j; -Wi pi' '.< Hi U:(,j'i' ; ill 11 i!^ wmWmm k 'j^rlriM"'"-^-. ■■■" tti'.;w;;,; ;;;>.■•,;-'. ... THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR A CONCISE HISTORY OF ITS CAUSES, PROGRESS, AND RESULTS BY JOHN FORMBY WITH SIXTV-SIX MAPS AND PLANS NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 153-157 FIFTH AVENUE 1910 l'*' /.K^ ^'"^'^'^ r^^ ^' ^ (q PRINTED BY MAzIeLL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD. LONDON AND AYLESBURY, ENGLAND. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION PP- i-5 CHAPTER I THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL Started at Beginning of Century — Struggle for Political Power — Slavery a Pretext, not a Cause — The Balance of State Power — The Fugitive Slave Act — Military Strength of the South in 1852 — The Kansas-Nebraska Bill — Brawls in Congress — Re-casting of Political Parties .......... pp. 6-15 CHAPTER II FROM THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 3RD, 1860 The two Candidates for the Presidency in i860 — Government on States Rights Principles — The Dred Scott Case — -Strength of the South in the Cabinet — Friction increases — The John Brown Raid — Floyd's Preparations — " Squatter Sovereignty "—The Democratic Convention, i860 — The new Parties— The Presidential Election — Buchanan's Message to Congress ..... pp. 16-29 CHAPTER III THE RIGHT OF SECESSION Principle claimed by the South — Former Threats of Secession — Was the Union only a Voluntary Compact ? — The Articles of Con- federation, 1778 — Their weak Points — ^Thc Constitution — Diversities of Interpretation — Alteration of State Constitutions — Federalism v. State Sovereignty pp. 30-39 vi CONTENTS CHAPTER IV SECESSION : FROM GOVERNOR GISTS CIRCULAR TO THE SECESSION OF NORTH CAROLINA Southern State Preparations in i860 — Governor Gist's Circular — General Scott's Views — Southern Machinations at Washington — South Carolina claims the Forts — National v. State Tenure — Buchanan temporizes — The South Carolina Commissioners — Defections from the Cabinet : the Advent of Stanton — January, 1861— Status quo at Fort Sumter — The Cotton States secede : Others at different Times — Crittenden's Compromise — Confederate Congress meets — Resignations of Southern Officers — Confederate Army formed — Fall of Fort Sumter — The North awakes — -Assignment of Commands- — Affairs in Missouri — The Peaceful Separation Fallacy — Acts of War by the South — Chronological Table ....... pp. 40-56 CHAPTER V THE TWO SIDES : THEIR POSITIONS, PROSPECTS, AND PLANS Boundaries — Character of large Areas — Character and Habits of the People — Confederate Lack of Resources — Military Geography — Railways — Confederate Lack of Plan — Their Coast — The two Capitals — The Raising of the Armies — Naval Matters — Southern Finance — The two Governments — State Sovereignty in the Confederacy — Political Objects — Military Plans pp. 57-73 CHAPTER VI PREPARING FOR WAR, AND SPARRING FOR POSITION I MAY 20TH TO DECEMBER 3IST, 1861 General — The Districts into which Operations fall — Northern Gunboats and Southern Cruisers — Confederate Agents in England — • The Foreign Enlistment Act — British Proclamation of Neutrality — Southern Manufactures — The first Steps in Organization — Affairs in Kentucky — The Call for Men : Appointment of Generals : Friction in South — McClellan made Commander-in-Chief : his Plans — Napoleon's Interference in Mexico — The East — Position in Virginia in May — Effect of making Richmond the Confederate Capital — The Moves before Bull Run — Joseph Johnston leaves the Valley — McDowell's Plan of Battle— Confederate Plans— Battle of Bull Run— The North prepares for War in earnest — West Virginia — Northern Communica- tions — Campaigns of Philippi and Rich Mountain : Lee's Campaign fails — The South-East — Expedition against the North Carolina Coast —The Taking of Port Royal — Coa,st Defence, south of Charleston — CONTENTS vii The West— Lyon's Campaign in Missouri, and Death -Move and Counter-Move along the Mississippi — Fremont's Emancipation Pro- clamation : his Removal — Union Changes in Command — Action at Belmont — Sidney Johnston's Dispositions — Union Dispositions and Plans — Gunboats on the Mississippi — The South and South-West — Naval Action below New Orleans — Confederate Plans in New Mexico — Naval Plans — The Blockade — The huge Task: Liability of Neu- trals — The War at Sea — The " Sumter " — The Letters of Marque— The " Trent " Affair — The " Nashville " — Summary — Major-General Lyon — Chronological Table ...... pp. 74-103 CHAPTER VII WAR IN EARNEST : THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 General — Stanton joins Lincoln's Cabinet — Lincoln — Lee's false Position — The East — McClellan and Joseph Johnston — McClellan and the Politicians — -Union Plans — The Co-operation of the Navy — Mud —T'he"Merrimac": attacks Union Fleet: Fight with "Monitor" — The "Monitor" — The " Merrimac's" short Career — Joseph Johnston retreats from Manassas — McClellan starts for Richmond — The Lines of Yorktown — Jackson in the Valley — Geography of the Shenandoah Valley — Actions at Kernstown, McDowell, Winchester — Union Panic — -Cross Keys and Port Republic — Jackson's March — Results of the Campaign — Geography of the Peninsula — Joseph Johnston's Opera- tions : Seven Pines — Lee takes Command — His Plans — Jackson arrives — The Seven Days' Battles — Pope's Army of Virginia — The South-East — Lee in the South-East — Burnside's and Goldsborough's Expedition — Fort Pulaski and the Florida Coast — The West — Garfield V. Marshall — Thomas v. Zollicoffer : Mill Springs — The Fort Donelson Campaign — Its Importance — Occupation of Nashville — The Pea Ridge Campaign— Pope takes New Madrid and Island No. 10 — Union Advance to Pittsburg Landing — East Tennessee — Battle of Shiloh — -Halleck advances to Corinth — His new Plans — Battle of Memphis — The South — Fortification of Vicksburg — Farragut takes New Orleans, but fails at Vicksburg — The South-West — Sibley's New Mexico Campaign — The Blockade — The Rise of Nassau — Mobile and Galveston — The War at Sea — The "Nashville" — The " Florida" saXXs from England, arrested at Nassau, and released — Summary — Notices — General Albert Sidney Johnston — Brigadier-General Turner Ashby — Chronological Table . ...... pp. 104-145 CHAPTER VIII THE SECOND HALF OF 1862. THE CONFEDERATE RALLY General — The Confiscation Act and Emancipation Proclamations — Slavery Question had to be faced — The Strain on I^incoln, August- September — Cartel of Exchange — The Problem of raising Men — viii CONTENTS Union Plans — The East — Lee's Position and first Moves — Union Impasse : Halleck made Commander-in-Chief — Pope's Bombast — (Note : Corps Nomenclature) — Pope v. Lee — Jackson's March — The Fog of War — Pope's Vacillation — Battle of Groveton : Porter's Dilemma — Battle of Manassas — Chantilly — Panic at Washington — Pope removed from Command — McClellan, Halleck, and Banks — Lee's Plans — The Invasion of Maryland— South Mountain — Battle of the Antietam, or Sharpsburg — Lee's Retreat — McClellan v. Lee in Virginia — McClellan removed from Command — Porter court-mar- tialled — Burnside in Command : his Plans — The Position of Freder- icksburg — Battle of Fredericksburg — Operations at Suffolk — The South-East — The West— Plummer beats Thompson — Plans in Ken- tucky and Tennessee — Morgan's Raid — Bragg's Invasion of Tennessee — Mistake of mixing in Politics — Battle of Perryville — Siege of Nash- ville — Campaign and Battle of Corinth — Changes of Commanders — Campaign and first day's Battle of Stone's River, or Murfreesboro — Grant's Administration: Negroes — McClernand's Intrigues — New Plans — Grant's Dilemma — The Mississippi Flotilla — The South — Operations against Vicksburg — Banks — -The South-West — Re-taking of Galveston — Affairs in Arkansas — The Blockade — The War at Sea — The "Florida" and "Alabama" commissioned-^The "Retribution" — Confederate Agents in England — The French Government and Mr. Slidell — Summary — Notices — Major-General G. B. McClellan — Major-General Pope — Major-General Buell — Major-General McDowell — Chronological Table ....... pp. 146-186 CHAPTER IX THE FIRST HALF OF 1863, TO JULY 4TH. THE CON- FEDERATE RALLY EXHAUSTED. THE NORTH GAINS DECISIVE VICTORIES General — Habeas Corpus Act — Plans of both Sides — The East — Hooker'succeeds Burnside — "Jack" Mosby — Operations at Suffolk — The Chancellorsville Campaign — Battle of Chancellorsville — The Union Cavalry — Lee after Chancellorsville — The Invasion of Pennsyl- vania — Confederate Re-organization — Scares at Richmond — Brandy Station — Lee's Advance — Hooker Moves — Stuart's Ride — Hooker resigns, is succeeded by Meade — The new Plans — Skirmish at Gettys- burg — Both Sides concentrate — Topography of Battlefield of Gettys- burg — The First Day at Gettysburg — The Second Day at Gettysburg — The Third day at Gettysburg- — ^July 4th — Confederate Slackness — (Note : Moves in the Gettysburg Campaign — Itinerary of Stuart's March)— The South-East — The West— Battle of Stone's River, con- cluded — Minor Operations — Halleck and Rosecrans — The Tullahoma Campaign — Burnside in East Kentucky — Patrolling the Rivers — The South — Arkansas Post — Grant's Army — Naval Attacks on the Missis- sippi — The first Vicksburg Campaign — The new Plan — Confederate CONTENTS ix Position — The Taking of Grand Gulf — Grierson's Raid -Campaign of Champion's Hill — Johnston's Moves — Siege of Vicksburg : its Sui- render— Events in Louisiana — The South-West— The Blockade — Attack on Charleston Blockade — The new Monitors — Dupont's Attack on Charleston — Results and Lessons — The " Weehawken " takes the "Atlanta" — Magruder takes Galveston — The War at Sea — The " Retribution " — The " Florida " — The " Alabama " — Wilkes super- seded in Command of U.S. Squadron — The "Alexandra" — Bulloch's Negociations in France — The " Georgia " — Summary — Notices — "Stone- wall "Jackson — -Lieutenant -General Pemberton — Major-General Reynolds — Major-General Van Dorn — Major-General McClernand — Chronological Table PP. 187-243 CHAPTER X THE SECOND HALF OF 1863. THE NORTH TAKES A WINNING POSITION Affairs in Mexico — Napoleon's Jealousy of the United States — Anarchy in Mexico — Joint Intervention of England, France, and Spain — England and Spain retire — France declares War — Napoleon's Instructions to Forey — Dubois de Saligny — Offer of Crown to Maxi- milian — Napoleon outwitted — General — Union and Confederate Plans — Opposition to Draft in North — The East — -Lee's Retreat from Gettysburg — Operations in Virginia — The South-East — Attacks on Forts Wagner and Sumter — The West — Morgan's Great Raid north of the Ohio — Rosecrans advances to the Tennessee — Campaign of Chickamauga — Battle of Chickamauga — Comments — Consternation in the North — Grant takes Command — Battle of Chattanooga — New Plans — Siege of Knoxville — The Mississippi Flotilla — The South — Johnston's Retreat — Fall of Port Hudson — The South-West^Banks in Texas — Operations in Arkansas — The Blockade — Attacks on Charles- ton Blockade — -Farragut in the Gulf — The War at Sea — The " Florida " — The "Alabama " and " Tuscaloosa " — The " Georgia " — The " Rappa- hannock " — -The " Pampero " — The " Coquette " — Bulloch's Negociations in France — Summary — Submarines, Breech-loading Magazine Rifles, Machine Guns — Notices — Major-General Rosecrans — Rear-Admiral Dupont — Chronological Table ..... pp. 244-279 CHAPTER XI THE FIRST HALF OF 1864. THE CLOSING OF THE NET General — Grant's Position — Premature Politics — The French in Mexico — Plans — Grant made Commander-in-Chief^ — The new Plans — The Situation of the Confederacy — The East — Longstreet in Tennessee — Kilpatrick's and Dahlgren's Raid — Re-organization under Grant- Operations in Western and South-Western Virginia — Plans for Butler — The Advance — The Wilderness Campaign— Battle of the Wilderness — Spottsylvania — Lee's Position on the North Anna — Hawes' Shop, X CONTENTS Totopotonioy — Cold Harbour- — ^Butler at Bermuda Hundred — Sheri- dan's Raid — Yellow Tavern— Sheridan's Fix — Hunter in the Valley- Cavalry Raids — Result of Cold Harbour — The Move against Peters- burg — ^The Siege of Petersburg — Grant's Policy — The South-East — The Olustee Expedition— The "Albemarle " : attacks Union Squadron — LieutenantCushing — The West^Forrestra.idsto Paducah — Re-organiza- tion of Army — Communications — Topography of Northern Georgia — Sherman advances to the Etowah — Railway Engineering — The Cross- country March — New Hope Church — Johnston's Position in front of Marietta — Sherman reaches the Chattahoochee — Forrest beats Sturgis — Morgan's Raid in Kentucky — Missouri and Arkansas — The South and South-West — Union Plans — The Meridian Campaign — Forrest beats Sooy Smith — The Red River Expedition — Recriminations- Affairs in Arkansas — The Mississippi Flotilla — The Blockade — Tor- pedo Attacks— The War at Sea — -The "Alabama " : sunk by the " Kear- sarge " — The "Tuscaloosa"- — The "Florida" — The "Georgia" — The "Rappahannock" — The French "volte face" — England buys the Turret-ships — Summary — Notices — General Polk — Lieut enant-Gener at J. E. B. Stuart — Major-General Sedgwick — Major-General Pleasonton — Rear- Admiral Semmes — Chronological Table . . pp. 280-325 CHAPTER XII THE SECOND HALF OF 1864. THE DISRUPTION OF THE CONFEDERACY General — Union Political Position — Mexican Affairs — The true Objectives — Union and Confederate Plans — Governor Brown of Georgia — The Trans-Mississippi District — Mihtary Stagnation — The East — Early's Dash at Washington — The Burning of Chambersburg — Sheridan takes Command in the Valley — The See-saw — Battle of the Opequon — Fisher's Hill, Tom's Brook, Hupp's Hill — Cedar Creek — Minor Operations — Comments — Siege of Petersburg — The Crater — - Attacks on Lee's Communications, and in the Peninsula — Re-organiza- tion — South-West Virginia — The South — Johnston retreats to the Chattahoochee — Sherman seizes a Crossing — Johnston's new Position — Sherman's Plans — Hood succeeds Johnston — Battles of Peach Tree Creek and Atlanta — Death of McPherson — Re-organization on both Sides : Sherman's new Move — Ezra Church — Union Raids — Opera- tions round Atlanta — Hood evacuates it — Rest and Re-organization — The next Union Move — Confederate Plans — Operations resumed — Farragut and Granger at Mobile — Topography — The Forcing of Mobile Bay — The South-East — Gushing sinks the "Albemarle" — Sher- man's March to the Sea — Hardee's Report — The Capture of Savannah — First Attack on Fort Fisher — The West and South-West — A. J. Smith beats Forrest — Defeat and Death of John Morgan — Attacks oh Sherman's Communications — Price's Invasion of Missouri, and Pefeat — Hood's Iiivasion of Tennessee — The two Sides — Hood ad- CONTENTS xi varices — Spring Hill — Franklin — Delays — Grant's Impatience — Battle of Nashville — Hood's Retreat — New Union Dispositions — Comments — The Blockade — The War at Sea — The " Florida " : captured at Bahia — International Complications — The " Tallahassee," alias " Olustee " — The " Chickamauga" —The "Shenandoah" — Purchase of the Ram " Sphinx " — The " Rappahannock " — Summary — Notices — Major-General Hooker — Major-General McPherson — Rear-Admiral Farragut — Major-General John Morgan — Chronological Table .... pp. 326-375 CHAPTER XIII THE FIRST HALF OF 1865. THE LAST STRUGGLES General— Plans of the two Sides — Aftairs in Mexico — The East — The Peace Commission — Small Winter Operations — Sheridan's Raid in the Upper Valley — Preparations for Lee's Retreat : Fort Stedman — • Sherman meets Grant — Dispositions and Strength — Dinwiddle Court House and Five Forks — Major-General Warren: Sheridan supersedes him — Petersburg untenable — Lee retreats, and Weitzel occupies Richmond — Lee's Last March — Sailor's Creek, Farmville, Appomattox — The Surrender — Naval Actions on the James — Flight of Jefferson Davis — Stoneman's Raids — The South-East — The Capture of Fort Fisher — Hoke's slow Retreat-^Schofield takes Wilmington and New Berne — Confederate Plans — Schofield in touch with Sherman — Kirk's Raid — Fort Sumter resists to the last : Evacuation of Charleston — The Campaign of the Carolinas — Averysboro — Johnston's Strength — Bentonville — Johnston retreats — The Union Army united at Goldsboro — Comments — The next Moves, and Plans — Johnston treats for Sur- render — The Assassination of President Lincoln — Negociations for Surrender of all Confederate Armies — Sherman's Terms disapproved — Johnston surrenders — Grant's Proposal negatived : Union Lack of Communication — Insult to Sherman — General Echols' Command, and the Flight of Jefferson Davis — The W^est — Thomas' Dilatoriness — The South and South-West — Plans — Canby's Campaign against Mobile — Wilson's Great Raid through Alabama and Georgia — Captures Jefferson Davis — The Blockade — The War at Sea — The " Shenandoah ' ' — The "Sphinx" becomes the " Stonewall" : her short Career — Sale of the " Rappahannock " — Mexico — Complications between France and the United States — Summary — Notices — Abraham Lincoln — General Hood — Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill — Chronological Table . pp. 376-414 CHAPTER XIV THE END OF THE MEXICAN COMPLICATION Army and Squadron sent to watch the French — The Confederate Scheme of joining Maximilian — ^Sheridan's Bluff — Imperialist Suc- cesses — Maximilian's fatal Edict — Bazaine stands out, and watches United States — Juarez advances : Sheridan's Share in this — Juarez xii CONTENTS and Ortega — Napoleon tries to get out and save face : Seward's Policy stiffens — The Empress Charlotte's Last Move — Maximilian decides to abdicate, then to remain— American Minister sent to Juarez — Defeat and Death of Maximilian — Grant's View of the French Expedition to Mexico pp. 415-420 CHAPTER XV RE-CONSTRUCTION Premature Attempts at Re-construction during the War— Lincoln and Johnson — Johnson's Position — The Politicians interfere with the Soldiers — Seward's wild Conduct in Europe — Lincoln's and John- son's Plans of Re-construction — The Amnesty — Provincial Governors — Some Southern Ideas — -Texas, Mississippi, Alabama — The Tests — 1866. Bills and the Presidential Veto — The Commission of Fifteen — Florida — The XlVth Amendment — Texas : Friction in Louisiana, and between the President and Congress — Jealousy of Grant — Congress takes up Re-construction — The Re-construction Acts — 1867. Johnson quarrels with Stanton — The Tenure of Civil Office Bill — The new Military Districts — The Effect of the Change — Review — 1868. The XlVth Amendment : Re-admission of some States — Mississippi, Virginia — The Test Oath—General Amnesty — The Office of Secretary of War : Changes — The Impeachment of President Johnson : un- scrupulous Procedure — Misrule in the South — Comparison of Civil and Military Rule — -Johnson and his Administration — 1869. Grant's Presidency : Disappointment — The XVth Amendment — Mississippi — 1870. Re-admission of several States — Trouble in the South — Summary of Grant's Work — Major-Generals Warren and Porter — (Note : Amendments to the Constitution, Nos. XIII, XIV, and XV) pp. 421-438 CHAPTER XVI SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR General — Stanton — Jefferson Davis — Grant, Rawlins — Lee — Sher- man — Joseph Johnston — Halleck — Bragg — Sheridan — Early — Meade — Beauregard — Banks — Price — Thomas — Taylor — Schofield — Hardee — Hancock — Longstreet — Wilson — Forrest — References to Personal No- tices elsewhere in Book ...... pp. 439-467 CHAPTER XVII RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR The Question of State Independence — Relation of the State to the Nation — The Negro Question — The "Alabama" Claims — The "Alabama" and "Florida" — The old Foreign Enlistment Act — Precedents — The CONTENTS xiii Acts of the North during the War — Indiscreet Ministers — Course of the Negociations — Liberal Plea of Not Guilty — Conservatives in Power — Liberals return — Weakening of the British Case — Grant's able Move — The British Government ceases to resist — Futile Attempts to save face — Instructions to the Arbitrators — The Court, Trial, and Verdict — A Lost Opportunity — Drafting of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870 — Other Disputes w^ith the United States — The Declaration of Paris — The American Mercantile Marine — Political Corruption — Politics and War — Freedom of the Press — Preparation for War — The Raising and Maintenance of Armies — Discipline — Old Generals — Cavalry — Typical Strokes — Disbandment — Naval Affairs — (Note : Principal Points of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870) . pp. 468-486 MAP INDEX . pp. 487-502 GENERAL INDEX pp. 503-520 "s PREFACE The present work was first planned because I found that after a careful study of all the main campaigns, and many of the minor ones, in the American Civil War, during a period of ten years or more, I knew little or nothing of the War as a whole ; of the interdependence of the campaigns, or of the effects of contemporary military and political occurrences, which were often so marked that the campaigns cannot be properly understood without them. I could get no book of convenient size dealing with the whole War by land and sea, nor any work in which contemporary events were sufficiently kept together, so as to explain the varying phrases of the War, or had maps of satisfactory size, on standardized scales. None set forth the real causes of the War, or a summary of its results, or gave sufficient attention to the distracting effect of the operations of Napoleon III. in Mexico. Almost all works on the subject are full either ot military technicalities or personal details, and it seemed that there was room for a condensed history of the War rather than of the fighting, with the chapters arranged in parallel columns, as it were, and furnished with cross-references, and careful summaries of the general position at each stage. The chronology is based on Phisterer's ** Statistical PREFACE Records," without which it could not have been attempted. Many of the conclusions arrived at are deductions from the close study of the maps which was requisite to bring them within one scheme of scales. A great difficulty was to find out what rail- ways were in existence at the time of the War, for the maps of different authorities do not agree; but Sherman's great War Map has been taken as a basis, and it is hoped that the result has been to secure accuracy as nearly as possible. Another difficulty was the variation in the spelling of names, and even in differences in the names assigned to the same places. The accounts of the two sides have been compared throughout, and the author has known personally some of the actors in these great events. The War unquestionably contains many lessons for the Mother Nation of England, and I hope that I have fairly and impartially carried out, within reason- able limits of size, the somewhat ambitious problem which I have attempted to solve. J. F. April 1 910. LIST OF MAPS IN SEPARATE VOLUME 1. A. THE SEAT OF WAR THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR 2. THE YEAR 1861 3. THE YEAR 1862 4. THE YEAR 1863 5. THE YEAR 1864 THE WAR AT SEA ^6. THE BLOCKADE 7. THE HIGH SEAS. ON MERCATOR'S PROJECTION 8. 4 A. THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN 9. B. THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 10. 2 A. CAMPAIGNS IN WEST VIRGINIA, 1861 11. B/3. MAGRUDER'S DEFENCE OF THE LOWER PENINSULA 12. 4 A. JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 13. 2 A. THE PENINSULAR AND VALLEY CAMPAIGNS OF 1862 14. B/3. THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES 15. 2 A. THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH 16. B. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 17. 8 A. THE CAMPAIGN OF MANASSAS 18. B. THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS xvi LIST OF MAPS IN SEPARATE VOLUME 19. 8 A. LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND 20. B. THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM, OR SHARPSBURG 21. B. THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG 22. A. CAMPAIGNS IN MISSOURI, l86l-2 23. 2 A. BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY 24. A. grant's dilemma, DECEMBER, 1862 25. B. THE battles of CHANCELLORSVILLE, FREDERICKS- y BURG, AND SALEM CHURCH ,^26. 4 A. THE CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG 27. B. THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. FIRST DAY 28. B. THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. SECOND DAY 29. B. THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, THIRD DAY 30. B. THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER, OR MURFREESBORO ( 31. 2 A. THE CAMPAIGNS FOR VICKSBURG 32. B. THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG 33. 4 A. THE COAST BETWEEN CHARLESTON AND SAVANNAH 34. B. CHARLESTON HARBOUR AND DEFENCES 35. B. THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 36. B. THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 37. 4 A. THE CAMPAIGNS OF TULLAHOMA, CHICKAMAUGA, AND CHATTANOOGA 38. B. THE WILDERNESS 39. B. SPOTTSYLVANIA 40. B. LEE'S POSITION ON THE NORTH ANNA 41. B/3. JOHNSTON'S LINES, NEW HOPE CHURCH — MARIETTA 42. 4 A. SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE 43. 2 A. EAST KENTUCKY CAMPAIGNS IN 1862. MORGAN'S RAIDS IN 1863 AND 1864 44. 2 A. THE END OF MORGAN'S GREAT RAID 45. 2 A. hunter's LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGN }/' LIST OF MAPS IN SEPARATE VOLUME xvii 46. 2 A. EARLY'S DASH AT WASHINGTON 47. 4 A. THE VALLEY CAMPAIGNS, 1863-4 48. B/3. ATLANTA AND ENVIRONS 49. 2 A. SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA 49A. A, MINOR OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI, 1863-4. GRIER- SON'S RAID, APRIL, 1863. THE MERIDIAN CAM- PAIGN, FEBRUARY, 1864. SOOY SMITH V. FORREST, FEBRUARY, 1864. STURGIS V. FORREST, JUNE, 1864. A. J. SMITH V. FORREST, JULY, 1864 50. A. WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1863-4. MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS 51. A. WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1863-4. LOUISIANA 52. 2 A. HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 53. B THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE 54. 4 A. SOUTHERN VIRGINIA. OPERATIONS IN 1864-5 55. B/3. THE ENVIRONS OF RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG, 1864-5 56. 2 A, THE CENTRAL MOUNTAIN DISTRICT 57. 4 A. WILMINGTON AND FORT FISHER 58. B. THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 59. 2 A. THE COAST DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 60. 2 A. THE CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS 61. B. FARRAGUT'S attack ON MOBILE HARBOUR 62. B/3, MOBILE TOWN AND DEFENCES 63. 4 A. CANBY'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MOBILE 64. 2 A. WILSON'S RAID IN ALABAMA AND GEORGIA 65. MEXICO. S/5 LEV'S CAMPAIGN IN NEW MEXICO, 1862 ERRATA Page V, line 2 in Contents of Chapter I. Instead of Slavery a Pretext, not a Cause, read The Slavery Question. Page 88, line 14. For great read Great. Page 89, line 3. For Fort, read Port. Page 89, lines 6 and 7, delete "the brother of the more famous W. T. Sherman." Page 181, last three lines. For Major-General . . . West Point, rra^Major- General John Pope served on General Scott's Staff in the Mexican War, and afterwards in the Cavalry on the Indian frontier. Page 267, line 11. For the XXth, readi\v^ Xlth and Xllth. (Cf. p. 302.) THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR INTRODUCTION The American Civil War seems at first such a tangle of disconnected details, spread over so vast an extent of country, that the reader soon gets bewildered and is apt to study one part to the neglect of another: moreover, the accounts of it are too long for ordinary use. It seems therefore that there is room for a short Synopsis, from which details of battles, especially, will be carefully eliminated. For the military student there are many works dealing with the whole, or with separate campaigns or battles ; but the majority of people are not specialists, and might like to have a short and connected account of this great struggle, and of the events which led up to it, the lack of which seems to have acted as a deterrent to the study of a most useful and interesting episode of history. Though it may appear superfluous to mention so many minor operations, yet it will be seen on examina- tion that almost all of them had a direct effect on the main phase of the War in the district for the time being, due partly to the abnormal influence of political and public opinion in this War, partly to the length of the communications of the armies, or to the question of supply. I 2 INTRODUCTION Another very great difficulty to the student of the American Civil War is that the principal men on the two sides belonged to the same nation, often to the same families, so that it is sometimes difficult to remember to which side a given person belongs : the names of the different leaders and warships on the Confederate side are therefore printed in italics, and of battles also, where called by them differently from the Union name. Owing to the fact that the tactical details of battles are avoided as far as possible, few names will be found of lower rank than that of General of Division. The War had been brewing for a long time,, but practically the history of it includes the three ad- ministrations of Buchanan, Lincoln, and Johnson, of the first and last of which short sketches are given. The War itself proceeded by regular well-defined steps throughout in the really vital part, between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River, where a successful blow by either side could strike at the heart of the other, in a military and practical sense. It was indecisive in Virginia till the latter part of the time, and swayed backwards and forwards, owing to the disastrous manner in which military considerations were overridden by political and senti- mental ones. Attention has been unduly concen- trated on the eastern theatre of war, on account of the political importance of the capitals, and because the best commanders and armies were there : for tactical study this is correct enough, but by such limitations the real history and general grasp of the War as a whole are apt to be lost sight of, since only secondary notice would be given to the regular stages by which it progressed in the central district, or, as it was then called, in the West. To summarize : after the fall of Fort Sumter, the rest of the year 1861 was employed in raising the armies, and in attempts to gain control of doubtful districts, in which the battle of Bull Run, or, as the A SHORT SUMMARY 3 Confederates called it, Manassas, was an isolated incident. The North was the gainer on the whole by these operations. In the first half of 1862 the War began in earnest, and during this time the North gained ground in the West, or centre, but lost in the East. In the second half of this year the Confederates failed to gain control of Maryland and Kentucky, but made head strongly, and at the end of it were at the height of their power, with the North badly defeated at all points save one. The writer considers that the battle of Stone's River, or Murfreesboro, on December 31st, was the military turning-point of the War, though the Confederates made various strokes at different times, for political purposes, which, had they succeeded, might have attained their end, the chief of which was the campaign of Gettysburg. From a purely military point of view, however, nothing could save the Confederacy unless the results of Stone's River were undone. The year 1863 opened with the Confederates fought out : they had made their effort, but could not maintain it, and had failed to secure the centre of the strategical line, which was vital for both sides. During the first half of this year the North improved their position generally, but were driven back in the East. In the second half of 1863 the North gained decisive victories all along the line, and at the end of the year held a winning position. The first part of 1864 was spent by the North in strengthening their position everywhere, and in preparing for the final campaigns. The latter part of this year was the beginning of the end, and, especially, the first permanent move forward in Virginia was then made by the North. * At the end of the year the Confederate power was completely broken. The first half of 1865 saw the last despairing 4 INTRODUCTION struggles of the Confederacy, the surrender of all its armies in the field, and the assassination of the great President Lincoln. It is unavoidable that the account of such a war should be written mainly from the point of view of one side, but as its object was the maintenance or disruption of a great nation, it should be generally considered from the Nationalist or Union standpoint, though some early stages of the quarrel, and the rights of and reasons for Secession, are perhaps better studied from the other side. There were faults, many faults, on both sides, which aggravated the early quarrels till war resulted, and however much one may sympathize with the gallant struggle of the Confederates in defence of what they believed to be their inalienable rights which were in jeopardy, still the answer that was often given in the Northern States to the writer, during Grant's Presidency, on the vexed question of States Rights and Secession, appears to be the right and logical view to take — viz. that the existence of the Nation is of more importance than the Wording of its Constitution (cf. p. 39)- Further, events were happening in the neighbouring country of Mexico, the result of the jealousy of the growing power of the United States on the part of Napoleon III., who tried to set up a countervailing influence, or take advantage of the weakness caused by disruption ; but, fortunately for the United States, their statesmen were aware of it, and also Napoleon was a little too late, and when he could perhaps have given trouble, they were ready to counteract him with an overwhelming force of veteran soldiers. Had the Confederates won, the situation would have been very different, and they themselves saw the danger, at a time when they had to strain every nerve against their Northern opponents. Great attention has been paid to the maps, especially to the standardizing of the scales, which is done in THE MAPS 5 only one work which the writer has consulted, and the lack of which is most puzzling. For instance, no words will explain the magnitude of Lee's task in holding the lines of Richmond and Petersburg so well as a comparison of the maps, on the same scale, of these lines, and of those o{ Johnston before Marietta, and of Hood at Atlanta, remembering that Johnston's and Hood's armies were much larger than Lee's at this time. With the exceptions of the Maps of the Progress of the War, of the War at Sea, and of Mexico, all are on one of two standard scales, or on factors or multiples of them, the campaign maps being based on Philip's Atlas scale of about 60 miles to an inch, A, those of the battles on the French military scale of 8?yJi5-o, i\ mile, or 2 kilometres, to an inch, B, the only scale which expresses both miles and kilometres in terms of an inch, with an error of less than i per cent., in yards. The scale of B is approximately forty-eight times that of A. As it is hoped that this Short History may be found useful as a refer- ence, the maps — those of the campaigns especially — contain the names of all places mentioned in much more special and detailed descriptions than are given here. In no other work with which the writer is acquainted are some important campaigns given in a map of useful size as a whole — e.g. that of Gettys- burg, and the lines of Richmond and Petersburg. CHAPTER I THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL To get to the origin of the quarrel between the two great parties and interests in America which cul- minated in the great Civil War, we must go back to the early days of the Republic. The trouble started about 1790, and had become serious in 1803. An attempt was then made at a compromise, which satis- fied no one, and which itself became the subject of dispute. It was a mere struggle for political power, which took the form that it did from the peculiarity of the system of State voting and State representation in the Senate, from the great part that the individual States, as such, without reference to size or impor- tance, had in the choice of President, and the con- sequent settling of the policy of the country for the next four years, which carried with it the patronage at the disposal of the winning party; it was only in the last few years before the outbreak that the quarrel crystallized round the slavery question. The cause of the War was the resistance of the Southern States to what they held to be uncon- stitutional and unjustifiable coercion on the part of the North, the diff'erences regarding the admission of new States being the proximate, the open threats of the Abolitionists, and the political victory of the Republican or Union party at the Presidential Election of i860, the deciding cause, of Secession and War. Former quarrels and crises had arisen, which had 6 POLITICAL SUPREMACY 7 brought up the questions of State Rights and the Right of Secession : these will be shortly dealt with later on. The two great interests in the nation were the traders and manufacturers on the one side, and the planters on the other, and these became the two political parties which fought for supremacy. The peculiar position which the individual States had under the Constitution, and their political power as States, intensified this, and slavery came into the quarrel merely as the supposed backbone of the planter party, which the other side attacked for that reason. Slavery was one of the greatest difficulties in draft- ing the Constitution, being then universal, except in Massachusetts, where it had just been given up ; it was supposed to be a declining institution, which might be acknowledged by a compromise, and left to fade away of itself In the Northern States it did decline, not from the growth of humanitarian feeling, but simply because it was not profitable finan- cially, the climate and industrial conditions being unsuitable to it. In the South, however, the invention of the cotton gin in 1793 gave a great stimulus to cotton production in those States which had a suitable climate, which climate also made coloured labour almost a necessity for the work. It is rather curious to compare the different attitudes of the North and South to slavery in early days. The slave trade was in the hands of the Northern traders, but was prohibited by the State Constitution of Georgia and by the laws of several Southern States. The Constitution of the United States, however, pro- tected it from interference by Congress till 1808, and when Congress did abolish it, as soon as it could, the dissentients came from both North and South. Virginia and Maryland began to allow emancipation by law, and showed a desire to be rid of it, as dis- creditable, and of doubtful utility (cf. p. 10). 8 THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL It was never pretended that the basis of the diffi- culty was other than the struggle for political power at first. When, in 1803, it was proposed that Louisiana be made into a State, out of part of the territory just bought from France, the jealousy of the New England section was such that there were threats of dissolving the Union ; but slavery was not mentioned as a point in the objection, though it existed in Louisiana. A Massachusetts statesman gave the reason frankly in a letter: "That the influence of our part of the Union must (i.e. certainly will) be diminished by the acquisi- tion of more weight at the other extremity." Moderate men began to look for some modus vivejtdi, which should check these interminable quarrels, and an understanding grew up that there should be a balance kept in the admission of new States, by making slave and free States alternately. At first they went on all right, thus : Free Stale. Slave State. Indiana, 1816. Mississippi, 1817. Illinois, 1818. Alabama, 1819. Maine, 1820. Missouri then applied, 1821, to come in as a slave State, but this was bitterly opposed by the North, which was beginning to demand that there should be no more slave States. The South, on the other hand, demanded the preservation of the tradition of the balance of States, and the quarrel waxed hot, when Clay saved an absolute rupture by proposing what was known as the Missouri Compromise, that Missouri should be ad- mitted as a slave State, but that in future there should be no slavery north of the parallel 36° 30', while to the south of this line any new States were to be allowed to choose whether they came in as slave States or not. This of course was only an armistice, a staving off for a time of the evil day, which was sure to come sooner or later. It was accepted by Congress, but many Southerners voted against ^t, holding that Missouri was ADMISSION OF NEW STATES 9 entitled to decide the matter for herself. As Jefferson Davis puts it, " the right or wrong of the institution of slavery was in no wise involved in these earlier controversies. They were essentially struggles for sectional equality or ascendancy." For the next twenty-nine years the new States came in on both sides in equal numbers, though not quite alternately, the line of demarcation being duly ob- served ; but in 1850 the Northern party opposed its,^^ being carried across the Continent to the Pacific, wherl the great territory of New Mexico and California was acquired from Spain. They had not objected to its being taken through the new State of Texas in 1845, paying an indemnity to that State for the partition, but, to quote Jefferson Davis again, they had then everything to gain and nothing to lose by keeping the compact ; when the conditions changed, so did their conduct. Practically, though, the climate of California was suited for white labour, that of Texas was not, or, at all events, was much less so. The quarrel blazed up again as hotly as ever, and another compromise or sop to the South was effected, which, as before, only put off the evil day, but it was such a one as made the difference worse. This was the passing of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 (cf. p. 28), by which the owners of slaves were allowed to recapture their slaves in any part of the free States, and to carry them back without trial by jury. Jefferson Davis and other prominent Southerners opposed it, not only because it merely gave them what they had before by the Constitution, but because they held it to be a bad thing to lay the obligations of the individual States on the General Government, and their feeling that this must do more harm than good was soon seen to be correct. This Act first made slavery, as such, a prominent plank in the political platform, and strengthened the hands of the Abolitionists Knmensely. Up to now, tfibugh their language had been violent, like that of all lo THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL extremists — to such an extent that even in 1831 the State of Georgia had offered five thousand dollars for the head of William Lloyd Garrison, who had started a paper called ** The Liberator " — yet the nation at large had not taken them seriously, nor interested itself much about the moral side of the question as distinct from the purely political. Now, however, things were changed. As McCarthy says : " States are like human beings, they resent being interfered with and preached at. The more the Abolitionists of the North thundered against slavery and inveighed against the South, the more doggedly the South resolved to stand by its slavery system." A little moderation might perhaps have weakened the Southern coalition when the split did come ; for, as we have seen, slavery might have been dropped or modified in many States, since in early days Virginia and Maryland were quite willing to let it go, though it was probably otherwise with the Cotton States, the leaders in Secession (cf. p. 7). Virginia was on the verge of a law of State Emancipa- tion in 1832, but it was rendered impossible by the excesses of the newly founded New England Anti- Slavery Society. The great evil of the inflaming of popular passions is the fact that the decision passes out of the hands of moderate men, who are best able to advise wisely and steer through the trouble, into those of demagogues and those swayed by their violence, who always form the numerical majority. For instance, many of the best men in the South would not have lifted a finger to preserve slavery; they considered it an unmitigated evil, even for the white population, and hoped that it would be gradu- ally eliminated. Of such opinions, notably, was General Lee. What they did contend for, though, was their State Rights, and many were driven to take up the defence of slavery qua slavery by the tactics of their opponents, among whom wsiS Alexander Stephens, afterwards the Vice-President of the Con- federacy, who was at first quite a moderate man. NULLIFICATION n Just at this time the South suffered an irreparable loss in the death of their. great States Rights leader, John Calhoun (March 31st, 1850). Many of the Northern States answered the passing of the Fugitive Slave Act by State laws which forbade their officials to take any part in the carrying out of its provisions, which were termed " personal liberty laws," thus nullifying the action of Congress and logically imposing on the General Government the duty of enforcing its own laws ; but the remedy would have been worse than the disease. This nullification was an old trick, as we shall soon see. In 1852 Franklin Pierce, Democrat, was elected President, taking office in the following year, and Jefferson Davis became his War Secretary, Soon after Davis took office a curious point arose, which must have been of use to him later when preparing for Secession — that in going through the list of officers for promotion, on the raising of several new regiments, it was seen that, on their military record, the number of those of Southern birth would be much larger than that of Northerners, and it was deemed advisable to maintain a geographical equality for political reasons. Thus one of the great elements of strength in the Confederacy was apparent long before the War, and, curiously enough, the Adjutant-General of this time, Colonel Cooper, was Jefferson Davis' Adjutant-General in the Confederate Government (cf. p. 66). Though the question of slavery, pure and simple, was now coming to the front by leaps and bounds, the next great move in the campaign was the Kansas- Nebraska Bill of 1854. This dealt with the organiza- tion of the Territorial Governments of Kansas and Nebraska, and the Missouri Compromise having been upset by the events of 1850, the purpose of this Bill was declared to be "to carry into practical operation the propositions and principles established by the compromise measures of 1850." It was added that "the true intent and meaning" of the Act was ''not 12 THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, or to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." The repeal of the Missouri Compromise had been worked by Mr. Douglas of Illinois, and he set to work to convince the Northern Democrats of its value, and of his substi- tute, the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. The arguments used against the Bill were more and more those of opposi- tion to slavery in itself, on both moral and logical grounds, as incompatible with carrying on a Republic which affirmed as its fundamental proposition the equality of men and their inherent right of self- government : it was in this connection that Abraham Lincoln first came to the front, as Douglas' great opponent in his own State of Illinois. Douglas was reputed to be the ablest debater and parliamentary hand in the country; but Lincoln challenged him to a public argument, and got decidedly the best of it, his speeches contributed much towards the result of the Illinois State elections, which split up Douglas' party. The result of the Bill in Kansas Territory was sheer anarchy. Kansas lay to the west of Missouri, a strong slave State, whose settlers were imbued with the wild, lawless life of the West, and believed in deeds rather than words for enforcing their ideas. The President sent, as Governor, Mr. Reeder of Pennsylvania, a strong Democrat, with no objection to slavery ; but, when the first elections were announced, the Mis- sourians mustered along the border, well armed, and swamped the polling with illegal votes. Trouble had been expected, but nothing to what actually took place. The first election, however, showed a majority of good votes for the slavery candidate, and he was declared duly elected ; but Governor Reeder, a just and honour- able man, set himself to put a stop to the scandals wrought by men avowedly of his own party, which ANARCHY IN KANSAS 13 were making government impossible. The invasion was met by a counter-invasion, each side of course accusing the other of starting the disturbance. There seems nothing to choose between the Southern Border Ruffians and their opponents, who were led by the notorious fanatic, John Brown. Between them they kept up a state of civil guerilla war during the whole of Pierce's term of office. Bogus elections were carried out by the two sides, who set up the rival draft Constitutions of Lecompton and Topeka. The former, recognizing slavery, was strictly legal, now that the Missouri Compromise was repealed, and slavery could only have been defeated by the anti- slavery party gaining a majority at the Lecompton Convention, not by keeping away from it. Governor Reeder vainly tried to keep order, but got to logger- heads with his Legislature, who passed laws over his veto and petitioned the Government to remove him, which the President had already seen to be necessary. His duties now devolved on one of the extreme slavery party, the Acting Governor, Woodson, and this party had it all their own way ; they adopted a Constitution copied from that of Missouri, and passed the most extreme slavery measures. This reign of the Border Ruffians caused the forma- tion of the Free-Soil party, mostly Democrat supporters of the President, who were roused by their misdeeds to combine against them and form an opposition State Constitution, called the Topeka Constitution. Kansas could not come in as a State with this, though backed by the newly formed Republican party, because the T^sMent and the decision of the Supreme Court were against it. Congress was hopelessly divided, the Republicans controlled the Lower House, the Democrats (the President's party) the Upper, and they barred the claim. Strengthened by this, those in power in Kansas became more and more outrageous, and passed laws to make the holding of Free-Soil principles, or rather of any principles in opposition to 14 THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL their own, a sort of treason. The Free-Soilers had had the worst of the civil war which had been going on for some time, and finally Woodson, with United States troops at his back, dispersed one of their meet- ings on July 4th, 1856. All passed off quietly, but the Topeka Constitution and its framers played a great part in the history of the State for all that. Nebraska, the State which was connected with Kansas in the Bill, was not troubled, for it was not only surrounded by anti-slavery States, but its climate was not suited to negro labour. In the country generally the feelings and passions of the more extreme men on both sides had risen to boiling point, and matters could hardly be worse : this was emphasized by the assault on Mr. Sumner of Massachusetts by Preston Brooks of South Carolina, in revenge for a caustic speech attacking his uncle, Mr. Butler of South Carolina, in a debate which became very bitter on both sides. Brooks was a member of Congress for South Carolina, and his party was powerful enough to limit his punishment to severe censure. Sumner was badly hurt, and unable to take his place again for months. There were several cases of personal violence in Congress, all coming from the same side, and the flame of sectional hatred was fanned on both sides by indignation meetings, etc., in the country. The assault on Sumner took place in May, 1856, and few things did more to rouse and unite the Northern side. In the last year of President Pierce's administration, at the time for the election of his successor, the two sides were so violently estranged that, had the De- mocrats not won the election, the War would have broken out then, four years before it really did. The political parties had lately been remodelled a good deal. The old Federalist party of early Republican days inclined to Nationalism rather than Federation of the States : on the other hand, the Republican, after- wards called the Democratic party, went in for State NEW POLITICAL PARTIES 15 Rights, the assertion of State Sovereignty, and the strictly Federal nature of the Union. To the old Federal party succeeded that of the Whigs, which, though not identical, favoured a strong central Govern- ment. The Whigs were a good deal broken up at the time of the Election of 1856, and the Know-Nothings, or American party, who opposed the overgrowth of the political influence of naturalized foreigners, and of the Roman Catholics, arose, but after this election declined. The Free-Soil party, largely composed of dissident Democrats, disgusted with the pro-slavery men in Kansas, united with some of the dissidents of the old Whig party to form the new Republicans, and soon became very powerful. The issue was principally between them and the Pro-Slavery De- mocrats — that is, slavery took the principal place for the first time. Few outside things contributed so much to bring this about as the publication in 1850 of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel, '* Uncle Tom's Cabin," which is probably the most effective political pamphlet on record. CHAPTER II FROM THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 3RD, 1860 Even at this time, in 1856, the question of peace or war hung on the personaHties, poHcies, and leader- ship of the two candidates for the Presidency — Buchanan and Fremont ; and it was fortunate for the United States as a nation that war did not break out under Fremont. It may be as well to give some slight sketch of them here. James Buchanan was born in a log cabin in 1791, on the then outskirts of civilization, in Western Penn- sylvania. His father was an Irish farmer, who emi- grated from Co. Donegal, and seems to have done pretty well, for he was able to educate his son as a lawyer. The young man rose rapidly in his pro- fession, and took to politics at the age of thirty, when he was elected to Congress ; in Jackson's Presidency he was sent as Minister to Russia, in 1833 became Senator for Pennsylvania, was Secretary of State under President Polk, and Minister to England in Pierce's time. Thus no man could have ascended the ladder more regularly. He was a typical Democrat of the old school, who believed in the minimum of interference by the central Government with the rights and institutions of the individual States. Though not a particularly strong man, he was able and honest, courteous, sensible, and conciliatory, and, as has been shewn above, of great and varied experience. 16 BUCHANAN AND FREMONT 17 At the time of his election he was sixty-five years of age, and not able to bear the strain of the difficult times through which he had to steer the nation, so that he was broken down and infirm before he laid down his office at the age of seventy. Still, it is doubtful whether a stronger policy at this time would have succeeded better than did his efforts to heal the breach by conciliation, for any attempt at force would only have made bad worse : things had gone too far. When all hope of saving the Union had departed, he still went on doing his best to minimize Secession and avert war, feebly, perhaps, but still honestly and gallantly, according to his lights, in the teeth of un- popularity, and even of personal danger, until he broke down under the strain. Of all the characters who appear on the stage of the great American Cival War, the most extraordinary is John C. Fremont, of Georgia, the Abolitionist candidate for the Presidency in 1856. Vain, frothy, unstable, the exponent of extreme opinions, he yet imposed on many sensible men, on account of the sentiment to which he appealed, and made a strong bid for victory ; but the success of such a man would have been a national calamity. He had been a mathematical professor in the navy, but threw up this appointment to go exploring, and met with the wildest adventures. Governor of California ~im^6, he was court-martialled for insubordination to a superior officer, and dismissed, when he went back to exploring and Indian fighting. He next appears as a candidate for the Presidency. On the outbreak of the War he was appointed one of the four new Major-Generals of the army and Governor of Missouri, but failed as a commander, and was dismissed for taking on himself to proclaim the freedom of the slaves without consulting his Government, thereby embar- rassing them at a critical time. He was once more given an independent military command, in Western Virginia, but resigned his commission on being placed 2 i8 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION under Pope in June, 1862, and was not employed again. He went into retirement till put in nomination for President against Lincoln in 1864 (cf. p. 326), but he had no chance, and his party withdrew him. After this he was only heard of as a wild speculator, alternately millionaire and pauper, and he died in obscurity a few years later. Only his work as an explorer appears to have been of value, for, though brave to a fault, he was useless as a soldier, because he could neither command nor obey. Though he had had great experience of troubled times and places, he was useless as Governor of a district, either in peace or war, for he had no adminis- trative ability, he was easily got at, owing to his over- weening vanity, and he winked at corrupt practices. With all his drive and cleverness, he was useless as a politician, for he was shifty, headstrong, and treacherous, and did not hesitate to advertise himself at the expense of his party. A man of brilliant genius, he was without ballast, and so made next to no use of his abilities. The essential difference between Buchanan and Fremont was this — that Buchanan never played to the gallery, while Fremont did little else. The sketch of the events of Buchanan's Adminis- tration is of course limited to the stages in the great quarrel between the North and South, but the President had no easy time in other ways : amongst other things, the troubles with Brigham Young and the Mormons in Utah became so acute as to require the despatch of a military expedition — a real difficulty in so distant a place. The election of such a thorough-going States Rights Democrat as Buchanan, who, though not an extremist, was probably a stronger one than his pre- decessor. Pierce, was an assurance that these claims would have full sympathy and recognition in the policy of the next four years, and removed the im- mediate danger of Secession, and of one party declar- THE DRED SCOTT CASE 19 ing war against the Government ; but the intensity of the hatred between the two factions was not abated in the least, and steadily increased till the election of Lincoln. It seems best to consider the period between elections, rather than that between the assumption and laying down of office by each President, because the election is the declaration of coming policy, and a President could not affect matters much in the last months of his term, in the sense of initiating anything, but simply carried on the Government till relieved. Directly after Buchanan's election an event occurred which added fuel to the fire and strengthened the hands of the Abolitionists immensely — viz, the final decision in the notorious Dred Scott case. This had been going on for years, and was the suit of a negro called Dred Scott, who claimed the freedom of him- self and his family on the ground that his master, a Missourian army doctor, had taken him to a free State, where, with his master's consent, he had married a coloured woman, who had also been brought as a slave from Missouri. The master. Dr. Emerson, died in Iowa, a free State, in 1844; and, when the widow returned with them to St. Louis, Scott claimed his freedom in St. Louis courts and won his case, but the judgment was reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Missouri. As being property under the trust created by her husband's will, Mrs. Emerson's power of emancipating them was doubtful, though she was willing to do so, and transferring them to her brother and trustee, Mr. Sanford, of New York, did not alter matters. Scott tried again in the United States Court at St. Louis, and again lost, on which he appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, It was argued there in the spring of 1856, but the decision was deferred. There was great excitement among the politicians of the Democratic side, who hoped to get a definition of the words "subject to the Constitution" in favour of limiting the control of the central courts over those of individual States, On March 6th, 1857, Chief 20 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION Justice Taney delivered the decision to the effect that " The Declaration of Independence and the Constitu- tion of the United States do not include or refer to negroes otherwise than as property ; that they cannot become citizens of the United States nor sue in the Federal Courts. That Dred Scott's claim to freedom by reason of his residence in Illinois was a Missouri question, which Missouri law had decided against him. That the Constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as property, and pledges the Federal Govern- ment to protect it, and that the Missouri Compromise Act and like prohibitory laws are unconstitutional. That the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction in the case and could give no judgment in it, and must be directed to dismiss the suit." Mr. Buchanan's inaugural speech had prepared people for a decision " that would dispose of a vexed and dangerous topic by the highest judicial authority in the land," but this was doing it with a vengeance — as the North said, on party political lines, for political reasons, and that it was a revolutionary exposition of the Constitution. But most especially offensive to them was the pitiless logic which would reduce the status of a negro, in the eye of the law, to that of a dog, or a bale of dry-goods. Though he lost his case at law, and the North and South went on quarrelling over it, Scott did not lose really, for Mr. Sanford transferred him and his family to Mr. Taylor Blow, the son of his old Virginian master, on whose estate he was born, who had been backing him in his fight for freedom, and who set them free in May, 1857, two months after the decision. This case brought Lincoln again into prominence as the opponent of Douglas in Illinois, where he spoke with the greatest effect and power. The militant Southern section of the Democratic party must have been well satisfied with the com- position of the Cabinet and the War Department, for they had a great advantage there. The Vice-President was John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, afterwards a A SOUTHERN CABINET 21 Major-Gcncrnl in the Confederate service; the Secre- tary of War, John B. Floyd, afterwards a Confederate Major-General; the Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb, an active Confederate ; the Secretary of the Interior, Jacob T/ionipson, another. The Adjutant- General of the Army, Colonel Cooper, took the same post under the Confederate Government, with the rank of General, and the Quarter-Master-General, Brigadier-General Joseph Johnston, became a Con- federate General. He was not in the War Office at the beginning of Buchanan's term, but joined it later. For a party which would have seceded, and gone to war, had they lost the late election, and fully intended to do so if they lost the next, this was pretty good representation, in most important places. Out of the nine seats in the Cabinet, the Southern States had five : Vice-President, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, Postmaster- General. Besides ih\s, Jefferson Davis had been Secre- tary of War under President Pierce. The civil war still went on in Kansas, during most of Buchanan's term, for the district was so given over to riot and bloodshed that at last a strong military force had to be used, which soon ended the disturb- ances, dispersed the political factions, and forced their leaders to flee from the Territory. Kansas was not admitted as a State till 1861. In the interval between Buchanan's and Lincoln's elections the Anti-Slavery party had increased rapidly, for their nominee, Fremont, had not been beaten by a large majority, and they had good hopes of success next time. In Congress their attacks on slavery, and all who upheld, or even did not condemn it, grew more and more bitter, arous- ing equal bitterness in return, till in March, 1858, Mr. Hammond of Virginia, in replying to a more virulent attack than usual, made a most uncompromising and powerful speech, in which he impressed on his hearers that the Southern States were well able to guard their own rights and interests, and would assuredly do so, 22 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION going on to deal with their prospects of separate existence in case of Secession. There was no mis- taking language like this, and it created a profound impression. In the autumn of that year the antago- nism was intensified by the agitation incidental to the approaching Presidential campaign. These encounters did not by any means always end where they began, in words, as we have seen, but in these cases the aggressors seem always to have been the more fiery spirits among the younger Southerners. In 1859 occurred the "John Brown Raid," which raised excitement to a dangerous pitch. John Brown, the fanatical Abolitionist and exponent of Free-Soil ideas, who, with his sons, had played a prominent part in the Kansas difficulties, had been, since the suppression of the trouble there, secretly engaged in organizing a plan to bring about a rising of the slaves in the South. In October, 1859, with the aid of a party of sixteen whites and five blacks, into whom he had infused his own reckless disdain of consequences, he actually invaded Virginia, and seized the Govern- ment Arsenal and other buildings at Harper's Ferry. Colonel Lee, as he then was, was ordered to take a battalion of marines and some militia, and capture the insurgents. He found that Brown had failed to stir up a rising of the slaves in the neighbourhood, and took the buildings, which were defended to the last, after a sharp fight. Five escaped, but Brown and six of his companions were tried and hanged for insurrec- tion and murder, justly enough ; but the extreme Abolitionist party made a martyr of him, and used the occurrence, however discreditable to their own side, to increase the sectional hatred to the utmost, with great effect. John Brown came from the wild country to the west of Lake Champlain, which is still known as " John Brown's Tract," so that his death touched the greatest of the Northern States, New York, and, what was perhaps more to the purpose, one which was usually Democratic in policy, thus weakening TENSION INCREASES 23 the support from the Northern Democrats to their Southern allies. After this, and the civil war in Kansas, the breach widened beyond repair, and the bond between the two sections was found to be intolerable, by the South at any rate. The North raved of coercion ; the South denied either the right or the power of the f'ederal Government to apply anything of the sort, and said plainly that Secession was the lesser evil, and must come. In the then temper of the North, it was clear that if it did come it meant war, for though many of the statesmen of both parties thought and hoped that this would not be a necessary consequence, even if Secession could not be averted, the two sides were so embittered against each other that they were passing quite beyond the control of politicians. At all events, they waited to see what result the coming Presidential Election would bring forth, though it is difficult to believe that matters would have turned out differently, who- ever had won. The North accuse Floyd, a militant Southerner, the Secretary of War, of using his official position to prepare for it, and put the Southern States in the best possible position before he resigned. He is said to have designedly scattered the small army along the Indian frontier, which was much disturbed, and in distant places, so that troops could not be collected when wanted, and Washington, especially, was left defenceless : but no distribution of the army could have stopped the rising, for to have strengthened, the garrisons all round would have precipitated war, and lost the garrisons, a serious deduction from the strength of the small United States army. The South say that when they seized the arsenals in their States, but few muskets, and these obsolete, and little powder, were found therein : most of the muskets had gone to be converted from flint to percussion action, perhaps in the hope that they would be back when wanted ; but Floyd did his best to buy better ones, and seems 24 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION to have used Government money freely. In Decem- ber, i860, just before his resignation, he proposed Secessionists for commissions in the forces being raised for the defence of Washington, and issued arms lavishly to their commands ; but he was out of power, and in Confederate service, when they made their great haul of the heavy guns which the United States forces abandoned at Norfolk Navy Yard. Thus the nation drifted toward war, and poor old President Buchanan could not stop it, for Congress, divided against itself, would do nothing. As the time for the Presidential Election of i860 drew near, the political excitement increased, but there was a split in the Democratic party, while that of their opponents was consolidated. This split arose over what was called the "Squatter Sovereignty doctrine," which was largely worked out by Mr. Douglas of Illinois : the Southern Democrats, headed by Jefferson Davis, vehemently opposed it. It was a development of the old struggle for political power, by gaining control of new or rising States by one party or the other. The Missouri Compromise had been broken by the refusal to carry the line through the Continent at the time of the admission of California as a State, and the Kansas- Nebraska Bill was engineered to restore to the Democrats the position they had lost by this occur- rence, ostensibly for the purpose of leaving the people of any Territory or State free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, within the Constitution. Douglas and others, however, expanded this into a claim that the first settlers of a Territory, in however crude and unformed a condition it might be, had a right to determine the character of its institutions. This was a very different thing, in reality, from the intention of the Bill, and Jefferson Davis, who before everything was a stickler for con- stitutional procedure, opposed it, partly for this reason, partly because he saw what an extremely dangerous two-edged weapon it was. The constitutional rule SQUATTER SOVEREIGNTY 25 was that Congress looked after and governed the Territories, which were considered to be United States land not yet formed into States, laid them off by boundaries which would be convenient for the formation of States in the future, and when, by reason of the number of their inhabitants, they were ready to be formed into States, it was from Congress that the authorization was derived for " the inhabitants to elect representatives for a convention to form a State Constitution, which was then submitted to it for approval and ratification." But, " logically carried out, this new theory of popular sovereignty would apply to the first adventurous pioneers settling in the wilderness before the organization of any Territorial Government by Congress, as well as afterward." That is, the whole thing would be an unseemly scramble in future, perhaps worse than the late events in Kansas. Though it is fair to say that the authors of this doctrine " disavowed any claim to its application prior to the organization of a Territorial Govern- ment," it by no means follows that their successors would have recognized any such limitation. Douglas was the ablest and most powerful man of the Democratic party in the Northern States, so the quarrel was extremely serious. In April, i860, the Democratic Convention met at Charleston to select party candidates for President and Vice- President, but,, disagreed as to the policy to be adopted, and separated without doing anything. It is interesting to notice that Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts (General Butler) proposed Jefferson Davis as the party candidate for President, and was one of the first to command in action against his troops in the field fourteen months later. This con- vention was broken up by the action of some of the more rabid Secessionists, led by Yancey of Alabama : before it met they tried privately to per- suade the representatives of some other Southern States, principally those on the Gulf, to take common 26 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION action, but this fell through. Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana tried to keep the peace, and restore unity in the party and country by all honourable means, but were opposed by the hotter spirits from Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas, those from the first-named State having come with directions, obtained by Yancey's influence, to withdraw if the convention did not accept the most extreme views with regard to the rights of citizens in the Territories. They were not accepted, and Alabama and others with- drew : the convention was then adjourned. One part met again at Baltimore, another at Richmond, and the Democratic party was thus hopelessly split up, different sections of it making different nominations for President and Vice-President. Douglas' party, the Northern Democratic National Convention, nomi- nated him and Fitzpatrick of Alabama; but Fitz- patrick declined to stand, and the name of Johnson of Georgia was substituted. The old, or States Rights section, the Southern Democratic National Convention, put forward Breckiiiridge of Kentucky, the then Vice-President, and Lane of Oregon ; some of the old "Whigs" and "Americans" fused into the Convention of the Constitutional Union Party, and nominated Bell of Tennessee and Everett of Massachusetts; while the new Republicans sent in the names of Lincoln of Illinois and Hamlin of Maine. The tenets of the first two parties have already been dealt with ; the Whig-Americans ignored the whole territorial controversy, and simply pro- claimed the non-committal policy of adherence to the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws ; while the Republicans declared that "slavery can exist only by virtue of municipal law," that there was " no law for it in the Territories, and no power to enact one," and that Congress was " bound to prohibit it in, and exclude it from, any and every Federal Territory." That is, the first three LINCOT.N'S ELECTION 27 of these parties were on one side, more or less, the last on the other — a divided party against a con- solidated one : the latter had been gaining ground while in opposition, and was straining every nerve to improve on its position at the last election, when it had made so good a bid for victory. Though its policy was decidedly anti-slavery, it was not, as last time, rabid Abolitionist, and there was no comparison between the ability and strength of its champions, then and now, for " Lincoln's cautious action with regard to the slave question undoubtedly held many factions together for Union, which would otherwise have held aloof, or have drifted into Secession. The cause of the Union first was Lincoln's policy, and its wisdom was justified by its success." Lincoln did not poll a majority of all the personal votes, the three opponents combined outnumbering him in the proportion of three to two, and it must be remembered that all three represented sections of the old Democratic party. This emboldened the Southerners to represent themselves as embodying the real feelings of the majority of the nation, and to set to work to take steps to carry their threatened secession into fact. The next occurrence after the election was the meeting of Congress on December 3rd, and it may fairly be said that the last act of President Buchanan's Administration was his Message to Congress on this occasion, for after it chaos reigned supreme, and no administration was possible for the country at large. So far as it related to the internal troubles of the country, his speech was to this effect. He lamented the decay of the prosperity of the Union, and its threatened destruction, which he attributed to "the long-continued and intemperate interference of the Northern people with the question of slavery." He said that they had been agitating in every way since 1835, and causing quarrels in Congress. The whole matter could have been settled by leaving the 28 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION slave States to manage their own institutions, for tliey as sovereign States were alone responsible for them, and the North had nothing to do with the matter. He relied on the good sense and patriotic forbearance of the people, because the election of a particular person did not afford just cause for dis- solving the Union, especially when the result appeared to be due to temporary causes which might never recur. (This seems to refer to the fact that there was not an absolute majority of personal votes for Lincoln.) He thought that revolution was not justified except to resist " a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not granted by the Constitution," and that mere apprehension of contingent danger was not sufficient. He denied that Congress had refused the Southern States their rights in the common territory, and held that the prohibition of slavery in Kansas was an unconstitutional act, which would, he trusted, soon be put right by the judiciary (cf. p. 9). The Fugitive Slave Act was a valid law, and the efforts to defeat it unconstitutional, for he reminded his hearers that not only was the principle of it an integral part of the Constitution, but that, had it not been made so, the Constitution would never have existed at all. Consequently, if the de- mand of the Southern States that the Acts passed to nullify it be repealed, were refused, this refusal would be a wilful violation of the Constitution, to which all the States were parties, and the injured States, t after having first used all peaceable and constitutional means to obtain redress, would be justified in revolu- tionary resistance to the Government of the Union. He denied the doctrine that, as each State had assented to the Union, it was equally at liberty to dissent from and leave it, instancing South Carolina, whose Federal officers had resigned and left chaos, but gave it as his opinion that the power to coerce any State into submission was not one of those delegated to the Central Government, and therefore BUCHANAN'S MESSAGE 29 could not be used, for, as a matter of history, it was proposed to, and expressly refused by, the Convention which drafted the Constitution. Such conduct would provoke war, not avert it, and he suggested some amendments to the Constitution on the question of slavery. Finally, he earnestly besought his hearers to weigh well what they were doing, and to consider what civil war would mean to the country and its prosperity. Though this speech took a strong party line of argument, still, coming from a Northern statesman, it was an honest last attempt to keep the Union together ; but the passions of both sides were now so thoroughly roused that the solemn warning of their venerable President was unheeded. CHAPTER III THE RIGHT OF SECESSION The election of Lincoln broke the last link with the Union for the Cotton States, which determined to secede, and immediately proceeded to do so in Decem- ber, the election having taken place on November 6th. Their object was to assert their own right of managing their own affairs, so far as domestic institutions were concerned, and to resist pressure or coercion of any kind from the Central Government, on the ground that the Union was but a compact of Sovereign and Inde- pendent States, from which any of them could retire at will : they thus claim that they were acting constitu- tionally throughout. The question of slavery was the pretext for this particular struggle for political power, but that of Federal control was the actual reason for Secession. How far were they right in their action? The point had been a moot one during the whole history of the Republic, to such a degree as to supply the issue which formed the dividing line between the two great parties in politics : it had reached an acute stage on several occasions, and dissatisfied States had often threatened to secede. It will be as well to describe shortly these early threats of Secession and their causes. I. In 1797 the arrogance of the French Directory, which, after France had helped the United States to gain their independence, treated them almost as a subject country, became so intolerable that war broke 30 EARLY QUARRELS 31 out the next year, and Congress, to meet the emer- gency, passed an Aliens Act, to deal with immigration and suspicious aliens, and a Sedition Act, to check disloyalty among American citizens. Although the operation of these Acts was limited to the current Presidential term, they were declared to be uncon- stitutional invasions of State rights ; and Kentucky, largely under the guidance and advice of Jefferson, the leading opponent of the Federalist party, who became President three years later, passed resolutions denouncing them, and State laws to nullify their operation. Virginia did the same, and called on other States to follow suit, and then Virginia and North Carolina went further, and actually consulted Jefferson as to their prospects of success if they left the Union and set up a state of their own. 2. When the proposition to admit Louisiana into the Union first came up, in 1803 (though it was not admitted till 1812), the question of the balance of power caused such friction that Secession was freely mooted by some of the Northern States, especially by Massachusetts, and no one seems to have considered it unconstitutional or treasonable. It was prophesied that severance between the free and the slave States must come at no distant date, and that the best con- ditions under which they could exist would be those of separation and subsequent alliance as two nations. It was held then, as by the Confederate statesmen in 1860-1, that this could be done quite peaceably b}^ mutual arrangement. In 181 1, Mr. Quincy of Massa- chusetts said openly in Congress that if the Bill to admit Louisiana were passed it "would break up the Union, and that it would be the right of all, and the duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation — amicably if they can, violently if they must." These expressions were ruled out of order, but the ruling was appealed against and reversed — a significant fact, when we consider the free use of the word " Rebellion " in 1861. %2 THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 3. The next case was caused by President Madison's Embargo Act of 1808, which, in attempting to deal with the difficulties caused by Great Britain and France each trying to prevent the United States from trading with the other, almost prevented the Americans from trading at all, and precipitated the War of 18 12, which was most unpopular in the North, in New England especially. The South, on the contrary, the home of the Loyalists in the War of Independence, was the warlike side, so much so as to cause a serious risk of a split between the two parts of the United States. The New England traders obstructed the Act by every means in their power, and in 18 14 the famous Hartford Convention met, of regularly appointed dele- gates from the Legislatures of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, with one or two from New Hampshire and Vermont, to consider grievances con- nected with the War, and this brought up the question of leaving the Union. They did not think it expedient at that time, but drew up a report dealing with the conditions under which Secession might become so, in which they complained of the combination of indi- viduals or of States to monopolize power and trample on their rights and commercial interests. The report ended thus : " Whenever it shall appear that the causes are radical and permanent, a separation by equitable arrangement will be preferable to an alliance by constraint among nominal friends, but real enemies." These New Englanders were much blamed for dis- loyalty, not because they thought of seceding, but for embarrassing their Government in war time, and thus indirectly aiding the enemy ; but the sudden end of the war put an end to their agitation, and the Embargo Act was soon taken off. Thus we see that, in the space of a very few years, Massachusetts and several other New England States had two quarrels with the United States, each of which was so acute as to make them consider the question of Secession. 