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WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
Emperor William II at his desk in his villa on the 
 Island of Corfu. 
 
WHAT GERMANY 
 
 WANTS 
 
 BY 
 
 EDMUND VON MACH 
 
 NON-REFERT 
 
 pqwvad • ais 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 
 
 1914 
 

 Copyright, 1914, 
 By Little, Brown, and Company. 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
 Published, October, 1914 
 
 m -4 19/4 
 
 THE COLONIAL PRESS 
 C. H. SIMONDS CO., BOSTON, U. 8. A. 
 
 
^ 
 
 A PERSONAL FOREWORD 
 
 During the preparation of this book the writer 
 received from his uncle, a veteran army officer 
 living in Dresden, a brief note containing the 
 following laconic record : 
 
 1793, your great grandfather at Kostheim. 
 
 1815, your grandfather at Liegnitz. 
 
 1870, myself — all severely wounded by 
 French bullets. 
 
 1914, my son, captain in the 6th Regiment of 
 Dragoons. 
 
 Four generations obliged to fight the French! 
 
 When the writer turns to his American friends 
 of French descent, he finds there similar records, 
 and often even greater sorrow, for death has 
 come to many of them. In Europe their families 
 and his have looked upon each other as enemies 
 for generations, while a few years in the clarify- 
 ing atmosphere of America have made friends of 
 former Frenchmen, Germans, Russians, and 
 Englishmen. 
 
 Jointly they pray that the present war may not 
 be carried to such a pass that an early and honor- 
 able peace becomes impossible for any one of 
 
vi WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 these great nations. Is it asking too much that 
 America may be vouchsafed in not too distant 
 a future to do for their respective native lands 
 what the American institutions have done for 
 them individually, help them to regard each other 
 at their true worth, unblinded by traditional 
 hatred or fiery passion? 
 
 In the tense moments of personal or interna- 
 tional intercourse, blessed are the contestants 
 who have a wise and a steadfast friend, one who, 
 knowing both sides, can reconcile their funda- 
 mental differences. Since war is generally only 
 the culmination of many previous grievances and 
 misunderstandings, the friend who will give 
 more time to a study of the true aims of the con- 
 testants than to their claims and counter-claims 
 in their moments of heated passion, is likely to 
 be most serviceable. 
 
 This is the purpose of the present book, to 
 show that Germany too had " hitched her wagon 
 to a star." If there had been the least danger of 
 doing more than this, namely of unloading on 
 any one of the other nations the bitterness which 
 many Americans have felt towards Germany, 
 the book would not have been written, for Amer- 
 ica can be the helpful friend only if bitterness 
 gives way to sympathy. 
 
 May there come out of this terrific struggle 
 ways and means of preventing similar tragedies 
 
A PERSONAL FOREWORD vii 
 
 in the future, not by laws and regulations, but by 
 a better understanding and a higher morality of 
 the peoples of the world. And may America, 
 who has adopted the sons of so many nations, 
 lead the way and gain the gratitude of mankind ! 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 A Personal Foreword 
 I. What Germany Wants 
 II. Alsace - Lorraine 
 
 III. The German Emperor 
 
 IV. The Past . 
 V. The New Empire 
 
 VI. Russia, the Slavs, and Germany . 
 VII. Germany and Continental Europe 
 VIII. Germany and England . 
 
 IX. Militarism 
 
 X. Conclusion 
 
 Appendix A. The Chancellor's 
 Speech in the Reichstag, August 5, 
 
 1914 
 
 Appendix B. Quotations from the 
 British " Bernhardi "... 
 
 PAGE 
 V 
 
 I 
 
 17 
 24 
 40 
 
 49 
 60 
 80 
 
 99 
 123 
 
 137 
 
 146 
 
 154 
 
What Germany Wants 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 In moments of great stress, when horror at ter- 
 rible agonies strikes deep into the souls of men, 
 their overwrought nerves need an outlet some- 
 where. Those friends of Germany who see in 
 the spontaneous outburst against that land only 
 hatred, ignorance, and prejudice, do not know 
 America. If Americans could not give vent to 
 their pent-up emotions by joining in the head- 
 liner's righteous indignation at the less harrowing 
 concomitants of war, such as the burning of a 
 city, but were obliged to think of war itself, of 
 the " poor devils " dying in the ditches, of the 
 machine guns w^iping out with a few turns of the 
 crank the youths of an entire village; if they 
 were forced to think of the wounded over whose 
 maimed bodies the battles are raging, or of 
 those who are forgotten and alone, they would 
 not be Americans, warm-hearted and quick of 
 sympathy, if they could stand it. 
 
2 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 Underneath all this seeming bluster and seem- 
 ing bitterness the real American, even he of Ger- 
 man descent, detects the desire of all classes to 
 be fair to the contestants. This appeared very 
 clearly in the advice of prominent men publicly 
 offered in the early days of the v^ar, to the effect 
 that America should distinguish between the Kai- 
 ser and the German people. Later it was found 
 that no such distinction could be made because 
 the agreement between the German people and 
 the Emperor had never been closer than it was in 
 the early days of August, 19 14, and is today. 
 
 Many friends of Germany, in their eagerness 
 to plead her cause, have added to the general 
 confusion by attacking the sincerity of her oppo- 
 nents. As if a course could be made righteous 
 by the mere fact that there was unrighteousness 
 also on the other side. This argument is useless 
 in America, where people are convinced that 
 Heaven does not always employ angels only to 
 carry out its purposes. 
 
 Paul Rohrbach, a well-known German publi- 
 cist, has stated the case very well, when he said 
 to his countrymen two years ago : " We need not 
 disguise the fact from ourselves that in many 
 parts of the world we are less liked than, for 
 instance, the English or the French. People will 
 say how can this be possible, since both England 
 and France have often been guilty of violence 
 
WHAT GERMANY WANTS 3 
 
 and insolence in their dealings with weaker 
 nations? This is true, but the more important 
 fact is also true, that powerful cultural influences 
 have emanated from both countries, and have 
 been gratefully felt in the whole world. Many 
 people therefore possess a vivid picture of what 
 the English and the French people have done for 
 the culture of the world while few have any 
 similar feeling toward Germany. Individual 
 citizens of foreign states who have made our 
 acquaintance or whose education enables them to 
 appreciate even without such an acquaintance the 
 German contributions to the general culture of 
 the world, will no doubt do justice to our achieve- 
 ments, but nations as such are little acquainted 
 with each other, and are hardly able to judge one 
 another objectively and fairly. It is therefore 
 not at all astonishing that the younger people of 
 the western hemisphere, whose states have re- 
 cently been formed, and the older states of 
 Asia, who are gradually leaving their seclusion 
 of thousands of years, should know little more 
 of us than our most recent accomplishments since 
 the foundations of the German Empire. Our 
 former achievements, such as the liberation of the 
 human mind in the age of the Reformation, the 
 part we played in the literature of the world from 
 the middle of the eighteenth century to the early 
 nineteenth century, and the foundation of the 
 
4 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 philosophy of ideas, these are all matters which 
 people of average cultivation do not understand. 
 What people do know is this — forty years ago 
 the Germans suddenly rose from an existence 
 which was insignificant both economically and 
 politically to one of great strength; they fought 
 for and won the rank of a world power, and have 
 since created a mighty army; they have tre- 
 mendously increased their commerce and their 
 industries, and have built ships; and they have 
 now also begun to demand consideration for 
 their interests in the world at large." 
 
 Friends of Germany should be grateful for 
 every American who knows Germany better than 
 Rohrbach here implies — and there are many — 
 and should endeavor to supply all the others with 
 information from which to form a correct pic- 
 ture of the fatherland. 
 
 England is pretty well understood here; not 
 a saint by any means forgetful of her own 
 interests, but on the whole drawing nearer all 
 the time to the moral perfection which her 
 leaders proclaim, and advancing the civilization 
 of the world in a way that America can under- 
 stand. 
 
 France, once the mistress of the world and 
 still holding a preeminent place, is dear to 
 Americans because of the charm of her lan- 
 guage, her art, her good taste, the courtesy of 
 
WHAT GERMANY WANTS 5 
 
 her people, her form of government, and the 
 help she gave America in her War of Independ- 
 ence. 
 
 Russia is very little known, although her liter- 
 ature, her art, and her music are constant topics 
 of study and conversation. As a country she is 
 felt to be a power with which the world has to 
 reckon. She is, she was, and she will be. 
 
 Whoever, therefore, is to blame for the actual 
 outbreak of this war, the belief is widely held that 
 Germany and her aspirations were directly or 
 indirectly responsible for it. It can be freely 
 admitted that there are aspects of the situation 
 under which such an interpretation is possible, 
 and it is therefore at this point that the question 
 arises, What does Germany want? 
 
 This is the really important question and one 
 which it should not be impossible to answer. It 
 differs therefore from others which it would 
 seem futile to propose at present for only the 
 future will be able to decide whether Germany, 
 or Russia, or perhaps Great Britain, could have 
 avoided the war; whether the Allies or the Ger- 
 mans are responsible for the atrocities men- 
 tioned in the papers, or whether, perhaps, both 
 should be acquitted from the charges of unnec- 
 essary brutality. To a certain extent the facts 
 are not yet available, and to a certain extent the 
 perfectly natural bias of the several editors — 
 
6 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 they would not be human if they could refrain 
 from taking sides — presents the facts in such a 
 way that the careful reader must refuse to form 
 his opinion only on what he reads. On Septem- 
 ber 28, for instance, one paper contained this 
 item under the caption " A Detestable Form of 
 Warfare " : " Can anyone doubt what would 
 have been the answer of Frederick the Great, 
 Napoleon, Wellington, Lee, or Grant, had it been 
 proposed to them to drop bombs into the throng 
 of Sunday promenaders of a city not besieged or 
 invested? . . . These great generals bombarded 
 cities whose inmates had to take the chances of 
 war. But there is a distinction between bom- 
 bardment and bomb dropping under such condi- 
 tions as governed the practice in Paris yester- 
 day." Another daily referred to exactly the 
 same incident as follows : " The dramatic event 
 of yesterday was the attack on the Eiffel Tower 
 by a German aircraft which suddenly appeared 
 high above Paris and made four unsuccessful 
 attempts from a great height to wreck this well- 
 known landmark. It would have been a pretty 
 coup had it succeeded, as it would have cut off 
 wireless communication between France and 
 Russia, a thing which the Germans no doubt are 
 very desirous of accomplishing. The casualties 
 resulting from this unsuccessful attack were 
 small. The accounts differ as to whether there 
 
WHAT GERMANY WANTS 7 
 
 were any fatalities or not. In some a man and 
 a child were killed, in others only injured." 
 
 Which account should a man in search of the 
 truth believe ? Did the Germans wish to destroy 
 the Eiffel Tower with its powerful wireless sta- 
 tion and was the resulting injury to the civilian 
 bystanders one of the unavoidable chances of 
 war? Or did the Germans, in fiendish brutality, 
 drop bombs on a throng of .Sunday promenaders, 
 using the Eiffel Tower as a pretext ? Unless the 
 reader has a previous knowledge of the character 
 of the German people which makes the one or 
 the other account probable, he is at a loss, since 
 the proof of the accuracy of either report is ob- 
 viously impossible at present. 
 
 The character of the German people, however, 
 will be fairly well established when their aspira- 
 tions are known and an answer is given to the 
 question. What does Germany want? 
 
 Some people may feel that a satisfactory an- 
 swer has been supplied by such books as Ger- 
 many and the Next War, by General von Bern- 
 hardi, and Pan-Germanism by Professor Roland 
 G. Usher. Since the German, Bernhardi, and the 
 American, Usher, are said to be in substantial 
 agreement, and the present war, in general, 
 seems to follow Bernhardi's prophecies, it is 
 natural that these two writers should seem to be 
 correct. > 
 
8 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 The conclusions which the reading public has 
 drawn from them are briefly these: Germany, 
 drunk with her material successes of the recent 
 past and trusting in the strength of her huge 
 army, has formed the plan of conquering the 
 world. She has nailed to her mast Madame de 
 Stael's motto " The patriotism of nations ought 
 to be selfish ", and recognizes no other law than 
 that of brute force. The present war marks a 
 step in her well-planned scheme. If successful, 
 she will annex Belgium and Holland, humiliate 
 France, try to despoil Great Britain of her navy 
 and her colonies, push Russia back towards Asia, 
 and establish, together with Austria, a huge 
 Balkan empire which will open for her a way to 
 Egypt and India. Just what will become of Italy 
 and Spain is not quite clear for, without resting 
 on her laurels, Germany will turn her eyes unto 
 the western hemisphere and make war on the 
 United States of America. 
 
 Although few readers believe that Germany 
 will succeed in the first step of this career they see 
 nothing improbable in Professor Usher's presen- 
 tation, for, whom the gods would destroy they 
 first make mad, and Germany is riding for a fall. 
 
 Those who know Germany do not agree with 
 Professor Usher, but then — that is their opinion 
 against his. Unfortunately for his argument 
 Mr. Usher has added to his book a bibliography 
 
WHAT GERMANY WANTS 9 
 
 which at least casts doubts on the impartiality of 
 his judgment for it shows that he consulted many 
 British journals, the Encyclopcudia Britannica, 
 nth Edition, six British books, three French 
 books, and not a single German book, while he 
 says of a volume of essays by British and Ger- 
 man statesmen " They do not afford much infor- 
 mation." He thus leaves us in doubt as to the 
 sources and contexts of those German writings 
 on which he has obviously drawn in support of 
 his own theory. They would seem to be taken 
 largely from the writings of a so-called Pan- 
 Germanic league which Mr. Usher himself con- 
 siders of insufficient importance to deserve men- 
 tion in his bibliography. 
 
 Nobody can deny that there may be persons 
 in Germany holding the views attributed to the 
 German nation by Mr. Usher, and that some 
 British publicists have frightened their country- 
 men into regarding the Germans as dangerous 
 madmen. 
 
 It is more difficult to prove that General von 
 Bernhardi also does not adequately represent the 
 Germans. Since the war began he and his wri- 
 tings have jumped into public notice, and in a 
 much quoted interview (September 27, 19 14) 
 President David Starr Jordan, of Leland Stan- 
 ford University, relates that he heard Bernhardi 
 lecture in San Francisco on May 25, 1913: 
 
10 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 " He had been on a tour round the world, stop- 
 ping at places where there were Germans, and 
 giving lectures under the official support of the 
 consuls of the Empire, and with the respective 
 consuls presiding in the chair." 
 
 At that time the author was the president of 
 the Bostoner Deutsche Gesellschaft, a society of 
 about six hundred members, Americans, Ger- 
 mans, and Frenchmen, interested in all phases of 
 German culture. He was constantly on the look- 
 out for speakers of prominence and was in close 
 touch with the Germanistic Society of America. 
 The German consul in Boston was a member of 
 the governing board of the Gesellschaft and so 
 were several professors of the neighborhood 
 whose intimate relations with the German Gov- 
 ernment are well-known. The German Ambas- 
 sador was an honorary member of the Gesell- 
 schaft. Bernhardi's name was not brought to 
 the attention of the lecture committee through 
 any one of these channels, which proves that his 
 writings meant little or nothing to the Germans 
 of New England. Their number may be com- 
 paratively small but since most of them have 
 home ties in Germany it would seem that also 
 there Bernhardi was not the man of the hour he 
 is believed to have been. 
 
 As a matter of fact, Bernhardi's book did not 
 voice the popular sentiment of Germany, for 
 
WHAT GERMANY WANTS 11 
 
 Bernhardi himself said in his introduction : " In 
 striking contrast to this military aptitude [of the 
 Germans] they have today become a peace- 
 loving — an almost too peace-loving nation. A 
 rude shock is needed to awaken their warlike in- 
 stincts, and compel them to show their military 
 strength," These words were written in Octo- 
 ber, 191 1, and no rude shock came to awaken 
 the German nation from pursuing its ways of 
 peace until August, 19 14. 
 
 The reason why Bernhardi's book, Germany 
 and the Next War, did not make a greater stir 
 was that such books ^ are by no means rare in 
 Europe. Written by military men, they are often 
 altogether technical, as for instance General von 
 Bernhardi's other great book War Today, and 
 when they touch upon social and political mat- 
 ters they are often so extreme that people do not 
 acknowledge them as true. 
 
 In the same year 191 1 a French officer, Colo- 
 nel Arthur Boucher, published a book entitled 
 La France Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain 
 (France Victorious in the Next War) ; and 
 even more remarkable was La Guerre de Demain 
 (The Next War) by M. Keller, published Sep- 
 tember 10, 1 89 1, in which not only the invasion 
 
 1 For a very similar book presenting the British view see The 
 Day of the Saxon, by Homer Lea, in which Great Britain is urged 
 first to attack and to destroy Germany^ and then to attack 
 Russia. For extracts from this book see Appendix B. 
 
12 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 ^■^f but also the final annexation of Belgium by 
 France was outlined. These designs on the neu- 
 trality of Belgium induced Charles Woeste, ex- 
 Minister of Justice, to write his eloquent book 
 La Neutralite Beige (Brussels, 1891). 
 
 While the two French books mentioned and 
 their discussions of tactical problems may have 
 been carefully studied by the French General 
 Staff nobody would be rash enough to claim 
 that they were representative of the aspirations 
 of the French people. The same is true of Bern- 
 hardi's book published under a similar title. In 
 so far as his advice is strategically good it will 
 probably be followed by the German army; but 
 it will, on reflection, hardly be doubted that 
 Bernhardi neither spoke for the Germans as 
 such, nor that his book had any influence on the 
 people as a whole. 
 
 If, then, Pan-Germanism is not what Germany 
 wants what was the purpose of her huge arma- 
 ments which brought her to the brink of bank- 
 ruptcy, as has been claimed, and made an 
 " armed camp " of her country? 
 
 Strangely enough neither of these assertions, 
 
 • both of which have been readily believed outside 
 
 of Germany, is true. On June 16, 19 14, Mr. 
 
 Edgar Crammond read a paper ^ before the 
 
 ^ Printed in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society , July, 
 1914. 
 
WHAT GERMANY WANTS 13 
 
 Royal Statistical Society in London on The 
 Economic Relations of the British and German 
 Empires, and stated that " the debt of the Impe- 
 rial German Government and the German Fed- 
 eral Governments amounted to 1,028,600,000 
 pounds, or £15.16.8 per head of the population, 
 while the debt of the United Kingdom amounted 
 to 747,750,000 pounds, or £16.10.0 per head of 
 the population." In the ensuing discussion, in 
 which Lord Welby, Sir George Paish and others 
 took part, it was brought out by Mr. J. Ellis 
 Barker that " In Germany there was on balance 
 no national debt, because the assets of the State 
 were considerably greater than all the State and 
 National Debts combined." These assets con- 
 sist of the State railways, forests, mines, salt 
 works, and so forth. While therefore the Na- 
 tional Debt of the United Kingdom amounts to 
 £16.10.0 (about $80.00) per head of the popula- 
 tion, there is in Germany a balance on the credit 
 side, the assets being larger than the liabilities. 
 No figures of the actual size of this balance are 
 available. A country, however, which makes 
 such a favorable showing on the figures presented 
 by its greatest rival can by no stretch of the im- 
 agination be called bankrupt, and with this, one 
 of the causes of the war frequently mentioned by 
 the " man on the street " is seen to be fictitious. 
 Germany did not go to war because " she had 
 
14 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 spent on her armaments as much as her credit 
 would stand ", nor because " she would have to 
 disarm unless she could retrieve her fortunes by 
 an enormous indemnity to be paid to her after 
 a successful war." 
 
 As regards the statement that Germany had 
 made an armed camp of the country, and that 
 this state of affairs had become unbearable, it 
 should be noted that the regular term of service 
 of her soldiers was two years and of all young 
 men of some education only one year, while 
 more young men of the proper age presented 
 themselves annually than could be used in the 
 army. At the outbreak of the present war more 
 than one million men, many of them not previ- 
 ously trained in the army, volunteered their serv- 
 ices, and early in September the Government was 
 obliged to announce that for the present no more 
 men could be enlisted. 
 
 Compare this with the conditions in other 
 European countries, where, in some instances, all 
 able-bodied young men had to serve in the army 
 not only one or two but three years. Remember, 
 also, the tens of thousands of German reservists 
 on furlough in every part of the globe, and un- 
 able to return home at this time, and you will 
 readily see that the picture of Germany as an 
 armed camp is overdrawn. Germans, moreover, 
 do not look upon the one or two years they spend 
 
WHAT GERMANY WANTS 15 
 
 in the army as so much time wasted but as an 
 invaluable training. They would agree with 
 Dr. Levi M. Powers, who wrote in the Glouces- 
 ter Times, September 12, 1914: "The German 
 boy at sixteen or seventeen is a spindled-shanked 
 prig. By the time the army is through with him 
 he is physically the best developed man of Eu- 
 rope, democratised by contact with all classes. 
 Because of her army Germany is a nation phys- 
 ically disciplined, and taught as no other people 
 the value and meaning of law and order." 
 
 This brings us to the point, so often over- 
 looked outside of Germany, that the German 
 army is a Citizen Army existing for the defence 
 of the fatherland. When its constituent units 
 are not in commission they are in commerce 
 throughout the world basing their commercial 
 actions on peaceful international relations, which 
 are best expressed by the lengthy terms of their 
 business contracts with citizens of other nations. 
 
 Since Germany started on her industrial de- 
 velopment she has never desired war. Her ag- 
 gressiveness has been solely commercial, and 
 commercial aggressiveness and military aggres- 
 siveness are mutually destructive. 
 
 Germany wants to keep the confines of her 
 home-land inviolate but is not desirous of join- 
 ing to them new lands of unwilling people. 
 
 She wants to develop her colonies and invest 
 
16 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 her money in the building of extra-territorial 
 railways which will ultimately bring her into 
 relation with new markets. 
 
 She wants to develop her home commerce and 
 industry, and increase the usefulness of her agri- 
 culture that she may give employment to a popu- 
 lation growing at the rate of about a million a 
 year. There has been no balance of emigration 
 from Germany for many years. 
 
 Over and above these desires she has the very 
 natural and proper ambition to be worthy of her 
 great past and to make her own contributions to 
 the civilization of the world. She wants social 
 justice, and she wishes to remove from her labor- 
 ing classes the ills of poverty. 
 
 Germany wants peace, for in peace only can 
 she do what she has set out to do. She wants 
 an honorable and a stable peace, and in so far as 
 the defects of her character have been contribu- 
 tory causes to misunderstandings she wishes to 
 eradicate these defects. She desires the good- 
 will of the world. 
 
CHAPTER 11 
 
 ALSACE - LORRAINE 
 
 Contrary to the general belief Bismarck is said 
 to have regretted more than anyone the necessity 
 of taking Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1871. 
 It is true that these provinces had belonged to 
 Germany from the time of the division of Char- 
 lemagne's empire in 843 to 1648, when Ger- 
 many, exhausted by the Thirty Years' War and 
 torn by internal dissensions, was forced to cede 
 the greater part of them to France ; Strassburg 
 and the surrounding territory was seized by 
 Louis XIV in time of peace in 1681. The peo- 
 ple of Alsace are almost entirely of German 
 stock, belonging to the Alemannian tribe, from 
 the name of which the French name for Ger- 
 many, Allemagne, is derived. That their native 
 speech is German will appear even to the unin- 
 itiated from such names as Miilhausen, Breisach, 
 Strassburg, Weissenburg, Saarburg, etc. Sim- 
 ilarly, the population of Lorraine is for the most 
 part closely related to that of the adjoining part 
 of Prussia.^ 
 
 * H. C. G. von Jagemann, The Outlook, September 16, 1914. 
 
