Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/outlineofmentalsOOharr AN OUTLINE jS-1'W OF MENTAL SCIENCE BY NARNIE HARIRISON «/ \»/ \M xb T \\i AUSTIN BEN C. JONES & CO. PUBLISHERS AND PRINTERS 1898 Copyright 1895 BY Narnie Harrison f Tn the Tmrh^rs nf Tsxax, mhnsg sgmiratlTS \m. )mxi mt msptmttmi to all this Bnnk is i£tlirafed. PREFACE "Pat," I said, "I'm sorry you fished all day and caug-ht nothing-." "Oh, that's all rig-ht," Pat answered cheerfully, "I niver meant to!" CONTENTS CHAPa?ER PAGE I. Mind and Matter 1 II. Consciousness 5 III. Attention 9, IV. The Intellect . ■ 15 V. The Intellect — ■ Present ative Power 18 VI. The Intellect — Representative Power — Memory 22 VII. Intellect — Representative Power — Imagination 29 VIII. The Intellect — Reflective Power 34 IX. Apperception 38 X. The Intellect — Intuitive Power. 42 XI. The Intellect — ^Elaboration — Concepts ... 46 XII. The Intellect — Elaboration — Judgment ... 49 XIII. The Intellect — Elaboration — Reason .... 52 XIV. Recapitulation 56 XV. Suggested Review 60 XVI. Extracts from Various Authors 64 XVII. The Sensibility 67 XVIII. Egoistic Emotions ■ 70 XIX. Aesthetic Emotions 73 XX. Ethical Emotions, etc . . . , 77 XXI. Religious Emotions 82 XXII. Intellect and Emotion 84 XXIII. Recapitulation ' 89 XXIV. Questions for Review 94 XXV. Extracts from Writers 98 XXVI. The Will . 101 XXVII. The Will and the Intellect ......'.. 107 XXVIII. The Will and the Emotions 114 CONTENTS. CHAPTER PAGE XXIX, Cultivation of the Will and of the Sensibilities 118 XXX. Questions for Review 121 XXXI. Extracts from Various Authors 123 XXXII. Definitions 125 XXXIII. Contrasted Terms 129 XXXIV. The Unity of the Mind 135 XXXV. Mental Abuses 139 XXXVI. Mental Disorders 143 XXXVII. Questions for Review 148 XXXVIII. In the School-Room 150 AN OUTLINE OP MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER I. Mind and Mattee. A perpetual Why is on the lips of the Mneteenth Century. From the present trend of thought and the spirit of the times, the Why is scarcely answered before it repeats itself through a chain of rea- soning. At length the limit of logic and explanation is reached, and to the last Why in all chains of inquiry, comes the answer, "I know it is so because I feel it is so — in my Thought, my Soul, my Mind." Mere consciousness, then, is the end and the beginning of reason. All material proof, all investigation, all illustration have reality only as they obey the laws of Mind. It behooves us, then, to study this Mind which holds within itself the answers to all primal and final Whys in this age of reasoning. The science evolved from this study is called Mental Science. What is Mental Science? It is the systematized knowledge of the human mind. Mental Science is based on universal consciousness, and its laws are evolved from universal experience. The science is not a psychical construction, but a psychical reali- zation. To study it, is not to gain new mental possessions, but to recognize our native endowments. The pursuit of this study does not lead to discovery, but rather to \^ revelation. Its propositions are self-evident. U AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Its germ is intuition; its development, experience; its fruition, the identity of individual mentalities. Of what value is this knowledge? Is it of any value to know ourselves, and to recognize the kinship of humanity? How may we utilize this knowledge? In the best use of our mental faculties; in the avoidance of their abuse; in the recognition and correction of mental deficiencies; in an intelligent sympathy with all human effort. U<* Yet while this knowledge is thus valuable and useful, it is gained only by patient, thoughtful pursuit. The student beginning the study of Mental Science will feel the ly need of the material element involved in almost all other branches of study. Missing the testimony of the five senses, the science will at first -'see. but vague connect™. / • This vagueness, however, disappears if he be thoughtful enough to make his own experience the realization of its laws. Or the student of Mental Science will at first be confused by the *' fact that Mental Science can not be tested by Material Experiment. By careful reflection, he will realize that, on the existence of mind, depends the possibility of Material Experiment; th at the logi - cal deduction of truths therefrom depends on the Science of Mind; that laws of Mind arei:he'lE)ases and tests of all formulae conceripn^ Matter. Wliile the study of History, of Languages, of Mathematics, of all the Natural Sciences, involves more or less study of the physical world, either by way of investigation or proof, the study of mind proper must be confined to the psychical. For the student to un- derstand clearlv this difference between the study of Mental Science MIND AND MA TTER. and the other studies Just mentioned, is but to understand the dif- ference beteen the terms: Mind and Matter. "What is matter? Never mind. What is mind? No matter." This is true indeed. Yet as these two elements are the sum of existence, it is well to state the main points of difference. Matter is physical; Mind is psychical. Matter is unconscious, and its existence is perceptible to Mind alone. Mind is, of itself, its own conceiver. Matter occupies space; Mind is immeasurable. Matter is the objective creation of Infinite Power; Mind is the re- flection of Infinite Power. Matter is divisible; Mind is a unit. Matter is inert; Mind originates its own activity. ^w** Matter has qualities; Mind has faculties. ^ — Matter is the result of the action of physical forces, directed by Divinity; Mind is the expression of the spiritual force of Divinity. '— -^hat form of matter which is most closely connected with mind is the human body, thejervailt--Af ife^h^^ '~~ The brain is that part of the human body which is most respon- sive to Mind, and is considered the center of the mind's various bodily instruments. v The Mind is not in the brain, any more than it is in the wrist. To say that the brain is the seat of thought, is thoughtless. \«. MindM^s infinite, intangible, immeasurable, and can not dwell in the finite, be absorbed by texture, or confined in space. When the beautiful body, with its singing lips, and flashing eyes, and mant- ling color, falls into dust, the Mind lives on apart, untouched in all its faculties. When men bury the head of man, they do not bury the thoughts of man. AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Does the thought, then, escape from the cells of the brain? Is Mind, or thought, a gas, which passes out from the body and goes into the atmosphere? Mind never was in the body. Z— The body is the physical expression of the real man, bearing tes- timony to the physical senses of other men; the mind is the real man holding thought-communion with other minds. When the body is gone, what then? w-- The mind has merely no instrument by which it can communi- cate with physical men. It then holds its native spiritual com- munion with spiritual existences. Think you when one loses a finger, part of his manhood is gone? If a portion of his brain is removed, does a portion of his nature ooze out with it? Can Mind be cut in slices with a surgeon's knife? Surely a man ought to be excused for lack of reverence, if a horse kick it out of his head. U^ Immortality of the Mind or Soul is not proved by argument, but asserted by intuition. If we take an artist's brush from his fingers, do we take away his aestheticism? We may take away the Mind's material instrument, we can not take aw^y a part of the mind itself. I— If we can not divide this immortal Mind, we can at least study its powers and faculties, by the names they bear, learn their functions, the order of their action, and know that in so doing we are studying the reality and eternity of existence. pk CONS CIO US NESS. CHAPTER II. Consciousness. Consciousness is a fundamental power of the mind. All mental phenomena depend on consciousness. Consciousness is the mind's power of self -knowing. ««**' The mind's knowledge of its own existence is subjective con- sciousness. The mind's knowledge of its own states is objective conscious- ness. So general and necessary is consciousness in all mental activity that one writer calls the mind "a thread of consciousness." By consciousness the mind knows that it is; knows that it is perceiv- ing; knows that it is hoping; knows that it is knowing, etc. I use the progressive form of the verb, for consciousness of men- tal activity is exercised simultaneously with the activity. — Within the mind's mere consciousness of its own existence, is held, it seems to me, the sense of immortality. ^^ For the mind to be conscious of its own existence, is to be con- scious of the intangibility, immateriality of that existence. Then by intuition, the mind knows that a nature involving immaterial, intangible attributes, can not be destroyed by material, tangible forces. (An intuition is but the mind's consciousness of a universal judgment.) Then must the mind, if mortal, merely cease to exist. Of this, the mind can not conceive. For, the consciousness that the mind AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. can not be destroyed by material forces, compels the cause of its de- struction to be mental, or within itself. Can mind be self-destructive through the medium of self-exis- tence? Can the consciousness of the mind be met and destroyed by the non-consciousness of the mind? Can consciousness produce non- consciousness? The mind can not know that it is not. To know is to be. Then the only possible condition, by which the mind can lose entity is that of becoming part of a greater mind. Is this destruction? This is in no wise destruction. •^ It is, I think, the highest expression of immortality. So, these supposed possibilities are as absurd as the contradic- tions of an axiom. Hence, I have said that the immortality of the mind is an intui- tion held in the consciousness — which is the sum of all intuitions. This being subjective consciousness, let us now consider the form of consciousness, called objective consciousness. I am not conscious of an object. I am conscious of perceiving that object. I am not conscious of the faculty of memory; I am conscious of remembering and the consequent reproduction. I know that I have a faculty, memory; know it, not by conscious- ness, but by reason, which is, of course, dependent on consciousness. By consciousness I know that I know that I have the faculty of memory. It has been asked over and again: Is consciousness suspended during sleep? We "sleep, perchance to dream." CONS CIO US NESS. Dreams are states of the mind. We are conscious of our dreams. Hence^ objective consciousness must be active in any sleep which holds a dream. Yet we rise in the morning from a dreamless sleep, it may be. Having no changing states or perceptions, the form of conscious- ness called objective consciousness must have been suspended. "Was consciousness of the mind's mere existence exercised during sleep? If it were, we can not remember it as we can the dreams. Further on, when we discuss memory, we shall see that memory can not reproduce such a mental condition as consciousness .of exis- tence alone. Yet, by reason, we may say: The mind must exist during sleep. The mind is an indivisible unit. The consciousness is the mental element combining the mind's various faculties in a complete whole. Hence, the subject form, at least, can not be suspended during mind-existence. I wish now to speak of an existence of which we are fully con- scious; yet is this existence almost too subtle, too mystic, for the "touch of a word." Yet, surely, it has been known by the consciousness of all. We move through this sphere of existence, thinking, acting out the thoughts in such ways as conditions permit. Are we not, however, conscious of vague, dim thoughts lying un- derneath the real ones? Do we not, in the press of life, hear often faint mind-voices calling to us for our attention? Thought-ghosts, so to speak, pass swiftlj' in and out between the real thoughts. Our memory brings back things we have seen; but underlying these visisons are vague memories of what we know not. Our imagination creates vividly; but still we are conscious of blur- red, mystic images in the background of reality. Some writers call this state sub-consciousness. Some call it semi-consciousness. Yet AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. it seems to me that the terms "sub" and "semi" apply rather to the state known b}'' the objective consciousness than to the conscious- ness itself. I should say, we are fully conscious of a sub-existence. What then? Are there two of us in this life, Robert Louis Steven- son? Or, do we pass from sphere to sphere in stages of transition, and is this dim shadow-self the ghost of a mind which is the me- dium between the was and the is? Or, is it dim prophecy which stands between the is and the to be? However that may be, well we know that this existence is "semi," not in number of faculties, but in distinctness, and, for every men- tal faculty that we have — subjective consciousness knows a ghost, a shadow, a whisper — what you will — all lightly held in a faint unity by a subtle repetition of itself. A TTENTION. CHAPTEE III. Attention". Attention is that power by which the mind can direct and change its own activity. Attention^ as well as consciousness, is necessary to all mental activity. Attention, as well as consciousness, may be either subjective or objective. Subjective attention directs the mind to the consideration of that which is mental; objective attention directs the mind to the consid- eration of that which is material. I hear the words of a sermon by the power of objective attention; I consider the thoughts of a sermon by the power of subjective attention. When the immediate cause of the exercise of attention is within us, we call the exercise of attention, purposed attention. When the immedate cause of the exercise of attention is without us, we call the exercise of attention, attracted attention. The wish to learn geology causes me to observe that stone. The mind is so directed by purposed, objective attention. I hear the song of a bird. This causes me to observe the bird. The mind is so directed by attracted, objective attention. The sight of a printed page causes me to study its thoughts. The mind is so directed by attracted, subjective attention. Wishing to read, I seek a book and consider its thoughts. The mind is so directed by purposed, subjective attention. 10 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Concentration is the prolonged exercise of attention in one direc- V/ tion. Concentration is necessary to the mastery of every subject, the thorough observation of every object. When exercised in spite of obstacles, it is a kind of intellectual patience, intellectual courage. Concentration is the door to knowledge, the gateway of the beau- tiful in art. By it alone, can we rightly use the brilliant birth-gifts of genius. "Poets are born,'' but poets are not born great. A marble epic may be chiseled out in a swift inspiration, but if it be marked by some one quality which makes it supreme among its fellows, the creator must have concentrated his thought for years in one direction. The execution may have been sudden; the thought back of it was not. Many complain that attention directs and changes the activity of their minds in such a way that they are powerless to thoroughly in- vestigate anything. "I try, but can not fix my mind on any sub- ject," is the complaint. Of course, exercise increases the power of concentration. Per- sistent eifort at fixedness of thought will finally bring an easy habitual concentration. Yet, I believe it is the lack of a strong, hearty purpose, rather than the unsteadiness of attention, which causes the mind to skim and dip from subject to subject. If you desire above all else to master Greek, will not attention be very ready to prolong the mind in that direction? Do you wish, above all else in the world, to observe that tree? Will attention let your gaze wander from it, in spite of yourself? If Evangeline had found Gabriel, do you think she would have had any trouble in fixing her eyes upon his face, instead of upon the reeds alona: the river-shore? V A TTENTION. H A man desires above all things to escape from a burning building. Yet, in the excitement attention does not fix his thought on any one means of escape, and he is burned. Even in this case, the result was caused by a lack of singleness of purpose. In the confusion, his thought was turned so rapidly from the window to the door, to the stair, that he did not utilize any. Two conditions would have helped him. If he had wished to escape through the door, and the door alone, attention woud have there held his mind's activity long enough to induce the necessary physical activity. Or, a man of habitual concentration might have fared better, even in such distraction. Yet, a ready attention is as valuable as a steady attention. What readiness is in attention, flexibility is in matter. This readiness of attention changes promptly the activity of the mind to suit the need of the moment. The quick, prompt action of attention need not be injured by the habit of concentration, nor concentration destroyed by attention's promptness to change the direction of the mind's activity. The concentration which holds the mind's activity in the chosen channel, with the promptness to change the direction — when an- other channel is chosen — this is the true, perfect exercise of the power of attention. Mercury, accustomed to hear the messages of the gods, and trans- fer them swiftly to mortals, is no mean foe for Hercules. I now come to consider a question asked by many teachers : "How may I hold my pupils' attention during class-work?" By "holding the attention," I suppose is meant commanding it to desired exer- cise. Let us consider first how to control the obective attention^ directing the thought to the map, globe, chart, picture, etc. Every one is familiar with mLcthods invented for this purpose. 