4. In 1828-30 Georgia refused to obey an Act of EARLY QUARRELS 33 Congress, or respect the treaties which the United States had made with some Indian tribes (cf. p. 41), and its Legislature passed State Acts in contravention of the Federal authority, and acted on them ; but President Jackson did not interfere. The crisis, how- ever, was acute, and his abstention probably saved the situation, for force would have been met by force. 5. In 1832 South Carolina, by her State Convention, and then by her Legislature, refused to recognize a tariff imposed by Congress, and prepared for Secession and war. By her original Constitution this State, as a sovereign commonwealth, reserved the right of making war and peace, and was the only one which did so, which may have had something to do with her warlike attitude. Congress passed an Enforcing Act to compel her obedience, and matters came to a deadlock; but the quarrel was soon settled by a compromise, the tariff being altered. But it must be remembered that an Act, conferring special powers on the President, the " Force Bill," as it was called, was passed on the same day as the Compromise Act (cf. p. 38). 6. In 1844 the measures for the annexation of Texas caused the greatest friction, and the North-Eastern States again threatened to leave the Union. The Legislature of Massachusetts adopted a resolution condemning the use by Congress of powers which had never been delegated to it, and adding, that the annexation of Texas might drive objecting States out of the Union. In 1845 they sent up another resolu- tion, to the effect that the admission of a foreign State by legislation was unconstitutional, and that such an act would not be binding upon the people of Massachusetts. 7. In 1856 the Cotton States were quite prepared to secede, had Fremont beaten Buchanan, and said so plainly. Here we have seven direct preparations for Secession, extending over the period from 1798 to 1856, none of 3 34 THE RIGHT OF SECESSION which were called treasonable at the time. Three of these, in 1803, 1844, and 1856, were on the main issue, the fight for political power by State votes, in the forma- tion of new States, and of these the first two were from New England. From the first the line of demarca- tion was clearly defined as that of the traders and manufacturers against the planters of the slave States. Only threats of actual Secession are dealt with here, but the struggle for political power by the admission of new States dates back to 1790. The other cases turned on the question of Federal control, the secondary element in the quarrel. Thus there was, throughout, a strong feeling that a State which came into the Union by agreement could leave it in the same way. This applies to new as well as to old States. How far was it justified ? The claim that the Union was a compact, into which the various Sovereign and Independent States had entered for their own mutual benefit and convenience, retaining their full rights of sovereignty unimpaired, was certainly true of the original Articles of Con- federation of 1778, and was not specifically abolished by the Constitution of 1787. The Articles of Confederation Article II runs thus : " Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." It must be remembered that each State has its own Constitution, and laws made under it, and that in this original Confederation there was no provision for national courts and laws, but the only law was State law, it being simply provided that the States recognized each other's laws, and gave protection to people from other States. These State Constitutions were thus THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 35 superior to the Articles of Confederation, so that probably the claim of South Carolina to decide questions of peace and war for herself could have been upheld, though contrary to them. They provide for the management of Foreign Affairs by the Central Government of the nation, keeping up an Army and Navy (without prejudice to the right of each State to maintain and manage its own Militia), dealing with questions of Trade and Customs, fixing Weights and Measures, National Finance, Coining Money, acting as Court of Final Appeal in disputes between States, etc., etc. ; but United States legal jurisdiction and courts were not constituted. A Committee of States, or any nine of them, might carry on the functions of Congress under certain circumstances. And Article XIII, the last, runs thus: *' Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviol- ably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual ; nor shall any alteration at any time here- after be made in an}'^ of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State." It was provided that Canada might come in at any time, but that any other new States applying for admission be agreed to by at least nine States ; and the States which agreed to these Articles were New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. These Articles were drawn up in 1778, and passed by many of the States in that year ; but the last, Maryland, did not do so till 1781. This Confederation was crude, being both too lax 36 THE RIGHT OF SECESSION and too rigid, and was soon found to be quite in- adequate, especially in the matter of trade and dealings with outside nations. Foreign traders found the State courts too local in their prejudices, and this injured trade ; while, with regard to the making of treaties, Washington truly said : " We are one nation to-day, and thirteen to-morrow : who will treat with us on those terms?" That is, that with all their republican impatience of control, they found that they were too much divided, and that some real national control was a necessity, though they would not use the word " national." Under these circumstances a Convention was called at Philadelphia in 1787 to draft something better, to which all the States except Rhode Island sent delegates, and they evolved the Constitution, which was agreed to by the different States. It opens with the words : " We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." This is a very different document from the Articles of Confederation. The Sovereignty of the States, as individuals, which was so markedly affirmed in them, is here nowhere mentioned ; but their rights of representation in Congress, including that of equal representation in the Senate, the security which they specially claimed at the time, were guaranteed, and Article IV defines their proper place as component parts of the nation, guaranteeing their individual, but not sovereign, rights. The great difference between the old and the new was the introduction of Federal jurisdiction. Article III establishing National courts and judges, and giving them precedence over the State courts and judges. THE CONSTITUTION 37 Article VII, the last, runs as follows : " The ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Con- stitution between the States so ratifying the same." The draft was said to have been agreed to unani- mously by the States present, by those of their delegates who signed it (but all did not do so), on September 17th, 1787: with the exception of Rhode Island, not represented, they are those which signed the original Articles. Delaware led off by ratifying the new Constitution that December, and the ninth State was New Hampshire, in June, 1788, Rhode Island coming in in May, 1790. Though in many States there was little or no opposition, the new Constitution was hotly debated in others : Massachusetts only passed it by a small majority; while Virginia, Rhode Island, and New York set forth, in the wording of their ratifications, that they retained the liberty ol taking back the powers thus granted to the Federal Government, whenever they might find it to be necessary, thus expressly reserving the Right of Secession. A great controversy has been made of the opening words, " We, the people of the United States," the extreme States Rights men affirming that they mean the people of the several States, not of the nation at large ; but the evidence is clear that the original was drafted in the names of the several States, and altered by the Convention. The Nationalists say that the new Constitution "appealed directly to the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures, to invest them with the citizenship of the entire Union." The question at issue between the partisans and the opponents of the new Constitution was not the Freedom of the People, but the Sovereignty of the State Legis- latures, between centralized and local Government. In a debate in Congress in 1830, Webster described 38 THE RIGHT OF SECESSION the difference between the Confederation and the Con- stitution thus : " The Confederation was, in strictness, a compact : the States, as States, were parties to it. But that was found insufficient and inadequate to the public exi- gencies. The people were not satisfied with it, and undertook to establish a better. They undertook to form a General Government, which should stand on a new basis — not a Confederacy, not a League, not a Compact between States, but a Constitution." Jefferson Davis^ in an argument more specious than sound, traverses this, quoting well-known Federalists to show that State Sovereignty remained unimpaired ; but they used the words to apply to it as strictly ivithin the Union, which, in its form of equal representa- tion in the Senate, the right most stoutly claimed at the time, was not altered. He also claims that, if any States retained the right of Secession, the same must be admitted for all, which by no means follows, looking to the different conditions under which they accepted the Constitution, and also that, in no case is there any right of coercing a State to remain within the Union if it wishes to leave it. This seems correct enough legally ; but before the Civil War there was a precedent (cf. p. 33). The fact remains that many States remodelled their State Constitutions, in view of the altered conditions, and this was no empty form ; for a State commands the allegiance of its citizens, and may punish them for treason to it, which had a great effect in making men, who did not agree with the action of their States, follow them into Secession, of whom the most notable was General Lee, who hated war as heartily as he hated slavery, and, though a Virginian, did not believe in the right of Secession, but was devotedly loyal to his State. State Constitutions are generally an- tagonistic to, or at least very jealous of, the Federal Government, and this is so far recognized, that the COERCION 39 Government has always had the greatest reluctance to interfere with them (cf. p. 469), or to pass laws necessary to bring them into line, although the Con- stitution has been from time to time amended, Washington and Hamilton had been the great ex- ponents of Federalism, and people saw its use during the troublous times of the War of Independence and the next few years ; but when the national danger was succeeded by political quarrels, great men by smaller fry, national interests by local jealousies, the pendulum swung over to the other side, even such a man as Jefferson being the exponent, if not the author, of the doctrine of " Nullification," or State resistance to the central authority, the State constituting itself the sole arbiter in the matter. This was based on the theory that there was no power of coercion, which would make the passing of Enforcing Acts, as against South Carolina in 1832, a pure farce, the whole difficulty being a striking example of the fallacies of those amiable visionaries who preach moral suasion only, when men's passions are thoroughly roused, a course which often brings war, but seldom, if ever, averts it. President Jackson, a really strong man, missed a great chance of settling the question on the occasion quoted, had he obtained the " Force Bill " to carry them out, before dealing with the Compromise. Taking it all round, the best legal exposition seems to be that of President Buchanan, quoted above ; but there is a higher view than that of mere legality, which Bryce sums up in four words (cf. p. 4) : " SALUS REIPUBLICiE SUPREMA LEX." CHAPTER IV SECESSION : FROM GOVERNOR GIST'S CIRCULAR TO THE SECESSION OF NORTH CAROLINA As Secession actually took place, it is necessary to go back a little, and overlap the end of Chapter II, for active preparations were in progress before the Presidential Election of i860. So early as the Feb- ruary of that year, Alabama voted 200,000 dollars for military contingencies, in case Lincoln got in, in the autumn. In October, Mississippi bought a large number of small arms, and Floyd, the United States Secretary of War, had them properly inspected ; in the same month Georgia voted 1,000,000 dollars for military contingencies, and South Carolina 100,000. On October 5th, Goveinior Gist, of South Carolina, sent a circular-letter re Secession to the Governors of the other Cotton States, in case Lincoln w^ere elected : the answers were not very encouraging, but he followed it up by calling the Legislature of his State together " to appoint electors of President and Vice-President, and also that they may, if advis- able, take action for the safety and protection of the State." On the 25th a secret conference was held at Senator Hammond's house, and when the Legislature met on November 5th, the day before the Presidential Election, the Governor, in his opening message, directly advocated armed Secession, and the meeting of force by force. Preparations were made for calling a State Convention for the purpose of Secession. GENERAL SCOTT'S "VIEWS" 41 On the other side, at the end of October, the Commander-in-Chief, General Scott, a loyal Virginian, sent his views in writing to the Secretary of War, in which he dealt more with the political than the military situation, and expressed the opinions that Secession was justifiable, and the right of coercion very limited, that disruption was preferable to inter- necine war, and that the country would probably split up peaceably into four new Republics, on lines which he defined ; but, as a Southerner, he advised the South not to secede, and hoped that they would not do so ; in any case, however, he deprecated the inva- sion of a seceded State. The contents of this most indiscreet paper soon leaked out, and distinctly encouraged the malcontents ; but Scott followed it up with the incredible folly, or worse, of publishing it in the papers, without the knowledge or consent of the President, in January, 1861 (cf. p. 70). From Floyd's private diary, which was found, it is plain that the Southern members of the Cabinet at Washington were in active correspondence with the Committee at Charleston, even to the length of arranging for the immediate purchase and delivery of muskets, and that this was done before any of the members of the Cabinet resigned. Mr. Buchanan's Message to Congress on December 3rd was a great blow to the North, for they had hoped that he, a Northern statesman, would have taken the oppor- tunity to proclaim the right of coercion of the State by the Nation (cf. p. t,^)). The original draft did inculcate submission to the facts created by Lincoln's election, and the use of force to compel it ; but on second thoughts, the lawyer got the better of the statesman, Buchanan's growing feebleness of purpose did not make for a vigorous policy, and the Message, as read, took entirely the opposite view. Even now, efforts were made in Congress to bring about a modus vivendi, but to no purpose. On December 14th ^bout half the Senators and Representatives from the 42 SECESSION Southern States issued a Manifesto to their con- stituents, from Washington, which may be called the official beginning of the Confederacy. It says that " argument is exhausted," though, only the day before, the Special Committee appointed to deal with the difficulty had offered to the Southern people "any reasonable, proper, and constitutional reme- dies, and effectual guarantees." The Democratic Government was still in power, and had practi- cally yielded to all the Southern demands ; plainly, therefore, the North were not the side which refused to reason. In South Carolina the State elections had replaced Gist by Pickens as Governor, but this caused no change in policy, for the new Governor immediately sent a letter to the President, dated December 17th, com- plaining that Charleston was threatened by the guns of the forts, that they were being strengthened, and, further, requesting permission to send a small State force to take possession of Fort Sumter, the Charleston Arsenal having already been handed over to the State authorities. As early as December 8th some of the South Carolina Representatives had warned the President that any attempt by the United States authorities to reinforce the forts would probably result in an attack on them ; and perhaps this was the reason why Buchanan did not take the advice of General Scott, who urged reinforcement, for he wished to avoid bloodshed, which must bring war, while Secession alone, he thought, need not do so. It would hardly be too much to say that on the answer to this claim of the Seceding States, to take over United States property within their borders at a valuation, as a constitutional right, turned the question of whether Secession was to be peaceable or not. In Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, the section which specially defines the powers of the Nation, as against the individual NATIONAL PROPERTY 43 jurisdiction of the several States, the wording runs thus : " The Congress shall have power ... to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever . . . over all places purchased by the consent of the Legis- lature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, etc., etc." This gives absolute power " in all cases whatso- ever," but only mentions those of tenure by purchase, whereas the Confederates describe some of these tenures as leases. Jefferson Davis maintains that the various States ceded land for forts, etc., on con- dition, expressed or implied, that they should be used only for the purpose for which the grant was made ; that this was sometimes National, sometimes State, Defence, and that, in the case of Fort Monroe, it was to revert to Virginia, if abandoned or put to other than National use. The whole point lies in the Right of Secession, which the Republicans did not acknowledge, but it certainly existed, legally, for the State of Virginia. Douglas acknowledged the right of the State to the land, if it seceded, and Buchanan was willing to consider it ; but it must be remembered that they were the leaders of the other party. The cases cited, however, were of places ceded by the various State Legislatures for a definite purpose, not sold. In any event, the Confederates held that the right of the Nation would be annulled by the Secession of the State in which the property in question stood, such Secession being perfectly lawful, since it would be manifestly impossible for a Sovereign Nation to tolerate the maintenance by another Nation, possibly hostile to it, of fortified places within its borders. They contended that the Right of Secession provided for the solution of the difficulty, which was a mere 44 SECESSION matter of arrangement or valuation, on the termina- tion of the contract between the seceding State and its former Nation. Mr. Buchanan's answer was again that of the cautious lawyer, rather than of the President of the United States, for he treated the question as open to argument, saying that it was for Congress, not for him, to decide the relations between the Govern- ment and the State of South Carolina, so that he could not surrender the forts, but that he had de- clined to reinforce them, trusting to the honour of South Carolina not to attack them pending settle- ment, and also hoping " that Commissioners will be sent by the Convention to treat with Congress on the subject." This was not only a direct recognition of the valuation theory, but of South Carolina as a Sovereign State outside the Union : still, however mistaken, it was all a consistent part of his policy to avert war, and, if he could not stop Secession, to disarm rancour, and part friends. He went on, however, to warn South Carolina that if she made war on the United States, the war resulting there- from would not be a case of a Nation using force to keep a State within the Union, which he con- demned, but merely of taking up the gauntlet which the State had thrown down — a perfectly legitimate ground for war. He added that no permission had been given to surrender the Arsenal to the State authorities, and that he was amazed at the demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter. The Secessionists at Washington saw at once the blunder that Pickens had committed in giving Buchanan a loophole for action, which it was their business to prevent, and persuaded him to ask the President to allow him to withdraw his letter : this consent was gladly given, and they were relieved from a most dangerous situation. The President made one more effort, and wrote to Governor Pickens in the most conciliatory tone, to see ANDERSON OCCUPIES SUMTER 45 if even now it might be possible to avert Secession ; but the Governor merely informed the bearer that there was no hope of doing so — in fact, South Carolina passed the Ordinance of Secession that very day, December 20th, and on the 24th issued an "Address to the Slave-holding States." On December 27th, the Commissioners from South Carolina came to see the President, re the transfer of the forts at Charles- ton; but, the very night before, Major Anderson, who was in command, then at Fort Moultrie, on the main- land, was alarmed at the preparations made by the Confederates to attack him, and moved his command into the sea fort of Sumter for greater safety, spiking the guns at Fort Moultrie before he left. This altera- tion of the status quo made the Commissioners' task almost impossible, for the people at Charleston were furious, describing Anderson's move as an act of war, and demanding that he be ordered back again, etc., etc. Anderson was, in fact, conforming to his orders most strictly, for he was in charge of several forts, without enough men to garrison any one of them, and had been told to use his discretion with regard to his position, and the manner in which they were held. Instead of negociating, the Commissioners tried to bully; but this was childish, for even Buchanan, in his present temper, could not order that United States forts be evacuated at their demand. Buchanan care- fully stated that he only met the Commissioners as private gentlemen, and did not recognize them officially ; but surely, in trying to save face on one point, he put himself in a false position on the other, by meeting them as the President. All this time Floyd, who even now did not resign his office as Secretary of War, was gaining time for his side, and keeping the President quiet by his advice ; but large sums of Government money were found to be missing, and his name was connected with the matter. Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury, had resigned a fortnight before ; he found the Treasury 46 SECESSION full, and left it empty. Cass, the Secretary of State, resigned also ; but this was from disgust at Buchanan's weakness in declining to advise a stronger policy in dealing with Secession, in his Message to Congress. ThontaSy another Secessionist, replaced Cobb ; but Black, the Attorney-General, a strong Union man, took Cass's place, and soon made his presence felt. He was succeeded as Attorney-General by Stanton, the strongest Unionist of all. In the last days of December, Stanton accused Floyd to his face, before the President, of embezzlement and treason, and forced him to resign on the 29th. The poor old President had quite broken down, and Black was so angry when he saw the weakness of his draft reply to the Commissioners from South Carolina, that he threatened to resign, but consented to stay on being allowed to re-write it in the President's name. In its new form it was a very different document, short and sharp, and ended their mission abruptly. The year 1861 thus opened with a stronger guidance of the National business, which caused the retire- ment from the Cabinet of the last two Secessionist members : their game was up. Before they went, though, a meeting of Southern Members was held in the Capitol itself, on January 5th, which arranged to hold a Convention for the purpose of Secession at Montgomery, Alabama, in the first half of February, and also that the Southern Representatives should not resign for the present, in order to obstruct the business of Congress as long as possible. Even so late as March i6th President Lincoln, speaking in the Senate, acknowledged no division of the United States, and Mr. Mason of Virginia was present. While the North were vacillating on the question of reinforcing Fort Sumter, in which discussions General Scott did not shew to advantage, Pickens set about making new works to threaten it, and at last the small steamer *' Star of the West " was sent there with supplies, but she was fired on and turned back : SOUTHERN STATES SECEDE 47 these were the first shots fired in the War. Anderson, however, in Fort Sumter, received his mails and suppHes regularly from Charleston, and was not molested, as the Confederates still thought that a peaceful solution would be reached and that force would be unnecessary, but they were determined to have the fort by some means or other : another reason why they troubled Anderson so little was that he was a Southerner, and they had hopes that he would think that his duty lay in Secession. The Southern States now took active measures : Mississippi left the Union on January 9th, Florida on the loth, Alabama on the i ith, Georgia on the 19th, Louisiana on the 26th, and Texas on February 2nd. (It seems, however, that Georgia did not secede with a view of continuing her existence outside the Union, but in order to revise the conditions under which she accepted the Constitution, and come back on better terms.) They then claimed the United States forts, arsenals, etc., as belonging to those States on whose land they stood, subject to valuation, and, with two exceptions. Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Pickens, off" Pensacola, Florida, the State Militia took posses- sion of them. Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina, did not secede till Lincoln called for their quota of troops after the fall of Sumter, and Kentucky remained neutral till the War had fairly started ; it was then divided, and did not go, as a State, to either side. Missouri also did not secede, being nearly equally divided, both in feelings and territory. Maryland, too, although strongly Southern in sympathy, did not secede, one reason being that her State troops would be called out rather for the defence of Washington than for the attack or coercion of the Seceded States. The Southern States, which formed the Confederacy, were thus divided into two batches : the first seceded on the question of States Rights, the second on that of Coercion. North Carolina was attacked by the North before she actually 48 SECESSION seceded, but after seizing the United States forts, etc. Thus these seizures were by no means simultaneous over the Southern States. The new Virginia Legisla- ture, indeed, elected on February 4th, was strongly against Secession, as was also that of Tennessee. Here we must go back a little. The suggestions in the President's Message of December 3rd were re- ferred to a small representative Committee of Thirteen, to which Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky proposed, as a working Compromise, that the South surrender the right of taking slaves into all the Territories, which was given to them by the Supreme Court, if the North would recognize it south of the old Compromise line of 36° 30' ; but that a Territory, on becoming a State, might do so with or without slavery, within any limits which Congress might fix. The Southerners accepted this, and the Northern Democrats pressed its acceptance, as the only chance of minimizing Secession ; but the Republicans, though they had fought for the Missouri Compromise, would have none of it. Crittenden brought it before the Senate for reference to the people direct, but was beaten : the President, in a special Message to Congress of January 8th, 1861, pressed it most earnestly, but in vain, and Crittenden's repeated efforts met the same fate. Then Virginia proposed a Peace Conference, which was called together at Washington on Febru- ary 4th, and represented twenty States : this also took Crittenden's Compromise as the best working basis, but the business was delayed, and this Compromise, and all modifications of it, were either shelved or defeated. At the end of February the House adopted an Amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Conference, forbidding any interference with slavery, but, though it also passed the Senate, it fell through, not being adopted by the requisite number of States. This was practically all that Congress did in the whole session to meet the danger, and was not done till after Secession had taken place, for they had steadily THE NEW CONFEDERACV 49 refused to vote either men or money, or give the President special powers, as had been given to Presi- dent Jackson to meet a smaller crisis. The first Confederate Congress met at Montgomery, Alabama, on February 4th, formed a provisional Govenimoit and drafted a Constitution, which was adopted on March nth. Jefferson Davis of Mississippi was elected President, Alexander Stephens of Georgia Vice-President. This was done on February 9th, Lincoln and Hamlin being officially elected to the same posts in the United States, respectively, on the 13th. On the 15th, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution to appoint Commissioners to the Government of the United States, to avert war, if possible, and help the work of the Peace Conference, but events moved so rapidly that nothing came of this. Since the middle of the preceding year the Governors of the Southern States had been increasing the strength of their State Militia, drilling it, and appoint- ing to commands officers whom they could trust. Also, since December, the seizure of United States property in Southern States had been going on ; but, with two exceptions, the Southern officers in the old service loyally handed over their charges to their successors, before resigning their commissions, where a successor could be appointed, or until turned out by force. These exceptions were Major-General Twiggs, a veteran of the Mexican War, and Captain G. Magritder, of the Navy : the former surrendered the military posts in Texas, where he was in command ; the latter, property in his charge at Norfolk, Virginia. Twiggs was made a Major-General in the Confederate service, and commanded at New Orleans, till succeeded by Lovell at the end of the year ; Captain Magruder is not mentioned again. The Confederates took the initiative in preparing for war, and passed an Act to organize a General Staff" for their Army, on February 26th ; another Act, on March 6th, provided for an Army, for twelve months' 4 50 SECESSION service, not to exceed 100,000 men. On March 15th they authorized the construction or purchase of ten gunboats. Already the President, Jefferson Davis, an educated soldier, who had served with credit in Mexico and elsewhere, had assumed the general control of military affairs in the Confederacy, as. it then existed, General Beauregard had taken command at Charleston, and General Bragg in Florida. At the beginning of April, Beauregard heard that a Northern fleet was on its way to relieve Sumter, so on the nth he called on Anderson to march out, for conveyance to a Northern port, not as a surrender. Anderson refused, and the bombardment opened on the 12th, the fort surrendering the next day, just as the small relieving fleet came off the harbour. Then the North awoke in earnest, and rallied to the flag which had been fired on, without distinction of political party. President Lincoln, who had assumed office on March 4th, issued a call for 75,000 militia for three months' service, which was answered by Davis hy a call for 32,000 men, who also threatened to issue letters of marque at sea. The North sent an expedi- tion from Fort Monroe to destroy the abandoned Navy Yard at Norfolk, on April 20th. Both sides began to assign commanders to various places, and to concentrate men under them, mostly State Militia, and the Northern Government offered the command of its armies in the field to two Southern officers. Generals Sidney Johnston and R. E. Lee, be- tween April 15th and 21st. Both returned the same answer, that they hoped that there would be no war, but that they would follow the fortunes of their respective States. Both immediately resigned their commissions, and joined the Confederate service. On April 23rd two important events occurred : General Lee was put in command of the Virginia State Militia, and Captain Lyon practically given the com- mand of the Department of the West (Missouri). On April 19th the North proclaimed a blockade of the THE FIRST MOVES 51 Southern ports from South Carolina to Texas in- clusive, and, on the 27th, after Virginia had decided to secede, and North Carolina had seized the National forts on her territory, extended it to those of these two States also. In the next few days President Lincoln called for men to serve for three years instead of three months. Western Virginia was occupied by State troops, as it was strongly Union in feeling, though still an integral part of Virginia. On May 6th the Confederate Congress passed an Act recogniz- ing the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States, and, a day or so afterwards. General Lee was given the command of the Confederate forces in Virginia, having before been but the nominee of the Governor of the State. At several places in Virginia a few shots were ex- changed between Union vessels and Confederate batteries, but the War began first in a connected form in Missouri. The Governor of this State was Jackson, a thorough Secessionist, who tried to carry the State to the Con- federate side in the February elections ; but the energy of F. P. Blair rallied the Union men and defeated him, the result being that a body of men were elected, none of whom w^ould vote for Secession. Blair was a very able politician, who had been of the greatest use to the Republicans at the late Presidential Election, and had a brother in Lincoln's Cabinet. As soon as South Carolina seceded, he got his adherents together, and drilled them carefully as Home Guards, but was very short of arms. Though there were plenty in the St. Louis Arsenal, they were not to be had during Buchanan's Administration ; but the local elections had so discouraged the Secessionist party that no attempt was made on the Arsenal till the beginning of April, when the Governor had at disposal a small volunteer brigade under General Frost. It was ar- ranged that the State Militia should be called out and put under Frost's command, who was then to 52 SECESSION camp in a position where he would have the Arsenal at his mercy : having no artillery, they sent for some to Baton Rouge. The Arsenal, however, was com- manded by a most capable man, Captain Lyon, who worked with Blair for the Union cause ; and they had exact information of their opponents' plans. Blair had reported to Washington that General Harney, com- manding the District, was of doubtful loyalty, so he was set aside, and Lyon put in his place for the time. Lyon then sent away some of the arms to Illinois, armed Blair's men with the rest, and took military command, making his camp on the very ground that Frost was to have occupied, and forcing him into a worse position, which he called Camp Jackson. Here he meant to^wait for his guns, and then move; but, as soon as the guns arrived, Lyon and Blair suddenly surrounded the camp with a very superior force, and took it, and everything in it, on May loth. On their return there was a riot in the streets of St. Louis, in which some people were shot, which, as Coercion, had the effect of causing the ex-Governor, Mr. Price, an honourable and very influential man, to offer his services to the Governor as a Confederate, though he had refused to vote for Secession. He had had military experience in the Mexican War, and was a fair commander in the field, so his defection was very important ; but the prompt action of Blair and Lyon in the next few days saved Missouri for the Union. These were not desultory operations as elsewhere, but the first beginnings of a regular stage of the War. (Continued on p. 92.) On May 20th, North Carolina, the last State to secede, left the Union for the Confederacy. This chapter takes us through the period of un- certainty and defection which lasted about seven months, from October to May, though no State actually seceded till December. Many clear-sighted men in the North saw that, in the then temper of the people, Secession spelt War ; but this opinion was by APPROACH OF WAR 53 no means general, especially in the South, where Se- cession was looked upon as an absolutely constitutional proceeding, which no reasonable man could question, and they therefore thought that, though there might be much irritation and some military preparation, this latter was rather the creation of the new military forces of the two new nations, with a little bluff thrown in, than a genuine intention of going to war, and that the then burning question of the National military property in the Southern States, when looked at, as they doubted not that it soon would be, clearly and without passion, was a mere matter of valuation. There was, however, another view of this point. Some of the more rabid Secessionists, looking at the lack of preparation in the North in the first quarter of the year, said that there would be no war because " the Yanks dared not fight," and thus did much to bring it about. The first blow to the peaceful separation opinion was Mr. Black's dismissal of the Charleston Com- missioners at the end of December; but still few thought that war would really come. At the Con- federate Convention in February at Montgomery, the general opinion was plainly expressed that there would be no war; later in the same month Lee said that the position did not justify war, and both he and Sidney Johnston, when offered Union command in April, said that they still hoped that war might be averted. These opinions, though, show that hope was steadily declining. After the fall of Sumter men's passions were roused to white-heat, both sides called out men in haste, doubtful and powerful States seceded, and when more hostile acts followed, such as the pro- clamations of blockade of April 19th and 27th by the North, and taking the United States officers at San Antonio, Texas, prisoners of war, by the South, on April 23rd, war was inevitable, and was formally recognized by the Confederates on May 6th. A fort- night afterwards the accession of North Carolina 54 SECESSION completed their side, more distinct acts of war had taken place in the meantime, and the two enemies stood facing each other. What were their positions, prospects, and plans respectively ? For District Areas in Chronological Table, see beginning of chapter vi, p. 74. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 55 1861 H w January February M.\Rcn 5. Expedition to relieve Fort Sum- ter leaves New York. 18. Publication of General Scott's " Views " in the "National Intelli- gencer." 4. Peace Confer- ence at Washing- ton, at the re- quest of the State of Virginia. 28. Amendment passed by Con- gress to forbid interference with slavery. (Never ratified.) < w D O 3. Georgia State seizes Fort Pu- laski. 9. The first shots of the War. The " Star of the West," for Fort Sumter, turned back. 10. The State of Florida secedes. 19. The State of Georgia secedes. 3. General Beau- regard takes com- mand at Charles- ton. 11. General Bragg takes command in Florida. 1 s 5. Alabama State seizes forts on Mobile Bay. 9. The State of Mississippi se- cedes. 11. Louisiana State seizes forts below New Orleans. 11. The State of Alabama secedes. 12. Florida State seizes land forts at Pensacola. 26. The State of Louisiana secedes. 4. Confederate Convention meets at Montgomery. 8. Co nf ederate Constitution adopted. 9. Jefferson Davis elected President. 18. Confederate .(4 ci of Congress to provide munitions of war, and — 26. to organize a General Staff for the Army, and — 28. to raise provi- sional forces. 6. Confederate ^ci for establishment of an Army, not exceeding 100,000 men, for twelve months' service. 11. Formal adop- tion of Confeder- ate Constitution. 15. Confederate Act, to build or buy ten gun- boats. Is CO ^ 2. The State of Texas secedes. 18. Surrender of U.S. Army posts in Texas by Maj.- Gen. Twiggs. 56 SECESSION 1861 April May 1-20 7 and 10. Reinforcements 1-3. Virginia calls for more sail from New York for men. Forts Pickens and Sumter. 3. Lincoln calls for volun- 15. President Lincoln calls for teers for three years, and in- 75, ooomen.forthree months' creases the Army and Navy service. of the United States. 17. The Virginia Convention 7. Virginia admitted into the secedes, subject to popular Confederacy. vote. 18. Naval attack on Con- 19. Lincoln proclaims block- federate batteries at Sewell's H ade of Southern ports, from Point. ^ South Carolina to Texas. w 19. General Patterson takes command round Washing- ton. 20. Expedition to destroy Navy Yard at Norfolk. 23. General Lee takes com- mand of Virginian State troops. 27. Blockade of Virginia and North Carolina ports pro- claimed. 12. Bombardment of Fort Si Sumter. w 13. Surrender of Fort Sumter. g 15, 16. Coast forts in North o Carolina seized by State 20. The State of North Caro- to authorities. lina secedes. 20. U.S. Arsenal at Liberty, 7. The State of Tennessee Missouri, seized by Seces- enters into a military league S sionists. with the Confederacy. 23. Captain Lyon takes tem- 10. Lyon captures Camp Jack- porary command of the son. Department of the West. 11. Riot at St. Louis. 6. The Confederate Congress recognizes the existence of war between the Confeder- H acy and the United States. § 17. Jefferson Davis calls for 17. The Confederate Congress 5 32,000 men, and offers to passes an Act to admit issue letters of marque to Tennessee and North Caro- privateers. lina into the Confederacy, under certain conditions. if 23. U.S. troops at San An- 6. The State of Arkansas ^ tonio, Texas, made prison- secedes. |i ers of war. CHAPTER V THE TWO SIDES : THEIR POSITIONS, PROSPECTS, AND PLANS ^ The dividing line between the two sides, early in 1861, may be said to start at Fort Monroe, in Vir- ginia, to follow the line of the Potomac River to its most northerly bend, thence to strike away south-west across Western Virginia and Kentucky, almost in a straight line to the Ohio River at the most southerly point of Ohio State, and thence to Paducah at the mouth of the Cumberland. Thence it followed the Ohio to Cairo, the Mississippi to St. Louis, and the Mis- souri to Kansas City, thence along the east and south borders of Kansas State to the present north-east corner of New Mexico, down the western border of Texas to the 34th parallel, and along that line west- ward to the Colorado River, following the river to Fort Yuma. It may be as well to explain here that the Western States were very different from what they now are, only California and Oregon having the same boundaries. That is to say, on the Union side were ranged Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massa- chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland (most un- willingly, at this time), West Virginia (not a State, officially, till 1863), Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, part of Kentucky, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, part of Missouri, Kansas, Oregon, California, with Nebraska, Washington, and Utah Territories, and ' Map 2. 57 58 THE TWO SIDES part of New Mexico Territory. The southern parts of West Virginia and Kentucky were at first either neutral or neutralized. On the Confederate side were Virginia (minus West Virginia), North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, parts of Kentucky and Mis- souri, all Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas (including part of Indian Territory), and part of New Mexico Territory. The great northern and western Territories were rather a source of weakness than strength to the Union side, for troops had to be kept there to deal with the hostile Indians, and also with the Mormons. But Indians were organized on both sides in the neighbourhood of Indian Territory : though they did not seem to have done much good to either, it was, perhaps, the best way of keeping them occupied. On the Confederate side, the country west of the Missis- sippi did not produce many men in proportion to its size, though better settled than that on the north ; but the supplies from thence were almost inexhaustible, and it was the stoppage of their supplies which was the principal damage to the Confederate cause by the Union conquest of the Mississippi. In the North the population was, for the greater part, manufacturing and trading, with lumbermen and pioneers from Wisconsin and Michigan : only a small proportion were hunters or accustomed to the use of firearms ; while those used to riding were very few indeed, and this deficiency was most serious at first. The population was about three or four times as great as that of the Confederacy. The Southerners were principally planters and hunters, with a good pro- portion of Western men — men who were always on horseback, carried arms habitually, and lived a hardy out-of-doors life, the best possible material for soldiers : as a set-off to this, they were less amenable to disci- pline. They had many more men of position and breeding as leaders — another great advantage. In numbers, however, they were very deficient, and, even THEIR RESOURCES 59 before the War, did not increase by means of immigra- tion, like their opponents. In resources the South were even more inferior to the North than in population, for they had next to no manufacturing power, and their people did not take to this work. Their railway repair shops, etc., were mostly worked by Northerners, who went back before war broke out, so that the South were even worse off than they seemed to be, and could not use to the best advantage the works that they had, to keep their rail- ways in repair during the War. At the beginning of it there were no works in the country which could roll a 2|-inch plate, cast a gun, or make a marine engine, except the Tredegar Works at Richmond; and, when the Confederacy started, Virginia had not seceded. There were also works at Atlanta (Georgia), at Selma (Alabama), and at New Orleans; but when this latter city was taken, their difficulties, especially of railroad repair, increased very much. In Virginia there were lead works at Wytheville, salt works at Saltville, and a good leather industry at Lynchburg. The Confederates were in need of everything for the equipment of an army and navy, having, as the agricultural section of the community, left all manu- factures to the North. Even in the State Armouries there were very few efficient arms, for most of the muskets had been sent away to be converted from flint to percussion action, and had not returned ; there was, besides, but little powder. Powder mills there were none, nor raw material with which to make powder : all these things were done in the North, and the South had to provide them in haste, when war was imminent. It was said of General Gorgas, the chief Ordnance Of^cer, that he created an Ordnance Department out of nothing. They had hardly any iron to repair bridges or build ships, and wood could not be seasoned in time, but had to be used green, which was one cause of the badness of Southern gunboats. The worst drawback, though, was the inability to build a 6o THE TWO SIDES marine engine. It is hardly too much to say that on this alone the whole War may have turned, in the matter of breaking the blockade, with a probable recognition by foreign nations as a result, and a cer- tain simplifying of the question of supply from abroad, by being able to send cotton, the real wealth of the South, to European markets : they might then have been able to finance the War ; but the price of supplies killed them. With two exceptions, all the vessels that they built or armoured failed through want of engine- power, and one of these did so from bad armour. The difficulty of supply dogged the footsteps of all Confederate generals. It has been well said that they were often unjustly blamed for not following up a success, since people did not consider that every battle pretty well exhausted their stock of ammunition, the replenishing of which was most difficult : in the matter of supplies they had to live from hand to mouth. Another reason was the deficiency in numbers, which generally obliged them to use up their reserves to hold their own. Attempts were made during the War to import iron, and men to work it in the shops, but to little purpose, because everything passed the blockade by driblets, and, besides the lack of iron, there was not enough coal for manufacturing pur- poses. Yet the South, with all these disadvantages, stood up to its great opponent for four long years. It is needless to specify the manufacturing resources of the North, for they had everything. Looking at the military geography of the country, the North was bounded by the Potomac and Ohio Rivers, both excellent bases of invasion, and practically under its control, but was cut in two by the Alleghany Mountains. Though the country was well populated on both sides, the lateral communications were bad, especially near the frontier, where most important. The principal one was the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- way, which was awkwardly placed, as it ran through Western Virginia, and was exposed to Confederate THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 6i raids : there was a roundabout line through Pittsburg, and that was all. Only one line ran from Washington northwards, which passed through Baltimore, a town most hostile to the North at first. A very important consideration was the lukewarmness of Kentucky : its neutrality delayed operations there till 1862, by which time the Union side were ready ; but their position would have been critical in the extreme had Kentucky been enthusiastic for the South, for a Confederate army could have been massed opposite the weak spot where the North was only one State deep, and have cut it in two, while these troops, as things were, had to be kept far to the southward. The striking line of the South was through the middle of this State, that of the North along the Tennessee River, in the western part of it, not only taking the former line in flank and rear, but attacking the Confederacy directly. Thus the valleys of the Cumberland and Tennessee, and the country between them, were the strategical key of the War, in the pure military sense, for the sturdy Middle States were the backbone of both sides, and in this district the most important point was Nashville, on the Cumberland. The Union base on the great rivers was Cairo, at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, being a most important strategical point in front of it. The Mississippi was vital to the Confederacy in the long run, but not im- mediately, for the South- Western States sent supplies rather than men, and it was an invaluable waterway to the side which had command on the water. It has been said that it was a danger to the Confederate States on the east bank, when the Union fleet got control, as affording means of flank attack, but it was really rather a protection than otherwise, for the country in Tennessee was not favourable, and, south of Memphis, the regions of swamp and forest were impenetrable to troops for hundreds of miles, the only good bases of invasion being Memphis and Vicksburg, 62 THE TWO SIDES and the land in their vicinity. South of the Ohio, no great navigable rivers came in on this side. On the west, however, these conditions were reversed, for here came in two great affluents, the Arkansas and Red River, navigable, and invaluable sources of supply to the South, while a landing could be made almost anywhere. Here the possession of the Mississippi gave a valuable line of attack, which the Unionists utilized to the full, first separating, then cutting up in detail, the South-Western States. The river line, therefore, which it was of most importance to the Confederates to deny to their opponents, was from some point covering Memphis on the north, to below the confluence of the Red River, which should be considered independently of New Orleans, a most important place in itself. It was vitally necessary to close the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, the latter especially, to the Union gunboats, the more so when the Confederate weakness in boatbuilding is remem- bered. The Confederacy was also divided by the Alleghany Mountains, as far south as Northern Georgia : but its railway system, had it been kept in fair working order, was the better arranged of the two. From Chattanooga, Tennessee, railways ran through the mountains to Richmond, via Knoxville and Lynchburg, to Charleston and Savannah, and to Memphis, on the Mississippi, an invaluable trunk system, which was almost entirely south of the Tennessee River, and from which several lines useful for attack ran north, uniting at Bowling Green, Kentucky, and thence running to Louisville on the Ohio, the great Union base : farther south, a line ran most of the way between Charleston and Savannah, and Vicksburg, with a gap between Montgomery and Selma, but these towns were joined by the navigable Alabama River : lines ran to the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, to Columbus and Paducah, from Mobile and New Orleans, and from Richmond south to Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah : there were THE CONFEDERATE POSITION 63 only a few short lines on the west of the Mississippi, for either side. The Confederate requirements for a covering line, a strong defence to their country, and base for attack of their opponents, could have been found in a short line from the Mississippi, by New Madrid or Hickman, via Forts Henry and Donelson, on the Tennessee and Cumberland respectively, to some point farther east, perhaps the important rail- way junction of Bowling Green ; but this required to be planned properly, in order to economize power as much as possible, not at haphazard, and here the want of good central control, and a well-thought-out plan from the outset, was sadly lacking. It was not till September, 1861, that this district was brought under one strong and able commander, Sidney Johnston, and he then found that different generals had been carrying out their own notions independently. On the Mis- sissippi alone there were half a dozen heavily armed positions, of which only one proved of the smallest use, the others falling easily ; more than one of them mounted over a hundred heavy guns, which the Con- federates could not afford to lose. Less than half of the garrison, armament, labour, and time, wasted on these, would have made one strong river-flank position to the strategic line practically impregnable. Of course all this work was not done by May 20th, but the con- sideration of it seems not out of place here. The Confederates having no navy, their whole coast-line was open to attack, but the peculiar conformation of the Atlantic coast, from the north border of North Carolina to that of Florida, was advantageous to them, for it consists of a long, low barrier of sandy islands, behind which is a narrow inland sea, forming a perfect maze of creeks and islands, which give lateral com- munication for great distances, without the necessity of going into the open sea at all. In many of these narrow places the Confederates had erected defensive works As we have seen, the Confederates had taken Fort Sumter at Charleston, and had gained a great prize in 64 THE TWO SIDES the large stock of heavy guns at Norfolk Navy Yard, which they were able to remove after it was abandoned before the expedition came which destroyed what was left. With two exceptions, they had taken all the old sea forts, mostly old brick erections of antiquated pattern, quite unable to withstand the heavier guns which had come in since they were built, and thus no accession of defensive strength ; they had also fortified other places, but, in their unwillingness to surrender a foot of ground, they fell into the same error as on the Mississippi, of trying to hold too much, were thus not able to stand against combined attacks by land and water, and lost heavily. They had the Government Navy Yards of Norfolk and Pensacola, but made little or no use of them, since neither had free access to the sea, one being in Chesapeake Bay, the other in the Gulf of Mexico. They succeeded, however, in con- verting the heavy smooth-bores which they had taken, to rifled guns, on the system of Brooke^ an ex-lieutenant of the U.S. Navy, who put a heavy band on the breech and rifled them ; these guns did excellent service. Washington, the Northern Capital, was about as bad a place for the purpose as could have been found, but the North took it as it stood, being the Capital. Besides the badness of its communications, it was actually on the frontier, commanded from the Virginian side of the Potomac. The District of Columbia had been carved out of Maryland, a slave-holding State, and was, like it, in great part Southern in feeling, so much so that at first Washington was the great centre of Confederate Intelligence : Beauregard, just before Bull Run, was kept exactly informed of McDowell's movements by Southerners there. When local volun- teers were organized to protect the Capital, many units were composed of known Secessionists, and Floyd, before his resignation, armed and equipped them well ; this was luckily discovered in time, and these disloyal troops were disarmed and dispersed, but the danger was extreme. The Northern Govern- THE TWO CAPITALS 65 ment was, metaphorically, living over a powder magazine. The great sources of weakness were the liability of the Capital to attack, and the timidity and selfishness of the politicians, who understood nothing whatever about war, and increased their own danger by the way in which they hampered the con- duct of it. The ground in front and rear was taken and fortified, till it was very strong, so much so that it has been called an ideal capital because it was so good a military base ; but surely its value as a military base was almost nullified by its being the political capital. The politicians should have moved well inland, where the^'^ would not have been liable to be terrified out of their wits by every Confederate raid, because, whenever they were so, they interfered with the military conduct of the War. On the other side, the Confederate choice of Richmond as a capital, soon after the War began, seems more un- fortunate, because they were in no way bound to go there. The fact of its being in the great State of Virginia did not counterbalance its disadvantages. Montgomery may not have been the best place, but it was, at all events, well removed from any possible attack. Instead of taking warning by the bad posi- tion of the Northern Capital, the Confederates copied the mistake. Looking to the fact that they had no sea power, and could not raise the blockade, Rich- mond was at the mercy of the sea power of the North, being on a navigable river within the heads of Chesapeake Bay, which was landlocked, and could be used by vessels which were not sea-going. Wash- ington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, stood on its upper waters, and Fort Monroe, which was never out of Union hands, was opposite the entrance. Richmond was thus exposed to attack, and had no direct communication with the outer world. Also, its being the Capital made the railways connecting it with the South more important, and they all had to pass through the narrow gap between the mountains 5 66 THE TWO SIDES and the sea : this apparent strategical danger was, however, neutralized by the very swampy nature of the country for some distance back from the coast. Another fault was that the position of Richmond confined the best Confederate general and army to one line of operations ; Lee called it a millstone, dragging the army down. The United States had only kept up a very small army before the War, hardly enough to keep the Indians and Mormons in order, and garrison a few posts, so the necessary expansion to large armies was a national matter with both sides, but with this difference — that on the Union side the old regiments kept together, losing officers, but hardly any men, because the latter were principally Irish and German emigrants, the native American not taking to the Service much. Thus many good officers remained with their old rank and commands till after General Scott's retirement, for he kept the army together, refusing to allow young officers to take volunteer commissions. Grant thought this a great mistake, and that, when the manhood of the nation had to be called to arms, the army should be broken up, and the trained officers and men distributed through the new units, with a step in rank, keeping only the Staff on its old footing. He thought that the South had a great advantage in having no army, but only a number of excellent officers, to create one. On both sides, however, the Staff was quite untrained for the work which was suddenly entrusted to it, and the regular army was so small, that only 3,000 men could be withdrawn from the West for the War. The South had a larger proportion of good officers to its population than the North had, and it will be remembered that, in President's Pierce's time, Jefferson Davis and Colonel Cooper, then Secretary of War and Adjutant-General respectively, had found this out on going over the lists for promotion by selection on the military record (cf. p. 11); we may be quite THE NEW ARMIES 67 sure that when the same two men were again co- operating, in raising the Confederate army, they did not forget it. The South, not being encumbered with alteration or addition, but raising an army de novo, and their leaders being men who understood army requirements much better than those of the North, made several wise variations. They first formed a General Staff, then raised their Army, and this was for twelve months' service, not as in the North, for three ; they gave full rank to their senior officers, corresponding to the size of their army, making Generals, Lieutenant-Generals, and Major- Generals, with well-defined seniority. This may sound a small matter, but it was not really so ; the generals were not, as in the North, all of the same rank, one being put to command the others, regardless of seniority, a distinction without a difference, which was a most disastrous source of jealousy and in- trigue. Another advantage was that each Southern general was entitled by virtue of his rank to the proper staff for working his command, which was not the case in the North, At first, on both sides, the insane practice prevailed of the election of officers by those whom they were to command, but it did most harm in the North, since a much stronger governance was maintained in the South, The new volunteer forces were outside of the State Militia; but in the early days of the War, when this was the only armed force, the political power of the Governors of States was most impor- tant, for they could deal with the State force as a whole, and appoint officers to it, up to a Major- General as State Commander-in-Chief, This enabled the Southern States to overpower small garrisons and seize army stores. In many States, though, the military value of the Militia was almost nil. The South made the great mistake of not appointing a Commander-in-Chief till their cause was hopeless ; and the North, after the retirement of General Scott, 68 THE TWO SIDES who was old and infirm, were unfortunate in their selection till the arrival of Grant. McClellan would probably have done much better than Halleck, had he not made himself impossible. On the naval side matters were more in favour of the Union, because, though the Navy was at its lowest ebb, the Confederates had neither ships nor the means of building them, and the blockade increased their difficulties enormously. Both sides set to work at once : the North to rake in anything that would float and carry guns, to start the blockade till something better could be had ; the South to try to buy what they could abroad, though they set aside money to build or buy gunboats, probably at home. At first they could only find one steamer fit for a sea-going cruiser, which was commissioned as the " Sumter." Their home-built boats were poor things, what with green timber and very inferior power of making either engines or armour. To remedy these deficiencies, they sent an officer to England in May with very free powers to buy or build. They had more officers than they could find command for, but few men. The North was very short of both officers, men, and ships ; though there had been plenty of warning, the Navy Department had made no preparations for war, and had only twenty- four available steamers when it broke out, scattered all over the world. Their heavy smooth-bores were very effective against wooden ships, but only the smaller patterns of rifled guns were reliable. New types of vessels were wanted for the peculiar coast and river work, for which the fine heavy frigates were quite unfit, but the sloop-of-war class was most useful. Ironclads were started at once. As to finances, little need be said of those of the North, which were strong and in full working order; nothing had to be created in a hurry. The South, however, was very poor : her wealth consisted in her raw products, and if she could not realize these she was helpless ; the Northern manufacturers supplied \ \ SOUTHERN FINANCE 69 her with everything, even tools. The principal security on which money could be raised abroad was cotton, but the difficulty was to get it there, for she had neither mercantile marine nor navy to protect it, or cover its formation, and open the Union blockade, which at first was weak. Messrs. Eraser, TrenJiolm, & Co., of Liverpool and Charleston, financed the Confederacy in Europe, and were in close touch with the Confederate agents. Though taxes were levied on other things, cotton was the basis of Confederate finance ; but a sounder one could have been made by taking more advantage of the resources of the country generally and establishing direct taxation (cf. pp. 96, 249). That this was not done was probably due to the fact that the Cotton States seceded in a body, and may have settled their financial arrangements before the others joined them : the consequence was that, though they got through the first year well, the Con- federates had to resort to inflation to supply the calls on the Treasury as the War went on, without making provisions for a corresponding return. The new cur- rency was, of course, in paper redeemable in a given time in specie, which time was extended by the issue of new bonds at high nominal interest ; each new issue, therefore, brought depreciation. Internal taxa- tion was tried, but was so unpopular that it was almost universally dropped, and the States paid their quota of taxation by borrowing on their own credit, which only increased the total public debt. Politically, Lincoln's Cabinet was not over-strong at first, for he had to adapt an old-fashioned form of government to a new use, the exigencies of Civil War, the prospects of War at all having dropped out of sight in its methods of working; and he himself was almost untried as a statesman, having risen to fame as the great debater who had beaten Douglas. Those, however, who knew Lincoln believed in his shrewd sense, and trusted him for his uncompromis- ing honesty; otherwise he was little known, and the 70 THE TWO SIDES outlook was not promising. The weakness of the end of Buchanan's Administration had produced dis- trust and distraction in the North, and the new Cabinet had not settled to its work when the storm burst. The new Ministers were : Vice-President, Mr. Hamlin ; Secretary of State, Mr. Seward ; War, Mr. Cameron ; Navy, Mr. Welles ; Treasury, Mr. Chase ; Interior, Mr. Smith ; Attorney-General, Mr. Bates ; Postmaster-General, Mr. Blair. At first it was suggested that it would be a good thing to have a bona fide Southerner in the Cabinet, and offers were made to several who belonged to seceded States; but the scheme fell through, and no wonder. A curious appointment was that of Mr. Cameron, of Pennsyl- vania, to be Secretary of War, for he was an old man, a pure politician, who knew nothing of military matters, put in to give his important State a seat in the Cabinet ; but this could surely have been done without assigning the most important place in it to an unfit man, when the Nation was about to fight for its life. Lincoln did not begin vigorously, except in his prompt proclamation of the blockade, and in his wise action in Kentucky (cf. p. 'jy\ His call for men for three months was almost childish, in the face of General Scott's strong warnings, and there was great delay and vacillation about the building of ships, especially ironclads, which were wanted immediately. General Scott, the Commander-in-Chief, was a source of weakness, as he was apt to mingle political with military advice (cf. p. 41). Though thoroughly loyal to the Union, he was a Virginian, and dealt with the possibility of political compromises; but he was an experienced soldier, who had fought against England in 181 2, and commanded in Mexico, and saw clearly the magnitude of the task, both as to time and force. None of the politicians did so, and, it seems, only Sherman among the soldiers. Lincoln's experience of war was confined to guerilla Indian warfare, and was perhaps harmful, as giving false notions. THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 71 On the Southern side, although the Cabinet was not particularly strong, the President^ Jefferson Davis, was an able and moderate man and a well-trained statesman, on " public form," a much better man than Lincoln : he and his Vice-President, Alexander Stephens, were thought too slow by the extreme Secessionists, for they had both opposed Secession as long as possible. It was an open secret that Davis, with his military training and experience, hoped for a command in the field rather than a seat in the Cabinet, but he accepted the choice of the Confederacy as his duty. He was practically his own War Secretary, and to a great ex- tent the adviser on the military conduct of the War. Cooper, his senior general, is only mentioned as a purely departmental officer. Davis was thus over- burdened by undertaking too much, and seems to have been unable to give sufficient attention to his primary duty of politics, especially to his relations with foreign countries. His Cabinet consisted of : Secretary of State, Mr. Toombs ; War, General Walker; Navy, Mr. Mallory ; Treasury, Mr. Memminger ; Attorney-General, Mr. Benjamin ; Postmaster-General, Mr. Reagan. The President of the Confederate Congress was Mr. Cobb, who had been Secretary of the Treasury under Buchanan : why he could not have been kept to his own work seems curious ; but Davis' enemies — for, like all strong men, he had plenty — accused him of appointing non-entities to his Cabinet, so that he might have no rival. This is not quite so, for Mallory had been Chairman of the U.S. Committee of Naval Affairs, and knew his work; and Benjamin was a man of conspicuous ability, who settled in England after the War, and rose to eminence at the Bar there, in spite of his late start. It is curious that Davis, the champion of State Sovereignty and Non-intervention, should have brooked no State independence, but ruled the Con- federacy as a whole with a strong hand. Grant often refers in terms of admiration to the way in which all 72 THE TWO SIDES were kept in line in the South, and any croaking or disloyalty sternly repressed, as of great advantage to their cause. Late in the War, Governor Brown of Georgia tried to assert State independence, but the result was only comic, and, personally, Lee was always a Virginian first, a Confederate after : his intense loyalty to his own State, to the exclusion of almost all other considerations, was not only a weak point in the conduct of the War as a whole, but even in the administration of his own army (cf. p. 196). Lee^s pro- vincialism was the one minor point in a very great character. Politically, the first object of the North was to pre- vent recognition of the Confederates as belligerents by foreign nations, as much as it was that of the South to gain it, as a de facto Government, at any rate. When the blockade was first established, the North took the line that it was m.erely a piece of internal control, which was no affair of outsiders ; but, though they never took this back in so many words, they had to abandon it in practice from the first, and carry on war as war, treating prisoners as prisoners of war, not as rebels, whatever they might call them. The military plan of the North was, first, to use their sea power to isolate the South, and then, in con- junction with the army, to work up and down the Mississippi from New Orleans and Cairo respectively, to meet and cut the Confederacy in two. There were thus two theatres of war. East and West, of which the latter was the more important in a military sense, the former in a political one. Davis saw as clearly as Lincoln that the question of sea power was vital to the South, and that he must not only try to break the blockade, but get ships to prey on the Northern commerce, which was both important and vulnerable, while the South had no commerce to attack. In answer to Lincoln's call for men, he offered letters of marque at sea, and this was answered by the blockade (cf. p. 98). The North were SOUTHERN POLICY 73 furious, and raved about piracy, etc., which did little harm. Only a few letters of marque were issued, to small vessels along the coast ; the Confederate cruisers on the high seas were all regularly commissioned ships of war. The South had several courses open to them in the War: 1. To try to win their independence directly by force of arms. It was necessary, however, that this be done fairly soon, if at all, unless they were able to raise the blockade. Their chance of doing this ended at Stone's River, or Murfreesboro, on December 31st, 1862. 2. To win recognition from foreign powers, so that they could accredit emissaries to them directly with a recognized diplomatic standing, and be able to con- clude treaties, raise loans, and perhaps form alliances, which might mean the co-operation of a naval force able to break the blockade and let in supplies, or even of allied troops. In the East the War was mainly political, and this was specially the business of Lee's army. Their real chance of this issue ended at Gettysburg, July 3rd, 1863, but a sort of chance occurred when the emissaries of the French (cf. p. 247), who were in Mexico, professed unbounded friendship ; but the object of it was too transparent, and, though they were then fighting with their backs to the wall, they would have none of it. 3. Their third and last chance was to tire the North out, for, as General Grant clearly shows, the North, being much more democratic in their Government, were thus much more susceptible to popular feeling, which was getting so thoroughly weary, that if the War had been protracted for another year, or even, perhaps, if Lee had won a great victory in 1864, they would probably have let the South go. He thinks that the chance of this ended when Johnston was replaced by Hood, before Atlanta, July i8th, 1864. CHAPTER VI PREPARING FOR WAR, AND SPARRING FOR POSITION. MAY 20TH TO DECEMBER 3 1ST, 1861 The American Civil War embraced such an enormous area that several distinct campaigns were generally going on at the same time in the different theatres of war, and the best way to deal with the difficulty appears to be to divide up the whole area into several smaller ones, counting the sea as one of them, and taking them seriatim, in the various periods into which the narration naturally falls, with cross-references chronologically : they are taken for the purpose of systematic description, and do not exactly correspond with any of the maps.^ They are : (i) East, (2) South- East, (3) West, (4) South, (5) South-West, (6) The Sea. The States between the Alleghanies and the Missis- sippi are generally called the Middle States now, but in the 'sixties they were called Western, and to retain this nomenclature will avoid confusion. The western border of No. i is that of the States of West Virginia and Virginia ; of No. 2, a line drawn north and south through Knoxville, Tennessee ; and that of Nos. 3 and 4 a north and south line, running slightly to the west of Little Rock, Arkansas ; No. 5 is to the west of this line. Their northern borders are : 1. The latitude of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 2. The northern boundary of North Carolina. 3. The latitude of Cincinnati, Ohio, to the longitude of Knoxville, Tennessee, thence north to the latitude of Harrisburg, and east to the Ohio. ' Map I. 74 NAVAL PREPARATIONS 75 4. The latitude of Guntersville, Alabama. 5. The northern boundary of Arkansas. The southern border of Nos, 2, 4, and 5, is the Gulf of Mexico, No. 2 just taking in the north of Florida. There were no operations in the south of Florida. The business of providing ships, especially river gunboats, was immediately taken in hand, and the Union Government sent for Eads, the great engineer, from St. Louis, and in August gave him an order to build seven gunboats for service on the Mississippi in two months, and also convert a big snagboat into an ironclad, all of which were most efficient vessels ; but in the matter of sea-going ironclads the Government hesitated for months, finally ordering three of different designs, of which only the " Monitor " class was re- peated. The South began work on the half-burnt hull of the '* Mernmac" in the summer, on Brookes designs, and also got possession of a number of steamers on the Mississippi, some of which were protected, others more heavily armoured as " rams," for river service, but only the mail-steamer ** Habana " was found fit for a sea-going cruiser ; she was soon commissioned as the C.S.S. " Sumter.'' The Confederate agents sent to Liverpool, Major Htise of the army and Captain Bulloch of the navy, began purchasing stores and munitions of war at once, in co-operation with their financiers there, Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm & Co. By the end of June, Bulloch had laid the keel of the cruiser afterwards known as the " Florida,'' and on August ist he signed the contract for the building of the ^^ Alabama." Both, especially Bulloch, found great difficulty in keeping outside the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, so as to give no pretext to the British Government for seizing either ships, armament, or stores. He therefore consulted a Liver- pool lawyer, the late Mr. Hull, who got the best opinions on this most difficult Act, and steered him through his legal troubles. The position, in short, 76 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 amounted to this : That it was no offence under the Act to equip a ship without the realm, or for any one to do so within it, provided that it was not to attack a friendly state. Any one might have a ship built within the kingdom, provided that she was not equipped there : equipping was the offence, not building} A shipbuilder had nothing to do with the use to which the ship he built was to be put, or with the trans- actions of his principals with other parties. In fine, " The Act was not intended to protect one belligerent from another, but to prevent prejudice to Great Britain herself by acts done within the kingdom which would endanger its peace and welfare." It has since been much altered (cf. pp. 478, 485). The Union side freely bought arms, etc., in England, and shipped them over (cf. p. 472), and also persuaded many men to emigrate, but did not enlist them till they reached New York, all of which they were perfectly entitled to do. The Confederates' difficulty was that they had no recognized diplomatic agents, as had the North, who could put pressure on the British Government. The British Proclamation of Neutrality was issued on May 14th, and caused great resentment among the more extreme politicians of the North, who looked on it as an unfriendly act, because it recognized the Confederates as de facto belligerents. This was curious, since President Jackson had issued a Pro- clamation of Neutrality when the Canadian rebellion of 1837 broke out (cf. p. 472). At home, the Confederacy began with some 15,000 rifles and 150,000 old muskets, many of them useless, and hardly any powder or cartridges ; they took the machinery from the Armoury at Harper's Ferry to safer places. Some States had a few serviceable batteries, but there were none in the Arsenals. Richmond could make field guns at the Tredegar Iron Works, and other works soon began to learn how to do so, and to rifle existing smooth-bores. ' Cf. pp. 471, 486. ORGANIZATION 77 When started, the process of manufacture was steady, of guns and powder, mills being set up in various places, but the latter was not of uniform quality; the best arms and powder were imported. Eight arsenals and four depots were established and fitted with machinery in 1861, but the troops were very badly equipped, for arms did not really begin to come in till the end of the year. A Mining Department was organized to work the lead mines at Wytheville and provide raw material generally. The North, as we have seen, had plenty of materiel, and their manu- facturing powers were ample. Both sides were now converted into armed camps, men being raised and drilled everywhere. The first steps in higher organization in the North were taken by the State Governors, Captain McClellan being given the command of the State troops in Ohio by Governor Dennison, but General Scott soon put him in charge of the Military Department of the Ohio, the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, to which was added West Virginia, for the protection of the vital Baltimore and Ohio line. McClellan had served with credit in the army, and was afterwards superintendent of a railway, which had brought out his great organizing ability. In April, Secretary Cameron telegraphed to the Governor of Illinois to secure Cairo, the key of the western river system, which was promptly done, and instant measures were taken to- crush the Secession movement in Maryland, Baltimore being occupied by an armed force in May. This State required the closest supervision during 1861. Wash- ington was protected by seizing the Arlington Heights just across the Potomac, on May 24th, which were strongly fortified, completing the ring round the Capital. In Kentucky, Governor Magoffin tried to carry the State into Secession, and, failing in this, issued a proclamation of neutrality. Lincoln, how- ever, acted promptly and wisely, and sent good officers there (cf. pp. 70, 481), who took military steps. 