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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2011 with funding from 
 The Library of Congress 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/outlinesofpsychoOOschu 
 
OUTLINES 
 
 OP 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 INSTITUTE WORK 
 
 CLASS-ROOM DRILL 
 
 ax 
 
 AARON SCHUYLER, LL. D., 
 
 AUTHOR OF PSYCHOLOGY, ALGEBRA, GEOMETRY, TRIGONOMETRY, 
 SURVEYING, AND LOGIC. 
 
 
 31 
 
 PRESS OF 
 
 THE C. B. KIRTLAND PUBLISHING CO., 
 
 SALINA, KANSAS. 
 
,<^ N 
 
 ^v 
 
 Preface. 
 
 The Author of the following condensed work has given 
 several courses of lectures on Psychology, using the OUTLINES 
 as the basis of his discussions. 
 
 Quite a demand has been created for these summaries in a 
 printed form. 
 
 It has been thought best to supply this demand, and 
 hence the issue of this compact book in a form both attractive 
 and convenient. 
 
 Schuyler's Treatise on Psychology has been taken as the 
 basis of this work, though other books have been consulted. 
 
 The Author hopes that these Outlines may awaken 
 thought in others corresponding to the thought they have 
 caused in himself. 
 
 A. SCHUYLER. 
 
 Kansas Wesleyan University 
 Salina, Kansas, July i, 1893. 
 
 Copyrighted, 1893, by Aaron Schuyler. 
 
z ? 
 
 
 a* 
 
 
 Outlines of Psychology. 
 
 I, INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 1 . Definition. — Psychology is the science which treats of the phenom- 
 ena and faculties of the human soul. 
 
 It treats directly of phenomena and indirectly of faculties, since faculties 
 are known only through phenomena. 
 
 A mental act implies the power to perform that act, and that power is 
 called a faculty. The susceptibility of being affected in a certain way is 
 also called a faculty. A power is chiefly active; a susceptibility is chiefly 
 passive. 
 
 Note. — A phenomenon is an appearance, as of an external object in 
 perception, or of a mental act or state to consciousness. 
 
 2. Aim. — The aim of Psychology is threefold: 
 
 1st. To ascertain the phenomena of the human soul. 
 
 2d. To analyze and classify the phenomena. 
 
 3d. To ascertain the conditions and laws of the phenomena. 
 
 Note. — A condition is something which must be in order that some- 
 thing else may be. Thus, the eye is a condition of seeing. 
 
 3. Utility.— The utility of Psychology is threefold: 
 1st. It supplies principles for other sciences. 
 
 2d. It cultivates the mind and thus contributes to perfection and con- 
 sequently to happiness. 
 
 3d. It checks the evils arising from a too exclusive pursuit of physical 
 science, by calling attention to our spiritual nature, moral dignity and 
 probable destiny. 
 
 (3) 
 
4: . OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 4. Means. — The means of study are the principal and collateral. 
 1st. The principal means of psychological study are threefold: 
 
 (1) Conciousness — the immediate knowledge of psychical phenomena. 
 
 (2) Reflection — the analysis and classification of phenomena. 
 
 (3) Rational intuition — the immediate apprehension of the necessity of 
 conditions and laws of phenomena. 
 
 2d. The collateral means of psychological study are manifold: 
 
 (1) A good treatise is indispensible as a guide. 
 
 (2) Comparative Psychology aids in the study of human psychology. 
 
 (3) Biology, Physiology, Anthropology, and Sociology are invaluable 
 auxiliaries. 
 
 (4) Intercourse with Society, close observation, and careful study of 
 current events reveal curiosities in human nature. 
 
 (5) Literature, especially history, biography, poetry, the novel and the, 
 drama illustrate social relations. 
 
 5. Rules for Investigation.— These are the following: 
 
 1st. Employ both the principal and collateral means of study. 
 
 2d. Take as fundamental the phenomena revealed in consciousness, all 
 the phenomena, and nothing but the phenomena. 
 
 3d. Analayze, compare, identify or discriminate, and classify the phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 4th. Determine the conditions and laws of the phenomena. 
 
 5th. Refer phenomena essentially alike to the same faculty, and phe- 
 nomena essentially unlike to different faculties. 
 
 6th. Reduce to a system. 
 
 7th. Register the results. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 II. CLASSIFICATION OF PHENOMENA. 
 
 f Acquisition. 
 
 1. Cognition 
 
 ro i • 4-- ^ Consciousness, 
 f Subjective | RefLecW 
 
 Rational — Intuition. 
 
 Objective — Perception. 
 
 ( Memory. 
 Representation.. \ Imagination. 
 ( Phantasy. 
 
 ( Conceiving. 
 
 [^Elaboration j Judging. 
 
 ( Reasoning. 
 
 ( Sensation. 
 Physical feeling, j Instinct. 
 ( Appetite. 
 
 ( Rest or fatigue. 
 
 2. Feeling .. <j Vital feeling ■] Vigor or languor. 
 
 ( Health or sickness. 
 
 ( Emotions. 
 Psychical feeling j Affections. 
 ( Desires. 
 
 ( Solicitation — the antecedent motive. 
 Volition.. \ Volition — the decision or choice. 
 ( Execution — the consequent. 
 
 Note. — Solicitation is antecedent to volition or act of will, and execu- 
 tion is consequent. They are exhibited in this connection because of their 
 intimate connection with volition. The antecedent motive is the usual 
 condition of volition, and the execution the usual effect. 
 
OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 III. CLASSIFICATION OF FACULTIES. 
 
 ro t,- *•• ~ ( Conciousness. 
 f Subjective.. | Reflection< 
 
 r Acquisitive faculties. . . .-{ Rational — Intuition. 
 
 (__ Objective — Perception. 
 
 ( Memory. 
 
 1 , Intellect «j Representative faculties j Imagination. 
 
 ( Phantasy. 
 
 ( Conception. 
 
 ^Elaborative faculties j Judgment. 
 
 ( Reason. 
 
 ( Sensation. 
 
 f Physical sensibility •] Instinct. 
 
 | ( Appetite. 
 
 2. Sensibility ...<{ Vital sensibility j Vigoror languor. 
 
 ( Rest or fatigue. 
 Vigor or languc 
 Health or sickness. 
 
 i Emotions. 
 Affections. 
 Desires. 
 
 ( Passive susceptibility— Susceptibility to motives. 
 
 3. Will ] Elective power— Ability to decide— Will proper. 
 
 ( Executive energy — Power of execution. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON THE INTRODUCTION. 
 
 1. Define Psychology. Of what does it treat directly? Of what in- 
 directly? 
 
 2. What does a mental act imply? What is a phenomenon? 
 
 3. State the aim of Psychology. Its utility. Means of study. Rules 
 for investigation. 
 
 4. Classify the Psychical phenomena. Classify the faculties. 
 
IV. CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 1. Definition. — Consciousness may be defined as an act and a faculty: 
 1st. As an act. — Consciousness is immediate knowledge of psychical 
 
 phenomena. 
 
 2d. As a faculty. — Consciousness is the capability of being conscious. 
 
 2. Conditions. — The facts of consciousness imply the requisite coudi- 
 tions: 
 
 1st. Psychical phenomena — the objects of consciousness. 
 2d. A mind or ego — the subject of the phenomena and of the conscious- 
 ness, having the faculty of consciousness, or capability of being conscious. 
 
 3. Objects of Consciousness. — The objects of consciousness, are: . 
 
 1st. Psychical phenomena — acts and states of the ego, but not external 
 objects, nor the ego, or soul itself, nor the faculties of soul. 
 2d. Contingent — that is, they happen, but are not necessary. 
 3d. Known by experience, not by reason. 
 
 4. Acts of Consciousness. — The acts of consciousness are: 
 
 1st. Intellectual acts — immediate knowledge of psychical phenomena, 
 not feelings, or states of the sensibility, nor volitions, or acts of the will. 
 2d. Empirical— pertaining to experience, not rational. 
 3d. Immediate — direct knowledge, not inferred. 
 4th. Intuitive — insight of their objects by immediate experience. 
 
 5. Actuality of Consciousness. — Any pnenomenon involves consciousness ; 
 for a phenomenon is an appearance; but an appearance of which there is 
 no consciousness is not an appearance, but a contradiction. 
 
 1st. Knowledge involves consciousness. — If I know, I know that I 
 know; for if I do not know that I know, I do not know. 
 2d. Feeling involves consciousness. — Prove this as above. 
 3d. Volition involves consciousness. — Prove this as above. 
 
 6. Possibility of Consciousness.— If consciousness is actual, it is, for a 
 stronger reason, possible. Hence the absurdity of Comte's view that 
 knowledge of mental operations, through consciousness, is impossible. 
 He says: "In order to observe, your intellect must pause from its activity; 
 yet it is the very activity that you want to observe. If you can not effect 
 the pause, you can not observe; if you do not effect it, there is nothing to 
 observe." It is impossible to know without being conscious of knowing. 
 
 (7) 
 
8 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 7. The Faculty of Consciousness.— The act of consciousness implies the 
 faculty, or capability of being conscious; for without this capability, con- 
 sciousness would be impossible. The faculty of consciousness is: 
 
 1st. Intellectual — Its acts are cognitions, or acts of knowledge. 
 
 2d. Conditionally necessary — The act being, the faculty must be. 
 
 3d. Known rationally — The faculty of consciousness is known ration- 
 ally as the necessary condition of the act of consciousness, which would 
 otherwise be impossible; but the faculty is not known empirically by an 
 act of consciousness itself. Consciousness, as a faculty, is not conscious of 
 itself, but of phenomena — acts or states which appear. 
 
 8. The Product of Consciousness. — The phenomenon, or object of con- 
 sciousness develops and crystallizes into an idea. The process of forming 
 the idea is called ideation. 
 
 9. Processes which are not Objects of Consciousness. — There probably are 
 certain operations, judging from results, whether physiological, psychical 
 or mixed, of which there is no consciousness; but if so, these are not phe- 
 nomena, which are always known to consciousness. These latent processes 
 have been called unconcious cerebrations, or unconcious mental opera- 
 tions. A subject under investigation often seems to develop unconsciously 
 while the attention is directed to other things. 
 
 10. Infinite Series of Conscious Acts. — Does consciousness involve an in- 
 finite series of acts? If the act of consciousness is a phenomenon, there is 
 consciousness of the act, and this consciousness is a new act of which there 
 is consciousness, and so on. All of this is possible by a special volition ; 
 but the series is, in general, broken up, by the fact that the attention is di- 
 rected to other things, or because the successive acts become fainter and 
 fainter, till they cease to be phenomena, or objects of consciousness. The 
 first that vanishes is not an object of a subsequent act, and with this act 
 the series comes to an end. 
 
 1 1 . Consciousness Simultaneous with its Object. — This is proved thus: 
 1st. Consciousness of a phenomenon cannot be antecedent to the phe- 
 nomenon, since then there would be consciousness of that which had no 
 existence. 
 
 2d. Consciousness of a phenomenon cannot be subsequent to the phe- 
 nomenon; for then there would be a phenomenon unknown to conscious- 
 ness, or an appearance which did not appear, which is absurd. 
 
 3d. Consciousness of a phenomenon is therefore simultaneous with the 
 phenomenon, since it is neither antecedent nor subsequent. 
 
 12. Consciousness a Logical Consequent of its Object.— Consciousness of a 
 phenomenon is a logical consequent of the phenomenon, though chronolog- 
 ically simultaneous. Logically the phenomenon involves the consciousness. 
 A logical consequent is often chronologically simultaneous with its logical 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. » 
 
 antecedent. Thus, if y = 3x, a change in x evidently involves a change in 
 y, as a logical consequence, though the change in y is simultaneous with 
 the change in x. 
 
 1 3. Kinds of Consciousness. — We may distinguish three kinds: 
 1st. Natural consciousness — Common to all healthy minds. 
 2d. Ethical consciousness — Reflection on moral states. 
 3d. Abnormal consciousness — The self -consciousness of bashful persons- 
 
 1 4. Conditions of Vivid Consciousness. — These are the following: 
 
 1st. The general conditions—objects of consciousness, or psychical phe- 
 nomena, the subject of consciousness, or the ego with a faculty of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 2d. Varying psychical phenomena. — Varying phenomena attract atten- 
 tion, but sameness is attended by decreasing intensity of consciousness. 
 "We soon become unconscious of hearing the ticking of the clock. 
 
 3d. Abstraction and attention.— Consciousness of a phenomenon becomes 
 more vivid as we abstract our thoughts from other things and concentrate 
 attention on the given phenomenon. 
 
 4th. . Cultivation.— The Vividness of consciousness can be increased by 
 cultivation through habitual exercise. 
 
 1 4. Relation to Education. — Consciousness is indispensable to knowledge. 
 Its study leads to the investigation of all the mental processes, and thus 
 develops the mind, and promotes sound education. 
 
 15. Validity. — The validity of consciousness must be admitted; for, if 
 we doubt it, we have no means of knowing that we doubt but consciousness 
 itself. Then we must doubt that we doubt, and doubt that we doubt that 
 we doubt, and so on. An indirect extension of consciousness is obtained 
 from testimony. 
 
 1 6. Difficulties.- -Consciousness presents certain difficulties: 
 
 1st It is introspective and therefore reverses the natural order of look- 
 ing outward as in perception. 
 
 2d. There is only one direct observer, since one mind can not be con- 
 scious of the operations of another. 
 
 3d. The phenomena of consciousness are, for the most part, exceedingly 
 complex. Thoughts, feelings and volitions follow in quick succession, 
 blend and vanish, thus presenting an incessantly shifting scene. 
 
 4th. Certain states resemble other states, and may be mistaken for 
 them. Thus, in morals, transient desires for goodness are often taken for 
 a settled purpose to live a life of rectitude. 
 
 5th. Preconception or anticipation gives rise to certain illusions. Thus, 
 the anticipation of pleasure at a party leads one to imagine that he is happy 
 when engaged in social intercourse. 
 
 6th. Opinions agreeable to ourselves we readily accept and say that we 
 believe them, though a more complete analysis might reveal doubt. 
 
10 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 17. Necessity for Reflection.— The above difficulties show the necessity- 
 subjecting the states of consciousness to the processes of reflection. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 1. Define consciousness as an act and as a faculty. 
 
 2. State the conditions of consciousness and characterize the object and 
 subject. 
 
 3. Describe the acts of consciousness. 
 
 4. Prove the actuality of consciousness by showing that it is involved in 
 knowledge, in feeling and in volition. 
 
 5. State Comte's view, and show its absurdity. 
 
 6. How is the faculty of consciousness known? Discuss it. 
 
 7. Discuss the product, or idea, and ideation. 
 
 8. -Discuss the view that there are mental operations of which there is 
 no consciousness. 
 
 9. Show that latent processes or unconscious cerebrations are not phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 10. Does consciousness involve an infinite series of acts? 
 
 11. Prove that consciousness is simultaneous with its object. 
 
 12. Show that consciousness is a logical consequent of its object, and that 
 a logical consequent may be simultaneous with its logical antecedent. 
 
 13. State and characterize the kinds of consciousness. 
 11. Illustrate its varying intensity. 
 
 15. State the conditions of vivid conscious consciousness. 
 
 16. Show the relation of consciousness to education. 
 
 17. Prove the validity of consciousness. 
 
 18. State the difficulties involved, and show the need of reflection. 
 
V. REFLECTION. 
 
 1. Definition. — Reflection may be defined: 
 
 1st. As an act.— Reflection is the turning back of thought to investigate 
 psychical phenomena. It involves abstraction, attention, analysis, synthe- 
 sis, comparison, identification, discrimination and classification. 
 
 2d. As a faculty. — Reflection is the ability to perform the act of re- 
 flection.- The faculty is known as the condition of the act. 
 
 2. Abstraction. — Abstraction has been regarded in different lights: 
 
 , f v . ( (1) The abstraction of certain qualities from other qualities, 
 
 ist. \ tews -j ^ The abstraction f thoughts from certain things. 
 
 9 a TTt '7 v $ (1) It avoids distraction. 
 &a. utility -j (2) It leadg tQ concentration# 
 
 3d. Illustration. — A philosopher absorbed in thought withdraws his 
 attention from other things. Thus, Kant walked the street unconscious of 
 the fact that one foot was on the curbstone and the other in the gutter, 
 though when he reached home he complained that one leg was shorter 
 than the other. It is not necessary to carry abstraction to such extremes* 
 
 3. Attention. — Attention may be considered under the following heads: 
 1st. Definition. — Attention is the concentration of thought upon a given 
 
 object. It concentrates thought as a lens light and heat. 
 
 2d. Condition. — The condition of attention is abstraction; for if we do 
 not abstract our thoughts from other things, we cannot so well attend to a 
 given thing. 
 
 WAS to object |f n f e --|- 
 
 3d. Kinds i (2) As to incitement, j ^J?®^ 6, 
 
 La.*,^ &x. 
 
 (11) 
 
12 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 (1) Clearness and distinctness — sharp views. 
 4th. Consequences ] (2) Intensified activity — like a convex lense. 
 (3) Final weariness— showing need of rest. 
 
 5th. Degree of effort, — The degree of effort varies directly with the at- 
 tractiveness of the distracting phenomena, and inversely with the attrac- 
 tiveness of the given phenomenon. 
 
 6th. Utility of diseipline. — The control of attention is a matter of great 
 importance. The power to concentrate or withdraw the attention should 
 be acquired early in life. Newton attributed his success to his power of 
 concentration. But it is sometimes best to let go. Do not study a problem 
 in company. 
 
 1st. Def. The resolution of an object into its elements. 
 
 2d. Objects admitting of analysis — complex, not simple. 
 
 4. Analysis. . -{ Q1 i\, T +u a (Reflection. 
 
 ^ 3d. Methods.... | Experim ent. 
 
 ( Hope = desire -f- expectation. 
 |^4th. Illustrations ] Fear = aversion .+ expectation. 
 
 ( Phenomena =cognition-|-feeling+ volition. 
 
 fist. Def. The recombination of elements given by analysis. 
 
 ( Desire + expectation — hope. 
 5. Synthesis. •{ 2d. Illustrations ] Aversion + expectation = fear. 
 
 ( Intellect -f- sensibility + will = soul. 
 
 ^4th. Utility — An object formed by synthesis becomes distinct. 
 
 fist. Def. The noting of resemblances and differences. 
 
 [" Abstraction. 
 OJ r, -,.,. J Attention. 
 
 8. Comparison-^ 2cL Condltlons - ' 1 Analysis. 
 
 ^Synthesis. 
 
 |^3d. Purpose, 
 
 Detection of resemblances. 
 Detection of differences. 
 
REFLECTION. 
 
 13 
 
 n + t\ « -•*■• ( The recognition of an object as a given 
 1st. uenmtion. | individual? or as a spe cimen of a class. 
 
 7. Identification. . <J 
 
 2d. Condition. — Comparison of an object with its idea. 
 
 f Present the same object to the eye 
 | several times in succession. 
 
 1^3d. Illustration^ 
 
 | Strike the same key of a piano several 
 ^ times in succession. 
 
 fist. Definition. — Distinguishing one object from another. 
 | 2d. Condition. — The comparison of one object with 
 8. Discrimination^ another. 
 
 ( Present different objects to the eye. 
 L3d. Illustration •] Present different sounds to the ear. 
 
 ( Call up different ideas. 
 
 f 1st. Definition . -{ 
 
 fThe assigning of objects essentially- 
 alike to the same class. 
 
 i 
 
 | The assigning of objects essentially 
 ^ unlike to different classes. 
 
 ( Comparison. 
 9. Classification..-^ 2d. Conditions. ■] Identification. 
 
 ( Discrimination. 
 
 13. Kinds. 
 
 f Generation j g$5£^ ti «- 
 
 1°™ iffifesffi H00 - 
 
 Note. — Synthetic specification is the formation of species from in- 
 dividuals, and generification is the formation of genera from species. 
 
 Analytic specification is the resolution of a genus into species, and in- 
 dividualization is the resolution of a species into individuals. 
 
 1 0. Definition Defined. — A definition is such a description of an object 
 as will distinguish it from all other objects. 
 
 An object is defined by referring it to its class and distinguishing it from 
 the other objects of the class by its characteristic property. 
 Thus, a triangle is a polygon of three sides. 
 
 1 1 . Laws of Genera and Species.— These are the following: 
 1st. Inclusion in a species is inclusion in the genus. 
 
 2d. Inclusion in a species is exclusion from whatever the species is* 
 excluded. 
 
14 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 3d. Inclusion in a genus is not necessarily inclusion of a given species 
 of that genus. 
 
 4th. Inclusion in a genus is inclusion in one of the species. 
 
 5th. Exclusion from the genus is exclusion from all the species. 
 
 6th. Exclusion from a species is not necessarily exclusion from the 
 genus. 
 
 7th. Exclusion from all the species is exclusion from the genus. 
 
 C 1st. The phenomena are fleeting. 
 
 1 2. Difficulties j 2d. Represented as ideas. 
 
 ( 3d. Introspective method difficult. 
 
 13. Rules for Reflection. — These may each be represented by a word: 
 Abstract, attend, analyze, synthesize, compare, identify, discriminate, 
 classify, define. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON REFLECTION. 
 
 1. Define reflection as an act and as a faculty. State the processes 
 involved. 
 
 2. Discuss abstraction, giving two views and definitions. Show its util- 
 ity, and illustrate by original examples. 
 
 3. Discuss attention, giving the definition, kinds, condition, consequences, 
 degree of effort, utility of discipline. Show its relation to education. 
 
 4 Discuss analysis, giving the definition, showing what phenomena ad- 
 mit of analysis, stating the methods, and illustrating. 
 
 5. Define synthesis, and give illustrations. 
 
 6. Define comparison, stating its conditions and purpose. 
 
 7. Define identification, state its condition, and give illustrations. 
 
 8. Define discrimination, state its condition, and give illustrations. 
 
 9. Define classification, state its conditions, give its kinds. 
 10. Define definition and illustrate. 
 
 11* State the laws of genera and species, and illustrate. 
 12. State the difficulties, and give the rules for reflection. 
 
VI. RATIONAL INTUITION. 
 
 1 . Definition. — Rational Intuition may be defined: 
 
 1st. As an act.— Immediate apprehension of fundamental necessary 
 truth. 
 
 2d. As a faculty.— The power to apprehend fundamental necessary truth. 
 3d. As a product.— The axiom or fundamental judgment. 
 
 2. Comparison of Empirical and Rational Intuition: 
 
 1st. In empirical intuition, the object is contingent and known by expe- 
 rience. Empirical intuition gives us facts. 
 
 2d. In rational intuition, the object is necessary and known by reason. 
 Rational intuition gives us the conditions of facts. 
 
 3. Illustration. — Thus, to illustrate the two forms of intuition: 
 
 1st. Empirical intuition gives body, succession, events, phenomena, acts. 
 2d. Rational intuition gives space, time, cause, faculties, ego. 
 
 4. Chronological and Logical Order of Empirical and Rational Intuitions: 
 1st. In the chronological order, empirical intuitions are first. Thus, 
 
 body is known before space, succession before time, events before cause, 
 phenomena before faculties, acts before the ego. 
 
 2d. In the logical order, the objects of rational intuitions are first. 
 Thus, space is before body, time before succession, cause before events, 
 faculties before phenomena, the ego before acts. 
 
 5. Theories as to the Origin of Rational Intuitions.— These are: 
 
 1st. Intuitions are derived from the experience of the individual. 
 
 2d. Intuitions are derived from the experience of the race. 
 
 3d. Intuitions are innate. The faculty is innate, not the act or product. 
 
 4th. Intuitions are the products of the acts of a rational faculty. 
 
 6. Criteria of Intuitions, — The tests of rational intuitions are: 
 
 1st. Clearness and distinctness. — They are distinguished from other truth 
 by their fundamental character and precise meaning. 
 
 2d. Self-evidence. — They shine by their own light and need no proof. 
 
 3d. Logical priority . — They are first in the logical order. 
 
 4th. Universality. — Their truth is universally admitted. 
 
 5th. Necessity. — They are necessary truths. This necessity is absolute 
 ■or conditional — absolute, as in space and time, which must be whether or 
 not bodies exist and succession takes place, but conditional, as in cause and 
 faculties— cause must be on condition that events take place, and faculties 
 must be if phenomena are given in consciousness. A thinker must have 
 ability to think, and this ability to think is a faculty. Thinking is not self- 
 existent — it does not cause itself, but requires a thinker having the ability 
 to think. A philosopher without faculties is a thinker without ability to 
 think. 
 
 (15) 
 
10 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 7. Reality of Intuition.— The reality of intuitions— the fact that there 
 are intuitions, is certified by consciousness. We are conscious of rational 
 intuitions — they are facts of mind as really as empirical intuitions. 
 
 Hence, Psychology, which deals with the facts of mind and attempts 
 their explanation, is a rational no less than an empirical science. 
 
 8. Validity of Intuitions.— The validity of rational intuitions is thus 
 shown: 
 
 1st. The common sense of mankind asserts their validity. 
 
 2d. They harmonize, that is, agree, never conflict. 
 
 3d. They are free from the usual sources of error. 
 
 4th. They are the beginnings of rational knowledge. 
 
 5th. Demonstration requires rational intuition; for tracing a demonstra- 
 tion backward, in the regress order, the series is either infinite or finite. If 
 infinite, there is no end, and nothing could be demonstrated. If finite, the 
 ultimate basis must be either assumed or known; if assumed, it is not 
 known, and there is no demonstration; if known, it must be known by 
 rational insight or intuition, since it is a necessary truth, not a contingent 
 fact, which is known by experience. 
 
 9. Conditions of Rational Intuitions. — These are the following: 
 
 1st. The objective condition. — The reality whose necessity is apprehended 
 by rational intuition as the condition of a fact of experience, which is 
 otherwise impossible. The necessity of a reality implies its actuality. 
 
 2d. The subjective condition. — The ego with innate power to apprehend 
 the necessity of the conditions of the facts of experience. The act is im- 
 possible without the actor with power to act. 
 
 3d. The empirical condition. — The experience of a phenomenon in con- 
 sciousness, or in general, the knowledge of any event. An event being 
 known, the innate power of rational intuition at once apprehends, by direct 
 insight, the necessity of its conditions. It sees that an event without con- 
 ditions is impossible. 
 
 10. Conditions in General. — The province of rational intuition is funda- 
 mental truth pertaining to the conditions of the phenomenal. Conditions 
 are thus classified: 
 
 Conditions { 
 
 Dynamic 
 
 Universal 
 
 Negative. 
 Positive 
 
 f Non-dynamic J 
 
 $ Time. 
 I Space. 
 
 Sequence. 
 
 ( Laws of thought j ganno^ 
 
 ^Special. . . -j 
 
 ( Special axioms. 
 
 ( Substance. 
 / Cause. 
 
RATIONAL, INTUITION. 17 
 
 (A) The non- dynamic conditions are universal or special. 
 
 1. The universal non-dynamic conditions are negative or positive. 
 
 1st. The negative, universal, non-dynamic condition is the absence of pre- 
 venting influences. If an event occurs it is not prevented. Thus, the fall 
 of a body implies the absence of support. 
 
 2d. The positive, universal, non-dynamic conditions are time and space. 
 
 (1) Time. — The truths pertaining to time are summarized thus: 
 
 a. Time is that in which things persist or succession takes place. 
 
 b. Time is a reality, objective, necessary, absolute. 
 
 c. Time has three divisions, past, present, future. 
 
 d. Time is infinite— the past has no beginning, the future no end. 
 
 e. Time was not created and cannot be destroyed. 
 
 /. The present is a moving date, infinitesimal in duration, omnipresent in 
 
 space. 
 g. Absolute time contains all times as parts whose dates and durations 
 
 are fixed. 
 h. Events occur in time, are non-exclusive, and may be simultaneous or 
 
 successive. 
 i. Time is not measurable directly in itself, but indirectly by motion. 
 j. Time is a condition of every event or thing. 
 
 (2) Space. — The truths pertaining to space are summarized thus: 
 
 a. Space is that in which bodies are situated and events take place. 
 
 b. Space is a reality, objective, necessary, absolute. 
 
 c. Space has three dimensions — length, breadth, depth. 
 
 d. Space is infinite — it has no limits beyond which there is no space. 
 
 e. Space was not created and cannot be destroyed. 
 
 /. Space is eternal — it exists throughout infinite time. 
 g. Absolute space contains all spaces which are simultaneous and fixed. 
 h. Bodies exist and move in space, and their positions are not fixed. 
 i. Space is directly measurable in itself and indirectly by motion. 
 j. Space is a condition of every event or thing. 
 
 2. The special non-dynamic conditions are the fundamental laws of 
 thought and the axioms of the special sciences. 
 
 1st. The fundamental laws of thought relate either to the harmony of 
 thought or to the sequence of thought. 
 
 (X) The laws of the harmony of thought are the following: 
 
 m Law of identity S Positive form— A thing is itself, A is A. 
 
 {i) uaw oi laennty j Negative form _ A thing is not anything than itself. 
 
18 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Consequence. — What is involved in a thing may be inferred, and what is 
 conflictive denied. 
 
 Note. — Any two propositions are congruent or conflictive — congruent 
 when they harmonize; conflictive when they clash. 
 
 Conflictive propositions are either contraries or contradictories — contra- 
 ries when they are not universally inclusive; contradictories when they are 
 universally inclusive. Thus, a >b and a < 6, are contraries, since they are 
 conflictives, but are not universally inclusive, as another relation, a- 6, is 
 possible; but the propositions, a and b are equal and a and 6 are unequal, 
 are contradictories, since they are conflictives, and are universally inclusive 
 — no other relation being possible. 
 
