secre- tary of State, however, stated that it was doubtful if Germany could return any reply without disclosing a certain amount of her plan of campaign. On August 2, 1914, the German Minister presented to the Belgian Foreign Min- ister an ultimatum which stated that Germany had "reliable information ... of the intention of France to march through Belgian territory," that it was "an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack.'* Germany agreed to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as the war was over and to indemnify Bel- gium for all damages if she would maintain an attitude of "friendly neu- trality." In case of refusal Germany stated that Belgium would be consid- ered as an enemy and the question would be left "to a decision of arms." (B.G.B. No. 20.) To this demand the Belgian government returned a flat re- fusal and stated that they were "firmly resolved to repulse by every means within their power any attack upon their rights." (B.G.B. No. 22.) At the same time Belgium called upon Great Britain, France, and Russia, as signatories of the treaty of 1839, to carry out the guarantee of Belgian neutrality. In response to this request Sir Edward Grey on August 4, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Germany demand- ing a satisfactory reply to her request that Belgian neutrality be respected and requiring an answer by midnight of the same day. Upon Germany's re- fusal to give such a guarantee Great Britain declared war on Germany. While the violation of Belgian neutral- ity was the ostensible reason for Great Britain's declaration of war, she had, as a matter of fact, intervened in the war two days before the dispatch of her ultimatum to Germany. In a speech made in the House of Commons on August 2, 1914, Sir Edward Grey stated that he had on that day assured the French government that the Brit- ish fleet would protect the northern coast of France from any attack by the German fleet. By this act Great Britain had tentatively intervened in the war, and the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany changed this partial and tentative intervention into full participation in the war. German authorities clearly appre- ciated that Germany's action in invad- ing Belgium would arouse public sen- 26 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR timent in most neutral countries and strenuous efforts were made subse- quently to justify their action. In a speech in the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, the Grerman Chancellor, Theo- bald von Bethmann-Hollweg,* said: "Gentlemen, we are now acting in self- defense. Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have possibly already entered on Bel- gian soil. Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law." But other grounds than that of bald necessity have been advanced by German apol- ogists to justify their action. It has been claimed that Prussia, and not the German Empire, signed the treaty of 1839 and hence the latter was not bound by its provisions. To this it has been answered that the German Empire succeeded to the obligations of its component parts and that all treaties survived that were not for- mally renounced. It has also been stated that the treaty of 1839 was superseded by the treaties of 1870 which latter had lapsed. From the debates in the British Parliament at the time of the proposal of the treaties of 1870 there is no indication that the treaty of 1839 was to be superseded but rather to be strengthened. Ger- many furthermore claimed that certain secret documents which were discovered among the papers of the Belgian gov- ernment at Brussels go to prove that Belgium had by its own acts relieved Germany of the obligation to respect * Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald Theodore Frederic Alfred von. Born (1856) in Bran- denburg, Germany. Educated at College of Pforta and at universities of Strassburg, Leipsic and Berlin. Appointed Landrat of Oberbarnim, Brandenburg. President Province of Brandenburg (1901), Minister of Interior (1905), appointed Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior and Vice President of the Prussian Council (1907), and Chancellor of the German Empire (1909). A mild conserva- tive, but non-partisan in domestic affairs. her neutrality. These documents con- tain an account of certain conversa- tions between the Chief of the Belgian General Staff and the British Mili- tary Attache at Brussels, relative to the sending of British military forces to Belgium in case of an invasion of the latter by Germany. The German authorities claim that this amounted to an Anglo-Belgian alliance against Germany. In answer to this charge King Albert * of Belgium stated, ac- cording to an interview in the New York World (March 22, 1915), that the conversations referred to had been long known to the German authorities, having been communicated to the Ger- man Military Attache at Brussels so as to avoid any semblance of entering into an unneutral agreement. Germany also complained that Belgian military preparations for the defense of her neutrality, instead of being impartially directed against the possibility of an attack from any of the Powers, were made entirely against German3^ To this it is answered that the fortress of Namur was directed against France as Liege was directed against Germany. Furthermore that if greater energy had been directed towards fortifying the German than the French frontier, this was but natural in view of the German activity in building military railways leading up to the Belgian frontier. Finally Germany declared that her invasion of Belgium was in response to violations of Belgian neu- trality by France. But of this no satisfactory evidence has been pro- * Albert I., King of the Belgians. Born in 1875. Carefully educated. Democratic and firiendly in manner. Traveled widely and student of economics and politics. Made tour of Belgian Congo and advocated reform in the treatment of natives. When he became King (December, 1909) many improvements were made in the administration of the colony. One of the heroic figures of the great war. Courtsey Review of Reviews HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH Prime Minister Resigned December 5, lgi6 LORD ROBERT CECIL Minister of Blockade ARTHUR J. BALFOUR Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Photo by Paul Thomi>son: N. Y. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE Prirre Minister and First Lord of the Treasu December 7, 1916 GREAT BRITAIN— FOUR CABINET MINISTERS OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 27 duced. To the impartial observer, therefore, it would appear that Ger- man justification for the violation of Belgian neutrality must rest entirely on the ground of military necessity. The Lichnowsky Memorandum. Notes taken by Prince Lichnowsky, formerly German Ambassador in Lon- don, were made public early in 1918 and caused a sensation in the press of the belligerent powers by their revela- tion of the friendly attitude of Eng- land and her desire to maintain peace in the period just preceding the war. The memorandum, which bears the title My London Mission, 191^-14-, was dated August 16, 1916. When called to account by his government the prince said that the document was meant for the family archives and that it had found its way outside that circle as a result of a breach of con- fidence. He expressed his regret and resigned his rank as ambassador. The government forbade the prince to write articles for the press. Space is lack- ing for the quotation of the letters, but the following summary indicates his general attitude. In the first place he emphasized the conciliatory attitude of the British statesmen, especially Sir Edward Grey. Reviewing the policy of the German government just before the war, he said that although it had made repeated errors there, everything was still open as late as July, 1914<. Agreement with England had been reached. If a representative of aver- age ability had been sent to St. Peters- burg he might have convinced Russia of Germany's peaceful intentions. The German government could have proven to Russia that it had no desire to seize the Dardanelles or to destroy the Serbs. At this time M. Sazonov was saying, "Leave Austria and we will leave the French," and the French ambassador was saying, "You need not follow Austria everywhere," He said that there was no need then of either alliances or wars, but only of treaties that would protect Germany and others and guarantee Germany an economic development. After Russia had been relieved of trouble in the west she would have turned again to the east which would have saved the situation. He said that Germany might also have taken up the matter of the limitation of armaments. He summed up the case against his own government as follows : "As appears from all oflBcial publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation: (1). We encouraged Count Berchtold to at- tack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us — whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of com- plete indifference. (2). In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonov emphatically de- clared that Russia could not tolerate an attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian re- ply- (3). On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria's hav- ing attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobili- zation by sending an ultimatum to St. Peters- burg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march — so that we deliberately destroj^ed the possibility of a peaceful settle- ment. In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world out- side Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world's war." In one of his papers the prince asks the following questions : "Is it not in- telligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is de- stro^^ed which constitutes a perma- 28 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR nent threatening of our neighbors?" . . . "Were those people not right who declared that it was the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi which domi- nated the German people — the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil?" Italy's Position. At the outbreak of the European War, Italy found her- self in a most trying position. To Austria and Germany she was bound by the defensive treaty of the Triple Alliance. Her position as a member of this alliance had from the beginning been unnatural. Ever since Italy ob- tained national unity in 1870, there has been a strong movement to obtain the Italian-speaking provinces of Tri- este and Trentino, still held by Aus- tria. This aspiration in Italy for what is called "Italia Irredenta," or unre- deemed Italy, has been a source of fric- tion between Italy and Austria. The first indication of Italy's waver- ing in the support of her allies was when she threw her influence against Germany at the Algeciras Conference in 1906. Again in 1908 Italy was much irritated when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, thereby strengthening her position on the Adriatic Sea. But the most serious blow to the diplomatic group of the Triple Alliance was given by Italy in 1911 when she declared war on Tur- key, a country which had come to be regarded as a member of the Triple Alliance group. Germany and Aus- tria were forced to stand by and allow Italy to weaken the influence of the Triple Alliance by dismembering Tur- key. All of these events indicated that Italy's attitude at the outbreak of a European war would be uncertain. Her position was made more precarious by her extensive coast line. Any war which involved Great Britain as an enemy would expose Italy to attack by the powerful British navy. Apart, however, from questions of vital self-interest, Italy maintained that under the terms of the Triple Al- liance she was not bound to come to the aid of Germany and Austria-Hun- gary, because, in her view, Austria- Hungary had been the aggressor and Italy's obligations under the treaty contemplated only a defensive war. Ac- cordingly on August 1, 1911*, Italy de- clared that she would remain neutral. Italy's declaration of neutrality did not, as the Italian Foreign Minister stated, "signify the relinquishment of Italian interests in the Balkans and in the Adriatic, but, on the contrary, the persuasion that such interests and as- pirations shall be validly supported while the neutrality be maintained." (I.G.B. No. 2.) Italy's next step was a most dif- ficult one to determine. Should she remain neutral she could expect to gain little from either side, and she had to fear from her former allies, Germany and Austria, in case of their military success, a revengeful attitude. On the other hand to join the Entente allies was a difficult policy to pursue. In the first place it involved the moral question of turning against her former allies. In the second place the Rus- sian and Serbian policy in the Balkans was not certain to be in agreement with Italy's ambition to control the Adriatic. Other considerations also caused Italy to hesitate before casting in her lot with the Entente allies. Such were the unfavorable financial condi- tion of the country, the pro-German sympathies of the royal family, and the opposition of ex-Premier Giolitti,* * GiOLiTTi, Giovanni. Born (1843) at Mon- dovi in Province of Cuneo. Educated at Turin. Served in a department of Ministry of Finance. Elected to Chamber of Deputies. 1889 became Courtesy Review of Reviews LEONIDA BISSOLATI Socialist Member of the Government BARON SIDNEY SONNINO Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince BERNHARD VON BULOW Germar^ Amhassarlor to iTalv' I'liotoerapU by Paul Ttiompson Count LUIGI CADORNA Lieutenant General and Chief of Staff FOUR MEN PROMINENT IN ITALY OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 29 who, with a strong personal following in the Italian Parliament, maintained that Italy should not enter the war. For 10 months the contest between the neutralists and the interventionists went on in Italy. Great efforts were made by Germany and Austria, espe- cially through Prince von Biilow and his Itahan wife, to influence public opinion in Italy. It was clear, how- ever, that there was a steady drift of popular sentiment in favor of the En- tente. This movement was strength- ened, too, by the death of the Marquis di San Giuliano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in October, 1914, who was popularly regarded as a strong sym- pathizer with Germany and Austria- Hungary. Baron Sidney Sonnino,* who succeeded him, is regarded as one of the most astute Italian statesmen since Cavour. In the meantime the Italian government had entered upon a series of communications with Austria- Hungary looking to a satisfaction of Italian aspirations and interests in the Balkans. The Italian Foreign Minis- ter began by setting forth that, under Article VII of the Triple Alliance, Italy was entitled to compensations, in the event of any occupation of Serbian territory, even temporarily, by Aus- tria-Hungary. The Austrian officials Minister of the Treasury and following year Minister of Finance. Forced to resign because of his policy of extreme economy. Became' President of Ministry in 1893. Introduced many reforms in favor of lower classes. In 1893 compelled to resign because of bank scan- dals. Became Minister of the Interior in 1901, resigned May, 1903. Prime Minister several times. Resigned last time in 1914 on veto of colonial budget. * Sonnino, SmNEY, Baron. Born (1847) at Pisa. Graduated from university there (1865). In diplomatic service (1867-72), "and after 1880 deputy in Italian legislature. Minister of Finance (1893-94). Minister of Treasury, Pre- mier and Minister of the Interior in 1906 and 1909-10. Accepted portfolio of Foreign Af- fairs December, 1914, when Italy made prep- arations to enter European war. Author of works on social and political topics. were not inclined to admit, at first, that Italy had any valid claim to com- pensations under the terms of the treaty of alliances. From this stand, however, Austria soon receded, probably under pressure from Germany, and conceded the prin- ciple that Italy was entitled to com- pensations. There followed several months of protracted negotiations. Italy demanded as the minimum that she would accept in the way of com- pensations "the district of the Tren- tino, a new district on the Isonzo, the special treatment of Trieste, the ces- sion of some islands of the Curzolari Archipelago, a declaration of Aus- tria's disinterestedness in Albania, and the recognition of our possession of Valona and Dodecanesia." To these demands Austria was willing to con- cede only a portion of the Trentino and was unwilling to make any cession before the end of the war. These fruitless negotiations culmi- nated in the declaration by Italy, on May 4, that she no longer considered herself bound by the provisions of the Triple Alliance. After three weeks of hesitation during which public excite- ment in Italy reached a high pitch, Italy finally declared war on Austria, May 24, 1915. Just before the final break, according to a statement made by the German Chancellor, Austria- Hungary made a last attempt to pur- chase Italy's neutrality offering (1) the Itahan part of the Tirol; (2) the western bank of the Isonzo "in so far as the population is purely Italian," and the town of Gradisca; (3) sov- ereignty over Valona and a free hand in Albania; (4) special treatment of Italian nationals in Austria and am- nesty for political prisoners who were natives in the ceded provinces; (5) Trieste to be made an Imperial free 30 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR cit}', and to have an Italian University. Furthermore, it was stated that Aus- tria would make these concessions at once and not wait for the conclusion of the war. Japan's Position. Japan's entrance into the European War was due to her treat}' of alliance with Great Brit- ain. After the Chinese-Japanese War Japan was deprived of the fruits of her victory, when Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula had to be returned to China at the demand of Russia, France, and Germany. Smarting un- der this humiliation, Japan turned to Great Britain and in 1902 negotiated a treaty of alliance, according to the terms of which Japan agreed to come to the defense of Great Britain's east- ern possessions if she were attacked by more than one Power. Great Britain on the other hand insured Japan against a European coalition such as had intervened at the conclusion of the Chinese-Japanese War. At the outbreak of the European War Japan saw her opportunity to re- venge her humiliation at the close of the Chinese War. Actuated also by a determination to carry out her obliga- tions to Great Britain, the Japanese representative in Berlin presented an ultimatum on August 19, 1914, "ad- vising" Germany to withdraw all war- ships from Asiatic waters and turn over to Japan the territory of Kiao- chow before September 15, 1914, which territory Japan promised eventually to restore to China. This port and surrounding territory had been ob- tained by Germany from China in 1897 as a compensation for the mur- der of two German missionaries. The Germans had fortified the harbor strongly and had made it a fine naval base. As Germany refused to reply to the Japanese demand, Japan declared war on August 23, 1914. The Japa- nese Foreign Minister defended this action on the ground that Japan was bound by treaty obligations to come to the aid of her all}'. Great Britain, and that Germany's position at Kiaochow gravely threatened the maintenance of peace in the Far East and the inde- pendence and integrity of China which Japan had bound herself to maintain. Turkey. Germanic influence had for a number of years prior to the out- break of the war been predominant in Turke}'. It was natural, therefore, that Turkish sympathies would be with the Teutonic allies. But Turkey hesi- tated, at first, to make common cause with Germany because of her exposed position and the fact that her recent experiences in the Balkan wars had left her exhausted. Events, however, rapidly forced Turkey to abandon her attitude of quasi-neutrality. Shortly after the outbreak of the war two Ger- man warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, in order to escape capture by the British and French fleets, sought refuge in the Dardanelles. The de- mand of England and France that these ships should either be forced to put to sea or be interned was answered by Turkey stating that she had pur- chased the ships from Germany. Tur- key also refused to remove the German crews of the two vessels. The Triple Entente also resented the action of Turkc}- in closing the Dardanelles and in serving notice that the "capitula- tions," under the terms of which the national subjects of various Powers were given special privileges in Turkey, would be revoked on October 1, 1914. When on October 29 the former Ger- man warship, the Breslau, bombarded the Russian Black Sea port of Theo- dosia, Russia accepted this as a dec- laration of war and the following day OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 31 the Russian Ambassador at Constanti- nople demanded his passports. This action of Russia was followed by France and England declaring war on Turkey, November 5, 191-i. Turkey's entrance into the war aroused the hope in Germany and some fear in Great Britain and France that a Holy War would be proclaimed by the Sultan which would arouse the Moslem popu- lations in India, Egypt, and Morocco. The Sultan's efforts in this direction proved unavailing, and no serious up- rising occurred among the Moham- medan subjects of Great Britain and France. The Balkan States. The opening of the European War found the Balkan Peninsula in the political shape given to it by the Treat}' of Bucharest, Au- gust 10, 1913, which closed the second Balkan War. This treaty, which rep- resented the latest effort on the part of the European Powers to adjust the Balkan situation, proved unsatisfac- tory to nearly all of the parties con- cerned. Turkey did not accept with good grace the loss of nearly all of her EurojDean territory'. Bulgaria was bit- ter towards her former allies, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, who she felt had treacherousW combined to deprive her of her just rewards. Serbia re- sented the action of Austria, Italy, and Germany in depriving her of an outlet to the Adriatic. ^Montenegro was dis- appointed in being forced to surrender Scutari. Finally Albania, the new state created by the Powers to thwart Serbia's ambition to reach the Adri- atic, was in a state of ill-disguised an- archy under the shadowy control of Prince William of Wied.* * "\ViLLiA3r OF WiED. Peixce (^Vilhel?! Feied- BiCH Heikrich). Born (1876) at Xeuv.-ied, Prussia. Studied law and political science at Jena. Later graduated with distinction at the Kriegsakademie. Accepted throne of Albania As has been seen, Serbia had been involved in the war from the beginning and Montenegro soon threw in her lot with her neighbor. The attitude of the other Balkan states was a matter of great concern to the diplomats of the allied groups. During the months suc- ceeding the outbreak of the war, a dip- lomatic struggle ensued in these states, with the aim of winning their support to one or the other side. In this struggle the diplomats of the Teutonic Powers had certain distinct advantages. In the first place the mon- archs (Constantine I,* Ferdinand l,f Charles It) of the three states, offered to him by great Powers of Europe (1914). Reign trouljled and forced to leave country September, 1914. Albanian Senaxte elected as ruler Burhan Eddin, the son of the former sultan of Turkey. His bitter opponent and rival for the throne was Essad Pascha. * CoxsTAXTiXE I., King of Greece, born (1868) in Athens, son of King George I. and Olga, niece of Czar Nicholas I. Studied at the Universities of Berlin and Leipsic. Mar- ried (1889) a sister of Emperor William II. of Germany. Received careful military training. Commander in chief of Greek forces in Turk- ish "War of 1897. In the Balkan War (1913-13) acquitted himself so well, he was hailed as na- tional hero. Became King of the Hellenes on March 21, 1913. Continued campaigns against Turks and Bulgarians and doubled area of country. During the European war he main- tained a strong pro-German attitude as a re- sult of which he was compelled to abdicate by the Entente Allies. He was succeeded by his second son Alexander. fFEEDixAXD I. Born (1861) in Vienna. Re- ceived excellent education. Offered throne of Bulgaria (1886) and took oath to constitution and title of Prince (1887). Not recognized bv Great Powers or Turkey until 1896. In 1908 proclaimed full independence of Bulgaria and assumed title of King. Royal title recognized by Powers and Turkey in 1909. Favored form- ation of Balkan League and prosecution of Balkan War (1913-13). As a result of this war territory increased, but not sufficiently to satisfy Ferdinand. i Chaeles I. Born (1839). Served in Prus- sian army. Elected Prince of Rumania (1866). Country in wretched condition. Showed tact and statesmanship in work of reorganization. Helped Russia in Russo-Turkish War (1877). Declared independence of Rumania shortly after beginning of war. In 1881 crowned King. Country developed, education advanced. Held aloof from recent war in Balkans. Be- loved by peasants, but opposed by landowning Boyards (lower nobility). 32 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania, were related by blood and marriage with the Teutonic royal families. Moreover, as the British Prime Minister (H. H. As- quith *) indicated in a speech in the House of Commons, Germany had a distinct advantage in that she could conduct her negotiations with a single- ness of purpose, as her interests and those of Austria-Hungary were identi- cal. On the other hand, the Entente diplomats had to consider the interests, not always identical, of three and, later, four Powers. Finally the En- tente allies were handicapped by the fact that Russian ambitions in the Bal- kans conflicted with the national aspi- rations of the smaller Balkan states ; that Italy's territorial ambitions in Al- bania ran counter to the legitimate as- pirations of Serbia, and that Greece resented the attempt of Italy to gain a foothold on the coast of Asia Minor, which was racially and historically Greek. In view of these conditions it is not surprising that the efforts of the En- tente diplomats, even had they been conducted more skillfully than they ap- pear to have been, should have failed. Bulgaria. — The second Balkan War left, as has been noted, a heritage of bitterness and hatred among the former Balkan allies. The Bulgars, smarting under the humiliation of the Treaty of Bucharest, welcomed the opportunity * AsQuiTH, Herbert Henry. Born (1852) in Yorkshire. Admitted to bar after gradua- tion from Oxford. Became member of Par- liament and won favor of Gladstone. Made Home Secretary (1882). Favored free trade. Helped turn Conservatives out of office (1905) and became Chancellor of the Exchequer under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and because of feeble health of Prime Minister, virtual head of government. Favored old-age pension bill, which was passed. Became Prime Minister (1908) and a liberal programme accelerated. House of Lords sheared of power of veto, be- cause opposed to social legislation and defeat of budget. He resigned on December 5, 1916, and was succeeded by David Lloyd George. to revenge themselves upon their for- mer allies. Completely disillusioned by their experiences of the past few years, they put aside all feeling of generosity or gratitude and frankly adopted a programme of "real politik." To the diplomats of the Entente and the Teutonic allies the Bulgarian au- thorities made it clear that all ques- tion of sentiment, so far as Bulgaria was concerned, was to be disregarded and that they were prepared to sell out to the highest bidder. Great Britain and France brought pressure to bear on Rumania, Serbia, and Greece to sat- isfy, in part, the territorial demands of Bulgaria. The Teutonic Powers made counter proposals promising Bulgaria a large part of Serbian territory in case of the success of the Central Pow- ers. For more than a year Bulgaria hesitated, apparently weighing the rela- tive advantages of the rival proposals. In the meantime the Bulgarian army was mobilized, in order to be prepared when the final decision was reached. It became increasingly evident as the months passed that the attitude of King Ferdinand and the military leaders was favorable to the Teutonic allies. Mat- ters were brought to a head Avhen, on Oct. 3, 1915, Russia notified Bulgaria that if she did not, within 24 hours, break with the Teutonic Powers, the Russian Minister would withdraw from Sofia. A similar demand was made by France, while Great Britain stated that if Bulgaria precipitated hostilities in the Balkans she would break off rela- tions with her. On Oct. 8, 1915, Bul- garia replied, rejecting these demands and throwing her support to the Teu- tonic Powers. In a manifesto issued by M. Radoslavoff,* the Bulgarian Pre- * Vaseil Radoslavoff, born in Lowatsch; stud- ied law at Heidelberg; at various times served as Minister of Justice, Minister of the Interior, M. VENIZELOS Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Resigned October 5, 1915 M. SKOULOUDIS Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece November 7, 1915 I American Presj Association M. TAKE JONESCU M. RADOSLAVOFF Leader of Conservative-Democratic Party — Rumania Prime Minister of Bulgaria FOUR BALKAN STATESMEN PROMINENT IN 1915 OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 33 mier, there was set forth the reasons for Bulgaria's decision. He stated frankly that considerations of self-in- terest had dictated the step. He pointed out that Bulgaria's chief eco- nomic interests were with the Teutonic Powers and Turkey, and that these in- terests would be seriously menaced if Constantinople fell into the hands of Russia. In reviewing the proposals of concessions made to Bulgaria by the opposing groups, he held that the Teu- tonic proposals were more advanta- geous to Bulgaria. And finally he had reached the conclusion that the pro- gress of the war indicated the probable success of the Central Powers, and it was vital to the interests of Bulgaria to be on the side of the victors. Greece. — Conflicting influences and interests complicated the situation in Greece at the outbreak of the war. On the one hand, the royal family was closely related to the Hohenzollerns, the Greek Queen Sophia being a sister of the German Emperor, William II. On the other hand, the Premier Venizelos * felt that the best interests of Greece would be served by joining the Entente allies. Popular sympathy in the coun- try appeared to be with the Entente group, and especially with France. In addition, Greece was bound by a treaty of alliance with Serbia which obligated her to come to the aid of Serbia if she and Premier; did much as Premier in 1913 to bring Balkan War to an end; became Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs (October, 1915) during European War; made important declarations of Bulgarian policy; shot at twice (March, 1916). * Venizelos, Eleutherios. Born (1864) on island of Crete. Graduated (1886) from Uni- versity of Athens in law. Made brilliant repu- tation as a lawyer. At 25 chosen to Cretan legislature. Minister of Justice in 1899. Fa- vored political union of Crete and Greece. Chosen Premier of Crete (1910). Central fig- ure in events in the Balkans. Greek premier in 1910. Had prominent part in revising Greek constitution. Championed side of Triple En- tente. were attacked by Bulgaria. During the first months of the war the diplomats of France and Great Britain directed their efforts to winning all of the Bal- kan states to the support of the En- tente. With this end in view both Greece and Serbia were urged to make territorial concessions to Bulgaria. These efforts were seconded by M. Venizelos, but the Greek King flatly opposed any territorial concessions and maintained that the best interests of Greece would be served by the observ- ance of strict neutrality. The break between the King and his chief Minis- ter led to the resignation of the latter in March, 1915. His return to office shortly after as a result of popular ap- proval expressed in the elections to the new Chamber was hailed as a victory for the Entente, and it was generally expected that Greece would soon enter the war. The situation became acute when, in September, 1915, Bulgaria mobilized her army and Greece did like- wise. Bulgaria's entrance into the war on the side of the Teutonic Powers raised the question of Greece's obliga- tion under the treaty of alliance with Serbia. M. Venizelos maintained that Greece was bound to come to Serbia's aid, but the King once more interposed his objections, holding that the treaty contemplated only a local Balkan war and not one in which the Great Powers were involved. Again M. Venizelos re- signed. In the meantime arrangements had been made by the Greek Premier with the Entente allies for the landing of French and English troops at the Greek port of Saloniki, which troops were to be used to aid Serbia. This use of a Greek port was a clear viola- tion of Greek neutrality and the Greek government entered a formal protest. It was understood on all sides that this protest was purely formal, and the 34 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR landing of troops continued. The resig- nation of M. Venizelos aroused some ap- prehension in France and England and pressure was brought to bear upon the new Premier, M. Zaimis,* to define his position. He stated that the attitude of Greece would be "neutrality, with the character of sincerest benevolence towards the Entente Powers." King Constantine, however, vigorously pro- tested against the violation of Greek territory by Great Britain and France. He maintained that it was the sheerest hypocrisy for these countries to pro- test against the violation of Belgian neutrality by the Germans, while they themselves were violating Greek neu- trality. He was strongly supported in these views by Stephanos Skouloudis, who succeeded Zaimis as Premier and who also took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The period of the premiership of Skouloudis was very stornly. The Al- lies seemed to fear that their Saloniki expedition was threatened from the rear by the Greek army. This fear of an attack compelled General Sarrail to keep a strong force on the Macedonian front. In order to remove this threat the Allies from time to time made de- mands on the Greek government which weakened the latter's military posi- tion. The Allies desired the use of the Peloponnesian railway to transport the regenerated Serbian army from Corfu to Saloniki. This was refused on the ground that it would be a violation of neutrality. After some hesitation the British Foreign Office announced that the troops would be transported by water. * Zaimis, Alexander. Born (1855) in Athens. Educated at universities of Athens, Leipsic, Berlin (Ph.D.), and Paris. Elected deputy (1885); Minister of Justice, (1890-92); presi- dent of Chamber of Deputies (1895-97); Pre- mier (1897-99 and 1901-03). Brought about annexation of Island of Crete to Greece (1913). This demand was only a preliminary to those which were to follow. In June, 1916, the Bulgarians crossed the Mace- donian frontier and seized several Greek forts. When war was not immediately declared on Bulgaria, the Allied Pow- ers demanded that the Greek army be demobilized. To enforce their demands, they blockaded the Greek ports and seized vessels and supplies in the har- bors. Martial law was declared in Sa- loniki and the Greek military com- mander was superseded by a French- man. The Greek government sent iden- tical notes of protest against interfer- ence with her trade by the Entente Pow- ers to the United States and to all the South American governments. Never- theless the result of the blockade was the demobilization of the 12 senior classes on June 9th. As soon as order was restored a new set of demands was made on the Greek government. Before they were officially received, however, the Skouloudis gov- ernment resigned. Former Premier Alexander Zaimis was again called upon to head the cabinet. The first act of his government was to accept uncondi- tionally the demands of the Allies, which included briefly, (1) demobiliza- tion of the rest of the Greek army, (2) replacing of the Skouloudis cabinet with a business cabinet favorable to the Allies, (3) dissolution of the chamber and the holding of new elections, and, (4) replacement of certain police func- tionaries who had permitted insults against the Allied legations. Upon the acceptance of these demands the Allied blockade was withdrawn. During this period of national un- rest there was gradually springing up a strong anti-German party. The seiz- ure of the garrison at Kavala by the Bulgarians, the abandonment of the Macedonian forts without a struggle OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 35 and the entrance of Rumania into the war, brought the move to a head. A Committee of National Defense was es- tablished by those who were opposed to the supine attitude of the Greek gov- ernment. It set up a provisional form of government for Macedonia and de- manded that the Bulgarians be driven out. In order to aid this movement to succeed the Allies took an active part in it. They seized enemy merchant- men in the Piraeus, the port of Athens. They also demanded and received all Greek ports and the use of the tele- graph system. On account of inabil- ity to handle the situation the Zaimis ministry resigned. The pro-Ally movement reached its height when a formidable revolution broke out in Crete during the third week in September. Venizelos immedi- ately left Athens with a number of sup- porters for the seat of the revolution. One of his chief followers was Admiral Coudouriotis, whose desertion of the King left the latter in a very serious predicament. A proclamation estab- lishing a provisional government was issued by Venizelos and Admiral Cou- douriotis, and within a very short time Macedonia and all of the Greek islands were under their control. The provi- sional government declared war on Ger- many and Bulgaria on Nov. 25, 1916. The Allies heartily approved the new Venizelos government and proceeded to make further demands on the new Greek government, headed by Spyridon Lam- bros. The new demands included the turning over to the Allies of the Greek navy, certain strategical railways, forts, mails, telegraphs, police service, naval material and the Piraeus. They further demanded that any Greek who so desired be permitted to join the new government. All these demands were acceded to as a result of necessity. Apparently still fearing an attack in their rear, the Allies demanded that all the arms and munitions belonging to the Greek army and navy be turned over to them. The Greek government was given until Dec. 1, 1916, to grant this last request. King Constantine re- fused to agree, marines were landed from the Allied fleet, and a scene simi- lar to the days of the French Revolu- tion occurred in Athens. True to his promise, Vice Admiral du Fournet fired upon royalist troops, when the time of his ultimatum expired. Thereupon a regular civil war broke out in Athens. Royalist troops fired upon Venizelists and vice versa. As a result of a truce King Constantine agreed to surrender all the mountain guns of the Greek army. When this was accomplished all the Allied marines were withdrawn to the fleet with the exception of a small guard. The Entente nations continued to exert a political and economic pressure upon the Greek government. King Con- stantine adopted a passive attitude of submission to the demands of the Allies and determined to rely on the ultimate recognition by the world that his treat- ment had been unjust. The long con- flict between King Constantine and the Entente came to an end on June 12, 1917, when the King abdicated in favor of his second son Alexander. This step was taken at the dictation of the Allies, who decided, after investigation, that the King and his elder son George were strongly pro-German. Zaimis, the prime minister, resigned and was suc- ceeded by Venizelos, the staunch friend of the Entente. One of the first acts of the new ministry was to declare war on Bulgaria and Germany (July 2). Al- lied control was withdrawn with the ex- ception of that over telegraphs and press censorship. Immediate steps 36 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR were taken to actively join the Entente army around Saloniki. This removed the continual threat of an attack by Greek forces in the rear of General Sarrail's army. See Southeastern Theatre, Rumania. — Somewhat the same di- vision of sentiment obtained in Rumania as in Greece at the outbreak of the European War. The King, Charles I, was a member of the Hohenzollern fam- ily, and it was rumored that there was a secret treaty between Rumania, Ger- many, and Austria-Hungary. The mass of the Rumanian population is composed of illiterate peasants, but among the educated classes there was a strong pro-French and especially pro- Italian sentiment. The Rumanians claim descent from Roman colonists ; and there has always been a strong sen- timental attachment to Italy amon^the Rumanians. Apart from conflicting sentimental influences, the question of the wisest policy for Rumania to pur- sue to advance her material interests was not easy to determine. On the one hand a large Rumanian population was included in the Austrian dominions in Transylvania, while on the other hand the Russian province of Bessarabia was equally Rumanian in nationality and more valuable economically than Tran- sylvania. At the head of the Rumanian minis- try was John Bratianu, one of the shrewdest statesmen in the Balkans. He advocated a policy of waiting, with the intention of entering the war at the proper time when the greatest reward could be obtained by the least fighting. The death of King Charles in October, 1914, and the entrance of Italy into the war, were expected to influence Ru- mania to join forces with the Entente allies. But the failure of the Russian campaign in Galicia and Bulgaria's alliance with the Teutonic Powers caused Rumania to continue her policy of watchful waiting. She continued this policy until April 28, 1916, when the Rumanian minister at Vienna presented a note to the Aus- tro-Hungarian Foreign Minister which said that Rumania considered herself at war with Austria-Hungary since nine o'clock the previous evening. She maintained that her treaties with the Central Powers had been continually broken since the war began and that Rumanians in Austria-Hungary were being persecuted. She intervened to prevent these persecutions, to shorten the war if possible, and to realize her national ideal. She thought an alli- ance with the Entente allies would best enable her to accomplish the last pur- pose. Portugal. Portugal was bound by a treaty of alliance with Great Britain, and at the outbreak of the European War Portugal stated that she was pre- pared to carry out her treaty obliga- tions whenever Great Britain desired her to do so. However, Portugal did not enter the w'ar until more than a year after the beginning of hostilities, although there were clashes between Portuguese and German troops in Af- rica. On Feb. 24, 1916, at the request of Great Britain, Portugal seized a number of German and Austrian ships lying in Portuguese harbors. On March 8, 1916, Germany declared war on Portugal, stating that the seizure of German vessels was done at the dicta- tion of Great Britain, and could be re- garded in no other light than as a hos- tile move against Germany. Czecho-Slovakia. This is the name of a new nation which was born as a result of the war. It comprises the former Austrian states of Bohemia, Moravia, part of Silesia, and the dis- OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 37 trict of Hungary known as Slovakia. It has a population of about 13 mil- lions with an area of 52,000 square miles. The natural wealth is estimated at 15 billions of dollars. Its declara- tion of independence was published at Paris October 18, 1918; the local gov- ernment was taken over in Prague Oc- tober 28, 1918, and the republic for- mally proclaimed the next day. The republic had maintained four armies, one in Bohemia, one in France, one in Italy, and a force of approximately 75,000 men operating in Russia and Siberia partially at the request of the Allied governments. The first presi- dent of the republic was Thomas Gar- rigue Masaryk, who was also one of the chief leaders in the movement for an independent Czecho-Slovakia. In the first part of August, 1918, the British government formally recognized the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied nation. The Italian and French governments had made special agreements with the Czecho-Slovak National Council in re- gard to the Czecho-Slovak army which had been formed in each of those coun- tries (see below). The British govern- ment definitely recognized the unity of that army and said that in considera- tion of their efforts to achieve inde- pendence. Great Britain regarded the Czecho-Slovak armies as constituting an Allied and pledged army waging regular warfare against Austria-Hun- gary and Germany. It also recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the representative of the future gov- ernment. At the beginning of Sep- tember the United States government also recognized the Czecho-Slovak Na- tional Council as a belligerent govern- ment clothed with proper authority and recognized the state of war between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. At this time the Czecho-Slovak forces were in the neighborhood of Chita and the com- posite Allied force was advancing in the Ussuri Province from Vladivostok. For an account of their military cam- paigns see Military Operations, Eastern Front. For the purposes of convenience the following dates of the declaration of war are given : CENTRAL POWERS Austria against Serliia — July 28, 1914. Austria against Russia— August 6, 1914, Austria against Montenegro — August 9, 1914. Austria against Japan — August 27, 1914. Austria against Belgium — August 28, 1914. Bulgaria against Serbia — October 14, 1915. Germany against Russia— August 1, 1914. Germany against France — August 3, 1914. Germany against Belgium — August 4, 1914. Germany against Portugal — March 9, 1916. Germany against Rumania — September 14, 1916. Turkey against the Allies — November 23, 1914. Turkey against Rumania — August 29, 1916. ENTENTE ALLIES Brazil against Germany — October 26, 1917. China against Austria and Germany — August 14, 1917. Costa Rica against Germany — May 24, 1918. Cuba against Germany — April 7, 1917. France against Germany — August 3, 1914. France against Austria — August 13, 1914. France against Turkey — November 5, 1914. France against Bulgaria — October 16, 1915. Great Britain against Germany — August 4, 1914. Great Britain against Austria — August 13, 1914. Great Britain against Turkey — November 5, 1914. Great Britain against Bulgaria — October 15, 1914. Greece (provisional government) against Ger- many and Bulgaria — November 28, 1916. Greece (Alexander's government) against Ger- many and Bulgaria — July 2, 1917. Guatemala against German)^ — April 23, 1918. Hayti against Germany — July 15, 1918. Honduras against Germany — July 19, 1918. Italy against Austria — May 24, 1915. Italy against Turkey — August 21, 1915. Italy against Bulgaria — October 19, 1915. Italy against Germany — August 28, 1916. Japan against Germany — August 23, 1914. 38 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Liberia against Germany — August 4, 1917. Montenegro against Germany — August 9, 1914. Nicaragua against Germany — May 7, 1918. Panama against Germany — April 7, 1917. Panama against Austria — December 10, 1917. Portugal against Germany — November 23, 1914. (Passed resolutions authorizing military in- terventions as treaty ally of Great Britain.) Portugal against Germany — May 19, 1915. (Military aid granted.) Rumania against Austria — August 27, 1916. (Allies of Austria also considered it a dec- laration against them.) Russia against Turkey — November 3, 1914. Russia against Bulgaria — October 19, 1915. San Marino against Austria — May 24, 1915. Serbia pgainst Germany — August 6, 1914. Serbia against Turkey — December 2, 1914. Serbia against Bulgaria — October 19, 1915. Siam against Germany and Austria — July 22, 1917. The Hedjaz (Arabia) against Central Powers — Jime'9, 1916. United States against Germany — April 6, 1917. United States against Austria — December 7, 1917. IV. MILITARY OPERATIONS The military operations of the great war, in which the Central Powers were by turns on the offensive and on the defensive, hinge on the plan of the German general staff according to which Austria, with a small German force, was to hold Russia in check, while Germany crushed France, both Central Powers uniting for the subse- quent Russian campaign. The strategy of the war from this \aewpoint falls easily under the follow- ing main divisions : I, Introduction and discussion of mobilization and re- sources ; II, Western theatre, or cam- paign against France; III, Eastern theatre, or campaigns against Russia; IV, Southern theatre, or campaigns against Serbia (involving Bulgaria's entry into the war) and Italian cam- paign; V, Southeastern theatre, or Turkish campaigns, including Suez, Gallipoli, and Caucasus. In no theatre of the war was the strategy unconnect- ed with events taking place or about to take place on other fronts. I. Introduction. The war that broke out in 1914 involved three continents and the seven seas. Not only its com- batants, but the killed and wounded, were to be numbered by millions. Every known resource of mechanical ingenuity was drawn upon, and old and forgotten methods of warfare were brought into play side by side with the most power- ful modern artillery, while aeronautics for the first time had occasion to show its worth. (See section Aerial Opera- tions.) The edifice of international law, of the conventions of warfare, so painfully built up after centuries of struggle, was toppled over as a thing of no account. With these considera- tions before us we must remark that in the space here available nothing but a statement of the principal facts can be attempted. But even so, the nature of the struggle on one front, the west- ern, calls for a word or two. When both sides simultaneously reached the sea there began a siege over the whole front that gave the struggle in this theatre a character unique in military history. At certain places in the "line" 32 parallel lines of German trenches were discovered by reconnoissance. The trench systems of this front were esti- mated, after including communication trenches, to be 25,000 miles long. Frontal attack became a necessity, since flanks there were none, and yet these attacks all proved failures, for the experience gained under the new conditions had not as yet led to such a disposition of forces and resources as to carry them through to a decision. The most desperate efforts were made, first by one and then by the other side, to raise the siege, so to say, by a con- centration at some selected point, and thus break through and end a situa- tion that only a few years ago would have been deemed intolerable. The war was finally won as a result of a series of brilliant flank attacks after the failure of major German frontal attacks. On the other fronts the phenomena of what may well now be called old- fashioned warfare were more or less reproduced, but even in their case a marked tendency to approximate to the 39 40 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR conditions in France manifested itself — indeed may be said to have estab- lished itself on a part of the Russian lines and to a certain extent on the Italian. A marked feature of this war was the so-called mobilization of in- dustries. So great was the draft made on the industrial resources of the coun- tries involved that the struggle, other conditions equal, may be said to have resolved itself into a competition by each side to outstrip the other in sup- plies and munitions. Mobilisation and Concentration. When it became evident that the gen- eral European situation was becoming more and more serious, covering troops {troupes de couverture) were sent by the French government to the eastern frontier. These troops, five corps in all, or 200,000 men, with cavalry, began their movement on July 31 at 9 p. m., and had completed it on August 3 at noon. They were not to cross a zone 8 kilometers wide along the frontier, in order to prevent any clash with the Germans, so long as war was unde- clared. On the German side the Em- peror, on July 31, decreed the Kriegs- gefahrzustand, or a sort of state of martial law, under which certain mili- tary measures could be adopted on the frontier, and the telegraph and railway services taken over by the military au- thorities. Mobilization proper, however, began in both Germany and in France on August 2, in France at midnight. It was asserted that in Germany the op- eration was set afoot well before the formal date given above. In both coun- tries it was carried on with the preci- sion that the whole world had learned to expect of Germany, but of which, as regards France, it was somewhat doubt- ful. The purpose of mobilization, it may be recalled here, is to pass from peace to war footing. Each man liable to service reports on a given date at a specified point, draws his arms, uni- form, and equipment, and joins a designated organization. Companies, battalions, regiments, etc., are thus brought up to war strength ; transport material is requisitioned and train ser- vice prepared. The French mobiliza- tion, in two periods of ten and six days respectively, closed on August 18 ; the German, according to the French, on the 16th. German authorities, how- ever, give the closing date as the 20th. Mobilization was followed by concen- tration. The French armies began their con- centration in the east of France from Belfort to the Belgian frontier, thus respecting the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg. By this course the French, incidentally, gave the Germans choice of ground and freedom of man- oeuvre. It should be recollected, how- ever, that the exact intentions of the German general staff were unknown; they might attack either on the right or the left bank of the Meuse, or attempt a demonstration by the Oise, or even risk a break from Nancy on to Verdun. Further, the possibility of the offensive had to be kept in view, and the offen- sive, for the French, was possible only in Alsace and Lorraine. In other words, the concentration of the French was both offensive and defensive; while guarding the approaches on the east, they would be ready to face in any di- rection. As a matter of fact, the plan of concentration could not be fully car- ried out ; it had to be modified because of the German advance through Bel- gium. Hence, in general terms, the French armies were stretched out from Belfort north and then northwest towards the Sambre, to join hands, if possible, with the English and Belgians. MILITARY OPERATIONS 41 Certain corps even pushed their way into Belgium itself. The German problem of concentra- tion was simpler, if, as there is reason to believe, their intention from the first was to smash their way through Bel- gium. They contented themselves with merely observing the strong eastern (French) frontier, and disposed their other armies northward through Treves, etc., to Aix-la-Chapelle, in position to inaugurate and carry through a vast sweeping movement through Belgium. They crossed the frontier of this coun- try without waiting for either mobiliza- tion or concentration, using for this purpose troops kept immediately avail- able near the frontier. On the periods of mobilization and concentration of the other combatants it is not necessary to dwell. In Aus- tria-Hungary the operation was merely a repetition of the German process, and, like that, carried out with prompt- ness and accuracy. Russia was ex- pected to be slow, but on the contrary was so energetic as to suggest a belief that she began before the formal dec- laration of war. England had no army to mobilize, but she prepared her "ex- peditionary force," crossed it over to the Continent, and got into position op- posite the German right in time to offer a resistance that was invaluable to the Allied cause. General Strategy and Resources. The War of the Nations originated as a struggle on the part of Austria-Hun- gary and Germany against the "Slavic Peril" — against the huge Slav empire of Russia and the small Slav kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. But from the very beginning of the conflict, de- fense against Russia was of minor in- terest as compared with the attack on Belgium, Britain, and France, The reason was quite simple. The German General Staff * had planned, so said the military experts, that the bulk of the German army should be hurled first against France, and then, having crushed France, be transferred to the east to turn back the tide of Russia's slow-mobilizing multitudes. For Rus- sia, with all her 171 millions of inhabi- tants in Europe and in Asia, was spread over so vast an area, and was so defi- cient in railways that 10 of her 36 army corps (an army corps may be counted as 50,000 men) could not be expected to arrive on the scene in the first month, and the remaining 26 could not begin a serious attack within the first few weeks of the war. Germany could leave 5 of her 25 army corps to coop- erate with 12 Austrian corps in hold- ing back the Russian advance guard, while 2 Austrian corps "punished" Serbia, and the remaining 2 Austrian and 19 German corps crushed France. The German armies in the west would isweep across Belgium — with its net- work of convenient railways and smooth highways — turning the flank of the strong line of French fortifications along the Franco-German frontier, and swoop down upon Paris with irresistible might. The French army annihilated, the German troops could be shifted from the west to the east (it is only a little more than 500 miles from Bel- gium to Russia, that is, twice the dis- * At the outbreak of the war, the Chief of the German General Staff was Helmuth von MoLTKE, who was born in Mecklenburg- Schwerin in 1848, served in the Franco-Prus- sian War of 1870-1871, was attached to the General Staff as adjutant under his famous uncle, Field Marshal von Moltke, and was ap- pointed Chief of the General Staff and general of infantry in 1906. During the course of the War of the Nations, he was superseded in chief command of the German forces by General Erich von Falkenhayn, who was born at Burg Belchau in 1861, served in China several years, acted as chief of staff of the 16th, and later of the 4th Army Corps, and was appointed minister of war in 1913. 42 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR tance from Albany to Buffalo) and reserves could be brought up to defeat the advancing Russians. The attack on France and Belgium, however, met with such fierce resistance that al- though 13 reserve corps were sent into France on the heels of 21 active corps, in August, followed by 4 substitute re- serve corps at the end of August, 8 Landwehr corps in September, and 5 semi-corps of reserves in October, in addition to 10 cavalry divisions, the German forces in France and Belgium had to fall back after their first swift stroke and could then do little more than hold a long intrenched battle line against the enemy. This delay in the west gave the dreaded "Russian hordes" time to mass in Poland for an invasion of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Austro-Hungarian araiies, more- over, began to show alarming weakness, and were unable either to conquer the Serbs in the south or to hold back the Russians in the north of the Hapsburg Empire. Germany was now compelled to fight the war on two fronts, shifting her troops back and forth as occasion required, and finding her magnificent strategic railways of incalculable value. Skillful distribution of forces, able gen- eralship, and superior equipment en- abled the Germans, with Austrian as- sistance, to hold back the Russian in- vaders, and even to take up an advance position in Russian Poland. After five months of the war, Germany was cer- tainly holding her own. Most of Bel- gium, Northeastern France, and part of Russian Poland were occupied by German troops, whereas only a small corner of Alsace and a bit of East Prussia had been lost to French or Russians. The prospect of ultimate victory for the German arms was, how- ever, becoming rather uncertain. To be sure, the danger of a Russian "tidal wave" sweeping over Germany from the east was no longer feared ; but in a long war, where endurance rather than speed of mobilization wins the victory, Ger- many would labor under great difficul- ties. Germany, with a total population of 65,000,000, Austria-Hungary with less than 50,000,000, and later Turkey with about 21,000,000 and Bulgaria with 5,000,000, aggregating 141,- 000,000, were confronted by a coali- tion representing 252,000,000 of Euro- peans, not to speak of Russia's 20,000,000 in Siberia and the vast transmaritime empires of Great Britain and France and later the 110,000,000 inhabitants of the United States. Ac- cording to the best information ob- tainable, Germany had placed between 4 and 5 million men in the field by the end of 1914, that is, for every 16 Ger- mans there was 1 soldier. Germany still had second-rate fighting men and fresh- ly matured youths to call upon, but ob- viously the number was limited. France likewise was limited ; an army of 5,000,- 000 would be one-eighth the population. But Russia boasted, in addition to 5j- 000,000 trained warriors, a reserve of population which could furnish 5,- 000,000 more if they could be mus- tered, trained, and equipped. Great Britain, with a population of over 45,- 000,000 to draw upon, was already drilling 1,000,000 or more recruits to take part in the battles of France. From the 15,000,000 white inhabitants of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 100,000 or more sol- diers might be sent to the battlefields of western Europe. The contingents of "native" soldiers brought from Af- rica by Great Britain and France, and the British Indians, were picturesque, but hardly numerous enough to exert an appreciable influence on the final issue. In short, the allies appeared to Pliolugraph by Paul 'rhonipson, N, Y. GENERAL ERICH VON FALKENHAYN WHO SUCCEEDED TO THE CHIEF COMMAND Photograph by Paul Thompson, N. Y. GENERAL HELMUTH JOHANNES LUDWIG VON MOLTKE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF Photograph by Paul Thompson, N. Y. GENERAL ALEXANDER VON KLUCK COMMANDER IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PARIS FOUR GERMAN GENERALS Photograph by Paul Thompson, N. Y. GENERAL PAUL VON HINDENBURG COMMANDER ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER MILITARY OPERATIONS 43 possess superior resources of men and munitions for the conduct of a pro- tracted war. If joined by Italy, or by one of the Balkan States, the Allies would enjoy a still more marked ad- vantage. Or again, if Austria-Hun- gary should be rent by internal dissen- sions, Germany would be left to fight against overwhelming odds. On the other hand, one of the Allies might con- ceivably refuse to make further sacri- fices, and either make peace or carry on the war in a half-hearted fashion. Or German generalship might win a brilliant victory and destroy part of the Allied army. Into any forecast to the war's outcome, these and similar considerations were bound to inject a considerable amount of uncertainty. The possibility that the Allies would capitulate separately, however, ap- peared very slight indeed after the agreement signed in London, September 5, by Russia, France, and Great Brit- ain, binding themselves not to make terms with Germany until they could do so jointly. Equipment of the Armies. No less perfect than the organization of the enormous armies was the equipment with which they fought. The War of the Nations was a battle of machines, waged with the help of every deadly device science could invent. The fea- ture of the conflict in the Franco-Bel- gian theatre was the new Krupp 11-inch howitzer. (A "gun" throws its pro- jectile in almost a straight line; a "howitzer" discharges its shell at an angle of elevation varying from 15° to 45°; a "mortar" is fired at a still greater angle of elevation, the object being to drop a shell on the top of a fortification or behind the earth-works of the enemy.) The new Krupp how- itzer, weighing nearly 40 tons, was hauled by powerful motors on two heavy motor trucks whose "caterpillar" wheels were shod with great flapping feet so as not to sink in soft ground. Arriving at the scene of action, two trucks were backed up together and the howitzer was ready to throw 11-inch shells at any object within a radius of six miles. The heaviest portable French siege piece had been the 10.7- inch howitzer, drawn in four parts, and difficult to move, assemble, and mount. Still more formidable than the Krupp "11" was the Austrian 12-inch howit- zer, built at the Skoda works. But the surpassing achievement of the Krupp gun factory at Essen was the produc- tion of a 16-inch (42-centimeter) siege piece which could be transported by rail and readily emplaced on a concrete foundation. From this gun, discharged by electricity, a shell one meter in length, weighing almost a ton, and filled with high explosive, could be hurled some 15 miles. Skilled mechanics from the Essen works accompanied each of the 7 or 8 of these 16-inch pieces which Germany was said to have put in the field. Two of these gigantic howitzers, stationed 10 miles from the inner forts of Antwerp, rendered the elaborate de- fenses of that city worthless. Even the smaller German howitzers were capable of demolishing the forts at Liege and Namur and wrecking the steel-domed cupolas which had been the pride of Belgium's forts. In the field, much smaller guns were ordinarily used. The German army employed a 3-inch gun capable of throwing 20 15-pound shells per minute at an enemy three miles away. The shell was timed to explode just before striking, and would scatter 250 steel bullets in the ranks of the enemy. Gun and carriage together weighed about a ton. Aeroplanes, whose value in warfare had long been discussed, now rendered service in lo- A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR eating the enemy, so that the artillery officers could instruct their gunners at what angle to fire at the unseen enemy. The French field gun was of slightly smaller bore than the German, but of greater power and weight. Machine guns or mitrailleuses were also used with telling effect. A machine gun is light enough to be packed on the back of a horse or drawn on a light carriage by a pair of dogs (as in the Belgian army) and even by the individual sol- dier ; it fires from 400 to 500 ordinary rifle bullets per minute. The regular arm of the infantry was the rifle, tipped with the bayonet for hand-to-hand en- counters. England used the excellent Lee Enfield rifle, France the Lebcl, Rus- sia the Nagant, Belgium the Mauser, Germany the Mauser, and Austria the Mannlicher; of these various makes, the German Mauser possessed the greatest muzzle velocity, although the French had the longest efl*ective range. Almost as important as artillery or fire-arms was the automobile. Motor cars encased in steel and armed with rapid-fire guns accompanied Von Kluck's cavalry on its swift advance. Speedy automobiles and motorcycles were invaluable for reconnoissance and communication where telephone, wire- less telegraph, or aeroplane was not available. Monster searchlights mounted on motor cars illuminated the field of battle by night. The greatest service of the motor, however, was be- hind the firing lines. An army cannot fight unless it is fed. To feed the mil- lions of fighting men, many thousands of motor trucks were ceaselessly em- ployed in conveying incalculable quan- tities of foodstuff^s. Finally, some of the most brilliant successes of the Ger- mans were won by hurrying troops in motor trucks to the most eff*ective point on the battle line. Other new devices invented and used during the war will be treated in the subsequent military history. II. Western Theatre. The German armies, by a surprise thrust through Belgium in August, 1914, sought to paralyze the French army. This op- eration failed at the Marne (Septem- ber) . Trench warfare resulted in the West, and from the North Sea to the Swiss border the line remained substantially unchanged to July, 1916, the battle of Verdun and the joint Allied off'ensive (July, 1916) forming the high-water marks of this fighting until the cam- paigns carried out on a grand scale in 1918. The detailed account of military op- erations on this front has seven main steps : (1) The fortunes of the Belgian army up to its escape from Antwerp and safe retreat to the Yser Canal ; (2) The relative dispositions of the rival armies of the French and German high commands up to and including the battle of the Marne; (3) The race to the seacoast which resulted in the es- tablishment of the intrenched lines from Dixmude to Bclfort; (4) The attempts of either side to break the intrenched line, including the battles of Ypres, Lille, Lens, and the Champagne drive inaugurated by Joff're to aid the hardly pressed Russians; (5) The battle for Verdun, in which the Germans sought a decision hoping not so much to shat- ter the French line as to shatter the morale of the French people and make a breach in Allied solidarity; (6) The Allied offensive in Picardy, in conjunc- tion with the Russian and Italian ac- tivities in the East and South. (7) The final attempt made by the Ger- mans to break through in 1918 and the successful Allied counter attack. It seems clear that Germany's plan of ac- MILITARY OPERATIONS 45 tion was first to crush France and then to fall upon Russia. What was the shortest road to France? The frontier was heavily fortified ; but even other- wise it would have left too narrow a front for the overwhelming armies which Germany intended to set in the field. Hence the shortest road lay through Luxemburg and Belgium. Of natural obstacles there were none; the three fortresses, Liege, Namur, and Maubeuge, were not in supporting re- lation to one another, the Belgian fron- tier was only 120 iniles from Paris, and the way lay through the easy valleys of the Oise and of the Meuse. Accordingly the Germans, violat- ing the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, undertook a vast sweeping movement, with its pivot at Mont Donon and its marching flank flung be- yond the Sambre and the Oise. The French, on the other hand, respecting the neutrality of the countries just mentioned, had planned to attack the Franco-German frontier directly, under the following distribution of armies: first army (Dubail) * from the Swiss frontier to Donon; second (de Castel- nau) f from Donon towards Metz; third (Ruff'ey) in the Woevre, facing the Metz-Thionville frontier region; * AuGUSTiK Yvox Edmond DtTBAiL, bom (1851) at Belfort; educated at Saint-Cyr, served in Franco-Prussian War, and later at- tended the Ecole de Guerre; general of brigade (1904); at Saint-Cyr was adjunct professor of geography (1874-76) and of military art and history (1880-85) and then commandant; wrote on his specialties; Commander of the Legion of Honor and possessor of various decorations; Military Governor of Paris during European War. t Edouard de Ctjrieres de Castelnatj, born in 1851; served in Franco-Prussian War; col- onel attached to general staff (1896); served in Cochin-China and Algeria; commander of "Iron Division" at Nancy (1899); early in Eu- ropean War commanded Second Army of Lor- raine and came to be known as the "savior of Nancy"; after battle of the Marne took com- mand of the Army of the Somme; chief of the general staff (December, 1915) ; went to Greece and helped plan defenses of Saloniki, fourth and fifth (Langle de Gary and Lanrezac) on the Belgian frontier. Germany placed in line the following armies: first (Von Kluck) the march- ing flank; second (Von Bulow) ; third (Von Hansen) ; fourth (Duke of Wiirt- temberg);J fifth (Crown Prince of Prussia) ; sixth (Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria) ; § seventh (Von Heeringen) ; eighth (Von Deimling), to remain on the defensive in Alsace. What may be counted as a ninth army, under Von Emmich, made up of ele- ments in immediate readiness, was to act as advance guard to the right wing, and carry Liege, on the expiration of the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian government. As has been implied, Belgium declined to agree to the demand made by Ger- many to allow German troops to cross Belgian territory to the French fron- tier. August 3 and 4, all doubt as to German intentions having been re- moved, the Belgian authorities ordered bridges destroyed on all probable lines of advance, and the Belgian forces to move forward as follows : the first di- vision from Ghent to Tirlemont; the second, Antwerp to Louvain; the fifth, t Albrjecht, Duke of Wtirttemberg, born (1865) in Vienna, son of Duke Philip of Wiirttemberg and heir presumptive to the throne of the Kingdom; married (1893) the Archduchess Margareta Sophia of Austria; held commands in regiments of Uhlans, Grena- diers, Dragoons, cavalry, and infantry, rising to be general in command of the Thirteenth Army Corps; in command of German forces in Belgium (October, 1914) after its invasion and temporarily took over command of Crown Prince's army (February, 1916) ; received Order Pour le Merite from the Kaiser. § Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, born (1869) in Munich, eldest son of Ludwig (Louis) III, who became King in 1913; mar- ried the Duchess Marie Gabriele of Bavaria (1900); had a university education and mili- tary training in the Kriegsakademie; traveled extensively in India, Japan, China, etc. (1902- 03) ; general, commanding the First Army Corps (1906); led Bavarian army in Euro- pean War and received from the Kaiser the Order Pour le Merite. 