12 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. These various methods are made up of the same elements, viz.: the use of familiar illustrations, the use of language which the stu- dent can understand, the use of frequent questions, the care to make the work individual, etc. The methods of controlling the exercise of the pupil's subjective attention to thoughts advanced by the teacher are so similar to the above, no further discussion is needed. Yet the method is not all. We have all seen two teachers, equally well informed, with equally good methods, adapted to the subject and the class. Yet in the class-work of one the attention of the students does not waver; in ihe other it does. The difference must be in the personalities of the two teachers. What then? The more earnest teacher is the more successful. A teacher may be faithful without being earnest. Pip played, as he should have done, just as Miss Havisham told him; but was his lieart in his play? A good method without earnestness will gain more attentive pupils than earnestness without a good method, but both together, ;as the gamin said of the span, "My, ain't them great horses! A fel- low would git to Heaven with them." Yet some may say that besides having a good method, and being in earnest, a teacher must have a fine natural power for attracting and holding the attention of others. This fine gift is called mag- netism. Magnetism is much discussed nowadays. I have thought it merely one effect of love or sympathy. How can love or sym- pathy help a teacher to attract and hold the attention of his stu- dents? It will, during the recitation, frequently cause his mind's activity to go out to the personality of those about him. Now and then during the explanation or illustration, his thoughts will turn for one swift second to the freshness of the natures about him; he will feel their childish anxiety; again he will wonder with them. ATTENTION. 13 fret with them, be glad with the little children. So the stronger, over-reaching mind of the teacher draws unto itself the minds of his pupils. By the old-fashioned bond of sympathy or the new- fashioned bond of magnetism, the minds of the students are re- peatedly drawn to the teacher for command. A sound method gives wise commands. However, when the teacher is inactive and silent, and the student thinking for himself — this is, indeed, the best recitation. It is a fine work for the teacher to induce the pupils to so cultivate their power of attention that they, themselves, will for themselves con- centrate their thoughts in the observation of any object, the con- sideration of any subject presented them. Let me make a prac- tical suggestion. Teacher (to primary class) : "Now, I will give you one minute to- look at this box. We will then see who can tell us the most about it." (Attention will not wander then. No time — only one minute.) Teacher (to primary history class): "Let us see who of you can write the most names of revolutionary soldiers, while I count twenty." (No time for thought to wander. The boy next is so quick.) Teacher (to rhetoric class): "I will assign to you, John, a sub- ject. You must talk on that subject two minutes." John is given the subject, "The United States Navy," and at once must begin to talk. Another pupil is assigned "Architecture;" another, "Grover Cleveland;" another, "Fishing," it may be, etc., throughout the class, requiring a ready response as soon as the subject is an- nounced. (No chance to turn the thoughts to one's self; no chance to heed the smiles and nudges of class-mates; no chance to "give up" after 14 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. taking a minute's thought. Three minutes must be filled with talk. The occasion calls for a steady attention. Th'3 variety of subjects calls for a ready attention.) Of course there will be fail- ures, but a week's practice works wonders. Such exercises as will cause the students to exercise subjective attention, without the aid of the teacher, helps to make men and women, who are attentive to duty in confusion, logical in surprise of argument, self-possessed in sudden danger. THE INTELLECT. 15 CHAPTER IV. The Intellect. Consciousness and Attention, you remember, must both be exer- cised in every mental act. So, also, must Conception. Conscious- ness, Attention, and Conception are called the three general Mind Powers. Hold this group of three in your mind, for Conception must be discussed further on, when we shall have explained certain terms involved therein. Let us now contrast these steps in the study of Mind with cer- tain steps in the study of Matter. Probably this will make clearer the terms we have just used and their relations to each other. In studying the world we live in, we notice three main elements which support every form of material existence. These are : Earth, Air, Water. In studying the Mind which is ours, we note three general powers, on which depend all forms of mental activity. These are: Consciousness, Attention, Conception. In studying the world we live in, we notice that all material ex- istence is divided into three great kingdoms. These are: Animals, Vegetables, Minerals. In studying the Mind which is ours, we should know that all forms of mental activity are three great divisions. These are: Intellect, Sensibility, Will. Now, suppose we were to select the Animal Kingdom, and notice at least four of the forms of life contained in it — Insects, Birds, Beasts, Men. Will that help you to understand that out of the three great divisions of Mental Powers we select the Intellect, and find four classes of Powers contained in it — Presentative Power, Eepresenta- tive Power, Eefiective Power, Intuitive Power? 16 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. The Intellect is the Mind's Power of Knowing. The Presenta- tive Power gives ns knowledge of Matter, through the five senses. The Eepresentative Power gives us images of absent objects. The Eeflective Power gives us knowledge of material and mental relations. The Intuitive Power enables us to realize all primary, universal truths. Any action of any of these four Intellectual Powers is called Intelligence. The action of the Presentative Power is also called Presentation. The action of the Eepresentative Power is also called Eepresen- tation. The action of the Eeflective Power is also called Eeflection. The action of the Intuitive Power is also called Intuition. Need I remind you that the Animal Kingdom (with its divisions of Insects, Birds, Beasts, Men, etc.,) and the Vegetable, and the Mineral, together with the three sustaining elements — Earth, Air, and Water — make up the world we live in? Does this illustrate the fact that the Intellect (with its divisions. Presentation, Eepresentation, Eeflection, Intuition), and the Sen- sibility and the Will, together with the three sustaining powers — Consciousness, Attention, and Conception — make up the Mind which is ours? The student must not think that the definitions given above are fixed beyond all change in using. The terms are just as flexible tc the occasion as are other words in the English language. For instance, the word "walk" may be used in different ways, viz.: "The plank walk is muddy;" "Your walk has done you good:" "Walk to the gate." Yet in defining it, one gives its most frequent usage, and com- mon sense bends the definition into desired shape, without losing its native force. THE INTELLECT. Yl So, I remind you, I have defined these terms according to their customary nse. While I have defined Presentation as the action of the Presentative Power, it may also he applied to the power itself, also to the form of knowledge produced by the exerciseof that power. Presentation is usually considered as a mental act; but it may also name a special Mental Power, also a special Mental Impression. So, of the other Powers of the Intellect. Don't put language into stocks, and there need be no confusion. Would you insist that a polygon must always be a figure with a great number of sides? 18 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER V. The Intellect — Presentative Power. The knowledge received by the action of the Presentative Power is called Perception. Perception is the knowledge of the material world gained by the action of the Presentative Power. The Pre- sentative Power has five mental agents, five sub-powers, called Fac- ulties. These Faculties have each a nerve of the human body as its physical agent. We speak of these Five Faculties as the Five Senses. Let us again define Perception. Perception is the knowledge of the material world gained through the Five Senses. The general term. Perception, includes the particular term, Per- cept. A Percept is the knowledge of the quality of an object, gained from sense-contact with that quality. A Percept is received through a single sense. A Percept is the direct effect of a Sensation. A Sensation is a nerve-afi'ection known in the Consciousness. The nerves of the human body are affected by the various quali- ties of matter. These nerve-affections produce five distinct classes of Sensations, These Sensations produce five distinct classes of Percepts — five classes of presented mental impressions. The Sensations exist only during the nerve-affection. The Per- cepts remain after the nerve^affections cease. The five classes of Percepts are: THE INTELLECT— PRESENTATIVE POWER. 19 Visual-Percepts, produced by the Sensation of Sight, of which the optic nerve is the physical agent; Sound-Percepts, produced by the Sensation of Hearing, of which the auditory nerve is the phys- ical agent; Odor-Percepts, produced by the Sensation of Smell, of which the olfactory nerve is the physical agent; Savor-Percepts, produced by the Sensation of Taste, of which the nerves of Taste are the physical agents; Touch-Percepts, produced by the Sensa- tion of Feeling, of which the surface nerves of the human body are the physical agents. Yet the clearness and number of Percepts vary greatly with the observer. Two men, with good eyes, see a tree. One sees — a tree; the other notes the waving boughs, the notched leaves, the gnarled roots holding the pools of yesterday's rain. Now why this difference? Why does one see more than the other? You have all heard of the fine poet-senses that catch the sublest fragrance in the woods and hear the sound of growing things. If this be true, it is not that the poet has a more sensitive ear or keener olfactory nerves, but the earnestness in the soul of him and the delicacy of the soul of him give a closer attention and quicker response to those qualities lost to the common herd of men. Is this earnestness and delicacy a cause or an effect? That is only another way of asking: Is delicacy of Perception natural or acquired? This is only another way of asking: Is close observation natural or cultivated? Sometimes natural — it should always be cultivated. Kindergarten teachers cultivate it in their beautiful object lessons with little children, and it should not stop here. A rhetoric teacher should have her students describe their Per- cepts or Sensations received by the qualities of some object, while it is before them, and the students will be surprised at their ac- quaintance with hitherto unnoticed details. 20 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. A rhetoric class was once taken to a wood and told to write, while there, a connected description of all the sounds they heard. From the whir of a bird's wing to a distant rifle-shot, they heard and wrote. Never again will they hear with such careless ears the music of the woods. Such exercises cultivate the habit of careful observation, or may induce it. They learned to listen well by listening well. The rules of correct observation of nature, of course, hold good in observation of Art. If the combination of our Percepts constitute our knowledge of that perceived — will we not carry away with us the larger, more correct knowledge, the more closely and carefully we observe? Yet one may ask how we may use this intricate knowledge gained from observation of minutiae. To-day we all ask of every physical and material possession — ^how shall I use it? A good descriptive writer is he who makes his described scene seem a real one, and a realistic description is one which tells the delicate details of structure, and these details must have been noted by the writer. An artist sees the minute beauties of a forest; he puts the minute beauties in his picture, and from the canvas we get the Percept of shade or coolness that the real forest gives. A close observer is a good letter writer, for it is the light touches on a letter which warm it into a talk. A woman who has kept her eyes open to the blending of colors in the tapestry of Nature will not employ some one to buy the carpets or curtains for her house. A good art-critic is worth as much to the world as a good artist. You are a good art-critic if you can tell why a work of art is good; if you can name the delicate touches, the minute details which make it faithful to Nature's loveliness; or if you are keen-sighted ( THE INTELLECT— PRESENTATIVE POWER. 21 enough, to see the sly touches which violate Nature to give a garish impression. I might go on forever, and never name all the practical uses of careful observation, which gives a broad, exact Perception. Teachers, cultivate this habit of close observation in your pupils. The kindergarten teacher, the teacher of rhetoric, of geometry, of botany, of physics, of reading, of drawing, have ample opportunity for cultivating the Perceptive Faculties. Call attention to the details of construction that careless childish eyes will overlook, and the beautiful exercise will grow into a habit. Not only the sense of sight can thus be cultivated. Can I forget the old gardener who used to take me by the hand and lead me through his old-time flower garden? He lacked for words, did this old gardener, and so he used to say: "Stop here, child, and listen how the pinks smell, and the peonies, and the violets — there now, there's some Easter lilies — I know they are there, though they are hidin' behind the snowball bush. There! didn't you get a whiff of jasmine? And there's a rose, as sure as the world." So I learned to listen as the old man said; and to-day, if I were blind, I hope I could count the footsteps of the spring. The wonderful skill of cultivated senses is seen in our asylums for the deaf, the dumb, the blind. The world will never grow tired of quoting Laura Bridgman, who, in her still, thick night, felt the five points of her stars and smiled. When teachers have caused the careful exercise of Sense-Facul- ties, they can not do better than require a description or reproduc- tion which is faithful in minute detail. This deepens the Percepts, and they are there for future use, so that in some lonely hour we may bring them back by Memory. 