 (2) Law of congruents. — The congruity of two propositions is consistent 
 with the truth of both, the falsity of both, or with the truth of either and 
 the falsity of the other. Thus a and b are unequal and a greater than b, 
 are congruents — both true, if 6<a; both false, if b=a; one true and the 
 other false, if b>a; but if a > b is true, a and b are unequal cannot be false. 
 
 Consequence. — From mere congruence, the truth or falsity of either of 
 two propositions can not be inferred from the truth or falsity of the other. 
 
 (3) Law of conflictives. — Two conflictive propositions can not both 
 be true. For since they clash, the truth of either implies the falsity of the 
 other. 
 
 Consequence. — If one of two conflictives is true, the other is false. Two 
 true propositions can not be conflictive. All truths exist in harmony. A 
 proposition is false if it involves a conflictive of a truth. 
 
 (4) Law of contraries. — Two contrary propositions can not both be 
 true, but may both be false. They cannot both be true, since they are 
 conflictives; but they may both be false, since other relations are possible. 
 Thus, a>b and a<b can not both be true, but both may be false, since it 
 may be true that a =b. 
 
 Consequences. — The truth of either of two contrary propositions involves 
 the falsity of the other, but the falsity of either does not involve the truth 
 of the. other. 
 
 (5) Law of contradictories. — Two contradictory propositions can not 
 both be true nor both false. They can not both be true, since they are 
 conflictives; neither can both be false, since no other relation is possible. 
 
 Consequences. — One of the two contradictory propositions is true and 
 the other is false. The truth of either involves the falsity of the other. 
 The falsity of either involves the truth of the other. 
 
 (Y) The laws of the sequence of thought are the following: 
 
 (1) A consequence requires a sufficient reason. It is not else warranted. 
 
 (2.) To affirm the reason is to affirm the consequence. Thus, if A has 
 the fever, he is sick. 
 
 (3) To deny the' consequent is to deny the reason. Thus, to deny that 
 A is sick is to deny that he has the fever. 
 
RATIONAL INTUITION. * 19 
 
 * (4) To deny a particular reason is not to deny the consequent. Thus? 
 to deny that A has the fever is not to deny that he is sick. He may have 
 some other disease, and hence "be sick. 
 
 (5) To deny every reason is to deny the consequent. Thus to deny of 
 A every disease is to deny that he is sick. 
 
 (6) To affirm the consequent is not to affirm a specified reason, but it is 
 to affirm some reason. Thus to affirm that A is sick is not to affirm that A 
 has the fever, but it is to affirm some disease. 
 
 2d. The axioms of the special sciences may be illustrated by: 
 The axiom of Geometry. — Either of two magnitudes identical in any 
 respect is, in that respect, a substitute for the other. 
 
 Remembering that similar magnitudes are identical in form, that equiva- 
 lent magnitudes are identical in extent, and that equal magnitudes are 
 identical in both form and extent, the fundamental axiom can be explicated 
 into three special axioms: 
 
 (1) The axiom of similarity. — Either of two similar magnitudes is, in 
 respect to form, a substitute for the other. 
 
 (2) The axiom of equivalency. — Either of two equivalent magnitudes is, 
 in respect to extent, a substitute for the other. 
 
 (3) The axiom of equality. — Either of two equal magnitudes is, in 
 respect to both form and extent, a substitute for the other. 
 
 Substitution renders an advance in thought possible. 
 The ordinary so-called axioms of mathematics are corollaries. 
 Thus, if equals be added to equals, the sums are equal. 
 Ijet a = b and c = d. By the law of identity, we have 
 
 a -f c = a -\- c. 
 
 Substituting, in the second member, o for a, and d for c, we have 
 
 a -f- c = b + d. 
 
 In like manner, deduce as corollaries, the other so-called axioms. The 
 law of identity is a metaphysical, not a mathematical axiom. 
 
 The so-called axioms, the whole is equal to sum of the parts, the whole is 
 greater than a part, or a part is less than the whole, are not axioms, but 
 corollaries from the definitions of whole and part. 
 
 The statement, the shortest distance from oue point to another is the 
 straight line having these points for its extremities, is neither an axiom 
 nor a definition of a straight line, but is a theorem. 
 
 (B) The dynamic conditions are substance and cause. 
 
 1. Substance. — The nature of substance is thus exhibited: 
 
 1st. Definition. — Substance is the substratum or underlying power 
 which manifests conjoined properties or qualities. 
 
 Attributes are conjoined properties manifested by a substance. They 
 are known by experience. Substance itself does not appear; but as attri- 
 butes cannot be attributes of nothing, and as their concurrence must have a 
 
20 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 cause, rational intuition apprehends the necessity of substance as the 
 ground of attributes and the explanation of their conjunction. 
 
 2d. Things. — A thing is a substance with its conjoined attributes. It has 
 quantity, quality and relation. Modality is the view of a thing taken by 
 the mind in the light of evidence as to its reality. It embraces the follow- 
 ing couples: Possibility or impossibility, probability or improbability, cer- 
 tainty or uncertainty, necessity or contingency. 
 
 3d. Division of Substance. — Substance is divided into matter and spirit. 
 
 (1) Matter. — The following is the classification of the properties of 
 matter: 
 
 f Magnitude. 
 f Occupies space.... ^iviSfbility. 
 f As to space I LUltimate incompressibility. 
 
 a. Primary] I Gained in space | ^1^ 
 
 As to time 
 
 Date. 
 Duration. 
 
 n +• $ Want of mechanical power, 
 
 inerna . . . • ^ Not want of chemical power. 
 
 f Gravity. 
 . , I Cohesion. 
 
 b. Secundo- \ Amnitv 
 
 Primary^ Attraction.^ Capill £ y attra ction. 
 
 I Electrical attraction. 
 
 (^Magnetic attraction. 
 
 ( Electrical. 
 ^ Repulsion., j Magnetic. 
 ( Caloric. 
 
 Note. — The secundo-primary properties give rise to the following pairs: 
 Hard, soft; solid, fluid; viscid, friable; tough, brittle; rigid, flexible; fissile, 
 infissile; ductile, inductile; elastic, inelastic; slippery, adhesive; crystal- 
 lized, uncrystallized. 
 
 c. Secondary, causing the sensations of < 
 
 Odor. 
 Flavor. 
 Touch. 
 Sound. 
 t Color. 
 
 Note. — The nature of secondary properties is occult, and their varieties 
 countless. 
 
 J Cogitates, feels, wills. 
 Is contained in space. 
 Has date and duration in time. 
 
RATIONAL INTUITION. 21 
 
 4th. The attributes of a substance harmonize with the laws of thought: 
 
 (1) Two congruent attributes may both be present in the same thing, or 
 both absent, or either may be present and the other absent; the presence 
 or absence of either does not inrolve the presence or absence of the other. 
 
 (2) Two conflictive attributes can not both be present in the same thing, 
 and the presence of either involyes the absence of the other. What of the 
 possibility of a square circle, or of a cubical sphere? 
 
 (3) Two contrary attributes can not both be present in the same thing 
 but may both be absent; the presence of either involves the absence of the 
 other, but the absence of either does not involve the presence of the other. 
 
 (4) Two contradictory attributes can not both be present in the same 
 thing, nor both absent; the presence of either involves the absence of the 
 other, and the absence of either involves the presence of the other. 
 
 2. Cause. — The nature of cause is thus exhibited: 
 
 1st. Definition. — A cause is that which produces an event. 
 
 Note. — Both substance and cause are dynamic. Substance operates 
 within itself in manifesting conjoined attributes which remain the same 
 till the substance itself is modified by causes ab extra. Cause operates 
 without itself on other things, producing events which begin and end in 
 in time, though an indefinite train of consequences may follow. 
 
 2d. Aristotle's classification of causes. — He gave four kinds: 
 
 (1) The material — the matter out of which a thing is made. 
 
 (2) The formal — the form which makes a thing what it is. 
 
 (3) The final — the purpose for which a thing is made. 
 
 (4) The efficient — the power which produces an event. 
 
 3d. Hume's view of cause. — Cause is an immediate and invariable ante- 
 cedent, but is destitute of efficiency, or is non-dynamic. 
 
 4th. MilVs view of cause. — "The cause, philosophically speaking, is the 
 sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together, the 
 whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the 
 consequent invariably follows." 
 
 5th. True View.— Cause is that dynamical condition which produces 
 an event. Conditions include all necessary antecedents, negative and 
 positive, dynamic and non-dynamic. Mill's causes are conditions, both 
 •dynamic aud non-dynamic. A cause is a dynamic condition which acts 
 without itself, and is thus distinguished from substance, which operates 
 within itself. A non-dynamic condition is hot a cause. Space is a condi- 
 tion but not the cause of motion. The absence of support is a condition 
 but not the cause of the fall of a body. By making cause the sum of the 
 dynamic conditions of an event, the popular and philosophic views are 
 made to harmonize, which is a desirable consummation. 
 
 Causes are distinguished from reasons, which are grounds of inference, 
 and from motives which are conditions of volition; but volition is caused 
 by the will itself in view of motives. 
 
22 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 6th. Laws of causality. These laws are the following: 
 
 (1) Every event must have an efficient cause. 
 
 How did the human mind discover this law? Theories: 
 
 a. By induction from perception. According to Hume, custom, or 
 mere habit of mind, accounts for causal judgment, and is the origin of the 
 idea of causation. He says: "The first time a man sees the communica- 
 tion of motion by impulse, as the shock of two billiard balls, he could not 
 pronounce that the one event was connected, but only that it was conjoin- 
 ed, with the other. After he had observed several instances of this nature,, 
 he then pronounces them to be connected. What alteration has happened 
 to give rise to this new idea of connection? Nothing but that now he. 
 feels these two events to be connected in his imagination." 
 
 In answer to this, observe that induction from experience gives the 
 probable, not the necessary; but the law of causality, as universally ad- 
 mitted, is — every event. must have a cause. Hume's view leaves out ef- 
 ficiency, and substitutes mere antecedence and consequence. If the cause 
 has no efficiency in the producing the event it might as well be absent; but 
 in this case the event does not occur; hence the cause has efficiency, other- 
 wise the event happens without a cause, or produces itself. 
 
 b. By induction from consciousness. In lifting a weight, for example,, 
 there is a consciousness of effort or exertion of energy, and this, no doubt, 
 gives us the idea of cause as efficiency. The same is true of all the effects 
 we produce. By induction it can be inferred, as highly probable, that 
 every event has an efficient cause but this is not the necessary judgment 
 that every event must have a cause. 
 
 c. From the belief in the uniformity of nature. But this belief gives the 
 probable, not the necessary, and hence does not give the necessary- 
 judgment. 
 
 d. From the mental impotence to conceive of an absolute commencement — 
 This is Hamilton's view. He says: "It is the inability we experience of 
 annihilating, an existence in time past, in other words, our utter impotence 
 of conceiving its absolute commencement, that constitutes and explains 
 the whole phenomenon of causality." This view bases a great philosoph- 
 ical law on impotence — a shaky foundation. But if there is no absolute 
 commencement, then there is eternal existence, which is also inconceivable. 
 If impotence to conceive an absolute commencement is a warrant for set- 
 ting it aside, then impotence to conceive eternal existence is a warrant for 
 setting that aside, but if there is no eternal existence, the first event oc- 
 curred without a cause, which sets aside the law of causality itself. 
 
 There is, however, an essential difference between the two inconceiv- 
 ables — an absolute commencement is inconceivable by the reason, but not 
 by the imagination; an eternal existence is inconceivable by the imagina- 
 tion, but not by the reason. 
 
KATIONAL INTUITION. 23 
 
 e. By rational intuition. The impossibility of an absolute commence- 
 ment, or the necessity that every event must have a cause, is at once appre- 
 hended by rational intuition. For before a thing is, it can not act, and can 
 not, therefore, bring itself into existence; if it does act, it already is, and 
 hence does not bring itself into existence. The law of causality, as a causal 
 judgment, is therefore based, not upon the impotence, but upon the potence 
 of reason — a solid foundation. 
 
 (2) The effect is always complex. — Thus, a blow of the hammer drives 
 the nail, agitates the air, produces sound, develops heat, etc. The elements 
 of a complex effect are sometimes simultaneous, sometimes successive. 
 
 (3) The cause is always complex. — This is true of the cause proper, or 
 the sum of the dynamic conditions. - For a stronger reason it is true of the 
 sum of all the conditions — dynamic and non-dynamic. 
 
 (4) The complexity of the cause is proportionate to the complexity of 
 the event. — Let us consider any effect and its cause, both of which we have 
 found to be complex. Now, any modification of the effect requires a modi- 
 fication of the cause, since the modification of the effect is an event which 
 must have a cause. A new element in the effect, therefore, requires a new 
 element in the cause. 
 
 (5) Like causes and conditions are followed by like effects. — For what- 
 ever exists in the causes and conditions to determine the effect in one case, 
 exists to determine it in the other, since by hypothesis the causes and con- 
 ditions are essentially the same. 
 
 7th. Law of events. — An event must occur in some manner, and the 
 mode of its occurrence is its law; hence every event must have its law. 
 
 8th. The absolute cause. — The absolute cause is the ultimate ground of 
 all reality — the ultimate reality itself. Herbert Spencer says: "I might 
 enlarge on the fact that, though Agnosticism fitly expresses the confessed 
 inability to know or conceive the nature of the Power manifested through 
 phenomena, it fails to indicate the confessed ability to recognize the exist- 
 ence of that Power as of all things most certain. One who says that 
 because the Infinite and Eternal energy from which all things proceed, can 
 not, in any way, be brought within the limits of human consciousness, it 
 therefore approaches to a nonenity, seems to me like one who says of a vast 
 number that, because it passes all possibility of enumeration, it is like 
 nothing [zero], which is also innumerable. Once more, when implying that 
 the Infinite and Eternal Energy manifested alike within us and without us, 
 and to which we must ascribe not only the manifestations themselves, but 
 the law of their order, will hereafter continue to be, under its transfigured 
 form, an object of religious sentiment, I have implied that whatever com- 
 ponents of this sentiment disappear, there must ever survive those which 
 are appropriate to the consciousness of a Mystery that can not be fathomed 
 and a Power that is omnipresent." 
 
24 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 The ultimate reality, though inscrutable as to essence, is not altogether 
 unknowable. It is known to be eternal, otherwise nonenity sprang into 
 entity; it is powerful, for it is the ultimate cause; it is wise, since the uni- 
 verse exhibits skill; it is benevolent, since there are provisions for the hap- 
 piness of sentient creatures; it is just, since there is a "power in the uni- 
 verse which works for righteousness." 
 
 1 1 . Subjective Conditions.— These are the ego with its faculties and 
 personal identity. 
 
 1. The ego with its faculties. — The doctrines relating to the ego are 
 thus exhibited: 
 
 1st. Definition. — The ego is the subject of psychical phenomena. 
 
 2d. Comparison of the ego and its phenomena. — The phenomena are 
 contingent, and are known by consciousness, and analyzed and classified by 
 reflection. 
 
 The ego is conditionally necessary; that is, necessary if there are phe- 
 nomena. The necessity of the ego is apprehended by rational intuition as 
 the ground of the phenomena known by consciousness. 
 
 3d. The faculties of the ego. — The faculties are known as the conditions 
 of the different classes of phenomena. Thus, since the ego thinks, it has 
 intellect; since it feels, it has sensibility; and since it puts forth volitions, 
 that is, chooses or decides, it has will. In like manner these fundamental 
 faculties are subdivided. 
 
 4th. Theories relating to the ego. — These theories are the following: 
 
 (1) Hume's theory. — The ego is resolvable into perception. He says 
 "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
 always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
 light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself, at 
 any time, without a perception, and never can observe anything but the 
 perception. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks 
 he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can no longer reason 
 with him. He may, perhaps, see something simple and continued, which 
 he calls himself, though I am certain there is no such principle in me." 
 
 Hume, in the first place, reduces all phenomena to perception, which, 
 psychologically, is incorrect; and in the second place ne identifies the per- 
 ception with himself ; but if what Hume calls I is identical with percep- 
 tion, what does he mean when he says, "I always stumble on some partic- 
 ular perception or other"? Does the perception stumble on itself, or one 
 perception on another? If Hume is a particular perception, there were as 
 many Humes as he had perceptions. It is true that the ego is not conscious 
 of itself, but of its phenomena. The ego knows the necessity, and hence 
 the actuality of itself as the condition of the phenomena of consciousness. 
 
 Hume accepted Locke's theory of knowledge— that all our knowledge is 
 derived from sensation and reflection. If this theory be true, the ego is 
 unknown and unknowable. A more searching analysis of psychical phe- 
 
RATIONAL. INTUITION. 25 
 
 nomena reveals rational intuition, which apprehends the necessity of the 
 ego as the condition of psychical phenomena. 
 
 (2) Reid's theory. — "Our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the 
 notion of a mind and the belief of its existence, and of its relation to our 
 thoughts." The word "suggest" is rather mild. 
 
 (3) Stewart's theory.— After considering matter, Stewart says: "The 
 case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately 
 conscious of its existence; but we are conscious of sensation, thought and 
 volition — operations which imply the existence of something which feels, 
 thinks and wills." This is correct and well expressed. 
 
 (4) Hamilton's theory. — "In so far as mind is the common name for the 
 states of knowing, willing, feeling, desiring, etc., of which I am conscious, it 
 is only the name for a certain series of connected phenomena, or qualities, 
 and consequently expresses only what is known. But in so far as it denotes 
 that subject or substratum in which the phenomena of knowing, willing, 
 etc., inhere — something behind or under these phenonema— it expresses 
 what in itself, or in its absolute existence, is unknown. The existence of 
 an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make from 
 the existence of known phenomena." If we are compelled to infer the ex- 
 istence of mind from the phenomena, then as a logical inference, it is not 
 altogether unknown. A logical inference from truth is true. 
 
 (5) Aristotle's theory. — "The soul is the principle by which we live, and 
 move, and perceive and understand." 
 
 (6) St. Augustine's theory. — "The mind knows itself, by knowing that it 
 lives, remembers, perceives, wills, thinks, knows, judges." 
 
 (7) Mill's theory. — My mind is but a series of feelings, a thread of con- 
 sciousness, with the background of the possibilities of feelings." The feel- 
 ings, and we may add, the cognitions and volitions, are the phenomena, the 
 background is the ego itself. 
 
 (8) Bain's theory. — "The operations and appearances that constitute 
 mind are indicated by such terms as feeling, thought, memory, reason, con- 
 science, imagination, will, passions, affections, taste." Bain, in speaking of 
 "the operations and appearances that constitute mind," identifies mind 
 with its phenomena. He also says "the mind is the sum total of subject 
 experiences." Experience of a thought or feeling or volition implies a sub- 
 ject both of the phenomena and of the experience. The discrimination of 
 one phenomenon from another implies an intelligent subject which being 
 differently affected by the phenonema discriminates one from the other. 
 Phenomena do not discriminate themselves. The identification of a phe- 
 nomenon on its recurrence implies a spiritual subject, enduring through 
 the period from the occurrence to the recurrence, and therefore distinct 
 from its fleeting phenomena. 
 
 (9) Dr. Porter's theory.— "Of the ego itself we are directly conscious. A 
 mental state which is not produced or felt by an individual self is as incon- 
 
26 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 ceivable as a triangle without three angles." This is true, but it only shows 
 
 that a mental state is inexplicable without an ego, but it does not show 
 
 that the ego is conscious of itself. It knows the necessity of itself by 
 
 intuition. An act can not originate itself. 
 
 2. Personal identity. — The doctrine of personal identity is thus shown: 
 
 1st. Definition. — Personal identity is the essential sameness of the ego. 
 
 2d. Theories. — What is the true theory of personal identity? 
 
 (1) Hume's theory that the ego is perception affords no foundation for 
 personal identity; perception is not the only mental act, neither does it re- 
 main the same. There is no personal identity in the changing perceptions. 
 
 (2) Bain's theory that the ego is the sum total of subject experiences 
 does not give personal identity; for these experiences are continually 
 changing. Identity can not consist in fleeting phenomena. 
 
 (3) Locke's theory. — He says: "Since consciousness always accompanies 
 thinking, it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and 
 thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking beings. In this 
 alone consists personal identity, that is, the sameness of a rational being; 
 and as far as this consciousness can be extended backward to any past 
 action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person." Conscious- 
 ness can not be extended backward at all — it is restricted to the present. 
 Locke probably meant memory; but then he confounds the evidence of 
 personal identity with personal identity itself. 
 
 (4) True theory. — The foundation of personal identity is found in the 
 ego itself — the subject of psychical phenomena. The necessity of personal 
 identity is known by rational intuition as the condition of the phenomenon 
 of memory. The ego that remembers a past experience must be the same 
 ege that had that experience, for one ego can not, from mere consciousness, 
 remember the experience of another ego. Consciousness reveals phenom- 
 ena, and this revelation is the condition on which rational intuition appre- 
 hends the necessity of the ego. Consciousness likewise reveals memory of 
 past phenomena, and on this condition rational intuition apprehends per- 
 sonal identity — the continued essential sameness of the ego. Memory 
 proves but does not constitute personal identity. 
 
 3d. Illustrations. — A boy wins a prize at school. When he becomes a 
 man he is made a general and wins a battle. Later he is elected president. 
 The general remembers winning the prize, and the president remembers 
 winning the battle, but not the prize. On Locke's theory, what can be 
 said of the identity of the' boy, the general and the president? What of 
 the identity of a tree throughout growth and decay? Of a wagon that has 
 been frequently repaired? 
 
 4th. Identity consistent with modification.— Personal identity is not 
 affected by growth, decline, change of opinion or character. Each person 
 knows the identity of himself as the condition of memory, but he knows 
 the idenity of other persons or things by external signs. 
 
RATIONAL, INTUITION. 27 
 
 QUESTIONS ON RATIONAL. INTUITION. 
 
 1. Define rational intuition — as an act, as a faculty, as a product. 
 
 2. Compare the empirical and rational intuitions and illustrate. 
 
 3. What is true of the chronological and logical order of empirical and 
 rational intuitions? Illustrate. 
 
 4. State and discuss the theories as to the origin of rational intuitions , 
 
 5. State the criteria of rational intuitions. How is their reality known? 
 How is their validity demonstrated? 
 
 6. What are the conditions of rational intuitions? Classify conditions. 
 
 7. What is meant by the negative", universal, non -dynamic condition? 
 
 8. What are the positive, universal, non-dynamic conditions? 
 
 9. Discuss time. Discuss space. 
 
 10. Classify the special non-dynamic conditions. 
 
 11. State the law of identity, both in its positive and negative form. 
 State the consequence. Are the subject and predicate of a definition 
 identical? How? 
 
 12. What are congruent propositions? Conflictives? Contraries, con- 
 tradictories? 
 
 13. State the law of congruents, also the consequences. Illustrate. 
 
 14. State the law of conflictives, also the consequences. Illustrate. 
 
 15. State the law of contraries, also the consequences. Illustrate. 
 
 16. State the law of contradictories, also the consequences. Illustrate. 
 
 17. State the laws of sequence. Illustrate. 
 
 18. State the fundamental axiom of geometry. Explicate it into three 
 special axioms, and deduce the ordinary so-called axioms. 
 
 19. Discuss substance, attributes, things. Classify substance. 
 
 20. What is meant by saying that the attributes of a substance harmon- 
 ize with the laws of thought. Illustrate the laws of congruents, conflict- 
 ives, contraries and contradictories. 
 
 21.. Discuss cause, giving definition, Aristotle's classification, Hume's 
 view, Mill's view, the true view. 
 
 22. State the first law of causality, giving theories as to how it is known. 
 
 23. State the remaining laws and illustrate. 
 
 24. State the law of events. Discuss absolute cause. Spencer's view. 
 
 25. What are the subjective conditions? 
 
 26. Discuss the ego, compare it with its phenomena, show how phenom- 
 ena are known, how the ego is known, and how the faculties are known. 
 
 27. Give the theories relating to the ego— Hume's theory, Reid's, Stew- 
 art's, Hamilton's, Aristotle's, St. Augustine's, Mill's, Bain's, Dr. Porter's. 
 
 28. Discuss personal identity, giving definition, theories— Hume's, 
 Bain's, Locke's, the true theory. 
 
 29. Give the illustration of the boy, the general and the president. 
 
 30. If a bad man becomes good is he the same man? 
 
28 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 VII. SENSATION. 
 
 1. Definition.— Sensation is the feeling occasioned by the excitement 
 of the organism. Thus, the sensations of smell, taste, touch, hearing and 
 sight are occasioned by the excitement of the organs of the special senses 
 There are also general sensations. 
 
 Note. — Sensations are feelings or phenomena of the sensibility; but 
 from their intimate connection with cognition, as the condition of per- 
 ception, it is necessary to discuss them in this connection. 
 
 2. General View. — Of sensations it can be said that in general: 
 1st. They have peculiar characteristics known only by experience. 
 
 2d. Their reality is certified by experience — we are conscious of sensa- 
 tions. Hence they are known facts. 
 
 3d. They are analyzed, identified or discriminated and classified by 
 reflection. 
 
 4th. They are referred, by rational intuition, to the ego as their subject, 
 and to some external object as their cause. A sensation felt implies a sub- 
 ject who feels; a sensation arising as a phenomenon in consciousness 
 requires a cause. Sensations neither feel themselves nor cause themselves. 
 
 3. Conditions of Sensations.— The conditions of sensations are the 
 following: 
 
 1st. The sensorium. — The sensorium consists of the nervous system 
 and the sense organs. It is the first condition of sensation. 
 
 1. The nervous system includes the brain, the spinal cord, the nerves, 
 and the ganglia. Afferent fibers carry currents to a center for redirection, 
 and the efferent carry them out, like the wires to and f rom the stations of 
 a telegraphic system. 
 
 2. The sense organs are the organs of the special senses — the eye, the 
 ■ear, etc. They are conditions of the special sensations. 
 
 2d. An excitant — some cause capable of exciting the sensorium. 
 3d. Action of an excitement upon the sensorium. 
 4th. The sensibility — the susceptibility of sensation. 
 Note. — The last condition — the sensibility, is psychical, the others are 
 physical or physiological. 
 
 4. Sensations Localized. — Sensations are localized, more or less 
 definitely in the sensorium, which, psychically considered, is the locus of 
 sensation. 
 
SENSATION. 
 
 29 
 
 5. Objects of Consciousness in Sensation. — The object of consciousness in 
 sensation is not the excitant, nor the sensorium, nor the sensorium excited, 
 nor the excitement of the sensorium, but the sensation in the sensorium. 
 
 Note. — There is a gap between the physiological fact — the excitement of 
 the sensorium, and the phychical fact — the sensation of the sensibility, 
 which has never yet been bridged. 
 
 The best that can now be said is that the soul sympathizes with the 
 body; but this is a poetic statement, not a scien title explanation. 
 
 6. Quality of Sensations. — The quality of a sensation involves: 
 
 1st. Existence — opposed to nonexistence, reality opposed to unreality* 
 2d. Identity. — A sensation is itself and nothing else. It has peculiar- 
 ity — its own characteristics, and particularity — the negation of the 
 characteristics of anything else. 
 
 7. Quantity of Sensations. — The quantity of a sensation involves: 
 
 1st. Degree of intensity— varying from zero to a degree ineupportable. 
 
 2d. Temporal relations — date or time when, and duration or time how 
 long. 
 
 3d. Spatial relations — locality in the sensorium, more or less definite, 
 and also extent and figure, indefinite or vague. 
 
 8. Analysis of Sensations. — A simple sensation does not admit of analysis; 
 but complex sensations are analyzed by reflection, and in special cases, as 
 in color, by experiment. 
 
 9. Synthesis of Sensations, — A combination of sensations by experiment 
 for any sense especially smell, taste, hearing, sight. 
 
 1 0. Relation of Sensations. — Relation may be considered as to kind and 
 as to variety. 
 
 1st. As to kind. — Sensations are similar, when derived through the 
 same organ, and dissimilar, when derived through different organs. Thus, 
 two colors are similar as to kind; but a color and a sound are dissimilar. 
 
 2d. As to variety.— Sensations are similar when of corresponding 
 quality, and dissimilar when of different qualities. Illustrate from color 
 sensations. 
 
 Note. — Sensations similar in kind may be similar or dissimilar in variety ; 
 but sensations dissimilar in kind or dissimilar in variety. Sensation 
 similar or dissimilar in variety may be similar or dissimilar in kind. 
 
 1 1 . Discrimination of Sensations. — The following are the proper means 
 of discrimination: 
 
 1st. Sensations dissimilar in kind are discriminated by the organs 
 excited. 
 
 2d. Sensations similar in kind are discriminated if dissimilar in variety. 
 
 3d. Sensations similar in kind and variety are discriminated if differing 
 in intensity. 
 
30 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 4th. Sensations similar in kind and variety and agreeing in intensity, 
 are discriminated if differing in the temporal relations of date and duration. 
 
 5th. Sensations similar in kind and variety, and agreeing in intensity 
 and in temporal relations are discriminated if differing in spatial relations: 
 
 ((1) Muscular. 
 
 | (2) Nervous, 
 fist. General^ (3) Nutritive. 
 
 (4) Respiratory. 
 I 1(5) Vital. 
 
 12. Classification of Sensations. «{ 
 
 f (1) Smell. 
 
 | (2) Taste. 
 [2d. Special.. «{ (3) Touch. 
 
 | (4) Hearing. 
 
 1(5) Sight. 
 
 1st. The general sensations comprise those not related to the special 
 senses: 
 
 (1) The muscular sensations are those felt in the contraction or relaxa- 
 tion of the muscles, as in standing, walking, lifting, pulling, pushing, strik- 
 ing, etc. 
 