18 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 In spite of this Bismarck foresaw that France 
 would not rest while she could hope some day 
 to regain these provinces. The very peace, 
 therefore, which concluded the Franco-Prussian 
 war laid the foundation of another war in the 
 future. This was a heavy price to pay, but with- 
 out Alsace and Lorraine the South German 
 States felt unable to join the federation of the 
 German Empire. Bismarck therefore yielded 
 and gave his reasons in a speech delivered May 
 2, 187 1. He pointed out that there had not 
 been " a generation of our fathers for three hun- 
 dred years which had not been forced to draw 
 the sword against France ", and that after the 
 successful war of 1870 it had become our duty 
 to take steps against similar attacks. The first 
 step was the federation of the German States in 
 the German Empire, which, owing to the then 
 existing geographical and strategic frontier, was 
 impossible of fulfillment without the occupation 
 of Alsace-Lorraine. Bismarck says, " I cannot 
 describe our condition, and especially that of 
 South Germany, better than with the words of 
 a thoughtful South German sovereign, the late 
 King William of Wiirtemberg, who said to me, 
 'The crux of the situation is Strassburg; for 
 as long as Strassburg is not German, South 
 Germany will be unable to give herself unre- 
 servedly to German unity and a national German 
 
ALSACE - LORRAINE 19 
 
 policy. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port 
 for an ever-ready army of one hundred thousand 
 or one hundred and fifty thousand men, Ger- 
 many finds herself unable to appear on the upper 
 Rhine with an equally numerous army on time. 
 The French will always be here first.' I believe 
 this instance taken from an actual occurrence 
 says everything. I need not add one word." 
 
 Bismarck then discusses the suggestion, which 
 had been offered, of making a neutral State of 
 these provinces, similar to those of Belgium and 
 Switzerland, so that there would have been a 
 chain of neutral states from the North Sea to 
 the Swiss Alps. He points out the impractica- 
 bility of this plan for several reasons but espe- 
 cially because " neutrality can only be maintained 
 when the inhabitants are determined to preserve 
 an independent and neutral position. This sup- 
 position would not be true in the immediate fu- 
 ture for the neutrality of Alsace and Lorraine. 
 On the contrary, it is to be expected that the 
 strong French elements which will survive in 
 the country for a long while will induce the 
 people to unite with France in the case of an- 
 other Franco-German war. The neutrality of 
 Alsace-Lorraine, therefore, would have been 
 merely a sham working harm for us and benefits 
 for France. Nothing was left, therefore, but 
 to bring both these countries with their strong 
 
20 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 fortresses completely under German control. It 
 was our purpose to establish them as a powerful 
 bulwark in Germany's defence against France, 
 and to move the starting-point of a possible 
 French attack several days marches farther 
 back." 
 
 Germany heartily concurred in Bismarck's 
 conclusion and has ever since believed that her 
 possession of these two provinces is necessary 
 for her safety. For France, however, their loss 
 was of great sentimental moment. The statue 
 of Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde in 
 Paris has been draped in mourning forty-three 
 years, and France has made no secret of her 
 intense desire to regain possession of these prov- 
 inces. It is idle to deny that all advances to a 
 better understanding between Germany and 
 France have failed on that account, and this in 
 spite of the sincere friendship which has drawn 
 individual Frenchmen and Germans together, 
 especially when they have met in foreign lands. 
 Germany could not be safe without Alsace- 
 Lorraine, and France would not be happy while 
 she mourned their loss. 
 
 This feeling in France, moreover, has been 
 artificially fanned by a small part of the Alsa- 
 tian press and most of the French press, who 
 have tried to make the world believe that the 
 inhabitants of these provinces wished to return 
 
ALSACE - LORRAINE 21 
 
 to French rule. How ill-founded this appeal to 
 French chivalry was appears from the letter 
 written to the presiding officer of the Reichstag 
 under date of August 5, 19 14, by the Alsatian 
 representative in the German Reichstag, Dr. 
 Ricklin. Dr. Ricklin is also the speaker of the 
 second chamber of the Alsatian legislature. The 
 letter, translated, reads: 
 
 Dear Mr. Speaker: Please excuse my ab- 
 sence from the Reichstag. I started for Berlin 
 Sunday night, August 2, but was taken ill sud- 
 denly and had to return to Carspach-Sonnen- 
 berg. I regret my absence from the Reichstag 
 very much because I should have liked to take 
 the opportunity of expressing there in the name 
 of my constituents my regret and deep sorrow 
 at the political difficulties which have arisen. 
 The idea of war between Germany and France 
 is so terrible and awful for us people in Alsace- 
 Lorraine that we hardly dare to think of it. We 
 do not want a war between Germany and France 
 at any cost, certainly not for the sake of alter- 
 ing our political position. People who have 
 spread a different view among the French and 
 have thereby fanned the French thoughts of 
 war, are traitors to our people and have drawn 
 upon themselves the curses of thousands of 
 Alsace-Lorraine people, fathers, mothers, and 
 wives, who with bleeding hearts must see their 
 sons and husbands go into the most terrible of 
 all wars. 
 
 To the last we hoped that we might be spared 
 
22 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 the terrors of a war between Germany and 
 France, and even now our people refuse to give 
 up hope. If, however, God has decreed differ- 
 ently, well — then the Alsace-Lorraine people 
 too will do their whole duty and they will do 
 it without a single reservation. 
 
 The rules of the Reichstag do not permit a 
 representative to vote by mail, but I have the 
 right to inform you, Mr. Speaker, that I should 
 have voted, if I had been present, in favor of 
 all the bills which the present state of affairs 
 demanded, including the bill granting the neces- 
 sary funds for carrying on the war. 
 
 You have the right, Mr. Speaker, to make any 
 use you choose of this letter. With the expres- 
 sion of great respect I am very sincerely yours, 
 (signed) Dr Ricklin, member of the Reichs- 
 tag. 
 
 This letter proves the accuracy of Bismarck's 
 prophecy that in time and by patience the hostil- 
 ity of the people of Alsace-Lorraine would be 
 overcome. " For we have," he said, " many 
 means at our disposal. We Germans are accus- 
 tomed to govern more benevolently, sometimes 
 more awkwardly, but in the long run really more 
 benevolently and humanely than the French 
 statesmen. We are, moreover, able to grant 
 the inhabitants a far greater degree of com- 
 munal and individual freedom than the French 
 institutions and traditions ever permitted." 
 This has been done and the loyalty of these prov- 
 
ALSACE - LORRAINE 23 
 
 inces in the present crisis is undoubtedly due to 
 the amount of communal and individual free- 
 dom which they have enjoyed under German 
 rule, and which is far in excess of the amount 
 of liberty granted Ireland under the recent Home 
 Rule Bill, or enjoyed by any French province 
 or municipality. 
 
 Added, therefore, to her firm belief that Al- 
 sace and Lorraine are necessary for her safety, 
 Germany has felt the need of -defending her 
 latest countrymen in the possession of their indi- 
 vidual and communal freedom, possible for them 
 only under German rule. 
 
 Germany knew that France had not abated 
 her desire to possess herself of these provinces, 
 for like an honorable opponent France had never 
 disguised her expectations in this matter. When 
 France, therefore, mobilized her troops after 
 war had been declared between Germany and 
 Russia — to which latter country she was bound 
 by a defensive, and possibly an offensive alliance 
 — war between France and Germany became a 
 certainty, especially when France declared that 
 she could give no assurances of peace, but would 
 do what her interests demanded. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE GERMAN EMPEROR 
 
 The German Empire is a federation of German 
 States, three of which have a republican form 
 of government. The Emperor is the president 
 and chief executive of the federation, but his de- 
 crees 'require for their vahdity the counter signa- 
 ture of a responsible minister. In time of peace 
 the larger States, such as Bavaria, are practically 
 independent even in their military affairs. In 
 war, however, the Emperor is the commander- 
 in-chief of all the troops of the empire, or 
 to quote the customary expression, the chief 
 " Kriegsherr." This is literally translated 
 " War-lord ", and in German implies that he is 
 the chief lord only in war, while in peace he 
 shares this honor with the executives of other 
 States. 
 
 The legislature of the empire consists of two 
 houses, the Bundesrat, or Council of the Federa- 
 tion, the members of which are. appointed by the 
 several States, and the Reichstag, which is elected 
 by universal suffrage. A declaration of war 
 needs the consent of the Bundesrat, " unless an 
 
THE GERMAN EMPEROR 25 
 
 attack on the territory or the coast of the Fed- 
 eration has taken place ", while the appropria- 
 tions for carrying- on the war must be voted by 
 the Reichstag. 
 
 As regards the present war, the votes of Par- 
 liament were unanimous, even the social demo- 
 crats, the Poles, Danes, and representatives from 
 Alsace-Lorraine voting for the necessary funds. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the powers of the 
 Emperor are circumscribed, and that his influ- 
 ence depends more on the strength of his per- 
 sonality than on the prerogatives of his office — 
 which, by the way, carries no salary. He re- 
 ceives a salary as King of Prussia from that 
 State. 
 
 If the present Emperor, nevertheless, has been 
 the most influential man in Germany in recent 
 years, this has been due to the fact that he has 
 completely identified himself with the aspira- 
 tions of Germany. What she wanted, he wanted 
 — ■ peace and progress. Did he at first lead the 
 people, or did they urge him on? It would be 
 difficult to say. The fact is that the people early 
 believed in Emperor William's wise leadership 
 and that this belief soon grew to be a conviction. 
 In the beginning there was much criticism, but 
 this gave way to liking, liking to admiration, 
 and admiration to sincere love. 
 
 Although handicapped from infancy by a crip- 
 
26 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 pled left arm, William II has become an all- 
 round athlete, being an especially fine horseman 
 and sailor, a good tennis player, and a crack 
 huntsman. The only reminder one has of his 
 deformity is found in the kind of photographs 
 of him offered for sale. When the Emperor is 
 taken in uniform with his left arm resting on 
 the hilt of his sword, the shadows can be so 
 managed that the deformity of this arm is hardly 
 seen. 
 
 This accounts for the many military pictures 
 of the Emperor, and is a pity, because it is apt 
 to make one forget that William II has been 
 after all the great prince of peace, and the patron 
 of the peaceful pursuits of the Germans, There 
 is no branch of art, including music and litera- 
 ture, no industry, no part of agriculture or com- 
 merce, no detailed plan of education, no sug- 
 gestion for the betterment of existing social 
 conditions, which he has not fostered or called 
 into life. 
 
 It is well known that William II has a high 
 idea of the so-called divine right theory. This, 
 as many assume, is " the patient's belief in his 
 own sanctity ", or, to quote again, " there is a 
 halo about his head." An American straw hat, 
 however, of the kind the Emperor is wearing 
 in the picture printed as the frontispiece of this 
 book, is a poor hiding place for a divine right 
 
THE GERMAN EMPEROR 27 
 
 halo. If more pictures of the Corfu kind, and 
 not so many of the miHtary kind, had become 
 known, less extravagant stories of the " war 
 lord " and his wrongly interpreted divine right 
 theories would have received currency. 
 
 The Germans have never believed these stories 
 for they were contradicted by the man whom 
 they saw working for their happiness and the 
 progress and safety of their country. 
 
 The Emperor is a deeply religious man, and 
 his " divine rights " theory means after all noth- 
 ing but what many people believe, namely that 
 God has placed each man in his own special 
 sphere, and has commanded him to do his best. 
 It is the great gospel of personal responsibility. 
 
 Nothing probably can give one a better under- 
 standing of this side of the Emperor's character 
 than his own speeches.^ On October 17, 1903, 
 when Prince August Wilhelm and Prince Oskar, 
 his fourth .and fifth sons, joined the church, the 
 Emperor addressed to them this advice at a din- 
 ner in his private residence in Potsdam : 
 
 My dear Sons : In this moment when v^e are 
 ready to call for a toast in your honor, and to 
 offer you our congratulations at having joined 
 the company of grown-ups in active service; 
 
 * A larger collection of the Emperor's speeches in translation 
 IS found in The German Classics, Vol. XIV, published by the 
 German Publication Society, 597 Fifth Avenue, New York. 
 
28 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 when you are eager for work in the Kingidom 
 of God, I as your father wish to give you some 
 advice on your way. 
 
 This day is for you, in a spiritual sense, what 
 swearing to the colors is to the officers and pri- 
 .vates of the army. Today you have become of 
 age spiritually, if I may say so, and the weap- 
 ons and armor you are to use have been prepared 
 for you by clever experts. I mean the men who 
 have taught you. It will be your duty from now 
 on to apply these teachings in all walks and con- 
 ditions of life. You may receive some further 
 instructions in this respect, but each man must 
 himself learn how to make use of the weapons 
 that have been entrusted to him, even those of 
 the spirit. 
 
 Your spiritual teacher very wisely emphasized 
 one idea in the magnificent speech he addressed 
 to you when he urged you to be " personalities." 
 This is something which concerns, I believe, 
 every Christian, for there can be no doubt that 
 we are right when we say of our Lord that His 
 was the most personal of all personalities that 
 ever walked this earth. 
 
 In the course of your education you have read 
 and heard of many great men — and you will 
 hear of more in the future — wise men, states- 
 men, kings, princes, and poets. You have read 
 what this one or that one bas said and have been 
 inspired by his words. Certainly! for what 
 German youth would not feel ennobled and en- 
 raptured by the inspired songs of Korner, for 
 instance? 
 
 But these, after all, are only men's words, and 
 
THE GERMAN EMPEROR 29 
 
 not one of them equals a single word of our Lord. 
 Be sure of this, that you may maintain it, when 
 later in the whirlpool of life you hear others 
 discuss religion and the person of our Lord, 
 and discuss them yourselves. No man's word 
 ever yet has been able to inspire with the same 
 aspirations people of all races and of all nations, 
 that they should all be striving to be like Him, 
 and to sacrifice their lives for Him. This mira- 
 cle can only be explained by the fact that the 
 words He spoke were the words of the eternal 
 God, and that they can create life and be alive 
 after thousands of years, when the words of 
 the wise men have long been forgotten. 
 
 If I look back upon my own personal experi- 
 ences, I can assure you — and you will have the 
 same experience, yourselves — that the center of 
 our life, especially when it is an active life of 
 responsibility, hinges on the attitude we take 
 toward our Lord and Savior. I have realized 
 this more fully every year. 
 
 Because we cannot ignore Him, every man is 
 forced, consciously or unconsciously, to adjust 
 the life he lives, the office he fills, the work he 
 does, to his attitude toward his Savior, and to 
 determine whether his efforts shall be agreeable 
 to the Lord or not. His own conscience, unless 
 it is atrophied, will keep him informed of these 
 matters. 
 
 There is only one advice I can give you for 
 your life, and I give it with all my heart. Work 
 and labor incessantly. This is the substance of 
 the Christian life. Look to your Bible and read 
 the parables of our Savior. The indolent man 
 
30 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 who remains inactive, satisfied to swim with the 
 tide and to have other people work for him, is 
 most severely punished, as is told in the parable 
 of the pounds. Whatever your preferences or 
 your talents may be, let each one of you endeavor 
 to do his very best in his own sphere and to 
 become a personality, to grow in the perform- 
 ance of his duties, to be active, and to follow the 
 example of our Savior. 
 
 Above everything-, see to it that all things you 
 do give pleasure, if this is possible, to your fel- 
 low-men — for there is nothing more beautiful 
 than to take pleasure jointly with others — and 
 if this is impossible may your work be at least 
 useful as the active and helpful life of our Lord 
 always was. If you do this you will have done 
 what we expected of you, and will be honest 
 German men and useful princes of my house, 
 and you will take part in the work that has been 
 allotted to all of us. May you accomplish this 
 and be blessed, and may God and our Savior 
 help you ! This is our wish today." 
 
 Another speech of the Emperor has a special 
 significance because he used the expression the 
 " German Empire Oak." This figure of speech 
 appealed to the people, who added it to the rich 
 storehouse of imagery of the German language. 
 
 The address was delivered on February 3, 
 1899, at a dinner which the president of the 
 province of Brandenburg had arranged for the 
 members of the provincial diet. Brandenburg 
 
THE GERMAN EMPEROR 31 
 
 was the earliest of the provinces of the present 
 Kingdom of Prussia entrusted to the care of the 
 Hohenzollerns. The Emperor seems to have an 
 especially warm place in his heart for the sons 
 of Brandenburg: 
 
 My dear Mr. President and Men of Branden- 
 burg : — ■ 
 
 The address which we have just heard gave 
 a most patriotic survey, poetically embellished, 
 of the deeds of the Hohenzollerns and the his- 
 tory of our people. I believe I am expressing 
 your own feelings when I say that two factors 
 made it possible for my ancestors to solve their 
 problems as they did. One, and the chief factor, 
 was that they of all the princes at a time when 
 such thoughts and feelings were not yet uni- 
 versal, realized their personal responsibility 
 toward God, and acted accordingly, and the 
 other, that they had the support of the people 
 of Brandenburg. 
 
 Put yourselves back for a moment to the time 
 when Lord Frederick I was appointed Elector 
 here, and exchanged his splendid home in Fran- 
 conia for the March of Brandenburg. According 
 to the historians, the conditions here at that 
 time were such that we today can barely con- 
 ceive of them. We can therefore understand 
 Lord Frederick's action only if we assume that 
 he felt it his duty to accept the country which 
 the emperor's favor had bestowed on him. He 
 was eager to introduce in Brandenburg system 
 and order, not only because he wished to please 
 
32 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 the emperor, and himself, but because he be- 
 lieved Heaven had assigned to him this task. 
 Similar motives we can trace with all my ances- 
 tors. Their big wars with other countries, and 
 their institutions and laws at home were ever 
 inspired by the one feeling of responsibility to 
 the people who had been given into their keep- 
 ing, and the country which had been entrusted 
 to them. 
 
 The president of the province has kindly re- 
 ferred to our trip to Palestine and what I did 
 there. I am free to say that I have had many 
 and varied experiences of an elevating nature in 
 that country, partly religious, partly historical, 
 and partly, also, connected with modern life. My 
 most inspiring experience, however, next to the 
 service in our own church, was to stand on the 
 Mount of Olives and see the spot at its base 
 where the greatest struggle of the world was 
 fought — by the One Man — for the redemp- 
 tion of mankind. This realization induced me 
 to renew on that day my oath of allegiance, as 
 it were, to God on high. I swore to do my very 
 best to knit my people together and to destroy 
 whatever could disintegrate them. 
 
 During my stay in that foreign country where 
 we Germans miss the woods and the beautiful 
 sheets of water which we love, I often thought 
 of the lakes of Brandenburg and their clear, 
 somber depths and of our forests of oaks and 
 pines, and then I said to myself that after all 
 we are far happier here than in foreign lands, 
 although the other people of Europe often pity 
 us. 
 
THE GERMAN EMPEROR 33 
 
 Speaking of trees, and our care and love of 
 them, I am reminded of an incident which is 
 of interest to us who have begun to assist the 
 growth of the German Empire. It happened 
 after the great and inspiring events of 1870-71. 
 The troops had returned, the exultation had 
 abated, people had resumed their former labors, 
 and the work of solidifying and developing the 
 new fatherland was beginning. The three pal- 
 adins of the grand old Emperor, the great gen- 
 eral, the mighty chancellor, and the faithful 
 minister of war, had sat down to a meal, for 
 the first time alone. When they had drunk their 
 first glass to the sovereign and the Empire, the 
 chancellor turned to his companions and said : 
 " Now we have obtained everything for the real- 
 ization of which we have been fighting, strug- 
 gling, and suffering. We have reached the high- 
 est goal of which we ever dared to dream. After 
 our experiences what more can there be to in- 
 terest and to inspire us?" There was a brief 
 pause, and then the old director of battles said, 
 " To see the tree grow ! " And the room was 
 very still. 
 
 Yes, gentlemen, the tree which we must watch 
 and care for is the German Empire Oak. It is 
 bound to grow, because it has the protection of 
 the men of Brandenburg. Here are its roots. 
 It has weathered many a storm, and has often 
 almost died, but its roots and shoots, firmly 
 planted in Brandenburg soil, will keep, God 
 grant, in all eternity ! 
 
 The wish to bring about peace among all the 
 people is magnificent, but one big mistake is 
 
34 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 generally made in all such calculations. As long 
 as unregenerated sin rules among men, there 
 will be war and hatred, envy and discord, and 
 one man will try to get the better of another. 
 The law of men, is also the law of nations. Let 
 us Germans, therefore, hold together like a solid 
 rock! And may every wave which threatens 
 peace, far away or at home in Europe, dash in 
 vain against this immovable rock — the German 
 people ! 
 
 Finally, one other speech may be quoted here, 
 because it expresses the conviction of the best 
 minds of Germany, namely that Germany can 
 only thrive if her sons are morally strong and 
 proof against the temptations of pride and envy. 
 This speech was delivered on April 24, 1901, 
 to the students of the University of Bonn, when 
 the Emperor's oldest son, the Crown Prince 
 Friedrich Wilhelm, entered the university: 
 
 My Dear Young Fellow-Students : I need not 
 tell you how my heart delights at being once 
 more in my beloved Bonn and in a company of 
 students. My mind reverts to the glorious pic- 
 ture of glistening sunshine and happiness which 
 filled my stay here years ago. Joy of life, joy 
 in the people, young and old, and above all joy 
 in the new German Empire, growing stronger 
 every day! 
 
 It is therefore naturally my dearest wish that 
 my beloved son whom I am now placing among 
 
THE GERMAN EMPEROR 35 
 
 you, shall be vouchsafed as happy student days 
 as I once had. And how could he possibly not 
 have them? Is not Bonn, this lovely town, ac- 
 customed to the activities of jolly youths, and 
 by nature as if created for this purpose! 
 
 But more ! Bonn is built on the Rhine ! 'Tis 
 here our vines grow, and here our traditions are 
 rich, for here every castle and every town is elo- 
 quent of our past. Let Father Rhine exert his 
 charm also on the Crown Prince as on all of 
 you! And when the cup passes from hand to 
 hand and the songs are gay, let your souls de- 
 light in the glorious moments, and dip deep into 
 them, as becomes German fellows in the prime 
 of life. But let the spring whence you draw 
 your pleasure be as pure and clear as the golden 
 juice of the grapes, and as deep and lasting as 
 Father Rhine! Let us look about us in the 
 blessed Rhinish lands, where our past rises in 
 visible form! Rejoice, my friends, that you are 
 German youths, when you pass from Aachen to 
 Mainz, that is from Charles the Great to Ger- 
 many's era of splendor under Barbarossa! 
 
 Why did this splendor not last? Why did 
 the German Empire decay? Because the old 
 Empire was not built on a strictly national basis. 
 The cosmopolitan idea of the old Roman Empire 
 of German nationality did not permit a devel- 
 opment along German national lines. A nation 
 is only possible when a demarkation line exists 
 between it and foreign people, when its own men 
 and women have personalities to correspond to 
 their racial peculiarities. Barbarossa's glory 
 had to wane, and the old Empire had to crumble 
 
36 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 because its cosmopolitism prevented the process 
 of a national crystallization of the whole. Here 
 and there a smaller district was firmly knit into 
 a principality and formed the nucleus of a future 
 State. Unfortunately this necessitated a conflict 
 between such a State and its leader on the one 
 hand, and the Emperor and the Empire serving 
 the cosmopolitan idea on the other. Thus the 
 Empire, declining in vigor, lost also its internal 
 peace. It is a pity that we m^ust write also over 
 this phase in the development of our German 
 people the weighty words of Tacitus, who knew 
 Germany so well. Propter invidiam (Because of 
 envy) ! The princes were jealous of the Em- 
 peror's power, just as they had been jealous of 
 Arminius, in spite of his victory. The nobility 
 was jealous of the growing wealth of the cities, 
 and the peasants envied the nobles. What fatal 
 consequences and bitter harm has not come to 
 our dear and beautiful Germany propter invid- 
 iam! The banks of the Rhine have a story to 
 tell of this. Well, what once could not be done, 
 God finally granted it to one man to achieve! 
 
 Aachen and Mainz are historical memories. 
 But in German breasts there had survived the 
 longing to be united into one nation, and Em- 
 peror William the Great brought it about, with 
 the assistance of his faithful servants. Let us 
 then turn our eyes to Koblenz, to the German 
 Square, and to Riidesheim, to the Niederwald, 
 where great monuments teach you that now you 
 are Germans in German lands and citizens of a 
 well-defined German nation. You will have to 
 do your share of the work for its safety and 
 
THE GERMAN EMPEROR 37 
 
 development, and you are here to prepare your- 
 selves for this work. The Empire stands before 
 you; it is thriving gloriously. Let joy and grat- 
 itude fill your hearts; and may you glow with 
 the firm and manly resolve to work for Germany 
 as Germans and to lift her and strengthen her! 
 The future is waiting for you. It will test your 
 strength. Do not waste it in cosmopolitan 
 dreams, or in one-sided party service, but exert 
 it to make stable the national idea and to foster 
 the noblest thoughts. 
 