22 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTEE VI. The Intellect — Represextative Power — Memory. Did we not say that the Representative Power gives ns thought- images of absent objects? The two mental processes of forming these images are Reproduc- tion and Construction. Reproduction is the mental process of forming — without the aid of sense-contact — past Percepts or Concrete Ideas. Construction is the mental process of creating images from re- membered Percepts or remembered Ideas. Yoii have not forgotten that the Presentative Power of the mind acts through five faculties. The Representative Power of the mind acts through only two faculties — Memory and Imagination. Re- production is exclusively the action of Memory. Construction is exclusively the action of Imagination. Remember, that whether we consider Reproduction — the action of Memory; or Construction — the action of Imagination — each is the activity of the Representative Power of the mind; and the Rep- resentative Power of the mind is that Power through which the Intellect receives thought-images of absent objects; and the Intel- lect is the mind's power of knowing. x^ow, are we ready to consider Memory the subject proper of this chapter? Memory is that faculty by which the mind, without the aid of sense-contact, reproduces the Images of past experience. Various A\Titers ascribe various functions to Memorv. THE INTELLECT— MEMORY. 23 One eminent writer makes Memory the faculty of Ketention. Eecollection, Eeproduction, and Eecognition. I consider Retention as a characteristic of the human mind and a condition necessary to the possible action of Memory, hut not an element of Memory's action. I consider the mental impression (which Memory reproduces) as a Cognition. The Eeproduction of a Cognition is of necessity Ee-Cognition. Hence I deem the use of both terms tautology. Likewise of Eecollection, for a Eeproduction of an Idea is a Eeproduction of a collection of Percepts — ^which is itself a Ee- Collection. Thus I would justify my definition of Memory. Memory re- produces Percepts and Ideas alone, and Percepts and Ideas are Cognitions of nerve-affections. Do we remember only that which we receive through the five Senses, or Sense-Faculties? We do. We remember the sights and sounds that made us sad or glad. We do not remember the sorrow or the joy. In remembering the sights and sounds, the emotion may return as an effect of the Memory, but not as an element of Memory itself. We say that we remember a day, but we remember the events of the day. We say, we remember the love we once had for a friend. A sentiment returned is as much a reality as the original senti- ment. It is no "counterfeit presentment," but renewed existence. Do we remember anger? We remember the significant action which caused the anger. The anger returns as an effect, but no special sentiment or passion or emotion is reproduced except as an eft'ect of the memory of its material cause. 24 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Memories may cause emotions; emotions are not remembered. No faculty is so strengthened by exercise as that of Memory. That Memory which is spoken of as a wonderful gift, is often but the achievement of patience. A lady making nursery rhymes to amuse the children composed couplets, and recited them without writing. Gradually the couplets were increased to stanzas. By six months' practice in repeating from the first with each added line of com- position, she was able to compose two or three hundred lines, and repeat without inditing them. Yet it was necessary, in the original production, for her to speak the words aloud — so that her memory of the lines was merely a Eeproduction of Sound-Percepts instead of Visual Percepts. A single stanza composed, not written or spoken aloud, and yet re- membered, is but the Memory of a Visual Percept, for in the com- position the thoughts were represented in the author's mind by words previously perceived and hence remembered. Close observation or concentration of Attention is a condition necessarily previous to the exercise of correct Memory. One writer gives as a rule for Memory: "Take an interest in that you wish to remember." To "take an interest" is hardly a voluntary mental act, but the effect of training or the involuntary bent of the mind. It seems to me better to say: "We remember that in which we are inter- ested." A pupil in my class gives as her excuse for poor lessons that she has not the Memory of her gifted cousin. Yet this complainer can remember every gown her desk-mate wore last year, the trimmings of last season's hats — feats of Memory of which her "gifted" cousin (who remembers her history and mathematics) is quite incapable. THE INTELLECT— MEMORY. 25 Ah! we attend to that in which we are interested, and attention is the offspring of interest, and Memory is dependent on Atten- tion. If Memory would be clear we must have a clear Percept, a distinct image and idea. How can we hope for a distinct repro- duction of indistinctness? The law of Association is an assistance to Memory. When a child I wished to learn the date 1001, which represented the year when a small party of people first touched the shores of Labrador. To my childish mind the figure "one" at each end of the date represented a slim man with a staff; the two noughts in the middle were two women wrapped in furs (now-adays it would never do to let a nought represent a woman). Yet from this asso- ciation of numerical figures with figures more familiar, I was always able to reproduce that little group of four figures on the coast of Labrador. So in remembering countless dates, and people's names. Amnesia, or loss of Memory, is induced by excessive use of nerve stimulants and by the diffuse reading of light literature. Either practice causes an excitation of the faculty of Imagination. Here construction commingles with Eeproduction, and hence we have a confused Memory which fails to have its distinctive action realized. Isolation from people, books, exciting scenes, etc., may restore the faculty. An overworked Memory is evinced by a refusal to reproduce ideas previously well remembered. Only by turning the attention from such subjects as involve an exercise of Memory will that faculty be restored to its normal con- dition. A secluded place with few sights and sounds to attract the atten- tion will rest an overworked Memory. 26 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. All know how the aged remember events of long ago, forgetting those of recent date. The old man tells you how deep the snow lay thirty years ago this night, and still he forgets yesterday's rain. He remembers the little maiden who laughed with him sixty years ago, and forgets his great-grandchild who sat on his knee this morning. This is easily explained. The Attention — the direct base of Memory — is turned to the past so that his mind fails to receive the impression of passing events. He naturally feels more interest in those fair old days than in these of which he says: "I have no pleasure in them." The expressions: "He is quick to learn, but forgets easily;" "He is slow to learn, but when he once learns, he never forgets," are worthy of remark. The idea seems to be that the readiness to learn is the cause of the forgetting, and the slowness in learning must precede a reliable memory's activity. What we consider learned quickly is often but imperfectly learned. Memory is faithful in reproducing exactly what was half learned. Memory does not half reproduce what was wholly learned. If we learn thoroughly — no matter how quickly — Memory will furnish a thorough reproduction. On the other hand, slow- ness in learning often means a habit of such concentration, that a complete mental reproduction l)y Memory gives evidence of a pre- vious faithful exercise of x\ttention. A mental impression, received with difficulty, does not insure a faithful exercise of memory; but a mental impression received with accuracy does. A mental impression once received is never effaced. Retention is an ever-abiding condition. Keproduction may be temporarily suspended, but a return of strength brings back the images which THE INTELLECT- MEMOR Y. 27 may have been concealed, but are never effaced. Various causes may bring them out, after a long suspension of recollection, or re- production. Scenes and events which we have never met before, often wear a familiar aspect, and we can not tell why. Some say they are the return of experiences in that part of our eternal life which is past. I can not discuss this here, yet this I know: When I reached the city of Edinboro for the first time, it seemed to me that I was back at home at last, after much wandering. I see a woman's face which I know I have never seen before in this life; yet it wears an old- acquaintance look; and some scientists tell us that these experi- ences are but the meeting with conditions which cause the exercise of that faint undertone of Memory — which undertone of Memory is one of the Faculties of the strange sub-self that every man ac- knowledges and no man imderstands. Teachers can do much for their pupils in the cultivation of this faculty. Assign them every day something to learn exactly, and gradually increase the amount, remembering that: 1. Gradual increase of exercise strengthens Memory. 3. Associate that which you wish to remember with some more familiar object. 3. Teach them concentration by requiring exclusive Attention to one thing at a time. This can only be gained by practice. 4. Careful observation and concentration of Attention effect a complete and careful Memory. 5. Avoid diffuse reading of light literature. Though Memory is by no means our highest faculty, yet she is an ever ready handmaid, bearing in her hands the thought food called Percepts and Ideas. 28 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Remember that the improvement or abuse of memory does not effect Eetention. This is the condition absolutely necessary to Memory's correct or incorrect activity, but exercise increases the readiness of Eecollection, the exactness of Eeproduction, the cer- tainty of Eecognition. THE INTELLECT— IMA GIN A TION. 29 CHAPTER VII. Intellect — Eepeeseisttative Power — Imagination. The Imagination is that faculty by which the mind constructs ideals. The elements of these ideals are the percepts and ideas re- produced by Memory. The construction by Imagination consists of combining these percepts or ideas into images and scenes unknown in previous ex- perience. Never having seen the ocean we may imagine it. This imagining, however, pictures the ocean with only those colors previously per- ceived, and ascribes to it a form either previously perceived, or constructed of previously perceived lines and angles. Imagine a creature with the head of a woman and the body of a bird. I have never seen such a creature, but the head and the body is each but the reproduction of a Percept. The combination of the two and their relation to each other are imaginary. So the ideals of Imagination contain no elemental quality which is not a Percept. Let us note the exact difference between Imagination and Mem- ory. Memory reproduces previous images or percepts. Imagina- tion combines these percepts or images into ideal constructions or relations. Imagination is called the creative faculty of the mind. It is constructive, not creative. The elements of its construction are furnished by Memory. We can not imagine a sound or color we have never heard or seen. We can imagine a combination of sounds and colors we have never seen or heard. 30 AN our LINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. A vivid Imagination constructs ideals of as much comjDleteness and detail as perceived objects. K fertile or exuberant Imagination constructs ideals of more and more varied qualities than are possessed b}' a similar natural object. The word "Imagination" is frequently misused. We hear the expression, "I imagine he will come." "We can believe or hope that he will come; we can imagine the scene of his coming, the welcome, as expressed, etc.; but we can not imagine a fact. We can not imagine a noble character. Our reason can select such trnits of character as are noble; Imagination can construct scenes or actions, in which this nobility of character expresses itself. You will understand, when I sa}'' that we can imagine only that which is material, if you will remember that Imagination, as an act, is image-making, picture-forming; the constituent parts of these im- ages or pictures are furnished by Memory; Memory is dependent on Presentation; Presentation is the action of the five sense faculties; the five sense faculties are exercised only by contact with the quali- ties of matter. The ideals constructed by a sound, wholsesome Imagination are" perfect. How shall we get a standard for this perfection? By cor- rect observation of nature. All art (which is the expression of an artist's ideal, either created or imitated), materializes Memories or Imaginings. A nation's art show=5 that nation's spirit. Those nations whose attention has been turned to flocks and herds, have found the standards for their ideals in the open fields. Hence, their works of art have been pure and true. Those nations whose attentions have been directed to cunning contrivances, in- tended to deceive, show to the world distorted figures in wood and THE INTELLECT— IMA GIN A TION. 31 stone; figures with slit ears, six-fingered hands, twisted limbs — the expression of a vitiated imagination. False Perceptions are steps toward immorality. Sometimes the mind is diseased in such way that Eepresentation is Judged to be Presentation. We call such sick fancies delusions. Delusions are not false images, they are false judgments. Phantasy is that imaginative action which creates grotesque, un- natural ideals. Dreams are the action of Imagination during sleep. They de- note unsound sleep, which causes the confused action of half-awake faculties. Delirium is that distorted mental condition whic(h ac- cepts Construction as Eeproduction, or commingles the action of Memory and Imagination. Teachers all realize that in some students the faculty of Imagina- tion needs restraint; in others, cultivation. These dreamers — they are delicate and dangerous charges. They must be awakened to the practical realities of life. They must be taught, that in studying the history lesson, it is far more important to think out the causes and effects of the war than to picture the battle-field. The artist teacher should be able to guide Imagination without hurt to it. Again, there are those students whose imaginations are sluggish. These are to be aroused to consider, not so much the laws of mathe- matics as the application of mathematics, and to be led to consider the significance of history, rather than historical events. It is a favorite method with teachers to curb the imaginative mind by emphasizing the student's work in mathematics, in sciences and in those branches which ret^uire exactness and experiment. On the other hand, the student whose imagination is defective is directed more to what things might be, or might have been, or will be, than to what was and is. 32 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Yet the faculty of imagination, held in abeyance, and properly used, is pleasure giving and elevating. Construction of an ideal should cause us to try to raise the real to the level of that ideal. A false exercise of the imagination makes the beautiful commonplace, and the commonplace beautiful. The power of creating beautiful images is a recompense for the barren- ness of surroundings, and the images are useful as well as beautiful if they induce the beautifying of those same barren surroundings. The exquisite touches in a house had better be the expression of unwritten poetry, than the expression of a full purse; and is not the attempt to materialize an ideal better than the sterotyped material which expresses no individuality? Imagination is the soul of art — Memory is its body. The sculptor dreams his ideal group; but in the marble expres- sion of that dream, his Memory of relations and proportions is his guide. An artist saw a woman in a wheat field and painted the scene from memory. Another artist created a picture of a young girl, standing in the half-open spring-time, with morning in the sky. The first was an imitator, the last a creator. The studies of literature proper and of rhetoric afford opportuni- ty for adaptation in instruction to both the over-active and sluggish imagination. The assignment of individual work in