 (2) The nervous sensations arise from the state of the nervous system, 
 not from special excitement. Some people are nervous. They need rest. 
 The nerves, however, are exited in all sensation. 
 
 (3) The nutritive sensations are connected with the nutritive system, 
 such as hunger, thirst, and their opposites, or from an unhealthy state of 
 the organs of digestion. A healthy man scarcely realizes he has a stomach; 
 a dyspeptic feels as if he had nothing else. 
 
 (4) The respiratory sensations are such as result from copious breathing 
 in pure air, or from bad air or from a lack of air. 
 
 (5) The vital sensations result from rest or fatigue, vigor or languor, 
 health or sickness, also from temperature, electrical or magnetic conditions. 
 
 2d. The special sensations comprise those related to the five senses: 
 (1) The sensations of smell are known by consciousness as located in the 
 nostrils. Odors are countless in variety. Their causes are occult. We 
 know, in general, that gaseous effluvia excite sensations of smell; but why 
 this or that peculiar sensation is excited by a particular gas, no one knows. 
 Whether due to the shape of the particles, to their motions, or to some 
 other cause, who can tell? 
 
 Sensations of odor are named from their effects, as agreeable or disagree- 
 able, pungent, stifling, etc., or from their causes, as the odor of musk, of a 
 rose, etc. Probably no two things, not even two roses from the same bush, 
 smell exactly alike. 
 
SENSATION. 31 
 
 (2) The sensations of taste are known by consciousness as located in the 
 tongue, the palate, and a portion of the pharynx. Flavors are numberless 
 in variety. Perhaps no two dishes of food taste exactly alike. The varieties 
 of flavors are named from their effects or from their causes. 
 
 The sense of taste is wonderfully discriminating, as is shown by experts 
 in detecting qualities in food or liquors; for this reason, perhaps, the word 
 taste has been employed in .ZEsthetics to denote the power to discriminate 
 and enjoy the beautiful in nature, literature and art. 
 
 (3) The sensations of touch are felt especially in the ends of the fingers, 
 the lips, and the tip of the tongue. Their nature can be learned only by 
 experience. The sense of touch is very important, in giving the best evi- 
 dence of an outer world. Touch may be regarded as the general sense — 
 the other senses being its special modifications, since they all involve con- 
 tact of something with the organ. On the theory of evolution, touch is the 
 primary sense — the other senses being differentiations of touch, 
 
 (4) The sensations of hearing are located in the ear. Sounds classified as 
 to quality and quantity exhibit a wonderful variety. They vary from low 
 to high, through all the intermediate degrees, and in like manner, from 
 feeble to loud, from soft to harsh, from smooth to rough, from light to 
 heavy, from musical to discordant. No two persons speak the same word 
 just alike. The peculiar quality of voice is called timbre. The trained ear 
 can take in the effect of an orchestra as a whole, or single out any one in- 
 strument, and follow that. 
 
 (5) The sensations of sight acquired through the eye are classified both as 
 to quality and quantity. Light varies from the faintest glimmer to daz. 
 zling brightness. 
 
 The primary colors, by their degrees of intensity and combinations, afford 
 shades wonderful in beauty and countless in variety. White light is pro- 
 duced by a combination of all the primary colors in due proportion; it is 
 also produced by combining two selected colors, called complementary. 
 Thus red and bluish green, orange and cyanogen blue, purple and green, 
 yellow and blue light, produce white; but a mixture of chrome-yellow and 
 ultramarine-blue pigments produce green. 
 
 The eye can not detect the difference between the white produced by a 
 combination of all the colors and that produced by a combination of com- 
 plementary colors, though the difference is readily detected by experiment 
 in their reactions. 
 
 A white circle on dark background looks larger than a black circle of the 
 same size on a white background. The explanation is physiological; it is 
 due to irradiation. A lady looks larger dressed in white than when dressed 
 in black. Should a large lady dress in white? 
 
 The length of a waye of red light is ^^- of an inch, that of a violet wave, 
 i^j- of an inch. Now, calling the velocity of light 192,000 miles per sec- 
 ond, how many vibrations are made per second by red light, by violet light? 
 
32 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 13. Laws of Sensation. — Physiological psychologists have established 
 the following laws: 
 
 1st. Fechner's law of the threshold. — Nervous excitement caused by the 
 stimulus must reach a certain pitch before sensation begins. The degree 
 of nervous excitement produced by the minimum stimulus at which sensa- 
 tion begins, is called the threshold. Excitement less in degree, caused by 
 a weaker stimulus, does not, therefore, occasion a sensation. Thus, we have 
 the minimum visibile, the minimum audibile, etc. 
 
 2d. Weber's law of increments. — The sensation varies with the excitement 
 and the excitement with the stimulus, according to the following law: 
 "The increase of the stimulus necessary to produce an increase of the sen- 
 sation bears a constant ratio to the total stimulus." Thus, let $ = the 
 stimulus causing a minimum sensation and — the least perceptible incre- 
 ment of any stimulus followed by a noticeable change in the sensation, the 
 differences of the terms of the series, as verified by experiment, 
 
 are the least noticeable. The difference increases with the stimulus. The 
 change of sensation in lifting 1 lb., then 2 lbs., is marked, but not in lifting 
 99 lbs., then 100 lbs. 
 
 In light, n = 100, in muscular sensation, n = 17, in pressure, heat and 
 sound, n = 3. 
 
 3d. Laws of relativity. — Of these laws there are several varieties: 
 
 (1.) Law of diminishing intensity.— The more numerous the sensations 
 simultaneously attracting attention, the less the intensity of any one. To 
 speak figuratively, as sensation spreads out in breadth, it diminishes in 
 depth. 
 
 (2.) Law of increasing intensity.— Successive sensations in striking contrast 
 heighten each other's effect. Illustrations— Go from a moderately lighted 
 room out of doors when the sun shines and snow is on the ground, and 
 after half an hour return. Go from a cold room to a warm one, and after 
 a-while return. 
 
 (3.) Law of joint effect. — A lingering sensation often combines with and 
 modifies a new sensation, or two simultaneous sensations may combine and 
 modify each other. This is shown by experiments in color. Light and 
 noise aggravate the pain of sickness. 
 
 (4.) Sensations vary with the attention given them; also in general, 
 they diminish with their duration, though the stimulus is constant. 
 
 Note. — Study thoroughly the organs of sense in works on Physiology; 
 also study sound, light and color in works on Physics. 
 
SENSATION. 
 
 33 
 
 QUESTIONS ON SENSATION. " 
 
 1. Define sensation, and illustrate for each sense. 
 
 2. Are sensations classed with the cognitions, with the feelings, or with 
 the volitions? 
 
 3. Are sensations to be referred to the intellect, to the sensibility, or to 
 the will? 
 
 4. Give the general view of sensations. 
 
 5. Describe the conditions of sensation. Which is psychical? What of 
 the others? 
 
 6. Discuss the objects of consciousness in sensation. 
 
 7. Discuss sensations as to quality and quantity. 
 
 8. State the relation of sensations as to kind, as to variety. 
 
 9. Show how to discriminate sensations. Classify the sensations. 
 
 10. Discuss the general sensations — muscular, nervous, nutritive, respira- 
 tory, vital. 
 
 11. Discuss the special sensations — smell, taste, touch, hearing, sight. 
 
 12. State the laws of sensation — the law of the threshold, the law of 
 increments, the law T s of relation. 
 
34 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 VIII. PERCEPTION IN GENERAL. 
 
 1 Definition i^ ^ ac< '- Pe + 1 ; cepti( fi S the acquisition of knowledge 
 i. uennition. j through the senses. 
 
 ( As a faculty.— Perception is the power to perceive. 
 
 Note.-A percept is the knowledge of a single quality of an object gained 
 through a single sense, as the cause of a sensation in the organ of that 
 sense. The cause of a sensation is inferred giving a percept. Percepts are 
 ideated, or developed into ideas. The combination of the percepts of an 
 object, gained through the several senses, is the appearance of that object 
 in perception. The appearance is ideated by the imagination. The idea is 
 presented when the object is present, but represented when the object is 
 absent. 
 
 The combination of all the known qualities of an object together with all 
 other qualities and powers is the object as it is in itself. 
 
 f The subject with powers of perception. 
 
 2. Conditions^ The object to be perceived. 
 
 [The synthesis of subject and object. 
 
 ( Physical — exciting cause. 
 f Objective, j Physiological —organs of sense. 
 
 ( Mechanical— action of cause, reaction of organ. 
 
 3. Elements.. <{ ^ Sensation \ Known h 7 consciousness. 
 
 I Analyzed ^ classified by reflection. 
 
 QlnhWi™ J Intuition \ °l J{j e necessity of subject-ego. 
 I Of the necessity of object— cause. 
 
 Inference— Judgment as to. cause. 
 
 t Ideation— Imagining the object or cause. 
 
 f External object acting on an organ of sense. 
 
 Excitement of the organ. 
 
 4. Succession -{ Sensation accompanying the excitement. 
 
 Intuition of the necessity of subject and object. 
 [Inference as to object or exciting cause. 
 
 5. Order of Treatment.-We shall follow the order: smell, taste touch, hear- 
 
 ing, sight. 
 
PERCEPTION. 35 
 
 IX. PERCEPTION THROUGH SMELL. 
 
 1. Definition. — Perception through smell is the act of gaining knowl- 
 edge of external objects through the sense of smell. 
 
 Note. — The act implies the power or faculty. The cause is inferred and 
 ideated, not as the occult cause in the gaseous effluvium, but in general, as 
 the object from which the gas is exhaled, as it would appear to the other 
 senses, especially to the eye. 
 
 A sense of smell. 
 Powers of perception. 
 
 2. Conditions^ Object having odorous qualities. 
 
 f Subject having 
 
 (_ Synthesis of subject and object. 
 
 ( Physical — exciting cause. 
 f Objective, j Physiological — organs of smell. 
 
 ( Mechanical — action of cause, reaction of organ. 
 
 3. Elements..^ 
 
 Sensation \ Known b ^ consciousness. 
 
 } Analyzed ^ classified by reflection. 
 
 Tnf - f - ( Of the necessity of subject— ego. 
 LSubjective<{ lrltmUon • \ Of the nesessity of object-cause. 
 
 Inference — Judgment as to cause. 
 
 ^ Ideation— Imagining the object or cause. 
 
 Note. — Of the subjective elements, the sensation is prominent. The in- 
 tuition of the necessity of the ego is unobtrusive, since being always pres- 
 ent, it does not attract special attention. The intuition of the necessity of 
 the object is more decided. The inference singles out the particular cause, 
 and ideation pictures the remote cause from which the odor comes as it 
 would appear to the eye. There may be a mistake in the inference, since 
 different bodies may have similar odors. A mistake in the inference is fol- 
 lowed by an erroneous idea. 
 
 ( It affords pleasure from agreeable odors. 
 4. Utility -j It warns of danger. 
 
 ( It is a test of the identity of objects. 
 
36 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 X. PERCEPTION THROUGH TASTE. 
 
 1. Definition. — Perception through taste is the act of gaining knowl- 
 edge of external objects through the sense of taste. 
 
 Note. — The faculty is of course implied by the act. The cause is in- 
 ferred and ideated, not in its occult nature, but as the object tasted, as it 
 would appear to the other senses, especially to touch and sight. 
 
 r c . . , . . ■. • „ \ A sense of taste, 
 f Subject having j Perceptive powers> - 
 
 2. Conditions-^ Object having sapid qualities. 
 
 (^Synthesis of subject and object. 
 
 ( Physical — exciting cause — food, 
 f Objective. •] Physiological — organs of taste. 
 
 ( Mechanical — action of cause, reaction of organ. 
 
 3. Elements..^ 
 
 f SftTisatioTi 5 Known h y consciousness, 
 sensation ^ Analyzed ^ classified by reflection.. 
 
 ^ Subjective-^ 
 
 Intuition 
 
 Of the necessity of subject —ego. 
 Of the necessity of object — cause. 
 
 Inference — Judgment as to cause. 
 
 (^Ideation — Imaging the object or cause. 
 
 Note. — Taste is a wonderfully discriminating sense. It is very sensitive 
 in the Epicure, who lives to eat. It constitutes the chief pleasure of many 
 persons; but a rational being should have higher means of enjoyment. It 
 is, however, indispensible in the economy of nature. 
 
 4. Utility 
 
 It contributes to enjoyment. 
 It guards against danger. 
 It is a test of identity. 
 
 5. Relation to Smell. — The organs of taste and smell are in proximity 
 and act in sympathy. Savory odors stimulate the appetite; but offensive 
 smells excite disgust and disinclination for bad. 
 
PERCEPTION. 
 
 37 
 
 XI. PERCEPTION THROUGH TOUCH. 
 
 1. Definition. — Perception through touch is the act of gaining knowl- 
 edge of external objects through the sense of touch. 
 
 Note. — The act implies the faculty. The cause of the sensation is in- 
 ferred and ideated by the imagination as a definite external object in con- 
 tact with the organ. 
 
 f Subject having 
 
 <J Organs of touch. 
 '( Perceptive powers. 
 
 2. 
 
 Conditions { Object having tangible qualities. 
 ^Synthesis of subject and object. 
 
 3. Elements 
 
 r Objective 
 
 ^ Subjective^ 
 
 ( Physical — exciting cause — object. , 
 
 ] Physiological — organs of touch. 
 
 ( Mechanical — action of cause, reaction of organ. 
 
 rQ ,• ( Known by consciousness, 
 foensation | Anaiyzed ^ c i ass ified by reflection. 
 
 | T f •+_• \ Of the necessity of subject — ego. 
 ' lnIumon I Of the necessity of object— cause. 
 
 Inference — Judgment as to cause. 
 Ideation — Imagining the object or cause. 
 
 Note. — The acute sensations caused by a hot or cold body, the pain from 
 a cut or bruise, or a diseased organ, as a decayed tooth, are not sensations of 
 touch. Weight gives a muscular sensation. 
 
 In touch the subjective elements, sensation, intuition, inference and idea- 
 tion are, in average cases, nearly in equilibrium. 
 
 4. Relation to Other Senses.— Touch is the general sense. The other 
 senses are its modifications, or special differentiations. 
 
 5. Utility. — Touch reveals the external world more positively than any 
 other sense. Sound supposed to be caused by something external may be 
 merely a ringing in the ear. An object supposed to be seen may be an illu- 
 sion. But when we touch an object, and handle it, and find it extended, 
 figured, solid, and resisting, we no longer doubt its reality. The object 
 we run against is not a phantom. 
 
38 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 XII. PERCEPTION THROUGH HEARING. 
 
 1. Definition. — Perception through hearing is the act of acquiring- 
 knowledge of external objects through the ear. 
 
 Note. — The act implies the faculty. The cause is inferred and ideated 
 as an external object in vibration, sending pulsations of air to the organ of 
 hearing. 
 
 f HuhWt having S ° r g ans of hearing, 
 subject having j Perceptive powe rs. 
 
 2. Conditions <{ Object having audible qualities. 
 ^Synthesis of subject and object. 
 
 ( Physical— exciting cause — vibrating body, 
 f Objective < Physiological— organ of hearing— ear. 
 
 ( Mechanical— action of cause, reaction of organ. 
 
 3. Elements ■< 
 
 ci , • ( Known by consciousness. 
 Sensation ] rr.i^/.^^.fl^u,,, 
 
 [Subjective-^ 
 
 Intuition 
 
 Analyzed ^ classified by reflection- 
 
 \ Of the necessity of subject— ego. 
 \ Of the necessity of object— cause. 
 
 I Inference — Judgment as to cause. 
 ^Ideation — Imagining the cause. 
 
 4. Relation of Subjective Elements.— Sensation is marked, intuition 
 moderate, inference and ideation prominent. 
 
 ( Reveals external objects, though not with the certainty of touch. 
 5. Utility ] Affords pleasure from conversation, oratory, music. 
 ( Warns of danger — give examples. 
 
 Note.— Study the ear carefully in works on Physiology or Physiological 
 Psychology, or still better, in the dissecting room of a medical college. 
 Obtain a clear idea of the following terms— external ear, middle ear, in- 
 ternal ear, concha, external auditory meatus, tympanic or drum membrane,, 
 tympanum, Eustachian tube, auditory ossicles, hammer, anvil, stirrup, 
 tensor tympani, stapedius, perilymph, endolymph, bony labyrinth,, 
 vestibule, canals, cochlea, ampulla, membranous labyrinth, utriculus, 
 sacculus, medialus, lamina spiralis, scala media, scala vestibule, scala 
 tympani, rods of Corti, hair cells, tectorial membrane, reticular membraner 
 basilar membrane, membrane of Reissner. 
 
PERCEPTION. 39 
 
 XIII. PERCEPTION THROUGH SIGHT. 
 
 1 . Definition. — Perception through sight is the act of acquiring knowl- 
 edge of external objects through the eye. 
 
 Note. — The act implies the faculty. The cause is inferred and ideated 
 as an external object radiating or reflecting light to the organ of vision. 
 
 f Subject having \ g r g ans ° f sight-eyes. 
 J B ( Perceptive powers. 
 
 2. Conditions <( Object having visible qualities. 
 
 ^Synthesis of subject and object. 
 
 ( Physical — exciting cause— body sending light, 
 f Objective j Physiological — organs of sight — eyes. 
 
 ( Mechanical — action of cause, reaction of organs. 
 
 Tntnition 5 0f the necessit 7 ot the subject— ego. 
 intuition j Qf the rjecessity of the object-cause. 
 
 Inference— Judgment as to cause. 
 (^Ideation — Imagining the cause. 
 
 4. Relation of the Subj ctive Elements. — Sensation is unobtrusive, except 
 in case of dazzling light or brilliant colors; intuition is moderate; inference 
 "and ideation are at their maximum. 
 
 f Swift, delicate, far-reaching. 
 5 Utilitv } R evea l s a world of marvelous beauty. 
 ' ] Affords pleasure from nature and art. 
 ^ Warns of danger. 
 
 6. Structure of the Eye, — Study the coats — sclerotic, cornea, choroid, 
 iris, retina; the chambers — anterior, posterior; the humors — aqueous, vit- 
 reous; the lenses — cornea, crystalline; ciliary muscles, optic nerve, pupil, 
 blind spot, fovea. The tubercula quadragemina, optic thalami, angular 
 gyrus, and frontal lobes, though not in the eye, are concerned in vision. 
 
 6. Defects in Vision. — Near-sightedness from too great convexity of the 
 lenses; far-sightedness from the flatness of the lenses; astygmatism from 
 the greater convexity of the lens vertically, and from defective spots; 
 spherical aberration from the greater refracting power of the lens near its 
 circumference; chromatic aberration from the different refrangibility of 
 the various colors; need of adjustment in looking at near and distant ob- 
 jects; flatness of the lens and loss of power of adjustment in old age; color 
 blindness. 
 
40 OUTLINES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 8. How a Point is Seen. — From a visible point, a diverging pencil of rays 
 of light enter the pupil of the eye, and is brought, by the lens, to a focus at 
 a point on the retina. This point is the vertex of an interior pencil of con- 
 verging rays, shorter than the exterior, the two cones having a common 
 base. The convergence of the rays to a focus at a point on the retina causes 
 an excitement at the point, accompanied by a sensation. This sensation is 
 objectified, ideated and .referred to the point at the vertex of the exterior 
 pencil as its cause. The point is thus seen in its true position. The ability 
 correctly to make this reference, or to see a point in its true position, is 
 acquired by experience, the sense of touch serving as tutor to the eye. If 
 the point is near, it can be touched by stretching forth the hand; if* farther 
 off, by going to it. 
 
 9. Accommodation of the Eye.— If the point be brought nearer the eye 
 than the normal distance of about 15 inches, the rays of the external pencil 
 would be more diverging, requiring more work of the lens, otherwise the 
 focus would be thrown back of the retina, and on the retina there would be 
 a circle of diffusion, causing the point to appear blurred. The lens is en- 
 abled to do. this work by the active accommodation of the eye produced by 
 the contraction of the ciliary muscle, causing the anterior surface of the 
 lens to be more convex, thus keeping the focus on the retina, and the 
 appearance of the point distinct. 
 
 If the point be removed farther from the eye. the rays of the exterior 
 pencil would be less diverging, requiring less* work of the lens, otherwise 
 the focus would be before the retina, and the rays crossing at the focus, 
 would form a circle of diffusion on the retina, and cause the point to appear 
 blurred. The lens is adjusted to this case by the passive accommodation of 
 the eye produ6ed by the relaxation of the ciliary muscle, allowing the an- 
 terior surface of the lens to flatten, thus keeping, as before, the focus on 
 the retina, and the appearance of the point distinct. 
 
 The fact of accommodation is thus illustrated by experiment. Fix two 
 pins upright about two feet apart, and closing one eye look at them with 
 the other nearly in range with the pins, about two feet from the nearest 
 pin. If attention be directed to either pin, the other will appear blurred. 
 Either pin can, at will, be made to appear distinct, by looking at it: but 
 both can not be made to appear distinct at the same time. 
 
 10. How an Object is Seen.— Rays of pencils from two visible points in 
 the surface of an object are brought to foci on the retina, in points which 
 are symmetrically arranged with respect to the corresponding points of the 
 points of the object, and since the axes or central lines of the pencils cross 
 in the lens, the higher point in the object corresponds to the lower on the 
 retina, the one on the left to the one on the right, and the reverse. 
 
 In like manner, rays of pencils from all the visible points of the object 
 are brought to their proper foci in corresponding points on the retina, thus 
 
PERCEPTION. 41 
 
 forming an image or miniature picture symmetrical with the object, that is, 
 the image is inverted and the sides reversed. 
 
 By an act of judgment, guided by experience and spontaneous from 
 habit, the cause of the sensation at each point of the image is Objectified, 
 located and ideated or seen in its proper position in the visible surface of 
 the object. Since each point of the visible surface is seen in its true posi- 
 tion, as proved in the perception of a variegated surface, the object is seen 
 in its true position and magnitude, and appears erect, though the image on 
 the retina is inverted. 
 
 If the rays from the several points of the object reach the retina before 
 coming to a focus, or if they come to a focus before reaching the retina, 
 circles of diffusion would bo formed, which by overlapping confuse the 
 image and render the perception indistinct. 
 
 It is the ideated appearance that is seen, not the image on the retina. To 
 see the image would require another eye back of the first. The mind is not 
 at all conscious of the image on the retina; but it is conscious of the ide- 
 ated appearance, which is its own construction, embodying its judgment as 
 to the cause of the sensation. In ordinary vision, the ideated appearance 
 coincides with the object, which is more than a visible idea, as is proved by 
 touch, or by the resistance it opposes to our movement. 
 
 The image on the retina can be seen in the eye of an ox, by taking off the 
 back part of the outer coats. 
 
 1 1 . Binocular Vision.— Why does'not the object appear double, since it 
 is seen with two eyes? The cause of the sensation in each eye is objecti- 
 fied, located and ideated in its proper position, giving virtually two appear- 
 ances; but since each appearance is in coincidence with the object, the two 
 appearances are in coincidence with each other, thus blending and forming 
 one appearance. That there are two blended appearances is made evident 
 by pushing one eye, which causes the appearances to separate. 
 
 Why does pushing one eye separate the appearances? It removes the 
 image on the retina of the eye pushed to a place not corresponding to the 
 place of the image on the other eye, and two such images could come only 
 from two objects, seen as two, if the eye was not pushed. The judgment is 
 formed, the cause located and ideated when the eye is pushed, the same as 
 for like sensations, in the normal case, when the eye is not pushed, in which 
 case the appearance is double; hence the reason why the appearance is 
 double when one eye is pushed. 
 
 1 2, The Material Reality.— How do we know there is such a reality? 
 
 To anticipate what we expect to prove, the material reality is the remote 
 cause of the excitement of the organ, and this excitement is the occasion 
 of the sensation. Strictly the excitement is the joint product of the action 
 of the external cause and the reaction of the organ. The sensation accom- 
 panies the excitement of the organ, and varies with the remote cause or 
 material object. The judgment infers the nature of the object, and the 
 
42 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 imagination ideates the judgment or pictures the cause. We infer what 
 sort of an object that must be whicn gives us certain sensations. The ide- 
 ated appearance is the spontaneous creation made by the imagination to 
 embody our conclusions. So far idealism is true— the objective images or 
 appearances are our own constructions, and being our own ideas, they are 
 objects of consciousness; but the idea embodies our inference as to the 
 material reality or external cause of the excitement of the organ, which is 
 the occasion of the sensation. The image combines the percepts of color r 
 locality, extent and form. This combination of percepts, as a mere creation 
 of the mind, located in space, could not, in itself affect the sense of touch, 
 nor offer any resistance to our muscular energy; but as the sense of touch 
 is excited, and locomotive energy resisted, there is, not only the visual 
 image, but a real object tangible and resisting. 
 
 Combining with the ideated visible appearance, the ideated inferences as 
 to the causes of the sensations through the other senses, we have a more^ 
 complex and perfect idea of the object. 
 
 The appearances of the same object to different minds are essentially 
 alike, which would not be the case, if the appearances were not conditioned 
 by an objective factor independent of the percipient minds. This objective 
 factor or external cause of the excitement of the organ, is therefore, a non- 
 ego, which being the same for the different minds, accounts for the agree- 
 ment of the appearances. If a so-called object is changed in the absence of 
 a person familiar with it, he will, on his return, notice the change. The 
 only rational explanation is that a real object, independent of the mind of 
 the person, was changed while he was absent. A farmer changes his 
 clothes, drives to town and buys goods, but finds, to his chagrin, that he has 
 no pocket-book with him. Is his pocket-book simply ideal — a. pure creation 
 of his imagination? If so, let him, if he can, create another, full of money. 
 A railway train is precipitated into a river by the breaking down of a 
 bridge. On investigation, the catastrophe is found to be occasioned by a 
 flaw in one of the main iron supports of the bridge. Is the flaw T merely an 
 idea? Common sense decides that the flaw is objectively real, since it was 
 followed by its consequence before it was ideated. 
 
 "Full many a gem of purest ray serene, 
 The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear; 
 
 Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, 
 And waste its sweetness on the desert air." 
 
PERCEPTION. 
 
 43 
 
 XIV. ACQUIRED PERCEPTION. 
 
 1. Definition. — Acquired perception is imagining how an object would, 
 appear to one sense by its appearance to another. Its guide is experience. 
 Acquired perceptions are derived through each sense. 
 
 2. Smell. — In smell we not only infer and ideate the cause of the sen- 
 sation, but imagine how the object would appear to one or more of the 
 other senses. Thus in smelling a ripe peach, I imagine how it would taste* 
 
 3. Taste. — In taste, though the food is not seen, you know what it is,, 
 and how it would appear to the eye. 
 
 4. Touch. — The perception of an object through touch is accompanied 
 by such acquired perceptions as would be directly given by the other senses. 
 
 5. Hearing. — In hearing we readily supply what the other senses would 
 give. Thus in hearing the well known voice of a friend, you imagine how 
 he looks, and know from the tones of his voice whether he is pleased or 
 angry. Strike a' barrel, and you know whether it is full or empty. In the 
 acquired perceptions through hearing there is great liability to mistake* 
 especially if the sound is unusual. The noise a pet squirrel made in turn- 
 ing his cage was mistaken for that of burglars drilling into a safe, and the 
 police were called out to capture the thieves. 
 
 6. Sight, — There are a variety of acquired perceptions through sight: 
 1st. The distance of an object is estimated from its magnitude and vis- 
 ual angle. Knowing the size of the church on yonder hill, and the visual 
 it subtends, I judge quite accurately its distance; but if I mistake the mag- 
 nitude, for example, take a pigeon-house to be a church, I shall greatly 
 over-estimate the distance. 
 
 2d. The magnitude of an object is estimated from its distance and visual 
 angle. Knowing the distance of the church, I judge its magnitude from 
 the visual angle. A pigeon-house appears as a large as a church, if mistaken 
 for the distant church. 
 
 3d. Magnitude is estimated by comparison. Knowing the magnitude of 
 one of two adjacent objects, the magnitude of the other can be inferred. A 
 mistake in regard to the magnitude of one leads to a false estimate of the 
 magnitude of the other. Dr. Abercrombie going up Ludgate Hill towards 
 
44 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 the door of St. Paul's church, took several persons standing in the doorway 
 to be children; but on coming up he found them to be men. He -had com 
 pared them with the door which was larger than he had supposed. 
 
 4th. The form of bodies, though known originally by touch, is yet in- 
 ferred, with surprising accura «y, from sight alone. An orange is to sight, a 
 yellow circle, yet it is represo tfced as spherical, with a rough surface, as 
 capable of exciting sensations of smell and taste, as naturally divisible into 
 ungula, and having seeds. An artist can paint, on flat canvas, a sphere, a 
 chair, a table, etc., which look as natural as the objects themselves. The 
 paintings reflect light as the objects do, causing similar sensations, and the 
 mind interprets and ideates accordingly. If by any cause we could have 
 the same sensations that certain visible objects give, we would seem to see 
 those objects. 
 
 5th. Clearness of vision causes objects to appear nearer, and dimness 
 causes them to appear more remote. The celestial vault appears nearer at 
 the zenith through clear air, than at the horizon through the misty atmos- 
 phere near the surface of the earth. Objects in Italy appear nearer than 
 equal objects in England at the same distance. Why do they thus appear? 
 Why do the sun and moon appear larger when seen in the horizon than 
 when seen near the zenith? 
 
 6th. Motion is detected by following the moving body with the eye, and 
 noticing the muscular sensations accompanying the movement of the eye- 
 ball; it is also detected, in indirect vision, by keeping the eye at rest while 
 the object moves across the field of view; again motion i^ detected by an 
 object changing its range in reference to other objects. 
 