 The spiritual heroes whom God's grace per- 
 mitted the German race to produce, from Boni- 
 face and Walther von der Vogelweide to Goethe 
 and Schiller are great. They have given light 
 and have been a blessing to all mankind. Their 
 work was universal, but they were Germans in 
 the strictest sense, they were well-defined per- 
 sonalities, and in short, men! Men we need 
 today more than ever. May you too strive to 
 be men! 
 
 How is this possible? Who can show you the 
 way? There is only one whose name we all 
 bear, who has borne our sins and blotted them 
 out, who has shown us by His life and work 
 how we shall live and work, our Lord and Sa- 
 vior. May He sow into your hearts moral seri- 
 ousness, that your motives may be pure and 
 your aims high. Love of father and mother, of 
 home and fatherland, depends on love of Him. 
 If you have this you will be proof against all 
 temptations, especially against pride and envy, 
 and will be able to sing and say, " We Germans 
 fear God and naught else in the world." If 
 
38 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 this is the case, we shall stand firm in this world, 
 and be able to spread culture. When I shall see 
 such a generation gather and grow up about my 
 son I shall be well satisfied to close my eyes when 
 the time comes, for then the rallying cry will 
 be, " Germany, Germany, above everything ! " 
 
 With confident heart I give you the toast, 
 " Long live the University of Bonn! " 
 
 These few speeches do not, of course, develop 
 a complete picture of the many-sided character 
 of Emperor William. They may, however, ex- 
 plain why the Germans love him, and why they 
 are sure that no selfish motives influence his 
 actions. 
 
 There has been not a little talk of a " military 
 clique," which is said to surround the Emperor 
 and through him to dictate the policy of the 
 Empire. He probably has his special friends, 
 but he is in constant touch with representative 
 men from all walks of life, and no complaint 
 has been heard in Germany during his reign that 
 it was difficult to reach his ear. The fact is that 
 the communal and individual life of Germany 
 is so thoroughly democratic and that the men 
 at the heads of the various departments are 
 drawn from so wide a range of social antece- 
 dents that it is no longer possible to speak of 
 a " clique " as in control of the government. 
 
 One other erroneous notion may finally be 
 
THE GERMAN EMPEROR 39 
 
 commented upon in passing. Many people have 
 believed that the Emperor could institute pro- 
 ceedings of lese majeste. He cannot do any- 
 thing of the kind. There are several paragraphs 
 of the legal code dealing with slander and insults 
 against the Crown, their prosecution, however, 
 is the same as that of other crimes and misde- 
 meanors, and is in the hands of the district 
 attorneys. 
 
 From whatever side the problem is attacked, 
 one always returns to the same conclusion that 
 Emperor William is well spoken of at home, not 
 because he is, or for that matter could be, auto- 
 cratic, but because his aims, throughout his 
 reign, have been the aims of the healthily pul- 
 sating life of Germany: Peace and Progress! 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE PAST 
 
 The earliest record of the German people is 
 contained in the writings of Tacitus, a Roman 
 historian of the first century of. our era, who 
 shows that both their virtues and their faults 
 were apparent even then. Their morality, he 
 said, accomplished more than elsewhere the best 
 of laws, while their love of individual freedom 
 made them impatient of restrictions, prevented 
 the formation of strong States, and rendered 
 them an easy prey of foreign invaders. What- 
 ever the Germans have since achieved has been 
 the result of tlieir individually high morality and 
 whatever ills they have suffered has been largely 
 due to their own petty jealousies. 
 
 Unlike the other great nations of Europe the 
 Germans discovered the value of a well con- 
 ceived national idea late. It was Bismarck who 
 preached it to them, and who taught them that 
 " no strong national existence is possible with- 
 out a sufficiently broad, local basis." This local 
 basis was supplied in 187 1 by the federation of 
 the German States under the presidency of the 
 
THE PAST 41 
 
 King of Prussia who bears the name of German 
 Emperor. 
 
 The creation of the Empire, however, would 
 have been insufficient and would not have made 
 a world power of Germany, if it had not been 
 supplemented by the popular will to he worthy 
 of a great past and the hope of a great future. 
 
 If one wishes to value the aspirations of Ger- 
 many today, one must know how this past ap- 
 pears to her people, how they expect to prove 
 themselves worthy of it, and what thoughts they 
 have of the future. 
 
 The history of all people down to the French 
 Revolution is the history of men rather than of 
 popular forces; not that the will of the people 
 had not made itself felt in earlier times, but that 
 it is much easier to understand the concrete 
 achievements of individuals than the abstract 
 workings of national ideas. 
 
 From Charlemagne, who proudly placed the 
 Emperor's crown on his own head in Rome on 
 Christmas eve of the year 800, down to the time 
 of Emperor Barbarossa whose name is even 
 today known and loved in every German house, 
 the Empire grew in strength and in prosperity. 
 " There was no prince in this world comparable 
 to the German Emperors, and German knights 
 and German women were the flowers of creation. 
 The thrift of the burghers brought wealth to 
 
42 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 the cities, and the honesty and loyalty of the 
 peasants became proverbial." 
 
 Such are the pictures unrolled in school to 
 the children, such the stories told in countless 
 books written for and eagerly read by the 
 masses. Everywhere the cardinal virtues of 
 chastity, loyalty, honesty, and thrift are glori- 
 fied, and everywhere the convictions of the read- 
 ers are strengthened that these are the virtues 
 which distinguished their ancestors. Nor are 
 the pictures wholly invented. In a world which 
 was only slowly transforming itself from a bar- 
 baric to a civilized state, the high personal mo- 
 rality of the Germans stood out from the gloom 
 of vicious habits like stars on a darkened sky. 
 
 Frederic Redbeard, that is Barbarossa, ruled 
 from 1 1 52-1 190. He conquered Italy in six 
 campaigns, and the stories of warmth and beauty 
 and sunshine south of the Alps which his sol- 
 diers brought back to Germany, surrounded the 
 Emperor with a halo of heavenly splendor. A 
 touch of the mysterious was added when the 
 news reached home that he had suddenly died 
 in Asia Minor on a crusade against the Turks. 
 
 His immediate successors were less strong, 
 but then came the reign of Emperor Frederick II, 
 1215-1250, the most splendid of all. In spite 
 of wars and minor revolutions the spiritual life 
 of Germany was wakening to the sunshine of a 
 
THE PAST 43 
 
 new day in the world's history. The Nibelungen- 
 Hed was composed, and Hartmann von der Aue, 
 Wolfram von Eschenbach and Gottfried von 
 Strassburg inspired the Germans with their 
 epics, while Walther von der Vogelweide 
 touched their hearts with his poems. 
 
 Soon after Frederick's death dissensions 
 racked the Empire, which was quickly dis- 
 membered. In the hearts and minds of the 
 people, however, the great Emperors continued 
 to live. Their memories were blended into one, 
 and the fable grew up of Emperor Barbarossa 
 sleeping in Kyffhauser Mountain in Saxony, 
 whence he would issue some day, when the Em- 
 pire should rise again in splendor, and a new 
 era begin for the German people. 
 
 Early in the nineteenth century Riickert gave 
 poetic form to these hopes of the Germans. The 
 poem translated ^ reads : 
 
 t The ancient Barbarossa, 
 
 Friedrich, the Kaiser great. 
 Within the castle-cavern 
 Sits in enchanted state. 
 
 He did not die; but ever 
 
 Waits in the chamber deep, 
 Where hidden under the castle 
 
 He sat himself to sleep. 
 
 ^ German Classics, Vol. V. p. 486. German Publication Society, 
 597 Fifth Avenue, New York. 
 
44 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 The splendor of the Empire 
 
 He took with him away, 
 And back to earth will bring it 
 
 When dawns the promised day. 
 
 The chair is ivory pm'est 
 
 Whereof he makes his bed; 
 The table is of marble 
 
 Whereon he props his head. 
 
 His beard, not flax, but burning 
 
 With fierce and fiery glow. 
 Right through the marble table 
 
 Beneath his chair does grow. 
 
 He nods in dreams and winketh 
 
 With dull, half-open eyes, 
 And once a page he beckons — 
 
 A page that standeth by. 
 
 He bids the boy in slumber: 
 
 " O dwarf, go up this hour, 
 And see if still the ravens 
 
 Are flying round the tower; 
 
 And if the ancient ravens 
 
 Still wheel above us here, 
 Then must I sleep enchanted 
 
 For many a hundred year." 
 
 Americans have wondered at times why the 
 Germans founded an Empire in 1871 when they 
 might have had a republic. Oppressed through 
 centuries, torn by dissension, by jealousy at 
 home and by grudging neighbors, the Germans 
 had centered all their expectations on the re- 
 
THE PAST 45 
 
 vival of their former splendor; and this re- 
 vival had always been connected in their minds 
 with the reappearance of their Emperor. For 
 the Germans, 1871 was the culmination of count- 
 less hopes. Without them they would have been 
 unable to put aside everything that through 
 generations had kept them separated, and made 
 them the play-ball of fate, and the laughing-stock 
 of England and of France. 
 
 While the death of Emperor Frederick 
 marked the end of the period of greatest out- 
 ward splendor for Germany, the mental and 
 commercial life of the people continued to de- 
 velop marvelously. The German Hansa, an alli- 
 ance of cities which were great centers of 
 commerce, grew to proportions which even to- 
 day would be called enormous. Belgium and 
 Holland were then parts of the Empire, and 
 their ports, together with those of Bremen, Ham- 
 burg, Liibeck, and Danzig, did practically all the 
 business of the world. It has been claimed that 
 in season ships cleared the great ports at the rate 
 of a ship a minute. 
 
 Minds were active everywhere, art flourished, 
 universities were founded, inventions were made, 
 and prejudices were being discarded — when 
 the greatest misfortune overtook the Germans 
 that can befall a people. They were rent in twain 
 by religious dissension, fiercer than had been 
 
46 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 known in the world before. Father and son 
 fought each other, brother killed brother, and 
 whoever had the upper hand in a district tried 
 to make converts or kill the heretics. And there 
 was no one strong enough to stop the bloodshed 
 and remind Catholics and Protestants alike that 
 they were Germans. 
 
 The result was the Thirty Years' War, 1608- 
 1648, which devastated the country and numbed 
 the people, decimated their numbers, and made 
 all memories of former splendor almost incred- 
 ible myths. 
 
 In the generations which followed the other 
 great nations of Europe forged ahead. The 
 former German Empire, while still holding to- 
 gether nominally, was a loosely knit association 
 of States. The more prosperous southern and 
 western States despised their poverty-stricken 
 brethren in the north, and both were used by 
 France or England to fight their battles for 
 them. The proud Louis XIV brought much 
 misery to the remnants of France's earlier rival. 
 Some provinces he took after successful wars, 
 others he stole in times of peace, outright. No 
 German prince dared to gainsay him. 
 
 At last, however, in the poor soil of the north 
 a new people grew up in the strict school of dis- 
 cipline and justice. Their masters were the 
 princes of Hohenzollern who had exchanged 
 
THE PAST 47 
 
 their Prankish homes for the March of Bran- 
 denburg. Ridiculed at first, the Great Elector, 
 in the seventeenth century, won final recognition 
 by his victories over the invading French and 
 Swedish troops. His ships sailed the oceans, 
 and even appeared on the west coast of Africa. 
 He strengthened his country and joined to it the 
 province of Prussia, where his son Frederick 
 crowned himself king on January i8, 1701, and 
 which gave its name to the new kingdom. 
 
 From then on the history of Prussia is well 
 known. Frederick II, the Great, established or- 
 der and a firm government in his kingdom after 
 he had defended it against the world at incred- 
 ible odds. His reputation spread through Eu- 
 rope and across the sea, and for the first time 
 for generations, a German in foreign lands could 
 feel proud again at being a German. 
 
 Brought up in the hard school of want and 
 obedience, the Prussian character, while efficient, 
 appeared to the other people austere and want- 
 ing in the graces of human intercourse. But it 
 was this very character, reliable and Indomitable, 
 which at last brought about the new German 
 Empire. First, however, it had to be chastened 
 and suffer much in the Napoleonic wars. It had 
 to learn the lesson that even the achievements 
 of a Frederick the Great count for naught in 
 the next generation, if this generation does noth- 
 
48 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 ing to deserve their blessing. There is no stand- 
 still in nature. Either we progress or we must 
 fall behind. 
 
 Today Germany has learned her lesson well. 
 She knows that she cannot rest on the successes 
 of 1870 and '71. If she would bring about the 
 splendor of earlier years she must be active. 
 And she has been active, for she knows that the 
 love of the past is valuable only when it contains 
 a promise of the future. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE NEW EMPIRE 
 
 Forty - three years of peace must be marked 
 off to the credit of the new German Empire. 
 
 This is almost the half-century which Moltke 
 prophesied it would take before the Germans 
 could feel secure in their new possession. Fifty 
 years, he said, they must stand fully armed to 
 defend themselves against a world which hates 
 new-comers. After that they may relax their 
 vigilance. 
 
 These forty-three years have seen a marvelous 
 development. 
 
 To begin, the increase of the population has 
 been very rapid, amounting today to more than 
 800,000 annually. The Germans grow so rap- 
 idly that they " gain in three years as many peo- 
 ple as there are Swiss people in the world, in 
 six years as many as inhabit Holland and Swe- 
 den, and in a generation as many as all the Span- 
 iards and Portuguese combined." ^ 
 
 1 The quotations in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, are 
 from Paul Rohrbach, Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, 191 2. 
 
50 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 A normally rapid increase in population 
 among a civilized people is an indication of its 
 high state of morality; while more than once 
 in history the decline of a nation has been pre- 
 ceded by a constantly falling birth rate. The 
 love of married life and of many children is the 
 best measure of a people's inner and outer state 
 of health. 
 
 " The blessing of many children," Paul Rohr- 
 bach says, " are still with us, in spite of all dif- 
 ficulties, as an after effect of those centuries 
 which ,have kept their meaning alive in our mor- 
 als and religion, and as the result of nature's 
 own sense of life trying to maintain itself against 
 the cold doctrine of utility. To the extent to 
 which nature and the strong mating sense of 
 the past grow dull, we mxust take active steps 
 toward recognizing that the bearing of children 
 is a public achievement, unless we are willing as 
 a nation to retrograde. Above everything, we 
 shall have to make it easier for the woman to 
 be a mother. This is the first and the most dif- 
 ficult problem of the woman question." 
 
 The greatest achievements of the new Empire 
 are connected with steps taken to make the 
 problems of life easier for those people who, with 
 small returns, contribute their all to the pros- 
 perity of the State. These are the workingmen, 
 and as the result of much wise legislation their 
 
THE NEW EMPIRE 51 
 
 lot in Germany is better today than anywhere 
 else in the world. The credit of having taken 
 the initiative in this whole movement belongs to 
 Emperor William I. At his request Bismarck 
 introduced the first bills in the Reichstag and 
 laid down the general principles which have 
 guided all subsequent laws. Replying to an 
 opponent's advice to go slow, because the State 
 was responsible for everything it did, Bismarck 
 said: 
 
 Gentlemen : I feel that the State may become 
 responsible also for the things it does not do. 
 No State can safely practice the laisses faire, 
 laissez aller theory, and all the unadulterated 
 political theories of Manchester, such as " let 
 each one do what he chooses, and fare as he 
 will ", or " who is not strong enough to stand, 
 let him fall ", or " he who has will receive more, 
 and he who has not, from him let us take.'' 
 
 At present our poor-laws keep the injured 
 laboring man from starvation. According to 
 law nobody need starve. Whether in reality 
 this never happens I do not know. But this is 
 not enough, if the man is to look contentedly 
 into the future and to his own old age. The 
 present bill intends to keep the sense of human 
 dignity alive, which even the poorest German 
 should enjoy if I have my way. He should feel 
 that he is no mere almstaker, when he is sick 
 or old, but that he possesses a fund which is his 
 very own. No one shall have the right to dis- 
 
52 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 pose of it, or to take it from him, however poor 
 he may be. This fund will open for him many 
 a door and secure for him better treatment. 
 
 Alms constitute the first step of Christian 
 charity, such as must exist to a great extent in 
 countries like France, where they have no poor- 
 laws, and where every poor man has the right 
 to starve to death. This is the first Christian 
 duty, and the second is the assistance com- 
 manded by law and given by individual com- 
 munities. A State, however, it seems to me, 
 which is composed very largely of Christians, 
 should let itself be permeated with the principles 
 which it confesses, and especially with those 
 which have to do with helping our neighbors, 
 and show sympathy for the lot which is threat- 
 ening the old and the sick. 
 
 These words were spoken April 2, 1881, and 
 may be said to have been the text on which the 
 whole fabric of German welfare legislation has 
 been built. As a result the conditions of the 
 German laboring men are better than they are 
 anywhere in the world — this at least is the 
 belief of the Germans. Emigration consequently 
 has fallen off to a point where it is practically 
 non-existing, or to quote the Journal of the 
 Royal Statistical Society: " During the last ten 
 years there was on balance no emigration from 
 Germany. On the contrary, there was immigra- 
 tion; whereas from England the emigration has 
 
THE NEW EMPIRE 53 
 
 lately been on an average between 200,000 and 
 300,000 (annually)."^ 
 
 The full importance of these figures is seen 
 when one realizes that also Germany used to 
 have an emigration of about 200,000 annually 
 before she was well started on her social wel- 
 fare legislation. Today she has an annual excess 
 of immigration over emigration of more than 
 half a million souls annually. Germany has 
 become a good place in which to live, and in 
 which " to look contentedly into the future and 
 to one's old age,'' even if one is simply a poor 
 man. 
 
 This should never be forgotten in a discussion 
 of the causes of the present war. The laboring 
 men, and that means the overwhelming majority 
 of all the people, were living under conditions 
 which they considered better than those in other 
 countries, and which the constantly broadening 
 labor laws promised to improve as time went 
 on, provided, always, that the growth of German 
 industry and commerce continued to keep step 
 with the increase of the population by birth and 
 immigration. 
 
 How phenomenal this growth of the German 
 industry has been in recent years appears from 
 the comparative table in the Journal just quoted. 
 
 ^ J. Ellis Barker, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Lon- 
 don, July, 1914, p. 813. 
 
54 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 It grew 204 per cent, from 1888 to 191 2, while 
 the British growth was only 100.7 P^^ cent, in 
 the same time. 
 
 The average German, however, was satisfied 
 to know that the German industry was growing 
 at a rate which gave steady employment not only 
 to all those willing to work in any one year but 
 found new employment every year for the addi- 
 tional 800,000, which is the average annual in- 
 crease of population; yes, even for more because 
 Germany has an excess immigration of several 
 hundred thousand. 
 
 The question, therefore, arose " Is the growth 
 of our industry assured for all times, or are there 
 forces at work in the world which would retard 
 or destroy it ? " 
 
 People have said " Why can the Germans not 
 be satisfied with the commerce they enjoy at 
 present? Why must they poke their noses into 
 every corner of the world, when they know that 
 this must arouse English animosity?" 
 
 The answer is very simple. Because they have 
 to feed each year at least one million mouths 
 more than they had to feed the previous year, 
 and because their morality forbids them to adopt 
 the small family or even the " no children " sys- 
 tem of other nations. 
 
 J^ standstill, therefore, for Germany under 
 present conditions was out of the question. She 
 
THE NEW EMPIRE 55 
 
 had to find ever new markets of the world, or 
 starve. 
 
 This, however, brought her into dangerous 
 competition with the country that loves to call 
 herself the " Mistress of the Sea," and which, 
 having had a start of centuries, regarded the 
 giant strides of the Germans with distrust. 
 
 In Germany the feeling grew that England 
 wished to destroy the world-markets of her rival, 
 and history seemed to bear this out, for had 
 England not destroyed or attached to herself 
 in turn the great world commerce of Spain, 
 Portugal, France, Holland, and the United 
 States? The merchant marines of all these 
 nations had fallen a prey to England, because 
 in the hour of need they had not been defended 
 by a sufficiently large navy. It was, therefore, 
 the duty of Germany to build a navy, not for 
 the sake of aggression, but to defend her world 
 commerce if England should find an opportune 
 moment of attack. This was Germany's view 
 of the case. 
 
 England, however, feared lest the German 
 navy grow too strong to be merely defensive. 
 She knew that Germany needed new markets 
 and opportunities every year, and suspected that 
 some day her rival, unable to create new mar- 
 kets, would try to rob her by force of her own. 
 
 In a perfectly natural way, therefore, feelings 
 
56 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 of mistrust began to separate the English from 
 the Germans, who by all the laws of nature 
 should stand side by side in this world in a joint 
 effort to advance the sum total of civilization. 
 
 That the great clash had to come in 19 14 is 
 the more regrettable since friends of peace had 
 detected the approach to a better understanding 
 between the Germans and the English. It is 
 now well known that the German Chancellor had 
 launched on a distinctly friendly English policy 
 some years ago. No one, however, probably 
 has stated the case so well as Lord Welby, who 
 is quoted in the July number of the Journal of 
 the Royal Statistical Society (1914, pp. 807, 
 808) as follows : 
 
 I and my generation, which of course goes 
 back to a very distant period, are astounded, 
 and rightly astounded, at the progress Germany 
 has made in the last sixty or seventy years. 
 The Germany we remember of the fifties was 
 a cluster of insignificant States under insignifi- 
 cant princelings, headed by the so-called hege- 
 mony of Prussia and Austria, intriguing against 
 each other, with the result that Germany was 
 really of no account in the world either as a 
 power, or as a nation. I ask you to compare 
 this with the picture Mr. Crammond's paper 
 ("Economic Relations of the British and Ger- 
 man Empires ") has shown you, and compare 
 it with the figures and with the marvelous prog- 
 
THE NEW EMPIRE 57 
 
 ress which is marked in almost every branch of 
 German industry. You must feel that Bismarck 
 added a great and new industrial force to the 
 productive power of the world. As far as I am 
 concerned, I hail with pleasure the development 
 of Germany, and I think most of my hearers 
 will agree with me in what, if I remember 
 rightly, Mr. Balfour laid down with very great 
 force, that it is a great mistake ever to think 
 that the development of one country is acquired 
 at the expense of another. The real fact of the 
 matter is that the development of one country 
 really adds a fresh source of supply to the indus- 
 tries of other countries. And therefore as far 
 as those relations (with Germany) are con- 
 cerned, I think you must all feel that the devel- 
 opment of Germany is of great benefit to the 
 world. 
 
 Those were generous and true words, unfor- 
 tunately much at variance with expressions 
 which have since fallen from the lips of the King 
 and of several of the British ministers. The 
 fact is, the two countries have never quite under- 
 stood each other. But since Lord Welby's words 
 are true, and will live, and the others will eva- 
 nesce as passion dies, the sooner both England 
 and Germany realize that neither country will 
 gain by destroying the prosperity of the other 
 the better it will be for both. 
 
 One hopeful sign that this realization may 
 dawn upon the people soon is found in the mag- 
 
58 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 nificent spirit of manly chivalry which has not 
 deserted all the leaders in the two countries. 
 One of the noblest documents of this war is the 
 Proclamation issued August 5, 19 14, by the 
 British Acting Governor of the Gold Coast: 
 
 There are amongst us now certain German 
 subjects under the greatest misfortune that can 
 fall upon the people of a martial race — that 
 they cannot be in their own country when war 
 has descended upon it. Let me call to your 
 minds that some of them have lived many years 
 on the Gold Coast, engaged to the benefit of its 
 population in missionary, medical, and mercan- 
 tile work; that some of them are our personal 
 friends ; and that from all we have received acts 
 of kindness and assistance. They are entitled 
 to more than our charity, they are entitled to our 
 chivalry. 
 
 Let, therefore, the chiefs make it known that 
 they will lay a very heavy hand on any of their 
 people who seek occasion to insult or molest 
 those who have for many years been amongst 
 us as our good friends and guests. For some 
 years the Gold Coast has been traveling along 
 the easy paths of peace and prosperity. It is 
 for its people to show now that they possess 
 courage and obedience, the virtues most needed 
 when the way is difficult, for war means, even 
 to the victor, not victory only but hardship, con- 
 fusion, and scarcity. Let us support the chances 
 of war calmly, patiently, and resolutely in the 
 English fashion. Let there be no vain boasting 
 
THE NEW EMPIRE 59 
 
 and no cowardly despair. If you can show stern 
 qualities in time of trial your name will be far 
 stronger than years of prosperity could ever 
 have made it. 
 