both cases may be of such character as will strengthen the feebler faculties. Yet I repeat, while it is a teacher's business to induce such mental exercises as will strengthen deficiencies, it is a delicate and dan- gerous work to tamper with the natural bent of the mind. All people were not meant to be alike. Imagination strongly effects morality. For the thought to dwell on pictures of crime, is, in a certain sense, to become familiar with crime. This familiarity lessens its hideousness. It even produces an interest in it. This interest becomes a curiosity as to its causes 777^ INTELLECT— IMA GIN A TION. 33. and. effects. This curiosity may grow to satisfy itself with obserya- tion of actual crime. The opportunity for this observation lack- ing personal experiment is suggested, hence we find the criminal a gradual development of a vicious Imagination. For the thought to dwell on the good and the beautiful is to in- duce gradually actions producing them. In some instances the natural inclination of the Invagination is to construct the beautiful, in others the hideous; but in many minds this inclination is cultivated by surroundings — companions, literature. The effect on Imagination is the key to the value of aesthetics, the degrading power of ugliness and coarseness, the influence of good and bad literature. Hence, all hail to the pictures and flow- ers in the school-room, the studies of nature, the books written by the wise and good. 3 — M. 34 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER VIII. The Intellect — Eeflective Power. You have not forgotten that Presentation is of five varieties, as the Presentative Power may have complete action through any one of the five sense-faculties. You have not forgotten that Eepresentation is of two varieties, as the representative power may have complete action either through Memory or through Imagination. I wish you to contrast, then, the above two powers with the third power of the Intellect — the Eeflective Power, which we are now to consider. The Refiective Power does not act through special mental facul- ties. It has no peculiar mental instruments for various phases of complete reflection. The exercise of no one faculty produces Reflection. The com- plete act of Reflection, however, is composed of four several mental acts. These four mental acts are distinct; but it is their sum, the addi- tion of the four, which makes the one complete action, called Re- flection. These four separate acts comprised in Reflection are : abstraction, analysis, synthesis, identification. Reflection is the mind's con- sideration of its own acts. How does the mind consider its own acts? To answer this question is, of course, to define the four separate acts comprised in reflection. When the mind would consider men- tal acts, thought must, of course, be withdrawn from material THE INTELLECT— REFLECTIVE POWER. 35 things. This withdrawal of thought from material things is the first act comprised in Reflection, and this first act is called Abstrac- tion. * Abstraction is the withdrawal of thought-attention from con- sideration of material things. Of course the thoughts are with- drawn from material things, that the mind may look in upon itself. Or, to put it more pretentiously, the motiTe of abstraction is Introspection. When the thoughts have been withdrawn from material things, then the mind, of course, proceeds to examine its own acts, and this examination is the second act comprised in Reflection, and this second act is called Analysis. Analysis is the separation of a mental act into its various ele- ments. You know what it means for a chemist to analyze a iluid, do you not? The chemist's analysis corresponds to a mental analysis of a mental phenomenon. After the mind has discerned the various elements in a mental act, it of course re-unites the thought-elements into the act under consideration; and this re-uniting of thought-elements is the third act comprised in reflection, and this third act is called synthesis. Synthesis is the re-combining of thought-elements into the men- tal act separated into these elements. Now when the mind has thus examined one of its own acts, the mind must realize that the act, so examined, is its own; and this realization is the fourth and last step comprised in Reflection, and this fourth step is called identification. Identification is the mind's recognition of its own phenomena. Now, is the Reflective Power, or the act of Reflection, plain to you? 36 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. To forget tlie things about us, in order to dwell upon our own thoughts; to find every single thought which enters into a mental action; to combine those single thoughts into the whole act which held them; to know and claim this act as our very own — this, in homely phrase, is called Eeflection. When we speak of double Eeflection or Reflective Comparison, we mean that mental activity which compares two mental phe- nomena and discerns their points of similarity or difi^erence. The word reflection is often too loosely used. We do not reflect upon the past. We remember the past; and we may reflect upon the action of the faculty of memory. Eeflection is not synonymous with reasoning, though it frequently precedes the exercise of reason. You will note that the definition here given makes Eeflection the mind^s consideration of its own acts. Is it correct to say, we refieet upon another's thoughts? It is, if we make the other's thoughts our own; but be careful that you do not confuse the act of reflecting upon another's thoughts, with the act of reasoning for or against the judgments asserted by another. Teachers should encourage reflection in their pupils. ISTo habit is more elevating morally; more strengthening mentally. A great fault with young students is a kind of mental slovenliness, which expresses itself in over-ready answers to the teacher's questions, hasty solutions to problems, etc. Now, according to definition of Eeflection, these hasty conclusions do not involve a lack of Ee- flection; but such mental hastiness may be cured by reflecting upon the mental action leading to said conclusions. To illustrate: A teacher conducts a recitation in history, has a pictorial history chart, and chances to ask, "Why was Cranmer burned at the stake?" The student's attention chances to be shifted back and forth from the subject considered to the object THE INTELLECT— REFLECTIVE POWER. 37 adorning the corner of the chart, which object is a rosary twisted about a cross. So, frora lack of concentration — not lack of reflection — the pupil answers absently: "Cranmer was burned because he was a Cath- olic." This statement being corrected, the clever teacher might request the pupil to reflect upon his own mental act that he may discern why he answered incorrectely, when he knew better. Then follows abstraction from the chart, analysis, synthesis, and identification. Eeason tells him that his attention shifted back and forth be- tween Cranmer and the picture of the rosary; that Eeflection was momentarily in conflict with Perception, and hence the foolish answer, which in common parlance is called absent-mindedness. Then the teacher leads the pupil to reflect and make the sentiment of those times his own. Silence is then in the class, and the stu- dent, in abstraction from the chart, reflects until he realizes that Cranmer was burned, not so much because he was a Protesiant^ but because Mary Avas a Catholic, and because she loved Philip all in vain. Thus Eeflection feeds reason, and Eeason conquers that childish habit — jumping to conclusions. 38 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER IX. Apperception. Apperception is the mental activity of assimilating knowledge by means of the interaction of new ideas with ideas previously re- ceived. Perception necessarily precedes apperception. It is necessarily involved in it, as apperception is but the result of the combination of two separate acts of perception, or classes of percepts. Perception recognizes physical phenomena; apperception realizes the psychic significance of these phenomena. The difference between perception and. apperception causes the difference between the emotions produced in various individuals by the same phenomenon. A child perceives a thunder-storm, and his perception consists of the sensation of sound and color, as given by thunder and lightning. The emotion induced is likely one of terror. A man perceives the storm. He takes these percepts of sound and color, and sets them over against, as it were, other percepts of kindred significance, as the tossing branches of forest trees and the piled up waves of the sea. Be the man a poet, he realizes unto himself a knowledge of the power and majesty of nature. Hence, the emotion is one of tranquil joy in the scene before him. Be he a scientist, he deduces certain laws formulating the activity of nature's forces. Perhaps here he has an emotion of pleasure that it is said scientists feel in observing the never-varying harmony of nature's laws. APPERCEPTION. 39 In either case the man apperceives the thunder-storm, and I may say here that the sense-impressions involved in this apperception are more numerous, complete, or in more delicate detail, than the simple percepts of the terror-stricken child. The child perceives the action of the storm; the man apperceives the action, in its significance, either from, an aesthetic or scientific standpoint. When apperception follows perception readily and immediately, we are likely to ascribe to the object of perception that which is the product of our own minds, thus making perception and apper- ception identical. Such an exercise of apperception is called Passive Apperception. Passive Apperception then may be defined as that activity of apperception which takes place without our conscious intent or ex- ercise of the will. A botanist looks at a flower and apperceives it at a glance to be- long to a certain class. This may be called Passive Apperception, and is characteristic of cultured thinkers. Let us contrast this with what is called Active Apperception. Active Apj)erception is preceded by a mental effort to assign the new percept to its proper relation toward old ones, which effort con- sists of varied thoughts and ideas which supplant each other in suc- cession. Active Apperception is accompanied by a state of mental dis- satisfaction, a desire to understand this new percept. This accom- plished, we become conscious of a change in our mental possessions. We are conscious of a gain or loss in our preconceived ideas. This consciousness some scientists call assimilation, and whether assimilation is the effect of apperception or an element of apper- ception, is a matter of opinion. 40 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. I should call assimilation the effect of apperception, but this effect is coincident with its activity. The perception which enters the consciousness, and induces the awakening of other percepts, is called the Object of Apperception. Among the awakened percepts, that percept which is most em- phatic, or distinct, is called the Subject of Apperception. We now come to consider the various phases of mental activity employed in the act of Apperception. First, we have an external or internal Perception. This Perception receives a mental response — to use a figurative expression, one might take the word salute. The Will then clauses various preconceived ideas to awaken, all of which bear some rela- tion tc the new perception. The relation between these various ideas and the new perception is emphasized by Comparison, From this Comparison new combinations of ideas are formed, until finally the new perception is assimilated or adjusted in its relation to the old ideas, and what was Perception becomes Apperception. Willman calls this "the perfected apprehension of an idea by means of other reproduced ideas." As has been said, apperception is a mental habit, characteristic of the thoughtful and cultured. Having in it the elements of re- flection and introspection, those who look inly apperceive where the so-called thoughtless perceive. Apperception brings the realization of the ethical value of a sim- ple act; the thought-impulse back of a work of art; the idea under- l5dng the familiar sights in nature; the soul-activity expressed in the various sounds given by nature's lower creatures, as bird, and the beast and insect; realizes the place in the great general plan of nature held by a single phenomenon; brings the world of mat- ter in touch with the world of mind, mingles the new with the old, compares and combines them, evolving a mental product which APPERCEPTION. 41 presents perception strengthened^ raised, adjusted, into its own psychical significance. It is said by some that apperception sharpens the sense-faculties. It does so only . indirectly. Those who desire to see the mean- ing of things and acts, ohserve things and acts more clearly, and in greater detail; the motive of observation being wider, observation is more complete, and, therefore, the eye is trained to note the deli- cate gradations of form, motion, or color, therefore becomes skillful in so doing, but the direct exercise of apperception does not in- volve directly the keener exercise of any sense faculty. We may glance at an object in nature carelessly, and just as we perceive it, we may apperceive it; but when habitual apperception becomes the motive of observation, observation becomes Interest, and interest dwells upon and lingers with, until all details are per- ceived. The sum of all apperceptions expresses the relation between the world of mind and matter, and the relation of various individual minds, to the great over-reaching, all-comprising, infinite, over-soul. 42 ^-V OUTLIXE OF MEXTAL SCIEXCE. CHAPTER X. The Ixtellect — IxiriTivE Povtee. The Inniitive Power is the power by which the mind realizes those truths necessary to all mental experience. If mental experience he impossible without this realized truth, or knowledge, such knowledge must precede all mental experience. If it precede mental experience, it must be native or innate. Hence, Intuition is the mind's innate knowledge. If this knowledge be diyided into separate forms, these forms may be called intuitions. Intuitions are the first truths realized by the mind. Xo matter how varied seem these intuitions, they can be divided into four classes alone. These are: Intuitions of Space: Intuitions of Being: Intuitions of Cause; Intuitions of Time. Intuitions of Space are the knowledge that there is a distance between objects; that each object occupies space: that if the space be removed the objects will meet. Intuitions of Being are the knowledge of the Ego and the Xon- Ego. or the knowledge: '1 exist, and things which are not I, exist;** that the Ego and Xon-Ego sustain relations to each other. Intuitions of Cause are the knowledge that each event has a cause. Intuitions of Time are the knowledge of the succession of events, of the past, present and future division of time; that these divisions are not separate, but continuous. THE INTELLECT— INTUITIVE POWER. 