D 
 
 AMERICA'S 
 POSITION 
 
 on the 
 
 SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 "Published by 
 The Weekly Review of the Far East 
 
 SHANGHAI, CHINA 
 
Qass 
 
 J16SL 
 
 1^-RjL 
 
 PRESENTED BT 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION 
 
 on the 
 
 SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 AS INDICATED IN PUBLIC SPEECHES 
 BY PRESIDENT HARDING, EX-PRESI- 
 DENT WILSON, SENATOR LODGE, 
 ETC., AND IN OFFICIAL HEARINGS 
 AND STATE PAPERS 
 
 Published by 
 
 The Weekly Review of the Far East 
 shanghai, china 
 
 Price ^ One Dollar 
 

 Gift 
 
 Publisher 
 
 PRESS OF riANSDELL INCORPORATED 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
Introductory Note 
 
 In this volume dealing with America's position on the 
 Shantung Question we have attempted to summarize as 
 far as possible public opinion in the United States on the 
 subject of China, the Open Door of Equal Opportunity, 
 and America's general relationship with the Far East. In 
 compiling the information included in "America's Posi- 
 tion on the Shantung Question," we have attempted to 
 bring together in readable form the statements of 
 present and former officials of the American Government 
 on this important question, and in addition have included 
 the testimony of a number of prominent Americans out- 
 side of government circles who through long years of per- 
 sonal contact are familiar with our new position in the 
 Orient. 
 
 It is our hope that this book may find a place alongside 
 "The Shantung Case at the Conference," by Thomas F. 
 Millard, which we published a few months ago. In Mr. 
 Millard's book, the Shantung and China questions were 
 considered largely from the standpoint of the decision of 
 the Peace Conference at Paris which awarded the former 
 German interests in China to Japan rather than to China, 
 their rightful owner. 
 
 After a careful search of the public records and state- 
 ments of members of the present as well as the previous 
 Administration, the outstanding fact is that there is 
 really no difference in the viewpoint of Americans on this 
 question. Such differences as do occur are in the last 
 analysis merely differences in method, rather than differ- 
 ences in principle. Shantung really typifies to the Ameri- 
 can mind about everything that is wrong in the old style 
 diplomacy, which has governed the foreign relations of 
 nations for so many years. 
 
 J. B. Powell, 
 Editor and Publisher, 
 Weekly Review of the Far East, 
 Shanghai. 
 
 The Weekly Review of the Far East (formerly Millard's 
 Review), is an American-owned and edited magazine de- 
 voted to the economic, political and social development of 
 the Republic of China. 
 
The Rape of China — The 
 Shantung Award 
 
 Careful study of the volumes of debate, discussions 
 and articles dealing with the controversy in the United 
 States over the Treaty of Versailles discloses one clear 
 fact, namely, that irrespective of their differences over 
 disputed questions, American statesmen and publicists 
 are of one mind that a grevious wrong was done China 
 when the Province of Shantung was allotted to Japan at 
 the Peace Conference in Paris. 
 
 Only in the degree of their condemnation do the 
 leaders of American thought vary in this regard. None 
 seek to excuse this encroachment upon the territorial in- 
 tegrity of China, and even those who most ardently advo- 
 cated the blanket ratification by the United States Senate 
 of the Versailles Treaty premised their position upon their 
 announced belief in the good faith of Japan when she 
 pledged herself to voluntarily return to China control of 
 the Shantung peninsula. 
 
 The unwillingness and the inability of the American 
 sponsors of the Versailles Treaty to defend the "rape of 
 the first great democracy of the Orient" — as President 
 Harding, himself, aptly characterized the Shantung 
 award — unquestionably weakened the case of those who 
 sought to mould American public opinion in support of 
 the Versailles Treaty. 
 
 Former President Wilson, in his numerous speeches 
 in behalf of the ratification of the treaty, never attempted 
 to justify the Shantung award, because — as he frankly 
 said in one address — "it has no merits." 
 
 Mr. Wilson styled it "an ugly, hopeless business," and 
 stressed the fact that "it was upon the instance of the 
 government of the United States that Japan promised to 
 
 [5] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 return all rights of sovereignty that China had granted 
 Germany over any portion of the province of Shantung." 
 The Senate of the United States officially recorded 
 its disapproval of the Shantung award when it adopted 
 the following reservation to the Treaty of Versailles : 
 
 "7. The United States witholds its assent to articles 156, 
 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to 
 any controversy which may arise under said articles between 
 the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan." 
 
 The comparatively few members of the Senate who 
 opposed this reservation did so not because they sanc- 
 tioned the crime against China but because, as they plainly 
 indicated, they believed that by ratifying the treaty and 
 the establishment of the League of Nations the wrong 
 done China would be righted. 
 
 That this was the attitude of the advocates of ratifi- 
 cation is shown by the substitute reservation offered by 
 Senator Pittman, a Democratic member of the Senate 
 Committee on Foreign Relations and one of former Presi- 
 dent Wilson's staunch supporters. The Pittman reserva- 
 tion which the majority opposing the treaty rejected for 
 obvious reasons, read as follows: 
 
 "Provided, That in advising and consenting to the ratification 
 of said treaty the United States understands that the German 
 rights and interests, renounced by Germany in favor of Japan 
 under the provisions of article 156, 157, and 158 of said treaty, 
 are to be returned by Japan to China at the termination of the 
 present war by the adoption of this treaty, as provided in the 
 exchanged notes between the Japanese and Chinese governments 
 of date May 25, 1915." 
 
 These two reservations to the Treaty of Versailles, 
 the first supported by the majority and the second by the 
 minority, clearly demonstrate that every member of the 
 United States Senate, regardless of party, viewed with 
 disfavor the deal at Versailles which illegally transferred 
 
 [6] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Shantung to Japan. These reservations are quoted at the 
 outset because they form the bases of virtually all dis- 
 cussions by the American controversialists upon the Shan- 
 tung question. Both condemn the award to Japan and 
 seek the same end, differing only in the method. 
 
 As a member of the Senate and as the nominee of his 
 party for the Presidency the present Chief Executive of 
 the United States denounced the Shantung award as im- 
 moral and as challenging every American utterance 
 "about lofty purposes and the reign of justice." 
 
 In his very first important speech of the 'campaign 
 Mr. Harding rejoiced that the Senate had refused to ap- 
 prove of the Shantung award. On another occasion he 
 declared that "all fair men realize the embarrassment in- 
 cident to the Shantung award." 
 
 In the various speeches he made after his return to 
 this country from Paris former President Wilson iterated 
 and reiterated his dissatisfaction with the transfer of 
 Shantung to Japan. Although he had signed the treaty at 
 Versailles which gave this Chinese province to Japan he 
 made it plain that he did so with the understanding that 
 Japan would live up to the promise of her peace commis- 
 sioners to restore Shantung to China in full sovereignty. 
 
 L7] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Traditional American Policy 
 
 The United States has consistently contended for a 
 Far Eastern policy, to quote the words of John Hay, 
 "which may bring about permanent safety and peace to 
 China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative 
 entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers 
 by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the 
 world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all 
 parts of the Chinese Empire." 
 