46 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Mons to Perwez ; the sixth, Brussels to Wavre. The fourth was to remain at Namur, and the third in its position, Hasselt-Liege-Verviers. These move- ments were covered by the cavalry di- vision (Waremme), by a mixed brigade at Tongres, and by another at Huy. The strength of this army was about 117,000 men, increased later by 18,500 volunteers, with the King in command. It was, if opposed by superior numbers, to hold good defensive positions barring the enemy's advance, and to await in these positions the arrival of troops from the British and French armies. But if this junction were impossible, then the Belgian army was not to run the risk of severe loss, but was to guard against being enveloped, and act so as to secure its communications, for the purpose ultimately of joining hands with the Allies. Opposed by equal num- bers, it was to attack, if conditions were favorable. In any case, Liege, Namur, and Antwerp were to be defended. Invasion of Belgium. — On August 4 two cavalry divisions crossed the fron- tier, advanced upon Vise, and there found the bridge destroyed. Behind the cavalry forces came an army composed of the seventh, eighth, ninth, and elev- enth corps. At the same time two other corps were concentrated at and near St. Vith — thus making a force of about 300,000 men on the roads lead- ing into Belgium and converging on Liege. On the 5th a demand was made on the governor of the fortress of Liege, General Leman, to allow an unopposed passage to the German army. This de- mand refused, the forts east and north- east of the town were attacked, but the Germans were repulsed. On the night of August 5 and 6 an attempt was made to break the Belgian line between the Meuse and the Ourthe, and succeeded in forcing the troops between the in- tervals of the forts to fall back. The mobile troops of the defense were now withdrawn to join the main army, leav- ing their garrisons in the forts. On the 12th large calibre fire was opened on the forts of the right bank, and by the 17th the last one had fallen to the Germans. During this time the main Belgian army had taken up a position on the Gette. On the 12th this stream was forced at Haelen, but an attempt to pass on was repulsed. Fresh troops came up and threatened to turn the Belgian left ; on the south they occu- pied Tirlemont; on the 18th the Bel- gian position was critical. Hence but one course was open to the Belgians: they retired on the 18th at dusk to take a position on the left bank of the Dyle. But the Germans advanced so rapidly that the Belgians could not safely stop, and were forced instead to continue their way to Antwerp, which they reached on the 20th. The Ger- mans entered Louvain on the 10th, Brussels on the 20th, and crossed the French frontier on the 24th. Namur was taken under fire on the 20th and 21st of August; on the 25th the last fort, Suarlee, fell. Here, as at Liege, heavy calibres were used. The commander of the 4th (Belgian) di- vision withdrew his forces on the night of the 23d and 24th of August, and succeeded 10 days later in entering Ant- werp. A new part now fell to the Belgian army. August 20 it had taken up a position resting on the forts of Antwerp with a detachment at Termonde. Its business now was to detain as large a force as possible, to take the offensive whenever an important engagement took place elsewhere, and to attack in the neighborhood of Antwerp whenever there was any chance of success. Ac- cordingly a sortie was made August 25 MILITARY OPERATIONS 47 and 26 ; on September 4 a German force that had driven its garrison out of Ter- monde crossed the Scheldt, but on the appearance of Belgian forces on the left bank crossed back, leaving Termonde once more in Belgian hands. After this date all hostile efforts to cross the river were checked and the line of retreat to the west kept open. Other operations took place, as on September 9, when the Belgians got as far as Louvain and forced the recall of a division from France to Antwerp. One effect of these operations was to delay for two days the march southward of a German corps, at the time when the retreat from the Marne had begun. The fall of Antwerp was, however, only a question of time ; the siege began on September 28, and in a very short time it became clear that the place could no more resist the German ar- tillery than had Liege and Namur. A delicate question then presented itself: to hold Antwerp as long as possible without compromising the retreat. Day by day the Germans continued their work of demolishing the detached forts of the place and drew closer and closer. On October 5 Lierre was occupied and the river crossed below the town. On the 3d and 6th of October they tried without success to cross the Scheldt. Furthermore, in France, the German right was steadily approaching the sea ; if they could reach it before the Bel- gians had made good their retreat these latter might be entirely cut off. The better to secure this retreat Ghent was occupied on the 9th by the French and British (7th division). The retreat, however, began on the evening of the 6th, and by the morning of the next day the entire Belgian army was across the river. The Germans had indeed crossed the Scheldt themselves, on the 6th at Schoonajrde, but were unable to inter- rupt the retreat. On October 10 Ant- werp capitulated, and on the 15th the Belgian army took its stand on the Yser, 82,000 strong. The subsequent fortunes of this army are bound up with those of the Franco-British forces on this front. Invasion of France. — When it be- came evident that France was to be in- vaded from Belgium, the 3d (French) army moved up (August 10) to Longwy, with the 4th army taking a position further west, and the 5th sta- tioning itself between the Sambre and the Meuse. General French (August 23) stood between the Sambre and the Scheldt, on the line Conde-Binche, with so much of the British expeditionary force, two corps and a cavalry division, as had crossed to the Continent. The German armies that had concentrated on the line Aix-la-Chapelle-Malmedy- Treves-Metz-Strassburg now moved out, Von Kluck through Belgium, Von Biilow to the Sambre (Namur-Char- leroi) ; Von Hansen and the Duke of Wiirttemberg across the Ardennes on Dinant and Neufchateau. The Crown Prince crossed Luxemburg. The Crown Prince of Bavaria marched against de Castelnau and in this region the general action opened on August 20, with the driving back of de Castelnau (invasion of Lorraine), who, however, brought up firm before Nancy, September 7. As early as August 15 some French troops had crossed the Belgian frontier and had engaged the Germans in minor af- fairs (e.g., Dinant). On the 22d Charleroi was taken by the Germans, who on the 23d attacked the French at this place and the British at Mons. As the 3d and 4th (French) armies were compelled to withdraw before an attack coming from Belgian Luxem- burg, the right flank of the fifth army extending almost up to Namur was ex- 48 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR posed, and that army withdrew. This in turn compelled the withdrawal of the English from Mons, and so the whole Allied army now retreated, vigorously pursued by the Germans, on the line Paris-Verdun. In spite of one or two checks suffered in the advance, as at Guise, it msij be said that on the whole this movement was up to a certain point irresistible. That point was reached when the Allies turned on crossing the river Marne, and not only defeated the Germans, but forced them to retreat to the Aisne. The French generalissimo, JofFre, had constantly kept before him the plan of so turning in the retreat from the Belgian frontier, and had se- lected the line Paris-Marne-Verdun as the proper place, and Sept. 6, 1914, as the proper date. On Aug. 20, 1914, General JofFre * assumed command of the Allied armies in France. He had before him the in- finitely grave problem of developing suitable powers of resistance, mostly out of beaten and retreating armies, and of selecting the time, place, and manner of applying these powers, which he did at the Marne (to be described later). After that battle the Allied armies under his command successfully held off the Germans, thus upsetting their plans of crushing France before proceeding to conquests elsewhere. The Approach to Paris. — During the retreat two new armies had been formed: one under General Foch f (the * JoFFRE, Joseph Jacques Cesaire. Born (1852) in Rivesaltes, Pyrenees. Student of military engineering at Ecole Polytechnique. Entered active service (1870) in Franco-Prus- sian War after which returned to Polytechnique. Became captain (1874); fought in Tonkin (1883-84); in Dahomey (1893). Professor in Higher War School for a time and then pro- moted brigadier general of division. Became chief of general staff (1911). Helped pass the three years' military service law. t Ferdinand Foch, born (1851) at Tarbes, Hautes Pyrenees, of a Basque family; served in the Franco-Prussian War as a subaltern; ninth), which took position between d'Esperej^'s (formerly Lanrezac's) and Langle de Gary's; and another (the sixth) under Manoury from Paris. This last army was to rest on the intrenched camp of the capital, face east on the right bank of the Ourcq, and attack Von Kluck's right. It is a sound prin- ciple of warfare that victory may be obtained only by beating the hostile army. When therefore the Allied armies passed into the Paris-Verdun gap. Von Kluck, sweeping down on Paris from the north, properly turned south-eastward after the enemy. But he had not reckoned upon the formation of the sixth army sent out from Paris, in motor vehicles of every description to take its place on the battle front. Before, however, taking up the Battle of the Marne, we must very briefly de- scribe what had in the meantime been taking place in eastern France ; the pressure in this quarter, indeed, cul- minated in conflicts contemporaneous with and forming a part of the great battle of September 6. Before the sud- den swerve of Von Kluck from Paris on September 4, it seemed as if the predic- tion that the Germans would be in Paris six weeks from the outbreak of war was about to be fulfilled. General Gallieni had begun to prepare the city for a siege. The noise of the battle could be heard by the Parisians. Events before the Marne. — After the declaration of war the French invaded both Alsace and Lorraine. These in- vasions came to grief. The French twice occupied Miilhausen ; the first time artillery captain at 26; professor of tactics in the Ecole de Guerre for five years and later, as general of brigade, its director; in command of various divisions before European War; during war commander of northern armies in France, gaining victories of the Marne and Ypres; known internationally as a strategist and au- thor of Principles of War and Conduct of War, published in French, English, Italian and Ger- man; received British G.C.B. GENERAL SIR E. H. H. ALLENE Commander in Palestine ud & Uii.k-rvvootl GENERAL SIR HENRY RAWLINSOM Photograph hy Paul Thompson, N. Y. GENERAL PAUL PAU COMMANDER IN THE MOVEMENT IN ALSACE I'hotograph by Paul Thompson, N. Y. GENERAL JOSEPH JACQUES CESAIRE JOFFRE FRENCH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF BRITISH AND FRENCH COMMANDERS IN THE WAR ^'■Ke- MILITARY OPERATIONS 49 they were driven out, the second they retired of their own accord. They had also reached Saarburg and Saarbriick- en. These invasions undoubtedly had a political end in view, conditioned of course by the possibility of military success. Incidentally, the Alsace op- erations were to contain troops that otherwise might have been used to re- sist the invasion of Lorraine. This in- vasion opened well enough: the French occupied Dieuze, Morhange, Chateau- Salins, across the frontier. But it came to naught at Morhange, in which the French, completely beaten, were driven back across the frontier, and were forced to settle down to the real busi- ness of protecting their eastern fron- tier. The Germans, early in August, occupied Cirey, Badonviller, and Bac- carat. Farther north the army of Metz got to within 15 miles of Verdun. StiU farther north the army of the Crown Prince, which had on August 22 crossed the frontier near Longwy (occupied the 27th), drove back the French, and finally took up a position between Bar- le-Duc and the Ardennes, facing east- ward, and opposed by General SarraiPs army. To the west of the Crown Prince the Duke of Wiirttemberg, who had crossed the Meuse near Mezieres, formed up, facing south between the Crown Prince's army and Epernay. The first French army (Dubail) in front of Epinal faced the east; on its left General de Castekiau continued the line east and north of Nancy, along the Meuse, until it rested on the defenses of Verdun. The garrison of Verdun car- ried it on east, north, and west of the position until it joined with Sarrail's ai'my. With the armies in these positions Nancy was attacked; its main natural defense in the chain of hills known as the Grand Couronne de Nancy. The Germans occupied various towns in the east, e.g., St. Die, but not without some heavy fighting in the Vosges. On the north they pushed the French back to the Grand Couronne, but never got be- yond it. The main army marched from Chateau-Salins and engaged the French in a series of stiff fights around the Forest of Champenoux. At the same time a part of the army of Metz, with its left resting on Pont-a-Mousson, joined in the attack. Six miles north- east of the city, on the plateau of Amance, de Castelnau had assembled his artillery. Before the troops from the north could cooperate with those from the east in attacking this position, Ste. Genevieve, 10 miles or so northwest of Amance, had to be occupied. Here Foch (August 22), with a modest force, defeated the Germans with fearful slaughter. The attack on Nancy from the east through Amance was equally unsuccessful. After much fighting along the entire position the bombard- ment of Amance began on August 30, 31 and lasted for more than a week. The contest over the entire line in- creased in intensity ; indeed, from the German point of view, it could do no less, for now (September 7-8) their armies were being pushed back from the Marne, and it was vital to their success that they should break through. The Emperor himself was present at the great assaults, six in number, made on Amance, and all driven back with loss. Checked before Nancy, the Ger- mans on September 10 evacuated Pont- a-Mousson, and on the 12th, Luneville, St. Die, and some smaUer places. They now concentrated their efforts between Toul and Verdun, with the purpose of surrounding the latter place. To this end they bombarded Fort de Troyon on the Meuse south of Verdun and several times attempted to take it by assault. 50 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR But the fort made an extremely gallant defense, and although almost reduced to extremities, managed to hold out. The final assault was delivered on the 13th of September. On the 20th a fresh advance was made on the for- tresses from the east to cross the Meuse south of Verdun. The garrisons of Verdun and Toul respectively pushed out attacks on the German flanks, while tlie Germans themselves advanced in the centre and captured the point of St. Mihiel on the Meuse (September 25). Grip on St. Mihiel. — The Germans crossed the river on the 26th and began to march northward towards the Aire valley. A situation was then developed that might have proved of the utmost consequence to the French. To meet it, Sarrail came down from the north, and the twentieth corps was hurried up from near Champenoux. At 5 p. m. of the 26th the advance guard of the corps, which had crossed at Lironville, got contact with the enemy. After some extremely heavy fighting the Ger- mans fell back to the Meuse and in- trenched at St. Mihiel, keeping their footing across the river at Camp des Romains. While these operations were taking place on the east and south, the other German armies had proceeded south- ward in pursuit of the retreating French and English (as related else- where). On September 6, the Crown Prince's army stretched from a point southwest of Verdun to the neighbor- hood of Bar-le-Duc. Verdun was thus almost completely surrounded. But the tide turned with the German defeat of the Marne; they retreated north- ward and divided right and left at the forest of Argonne. This rocky, hilly forested ridge, about 30 miles long north and south and 8 miles wide, then became the scene of incessant close fighting all through the autumn and winter. In the northern part of the Argonne Forest the Aire runs west to fall into the Aisne. This pass, called the Gap of Grand Pre, pierced as it was by a railway, would have been useful to the French, and so was one objective kept constantly in view by them in the operations of this region. These now took on the character that prevailed farther in the west, trench warfare, with the French pressing the Germans slowly back. Farther south there was much fighting on both sides of the St. Mihiel wedge, and in the Bois le Pretre to the eastward. In Alsace, after the second evacua- tion of Miilhausen, the French took up and held an intrenched position in front of Belfort from Thann to Moos until winter, when they fell back a little nearer to Belfort. Trench conditions developed here also, except that there were desperate struggles to take and hold Hartmannsweilerkopf, a mountain about 2900 feet high some miles to the north of Tliann, which changed hands several times. Apart from various thrusts and points at German territory, the main purpose of the French was to cover the great position of Belfort. In this they succeeded. The Battle of the Marne. — Between the close of the retreat and the battle about to be described air reconnois- sances, etc., had revealed the fact that Von Kluck had changed direction to the southeast. The Battle of the Marne opened on Sunda}^, September 6. On the 3d the British had fallen back of that river and later had taken up a position behind the Seine. About this time (September 4) JofFre had resolved to take the offensive, wheeling up the left flank of the sixth army, pivoting it on the Marne, to move on the Ourcq. MILITARY OPERATIONS 51 The British were to fill the gap between the sixth and fifth French armies. Ger- man troops had been reported moving southeast along the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th and were now halted and facing that river. Heads of columns were also seen crossing at Changis, La Ferte, Nogent, Chateau- Thierry, and Mezy. The Allies' line on the 6th reached from Ermenonville, in front of the left flank of the sixth army, through Lizy on the Marne, Mauperthuis, to Esternay and Charle- ville, the left of the ninth army under Foch, and so along the front of the ninth, fourth, and third French armies to a point north of Verdun. Recollecting, then, that the first and second French armies based on Belfort- Verdun were facing the German seventh and sixth, the French order of battle on September 6 was : the third army (Sarrail) Verdun-Bar-le-Duc, opposed by the German third (Crown Prince) ; the fourth (de Langle de Cary) across the plain of Champagne, south of Vitry- le-Francois, facing north, and opposed to the German fourth (Prince of Wiirt- temberg) ; the ninth (Foch) Mailly- Sezanne, opposed to the German second (Von Biilow); the fifth (d'Esperey) Esterney-Courtacon, with Conneau's cavalry on his left. The sixth army (Manoury) held a line north and south, with its right at Meaux and its left near Betz. The fifth and sixth armies were to engage Von Kluck. The gap between the fifth and sixth (French) armies was held by the British five divi- sions and five cavalry brigades, Ville- neuve-le-Comte to Jouy-le-Chateau. Von Kluck left two corps (II and IV) on the east bank of the Ourcq to hold the sixth army, while he proceeded with III, IV, and VII to Coulommiers, Rebais, and La Ferte Gaucher to at- tack the left and centre of the fifth (French) army. He had pushed for- ward two cavalry divisions towards Coulommiers and Crecy to give notice of any attack possibly coming from that quarter, and had occupied the villages on the west bank of the Ourcq. ;; The battle began at daylight Sep- tember 6 by the advance of the sixth army against the villages just men- tioned, and became general over the whole line from Paris to Verdun. In this struggle the British at once took a hand, and moving northeast, drove back Von Kluck's cavalry and advance guards. In the words of Sir John French, it must have been at about noon "that the enemy realized the pow- erful threat that was being made against the flank of his columns moving southeast." By night the British had reached the line Dagny-Coulommiers. This retreat of the Germans uncover- ing the west flank of the troops oper- ating against the fifth army forced these to withdraw and enabled the fifth to reach the Grand Morin between Es- ternay and La Ferte Gaucher. In the meantime the struggle further east had been most serious. Foch was heavily engaged with Von Biilow, and on his right with Von Hansen. On the whole, the centre had all it could do to hold its own, while the right even fell back a little. The day closed with the balapce leaning a little in favor of the Germans, except on their left, when Von Kluck began to realize that he must look to his right as well as to his front. Sep- tember 7 was a day of desperate struggle, with the Allies progressing in the west, but not elsewhere. On the 8th the German right was definitely turned, and began to retreat. On this day, d'Esperey carried Montmirail, and thus made an opening on Von Billow's right. Into this opening Foch 52 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR pushed his left, and he is reported to have discovered a gap between Von Billow and Von Hausen, of which he also took advantage. The third and fourth armies on this same day held on only by the most devoted courage in face of the equally devoted attacks made upon them, September 9 saw the scale turn in favor of the Allies. The line of the Ourcq was taken ; French and d'Esperey joined hands at Cha- teau-Thierry in the evening. Foch drove a part of Von Billow's right into the marshes of Saint-Gond and attacked his left with success, while the Saxons on Von Billow's left, after heavy losses, were pushed back towards Chalons. The third army still held. By the 10th there could be no doubt that the Allies had won a victory: the Germans re- treated, and in good order, to the Aisne, where they occupied a line said to have been prepared in advance. The Battle of the Marne must be re- garded as a significant defeat for the German army. Flushed with success, having the initiative, opposed to troops supposedly dispirited by defeat after defeat during a long and exhausting re- treat, the Germans found this check as unexpected as the French found it wel- come. On the French side moral forces were developed whose intensity con- tinued undiminished. The Germans, although not disabled, were neverthe- less compelled radically to change all their plans of operation. The German position on the Aisne extended from a point on the Heights of the Meuse north of Verdun, west across the Argonne country and the plain of Champagne to Rheims, north- west across the Aisne, west along the Heights of the Aisne to the Foret de I'Aigle, north of Compiegne. This po- sition was of great strength, carefully intrenched and thoroughly supplied. The Allied aiTnies followed the Germans in their retreat. On the morning of the 13th the British advanced, and in spite of the resistance of the Germans passed the Aisne on pontoon bridges, a re- markable military achievement. The Allied lines, September 21, reached from the extreme south of Alsace through St. Die, Luneville, Pont-a- Mousson, Consenvoye, Grande Pre, Souain, Craonne, Noyon, to Le Catelet. Strong German forces held St. Quen- tin. In the east the Germans had pushed their way along the promontory of Hatton Chatel towards St. Mihiel and were shelling the forts of Camp des Romains and des Parodies. On the 26th they crossed the Meuse near St. Mihiel. Ypres was occupied on Octo- ber 1-i by the British seventh division, which had assisted the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Antwerp. A period of deadlock now followed on the Aisne, during which each adversary made the most determined efforts to outflank the other on the west. From the Aisne to Flanders. — These efforts were logical for both sides. An attack on the German left, even if suc- cessful, would not interfere with their communications through northern France with Belgium and Germany. A frontal attack would have called for resources not then in the possession of the Allies. To turn their right, how- ever, might result in cutting some of the communications, might even save Antwerp. It would in any case assist the retreat of the Belgians and British from that city. Moreover, it was not impossible that the Germans might strike at Calais and Boulogne; it was not inconceivable that they might even push their way as far southwest as Abbeville. Accordingly about Septem- ber 20 an army was formed west of Compiegne, and its command given to MILITARY OPERATIONS 53 de Castelnau, who was to fill the gap between the Oise and the Somme, and to push his lines north of the Somme; as objectives he had St. Quentin and La Fere. On the 21st de Castelnau's right had moved as far as Noyon; there was violent fighting around Lassigny. From Lassigny the French right moved towards Roye, while their left momen- tarily occupied Peronne. The Germans in the meantime concentrated a large force in the region, formed in part of troops drawn from the centre on the Aisne, and from Lorraine and the Vosges. On the 25th the French near Noyon were pushed back on that day and the next two, and the whole line as far as the Vosges was engaged. De Cas- telnau was driven from Lassigny, but during the next few days managed to hold his own. There was now some dan- ger that the Germans would themselves outflank the French; to meet this pos- sibility a new army (tenth, Maud'huy) was formed. De Castelnau was now merely to hold his position. Maud'huy's line ran from the Ancre through Arras and Lens to Lille, and his plan would be to move on Valenciennes. The Germans, who were in force in the region of Cam- brai and Douai, planned to take Lille, turn on and force back Maud'huy ; at the same time other forces would ad- vance on Boulogne, Calais, and Dun- kirk. The battle opened October 1, and by the 4th the French had been pushed back west of Lens, and were beginning to retire to the hills behind Arras. On the 6th the Gennans shelled Arras, and later attempted to take the town, in which they failed. They had succeeded, however, in repelling Maud'huy's of- fensive, and had prevented the turning of their flank. It was now decided to move the British force from their trenches on the Aisne to the left of Maud'huy, who now, like de Castelnau before him, would remain on the defen- sive. The situation of the Allies was critical. Antwerp was about to fall, the Lys had been crossed by the Ger- mans and Ypres occupied by them (Oc- tober 3). The channel ports as well as Lille were in danger. The presence of Germans in the region about Haze- brouck and Ypres implied an attempt either to intercept the British and Bel- gians retreating from Antwerp, or to turn Maud'huy's left in the region of Lens. JofFre therefore decided to con- centrate still another army between Lens and Dunkirk, which, with the Brit- ish, was to form the extreme left of the Allies. This army was to be com- manded by General d'Urbal, while Foch was to take general charge of the four armies — de Castelnau's, Maud'huy's, French's, and d'Urbal's. The transfer of the British forces was successfully accomplished ; they were to take posi- tion north of the line Bethune-Lille, at- tack the enemy opposing Maud'huy's left wing west of La Bassee, and at- tempt to defend or recover Lille, as the case might be. The country in which the operations of many months on the left of the Allies were to take place consists essentially of the plain of the Scheldt. This plain is broken by no natural obstacles but is intersected by many canals. The Scheldt bisects it roughly and receives the Lys at Ghent. On the western boun- dary of the plain rises the higher land running from Calais southeast to Peronne, at the base of which runs a series of waterways, mostly canals, forming as it were a wet ditch to the ta- bleland to the westward. The ditch was held by the French. The Germans oc- cupied Ghent, Bruges, and Ostend, and succeeded in capturing Lille, but were driven east of Ypres by the British. 54 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Further south, the Allies pushed the Germans back towards Lille between the Lys and the Bethune-Lille Canal. While these movements were going on the other French armies still further to the south were in conflict with the Ger- mans from Bethune to Compiegne. This period is signalized by Joffre's third attempt to turn the German right. Lille, although held by the French, was in danger of being cut off by the ad- vance of the Germans west of the city south of the Lys, and the possibility was still strong that the Germans might make a rush for Calais and Dunkirk, or else try to crush the British and Bel- gians in retreat from Antwerp. Hence Lille was to be saved, if possible, and at any rate the other purposes of the Ger- mans were to be negatived at any cost. The offensive was taken up by d'Ur- bal's army, the British Seventh Divi- sion, and the main forces of the British coming up from the Aisne. On Octo- ber 11 the Allies engaged the Ger- mans in a position extending from Mont-des-Cats southwest of Ypres through La Bassee to Vermelles. Part of this position was carried, but the main purpose, to drive the Germans out of La Bassee and to save Lille, failed. On the 10th this city had been bombarded; on the 13th it was sur- rendered. To the north the Allies had met with some success, driving the enemy from Ypres as their comrades were entering Lille. On the 17th the Allies lay approximately north and south from the Forest of Houthulst, holding the villages of Langemarck, Poelcapelle, Passchendaele, and east from Ypres to Zonnebeke and south to Wytschaete and Nieppe. Battle of the Yser. — On October 16 the Germans attacked Dixmude and opened the Battle of the Yser. The left wing of the Allies now stretched from Compiegne through Arras, Ypres, and Dixmude to Nieuport. With the com- mand of the sea in the hands of the Allies, the efforts of the Germans were necessarily confined to the fronts Nieu- port-Bethune and Bethune-Compiegne. The nature of the ground north of Be- thune greatly influenced the character of the operations, at first rolling, and then, as the sea is approached, flat and open, filled with dikes and ditches. From Nieuport to Dixmude the line was held by the Belgians and French colonial in- fantry. Then from Dixmude past Zon- nebeke came French Territorials and cavalry, then British, who continued on to Bethune. From Dixmude to Nieu- port the Yser is canalized, and 15-20 feet above the ground to the west, across which runs the embanked rail- road between the same points. As the countrj" could be flooded, the bridge crossings were more than usually im- portant. Off the roads the ground was difficult to cross, by reason of ditches, dikes, etc., and, moreover, was marshy, so that artificial cover could not be made. For eight days, by night as well as by day, the Germans assaulted the Belgian position only to be repulsed and beaten back. The British monitor fleet, mounting 6-inch rifles, did great service shelling the German right and rear, during which Knocke was partial- ly destroyed. The conduct of the Bel- gians and the French colonial infantry during these eight days was beyond all praise: they had held their position against superior numbers backed by ar- tillery under the most terrible and dis- couraging circumstances, and had suc- cessfully prevented the desperate ef- forts of the Germans to break through across the position to Dunkirk and Calais. The plan of the Allies had been to fight a defensive battle on the Yser, and MILITARY OPERATIONS 55 to attack with their centre and right in front of Ypres and south of the Lys re- spectively. French's specific objective was the capture of Menin on the Lys, halfway between Roulers and Lille, as necessary to an offensive that should take Bruges and thus cut the German communications. To hold the road Menin-Roulers-Ostend was essential to German success, because from it ran out westward all the roads leading to the Allied line between Ypres and the sea. Heavily reenforced on the 19th, the Germans themselves took the offensive, captured Roulers, most of the Roulers- Dixmude road, and all of the Menin- Roulers-Dixmude-Ostend road and rail- road. The Menin operation failed. The plan assigned to Sir Douglas Haig,* to push through and if possible to cap- ture Bruges, became impossible of ac- complishment, for the Germans, in spite of the most determined resistance, in spite of frightful losses, were gaining, and it became evident that the best the Allies could hope for was to hold on until reenforcements could come up. By the night of the 22d the Germans had crossed the Yser Canal at Tervaete, and north of Ypres had pierced the Allied lines. South of that city there was only a thin line, and the right of the Allies was withdrawing from the Givenchy-Radinghem ridge. But on the 23d the Allied prospect brightened. * Sir Douglas Haig, born (1861) in Fife- shire; educated at Brasenose College, Oxford; served with distinction in the Sudan and in South Africa; later held important posts of India, being chief of staff (1909-1912); was general officer in command at Aldershot (1912- 14) ; general in command in the First Army from landing of expeditionary force in Euro- pean War (1914); distinguished himself in the retreat from Mons, at the Aisne, at Ypres, and Neuve Chapelle; succeeded Sir John French as commander in chief of British forces in France and Belgium (December, 1915); G.C.B. and Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor of France; author of Cavalry Studies (1907). The Forty-second French Division (Grossetti) with howitzers had reached Furnes and relieved the Belgians in Nieuport. On the night of October 23- 24, 14 assaults were made on Dixmude and all repulsed. North of Ypres, Brit- ish reenforcements had come up, moved on the enemy, captured their trenches, and beat back five attempts at recap- ture, and in the evening of this day a division of the French Ninth Corps was moved into the line. So far the Germans had failed to break through. On the 24th the French on the left stormed Lombartzyde and moved on Westende, thus menacing the German right. To prevent this the Germans opened a determined attack on Nieuport, and along the Yser Canal as far south as Dixmude. These at- tacks failed. The next day the battle was renewed ; guns were mounted on the dunes to beat off the fleet. So tremen- dous was the effort made that Joffre, October 25, resolved to flood the coun- try. But the water was slow to spread over the meadows. In the meantime the Germans continued their attack, and on the 26th seemed to be in a fair way to reach Pervyse, halfway between Nieu- port and Dixmude. On the 28th they attacked all along the line. But in the meantime Joffre was hurrying up re- enforcements, and the water was rising. The next day attack after attack was made on Pervyse-Ramscapelle, and the latter place was captured that night. The 30th found the British fleet reen- forced by five destroyers, the Germans in Ramscapelle and along the railroad, but between it and the canal embank- ment the water was mounting. All day the struggle continued for Ramscapelle, the embankment, and Pervyse. The 31st saw the Germans driven back across the railroad and the inundated region east of the canal. 56 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Battle around Ypres. — The Battle of Ypres is not a separate event from the Battle of the Yser. They really over- lapped, and are indeed only periods of increased intensity of combat distin- guished by the prominence of a special objective on the part of the Germans, and of a special effort by the Allies to prevent the realization of that objec- tive. Both of these battles are by the French denominated the battles in Flan- ders, a better name tlian Yser and DV0OR._ ScALfi: StaT.Mh.e« YPRES BATTLE FRONT Ypres. However this may be, opera- tions on the Yser proper were checked by the inundation spoken of above and by the expulsion of the Germans from Ramscapelle. The scene now shifts to the southward, to the attempts made by the Germans to capture Ypres in the pursuit of the objective still held by them, to wit, to break through the Al- lied lines to the French channel ports. On October 24 the Allies lines ran in a great arc from Dixmude through Langemarck, Gheluvelt, through the woods southeast of Ypres, along the eastern ridge of the Mont-des-Cats, across the Lys, to La Bassee. This position was energetically attacked on this day by the Germans, who very nearly succeeded in taking possession of Gheluvelt. Attacks on Mont-des- Cats were beaten off. At various other points likewise the Allies held. On the 23d a French division had entered Ypres, and for the first time East In- dian troops entered the trenches to do battle for the Empire — Gurkhas, Sikhs, etc. They were afterward withdrawn, for climatic reasons, it was said. Fight- ing continued through the 25th, and on the 26th many attempts were made against the Nieuport-Dixmude line. The advantage this day lay on the whole with the Germans, who had moved up the Menin- Ypres road, capturing Gheluvelt, and, south of the L^'s, had got hold of part of Neuve Chapelle. On the 28th Gheluvelt was recaptured by the British, who also drove the enemy to the edge of Neuve Chapelle. Return- ing to the attack, the Germans recap- tured the entire village, only to be driv- en out again, this time by a force com- posed in part of East Indian troops. Passing over the fighting of the next day or two, on the 28th a wireless was intercepted, saying that the Germans would attack next morning. On that day (the 29th) the French south of Bethune took the offensive so as to keep as large a force as possible of the enemy from joining in the struggle around Ypres. On the 30th and 31st French reenforcements continued to arrive. The Allied position on the morning of the 31st ran from Zonnebeke on the north to Festubert on the southwest. The eastern" ridges of Mont-des-Cats were still held by the Allies ; south of this the line extended to the Lys, cross- ing it and curving around Armentieres to Neuve Chapelle and thence to Festu- bert. The German plan was to hold on MILITARY OPERATIONS 57 the flanks and to make their main at- tack on the centre to Ypres : if the cen- tre could be broken, and the ridge of Mont-des-Cats captured, the Allied forces would be cut in two, and permit either an advance on Boulogne or an at- tack south of the Lys against the Al- lies intrenched there, or indeed both. At daybreak the Germans opened an in- tense fire on the lines southeast of Ypres and drove the British back into their re- serve trenches. An equally violent at- tack was made across the Ypres-Com- ines Canal, which also drove back the British. At one or two points the lines were momentarily broken. In general the Germans had advanced in the cen- tre and were within a few miles of Ypres, In the north the French had taken Bixschoote and reached Passchen- daele. On the Yser, at Ramscapelle, the Germans were hurled across the ca- nal, and farther south the French pushed their offensive in the direction of Roulers. But in the centre a tremen- dous effort was made to crumple up the British line and capture the ridge of Mont-des-Cats and Ypres. The defense made by the British, outnumbered and outgunned, against the successive at- tacks of the Germans will ever remain remarkable in their annals. These at- tacks came very near succeeding; the thin British lines, worn out by their efforts to hold, exposed to artillery fire, began to fall back, and the guns were even withdrawn to Ypres. The roads behind the Germans were filled with mo- tor vehicles ready to take the troops to any point of the field. But at this mo- ment the British stood their ground. The Germans coming up the Menin- Ypres road were stopped, and were driven out of the woods east and south- east of Ypres. To the south the de- fense was equally spirited, keeping the Germans from reaching the ridge of Mont-des-Cats. November 1 the Ger- mans took Wytschaete and Messines, villages at the foot of the ridge, but failed to make the ridge itself. The struggle continued during the whole of this day ; the Germans were driven out of Wytschaete, but the village was abandoned. On the 2d Neuve Chapelle was carried, but the attempt on Armen- tieres failed. North of the Lys re- newed efforts to gain possession of the ridge of Mont-des-Cats proved unsuc- cessful. On the 3d the French took the offensive from Dixmude-Nordschoote ; the effect of this was to hold back forces that otherwise would have moved against the lines farther south. And so it went day after day. The Germans made another great effort on November 10, when they shelled Dix- mude more heavily than ever before, blew up the French trenches and ad- vanced against the town. After a ter- rible hand-to-hand fight the French withdrew to the west of the Yser, On the remainder of the front artillery played and assaults were made. The 11th opened with tremendous artillery fire from both sides of the Menin-Ypres road, lasting three hours. Immediate- ly afterward 15 battalions of the Prus- sian Guard advanced from the east, while at the same time charges were un- dertaken by other troops. Everywhere north of the Lys the Allied front was attacked. Everything failed except the effort of the Prussian Guard, who got up to within a few yards of the trenches only to recoil and finally to retreat be- fore the blasting fire that greeted them. The Battle of Ypres was over, after having lasted one month, with stag- gering losses on both sides. It must be accounted a German defeat. The conclusion of the battles of Flan- ders, November 11, 1914, marks the be- ginning of what may be called the long 58 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR siege of the armies over the whole line from the sea to the Swiss frontier. It was a time of ceaseless watching, of hardship and trial, of continuous fight- ing with neither side able to advance at the expense of the other. Local advan- tages gained first by one and then by the other adversary in no way affected the issue, and indeed, as measured by the ground gained, could not be repre- sented on an ordinary map. A word is perhaps not out of place in respect of the nature of the contest that now be- came the rule over the entire western front. Trench warfare over this front took the place of what may now be called old-fashioned operations in the open. Mining and countermining be- came the rule : the lines in reality were areas of parallel trenches protected by networks of barbed wire so thickly in- terlaid and interwoven that only long- sustained artillery fire proved equal to breaking them down in clearing the way for assault. The troops lived in and under the ground, so that the shrapnel, the ideal man-killing projectile against troops in the open, proved nearly use- less, and was replaced by the high ex- plosive shell, able to pierce overhead shelter and overwhelm the occupants. Operations degenerated into a struggle of wear and tear. So close did the lines draw to each other that antiquated methods and weapons sprang into new life : hand grenades, knives, and even clubs for close work. Trench mortars came into existence. Asphyxiating gases, in violation of The Hague Con- vention, were used. Artillery took a po- sition of first importance, as was but natural, seeing that a state of siege warfare had developed. The reason of this state of affairs is to be found, in part at least, in the air service, making surprise well-nigh impossible, and allow- ing time for the threatened side to make ample preparations to resist any im- pending movement. It also greatly in- creased the efficiency of artillery by en- abling batteries to correct their fire, and by discovering and assigning tar- gets invisible from the batteries them- selves. In this tremendous struggle some few encounters deserve passing no- tice before going on to the serious at- tempts made by the Allies to break through the German lines. Thus the French took Vermelles on December 7; later in the month there was some ex- tremely heavy fighting in and near Givenchy, followed a few days after- ward by the capture of St. Georges by the Allies (French and Belgians). Jan. 3-4, 1915, was marked by a French vic- tory at Steinbach in Alsace. Soissons, too, became the scene of great activity. North of this city the French on Janu- ary 8 captured Hill 132, and pushed their way eastward. The German coun- ter attack, made in force, drove the French in from the east, and finally re- captured Hill 132. The French were compelled to cross the river. Under any other circumstances this action would have constituted a considerable aff'air ; in reality it was only an inci- dent. The next action standing above the general level was that in the region of La Bassee. On January 25 a German demonstration was made along the whole front, from Festubert to Vermel- les and as far north as Ypres. Bethune was shelled. This contest lasted sev- eral days and ended in the repulse of the Germans. The French won some success in Champagne during this period, in the neighborhood of Perthes (February 16), and on the whole had rather the better of it until the month of March. Battle of Neuve Chapelle. — The event of this period is, however, the MILITARY OPERATIONS 59 Battle of Neuve Chapelle, an operation carried out by the British. The imme- diate purpose of the Allies was to carry this village, as the first step in an ef- fort to pass on and capture the ridge Aubers-Illies, held by the Germans, and curving westward between these two points. If this ridge could be taken, it was not impossible that the attack might even result in the capture of Lille, an event that would have been of the first importance to the Allies, as menacing the German position north- ward to the sea. Neuve Chapelle itself sits in the easterly angle of a lozenge formed by the roads breaking off from the main road La Bassee-Estaires. The village itself, with the eastern side of the lozenge, was held by the Ger- mans ; the western side by the British. Strongly reenforced, the British at 7.30 A.M. on the 10th of March opened a bombardment said to surpass in inten- sity anything ever heard before. It was effective everywhere except at the ex- treme north point of the front of at- tack, where it failed to break down the wire entanglement. After 35 minutes the fire was shifted to Neuve Chapelle, and the British infantry advanced. In the village and south of it the attack succeeded, but to the northeast was held up by wire entanglement just men- tioned. It held off the advance until the artillery succeeded in breaking it up. By 11 A.M. the whole village and wood leading from it northeast and southwest had been taken. So well di- rected was the artillery fire that the at- tempt of the Germans to bring up troops was completely stopped. The British, however, made no further prog- ress. The German fire had cut all or nearly all the telephone wires and communica- tion with the rear became almost impos- sible. Furthermore the orchard north of the village had remained in German hands and so threatened the flank of the advance towards the Aubers-Illies ridge. There thus arose a delay of four and a half hours, which the Ger- mans took full advantage of to repair their lines, organize fresh defenses in rear, and bring up reenforcements. When the British advanced again, they were stopped both north and south by machine-gun fire. The next day found the British east of Neuve Chapelle, but the remainder of their plan had miscarried. On the 12th the arrival of German reenforcements put the British on the defensive. That night the British set to work to con- solidate the positions won, some 1200 yards on a front of 4000. The 13th was taken up in beating off' a few Ger- man counter attacks. On the 14th the battle died down on both sides. The British casualties were extremely se- vere, over 12,000 killed and wounded; so also were the German. The net re- sult of the battle was undeniably a Brit- ish defeat, in that they had failed to carry through their plans. But it is also undeniable that they had managed to break the enemy lines ; whether the price paid was worth it, is doubtful. After Ypres and Neuve Chapelle. — In the next month, April, 1915, the Ger- mans made another great effort on a large scale to break through the Allied lines on the north and so gain the chan- nel ports. In anticipation of their ad- vance the British took the offensive themselves on April 17, with the result that, as before in the same region, the German plan was frustrated. The Al- lies were posted along an arc running from Steenstraate on the Yperlee Ca- nal east, southeast, southwest, through Langemarck, through Broodsende- Becelaere, from which last point the line curved round to Hill 50 and to 60 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR the Ypres-Comines Canal. The chord of this arc was formed by the Yperlee Canal to a pomt about a mile southeast of Hill 60. From this position the Al- lies were driven back to a line close to Ypres, with especially heavy fighting in and near St. Julien, where the Canadian contingent distinguished itself. The Germans even got across the canal at Steenstraate, and for a time the posi- tion of the Allies was precarious. In this particular battle of Ypres the Germans made use of deadly gases. By means of these the French troops de- fending the northern part of the arc were driven out ; these gases were later again and again discharged against the British. Until respirators were fur- nished later, there was no living in the fumes let loose on the trenches under at- tack. Day after day the contest went on, the Germans attacking and the Al- lies resisting, with the utmost despera- tion. On the 30th a vigorous attack by the French pushed back the enemy on the north of the line. On May 8 a concentrated effort — one of many — was made to reach Ypres. Allied (Brit- ish) attempts to push back the enemy coming up on both sides of the Ypres- Roulers road were unsuccessful. On the 9th, fresh but unsuccessful at- tempts were made on Ypres. On tliis. day the French were successful at La Bassee (Carency), the English unsuc- cessful south of the Lys. On the 11th, Ypres was severely shelled. On the 13th, the British met with some suc- cess on the Ypres-Roulers railway, as well as towards the north. The French on May 15 recaptured Steenstraate and got up to the canal; by the 17th they were masters of the left bank. In its entirety this battle of a month's duration must be regarded as a defeat for the Germans. Setting out to take Ypres and break through, they had, in spite of many local successes, largely at least at the outset due to their use of poisonous gases, failed to carry out their plan. They had lost many thou- sands in killed, wounded, and prisoners. During the later part of the struggle around Ypres the British made a second attempt to carry the Aubers ridge with the capture of Lille as the principal ob- jective. The battle opened JNIay 9 and lasted until May 20. The net result ARTOIS BATTLEGROUND was that the Allied lines were ad- vanced some 600 yards over a front of four miles. This battle comprised two actions known as Aubers Ridge and Festubert. Battle of Artois. — Before the contest before Ypres, just described, had closed, the French began the tremen- dous Battle of Artois, on the plateau of Notre Dame dc Lorette and south of it, or the line La Bassee-Arras. If this operation could be carried through German communications be- MILITARY OPERATIONS 61 hind it would be threatened and there might be a chance of taking Lille. The German positions on this front were of the strongest. They held the high ground around Loos, the ridges north of the Souchez stream, and most of the plateau run- ning south of Lens to the banks of the Scarpe. Upon this position had been expended every effort of modern mili- tary science to make it secure. Be- tween Souchez and Arras was a network of trenches known as the Labyrinth (underground), about 2 miles square. The ridge of Notre Dame breaks off abruptly to the south in spurs, the eastern one of which, the Souchez spur, commands Ablain St. Nazaire and a sugar refinery between Ablain and Souchez, held by the Germans. From one of these spurs trenches had been constructed across to the Arras-Be- thune road. South of Ablain are the heights of Carency, connected by trenches with Ablain and Souchez, and by another series, the "White Works" (white chalk), with La Targette on the Souchez-Arras road. East of La Targette i^ Neuville St. Vaast, like the Labyrinth, an underground fortress. In other words, not only was the surface of the ground admirably fortified by elaborate trenches and redoubts, sup- plied with ammunition, etc., but sub- terranean areas had been excavated to house troops and supplies, where, safe from aerial observation and overhead fire, they could be kept until needed, to repel the enemy already exhausted and reduced by his advance. General d'Urbal was in immediate command, assisted by Foch and Joffre, but to General Petain, later to distin- guish himself at Verdun, belongs the credit of the reduction of the Labyrinth. Seven corps were engaged, and over 1100 guns of all calibres had been con- centrated for the preparation. For months the French sappers had been occupied in mining the German defenses. The battle opened at 6 a.m. on Sunday, May 9, by the fire of the 1100 French guns. Three-quarters of an hour later the Carency mines were blown up, as were others on the Notre Dame ridge. The bombardment lasted three hours and at 10 the infantry moved out. All day the battle raged. Three of the five trenches on Notre Dame plateau were carried ; when night fell the French dug themselves in. South of Notre Dame, at the same time, the French at- tacked Carency, took the trenches, but failed to take a work on the east. They nevertheless pushed on to Souchez. La Targette was taken, as was part of the White Works. Passing on, a part of Neuville St. Vaast was then captured. On the 10th the fighting continued. On the 11th the attack on Neuville St. Vaast reduced the cemetery, but the Labyrinth still held out. The next day Notre Dame de Lorette fell, as did Carency. From Carency the French pushed on to Ablain St. Nazaire. But the Germans still held on to a spur of the Notre Dame ridge, the spur of the "White Way." On the 21st, however, the spur was carried, as was most of Ablain. A few Germans, however, still held the cemetery, only to be dislodged on the 28th. Three days later the French took the Souchez refinery and in June captured the Labyrinth. Indeed, fighting went on in this region until the autumn. Each side is estimated to have lost 60,000 men in this tremendous bat- tle. Having regard to the ultimate purpose of the French in taking the of- fensive, it must be admitted that they failed : they had not broken through the German lines. Lille was still in posses- sion of the enemy whose communications were still open. In all probability, 62 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR however, the Germans had been kept so busy as to have no troops to spare for the attempt on Ypres previously de- scribed. And it was further proved that with sufficient preparation by ar- tillery and mining German positions could be carried to a considerable depth. Simultaneously with the Battle of Artois, there was considerable activity further east in the Argonne region and on the St. Mihiel salient, on the western front of which the French succeeded in capturing Les Epargcs. They also met with some success on the southern face, on the edge of the Forest of Apremont. Southeast of Luneville in the Vosges the Germans took the Ban de Sapt on June 22. In July it was recaptured by the French, who also made some small ad- vances in Alsace. Batth of Champagne. — The French check in the Artois country was fol- lowed by fighting chiefly in the Vosges, mostly of a local character. This con- tinued until September, when the French opened an offensive for which they had long been making prepara- tions. Apart from the advantage that would accrue if this oifensive should succeed, there were reasons of a politi- cal order that called for something more from the Allies than mere nibbling at the German lines. The German cam- paign in the east was meeting with suc- cess. To counterbalance this success, and at the same time to relieve the pres- sure on the Russians, it was regarded as necessary to deal the common enemy a mighty blow in the west. To keep him ignorant of the precise point at which the blow was to fall, for weeks previous substantially the entire German posi- tion was subjected to intense bombard- ment. Beginning in the middle of Au- gust, this bombardment was especially heavy on the Belgian front in the Souchez region, before Arras and Roye, along the Aisne, in Champagne, and fin- ally in the Argonne and Woevre dis- tricts, and in Lorraine. As the time drew near for the infantry work, the bombardment increased in intensity over the front selected for attack. That front was in Champagne, between Au- berive on the west and Ville-sur-Tourbe on the east, a distance of some 15 or 16 miles. The centre of the French line was defended by the 6th, 5th, and 4th armies. The front held by the 4th (Langle de Cary) was the one selected from which to deliver the offensive. Some 4 or 5 miles behind the corre- sponding German position and roughly parallel to it, runs the Bazancourt- Challerange railway. If the French of- fensive could reach this railway a mis- chief would be done to the enemy, for this road communicated with Metz on the east. But the natural strength of the German position had been increased by the arts of the engineer. From Au- berive this position followed the crest of the low ridge north of the Suippes Riv- er, rising, as it passed though Souain, then by Perthes, with Tahure behind (north of) it, and terminated at Mas- siges. To say that this whole position was intrenched is scarcely to do justice to the effort spent on its defensive or- ganization; not only were there the usual trenches (lines) facing the enemy position, but cross trenches had been dug over the entire area, from which flanking fire could be delivered upon the enemy if he should succeed in passing the first and subsequent lines. There were really two positions, two miles or so apart, the first immediately in front of the French, the second on the re- verse of the ridge. The area between them was a network of trenches and en- tanglements. On September 22 the bombardment MILITARY OPERATIONS 63 increased in intensity and was kept up until the 25th, when the French infan- try broke out of its own trenches and gained practically the first line posi- tions of the enemy by 12 o'clock noon. At some points, however, the Germans held, and the work therefore became in some sort a series of isolated and de- tached actions. On the left the attack was exposed to the German artillery fire from the plateau of Moronvillers, in front it came up against the salients of the ridge. The first line was carried, however, and the right of this attack held all day, and later pushed on deep- er and deeper into the German network. To the right of the St. Hilaire-St. Souplet road, much the same thing happened, the French left being stopped while the right managed to advance and took all four lines of trenches. Fur- ther east the enemy trenches were pene- trated to a depth of about 500 yards, but machine guns stopped the advance. North of Souain the French met with pronounced success, carrying trench after trench almost to the Navarin Farm. Between Souain and Perthes the German position had been most sol- idly organized, but in its eastern por- tion the defenses were comparatively weak. Here the French delivered their main attack in this part of the front, the remainder (the left) playing a sec- ondary part. The attack carried the French advance as far as the Souain- Tahure road. In the Mesnil sector (east of Perthes) the greatest difficul- ties were encountered, but still further east, north of Beausejour, the French had better fortune, pushing north as far as Maison de Champagne. On the extreme right (Massiges) the colonial troops reached the top of the plateau in an incredibly short time, but could not advance, because of the effective machine-gun fire here developed. The first day's fighting therefore had pushed back the enemy lines in the centre: the flanks had not been driven in, but the French managed to secure the ground gained. In the west, on the 27th, the French got up to the Epine de Vede- grange, but no farther. On the next day the fighting died down in this sector of the battlefield. In the Souain sector the French on the 28th made contact with the second German position in these parts. Between Souain and Ta- hure, in front of Perthes, contact with this second position was also establish- ed, but here the French remained, dig- ging themselves in, until October 6. While all these events were occurring in the centre and left, the most desper- ate struggle of all was going on to the north of Massiges. From the plateau three long spurs ran down like fingers, whence the name given to them and to the plateau from which they spring, La Main de Massiges. These were strong- ly held by the Germans. The French accordingly attacked across the back of the hand, and got up on the pla- teau. The general result of this battle, the local and separate contests of which were not over before October 4, was that the French gained the Massiges plateau, the Tahure ridge, and various points in the German second position. The elaborate intrenchments and work of the first positions were taken. The total number of prisoners officially giv- en was over 23,000; many guns and much war material fell into the hands of the French. But as in all the other cases of real battles, as distinguished from the daily local strife, on the long front, the German lines were not brok- en ; they were merely pushed back. Al- though, therefore, the Germans had suf- fered a defeat in that they had been driven out of their positions, yet it must A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR be admitted, on the other hand, that the French had been disappointed of their purpose. This apart, there can be no question as to the thoroughness of the German defeat. The French staff estimated the German loss in killed, wounded, and missing at 140,000. Battle of Loos. — ^While this great battle was going on in Champagne, the Allies were renewing their offensive in Artois, the British in the Battle of Loos, the French in that of Vimy. As before in this region, the objective was to push into the plain of the Scheldt. Reenforcements both of men and of guns had given the British the necessary elements to undertake the offensive. Thanks to this increased strength, they had extended their trenches southward to Grenay, opposite to Loos and Lens. It is apparent, therefore, that in the month of September theAllies undertook a general offensive, for in addition to their two mighty efforts in Champagne and Artois, the Germans were kept busy in other regions of the front, by dem- onstrations on the extreme left, in which the navy took a part, in front of Ypres and also in the Vosges. In spite of the Battle of Artois, the Germans still held the eastern slopes of Notre Dame de Lorette ; from this point their lines stretched north in front of (west of) the Loos-Hulluch- Haisnes ridge to the canal near La Bas- see ; south, they curved through Angres and Lievin to Souchez, thench eastward of the high road from Bethune to Arras. Between Haisnes and Hulluch lay the powerful Hohenzollern redoubt, a work more or less like the Labyrinth. Their general position thus formed a sort of salient oriented