78 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 established a training camp, and created a feeling of security amongst Unionists, while Magoffin was still dabbling with politics, the time for which had gone by. In many places both sides were actively re- cruiting and drilling, but sensibly agreed not to molest each other at this stage. In Missouri, Blair and Lyon, having prevented the Secession of the State, were preparing to follow up their success. Lincoln soon saw the mistake of three months' service, and on May 13th called for 42,000 Volunteers, 22,000 Regulars, and 18,000 Sailors, for three years or the duration of the War. General Scott said plainly that the short-service men would only be fit for garrison duty, lines of communication, and the defence of the military frontier close to Washing- ton, while larger schemes such as the opening of the Mississippi must wait till a better-trained Army was ready, and a Navy to act with it. The Union side were merely raising men, and gave little thought to adequate provision for the command of their armies when raised, for they put officers over the various bodies of troops as formed. Soon, however, they made four Major-Generals, next in rank to General Scott— McClellan, Fremont, Banks, and Halleck. Much more thought was given to this in the South, who set to work to form a Regular Army throughout, with proper seniority among its higher officers. These were told that the seniority of the old Service would still hold good, and five full Generals were gazetted on August 31st, with seniority as follows: Samuel Cooper^ May i6th; Sidney Johnston, May 28th; R. E. Lee, June 14th ; Joseph Johnston, July 4th ; G. T. Beauregard, July 21st. This caused serious friction, for, though none of them had held sub- stantive rank above Colonel in the old Service, both the Johnstons had been Brigadier-Generals in a way, Sidney Johnston acting with troops without nominal YSiuk, Joseph Johnston ranking as temporary Brigadier- General while holding the Staff appointment of FRICTION ABOUT RANK 79 Quarter-Master-General in Buchanan's Government. He claimed that by virtue of this temporary rank he was senior officer, accused Jefferson Davis of in- tentionally slighting him, and attacked him bitterly. General Taylor, a great friend of both, tried vainly to heal the breach, but says that Johnston was in the wrong, for it was the rule of the old Service that Staff rank did not count as seniority for pro- motion, only substantive rank, and that this rule had been strictly kept. Others also had grievances : Bragg had left the Army owing to a quarrel with Davis in 1856, which still rankled, and Beauregard was also said to be dissatisfied. All this looks as if the charge of vindictiveness made against Davis had some truth ; but Bragg was a notoriously quarrel- some man. These differences are only mentioned here on account of their very serious effect on the conduct of the whole War. It is very curious that the senior officer on the Northern side was a Virginian ; on the Southern, a New Yorker. On the Northern side, McClellan was appointed Commander-in-Chief on October 31st, on the re- tirement of General Scott. The District commands were held by the following : Department of the Ohio, General Buell. Department of Missouri, General Halleck. At Port Royal, General T. W. Sherman. In the South- West, General Butler. McClellan's plans were to strike at Richmond and Nashville, with some secondary moves. He him- self would march into Virginia ; Buell, in eastern Kentucky, was to secure that district, relieve eastern Tennessee, and then turn on Nashville; Halleck to look after the troublesome State of Missouri, western Kentucky, and Tennessee ; Burnside to occupy the coast of South Carolina ; T. W. Sherman to seize Savannah, and prepare to regain Charleston ; Butler to attempt the recovery of New Orleans and the 8o MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 lower Mississippi. These strokes were to be delivered simultaneously ; but McClellan delayed too long, and in the meanwhile the Confederates had won the action of Ball's Bluff on the Potomac, a little above Washington, and had blocked the lower river with batteries. Lincoln wanted to move against Richmond via Centreville and Occoquan Creek, and a Joint Committee of Congress was appointed to inquire into the conduct of the War. In the middle of 1861 occurred the first signs of the interference of Napoleon III in Mexico, in the communications with Mr. Seward about joint inter- ference in that country (cf p. 245). (Continued on p. 104.) The East During May,^ the Confederates had erected some batteries on the coast, and in the creeks and river mouths, which occasionally exchanged shots with the Union gunboats, since Lee's policy, as commander in Virginia, was rather to block the Potomac than take Baltimore, as the wilder spirits urged, and to hold Manassas Junction against the base which the North had seized at Alexandria. The commander there also drew his attention to the strategical im- portance of the junction with the railway from the Shenandoah Valley, which was at this time thought to be of primary importance, being a great food- producing district not worked by slave labour, with a large white population enthusiastically Southern in feeling. It was bounded by mountain ranges, and of a size which could be held by a medium force; it lay between the main portion of Virginia and West Virginia, just across the mountains ; but West Virginia was strongly Unionist, and had formed itself into a provisional State, repudiating the authority of the Governor of Virginia. If therefore the North could control the Valley, not only would the Con- ' W. Camp Jackson, Mo., May loth. CONTROL OF THE VALLEY 8i federates be deprived of a district from which they drew large supplies of both men and food, but of an excellent line of attack, and, further, West Virginia would be cut off, which would be a first step in General Scott's policy of severing from the Con- federacy one district after another, till it fell.^ Harper's Ferry, at the mouth of the Shenandoah, was supposed to be of immense strength and great strategical importance, and even Lee., who knew it well, seems to have shared this view ; but when, after being seized by the Confederates in April, Joseph Johnston was ordered to hold it against any attempt at recapture by a force under Patterson, his trained judgment instantly apprised it at its true value, and he reported to Davis that to make it safe would take many more men than it was worth, with the certainty of heavy loss if attacked, and obtained permission to retire up the Valley to Winchester. Johnston's opponent, Patterson, was a veteran of the Mexican War, with a creditable record, but too old for active service. He was ordered to guard Washington from an attack via Harper's Ferry and cover the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, to which was afterwards added the duty of holding Johnston fast in the Valley. McDowell was appointed to command the force for the defence of the Capital, and hold fast troops which might go to strengthen yo/i;;5/o;?, at this time, a role secondary to Patterson's. Other forces on both sides were a small one under Butler, based on Fort Monroe in the Peninsula of Virginia, opposed by Magruder, who, with smaller numbers, ably handled, beat him in a skirmish at Big Bethel on June loth,^ and a Confederate force under Huger (pronounced Hugee), guarding the south bank of the James, by Norfolk Navy Yard. A Union train under Schenck was ambushed at Vienna on June 17th. ^ When Richmond became the Confederate Capital, ' Cf. p. 87. * E. Philippi, W. Va., June 3rd. ^ W. Boonville, Mo., June 17th. 6 82 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 however, on June ist, the strategical balance changed entirely ; Manassas became of primary importance as the approach to it, and was reinforced, Beauregard being sent to take command, while McDowell's role was changed from defensive to offensive. He told General Scott that he could manage Beauregard if Johnston were held off, and was promised that this should be done, Patterson being ordered to hold the latter fast, or at all events to neutralize any move he might make, by following close on his heels. The small Confederate successes had been made the most of, and they were confident, while the North were rather depressed, and badly wanted a success on their side to counterbalance them. On the Confederate side, the military operations were directed by Davis, with advice from Cooper and Lee, not an ideal arrangement — any one of them could have done better. Beauregard was kept well informed of McDowell's movements by his agents in Washing- ton, so bided his time confidently ; and Johnston, who had retired to Winchester before Patterson's much stronger force, was watching him closely, and covering the Manassas Gap Railway. With Davis' consent, Beauregard had arranged a plan of joint action with Johnston, that the latter should join him on the field if McDowell advanced. As the time for the move drew nearer,^ Scott reiterated his orders to Patterson to act vigorously, and hold his opponent fast by an attack, but he kept asking for reinforcements to enable him to do so (though he had 18,000 men \.o Johnston' s 9,000 or 10,000), hesitating, and calling councils of war. A Southern lady living in Washington informed Beau- regard the moment McDowell moved, and he warned Johnston. This army at Manassas was the only one that the Confederates ever called the Anny of the Potomac, and was some 22,000 strong, with 27 guns. Johnston brought with him 8,000 or 9,000 men of his Army of the Shenandoah, with 20 guns, and McDowell's ' E. Rich Mountain, W. Va., July nth. BEFORE BULL RUN 83 command was from 30,000 to 33,000 strong, with 49 sruns. It seems that reinforcements were sent to Patterson at the List minute, which, had they gone to McDowell, would have turned the scale, and that, when Johnston slipped away, he left 22,000 Union troops idle, "observing" the 1,000 or 1,500 Confede- rates remaining to bluff them under the brilliant Magrudcr, who carried out his task to perfection. This large force was no danger to the Confederacy, and had to retreat as the result of the battle of Bull Run. It is but fair to Patterson to say that the loss of men from the termination of their three months' service was a very serious difficulty, which also affected McDowell to a less extent, in the very presence of the enemy. McDowell's plan of battle was to turn the enemy's left, force him from his position, and break the Manassas Gap Railway — that is, cut him off from Gainesville on his left rear, which would prevent /o/z/^- stons troops from joining ; but the Confederates made haste, while he delayed, wasted several days, and made a useless reconnaissance in force against the Con- federate left at Blackburn's Ford, which brought on a bigger action than he intended, and, before the main battle was ioM^X., Johnston had arrived with half his army. This action unduly depressed the one side and elated the other, but, while it made Beauregard expect a frontal attack, it showed McDowell that this would not do, for his adversary was well posted behind a small stream, which had difficult banks in places. Two Union divisions were to make a wide turning- movement round the Confederate left, with Tyler's strong division to threaten this part of their line in front and hold it fast, at first by a demonstration only. A sufficient force was left to hold the Confederates to their main position along the stream, and was to try to prevent them from sending help to their left, when turned. On the other side, Johnston took command as senior 84 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 officer, but adopted Beauregard's plan, to make a converging attack on Centreville, McDowell's base, and crush him before Patterson could come up. McDowell, however, spoilt their plan by attacking first. Their left was very weak, and, when the turning movement was discovered, the danger was imminent, for half of Johnstoiis army was not up, and the attack was aimed at the most vulnerable point; but the officer commanding the extreme left. Colonel Evans, was an able man, and took perhaps the boldest and most effective step of the whole War to meet the danger. He soon recognized that Tyler, with all his strength, would not use it at this time (though his orders were to make a strong demonstration), while the stopping of the turning column at a distance was of vital import- ance, to let the expected reinforcements come up and give them room to act. Although he commanded but two battalions (of ten companies each) and two guns, he left four companies only to face Tyler, and moved away with the rest to strike at the coming column, sending word of what he was doing to the senior officer commanding the left of the line. Of course he could not, with his tiny force, stop the enemy, but he delayed them seriously on Matthews Hill, while a strong Confederate line was being formed on the Henry Hill, about a mile in rear. To gain a little more time, a brigade and a battery were sent to his support, but at last this weak line was forced back, and Tyler also began to move, on the flank. The new line on Henry Hill was not ready when the Union batteries opened fire from Matthews Hill, and the bringing back of the troops from that advanced position caused much confusion ; but all were rallied, and the line formed, under cover of the inflexible steadiness of Jackson's brigade, which earned him his nickname of " Stonewalir During the morning, the Confederate generals had had several pieces of information : first, that their own attack on Centreville was late in starting ; next, BATTLE OF BULL RUN 85 that McDowell had been too quick for them, and was attacking ; and then, when they essayed to change their plan, and turn his left, holding on with their own, that the Union attack was so serious that they would want every man they had to stop it. They instantly took up the new conditions so as to bring every available man to the critical point, where Beauregard took charge, Johnston directing the whole battle. Some fresh men came up from Richmond to strengthen the line on the front of Henry Hill, but after a while it was forced back to the rear crest : it had now become evident that McDowell was throwing his whole weight in here, and that nothing was to be feared from his left, so the right and centre were denuded to the utmost, only making a small demon- stration, while every man who could be spared went to the left. McDowell's task became more difficult, for, having before had the advantage of thick ground, he now had to attack across the open at close quarters, which was not in favour of his rifled guns, as against smooth-bores. Two of his batteries were pushed forward, and wrecked by the Confederate fire, a furious fight took place round them, the Confederate reserves came up from their right, and Kirby Smith's brigade, from the railway, attacked the Union flank : this turned the scale, and the Union troops were driven off the hill. McDowell formed a new line on the other side of Young's Branch, but now to stave off defeat, no longer to win : the Confederates ad- vanced against it in front, while Early's brigade, from reserve, which had marched round, struck it in flank : the battle was won, and McDowell's men finally broke and retreated. At first they moved in good order, followed only by artillery fire, but on reaching Cub Run the retreat degenerated into panic, and they never stopped till they reached Washington, twenty miles away. The officer commanding the Union left had been able to stop the Confederate demonstration there, but troops were sent back to 86 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 the base at Centreville in error, where the reserve lay idle, under a worse than incompetent commander, while the battle was being lost for want of it. Each side had about 18,000 men engaged, the Unionists 24 guns, the Confederates 21. Union loss, 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 1,312 missing— total 2,896. Confederate loss, 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 13 missing, total 1,982. There was no general pursuit, for the winners were as much demoralized by victory as the losers by defeat, both sides being composed of raw troops with little discipline. But for this, McDowell's plan, which was good, might have succeeded ; some think that Johnston, with a brigade of regulars, could have marched to Washington, which was panic-stricken. The action of the commanders on both sides is worth noting : Major-General McDowell, a major in the old army, remembered the Major, but forgot the General, and went forward into the thick of the fight, where he was only in the way of his subordinates, and could not control the battle or look after his reserves, of which he had plenty idle ; while the Johnston-Beauregard combination was most happy, for they took their places so as to direct the battle to the best advantage : their correct insight into the dispositions of the enemy, and free use of reserves, are extremely instructive. Thus ended the first great collision. The North settled down for a long war, the three months' service, just expiring, was changed to three years' service, and Congress took powers to raise half a million men : military operations practically ceased for a time. McClellan was sent for from West Virginia to take command, and commanded the Union Army of the Potomac from July 27th to October 31st, Muring which time he raised its strength to 134,000 men. Patterson ' W. Wilson's Creek, Mo., August roth. S.E. Fort Hatteras, N.C., August 28th, 29th, S. Head of the Passes, October 12th. WEST VIRGINIA 87 was not employed again. On the Confederate side, Johnston established himself at Manassas, but the people thought the War over, and crowds left his army. In answer to his appeals for reinforcements, to cross into Maryland in rear of Washington, Presi- dent Davis replied that men were wanted everywhere, and he could not send any.^ WEST VIRGINIA (Continued from p. 81.) West Virginia lies mostly in the watershed of the Ohio, and gravitated gener- ally to the State of that name in feeling, except on the lower Shenandoah. The first operations after the declaration of war took place here, where the people had formed a provisional Union State. This was a most important fact for the North, for their great strategical railway ran through it, special points of which, such as bridges and tunnels, might easily be broken. Lee had said that the destruction of Cheat River bridge would be worth an army to his side. Another main line of transit was the valley of the Great Kanawha River, Both sides sent officers into this district, to gain control and raise men, Colonel Kelley at Wheeling, and Colonel Porterfield at Beverly. The latter promptly attacked the railway, to protect which, McClellan, in whose district West Virginia had been placed, sent a small force, and Porterfield retired to Philippi, where he was surprised and routed on June 3rd : ^ this action had the greatest political value, for it reassured the waverers in the district which the Confederates had overrun, more than three-quarters of West Virginia. The Union force was strengthened to protect Union- ists better, and put down Secession ; the Con- federates sent Generals Garnett and Wise to repair ' W. Belmont, Mo.. November 7th. The " Trent " affair, November 8th. S.E. Port Royal, S.C., November 7th. * W. Boonville, Mo., June 17th, 88 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 their loss, on which McClellan took the command himself, and drove them from the mountain passes which they were holding at Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain, on July loth and nth. Part of their force surrendered, while Garnett fought a rear-guard action at Carrick's Ford, on the Cheat River, in which he was killed and his trains lost. These little campaigns had great military and political results, that of Rich Mountain being decisive, for, though operations went on for some time longer under Rosecrans, after McClellan went to Washington, the Confederates, even under Lee, never regained the ground lost, and the year ended with their being forced out of the great Kanawha Valley, leaving the new State controlled by the Union side. (Continued on p. 105.) The South-East It will be as well to deal here with the combined military and naval operations in the district, on the coast, and the inland waters, leaving purely naval matters, such as the Blockade, to a separate division. ^The first was the expedition against the coast of North Carolina, under General Butler and Admiral Stringham, at the end of August, which took and occupied Forts Hatteras and Clark, at Cape Hatteras, and gained the command of the best sea entrance to North Carolina waters. In September, the officer left in command found that the Confederates were forti- fying positions in his front, asked for reinforcements, and was able to hold his own. To improve the ad- vantage, and drive back the Confederates, who were still threatening. General Burnside and Admiral Goldsborough were ordered to get ready another combined expedition, and were ready to sail at the end of the year with three brigades and over twenty gunboats and armed steamers. On the Atlantic coast, the Blockade v/as in the ' Map 59, p. 390, THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION 89 difficult position of having no good harbour for a base, and Captain Dupont suggested a combined expedition to seize one, preferably the excellent harbour of Fort ^ Royal in South Carolina, between Charleston and Savannah, which commanded the inner waters con- necting them. General T. W. Sherman, the brother of the more famous W. T. Sherman, was directed, with Dupont, to organize an expedition of 12,000 men, and keep its destination a strict secret. They sailed from Hampton Roads on October 29th,^ but their fleet was caught in a gale and suffered severely, not reaching the blockading fleet off Charleston till November 3rd.^ Here definite orders were received but the Confederates had got wind of the expedition, and were ready for it. Port Roj^al Heads were guarded by two forts and by a few small gunboats under the gallant old Commodore Tattnall. The Union fleet consisted of two steam frigates, four sloops, three steam, one sailing, and three gunboats in the main line, and five gunboats in the flanking line, specially detailed to watch Tattnall and protect the transports. The fleet passed slowly, firing on both forts, while the flankers kept off the enemy's gunboats; then the main line turned, coming round again close to the larger fort. Walker, and silencing it. The Confederates evacuated it, and a landing- party ran up the Stars and Stripes. Soon after, the other fort was found to be empty. Fort Walker was very well constructed, and the two mounted 52 guns, some very heavy. As the expedition advanced inland up the rivers, the Confederates burnt and abandoned everything, and Port Royal Harbour, the best on the coast, was taken. This made it possible to maintain an effective blockage within the entrances of the whole coast from Charleston to Cape Florida, except at ' Map 33, p. 232. * S. Head of the Passes, October 12th. ' W. Belmont, Mo., November 7th. The '• Trent" affair, November 8th. 90 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 Fernandina, besides making a base for the sea-going squadron. The army made a strong camp at Fort Walker, and secured the country round the harbour, which the Confederates planned to retake ; but Sher- man heard of it, and asked Dupont for a naval con- tingent to act with him, with which he drove them in on January ist, 1862. Lee was put in command of the Department of South Carolina^ Georgia, and Florida, in November, and set to work vigorously to plan and erect coast defences, to shut in Port Royal, and protect Charleston and Savannah (cf. p. 125). Speaking generally, this line from Winyaw Bay, S.C, to St. Mary's River, pro- tected the most valuable agricultural section of the South, and the principal line of communication be- tween the Mississippi and the Potomac, till Sherman's March to the Sea took it in rear, and broke the back of the Confederacy. (Continued on p. 123.) The West (Continued from p. 52.) As soon as General Harney was disposed of in Missouri, Lyon and Blair acted vigorously. Some amiable people, who dreamed of neutrality for the State, sought to make a truce between Lyon and Price, now commanding the Con- federates ; but Lyon ended the meeting by an un- qualified assertion of the authority of the United States, and immediately moved against Price and Governor Jackson, who fled via Jefferson City to Boonville, where, on June i/th,^ he attacked and dis- persed their troops.^ Though but a skirmish in magnitude, this action was most important, for it dealt a blow at the power of Secession in the State from which it never recovered, and secured the Union men in northern Missouri. Price retreated to the south- west, and joined McCidloch, from Arkansas ; he also hoped to have had the help of Hardee, in northern Arkansas, but this was not given. Sigel, one of ' E. Philippi, W. Va., June 3rd. '' Map 22, p. 166. BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK 91 Lyon's lieutenants, attacked Price at Carthage, but was driven in, on which Lyon moved on Springfield. On July 9th, ^ Major-General Fremont was put in command of the Department, and approved of Lyon's plans. Meanwhile, on the other side, McCuUoch, a brave but insubordinate man, not the equal of Price as a soldier, refused to serve under him, and Price, to save friction, let him take command. They had some 10,000 men, and Lyon moved against them from Springfield with about 6,000, but better organized : he adopted the extremely risky plan of trying to surprise them with simultaneous attacks in front and rear, but these were badly timed ; Sigel's in rear was beaten, and Lyon's in front hard pressed, Lyon him- self being killed while bringing up his reserves. This was the battle of Wilson's Creek, on August loth. General Sturgis took command, and retreated to the north of the State, while Price, who resumed command of the Confederates, reoccupied Springfield, and took Lexington on September 20th. On the Mississippi, Pillow had warned President Davis in June of the danger of the Union forces opening up the river, and wanted to move forward to seize Columbus, Kentucky ; but Davis did not wish " to force Kentucky's neutrality," and refused per- mission. When Polk, however, took command, on July 4th, he seized and fortified Columbus, Hickman, and other places, rather at random, and also planned and began Forts Henry and Donelson. Kentucky answered by appointing General Anderson, of Sumter fame, to command her militia, thus, at last, taking the Union side as a State. Polk had Pillow, Hardee, and Thompson under him, whose commands amounted to over 12,000 men, and he planned to seize Cape Girardeau, between St. Louis and Cairo, then take Cairo, and sweep southern Missouri, but Fremont was warned in time, and sent Grant from Jefferson ' E. Rich Mountain, W. Va., July iith. E. Bull Run, Va., July 2 1 St. 92 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 City to take it, and assume command of south-eastern Missouri and southern Illinois, with headquarters at Cairo. He carried out his orders, but heard on reach- ing Cairo ^ that Polk was moving to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, marched at once, and forestalled him again ; he then seized the ground at the mouth of the Cumberland, and that opposite Cairo, fortifying all three positions during September.* At St. Louis, the Confederates, elated by the success of Bull Run, made head so much that Fremont felt that he must take strong measures, and at the end of August issued the famous proclamation that the property of " persons in rebellion against the United States " would be confiscated, and their slaves set free. He never consulted his Government before doing this, and embarrassed them very much (cf. p. 147), since they were elected on a Union, not an Abolitionist, platform, the result being that he was recalled on November 2nd, and Hunter sent to succeed him. Fremont had been collecting a force of 40,000 men to disperse Price's army, and then turn on the Con- federates all along the river, and roll them up, an ambitious programme. With this force he was on the point of bringing Price to action near Wilson's Creek, when Hunter arrived, took command, and re- treated without fighting. A week later. General Halleck came to take command of the Department, Missouri and Illinois, to which was now added Kentucky as far as the Cumberland River. Previous to this, Grant, who was ordered to prevent the Confederates detaching troops to help Price^ took a brigade, with two guns and a few cavalry, and moved from Cairo to Belmont, opposite Columbus, making a strong reconnaissance, which drew all attention to himself. He drove Pillow in, but when Polk came up was almost surrounded, but succeeded in getting back to his boats. He had also sent a small ' S.E. Fort Hatteras, N.C., August 28th, 29th. '•^ S. Head of the Passes, October 12th. THE CONFEDERATE POSITION 93 expedition along the west bank, which was protected by this action ; he took two guns and some prisoners, and brought 3,000 men into action against 7,000. The Confederates lost heavily in this sharp fight, which gave great confidence to Grant's command, and was fought on November 7th. ^ On the Confederate side, General Sidney Johnston had been put in command of Department No. 2, the States of Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, the country to the west, and the western half of Mississippi, on September 15th, and at once set to work to deal with the situation as a whole. Since Grant had seized the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, it was more than ever urgent to close these vital avenues against the Union side, and so the construction of Forts Henry and Donelson was hurried on, and that of Fort Heiman, opposite Fort Henry, begun. Here the rivers are within twelve miles of each other, giving a very short defensive line. Bnckner, in middle, and Zollicoffer, in eastern Tennessee, had, before this, been collecting troops to advance into Kentucky, by Johnstons orders, the former seizing and fortifying Bowling Green, the latter Cumberland Gap, the gate of eastern Kentucky. Johnston's line thus extended from the Mississippi to the Cumberland Mountains, Polk's command being on the river, Buckner's in the centre, Zollicoffer' s in the mountains, on the right. Both of the two latter had advanced farther, but had to fall back, but in November Zollicoffer advanced to Mill Springs and entrenched himself there. The dispositions on Johnston's right seem feeble, for Cumberland Gap was not only the base for this flank, covering that of his main attacking position at Bowling Green, but was in itself a most important strategical position commanding east Kentucky and West Virginia, and covering the Confederate com- ' S.E. Port Royal, S.C, November 7th. The " Trent" affair, November 8th. 94 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 munications between Richmond and Chattanooga also. Being the gate of the mountains, it enabled troops to be transferred from one side to the other. This district therefore should have been entrusted to a good force, not too local in composition, under a carefully selected officer, instead of to two small local ones of inferior quality, commanded by inferior men, for Zollicoffer^ though brave and active, was a pure civilian, appointed for local reasons, and the position of Crittenden, his military adviser, a false one, while Marshall, the other, a good soldier theoretically, was physically unfit for active service, and so extremely democratic in his notions that he could maintain no discipline. He was not even under Johnston's orders, but had been sent from Richmond, and was based on Virginia. This position was a striking instance of the way in which the Confederate cause suffered by the lack of a Commander-in-Chief, to bring all forces properly into combination. The Union Departments were re-organized on November 9th, Halleck succeeding Fremont at St, Louis, his command reaching to the Cumberland River, and Buell taking Kentucky to the east of it, with Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Tennessee. Prices troops in central Missouri were much scattered, so Halleck sent Pope against him, who broke up a number of these detachments, on which Price retired. At the end of the year. General Curtis came to com- mand the Army of the South-West. Buell was Johnstons immediate opponent, and his instructions were to strike at Knoxville, behind Cum- berland Gap, and at the important Confederate com- munications there ; but he submitted an alternative to McClellan, to move the main column up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, at Nashville join another moving by the east of Bowling Green, occupy the Confederates there and at Columbus with demonstra- tions, till their positions were turned, and not con- centrate or give a sign till all was ready. He rightly UNION PLANS AND MOVES 95 laughed at the idea of any danger from an advance of Biickner or Zollicoffer^ for they were not the men, and had not the means, to make one ; but had Johnston been able to concentrate a good striking force in Bnckner's rear, things would have been very different. Sherman thought this danger very real indeed, and says that in October the Confederates could have walked into Louisville, the Union base. Buell's plan seems faulty because the North had not at that time enough men so placed as to make it feasible, and it would have required a re-arrangement of the com- mands; he also wasted time in arguing by letter. McClellan's looks better adapted to the circumstances, for Sherman was quite able to watch Biickner and Hardee, in his front ; while Buell, by concentrating to the left, could probably have swept Zollicoffer away, and seized Knoxville. The actual operations were : Schoepf was opposing Zollicoffer, and Buell ordered Thomas to join him, take command, and drive Zollicoffer out of the State ; Nelson had been on the Big Sandy River with a small force, and had had some success, but when he was moved, the Confederate force there was put under Marshall and strengthened ; Buell ordered Garfield to drive Marshall away, and he moved forward on December 23rd. Several campaigns were thus starting at the end of the year, here and in Missouri. On the Mississippi some gunboats were improvised before the end of the year, and some Union iron- clads delivered; but they were hardly used before the beginning of 1862. (Continued on p. 125.) The South and South-West In the South the only action was naval. On October 12th the Union fleet attempted to enter the Mississippi, but were attacked by a Confederate ram at the Head of the Passes and driven down to sea again ; the ram also was injured, and broke down. 96 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 Nothing definite was done here till Farragut came. Besides this, there were a few minor attacks and landings in various places.^ (Continued on P- I35-) In the South-West only a few skirmishes took place, and the evacuation of the United States posts in New Mexico and Arizona, in consequence of the ** Tiviggs surrender," was completed, under pressure from the Confederate local forces. In July, Davis ordered General Sibley to organize an expedition, to be self- supporting, and to secure the forts, etc., in that dis- trict, as a base from which to seize California and treat with Juarez, then in great straits, for the purchase of the northern provinces of Mexico (cf pp. 60, 249). Sibley, who knew the country, informed him that this proposition would be favourably considered. With the control of this great gold and silver-producing district, the Confederate finances might be put on a sound basis. At the end of the year Sibley was ready to start from Texas. On the other side. General Canby was appointed to command the New Mexico district in November, with orders to recover it. (Continued on p. 138.) Naval The two main plans of the Union Government for the conduct of the War involved the co-operation of the Navy. The first was the opening up of the Missis- sippi by the combined military and naval forces, so as to cut the Confederac}^ in two ; the second to close all the Confederate ports by blockade, and starve out the enemy. After the reverse of October 12th a naval expedition was organized against New Orleans and its forts, a number of mortar-boats being especially built for it. > S.E. Port Royal, S.C, November 7th. W. Belmont, Mo., November 7th. The " Trent " affair, November 8th. AFFAIRS AT SEA 97 THE BLOCKADE The task of blockading some 3,000 miles of coast with only thirty-five ships — all that were then avail- able — was impracticable, in the sense that a blockade, to be binding, must be effective. It was kept up in a few places at first, being only formal in others, till there was force at disposal to make it real. Wherever practicable a lodgment was effected on land, which greatly relieved the blockading squadrons. The liability of neutral vessels depends on their knowledge of the blockade ; so that, while formal warning was given at first, and the first captures released, knowledge was presumed later on. Liability begins with the act of sailing for a port known to be blockaded, therefore an intermediate one was soon used ; but this device, as also those of transference of cargo, etc., where the intention was plain, was found out and frustrated. Still, many vessels got through, and the trade of Nassau, Bermuda, and Matamoros (Mexico) increased enormously. (Continued on p. 139.) THE WAR AT SEA At sea the principal operations were those of the C.S.S. " Sumter^'' which was altered from mail steamer to cruiser at New Orleans in April and May, and sailed from the Mississippi early in July, under the command of Captain Semmes} She was chased by the U.S.S. " Brooklyn," but escaped, and raided the West Indian and Atlantic waters for six months, took fifteen prizes, and reached Gibraltar in January, 1862. Here, being closely watched by the Northern navy, and unable to refit, she was laid up, and finally sold. Her career, therefore, belongs entirely to the year 1861. A few small vessels took out Davis' letters of marque ' E. Bull Run, Va., July 2 1st. 98 MAY TO DECEMBER, i86t (cf. p. 72), and some were taken, their officers and men being sent to New York for trial as pirates. On this, Davis wrote to Lincoln, on July 6th, saying that, if they were treated in this way, he should be compelled to do the same to a similar number of Union prisoners, and renewed a proposition which he had before made for an exchange. Getting no reply, he made the Union prisoners draw lots, to be treated in the same way as the crew of the Savannah^ who were not treated as pirates. The question of exchange was not properly settled for another year between the two Governments (cf p. 149). In October, the U.S.S. " San Jacinto " (Captain Wilkes) was looking for the ''Sumter' in Cuban waters, when the captain heard that Messrs. Slidell and Masoit, the Confederate Commissioners to Europe, were at Havana, intending to sail to England in the British mail steamer " Trent." He therefore lay in wait for her, hove her to, and seized the Commissioners, on November 8th. His action nearly brought on war with England — the Guards were ordered to Canada, and the situation was critical in the extreme, but Lincoln and his Govern- ment kept their heads. They saw what Wilkes' action meant, and that it could not be defended, but the great difficulty was the popular excitement in both countries : the last act of the Prince Consort was to tone down the angry letters. Mr. Seward wrote a manly and sensible despatch, acknowledging that the act was the error of an officer, for which England had a right to expect reparation, and added that " the prisoners will be cheerfully liberated." Later on we shall see Captain Wilkes' high-handed ways carried to the verge of insubordination, and hampering his superior officers (cf pp. 178, 234). On October 26th the ''Nashville" a fast paddle steamer, armed as a cruiser, left Charleston and cruised in the North Atlantic, putting in at Southampton on November 21st for repairs, and remaining there till the end of the year. (Continued on p. 140.) SUMMARY AND NOTICE 99 Summary Union Gains. — Several lasting steps were gained during the year. In West Virginia the skirmish ot Philippi confirmed the political, the campaign of Rich Mountain the militar}^ situation. In Missouri the seizure of Camp Jackson prevented the Governor {rom establishing Secession rule, and the action of Boon- ville secured northern Missouri for the Union. The country at the confluence of the four great rivers' Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, and Cumberland, was also secured — an invaluable base for opening the Mississippi and for striking at the heart of the Con- federacy. The Navy seized Cape Hatteras and Port Royal, the latter base being practically a necessity for the effective maintenance of the Blockade. Union Loss. — Major-General Nathaniel Lyon, killed in action. Confederate Gain.— The northern half of New Mexico and Arizona, a possible base for extension westward. (Continued on p. 141.) Major-General Lyon A very great man passes from the scene thus early in the War, who, had he been spared, bade fair to become the greatest commander of all. He made and carried out his plans quickly and surely, so that every move, no matter how small his force, had decisive results, with the sole exception of the action in which he lost his life. Here is a generous appreciation of him by a Confederate officer, Colonel Snc ad \ "Rarely have 1 met so extraordinary a man as Lyon, or one that has interested me so deeply. Coming to St. Louis from Kansas on the 6th of February, this little, rough-visaged, red-bearded, weather-beaten Connecticut captain, by his intelligence, his ability, his energy, and his zeal, had at once secured the confidence of all the Union loo MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 men in Missouri, and had made himself respected, if not feared, by his enemies. In less than five months he had risen to the command of the Union armies in Missouri, had dispersed the State Government, had driven the Governor and his adherents into the extremest corner of the State, had almost conquered the State, and would have completely conquered it had he been supported by his Government ; and now he had given his life willingly for the Union which he revered, and to the cause of Human Freedom, to which he was fanatically devoted." (Continued on p. 142.) CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE lOI 1861 May 21-81 21. Magruder takes command at Yorktovvn. 22. Butler takes command at Fort Monroe. 28. McDowell takes command in North-East Virginia. June 6. Virginian forces trans- ferred to the Confederate States. 10. Magruder beats Butler at Big Bethel. 17. Action at Vienna. 31. Naval Attack on Con- federate batteries at Acquia Creek. McClellan's Campaign in West Virginia. 3. Philippi. Sooth West Souxh-East Lyon's Campaign Guerilla Warfare 24. Resolutions of mediation and neutrality adopted by Kentucky. in Missouri. 17. Battle of Boonville. in Missouri. 11 o i Capture of the " Savannah," letter of marque, at end of month. MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 1861 July August Septembbr Patterson and Jo- seph Johnston in the Valley, Beau- regard and Mc- Dowell in front of Washington. 16. M c D w e 1 1 moves on Manas- Rosecrans v. Lee in sas. West Virginia. « 21. Battle of Bull Run. Campaign in West Virginia. 10. Laurel Hill. 11. Rich Mountain. 13. Carrick's Ford; Pegram surrenders. 28, 29. Fort Hat- ii teras taken by Union troops. Lyon's Cam- Sidney Johnston paign in Missouri, to forms a Defensive | 5. Action near Car- 10. Wilson's Creek. line in Kentucky. thage, Missouri. Guer ilia Warfare in Missouri. | ^ \Z. Polk takes At end of month H command of De- Grant seizes Pa- ^ partment No. 2 — ducah, and the He adquarters. mouths of the Memphis. Cumberland and Tennessee, and g fortifies them . . during September. C3 5 United States p osts, in Arizona and New Mexico, evacu- 8. Sibley orderec ated by the army. to raise a force in Texas to expel U.S. forces from a^ New Mexico. Is 6. Jefferson Davis K i2 writes to Lincoln ^ about the prison- 03 vetoed by Davis as unconstitutional, a fatal error. Lee soon resigned the useless position. (Continued on p. 147.) The East (Continued from p. 88.) We left McClellan and Joseph Johnston facing each other, barely twenty miles apart, one at the lines of Washington, the other covering Manassas Junction at Centreville : here they remained a month or so longer,^ organizing and training their armies, but making no hostile move, and seeming to regard the space between them as neutral ground. They were, however, very differently circumstanced, ' W. Paintsville, Ky., Januaiy 7th. W. Mill Springs, Ky., January igtli, 20th. S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th. W. Fort Donelson, Ky.. February i6th. S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st. W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March sth-8th. W. Pound Gap, Ky., March 6th, io6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 for while Johnston^ thanks to his excellent " Intelligence Department " in Washington, knew all about the Army of the Potomac, McClellan's information about him, derived, oddly enough, from professional detec- tives, was quite wrong, for it made him out to be twice as strong as he really was. This affected the Union plans very much, for, except Patterson, McClellan was more influenced by the bogey of his enemy's imaginary strength than any general in the War. The first real hostilities in the East broke out between the politicians of Lincoln's Cabinet and McClellan, who took the extreme civil and military views respectively of their positions and duties with regard to the conduct of the War. The Cabinet believed in debate in council, every member's opinion being equally good, while McClellan held his tongue, which in the then state of feeling at Washington was more than usually a military necessity ; but he shewed a total lack of tact and temper, treated the politicians " de haut en bas," and made no concealment of his contempt for them and their opinions ; he was also extremely rude to President Lincoln. The members of the Cabinet were much aggrieved, claiming that they had a right to be consulted in the affairs of the nation, and when McClellan wanted support he did not get it, essential points in his plans being counter- manded, which caused them to fail. This trouble arose again when the same set made the same com- plaint against Halleck, and against Lincoln for allowing such a state of things. At this time Lincoln was so strongly pressed to remove McClellan from the Army, that it was decided to do so ; but a plan of attack was settled, and he was kept in command of the Army of the Potomac, the Command-in-Chief being taken from him. To go back a little, McClellan had wanted to re- commence operations earlier all along the line, but organization was backward in the West, and the McCLELLAN AND THE CABINET 107 complications with England over the " Trent " affair, of which he saw the full danger, made him keep concentrated in his own hands the largest force that he could, for use in any new direction, till the trouble had blown over. In December he was seized with typhoid fever, which delayed matters for weeks, after which so severe a spell of weather set in as to stop opera- tions with any but the most seasoned soldiers. It was largely in consequence of the awful state of the roads that he planned to move by sea and take Rich- mond in flank and rear, in order to get to work sooner. All plans had to be explained to Committees, civil and military, and Government sanction obtained for them, while the President issued army orders also. One of these was to appoint commanders to the new Army Corps into which the Army of the Potomac was divided, which McClellan had specially asked should not be done till he could form a better opinion of the capacities of his lieutenants ; another, on January 27th, was an order that all the armies of the Union should take the offensive on February 22nd, Washington's birthday, and the pretext for removing McClellan from the Command-in-Chief was his non- compliance with this, though, before it was issued, he had ordered Grant, in the West, where the climate was more open, to move against Fort Donelson. Lincoln's original plan was to move by the Occo- quan, through Virginia, driving Johnston back, and McClellan's idea of going by sea was bitterly opposed by the politicians as " a traitorous move to uncover Washington," which was well defended ; but at last, after interminable explanations, they allowed it. It need hardly be said that secrecy could not be properly kept with all this discussion, and the plan probably came to Johnston's ears. McClellan's first idea was to move via Urbanna on the lower Rappahannock ; but Johnston's able retreat from Centreville, at exactly the right time, to the south of that river, defeated this, and caused the base to be changed to Fort io8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 Monroe on the Peninsula, another delay, which gave the Confederates time to forestall McClellan there, and make him fight his way. It was at first intended that the Navy should co-operate, but, incredible as it may seem, the military authorities did not communicate with those of the Navy, so the latter got no orders, and this part of the plan fell through. Admiral Goldsborough always main- tained that the first move in this quarter should have been one to retake Norfolk Navy Yard and district, which would have been quite feasible, and that this would have given a good permanent base from the first, threatening Richmond on both banks of the River James, which Fort Monroe, owing to its cramped position, could not do. This counsel seems most correct, but unfortunately for the Union cause it was not followed ; had it been, the co- operation of the Navy would have been ensured, and the ^^ Merrhnac'' destroyed before she was ready. The Confederates abandoned Norfolk Navy Yard in May, to concentrate their forces, but they had had the use of it and its resources for over a year, which was of incalculable benefit to them. McClellan's main idea had always been to place the Capital beyond the danger of a sudden "coup de main" by creating a system of strong defensive lines, in which a sufficient garrison would give a feeling of political and civil security, leaving the whole of the mobile army free for offensive operations ; but, unfortunately, there was no point on which the fears of the politicians hampered the conduct of the War more than on this, for no strength of lines or garrison could mitigate their panic terror whenever a raid was threatened, but they must insist on diverting an army from its proper work, even if the success of an important campaign were jeopardized thereby. Here, perhaps, it may be convenient to refer once for all to a subject which is not sufficiently taken into consideration when the slowness of this MUD AND ROADS 109 or that general is criticized— that is, that no one who did not know America at the time of the War, or within ten years or so after it, has the faintest conception of the meaning of the word MUD. The writer has stood up to his waist in mud, on one of the principal roads of the West, and has seen waggons down over axles, floating in it. The roads were, for the most part, what were expressively termed " dirt roads," that is, passages between lines of fences, formed or metalled in no way whatever. Where anything more was done, it is nearly always specified, the road being described as a " pike," short for turnpike, or a "plank" or "corduroy" road. A " pike " was often a good metalled road, while both "plank" and "corduroy" roads were made on the same principle, being based on three longitudinal lines of heavy timber, across which were laid lighter pieces, forming a continuous floor ; in the first case the wood was squared and sawn, in the second it was merely rough logs. A good plank road gave very good going, and a new corduroy one was fair, but the latter sort was used principally in swampy and uninhabited places, and soon got rotten and out of repair : the experience of travelling over a road of this sort is not readily forgotten. The Confederates had been hard at work at Norfolk Navy Yard, converting the hulk of the old frigate " Merrimac " into the ironclad " Virginia,'' but no one ever calls her by this name. She had a central battery, with inclined sides amidships, the ends being awash ; the battery was armoured with four inches of iron and armed with ten guns, two 7-inch rifled, one ahead, one astern, also able to be fought on either broad- side, and eight broadside guns, two 8-inch rifled, and six 9-inch smooth-bores : she drew 22 feet, and was very clumsy and slow, the alterations having quite spoilt her handiness. On March 8th, ^ the Union fleet— four frigates, a sloop, ' W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th. no THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 and some gunboats — was lying in Hampton Roads, when the " Merrimac " came down from the yard, rammed and sank the sloop " Cumberland," and drove the " Congress " into shallow water, setting her on fire with shells. The other three frigates ran aground, but the ^'Merrimac'' did no more, owing to the falling tide and failing light, intending to return and finish her work in the morning. She had been much knocked about outside her armour, having lost funnel, davits, etc. This success, like every other of the Confederates in Virginia, produced a panic among the valiant Northern politicians, who said that the 'Merrimac" had Washington at her mercy. Next morning, however, a small, insignificant object was lying alongside the " Minnesota," of which there was hardly anything but a turret showing — the famous "Monitor," which promptly engaged the '^ Merrimac'' when she came out : the latter was working very badly, being hardly able to keep steam, owing to the loss of her funnel. The " Monitor," with her light draught of 10 feet, had much greater choice of position in the narrow channels : the " Merrimac^' finding that her shot took no effect, tried to ram, but was too clumsy, and was easily avoided. Captain Worden of the " Monitor " was badly wounded in the conning-tower, and the ship drew out of action for a time ; when she came back, her opponent was retiring. A drawn battle, rather in favour of the " Monitor." The latter was of a new type altogether, and has been described as a " cheesebox on a plank," for her funnel, when lowered for action, was fiush with the deck, which was only a few inches above water ; the single turret was armed with two i i-inch smooth-bores, and protected with six inches of armour, while the conning-tower, the only other thing shewing above deck, had 9-inch armour. She was handy, but not seaworthy, and was nearly lost in coming from New York. Two great advantages were that the guns could be trained in almost any direction without THE "MONITOR" AND THE '' MERRIMAC" in turning the ship, and that the crew did not depend on the port-hole shutters for protection whilst loading, since the turret could be turned away for the purpose. Had the '^ Merrimac" been seaworthy, this might have been the decisive action of the War, for the raising of the Blockade was a vital necessity for the Confederates.* As it was, all that they would have gained by the defeat of the " Monitor " would have been to drive the Union fleet to sea, and perhaps force McClellan to use a land route. The '* Merrimac's " captain, Buchanan, was wounded in the action, and Tattnall took his place. The ship was repaired at the beginning of April, but her draught had been increased, reducing her speed to four knots. She took station in the James River to protect the flank of Magntders lines in the Peninsula, but, though she challenged the Union fleet more than once, they were not to be drawn into action, though the "Monitor" was there, it being Goldsborough's policy to cover McClellan's expedition and risk nothing. The ^^ Merrimac's'' engines were so wretched that it would have been useless to take her outside, even could she have got there, for she was not safe in an ordinary sea. When the Confederates evacuated Norfolk on May 9th, she lost her base : she was too clumsy to fight, depended on her draught for pro- tection, and drew too much water to get away ; Tattnall had therefore no option but to destroy her. The ship had been so much relied on for the protection of the James River that the lower reaches were not fortified, but batteries were thrown up when she was destroyed, which successfully resisted the Union ironclads, and a gunboat flotilla was also organized on the James. On the Confederate s\<\e, Johnston h2.d kept up his bluff" at Centreville till the last possible moment, when, seeing that McClellan was moving, and that his 40,000 men could not stand against four times their number, and also that, being liable to be turned by sea, his position did not defend Richmond, he retired behind 112 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 the Rappahannock, which, as we have seen, upset the first Union plan, and gave the defence more time, but this entailed the dismantling of the Confederate batteries on the lower Potomac. The Union expedition began to embark on March 17th,' and political interference with it began also, a division of 10,000 men being held back at Washing- ton. When McClellan was deprived of the Command- in-Chief, just before sailing, he was not notified, and only saw it in the papers : on reaching Fort Monroe, he found that the Department of Virginia had also been taken from him, and heard from Admiral Golds- borough that the Navy would not co-operate ; but Goldsborough did his best to help him. He had made his plans on the promise of 155,000 men, but found himself reduced to a nominal 92,000.- As soon as he began to advance after landing, he was confronted by Magruder^ who, with about an eighth of his force, held him in the lower Peninsula and opposite Yorktown for a month, covered by the '' Merrimac'' on his right flank, and by batteries on both sides of the strait at Yorktown on his left. Magruder's operations are a model in their way, and there he waited till McClellan began to besiege his lines in form, when he slipped away exactly at the right time, falling back on ample reinforcements under Longstreet, who fought the rear- guard action of Williamsburg, and brought all away safely.^ This brings us to the beginning of May, and we must now turn back and look at the situation in the ' W. New Madrid, Mo., March 13th. S.E. New Berne, N.C., March 14th. E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd. ■^ The ''^Florida" leaves England. S.W. Apache Canon, N.M., March 26th-28th. ^ W. Shiloh, Tenn., April 6th, 7th. W. Island No. 10, Tenn., April 8th. S.E. Fort Pulaski, Ga., April loth. France declares war on Mexico, April 17th. S.W. New Orleans, La., April i8th-28th. S.E. Fort Macon, N.C, April 29th. JACKSON IN THE VALLEY 113 Shenandoah Valley and round Washington, where McClellan, when he started, had left 35,000 and 42,000 men respectively. On January ist, Jackson marched from Winchester against the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, to break it, cut the communications between Banks at Frederick and Rosecrans in West Virginia, and isolate Kelley at Romney. Kelley retired, but Jackson succeeded in the rest of his plan, and held Romney. He hoped to damage the railway more, but was foiled by the indiscipline of a subordinate, who complained direct to the Secretary of War, by whom Jackson was ordered to move him from that place. So gross an attack on military discipline was not to be borne, and Jackson sent in his resignation : Johnston and Governor Letcher backed him up, and the Secretary gave way. Jackson's judgment was soon vindicated, for the Union troops re-occupied Romney, and com- pelled Johnson, in the Alleghanies, to fall back. Jackson soon found himself opposed by a force 38,000 strong, made up from several small ones, under General Banks, which was at first spread out from Frederick to Romney, while he had but 4,600. At the end of February, Johnston was preparing to retreat from Centreville, and Jackson saw that he would sooner or later have to conform, sent his baggage to the rear, and began by advancing into close touch with the enemy. This was the opening move of the famous Valley Campaign in which he was the guiding factor, and which is best studied from the Confederate side. The peculiar strategic feature of the Shenandoah Valley is the Massanutten range of mountains, which runs up the middle of it for forty miles, beginning at a point about forty-five miles from the Potomac. It is impassable to any armed force except by one road which crosses it near the middle. The main valley is on the west side, through which runs the North Fork of the Shenandoah, with Strasburg at the foot of it : the South Fork runs on the east side, through the Luray Valley, with Front Royal at the foot. At 114 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 the south end of the range, at the head of both valleys, is Cross Keys. The Luray Valley is separated from Virginia proper by the Blue Ridge, through which run several passes or " Gaps," while a little above Cross Keys is the important town of Staunton. The keynote of the whole campaign is to be found in the fact that Jackson was the first who fully realized how very great was the influence which could be exerted on the politicians at Washington by even a small force within striking distance, though Lee soon found it out for himself. When Joknsion retired from CentreviWe,^ Jackson was left isolated in front, with the simple orders to detain as many Union troops as possible in the Valley to prevent them from joining McClellan, without unduly jeopardizing his own command. When McClellan moved forward, he ordered Banks to occupy Win- chester, which Jackson's small force could not prevent. His numbers had been magnified by rumour, but Banks soon heard how small they were, and sent away two of his three divisions, thinking one enough there; it was about 11,000 strong. On March 21st, Jackson heard that the enemy was retreating and advanced, but Ashby, his cavalry commander, who had had a skirmish with the enemy, quite underestimated their force, teWing Jackson that he had only a brigade, with guns and cavalry, before him, probably a rear- guard. On the 23rd, Jackson came up, found the enemy at Kernstown, close to Winchester, and attacked at once, holding their front, on open ground, with one- third of his command, and attacking their somewhat exposed and weaker right flank through the woods with the rest. The woods, however, made his artillery useless ; the Union force was twice as strong as he thought, and was well handled by General Kimball. Jackson was beaten, though the Confederate attack was so furious that at one time the issue was doubtful. Kimball lost more in killed and wounded, and was ' E. "Monitor" and "■ Merrhnac" March 8th. JACKSON IN THE VALLEY 115 quite unable to follow. Jackson, though beaten, attained his object : the North was literally astounded at his skill and audacity, and the troops sent away were recalled in haste, for he had shewn that he could neither be brushed aside nor ignored. Banks, with 20,000 men, now observed him cautiously,^ remaining in the same place for weeks together, continually harassed by Ashby's cavalry. Johnston now wanted Jackson to retire by the Luray Valley, to prevent Banks from seizing Front Royal, between them ; but Jackson preferred the other valley, for if Banks would follow, which he did, he would be more isolated, while he himself would be able to watch Fremont's command, which threatened the Valley from the west, and support Johnson in the mountains. The Confederate Secretary of War now made another mistake in giving Ashby an independent cavalry command ; but he and Jackson seem soon to have adjusted the difference between them, for we find them going on again as usual. On the upper Rappahannock was Eivell with 8,000 men, not far from Swift Run Gap, but, as Banks could cut their communications if he moved on it across the Massanuttens, Jackson suddenly marched and secured it, camping close by, in the Elk Run Valley. Banks followed to Harrisonburg, 2iWd Johnson came to Staun- ton, having Fremont, with a larger force, in front of him. Jackson's position held Banks fast, and Fremont's men were scattered across West Virginia. At this time McClellan was stuck fast in front of Magruder's lines, in rear of which Johnston's army was rapidly assem- bling, but McDowell had been moved from Washing- ton to Fredericksburg, and the Northern prospects looked better. Lee, however, was given the charge of all operations in Virginia, and put Ewell uxid^v Jackson, who brought him near to Swift Run Gap,' and then moved suddenly across Banks' front to attack Milroy, one of Fremont's lieutenants, in the mountains to the west, picking up Johnson as he went. To do this, he ' E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., April 5th-May 3rd. ii6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 began with a demonstration against Banks, to keep him quiet, and then moved on Staunton. Banks thought he had retreated, and that men might now be sent to McClellan, but on second thoughts this seemed too risky, for where was he? Banks, Fremont, and McDowell stood round, with 70,000 men to Jackson's 5,000, but Asliby was between them, blocking their communications, and they hardly dared to move, for WHERE WAS JACKSON? Johnson'' s command added some 2,500 men to Jackson's force, and they came up with Milroy at the village of McDowell, in a position difficult of approach, and halted close opposite. Mil- roy wanted to retreat, but thought that his best chance lay in making a strong attack first ; this, how- ever, was heavily beaten, but he made good his retreat. Jackson did not follow far, but returned to the Valley, where Ewell ]ome.d him ; with some more men sent by Lee, this brought his little army up to 17,000 men. Banks, now with only 10,000, had fallen back to Strasburg, where he entrenched himself; Jackson cut him off from Fremont by blocking the roads through the passes, and retired to Harrisonburg. It was now the beginning of May, and Confederate prospects looked so bad that Lee urged Jackson to strike again, swiftly and hard. The North now hoped that the Valley was at last secure ; McDowell began to move away towards McClellan ; while Banks thought his enemy safe at Harrisonburg for the time, and distributed his com- mand from Strasburg to Winchester, with the cavalry watching the flank at Front Royal. Suddenly Ashby burst on the Union cavalry, driving it in in confusion, and hard on his heels down the Luray Valley followed the whole of Jackson's force, rolling up detachment after detachment, and driving the entire command through Winchester, and over the Potomac. Banks could only save the Strasburg detachment, no stand was possible, and had not Ashby' s men got out of hand, and stayed to plunder, he would never have JACKSON IN THE VALLEY 117 reached that river ; the Confederate infantry stopped just beyond Winchester from sheer exhaustion, and this saved him; a day or so after, the Stoneivall Brigade struck at Harper's Ferry.^ Another wild panic seized Washington : McDowell was stopped, and much of his command taken to defend the Capital ; Fremont was called in ; and McClellan was told that he must either attack Richmond at once, or come and defend Washington. The whole plan of the Unionists in the east was again broken up, but when they stopped to think, had not their enemy over-reached himself and fallen into a trap, for McDowell and Fremont, with more than double numbers, were nearer to a point of junction, on his line of retreat, than he was to that point. They were ordered to hurry and cut him off, but groped forward timidly, while Jackson marched and just brushed past, going on to Harrisonburg.^ If he had failed to get through, he had intended to retreat into Maryland, but, had he done so, he would have found that Stanton, who expected this, was ready for him. Fremont followed in pursuit. Shields' division of McDowell's Corps watching the Luray Valley from Front Royal, and Jackson went on to Cross Keys, whence he could watch both valleys, reaching it on June 5th. Here fell General Ashby, in a cavalry skirmish, a great loss to the Confederates, Jackson went to Port Republic in the upper Luray Valley with most of his force, whence he could watch Shields, and keep touch with Ewell at Cross Keys. Shields advanced in isolated detachments, and Fremont attacked Ewell just as the first of these came in front of Port Republic : the situation at first looked critical ; but Jackson soon saw that there was but a small force to deal with, and sent most of his men to help Eivell. Fremont attacked at Cross Keys by driblets, and Ewell, handling a smaller force ably, beat him handsomely, while Jackson held ' W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss. , May 30th. ^ E. Seven Pines, Va., May 31st to June ist. ii8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 his own. The next day the plan was reversed, Jackson turning on Shields with most of his force, and watch- ing Fremont's beaten troops with the rest : he had calculated on settling Shields' men quickly, but the detachment, under Tyler, fought so stoutly that there was danger of Fremont coming up in force in rear before they were beaten ; he therefore broke down the bridge by which Fremont must approach, who only interfered with a little artillery fire, Tyler was finally driven back on the rest of his division, which checked Shields, and Jackson concentrated his army at Brown's Gap. Fremont retired, followed hotly by the Con- federate cavalry, now under Munfofd, to Strasburg. Jackson turned back into the Valley as if to follow, but was really making arrangements to go to Richmond, for McClellan had been checked at Seven Pines, and it was important to get up at once. He concealed his plans from every one but Colonel Munford, the army being ordered to know nothing and ask no questions. Jackson moved first on Gordonsville, which might be either against Washington or McClellan's army, and rode forward, meeting Lee on the 23rd. Munford kept his cordon of scouts so well that not the least whisper of the march got out, Jackson's late opponents fearing instant attack, when he was actually fighting before Richmond, McDowell alone saw that the right thing was to reinforce McClellan and nQ.g\ect Jackson ] but the terrified politicians would have none of it, and when the march became known it was too late to do so. In thirty-eight days the Army of the Valley had marched four hundred miles and fought three battles and many minor actions, winning all, Jackson struck such terror into his opponents that they would hardly stand against him at the end of the campaign. His force never reached 18,000 men, yet with it he had paralysed the action of over 70,000, and had kept more than 50,000 from joining McClellan, whose plans de- pended on their support. The main campaign in the Peninsula of Virginia THE PENINSULA OF VIRGINIA 119 was the very opposite to the brilliant secondary one just described, for it principally consisted of about a week's heavy and continuous fighting between two large forces, in rather a small space. The features of the terrain were also quite different, the Peninsula of Virginia being for the most part low and flat, with sluggish streams, large swamps, and thick woods. Only on the north of the Chickahominy, and close to Richmond, was there any extent of fairly high, clear ground. Curiously enough, there were no good maps of it, and many mistakes were due to this. Both Lee And Johnsto)i were blamed, but neither had been much on the spot since the War began, and then had had more urgent business. Lee made arrangements for a survey, but McClellan was already on them : he was well supplied with maps, for the officers of the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry had been making sketches of the ground for some weeks, from which he got a far better map than any that the Confederates had. The Peninsula was bounded on the north by the estuary of the York (called the Pamunkey above tide water), and on the south by the James, was about seventy-five miles long, from Richmond to Fort Monroe, and twenty less to the Yorktown lines, while the scene of the main fighting was a space about twenty miles square, to the east and south-east of Richmond. As soon as McClellan had passed the Yorktown lines and driven Longstreet back at Williamsburg,^ his first care was to get his troops in hand, who were landing at different places, and to establish a proper base and lines of supply. He took West Point for his main depot and White House for his immediate base, by orders from Washington, for he himself preferred a base on the James. By May 24th ^ he was in posses- sion of several bridges over the Chickahominy, and Johnston's army was all to the south of it. He heard on that day that McDowell would join him via ' E. McDowell, W. Va., May 8th. * E. Front Royal and Winchester, Va., May 23rd-25th. I20 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 Fredericksburg in a few days, but later was informed of the changes due to Jackson's rout of Banks, and that the President thought that the main effort must be in front of Washington. While there was any chance of McDowell's co-operation, McClellan kept to his base on the Pamunkey, but when Jackson appeared on the scene, and this became impossible, the base was shifted to the James, for which all preparations had been made beforehand. The Army of the Potomac consisted of the Ilnd, llird, IVth, Vth, and Vlth Corps, the cavalry being very weak, and its strength on June 20th was 105,000 men. The Confederate army was about 86,000 strong, including y«c^5ow'5 command. The Confederates had a force at Hanover Court House watching McDowell, which McClellan drove in. Johnston at first brought his army to the north of the Chickahominy, and McClellan's came up slowly, seizing some bridges, and moving a part of the army to the south side on May 24th. Johnston then crossed to the south of the river, because, in the first place, McDowell was not coming, and Jackson was, and also because the Confederate defence of the river James had been so much entrusted to the " Merrimac " that no proper batteries had been made on that side, and when she was destroyed it not only wanted more protection, but McClellan was more likely to try to use it. The Chickahominy has swampy banks and is often difficult to cross except at the bridges; on May 31st ^ it was swollen and unfordable, some of McClellan's bridges were destroyed, and half his army was on each side. Johnston promptly attacked the force on the south side, throwing twenty-three brigades against it, and watch- ing the other half with only four. This was the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines^ which went on for two days, the Union army being driven back some dis- tance. On the evening of June ist, Johnston was severely wounded, and the next day Lee was appointed ' W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss., May 30th. LEE SUCCEEDS JOHNSTON 121 to succeed him in the command of the army, while continuing to control all operations in Virginia.^ For the next three weeks the weather was so bad that the roads were almost useless for the movement of troops, and McClellan fortified his position, but no more : he was also waiting for reinforcements, which has been bitterly said to have been his normal position. When Lee took command, he was still uneasy about McDowell's Corps, which was watched by Stuart's cavalry, and thought it best to drive McClellan off his line of retreat by moving to the north of the Chicka- hominy and attacking the Union right. Stuart was ordered to make a reconnaissance in rear of the enemy's army,^ and rode completely round it with a cavalry brigade and two guns, from Ashland, via the Pamunkey, round to the James, and back along that river to the Confederate lines : they had little fighting, but brought much information. The principal value of the ride was the confidence which it gave to the men, for McClellan's change of base foiled Lee's plan. Lee ostentatiously sent reinforcements for Jackson to Gordonsville, which, as was intended, had a great effect on Lincoln and Stanton, and thus indirectly hampered McClellan. He actually ordered Jackson to start for Richmond on the 20th, but this march had been discussed before between them. With the arrival of Jackson begin what are called the Seven Days' Battles. On the 25th, McClellan moved to within five miles of Richmond, Jackson seemed lost, and McDowell was ordered up again, some of his troops reaching McClellan. But Jackson was then at Ashland, twelve miles away, and McClellan heard rumours which made him suspicious : his right was at Mechanicsville, and Jackson^ with A. P. Hilly was to attack it in the morning ; but Jackson was late, ' W. River battle of Memphis, Tenn., June 6th. E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th. E. Port Republic, Va., June 9th. ' June I2th-J5th. 122 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 so Hill went in alone on the 26th, and was badly beaten, but Jackson's presence was now revealed, and decided McClellan to change his base to the James at Harrison's Landing. On the 2'/\\\, Jackson, A. P. Hill, and Longstreet, attacked Porter's Vth Corps at Gaines' Mill, and drove it back, taking 22 guns, while Magriidcr manceuvred so ably on the south bank of the river, as to prevent any help being sent to Porter, who was quite overmatched. The Confederates, with a smaller army, had again succeeded in bringing greater numbers to the decisive point. Eivell was sent to break McClellan's communications with the York River, which he did, but the latter did not care, having changed his base to the James. ^ We now enter on the second phase of the campaign, the retreat and escape of McClellan. On the 29th, the Confederates took the initiative, attacking in various places on the south of the Chickahominy, but McClellan had had the bridges broken, which kept Jackson back that day. Lee had now found out the change of base and retreat, and tried to cut it off. On this day Keyes, with the IVth Corps, was sent to occupy Malvern Hill, and get into^ touch with the gunboats. The Confederates were pressing forward on the Glendale, Williamsburg, and Newmarket roads, but luckily for McClellan Stuarfs cavalry was follow- ing Stoneman's to White House, in a false direction. June 30th was the critical day, the battle of Glendale and Frayser's Farm, for had Jackson, who was checked at the White Oak Swamp, got up in time, nothing could have saved McClellan's army. As it was, the pursuit was checked with the loss of a few guns, and time gained for the position of Malvern Hill to be taken up, to cover the embarkation of the army, which was a very strong artillery position, with flanks resting on the James. The Confederates did not know the ground, and lost their way, throwing out Lee's plans. They could not get their guns through the thick, ' S. Naval attack on Vicksburg, Miss., June 26th-29th- END OF THE CAMPAIGN 123 swampy country, the attack was disjointed, and failed, and the Union troops moved to Harrison's Landing on the night of July ist, after the battle, getting away from Malvern Hill safely ; but had Lee's troops been able to get through the mud round it, on the 2nd, McClellan's army might have been destroyed, for Malvern Hill did not protect the Landing, and the disorganization was so great that ground which did do so was not fortified till Stuart, following Stoneman, came up and foolishly opened fire from thence with some horse artillery guns. This roused the Union troops to their danger, Stuart was driven off, and the ground made safe, before the Confederate infantry could get up. There was no more fighting, or hin- drance to the embarkation of the Union troops, but this did not take place for some weeks. This Peninsular Campaign is the only one in which Jackson did not come up to his reputation ; he was late at Mechanicsville, and not at his best at either Frayser's Farm or Malvern Hill, but the explanation is that he was down with fever during the whole of th^. week. McClellan, throughout, seems to have been oppressed with the *' enormous forces " against him, and when he knew of Jackson's arrival from the Valley, to have given up all idea of taking Richmond, and thought only of saving his own army from destruction. His change of base was a most difficult operation, carried out with consummate skill. On June 26th, President Lincoln ordered the Army of Virginia to be formed, composed of Banks', Fre- mont's, and McDowell's commands, each as an Army Corps, and placed General Pope in command. Fre- mont refused to serve in a subordinate capacity, resigned his commission, and was not employed again. (Continued on p. 150.) The South-East (Continued from p. 90.) General Lee remained at his post, organizing the Atlantic coast defences of 124 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 the South till March, when he was recalled to Rich- mond. His lines were made for the combined action of infantry with artillery, both field and heavy, in carefully placed batteries, and they were wonderfully effective. ^Burnside's and Goldsborough's expedition sailed for Cape Hatteras early in January, but met with such bad weather that they took a month to assemble in Pamlico Sound. ^ They took Roanoke Island, which gave the control of the inner waters of North Carolina, on February 8th, then seized Elizabeth City, and drove the enemy out of Winton.