 Commercially our relations with China began when 
 the first American clipper ship visited the shores of that 
 country some 136 years ago. On July 3, 1900 Mr. Hay in 
 his note to all the Powers said : 
 
 "In this critical posture of the affairs in China it is deemed 
 appropriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as 
 the present circumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to 
 the policy initiated by us in 1857, of peace with the Chinese nation, 
 of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives and 
 property of our citiens — . The policy of the Government of the 
 United States is to seek a solution (of the existing troubles) 
 which may bring about permanet safety and peace to China, pre- 
 serve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all 
 rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international 
 law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and im- 
 partial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." 
 
 Mr. Hay's "Open Door" declaration to France, Ger- 
 many, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia, which was 
 accepted by those Powers nearly a quarter of a century 
 ago, has been adhered to strictly by all succeeding Ameri- 
 can Secretaries of States and is the policy of the United 
 States Government today. 
 
 In the Root-Takahira agreement of November 30, 
 1908, Mr. Elihu Root, then the American Secretary of 
 State, who is one of the commissioners to the present con- 
 ference, re-affirmed the Hay doctrine in the following 
 
 [8] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 agreement with Baron Kogoro Takahira, the Japanese 
 Ambassador to the United States : 
 
 "1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the 
 free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific 
 Ocean. 
 
 2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any 
 aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the exist- 
 ing status quo in the region above mentioned, and to the defense 
 of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry 
 in China. 
 
 3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to re- 
 spect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said 
 region. 
 
 4. They are also determined to preserve the common in- 
 terests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means 
 at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the 
 principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all 
 nations in that Empire. 
 
 5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as 
 above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above de- 
 fined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with 
 each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what 
 measures they may consider it useful to take." 
 
 This policy was re-enunciated by Secretary of State 
 Charles E. Hughes, the head of the American Commission 
 at the present conference, in his letter to the Chinese 
 minister accredited to the United States on July 1, 1921. 
 
 In part, Mr. Hughes wrote as follows : 
 
 "Your reference to the principle of the open door affords me 
 the opportunity to assure you of this Government's continuance 
 in its whole-hearted support of that principle, which it has tra- 
 ditionally regarded as fundamental both to the interests of China 
 itself and to the common interests of all powers in China, and in- 
 dispensable to the free and peaceful development of their com- 
 merce on the Pacific Ocean. The government of the United States 
 has never associated itself with any arrangment which sought to 
 establish any special rights or privileges in China which would 
 abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly 
 states: and I am happy to assure you that it is the purpose of this 
 
 [9] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Government neither to participate nor to acquiesce in any arrange- 
 ment which might purport to establish in favor of foreign in- 
 terests any superiority of rights with respect to commercial or 
 economic development in designated regions of the territories of 
 China, or which might seek to create any such monopoly or prefer- 
 ence as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any 
 legitimate trade or industry or from participating with the 
 Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise/ 
 
 An effort has been made by some Japanese statesmen 
 to create the impression that the United States abandoned 
 the policy laid down by Secretary Hay and re-affirmed by 
 Secretary Root when the so-called Lansing-Ishii agree- 
 ment was made by Secretary of State Lansing and Vis- 
 count Ishii in 1915 recognizing Japan's "special interest" 
 in China. This theory, however, was exploded by Sec- 
 retary Lansing himself when he appeared before the 
 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during the hear- 
 ings upon the Treaty of Versailles. 
 
 Asked to give his interpretation of his agreement 
 with Viscount Ishii, Secretary Lansing said: 
 
 "Ishii said he thought that Japan's special interest in China 
 should be recognized in any agreement we might make. I said 
 that of coure the United States recognized that because of geo- 
 graphical location Japan had a peculiar interest in China, but 
 that the danger of putting it in any agreement was that it might 
 be misconstrued and that therefore I objected to it. 
 
 "I further told him that if he understood 'special interesf 
 meant 'paramount interest' I could not discuss it further. 
 
 "Ishii suggested a 'Monroe doctrine' for the Far East. I 
 told him that the MONROE DOCTRINE DID NOT GIVE THE 
 UNITED STATES A PARAMOUNT INTEREST OVER ANY 
 NATION ON THIS HEMISPHERE. AND I THOUGHT THE 
 SAME PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE GIVEN ANY OTHER NATION 
 WITH REGARD TO CHINA. ISHII MAINTAINED SILENCE." 
 
 Commenting upon Secretary Lansing's testimony, in 
 a speech in the Senate on October 14, 1919, Senator Henry 
 Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
 
 [10] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Foreign Relations, and one of the American commission- 
 ers to the present conference, said : 
 
 **This shows clearly that the American government recog- 
 nized no special interest of Japan in China greater than an inter- 
 est such as the United States has in Mexico or Canada, and that 
 Lansing positively refused even to discuss with Ishii any 'para- 
 mount interest' in China. Moreover, since the Japanese have been 
 talking about the 'Monroe doctrine' as applied to the Far East, 
 it is worthwhile to note that Secretary Lansing positively asserted 
 that the 'Monroe doctrine' did not give the United States a para- 
 mount interest over any nation on this hemisphere, and that 'no 
 paramount interest and no special privileges should be given any 
 other nation with regard to China.' It is fortunate that the 
 State Department has, even at this late date, given its interpre- 
 tation of this agreement." 
 
 Senator Lodge, in this same speech, revealed that 
 shortly before Viscount Ishii's arrival in this country, a 
 confidential memorandum purporting to be Ishii's pro- 
 gramme was secured by the State Department and two or 
 three other interested parties. Ishii was to say, accord- 
 ing to this memorandum, "that Japan has no ulterior 
 motive in respect to the integrity of China; that she ad- 
 heres to her open door pledges; that nothing subversive 
 of China's sovereignty is contemplated ; that Japan's sole 
 object is, by means entirely pacific, to bring order out of 
 chaos in China, with no special privilege in view; that 
 Japan understands China better than any other nation, 
 and, owing to her geographical proximity and special 
 political position, and interests in the Far East, she should 
 therefore, when essential, take the leading role in dealing 
 with China as the United States does with the nations of 
 the Western Hemisphere." 
 
 Commenting upon this memorandum, Senator Lodge 
 said: 
 
 "It is to be noted that in spite of Viscount Ishii's attempt to 
 secure all these demands, in spite of the fact that in the Lansing- 
 Ishii agreement, as it was published by Japan in China and 
 
 [11] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 throughout the Far East, he apparently had secured these aims, 
 he had, as a matter of fact, failed in his chief purpose.'* 
 
 Referring specifically to the Shantung award, in an- 
 other part of this speech, Senator Lodge said : 
 
 "It is a great wrong, this giving of Shantung over to the 
 control of Japan. Morally it is indefensible, and it is no answer 
 to say that we failed to object to the German seizure of Shantung. 
 As a matter of fact, the open-door policy of Mr. Hay was the 
 reply to the German movement and for the time arrested it . . . 
 It seems to me an intolerable wrong. I desire at least that my 
 vote should record for the benefit of those who come after me that 
 I in no way was associated with this wrong to man and to the 
 cause of freedom and justice." 
 
 Senator Lodge as the chairman of the Senate Com- 
 mittee on Foreign Relations was the author of the Shan- 
 tung reservation to the Versailles Treaty denouncing the 
 Shantung Award, which the Senate adopted. 
 