southwestward on the axis Souchez-Lens. Tlie plan contem- plated that the British should drive at the northern side of the salient (Loos- Hulluch-Haisnes), the French at the southern (Vimy Heights). The capture of either of these positions would force the evacuation of Lens. The terrain over which the British were to advance was covered with villages, pits, gal- leries, slag heaps, and mine works gen- erally, all connected by trenches. More- over, the industrial pits and galleries had been taken over and extended by the Germans for war purposes. The entire area had been defensively organ- ized, and equipped with machine guns, artillery, and small works and trenches generally. In front of the French po- sition, northeast of Neuville St. Vaast, lay the wooded heights of Vimy running northwest to Givenchy with hills 140 and 119 as conspicuous elevations. Preparations for the great offensive were completed by September 24. Specifically the British were to capture Auchy, Haisnes, Pit No. 8, and the Hohenzollern Redoubt; further south the ridge between Hulluch was to be the objective, involving the capture of Loos, and Hill 70 to the east of the town. The French, as stated, were to attack the Vimy Heights. Amply pro- vided with artillery, the British besides were to employ, for the first time, a gas that stupefied but did not kill. The action opened with artillery prepara- tion on the 24th. During this day the entire German position within range was taken under fire by both the French and the British artillery. On the 25th this fire was renewed very early in the morning, and suspended two hours later in order to allow the infantry to ad- vance. Tliis they did at 6.30 a.m. The French, however, continued the artil- lery preparation until noon. On the extreme left, between the canal and Pit No. 8, the British met with a serious repulse. Part of the Hohenzollern Re- doubt was carried, so was Pit No. 8. Haisnes was taken as early as 8 a.m., MILITARY OPERATIONS 65 but had to be abandoned by 5 p.m. Loos, after a terrible struggle, fell to the English, as did Hill No. 70. A counter-attack by the Germans recov- ered most of Hill 70. As night fell, the British line ran around the south of Loos to the western part of Hill 70, past the west of Hulluch quarries to Pit No. 8, then east of Hohenzollern Re- doubt, and so back to the original posi- tion. The fighting was renewed the next day with no material results on either side. By night the line ran back from Hill 70 to the Loos-La Bassee road, then north along this road, then northeast of Hulluch. The remainder of the line was unchanged. On the 27th the Germans recaptured Pit. No. 8 and forced their enemies back to the eastern part of Hohenzollern Redoubt. The next few days were filled with desperate fighting, more or less localized. The net result, so far as the British were concerned, was the capture of Loos and a portion of Hill 70. The French, on their side, advancing a little after 12 o'clock noon, had made but slight progress. They took the Souchez cemetery, but lost it later, and reached the lower slopes of Hill 119. The German garrison of Souchez re- tired to Hill 119. On the 28th Vimy Heights were attacked; the western slopes and a large part of the wood of Givenchy were taken. This battle must be regarded as a failure on the part, of the Allies. It would seem that the British had no re- serves available to clinch the results obi- tained in their advance. The Germans thiis had time to rally and counterat- tack. It would seem too that the French perhaps made a mistake in de- laying their advance on the 25th by six hours. Had they moved out at the same time, the French left and the Brit- ish right might have joined hands. The Allies' losses were very heavy. The British alone lost 50,000 men in this battle. Disappointed, however, as were the Allies in respect of the main pur- pose they had in view, both in Cham- pagne and in Artois, they had, never- theless, made some real gains. In the latter regions they were gradually pushing the Germans to the rim of the plain of the Scheldt. The British gain had, as it were, pushed a salient in be- tween La Bassee on the north and Lens on the south, thus creating in some sort two German sahents. After the battle the French relieved the British from the French left up to and including the village of Loos and a part of Hill 70. The position of the Allies in this new salient of Loos was none too secure. But apart from this, it was clearly incumbent on the Ger- mans to try to recover the terrain they had just lost. They accordingly, on September 29, attacked the northwest face of the British salient, but were beaten off. The French on their side advanced to Hill 140. The next day the German attempts on the northwest face were renewed. October 1 the French made more progress on Vimy Heights. October 3 was marked by a fresh attack on the northwestern face, and most of the Hohenzollern Redoubt was recaptured. On the 8th a counter- attack was made on the British posi- tion. It was repulsed with loss, as were the attempts made on the French near Neuville St. Vaast. Later, October 13, these attempts on the French were re- newed with very much the same results. On this day the British themselves took the offensive in an effort to extend the northern face of their salient. This ef- fort very nearly succeeded in gaining the Hohenzollern Redoubt for the Eng- lish, a part of which only was held, how- ever. October 19 the British line ran 66 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR from Auchez-Hohenzollern, St. Elie, and then, so as to encircle Loos on the east and south, back to the old trenches. The close of the year 1915 saw the adversaries confronting one another on this as on other portions of the front. But in respect of the northern region it must be remarked that unsuccessful as the Anglo-French efforts to break through had proved, yet they had suc- ceeded in pushing back the Germans to the last ridge of hills separating the area of conflict from the plain of the Scheldt. One more drive like the Sep- tember one, and the Germans might be pushed into the plain and so lose this part of France. Hence they reenforced their hold by reenforcements estimated at 600,000, and throughout the winter obtained a few minor successes. Verdun. — But these, as well as all the other events, gave way in February, 1916, to the most determined attempt yet made by any of the combatants on any front to win a decision. On the 21st of this month the Germans opened their assault on Verdun. But this place had changed its character since the opening days of the war. Warned by the fate of Liege, Namur, and Mau- beuge, it had passed from the condi- tion of fortress pure and simple to that of fortress related to an army in the field. Hence its reduction was no long- er a matter of sufficient pounding by 42-centimeter guns. General Petain * was summoned to conduct the of- fense. * Henri Philippe Petain, born in 1857; de- livered notable lectures at the Ecole de Guerre, for which he was decorated by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria; at beginning of European War was colonel of the Thirty-third Regiment of Infantry at Arras; distinguished himself in the retreat from Charleroi to the Marne; pro- moted general of division; in command of an army corps took Carency, breaking through the German front; in 1915 was in command of part of the "Iron Division" of Colonials in Artois and Champagne; given command of armies around Verdun. The first German drive was delivered against the point of the Verdun salient by heavy columns, over a 7-mile front, from Consenvoye to Azannes. After a prolonged bombardment of heavy artil- lery — it is estimated that during the first four days no fewer than 2,000,000 shells were fired — these columns struck the French advanced lines, and at the end of a week had advanced 4 miles towards Verdun. The right, advancing along the Meuse, had reached Champ- neuville ; the centre, after taking Beau- mont, faced the ridge known as the Cote de Poivre ; while the left, after captur- ing Ornes, threw itself against Fort Douaumont, the most northerly of the permanent forts of Verdun. After sev- eral costly repulses this fort was storm- ed and held by the 24th Brandenburg regiment. The second phase of the attack shifts to the east. Pushed back to a line run- ning west from Douaumont along the Cote de Poivre to the Meuse, the French now lost Mauheulle and Fresnes, From these points the Germans made their way across the Woevre plain to the edge of the plateau on which the per- manent forts are constructed, and ad- vanced to Eix, about 5 miles from Ver- dun. The total gains so far amounted to over 100 square miles. Operations in this sector culminated in assaults on the fort and the village of Vaux, 2 miles southeast of Fort Douaumont. From conflicting reports it would seem that the German infan- try finally won the village, but failed to carry the fort and the slopes to the east. The Germans now turned their atten- tion to the territory west of the Meuse. Their advance east of the river had found its flank exposed to artillery fire from the west. Moreover, it might be possible to cut the western railroad MILITARY OPERATIONS 67 communication of Verdun. Opening in this region on March 6 the Germans, after taking Forges and Regneville, found further progress barred by two fortified heights — the Cote de I'Oie and Le Mort Homme, both over 800 feet high. On the lower hills between these points is the wood known as the Bois des Corbeaux, strengthened with en- tanglements and batteries. Here, final- ly, the Germans made some gains, so that their advance, some 2 miles south of Forges, brought their line into ap- proximate alignment with their posi- tions farther east, and threatened the French line, strongly posted on Le Mort Homme. Moreover, they had some success as far west as Melan- court. In the fifth week of the campaign the point of attack was shifted still far- ther west, about 3 miles beyond Le Mort Homme. On March 21 the wood north- east of Avocourt, and on the 22d Hau- court Hill, were captured. This left the French positions at Melancourt and Bethincourt exposed. The greater part of Le Mort Homme, as well as the woods that flanked it, was now held by the Germans. On the night of March 30 the town of Melancourt was attacked from three sides, and at dawn carried. The Be- thincourt position was thus rendered still more precarious, though the French had succeeded in retaking a small section of Avocourt Wood. In the meanwhile Douaumont ridge and vicinity were first shelled and then attacked by infantry. A sudden attack gave the village of Vaux to the Ger- mans. The next day Caillette Wood, between Vaux and Douaumont, was penetrated by a strong German attack, but the French first lines, about 300 meters south of Douaumont village, held against a German assault, in which the attack was made in successive waves of great strength. The struggle over Caillette Wood, the first week in April, although severe, yields in interest to the operations now resumed west of the Meuse. On April 5 the Germans took Haucourt, half a mile southeast of Melancourt. The withdrawal from Bethincourt was now rendered inevitable, and skillfully made on April 8, with small losses ; the new French line was established a mile to the south. Still keeping the offensive and continuing to make gains in this sector, the Germans penetrated the French lines on hills 265 and 295 (near Le Mort Homme), and captured a mile and a quarter of French trenches on Termiten Hill. This latter gain marks substantial progress towards Hill 304, the key position of this whole region. An interesting and novel illustration of the future powers of air craft in actual battle was furnished at Cote de Poivre. As the Germans were bringing up a bat- tery to shell this ridge an air squad- ron came up and dropped bombs on the battery from an altitude of less than 1000 feet. The first round of bombs killed 9 horses and 30 men, and wounded and frightened so many oth- ers that the guns had to be abandoned. At the end of three months' continu- ous fighting, the Verdun campaign had not reached a decisive issue. Whatever gains were made, however, were made by the Germans. Up to this time they had occupied about 150 square miles of ter- ritory, and approximately 30 villages. Their lines were shortened 10 miles (40 to 30) and they had pushed forward an average of about three miles. On May 4, the Germans again re- newed their offensive with increased ferocity. The main attack was again directed against Hill 304 which domi- nated the ridge west of the Meuse. The 68 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR German artillery preparation had been scarcely if ever equaled for rapidity and intensity of concentration. In one week the Teutons made seven attacks. Ultimately east of Hill 304, all the trenches and shelters were destroyed and then carried chiefly by means of poisonous gases. Despite this the hill itself could not be taken. They at- tacked Le Mort Homme from all sides and finally succeeded in establishing a foothold between it and Hill 304. They then attacked from a new angle and captured Cumieres, a village close to the Meuse. A strong French counter at- tack only succeeded in recapturing a part of the village. The Germans made their farthest advance up to this time when, on May 30, attacking with fresh soldiers drawn from another quarter, they captured Caurette Wood on the east of Le Mort Homme. They now occupied the northern slope and posi- tions well around on each side and threatened to cut the French off from their line of communications. In the meanwhile the action on the east bank of the Meuse had been rapid. The French by a surprise attack cap- tured Fort Douaumont on May 22, but were unable to maintain their position, inasmuch as the Germans recaptured it in ten days as well as Caillctte Wood. Upwards of 2000 prisoners were taken by the German forces. On the east of Fort Vaux the Teutonic forces also made advances. It was surrounded on three sides and its fall was only a mat- ter of a few days. A small garrison of 1000 men was left in the fort to defend it. By most courageous fighting this handful of men held the " Germans at bay for five days. Tliey were finally compelled to surrender on June 7. In the latter part of June the Ger- mans captured the village of Fleury which is only ^'^A miles northeast of Verdun. The French counterattacked and won back a foothold in the village which they stubbornly maintained and thus offset to some extent the import- ance of the German victory. West of the Meuse, the efforts of the Germans seemed to be in vain at Avocourt, Cumieres, and Hill 304, although they held almost all of Le Mort Homme. However they captured Thiaumont by assault on July 3, and held it until early August when they were driven out by the French. Then followed the spec- tacle of almost daily changes in pos- session of the work. It remained ul- timately in the hands of the Germans. The struggle for Verdun now became a deadlock, neither side being able to advance. The Germans were forced to withdraw some of their men from the Verdun front in order to reinforce their position on the Somme. This deadlock continued until the latter part of Oc- tober, when the French regained in three hours what it had taken the Ger- mans months of effort to attain. It was the most brilliant action of the whole Verdun campaign. General Ni- velle planned his attack so that it would occur when the German lines were the weakest and thus have a greater chance of success. His artillery preparations were brief but of exceedingly great in- tensity. Then came the infantry attack on October 24. It advanced in four columns. The first was between Pepper Hill and Thiaumont Farm. This divi- sion advanced about a mile and carried Thiaumont Farm and Thiaumont Work and the Haudromont Quarries. The second division was to take Hill 320 and the Caillette Wood. It carried both these positions by an irresistible rush. Although this was all they were supposed to accomplish the commander decided to continue his push forward. Consequently they proceeded beyond MILITARY OPERATIONS the wood and surrounded the Douau- mont Fort. The village of Douaumont on the west was captured and then a rush was made for the fort itself. The Prussian defenders refused to surrender and nearly every one of them was killed before the French completely occupied the work. The third division advanced about half a mile, capturing the remainder of Vaux-Chapitre Wood and all of Fumin Wood. The fourth division pushed the Germans from Chenois and Laufee woods, captured Damloup battery and encircled Vaux Fort on the east, south and west. After the failure of German counter attacks, the French began to finish the encircling of the fort on the next day. It fell on the night of No- vember 1-2. During the next six weeks there were scarcely any infantry engagements and tlie artillery actions which occurred were only of minor importance. On the 15th of December, however, General Nivelle executed another great coup. He attacked on a front of 6 miles after a three-day artillery preparation. He succeeded in penetrating the German front for a distance of nearly 2 miles, and according to a Paris report cap- tured over 11,000 prisoners. Vacherau- ville, Louvemont, Chambrette Farm, Hardaumont and Bezouvaux were tak- en. On the 16th and 17th new gains consolidated the French positions. After this advance the Verdun front once again became quiet, each adver- sarj"^ watching the other and being con- tent to remain on the defensive. After 10 months of heavy fighting the Ver- dun struggle was virtually over. In the last analysis it was a great French vic- tory. The moral effects on the French troops and French nation can scarcely be. estimated. As a reward for his hero- ic work at Verdun, General Nivelle was made commander-in-chief of all the French armies, succeeding General Joffre. The purpose of the Germans in se- lecting Verdun as a point of attack gave rise to much discussion. The date of the attack was well chosen, in an- ticipation of a general Allied offensive on the western front, but Verdun itself had long ago ceased to be a fortress in the technical sense of the word. Hence the German effort falls into the same class as all others, whether German or Allied, to obtain a decision in the west. The effort made at Verdun might have produced better results if made nearer to Paris. Even if successful it would result, moral effect apart, in merely straightening the German lines (accom- panied of course by a similar straight- ening on the French side), unless, in- deed, it was believed that a real breach could be made, opening the way for a real advance into the heart of France. It is declared in some quarters that the determining condition of the selection was for political and dynastic reasons the need of a victory for the Crown Prince; and it is further declared that Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen both opposed Verdun as the theatre of the new offensive. One thing stands out : the enormous losses of the Germans for the sake, so far, of a few square miles of French territory. Campaign in Picardy. — The expect- ed Allied offensive on the western front began in the last week of June by a continuous shelhng of the German lines on the British front. The point chosen for the attack was at last seen to be the junction of the British and French lines near the Somme River. The preparation ior the advance was unique. The new mortars of the Allies were first concentrated on the first line trenches of the Germans. They 70 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR were kept in that position for 10 min- utes and then concentrated on the sec- end line of trenches. While firing on these the Allied troops rushed out and easily took the first line. In many cases the trenches were completely destroyed, and the attackers in some instances swept on to the second and third lines. Another unique thing about the battle on this front was the institution of the trench-raiding system, after prolonged shelling. At night a raiding party would rush into an enemy trench and would abandon it as soon as the occu- pants were bombed or captured. This was also important as a method of find- ing out the effectiveness of the artillery firing. The objective of this campaign was the capture of Bapaume and Peronne. The British were to take the former and the French the latter. By the end of the first week the French had advanced about 4 miles and had captured Curulu, Estrees and Heure. They took about 800 prisoners. During the same week the British advanced about 2 miles and captured La Boisselle, Thiepval, and Contalmaison. They took about 6000 prisoners. It was apparently the plan of campaign for the French and Brit- ish armies to advance pari passu, in- asmuch as in the second week the French just held the positions won and waited for the British to come abreast of them. The British captured Trones Wood for the second time on July 11, and again took Mametz Wood on the next day. On the 15th they captured the village of Pozieres and 2000 prison- ers. In the meantime the French had advanced eastward and captured Biaches, only 2 miles from Peronne. They had also taken Hill 97, the high- est land in the neighborhood and a posi- tion which controlled the Somme valley for some distance. The latter part of July saw the French positions consoli- dated and the British firmly entrenched in Pozieres. In the first week of August the Brit- ish and Australian troops advanced from their trenches north of Pozieres and captured the top of a crest which overlooks Courcellette and Martin- puich. This gave them a direct out- look on their immediate objective Ba- paume, which was 6 miles distant over a stretch of rolling country. On Au- gust 8 a combined French and British offensive made important gains towards Guillemont, west of Combles. The re- sult was a gain of from 300 to 500 yards on a front of about 4 miles. Ger- man counter attacks with the aid of liquid fire succeeded in taking 50 yards of trenches from the Australians north- west of Pozieres. The next Allied advance occurred north of the Somme. The French moved forward from a point opposite Harde- court (where they joined the British) to the Somme. The advance stopped. The pushing in of this wedge placed Clery and Guillemont in a pocket. Northwest of Pozieres the British, on the 14th, advanced about 350 yards on a front of approximately a mile, while the French further strengthened their position on Hill 109. On the 16th the French made substantial gains north of Maurepas and also south of that town, between it and Santerre. The efforts of the French in driving eastward toward Guillemont, Clery and Maure- pas seemed to indicate that they were going to try to approach Peronne from the north rather than to expose them- selves to a frontal attack. On the 24th Maurepas fell and the French pushed several hundred yards beyond on a 1^/4 mile front. This left Clery almost completely surrounded and left the French in front of Combles, an MILITARY OPERATIONS 71 important railroad centre. The Brit- ish advanced 300 yards south of Thiep- val and put this town in a similar posi- tion to that of Clery. The month end- ed with the British seizing ground be- tween Guillemont and Ginchy. Strong German counter attacks had been re- pulsed all along the line. During the month of September Com- bles and Thiepval were captured by the French and British respectively. The French salient between Ginchy and Clery was deepened by the capture of several small villages. The result was that the new French lines were estab- lished on the outskirts of Combles. Then south of the Somme a great effort on the part of the French succeeded in capturing Berny, Soyecourt, almost all of Vermandovillers, Chilly and about 2 miles of the railroad running from Roye to Chaulnes. During the second week the British thrust out west of Combles and succeeded in taking the entire vil- lage of Ginchy. The British lines were now within a few hundred yards of Combles. Taking advantage of this thrust, the French prepared to com- plete the pocket around Combles. After a heavy artillery preparation, the infan- try advanced on the 12th. They ad- vanced a distance of about 2 miles and gained the Peronne-Bapaume road just south of Rancourt. The next day they captured Bouchavesnes and Hill 76. On the 16th and 17th the Allied armies stormed German positions over 4 miles in length. In this advance the British captured the famous "Danube Trench." They also captured the almost impreg- nable Mouquet Farm which had been the scene of several hard struggles. On the 20th the Germans made strong counter attacks in order to re- gain the ground lost to the French north of the Somme. They attacked on a three-mile front for a period of al- most 10 hours but were repulsed. On the 25th, another great forward movement of the Allies began and re- sulted in victories on a front almost 15 miles long. The British captured the villages of Morval and Lesboeufs, north of Combles. The French took Rancourt and went right up to the village of Fregicourt. These two movements com- pletely cut off all means of escape from Combles. On the 26th it was taken. The British swept in from the north and the French from the south. A large quantity of war supplies fell to the vic- tors. The British also took Thiepval, which was of even greater importance than the taking of Combles, because it had checked them ever since the cam- paign began. Not content with these gains, the Allies pushed on. The Brit- ish captured a very strong redoubt northeast of Thiepval and were now less than 3 miles from Bapaume. The French advanced east of Rancourt and also entered the St. Pierre Vaast Wood east of Fregicourt. The first week in October saw a com- parative lull in the battle on the Somme. The British and the French made some small advances but seemed to be resting up for a renewed effort. This began on October 7. The Allies by a con- certed movement pushed forward over half a mile on an eight-mile front. The British captured Le Sars. The French, breaking through the German Morval- Bouchavesnes trenches, pushed their line to the top of Sailly-Saillisel ridge and were right at the entrance to the village of Sailly. South of the Somme the French occupied the village of Bo- vent on the 10th, and also took a large part of Chaulnes Wood. In the next two weeks the Allies extended their lines up to the village of Le Transloy and the French gained a foothold in the village of Sailly-Saillisel. 72 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR On October 30 the Germans began strong counter attacks. They succeed- ed in driving the Allies out of part of La Maisonette and took several hun- dred prisoners as well as several lines of trenches. The positions gained were the most threatening to Peronne held by the French. The heavy fighting was done by German troops which had been withdrawn from the Verdun front. In November it appeared that the Al- lied offensive had spent itself without accomplishing its objective. The heavi- est fighting was in the Ancre Brook region, at the northern end of the Somme battle front. Before this op- eration took place the French had suc- ceeded in tightening their hold on the Le Transloy region and in taking the greater portion of Saillisel. They also captured Ablaincourt, Ablaincourt Cemetery and Pressoire. On the 11th they took the rest of Saillisel. On the 13th began the great drive in the Ancre region. By a surprise attack the Brit- ish penetrated the whole German front. On the 14th they advanced up the An- cre valley and captured the village of Beaucourt. This gave them a position overlooking Bapaume and straightened out a salient which threatened their lines in this region. Strong German counter attacks in the vicinity of Pres- soire resulted in the retaking of part of that village. On the 16th the French counterattacked and succeeded in re- gaining these positions. During the months of December, 1916, and January, 1917, the positions on the Somme front remained practi- cally the same. The days were broken by skirmishes and artillery duels and the nights by trench raids, but the ex- tremely cold weather, the fog and enormous shell holes filled with water made any real advances out of the ques- tion. Another unique feature of the Somme battle ought to be mentioned here. It was the use by the Allies of great armored tractors. They were carried along on giant caterpillar wheels and could go right over trenches and shell holes without having their progress impeded. They were armed with machine guns and wrought con- siderable havoc, especially where the ground was anyway level. The new Allied attack in the west was part of a general plan whereby the Allies attacking simultaneously on all fronts — France, Russia, Italy — hoped to deprive the Central Powers of the advantage they hitherto derived from their interior position of being able to move troops quickly from one threatened position to another. The success achieved in the early part of the new offensive proved the soundness of this plan. Contimiation of the Campaign in Ficardy {Battle of the Somme). — Dur- ing the month of December the Allied army devoted almost its entire energies to the improvement of its positions. New trenches were built and the old ones improved. Roads and other means of communications behind them were put in the highest state of efficiency. When the weather permitted further operations the first British object was to drive the Germans from the re- mainder of the Beaumont Hamel Spur and the Beaucourt Valley. By the end of January, as a result of a series of minor operations, the high ground north and east of Beaumont Hamel was oc- cupied and they had pushed across the Beaucourt Valley and had gained a footing on the southern slopes to the west. The possession of this spur gave the British complete artillery control of the Beaucourt Valley and the western slope. The capture of German trenches MILITARY OPERATIONS 73 on the western slope on the night of February 3-4 made the German hold on Grandecourt and the positions west of that place and south of the Ancre Val- ley very uncertain. The result was that these positions were abandoned and this were successful it would bring into view hostile batteries in the upper An- cre Valley and would command the ap- proaches to Miraumont on the west. These two attacks were executed on the night of February 17, and continued From Current History Magazine, New York Times Co. Scene of the Germax Withdrawal Grandecourt was occupied on Febru- next day. The fighting was severe ary 7. and fraught with counter attacks. The British High Command now de- The British plans succeeded, neverthe- vised a scheme to carry its line along less, with the result that, after a heavy the spur which runs northward from the bombardment the villages of Pys, Mir- Morval-Thiepval ridge about Courcel- aumont and Serre were found to be ette and so gain possession of the high evacuated and were occupied, ground at its northern extremity. If The capture of Puiseux-au-Mont on 74 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR February 27-28 and the villages of Le Barque, Ligny-Thilloy and Thilloy on March 2, had driven the Germans back to the Le Transloy-Loupart line with the exception of the salient formed by the village of Irles. This was taken by assault on March 10. The Le Trans- loy-Loupart line was now so heavily bombarded that the Germans were com- pelled to retire to a parallel system of trenches on the other side of the vil- lage. The German Withdrawal. — General Haig in his report on May 31, 1917, stated that for some time previous to the middle of March observations seemed to indicate that the area of Ger- man withdrawal would be greater than the one described above. It was learned that the Germans were preparing a new defensive line called the "Hindenburg Line," which branched off from the original line at Arras, ran southeast- ward to Queant and then passed west of Cambrai toward Saint Quentin. Hin- denburg apparently feared the salient between Le Transloy and Arras which became more difficult to hold as the British pushed up the Ancre Valley. On March 14, it was discovered that practically all the German first line trenches before St. Pierre Vaast Wood had been evacuated. About the same time it was discovered that the German forces south of the Somme had been greatly weakened. As a result of these observations, the British and French High Commands ordered a general ad- vance for March 17. By the evening of the same day Chaulnes and Bapaume had been captured. These were de- fended by machine guns and infantry left to cover the retreat. On March 18, Peronne was taken by the British in conjunction with the French. By March 20, the British had crossed the Somme River in large numbers and had established a line from south of Ger- maine, where they joined the French, through Havcourt to Bus. This move- ment necessitated hasty building of bridges across the Somme. All the old bridges had been destroyed by the re- treating Germans. Northeast of Ba- paume, Morchies had been occupied. The Allied advance continued, meet- ing with little opposition, so that by the first week in April, the British were established on a line running through Selency, Jeancourt, Epehy, Ryaul- court, Doignies, Mercatel, and Beau- rains. This line brought the British and French into contact with the "Hin- denburg Line" from Arras to Saint Quentin. This withdrawal on the part of the Germans returned to France ap- proximately 1500 square miles' of ter- ritory. It was the first time since trench warfare had started that cavalry and large bodies of troops had partici- pated in an open battle. The retreat- ing Germans had completely devas- tated the country as they withdrew. Roads, railways, and bridges were sys- tematically destroyed. Houses, wells, and orchards were blown up with dyna- mite. Not a thing was left which could be of the least value to the advancing armies. Battle of Arras. — One of the reasons for the German withdrawal was to nul- lify any preparations the Allies had made for a spring offensive. This ob- ject failed of realization when scarcely a week later the British began an of- fensive on a 12-mile front north and south of Arras. The battle gradually extended to an offensive over the whole line from Arras to Saint Quentin. The heaviest fighting was done on a line ex- tending from Givenchy, southwest of Lens, to Henin, southeast of Arras. This line has commonly been called the hinge on which Hindenburg swung his GENERAL ROBERT NIVELLE GENERAL FERDINAND FOCH GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG. G.B.C. GENERAL A. BRUSILOV GENERALS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES MILITARY OPERATIONS 75 retreat after the battle of the Somme. A four-day artillery preparation of al- most unprecedented violence paved the way for the advance. On the first day of the battle, Canadian troops stormed Vimy Ridge, the top of wliich was liter- ally blown off by the artillery. Four thousand prisoners and large quantities of war material were captured here. On April 10, the British advanced to the outskirts of Monchy-le-Preux, which threatened Mochy and the entire Arras- Cambrai road. On April 11, Monchy fell and on the next day Wancourt and Heninel did likewise. On April 13, the battle took an en- tirely new turn. Sweeping northward from their new positions east of Arras the British drove the Germans back on a 12-mile front, capturing six villages and seriously threatening the coal city of Lens. On the 14th the British pushed closer to Lens and on the 15th entered the outskirts of the city itself. For several days no further progress was made because of severe artillery duels, violent counter attacks, and con- solidation of positions. On April 24, the British pushed for- ward east of Monchy and the next day advanced south of the Scarpe River. Three days later they broke the "Opp};- Line," a switch of the Hindenburg line, by the capture of Arleux-en-Gohelle. They also occupied a part of Oppy vil- lage (29th), but were compelled to re- tire from it in the face of heavy ar- tillery fire. On May 3, the British took Fresnoy and part of Bullecourt, but were later forced to give them up on account of heavy counter attacks. It may help to realize the fierceness of the fighting when it is stated that Ga- vrelle changed hands eight times in one day. The British reentered Bullecourt on May 12, and also took part of Roeux. In the next three days these po- sitions changed hands three times, with the Germans having the better of the counter attacks. The battle of Arras had now prac- tically come to a standstill. In the first two weeks of June the British were driven back east of Loos, from Bulle- court and east of Monchy-le-Preux. The Germans had lost 15,000 prison- ers and nearly 200 guns. The total effects of the battle of Arras was the placing of Lens in a pocket, the mouth of which was ever growing smaller. This city was a nest of machine guns and all the houses had been leveled so that the German artillery might get a full sweep. The British suddenly shift- ed their operations to the Ypres sector. {See below). Aisne Offensive (April, 1917). — The French pursuit of the Germans after their great retirement was very rapid. Their advance was directed toward La Fere. Without any serious opposition the French reached Tergnier, 2 miles from La Fere. Further south, how- ever, the French struck a snag in the Ailette River which protected the for- ests of Coucy and St. Gobain. They succeeded in crossing the river and cap- turing the village of Coucy, but were unsuccessful in their attempts to cap- ture the forest of St. Gobain, which was one of the main defenses of the Hin- denburg line. Moving their line east- ward, the French pushed the Germans back along the Oise River and thus threatened the German hold on St. Quentin. In the meantime the British had thrown a semi-circle around St. Quentin on the north and west of the town so that the artillery controlled the approaches to it. All attempts on the part of the Allies to take the city failed, however. On April 16, the French launched a great offensive on the Aisne River. 76 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR They attacked on a 23-mile front from Soissons to Rheims. The Germans had held this line since their retreat from the Marne. For 10 days French ar- tillery had prepared for the offensive and for a similar length of time the Germans had been bringing up great quantities of men and guns to meet the expected attack. A successful attack by the French would threaten the im- portant city of Laon. On the first day the entire German positions on the front line were taken along with 10,000 prisoners. By the end of the third day the French had taken 17,000 pris- oners and 75 guns. The villages of Chavonne, Chivy, Ostel, and Braye-en- Laonnois were captured. Further west on the southern bank of the Aisne the French captured all of Vailly and an important bridgehead. Hindenburg brought up thousands of fresh troops and on April 19, delivered one of the strongest counter attacks of the entire war between Juvincourt and Berry-au- Bac, but they were thrown back in dis- order after furious fighting. On the same day the French advanced on the eastern end of the battle front in west- ern Champagne and threatened the town of Moronvillers. On April 20, the French pressed the Germans back toward the Chemin des Dames, an important road running along the top of the heights north of the Aisne River. In this sector Mal- maison fort protecting the road from Soissons to Laon prevented further French advances. For the next 10 days there were severe artillery duels and numerous local engagements and coun- ter attacks, with the advantage usually with the French. The terrain of the Aisne territory was peculiar. It con- sisted of limestone cliffs, which were honeycombed with natural and artificial caverns, which were practically immune to French artillery fire. This necessi- tated fierce hand to hand struggles, sometimes far underground. On May 4, Craonne and several strong points north and east of it, as well as the German first-line positions on a front 2^ miles northwest of Rheims were taken by the French. Craonne is on the southern end of the Chemin des Dames ridge. Counter at- tacks of unprecedented violence failed to shake the French grip on the Ladies' Road (so called because it was built by Louis XV as a promenade for his daughters). They gradually pushed ahead from the eastern and western slopes until they controlled the entire road and thus overlooked the Ailette River and valley from which the heights of Laon rise. Almost ceaseless counter attacks were made against the newly won French positions but completely failed, despite temporary local success- es. The French completed their opera- tions by driving the Germans across the Ailette River (October, 1917), and then turned their energies to the Battle of Flanders (see below). French Success at Verdun. — On Aug. 20, 1917, after nine months of compara- tive quiet the French resumed the offen- sive at Verdun. After a thi'ee-day bom- bardment they advanced on both sides of the Meuse and penetrated a mile and a quarter on an 11-mile front. They captured Avocourt Wood, Le Mort Homme, Corbeaux and Cumieres woods. Cote de Talou, Chapneuville, Mormont farm. Hill 240 and 4000 prisoners. In the next four days smashing blows were delivered which resulted in the capture of Regneville, Samogneux, Cote de I'Oie and 15,000 prisoners. By the 15th of September the French had recovered 100 square miles of the 120 the Ger- mans had seized in their great offensive. They now held all the dominating posi- MILITARY OPERATIONS 77 tions in the Verdun sector and strong German counter attacks failed to dis- lodge them. Battle of Flanders. — On June 7, 1917, occurred one of the most spec- tacular battles of the entire war, that for the Messines-Wytschaete ridge. This ridge formed a salient which domi- nated the entire Ypres sector and which was literally a thorn in the sides of the Allies. For over two years Brit- ish sappers had been burrowing under this ridge and finally succeeded in plac- ing in position, undetected by the Ger- mans, 19 mines containing more than 1,000,000 pounds of ammonite. These were exploded by electricity on the morning of June 7. It was like a tre- mendous earthquake. The whole tops of the hills were blown off and the roar could be heard for a distance of 1'50 miles. A tremendous shell fire which had been playing on the ridge for two weeks reached its greatest intensity as the mines were exploded. After the explosion the British infantry rushed forward and by the end of the day had wiped out the entire salient. Seven thousand prisoners and many guns were taken with relatively small losses to the attackers. Even the rear protecting positions were taken. The attack was on a 5-mile front and penetrated to a depth of 3 miles. The Germans retaliated for this al- lied success by a successful attack on the Allied line at its most northern ex- tremity in Belgium. On July 11, after strong artillery preparation, the Ger- mans made a strong infantry attack on the British positions east of the Yser River. The British line at this point was about 600 yards east of the river. Their entire lines of communication had to cross the river to supply the first- line trenches. The Germans complete- ly destroyed the lines of approach and captured or killed the entire British force east of the river (about 3000). Twelve hundred prisoners were taken. The reduction of the Messines-Wyt- schaete salient prepared the way for further Allied activities in the Ypres sector. Consequently, on July 31, 1917, the British and French began an of- fensive which lasted intermittently down to the beginning of 1918, when weather conditions forced a halt. The objects of this offensive were to compel the Ger- mans to give up their submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge and to en- velop the important industrial centre of Lille. For three weeks previous to the above date, the artillery prepara- tions on both sides had been stupendous. The infantry attack was on a 20-mile front from Dixmude to Warneton. The first attack passed the German third- line trenches. On August 1, a severe rainstorm lasting 50 hours began, and perforce held up further operations. On August 10, Westhoek village and ridge were carried by storm. The French took Bixschoote. The next day the British attacked in Glencorse Wood. The artillery battle reached heights never before attained. Both sides seemed to have unlimited supplies of ammunition. The German and al- lied barrage fires were wonderful to watch. On one occasion five distinct British barrages were counted. The Germans devised on this front a new method of defense. The trench system was practically given up and concrete redoubts, called by the British "pill- boxes," were erected in the shell holes. They were nests of machine guns and were often invisible to airplanes. This did away with the necessity of keeping great quantities of troops in the for- ward trenches and allowed the advance lines to be held by scattered forces. The terrain was also peculiar. The 78 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR heavy torrents of rain made the flat ground a veritable quagmire. The in- fantry sank up to their knees in mud and it was almost impossible to bring up heavy artillery. On August 16 the Allies struck again on a 9-mile front north and east of Ypres and carried practically all their objectives. On the left the French drove the Germans from the salient be- tween the Yser Canal and Martjevaart and captured the bridgehead at Drei- grachten. In the centre the British cap- tured the strongly fortified position of Langemarck and pushed forward for another mile. On the right the British failed to capture the high ground al- most due east of Ypres. They seized it in their first assault but were compelled to give it up. Weather conditions pre- vented any further operations for an entire month. From the middle of September to the middle of October five brutal assaults by the allies made a great salient into the enemy positions. On September 20, an attack began on an 8-mile front be- tween the Ypres-Comines canal and the Ypres-Staden railway. This resulted in the capture of Inverness Copse, Glencorse Wood, Nonne Boshen, Pots- dam Vampir, Iberian farm, and Gal- lipoli. All of these places were named by the Allied troops in front of them. In the centre Veldhoek and part of Polygon Wood were taken. All of these gains were consolidated. On Sep- tember 26 came another great smash at the German lines. Driving on a 6-mile front, Tower Hamlets Spur, the re- mainder of Polygon Wood and Zonne- beke were taken. The advance was ap- proximately 1/2 mile. On October 4, the Allies again attacked on an 8-mile front. The British gained control of the Passchendaele ridge (their immedi- ate object in the Flanders battle) as far as Broodseinde. The weather pre- vented any further attacks or counter attacks. On the 9th, a fourth concerted blow captured St. Jean de Mangelaere and Poelcappelle. On the 12th, an- other attack, interrupted by the weather, brought the Allies up to with- in 500 yards of the town of Passchen- daele. These five blows captured an area of approximately 23 square miles and carried the Allies to the Ypres- Roulers road on the northeast as well as an advance of a mile over the Ypres- Menin road. Roulers was now in the range of the heavy artillery, which was also able to sweep the Flanders plain. The losses of the Allies were compara- tively slight. After a brief lull the Battle of Flan- ders was continued on October 22. On that day the British and French ad- vanced on both sides of the Ypres- Staden railroad. The French secured the southern part of Houthoulst For- est and a number of fortified farms. The 26th saw another big advance in the same direction. The British ad- vanced west of Passchendaele and north of Gheluvelt, while the French took Draeibank and several more fortified farms. On the 28th the French and part of the reorganized Belgian army cap- tured the Mercken peninsula (formed by canals on three sides) south of Dix- mude. On the 30th the British ad- vanced from the positions won by them on the 26th and captured most of Pass- chendaele, but were compelled to retire in the face of heavy counter attacks. A week later after heavy bombardment, the Canadians advanced, took the town and continued 800 yards beyond it. Furious German counter attacks in the next few days failed to penetrate the new British line. The British then pro- ceeded to clear the rest of the spur by advancing northwest of the town. They MILITARY OPERATIONS 79 were now within 5 mile^ of Roulers. The entire Ypres front remained prac- tically the same until the beginning of 1918. The British efforts were turned to the battle that developed at Cambrai and the Belgian front was the scene of heavy artillery duels and trench raids carried out to relieve the pressure on the Cambrai front. Battle around Cambrai. — On Nov. 21, 1917, began one of the greatest bat- tles of the year in the region around Cambrai. For a time it appeared as if the British were going to smash the Hindenburg line to pieces. Then the Geraians started a counter offensive which almost nullified the British gains. The battle was a surprise attack with- out artillery preparation, a method practically unheard of in the present war. The attack was on a 35-mile front between St. Quentin and the Scarpe River, although the main part of it was due west of Cambrai. Huge "tanks" screened by smoke led the ad- vance and plunged through the Ger- man defenses as though they were pa- per. The first day netted 5 miles, 8000 prisoners and a number of guns. Gen- eral Julian H. G. Byng was in direct command of the operations. The vil- lages of Benavis, La Vacquerie, Ribe- court, Havrincourt, Marcoing, Grain- court, Anneux, and Noyelles-sur-l'Es- caut were captured as well as several forests and fortified farms. Part of Bourlon Wood, the dominating height around Cambrai, and part of Bulle- court were also taken. The villag-e of Fontaine Notre Dame, 3^ of a mile from Cambrai, was captured but the Germans retook it the next day. Open fighting prevailed and the cavalry played a big part in the British ad- vance. On November 23 the British attack was renewed and a bitter struggle en- sued in the neighborhood of Moeuvres (south of Bourlon Wood) and at Creve- coeur, south of Cambrai. The British took a hill dominating the former po- sition. Cambrai was under British shell fire and Queant was in serious danger. Bourlon Wood and village changed hands several times. The Germans made tremendous efforts to hold these dominating positions, but the British held on to them tenaciously un- til encircled by German troops and finally driven out of the village. Cam- brai was heavily shelled from the Bour- lon Wood. On November 30 the Germans began a grand counter offensive on a 16-mile front on the north, south, and east sides of the British wedge. On the north and east they failed to gain, but on the south they reached La Vacquerie and Gouzeaucourt taken by the British on the first day of their offensive. On De- cember 2, after ten attacks the Germans occupied Masnieres. The German re- ports stated that 6000 prisoners and 100 guns had been taken by them up to December 4. The success of the German counter drive on the south compelled the British to rectify their line on the eastern side. Consequently they withdrew from Bour- lon Wood and gave up Noyelle-sur- I'Escaut, Anneux, Cantaing, Grain- court, and Marcoing. Approximately one-half of the territory gained by the British was regained by the Germans. American engineers, working behind the British lines, were caught when the Ger- mans broke through. They seized guns from fallen soldiers and fought vali- antly. Several lost their lives. The entire western front was now alive with artillery action from the sea to Switzerland. All the European newspapers predicted a big drive "some- where on the front." A furious attack 80 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR west of Cambrai on December 13 was repulsed by the British, The Germans attacked between Bullecourt and Queant (10 miles) in mass formation but were unable to break through. The line on the entire front was the same at the be- ginning of 1918, because winter put an end to any further operations. Allied Unity. — The prime ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain met at Rapallo, Italy, on November 9 and formed the Supreme War Council, which was to coordinate the military powers of the Allies and wage war as a unified group and not as individuals. The members of the Supreme War Staff were to be Generals Cadorna (Italy), Foch (France), and Wilson (British). According to the agreement, "The Su- preme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war. It prepares recommendations for the considerations of the govern- ments and keeps itself informed of the execution and reports thereon to the re- spective governments." On November 7, 1917, a United States Commission headed by Colonel E. M. House arrived in London to con- sult with the Allies. Secretar}^ of State Lansing announced that the object of the mission was "a more complete co- ordination of the activities of the vari- ous nations engaged in the conflict and a more comprehensive understanding of their respective needs, in order that the co-belligerents may attain the highest efliciency." He strongly emphasized the fact that it was a war and not a peace conference. Most of the other Allies sent representatives with the same ob- jects in view. President Wilson cabled to Colonel House that "unity of plan and control" were essential and he told him to attend the first meeting of the Supreme War Council. Colonel House returned in late December, and urgred the hasty despatch of American forces to Europe, as well as the speeding up of shipbuilding, and the securing of Allied unity. American Expeditionary Force. — The first contingents of a United States Army to fight in Europe arrived at a French port on June 26-27, 1917. They were commanded by Major-Gcn- eral William L. Sibert and received a tremendous ovation from the French people. The transports on the way over had been unsuccessfully attacked twice by submarines. Gen. John J. Pershing,* the Commander-in-Chief of the American force, had been in France for some time preparing for the coming of the "Sammies," as the French char- acterized the American soldiers. Training camps for the American troops had been located in various parts of France and were ready for occupancy when the soldiers arrived. Infantry, artillery, aviation, and medical bases were established. The number of men gradually increased, man}' of them stop- ping in England before going over to France. An intensive system of train- ing was entered upon during the latter part of July. The instructors were offi- cers and men of the British and French armies. The American transportation service took over all railways leading to American bases and a section of French forest was turned over to Amer- * Pershing, Johk J. Born in 1860 and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1886. First American to com- mand American troops on European battle- fields. Graduate of West Point; entered reg- ular army as second lieutenant in 1886. Fought in Indian wars against Apaches and Sioux. Engaged in war with Spain in Cuba, and after peace declared ordered to Philippines. Then a captain. Fought with great bravery against Moros and made brigadier general in 1906, being jumped over 862 senior officers. Sub- dued Moros in 1913 and returned to United States and stationed at El Paso, Texas. After Villa raid on Columbus, N. M., led punitive raid into Mexico. Known as "Black Jack" in army. MILITARY OPERATIONS 81 ican lumbermen to supply the needs of the expeditionary force. The news that American forces were in action "somewhere in France" was given out in a dispatch on Oct. 27, 1917, which stated that the artillery had fired the first shot and that the infantry had entered the first-line trenches. The activities did not mean that American troops were taking over a section of trenches on the western front, but that they were completing their training un- der actual war conditions. A few nights later the Americans crept out into "No Man's Land" on reconnoitering expedi- tions. Every so often the troops in the trenches were changed so that as many troops as possible could get a taste of real war conditions. On November 3, the Germans announced the capture of American prisoners when a salient which they occupied was cut off from the main trenches by a barrage fire. The Americans lost 3 killed, 11 wounded, and 11 missing. Although no official announcement was made as to the exact location of the sector, a com- parison of the various reports seemed to show that the region was in the Vosges Mountains where the Rhine- Marne Canal crosses the boundary line between France and Lorraine. During November and December, 1917, inter- mittent artillery duels and engagements between patrols occurred, but no con- flict of any size developed. The Last Year of the War on the Western Front.— The months of Janu- ary and February, 1918, were months of comparative inactivity along the bat- tle line from the North Sea to the Swiss border, as well as in Italy, the Balkans, and Asia Minor. The outstanding fea- ture of the war at the close of 1917 was the signing of an armistice between the Central Powers on the one hand and Rumania and the de facto government of Russia on the other. The defection of Russia from the side of the Allies was the signal for a tremendous pub- licity campaign in Germany, which pre- dicted a gigantic blow on the western front which would completely crush the British and French armies before the American forces could land in sufficient numbers to give any substantial aid. The depression in allied countries caused by the abolition of the eastern front was somewhat overcome by Allen- by's victories in Asia Minor and the unexpected rapidity with which the United States rushed men and material to Europe. The chief cause for the optimistic tone of the Teutonic press was the fact that huge quantities of material and a large number of men could now be trans- ferred from the eastern front for imme- diate service on the western front. The German High Command adopted a policy of careful selection of the men who were to be transported westward. As a skeleton for the new divisions to be formed they picked out all the sol- diers in Russia between the ages of 25 and 35. They realized that it would be impossible to withdraw all the men from Russia inasmuch as the terms of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk provided for the occupation of a considerable amount of Russian territory by German troops. While it was generally known that the personnel and morale of the Germans on the eastern front were considerably lower than on the western front, never- theless the German Command hoped to build up from eastern material about 59 or 60 divisions of 12,000 men each. This would increase the fighting strength on the western front by about 700,000 men. About the middle of Feb- ruary according to a French official statement it was estimated that there were already on the western front 82 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR 2,100,000 men and that further incre- ments from the east and from new re- cruits would bring the highest total of men available to 2,340,000 men. This total would approximately equal the to- tal number of men France and England had available. American, Belgian, and Portuguese troops practically assured the Allies a numerical superiority over the whole front although not necessarily in any one sector. Any numerical ad- vantage that the Allies possessed was more than counterbalanced by the su- periority of the German railway sys- tems. The Germans were fighting on in- terior lines and the Allies on exterior lines. The German railway system may be likened to a huge wheel. All lines radiated from the hub and could feed any part of the rim (battle line), while on the other hand the Allies in order to supply their lines were compelled to travel around the outside of the rim, a much longer process. On the western front during the first ten weeks of the year the fighting con- sisted of a series of almost unending trench and aerial raids, carried out for the purposes of reconnaissances. Some- times the trench raids would follow heavy bombardments, but generally speaking thejj^ were carried out by small patrols under cover of darkness. The Germans with varying success carried out raids in Flanders, Artois, Picardy, the Verdun sector, Champagne, and Lorraine, with the evident intention of ferreting out the weak points of the allied line for the much heralded offen- sive on the western front. The purpose of the allied raids was to discover, if possible, the places on the German lines where any unusual concentrations were being made. The aerial raids to a large extent were carried out over the Rhine and Moselle river valleys, where it was known that the troops transported from the eastern front were being refitted for service on the western front. The American troops, which had been pouring into France in an ever increas- ing stream, and which had been grad- ually concentrating in camps at Toul and Nancy, had finally reached the stage of training when they were ready to take over a section of the battle line. The sector allotted to them was about eight miles long and was on the south- ern side of the St. Mihiel salient, which had been established by the Germans, advancing from Metz, in 1914, and which had withstood several attempts on the part of the French to "pinch" it. The American line was roughly be- tween Flirey and Remenauville on the east and Apremont on the west. The Germans lost no time in trj'ing out the new American forces by means of heavy bombardments of high explosives and gas shells. The Second Battle of Picardy. — On March 21, 1918, came the great blow which the German press and public had been so continually prophesying since the collapse of Russia and Rumania. The German plan was based upon sound military strategy. It recalls to mind the famous campaign carried on by Na- poleon in Italy in 1796-97. Napoleon at the head of an army which had just crossed the Alps found himself facing superior forces composed of Austrians and Sardinians. He struck at Mon- tenotte, the point where the two enemy armies joined, forced his way through, rolled up the Sardinian army on its base and compelled Sardinia to sign a separate peace. Then he faced and conquered Austria. The German con- ception was strikingly similar. It was to strike the Anglo-French line where the two armies joined, break through and reach the channel ports, and thus either confine the British, Belgian, and MILITARY OPERATIONS 83 Portuguese armies in the narrow region between the Somme and the Belgian bor- der or drive them into the sea, and then turn their attention southward to the French armies and make a direct ad- vance on Paris. This attack was so timed as to offset any increase to the alHed force from the United States. The success of this scheme depended entirely on a complete breakthrough at the junction point of the British and French armies. A tremendous gap was made and for four or live days it ap- peared as though they were about to accomplish their purpose, but, fortu- nately for the Allies, it was closed in time to prevent a complete disaster. The front chosen for the attack was between Marcoing, near Cambrai, and the Oise river, and was held by the Brit- ish 5th army, under General Gough. This section of the battle line was taken over by the British from the French at the beginning of the year. The 5th army was composed of about 14 divi- sions or roughly 170,000 men, which had to protect a line about 50 miles long. It is difficult to understand why this particular section of the line was held so lightly. This inadequate force was attacked by a force composed of between 40 and 50 divisions, amounting to approximately 750,000 men, about 150,000 of which were concentrated be- tween St. Quentin and La Fere. It is scarcely to be wondered at that the British army was brushed aside by such a superiority of men, and by the dogged determination on the part of the Ger- mans to get through at any cost. The line held by the British was very carefully constructed and admirably suited to defense by a force compara- tively inferior to the attacking force. It really consisted of three separate de- fensive positions, an outpost line, a re- sistance line, and then in case these were penetrated, a battle line, where the main battle was to be fought. The outposts were so arranged that a terrible enfilad- ing fire could be poured into the Ger- mans as soon as they penetrated this outpost line. The German armies fac- ing the battle line were under the su- preme command of Crown Prince Rup- precht of Bavaria, and the individual armies under the leadership of von Below, von der Marwitz, and von Hutier. The plan of attack was drawn up by the last named general. The weather favored the Germans to a very large extent. The attack was begun a little before 5 o'clock on the morning of the 21st under the cover of such a heavy fog and mist that it was impossible to see more than 100 feet ahead. General Gough knew from docu- ments taken from German prisoners that the assault was impending and had made preparation to meet it, but his preparations were practically nullified by the weather conditions. The first line of defense, i. e. the outpost line, was taken before the British were cogni- zant of the fact that the attack had begun. The tremendous superiority of numbers forced the resistance line very quickly and enabled the Germans to rush up to the battle line, or last system of defense. Here again the inequality of numbers ultimately told and the Ger- man armies forced their way through where some of Gough's divisions joined. Apparently the British had made no provisions for a breakthrough, because there were no defense positions behind the third defense s^^stem. The road to Amiens seemed opened and only heroic eflPorts saved it. As has been stated above, the terrific battle of Picardy began shortly before 5 A. M. on March 21. It was preceded by a brief but very intense artillery fire which was composed mainly of high ex- A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR plosives and gas shells. Simultaneously a heavy artillery fire broke out in the Champagne and Lorraine sectors with the obvious purpose of preventing the bringing up of reinforcements to the vital places attacked. The Germans From Current History Magazine, published by the New York Times Co. " Shaded Portions Show Total Gains of the Great Ger3iax Offensive. The Numerals Indicate the Sequence of the Four Battles OH Phases. The Drive on the Somme was Launched March 21, that in Flanders April 9, the Champagne Drut: May 27, and the Offensive on the Oise June 9. also bombarded Paris with a long range gun placed in the forest of St. Gobain, approximately 75 miles away. This gun killed many civilians and did much material damage in Paris, but instead of causing the Parisians to become panicky, it seemed to renew their grim determination to carry on. The battle line of the German offensive extended from southeast of Arras in the direction of Cambrai, as far as La Fere. The first infantry attack broke through the first and second lines of British trenches on a 16-mile front from Lagnicourt to just south of Gouzeaucourt. The re- sult of this attack was the evacuation of the British positions in the salient that remained after the battle of Cam- brai at the close of 1917. On the 22nd, the Germans after more heavy artillery preparation smashed through the entire British position along the whole front. The British 5th army was now com- pletely cut off from the permanent French position at La Fere and the per- manent British positions at Arras. Be- tween these two points there was a struggling mass of humanity with prac- tically no organization as far as the Allies were concerned. The Teutonic armies were advancing along the road to Pcronne and Albert, along the direct route from St. Quentin to Amiens, and down the Oise river valley along two roads, one of which led to Paris and the other to the south of Amiens. For four days it seemed certain that the German plan was to succeed and a permanent wedge inserted between the French and the British armies. On the 23rd the British were defeated near Monchy, St. Quentin, La Fere, and opposite Cam- brai, and the British second positions between Fontaine les Croiselles and IMoeuvres were penetrated. The Allies hoped to be able to hold the line of the Somme, but were unable to do so be- cause no adequate defenses had been constructed there. On the 24tacked towards Lazarevatz, and a de- 156 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR tached force 20 miles southwest guard- ing the valley of the western Morava. On November 20, the first of these at- tacks proved successful and drove in the Serb centre. By the 24th, the ac- tion had extended over the whole front with continued success falling to the Austrians, who later in the month got possession of the Suvobor mountains, dominating, as it were, the Serbian po- sitions. They had now succeeded in ex- tending their front to Belgrade, and had thus cut the region in two, driv- ing back the Serbs in the direction of Kraguyevats, on a line from the Bel- grade railway to the western Morava. The situation was now saved to the Serbs by a resumption of the offensive. On December 2, they attacked and, on the 5th, recaptured the Suvobor, and drove back the Austrian right and cen- tre to Valievo. The advance was equal- ly successful in the other sectors. Its result was an interposition between the three Austrian corps on the south and the two farther north. The three south- erly corps retreated as well as they could on the frontier. Tlie action now turned towards Belgrade, towards which the Austrians were steadily driv- en back. The evacuation of the capital occurred on December 14 and 15. Near- ly 42,000 Austrians were taken prison- ers ; 60,000 were killed and wounded. Bulgaria. — Serbia was once more in October, 1915, called upon to defend her territory, for Bulgaria had finally decided to cast in her lot with the Cen- tral Powers. Accordingly her armies crossed the Serbian frontier towards Nish, striking in conjunction with the Austro-German forces, which had al- ready begun their invasion from the north. Meanwhile French and English troops, debarked at Saloniki, were has- tening up along the Saloniki-Nish rail- road. The importance of the new cam- paign centred in the strategic value of the railroad, as there was no other line from Austria to Constantinople that did not cross Rumanian territory. At Yelika Plana, 25 miles from the Serbian frontier, the railroad forks, its two branches running respectively to Bel- grade and to Semendria, with the latter route in the Morava River. It was up this line that the Austro-Germans advanced, after capturing Belgrade. In the first week of October the Aus- tro-German army, reported to be 300,- 000 strong, crossed the Danube near Belgrade and at Semendria, while other armies attacked farther west along the Drina and Save rivers. Among the com- manders of the invading armies was Field Marshal von Mackensen, in com- mand of the army east of Belgrade. Bulgaria's first operations were di- rected towards Nish. But realizing the danger of the arrival of Allied reen- forccments from Saloniki, the Bulgar- ians then developed their main attacks farther south against the railroad, at Vranya and Vilandovo. At the latter point, only five miles from the south- western comer of Bulgaria, an army of 40,000 men threatened to cut the rail- way. Serbo-French troops, however, hurried up, and threatening the Bul- garian town of Strumnitza behind these troops, compelled them to fall back. At Vranya, however, some 60 miles south of Nish, the Bulgarians were more successful. The advance of the Austro-German columns from the north was at first slow, for by the end of October they had gained, advancing on a 100-mile front, only from 25 to 40 miles south of Belgrade. Another column about this time crossed the Drina River at Vishegrad, and constituted a new army of invasion. In the south, however, the Bulgarians having seized the Nish- MILITARY OPERATIONS 157 Saloniki railroad at Vranya, promptly confirmed their grip on the enemy's line of supplies by taking the important junction city of Uskub, and Veles, 25 miles farther south. And in the mean- time, their columns directed towards Nish were making progress, and Pirot, on the Nish-Sofia line, was stormed aft- er a four-day battle. The Germans took the Serbian arsen- al at Kraguyevats during the second week in November. In the meantime, the other Austro-German columns had reached the east and west line of the Western Morava, at Krushevats at Kralyevo, before the middle of the month. The fall of Nish was not long delayed, upon a heavy bombardment by the Bulgars, A route to Constantino- ple had already been opened via the Danube, when Germans and Bulgars joined hands near Orsova. Meanwhile the Anglo-French forces from Saloniki held the railroad from Krivolak south to the frontier, and had gained some successes against the Bul- gars around Strumnitza. But these, moving with ease around the French left to the Babuna Pass, 25 miles west of Krivolak, swept aside the small Ser- bian defending force, and descended through the mountains upon Prilep and Krushevo. The French were scarcely able to maintain their position on the Vardar and Cerna rivers, and the small British force was but little in evidence north of Doiran. An Italian support- ing army was rumored to be about to land at Avlona. The remaining strokes in Serbia's de- feat followed quickly. Sienitza, Novi- bazar, ]Mitrovitza (the last the tempo- rary Serb capital) fell in rapid succes- sion before the Austro-German columns. Teutonic and Bulgarian invading forces joined hands at Prishtina, on the rail- road branch south of Mitrovitza, which surrendered with 10,000 men. On the last day of the month, the two remain- ing cities of importance, Prisrend and Monastir, were lost to Serbia. Sixteen thousand prisoners were taken at Pris- rend ; the rest of the fugitive northern army was driven either into Montenegro or Albania. At the beginning of December the main object of the German-Bulgar cam- paign in Serbia had been achieved. The Serbian army had been eliminated as a fighting force and the surviving Serb troops, fewer than 100,000 men, driven into Montenegro and Albania, where they were pursued by the Austrians, against whom they could make no stand whatever. The retreat of the Serbs from Kat- chanik left the French left flank, on the Cerna River, in a critical position. The retreat of the Allies, however, was skillfully conducted, and they succeeded in escaping to neutral territory, where they fortified themselves at Saloniki, with the intention apparently of hold- ing their position at all costs. Monte- negro was conquered by the Austrians in January. The capture of INIount Lovcen, dominating Cettinje, determin- ed the fall of the capital. The Aus- trians then proceeded to take Scutari in Albania (January 25, 1916), and joined hands with the Bulgars at El- basan, east of Durazzo, on February 17. The Italians abandoned the place February 26, and the Austrians now ad- vanced against Avlona. The remnant of the Serbian army was transported by the Allies from the Albanian coast to the Island of Corfu to undergo re- organization. After a few months' rest the refitted army of 100,000 men was taken to Saloniki to reenforce the French and British forces concentrated there and await developments in the Balkans. 