^ The Confederates had blocked the Neuse River at New Berne and made strong works there, but this position was taken on March 14th,* with over 60 guns and many prisoners, and Burnside fortified it against any attempt at re- capture. Lastly, he moved against Fort Macon, on Bogue Island, a strong old-fashioned fort, which had to be reduced by a regular siege, and fell on April 29th. ^ The Confederates had fortified a position commanding the Dismal Swamp Canal, which they were said to be going to use, to pass rams, which they were building, through to the river James. An expedition seized this position, and sent a steamer through, to secure the waterwa}'- for the Union, a great shortening of communications. On paper this gave an excellent position, reaching from Roanoke Island to Norfolk, which directly flanked the vulnerable southern com- ' Map 59, p. 390. ^ W. Paintsville, Ky., January 7th. W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th. ' W. Fort Donelson, Ky., February i6th. S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st. * E. "Monitor" and '^ A/err iwac," Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th. W. Pound Gap, Ky., March 6th. W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th. W. New Madrid, Tenn., March 13th. S.W. Apache Canon, N.M., March 26th-28th. * E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April. E. Jackson in the Valley, all April. S. New Orleans, La., April i8th-28th. THE SOUTH-EAST COAST 125 munications of Richmond, passing through a narrow belt of country, but the ground was too swampy for it to be of any practical use. ^ T. W. Sherman and Dupont defeated a Confederate attempt to retake Port Royal on January ist, after which it was not molested. Its capture was followed by the abandonment of the coast south of Charleston by the Confederates, except Fort Pulaski, commanding the entrance to Savannah, one of the old brick forts. The surrounding land was so swampy that it was thought that the fort could not be invested, but Sherman sent an expedition under Gillmore, who managed to make batteries on the mud marshes, beginning on February 7th, and opened fire on April loth, the fort surrendering the next day. The result was to close the Savannah River to blockade- runners (cf. p. 366), and set free some of the blockading vessels for service elsewhere. There were sundry other small actions up and down the coast. At the end of February, Dupont sent an expedition against Fernandina, Florida, but there was no resistance, for Port Royal took most of the back-waters in rear, and in this case the strong defences were abandoned by orders from Lee (cf. p. 90). St. Augustine was next occupied, also without fighting. The coast defences here were for the most part given up, and the Union gunboats patrolled the back-waters of this part of Florida. (Continued on p. 165.) The West (Continued from p. 95.) In the extreme east of Kentucky, Garfield had been trying to get his com- mand started through the mud against Marshall at Paintsville, and came close to it on January 6th. ^ Next day he attacked him, without result, in a position to which he had withdrawn : both sides retired, Garfield to the Big Sandy River, where he remained till ' Map 33, p. 232. -' Map 43, p. 308. 126 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 March. Marshall had great difficulty in supplying his men, and sent many back, south of the Cumber- land Mountains. Garfield again advanced, and on March 6th drove him back from Pound Gap, freeing eastern Kentucky from the Confederates, and then went on to join Buell, leaving a force to watch his late opponents. ^The next force in the line, under Thomas, was also delayed by mud : it had been ordered to move in December, Thomas started on January ist, and on the 17th came to Logan's Cross Roads, within ten miles of Zollicoffer's fortified position at Mill Springs. He had not yet picked up Schoepf, so Crittenden, who had assumed command of the Confederate force, de- termined to attack before their junction, and did so on the 1 8th: after a severe fight in which General Zollicoffer was killed, the Confederates fell back beaten, and Thomas pursued to the Mill Spring lines, Schoepf joining him there. Each side had about 4,000 men in action. The next morning Thomas moved out to attack the lines, but found them empty : the Con- federate retreat was an absolute rout. This was the first real Union success of the War, and broke down the right flank of Sidney Johnston's formidable line, from here to the Mississippi, The Confederates call this action Fishing Creek. In January, McClellan directed Grant to make a reconnaissance to prevent the Confederates from sending reinforcements from Columbus, Fort Henry, or Fort Donelson, to Buckner, who was at Bowling Green, confronting Buell. He at once advanced in two columns between the Mississippi and the Ten- nessee, to threaten both sides, which effectually held the enemy to his position, and helped Thomas in his advance on Mill Springs. Finding that Fort Heiman on the Tennessee, opposite Fort Henry, was very weak, Grant asked Halleck's permission to take it, which was at first refused, but when Admiral Foote ' Map 43, p. 308. FORT DONELSON 127 joined in the application, it was granted, and they started on February 2nd. The rivers were very high, and Fort Henry, on low ground, was partly flooded : Fort Donelson on the Cumberland was very strong, and the lines of the two forts were only seven miles apart. This double position was so vital to the Con- federates that Grant assumed that they would send every man they had to make it safe ; but Johnston made two mistakes, first in dividing his disposable force and sending only half of it, secondly in sending this into Fort Donelson, not keeping it outside as a covering force : he should have gone himself, with every available man. Tilghman^ commanding Fort Henry, in a bad position, sent most of his men to Fort Donelson, and soon surrendered;^ a Union gun- boat was then sent on to break the Memphis and Ohio railway bridge over the Tennessee. Floyd, Pillow, and Biickner were commanding at Fort Donelson. Floyd was merely a political general, Pillow, who had been in the Mexican War, had won more notoriety by intrigues than honour by fighting, but the junior, Buckner, was an able soldier. A recon- naissance shewed that the fort was only approachable on the west, the Cumberland River being on the east, and flooded streams on north and south : the Con- federate lines on the west were strong, between the streams, with continuous abattis. Halleck sent all the reinforcements that he could, while Foote brought the gunboats round from the Tennessee. Grant at first had only 15,000 men, against 21,000 in an en- trenched position, but more soon came. Remembering Pillow's incapacity (cf. p. 442), he began with one or two important movps, which he would never have dared to make against a competent man. Foote came the day after, the 13th, and next day they made a combined attack, without result. The weather was very cold, and the men suff"ered much. The gunboats were badly mauled and not available again at once, ' S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th. 128 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 and the Confederates then attacked, with some success on the Union right : Grant, however, saw that they were trying to cut their way out, and at once attacked on the other flank, broke their Hnes, and took a winning position. After his treason in December, i860, Floyd was very doubtful of his treatment if taken, so he and Pillow got away on a steamer, leaving Buckner to surrender the fort, the only thing to be done. Forrest with the cavalry cut his way out. It was here that Grant's famous letter, demanding immediate and unconditional surrender, was written, and on the i6th the fort surrendered, with some 15,000 men, about 4,000 having gone with Floyd, Pillow, and Forrest. Grant had about 27,000. Floyd and Pillow disappear from the War, for though Johnston gave them fresh commands, the appointments were not sanctioned. This should have been, if followed up, the decisive battle of the War. Johnston saw its full importance, and it depressed the South more than any event till the surrender of Lee. Grant says in his " Memoirs," " My opinion was and is still that immediately after the fall of Fort Donelson the way was opened to the National forces all over the South-West without much resistance. If one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg with the troops we then had." ^ Grant moved on Clarksville, which he found evacu- ated, but had not then enough transport to attack Nashville. The fall of Fort Donelson broke Johnston*s great line, and he fell back to a new one 200 miles to the south, along the Memphis and Charleston Rail- way. This made Nashville untenable, and Thomas occupied it early in March, by Buell's orders, who also had sent Mitchel against Bowling Green in Feb- ruary, to prevent help being sent to Fort Donelson, ' S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 2 1st. EVENTS IN MISSOURI 129 which place he entered without resistance. Johnston's retreat left the Confederate position at New Madrid and Island No. 10, the left of their old line, uncovered, and Pope was sent against it, while Grant followed Johnston directly. The Memphis-Corinth-Chattanooga Railway was vital to the safety of the Confederacy, and Beauregard^ who commanded near Corinth, wanted to collect 40,000 men, and attack Paducah, but Johnston disapproved, thinking it better to con- centrate on the spot, take the offensive, and fight a decisive battle near the railway. While these operations were going on in Kentucky, another attempt was made to drive the Confederates out of Missouri, and undo Hunter's aimless retreat when he took over the command from Fremont, which left much of Fremont's and Lyon's work to be done again. At the end of 1861 General Curtis had come to take command of the Army of the South-West, and marched against the enemy on February loth. ^Johnston had put the Confederate army under the command of Van Dorn, an able man, and a trained soldier, since Pj'ice and McCnlloch, who were com- manding separate detachments at the time of the Union advance, were never likely to pull together. Price retreated before Curtis into Arkansas, and joined McCnlloch ; Van Dom's headquarters were at Pocahon- tas, whence he hastened to the arm}^, and on March 6th tried to cut off a detachment under Sigel, but the latter got back to his main body. Van Dorn then moved in the night to get round Curtis' entrenched position, but was discovered ; McCnlloch made a furious attack on the 7th, but was beaten off and killed ; Van Dorn and Price, however, on the other flank, drove the Union line in, but night put an end to the fighting. The battle was renewed next day, when the Union troops advanced and drove the Con- federates off the field. This was the battle of Pea Ridge, or as the Confederates call it, Elkhorn Tavern. ' Map 22, p. 166. 9 136 THE FIRST HaLF OF 1862 With the exception of a raid in October, it gave peace to Central Missouri for two years. This battle was the converse of that at Wilson's Creek, for here the Union side were in position, and the Confederates attacked in two bodies, which lost touch, and were beaten in detail. The Union strength was 10,500, with 49 guns; loss, 1,384, including 201 missing. Confederate numbers, 16,200, including two Indian brigades, with 50 guns; loss, 800 to 1,300, including 200 to 300 prisoners. After this battle, the Confederate forces were sent to strengthen their army in Tennessee, and Curtis was unopposed, but the area of his control was his power of supply. (Continued in West, p. 165 ; South- West, p. 176.) On February 14th, Halleck ordered Pope to go and reduce the position of New Madrid and Island No. 10, which the Confederates had fortified when they de- cided to leave Columbus. The position was a sharp bend, forming two well-defined peninsulas, and the island commanded the approach from Cairo. Tipton- ville, which was almost cut off by swamps, was opposite New Madrid. Pope soon found that he must have some heavy siege guns, and till they came, set to work to block the river to the enemy. On March 1 2th, New Madrid was bombarded, and evacuated in the night, the Union troops going on to stop the river below by Tiptonville. The gunboats engaged the island, and there seemed no passing it : Pope tried to do so by cutting a canal, opposite, but this gave the Confederate engineer time to improve his works, and Foote was then asked if he could run past the batteries with some of his boats : this was done by night, and the batteries below were silenced. The Confederates retreated on Tiptonville, Pope pushed a strong force across the river, and cut them off, when three generals and 7,000 men surrendered, and 150 good guns were taken, on April 7th. Pope then went on against Fort Pillow, farther down, but was re- called by Halleck to Pittsburg Landing. THE MAIN CAMPAIGN 131 After the fall of Fort Donclson, Johnston and Beauregard were separated, one being in middle Tennessee, the other on the Mississippi : it was impor- tant to keep them apart, and Halleck sent Grant up the Tennessee to harass their communications. On March nth,' Halleck's command was enlarged to include all Kentucky, which brought Buell under him, whom he ordered to move on Savannah, where his army was concentrating : this altered the whole position. On the Confederate side, Johnston was bitterly attacked for the loss of Fort Donelson, but the President backed him up. When he retreated from Nashville, and was cut off from Beauregard, he gave up central Tennessee to effect a junction with him, and moved on Corinth via Murfreesboro and Decatur, to protect the railways, reaching it on March 24th, with 40,000 men. Grant was twenty-three miles away, Buell ninety ; it was plainly his best move to crush the one before the other could come up, but he waited for Van Dorn, coming from Missouri, and lost the chance, for Buell was marching all the time. Halleck had put Grant's command under C. F. Smith, and sent it to Pittsburg Landing, to select a site for a depot, with a view to moving on Corinth, but the troops were camped on both sides of the river, not disposed to meet attack. Grant took com- mand again on March 17th, and arranged to advance as soon as Buell came, but though he knew that the Confederates were concentrating at Corinth, twent}'' miles away, he seems not to have altered the scattered dispositions , his headquarters were at Savannah, the point on which Buell was moving, nine miles awa}', and he used to go to Pittsburg Landing in the day- time and back at night.^ ' E. "Monitor" and ^^ Merrimac" Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th. W. Pound Gap, Ky. , March 6th. W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th. S.E. New Berne, N.C., March 14th. ■^ E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd. S.W. Apache Cafion, N.M., March 26th-28th. 132 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 Before starting to join Grant, Buell had sent G. W. Morgan to seize Cumberland Gap, which after some manoeuvring against Kirby Smith he succeeded in doing, while Mitchel, in middle Tennessee, was to strike at Huntsville, Alabama, and occupy the Mem- phis-Charleston railway, which he did immediately after the battle of Shiloh, but he destroyed bridges, which was not wanted to be done. Mitchel was much bothered by a cavalry raid under John Morgan, who surprised some detachments, but was defeated at Lebanon, Tennessee. Though organized opposition was over, yet a good deal of guerilla warfare went on, which gave him much trouble in holding the main line for over a hundred miles, from Stevenson to Decatur and Tuscumbia. On April 4th, Grant's outposts had a sharp skirmish with the Confederate cavalry, but even though it was now clear that Johnston was advancing, Grant neither concentrated his scattered force nor moved his own headquarters to the threatened point : he had been a good deal hurt by his horse falling with him, but this hardly seems to account for the neglect. Johnston had intended to attack on the 5th, but the formation of his army took so much time that a surprise that day was out of the question : he attacked, however, the next day, with three Arm}- Corps, each in one line, a most cumbrous formation in such thick ground (cf. p. 160). He drove Grant's men steadily back from near Shiloh Church into a corner by Pittsburg Landing, between the Tennessee River and Owl Creek, but was killed about 2.30 p.m., and Beauregard took command. As the assailants got nearer the river they came under the fire of the gunboats, a deep ravine protected the Union flank, and the retreating guns formed a strong line, which checked them : just in the nick of time Buell's leading brigades came up, and the Confederates drew off for the night, the newcomers taking up the Union outposts : the battle was saved. The next morning. Grant, now strongly reinforced, attacked, SHILOH AND AFTER 133 and by evening the Confederate army was in full retreat on Corinth. In this battle, commonly called Shiloh, from Shiloh Church, which was in the centre of the battlefield, the brunt of the fight fell on Sherman, who gained great credit, but Grant was much blamed for his action on and before the first day. On the 9th, a force was sent forward in pursuit, but its cavalry was driven in by Forrest, who gained time for Beauregard to reach Corinth unmolested. Both sides had failed in their objects : the Union army had not marched to Corinth unopposed, and the Con- federates had not beaten Grant and Buell in detail. Halleck came and took command on the iith,^ and when Pope's and other reinforcements came in he had over 100,000 men, but he waited too long for them. He divided the army into four Corps, with Grant as second in command, and felt his way to Corinth most timidly, entrenching at every halt, ordering his leading troops not to get into serious action, and allowing the enemy to delay him in every way.^ Beauregard was reinforced, nominally to over 100,000 men, but sick- ness and absence reduced his effective force to 53,000. Though his position at Corinth was very strong, it was too large for his force, and he could not risk being shut up there. He therefore gained as much time as possible in order to remove his sick and stores, and so well did Halleck's over-caution play into his hands ^ that Sherman did not get up to the main position, twenty miles from Pittsburg Landing, till May 17th, while it was the 27th before anything like a general movement was made. This was held off, and on the 29th and 30th ^ Beauregard got clear away : ' S.E. Fort Pulaski, Ga., April loth. - S. New Orleans, La., April i8th-28th. E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April. E. Jackso7i in the Valley, Va., all April, ^ E. Williamsburg, Va., May 5th. E. McDowell, W. Va., May 8th. * E. Front Royal and Winchester, Va. , May 23rd-25tli, E, Seven Fines, Va., May 31st, June isl. 134 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 on the 31st Halleck occupied Corinth. A few days later, Beauregard was found in a very strong position at Tupelo, but both sides separated without further fighting. The Confederate army was redistributed, and Beauregard went on sick-leave, being succeeded by Bragg. It was in the pursuit of Beauregard from Corinth that Sheridan came to the front. He, as a smart young professional soldier, was recommended for the command of a cavalry regiment, and did so well that he was soon given a brigade, after which he never looked back, Halleck had been wonderfully successful in his command, or rather his lieutenants had, for the Con- federates had been driven steadily back without a check, ever since he took command at St. Louis the November before. He now prepared to move East, with Chattanooga as his objective, and began by sending Buell back into middle Tennessee, to ensure the safety of the western part of that State. Buell's new orders were based on the fact that the Confederate concentration in Mississippi would nearly empty Ken- tucky and Tennessee of their troops, which would enable him to strike at Chattanooga, but his trouble was the long and vulnerable railway from his base, Louisville. Halleck ordered him to move on Hunts- ville, in June,^and repair the Memphis-Charleston rail- way for this attack and future use, and would not consent to his advancing via Nashville and McMinnville. The possession of Corinth on the Memphis-Char- leston line by the North, made Memphis untenable by the Confederates, and Forts Pillow and Randolph, built for its protection by water, were abandoned ; but the Confederates had got together a strong gun- boat flotilla, under Hollins, who did not wish to retire without trying conclusions with the Union boats, now ' E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th. E. Port Republic, Va., June 9th. E. The Seven Days, Va., June 26th-Tuly 1st. 3. Naval attack on Vicksburg, Miss., June 26th-29th, THE BATTLE OE MEMPHIS 135 commanded by Davis. Hollins was driven back in a small action on May loth, though two Union boats were sunk, and Davis followed to Memphis, a de- cisive battle being fought on June 6th, in which the Confederate flotilla was destroyed. Memphis sur- rendered to Davis, who then went up the White River, to co-operate with General Curtis, after the battle of Pea Ridge, till the end of the month. The battle of Memphis decided the control of the Mississippi, for, though the great river was still blocked by strong works at Vicksburg and elsewhere, the Confederate gunboats were almost a negligible quantity thence- forward : here and there a few were got together, and there were some Union scares of armoured rams, but that was all. (Continued on p. 165.) The South (Continued from p. 95.) In December, 1861, the urgent importance of fortifying Vicksburg had been pressed on General Lovell, commanding the Confederate Department No. /, at New Orleans ; but he was so short of both men and means that he could do nothing.^ When Fort Donelson fell, however,^ and the Union forces came South, the matter became vital ; Beaure- gard, an excellent engineer, drew up plans, and the fortifications were put in hand early in April and pushed forward, so that they were ready before any attack came. During the second quarter of 1862, the work here was hard and continuous, but there was very little fighting. By the middle of June, the works were ready, and troops sent to garrison them. Van Dorn being sent to take command. The command of the naval expedition against New Orleans was given to Captain Farragut, who sailed from New York on January 9th, and reached his ' W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th. - S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th. S^W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st., 136 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 headquarters at Ship Island on the 20th. The fleet consisted of four screw sloops, of from 22 to 24 guns each, one paddle steamer, of 17, nine gunboats, a number of mortar-boats, and some armed merchant steamers. Bringing the heavy vessels over the bar was a difficult operation^ as they had to be lightened a good deal, and it was April 7th ^ before all were over. The river was defended by two principal works. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, nearly opposite each other, some ninety miles below New Orleans : there were three armoured rams, the ^^Manassas," ^^ Louisiana,'" and ''Mississippi,'' the two last not quite finished, and several others, mostly armed river boats. Besides a number of fire-rafts for the attack of the Union wooden fleet, there were obstructions, and the river was blocked by a line of hulks chained together. The forts mounted over 100 guns, but only half of these were heavy : there were other works higher up, and an inner line close to New Orleans. The weak point of the defence was that all its forces were not under the same command, the naval command being divided between the Confederate Navy and that of the State, and independent oi Lovell. The '■'Louisiana " was moored near the forts as a floating battery. Farragut recon- noitred carefully, and advanced on the i8th, the mortar- boats leading : they kept up a heavy fire on the forts for two days, as a preliminary, and then the line of hulks was broken by two of the gunboats. Farragut advanced in two columns on the night of the 23rd : the heavy ships covered the gunboats, and the mortar- boats kept down the fire of the forts with a continuous bombardment while the fleet was passing : one column passed within some fifty yards of the forts with little loss, being sheltered by the raised bank of the river. The Confederates sent down their fire-rafts, but ' E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April. E. Jackson in the Valley, Va., all April. W, Shiloh, Tenn., April 6th, 7th. W. Island No. 10, Tenn., April 8th. S.E- Eort Pulaski, Ga., April loth. CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS 137 managed them badly, allowing them to drift singly with the current, so that they were easily avoided ; one, however, was brought down by a tug against the flagship " Hartford," setting her on fire when in close action with the forts, but she cast it adrift, sank the tug, and put the fire out, without slackening her own fire ; a gallant performance. Had these rafts been lashed in line, sent down in big batches, or steered, they would have been very formidable. The ram " Manassas " charged the Union fleet, ramming the " Brooklyn," and doing damage which would have been serious at sea ; she went on to attack the " Mississippi," but ran aground, and, being riddled with shot, was adandoned and blown up : the ^''Louisiana " hardly used her guns, and the undisciplined State Defence fleet behaved badly. Some of the Union fleet did not get past, but Farragut went on past the other lines and anchored at New Orleans. He first destroyed the ram ^'Mississippi,'" which would have been ready in a few days, and then summoned the forts to surrender on the 25th, shelling them till they did so on the 28th :^ the ''Louisiana " was set on fire and blown up. A few days afterwards the Confederates evacuated Pensacola, Florida, the Union forces took possession on May loth, and it became the headquarters of the Gulf Squadron. It is said that Napoleon Hlrd, of whose intrigues we shall see more, had hinted that if New Orleans held out he might refuse to respect the blockade, or formally recognize the Confederacy. This would have been most serious for the Union cause, but Farragut's success averted it. On May ist. General Butler came and took military possession of New Orleans,- and Farragut went on up the river : he took one or two small places, but at Grand Gulf his gunboats were roughly handled, and, though he had the mortar fleet with him, he did not think that he could clear the river, without army ' S.E. Fort Macon, N.C., April 29th. ^ E. fackson in the Valley, Va., all May. 138 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 co-operation at Vicksburg, which, though not quite completed, was strong enough to resist him. He withdrew at the end of May,^ for his crews were sickly, his ships were knocked about, and the river was getting very low. Late in June - he went up again, and brought his mortar-boats into action against Vicksburg, moving the fleet slowly past the batteries, whose fire they could keep down, but that was not taking the place or clearing a thoroughfare for steamer traffic. He communicated with Davis' flotilla, which had come down from the White River. (Continued on p. 175.) The South-West ^(Continued from p. 96.) At the beginning of January,^ General Sibley moved against Fort Craig, New Mexico, with about 2,000 men, his opponent, Canby, having 3,800, mostly regulars. A battle was fought at Val- verde on February 2ist,^ just across the Rio Grande from the fort, in which the Confederates had the best of it, taking some guns : Canby retreated into the fort. Sibley then moved on to Albuquerque and Santa Fe, but in March Colonel Slough came to Fort Union and took command of the northern section. He moved against Colonel Scurry and completely defeated him at Apache Canon, or Glorieta^ on March 28th.® Soon after, Canby moved out to co-operate with him, and fought some indecisive actions : time was all in his favour, for when the United States troops had ' W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss., May 30th. E, Seven Pines, Va., May 31st, June 1st. E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th. E. Tort Republic, Va., June 9th. - E. The Seven Days, Va., June 26th-July ist. ^ Map 65, p. 420. * S.E. Confederate attack on Port Royal, S.C, January ist. W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th. * S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th. W. Fort Donelson, Ky., February l6th. " E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd., NEW MEXICO 139 evacuated the territory, they had destroyed or removed their stores, and Sibley could not main- tain his men, for, though he claimed the territory. Confederate paper-money did not circulate, Slough was quite able to cover Fort Union, and Fort Craig vi'as too strong to attack ; there was, there- fore, nothing left for him but retreat. Canby let him go, being content with watching him out of the country, for he would have had to feed prisoners : he was, however, severely blamed for his inaction. SibUys retreat was most disastrous : he reached Fort Bliss in May, but went on to San Antonio when he heard that a Californian force was coming against him. This campaign ended Confederate control west of Texas, and the country was taken over again and administered by the Union side. (Continued on p. 176.) The Blockade (Continued from p. 97.) The Blockade went on steadily, the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron under Goldsborough, the South under Dupont, mostly picking up small vessels in the inner waters : at this time, however, the regular blockade-runner began to come on the scene, a vessel built for the business, for speed rather than amount of cargo, for the profits were so great, as prices rose, that it paid to run ships of this sort. They mostly started from a port near to the blockaded one, Bermuda, Nassau, or Havana, the goods coming out in ordinary vessels, from which they were transhipped. The trade of Nassau, especi- ally, increased enormously : without direct evidence it was most difficult to stop the traffic, and vessels bound for Matamoros, close to the Texan border, were generally ordered to be released if captured, on the ground that a neutral port could not be blockaded. Contraband of war was even sent via New York to I40 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 Nassau, but this trade increased so much as to arouse suspicion, and soon a most rigid scrutiny was instituted, which' put a stop to it. There was no hesitation in condemning a vessel of the blockade-runner type if caught, but at this time most of them got through, for the blockade was not very close, and the risk of being hit was small at night, when they always approached the coast, where they had private signals to guide them in. This service was very well organized, coast troops being told off for it, with field artiller}^ in some places, so that, even if a vessel had to be run ashore, the cargo was often saved. Dupont made several attempts to seal up Charles- ton by sinking ships in the channel, but without success. In the Gulf of Mexico the Blockading Squadron was divided, the eastern portion being based on Key West, the western at Pensacola. Farragut took command of this latter district in February. The principal ports were New Orleans and Mobile : the first was taken in April, but Mobile, though easy to blockade, was also easy to defend, being at the head of a large bay, with a narrow entrance guarded by strong forts : there were inner channels among the islands, which were most difficult to watch. Galveston, Texas, was easy to blockade, and not well de- fended. During the first half of the year, Farragut was up the Mississippi with the bulk of his com- mand, leaving a few small vessels to maintain as good a blockade as they could. (Continued on p. 177.) The War at Sea (Continued from p. 98.) The ''Sumter's" career as a cruiser ended in 1861, though she was not actually sold till December, 1862. The ''Nashville " started back from Southampton in February, and took two prizes, after which she was not employed again as a sea-going THE ''FLORIDA'' 141 cruiser, not being strong enough, but was kept at Savannah for local defence. In March,^ the new cruiser ^' Florida l' built on the Mersey, was ready for sea: she was called the "Oreto," and was ostensibly to trade to Palermo, but her destination was changed to Nassau just before sailing. Not an officer or man was enlisted for the Confederate service, and she carried no warlike stores, though in the United States case for the Geneva Arbitration it was stated that she had on board guns and carriages. It was difficult to get a commander and crew : Bidloch had wanted Pegram of the " Nashville^''' but he had gone, and as it was dangerous to keep her lying in the Mersey, Captain Low, an Englishman in Confederate service, was told to go as a passenger, and at Nassau to hand the ship over to Captain Maffitt; but, as he had not arrived when she got there, she was detained on suspicion, but released, nothing contraband being found on board, though Captain Hickley, R.N., who examined her, had reported that she was in every re- spect fitted as a man-of-war, with magazines, etc., com- plete, and could be armed and made fit to go into action in twenty-four hours (cf. p. 471). Maffitt arrived in May, and took charge, but these delays went on till August, for the Northern Navy had established a blockade of the channels outside Nassau. (Continued on p. 177.) Summary (Continued from p. 99,) Union Gains. — Nothing in the East. In the South-East, the capture of Roanoke Island, and control of the inland waters of North Carolina, and of most of those of South Carolina and Florida. In the West, there were a number of distinct steps : Mill Springs, the taking of Fort Donelson, Shiloh, the occupation of Nashville, Corinth, Memphis, ' E. " Monitor" and " Merrimac,'' Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th. The " Florida'''' sails from England in March. 142 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 and the Memphis-Charleston railway, and the naval battle of Memphis : in Missouri, the battle of Pea Ridge. In the South, the taking of New Orleans, opening the greater part of the Mississippi, and the occupation of Pensacola. In the South- West, the re- gaining of the territory west of Texas and Arkansas. At Sea, a steadily improving Blockade, Confederate Losses. — General Albert Sidney Johnston and Brigadier-General Turner Ashby, both killed in action. (Continued on p. 179.) Notices of Officers (Continued from p. 100.) Albej^t Sidney Johnston was the hope of the Confederacy, senior to Lee, and better known at the beginning of the War. Born in Ken- tucky in 1803, he served in the Army from 1827 to 1834, but saw only Indian warfare: in 1836 he went to Texas, then an independent Republic, rose to com- mand its Army, and was also Secretary of War. He served with credit under General Taylor in Mexico, and was given rank again in the United States Army after the annexation in 1849. In 1857 he commanded the remarkable expedition to Utah with conspicuous ability, and commanded in California from December, i860, till the outbreak of the Civil War. In the War, it would have been well for the Confederates had he had the command of the Western States sooner. His strategy seemed feeble, in both the Fort Donelson and Shiloh campaigns, and his clumsy dispositions lost a day at Shiloh, which was important. Personally, he was a man of the most noble character, and the idol of the South. Brigadier-General Turner Ashby, Jackson's Cavalry Commander, was rather a typical Southern gentleman than a great soldier. A magnificent rider, of reckless courage, and indefatigable activity, he preferred the excitement of war to its routine duties, and did not enforce discipline properly, by which Jackson's plans TURNER ASHBY 143 Suffered, at least once. Still, his strategic cavalry handling before the battle of McDowell remains a model of such work, and Jackson said that he had never known a better partisan officer. Ashby was a power in himself, and his death was a serious loss to the Southern cause. (Continued on p. 180.) 144 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 1862 January February March s ^ 8. The "Monitor" and " Merrimac" i n H amp ton Roads. 17. McClellan starts for the Peninsula. Jackson in the Valley. 23. Kernstown. < w § 1. Confederate at- tack on Port Royal fails. Operations of the Coast Division, under B urnside. 8. Roanoke Island. 14. New Berne. 7. Paintsville. 19, 20. Mill Springs or Fishhig Creek. 8. Fort Henry taken. 16. Fort Donelson taken. 6. Pound Gap. 5-8. Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern. Pope before New Madrid. 13. New Madrid taken. s § a The " Nashville" at Southampton. Sibley's Expedition Ariz 21. Valverde. The "Nashville" in to New Mexico and ona. 26-28. Apache Ca- non, or Glorieta. The "Florida" sails from England, un- armed. bhe North Atlantic. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 145 1862 Aprii. Mav JuNB TO July 1 McClellan's Siege of Yorktown to 5. 5. Williamsburg. 31, June 1. Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines. Jackson's Campaign in the Valley, to 15. a 8. McDowell. 8. Cross Keys. f5 23-25. Front Royal, : 9. Port Republic, Winchester. 12-15. Stuart's ride. 26 to July 1. The Seven Days' Battles. Gillmore's Coast Operations. 10. Fort Pulaski 4j taken. w Burnside's Coast S Operations. 29. Fort Macon tc taken. The Shiloh Cam- paign. 6, 7. Battle of Shi- 6. River battle of loh. Memphis. 1 Halleck's advance 17. Halleck before on Corinth. Corinth. 8. Pope takes Is- Beauregard evacu ates Corinth and land No. 10. retreats to Tupelo. 18-28. Farragut takes New Or- leans. 26-29. Naval a t- tack on Vicks- < burg. Sibley's retreat to Texas. < 17. France declares ^^H War on Mexico. ^ i r to 10 CHAPTER VIII the second half of 1 862. the confederate rally General (Continued from p. 105.) In September, 1862, came Lincoln's Proclamation emancipating the slaves, the steps leading to which are better put here in a con- nected form than kept to their strict chronological order. It must be remembered that Lincoln was elected on Union, not Abolitionist, lines, and always acknowledged it, so that this Proclamation was a dis- tinct change of policy. In August, 1 86 1, Congress passed what was called the Confiscation Act, providing that "any propert}^ used by any persons for the purpose of taking part in insurrection against the United States shall be law- ful prize, and be condemned as such." This included slaves, such hostile employment vitiating any future claim of ownership. It was called unconstitutional, but Congress claimed that it had a perfect right to deal with the exceptional situation. The Act did not emancipate slaves as such, but only those directly employed in work for the furtherance of the War against the United States. At that time it was thought that an Emancipation Proclamation would have been dangerous to the Union, as it might have lost Kentucky and Missouri, and locked up many more troops in Maryland. In March, 1862, Lincoln sent a Message to Congress, 146 EMANCIPATION QUESTIONS 147 advocating the gradual abolition of slavery, and in- viting the co-operation of slave-holding States. Though adopted by Congress, no States responded, and the attempt fell through. In April, slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia. General Fremont was removed from command in Missouri in November, 1861 (cf. p. 92), for what seems a similar step to the Confiscation Act, but the difference lay in this, that his proclamation confiscated the property of persons " in rebellion," and declared their slaves free, without the proviso that such property or slaves must have been used against the Union, and further, would have been dangerous in the hands of such a rabid Abolitionist. The North was not at this time strong enough to enforce the Act, and it remained a dead letter till July, 1862, when another Act was passed which declared forfeit to the United States the property of all persons taking part in, or aiding, rebellion, after sixty days from the giving of public warning by the President, and that all captured or escaped slaves " be deemed captives of war, and be for ever free of servitude. That, except for some crime, no slave escaping, and being claimed, be delivered to his owner unless he shall prove that he had nothing to do with rebellion." This was practically Fremont's proclamation of the year before, the point lying in Congress treating Secession as treason and rebellion, under the section of the Constitution which authorized measures " to suppress insurrections." This could not be carried into practice in the conduct of the War, nor, in the case of at least one State, be legally maintained. Slavery, though, could not be ignored any longer, because each Union general dealt with it in his own way, often politically. Sherman, for instance, who had been a lawyer before the War, instructed his officers to mete out plain, substantial justice, to have nothing to do with confiscation, and to restore the property of those who took the oath of allegiance, holding that "all 148 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 persons living in ttie lines are presumed to be good citizens, and are entitled to the protection of the laws of the United States so long as they conform to them," and that " every opportunity should be given to the wavering and disloyal to return to their allegiance." He disapproved of harsh measures, as likely to em- bitter and prolong the War, and it would have been well had his clear view of justice and common sense been generally acted on by the country. In August, an Emancipation Proclamation by General Hunter was disallowed, on the ground that such matters were the prerogative of the Executive, and ultra vires in a subordinate ; but, in the first half of September, Lee's victorious army was on Northern soil, at the very doors, Bragg was march- ing through Kentucky towards Louisville, a superior Confederate force advancing to take Corinth and the strategic railway, and Nashville in great straits, closely besieged : chaos reigned at Washington, Halleck was incapable, the politicians panic-stricken, and the strain on President Lincoln became insupport- able. A deeply religious man, who viewed slavery from the moral standpoint, he became convinced that these continual defeats were the judgment of God on the nation which would not abolish it, and vowed to Heaven that he would do so, if a victory were vouchsafed to the Union arms. A day or so later, Lee's invasion had failed, the Proclamation of Emancipation was issued, and then followed, in quick succession, the failure of Bragg s stroke, the defeat of Van Dorn before Corinth, and the relief of Nashville. This new departure in principle made the War "before all the world, not only a war for a political union, but also a war against slavery," and had the greatest effect on European opinion, where it " created so commanding a sentiment in favour of our cause that our enemies there could not prevail against it." It did not cause the dissensions in the North which had been feared, and checked the alarming increase of PRISONERS AND RECRUITING 149 political power which the continual failures of 1862 had given to the Democrats. An important matter in the conduct of the War was settled on July 22nd, when a regular Cartel of Exchange was arranged between the two Govern- ments (cf. p. 98). Previous to this, the Union Government, though unable in practice to treat prisoners as rebels, had refused officially to recognize them as prisoners of war, but in 1862 the Confeder- ates held the greater number of prisoners, and the obstinacy of the North was injuring their own peopU Prisoners had been exchanged before this arrange- ment, but the negociations were irregular and un- certain. Both sides now began to feel the pinch of keeping up their armies to strength, and replacing the drain of war. Lincoln, in July, issued his famous call for 300,000 men, to serve for three years or the duration of the War, which inspired one of the most stirring calls to arms ever written, curiously enough by a Quaker, beginning, " We are coming. Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more." The Confederates felt the difficulty worst, owing to their smaller popula- tion: though they had at first thought out the measures for making war better than their opponents, they had overlooked this vital matter. When enthusiasm was high, voluntary enlistment was enough, but when the novelty passed off, and the small pay was considered, conscription became necessary, as the only means that could be devised for the preservation of the army. Sherman says, " the progress of our Western armies had roused the rebel Government to the exercise of the most stupendous energy. Every man capable of bearing arms in the South was declared to be a soldier, and forced to act as such. All their armies were greatly reinforced, and the most despotic power was granted, to enforce discipline and supplies." The Confederate Conscript Law, passed in the previous April, rendered all men between eighteen and thirty- ISO THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 five liable to service during the War, making them subject to the Confederacy, and annulling State control (cf. p. 330). In the East, the Union object was clear, to cover Washington and the retreat of the Army of the Poto- mac, and stop Lee^ measures of defence, pure and simple, though the politicians should have seen that their order of importance ought to have been inverted. The same course had to be adopted in the West, owing to the dispersion of Halleck's great army, which gave the Confederates a chance of invading Union soil here also ; but both here and in the East they made the fatal mistake of mixing political and military objects, and expecting men to rise with help who would not do so without it (cf. p. 481). Chattanooga had now become a vital strategic point, in Missouri and Tennessee guerilla warfare was going on, and on the Mississippi things were in statu quo. (Continued on p. 187.) The East (Continued from p. 123.) McClellan made his position at Harrison's Landing very strong, and there he re- mained for some six weeks. Lee watched him with a brigade of cavalry, and on the night of July 31st bom- barded his camps : he concentrated the army nearer to Richmond, where it could act in any direction. Pope had taken up his new command just at the beginning of the Seven Days' battles before Richmond, and began with an able disposition, which covered the ground well, watching both the important junction at Gordonsville and the Shenandoah Valley. His line was along the Rappahannock, with a division at Fredericksburg to keep open the line to Acquia Creek, an isolated position, which was ordered from Washing- ton against his wish. He objected to McClellan's change of base as giving the Confederates the chance of exchanging Capitals, which would be fatal to the North, but not to them, for Lee was thus put between POPE'S FIRST MOVES 151 the two Union armies. Both in numbers and quality, the Army of Virginia was inferior to the Army of Northern Virginia^ and Pope's chance was to act in concert with a diversion by McClellan, but though the latter planned to attack again, he was not allowed to do so. Here arose a dangerous impasse, two in- dependent Army Commanders being at cross pur- poses, and Pope suggested that his old chief, Halleck, be placed in command of both, but the President went further, and made him Commander-in-Chief, without consulting Stanton, who was furious with what he called Pope's interference. Had McClellan been trusted, his army would have been kept to hold Lcc fast at Richmond, but he was impossible, and was brought back in August. When Pope took up his new command he quite lost his head, and issued a most unfortunate and bombastic order, which set every one against him, and his sneers at the Army of the Potomac did not mend matters. Sigel was put in command of his First Corps,^ vice Fremont resigned. Lee had sent Jackson to secure Gordonsville, when first threatened, but soon Pope repeated the attempt in force, with Banks' Corps.^ Banks' orders were vague, and he thought Jackson was to be attacked, but Pope only wanted him kept in check : the attack was made on August 9th at Cedar Mountain, and was severely beaten. Pope had begun well, and made Lee weaken his army by a large detachment, but when McClellan began to leave the Peninsula, Lee's hands were much freer, for he could either fall on the retreating army with his full ' There is much confusion in Corps nomenclature at this time. The original Corps of the Army of the Potomac were designated by Roman numerals, Pope's Corps by words. Thus McDowell's Corps was both the 1st and the Third, Sumner's the Ilnd, Banks' the Second, Heintzelman's the Illrd. After this all Corps were numbered consecutively, but there were so many changes from amalgamation and new units, that it would be useless to try to follow them. ■ S. The ^^ Arkansas'' in action, July 15th. W, Morgan^ Raid in Kentucky, July. 152 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 weight, or use part for this, watching Pope with t he rest, or neglect McClellan and throw all his weight on Pope, who was rather in an exposed position. ^ He chose the last, and even before McClellan went, he was confronting Pope with 55,000 men, outnumbering him by 20,000. Pope's communications at Culpeper being rather exposed, he made a skilful retreat behind the Rappahannock, covered by his cavalry, and took up a line from Sulphur Springs to Kelly's Ford. Halleck, however, hampered him by making him keep open communications with Acquia Creek, by which McClellan was to advance to his support, and Lee^ seeing the danger of this, resolved to strike at once : he concentrated his army on the 21st, and then began some skilful manoeuvring on both sides. Lee tried several times to cross the river, and Jackson got a few men over, but they were cut off by a flood : Longstreet watched the river from Rappahannock Station to Kelly's Ford. Lee meant to turn Pope's right and move on Manassas via Warrenton, but Pope saw this, and formed the bold plan of crossing the river and attacking him in flank and rear, asking Halleck to move the reinforcements to conform (cf. p. 451). The plan was spoilt by a freshet on the night of the 22nd, when Pope, seeing that Longstreet could not cross, neglected him, broke the bridge at Rappahannock Station, and concentrated at Warrenton. Stuart made a raid and took a few prisoners, and Jackson retired from Sigel's front, Longstreet taking his place. Lee was now in a very bad position, for Pope had detained him far longer than he had expected, and McClellan's army was coming up ; he therefore had recourse to the really desperate move of sending Jackson round by White Plains and Thoroughfare ' S. Baton Rouge, La., August 5th. S. Farragut and Williams at Vicksburg, Miss., August. The " Florida " and " Alabama " armed at sea, August. W. Raids of Forrest and Morgan, middle of August. W. Bragg invades Kentucky, August, September. EVENTS BEFORE MANASSAS 153 Gap on Manassas, two days' march ahead of Longstrcct, who followed by the same road, thus dividing his army to make a flank march round an enemy of about equal strength, who held interior lines, and might defeat the operation in detail. So far the manoeuvring had been in Pope's favour, but he now trusted to Halleck to secure his rear, only sending one division to Manassas: he thought that Jackson was going for the Shenandoah Valley, but should have made Thoroughfare Gap safe. Be- tween the 24th and 26th he was reinforced by some 23,000 men, four divisions of the Army of the Potomac and reserve troops, but he groped about slowly, while Jackson marched, and reached Bristoe Station undis- covered with 25,000 men, on the 26th. Pope was so positive that Jackson was going to the Valley that he sent no troops either to Thoroughfare Gap or Gainesville : he also trusted to Halleck, a fatal mistake. When he heard of Jackson's proximity, he thought it was a raid, and sent a small force to drive him away, ordering concentration at Gainesville, but the action showed him that Jackson was in force between him and Washington. Though the latter had destroyed the great Union depot at Manassas, he was in the greatest danger, for the Union army was closing in, Lee was not up, and he could neither stay where he was nor retreat : he therefore moved to the old battlefield of Bull Run on the 27th. Pope's dispositions were sound, and would have put him in the best position to deal with any developments, besides cutting o^ Jackson, but the Fog of War de- scended on him, and he got bewildered and excited. He saw that only a portion of Lee's army was before him, and without waiting for exact information, jumped at the idea of " bagging the crowd," and concentrated on Manassas, changing the positions of well-placed troops, and losing a day, which saved Jackson. McDowell, however, had kept his head, and sent Buford's cavalry to Gainesville, which met 154 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 Longstreet at White Plains, and disclosed the whole situation : he promptly ordered Sigel, who was under his command, to stop Longstreet at Haymarket, sending a division to flank him at Buckland Mills, and at the same time looking out for Jackson. On getting Pope's orders to move on Manassas, he left one division and the cavalry to hold Longstreet, which actually did so for a whole day, and brought the rest in. Sigel had found Jackson, whom Pope might have destroyed, but for the concentration. When this was done, Jackson had gone. Pope ordered a pursuit, Jackson, finding his enemies gone, did the same, and ordered A. P. LI ill to pursue ; but Hill had captured some despatches, knew Pope's plans, and joined the main body. Pope thought that King, whose division was \\o\d\ng Jackson at Gainesville, was pursuing him, and let things go on, but had he known it, Jackson was at his mercy. Both sides were entirely in the dark on the 28th. King and Ricketts, who had been fighting Jackson and Longstreet separately, knew nothing of Pope's plans, and retired to Bristoe Station. Pope intended to move in overwhelming force against Jackson's supposed flank and rear the next day, but his orders were badly worded, especially those to Porter (Vth Corps) : even when he got the day's reports, and altered the orders, they were still un- suitable, for he refused to believe that Longstreet was up, and persisted that he could destroy Jackson ; but his chance was gone, his supplies done, and his men worn out. He now forbade a general action, ordering a retreat behind Bull Run for supplies, if the enemy were in force, intending to take position at Centreville, pick up his reinforcements, and fight there, a good plan, had he stuck to it. These were the orders for the 29th. Porter and McDowell were to go to Gainesville, but as they went they saw the battle at Groveton, and heard that Longstreet was close at hand. On this morning, Jackson, behind Bull Run, did not know whether Longstreet could get through, GROVETON AND MANASSAS 155 for he was quite cut off, and thought best to take a position at Groveton, where he could hold on, and gain time for the Confederate concentration. He was attacked by Sigel and Reynolds, but held his own, and soon heard that relief was near, but the whole Union Army was also near, and the fight not over. He had beaten off Sigel, when Pope arrived, took command, and made a concentrated attack on him, in which battle his terrible powers of counter- stroke were never more effective. Longstrcet seemed to have escaped notice, and only came into action in the evening, to some extent. Porter and McDowell found that their orders were unsuitable to the real situation, and could get no answer to their messages to Pope : McDowell moved off, leaving Porter to confront the whole of Lougstrecfs Corps. When Pope's orders came, they dealt with an unreal situa- tion, and had they not done so, it was then too late to carry them out. Had Pope's whole army been up early, it might still have been possible to crush Jackson, but, when he arrived, he seemed quite to have forgotten his own orders and intention not to fight a general action on that ground ; but he may have still thought that his original plan was possible. The Confederates fell back a little during the night, and Pope still maintained that they were retreating : he was furious with Porter for not carrying out his impossible orders of the day before, and thought the report oi Longstreefs Corps being present was only an excuse. He elected to fight it out there, and gave orders to " pursue the enemy." Lee saw the mistake, and let it go on, for he had formed one of the greatest plans of his life, trusting to Jackson's weakened Corps to bear the brunt of the Union attack, while Longstrcet moved round to take Pope in flank. Pope did not expect an attack on his own left, and had withdrawn troops which covered the left of his own attack, which was beaten. McDowell, in this part of the field, saw the danger, and took steps to meet it, and at last 156 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 Pope saw it too, and acted promptly and well, but too late. Jackson could only just hold his ground, with sup- port from Longstreefs artillery. Longstreet struck at the salient of the Union position, Bald Hill, Jackson advancing at the same time. The position was at length carried, but the Henry Hill held out till dark, and under cover of this defence the Union army retreated across Bull Run in good order ; there was no pursuit, and just after the battle 20,000 good fresh troops came up, from the Hnd and Vlth Corps. The Union army had 55,000 men in action, the Confederates 54,000 : the Union losses for the two days are not separated from those of the rest of the campaign, but the Confederates lost 9,474. The battle was fought on the old Bull Run battlefield, with the positions reversed, and is generally called the Second Bull Run, or the Second Manassas^ but the two would seem to be better described if the first was called Bull Run, the other Manassas. On the 31st the Confederates began to move, and Jackson got the worst of a severe action with the IXth Corps at Chantilly : Pope's army was withdrawn to the lines of Washington next day. Neither Pope nor his men were demoralized, but the public were, and Halleck, who at first behaved as if he still trusted him, was too weak to resist their pressure, suddenly removed him from command, and put no one in his place : then the army did go to pieces. Had Pope fallen back on his communications on the 25th and 26th, he would have caught Jackson isolated and crushed him, and had he stuck to his plan of fall- ing back to Centreville on his supports, he would have got away safely ; but he fought a general action with- out them. He had not the confidence of the army, like McClellan, and his braggadocio and abuse of the Army of the Potomac set every one against him. He disappears from the War. BANKS SAVES THE SITUATION 157 Just before the battle, McClellan reported to Halleck at Washington, but the latter was helpless, as ever, in emergency, so McClellan did the work, but had to wait for sanction for everything: but for this, the Vlth Corps would have been up before. He was expressly limited to the command of the Washington lines, even after the battle. He wanted to know whether the troops, 70,000 good men, were to be used to help Pope to win, or to defend the Capital, and while Halleck vacillated. Pope was beaten. Pope being dismissed, and matters getting worse, Lincoln took charge, and on September 3rd appointed McClellan to command the army. This change was made possible by the nerve and ability of Banks, on whom the weight fell, through Halleck's default. Though too ill to take the field himself, he was directed to assume command at Washington in McClellan's absence, and through his exertions chaos was reduced to order, McClellan's army was enabled to start, and steady re-organization went on at Washington. He made the situation safe. Lincoln thought that Lee might cross the border, and that Baltimore and Pennsylvania must be covered as well as Washington. Lee gives his plans thus: That as Virginia was now clear of the enemy, it was desirable to keep it so, and also to move into Maryland, since its " condition encouraged the belief that the presence of our army would induce the Washington Govern- ment to retain all its available force to provide against contingences," i.e. that he {Lee) would utilize the known Southern sympathies of the State. His mili- tary plan was " to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order, by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications. Having accomplished this object, it was proposed to move the army into western Mary- land, establish our communications with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and by threatening Pennsylvania induce the enemy to follow. 158 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 and thus draw him from his base of supplies." The plan was good, giving a chance of striking at one of the objectives, and of raising recruits : it would also shift the burden of occupation on to the enemy, and secure the crops of the Valley and of north-east Virginia. Further, the Confederate army was more mobile, and McClellan never attacked. There was, however, another point, and a difficult one : Were Lee and his army in a condition to carry the plan out ? It must be done at once, if at all, but the men were in rags, and the whole army in urgent need of a refit. Was the time or the refit most wanted ? He wanted recruits, but the ragged misery of his army was not an attractive advertisement. Another thing, his numbers were not sufficient to encourage doubters. Further, he had not calculated on the way in which the defeat of Manassas had united the North, or that Maryland was so firmly controlled, that no rising was now possible, while Washington was secure. The refit was an absolute necessity, and the decision must be condemned as ill-considered and premature, resulting in more harm than good to the Confederate cause. McClellan had foreseen Lee's probable move, and watched the fords with cavalry, the Confederates crossing on the 4th, He moved west from Washing- ton, with his right well forward and his left on the river, so as to cover both Washington and Baltimore, concentrate at once in any direction, and be able to follow into Pennsylvania if required. Lee crossed at Leesburg, and moved on Frederick, hoping that this would cause the retreat of the Union troops at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, which were on his communications; but as it did not, he determined to free them as he went, trusting to McClellan's slow- ness, and ordered Jackson to clear Martinsburg, and McLaws and Walker to take Harper's Ferry. The army was to pass the mountains and concentrate I near Hagerstown. These orders were issued at THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 159 Frederick on the 9th, but a copy was left behind, which fell into McClellan's hands on the 13th. He had been moving slowly, and Halleck's interference made things worse, but he now woke up, for he had just time to catch Lee's army separated, and beat it in detail. Jackson had cleared Martinsburg, but the taking of Harper's Ferry caused a delay which would have been fatal had McClellan moved at once ; but he delayed till next day, and the danger passed. The Union army moved in two bodies, on Cramp- ton's and Turner's Gaps, in the South Mountain Range, where, on the 14th, was fought the confused series of actions for Turner's Gap, called the battle of Boonsboro or South Mountain, between the Union advance and D. H. Hill and Loiigstrect, who fell back, though McClellan did not know this till next morn- ing. These actions gained time for the capture of Harper's Ferry and the concentration of the Con- federate arm}' at Sharpsburg. McClellan had lost both chances, of beating Lee in detail, and of saving Harper's Ferry. Both he and Franklin, commanding the Vlth Corps, were so much impressed with Lee's "enormous forces," that they did not press on as they should have done. Lee issued a proclamation to the people on getting into Maryland, saying that his army had come to help them to throw off the yoke of the North, which deprived them of their rights, believing that they wished to do so, but if this had ever been true, they were now under firm control, and the proclamation was coldly received. The people sympathized with the South, but not to the extent of making their State part of the theatre of war. Lee heard of the battles of South Mountain and the capture of Harper's Ferry at the same time, and was astonished at McClellan's new activity, on which he had not reckoned. Maryland was apathetic, and his political attempt had failed : it was no use going on, and he had the choice of either recrossing the Potomac or of holding his ground, and chose i6o THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 the latter, though the most risky, because he wanted to shew the Maryland people that he was as good as his word, and a successful action might cause a change in his favour. He therefore took position at Sharpsburg with the troops which were up, on the 15th, and though McClellan came up, he did not attack. Next day Lee changed position to cover his retreat better, standing across an angle of the Potomac, with the unfordable Antietam Creek about 800 yards in front of his right and centre. Jackson came up, and Hooker's 1st Corps took ground opposite Lee's left for the attack next day, and this disclosed the plan, which was to attack his left strongly at first, and if successful, to push a Corps against his right, and cut off his retreat, holding him in the centre. This plan was spoilt by delays in execution, partly owing to jealousy among the Union generals. McClellan's orders for the 17th were clumsy, and made combined action difficult, and Lee had seen through his plan the day before. During the morn- ing, the 1st, XHth, and llnd Corps attacked the Confederate left in succession, piecemeal, and without mutual support, and also were formed in long lines, close together, a most clumsy and helpless order (cf p. 132): they gained a little ground by the Dunker Church, but Jackson retook it with one of his great counterstrokes. The holding action in the centre was carried out by the Vlth Corps and part of the IVth, mostly with artillery, but had McClellan thrown in his strong IXth Corps on the Confederate right, when Lee had his hands full on the other flank in the morning, the Confederate army must have been destroyed. The IXth went in alone, after midday, and was beaten. Though there was a little desultory fighting afterwards, the battle was practically over : tactically it was a draw, but an invading army cannot afford such a result, and the invasion of Maryland was at an end. AFTER SHARPSBURG i6i The Union army was 87,000 strong, and its losses 12,500; the Confederate, 35,000 strong, losses about 9,500. Lee's awful losses would have broken down a weaker man, and his resolution was never better shewn than when he decided, after hearing the reports that night, and against the opinion of his generals, not only to hold his ground, but to drive in the Union right in the morning : he only gave the attack up when a careful reconnaissance shewed it to be impracticable; but he stood his ground, and offered battle again all day, but it was not accepted. It is said that in the early dawn of the i8th, the Union scouts were checked by seeing an extended fighting-line in their front, and waited till it got light, when, as no one moved, they advanced and found a line of dead men, and that the time gained by this check enabled Lee to make his dispositions. McClellan's army was much disordered, but his reason for not attacking on the 1 8th was probably due to his habitual over- estimate of the enemy's strength, and this gave Lee the invaluable time required to arrange for retreat : that night the Confederate army crossed the Poto- mac. Next day there was an attempt at pursuit, but Jackson was at hand, and under his direction the rearguard turned so savagely to bay that it was not molested further, and both armies drew off to rest and refit. ^ McClellan held the line of the Potomac, inactive. On October 6th, ^ Halleck ordered him to go and fight Lee, or drive him south, but he did not move, and Stuart raided round his army, destroying much property, and returning to Virginia in safety. At the end of the month, McClellan moved on Warrenton, ' W. luka, Miss., September 19th, 20th. W. Bragg' s Invasion of Kentucky, September. W. Siege of Nashville, Tenn., September. * W. Corinth, Miss., October 3rd, 4th. W. Perryville, Ky., October 8th. VV. Fredericktown, Mo., October 21st. II i62 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 to get between Lee and Richmond, and force him to concentrate farther south, by Gordonsville, which would clear the way for an advance by Fredericks- burg or the Peninsula. The North, however, had had enough of him, his vapours, delays, and excuses, for though he had driven Lee out of Maryland, and covered Washington, yet he was impossible, always quarrelling with the Government, and at loggerheads with his generals, so, on November /th,^ he was relieved, and Burnside put in his place. He was not employed again during the War, McClellan's retirement was immediately followed by the trial and disgrace of General Fitz John Porter, for the causes of which we must go back a little. General Pope's report on the battle of Manassas censured Generals Porter, Franklin, and Griffin, and recom- mended that they be removed ; but when McClellan returned to command, he persuaded the President to retain them. When McClellan left, however. Porter was relieved on the same day, and the case against him only was taken up. He was tried by court- martial, charged with disobedience of orders at the battle of Manassas, and with shamefully retreating in- stead of pushing into action, and cashiered. The sequel will be found later on (cf. p. 437). When Burnside took command he proposed to feint at Culpeper and Gordonsville, and then move on Fredericksburg, to go on against Richmond ; and this was approved, with the proviso that it be done quickly if at all, Halleck engaging that the requisite stores, especially pontoons, should be sent forward at once (cf. p. 451). Burnside re-organized the army in three Grand Divisions of two Corps each, under Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker, and moved to the Rappahannock in the middle of November; but the pontoons were late, and this altered the situation. Sumner reached the river on the 17th, and was told to wait for the pontoons, at a time when Lee had ' W. Relief of Nashville, Tenn., November 17th. EVENTS BEFORE FREDERICKSBURG 163 only a weak picquet line along it, Lo)igstreefs Corps being at Culpeper, and Jacksoiis in the Valley. Lee feared that the enemy would be on him before he could concentrate on the Rappahannock, and at first thought of taking position on the North Anna River in rear, with such troops as he could get together, manoeuvring against the Union flank with the rest ; but when he knew the reason of Burnside's delay, he determined to concentrate the whole army at Fredericksburg, as a stronger defensive position, and fight there. It was an unfortunate decision, for the position had two grave faults : it could be turned by the fords above Falmouth ; but especially, the ground on the north side of the river would prevent any pursuit if successful, and the battle could not be decisive. Lee's real reason for fighting here against his better judgment, was that the President had ordered him not to retire more than he could help, hoping for European intervention if he held his ground. The high ground on the north bank commanded the lower wooded hills on the south, which had a strip of low land between them and the river ; so Lee decided to allow his enemy to cross, and catch him deploying on the level, with the river behind him. He therefore kept his works and troops well back, at the edge of the woods, and, to deceive Burnside, did not complete his concentration till the day before the battle, but had all troops warned and in easy reach. The Confederate army was 78,000 strong. Burnside had wished to make Lee concentrate, and then slip away by sea and attack Richmond ; but Lee watched the lower river till the very last, and the Government and public opinion prevented Burnside from carrying out his plan : he had to fight there, but thought now that he had caught Lee's army scattered, and could beat him in detail. The Confederate position was six miles long, resting its left on the river opposite Falmouth ; and Burn- i64 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 side determined to attack it straight in front, without proper reconnaissance, and making little or no plan beyond sending in Sumner's Grand Division on the right, Franklin's on the left, and ordering Hooker's to follow Sumner. He posted a great line of guns, many of them heavy, on Stafford Heights, and threw his pontoons over the river in full view of Lees army on December nth, when there was some sharp fight- ing at the bridges. The morning of the 12th was foggy/ and Sumner and Franklin crossed and began to deploy ; but Sumner had not room for his numerous guns on the cramped ground. Hooker was kept in reserve behind the river. The army was 113,000 strong. Burnside's orders were very vague : those to Franklin merely tied his hands and weakened his attack, since he had to keep an eye behind him to hold the line of retreat open, which was the business of the reserve. Franklin had Jackson's Corps in his front, while Sumner faced Longstreet. The battle of Fredericksburg, on the 13th, was very simple. Franklin's attack was strongly met and ilanked, but at length he got forward and hrokQ Jack- son's first line, but the second line and reserves closed in and drove him back with heavy loss. Sumner, who had no definite orders, attacked the very strong ground of Marye's hill, and was repulsed with fearful loss ; and then Franklin was ordered to attack again, but could get no more out of his beaten troops. Hooker covered the retreat as best he could. Burn- side quite lost his head, and thought of attacking the next morning with one Corps, but was dissuaded. Lee expected an attack, and kept his strong position ; but he never could have advanced from it against the great line of Union guns. The Union loss was 12,633, the Confederate 5,377. The two armies remained facing each other across the Rappahannock till the end of the ' S.E. Foster's Expedition to Goldsborough, N.C., December I2th-i8th. OPERATIONS AT SUFFOLK 165 year,* the Confederate cavalry making several raids within a short distance of Washington. Suffolk, on the Nansemond, with the railway to Petersburg and Weldon, is the key to the approaches to the lower James from the south, and in September Generals Pcttigrew and French advanced against it. General Peck was sent from Fort Monroe with three brigades to seize it, and fortified the position care- fully, which alarmed the Confederates, who thought that this was to be the base for a new move on Richmond : they therefore stopped their advance and fortified a line along the Blackwater, against it. (Continued on p. 188.) The South-East (Continued from p. 125.) Foster succeeded Burnside in the command of the Coast Force at New Berne, and in December- he advanced and dispersed a Confederate force which was concentrating at Golds- borough ; this was about the only military operation in this district in the half-year. (Continued on p. 217.) The West MISSOURI (cf. p. 130) (Continued from p. 135.) After the battle of Pea Ridge the Confederates were scattered and powerless, though fighting went on here and there, but in Octo- ber Colonel Thompson got a force together and began marauding in the south-east of the State. Colonel Plummer was sent against him with a Union force, and completely defeated him near Fredericktown on October 21st, after which only guerilla fighting went on in places. ' vS. Holly Springs, Miss., December 20th. VV. Chickasaw Bluffs, Miss., December 29th. The " Monitor" founders at sea, December 29lh. W. Stone's River, Tenn., December 31st. - E, Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, i66 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE (cf. p. 1 34) East of the Mississippi, at the end of June, Halleck's great army was widely scattered, and its communica- tions were both long and vulnerable, for subsistence necessitated dispersion. McClellan in Virginia had begun to agitate for reinforcements from the western army, but if this were now weakened, all that had been gained would be lost again. Pope had just gone East, and Rosecrans took his place. Grant and Buell resuming their old commands;^ in the middle of July, Halleck went to take up his duties as Commander- in-Chief, and Grant succeeded him, but kept his army command. Buell, based on Louisville, was at Huntsville, Alabama, on the Memphis-Charleston line, preparing to strike at Bragg s base at Chattanooga, while Morgan was at Cumberland Gap, and the line Vicksburg-Port Hudson was the only part of the Mississippi now held by the Confederates. Grant sent reinforcements to Buell, reducing his own and Rosecrans' forces to 42,000. He had to guard 200 miles of railway, and therefore concentrated at three main points, Memphis, Corinth, and Tuscumbia, with some troops at Jackson and Bolivar. Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard, was about to march from Tupelo to Chattanooga, to which place Sidney Joh}tston had sent all surplus stores, and make it his base for the next move. Things were going very badly for the Union in the East, and he seized the opportunity of their dispersion in his district to strike a blow, in co-operation with Van Dorn and Price from Mississippi, which should at all events free Tennessee from the invader, if not drive him back altogether. The Union chance was thus lost, and Bragg controlled events, for their armies were not again united till after the fall of Vicksburg, when they were collected under Grant to drive him out of ' E. Cedar Mountains, Va., July gth. S. The " Arkansas " in action, July 15th. BKAGG'S PLAN OK CAMPAIGN 167 Chattanooga. The Confederates made great efforts to raid the Union depots and lines of communication. In the race for Chattanooga, Bragg had the great advantage of marching in country clear of the enemy, with no fear for his communications, while his oppo- nent was hampered by the repairs of the railway, and weakened by detaching troops to guard it against Confederate cavalry raids in his rear. John Morgan^ heavily defeated in May, started with a fresh raid from Knoxville in July, sweeping through central Kentucky and destroying depots, telegraphs, and railways. He claimed to have travelled over 1,000 miles in 24 days, destroyed all U.S. stores in 17 towns, and neutralized and dispersed 2,700 men, with a loss of 20, recruiting 300 on the way. At the same time Forrest started from McMinnville, and surprised and took Murfreesboro, with huge stores and much treasure, easily eluding the force sent against him, and attacking the line south of Nashville, while Morgan dealt with that to the north of it. Buell was helpless for want of cavalry, small infantry detach- ments being useless, and even when he got it, was not at first able to make head. Buell knew that Bragg was going to move against him, but not by what route, but he assumed that Nashville, held by Rosecrans, would be his objective, and posted Thomas at McMinnville, on the flank of Braggs route. Bragg manoeuvred to confirm him in this idea, till the available Union force was con- centrated in Murfreesboro, leaving the rest of the country clear. Bragg's plan, which was intended to free the soil of the South from the Northern armies, was for Kirhy Smith to move through eastern Ken- tucky to Lexington and thence to Cincinnati, while he himself, with the main army, pushed through central Kentucky to Louisville. Van Dorn and Price were to move on Corinth, to prevent Rosecrans from reinforcing Buell. With Louisville and Cincinnati in their hands, it would be a short step to the i68 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 Northern States, and, with the number of recruits which they hoped to obtain en route, they could easily resist any force brought against them. This had been Sidney Johnston's plan, which Bragg, as his successor, tried to carry out, but success depended on the man, for Johnston was a Kentuckian and most popular there, while Bragg was the very reverse, and spent the crisis of the campaign in wrangling and wasting time with politics, when all his thoughts should have been kept for purely military matters. Kirby Smith threatened Cumberland Gap, and Buell detached a force to watch him early in August,^ but found that this district was taken from his com- mand, which did not help the Union side. Kirby Smith cut the post off, perhaps owing to this, and then moved on Cincinnati, defeating Nelson at Rich- mond, in front of Louisville, on the 23rd, and, while threatening the latter place, taking care to keep his men together for the decisive battle. Though this ad- vance caused the utmost consternation in Cincinnati,^ the Kentucky people were lukewarm in the Con- federate cause, and did not come forward. Bragg moved on Gainesville, forcing Buell to use a parallel line farther west, and to leave detachments at various places, but missed a chance of bringing him to action while in retreat and weakened. Buell would then have been driven into Ohio to refit, and Bragg could have wintered and recruited in Kentucky, or con- centrated against him when he moved south on Nashville. Buell, at Murfreesboro, did not find out what was going on till the beginning of September, and started for Louisville on the 7th, hoping either to retard Bragg's march, or to make him, "if he would not fight for Kentucky, leave the State in the posses- sion of the Union forces before he could gain anything by his advance." Though Bragg had the start, he ' S. Baton Rouge, La., August Sth. ■' E, Manassas, Va., August 30th, BRAGGS INVASION OF KENTUCKY 169 lost time by taking Munfordsville/ which let his opponent up, so he retreated to Bardstown to keep touch with his depot at Lexington, and uncovered Louisville, where Buell went at once, filled up with supplies, and moved out again on the 30th. His army now consisted of three Corps and two divisions, which latter were sent against Kirby Smith, with whom Bragg tried to make a junction, retiring fight- ing. He had already given up the great attack on the North, for the huge political promises of a rising en masse were utterly false, and he was encumbered by the mass of supplies which he had brought for his intended recruits; he said openly that the State was not worth fighting for, and only wanted to get away, the battle of Perryville^ being fought as a rear- guard action to cover the concentration and retreat, while he and Kirby Smith were at Frankfort, installing a provisional Confederate Governor of the State. Bragg relied on the separation of the Union forces, and told Polk, on whom the command of the battle fell, to crush the portion at Perryville, McCook's Corps, on October 8th. McCook, however, held his ground, and the Union army concentrated during the battle. Buell intended to attack the next day, but found that Bragg had retired in the night. Union force : strength 58,000, 22,000 being very raw, loss 4,211. Confederates: strength 35,000 to 40,000, loss 3,396. Buell followed, but Bragg held him off with his rearguard, and retreated steadily, the pursuit ceasing before he reached Cumberland Gap.