 In the debate that ensued upon the Shantung award. 
 Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, one of the vigorous 
 critics of the Versailles Treaty said in answer to those 
 senators who sought to leave the question to the League 
 of Nations for settlement : 
 
 "It seems to me the point of difference is this: Japan stole, 
 that country. She says now to the world, ^Confirm us in our title 
 and after we have been confirmed in our title we will give it back.* 
 Some of us say, 'We refuse to confirm you in your title; give it 
 back now.' That is the difference." 
 
 Again, Senator Reed said : 
 
 "If we were settling these things according to the old cold- 
 blooded philosophy and China had stayed out of the war and done 
 nothing we might have said, 'Well, Japan, you got that loot; that 
 is a part of your swag take it.' But, according to the old-fashioned 
 brutal philosophy, even if it were rogues robbing and plundering, 
 the honor among thieves would have repudiated the proposition to 
 give to one of the parties the right to rob another who was en- 
 gaged in the enterprise. 
 
 [12] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 "We were not supposed to be thieves. The world was strug- 
 gling with this great giant, the Teutonic force. We called China 
 in and China came. Part of her lands had been taken. It is not 
 true that Japan took that peninsula; it is true that Japan and 
 England took it. England was too honorable to claim that she 
 owned the thing that was Chinese, but after her treaty with Japan 
 she was not in a position to say that Japan should not take it. 
 I say in all the history of the world I know of no similar picture 
 of perfidy ; nothing blacker in the annals of threachery and double 
 dealing between nations. 
 
 "Behold the scene : French and English Armies are struggling 
 to preserve their countries; they have been driven back and back 
 until their hearts are almost in despair, brave and noble as are 
 their hearts. The United States is entering the contest, having 
 only one real interest, the vindication of our national rights, but 
 being willing to help preserve and save others. The United States 
 comes to China and asks China if she will not also cast her lot 
 with the nations struggling against Germany. China sends 300,- 
 000 of her men with pick and shovel to dig in the trenches under 
 that rain of hell that poured from the mouths of German guns. 
 Chinese laborers lie there sweltering in their blood, along with 
 British, along with French, along with Americans, but not along 
 with Japanese — at least with very few of them, for I am informed 
 that that country lost in the war only a few hundred men. So 
 they fight to win a glorious victory. Then the day comes when 
 China — her eyes swimming with delight, her heart buoyed up 
 with the thought that now she is coming to a tribunal that will 
 restore her to all her ancient rights and will take the oppressor's 
 heel from her breast — finds that her fairest Province has been 
 divided up, and that while she fought they were betraying her; 
 while her sons died, they were dividing the profits. 
 
 "There may be Senators on the floor who will vote for that 
 sort of thing, but when they do let them not do it with the solace 
 that they are doing it for the good of China. China knows her 
 ancient and treacherous enemy, China knows her rights, and 
 China knows that if this Province is honestly going to be returned 
 the time to return it is now; that when a man asks a decree of 
 court to confirm him in a title to property that is not his, upon 
 the pretext that he is going to give it back after he has secured 
 the title, that is the pretext of a rogue. That is the artifice of a 
 man who does not possess common honesty. There is not a 
 
 [13] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 lawyer here but would say to a litigant under such circumstances 
 that the time to turn it over is when the decree is written. Let 
 us write it in the decree now and here that this great act of 
 justice shall be done. But, no; the cunning Prussian of the Orient 
 proposes to get a title sanctioned, warranted, and guaranteed by 
 the league of nations with its holy seal affixed, and then it will 
 settle the question hereafter whether it thinks that it is ready to 
 give back this property that it has taken. It is a good thing to 
 mix a little common sense even in our dreams. He who thinks 
 on this matter from the practical standpoint of life must know 
 that Japan, having laid her hand of steel upon the throat of China, 
 does not intend to relax her grip." 
 
 [14] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 President Harding Rejoiced That America Dissented 
 
 To Shantung Award 
 
 (Extract from speech by Mr. Harding delivered before the 
 Loyal Order of Golden Heart, Marion, Ohio, September 21, 1920.) 
 
 "Some twenty years ago, when America had first 
 planted the flag of this Republic, with every glittering 
 star fixed, as a banner of hope and stability in the Orient, 
 there broke out in China what was know as the Boxer 
 Rebellion. The rebellious boxers in their warfare en- 
 dangered all the foreign residents in the city of Peking. 
 It became necessary to send a military expedition to the 
 relief of those beleaguered citizens of the various nations 
 of the earth. And I always like to recall that a son of our 
 own State of Ohio led the military expedition, the late 
 General Chaffee. They brought about the relief of the 
 citizens of foreign countries imprisoned in Peking, and in 
 a little while the military forces were withdrawn. Then 
 representatives of the several nations engaged in that 
 expedition sat about a table and figured out the expense 
 of the several countries who had sent military relief. 
 The sum presumably necessary to pay the United States 
 for the protection of its citizens was assessed against 
 China, and a like sum or proportionate sum, was assessed 
 against the Government of China for Germany, for Great 
 Britain, for France, and the other nations involved. 
 
 "Later on we came to cast up the accounts in detail, 
 and we found that the Government of China had paid 
 $8,000,000 in money to the United States more than was 
 necessary to recompense us for our military endeavors. 
 And the United States returned that money to China, 
 sent back $8,000,000 that they had paid us in that award — 
 the first time such a thing was ever done in the history 
 of the world. That was the first great illustration of a 
 fraternal spirit among nations. And that is why China 
 
 [15] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 plants its faith in the example, in the democracy, in the 
 justice of the United States of America. And we, my 
 countrymen, are greater today by reason of the example 
 which we then set to the world than we could ever hope 
 to be by force of arms, no matter how large our army and 
 navy may be. 
 
 "An interesting aftermath resulted in the peace con- 
 ference in Paris. China went into the war at our request, 
 I do not know that you recall it but that oriental people, 
 at the suggestion of the State Department of our country, 
 declared war against the Central Empire, of Germany 
 and Austro Hungary. And when the war settlement came 
 about China sought to be represented at the peace con- 
 ference and they ought to have been represented. For 
 some reason or other they were not. Then they said, "we 
 will trust the United States of America to represent us, 
 with confidence in that great Republic." And yet, some- 
 how in the Peace Conference, through contracts secretly 
 made, China had no voice in the settlement and instead 
 of being awarded the freedom of her own people under 
 the gospel of self determination for which America spoke, 
 several million of her people were delivered over to a 
 rival nation, with the consent and approval of those who 
 spoke for America in Paris. But when that compact came 
 into the United States Senate, 1 rejoice that there were 
 Americans in the United States who said "No" and we 
 did not approve of the Shantung award. And we kept 
 the plight and faith in the lesson we taught China some 
 twenty years ago."' 
 
 (Address by Mr. Harding on the League of Nations, in the 
 United States Senate, September 11, 1919.) 
 
 "Let me digress for a moment to suggest some of my 
 own impressions gathered during the hearings granted 
 to the American representatives of the aspiring peoples of 
 
 [16] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Europe, Asia and Egypt, whose aspirations and long de- 
 ferred hopes of liberty and nationality are alleged to have 
 been safeguarded in this super creation of humanity. It 
 was futile, of coure, for a Senate Committee to assume 
 to answer prayers or comply with protest, for our func- 
 tion is not one of negotiation. However, there are citi- 
 zens crying to be heard, after a denial at the fount of 
 justice in Europe, and we listened. They begged amend- 
 ments or rejection to save their liberty or to preserve 
 their nationalities or to maintain their homogeneous peo- 
 ples. 
 