43 ISTow, the fact that these are the native knowledge of human minds can be plainly seen, by watching every infant that ever lived to show its wants. The several intuitions of time, space, being and cause can all be seen as plainly as the day, if we analyze some sim- ple act of the young child, such as the half -lifting of its hand to its mother. It has been said by some that mankind has intuitions and in- stincts, while brutes have instincts alone. As for myself, I shall not presume to say how near the intellect of brutes is to the intellect of men. Looking into the eyes of a dog or of a horse, we often see that ex- pression which we are pleased to call the look of humanity, while in the eyes of human beings we see what we call a look of brutish stupidity. I dare not say how near together I think the brute intelligence and human intelligence come, especially if we take the lowest type of man, and the highest type of brute. However, instinct must be defined; as it is, no doubt, a pos- session of both brutes and men. Instinct is that innate force which impels to such action as will gratify desires. Observation has shown us that this is the only apparent sig- nificance of brute instinct. Yet psychologists ascribe to human instinct certain elements which can not be defined here, so will be later on, when the nec- essary terms have been scientifically discussed. The intuitions discussed are capable of much expansion, yet their utmost expansion contains but a variety of terms expressing the same idea. For example, the intuition that past, present and future time blend continuously, may be so expanded that the think- er will be compelled to realize the falseness of the saying, 'Vhen 44 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. time stops and eternity begins," and the trnth that eternity has always been and alwa3^s will be, that we are in eternity now. Yet in this thought is but an expansion of time. Or if we expand the -intuition of cause, the mind informed of history will see a direct connection of cause and effect between Abraham's and Sarah's departure from Ur, the city of Chaldea, and the sailing of the Puritans away from England's coast. Yet this realized connection is but an intuition of cause. These four classes of intuitions above enumerated are at the base of all departments of education. If teachers will but lead their pupils to exercise expansion of these intuitions as the primary step in the acquirement of knowledge, much active intelligence would supplant the passiveness of students who are carried along on the mind of the teacher, so to speak. As Intuition must precede all mental experience, it may seem more reasonable to have first discussed Intuition in the explanation of the intellectual powers. I have reserved it for the last, as I wished to discuss intellectual activity from its end to its beginning (which has been done), and then from beginning to end, which I shall proceed very briefly to do in some sentences of recapitulation. First, the primary truth of being, or of cause or of time or of space, must be realized, as the beginning of intellectual activity. This done, the Intellect proceeds to acquire knowledge through its five sense faculties. This knowledge, gained, may be represented through Memory or Imagination. Then the Intellect obtains the knowledge of the various mental phenomena through Eeflection. We have discussed these four intellectual powers, PresBntative, Representative, Reflective and Intuitive, separately, yet how nearly they are related. Indeed, the relations existing between these in- THE INTELLECT— INTUITIVE POWER. 45 tellectual jDowers are illustrated by those existing between the sev- eral parts of the simple English sentence. First, on the significance of the words in the sentence depends their combination into the expression of a thought. So on Intuition rests the combined perfection of the other powers. We speak individually of the subject of a sentence, but why is it the subject, except for its relation to the verb? So the Presentative Power does not hold within itself its entire significance, but it is relative. Then there is the predicate of the sentence, complete in its en- tity, yet so called on account of its relation to the subject. We noted how the Eepresentative Power drew from the knowl- edge of presentation, psychical material for its action, and was so related to it. The object of the sentence is an individual part, yet it is acted upon by and related to the verb. So the Eeflective Power depends on previous mental phenomena for its action. Again, as two or more simple sentences may be combined into one sentence, so we may combine the various forms of knowledge received. The sentences so combined form as effects compound and com- plex sentences. The effect of the combined forms of knowledge are expressed in the terms judgment, reason, concept. These three terms we shall now proceed to consider. I hope you have not forgotten that this intellectual activity, with all other mental activity, depends on the mind's Consciousness, and the fact that the mind may exercise its Intellect to the exclusion of other powers, depends on Attention, and that we have yet to con- sider the mind's general power. Conception. 46 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER XI. The Intellect — Elaboration" — Coxcepts. Elaboration, or elaborative knowledge, may be called complex knowledge. Complex knowledge is such knowledge as is obtained by a double or complex action of the intellect. The first form of Elaboration which we are to consider is Con- ception, or the power of forming concepts. Do you remember the mention made in our second chapter of the three general mind-powers — Consciousness, Attention, Con- ception? Have you forgotten that we discussed Consciousness and Atten- tion — but Conception — well, Dick's mother was to give him, yes- terday, three kinds of medicine, one very soon after the other. Wlien he had taken two doses, Dick looked up mournfully and said: "Mamma, hadn't you better leave that other kind over until to-morrow, so these two can have room to take effect?" Now, I did not leave over this general mind-power, Conception, that Consciousness and Attention might have room to take effect. There were, however, certain terms I had to use in discuss- ing Conception that had to grow familiar to you by degrees. That is the reason, you remember, that I have put off this subject until noW'. Conception is that power by which the mind forms class-ideas. A Conception is the mind's idea of a special class. Percepts formed by perception are necessary steps to Concepts formed by the power of Conception. Look at that bit of life in a tree.' You THE INTELLECT— ELAB OR A TION— CONCEPTS. 47 perceive its several qualities, which, act, you know, gives several per- cepts. When all its qualities have been perceived, your mind has an image or presented idea. Let us name this presented idea — let us call it a wren, if you please. Some winter day you perceive a spot of fluttering crimson on the snow, and chance to know it is a rohin; you lift your eyes to the cage in your window where you see a canary, a bit of imprisoned sunshine; and, out there in the yard stands a peafowl with its necklace of emeralds and rubies and a million rainbows trembling in its feathers. You realize that you have a number of presented ideas which have many qualities in common. These presented ideas must be kin, must belong to the same family. Here Conception combines these ideas into a class, separating them from other objects. The class needs a general name which will apply alike to robin and wren, canary and peafowl. This name chances to be bird, or fowl — either will do. Then you have an idea of what a bird is. This class idea is called a Concept. A true Concept of the bird class must have only such qualities as are common to all birds. So a Concept must be purely abstract. If you shut your eyes and picture a bird, giving it special color, or size, it is either the memory of a presented idea, or an imagination constructed of remembered elements. A true Concept contains no individual qualities — is composed of qualities common to the individuals forming the class — therefore is an abstract idea. A maximum Concept is a concept extended to the utmost limit. A subordinate Concept is included in a similar Concept. Bird, child, bear, man, are all subordinate Concepts included in the maximum Concept — animal. A minimum Concept is the Concept of a single part of an individual whole. 48 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Beak is a minimum Concept of a single part of the individual bird, which is a subordinate Concept included in the maximum Concept, animal. False Concepts are the effect of an imperfect education or limited observation. The Indian, out of sight of the habitation of white men, forms his Concept of a dwelling from the crazy wigwams about him. The unlettered man who has never been beyond his native vil- lage, fancies that the class of buildings named churches must have just such a spire, and altar and aisle as that in which he has dozed on Sunday for forty years. Intersecting Concepts are those Concepts which have some quali- ties in common. Saints, women, are Intersecting Concepts, but I shall not dare to say they are identical. In primary work, teachers should be careful lest the object les- sons give the children Concepts which are too narrow, thereby causing them to name the species, the genus. The object before the pupils may lack many of the qualities found in the various individuals of its class, and the pupils must be told how children of the same family have given names peculiar to the individuals included in the family, and individual features distingushing them, family likenesses combining them. Teaching pupils to form broad, true Concepts instead of false, narrow ones, is the first step in a broad-guaged education. Later we see this broad-guaged education belonging to a man who in- cludes in his Concept, gentleman, not only the accepted gentility, but him with his leather apron on, the horse's hoof on his knee — and bad grammar, and an honest, kindly heart. Finally, the man who has been taught from the very first how extended minimum Concepts may become, sees brotherhood in humanity, and does reverence to every earnest creed. THE INTELLECT- ELABORATION— JUDGMENT. 49 CHAPTEE XII. The Intellect — ELABOEATioisr — Judgment. Judgment is that faculty by which the mind asserts its own de- cisions. Each decision is termed a judgment. A single Judgment, or decision, as well as the sum of all judg- ments, bears the general name — Elaboration, or Elaborative Knowl- edge. Judgment, it will be remembered, is only one of the three forms of elaboration. Some may confuse double reflection with Judgment. Double reflection compares two mental actions. Judgment as- serts their similarity or their difference. Judgment is somewhat similar to Conception. Conception recognizes the completion or beginning of a mental act, the combination forming a class; and judgment asserts the en- tity of the individuals, and of the combinations. A proposition is the expression of a judgment. Every proposition has three terms — subject, predicate, copula. The subject is that of which an assertion is made. The predicate asserts. The copula states the relation between the subject and predicate.. These three elements, however, are not always expressed by thrfee separate words, but the three ideas exist. Judgments are of various kinds: 1. An analytical judgment separates the subject into its parts. Example — A square has four sides. 4 — M. s. 50 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 2. A synthetic judgment asserts a relation between a class and a characteristic of a larger class. Example — All planets attract other bodies. 3. A problematical judgment asserts an individual opinion. Ex- ample — Tennyson is a charming poet. 4. An assertive judgment exjDresses an individual conviction. Ex- ample — God loves sinners. 5. A categorical judgment is an unconditional assertion. Ex- ample — Man is mortal. 6. A conditional judgment is an assertion qualified by a condi- tion. Example — If he be truthful, he is brave. 7. A universal judgment is an assertion of all the objects of one class. Example — All men are liars. (I hope not.) 8. A particular judgment is an assertion of part of a class. Ex- ample — Some men are liars. 9. An affirmative judgment affirms the relation between subject and predicate. Example — Men are wicked. 10. A negative judgment denies the relation between the subject and predicate. Example — Men are not wise. 11. An extensive judgment is the assertion of the partial extent of a quality. Example — Evergreens are the live-oak, cedar and pine. 12. A comprehensive judgment is the assertion of a quality as belonging to an entire class. Example — All Africans are black. Of course one judgment may combine two or more of these varie- ties. *nie varieties named are merely such characteristics, if said judg- ments are viewed from certain standpoints. The standpoints from which we consign the judgments to above classes are: (1) Origin. (2) Certainty. (3) Form. (4) Quantity. (5) Quality. (6) Inclusion. THE INTELLECT— ELABORA TION—JUD GHENT. 51 The Judgment, "Some men are not insane/' is particular, if ■viewed from tlie standpoint of qnantity, is negative if viewed from the standj)oint of quality, unconditional, if viewed from the stand- point of certainty. Judgment is considered as somewhat opposite to Imagination, but in reality a series of judgments — or a series of decisions as to the relations of ideas is necessary to the correct im- agination. Often the soundness of Judgment is confounded with quickness of Intuition. Those intuitive truths constitutional to the human intellect are by some writers classed as demonstrative judgments. I, however, do not wish to so name them, as I then lose the term expressing combination of elaborative with constitutive knowledge. Hence, I prefer to name them intuitive judgments. The cultivation of Judgment means the cultivation of independ- ence of thought and of mental self-reliance. K careful teacher is sometimes at a loss how to encourage inde- pendence, and at the same time avoid that egotism which takes a ready root in young minds. ISTo rule can be laid down except the exercise of judgment. The exact sciences which cut off anything like speculation should be the proper medium through which stu- dents may cultivate judgment. To elicit from a student an original pro]30sition is to strengthen the student in his judgment, for the half -formed unexpressed judg- ments serve to weaken the power of discrimination and discern- ment. 52 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTEE XIII. The Intellect — Elaboration — Eeason. Eeason is that faculty by which the mind so connects judgments as to effect a conclusion. The activity of reason is called reasoning. The two processes of reasoning are termed Induction and Deduc- tion. Induction is that ^^rocess of reasoning by which a universal truth is inferred from the observation of particular facts. Deduction is that process of reasoning by which particular facts are inferred from a general truth. The conditions auxiliary to Induction are Observation^ Experi- ment, Hj^pothesis. By Observation we note phenomena; in Experiment we effect a combination of phenomena or test the effect of certain conditions applied to phenomena. Here we formulate a Hypothesis, which is a theory, explaining all the facts of the phenomena observed, or those effected by experi- ment. The formulation of a hypothesis is sometimes called construc- tion by scientific imagination. jSTow comes the verification of this hypothesis. This is Induction proper. Every series of induction or inductive judgments is based on two primary judgments. 1. Every event has a cause. 3. The same causes will always produce the same results. A logical statement of Deduction is called a syllogism. THE INTELLECT— ELABORATION— REASON. 53 A syllogism contains three terms — the major term, the minor term, the middle term. A syllogism contains three propositions, which are designated as follows: The major premise, the minor premise, the conclusion. The following is a correct syllogism: 1. All animals breathe. 2. The horse is an animal. 3. Therefore the horse breathes. In this syllogism, the term "breathes" is the major term. The major term is always the predicate of the conclusion. The term 'liorse" is the minor term. The minor term is always the subject of the conclusion. The term "animal" is the middle term. The middle term is al- ways the medium of comparison. In every syllogism the leading proposition is called the major premise, the second is the minor premise, the last the conclusion. In every correct syllogism the major premise expresses the re- lation between the major term and the middle term. The minor premise expresses the relation between the minor term and the middle term. As a necessary consequence of these two re- lations, the conclusion expresses the relation between the major term and the minor term. This conclusion is but a form of the axiom: "Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other." Let us study another syllogism, whose minor premise is not quite so self-evident. 1. All despots are t3rrannical. 2. Alexander the G-reat is a despot. 3. Therefore Alexander the G-reat was tyrannical. The major premise should be universally accepted truth, requir- ing no proof; for, in exact proportion to its certainty is the cer- tainty of the conclusion. 