158 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Allied Offensive in Albania. — On July 6, 1918, the Allies, chiefly Italians and French, began to advance in Al- bania. The Italians crossed the Voyu- sa river and took 1000 prisoners. Tlie French started down the valley of the Devoli river. By the 10th, the Ital- ians had reached Fieri, which controlled the only good road to Berat, the imme- diate objective. They had also reached the Semeni river, and, with the French, were rapidly converging on that city, which fell on the 11th. From here the Italians and French marched on El- bassan, which is on the road to Duraz- zo. Before Durazzo could be reached, the Skumbi river would have to be forced. This stream was very strong- ly fortified and the retreating Aus- trians, reinforced, were reformed be- hind this line and began a counter-of- fensive. The Allies were compelled to beat a precipitate retreat and by Au- gust 29 were back of the Fieri-Berat line which they held until the great Bal- kan offensive began in September. {See below.) The long-awaited Allied drive from Saloniki began on July 29, when the reorganized Serbian army began to move north. Within two days it was entrenched 300 yards from the Greek frontier. With the entrance of Ru- mania into the war, an Allied offensive from the Adriatic to the ^gean began (August-September). The Italians ad- vanced in Albania, the French attacked from the Vardar to Lake Doiran, and the British crossed the Struma River and strongly entrenched themselves on the eastern bank. A Franco-Russian force advanced along the western bank of Lake Ostrovo and took Fiorina by assault on September 18. This opened up the road to Monastir, which was at- tacked by the French and Serbians about 15 miles northeast of Fiorina. In the meantime the Bulgarians con- tinued their invasion of northern Greece. Early in September a Bulgarian force crossed the frontier and took the fort of Drama. The Greeks made only a slight resistance. Seres was then taken and the provisional government de- scribed above (Outbreak of the War: Greece) was organized. The port of Kavala, long desired by the Bulgarians, was next seized. The Germans claimed that the garrison asked them for food, shelter, and protection. The Greek sol- diers were sent to Germany as guests of the nation in order not to violate Greece's neutrality. The fall of Kava- la completely cut off the Greek soldiers in the far eastern part of Macedonia. During the month of October the en- tire Allied line advanced. The Italian forces in Albania joined those of Gen- eral Sarrail and thus prevented any at- tempt to envelop his army. The Ser- bians continued their advance and stormed Kotchovie on the 1st. They then crossed the Cerna and broke through the Monastir defenses. With the aid of the French they won a very important political success by captur- ing the city on November 19. From a military point of view the victory was not so very important because severe weather prevented a successful pursuit. The entire front was quiet in 1917. The Allies' task was to move up the Varda, Struma, or Cerna valleys. This was made hopeless by the inactivity of the Russian armies. Local fighting oc- curred around Lake Doiran. The sit- uation up to September, 1918, Avas ap- proximately as in January, 1917. The Surrender of Bulgaria. — Bul- garia was the first of the Central Pow- ers to surrender to allied arms. This act marked the beginning of the end of the great war of the nations. Bul- garia's surrender was the direct result MILITARY OPERATIONS 159 of a brilliant offensive carried out by French, British, Italian, Greek, Serbian, Czechoslovak, and Jugoslavic forces, under the supreme leadership of Gen- eral Franchet d'Esperey. The capitu- lation of Bulgaria meant the isolation of Turkey and her eventual loss to the Central Powers. It was also the death knell of the Teutonic Mittel Europa and Pan German ideas. British and Greek troops struck around Lake Doi- ran, on the right of the Macedonian front ; French and Serbian troops struck in the centre, and Italians struck on the left near and in Albania. The artillery preparations began on Sep- tember 14, 1918, and on the 17th-18th the Allied right started to advance, as well as the centre, which captured 45 villages and crossed the Perez river. On the 21st, the Serbs east of Monastir ad- vanced 9 miles and freed 9 villages. By September 22, the Serbians had succeeded in cutting the communica- tions of the First Bulgarian Array, operating along the Vardar, and those of the Second Bulgarian Army and the Germans north of Monastir. This day saw a general pursuit of the armies of the Central Powers on a 90-mile front. On the 23d, the Serbians and French crossed the Vardar in the direction of Krivolak. On the 24th, French cavalry entered Prilep. The next day saw the capture of Ishtib and the formidable barriers to Veles. The British entered Strumnitza on September 26, and the Serbians reached Kochana and Veles. The Italians, with the aid of the Greeks and French, were marching on Kichevo. The road to Sofia was opened to the victorious Allies. Consequently, the Bulgarians sued for a separate ar- mistice. One containing terms of un- conditional surrender was granted on the 30th, when active fighting ceased. The last act of the fighting was the occupation of Uskub by the French on the 30th. A brief summary of the ar- mistice terms, which were purely mili- tary, are as follows : Bulgaria was to evacuate all allied territory, demobilize her army as rap- idly as possible, and turn over to the Allies all means of transport. The Allies were to be allowed to pass through Bulgaria if necessary to future military operations. Control of the Danube and Bulgarian merchant marine on that river to be given up. All important strategic points to be occupied by the Allies if they wish. If any part of Bulgaria was taken over it was to be occupied by British, French, and Italian troops. Evacuated portions of Greece and Serbia to be occupied by Greek and Serbian troops respectively. The armistice was to remain in op- eration until a general peace was con- cluded. Interest in the Balkans after the signing of the armistice centred in the driving out of the Teutonic troops from Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro. On October 1, the Bulgarians began to evacuate Serbian territory and two days later the Austrians began the evacua- tion of Albania. Greek troops entered Seres and seized the Demis-Hassan Pass on the 4th, and on the 8th they occupied Drama. Italians entered El- basan, Albania, on the 9th and the Al- lies took Nish on the 13th, thus cutting the Berlin-Constantinople railroad. The 15th saw the fall of Durazzo. (The naval base had been destroyed on the 2d by an Allied navy, which included American submarines.) On the 17th, the Serbians captured Alexinatz and Krushavatz, and the German forces in western Serbia retired into Montenegro. On the 21st, the French reached the 160 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Danube near Vidon. Nine days later the Austrians fled from Montenegro and Cettinje and other places were occu- pied by insurgents. On the same day Scutari was seized by Albanian and Montenegrin irregulars. On November 3, Belgrade was reoccupied and the Second Serbian army reached the Bos- nian border, which they passed, and, after crossing the Danube and Save This new force added about 600,000 men under arms to the Allied cause and could increase this amount to 900,000 including the reserves. From the out- set it was apparent that the Rumanian plan of attack was to invade Transyl- vania and thus attain the Rumanian ideal, i.e., to capture and hold the prov- inces of Austria-Hungary that were in- habited by Rumanians. As later events Mesopotamia and Patj:stiite Areas rivers, entered Serajevo, the scene of murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdi- nand and his wife, on June 28, 1914, on the 10th. The Macedonian front, which had been comparatively inactive since the beginning of the war, had suddenly be- come alive in September, 1918, and the operations there resulted in the cap- ture of nearly 100,000 prisoners and the complete elimination of Bulgaria from the war. Rumania. — As has been stated above the question of Rumania's entrance into the war was settled on April 28, 1916- turned out, the geographical features of Rumania were to play an important part in her campaigns. In general the shape of the country is like a large Y. The bottom of the Y is bounded by the Black Sea and the two arms are bound- ed across their mouth by the Austro- Hungarian province of Transylvania. Russia is on the north and Bulgaria on the south. The Alps (in Transylvania) and the Carpathians form formidable natural barriers. The Danube forms another natural boundary on the south for a part of the distance, but the ac- quisition of Bulgarian territory at the MILITARY OPERATIONS 161 close of the Balkan Wars added a strip of territory bordering on the Black Sea which was peculiarly vulnerable. It later proved that this was going to be the point of Bulgarian attack and the starting place of tlie great German drive which ultimately resulted in the complete overrunning of the country. Immediately after the declaration of war the Rumanian forces swept into Transylvania with all the vigor a new army on its first campaign possesses. The first objectives were the two Tran- sylvanian cities of Kronstadt and Her- mannstadt just across the border. By the end of August both of these places had been captured with very little op- position. The Rumanians continued their impetuous advance apparently not taking into consideration the distance they were traveling from their base and also not considering their weak defen- sive line on the south. After the fall of Kronstadt they immediately struck west towards the coal fields. Another army, liowever, had crossed the Vulcan Pass and had captured Petroseny in the cen- tre of these fields on August 31. A third army captured Orsova on Septem- ber 1, after five days of the heaviest fighting the campaign had yet seen. On September 9 the Rumanians captured six more small villages and now held in their possession nearly one-fourth of Transylvania. The campaign now assumed such serious proportions that Von Hinden- burg was sent down with 450,000 men to check it. The Rumanians were not able to make any headway against the new enemy. They were forced to give up the Szurduk Pass and after the cap- ture of Petroseny were forced to give up the Vulcan Pass also. The check, however, was only temporary, inasmuch as in the middle of September another offensive on a large scale was begun west of Hermannstadt. It succeeded in driving the Teutons out of both the Szurduk and Vulcan passes. It then pushed on into the Jiu valley. This marked the high tide of the sec- ond Rumanian invasion, since the Ru- manians suffered a severe setback at Hermannstadt. The victory won here by the Austrians and their German al- lies was one of the greatest of the war. The battle raged four days and resulted in the complete annihilation of the first Rumanian army. The German army was divided into two parts. The first attacked the Rumanian front at Her- mannstadt while the second by a rapid enveloping movement came up in the Rumanian rear and cut off their only line of retreat, through the Red Tower Pass. The fleeing Rumanians were swallowed up when they came to this pass by a large force of Bavarians. Von Falkenhayn now stood at the entrance to Rumania without being opposed by any real army. The second Rumanian army tried to save the precarious situa- tion but came on the scene too late and was checked everywhere on a 50-mile offensive. The remains of the first army fled in great disorder through the Car- pathians to the east and west of the Red Tower Pass. Rumania was now threatened from another quarter, on the south. The forces in this sector were entirely insuf- ficient to withstand the attacks of the allied Bulgar and German army. The expected Russian reinforcements failed to arrive on scheduled time and another great drive similar to that in Serbia was begun. It entered the Rumanian terri- tory in two columns. The first under Von Mackensen entered the Dobrudja and captured Tutrakan on September 3. The garrison of 20,000 men was forced to surrender. On September 10 Mackensen took a second large fortress, 162 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Silistria, which lies on the south bank of the Danube, The garrison of this fortress had been defeated by the Bul- garians in an attempt to relieve the fortress of Tutrakan. The second invading column at- tacked along the coast of the Black Sea. It captured Dobric and the seaports of Kali Akra, Baltjic and Kavarna. The arrival of a Russian force, however, compelled the invaders to give up all of these places with the exception of Baltjic. The battle on this front now settled down into trench warfare with the Rumanians holding a strong posi- tion extending from the Danube to the Black Sea. Rumania was now like a nut in the jaws of a nutcracker. Van Falkenhayn was pushing on from the north and Von Mackensen from the south. It was almost inevitable that she was to be crushed even as Serbia had been. Rus- sian reinforcements had been sent to strengthen the Rumanian line but they only succeeded temporarily. The Grand Duke Nicholas was placed in charge of these forces and he was also military adviser to the Rumanians. In the middle of October, 1916, King Fer- dinand of Rumania took personal com- mand of the Russo-Rumanian army. In the north the Germans pushed their way through the Vulcan Pass, hav- ing taken it by storm. Gradually Von Falkenhayn succeeded in pushing the Rumanians completely off the Transyl- vanian Alps. They also advanced fur- ther south of Kronstadt towards Kim- polung and the Sinaia, the Rumanian summer capital. They now had a grip on the railroad which ran to Craiova and then to Bucharest. By the last week in October Von Falkenhayn had reached Azuga, which was only 7 miles from Sinaia and almost on the border of the Rumanian oil fields. He also threatened to envelop the Rumanian army which still held Orsova. The Rus- sians and Rumanians now made a strenuous effort to stop Von Falken- hayn's advance. They started an of- fensive on the Moldavian frontier, which while it lacked power at least held open the rail communication with Russia. In the region around Kimpo- lung and south of the Vulcan Pass the Rumanians not only checked the Ger- mans but succeeded in pushing them back. By the end of October they had forced them back to the frontier in the neighborhood of the Szurduk Pass. The trench warfare which existed in the southern sector was broken by Von Mackensen in the third week of Octo- ber. On the 23d of this month he took Constanza and two days later the very important city of Cernavoda. This was the Danube bridgehead which controlled the railway to Bucharest. Constanza was the port of entry for Russian troops and supplies, sent to assist Ru- mania. Besides this Constanza was the largest seaport Rumania had and was the base of its Black Sea fleet. At Cernavoda the railway from Constanza to Bucharest crosses the Danube. This bridge is of immense size, being 11 miles long. The other side of it from Cernavoda crosses great swamp lands. The Germans did not immediately at- tempt to cross this bridge and pursue the Rumanians towards Bucharest. In- stead they followed up the coast line of the Black Sea. On October 2T Mack- ensen seized the city of Hirsova. He had an opportunity to cross the Danube here by pontoon bridges, since the ground was not so marshy as it was in the vicinity of Cernavoda. By this time the flight of the Slavic allies was precipitous and they did not attempt to hold any defensive positions. By the end of October Mackensen had estab- MILITARY OPERATIONS 163 lished his line well north of the Con- stanza-Cernavoda railway. An at- tempted Rumanian offensive through Bulgaria in order to attack Macken- sen's rear failed and the Rumanians were forced to retire to their own terri- tory. In the early part of the month of November the Russians and Rumanians made strenuous and for a time suc- cessful efforts to stem the tide of Ger- man invasion. Their main aim was to save the Cernavoda bridge. When they retreated across this bridge they had destroyed only a few spans of it and evi- dently they were easily replaced by the Germans. In the north the Slavs were also temporarily successful, but were unable to withstand the Teuton push. Von Falkenhayn's troops were push- ing south through the Predeal, Vulcan, and Rothenthurm passes and were ad- vancing down the Alt and Jiu valleys. They captured Tirgujiul and Liresht and then swept across the plains of Wallachia. A simultaneous movement was started in the extreme western part of Rumania near the Iron Gate. The object of these two drives was to cap- ture Craiova, the capital city of west- ern Wallachia. After administering a severe defeat to the Rumanian army. Von Falkenhayn took this place on No- vember 20. He immediately fortified it strongly in order to have a base of at- tack on Bucharest. The Rumanians made preparations to hold the Alt val- ley as a defensive line. Mackensen's ac- tivities in the south, however, prevented this. He forced the crossing of the Danube at Zimnica, a spot where the river is both wide and deep. This threatened to cut the Rumanian line of communica- tions and as a result the Alt river line was abandoned. The Vedea river was next chosen as a defensive line, but this also had to be abandoned because the Germans crossed the Danube at another point and cut the railroad which sup- plied the Vedea line. The Rumanians again started their retreat towards Bu- charest. At each of the small streams the Germans had to cross, however, their defense stiffened, but never suffi- ciently to stop the invading forces. By the end of November the Germans had reached the Arges river, the last river of any size between them and Bucharest. The fall of the capital was now almost a certainty and the Rumanian govern- ment was moved to Jassy on the 29th. The attack on the capital city was made from the north and south. The real danger to the city was from the north. The Rumanians made their last stand on the Averescu. The Germans, however, swept down from south of Kronstadt and crossed this stream themselves and after several victories captured Bucharest on December 7. On the same day Ploesci, in the centre of the oil district, fell. The Germans then drove the fleeing Rumanians across the Jalonitz river and captured Mizil on the 12th and Buzeu on the 15th. The Slavic allies retired to the Rimnik- Sarat river, which they managed to hold for five days. This enabled them to remove their supplies to Braila. The Germans forced the passage of the river on the 27th and pushed the enemy into Braila. The Russo-Rumanians made a strong stand at the Matchin bridgehead, on the Danube. This really controlled the way to Braila. Nevertheless, in the face of a heavy artillery bombardment they were forced to retire from the bridge- head on January 3, 1917. This cleared the Dobrudja of Russians and Ruman- ians with the exception of a small neck of land which extended towards Galatz. On January 5, Braila, Rumania's chief 164 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR commercial city, fell into the hands of the Germans. The Slavic allies were now completely driven out of the Dob- rudja. The Russians were forced to cross to the north bank of the Sereth. Fokshani fell on the 8th. A new line, formed on the Putna, had to be aban- doned on the 10th. Vadeni, 6 miles from Galatz, was captured on the 14th, but was recaptured on the 17th. Bitter fighting ensued until August, 1917, when the German drive was stopped. The line ran south of Galatz, then northwest along the Hungarian border to the Pruth, east of Czernowitz. The Teutons held all Rumania excepting part of Moldavia. Exposures made by the Russian revolutionists showed that Rumania was betrayed by Stiirmer, the Russian Premier. The promised Rus- sian protection on its flank had been withheld. The Rumanians entered an armistice with the Teutons in Decem- ber, 1917. See Eastern Theatre. Treaty of Bucharest. — The complete collapse of Russia and the inactivity of the allied army at Saloniki left Ru- mania isolated. The Rumanian gov- ernment was loath to enter into any peace negotiations, but two ultimatums were received from General Mackensen, the German Field Marshal, which stated that unless Rumania entered into peace negotiations, she would be overrun by the German army and completely de- stro3'ed as a state. Accepting the in- evitable, Rumania entered into negotia- tions and was compelled to accept a humiliating peace. Some of the more important terms were as follows : The Dobrudja as far as the Danube was to be ceded to the Central Powers ; recti- fications of the boundary line between Rumania and Austria-Hungary were to be permitted and recognized by Ru- mania ; the port of Constanza to be used by the Central Powers as a base for Black Sea trade; the Rumanian army to be demobilized under the supervision of Field Marshal von Mack- ensen ; Rumanian troops to evacuate all Austro-Hungarian territory occupied by them ; Teutonic troops to be permit- ted to cross Rumania in order to get to Odessa ; Allied oflScers in Rumanian service to be dismissed at once ; eco- nomic advantages, such as the control of railways, wheat crops, and petro- leum wells, to be granted to the Central Powers for an indefinite period of time. V. Southeastern Theatre. The stra- tegic importance of Turkey from the Germanic point of view lay in keeping supplies from Russia through control of the Dardanelles. Turkish military activity manifested itself on five dis- tinct stages. 1. Caucasus, {a) Turk- ish thrust against Russia (1914-15); (6) Russian campaign (1916) forcing Turkish armies behind Trebizond, Er- zerum, and Bitlis line to the west, and threatening Bagdad to the south. 2. Gallipoli campaign by Franco-British forces. 3. Turkish attack on Suez Canal. 4. British advance on Mesopo- tamia. 5. Collapse of Turkey. Turkey, Caucasus, Egypt. — War was declared between Russia and Tur- key on October 30, 1914, and between England (and France) and Turkey on November 5, 1914. But at the end of July, 1914, Turkey had already begun to mobilize ; by the end of October it was estimated that she had some 500,- 000 men in her army with 250,000 more at the depots. These troops were concentrated in three principal groups ; near Constan- tinople and in Asia Minor, in the Cau- casus, and in Syria. The Turks under Enver Pasha, at once opened a winter campaign in the Caucasus. Here, in- deed, they had been anticipated by the Russians, who, crossing the frontier, MILITARY OPERATIONS 165 captured, on November 13, a position near Koprukeui and Erzerum. From this they were compelled to withdraw, but returning to the attack recaptured the place November 20. What had been intended as a mere demonstration by the Russians was converted into a seri- ous matter by the initiative and energy of the Turks. The Russians would nat- urally advance by the Kars-Erzerum road. Hence the Turks purposed to hold the Russians on this road, while making an enveloping movement on the left against Kars and the Russian right. This plan came near succeeding. The Russians were pushed back from Kop- rukeui to Khorosan and were driven out of Ardahan on January 1. Two Turk- ish corps reached Sarikamish, the Rus- sian railhead south of Kars, on Decem- ber 25. But the weather and the season, together with the natural diffi- culties of the country, brought the plan to naught. One of the two Turkish corps was driven back from Sarikamish (January 1) and the other dislodged on the 3d. Ardahan was recaptured. The remaining body at Khorosan sur- rendered. Two Russian columns that had crossed the Turco-Persian frontier reentered Tabriz, which had been occu- pied by the Turks early in January, on January 30. Relieved from command in Europe and sent to the Caucasus, the Grand Duke Nicholas inaugurated a midwinter campaign, 1915-16, with an army estimated at 300,000 men. On February 16 he took Erzerum with 13,- 000 prisoners. The part of the garri- son that escaped fled to Trebizond, to the Van region and elsewhere, with the Russians in pursuit. One column cap- tured Bitlis on March 3, and advanced south in the direction of Sert. An- other column marched on Erzingan. In the direction of Trebizond the Turks were defeated at Kara Dere, and Trebi- zond itself was taken April 20-21. A Turkish attempt to turn the Russian left in the neighborhood of Trebizond was checked, and the Russians contin- ued their march westward. Baron von der Goltz was in command of the Turk- ish troops. Two flying detachments in Persia carried on operations, one in the Urumiah district, the other from Ker- man-Shah, taken by the Russians, towards Bagdad. Simultaneousl}^ with the original Caucasian campaign mentioned above an expedition under Djemal Pasha was undertaken against the Suez Canal. The importance of this waterway to the Allies is self-evident. In anticipation of an attack upon it, troops had been collected in Egypt, consisting chiefly of East Indians and Colonials, with a few Imperial service units. In the canal itself several French and English war- ships took position to assist in the de- fense. Moreover, during the autumn and winter the position had been thoi'- oughly strengthened by modern field fortifications ; the defenses consisted of bridgeheads on the east covered by in- trenched positions on the western bank at El Kantara, El Ferdan and Ismailia, Tussum and Serapeum, Shaluf and Kubri. Dejemal Pasha formed his forces of 30,000 men into three columns. The northerly one, of about 6000 men of all arms, followed the caravan road from Rafa to El Kantara ; the southerly, of 3000, the pilgrim road from Nakhl to Suez ; the middle column, that from Kossaima to Ismailia. This last road happened to be practicable at this time because a rainfall had filled a pool on the line. Pontoon boats accompanied the expedition, whose march was well organized and well carried out. On January 26 the advance guards of the south and middle columns were reported 166 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR near the canal. The Turks were com- pletely beaten (February 2-3). The main attack (Tussum-Serapeum) was made by the middle column ; that of the southerly (Suez) was a fiasco; the northern made a better though vain ef- over 6 miles to a position east of Birs- el-Manca. Many guns and 2500 pris- oners fell to the victors. In December the British captured El Arish and the strongly fortified position of Maghda- bah. These victories effectively stop- Gallipoli Peninsula, Scene of Disastrous Campaign fob the Control of the Dardanelles fort (Kantara); on the night of Feb- ruary 6-7 a general retirement began. The next serious threat on the canal was made in August, when the Turks attacked the British positions at Ro- mani. The British gave way before a strong frontal and flank attack. Think- ing they were retreating, the Turks sprang forward in pursuit order, and soon were lost in the dunes. Then the entire British front attacked and com- pletely routed the Turks, driving them ped further threats of raids on the ca- nal. On January 11, 1917, the British took six lines of trenches and 1600 prisoners at Rafa, on the Sinai penin- sula. (See below.) Dardanelles. — The Turkish arms thus came to grief in both the Caucasus and in Egypt. Better fortune waited upon them in the Dardanelles. The temptation to strike a blow at the vi- tals of Turkey by taking possession of the Dardanelles, and hence of Constan- MILITARY OPERATIONS 167 tinople, was irresistible. Success here would have met with a rich reward. A way would have been opened to supply Russia with the war munitions she so sorely needed; the Balkan ques- tion would have been settled out of hand, and in a manner favorable to the Allies. But the entire campaign was mismanaged from the outset ; the nature of the effort to be made was cer- tainly not correctly estimated; efforts were scattered, time was lost. For the naval campaign, reference should be made to the naval subdivision of this article. It opened on Novem- ber 3, 1914, and it was not until the following March that joint land and naval operations were decided upon. By that time the Turks had received ample warning, and here, as elsewhere, under German leadership, had made what turned out to be more than ample preparation. In the Gallipoli peninsula nature was on the side of the defense. Fur- thermore the Turks enjoyed an ad- vantage in their supply of men, for the bulk of their forces were in the neigh- borhood of Constantinople and could therefore be drawn on as needed. Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton was selected to direct land operations for the Allies. These were to be carried on by a French force under General d'Amade, drawn from north Africa, and by Colonials, Terri- torials, and some Indians from Egypt and Imperial troops. On arriving at Tenedos (March 17), selected as his headquarters, Sir Ian made up his mind that the transports had been so badly loaded that he would not undertake any operations until the loading had been corrected. The trans- ports were accordingly sent back to Egypt to be reloaded. Upon their re- turn, five weeks had been lost to the Allies and gained to the Turks. The British began their Landing on April 25. How strong the force of the Turks was is not accurately known ; it must have been well over 100,000. The German General Liman von Sanders had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces at the Darda- nelles. The chief landings were made at the tip of the peninsula. Once ashore, the advance was to be made against the village of Krithia, and the height of Achi Baba was then to be carried. At each of the beaches selected, the Turks were ready and received the landing party with tremendous fire. The Aus- tralian and New Zealand corps ("Anzac") near Gaba Tepe especially distinguished themselves by rushing the opposing Turks with the bayonet, clear- ing the slopes and securing a foothold on the top. The French landed a regi- ment on the Asiatic side, near Kum Kale, for the purpose of preventing an attack by gunfire against the trans- ports at the nose of the peninsula. In this they were more or less successful, but at considerable loss to themselves. The result of the work of the 24 hours was that the Anzacs, isolated, were holding a semicircular line against an enemy ever increasing in numbers, other landings were abandoned, some forces were holding their own but isolated, while other landing parties had man- aged to join hands. The next three or four days were marked by severe fight- ing and an advance of the British from the southern beaches. By the after- noon of April 28 some of the troops had pushed up to within 1300 yards of Krithia, but could get no farther. The lines then dug in. On May 1, the Turks attacked at night, and there was a counterattack the next day. This is the first so-called battle of Krithia. The second occurred on May 6, and was an attempt to win the Krithia ridge; this 168 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR attempt failed, but the British ad- vanced their lines 500 yards. The third came off on June 4, with the same ob- jective and the same result. The fourth was fought on July 12, and re- sulted in an advance of 300 yards more or less. Achi Baba still remained in Turkish hands. Meanwhile, the Turks were attacking the Anzacs (May 5-10) and were repulsed. They renewed their efforts in great force May 18, and were again beaten off with great loss. There were other engagements, as that of the French (June 21) who captured a work known as the Haricot Redoubt, and the English action of June 28, known as the battle of the Gully Ravine. And so it went until fresh British forces were landed at Suvla Bay on August 7, and the Anzacs advanced upon the ridges of Sari Bair, But before the landing at Suvla Bay, the Allies on July 12 made a fresh at- tack in front of Krithia. It resulted in the capture of trenches and was fol- lowed on the next day by another gen- eral attack, resulting in a similar cap- ture. But no really significant success was obtained. The Suvla Bay landing and simul- taneous operations at the tip of the peninsula and by the Anzacs consti- tute the last great attempt to drive the Turks off the peninsula. Sir Ian Ham- ilton in May had asked for two addi- tional corps. By the end of July he got them. His plan was now to re- enforce the Anzacs and direct them to make a drive to capture Sari Bair. A landing at Suvla Bay would surprise the Turks, and might enable the Anzacs after taking Sari Bair to push on to Maidos. The Turks at Krithia and on Achi Baba would thus be cut off. A containing attack was to be made at the tip of the peninsula. This attack was delivered on August 5 and failed. It was renewed on the 7th and resulted in minor local successes ; its main pur- pose of keeping the Turks busy on the spot, and then preventing them from lending a hand elsewhere, may be said to have been realized. The Anzacs, re- enforced, attacked on the 6th, and very nearly succeeded in their purpose ; but on the 9th an assaulting column lost its way, and so arrived too late to clinch the positive gains already made on the spur to the southwest of the main ele- vation (Hill 305) of the Turkish posi- tion. During the attack on Sari Bair the landing at Suvla Bay was begun August 6 by night under the direction of Lieut. General Sir F. Stopford. It resulted in failure, for although the troops got ashore, yet once there they accomplished nothing. Apparently there was no well-thought-out plan of operations, or, if there was, it was not carried out. Some of the troop units were landed at places other than those designated, others were late in moving out. Some local successes were obtain- ed, however, and on the evening of Au- gust 7 the British extended in a semi- circle around the bay. On the 8th the British stood fast and made no attempt to advance, and so lost their opportun- ity not merely to accomplish something on their own account, but to help their comrades farther south engaged in the desperate struggle of Sari Bair. The enemy were fewer in numbers than the British and were not in heart. The re- sponsibility for the inaction of the 8th must rest with General Stopford, but Sir Ian Hamilton must come in for some part of the blame. There was more or less fighting during the next week; on the 15th General Stopford turned over the command of his troops to General de Lisle. Open fighting gave way to trench work. There was one more battle on August 21, when an at- MILITARY OPERATIONS 169 tempt was made to take Hill 100, about two miles east of Suvla Bay. Sir Ian Hamilton was recalled in October, and the whole peninsula evacuated in De- cember and January. Mesopotamia. — The long-standing conflict between British and German in- terests in the Persian Gulf cannot be said to have had any immediate military bearing on the decision of the British government to open a campaign in the Mesopotamia. British interests, how- ever, called for protection, and in par- ticular the plant of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on Abadan Island, with its 150-mile long pipe line, and the oil fields at Ahwaz on the Karun River. This plant, intended to furnish fuel oil for the royal navy, was an enterprise in which the government was financially interested. Moreover, a successful cam- paign in the great valley would hurt Turkey's standing in the Mohammedan world, and from purely a military point of view would prove of assistance to the Allies. A small force had been sent to the Gulf before the outbreak of hos- tilities. On November 7 it reached the mouth of the river and took a small village, Fao by name, three miles up. Thence the expedition moved up river to Abadan, for the protection of the works already mentioned, and Novem- ber 11 had a brush with the Turks on the Turkish side of the river at Saniyeh. Reenforcements joined this column on the 15th, and the combined forces, after some minor engagements, on November 23 entered Basra after its evacuation by the Turks ; and on December 9, after getting into the rear of Kurna, received the surrender of its garrison, 50 miles up river. The British now took up an intrenched position, and might have been content merely to hold the road down to the sea if it had not been for a Turkish counteroffensive in April, 1915. Early in January of 1915 the Turks were found to be holding a strong posi- tion north of Mezera. An expedition drove them out of their lines. They next appeared at Ahwaz up the Karun River. A reconnaissance showed them to be in strength, and it was evident that they were contemplating an at- tack on the main British position. This attack occurred April 11-12 at Kurna itself, Ahwaz, and Shaiba. The action at Shaiba lasted three days and resulted in a serious Turkish defeat. During May but little happened, but on May 31 the British moved out and proceeded up as far as 75 miles from Kurna. From Amara a road runs to Ahwaz, the con- trol of which assured the security of the oil region. The Turks had in the meantime withdrawn to Kut-el-Amara, 150 miles up the Tigris. On May 31 a Turkish force north of Kurna was dispersed; on June 3 Amara was occupied. The Turks with- drew to Kut-el-Amara. From the Tig- ris at this point a cross river runs al- most due south to join the Euphrates at Nasiriyeh. Unless this cross river were in British control the Turks could use it to menace the British left. Hence a force was sent against Nasiriyeh and on July 24 captured the place, the Turks retreating toward Kut. Early in August General Townshend went up the river marching on Kut, and on Sep- tember 25 contact was made. A battle was fought on the next two days, and at dawn on the 29th it was discovered that the Turks had evacuated the posi- tion of Kut-el-Amara and retreated on Bagdad, They were pursued and con- siderable loss inflicted on them. By September 30 General Townshend was within 100 miles of Bagdad by road and 200 by river. He continued his march, and at Ctesiphon, about 30 miles down river from Bagdad, fought, November 170 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR 22-25, an indecisive battle against su- perior numbers. At first victorious, he was compelled in consequence of his lack of reserves and his shortage of am- munition to fall back in the face of Turkish reenforcements. He retreated to Kut after having lost about one- fourth of his total 20,000 men. Here he intrenched and was besieged by the Turks. All attempts to succor him having failed, and his supplies being exhausted. General Townshend on April 30 was compelled to surrender to the Turks, after a gallant defense protracted for 143 days. This surrender simply meant that the ill-advised expedition against Bagdad had failed; it was still the fact that the original purpose of the Mesopotamian campaign had been ful- filled. General Aylmer's relief expedi- tion, setting out January 6, 1916, after defeating the Turks in two battles, man- aged, January 21, to reach a point only eight miles from Kut-el-Amara. But floods now came to the Turkish rescue and Aylmer was forced to fall back. He set out again in February, better equipped with boats, and after meeting with a reverse at Felahie defeated the Turks at Umm-el-Heuna, April 5 ; the next day the capture of Felahie was an- nounced. He was now within 23 miles of Kut; but the Turks in the meantime had occupied strongly intrenched posts to dispute any further advance, imped- ed as before by floods. Much fighting took place, and although some ground was gained the relief force was unable to gain any decisive success. General Aylmer's forces continued to hold their lines in the neighborhood of Kut dur- ing most of 1916. In December, 1916, and January, 1917, there were several engagements of a local character in the neighborhood of Kut-el-Amara. In February, 1917, the Mesopota- mian campaign again began to assume importance. As a result of local en- gagements and manoeuvering for po- sition the British by the middle of Feb- ruary had established their line on both banks of the Tigris, where it formed a bend west of Kut-el-Amara, and conse- quently hemmed in the Turks in this town. On February 23 bodies of Brit- ish troops were ferried across the Tigris under the protection of artillery and machine-gun fire. These troops cleared the opposite bank sufficiently to enable General Maude to erect a pontoon bridge. By the next day part of the Shamrun peninsula and Sanna-i-yat were seized. The taking of these im- portant positions compelled the Turks to abandon Kut-el-Amara and to re- treat toward Baghela, 24 miles up the river. The British cavalry followed the flee- ing Turks on their right, the infantry their centre and gunboats on the Tigris their left. The last-mentioned forces caused considerable havoc among the Turks, by getting ahead of them and firing upon them as they advanced. The British left wing under Sir Percy Lake, crossed the Tigris below its junction with the Diala and marched on Bag- dad, 20 miles away. On March 10, an attack on Bagdad from both sides of the river drove the Turks back on the city itself. During the night the Turks evacuated the city and left the British artillery captured at Kut-el-Amara and the greater part of their own. The fall of Bagdad was not of great strate- gic importance but had a great moral effect throughout the world. Besides that the entire cultivated lands of Baby- lonia fell into the hands of the British. A Russian offensive drove the Turks from Hamadan and gave promise of a Russian-British advance which would completely occupy Turkey in Asia. The MILITARY OPERATIONS 171 Russian revolution upset these plans arid enabled the Turks to withdraw troops from the Armenian front to stem the British advance. During June and July the Turks drove the Rus- sians across the border into Persia and left the British left wing in a very exposed position. After the fall of Bagdad the Turks retreated up the Tigris toward Mosul and up the Euphrates toward Aleppo. The main body took the first route with the idea of holding the headwaters of the Diala until they could rescue their army which was practically lost in Per- sia as a result of renewed Russian ac- tivities. The latter had crossed the border of Persia again and had joined with the British outposts. General Maude seized Feluja on the Euphrates with the general purpose of ascending that river and capturing El Deir which was the key to the crossroads leading to Damascus, Aleppo, and Mosul. The plan was to have the centre advance on Mosul, the right wing to clear the cara- van route into Persia and the left wing to secure El Deir. The first step ac- complished in this advance was the cap- ture of Samara on April 23. This put the Samara-Bagdad railroad in the hands of the British and facilitated the bringing of supplies from the Jatter city. The British right flank was left in an exposed position again by the complete downfall of the Russian armies and the reoccupation of Khanikan by the Turks (July) on the Persian bor- der. This town controls the caravan route from Bagdad to Kermansha. A word or two should be mentioned here of the revolt in the Hejaz, which declared its independence under the leadership of the Grand Sherif of Mec- ca, Hujayn Ibn Aly, who took the title of King. This revolt was engineered by the Entente allies and won over the orthodox Arabs and the Syrians op- posed to Turkish rule. Arms and am- munition of the latest type were sup- plied to the revolutionists and they took several Turkish towns and seriously hampered' the Syrian railway system of the Turks. When fighting could be resumed, aft- er the heat of the summer, the British on September 30 captured Ramadie on the Euphrates and the entire army of Ahmed Bey. This followed the brilliant storming of Mushaid Ridge on the pre- vious day. On October 5, the Russians took by assault Nereman, 50 miles north of Mosul which was now seri- ously menaced. The British were with- in 100 miles of it on the south. They advanced still further v/hen they took Tekrit 15 miles north of Samara. Op- erations halted here again for a long time because of the final collapse of the Russian forces with the consequent ex- posure of the British right wing. Gen- eral von Falkenhayn, who had won such a great reputation for himself as Chief of Staff in Germany and as a command- ing General in the Rumanian campaign, was now sent to Asia Minor to com- mand the Turkish forces and spent the rest of 1917 building up the Turkish forces at Aleppo. He succeeded Gen- eral von der Goltz, who had been assas- sinated. The 1917 Campaign in Palestine. — As was stated above (section Turkey, Caucasus, Egypt) the British began an advance on Rafa on the Sinai peninsula in January, 1917. This town fell early in February and the British advanced northward toward Gaza and eastward toward Beersheba. They were com- pelled to spend the summer on the Gaza river after failing to take these places. In October they started forward again and by January, 1918, had won a series of brilliant successes. On October 31, 172 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Beersheba was taken in a sudden as- sault and on November 6 Gaza fell. By November 15, General Allenby * had cut the JafFa-Jerusalem railway at Ludd and Er Ramie. Two days later Jaffa, the port of Jerusalem,- was oc- cupied. The British advanced down the Surar River valley toward the Holy City and up the Damascus-Beersheba railway in order to encircle the city and cut off its supplies, so that it would not come under the bombardment of the ar- tillery. All the towns surrounding the city were gradually taken by storm and as the British closed in it became apparent that the Turks would not risk a siege. The city fell on December 10. There was general rejoicing throughout the world over the return of the city to Christian hands after having been in Turkish hands for almost seven, cen- turies. The Turks west and northwest of the city broke up into small bands and carried on guerilla warfare until the British finally got control of all the high land. General Allenby then pushed across a small stream 4 miles north of Jaffa and captured several small towns which gave him all the high land in the neighborhood, and as- sured a good defense of the Jaffa-Jeru- salem railroad. The success of the British arms in Palestine effectively put an end to Turkish threats on the Suez Canal and Egypt which had been going on for three years. It also revived the hopes of the Zionists, who dreamed of a re- establishment of the Jewish nation in Palestine. The British government an- * Allenby, Sir Edmund Henry Hynbian. Born 1861. Served in Bechuanaland Expedi- tion, 1884-85. With British forces in Zuhiland in 1888. Took part in South African War with distinction. Skill contributed largely to vic- tories of Somme and Aisne. In June, 1917, put in command of expedition to Palestine. Cap- tured Jerusalem December 10, 1917, and en- tered on December 11. nounced on several occasions that it looked with favor on the Zionist move- ment. The Collapse of Turkey {October). — Turkey was the second member of the Central Powers alliance to surrender to Allied arms. This was a direct result of a crushing defeat administered by General Allenby. As was narrated above, Jerusalem was captured by Gen- eral Allenby in December, 1917. Be- tween that time and September, 1918, the British commander was making preparations for his attack on a grand scale. His first object was to secure his right flank by the capture of Jericho and the line of the Jordan. This opera- tion was carried out in February, and was highly successful, the two objectives having been taken shortly after the middle of the month. During March General Allenby was engaged in gaining a line which would enable him to carry out operations east of the Jordan and against the Hedjah railway, in coopera- tion with the Arab forces under the Emir Faisal. These were southeast of the Dead Sea and were under the com- mand of Allenby. Rainy weather and the raising of the level of the Jordan river prevented General Allenby from making any advance across that river. He made several raids which materially hindered the Turkish forces. His fur- ther progress was also held up by the difficulties of the Allies in France. He reported that in April the 52nd and 74th divisions, nine yeomanry regi- ments, five and a half siege batteries, ten British battalions, and five machine gun companies were withdrawn prepar- atory to embark for France. In May 14 more battalions were sent to Europe. During July and August 10 more Brit- ish battalions were withdrawn from the fighting in the eastern area. While it is true that most of these units were MILITARY OPERATIONS 173 replaced by Indian forces, nevertheless his actual fighting force was so reduced that he was unable to continue the ad- vance against the Turkish troops un- til the following September. During the hot summer months the only fight- ing of any note was an attack deliv- ered by Turkish-German forces on July 14). It gained initial successes by tak- ing Abu Tellul, an important height, and surrounded several other advanced positions. These gains were almost im- mediately lost again as a result of a brilliant counterattack by Australian forces. On September 18, the British and the Arabs began an advance in Mesopo- tamia and Palestine which was ulti- mately to result in the surrender of Turkey and settle once and for all the Berlin to Bagdad route which had al- ready been broken by the collapse of Bulgaria. Allenby made minute prep- arations for his blow and completely fooled the Turks as to his intentions. The British, with some French forces in support, struck on a 16-mile front and broke through the Turkish lines between Fafat and the sea and advanced 13 miles. By the 22d, enemy resist- ance between the Mediterranean and the Jordan river had practically brok- en down completely and the Allies were forging ahead rapidly. In 4 days they had advanced approximately 60 miles and had occupied Beisan, Nazareth, and El Afule. Arab forces east of the Jordan destroyed railroads and bridges crossing the stream and thus forced the Turks to retreat in a northerly di- rection only. Haifa and Acre were seized on the 23d and the Turks east of the Jordan were forced to retreat southerly in the direction of Anrnian^ Three days later saw the British at the Sea of Galilee and the occupation of Tiberias, Semakh, Es-Samra, and Am- man. On the 27th the British forces joined with the Arabs east of the Jor- dan at Mezeris. The advance was now a steady pursuit, without any frontal fighting on the part of the Turks. Da- mascus fell on the 1st of October, Zahich and Rayak on the 6th, and Tri- poli and Homs on the 16th. In the first three weeks of the campaign more than 80,000 prisoners and 350 guns fell into the hands of the British and Arabs, The last half of October saw the cap- ture of Aleppo and the complete defeat of the Turkish troops along the Tigris by British forces under General Mar- shall. This last event was accomplish- ed by the capture of Kaleh Sherghat, which completely cut off communication with Mosul, which with Aleppo, was the main base of supplies of the Turkish- German forces in Asia Minor. Facing a supreme disaster, the Turks sued for an armistice. They sent the British General, Townshend, who had been captured at Kut-el-Amara, to the Allied commander of the ^gean fleet. Vice Admiral Calthorp, to ask for terms. He asked for regularly accred- ited agents to carry on the negotiations. These were sent to the island of Lemnos, and after a 3-day session, terms were handed to the Turks which they ac- cepted on October 30, and which went into effect the next day. A summary of these terms, which practically amounted to unconditional surrender, follows : The Dardanelles, Bosphorus, and Black Sea were to be opened to the Al- lies. The location of all mine fields, etc., were to be disclosed. Allied prisoners of war were to be given up. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army. Surrender of all Turkish warships, and use of mercantile vessels. 174 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Allied occupation of any strategical points in Turkey desired by them. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces from Persia. Transcaucasia to be evacuated if Al- lies desire. Wireless, telegraph, and cable sys- tems to be controlled by the Allies. • Allies to be permitted to purchase supplies of all kinds. The surrender of all garrisons in Asia Minor and Turkish Africa. All Germans and Austrians to get out of Turkey within a month and Tur- key was to break off all relations with them. Colonies. Africa. — ^As early as Au- gust 7 the British Imperial government telegraphed the South African govern- ment to suggest the desirability of seiz- ing such parts of German Southwest Africa, "as would give them the com- mand of Swakopmund, Luderitzbucht, and the wireless stations there or in the interior." But before operations could be carried on against German territory the local government found itself face to face with a rebellion in sympathy with, if not inspired by, Germany, and having for its end the establishment of independence. Maritz, one of its lead- ers, was, on October 26, completely de- feated by loyalist troops under the di- rection of General Smuts, so that the rebellion came to an end in those parts. A more serious situation existed in the Union itself. But here too the loyalists prevailed. On October 27 General Botha took the field against General Beyers, the leader of the rebels, defeated him at Commissie Drift, and scattered his troops. On November 12 Botha routed De Wet at Mushroom Valley. A fugitive, De Wet was taken prisoner on December 1. Beyers, who in the meantime had collected another force, was again beaten December 7 and in escaping was drowned while trying to swim his horse across the Vail River. His death and De Wet's capture ended the rebellion, though small parties kept the field for some time afterward. Togoland was taken in a campaign that lasted just three weeks, from Au- gust 7 to August 28, 1915. Surround- ed on three sides by hostile territory, with the sea under British control, it could not hope to offer any resistance. The allied base was the littoral; minor expeditions entered the country from the north, the east, and the west. The capital of the colony, Lome, fell on the sixth. The campaign thereafter had for its objective the powerful wireless station at Kamina, 125 miles from the coast. This point was entered, after some fighting by the Allies, on the 27th, and the colony was surrendered by its Governor. The German forces could not have exceeded 1000, mostly natives. Kamerun called for a more serious effort on the part of the Allies. Like Togoland, it was surrounded on all sides by hostile territory, with the sea under Allied control. But its vastly greater area made operations more dif- ficult and it was more strongly defend- ed. Three expeditions from the north- west were defeated by the Gennans in August and September, 1915. Attack- ing from the sea, however, the Allies took Duala (September 27) and from this point widened their holding. Early in October it was clear that the colony would be lost. Two columns pushed their way into the interior along the railways, one of which on October 26 took Edea, repelling six weeks later a counterattack for its recovery. The other column north of Duala captured the entire railway and advanced be- yond its head. The French sent down troops from the Tchad, and others re- enforced by Belgians from Equatoria. MILITARY OPERATIONS 175 The result of all these efforts was that German resistance was well worn down, and came to an end with the surrender of Mora Hill early in 1916. The situation in German Southwest Africa was complicated by the South African rebellion. This rebellion crushed, real operations began in Janu- ary, Luderitz Bay having been occu- pied as early as September 18, 1914. Swakopmund was occupied January 14. The campaign was directed against the capital Windhoek and carried on by two armies ; the northern under Botha was to move from Swakopmund ; while the southern under Smuts, divided into three columns, was to move east from Luderitz Bay, north from Warmbad, and west from Bechuanaland. By May 1, the end was near. On the 12th, Botha entered Windhoek and the strug- gle was practically over; for pushing on to Grootfontein, now the German capital, he there, on July 9, received the surrender of the enemy forces. The most important colony in Africa, German East Africa, gave the British far more trouble than any of the others. Here the Germans disposed of some 8000 men, though all reports as to forces in the colonies are subject to cau- tion, and the British forces at the be- ginning were insignificant, say 1200. Daring August, 1911, some successes fell to the British. For example, they demolished, August 13, the port of Dar- es-Salaam. On September 3, British re- enforcements arrived in time to check German operations against the Uganda railway. September was taken up by German attacks without any special re- sult. The British remained on the de- fensive, waiting for troops from India. These arrived November 1, and lay off the German port of Tanga. An attack made on the 4th resulted in a decided reverse for the British, who were com- pelled to reembark. The Germans now invaded British East Africa, but were pushed back to Jassin in German ter- ritory, where on January 18 they de- feated the British, and forced a with- drawal of all the outlying posts in this region. They had, as early as Sep^ tember, 1914, invaded northeast Rho- desia, where they came into contact with Belgian troops. April, 1915, was spent in skirmishing. In July, 1915, the Konigsherg was destroyed. This vessel, after doing much mischief, had been chased by British cruisers and had taken refuge (November, 1914) in the Rufiji River. Her guns, however, were removed and used in the defenses of Ta- bora, on the main east and west line of the colony. General Smith-Dorrien, later relieved by General Smuts, was sent out to take command of the troops in Bntish East Africa and the invasion proceeded from that region, as well as from Nyassa on the south. The British expedition commanded by General Jan Smuts won an impor- tant victory at the Kitovo Hills, near the northern boundary of German East Africa. After five days O'f fighting (March 7-12) the Germans fell back to a position in the forest along the Rufu River. As a result of the operations that followed, the Germans, although reenforced, were compelled to abandon their positions and retire southward along the Tanga railway. The Allies began in September to tighten the ring around the colony. The Belgians, French, British, and Por- tuguese were invading it from all sides. All of the seaports were in their hands and Tabora, a strong fortress in the north, was captured (September 1-11), by the Belgians. Progress was slow but in December, 1917, its probable com- plete occupation was announced. General von Lettow-Vorbeck, the 176 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR German commander who had held out against the Allies for such a long time, finally surrendered to the Allies on No- vember 14, 1918, three days after the signing of the armistice. During No- vember, 1917, one German force oper- ating in German East Africa was cap- tured and the other (the only remain- ing one) escaped into Portuguese East Africa. It was chased southward al- most as far as the Zambesi River through almost impassable country. Turning around, von Lettow-Vorbeck took another route and again reached German East Africa in September, 1918. He was quickly compelled to re- treat again and this time he marched into northern Rhodesia, where he sur- rendered just south of Kasama. The Pacific. — Japan, as Great Brit- ain's ally, declared war on Germany August 23, 1914, but confined her of- fensive to Germany's possessions in the Pacific. On August 27, she began the blockade of Tsingtao, and by the end of September, two Japanese armies and a few English troops had completed land- ing, one on the north, the other with the English at Rozan Bay. The German defenses consisted of three lines, the first of fortified hills, the second of 10 forts, the third of five. By September 28, the first two lines had been carried, and the siege was begun. October 31 a general attack was opened on the third line which was occupied November 6. The next day the place was surrendered with 201 officers and 3841 non-commis- sioned officers and men. The Japanese land forces engaged in the siege num- bered 22,980 officers and men, with 142 guns. The British forces were far less numerous, 920 European troops and 450 Sikhs. The Britisli casualties were insignificant, 12 killed and 62 wounded ; the Japanese relatively very little greater, 236 killed and 1282 wounded. For the capture of other German is- lands in the Pacific see the section on Naval Operations. V. NAVAL OPERATIONS At the outbreak of the war the bel- ligerent navies were constituted as shown in the subjoined tables. For the sake of space and conciseness, cer- tain methods of lettering and abbrevia- tion are used in the tables and through- out the article, viz. : Abbreviations: a.c, armored cruiser; a.c.d., armored coast-defense vessel; 6.c., battle cruiser; b.s., battleship; c, cruiser (not ar- mored); des., destroyer; Div., division (of a fleet or squadron); g.h., gunboat; Sq., squad- ron; sub., submarine; t.b., torpedo boat. EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIOKS First example: b.s. Iron Duke (25d-10gl3.5- 22k). Explanation: b.s. stands for battleship; small capitals indicate that the vessel is of the dread- nought type; 25d means 25,000 tons' displace- ment; 10gl3.5, that the main battery consists of 10 guns of 13.5-inch calibre; 22k, that the maximum speed is 22 knots. Second example: des. Ferret (0.75d-2g4, 2g3- 37k), Hind (same). Hydra (same). Explanation: this means that the destroyer Ferret has a displacement of 750 (0.75 x 1000) tons, carries a main battery of two 4-inch and two 3-inch guns, and has a maximum speed of 27 knots; and that the Hind and Hydra are the same as the Ferret in all respects. Forces ix the North Sea and Adjacent Waters GREAT BRITAIN First Fleet (Admiral J. R, Jellicoe, com- manding) Flagship, b.s. Iron Duke (25d-10gl3.5-22k) ; tenders, c. Sappho (3.4d-2g6,6g4.7-20k), des. Oak (0.8-2g4,2g3-32k) ; repair ships, Cyclops (lld-13k). Assistance (10d-13k). 1st Battle Sq., 1st Div.: b.s. Marlborough (25d-10gl3.5-22k), St. Vincent (19d- 10gl2-21k), Colossus (20d-10gl2-21k), Hercules (same). M Div.: b.s. Neptune (19d-10gl2-21k), Su- perb (same), Collingwood (same). Van- guard (same). 