 This language is understood by people of all 
 lands. If there were more Germans and English- 
 men to speak it their countries would soon out- 
 grow their suspicions, and England rest assured 
 that no danger is lurking for her in Germany's 
 prosperity. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 RUSSIA, THE SLAVS, AND GERMANY 
 
 The Russians are Slavs, but it is a great mistake 
 to assume that everybody who has suffered at 
 the hands of autocratic Russia blames the Slavs 
 for his experiences. 
 
 Most Germans of the northeastern provinces, 
 whether or not they know it, have Slav blood in 
 their veins. It has even been claimed that Prus- 
 sia succeeded in building up a strong State of its 
 own, and later of founding the new Empire, 
 because she was not obliged to deal with the cen- 
 trifugal forces of pure-blooded Germans. 
 
 Many Slavs in Western Russia, Poland, and 
 the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungaria, are as 
 highly civilized as any people in the world. 
 They are even apt to give one the impression of 
 a higher civilization, because their culture is 
 personal rather than national. In the Dual Mon- 
 archy, for instance, any distinctly Slavic national 
 pursuit of culture would drive the Slavs away 
 from the centers of greater culture to the less 
 advanced strongholds of Slavic thought. 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 61 
 
 In Russia, on the other hand, the gulf which 
 separates the spiritual horizon of the upper 
 classes from that of the masses is so incalculably 
 great that it is impossible to speak of a national 
 state of Russian culture. No one who has not 
 seen the peasants in the interior of the country 
 has any idea of the kind of human material of 
 which the hundred million Russians largely con- 
 sist today. You could not call them poor, just 
 as you would never think of applying this term 
 to any of your household pets. They do their 
 work, they get their food, and then they sleep, 
 with an occasional fight by way of diversion. 
 
 Some writers have favorably commented on 
 the treatment which the peasants receive from 
 the great lords, in whose demeanor there is not 
 the least arrogance. You might as well expect 
 arrogance in the way a man addresses his horse. 
 Wherever the remotest chance of claiming equal- 
 ity is absent on the one part the narrow defense 
 of arrogance on the other part is obviously not 
 called for. 
 
 These peasants cling to their native land with 
 a pertinacity which hints of the fine qualities 
 dormant within them. They are all of one re- 
 ligion, the Greek Orthodox — the exceptions are 
 very few — and the Czar, their " little father," 
 as they call him, is for them God's representative 
 on earth. They are either absolutely faithful, 
 
62 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 like well trained dogs, or they turn upon their 
 masters with a ferocity quite unknown in the 
 West. 
 
 Their ideas of right and wrong are very posi- 
 tive and in order to arouse the peasants to war- 
 fare, they must be told the most outrageous tales 
 about their enemies. Once aroused they try to 
 wreak vengeance on the enemy commensurable 
 with the distorted picture of them which their 
 masters have drawn. 
 
 The result is, of course, the barbarous warfare 
 which has often characterized the Russian cam- 
 paigns. An army which consists largely of Rus- 
 sian peasants cannot be held in check by the best 
 and most humane of officers. The so-called 
 Cossacks are mounted troops from the interior 
 and of very much the same character. 
 
 The fecundity of the Russian peasant class is 
 enormous, but since the death rate is also very 
 large, owing to ignorance and the lack of sani- 
 tation, the rate of increase in the Russian popu- 
 lation is only very little more than that of Ger- 
 many. 
 
 If ignorance in its literal sense, that is absence 
 of all knowledge, is characteristic of large num- 
 bers of the lower classes, dishonesty, that is graft 
 in its most offensive kind, is characteristic of 
 many of the higher officials. When the writer 
 was in Russia a few years ago his baggage was 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 63 
 
 stolen as he was on the point of crossing into 
 Persia. In his endeavor to trace it, he was held 
 up for a bribe by one person after another. His 
 last interview was with the chief of police, who 
 doubled the original demand of five rubles, and 
 when they were not paid, declared his inability 
 to do anything. The writer having heard of the 
 arrival of the governor in Erivan, refused the 
 chief's demands, and called on the governor, 
 whose name was known to him as that of one 
 of the noblest families of Russia. The governor 
 was very gracious, listened attentively, and with 
 growing annoyance, to the complaint. At last 
 he jumped up, very angry. " Oh, these petty 
 thieves," he exclaimed over and over again as he 
 paced the floor, "Oh, these petty thieves — " 
 Suddenly he stopped before his visitor, looked 
 him square in the eye, slapped him cordially on 
 the shoulder, as if a thought had just come to 
 him, and cried, " I'll tell you what ! Give me 
 twenty-five rubles, and I will see that you get 
 your baggage tomorrow!" He was as good as 
 his word. 
 
 Graft and lying have ever gone hand in hand, 
 and those who know the country believe that 
 even the Czar has no idea of what is really going 
 on in the Empire. At the outbreak of the present 
 war the Czar and his ministers gave assurances 
 " on their honor " which were at variance with 
 
64 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 the best obtainable information concerning the 
 Russian mobilization. It is quite possible that 
 they believed what they said, but that they did not 
 know. Later in the fall of this year, it is said, 
 the Czar had intended to test the rapidity of the 
 mobilization of his troops in a grand manoeuver. 
 On a certain day he was to issue his orders of 
 mobilization and when it was complete the gen- 
 erals were to report to him. 
 
 Russian generals would not be Russian, as 
 travelers use this term, if they had not taken 
 precautionary measures to be well within the 
 time limit expected of them. It would therefore 
 be not at all surprising if they had begun their 
 mobilization secretly and weeks in advance of 
 time. 
 
 To realize why Russian mobilization must be 
 slow, one has only to glance at the records of 
 the Russian railway rolling stock.^ The whole 
 empire, in Europe as well as in Asia, owns less 
 than 20,000 passenger coaches, 1,000 of which 
 are parlor cars! The total seating capacity of 
 these coaches is less than 700,000, while the 
 German seating capacity is four times as great, 
 and if one compares the distances in Germany 
 with those in Russia, not four times but more 
 nearly forty times as great! Russia has less 
 
 ^ Statistics published in North German Gazette, August 23, 1914, 
 Second edition, page 2. 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 65 
 
 than 400,000 freight cars, while Germany has 
 almost 600,000 freight cars. 
 
 This is the reason why Russia needs time to 
 concentrate her millions of soldiers, and if she 
 is beaten anywhere finds it dijEficult to escape as 
 complete a defeat as that of Tannenberg in East 
 Russia, where four and one half Russian army 
 corps were so completely destroyed that no 
 mention of them has occurred in subsequent des- 
 patches, and over 90,000 unwounded prisoners 
 were taken. These figures are so enormous that 
 few American papers have believed them. But 
 the man who knows the swamps and lakes of 
 that region, with their distant crown of beauti- 
 ful hills, and knows the Russians, and is told 
 how the German general succeeded in placing his 
 cannon on those hills, sees nothing improbable 
 in the official report from Berlin. Nor is he at 
 all astonished at the denial of the defeat by the 
 Russian generals, for unless the higher Russian 
 officials have very much changed in recent years, 
 they are as ready today as they ever were to play 
 fast and loose with the truth in their reports to 
 the Czar. 
 
 In the foreign policy of Russia the great 
 masses of the population cannot be said to have 
 either a voice or an interest except in so far as 
 they have been led to believe that certain things 
 are absolutely necessary for their " little father," 
 
66 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 and that wicked enemies are trying to prevent 
 him from acquiring them. 
 
 In this way the minor Slavic races of the 
 Balkans have been represented to the Russians as 
 oppressed by the godless Dual Monarchy, and 
 crying out for the help of God's representative 
 on earth. 
 
 The mainspring, however, of Russia's policy 
 has been, for a long time, her need of a harbor 
 which she can use the year around and which 
 has free access to the sea. All her great harbors 
 are ice-blocked in winter or secluded in the 
 Black Sea. From Russia's point of view this 
 demand is natural and fair. The difficulty is 
 that at present no such harbor is to be had for 
 the asking. Constantinople has always appealed 
 to Russia as meeting her wishes. But not to 
 mention the fact that the Turks already possess 
 it, there are other claimants, notably Great Brit- 
 ain and Austria, and latterly one or more of the 
 Balkan States. 
 
 When Russia neared Constantinople in her 
 war with the Turks, Great Britain addressed to 
 her the following note, on May 6, 1877. " The 
 vast importance of Constantinople whether in a 
 military, a political, or a commercial point of 
 view is too well understood to require explana- 
 tion. It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to point 
 out that Her Majesty's Government are not pre- 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 67 
 
 pared to witness with indifference the passing 
 into other hands than those of its present pos- 
 sessor, of a capital holding so peculiar and 
 commanding a position." 
 
 This has been Great Britain's attitude ever 
 since. Constantinople holds the key not only to 
 Asia Minor and thence to Egypt, but also over- 
 land to India. For this reason she cannot view 
 ''with indifference" the passing into strong hands, 
 of Constantinople. A strong power firmly es- 
 tablished on the Bosphorus would threaten both 
 her African and her Asiatic possessions. 
 
 It would probably have been immaterial to 
 Great Britain whether Russia or Austria sup- 
 planted the Turks. The important thing was to 
 maintain the status quo, for as long as Turkey 
 was strong enough to keep both aspirants at 
 arm's length, and at the same time to maintain 
 a semblance of order in the Balkan States, Great 
 Britain had nothing to fear. This is the reason 
 why she has never exerted her great moral influ- 
 ence in the interest of real reforms in Turkey, 
 where any change could precipitate a catastrophe. 
 
 All this might have been of secondary impor- 
 tance for Germany, if she had not been bound 
 to Austria by ties of friendship and treaty obli- 
 gations.^ She was, therefore, concerned with 
 
 ^ For a discussion of conditions leading up to this treaty see 
 Chap. VII. 
 
68 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 the Balkan situation in so far as it touched the 
 vital interests of her ally. How vital these in- 
 terests are appears from a glance at the map and 
 a brief historical survey. 
 
 The Dual Monarchy consists of the great 
 kingdom of Hungary ; of those German parts of 
 the old German Empire, dismembered by Napo- 
 leon, which were not reembodied in the federa- 
 tion of German States of 1871 ; of Bohemia, 
 and of a few other provinces. The most impor- 
 tant are, first, the Tirol and Triest, with the sur- 
 rounding territory, where there is an Italian 
 population ; secondl)^, Galicia, an original part of 
 Poland, and inhabited by Slavs; and thirdly, 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, also largely Slavic. 
 On the southern frontier there used to be Tur- 
 key. Gradually, however, one State after an- 
 other won its independence, and today Ru- 
 mania and Servia are Austria's neighbors in the 
 south. Still farther south are Bulgaria, Monte- 
 negro, Albania, and Macedonia, all original 
 provinces of Turkey, and largely inhabited by 
 Slavs. 
 
 The Dual Monarchy is thus surrounded on 
 three sides by Slavic races, for Bohemia in the 
 northwest is inhabited by Czechs, who are 
 Slavs. 
 
 At present the German element controls the 
 government in the Dual Monarchy. The mur- 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 69 
 
 dered archduke, however, who was the heir- 
 apparent, had, it is said, a far-sighted plan, 
 whereby all the races represented in the Empire 
 were to share in the government in proportion 
 to their size and population. He was a friend 
 of the Slavs, not only for political reasons, but 
 sincerely. He even overcame all opposition to 
 a marriage with a lady of Slavish descent, and 
 for the sake of his love for her had to renounce 
 for his children the right of succession to the 
 throne, because she was not of royal blood. 
 
 If the archduke had been permitted to carry 
 out his policies he would probably have made a 
 strong* Empire of the Dual Monarchy, for, con- 
 trary to the general belief, the Austrian Italians, 
 Czechs, Poles, and other Slavs are patriotically 
 Austrian. 
 
 Where there is so much foreign propaganda, 
 Russian, Servian, and Italian, all meant to dis- 
 rupt the Monarchy, it would be dangerous to 
 speak with too much assurance, but visitors to 
 the Tirol, Bohemia, Galicia, and Bosnia have 
 received the impression that the masses in gen- 
 eral are satisfied with their Austrian allegiance, 
 and that of the educated people an overwhelm- 
 ing majority feel the same. 
 
 This is not surprising, because, barring the 
 Italian Austrians, all the other people in question 
 would exchange a union with a highly civilized 
 
70 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 State for one of far less advanced ideas. There 
 can be no doubt that the Bohemians and GaH- 
 cians are better off now than if they fell under 
 the autocratic sway of the Czar. The greatest 
 losers, however, by a change would be the people 
 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These provinces 
 were incorporated into the Dual Monarchy in 
 1908 after they had been Austrian for all prac- 
 tical purposes through thirty years. 
 
 This act of Austria appeared so arbitrary at 
 the time, and is so often mentioned as at the 
 bottom of the present war, that it is advisable 
 to listen also to the Austrian explanation, and 
 to check its credibility by an impartial source of 
 information, such as is contained in the Report 
 of the International Commission to Inquire into 
 the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. 
 It is one of the publications of the Carnegie En- 
 dowment for International Peace, and was is- 
 sued in 19 14. 
 
 Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, Senator of 
 France, and Professor Paul Milioukov, member 
 of the Russian Douma, were prominent members 
 of the commission. In addition there were two 
 representatives of Great Britain, one of the 
 United States, one of Austria, one of Germany, 
 and one other Frenchman. 
 
 Russia's successful war against Turkey in 
 1877 was terminated by the Treaty of San Ste- 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 71 
 
 fano and the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Both 
 these treaties meant a check to the Russian ad- 
 vance toward Constantinople. Russia was, how- 
 ever, permitted to push the entering wedge of 
 her influence into the Turkish Empire by receiv- 
 ing a practically free hand in Bulgaria. This 
 State, while still under the suzerainty of Turkey, 
 was to be independent under Russian tutelage. 
 Since it was obviously unfair to Austria-Hun- 
 gary to have her powerful neighbor to the north 
 and east, Russia, get a foothold also to the south 
 of her, without being able to exert her own in- 
 fluence in the Balkan provinces, Turkey ceded 
 to her Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose future 
 allegiance to Turkey was to be only nominal. 
 This met with Russia's approval, v^hose note to 
 Great Britain, June 8, 1877, reads : Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, " being situated conterminously 
 with Austria-Hungary, give the latter a right to 
 a preponderating voice in their future organiza- 
 tion." These provinces were ceded to Austria 
 in July, 1878. They were occupied by Austria 
 on July 28, 1878, and the final treaty with Tur- 
 key was signed on April 21, 1879. 
 
 Nobody who knows conditions existing in the 
 Balkans at that time will believe that Austria 
 should have taken a plebiscite to see whether the 
 inhabitants wished to leave Turkey and become 
 Austrian. Such things were not done at that 
 
72 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 time, the best proof of which is that England 
 forced Turkey to cede to her the island of Cy- 
 prus under practically the same conditions on 
 August 14, 1878. Nor has the island since been 
 returned to Turkey or been permitted to form 
 its own government. On the contrary, it has 
 been incorporated into the British body politic. 
 
 As soon as Austria took hold of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina roads and railways were built, tel- 
 ephones and telegraphs installed, rich mines were 
 opened, and best of all, many schools were built. 
 The lower class Mohammedans were altogether 
 illiterate, and of the Catholics less than four per 
 cent, could read or write. Thirty years of good 
 government had placed the provinces on the road 
 to success, when the Balkan troubles began. 
 Bulgaria had long since thrown off Turkish 
 suzerainty and Russian tutelage. Rumania had 
 grown strong, Servia had developed great prow- 
 ess, and it became apparent that Turkey, driven 
 back unto Constantinople, could not again exert 
 any claims on Bosnia and Herzegovina. As long 
 as these provinces were nominally Turkish, Ser- 
 via or Bulgaria could have asked them of Turkey 
 with a semblance of right as an indemnity in a 
 war that everybody saw coming, and which actu- 
 ally took place within a few years. 
 
 This would have been a misfortune for these 
 provinces, which were thriving under Austrian 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 73 
 
 rule. The inhabitants are largely Slavs, it is 
 true, but while the Servians and the Bulgarians 
 are also Slavs there never have been greater 
 cruelties recorded than are described in the Car- 
 negie Report on the Balkan Wars as having 
 taken place between these two Slavic races. If 
 this Report were not illustrated with photo- 
 graphs of some wretches surviving their tor- 
 tures, one would hardly believe these accounts. 
 The saddest part of the whole affair is that such 
 excesses are done in the name of freedom, and 
 that Austria's wish to protect the Bosnians from 
 a like fate is heralded to the world as an act of 
 autocracy. No more cruel thing could have been 
 done than to leave the status of Bosnia uncertain, 
 and to expose her to the unspeakable outrages 
 which reduced Macedonia to a wilderness, when 
 Turkey was driven out and the several Slavic 
 States and Greece began to fight among them- 
 selves for the possession of Macedonia. 
 
 Read the Carnegie Report on the Balkan 
 Wars, and then an account of the progress made 
 by Bosnia under Austrian rule from 1878 to 
 1908. This is the only fair way of deciding the 
 question whether Austria was justified in incor- 
 porating these provinces. Many conversant 
 with the conditions in the Balkans believe that 
 Austria would have committed a crime against 
 humanity if she had left Bosnia to be the play- 
 
74 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 thing of the lesser Slavic nations, and had per- 
 mitted her to share the fate of Macedonia. 
 
 One other fact which seems to stand out 
 clearly from the Carnegie Report is the improba- 
 bility of Servia taking any decisive step diplo- 
 matically before being assured of Russia's sup- 
 port. One is tempted, in fact, to say that for 
 some time Servia had taken no step which was 
 not really an act of Russia. This statement, it 
 is true, cannot be proved by the Report, but the 
 number of Servian officers and officials on the 
 Russian payroll is enormous. 
 
 The murder of the Austrian archduke on 
 June 28, 19 14, by Servian assassins, and with 
 weapons supplied from the Servian arsenal by 
 Servian officers, made not nearly the impression 
 on the world at large that it made on Austria. 
 Elsewhere people were too satiated with the hor- 
 rible accounts from the Balkans, to be startled. 
 If they will, however, imagine such a thing as 
 the murder of the most prominent American by 
 Mexican assassins and with weapons supplied by 
 the Mexican Government, and if they will further 
 imagine the escape of the conspirators into Mex- 
 ican territory by the help of the Mexican offi- 
 cials, and the Mexican press breaking forth into 
 joyful paeans at the success of the crime, while 
 the Mexican Government was taking no steps 
 against any of the conspirators — then they will 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 75 
 
 begin to realize the feelings of Austria at the 
 dastardly murder of Serajewo. 
 
 This assassination, moreover, was only the 
 culmination of numberless Servian acts designed 
 to disrupt the Dual Monarchy. Russia would 
 gain most by the downfall of Austria-Hungary, 
 and since her strong influence in Servia is known, 
 the suspicion has grown that some of her leaders 
 were not ignorant of the attempt made on the 
 life of the archduke. 
 
 Almost four weeks after the murder Austria 
 sent her ultimatum to Servia. It was very 
 strongly worded and undoubtedly less diplomatic 
 than Great Britain would have wTitten it had she 
 been in Austria's position. The British State 
 papers are always well written, for her world- 
 wide interests have taught her that official docu- 
 ments are strong factors in the shaping of public 
 opinion. They are, therefore, written not only 
 for the benefit of the recipient, but also for the 
 world at large. If Germany and Austria would 
 follow this example they would meet less oppo- 
 sition in foreign countries. It is not so much 
 what they do as the way they do it that offends 
 people. 
 
 Germany has only recently acquired the rank 
 of a world power, and is perhaps excusable if 
 she feels that it is more important to be right 
 than to appear right. Such an attitude, however. 
 
76 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 is not wise, for it may convey the impression to 
 distant people that their opinion is not valued, 
 and that, of course, is offensive. 
 
 A more temperately worded ultimatum to 
 Servia might have won the sympathy of the 
 world for Austria, instead of seemingly proving 
 Servia's contention that the Dual Monarchy was 
 arbitrary. People in possession of the facts can- 
 not for one instant believe that Bosnia would 
 be better off if she were united with Servia, but 
 the vast majority of the people cannot know all 
 the facts, and since Austria's note appeared to 
 be arbitrary, it was natural for people to assume 
 that her rule was also arbitrary. 
 
 When Russia mobilized and apparently sup- 
 ported the Servians, Germany was placed before 
 the dilemma of breaking faith with her ally, or 
 of facing a possible war with Russia. The Ger- 
 mans believe that their government was influ- 
 enced in its action solely by its desire to be faith- 
 ful to an ally in its hour of need. 
 
 Worldly wisdom, however, would have coun- 
 seled the same course. If Germany had for- 
 saken Austria in July, 19 14, she would un- 
 doubtedly have postponed the evil day, but when 
 at last that day had come, Germany would have 
 been obliged to fight entirely alone, for Austria 
 could not have forgiven her desertion. 
 
 In this connection Bismarck's explanation of 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 77 
 
 the alliance with Austria is important. He made 
 it in the Reichstag on February 6, 1888, two days 
 after the treaty had been published. This should 
 be borne in mind, for anti-German publicists 
 have given as one of their reasons why they 
 could not sympathize with Germany their belief 
 that secret alliances are at the bottom of the 
 great war. Germany's treaties are and have 
 been for years public property, while some of the 
 agreements of the allies have been and still are 
 secret. 
 
 Bismarck explained that Germany had owed a 
 debt of gratitude to Russia for her support dur- 
 ing the Napoleonic wars, and that this realiza- 
 tion had determined his unwavering support of 
 Russian demands at all international conferences 
 where Germany had had a voice. Russia, never- 
 theless, had felt aggrieved at her failure to reach 
 closer to Constantinople after her war with 
 Turkey in 1877, and had blamed Germany for 
 it. " What then was my surprise and natural 
 disappointment," said Bismarck, " when gradu- 
 ally a sort of newspaper campaign began in St. 
 Petersburg, which attacked the German policy, 
 and cast suspicion on my personal intentions. 
 These attacks increased in the following year to 
 the strong request, in 1879, for pressure to be 
 exerted by us in Austria in matters where we 
 could not attack the Austrian rights as such. I 
 
78 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 could not consent, for if we should have been 
 estranged from Austria, we should necessarily 
 have fallen into a dependence on Russia, unless 
 we had been satisfied with standing entirely 
 alone in Europe. Would such a dependence 
 have been bearable? Formerly I had believed it 
 might be, when I had said to myself : ' We have 
 no conflicting interests at all. There is no reason 
 why Russia should ever cancel her friendship.' 
 But the Russian behavior concerning the Con- 
 gress disappointed me, and told me that we were 
 not protected from being drawn into a conflict 
 with Russia against our wishes, even if we placed 
 our policy (for a time) completely at her dis- 
 posal. . . . This is the origin of our Austrian 
 treaty." 
 
 Twenty-six years have passed since Bismarck 
 said this, and in spite of frequent attempts at a 
 better understanding Russia has never forgotten 
 that it was the voice of Germany which, as she 
 believes, turned the scales in favor of Turkey 
 and kept the Russian people out of Constanti- 
 nople. 
 
 The stronger Germany grew and the more 
 faithful she proved to her allies the less willing 
 was Russian public opinion to look for friend- 
 ship with her western neighbor. On the con- 
 trary the conviction increased that Germany 
 stood in the way of Russian aspirations. This 
 
RUSSIA, SLAVS, AND GERMANY 79 
 
 feeling is well expressed in the words which have 
 often appeared in the Russian press, and which 
 have been heard in the conversation of people 
 everywhere, occasionally even in high quarters : 
 " The Russian road to Constantinople goes 
 through Berlin." 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 GERMANY AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE 
 
 Present - day writers have to contend with the 
 difficulty of seeming to present ex parte evidence. 
 No such presumption attaches to speeches de- 
 livered long before the war and addressed to the 
 Germans exclusively. They explain, for in- 
 stance, what Germany really believed when she 
 laid the foundations for her army and navy, and 
 are, therefore, invaluable for the man who 
 wishes to form his own opinion on the causes of 
 the European war. 
 