 7th. In the perception of number, how many can we accurately see at 
 once without counting? Test by experiment. A vast multitude, as the stars 
 of heaven, can be seen at a glance, but vaguely, not the defiuite number. 
 
 7. Development of Perception.— The facts of sensation, intuition, infer- 
 ence, and ideation, and the senses, instincts, and faculties implied are to be 
 accepted as original. 
 
 The development of the powers of perception in children is effected by 
 their endeavors to learn the properties and relations of things. They make 
 many experiments, and learn both by success and by failure. They observe 
 and reflect and classify and remember. 
 
 The perceptions following sensation are at first obscure and indistinct. 
 A sensation of pleasure or pain attracts attention, which for the time is 
 withdrawn from other things, and an effort is made to enjoy the pleasure 
 or avoid the pain. 
 
 Two or more senses may be employed at the same time, giving groups of 
 ^sensation simultaneous or successive, which become associated, so that 
 when one is experienced the others are expected. 
 
PERCEPTION. 45 
 
 Intuition awakes and apprehends the necessity of self as subject of the 
 sensations, and the necessity of objects as causes. The causes themselves 
 are discovered by investigation, one sense taking and correcting the de- 
 cisions of another. 
 
 The hand, the eye, the ear, reinforced by the other senses, are the means 
 of investigation. 'When objects are not only visible, but excite the sense of 
 touch, and resist movement, they are known to be realities, something more 
 than mere ideas. 
 
 The idea gained by one sense calls up the associated ideas that could be 
 gained by the other senses. We seem to perceive more than we actually 
 do, since representation reinforces presentation. 
 
 Bodies are perceived as occupying space, having magnitude and form, as' 
 contained in space, being at rest or in motion, and as having date and dura- 
 tion in time. Things and events require not only non-dynamic conditions, 
 but dynamic — substance and cause. Substance is the condition of things, 
 and causes of events. 
 
 A material object is a substance with attributes, not merely a combina- 
 tion of qualities, nor is one quality the substance of which the other quali- 
 ties are attributes. The substance is the common ground or substratum 
 involving a combination of. energies which manifest conjoined qualities ex- 
 citing the various senses, thus occasioning the corresponding sensations. 
 The causes of the sensations are inferred, objectified and ideated as quali- 
 ties in objects exterior to ourselves. The complex ideas acquired by per- 
 ception are not regarded as mere ideas, creations of the mind corresponding 
 to nothing, but as having an objective factor, and representing our discov- 
 eries of the properties of external objects. This is their significance. 
 
 Events in the material world require not only the non-dynamic condi- 
 tions, negative and positive — the absence of preventing influences, or no 
 hindrance, and time and space, or opportunity, but an antecedent which, 
 we are now to show is a dynamic condition, or an efficient cause. 
 
 Taking efficiency out of the antecedent, it becomes non-dynamic, and 
 nothing is added to the non-dynamic conditions which were present before 
 and the presence or absence of the antecedent would be a matter of indif- 
 ference, which is not the case, since the absence of the antecedent is not 
 followed by the event; hence the antecedent adds something which is not 
 non-dynamic, that is, something which is dynamic; hence the antecedent is 
 an efficient cause. 
 
 8. Errors in Perception. — Errors in perception are not errors in sensa- 
 tion; for we are conscious of sensation. Neither are errors in perception 
 errors of intuition which apprehends the necessity of the subject and tha 
 necessity of the cause. ■ . 
 
46 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 The error is found in inference which judges of the cause of the sensa- 
 tion. The erroneous judgment when ideated becomes an an illusive 
 appearance not corresponding to the reality. 
 
 The cause of these illusions is objective, subjective, or both objective 
 and subjective. 
 
 1st. Objective illusion is due to something in the object which gives a 
 sense impression similar to that which would be given by the supposed ob- 
 ject. The object thus suggested is erroneously inferred and ideated. 
 
 2d. Subjective illusion is due to some preconception or expectation. 
 The object expected is imagined and believed to be perceived. 
 
 3d. Illusion objective and subjective is due to both of the above causes. 
 This is the most common cause. Thus in ghost-seeing, the suggesting ob- 
 ject and the anticipation combine, the inference is made according to the 
 anticipation, which is quickly ideated by the imagination, and the dreaded 
 ghost is seen. 
 
 Errors arise in interpreting the words or looks of another; likewise in 
 judging of beauty, certain elements are supplied by the object, other ele- 
 ments by the mind. 
 
 9. Experiments in Perception. — Many interesting experiments can be 
 performed: 
 
 1st. Look at the knob of the door, pushing one eye. Two knobs appear. 
 Why? Why does one appearance appear to move? 
 
 2d. Look at the knob, holding a pencil about six inches in front of the 
 eyes. If attention be directed to the knob, the pencil will appear double; 
 if to the pencil, the knob will appear double. Why? 
 
 3d. Cross the fingers and roll a pencil between them. Two pencils will 
 appear to touch. Why? 
 
 4th. Roll a sheet of paper into a tube about one inch in diameter. Look 
 through the tube with one eye, and at the hand placed by the side of the 
 tube with the other. A hole the size of the tube will appear in the hand 
 through which objects may be seen. 
 
 5th. Look at the following figure with the book eight inches from the 
 eyes: What do you see and why? 
 
 Gth. Does the knob of the door appear single or double to a cross-eyed 
 person? 
 7th. Does a person ever feel pain in a foot that has been amputated? 
 
PERCEPTION. 47 
 
 8th. Close the right eye and look at the star with the left, holding the 
 book one foot before the face. Why does the disk disappear? 
 
 9th. Contrive original experiments. 
 
 1 0. Activity and Passivity.— The ego is active in subjecting itself to cer- 
 tain conditions. Thus a person voluntarily goes into a warm room or a cold 
 one; into a light or dark room; puts sugar or salt into his mouth, etc. 
 Having done any of these things the sensation follows. There is activity in 
 -complying with the conditions, passivity in the sensation. 
 
 In perception the soul is active in bringing the object before the senses, 
 or m going to the object, and abstracting his attention from other things 
 and concentrating it on the given object; this done, he is passive in the 
 sensation, active in studying the object, passive in yielding to evidence, and 
 spontaneously active in ideating the appearance. 
 
 The complete ideas we have of objects are the fruits of much experience 
 and many investigations made long ago, and perhaps now forgotten. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON PERCEPTION. 
 
 1. Define perception as an act, as a faculty. 
 
 2. Define a percept. What does a combination of percepts give? 
 
 3. When is an object presented? When represented? 
 
 4. State the conditions of perception. Give the elements. 
 
 5. State the order of succession. State the order of treatment. 
 
 6. Define perception through smell. What does the cause imply? 
 
 7. How is the cause of sensation ideated? 
 
 8. State the conditions of perception through smell. Give the elements 
 
 9. State the relative prominence of the elements. In which element 
 does error originate? What other element is affected by the error? 
 
 10. State the utility of the sense of smell. 
 
 11. Define perception through taste. What is implied by the act? 
 
 12. How is the cause of the sensation ideated? 
 
 13. State the conditions of perception through taste. Give the elements 
 
 14. State the discriminating power of taste, transferred use, utility. 
 
48 OUTLINES ON PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 15. Define perception through touch. Give its conditions, its elements. 
 
 16. What is the relation of touch to the other senses? State its utility. 
 
 17. Define perception through hearing. State conditions, elements, 
 relation of subjective elements, utility. 
 
 18. Describe the structure of the ear. 
 
 19. Define perception through sight. State conditions, elements, relation 
 of subjective elements, utility. 
 
 20. Describe the structure of the eye. State its defects. 
 
 21. Show how a point is seen. 
 
 22. What is a circle of diffusion? In what two ways formed. 
 
 23. Explain the accommodation of the eye. 
 
 24. Show how two points are seen. How an object is seen. 
 
 25. How an object is seen in its true position and magnitude. 
 
 26. Describe binocular vision. Discuss the material reality. 
 
 27. Define acquired perception, and discuss for each sense. 
 
 28. Discuss the development of perception. Discuss the errors. 
 
 29. Give the experiments of the text. Invent original experiments. 
 
 30. Discuss activity and passivity in sensation and perception. 
 
XV. THEORIES OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 1 . Ionic Philosophers. — Thales, Anaximander and Anaximines en_ 
 deavored to find the ultimate principle of things, but they threw no light 
 on perception. 
 
 2. Pythagoras. — Pythagoras found the principle of things in number, 
 but did not explain perception. 
 
 3. Eleatic Philosophers. — Xenophenes, Parmenides and Zeno held that 
 perception through sense is illusive, reason alone giving true knowledge. 
 They found the principle of things in Being. Zeno undertook to prove the 
 impossibility of motion. 
 
 4. Hereclitus. — Hereclitus found the principle of things in Becoming, 
 that is, in change; but did not explain perception. 
 
 5. Empedocles. — Empedocles held that bodies send off effluxes, which 
 enter the pores of the various senses and occasion perception. In sight, ef- 
 fluxes also pass from the eye. The meeting of the two streams occasions 
 the images seen in vision. He also held that the knowing subject and the 
 known object must be of like nature — a false assumption, though powerful 
 in its influence on speculation. 
 
 6. Plato. — Plato held that sensation is the joint product of the subject 
 and object; that as the individual factor varies, sensations vary; and there- 
 fore, that perception through sensation is illusive. 
 
 7. Aristotle. — Aristotle discriminated between sensation and perception. 
 We have certain knowledge [consciousness] of sensation; but perception, 
 involving a judgment, is liable to error. Each sense perceives its own ob- 
 ject. The heart is common sensory. All objects have motion or rest, num- 
 ber, magnitude and form. 
 
 8. Schoolmen.— The Schoolmen held that material objects are not per- 
 ceived, but only their species [images]. For this view they gave the follow- 
 ing reasons: 
 
 1. The object when apparently seen is not in 'contact with the organ. 
 
 2. The object is material while the soul is spiritual. The two being un- 
 like can not act on one another. This is the doctrine of Empedocles. 
 
 3. Since the object can not affect the soul, the soul can not perceive the 
 object. 
 
 4. Everything immediately known must be in the mind, but this is not 
 true of the distant object. The answer to this is that the distant object is 
 mediately know. It is known through the senses. 
 
 ' (49) 
 
50 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 5. The object does not vary, but the appearance varies according to the 
 position of the subject, or as an object seen in a mirror. 
 
 Remarks. — 1. The more intelligent of the Schoolmen did not regard the 
 species as material. 
 
 2. In maintaining that the species, acting on the sense, incites the mind 
 to perceive the object, the way was prepared for the gross doctrine of an 
 intermediate material image representing the object. 
 
 3. The objection to this is that we might as well perceive the object as 
 the image; but if we perceive the image, how do we know that it correctly 
 represents the object? 
 
 4. The truth is, the idea is not independent of the mind — an object of 
 perception. It is the product of perception — the outcome of the complex 
 act. It embodies the mind's judgment as to the nature of the object — it is 
 the ideated inference. 
 
 5. All this becomes clear by noticing the succession of acts in perception: 
 
 (1) Excitement from action of object — cause, and reaction of the organ. 
 
 (2) Sensation accompanying the excitement of the organ. 
 
 (3) Intuition of the necessity of the subject— ego, and of the object, cause. 
 
 (4) Judgment as to the nature of the object or cause. 
 
 (5) Ideation of the judgment by the imagination. 
 
 6. The idea embodies our discoveries as to the nature of the object. It 
 is the mind's own construction — a mental product representing a material 
 object. If it is objected that an idea can not represent a material object, 
 since the two are wholly unlike, the reply is, one thing does not have to be 
 like another in order to represent it. A letter represents a sound, yet the 
 two are very unlike. In one point of view, the Geometric, the idea and the 
 object are analogous — the idea has ideal form truly representing the real 
 form — the image of a sphere may be in coincidence with the sphere. But 
 the idea is not a physical solid as the sphere may be. 
 
 9. Descartes. — The view of Descartes can be summarily presented thus: 
 
 1. Descartes assumed nothing, but doubted everything it was possible 
 for him to doubt. One thing he could not doubt — the fact that he doubted; 
 but doubting is one form of thinking. He could not doubt the fact of his 
 thinking. Thinking requires a thinker— his thinking involved his exist- 
 ence. Cogito, ergo sum. Hence he made consciousness of phenomena the 
 basis of his system. 
 
 2. Descartes proved the existence of God thus: We have an idea of an 
 all-perfect Being; but existence is essential to perfection, therefore, the 
 most perfect Being exists; or thus: 
 
 The idea of a most perfect Being is too great for us to form; but since we 
 have it, God must have formed it in us; therefore God exists. 
 
PERCEPTION. 51 
 
 3. The veracity of God is our warrant for passing from the ego to the 
 world of matter. The essential property of matter is extension. The 
 other properties, such as hardness, color, etc., are variable, and therefore 
 accidental. Matter is not dynamic. 
 
 4. The essential attribute of mind is thought. Ideas are similar to their 
 objects and are caused by a non-ego, but not by matter, since matter is not 
 dynamic. Hence God is the origin of our ideas. 
 
 5. Matter and mind are totally distinct, and can not, therefore, act upon 
 one another. This is the assumption of Empedocles. 
 
 Remarks. — 1. Descartes, in basing his system on the facts of conscious- 
 ness, laid the immovable foundations of the edifice of truth, and thus 
 became the founder of Modern Philosophy. 
 
 2. He sharply discriminated between extended matter and thinking 
 mind. No interaction, or causal relation can exist between them. In fact, 
 matter not being dynamic, can not be a cause. The doctrine of this para- 
 graph is erroneous. Matter and mind interact, and matter is dynamic. 
 
 3. His demonstration of the existence of God is open to objection. It 
 does not follow that what we clearly conceive has an objective existence, as 
 a centaur, a griffin. Neither does it follow that God must have given us 
 the idea; for we readily conceive of beings more perfect than ourselves. 
 
 4. In saying that ideas are similar to their objects, Descartes used the 
 word similar with some latitude. A body may be hard, but our idea of it 
 is not hard. They are correct or incorrect according to the judgment. - 
 
 5. Descartes was right in saying, that because our ideas are beyond our 
 control, they are occasioned by a non-ego; but as matter is non-dynamic, it 
 can not form the idea of body in us; hence, when the body is present, God 
 intervenes, and gives us the idea of the body; and for the truthfulness of 
 the idea, we rely on the veracity of God. It is not true that matter is non- 
 dynamic. The idea is our own and varies with our judgment. 
 
 10. Malebranch. — Malebranch gave the elements of perception thus: 
 
 1. Action of excitant or objective cause upon the organ. 
 
 2. Affection of the organ acted upon by the object. 
 
 3. Sensation consequent on the excitement of the organ. 
 
 4. Judgment as to the nature of the object or cause. 
 
 Malebranch also held the following views: 
 
 1. Matter and mind are heterogeneous entities and, therefore, can not 
 interact. Empedocles again. 
 
 2. Ideas are presented by the power of God, when the object is present. 
 
 3. God is the place of spirits. We see all things in God. 
 
 4. Ideas are distinct, both from the object and from the mind. 
 
 5. Ideas are truthful, since they are God's representatives of objects. 
 Remarks. — 1. Malebranch explained perception more clearly than any 
 
 preceding philosopher, than even Descartes himself. 
 
52 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 2. He omitted the intuition of the necessity of subject and object, also 
 ideation. 
 
 3. If the external object acts on the organ, matter has dynamic powers. 
 
 4. The excitement of the material organ can not, according to Male- 
 branch, be the cause of the sensation of the soul, since matter can not act 
 on mind; but on the occasion when the object is present, God intervenes,, 
 causes the sensation, and presents the idea. 
 
 5. He thus adopts "Occasionalism," which was implicit in Descartes, but. 
 was developed by Geulinx. 
 
 6. Sensation serves to call attention to God's ideas. 
 
 7. The judgment is the perception of the Divine idea. 
 
 8. In fact, the idea is our construction embodying our judgment. 
 
 1 1. Spinoza. — Spinoza's views bearing on perception are thus stated: 
 
 1. Spinoza postulated one substance — God having the two attributes — 
 thought and extension. 
 
 2. There is no causal connection between thought and extension. 
 
 3. There is correspondence between thought and extension — thought 
 corresponds to thing, and idea to object. This correspondence is the expla- 
 nation of perception. 
 
 1 2. Arnauld. — Arnauld's views may be summed up thus: 
 
 1. Arnauld held that the soul perceives the object, not the idea. 
 
 2. The idea is the perception. It has no existence apart from the- 
 perception. 
 
 3. The mind perceives objects directly, or it could not know that the 
 ideas truly represent the objects. 
 
 Remarks. — 1. It is better to say that the mind perceives objects than to 
 say it perceives ideas. Ideas are not existing entities for the mind to look 
 at. The mind perceives, that is, judges what the object is, from the sensa- 
 tion it causes, and the imagination embodies this judgment in an idea. 
 In sight, this is called seeing the object, which is the best statement for 
 common purposes. 
 
 2. Arnauld's statement that ideas have no existence apart from the act 
 of perception is true of presentation but not of representation. 
 
 3. We do not compare ideas with objects to ascertain whether or not the 
 ideas correctly represent their objects, for that would imply that we had 
 independent knowledge of objects; but the best knowledge we have is that 
 embodied in the idea obtained by perception. We may, however, compare 
 the idea obtained in an indirect way, as from a picture, by reading, or from 
 oral description, with the idea obtained from seeing the object; and that 
 obtained at one time with that obtained at another time. 
 
 4. How do we know that the idea truly represents the object? It is the 
 result reached after due examination— the embodiment of deliberate judg- 
 ment as to the cause of the sensation. The judgment may be true or false. 
 We take it at its true value. It is the best that we can do, and must suffice. 
 
PERCEPTION. 
 
 53 
 
 13. Locke.— The doctrines of Locke relating to perception are the 
 following: 
 
 1. Locke held to two sources of knowledge— sensation and reflection. 
 
 2. "The mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention 
 -of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge is real only so far as there is a 
 conformity between our ideas and the reality of things." 
 
 3. Matter has two classes of properties— primary, embracing solidity, 
 ■extension, figure, motion or rest, number; and secondary, embracing smell, 
 taste, sound,- color. 
 
 4. "Ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and 
 their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas pro- 
 duced in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblance to them at all." 
 
 Remarks. — 1. In deriving all knowledge from sensation and reflection, 
 Locke ignored rational intuition as a source of knowledge, and the result 
 has been disastrous, as seen in the skepticism of Berkley and Hume. 
 Locke makes the statement: "He would be thought void of common sense, 
 who asked, on the one side or on the other side, went to give a reason, why 
 it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." How did Locke 
 know this? From sensation? From reflection? 
 
 2. If we know things "only by the intervention of ideas," how do we 
 know that "there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality?" Ideas 
 ■do not intervene, that is, come between our minds and the objects. Our 
 ideas are our knowledge of objects. We find out the nature of objects by 
 inferences, by judgments, and our ideas are the mental pictures of our 
 discoveries. 
 
 3. Locke's classification of the properties of matter has some merit. See 
 page 20, for a full classification of the properties of matter, 
 
 4. If "our knowledge is real only so far as there is a conformity between 
 ■our ideas and the reality of things," and if "the ideas produced in us by the 
 secondary qualities have no resemblance to them at all," how did Locke 
 know that there are secondary qualities? Did he know it by sensation? 
 Did he know it by reflection? 
 
 The truth is we know the necessity of secondary qualities by rational in- 
 tuition. We have certain sensations of smell, taste, etc., of which we are 
 conscious; and these sensations must have causes adequate to produce 
 them, though the peculiarity of the causes is occult. 
 
 1 4. Berkley. — Berkley's views are thus summarized: 
 
 1. Ideas are the things immediately known. 
 
 2. Ideas do not represent material objects. 
 
 3. Material objects do not exist. 
 
 Berkley reasons thus: "Are the supposed original things perceivable or 
 no? If they are, then they are ideas; if not, then ideas can not represent 
 them. Can a color represent something invisible? " 
 
54 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 "Since we are affected without, the power must be without in a being dis- 
 tinct from ourselves. From the effects I see there are actions, if 
 actions, then volitions, if volitions, then will; but ideas can exist only in an 
 understanding; but will and understanding constitute Mind or Spirit." 
 
 Remarks. — 1. Berkley was not a subjective, but an objective Idealist. 
 He held that ideas exist in a being apart from ourselves — that they are 
 God's ideas. But ideas are our constructions, since they vary with our in- 
 ferences. They are our ideated judgments. 
 
 2. Berkley held that ideas are perceivable. Ideas are not independent 
 objects of perception that we can look at. They are our own creations 
 made to account for our sensations, and are thus the outcome of perception. 
 
 3. Berkley's doctrine is the legitimate conclusion of the philosophy of 
 Locke, as applied to the material world, and as a reductio ad dbsurdum 
 argument, is a refutation of that philosophy. 
 
 1 5. Hume. — Hume's views of perception are thus summarized: 
 
 1. An idea is a copy taken by the mind of an impression made on a sense- 
 The impression makes us perceive pleasure or pain, hunger or thirst, etc. 
 
 2. The idea, when it returns, produces new impressions of hope, fear, 
 etc., which are ideas of reflection. 
 
 3. As the idea of substance can be derived neither from sensation nor 
 reflection, we have no right to such an idea. Matter is* an aggregate of 
 ideas of qualities, and mind is perception. 
 
 4. The idea of space is derived from the perception of visible and tangi- 
 ble objects. 
 
 5. The idea of time is derived from the succession of ideas. 
 
 6. The idea of cause is that of immediate and invariable antecedence. 
 "We may define cause to be one object followed by another where all the 
 objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second." 
 
 Remarks.— 1. If Hume is right, we not only have no right to the idea of 
 substance, but we could not have it all; but we do have this idea, therefore 
 Hume is wrong. The idea of substance is derived neither from sensation 
 nor reflection, but from rational intuition. 
 
 2. The same is true of the idea of cause as efficiency. We not only have 
 no right to this idea, if Hume is right, but we could not possibly have it; 
 but Hume himself had the idea; for he says: "As to those impressions 
 which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly 
 inexplicable by human reason." If cause is simply an antecedent, the cause 
 of a sense impression is not inexplicable; for we know the antecedent. 
 
 3. The mind is more than perception — more than even the aggregate of 
 phenomena. Cognition, feeling and willing, are not self-supporting, any 
 more than running is self-supporting. The horse runs, the boy runs; but 
 running does not run itself, neither does thinking think itself. Thinking 
 requires something that thinks— a subject. The ego is the subject of think- 
 ing, feeling and willing. 
 
PERCEPTION. 55 
 
 4. Hume's conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum of Locke's philosophy, 
 more decisive even than that of Berkley. 
 
 5. It may be true, as Hamilton thinks, that Hume was not a Dogmatist, 
 and did not even believe his own conclusions, but that he was a skeptic, 
 showing the absurdity of the conclusions involved in the principles of the 
 prevailing philosophy, and hence its falsity. 
 
 1 6. Kant. — Kant's views bearing on perception are thus summarized: 
 
 1. Knowledge begins with the experience of phenomena. 
 
 2. Knowledge does not all arise out of experience. 
 
 3. Elements of knowledge \ gmpirical-CJontingent-a posteripri. 
 
 6 I Rational— Necessary — a prion. 
 
 { Pure— in absolute necessity \ gJJ^fg 
 
 4. A priori \ 
 
 \ t • -,.,. n .j. ( Substance. 
 
 (^Impure — in conditional necessity - n ause 
 
 o. 
 
 pi \ Matter — empirical intuition — given a posteriori in sensation. 
 
 n } Form — pure intuition — given a priori in perception. 
 
 6. The form given a priori is a subjective law of thought, not an objec- 
 tive law of things. Our minds must think of events as having causes, of 
 bodies as existing in space, and of succession as taking place in time, but 
 this may not be so, in reality, of things in themselves. 
 
 7. Kant sums up his doctrine of perception thus: "All our intuition is 
 but the representation of phenomena; the things which we intuit are not in 
 themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are 
 their relations in themselves as they appear to us; and if we take away the 
 subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, 
 then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but 
 even space and time themselves disappear; and as phenomena can not exist 
 in themselves but only in us." 
 
 Remarks. — 1. If we take away the subject, space and time would of 
 course disappear as to that subject, since then by hypothesis, the subject 
 would not be anything to which they could appear. The ideas of space and 
 time, as phenomena, can exist only in a subject; but space and time, as 
 necessary realities in themsel /es, would continue to exist though the sub- 
 ject were annihilated. 
 
 2. It is true that things are not the same as [identic il with] our repre- 
 sentations of them ; an object is one thing, and our representation of it is 
 another; but if things in themselves are wholly unknown, how did Kant 
 know that their relations in themselves are not as they appear to us? 
 
 3. It is true that we do not know the essential constitution of objects as 
 things in themselves, but the fact that the a priori elements are the same, 
 whatever our sensations may be, proves that they are not vitiated by our 
 sensations, and hence they are the same to all rational minds. 
 
56 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 4. Space and time are absolute realities in themselves. In the Geologic 
 ages, countless years before man appeared, the earth existed and revolved 
 about the sun, that is, moved through space; hence space existed; and the 
 Geologic periods succeeded one another, that is followed in time; hence 
 time existed. If all mind was annihilated, the material universe remaining, 
 the worlds revolving as now, space and time would be the necessary condi- 
 tion of these worlds. 
 
 1 7. Reid.— Reid's views can be thus briefly stated: 
 
 1. We perceive not the idea but the very thing itself. 
 
 ( Conception of the object perceived. 
 
 2. Perception involves j Irresistible belief in its present existence. 
 
 ( Belief immediate, not the result of reasoning. 
 
 Remarks.— 1. Conception is not the first thing in perception, but the 
 last; it is not immediate, but mediate through sensation; the passage from 
 sensation to the conception [idea] is not immediate, but mediate, through 
 the inference as to the cause of the sensation. If there were no sensations 
 there would be no inference; if no inference, then no idea. It may be ob- 
 jected that an object, as a wall, does not act to cause a sensation. If reflects 
 light. If external objects did not, in some way, affect us, we should never 
 be aware of their existence. 
 
 2. In regard to color, Reid says: "That idea which we have called the 
 appearance of color, suggests the conception and belief of some unknown 
 quality in the body which occasions the idea; and it is to this quality, and 
 not to the idea, that we give the name of color." If the quality called color 
 is unknown, do we perceive the very thing itself? Reid here goes back on 
 his own theory. 
 
 1 8. Hamilton. — H imilton states his own views of perception thus: 
 
 1. ''For example, I see an inkstand. How can I be conscious that my 
 present modification exists— that it is a perception, and not another mental 
 state — that it is a perception of sight to the exclusion of every other sense — 
 and finally that it is a perception of the inkstand, and of the inkstand only — 
 unless my consciousness comprehends within its sphere the object, which, 
 at once determines the existence of the act, qualifies its kind, and distin- 
 guishes its individuality? Annihilate the inkstand, you annihilate the per- 
 ception; annihilate the consciousness of the object, you annihilate the con- 
 sciousness of the observation." 
 
 2. "What is the external object perceived? Nothing can be more ridicu- 
 lous than the opinion of philosophers in regard to this. For example, it has 
 been curiously held (and Reid is no exception), that in looking at the sun, 
 moon, or any other object of sight, we are, on the one doctrine, actually 
 conscious of these distant objects; or on the other, that these objects are 
 those really represented in the mind. Nothing can be more absurd: we 
 perceive through no sense aught external but what is in immediate relation 
 and immediate contact with its organ." 
 
PERCEPTION. 57 
 
 Remarks. — 1. It is true that if you annihilate the inkstand, you annihilate 
 the perception; but it is not true that if you annihilate the consciousness 
 of the object, you annihilate the consciousness of the operation. Conscious- 
 ness is immediate knowledge; but the perception of the inkstand is mediate 
 through sensation. If the inkstand did not, in some way, affect us, for ex- 
 ample, by reflecting light, thus causing a sensation, we should not be aware 
 of its existence. But when we infer the cause of the sensation, and ideate 
 the inference, we are conscious of the idea or appearance, which is our own 
 idea of the inkstand, that is, a product of our own construction. 
 
 2.- Hamilton refutes himself when he says: "We perceive through no 
 sense aught external but what it is in immediate relation and immediate 
 contact with its organ." Then we do not even perceive the inkstand on the 
 desk, unless it is brought into contact with some organ of sense. But 
 Hamilton has already said that if we see it, we perceive it, and are conscious, 
 not only of the perception, but of the inkstand itself. Then why are we 
 not conscious of the sun or moon? Does distance make the difference? 
 The inkstand is not in contact with the organ of sight. Then we do not 
 perceive it, and are not conscious of it. But Hamilton says, we do perceive 
 it, and are conscious of it. Hence, we are both conscious and not conscious 
 of it, at the same time, which is absurd. 
 
 3. We should distinguish between the idea — the image, and the object. 
 In looking into a mirror we see an image of ourself behind the glass. Is 
 that image ourself? Is it the object? We are conscious of appearances, 
 which are our own ideas. These appearances are not the material objects; 
 but of these objects we are not conscious. Place a lamp between two mir- 
 rors nearly parallel, and the images of the lamp are multiplied indefinitely. 
 Do we multiply the lamp itself? No. Only one lamp is manifest to touch. 
 Then the image is not the object. 
 
 4. In denying that we are conscious of external material objects, we do 
 not deny the testimony of consciousness; for consciousness gives no such 
 testimony, when we discriminate between the appearance and the object, 
 which we must do when looking into a mirror, and ought to do in all other 
 cases. Hamilton's statement, therefore, that if we are not conscious of ma- 
 terial objects, consciousness gives a false testimony, is void of force. We 
 have falsified no fact of consciousnes, and may still hold with Hamilton him- 
 self, the sound principle— -"the falsity of one fact of consciousness being ad- 
 mitted, the truth of no other fact of consciousness can be maintained." 
 