2d Battue Sg., 1st Div.: b.s. King George V (24d-10gl3.5-21k), Ajax (same). Auda- cious (same), Orion (23d-10gl3.5-21k). 2d Div.: b.s. Centurion (24d-10gl3.5-21k), Conqueror (23d-10gl3.5-21k), Monarch (same), Thunderer (same). 3d Battle Sq., 1st Div.: b.s. King Edward VII (16d-4gl2,4g9.2-19k), Hibernia (same), Africa (same), Britannia (same). 3d Div.: b.s. Common/wealth (16d-4gl2,4g9.2- 19k), Dominion (same), Hindustan (same), Zealandia (same). 4th Battle Sq., 1st Div.: b.s. Dreadnought (18d-10gl2-21k), Temeraire (19d-10gl2- 21k), Bellerophon (same), Agamemnon (17d-4gl2, 10g9.2-19k). 3d Div.: Not organized; ships under con- struction. Scouts: 1st Sq., c. Bellona (3.3d-6g4-26k) ; 2d Sq., c. Boadicea (3.3d-6g4-26k) ; 3d Sq., c. Blanche (3.4-10g4-26) ; 4th Sq., c. Blonde (3.4-10g4-26k). 1st Battle Cruiser Sq.: b.c. Lion (26d-8gl3.5- 28k), Princess Royal (same). Queen Mary (27d-8gl3.5-28k), New Zealand (19d-8gl2-27k). 2d Cruiser Sq.: a.c. Shannon (15d-4g9.2, 10g7.5- 23k), Achilles (14d-6g9.2,4g7.5-23k), Cochrane (same), Natal (same). 3d Cruiser Sq. : a.c. Antrim (Ild-4g7.5,6g6- 22k), Argyll (same), Devonshire (same), Roxburgh (same). 4th Cruiser Sq.: a.c. Sufolk (10d-14g6-23k), Berwick (same), Essex (same), Lancas- ter (same). 1st Light Cruiser Sq. : c. Southampton (5.4d- 8g6-26k), Birmingham (5.4d-9g6-26k), Lowestoft (same), Nottingham (same). Destroyer Flotilla of 1st Fleet: c. Amethyst (3d-12g4-22k), carrying flotilla com- mander. 1st Sq.: c. Fearless (3.4d-10g4-25k) and 20 destroyers (0.8d-2g4,2g3-28 to 30k). 2d Sq.: c. Active (3.4d-10g4-25k) and 20 de- stroyers (0.8d-2g4, 2g3-28k). 3d Sq.: c. Amphion (3.4d-10g4-25k) and 13 destroyers (ld-3g4-29k). 4th Sq.: des. Swift (2.2d-4g4-35k) and 20 destroyers (0.9d-3g4-32k). Second Fleet Flagship: b.s. Lord Nelson (17d-4gl2,10g9.2- 19k). 5th Battle Sq.: b.s. Prince of Wales (15d- 177 178 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR 4gl2-18k), Bulwark (same), Formidable (same), Irresistible (same), Implacable (same), London (same), Queen (same), Venerable (same). Scout: c. Diamond (3d-12g4-22k). 6th Battle Sq.: b.s. Russell (14d-4gl2-19k), Albemarle (same), Cornwallis (same), Duncan (same), Exmouth (same), Ven^ geance (13d-4gl2-18k). Scout: c. To- paze (3d-12g4-22k). 5th Cruiser Sq.: a.c. Carnarvon (lld-4g7.5,- 6g6-22k), Sutlej (12d-2g9.2,12g6-21k), c. Liverpool (4.8d-2g6, 10g4-25k). 6th Cruiser Sq.: a.c. Drake (14d-2g9.2,16g6- 22k), King Alfred (same). Good Hope (same). Mine Layer Sq.: c. Andromache (3.4d-6g2.2- 20k), Apollo (same), Intrepid (same), Iphigenia (same), Latona {same), Naiad (same), Thetis (same). Third Fij:et 7th Battle Sq.: b.s. Caesar (15d-4gl2-18k), Hannibal (same). Illustrious (same), Magnificent (same). Majestic (same). Mars (same), Victorious (same), Prince George (same). Tender: c. Doris (5.6d- llg6-20k). 8th Battle Sq.: b.s. Albion (13d-4gl2-18k), Canopus (same). Glory (same), Goliath (same). Ocean (same), Jupiter (15d- 4gl2-18k). Tender: c. Proserpine (2d- 8g4-20k). 7th Cruiser Sq.: a.c. Aboukir (12d-2g9.2, 12g6- 21k), Hogue (same), Cressy (same), Bacchante (same), Euryalus (same). 8th Cruiser Sq.: Not organized. 9th Cruiser Sq.: a.c. Donegal (10d-14g6-23k), Monmouth (same), c. Europa (lld-16g6- 21k), Amphitrite (same), ArgonoMt (same). Challenger (5.9d-llg6-21k), Fiii- dictive (5.8d-10g6-19k), Highflyer (5.6d- llg6-20k). 10th Cruiser Sq.: c. Edgar (7.4d-2g9.2,10g6- 20k), Grafton (same), Hawke (same), Theseus (same). Crescent (7.7d-lg9.2, 12g6-20k), Royal Arthur (same), Gib- raltar (7.7d-2g9.2,10g6-20k). Patrol Flotilla. Consists of 6 scout cruisers as flagboats and the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th destroyer flotillas (79 boats— 360 to 1050 tons) ; 7 old cruisers and the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th submarine flotillas (3 boats of 210 tons, 36 of 320 tons, 8 of 630 tons, 6 of 825 tons) ; also 24 torpedo boats of 250 tons. Coast-Defense Flotillas. These are separ- ately organized for each port and consist of 21 destroyers (320 to 480 tons), 44 torpedo boats (75 to 750 tons), and 7 submarines (210 to 320 tons). FRANCE (North Sea and Atlantic Forces) 2d Light Sq. : Armored Cruiser Div.: a.c. Mar- seillaise (10d-2g7.6,8g6.4-21k), Aube (same), Cond^ (same). Destroyer Flotilla: c. Dunois (0.9-6g2.5-22k) flagboat; three divisions of 6 boats each (310 to 340 tons, 26 to 27 knots). Submarine Flotilla: Five divisions with 5 de- stroyers as flagboats, 18 submarines (550 to 810 tons). Mining Flotilla: Two mine layers (600d- 20k), 1 gunboat (950d-21k),'l destroyer (300d-26k). Schoolship Div.: a.c. Gloire (10d-2g7.6,8g6.4- 21k), Jeanne d'Arc (Ild-2g7.6,14g5.5- 23k), Gueydon (9d-2g7.6,8g6.4-21k), Dw- petit Thouars (same). Coast Defense. The mobile defense of Cher- bourg, Brest, Rochefort, Dunquerque, and Bidassoa consists of 2 destroyers, 7 torpedo boats, and 11 submarines. RUSSIA (Baltic Sea only) Active Fleet (Admiral von Essen, command- ing) Battleship Sq. : 6.*. Czarevitch (13d-4gl2-18k), Imperator Pavel I (16d-4gl2,14g8-18k), Andrei Pervosvanyi (same), Slava (14d- 4gl2-18k), a.c. Rurik (15d-4gl0,8g8- 22k). Armored Cruiser Sq.: a.c. Gromoboi (13d-4g8, 22g6-20k), Bayan (7.8d-2g8,8g6-21k), Pallada (same), Admiral Makarov (same), des. Novik (1.3d-4g4-36k). Destroyer Flotilla, 1st Sq.: Base, Libau; 4 divisions of 9 boats each (350 to 580 tons, 26 knots). 2d Sq.: Base, Helsingfors; 2 divisions of 9 boats, 1 of 8 boats (350 tons, 26 knots). Submarine Flotilla, 1st Div.: Base, Libau; 2 boats of 370 tons, 1 of 150, 1 of 129. 2d Div.: Base, Reval; 4 boats of 450 tons. Ships in Reserve, battleships: Imp. Ale.v. II (9d-2gl2, 5g8-15k), Petr Velikii (lOd- 4g8-12k). Armored cruiser: Rossya (12d-4g8,22g6-19k). Cruisers: Diana (6.7d-8g6-20k), Aurora (same). Destroj'ers and submarines: Many building; some completed. Torpedo boats: About 20 (108 to 150 tons). GERMANY High Seas Fleet (Vice Admiral Ingenohl,* commanding) Flagship: Friedrich der Grosse (25d-10gl2- 23k). * Oscar von Ingenohl, born (1857), at Neu- wied; spent half of his seafaring life in the NAVAL OPERATIONS 179 1st Battleship Sq., 1st Div.: b.s. Ostfkieslakd (22d-12gl2-21k), Helgoland (same), Thuringen (same), Oldenburg (same). 2d Div.: b.s. Posen (19d-12gll-30k), Nassau (same), Rheinland (same), Westfalen (same). 2d Battleship Sq., 1st Div.: b.s. Preussen (13d-4gll-18k), Schleswig-Holstein (same), Pommern (same), Schlesien (same). M Div.: b.s. Hannover (13d-4gll-18k), Hes- sen (same), Lothringen (same), Deutschland (same). 3d Battleship Sq., 1st Div.: b.s. Kaiser (24d- 10gl2-23k), Kaiserin (same), Pr. Reg. LuiTPOLD (same), Konig Albert (same). 2d Div.: Ships not completed. Cruiser Sq., Battle Cruiser Div.: b.c. Seydlitz (25d-10gll-29k), Von der Tann (19d- 8gll-27k), Moltke (23d-10gll-27k), Derfflinger (28d-8gl2-30k). Light Cruiser Sq.: c. Koln (4.3d-12g4.1-27k), Kolberg (same), Mainz (same), Rostock (4.8d-12g4.1-27k), Strassbiirg (4.5d- 12g4.1-27k), Stralsund (same), Dresden (3.6d-10g4.1-24k), Stettin (3.4d-10g4.1- 24k). Destroyer Flotillas: 1st Flotilla: 12 boats (550 tons-2g3.4-32.5k). M Flotilla: 12 boats (570d-2g3.4-33.5k). 3d and 4th Flotillas: each of 12 boats (640 tons-2g3.4-32.5k). 5th Flotilla: 12 boats (616 tons-2g3.4-30k). 6th and 7th Flotillas: each of 12 boats (550 tons-2g3.4-30k). Submarine Flotillas: 1st Flotilla: 7 boats, U- 21 to U-27 (910 tons). 2d Flotilla: 7 boats, U-I4 to U-20 (295 tons). 3d Flotilla: 7 boats, U-7 to U-13 (255 tons). Mine Layers Flotilla: Arkona (1970 tons). Nautilus (same), Albatross (2200 tons), Pelikan (2360 tons). Reserve Squadrons 4th Battleship Sq. : b.s. Wittelsbach (12d- 4g9.4-18k), Zahringen (same), Schwaben (same), Mecklenburg (same), Elsass (13d-4gll-18k), Braunschioeig (same). 5th Battleship Sq. : b.s. Kaiser Barbarossa (lld-4g9.4-18k), Kais. Wilhelm der Grosse (same), Kais. Wilhelm II (same), Kais. Karl der Grosse (same). Armored Coast-Defense Sq. : a.c.d. Sieg- Far East in command of various vessels; at- tached to Admiralty in Berlin (1897-1901); ac- companied the Kaiser on many of his cruises and for a time commanded the royal yacht Hohenzollern; rear admiral (1908); commander of second squadron of the high-sea fleet (1910); served in command during early part of Euro- pean War, but was removed (February, 1915). fried (4d-3g9.4-15k), Beowulf (same), Frithiof (same), Heimdall (same), midebrand (same), Hagen (same), Odin (3.5d-3g9.4-15k), Aegir (same). Squadron of Instruction, Cadet and Seaman Schools: c. Freya (5.6d-2g8.2,8g5.9-18k), Hertha (same), Vineta (same), Victoria Louise (same), Hansa (same), b.s. (old) Konig Wilhelm (10d-22g9.4-15k). Gunnery School: b.s. Wettin (12d-4g9.4-18k), a.c. Bliicher (16d-12g8.3-23k), Prinz Adalbert (9d-4g8.2,10g5.9-20k), c. Augs- burg (4.3d-12g4.1-27k), Danzig (3.2d- 10g4.1-23k), Stuttgart (3.4d-10g4.1-24k). Torpedo School: b.s. (old) Wiirttemburg (7d-6gl0.2-16k), a.c. FUrst Bismarck (Ild-4g9.4,12g5.9-19k), Friedrich Karl (9d-4g8.2,10g5.9-20k), c. Miinchen (3.2d- 10g4.1-23k). Old battleships: b.s. Worth (10d-6gll-17k), B randenbtirg ( same ) . Destroyers and submarines: About 35 destroy- ers, 6 submarines, 50 torpedo boats and several old cruisers and coast-defense craft were in reserve or laid up. Belligerent Naval Forces in the Mediterranean GREAT BRITAIN 2d Battle Cruiser Sq.: b.c. Inflexible (17d- 8gl2-27k), Indomitable (same). Indefat- igable (19d-8gl2-27k). 1st Cruiser Sq.: a.c. Defense (15d-4g9.2,10g7.5- 23k), Black Prince (14d-6g9.2,4g7.5-23k), Duke of Edinburgh (same). Warrior (14d-6g9.2,10g6-23k). Light cruisers: c. Gloucester (4.8d-2g6,10g4- 26k), Chatham (5.4d-9g6-26k), Dublin (same), Weymouth (5.3d-8g6-26k). 5th Destroyer Flotilla: 24 boats (550 tons-27 knots). Submarines: 6 boats of 320 tons. FRANCE First Fleet (Vice Admiral Boue de Lapeyfere, commanding) Section of the Commander in Chief: Flag- ship: b.s. Courbet (23d-12gl2-21k), b.8. Jean Bart (23d-12g-12-21k), c. Jurien de la GraviSre (5.6d-8g6.4-23k). 1st Battleship Sq., 1st Div.: b.s. Diderot (18d-4gl2,12g9.4-19k), Danton (same), Vergniaud (same), France (23d-12gl2- 21k). 2d Div.: b.s. Voltaire (18d-4gl2,12g9.4-19k), Mirabeau (same), Condorcet (same), Paris (23d-12gl2-21k).- 2d Battleship Sq., l.tt Div.: b.s. Verity (15d- 4gl2-19k), Republique (same), Patrie (same). 180 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR 2d Div.: b.s. Justice (14d-4gl2-19k), Dem- ocratie (same). Light Sq., 1st Div.: a.c. Jules Michelet (12d- 4g7.6,12g6.4-22k), Ernest Renan (13d- 4g7.6,12g6.4-24k), Edgar Quinet (14d- 14g7.6-23k), Waldeck Rousseau (same). Sd Div.: a.c. Mon Gambetta (12d-4g7.6,12g 6.4-23k), Victor Hugo (same), Jules Ferry (same). Supplementary Battleship Div.: b.s. Sufren (12d-4gl2-18k), St. Louis (lld-4gl2- 18k), Bouvet (12d-2gl2,2gl0.8-18k). Destroyer Flotilla: flagboat, des. Bov.chier (0.70d-2g3.9,2g2.5-32k). 1st Div.: 5 boats (0.73d-2g3.9,2g2.5-33k). 2d Div.: 5 boats (0.4 to 0.45d-6g2.6-28k). 3d Div.: 5 boats (0.45d-6g2.6-28 to 31k). 4th Div.: 6 boats (0.33 to 0.4d-lg2.6-27 to 30k). 5th Div.: 6 boats (0.33d-lg2.6-29k). 6th Div.: 5 boats (0.75d-2g3.9,4g2.6-30 to 32k). Submarine Flotilla: flagboat, des. Dehorter (0.75d-2g3.9,4g2.6-31k). 1st Div.: des. ArbaUte (0.3d-lg2.6-31k), 3 submarines (550 tons). 2d Div.: des Hallebarde (0.3d-lg2.6-27k), 2 submarines (550 tons). 3d Div.: des. Dard (0.3d-lg2.6-29k), 2 sub- marines (550 and 490 tons). 4th Div.: des. Mousqueton (0.3d-lg2.6-29k), 3 submarines (550 tons). 5th Div.: des. Sarbacane (0.3d-lg2.6-29k), 2 submarines (550 tons). Mine layers: Casabianca (945 tons), des. Baliste (300 tons). Schoolship Div.: b.s. Jaureguiberry (12d-2gl2, 2gl0.8-18k), Charlemagne (lld-4gl2- 18k), Gaulois (same), Marceau (lld- 4gl3.4-16k), a.c. Pottruau (5.3d-2g7.6,10g 5.5-19k), g.b. La Hire (0.9d-6g2.6-22k), transport Tourville. Defense Mobile. At Toulon, 3 submarines, several torpedo boats, 1 mother ship for aeroplanes; at Bizerta, 3 submarines and several torpedo boats. Morocco Div.: c. Du Chayla (4d-6g6.4,4g3.9- 20k), Cassard (same). Levant Div.: a.c. Latouche Treville (4.7d-2g7.6, 6g5.5-18k), Bruix (same). Miscellaneous : In addition to the active forces mentioned, there were 5 old battleships (1891-97), 4 old armored cruisers, and 10 old cruisers which were on special ser- vice, in reserve, or laid up; also about 12 destroyers, 17 submarines, and 115 tor- pedo boats. RUSSIA Mediterranean Sq.: a.c. Bogatyr (6.7d-12g6- 23k), Oleg (same). GERMANY Special Sq.: b.c. Goeben (23d-10gll-27k), c. BresloM (4.5d-12g4.1-27k). AUSTRIA-HUNGARY Battle Fleet (Admiral Haus, commanding) 1st Div.: b.s. Viribus Unitis (20d-12gl2-21k), Tegetthoff (same), Prinz Eugen (same). 2d Div.: b.s. Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand (14d- 4gl2,8g9.4-20k), .Radeisfc^ (same), Zrinyi (same). 3d Div.: b.s. Erz. Ferd. Mac (10.5d-4g9.4-20k), Erz. Friedrick (same), Erz. Karl (same). Cruiser Div.: a.c. Sankt Oeorg (7.2d-2g9.4,5g7. 6,4g5.9-22k), Kaiser Karl VI (6.2d-2g9.4, 8g5.9-21k), des. Turul (0.4d-lg2.8,7gl.8- 28k), Velebit (same). Scout Div.: c. Saida (3.4d-7g3.9-27k), Novara (same). Ad. Spawn (same), Helgoland (same). Coast-Defense Service, 1st Div.: b.s. Haps- burg (8d-3g9.4-19k), Arpad (same), Badenburg (same). 2d Div.: b.s. Wien (5.5d-4g9.4-17k), Monarch (same), Bnda-Pest (same). Crtiisers: a.c.d. Kronj^rinz Erzherzog Rudolf (6.8d-3gl3-16k), a.c. Kaiserin Maria The- resa (5.2d-2g7.6,8g5.9-19k). c. Kaiser Franz Joseph I (4d-8g5.9-19k), Aspern (2.4d-8g4.7-20k), Tzigetvar (same), Zenta (same). Panther (1.5d-2g4.7-18k). Destroyer Flotilla: 6 boats (0.8d-2g4-32.5k), 10 boats (0.4d-lg2.8-28k) ; reserve: 1 boat (0.5d-6gl.8-26k), 6 boats (0.4 to 0.5d- misc.-20 to 23k). Torpedo-Boat Flotilla: 12 boats (0.25d-2g2.8- 28k), 24 boats (0.2d-4gl.8-26k), 12 boats (0.1d-2gl.8-28k), 6 boats (0.1d-2gl.8- 26k), 11 boats (0.1d-2gl.4-19k), mother ship (13d-4g4.7-20k). Submarine Flotilla: 2 boats (270 tons), 3 boats (300 tons), 2 boats (273 tons), 1 depot ship (ld-4g2.8-15k). ITALY Note. — Though Italy did not enter the war until later, for purposes of comparison the condition on Aug. 1, 1914, is given. Active Fleet (Vice Admiral Marcello, com- manding) First Sq., 1st Div.: b.s. Dante Alighieri (19d 12gl2-23k), GiULio Cesare (22d-13gl2- 28k), Leonardo da Vinci (same), c. Nino Bixio (3.5d-6g4.7-29k). 1st Destroyer Flotilla: 4 boats (0.7d-lg4.7, 4g3-30k). 3d Div.: b.s. Regvna Margherita (13d-4gl2, 4g8-20k), Benedetto Brin (same), Eman- NAVAL OPERATIONS 181 uelo Filiberto (10d-4gl0-18k), Ammirag- lio di St. Bon (same). 4th Destroyer Flotilla: 6 boats (0.4d-4g3- 29k). oth Dk\: a.c. Giuseppe Garibaldi (7.2d-lgl0, 2g8,14g6-20k), Varese (same), Frarv- cesco Perruccio (same), Carlo Alberto (6.4d-12g6-19k), ^.6. Coatit (13d-12g3- 23k). 5th Destroyer Flotilla: 6 boats (0.33d-lg3, 5g2.2-30k). Second Sq., 2d Div.: b.s. Regina Elena (12.5d- 2gl2,12g8-22k), Vittorio Emmamiele III (same), Roma (same), Napoli (same), c. Quarto (3.2d-6g4.7-28k). 3d Destroyer Flotilla: 6 boats (0.7d-lg4.7, 4g3-30k). 4th Div.: a.c. Pisa (10d-4gl0,8g7.5-23k), Amalfi (same), San Giorgio (9.7d-4gl0, 8g7.5-23k), San Marco (same), c. Ma/r- sala (3.5d-6g4.7-29k), g.b. Agordat (1.3d-12g3-23k). M Destroyer Flotilla: 6 boats (0.4d-4g3- 29k). In Reserve or on Special Service in the Mediterranean : Battleships: b.s. Conte di Cavour (22d- 13gl2-23k); old battleships, b.s. Dan- dolo (12d-4gl0-16k), Duilio (same), Sardegna (13d-4gl3.5-20k), Sicilia (same). Re Umberto (same). Armored cruiser: a.c. Vettor Pisani (6.4d- 12g6-19k). Cruisers: c. Libia (3.7d-2g6,8g4.7-22k) and 6 old cruisers (2200 to 3500 tons). Destroyers: About 14 (300 to 700 tons). Torpedo boats: About 93 (34 to 215 tons). Submarines: 20 boats (110 to 463 tons). Ships in Foreign Waters: China Seas: a.c. Marco Polo (4.5d-6g6,10g4.7- 19k). Red Sea and Indian Ocean: c. Piemonte (2.6d-10g4.7-22k), Calabria (2.5d-6g4.7- 16k). TURKEY Note. — Though Turkey did not enter the war until later, for purposes of comparison the condition on Aug. 1, 1914, is given, adding the GoEBEN and Breslau. The battleships build- ing in England were taken over by Great Britain at the outbreak of war. So far as known the Turkish navy had no fleet or squad- ron organization. The vessels were as follows: Battle cruiser: Sultan Selim Javuz (ex-Goe- ben) (23d-10gll-37k). Ba'ttleships (old): Kheyr-ed-din Barbarossa (10d-6gll-17k), Torgut Reis (same). Old b..' j/iUlK Ih IH ) Harris & Ewingr. Washinfiton. D. C. CAPTAIN FRANZ VON PAPEN German Military Attache Harris & Ewingr, Washing-ton, D. C. CAPTAIN KARL BOY-ED German Naval Attache REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TEUTONIC POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES. 1915 NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 251 gard to stirring up revolutions in Ire- land. Both Devoy and Judge Cohalan denied any guilty connections with the German government. Evidence was found to indicate that several American citizens, who were well known as jour- nalists and lecturers, had received pay- ment from German authorities for pro- paganda work. These included Edwin Emerson and F. J. Archibald, who was arrested in 1916 while carrying impor- tant papers to Germany from the United States. The documents revealed through this seizure were of the great- est value in searching for evidence of German activities, and in bringing about the arrest of many suspected per- sons. The State Department, through its secret service, discovered, during 1917, that messages had been regularly sent between Argentina and Germany, through the medium of the Swedish min- ister to Argentina, and that the Ger- man minister in Mexico had in March, 1916, strongly commended the work in behalf of Germany done by Folke Cron- holm, the Swedish Charge d'Aff aires in Mexico. He recommended a decoration in recognition of his services. Much more sensational, however, was the declaration made public of the cor- respondence carried on by Count Lux- burg, the German Charge d'AfFaires at Buenos Aires, with the Foreign Office at Berlin through the Swedish legation as a medium of communication. The first of these messages made public was dated May 19, 1917. After detaiHng the re- lease of certain German and Austrian ships by the Argentine government, and speaking of the change in public feeling in Argentina in behalf of the Germans, he said: "This government will, in the future, only clear Argentine ships as far as Las Palmas. I beg that the small steamers Oran and Guazo, thirty-first January (meaning, which sailed 31), which are now nearing Bordeaux with a view to a change of flag, may be spared if possible, or else sunk without a trace being left ('spurlos versenkt')." Another message followed on July 3 : "I learn from a reliable source that the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is a notorious ass and anglophile, declared in a secret session of the Sen- ate, that Argentina should demand from Berlin a promise not to sink more Ar- gentine ships. If not agreed to, rela- tions would be broken off. I recom- mend refusal, and if necessary, calling in the mediation of Spain." Other messages in the same form fol- lowed, showing that a constant com- munication had been carried on between Argentina and Germany through one source. The Swedish government de- nied any wrong intentions or acts, but a. satisfactory adjustment had not been made at the end of the war. On Sep- tember 21, the Secretary of State made public the following message from von Bernstorff to the Berlin Foreign Of- fice, dated January 22, 1917: "I request authority to pay out up to $50,000 in order, as on former occa- sions, to influence Congress through the organization you know of, which can perhaps prevent war. I am beginning in the meantime to act accordingly. "In the above circumstances a public ofScial German declaration in favor of Ireland is highly desirable, in order to gain the support of Irish influence here." The publication of this message created a profound sensation in Con- gress. A resolution was at once adopt- ed to investigate as to any possible criminal plans in German activities as indicated by this note. No definite ac- tion, however, was taken. 252 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR On September 22, 1917, the Secre- tary of State published the follow- ing: "In view of inquiries which have been made as to whether Count Bemstorff knew of the purpose of his government to renew relentless submarine warfare when he sent his message of January 22, 1917, asking authorization to ex- pend $50,0001, I can state that the Department of State possesses conclu- sive evidence that on or before Janu- ary 19, Count Bernstoi-fF had received and read the Zimmermann telegram to Minister von Eckhart in Mexico which contained the following: " 'We intend to begin on the 1st of February unrestricted submarine war- fare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral.' "Count von BernstorfF was, there- fore, fiilly advised of the intentions of the Imperial government at the time when he asked for authority of Berlin to employ funds for an organization to influence Congressional action in favor of the continued neutrality of this coun- try." On December 21, 1917, Secretary Lansing made public another series of telegrams exchanged between Count Luxburg and the German government through the Swedish Minister. These made it plain that the German govern- ment was keeping in close touch through this channel with happenings in South American countries. It indi- cated also the strong desire of the Ger- man government to preserve the neu- trality of this country. One of the most daring attempts at propaganda work was carried on by a Levantine adventurer, Bolo Pasha, who came to the United States with the purpose of influencing or purchasing newspapers in behalf of German propa- ganda. He was supplied with a large amount of money by the German gov- ernment, and large sums were deposited with a banking house of German affilia- tions in New York City. On his arriv- al in this country, Bolo entered into negotiations with Adolph Pavenstedt, then a member of the banking house of Amsinck and Co. Pavenstedt carried Bolo's plans to Ambassador Bernstorff", and as a result, the German Ambassa- dor directed Hugo Schmidt, the Ger- man financial agent in America, to pay to Bolo $1,750,000. Bolo secured introductions to prom- inent men, including William Randolph Hearst, whom he convinced that he was a friend of France and was carrying on work in behalf of that country. It was afterward revealed that he was in close relations with Senator Humbert of Pi-ance, who received large sums of money from the German funds supplied Bolo. The intrigues of Bolo Pasha were revealed through an investigation carried on by Merton Lewis, the at- torney-general of New York, who sent the evidence in his hands to the French government. Bolo's work was carried on not only in the United States, but in Canada, but no evidence is shown that his eff'orts to influence or purchase pa- pers was successful. He was executed. Embargo and Blockade of German Trade. — The problem of dealing with neutral countries which bordered on Germany, and which normally obtained large food supplies from the United Stales, was one of the most vexing prob- lems with which the American govern- ment had to deal. Extraordinary in- crease in these imports during the years of the war, made it evident that these countries were supplying immense quan- tities of stores to Germany, and thus prolonging the war. The President is- sued a proclamation declaring that aft- NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 253 er August 30, 1917, no exports from American ports could be shipped to any country in the eastern hemisphere ex- cept under a license granted by the Ex- port Council. This restriction, so uni- versal in application, was specifically aimed at the European neutral coun- tries now trading with Germany, In an explanatory note accompanying the proclamation the President said : "The purpose and effect of this proc- lamation is not export prohibition, but merely export control. It is not the intention to interfere unnecessarily with our foreign trade ; but our own domes- tic needs must be adequately safeguard- ed, and there is the added duty of meet- ing the necessities of all of the nations at war with the Imperial German gov- ernment. "After these needs are met, it is our wish and intention to minister to the needs of the neutral nations as far as our resources permit. This task will be discharged without other than the very proper qualification that the liberation of our surplus products shall not be made the occasion of benefit to the enemy, either directly or indirectly." The embargo was later modified by the removal of the license ban from a number of commodities for export to countries other than Germany, her al- lies, and neutral nations bordering on Germany. The effect of this modifica- tion was to concentrate the embargo against Holland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, the countries from which Ger- many secured large quantities of sup- plies. Holland had previously entered into an agreement with Germany which fixed the percentage of the exports from the Netherlands to the Central Powers, and to the nations at war with them. The United States government refused to recognize this agreement as equit- able and intimated that while it was ob- sei"ved, no American commodities, in- cluding foods, cattle, fodder, and dairy products would be permitted to enter Holland. Holland clung to the agree- ment in order to obtain coal and other commodities from Germany. As a re- sult of this embargo, a large number of Dutch and other neutral vessels load- ed with grain and other food products, were held in New York harbor and else- where. The United States government refused to permit them to sail under conditions which enabled the cargo to take the place of food supplies from Holland to Germany. The United States proposed that these ships with the cargo be sent to the Allies or un- loaded for American use, and that the vessels be placed in the American coast- wise trade. The Dutch government re- fused, fearing the attitude that Ger- many would take if aid was given to her enemies. There were in all eighty- four Dutch ships held idle in American ports for six months, and they entailed expenses to their owners exceeding twenty-five million dollars. An arrange- ment had not yet been arrived at at the end of the year. Financing the War. — The United States government determined to raise the money necessary for the conduct of the war by three methods: (1) loans, (2) revenue under the existing laws, (3) new taxation. The Treasury De- partment decided to raise the money immediately needed by means of bond issues. Consequently books were opened, offering $2,000,000,000 worth of 31/0 per cent convertible gold bonds. The loan was called the "Liberty Loan." Subscriptions closed on June 15, 1917. Amounts were allotted to each of the twelve Federal Reserve districts and in practically every district the amount allotted was over-subscribed. The cam- paign was carried on with a great dis- 254 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR play of posters, ringing of bells, and speeches by prominent men. There were approximately 3,000,000 subscribers and the loan was oversubscribed by al- most $1,000,000,000. Books were open- ed for a second liberty loan on October 1, 1917. These offered from $3,000,- 000,000 to $5,000,000,000 worth of 4 per cent convertible gold bonds bearing interest from November 15. As was the case with the first Liberty Loan, the sec- ond Liberty Loan bonds were enthusi- astically bought by the American peo- ple. The maximum amount was ap- proximately reached by means of 10,- 000,000 individual subscriptions. The War Revenue Act as passed in Sep- tember, 1917, contained drastic taxa- tion measures. An additional tax and surtax were levied on incomes and a graduated excess profits tax on corpor- ations, partnerships, and individuals was put in operation. Internal taxes on tobacco, liquor, transportation, amusements, etc., and an increase in postal rates were expected to produce a vast revenue. The estimated cost of the first year of the war was $18,500,- 000,000. For other information see sec- tion on Financial and Economic As- pects. Presidenfs Address to Congress. — On December 5, 1917, President Wilson delivered a very important message to Congress. He emphasized the fact that the only possible peace was one after a military victory, when it would be ne- gotiated with responsible representa- tives of the German people. He stated that international peace after the war must come from a partnership of peo- ples and not of governments. America would consider the war won when the German people were ready to agree to a settlement based on justice and repara- tion of wrongs their rulers have done. "Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource, whether of men, or money, or of materials, is being devoted and will continue to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I coun- sel to carry their advice elsewhere. I will not entertain it." He asked for a declaration of war against Austria and it was declared on December 7. His speech created a profound impression both at home and abroad. Sinking of the Lusitania. — Before the government of the United States had formulated any action in connection with these cases (see above) the world was shocked at the terrible news that the Cunard Line steamship Lusitania had been sunk on May 7, 1915, by a German submarine off Old Head of Kinsale at the southeastern point of Ireland, resulting in the loss of 1150 lives, of whom 114 were known to be American citizens. Prior to sailing of the Lusitania from New York on her fatal voyage, an advertisement signed by the German Embassy appeared in many newspapers warning Americans of the danger of traveling on British vessels through the war zone. The first feeling of horror at the ter- rible catastrophe was succeeded by a feeling of bitter resentment in America at what appeared to be a ruthless sacri- fice of innocent lives. It appeared, at first, as if a break between the United States and Germany were inevitable. President Wilson waited six days before taking definite action, stating that it was important to act with deliberation as well as with firmness. In the mean- time the German government, on May 10, 1915, sent a communication to the United States government expressing its sympathy for the loss of American NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 255 lives, but at the same time maintaining that the responsibility rested with the British government, which through its plan of starving the civilian population of Germany by prohibiting the impor- tation of foodstuffs, had forced Ger- many to resort to retaliatory measures. It was further claimed that British mer- chant vessels were generally armed, and repeated attempts had been made by such vessels to ram submarines. Finally it was stated that the Lusitania carried a large quantity of ammunition in her cargo and warning had been given by Germany that such vessels were lia- ble to destruction. On May 13, 1915, the eagerly awaited statement of the United States was sent to Germany. With a dignity and an earnestness which the gravity of the situation called for, President Wilson reviewed the series of acts of German submarine commanders culminating in the sinking of the Lusitania, which he said "the government of the United States has observed with growing con- cern, distress, and amazement." Referring to the claim that the alleged illegal acts of her adversaries justified Germany in adopting retaliatory meas- ures the American note stated that the government of the United States could not admit that any such measures were legal which infringed the clearly estab- lished rights of neutrals under interna- tional law. These rights include the protection of the lives of noncombatants traveling on unarmed merchant vessels and the right of neutrals to travel on the high seas wherever their legitimate business calls them. In view of these clearly established principles the note stated that "it confidently expects the Imperial German government will dis- avow the acts of which the government of the United States complains ; that they will make reparation as far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the re- currence of anything so obviously sub- versive of the principles of warfare, for which the Imperial German government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended." In conclusion it was stated that "the Imperial German government will not expect the government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment." Some hope was felt that the German government would disavow the act when on May 11, 1915, a note was issued explaining its attitude with respect to American and other neutral ships in the war zone. It stated that the Ger- man government had no intention of at- tacking such neutral ships if they were guilty of no hostile act. Even if such ships carried contraband they were to be dealt with according to the rules of international law applying to prize war- fare. It further stated that if a neutral ship should be destroyed by mistake the German government would "unre- servedly recognize its responsibility therefor." While this did not cover the question involved in the Lusitania case, viz., the right of neutrals to travel in safety on merchant vessels under a belligerent flag, nevertheless it was a distinct modification of the policy an- nounced in the proclamation establish- ing the war zone. On May 28, 1915, the German gov- ernment submitted a note defining its position in regard to the various ques- tions raised in the American note. With regard to the cases of the Cush- ing and the Gulflight it was stated that an investigation was in progress and the 256 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR results of this investigation would be communicated to the United States gov- ernment shortly. (A note was sent by the German government on June 4, 1915, expressing regrets for the sinking of the Gulflight, explaining that no dis- tinct marks were seen on the vessel by which she could be identified. Germany further agreed to furnish full recom- pense for the damage done. In regard to the Cushing the German government asked for additional information in the possession of the American government in order that a conclusion might be reached in the matter.) In regard to the F aloha, it was again stated that the commander had disregarded the order to lay to and had sent up rocket signals for help. Concerning the Lusitania, the Ger- man government took the position that the government of the United States had not considered all of the material facts in the case. It then repeated the charge that the Lusitania had guns on board mounted under decks, that the British government had issued orders to merchantment to ram submarines, and that in view of these alleged facts the German commanders "were no longer in a position to observe the rules of cap- ture otherwise usual." It was further contended that the Lusitania carried large quantities of ammunition and a number of Canadian troops, and that the German government was justified in destroying war munitions destined for the enemy. Finally it was asserted that the rapid sinking of the Lusitania was due to an explosion of the cargo of ammunition. (It was categorically denied both by the British authorities and the American port officials at New York that the Lusitania carried guns and war munitions.) The German gov- ernment requested the American govern- ment to carefully consider the above statements and express its view m re- gard to them when the German govern- ment agreed to make a final statement as to its position. It was at this juncture in the nego- tiations that Mr. Bryan resigned as Secretary of State on the ground that he was unable to agree with the Presi- dent as to the proper policy to pursue in dealing with the difficulties with Ger- many. The two points upon which Mr. Bryan in his letter of explanation stated that he was not in agreement with the President were ( 1 ) as to submitting the Lusitania case to the investigation of an international commission and (2) as to warning Americans against travel- ing on belligerent vessels or vessels carrying cargoes of ammunition. Mr. Bryan held that the questions in dis- pute should be considered by an inter- national commission, and secondly, that American travelers should be warned as above indicated. The next diplomatic move was made on June 9, 1915, when the American government replied to the German gov- ernment that it noted with satisfaction the position taken by the latter in the cases of the Cushing and Gulflight. In regard to the Falaba the United States was unwilling to admit that the at- tempt on the part of the merchantman to escape capture altered the obliga- tion of the commander of the attacking vessel to provide for the safety of the lives of those on board the merchant- man. In regard to the statements made by Germany that the Lusitania was armed, the American government stated that it had official information that such was not the case. With regard to the carrying of contraband by the Lusi- tania, it was held that this was entirely irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used in sinking the ves- sel. Brushing aside these extraneous NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 257 issues, the American government took its stand firmly on the ground that it was "contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of human- ity," and it stated that it "very ear- nestly and very solemnly" renewed its representations made in the previous note. A reply to this note came from the German government on July 8, 1915. There was in this communication little evidence of a desire to meet the issue. There were the usual assertions in re- gard to England's inhuman methods of warfare and a suggestion for guard- ing the safety of American vessels in the war zone. The rejoinder to this note sent by the government of the United States on July 21, 1915, indicated very clearly that it considered the German communication evasive and unsatisfac- tory. It stated once more in the clear- est manner possible the real question at issue, namely, that acts of reprisal against an enemy are indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowl- edged rights. The note further gave pointed evidence that the United States government felt that the discussion had gone far enough and that "it cannot believe that the Imperial government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander." Despite this urgent suggestion from the United States that the matter should be speedily settled the negotiations dragged on. There was evidence, how- ever, that the German government was attempting to find some solution which would concede most that the United States was contending for while at the same time avoid the appearance of be- ing humiliated. For example, on Sept. 1, 1915, Ambassador von Bernstorff, in a letter to the new Secretary of State Lansing, gave assurance that German submarines would not sink any more liners without warning. It is to be noted that this included ships belonging to belligerents as well as neu- trals. Finally, in November, the Ger- man government authorized its Am- bassador at Washington to begin ne- gotiations looking to a settlement of all outstanding issues between the two na- tions. While the negotiations in regard to the Lusitaniu were being conducted, further complications arose from the continued action of German submarines and commerce destroyers. The sinking of the American schooner Wm. P. Frye by the German auxiliary cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich led to an exchange of notes in which Germany finally agreed to pay an indemnity for the loss of the vessel and cargo, and also made the important stipulation that thereafter no merchant vessel would be sunk until the safety of the crew and passengers was made absolutely certain. In the case of the British steamship Arabic, sunk by a German submarine on Aug. 19, 1915, the German govern- ment at first refused to acknowledge any obligation in the matter, as it was contended that the Arabic had at- tempted to ram the submarine. Later, however, the German government agreed to pay an indemnity for the loss of American lives on the Arabic and fur- ther stated that the instructions to the commanders of submarines had been made so stringent that a repetition of incidents similar to the Arabic was con- sidered out of the question. Just when it appeared that the issues between Ger- many and the United States which had arisen in connection with the operations of the submarines were about to be set- tled, a new issue appeared which seri- ously complicated the whole situation. Question of Armed Merchantmen. — It had long been a recognized right un- 258 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR der international law for merchant ves- sels to carry armament for defensive purposes. This practice dates back to the days of piracy and privateers, and the armament of a merchantman was in- tended for purposes of defense against these irregular enemies. It was never contemplated that such armament would be available against a regular man-of- war. The appearance of the submarine, however, changed the aspect of an armed merchantman. Even small-calibre guns would be effective for sinking these frail craft. The German government contended that Great Britain had mounted guns on a large number of merchant vessels and had issued instructions to the mas- ters of such vessels to attack submarines which approached their ships. Under these circumstances the German govern- ment contended that such vessels were in fact men-of-war and might be sunk without warning. There was much force in this argument, and the United States government in a communication to the belligerent Powers stated that, in view of the changed conditions of war- fare and the disappearance of pirates and privateers, it was seriously consid- ering regarding all armed merchantmen as vessels of war. It was suggested that the belligerents agree that submarines observe the rules of international law and at the same time that all armament should be removed from merchant vessels. While this note was being considered by the belligerent Powers, matters were brought to a head when on Feb. 10, 1916, the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary notified the United States that after March 1, 1916, armed belligerent merchant vessels would be sunk without warning by the Teutonic Powers. At about the same time it became known that the Entente Allies would not accept the compromise sug- gestions proposed by the United States. This new development in the subma- rine issue aroused serious concern in the United States. There was a strong sentiment in Congress that the govern- ment should carry out its announced position of considering all armed mer- chantmen as vessels of war. The ad- ministration felt, however, that as the belligerent Powers had declined to ac- cept its suggestion for disarming mer- chant vessels it was not within its right to insist upon this modification of in- ternational law. For a time it appeared as if a serious breach would occur be- tween Congress and the Administration. Resolutions were introduced in both Houses of Congress, calling upon the President to warn Americans not to travel on armed merchantmen. The President did not welcome this interven- tion of Congress in the conduct of ne- gotiations with foreign Powers, and in order to place Congress on record, he asked for and received what in effect was a vote of confidence from Congress. This new issue once more delayed the final settlement of the issues between Germany and the United States. The President refused to continue further the negotiations relative to the Lusi- tania case until Germany gave assur- ances that the submarine warfare would be conducted in such a wa}^ as not to imperil Americans traveling on the high seas. In a note presented to the State Department, Feb. 16, 1916, Ger- manv recognized her liability in the Lusitanm affair. She promised repara- tion and said that submarine operations (as reprisals) must only be directed against enemy subjects. The sinking of the French cross- channel steamer Sussex aroused seri- ous concern in the United States in view of the promises which had been made NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 259 by Germany. In a communication sent to the American government on April 10, 1916, the German authorities of- fered an explanation of the sinking of several vessels, and denied responsibility for the sinking of the Sussex. Presi- dent Wilson, in order to bring the whole issue to a final settlement, if possible, sent on April 19, 1916, a communication to German}' which was clearly in the nature of an ultimatum. It stated that an impartial investigation conclusively established the fact that the steamer Sussex was sunk without warning by a torpedo of German manufacture. It then reviewed the submarine activities for the preceding year and pointed out how submarine commanders had con- tinued to sink merchant vessels, both belligerent and neutral, without warn- ing, despite the explicit promises of the German government. In conclusion it was stated that unless the German gov- ernment "immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the gov- ernment of the United States can have no other choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire alto- gether." On the same day that this note was sent, President Wilson, before the two Houses of Congress, read a message in which he reviewed the course of nego- tiations in connection with submarine warfare and informed Congress of the nature of the message which he had sent to Gernriany. In reply to this note the German government stated that it was possible that the Sussex was sunk by a German submarine, and if further investigation should establish this to be the case "the German government will nolt fail to draw the consequence resulting there- from." On the other hand the Ger- man authorities denied the assertion made in the American note that there had been an indiscriminate destruction of vessels by German submarines. They defended the activity of the submarines as a legitimate retaliation for the al- leged violations of international law by Great Britain. However, it was stated that submarine commanders had re- ceived further instructions to the fol- lowing effect : "In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and with- out saving human lives, unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance." While this was a substantial agree- ment to the demand of the United States, the note went on to say that Ger- many would expect the United States government to "demand and insist that the British government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war," and in case the British government failed to do so "the German government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve to itself the com- plete liberty of decision." This con- cluding statement held out the possi- bility of a renewal of submarine warfare without restrictions in case Great Britain did not modify her policy of blockade. To this communication the United States government returned an immedi- ate reply, stating that it would rely upon a "scrupulous execution" of the new policy by the German government. At the same time the note stated that the United States government could not agree that the continuance of this new policy of submarine warfare by Ger- many was "contingent upon the conduct 260 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants." Shipment of War Munitions. — Shortly after the outbreak of the war large orders for war munitions were placed by the Entente Allies with Amer- ican firms. The complete control of the seas by the British and French fleets made it impossible for the Teutonic Powers to obtain similar supplies. Comment in the German press indicated that the feeling in Germany was very strong that the United States was not observing a strict neutrality by allow- ing such shipments. On April 4, 1915, Ambassador Bemstorff called the mat- ter to the attention of the United States government officially. He maintained that while the United States had taken no action in regard to alleged violations of international law by Great Britain in interfering with neutral trade, it had allowed American firms to supply large quantities of war munitions to Ger- many's enemies. He maintained that conditions in the present war were unique, that while theoretically arms might be shipped from the United States to Germany, practically they could be sent only to her enemies. A real spirit of neutrality called for the stoppage of a trade which was aiding only one side. In a vigorous reply to this note Presi- dent Wilson set forth clearly the posi- tion of the United States. He first called attention to the fact that her relations with England could not be made a subject of discussion with a third government. With regard to the shipment of arms and ammunition, the President pointed out that any change in the laws of neutrality during the progress of a war would be a departure from the principle of strict neutrality and the placing of an embargo on the trade in arms would constitute such a change. In reply to a similar protest by the Austro-Hungarian government on Aug. 1, 1915, the government of the United States on Aug. 12, 1915, made an ex- haustive statement of its position. It reiterated the statement made in the reply to Germany that any change in the rules of neutrality made during a war would violate the spirit of neu- trality. In addition it pointed out that it had never been the policy of the United States to maintain a large mili- tary establishment or great stores of ammunition and had depended upon the right to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral Powers in time of war. To prohibit such trade would compel every nation to have on hand sufficient munitions of war to meet any emer- gency, and would practically make every nation an armed camp. Apart, then, from any question of the legality of an embargo on arms, the United States government felt that it would be a mistaken policy as it would deliberately encourage the spirit of militarism. Relations with Austria^Hungary. — During the year 1915 two serious dis- putes arose involving the United States and Austria-Hungary. The first of these concerned the activities of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Theodor Dumba.* On Sept. 1, 1915, James F. J. Archi- bald, an American newspaper corre- spondent, was arrested by the British authorities, when the steamer Rotter- dam put into Falmouth, for carrying dispatches from the German and Aus- trian embassies at Washington to Ber- * Constantin Theodor Dumba, born (1856) in Vienna; graduated in law at the University of Vienna (1878) and then studied in Paris; en- tered Austrian Foreign Office (1879); Privy Councillor (1908); Ambassador from Austria to the United States from 1913 till his recall on demand of the United States government in 1915. NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 261 lin and Vienna. Among the papers was a letter from Dr. Dumba, suggesting a plan for crippling the munition fac- tories in America by fomenting strikes among the Austro-Hungarian laborers in these factories. Dr. Dumba admit- ted the authenticity of the documents and defended his action on the ground that it was his duty to bring to the attention of his fellow countrymen em- ployed by the manufacturers of muni- tions that they were engaged in enter- prises unfriendly to the fatherland, and that the Imperial government would re- gard them as guilty of a serious crime, punishable by penal servitude, should they return to their own country. This explanation proved unsatisfac- tory to the American government and Secretary Lansing notified the Austrian government that as Dr. Dumba had "conspired to cripple legitimate indus- tries of the people of the United States and had flagrantly violated diplomatic propriety by employing an American citizen protected by an American pass- port as a secret bearer of official dis- patches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary," he was no longer acceptable to the United States as the Ambassador from Austria-Hungary. In answer to this demand the Austro- Hungarian government agreed, on Sept. 27, 1915, to recall Dr. Dumba. The second incident involving the two countries was the sinking of the Italian steamer Ancona on Nov. 7, 1915, by an Austrian submarine. The Ancona had attempted to escape but was overhauled. It was charged by the survivors that the submarine continued to fire after the Ancona had stopped. In all more than 200 lives were lost, among them nine American citizens. In a vigorous note the government of the United States, on Dec. 6, 1915, demanded that the Austro-Hungarian government should disavow the act, that the commander of the submarine should be punished, and that an indemnity should be paid for the loss of the lives of American citizens. To this the Austro-Hungarian gov- ernment replied on Dec. 15, 1915, ask- ing for more specific information upon which the government of the United States based its charges. On Dec. 19, 1915, the American government replied, stating that it based its charges on the official report of the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty, and declined further to specify the additional testimony tend- ing to corroborate the Admiralty's re- port. The incident was closed by the Austro-Hungarian government grant- ing practically all of the American de- mands. In a note sent Dec. 29, 191'5, it was stated that the submarine com- mander had been punished for not tak- ing into consideration the panic aboard the Ancona which rendered disembark- ment difficult. It agreed that Austria- Hungary should indemnify American citizens affected. While disclaiming re- sponsibility for lives lost by the shots which were fired while the Ancona was attempting to escape, or for those lost by the faulty lowering of lifeboats, Aus- tria agreed not to press for proof that the American lives were lost through the fault of the submarine commander, and agreed "to extend indemnities to those whose cause cannot be established." In conclusion the note stated that the Austro-Hungarian government "re- served to itself the right to bring up for discussion at a later time the difficult questions of international law con- nected with submarine warfare." Public Opinion in the United States. — Public opinion in the United States was sharply divided as to the lessons to be drawn from the war, and as to the policy which that country should adopt. 262 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR On the one hand a vigorous campaign was inaugurated to strengthen the miH- tary and naval defenses of the United States. It was urged with great ear- nestness that the war had demonstrated the futihty of mihtary unpreparedness and that the United States was in par- ticular danger because of her great wealth which other nations would covet- On the other hand it was urged with equal fervor that the cause of the war was primarily the great military arma- ments in Europe, and that the United States would make a great mistake by joining in the competition for military preparedness. It was pointed out by the advocates of peace that the ener- gies of the country should be devoted to finding some means, if possible, to end the war, and to further the plans for preventing future struggles. Per- haps the most noteworthy, and cer- tainly the most picturesque, of the efforts of the pacifists in the United States was the expedition organized by Henry Ford, a millionaire automobile manufacturer, to go to Europe to dis- cover some means of ending the war. A liner was chartered for the purpose. Included in the party of about 150 were a number of prominent American men and women, together with a consider- able number of newspaper and maga- zine writers and moving-picture men. The United States authorities let it be known that the mission was in no sense officially sanctioned, while the Euro- pean countries at war clearly indicated that the expedition was not welcome. Despite these discouragements the party sailed on Dec. 4, 1915. During the voyage serious discord developed among the members of the party. The expedition reached Christiansand, Nor- way, on Dec. 18, 1915. A few days later it was announced that Mr. Ford would have to leave the party and re- turn to America because of illness. The remainder of the party went on to Co- penhagen, and later to The Hague, where a number of meetings were held with delegates from other neutral coun- tries. The expedition accomplished nothing of importance towards ending the war. President Wilson, in order to get first-hand information concerning the condition of affairs in the belligerent countries, sent Edward M. House * abroad as his personal confidential agent. It is thought that the Presi- dent was seeking to discover whether the time was opportune to offer media- tion. (See below.) Scandinavian Countries. Immediate- ly after the outbreak of the European War the three Scandinavian countries declared their neutrality and the gov- ernments of Norway and Sweden pub- lished identically worded explanatory communications which stated that the two governments had agreed to main- tain their neutrality and had exchanged binding assurances with a view to pre- venting any situation arising which would precipitate hostilities between them. In Sweden there was a strong Ger- manophile sentiment among the military class, which is in reality more a dislike of Russia than a love of Germany. This anti-Russian feeling is due mainly to the fear that Russia contemplates aggression against the Scandinavian peninsula. In Denmark and Norway the popular sentiment appeared to be favorable to Great Britain. The geo- graphical position of these countries, * Edward Mandell House, born (1858) at Houston, Tex.; educated at Cornell University; active in Democratic politics in Texas and di- rector of the campaigns of many successful Democratic nominees for Governor from 1892; himself never a candidate for office; confiden- tial adviser of President Wilson from the time that Wilson was Governor of New Jersey. NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 263 especially of Denmark and Sweden, made it peculiarly difficult for them to maintain their announced position of neutrality. They controlled the en- trance to the Baltic Sea and were so situated as to provide easy transit to both Russia and Germany. On the initiative of the Swedish gov- ernment a conference of the three Scan- dinavian monarchs was held at Malmo, Sweden, in December, 1914. It was called for the purpose of taking counsel together regarding means for limiting and counteracting the economic diffi- culties imposed on the three countries by the war. This conference was fol- lowed by the issuance of an identically worded protest to the nations at war against their measures which threatened neutral commerce. The interference with Swedish trade, especially by Great Britain, led to the adoption of retaliatory measures on the part of Sweden. Embargoes were laid on wood pulp and other commodities needed by the Entente Allies. In order to reach a solution of the question of neutral trade Great Britain, in July, 1915, sent a commission to Sweden. Some months later it was stated that a satisfactory arrangement had been made. A second conference of the premiers and foreign ministers of the three countries was held in March, 1916, at Copenhagen with the purpose of strengthening the understanding be- tween them. It was reported that an agreement had been reached that if any one of the three nations should become involved in the war, the other two would not align themselves with the opposing belligerents. It was further decided that at the proper time steps should be taken by the three Powers in con- junction with other neutrals to protect the interests of neutrals generally. The transaction of foreign commerce became more difficult and during 1917 the Danish government was obliged to import for its own account foodstuffs and provisions. Industries were not permitted to go beyond certain hours and strict economy in the use of gas and electricity was enforced. In Norway because of the curtailment of imports by the United States as a result of its policy of restricting im- ports to neutral countries bordering on Germany an agreement was made be- tween the two countries for the ship- ments of certain supplies upon guaran- tees being given that would prevent their reexportation to Germany. The agreement also provided that if any of the supplies were shipped to other coun- tries bordering on Germany, Norway would make an agreement with the coun- try to which the supplies were shipped that no such would be shipped to Ger- many. Norway was the first of the northern European neutrals to be ra- tioned. When the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, after the renewal of unrestricted sub- marine warfare, it made the suggestion to other neutral countries that they fol- low its example. To this suggestion the Swedish government replied that such method was contrary to its prin- ciples of policy. On February 14, 1917, it was an- nounced that the Scandinavian powers after a consultation lasting a week held at Stockholm had handed identical notes to the German ministers in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden protesting against submarine blockade, refusing to admit its legality, and holding Germany ac- countable for damages. On November 29, 1917, a conference of the Scandi- navian Powers was held at Christiania on the invitation of King Hakon of Norway and King Gustav of Sweden. 264 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR The meeting was explained as an en- deavor of the three Scandinavian coun- tries to find means of self-defense against the Central Powers. During 1917, there were 85 Danish vessels of 66,000 net tons and 434 Norwegian vessels of 687,000 gross tons sunk by torpedoes, mines, or gun fire. In Sweden a great number of hunger demonstrations occurred all over the country. In many cities numbers of bake-shops were plundered by women and in the country districts bands of men demanded that the farmers turn over to them their reserve supplies. Soldiers joined in these demonstrations. While the Parliament was in session in Stockholm a band of workmen number- ing several thousands gathered before the building to demand that exports be stopped and that foodstuffs be better distributed. Many people demanded an immediate commercial agreement with England. The Queen was especially un- popular among the Socialists, who called her the German Queen of Sweden, and she was accused of causing provi- sions to be smuggled into Germany. In 1918 the Norwegian government took over the supply of breadstufFs to provide better distribution. The rise of prices continued in all the Scandinavian countries. In Denmark the housing problem caused much anxiety, and many people had to purchase houses in order to secure residences. In Copenhagen it was provided that no rent be in- creased without the sanction of the Copenhagen house rent board, and dur- ing the year February 23, 1917, to Feb- ruary 23, 1918, the cases brought be- fore the board numbered 24,000. The expenses of a working family of five increased from 2,000 kroner in July, 1914, to 3,635 kroner in July, 1918. Netherlands. The geographical sit- uation of the Netherlands made its relations to the belligerents even more difficult to adjust than was the case in the Scandinavian countries. At the outbreak of the war there was consider- able apprehension in Holland that their country might suffer a fate similar to that of Belgium. The authorities, how- ever, determined to defend the neutral- ity of Holland to the best of their ability, and with this end in view the Dutch army was mobilized and sent to the frontiers. These military measures, together with the expenditures made in caring for a large number of Belgian refugees who fled to Holland, entailed a considerable financial burden upon the country. In common with other neu- tral countries, Holland was seriously affected by the restrictions placed upon neutral commerce, especially by Great Britain. As Holland offered an easy means of communication with Germany, Great Britain deemed it necessary, in order to make her blockade of Germany effective, to adopt some measure to pre- vent neutral goods passing through Holland to Germany. With this end in view there was organized a company known as the Netherlands Overseas Trust, to which was to be consigned all imports which might be of use to Ger- many. This company agreed to dispose of these imports so that none should reach Germany. The war curtailed and restricted the commerce of the country and to supply the needs of the people factories were built. As a result Dutch industry was strengthened and will have a permanent effect on the foreign commerce of the country. On February 22, 1917, seven Dutch merchant vessels were torpedoed in the North Sea. German naval regulations as to time of leaving and route to be followed had been complied with, and after a discussion of several months the NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 265 Dutch government received satisfac- tion, Germany promising to replace the ships sunk by ships of equal value. The feeling among the Allies was that Germany had agreed to this in order not to push Holland too far, as she ob- tained supplies from her. On April 21, 1917, Holland made the announce- ment that she would remain neutral during the war. In the latter half of July, 1917, German and Dutch govern- ments discussed the economic situation. The problem of coal and credits was the most important. Germany could not export more than 200,000 tons of Ger- man and 50,000 tons of Belgian coal, which quantity she could continue to deliver until March 31, 1918. To ren- der the rate of exchange stable Ger- many proposed that Holland should place at her disposal a definite amount of florins for the coal obtained to be covered partly by cash payment and partly by credit, the credit to be car- ried by a consortium of German banks. On September 11 of the same year it was reported that England was ready to deliver 180,000 tons of coal monthly, if Holland would place 180,000 tons of shipping space at the disposal of the Belgian Relief Commission. When the States General convened the Queen de- clared that Holland should hold herself ready to resist any infringement of her neutrality. During the year 1917, the neutral countries bordering on Germany gave rise to a vexing problem to the United States. Extraordinary increase in imports to these countries of food sup- plies made it evident that large quan- tities were sent to Germany. Accord- ingly President Wilson issued a procla- mation (August 30, 1917) that no food- stuffs could be sent to Europe without a license granted by the Export Coun- cil. A later modification of the regula- tions resulted in the concentration of the embargo on Holland and the Scan- dinavian countries from whom Germany received large quantities of supplies. Holland had an agreement with Ger- many fixing the percentage of exports from the Netherlands to the Central Powers. The United States intimated that as long as the agreement lasted no American commodities would be per- mitted to enter Holland. Holland needed coal and other commodities from Germany and clung to the agreement. As a result of this embargo large num- bers of Dutch and other neutral ves- sels were held in American harbors. The United States refused to allow them to sail under conditions which would allow their cargoes to take the place of food supplies shipped to Ger- many. The United States proposed that the ships and their cargoes be sent to the Allies or unloaded for American use and vessels placed in American coastwise trade. The Dutch govern- ment, afraid of Germany's attitude, re- fused. Eighty-four ships were thus held up. The vessels were finally allowed to go (August, 1918) on condition that most of the supplies should go to the relief of Belgium. The restrictions upon commerce by the Allies and the scarcity of bottoms during 1918, had a depressing effect on Dutch foreign trade. Factories were closed and as a result laborers who lived near the border traveled in and out of Germany daily to work in that country's war industries. The govern- ment was forced to regulate the prices of various commodities to keep them from advancing too high. A number of Dutch vessels were sunk by submarines and mines and one was confiscated by a German prize court. Two of the steamers sunk by submarines belonged to the tlolland-American line and Ger- 266 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR many agreed to place at their disposal an equivalent of German ships interned in Holland. The Allied need of more shipping re- sulted in the United States and Great Britain taking over all Dutch shipping. On January 25, 1918, a temporary agreement was made for the use of Dutch vessels outside of the submarine zone. The Dutch government did not live up to its part of the agreement be- cause of pressure brought to bear on her by Germany. The President, there- fore, on March 20, 1918, proclaimed that Dutch ships be at once employed in American service, promising ade- quate compensation and provision for losses by enemy attack. Eighty-seven vessels with a gross tonnage of 980,000 were thus taken over. These were re- turned as soon as possible after the signing of the armistice. Switzerland. The situation of Switz- erland was unique. The little country was completely surrounded by the na- tions at war. The sympathies of the people were determined by their racial affiliations. There are three distinct racial groups in Switzerland, namely," German, French, and Italian, of which the German group is the largest. De- spite these conflicting sympathies, the Swiss authorities were determined to maintain the neutrality of the country, and the army was mobilized in order to prevent any violation of this neu- trality by the belligerent Powers. In dealing with the problem of imports into Switzerland, the Entente Allies fol- lowed much the same policy as had been adopted in Holland. There was or- ganized a company called the Societe Suisse de Surveillance Economique, through whose hands imports which might be of service to Germany were to pass. In 1917 the Federal government in order to obtain the requisite food sup- plies and fuel and raw materials for Swiss industries, guaranteed that with certain exceptions neither imports from one gi'oup of belligerents or articles manufactured from them shall be ex- ported in any form to a country in the opposite group. In the latter part of 1917, the Krupps established a branch factory at Lucerne with a capital of 30,000,000 marks. In January, 1917, there were fre- quent rumors of an intention on the part of Germany to invade Switzerland. The French government on January 5 renewed assurances already given that it would respect the neutrality of Switzerland. The Swiss government took measures to put Switzerland on guard. On April 14, 1917, 15,000 workmen met in Zurich and protested against the high cost of living and de- manded a government monopoly in food supplies and their distribution at fair prices. In the autumn of 1917 there were persistent rumors in the press of France and Germany of the intentions on the part of the other country to vio- late the neutrality of Switzerland. France again assured Switzerland of its intention to respect rigidly and hon- orably the neutrality of Switzerland. In June, 1918, an agreement with Germany in regard to iron, coal and steel was published. This economic con- vention was to last nine months and its main provisions were as follows : Ger- many granted to Switzerland permis- sion to export each month 2,000,000 tons of coal and 10,000,000 tons of iron and steel, the price of coal to be on the average of 173^^ fi'ancs per ton, Ger- many consenting to a rebate of 40 francs a ton for the 60,000 tons which represented domestic consumption. Each party was to be permitted to ex- port products of exchange in the pro- NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 267 portionate quantity. Switzerland ac- cepted a system of control, under the so-called Switzerland Fiduciary Office, which was to go into operation July 15, 1918, and which was to be responsible solely to the Federal Council. It was agreed in principle that Switzerland might freely make use of German coal in manufactures which might be ex- ported, but the merchandise manufac- tured from German coal could not be sent into countries at war with it unless it was shown that an equal amount of non-German coal had been employed in that enterprise. The Germans delayed the negotiations and increased their de- mands, but when France informed Switzerland that the Allies were ready to supply her with 85,000 tons of coal a month, Germany hastened to conclude the convention. On September 13, 1918, the French government abrogated the French-Swiss commercial convention of 1906. This was in accordance with the policy of the Entente Allies to put an end to all treaties containing the most favored nation clause. South American Countries. All of the South American countries were seriously affected by the outbreak of the European War. A large amount of the business in these countries was carried on by European credit and the dislocation of the European financial markets seriously crippled the business interests in South America. Moreover, a large part of the export trade of these countries was cut off and emergency measures had to be adopted to relieve the situation. In Chile a moratorium was declared, and the President was empowered to extend government aid to the nitrate industry, the most impor- tant in the country. Argentina floated two loans, one of $15,000,000 and the other of $25,000,000, in the United States. This was the first time a South American country had negotiated a loan directly in the United States. Chile became involved in a dispute with the belligerents when, on April 2, 1915, the German cruiser Dresden, which had entered Chilean waters and had been ordered interned, was sunk by a British squadron. Chile demanded an apology from Great Britain for this violation of her sovereignty and this de- mand was conceded. Germany sent a sharply worded note protesting against the acceptance of this apology, and Chile replied by demanding an apology from Germany for overstepping the bounds of international law in interven- ing in a question which involved Chile's relations with another Power. After some discussion the matter was ad- justed peaceably. Reception of the Barred Zone Note. — The issuance of the barred sea zone note on Jan. 31, 1917, created a pro- found impression in all the South Amer- ican republics. None of them, however, seemed ready to take the step adopted by the United States government and sever diplomatic relations. Brazil re- plied in part: "... The unexpected communication we have just received announcing a blockade of wide extent of countries with which Brazil is con- tinually in economic relations by foreign and Brazilian shipping has produced a justified and profound impression through the imminent menace which it contains of the unjust sacrifice of lives, the destruction of property, and the wholesale disturbance of commercial transactions. . . . For these reasons the Brazilian government, in spite of its sincere and keen desire to avoid any disagreement with the nations at war, with whom it is on friendly terms, be- lieves it to be its duty to protest against this blockade and consequently to leave 268 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR entirely with the Imperial German gov- ernment the responsibility for all acts which will involve Brazilian citizens, merchandise, or ships and which are proved to have been committed in dis- regard of the recognized principles of international law and the conventions signed by Brazil and Germany.'