 The reasons which induced the German Gov- 
 ernment to propose a great increase in its mili- 
 tary strength in 1888, and which made the 
 Reichstag willing to vote the necessary funds, are 
 contained in a speech by Bismarck,^ delivered 
 February 6, 1888, and known under the title 
 " We Germans fear God and Naught else in the 
 World." 
 
 ^An excellent collection of Bismarck's speeches in translation 
 is given in the German Classics, edited by Prof. Kuno Francke, 
 and published by the German Publication Society, 597 Fifth 
 Avenue, New York. 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 81 
 
 Bismarck left the elucidation of the bill for 
 which he was speaking to his assistants, and gave 
 his hearers a survey of the recent history of 
 Europe in so far as it touched Germany. He 
 assured the Reichstag that Germany was com- 
 pelled to be strong because she was placed in the 
 heart of Europe amidst warlike nations and 
 because she would have to defend her union. He 
 urged a strong army of defence, and promised 
 that Germany should never use it as a means of 
 attack. His arguments proved convincing, and 
 it must be admitted that Germany has never in- 
 tentionally deviated from the principles he laid 
 down. He said in part: 
 
 I am confident that the German Reichstag will 
 grant us an increase in our armed force, and will 
 do so, not on account of the position in which 
 we happen to find ourselves, nor of any fears 
 which may be swaying the stock exchange and 
 public opinion, but because of an anticipatory 
 estimate of the general conditions of Europe. 
 In addressing you, therefore, I shall have to say 
 more about these conditions than about the bill. 
 
 A year ago we were largely concerned with the 
 possible cause of war emanating from France. 
 Since then a peace-loving president has dropped 
 the reins of government, and another peace- 
 loving president has succeeded him. It is a fa- 
 vorable sign that the French Government did not 
 dip into Pandora's box in calling to office another 
 chief magistrate, and that we may be assured of 
 
82 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 the continuance under President Carnot of the 
 peaceful poHcy which President Grevy was 
 known to represent. Changes in the French 
 cabinet are even more reassuring than the change 
 in the presidency, where a great many different 
 reasons had to be considered. The ministers 
 who might have been ready to subordinate the 
 peace of their own country and of Europe to 
 their personal plans have resigned, and others 
 have taken their places of whom we need not 
 fear this. I believe, therefore, that I may state 
 that our outlook toward France is more peaceful 
 and less explosive today than it was a year ago, 
 and I am glad to do this, because I wish to quiet, 
 not to excite, public opinion. 
 
 The fears which have sprung up during the 
 last twelve months have had to do more with 
 Russia than with France, or I may say with the 
 exchange of excitement, threats, insults, and 
 challenges in the French and Russian papers 
 during the past summer. 
 
 Nevertheless, I believe that our relations with 
 Russia have not changed from what they were 
 last year. The only events which could have 
 occasioned a change of opinion are the attitude 
 of the Russian press and the allocation of the 
 Russian troops. 
 
 As regards the press, I cannot assign iany 
 importance to it per se. People say that it is of 
 greater consequence in Russia than in France. 
 I believe the very opposite to be true. In France 
 the press is a power influencing the decisions of 
 the government. In Russia it is not, nor can it 
 be. In both cases, however, the press is, so far 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 83 
 
 as I am concerned, mere printer's ink on paper, 
 against which we do not wage war. It cannot 
 contain a challenge for us. Back of each article 
 in the press there stands, after all, only the single 
 man who guided the pen which launched this 
 particular article into the world. 
 
 I now come to the other point, the allocation 
 of the troops. It used to take place on a big 
 scale, but only since 1879, when the Turkish war 
 was concluded, has it assumed the proportions 
 which today seem threatening. It may easily 
 appear as if this accumulation of Russian troops 
 near the German and Austrian frontiers — 
 where their support is more difficult and more 
 expensive than farther inland — could only be 
 dictated by the intention of surprising and at- 
 tacking one of the neighbors unprepared, sans 
 dire gare! (I cannot for the moment think of 
 the German expression.) Well, I do not believe 
 this. In the first place, it would be contrary to 
 the character of the sovereign and his own words, 
 and secondly its object could not easily be under- 
 stood. Russia cannot intend to conquer any 
 Prussian provinces, nor, I believe, any Austrian 
 provinces. Russia has, I believe, as many Polish 
 subjects as it cares to have, and has no desire 
 to increase their numbers. To annex anything 
 but Polish districts from Austria would be even 
 more difficult. No reason exists, no pretence 
 which could induce a European monarch sud- 
 denly to assail his neighbors. I even go so far 
 in my confidence as to be convinced that a Rus- 
 sian war would not ensue if we should become 
 involved in a French war because of some explo- 
 
84 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 sive happenings in France, which no one can 
 foresee and which surely are not intended by the 
 present French Government. A French war, on 
 the other hand, would be an absolute certainty 
 if we should be involved in a Russian war, for 
 no French Government would be so strong that 
 it could prevent it, even if it was inclined to do 
 so. But as regards Russia I still declare that I 
 am not looking for an attack; and I take back 
 nothing from what I said last year. 
 
 You will ask : " If that is so, what is the use 
 of this expensive allocation of the Russian 
 troops?" That is one of the questions for 
 which one hardly can expect an answer from a 
 ministry of foreign affairs, itself vitally inter- 
 ested. If we should begin to ask for explana- 
 tions, we might receive forced replies, and our 
 surrejoinders would also have to be forced. 
 That is a dangerous path which I do not like to 
 tread. Allocations of troops are things for 
 which one does not take the other country to 
 task, asking for categorical explanations, but 
 against which one takes counter precautions with 
 equal reserve and circumspection. 
 
 I cannot, therefore, give an authentic declara- 
 tion concerning the motives of this Russian allo- 
 cation, but, having been familiar through a gen- 
 eration with foreign politics and the policy of 
 Russia, I can form my own ideas concerning 
 them. These ideas lead me to assume that the 
 Russian cabinet is convinced, probably with good 
 reason, that the weight of the Russian voice in 
 the diplomatic Areopagos of Europe will be the 
 weightier in the next European crisis, the 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 85 
 
 stronger Russia is on the European frontier and 
 the farther west the Russian armies stand. Rus- 
 sia is the more quickly at hand, either as an ally 
 or as a foe, the nearer her main army, or at least 
 a large army, is to her western frontier. 
 
 This policy has directed the Russian allocation 
 of troops for a long while. You will remember 
 that the army assembled in the Polish kingdom 
 during the Crimean War was so large that this 
 war might have ended differently if the army 
 had started on time. If you think farther back, 
 you will see that the events of 1830 found Russia 
 unprepared and not ready to take a hand, because 
 she had an insufficient number of troops in the 
 v\^estern part of her empire. I need not, there- 
 fore, draw the conclusion from the accumulation 
 of Russian troops in the western provinces 
 (sapadnii Gnhernii, as the Russians say), that 
 our neighbors mean to attack us. I assume they 
 are waiting, possibly for another Oriental crisis, 
 intending then to be in the position of pressing 
 home the Russian wishes by means of an army 
 situated not exactly in Kasan, but farther west. 
 
 When may such an Oriental crisis take place, 
 you ask. Forsooth, we have no certainty. Dur- 
 ing this century we have had, I think, four crises, 
 if I do not include the smaller ones and those 
 which did not culminate. One was in 1809 and 
 ended with the treaty which gave Russia the 
 Pruth-frontier, and another in 1828. Then there 
 was the Crimean War of 1854, and the war of 
 1877. They have happened, therefore, at inter- 
 vals of about twenty years and over. Why, then, 
 should the next crisis take place sooner than after 
 
86 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 a similar interval, or at about 1899, twenty years 
 after the last one? I for one should like to 
 reckon with the possibility of its being postponed 
 and not occurring immediately. 
 
 Then there are other European events which 
 are wont to take place at even intervals, the 
 Polish uprisings, for instance. Formerly we had 
 to expect one every eighteen or twenty years. 
 Possibly this is one reason why Russia wishes 
 to be so strong in Poland, that she may prevent 
 them. Then there are the changes of govern- 
 ment in France which also used to happen every 
 eighteen or twenty years; and no one can deny 
 that a change of government in France may 
 bring about such a crisis that every interested 
 nation may wish to be able to intervene with her 
 full might — I mean only diplomatically, but 
 with a diplomacy which is backed by an efficient 
 army close at hand. 
 
 I assume on the strength of my purely techni- 
 cal-diplomatic judgment, which is based on my 
 experience, that these are the intentions of Rus- 
 sia and that she has no wish to comply with the 
 somewhat uncouth threats and boastings of the 
 newspapers. And, if this is so, then there is 
 surely no reason why we should look more 
 gloomily into the future now than we have done 
 at any time during the past forty years. The 
 Oriental crisis is undoubtedly the most likely to 
 occur, and in this our interests are only second- 
 ary. When it happens, we are in a position to 
 watch whether the powers, who are primarily in- 
 terested in the Mediterranean and the Levant, 
 will make their decisions and come to terms, if 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 87 
 
 they choose, or go to war with Russia about 
 them. We are not immediately called upon to do 
 either. Every great power which is trying to 
 influence or to restrain the policies of other coun- 
 tries in matters which are beyond the sphere of 
 its interests is playing politics beyond the bounds 
 which God has assigned to it. Its policy is one 
 of force and not of vital interests. It is working 
 for prestige. We shall not do this. If Oriental 
 crises happen, we shall wait before taking our 
 position until the powers who have greater inter- 
 ests at stake than we, have declared themselves. 
 
 There is, therefore, no reason, gentlemen, why 
 you should look upon our present situation with 
 unusual gravity, assuming this to be the cause of 
 our asking for the mighty increase of our arma- 
 ments which the military bill contemplates. I 
 should like to separate the question of reestab- 
 lishing the Landwehr of the second grade, in 
 short the big military bill and the financial bill, 
 from the question of our present situation. It 
 has to do, not with a temporary and transient 
 arrangement, but with the permanent invigora- 
 tion of the German Empire. 
 
 That no temporary arrangement is contem- 
 plated will be perfectly clear, I believe, when I 
 ask you to survey with me the dangers of war 
 which we have met in the past forty years with- 
 out having become nervously excited at any one 
 time. 
 
 In the year 1848, when many dikes and flood 
 gates were broken, which until then had directed 
 the peaceful flow of countless waters, we had to 
 dispose of two questions freighted with the dan- 
 
88 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 ger of war. They concerned Poland and Schles- 
 wig-Holstein. The first shouts after the Martial 
 days were : War with Russia for the rehabihta- 
 tion of Poland ! Soon thereafter the danger was 
 perilously near of being involved in a great Eu- 
 ropean war on account of Schleswig-Holstein. I 
 need not emphasize how the agreement of 
 Olmiitz, in 1850, prevented a great conflagration 
 — a war on a gigantic scale. Then there fol- 
 lowed two years of greater quiet but of general 
 ill feeling, at the time when I first was ambassa- 
 dor in Frankfort. In 1853 the earliest symptoms 
 of the Crimean War made themselves felt. This 
 war lasted from 1853 to 1856, and during this 
 whole time we were near the edge of the cliff, 
 I will not say the abyss, whence it was intended 
 to draw us into the war. I remember that I was 
 obliged at that time, from 1853 to 1855, to alter- 
 nate like a pendulum, so to speak, between 
 Frankfort and Berlin, because the late king, 
 thanks to the confidence he had in me, used me 
 as the real advocate of his independent policy 
 whenever the insistence of the western powers 
 that we too should declare war on Russia grew 
 too strong, and the opposition of his cabinet too 
 flabby for his liking. Then the play was staged 
 — I do not know how often — when I was called 
 back here and ordered to write for His Majesty 
 a more pro-Russian dispatch, and Mr. von Man- 
 teuffel resigned, and I requested to be instructed 
 by His Majesty to follow Mr. von Manteuffel, 
 after the dispatch was gone, into the country or 
 anywhere else, and to induce him to resume his 
 office. Yet each time Prussia was hovering on 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 89 
 
 the brink of a great war. It was exposed to the 
 hostility of the whole of Europe, except Russia, 
 if it refused to join in the policies of the west 
 European powers, and, if it did, it was forced to 
 break with Russia, possibly for a very long while, 
 because the defection of Prussia would probably 
 have been felt very painfully in Russia. 
 
 During the Crimean War, therefore, we were 
 in constant danger of war. The war lasted till 
 1856, when it was at last concluded by the Treaty 
 of Paris, and we found, in the Congress of Paris, 
 a sort of Canossa prepared for us, for which I 
 should not have assumed the responsibility, and 
 against which I vainly counseled at the time. 
 We were not at all obliged to play the part of a 
 greater power than we were, and to sign the 
 treaties made there. But we were dancing at- 
 tendance with the view of being permitted to sign 
 the treaty. This will not again happen to us. 
 
 That was in 1856, and in 1857 the problem of 
 Neuchatel was again threatening war. This did 
 not become generally known. In the spring of 
 that year I was sent to Paris by the late king to 
 negotiate with Emperor Napoleon concerning the 
 passage of Prussian troops in an attack upon 
 Switzerland. Everyone who hears this from me 
 will know what this would have meant In case of 
 an understanding, and that it could have become 
 a far-reaching danger of war, and might have 
 involved us with France as well as with other 
 powers. Emperor Napoleon was not unwilling 
 to agree. My negotiations in Paris, however, 
 were terminated because His Majesty the King 
 in the meanwhile had come to an amicable under- 
 
90 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 standing in the matter with Austria and Switzer- 
 land. But the danger of war, we must agree, 
 was present also during that year. 
 
 While I was on this mission in Paris, the Ital- 
 ian War hung in the air. It broke out a little 
 more than a year later and came very near draw- 
 ing us into a big general war of Europe. We 
 went so far as to mobilize, and we should un- 
 doubtedly have taken the field, if the Peace of 
 Villafranca had not been concluded, somewhat 
 prematurely for Austria, but just in time for our- 
 selves, for we should have been obliged to wage 
 this war under unfavorable circumstances. We 
 should have turned this war, which was an Ital- 
 ian affair, into a Franco-Prussian war, and its 
 cessation, outcome, and treaty of peace would no 
 longer have depended on us, but on the friends 
 and enemies who stood behind us. 
 
 Thus we came into the sixties without the 
 clouds of war having cleared from the horizon 
 for even one single year. 
 
 Already in 1863 another war threatened 
 hardly less ominously, of which the people at 
 large knew little, and which will only be appre- 
 ciated when the secret archives of the cabinets 
 will be made public. You may remember the 
 Polish uprising of 1863, ^-^^ ^ shall never forget 
 the morning calls which I used to receive at that 
 time from Sir Andrew Buchanan, the English 
 ambassador, and Talleyrand, the French repre- 
 sentative, who tried to frighten me out of my 
 wits by attacking the Prussian policy for its in- 
 excusable adherence to Russia, and who used 
 rather a threatening language with me. At noon 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 91 
 
 I then used to have the pleasure of listening in 
 the Prussian diet to somewhat the same argu- 
 ments and attacks which the foreign ambassa- 
 dors had made upon me in the morning. I suf- 
 fered it quietly, but Emperor Alexander lost his 
 patience, and wished to draw his sword against 
 the plotting of the western powers. You will 
 remember that the French forces were then en- 
 gaged with American projects and in Mexico, 
 which prevented France from taking a vigorous 
 stand. The Emperor of Russia was no longer 
 willing to stand the Polish intrigues of the other 
 powers, and was ready to face events in our com- 
 pany and to go to war. You will remember that 
 Prussia was struggling at that time with difficult 
 interior problems, and that in Germany the 
 leaven had begun to work in the minds of the 
 people, and the council of the princes in Frank- 
 fort was under contemplation. It may be read- 
 ily granted, therefore, that the temptation for my 
 gracious master was very strong to cut, and thus 
 to heal, his difficult position at home by agreeing 
 to a military undertaking on a colossal scale. 
 
 At that time war of Prussia and Russia to- 
 gether against those who were protecting the 
 Polish insurrection against us would undoubtedly 
 have taken place if His Majesty had not recoiled 
 from the thought of solving home difficulties, 
 Prussian as well as German, with foreign help. 
 We declined in silence, and without revealing to 
 the other German powers who had hostile proj- 
 ects against us the reasons which had deter- 
 mined our course. The subsequent death of the 
 King of Denmark changed the trend of thought 
 
92 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 of everybody interested. But all that was needed 
 to bring about the great coalition war in 1863 
 was a " Yes " instead of a " No " from His 
 Majesty the King in Gastein. Anybody but a 
 German minister would perhaps have counseled 
 affirmatively, from reasons of utility and oppor- 
 tunism in order to solve thereby our home diffi- 
 culties. You see neither our own people nor 
 foreigners really have a proper appreciation of 
 the amount of national loyalty and high princi- 
 ples which guides both the sovereign and his 
 ministers in the government of German States. 
 
 The year 1864 — we just spoke of 1863 — 
 brought a new pressing danger of war. From 
 the moment when our troops crossed the Eider, 
 I was ready each week to see the European 
 Council of Elders interfere in this Danish af- 
 fair, and you will agree with me that this was 
 highly probable. 
 
 In 1865 it faced about, and the preparations 
 for the war of 1866 were beginning. In 1866, 
 however, the war broke out in full force, as you 
 know. A circumspect use of events alone ena- 
 bled us to ward off the existing danger of turn- 
 ing this duel between Prussia and Austria into 
 a fierce European war of coalition, when our very 
 existence, our life and all we had, would have 
 been at stake. 
 
 This was in 1866, and in 1867 the Luxem- 
 bourg problem arose, when only a somewhat 
 firmer reply was needed to bring about the great 
 French war in that year, — and we might have 
 given it, if we had been so strong that we could 
 have counted on success. From then on, during 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 93 
 
 1868, 1869, and up to 1870 we were living in 
 constant apprehension of war, and of the agree- 
 ments which in the time of Mr, von Beust were 
 being made in Salzburg and other places between 
 France, Italy, and Austria, and which, we feared, 
 were directed against us. The apprehension of 
 war was so great at that time that I received calls 
 — ■ I was the president of the cabinet — from 
 merchants and manufacturers, who said : " The 
 uncertainty is unbearable. Why don't you 
 strike the first blow? War is preferable to this 
 continued damper on all business! " We waited 
 quietly until we were struck, and I believe we did 
 well to arrange matters so that we were the na- 
 tion which was assailed and were not ourselves 
 the assailants. 
 
 Now, since the great war of 1870 was waged, 
 has there been a year, I ask you, without the 
 danger of war? In the first years of the seven- 
 ties — the very moment we came home, the ques- 
 tion arose : " When will be the next war ? When 
 will revenge be given? Within five years at the 
 latest, no doubt?" We were told: "The ques- 
 tion whether we shall have to fight and with 
 what success surely rests with Russia now-a- 
 days. Russia alone holds the hilt." It was a 
 representative of the Catholic party who thus 
 remonstrated with me in the Reichstag. But I 
 wish to complete the picture of the forty years 
 by saying that in 1876 the clouds of war again 
 began to gather in the south. In 1877 the 
 Balkan War was waged, which would have led 
 to a conflagration of the whole of Europe, if this 
 had not been prevented by the Congress gathered 
 
94 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 in Berlin. After the Congress an entirely new 
 eastern picture presented itself to us, for Russia 
 was offended by our attitude in the Congress. 
 
 Then there followed a period when we felt the 
 results of the intimate relations of the three em- 
 perors, which for some time permitted us to face 
 the future with greater placidity. But at the first 
 symptoms of any instability in the relations of 
 the three emperors or of the termination of the 
 agreements which they had made with one an- 
 other, public opinion was possessed of the same 
 nervous and, I believe, exaggerated excitement 
 with which we have had to contend these last 
 years, and which I consider especially uncalled 
 for today. 
 
 From my belief that this excitement is uncalled 
 for I am far from drawing the conclusion that 
 we do not need an increase in our armaments. 
 The very opposite is my view, and this may ex- 
 plain the tableau of forty years vi^hich I have just 
 exhibited before you. 
 
 Great complications and all kinds of coalitions, 
 which no one can foresee, are constantly possible, 
 and we must be prepared for them. We must 
 be so strong, irrespective of momentary condi- 
 tions, that we can face any coalition with the 
 assurance of a great nation which is strong 
 enough under circumstances to take her fate into 
 her own hands. We must be able to face our 
 fate placidly with that self-reliance and confi- 
 dence in God which are ours when we are strong 
 and our cause is just. And the Government will 
 see to it that the German cause will be just 
 always. 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 95 
 
 We must, to put it briefly, be as strong in 
 these times as we possibly can be, .and we can 
 be stronger than any other nation of equal num- 
 bers in the world. I shall revert to this later — 
 but it would be criminal if we were not to make 
 use of our opportunity. If we do not need our 
 full armed strength, we need not summon it. 
 The only problem is the not very weighty one of 
 money — not very weighty I say in passing, 
 because I have no wish to enter upon a discus- 
 sion of the financial and military figures, and of 
 the fact that France has spent three milliards for 
 the improvement of her armaments these last 
 years, while we have spent scarcely one and one 
 half milliards, including what we are asking of 
 you at this time. But I leave the elucidation of 
 this to the minister of war and the representa- 
 tives of the treasury department. 
 
 When I say that it is our duty to endeavor 
 to be ready at all times and for all emergencies, 
 I imply that we must make greater exertions 
 than other people for the same purpose, because 
 of our geographical position. We are situated 
 in the heart of Europe, and have at least three 
 fronts open to an attack. France has only her 
 eastern, and Russia only her western frontier 
 where they may be attacked. We are also more 
 exposed to the dangers of a coalition than any 
 other nation, as is proved by the whole develop- 
 ment of history, by our geographical position, 
 and the lesser degree of cohesiveness, which until 
 now has characterized the German nation in 
 comparison with others. God has placed us 
 where we are prevented, thanks to our neighbors, 
 
96 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 from growing lazy and dull. He has placed by 
 our side the most warlike and restless of all na- 
 tions, the French, and He has permitted warlike 
 inclinations to grow strong in Russia, where 
 formerly they existed to a lesser degree. Thus 
 we are given a spur, so to speak, from both 
 sides, and are compelled to exertions which we 
 should perhaps not be making otherwise. The 
 pikes in the European carp-pond are keeping us 
 from being carps by making us feel their teeth 
 on both sides. They also are forcing us to an 
 exertion which without them we might not make, 
 and to a union among us Germans, which is 
 abhorrent to us at heart. By nature we are 
 rather tending away, the one from the other. 
 But the Franco-Russian press within which we 
 are squeezed compels us to hold together, and 
 by pressure our cohesive force is greatly in- 
 creased. This will bring us to that state of 
 being inseparable which all other nations pos- 
 sess, while we do not yet enjoy it. But we must 
 respond to the intentions of Providence by 
 making ourselves so strong that the pikes can 
 do nothing but encourage us. 
 
 Formerly in the years of the Holy Alliance — 
 I am just thinking of an American song which 
 I learned of my late friend Motley : " In good 
 old colonial times, when we lived under a King " 
 — well, those were the good old patriarchal times 
 when we had many posts to guide us, and many 
 dikes to protect us from the wild floods of Eu- 
 rope. There were the German Union, and the 
 real support and consummation of the German 
 Union, the Holy Alliance. We had support in 
 
GERMANY AND EUROPE 97 
 
 Russia and in Austria, and, above all, the guar- 
 anty of our diffidence never permitted us to 
 express an opinion before the others had spoken. 
 
 All this v/e have lost ; we must help ourselves. 
 The Holy Alliance was wrecked in the Crimean 
 War — not through our fault. The German 
 Union has been destroyed by us, because the 
 existence which we were granted within it was 
 unbearable in the long run for ourselves and 
 the German people as well. After the dissolu- 
 tion of the German Union and the war of 1866, 
 Prussia, as it was then, or North Germany, 
 would have become isolated, if we had been 
 obliged to count with the fact that nobody would 
 be willing to pardon our new successes — the 
 great successes which we had won. No great 
 power looks with favor on the successes of its 
 neighbors. 
 
 To sum up : I do not believe in an immediate 
 interruption of peace, and I ask you to discuss 
 this bill independently of such a thought or ap- 
 prehension, looking upon it as a means of ma- 
 king the great strength which God has placed 
 in the German nation fully available. If we do 
 not need all the troops, it is not necessary to 
 summon them. We are trying to avoid the con- 
 tingency when we shall need them. 
 