 1 9. Mill.— The views of John Stuart Mill may be thus stated: 
 
 1. Mill assumes states of consciousness with their temporal relations of 
 co-existence and sequence, also the laws of association. 
 
 2. To develop the notion of space, Mill says: "Suppose two small bodies, 
 A and B, sufficiently near together to admit of their being touched simul- 
 taneously, one with the right hand, the other with the left. Whatever the 
 notion of extension may be, we acquire it by passing our hand from A to B. 
 
58 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 This process, so far as we are conscious of it, consists of a series of varied 
 muscular sensations, differing according to the amount of muscular effort, 
 or the effort being given, differing in length of time. Now, this'which is 
 unquestionably the mode in which we become aware of extension is consid- 
 ered to be extension. We have no reason for believing that space or exten- 
 sion in itself is anything different from that which we recognize it by." 
 
 3. Sensations, reminiscences of sensations, order of sensations, and asso- 
 ciation suggest the possibility of sensation, and this possibility of sensation 
 is the external world. "The sensations, though the original foundation of 
 the whole, come to be looked at as a sort of accident depending on us, and 
 the possibilities much more real than the actual sensations, nay, as the very 
 realities of which they are only the representations, appearances, or effects. 
 The whole set of sensations, as possible, form a permanent background to 
 any one or more of them that are, at a given moment, actual; and the pos- 
 sibilities are conceived as standing to the actual sensations in the relation 
 of a cause to the effects, or of canvas to the figures painted on it, or of a 
 root to the trunk, leaves and flowers, or of a substratum to that which is 
 spread over it, or in transcendental language of matter to form." 
 
 Remarks. — 1. Mill assumes two small bodies. These bodies must have 
 some size, else they would be nothing; but size implies space. These bodies, 
 Mill supposes to be sufficiently near to be touched, one with the right hand, 
 the other with the left. Nearness and remoteness imply space. One hand 
 is moved from A to B. Motion implies space. The idea of space is already 
 developed, and we have no need to call in the aid of muscular sensations. 
 But suppose space is recognized by muscular sensation, is that a sufficient 
 reason for identifying them? Is a thing recognized to be identified with 
 the means of recognition? 
 
 2. But according to Mill the idea of space is not yet developed, as he is 
 endeavoring to explain its origin. Hence the two bodies must not be con- 
 sidered bodies, but two sensations, and these sensations are followed by 
 the muscular sensations; but we must not assume movement, for that im- 
 plies space. Then we have certain sensations followed by other sensations. 
 The succession of sensations implies time, but not space; much less, in this 
 succession of sensations space itself. 
 
 3. The sensations of touch in the two hands, being simultaneous and 
 similar in quality, can be discriminated only as being reciprocally external, 
 and this discrimination involves the idea of space; but a sensation of touch 
 is not space. 
 
 4. Mill conceives the possibilities of sensations as standing to actual 
 sensations in the relations of causes to their effects. If by possibilities of 
 sensations are meant the objective realities independent of us, we would 
 yield assent; for these might indeed cause sensations in us; but this can 
 not be the meaning of Mill, since he holds that "sensation is the original 
 
PERCEPTION. 59 
 
 foundation of the whole." Associated with the color of an apple are a num- 
 ber of possible sensations of smell, taste, touch. Is the possibility of these 
 sensations the cause of color? The cause of the sensation of color, or of 
 any other special sensation is not the possibility of other sensations, but- 
 the quality in the object which excites that special sensation. 
 
 5. The fact that sensations often come unsought, and that when the 
 conditions are complied with, they are beyond our control, warrant us in 
 referring them to objects independent of ourselves. Rational intuition ap- 
 prehends the necessity of cause, on the condition that we have sensations; 
 the judgment infers what these causes are, and the imagination ideates our 
 inferences. 
 
 20. Dr. Porter. — Dr. Porter holds the following views: 
 
 ( The perceiving agent as a pure spirit. 
 
 1. Three egos ] The percipient agent animating the sensorium.. 
 
 ( The individual as spirit sensorium and body. 
 
 ( The sensorium in excited action. 
 
 2. Three non-egos j The body as other than the sentient soul. 
 
 ( The surrounding universe. 
 
 3. "In original perception, the object directly apprehended is the senso- 
 rium as excited to some definite action. The ego and non-ego contrasted 
 are the first named above. This non-ego is the percept appropriate to each 
 of the sense organs." 
 
 4. "A material thing or object, as known by sense-perception, is a com_ 
 pleted whole made up of separate percepts." 
 
 5. "An acquired perception is gained by using the knowledge directly 
 given by one sense, as the sign or evidence of the knowledge which we 
 might gain by another." 
 
 6. "The sensorium consists of the nervous system and sense organs." 
 
 7. The soul is not aware that it has nerves at all or that any one or more 
 of them are brought into action." 
 
 Remarks. — 1 A material thing is a combination of percepts; a percept 
 is the sensorium excited; the sensorium is the nervous system and sense 
 organs; the soul is not aware that it has nerves at all, or that one or more 
 of them are brought into action. According to this what does the soul 
 know in original perception? Is an apple the sensorium excited through 
 the eye, the ear, the touch, the taste, the smell? What causes the excite- 
 ment? 
 
 2. Let us see if we can do better by combining original and acquired 
 perceptions. In this case, the object is nothing more than the sensorium. 
 
60 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 actually excited through certain sense organs, together with the concep- 
 tion of how it might be excited through other sense organs. Is an apple 
 growing on a tree, which has neither been seen, nor touched, nor tasted, 
 nor smelt, the sensorium actually excited through one or more of the 
 senses, plus the conception of how it might be excited through the other 
 senses? If it asked, what evidence have we that there is such an apple, 
 we reply, dare you deny it? To deny is dogmatic. It has no logical war- 
 rant. 
 
 3. We now give our final statement of the facts of perception: 
 
 (1) An excitement in an organ of sense attending the action of an object 
 and the reaction of the organ. ' 
 
 (2) The excitement is coir, eyed to the brain by the nerves. 
 
 (3) The sensation consequent upon the excitement of the sensorium. 
 
 (4) The intuition apprehending the necessity of the subject or ego. and 
 of the object or cause. 
 
 (5) Judgment inferring what the cause is in reality— the percept. 
 
 (6) Ideating the percept, or quality in the object which excited the organ. 
 Other qualities of the object may excite other organs of sense, and by 
 
 similar processes, we form ideas of these qualities. The combinations of 
 these ideas is the complex idea which embodies our knowledge of the 
 object. There are, no doubt, unknown qualities in the object, 
 
 Do we know the object as it is in itself? We press our hand upon a 
 block, and pronounce it hard, by which we mean that the pa;ts are firmly 
 held in their relative positions. Is not this true of the object in itself? We 
 look at it, and handle it, and pronounce it to be a cube, by which we mean 
 that it is bounded by six equal squares, that it has eight corners and twelve 
 edges. Are not these true of the object in itself? But if we attempt to 
 find out the essence of the body, the secret of its constitution, the nature 
 of the underlying forces, we shall find that we have undertaken to solve a 
 problem which transcends the utmost exertion of our powers. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON THEORIES OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 1. What of the Ionic philosophers? Pythagoras? The Eleatics? Her- 
 aclitus? 
 
 2. Give the theory of Empedocles. What of his doctrine of likeness of 
 subject and object? 
 
 3. Give Plato's theory. His estimate of sense knowledge, of rational 
 knowledge. 
 
 4. Give Aristotle's theory. How did he account for error in perception? 
 
PERCEPTION. 61 
 
 5. Give the theory of Schoolmen. According to them what is perceived ? 
 
 6. Give the points m the theory of Descartes, and discuss them. 
 
 7. State the items in the theory of Malebranch, and discuss them. 
 
 8. Give Spinoza's theory, and your opinion of its truth. 
 
 9. Give the views of Arnauld, and discuss them. 
 
 10. Give the doctrines of Locke, and discuss them. 
 
 11. Give Berkley's views and discuss them. 
 
 12. Give Hume's views, aud discuss them. 
 ' 13. Give Kant's views, and discuss them. 
 
 11. Give Reid's views, and discuss them. 
 
 15. Give Hamilton's views, and discuss them. 
 
 16. Give Mill's views, and discuss them. 
 
 17. Give Dr. Porter's views, and discuss them. 
 
 18. Which of these philosophers were epoch makers? 
 
 19. What can you say of the comparative influence of Descartes and 
 Locke? 
 
 20. What can you say of the comparative influence of Hume and Kant? 
 
OUTLINES ON PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 XVI. REPRESENTATION. 
 
 "As an act. — Representation is the process by which the 
 intellect reproduces its acquisitions. It is 
 re-presentation. 
 
 1. Definition. . *{ As a product. — Representation is the idea reproduced by 
 
 the act of representation. It is also 
 called an image. 
 
 As a faculty. — Representation is the power to reproduce. 
 
 ( Occular — Look at an object, close the eyes and represent it. 
 Illustrations j Auricular — Listen to a sound, then imagine it. 
 ( Tactual, gustatory, olfactory — Illustrate. 
 
 ( Objects present, sensations definite, ideas 
 
 f Perception -j definite, individual, in relation to one 
 
 ( another, to time, space, cause. 
 
 ompanson -j , Objects absent, sensations wanting, ideas 
 
 j Representation \ indefinite, individual, in relation to one 
 [_ ( another, to time, space, cause. 
 
 4. Classes. 
 
 5. Theories. 
 
 Memory — Ideas correspond to past realities. 
 Imagination — Ideas corresponding to ideals. 
 Phantasy — Ideas grotesque — phantoms. 
 
 Obscure activities — Faint consciousness of connecting link. 
 Mental latency — No consciousness of connecting link. 
 Unconscious cerebration — Nerve action. 
 
 6. Product 
 
 f A psychical object — created by the imagination. 
 I An evanescent object — disappears quickly. 
 J An intellectual object — intellect recognizes it. 
 ' " j A representative object — represents an object real or ideal. 
 J Less vivid than the original, more indeterminate. 
 ^Contains fewer elements, which are recalled in succession. 
 
 7. Utility. 
 
 ( Source of pleasure, useful in thinking, aids observation, 
 ( prepares for action, furnishes ideals for real life. 
 
 Note. — The greater part of our knowledge is, at a given time, out of 
 ^consciousness, yet it recurs according to certain laws. 
 
REPRESENTATION. 63 
 
 XVII. LAWS OF REPRESENTATION. 
 
 1 , General or Primary Laws. — These laws are based on the principle: 
 Things known as correlative suggest one another. Explicated thus: 
 
 1st. Usual statement 
 
 2d. Aristotle's statement 
 
 f (1) Law of co-existence or consecution in time. 
 
 (2) Law of contiguity in space. 
 
 (3) Law of dependence, as cause and effect, etc 
 
 (4) Law of resemblance or contrast. 
 
 (5) Law of mutual relation. 
 
 ^(6) Law of sign and signification. 
 
 (1) Law of contiguity in time or place. 
 
 (2) Law of resemblance or contrast. 
 
 ( (I) Law of resemblance. 
 
 3d, Hume's statement •] (2) Law of contiguity. 
 
 ( (3) Law of cause and effect. 
 
 4th. Hamilton's statement j $ ^ °jj affinity 116117 " 
 
 5th. Bain'sstatement....\^}Z^Z&: 
 
 6th. Augustine's statement. — Law of redintegration — Objects connected 
 in a mental state suggest one another. 
 
 7th. Porter's statement. — "The mind tends to act again more readily in 
 a manner or form which is similar to any in which it has before acted in 
 any defined exertion of its energy." 
 
 Note. — Dr. Porter's statement is hard to remember, but it has the merit 
 of basing the law on the mind's tendency to action, and not on the affinity 
 of ideas for one another, as if there was mutual attraction between them. 
 Thus, Bain says: "Actions, sensations and states of feeling occurring to- 
 gether or in close succession, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a 
 way that when any one is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are 
 apt to be brought up in idea." 
 
 The Author believes the following to be a more complete statement of 
 the laws of representation than any heretofore given: 
 
 8th. Complete laws.— The complete laws of representation are: 
 (i) Law of reproduction. — The mind tends to reproduce an act or state, 
 and the tendency increases with the number of repetitions, and with the 
 recentness of the repetitions. Hence any previous act or state is .more or 
 less likely to recur, since the mind tends to act as it has acted before. 
 
Gl OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 (2) Law of integration. — The mind tends to complete any process it be- 
 gins, if it has performed a similar process before. The law of reproduction 
 accounts for beginning to reproduce, and the law of integration for the 
 completion— going through after beginning. 
 
 (3) Law of transition. — In performing either of two processes, having 
 similar elements, the mind when reaching that element, is liable to make 
 a transition to the other process, which it tends to complete by the law of 
 integration. 
 
 Note. — This accounts for the not uncommon fact of switching off from 
 one track of thought to another. It is possible to switch off from the sec- 
 ond track to a third, and so on. Since the knowledge of opposites is one, 
 antithetical elements, as well as similar, serve the purpose of a switch. 
 
 2. Special or Secondary Ideas. — The primary laws are re-enforced by: 
 
 1st. Abstraction and attention — Withdrawal of the thoughts from irrel- 
 evant things and concentration of them on the thing which it is desirable 
 to reproduce. 
 
 2d. Time of contemplation — If a thing is dwelt upon, it is more liable to 
 be reproduced, than if it receive but a passing glance. 
 
 3d. Frequency of repetition — We all resort to repetition in memorizing. 
 
 4th. Recentness of date — We feel more sure of what we have just 
 thought over. 
 
 5th. Vividness of apprehension — Clear, distinct and vivid thoughts are 
 more likely to recur than the obscure, indistinct and lifeless. 
 
 6th. Strength of apprehension— A thought firmly grasped is more likely 
 to recur than one feebly apprehended. 
 
 7th. Freedom from entangling relations— A song heard from many sing- 
 ers is less likely to call up a particular singer; but if the first singer made 
 an impression, and we have formed the habit of calling her up, whenever 
 we hear that song, the oftener we hear it, whoever be the singer, the more 
 likely will we be to think of the first singer. 
 
 8th. Interest excited— We are more. likely to recall things interesting 
 than things indifferent. This in part accounts for the fact that we remem- 
 ber better what occurred in youth than what occurred last year. 
 
 9th. Good health— Memory is strengthened by good health and weak- 
 ened by sickness. 
 
 10th. Habits of thought.— We readily recall those things which are in 
 our line of thinking. 
 
 11th. Natural aptitude— Some readily recall facts, others principles; 
 some names, others faces. 
 
 12th. Classification— Classified knowledge is readily recalled. 
 
 13th. Association— We associate in various ways— by time, place, simi- 
 larity, dissimilarity, relation, cause and effect, words, etc. 
 
REPRESENTATION. 
 
 65 
 
 3. Peculiarities of Representation.— The following are worthy of notice: 
 1st. Connecting links.— The succession of ideas or of trains of represen- 
 tations depends on the fact that the mind passes from one to the other 
 through certain connecting links, which are thus classified: 
 
 rpi { Similar elements in the ideas or trains. 
 
 Ulear . . . ^ Antithetical elements in the ideas or trains. 
 
 ^ m ^ s "j ^ Known to consciousness at the time. 
 
 j .f sycmcai ■{ Tj n known to consciousness at the time. 
 [_ Obscure^ <• 
 
 ^Physiological —Unconscious cerebrations. 
 
 2d. Interruptions— Alter the mind is developed and furnished through 
 the senses with requisite facts, it could employ itself with endless represen- 
 tation, though the senses were forever sealed. But the train of represen- 
 tations may be interrupted in either of two ways: 
 
 (1) Objective interruption. — Every new object presented to the senses 
 awakens perception, and tends to interrupt representation. The mind 
 may, however, be so absorbed in representation, that it. no longer atten- 
 tively observes, or the two processes may go on together. A word spoken 
 by another may interrupt one train of representions and start another. 
 
 (2) Subjective interruption. — The mind has power, by act of will, to in- 
 terrupt pne series of representations and introduce another. It can seek a 
 new object of perception, or begin a process of reasoning. There is also an 
 indirect control over spontaneous representations, since those images tend 
 to recur upon which the mind dwells frequently and with pleasure. It is, 
 therefore, a matter of great importance that we be careful in the selection 
 of the objects upon which our minds are allowed to dwell. Think of the 
 true, the beautiful and the good; banish the false, the ugly and the 
 degrading. 
 
 4. Habit. — Habit affects representation, and has an important bearing 
 on education and morals. It may be thus outlined: 
 
 1st. Definition. — Habit is the aptitude acquired by repetition. 
 
 2d. Physical basis. — Habit has a physical basis in the plasticity of the 
 brain, nerves and muscles, especially in youth. One nerve current natur- 
 ally follows the track of another. A table-cloth folds readily in the usual 
 way. A musician's lingers are trained. 
 
 3d. Classes of habits. — Habits naturally fall into three classes: 
 
 (1) Physical habits— Illustrated by winding a watch at a certain time of 
 day; putting on the same boot lirst; putting the same arm first into a 
 a sleeve of a coat. 
 
 (2) Mental habits— New processes are difficult, old ones easy. 
 
 (3) Moral habits — Vice or virtue is confirmed by habit. 
 
Ob OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 4th. Laws of habit. — The laws of habit are the following: 
 
 (1) Acts tend to recur — true of mental, moral or physical acts. 
 
 (2) Tendency to recurrence increases with the number of repetitions. 
 
 (3) Tendency to recurrence varies with the recentness of the repetition. 
 
 5th. Effects of habit.— The effects of habit are the following: 
 
 (1) Habit renders movement spontaneous or automatic. 
 
 (2) Habit diminishes effort, whether physical, mental or moral. 
 
 (3) Habit favors accuracy, as in the skill of an expert. 
 
 (4) Habit sets thoughts free; a trained artisan works and at the same 
 time thinks of other things. 
 
 (5) Right habits are allies, not enemies. 
 
 (6) Exceptions weaken the force of habit. 
 
 (7) Should bad habits be overcome suddenly or gradually? 
 
 (8) Good habits are confirmed by patient continuance in well doing. 
 
 (9) Act out the purpose of reform at every opportunity. 
 
 (10) Wrong doing involves its own punishment. 
 
 (11) Right doing involves its own reward. 
 
 (12) Habits crystallize into character. 
 
 (13) A good character manifests itself in a righteous life. 
 
 5. Association.— Association may be considered as the following: 
 
 f Lower -4 
 
 I 
 1st. Kinds ^ 
 
 rci , ,. ( Magnitude and form. 
 
 f Space relations. . . . ) Dir * cticm , distance. 
 
 . ,. ( Date and duration. 
 
 (Time relations ^ Simultaneity, succession. 
 
 f Logical relations. 
 
 L Higher <j 
 
 t Metaphysical 
 
 Genus and species. 
 Premises and conclusion. 
 
 { Substance and attribute. 
 I Cause and effect. 
 
 f Law of habit— The mind tends to act as it has acted before- 
 
 Either of two simultaneous or successive processes re- 
 calls the other. 
 
 Tendency to recall varies with the frequency of the asso- 
 2d. Explanation -j ciation, its intensity, and the absence of rival tendencies. 
 
 I In case of several associations, the one prevails that has 
 been most frequent, most intense, or is related to pres- 
 ent emotional experiences. 
 
 L The recall may be total or partial. 
 
REPRESENTATION. 
 
 G7 
 
 f Affects our opinions and manner of life. 
 Conduct of lower classes regarded with disfavor. 
 Conduct of higher classes regarded with favor. 
 Lower classes adopt the fashions of the higher. 
 
 3d. Effects <{ Higher classes seek distinction in new fashions. 
 
 "A soft answer turneth away wrath." 
 "Grievous words stir up anger." 
 Parties and sects seek honorable names. 
 
 ^Opprobrious epithets are given to opponents. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON REPRESENTATION. 
 
 1. Define representation as an act, as a product, as a faculty. 
 
 2. Illustrate the kinds of representation — occular, auricular, etc. 
 
 3. Compare perception and representation. 
 1. Classify representation. 
 
 5. State the theories as to representation. 
 
 6. Describe the nature of the product. 
 
 7. State the utility of representation. 
 
 8. How are the laws of representation divided? 
 
 9. State the principle on which the primary laws are based. 
 
 10. Give the usual statement of the primary laws. 
 
 11. Give Aristotle's statement, Hume's, Hamilton's, Bain's, Augustine's, 
 and Dr. Porter's. 
 
 12. How does Dr. Porter's statement differ from those of the others? 
 
 13. Name and state the complete laws of representation. 
 
 11. Name and describe the secondary laws of representation. 
 
 15. Discuss the peculiarities of representation — connecting links, inter- 
 ruptions. 
 
 16. Discuss habit, giving definition, basis, classes, laws, effects. 
 
 17. Discuss association, giving kinds, explanation, effects. 
 
68 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 XVIII. MEMORY, 
 
 f As an act.— Memory is the retention, reproduction and rec- 
 ognition of past acquisitions. 
 
 1. Definition . . ^ As a product. — Memory is the idea retained, reproduced 
 
 and recognized. 
 
 l^As a faculty. — Memory is the capacity to retain and power 
 to reproduce, and recognize past ideas. 
 
 r -o , , • ( Retiring the idea from consciousness, 
 
 f Retention . . . . j Conser * ing the effect> 
 
 o ri ftmnn »o J r> ^a ,»*■• ( Recalling the idea to consciousness. 
 2. Elements. . . 4 Reproduction } Reconstr - ucting the idea . 
 
 -o u.: { Identifying the idea as a former possession. 
 
 ^Recognition . . } Locali / in / m space and fcime< 
 
 f Not certified to by consciousness. 
 
 Inferred — If A recalls B, the effect of B remains 
 3. Retention. . <j Illustrations 
 
 Plato likened retention to a stamp by a seal. 
 Cicero compared it to a store-house. 
 Gassendi compared it to folds in cloth. 
 
 ^Theories 
 
 f Psychical— Present state a resultant of 
 j past states. 
 
 ^Physiological — Nerve current makes . a 
 neural track. 
 
 f Condition — Retention of effect. 
 
 a d««h«^. .«*:«» J i?i« w „«+r. ^ Recalling from unconsciousness. 
 
 4. Reproduction^ Elements j Reconstruction^re-adjusting, focusing. 
 
 L. j { Voluntary — by voluntary effort. 
 
 ^- in s ' * ( Involuntary — occurring spontaneously. 
 
 f Conditions — Retention and reproduction. 
 
 9 nM n< j ( Identifying as representing a former idea. 
 
 ^Elements ■] Localizing in space, time and relation. 
 
 ( Faith in memory and in personal identity. 
 
69 
 
 r rnmnaricnn *> Perception— Sensation, judgment, ideation. 
 
 t>. uompanson ^ jy[ emory _R e tention, reproduction, recognition. 
 
 7. Varieties. 
 
 rivr „ -j , ., ( Faces, colors, forms, names, words. 
 
 (-Memory of details.. . j Times ' ? places ; dates ^ nec dotes,f acts. 
 
 -» ;r o . . n ( Reasons, conditions, causes, theory. 
 
 L Memory of principles j ArgumentS) demonstrations. 
 
 f Law — Exercise the memory — make it a business. 
 
 8. Cultivation ■{ f Abstract, attend, secure clear ideas. 
 
 \ Grasp vigorously, take an interest. 
 
 [ Conditions { Repeat, communicate, observe relations. 
 
 | Classify, associate, discover reasons. 
 1 Use mnemonics, review before using. 
 
 f Momentary displacement. 
 | Voluntary banishment. 
 
 q FnrnatfuInPssJ Effort required to recall, ■ 
 
 9. Forgetrulness^ Presenfc failure to recall> 
 
 j Repeated failures to recall. 
 [Attempt to recall abandoned. 
 
 • ( Cyrus, Themistocles, Hannibal, 
 
 10. Examples •] Seneca, Scaliger, Pascal, 
 
 ( Euler, Hamilton, Macaulay. 
 
 Note. — A great memory, especially of principles, is not inconsistent with 
 great powers of mind in other respects. "Scaliger committed Homer to 
 memory in twenty-one days, and the whole of the Greek poets in three 
 months; and who taking him all in all was the most learned man the world 
 has ever seen. During his life-time he was hailed as the Dictator of the 
 Republic of Letters, and posterity has crowned him as the prince of phil- 
 ologers and critics." 
 
 QUESTIONS ON MEMORY. 
 
 1. Define memory as an act, as a product, as a faculty. 
 
 • 2. State and characterize the elements in memory. 
 
 3. Discuss retention, reproduction, recognition. 
 
 4. Compare perception and memory. 
 
 5. Explain what is meant by the varieties of memory. 
 
 6. State how memory is cultivated. 
 
 7. State the degree of forgetfulness. 
 
 8. Give the examples mentioned of great memory. Give other examples. 
 
 9. Why do certain people in narrating give irrelevant incidents? 
 10. Does the memory interfere with the higher powers of thought? 
 
70 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 XIX. IMAGINATION. 
 
 1. Definition 
 
 f As an act. — Imagination is the construction of mental 
 images. 
 
 As a product. — Imagination is the image constructed. 
 
 I 
 
 [As a faculty. — Imagination is the power to construct 
 mental images. 
 
 Note. — Imagination is released from the restriction of the presence of 
 objects, as in perception, and from the restriction of correspondence to past 
 realities, as in memory; that is, it has freedom of construction. 
 
 f Freedom from restriction from facts. 
 9 PharartprktirJ Picturing power— idea visible to the mind's eye. 
 £.. bnaractensucs-j Modi f ying pow er— form changed at will. 
 
 [Creating power — new forms created. 
 
 « Ki nt j s S Representative imagination — in ideation. 
 \ Creative power — new forms created. 
 
 Position, magnitude, form. 
 
 f Space \ Direction, distance. 
 
 Motion, rest. 
 
 4. Restrictions. 
 
 5. 
 
 Date, duration. 
 
 Time -j Past, present, future. 
 
 Simultaneity, succession. 
 
 Po^sibTt ^ Elements congruent — a red sphere. 
 
 1 l y } Connectives excluded— a square circle. 
 
 f Consciousness gives elements of internal 
 
 I p n n <j Perception gives elements of external 
 [ images. 
 
 f Positing in space and time, constructing. 
 Phases -J Ma g ni ty in g» diminishing, distorting. 
 
 ' j Decomposing, recomposing, compounding. 
 [Anticipating, annihilating, recreating. 
 
 6 Active ^ ^ n °hi^ren, poets, dramatists, novelists. 
 
 } Painters, sculptors, discoverers, inventors, etc. 
 
 7. Utility. 
 
 In practical life, science, art. 
 Literature, morals, religion. 
 
IMAGINATION. 7 1 
 
 f Mistakes fancies for realities. 
 Leads to reverie or day-dreaming. 
 
 S Danaers J Evil ima £ es corrupt morals. 
 
 y J Pascal says: "It is the enemy of reason, the mistress of 
 
 error and falsehood." 
 l^Malebranch says: "It is the mad-cap of the house." 
 
 ( Supervision, restraint, direction. 
 9. Necessities. . . j Development, exercise, rest. 
 ( A field for activity. 
 
 f Cultivate choice language and aesthetic feeling, 
 in A...,- a i lnn J Contemplate beauty in Nature, Art, Literature, 
 i u. cultivation . . < Collect and construct beautiful ideas. 
 
 ^ Produce beautiful creations in Art and Literature. 
 
 Note. — To cultivate space imagination, take the following: Conceive a 
 point to run out in a straight line for a million years, with the velocity of 
 light. Let this line revolve about its origin in the same plane, it will gen- 
 erate a circle with this line for a radius. Conceive this circle to revolve 
 about any diameter, it will generate an immense sphere. Can you con- 
 ceive the magnitude of this sphere? What is outside of this sphere on all 
 sides? What is the ratio of the sphere to the out-lying space? 
 
 QUESTIONS ON IMAGINATION. 
 
 1. Define imagination as an act, as a product, as a faculty. 
 
 2. From what is imagination released? 
 
 3. State and describe the characteristics of imagination. 
 
 4. State the kinds of imagination and tell when employed. 
 
 5. State and discuss the restrictions of the imagination. 
 
 6. State and describe the phases of imagination. 
 
 7. In whom especially is imagination active? 
 
 8. Point out the dangers attending the imagination. 
 
 9. What does imagination need? 
 
 10. How is imagination cultivated? Give a method of imagining space. 
 
72 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 XX. PHANTASY. 
 
 f As an act. —Phantasy is the formation of a series of grotesque 
 images. 
 
 ] As a product. — Phantasy is the image appearing as object. 
 
 [As a faculty. — Phantasy is the power to perform the act of 
 phantasy. 
 
 Note. — Representation takes the form of phantasy in case of the suspen- 
 sion of recognition, as in memory, and of thought and volition, as in imagi- 
 nation. The products are called phantasms, phantoms, spectres, appari- 
 tions, etc. 
 
 ( Phantasy occurring in wakefulness. 
 2. Classes. . j Phantasy occurring in sleep. 
 
 ( Phantasy occurring in either state. 
 
 3 Phantasvof [Reverie— Day-dreaming. 
 Wakpf.ilmUJ Hallucination— Seeing spectres. 
 w anew in ess <; i ntox i cat i ori _From alcohol or opium, etc. 
 [Insanity— Unsound mental action. 
 
 Note. — Reverie is a mild, indolent form of fancy. 
 
 Hallucination is often experienced by patients suffering from fever. 
 There is an organic affection, and the patient sees faces and imps floating 
 before his eyes. These images have no objective reality, but because of 
 the organic affection, they are not simply the creations of the imagination. 
 