54 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. If we begin with the statement: "All despots are strong- minded/' the base of argument is open to contradiction; hence, nothing certain can be builded on this doubtful base. The major premise should be stated affirmatively. In the syllogism, all men are not wise. Therefore — ^but here we find that John may be one of the many foolish. Again, the major premise must include the minor. In the syllo- gism, some men are wise. John is a man. Therefore — but John may not be one of the "some men" who are not wise; or, All flowers grow. The child grows. Therefore — but is the child a flower? It is a difficult thing for young students to form syllogisms which fulfill the necessary logical conditions. !N"o mental process is more subtly deceiving to an untutored mind. Yet, in these cases, where a syllogism is formed with errors so delicate as to make it seemingly correct, the teacher should replace the terms used with more familiar terms, retaining the form of the syllogism, and thus emphasizing the absurdity. The only safeguard is to give such work in class recitations, im- pressing upon them the necessity of at first constructing syllogisms, not from independence of thought, but for carefulness to fiulfiU conditions named above. After repeated practice, the reasoning fac- ulty will become strengthened to such skill that the propositions composing a logical syllogism will suggest themselves with th.e readiness of intuitive truths. The minor premise calls for the information to be derived from investigation. This is to be corroborated by signiflcant facts, data, statistics, illustrations. In truth, all the individual thought of the writer or speaker is expressed on this minor premise. THE INTELLECT— ELAB OR A TION— REASON. 55 In logical argument, the choice of what universal truth you will select as your major premise, necessarily included in it, will be such that your presented information can sustain. In the syllogism — 1. All despots are cruel. 2. Napoleon was a despot. 3. Therefore JSTapoleon was cruel. I choose my major premise because the minor premise will then he such a proposition as I know I can clearly verify by facts I have at hand. Did I wish to prove that Napoleon was cruel, and I had strong facts to show he approved of bloodshed, but not proof that he was a despot, I should choose rather for my major premise, "All approv- ers of bloodshed are cruel." The conclusion is, of course, but a necessary inference from the foregoing propositions. Frequent exercise in forming correct syllogisms is a most valuable mind-training. 56 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTEE Xiy. Eecapitulatiox. I wish now to give a review of the activity of the Intellect's vari- ous faculties. I choose a very simple act involving them. A year-old child holds a bright ball, which pleases him. The next day he can not find it, cries for it, but can not tell his mother what he wants. The mother offers him his rubber doll, Jingles his little bell, taps on the window, and points to the world outside, but to no avail She then empties a spoonful of broth into his mouth — • a moment's gurgle, and then the cry goes on. At last she offers him an apple, which is the color, the size, and near the shape of the ball he held yesterday. Does a child think quickly? ATI13', even while the cheeks are wet, the face dimples into gladness, and a smile springs in the eyes, to shine through his foolish tears. Ejiowing the end of the chain of activity as we do, we may be- gin at the beginning. Before the child cried, he must have five Intuitive Judgments: I exist, and something which is not I exists. There is a space be- tween that something and me. I have it not in this present time, and want it in the nearest future, for the lack of it is the cause of my present discontent. 1. Intuition of Being. 2. Intuition of Space. 3. Intuition of Time. 4. Intuition of Cause. Then the child experienced Presentative knowledge through his faculty of seeing each time his mother tried to hush him by showing him some object. RECAPITULA TION. 57 Now^ next to this knowledge^ came Eepresentative knowledge, Avhen, on the basis of Attention, the child's mental activity was directed to the hall he held on yesterday. Attention had not been dormant until then. It had, of course, been acting as it always does, jointly with Consciousness. Now, Memory must have been the rejDresentative faculty in action, the child must have remem- bered the various percepts he received while in sense-contact with the ball, for other objects, with other qualities, did not satisfy him. When his mother tapped on the window and pointed to the world outside, he realized he couldn't take the world in his hands and squeeze it to suit him, as he did his ball (not now, child; maybe, when you are older); hence he decided: "I still am not satisfied.'' This realization and this decision may have been an example of incomplete Eeflection, or of complete Eeflective knowledge, and a Judgment, or Elaborative knowledge. For who has not seen a year-old child do as I fancy this one did when his mother tapped on the window pane? He loked out of the window for one brief sec- ond; then followed a brief space when he saw not the window, but was thinking — just one little bit of thinking — and then the cry broke out afresh. It is such a heavy thing to lay on a child-mind, but it does seem as if he voluntarily withdrew his Attention from that window to think about his trouble. I dislike to call the child's mental activ- ity such hard names, but it does seem this was Abstraction for the purpose of Introspection. Then he must have analyzed his grief; then he must have re-combined its elements into the whole Cause — which was an example of Synthesis. Now, he may or may not identify this as his own Mental activity, and then compared this phase of Mental activity with that induced by the sight from the 58 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Mdndow, which was an example of Comparison. Here he renders a judgment: "There is a space between that world and me; there is none in the memory of my ball I had yesterday." Here a final judgment is: "I am not satisfied." Now, according to this, the Mental activity thus simply ex- pressed comprised the exercise of such intellectual faculties as are necessary agents for the intellect in securing its four forms of knowledge — Intuitive knowledge, Presentative knowledge, Kepre- sentative knowledge, and Eeflective knowledge. Perhaps the most doubtful assertion of the child's Mental activ- ity is the statement of Double Eeflection, or Comparison. Such activity involves no faculty foreign to an infant's mind, but merely represents a flexibility of thought which seems impossible for such an age. One might correct this, and say that instead of contrasting the action of Memory with the action of Imagination (Double Re- flection) he merely contrasted the effects of these faculties (the Represented and Presented Idea). Yet one must allow him single reflection, when, at the last, with a faulty Judgment, he accepted the apple as his ball and declared, "In this state of mind I am content." Dilute all these terms to the consistency of babyhood, put it in Mother Goose terms, and 'twill not be unreasonable. "Weakness and strength are but relative terms, and the two differ not in ele- ments, but in proportion and adaptation. The phases of mental activity here suggested seem at first glance beyond the mental strength of a year-old child. Yet it will be re- membered that Infancy is Infinity in miniature, and the mind of a year-old child is as complete as that of a man of forty. It does not differ in its number of faculties, but in the length, height, and breadth of action. I tell a little child of seeing two big dogs snap RECAPITULA TION. 59 and growl over a bone;, and the cMld's eyes widen, and he creeps closer as his Imagination constructs an ideal of remembered ele- ments. A grizzled soldier pictures to himself to-morrow's battlefield, of bannered hosts, with flashing arms and martial music — fighting over the island of Cuba. Yet is his picture — as was the child's two big dogs with a bone — merely the action of Imagination, no more. What, indeed, is the seer bending over his books, or searching in his laboratory, but " An infant crying in the night, An infant crying for the light. And with no language but a cry?" 60 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTEE XV. Suggested Eeview. The consideration of tlie Intellect has now been completed. The following review is suggested as a convenient condensation of the foregoing chapters. The same plan will be repeated at the close of our consideration of the Sensibility and that of the Will: 1. Define Mental Science. 2. How may the knowledge of Mental Science be utilized? 3. i!^ame six distinctions between Mind and Matter. 4. State relation between Mind and Body. 5. Name the Mind's three general powers. 6. Define each. 7. Illustrate oflB.ce of each. 8. ]N"ame a mental activity induced by each. 9. Define the Intellect. 10. Name four media through which the Intellect exercises its activity. 11. State the actions of these four classes of Mental Powers. 12. Define the term Perception. 13. Name a sjTionymous tenn. 14. Define Percept, and name a synonym. 15. Define Sense-Faculty. 16. Name and define five classes of Percepts. 17. What habit increases number of Percepts? 18. Suggest an exercise valuable for cultivation of this habit. 19. Name two forms of Eepresentation. SUGGESTED REVIEW. 61 30. Define eacli. 21. "What faculty secures each? 22. State distinction between the actions of these two faculties. 23. Trace a chain of Mental Activity comprising all forms of Presentation and Eepresentation. 24. Define Memory. 25. ISTame and define conditions necessary to action of Memory. 26. ISTame the effect of a single act of Memory. 27. Define Eecollection. 28. What class of impressions can be remembered? 29. Give suggestions for cultivation of Memory. 30. What law assists Memory? 31. Define Amnesia, and state cause. 32. State suggestion for rest of Memory. 33. Name characteristics of Memory of the aged. 34. Define Imagination. 35. Name elements of Ideals. 36. State limit of Imagination. 37. Define a vivid Imagination. 38. Define a fertile Imagination. 39. What is meant by an Imaginative Mind? 40. State some practical uses of this Faculty. 41. Define Phantasy. 42. Define Dreams. 43. State some methods of curbing the Imagination. 44. Suggest rules for cultivating it. 45. Define Eeflection. 46. State main difference between Eeflection and Presentation, between Eepresentation. 47. Name elements of Eeflection. 62 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 48. Define each. 49. Give order of action. 50. Define Eeflective Comparison. 51. State mental efl:ect of Eeflective habits. 52. State peculiar mental benefit derived from each act of Ee- flection. 53. Suggest several questions to give students for the sake of in- ducing Eeflection. 54. Define Intuition. 55. Define Intuitions. 56. Name four classes of Intuitions. 57. Define each. 58. State distinction between Intuition and Instinct. 59. Expand an Intuition of Space. 60. Define Elaboration. 61. State three forms of Elaboration. 62. Define a Concept. 63. State distinction between a Concept and Percept. 64. Trace by steps the formation of a Concept. 65. ISTame auxiliary condition of Induction. 66. Define exercise of each condition. 67. What is Scientific Imagination? 68. Name the two basal Primary Judgments. 69. Define a Syllogism. 70. Define each Judgment therein. 71. State three terms in the series. 72. Write a correct Syllogism. 73. State each term and its general office. 74. Write incorrect Syllogism, and give reason of incorrectness. SUGGESTED REVIEW. 63 75. Name all conditions necessary to a Major Premise. 76. Name elements of necessary corroboration of Major Premise. 77. Name characteristic of Conclusion. 78. What studies induce Reasoning? 79. State some action which you consider to be the physical ex- pression of the exercise of all the Intellectual Faculties. 64 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTEE XVI. EXTEACTS FeOM YaRIOUS AUTHORS. It is often said that writers on Mental Science differ on vital points. The difference is, I think, less a difference of belief than a difference in a choice of terms expressing that belief. The three subjects on which authors are seemingly most at variance are the subjects of Memory, Imagination, and Judgment. On these three subjects, then, I give brief quotations from various writers: "Memory is knowledge of particular things once present, but no longer so." — Dewey. 'Tn Memory a thing is posited in space." — Schuyler. "Memory is like a piece of cloth, which, receiving certain folds, retains the tendency to receive the same folds afterward." — Gas- sendi. "Memory enters into all mental activity." — Baldwin. "Eecollection may be ranged in formal Judgments, and then carried to deductive conclusions in logical syllogisms." — Hickok. "Eemembrance is a generic term, Eecollection is a specific term.'* — Hewett. "Each Faculty has its own Memory." — Gall. "The time-element in Memory has two aspects — succession and duration." — Hill. "The power of Memory is a spiritual activity incapable of being conceived of as following out any physical condition." — ^Ladd. "Eemembrances consist of fewer details than the original idea." — Baldwin. EXTRA CTS FR OM A UTHORS. 65 "The two conditions inducing Memory are contiguity and sim- ilarity." — Bain. "The power to refer particular cases to general principle is philo- sophical Memory." — Schuyler. We shall next give a few extracts on Imagination: "Imagination may be Associative, Penetrative, or Contempla- tive."— Hill. "Imagination denotes operations of the mind upon objects gov- erned by fixed laws."- — Wordsworth. "Imagination bodies forth the form of things unknown." — Shakespeare. "IsTo human mind has ever conceived a new animal." — Hill. "Imagination forms the Ideal standard of attainment for moral, and spiritual excellence." — Schuyler. "Imagination is the power of self purposely to put his experi- ence into new form." — Baldwin. "Imagination is the power to make new combinations."— G-arvey.. "Imagination is the power to modify and combine the products of Memory." — White. "Constructive Conception passes above Memory as being an exer- cise of Constructiveness, and falls below Imagination as containing no originality or invention." — Bain. "The understanding working in any way beyond logical reality is purely imaginary." — Hickok. Lastly, we quote on the subject of Judgment: "judgments are of Quantity, Quality, Eelation, Modality." — Kant. 5 — M. S. 66 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. "The principles of expression (Judgment) are affirmation, nega- tion, disjunction, hypothecation." — Sehuvler. '"In forming a logical Judgment the mind holds before itself two Concepts, or a Concept and a Percept." — Hewett. "Judgment is an essential element of belief." — Baldwin. "Judgment is the faculty to discern truth." — Stormouth. "All unsettled disagreements between Affirmations and legations must be referred to thorough experiment, and meantime the point in controversy must be held as indeterminate." — Hickok. "Judgment is the power to compare notions as to agreement or disagreement." — ^ilcCosh. "The laboratory of experimental science is an excellent primary school of Judgment.'"' — Hill. The above quotations are not made with systematic selection. They represent, so to speak, odds and ends of thought from various authors, which may interest and benefit the student, and with a skillful teacher form the basis of a most valued recitation. THE SENSIBILITY. 