 This attempt is as yet made rather difficult 
 for us by the threatening newspaper articles in 
 the foreign press, and I should like to admonish 
 these foreign editors to discontinue such threats. 
 They do not lead anywhere. The threats which 
 we see made — not by the governments, but by 
 the press — are really incredibly stupid, when 
 
98 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 we stop to reflect that the people making them 
 imagine they could frighten the proud and pow- 
 erful German empire by certain intimidating 
 figures made by printer's ink and shallow words. 
 People should not do this. It would then be 
 easier for us to be more obliging to our two 
 neighbors. Every country after all is sooner 
 or later responsible for the windows which its 
 press has smashed. The bill will be rendered 
 some day, and will consist of the ill-feeling of 
 the other country. We are easily influenced — 
 perhaps too easily — by love and kindness, but 
 quite surely never by threats ! We Germans fear 
 God, and naught else in the world ! It is this 
 fear of God which makes us love and cherish 
 peace. If in spite of this anybody breaks the 
 peace, he will discover that the ardent patriotism 
 of 1813, which called to the standards the entire 
 population of Prussia — weak, small, and 
 drained to the marrow as it then was — has 
 today become the common property of the whole 
 German nation. Attack the German nation any- 
 where, and you will find it armed to a man, and 
 every man with the firm belief in his heart : God 
 will be with us. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 GERMANY AND ENGLAND 
 
 Two years ago Paul Rohrbach ^ addressed to 
 the Germans a powerful plea for a more pur- 
 poseful realization of their moral responsibilities 
 as a world power. He showed them their past, 
 pointed to the defects of their character, to their 
 problems at home and abroad, and closed with 
 an impassioned appeal that they drop from their 
 train of thoughts and actions every petty notion, 
 and be worthy of the material greatness they 
 had achieved. In this world, he said, only moral 
 questions count, and nobody can long maintain 
 a position of importance unless moral forces 
 issue from him for the benefit of mankind. 
 
 Rohrbach's whole book is a book of peace 
 and moral justice. He is, therefore, the last 
 man to misrepresent wilfully England's attitude 
 toward Germany; and what he said to his coun- 
 trymen two years ago may well be quoted as 
 having shaped the opinions of the most thought- 
 
 ^Paul Rohrbach. Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, published 
 by Karl Robert Langewiesche, Diisseldorf, 191 2. 
 
100 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 ful, especially since his book was sold by the 
 tens of thousands. 
 
 It may be doubted whether the many threat- 
 ening remarks from English statesmen and pub- 
 licists quoted by Dr. Rohrbach should have been 
 taken by him at their face value. He, however, 
 believed that they expressed the temper of the 
 British people, and the British attitude since the 
 war would seem to bear him out. In war time, 
 however, passions are high, and people repeat, 
 from a sense of patriotism, what they do not 
 really believe. When people realize that they 
 have given their opponents reasonable cause for 
 suspicion, the foundations for an amicable un- 
 derstanding are quickly found. Herein lies the 
 hope of the cessation of the British-German bit- 
 terness. If Germany could feel sure that Great 
 Britain did not wish to destroy her commerce, 
 and if Great Britain felt that Germany had no 
 desire of attacking her, the two nations, who are 
 each other's best customers, would no longer 
 wish to wage a war to the death. 
 
 Great Britain also should realize that, however 
 sincere she is in her claim that she went to war 
 as the protector of neutral Belgium, there are 
 incidents in her career which justify an opponent 
 in doubting this. British men and women have 
 done much to advance the civilization of the 
 world and may perhaps justly claim that the 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 101 
 
 present state of British morality in dealing with 
 other nations is such that it is unfair to judge 
 Great Britain by what she did years ago. The 
 political memory of nations, however, is long, 
 and Germany has not forgotten that only about 
 a hundred years ago the British fleet appeared 
 before Copenhagen and bombarded the open 
 city, destroying, among other buildings, the finest 
 church of Denmark. Denmark was then a neu- 
 tral country during the war between Great 
 Britain and Napoleon. Great Britain did not 
 respect her neutrality, but after her successful 
 bombardment carried off the Danish fleet as a 
 prize. She did the same thing in 1807 with the 
 island of Madeira, which she kept in her pos- 
 session until 1814; and in both cases her excuse 
 was that she wished to anticipate a possible 
 invasion of these countries by Napoleon. 
 
 In view of such comparatively recent events, 
 she should at least acknowledge the reasonable- 
 ness of her opponent's suspicion, and try to allay 
 it rather than to fan it by the inflammatory 
 speeches of some of her statesmen. 
 
 In quoting the following extract of the sixth 
 chapter of Dr. Rohrbach's book, the attempt is 
 made of showing that it was easy for Germany 
 to believe that Great Britain was planning her 
 destruction : ^ 
 
 ^ Compare, however, above with Chapter V. 
 
102 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 It is so important for us to understand the 
 gradual development of the English animosity 
 against us, and without this so impossible to 
 understand the workings of present-day politics 
 that we must discuss this subject at some length 
 before we can indicate a proper course of action. 
 If one looks for a date after which our relations 
 with England grew strained, the year 1890 oc- 
 curs to one, when England ceded to us the island 
 of Heligoland in return for considerable con- 
 cessions in Africa. The cession of Heligoland 
 clearly proves that at that time nobody in Eng- 
 land believed that the German navy could ever 
 grow strong enough to be dangerous to Eng- 
 land's supremacy on the sea. It is true that the 
 English merchants had already begun to com- 
 plain of German competition. In 1887 the Eng- 
 lish law was passed that goods not manufactured 
 in England should be so marked. It was aimed 
 against Germany, but the legend " Made in Ger- 
 many " had soon a different meaning from the 
 one the law makers had expected it would have. 
 But whenever the German fleet was discussed in 
 England it was in the sense of the remarks which 
 Lord Palmerston addressed to the Germans 
 through his press in 1861, when the Schleswig- 
 Holstein question became acute; plow your 
 fields, sail with your clouds, build your castles 
 in Spain, for you have never had the genius of 
 crossing the oceans or sailing the seas or even 
 your inland waters ! 
 
 What would not England give today if she 
 could annul her cession of Heligoland to Ger- 
 many! Did our government desire the posses- 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 103 
 
 sion of Heligoland as long ago as the time when 
 the Zanzibar treaty was made, because our re- 
 sponsible statesmen foresaw our future devel- 
 opment ? One would be glad to answer this ques- 
 tion with yes. But as a matter of fact the pur- 
 chase of Heligoland had been more than once 
 suggested to England, but without avail, by 
 Bismarck himself during the preceding decades. 
 The realization, however, of the economic 
 changes in Germany and its consequently al- 
 tered political status, did not come either ito 
 ourselves or to the English people earlier than 
 during the decade intervening between the Zan- 
 zibar-Heligoland treaty of 1890 and the navy 
 law of 1900. When the plans for our navy were 
 proposed and the reasons for its increase devel- 
 oped before the people, public opinion was gen- 
 erally able to follow the discussion. The great- 
 est credit for having instructed the nation on 
 the transoceanic matters vitally affecting its in- 
 terests belongs to the navy department. The 
 material which this department placed before the 
 people in pamphlets, lectures, newspaper arti- 
 cles, books, and, finally, in the discussions in par- 
 liament, represents one of the grandest forces 
 of instruction ever wielded in any cause. 
 Neither before nor after the introduction of the 
 navy law by Admiral von Tirpitz has there been 
 as close a touch between the government and 
 the people as existed at that time. The review 
 of the huge figures, which represented the 
 growth of our interests abroad, was very im- 
 pressive, and the necessity of protecting them 
 with a large fleet was conclusively proved. 
 
104 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 Everything that is famiHar to us today: the 
 danger for Germany of a naval blockade, the 
 destruction of our home-commerce if one de- 
 prives us of our foreign markets, all this was 
 then for the first time elucidated -— and how 
 much smaller were those figures and values 
 twelve years ago than they are today. 
 
 The notion that we can continue to live con- 
 tent with defending and keeping what we have 
 already attained, gave place, at least in the case 
 of the intelligent people, to the conviction that 
 Germany would face a decision concerning its 
 future of even greater moment than it had been 
 called upon to meet during the periods of re- 
 construction from Koniggratz to Versailles. 
 People saw visions of a Germany still more 
 firmly rooted in the commerce of the world, and 
 drawing from it its sustenance in increased meas- 
 ure ; a Germany which one day would be met by 
 England in her panoply with the threat: I bid 
 you stop! that I may take my place! 
 
 In England people like to ignore the possi- 
 bility of Germany's commerce growing to men- 
 acing proportions. For this reason, we are told, 
 a big navy is superfluous for Germany unless 
 she intends to fight England with it. If Ger- 
 many had no other intentions than to protect 
 her commerce with her fleet, then the expenses 
 which it incurred for her fleet were altogether 
 unnecessary, because nobody, and England least 
 of all, was thinking of endangering the German 
 trade. The first lord of the admiralty, Winston 
 Churchill, referred to the English and German 
 navies in a speech in Glasgow on February 9, 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 105 
 
 1912, as follows: "We have no thoughts and 
 we have never had any thoughts of aggression 
 — and we attribute no such thoughts to other 
 Great Powers. There is, however, this differ- 
 ence between the British naval power, and the 
 naval power of the great and friendly Empire 
 of Germany. The British Navy is to us a neces- 
 sity, and from some points of view the German 
 Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury. 
 Our naval power involves British existence. It 
 is existence to us, it is expansion to them. We 
 cannot menace the peace of a single continental 
 hamlet nor do we wish to do so no matter how 
 great and supreme our Navy may become. But 
 on the other hand, the whole fortunes of our 
 race and Empire, the whole treasure accumu- 
 lated during so many centuries of sacrifice and 
 achievement would perish and be swept away 
 if our naval supremacy were to be impaired. It 
 is the British Navy which makes Great Britain 
 a Great Power. But Germany was a Great 
 Power, respected and honored all over the 
 world before she had a single ship. Those facts 
 ought to be clearly stated because there is no 
 doubt that there is a disposition in some quar- 
 ters to suppose that Great Britain and Germany 
 are on terms of equality so far as naval risks 
 are concerned. Such a supposition is utterly 
 untrue. The government is resolved to main- 
 tain the naval supremacy which this country 
 enjoys." Thus spoke the English present first 
 lord of the admiralty. But once there was an- 
 other leader of the English navy, George Monck, 
 Duke of Albemarle, Cromwell's lieutenant 
 
106 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 against Holland. When it seemed desirable to 
 hunt up another reason or excuse for an attack 
 on Holland, Monck said : " What does this or 
 that reason matter? What we need is a slice 
 of the commerce which the Dutch now have." 
 
 A few years later Charles H wrote to Louis 
 XIV, when the two nations were contemplating 
 an alliance against Holland, that there were 
 some serious obstacles to an agreement, the chief 
 of which were " the present great pains of 
 France to create commerce and to be a naval 
 power of consequence. This is for us, who can 
 be great only by our commerce and our navy, 
 so serious a cause of suspicion, that every step 
 which France is taking in this direction, of 
 necessity must rekindle the jealousies of the two 
 nations." A century later, when the seven years' 
 naval war between England and France was 
 ended, Pitt, the English minister, said that 
 France was especially dangerous to England as 
 a naval and commercial power and that the chief 
 English successes were the damage done to 
 France along these lines. He also added his 
 regrets that France had been given the oppor- 
 tunity of rebuilding her navy. 
 
 In view of these historical witnesses concern- 
 ing the real views of English statesmen, kings, 
 and admirals as regards nations who claim an 
 important share of the commerce of the world, 
 and the right to protect it with their own navy, 
 would it not be somewhat risky, if we placed 
 entire confidence in the assurances coming from 
 England today that we could rely even without 
 a fleet on the pacific intentions of England and 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 107 
 
 be assured of a safe competition in the commerce 
 of the world? All due respect to Mr. Churchill's 
 word as the expression of his personal opinion! 
 But all too often a different tune has sounded 
 from England, emanating, moreover, from the 
 highest quarters. Who finally can guarantee 
 that the other political party which at present is 
 not guiding the destinies of the country, wiU not 
 sing a different tune when it comes to power? 
 Even the present Liberal Lord of the admiralty 
 will hardly look upon the campaign speeches of 
 the leader of the Conservatives during the re- 
 cent campaign on the " German danger " as 
 calculated to quiet Germany. 
 
 On the contrary, the true attitude of England 
 toward our navy and commerce is revealed by 
 such comments as were contained in the famous 
 article in the Saturday Review of September, 
 1897, which made a great stir in England and 
 the whole world, and frankly stated that Eng- 
 land's prosperity could only be saved if Ger- 
 many were destroyed. " England," the article 
 says in part, " with her long history of success- 
 ful aggression, with her marvelous conviction 
 that in pursuing her own interests she is spread- 
 ing light among nations dwelling in darkness, 
 and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of 
 the same blood, with a lesser will-force, but 
 perhaps with a keener intelligence, compete in 
 every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at 
 the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the 
 East, in the islands of the Southern Sea, and 
 in the far Northwest, wherever — and where 
 has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible, 
 
108 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 and trade has followed the flag, there the Ger- 
 man bagman is struggling with the English 
 pedlar. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to 
 build, a native to convert from breadfruit to 
 tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the 
 German and the Englishman are struggling to 
 be first. A million petty disputes build up the 
 greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. 
 // Germany were extinguished tomorrow, the 
 day after tomorrow, there is not an Englishman 
 in the world who would not he richer. Nations 
 have fought for years over a city or a right of 
 succession. Must they not fight for two hun- 
 dred million pounds of commerce ? " 
 
 The article then goes on to say that a most 
 tangible conflict of interests existed between 
 England and Germany, and that England, more- 
 over, was the only great power which could 
 make war on Germany without running an 
 enormous risk, and even with an undoubted 
 prospect of success. " Her partners in the 
 Triple Alliance would be useless against Eng- 
 land; Austria because she could do nothing; 
 Italy because she dare not lay herself open to 
 an attack by France. The growth of Germany's 
 fleet has done no more than to make the blow 
 of England fall on her more heavily. A few 
 days, and the ships would be at the bottom, or 
 in convoy to English ports ; Hamburg and 
 Bremen, the Kiel Canal and the Baltic ports 
 would lie under the guns of England, waiting 
 until the indemnity were settled. Our work 
 over, we need not even be at the pains to alter 
 Bismarck's words to Ferry and to say to France 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 109 
 
 and Russia, ' Seek some compensation. Take 
 inside Germany whatever you like. You can 
 have it.' " 
 
 Germaniam esse delendam! 
 Down with Germany! 
 
 Thus the article concludes, and we know very 
 well that it does not reflect the feelings of the 
 whole of England, but nevertheless of a con- 
 siderable portion of the English nation. 
 
 A few years ago a former colleague of Win- 
 ston Churchill, Mr. Arthur Lee, civil lord of 
 the admiralty, that is to say, an active member 
 of the English government, expressed himself 
 even more clearly when he said in a public 
 speech on February 3, 1905, that the center of 
 the naval power in Europe had shifted, and that 
 England would have to look with care, although 
 not with anxiety, to the North Sea rather than 
 to the Mediterranean. If the English navy 
 should be thus redistributed and war should 
 come, then England could strike the first blow 
 before the other party had time to read in the 
 newspapers that war had been declared. 
 
 Late in the fall of 1904 after the misunder- 
 standing near the Doggerbank between the Rus- 
 sian fleet on its way to Asia and the fishermen 
 from Hull, the opinion was expressed in Eng- 
 land that Germany had warned Russia of a pos- 
 sible attack by Japanese torpedo boats, and at 
 the same time had placed her own ships in readi- 
 ness against England. In this connection the 
 semi-official Army and Navy Gazette remarked 
 that it was intolerable that England should be 
 forced solely by the existence of the German 
 
110 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 fleet to take precautions which otherwise would 
 not be necessary. " Before now we have had 
 to wipe out of existence a fleet which we had 
 reason to beheve might be used as a weapon to 
 our hurt. There are not wanting those both in 
 this country and on the Continent who regard 
 the German fleet as the one and only menace to 
 the preservation of peace in Europe. This may 
 or may not be the case. We are content to point 
 out that the present moment is particularly op- 
 portune for asking that this fleet should not be 
 further increased." One of the most influential 
 English papers, the Daily Chronicle, referred 
 to this proposal and the speech of the lord of 
 the admiralty, Mr. Lee, by saying that we should 
 have peace in Europe for sixty years if the 
 German navy had been destroyed in October, 
 1904; and that the words of Mr. Lee — pro- 
 vided they had the sanction of the cabinet — 
 were wise, for they contained a pacific declara- 
 tion of the immutable intentions of the mistress 
 of the sea. 
 
 Such depositions do not well agree with the 
 assertion of Mr. Churchill that England neither 
 had nor ever had had aggressive intentions 
 against Germany. And what does he mean by 
 England? Is it the responsible office holders 
 of the party which happens to have the majority 
 in parliament? Or the sum-total of the English 
 nation? Or the preponderating part of public 
 opinion in England? These are all forces which 
 may change, under certain conditions, more 
 speedily than anybody in Germany can foresee. 
 If it is difficult, according to the well-known 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 111 
 
 dictum of Bismarck, to enter into a binding 
 political contract with England, because the Eng- 
 lish constitution does not permit treaties of 
 specified durations, it is even less possible to rely 
 on the expressions of momentary opinions either 
 by the press or even by persons in responsible 
 positions. We all know that we were very near 
 a. war with England during the summer and 
 early fall of 191 1. We also know that on Sep- 
 tember 18, 191 1, the English fleet in the North 
 Sea and the canal was ready for action, that a 
 simultaneous attack against Kiautschou and our 
 possessions in the South Sea was being pre- 
 pared, and that negotiations with France were 
 under way for her assistance in a war on land. 
 We know that a year earlier English public 
 opinion and policy had strenuou^y objected to 
 the fortification of the mouth of the Schelde. 
 Why? Because this would have lessened the 
 opportunity of sending English troops through 
 the Schelde to unite with the French army in a 
 war on Germany. It is, therefore, impossible 
 to submit, with tied hands, to the kind intentions 
 of the English, and to leave to them the sole 
 control of the seas. It is equally impossible to 
 place one's trust in the one-sided assurances of 
 English statesmen who say that they had not 
 intended to attack us, when not only the quan- 
 tity but also the weight of contrary English 
 statements compel us to believe that the denial 
 in this case is probably only intended to be an 
 excuse and is meant for the less informed gen- 
 eral public. 
 
 Ever since 1897, when the first solitary cries 
 
112 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 for a war with Germany gradually began to 
 swell into a mighty chorus, down to the mobi- 
 lization and negotiation with France in 191 1, 
 there have been many orators who have uttered 
 the famous word of Cato against Carthage in 
 its appropriate variation : Ceteriim censeo, Ger- 
 maniam esse delendam (For the rest I hold 
 that Germany must be destroyed). "If the 
 German fleet were destroyed, the peace of Eu- 
 rope would be secure for two generations. Eng- 
 land and France, or England and the United 
 States, or all three would vouch for the freedom 
 of the sea, and prevent the construction of new 
 ships, which are dangerous weapons in the hands 
 of ambitious powers with a growing population 
 and without colonies." These words from an 
 influential English organ in the critical fall of 
 1904, after the Russian mistake in the North 
 Sea, represent the true feeling of a considerable 
 part of English public opinion. They deserve 
 our attention fully as much as the pacific utter- 
 ances of individuals. It is not our intention to 
 impugn the sincerity and the honest desire of 
 those English friends of peace, who like our- 
 selves are striving to avoid an armed encounter 
 of the two nations, but not one of these esti- 
 mable gentlemen can guarantee to us that in 
 the decisive moment his voice will win over that 
 of the anti-German party which is resolved to 
 secure the welfare of England according to the 
 principles of Admiral Monck, William Pitt, 
 Palmerston or the lord of the admiralty Mr. 
 Arthur Lee. Where were the advocates of 
 peace, when in September, 191 1, the English 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 113 
 
 battleships and cruisers and torpedo boats and 
 submarines lay at anchor waiting the order to 
 steam forth into the North Sea to attack the 
 naval power, the shore fortifications and the 
 commercial cities of Germany? Who can know 
 what motives in the last minute were counsel- 
 Hng peace? Nobody in Germany knew of the 
 danger which was threatening us, and it is un- 
 likely that in England the war party made con- 
 fidants of the advocates of peace, the Anglican 
 Church dignitaries, or the men who are working 
 for a peaceful understanding with Germany, 
 and who are reproaching us now for our sus- 
 picion. 
 
 When the first insignificant attempts were 
 made in Germany to create a navy, and a certain 
 grudge began to stir in England, Prince Bis- 
 marck declared in the Reichstag, January lo, 
 1885 : " It is not surprising that England in her 
 consciousness that ' Britannia rules the waves ' 
 looks up with wonder at seeing her landlubber 
 cousins — for thus she thinks of us — suddenly 
 go to sea. The highest influential circles of 
 England, however, do not share this feeling, and 
 find it difficult to moderate in time the expression 
 of this surprise in their subjects." No German 
 chancellor today could speak thus of the relation 
 between the influential and- the non-influential 
 circles in England. 
 
 We do not take it at all amiss that England's 
 pride and consciousness of mastery revolts at 
 the imputation that she should hereafter recog- 
 nize the interests of another nation as equal to 
 her own, not only in Europe but also in the trans- 
 
114 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 oceanic world. Nobody in the world has the 
 right to blame a great and sovereign nation if 
 it prefers, under these conditions, to fight rather 
 than to submit. It is true, as Mr. Churchill said, 
 that all possessions of the English race are en- 
 dangered as soon as her power on the seas is 
 at stake. But we can reply with exactly the same 
 right : Not only our goods and wealth, but also 
 our national existence and the future of our 
 national idea in the world are at stake, when 
 our defences by land and by sea are insufficient 
 to make our opponents look on an attack upon 
 us as too great a risk. It does not occur to us 
 to deny the superiority of the English fleet, and 
 if the English people wish very much to use the 
 word supremacy rather than superiority, they 
 are welcome to do so. But when they interpret 
 their " supremacy " to mean that our interests 
 shall yield to theirs everywhere in the world they 
 will compel us to fight with them for our future, 
 that is to say, our national existence. If they 
 wish to prescribe to us how far we may go in 
 the world to spread our ideas, we should be fools 
 and cowards if we were to acknowledge this 
 foreign command as binding without recourse 
 to arms. 
 
 If fate has decreed that we shall not reach 
 our goal of being a world nation, then this deci- 
 sion should not rest with the proclamation of 
 English supremacy but with the thundering 
 voice of the guns. No greater harm can come 
 to us if we are conquered hy the English than 
 if we voluntarily renounce our claim of equality 
 with them. 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 115 
 
 The same necessity which drove England 
 along the road of naval development has deter- 
 mined our course. We have seen how every 
 year a larger part of our population has been 
 dependent for its daily bread on a growing share 
 in the markets of the world. Germany must be 
 able to stand the competition of all the other na- 
 tions, notably England, and it has shown its abil- 
 ity to do so. The nation which possessed not 
 only a superior navy but one so absolutely the 
 master of our own that it could influence our 
 policy by the mere threat of a naval war, would 
 have a tremendous power over us. The more 
 we come to be a people which lives by its share 
 in the markets of the world, the more we must 
 take care that we are not suddenly pressed 
 aside or driven away from it by a stronger na- 
 tion. 
 
 In spite of this, good relations between Ger- 
 many and England are not impossible, and 
 should, therefore, be eagerly sought. They are 
 more desirable for us and for them than any- 
 thing else. They can, however, only be achieved 
 on the basis of a formal and absolute equality. 
 This means that the vital interests of one nation 
 must be respected by the other. The American 
 secretary of the navy, Mr. Morton, stated on 
 November i8, 1904, that he was in favor of a 
 fleet which was so strong that no other nation 
 would dare to risk an encounter with it. Accord- 
 ing to his opinion the American navy should be 
 inferior to none. Half a year later President 
 Roosevelt declared that a first class fleet capable 
 of meeting any hostile combination was the best 
 
116 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 and cheapest guaranty of peace; and that the 
 person who had not noticed this in the history 
 of all the people in recent years must be blind. 
 Even more concise was the question, asked by 
 an American writer on naval matters, Commo- 
 dore Fisk, in his book on the American naval 
 policy (1905): "Why should a country like 
 England, which is not larger than the United 
 States, have need of the larger navy? " No such 
 word has ever been uttered from our side con- 
 cerning the relation of the German navy to that 
 of England. 
 