* Chile refused outright to recognize the legality of the German attempt to establish barred zones and "conse- quently reserves liberty of action to protect all her rights in the event of any hostile acts against her ships." Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, Panama, and Cuba all took similar ac- tion. The keynote of their replies was that any act on the part of Germany against their rights as neutrals would be considered unfriendly. During 1918 the attitude of Chile toward the war was a subject of much comment, for it was not understood why she was so firm against taking any part in the war. This seemed to be the re- sult in the first place of a belief that German military power could never be conquered. Then there was no clear perception of the economic consequences of the war in case of a German victory. Nor did the fear of German imperial ambition count for much, for what was said on that subject by the Entente Allies was attributed to propaganda. Finally, there was no faith whatever in the military strength of the United States. Soon after the declaration of war be- tween the United States and Germany, Brazil issued a proclamation of neu- trality as between those two nations, although there was a strong party in the country which favored a declara- tion of war based on the grounds laid down by President Wilson of the United States. She kept this attitude of neu- trality until June 4, 1917, when the Brazilian Ambassador handed to the State Department at Washington a note which read in part, "Brazil ever was and now is free from warlike ambi- tions, and, while it always refrained from showing any impartiality in the European conflict, it could no longer stand unconcerned when the struggle involved the United States, actuated by no interest whatever but solely for the sake of international judicial order, and when Germany included us and the other neutral powers in the most violent acts of war." Brazil seized about 150,- 000 tons of German merchant vessels in her harbors and ordered her fleet to cooperate in the patrol work in the southern Atlantic. Brazil declared war on Germany on Oct. 26, 1917, and immediately took steps against her large German popu- lation. She annulled all contracts en- tered into for public works with Ger- mans, forbade land cessions to Ger- mans, took over the control of German banks, and interned all German sub- jects. Disorder immediately broke out in the large German settlements in southern Brazil, and an army had to be sent to restore order. Shortly after her declaration of war Secretary of State Lansing (United States) pub- lished two telegrams from Count Lux- burg, the German Charge d'Aff'aires at Buenos Aires, to Berlin through the Swedish legation^ stating that the situ- ation in Brazil was serious, but that a visit of a submarine squadron would materially relieve the situation. Brazil had knowledge of these before she de- clared war. By the end of 1917 the situation in Argentina was very acute. On Sept. 8, 1917, Secretary of State Lansing published telegrams that had been sent to Berlin in cipher through the inter- mediary of the Swedish foreign office. NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 269 The first one under the date of May 19, 1917, states that in the future Ger- many had better adopt one of two poli- cies with regard to Argentine ships. They must either let them alone or sink them without leaving a trace of their sinking (spurlos versenkt). In a tele- gram dated July 9, he reiterated the same sentiments. The publication of these created a profound impression on the country. Mobs gathered in the streets of the capital, German houses were wrecked and burned. Troops had to be called out to quell the riots. Count Luxburg was handed his pass- ports and the Argentine Senate passed a resolution asking for the breaking off of relations with Germany. President Irigoyen refused to sanction the reso- lution even after it had been passed by both houses. He announced that Ar- gentina would maintain her neutrality as long as Germany lived up to the pledge given in October, 1917, "to rec- ognize the Argentine flag and respect the nation and people." The country was almost in a state of civil war over the question of whether the country should go to war or not. A big strike on the railroads helped to mix up mat- ters further and to put the state in a serious plight. Costa Rica severed diplomatic rela- tions with Germany on Sept. 21, 1917. On October 6 the Peruvian government handed his passports to the German minister. On October 10, the govern- ment announced that the harbors of Peru were opened to the warships of the Allies. On October 8, Ecuador an- nounced that the minister from Peru who was also minister to Ecuador would not be received in that country. In ' December, 1917, she broke off diplo- matic relations with Germany entirely. Uruguay broke ofF relations with Ger- many on October 7. The President in his address to the Parliament stated that Uruguay had not received any harsh treatment at the hands of Ger- many but that the country should join hands with those fighting for justice and democracy. She seized almost 50,- 000 tons of German shipping in her harbors. Paraguay had also broken off relations with Germany soon after the publication of the "barred sea" note. In December, 1917, the State De- partment at Washington published sev- eral more telegrams sent to Berlin by way of the Swedish legation. The pur- port of most of them was to unify the German population of South America, which was very great, and organize them against the South American re- publics. They spoke very sneeringly of the people of South America, re- ferring to them one time as Indians with a slight veneer over them. Central American Countries. The addition of the United States to the belligerents profoundly influenced other neutral states, especially the South and Central American republics. Some had suff'ered from the German submarine campaign and were encouraged to fol- low the lead of the United States in breaking with Germany. Others who had not suff'ered material damage were influenced by the close ties which bound them to the United States. Of the lat- ter group were Cuba and Panama. On April 7, 1917, the day after the declaration of war by the United States, a war resolution passed both houses of the Cuban Congress and signed by the President. This declared that a state of war existed between Cuba and Ger- many from that date and the Presi- dent was authorized to use the military and naval forces in any manner he thought necessary. Four German and one Austrian vessel were seized in Cuban 270 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR waters. Toward the end of the month a mission was appointed to visit the United States and confer with the American government on Cuba's part in the war. The President authorized the issuance of $13,000,000 of bonds as a war loan beginning July 1 to bear in- terest at not more than six per cent. On May 26, 1917, several revenue meas- ures were announced, including taxes on sugar and the net income of mining and engineering companies. On August 3, 1918, the Congress passed a law au- thorizing obligatory military service applying to all male Cubans not espe- cially exempted. The age limit was twenty-one to twenty-eight years. The army was to be composed of 17,000 men and the necessary officers. A reserve force was also created, the number to be determined later. A custodian of enemy property was created on Sep- tember 18, 1918. Foreign enemies were defined as nations of an enemy coun- try ; nationals of a neutral power if they violate Cuban laws with intent of aiding country with which Cuba is at war; persons, societies, etc., domiciled in enemy territory and maintaining commercial relations with it ; persons, societies, etc., regardless of domicile whom the national safety or war neces- sities require to be included in the list of enemies. Panama also followed the lead of the United States and declared war against Germany April 7, 1917, the day after the American declaration. Toward the end of May, 1917, al- leged proof of conspiracies between German agents and former President Gonzales were made public in Costa Rica. Meanwhile on April 12 the Costa Rican government had placed its waters and ports at the disposal of the United States for war purposes. On April 26 it cancelled the letters patent of all Germans in its consular service. By this time a guard service had been or- ganized along the coasts and boundaries as a protection against German activi- ties. On May 23, 1918, it formally declared war against Germany. On April 28, 1917, martial law was declared in Guatemala because of dis- turbances along the frontier supposed to be of German origin. On April 18, 1917, diplomatic relations were broken off with Germany and on April 22, 1918, war was formally declared against her. Haiti declared war against Germany on July 20, 1918, because of the tor- pedoing of a French steamer causing the loss of eight Haitians. Nicaragua formally declared war against Germany on May 7, 1918. Honduras declared war against Germany on July 19, 1918. China and Siam. On resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare China issued a protest on February 9, 1917, saying that diplomatic relations would be broken off if the protest was not regarded. On the breaking of diplo- matic relations between the United States and Germany, China began dis- cussing similar action and on March 14 handed the German Ambassador his passports. China demanded of the En- tente Allies and the United States the suspension of the Boxer indemnities amounting to $30,000,000 a year and would last till 1940; consent of the Powers to raise her import duties ; their consent to the posting of troops at Tientsin and on the Tientsin railway and in the neighborhood of thelegations. The Allies, anxious to have China enter the war, not so much to take part in the fighting, but to provide a reserve of men, had already promised part of these concessions. China had already supplied 100,000 laborers and farm hands to the Entente man-power, for NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 271 the most part in France, and the drown- ing of some of them on their way over on the Athos and other boats led to the first protest from China against Ger- man methods. Difficulties accompanied the breaking of relations with Germany. On March 4, 1917, when the cabinet decided to follow the example of the United States, the president refused approval and the prime minister and several of the other ministers resigned. Parliament and the vice-president supported the cabinet. The president later yielded and the prime minister returned to office. The German reply to the Chinese was con- sidered unsatisfactory and on the same day (March 10) the House voted to break ofF relations. The Senate took the same action on the following day. All merchant ships in Shanghai were seized and guards placed on them. Evidence of intent to destroy them was found. The question of declaring war was now debated and an extended discussion in Parliament went on. A special com- mission for international affairs was appointed to report on the subject. The commission decided in favor of en- try into the war. A secret session of Parliament was held on May 9, 1917, and a resolution declaring war was re- ferred to a standing committee. The Prime Minister urged its passage and a heated debate followed. After a stormy session the House of Representatives refused to pass the resolution on May 11 on the ground mainly that the war ought not be entered into until the cabi- net was reorganized. A mob gathered around the Parliament building and threatened violence and had to be dis- persed by troops. On May 19 the House decided not to consider any war measures until the resignation of the prime minister and the reorganiza- tion of the cabinet. A deadlock in the House and Senate on the war question followed. There was a strong demand in and out of Parliament for the resig- nation of the prime minister, who it was feared, in case of war, might vio- late the constitution and place the power in the hands of the Conservative Military Party. On the other hand the military governors objected to his dis- missal. On May 29 it was announced that the military governors of several provinces had declared their independence of the Central government. The president was forced to flee and the Manchu dynasty was declared reestablished. However, the government recovered strength and the emperor was forced to abdicate and the new imperial gov- ernment overthrown July 8-12. It was claimed that the Germans were respon- sible for the counter-revolution, but this was not established. What seems more certain is that the revolution was con- nected with international affairs, espe- cially with the relations between the United States and Japan and the Rus- sian revolution. The Chinese declara- tion of war checked by the constitu- tional crisis and by the attempt to restore the monarchy was unanimously decided upon by the cabinet and ap- proved by the president on August 5, 1917. China continued sending laborers to Europe, about two-thirds going to England and one-third to France. By the close of August, 1918, it was esti- mated that from 1,000 to 5,000 work- ingmen a month were transported to France by way of the Suez Canal and that 150,000 were at work on French territory, being employed in munition plants, in quartermaster's and engineer- ing branches of the army. A bureau of immigration was established to look after these workingmen. Two special 272 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR delegates were sent to England and France to watch over them and straighten difficulties that might pos- sibly arise between them and their em- ployers. China took little part in the war. It was thought that with the suspension of the Boxer indemnity and the increase in import duties China would develop industries and supply the Allies with raw materials. Instead the Allies com- plained the resources were squandered in civil war. The Chinese army was not properly organized and did not take part in the war. The appointment of a Chinese ambassador to the Papal See indicated a desire to embarrass the Allies. China did not deal effectively with German intrigue and did not prop- erly supervise enemy property. The Chinese enemy trading act though promulgated was not enforced. She was informed that a speedy and com- plete execution of the agreement was necessary to her enjoying equal privi- leges with the Allies at the peace con- ference. Siam declared war against Germany and Austria on July 27, 1917, interning the subjects of those countries and seiz- ing the enemy ships. For a long time past the Entente made demands on her. After the war broke out numbers of Germans in the Indo-Chinese posses- sions of France and the Indian terri- tories of England sought refuge in Siam. They recruited bands among the natives and organized movements against the Allies and the government looked on apparently indifferent. France demanded that she choose be- tween the Entente Allies and their ene- mies, and Great Britain, which before the war had great influence, presented an ultimatum to the Siamese govern- ment. The break with Germany fol- lowed. This restored order to the French and British possessions in the East. Liberia. The trade of this country was conducted almost wholly by Ger- man residents who controlled both im- ports and exports, but since the war began operations were at first restricted and later almost stopped by British war measures and Liberia was nearing starvation, according to official dis- patches received at Washington Febru- ary 4, 1917. Relations with Germany were broken off on May 8. This was important because many cables had their points of landing in Liberia and had been used by Germany as a base against the British. War was declared on August 4, 1917. Compulsory mili- tary service during the war was set up and some hundreds of laborers were sent to France for war work. Vigorous action was taken against German citizens. X. PEACE PROPOSALS AND STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS The most important move towards peace occurred in December, 1916. On the 12th of that month, Germany, Aus- tria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria submitted practically identical notes to the diplomatic representatives of the United States, Switzerland, and other neutral countries as well as to the Vati- can. No terms were mentioned but the Allies were asked "to enter forthwith into peace negotiations." The notes were forwarded to the Allies without comment. Russia immediately refused to open any negotiations whatever. Italy and France made similar declara- tions. Lloyd George, the new premier of England, declared that little could be expected of the peace move now and that "the very appeal for peace was de- livered ostentatiously from the triumph- al chariot of Prussian militarism." Rather unexpectedly the United States, on December 18, sent a note to the belligerent nations asking them "the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out." Germany replied on December 26 that the only thing she was willing to consider was a meeting of representatives of the bel- ligerent nations while the war was con- tinued. The Allied reply was received on January 12, 1917. It was a compila- tion of the views of all the Entente Powers and demanded (1) restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro with indemnities; (2) evacuation of in- vaded territories of France, Russia, and Rumania with reparation; (3) reor- ganization of Europe under guarantees to insure to all nations respect and lib- erty of development; (4) restitution of territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the people's will; (5) liberation of Slavs, Ruman- ians, Italians, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; (6) enfranchise- ment of population subject to Turkey; (7) expulsion from Europe of the Ot- toman Empire. This note effectively stopped for the time being all attempts to bring about peace, inasmuch as the world realized that the demands of the Allies could be gained only on the bat- tlefield and not in a conference. Pope Benedict's Peace Appeal. — In August, 1917, Pope Benedict * sent an identical note to all the belligerent pow- ers on the subject of peace. The note as translated by the State Department at Washington was published in the American newspapers on August 16. The first paragraphs stated that the Pontificate has made every effort to re- main absolutely impartial and thus espouse the cause of no one group of belligerents. It relates the unsuccessful attempts to mediate at the end of the first year of the war and then states the "base of a just and lasting peace." . . . First, the fundamental point must be * Benedict XV (Giacomo della Chiesa). 260th Pope, elected September 3, 1914. Born (1854) in Pagli, diocese of Genoa. Took de- gree in jurisprudence at University of Genoa. Ordained a priest in 1878. In 1883 appointed secretary to the Nunciature at Madrid. On re- turn to Rome made permanent Under Secre- tary of the Secretariat of State. Made pre- late (1900), consultor of Holy Ofllce (1901), Archbishop of Bologna (1907), and Cardinal (May, 1914). Known as man of diplomacy, cool and level-headed. Keen reverence for all traditions of the Vatican and foe of Modern- ism in Church. 273 274 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR that the material force of arms shall give way to the moral force of right, whence shall proceed a just agreement of all upon the simultaneous and recip- rocal decrease of armaments, accord- ing to rules and guarantees to be estab- lished, in the necessary and suffi- cient measure for the maintenance of public order in every State ; then tak- ing the place of arms, the institution of arbitration, with its high pacifying function, according to rule to he drawn in concert and under sanctions to be de- termined against any State which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards." The Pope then takes up the question of the war, and suggests absolute free- dom of the seas. He also asks for mu- tual restitution of all territory that has changed hands during tlie war. "As re- gards territorial questions, as, for in- stance, those that are disputed by Italy and Austria, by Germany and France, there is reason to hope that, in con- sideration of the immense advantages of durable peace with disarmament, the contending parties will examine them in a conciliatory spirit, taking into ac- count, as far as is just and possible, as we have said formerly, the aspira- tions of the population, and, if occasion arises, adjusting private opinions to the general good of the great human so- ciety." He suggested that the ques- tions of the Balkan States, Poland, and Armenia might be settled on the same principles. The press in Entente countries se- verely criticized the Pope's appeal on the grounds that it made no condemna- tion of Germany's atrocities, the inva- sion of Belgium and the submarine war- fare. The Pope replied to this by stat- ing that he was acting as a peacemaker and not as a judge and that if he at- tempted to decide which set of bel- ligerents was right his peace attempt was certain to be a failure. On August 27, 1917, President Wil- son replied to the Pope's note through Secretary of State Lansing. It stated that, "Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else." After reviewing the methods suggested in the Pope's note, the President's re- ply states : "It is manifest that no part of this programme can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the status quo ante furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peo- ples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military es- tablishment controlled by an irrespon- sible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceed- ed to carry out the plan without re- gard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of inter- national action and honor ; which chose its own time for the war ; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly ; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy ; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood — not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor ; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fiffclis of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. . . . They (the American peo- ple) believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments — the rights of peoples great and small, weak or powerful — their equal right to freedom and secur- ity and self-government and to a par- ticipation upon fair terms in the eco- nomic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 275 they will accept equality and not seek domination. . . . We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people them- selves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. With- out such guarantees treaties of settle- ment, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German government, no man, no nation can now depend on." President Wilson^s reply to Pope Benedict received the hearty approval of the press of the United States. Even the German papers printed in that country seemed to favor the note. The Allies of the United States, through their statesmen and press, endorsed the stand taken and the more enthusiastic of them hailed Mr. Wilson as the spokesman of the Entente. In Germany the government and pan-German or- gans bitterly attacked the President's note, claiming that it was nonsense to say that the German people were op- pressed by an irresponsible government. They cited the fact that the entire Ger- man people had time and time again re- peated that they stand firmly behind the government. The Socialist newspaper, Vorwdrts, stated editorially, "The gov- ernment of a country at war with us has a perfect right to demand that for the conditions under which peace is to be concluded the people themselves shall be the guarantee." Semi-official organs in France, Great Britain, Italy, and Rus- sia announced to the world that the re- ply of President Wilson represented their own attitude toward the peace proposal. The official replies of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires were made public on September 22, 1917. The main theme of both notes was identical. It was that both empires agreed with the Pope's desire to have the right of might give way to moral force. Both stated that arbitration with efficient guarantees should follow an immediate disarmament by all the nations of the world. Freedom of the seas and the right of independent economic progress was inalienable to all nations. The press of the Entente countries passion- ately attacked the replies, not so much because of what was contained therein, but because of what was not said. Noth- ing was said of the evacuation, restitu- tion, and indemnification of Belgium, nothing of Alsace-Lorraine, nothing of Poland, Armenia, Trentino, etc. Sub- sequent statements by German diplo- mats refused absolutely to debate the question of Alsace-Lorraine. British Statement of War Aims. — At the beginning of 1918 a compre- hensive statement of British Labor war aims, passed by official representatives of the trade unions and the Labor par- ty, was made public. Its effect upon the governments of Great Britain and the other Allies was immediately per- ceptible and it continued to influence them in the formulation of war pur- poses throughout the year. It declared that "whatever may have been the ob- jects for which the war was begun, the fundamental purpose of the British la- bor movement is that the world may Sienceforth be made safe for democ- racy." It opposed any attempt to turn the war into a war of conquest and de- clared that it should not be prolonged for a single day after the conditions for permanent peace could be obtained, but it held that certain reparations and res- titutions were necessary. These should be based on the principle of self-deter- 276 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR mination of all the peoples concerned and should seek to remove the causes of future conflict. They included: Ger- man restoration of Belgium to complete independence, and reparation, under the direction of an international com- mission, of the wrong done; the right of the people of Alsace-Lorraine under the protection of a supernational au- thori^, or League of Nations, to decide their own future political status ; the support of the claim of the people of Italian blood for union with their kins- folk, but the condemnation of Italian aims of conquest or imperialism; the settlement of other cases in dispute, such as those of Luxemburg, the Poles, and others, on the principle of self- determination by the peoples; the granting to the Jews of all lands the same rights of tolerance, freedom of residence, and equal citizenship that ought to be accorded to all the inhabi- tants of every nation. It recommended that Palestine be freed from Turkish domination and set up as an indepen- dent state, under international guaran- tee, to which Jews might return if they desired; the neutralization of Constan- tinople and the placing of it along with a part or possibly all of Asia Minor under an impartial administration ; and the reorganization of the Balkans by a special commission or an international conference on the principles of: (1) Self-determination by the peoples with- out regard to Austria, Turkish, or oth- er alien control; (2) independent sov- ereignty of the predominant nationali- ties ; (3) universal adoption of reli- gious freedom, and equal citizenship of all races, and of local self-government ; (4) a customs union of all tlie Balkan states; (5) a federation of all national Balkan states for the joint voluntary arrangement of matters of common concern. It urged the abandonment by all the belligerents of all dreams of African Empire, and the transfer of the present colonies to a super- national authority or League of Na- tions. As to plans for an economic war after peace was secured, the Labor movement declared squarely against them. It favored government control of indispensable commodities for some time after the war in order to meet the needs of the whole community; and it held that homes, factories, and farms destroyed by the war should be restored immediately upon the return of peace. It demanded a complete judicial inves- tigation of the charges that particular governments had ordered and particu- lar officers had committed acts of cruelty, violence, theft, and other of- fenses unjustified in the common usage of war ; and it recommended that a court of claims and accusations should be set up in the interest of the non- combatant victims of such inhumanity and ruthlessness. The memorandum declared emphatically against imperi- alism in all countries ; and favored the complete democratization of all govern- ments, the universal abolition of com- pulsory military service, and the crea- tion of a supernational authority, or League of Nations, endowed with law- making authority and with power to en- force its decrees. In response to the continued demands that the Allies' war aims be distinctly declared, Mr. Lloyd George made a statement in regard to them in an ad- dress to the delegates of the trade unions on January 5. He said that the war aims of the Allies had been dis- cussed by him, the leaders of the La- bor party, with Mr. Asquith, Viscount Grey, and representatives of the Do- minions. He declared in the first place, that the Allies were not fighting against the German people, and were not seek- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 277 ing and had never sought to destroy or disrupt the German people or Ger- many, or to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to seize Constantinople, or to de- prive Turkey of those lands which are occupied by people mainly of Turkish race. He then outlined the purposes for which the Allies were fighting. They may be summarized as follows : 1. — Europe. Complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be made for the de- vastation of its towns and provinces. Restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania. Complete withdrawal of the alien armies and reparation for the injuries inflicted. Support of the French democracy in their demand for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, with- out regard to the wishes of the popu- lation, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorpo- rated in the German Empire. An independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, an urgent ne- cessity for the stability of western Europe. Genuine self-government on true democratic principles to those Austro- Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it. Satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue. Justice to men of Rumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspira- tions. II. — Asia and Africa. Constanti- nople to remain Turkish capital. Passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea to be international- ized. Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine entitled to recog- nition of their separate national con- ditions. German colonies held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inliabitants of such colonies. III. — In General. Reparation for injuries done in violation of internation- al law, especially as regards British seamen. The establishment of some interna- tional organization of an alternative to war as a means of settling interna- tional disputes. Sanctity of treaties to be reestab- lished. A territorial settlement to be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed. The creation of some international organization to limit the burden of ar- maments and diminish the probability of war. President WUson's'Tourteen Points" Message. — Soon after Lloyd George had made this brief and general state- ment of war aims. President Wilson sent to Congress (January 8) an im- portant message which set forth his peace programme in considerable de- tail, summing up the essentials of a final settlement in fourteen points, which be- came the subject of extensive discussion in the closing months of the year. The fourteen points he stated as follows : I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at; after which there shall be no private in- ternational understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. • 278 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equalit}^ of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely im- partial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sover- eignty the interests of the populations con- cerned must have equal weight with the equi- table claims of the Government whose title is to be determined. VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co- operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and un- embarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sin- cere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself de- sire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their com- prehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she en- joys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which thej^ have themselves set and determined for the government of their rela- tions with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of inter- national law is forever impaired. VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored; and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unset- tled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the inter- est of all. IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recog- nizable lines of nationality. X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safe- guarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. XI. Roumanla, Serbia and IMontenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories re- stored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and inter- national guarantees of the political and eco- nomic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now imder Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolute- ly unmolested opportunity of autonomous de- velopment, and the Dardanelles should be per- manently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under in- ternational guarantees. XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure ac- cess to the sea, and whose political and eco- nomic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international cove- nant. XIV. A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants, for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of po- litical independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. The President's statement was sup- ported by Congress and the American press with surprising unanimity. Hard- ly any criticism of it appeared at the time. In Great Britain it was received with enthusiasm, as definitely stamping the Allied war aims with American ap- proval. It was declared to present es- sentially the same conditions as those laid down by Lloyd George. British labor organizations promptly en- dorsed and declared their unqualified support of a continuance of the war for these purposes. In the French press it was accepted by leading journals as an expression of French aims. Lloyd George answered in an Anglo-French declaration published a day or two later accepting its principles. Italy appar- ently supported it, though there were some suggestions that Italian aspira- tions in the Adriatic were not sufficient- PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 279 ly emphasized. In Russia the official Bolshevik organ denounced the Presi- dent as the representative of capitalism and threw suspicion on his words of good-will toward Russia. The Central Powers on War Aims. — ■ On January 25, 1918, Count von Her- tling, imperial chancellor of Germany, and Count Czernin, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, made their answers to the statements of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson. The principal points in Count von Hertling's reply were as follows : The Central Powers had been the first to favor extensive publicity of diplomatic agreements. The defensive alliance between Germany and Austria had been public ever since 1889, where- as the offensive agreements of the Al- lies were disclosed only through the present war and chiefly by Russia's publication of her secret documents. The Central Powers had again shown their adherence to the principle by the complete publicity which had been given to the peace negotiations of Brest- Litovsk. Mr. Wilson's principle of ab- solute freedom of navigation in peace and war was accepted by Germany, who, however, dissented from his quali- fication that this rule would not apply when the seas should be closed by in- ternational action. Germany also fully concurred in the demand that there should be no economic war. As to the reducing of armaments, the German government considered it entirely suit- able to discussion. In regard to the impartial adjustment of colonial claims in which the interests of the peoples con- cerned should have due weight, Ger- many believed there would be some dif- ficulty in applying this principle, but that for the present Great Britain should come to an understanding with her ally as to the nature of the pro- posal, Germany demanded uncondi- tionally the reconstruction of the co- lonial possessions of the world. To the demand that all the Russian territory be evacuated, and that Russia have full opportunity for self-development, he re- plied that since the Allies had not ac- cepted the proposal to take part in the Brest-Litovsk conference, the ques- tion concerned only Russia and the Cen- tral Powers. He declared in regard to Belgium that annexation was not part of the German plan but declined to dis- cuss the Belgian question so long as the Allies refused to admit that the only possible basis for peace negotiation was the integrity of the territory of the Central Powers. In regard to Alsace- Lorraine, he said that forcible annexa- tion was no part of the plan of Ger- many, but that Germany and France must settle the question between them- selves and that Germany would never consent to being robbed of the prov- inces. The invaded portions of France were a "valuable pawn" in the hands of Germany. The demand of President Wilson that the non-Turkish popula- tion in the Turkish Empire should be assured of self-government and that the Dardanelles should be permanently opened, he dismissed by saying that that point must be left to the Turkish statesmen. To the demand for an in- dependent Poland he replied that it was the Central Powers that had rescued Poland from Russia's despotism, that therefore it was the business of the Cen- tral Powers to settle the future of Po- land, and that this task had already well advanced. Finally, in regard to the League of Nations, he said that after all other questions had been set- tled the Imperial government would be glad to investigate the principle of such an organization. Count Czernin's reply went further than von Hertling's toward meeting the 280 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR American demands and the inconsist- ency between the two gave rise to much comment in the press, especially as the German foreign minister had declared that he completely agreed with the views of his Austro-Hungarian col- league. The main points in Count Czernin's reply were as follows : He had no objection to make to the plan for open diplomacy, although he did not see how it could be executed. He was en- tirely in accord with the President on tihe principle of absolute freedom of navigation. He approved as just and reasonable the removal of economic bar- riers. He approved heartily the Presi- dent's words in regard to reduction of armaments. As to Russian territory, Austria did not desire for herself any of the Russian land and said that be- tween the diverging views of the Rus- sian and German delegates in regard to the western provinces and Poland a mid- dle solution must be found. He made no specific reference to Belgium fur- ther than to say that Austria would de- fend the possessions of her ally as she would her own. He declared that Italy had neglected her opportunity to ex- pand before the war without any sac- rifice of life and that she had gone into the war simply with a view to her own advantage. He refused to discuss the demand that the peoples of Austria- Hungary should have an opportunity for self-development, saying that he could not accept advice as to the con- duct of the internal administration of Austria-Hungary. In regard to read- justment in the Balkans on lines of nationality, he said that he refused to make a one-sided concession to the en- emy. He dismissed the question of Turkey's status with the same general remark that he had applied to Belgium, namely, that Austria would defend the possessions of her war ally. He agreed to the proposal for a Polish indepen- dent state, saying that Austria-Hun- gary also desired it, and wished Poland to have a free decision. Finally he said that the idea of a League of Na- tions would probably meet with no op- position in Austria. President Wilson's Reply to the Cerv- tral Powers. — In an address to Con- gress, February 11, 1918, President Wilson after traversing the arguments of Count von Hertling and Count Czer- nin, set forth four principles upon the acceptance of which a discussion of the terms of peace would be possible. These were, in brief: (1) Each part of the final settlement to be based on the es- sential justice of that particular case. (2) Peoples and provinces not to be bartered from one sovereignty to an- other as if they were chattels. (3) Every territorial settlement to be made in the interest of the populations con- cerned. (4) National aspirations to be satisfied to the utmost without intro- duction or perpetuating elements of dis- cord. The Sixtus Letter. — As noted above, Count Czernin informed the city coun- cil of Vienna that he agreed to the four principles laid down by Mr. Wilson in his address of February 11, and that only Alsace-Lorraine stood in the way of peace with France and thereupon Premier Clemenceau replied that such discussion as had taken place had been only at Austria's instance. M. Cle- menceau published later the celebrated "Sixtus Letter," dated March 31, 1917. This had been sent and received on the condition that it should be regarded as confidential. It was addressed by the Emperor Charles to Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, whom it requested to commu- nicate to specified French officials the Austrian emperor's desire for peace and Jiis readiness to use his influence to PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 281 bring it about, and to assure the grant- ing of the just claims of France in re- gard to Alsace-Lorraine and the resto- ration of Belgium and Serbia. It ap- pears to have been discussed by Presi- dent Poincare and Premier Clemenceau together with a committee of French deputies and also by King George and the British premier, Lloyd George, but to have been dismissed as insincere. These points were brought out in the British parliament on May 16 in a re- ply of the British foreign minister, Mr. A. J. Balfour, to the questions raised by certain members of parliament who were identified with the policy of peace by negotiations. In the course of the discussion at that time, Mr. Balfour said that the government was ready to listen to peace proposals if they were brought forward by representatives of a country with which England was at war. German War Aims. — To the message of President Wilson on February 11 set- ting forth the four points upon which the negotiations might be based, the German chancellor, von Hertling, had replied that the four points were ac- ceptable but must be agreed to squarely by all the belligerents. The inde- pendence of Belgium was conceded, but under limitations to safeguard the in- terests of Germany. He said that the subject of Alsace-Lorraine was not de- batable and he declared that the only obstacle to peace was British imperial- ism. The attitude of the German gov- ernment was further illustrated by the address of the chancellor in the German parliament toward the end of June. He said that the proposal of the Society of Nations after the war would be in- jurious to Germany. He said that he had favored the four principles dis- cussed by President Wilson, but that from the views of the Allies as expressed since then, it was manifest that a peace based upon a league of nations would not be one that Germany could accept, for Germany's enemies would dominate it and isolate her. By their commer- cial rivalry and economic pressure they would stifle the economic life of Ger- many. On June 24 the Foreign Min- ister von Kiihlmann in the course of an address on Germany's war aims said in effect that the war could not be won by arms alone and that peace could only be had by negotiations. This aroused a storm of protest from the Pan-Ger- mans and Germans and was criticized from other points of view. By a part of the Allied press it was regarded as an attempt to make the enemies of Ger- many believe that favorable terms could be had at that time, whereas later Ger- many might not be willing to accord them. Von Kiihlmann afterwards ex- plained his words as meaning that while Germany intended to persevere until she was successful in a military sense, diplo- matic arrangements would have to fol- low, and he hoped the Entente Allies would offer terms appropriate to the situation and satisfactory to Ger- many's vital needs. The chancellor de- fended von Kiihlmann from the attacks that were made upon him, but neverthe- less it cost him his post and he resigned on July 9, being succeeded by Admiral von Hintze. In spite of the distrust of von Kiihlmann's sincerity and in spite of the attacks made upon him in Ger- many, it appeared from subsequent events that the hopelessness of military victory was felt by a large and increas- ing number of Germans. Persons con- versant with German affairs reported later that they had observed distinctly as early as July the growing conviction that Germany was in a military sense beaten. In the debate that followed von Kiihlmann's speech, the leader of the 282 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR minority Socialists made a bitter attack upon the government, blaming it for its ruthlessness in the matter of Belgium, its aggressive course, its imperialism, its constant misrepresentations as to the war, its atrocious conduct in Ukraine, etc. He pointed to one instance after another in which the government had cheated the people by the hope of suc- cess as in the case of the repeated as- surance that the submarine campaign would lead to victory and the frequent assertion that the United States would not enter the war. Other Peace Discussions in July, 1918.— On July 16 the Austro-Hun- garian foreign minister. Baron Burian, who had succeeded Count Czernin, de- clared his approval in the main to the "four new points" which President Wil- son had stated in his Mount Vernon speech on July 4 aild his readiness to discuss everything except what applied to the territory of the Dual Monarchy. He said the territorial claims of the Al- lies were inadmissible but that they alone stood in the way of a settlement. Austro-Hungarian internal affairs con- cerned Austria-Hungary alone, and their discussion by the Allies was "an offensive of irritation." On July 3, Lloyd George in a speech to the Na- tional Union of Manufacturers said the longer the war continued, the more se- vere would be the economic terms of the peace ; that the fullest possible eco- nomic agreement between the Allies was necessary ; and that Great Britain must come to a complete understanding with her Allies and with her own Dominions in regard to the problem of raw ma- terials and transport. He declared for trade preference within the empire. On July 19, the French National Congress of Socialists passed a resolution calling upon the government to revise its war aims, denouncing imperialism, and de- claring for a Wilson peace. It also passed a resolution demanding immedi- ate negotiations for a League of Na- tions. At the same time Lord Lans- downe gave out his views, which attract- ed wide attention and caused sharp criticism as tending toward a policy of weakness. He said that the world was drained of men and money ; that the birth rate was falling off; that the de- sire for peace was widespread ; and that nevertheless the spokesmen of the bel- ligerent powers applied themselves merely to recrimination. He believed that now was the time for peace since the moment had come when the Allies were showing that they could hold their own in the conflict and he believed any reasonable proposal should be consid- ered. Alsace-Lorraine Question. — Early in June there was a demonstration in Switzerland on the part of the Alsace- Lorraine residents. Delegates from all of the Alsace-Lorraine organizations in Switzerland met in assembly in Berne. The committee on investigation pre- sented a report urging the final aban- donment of any idea of neutralization and declared for unconditional re-ab- sorption of Alsace-Lorraine in France. Among the Alsatians in Switzerland were many who had fought on the Ger- man side during the war and there were others who had lived in Switzerland a long time and become citizens. They unanimously expressed the wish to re- turn to France not only for reasons of sentiment but because they could not see any other guarantee for the peace- ful development of Europe in the fu- ture. Those who had formerly believed in neutralization seemed to have come over to this view. Swiss sentiment in general was on the same side. The question of a popular decision in Al- sace-Lorraine was much discussed dur- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 283 ing the year. The objections raised against the plebiscite were as follows : The proper field for the action of uni- versal suffrage was in the election to legislative bodies or the direct vote on< measures submitted to the people by parliament as in the referendum. These decisions might be changed as popu- lar opinion varied, but when a popular vote decides the question of nationality that decision must be regarded as final. Yet such a vote could be very easily tampered with, and perhaps controlled in the interest of one side. The plebi- scite was generally opposed both by the French and the Alsace-Lorrainers. Since 1871 an inhabitant of Alsace- Lorraine had not been free to express his national preference and even now in voting he would be haunted by the mem- ory of all that he had suffered under the military dictatorship during the war, and he would think with dread of the revenge which Gei-many would take upon the minority if the decision were favorable to her. Secrecy of the bal- lot would do no good, for during many years the German authorities had spied upon and ascertained the views of all the natives. In these circumstances the weak and timid would all vote against their convictions and their real senti- ments. A good many of them would reason thus : If I displease the En- tente I can always get out of the diffi- culty without damage, but if I rouse the anger of Germany, woe betide me. In favor of the plebiscite it was said that it would bring Germany to terms and that she would renounce all fur- ther claims. Hence, it would consoli- date the peace. To this it was replied that Germany would never submit to a vote that was adverse to her. The lead- ers of Germany do not admit the right of peoples to dispose of themselves and they are opposed to a genifine plebi- scite. The reason why they consent to a consultation of the people is because they hope to bring pressure to bear upon the vote and more especially be- cause they expect as a result of that concession to obtain a peace which will leave them enough power to resume their schemes for dominating the world. In a debate in the German parlia- ment in the latter part of June the Ger- man view was indicated. One of the Socialist deputies said we must not be surprised if the population in Alsace- Lorraine is to-day full of hatred and the desire for revenge against Germany. Unless Alsace-Lorraine becomes a self- governing member of the state we shall lose the good-will of the people, even though retaining the country. If one were to organize to-day a plebiscite, four-fifths of the people would choose for France if only to get rid of our oppressive rule. A deputy on the op- posite side expressed the hope that these ideas were false, but he added that the pro-German tendency in Alsace- Lorraine had wholly disappeared, doubtless because the conviction ob- tained among the people that the En- tente would come out victorious in the war. In England at about the same time reference was made to the attempt of the Germans to give the impression that the war had been imposed upon them by France because France wished to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine and that the claim of France to those provinces was the only thing that stood in the way of a reasonable peace. This was characterized in England as elsewhere among the Allies as merely the attempt of Germany to cause discord among the members of the Entente. As soon as the armistice was signed (November 11), the French government began to take the necessary measures for the for- 284 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR mal recovery of the provinces, and three commissioners were appointed to act for the government in their three respective divisions, namely, Alsace, Upper Alsace, and Lorraine. Mean- while the armies of the Allies had al- ready occupied parts of the provinces in their advance toward Germany. See above under Military Operations. Dissensions Among the Central Pow- ers. — During 1918 there was much discussion in the press of the clash between the respective ambitions of the Turkish and Bulgarian govern- ments. It Avas evident that Ferdinand of Bulgaria aimed at leadership in the Balkans and that he had not consoled himself for the check of 1913, when he hoped to find the way open to Con- stantinople. But the ambitions of the Turks were awakened by the downfall of Russia. They wished to control Russian Armenia and to gain a foot- hold in the Caucasus and were believed to be coveting the Crimea, with the ap- parent aim of turning the Black Sea into a Turkish lake. These designs alarmed B>ulgaria and the conflict in aims between the two governments was brought in the affair of the Maritza on one hand and the affair of the Do- bruja on the other. The treaty of Bucharest (see above) had given ab- solute possession to Bulgaria of only the northern part of the Dobruja and this was far from satisfying her. The least she expected was the annexation of the whole Dobruja. This, however, was opposed by the Turks ; and the German government, failing to bring the two rivals into harmony, adopted the policy of joint control for north- ern Dobruja, The Bulgarians, on the other hand, refused to yield to the Turks in the affair of the Maritza. On the right bank of this river the Central Powers, in order to win the Bulgarians to their side, had obliged the Turks to cede to Bulgaria the station of Adria- nople in 1915, and the main line to Constantinople was thus left at the mercy of the Bulgarians — a situation highly objectionable to the Turks, who therefore demanded the revision of that agreement. In this demand they were supported by the Germans. The Bul- garians sharply refused and in one of their papers, on June 19, a writer re- marked that Bulgaria was surprised at the attitude of the Turks, who seemed to assume that agreements between al- lies were merely scraps of paper. The German government apparently was having difficulty in keeping the peace with them. Her policy inclined toward Turkey and this was explained in the press of the Entente Allies on the ground that Germany wished to con- solidate her power all the way from Constantinople to Bagdad. Bulgaria's attitude, on the other hand, was dis- turbing and her czar showed little in- clination to work for the King of Prus- sia. The design of a greater Bulgaria threatened Germany's plan for the con- trol of the routes to the east. That is why she hesitated to surrender the whole of the Dobruja and encourage Turkey to claim Adrianople. The German government had given Bulgaria the right to annex eastern Serbia, but the Bulgarian government was apparently not satisfied with that so long as the status of the Dobruja was not determined in its favor. Tur- key had insisted that the question of the Dobruja should form part of the whole subject of the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier and the German government for the present consented to this. The Turks opposed the granting of the Dobruja to Bulgaria so long as the lat- ter did not offer any compensation. While the Turkish-Bulgarian dispute PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 285 continued the German government took the stand that it could not settle these questions and it would not make good its alleged promises to give Bulgaria the Greek towns of Calvalla, Drama, and Seres. At this time the Czar Ferdi- nand was reported in the press to have taken a long journey in foreign parts and this was supposed to mean that he had gone to Berlin to press his claim. At the same time the Bulgarian prime minister, M. Radoslavoff, who was friendly to Germany, resigned and was succeeded by an anti-German, M. Mali- nofF. This was attributed to resent- ment at Germany's attitude and at her niggardliness in provisioning Bulgaria, where the food situation had become critical. Now that von Hintze had succeeded to von Kiihlmann, there seemed a better chance for Bulgaria be- cause von Hintze had from the begin- ning shown sympathy with the Pan- German element and the Pan-Germans heartily supported Bulgaria's claim both to the Dobruja and to the Greek cities. They favored the plan for the greater Bulgaria of the future which should include even Saloniki. As to the difficulty between Germany and Turkey, it was regarded at the beginning of August to be so acute as to threaten a rupture. This, however, seemed improbable, for the Young Turks who were in power were not like- ly to come to any agreement with the Entente Allies. The Allies could not recognize a government which was founded upon the crimes of Enver, Ta- laat and Djemal and which still held under its tyranny the Armenians and Syrians. The Allies would have to in- sist upon the liberation of those peo- ples and to this the Young Turk gov- ernment would never consent. Compro- mise seemed out of the question. Never- theless the relations between Germany and Turkey appeared to be far from harmonious. Germany had large de- signs in the East and hoped to realize them by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to which Turkey had agreed in return for certain concessions in the Caucasus. But now that Turkey virtually demand- ed the sole control of the Black Sea, which would eventually bar the way of Germany toward the East, there was much indignation in Germany, where the press bitterly denounced what they characterized as Ottoman chauvinism. The Turk retorted with the same ar- guments for their course in the Cau- casus as the Germans had employed on behalf of an independent Flanders, that is to say, Turkey argued that just as the Germans had undertaken to create an independent state in that part of Belgium which was akin to them in race, so the Turks wished to recognize the movement for independence on the part of their own kinsmen in the Caucasus. At other points the Turks were said to have ambitions inconsistent with the purposes of Germany : For example, Germany wished the Turks to drive the British from occupied territory, espe- cially in Mesopotamia, but the Turks realized that the task was too great and sought objects less difficult to attain in the Caucasus, Persia, and in the Black Sea. The German press reproached the Turks bitterly for this policy, say- ing that instead of trying to encroach in the direction of the Caspian and Baku, they should turn their efforts toward Bagdad. Turkey was accused even of coveting the Crimea and its ports in order that the Ukraine should not become a Black Sea power and of aiming to secure in the Caucasus a bar- rier against Russia in the East in or- der to protect Turkish communications with Persia. In short, a portion of the German press believed that Turkey was 286 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR aiming to turn the Black Sea into a Turkish lake and thereby choke off all trade from European Russia. The chief difficulty between Germany and Austria-Hungary arose from the question of Poland. The Germans had thought that von Burian would be less insistent in regard to Poland than his predecessor, Czernin, but to their sur- prise he had declared that the incor- poration of the Polish kingdom in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was a vital necessity. In the German press it was said squarely that German interests were superior to Austrian interests ; that the Germans would consider the Polish question from the German point of view, which required that there should be a strong strategic frontier. The safety of Germany was the first consideration. The Germans had not won their victories in order to be en- circled on the east by a Polish-Galician state. Some Pan-German organs de- manded that the Austro-Polish solu- tion be rejected at once. They said that after the arrangement following the meeting of the two emperors the German public had believed that this Austro-Polish plan had been abandoned. Seldom, they said, had a project been rejected more unanimously by public opinion, and they complained of its revival. The Austrian emperor by go- ing to German military headquarters (May 12) for his famous interview with the kaiser had given the impression that he had abandoned his Polish claim. Shortly after he had returned to Vienna the whole project reappeared. It looked as if there was a real disagree- ment between the governments and as if Germany had been deceived. They demanded that the two governments promptly come to an agreement for the definite settlement of Poland's status so that the Entente Allies would be brought face to face with it as an ac- complished fact. As time went on it became apparent that the difficulties between Hungary and Austria were growing more and more serious. Hungary believed her- self to be supported by Berlin. A Hun- garian journal declared Hungary would have the right even to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria and added