^ Meanwhile Breckinridge had been besieging Nash- ville, and reduced it to great straits : at one time he gained considerable success, but Bragg forbade him to storm the place for political reasons. It was relieved ' E. Sharpsburg, Md., September 17th. VV. luka, Miss., September 19th, 20th. * W. Corinth, Miss., October 3rd, 4th. ' W, Fredericktown, Mo., October 2ist. I70 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 on November 17th. Bragg made a great mistake in detaching so large a force for this siege, as he wanted every available man for his main object. Buell gave up the pursuit in order to cover Nashville, for he expected Bragg to concentrate within reach of it and fight a decisive battle for Kentucky, but he did not do so. To go back to the secondary Confederate operations in connection with the Kentucky campaign. Bragg called up the forces of Van Dorn and Price from Mississippi, to prevent the junction of Rosecrans and Buell. Price was the nearest, and struck at the Union post at luka, which he took, but this gave Grant the chance of striking at him before Van Dorn could come up : he attacked on two sides, ^ to surround him, but the timing of the combination failed, and Price got away and joined Van Dorn, Lovell also joining them a few days later. Grant was so hampered by the Confederate cavalry raids that he used the triangle of lines by Humboldt, and made his headquarters at Jackson. Van Dorn considered the situation, and thought that he could best attack Grant's great fortified triangle from the west or north-west against Corinth, when success would entail the fall of the whole and drive him back into Kentucky, as Bragg had driven Buell, destroying the whole fruits of the Union campaign from Fort Henry to Corinth. He started to carry this out at once, and attacked Corinth on October 3rd. After a very severe fight the Union forces were driven from the advanced to the main line of defence. The battle was renewed the next day, Van Dorn attacking the main position furiously. Several redoubts were taken and retaken, but the main attack failed, the supports being late, and by noon the Confederate army was in full retreat. Rose- crans could not pursue, for his men were worn out, but, being reinforced on the 5th, he started to do so : Grant sent other troops to cut off Van Dorn's retreat, but he got away, and the troops were recalled. Each ' September 19th, 20th. CHANGES IN COMMAND 171 side had about 23,000 men in action : Rosecrans' losses were 2,359, ^^^^ Dorn's 4,838, There seems to have been more blame than praise earned in these cam- paigns. Both Buell and Bragg were blamed for the Kentucky campaign, and Grant was much dissatisfied with Rosecrans in that of Corinth. Sherman says that the effect of the battle of Corinth was very great,' and enabled the Union side to assume the offensive, being a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in west Tennessee (cf. p. 240). Jefferson Davis replaced Van Dorn by Pemberion, and Rosecrans succeeded Buell on November 24th, for Halleck, as soon as the Kentucky campaign was over, had ordered the latter to make a campaign into eastern Tennessee, on very unfavourable lines. Buell answered that it was im- practicable, and disposed his men to cover Nashville and the railway, on which Halleck removed him from command. The fact was, that the greatest pressure was being brought to bear on President Lincoln to send help to the Unionists of Knoxville and district, who were being very roughly handled, and he insisted that this be made a matter of urgency. Rosecrans, like Buell, expected Bragg to concentrate near Nashville and fight for Kentucky, in order to save Tennessee also, and began by restoring his communications with Louisville ; but Bragg concen- trated at Murfreesboro,^ sending out almost all his cavalry to raid, on which Rosecrans moved against him from Nashville on December 26th. The advantage which he so promptly seized was a very real one, for Morgan was now in command of a model independent cavalry force of two brigades, with artillery. He did much damage, but was far away when the decisive battle was fought, wasting his power on secondary objects ; his presence would probably have turned ■ W. Peiryville, Ky., October 8th. * E. Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th. W. Forrest's Raid, late December. S. Holly Springs, Miss., December 20th. 172 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 the scale. Bragg was on the watch, and delayed his enemy for several days with advanced detachments, while he concentrated his army at leisure in his chosen position on Stone's River. Rosecrans came in front of it on the 29th,^ and spent the 30th in reconnaissance and preparation for the attack on the morrow. Bragg's main body was on the west of the river, with a detachment under Breckinridge on the other side, covering his base and line of retreat, which Rosecrans planned to attack with two Corps, leaving one, McCook's, to hold its own for the requisite time. Oddly enough, Bragg s plan was exactly the same, for his right, under Breckinridge, to hold its own, while with the rest he destroyed McCook. Bragg struck first, and caught McCook unready, and badly posted, Hardee's Corps driving him in with a rush. Luckily, the next Union Corps, Thomas', had not yet moved, and steadied the fight till Rosecrans came up in person. He saw at once that his planned attack must be abandoned, and that he could only just hold his own, and ordered Crittenden's Corps, which had started, to come back into reserve. The fighting was most furious, Thomas' stubborn defence being gradually driven back, and the reserves brought into action. Bragg also was quite alive to the importance of the struggle, and threw in his last reserves for a final great attack, which was repulsed, and the battle ceased from sheer exhaustion, after the most frightful losses. The Union line was driven back a good way, but still held the key of the position. The result was due to Rosecrans' brilliant personal leadership, with- out which even Thomas' dogged defence would have been of no avail. Bragg brought up his trains, to finish it where he stood, but his army was quite fought out. (Map on p. 218.) To return to Grant, and the headquarters of the district. He had started a very important move in ' S- Chickasaw Bluffs, Miss., December 29th, GRANT'S TROUBLES AND PLANS 173 the administration of the country, the employment of freed sLaves within their own districts, on a regular system, which was practically the beginning of the " Freedmen's Bureau " : they were thus able to main- tain themselves at their own homes ; they were not at first paid wages, but carefully looked after, and supplied with what they wanted in return for their labour. The military situation was, that he had hardly enough troops to defend the district which he occu- pied, but might cover it by driving the enemy back, and after the battle of Corinth the time seemed favourable for taking the initiative : he therefore proposed to concentrate at Grand Junction, and move down the railway to the back of Vicksburg, Halleck ordering Curtis to co-operate with him from Helena. He was told that he might soon expect a good reinforcement of new levies. He was, however, bothered with a political intrigue, for one of his lieutenants, McClernand, a man of great political influence, had gone to Washington and got the com- mand of an independent river expedition against Vicksburg behind Grant's back, who heard of it when making his new plans, and asked where he stood. He was told that he commanded the troops in his department, but that operations in Mississippi must be confined to the enemy's troops, which must be turned by a river column. This looked ver}^ like holding Grant back till McClernand had made his try. Grant and Sherman talked things over, and seemed to have the choice of two courses : 1. To send Sherman back to Memphis with two divisions, to pick up the new levies there, and the troops at Helena, and move down the river to the mouth of the Yazoo, to attack Vicksburg in rear, while Grant co-operated from Oxford. 2. To concentrate the whole force at Grenada, repair the railway to Memphis, and then move against Vicksburg via Jackson. 174 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 No. I had the disadvantage that the enemy held the interior lines, but as both portions were strong enough to take care of themselves, it was thought better than No. 2, which meant moving by land alone, and repairing railways ; but as they could not be used in the later stage of the advance, this would be too slow. Admiral Porter and his flotilla were to co-operate. Halleck was kept informed, and on December 5th he told Grant not to go south of the Tallahatchie river for the present, and authorized him either to command the river column or give it to Sherman : he chose the latter, partly to forestall McClernand, whom he did not think fit for it.^ On the i8th he was told to form his army into four Corps, giving one to McClernand, which was to operate down the river, and this was the reason why he took command himself The Confederates were now thoroughly alarmed, and put Joseph Johnston in command from the Alle- ghanies to the Mississippi, with Bragg and Pemberton under him, though he pointed out that the district was too large to work. Forrest was sent to rein- force Pemberton^ and moved against Grant's com- munications, making a most successful raid which destroyed the railway from Jackson to Columbus, cut off Grant's communications with Columbus and Washington, from the 19th to the 30th,^ and stopped his supplies for a longer time. Van Dorn also made a cavalry raid from Tupelo, and destroyed Grant's main depot at Holly Springs, and then attacked Bolivar, but was repulsed, and retired to Grenada. Grant had sent out his cavalry against the Mobile- Ohio Railway, but they were hastily recalled, to drive Van Dorn away. The Confederates were using their interior line with a vengeance against Grant's luck- less scheme No. i, for the raids had a most decisive ' E. Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th. - W. Stone's River, Tenn., December 31st. GRANT PARALYSED 175 influence. Grant had to fall back, and lost touch with Sherman, who had started down the river from Memphis, with 32,000 men^ without waiting for McClernand. He attacked Chickasaw Bluffs, before Vicksburg, in pursuance of his orders, on the 29th, but was heavily repulsed : he could not keep his army- there, on low, unhealthy ground. Grant could not help, and he returned to the Mississippi on January 2nd. Though all these operations are put in the Western district, as I have defined it, for continuity of narra- tive, some of them were in the Southern. The Mississippi flotilla, whose headquarters were at Cairo, was much strengthened, two new types of gunboats being added : one light, called " tinclads," proof against field-guns and musketry, and of light draught ; the other heavily armed and armoured, drawing nine feet of water. Porter had succeeded Davis in command, and was busy equipping them till late in November. Davis, before he went, had arranged with General Curtis to scour the river on both sides, to prevent the Confederates, who were continually attacking Helena, from making a lodgment anywhere. A division of gunboats was told off to patrol the rivers Tennessee and Cumber- land, but the most important change was that the control of the flotilla was transferred from the Army to the Navy, a great gain in efficiency. (Continued on p. 217.) The South (Continued from p. 138.) Such urgent orders were sent to Farragut to take Vicksburg, that though he saw that his fleet would require the aid of a large land force to do so, he tried with a small one,^ a brigade and two batteries under Williams, which landed and took position while the fleet ran past the batteries, but could do no more. Williams was not strong enough to cut the place off by a canal, ' W. Morgan's and Forrest's Raids, mid-July. 176 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 the season was unhealthy, and he returned to Baton Rouge. The Confederates had built a powerful ram, the ^'Arkansas,'' which was attacked by the Union gun- boats in the Yazoo River on July 15th, and then ran through the fleet to Vicksburg. Van Dorn proposed to take Baton Rouge and the mouth of the Red River, to keep touch with the West ; but his attack on Baton Rouge, on August 5th, failed, the ram broke down, and being found useless, partly owing to her wretched engines, partly to damages received in action, was destroyed. Breckinridge, however, secured the mouth of the Red River, and seized and fortified Port Hudson : the Union troops fell back to New Orleans at the end of the month. When communication was made between the fleets on the upper and lower river on July ist. Porter reported the importance of the Red River and the Atchafalaya to Farragut : had these been seized and held, the Union side would have gained a solid step forward, which was not done by the premature attack on Vicksburg. At the end of November, some gunboats were sent up the Yazoo under Walke, to clear the way for the army, and had continuous and severe fighting, losing one of the new heavy boats by a mine. In December, Banks succeeded Butler in command of the Department of the Gulf, being ordered to co- operate with Grant, occupy the Red River country, protect Arkansas and Louisiana, and form a base for operations against Texas. Though his army, now numbered as the XlXth Corps, was over 30,000 strong, it was so scattered by detachments that only half that number was at his disposal (cf. p. 228). (Continued on p. 221.) The South-West (Continued from pp. 130 and 139.) In Arkansas, in July, Hindman was sent to re-organize the Con- THE SOUTH-WEST. AFFAIRS AT SEA 177 federate district, and raise a new army, which he did with great energy, and Curtis retreated to Helena. More troops were collected on the Union side, and an " Army of the Frontier " formed under Schofield, who nearly cleared the State of Confederate forces by the end of the year. Magruder, the Con- federate commander in Texas, retook Galveston on January ist, 1863, which may be considered as a part of the great Confederate rally. (Continued on p. 269, Chapter X.) The Blockade (Continued from p. 140.) The Blockade was being steadily drawn tighter in the narrow waters of the east coast, and strengthened outside the main ports ; but, while Fort Fisher stood, it was always at a dis- advantage off Wilmington. Several efforts were made to block the entrance to Charleston by sinking ships in the channel, but without success. The North suf- fered a loss, perhaps more sentimental than very great, in the foundering of the famous " Monitor" at sea on December 29th, on her voyage to New York. Really, however, her defects were known, and a better class of vessels of the same type was nearly ready to take her place. In the Gulf, Farragut controlled the whole coast, except at Mobile and Sabine River. (Continued on p. 229.) The War at Sea (Continued from p. 141.) The Confederates now began to make themselves felt at sea. In August the ''Florida^' which had been closely watched for a long time by the Northern cruisers at Nassau, while trying to meet the vessel carrying her armament, which was waiting about in the neighbourhood (cf. p. 471), succeeded in doing so; but she was short of stores and men, her crew were down with fever, and she ran for Havana, lying there for some months, till 12 178 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 her captain, Maffitt, ran the blockade into Mobile to fit up properly, and was there till the close of the year. In August, also, the " Alabama " met her tender, and was armed at the Azores, having left Liverpool in July. She immediately began her attack on Northern commerce, destroying twenty vessels in the first two months in West Indian waters, but was nearly caught by the " San Jacinto " in November. The North made a systematic attempt to stop these cruisers, telling off special vessels for the work, and giving them excellent information. This service was in charge of Captain Wilkes, of " Trent " notoriety, and he shewed his high-handed ways to the detriment of his own side, annexing to his own command vessels belonging to others which came in his way (cf. pp. 98, 234). Farragut and others fell foul of him over this, and the friction was a help to the " Alabama " at least once. An American steamer, called the " Uncle Ben," had been seized in Cape Fear River at the very beginning of the War; she was converted to a sailing ship, armed, and about November sailed as the cruiser " Retribution" and kept among the Bahama Islands, doing much damage. Meanwhile, Bulloch was not idle in England : he had definite orders to build some sea-going ironclads, and finally contracted with Lairds' to build two turret- ships as soon as possible, which were begun in July. Lieutenant North, of the Confederate Navy, was sent over with, it seems, independent instructions, and he contracted for an armoured frigate, which was built on the Clyde ; but, when nearly finished, it was so evident that she would be stopped, that she was sold to the Danish Government. A small wooden vessel was also being built for Bulloch by Miller of Birken- head, who built the " Florida" and at the end of the year she was nearly ready for launching. Although the French Proclamation of Neutrahty was much more stringent than the English, since it forbade any French subject to co-operate in any FRENCH NEUTRALITY 179 manner ivhatever in the equipment or armament of a vessel for either side, yet in 1862 Mr. Slidell, the Confederate Commissioner to France, received an in- timation that if his Government made arrangements to build ships of war in France, the builders would not be interfered with, and the ships would be allowed to leave French ports on any moderate excuse. This hint came from an authoritative source, and we shall see the reasons for it later (cf. p. 235). (Continued on P- 233-) Summary (Continued from p. 142,) Though the Confederates seemed to have reached the height of their aggressive power in September and October, their recoil from the extreme points which they then reached was not the result of a defeat in battle on either of the two main theatres of war, for these expeditions both had the defect that they were political as well as military, and both Sharpsbiirg and Perry ville were fought when the army was retreating, having failed in its political object. Corinth was a real defeat, and felt as such, but a fortunate battle might still undo the results of the Fort Donelson campaign in the West, and they were within an ace of winning it at Stone's River. At the end of the year, nothing could be more uni- formly gloomy than the Union prospects. In the East, the Army of the Potomac had just received another stunning blow, and was helpless for the time being ; but Lee was not in a position to follow up his success, and President Davis made the fatal mistake of acting as if the War were practically ended, instead of straining every nerve to finish off his opponents. Neither Lee^ Johnston, nor Bragg was deceived on this point in the least. In the West and South, Grant was helpless, his troops dispersed, and his communications destroyed : Farragut had had to retire on New Orleans, having failed in his attempts on Vicksburg, and the Con- federates had strengthened their lines on the Missis- i8o THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 sippi : Sherman, isolated from Grant, had just been heavily defeated before Vicksburg, and Rosecrans, at Stone's River, was driven back and beaten to his knees, but still unconquered. At sea, the blockade of Galveston was raised on January ist, 1863, the famous " Monitor" went down in December, and the " Florida " and " Alabama " were let loose, the latter preying actively on Northern commerce. Union Gain. — The State of Missouri and part of Arkansas, the control of the Mississippi from Helena to Vicksburg, and almost all the Gulf Coast. Confederate Gain. — Galveston, Texas, retaken. (Con- tinued on p. 236.) Notices of Officers (Continued from p. 143.) A number of Generals dropped out, and were not employed again in the War, of whom the most notable were Generals McClellan, Pope, Buell, and McDowell. George Brinton McClellan was educated at West Point, and distinguished himself in the Mexican War as an Engineer : he was attached to the Allied Armies in the Crimean War, left the Army as a Captain, and became the Manager of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- way, where his great organizing powers had full scope. On the outbreak of the Civil War he was given the command of the State forces of Ohio, but soon got a larger district from Government, and was one of the four new Major-Generals first appointed. His campaign in West Virginia was brilliant, and the day after the battle of Bull Run he was given the command of the Army of the Potomac, becoming Commander- in-Chief soon after, but he did not hold this office long. He raised his army to a great strength, and so thoroughly organized and trained it that it never lost the stamp of his hand, or its enthusiastic loyalty to him personally, which latter fact was, later on, embarrassing to the Government. Naturally a man of charming manners, his sudden advancement seems McCLELLAN i8i to have turned his head, and he posed as the saviour of his country, somewhat prematurely. He minded his own business, and took no notice of amateur advice, especially of that of the politicians of Washing- ton, but he went too far in the undisguised contempt and rudeness with which he treated them all. It is difficult to understand why Lee said that McClellan was the ablest commander whom he met in the War, for his faults as a commander in the field were flagrant. He was over-cautious and dilatory, and though able to plan could never strike, or throw his weight on the decisive point. He was always unduly oppressed with the ** enormous forces " of the enemy, even when far inferior to his own, and would refuse to move till reinforced, which was curious in a man so confident otherwise. The devotion of his men was also curious, for he was hardly ever .seen in battle, or seemed to influence it when it was going on : he was no conspicuous, dashing leader, as were Sheridan and Stuart. He was always laying on others the blame of any failure, and the relations between him and his Government went from bad to worse, till he became impossible. McClellan is a striking illustration of the fact that a very great military organizer, good handler of large bodies of men, and fair strategist, may be only a mediocre commander in the field on a large scale. In the two latter ways his talents seemed to lie in a smaller compass, for his little campaign in West Virginia was most effective. Still, no account of the War can fail to acknowledge his great services, for he forged the weapon which others used with crushing effect. Though he ran as Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1864, he repudiated the doctrine of the extremists of the party, who advocated the abandonment of the war as a failure. He was, how- ever, beaten by an overwhelming majority. Major-General John Pope's only service before the War had been in the cavalry on the Indian frontier, after he left West Point. He is often called a mere i82 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 incompetent braggart, due to the effect produced by his amazing Order on taking command of the Army of Virginia, and by the airs which he assumed; but is this judgment fair ? He lost his head and made a fool of himself, but an unbiassed examination of his work shews him to have been a most able soldier. In the West he was considered Halleck's best lieu- tenant, and did well whatever was entrusted to him : he also did well in the command of a Department, and was put in command of the Army of Virginia when it was seen that McClellan's retreat would uncover Washington. This was a scratch force of three Corps, of which only one had much military value, yet with these, and some reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac, he did as much as, or more than, any other Eastern commander on the Union side. Though opinionated and obstinate, he was bold,, skilful, and wary, quick to plan, to manoeuvre, and to strike, the only man who could stand against Lee and Jackson on even terms in manoeuvre or battle. His good manoeuvring drove Lee to the desperate expedient of Jackson's flank march, which might almost be described as the gambler's throw of strategy, and was only saved from total failure by the merest accident ; then, when the battle came, no Eastern Union army was so little beaten as was the Army of Virginia, the next day. Pope was an excellent commander when he could see the situation for himself, but had not the gift of writing clear orders, and failed in co-ordinating the movements of a number of large units. He was the first Eastern commander who thoroughly understood the use of cavalry, which after his time increased in numbers and efficiency. He was also no intriguer, and, though aggrieved at the manner of his removal from com- mand, did not resign his commission in a huff, like some, but accepted as duty the insignificant task of keeping order on the Indian frontier. During the Reconstruction period, after the War, he was given BUELL AND McDOWELL 183 the military command of one of the disturbed districts of the South. Don Carlos Buell was a West Point man, a thorough soldier, and excellent organizer, who drilled and or- ganized his army carefully from the first ; the Army of the Cumberland owed its efficiency to him as much as did the Army of the Potomac to McClellan, He was a good strategist, and the great campaign of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Nashville was planned by him : at Shiloh he saved the situation. He seems to have made few or no bad mistakes in the field, and owed his removal to criticizing Halleck's plans, and not attempting to do what he believed to be im- possible. He was one of the officers who had been shelved, to whom Grant, when Commander-in-Chief, again offered command in the field, but his Spanish pride made him refuse to serve under an officer who had been junior to him. It seems a mystery why General Irvin McDowell held no command in the field after the battle of Manassas. An old West Point man, a soldier pure and simple, he never intrigued or meddled in politics, and it does not appear that he ceased to be employed because he was a " McClellan man," as it is almost certain that Porter did. Though senior to Pope, he worked under him loyally, which good service Pope cordially acknowledged. He was an excellent or- ganizer, and had the clearest military insight of any Eastern Union officer in the early part of the War, being the one man who saw through the object of Jackson's Valley Campaign, and the way to deal with the whole situation ; but his advice was not taken. When the Fog of War descended so thickly on Pope and Jackson, in the last two days before Manassas, McDowell was the only man who saw anything through it ; in the battle itself, his information and observation were the most accurate, and both the measures which he advised, and those which he took, throughout, were those best fitted to deal with the i84 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 situation. His one military mistake seems to be that he went too far forward at the battle of Bull Run, and lost control of it. He had a sharp tongue, how- ever, and was unpopular in the Army. He demanded an enquiry after Manassas, as an answer to some adverse criticism, but although this was not proved true, he was not employed again. (Continued on P- 237-) CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 185 1862 Jm-Y August September The Army of the PO|tomac at Harrison's Landing, to 15. 14. Pope and Lee, preliminary, to 23. Banks and Jackson 24. Campaign of Manassas to 1. in the Valley. 29. Battle of Grove- 3. Pope relieved H 9. Cedar M u n - ton. from command. 5) < tain. 30. Battle of Ma- McClellan ap- W nassas. pointed. 31. Chantilly. 3-19. Lee's Inva- sion of Maryland. 14. South Mountain. 17. Battle of Sharps- burg, or the Anti- etam. 1 w (0 Morgan's Raid in 7. Bragg's Invasio n of Kentucky. Kentucky. 23. Richmond. 7. Buell marches Forrest's Raid in against Bragg. ^ Tennessee. Siege of Nashville. H Van Darn's and P rice's Campaign. ^ 19,20. luka. Guer ilia Warfare in Mis souri. Combined Operation s on the Mississippi. Porter equip ping the new Missis sippi flotilla. 15. The"Arkansas" 5. Van Dorn at- in the Mississippi. tacks Baton Farragut and Wil- Rouge. B liams attack 1 § Vicksburg. « • Combined Operation Farragut retires to New Orleans. s on the Mississippi. 1 Hindman re-organ- Union " Army of th e Frontier " formed H « izes Confederates j under Schofieldlin Arkansas. 1^ in Arkansas. 1 I The "Florida" goes ^1 Ironclads laid to Havana. B down for the Con- The " Florida" and The "Alabama" at 3 federates, two at the "Alabama" sea. eo < Laird's, one on the i armed at sea. jj Clyde. 1 1 1 i86 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 1862 October November December, to January 1, 1863 McClellan watching 7. Burnside suc- Lee in Virginia. ceeds McClellan. 15. The Fredericksb urg Campaign, to 20. g 13. Battle of Freder- ^ icksburg. Some Confederate raids, nearly to East Washington. 12-18. Foster's Ex- ii pedition to Golds- to borough, N.C. Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky, to 20. 8. Perryville. Siege of Nashville, to 17. Van Dorn's and fc! Price's Campaign.; Last half of De- .5 3. Corinth. cember. Forrest's ^ Thompson and 24. Rosecrans suc- raid on Grant's Plummer in Mis- ceeds Buell. communications. souri. 26. Rosecrans 21. Fredericktown. marches against Operations on the Bragg. Mississippi. 31. Battle of Stone's Porter equippi ng his flotilla. River. Operations on the Van Dorn's raid Mississippi. against Grant. H 20. Holly Springs. 1 1 Walke's Gulnboats up the Yazoo. c/* 29. Chickasaw Bluffs. Schofield nearly cle ars Arkansas of Con- Magruder retakes federate troops. Galveston, Janu- ary 1, 1863. Farragut gains cont rol of the whole Gulf Coast, except Mobile | ^i and Sabine River. h The "Florida" at The " Florida" goes The " Florida " at w^< Havana. to Mobile. Mobile. §1 The " Alabama", at sea, in West In dian waters. w9 1 29. The "Monitor" founders at sea. The "Retribution" at sea, among the Ba- hama I slands. CHAPTER IX the first half of 1 863, to july 4th. the confede- rate rally exhausted, the north gains decisive victories General (Continued from p. 150.) The elections of 1862 had gone against the party which wished to prosecute the War vigorously and finish it, with results which caused serious difficulty later. On March 3rd, Con- gress passed an Act authorizing the President to suspend the Act of Habeas Corpus "whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it " (cf. p. 251). The Constitution especially allowed this to be done, in cases of emergency. The great Confederate Rally ended at Galveston on January ist; the South had shot its bolt, and its chance of winning independence by force of arms passed away with the old year, broken against the indomitable defence of Rosecrans' army at Stone's River. The North were thus free in the West to pull themselves together, though it was some time before they could begin to move forward steadily, but in the East they had another bitter disappointment and danger before they reached the same point. Their objects were : to open the Mississippi, seize the Confederate base at Chattanooga, drive Lee back on Richmond, and protect the Unionists in east Tennessee. The Confederate objects were at first to cover Chattanooga and hold Rosecrans, concen- 187 i88 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 trating against Grant, and to strengthen their position on the Mississippi. In the East, after Chancellors- ville, to make a decisive politico-mihtary stroke, to play on civilian fears, and to bid for foreign recogni- tion. (Continued on p. 249.) The East (Continued from p. 165.) On January 2Sth, Hooker succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac, and went back to the organization by Army Corps, of which he had seven, his total strength being 124,000 to Lee's 62,000: as both sides were spread out along the Rappahannock, facing each other, it is evident that Lee's line was the weaker : they remained in observation till the end of April. It was in the spring of 1863^ that the celebrated '^ Jack " Mosby began his raids and surprises on Union outposts and communications. He was a partisan leader pure and simple, who depended for success on ubiquity and the smallness of his force. When the Army of the Potomac was lying in front of Centreville, he attacked their outposts continually, and caused such a scare that the planks of the chain bridge at Washington were taken up at nights ; at this time he could not muster more than 20 men. He was often pursued by large forces, but easily escaped. In February he nearly succeeded in captur- ing General Wyndham in his own quarters, and did ' S.E. Charleston. Confederate rams attack blockaders, January 3rd. W, Stone's River, January ist-3rd. W. Bragg retreats, January 4th. S. Arkansas Post, January nth. S.W. Magruder retakes Galveston, January ist. The " Alabama'" sinks the " Hatteras," January nth. The " Florida " leaves Mobile, January 15th. S. Grant on the Yazoo, February and March. S. Banks v. Taylor, February and March. S. Farragut attacks Port Hudson, March 14th. S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th. S. Grant moves to Grand Gulf, April. Crosses river, 29th. S. Grierson's Raid, April I7th-May 2nd. OPERATIONS AT SUFFOLK 189 take General Stoughton in his, soon after. Just before the battle of Brandy Station, Hooker asked for the cavalry division from Washington to reinforce Plea- sonton (cf. p. 195), but it was refused, as being necessary to hold the communications against Mosby, who had just destroyed a supply train. He was chased by a major-general and 3,000 men, vanished, and a few days afterwards captured a cavalry camp in Maryland, He often neutralized a hundred times his own force, and created a constant feeling of in- security on the Union side. We saw that in September, 1862, General Peck had seized the important position of Suffolk, and made the Confederates fortify a line against it to protect Richmond. In February, Hooker being still inactive, Longstreet was sent with two divisions to strengthen the troops already there, and take command of this district, with headquarters at Petersburg. His force was about 20,000, while Peck began with 15,000, and was reinforced up to 25,000. Longstreet invested Suffolk, and made several unsuccessful assaults, the gunboats of the James flotilla taking an effective part in the defence. On April 19th, part of his lines were taken, but he reported still that he could take the place, but that it was not worth the cost, and that he should confine himself to getting supplies. Hooker moved before Lee expected, and Longstreet did not arrive in time for Chancellorsville, though sent for in all haste. The main armies were in their old places, Lee at Fredericksburg, Hooker opposite, and Hooker's plan was to feint below that town with three Corps under Sedgwick, while Slocum with the other four went round by Kelly's Ford against Lcc's left and rear, so as to turn him out of his works on the heights. Hooker began, rightly enough, by ordering Stone- man to move against Lee's communications with the cavalry, try to make him fall back for want of supplies, and then harass and detain him till the igo THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 main army, following a fortnight after, came up. The Confederate cavalry was very weak at this time, while his own was strong. The weather was wet, and the river unfordable, which delayed Stoneman's start for a fortnight, and then Hooker would not wait, and all crossed together. His impatience spoilt his plan, for his cavalry were of little use to him on this account. He made demonstrations in various places to puzzle Lee, and on April 28th his army began to cross. Averell, with a cavalry division, outmanoeuvred Stuart, who fell back on Anderson's force at Chan- cellorsville. Sedgwick handled his command most ably, to make it seem larger than it was, and got a good part of it over the river, but as he did not advance, Lee saw that the attack would come on the other side, and at once concentrated on Chancellors- ville, leaving a force to watch him. Hooker dallied so long in front that Anderson had time to fortify his position, and Lee to concentrate his army : a prompt stroke would have driven Anderson back, and secured Banks' Ford, which would have brought the wings of the Union army twelve miles nearer to each other, and forced Lee to fight at a disadvantage, but now he was between them, and the disadvantage on the Union side. When Hooker moved, he found his enemy in front of him in a fortified position. On May ist. Hooker moved out to attack and drive back the enemy, and form a line from Tabernacle Church to Banks' Ford, but he got into thick cover, the troops lost their way, and the resistance was strong and ably managed. Though ground was gained, the advantage was not pressed, and the Union army fell back to its old positions. The left rested on the river, but Howard's Xlth Corps, on the right, was " in the air." Howard was warned about it, but he was so over-confident, and so tetchy about being in- terfered with, that Hooker said no more. The more Lee looked at his enemy's position the less he liked it. Hooker's centre and left were unassailable, but Stuart JACKSON'S FLANK MARCH 191 discovered that the right was not so, on yN\\\z\\ J ackson proposed to march round through the woods with his own Corps and drive it in, which was approved. This left Lee to withstand Hooker's whole army with almost a skeleton force, and, as a plan of battle, was risky in the extreme, but it promised great results if successful : Lee had used it with success at both Man- assas and Sliarpsbiirg, for he relied with confidence on the valour and devotion of his men, and they never failed him. Had Howard strengthened his positions like the others, Jackson would have been held fast, and Lee probably destroyed, Jackson started at once, screening his movements with cavalry, but the column was seen, and the march reported to Hooker as either a retreat or an attack on Howard, to whom an urgent warning was sent, and also to Slocum, commanding the next Corps. Attacks to try the Confederate front showed Hooker that they were not retreating, so must be attacking, but though Sickles proposed to cut off Jackson, and Slocum attacked Lee single-handed, he vacillated, and would not order a combined attack, which might have had great results. The Union cavalry followed Jackson for some distance, but then came back. Howard laughed at the reports of Jackson's march, and only threw out two battalions to cover his flank, while he sent his reserve brigade to support Sickles. His men, therefore, were off their guard when the attack burst on them, and drove them in in utter rout, for which they were unjustly blamed, for no troops could have withstood such an attack under such circumstances. The whole Corps was driven to the rear, the only question being whether the rest of the army could hold its ground ; but a desperate cavalry charge saved a line of guns, which was able to maintain its fire and keep the Con- federate advance in check till reinforcements came, and steadied the fight. Jackson sent for Hill's fresh division to hold the front in the evening, going for- ward himself to reconnoitre, but as he returned in the 192 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 dusk he was fired on by his own outposts and mor- tally wounded : he died on the loth. In the night (of May 2nd) Sickles recovered a good deal of the lost ground and some of Howard's guns, etc., by a deter- mined attack, and the 1st Corps came up fresh. Pleasonton, commanding the army cavalry, held Hazel Grove, the key of the position, which he fortified, and Hooker ordered Sedgwick to take Lee in rear. The unlucky Xlth Corps was sent away to re-organize. On May 3rd, Hooker formed a new line at Hazel Grove with an exposed salient, which was taken by Jackson's Corps, now under Stuart^ and from it his guns searched the main Union position with fire. The Confederates took two lines on the east of the road, but the third was held till night. On the west side, after a furious battle, swaying to and fro, the last Union line was taken. Hancock held on till the last, and retired in good order. The Union army now stood on three sides of a square, and had 37,000 fresh men in reserve, while they were surrounded and attacked by Shtart with only 26,000 exhausted men, disposed on a weak, over-extended line : had halt these reserves been put in, the fortunes of the day could have been retrieved. Hooker was incapacitated from the concussion of a shot striking the pillar of a house against which he was leaning, but as he was not unconscious, no one else would take the responsi- bility of acting. Lee, that morning, had found his enemy's position too strong to attack with his skeleton force, and turned on Sedgwick. Hooker's plan had depended on the latter attacking Lee's rear at day- break, but it was nearly noon before he had taken Marye's Hill, opposite Fredericksburg, and then, instead of pushing on at all hazards, he halted till three o'clock to reform : this gave McLaws time to take position at Salem Church and stop him ; he could not force this position, and meanwhile the main Union attack was beaten. A bridge was thrown in the night to shorten the THE END OF THE BATTLE 193 communications between the Union wings, and Sedg- wick sent for orders, but Hooker, who was still dazed from the shock, was understood to say that he must take care of himself. On the 4th, the main Union body was inactive, and Lee kept it quiet by attacking with a small force, while he reinforced McLaws^ to capture Sedgwick's command or drive it across the river. It was surrounded and driven back to a convex position, with both flanks resting on the river, and only the road to Banks' Ford open for retreat, but, luckily, the engineers threw another bridge in its rear. The main Union army was in a similar position some miles off, and Lee's army between the two. Lee now determined to break Sedgwick's centre, and crush him, but the day was getting on : Early attacked his left, to cut him off from the river, but though driven back, his line was not broken, and at dark he was still covering the bridges. In the night he took up a shorter line, but to do so abandoned Taylor's Hill, the key of his position, for which he has been censured, since it might have en- abled Hooker to concentrate, and practically attain his object, but Hooker was still useless; Sedgwick's force had had all the heavy fighting of the day, and it was reported that Lee had been strongly reinforced : Sedgwick had to deal with the situation as he found it. Lee did not molest his retreat. On the 5th, the Union army retired, and was not followed, leaving its dead and wounded, 14 guns, and 20,000 stand of arms. The Union loss was 17,197, of whom 5,000 were missing, that of the Confederates 13,019, of whom 2,753 were missing. To turn back to Stoneman and the Union cavalry. They did not get their intended start, and had no influence on the battle, for their army was in retreat before they came on Lee's communications, where they did little damage, though his main depot was at their mercy, and the loss of it would have made him fall back for substance, victory or none ; but 13 194 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 they did not know where to strike. Stoneman covered his march with a division, and was getting into touch with the enemy when he was recalled : he covered himself by raiding and breaking rail- ways in all directions, and rejoined on the 8th. He detached Kilpatrick's command, which passed close to Richmond and caused great alarm, going on thence to Gloucester Point, held by the Union troops, and then, by skilful manoeuvring, to Urbanna, where the crossing of the Rappahannock was covered by a gunboat. Kilpatrick rejoined on June 3rd, After Chancellorsville,^ things remained in statu quo for some time, as both armies wanted rest. Lee was depressed, for the Confederacy could not continue the War at such fearful cost, and he had lost his great lieutenant, ^'■Stonewall'" Jackson. He saw that an immediate alteration of balance was necessary ; but the South was elated, thinking that the War could now be finished by another victory, this time on Northern soil. The reports of its agents, both abroad and in the Northern States, all spoke of a favourable change of opinion, that France was becoming very civil, and England only waiting for some such event to recognize or even join them, and that the Northern people were sick of disaster and ruinous taxation, and would then be quite willing to come to terms. On the other hand, it was plain that if Johnston were not strongly reinforced Vicksburg must soon fall, with disastrous consequences. Were they not now in a position to hold their own in the East for a time, with a smaller army, and send Longstreet's fine Corps to him ? Long- street wanted to send troops to enable Bragg to start another Kentucky campaign, and draw Union troops off. And, thirdly, Lee might take position in the Valley with two Corps, using the third (cf. p. 195) to raid ' S. Grant fights his way round Vicksburg, and invests it, May ist-i8th. S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th. Mexico. The French take Puebla, May 17th. I CONFEDERATE PLANS 195 Pennsylvania, and cut the communications between east and west. What was wanted was to settle on the decisive point, and bring all available troops to bear on it : the chance of a great victory on Northern soil was distinctly better than that ot avoiding defeat in the South : further, it would be immediately decisive, while the latter would not, and even fair success in the North would probably bring foreign recognition, with the power of raising loans, or even the chance of an alliance, as an offset to the loss of the great river, which, in such a case, might be only temporary. Longstreefs dispersion theory would not do, and public opinion demanded something more energetic than the last plan. Lee advised that Longstreet should remain in the East, and that the Army of Northern Virginia should invade Pennsylvania. The Confederate Government gave their great general a free hand, and consented to abide by his decision. The general plan being settled, the next thing was the choice of route. Hooker was protected on the east by the wide rivers and Union gunboats, and their army would be exposed to defeat in detail if it crossed the Rappahannock by Fredericksburg. The lines along the east or west side of the Blue Ridge re- mained, and Lee at first intended to use the former, relying on Stuart to flank the march and hold Pleasonton (cf. p. 189), who now commanded the Union cavalry, in check ; but the battle of Brandy Station, on June 9th, so weakened the Confederate cavalry that he changed his plans. During May, Longstreet and his two divisions had come in from Suffolk, and Lee's army was now 88,000 strong, of whom some 68,000 were effective. He re-organized it in three Corps (cf. p. 194), of which Longstreet kept the First, Ewell took the Second, and A. P. Hill the Third; there was thus no direct successor to Jackson, for though Stuart, who took his Corps pro tempore, proved a brilliant handler of 196 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 all Arms in general action, he could not be spared from the cavalry. He was certainly junior to both the new Commanders, but in choosing them Lee was not guided by seniority, nor even, it is said, by merit, for he passed over the two senior officers (cf. p. 72), Generals D. H. Hill and McLaws, for the sole reason that they were not Virginians. The break-up and resettlement caused some friction. Richmond had been denuded of troops in order to collect an army strong enough for the work, although the Union forces held Fort Monroe and other places in the lower Peninsula, with the IVth Corps and other troops. General Dix being in com- mand of the District. Lee was much blamed for exposing the Capital, and was sensible of the danger, asking the President to put a reserve army under Beauregard at Culpeper, where it could be used in either direction, but all available troops were wanted where they were. The battle of Brandy Station was followed by Ewell's advance, which caused such terror that Dix was ordered to strike at Richmond and at Lee's communications. He moved out in several columns, one of which was within fifteen miles of Richmond, on the 15th, and the panic was so great that Lee was very nearly recalled ; but the Government got together some troops, and warded it off: this was the second panic in a month, Kil- patrick's raid causing the other. ^The first move in the campaign was the cavalry action at Brandy Station on June 9th. Pleasonton, with three cavalry divisions and two infantry brigades, was watching the fords of the upper Rappahannock, and thinking that Stuart was at Culpeper and off his guard, planned to surprise him, and ordered the cavalry divisions to converge on Brandy Station by different routes, posting the infantry to cover the retreat. Stuart, however, was at Brandy Station ' S. Sieges of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, June. Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th. THE CAMPAICxN OPENS 197 with his whole force, and beat the first two Union divisions, which came up separately, in detail, the third arriving too late to do any good. The Con- federate infantry was coming up, and Pleasonton retreated : but for Mosby and his merry men, he would have had another division, and might have ruined the Confederate cavalry, with the most far- reaching results. He claimed to have gained valuable information and crippled Lee's cavalry, fairly enough, for Lee had to change his plans in consequence, and move by the Valley. Though it abounded in supplies and was protected by the mountains, the passes of which could be held by small forces against Hooker's army, this route lengthened his communi- cations very much. A strong Union garrison at Winchester under Milroy had first to be dealt with, and though Halleck saw through Lees plans, he had only told Milroy that he would soon have to fall back, but might remain for the present, since he re- ported that he had only a small force in his front. Suddenly Ezvell fell on him with his whole Corps, and drove him in in confusion, but this fighting took three days, and though it cleared the Valley, the delay gained both time and valuable information for the Union side. To return to Hooker. He got wind of the proposed invasion at the end of May, and saw clearly that all troops must be under one command, so as to be directed to a common end to the best advantage : he therefore applied to Halleck for the garrison of Harper's Ferry, and other troops not under his command, but was refused. His army was then along the Rappahannock by Fredericksburg, and when he heard that Ewcll had gone to the Valley he merely made dispositions to keep him there, and remained in observation. He first proposed to stop Lee's advance by keeping back, to destroy his rear Corps and communications, but was forbidden to uncover Washington and Harper's Ferry, the former being strongly held, the latter of no military 198 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 value. On June loth, hearing that Richmond was practically defenceless, and Lee moving away, he pro- posed to march south, join the large force under Dix, seize Richmond, and then move his army back north of the Potomac, but was told that Lee's army must be his objective. When the Confederates heard this they thanked Halleck for another good turn. Hooker's plan was therefore to cover Washington and move parallel to Lee's advance, so as to strike at his com- munications at the first chance, and on the 13th he began to move his army back in two wings, the left, the 1st, Ilird, and Xlth Corps, under Reynolds, while he took the right, the llnd, Vth, Vlth, and Xllth. He took position at Centreville, with his left covered by the cavalry. Great was the alarm in Pennsylvania, and Military Departments for defence were hastily formed, while Lincoln called for 120,000 men for temporary service, but had not arms for them. Meanwhile Ewcll ad- vanced to the Potomac, and one of his brigades crossed it and reached Chambersburg on the 15th : the people fled in terror, calling on Hooker for protection, but he was not to be drawn from his purpose. On this day, when Lcc was so nearly recalled to Richmond, the main advance began, the Vlth Corps retired from Fredericksburg, and Hill, who was watching it, moved to Culpeper, while Longstreet marched on the east side of the Blue Ridge with his flank covered by the cavalry. His object was to hold Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps and tempt Hooker to move against them, when he might be attacked with advantage, or give a chance for a stroke at Washington. Hooker saw this, but wanted to get possession of Loudon County so as to throw Lee's march further away, and lengthen his communications. After some smart cavalry fighting, which resulted in Stuart being driven back from Aldie's Gap on Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps in rear, and on Longstrecfs Corps, he gained his object, and then watched, for he did not think that Lee would lengthen THE INVASION 199 his communications so much as to invade Pennsyl- vania ; but Lee was " between the devil and the deep sea," and his only chance was to go forward. Ewelts Corps crossed the border, the other two covering his rear. On the 1 8th, Hooker seized the gaps of the Bull Run Mountains with three Corps, the rest being in the second line, which gave him a capital base, and covered Washington : he thought it needless to keep a large force idle there which would be of use at the front, but the Government were too frightened to hear reason. This move threw Lee's march along the Cumberland Valley : still the politicians would not let the Washington garrison hold the passes of the South Mountain to free Hooker, who was still south of the Potomac; but when he saw where the enemy was going, and that Washington was safe from surprise, he decided to follow on a parallel line east of the mountains. On the 25th, he began to cross the Poto- mac, three Corps to watch the gaps of South Moun- tain, three in second line, and one at Harper's Ferry, to threaten Lee-s communications. On this day Long- streefs and Hill's Corps got to Hagerstown, and Ewell was at Chambersburg, with Early's division moving on York. Lee was quite in the dark about the enemy's movements, for Stuart, the eyes of the army, was out of touch with half the cavalry, and most of the remainder was guarding the gaps and communica- tions, only one brigade being at the front, with Ewell. Stuart's ride round the Union army is often thought to be a raid, ordered by Lee, who is blamed for the mistake of parting with him just before a battle, but the fact was that more cavalry was urgently wanted at the front on the Susquehanna, most of it having been kept back to cover the flank of the march, and Stuart was sent by the shortest route. Lee, of course, con- sidered the probable moral effect of the march of three Confederate brigades close to Washington, but it was to be a march, not a raid. Stuart started on the 200 THE FIRST HAI.F OF 1863 24th/ to go by the rear of Hooker's positions, but next day he found the whole Union army in motion, and had to make long and dangerous detours to avoid it, thus losing touch with Lee, who got no information from him. On the 28th, he captured a large supply train close to Washington, and made the mistake of taking it along with him : this was turning the march into a raid, but it is said that he wanted to get even with Pleasonton for his defeat at Aldie's Gap. Lee, trusting him to act in the spirit of his instructions, had not tied him with definite orders. His march caused the usual scare at Washington, and at the same time Richmond was in the same condition, for a cavalry raid, sent by General Dix, was close to the town. On the 27th, Lee knew nothing of Hooker, and Ewell's Corps reached the Susquehanna, being at Car- lisle, Kingston, and York, while Longstreet and Hill were at Chambersburg. Lee heard, on the 28th, that Hooker had crossed the Potomac. To return to Hooker. Disregarding Eivell, he had followed the enemy's main army, crossing the Potomac on the 25th and 26th : on the 27th the left wing was watching the gaps west of Frederick, the right wing at Frederick, and one Corps near Harper's Ferry. On the 28th, Hooker ordered the XHth Corps to pick up the garrison of Harper's Ferry and strike at Lee's communications, but as Halleck forbade the garrison to move, he sent in his resignation, because "he was not allowed to manoeuvre his own army in the presence of the enemy," and it was accepted. To get at the real reason for this extraordinary instance of " swap- ping horses in crossing a stream," changing the com- mand of the army just before the decisive battle of the War, as well as for the persistent way in which Hooker was thwarted, we must go back a little. When it was necessary to look for a successor to Burnside, after Fredericksburg, the choice lay between Hooker, Reynolds, and Meade, but both Halleck and ' W, Rosecrans' Tullahoma Campaign. MEADE SUCCEEDS HOOKER 201 Stanton were against Hooker for chief command. Reynolds was sounded, but stipulated for a free hand, which threw him out, and then a strong political ring took up Hooker, and Lincoln appointed him, against Stanton, who at first thought of resigning, but was too loyal to do so on a personal question, and gave Hooker his best support. When the retreat from Chancellorsville was known, it was decided that Hooker must not be entrusted with the conduct of another battle. He knew something of this, but his political faction was so powerful that the great mis- take was made of letting him begin the next campaign, which he did with such ability and success that he hoped to be allowed to carry on ; but it was settled that he should not do so, and strong measures were taken to force his hand, for political reasons, so that he should rather resign than be dismissed : this is the explanation of the seemingly insane way in which he was thwarted. The risk of having the decisive battle on them before the change was made, was imminent, and an officer was sent down at night to wake Meade up, order him to take command, and then settle with Hooker. The tension for all parties was extreme : Meade did not like it at all, while Hooker was excessively sore and hurt, but the transfer was effected by the Staff, and Hooker left the Army of the Potomac next day. _ .. Meade took command on the n 4 gITt of the 28th, the day that Lee heard of the movement of his army, and both sides had to pause, get their armies in hand, and make new plans. Hooker had intended to advance to the Susquehanna on a broad front, keeping his left strong against Longstreet and Hill, with the XHth Corps following Lcc in rear to harass his communi- cations, or cut him off if defeated. Meade varied this by calling this Corps in, and also the garrison of Harper's Ferry, the very thing which had just been forbidden to Hooker. The general idea was to cover Philadelphia if Lee went north, and Baltimore or 202 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 Washington if he turned back. When Lee heard of Hooker's moves, he proved their wisdom by at once turning back : his extreme care for his communications was rather on account of ammunition than food. He determined to strike at Baltimore, since this would draw the Union army away from the Cumberland Valley, his line of communication, and sent orders on the night of the 28th for a concentration at Cashtown, for he did not then know that Meade's new orders did not menace his line of retreat. When Meade took command, he had three Corps at Frederick, one just to the south of it, one near Harper's Ferry, and two near Middletown, watching the South Mountain. Lee seemed to be pressing forward to the Susquehanna, and Halleck indicated York as a likely find, so the Union orders were made for an advance on a broad front on the 29th, which would bring the left wing to Emmettsburg and neigh- bourhood, the right to Westminster and the country just west of it. Of the three cavalry divisions, one was on the outer flank of each wing, and one (Kil- patrick's) was sent to stop Sfnari : Army Headquarters to Taneytown. On this day, the bulk of the Con- federate army was at Chambersburg and Fayetteville, with a division at Cashtown, the point of concentra- tion, other outlying ones at Carlisle and York, and two cavalry brigades along the Susquehanna. The left cavalry division, under Buford, had pushed detachments to the west of the mountains, without locating the enemy, but on this day a Confederate brigade sent from Cashtown to Gettysburg, a seat of the boot trade, to get what it could, brought word that the Union army was in force a little to the south, and Hill, on hearing it, ordered it to return to Gettys- burg the next day. On the 30th, Stuart met Kilpatrick at Hanover, and managed to break off the action and get away, but where was he to go ? The enemy's troops were between him and his army, so he struck for York to join Early, but he was gone, then tried THE ARMIES CLOSE TOGETHER 203 Carlisle to find Ezvcll, and ran against a force of Union militia : he then heard of Lees concentration near Gettysburg, and got there on July 2nd with men and horses utterly worn out from marching night and day. Had he left the waggon train alone, he might have arrived in time to be of use. Pcttigreiv's brigade of HetKs division occupied Gettys- burg as ordered on the 30th, but retired when Buford appeared with two cavalry brigades in the afternoon. Buford then occupied it as well as he could, and sent word to Reynolds and Pleasonton. Pleasonton was anxious about Gettysburg, as it was the key to both sides of the South Mountain range, standing in a place where the hills are lov/, and easily passable, while a number of good main roads radiated from it in all directions ; in fact, it was the most important road centre between the Susquehanna and the Potomac. The Confederates, as we have seen, heard of the approximate position of the Army of the Potomac on the night of the 2$th, but it was some twenty-four hours later before Meade got definite information about them, that they were not moving northward, but were close at hand to the north-west. On the evening of the 30th the two armies lay, the Confederates to the north and west, the Union to the south and east, of Gettysburg, mostly within a radius of about twenty miles. Considering that Lee had ordered concentration near Gettysburg on the 28th, and had definite information of Meade's whereabouts on the 29th, a day sooner than Meade had of his, the Confederate movements seem slack : there should never have been any advanced fighting for Gettysburg, but the smartness of the Army of the Potomac under its new chief had taken them by surprise. The Confederates were about 73,000 strong. On this evening Meade got information of the presence of the Confederates in force, and found his army scattered, close to them : they were better placed for concentration than he was, and could 204 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 probably forestall him on the important position of Gettysburg. His left wing was badly exposed, and liable either to be destroyed in detail, or to draw the army into a general action at a disadvantage, by having to come up by driblets to extricate it. The problem was to find a place of safe concentration, and he sent engineers to select a good one for the purpose, whether Lee came from the north or the west, indicating the general line of Pipe Creek as a suitable locality, to the east of which stream runs a low line of hills called Parr's Ridge. Westminster, just in rear, was a railway terminus and an excellent base, being also a good road centre. This position covered Washington and Baltimore, and could not be turned without great danger, so that Lee must either attack it or retreat. The orders for July ist were that the army should close in to its left front thus : Ist and Xlth Corps, Gettysburg (both under Reynolds) ; Ilird, Emmettsburg; Ilnd, Taneytown ; Vth, Hanover; XHth, Two Taverns (Slocum to command the two latter) ; Vlth to remain at Manchester and await orders. Corps Commanders were, however, informed that it might be necessary to fall back on the Pipe Creek position, and were given careful instructions as to how it was to be occupied, if ordered. Although the move of the army indicated preparation for a battle, Meade told Reynolds that he was not sure whether he would attack or not till he knew more of Lee's plans, but the matter was decided for him, and he accepted the fight at Gettysburg, though it is said that he did not like the position. Though nominally over 100,000 strong, the Army of the Potomac had probably about 82,000 present, for it lost many men by straggling ; but had Halleck called in the scattered detachments and garrisons available, he could have added some 30,000 to this number, which would have made the battle immediately decisive. The battlefield of Gettysburg lies between two streams, Willoughby Run and Rock Creek, on the THE BATTLEFIELD 205 west and east respectively, which rise north of the town, and run past it in a southerly direction, being some two miles apart opposite it, and three at the south end opposite Round Top : the sides of both streams are wooded. To the west, the roads from Chambersburg and Hagerstown crossed Willoughby Run and converged at the entrance to the town a mile further on, while those from Mummasburg, Carlisle, and Harrisburg converged at the north entrance ; these were the roads by which the Con- federates advanced. A line of hills ran close along the east side of Willoughby Run, S.S.W. from Oak Hill, a commanding eminence a mile and a half north of the town, and from the same point another line of hills ran nearly south. This was called Seminary Ridge, from a theological college on it, just west of the town. Immediately south of Gettysburg lies Cemetery Hill, and from it an irregular ridge. Cemetery Ridge, runs S.S.W., which almost joins Seminary Ridge a mile and a half further south, at Peach Orchard : a mile S.E. from this are two steep eminences, called Round Top and Little Round Top, and in the Plum Run Valley, between them and Peach Orchard, is a rough tangle of wood and rock called the Devil's Den. On the other side, the ridge turns eastward at Cemetery Hill and runs in a semi- circle to Rock Creek, a mile away, ending in a height called Culp's Hill. Inside this inner position runs the Taneytown road, due south from Gettysburg, on which were Meade's headquarters in the battle. The First Day at Gettysburg, July ist' Buford was occupying a line from McPherson's Farm, running north, and held it from 8 to 10 a.m. against HetKs advance from Cashtown. The 1st Corps then came up and relieved him, but they were driven back to Seminary Ridge, and Reynolds was killed when bring- ' W. ^ra^ escapes to Chattanooga. End of Tullahoma Campaign, July I. 2o6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 ingup reinforcements: at noon Howard arrived with the Xlth Corps, and prolonged the line to the right, post- ing his reserve at the Cemetery. Buford had moved off and formed a line on the hills to the north, facing north, and also scouted to his front, where he soon met Ewell, and reported his advance, on which Howard threw back his right to face north, and asked the nearest Corps for support, as his line was much over-extended. Lee had told Ewell not to bring on a general action till the army was concentrated, but he seized the impor- tant point of Oak Hill, enfiladed the 1st Corps, and drove in the cavalry line : the Xlth extended more, to cover this ground, but Early came up and took them in flank, driving them through Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill. ///// then drove the right of the 1st Corps to Seminary Ridge, Buford covering their retreat. Howard, who commanded on the field, had had warn- ing of this attack, and neglected it, as at Chancellors- ville. A second attack drove the Corps back to the Cemetery Ridge, where the position had been carefully fortified by Steinwehr, commanding the reserve division, on which the Corps was rallied : the 1st prolonged the line to Culp's Hill. When Meade heard of Reynolds' death, he sent Hancock to take command of the field, who arrived near the Cemetery at about 4.30 p.m., while on the other side. General Lee reached the Seminary, and ordered a reconnaissance of the Union position, hoping to carry it, but his troops on the ground were in no condition to attack till 5.30, and by that time it had been made secure. The position was now a good one, suitable for the force holding it. Thus ended the first day's battle. The selection of Hancock to supersede Howard in command was somewhat curious, as he was the junior Corps Commander, but so far as merit goes he was, after Reynolds' death, about the most brilliant officer in Meade's army ; but it nearly caused friction, for Howard insisted on his seniority, the difficulty being THE CONFEDERATE PLANS 207 got over by Hancock's tact. They selected the ground round from Gulp's Hill to Round Top as the best position in which the army could fight. Hancock trans- ferred the command to Slocum, when he came up, and went back to report to Meade. Meade has been blamed for remaining at Taneytown on this day, but he was in the centre of his army, for he did not know where Lees main force was. The Second Day at Gettysburg, July 2nd Lee, the attacker, had now to consider his position and prospects. Longstreet wanted to turn Meade's left, cutting him off from Washington, and either forcing him to attack, or fall back on Pipe Creek, which he thought would uncover the Capital. Lee, however, saw that while Meade could wait, he could not, for, having only one cavalry brigade up, he could not live on the country, and depended on his trains : if he advanced eastward, Meade could cut his communica- tions. A battle was necessary to the invader, and a defeat at Gettysburg would be less serious than one further east, for he would only have to hold the passes of South Mountain to cover the retreat. Be- sides, not counting cavalry, all his army was up, except a division and a brigade, and he knew that Meade's was several Corps short : he also knew that some of these troops were close to, and would arrive during the next forenoon, so that there was no time to lose. He therefore determined to attack at once, and ordered Longstreet, on the right, to begin as early as possible in the morning, while Eivell, on the left, as soon as he heard that he was fairly in action, was to attack the Union right about Gulp's Hill, to prevent the other part of the line being reinforced, Hill, in the centre, using his Corps as required. A plan of this sort is always very risky, but in this case was particularly so, since the Confederate army enfolded a long and narrow position on three sides, and a message from 2o8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 one flank to the other had to go a long way round : a slightly concave position is often very strong, but here the advantages disappeared, the parts of the army being too far apart for combined action. Meade arrived on the ground soon after midnight, and inspected the positions as soon as it was light A first he thoughtt of attacking Ewcll, but on examination found that this was not advisable, and decided to stand on the defensive, taking the precaution to order his Staff to have everything ready for retreat on Pipe Creek in case of need. The Union Corps were posted thus, from right to left: Xllth, Culp's Hill and ground to the N.W. ; at the Cemetery salient, the Xlth and 1st ; along Cemetery Ridge, the Ilnd and llird, as they came up; the Vth in reserve. The last three Corps, with the Artillery, were coming- in during the whole morning, so that the whole left flank of the Army of the Potomac was at Lee's mercy till nearly noon. The ground for the llird Corps was weak, with nothing better in the rear ; Peach Orchard in front of it was not good, but its possession would be advantageous to the attack, and to that extent it was advantageous to deny it to them. Sickles, there- fore, who commanded the Corps, determined to take the risk of occupying this advanced position, which might at all events gain time, for time was everything just then. On the Confederate side, Longstreet was to open the ball, the rest taking the time from him, and he should have started his men as early as possible, but in the early morning he was with Lee at the Seminary, argu- ing on the advantages of his own scheme of turning Meade's left and forcing him to attack, till Lee would wait no longer, and sent him back to his Corps. Fine soldier as Longstreet was, he was sometimes a difficult subordinate. He was to attack at once with the troops that he had, but he first waited for a brigade, to complete Hoocfs division, and then McLaws division took a roundabout route to avoid being seen by the THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK 209 Union signallers on Round Top, and lost over an hour : it was 4 p.m. before the First Corps was ready to attack, instead of doing so soon after daybreak, when the position could not have been defended : by 4 it was manned and ready. Hood w'as deploying his men about 3, and proposed to go round, turn the Union flank, and seize Round Top from the south, which could have been done while McLaws was coming up, but this time Longstreet would not wait. Meade had called his Corps Commanders and Staff together about 3, and Warren, the Commanding Engineer, went thence to the signal station on Little Round Top, and saw that the woods opposite were full of men, while no Union troops were on the ground : he laid hold of some troops of the Vth Corps, and brought them up in the nick of time to repulse a Texan brigade, which had just reached the top ; from this time till dark, furious fighting went on in the broken ground below. McLazvs broke the ex- posed salient of Peach Orchard, Sickles was wounded, and his Corps steadily driven back to the main posi- tion, Hancock, by Meade's direction, taking command ^ of this, with his own Ilnd. A little after 7 p.m. the \ o^*-*- Confederate attack had broken the main Union line. but Meade was indefatigable in bringing up reinforce- / / e \ Q^*^ ments, while supports for the attack were not forth- OvO^' coming, so that they were turned out, but at night y, ^ held the bases of the Round Tops, the Devil's Den, ^ and the Emmettsburg road. Ewells troops advanced, after an artillery duel, about 6.30 p.m. and found the Union position almost bare, for every man who could be spared had gone to help Sickles at Peach Orchard. Greene, who com- manded the defence here, handled his one brigade most ably, with the help of a few men from the Xlth and 1st Corps, and held on till dark, but Johnson's Confederate division had seized the works of the Xllth Corps close to the Baltimore road, whose garrison had been sent away to other places, but it 14 a 2IO THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 was too dark for them to see the advantage they had gained, Lee's orders were, that when Ewell attacked on the right, with Johnson's division, the others, Early's and Rodes\ should assault Cemetery Hill. Early attacked at 7 o'clock, broke the Union line, and held the position for an hour, but Rodes, for some reason, did not move, and then the troops which Hancock no longer wanted on the left came back, and turned Early out. Stuart and his cavalry came up on this day, after a smart brush with Kil- patrick, but were not available for action. The result of the day's fighting was that the Con- federates had broken into the Union main line with every one of their attacks, and had held it for a time, but had failed for want of support. It was the most disjointed battle that Lee ever fought, for the attacks not being simultaneous, as intended, the Union re- inforcements could be sent backwards and forwards. On the other side, exactly the reverse was the case, Meade and Hancock getting troops up in the nick of time to save every point. TheJ\rmy of the Potomac had never been so smartly handled. In the afternoon ""Sedgwick's strong Vlth Corps came up, tired with its 35-mile march from Manchester, and made some of the ground safe, but was not available for much fight- ing. Buford's shattered cavalry division was sent to guard the base at Westminster, and Gregg's was to have replaced it, but the one had gone before the other arrived, so that Meade was deprived of the use of his cavalry all day. The Confederates had gained ground on both flanks, and were in possession of the Union works on the extreme right, which their late owners, who got back after dark, and bivouacked close by, purposed to recover as soon as it was light enough. The Third Day at Gettysburg, July 3RD To begin with the attacking side again. Lees posi- tion was a most anxious one : he had gained some I PLANS FOR THE THIRD DAY 211 successes, but the losses were fearful ; he was in an enemy's country, and could not replace them. He had one fresh division, and Stuarfs cavalry had come up, but they were in very poor condition. The ques- tion was less, could he attack ? than, could he afford not to do so ? for if he had a chance of victory, now was the time to use it, and to pass to the defensive at this stage would be to acknowledge defeat. It being decided that he should attack again, the question was, where and how ? Loiigstrcet, it is said, considering how his Corps was shaken, and the position generally, advised that the advantage on their left should be improved, and all forces which could be spared turned to that point, but Lee thought it too dangerous, for, unless success was decisive, his retreat might be cut off, while the shape of the Confederate line was so awkward as to make the plan unlikely to succeed. Part of HiWs Corps was comparatively fresh, and he decided that the attack should be made by Pickett's division of Longstrcefs Corps, when it came up, sup- ported by these troops, but, though only five miles away, no attempt seems to have been made to hasten Pickctfs arrival. Ewell was to reinforce Johnson, so that he could drive in the Union right at the same time, but the orders were not worked out with the usual skill, on this occasion, for Lee had not recovered from an illness which he had had in the spring, and was not himself at Gettysburg. Meade called a Council of War after dark on the 2nd. His prospects were by no means rosy, either, for out of seven Corps, three, the 1st, HIrd, and Xlth, were practically ruined, the Hnd and Vth much shaken, and only the Vlth and XHth anything like intact ; one of his cavalry divisions also was ruined, and had been sent away to refit. There was no ques- tion of attacking, but all thought they should fight it out where they stood, in which opinion Meade concurred, and then issued excellent orders for the purpose. On the extreme right, a strong line was 212 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 to be formed on Power's Hill, opposite Gulp's, and Johnson turned out of the Xllth Corps' works at dawn ; the Ilird Corps to go into reserve, the Vth taking its place in line, and some reinforcements for the 1st helped to eke this out ; most of the Vlth Corps was also held in reserve. Gregg's cavalry division was on the right on Rock Greek, facing Stuart^ while Kilpatrick's came in on the left. The army was better posted than the day before, when it came up by drib- lets, and all its parts were now well connected to- gether. Still, the exhaustion was so great that these dispositions were not carried out by dawn, or for some time after, and an early attack by the Confederates might have settled the matter. On the Confederate side, Ezvell's Corps was the only one ready early ; Johnson had been strongly re- inforced during the night, but the initiative here was taken by the other side, who attacked at daybreak in great force. Johnson fought gallantly all morning, but at about 1 1 o'clock had to retire. To prepare and cover the main assault, of Pickett s division, Lee formed a line of over 100 guns, which was faced by one of over 80, but it was imperative to economize ammuni- tion for the decisive moment, to the Confederates especially, who had not really enough to undertake such an operation at all. Again, in this unfortunate battle for them, the Confederate lack of combination was apparent, for they did not open fire to prepare the attack till 11 a.m., the very time at which their left wing was retiring, beaten, and the point of the whole plan was that these two attacks should be simultaneous, and help each other. After a time, the Union batteries ceased firing, to save ammuni- tion, and though neither Longstreet^ nor Alexander, who commanded the Confederate line of guns, thought they were really silenced, there was nothing for it but to order Pickett to move forward, at 3 p.m. Then the Union guns reopened, raking his line with cross fire, which caused a change of direction, and THE END OF THE BATTLE 213 threw his supports out ; though he got through, and stood for some ten minutes among the wrecks of the Ilnd Corps Artillery, the men soon fell back in groups, and there was nothing for those in the rear to support. The Confederate guns ceased firing, to save ammunition in case of an advance by Meade, but none came, and the troops were coolly and quietly re-formed. Though desultory firing did not cease, the battle was over, in this, the principal part of the field. The cavalry were engaged on both flanks. Gregg's and Stuarfs divisions were fighting all day, Gregg getting rather the best of it. On the Union left, Kil- patrick moved against the Confederate right about 5 p.m. and made several charges, but though costly, they effected little, for there seemed to be no com- bination with the other arms. The numbers were not so uneven as the nominal strength of the forces would shew, for the Union army lost more men by straggling, in the severe marches by which it was concentrated : the Con- federates were veterans, and better marchers. On the first day the Confederates were the stronger, about as 25,000 to 18,000. On the second day there were per- haps 50,000 a side, but the Confederates, in their main attack, threw 15,000 against 10,000. On the third day there were perhaps 70,000 a side, of whom a large part of the Union Vlth Corps were not engaged. The losses were : Union 17,569, missing 5,434, total 23,003 ; Confederate 15,401, missing 5,150, total 20,551. The Union side lost Generals Reynolds and Farnsworth, killed, and the Confederates, Generals Pender, Armistead, and Garnett. On July 4th,' Lee entrenched a line from Oak Hill to Peach Orchard, and started his trains back under cover of it, facing Meade all day. Meade ordered French, at Frederick, to seize the lower passes of ' S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th. S. Taylor threatens New Orleans, July 4th. 2T4 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 South Mountain, and started some cavalry to harass the retreat further back, if it took place as he expected, but the day was principally passed in trying to ascer- tain Lee's movements, and in the care of the wounded : besides, it rained in torrents all day, which hindered movement. Meade determined to hold the ridge, which he still thought he could do, against attack, and forbade his subordinates, in the conduct of several small engagements which broke out, to risk bringing on a general action, but, if he could then have succeeded in crushing Lee's army, he would have saved two years of war. Whether this was possible was the question, for his army was so disorganized that it would hardly seem to have been in any condition to attack on the 4th. In this campaign, up to and during the battle, the Confederates acted as if they underestimated their enemy. They were certainly surprised by the un- expected smartness of movement of the Army of the Potomac, when it came under the orders of a first-rate handler of large numbers, and, though theirs was really the better manoeuvring army of the two, they failed to concentrate in time. Another thing : Lee had not realized the magnitude of the loss of Jackson^ that he had no other general who could be trusted with his peculiar work, especially in the matter of acting without definite orders. Note. — Moves in the Gettysburg Campaign The Army of the Potomac was formed in seven Army Corps, and a Cavalry Corps of three divi- sions. The Army of Northern Virginia in three Army Corps, and a Cavalry force of six brigades, of which three were with the army, three with Stuart. A mounted brigade under Imbodcn followed the army, but did not join till after battle. June 3rd. — Both armies concentrated, facing each MOVES IN THE CAMPAIGN 215 other, Union on Stafford Heights ; Cavalry, Warrenton Junction. Confederate at Fredericksburg : Stuart, Culpeper C.H. June 6th. — Union, same place, but half a Corps across the river. Confederate Corps : Fredericksburg, Chancellors- ville, Culpeper C.H. Cavalry, Fredericksburg. Stuart, Culpeper C.H. June 9th. — ^Union army : No change. Cavalry, Brandy Station. Confederate : one Corps Fredericksburg, two Cul- peper C.H. Cavalry, Fredericksburg. S/w^r/, Brandy Station. (The Cavalry battle of Brandy Station was fought.) June I2th. — Union : Four Corps opposite Fredericks- burg, the others at Stafford C.H., Deep Run, and Bealeton. Cavalry, Warrenton Junction. Milroy's command in Valley, at Winchester and Berryville. Confederate Corps : Fredericksburg, Culpeper C.H., Front Royal (in Valley). Cavalry, Fredericksburg and Millwood (in Valley). Stuart, Brandy Station. June 13th. — Union Corps : Two at Dumfries, the rest at Hartwood, Deep Run, Bealeton, Freeman's Ford, Catlett's Station. Cavalry, Warrenton Junction. Milroy driven out of Valley. Confederate Corps : Chancellorsville, Culpeper C.H., and in Valley, at Winchester and Martins burg. Cavalry, Culpeper C.H., and Martinsburg. Stuart, Culpeper C.H. June 17th. — Union Corps: Two at Manassas Junction, the others at Occoquan Creek, Brimstone Hill, Fairfax C.H., Centreville, Herndon Station. Cavalry, Aldie. Confederate Corps: Culpeper C.H. ; Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps ; Winchester and Shepherdstown, in the Valley, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Cavalry, Freeman's Ford, Thoroughfare Gap, Chambersburg. Stuart, Middleburg, Ashby's Gap. June 24th. — Union Corps : Leesburg, Edwards' 2i6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 Ferry, Broad Run Railway Bridge, Aldie, Gum Springs, Centreville, Thoroughfare Gap. Cavalry, west of Aldie's Gap. Militia at Gettysburg. Confederate Corps : Boonsboro ; Hagerstown ; Mc- Connellsburg, Chambersburg, and Greenwood. Ca- valry, Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, Chambersburg. Stuart, Salem. June 25th. — On this day Hooker began to move his whole army into Maryland, and Stuart, who started to march round his camps, and join Ewell at the front, found all the Union troops in motion. June 28th. — Union Corps : Three along South Mountain, three at Frederick, one at Urbanna. Cavalry, Monocacy, Adamsville, Boonsboro. Militia at Har- risburg and Columbia on the Susquehanna, none at Gettysburg. During the night Meade succeeded Hooker in command. Confederate Corps : Chambersburg ; Greenwood ; Carlisle, York, and Wrightsville. Cavalry, Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, Mechanicsburg, and New Holland, the two last at the front. Stuart, Rockville. June 29th. — Union Corps : Two south of Emmetts- burg, two south of Middleburg, two at Uniontown, one at Taneytown. Cavalry, Sabillasville ; S.W. of Westminster ; Littlestown. Confederate Corps : Chambersburg ; Fayetteville, Cashtown, and Fairfield ; Chambersburg, Carlisle, York, and Wrightsville. Cavalry, Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, Mechanicsburg, New Holland. Stuart, Westminster. On this day Meade ordered French's division, from garrison duty, to cover his rear, and hnboden's Con- federate brigade, on the same duty, was at McCon- nellsburg. June 30th. — Union Corps : Marsh Run, Littlestown, Emmettsburg, Bridgeport, Uniontown, Union Mills, Manchester ; Headquarters and Artillery, Taney- town. Cavalry, Cemetery Hill (S.W. of Gettysburg), Westminster, Hanover, French's command reached STUARTS MARCH 217 Crampton's Gap, en route for Frederick, and there were militia at Carlisle, Harrisburg, and Columbia. Confederate Corps : Chambersburg ; Greenwood and Cashtown ; Fayetteville, Heidlersburg, and Huntertown. Cavalry, Martinsburg, Huntertown. Stuart, Hanover. ITINERARY OF STUARTS MARCH June 25th and 26th. — Started from Salem, but delayed by the marching columns of the Army of the Potomac. June 27th.