 "Spokesmen for China cried out against the rape of 
 the first great democracy of the Orient, and the plea was 
 eloquent with recited sacrifices and noble assistance in 
 the winning of the war. We uttered our chagrin that the 
 spokesmen for the American conscience — aye, for the 
 "conscience of civilization" — had sanctioned the confessed 
 immorality of the Shantung award to satisfy a secret 
 covenant against which we righteously proclaimed. 
 
 "All fair men realize the embarrassment incident to 
 the Shantung award. Perhaps we cannot change it. No 
 one believes we mean to go to war to restore to China what 
 Germany looted and Japan traded for. But we need not 
 be a party to an international immorality that challenges 
 our every utterance about lofty purposes and the reign of 
 justice. I want it recorded, for all the world to read, that 
 America esteems her unarmed friend no less than she re- 
 spects her armed associate." 
 
 Speaking again in the Senate in November, 1919, (Congres- 
 sional Record, pages 87, 91, 92), Mr. Harding said in respect to 
 the Treaty of Versailles: 
 
 "I have not liked this treaty; I think, as originally 
 negotiated, it is the colossal blunder of all time ; but recog- 
 nizing the aspirations of our own people and the people 
 
 [17] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 of the world to do something toward international cooper- 
 ation for the promotion and preservation of peace and a 
 more intimate and better understanding between nations, 
 I wish to make it possible to accept this covenant. I could, 
 however, no more vote to ratify this treaty without reser- 
 vations which make sure America's independence of 
 action, which make sure the preservation of American 
 traditions, which make sure and certain our freedom in 
 choosing our course of action, than I could participate in 
 a knowing betrayal of this republic." 
 
 [18: 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Ex-President Wilson Condemned Violation of 
 China's Integrity 
 
 On his final speaking tour of the Country in behalf of 
 the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and the League 
 of Nations, which resulted in his physical collapse, Wood- 
 row Wilson unhesitatingly attacked as immoral the Shan- 
 tung award and all other violations of China's territorial 
 integrity. 
 
 "China has been the common prey of the great Euro- 
 pean Powers," he said. "Perhaps I should apologize to 
 the representatives of those Powers for using such a word, 
 but I think they would admit that the word is justified. 
 Nation after nation has demanded rights, semi-sovereign 
 rights, and concessions with regard to mines and railways 
 and every resource that China could put at their disposi- 
 tion, and China has never been able to say 'No.' 
 
 "For my part, my moral judgment is against the whole 
 set of concessions. They were all of them unjust to China, 
 they ought never to have been exacted, they were all ex- 
 acted by duress from a great body of thoughtful and 
 ancient and helpless people. There never was any right 
 in any of them. Thank God, America never asked for any, 
 never dreamed of asking for any . . . ." 
 
 At another time on this tour he said : 
 
 "I have frankly said to my Japanese colleagues in the 
 conference (at Paris), and therefore I can without im- 
 propriety say it here, that I was very deeply dissatisfied 
 with that part of the treaty (the Shantung award). But, 
 Japan agreed at that very time, and as part of the under- 
 standing upon which those clauses were put into the 
 treaty, that she would relinquish every item of sovereignty 
 that Germany had enjoyed in China, and that she would 
 retain only what other nations have elsewhere in China, 
 certain economic concessions with regard to the railway 
 
 [19] 
 
AMERICA'S PO SITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 and the mines, which she was to operate under a corpor- 
 ation and subject to the laws of China." 
 
 Again speaking on the Shantung award, Mr. Wilson 
 said: 
 
 "I no not like the settlement any better than you do, 
 but these were the circumstances: In order to induce 
 Japan to cooperate in the war and clear the Pacific of the 
 German power England, and subsequently France, bound 
 themselves without any qualification to see to it that 
 Japan got anything in China that German had, and that 
 Japan would take it away from her, upon the strength 
 of which promise Japan proceeded to take Kiaochow and 
 occupy the portions of Shantung Province, which has been 
 ceded by China for a term of years to Germany." 
 
 Explaining how Germany got Shantung in the first 
 place, Mr. Wilson said : 
 
 "She had made the death of two German missionaries 
 at the hands of irresponsible mobs in certain provinces of 
 China an excuse for taking this valuable part of China's 
 territory. It makes anybody who regards himself as a 
 Christian blush to think what Christian nations have done 
 in the name of protecting Christianity." 
 
 Previously, President Wilson had explained in detail 
 to members of the Senate Committe on Foreign Relations 
 at a White House conference his understanding of Japan's 
 promise to return Shantung to China. 
 
 Following is an extract from the official report of this 
 conference, held on August 19, 1919 : 
 
 Senator Swanson. Can you tell us, or would it be proper 
 to do so, of your understanding with Japan as to the return of 
 Shantung? That is a question which has been very much dis- 
 cussed. 
 
 President Wilson. I have published the wording of the 
 understanding. Senator. I can not be confident that I quote it 
 literally, but I know that I quote it in substance. It was that 
 Japan should return to China in full sovereignty the old province 
 
 [20] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 of Shantung so far as Germany had had any claim upon it, pre- 
 serving to herself the right to establish a residential district at 
 Tsigntao, which is the town of Kiachow Bay ; that with regard to 
 the railways and mines she should retain only the right of an 
 economic concession there, with the right, however, to maintain 
 a special body of police on the railway, the personnel of which 
 should be Chinese under Japanese instructors nominated by the 
 managers of the Company and managed by the Chinese Govern- 
 ment. I think that is the whole of it. 
 
 The President. She has not retained sovereignty over any- 
 thing. 
 
 Senator Williams. She has not? 
 
 The President. I mean, she has promised not to. 
 
 Senator Williams. During the period of the lease? 
 
 The President. No; she has promised not to retain 
 sovereignty at all. Senator Borah asked whether this under- 
 standing was oral or otherwise. I do not like to describe the 
 operation exactly if it is not perfectly discreet, but as a matter 
 of fact this was technically oral, but was literally written and 
 formulated and the formulation agreed upon. 
 
 Senator Johnson. (Of California) When, Mr. President, 
 is the return to be made ? 
 
 The President. That was left undecided. Senator, but we 
 were assured at the time that it would be as soon as possible. 
 
 Senator Johnson. (Of Colifornia) Did the Japanese de- 
 cline to fix any date? 
 
 The President. They did at that time, yes; but I think it 
 is fair to them to say not in the spirit of those who wished it to 
 be within their choice, but simply that they could not at that time 
 say when it would be. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California.) The economic privileges 
 that they would retain would give them a fair mastery over the 
 Province, would they not, or at least the Chinese think so? Let 
 me put it in that fashion, please. 
 
 The President. I believe they do. Senator. I do not feel 
 qualified to judge. I should say that that was an exaggerated 
 view. 
 
 Senator Johnson. (Of California) But the Chinese feel 
 that way about it, and have so expressed themselves. 
 
 [21] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 The President. They have so expressed thmselves. 
 
 Senator Knox. Mr. President, the economic privileges that 
 they originally acquired in Korea, and subsequently in Inner and 
 Outer Mongolia, and in Northern and Southern Manchuria, have 
 almost developed into a complete sovereignty over those countries 
 have they not? 
 