significantly that perhaps even now the time had come that Berlin and Buda- pest would have to interfere and insist that Austria should pursue a policy faithful to the Allies. In Germany there seemed from the newspapers to be strong sympathy with Hungary, though this was perhaps for the pur- pose of stirring up enmity between the two parts of the Dual INIonarchy. For example, a German newspaper declared that it seemed extremely probable that Austria would fall to pieces. The Czechs, Poles, Southern Slavs, and other races with very divergent aims were all struggling for their complete independence, and feeling themselves too cramped within the Austrian state, they were sure to separate sooner or later. A German journal in Berlin declared that the only salvation for Austria was to transform herself into a Federal state. With only 10,000,000 Germans, it said, against 18,000,000 non-Ger- mans there would necessarily always be hostility on the part of the latter. The state could not exist unless it were transformed into a Federal organiza- tion. Thus, part of the German press sustained the same principle that Presi- dent Wilson had advocated, but this was interpreted by the press of the Allies as a step to the ultimate organization of the nations of Austria under the con- trol of Germany. With Hungary on her side, and with the Slav races pla- cated, there would be a chance for Ger- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 287 many to work out a system of control. Peace Discussions in August and September. — Mr. Balfour, the British foreign minister, reaffirmed British aims in an address in the House of Com- mons early in August. He announced that Great Britain would not consent to the return of the German colonies and that Germany was dominated by the moral doctrine of the mailed fist. Dr. Solf, the German colonial secre- tary, made an attack on the Allied at- titude on August 20. He asked where the blame lay. He said that the enemy had renounced the ideal of a League of Nations inasmuch as he had decided upon an economic war against Ger- many. He said that the German gov- ernment had already declared that Bel- gium would not be kept by Germany. This, he said, disposed of the preten- sion that Belgium was at present a cause of the war. As to the attack on Germany's eastern policy, he said that the Brest-Litovsjc peace was made by agreement between the Russian and German governments and that it per- mitted the frontier peoples of Russia, after centuries of oppression, to live their own lives ; also, that the only dif- ference between Russians and Germans in regard to the peace had to do with the ways and means of conferring in- dependence upon these border peoples. The Germans insisted upon safeguards against anarchy. He declared that the Brest-Litovsk peace was the framework of a policy which in future would be car- ried out. He came to the conclusion that the enemy would not want peace by negotiation and he declared that he was waging a war for plunder and glory and was carried away by arro- gance. As to the extreme views of Ger- many, be spoke of the Pan-Germans as a small group without influence in poli- tics and without influence in the gov- ernment. Lord Robert Cecil on behalf of England issued a statement in an- swer to Dr. Solf. He denied that the Pan-German element was without power, pointing to the fact that only a few weeks before von Kiihlmann was dismissed for saying that Germans could not have everything their own way and Count von Hertling, the chan- cellor, had to make an explanation. As to Belgium, the chancellor had said he looked upon it as a pledge, adding that it would become closely related in com- mercial association with Germany. As to the Brest-Litovsk treaty, it was evi- dent that those border peoples had been so constituted as to have as little in- dependence as possible. As to the Ger- man colonies, he denied the moral right of Germany to be a protector of the colored colonies ; characterizing their rule as brutal and callous. During September there was a threefold peace movement on the part of the Central Powers, comprising three features : First, a note from the Austro-Hunga- rian government to all other govern- ments proposing a conference to discuss peace, but not in a binding manner ; sec- ond, a definite offer of peace to Belgium by Germany ; third, an off'er to the Ger- man minister in Finland to refrain from attacking eastern Karelia on condition that the Allies withdraw their troops from that region and also from the whole Murmansk coast. The most im- portant of these moves was the Austrian note. This declared that in spite of obstacles, the peace discussion had made progress and that almost all the bel- ligerents had again and again expressed themselves on the conditions of peace. The attitude had gradually changed and the differences between the two sides had diminished. It was manifest that in both camps there was a growth of the desire for peace. Remarks of 288 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Mr. Balfour were cited to indicate that the Entente Allies had abandoned their demand for the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Cen- tral Powers had made it clear that they were waging a war of defense. Certain general principles were practically ac- cepted by both parties. In his messages of February 11 and July 4 President Wilson had asserted principles which were not contradicted by his allies and which were not likely to meet objection from the Central Powers. Discussion of the subject in public only embit- tered opinion and served no practical purpose. Statesmen who discussed it publicly were obliged to exaggerate lest they should endanger the interests of their country in the prosecution of the war. Therefore, it was suggested that a discussion should take place between the representatives of the governments and only between them. Such a dis- cussion was not to be binding and there was to be no interruption of hostilities. Such an exchange of views far from be- ing harmful could only be useful to the cause of peace. The reply of the United States government to this overture was as follows : "The government of the United States has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States could consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a mat- ter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain." The German proposal to Belgium suggest- ed that the political and economic inde- pendence of Belgium should be re- stored after the war on certain condi- tions, namely, those set forth in the memorandum as to Germany's pre-war commercial treaties with Belgium and the cooperation of Belgium in trying to secure from the Allied governments the restoration of the German colonies. The Austrian note contained nothing about restoration or reparation and it produced no effect in the Allied coun- tries. As to the German offer in re- gard to eastern Karelia, it was pointed out by the Allies that the Germans had few, if any, troops there and that the proposal really came to nothing. The net result of this peace offensive was practically negligible. The Approach of Peace: The Ger- man Crisis. — After the surrender of Bulgaria (see military section above) the demoralization of the Central Pow- ers was soon manifested. On Septem- ber 30 the German chancellor von Hertling, and the foreign secretary, von Hintze, resigned, and Prince Max of Baden, who had been a moderate in politics, was appointed chancellor two days later. Dr. W. S. Solf, the colo- nial secretary, was appointed foreign secretary and a coalition ministry was forced of which two Socialist deputies, Scheidemann and Bauer, and two Cen- trist deputies, Groeber and Erzberger, were members. The news was followed by details showing a radical change in the German political system. The ma- jority parties had gained control of the parliament and their programme was as follows : Adherence to the prin- ciples set down in the government's re- ply to the Pope's note of August 1, 1917; a declaration that Germany is ready to join the league of nations if it comprises all states and is based on the idea of equality, etc. ; a plain decla- ration as to the restoration of Bel- gium and an agreement in regard to in- demnity; the peace treaties hitherto concluded not to stand in the way of a conclusion of general peace ; Alsace- Lorraine to be an independent Federal state ; electoral reform to be carried out immediately in Prussia ; strict observ- ance of constitutional responsibility PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 289 and the summoning of government rep- resentatives from parliament ; the rules as to a state of siege to be amended in order to protect personal liberty, right of meeting and freedom of the press. In an address to the Reichstag, the new chancellor set forth this pro- gramme and declared that in conform- ity with the imperial decree of Septem- ber 30, the political leadership of the empire had completely changed. He addressed parliament in the belief that he was speaking in accordance with the will of the majority of the people. Henceforth the people must take an active part in deciding their destiny. In other words, the majority of the freely elected political leaders must be behind the action of the government. He said : "In the matter of international policies, I have taken a clear stand through the manner in which the formation of the government was brought about. Upon my motion, leaders of the majority parties were summoned for direct advice. It was my conviction, gentle- men, that unity of imperial leadership should be assured not only through mere schismatic party allegiance, but by the different members of the government. I considered almost still more important the unity of ideas. I proceeded from this viewpoint and have, in making my selections, laid greatest weight on the fact that the members of the new imperial government stand on a basis of a just peace of justice, regardless of the war situation, and that they have openly declared this to be their stand- point at the time when we stood at the height of our military successes. I am convinced that the manner in whicli imperial leadership is now constituted with cooperation of the Reichstag is not something ephemeral, and that when peace comes a government cannot again be formed which does not find support in the Reichstag and does not draw its leader there- from." At the same time he announced the sending of a message of peace to Presi- dent Wilson. He said he had appealed to the President because in the latter's message to Congress on January 8, 1918, and in his speech of September 27, he had proposals which Germany could accept as a basis of negotiation. German and American Peace Notes. — On receipt of the note, October 5, 1918, the people throughout the United States were greatly stirred by the re- port that Germany had accepted the terms of peace demanded by the Allies. It was soon found that the rejoicing was premature, but Germany had, nevertheless, taken the first step which led to the conclusion of hostilities. The note requested the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking measures to avoid further bloodshed. It declared that the German government accepted as a basis for peace negotiations the programme laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress on January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially in his address of September 27, 1918. It asked the President of the United States to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air. On October 8, the American secre- tary of state returned the following an- swer: "Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straight- forward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accept the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on January last and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into *discus- sions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application? "The President feels bound to say with re- gard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessa- tion of arms to the governments with which 290 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR the Government of the United States is asso- ciated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would mani- festly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory. The Pres- ident also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view." In reply to these questions by Presi- dent Wilson, Germany sent the follow- ing message on October 12, signed by Dr. Solf, state secretary of the foreign office: "In reply to the questions of the President of the United States of America the German Government hereby declares: The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of Janu- ary 8 and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into dis- cussions would be only to agree upon practi- cal details of the application of these terms. The German Government believes that the Governments of the powers associated with the Government of the United States also take the position taken by President Wilson in his ad- dress. The German Government, in accord- ance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armis- tice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation. "The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrange- ments concerning the evacuation. The pres- ent German Government, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step toward peace, has been formed by conferences and in agree- ment with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people." The United States secretary of state, under date of October H, sent the fol- lowing reply : "The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of October 8 and 12, 1918. It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military ad- visers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide abso- lutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military su- premacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels con- fident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments. "The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Govern- ments with Avhich the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will con- sent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in. At the very time that the German Govern- ment approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace, its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present en- forced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been re- garded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and vil- lages, if not destroyed, are being stripped not only of all they contain, but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a ces- sation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoli- ation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts. "It is necessary also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German govern- ment has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on July 4 last. It is as follows: " 'The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 291 its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency.' "The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It- is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. "The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indis- pensable that the governments associated against Germany should know beyond a perad- venture with whom they are dealing. "The President will make a separate reply to the royal and imperial government of Aus- tria-Hungary." Although there was some criticism of this course in the United States dur- ing the negotiations, the President's di- plomacy appeared to meet with general approval among the Allies and the above note was received by the press of the Allied countries with especial satisfac- tion. The German reply to the President's note of October 14 was as follows: "In accepting the proposal for an evacuation for occupied territories the German Govern- ment has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the con- ditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers, and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for ar- rangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. The German Government sug- gests to the President that an opportunity should be brought about for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the Ger- man people and with opening a way to a peace of justice; "The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat destructions will al- ways be necessary, and they are carried out in so far as is pei-mitted by international law. The German troops are under the most strict instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished. The German Government fur- ther denies that the German Navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Govern- ment proposes with regard to all those charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral com- missions. "In order to avoid anything that might ham- per the work of peace, the German Govern- ment has caused orders to be despatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedo- ing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return. As a fundamental condition for peace the President prescribes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hither- to the representation of the people in the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Govern- ment. The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of representation of the peo- ple in decisions of peace and war. These con- ditions have just now undergone a funda- mental change. A new Government has been formed in complete accordance with the wishes (principle) of the representation of the peo- ple, based on equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. "The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government. In the future no Government can take or con- tinue in office without possessing the confidence of a majority of the Reichstag. The responsi- bility of the Chancellor of the empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the Constitution of the empire so that the consent of the repre- sentation of the people is required for de- cisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic con- tinuance. "The question of the President — with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing — is therefore answered in a clear, unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which is free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence and is supported by the approval of an overwhelm- ing majority of the German people. 292 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Prince Max, the chancellor, in a speech to the Reichstag October 22 re- ferred to the necessity of a "peace of justice" and declared that it was Ger- many's duty not to submit to a peace of violence without a fight. At this stage of the negotiations the American public was alarmed lest peace should come about by bargaining, and there was a loud demand for "unconditional surrender." Many public men, espe- cially among the Republicans, expressed suspicion of the President's course and advocated a short, sharp reply saying that the question of armistice should be referred to the generals in the field. The American government's reply to the foregoing German note was as fol- lows: "Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918, and the prin- ciples of settlement enunciated in his subse- quent addresses, particularly the address of September 27, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanated, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and con- ducted the present war on German's behalf but from Ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming major- ity of the German peoples; and having re- ceived also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the Pres- ident of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice. "He deems it his duty to say again, how- ever, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a posi- tion to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostil- ities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his cor- respondence with the present German author- ities to the Governments with which the Gov- ernment of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their mil- itary advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Gov- •ernments associated against Germany the neces- sary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her un- equivocal acceptance of the terms and princi- ples of peace from which the whole action pro- ceeds. "The President would deem himself lacking in candor did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German For- eign Secretary in his note of October 20, it does not appear that the principle of a Gov- ernment responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guar- antees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future war has been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been, and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the empire is unimpaired; that the determinat- ing initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been tlie masters of Germany. "Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straight- forward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften, what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the government of the United States can- not deal with any but veritalile representatives of the German people, who have been assured a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical auto- crats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Em- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 293 pire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leav- ing this essential thing unsaid. On October 27 Germany requested proposals for an armistice in the fol- lowing note : "The German Government has taken cogni- zance of the answer of the President of the United States. The President is aware of the far-reaching changes which have been carried out and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure, and that peace nego- tiations are being conducted by a people's Gov- ernment in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the power to make the deciding conclusions. The military powers are also subject to it. The German Government now awaits proposals for an armistice, which shall be the first step toward a just peace as the President has described it in his proclama- tion." To this the American government re- plied on November 4 : "In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President had transmitted his cor- respondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that if those Governments were disposed to accept peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments asso- ciated against Germany the necessary terms of auch an armistice as would fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deem such an armis- tice possible from the military point of view. The President is now in receipt of a memor- andum of observations by the Allied Govern- ments on this correspondence, which is as fol- lows: " 'The Allied Governments have given care- ful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Govern- ment. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the Pres- ident's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference. Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Con- gress of January 8, 1918, the President de- clared that invaded territories must be re- stored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this pro- vision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the ag- gression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.' "I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the mem- orandum above quoted, I am further in- structed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Govern- ments to receive properly accredited repre- sentatives of the German Government and to communicate to them terms of an armistice. Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my high- est consideration. Robeht Lansing." Austrian Peace Move. — At the same time that Prince Max sent the German note of peace, the Swedish government was requested by the Austro-Hungar- ian goverment to submit to the Presi- dent the following message (October 7, 1918): "The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war, and repeatedly given documentary evi- dence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honorable peace, hereby addresses itself to His Lordship the President of the United States of America, and offers to conclude with him and his allies an armistice on every front on land, at sea and in the air, and to enter immediately upon nego- tiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 13, 1918, should serve as a founda- tion and in which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account." 294 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR To this the United States govern- ment replied under date of October 18, as follows : "The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he can- not entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of ut- most importance which, occurring since the de- livery of his address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and re- sponsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at the time occurred the following: "10. The peoples of Austria-Hungarj% whose place among the nations we wish to see safe- guarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous develop- ment. "Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Gov- ernment of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro- Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho- slovak National Council is a de facto belliger- ent Government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the national- istic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom. "The President is therefore no longer at lib- erty to accept the mere 'autonomy' of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they and not he shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hun- garian Government will satisfy their aspira- tions and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations. Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Robert Lansing." At the same time the Emperor Charles issued a manifesto declaring that the reconstruction of the country must begin and that the wishes of the Austrian people must be made to har- monize. Austria, he said, would become a Federal state in which every race should form its own national state with- in its national dominion. He also ad- dressed a message to the army and fleet referring to the plan for a Federal state. In the Hungarian parliament there was a declaration on the part of the prime minister that peace must be concluded and that after Austria was organized on a Federal basis, the Hungarian state would organize its in- dependence, but would maintain a personal union with Austria. Count Mi- chael Karolyi attacked the prime min- ister, demanding that peace negotia- tions be opened at once. Soon after- wards Count Tisza declared that the country must admit that it had lost the war and that he approved of the government to make peace on President Wilson's terms. Count Karolyi at- tacked the government's foreign policy from the beginning of the war, blaming it for bringing on the war and speci- fying how it might have avoided the conflict. On October 28 the Austro-Hunga- rian foreign minister. Count Julius An- drassy, transmitted through the Swe- dish government the following reply : "In reply to the note of the President, Mr. Wilson, to the Austro-Hungarian Government, dated October 18 of this year, and about the decision of the President to take up, with Aus- tria-Hungary separately, the question of armis- tice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment has the honor to declare that it adheres both to the previous declarations of the Presi-- dent and his opinion of the rights of the peo- ples of Austria-Himgary, notably those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, contained in his last note. Austria-Hungary having thereby accepted all the conditions which the President had i^ut upon entering into negotiations on the subject of armistice and peace, nothing, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, longer stands in the way of beginning tliose ne- gotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government therefore declares itself ready to enter, without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations, into negotiations for a peace betv/een Austria- Hungary and the Entente States, and for an immediate armistice on all the fronts of Aus- tria-Hungary, and begs the President, Mr. Wil- son, to take the necessary measures to that ef- fect." The Beginning of the Collapse. — During the last ten days of October, when the notes were passing between the Uiiited States government and the for- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 295 eign offices of the two Germanic powers, the following events rapidly succeeded one another: In Germany the general staff was divided on the question of the peace offer, Ludendorff opposing and Hindenburg favoring. Hindenburg pre- vailed and on October 22 an order from the German general headquarters which had been captured by the French was made public. In it Hindenburg de- clared his approval of the government's peace offer and called upon the army not to interfere with it. Ludendorff re- signed and on October 27 Gen. von Los- sing, who had been chief of staff in the battle of Arras in April, 1917, was an- nounced as his successor. In the Reichs- tag Dr. Solf, the foreign secretary, in response to inquiries, declared it was the government's intention to carry out honestly the principles set forth by President Wilson, including specifically the Polish and Alsace-Lorraine ques- tions. Meanwhile the power of the So- cialists was steadily mounting. The government released Hcrr Liebknecht on October 22. The Independent So- cialist leader, Haase, demanded in the Reichstag on October 24 that the mon- archy give way to a republic and there was evidence that the working class throughout the country was behind him. In the Prussian house of deputies there was sarcastic comment on the govern- ment's sudden conversion to democracy, which was characterized as a comedy that foreign governments ought to see through; militarism and imperialism were declared to be as superfluous as the dynasty. Mass meetings of the In- dependent Socialist Democrats were re- ported throughout all Germany. In Austria-Hungary the Hussarek ministry resigned, and on October 26 it was announced that Dr. Heinrich Lammasch, an advocate of peace, would form a cabinet. Meanwhile a movement for a new German-Austrian state within the empire had resulted in a so-called Constituent German Assembly which met at Vienna on October 21 and unani- mously passed a resolution declaring it to be the will of the German people in Austria to determine their own destiny and form an independent state. By the end of October a condition of anarchy was reported throughout the country. A provisional government was set up and a republic proclaimed. The em- peror abdicated November 3. In Hun- gary the movement to break away from Austria proceeded rapidly and on Octo- ber 17 the diet adopted a resolution de- claring Hungary independent except for the union in the person of the em- peror. Soon afterwards Count Michael Karolyi led a sharp attack upon the ministry and demanded the resignation of the prime minister, Dr. Wekherle. The latter resigned on October 25 and was succeeded by Count Apponyi. The announcement of the emperor's inten- tion to concede the independence of Hungary produced no effect, and early in November the diet, now styling itself the national assembly, proclaimed Hun- gary a republic with Count Michael Karolyi as prime minister of foreign affairs. Meanwhile the disintegration through the Slav movements for separa- tion was continuing. The Czecho-Slo- vak provisional government sitting in Paris issued a formal declaration of in- dependence, asserting that the Czecho- slovaks would no longer live under the direct or indirect rule of the violators of Belgium, that they repudiated the Vienna government's promises of inde- pendence, and that no one among them would care to have anything to do with those who had not wished to do justice to them or to the Polish and Jugo-Slav nations. There were violent scenes in the diet as the result of the assertion 296 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR of a Rumanian deputy that henceforth the Rumanians of Hungary were a na- tion. The resignation of Dr. Wekherle had followed the news that a Croatian regiment at Fiume had disarmed the Hungarian Honved (militia). This movement was a sequel to several south- ern Slav attempts at revolt in the army and navy, notably the mutinies among the sailors of the fleet in Italian wa- ters in the latter part of 1917 at Se- benico and Pola and in February, 1918, at Pola and Cattaro. The Croatian troops after the revolt at Fiume seized the buildings of the city. All Croatia meanwhile was in revolt. In the United States a great Slavic demonstration took place at Independence Hall, Phila- delphia, October 27, comprising repre- sentatives of eighteen Slav states of Middle Europe with a population of some fifty millions and representatives of other nationalities under alien rule. Among them wore Poles, Czecho-Slo- vaks, Jugo-Slavs, Ukrainians, Ukro- Russians, Lithuanians, Rumanians, Italian Irredentists, Unredeemed Greeks, Zionists, and Albanians. Mean- while preparations were made for an Allied conference at Paris where Col. House, as the personal representative of the President, arrived on October 26 and was followed by the British prime minister, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Arthur J. Balfour, secretary for for- eign affairs. On November 11 the armistice with Germany was signed. See military section above. Although the above evidences of dis- ruption in Austria-Hungary and in Germany were reported in the press, prominent statesmen in the countries of the Allies continued to profess the be- lief that the peace move of the two Central Powers was of the same order as previous peace moves and could not be regarded in any other light than as an attempt to secure an advantage. The belief that it was merely part of Germany's and Austria's diplomatic strategy continued down to the moment of the conclusion of the armistice. The complete internal disorganization of the two Germanic powers during October and the first week in November seemed not to be in the least appreciated by many of the leading statesmen in spite of the numerous signs. Dr. Solfs Appeal. — Shortly after the signing of the armistice, an appeal was addressed by Dr. Solf to the Allied governments, comprising among others the following points : The conditions imposed by the armistice, he said, threatened the economic security of the left bank of the Rhine and its relations with German territory on the right bank. Unless those conditions were modified, Germany could not exist, and, moreover, the peaceful development which was beginning in Germany would be checked, with the result that a more or less Bolshevist movement would take shape. Hence it was urged that normal intercourse between the left bank of the Rhine and the rest of Germany and with foreign countries should not be dis- turbed even during military occupation. Then followed a long list of economic activities that Germany desired to re-, sume in relation to the left bank of the Rhine, including permission to exploit as hitherto the coal, potash, and ore mines ; to transport the requisite coal, ore, and potash; to use completely the Rhine for transports within the old boundary of the German Empire ; to have the right of free navigation via Rotterdam and the coast for provision- ing Germany ; to have free railway traf- fic and the right to electric power ; to allow the civil and military organiza- tions on the left bank of the Rhine to continue to work, etc. PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 297 At the same time, a special appeal was made to the United States govern- ment that the distress was urgent and that the oppressive terms of the armis- tice were making the situation unbear- able ; that anarchy could only be avoid- ed if aid were quickly given. The gov- ernment of the United States was im- plored to save the German people from starvation and anarchy by sending en- voys to the Hague or some other place to discuss with envoys from Germany details as to how American aid could be given. Still another appeal was made to the United States government requesting the President's intervention on behalf of the German civilians in Turkey who, by the 19th article of the Anglo-Turkish armistice, were required to leave the Turkish Empire — a re- quirement that would cause severe hard- ship especially to the poor people un- der German care, etc. France and Peace Terrm. — On De- cember 30 Premier Clemenceau made an important address in the chamber of deputies, in the course of which he re- plied to various criticisms, especially in regard to his not having kept the chamber informed as to what was going on. He said if he had told the cham- ber all the details of the discussions in regard to the various claims of the pow- ers, he would have been the worst prime minister in Europe. He declared that while he was in accord with President Wilson on some points, he disagreed with him on others; and he added this statement, which was regarded as high- ly significant since it indicated a di- vergence of view between the French government and the governments of the United States and England. He said France found itself in a particularly difficult situation. It was the nearest country to Germany. The United States was at a distance and it took its own time in entering the war. England entered immediately upon the appeal of Mr. Asquith. "We have suffered and fought ; our men have been mowed down, and our cities and villages destroyed. There exists an old system of alliance known as the balance of power. Every- bo'dy seems to condemn it now, and nevertheless if England, the United States, France, and Italy had agreed that whatever power would attack any one of them, it would be equivalent to a declaration of war upon the whole world, this war would never have taken place. This system, moreover, which I have not renounced, will be my all-guid- ing thought at the Peace Conference if your confidence sends me there." He demanded a vote of confidence saying that if there were any doubt as to the wisdom of leaving him in control, it should be settled now. The vote of confidence was accorded by an over- whelming majority, namely, 398 against 93. XI. RELIEF MEASURES The outbreak of the European War Ambassador at Berhn and the American very soon made it evident that milHons of innocent victims .in the fighting areas would be without independent means of support on account of wholesale de- struction of property, the confiscation of food supplies, and the paralysis of industry. This was first illustrated in Belgium, where it was estimated that by November, 1914, over 6,000,000 peo- ple had been rendered homeless and 1,500,000 destitute. The prosecution of the war, however, resulted in the creation of a similar situation in Rus- sian Poland, Galicia, and in Serbia. The situation in Poland was even worse than that in Belgium. Finally the un- precedented butchery of the Armen- ians by the Turks rendered relief for the remnant of the Armenian popula- tion an absolute necessity. As early as September, 1914, relief organizations began to be formed in the United States. After considerable duplication at first, relief committees gradually were systematized under cen- tral committees. All sorts of devices were resorted to, including appeals through newspapers, endless-chain whist parties, fairs and bazaars, the- atrical and musical performances, "tag" days, balls and fetes of various kinds, and appeals through churches and other organizations. Commission for Relief in Belgium. — This was the most extensive relief or- ganization, embracing all neutral coun- tries. It was brought into existence through the activities of the American and Spanish ambassadors at London and ministers at Brussels, the American Minister at The Hague. There were national organizations in America, Spain, Italy, and England, besides a most extensive distributory organiza- tion in Belgium and northern France. It carried out the distribution of its aid in Belgium through the Comite Na- tional de Secours et d'Alimentation. Similarly on account of the devasta- tion in the occupied French territory the Comite d'Alimentation du Nord de France was organized. The commis- sion had assembling depots in every State in the United States, and repre- sentative executives in all but about 12 States. The committee secured pledges from England, Holland, and Germany, per- mitting the transportation of food products to the occupied territory and the pledge of Germany that such food would not be confiscated for war pur- poses. The general policy of the com- mission was to cooperate with organi- zations of every sort in Belgium and northern France ; local committees were brought into existence in almost every commune of the occupied territory, and over these were district and provincial committees, all under the Comite Na- tional. The work was carried out un- der three main divisions : the Provision- ing Department; the Financial Relief and Exchange Department ; and the Benevolent Department. The Provi- sioning Department provided food for about 7,000,000 people in Belgium and 2,300,000 in northern France. Food- stuffs were sold to the population and the profits thus secured were used by 298 1 . A Relief Ship sailing from Norfolk, Va., flying flag of the Commission and having the appropriate marking on the side 2. A Steamship discharging at .Rotterdam supplies purchased in the United States by the Commission 3. Feeding Belgian Children WORK OF THE COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM RELIEF MEASURES 299 the Benevolent Department for the care of the destitute. Food was given out through a system of canteens covering all Belgium, meals being supplied at a per capita cost of only eight cents a day. There were also baby canteens, cheap restaurants, meals for school children, and in some cases provision of shelter. Aid was also given to or through the following: a committee to aid doctors and pharmacists by sup- plying medicines, serums and other ne- cessities ; child institutions working for the better feeding of infants, the aid of private and public orphanages, and assistance to war orphans and other homeless children; the treatment of in- digent consumptives ; an agricultural committee to control the supply of seeds and fodder; a committee for the aid and protection of artists, some 50,000 lace workers (mostly Belgian women), destitute foreigners, and refugees from other localities ; a committee for the re- habilitation of churches ; local work- rooms for the repair of clothing for the destitute; and miscellaneous grants for Cardinal Mercier for trade training for maimed soldiers, and for maternity hos- pitals. The total amount of money entrusted to the commission up to the close of the war was about $500,000,000, which, with the exception of overhead charges, were spent for food in Belgium and France. The British and French gov- ernments contributed more than $150,- 000,000 for rehef in Belgium. After the diplomatic break between the United States and Germany the Dutch took over the work of the Commission. Belgian Relief Fund. This fund "for women, children and other non- combatants" had its headquarters in New York City. It embraced numerous local committees, including one in every State. Most of the cash received was spent for food, but small sums were sent to refugees in Holland and to war victims in the unoccupied parts of Bel- gium. Jewish Relief. On account of the great number of Jews in Poland and other parts of Europe who suffered ex- treme privation as a result of the war, the American Jewish Relief Committee for Sufferers from the War was organ- ized in New York City. Towards the close of the year 1915, a most active campaign for funds was undertaken. Local committees were formed in cities throughout the country. In 1916 a great bazaar was held in New York City which realized about $1,000,000. In Great Britain was formed the Rus- sian Jews' Relief Fund for the aid of Jews in Russia and Poland. It had branches in all the principal cities. By means of it over 120 relief centres were feeding every day more than 200,000 homeless and destitute Jews. In Russia a central relief committee at Petrograd sent out word that mili- tary authorities had forcibly removed 250,000 Jews from their homes in the occupied territory and that 200,000 more had left voluntarily. The com- mittee had opened employment agencies in 31 cities and equipped 10 workshops. Hospitals, asylums, infirmaries, and schools were opened. The Federal Council of Allied War Charities comprised some seventy-five organizations of varied interest and na- tional in scope. It was created as a part of the movement to coordinate ac- tivities, decrease duplication, and in- crease financial responsibility and ef- ficiency. It served also as a medium for effecting concerted action of its constituents with the Red Cross. The latter's Committee on Cooperation ex- tended an invitation to the war relief bodies to become auxiliaries of the Red 300 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Cross and this was accomplished to some extent. The individual organiza- tions, however, were loath to surrender their independence either in the collec- tion of funds or in the machinery, meth- ods, and area of the distribution of benefits. The aggregate membership of the bodies in the Federal Council was over 2,000,000. Its members had sent a total of more than $4,000,000 in cash and goods for relief work in Europe since the war began. Quakers in War Relief. Within a few months after the outbreak of the war Quakers of the United States and England began relief activities among peasants of devastated areas in France and Belgium. By the fall of 1917 they had erected nearly 500 wooden houses for peasants and assisted in securing supplies of agricultural implements and tools, seeds, poultry, rabbits, etc., as well as household furniture and uten- sils. They established work-rooms for farm women, convalescent homes, a small general hospital, and a mater- nity hospital. They organized indus- tries and recreation among the thou- sands of Belgians in refuge camps in Holland. Later they began similar work among Russians driven from home on the eastern battle line, this branch being in charge of the American Friends Service Committee, assisted by a group of English Friends. This committee began in July, 1917, also the training at Haverford College of 100 young men for reconstruction work in France, including agriculture, building, repair- ing, sanitation, medical and social work. The American Ambulance was one of the most important relief activities. It organized ambulance sections for work in different parts of France, and Italy, and at Saloniki. Ambulance drivers were secured primarily from American colleges, considerably more than 1,000 such men having been re- cruited. The American Ambulance Field Service had in July, 1917, eight- een sections of ambulances serving the French army with staffs totalling 700 volunteers. In all it was maintaining more than 700 ambulances at the front, in reserve, or under construction. A branch of this service, ammunition transport, had nearly 80,000 auto- trucks at work. This latter branch was long handicapped for lack of capable drivers, but by mid-summer this was overcome, three reserve groups of forty men each being under train- ing. The American Ambulance Hos- pital at Paris was at first run entirely by voluntary workers ; it was after- wards turned over to the Red Cross. It then became the American Military Hospital, run by American money, with its staff drawn from various coun- tries, partly volunteer and partly paid professional physicians and surgeons. It had 600 beds, excellent surgical equipment, 250 motor ambulances, a hospital train fitted to accommodate 264f wounded and having operating room, sterilizing plant, diet kitchen and a staff of doctors, surgeons, and nurses. Another feature was the Mo- bile Field Hospital with 108 beds; and still another the Advance Hospital near the front at Juilly-sur-Marne. It organized the War Relief Clearing House for France and her Allies with its American headquarters in New York and its Paris headquarters in the house of the former ambassadors of the United States to France. This body was officially recognized by the French government as the agency for the distribution of American charity in France. It was given free transporta- tion by the French government for all of its supplies on French liners and over all French railways. RELIEF MEASURES 301 Perhaps the most important other relief activities were those directed toward Poland and Serbia. To a large extent Jewish relief funds were direct- ed toward the former country. There was in addition the Polish Victims' Re- lief Fund with headquarters at 33 West Forty-second Street, New York, Frank A. Vanderlip, treasurer, which had collected more than $1,150,000 at the beginning of 1919. There was also the PoHsh Children's Relief Fund, 37 East Thirty-sixth Street, New York, Mrs. Louisa Satterlee, treasurer, which had collected over $50,000. The Serbian Relief Committee had head- quarters at 70 Fifth Avenue, New York, Murray H. Coggeshall, treas- urer; it had secured $450,000. The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, 1 Madison Avenue, New York, and Cleveland, Ohio, H. Dodge, treasurer, had spent many millions of dollars and was at the close of the year planning a drive for $30,000,000 more. The Serbian Aid Fund Cloth- ing Committee, 338 Madison Avenue, New York, was engaged in a campaign for 500 tons of warm clothing to be transmitted through the Serbian lega- tion at Washington ; while the Serbian Aid Fund, 1 Madison Avenue, New York, Otto T. Bannard, treasurer, had collected over $180,000. Some of the other principal relief funds with their headquarters, treas- urers, and collections to the close of 1918 were as follows : American Com- mittee for Devastated France, 16 East Thirty-ninth Street, New York, Dr. A. C. Humphreys, treasurer, $501,592; American Committee for Training Maimed Soldiers, Hotel Biltmore, New York, Mrs. Edmund L. Baylies, $428,- 763 ; American Fund for French Wounded, 73 Park Avenue, New York, Mrs. W. P. Bhss, $567,693; Amer- ican Students Committee, 107 East Thirty-seventh Street, New York, H. R. Sedgwick, $131,293; American Women's Hospitals, 637 Madison Ave- nue, New York, Dr. Sue Radcliffe, $310,029 ; British War Rehef Associa- tion, 542 Fifth Avenue, New York, Henry Clews, $171,258; Christian Re- lief in France and Belgium, 105 East Twenty-second Street, New York, Al- fred R. Kimball, $155,419; Duryea War Relief, 9 East Thirtieth Street, New York, Charles E. Warren, $218,- 860; Fatherless Children of France, 140 Broadway, New York, Alexander J. Hemphill, $741,043; Food for France, 10 East Fifty-eighth Street, New York, Alexander J. Hemphill, $148,485; Free Milk for France, 675 Fifth Avenue, New York, Henry E. Cooper, $98,237; Italian War Relief Fund, 347 Madison Avenue, New York, S. R. Bertron, $43,730; Lafayette Fund, Hotel Vanderbilt, New York, Francis Roche, $301,000; Secours Na- tional Fund, 16 East Forty-seventh Street, New York, Mrs. Whitney War- ren, $581,148; Stage Women's War Relief, 366 Fifth Avenue, New York, Mrs. Shelley Hull, $178,321. Red Cross. This society was put to the severest test it ever had to under- go. In all the belligerent countries, the work of the relief committees was supplemented by the efficient service rendered by the Red Cross Society. The American National Red Cross So- ciety rendered greater continuous ser- vice than was ever given by any Red Cross of a neutral country during a foreign war. At the outbreak of the war this society had an enrollment of about 6,000 nurses and surgeons. It sent over a number of surgical and sanitary units (a unit is a working force of 3 surgeons and 12 nurses sent to a hospital, together with the neces- 302 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR sary supplies) for hospital work and the relief of noncombatants. An enor- mous quantity of purchased and do- nated medical, surgical, and hospital supplies, bed linen, garments, etc., were shipped from the United States to practically all the battle fronts by the American Red Cross. In Serbia and Montenegro the American Red Cross, in conjunction with the Rocke- feller Foundation, suppressed the epi- demic of typhus fever which destroyed 150,000 lives. United War Work Drive. One of the most comprehensive and unique campaigns for relief work with the military forces was that carried out in November, 1918, in combination by the National War Work Council of the Young Men's Christian Association, the War Work Council of the Na- tional Board of the Young Women's Christian Association, the National Catholic War Council (Knights of Co- lumbus), the Jewish Welfare Board, the American Library Association, the Salvation Army, and the War Camp Commimity Service. These organiza- tions were engaged in activities dis- tinctly different from those of the bodies treated in the foregoing para- graphs, inasmuch as their work was designed primarily to maintain the morale of soldiers in the fields. These seven agencies sought a total of $170,- 500,000 to be distributed as follows : Y. M. C. A., $100,000,000; K. of C, $30,000,000; Jewish Welfare Board, $3,500,000 ; American Library Asso- ciation, $3,500,000; Salvation Army, $3,500,000; War Camp Community Service, $15,000,000. This was the most remarkable campaign of money solicitation ever carried out in the United States. It was organized by experts in such activities. In every community an organization was per- fected and the campaign, which lasted for one week only, was carried out with vim and exceptional thoroughness. Total pledges in excess of the amount originally expected were secured. The Near East. Next to Belgium the most important relief problems at the close of war were those connected with the millions of destitute persons in Ar- menia, Syria, Russian Caucasus, Meso- potamia, Macedonia, Egypt, and Pal- estine. Throughout this immense area the Red Cross did not maintain any relief system. To meet these problems the American Committee for Relief in the Near East was organized and in- corporated by act of Congress. Among its principal organizers were Harry G. Hoak, William G. Willcox, John B. Breighton, Mrs. George W. Vander- bilt, Mrs. Nicholas Murray Butler, Mrs. W. Bourke Cochran, Mrs. Adrian Iselin, Mrs. Ogden Mills Reid, Mrs. Oren Root, Mrs. W. E. Guggenheim, Charles E. Hughes, Bishop Greer, and Rabbi Wise. It began at once to for- mulate plans for an extensive campaign to raise $30,000,000 for relief work. Fraudulent Charities. From time to time, from the very beginning of war charities in the fall of 1914, there were exposures of fraudulent promotions and solicitations. The most exten- sive exposure, however, was the result of a special investigation made by the District Attorney of New York and made public at the close of 1918. He found that millions of war charities had been stolen and announced that his investigation was the means of re- covering $250,000 for worthy projects. He recommended Federal investigation. His study led to the indictment of twenty-six alleged offenders, a number of whom were convicted by the end of the year. It was shown that the Na- tional Committee of Defence had esti- RELIEF MEASURES 303 mated that the American people had contributed between three and four billion dollars for war relief work, of which about 60 per cent was raised in New York. The investigation showed that many persons of high character and great prominence had carelessly lent their names to the charitable pro- motions of "ex-convicts," "confidence men," "adventurers," and "social para- sites." The "social climber" found in' ostentatious philanthropy and patriot- ism means of acquiring social recogni- tion. Frequently names of well-known persons were used without their con- sent or knowledge. The investigation showed that many projects made con- tracts with solicitors whereby the lat- ter received from 40 per cent to 85 per cent of all their collections. The district attorney thought that worthy war relief societies had been robbed of $3,000,000 and that in a great many cases two-thirds of the money collected had been wasted by fraudu- lent or careless methods. After in- vestigating 534 organizations he clas- sified many of them as wasteful, profit- eering, or foolish charities, and mis- cellaneous frauds. He declared: "The field of war relief work in the United States presented a vast jungle of forms and fancies as various as the human imagination might suggest." Among those classified as wasteful he enumer- ated the Army and Navy Bazaar, the American Ambulance in Russia, Hol- land-American Home for Belgian Wid- ows and Orphans ; and the French Restoration Fund. XII. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS In ancient times wars involved the entire male population and frequently the women as well in the actual fighting and campaigning, but modern wars affect the vast majority of the popu- lation, even of belligerent nations, only through their economic relations. The development of the vast mechanism called into operation by war to-day has however required such immense financial transactions and such gigan- tic demands upon industrial resources that these indirect effects in the Euro- pean War were felt not merely by every family in the fighting areas but indeed by every family in the civilized world. The first immediate financial effect of the outbreak of war is a dis- turbance of the machinery of inter- national credit. Foreign investments frequently aid during peace in restor- ing the balance of trade, but in this war investment movements were exact- ly reversed. Thus normally the great excess of United States exports of merchandise over imports is offset in large part by foreign investments in American securities. But the war brought a sharp- reversal of this proc- ess, the New York Stock Exchange being deluged with orders from abroad to sell at any price. The outbreak of hostilities creates a desire to delay payment of obligations owed but to insist on immediate payment of those due. Trade temporarily comes to a standstill and gold shipments become dangerous and are impeded by great advances in insurance rates and by the reluctance of its holders to part with it. Moreover so paralyzing was the effect of the war at the moment it began that a temporary cessation of international exchange must have been inevitable. The greatest force of these conditions was naturally felt at Lon- don, the world centre. Consequently we find there the government taking most extraordinary measures to restore the movement of exchange. In war as in times of financial crisis each na- tion seeks to increase its gold holdings. This can be done only by increasing exports, decreasing imports, selling foreign investments, or contracting ob- ligations abroad. Now it is not pos- sible for belligerent nations to increase their exports because of the disturb- ance of their own production, the drafting of workers into the armies, the increased demand for goods due to the war, and, in the case of nations hostile to England, the control of the high seas by the British fleet. On the other hand all fighting nations experi- ence a greatly increased demand for goods, especially for food and all kinds of military supplies. This may be in part offset, and vigorous efforts were made in all countries and notably in England, France, and Germany to off- set this in part, by cutting down the consumption of articles classed as lux- uries. The great reduction of trade to and from the Central Powers made their foreign exchange problem rela- tively simple, though the rates of ex- change ran heavily against them. The Allies on the other hand began the war with rates of exchange in their favor, mainly owing to the enormous obliga- tions of the United States. This sit- 304 FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 305 uation, however, was within a few months exactly reversed owing to the extensive purchases of the AlHes and the great volume of American securi- ties sold by them. So unfavorable be- came the rate and so necessary were Ajnerican goods that international loans of unprecedented size were ef- fected to enable the Allied Powers to continue their purchases in the Amer- ican market. Closely involved with the problem of international exchange are the bank- ing institutions and their rates of in- terest. In addition, however, the banks must meet great internal problems con- nected with currency, the flotation of government loans, and the special problems arising from the unique con- ditions in internal trade. Currency systems are deeply aff*ected though less markedly than formerly when their basis was less firmly established. Nev- ertheless the shock of war was every- where so pronounced in its effect upon instruments of credit that every bellig- erent nation and the United States were compelled to issue additions to their outstanding currency. The in- terruption of foreign trade and the consequent dislocation of business are reflected in the movement of the stock markets. Almost upon the instant that hostilities began the world's stock exchanges were paralyzed. The Bourses at Toronto and Madrid closed July 28 ; those at Vienna, Budapest, Brussels, Antwerp, Berlin, and Rome on July 29; and those at Paris, St. Petersburg (Petrograd), Montreal, and all South American centres on July 30. This threw the burden of the world's stock market operations on the London and New York exchanges. The former of these closed on July 31 for the first time in its history. The governors of the New York Exchange thus faced a crucial situation. A panicky state of mind prevailed; brok- ers were deluged with orders, especially from abroad, to "sell at the market" ; it was evident that to remain open meant complete demoralization. Con- sequently this exchange also was closed on July 31, shortly after that at Lon- don. The gradual readjustment of indus- tries to the new war basis is another fundamental aspect of its eff^ects. Nev- er before was concerted action in in- dustrial life so supremely important for the outcome of a trial at arms. The war brought about an actual mobiliza- tion of industries for war purposes in every belligerent country. Moreover the productive eff^orts of neutrals, not merely in munitions manufacture, but in many lines, were tremendously stim- ulated. The productive power of the entire world was raised almost to its highest pitch in the vast attempt at mutual destruction by the belliger- ents. Never were goods produced so abundantly and never was capital de- stroyed so rapidly or the world has- tened towards pauperization at such a pace. The nearly complete cessation of exports from the Central Powers in- volved a violent readjustment in many industries previously engaged in pro- ducing for foreign markets. Among the Allies such industries were less disturbed, while in the United States and other neutral countries there were numerous t,ransfo'rmations due not merely to the development of munitions factories, but to the manufacture of all kinds of military supplies, and the development of industries for supply- ing articles previously imported from Germany and Austria as well as sup- plying the similar needs of other neu- trals. Finally the outbreak of the war was speedily followed in every nation 306 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR by the adoption of special financial measures for supplying the needed pub- lic funds and the longer the war con- tinued the more vital became the ex- tent, variety, and basis of the various war loans. The foregoing — exchange, banking, currency, stock market, war loans, and the readjustments of indus- try — constitute the principal features of the effects of war on finance and trade. International Exchange and Banking Problems. The financial problems con- fronting the bankers and traders of Great Britain were of the most mo- mentous importance for the trade and commerce of the world. The priority of England in the development of in- ternational trade had long since made London both the financial and commer- cial centre of the world. In conse- quence an important part of London financial institutions had been devoted to settling accounts between debtors and creditors in all parts of the world. Here are included the accepting houses, bill brokers and discounters, and the banks. The immense volume of this business is realized when it is known that at any one time there were before the war about $1,600,000,000 of trade and finance bills for which the accept- ing houses and banks were liable, many millions falling due daily. The entire system of handling international ex- changes collapsed early in August and it was not until about mid-September that regular quotations of rates of "exchange again appeared in London. Accepting houses and joint-stock banks faced ruin because chents for whom acceptances had been made failed to remit ; but these clients themselves were confronted with canceled orders, cessation of trade, stoppage of the supply of goods, impossibility of re- mitting and similar contingencies. The discounters and bill brokers found themselves with large quantities of dis- counted bills on hand for which they could not be reimbursed and at the same time their banks were calling for a return of loans. Even the banks themselves were directly involved through the possession of bills which they had discounted. Moreover their loans to bill brokers were counted as quick assets and the embarrassment of the brokers necessarily weakened the banks. To check demands upon its re- sources the Bank of England raised its rate to 10 per cent. Before this situation became unman- ageable, the government on August 2, two days before its own declaration of war, declared a moratorium on bills of exchange to last one month. This checked the tendency to panic by giv- ing a breathing spell during which methods and means of handling the problem were formulated. Nine days later a Treasury state- ment announced tliat the Bank of Eng- land would rediscount on certain terms any "approved bill" before it became due; and that acceptors of bills would be given time in which to make pay- ment but would be required to pay 2 per cent above bank rate for the priv- ilege of extension. The government suggested that the bank be prepared to approve all bills customarily dis- counted, "and also good trade bills, and the acceptances of such foreign and colonial finns and bank agencies as are established in Great Britain," with the understanding that the govern- ment would guarantee the bank against loss. On September 5 another Treas- ury statement announced that, owing to the choking of the exchange mechan- ism by premoratorium bills, acceptors would be lent funds for paying such bills as they came due, and that any FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 307 unpaid balance of such loans would not be pressed "for a period of one year after the close of the war." Thus both old and new acceptances seemed amply protected. A further difficulty was met in foreign indebtedness. On November 3 was promulgated a plan to investi- gate solvent traders and advance them funds up to 50 per cent of the foreign debts due them. Thus every obstacle to the resumption of exchange business was removed. On the Continent sim- ilar, but less stupendous, problems were to be met. Moratoria were declared in every belligerent country except Germany, and in some neutral coun- tries for reasons similar to the fore- going. Germany avoided a morator- ium mainly because of her isolation and partly by the stoppage of collections on bills owed abroad. In both France and Germany, as in England, the cen- tral banks were permitted to greatly enlarge their note circulations and thus expanded to unprecedented figures their rediscounts for other banks. The most serious aspect of the American financial situation and the fundamental cause of most difficulties was the stupendous debt owing to Europe upon the outbreak of war. Although this country had normally a trade balance of about one-half bil- lion dollars annually, nevertheless its indebtedness for interest and dividends, for tourists' expenditures, for freight, and other items, changed the great trade surplus into a net debt. Sir George Paish, an international au- thority who was sent to the United States in October, 1914, by English bankers to expedite the payment of these obligations, estimated their total at $600,000,000. This included more than $100,000,000 of short-term loans which ordinarily could have been easily renewed or met by fall exports. Abroad refuge had been taken behind mora- toria; and the great central banks of Europe served to pool resources and control operations, while in the United States the new Federal Reserve System was not yet in working order. Al- though $45,000,000 in gold was sent to Europe during the last few days of July and the first week of August, sight exchange on London at New York, normally $4.86 per pound ster- ling, rose to $5, then to $6, and finally to $7, a height never before approach- ed, and regular exchange was not quoted until September 11. A special factor in aggravating the banking dif- ficulties at New York was the matur- ing early in the fall of about $82,- 000,000 of New York City warrants held in London and Paris. To meet these and to strengthen the city's cred- it there was provided a loan of .