 The English people say, to be sure, that it was 
 we and not the Americans who wished to attack 
 them. This assertion can be caused by only two 
 motives, either conscious hypocrisy, hunting for 
 an excuse to attack us with a semblance of right, 
 or insufficient political deliberation. The latter 
 is probably the weightier cause. Either, we 
 attack England and are beaten, then a national 
 catastrophe is staring us in the face, or, the 
 highly improbable and inconceivable happens, 
 and we actually conquer the English fleet, al- 
 though ours is only half as big, and are proceed- 
 ing to force on England a disadvantageous 
 peace. At that moment an European coalition 
 against us is with absolute certainty an accom- 
 plished fact, destined to deprive us of the prize 
 of victory. Not only France and Russia, but 
 also our ally Austria-Hungary together with 
 Italy and all the minor States could do nothing 
 less than to unite against us as soon as a decisive 
 German victory over England was impending, 
 and before we assumed the dictatorship of Eu- 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 117 
 
 rope. They would have to do it for the sake 
 of their own future. 
 
 To understand this, one needs only an ele- 
 mentary political knowledge. If England never- 
 theless makes official use of the notion that Ger- 
 many might attack her, we may forgive the man 
 on the street and the sensational press their 
 ignorance of the political ABC. But if politi- 
 cians of note and statesmen who are guiding the 
 affairs of the nation, or after a change of par- 
 liamentary majorities may be called to such of- 
 fices, express such ideas, they must not be aston- 
 ished if we begin to suspect that England is 
 not so much afraid of an attack by us, as that 
 she desires to make preparations for an attack 
 on us. 
 
 No German politician or statesman, no Ger- 
 man paper or intelligent man in Germany has 
 ever hinted or expressed the thought that we 
 should build as large a navy as the English or 
 even as large as that part of the English navy 
 which is kept in home waters. What we need, 
 and what we must have at all hazards, with or 
 without the good will of England, is a navy 
 strong enough to endanger England's superior 
 position on the sea, if she should attack us, even 
 if the immediate outcome should be advanta- 
 geous to her. We must have so many ships that 
 the losses which England will sustain in putting 
 us down will deprive her of her naval superiority 
 over the other intact navies of the world. No 
 English policy can risk this. Let the English 
 build as many ships as they think necessary for 
 their safety but let them count with this fact 
 
118 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 once and for all, that we shall say: We do not 
 care how many ships you build, we shall and 
 must build so many that it will be too dangerous 
 for you to run the risk of an attack on us. From 
 the German point of view this is so clearly a 
 defensive policy that it is altogether impossible 
 to impute to it aggressive tendencies. It gives 
 to England what is hers and cedes to Germany 
 her own. If the English are not content, pre- 
 ferring to maintain their absolute " supremacy " 
 even for an attack, they show that they will not 
 acknowledge our political and national equality 
 in the world. But then it is they, and not we, 
 who are constantly turning the screw of in- 
 creased armaments. Financially we shall be able 
 for a long while yet to raise the means for bat- 
 tleships, cruisers, and whatever else is necessary 
 for a naval war. The sacrifices which Prussia 
 and other States and people have made in crit- 
 ical times are an entirely different thing from 
 the taxes which even in an extreme case may 
 be required of us. If, nevertheless, the day 
 should come when not our financial ability but 
 our national readiness to make sacrifices gives 
 out, and the majority of the German people pre- 
 fer to save money in its defences rather than 
 to advance the German idea in the world, well, 
 then we shall have deserved no better fate than 
 that the English shoot us down and proclaim 
 to the people of Europe : Help yourselves ! Take 
 your compensation from Germany wherever you 
 wish ! 
 
 We Germans know that nature herself com- 
 pels us, whether or no we like it, to push the 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 119 
 
 roots and fibers of our economic life ever deeper 
 into the world abroad. In doing this we are 
 met by the suspicion, jealousy, hostility, and the 
 special policies of other mighty people. If until 
 now an outbreak of hostilities has been pre- 
 vented, and often at the last moment, it is no- 
 where written that this will always be so. Under 
 these conditions how can we justify any calcula- 
 tions as to how much less strong we should keep 
 our defences, of our own free will? Is there 
 any other reason than our strength why our 
 opponents s.hould spare us? Will England, 
 France, and Russia hesitate to use their superior- 
 ity as soon as they think it is suMcient to worst us 
 and our friends? What shall keep them from 
 it? Would the desired revenge for 1870 restrain 
 the French? Or their anxiety over our com- 
 merce and navy restrain the English ? Or would 
 the Russians hesitate because of their antipathy 
 against us, their anger at our faithful support 
 of our ally, Austria-Hungary, or because they 
 need a thorough reparation for their defeats in 
 East Asia? The balance between desire and 
 hesitation will be kept in the camp of our oppo- 
 nents only while we are strong. When we are 
 no longer strong, or at least no longer seem to 
 be so, then the others will be impelled as by an 
 elemental force to remove from their midst an 
 inconvenient nation. This is the true state of 
 affairs, and yet there are patriotic Germans who 
 deliberate whether it would not be better to save 
 millions, and so risk thousands of millions and 
 even the very future of the German idea in the 
 world ! 
 
120 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 Everything that has been said thus far may- 
 be summed up by repeating, that as we are 
 situated today nobody, no individual power nor 
 probable combination of powers, can do us any 
 harm except in conjunction with England. In 
 saying this we assume that our alliance with 
 Austria-Hungary will continue as firm as it has 
 been in the past. The correctness of this as- 
 sumption is based on the fact that the German- 
 Austrian protection is mutual. We are easily 
 a match for France alone, and a Franco-Russian 
 combination will automatically put the Austro- 
 Hungarian army into action. Italy belongs 
 nominally to the Triple Alliance, hut it is better 
 not to speculate on her movements, because her 
 public opinion is uncertain, and her dynasty not 
 suificiently secure to he able to insist on carrying 
 out a treaty in the face of a hostile public opin- 
 ion. From the present state of European pol- 
 itics, therefore, it follows of necessity that who- 
 ever harbors plans against Germany must seek 
 an understanding with England. England, on 
 the other hand, has systematically endeavored 
 to gather into her camp whatever forces are 
 inimical to our interests. If we are strong 
 enough to keep England from attacking us by 
 sea, then we need not trouble about anything 
 else. The only means, however, of accomplish- 
 ing this, is a strong navy. If it suffices to keep 
 Ensrland at bay, this very fact secures the peace 
 of Europe. We cannot and we must not deviate 
 from this naval policy, which depends entirely 
 on the English naval program. In this con- 
 nection it was very fortunate for us that the 
 
GERMANY AND ENGLAND 121 
 
 experiences of the naval encounters between 
 Russia and Japan induced England to adopt the 
 Dreadnought type of battleships. This type 
 greatly depreciated all the older ships in any 
 navy, and while it would have been a hopeless 
 task for us, in the pre-Dreadnought period to 
 catch up even in a remote way with the tremen- 
 dous superiority of the English navy, the Dread- 
 noughts gave a new start on equal terms to all 
 nations. To their misfortune, the English people 
 thought that they would preserve the absolute 
 superiority in the construction of huge modern 
 battleships for a considerable length of time. 
 But in this they were mistaken, for owing to 
 the introduction of the Dreadnought type we 
 have caught up with them in the last six years 
 to an extent which formerly would have ap- 
 peared to be a fantastic improbability. Our 
 relation to them in Dreadnought strength is 
 already slightly better than i : 2, and if the defi- 
 nitely adopted scheme of our naval construction 
 did not happen to contemplate a decrease of new 
 ships in the next few years, this proportion 
 would for the present be maintained. 
 
 Our second factor of safety lies in fostering 
 our good relations with Turkey. The financial 
 and general economic strengthening of the Turk- 
 ish Empire, the construction of railways, and, 
 above everything else, a large, well armed, and 
 ready Turkish army, these would weigh so dis- 
 tinctly in our favor, if our opponents should 
 break the peace, that the progress of Turkey 
 must be a subject of great interest for us. If 
 our policy, nevertheless, was not able to keep 
 
122 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 Italy from her attack on Tripolis and to obviate 
 the consequent serious complications for Turkey 
 in her affairs both at home and abroad, it shows 
 unfortunately that a nominally allied power like 
 Italy does not believe that German interests 
 impose upon her any obligatory considerations. 
 Our present political situation is doubtless 
 subject to the interpretation that we are no 
 longer so respected as we were in Bismarck's 
 time, and many people express their patriotic 
 fear that we are no longer successful in any- 
 thing. This much is correct, that our opponents 
 at present are in a position to prescribe for us 
 to a certain extent what we shall do, unless we 
 should be willing to break all existing political 
 knots by a great war. Such a war, however, 
 would be so great a risk to what we have achieved 
 and still may achieve that we cannot decide on 
 it, unless the opposing parties plan something 
 'which will either infringe our honor or imperil 
 our national existence — or by an attack on us 
 will relieve us of the trouble of making a decision 
 at all. If this does not happen, our only possible 
 policy toward England and the powers in her 
 train is to be always armed to the full extent 
 of our ability, and to declare at the same time 
 our inviolable readiness to have peace and a loyal 
 understanding with our opponents, provided 
 they will give us a pledge that such an under- 
 standing will be sincere and lasting. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 MILITARISM 
 
 Germany is often called the home of militarism ; 
 and in spite of her contributions to civilization 
 many have taken sides against her in the Great 
 War, because they believe that a defeat of the 
 German army will prove to be a victory for anti- 
 militarism, throughout the world. Germany's 
 friends are convinced that this will not be the 
 case, because Germany is not the home of mili- 
 tarism, either as regards the military spirit of 
 her people, or the efforts of the government to 
 have the most expensive military machinery at 
 its disposal. 
 
 These facts are so contrary to the general un- 
 derstanding that one is hardly astonished to have 
 their accuracy challenged. No conclusions can 
 be drawn from the attitude of the people since 
 the war, because ranks are always serried when 
 foreign danger threatens, and the French and 
 English are as determined as the Germans to 
 defend their honor and their country. But be- 
 fore the war? Nobody who really knew the 
 country then could have called the Germans 
 
124 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 belligerent or eager for war. As has been said 
 above, the Germans were commercially aggres- 
 sive, branching out all over the world. They 
 were building up one trade here, another there, 
 and trying to win the confidence of the people 
 everywhere. Some of the biggest enterprises 
 were contemplating contracts to be made for a 
 number of years, while others, such as the im- 
 portation of metal ores from South America 
 necessitated the investment of enormous sums in 
 an ore-carrying fleet. Even the smaller enter- 
 prises had to reckon with a settled future, for a 
 first assignment of goods is often attended by 
 great expenditures of advertising and other 
 overhead charges. Only after the channels of 
 distribution have been prepared are profits as- 
 sured. No nation, therefore, will enter on an 
 aggressive commercial career, as long as it is 
 determined to bring about a war for its own 
 aggrandisement. 
 
 As regards Germany, it will probably not be 
 denied that the majority of her people were fol- 
 lowing the peaceful paths of commerce and in- 
 dustry, and of agriculture, but it is believed that 
 her army was so big, and had grown so strong 
 that its warlike spirit prevailed and set at naught 
 the wishes of the great majority. Anybody who 
 will take the trouble of looking through the list 
 of names of officers of the German army, and 
 
MILITARISM 125 
 
 will trace their family (Connections, will at once 
 be faced by a fact which tends to disprove this 
 theory. In many cases the great army leaders 
 are brothers or fathers of the men who stand 
 high in the commercial world. The writer 
 ^knows of his own experience that one of the 
 cavalry generals prominently mentioned in con- 
 nection with the German right wing in the battle 
 of the Aisne is the owner of one of the largest 
 and oldest establishments, if not the oldest busi- 
 ness, in the city of Danzig. The brother of this 
 general was a farmer, and all his relatives on his 
 mother's side are in business. 
 
 There is not such a thing in Germany as a 
 military clique, out of sympathy with and op- 
 posed to the great masses of the people. Nor 
 could there be, because the future lay bright 
 before the Germans for just so long as they 
 could retain peace. Those who doubt this asser- 
 tion should ask themselves which European 
 nation had been the undoubted gainer during the 
 past forty years? In population Germany had 
 grown to be fifty per cent, larger than the United 
 Kingdom, and about seventy-five per cent, larger 
 than France. In commerce it had advanced 
 from almost the last place among the big nations 
 to the second place, easily outstripping France 
 and even forging ahead of the United States in 
 bulk of imports and exports, although the United 
 
126 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 States has a world monopoly in cotton. In rate 
 of progress Germany excelled the United King- 
 dom at the ratio of more than two to one, ac- 
 cording to the figures of the Journal of the Royal 
 Statistical Society (London, July, 19 14, pp. 788- 
 789), for the German rate of increase from 1888 
 to 19 1 2 was 204 per cent, while the rate of the 
 United Kingdom was only 100.7 P^'" cent. In 
 recent years Germany took three steps in advance 
 to every two taken by the United Kingdom. 
 Another twenty years of honorable peace, and 
 Germany would have stood in the first rank of 
 the European nations, provided the rate of prog- 
 ress of the past decade could have been main- 
 tained. 
 
 These figures, or at least their substance, were 
 well-known in Germany; and the intensity of 
 a hopeful outlook on the future was comparable 
 only to the richly pulsating life in the United 
 States. Germany and America were the two 
 countries of western civilization where interest 
 and pride in a constantly changing present and 
 the sure promise of an even richer future kept 
 the people from being hypnotized by past griev- 
 ances or imaginary wrongs. Great Britain rarely 
 forgot her sorrow at seeing her absolute control 
 of the markets of the world slip from her grasp, 
 while France, whose population stood still, could 
 not take her eyes from Strassburg and " re- 
 
MILITARISM 127 
 
 venge." " If one of our older generation," says 
 Paul Rohrbach, " who was in France in 1870 or 
 '71, revisits today the cities which he knew then, 
 he stands aghast before the fact that time seems 
 to have stood still there. The same houses and 
 streets and squares, the same city confines as fifty 
 years ago ! In Germany, where there is an enor- 
 mous increase of all large and fairly large cities, 
 where there is a rapid development of all com- 
 munications, and an extraordinary increase of 
 the fortunes of men, we can hardly imagine such 
 a state of affairs," 
 
 It is because the German people were so ex- 
 traordinarily successful in peace that they had 
 become forgetful, in the words of the much 
 quoted General von Bernhardi — although these 
 particular words are rarely quoted — forgetful 
 of their military abilities and had become too 
 peaceful for their own safety. It was not thus 
 in France, where thoughts of a war with Ger- 
 many made the hearts beat faster, and where, in 
 spite of all assurances of peaceful intentions, an 
 intense love of military prowess had survived. 
 These were the strong emotions which gave sta- 
 bility to a not overstrong government and which 
 consoled the country for the standstill to which 
 its own small family and not-more-than-two- 
 children average had condemned it 
 
 Russia, of course, is a far more military State 
 
128 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 than Germany, nor is it to be assumed that Ger- 
 many's defeat would quench the mihtary spirit 
 of the newer States such as Servia, Bulgaria and 
 Greece, not to mention Japan. 
 
 In so far, therefore, as the spirit of the people 
 is concerned, Germany is surely not the home of 
 militarism, especially not if militarism connotes 
 the desire of attacking other people. 
 
 Militarism, however, has another meaning in 
 the minds of people, for it may refer to the tre- 
 mendous risk which lurks in the mere existence 
 of a strong fighting machine. This risk, it is be- 
 lieved, is greatly increased when the constitution 
 of the country where it is found, places the arbi- 
 trary control over it in the hands of one man. 
 The German army, it is said, is the best army in 
 the world, and the German Emperor has absolute 
 control over it. He even has the right to declare 
 war, if " an attack on the frontiers or the coast 
 of the Empire has been made ", although under 
 all other circumstances he needs the consent of 
 the Federation. 
 
 It may readily be agreed that this is a defect 
 of the German constitution, and that nothing is 
 gained thereby. In the present war the Emperor 
 had not only the unanimous consent of the Coun- 
 cil of the Federation (the Bundesrat) but also 
 of the Reichstag. It is not generally known that 
 the Emperor took no steps, from the moment the 
 
MILITARISM 129 
 
 situation began to look critical, except in consul- 
 tation with the leaders of all the parties of the 
 Reichstag, and with the governments of all the 
 federated States. Nothing, therefore, would 
 have been altered, if the constitution had made 
 the declaration of war the duty of the elected 
 representatives of the German people instead of 
 entrusting it jointly to the Emperor and the 
 Council of the Federated States. The German 
 people, knowing William II, never doubted that 
 this would be his course, while strangers, who 
 knew only the wording of the constitution and 
 were less familiar with the character of the 
 Emperor and the temper of the German people, 
 are excusable if they assumed that the Emperor 
 acted with an arbitrariness for which the con- 
 stitution seemed to offer an excuse. 
 
 As a matter of fact, it is unbelievable to any 
 German that the Emperor, even if he were not 
 as peace-loving as William II is, would commit 
 them to a war against their wishes. This is as 
 unbelievable to them as it would be to Americans 
 that their president as commander-in-chief of the 
 army and navy should wilfully direct the move- 
 ments of the American forces so that war ensued 
 against the wishes of the people. 
 
 This disposes, to a certain extent, of the dan- 
 ger to the peace of the world lurking in the Ger- 
 man constitution, but it still leaves the oppor- 
 
130 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 tunity for claiming that Germany is the home of 
 militarism because she has the largest army in 
 the world in proportion to her size. 
 
 In this connection it is interesting to compare 
 the actual figures, and to see how much the sev- 
 eral big nations of the world have been in the 
 habit of paying for their " national defences." 
 The complete figures of all the countries for the 
 past two years are not yet available. They are 
 larger in every instance than the latest figures 
 given below. But since the actual increase in the 
 German figures is less than the increase in the 
 French and British, and especially the Russian 
 figures, the argument of the present investigation 
 will not be affected. To guard against any inac- 
 curacy, the German figures are given as they 
 were published in million marks, and to simplify 
 the comparison the other figures are reduced to 
 million marks. The approximate value of a 
 mark is almost twenty-four cents, or for rough 
 calculation one-fourth of a dollar. 
 
 1. Germany expended, — 
 
 1902 1911 
 
 For the Anny 670,000,000 marks 810,000,000 marks 
 
 For the Navy 205,000,000 " 450,000,000 " 
 
 Together 875,000,000 " 1,260,000,000 " 
 
 Figured per capita of the population this was 
 in 1902 ig marks and in 191 1 ip 1-5 marks. 
 
 2. The United Kingdom expended, — 
 
MILITARISM 131 
 
 1902 1911 
 
 For the Army 585,000,000 marks 547,000,000 marks 
 
 For the Navy 633,000,000 " 906,000,000 " 
 
 Together 1,218,000,000 " 1,453,000,000 " 
 
 Figured per capita of the population this was 
 in 1902 2^ marks and in 191 1 j^ marks, or about 
 60 per cent, more than Germany. 
 
 3. France expended, — 
 
 1902 1911 
 
 For the Army 584,000,000 marks 718,000,000 marks 
 
 For the Navy 243,000,000 " 333,000,000 " 
 
 Together 827,000,000 " 1,051,000,000 " 
 
 Figured per capita of the population this was 
 in 1902 21 marks, and in 191 1 26 1-2 marks, or 
 about 38 per cent, more than Germany. 
 
 4. The United States expended, — 
 
 1902 191 I 
 
 For the Army 511,000,000 marks 559,000,000 marks 
 
 For the Navy 349,000,000 " 535,000,000 " 
 
 Together 860,000,000 " 1,066,000,000 " 
 
 Figured per capita of the population this was 
 in 191 1 almost 12 marks, or only 62 1-2 per cent, 
 of the German expenditures. 
 
 5. Russia expended, — 
 
 1902 1911 
 
 For the Army 741,000,000 marks 1,048,000,000 marks 
 
 For the Navy 217,000,000 " 238,000.000 " 
 
 Together 958,000,000 " 1,286,000,000 " 
 
132 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 Figured per capita of the population this was 
 in 1902 about 7 marks and in 191 1 8 1-2 marks. 
 
 Of these five nations, therefore, the United 
 Kingdom spent most on her army and navy. 
 Russia came next, then follov^ed in this order, 
 Germany, the United States and France. Reck- 
 oned, however, per capita of the population, the 
 United Kingdom and France are far in advance 
 of Germany, while the United States and Russia 
 are at the bottom of the list. 
 
 But to read the true value of these statistics 
 one should also investigate the increase of wealth 
 per capita of the population, and then it will be 
 seen that the 19 1-5 marks per capita paid in Ger- 
 many in 191 1 weighed less heavily on the people 
 than the 15 marks in 1902, for their average 
 wealth had grown enormously. If on the other 
 hand the average wealth in Russia is considered, 
 the 8 1-2 marks per capita she paid in 191 1 is 
 much greater than the 19 1-5 marks paid by 
 Germany. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that also from the point 
 of actual expenditure Germany cannot be called 
 the exclusive home of militarism. This would 
 be even clearer if the most recent figures were 
 available, for, as was said above, France increased 
 within the last years the length of service of her 
 soldiers from two to three years and enlisted in 
 her army practically every young man who was 
 
MILITARISM 133 
 
 not too obviously incapacitated. This, it has 
 been claimed, was on her part a move to which 
 the size of the German army had compelled her. 
 But no flight of the imagination of even the most 
 anti-German observer has been able to detect on 
 the part of Germany any intention of attacking 
 France. If France had not v/ished to assist 
 Russia, or rather to fight Germany when the 
 latter was partly engaged by Russia, there need 
 not have been a French-German war. Germany 
 surely did not want anything of France, while 
 France had set her heart on Alsace-Lorraine. 
 
 The tremendous expenditures for the British 
 army will probably be a distinct surprise to the 
 Americans, many of whom have been thinking 
 only of the British navy. Whether they agree 
 with Germany or not they will appreciate the 
 humor of the situation as it appears to the Ger- 
 mans, who are told that the British are fighting 
 to put down militarism, when they are actually 
 paying sixty per cent, per capita more for their 
 armaments than Germany. 
 
 The humor of the situation even grows when 
 the British attitude is taken into consideration. 
 In a friendly discussion with an American of 
 English descent the author was told that the suc- 
 cess of the allies would result in universal dis- 
 armament by the establishment of an interna- 
 tional police. When he inquired how, in view of 
 
134 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 the general disarmament, the decrees of this 
 court would be enforced, he was told : " Oh, well, 
 the British navy will naturally form an important 
 part of this police." 
 
 From these various points of view, therefore, 
 Germany pleads " not guilty " to the charge of 
 being the home of militarism. But if we strip 
 militarism of its unpleasant connotations of ab- 
 solutism and vicious aggressiveness, and think of 
 it in its more literal meaning as having to do 
 with the militia, the citizen-army of a State, then 
 Germany is willing to acknowledge that she has 
 endeavored to build up the best citizen-army for 
 defence her conditions permitted. Of this she is 
 not ashamed, nor does she fear that America, the 
 home of men ready to die for freedom, will 
 blame her when everything is understood. 
 
 Many British writers and speakers are quoting 
 disconnected sentences from the book of a Ger- 
 man fire-eater to prove that the Germans as such 
 are like him. There are, however, similar books 
 presenting the bellicose intentions of the British 
 nation, notably one dedicated in 19 12 to Field- 
 Marshal Lord Roberts, and so far as the writer 
 knows, never repudiated either by him or any 
 other British soldier or statesman. The quota- 
 tions from this book, printed as Appendix B, 
 should convince the reader that no country has 
 a monopoly of fire-eaters, and that if militarism 
 
MILITARISM 135 
 
 is rampant in Germany because Bernhardi wished 
 to arouse his people to a danger which he saw 
 coming, it is thriving even more luxuriantly in 
 England, according to Homer Lea. 
 
 Both conclusions, however, are in error, for in 
 so far as Bernhardi preaches that " might is 
 right " he is a little German, as Homer Lea is 
 voicing the best British traditions when he calls 
 on Albion to gird her loins for " it is the first 
 duty of the British nation to arrest or destroy 
 German power." 
 