 Senator McCumber. Mr. President, I should like to get as 
 definite an understanding as I can, at least, of how these promises 
 of Japan to return Shantung are evidenced today. In v^^hat form 
 do they appear ? 
 
 The President. They are evidenced in a proces-verbal of 
 the so-called council of four — the name that we ourselves used 
 was very much more pretentious; we called ourselves the coun- 
 cil of the principal allied and associated powers — but the four 
 who used to confer, or rather the five, because Japan was there, of 
 course, at that time. 
 
 Senator McCumber. The principal points were taken down 
 in writing and read over and compared and preserved, were they? 
 
 The President. Not read over and compared, but pre- 
 served. The process each day was this. Senator; the matters 
 discussed were summarized and the conclusions reached were re- 
 corded in a proces-verbal, copies of which were distributed within 
 24 hours ; and, of course, it was open to any one of the conferees 
 to correct anything they might contain. Only in that sense were 
 they corrected. 
 
 Senator McCumber. Where are those records kept now? 
 
 The President. They are in Paris, sir. 
 
 Senator McCumber. Is there any objection to their being 
 produced for the committee? 
 
 The President. I think there is a very serious objection, 
 Senator. The reason we constituted that very small conference 
 was so that we could keep with the utmost absence of restraint, 
 and I think it would be a mistake to make use of those discussions 
 outside. I do not remember any blazing indiscretion of my own, 
 but there may be some. 
 
 Senator McCumber. In those conversations it was fully 
 understood that Japan was to return Shantung as soon as pos- 
 sible? 
 
 The President. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator McCumber. Was there anything stated as to what 
 
 [22] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 was meant by "as soon as possible" — that is, to place it within any 
 definite period at all? 
 
 The President. No, sir; no. We relied on Japan's good 
 faith in fulfilling that promise. 
 
 Senator McCumber. Was there anything outside? If I 
 go too far in my questions you can signify it, Mr. President. 
 
 The President. How do you mean "outside," Senator? 
 
 Senator McCumber. Was there anything said by Japan as 
 to anything that she would want to do before she would turn the 
 territory over to China? 
 
 The President. No ; nothing was mentioned. 
 
 Senator McCumber. Then "as soon as possible" would nat- 
 urally mean, would it not, as soon as the treaty had been signed 
 under which she accepts the transfer from Germany? 
 
 The President. Well, I should say that it would mean that 
 the process should begin then. Of course there would be many 
 practical considerations of which I know nothing that might 
 prolong the process. 
 
 Senator McCumber. And all that Japan reserves is the 
 same that other great nations have reserved— certain conces- 
 sions ? 
 
 The President. A residential concession and economic con- 
 cessions ; yes, sir. 
 
 Senator McCumber. The same as Great Britain and France 
 and other countries have retained there? 
 
 The President. Yes ; and I ought to say that the represen- 
 tatives of Japan showed every evidence of wishing to put the mat- 
 ter upon just the same basis that the dealings of other nations 
 with China have rested upon for some time. 
 
 Senator McCumber. The whole purpose of my question, 
 Mr. President, is to satisfy my mind, if I can, that Japan will in 
 good faith carry out her agreement. 
 
 The President. I have every confidence that she will. 
 
 Senator Moses. Mr. President, are these proces-verbaux 
 to be deposited anywhere as a matter of public record? 
 
 The President. That had not been decided. Senator. Of 
 course, if they were deposited as a matter of public record, there 
 would be certain very great disadvantages. 
 
 Senator Moses. Are they to be deposited with the Secre- 
 tariat of the League of Nations? 
 
 [23] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 The President. No, sir. 
 
 Senator Moses. Without some such depository, how other- 
 wise would this engagement of Japan, as embodied in the proces- 
 verbal, be brought forward for enforcement? 
 
 The President. There would be as many copies of the 
 proces-verbal as there were members of the conference in exist- 
 ence much longer than the time within which we shall learn 
 whether Japan will fulfill her obligations or not. 
 
 Senator Moses. You mean in the private papers of the per- 
 sonnel of the council of four? 
 
 The President. I would not call them private papers. I 
 have a copy. Senator. I regard them as a public trust, not private 
 papers, and I can assure you that they will not be destroyed. 
 
 Senator Moses. Suppose that each member of the council 
 of four had passed out of office, out of any position of power, at a 
 time when it became evident that Japan was not keeping the 
 engagement as it was embodied in the proces-verbal on the day 
 when this record was made, in what manner did you expect that 
 engagement to be brought forward for enforcement? 
 
 The President. I should deem it my duty — I cannot speak 
 for the others — to leave those papers where they could be made 
 accessible. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). Do you know, Mr. 
 President, whether or not our Government stated to China that 
 if China would enter the war we would protect her interests at 
 the peace conference? 
 
 The President. She knew that we would as well as we 
 could. She had every reason to know that. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). You did make the at- 
 tempt to do it, too; did you not? 
 
 The President. Oh, indeed I did; very seriously. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). And the decision ulti- 
 mately reached at the peace conference was a disappointment to 
 you? 
 
 The President. Yes, sir. I may frankly say that it was. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). You would have pre- 
 ferred, as I think most of us would, that there had been a different 
 conclusion of the Shantung provision, or the Shantung difficulty 
 or controversy, at the Paris Peace Conference? 
 
 The President. Yes ; I frankly intimated that. 
 
 [24] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 China Entered World War at Request of 
 United States 
 
 Examination of J. C. Ferguson, American Expert of many 
 years residence in China, who was attached to Chinese delegation 
 at Paris Peace Conference. 
 
 (Extract from hearing of Foreign Relations Committee, 
 United States Senate, on Peace Treaty with Germany, Wednesday, 
 August 20, 1919.) 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). Do you know whether 
 or not the request was made by our Government of the Chinese 
 Government to enter the war? I think the President testified to 
 that yesterday and your statement would be only cumulative. 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. (Witness) I might say that I was one of 
 the persons who communicated that request on behalf of the 
 Minister to the Chinese government, and was cognizant of the 
 request and saw the request. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). Will you state whether 
 or not in pursuance of the request of the United States, China did 
 enter the war? 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. It was at the request and on the continual 
 urging of the United States official in Peking that China entered 
 the war. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). Do you know whether 
 or not any representations were made to China by the United 
 States Government that the United States would safeguard 
 Chinese interests at the Peace Conference? 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. I never heard officially of any such state- 
 ments, though I am cognizant of the fact that the United States 
 promised China — that is within my own personal knowledge — 
 promised to support China in her claim to being represented at 
 the Peace Conference. There was doubt as to whether China 
 would be given a seat in the Peace Conference previous to enter- 
 ing into the war, and I know that the United States promised to 
 use her best offices to secure a seat for China, even before she had 
 entered the war, in view of this Kiaochow incident. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). And when those repre- 
 sentations were made, they were based upon the Chinese view- 
 point that she wanted the Kiaochow matter determined at the 
 Peace Conference? 
 