 Intoxication is likely to be attended by mania, frenzy, delirium, idiocy, 
 degradation, loss of property, character, self-respect, happiness, hope. In 
 delirium tremens, there is nervous excitement, sensation, inference and 
 ideation. The hobgoblins seen are more than creatures of the imagination, 
 though they have no objective reality. 
 
 In insanity, the mind is often haunted by some dominant idea. The sub- 
 ject imagines himself to be some person of distinction, or entertains some 
 chimerical notion. 
 
 ( Simple dreams. 
 
 f Dreaming ■] Medleys. 
 
 ( Artistic dreams. 
 
 a nL i t pi j 1 at- U4. \ Horrid visions of danger. 
 
 4. Phantasy of Sleep . . . <j Nightmare ... ] No pQwer tQ es(jape Q » mQve 
 
 ( Natural — Sleep-walking. 
 [Somnambulism •] Morbid— Induced by disease. 
 Artificial — Hypnotism. 
 
PHANTASY. 73 
 
 Note. — The cause of dreams can often be traced. Dr. Reid had a blister 
 on his head, and dreamed that he was scalped by Indians. Dr. Gregory 
 had a hot bottle at his feet, and dreamed that he was walking on Mt. Etna- 
 Discoveries are sometimes made in dreams, lost things found, or problems 
 solved. The mind acts with amazing rapidity. It is often not surprised at 
 incongruous appearances, not shocked at barbarities. Does the mind 
 always dream in sleep? Are we responsible for our dreams? 
 
 Nightmare is induced by indigestion, or imperfect circulation of the 
 blood. Beware of late hearty suppers. 
 
 Somnambulism is an interesting subject, and in the form of hypnotism, 
 is at the present time attracting attention. It is a debated question: 
 "Whether a subject in a hypnotic condition possesses any free will, and 
 whether in such a state, it is possible to transform him into a criminal, or 
 at least, for the time being, into becoming an accomplice in crime?" 
 
 rm„- \ Involuntary. 
 
 5. Phantasy of Either f Clairvoyance ... Voluntary / 
 
 state «j 
 
 I vj { ftT , { Natural. 
 
 ^- Vlslon | Supernatural. 
 
 Note. — As to clairvoyance, after allowing for deception, guess-work r 
 drawing information from others by cautious generalizing, little if anything 
 would remain to be explained. 
 
 In regard to natural vision, it is possible that certain minds can act in 
 sympathy with other minds, at a distance. Premonitions sometimes 
 prove true. 
 
 Supernatural vision finds its best illustration in the Hebrew prophets. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON PHANTASY. 
 
 1. Define phantasy as an act, as a product, as a faculty. 
 
 2. When does representation take the form of phantasy? 
 
 3. Give the classes of phantasy. 
 
 L Discuss the phantasy of wakefulness, under the forms of reverie. 
 
 5. Discuss the phantasy of sleep — dreaming, nightmare, somnambulism. 
 
 6. Do you always dream when you sleep? Are you -responsible for 
 your dreams? 
 
 7. Relate cases of nightmare. What is the cause? Remedy? 
 
 8. Relate cases of somnambulism. 
 
 9. What is your opinion of hypnotism? 
 
 •10. Is there danger to health or to morals attending hypnotism? 
 
 11. Discuss the phantasy occurring indifferently in wakefulness or in 
 sleep, under the forms of clairvoyance and vision. 
 
 12. Give your opinion of clairvoyance. 
 
 13. Give examples of premonition that have proved true. 
 
 11. Give reason for believing that the Hebrew seers were true prophets. 
 
74 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 XXI. ELABORATION. 
 
 1. Definition. — Elaboration is the process of classifying, conceiving, 
 j udging and reasoning. These are the logical processes — the act is thought. 
 Note. — The products of elaboration are classes, concepts, judgments, 
 arguments. • The faculty of elaboration, or power to elaborate, is variously 
 styled — the understanding, the elaborate faculty, the discursive faculty, 
 the faculty of relations, the thought faculty, the comparative faculty, the 
 logical faculty, the rational faculty. 
 
 rttpnpralization J Synthetic specification. 
 [ ^ enerallzatlon \ Generification. 
 2. Classification •{ 
 
 I rk^oi™ S Analytic specification. 
 
 ^ Dlvlslon ---- I Individualization. 
 
 Note. — In ascending by generalization from individuals to species, and 
 from species to genera, we abstract thought from differences and attend to 
 agreements. Generalization enables the finite powers of man to grapple 
 with the infinity of nature. Division renders our knowledge more definite 
 and minute. 
 
 3 Concention J Act— The process of forming concepts. 
 . ^oncep o . . . ^ p ro d uc t_Concepts— the common qualities of a class. 
 
 (Nomenclature denotation. 
 
 Denomination ] < Connotation. 
 
 ( Terminology. 
 
 Note. — Denomination or naming embraces nomenclature and terminol- 
 ogy — nomenclature assigns names to classes of objects, and thus embodies 
 them in verbal signs; terminology assigns names to the parts and proper- 
 ties of individuals. The name denotes all the subdivisions of a class, 
 whether species or individuals, and connotes all their common attributes. 
 Individuals are not named except in important cases. 
 
 'Characteristic — The property used in defining. 
 
 ( Specific — Common to the individuals of a 
 Common \ species. 
 
 Property *{ ( Generic — Common to the species of a genus. 
 
 Peculiar — A circle is the maximum for a given perimeter. 
 Constant — Inertia is a constant property. 
 [ Variable — Weight is a variable property. 
 
CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION. 
 
 75 
 
 6. Definition. — We can now more fully treat of definition. 
 
 1. A definition is such a description of an object as will distinguish it 
 from all other objects. Thus, a rectangle is a right-angled parallelogram. 
 
 2. An object is defined by referring it to its genus, and distinguishing 
 it from all other species of the genus by its characteristic property. Thus, 
 parallelogram is the genus of rectangle, and right-angled its characteristic 
 property. 
 
 3. A definition should have the following qualities: 
 
 (1) A definition should be clear, distinct, comprehensive and true. 
 
 (2) The subject and predicate are extensive and interchangeable. 
 
 (3) A definition should not be circular. 
 
 (4) A definition should not be problematic. 
 
 (5) A definition should be positive rather than negative. 
 
 (6) A definition admits of no exceptions. 
 
 4. Definitions are of the following kinds: 
 
 (1) A nominal definition is a definition of name. 
 
 (2) A real definition is a definition of a thing. 
 
 .(3) A genetic definition defines a thing by its mode of production. 
 
 7. Generalization. — Generalization has two varieties, as follows: 
 
 1. Synthetic specification is finding individuals having common quali- 
 ties, arranging them into a species, and combining their common qualities 
 into a concept of that species. 
 
 2. Generification is finding species having common qualities, arranging 
 them into a genus, and combining their common qualities into a concept of 
 the genus. 
 
 3. Generalization reduces multiplicity to unity, and thus enables the 
 human mind to master the wealth, of nature. 
 
 4. The higher we ascend, the greater the number of objects included, 
 and the fewer the number of common attributes — the greater the extent 
 the less the content. 
 
 8. Division. — Division has two varieties, as follows: 
 
 1. Analytic specification is resolving a genus into its species, and form- 
 ing the concepts of these species. The concept is the combination of the . 
 common attributes. 
 
 2. Individualization is resolving a species into individuals, and noting 
 their attributes. The combination of the known attributes is the idea of 
 the individual. 
 
 3. A division of two members is a dichotomy, one of three a trichotomy, 
 etc. Every division can be made a dichotomy. It is also called bifurcate — 
 two branches. 
 
76 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 4. Division resolves unity into multiplicity— more classes, down to 
 individuals. 
 
 5. The lower we descend, the less the number of objects in a class, and 
 the greater the number of common attributes — the less the extent the 
 greater the content. 
 
 6. The rules for division are the following: 
 
 (1) The division is made by a common attribute of one of the members. 
 
 (2) The attribute must not be changed in the same division— giving cross 
 divisions. 
 
 (3) Select the attribute, or principle of division, in view of the aim. 
 
 (4) Each member is less than the whole. 
 
 (5) The sum of the members is equal to the whole. 
 
 (6) Proceed continuously, that is, do not leap over divisions. 
 
 9. Quantity of Concepts.— The quantity of a concept is of two kinds: 
 
 1. Comprehensive, corresponding to the connotation of the name of the 
 class, called also its matter, content, depth, intensive quanity. 
 
 2. Extensive, corresponding to the connotation of the name of the class, 
 called also its sphere, extent, breadth, extensive quantity. 
 
 1 0. Relations of Content and Extent.-These relations are the following: 
 
 1. The content of a concept varies inversely as its extent. 
 
 2. Being, the highest genus, is a maximum as to extent, and a minimum 
 as to content. It can not be defined; its extent can be divided; its content 
 can not be analyzed. 
 
 3. An individual is a minimum as to extent and a maximum as to con- 
 tent. It can be defined; its extent can not be divided; its content can be 
 analyzed. 
 
 4. A class, not the highest genus, is neither a maximum nor a minimum, 
 either as to extent or content. It can be defined; its extent can be divided; 
 its content can be analyzed. A concept is universal, applying to every in- 
 dividual of the class. 
 
 1 1 . Nature of Universal. — Three theories have been held: 
 
 1. Realism holds that a universal has a real objective existence, inde- 
 pendent of the class and of the mind — the perfect pattern for the individuals. 
 
 A universal is an element both in being and in idea, the other element 
 being particular. A class has real existence, and has universal attributes, 
 that is, attributes belonging to all the individuals of the class. The concept 
 is found in the idea of every individual of the class, and is therefore 
 universal. 
 
 2. Nominalism is the doctrine that only individuals have a real exist- 
 ence; that all our ideas are particular; that the only thing universal is 
 the name. 
 
CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION. 77 
 
 The common attributes are universal, since they belong to every individ- 
 ual; the concept is universal, since it is found in the idea of every individual 
 of the class; the name of course is universal. 
 
 The idea of an individual — the concept of the class + the peculiarities 
 of the individual. 
 
 Take the idea of an individual, drop its peculiarities, and incorporate 
 those of another, and so on, through the class, then the constant elements 
 constitute the concept, which vanishes as soon as all individual peculiarities 
 are dropped. A pure concept can not, therefore, be imagined, it can only 
 be thought. Take the idea of a horse, vary the color many times, then 
 drop all color; the concept is left to thought, but not to the imagination. 
 The idea has vanished. 
 
 3. Conceptualism is the theory that a universal has a real existence in 
 the mind of the thinking subject as a pure concept embracing only the 
 ideas of common qualities. In this form, it can not be imagined. 
 
 What kind of an existence then has it? The common attributes exist in 
 every individual of the class, and the concept is in the idea of every indi- 
 vidual. 
 
 1 2. Order of Procedure. — How does the mind naturally proceed in elab- 
 oration? Do children first ascend by generalization, then descend by 
 division, or do they first descend, then ascend? Three views have been 
 given: 
 
 1. Vives, Locke, Rousseau, Condillac, Adam Smith and others held the 
 view that particulars are before generals, and proper nouns before common. 
 
 2. Leibnitz, Turgot and others held that generals are before particulars 
 and common nouns before proper. 
 
 3. Hamilton held that either order is followed indifferently. 
 
 13. Quality of Concepts. — The qualities of acoocept maybe treated in 
 pairs: 
 
 -. \ Clear — When it is distinguished as a whole from other concepts. 
 ' } Obscure — When it is confounded with other concepts. 
 
 9 
 
 3 
 
 D. 
 
 ^ Distinct — When the subdivisions or attributes are discriminated. 
 } Confused — When the subdivisions or attributes are confounded. 
 
 \ Adequate — When the view is sufficient for the purpose. 
 
 I Inadequate— When the view is not sufficient for the purpose. 
 
 \ Intuitive — When the meaning is represented in consciousness. 
 
 ( Symbolic— When the word is used as a symbol without representation. 
 
 { Complete — When all the elements are represented. 
 
 I Incomplete — When only a part of the elements are represented. 
 
78 OUTLINES ON PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 ■I 
 
 True— When it corresponds to its object. 
 
 False — When it does not correspond to its object. 
 
 7 ( Valid — When there is evidence of its truth. 
 / Invalid — When it is assumed without evidence. 
 
 14. Relation as to Content. — These relations are as follows: 
 
 rjA a „4-i nt fl S Absolute— No examples, 
 identical . . . ^ Relative _ Equilateral triangles and 
 
 1. As ."to identity \ equiangular. 
 
 r>iffAr«nt 5 Absolute— No example, 
 ^itterent '" ( Relative-Any two things. 
 
 ( Congruous — When the elements harmonize. 
 
 2. As to congruity j < Contraries-Right angles, acute angles. 
 
 ^ oonnicuves ^ Contradictories— Being and non-being* 
 
 A and not-A. 
 
 . 7 ( Co-ordinate— Sides and angles of a triangle. 
 
 As to ranfc.. | Subordinate— Sides to the triangle. 
 
 1 5. Relation as to Extent. — These relations are as follows; 
 
 1. Co-extension— The same ( Equilateral and equiangular triangles. 
 
 in extent. Thus j 
 
 ( Subject and predicate of a definition. 
 
 2. Subordination— In sub- ( An individual to its species. 
 
 division, thus 
 
 A species to its genus. 
 
 3. Exclusion — No common extent. Thus horses and lions. 
 
 4. Intersection — Parts of the extents common. Thus, men and liars. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON ELABORATION. 
 
 1. Define elaboration as a process. 
 
 2. What are the products of elaboration called? 
 
 3. Give the different names for the faculty. 
 
 4. Classifiy elaboration. 
 
 5. What do we do in generalization? What is division? 
 
 6. What is conception as an act, as a product? 
 
 7. Classify denomination. What is done in nomenclature? In ter- 
 minology? 
 
 8. What does a name denote? What does a name connote? 
 
 9. Classify property, and illustrate 
 
 10. Discuss definition, giving qualities and kinds. Illustrate. 
 
 11. Discuss generalization, giving definition, kinds. Illustrate. 
 
CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION. 19 
 
 12. Discuss division, giving definition, kinds, rules. Illustrate. 
 
 13. Discuss the quantity of concepts — comprehensive, extensive. 
 
 14. Discuss the relation of content and extent. 
 
 15. Discuss the nature of universals — realism, nominalism, conceptu alism . 
 
 16. Give the theories as to the natural order of procedure. 
 
 17. Give the seven pairs of quality of concepts. 
 
 18. Give the relations of content, as to identity, congruity, rank. 
 
 19. Give the relations of extent — co-extension, subordination, exclusion,, 
 intersection, and illustrate. « 
 
 20. What relation is expressed by each of the following propositions? 
 All S is P, No S is P, Some S is P, Some 8 is not P. 
 
 21. Are any of the above propositions ambiguous? Which? 
 
 22. Are the following propositions ambiguous? 
 
 S is co-extensive with P, S is subordinate to P, S is excluded from P y 
 S intersects P. 
 
 Note.— The relations as to extent may be clearly expressed by circles: 
 Co-extension by a circle with the letters S and P within, representing co- 
 incident circles; subordination by a small circle within a larger, the letter 
 S being in the small circle, and P in the enclosing ring of the large; 
 exclusion by two circles exterior to each other, S in one and P in the others 
 intersection by two intersecting circles, S in one, and P in the other. 
 Draw these circles, and illustrate. 
 
80 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 XXII. JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 1 . Definitions. — Judgment and proposition are thus denned: 
 
 1. A judgment is the decision that a certain relation exists between two 
 objects t>l thought. Thus, man is a rational being. 
 
 Note. — A concept involves the judgment that certain attributes belong 
 to every object of a class. It is an implicit judgment. 
 
 2. A proposition is the expression of a judgment. It has a subject, a 
 predicate and a copula. Thus, S is P. S is the subject, P the predicate, 
 and is the copula. 
 
 Note.— Sometimes, for logical purposes, it is necessary to change the 
 form of a proposition. Thus, Trees grow — Trees are things which grow; 
 Birds are beautiful = Birds are beautiful animals. 
 
 A proposition does not necessarily imply the existence of the subject. 
 Thus, A griffin is half lion and half eagle. 
 
 The subject and predicate are called terms. A term may be singular, as 
 George; common, as boy; collective, as senate; attributive, as white; ab- 
 stract, as humanity. 
 
 The modality of a proposition marks the estimate of evidence. Thus, 
 This is certainly the boy who stole the fruit — That this is the boy who 
 stole the fruit is a certainty. 
 
 2. Classification of Propositions. — Classification has several points of 
 
 1. As to logical ( Comprehensive— In view of content. 
 
 quantity. ( Extensive— In view of extent. 
 
 r D • -, • \ Assumptive — Not known by intuition. 
 I ^ rimitlve \ Intuitive— Known by intuition. 
 
 2. As to origin, i 
 
 | -n • f - { Problematic — Not demonstrable, doubtful. 
 ^Derivative j Demonstrative— Capable of demonstration. 
 
 ,, ( True — When the statement corresponds with the reality. 
 
 3. As to truth,.. . j p a i S e— When the statement does not correspond. 
 
 a \ *r 7-j-i | Valid — When there is sufficient evidence. 
 
 4. As to validity -j i nva iid— When there is not sufficient evidence. 
 
 f Categorical — Without condition, A is B. 
 i 
 
 5. As to form ..A , Hypothetical, If A is B, C is D. 
 
 ^Conditional •] Disjunctive, A is B or C. 
 
 ( Dilemmatic, If A is B, C is D or E. 
 
JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS. 81 
 
 3. Classification of Categorical Propositions. —Quantity and quality are 
 considered. 
 
 r A -♦ * •* \ Universal— All S is P; No S is P. 
 
 1. As to quantity } Part icular-Some 8 is P; Some 8 is not P. 
 
 2 As to «+/«7»Ym * Affirmative— All S is P ; Some S is P. 
 A as to gnamt/ j Nega tive— No £ is P; Some S is not P. 
 
 Symbolizing these propositions, respectively, by A, E, I, O, we have: 
 
 f Universal j Affirmative (4) All S is P. 
 
 Categorical j umversai ^Negative {E) No S is P. 
 Propositions -j 
 
 I Partipular S Affirmative (J) Some £ is P. 
 
 ^ aiucular ^Negative (O) Some £ is not P. 
 
 Note. — (A) is true, if S is subordinate to P, or if S is co-extensive with P. 
 (i?) is true, if S is excluded from P. (J) is true, if (A) is true, or if S inter- 
 sects P, or P is subordinate to & (O) is true if (E) is true, or if S intersects 
 P, or P is subordinate to S. 
 
 For a full discussion of these propositions, see Schuyler's Psychology. 
 
 4. Distribution of Terms. — The following points are to be noted: 
 
 A term is distributed when it is applied to every object of the class. 
 A term is undistributed when it is applied to a part of the class. 
 Thus man is distributed in all men, every man, no man, and undis- 
 tributed in some men. 
 
 f All universals distribute their subject. 
 Rules I ^ ne gatives distribute their predicate. 
 j No particular distributes its subject. 
 l^No affirmative distributes its predicate. 
 
 Note. — An individual term is considered distributed and treated as a. 
 universal. 
 
 It is safe, in general, to treat the predicate of an affirmation as undistrib- 
 uted; but in fact, it is distributed when the predicate is either subordinate 
 to, or co-extensive with the subject. In definitions, the predicate is always 
 distributed. 
 
 5. Conversion of Propositions.— The following is the doctrine of con- 
 version: 
 
 Conversion is the interchange - of subject and predicate. Thus, take the 
 proposition, A is B, then the converse is B is A. 
 
 The original proposition is the convertend; the result is the converse. 
 Which of the above is the convertend? Which the converse? 
 
 Conversion is immediate when the original proposition is converted with- 
 out preliminary change of form; mediate when there is a preliminary 
 change of form. 
 
82 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Conversion is simple when the convertend and the converse have the 
 same quantity and quality; by limitation when (A) is converted into (J), 
 and (E) into (O). 
 
 A term must not be distributed in the converse which is not distributed 
 in the convertend. 
 
 (A) admits of immediate simple conversion, in case of co-extension. 
 
 Thus, all triangles are polygons of three sides. All polygons of three 
 sides are triangles. 
 
 (A) always admits of immediate conversion by limitation. 
 
 Thus, all S is P, some P is S. True in subordination or co-extension. 
 
 (E) always admits of immediate simple conversion. 
 
 Thus, no S is P, no P is S. 
 
 (E) always admits of simple conversion by limitation. 
 
 Thus, no S is P, some P is not S. 
 
 (I) always admits of immediate simple conversion. 
 
 Thus, some S is P, some P is S. 
 
 (O) always admits of mediate simple conversion. 
 
 Thus, some S is not P = some S is non-P, some non-P is S. 
 
 (O) admits of immediate simple conversion, unless P is subordinate to S. 
 
 (A) can be changed to (E), and the result converted simply or by limitation. 
 
 Thus, all S is P = no S is non-P, no non-P is S, some non-P is not S. 
 
 {E) can be changed to (A) and the result converted by limitation. 
 
 Thus, no S is P = all S is non-P, some non-P is S. 
 
 6. Classification of Hypothetical Propositions. — There are five groups: 
 
 (It A is B, A is C. (It A is B,C is A. 
 
 J If A is B, A is not C. 9 J If A is B, C is not A. 
 
 x - ] If A is not P, .4 is C. ] If ^L is not B, C is A. 
 
 [if ^4. is not B, A is not C. I If A is not P, C is not A. 
 
 fit A is B, B is C. fit A is P, C is B. 
 
 If ^1 is P, B is not C. 4 J If A is P, C is not P. 
 
 "" A is not P, P is C. ] If A is not P, C is P. 
 
 A is not P, P is not C. I If A is not P, C is not P. 
 
 in 
 
 •iif 
 Lif 
 
 If A is B,C is D. f The first is true if P is C- 
 
 If A is B,C is not P. -vr-i.. J Illustrate by circles. 
 If A is not P, C is D. } Tell when the others are true. 
 
 [If A is not P, C is not D. ^ Illustrate by circles. 
 
 1 . Classification of Disjunctive Propositions.— The following is the classifi- 
 cation: 
 
 rTT 1 ( This electricity is vitreous or positive, 
 
 unexciusi/e j Augustme was a sa i nt or a philosopher. 
 
 Disjunctives i ^ In the copula- s either is or is Dot P< 
 
 ^ Exclusive • • / Tn ih( , fftrrnR \ In the subject, R or 5 is P. 
 I in the terms J In the predicate? s is /> or ( 
 
 Q. 
 
JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS. 83 
 
 Note. — The last proposition is known a priori, if P and Q are contradic- 
 tories. Thus, we know, at once, that any angle is right or oblique, but we do 
 not know that it is right or acute, unless we have excluded the case obtuse. 
 
 Dilemmatic propositions are formed by combining hypothetical proposi- 
 tions with disjunctives. Illustrate. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 1. Define a judgment. What is the relation of a concept to a judgment? 
 
 2. Define a proposition. What are the elements of a proposition? 
 
 3. What are the terms of a proposition? State the kind of terms. 
 
 4. Classify propositions as to logical quantity, as to origin, as to truth, as 
 to validity, as to form. 
 
 5. Classify categorical propositions, as to quantity, as to quality. 
 
 6. Divide categorical propositions as to quantity, and subdivide as to 
 quality. 
 
 7. When is (A) true? When is (E) true? When is (I) true? When is 
 (O) true? 
 
 8. Illustrate the answers to the 7th question by circles. 
 
 9. Discuss distribution of terms, giving the definitions, rules and note. 
 
 10. Discuss conversion, giving definitions, and showing how (A) is con- 
 verted; how {E) is converted; how (I) is converted; how (O) is converted. 
 
 11. Classify the hypothetical propositions, showing when each is true. 
 
 12. Classify and discuss disjunctive propositions. 
 
 13. How are dilemmatic propositions formed? Illustrate. 
 
84 
 
 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 H 
 
 XXIII. DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 
 Immediate Inferences— Inferences without a middle term: 
 
 ((A) S ¥ ^ is true ' ( J ) is true > and ( E ) and (O) are false. 
 w \ If (A) is false, (O) is true. 
 
 (E) \ I f ( E ) is true ' (°) ie true » and M and '(/) are false. 
 W J If (J£) is false, (J) is true. 
 
 /j^ ( If (I) is true, (J£) is false. 
 
 ) If (I) is false, (4) is false, and (E) and (O) are true. 
 
 1(0) 
 
 If (O) is true, (A) is false. 
 
 If (O) is false, (E) is false, and (A) and (7) are true. 
 
 2. From conversion.— Each proposition, (A), (E), (I), (O), at once, yields 
 its converse. 
 
 3. From modality.— Necessity implies actuality; actuality, probability- 
 probability, possibility. 
 
 4. From composition.— A is in C, B is in C • .■. A and £ are in C. 
 
 5. From division.— Angles are acute, right or obtuse; .-. Acute angles 
 are neither right nor obtuse. 
 
 6. By privitives.—A]\ S is P; .: No S is non-P. 
 
 7. By determinants.— An Indian is a man; .-. A happy Indian is a 
 happy man. 
 
 Note.— Beware of the 7th. Thus, Americans are human beings; .-. The 
 majority of Americans is a majority of human beings. 
 
 2. Mediate Deductions.— Deductions through a middle term: 
 The relation of two terms is often deducible from their separate relation 
 to a third term, called the middle term. Reasoning is indirect comparison. 
 An argument in regular form is a syllogism. 
 
 ( All responsible agents are free agents. ( All HI is P. 
 
 Thus j Man is a responsible agent. Also ] All S is M. 
 
 ( .'. Man is a free agent. ( .•, All S is P. 
 
 P is the major term, S the minor, and M the middle. The predicate of 
 the conclusion is always called the major term, and the subject the minor. 
 The medium of comparison is the middle term. 
 
 The major and minor terms are called the extremes. 
 
 The major premise is the premise containing the major term; and the 
 minor premise is the one containing the minor term. 
 
DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 85 
 
 Note.— Mill says that the syllogism begs the question, since the major is 
 not known to be true, unless the conclusion is known to be true. 
 
 ( All men are mortal. ( All men are mortal. 
 
 Thus ] John Jones is a man. or < Gabriel is a man. 
 
 ( .-. John Jones is mortal. ( .*. Gabriel is mortal. 
 
 Now Mill says: "If you do not know that John Jones is mortal, you 
 would not know that all men are mortal." This looks plausible; but we 
 would assert that all men are mortal, if we did not know of the existence 
 of John Jones. Take the second argument, and suppose we were in doubt 
 whether Gabriel is a man or the angel, we would still assert that all men 
 are mortal; then suppose we discover that the Gabriel referred to is a man, 
 we could logically draw the conclusion, Gabriel is mortal. 
 
 ( All on board a certain vessel at a certain time were drowned. 
 Again j John Jones was on board that vessel at that time. 
 ( /. John Jones was drowned. 
 
 We might know the truth of the major premise without knowing the 
 truth of the conclusion. Afterward, learning the truth of the minor, we 
 could logically draw the conclusion, and thus gain new knowledge. It is a 
 shame for a logician to say that the syllogism begs the question. 
 
 3. Principles.— To prove (A), (P), (/), (O). 
 
 1. The conclusion (A) is warranted, if all M is P and all S is M. 
 
 i All If is P. ( If the relation in either premise is that of 
 
 Thus < All S is ikf. Note \ subordination, so it will be in the conclusion. 
 ( .'. All S is P. ( Each may be a case of co-extension. 
 
 2. The conclusion (E) is warranted, if all of either extreme is contained 
 in the middle, and all of the other extreme is excluded from the middle. 
 
 (AllPisJf. " (NoPisM. 
 
 Thus ] No 8 is M. or ] All 8 is M. 
 
 (.-. No S is P. (.-. No Sis P. 
 
 3. The conclusion (J) is warranted, if all the middle is contained in both 
 extremes, or if all of the middle is contained in either extreme and a part 
 of the middle in the other — the same thing must be in both extremes. 
 
 (AllilfisP (AllitfisP. ■ (Some If is P. 
 
 Thus ] All M is S. or ] Some M is S. or ] All M is S. 
 
 ( .-. Some S is P. ( /. Some S is P. ( -.-.. Some S is P. 
 
 ( Some M is P. 
 Is the following valid? ] Some M is S. Why not? 
 
 ( .*. Some S is P. 
 
 (One-half of M is P. 
 What of the following? ] Three-fourths of M is S. 
 (.: Some Sis P. 
 
86 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 4. The conclusion (O) is warranted, if all the major is excluded from th6 
 middle, and some of the minor is contained in the middle; or if all the 
 major is contained in the middle, and some of the minor is excluded from 
 the middle; or if all the middle is contained in the minor, and some of the 
 middle is excluded from the major. 
 
 ( No M is P. ( All P is M ( Some M is not P. 
 
 Thus ] Some S is M. or ] Some £ is not M. or ] All M is S. 
 
 { .'. Some S is not P. ( .-. Some S is not P. ( .-. Some S is not P. 
 
 Fallacies. — Any violation of the above principles is a fallacy. The fol- 
 lowing are the formal fallacies, as usually given: 
 
 1. Undistributed middle. — When the middle is distributed in neither 
 premise. Illustrate this and each of the following, by circles. 
 
 2. Illicit process. — When either term is distributed in the conclusion 
 and not in a premise. 
 
 3. Particular premises. — Particular premises involve the undistributed 
 middle or an illicit process. 
 
 4. Negative premises. — Negative premises warrant no conclusion. 
 
 5. Universal conclusion and one particular premise. — This involves 
 either the undistributed middle or an illicit process. 
 
 6. An affirmative conclusion and one negative premise. — This always 
 involves a fallacy. 
 
 7. A negative conclusion from affirmative piremises — Always a fallacy. 
 
 8. Ambiguous middle. — An ambiguous middle involves a fallacy. 
 
 5. Rules for Guarding against Fallacy. — These rules are the following: 
 
 1. Every syllogism must have three terms, and only three — the major, 
 the minor, and the middle, and these terms must not be ambiguous. 
 