67 CHAPTEE XYII. The Sensibility. In the first place. I do not like the term Sensibility. I use it because the division of Mental Powers, into the Intellect, Sen- sibiltj^. Will, is so familiar that I cleave to the term, as a guide-post to what I want to say. I should prefer the term Emotion, or Emo- tions, which is generally used as a sub-head of Sensibilty. However, Sensibility is the Mind's Power of knowing pleasure or pain. These Mental pleasures and pains are named to suit the degrees of their intensity. I object to the term "feeling" used by Scientists, as the term generally expresses the action of one of our Sense-Faculties. Just here, many writers on Mental Science say that these pleas- ures and pains are often caused by ph5'-sical conditions, and pro- ceed to name said pleasures and pains as Sensations. I consider that the term Sensation has been absorbed in defin- ing a cognized nerve-aifection. I believe there is no pleasure or pain in anj^ Sensation. The plea,sure or pain is made possible by that power of the mind called Sensibility, but the pleasure or pain is not a part of the Sensation. By the power of Sensibility or Emotion, the Mind may enjoy or dislike, may desire or repel, may approve or disapprove, may find pleasure from or pain from a Sensation, but the feeling induced is no constituent element of a cognized nerve-affection — of a Percept — of a Sensation. Do not, you ask, this Sensation and the enjoyment therefrom follow so closely as to mingle the phases of activity? All phases of mental activity seem to mingle in a quick, active mind. Who can 68 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. draw a breath between the action of Memory and of Imagination? Yet by the power of Conception the distinctiveness of mental ac- tion is not destroyed by its rapidity. The physical organ, the palate, is in contact vnxh the flavor of some object, and a nerve- aft'ection is caused. The nerre-affection is received by the mind and thereon expressed. This expression is a Cognition, a Percept, a Sensation. We may say, carelessly, "That was a pleasant Sen- sation,"" but the pleasure is purely in the Mind. "Were it not so, the same Sensation would affect all people in the same way. What in reality is the music of one nation is another's discord, "One man's medicine is another's poison." One loves this color, another that: one woman is most pleased by the sight of a thunder storm, another by a blue sky; one likes bananas, another will not eat them; and who of us that loves roses can understand how Queen Anne would faint at the smell of a rose? Is the olfactory nerve, the auditory nerve, the optic nerve, of varied texture or construc- tion? The difference lies in the minds of their possessors. My tooth aches, and your tooth aches, and we both are ex- tremely dissatisfied with that sensation. So are all people I have ever seen. Yet if we should find a human monstrosity who said he enjoj'ed the toothache, the monstrosity would lie in the ]Mind, not in the nerve. One might suggest that on the whole people are pleased by the same sight, sounds, etc. This is true in propor- tion to the kinship of mentalities. I know a man with a Eoman nose who enjoys very much the smell of a tan-yard. Do you think a Eoman nose would of itself ever enjoy anything so Carthaginian as even the smell of a bullock's hide? It surely was the strong truth that pleasure or pain is in the mind, which helped the old- time martjTs to walk beds of fire with glory in their faces. "Was it not that which put a song on Joan's lips when the flames scorched her feet? THE SENSIBILITY. 69 Did not Milton so believe when he let Satan's mind see shadows in the perfect light of angels? Hence he wrote: "The mind is its own place^ and of itself can make a Hell of Heaven, a Heaven of Hell/' Yet what is meant by the influence of surroundings? Merely the stamp of Mentality, which changes on account of its own habitual pleasure or pain. Consider what influence has continued gratification or disap- pointment on the temper and disposition of a child. I am glad that I do not agree with some Mental Scientists that the intellectual faculties may be classified, and defined, but the emotions are vague, indefinable. To me there is a clear thought-connection between the Mind's powei of knowing, and the Mind's power of knowing pleasure and pain. The various activities of the Intellect may give us pleasur- able or painful Emotions. Sight and sound please or pain — ^hence we have Emotions caused by the action of Intellect named Presentation. Emotions are also caused by Memory or Imagination — Emotions caused by Eepresentation. Emotions, too, are caused by Intuitions, and there are Emotions effected by such unemotional mental activities as Eeflection and Eeasoning. These various classes of Emotions we shall now con- sider. Eemember that an Emotion is a transitory Mental pleasure or pain. Scientists say Emotions differ in intensity — that is, the mind differs in degree of enjoymentor suffering. This means, of course, the degree of concentration or the length of time which the Atten- tion is directed to said Emotion. This time and degree of concen- tration measures the corresponding inaction of the other counter- acting Mental Faculties. 70 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTEE XVIII. Egoistic Emotions. Egoistic Emotions involve a desire for immediate Self- Gratifica- tion. I drink; I experience a nerve-aifection, a Sensation, a Percept. Throiigli Sensibility, the Mind approves it and finds pleasure therein — an Emotion of pleasure. A certain time elapses, and my mind desires to repeat this Sensation. Speaking physically, cer- tain nerves call for another drink. For me to stop here and ex- plain that nerve-affection called "thirst," would be to touch Physi- ology, It is sufficient to say that nerves are affected by a lack of habitual contact with an object as well as by contact with it. Physiologists can explain the dryness, the stringency, or the in- flammation characterizing the nerve-affection named thirst. Suf- ficient for us, that a normal Mind does not enjoy this Sensation. In plain terms, we do not like to be thirsty. This pain may cause us to remember the Sensation of drinking, and, by the exercise of the Intuition Judgment of Cause and Effect, we desire a draught of water — ^which draught the Intellect knows will repeat the de- sired Sensation. These recurring Mental desires to repeat certain Sensations caused by physical conditions, are called Appetites. Instinct dictates to us the means for the gratification of natural appetites. What Intuition is in the realm of Intellect, Instinct is among the Emotions. Instinct is an unreasoning approval of cer- tain physical activities, and perhaps we may say Impulse is the EGOISTIC EMOTIONS. 71 expression of Instinct, thongh in common j)arlance the terms are made synonymous. Hunger, thirst, cold, are natural Appetites, seeking food, drink, warmth. Of course the Mind can for some time abstract its attention from those physical conditions which require food, drink, fire — and so, on many a desert waste, by empty larder, or through miles of snow, the strong heart has forced the body to endure, by fixing the thoughts on other things. This, of course, involves an exercise of Will which can not here be discussed. Beside normal appetites, the Sensibility has acquired and in- herited appetites. These last, being inherited, are of course native, yet the best term I can find to apply to these inherited appetites to distinguish them from normal appetites, is the term abnormal. Appetites acquired are more transitory, more fitful, than normal Appetites. T, of course, speak of healthy Appetites, not the dis- eased Appetite for strong drink or opiates — the discussion of which I leave mainly to physiologists. Varied forms of knowledge effect individual sensibilities in vari- ous ways. One man enjoys a rare beef-steak as much as another a sonata by Beethoven, and a woman with a new bonnet may be happier than either one. ISTow, the difference in the forces necessary to eft'ect Sensibility may partly be due to the different circumstances which have turned the Attention into different channels. The habitual channel to which the attention has been directed induces a ready concentration of Attention to objects which are of the same class as this channel. In other words, the man may enjoy his beef-steak more, because he thinks more about it. He thinks more about it because his Attention is more exclusively concen- 72 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. trated upon it; this concentration is eas}^ because his Attention is habitually directed to objects of the same class. Whether this habitual trend of Attention has been forced by ex- ercise of circumstances, or is native inclination, is another thing. Certainly all people are not alike, and diversity of tastes is a clear element in political economy which may be exemplified in that happy condition of domestic affairs: "Jack Spratt would eat no fat. His wife would eat no lean, ' And so they both together sat. And made the platter clean." AESTHETIC EMOTIONS. 73 CHAPTER XIX. Aesthetic Emotions. Aesthetic Emotions are aroused b_y Contemplation of Beauty in Nature, and in the Fine Arts. While many may object to the term, Emotion, being applied to the pleasure derived from a Sensation of Taste, all will allow that Emotion may be an effect of color and harmony. It does indeed seem more suitable that a mind should be moved to gladness by autumn-fire, or tremulous music, than by the flavor of a pineapple, or of quail on toast. Yet it is hard to say why some of the Senses are considered media of nobler mental impressions than others. Re that as it may, those Mental pleasures derived from Percepts of color, form, motion, and sound, are named Aes- thetic Emotions. That mental bias which is habitually responsive in its Sensibility to the Sensations just named, is called Aestheti- cism. Aestheticism is the love of and habitual study of the beauti- ful; and a person whose attention is mainly directed to studies of the beautiful is called an Aesthete. The gentler forms of beauty in- spire us with an Emotion called Admiration. Sublime Beauty fills us with Awe. Some writers have nam.ed Intuitions of Beauty as one division of the Constitutive knowledge of the Mind, but these Intuitions of Beauty can contain no definition of Beauty as a Universal Judg- ment. It does seem as if the minds of some people have Sensibility too sluggish to be stirred by any beauty. 74 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. He sits in Ms door-way, puffing his cob-pipe, and the sunset may hang out its scarlet banners, the winds may stir a hundred trees into drowsy melody, the river may wind in gracefulness at his very feet, but to all seeming he has no Emotion of gladness, no benedic- tion from this beauty Yet how do we know? May be even he himself does not know. But a peace comes over him — ^vague, un- meaning to him. He has no thought that it is an Aesthetic Emo- tion; but somehow, sitting there in the evening, he believes that his wife's temper is not so bad as it used to be, and that may be the crops will turn out well after all. If you were to tell him his tranquil joy was the effect of the western sky, or the evening hymn, he would not understand. Can, then, the Mind have an Emotion without being conscious of the Sensation causing it? No, the Sensation must be realized by Consciousness, but it is not necessary that Eeason should name said Sensation as the cause of the Emotion, or Eeflection analyze the Emotion of Pleaure into its Percept-elements. So, as all minds have Sensibility, it does seem to me that this Sensibility must in every mind be moved by the touch of beaut}^ to some degree. Of course, dilTcrcnt Souls have Emotions of different intensity. This variance may be natural or the effect of cultivation. When the ear and eye become habituated to certain Sensations, there arises in the mind an Appetite for color and harmony similar to hunger and thirst. As long fasting sharpens the appetite, so absence from familiar scenes makes the eye and ear long for them. So we may speak of Aesthetic Appetites. Take a sailor to the inland, and after a time he will long for the sound, and even the smell, of the sea. Take the musician away from all music. Will there not be in his mind hungering and thirsting after melody? AESTHETIC EMOTIONS. 75 I knew a man born and reared in the Northland, who was dying in the tropics, and who believed that a sight of his snow-hills would bring him back to health. These Appetites for specific color and form are called Desires. Teachers can do so much toward cultivating the Sensibility in its Aesthetic Emotions. Here the teacher of Ehetoric has fortunate work. Eequire of your class a description of a bit of Nature. This induces careful Observation. Observation of Nature induces appreciation of its beauty. Ap- preciation of beauty is pleasure in beauty, which pleasure we have termed an Aesthetic Emotion. By Botany and i^stronomy, Aestheticism is cultivated — ^not that a scientific investigation of stars and flowers will thrill us with its dedu.ctions, but the careful observation necessary to such study reveals hidden beauties. A teacher may also assist pupils in forming tasteful standards of beauty. It is of course due to personality as to what the standard of beauty is. It has been noted, however, that coarse, ignorant people require more garish colors to please the eye, and require volume and rapidity of sound for pleasing harmonies. Uncultivated taste seems to require emphatic or pronounced qualities to cause pleasurable emotions. This may be explained by the lack \pf re- sponsiveness of Sensibility. "^s^ A keen or delicate Sensibility responds to delicate touches, as in the Material world a light breeze stirs the aspen leaf. This delicate sensibility may, of course, be a native dowry, as has been said. I knew a mountain girl, ignorant of art and letters, who would laugh aloud at the laughter of her own mountain streams, and even so light a sound as a dove's call could somewhat sadden her. If one lack this delicacy of Emotion, cultivation of Observation and association with the beautiful, of course, does much. Emotions 76 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. of pleasure are produced by Beauty; Emotions of pain by deformity. Wliat K"ature effects in the Sensibility, Art does also — true Art being but an imitation of ISTature. May we not believe that the daily exercise of Sensibility in the line of Aestheticism, will induce a hungering and thirsting after the Perfect, until we say with DaTid: '"As the liart panteth after the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after Thee, Oh, God." ETHICAL EMOTIONS, ETC. 77 CHAPTEE XX. Ethical Emotions, etc. You will note how intimate the relation between the Intellect and the Sensibility, in onr consideration of Egoistic and Aesthetic Emotions. Both classes are the direct effect of the exercise of the Sense-Faculties. Both are the various forms of Sensibility's response to the one form of Intellect's activity — Presentation. - Yet, who will say that Emotions are induced by direct action of the Sense alone? — though I am sure Sensibility as a term would imply this. Emotions are effected by Eepresentation also. Memories and Imaginations induce Emotion. ISTow, if the Memory and Imagination picture merely a scene — a picture involving no question of right or wrong — ^the Emotions are still but Egoistic or Aesthetic. Yet, if scenes or actions are Presented or Eepresented, and Eeason or Eeflection considers the moral elements in them — ^then the Emotions aroused are Ethical. Ethical Emotions are induced by a moral view of Presented or Eepresented scenes. While the classes of Egoistic and Aesthetic Emotions are few and simple, there is a variety of Ethical Emotions. Do not forget that all emotions are divided into two main classes. Mental pleasures and pains, which pleasures and pains are pos- sible through the mental power — Emotion, or Sensibility. To proceed now with Ethical Emotions. I remember an action of mine. I consider this action — that is, my attention rests upon it. Row, if tliis view is a moral view, I consider the action as to its 78 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. motive and effect. (This consideration of motive and effect, of course, necessitates the action of Judgment and Eeason.) Then Judgment and Reason render a decision as to motive and effect. This decision affects the Sensibility or Emotion. A single phase of its activity named an Emotion is produced. This Emotion, caused as it is by a moral vicAv of an action reproduced by Mem- ory, is an Ethical Emotion. Ethical Emotions may be loosely classified. The shades of feeling blend so delicately and the Sen- sibility is so pliant to lean out of one into another, that I wish you to understand that in this classification of Ethical Emotions there are no severely drawn lines of distinction. The best classification I can make is: Emotions of Pride, of Humility, of Hope, of Fear, of Sympath}', of Antipathy. Now, there are, of course, many Emotions which are somewhat between the two forming the above pairs. Yet these medium Emotions do not have an exclusive stamp. They differ from the Emotions mentioned mainly in intensit}^, or they are named otherwise on account of accidental surrounding circumstances. Mental Scientists range the Pleasant Egoistic and Aesthetic Emotions in terms of Contentment, (*heer- fulness, Joy, Eapture, and the Painful Emotions, in such terms as Discontentment, Gloom, Grief, Despair. Yet su^ii tonn>; do