 [25] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. At the Peace Conference and not by virtue 
 of the Treaty of 1915. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). Do you know whether 
 or not any of the Chinese in Shantung Province went to the war 
 in any capacity? 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. Great Britain and France both approached 
 the Chinese government early in 1915 for the purpose of recruit- 
 ing laborers, and although China had not declared war against 
 Germany, her position relative to the Allies was well known, and 
 the Allies were given permission openly to send officers into 
 Shantung and other Provinces to recruit Chinese laborers. As a 
 result of that stations were established for the shipment of these 
 laborers at Wei-hai-wei and at Tsingtao, and from those two 
 stations about 175,000 laborers were sent via Canada and the 
 Atlantic Ocean to France and England, where they dug trenches, 
 worked in munition factories, and did many other forms of labor. 
 I might say that the work that was done by these Chinese laborers 
 is well known to the Young Men's Christian Association organiza- 
 tion of America, which organized a band of Chinese secretaries to 
 work among these men, and they have the full details of what 
 they did in France and England. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). Did a large part of 
 those laborers come from the Province of Shantung? 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. Practically all those that were recruited by 
 the British Government came from Shantung Province. About 
 20,000 of them went from a Southern Province by the Suez Canal, 
 but they were not as strong, able-bodied men as those from 
 Shantung Province. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). Do you know whether 
 any of them were killed over there? 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. A great many of them were killed; and I 
 might say from my personal knowledge in crossing the Pacific 
 with one boat load of them, consisting of 2,300 men, and talking 
 with them, that they all hoped they were going into the war, and 
 not simply to go there as laborers, and were anxious to be in the 
 war. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of Calif orina). Has Japan, since 1914, 
 secured any rights in addition to those which Germany had form- 
 erly in the Shantung Province? 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. Oh, yes. Great rights. 
 
 Senator Johnson (of California). State briefly and gen- 
 erally what they are. 
 
 [26] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Mr. Ferguson. The 1915 Treaty (21 demands) and notes 
 referred to four geographical groups, of which Shantung was 
 only one ; and by that same Treaty and by those same notes Japan 
 acquired in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia new rights of 
 residence, rights of purchasing agricultural lands, rights to con- 
 struct five railroads which I could indicate on the map if it was 
 any benefit. * * * Rights over six mining districts in Manchuria 
 and three mining districts in the Province of Kirin, the right to 
 connect the Kirin-Chang Chun Railway with the Korean border, 
 the right to extend the railway westward into Chao-Wang, the 
 great mart of Eastern Inner Mongolia, and greatly strengthened 
 her claim upon Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. In one way 
 those claims were extended most markedly by the extension of 
 the lease of Port Arthur and Kiachow for 99 years, the extension 
 of the lease of the Southern Manchurian Railway for 99 years, 
 and the extension of the Antung-Mukden Railway to 99 years, so 
 that those leases do not expire until the 21st century. She ac- 
 quired in addition certain rights in the Yangtse Valley, chiefly 
 those in reference to the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron and Steel Company, 
 which she obtained the right to make a joint concern between 
 Japanese and Chinese. Under this company is owned the Ta-Yeh 
 Iron Mine from which Japan obtains nearly all of her supply of 
 iron ore for her iron factories. She obtained also the promise 
 from China in reference to the Province of Fu-Kien, opposite 
 Formosa, that no docks or harbors should be leased to any other 
 power, or that China would not borrow money from any power 
 for developing docks there but herself. I might state that in ref- 
 erence to the railways which Japan acquired in Manchuria and 
 Eastern Mongolia, they are nearly all strategic military railroads 
 and not needed for present commercial purposes. 
 
 L27J 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Opium Traffic In Shantung Increased Under 
 ^Japanese Rule 
 
 Examination of Professor E. T. Williams, former First Sec- 
 retary American Legation at Peking, and Expert in Chinese 
 Affairs, attache to American Peace Delegation at Paris Peace 
 Conference and at present an expert adviser to the American 
 Delegation to the Conference on Limitation of Armament and 
 Pacific Far Eastern Problems. 
 
 (Extracts from hearings of Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
 mittee, United States Senate, on the Treaty of Peace with Ger- 
 many, August 22, 1919.) 
 
 Senator Brandegee. Have you any knowledge to what ex- 
 tent the opium traffic has increased, if it has increased at all, since 
 Japan has had the Shantung concession ? 
 
 Professor Williams. According to the statement of the 
 Chinese who were at the Peace Conference, it increased tremend- 
 ously during the three or four years of Japanese occupation of 
 Tsing-Tao. I have a statement made by Liang Chi-Chao, if you 
 would care to hear it. 
 
 Senator Brandegee. I would like to have you put it into 
 the record. Is he a competent authority? 
 
 Professor Williams. He is the greatest living Chinese 
 scholar and he was one of the men in 1898 who was condemned 
 to death but escaped to Japan where he has many friends. 
 
 The Chairman. You can put that in the record. 
 ■ The statement referred to is here printed in full as follows : 
 
 Contraband opium and morphia became common 
 articles; it has been estimated that no less than 12 tons 
 of morphia and 65 tons of opium were smuggled into 
 Shantung in 1918 alone. 
 
 Senator Brandegee. If it be true that Japan has agreed 
 to get out only in accordance with such conditions as she may 
 agree upon with China, does it not leave it practically within the 
 sole power of Japan to get out or stay on? That is, can she not 
 refuse to agree with China and continue to stay on the ground 
 that China is unreasonable about the conditions, and that the 
 
 [28] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Treaty provides that she need not get out until they have agreed 
 on conditions? 
 
 Professor Williams. Well, they have practically agreed, 
 you see, in this convention of 1915 (21 demands) ; but China's 
 position was that that Treaty was no longer binding, not only be- 
 cause it was forced upon her, but because, after entering into this 
 convention, China herself declared war upon Germany and abro- 
 gated all her treaties with Germany, including this lease of 
 Kiachow. Therefore, there was not anything to be discussed be- 
 tween Japan and Germany. 
 
 Senator Brandegee. Have you any idea from your knowl- 
 edge and experience of the situation there, why it is that Japan 
 declines to name a definite day — even a remote day — when she 
 will get out? 
 
 Professor Williams. I should say probably it was because 
 of the attitude of China in refusing to sign the Treaty. 
 
 [29] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 America Never Did Countenance Germany^s 
 Occupancy of Shantung 
 
 {Congressional Record, October 13, 1919.) 
 
 In answer to the charge in some quarters that John 
 Hay did not offer objection to the taking of Shantung by 
 Germany when he was Secretary of State, Senator Borah 
 explained and answered this criticism as follows : 
 
 "The two German missionaries that were killed in 
 Shantung, over which the dispute afterwards arose, were 
 killed in November, 1897. The date of the German lease is 
 that of March 6, 1898. President McKinley on August 23, 
 1898, notified Mr. Hay (then Ambassador to England), by 
 cable that he would offer him the Secretary of Stateship. 
 Mr. Hay accepted the appointment and became the Secre- 
 tary of State on September 30, 1898, actually entering 
 upon the performance of his duties of the office on 
 October 1, 1898. The German Treaty was consummated, 
 therefore, some six months prior to the time that Mr. Hay 
 became Secretary of State. 
 
 "After Mr. Hay became Secretary of State, Italy fol- 
 lowing the program which had apparently been outlined 
 in China by Great Britain, France and Germany, also 
 sought certain concessions in China to which Mr. Hay 
 objected. He afterwards, as the world knows, immediately 
 after he became Secretary of State, took up the work of 
 checking further division of China and of establishing the 
 policy associated with his name known as the 'Open Door.' 
 