— Reached Dranesville in afternoon, and crossed the Potomac that night. June 28th.— Rested his men in morning; then advanced to Rockville, where he took a Union convoy, and halted for the night. June 29th. — Damaged the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- way at Hood's Mills ; halted for the night at West- minster, after a brush with Kilpatrick. June 30th. — Sharp action with Kilpatrick at Hanover in afternoon ; broke it off, and marched all night, to join Ewell at Carlisle. July 1st. — Dover in morning, met defence force at Carlisle, Ewell gone, received Lee's orders for con- centration, and turned back, marching continuously. July 2nd. — Rejoined Lee before Gettysburg in even- ing; horses quite used up. (Continued on p. 252.) The South-East (Continued from p. 165.) The only military operation in this district was a small expedition by the Union coast forces to Jacksonville, Florida, which they did not permanently hold, to disperse Secessionists, in March. For the naval operations, see Blockade, p. 229. (Continued on p, 255.) The West (Continued from p. 175.) At Stone's River, on January ist,^ Bragg made several feints to find out whether ' S.W. Magruder retakes Galveston, January ist. 2i8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 Rosecrans was retreating or not : though he might have held his own against an attack, he was quite unable to make one : the Confederate army was com- pletely fought out. Rosecrans took the offensive and sent a division across the river, which fortified a position from which it could enfilade Polk's Corps, so that on the next day, the 2nd, Bragg found that he must either take this position or move Polk. He attacked, but unsuccessfully, Rosecrans reinforcing his advanced force and improving his position. On the 3rd,' Bragg attacked again, but his men were driven back into their works, which were taken. Next day he made an able retreat to Tullahoma, covered by his cavalry. Though strong in this arm, he had felt the loss of Morgan very badly in the campaign. The Union cavalry under Stanley were well handled. The Union's weak point was McCook's faulty disposition, against which Rosecrans should have guarded by not giving him the post of danger, for McCook had failed him at Perryville in the same way. The Union army was 43,400 strong, and its loss in killed and wounded 8,800, with 2,800 men and 28 guns taken. The Confederate strength in the battle was 46,000, with a loss in killed and wounded of 9,000, with 1,100 men and 3 guns taken. Rosecrans next re-organized his army in three Corps, numbered XlVth, XXth, and XXIst, and took over from Grant the control of the Tennessee and Cumber- land Rivers. There was little movement of the main armies till the end of June,^ for Morgan had destroyed the Louisville line so badly that it took a long time to ' S.E. Confederate rams attack blockaders off Charleston, January 3rd. ^ S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th. S. Grierson's Raid, April ijth-May 2nd. S. Grant takes Grand Gulf, April 29th. E. Chancellorsville, May ist-4th. S. Grant invests Vicksburg, May i8th. S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th. E. The Gettysburg Campaign opens. Brandy Station, June 9th. Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th. MINOR MOVES 219 repair, and many troops to guard. Tennessee was so important to the Confederates that Bragg remained there as long as he could, where he could also hold Rosecrans in his front. Grant wanted Rosecrans to advance, and prevent Bragg from sending troops to Johnston or Pcmberton^ but he thought that it was better to keep him where he was, lest he moved his whole force to help one of them before Grant had settled with them, and also that his army, where it was, could act as Grant's reserve. He did not, however, prevent Bragg from depleting his army to help Johnston, out side Vicksburg, but Johnston did not strike, and Rose- crans drove Bragg in before they returned. Grant's contention was that he should have struck sooner and harder, but this seems to have been impracticable. There were a number of minor operations, chiefly in the form of cavalry raids on communications, and Rosecrans, like Buell, asked in vain for more cavalry. He sent Colonel Streight from the lower Cumberland round through northern Alabama, who fought several actions with Forrest, to whom he had to surrender at a crossing of the Coosa River.^ This raid ended in the Southern district, but was in connection with Rosecrans' operations. In April, Grierson started from La Grange, Tennessee, and raided through Mississippi, but this was in connection with Grant's operations in the Southern district (cf. p. 225). Halleck's mind again comes in, with evil conse- quences : he had stopped Buell from taking Chat- tanooga when he had a chance, and now quarrelled with Rosecrans. In March he wrote a letter, of which both Rosecrans and Grant had copies, offering the vacant Major-Generalship of the United States Army to the first general who gained a real victor}^ The cool-headed Grant put it away without comment, but the high-spirited Rosecrans took it as a personal insult, and told Halleck plainly what he thought of him and his huckstering ways (cf. p. 276). With a ' Map 64, p. 404. 220 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 nature like Halleck's, in chief command, this was a fatal mistake, for it was never forgiven, and Rosecrans' requests in future were neglected. It is only fair to say, though, that Grant found him a difficult subor- dinate, though he recognized his great ability. Grant, with Halleck and Stanton, urged him to attack Bragg, but the country was hopelessly muddy, and he waited till June, since he heard good reports from Vicksburg, and of Burnside's approach to Knoxville. On June 23rd he ordered the advance from Murfreesboro. ^ Bragg's base was Chattanooga, and his advanced line from Shelbyville to Wartran, with cavalry on the flanks, at McMinnville and Columbia, the main position being a large entrenched camp at Tullahoma. Rose- crans held the first Confederate line with a feint, and moved round to strike at their line of retreat : though much delayed by mud, he mancEuvred Bragg out of all his positions by July ist,^ with but little fighting, and with fine weather would very likely have cut him off. Bragg escaped across the mountains to Chattanooga. In this most brilliant little campaign Rosecrans regained what had been lost the year before, driving an army 43,000 strong out of good positions with less than 60,000 men, with a loss of only 560. Though Burnside takes no active part in the affairs of the first half of 1863, yet his command was a factor which Bragg could not ignore. He took command of the Department of the Ohio in March, with special instructions to protect the Unionists of the Knoxville district from Confederate oppression, and to intercept the important railway from Lynchburg to Chattanooga. He was to organize a force in Kentucky, and co-operate with Rosecrans' advance by moving against Knoxville, but he did not press forward, and seems only to have ' Map 37, p. 268. - E. Gettysburg, July ist-3rd. S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th, S. Taylor threatens New Orleans, July 4th. THE RIVER PATROLS 221 come into evidence when the Tullahoma campaign was over. Buckner was holding Knoxville at this time. Tennessee and Kentucky were much disturbed by Confederate guerillas, and now the value of the gun- boat division which had been told off to patrol the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers became apparent, for these raiding parties had a few guns for the attack of transports, but the gunboats could move faster than a land force, and stop the crossings of the rivers. A serious attack on Fort Donelson in February was beaten by the fire of a gunboat, and, on the Missis- sippi, on July 4th, the Confederates attacked Helena, Arkansas, and carried part of the position, but were then beaten by one of the gunboats. This was one of Johnston's operations against Grant's communica- tions. (Continued on p. 257.) The South (Continued from p. 176.) When Sherman retreated to the Mississippi on January 2nd,^ after his repulse at Chickasaw Bluffs, he met McClernand, who pro- duced his credentials and took command. Sherman suggested to him and Porter that they should move up the White River to attack Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman, which was done successfully, the fort sur- rendering on the 13th. Grant then ordered the troops back to the Mississippi, since they were intended for the attack of Vicksburg, and took command himself. McClernand was thus brought to his place as a Corps Commander in Grant's army, much to his disgust. The army now consisted of four Corps, the Xlllth, XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth, under McClernand, Sher- man, Hurlbut, and McPherson, respectively. The XVIth remained at Memphis as depot. Soon after the fall of Arkansas Post, Admiral Porter attacked the Red River, which the Con- ' W. Stone's River, January ist-3rd. Bragg retreats. S.W. Magruder retakes Galveston, January ist. S.E. Confederate rams attack blockaders off Charleston, January 3rd. 222 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 federates controlled, by sending three of his vessels down past the Vicksburg batteries, but one was sunk in action, and the others taken. On hearing of it, Farragut determined to move, came up with his fleet, and attacked Port Hudson, nominally in co-operation with Banks, but the land force was not able to take part : the ships were very severely handled, the "Mississippi" being destroyed, and only the flagship " Hartford " and one other getting past, but they were able to gain control, and close the Red River to the Confederates. Farragut then came up to the south of Vicksburg, and got into communication with Porter and Grant. To open the campaign against Vicksburg, Grant ordered the canal to be enlarged which had been cut the year before, but when he came, saw that this would be useless, as the enemy had established a battery which enfiladed it. He then tried to turn the position by the bayous of the Yazoo and its tributaries, but the distances were great, the work slow, and the Confederates forestalled and defeated all his attempts. He spent February and March in vain endeavours to turn the right flank of the defences, and then had to devise something else ; but what ? There seemed a choice of three plans : (i) To assault the batteries. (2) To go back to Memphis and start afresh, along the Mississippi Central Railway. (3) To move round opposite Vicksburg, cross the river below it on to the high land, and attack it in rear. The first would almost certainly be defeated. From a military point of view the second was the best, but Grant chose the third, though it was most risky, and even the supplies depended on success, because if successful it would be decisive, and political considerations forbade even the semblance of retreat. The war was at a standstill, generally, and many clamoured for his removal from command. It was the turning- point of his career. The detail of the plan was THE CONFEDERATE POSITION 223 to move down the bayous to the west of the river to New Carthage, some thirty miles below Vicks- burg, run the gunboats and transports past the batteries, make a combined attack on Grand Gulf, and bring the army over ; then to move along the valley of the Big Black, and attack the land side of Vicksburg. The original plan appears to have been for Banks to co-operate from the South, but this was nullified by the unexpected strength of Port Hudson. The Confederate line was very long, there being several outlying works such as Fort Pemberton, up the Yazoo to the north, but the main line began at Haines' Bluff, a detached position north of the town, and ran with intervals to Grand Gulf, 30 miles away by land, 60 by water. To Port Hudson, also in Pemberton's command, the line was 200 miles long, and was held by about 50,000 effective men. The latter position was quite new, for the Con- federates, after Sherman's attack at Chickasaw Bluffs, had recognized that the Union army meant business, that they could not form a flotilla to oppose Porter's, so that the river must be held by land works, and the fortifications of Port Hudson, just begun, were pushed forward in all haste in January. Fort Pemberton and Grand Gulf were the outworks of the main line : to the north stretched the Yazoo watershed, a district of swamp, tangled forest, and bayou, from where the high land receded from the Mississippi, 180 miles away, to where they met again at Vicksburg, each curving outwards till there was a breadth of some 50 miles between them in the centre. Fort Pemberton was in the middle of this almost impenetrable tangle, through which Grant vainly tried to force his way. The river front of the Vicksburg fortifications was three miles long, and the works were carried round in rear at a distance of about two miles from the town. Some nine miles back from the Mississippi ran the Big Black River, coming out by Grand Gulf, 30 miles below. There were also strong 224 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 works at Warrenton on the Mississippi, a few miles south of Vicksburg. The garrison was commanded by Stevenson, the district by Pemberton. From Vicks- burg a railway ran eastward, connecting it with two important lines, the New Orleans and Memphis, and the Mobile and Ohio, at Jackson and Meridian re- spectively. A relieving force was being assembled to the north-east, but Johnston, the Confederate com- mander from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, was at this time at Tullahoma with Bragg. On the Union side, McClernand's Corps moved on March 28th, and reached New Carthage on April 20th,^ the gunboats passing the batteries on the i6th. The ground was swampy and the work of moving the army very slow, but all were ready by the 29th, opposite Grand Gulf. On that day Grant tried to cover the crossing with the fleet, but the gunboats were very roughly handled, and could not stand the plunging fire from the high batteries, and he saw that the place must be taken by the army. Next day the fleet bombarded the place, and McClernand's Corps crossed : Sherman was sent to make a demon- stration at Haines' Blufif to cover this operation, and handled his force so well that Pemberton thought that the real attack was there, and recalled the re- inforcements which he had sent to Grand Gulf, which ensured Grant's success, but Boiven, com- manding at Grand Gulf, made such a gallant defence against overwhelming numbers that the fighting was very severe before McClernand made good his foot- ing on the high ground. Sherman rejoined the army on May 7th.^ At this critical time Grant had the good luck to be cut off from Washington, for Halleck ordered him to join Banks further south, which would have killed his plan. This order was delivered to him when he was driving Bozven before him, but he could then disregard it, owing to the ' S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th. ■^ E. Chancellorsville, May ist-4th. GRIERSON'S RAID 22^ changed circumstances. He made his base at Grand Gulf, for the new campaign. When Grant was withdrawing his army from the north side, Pembertoii reported that he was retreating, and was ordered to send to Bragg all the troops that he could spare, which he did before he found out his mistake : he was only able to get a few of them back, and especially missed Van Dorn's cavalry, for he had to use infantry to do their work in trying to stop Grierson.* Grierson's raid was one of the most successful of the War. He left La Grange on April 17th with about 1,700 men, but detached a regiment, and went on with 1,000, marched 600 miles in sixteen days through the State of Mississippi^ destroyed some 50 miles of railway, and inflicted more loss than he suffered, distracting the enemy's attention at a most critical time. He rode into Baton Rouge on May 2nd. This was almost the only successful raid carried out in an enemy's country, but it passed from one secure base to another, avoiding the great danger of return. Pembertoii s army was over-extended and weak in the centre, stretching from near Vicksburg to Jackson, forty miles away, when Grant got a footing to the south : he was told to concentrate, but thinking that Grant would have to retire from want of supplies, did not do so. Johnston came down with a small force, but though he had been ordered to go and take command of the army outside Vicksburg, did not do so, but told Pemberton to come and join him. Grant was too quick for them, he struck and broke Pembertoiis centre at Champion's Hill, and then drove off the force at Jackson ; he next turned on Johnston and drove him away also. Johnston's plan was to fight a decisive battle for Vicksburg in the field, not to shut up a large force there, which must fall with the place, and whose strength, added to the field army, would do more to secure it. Pemberton on the other hand did not want ' Map 49A, p. 35o. 15 ii26 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 to uncover Vicksburg, as being the key of the Missis^ sippi, and also an enormous depot ; further, it was the Southern poHcy to gain time, either for foreign recog- nition, or to tire the North out. This plan, however, had no real chance of attaining its objects : Johnston'' s was the true view, but he was by no means the man to carry it out. Pemberton then went south to cut Grant's communications, which did not then exist, and the Confederate commanders were at cross-purposes ; they had about as many men as Grant, 40,000, but divided, with his army between them, and he beat them in detail. Grant having thus prevented the junction of the Confederate generals, and driven their troops apart, thought best to strike while the iron was hot and take Vicksburg by storm : he surrounded it, making connection with the fleet on both flanks, on the i8th,^ and made an unsuccessful assault next day. He then set to work to make good roads to the Yazoo for his right flank, and was very anxious to take the place before Johnstons new army, which was concen- trating at Canton, could interfere; but Grierson's destruction of railways had hindered this very much. Grant also sent for all possible reinforcements, and was so promptly answered that Johnston's chance was soon gone. After the failure of the 19th, Grant care- fully reconnoitred Vicksburg, and tried again on the 22nd : he was checked, but McClernand's men got into a redoubt, and he reported to Grant that if the other Corps would now do their part, the place was theirs. They therefore attacked again, only to make bad worse, for before they did so, the redoubt had been retaken, and McClernand's men made prisoners ; the result was a heavy defeat. McClernand published a most offen- sive congratulator}^ order to his command, claiming that they had taken the' place, but that the others had failed them, which was absolutely untrue. Grant therefore removed him from his command, and gave it to General Ord. ' Mexico. The French take I'uelila, May 17th. THE FALL OF VICKSBURG 2*7 Pembcrton, wlien his troops had been defeated out- side the town, retired within its lines, abandoning the outlying works. Vicksburg lies on a line of bluffs rising from the river, and deeply seamed by ravines, a position very favourable for defence, but the best line was too long for his force of less than 30,000 men, and though it was well fortified, with many guns, the proportion of heavy ones was too small. Grant, find- ing that the place could not be rushed, invested it, for PcDibcrtou had to feed the population as well as his own men, so could not hold out long, though Johnston, whose army was now said to be 30,000 strong,^ might raise the siege. To cover it, therefore, he took the IXth Corps, which had just come, and a division from each of the others, and put them under Sherman in the middle of June, Sherman took a position from the Benton Road, east of Haines' Bluff, along the valley of the Big Black to the railway-crossing, and fortified it carefully, holding Johnston in check till Petnberton, who had been waiting in his trenches for forty-seven days, gave up in despair, and surrendered on July 4th.^ Johnston was always suggesting plans, but did not strike. 24,491 men were surrendered, 172 guns, 60,000 small arms, and a great quantity of ammunition. Grant began with 43,000 men, and ended with 75,000; his losses were 9,362, including 453 missing. Pcni- berton's greatest force just before the siege was 40,000 ; when he moved into the town it was only 28,000. His losses were probably about 10,000, but the campaign cost the Confederates the Mississippi and the States to the west. This was the first compaign in the War in which the newly raised coloured troops were regu- larly used, both with the main army and to guard the country in rear, though a few were with Banks at Port Hudson in May. ' Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th. - K. Gettysburg, July ist-jnl. W. Bragg escapes to Chattanooga : end of Tullahoma campaign, July 1st. 228 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 ^ EVENTS IN LOUISIANA (cf. p. 1/6) After the capture of Galveston by Magruder, works were thrown up in south-western Louisiana at La Fourche, Donaldsonville, Brashear City, and Berwick Bay, to protect the Union troops acting along the Mississippi, and secure the rear of New Orleans. Banks' troops were raw and badly equipped, and when he started for Vicksburg from the south he knew nothing of the occupation of Port Hudson, which was a complete surprise to him ; he could neither communicate with Grant nor turn the place by the other side of the river, but went back from Baton Rouge to co-operate with Farragut in March. Farragut, however, attacked at night, so that the army had to be mere spectators. Banks returned to the Atchafalaya, where he was opposed by Taylor, whom he drove back on the Teche to Fort Bisland, and then took that place. Thence he moved to Alexandria on the Red River, and Taylor retired to Shreveport, on which Banks, now in communication with Grant, crossed the Mississippi, and moved against the rear of Port Hudson on May 23rd. He invested it on the 26th, and assaulted it the next day, gaining some ground ; then a regular siege was begun, but the force was sickly, Grant's success problematical, and his com- munications harassed by Taylor. Banks assaulted again on June 14th, and was heavily repulsed. Meanwhile Taylor crossed the Atchafalaya, surprised Brashear City and Bayou Boeuf, threatened Donald- sonville, and mounted guns to cut off the Union communications with New Orleans, which was very weakly held. A division had been sent to attack Grant's communications at Milliken's Bend, and when this failed, Taylor asked for these troops, with which he might have taken the place, but they were refused. He came up within a few miles of the cit}^ and was checked by the fire of the gunboats, but the situation ' Map 51, p. 362. THE NEW MONITORS 229 was so serious that Emory, in command there, wrote on July 4th to tell Banks that he must choose between New Orleans and Port Hudson. After the naval attack on Port Hudson in March, Porter made several expeditions up the rivers, doing much damage, and then went on to Vicksburg, leaving some boats with Banks, while Farragut, find- ing things going on well, had gone to sec after the blockading portion of his command, in the Gulf. (Continued on p. 268.) The South-West (Carry forward from p. 177, Chapter VIII, to p. 269, Chapter X) The Blockade (Continued from p. 177.) On the South-East Coast the War centred round Charleston. On January 3rd,^ the two Confederate rams, the " Palmetto State " and " Chicora^' dashed out against the blockading squadron, and attacked two armed merchant steamers, which surrendered, but the nearest warships closed in, on which the rams returned to Charleston, and never got through the blockade at all, but the Confederates made a great proclamation for the benefit of foreign nations, claiming to have raised it. The new monitors soon arrived from the North, and Dupont sent them on small expeditions to test them. The " Montauk " attacked Fort McAllister, on the Ogeechee, and stood its fire well, and in March she went up that river again and destroyed the Confederate cruiser ^^ Nashville'' under the guns of the fort. Dupont's deductions from these minor operations were that " whatever degree of impenetrability they might have, there was no corre- sponding quality of destructiveness as against forts," and it confirmed his opinion that Charleston should be attacked by a combined naval and military force, of ' \V. Stone's Kiver, January 1st -3rd. ^ragg- retreats. S.W. Magrtider retakes Galveston, January 1st. The " Ala/mnia" sinks the " Ilatteras," J.-xnuary nth. Jh.e " Florida " leaves Mobile, January 15th. 230 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 which the army should contribute 25,000 men, but they could not then be spared. It seems curious that Burn- side's useful coast force could not have been used, in- stead of being broken up after clearing Pamlico Sound. Mr. Fox, however, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, an ex-naval officer, had formed a most exagger- ated opinion of the powers of the new vessels, and Dupont was told he was expected to take Charleston with the force at his disposal, 9 new ironclads and 5 unarmoured gunboats. He had already tried to block the harbour by sinking vessels in the fairway, but with only temporary effect. Seven of the iron- clads were improved monitors, which, though larger and better than the original, were not really able to " keep the sea," his flagship was a large central battery ship, carrying 18 guns, and one was a lightly armoured vessel, the " Keokuk." The flagship, " New Iron- sides," had 4|-inch plates, the regular monitors eleven i-inch plates, and the " Keokuk" i| to 2-inch armour. The monitors carried guns of different calibre in their single turrets, a curious arrangement, with their poor magazine space. They drew 1 1 feet each, the flagship rather more. ' This force assembled at North Edisto, and on April 6th, crossed the bar and anchored off Morris Island, but haze prevented the attack. Next day at noon they weighed anchor, but to handle a squadron of new-type ships in a narrow, shallow channel, in a tideway, was most difficult and tedious. The flagship steered so badly that she had to anchor and let others go on more than once : once she lay right over a big submarine mine, but the firing gear would not work. The orders were to go forward without re- turning the fire from Morris Island, and concentrate their fire on the north-west face of Fort Sumter, at ranges of from 600 to 800 yards, the gunboats to form outside the bar, and be ready to help the ironclads. The Confederates had marked the ranges with ' Map 34, p. 258. DUPONT ATTACKS KORT SUMTER 231 buoys, and placed obstructions and submarine mines, which caused confusion in the advance, and the ships masked each other's fire. At 2.50, Fort Moultrie opened fire, followed by other Confederate works ; the leading ships turned at the line of obstructions between the bank near Sumter and Sullivan's Island, and were clubbed between the two strongest forts, and severely punished. The flagship could not be got to her place, so Dupont ordered the fleet to withdraw at 4.30, intend- ing to renew the attack next day, but when the reports came in in the evening he had the moral courage to say that he would not turn a repulse into a disaster. The results of this, the first important action of ironclads, may be instructive. The fleet had been exposed to converging fire from many heavy guns, five monitors were more or less disabled, and the wretched " Keokuk" was literally riddled, and sank the next morning. In the others, the armour, though badly damaged, had prevented much loss of life, but the diff'erence between the solid plates of the flagship and the laminated pro- tection of the monitors was most marked : in the former vessel there was a sense of absolute security in the battery, while the men in the turrets were exposed to flying bolts and splinters, and the armour was crushed in in many places. The "Nahant's" turret jammed, water poured in round that of the " Passaic," and the " Passaic," " Patapsco," and " Nantucket," had each a gun put out of action. The damage inflicted was but slight, only the barbette guns of Sumter having suffered to some extent. The armament was quite unsuited to the work, being mainly the heavy 15 and ii-inch smooth-bores, of short range, which, although most effective against wooden ships, were not so against forts, for the ships were compelled to stand in to a range where the forts had the advantage : a powerful long-range rifled gun was wanted. So much for details. The general lessons were that the number of guns was insufficient, the fire too slow, the view from the conning-towers unsatisfactory, while the 232 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 crews were not large enough to detail a landing party to secure any advantage. These were insuperable difficulties in the way of a purely naval attack. On the side of the defence, the heavy concentrated fire at marked ranges had its full effect, and the obstructions were well placed and useful, but the submarine mines did no harm : several exploded close to the ships, but only shook them, while the electric firing gear failed in the one case where it could have been used. A land force of 30,000 men was ready to deal with an attack by the army, but after this action it was broken up, and most of it sent elsewhere. On the evening of the attack, Dupont was ordered to send all his ironclads but two to New Orleans, the opening of the Mississippi being the most pressing work, while he held his position as best he could with what force was left. General Hunter also proposed to occupy Morris Island with the army, but Dupont had to decline to co-operate.^ The Confederate force available would at this time have been able to defeat this plan. Early in June, information was received that the Con- federate ironclad " Atlanta,'' late the blockade-runner " Fingal," which had been converted at Savannah, was lying in Wassaw Sound, and would soon sweep off the Union vessels, and the monitors "Weehawken" and "Nahant" were sent there. On June 17th, the " Atlanta " came down to attack them, but got aground, when the " Weehawken " took an advantageous position at short range, and with four shots so ruined her armour that she surrendered : the " Nahant " took no part in the action. Dupont sent his battered ironclads to Port Royal for repairs ; meanwhile the order to send them away ' E. Chancellorsville, May ist-4th. S. Grant invests Vicksburg, May i8th. S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th. Mexico. The French take Puebla, May 17th. Mexiqo. The F,reyi^ch enter Mexico City, June 5tb. RECAPTURE OF GALVESTON 233 was countermanded, and he was told to attack Charleston again on April i6th, but this was im- possible, as the repairs took some months. On June 12th, Gillmore succeeded Hunter in command of the army, and got together men and materiel for com- bined action with the fleet.^ The Gulf of Mexico Magruder, commanding in Texas, planned to re- cover Galveston by an attack of his army, supported by two improvised gunboats, and to raise the blockade, and on January ist carried out his plan, bringing two brigades against a small Union force of a few com- panies. He took one Union vessel, and destroyed another, losing one of his own gunboats in the action. Galveston was not recovered by the North, but they re-established the blockade in about a week. The Confederates broke the blockade at Sabine Pass, which was restored at once, but they also drove off a small land force in connection with it on January 2ist, and an attempt to regain the ground failed. (Continued on p. 270.) The War at Sea (Continued from p. 179.) The '•^ Retribution''' ended her cruise in the Bahamas, being brought to Nassau, and sold, in February. We left M a ffitt 2in6. the ''Florida'' at Mobile, where he had run in with half a crew, to recruit and refit. In January, he chose a thick, wild night, with half a gale blowing, to elude the blockad- ing squadron, and got clear off, though chased. He took some prizes in West Indian waters in February, and then ran down the South American coast ; in five months he destroyed 14 ships, using the colliers for supplies. One prize was commissioned as a cruiser, ' E. Gettysburg, July ist-3rd. S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th. W. Bragg escapes to Chattanooga : end of Tullahoma Campaign, July Ist. 234 THP: first half of 1863 and put under Read, who did much mischief along the Atlantic coast of the United States, twice changing into another vessel as soon as the one he was in became too well known. He made a bold attempt to cut out a ship from the harbour of Portland, Maine, but was defeated and captured. These ships were, the " Clarence,'' taken off the Brazilian coast, cruising in May and June, " Tacony,'' at work in June in mid-Atlantic, '^Archer,'' on American coast, end of June. Together they took 16 ships. When the " Alabama " was cruising in the Caribbean Sea, Seinmes saw by papers taken in prizes that Banks intended to attack Galveston and invade Texas. He therefore planned to get to Galveston at the same time as the fleet of transports, and make a night attack on them, as there would probably be no escort, and they would be busy with landing preparations. He came up a little before dark on January nth, but saw, instead of transports, the Union fleet coming back to re-establish the blockade. The " Hatteras," an armed merchant steamer, came out about dark to see what the "^/a6rtm«" was, a sharp action ensued, and the " Hatteras " went down in thirteen minutes ; she had not a chance against her opponent. The " Ala- bama" went back to the Atlantic, to the crossing of the homeward-bound and East India trades, working out- wards from the north end of the Bahamas to about half-way between the Canaries and Bermuda, where on March 2nd she turned south down the South American coast, till at the end of June she was due south of Bahia, about opposite Rio. She seems to have taken about 20 prizes in that time. The Northern flying squadron, looking for Con- federate cruisers, which had been under Wilkes, was in June given to Lardner, as Wilkes had made himself impossible by his constant quarrels with other naval officers (cf. pp. 98, 178). In Europe, Bulloch was working away to supply his Government with ships and munitions of war, and THE ''ALEXANDRA'' CASP: 235 in March a small wooden steamer was launched for him by Miller of Birkenhead, and called the " Alex- nndrar She was being got ready for sea, but not armed in any way, when the U.S. Consul, Mr. Dudley, filed affidavits that she was intended for the Con- federate States, and she was seized on April 5th ; the matter was brought to trial in June, the complaints being that the ship was being " equipped," not " armed." The jury found for the defendants, but this was reversed in November, and she was detained. To finish the matter here : her name was changed, and she sailed as a merchant ship for Halifax under another name, thence to Nassau, where she was seized again, but the court decided that there was nothing to justify her forfeiture, and she was released in May, 1865, after the War was over. When the " Alexandra " was seized, and Lord John Russell stated that a much sharper watch would be kept in future, the difficulties increased enormously, especially as the two ironclad turret-ships which Laird was building were such unmistakable war- ships, fit for nothing else. In view of the overtures which had been made to Mr. Slidcll in France, it was hoped that they might be fitted out there, and got away from England as the ostensible property of a French subject. They should have been ready in the first half of the year, but armour-plating was a new business, and there were many dela3^s. Bulloch was given a free hand, and sold the ships to a French firm for whom Laird agreed to complete the contract, as they had an order for two ironclads from the Pasha of Eg3^pt, and all seemed right, but they agreed with Bulloch to re-sell them to him beyond British jurisdic- tion for a sum which would give them a fair com- mission. Bulloch went to France in March, to see a French ship-builder, who informed him that he had been officially and confidentially told that the Emperor was willing that he should build ships for the Con- federates (cf, p. 179), that he could send them out 236 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 under the French flag to any place, and that if the United States raised objections, he could get authority to complete, arm, and despatch them, as a matter of legitimate business. A contract was made with him to build four clipper corvettes, each carrying twelve to fourteen 6-inch rifled guns of regulation French pattern, and he received a letter dated June 6th, from M. Chasseloup-Laubat, the Minister of Marine, grant- ing him authority to arm these ships. In June, Bulloch was told to build some sea-going ironclads able to navigate the Mississippi and fight vessels carry- ing 15 and ii-inch guns, as soon as possible (cf. p. 273). France was evidently the only place where this could now be done, since nothing more was required than the most ordinary business prudence. The Confederate Government sent over Commander Maury ^ on special service, at the end of 1862, and in March, 1863, he bought a new iron steamer on the Clyde, called the " Japan." She sailed in April, met her armament off" Ushant, a cousin of Maury's took command, and she was commissioned as the " Georgia'' ; she sailed across the Atlantic, reaching Bahia in May, coaled there, and went on towards the Cape of Good Hope. (Continued on p. 271.) Summary (Continued from p. 180.) During the first half of 1863, the War for a time was at a standstill, for though the South was exhausted, the North could make no progress : Hooker could not move, all Grant's efforts were failures, Rosecrans was stuck fast in front of Bragg, and Banks and Farragut were blocked at Port Hudson. Then Lee swept back his enemies from Chancellorsville, over the border, and followed them up : he deliberately planned this in- vasion to be the deciding point of the War, but failed to win, rather than was beaten, at Gettysburg : like so many decisive battles^ this was tactically indecisive. SUMMARY •> 237 Johnston was at cross-purposes with Jefferson Davis and Peniberton, so that Grant invested and took Vicks- burg, the other decisive point, at the same time. At the same time also, Rosecrans had just manoeuvred Bragg out of central Tennessee back to his base, Chattanooga. All three were winning strokes, and July 4th, Independence Day, saw the future existence of the Nation secured. Abroad, however, Napoleon's progress in Mexico began to be a factor in the conduct of the War, affecting both sides, and his new ventures there made him wish rather for two republics to the north of it than one : he was very favourable to the Confederate agents, but did not go so far as definite . political recognition. The half-year closed with the Union prospects as bright as they had been gloomy at the end of the preceding one; the North had permanently gained the control of the Mississippi (for the fall of Vicksburg brought that of Port Hudson), of Kentucky, of Ten- nessee, west of the Cumberland Mountains, and of Alabama, north of the Tennessee River. Union Loss. — Major-General John F. Reynolds, killed in action. Confederate Loss. — Lientenant-General Thomas J. Jackson, died of wounds. (Continued on p. 274.) Notices of Officers (Continued from p. 184.) Several prominent men disappear from the War during this half-year, " Stone- wall" Jackson, Generals Penibcrton, Reynolds, Van Dorn, and McClernand. A short notice of the most remarkable and fasci- nating character of the Civil War must necessarily be very bald, and readers are referred to Henderson's delightful book, " Stonewall Jackson." Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born at Clarksburg, West Virginia, in 1824, lost both parents when quite young, and was brought up by an uncle. His father died very poor, 238 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 and he had to make his own way, which developed his character early. He went to West Point in 1842, and, in spite of his defective education, did well enough to get a commission in the Artillery, four years later, just as the Mexican War broke out. During the first part of it he was on fortress garrison duty, but went to the front with General Scott in 1847, being appointed to a field battery; he gained great credit at Contreras and Chapultepec, was men- tioned in despatches, and breveted, first Captain, then Major, within eighteen months of joining the Army. In 185 1 he left the Army, his health having been injured by the Mexican War, getting an appoint- ment as Professor at the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington. Here he married, and had time for military study, and the religious side of his character developed, which had hitherto been in abeyance. Like Lee,, Early, and other great Confederate soldiers, he was against Secession, but followed the fortunes of his State, to which he considered his first duty to lie. His first command was at Harper's Ferry, where he had the difficult task of driving notions of discipline and duty into his motley levies, his stern ideas on these questions making him most unpopular with all ranks at first, but when war had taught the value of them, no man was more adored by his command. They first saw this at Bull Run, where the steadi- ness of his brigade earned for its commander the nickname of ^'' StonewalV : this, however, was for the outside world ; to his own men he was " Old Jack." A fortnight before this he received his commission as Brigadier-General, and from that time to the day of his death the history of his services is that of the War in Virginia. There was nothing showy about Jackson ; he was a good, though ungraceful, rider, and often both badly mounted and shabbily dressed : as a Yankee prisoner remarked to his comrades, " Boys, he's not much to look at, but if we'd had him we shouldn't have been in this mess." He believed in JACKSON, PEMBERTON, REYNOLDS 239 hiystifying his opponents and concealing his own plans, but carried the latter idea too far, for had anything happened to him, no one else knew enough to carry them out. He was a model subordinate, the only one to whom Lee could entrust a task without definite orders, and, though he always spoke his mind, he accepted an adverse decision without cavil. Per- haps his greatest military peculiarity was his terrible power of counterstroke, in which no one has ever approached him. Though the kindest of men, always ready to pardon a mistake, to anything savouring of dishonesty, untruthfulness, or neglect of duty, he was absolutely merciless, and his code of morality was most rigid. The mainspring of his life and of all his actions was his trust in God, duty first, popularity nowhere. A shy and self-contained man, in public he was reserved and reticent, but in his home his warmly affectionate nature came out fully, and he was one of the happiest of men. In fine, Jackson seems really to have succeeded in being what the best of the seventeenth-century Puritans tried to be. Licutenant-General Pemberton is principally remark- able for the fact that he was about the only Northerner who held high command in the field on the Confederate side. He was a Pennsylvanian, educated at West Point, who had served with distinction in the Mexican War, but, though a very good officer, he could not be called a first-rate general. When in the old Service, he was quartered in the South for a long time ; he married a Virginian lady, and imbibed the States Rights doctrine so thoroughly that he practised it by fighting against the side of his own State. After the fall of Vicksburg he was not employed again. Reynolds was said to have been the best officer who was killed in the War on the Union side. He was a brilliant soldier, who had served wdth credit in the Mexican War, and a smart and handsome man, universally popular. The choice of Burnside's suc- cessor in command of the Army of the Potomac lay 240 THE FIRST HALF OF tS&s between him, Hooker, and Meade, but he put himself out by stipulating for a freer hand, if chosen. When Hooker had to go, the whole army looked to Reynolds, but the politicians put Meade in, much against his will, for he was one of Reynolds' warmest admirers. Reynolds was in command of a wing of the army, and it was to him that Meade looked to manage the all- important opening stage of the great battle of Gettys- burg, where he fell, respected and lamented by both sides. Major-Genera I Earl Van Dorn passed out of West Point in 1842, with Rosecrans, Pope, Longstreet, and others, distinguished himself in the Mexican War, and was major in the old Army when the War broke out. He was one of the first to resign his commission, and offered his sword to his native State, Mississippi. A brave and dashing soldier, his ability was greater than his good fortune, for, with few mistakes, he made few successes in army command. He raised such a storm by his enforcement of martial law in his own State, that after Corinth he was superseded by Pern- berton (cf. p. r/i), and given a cavalry command, which seemed to suit him much better, and where he exercised a real power, his greatest success being the destruction of Grant's main depot at Holly Springs, in December, 1862. In the summer of 1863 his health broke down, and he died the next year. Personally, he was a handsome and charming man, but of rather delicate physique. Major-General McClernand was a powerful politician before the War, a Member of Congress from the President's own State, Illinois, and who had great influence with him, which got him a high command. He grasped the methods of systematic warfare on a large scale more quickly than any other civilian general, and would have made a fine ofiicer, but that he was insubordinate and unscrupulous, and an incorri- gible intriguer, who trusted to shady methods to get what would have been earned better by a proper use McCLERNAND 241 of his own great abilities. No braver, and few abler men, took part in the War, and he might have aspired to almost any position at the end of it, but he was the worst of the politicals, his crooked ways were his ruin, and he was dismissed in disgrace. Exit McClernand. (Continued on p. 275.) 16 242 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 1863 January Fbbruakv March 8. Mosby captures General Stough- H ton at Chantilly. ? Longstreet command ing against Peck, at w Suff oik. 8. Confederate rams < attack blockaders, w off Charleston. 1 29. Jacksonville Ex- pedition, Florida. 1-3. Battle of Stone's River. 4. Bragg retreats. (1 11. McClernand Guerilla Warfare in Kentucky and 1 takes Arkansas Post. Tenn essee. Grant getting his Grant's fruitless att empts to get at Vicks- army to Vicks- burg through the swamps of the Yazoo 8 burg. Valley. g First Operations. 14. Farragut at- 03 tacks Port Hud- son. Banks and Tayl or in Louisiana. 1. Magruder re- takes Galveston. i 11. The "Alabama" sinks the " Hat- The "Alabama" an d " Florida " at sea. Is teras," off Gal- -R veston. (4 ^ 15. The "Florida" ^p escapes from Mo- B^ bile. g The "Retribution" The "Retribution" to at sea, among the Bahamas. sold at Nassau. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 243 18«8 April May JUNB, TO July 4 1-4. Battle of Mosby captures a Chancellorsville. supply train. 12. Siege of Suffolk, to 4. . 3. 28. S t n e ni a n ' s Gettysburg Cam- Raid, to ... . 8. Kilpatrick's. to • paign. 20-28. Glendenin's 9. Brandy Station. Raid below Fre- 11. Confederates ;3 dericksburg. cross Potomac. 28. Meade succeeds Hooker. July 1-3. Battle of Gettysburg. June 15. Dix threa- tens Richmond. 26-30. Dix a d - vances on Rich- mond. < 7. Naval bombard- 17. The "Weehaw- to ment of Fort ken " captures Sumter. the "Atlanta." 23-July 1. Rose- crans' Tullahoma H Campaign against ^ Bragg. 27. Streight's Raid. to 3. July 4. Confederate attack on He- 17. Grierson's Raid, to lena fails. Grant moves his 2. army to South of 1-18. Grant fights Vicksburg, and his way round to crosses the Mis- east of Vicksburg. sissippi at Grand 18. Siege of Vicksb urg, to July 4. 8 1 Gulf, 29. 18. First Assault. July 4. Vicksburg 16. Fleet passes 20. Second assault. surrenders. w Vicksburg bat- Banks moves teries. against Port Hudson. Banks and Taylor 27. Siege of Port H udson. in Louisiana. 6. The" Clarence" at sea, off South Ameri- g can and West In dian coasts, to 10. Is 10-25. The" racony" C--H in mid-Atlantic. Si 25. The "Archer" along U.S. coast. H The -A lab ama" and "Florida" at sea. p Mexico. 5 17. The French 5. The French enter take Puebla. Mexico City. CHAPTER X the second half of 1 863, the north takes a winning position Affairs in Mexico As the operations of the French in Mexico began to be a real factor in connection with the Civil War in the summer of 1863, it may be well to give a sketch of them here to date. Napoleon Ilird had long watched with apprehension the marvellous progress of the United States, and considered that it was becoming a menace to the Old World : so long as the different American countries kept within themselves, and supplied the raw material for his French manufactures, he was content, but when the United States threatened to become a serious manufacturing rival, and also gained influence over her neighbours, he cast about for some pretext to intervene, and place a limit on her growing power, so as to adjust the balance to his liking. Since the overthrow of the Spanish dominion b}^ Yturbide in 1822, Mexico had had no stable govern- ment, but was the prey of factions, and of adventurers rather than rulers, of whom some were strong and some were honest, but none combined these qualities till the advent of Juarez. After 1856, the main struggle was that of the Liberals against the supporters of the absolute power of the Roman Catholic Church, the Clericals. The country was bankrupt, with no pro- 244 CHAOS IN MEXICO 245 spect of improvement. In 1846, its President, Paredes, had said that its best chance was the monarchy of a foreign prince, backed by Europe, and in 1859 Pre- sident Buchanan had asked Congress for military force to invade Mexico to obtain security for their loans, laying down their position clearly : that Mexico was like a ship drifting, directed by unstable passions, and that the United States should hold out a helping hand, for if any one else came in they might have to intervene at a disadvantage. This fear nearly came true, for two events played into Napoleon's hands in 1 861 : the outbreak of the Civil War, and the sus- pension of payment by Juarez' Government, in April and July respectively.^ The latter afforded a pretext for immediate intervention, while the former not only made the United States unable to interfere with him, but gave him a chance of weakening them permanently by aiding their definite separation, and at the same time setting up a power on their borders to curb their expansion. He remembered Paredes' saying, and was in communication with Mexican refugees of the de- feated Clerical party, who consulted him about ap- proaching some Catholic prince and establishing a monarchy. He recommended Maximilian of Austria, whom they sounded in the spring of 1862 to such effect that he refused the proffered crown of Greece a year later. When Mexico suspended payment, France and England broke off relations with President Juarez, and then, v.^ith Spain, agreed on joint intervention to obtain security, and asked the United States to join them. Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State, did not consent (cf p. 80), but proposed to Congress on October 14th that the United States should meet claims on Mexico up to a given sum, taking as security the public domain and the valuable mines; this, how- ever, the last thing that Napoleon would have wished, was not agreed to. The three Powers signed the ' E. Battle of Bull Run, July 21st. 246 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 Convention of London on October 31st, again asking the United States to join them, but this time Mr. Seward sent a strong reply ^ to the effect that the States could not agree to any measures of coercion in the distracted state of Mexico, and adding that " it is of the highest importance to the United States that the Sovereigns agreeing to the Convention do not seek for any territorial aggrandisement, and do not intend to exert any influence to hinder the right of the Mexican people to the free choice and estab- lishment of their own form of government." The joint expedition started and arrived in De- cember, but in January, 1862, the French admiral made claims against which the others protested. In February,^ the Convention of Soledad was signed, recognizing Juarez, and formally disclaiming any intention of attacking the independence, sovereignty, or integrity of the Mexican Republic. This was conformable with the intentions of England and Spain, whose ideas of intervention were limited to such acts as the seizure of the Customs as guarantees for pay- ment ; but Napoleon suddenly sent very large rein- forcements,' and brought back the Clerical refugees who had been intriguing with him to establish a monarchy, that is, to interfere with the form of government, so his allies broke off the agreement, sent their men back, and let France go on alone. The French notified the Mexican Government that hostilities would begin as soon as the troops of the other nations had retired, and persuaded the refugee General Almonte to proclaim himself dictator ad interim. As the Convention of Soledad would put the French troops in a very bad position in case of war, their commander. General Lorencez, broke it on some flimsy pretext, and advanced against the Mexican ' The "Trent " affair, November 8th, 1861. 2 W. Fall of Fort Donelson, February i6th, 1862. •* E. The " Monitor" and " Merriuiac" March gth. E. McClellan starts for the Peninsula. WAR IN MEXICO 247 general Zaragoza on April igth.' He had very hard fighting, was beaten at Pucbla, and gained ground very slowly, so General Forey was sent out to take command in October. Napoleon showed his hand too much at this time- in his attempts to create a Buffer State between Mexico and either or both parties in the Civil War, for his Consul in Texas wrote to the Governor of that State to suggest the re-establishment of the old Republic, that is, the secession of Texas from the Confederacy, adding that the answer would be a useful guide to him in corre- spondence with his own Government (cf p. 73). The French Consul at Richmond had also been meddling in the matter,^ and both of them were ordered to leave the Confederate States. In the spring of 1863,^ Forey advanced, taking Puebla in May, driving Juarez from Mexico City, and entering it on June 5th. Now was his time to put in force his instructions for the recon- struction of the country, which were written by Napoleon himself, and laid stress on the danger of the United States becoming the controlling power on the American continent, but said that if Mexico, with French help, obtained a stable government, " we shall have placed an impassable barrier against the encroachments of the United States." Definite in- structions were given for calling an Assembly and forming a provisional coalition Government of all parties, who were to ascertain the will of the nation as to the form of government desired, with due care : ' E. McClellan before Yorktown, all April. S. Capture of New Orleans, April 20th. - E. June. The Peninsular Campaign. E. Lee's Invasion of Maryland, September. W. Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky, September. ' E. Fredericksburg, December 12th. W. Stone's River, December 31st. ' E. Chancellorsville, M.ny ist-4th, 1863. W. Tullahoma Campaign. June. E. Battle of Gettysburg, July ist-3rd. S. Surrender of Vicksburg, July 4th. 248 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 if a monarchy were chosen, the name of Maximilian was to be submitted as the candidate approved by France. The Emperor went on to say that whoever took the throne would have to act in the interests of France, both because they were identical with those of Mexico, and because he would be dependent on French support, and reminded Forey that the carrying out of the objects of the expedition was a necessity for the honour of France, both military and political. Napoleon's trusted agent in the country, however, to whom his generals were referred for instructions, was M. Dubois de Saligny, an ambitious and intriguing man, whose reports were framed rather to suit his master's wishes and his own ambitions than the real state of affairs, and the idea of an honest plebiscite did not suit him at all : his aim was rather, now, to commit Napoleon to an enterprise from which he could not recede, and by means of which he, de Saligny, might perhaps rise from his present anomalous position to be Ambassador at the Imperial Court of Mexico. No time was to be lost for him and Almonte, who persuaded Forey to issue the requisite proclama- tions, and then chose a Governing Committee of 35, who named a Provisional Executive of 5, and an "Assembly of Notables" of 215 members, all the members of these Committees consisting of their own supporters in the Clerical party. The Assembly passed the following Resolutions on July loth : (i) "That the Government be a hereditary Catholic Monarchy." (2) " That the monarch's title be The Emperor of Mexico." (3) "That the Crown be offered to Maximilian." (4) "That in case of his refusal, Napoleon be asked to name another suitable prince." The Provisional Government called itself "The Regency of the Empire," got in the adhesion of some towns in French occupation quickly, and sent to Maximilian, to offer him the Crown as the genuine wish of the people, these adhesions being only an MAXIMILIAN ACCEPTS THE CROWN 249 instalment. He accepted it, if ratified by tlie voice of the wliole nation, and they plied him with nominal adhesions and votes, till on December 26th he wrote and accepted the Crown definitely. Napoleon had begun to suspect that de Saligny was playing his own game, and was very angry when he found how he had been outwitted : he wrote at once, repudiating the Resolutions, and insisting that his instructions be carried out properly before anything were fixed, for the farce was too flagrant to pass muster, and the blame lay on him. He recalled de Saligny and Forey, but the mischief was done : he was, however, pacified by the fresh adhesions sent to Maximilian, and let things go on, appointing Bazaine, who had been in the country for some time, to the command. Having driven back the Mexican army, the next thing was to settle down, and try to re-organize the hopeless finances, both for their own sake, and also to enable them to bear a good share of the cost of the expedi- tion. Napoleon took the same view as Seward and Jefferson Davis (cf. pp. 69, 96), and planned to get a concession of the valuable Sonora mines for a French company, on condition that it paid a tax to the Mexican Government, and also part of its profits to the French Government. In December the French Minister at Washington said to Seward that the Emperor would be willing to act as a Mediator when the time came for the inevitable separation between North and South, but after Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, Seward could laugh at him. This only increased the pro- found suspicion with which he regarded the Emperor and all his projects, which was confirmed by informa- tion from other sources. General Position and Plans (Continued from p. 188.) After the taking of Vicks- burg, Halleck repeated his mistake of the summer before, and dispersed Grapt's army instead of keeping 250 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 it together to break down all opposition, leaving him there with merely a skeleton force. Rosecrans wanted more men to guard his communications before he advanced on Chattanooga, but they were refused. Grant wished to use the whole army against Mobile, and Banks also was for attacking it, when Port Hudson surrendered, but Halleck seemed to think the trans- Mississippi district of most importance, while the President was anxious to secure a good foothold in Texas, on account of his suspicions of Napoleon, and the effect of the entry of the French troops into Mexico City on June 5th. He expected French interference in the War, which fear was shared by the Confederates. P'or both sides the main objective was the central district, the possession of Chattanooga : though not perhaps quite realized in July, it soon became fully apparent, and everything else was made secondary to it, as being the last military base of the Confederacy in front of its heart, Atlanta, now an invaluable manu- facturing centre. The object of Grant's proposed attack on Mobile was to gain quickly a base from which Atlanta and Bragg s army might be attacked in rear. As he said, there was no need of a great expedi- tion to Texas to watch the French, for with the Union command of the sea, a strong garrison might be main- tained at Brownsville, which was all that was wanted at the time. In the East, Meade was a most cautious strategist, following Lee with little vigour even before he sent troops to Chattanooga, and Burnside, in east Tennessee, hardly affected the main issue. In the South-East, a great combined attack was planned on Charleston : success here would have left the Con- federates but one Atlantic port, Wilmington, to which the coast and blockading forces could then have turned their attention ; Mobile, their only other port, was at this time but weakly held, and would probably have quickly fallen to a land attack. On the Confederate side, the loss of Vicksburg and the failure at Gettysburg were felt to be the beginning THE SOUTH'S LAST CHANCE 251 of the end : from henceforth they fought with little hope, and General Taylor could not see why his Government went on with a struggle which was only ruining the country, though he, as a soldier, fought so long as they kept up the War. There was, though, as both Grant and Sheridan have put on record, still a chance, and not a hopeless one, of tiring out the North politically^ by the increase of the voting power of those who opposed the vigorous prosecution of the War, The elections of the autumn of 1862 had gone much in their favour, which made Grant take the great risk that he did in choosing the plan for the final attack on Vicksburg. The consequence was that the North had the greatest difficulty in raising men, even by offering high bounties, and the Government was compelled to resort to conscription. In September, the President used the powers given him by the Act of March 3rd (cf, p. 187), and suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus for the duration of the War, in support of the new Conscription Laws. The authorities would not use force to raise men, and there were serious riots in New York, to quell which, and enforce the draft, troops were sent back from the army. All this gave encouragement to the Confederates, and was a legitimate factor in their calculations. Chattanooga was much more valuable to them than to their opponents, for on the south side it was not only strong, but had good communications, and if they could but clear the Knoxville district, it commanded their best railway line and junction, even after the loss of the Memphis branch. We have seen the extreme danger of New Orleans from Taylors able operations in western Louisiana, and Banks' nerve in holding to his objective at Port Hudson after Emory's alarming letter of July 4th cannot be too strongly commended. In August, the Union Government began to think of re-establishing Civil Government in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and Halleck wrote to 252 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 Sherman about it, but he was strongly against putting power into local hands at this stage (cf. p. 421). (Continued on p. 280.) The East (Continued from p. 217.) We have seen that both armies stood facing each other during July 4th, Lee entrenching a line in which he might resist attack and gain time for the retreat of his trains and wounded. Meade also prepared to resist attack, for his troops were too much shaken to make one, and he employed the day in re-organizing and caring for the wounded. He was also watching whether Lee would retreat, and sent back cavalry to strike at him if he did so. On the 5th, he followed cautiously, Sedgwick coming on Early's rearguard, which formed up to cover the trains, but was only molested by long-range artillery fire. At this time Kilpatrick's cavalry was attacking Lee's trains further back, and Lee was thus able to turn on him and save them, but had Sedgwick been allowed to attack in force, this could not have been done, for Lee must have turned his whole attention to him, with results which would have been disastrous, and might have ended the War. Lee was almost out of artillery ammunition, and the garrisons might have been used with effect against the retreating Confederates ; the risk would have been little, and the result great, but this chance was lost. Meade moved very slowly, while Lee marched day and night,^ and gained so much time, that when he found the Potomac in flood, and could not cross, he had time to fortify a position, and renew his ammunition supply before his pursuers appeared. Lincoln urged the pressing of the retreat, but Meade did not rise to the occasion : on coming to Le^s position, he spent the 12th and 13th in reconnais- sance for an attack on the 14th, but then found that Lee had crossed the river in the night. If below par ' W. Morgan's Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July. S. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9th. LEB^S KETREAT 253 at Gettysburg, Lee was at his best in the retreat from it, which was wonderfully managed. There was some sharp cavalry fighting, which cleared the way into Hagerstown for the retreating army. The Union cavalry seems to have been less well handled than before, while Stuart, like Lee, was at his best, but to leave two cavalry brigades in Virginia till July ist was a great loss of power on the Confederate side in the campaign. Lee retreated by way of the Valle}"^, crossing the Blue Ridge by Chester and Thornton's Gaps to Cul- peper, Meade advancing to the Rappahannock. At the beginning of September,^ Meade heard that Lee had sent away large forces to strengthen other places, and advanced, Lee falling back ; but a few days later came the news of Chickamauga, when the Xlth and Xllth Corps were put under Hooker, and sent to Tennessee. Lee's army was reduced to 38,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry : he depended largely on the watch- fulness of his cavalry, and Stuaii's outpost service at this time is a perfect model of such work. Meade's cautious strategy, at this time of Lee's weakness, was ordered by Halleck, which looks like another good chance missed. In October,^ Meade, hearing that Lee was going to advance, fell back to Centreville, his cavalry being badly beaten at Buckland Mills on the 19th. As Lee did not follow, Meade took position at Warrenton. In these operations Lee had several chances of striking at Meade's columns in detail, but probably because of the weakness of his army he was over-cautious ; also, Pleasonton's able handling of the Union cavalry foiled him, time and again. Meade advanced again to the Rappahannock at the ' The *^ Alabama" " Tuscaloosa,''' and ^^ Georgia" at the Cape of Good Hope, August. W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th. S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th. S.E. Fort Wagner taken, September 7th. W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th. ■^ Mexico. The Crown offered to Maximilian, October 3rd. 254 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 beginning of November, and attacked, taking a part of the Confederate works, while the rest of the army crossed the river. After some fighting, both sides were facing each other on Mine Run at the end of the month. ^ Meade planned to attack both of Lee's flanks, one of which attacks he expected, and defeated, but depleted the other flank to do so, and had not Meade stopped the attack here, when he heard that the other had failed, it would probably have succeeded. The chance was lost, for when he wished to attack there the next day, the position had been made safe. On December ist, the army returned to its old camps on the north of the Rapidan : headquarters. Brandy Station. Both sides remained inactive during the winter. In the Valley, Imboden commanded a cavalry force some 3,000 strong after Gettysburg, with which he struck at the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, doing damage and creating a feeling of insecurity. On the Union side, Averell made two raids, one to overawe the Moorefield district of West Virginia, which was strongly Confederate in feeling, the other, in December, to the west of Lynchburg, breaking the Virginia and Tennessee Railway, and destroying a great depot of stores. Though the covering of Washington always tied the Union army, yet it was not fair to blame Meade for having done so little, since Halleck forbade him to take a more decided line. His campaign was marked by some brilliant manoeuvring and handling, in partial actions, very interesting to the student of tactics, but hardly so to the general reader. The result remained in Lee's favour, for he had never been fairly tackled. (Continued on p. 284.) ' W. Siege of Knoxville, November 1 7th-December 4th. W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th. The " Alabama " in the Sunda Islands, November, December. Mexico. The French occupy Tampico, November. Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December. Mexico. Maximilian accepts the Crown, December 26th. GILLMORE BEFORE CHARLESTON 255 The South-East (Continued from p. 217.) In this district, attention was centred on the operations against the defences of Ciiarleston on the south side, especially Fort Wagner on Morris Island, by the army and navy combined. As we saw, General Gillmore had been making pre- parations for it in June, and on July 6th Admiral Dahlgren came to relieve Dupont. Gillmore, a first- rate Engineer, who had attacked several places on the coast, notably Fort Pulaski, off Savannah, was sent for to Washington after the failure of the naval attack on April 7th, and consulted as to the silencing of Sumter, so that ironclads could go up the harbour. He thought that it might be done by rifled guns from Morris Island, but said that with the small force available no advance could be made against the city from the swampy islands at the mouth of the harbour against the Confederate works and forces on James Island. The army work was to be restricted to taking Morris Island and silencing Fort Sumter, in these stages : (i) To gain a secure footing on the south end of Morris Island. (2) To besiege Battery Wagner, a strong work on it : this taken, the other works on the island would fall. (3) To destroy Fort Sumter from the position thus gained, and aid the fleet by fire when it attempted to enter the harbour. (4) The fleet to remove the obstructions, run past the enemy's batteries, and go up to the city. The creeks of the inland waters behind the coast islands communicated with the waters held by the Union fleet, and were strongly fortified, where they approached Charleston. Several Union attacks here had been beaten. The Union held the coast islands, except Morris Island. By adding the little garrisons to the Port Royal force, there would be 11,000 men available : they had some 200-pounder rifled Parrott guns, and some heavy mortars. Much of the ground 256 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 was deep swamp, while Battery Wagner, the principal objective, was a very strong work, which had been closed in rear during the siege, and made into a small fort. It extended right across the island, which was a low neck in front, often awash at high tide, and all approach was over absolutely open ground, flanked by the Confederate batteries on James Island. The first move was a demonstration up Stono Inlet, which drew off some of the defence force, when a landing was effected on Morris Island on July loth.^ Next day an unsuccessful attack was made on the fort. Batteries were made, armed, and opened, and another attempt made on the i8th, which was beaten by a terrible musketry fire at close range. On the first occasion, four monitors supported the attack, on the second, the flagship and five monitors. They had been improved, and stood fire better. The silencing of Sumter being the principal object, it was decided to attack it, and besiege Fort Wagner, at the same time, since Sumter was within the range of the guns mounted in the parallels for the attack of Wagner. The fire of the defence, in front and flank, was most severe, but the approaches moved forward steadily, and on August 17th ^ the attack on Sumter began with such effect that it was soon a mass of ruins, having only one gun serviceable on the 24th : it was reduced to an infantry outpost. Meanwhile the approaches to Wagner, aided by fire from the ships, were advancing, but the narrow neck in front was so difficult to pass that mortar fire was largely used, and the " New Ironsides" came close in on September 5th. The rifled guns from the batteries did little damage to the sand parapets, but the heavy and accurate fire of the ship's great i i-inch smooth-bores was most effective, for the big shells lobbed into the work, burst just over ' W. Morgan! s Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July. S. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9. - The '■^Alabama" " Tuscaloosa," and ^* Georgia" at the Cape of Good Hope, August. AFFAIRS AT CHARLESTON 257 the guns, and silenced the fire completely : though the defenders' flank fire from James Island was main- tained with great effect, the sap was close to the ditch on September 6th, and the work was evacuated that night.' This brought the fall of Battery Gregg, on Cumming's Point, just opposite Sumter. Wagner was very strong, and practically uninjured. Fort Sumter was summoned to surrender, but refused, and on the 8th a boat attack was made on it, which failed. To put pressure on Charleston, a sand-bag battery was constructed on the swamp, of piles and framework, armed with a 200-pounder Parrott, which threw shells into the town at the then great range of 8,000 yards, but burst after a few rounds, after which a pair of heavy mortars were put there, to attack James Island. After Sumter was practically silenced, at the end of August, Dahlgren asked for another bombardment on the 30th, to enable him to go up the harbour, but he did not attempt to do so, or to remove obstructions. Sumter was heavily bombarded on October 26th, and at diff'erent times afterwards, to prevent guns being remounted. There were no more aggressive opera- tions against the defences of Charleston.