 2. Every syllogism must have three, and only three propositions — two 
 premises, the major and the minor, and the conclusion. These propositions 
 must not be ambiguous. 
 
 3. The middle term must be distributed at least in one of the premises. 
 
 4. A term must not be distributed in the conclusion which is not dis- 
 tributed in a premise. 
 
 5. If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion is affirmative. 
 
 6. If one premise is affirmative and the other negative the conclusion is 
 negative. 
 
 7. If both premises are negative, there is no conclusion. 
 
 8. If the conclusion is universal, both premises must be universal. 
 
 9. If one premise is universal and the other particular, the conclusion is 
 particular, 
 
 10. If both premises are particular, there is no conclusion. 
 
 6. General Laws.— There being no formal fallacy, these laws are: 
 
 1. The truth of the premises involves the truth of the conclusion. 
 
 2. The falsity of the conclusion involves the falsity of one of the premises. 
 
DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 87 
 
 3. The falsity of a premise does not involve the falsity of the conclusion. 
 It only shows that it is not proved. 
 
 4. The truth of the conclusion does not involve the truth of the premises. 
 
 ( Every month has thirty days. 
 Illustration j April is a month. 
 
 ( .*. April has thirty days. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 
 
 1. What is an immediate inference? 
 
 2. Draw the immediate inferences from (A), (E)> (7), (O). 
 
 3. Give the inference from conversion, from modality, from composition, 
 from division, by privatives, by determinants. 
 
 4. What is mediate deduction? What is the nature of reasoning? 
 
 5. Give a syllogism ; point out the major term, the minor, the middle; 
 which is the major premise? the minor? Is the middle term in the con- 
 clusion? 
 
 6. Vindicate the syllogism against the charge of begging the question. 
 
 7. State the principles to prove (A), (E), (I), (O). Illustrate. 
 
 8. State and discuss the formal fallacies. 
 
 9. Give the rules for guarding against fallacy, 
 10. Give the general laws of the syllogism. 
 
88- OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 XXIV. MOOD AND FIGURE. 
 
 1. Definition of Mood. -The mood of a syllogism is the designation of 
 each of its propositions, taken in order, by the appropriate letter, A, E, J 
 or O. 
 
 ( No M is P. 
 Thus, EAE is the mood of ] All S is M. 
 
 ( .'. No S is P. 
 
 2. Possible Moods.— Any one of the four propositions, A, E, I, O, may 
 be the major premise, each having A, E, T or O for the minor, making six- 
 teen pairs of premises, each pair having A, E, I or O for the conclusion, 
 giving, in all, sixty-four possible moods. Form them. 
 
 3. Valid Moods.— Of these sixty-four moods, all except eleven involve 
 some fallacy, or violate some rule. Show this. The valid" moods are: 
 
 AAA, A AT, AEE, AEO, All, AOO, EAE, EAO, EIO, IAI, OAO. 
 
 If the conclusion is A, each -premise must b© A. If the conclusion is E, 
 one premise must be A and the other E. If the conclusion is 7, both prem- 
 ises must be affirmative, and one, at least, A. If the conclusion is O, one 
 premise must be affirmative, and one negative, and one, at least universal. 
 
 4. Definition of Figure. -The figure of a syllogism is the position of the 
 middle term with respect to the extremas in the premises. There are four 
 figures: 
 
 M is P. 
 
 
 ( P is M . 
 
 
 ( M is P. 
 
 
 ( P is M. 
 
 S is M. 
 
 2d Fig. 
 
 ] S is M. 
 
 3d Fig: 
 
 ] M is S. 
 
 4th Fig. 
 
 ] M is 5\ 
 
 $ is P. 
 
 
 ( S is P. 
 
 
 ( S is P. 
 
 
 ( 6- is P. 
 
 1st Fig. 
 
 In the first figure, the middle term is the subject of the major premise 
 and the predicate of the minor; in the second, it is the predicate of both; 
 in the third, the subject of both; in the fourth, jthe predicate of the major 
 and the subject of the minor. 
 
 5. Fig. I.— Valid Moods \ Affirmative, AAA, AAl All. 
 3 /Negative, EAE, EAO, EIO. 
 
 Discarding AAI and EAO, though valid, as weak forms involved in 
 AAA, and EAE, respectively, we have: 
 
MOOD AND FIGURE. 
 
 89 
 
 6. Doctrine of Fig. I.— The middle term is the subject of the major 
 premise and the predicate of the minor. The major premise is universal 
 and the minor affirmative- The conclusion agrees in quality with the 
 major premise, and in quantity with the minor. All forms of conclusion, 
 A, E, I, O, are admissible in Fig. I. Write the syllogism of Fig. I, observ- 
 ing the moods and figure, and illustrate by circles. 
 
 -i r;„ ii \i~ua M nn A* \ Universal, EAE, AEE. 
 
 7. F.g. II— Valid Moods. j Particular5 EAO \ AEOj eio ^ AO o. 
 
 Discarding EAO and AEO as involved in EAE and AEE, we have: 
 
 8. Doctrine of Fig. IS. — The middle term is the predicate of both 
 premises. One premise is affirmative and the other negative. The major 
 premise is universal. The conclusion is negative and agrees in quantity 
 with the minor premise. 
 
 Write the syllogisms of this figure, and illustrate by circles. 
 
 o c;„ in v„i;«4 tM nn Ac \ Affirmative, AAl, IAl, All. 
 
 9. F,g. HI -Valid Moods ) Negative> EA0% 0A0} EI0 . 
 
 10. Doctrine of Fig. Ill,— The middle term is the subject of both prem- 
 ises. One premise is universal, and the minor is affirmative. The con- 
 clusion is particular and agrees in quality with the minor premise. Write 
 the arguments. Illustrate by circles. 
 
 ii c-.~ iv \i~r.A m^^j- \ Affirmative, AAI, IAI, 
 
 11. Fig. IV— Valid MOOdS \ AT «.■ ,, tt,A ^n-i n -in nrn 
 
 3 } Negative, AEE, AEO, OAO, EIO. 
 
 Discarding AEO as involved in AEE, we have: 
 
 12. Doctrine of Fig. IV. — The middle term is the predicate of the major 
 premise and the subject of the minor. Either the major premise must be 
 negative, or the minor universal. If the conclusive is affirmative, both 
 premises must be affirmative, the minor universal, the major universal or 
 particular, and the conclusion particular. If the conclusion is negative, 
 the major premise must be universal, and if affirmative, the minor must be 
 a universal negative, and the conclusion universal; but if the major is neg- 
 ative, the minor must be affirmative, universal or particular, and the con- 
 clusion particular. Write the syllogisms. Illustrate by circles. 
 
 13. Exercises.— Draw the conclusions from the following premises, and 
 state the figure and mood of each syllogism. 
 
 -. ( All mammalia are vertebrates. 
 
 \ Some amphibious animals are mammalia. 
 
 2 { No planets are self-luminous. 
 ( All planets are heavenly bodies. 
 
90 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 o \ No fish suckles its young. 
 ' I The whale suckles its young. 
 
 a { Ruminants are not predacious. 
 * ( The lion is predacious. 
 
 Supply premises which prove the following conclusions, and state th< 
 figure and mood of the syllogism. 
 
 1. No vicious conduct is heroic. 
 
 2. No wicked man is happy. 
 
 3. Some worthy of admiration are not philosophers. 
 
 4. Some who are admired are dreaded. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON MOOD AND FIGURE. 
 
 1. Define the mood of a syllogism, and illustrate. 
 
 2. Write out all the possible moods. Which are invalid and why? 
 
 3. Write the valid moods. What is the number of valid moods? 
 
 4. Define the figure of a syllogism. Write the four figures. 
 
 5. Write the valid moods of figure I. State the doctrine. 
 
 6. Write the syllogisms of figure I, and illustrate by circles. 
 
 7. Write the valid moods of figure II. State the doctrine. 
 
 8. Write the syllogisms of figure II, and illustrate by circles. 
 
 9. Write the valid moods of figure III. State the doctrine. 
 
 10. Write the syllogisms of figure III, and illustrate by circles. 
 
 11. Write the valid moods of figure IV. State the doctrine. 
 
 12. Write the syllogisms of figure IV, and illustrate by circles. 
 
XXV. MISCELLANEOUS SYLLOGISMS. 
 1 . Compound Syllogisms. — There are three varitiee: 
 
 ( All B is A. 
 
 1. Prosyllogism < All C is B. Note S ^ e conc l us i° n °* the first 
 
 ( .'. C is A. ) / is a premise of the second. 
 
 All D is C. f Episyllogism. 
 .'. All D is A ) 
 
 2. Epichirema.— The reasons for the premises are given in connection 
 with them. 
 
 mi ( ^4 is B, for J. is C and C ie B. > ~ . „ 
 ThuB I D is ^, for D is E and J? is A \ " D 1S ^ 
 
 3. Sorites or chain syllogism. — There are three forms: 
 
 fAll^isJ?. fAll^isi?. 
 
 . Aff J All B is G. N 1 All B is C. N \ Eacn predicate 
 
 i. An.i An Q ig ^ i\eg.<j No is ^ inote j becomeB su bject. 
 
 [v: Alibis D. [.-.NoAisD. 
 
 fAll^isA (No Bis A. 
 
 2 Aff J A11 C is 5 ' Nfto- i AU C is ^' Notf 1 
 
 ' All Z> is C. ^^'I All Z> is C. iNOTE | becomes predicate. 
 
 All C is 5. ^ J All C is B. Mrvrc , 5 Each subject 
 
 [.-. All Z) is A l.'.NoDiaA. 
 
 f All ^ is J3. fAU^isJS. 
 
 j All B is G. | All B is C. 
 
 3 Nes J No C iB ^ Nes J AU C is R Note J The tw0 forms 
 
 6. JNeg.«j An ^ is D INeg.<j Nq ^ is D INote J are oolKbined> 
 
 | All F is E. | All F is E. 
 
 {.'.NoAisF. I/. No A isF. 
 
 2. Conditional Syllogisms.— There are three varieties: 
 1. Hypothetical syllogism.— These are constructive and destructive. 
 
 (It A has the fever, he is sick. ( If A has the fever, he is sick- 
 
 (1) J But A has the fever. (2) < But A is not sick. 
 
 ( .'. A is sick. (.'.A has not the fever. 
 
 Prineivles \ Affirming the condition affirms the consequent. 
 ■P \ Denying the consequent denies the condition. 
 
 (91 ) 
 
"92 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 2. Disjunctive Syllogism—There may be two alternatives or more than 
 two: 
 
 ( A is B or C. ( A is B or C. ( Affirming denies. 
 
 (1) ] But A is B. (2) ] But A is not B. Note ] If B and C conflict. 
 
 ( .-. A is not C. ( ••. A is C. ( Denying affirms. 
 
 4 is either B, C, D or E. ( ^ is either B, C, D or E. 
 
 But 4 is J5. f ] But ^ is neither £, C nor D. 
 
 .•. ^4 is neither C, D nor £". | ( .\ A is 2£. 
 
 (2)rj • 
 A is either B, C, D or E. \ (A is either £, C, D or £. 
 
 But yl is either B cr C [_ ] But A is neither B or C. 
 
 .-. A is neither D nor E. ( .-. 4 is either D or J£. 
 
 XT ( Affirming a part denies the rest in case of conflictives. 
 
 ij \ Denying a part affirms the rest determinately or indeterminately. 
 
 3. Dilemmatic Syllog ism.— There are several varieties: 
 
 1. Simple ( If A is B, X is Y. ) ( A is B, or ) 
 Constructive ] It C is D, X is Y. i But } is D, or [■ .-. X is F. 
 
 ( If E is .F, X is Y. ) ( JB is F. ) 
 
 2. Simple ( If ^ is B, C isD.) ( is not D, or ) 
 Destructive -J If ^4 is /i, # is F. [ But J # is not F, or £ .\ A is not £. 
 
 ( If A is S, G\sH.) ( G is not #. 
 
 3. Complex (li A is B,G is H.) ( A is B, or ) ( G is if, or 
 
 Constructive \l£ C is D, J is K. [But ] C is A or £ .-. 3 J is #, or 
 
 If EisF, LisM. ) (EisF. ) I L is M. 
 
 4. Complex ( If A is £, G is H. ) f G is not if, or } ( A is not 7i, or 
 
 Destructive ]ll C is D, J is K. I But •] </ is not i£, or [■.'.■} C is not JD,or 
 If E is F, L is .M. ) ( L is not M, ) ( E is not F. 
 
 3, Reduc io ad Absurdum. — This method of demonstration is thus 
 explained: 
 
 f All truths harmonize— No truth can conflict with another 
 [• truth. 
 
 1. Principles <{ A proposition is false if it involves the conflictive of a 
 
 | truth. 
 
 ^ If a proposition is false, its contradictory is true. 
 
 2. Application.— To prove a proposition true by the reductio ad absur- 
 dum method, assume it false, that is, assume its contradictory true. Then 
 show that this contradictory involves the conflictive of a truth, that is, the 
 absurdity that one truth conflicts with another truth. This contradictory 
 of the given proposition is, therefore, false, and if false, its contradictory, or 
 the given proposition is true. 
 
MISCELLANEOUS SYLLOGISMS. 93 
 
 Note. — To prove that a — b by the reductio ad absurdum, we must show 
 that a>b is false because involving an absurdity; likewise that a<b is false, 
 hence a = b is true. 
 
 A. Definite Deduction — In extensive quantity, two objects of thought 
 must sustain one of the following relations: Co-extension, exclusion,, 
 subordination, intersection. These relations may be symbolized respec- 
 tively by (C), (E), (8), (I), which, when placed between two terms, may be 
 read; is co-extensive with, is excluded from, is subordinate to, intersects. 
 In case of subordination, we can always take the subordinate for the subject. 
 Then we have: 
 
 f S (C) P f S is co-extensive with P. 
 
 ! s (r 
 
 v (E) P t>_ l 1 8 is excluded from P. 
 
 1. Definite propostions ^ 8 ^ p Read^ & ig subordinate to P 
 
 IS(I) P IS intersects P. 
 
 2. Laivs.— .The laws warranting the conclusions, (C), (E), (S), (I), are 
 the following: 
 
 (1). Co-extension is warranted, if each extreme is co-extensive with 
 the middle. 
 
 (P(C)M. 
 Thus \ 8 (C) M. Illustration: A circle with M, 8, P within. 
 
 (.\S{C)P. 
 
 (2). Exclusion is warranted, if one extreme is subordinate to or co-ex- 
 tensive with the middle, and the other extreme is excluded from the middle. 
 
 (P{S)M. (P(C)M. (P(E)M. (P(E)M. 
 
 Thus ] S (E) M. ]S(E)M. \ S {S) M. ] S (C) M. 
 
 ( .'. 8 {E) P. ( .'. S (E) P. ( .-. 8 (E) P. ( .-. 8 (E)P. 
 
 (3). Subordination is warranted, if the middle is subordinate to the 
 major, and the minor is subordinate to or co-extensive with the middle, or 
 if r the middle is co-extensive with the major, and the minor is subordinate 
 to the middle. 
 
 (M(S)P. (M(S)P. (M(C)P. 
 
 Thus ] 8 (S) M. \8{G)M. ) S (S) M. 
 
 ( .•. 8 {S) P. ( /. 8 (S) P. ( .'. 8 (8} P. 
 
 (4). Intersection is warranted, if the middle is co-extensive with one 
 extreme and intersects the other. 
 
 (M(C)P. {M[I)P. 
 
 Thus] 8{1)M. ] S(C)M. 
 
 (.:8(I)P. L:8 (I) P. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 1. Give the prosyllogism and the episyllogism. 
 
 2. Give the epichirema, illustrate by a concrete example. . 
 
94 OUTLINES ON PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 3. Give the first form of the sorites, affirmative and negative. 
 
 4 . Give the second form of the sorites, affirmative and negative. 
 
 5. Give the third form of the sorites— two examples. 
 
 6. Give the hypothetical syllogism, constructive and destructive. 
 
 7. Give all the forms of the disjunctive syllogism, and the principles. 
 
 8. Give the four forms of the dilemma, and name each class. 
 
 9. Give the principles of the reductio ad absurdum, and application. 
 
 10. How many relations exist between two things in extension? What? 
 
 11. Give the notation, write the propositions and read them. 
 
 12. Give the law warranting the conclusion (C), also the syllogism. 
 
 13. Give the law warranting the conclusion (E), also the syllogisms. 
 
 14. Give the law warranting the conclusion (S), also the syllogisms. 
 
 15. Give the law warranting the conclusion (I), also the syllogisms. 
 
XXVI. INDUCTION. 
 
 1 . Definition. — Induction is the process of inferring general propositions 
 from particular cases. It includes, therefore, both the discovery of the 
 particular instances and the inference of the general propositions. 
 
 2. Subsidiaries. — The subsidiaries of induction are the following: 
 
 1. Experience— the accumulated knowledge of the past, personal and 
 foreign. 
 
 2. Observation — the direction of the attention to external facts, as in 
 perception, or to internal facts, as in consciousness. 
 
 3. Experiment — the act of placing the facts in circumstances favorable 
 for observation, by means of instruments or apparatus, by which we vary 
 the conditions of the phenomena. In pure observation, we find our in- 
 stances; in experiment, we make them. Trial is simple experiment. 
 
 4. Hypothesis— a supposition to account for certain phenomena. It is 
 useful in setting apart the phenomena to be explained; in affording a prob- 
 able explanation, though unverifiable, or which may afterwards be verified 
 or refuted, or which may lead to another that may be verified. It should 
 be, at least, possibly true, and capable of accounting for all the phenomena, 
 without exception. 
 
 5. Analogy — the likeness of relations, or the resemblance of two things 
 in certain respects, from which we infer that an additional fact known of 
 one is probably true of the other. 
 
 (A has the attributes p, q, r and s. 
 Thus j L has the attributes p, q, r. 
 
 ( .*. L probably has the attribute s. 
 
 • This is analogical reasoning. It can be refuted, if it can be shown that 
 conditions indispensable to s are found with A but not with L, or that 
 attributes or circumstances of L prevent s. 
 
 6. Classification and denomination are also subsidiaries of induction, 
 but these have been sufficiently treated in Section XXI. 
 
 3. Classification. — Induction may be classified as follows: 
 
 C Mathematical — demonstrative. 
 
 Induction 
 
 t nmpol S Perfect — demonstrative, 
 logical j i mper fect— probable. 
 
 2. Mathematical induction is the method of proving a general propo- 
 sition by the fact, found by trial, that it holds true for several of the first 
 
 (95) 
 
96 OUTLINES OP PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 cases, and by the principle, proved by reasouing, that if it holds true for 
 any case, it holds true for the next. 
 To illustrate, we shall prove, by mathematical induction, the proposition : 
 The difference of the same powers of tvjo quantities is divisible by the differ- 
 ence of the quantities. By actual trial, we find that 
 
 (a-&)-r(a-6)=l; (a*-b*) + {a-b) = a-\-b; (a^-fa) +(a—b)=a*+ab+b*. 
 This gives the required fact. To prove the principle, we shall divide 
 qu-\-1 — l)n-{-l by a - b, as follows. 
 
 a n+l - frn+1 
 a n+l ~a n b 
 
 a-b 
 
 a n =the quotient. 
 a n b - b n +! = b (a n - l) n ) = the remainder. 
 
 Now, if a n — b n , which is a factor of the remainder, is divisible by a — 6, 
 the whole remainder, and consequently the dividend, is divisible by a — 6; 
 that is, if the difference of any powers of the same degree is divisible by 
 the difference of the quantities, the difference between the powers one 
 degree higher is divisible by the difference of the quantities. This is the 
 principle required. 
 
 Now it has been found by trial that the difference of the powers of th& 
 same degree, up to the third power, is divisible by the difference of the 
 quantities; hence, by the principle, proved by reasoning, the difference of 
 the fourth powers is divisible by the difference of the quantities, and if the 
 difference of the fourth, then the difference of the fifth, and so on, to any 
 degree. 
 
 2. Perfect induction examines all the cases, and proves them in detail; 
 hence the general proposition is trne. This is applicable only when the 
 number of cases is limited, as in the following example: 
 
 ( A has the property P, so has B and C and D. 
 Thus ] But A, B, C, I), are the whole of the class E. 
 ( .-. All of the class E have P. 
 
 3. Probable induction is the process of inferring the probability of a 
 general proposition from an examination of some of the particular instances. 
 
 Suppose we have the class, A, B, C, D, E, . . , L, M, JV, . . . X, 
 F, Z, and that we have examined A, and found that it contains the obvious 
 attributes, p, q, r, also the more concealed attribute s. Now we examined, 
 and find that it contains p, q, r. Then we reason, by pure analogy, 
 
 A has p, g, r and s. 
 Thus-] L hasp, q, r. 
 
 L probably has s. 
 
INDUCTION. 97 
 
 We next examine B, and find that B contains p, q, r, also s. This 
 strengthens the conclusion that L has s. We now begin to pass from anal- 
 ogy to induction, not on the side of the conclusion, but on the side of the 
 evidence. In like manner, we examine C and D and E, and so on up to and 
 including K, and find that each has, not only p, g, r, but also s. All the 
 time, the evidence is strengthening that L has s. 
 
 Let us now take M, another individual of the class, differing in no essen- 
 tial respect from L, then the probability that M has s is the same as that L 
 has s. The same is true for N, and so on, for each of the remaining objects 
 of the class. The probability that each has s is the same as the probability 
 that L has s; hence we infer that all the objects of the class have s. 
 
 We have now passed from analogy to induction, not only on the side of 
 the evidence, but also on the side of the conclusion. 
 
 It should be observed, however, that the probability that all the individ- 
 uals of the class have s is not equal to the probability that any one of them, 
 as L, has s, though at first thought this will be believed to be true. For 
 since there is a chance of failure in each case, there is a greater chance of 
 failure when all are taken, than when only one is taken. 
 
 Let — = the probability that L has s, also that M has s, and so on. 
 
 Then the probability that L and M have s is (— y ; the probability that 
 L, M and N have s is (— ) . Let n be the number of the individuals L, M, 
 N. . . . X, Y, Z, then the probability that all have s is (— ) n . 
 
 If now, on careful examination, it is found that L has s, L is transferred 
 from the extent of inference to that of the evidence, thus increasing — , 
 and diminishing n, and so on, for each case examined, and found to have s. 
 
 The increase of — and the decrease of n, both conspire to increase (— ) n . 
 
 Suppose we have gone on, in like manner, through the class, finding that 
 each individual has s, till we reach Z, which also is found to have s, then 
 
 — = h and n — 0. 
 
 y . 
 
 Then \J^ n — \° — \ — the certainty or" perfect induction, which is, there- 
 fore, the limiting case of probable induction. 
 
 4. Ground. — Analogy and Induction have for their common ground: 
 The principle — Like conditions have like consequents. Take two cases in 
 which the conditions are essentially alike; then whatever conditions deter- 
 mine the consequent in one case, exist to determine it in the other, and the 
 same result will follow. 
 
 Induction approaches certainty in proportion as the cases approach iden- 
 tity as to essential conditions. 
 
yb OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 The mathematician thus proves the proposition: The square of the hypot- 
 enuse of a right triangle i» equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other two 
 sides. He constructs a right triangle, and describes squares on each of the 
 three sides, and then proves, for that particular figure, that the square of the 
 hypotenuse is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other sides. He 
 at once infers the general proposition, that the same is true of every other 
 right triangle, of which there is an infinite number, varying in size from those 
 too small to be seen by the naked eye to those millions of miles in extent, 
 varying also infinitely in the relative proportions of the sides. Now, here 
 seems to be the widest possible deduction from a single case. But observe 
 that the demonstration does not depend on the size of the triangle, nor on 
 the relative length of the sides, but solely on the fact that the triangle is 
 right angled, and hence holds true for all right triangles. 
 
 In chemistry, a very few experiments warrant a wide induction, for like 
 conditions are readily found; but this is not the case in natural history, 
 where the inductions are notoriously uncertain, as in the color of domestic 
 animals. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON INDUCTION. 
 
 1. Define induction. What does it include? 
 
 2. State and describe the subsidiaries of induction— experience, obser- 
 vation, experiment, hypothesis and analogy. 
 
 3. Classify induction. Which are demonstrative? Which is probable? 
 
 4. Discuss mathematical induction, and illustrate by employing it in 
 proving a theorem. 
 
 5. Define perfect induction, and illustrate. 
 
 6. Define probable induction, and illustrate by v the case in the text, 
 which discuss in full. 
 
 7. State the principle called the ground of induction. 
 
 8. Why do you regard this principle true? 
 
 9. When does induction approach certainty? 
 
 10. When does it reach certainty? Illustrate by the square of the 
 hypotenuse. 
 
 11. What of the probability of the inductions in Chemistry? 
 
 12. What of the probability of the inductions in Natural History? 
 
XXVII. FEELINGS. 
 
 1. Definition, — Feelings are agitations of the soul. They imply the 
 sensibility, or the susceptibility of feeling. 
 
 2. Accompaniments, — These are, in general, pleasure or pain. 
 
 1. Pleasure is the agreeable feeling which accompanies normal activity 
 or passivity. It is involved in the energy, due in degree and duration, of 
 one or more of our active powers, or the excitement of our passive suscepti- 
 bilities. 
 
 The pleasure is the most complex and agreeable when the greatest num- 
 ber of powers or susceptibilities are involved, and when the energy or 
 excitement is neither excessive or defective. 
 
 The most intense pleasures are short-lived. The soul returns, with satis- 
 faction, to the less intense, but more prolonged enjoyments. 
 
 2. Pain is the disagreeable feeling which accompanies abnormal activity 
 or passivity. It is involved in the energy, undue in degree or duration, or 
 irregular in action, of one or more of our active powers, or the excitement 
 of our passive susceptibilities. 
 
 Injury or lesion of the organism causes irregular action and is attended 
 by acute pain. The soul sympathizes and suffers with the body. 
 
 As our views enlarge and embraoe the future, our conceptions of pleas- 
 ure and pain naturally lead to those of happiness and misery, which are 
 more abiding. 
 
 3. Classification. — For classification of feelings, see page 5, on which 
 the psychical phenomena are classified at one view. 
 
 4. Physical Feelings. — These are sensations, instincts, appetites. 
 
 1. Sensations as conditions of perception have been treated in Section VII. 
 
 2. Instincts are blind impulses to action prompted by organic conditions. 
 They are blind tendencies of the individual, though implanted by the fore- 
 thought of the Creator to accomplish designed ends. 
 
 The instincts may be reduced to three classes: 
 
 (1) Those relating to subsistence, as in procuring and storing food. 
 
 (2) Those relating to the propagation of the species, as pairing, building 
 "nests, and caring for the young. 
 
 (3) Those of a more general nature, as hibernation and migration. 
 Instincts have the following characteristics: 
 
 (1) Through organic conditions they prompt to those actions whose end, 
 though not foreseen by the individual, is his own well-being or that of the 
 race to which he belongs. 
 
 (99) 
 
100 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 (2) Instinctive actions are performed by individuals of the same species 
 in essentially the same way, without the guide of experience. 
 
 (3) In certain cases, instincts act periodically. Old birds care for their 
 young till they are fully fledged, then leave them to care for themselves. 
 
 (4) Instincts are not rigidly fixed, but within certain limits are plastic, 
 thus enabling the individual to adapt itself to its environment. 
 
 The conditions for the manifestation of instinct are stimuli, external or 
 internal. Birds of passage, incited by the increasing cold of autumn, 
 migrate to warmer climes. A hen from internal impulse sits on her eggs. 
 Examples of instinct are found in the spider, the bee, the ant, the beaver, 
 in hibernating animals and migratory birds. All organic beings have more 
 or less instinct. In man, instinct is overshadowed by the higher powers of 
 thought. Animals and man are thus contrasted: 
 
 (1) The lower animals in caring for their young are concerned alone with 
 their physical wants, and with these only till they are able to care for 
 themselves. In man, the solicitude of parents for their children extends to 
 their intellectual, moral and spiritual welfare, and continues unabated 
 through life. 
 
 (2) The thinking of animals is from particulars to particulars, while man 
 generalizes his knowledge into concepts, and proves general propositions. 
 
 (3) The language of animals is purely the instinctive one prompted by 
 nature, while man has developed an artificial language, spoken and written, 
 admirably adapted to meet his present requirements, and to provide for 
 unlimited advancement. 
 
 (4) As to knowledge, animals are stationary, except within narrow limits 
 in the training they receive from domestication, while man is progressive 
 without limit. 
 
 (5) Animals are destitute of moral and religious faculties which are the 
 crowning glory of man. 
 
 3. Appetites are the cravings of the recurring wants of animal life. 
 They seek immediate gratification, while instincts have an ulterior end. 
 Appetite prompts the spider to eat his prey; instinct to spin his web. 
 
 Appetites are physical as to their origin, conditions and immediate ends. 
 They are periodical in their manifestations. As cravings, they involve dis- 
 comfort, and their gratification is attended with pleasure. Beside the end 
 of immediate gratification, they involve the more permanent well-being of 
 the individual. 
 
 Excessive indulgence of appetite, makes the sluggard, the glutton, the 
 drunkard, the debauchee. Diseased or perverted appetite can be overcome 
 by persistent endeavor, thus bringing the force of habit on the right side. 
 
 2. Vital Feelings. — These feelings are grouped in three pairs: 
 1. Rest and fatigue. — The feeling of rest is a consequence of ceasing, 
 for a time, from labor, and indulging in repose. After rest there is an in- 
 centive to activity. Action, if not excessive, is a source of enjoyment; but 
 
FEELINGS. 
 