 People removed from the seat of the conflict 
 should not forget that one of the principles of 
 modern warfare is to attack the enemy every- 
 where, and not to confine oneself to slaughtering 
 his troops. It is considered fair to starve him, 
 to deprive him of his credit, and to assail his 
 reputation. The obliquity of this course appears 
 when it is seen that often untruths are the 
 weapons used to achieve this end. Even consci- 
 entious papers are unable to ascertain the relia- 
 bility of despatches. They therefore print, and 
 unwittingly help to disseminate erroneous infor- 
 mation. 
 
 On the foundation blocks of such reports a 
 structure has been reared into which the few 
 definitely known facts seem to fit with great 
 nicety. Germany, it has been claimed, is the 
 home of that detestable malady called militarism. 
 
136 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 A victory of the Allies will eradicate it from the 
 world. 
 
 It is impossible to answer all the arguments 
 which have been advanced by those who would 
 make this thesis acceptable in the eyes of Amer- 
 icans. Americans hate the evils of militarism 
 like no other people and have determined to 
 stamp it out from the world. There should be no 
 need for such huge armaments as the great pow- 
 ers have felt obliged to carry in recent years, and 
 while the notion that Germany was the chief 
 offender and had been staggering under her bur- 
 den, is incorrect, her friends are the first to wel- 
 come any means that would reduce the European 
 armaments, after this war, to more wholesome 
 proportions. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 German statesmen have often called England a 
 hypocrite, and themselves have been called un- 
 scrupulous believers in the pernicious doctrine 
 that might makes right. Both estimates are un- 
 just. An individual person may prefer to suffer 
 rather than to do or seem to do an unjust act, 
 but the men charged with the welfare of a 
 nation must make this welfare the main con- 
 sideration of their actions. While they will 
 shrink from taking an actually unjust 'step, they 
 may not feel justified in refraining from doing 
 what they think is right and necessary, merely 
 because it may appear to be wrong. To this ex- 
 tent Germans and Britons are alike. In their 
 way of explaining their actions, however, their 
 fundamental differences of character are seen. 
 
 The Briton feels obliged to advance some 
 kind of a moral reason for what he does, and 
 thereby shows that he believes morality should 
 rule the actions of nations as well as those of 
 
138 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 individuals. Sometimes the reason he advances 
 seems far-fetched to those who are famihar with 
 all the facts, but to those at a distance morality 
 seems to have won another victory. 
 
 The German shrinks from advancing a reason 
 which is not, in reality, the one that is controlling 
 his action. With a regard for morality as high 
 as that of the Briton, he refuses to make moral- 
 ity an excuse, and when the welfare of the nation 
 and dire necessity have forced him to do as he 
 did, he baldly states this fact, although his case 
 would be stronger in the court of public opinion, 
 if he had justified himself. 
 
 The German infringement of the neutrality of 
 Luxembourg and Belgium is a case in point. On 
 August 4, the German Chancellor announced ^ 
 to the Reichstag that by infringing the neutrality 
 Germany had broken the law of nations, but that 
 Germany was fighting for her existence against 
 several foes, and in self-defence had been forced 
 to take this step. This open confession, unem- 
 bellished by any excuses, is truly German. 
 
 Sometimes a prisoner pleads guilty because he 
 is too proud to take advantage of the safeguards 
 offered by the law, and then the humane judge 
 refuses to accept his plea, and assigns to the 
 accused a lawyer. Suppose that In this case the 
 court of public opinion should refuse to accept 
 
 iSee Appendix A: The Chancellor's speech. 
 
CONCLUSION 139 
 
 Germany's plea of guilty, and should insist upon 
 a defence. It could be based on several, notice- 
 ably three, lines of argument. 
 
 First, Belgium had shown such hostility 
 toward Germany and such warm friendship 
 toward France in recent years that Germany's 
 fear that Belgium would not remain neutral was 
 reasonable. An advance by France through Bel- 
 gium would have been fatal to Germany, for the 
 geographical aspect of the country is such that 
 she could not have defended herself here with 
 only half of her army, the other half being en- 
 gaged on her Eastern frontier. An initial suc- 
 cess by the French in that part of Germany 
 would have threatened her only big ports, 
 Bremen and Hamburg, and her naval base at 
 Kiel. Their destruction, however, would have 
 been fatal. The artillery at Liege was under the 
 instruction of French officers, and the fact that 
 these officers were not requested to leave, but 
 remained in the country after mobilization was 
 ordered in Germany and France, adds to the 
 justification of Germany's belief. The law 
 knows no favorites. If Germany was right in 
 believing that Belgium would not preserve her 
 neutrality, the law which forbade her from en- 
 tering Belgium would have worked an injustice. 
 Belgium was no longer entitled to immunity 
 from invasion. Germany is innocent; as wit- 
 
140 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 nesses, call the files of the Belgium press of the 
 past two years, and the French officers who re- 
 mained in Liege. 
 
 The second argument would run as follows: 
 Belgian neutrality rests on the treaty of 1839, 
 which was signed by Great Britain, France, Rus- 
 sia, Prussia, and Austria, in addition to Belgium 
 and Holland. This treaty was in the nature of 
 a contract, and as such enjoys all the validity 
 the law gives it. The law, however, does not 
 recognize the validity of a contract signed under 
 duress. Prussia and Austria were forced to sign 
 the treaty. As witnesses, call any creditable his- 
 tory describing the events of 1839. As further 
 witnesses, call the treaties made by Great Britain 
 and Prussia, and Great Britain and France on 
 August 9 and 11, 1870, guaranteeing the neutral- 
 ity of Belgium during the Franco-Prussian War. 
 H Great Britain had considered the neutrality 
 agreement of 1839 valid, why should she have 
 made another agreement in 1870? Or, if she 
 considered the earlier treaty valid, but doubted 
 the reliability of the signatories, how could the 
 signatures of these powers be said to be more 
 trustworthy because they were signed to a new 
 treaty? And why did the treaties of 1870 con- 
 tain the clause that they were to terminate with 
 the end of the war, after which the neutrality of 
 Belgium was to rest on whatever validity there 
 
CONCLUSION 141 
 
 was in the treaty of 1839? Finally, call as wit- 
 ness the speeches of Mr. Gladstone, who said in 
 1870, referring to the neutrality treaty of Bel- 
 gium, " I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine 
 of those who have held in this House what 
 plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple 
 fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding" 
 on every party to it, irrespective altogether of 
 the particular position in which it may find itself 
 at the time when the occasion for acting on the 
 guarantee arises." For all these reasons, the 
 contract of 1839 is invalid, and Germany is not 
 guilty. 
 
 The third line of argument would claim that 
 Germany was fighting for her very existence. It 
 is immaterial whether her own lack of precau- 
 tion had brought her to the pass where she had 
 to defend herself from three or more foes. 
 Her life was in danger. As witnesses call the 
 speeches of King George in proroguing Parlia- 
 ment, of Mr. Lloyd George, and of the openly 
 expressed intentions of France and Russia. The 
 law recognizes self-defence as a valid excuse. 
 Germany, therefore, is not guilty. 
 
 Suppose, now, that the judge of public opinion, 
 after listening to these arguments, turned to 
 Germany and she should repeat, as she probably 
 would, that she had felt obliged to act as she did, 
 and would leave it to him to decide whether she 
 
142 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 was guilty or not, would not the judge, before 
 passing sentence, call the witnesses demanded by 
 counsel, and if some could not be brought into 
 court for some time, would he not adjourn the 
 case to a later day ? And in the meanwhile, is it 
 not the rule in all civilized countries that the ac- 
 cused is considered innocent until he has been 
 proved guilty? Condemnation on ex parte evi- 
 dence is abhorrent to all justice-loving countries, 
 and to none perhaps more than to America. 
 
 Similar arguments may be made in defence of 
 many further accusations brought against Ger- 
 many. Some, however, appear today so well 
 substantiated that even unprejudiced people are 
 justified in forming an opinion. 
 
 Nothing probably has struck greater horror to 
 the hearts of peace-loving people than the drop- 
 ping of bombs from Zeppelins and other airships, 
 for the resulting loss of life seems so utterly un- 
 necessary, and especially pitiful if it hurts non- 
 combatants and even maims a little child. The 
 excuse that Germany did not sign the Hague 
 Conference, which forbade the dropping of 
 bombs from the air, cannot justify her. The 
 real facts in the case, however, are little known. 
 Take for instance the Zeppelin raids on Ant- 
 werp. 
 
 Antwerp is a well-fortified city with a com- 
 plicated machinery of defence, many forts, and 
 
CONCLUSION 143 
 
 connections between the forts themselves and the 
 city and the forts. There are also means of 
 placing a great part of the country outside the 
 city under water. The defence of a modern 
 fortress offers many technical problems, all of 
 which are worked out in detail beforehand. No 
 one man — or body of men — can carry the de- 
 tails in his head. If the plans are destroyed, a 
 vigorous defence of the city becomes impossible. 
 The same, of course, will be the case if the pow- 
 der magazines and the arsenals are destroyed. 
 An attack, therefore, from the air on the military 
 headquarters of a fortress, is like an attack on 
 the brain of an organism. If it is successful it 
 paralyzes the whole body. A Zeppelin raid on 
 Antwerp which should destroy the plans of a 
 working defence, or the supply of ammunition 
 and provisions, would save the attacking army 
 hundreds if not thousands of lives. From this 
 point of view, therefore, it is not at all wanton, 
 but actually humane. 
 
 But, it has been advanced, no bombardment 
 should be made without previously giving notice 
 of the intention to begin the bombardment, ac- 
 cording to the rules of the Hague Conference. 
 This is a mistake similar to many others made 
 by people who believe that the Hague Conference 
 laid down a complete set of laws. The Hague 
 Conference contains only those stipulations on 
 
144 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 which all the nations signing them could agree. 
 But it requested the several nations to issue com- 
 plete regulations to their troops for use in war. 
 In these the Hague paragraphs were to be incor- 
 porated. The British had no such regulations 
 until recently, while the French and German 
 regulations are not at hand. It may, however, 
 be even better to judge the conduct of the con- 
 testants, not by their individual interpretations 
 of the Hague agreements, but by the regulations 
 issued to the army of the United States. These 
 have been re-printed and issued, together with 
 the Texts of the Peace Conferences at The 
 Hague, by the International School of Peace, 
 Boston, 1908. 
 
 Paragraph 19 says : " But it is no infraction of 
 the common law of war to omit thus to inform 
 the enemy [of an intended bombardment]. Sur- 
 prise may be a necessity." 
 
 Paragraph 26 says : " The people and their 
 civil officers owe strict obedience to them [com- 
 manding generals of the invading army] as long 
 as they hold sway over the district or country, 
 at the peril of their lives." 
 
 Paragraph 27 in speaking of retaliations says : 
 " A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent 
 no other means of securing himself against the 
 repetition of barbarous outrage." 
 
 Paragraph 54 acknowledges the right to de- 
 
CONCLUSION 145 
 
 mand hostages, although they " are rare in the 
 present age." 
 
 Paragraph 82 has reference to the so-called 
 franc tireurs, and says that they " shall be treated 
 summarily as highway robbers or pirates." 
 
 All these things are utterly abhorrent to most 
 people, who consider them survivals of an earlier 
 time. So they are, but they are the rules by 
 which the awful game of war is played. Let us 
 condemn the game, or all that take part in it, 
 but let us not single out one of the participants, 
 as long as he keeps within the rules, and make 
 him the recipient of the indignation which be- 
 longs to the rules of war as such, especially not 
 when we know the disparity in the amount of 
 news which can reach us from the several armies. 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 THE chancellor's SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG, 
 AUGUST 5, 19 14 
 
 A TERRIBLE fate is breaking over Europe. Since 
 we won in war the respect of the world for our 
 German Empire we have hved in peace forty- 
 four years, and have guarded the peace of Eu- 
 rope. In peaceful labor we have grown strong 
 and mighty ; and people have envied us. In nervy 
 patience we have suffered hostilities to be fanned 
 in the east and the west, and fetters to be forged 
 against us. The wind was sown there, and now 
 we have the whirlwind. We wanted to go on 
 living and working in peace, and like a silent 
 vow, from the Emperor down to the youngest 
 recruit, this was the will: Our sword shall not 
 be drawn except in a just cause. Now the day 
 has come when we must draw it. Russia has put 
 the torch to our house. We have been forced 
 into a war with Russia and France. 
 
 Gentlemen, a number of papers penned in the 
 stress of hurrying events have been distributed to 
 
APPENDIX A 147 
 
 you.^ Let me single out the facts which charac- 
 terize our action. 
 
 From the first moment of the Austrian con- 
 flict we strove and labored that this conflict 
 might be confined to Austria-Hungary and Ser- 
 via. All the cabinets, notably the English cabi- 
 net, took the same ground, only Russia insisted 
 that she would have to say a word. This was 
 the beginning of the danger threatening Europe. 
 As soon as the first definite news of military- 
 preparations in Russia reached us, we declared 
 in St. Petersburg, kindly but firmly, that military 
 preparations against us would force us to take 
 similar steps, and that mobilization and war are 
 not far apart. Russia assured us in the most 
 friendly way that she was taking no measures 
 against us. England in the meanwhile was try- 
 ing to mediate between Austria and Servia, and 
 was receiving our hearty support. On July 28 
 the Emperor telegraphed to the Czar asking him 
 to consider that Austria had the right and the 
 duty to protect herself against the Greater- 
 Servian plots which threatened to undermine her 
 existence. The Emperor called the Czar's atten- 
 tion to their common monarchical interest 
 
 ^ These papers the New York Times printed as The German 
 White Paper," obviously a misnomer. While the Times deserves 
 thanks for having published this information, the comparison of 
 this hurried compilation with the well arranged British White 
 Paper has been unfavorable to the cause of Germany. 
 
148 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 against the crime of Serajevo, and asked the 
 Czar to help him personally to smooth away the 
 difficulties between Vienna and St. Petersburg. 
 At about the same time, and before he had re- 
 ceived this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor 
 to help him and to counsel moderation in Vienna. 
 The Emperor accepted the part of mediator, but 
 he has hardly begun to act, when Russia mobil- 
 izes all her troops against Austria-Hungary. 
 Austria-Hungary on the other hand had mobil- 
 ized only her army corps on the Servian frontier, 
 and two other corps in the north, but far re- 
 moved from Russia. The Emperor at once 
 points out to the Czar that the Russian mobiliza- 
 tion makes his mediation, undertaken at the 
 Czar's request, very difficult if not impossible. 
 We nevertheless continue our mediation even to 
 the extreme limit permitted by our alliance. 
 During this time Russia of her own accord re- 
 peats her assurance that she is taking no military 
 preparations against us. 
 
 Then there arrives the 31st of July. In 
 Vienna a decision is due. We have already suc- 
 ceeded so far that Vienna has renewed a personal 
 exchange of opinion with St. Petersburg, which 
 had stopped for some time, but even before a 
 decision is made in Vienna, we receive the news 
 that Russia is mobilizing her entire army — that 
 is, she is mobilizing also against us. The Rus- 
 
APPENDIX A 149 
 
 sian Government, which from our repeated repre- 
 sentations knows what a mobiHzation on our 
 frontier means, does not notify us, and gives us 
 no explanatory reply. Not until July 31st in the 
 afternoon a telegram is received from the Czar 
 in which he says that his army is taking no pro- 
 vocative attitude towards us. But — the Russian 
 mobilization on our frontier was vigorously be- 
 gun as early as during the night of July 30th. 
 While we are still trying to mediate in Vienna 
 at Russia's request, the whole Russian military 
 force rises on our long, almost open frontier; 
 and France, while she is not yet mobilizing, con- 
 fesses that she is making military preparations. 
 And we? We had intentionally refrained, up to 
 that moment, from calling a single reservist to 
 the colors — for the sake of the peace of Europe. 
 Should we now be waiting any longer, until the 
 powers between whom we are wedged in would 
 choose their own moment of attack? To expose 
 Germany to this danger would have been a 
 crime! For this reason we demanded at once, 
 on July 31st, that Russia demobilize, which ac- 
 tion alone could still have preserved the peace of 
 Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Pe- 
 tersburg was simultaneously instructed to declare 
 that we should have to consider ourselves at war 
 with Russia, if she declined. The Imperial Am- 
 bassador has followed his instructions. 
 
150 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 Even tcKiay we do not yet know Russia's reply 
 to our demand that she demobiHze. No tele- 
 graphic news has reached us, although the tele- 
 graph went on for a while communicating many 
 less important matters. So it came that when 
 the time limit was long past the Emperor was 
 obliged to mobilize our military forces at five 
 o'clock in the afternoon of August ist. At the 
 same time we had to ask for assurances as to the 
 attitude of France. She replied to our definite 
 inquiry whether she would be neutral in a 
 Russian-German war by saying that she would 
 do what her interests demanded. This was an 
 evasion of our question if not a negative reply. 
 The Emperor nevertheless ordered that the 
 French frontier be respected in its entirety. This 
 order has been rigorously obeyed with one single 
 exception. France, who mobilized at the same 
 hour that we did, declared that she would respect 
 a zone of ten kilometers on our frontier. And 
 what did really happen? Bomb throwing, flyers, 
 cavalry scouts, and companies invading Alsace- 
 Lorraine. Thus France attacked us before war 
 had been declared. 
 
 As regards the one exception I mentioned, I 
 have received this report from the General 
 Staff : " As regards the French complaints con- 
 cerning our transgressing her frontier, only one 
 
APPENDIX A 151 
 
 case is to be acknowledged. Contrary to definite 
 orders a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, led 
 it would seem by an officer, crossed the frontier 
 on August 2d. It appears that all were shot ex- 
 cept one man, who returned. But long before 
 this one act of crossing the frontier took place, 
 French flyers dropped bombs as far from France 
 as South Germany, and near the Schluchtpass 
 French troops made an attack on our frontier 
 guards. Thus far our troops have confined 
 themselves to the protection of our frontier." 
 This is the report of the General Staf¥. 
 
 We have been forced into a state of self-de- 
 fence, and the necessity of self-defence knows no 
 other law. Our troops have occupied Luxem- 
 burg, and have perhaps already been obliged to 
 enter Belgian territory. That is against the rules 
 of international law. It is true that the French 
 Government announced in Brussels that it would 
 respect Belgian neutrality as long as its oppo- 
 nents would do so. But we knew that France 
 was ready for an invasion of Belgium. France 
 could afford to wait. We could not wait. An 
 attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might 
 have been fatal. We were therefore obliged to 
 disregard the protest of the Luxemburg and Bel- 
 gian governments. For the wrong we have done 
 thereby we shall try to atone, as soon as our mill- 
 
152 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 tary end is obtained. People who like ourselves 
 are fighting for their lives and homes must think 
 of naught but how they may survive. 
 
 Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoul- 
 der with Austria-Hungary. As regards the atti- 
 tude of England, Sir Edward Grey's remarks 
 yesterday in the lower house of Parliament have 
 shown what her stand will be. We have assured 
 the English Government that we shall not attack 
 the north coast of France as long as England 
 remains neutral, and that we shall not infringe 
 the territorial integrity and independence of Bel- 
 gium. This assurance I here repeat before the 
 whole world ; and I may add, as long as England 
 remains neutral, we shall not even take any hos- 
 tile measures against the French merchant 
 marine, provided France will treat our merchant- 
 men in the same way. 
 
 Gentlemen, this was the course of events. 
 Germany enters this war with a clear conscience. 
 We are fighting to protect the fruits of our peace- 
 ful labor, and our heritage of the great past. 
 We are fighting for our future. The fifty years 
 are not yet past during which Moltke used to 
 say we should have to remain armed if we were 
 to protect our heritage and our achievements of 
 1870. 
 
 Now the supreme hour has come which will 
 
APPENDIX A 153 
 
 test our people. But it finds us ready and full 
 of confidence. Our army is in the field, our fleet 
 is well prepared, and back of them stands the 
 whole German people — The Whole German 
 People. 
 
APPENDIX Bi 
 
 QUOTATIONS FROM THE BRITISH " BERNHARDI " 
 
 The Day of the Saxon by Homer Lea, Harper 
 & Bros., London and New York, 1912. Dedi- 
 cated to Field Marshal Lord Roberts. 
 
 It is the first duty of the British nation to 
 arrest or destroy German power. (Page 204.) 
 
 The neutrality of a minor state, once it is in- 
 cluded in the theater of war waged between 
 greater nations, becomes an anomaly. (Page 
 
 2I3-) 
 
 Whenever it becomes apparent that one Euro- 
 pean state or racial coalition is seeking the over- 
 lordship of Europe ... it at once becomes im- 
 perative upon the British nation to destroy this 
 power and the means that make it possible. 
 (Page 214.) 
 
 The occupation [of a neutral country] . . . 
 arouses in the British nation the appearance of 
 great opposition to the violation of neutral ter- 
 ritory. This is false, for the Empire is not 
 moved by the sanctity of neutrality. It is only 
 a means of avoiding responsibility and shifting 
 * See also Chapters I and IX, 
 
APPENDIX B 155 
 
 it upon these nations, deluding themselves with 
 the belief that such declarations are inviolable; 
 whereas no nation has violated neutral territory 
 and denied their obligations more frequently 
 than the Saxon. (Page 226.) 
 
 National disintegration originates in peace. 
 (Page 233.) 
 
 If the Saxon race is to survive it can do so 
 only as a whole (i) through the military and 
 naval unification of the Empire; (2) the com- 
 plete separation of the military and naval system 
 from the civil government of the dominions and 
 colonies; (3) the introduction of universal and 
 compulsory military service among the Saxons 
 throughout the Empire; (4) all armies to be 
 organized on the basis of expeditionary forces; 
 (5) the size and distribution of the Imperial 
 armies to be determined by the size and distribu- 
 tion of its probable adversaries; (6) the mili- 
 tancy of the Saxon race, and the actual military 
 power of the Empire increased with every mili- 
 tary increment made by nations whose natural 
 lines of expansion are toward territories and 
 peoples now under British dominion; (7) the 
 military and political unity of the Empire must 
 progress toward greater centralization as the 
 population of its component parts is increased. 
 (Pages 239, 240.) 
 
 A confederacy i§ an old ignorance. It is a 
 
156 WHAT GERMANY WANTS 
 
 falsification of political independence, and has no 
 more a place in a modern state than have those 
 other blind errors nations have put away for- 
 ever. (Page 241.) 
 
 The brutality of all national development is 
 apparent, and we make no excuse for it. To 
 conceal it w^ould be a denial of fact; to glamour 
 it over, an apology to truth. There is little in 
 life that is not brutal except our ideal. As we 
 increase the aggregate of individuals and their 
 collective activities, we increase proportionately 
 their brutality. (Page 10.) 
 
 Only the immediate causes and manner of war, 
 those last straws that break down the peace of 
 nations, alter from age to age. In the past it 
 was the individual who was the predominant 
 factor, today, nations, tomorrow, races. (Page 
 
 There can be no further extension of British 
 Sovereignty without encroachment upon the po- 
 litical rights and territorial possessions of other 
 nations. (Page 23.) 
 
 It is very simple, this irrevocable law of war. 
 It is terrible in its simplicity. (Page 23.) 
 
 For a Saxon to deny war is to epitomize human 
 vanity. (Page 22.) 
 
 In the development of the Russian Empire 
 man has more nearly approached those character- 
 istics that mark the measured, unhurried growth 
 
APPENDIX B 157 
 
 of Nature. In its extension it has moved onward 
 with elemental propulsion. Like a glacier, its 
 movement is only apparent by periods of time. 
 So imperceptible is the terrible, imperturbable 
 grind of its way that we do not perceive its 
 progress until it has passed a given point. What 
 it does not crush it erodes. What it does not 
 erode it forces on in front until into some crev- 
 asse, great or small, it pushes the debris that 
 impedes its way. It moves on. (Page io6.) 
 
 There is a savage sublimity in this thought — 
 to use empires as stepping stones. (Page 146.) 
 / Wars have brought about the formation of this 
 Empire and wars will prolong or shorten its 
 existence. (Page 3.) 
 
 By wars and conquests, by theft and intrigue, 
 by the same brutal use of physical power, was it 
 [the British Empire] put together piece by piece. 
 (Page 10.) 
 
 The scorn of war, like the denial of death, 
 belongs to the same category of self-deception. 
 (Page 6.) 
 
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