- Some small raids and minor operations were carried out in North Carolina, and at St. Augustine, Florida. (Continued on p. 299.) The West (Continued from p. 221.) At the end of June, Bragg, at Tullahoma, finding himself threatened both by Rosecrans, and by an advance of Burnside against Buckner at Knoxville, ordered Morgan to raid into ' S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th. W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th. W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th. - W. Siege of Knoxville, November ijth-December 4th. W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th. The ^^ Alabama" in the Sunda Islands, November, December. Mexico. The French occupy Tampico, November. Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December. Mexico. Maximilian accepts the Crown, December 26th. 17 i2S8 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 Kentucky, break Rosecrans' railway connection with his base, and attack his detachments. Morgan wanted to go on into Ohio, but Bragg would not consent ; he ^started on July 2nd from Burkesville, with 2,460 men and 4 guns, and though the Cumberland River was watched by 10,000 men, eluded them cleverly, and got across. He then proceeded to carry out his own idea, not Bragg's, and marched north : he was driven back at Green River, but took the post at Lebanon, and then moved to Brandenburg on the Ohio, crossing the river on the 9th into Indiana, followed by troops from Kentucky. The militia were called out, and met him everywhere. He turned north-west, marching round the north of Cincinnati to Buffington Island, where his pursuers closed on him, and he lost half his men, but got away. He then struck for Pennsyl- vania, but had to surrender at Beaver Creek, near New Lisbon, Vv'ith only 400 men. Had he obeyed his orders he would have helped his side more, for he did not succeed in either breaking up the railways or disturbing Rosecrans' communications, being dealt with by the militia of the different localities. Rosecrans, when he followed Bragg up towards the Tennessee River,^ had to rest and refit, and repair his communications, his first supply train not getting through till July 25th, when he established a depot at Stevenson. He wanted to know what Burnside was doing, for on his movements depended much of the safety of crossing the river against Bragg's flank and rear. Also, he asked that part of Grant's scattered army be used to protect his long line of communica- tions. Again, if he waited till the middle of August, the corn would be ripe, another great point, so he waited, and made his preparations. He could either attack Chattanooga from the north or north-west, and besiege it, or cross the river and flank Bragg out. ' Maps 43, 44, p. 308. • E. Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th-i6th. W. Port Hudson surrenders, July 9th. ROSECRANS MOVES AGAINST BRAGG 259 The first would give him very bad communica- tions over barren country, leaving good ones to his opponent : the second would be at the best place for the defence ; he therefore chose the third, and determined to cross the river below Bridgeport, where Bragg had a detachment, move across the tangle of mountains to the south of it, and strike at his communications, the railway to Dalton. His own army was then lying on the line McMinn- ville-Winchester,' and when the main depot in front was made safe, Crittenden's Corps moved up to the Tennessee River on August 20th, on the north and west of Chattanooga, and next day fired on it. Bragg drew in his detachment from Bridgeport, and con- centrated against the feint. Rosecrans further puzzled him by threatening a long line of the river, and on the 26th Burnside moved forward, on which Bragg called in Buckner from Knoxville. Burnside occupied Knox- ville on September 2nd, and Cumberland Gap on the 9th. He was now to move down to connect with, or perhaps join, Rosecrans, and marched out with the greater part of his force, leaving a garrison to fortify Knoxville. The field force had reached Cleveland, and was getting into touch with the Army of the Cumberland, when the battle of Chickamauga was fought, in consequence of which it returned to guard east Tennessee. Under cover of Crittenden's feint, the rest of the Union army moved to its assigned places, and crossed the Tennessee between August 29th and September 4th, getting into touch with the Con- federate outposts on the 6th. ^ On the 9th, Rosecrans heard that Bragg had evacuated Chattanooga and gone south : he ordered McCook's Corps to strike across and cut off his retreat, but on the nth the ' The ^'Alabama,'' " Tuscaloosa" and " Georgia" at the Cape of Good Hope, August. ■■' S.E. Fort Wagner taken, September 7th S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th. 26o THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 passes were found blocked, the advanced troops could not get forward, and definite information came in that Bragg s army was concentrated right in front, at the exit from the mountains, and that he was ex- pecting Longstreefs Corps from Virginia. This was serious, for the Union army was scattered over a front of some thirty miles, in a maze of valleys, with very bad going, and worse communication between them, and under these unfavourable cir- cumstances it was vital to concentrate it at once. Rosecrans had made a rash and badly calculated move, and was caught in the middle of it. Bragg saw his opponent's mistakes, on the 8th, both in thinking that he was in retreat, and in his loose dispositions, and gave orders which would have exposed the Union army to defeat in detail, but he was on bad terms with his subordinates, who delayed, and gave Rosecrans the time he wanted. Bragg ordered a concentration on the east bank of the Chickamauga, keeping up a cavalry screen till Longstrect arrived from Virginia, which he did on the 1 8th and 19th, without cavalry or artillery. Bragg issued his orders on the i8th for the battle next day, intending to destroy the Union left, seize the Lafayette road, and cut Rosecrans off from Chattanooga. His Corps were to advance in succes- sion from the right, outflanking the Union left, and turning to the left as they crossed the river, so as to drive the Union forces southward up the valley from Polk's front : Polk, the left Corps but one, who was really facing the bulk of the Union army, to push forward and join in the attack. D. H. Hill, on the left, was to cover that flank by attacking Rosecrans' right. These movements were not carried out as soon as they should have been, partly owing to the bad ground and the unexpected resistance of the Union outposts, but partly also to the dilatori- ness of some of the commanders. Between the 12th and i8th, Rosecrans was con- THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 261 centrating, some of his troops being far to the south at McAlpine, and on the i8th he sent Thomas to occupy the important Lafayette road. He held the line Crawfish Springs-Lee and Gordon's Mills- McLennon's Cove, the general line being along the Chattanooga-Rossville road. The whole army was in position about daybreak on the 19th. He told Thomas, when he sent him to the left, that he was to hold the Rossville road, and that, if hard pressed, the whole army would come to his help. On this day, 1 8th, there were some movements near the fords, and Thomas took more ground to his left. Next day, Thomas moved first, and Bragg found that instead of outflanking his enemy, he was outflanked himself, and was attacked instead of attacking, for a sharp fight began before his troops were in their places. Both sides brought up supports, and the battle swayed backwards and forwards. Bragg, seeing that Rosecrans had discovered his plan, and would fight for the Rossville road, put Polk in command on the right, supporting him with Hiirs Corps, A furious attack drove Thomas back and reached the Lafayette road, but it was recovered, and Thomas took up a more compact position. Granger, with three brigades in reserve, was at Rossville, covering the rear and left. The first day's battle was in favour of Rosecrans, for Bragg had failed to shake his hold on the important roads. For the next day, Bragg, now that all Longstreef s force was in, divided the army into two commands, under him and Polk, on the left and right re- spectively. The attack was to be made in echelon from the right, at dawn : when in action, the whole army was to wheel to the left, but also to press the Union left, to seize the Chattanooga road. Rosecrans' plans for the 20th were for Thomas to hold his old position and the Rossville road, McCook to hold his advanced line as long as possible, touching Thomas with his left, Crittenden to be in 262 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 reserve in rear of the centre. All the troops were not in their places at daybreak, and Rosecrans found much fault with McCook's disposition, directing him to alter it. Much time was lost in making these corrections. On the other side, Bragg came up and found the attack hanging fire, and Polk not present. He saw that Thomas was not holding the Chattanooga road strongly, and threw a heavy attack on it, which was repulsed, but he now put his whole weight in here, and Thomas had to call on McCook for re- inforcements till a thin place was made in the line : before it could be made good, Longstreet burst in with one of his tremendous attacks, with five divisions, broke the line, and cut the Union army in two on Thomas' right, while Bragg again attacked on his left, to cut him off from Chattanooga, but was again repulsed. Longstreet, however, now saw that the conditions warranted a departure from the original plan of battle, and instead of wheeling to his left, to drive McCook up the valley, turned to the right on Thomas, Crittenden's men had all been thrown into the fight, and Granger's command at Rossville was the last reserve ; he had been told to stay there, to cover the rear, but saw also that his orders were no longer applicable, and moved up in the nick of time to save Thomas from defeat. Longstreef s last reserve was all that remained on the other side, and Bragg threw it in for a last furious attack, which failed, and when night fell Thomas was still holding his ground. Just before Longstreef s attack, Rosecrans had gone to look after things on the right, and could not return to Thomas except via Rossville. He there heard that the army was beaten, and made the fatal mistake of not going to see for himself, but to Chattanooga, to make arrangements for his beaten army, sending to tell Thomas to take command on the field, and retreat to Rossville. Thomas, however, deterrnined to hold COMMENTS ON THE CAMPAIGNS 263 on till dark, and did not move till all attacks had been beaten off. He then took post at Rossville Gap till all was ready at Chattanooga, when the whole army was brought there, and works thrown up which protected it from direct attack. Though Rosecrans' full strength was 67,500 men, his long line took so many to guard it that he had no more than 55,000 on the field, out of which he lost 11,080 in killed and wounded, missing 5,255, total i6,335- Bragg had some 70,000 men in action ; his losses were believed to be 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, 2,003 missing, total 20,950. Up to the time that Bragg left Chattanooga, Rose- crans had outgeneralled him at every point : it was a most masterly performance to turn out a man of his calibre, first from Tennessee, then from his base, in such a way, but the calculations for the campaign which ended at Chickamauga do not seem to have been so carefully worked out as before. Rosecrans appears over-confident, to have under-estimated the difficulties of the country of northern Alabama, after crossing the Tennessee, and, when he heard that his opponent was moving out of Chattanooga, to have been too ready to assume that he dared not face him, and to have acted rashly in consequence : that he was not beaten in detail was more owing to the friction among the Confederate generals than to his own good management. Bragg never expected him to come the way he did, because he rightly thought the country too difficult for such an operation. The loss of time in concentrating the Union army was what brought on the battle of Chickamauga ; otherwise it would have been better to seize Chattanooga, which Bragg left to fight on better ground. Grant thought that when Rosecrans had got Bragg out of Chattanooga, he should have entrenched in a strong position, and not have rushed blindly forward, with his columns out of touch with each other, but his great mistake, 264 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 which was fatal, was in leaving the field on hearsay evidence, and going to do quartermaster's work, which a subordinate could have done as well : further, if the danger was extreme, there was the post of the commanding general. He had gloriously shewn at Stone's River how his brilliant leadership could turn defeat into victory, and he now failed on what seems his strongest point : this case was no worse, and his personality was again indispensable. Thomas' in- domitable character again saved the army from de- struction, but he lacked the quickness and dash of Rosecrans, to go further and win. McCook failed again, and should never have had this chance. It is curious that the main battle was fought by subordinates, Longstreet and Thomas, almost entirely. This was one of the hardest battles of the whole War, of which it was said that neither side ever fought so well. D. H. Hill says that the " barren victory " broke the Confederates' hearts, and that their dash was never again seen to perfection. Bragg had again fought his army to a standstill against the great Rosecrans-Thomas combination, and lost his objective, Chattanooga. Both sides lost by the campaign, Rose- crans tactically, Bragg strategically, and neither could profit by his success in the other direction. Great was the consternation in the North at the news. Reinforcements were hurried up from all sides : Hooker went from the East, with the Xlth and XHth Corps, 15,000 strong, Sherman and Hurlbut sent troops from Vicksburg and Memphis, and Burnside moved forward. Rosecrans was in a most precarious position, down in a hole, with approaches from north and north-west over sixty miles of rough mountain tracks, and these made insecure by Confederate cavalry, while his regular line of supply from the west passed through the Tennessee Valley, which his enemies commanded. The railway to Knoxville was useless, owing to Confederate operations, and Chatta- pooga was a wretched position, commanded from all THE DANGER OF CHATTANOOGA 265 sides. Bragg was thus certain that the Union troops must soon evacuate it, unless help came. The news from Chattanooga became worse and worse, for retreat would have meant not only the loss of all Rosecrans' guns, but of the army itself as an organized body, such a disaster, in fact, as had not yet been incurred, which would have gone far to neutralize the results of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and to avert which a stronger hand was wanted. Grant was put in command of the country between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, with the excep- tion of Banks' district, and chose the scheme of re-organization which substituted Thomas for Rose- crans. McCook and Crittenden were also relieved from command. The XXth and XXIst Corps were made into a new IVth, and put under Granger, Sherman and Hurlbut were hastening up, and things looked better. Grant at once took up the shortening of the line of supply, by river and a new bridge near Wauhatchie, covered by Hooker's command, and when it was opened on November ist, Thomas' army had only two or three days' rations left. ^ At this time Bragg sent Longstreet away against Burnside, at Knoxville, which seems a huge mistake, to send away his best lieutenant and two divisions, just before an important campaign, but the reason was that they could not pull together, and Jefferson Davis came down, it is supposed, to settle the trouble. Grant, who knew both men well, was not surprised, for Bragg was most quarrelsome, and Longstreet would not be put upon. When he heard that Longstreet had gone, he planned to attack Braggs position as soon as Sherman came, for he wished him to take the principal attack, as he thought that Thomas' army was rather demoralized. The weather was so bad that Sherman did not arrive till the 21st: he was to attack Missionary Ridge, supported by part of Thomas' command, the rest making a feint of attacking from ' The ^^ Alabama" in the Sunda Islands, November, December. 266 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 Chattanooga, Hooker to hold Lookout Valley, and Howard's Xlth Corps, north of the river, held at disposal. On the 23rd, Thomas was sent to make a recon- naissance in force, to see whether Bragg was sending men away or retreating : he gained some ground on the side of Missionary Ridge, and entrenched it, while Sherman attacked the north end of the hill, with the same result. Sherman was ordered to attack at dawn on the 24th, and was told that Thomas would do the same. Hooker making a demonstration against Look- out Mountain. The day opened thick and wet, and the Confederates on the high ground could not see what was going on below, which helped Hooker, who pushed up Lookout Mountain, above the clouds, cleared the near end of it, and drove the Confederates down the other side : he entrenched where he stood. On the 25th he went on to Rossville, chasing the enemy till dark, from there, and from their works on the battlefield of Chickamauga. On this day, Sherman made his main attack on Missionary Ridge, but was stoutly opposed, till Grant told Thomas to take four divisions, seize the first line of rifle-pits in his front, and await orders, but instead of this they charged right up the steep hill and cleared it, because the fire on the first line of works taken, from those in rear, was so severe that they were less exposed if they went on up the steeper part of the hill. Though this part of the Confederate main line was very strong, Bragg sent for reinforcements as soon as he saw the move, but the Army of the Cumberland would not be denied, and swept over all with hardly a check, driving his troops back beyond Chickamauga Station. In the night he withdrew his troops from Sherman's front, and Sherman occupied their ground: the pursuit was kept up till the 28th, and the railway to Atlanta destroyed in many places. Union strength, 57,000 : killed and wounded, 11,405; missing, 4,774 ; total, 16,179, AFTER CHATTANOOGA 267 Confederate strength, 71,500: killed and wounded, 15,801 ; missing, 2,003 J total, 17,804. This great victory of Chattanooga enabled Grant and Sherman to plan the stroke which should sweep through the heart of the Confederacy and bring home to its people the meaning of WAR, at their own doors: the first stage being the advance to Atlanta, the great railway and manufacturing centre of the South, to be undertaken the next spring: the XlVth Corps was thrown forward to Dalton, the IVth sent to Cleveland, and the XXth to hold Lookout Valley. Grant went to his headquarters, Nashville, on December 20th, and on the other side, Johnston succeeded Bragg on the 27th. When Burnside heard of the battle of Chickamauga, he went back to watch east Tennessee. In October he was attacked from the east, but drove his assailants back : on the 22nd, however, his outposts were driven in, and he lost the country south of Loudon, his troops being drawn in to Knoxville on November ist, to oppose Longstreet, whose strong cavalry was under Wheeler. They tried to cut off Union detachments and occupy advantageous ground opposite Knoxville, while Burnside tried to get in his trains and supplies, and gain time to finish the defences. A sharp rearguard action was fought at Campbell's Station on November 1 6th, in which the last trains were safely brought in, the ground being held till dark. Knoxville lies on the Holston River, a tributary of the Tennessee, and has some natural strength as a position, which had been carefully improved by fortifi- cation, the lines on the north side being about 5I miles long, with many redoubts and batteries : there were also interior lines, in case of need. On the south side there were some works, but no continuous line. The principal works, however, were not finished, and had to be used as they stood. On the 17th, the troops were set to strengthen the lines, under cover of the Union cavalry, which held its position outside the lines 268 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 till dark, and by noon next day the place was defensi- ble, the cavalr}- holding on till 2.30, when they were driven in. Then the siege began, though the town was not completely invested. A heavy attack was made on the 29th, but defeated with great loss. This was the last of the fighting, for on December ist the Confederate trains were seen to be moving, the siege being raised on the 4th : on the 8th, General Sherman rode in. The garrison had been in the greatest straits for food, and suffered much from exposure in the trenches. After the battle of Chattanooga, Grant had sent the IVth Corps and other troops, under Sherman, to relieve Knoxville, before which Longstreet retired, but remained in east Tennessee during the winter. Burnside resigned, and was succeeded by Foster. The Union communications were much harassed by guerillas, in Tennessee especially, which kept a great many Union troops to watch them : Grant, at first, was not strong enough to put them down, then he had more urgent work to do. On the Mississippi, the Navy Department put the whole river above New Orleans under Porter, Farragut restricting himself to the work at sea. Porter divided his command into eight districts, six of which were on the Mississippi, one on the Ohio, from Cairo to the mouth of the Tennessee, while the eighth took the Upper Ohio and the Valley of the Cumberland : the number of districts was afterwards increased to eleven. (Continued on p. 301.) The South (Continued from p. 229.) As soon as Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg, he retreated,^ followed by Sherman, whose army had been reinforced for the purpose, and now numbered 48,000 men. Johnston halted at Jackson, which had been strongly fortified, ' W. Alorgan^s Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July. E. Lees Retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th-i6th- THE MISSISSIPPI OPENED 269 on the 7th, and Sherman prepared to besiege him, but he was not to be caught, and got his army away most skilfully on the night of the i6th. Grant wanted to keep Sherman's force in hand, so the pursuit was not carried far. Banks was pressing Port Hudson hard, and when Gardner, commanding there, heard of the surrender of Vicksburg, he also surrendered, on the 9th, but he must have done so in a very few days. At the begin- ning of the siege he had 7,000 men to Banks' 14,000. 51 guns were taken, and a great number of small arms. The fall of Port Hudson cleared the Mississippi, which was henceforward entirely controlled by the Union forces. The first steamer from New Orleans reached St. Louis on July i6th. As soon as he was free, Banks moved against Taylor and drove him back, recovering Brashear City and lower Louisiana. Taylor retired to Opelousas, and kept annoying the Union posts till the end of the year. (Continued on p. 309.) The South-West (Continued from p. 177, Chapter VHL) Banks' next work was to deal with the trans-Mississippi country : Halleck wanted a move on Shreveport, but the Red River was so low that Banks, who had full discretion, decided to move first against Sabine Pass and City, and strike from thence at Houston, the capital of Texas. He went by sea, convoyed by some gunboats, and made a combined military and naval attack on Sabine Pass, on September 8th,^ but was defeated. He then thought of marching into Texas, but the distance was so great that he went back to an ex- pedition to go by sea, which sailed from New Orleans on October 26th, landed at Brazos, November 2nd, and occupied Brownsville on the 6th. Leaving a force ' W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th. W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th. 270 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 there, Banks proceeded to occupy the coast islands/ from thence to the Sabine, taking a strong work on Matagorda Bay on December 30th. In May, Curtis was reheved in command of the Department of Missouri and Arkansas by Schofield, who sent all the men he could spare to Grant, while Steele, acting under him, took command of the army in Arkansas in July. On the other side, Kirby Smith had succeeded Holmes in February, with Holmes and Price under him. Holmes attacked Helena on July 4th, on Grant's communications, but was repulsed, and Steele soon after moved against Price, who re- treated, Steele being then ordered to hold the line of the Arkansas River till Banks moved up the Red River, and both sides remained in statu quo till the end of the year. Kirby Smith made no attempt to collect the really considerable forces under his com- mand, and strike with them as an army, while Halleck's orders tied fast the 47,000 men under Schofield and Steele. (Continued on p. 309.) The Blockade (Continued from p. 233.) Before Charleston, the Confederates attacked the blockading fleet with tor- pedo-boats, an unsuccessful attack being made on the '• New Ironsides," on October 5th : no real harm was done, but she received a severe shock, and the engine- rooms of both vessels were flooded with the water thrown up, the boat's fires were put out, and her crew taken prisoners. This boat was practically a sub- marine, showing only a small hatch above water : she had been used twice before, both times going down and drowning her crew. Early in December, the monitor " Weehawken " sank at her anchors : she ' W. Siege of Knoxville, November I7th-December 4th. W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th. Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December. AFFAIRS AT SEA 271 Was overloaded with ammunition and badly trimmed, so that when water came in through the hawse-holes, which had, carelessly, not been packed, it would not flow to the pumps, and she foundered. ' So long as Fort Fisher held out, the blockading fleet off Wilmington had to keep well away to sea : ironclads could not be used here, for they were not really seaworthy, and the coast was more exposed than at Charleston. Farragut, now relieved of the care of the Mississippi, was keeping watch and ward in the Gulf of Mexico, but on the Mexican border the situation was com- plicated by the presence of the French fleet, watching the Mexican port of Matamoros, by which route arms were being run in, both by the Union side, for Juarez, whom the French were steadily driving northwards, and for the Confederates, to be smuggled into Texas. The task of the French cruisers was very difficult, since, if they found arms, they did not know for whom they were intended. They seized Tampico in November, to get hold of the Customs of that port. (Continued on p. 313.) The War at Sea (Continued from p. 236.) The ^^ Florida" ran into Bermuda in July,^ to refit, but as she wanted more thorough repair, she sailed for Brest at the end of the month, and remained there till the end of the year. At the beginning of July, the ^^ Alabama" was to the east of Rio, and turned to cross the Atlantic to the Cape of Good Hope, where she arrived in August,^ eluding the U.S.S. " Vanderbilt." She had in com- pany a prize which had been commissioned as the ** Tuscaloosa^'' which Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker ' E. Le^s Retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th- 1 6th. W. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9th. * S.E. Fort W\igner taken, September 7th. S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th. W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th. 272 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 refused to admit, as a prize, but was overruled by the civilian authorities ; the Home Office, however, ruled that the admiral was right. When she came back, after an unsuccessful cruise in the Atlantic, she was detained, but released because she had been allowed in before. The " Alabama " struck eastward across the southern Indian Ocean, via St. Paul's Island, then up to the Straits of Sunda, which she reached early in November,* and began to prey on American shipping with great effect, remaining in the narrow seas between Sumatra, Borneo, and Siam, till the end of the year. The " Georgia " was also at the Cape in August, having left Bahia in May. She went to the North Atlantic, and came into Cherbourg for repairs at the end of October, where she remained till the end of the year. Her sail power was insufficient to patrol the trade routes for any length of time, which made her use too much coal to be a successful cruiser under Confederate conditions (cf p. 316). Maury bought a vessel called the " Victor," which was sold out of the British Navy in the autumn, and though she was allowed to be rigged at Sheerness, as was the custom, he feared that she would be stopped, and ran her off to sea before she was ready, where she was commissioned as the ^^Rappahannock." She put into Calais for repairs, and was handed over to Captain Barron, who directed the Confederate cruisers from Paris, having originally come to Europe to take over the turret-ships from Laird. He kept her there till the end of the year, looking for a chance to arm her. In the summer. Lieutenant Sinclair was sent to England with orders to build a cruiser, and take command of her : he found a suitable steamer building on the Clyde, nearly ready for sea, and made arrange- ments to buy her, but she was seized before she left the builders' hands, while still their property. They compromised the case with the Crown, so that the ' W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th. SHIP-BUILDING IN FRANCE 273 ship remained their property, but they were not to sell her for two years without the Crown's consent. She was called the " Pampero." Urged on by the Northern agents, the English Government, on October 9th, seized the two turret- ships at Laird's, although sold to the French firm, the builders working on them under guard, with a powerful squadron lying outside in the Mersey. The Government tried to buy them from the French owners, but they declined to entertain the proposal. Owing to the difficulties of constructing engines in the Confederate States, Bulloch looked out for a vessel to carry marine engines, which he could buy in England, a service beyond the capacity of the ordinary blockade-runner. In October he bought a vessel in Glasgow, called the " Coquette,'^ which proved herself most useful for this service. On receipt of the letter, ordering him to get some sea-going ironclads built (cf p. 236), Bulloch went into the difficult conditions very carefully, and on July i6th contracted with the French builder already mentioned, to build two such small, handy, and powerful vessels. At the end of November, they were progressing rapidly, and the four corvettes also, but just then things began to look less rosy, for the Northern Government found out what was going on, and interfered vigorously : he saw grave difficulties ahead, and doubted his ability to get the ships to sea, in spite of the assurances of the French Government that it would be all right. So far had they gone, that Mr. Slidcll was confident that their policy, and that of the Emperor, was that the Confederate States should be able to maintain their position, and he believed that they would have been recognized by France, if England would have done the same, but that France was not prepared to take the step alone. The financing of the orders for these ships was extremely difficult. Bulloch was repeatedly asked if he could not buy some old ironclads, but reported that they would either be too heavy, or else 18 274 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 merely unseaworthy floating batteries. (Continued on p. 315.) Summary (Continued from p. 237.) The end of 1863 saw the positions of the two sides almost reversed, from those of the end of 1862 ; for the North were then beaten at all points, the only question being whether the South could maintain their advantage : now, the North had opened the Mississippi from end to end, cutting the Confederacy in two, and had also won the battle which Lee elected to make decisive for political reasons. Though Chickamauga was a set-back, yet the battle of Chattanooga finally secured the advantage gained and placed the Union in a winning position, from which it could go forward and finish the War. The end was now in sight. Union Gains, — In the East, the northern half of Virginia proper ; for the line of the Rapidan and Rappahannock, east of the Blue Ridge, was never again lost. In the West and South, the country as far south as the line Vicksburg-Ringgold, also the southern half of western Louisiana. Confederate Gains. — Nil. No prominent officer was killed on either side. The year 1863 was remarkable for the first employ- ment in war of two weapons which, even in the opening of the twentieth century, were hardly de- veloped, viz. the Submarine Torpedo-Boat and the Breechloading Magazine Rifle, and also for the first use of Machine Guns. The Submarine is, of course, a very old idea, but the Confederates first made it practical, in the sense that in their hands it became a real offensive weapon ; but the service was most desperate, for the wretched things went down and drowned their crews as often as not. They were not true submarines, not being entirely submerged, but the principle was there : only a small hatch, some ten feet long by two feet high, MAGAZINE RIFLES 275 shewed above water, which was practically invisible in a bad light. They used spar torpedoes. During this year also the first practical breechload- ing magazine rifle, the Spencer Repeater, came : the Colt Rifle, merely a revolver with a stock and long barrel, had been used, but the loss of gas made it a poor rifle. The Spencer was a good weapon for its day, with a tube magazine running down the small of the butt, charged from the butt-end, and holding eight cartridges. Later came the Henry Rifle, improved by Winchester, with its long under-barrel magazine hold- ing seventeen rounds. It was in reference to these that the Confederates used to say that " those con- founded Yankees loaded up their guns in the morning, and shot all day." The Northern soldiers used their repeaters, tactically, to the best advantage, on the defensive, holding their magazine fire till the assault got to close quarters, and then crushing it all at once. Repeaters were principally served out to the cavalry, who had to hold positions with small forces till rein- forcements came, for whom this power of repelling attack was specially necessary. The Breechloader did not become general during the War, but was developed at this time, but the Magazine principle was kept in abej'ance for military purposes for many years, until it was adapted to take cartridges of the size and shape which the increasing power of military rifles required. We have also, in this year, the first mention of a machine-gun, Requa's, which Gillmore used in the trenches before Fort Wagner. Catling's is said to have been invented during the War, but I have found no mention of its use. (Continued on p. 317.) Notices of Officers (Continued from p. 241.) On the Union side, several senior officers were relieved from command, of whom the most notable were General Rosecrans and Admiral Dupont. 276 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 Major-General W. S. Rosecrans was a professional soldier, educated at West Point, of brilliant and well- known attainments, and was one of the three men whom General D. H. Hill named as the most dangerous opponents of the Confederacy when the War broke out. He was warm-hearted and impulsive, beloved by his men, and the soul of honour, even to the verge of quixotism — witness his quarrel with Halleck at the beginning of the year (cf p. 219). A brilliant leader in battle, he was probably the best minor strategist whom the War produced, and was the only man against whom even Lee could do nothing, in West Virginia, but he was enamoured of his own opinion, and seems to have done little to adapt his own plans to those for the War as a whole. Grant found him a plaguy lieutenant, probably for this reason, and was on the point of relieving him from a subordinate command in his army, when he was given the com- mand of the Army of the Cumberland, to succeed Buell. After Chickamauga, Grant's first act was to replace him by Thomas. He was given the minor command in Missouri later on, where he, or rather Pleasonton, defeated Price's invasion of that State. At the opening of the War, Captain Dupont, of the Navy, was President of a Commission appointed to consider the problem of blockading the long coast line of the Confederacy, and drew up a careful memoir thereon. He suggested seizing Port Royal as a base, and was requested to co-operate with General T. W. Sherman in organizing an expedition against it, being appointed Flag-Ofificer, as it was then termed, before sailing. When the rank of Rear-Admiral was created, in July, 1862, he was the second on the list. In the spring of 1863, we have seen that his opinion of the naval attack on Charleston, which he was ordered to make, was correct, and after it he had the moral courage to decline to make bad worse ; but the Navy Department shirked the responsibility, and the disappointment of the country was visited on him. DUPONT 277 He was very harshly treated, and reHeved from com- mand ; but his dashing successor, Dahlgren, could do no more, with the Navy alone. Dupont was after- wards offered the command of the Pacific Squadron, but indignantly refused a peace command in war time. (Continued on p. 320.) 278 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 1863 July 4-31 August September 4-16. Lee's Retreat Operations of Meade land Lee in Virginia. from Gettysburg. ^ 25-30. Aver ell's Raid in West Virginia. Charleston. Combi ned attack on Fort 6. Fort Wagner & Wag ner. taken. ^ H § to Morgan's Raid into 9. Burnside occu- I ndiana and pies Knoxville. Ohio. 10-20. The Chicka- ^ 4. Holmes defeated mauga Cam- s at Helena, Ar- paign. ^ kansas. 19-20. Battle of Chickamauga. 9. Surrender of 9. Banks defeated Port Hudson. at Sabine Pass. Banks v. Taylor in 1 Louisiana. Steele drives back Price, in Arkansas. 16. The ••Florida" at Bermuda. Is 25. The ••Florida" goes from Bermuda to France. The '•Alabama" 3. The "Florida" Si a.nd " Tuscaloosa" \ at Brest. | ^p at the Cape. H < The "Georgia" at t he Cape, and in the P North Atlantic. W CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 279 1868 October November December Operations of Meade and Lee in Virginia. 8-21. A verell's Raid in South- west Virginia, 17. Grant takes command, from Alleghanies to Mississippi River. 17. Siege of Knox- ville, to . . . 23-25. Battle of Chattanooga. 4, Longstreet re- treats. ^8 The J. The " Georgia" The " Rappahan Mexico. 3. The Crown offered to Maxi- milian. Banks occupies "Florida" at Brest, comes to Cherbourg, nock " lying at Cal The "Alabama" in and the neighbour Mexico. The French seize Tampico. the Texas Coast. refitting. and stays there. ais, unarmed. the Sunda Islands, hood of Singapore. Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros. 26. Maximilian ac- cepts the Crown. CHAPTER XI the first half of 1 864. the closing of the net General Position and Plans (Continued from p. 252.) The feature of the open- ing year was the commanding position to which Grant had risen : for the first time, the balance of interest had shifted from the political to the military centre of the War, and all hopes were pinned on the great com- mander in the field, rather than on the dictator in the office. Halleck had interfered with him less and less, and now the plans for finishing the War were being openly made by Grant and Sherman : though Lee's was the best Confederate army in the field, both it and the Army of the Potomac had been playing a subordinate part in the last few months. The politicians thought it would be a capital move to bring one of the seceded States so under the control of the Union that they could form a State Government, to take part in the Presidential Election of 1864, and they chose Florida, because it was very open to attack by sea, and had been denuded of men for the Confederate service (cf p, 299). The movements of the French in Mexico also de- manded attention, for they had driven back Juarez to the north-west, and entered Guadalajara on Janu- ary 5th, and Napoleon had also managed to get the valuable Sonora Mines ceded to a French Company, and thus under his control. These, properly worked, 280 GRANT MADE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 281 would furnish the money for his project, which the French nation was tired of providing. The plans at the very beginning of the year were that Thomas, at Chattanooga, was to hold Johnston fast and prevent him from detaching against Sherman, who would strike at Meridian, and so destroy the railways that a small force could hold the east side of the Mississippi Valley, while the Red River Ex- pedition, under Banks, would do the same for the west side. A great concentration would then be made against Johnston, and Banks was to go on against Mobile in combination with Farragut, which, if taken, would be a fresh base for cutting another great slice off the Confederacy. Grant thought that the next great campaign would be through east Tennessee against Virginia, but in any case the two sides of the Mississippi must be cleared. ^ On March 3rd, Grant was called to command the armies of the United States, the rank of Lieutenant- General being revived in his favour. This marked a great change in the President's policy, he at last saw that civilian direction of and interference with military movements simply spelt disaster, and for the future allowed Grant to translate Government re- quirements and views into military plans, giving him his whole-hearted support. Even that stickler for political supremacy, Stanton, assented for the present, but the real cause of this happy change was the per- sonality of Grant. The others saw that they were at last dealing with an absolutely loyal and single- minded man, unassuming, able, and resolute, who could really be trusted. Halleck remained at Wash- ington as " Chief of the Staff," and saw to the corre- spondence of the War, as a link with the Cabinet. Before he became Commander-in-Chief, Grant's plan was to strike at Johnston's army first, then at Atlanta, Banks moving against Mobile : as Banks was not ' S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th. S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. 282 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 then under his command, this inclusion is significant. Grant thought that Forrest was the most dangerous opponent in the Mississippi Valley and that in second- ary operations he was probably the best officer on either side. After his promotion he varied the plan but little. He considered Butler's army at Fort Monroe his left, Meade's the centre, and his old army, now under Sherman, the right. Other forces were Sigel's in the Valley, Banks' in Louisiana, and Steele's in Arkansas. Butler was to move on the south side of the James against Richmond, Meade against Lee^ who was entrenched behind the Rapidan, and Sher- man to push Johnston beyond Atlanta. These move- ments were to be made in the last week in April, but by that time it was probably seen that Banks could not co-operate. Though Richmond was still very important, yet it was considered that its value had declined, the likeli- hood of European recognition of the Confederacy being less, and that the attitude of Great Britain to- wards Mexico in 1862 shewed that she would not side actively with the Confederates, but that the French invasion looked as if they might do so. This was a false inference, for England kept the two matters separate, going to Mexico only to protect her own interests, with no regard to her policy about the Confederacy, while France, the smaller creditor of Mexico, used this pretext to interfere for ulterior designs against the United States, in which the back- ing of the Confederacy was a factor. She gave the Confederates to understand that she would recognize them if England did. Not one of the eleven original Confederate States was now intact, but North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, were nearly so, and these four, with the bulk of southern Virginia and part of northern Florida, still held solidly together : of the rest, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, were cut off, in Mississippi the Confederate power was broken, THE CONFEDERACY DISSOLVING 283 and Tennessee had passed under the control of the Union. The signs of exhaustion were unmistakable : there were not the means of meeting the losses of another campaign, and the only chance was to gain time on the defensive. In March, Davis ordered Johnston to invade Tennessee, Longstrcd advancing from the Holston Valley and meeting him at Kingston, when the whole was to march into the valley of the Duck River : query, against Nashville, the real key of the War? This plan assumed a combined strength of 75,000 men, h\xi Johnston shewed that it would give barely 57,000 against Sherman's 110,000, which could deal with the two parts separately from its present position. The trans-Mississippi district was lost to the Confederacy if it could neither break the Union control of the river somewhere, nor engage so many troops to secure it as would cause paralysis elsewhere or make the North lose an important battle, for Banks' expedition was known to have denuded the garrisons to the last degree, and defeat, involving a retreat from distant Shreveport, should destroy it. Sherman would be stopped, and such trouble and delay caused as might tire the North out. In these calculations it was not seen that so long as the North controlled the Mississippi and central Missouri they could disregard the defeat of Banks, for Sherman's Meridian campaign had restricted the Confederates to their troops west of the river, where the Union forces were quite able to hold them fast. The Blockade was becoming stricter and stricter, and the distress in the Confederacy more and more acute, so that instead of growing cotton as a medium of exchange they were forced to convert Georgia into a wheatfield, to raise food, because they could not deal with cotton. Though their cruisers had practically driven the American flag from the sea, yet this brought no gain to them, as their lack of fighting ships prevented them from utilizing their advantage. (Continued on p. 326.) 284 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 The East (Continued from p. 254.) The first events in this district are more connected with the Chattanooga and Knoxville campaigns in the West than with those in Virginia, the problem being how to deal with Long- street, who had retired into East Tennessee for the winter. Grant came down to see Foster, who had succeeded Burnside, and was watching Longstreet, and who suggested that it would be best to let him be quiet where he was as long as possible, since he would do more harm anywhere else, to which Grant agreed. Foster's health broke down, and he was succeeded in command of the Department and Army of the Ohio in February by Schofield from Missouri. As we have seen, Davis' proposal for Longstreefs and Johnston's action was shown to be impracticable, so the former remained where he was till Lee sent for him in April. In January and February ^ the two armies stood watching each other on the Rapidan, but on Feb- ruary 28th Kilpatrick started for a cavalry raid on Richmond to try to release the Union prisoners there. He divided his force into two columns, putting one under Colonel Dahlgren, but a warning was sent to Richmond from the front, and its garrison moved out and stopped both columns. The raid failed, Dahlgren was killed, and papers were found on his body inciting his men to kill Davis and his " traitorous crew," which brought a strong letter from Lee to Meade, who, however, was able to assure him that no such order had been given to Dahlgren by any military superior. The raid was ordered from Washing- ton without Meade's approval, but although it de- pended for success on secrecy, was currently discussed there, and the plan got out. Other movements were ' Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January. S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th. S. Sooy Smith v. Fo7-rest, February i8th. S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. S E. The " Housatonic " sunk off Charleston, February i8th. UNION RE-ORGANIZATION 285 made as diversions, one of which, under Custer, suc- ceeded in drawing off Sfiiari's attention. On March 3rd, Grant was appointed Lieutenant- General to command the armies of the United States. He at first intended to direct operations from the West, but after he had been to Washington, saw that his place was in the East ; but in the field, not in a hot-bed of intrigue like the Capital. He recognized the awkwardness of being with the Army of the Potomac, but did not delegate authority properly to Meade, and often issued detailed orders over his head. In the West he was succeeded by Sherman, and Sherman by McPherson. The Army of the Potomac was re- organized by consolidating its five Corps into three, numbered the Ilnd, Vth, and Vlth, under Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick respectively. This has been criticized as a mistake, in view of the very thick country in which they had to work, for which a greater number of smaller commands would have been better. Meade suggested that Grant might want another ofificer in his place, begging him to consider no one's feelings in the interests of the nation, which much raised him in Grant's esteem ; but he did not want to lose him. He did, however, substitute Sheridan for Pleasonton in command of the cavalry, for he was not satisfied with the reports of cavalry work in the East. Sheridan laid his ideas of it before Meade, viz. to use cavalry as a strong and united body to break down that of the enemy ; but Meade's notions of it were confined to out- posts and scouting and the protection of convoys, and he did not see that the best security lay in defeating the enemy's power of attack. Still, he conceded some- thing, of which Sheridan made full use, but he did not get a free hand till after the battle of Yellow Tavern. ^ The Shenandoah and Kanawha Valleys were formed into a Department and put under Sigel, Crook being specially charged with the latter. They were to attack the Confederate, and protect the Union, lines of commu- ' Maps 47, 56, pp. 338, 388. 286 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 nication, Crook going against tlie Virginia-Tennessee line and the salt works, while Sigel threatened the Virginia Central at Staunton. Crook started at the end of April ; ^ he failed in his attack on the salt and lead works at Saltville and Wytheville, but drove the Confederates back at Cloyd's Mountain, and succeeded in breaking the railway bridge over the New River. Sigel says that this stroke would have been much more useful before Longstrect returned from Tennessee, for he had just taken post at Gordonsville, on Lees left. Sigel himself moved forward to create a diversion and free Crook, covering his flanks with two cavalry forces; but both were beaten, on May 8th and 13th, by Morgan^ who was then commanding the Confederate Department of Soiith-lVestern Virginia. Burbridge's division from Kentucky was ordered to reinforce Crook, but when Morgan went on his raid into Ken- tucky at the beginning of June, Burbridge turned back and defeated him (cf. p. 308). Sigel met Breckinridge advancing on the other side on May 25th at New Market, and was defeated, losing some guns and re- tiring down the Valley from one position to another. He heard of Crook's success, and was planning a combined move when Hunter came to succeed him in command of the Department,^ under whom he took command of a division (cf. p. 295). Though some of these operations were successful, yet they did no good as a whole, because Lee from his central position was always able to get the advantage. The consequence was that a large force had to be told ' S.W. Sabine Cross Roads, April 8th. S.W. Pleasant Hill, April 9th. S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th. W. Forrest's Raid, Fort Pillow, April 13th. S.E. Confederates retake Plymouth, April 19th. W. Sherman moves against /ohnstofi. May 5th. E. Kautz' Raid, May 4th-i2th. E. The Wilderness. May Sth-jth. E. Spottsylvania, May 8th- 1 8th. E. Sheridan's Richmond Raid, May 9th- 1 3th. '' W. New Hope Church, May 25th-June 4th, THE NEW UNION PLANS 287 off to do the work that half the number could have done, early in May. Sigel never had 10,000 men ; Sheridan, who soon followed him, had 40,000. Lee recalled Breckin- ridge after Sigel's defeat, but soon had to send him back. ^ Grant wanted Butler's army to act in concert with the Army of the Potomac, establishing itself to the south of Richmond, and holding City Point as strongly as possible, but Butler's idea was to occupy Bermuda Hundred, which, though good for defence, was not so for offence, holding City Point with a comparatively small force. Butler's, the secondary object, was Rich- mond, Meade's, the primary one, Lees army. If Lee fell back on Richmond, the Army of the James was to unite with that of the Potomac on the river above the town, and they would destroy the Confederate lines of supply according to the direction of his retreat, the force in the Valley acting in concert with them if possible by destroying the lines of supply there, and then making a junction with the main army in Central Virginia. Merely taking Richmond would not prevent Lee from retiring westward, where he might perhaps join Johnston, and in any case would be most difficult to hem in. Then, by which flank should the main army move ? To go by the right would give better country but worse communications, but it might prevent Lee from interfering with the Valley, which he could now do freely. To go by the left would be to work in difficult country, but the communications would always be short to different points on Chesapeake Bay, following the advance, and no troops would be wanted to guard them. Still, though the troops might fight their way through the thick country, which was thoroughly known to their opponents, the movement of the trains would be difficult, at first at all events, for Lees signal station on Clark's Mountain commanded the whole country. Grant chose the second alternative. Meade's army, counting Burnside's IXth Corps, ' Map 54, p. 386. 288 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 which was not added to it till the end of May, was 118,769 strong, with 316 guns, while Lee's was 61,953 strong, with 224 guns. The bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia lay along the Rapidan from Barnett's Ford to Horton's Ford, nearly twenty miles. The left was rather refused, the river, front entrenched, and the right covered by the Wilderness, the cavalry being mostly on the lower river, where forage was better. Longstreet was at Gordonsville to guard that side, but was too far away when the move came. Headquarters, Orange Court House. A day or two before the army moved, the ubiquitous Mosby might have captured Grant, who was returning to the army from Washington by train without any guard. Mosby had just crossed the line in pursuit of some Union cavalry : had he seen the train, he would have got a better prize. THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN, FROM THE RAPIDAN TO COLD HARBOUR The Army of the Potomac began to move at mid- night on May 3rd,^ two cavalry divisions leading : Butler started on the 5th. The two columns crossed the river and reached their destinations unmolested, rather to Grant's surprise. A short march was made to keep the trains covered, which did not get over till the afternoon of the 5th. That morning the army moved forward on the roads through the dense woods, and Lee planned to do what he had done suc- cessfully before, attack it in the flank and pen it up by the river, but this time he had to deal with a very different antagonist. Even Lee attempted no bolder stroke than to attack double numbers in thick ground, and had Longstreet been at hand when wanted, more might have been done, but he was away at Gordons- ville and did not arrive till the best chance had passed. This was one of the disadvantages of watching a long line with inferior forces, which had to be accepted. ' W. Sherman marches a.ga.\ns\. /oknston. May 5th. BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 289 The battle of the 5th was severe, between the Ilnd and Vth Union Corps and those o{ Ewell and Hill; the Union troops were brought to a stand by flank attacks, but Lcc forbade the bringing on of a general action till Longstreet came, so both sides halted and entrenched where they stood. Next day the Confederates repulsed an attack, then made one, and were beaten : just then up came Longstreefs men at the double along the plank road, and the Union troops were again checked. Meade sent for reinforcements, and there was a lull till Longstreet moved again, driving Birney's division back in confusion, but as he went forward to make dispositions to follow up his success he was severely wounded by his own men, which stopped the Con- federate attack. Both sides now tried to combine their efforts in the thick cover, but Longstreefs men, now under Anderson, drove Hancock's back to their works, Burnside failed to move Hill, and after several ineffectual attacks by both sides the fight became stationary, and darkness fell. On the Union right, Ewell made a sudden and effectual attack, but gained no real advantage. On this day Stuart got the better of Sheridan, who fell back to cover his trains : next day Sheridan beat Stuart, but could not pursue and expose the trains. On the 7th, Lee had a strong en- trenched line across the turnpike and appeared more dangerous than ever ; Grant turned his trains off to the left, and moved by that flank in the night to Spottsylvania. On this day the Confederate cavalry made a desperate attempt to get at the huge trains on the Union left rear, defended by their cavalry, which beat them off with heavy loss, both then and on the morning of the 8th. On the 8th, Grant started Sheridan on his cavalry raid to Richmond (cf p. 295). No great battle had ever been fought on such ground, for it was almost like fighting blindfold, but Lee deliberately chose it because his enemy could not use his superiority of numbers. Grant had tried to force back the Confederate advance on the Orange 19 29© THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 plank road and so get between their army and Rich- mond, while Lee tried to strike a crushing blow at the head of Grant's column where it crossed this road and throw it back into the Wilderness in confusion. Both plans failed, but the advantage remained with the Confederates to this extent, that at the end of the battle they were closer to the Union line of march than at the beginning, and had inflicted more loss than they had suffered, but their losses were irreparable ; those of the other side were not. The North lost some 15,000 men, the Confederate about 11,000, in killed, wounded, and missing. On the night of May 7th, Stuart informed Lee that Grant's trains were moving southward, then that his army was doing the same, and the race for Spottsyl- vania began. Stuart's cavalry blocked the road, the Union infantry came up to dislodge him, and that of his own side in support ; after a sharp action, the Confederates held their ground at the Court House, and both sides entrenched. A heavy attack was made later by the Vth and Vlth Corps, which was defeated. Next day, the 9th, Lees army was all up, and took up a line covering Spottsylvania Court House. The position was a great salient with both flanks resting on the river Po, and the right extending over the Fredericksburg road. Both sides strengthened their positions, and while superintending this work. General Sedgwick, commanding the Vlth Corps, was killed, a most serious loss to the Union army. On the loth, Hancock moved round the Confederate left with a reconnaissance in force, and threatened their trains in rear, but Early attacked him sharply, and he fell back as ordered. On this day also, the main Confederate lines were furiously assaulted, the last attack being repulsed with fearful loss. On the nth, there was no serious fighting, and Lee thought that Grant was beginning to withdraw from his front, and expecting another race for the next position, he ordered some guns to be withdrawn from places whence they would SPOTTSYLVANIA 291 be difficult to move in a hurry, on the left and centre, most of those at the point of the salient being removed. This position had been occupied because it was good for artillery and would have been advantageous for the enemy, but as such a projection is always more or less dangerous, the apex of the salient had been strengthened by a line across its base. At dawn on the 1 2th, a strong attack forced this point, the guns were sent back to support the defence, but only came in time to be taken, with almost the whole oi Johnson's division. The supports, however, quickly occupied the line in rear, and Hancock's attack was stopped, Lee putting in ever^ man to save his centre : all that day, and far into the night, raged the desperate hand-to- hand struggle across the Confederate breastworks, in rear of which a shorter and better line was being made, which was taken up at dawn on the i3th.^ From then to the i8th, the arm}'' was gradually shifted more to the eastward to meet the extension of Grant's left, as before. On the latter day came a last great effort by the Ilnd and Vlth Corps to force the line here, which was the greatest failure of all, after which the advance of the Army of the Potomac by its left flank began again, and Ewcll was sent to head it off on the 19th : - he held on all the next day and then had to withdraw, but delayed the operation for twenty-four hours. In no other battle in this desperate War was the fighting so heavy and long-continued or the losses so awful, and it was from here that Grant wrote the famous letter to Halleck, in which he said, " I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer." On the night of the 20th, Hancock was sent towards Richmond, hoping to tempt Lee to attack and expose himself to a counter in tlie open, but he saw the trap, and reported the move to Richmond. Pickett, in command there, moved out and stopped Hancock, and then the rest of the Union army marched off for the ' W. Sliernian at Resaca, May I3th-i6th. - W. Sherman at Cassville, May I9th-22nd. 292 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 North Anna, the Confederate army starting next morning. This time Lee had the advantage of marching by the chord of the arc on which Grant was moving and was able to take position on the south bank, and rest his men, before the Union army appeared, on the 23rd. The position which Lee had now taken up to stop Grant's advance is about the most astonishing instance of military checkmate on record, and cannot be more clearly explained than in the words of the Confederate General Law : " It did not seem to be General Lee's purpose to offer any serious resistance to Grant's passage of the river at the points selected. His lines had been retired from it at both these points, but touched it at Ox Ford, a point intermediate between them. Hancock's Corps, having secured the Chester- field bridge, crossed over it on the morning of the 24th, and, extending down the river, moved out till it came upon Longstreef s and Ewells Corps in position and ready for battle. The Vlth Corps (General Wright) crossed at Jericho Mill and joined Warren. The two wings of Grant's army were safely across the river, but there was no connection between them. Lee had only thrown back his flanks, and let them in on either side, while he held the river between them : and when General Grant attempted to throw his centre, under Burnside, across the ford and the bridge, it was very severely handled, and failed to get a foot- hold on the south side. A detachment from Warren's Corps was sent down on the south side, to help Burnside across, but was attacked by Mahone's division, and driven back with heavy loss, narrowly escaping capture. General Grant found himself in what may be called a military dilemma. He had cut his army in two by running it upon the point of a wedge. He could not break the point, which rested upon the river, and the attempt to force it out of place by striking on its sides must necessarily be made without much concert of action between the two NORTH ANNA AND COLD HARBOUR 293 wings of his arm^^ neither of which could reinforce the other without crossing the river twice ; while his opponent could readily transfer his troops, as needed, from one wing to the other, across the narrow space between them." For two days Grant tried every way to get forward, but Lee's position was absolutely impregnable : the master of numbers was completely foiled by the master of fence. Lee has been blamed for not following up Grant's repulse by an attack, but not only was he ill at the time, almost confined to his tent, but it would have been foolhardy to attempt to cross the river and attack double numbers in open country. Leey however, thought that he had lost a chance of gaining an advantage. On the morning of the 27th,' Grant's army had disappeared, and again the race began, Lee trying to head him off: on the 28th, a severe cavalry action was fought at Hawes' Shop ; this gained time for the Confederate infantry to fortify a position on Totopo- tomoy Creek, which Grant found too strong to attack, so again " sidled off," to Cold Harbour. On the 31st, Sheridan's cavalry had taken possession of Cold Harbour, and was followed by the Vlth Corps, and three divisions under Smith, from the Army of the James, Longstrecf s Corps and part of Hilts were thrown across their front on June ist, but although at first driven back, restored their line : both sides entrenched, and it looked like a repetition of Spott- sylvania. On June 2nd, Early attacked the Vth and IXth Corps, preventing their co-operation in the next day's battle. During the night the Confederate line was shortened and strengthened, and repulsed a great attack the next morning with the most awful loss, the whole affair only lasting eight or ten minutes. Although Grant issued orders for a general attack, both that afternoon and the next day, they could not ' W. Sherman at New Hope Church, May 25th-June 4th. Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th, 294 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 be carried out, so appalled were all ranks by the slaughter. The army was therefore directed to entrench where it stood. Lee had to send away troops to the Valley at this time, which prevented him from taking the offensive (cf. p. 296). Eivell resigned com- mand of the Second Corps from ill-health, and was transferred to the lines of Richmond, being succeeded by Early. During this campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbour, two secondary operations had been going on : the first, the move of Butler's army to the James, the second, Sheridan's raid on Richmond. ^ Butler's army of the James (cf. p. 300), consisting of the Xth and XVIIth Corps, an independent division, and Kautz' cavalr}^ division, moved on May 5th by sea to the south side of the James, and took up a position at Bermuda Hundred, which it entrenched across between the Appomattox and the James, but not as Grant wanted, for the main force was not at City Point. On the 9th, Butler moved out against the defences of Richmond and carried a part of the Confederate lines at Drury's Bluff on the night of the 13th, but on the i6th he was driven back into his lines by Beauregard, who entrenched a line opposite him, bottling him up so that he could safely be held with a small force, which would allow of reinforce- ments being sent to Lee, but this cut both ways, for Butler was also strong enough to detach three divisions to Cold Harbour and send his cavalry under Kautz to attack the Danville railway. Kautz started on the 1 2th and got back on the i8th, having destroyed some stations and trains and part of the Danville line, and then done the same to the South Side line. On the Confederate side, Beauregard, a first-rate engineer, had been brought from Charleston where the danger seemed to have blown over, to command at Richmond where it was imminent, Pickett taking charge of the lines of Petersburg. ' Maps 54, 55, p. 386. SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID 295 On May 8th, Grant ordered Sheridan to make a raid towards Richmond (cf. p. 289) : he started on the Fredericksburg road next day with 10,000 men, and destroyed part of the Virginia Central line, Stuart concentrating against him. On the nth, they met at Yellow Tavern, only six miles from Richmond : a severe battle ensued in which the Confederates were defeated and Stuart mortally wounded. His loss was a most serious one to Lee, and he was, like Sedgwick, mourned by both armies. Sheridan moved forward in the night and lost his way in the mud, close to the defences of Richmond, where the command was in a most dangerous trap, but was extricated by his indomitable pluck, and marched round to Haxall's Landing, on the James ; here he got supplies from Butler, started back on the 2 1 St, and rejoined Grant four days later, having drawn off and defeated Lee's cavalry, with the loss of their leader, damaged his communications, and, especially, given a moral strength and confidence to the Union cavalry which it never afterwards lost. • When Hunter relieved Sigel in the Valley (cf. p. 286), he was ordered to strike at Staunton, and at Gordons- ville or Charlottesville, to hold as many Confederate troops as possible, try to join Crook at Staunton, thence move to Lynchburg, and destroy the railway and canal there : he was specially ordered to live on the country. He moved out on May 26th with 8,500 men and 21 guns, driving back a Confederate force, and occupying Staunton on June 6th, Crook joining him on the 8th with nearly 10,000 men. He thoroughly destroyed the Virginia Central line and the factories and stores at Staunton, going on to strike at Lynchburg, a manufacturing town in a rich district, the most important town to Lee after Richmond, but his cavalry was away on a raid and out of touch, which delayed him at Lex- ington and saved Lynchburg, for the Confederates ' Map 47, p. 338. 296 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 repaired the railway and closed in. Lee had sent back Breckinridge against Sigel on June 7th, and when he heard of Hunter's advance, Early s Corps followed on the 13th. ^ar/y moved to attack Hunter in rear, for he had gone by the west of the town : the other side would have been better as threatening Gordonsville, and giving him a better line of retreat. He was driven through Buford's Gap down the Kanawha Valley, but Early did not follow far, wishing to keep in touch with Lee. Hunter's men suffered severely in the retreat, for the country was barren and their main depot had been moved from Meadow Bluff to Gauley Bridge, as safer from raids. They met the first supplies on June 27th, and their troubles ended. Grant has been blamed for these campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley, but he could well afford to divide his army, while Lee could not, and he thus forced Lee to detach largely (cf. p. 294). Hunter had done more than he expected, and had got well out of a difficult fix, but strategically he had uncovered the Valley and the way to Washington more than Sigel had done, though defeated. Lee took full advantage of this, and ordered Early and Breckinridge to strike at Maryland and again play on the fears of the Washington politicians, to relieve Richmond. Sheridan was sent to co-operate with Hunter, destroying the railway at Trevilian Station and near Charlottesville. Wherever he came on the line, he broke it, and had a sharp action at Trevihan Station with the Confederate cavalry : though he drove them back, he heard nothing of Hunter, and returned. He started on June 7th, and rejoined the army on the 29th. The battle of Cold Harbour definitely defeated Grant's plan of interposing between Lee and Rich- mond, and Richmond had been made so strong that he went round to the south and besieged Petersburg, in the end. At this time he debated whether to GRANT ATTACKS THE RAILWAYS 297 continue his move by the left to the south of the James, or invest Richmond from the north. Though the latter seemed to protect Washington the best, the communications via Fredericksburg v^^ould be exposed, and those of Lee, to the south, unmolested. The hope of beating Lee to the north of Richmond had also failed, so Grant determined to hold his ground, sending the cavalry to break the railways to the west, and then to move the army to the south side of the James. Meade sent Wilson, with his own and Kautz' cavalry divisions, to cut the Weldon and Southside railways and go on doing damage till stopped. He started on the 22nd, and did much damage, but was surrounded by the Con- federate cavalry and beaten at Reams' Station, losing all his guns : the wreck of the command got back on July 2nd. Grant did not blame him, thinking that the damage balanced the loss, for he had marched 300 miles in ten days, destroying 60 miles of railway and much rolling-stock. Grant remained opposite Lees lines at Cold Harbour till June i2th,^ when he moved the army across the James, the leading troops reaching the river the next night. Smith had been sent back to Butler for an attack on Petersburg on the loth, which failed : another attack was made on the afternoon and evening of the 15th, and a gap made in the Con- federate line, but Smith lost time by securing his own line instead of seizing the chance, which by the next morning had passed away. The Confeder- ates admitted that he had had the prize in his grasp. Next day all the army was up, and attacks were made on it and the two following days, gaining some ground, but driving Lee back to a stronger line. Up to the i8th the place had been defended by Beauregard, but on that day the Army of Northern ' W. Sherman at Kenesaw Mountain, June ioih-30th. Cherbourg. The " Kearsarge" sinks the '■'Alabama^'' June 19th. Mexico. Maximilian enters Mexico City, June 12th. 298 THE FIR^T HALF OF 1864 Virginia began to come in and occupy the works. Lee had kept outside to defend Richmond, not at first thinking that Grant was really going to strike at Petersburg, but at last Beauregard's report and his own observations convinced him. The Union army surrounded the place, but without attacking, and the long siege of Petersburg had begun. The Confederates had formed a strong flotilla on the James, including some ironclads, which tried to molest Grant's move across to the south side, but he had a sufficient force of monitors and other vessels to hold them in check, and also placed obstructions in the river. When the Army of Northern Virginia fell back on Richmond, the Confederates felt the want of a Commander-in-Chief badly, for Beauregard, whose plans had to fit in with Lee's, was not under his command, and all communications passed through Bragg, the Presidents Chief Staff Officer. Lee, also, had been ill during the retreat from the North Anna to Cold Harbour, perhaps the most critical and anxious time of all for making plans for co-operation and the defence of Richmond. When the Army of the Potomac found itself stopped by the defences of Petersburg, Grant determined to invest the place partially by a line of works stretching round towards the Southside Railway, consisting of redoubts connected by infantry parapets, from which the army might be moved at any time against the rail- ways or Lee's army, leaving a small force to hold them against attack. The Confederate works were similar, except that their redoubts were not closed in rear. Grant's polic};' of wearing down Lee's army by mere attrition, on the principle that the North could afford to lose men while the South could not, would have failed before the enormous losses of this campaign, with a less resolute man. The fighting was mostly what the great Duke of Wellington called " bludgeon work," and the losses of the Army GRANT'S AWFUL LOSSES 29^ of the Potomac, in the forty-three days from the Rapidan to the James, came to the appalling total of 60,000 men : 3,000 more were lost in the last ten days of June, and Butler lost about 7,000 : total for May and June, 70,000. Lee's losses in the same time were 20,000. For desperate and sustained fighting, there was nothing in the War to equal that at Spott- sylvania, but the greatest slaughter in a short time, with its paralyzing moral effect, was at Cold Harbour. (Continued on p. 331.) The South-East (Continued from p. 257.) In accordance with the plan to get one of the seceded States to take a nominal part in the Presidential Election in the North for political reasons, and the selection of Florida for the experiment (cf. p. 280), President Lincoln wrote to Gillmore, in whose Department Florida was, in January,^ and he sent a division under Seymour, which was accompanied by five gunboats. It was thought that a column striking inland from Jacksonville might break up the internal communications and form a base for Union sympathizers. The declared objects were : (i) To procure an outlet for the raw products of the State. (2) To cut off the enemy's supplies. (3) To recruit for the coloured regiments. (4) To restore Florida to her allegiance. The expedition landed at Jacksonvilleon February 7th,' and a proclamation was issued, calling on the people to take the oath of allegiance, and declaring that the State had now passed under Union control. Seymour advised taking a strong position on the coast which would be an equally good rallying place for Union people, without the risk of an expedition inland, but ' S.W. Banks recalled from Texas, January 4th. Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January. '^ S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th, S. Sooy Smith v. Forrest, February i8th. 300 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 was ordered to go on. By the 13th the Confederates had collected about 5,400 men and 12 guns, under Finegan, at Ocean Pond on the Olustee. The country was open, but the small lakes were obstructions. Seymour advanced with about an equal force, and after a hard fight had to retire to Jacksonville with the loss of 6 guns, and thus ended the attempt to bring Florida back into the Union. Soon afterwards, when Grant consolidated all the outlying forces that could be spared for service at decisive points, most of these coast forces were withdrawn and sent to the Army of the James as the Xth Corps, under Gillmore (cf. p. 294). The Confederates had built a formidable ironclad ram, the " Albemarle'^' on the Roanoke River : she was of their usual central battery type, with inclined sides and low ends, and was protected by four inches of armour in two thicknesses ; she had twin-screws and good engine power, and carried a heavy gun at each end of the battery, so mounted that it could be fought in line with the keel or on either side. They decided to attack the town of Plymouth, then held by Union forces, and General Hoke was ordered to co-operate. On April i8th,^ the ^'Albemarle'' went down the river, passed the forts without injury, rammed and sunk one Union boat, and drove off another. By the use of her ram she was nearly lost, for vessels of her type are not adapted either to give or receive a blow with the stem : having no proper " inclined water-line " they cannot offer effectual resistance against being dragged or pushed down, and swamped. The next morning, Hoke attacked the land works and carried them, but with heavy loss. On May 5th, ^ the ''Albemarle'' steamed down the river into Albemarle Sound with two transports in company to fight the Union squadron, four double- ' S.W. Red River Expedition, March 8th-May 19th. - E. Grant marches against Lee, May 3rd. W. Sherman marches z.ga.'ms,^ Johnston, May 5th. THE ''ALBEMARLE'' 301 ended gunboats and some armed steamers. A sharp action ensued, in which her armour proved a complete protection, but she was nearly sunk by being rammed by the gunboat " Sassacus." She replied with a shot through her assailant's boilers which put her out of action, another gunboat signalled that she was sinking, and the Union squadron drew off: this was prudent, the object being to hold the inland waters, which could not have been done had more ships been disabled. Both sides retired, and the '■''Albemarle'" lay off Plymouth, strongly guarded on all sides: her mere presence there was a terror to her enemies. Lieutenant Gushing of the " Monticello " had made a name for himself in the Navy by the most daring exploits : he had raided the Confederate headquarters at Smithville, Cape Fear River, and in June had reconnoitred up to Wilmington, and captured some despatches ; he had also found out that the Con- federates had destroyed their ironclad the " Raleigh''' This was clearly the man for a desperate service, like the cutting out or destruction of the " Albemarle" so Admiral Lee sent for him, agreed to his plan of attacking with two armed launches, and sent him to Washington to lay it before the Secretary of the Navy. (Continued on p. 353.) The West (Continued from p. 268.) Early in the year ^ there was a good deal of guerilla warfare in Tennessee and Kentucky, which the scattered Union forces were powerless to check. The head and front of the trouble was the ubiquitous Forrest, who raided up ' Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napuleon, January. SW. Banks recalled from Texas, January 4th. S.E. The " Housatonic " sunk off Charleston, February 17th. S. E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th. S. Sooy Smith v. Forrest, February 18th. S.W. Red River Expedition, March 8th-May 19th. 302 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 from the south (cf. p. 310) early in April, between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, as far as Paducah, where he was repulsed, and then turned back towards Memphis, attacking and taking Fort Pillow, which was held by coloured troops : his men began to massacre the garrison, but he stopped the slaughter as soon as he came up. Sherman acquits him from blame, saying that the policy, which he himself had always opposed, of raising troops from their own slaves to keep them in order in their own districts, made the Confederates so " fearfully savage " that they became quite uncontrollable on such occasions. After this Forrest went back into Mississippi. When Sherman succeeded Grant in the West, the Xlth and Xllth Corps were amalgamated to form a new XXth under Hooker, Howard took the IVth Corps, and a cavalry corps of four divisions was formed, but these seem to have been distributed among the different armies before the advance. He had the Armies of the Cumberland, IVth, XlVth, and XXth Corps, under Thomas, of the Tennessee, XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth Corps, under McPherson (of which the two former had each a division with Banks, ^ and the latter did not join till June), and that of the Ohio, under Schofield, the XXlIIrd Corps, less a division in Kentucky under Burbridge. Sherman was most anxious to get back the divisions lent to Banks before he started, but it was soon clear that he must go without them. The base of the Army of the Cumberland was Louis- ville, and Cincinnati for that of the Ohio, the great problem being that of supplies. Nashville, the chief depot, was 136 miles from Chattanooga, in the enemy's country, and had to be guarded. The Army of the Cumberland had practically the control of the rail- ways, which caused friction, so Sherman took charge ' These two divisions were under A. J. Smith, and never rejoined their Corps. They were renumbered as the XVIth Corps, the other divisions of the old XVIth going to fill up the XVIIth, but for a time there were two corps numbered XVI (cf. pp. 344, 362). SHERMAN MOVES FORWARD 303 of them himself, and, with the patriotic help of Mr. Guthrie, the President of the Louisville and Nash- ville Railway, collected sufficient transport for the work. He aimed at getting together a picked force of 100,000 men, in the lightest possible marching order, to be ready by May ist. The actual strength then was 98,797 men and 254 guns, not counting Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry divisions, which soon joined. The key to the topography of the country south of Chattanooga is the direction of the Alleghany Chain, nearly N.N.E. and S.S.W. of which the eastern ranges run out, ending in broken country. Sherman was practically tied to the railway, for if he made Cleveland his base he would uncover Tennessee. Johnston quite saw this, and made his main position at Dalton im- pregnable, hoping that Sherman would come to grief against it. Sherman first planned to threaten him in front and send McPherson out beyond Resaca against his communications ; but McPherson's army was so weak that it was brought closer up, arid sent against Resaca by a shorter way, where it would be in touch with the army. Sherman was at his Depart- ment Headquarters at Nashville till the end of April, when he went to the front, and on May 5th, ^ the day fixed by Grant, the army started. On the 7th it came up to Johnston's position, naturally strong and arti- ficially strengthened to the utmost, and the orders were to hold him while McPherson went round by Snake Creek Gap, which was a complete surprise to the Confederates ; but even so, Johnston had so guarded his rear that McPherson found Resaca too strong to attack, and fortified a position at the mouth of the gap, to which he retired. Sherman thinks that in this he was over-cautious and lost the chance of a lifetime ; but it must not be forgotten that the ' S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th. E. Grant marches against Lee^ May 3rd. E. The Wilderness, May sth-yth. 304 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 whole movement depended on McPherson, and that he was not in chief command. Though the position was now untenable, Johnston held on at Dalton all the loth,^ but retired suddenly on the nth and had his whole army in well-prepared defences at Resaca, before Sherman's, which had moved first, could deploy against them. Sherman again planned to hold him in place by an attack while he sent troops to get in his rear, across the Oostenaula River, to attack the rail- way near Calhoun. On the 15th,- the entrenchments of Resaca were sharply attacked, but Johnston held his own and retired at night : though his army was only half as strong as Sherman's, he had the advan- tages of positions fortified in advance by gangs of negroes, under his engineers, and of concentration. The Union army, on the contrary, was more or less dispersed, and had to grope its way by tracks over the roughest country. Though Johnston retired in the night of the 15th, and pursuit was immediate, his rearguard was not overtaken till the evening of the 17th, ^ and the next morning had again disappeared. The Union army reached Kingston on the 19th, and the enemy was reported to be in a strong position at Cassville, four miles to the east : Thomas' and Scho- field's armies were converging on this place, and McPherson was directed to strike at the railway in rear of it. The Confederate rearguard fell back on its lines in excellent order, and preparations were made for Thomas and Schofield to attack next day, but in the morning Johnston had again disappeared. Sherman, knowing the Confederate army to be about 60,000 strong, in three Corps, could not see why so good a position had been abandoned ; but Johnston told him after the War that he had fully intended ' E. Spottsylvania, May 8th-i8th. E. Sheridan's Richmond Raid, May 9th-i3th. E. Cloyd's Mountain and Wytheville, May loth. '' E. Butler before Richmond : Drury's Bluff, May I2th-i6th. ' S.W. Banks at Simsport : end of Red River Expedition, May i6th-i9th. THE ADVANCE CHECKED 305 to fight, but that owing to a disagreement with his generals, he continued the retreat beyond the Etowah River and the Allatoona Range of mountains, where he held the hills to the south with a thin line, with his main body in reserve. The country here was more broken, and gave him a better choice of positions. The art of repairing railways had been brought to such marvellous perfection by Colonel Wright, Sher- man's railway engineer, that Johnston's destruction of them caused very little delay. The camp joke ran that he " carried a spare tunnel along." Sherman halted at Cassville a few days to rest his men, repair communications, and get up supplies. Knowing the country, and the great strength of the Allatoona Pass, through which the railway runs, which was Johnston's line of retreat, he determined to turn it via Dallas, the Army of the Cumberland, in the centre, marching straight on that place, that of the Ohio to the left of it, and the Army of the Tennessee to the right, rather to the south. It would be a difficult and risky move to leave the railway and depend on the waggons for twenty days, in a thick and almost roadless country ; but it was the lesser evil of the two. The march started on the 23rd,^ and on the 25th all the columns were moving on Dallas and came into touch with the enemy near that place. The Con- federates were ready for them behind a strong line of works, near the centre of which, at New Hope Church, there was some very severe fighting, on that and the following days.^ This line completely blocked the Union march to get round south of the Allatoona Pass, and in touch with the railway again, as soon as possible. Sherman wanted to pass McPherson's army from right to left, but a strong force in front held it ' E. Lee on the North Anna, May 23rd-27th. '' Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th. E. Hawes' Shop, May 28th. E. Totopotomoy, May 29tii 31st. 20 3o6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 fast, and it could not move before June ist : the whole army though was gradually sidling away to the left, towards Acworth, by continuous fighting, both sides extending their lines in hot action. On June ist,^ Sherman sent two cavalry divisions to seize the ends of the Allatoona Pass, and ordered the railway to be repaired from Kingston forward. On the 4th, the move to the railway was made, John- ston having gone. This closed the first phase of the campaign, in which, practically in the month of May, the Union army had advanced 100 miles over the most difficult country from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, with continuous, but not heavy fighting, till they got to New Hope Church. The Union loss amounted to 9,299, all told, while the Confederate loss was 5,393, not counting missing, probably about 8,500 in all. Sherman's cavalry divisions joining had brought in some 7,500 men, making about 105,000 in all, while Johnston started the campaign with 42,856 men, but Polk's Corps and other troops gave him over 64,000 men at New Hope Church. When Johnston moved away from his front, Sher- man shifted McPherson's army, which was stronger than Schofield's, to the left, and Schofield's to the right, of Thomas, and strengthened Allatoona as a secondary base. Blair came in on the 8th with the two good divisions of the XVHth Corps, which balanced the losses. On the loth, the army advanced against the very strong position on three hills, Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain, which however was rather long for the defending force. It commanded all the approaches, and made great caution necessary, while the wet weather delayed movements. The Confederate cavalry were threatening the com- munications, and Forrest beat Sturgis on the loth (cf p. 308), who had been sent against him from Memphis, but was held off by other Union forces. A long line of works was made in front o{ Johnston's ' E. Cold Harbour, June ist-i2th. THE LINES BEFORE MARIETTA 307 by the r4th,^ and the weather improved : on this day General Polk was killed when going round his lines on Kenesaw Mountain. Though the Union troops gained some ground next day, they found better lines con- fronting them, as strong as a permanent fort : the work of fortification was so severe that Sherman organized pioneer corps of freed slaves, which was a great saving to his men. Johnston kept contracting his line, and Sherman thought that this was to collect a force for offence, to strike at the railway on which he depended. A large Confederate cavalry force passed to his rear, of which he warned his communica- tion troops. The Union army worked on the principle of an advance against fortified positions, gaining ground by degrees, by continuous fighting, but as soon as they took one line, they found a new one confronting them: Schofield therefore ordered his army to take so much ground that Johnston must over-extend and weaken himself. On the 27th, a great assault was made, which failed, but the Union men held their ground and made works close to the Confederate lines. They lost about 2,500 men, the Confederates 800. In this fortnight's fighting, both sides being in fortified lines, Sherman records that all attacks failed, by whichever side made. Meanwhile Schofield had moved to a position threaten- ing yo/ms/o;/ '5 retreat, Stoneman's cavalry was nearly up to the Chattahoochee on the right, and Sherman, to avoid the fearful losses of attacking entrenchments, planned to move round again as before, leaving the railway, striking it again at Fulton, and trusting to the cavalry to hold Allatoona, his immediate base. This ended the month of June, in which Sherman's army lost 7,500, JoJinston's nearly 6,000, a great contrast to the awful butcher's bill in the East. ' W. Burbridge beats Morgan at Cynthiana, Ky., June I2th. E. Siege of Petersburg begins, June 15th. E. Action of Ream's Station, June 22nd. Cherbourg. The " Kearsarge" sinks the " Alabama" June 19th. Mexico. Maximilian enters Mexico City, June 12th. 3o8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 When they reached Kingston, the armies moved into what we have for convenience called the Southern Division of the theatre of war, in which these opera- tions will be continued (cf p. 341). ^ Sherman had sent Sturgis from Memphis to drive Forrest back and cover the communications (cf. p. 306). He started on June ist with two small cavalry brigades and some infantry, 5,000 men, and two batteries. On the loth, he reached Brice's Cross Roads, and met Forrest. After a hard fight, lasting all day, he was driven back with the loss of all his guns, and a small infantry brigade which came up could not retrieve the crushing defeat, Sherman ex- pected that raids along his whole line of communica- tions would follow. General Smith, with the two divisions from Banks' army, had returned to Memphis on June 9th, and was ordered to join Canby at Mobile, but the occasion was so urgent that he was sent against Forrest instead, and by the end of June had advanced as far as La Grange. Wheeler attacked the Nashville and Chattanooga railway, but Rousseau, commanding at Nashville, drove him off. Morgan^ who was in command of the Department of South-Western Virginia^ which included part of east Tennessee (cf. p. 286), had been fighting against Crook and Averell in Virginia in May, and heard that they were to be reinforced: he had also been instructed by Bucknery his predecessor in command, to strike at Kentucky. He started with about 2,000 men, drove off the Union garrison of Pound Gap and pushed on, sending detachments to cut the railways, to stop troops being sent from the north, but Burbridge, commanding a division of the XXIIIrd Corps and a cavalry division, moving from Kentucky to join Crook, heard of this march and doubled back. Morgan took Mount Sterling on the 9th, but a detachment which he had left there was routed by the Union cavalry that night. He took Lexington next day, then Cyn- ' Map 49A, p. 360. RE-ORGANIZATION AND PLANS 309 thiana, capturing a cavalry brigade coming up to its relief, but on the 12th Burbridge came up in force and routed him with the loss of half his command. He got back to Abingdon, Virginia, on June 20th. Though defeated, he had caused the diversion he intended, and delayed the apprehended incursion into south-western Virginia for some months. At the beginning of the year, the commands in Missouri and Arkansas were divided, Rosecrans coming to take the former, on January 28th, while Steele was confirmed in the latter, which he had formerly commanded under Schofield, who, as we have seen, succeeded Foster in the Department of the Ohio. In March, Pleasonton came to command Rosecrans' cavalry. (For Mississippi Flotilla, cf. p. 313.) (Continued on p. 359.) The South and South-West (Continued from pp. 269, 270.) At the end of 1863, Banks had occupied several places on the Texan coast, but in the beginning of January ^ Halleck sent him back to New Orleans to prepare for the Red River Expedition, which had to be made in the spring in combination with the Navy. In order to clear the Mississippi River and Valley and free as many men as possible for the campaign in the West, the attack of Johnston's army, and advance to Atlanta, Banks and Porter were to strike to the west up the Red River, while Sherman swept the Confederate troops out of central Mississippi. One great object was to drive back Forrest, for which General Sooy Smith, who was at Memphis with 2,500 cavalry, was to start the first week in February, when Sherman moved from Vicks- burg. A Confederate concentration against Sherman might enable Smith to strike south from Corinth and destroy the railway, and when Sherman had broken ' Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January. 3IO THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 the line crossing it at Meridian,* Memphis and Nash- ville would be safe from a large force for some time. Polk commanded the Confederates near Meridian, two divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, not counting Forrest's command. Sherman marched on February 3rd with four divisions straight for Meridian, and drove the Confederate cavalry before him, but they harassed his march steadily, and once nearly took him prisoner : their infantry made no stand. ^ He remained at Meridian several days, breaking railways and destroying stores. He gave out that he was going to Mobile, to distract attention, for he really meant to be back at Vicksburg on March ist to co- operate with Banks on the Red River, but Grant forbade this, and ordered him back to his army at Huntsville, Alabama. *To return to Sooy Smith. He was to start from near Memphis on February ist, with 7,000 cavalry and 20 guns, destroy the enemy's communications, drive back his cavalry, and meet Sherman at Meridian on the loth. He was delayed by floods and did not reach West Point, between Tupelo and Meridian, till the i8th,^ where he came on Forrest in a strong position, and retired, Forrest following. On the 22nd,^ a sharp fight took place much in Forrest's favour, who took 6 guns, and the Union retreat became a rout before reaching Memphis. Forrest had only 2,500 men. After re-organizing his command, he moved north, raiding into Kentucky (cf. p. 302). (Continued on p. 341.) THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION (Map 5 1, p. 362) The plan for this expedition was that Porter's flotilla, taking Smith's force in transports, should move up the Red River and be at Alexandria on March 17th, while Banks marched across from the ' S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. ' The " Housatonic" sunk off Charleston, February 17th. ' E. Kilpatrick 's and Dahlgren's Raid to Richmond, February 28th- March 4th. * Map 49 A, p. 360. THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION 311 Teche and joined them there, and that Steele should come and meet them at Shreveport. Two armies and a fleet, hundreds of miles apart, were to con- centrate on a given day within the enemy's lines, on a difficult river, which was both obstructed and fortified, a most risky plan. Smith had 10,000 men, Banks 17,000, Steele 15,000, 42,000 in all, while Kirby Sinif/i, commanding the Confederate Department, could oppose them with 25,000. Taylor, commanding in western Louisiana, covered Alexandria with one division, which fell back when the flotilla and Smith's force came up and took Fort De Russy on the 13th, in front of that place. Banks was detained at New Orleans by Lincoln's orders, installing the new Governor and officials of the " free State " of Louisiana, and directed Franklin to start with the troops, the larger part of the Xlllth and XlXth Corps, and a raw cavalry division under Albert Lee. Lee reached Alexandria on the 19th, Banks on the 24th, and the infantry the two following days. On the 27th, Banks received fresh orders from the Commander-in-Chief to return Smith's force to Sherman in less than a month whether Shreveport were taken or not, and that he was himself then to go against Mobile, but the expedition was not counter- manded. Banks might get to Shreveport, and might be joined by Steele in time : both were unlikely, but he took the risk. The river was lower than usual, and the progress of the flotilla slow, the heavier boats being unable to pass the rapids above the town, be- hind which Taylors force was waiting, but he was surprised near Henderson's Hill, lost most of his cavalry, and retired beyond Natchitoches as the Union army advanced, now only 26,000 strong. Magruder however sent him a cavalry division from Texas, and two of infantry, from Price in Arkansas, were on their way. His enemy was toiling over a barren stretch of country, with a huge length of train to guard, on one road, across which he took up a good position 312 THE FIR^ HALF OF 1864 at Sabine Cross Roads. On April 8th, he suddenly attacked the Union flank and drove it in : reinforce- ments were brought up by Franklin, who was wounded, but they only staved off defeat for a time : the whole army was driven back in disorder, but a brigade came up in rear and stopped the pursuit. The campaign was lost to Banks, with Shreveport only two marches in front. Price's two infantry divisions joined Taylor that night. The Union army took position at Pleasant Hill, and Taylor, following in pursuit, attacked them there : after a fierce battle, in which about 12,000 men were engaged on each side, the Confederates were completely beaten and fell back in confusion. Kirby Smith joined Taylor that night, and decided to move against Steele, leaving Taylor to harass Banks. Banks now fell back on the river, where the flotilla was in great difficulties, but it managed to reach the falls of Alexandria with the loss of one ironclad, and here the real trouble began. Taylor attacked, but was driven off, and then Hunter came ^ with orders from Grant to Banks to end the campaign, but this was easier said than done, for he could not abandon the twelve gunboats and thirty transports in their perilous situation, with the water falling, and an active enemy on both banks. Colonel Bailey, an engineer, raised the water by building dams till they were able to pass, but only by stripping the ironclads of some armour, and destroying a number of guns. The building of the dams and passing of the boats took from April 30th to May i3th,^ and the whole expedition reach Simsport on the i6th, losing several vessels on the way. After a sharp rearguard action they crossed the Atchafalaya safely on the 19th. ' W. Forresfs Raid, Fort Pillow, April 13th. S.E. The Confederates retake Plymouth, April 20th. "■ S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th. E. Grant marches against Lee, May 3rd. W. Sherman marches ?i%^ms,\. J ohnston. May 5th. E. The Wilderness, May Sth-yth. ' E, Spottsylvania, May 8th- 1 8th. STEELE AND PRICE 313 Thus ended this ill-fated expedition, which produced recriminations on both sides ; Porter and Banks were at loggerheads, and the latter found that Canby had been put over him ; several Union commanders were changed, Porter was replaced by Lee, and, on the other side, Taylor attacked Kirhy Smith, his com- mander, so bitterly, for losing such a chance, that he was relieved. It being considered too late to use Banks' army against Mobile, the XlXth, with part of the Xlllth, Corps, were sent to Grant in the East. We have seen that part of the plan of the Red River Expedition was that Steele should co-operate with Banks from Arkansas. He started and drove back Price, who had sent reinforcements to Taylor, but on hearing of Banks' retreat, and that Price had been reinforced, fell back on Little Rock. Price attacked him in his retreat, and a severe battle took place at Jenkins' Ferry on the Saline River on April 30th, in which the Confederates were badly beaten, and Steele continued his march without molestation. His district was put under Canby, commanding the Gulf Department, as Sherman could not now give attention to it. Price planned an incursion into Missouri and began collecting his force, but did not move for some months (cf p. 360). The army being now mostly removed from the Mississippi, very heavy patrolling duty devolved on the gunboat flotilla ; several expeditions were under- taken up the Yazoo in pursuit of raiders, and the service up the Tennessee and Cumberland, in rear of the army, became so important that an nth gun- boat division was formed. (Continued on p. 359.) The Blockade (Continued from p. 271.) The Blockade was steadily increasing in stringency, and the Confederacy felt the pinch severely : all efforts to raise it by fighting ships 314 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 having failed, they turned their attention more to submarine attack with torpedoes. In the district of the North Atlantic Squadron two attacks were made, on the U.S. frigates *' Minnesota " and " Roanoke," on April 9th and i2th.^ In both cases the torpedo was exploded close under the ship. The "Minnesota" seems to have kept a bad look-out, and her assailant, a " David " or submarine, was seen making off: the ship was little the worse. The " Roanoke " was badly shaken, but not endangered : nothing was seen of her assailant. If the spar torpedo was fired by electricity, not contact, the small damage done may be due to its having been fired prematurely, on account of the great risk of the attacking boat going down with the ship. In the South Atlantic district, in Charleston waters, there were three attacks. The first, on February i/th,^ sank the gunboat " Housatonic " : after dark something like a plank was seen close to the ship, and the torpedo exploded before a gun could be fired, the ship sinking at once : the torpedo-boat was lost, and probably sank with her. The other two attacks were made on the " Memphis " and " Wabash," on March 6th and April i8th,^ but a bright look-out being kept, each opened a heavy fire : in both cases the boat is believed to have been sunk. In the Gulf of Mexico, Farragut wanted to attack Mobile at the beginning of the year, in combination with the Army, but had to put it off, as Banks' troops were under orders for the Red River. He heard of the approaching completion of the Confederate iron- clad " Tennessee " in March, and begged for reinforce- ments to take the place before she was ready, but in vain. (Continued on p. 366.) • S.W. Sabine Cross Roads, April 8th. S.W. Pleasant Hill, April 9th. ■^ S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th^ * S.E. The Confederates retake Plymouth, April 20th. THE "KEARSARGE" AND THE ''ALABAMA'' 315 The War at Sea (Continued from p. 274.) The sudden appearance of the " Alabama " in the China Seas soon paralyzed the American trade, and their ships were all locked up in port. There was thus nothing more to do there, and when the U.S.S. "Wyoming" came in search of the "Alabama,'' she sailed westwards at the beginning of the year, reaching Cape Town in February : though she crossed the trade route of the Indian Ocean, touching in India on January 14th, she did not meet a single American ship till she came off the Brazilian coast at the end of April.' Here she turned north- wards and took two ships, going on to Cherbourg for repairs, which were badly needed, and reaching that port on June nth. While waiting to dock, the U.S.S. " Kearsarge " came in to pick up the prisoners whom Semmes had just landed, but was not allowed to do so in a neutral port, and went out again. Semmes sent a message to ask her captain, Winslow, to wait till the " Alabama " had coaled, when he would come out and fight. The two ships were very fairly matched, of about the same tonnage, between 1,000 and 1,100, and size of crew about 150. The " Alabama" was faster, and carried one gun more, but the armament of the " Kearsarge " was more effective against a wooden ship at suitable ranges, for her two ii-inch smooth- bores were more destructive than the " Alabama's " rifled loo-pounder and smooth-bore 68-pounder. The *' Alabama" carried six 32-pounder smooth-bores; the " Kearsarge " four, and a light rifled gun. On June 19th, Semmes stood out; his enemy was waiting, and at about a mile range the ^'Alabama's" rifled gun opened the fight ; then the ships closed to about 500 yards, steaming round each other in circles : this was the very best range for the " Kearsarge," and she made full use of it. Winslow had protected the vulnerable parts of his ship by chain cable, boxed in, ' S.E. The "Housatonic" sunk off Charleston, February 17th. 3i6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 and the " Alabama's " shot took little effect. She soon began to sink, and surrendered. Winslow had only two boats left, and asked an English yacht, the " Deerhound," to help in saving life, which she did, landing Semmes and many of his crew in England. The United States Government demanded their sur- render as escaped prisoners, to which Lord John Russell replied that not only was there no obligation to do so, but that even could he do so legally, he would not violate national hospitality. In this action the " Alabama's " gunnery was inferior, as was likely, seeing that she could spare no ammuni- tion for practice, and that her powder had deteriorated with age. One shell lodged in the " Kearsarge's " stern post early in the action, which would have altered the result had it exploded. Thus ended the career of the famous " Alabama." The " Tuscaloosa" Captain Lozv, had been cruising in the Atlantic with very poor success, because the American flag had almost vanished from the sea. She was at Cherbourg when the ^^ Alabama " came in, and some of her officers wanted to join their old ship for the fight, but this would have violated French neutrality, and was forbidden. Nothing more is heard of the '* Tuscaloosa" as a cruiser, and she seems to have been disarmed, and gone to sea again as a merchant steamer. At the end of 1863, the ^^ Florida" was repairing at Brest, and sailed in February, 1864, cruising in the North Atlantic and along the American coast, where she de- stroyed some vessels, and went in to Bermuda to coal. The " Georgia" as we saw, was put at the disposal of Captain Barron in France, but being an unsatis- factory cruiser (cf. p. 272), he sold her to an English merchant : she was however followed and seized by the U.S.S. " Niagara," and condemned at Boston, while those who had fitted her out were prosecuted in England under the Foreign Enlistment Act, and fined. The ^'Rappahannock" was lying at Calais waiting THE FRENCH CHANGE OF POLICY 317 for a chance to fit out and sail, but the French would not allow any armament or increase of crew, so she stayed there as depot ship. At the beginning of the year,^ the builders of the Confederate warships in France were formally told by the Government that the ironclads would not be allowed to sail, and the corvettes must not be armed in France, but nominally sold as neutral traders, which was almost a " volte face " after the assurances which had been given. Bulloch arranged for a nominal sale of the corvettes, and hoped that he could smuggle away one of the rams if he could sell the other to Sweden. In June, however, he heard that the builders had sold all the vessels to other Governments by Napoleon's imperative orders, and that the French Government required proof that the sales were bona fide. The French builder was as much surprised as was Bulloch, whom he met with Slidell, but they could do nothing. The explanation of this sudden action was that the American Embassy in Paris had got possession of some letters which disclosed all the transactions, and their Government was able to put powerful pressure on Napoleon. During this spring also^ the two turret-ships fitting out at Birkenhead, which had been sold to a French firm, were bought by the English Government and added to the Navy as the " Scorpion " and " Wyvern." (Continued on p. 366.) Summary (Continued from p. 275.) The North had gained the Peninsula and the country up to Richmond, in the East : in the West they controlled the country as far ' Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. Mexico. Cession of Sonera Mines to Napoleon, January. S. Meridian Campaign, February. S.W. Red River Expedition, March-May. * E. & W. Grant and Sherman start, May. Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th. Mexico. He enters Mexico City, June 12th. 3i8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 south as the Chattahoochee, within striking distance of Atlanta, and all to the west of the Mississippi, for though challenged, their power was never in danger again. The Blockade was drawn tighter, and the Confederates reduced to the greatest straits. The second quarter of the year had fully vindicated the substitution of military for civilian control of the War, for all efforts were properly directed to a common end for the first time, while on the other side the lack of this advantage was seen on several occasions. Napoleon and his plans require a word here. In judging him, it must not be forgotten that with all his personal, all his family, ambition, there never was a more patriotic Frenchman, but that it was the very essence of his nature to prefer crafty ways to open ones, and that he saw his duty to France through Napoleonic spectacles. While maintaining the military prestige of France, it was his special ambition to do for her supremacy in the arts of peace what his great predecessor had done for her in war, and in this, England and America were his principal rivals. The Mexican Expedition was his way of dealing with the latter, and of gaining military prestige in the New World at the same time, while the action of the British Government with regard to the ships building for the Confederates in England, afforded him an opening for increasing French trade at their expense in 1863. He gave Slidell to understand that he would be willing to recognize the Confederacy, but that the hindrance to this was the action of his ally England, and he told French shipbuilders that they had now a capital chance of cutting in for a share of the trade, and that he would defend their right to do " legitimate business," on the broadest possible lines, and would not be too inquisitive about the bona fides of their customers. In the summer of 1864 the situation was quite different. The Confederacy was weakening so rapidly that it was more than doubtful whether the ships could arrive in time to be of use, while the NAPOLEON'S POLICY 319 North was not only becoming stronger daily, but very seriously angry about the shipbuilding, and as it was no part of his plan to increase the complication by a direct quarrel with them, it seemed advisable to simplify things by dropping the Confederacy, which was now useless to him as a card in the game, and by directing his whole attention to Mexico. Here his army was progressing well, driving Juarez back to the far corners of the land, Maximilian had landed and entered Mexico City with great eclat, and it seemed quite on the cards that by pushing on here, the Empire might be firmly established before the United States recovered the power of interference. He could therefore trouble himself less with their steady sup- port of the Mexican Republic, and opposition to the Empire. He had also got his hands on the Sonora Mines, and hoped to finance his venture from that source, for the grumbling of the French taxpayer at having to find the money for it was becoming too ominous to be disregarded. The midsummer of 1864 found the Confederates in a worse position than ever, for Lee had been forced back to his lines before Petersburg, in the East, and his serious losses could not be replaced ; President Davis much wanted to follow the example of the North and enlist coloured troops for service, for many of the negroes openly said that they would sooner fight " for their own white men," but there was such opposition to the idea that it was shelved for a year, and when passed in the spring of 1865 was too late. In the West, Johnston had been turned out of position after position, although with almost miraculous intuition he knew exactly how long he could hold them, even after they had become untenable in a military sense, but when on the defensive he never, like Lee, attacked in earnest. In the South-West, Kirby Smith had thrown away a great chance of wrecking both the naval and military parts of the Red River Expedition ; but this was not the crisis of the War, as Taylor thinks, be- 320 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 cause though the Expedition was a total failure, and the Confederates regained possession of much territory, the Northern control of the Mississippi remained un- broken. This being so, it seems odd that the North diverted so many men for a campaign of so little military importance, but it is said to have been a political move. Grant and Sherman had the two main Confederate armies by the throat, and they could quite well let the West simmer for a time. The South-West was definitely cut off from the mass of the Confederacy : Taylor says that after May i8th not a shot was fired in their Trans-Mississippi Department. In Missouri there was a small campaign in the autumn, and then all was quiet. The Confederates had gained no real success against the Blockade or in the rivers and sounds, while at sea, though the American flag had practically dis- appeared, they had lost the famous '* Alabama" and could not replace her, and the powerful vessels building for them in Europe were stopped and sold to others. The sad keynote of the Confederate position was LOSS, LOSS, LOSS, WHICH COULD NOT BE MADE GOOD. Union Loss. — Major-General Sedgwick, killed in action. Confederate Losses. — General Polk, killed in action Lietitenant-General Stuart, died of wounds. (Continued on p. 369.) Notices of Officers (Continued from p. 277.) Several well-known names disappear : on the Union side. Generals Sedgwick and Pleasonton ; on the Confederate, Generals Polk and Stuart, and Admiral Semmcs. Pleasonton and Semmes went to minor parts, and disappear as great leaders. General Leonidas Polk was the Bishop of Louisiana when the War broke out, but then took so active a part in Secession and was so influential a man in the South, that he was given a high command : though he had gone into the Church, he was educated at West POLK, SrUART, S'EIJGWICK ^it Point, then, as perhaps now, the best school in the world, and had many army friends. At first he was in command of a district, but soon took an active part in the field, and was a fair general, though he seems not to have pulled well with Bragg^ but this was not singular. He was killed while going round his lines on Kenesaw Mountain. Lieutenant-General J . E. B. Stuart, nicknamed *'Jeb," from his initials, was a very young man for his position, having been a lieutenant in the 2nd Cavalry when the War broke out, but he was so universally beloved that his rapid rise, due entirely to his conspicuous talents, seems to have caused no jealousy. Of medium height, he was a powerful, handsome man, of sunny disposition, fond of bright colours, and of the showy side of cavalry service, while not neglecting its essentials. A sincere and earnest Christian, his rule of life was as strict as Jackson's own, and between these two men, outwardly so different, was the strongest bond of sympathy and regard. Stuart seems to have been Lee's favourite subaltern in the old 2nd Cavalry, and the two were together at the time of John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. Lee felt his loss most acutely, as a man and a dear friend, as well as in his character of the magnificent cavalry general who could not be replaced. He brought the Con- federate cavalry to a pitch of efficiency to which their opponents could not attain for a very long time, he used the sword as freely as the rifle, while as a scouting officer, and especially on outpost duty, he was unrivalled. On the one occasion on which he had command of the three Arms in action, when he took over the Second Corps at Chancellorsville, aher Jackson was wounded, he proved himself a master of the art, and it is a moot point whether he would not have been of more use as Jackson's successor than even as Commander of the Cavalry. Major-General John Sedgwick was one of the most universally esteemed officers on either side. He was 21 322 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 a brave, honest, thorough-going soldier, who never intrigued or made interest in any way. It is said that he was proposed for the command of the Army of the Potomac after Fredericksburg, but said that he would not do, being a " McClellan man." He was on several occasions given the command, more or less inde- pendent, of forces larger than one Corps, and was a good, though not brilliant, handler of large bodies. Major- General Alfred Pleasonton was a major in the famous 2nd Cavalry of the old Service when the War broke out, and rose to command the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, which he brought to a high state of efficiency. He was an excellent cavalry handler, as was shown during Lee's march to the border before Gettysburg, and in Meade's operations in Virginia afterwards. Good as he was, though, the management of the Arm did not please Grant when he came east as Commander-in-Chief, and he replaced him by Sheridan, though he said that this was no reflection on Pleasonton. May not part of the reason of the poor cavalry tactics have been Meade's views on the subject, which Pleasonton was not strong enough to combat as did Sheridan, with Grant to back him ? At Chancellorsville he was put in com- mand of a scratch force of all arms which he handled brilliantly, and was mainly instrumental in stopping Jackson's attack after the rout of the Xlth Corps. In March, 1864, he was sent to Missouri, where he was placed in charge of the cavalry under Rosecrans, and took the principal part in driving Price out of that State. Rear- Admiral Raphael Seimnes ended his notable service at sea with the loss of his ship, the famous " Alabama,'' but he continued to serve till the end of the War, commanding the Confederate flotilla on the James, and after the evacuation of Petersburg guarding the railways with a small naval brigade : these however were but minor points, and a notice of him would most fitly come in here. SEMMES 323 In the Mexican War he commanded a ship at the blockade of Vera Cruz and afterwards went to Mexico City with the army. He had specially studied inter- national law, and was thus well qualified for his very responsible duties, which required him to represent his Government abroad diplomatically and to know exactly Vi/hat he might or might not do, without sending home for instructions. He was not considered a particularly smart or showy handler of a ship, but was unequalled in a comprehensive knowledge of what was required in making and carrying out large plans. His strategy, aimed at the destruction of American commerce, was unique, and was based on a most thorough knowledge of the great ocean highways : one of his peculiarities was his marvellous power of judging exactly how long he could stay in any locality before a heavier vessel of the United States service came to drive him away, and the combination of these qualities enabled him with the little " Alabama " to do more damage to his country's enemies than has been done by any single vessel before or since. After the War he settled in Mobile as a lawyer. (Continued on p. 371.) 324 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 1864 January February March 3. Grant appointed Commander - in - H Chief. U3 28- 4. Kilpatrick's and Da hlgren's raid to Rich- mo nd. H aj < W n p Olustee Expedition. 20. Ocean Pond. 19. Schofield takes command of De- S partment of the 28. Rosecrans takes command in Mis- souri. Ohio. 3. Sherman's Meri dian Campaign, to 5. 1-25. Sooy Smith 8. Red River Ex- and Forrest. pedition. S 22. Action at West 1 Point. Steele and Price in to Arkansas. 4. Banks recalled from Texas. 1st week. The "Alabama" leaves the Chi na Seas, and sails ►J Westward. > XI 17. The sinking of the "Housatonic" off Charleston. If The " Rappahannock " lying at C alais, unarmed. Mexico. The " Florida " in the Atlantic. to 5. The French en- The "Tuscaloosa" in the Atlantic. ter Guadalajara. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napo- leon. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 325 1864 April May Jmra 3. Grant marches 1-12. Cold Harbour. apainst Lee. 15. Siege of Peters- 4-12. Kautz' Raid. burg begins. 5. Butler marches 7-29. Sheridan's against Rich- Trevilian Raid. mond. 11. Battle of Tre- 5-12. Battle of the vilian Station. Wilderness. 22-July 2. Wilson's 8-18. Spottsylvania. Raid. 9-13. S h e r i dan's 29. B a t t 1 e of 1 Richmond Raid. Ream's Station. 11. Battle of Yel- low Tavern. 12-16. Butler be- fore Richmond. 23-27. Lee on the North Anna. 28-31. Hawes' Shop and Totopotomoy. 1-26. Sigel's Valley Campaign. 26. Hunter's Lynch burg Campaign and retrea t. to 27. K H 20. The Confeder- 5. The '"^Albemarle" S? ates retake Ply- fights a Union ^« mouth. Squadron. ■ Forrest's raid in 5. Sherman 1-12. Sturgis and Kentucky and marches against Forrest. Tennessee. Johnston.. 10. Brice's Cross 13. Captures Fort 15. Occupies Re- Roads. Pillow. saca. 1-22. Morgan's raid S 19-22. AtCassville. in Kentucky. ^^ 12. Action at Cyn- thiana. 25. At New Hope Church, to 4. 10-30. Sherman be- forc Kenesaw Mountain. Red River Ex pedition, to 19. 8. Sabine Cross 9-13. The Union Roads. flotilla runs the 9. Pleasant Hill. rapids at Alex- ^ Steele and Price in Arkansas. andria. 30. Jenkins' Ferry. The " Rappah annock " lying at Cal ais, unarmed. :3 The "Florida" in the Atlantic, to Bermuda. LESSONS OF THE WAR selves from their commands at a critical time, to look after their own elections to Congress. They would probably have found that stricter attention to the country's service was the best political ticket. This War provided another illustration of the old adage, " Youth will be served," for, magnificent soldiers as they were, Lee^ Joseph Johnston^ and Bragg had not the vitality and drive of their younger days. Lees health broke down in 1863, and he was never the same man again. The first two were each about 54 in 1 86 1, Bragg close on 50, while Grant was 39, Sherman 41, and Sheridan 30. Perhaps the principal military lesson is in the use of Cavalry. The problem of getting Cavalry to fight well on foot, without losing its Cavalry Spirit, is often spoken of now-a-days as a sort of ideal to be approached rather than attained; but Sheridan, S//mr/, and Forrest all solved it to perfection, using mounted and dismounted action indifferently, though the two latter had few real cavalry in proportion to the size of their commands. Compare Buford's fine handling at Gettysburg. Strategically, Bragg's use of cavalry to paralyze Grant, and isolate Rosecrans,in December, 1862, and, on a smaller scale, AsJiby's, when he bewildered and paralyzed the large forces surround- ing Jackson, before the battle of McDowell, and Miinford's, screening Jackson's march to the Penin- sula, are models in their way. Lee, great general as he was, did not get the full use of his cavalry, for he allowed it to be away when he fought his two most important battles, Sliarpsburg and Gettys- burg : Hooker and Hood both made the same mistake. Much has been said about Raids, but on a large scale they are two-edged weapons: they seem of little use in an enemy's country, while his armies are unbroken, and must not be undertaken just before an important battle : a small body will see as much or more, run less risk, and incapacitate fewer horses. The most able and daring move in the whole War DISBANDMKNT, NAVAL AFFAIRS 485 was probably Evans defence of the Confederate left at Bull Run, when he divined Tyler's orders from his hesitation, and McDowell's whole plan, and dared to mask this strong division with four companies, while he took the rest of his tiny force to the decisive point, and gained the time and ground which saved the battle. For a night march and daybreak attack, so much in vogue now, there is no better example anywhere than Hardee's attack at Atlanta. The disbandment of the armies at the end of the War had an excellent effect, for thousands of men, in the best condition, set to work on the huge task of opening out the Great West, which turned their ener- gies into a useful channel. America has never looked back. This result of what is usually a most critical and dangerous period may be looked on as unique. The Northern Navy was, at first, both weak and inefficient, not ready for war, and ships were im- provised and run up in such haste, that many were almost useless. On the Southern side, it is hardly too much to say that if they could have built an efficient marine engine, they might have broken the blockade, and perhaps turned the tide in their own favour. Though this was quite patent, they did nothing beforehand to remedy the deficiency. At sea, Semmes' strategy consisted in striking at the trade routes, and in calculating how long he could stay in any locality before a more power-ful vessel came to drive him away. This he carried out with such marvellous accuracy and success, that no one vessel ever did so much harm to an enemy as did the little ''Alabama:' Note. Some Principal Points in the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870 This Act, Section 8, i (cf. p. "/G), makes it an offence if any one "builds, agrees to build, or causes to be built, a ship with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe," etc., etc., or 486 RESULTS ANt) LESSONS OF THE WAR (Section 8, 4) " despatches, or causes or allows to be despatched, any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe," etc, etc. " Provided that he shall not be liable if on proclama- tion of neutrality he furnishes the Secretary of State with particulars of the contract, and gives security that the ship be not despatched without Her Majesty's license before the end of the war." Section 9. The onus of proof, in a disputed case, lies on the builder, that he could not have known that the ship was intended to be used against a friendly State. (The conditions to satisfy this Clause are very stringent.) Section 21. Customs and other local officers may seize and detain ships liable to seizure and detention, without prejudice to the overriding authority of the Court of Admiralty. Section 30. " Equipping " includes " fitting or adapting for sea or for naval service," using the words "any tackle, apparel," etc., besides "arms," etc. (Cf pp. 'je, 471.) There are also stringent provisions, forbidding Her Majesty's subjects to leave the country for the pur- pose of taking service with either side, or inducing or allowing any one else to do so. MAP INDEX LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND BATTLE MAPS IN BRACKETS Ala. Alabama (Ant.) The Antietam, Sharpsbur:; Ark. Arkansas (Atl.) Atlanta (B.R.) Bull Run (Chan.^ Chancellorsville (Char.) Charleston (Chat.) ChattanooRa (Chick.) Chickaniauga n.C. District of Columbia Del. Delaware Fla. Florida (Fred.) Fredericksburg (Ft. F.) Fort Fisher Ga. Georgia (Get.) Gettysburg 111. Illinois Ind. Indiana lo . Iowa I.T. Indian Territory Kan. Kan.sas Ky. Kentucky L,a. Louisiana (Man.) Manassas Md. Maryland Me. Maine Mex. Mexico Miss. Mississippi Mo. Missouri (Mob.) Mobile (Murf.) Mur/rees'ioro, Stone's River (N.A.) North Anna (Nash.) Nashville N.C. North Carolina N.J. New Jersey N.M. New Mexico N.Y, New York O. Ohio Pa. Penn i. 2-5, 8, 12, 13, 26, 46 Winton, N.C., 59 Woodbine, Md., 26 Woodstock, Ga., 49 Woodville, Ga. , 49 Woodville, Miss., 51 Wrightsville, Pa., 26 Wytheville (or Whyteville). Va, (S.W.), I. 2-5, 10, 56 Yadkin R., N.C., 56. 60 Yallabusha R., Miss., i, 31, 49A Yazoo City, Miss. (Vicks.), 31, 49A Yazoo Pass, Miss. (Vicks.), 31 Yazoo R., Miss., i, 24, 31, 49A Yellow Tavern, Va., 54 York, Pa., i, 26 York R., Va., 11 Yorktown, Va. (Pen.), 11, 13 Yorkville, S.C, i, 56, 60 Young's Branch, Va. (B.R.), 9, i£ Young's Mill, Va. (Pen.), 11 Yucatan, Mex., 65 Zacatecas, Mex., 65 Zamora, Mex., 65 Zanesville, O., 44 Zoar Ch., Va. (Chan.), 25 INDEX For List of Abbreviations see beginning of Map Index, p. 4B7. Abolitionists, 6, 9, 10, 17, 19, 21, 22, 27, 92, 146, 147, 409, 410, 433. 442 Adams, Mr., Minister to London, 405, 471, 473, 474. 477. 478 "Alabama," cruiser, 75, 178, i8o, 185, 186, 234, 242, 243, 271, 272. 278, 279, (sunk, 315, 316), 320, 323-5, 368, 485 Alabama, State, 8, (Representa- tives, 26), 40, 47, 55, 58, 219, 237, 263, 282, 349. 365. 377. 396, 400, 402, (Wilson's Raid, 403, 404), 407, 408, 413, 414, 425, 430, 431, 452, 465 "Alabama " Claims, 471, 473, 475, 477 Alabama R., 62 "Albemarle," river ironclad, 300, 301, 325, (sunk, 353, 354^, 375 Alexander, E. P., Brig. -Gen., 212 "Alexandra," 235, 471 Alexandria, La., 228, 310-12, 325 Aliens Act, 31 Alleghany Mts. (see also District), 2, 60, 62, 74, 113, 128, 174, 224, 265, 279, 303, 459 Almonte, Mex. Gen., 246, 248 Amendments to the Constitution, 429, 431, 435, 437. 438, 468 American Party (Know-Nothings), 5. 26 Amnesty, 397. 424. 425. 43i. 432 Anderson, R., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 45, 47. 50. 91 Anderson, R. H., Lieut. -Gen., 190, 289, 334. 385 Anna R., North, Va., 163, (Lee's Position on, 292, 293), 298, 325 Antietam Cr., Md., (Battle, 160), 185, 371, 411 Apache Caiion, N.M. (or Glorieta). 138. 144 Appomattox C.H., (Lee's Sur- render, 385. 386), 396, 399, 444. 446 Arbitration, 473, 476, 477, 478 "Archer," cruiser, 234, 243 Arizona Territory. See New Mexico "Arkansas," river ironclad, 176, Arkansas, State, (Representatives, 26), 47, 56, 58, 75, 90. 93, 129, 142, 176, 180, 185, 186, 251, 270, 278, 282, 309, 311, 313, 324. 325. 360, 376, 421, 430, 431. 436, 4^1. 462 Arkansas Post (or Ft. Hindman), 221, 242 Arman, M., French Ship-builder, 424 Armistead, L. A., Brig. -Gen., 213 Army of Georgia, 395 Missouri, 407 Northern Virginia, 151, 195, 214, 288, 297, 298, 407 Tennessee, 407 Virginia, 123, 182 Army of the Cumberland, 183, 259, 266, 276, 302, 305, 343, 354-6, 395 Frontier, 177, 461 James, 287, 293, 294, 300, 381 Ohio, 284, 302, 305, 343, 395. 461 Potomac, 82 Potomac, 86, 106, 107, 120, 151. 153. 156, 179. 180, 182, 183, 18S, 201, 203, 204, (at Gettysburg, 208-14), 285, 287, 288, 291, 298, 299, 322. 326, 382, 453. 463 Shenandoah, 82 Shenandoah, 334 South-West (or, of South-West Missouri), 94, 129, 453 503 504 INDEX Army of the Tennessee, 302, 305, 344. 345. 354. 356, 370 Valley, 118 Arthur, C, President, 437 Ashby, T., Brig. -Gen., 1 14-17, (Notice, 142-3), 484 "Atlanta." See " Tallahassee" "Atlanta" ("Fingal"), ironclad, 232, 243, 386 Atlanta, Ga., 5, 59, 73, 250, 266, 267, 281, 282, 309, 318, 329, 331, (Operations round, 341-7), 348, 354. 356, 370. 374. 394. 462, 463, 485 Augur, C. C, Maj.-Gen., 336 Averell, W. W., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 190. 254, 278, 279, 308, 333, 334 Averysboro, (Battle, 392, 393), 413 Bahama Is., 178, 186, 233, 234, 242 Bahia, Brazil, 234, 236, 272, {"Florida" captured at, 366, 367). 375 Bailey, J., Col., 312 Baltimore, Md., (Democratic Con- vention, 26), 61, 65, 77, 80, 157, 138, 201, 202, 204 Baltimore and Ohio Ry., 60, 77, 81, 112, 113, 180, 217, 254, 331. 333. 335. 336 Banks, N. P., Maj.-Gen., 78, 113-16, 120, 123, 151, (at Washington, 157), 176, 184, 222-4, 227, (at Port Hudson, 228, 269), 229, 234, 236, 242, 2|3, 250, 251, 265, 270, 278, 279, 281-3, 302, 308. 309, (Red River Expedition, 310-13), 314, 324,421, (Notice, 457, 458), 460 " Barracouta," H.M.S., 405 Barron, S., Capt., 272, 316, 406 Bate, W. B., Maj.-Gen., 363 Bates, Mr., 70 Bazaine, French Gen., 249, 378, 406, 407, 416-20 Beauregard, G. T., Gen., 50, 55, 64, 78, 79, 82, (at Bull Run, 83-5), 86, 129, 131, (at Shiloh, 132, 133), 134, 135. 145. 166, 196, 294, (at Richmond, 297, 298). 338, 348. 356, 3^52, 377. 378, (commands in South, 402), 403. 448, 452, (Notice, 457) Belknap, W. W., Maj.-Gen., 449 Bell, Mr., Candidate for Presidency, 26 Belmont, Mo., (Action at, 92, 93), 103 Benjamin, Mr., 71 Bentonville, N.C., (Battle, 393), 413. 450 Bermuda, 97, 139, 234, 271, 278, 316, 325, 366, 368 Birkenhead. See Liverpool Birney, D. B., Maj.-Gen., 289 Black, Mr., 46, 53, 440 Blair, F. P., Maj.-Gen., (saves Missouri, 51, 32), 78, 90, 306, 344. 347. 354. 355, 483 Blair, M., Mr., 70, 379, 458 Blow, Taylor, Mr., 20 Blunt, J. G., Maj.-Gen., 361 Booneville, Mo., (Battle of, 90), 99, loi, 461 Boonsboro, Md., (Battle of, 159; see South Mountain), 216 Bowen, J. S., Maj.-Gen., 224 Bowling Green, Ky., 62, 63, 93, 94, 126, 128 Bragg, Braxton, Gen., 50, 55, 79, 134, 148, (invades Kentucky, 167-9), 170, (at Stone's R., 171- 2, 217, 218), 174, 179, 185, 186, 194, 219, 220, 224, 225, 236, 237, 242, 243, 250, 257-60, (at Chickamauga, 261-3), 264, (at Chattanooga, 265-7), 298, 321, 357. 359. 370-3. 388-90, 393, 400, 413, 444, 448, (Notice, 451-3). 459. 460, 462, 481, 484 Brandy Sta. Va., 189, 195, (Battle of, 196, 197), 215, 243, 254 Brazil, Emperor of, 477 Breckinridge, J. C., Maj.-Gen., 20, (Candidate for Presidency, 26), (besieges Nashville, 169, 170), (at Stone's R., 172), 176, (in Valley, 286, 287), 296, (in S.W. Virginia, 340), 360, 362, 397, 400, 401, 424 Brice's Cross Roads, Miss., (Action at, 308), 325 Brooke, J. M., Lieut., 64, 75 ' ' Brooklyn, ' ' sloop-of -war, 97,137, 351 Brooks, P., Mr., 14 Brown, John, (in Kansas, 13), (at Harper's Ferry, 22), 321 Brown, Joseph, Governor, 32, 330, 347. 350, 355. 371 Buchanan, F., Adm., iii Buchanan, J., President (see President), 2, (Notice, 16, 17,) 20, 24, (Message to Congress, INDEX 505 27-9), 33. 39. 41. 42-4. 48. 51. 70, 71, 78, 104, 245. 440, 450 Buchanan, R. C, Bvt. Maj. Gen., 431 Buckner, S. B., Lieut. -Gen., q-^, 95, (at Ft. Donclson, 126-8), 220, 258, 259. 308. 444 Buell, D. C, Maj. -Gen., 79, 94, 95, 126, 128, (at Shiloh, 131-3), 134, (against Bragf; in Ken- tucky, 168-71), 180, (Notice, 183), 185, 186, 219, 276, 452 Buford, J., Maj. -Gen., 153, 202, 203, (at Gettysburg, 205, 206), 210, 484 Bull Run, Va., 2, 64, (Battle of, 83), 102, 153, 154, 156, 180, 184, 237, 448, 455-7, 460, 483, 485 Bulloch, J. D., Capt., 75, 141, 178, 234-6. 273, 317, 366, 368. 369, 375, 404-6, 413 Burbridge, J. G.. Bvt. Maj. -Gen., 286, 302, (against Morgan in Kentucky, 308-9), (in S.W. ' Virginia. 340), 360, 374, 375 Burnside, A. E., Maj. -Gen., 79, (in North Carolina, 88, 124), 144, 145, (at Fredericksburg, 162-5), 186, 188, 200, 220, 230, 239, 250, 257-9, 264, 265, 267, 268, 278, 284, 287, 280, 292, 338 Butler. B. F., Maj. -Gen., (at Democratic Convention, 25), 79, 81, 88, loi, 137, 176, 282, 287, 288, (before Richmond, 294. 295. 297. 299, 339), 325, (at Ft. Fisher, 358), 359, 374. 375 Butler, Mr., 14 Cairo, 111., 57, 61, 72, 77, 91, 92, 130, 175, 268 Calhoun, J., Mr., 11 Cameron, S., Mr., 70, 77, 104, 440 Camp Jackson, Mo., 52, 56, 99 Campbell, Mr., 379 Campbell, Mr., 420 Canada, 35, 76, 98, 472 Canby, R. S., Maj. -Gen., 96, 103, (in New Mexico, 138, 139), 308, 313. 348, 350, 352. 376, 377. 395, (Mobile Campaign, 401-3), 411, 430, 461 Carolina, North, State, (Repre- sentatives, 26), (considers Se- cession, 31), 35, 41, 47, 51, 52, 56, 58, 88, (Burnside's Expedi- tion, 124), 141, 237, 282, 355, 376. 387, (Schoficld's Opera- tions, 390), 399, 413, 414, 424, 430, 431, 462 Carolina, South, State, 28, (Dis- pute with U.S.. 33), 35, 39. 40. (sends Commissioners to Wash- ington, 42, 44-6, 53), 51, 56, 58. t^. 74. 79. 103, 141, 282, 349. 371. 376, 395. 430. 431 Carpet-baggers, 433, 436 Carrick's Ford, \V.Va., (.\ction at, 88), 102 Cass, L., Mr., 46 Cavalry, 484 Cedar Cr., Va., (Val.), (Battle. 33'^^'). 370. 375 Cedar Mt., Va., (Action at, 151), 185 Centrcville, Va., (Bull Run, 80-4), 86, 105, 107, III, 113, 114, 154, 156. 188, 198, 215, 216, 253 "Chameleon," 368 Chanccllorsville, Va., (Battle, 190- 3), 201, 206, 215, 236, 243, 321, 322, 372 Chantilly, Va., (Action, 156), 185, 242 Charleston, S.C, 25, 41, 42, 45, 47. 50. 55. 62, 69, 79, 89, 90. 98, 125, 140, 177,229, (Dupont's Attack, 230-2), 233, 242, 250, (Gillmore's Attack, 255-7), 270, 271, 276, 278, 294, 314, 324, 329, 355. 357. 358, 366, 377, 390, (evacuated, 391). 392, 395, 404. 413 Charlottesville (or Charlotte), Va., 295. 296, 335 Chase, Mr., 70 Chasseloup-Laubat, M., 236 Chattanooga, Tenn., 62, 94, 128, 129, 134, 150, 166, 167, 187,219, 220, 237, 249-51, 258, 259. 261-4, (Battle, 265-7), 268, 274, 279, 281, 284, 302, 303, 306, 348, 349, 408, 452, 462 Cheatham, B., Maj. -Gen., (at At- lanta, 342-5), 362, (at Franklin, 363) " Chickamauga," cruiser, 368, 375 Chickamauga, Ga., 253, 259, 260, (Battle, 261-3), 266, 267, 274, 276, 278, 452, 459 "Chickasaw," monitor, 352 " Chicora," c.d. ironclad, 229 Civil Rights Bill, 426 "Clarence," cruiser, 234, 243 5o6 INDEX Clarendon, Lord, 474, 475 Clay, Mr., 9 Cleburne, P.. Maj.-Gen., 363 Cleveland, G., President, 437, 481 Cloue, French Commodore, 417 Cloyd's Mt.. Va. (S.W.), (Action at, 286) Cobb, Howell, Mr., 21, 45, 46, 71 Cold Harbour, Va., 288, (Battle, 293. 294). 296-9, 325 Collins, Capt., 366, 367 Coloured Troops, 227, 302, 319, 340. 357. 377 "Columbia," c.d. ironclad, 391 Columbia, S.C, 355, 358, 391 Columbus, Ky., 62, 91, 92, 94, 126, 130, 174 Compromise Act, 33, 39 Confederation, Articles of, 34, 35, 38 Confiscation Act, 146, 147 "Congress," sloop-of-war, 110 Connecticut, State, (considers Se- cession, 35) Conscript Laws, 149, 251 Constitution, State, 38, 47 Constitution, U.S., 34, 36, 38, 47, 48 Constitutional Union Party, 26 Cooper, S., Gen., 11, 21, 66, 71, 78, 82 "Coquette," 273, 366 Corinth, Miss., 128, 129, 131, {Beauregard at, 133), 134, 141, 145, 148, 166, 167, (Battle, 170, 171), 173, 179, 186, 240, 309, 453 Cotton States, 10, 30, 33, 40, 69 Cox, J. D., Maj.-Gen., 390, 482 Crampton's Gap, Md., 159, 217 Crittenden, G., Maj.-Gen., 94, (at Mill Springs, 126) Crittenden, J. J., Senator, 48 Crittenden, T., Brig.-Gen., (at Stone's R., 172), (at Chicka- mauga, 259, 261, 262), 265 Crook, G., Maj.-Gen., (in S.W. Virginia, 285, 286), 308, (in Valley, 332, 334, 336, 380) Cross Keys, Va. (Val.), 114, (Action, 117), 145 Croxton, J. T., Bvt. Maj-Gen., 403, 404, 413 Culpeper C.H., Va.,152, 162, 163, 196, 198, 215, 253 "Cumberland," sloop-of-war, no Cumberland Gap, 93, 94, 132, 166, 168, 169, 259 Cumberland Mts., 93, 126, 237 Cumberland R., 57, 61-3, 92-4, 99, 102, 127, 175, 218, 219, 221, 258, 268, 313 Curtis, S. R., Maj.-Gen., 99, (at Pea Ridge, 129), 130, 135, 173, 175, 177, 270, 361, 453 Gushing, W. Comr., 301, (sinks "Albemarle," 353, 354), 375 Custer, G., Maj-Gen., 285, 335, 337. 375 Dahlgren, J. A., Rear-Adm., 255, 257, 277. 404 Dahlgren, U., Col., 284, 324 Danville Ry., 299, 380, 383, 384 Davis, C. H., Rear-Adm., (at Battle of Memphis, 135), 138, 175 Davis, Jefferson (or President), 9, II, (opposes Douglas, 21, 24), 25, 38, 43, (elected President, 49), 50. 55. 56, 71. 72. 79. 81, 82, 87, 91, 96, 98, 102, (refuses to make Lee Commander-in- Chief, 105), 163, 171, 179, 196, 237, 249, 265, 283, 284, 298- 319. 330. 344. 345, 347-9, 355. 371. 379, 380, 384, 387, (ap- proves of Surrender, 397), (Flight, 399-40 1 ) , (Capture, 404) , 405, 407, 412, 414, 439, (Notices, II, 71, 441, 442), 450, 452, 457, 458, 460, 473 Davis, Jefferson, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 346. 355 "Deerhound," English yacht, 316 Democrat Party, 13, 15, 18, 20, 23, 24, (Conventions, 25, 26), 48, 149,181, 326,409, 437, 440,464 Dennison, Governor, 77 Department No. i, 135 No. 2, 93 Trans-Mississippi, 311, 320 Department of Alabama, 408 Arkansas, 309 Missouri, 79, 92, 94, 270, 309, 361. 461 New Mexico, 103 South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, 103, 462 South-West Virginia, 286, 308, 340, 360, 373 Virginia, 112 Washington, 40S West Florida and Alabama^ 452 INDEX 507 Department of the Gulf, 176, 313, 350 Ohio, 77, 79, 94, 220, 284, 309, 461 Shenandoah and Kanawha, 285 South-West, 348 Diaz, Porfirio, Mex. Gen., 327, 375. 378, 416, 417, 420 Dinwiddie C.H., Va., (Action at, 382), 413 District, Alleghany-Mississippi, 2, 74, 128, 174, 224, 265, 279, 459 2nd Military, 448 Southern, 466 Trans-Mississippi, 58, 61, 62, 227, 250, 269, 283, 318, 330, 371, 400, 408. 415 District No. i, Virginia, 430, 462 No. 2, North and South Caro- lina, 430 No. 3, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, 430 No. 4, Mississippi and Arkansas, 430 No. 5, Louisiana and Texas, 430 District of Mississippi and Ala- bama, 462 Northern Georgia, 342 the Carolinas, 390 Dix, J., Maj.-Gen., (threatens Richmond, 196), 198, 200, 243 Donelson, Ft., Tenn., 63, 91, 93, 107, 126, (taken, 127, 128), 130, 131. 135. 141. 142. 144. 179. 183. 221, 372, 444, 451, 466 Douglas, Stephen, Mr., 12, 20, 24 25, (Candidate for Presidency, 26), 43, 69, 409 Drew Bill, 470 Dubois de Saligny, M., 248, 249 Dudley, T., Mr., U.S. Consul at Liverpool, 235 Duke, B. W., Brig. -Gen., 400 Dupont, S. F., Rear-Adm., (at Port Royal, 89), 90, 125, 139, 140, 229, (attacks Charleston, 231), 232, 255, 275, (Notice, 276, 277) Eads, James, Mr., Engineer, 75 Early, Jubal, Lieut. -Gen., (at Bull Run, 85), 193, 199, 202, (at Gettysburg, 206, 210), 237, 252, 290, 293, 294, 296, 329, (attacks Washington, 331, 332), (in Valley, 333-7, 380), 338, 370. 374. 375. 440. (Notice, 455. 456) Echols, J., Brig. -Gen., 399, 400 "Edith." Sec " Chickamauga" Elkhorn Tavern, Ark. See Pea Ridge Emancipation, 7, (Virginia State, 10), 17, (Fri;mont's Scheme, 92), 146-8, 41 1, 424, 427, 471 Embargo Act, 32 Emerson, Dr. and Mrs., 19 Emory, W. H., Maj.-Gen., 228, 251. 458 Emperor. See Napoleon Emperor of Brazil, 477 Empress of Mexico, 419 Enforcing Act, 33, 39 England. See Great Britain Escobedo, Mex. Gen., 416-18, 420, 454 Evans, N. G., Brig. -Gen., 84, 485 Everett, Mr., Candidate for Vice- Presidency, 26 Ewell, R. S. , Lieut. -Gen. , (in Valley, 115-17), 122, 195, 196, 198- 200, 203, (at Gettysburg, 206- 11), 216, 217, (in Wilderness Campaign, 289-92), 294, 385 Ewing, F., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 360 Exchange Cartel, 98, 149 Fair Oaks, Va. (Pen.). Sec Seven Pines Farmville, Va., 385 Farnsworth, E. J., Brig.-Gen., 213 Farragut, D. G., Rear-Adm., 96, 135, (takes New Orleans, 136, 137), 140, 145, (attacks Vicks- burg, 175), 177-9, 1S5, 186, 222, 228, 229, 236, 242, 268, 271, 281, 314, 348, (takes Mobile Harbour, 350-352). 3^^6, 371, (Notice, 373), 374. 403, 406 Federalist, or Nationalist Party, 37. 39 Finegan, L., Brig.-Gen., 300 "Fingal." See "Atlanta" Fischer, Father, 419 Fish, Mr., U.S. Secretary of State, 474. 475 Fisher, Ft., N.C., 177, 271, 329, (ist Attack, 358, 359). 366.368, 375- 377. 384. 386, (taken, 388, 389), 404, 413 Fisher's Hill, Va. (Val.), 333, 334 Fishing Cr., Ky. See Mill Springs Fitzpatrick, Mr., Candidate for Vice-Presidency, 26 Five Forks, Va.. (Battle, 382), 383, 414. 436 5o8 INDEX "Florida," cruiser, 75, 141, 144, 177, 180, 185, 186, 233, 242, 243, 271, 278, 279, 315, 324, 325, (taken, 366), 367, 371, 374, 375. 471-3. 477 Florida, State, (Representatives, 26), 47. 50, 55, 58, 63, 75, 103, 125, 141, 200, (Northern Con- trol, 282, 299, 300), 407, 422, 426, 430, 431, 447, 452 Floyd, J., Brig. 'Gen., 21, 23, (prepares for War, 40, 41, 45), (leaves the Cabinet, 46), 64, 104, (at Ft. Donelson, 127, 128), 440 Foote, A. H., Rear-Adm., (at Ft. Donelson, 126, 127), 130 Force Bill, 33 Foreign Enlistment Act, British, 75. 316, 471, 473, 477, 478, 486 Forey, French Gen., 247-9 Forrest, N. B., Lieut. -Gen. (at Ft. Donelson, 128), 133, 167, 174, 185, 186, (beats Streight, 219), 282, 301, (takes Ft. Pillow, 302), (beats Sturgis, 308), 309, 310, 324, 325, 3 |8, 349, (beaten by A. J. Smith, 359), 360, (in Nashville Campaign, 362-5), 373-5, 400, 402, (against Wilson 403), 404, 414, 439, 465, (Notice, 466, 467), 484 Foster, J. G., Maj.-Gen., 165, 186, 268, 284, 309, 357, 358, 391, ^61 Fox, Mr., Assistant Secretary of Navy, 230 France, 30, 32, 145, 179, 194, 235, 245, 246, 248, 273, 278, 282, 317, 318, 378, 407, 419, 420, 424, 472, 479 Franklin, Tenn., (Battle, 363), 364, 365, 375 Franklin, W. B., Maj.-Gen., 159, 162, (at Fredericksburg, 164), 311. 312 Fraser, Trenholm cS- Co., 6g, 75 Fray.ser's Farm, Va. (Pen.), (Battle, 122), 123 "Fredericksburg," river ironclad, 386 Fredericksburg, Va., 115, 120, 150, 162, 163, (Battle, 164), 1S6, 189, (2nd Battle, 192), 195, 197, 198, 200, 215, 243, 290, 295, 296, 321, 372 Fredericktown, Mo., (Battle, 165), 186 Free Soil Party, 13, 14, 15, 22 Freedmen's Bureau, 173, 426 Fremont, J. C, Maj.-Gen, (Candi- date for Presidency, 16, 326), (Notice, 17, 18), 21, 33, 78, (in Missouri, 91, 92), 94, 103, (in Valley, 1 15-18), 123, 129, 147, 151 French, S. G., Maj.-Gen., 165 French, W. H., Maj.-Gen., 213, 216 Front Royal, Va. (Val.), 113, 115, (Action, 116), 117, 145, 215 Fugitive Slave Act, 9, 11, 28 Gaines, Ft., Ala. (Mob.), 351, (taken, 352), 374 Gaines' Mill, Va. (Pen.), Battle, 122 Galveston, Tex., 140, (re-taken, 177), 180, 186, 187, 228. 233, 234, 242, 403, 41 :, 416 Gardner, F., Maj.-Gen., 269 Garfield, J. A., Maj.-Gen. and President, 95, (beats Marshall, 125, 126), 464, 481 Garviett, R. B., Brig. -Gen., 213 Garnett, R. S., Brig. -Gen., 87, 88 Garrard, K., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 303, 344 Garrison, W. L., 10 Gatling, Dr., 275 Geneva. See Arbitration. "Georgia" ("Japan"), cruiser, 236, 272, 278, 279, 316 Georgia, State, 7, 10, (Represen- tatives, 26), (refractory, 32, 35, 41), (Reasons for Secession, 47). 55. 5^. 62, 103, 282, 283, 328, 342, 348, 355, 371, 391. 396, 414, 430, 431, 435, 465, 484, Gettysburg, Pa., 73, (Campaign, 196-205, 213, 214, 252-3, Moves, 214, 217), (Battle, 205-13), 236, 240. 243, 249-51, 254, 265, 278, 322, 455, 456, 459. 464 Gillem, A. C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 387. 401 Gillmore, Q. A., Maj.-Gen., (takes Ft. Pulaski, 125), 145, 233, (at- tacks Charleston, 255-7), 275, 299. 300. 395. 465 Giltner, H. L., Col., 340 Gist, Governor, 40, 42 Gladstone, W. E., Mr., 473, 474 Glendale, Va. (Pen.), Action, 122 Glendenin, Col., 243 INDEX 509 Glorieta, N.M. See Apache Ca- non Goldsboro, N.C., 165, 186, 381, 390, 392-4 Goldsborough, L. M., Rear-Adm., 88, 108, III, 112, (on North CaroUna Coast, 124), 139 Gordon, J. B., Lieut. -Gen., 336, 381. 385 Gordonsville, Va., 118, 121, 150, 151, 162, 286, 288, 295, 296, 335. 337. 380 Gorgas, J., Brig. -Gen., 59 Grand Gulf, Miss., 137, 223-5, 243 Granger, G., Maj.-Gen.,(atChicka- mauga, 261, 262), 265, (at Mo- bile, 350. 352, 402), 362, 365, 374 Grant, U. S., General and Presi- dent (see President), 4, 66, 91, (seizes Paducah, 92), 93, 102, 107, (at Ft. Donelson, 126-8), 129, (at Shiloh, 131-3), 166, 170-6, 179, 180, 182, 186, 188, 218-21, (at Vicksburg, 222-7), 228, 236, 237, 240, 242, 243, 249-51, 258, 263, (at Chatta- nooga, 265-7), 268-70, 276, 279-82, 284, (made Commander- in-Chief, 285), 287, (Wilderness Campaign, 288-97), (at Peters- burg, 298, 337, 338, 380, 381, 383). 300. 302, 303. 310-12, 320, 322, 324-6, 328, 329, 330, 332-5. 342. 344. 348. 349, 355. 356. 358, 359, 363. 370. 372, 373. 376, 377, 382, 384, (at Appom- attox, 385, 386), 387, 389, 392, 395. 398, 399. 401. 402, 405. 409, 414, 415, 420, 423, 424, 427-30, 432, (made President, 435). 436, 437. 441. (Notice, 442-5), 446, 448, 449, 451-4. 459-61, 463-6, 471, 475, 480, 482, 484 Great Britain (England), 32, ("Trent" Affair, 98), 107, 194, 235, (in Mexico, 245, 246), 272, 273, 282, 317, 318, 329, 378, 424, ("Alabama" Claims, 471- 8), 479 Greene, G. S., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 209 Greeneville, Tenn., (Action, 360), 373. 374 Grierson, B. H., Maj.-Gen., 219, (Raid, 225), 226, 243, 402 Griffin, C, Maj.-Gen., 162, 283 Groveton, Va., 154, (Battle, 155), 186 Guthrie, Mr., 303 " Habana." See " Sumter " Habeas Corpus Act, 187, 251 Haines' Bluff, Miss. See Vicks- burg Halleck. H. W., Maj.-Gen., 68, 78, 79. 92, 94, 103, 106, 126, 127, 131, 132, (after Shiloh, 133, 134), 145, 148, 150, (made Com- mander-in-Chief, 151), 152, 153, (after Manassas, 156, 157), 159, 161, 162, 166, 171, 173, 174, 181, 197, 198, 200, 202, 204, 219, 220, 224, 249, 251, 253, 254, 269, 270, 276, 280, (be- comes " Chief-of-Staff," 281), 291, 309, 329, (Early's Attack on Washington, 332), 333-5. 361, 370-2, 399, 421, 423, (No- tice, 450. 451), 453 Halltown, W.Va., 334 Hamilton, A., Maj.-Gen., 39 Hamilton, Mr., Provisional Go- vernor, 425 Hamlin, H., Mr., Vice-President, 26, 49, 70 Hampton, Wade, Lieut. -Gen., 391, 393 Hampton Roads, Va., 89, (Action, no). 144, 358, 359, 367, 379 Hancock, W. S., Gen., (at Chan- cellorsville, 192), (at Gettys- Vjurg, 206, 207, 209, 210), (Wilderness Campaign, 289-92), (round Petersburg, 338-40), (in Louisiana, 430, 431), 439. 45^, (Notice, 463, 464) Hardee, 11'. /., Lieut. -Gen., 90, 95, (at Stone's R., 172), (at Atlanta, 343-6), (in Georgia, 356-8), 391, (at Averysboro. 392), 393, (Notice, 462, 463). 464. 485 Harney, W. S., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 52. 90 Harper's Ferry, W.Va., (John Brown's Raid, 22), (taken, 81, 158, 159). 117. 197. 199-202, 237. 321 Harrison's Ldg., Va. (Pen.), (Ac- tions, 123, 150), 185 "Hartford," sloop-of-war, 137, 222, 351 " Harvest Moon," flagship, 404, 413 5IO INDEX • Hatteras," armed steamer, 234, Hatteras, Ft., N.C., 88, 102 Hawes' Shop, Va., (Action, 293), 325 Hayes, R., President, 436, 437 Head of Passes, La., Naval Action, 103 Heiman, Ft., Ky., 93, 126 Helena, Ark., 173, (Actions, 175, 221, 270), 177, 180, 243, 278 Henderson's Hill, La., Action, 311 Henry, Ft., Tenn., 63, 91, 93. (taken, 126), 127, 144, 170, 183 Heth, H., Maj.-Gen., (at Gettys- burg, 203, 205), 444 Hickley, Capt., R.N., 141 Hill, A. P., Lieut. -Gen., (in Penin- sula, 121, 122), (Manassas Cam- paign, 154), 191, 195. 198-202, (at Gettysburg, 206, 207, 211), (Wilderness Campaign, 289, 293), (round Petersburg, 338, 340, (killed, 383), 408, 409, (Notice, 412) Hill, D. H., Lieut. -Gen., 159, 196, 260, (at Chickamauga, 261), 264, 276, 459 Hindman, Ft. See Arkansas Post Hindman, T. C, Maj.-Gen., 176, 185, 461 Hoke, R. F., Maj.-Gen.. 300, 388- 90. 393 Hollins, G. M., Conn., 134, 135 Holly Springs, Miss., 174, 186, 240 Holmes, T. H^, Lieut.-Gen., 270, 278 Hood, J. B., Gen., 5, 73, (at Gettysburg, 208, 209), 330, (at Atlanta, 342-50). 355. 360, (invades Tennessee, 362-6), 370, 374. 375. 377. 378. 390. 392, 401, 402, 409, (Notice, 412), 465, 466, 484 Hooker, J., Maj.-Gen., 160, 162, (at Fredericksburg, 164), 188- 9, (at Chancellorsville, 190-3), 194, 197-202, 216, 236, 240, 243, 253. (at Chattanooga, 264-6), 302, (at Atlanta, 343, 344). (Notice, 371, 372), 484 " Housatonic," gunboat, 312, 324 Howard, O . O.. Maj.-Gen. (at Chancellorsville, 190-2), (at Get- tysburg, 206), 266, 302, (at At- lanta, 343, 344. 346). 35^'-8, 372. 393. 394 Huger, B., Maj.-Gen., 81 Hull, F. S., Mr., 75 Humphreys, A. A., Maj.-Gen., 340 Hunter, D., Maj.-Gen., 92, 103, 129, 148, 232, 233, 286, (Lynch- burg Campaign, 295, 296), 312, 325. 332, 333. 370. 451 Hunter, Mr., 379 Huntsville, Ala., 132, 134, 166, 310, 362. 363, 365 Hupp's Hill, Va. (Val.). (Action. 335). 336. 375 Hurlbut, S. A., Maj.-Gen., 221, 264, 265 Huse, C, Major, 75 Illinois, State, 8, 12, 20, 52, 57, 77, 92, 240 Lmboden, J. D., Brig. -Gen., 214, 216, 254 Independence, Mo., 361, 375 Inflation Bill, 436 Irwinsville, Ga., 404 Island No. 10, 129, 130, 145 Italy, King of, 477 luka. Miss., 170, 185 Jackson, A., General and Presi- dent, 33, 39, 49, 76 Jackson, C., Governor, 51, 90 Jackson, T. J., Lieut.-Gen., 84, (Valley Campaign, 1 13-18), (Peninsular Campaign, 120-3), 144, 145, (Manassas Campaign, 1 5 1-6), (Invasion of Maryland, 158-61), 163, 164, 182, 183, 185, (Chancellorsville, killed, 191, 192), 194, 214, (Notice, 237-9), 321, 322, 337, 344, 412, 440, 455. 456, 4. 460, 463-5. 484 Sherman, T. W., Maj.-Gen., 79, (takes Port Royal, 89), 90, 125, 276 Sherman, W. T., Gen., 70, 90, 95, (Shiloh, 133), 147, 149. 171. 173- 5, 180, (Arkansas Post, 221), (Vicksburg, 222, 223, 224, 227), 252, 264, (Chattanooga, 265- 7), 268, 269, 280-3, 285, (ad- vances from Chattanooga, 302- II). 313. 320, 324, 325, 328, 329. 335. (at Atlanta, 341-7). 348-50, (March to the Sea, 354-8). 360-2, 365, 369, 372, 374-8, 380-2, 387, 389-91, (Campaign of the Carolinas, 391-5). 396-400, 403, 404, 414, 420, 421, 424, 427, 428, 432.437. 441.44). (Notice, 447, 449). 450-2, 454, 456, 459-63. 465, 482, 484 Shields, J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 117, 118 Shiloh, Tenn., (Battle, 132, 133), 141,142,145, 183,449,451, 453 Ship Id., Miss., 136 Sibley, H. H., Brig. -Gen., 96, 102, (in New Mexico, 138, 139), 144, 145 Sickles, D., Maj.-Gen., igi, 192, (at Gettysburg, 208, 209), 430 Sigel, F., Maj.-Gen., (in Missouri, 90, 91, 129), 151, 152, (Manassas. 154. 155). 282, (in Valley, 285- 7. 331). 295. 296, 325 Sinclair, E. T., Lieut., 272 Slaughter, Maj.-Gen., 416 Slidell, J., Commissioner to France, 98, 179, 235, 273, 317, 318 Slocum, H. W., Maj.-Gen., (at Chancellorsville. 189, 191), 207, 344, (at Atlanta, 347), 355, (in the Carolinas, 392-5) Slough, J. P., Brig. -Gen., 138, 139 Smith, A. J., Maj.-Gen., 308, (Red River Expedition, 310, 311), 348, (beats Forrest, 359, 360), (in Missouri, 361), (in Tennessee, 365), 366, 374, 401, (at Mobile, 402) Smith, G. W., Maj.-Gen., 330 Smith, Kirby E., Gen., (at Bull Run, 85), 132, (in Kentucky, 167-9), 270, (Red River Expe- dition, 311-13), 319, 329, 361, 376, 403, 408, 41 ^, 415, 460, Smith, Mr., 70 Smith, W. F., Maj.-Gen., 293, 297 Smith, W. Sooy, Brig.-Gen., 309, (fights Forrest, 310), 324 Snead, T., Col., 99 Soledad, Mex., Convention of , 246 Solicitor-General (England), 472, 473 Sonora, Mex., 249, 280, 319, 324, 328, 407 South Carolina, State. See Caro lina. South. South Mountain, Md., (Battle, 159, sec Boonsboro), 185, 199, 202, 203, 207, 214, 216 Southside Ry.,Va., 294,297, 298, 339. 375. 380, 383, 384 "Sphinx." See "Stonewall" Spottsylvania, Va., (Battle, 290, 291), 293, 299, 325 Spring Hill, Tenn., 362, 375 Squatter Sovereigntv, 24 Stanley, D. S.. Maj.-Gen., 218, 346 Stanley, Lord, 474 Stanton, E. M., Mr., Secretary of War, 46, 104, 117, 121, 151, 201. 5i8 INDEX 220, 281, 332, 370, 399, 40S, 410, 429, 432, 433, 439, (Notice, 440. 441), 451 " Star of the West," 46, 55 State Rights, 10, 11, 15, 18, 26, 47 State Sovereignty, 15, 36, 38, 43, 44, 71, 72, 150, 330, 428, 441, 442, 446, 448, 469, 481 Staunton, Va., 114-16, 286, 295, 380 Steedman, J. B., Maj.-Gen., 342, 346, 360 Steele, F., Maj.-Gen., 270, 278, 282, 309, 311, 312, (beats Price, 313), 324, 325, 329, 361, 376, (at Mobile, 402) Steinwehr, A., Brig. -Gen, 206 Stephens, A., Mr., Vice-President, 10, 49, 71, 379 Stevenson, C. L., Maj.-Gen., 224 Stewart, A. P., Lieut. -Gen., 345, 362, 363 Stoneman, G., Maj.-Gen., (in Peninsula, 122, 123), 189, 190, (Raid, 193, 194), 243, (in S.W. Virginia, 340, 341), (taken Prisoner, 346), 374, 375, (Raids, 387. 396), 390, 395. 399, 401. 413. 414 Stone's R., Tenn., 3, 73, (Battle, 172, 217,218), 179, 180, 186, 187, 242, 264, 370, 373, 452 " Stonewall " (" Sphinx " ), iron- clad, 406, 413, 414 Stoughton, C. B., Bvt. Brig. -Gen., 189, 242 Stowe, Mrs. H. B., 15 Streight, A. J., Bvt. Brig. -Gen., 219, 243 Stringham, S. H., Rear-Adm., 88 Stuart, J. E. B., Lieut. -Gen., (in Peninsula, 121, 123), 145, 161, 181, (Chancellorsville, 190, 192, 195, (Brandy Sta., 196, 197), (Gettysburg Campaign, 198, 199, 202, 210-13, 215, 216), 253, 285, (Wilderness, 289, 290), (Yellow Tavern, killed, 295), (Notice, 320, 321), 440, 464, 484 Sturgis, S. D., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 91, 306, 308, 325 Submarines, 274, 314 Suffolk, Va., 165, 189, 195, 243 Sumner, E. V., Maj.-Gen., 162, 164 Sumner, Mr., 14 " Sumter " {" Habana "), cruiser, 68, 75, 97, 98, 102, 103, 140 Sumter, Ft., S.C, 2, 42, 44-7, (surrenders, 50), 53, 55, 56, 63, 230, (Attacks on, 231, 255-7), 243. 390 Supreme Court of United States, 19 " Tacony," cruiser, 234, 243 Taft, Mr., Secretary of War, 446 " Tallah a ssee " ("Atlanta"), cruiser, 367, 374 Taney, Chief Justice, 20 Tattnall, J., Commodore, 89, 11 1 Taylor, R., Lieut. -Gen., 79, 228, 242, 243, 251, 269, 278, (Red River Expedition, 311-13), 319, 320, 348, 357, 378, 400, 402, 408, 414, 448, (Notice, 460, 461), 466 Taylor, Z. , General and President, 142 "Tecumseh," monitor, 351 " Tennessee," ironclad, 314, 350-2 Tennessee, State, 47, 48, 56, 58, 61, 79, 93, 94, 130. 132, 134, 150, 166, 171, 185, 187, 2ig, 221, 237, 242, 250, 253, 259, 263, 267, 281, 283, 284, 286, 301, 303, 308, 325, 340, 341, 343, 348, 349, 360. 362, 374-6, 387. 395, 396, 402, 422, 425. 428, 465 Tennessee R., 61-3, 92-4, 99, 102. 126, 127, 131, 132, 175, 218, 221, 237, 258, 259, 263, 268, 302, 313, 362, 363, 365, 403 Tenure of Civil Office Bill, 429, 432, 435 Terry, A. H., Maj.-Gen., 388-90, 392. 404 Texas, State, 9, (Representatives, 26). 33, 47, 49. 51, 55-^. 96, 102, 139, 142, 145, 176, 177, 233, 234, 246, 250, 271, 279, 282, 309, 311, 324, 327, 415. 416, 425, 427, 430, 435, 454 Thatcher, H. K., Act. Rear-Adm., 403, 415 Thomas, G. H., Maj.-Gen., 95, (at Mill Springs, 126), 128, 167. (at Stone's R., 172), (at Chicka- mauga, 261), 262, 264, 265, (at Chattanooga, 266), 276, 281, (in Georgia, 302, 304, 306), (at Atlanta, 341-5), 34^-50, 355- (Nashville Campaign, 362-5), 370, 372, 376, 377, 387, 395, 401, 403, 422, 446, 457, (Notice, 459-60), 465 INDEX 5'9 Thomas, Lorenzo, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 433 Thomas, Mr., 46 Thompson, Jacob, Mr., 21 Thompson, M. J., Brig.-Gen., 91, 165, 186, 407, 414 Tilghman, L., Brig.-Gen., 127 Tom's Brook, V^a. (V'al.), 335, 375 Toombs, Air., 71 Topeka, Kan., Constitution of, 13, 14 Torbert, A. R. A.. Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 335. 337. 375 Totopotomoy Cr., Va., 293, 325 Tredegar Works, Richmond, Va., 59, 76 " Trent," R.M.S., 98, 103, 107, 178 Trevilian Sta., Va., 296, 325 Tullahoma, Tenn., 218, 220, 224, 243. 257 Tupelo, Miss., 134, 145, 166, 174, 310. 375. 402 "Tuscaloosa," cruiser, 271, 278, 316, 324, 325, 477 Twiggs, D. E., Ma]. -Gen., 49, 55, 96 Tyler, R. C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 83, 84, 118, 448, 485 ' ' Uncle Ben. ' See ' ' Retribution Union, Ft., N.M., 138, 139 Union Pacific Ry., 448 Upton, E., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 403 Valverde, N.M., 138, 144 " Vanderbilt," sloop-of-war, 271 Van Dorn, E., Maj.-Gen., (Pea Ridge, 129), 131, 135, 148, 166, 167, (Corinth, 170), 171, (Raid, 174), 176, 185, 186, 225. 237, (Notice, 240), 373 Vermont, State, (considers Seces- sion, 32), 57 Veto, Presidential, 426 Vicksburg, Miss., 61, 62, 128, 135, 138, 145, 166, 173, (ist Attacks, 175), 176, 179, 180, 194, 219- 21, (Grant's Campaigns, cap- ture, 222-7), 228, 229, 237, 239, 242, 243, 249-51, 264, 265, 268, 274. 309. 344. 372, 421. 436, 465 " Victor." See "Rappahannock " Victoria, Queen, 477 " Virginia." See " Merrimac" " Virginia," river ironclad, 386 Virginia, State, 3, 7, 10, (Repre- sentatives, 26), (considers Se- cession, 31), 35, 37, 43. 47, 48, 51. 55. 56, 58. 59. 74. 79, 80. 94, loi, 107, 114, 115, 121. 158, 161, 166, 186, 253, 260, 274, 278, 279, 281, 282, 284, 286, 309, 332, 333, 335. 340. 342. 355, 3^'0, 374-6, 380, 387, 3^5, 413, 430,431.435, 451. 462 Virginia and Tennessee Ry., 254, 286 Virginia Central Ry., 286, 295, 336, 337, 380, 387 "Wabash," frigate, 314 " Wachusett," gunboat, 366, 375 Waddell, J. S., Capt., 369, 465, 407 Wagner, G. D., Brig.-Gen., 363 Walke, H., Capt., 176, 1S6 Walker, J. G., Maj.-Gen., 158 Walker, L. P., Brig.-Gen., 71 Walker. Sir B., Adm., R.N., 271 Wallace, Lew, Maj.-Gen., 332 Warren, G. K.. Maj.-Gen., (Get- tysburg, 209), 285, (Wilderness Campaign, 292), (round Peters- burg, 338, 340, Five Forks, superseded. 383), 436, 437. 454 Washington. D.C., 23, 24, 41, 42. 44, 47, 48, 55, 56, 61, 64, 65, 77, 78, 80-2, 85-8, 102, 106, no, 112-14. 115, 117-20, 148, 150, 153, 156-8. 162, 165, 173, 174, 181, 186, 189, 197-200, 202, 204, 207, 224, 249, 254, 255, 281, 284, 285, 288, 296, 297, 301, 329, (Early before, 331, 332). 333. 336, 338. 340. 367. 370. 371. 374- 386, 398. 399. 408, 414, 419, 427, 448, 458, 475 Washington, G., General and President, 36, 39, 41, 107, 445, 469 Waynesboro, Va. (Val.), 380, 413 Webster, Mr., 37 "Weehawken," monitor, 232, 243, 270 Weitzel, G., Maj.-Gen., 340, (at Ft. Fisher, 358, 359), 382, 384, 414, 417, 422 Weldon Ry., 297, 338, 340, 374, 375 Welles, G., Secretary of the Navy, 70, 409 West Point, Miss., 310, 314 West Virginia, State, 17, 57, 58, 60, 74. 77, 80, 86, 87, 93, 99, 520 INDEX IOI-3, 113, 115, 180, 254, 276, 278 Wheeler, J., Lieut. -Gen., 267, 308, 343. 346, 348, 356, 360, 374, 393 Whigs, 15, 26, 409 Whiting, W. H. C, Maj.-Gen., 388 Wilcox, C. M., Maj.-Gen., 444 Wilderness, Va., 288, 290, 294, 325 Wilkes, C, Capt., 98, 178, 234 Williams, A. S., Maj.-Gen., 355 Williams, T., Brig. -Gen., 175, 185 Williamsburg, Va. (Pen.'*, 112, 119, 122, 145 Wilmington, N.C., 62, 177, 250, 271, 301, 329, 350, 359, 366-8, 371. 375. 376, (taken, 389), 390, 395. 396, 413. 461 Wilson, J. H., Maj.-Gen., 297, 325. 334. 335. (Nashville Cam- paign, 362, 364, 365), 396, 401, (Raid in Alabama, 403, 404), 413, 414, 439, (Notice, 465, 466) Wilson's Cr., Mo., (Battle, 91), 92, 102, 130, 461 Winchester, Va. (Val.), 81, 82, 113, 114, 116, 117, 145, 197, 215, 259. 331. 334 Winslow, J. A., Capt., 315 Wisconsin, State, 57, 58, 483 Wise, H., Maj.-Gen., 87 Woodson, Act. Governor, 13, 14 Worden, J. M., Rear-Adm., 110 Wright, H. G., Maj.-Gen., 292, 332, 336. 382, 383 Wright, W., Col., 305, 394 Wyndham, P., Col., 188 "Wyoming," sloop-of-war, 315 Wytheville, Va. (S.W.), 59. '77, 286, 340, 387 "Wyvern," H.M.S., 317 'Yancey, W. L., Mr., 25, 26 Yazoo City, Pass, River, Miss., 173, 176, 186, 222, 223, 226, 242, 313 Yellow Tavern, Va., 285, (Action, 295). 325 Yorktown, Va., (Pen.), loi, 112, "9. 145 Young, Brigham, 18 Yturbide, Mex. Emp., 244 Zaragoza, Mex. Gen., 247 Zollicofjer, F., Brig.-Gen., 93-5. 126 v-V Printed by Hazell, IVatson <§• Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury, England.