 "Mr. Hay was not Secretary of State at the time the 
 German aggression took place, and the aggressions which 
 followed the German aggressions he sought from his first 
 entrance as Secretary of State to prevent. He exercised 
 his influence from the very beginning to protect the in- 
 tegrity of China. 
 
 [30] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Shantung Award Is Morally Indefensible, Said 
 
 Senator Lodge 
 
 {Senator Lodge on Shantung Amendment, Treaty of Versailles, 
 
 October 14, 1919.) 
 
 In Speaking in the Senate in opposition to the Shan- 
 tung award in the Treaty of Versailles and in support of 
 his amendment denouncing this award, Senator Lodge in- 
 dicated his distrust of Japan's promise to return the con- 
 trol of Shantung to China because of the failure of Japan 
 to set a definite date for the return. He cited this as a 
 "vital omission" and said that it was only possible to deter- 
 mine what Japan is likely to do by considering what she 
 has done during the past twenty-five years. 
 
 "If we find in the history of that period," said Senator 
 Lodge, "that Japan has consistently advanced in her con- 
 trol of China, has constantly invaded Chinese rights and 
 taken over Chinese territory, it seems to me absolute 
 proof that this well-defined policy will be continued in 
 Shantung as it has been so successfully followed every- 
 where else. For this reason I desire to sketch very briefly 
 the course of Japanese policy in China." 
 
 Senator Lodge then traced the various Japanese 
 aggressions on Chinese territory beginning with the adop- 
 tion of the Japanese policy of expansion, which he said, 
 seemed to have been reached in 1894 at the time of the 
 Chinese-Japanese war, down to the arrangement during 
 the World War which through secret agreement, unknown 
 to China and to the United States, transferred the Ger- 
 man control of Shantung to Japan. In the various aggres- 
 sions upon Chinese territory by Japan Senator Lodge 
 listed the Island of Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula, 
 including the Fortress of Port Arthur and Manchuria. 
 
 Senator Lodge pointed out that the United States 
 never at any time had consented to these aggressions on 
 the part of Japan or had recognized the right of Japan to 
 
 [31] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 speak for China or to encroach upon China's sovereignty. 
 He reviewed the efforts of Viscount Ishii, through the 
 Lansing-Ishii agreement, to gain America's recognition 
 of Japan's plans and asserted that Viscount Ishii had 
 failed in his chief purpose in spite of the fact that in the 
 Lansing-Ishii agreement, as it was published by Japan in 
 China and throughout the Far East, an effort had been 
 made to show that Viscount Ishii had secured these aims. 
 In support of his statement that America refused to rec- 
 ognize that Japan had any paramount interest in China, 
 Senator Lodge quoted from the testimony of Secretary 
 Lansing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
 tions, as follows : 
 
 "Ishii said he thought that Japan's special interest in China 
 should be recognized in any agreement we might make. I said 
 that of course the United States recognized that because of geo- 
 graphical location Japan had a peculiar interest in China, but 
 that the danger of putting it in any agreement was that it might 
 be misconstrued and that therefore I objected to it. I further 
 told him that if he understood 'special interest' meant 'paramount 
 interest' I could not discuss it further. Ishii suggested a *Monroe 
 doctrine' for the Far East. I told him that the Monroe doctrine 
 did not give the United States a paramount interest over any 
 nation on this hemisphere. And I thought the same principle 
 should be given any other nation with regard to China. Ishii 
 maintained silence." 
 
 "This shows clearly," said Senator Lodge, "that the 
 American Government recognized no special interest of 
 Japan in China greater than an interest such as the 
 United States has in Mexico or Canada, and that Lansing 
 positively refused even to discuss with Ishii any 'para- 
 mount interest' in China. Moreover, since the Japanese 
 have been talking about the 'Monroe doctrine' as applied 
 to the Far East, it is worth while to note that Secretary 
 Lansing positively asserted that the 'Monroe doctrine' did 
 not give the United States a paramount interest over any 
 
 [32] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 nation on this hemisphere, and that 'no paramount inter- 
 est and no special privileges should be given any other 
 nation with regard to China.' " 
 
 In another part of this speech Senator Lodge said : 
 
 "It is a great wrong, this giving of Shantung over to 
 the control of Japan. Morally it is indefensible, and it is 
 no answer to say that we failed to object to the German 
 seizure of Shantung. As a matter of fact, the open-door 
 policy of Mr. Hay was the reply to the German movement 
 and for the time arrested it. * * * It seems to me an 
 intolerable wrong. I desire at least that my vote should 
 record for the benefit of those who come after me that I 
 in no way was associated with this wrong command and 
 to the cause of freedom and justice." 
 
 Senator Lodge put into the record as part of his 
 speech a letter addressed by Charles Sumner Bird, a dis- 
 tinguished citizen of Massachusetts, to former President 
 William Howard Taft, in which Mr. Bird refused to con- 
 tribute to the League to Enforce Peace, of which Mr. Taft 
 was then the head, because "the League Covenant which 
 you ask me to support pardons the looting of the Chinese 
 Republic, our traditional friend and ally, by the Japanese 
 Monarchy, a monstrous crime, which if ratified by the 
 Senate will brand my country for all time as the faithless 
 ally of a great but helpless people." 
 
 Senator Lodge also included as part of his speech an 
 editorial from the Christian Science Monitor, which, in 
 part, reads as follows: 
 
 "The war won, the representatives of the various 
 nations arrived at Paris with their treaties in their 
 pockets. Japan produced her secret treaties with France 
 and the United Kingdom, and demanded her pound of 
 flesh. It has been held that a treaty, no matter how 
 gained, is a sacred undertaking, and that the allied nations 
 could not break their treaties with Japan without sub- 
 
 [33] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 jecting themselves to the scorn of the world for treating 
 these treaties as scraps of paper. But the interesting fact 
 is that the allied nations not only did treat as an absolute 
 scrap of paper the treaty between China and Germany, 
 but at the instigation of Japan read into that treaty some- 
 thing which was never contained in it. The treaty be- 
 tween China and Germany expressly declared that the 
 Chinese concessions in Shantung were non-transferrable 
 to any other nation. Therefore the treaty between Japan 
 and Germany, by which Germany transferred to Japan 
 her concessions in Shantung, was only another instance 
 of converting a treaty into a scrap of paper. Japan ac- 
 quired from Germany, by this treaty, something Germany 
 had no power to convey. Yet on this iniquitous transaction 
 is founded the theory of the sacred inviolability of the 
 secret treaties between Japan, France and the United 
 Kingdom. 
 
 "It is evident from all this that the secret treaty, as 
 well as Japan's treaty with Germany, represented a bond 
 similar to that which Shylock obtained from Antonio. 
 And the comparison is much closer than appears at first 
 sight. It will be remembered that again and again, during 
 the present controversy, much has been made of the fact 
 that Japan has promised to return to China her sovereign 
 rights in Shantung. But those sovereign rights never 
 were transferred from China to Germany, and therefore 
 never could have been transferred from Germany to 
 Japan. And it is exactly here that the comparison to 
 Shylock becomes so peculiarly exact. It will be remem- 
 bered in the Court in Venice, when Shylock pressed his 
 bond, Portia, in the garb of Balthazar, replied : 
 
 " 'This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood ; the 
 words expressly are a pound of flesh.' 
 