$100,- 000,000 in gold to which every bank and trust company in the city but one contributed. At the same time bank- ers of the country created a "Gold Pool" of over $100,000,000 to meet urgent mercantile obligations abroad, and to provide gold needed for export. It was composed of contributions from banks in reserve cities in proportion to their gold holdings. It served as a guarantee against the complete col- lapse of American credit abroad and removed from the banks the necessity of seeking refuge behind an unofficial moratorium. Portions of this fund were shipped to the branch of the Bank of England established at Ottawa, Can- ada, to serve as a basis for exchange on London. The sharp rebound of trade towards the close of the year, the entrance of the world into the American market for goods and loans made possible the dissolution of the "Gold Pool" in January, 1915. The exchange situation was made 308 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR particularly difficult by the great re- duction of the export trade, especially the exportation of cotton. Moreover the prosperity of the South was seri- ously threatened unless some means could be devised whereby cotton could serve as a basis for additional credit. Congress and Secretary McA,doo au- thorized banks to issue emergency cur- rency on the basis of cotton ware- house certificates. About the same time a plan for a Cotton Loan Pool was devised whereby pledges to supply funds to be loaned through Southern banks to cotton growers were deposit- ed with members of the Federal Re- serve Board as individuals. By the middle of November more than $100,- 000,000 was thus subscribed. How- ever the considerable revival of the ex- port trade in cotton towards the close of 1914 together with the great im- provement of internal trade, and the bracing effect of the establishment of the Federal Reserve System made the cotton pool well-nigh unnecessary. It became inoperative in January, 1915, only $28,000 having been applied for. The rates of international exchange reflect the conditions both of trade and of credit. At New York the rate on London was not regularly quoted until September 11, when the cable transfer rate stood at $4.95, par of exchange being $4.86. It became still more unfavorable, reaching $4,975 in the weeks of October 8 and 15. It thereafter fell steadily, reaching par on December 22. It continued to fall until early September, 1915, when it reached $4.63. It was partially re- stored by the Anglo-French loan, but only for a brief period. In December the British government began to bor- row or purchase American and Cana- dian securities owned by English citi- zens with a view to their use as secur- ity for loans to be advanced by Amer- ican bankers as a means of preventing further declines in the rate of ex- change. About the same time the im- portation of certain luxuries was pro- hibited for a like reason. At Paris the rate of exchange was slightly unfavorable to London during the first half of October, no rates be- ing quoted during August and Sep- tember; it gradually declined until November 26 and thereafter rose con- tinuously, reaching par again Febru- ary 19, 1915. It thereafter continued to become slightly more unfavorable to Paris with every passing week. In May, 1916, Finance Minister Ribot be- gan the collection of American, Swiss, Dutch, Scandinavian, and South Amer- ican securities to be used as a basis for credits for equalizing exchange with the United States. At the same time the government announced a long list of articles the importation of which was prohibited partly to affect ex- change rates. Almost from the beginning of the war rates of exchange were unfavor- able to Berlin. The slight volume of foreign trade and the adjustment of outstanding accounts early brought the rates to considerable stability. Nevertheless the continued purchases in neighboring neutral countries and the steady inflation of German cur- rency brought about a decline of Ger- man credit in the later months of 1915. Thus the exchange rate at New York had been only 14 per cent unfavorable until November, 1915, when it dropped rapidly to 26 per cent unfavorable. Similar rapid declines brought about rates unfavorable by 38 per cent at Amsterdam, and by 28 per cent at Zurich. As stated above the New York Stock Exchange was forced to close very FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 309 quickly after the closing of the Lon- don Exchange. This naturally dis- turbed the banking situation since con- siderable loans were based on stock as collateral. Such collateral is general- ly most fluid of all, but with its mar- ket closed it became quite solidified. The banks, however, gradually reaxi- justed affairs without forcing repay- ment of loans or otherwise unduly dis- turbing a delicate situation. The re- opening of the Exchange was delayed in part to prevent the resumption of the pressure of European sellers and the consequent increase of foreign ob- ligations. The Exchange declared the level of prices on July 30 the official minimum, and on this basis some transactions were carried through un- der the direction of a Committee of Five. In this manner more than $100,- 000,000 of bonds and 250,000 shares of stock were transferred by the end of November. In Philadelphia public auction sales of stocks and bonds were held at various times, prices ranging not far below those of July 30. Grad- ually at New York the scope of ex- change business was enlarged ; trans- actions in a restricted list of bonds were begun on November 28 ; and two weeks later trading in 181 specified stocks with definitely established mini- mum prices was begun. The total deal- ings, however, on the New York Ex- change aggregated only 47,899,000 shares for the year 1914, slightly more than one-third those of 1912. With the opening of 1915, however, pessimism gradually disappeared un- der the revival of business and was re- placed by waves of speculative fever in the stock market. This was notably true in April when 21,000,000 shares were transferred, and in August, Sep- tember, and October, 26,000,000 shares being transferred in the latter month. The shares of the munitions companies were popularly known as "war brides." Many of these stocks made most phe- nomenal advances in price during the year. Less speculative interest was shown in the stocks of numerous com- panies manufacturing supplies the de- mand for which had been greatly stim- ulated by the conditions of war. More- over the great increase in the volume of railway traffic, which towards the close of 1915 amounted to an unpre- cedented congestion of fi-eight and the refusal of numerous roads with ter- minals on the Atlantic seaboard to re- ceive additional goods for export dur- ing certain periods, resulted in ad- vances in railway stocks. This revival of business did not occur soon enough to prevent a very large amount of rail- way mileage from going into the hands of receivers, but railway stocks in gen- eral showed advances of 10 to 20 points. The bond market likewise reflected the great abundance of capital seeking investment. While advances in bond prices were not remarkable, there was a general upward movement ranging from 1 to 6 per cent during 1915. Moreover the easy money market re- sulted in the ready flotation of an un- usual amount of public and corpora- tion bonds. In addition to the foregoing the American market absorbed an aston- ishing volume of securities previously held by foreign investors. At the open- ing of the war the par value of Amer- ican corporation securities owned abroad was variously estimated at from $4,000,000,000 to $6,000,000,- 000. The most authoritative estimate showed that $620,000,000 of these se- curities were repurchased during the first five months of 1915 ; the estimate for the entire year was that not less 310 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR than $1,000,000,000 of such stocks and bonds were transferred to Amer- ican investors. See below. Currency. Every country in war time experiences an irresistible demand for increases in credit instruments. Not only do governments issue treasury notes but banks are certain, as in times of panic, to increase their note issues. In England there was much discussion of a proposed "suspension of the Bank Act," meaning a proposal to permit the Bank of England to expand its note circulation without increasing its reserves. The steps devised for rees- tablishing foreign exchange obviated this measure, though Bank of England circulation was expanded and a large volume of £1 and 5s treasury notes were issued. A law of August 7 made not merely these treasury notes legal tender but also postal money orders. Provision was also made for the issue of certificates, like clearing-house cer- tificates, for the settlement of bank balances. Finally the currency and Bank Notes Act authorized the Bank of England to issue to depositary banks notes up to 20 per cent of their deposits and current balances. In May, 1916, the bank held $140,000,- 000 in gold against over $500,000,000 of paper. The bank, however, owing to its command of the entire gold pro- duction of South Africa amounting to about $200,000,000 per year, was en- abled to make extensive gold shipments to the United States and at the same time maintain its credit unimpaired. In France the government authorized practically unlimited issues by the Bank of France and various promises of the government were issued. (See below, Cost of the War.) It was esti- mated that whereas the actual inflation in England amounted to about 14*4* per cent by December, 1915, it was 157 per cent in France. In Germany, as explained below, the Darlehnskassen and the Kriegskredithanken notes were based on property of various kinds. These tended to drive gold and silver out of circulation so that the govern- ment authorized the Reichsbank to is- sue its own notes in exchange for them. At the same time, however, the bank was instructed to refuse to pay out gold for its own notes, but a vigorous effort was made to increase the bank's gold reserves. This reserve was thus increased from about $300,000,000 in July, 1914, to $610,000,000 in Janu- ary, 1916. But the notes for which the bank was responsible had increased from $475,000,000 to $1,560,000,000. Austria and Hungary likewise went speedily to a paper basis. The breaking down of the mechanism of international credit seemed certain to produce a panic in American bank- ing circles. The American banking system was individualistic and proverb- ially weak under strained credit. It failed to supply additions to the cur- rency at times when most needed. The Federal Reserve System was particu- larly designed to remedy this weak- ness, but in August, 1914, this system had not been finally established. After a conference of bankers and the Sec- retary of the Treasury at New York on August 2 it was decided to issue emergency currency under the Aldrich- Vreeland Act as modified by the Fed- eral Reserve Act of 1913, and to issue in addition clearing-house certificates. Congress responded to the situation by hurriedly enacting a law reducing the tax on emergency notes for the first three months to 3 per cent and in- creasing their limit to 125 per cent of capital and surplus. Moreover State banks affiliated with the reserve sys- tem were authorized to take out notes; FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 311 and cotton and tobacco warehouse re- ceipts were made a legal basis for note issues. In consequence more than $250,000,000 of emergency currency had been issued by September 1 ; a to- tal of $384,500,000 of such notes was issued by December 1. Very little pub- licity was given to the issue of clear- ing-house certificates in principal bank- ing centres of the country, but $250,- 000,000 of them were issued. Prac- tically all of the emergency currency and the clearing-house certificates were retired by the end of January, 1915. Meanwhile the banking and credit sit- uation had been materially strength- ened indirectly by the revival of trade and directly by the final establishment of the Federal Reserve System, which was in full working order by November 28, 1914. See below. Employment and Wages. In every nation the opening of hostilities brought on a temporary paralysis of trade, mak- ing the problem of unemployment acute in every belligerent country. Special committees, national and local, and special relief funds were created to meet the situation. The gradual read- justment of industry to a war basis and the recruiting of vast armies, how- ever, very soon solved the problem. In Great Britain the labor problem was greatly complicated by the re- quirements of international trade. There were not merely the demands of the army and navy for equipment and munitions, but the immense difficulty of paying for greatly increased im- ports from countries to which exports were reduced. This difficulty was greatly increased by the requirement that Great Britain aid in financing her allies and colonies. Consequently the raising of an army at home was di- rectly counter to her financial and com- mercial demands. The general effect of war on labor was stated by Glad- stone to be an immense stimulus dur- ing war with enlarged employment and rise in wages, but excessive labor com- petition, severe unemployment, and reductions in wages when war is over. The truth of the first part of this statement was made manifest in 1914. Very shortly in every country there was less unemployment than in times of peace, labor shortage actually be- came acute, wages advanced, and great numbers of women were drawn into unwonted industrial pursuits. At the outset Great Britain was more unfavorably situated with regard to the manufacture of munitions of war than France, Germany, or Austria. Except for a few scattered private firms, a few small governmental estab- lishments working for both army and navy, and the Woolwich Arsenal em- ploying about 10,000 men, she had no munitions factories operating in July, 1914. Nevertheless 18 months later the entire country was dotted with such factories, their creation being one of the striking phenomena of the war. The astounding demands early aroused the existing arm makers to the highest pitch of activity, but it early became evident that the output of existing plants would be inadequate. By Feb- ruary, 1915, it became manifest that heroic measures must be adopted to se- cure an adequate output. Out of the delays and confusion resulted a minis- terial crisis in May, 1915, which led to the formation of the Ministry of Munitions with Mr. Lloyd-George as its head. This sought to develop the latent capacities of manufactures in engineering and mechanical trades. The entire country was divided into eight munitions districts, besides two in Scotland and two in Ireland, with committees in principal towns. In 312 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR March the Defense of the Realm Act had authorized the government to com- mandeer any factory for war purposes. Under this Act many old plants had already been transformed and new ones built, equipped, and manned. The Ministry of Munitions was needed, however, to bring order out of existing chaos by centralizing responsibility and control. It systematically inves- tigated and listed every available fac- tory and private resource. By the close of 1915 there were in addition 33 national shell factories employing from 300 to 1,000 persons each, which had been created at government expense by adapting existing establishments. At the same time a number of national projectile factories were being com- pleted to manufacture ammunition for a new type of heavy gun. Gradually the staff of the munitions office, includ- ing over 3,000 persons divided among numerous departments, was brought to a high state of efficiency. From the first a source of great embarrassment was the inadequacy of skilled labor and its attitude towards the training and employment of unskilled workers. This problem was intensified by the enormous enlargement of the munitions industry, and was not alleviated by ex- tensive advertisement for machinists in the United States. It was estimated that early in 1916 this business alone employed not less than 1,000,000 workers. Among these were included about 300,000 women who were found in England, as in France and Ger- many, to be capable of performing practically every kind of labor re- quired in munitions making. The or- ganized skilled workers objected to the *'dilution" of the shops by unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and resorted to strikes and other interruptions. Acts of Parliament very considerably re- duced the privileges of labor to leave work and to transfer at will, but spe- cial boards for adjusting demands were created and elaborate rules were estab- lished to protect the health of the workers, especially of women and chil- dren. Statistical measures of the amount of unemployment were not wanting. The Labor Gazette gave the percent- age of trade-union members unemployed in June, 1914, as 2.4; it rose to 7.3 in August, and declined steadily there- after to 2.5 in December, 1914, and to 0.5 in February, 1916. Wages showed little advance before January, 1915, but in February moved sharply upward in engineering, shipbuilding, railway sei-vicc, docking, and carting, and thereafter the advance spread to all lines. Tlie dearth of skilled labor re- sulted in many labor tangles,- but the government and trade-union officials succeeded in maintaining an unusual degree of industrial peace. The num- ber of trade disputes in 1914 was 999, involving 448,529 workers and a loss of 10,111,337 days of work; while in 1915 they numbered only 674, involv- ing 445,936 workers and a loss of only 2,929,700 days of work. The French Ministry of Labor re- ported that in August, 1914, only 48 per cent of establishments and 58 per cent of workers were employed. There was, however, a continuous improve- ment. By October, 1915, 81 per cent of establishments and 98 per cent of workers were employed. In metal manufactures and transportation new workers had been employed in num- bers nearly sufficient to offset those with the colors ; and this was partially true of food and chemical industries. But in printing, woodworking, build- ing, glass and pottery making, and precious metals the numbers employed FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 313 at the later date were less than half the peace normal. As in England women were drawn in great numbers, not only into munitions manufacture, but into many lines of industry, agri- culture, and transportation. In Germany the general course of events was very similar to that in Eng- land and France. The general dis- location of industry at the outbreak of the war brought into operation con- certed action not merely to relieve un- employment but to shift industry to a war basis. The amount of unemploy- ment among trade unions was 22.4 per cent at the end of August, 1914. It dropped to 15.7 per cent by the end of September, and continued steadily downward to 7.2 per cent at the end of December. This, however, was suf- ficiently above normal to require a special appropriation of $125,000 per month by the city of Berlin to relieve unemployment during the winter of 1914-1915. By May, 1915, trade- union members unemployed numbered only 2.9 per cent ; by September, only 2.5 per cent, at which percentage it remained until February, 1916. As in other countries all trades engaged di- rectly or indirectly in the production of military supplies were unusually prosperous, were employing unusual numbers of workers, and paying higher wages than before the war. But among hat makers, printers, lithographers, bookbinders, woodworkers, and porce- lain workers the percentage of unem- ployment was considerably higher than normal. The employment of women was very extensive ; their number in un- accustomed pursuits reached 500,000 by July, 1915 ; they were found in nearly every branch of industry. The effect of the war upon American industrial conditions was most remark- able. The impetus of the new demands set up by the war began to be felt be- fore the close of 1914. Early in 1915 feverish activity began in various branches of the iron and steel industry, in the production of copper, lead, spel- ter, and other metals, and in all branches of munitions manufacture. From these industries the impetus gradually spread to all allied indus- tries and to those engaged in manu- facturing such articles as automobiles, railway suppHes, boots and shoes, blan- kets and woolen goods, and food prod- ucts. While in the fall of 1914 unem- ployment had been extensive, this prob- lem gradually disappeared, with the result that by the middle of 1915 there was an actual scarcity of labor in many lines, especially skilled labor, and wages had begun to advance. Conse- quently by the fall of 1915 the tremen- dous stimulus to American industry had reached all branches of the retail trade. Estimates of war orders placed in the United States during 1915 varied widely, ranging all the way from $1,000,000,000 to $2,000,000,- 000. During the early months of 1915 the Allies were victimized extensively by smooth, self-constituted, and often irresponsible agents of manufacturers, and by other speculating intermedia- ries seeking fortunes in commissions on war orders. Occasionally the Allies were defrauded by the manufacturers themselves. In all of this immense war business there was a feverish haste and a recklessness in expenditure that involved much waste. This was reduced, however, by the development by the Allies of regular channels for placing orders and by an elaborate and ex- tremely thorough system of inspection of products. {See below.) American Foreign Trade. Not only did the Allies resort to the United States for unprecedented quantities of 314 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR goods of numerous kinds, but Secre- tary of Commerce Redfield pointed out in his annual report for 1915 that the demands of Canada, Central and South America, India, the Near East, South Africa, and indeed every part of the world for American goods had in- creased. The impetus of this world- wide demand was scarcely felt during 1914. Consequently the exports in that year differed very little from those of the preceding years, being slightly less than in 1912 or 1913. For the calendar year 1915, however, the exports reached the remarkable figure of $3,547,480,372. This was an excess over imports of $1,768,883,677, an excess more than two and one-half times that of the previous maximum in 1913. Net importations of gold ag- gregated $530,000,000 in 1916, as compared with net importations of $420,000,000 in 1915. The fiscal year, 1916, showed imports valued at $2,- 197,883,510 and exports at $4,333,- 482,885; 1917, imports, $2,659,355,- 185, exports, $6,290,048,394; 1918, imports, $2,946,059,403; exports, $5,- 928,285,641. The immense volume of American export trade created an unprecedented situation in the shipping world. By the fall of 1915 the quantity of goods for export actually exceeded the car- rying capacity of merchant vessels available, in spite of great advances in freight rates and the utilization of every type of craft however old. Brit- ish experts pointed out that their gov- ernment had requisitioned for war pur- poses not less than 50 per cent of the entire British merchant fleet. German submarine activities had destroyed about 6 p€r cent. Moreover the large German merchant marine was practic- ally nonexistent. Consequently freight rates first doubled, then trebled and quadrupled, and in special cases ad- vanced as much as 900 per cent by the spring of 1916. In some instances a vessel would earn its entire cost on a single round trip. Antiquated steam vessels were selling at prices from two to five times their value before the war; consequently there developed unpre- cedented activity in American ship- building yards. By April 1, 1916, or- ders had been given for 360 vessels with a tonnage of more than 1,000,000, and 6,000,000 were expected in 1918. World Trade. The war seemed des- tined to have permanent and far-reach- ing effects upon the world's commerce. In America active measures were begun before the close of 1915 to strengthen the American hold upon new markets and to increase cooperation in foreign trade after the war. On December 1, 1915, e.g., was organized the American International Corporation, with $50,- 000,000 capital. Its purpose was to develop trade connections in foreign countries and promote the investment of American capital abroad. Its or- ganization was led by the National City Bank, which was then engaged in establishing branches in principal South American countries. This bank also had acquired control of the Inter- national Banking Corporation with 16 banks in China, Japan, India, the Philippines, and Panama. The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission and numerous business organizations de- voted much attention to the further- ance of all efforts to secure a firm grasp of markets previously held by English and German traders. Similar- ly plans were formulated early in 1916 for systematic study of the demands of Europe during the period of recon- struction following the war. Among the Allies every effort was made to FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 315 stamp out every trace of German eco- nomic penetration, and plans were formulated for reducing German com- petition upon the restoration of peace. On April 23, 1916, there opened in Paris the International Parliamentary- Economic Conference of the Entente Allies for the discussion of trade agree- ments and legislative measures designed to reduce German competition and facilitate trade among the Allies and their colonies. From Germany it was reported that systematic measures were being taken to prosecute most vigorously efforts to regain lost trade. See below. Foreign Credits. The commanding importance of the United States as the greatest neutral market of the world made it for the first time in its history a lender on a large scale. During 1915 loans aggregating $1,000,000,000 were contracted in America by foreign gov- ernments, more than four-fifths of the proceeds being expended there for war supplies. Loans to the Canadian Do- minion government, eight provinces, and ten cities, aggregated $147,000,- 000. Argentina borrowed $64,000,000 ; Switzerland, $15,000,000 ; Sweden, $5,- 000,000 ; Norway, $8,000,000 ; Greece, $7,000,000; notes of the German Treasury to the amount of $10,000,- 000 were sold to American investors. Russia secured loans for $92,000,000; Italy borrowed $25,000,000; but the great loans were those contracted by France and Great Britain. In addi- tion to the Anglo-French loan of $500,- 000,000, France secured $75,000,000 on notes, bonds, and collateral ; and London banks borrowed $50,000,000. The purpose of these loans was to equalize rates of exchange, but in spite of them and extensive gold shipments sterling exchange declined to $4.63 by September, 1915. It was therefore nec- essary for British financiers to restore a more normal rate. In that month a commission of British and French fi- nanciers came to the United States to establish a credit for $750,000,000 or even $1,000,000,000. The sum, however, was reduced to $500,000,000 after various conferences. A syndicate was formed led by J. P. Morgan & Company which took the loan at 96 or on a basis to yield an average of 5.75 per cent. Early in 1916 Argentina? se- cured an additional $15,000,000 ; and Canada, $75,000,000. See below. Prices and Food Supplies. Inevitably the war had a far-reaching effect upon the movements of prices throughout the world. War not only destroys existing property, but it requires the creation and consumption of goods in amounts immesnsely greater than the demands of peace. All sorts of raw materials are required in unprecedented amounts and their prices together with those of products made from them rise corre- spondingly. The most striking ad- vances were those of copper, nickel, lead, zinc, and all kinds of steel prod- ucts, together with the various con- stituents used in the manufacture of explosives ; but even more important in their effect upon the general wel- fare of the inhabitants not only of bel- ligerent but of all other nations was the rise in the prices of food products. Thus, e.g., the price of copper rose from about 12 cents to nearly 30 cents per pound; cotton doubled in value; and food prices rose so extensively that administrative measures to regu- late them were undertaken by Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hol- land, Italy, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Tur- key. Most of these countries prohibited the exportation of foodstuffs. In most 316 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR of them municipal authorities either alone or in conjunction with national or military authorities fixed maximum prices. The actual extent olf the rise in prices is best indicated by index num- bers. For the United States Brad- street's Index rose from $8.7087 on August 1 to $9.8495 on August 15, 1914. It dropped during the next 10 weeks and thereafter rose steadily to $11.7598 on April 1, 1916. In Great Britain an astonishing rise in the price of coal resulted in the appointment of a commission of investigation in March, 1915. Tliis body found that the increase of 100 per cent or more was a natural consequence of the recruit- ing of nearly 250,000 miners and in- creases in cost of transportation. Ac- cording to the Board of Trade Labour Gazette retail food prices advanced from July, 1914, to March, 1916, by 45 per cent in small towns and 51 per cent in large towns, an average of 48 per cent for the United Kingdom. The greatest interest attached to the question whether Germany could be starved into submission. Normally the annual excess of German food imports over exports is considerable. In 1912 and 1913 this excess amounted to 2,- 000,000 tons of wheat, 3,000,000 tons of barley, 1,000,000 tons of com, and 500,000 tons of rice and potatoes. There are normally also large imports of meat and animal products, oil cake, and fodder. Imports amounted to about 40 per cent of the annual consumption of meat products, and 20 to 30 per cent of grains and vegetable products. The war cut off most of the imports ; the campaigns in East Prussia and Alsace destroyed crops ; agricultural labor was reduced; North Sea fisheries were closed; and Chile fertilizer no longer available. Nevertheless considerable supplies were still derived from Hol- land, Scandinavia, and Switzerland, and through military and diplomatic oper- ations large supplies of grain and fod- der were procured from Bulgaria and Rumania. Moreover the entire eco- nomic resources of the Empire were mobilized by the early creation of an economic general staff, "The Division of Raw Materials of War," which re- organized industry, reduced consump- tion, reclaimed old materials, utilized by-products, created new materials and new chemical and industrial methods, erected factories, controlled goods seized by the armies and had great powers of appraisal and price fixing. By January, 1915, the extravagance of many consumers, the speculation in food prices, and the manipulation of food supplies and markets induced the government to extend its control. On January 25 it was decreed that all sup- plies of wheat and rye should come un- der control of the War Grain Associa- tion ; and local supplies were placed in charge of Communal Associations. The consumption of cereals was brought un- der the supervision of an Imperial Dis- tributing Bureau. In February a sys- tem of regulating the bread supply by bread cards, which limited the weekly consumption of each individual or fam- ily, was instituted. With the passage of time similar regulations were ex- tended to meat and vegetables, and finally in May, 1916, the control of all food supplies was placed in charge of a "food dictator" or government bu- reau. While the best statistical evi- dence seemed to indicate that food sup- plies were sufficient to meet minimum re- quirements there was some evidence that high prices led to serious food riots and much popular discontent late in 1915 and in 1916. According to the Prus- sian official Statistische Korrespondenz FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 317 the prices of 20 important food prod- ucts rose 88.5 per cent from July, 1914, to Feb. 1, 1916. In Vienna official reports showed an advance of 112.9 per cent in 17 im- portant foods from July, 1914, to De- cember, 1915. In Italy the general level of food prices was 31.2 per cent higher in December, 1915, than in July, 1914. The official index of retail food prices in Australia advanced 31 per cent from July, 1914, to July, 1915; 39 per cent to August, 1915 ; and then fell, being 31 per cent higher in No- vember, 1915, than in July, 1914. In New Zealand general prices rose 30 per cent from August, 1914, to December, 1915, inclusive. Official publications showed that in Copenhagen the cost of living rose 24.2 per cent from July, 1914, to February, 1916; for food prices alone the advance was 33.4 per cent. The Monthly Labor Review for October, 1918, gave comparative fig- ures of changes in retail prices from July, 1914, to various dates in 1918 for a considerable number of countries. If the retail price level of July, 1914, be considered in each case equal to 100, then the retail prices of 22 foodstuffs in the United States advanced to 125 by January, 1917; 157 by January, 1918 ; and 159 by June, 1918. In Aus- tralia 46 foods advanced to 125 by January, 1917; 129 by January, 1918, and 131 by March, 1918. The Austra- lian price level for foods did, in fact, change little after July, 1915, when it was 131. For Vienna, Austria, figures were not abundant, but showed that 18 foods rose to about 220 by January, 1916; 272, by January, 1917, and 315 !by August, 1917. Subsequent com- parative figures were lacking. In Can- ada 29 foodstuffs reached a level of 138 by January, 1917; 167 by Janu- ary, 1918, and 172 by June, 1918, thus exceeding the advance in the United States. In France, 13 foodstuffs, in cities over 10,000 population, except Paris, rose to 123 by July, 1915; 141, by July, 1916; 184 by July, 1917, and 232 by April, 1918. While a satisfac- tory index for Germany was wanting, it was found that 19 foodstuffs at Ber- lin had somewhat more than doubled in prices between July, 1914, and October, 1916. In Great Britain the index of 21 foodstuffs doubled between July, 1914, and June, 1917, but remained al- most stationary for the succeeding year. Tlie index of 24 articles of food for Norway had doubled by March, 1917, when the index was 204 ; it rose steadily to 312 in May, 1918. For Sweden, the advance was less sharp than in Norway; the index for 21 articles of food did not reach 200 until Novem- ber, 1917 ; for May, 1918, it was 258. From the Labour Gazette (October, 1918), it appears that the cost of liv- ing in Norway had advanced during the war up to April, 1918, by at least 140 per cent, while wages had advanced only 90 per cent. In Sweden, the cost of living, based on the average family bud- get, was estimated to have increased 119 per cent during the same period. Cost of the War. The real cost of war should be measured in terms of the sacrifices of the people engaged in it and of the rest of the world. Such sacrifices would include not merely the loss of lives of those killed in combat, the sufferings of the wounded, and the increased death rate both during and after the war consequent upon injuries and deprivations, but also the labors, hardships, and sufferings imposed upon the soldiers and the non-fighting popu- lation both during actual hostilities and during the long years of recupera- tion thereafter. It is evident that such 318 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR a cost cannot be computed. Even when measured in financial terms the cost should include not merely the huge pub- lic expenditures but also the dislocation, misdirection, and destruction of produc- tive power, both of labor and of capital, and the destruction of private and pub- lic property, works of art, and great historical landmarks. It is evident that these latter items can be only roughly approximated. Consequently the cost of war is usually stated in terms of gov- ernmental expenditures. Tlie approximate per capita indebt- edness on March 1 was : Great Britain, $242; France, $330; Germany, $177; Austria-Hungary, $159; Italy, $87; and Russia (in Europe), $57. The daily cost of war gradually in- creased from less than $40,000,000 per day at the beginning to fully $122,- 500,000 per day to January, 1918. The following table estimates total and daily costs, exclusive of the United States. Country Cost to Jan. 1, 1918 Daily cost Great Britain $27,236,500,000 18,405,000,000 14,.S40,000,000 7,650,000,000 2,165,000,000 $32,500,000 17,000,000 Russia Italy 16,000,000 10 000 000 Other Allies 3 000,000 Total for Allies $69,796,500,000 24,455,000,000 10,475,000,000 1,755,000,000 $78,500,000 27,000,000 Austria-Hungary Turkey and Bulgaria. . . . 15.000,000 2,000,000 Central Powers 836,685,000,000 $44,000,000 $106,481,500,000 $122,500,000 The loans of the various belligerents from the beginning of the war to March 1, 1916, aggregated over $29,- 000,000,000. Of this enormous sum the Allied Powers had contracted 68 per cent and Great Britain alone 26 per cent or more than one-fourth. British loans included the first war loan of $1,750,000,000 of 31/2 per cent bonds on a basis of 3.97 per cent ; the second war loan of $2,925,000,000 of 41/2 per cent bonds on a basis of 4.58 per cent ; and treasury bills of over $2,000,000,- 000. There were also included loans for Canada, India, and Australia ag- gregating over $260,000,000, one-half of the Anglo-French loan in the United States, and advances to Allies and col- onies exceeding $2,000,000,000. In ad- dition to the above the English Chancel- lor of the Exchequer had announced in February, 1916, that an additional war credit of $2,500,000,000 was immediate- ly needed, bringing the English total of loans to over $10,000,000,000. The principal item for France was the Loan of Victory of 5 per cents at 87 to yield 5.75 per cent aggregating $3,100,000,- 000. There were advances from the Bank of France to Feb. 17, 1916, of $1,120,000,000; bonds and notes in London of $506,000,000; and one-half of the Anglo-French loan, besides notes and banking credits in New York amounting to $80,000,000. France had also issued national-defense bonds to the amount of $1,392,584,000. Russia had issued four internal loans aggre- gating $1,545,000,000; 4 per cent bonds to the amount of $309,000,000; treasury bills at 5 per cent aggregat- ing $1,364,750,000; and had con- tracted loans in England, France, Japan, and the United States to com- plete her total. In Italy there had been three issues of 25-year bonds bearing 4% or 5 per cent in the aggregate amount of $1,190,000,000. In addition she had contracted obligations in Eng- land for $250,000,000 and in the United States for $25,000,000. France and England had advanced to Belgium $218,000,000. Japan issued a loan for $26,000,000 in 1914. Serbia had se- cured $33,000,000 from France. The German loans began with a 5 per cent issue at 97.5 in September, 1914, to the amount of $2,125,000,000. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 319 A second issue of 5 per cents at 98 in May, 1915, totaled $2,250,000,000. A third in September, 1915, at 99 aggre- gated $3,000,000,000. The fourth loan bearing 5 per cent interest, the books for which were closed in April, 1916, reached $2,500,000,000. Special banks {Darlelmshassen) Avcre estab- lished by the government for the pur- pose of advancing money on securities of various kinds, such money to be in- vested in the loans. Similar advances of paper money (Darlehnskassen- scheine) were made on goods for export but unable to leave Germany during the war. In some cases even pledged prop- erty, household goods, and instruments of trade could be mortgaged to these banks in order to secure funds for in- vestment in the war loans. In the sec- ond loan the bonds of the first loan were accepted in part payment ; but the amount of such transactions was not published. In the third loan the gov- ernment exchanged its obligations for contracts of manufacturers and traders to deliver to the government goods of a specified value. It was believed by many that the slight resort to taxation, the great expansion of paper currency, and excessive use of credit were unsound methods of war finance. The Austro-Hungarian loans includ- ed a first, second, and third Austrian loan aggregating $1,782,000,000 and a first and second Hungarian loan aggregating $471,000,000 besides loans contracted in Germany to the amount of $298,500,000. The actual expend- itures, however, of the Dual Monarchy were somewhat shrouded in mystery. In floating their loans special banks and methods similar to those adopted in Germany were used. Turkey contracted two loans in Germany amounting to $214,000,000; and Bulgaria borrowed $30,000,000 from German bankers. In addition to the foregoing various neutral countries had been forced to contract loans by the added expend- itures made necessary by the war. These amounted to $143,000,000 in Holland; $40,000,000 for Rumania; $25,000,- 000 for Egypt; $51,000,000 for Swit- zerland; $28,000,000 for Denmark; $24,800,000 for Spain ; $16,000,000 for Norway; $14,380,000 for Sweden; and $8,000,000 for Greece. The Last Two Years of the War. The Wall Street Journal computed the total outlay of all nations for the first three full years of war, July, 1914, to August, 1917, at 90 bilHon dollars. The daily cost had reached $117,000,- 000. The daily cost to Great Britain rose to about $40,000,000 in the winter of 1916-17, but fell ofF nearly $5,000,- 000 by mid-summer. The total for all belligerents must have approximated at least 122 billions by the middle of 1918. American War Finance. The Fed- eral war finance programme was pro- digious. Little exact knowledge existed within the first months after the decla- ration of war of the total disbursements that would be required. Even as late as November 1 estimates were given to the papers that the requirements for the fiscal year 1917-18 would range from 14 billion dollars to 19 billion dollars. The actual appropriations for war purposes made by the 64th Con- gress, 2d session, were $1,977,210,000. The appropriations made by the 1st session of the 65th Congress were $16,- 901,967,000. There were in addition authorized contracts for $2,511,954,- 000. The total of these three items is $21,390,731,000. Of this seven bilhon dollars was to be lent to the Allies at the rate of $500,000,000 per month. It was not known even in December how much of these vast appropriations would be actually spent before June, 320 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR 1918. It did not seem possible in view of the productive capacity of the coun- try for the government to spend the entire appropriation. In December there was much agitation over the de- lays in production. It was reported that, although the government's pro- gramme called for expenditures of one billion dollars in October, only $450,- 000,000 of goods could be produced. To secure funds an extensive system of new taxes was authorized and two lib- erty loans were put out besides short- term Treasury certificates of indebted- ness and the war savings stamps de- scribed below. Acts authorizing the issue of loans were passed on April 24 and September 24, 1917; the former called for seven billion dollars of bonds and the latter for .$11,538,945,460 of bonds, certificates, and savings stamps. First Liberty Loan. — In the war revenue act of April 24, 1917, Congress had authorized the borrowing of $7,- 000,000,000, of which three billions were to be invested in war bonds of the Allies. On May 14, 1917, Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo announced the offering of the first Liberty Loan to consist of $2,000,000,000 of 30-year 3% per cent bonds. These bonds were absolutely exempted from all Federal and State taxes except the Federal in- heritance tax. They were made con- vertible into the bonds of any subse- quent issue at a higher rate of interest. In order to secure subscriptions an or- ganization was perfected with the twelve Federal reserve banks as the central agencies in their respective districts. In addition to the twelve district com- mittees great numbers of subcommit- tees, including one in every city and town, with still other subordinate com- mittees for special classes or groups in each community, were brought into operation. Numerous avenues of pub- licity were utilized. Subscriptions were closed on June 15 and the bonds dated from that day although not issued un- til late in the year. Total subscrip- tions from more than 4,000,000 persons were $3,035,000,000. Since only $2,- 000,000,000 had been offered, the larger applications were reduced. Each re- serve district, except those centering at Kansas City, Minneapolis, and Atlanta, collected subscriptions in excess of the allotment. The Second Liberty Loan. — Sub- scriptions to the second loan were opened October 1, 1917, and closed October 27. The minimum amount au- thorized was three billion dollars with the proviso that one-half of any ex- cess subscriptions would be accepted. The plan called for payment down of 2 per cent, 18 per cent on November 15, 40 per cent on December 15, and 40 per cent on January 15, 1918. The interest rate was 4 per cent, payable semi-annually on November 15 and May 15. The bonds will run for 25 years, but are redeemable at the option of the government after 10 years. They are convertible into any subse- quent war issue bearing a higher rate of interest within six months after such issue is announced. They are exempt from State and local taxation except State inheritance taxes and the "addi- tional" income taxes ; such "additional" tax, however, applies only to the inter- est on holdings of .$5,000 or more. It was believed that this issue was by these taxes made more attractive to the small investors. The same thorough organi- zation for every State and locality was utilized as in the case of the First Lib- erty Loan. There were also numerous advertisements by billboards, street cars, newspapers, magazines, and circu- lars ; numerous corporations and bank- ing and other institutions generally FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 321 urged their employees or constituencies to subscribe. Much interest and enthu- siasm was also aroused by hundreds of volunteer canvassers and speakers. The total subscriptions from 9,500,- 000 persons were $4,617,532,300, so that the actual issue was $3,808,766,- 150. In every Federal Reserve Dis- trict the minimum allotment was over- subscribed, the percentage of over- subscription ranging from somewhat less than 4 per cent for Dallas to 62 per cent for Cleveland, 68 per cent for Richmond, and 72 per cent for New York ; the average over-subscription was 54* per cent. In determining the allotments it was decided to fill all sub- scriptions up to and including $50,000 at the full amount ; but to allow only 90 per cent of subscriptions between $50,000 and $100,000, but no allow- ance in this group to be less than $50,- 000 ; 75 per cent of subscriptions be- tween $100,000 and $200,000, but no allotment less than $90,000 ; 60 per cent of subscriptions between $200,000 and $1,000,000, but none less than $150,000; 50 per cent of subscriptions between $1,000,000 and $8,000,000, but no allotment less than $600,000 ; 41.2 per cent of subscriptions between $8,000,000 and $30,000,000, but not less than $4,000,000; and 40.8152 per cent of a subscription for $50,000,000. Treasury certificates which were out- standing to the amount of $2,320,493,- 000, due at different dates in November and December, were applicable to pur- chase of these bonds. In the stock mar- ket the 3I/2 per cent Liberty Bonds had fluctuated about par with a usually slight discount before the issue of the second series. Thereafter the 3^43 fluctuated about 98-99 and the 4s about 97-98. Third Liberty Loan. — On April 6 the campaign for the Third Liberty Loan was launched and continued until May 4. During this period 18,376,815 peo- ple subscribed to $4,176,516,850 in bonds, an over-subscription of nearly 40 per cent. These bonds are of shorter term than any of the other issues, be- coming due in 1928, but unlike the other issues are not collectible before ma- turity. They bear 41/^ per cent inter- est and are not convertible, thus differ- ing from the First and Second Loans, but similar in this respect to subse- quent issues. Inheritance taxes are payable with these bonds, for which purpose they are receivable at par, if they have been held for six months prior to death. These are exempt from all State and local taxation but are sub- ject to surtaxes, inheritance taxes, and excess and war profits taxes, on hold- ings in excess of $50,000. Fourth Liberty Loan. — The largest sum ever raised in a single national loan was raised in the drive for this loan, which extended from September 28 tQ October 19. The vastness of the efforts may be gleaned from the fact that the Fifth Federal Reserve District alone mailed $9,000,000 of advertising matter to prospective buyers; $6,989,047,000 was raised, and there were over 21,000,- 000 subscribers. But while the number who bought was unparalleled, the greater part of the loan was taken by the wealthy. For instance, in the New York Federal Reserve District, with 3,604,101 subscribers, 2,279,165 sub- scriptions were for $50 bonds, totaling but $113,958,250, whereas 967 of the larger subscribers alone invested in $768,167,950 of the total, of slightly over $2,000,000,000. The bonds ma- ture in 1938 but are collectible in 1933. Additional exemption is granted in that the interest on amounts of the bonds not in excess of $30,000 is not subject to surtaxes. 322 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Fifth Loan. — Before the close of 1918 plans were well under way for the floating of this loan — the Victory Loan, as it was to be called. The first and second issues of Treasury Certificates of indebtedness in anticipation of the Fifth Loan were oversubscribed, one of the subscribers of the latter issue being the Japanese government. These cer- tificates bore interest at 4^ per cent and matured May 6, 1919. The Vic- tory Loan was over-subscribed. Stabilizing Market Values. — With a view to keeping the price of Liberty Bonds from dropping below par pur- chases of such bonds were made by the treasury's sinking fund. Until Novem- ber 1, $24'1,036,500 worth of bonds were purchased on the open marjiet for $234,310,443, making an average price of 96 per cent. These purchases were made in accordance with the act of April 4, 1918, which authorized the Sec- retary of the Treasury to buy at such prices and upon such terms as he might prescribe. This did not prevent a con- siderable decline in market values of all except Liberty Ists. War Savings Stamps. — For the pur- pose of raising funds and cultivating thrift Congress authorized the sale of war savings stamps in two denomina- tions, 25 cents (thrift stamps) and five dollars (war savings stamps). A Thrift Card was furnished having space for 16 stamps ; when filled this could be exchanged for a $5 stamp by the pay- ment of 12 cents in December, 1917, or January, 1918; thereafter the cost for 16 stamps advanced one cent per month. These large stamps could be attached to a War Savings Certificate which had spaces for 20 stamps. If this was filled out between December 1, 1917, and January 31, 1918, at a cost of $82.40, the government would redeem the certificate on January 1, 1923, for $100; similarly for later dates. All stamps and certificates ma- ture in five years from date of issue. The difference between $4.12 and $5.00 is the interest on the former sum for five years at 4 per cent compounded quarterly. No one person could hold more than $1000 worth of these certifi- cates, nor purchase more than $100 worth at one time. The stamps were redeemable at the post oflSce at any time at a lessened rate of interest. To carry out the plan there were appointed six Federal directors, giving their time to the work, each being in charge of two Federal reserve bank districts. There was a director for each State and fur- ther organization reaching to cities, counties, and towns. The national com- mittee was : Frank A. Vanderlip, who resigned the presidency of the National City Bank of New York to serve with- out pay as chairman of this committee ; Mrs. George B|ass, Chicago ; Henry Ford, Detroit ; F. A. Delano, Washing- ton ; Eugene Meyer, Jr., New York, and Chas. L. Bayne, Boston. The sale of these stamps was begun on December 3, 1917, under the super- vision of the National War Savings Committee. This met with compara- tively little success at first, there being considerable passive and some active op- position, and in the opening month only $10,236,451 in stamps were sold. Great- er publicity, however, was given to the stamps, and they were put on sale at every post ofl^ce and by letter carriers. In addition agents for the sale of the stamps were appointed by the Secre- tary of the Treasury, these numbering 233,287 at the end of October, 1918, while 151,361 war savings societies, numbering from 10 to 12,000 members each, had been formed by November 1, 1918. The sales gradually increased until FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 323 they reached their maximum in July, 1918, during which months $211,417,- 942.61 of stamps were disposed of. By November 1, 1918, the cash receipts from this source totaled $834,253,- 213.44, representing an average ma- turity value of a little over $1,000,000,- 000. Few persons availed themselves of the provision allowing for the re- demption of the stamps, the redemption constituting less than 1 per cent, of the cash receipts. The success of this experience has led the Secretary of the Treasury to suggest in his annual re- port that this be made a permanent part of the scheme of the nation's finan- cing. On September 24 an act was passed permitting the individual to hold as much as $1000 of War Savings Stamps of any one issue; this super- seded the previous restriction of $1000 of stamps of all issues. This act also increased the total of stamps authorized from two to four billion dollars. About the same time Mr. Frank A. Vander- lip, who had for a year given up his duties as president of the National City Bank to supervise the thrift campaign, resigned this latter function. The work was incorporated in the activities of the Treasury Department. Treasury Certificates. — In order to raise immediate cash largely for the purpose of carrying out the proposed loans to the Allies, the Treasury issued at sixteen different times the varying amounts of temporary certificates of in- debtedness. Their total amount was $4,028,698,000 ; only $690,000,000 issued November 21, 1917, bearing 4 per cent interest and due June 25, 1918, were still outstanding at the close of the year. Two small issues on March 31 and October 29, 1917, bore 2 per cent interest ; 2 issues on April 25 and May 10, 1917, bore 3 per cent; 2 on May 25 and June 8, 1917, bore 3^4 per cent ; 3 issues on August 9, August 28, and September 17, 1917, bore 3^/2 per cent ; and 7 other issues, all after Sep- tember 26, 1917, bore 4 per cent. Near- ly $2,500,000,000 of these certificates were placed through the Federal reserve banks at New York. Advance to Allies. — The plan of the government included advances to the Allies of $500,000,000 per month. The first advance was of $200,000,000 to Great Britain on April 25, 1917. By the close of the year the total advances had reached the sum of $4,236,400,000, distributed as follows: Great Britain, $2,045,000,000; France, $1,285,000,- 000; Italy, $500,000,000; Russia, $325,000,000, of which $5,000,000 was for the Rumanian government ; Bel- gium, $77,400,000 ; and Serbia, $4,000,- 000. These advances were made on the basis of the obligations of foreign gov- ernments purchased by the Treasury. Loans were first made at the rate of 3 per cent per annum, but soon advanced to 3^/4 per cent in order to conform to the rates paid by the Treasury on its own certificates of indebtedness. Following the flotation of the first Lib- erty Loan the rate on foreign loans was advanced to 3^/2 per cent ; and finally following the issue of the second Liberty Loan the rate was raised to 4^4: per cent. Preceding our entrance into the war it had been the practice of foreign gov- ernments to issue loans in this coun- try; subsequently to our entrance, in order to avoid the competition of for- eign governments with our own, the policy of making loans to the Allies by the government itself, as indicated in the following paragraphs, was adopted. It was estimated that previous to th^ American declaration of war about $2,500,000,000 of foreign war loans had been floated in this country. The 324 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR only variation from the new rule was the issue by the British Treasury through the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company of 90-day discount bills. It was planned to issue about $15,000,000 of bills weekly up to a total of not over $150,000,000. In fact, the total issued was only $100,000,000; this amount, bearing 6 per cent interest, was out- standing at the close of the year. In addition, the same firm acting for the British and French governments, sold some of the collateral upon which pre- vious loans had been based and repur- chased part of such loans themselves. Canada. War financing occupied much of public attention in Canada dur- ing 1917. On February 8, 1917, Pre- mier Borden in his budget speech stated that the cost of the war had exceeded all expectations. For the year 1917- 18 the estimated military and naval ex- penditures were put at $433,000,000, compared with $217,000,000 for the preceding year ; $166,000,000 for 1915- 16, and only $61,000,000 for 1914-15. The loans of the year included the third war loan of $150,000,000 in 5 per cent bonds at 96, issued in March, 1917. A loan of $100,000,000 was floated in the United States in July, 1917, through the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company. This was the only foreign loan floated in the iXnited States after its entrance into the war, and special permission for it was given by Secretary of the Treas- ury McAdoo. Finally in November, 1917, the Victory Loan was put out, 807,361 subscribers asking for $417,- 000,000. The loan amounted to $400,- 000,000, in the form of 51/0 per cent gold bonds in three series, maturing in 1922, 1927, and 1937. The flotation of this immense loan in Canada was an evidence of sound financial conditions ; in 1916 two-thirds of the Canadian loans. Dominion and Provincial, had been floated in the United States, where- as in 1917 only slightly more than one- fifth were sold here. In connection with war financing, Canada began early in the year to issue savings stamps and certificates on a plan similar to that adopted previously in Great Britain and later in the United States. In trade and manufacturing new high points were reached. Exports for 11 months totaled $1,399,000,000, as compared with .$961,666,000 and $521,953,000 for similar periods of 1916 and 1915. Im- ports for this period were $943,500,- 000, as compared with $698,709,000, and $405,973,000 for the like periods of 1916 and 1915. There was thus a favorable balance of trade of nearly twice that of 1916 and fully three times that of 1915. Crops were fairly abundant and prices high. Shipbuild- ing rapidly advanced on both coasts. Mineral production was hampered by labor shortage and unrest but the to- tal value of output was $200,000,000, as against $190,646,000 in 1914, and .$39,000,000 in 1916, to $35,000,000 in 1917. Various new industries, notably potash, toy-making, and dye manufac- ture, developed rapidly. War orders aggregating about $1,812,000,000 were placed by the Imperial Munitions Board. Canada's Fifth War Loan was suc- cessful beyond all expectations. The subscriptions totaled $695,389,000, while the maximum asked for was $600,- 000,000 and the minimum $300,000,- 000; the government accepted the max- imum asked for. Maturing at five and fifteen years, the bonds become due on November 1, 1923 and 1933, and yield 5^2 per cent interest, payable semi- annually. The bonds may be convert- ed into any future domestic issues of like maturity or longer made during FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 325 the war. Unlike the later liberty issues in the United States, the bonds are ex- empt from taxes, including any income tax imposed in pursuance of legislation enacted by the parliament of Canada. The campaign extended from October 28 to November 16, 1918, and there were 1,104,107 subscriptions. The province of Ontario had 542,648 sub- scribers for $336,055,000. In the en- tire Dominion one person in every 7.08 subscribed and the average per capita subscription was $88.91. Great Britain. The great financial and commercial strength of Great Brit- ain showed to superior effect amidst the tremendous obstacles of the third year of war. Aggregate war expendi- tures reached £4,200,000,000 in Feb- ruary, 1917. In September, 1917, the war cost above the normal peace bud- gets was estimated at five billion pounds sterling ($25,000,000,000) and yet not the slightest feeling of uncertainty had been manifest as to the soundness of the financial structure. This estimate, made by the Select Committee on National Expenditure, showed that advances to Alhes had amounted to £1,321,000,000 to September, 1917. The deadweight national debt had thus been increased by about £3,500,000,000 and the an- nual debt charge by over £200,000,000, or a billion dollars. It was estimated that each six months of war would add £750,000,000, exclusive of advances to Allies, to the debt and £45,000,000 to the annual debt charge (interest at 5 per cent and sinking fund 1 per cent). The total war credits for the fiscal year April, 1917, to March, 1918, inclusive, were £2,450,000,000. There were quan- tities of Treasury bills outstanding at all times, their volume in December being £1,059,000,000. As elsewhere, prices advanced sharply. The London Economist estimated the index level of general prices as follows: Average for 1901-5, 2200; September 30, 1916, 4423; September 30, 1917, 5634. As indicated above, British purchases in the United States necessitated large loans from the United States govern- ment to maintain trade balances. In addition for the same purpose, British owners of American securities were es- timated to have sold $1,750,000,000 of them back to American investors since the war started. The high rates of interest caused British Consols to drop in January to 51%, their lowest since 1803, while securities in general continued to shrink in market values. The London Bankers' Magazine report- ed that declines in the market values of 387 representative stocks amounted to nearly £158,000,000 for the year and to £771,000,000 since July, 1914. The high level of trade is indicated by total exports for the eleven months ending November 30, 1917, of £488,168,000, an increase of 4.6 per cent over the same period of 1916 and 26 per cent above those of 1915. Imports for eleven months were £980,500,000, or 12.2 per cent for the same period of 1916, and greatly exceeding any previous year. Re-exports, however, were only £66,- 372,000 for 11 months, a dechne of 27.6 per cent and much less than any recent year. In October, 1917, Great Bl-itain in- augurated its system of continuous sale of bonds known as National War Bonds and sold them throughout 1918. These consisted of 5 per cent bonds of 1922 at 102, of 1924 at 103, and of 1927 at 105, and of 4 per cent bonds of 1927. The coupon bonds were put forth in de- nominations ranging from £50 to £5000 and there were also registered bonds which are transferable either by deed or in the Bank Transfer Books. A legal tender privilege is attached, the 326 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR bonds being accepted at par and ac- crued interest by the commissioners of inland revenue in payment of death duties, provided bonds were held for six months before the date of decease. Both principal and interest are exempt from all British taxation, present or future, if shown to be in the beneficial ownership of persons neither domiciled nor ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. Interest on the 4 per cent bonds is exempt from British income taxation other than the super tax. The 5 per cent and the 4 per cent bonds both have a convertibility feature. The chancellor pointed out that in the year beginning October 1, 1917, over £1,120,000,000 had been inrested in war bonds, much more than expected ; by January 18, 1919, the total had reached £1,500,000,000. The advan- tage claimed for the system of continu- ous borrowing is that it raises more money with the least disturbance of financial conditions, and it is argued that it is the best from a point of view of financial stability after the war is over. Through its representatives in the United States, J. P. Morgan & Com- pany, the British government offered its short term treasury bills through- out the year, these bonds selling on the market at S^/G per cent at the beginning of 1918, the interest increasing to 6 per cent for the greater part of the year, and the bonds being again offered at 6 per cent during 1919. During the first four years of the war Great Brit- ain had borrowed over £5,900,000,000. The total indebtedness of Great Brit- ain on January 1,1919, was about $40,- 000,000,000, over 44 per cent of the national wealth. Germany. Financial conditions with- in the Central Powers were largely shrouded in mystery. There were, however, many indications of financial stress, food and clothing shortage, and industrial unrest. The war finances were a prodigious burden. The fifth war loan was reported in April, 1917, to have produced 12,770,000,000 marks ($3,192,000,000). In February, 1917, the Reichstag authorized a sixth credit of 15 billion marks and in July a sev- enth of like amount. The sixth loan was reported to have produced $3,089,- 000,000, and the seventh $3,156,000,- 000. This last called out 5,213,000 subscribers, of whom 3,233,000 made subscriptions of $50 or less, and 1,280,- 000 others subscribed less than $250 each. The total number of subscribers was less than for the fourth and fifth loans and greater reliance was placed on the large banks. The rapid growth of the public interest charge, the al- most complete absence of foreign trade, and the concentration of industrial ef- forts within the narrowest range of military necessities made increasingly difficult the preservation of a sound financial structure. In addition, in July, 1917, Germany assumed respon- sibility for war expenditures of Bul- garia and Turkey. Numerous reports indicated increasing food scarcity and the efforts of the authorities to supply fertilizers and seeds and stimulate pro- duction. Nevertheless, Mr. Hoover re- ported to President Wilson in May, 1917, that the Germans could not be starved into surrender. The scarcity of gold and silver gave great concern because of the unfavorable trade bal- ances with neighboring neutrals. The Reichsbank repeated its appeals for gold in any form and the government threatened to demonetize silver if it were not brought out of hiding. Loans were secured from Switzerland and Hol- land largely, according to report, by threats to cut off their coal supply. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 327 The scarcity of clothing necessitated government regulation and the issue of clothing cards. Plans for the rehabilitation of the merchant fleet and the recovery of for- eign trade made much progress. It was reported that a merchant fleet was under construction ; that the govern- ment would make generous allowances for vessels lost during the war and heavily subsidized shipping after the war; and that similar steps would be taken with reference to various branches of trade, especially toy-making and dye-manufacture. It was planned also to utilize monopolies of buying under government direction to secure raw ma- terials. During 1918 the German government floated two war loans, the eighth and the ninth. The eighth loan, off*ered to the public from March 18 until April 18, consisted of bonds bearing 5 per cent interest and treasury certificates bearing 4