 101 
 
 continued action brings on a sense of fatigue, if prolonged beyond the 
 period when the vitality accumulated in rest is exhausted, so that demands 
 are made on the reserve forces of the system. 
 
 2. Vigor and languor.— These feelings are analogous to rest and fatigue, 
 but are of longer duration and depend on more permanent conditions. A 
 man's general condition, for a prolonged period, may be characterized as 
 vigorous, yet he may experience, in this period many alternations of rest 
 and fatigue. 
 
 Vigor is the predominance of vitality over decay. Languor is a relaxed 
 condition tending to decay. 
 
 3. Health and sickness.— Health is the felicitous performance of vital 
 functions. Sickness is the abnormal condition of disease. 
 
 Each disease has its own symptoms and its peculiar feelings, which can 
 be realized only by experience. The symptoms of disease and the accom- 
 panying feelings are described in works on pathology. 
 
 The peculiarity of temperament, whether sanguine, lymphatic, bilious, 
 nervous, or their combinations, more or less modify our feelings. 
 
 3. Psychical Feelings. — There are three classes: 
 
 1. Emotions are agitations of the sensibility purely psychical. They 
 may be preceded by physical conditions or followed by physical effects. 
 
 There are various classes of emotions, as follows: 
 
 (1) Emotions arising from general conditions fall in pairs: 
 Cheerfulness, dejection; content, discontent; gladness, depression; joy, 
 
 sorrow; rapture, melancholy; self -satisfaction, self-dissatisfaction; self-com- 
 placency, self-displacency ; self -congratulation, self-reproach ; self-sufficiency, 
 self-depreciation. 
 
 (2) Aesthetic emotions have reference to the sentiment of taste and the 
 different forms of the beautiful. These feelings find play in novelty, associ- 
 ation, fashion, habit and custom; in wit, humor, ridicule, the comic, the 
 ridiculous; in unity and variety; harmony, grace of attitude or movement; in 
 resemblance or contrast; in regularity, proportion, symmetry, variety; in 
 beauty, grandeur, sublimity; in society, nature, literature, art. 
 
 (3) Ethical emotions relate to conduct as right or wrong, involving a 
 sense of obligation to do the right and to avoid the wrong; a sense of re- 
 sponsibility or accountability in facing the consequences of conduct; a sense 
 of recompense for right actions, in the approval of conscience, of good men 
 and of God; for wrong actions, in the disapproval of conscience, of good men 
 and of God. It is a terrible calamity to become morally debased, but the 
 highest happiness to acquire moral integrity. 
 
 2. Affections are emotions with a current directed outward and termin. 
 ating on some object. They are benevolent or malevolent. Love and hat- 
 red are strong types of these affections: 
 
 (A) The benevolent affections are of several varieties: 
 
102 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 (1) Sympathy is fellow feeling. It rejoices with those that rejoice, and 
 grieves with those in distress. It is the opposite of coldness and hard- 
 heartedness. 
 
 (2) Pity is sympathy excited by suffering. It has an air of superiority 
 and condescension about it that is not pleasant to a high-minded sufferer. 
 It is also inclined to waste itself in words. 
 
 (3) Compassion is sympathy for misfortune which prompts to an effort 
 for relief. The priest and the Levite, no doubt, felt pity for the man who 
 fell among thieves, yet they passed by on the other side; but the good 
 Samaritan had compassion on him, dressed his wounds, put him on his own 
 beast, took him to an inn, and paid for his care. 
 
 (I) Mercy is compassion extended to fallen enemies, or to those exposed 
 to suffering for demerit, by one who has the means of vengeance, or the 
 power to remit or mitigate the penalty. 
 
 (5) Gratitude is the feeling experienced towards a benefactor. 
 
 (6) Thankfulness is a sense of kindness received, and a willingness to 
 acknowledge it in words. Thankfulness may exist in form when gratitude 
 is not felt. The sentiment of mankind approves of thankfulness, but de- 
 mands gratitude. Unthankfulness is a breach of etiquette. Ingratitude 
 is a moral baseness. 
 
 (7) Esteem is the regard we feel for another in view of excellencies. 
 
 (8) Friendship is the mutual attachment of two persons, exclusive of 
 kinship or love. It is sometimes very strong, as in David and Jonathan, 
 Pythias and Damon. 
 
 (9) Self-love is that form of love in which the subject and object are 
 identical. Due self-love, or self-respect guards our character from what- 
 ever is debasing. Undue self-love is selfishness. It seeks gratification re- 
 gardless of others. It has several forms: 
 
 Egotism seeks to make one's self conspicuous, and obtrudes the great I 
 whenever it finds an opportunity. 
 Haughtiness looks down with contempt on those regarded as inferior. 
 Pride exalts self and glories in its own achievements. 
 Selfish ambition seeks for power and distinction regardless of the means. 
 
 (10) Conjugal love is that attachment which ought to exist between hus- 
 band and wife. It is the strongest human affection. Why is it so often 
 broken? 
 
 (II) Parental and filial love exists between parents and children— Paren- 
 tal exhibited by parents; filial by children. Parental love is paternal or 
 maternal, as felt by the father or mother. 
 
 Fraternal love exists between brothers and sisters. These family affec- 
 tions exhibit divine wisdom in their constitution, and work for the good of 
 mankind. 
 
FEELINGS. 103 
 
 (13) Philanthropy is the love of mankind. It is a broad and generous 
 sentiment, neither bounded by state lines, nor restricted by language or 
 race. It makes a Howard or a Wilberforce. 
 
 (14) Patriotism is love of country. It is an honorable sentiment. Though 
 inferior to philanthropy in breadth, it is superior to it in depth. 
 
 (15) The Idve of home is kindred to that of patriotism, but more intense. 
 Nostalgia is home sickness. It is felt most severely by the uncultivated. 
 
 (16) Piety is love for God. It is a complex sentiment involving reverence, 
 adoration, gratitude, trust, obedience. It stimulates every noble sentiment. 
 
 (B) The malevolent affections have several varieties: 
 
 (1) Dislike is the repugnance felt towards a disagreeable object. 
 
 (2) Antipathy is a strong dislike. In certain cases it is, perhaps, heredi- 
 tary or constitutional. In this form, it exists between certain animals, or 
 between certain races of men. 
 
 (3) Contempt is the feeling of dislike towards those regarded base. ' It is 
 not inconsistent with the hope that the obloquy cast upon its object may 
 cause reformation. 
 
 (I) Scorn leads to the rejection of something proffered as unworthy of 
 acceptance. Contempt implies that something is not good in itself; scorn 
 that it is not good enough for us. 
 
 (5) Disdain is the feeling entertained towards those despised as unworthy 
 of consideration. 
 
 (6) Haughtiness is the effect of pride, and leads to the feeling of disdain. 
 
 (7) Arrogance is a compound of pride and vanity. The pride of an arro- 
 gant man would load to disdain, if his vanity did not covet praise. 
 
 (8) Envy is the resentment felt at the success or superiority of others. 
 The true remedy is to bring ourself up, and not to bring a superior down. 
 
 (9) Jealousy is a burning desire to possess or to keep something regarded 
 as valuable, coupled with the fear that another will appropriate it. 
 
 The typical case of jealousy is that exhibited by a lover who believes that 
 he is being supplanted by a rival in the affections of the one he loves. 
 
 (10) Malice is ill-will cherished towards others terminating in evil intent 
 or premeditated injury. 
 
 (II) Resentment is the reaction of feeling in response to a sense of personal 
 injury, or of injury to our friends, taken as personal. As implying malice, 
 resentment is to be distinguished from indignation occasioned by the unjust 
 or atrocious conduct of others, which, springing from a sense of honor and 
 exempt from personality, is not inconsistent with a benevolont disposition. 
 
 (12) Hatred is cherished resentment. It broods over wrong, takes time 
 for consideration, and deliberately plans retaliation. Hatred between indi- 
 viduals leads to feuds between families and clans or tribes. 
 
 (13) Anger is sudden and strong resentment. It often produces intense 
 excitement, and manifests itself in deeds of violence. 
 
104 OUTLINES OF PSYCHO-LOGY. 
 
 (14) Wrath is heightened anger felt toward inferiors. It may be simply 
 righteous indignation, as the wrath of God. 
 
 (15) Rage is a violent ebullition of ang^r breaking out into extravagant 
 expressions and vehement demonstrations of resentment. 
 
 (16) Fury is excessive rage, lashing the soul to such a pitch of excitement 
 that it is no longer under the control of reason. 
 
 (17) Revenge is deep-seated hatred manifesting itself in retaliation. It 
 should never be cherished. To God belongeth vengeance. 
 
 (18) Do the malevolent affections afford pleasure? They in certain cases 
 do, as when children delight in teasing, or students in hazing, or when one 
 rejoices in the defeat of a rival, or in the fall of an enemy. The patriot is 
 proud of his nation's glory, and rejoices in the defeat of the enemy. 
 
 3. Desires. — A desire is a craving for a supposed good not in possession. 
 The object of desire is either known or believed to be a good, that is, some- 
 thing whose possession would afford satisfaction. It is an emotion with a 
 current directed towards self. 
 
 Aversion is negative desire — a desire to be rid of a supposed evil. Desire 
 attracts; aversion repels. 
 
 (J.) Ganeral desires and aversions may be reduced to three classes: 
 
 (1) The desire for happiness or the aversion to misery is universal. 
 Even a stoic admits that happiness is to be preferred to misery, though the 
 one is to be received without exultation, and the other to be endured with- 
 out complaint. Happiness is the consequence of proper action, that is, 
 of obedience to law; but knowledge is the condition of proper action; there- 
 fore, knowledge is the condition of happiness. 
 
 (2) The desire for perfection or the aversion to imperfection is natural 
 and therefore legitimate, when not realized at the expense of others. Per- 
 fection is physical, intellectual or moral, each contributing to the others. 
 
 Physical perfection embraces health, strength, agility, gracefulness and 
 beauty. It requires the observance of the physical laws in exercise and 
 rest, food, drink, pure air, proper clothing, shelter, cleanliness of person. 
 
 Intellectual perfection consisting in the symmetrical development and 
 complete control of all our powers of intellect is a lofty ideal inciting to 
 higher attainments. 
 
 Moral perfection, a right intent of heart and a conformity of conduct to 
 ethical principles, is not only a lofty ideal but an attainable end. 
 
 (3) The desire for usefulness or the aversion to uselessness growing out 
 of social relations is legitimate and praiseworthy. It naturally leads to 
 thoughtful plans and to noble deeds. It produces the benefactors of the 
 human race. 
 
 (B) Special desires and aversions may be reduced to three classes: 
 (1) The desire for knoivledge or the aversion to ignorance takes in the 
 wide field of science, literature and art, also the professional and practical 
 pursuits of life. The field of knowledge is vast and greatly diversified, 
 
PEELINGS. 105 
 
 and is a never-failing source of pure enjoyment. The desire for knowledge 
 is augmented by the fact that it gives scope to activity, affords satisfaction 
 in its pursuit and possession, and confers distinction and influence, also by 
 the consideration of the disabilities attending ignorance. 
 
 (2) The desire for wealth or the aversion to poverty checks vice, pro- 
 motes industry and fosters the useful arts. The possession of wealth 
 gratifies the desire for it, affords the means for the gratification of other 
 desires, confers the dignity of independence and social distinction, and 
 supplies the means for promoting the welfare of others. 
 
 Avarice or the undue desire for wealth induces anxious care and slavish 
 toil, begets covetousness, and culminates in mammon worship or miserly 
 wretchedness. 
 
 (3) Ambition the desire for power and fame and the aversion to infer- 
 iority and obscurity is a powerful impulse to action. The ambition to be 
 useful is a laudable virtue, but selfish ambition is a vulgar vice, detestable 
 in itself and dangerous to society. 
 
 Pride desires power; vanity fame. Mortification is wounded vanity. 
 Pride is self-esteem; vanity is love of approbation. 
 (C) The compound desires and aversions are hope and fear. 
 
 (1) Hope is the desire and expectation of good. It looks to the future. 
 Desire and expectation, the two elements of hope, are not always in equi- 
 librium. Expectation is an intellectual element and varies with the degree 
 of probability. Desire is a feeling, a phenomenon of the sensibility, and 
 varies with the estimated value of the object. 
 
 Faith is confidence in a person or thing from which we hope to realize 
 some object of desire. The object of hope is a good; the object of faith 
 some pe.son or thing regarded as a source of good. 
 
 Trust implies the committal of an interest to an object of faith. Hope is 
 a powerful spring of action; its loss usually paralyzes effort, but when 
 coupled with resentment, it exhibits the rashness of despair. 
 
 (2) Fear is the aversion felt towards expected evil. Expectation is the 
 common element of hope and fear; but the object of expectation in hope is 
 a good, in fear an evil. The desire of hope and the aversion of fear are 
 opposites. 
 
 Anxiety is a form of fear in which the evil is possible and uncertain 
 rather than probable and expected. It may be prolonged indefinitely. 
 
 Apprehension indicates a stronger probability than anxiety. It antici 
 pates evil. 
 
 Alarm is the fear excited by the presence of sudden danger. 
 
 Dread is the fear of some impending calamity. 
 
 Terror is paralyzing fear, rendering the subject helpless. 
 
 Horror is sympathetic terror induced by the sudden calamity of others. 
 
106 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Despair is the absence of all hope of deliverance from calamity. It may 
 result in complete inactivity, or it may, as sometimes in war, exhibit pro- 
 digious effort known as the courage of despair. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON THE FEELINGS. 
 
 1. Define the feelings, and state their usual accompaniments. 
 
 2. Discuss pleasure and pain. 
 
 3. Give the general classification of the feelings. See page 5. 
 1. Give the classes of physical feelings. 
 
 5. Define sensations and classify them. See Section VII. 
 
 6. Discuss instincts, giving their classification and characteristics. 
 
 7. Compare man with the lower animals. 
 
 8. Discuss the appetites. How would you cure a perverted appetite? 
 
 9. Discuss the three pairs of vital feelings. 
 
 10. Classify the psychical feelings. 
 
 11. Classify the emotions, and discuss the general emotions, the a^stheti- 
 cal emotions and the ethical emotions. 
 
 12. Classify the affections. What is the direction of the current of 
 emotion in affection? 
 
 13. Name the varieties of the benevolent affections and discuss each. 
 11. Name the varieties of malevolent affections and discuss each. 
 
 15. Compare envy with jealousy. Which is the more excusable - 
 
 16. What is desire?. W T hat is aversion? 
 
 17. Classify the general desires and aversions and discuss each. 
 
 18. Classify the special desires and aversions, and discuss each. 
 
 19. Classify the compound desires and aversions, analyze hope and fear. 
 
 20. Define anxiety, apprehension, alarm, dread, terror, horror, despair. 
 
XXVIII. VOLITION. 
 
 1 . Definitions. — Volition is the decision to act in a given manner. 
 Choice is the election of one of two or more alternatives. It is one species 
 
 of the genus volition. Alternatives are necessary to choice. 
 
 Preference is the favor accorded to one alternative in deeming it rather 
 to be chosen than another. It naturally precedes choice. 
 
 Indifference is the absence of preference. It signifies that one alterna- 
 tive is regarded as neither more or less worthy to be chosen than another. 
 
 A purpose is a predetermination to enter on a given course of action. It 
 may be regarded as a general volition determining many subsequent 
 volitions. 
 
 Refusal is the expressed decision not to accept a given proffer, or not to 
 comply with a given request. It is negative choosing expressed. 
 
 The willis the faculty Of volition. If the ego decides, it has power to 
 decide, and that power is called the will. When we say, for convenience, 
 that the will decides or choses, we mean that the ego itself decides or 
 chooses by its power of decision or choice called the will. 
 
 2. Order of Phenomena. — The order of the phenomena is as follows: 
 
 1. P re-volitional. —The intellect discerns the properties of many, things 
 which affect the sensibility as agreeable or disagreeable, thus exciting the 
 appetites and inducing affections benevolent or malevolent, and awakening 
 desires or aversions. 
 
 The appetites crave gratification. The affections go out to their objects 
 in love or hatred. The desires seek those objects which are agreeable to 
 the sensibility. The aversions repel those that are disagreeable. 
 
 The appetites, the affections, the desires and the aversions are motives or 
 springs of action which solicit the will to act in making its decisions. 
 
 The intellect looks over the whole ground, deliberates by weighing the 
 motives and balancing the reasons, till the case is fully made up, and the 
 judgment has pronounced its final opinion. 
 
 2. Volitional. — All this time, the will has refused to act, or has sus- 
 pended its decision, or postponed action from time to time, waiting for fur- 
 ther light, till the intellect has gathered in all available evidence, and 
 drawn its final conclusion, and handed the case over to the will for its 
 decision. 
 
 In view of the conclusion arrived at by the intellect, the will, with per- 
 fect freedom, that is, without constraint or restraint, asserts its power, and 
 acts, or puts forth its volition in making the choice or decision. 
 
 The will itself decides; it acts; it makes the choice; it exerts its energy in 
 making the decision. Consciousness testifies to the act. The will is not a 
 
 ( l<-7 ) 
 
108 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 dead-head, quiescent and passive, compelled by motives and reasons; for 
 then it would not act, it would only be moved like a log of wood; but it 
 does act, it does exert its energy as consciousness testifies; hence it is not 
 ■compelled by motives, and is therefore free. 
 
 The will is, however, under moral obligations to act according to reason, 
 and herein lies its responsibility; but it is not necessitated to act in this 
 way, and often acts contrary to reason. In acting in accordance with rea- 
 son, it receives the approval of conscience; in acting contrary to reason; it 
 receives the condemnation of conscience. 
 
 If the will is not free, if its action is either constrained or restrained, 
 conscience could neither reasonably approve nor condemn, and the voice of 
 •conscience would be an anomaly in human nature. 
 
 But where is freedom found? It is not found in the feelings — the appe- 
 tites, affections, desires or aversions, for these are excited by their appro- 
 priate causes; it is not in the judgment or conclusion inferred by the intel- 
 lect, for that is necessitated by the evidence; it is not found in the volition 
 as an act or product, for these are caused by the will; it is not found in the 
 execution, for this is determined by the volition; but it is found in the will 
 itself. The will makes the decision; it causes its volitions; but it is not 
 caused to cause them. The will alone is free. 
 
 3. Post-volitional. — The volition being put forth, the decision made, the 
 alternative chosen, there remains to be accomplished the post-volitional act 
 by which the volition is executed, that is, carried into effect, which is 
 usually done through the instrumentality of the body. 
 
 Illustration. — An apple is offered me. My appetite is excited, and a de- 
 sire for the apple induced, which acts as a motive soliciting me to accept 
 the offer. Being naturally fond of apples, and no counter motives appear- 
 ing, or none of sufficient weight, I decide to accept. It now remains to put 
 forth the hand, take the apple and eat it. Tbis is the execution of the 
 volition and is a voluntary action. 
 
 3. Relation of Motives to Volition. — Motives are indeed causes. They 
 affect the sensibility and awaken thought. They solicit, but do not cause 
 volition. The will itself causes its volitions. 
 
 If motives were the causes of volitions, then any volition would be the 
 resultant of all the motives brought to bear upon it, thus bringing the phe- 
 nomena of volition within the province of mechanics; but this is demon- 
 strably not the case. Thus, let a person standing at one corner of a square 
 field be solicited by two friends, one at each of the adjacent corners, the 
 motives for going to the two being equal, he would go in the diagonal of 
 the square, till passing the center by his momentum, he would be drawn 
 back, and after a few vibrations, would come to rest at the intersection of 
 the two diagonals. 
 
VOLITION. 109 
 
 4. Power of Contrary Choice.— Can the will choose differently from what 
 it does choose? It is possible to be mystified by such a question. It is of 
 course, impossible for the will to choose a given alternative, and at the same 
 time, not to choose it, but to choose some other alternative. The true 
 question is: Can the will choose a different alternative from any one of the 
 possible alternatives? It can. Let A name any of the alternatives, X, Y r 
 Z, then B can always choose another. 
 
 It is sometimes said that we are conscious of the power of contrary 
 choice; but this is not correct, for we are not conscious of powers, but of 
 phenomena. We know the necessity of powers by rational intuition as the 
 condition of the phenomena. If there is consciousnes of the power of con- 
 trary choice, controversy on that point would be at an end; for a datum of 
 consciousness compels recognition. Since the will is not compelled to 
 choose a designated alternative, it is free to choose any alternative. 
 
 5. Relation of Responsibility to Freedom.— What does the conscience of 
 the criminal say? It declares him guilty and deserving of punishment. 
 The criminal arraigned before the bar of his own conscience, confesses hi& 
 crime, admits his guilt, and acknowledges the justice of his punishment. 
 
 If he believed that his choice was necessitated, his conscience would acquit 
 him of guilt, not that he did not do the deed, or that he did not will to do it, 
 but that he could not help doing it, since he could not help willing to do 
 it. But his conscience does not acquit him of blame. In his inmost soul he 
 believes that he is guilty. He could not be guilty in the sense of being to 
 blame, unless his will was free in the act of volition. He could not believe 
 himself to be guilty unless he believed himself to be free; but he does be- 
 lieve himself guilty, therefore he believes himself free. In this case, the 
 criminal is no theorizer, he is no sophist. His conscience is the voice of 
 nature, yea, the voice of God, declaring in tones not to be misunderstood 
 "that he was not passive but active in his crime. 
 
 6. Ground'of Obligation.— In the world, there are immense possibilities 
 of both good and evil, each being two-fold— good embracing perfection and 
 happiness, and evil imperfection and unhappiness. Good and evil are ends 
 — good the end to be sought, evil the end to be avoided. 
 
 The good and the evil pertain both to ourselves and to others. We are 
 at liberty to seek good for ourselves, and to avoid evil, so long as we do not 
 encroach on the rights of others. We are under obligations to promote the 
 welfare of others and to shield them from evil so far as in so doing we bring 
 no serious evil upon ourselves. 
 
 The useful and the deleterious are means to their ends— the useful the 
 means to good as its end, and the deleterious the means to evil. 
 
 Now, man, as a moral being, as a free agent, is under obligations, so far 
 as it is in his power, to realize the good, both for himself and for his fellow 
 beings, and to avoid the evil. Requiring others to respect his rights, he 
 
110 OUTLINES ON PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 ought to respect their rights, and be mindful of their happiness. In fact, if 
 he does not respect the rights of others, they will not respect his rights; 
 hence to secure his own rights, he must respect the rights of others. 
 
 Mutual benevolence is the fundamental moral obligation, and is of uni- 
 versal application. 
 
 "All things therefore whatsoever ye think it right that men should do 
 unto you, even so do ye also unto them." 
 
 We should love good and hate evil, and strive earnestly to realize the 
 good and to avoid the evil. 
 
 Conscience, though not infallible, is always to be obeyed. We should 
 seek to give it light from every possible source: 
 
 From revelation, from the church, from nature, from the constitution of 
 man, from social customs, from civil law, from philosophy, from science 
 from thinking, from every possible source, and then act according to the 
 dictates of the highest reason and an enlightened conscience. 
 
 7. Unreasonable Action. — Why do men act unreasonably? Socrates 
 held that since every man desires his own good, he will secure it if he knows 
 how, and that moral delinquencies are resolvable into intellectual blunders. 
 With -all respect for the wisdom of Socrates, we dissent from this opinion as 
 contrary to the facts of experience. 
 
 It is not simply because misinformed that men act contrary to sound 
 judgment, for this we are all liable, at times, to do, but that with their eyes 
 wide open to all the consequences, they will pursue a course that will bring 
 evil upon them, or refuse to do that which they admit will be for their 
 highest good. 
 
 Unreasonable action then is volutary action contrary to a man's deliber- 
 ate judgment. Impulsive acts are often performed through sudden 
 desire, anger, or fear, which will not afterwards stand the test of reason. 
 Sometimes these acts so quickly follow the impulse, tfiat not only no time 
 is taken for deliberation, but there is not even, at the time, a consciousness 
 of uneasiness in regard to the consequences. Persons accounted sane often 
 act unreasonably. Under strong impulse of appetite or passion, the will 
 sometimes seems impotent to resist. The act is performed, the deed is done. 
 
 There are, however, cases where the impulse is admitted not to be over- 
 mastering, where in fact there is deliberation and the consequences are 
 foreseen, but sophistry unconsciously creeps in, or is even vaguely allowed, 
 the attention is directed to present gratification and withdrawn from 
 remote consequences, and then the will sets reason aside and acts from 
 impulse to secure the present gratification. 
 
 In certain cases, the will surrenders its control, hands the reins of govern- 
 ment over to the contending parties— impulse and reason. The most 
 intense, the appetite, the passion, or the desire, seizes the reins and the 
 whip, and drives the victim on to ruin. This is the consequence of the 
 
VOLITION. Ill 
 
 base abdication by the will of its rightful throne. Nothing is better for the 
 will to do than to seek to enlighten the judgment, and then rule according 
 to the dictates of the highest reason. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON VOLITION. 
 
 1. Define volition, choice, preference, indifference, purpose, refusal. 
 
 2. Define the will and give its relations to the ego. 
 
 3. Is the will a separate entity which decides and chooses, or does the 
 ego decide and choose by its power called the will? 
 
 4. State the order of phenomena connected with volition. 
 
 5. Discuss the pre -volitional phenomena. 
 
 6. Discuss the volitional phenomena. 
 
 7. Discuss the post-volitional phenomena. 
 
 :8. Illustrate the threefold order of the phenomena. 
 
 9. Give the relation of motives to volition. 
 
 10. Discuss the power of contrary choice. 
 
 11. Discuss the relation of responsibility to freedom. 
 
 12. Discuss the ground of moral obligation. 
 
 13. Give the fundamental principle of obligation and the golden rule. 
 
 14. Is conscience an infallible guide? Should it always be followed? 
 
 15. Name the sources of light to guide the conscience. 
 
 16. Discuss unreasonable action. 
 
 Supplementary Note. — What is the present drift of Psychology? What 
 is the drift of Philosophy? 
 
 The present activity in Psychology is evidently in the line of Physiologi- 
 cal Psychology. It is well to cultivate a too long neglected field. The 
 physiological conditions of mental phenomena can not be too well under- 
 stood. Prof. James says: "At present Psychology is on the material tack, 
 and ought, in the interest of ultimate success, to be allowed full headway 
 even by those who are certain she will never fetch the port without putting 
 down the helm once more." 
 
 The investigations in this line are conducted largely by the experimental 
 method. We welcome any light obtained from this source. 
 
 It should, however, be remembered that no amount of physiological study 
 will ever explain the nature of consciousness, or of reflection, or of rational 
 intuition, and that only in part can it explain sensation, perception, and 
 representation, but that it wholly fails to explain the logical processes of 
 generalized thinking through the forms of conceiving, judging and reasoning. 
 
 Is it possible by studying the nerves, to understand the nature of an 
 argument, or to appreciate the difference between a valid syllogism and a 
 formal fallacy? 
 
 The principal methods of studying the mind through consciousness, 
 reflection and rational intuition will always remain principal, and Physio- 
 logical Psychology, though important, will always remain collateral. 
 
112 OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 The drift of Philosophy is towards Idealism, and this has been the ten_ 
 dency since the time of Kant. While Kant held that our knowledge is only 
 of phenomena, he yet believed in the existence of things in themselves 
 apart from the phenomena, but that the nature of these things is wholly 
 unknown. A thing in itself is one that exists, though not perceived. 
 
 If we know only phenomena, and things in themselves are wholly un- 
 known, we have nothing to do with them, and might as well deny their 
 existence. This was the natural, the almost inevitable step taken by 
 Idealism. The denial is, however, dogmatic. 
 
 Phenomena are the joint products of two factors — subjective and objec- 
 tive. Though Kant had too good sense to deny the existence of things in 
 themselves, he was wrong in declaring them wholly unknown. We know 
 them as the objective factor in the products called phenomena— as the 
 causes of our sensations. The phenomena are the creations of our imagina- 
 tions, and so far Idealism is right, but not wholly so; for these phenomena, 
 these ideas are the embodiments of our judgments as to the causes of our 
 sensations. The sensations are caused by external things, are modified as 
 the things are modified, and our ideas undergo corresponding modifications. 
 Even Berkley held that we are affected by things without ourselves, but 
 that these things are not material things, but are ideas in God's mind, and 
 are objects of perception. The ideas are our own, so far as the subjective 
 factor is concerned, made by us to account for our sensations, but they vary 
 indefinitely as our sensations vary, and our sensations vary with their 
 causes. Appearances are thus naturally explained. 
 
 A person enters a room and sees an ordinary chair and a rocking-chair. 
 Another person comes in and sees the same things. We all see our moon, 
 and with a telescope, the moons of Jupiter. Why should the two persons 
 agree in seeing the chairs, if there are no chairs? Why should we all agree 
 in seeing our moon or the moons of Jupiter, if there is no moon, no Jupiter, 
 and no moons of Jupiter? The Idealist answers: There is indeed 
 the- phenomenal world, the show world, but it is our own creation, 
 and we all see alike, because we have a common nature. 
 
 Prof. Royce in his captivating book, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy \ 
 says: "Hence, not the abiding matter of the moon, as something that 
 should stay there when you and I had both departed, but some common 
 law that holds for your spirit as for mine, is the basis for the seeming, 
 permanence and common outer reality of the moon for us." 
 
 This explanation gives meager satisfaction. Why should we see any 
 chairs at all, or any moon, or any Jupiter? Is there any law that pre- 
 destinates us to see the moon, if there is no moon? If so, what is that law? 
 The explanation is not satisfactory, and it is evident that Idealism has not 
 spoken the last word in philosophy. 
 
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