 "Now, it is perfectly plain that the bond never gave 
 Japan the sovereign rights of China in Shantung, and 
 
 [34] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 therefore that in proposing to return them Japan is in 
 very much the position in which Shylock found himself 
 upon that occasion. 
 
 "These, then, are the plain facts of the case. How the 
 allied ministers ever permitted Japan to gain her ends is 
 one of the mysteries of diplomacy, and the mysteries are 
 many. The scales, however, have fallen from the eyes 
 of the world, since the gentlemen concerned set their hands 
 and seals to those bonds in Paris. France and the United 
 Kingdom may possibly still think that they are held by 
 the treaties obtained from them during the war. But the 
 Senate of the United States is under no such pressure." 
 
 [35] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 American Policy of Sympathetic Interest Toward 
 All Countries of Far East 
 
 James Brown Scott, Director of the Division of Inter- 
 national Law of the Carnegie Endowment for Interna- 
 tional Peace, in a short introductory note to "Treaties and 
 Agreements With And Concerning China," by John V. A. 
 MacMurray, published by the Carnegie Foundation, in 
 part, said : 
 
 "It is a source of pleasure to the good people of these 
 United States, that the policy of their government has 
 invariably been one of sympathetic interest in and toward 
 the Far East, and that it has never sought to make of the 
 needs and distress of the peoples of Japan and China, a 
 source of profit. It is worth while recalling that as a con- 
 sequence of the Boxer troubles an indemnity equivalent 
 in round numbers to $333,000,000 United States gold was 
 exacted from China under the Protocol of September 7, 
 ]901, which sum was to be paid with interest at 4 per 
 cent per annum, by installments running through a period 
 of thirty-nine years. The sum of $24,440,778.81 was 
 allotted to the United States. But as this sum was found 
 to exceed the actual losses to American interests and prop- 
 erty, the amount in excess of $11,961,121.76 was remitted 
 by the Government of the United States. It was felt that 
 the sum originally allotted might exceed American claims, 
 but it was feared that if the United States should refuse 
 to accept it, it would not be credited to China, but would 
 be apportioned among the other Powers. In communi- 
 cating the intention of the United States to remit the pay- 
 ment of the balance of the sums to which the United 
 States was entitled under the Agreement of 1901, Mr. 
 Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, said in his note of 
 June 15, 1907, addressed to the Chinese Minister in Wash- 
 ington : 
 
 [36] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 It was from the first the intention of this Government at the 
 proper time, when all claims should have been presented and all 
 expenses should have been ascertained as fully as possible, to 
 revise the estimate and account against which these payments 
 v/ere to be made, and, as proof of sincere friendship for China, to 
 \ oluntarily release that country from its legal liability for all pay- 
 ments in excess of the sum which should prove to be necessary for 
 actual indemnity to the United States and its citizens. 
 
 "The remission was gratefully accepted by the 
 Chinese government, on behalf of which the Prince of 
 Ch'ing, President of the Chinese Foreign Office, said in a 
 note dated July 14, 1908, to the Honorable William Wood- 
 ville Rockhill, then American Minister to China: 
 
 The Imperial government, wishing to give expression to the 
 high value it places on the friendship of the United States, finds 
 in its present action a favorable opportunity for doing so. Mind- 
 ful of the desire recently expressed by the President of the United 
 States to promote the coming of Chinese students to the United 
 States to take courses in the schools and higher educational insti- 
 tutions of the country, and convinced by the happy results of past 
 experience of the great value to China of education in American 
 schools, the Imperial government has the honor to state that it is 
 its intention to send henceforth yearly to the United States a 
 considerable number of students there to receive their education. 
 
 "This is not an isolated case. Many years before, in 
 1863, the Strait of Shimonoseki, improperly closed to com- 
 merce, was opened by the joint action of France, Great 
 Britain, Holland and the United States. An indemnity, 
 amounting to $3,000,000 was exacted from Japan, which 
 was paid, as the late General Foster says in his admirable 
 little volume entitled, American Diplomacy in the Orient, 
 'after some delay and great embarrassment, because of 
 the poverty of the treasury.' Each participating nation 
 received an equal share. The action of the United States 
 and the action of the other Powers is thus stated by Gen- 
 eral Foster: 
 
 [37] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 The sum paid to the United States remained in the treasury 
 unused for twenty years. The public conscience was troubled as 
 to the justness of the exaction, and in 1883, by an Act of Congress, 
 the amount received was returned to Japan, and accepted by that 
 government "as a strong manifestation of that spirit of justice 
 and equity which has always animated the United States in its 
 relations with Japan." None of the other three nations partaking 
 of the indemnity have seen fit to follow this example. 
 
 "It is also to be said that none of the Powers partak- 
 ing of the Chinese indemnity — France, Germany, Great 
 Britain, Japan and Russia — 'have seen fit to follow this 
 example.' " 
 
 [38] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 American Chamber of Com^merce of China 
 on Shantung Decision 
 
 (Introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator Norris, of 
 Nebraska, on October 13, 1919.) 
 
 "It is difficult for the American people to realize the 
 feeling that this decision (the Shantung Award) has pro- 
 voked in the minds of the Chinese people. It has had 
 about the same effect that the giving of the State of Cali- 
 fornia or of New York State to a foreign power would 
 provoke among the people of the United States. 
 
 "Germany's control of Shantung Province, while irk- 
 some, had nothing of the present effect, because Germany 
 was on the other side of the world, and the weight of the 
 iron hand in China was light. 
 
 "Japan is an Asiatic power, and with her control 
 established in Shantung Province, on the China mainland, 
 Chinese people see the fate of Korea, Formosa and Man- 
 churia before them. When Japan first intervened in 
 Korea she announced that it was for the purpose of estab- 
 lishing the independence of the country. Now after 20 
 years the Korean people are engaged in a life and death 
 struggle to gain their liberty from Japan. 
 
 "The adoption of the efficient German system in 
 Japan had its advantages in the past, but now, in the light 
 of a new understanding, it has its distinct disadvantages. 
 Japan is now dominated by a militarism that is potentially 
 just as dangerous as was the German militarism that 
 America helped to crush. The Korean Peninsula fur- 
 nished the first stepping stone, and then followed Man- 
 churia, Shantung Province, and Fukien Province of China 
 are now to follow unless something is done by America to 
 stop it. Japan is now working to fix her control on the 
 Asiatic mainland. With China's unlimited resources of 
 minerals, foodstuffs and manpower under the control of 
 
 [39] 
 
AMERICA'S POSITION on the SHANTUNG QUESTION 
 
 Japanese militarists the next war is bound to be in the 
 Pacific and America is certain to be drawn into it. With 
 the great distance involved, and with the almost certain 
 racial element involved, it doesn't require much imagina- 
 tion to foresee the future. 
 
 "In the archives of the State Department at Washing- 
 ton is to be found a complete record of Japanese under- 
 hand intrigue in China since the beginning of the war. In 
 the correspondence of the American Legation and the 
 American consulate at Tsingtao is all the information that 
 American needs for 'proof as to Japan's real purposes in 
 China. 
 
 "It is to the future vital interest of the American peo- 
 ple that these matters be made public." 
 
 [40] 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS^ 
 
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