not specialize Emotions. They merely represent the degrees of Pleasure and Pain found in all Emotions, whether Egoistic, Aes- thetical, Ethical, or Eeligious. One Mental Scientist confines the Emotions of Grief and Joy to the Egoistic Emotions, and in the same chapter defines Egoistic Emotions as those derived from self-interest. Pride is an Emotion of self-approval. It may be induced by the Memory of action, in which we know our motives were a desire for the pleasure of others. It may be induced by an imagined scene in which we are the central figure, receiving homage. Such ETHICAL EMOTIONS, ETC. 79 scenes may also arouse Pride in their Presentation. A mild form of Pride may be named Self-Complacency. An extreme form accentuating our superiority is called Haughti- ness. Humilit}'' is an Emotion of Self- Abasement. It is not necessary to name the numerous causes of lowliness of Mind. It is, of course, induced by circumstances opposite in their nature to those arousing Pride. The Emotion of Hope is an expectation of the fulfillment of a desire. Hope is one phase of the responsiveness of Sensibility to the action of the Intellect through Eeason. The Primary Judg- ment, "The same causes produce the same results," may be changed to similar causes produce similar results. Then the Eeason proceeds. This circumstance is similar to that. That circumstance produced a certain result. The certain result is similar to the result I desire. When the Intellect through Eeflection considers the Emotion of Hope, it is found, as stated, to be the effect of these Judgments. Yet when Hope flashes up in the Soul, this action of Intellect seems lost in that of Sensibility. The Emotion of Fear is the expectation of undesired conditions. Fear is of course induced by the same Intellectual action as Hope. The difference lies merely in the fact that Eeason produces an expected pain instead of an expected pleasure. The Emotion of Sympathy makes another's emotions our own. Sympathy is one phase of the responsiveness of Sensibility to the action of the Intellect through Eeflection or the various Elabora- tive Faculties. Sympathy is the direct effect of that syllogism whose conclusion will assert the kinship of humanity. While other Emotions are 80 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. either pleasures or pains, the term Sympathy includes both Mental pleasures and pains. We rejoice with those that do rejoice, and that is Joy. We weep with those that weep. That is Grief. So I cannot assign all Joy and all Grief to that class called Egoistic Emotions. I sym- pathize with the architect in his work. That does not mean the Aesthetic Emotion caused by the beauty of the building. Eather this : The sentiment of that architect, of which the building is but a feeble expression, is my own. A perfect Sympathy and a contin- ued recurrence of it as an Emotion, does, it seems to me, signify the Emotion of Love — which Emotion is thought difficult to de- fine. I suppose the Emotion of Love must signify differently to different people. Yet I can not conceive it to be other than a per- fect and abiding sympathy. As the word Emotion expresses a transitory activity of the Sensibility, I would have you understand that the abidingness of sympathy measures the continuation of Love. I suppose there is such a thing as sympathizing in part. This must mean that certain partitive thought-elements of others are made our own, but not all. I should not call this Love. Perfect Sympathy is to my mind named Love. If we sympathize perfectly for one instant with another, that is an instant's Love. As sound-waves follow each other so closely in recurrence as to make a continuation of sound, so I deem the quick and repeated action of Sjanpathy to make that Love that has a dwelling-place in the Soul. The Emotion of Antipathy is exact opposition to the sentiments of another. Antipathy is the opposite of Sympathy. As the perfection and steady recurrence of Sympathy constitutes Love, I deem the extreme and steady recurrence of Antipathy to be Hate. When one Emotion follows another so closely as to seem- ingly blend, a name is given which expresses a combination of the ETHICAL EMOTIONS, ETC. 81 two. Jealousy is the intimate connection between Love and Fear. Envy implies a close connection between Love and Desire. Pity< is the combination of Sympathy with Pride. We might have a, hundred pages on the Emotions and never include all the terms applied to Emotional activities. Yet let us remember that all Emotions are either agreeable or disagreeable, and the various terms expressing Joy, the various terms expressing Sorrow, are the various degrees of pain and pleasure which is a common accom- paniment of Egoistic, Aesthetical, Ethical, and Religious Emo- tions. 82 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTEE XXI. Eeligious Emotioxs. Eeligious Emotions are produced by the contemplation of our relation to a Supreme Being. It is one phase of the responsiveness of Sensibility to the action of the Intellect, chiefly through Intuition, Eeflection, Eeason. The Intuition of Being is the Intuition of the Ego and Xon-Ego. The Judgment asserts the grandeur of the works of IsTature. Eeason concludes that a Higher Power than Man, has created them. The belief in this existence of a higher Power produces various Emotions. The Hope, which we named as an Egoistical Emotion, becomes a Eeligious Emotion when it looks out toward Immortality as a gift of God. The ethical Fear of a tarnished reputation, is a Eeligious Fear, if a Fear, of the disfavor of the Spirit of all Good. The Awe inspired by a sight of a Thunder-storm leaping among the Alps, is a Eeligious Awe if it pay homage to the Maker of such Majesty. Love for humanity is religious Love, if it love humanity because every Being is a thought of God. Love for God is but the Soul's approval of attributes of God or •elements of Goodness. When this Eeligious Love, through the materialistic stamp of the finite, seeks an imagined personality on which to fiix itself — then the Love has in it a part of those elements which constitute liuman Love. The Emotion of Gratitude may be either Ethical or Eeligious. "WTien Ethical it combines a sentiment of humanity, a sentiment of approval at the action of another, a Judgment RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS. 83 asserting the good motive of such action^, and a Judgment or Judgments proving the personal benefit derived therefrom. When Eeligious, the same Mental activity takes place, ascribing to the Deity, the Goodness of His Love. So I should sum iip all Eeligious Emotions in the terms of Hope, Fear, Awe, Love, Gratitude. 84 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER XXII. Intellect and Emotion. Intellect and Emotion are, in a well-balanced mind, thorouglily reciprocal. Tlie supposed conflict between these two divisions of Mentalit}'' is perhaps the cause of the supposed conflict between Science and Eeligion. This conflict, beginning in the thirteenth century" with the motto of Scholasticism, "We believe in order that we may understand," has been in these latter days reversed to: We would understand in order to believe. Thought is fast reaching that reconciliation between Science and Eeligion, or Reason and Faith if you will, in which reconciliation is the motto: "To believe is to imderstand." It is, of course, true that the Emotional nature (the nature in which the activity of Sensibility surpasses the ac- tivity of the Intellect) accepts a creed with that unreasoning enthusiasm which leaps out in passionate desire to the Infinite as the Creator of the world, the Lover of Mankind. Cold Reason, on the other hand, through the Science of Geology, would reason Creation down to an atom of MattA". Yet back of that atom of Matter is Cod, and faithful thinkers are to-day studying and writ- ing of the Geology of the Bible, in which there is no contradiction to the scientific classification of strata, for "a thousand years in His sight is as a day." Two main classes of thinkers to-day are Materialists and Idealists. The attention of Materialists is devoted mainly to the physical world, of Idealists to the psychical. The basal belief of Material- ists K' that all thought is a result of certain physical action of the INTELLECT AND EMOTION. 85 brain-cells. The Idealists hold that all physical Activity is but ar expression of thought. It is hard indeed for poor Mortality to be freeed from the Ma- terialistic element in thought. As little children can not think the figure "six/' but would have six sticks laid before them to im- press the Idea of number, so we children, groping through the dark, need the object lessons of ear and eye, and touch, to illustrate the thought with which we wrestle. It IS mainly the difference between Materialism and Idealism that is the difference between Paganism and Christianity. In the childhood days of the world, when lights were dim, the children of Men worshipped not a Spirit of holy attributes but the several material expressions of noble traits of character. They were too young to give heart-service to the quality of Truth, but they must needs have a statue of Truth in the market- place, and they laid their sheaves at the feet of it. A marble Justice with blindfolded eyes and even scales elicited sacrifice. As the world grew older into thought, these various traits were combined into one Personality. This Personality grew into Ideal- ity. This Ideality into Spirituality. This Spirituality was the sum, the combination, the spirit of all Grood — the G-od. To this God the Mind or Soul gave reverence, and smoking incense, slain bullock, garnered sheaves, became a part of the Materialist past — replaced by sentiments, emotions, heart-service. Yet, there stands clear a figure between the Materialistic and Ideal days — ^the Christ whose feet touched the earth, whose arms held little children — whose hand held the sea still. Yet his Ee- surrection and Ascension makes His Spirit a thought-support on whicJL the worship of Ideality may lean. We have noted that the activity of the Sensibility is the direct effect of the act of Intellectual activity. Yet it is interesting to 86 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. notice how the choice of terms naming the qualities of scenes or objects of Nature, of works of Art, or physical activity, is guided by the effect of said acts on the Sensibility. It is ascertained what Emotion a certain quality or the sum of qualities will arouse. From that Emotion, the quality or general stamp is named. Let us consider the effect of certain works of literature on the Emo- tions. My attention is directed to a piece of literature, and my Judgment asserts the existence of a peculiar quality. I do not name this quality until I know by Eeflection what Emotion it arouses. I find it is an Emotion of sadness, and by general consent the vquality arousing said Emotion is called pathos. Humor is that quality which arouses an Emotion of Cheerful- ness. Comedy is that quality which arouses an Emotion of Cheer- fulness, combined with an Emotion of self -Approval or Pride. These two combined Emotions are sometimes called Eidicule. Anything that is entirely comic will, if Eeflection is careful, call for a certain sense of a Superiority on the part of reader or be- holder. Tragedy is that quality which arouses an Emotion of Horror. Horror is the extremity of Fear, not of necessity a Fear of experiencing similar conditions, but the Fear springing from ihe Imagination of such personal experience in scenes of which we are spectators. ISTow, a drama generally accepted as a tragedy may not arouse this Emotion in some individual mind, but the thoughts expressed were intended or likely to arouse the Emotion of Horror. Of course the names, sentiments aroused, and of the qualities inducing them are used interchangeably, as we may speak of the sadness of a piece of literature or an Emotion of Pathos, etc. I now come to Wit — a quality of thought which I am utterly unable to define, or to name the Emotion it causes. Wit pleases, and surprises; but as for myself, I'd as soon try to catch and hold INTELLECT AND EMOTION. 87 the flash of a diamond, as to define this bright, effervescent, start- ling quality called Wit. These qualities of Literature named above, induce Emotions just in proportion as they were the real Emotions of the writers. A cultivated Intellect may teach the art of expressing exquisitely a feigned Emotion, but the effect of such skillful expression is to arouse an Emotion of admiration of the artist's skill, but not a sympathy of thought. It IS the constitutional lack of delicacy of Emotion, in a singer,, which makes her hearers say: Her voice is highly cultivated. My Intellect, through Judgment and Eeason, renders this decision, but my sensibility is not moved — she has no soul in her voice. The singer may have a keen Sensibility but a neglected Intellec- tuality. Hence she can sing only simple ballads whose thought she can make her own — though her voice be highly cultivated. Let the singer have a trained voice, ready Emotion, and an Intellect grasping the rules of harmony, of all the subtle relations between Sound and Sense, and you have Adelina Patti, with the wcrld at her feet. x\ll know that Nature has given to some indi- vidual minds, an uneven division of Mentality among Intellect^ Sensibility and Will. To the stronger plane of Mentality the at- tention most naturally turns. In the realm of the Intellect we find some Faculty predominately strong, the Imagination for in- stance, and so to Imaginative Literature, or so to castle-building the Mental activity is directed, and we have an Imaginative mind. In the realm of Sensibility some Emotion is peculiarly ready to respond to influence — ^the Emotion of Gloom for instance — so we have a Melancholy Mind. This peculiar Intellectual Emotional bias we name as the Indi- vidual Temperament. The usual classification of Individual Tem- 88 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. perament is as follows: The Choleric, the Sanguine, the Melan- cholic, the Phlegmatic. The Choleric Temperament is one in which the Emotion of Pride is pecnliaii)^ susceptible. It is said by Schuyler that the "Choleric Temperament belongs to those who are born to rule." The Sanguine Temperament is one in which the Emotions of pleasure are quickly responsive. The disposition is cheerful. Such people ''look on the bright side of things." The Melancholic Temperament is exactly opposite from the Sanguine. The Phlegmatic Temperament has a general slowness or slug- gishness of Sensibility. Into a teacher's keeping come all these various Temperaments. A teacher with a broad Sympathy can feel for all. To so guide the students as to equip them for gaining true happiness — that is best. It would take too long to suggest the various means by which the Choleric Temperament may be subdued, the Sanguine re- strained, the Melancholic cheered, the Phlegmatic warmed. Yet m all training and teaching, Individuality must wear the purple robe. It may be the teacher's duty to adorn that robe, to brush tlie dust from it, but let him not presumptuously and use- lessly attempt to clothe the Nature in a Temperament of his own Fashionino;. RECAPITULA TION. 89 CHAPTER XXIII. Eecapitulation". Let us consider an ordinary experience^ to find in it the exercise of the various Intellectual Faculties and the Emotions, as a review of our study of the Intellect and the Sensibility. I walk along a country road. We begin with the Intuition of Being. "I exist/' and '^those things around me exist." The sense of mere Being now gives me an Emotion of Pleasure. I am glad that I do live, for my Con- sciousness tells me that my Mind can be gladdened by my sur- roundings. I have a Visual Percept of the trees, the Odor-Percept from the flowers comes to me, the Sound-Percept is gained from the wind in the trees, and a Touch-Percept as that wind fans my face. I haye a Savor-Percept from the fruit I gather. All these forms of Presented knowledge give me an Emotion of Pleasure. This Emotion, being aroused by the sights and sounds of Nature, is called an Aesthetic Emotion. These various Percepts seemed to touch, but did not blend. I did not fancy I heard the fragrance of the flowers, or touched the greenness of the trees. Conception, the general Power of the mind, kept these Percepts distinct, and the combination of Percepts distinct. Consciousness makes me know that I am glad. Here I experience an Emotion — called a desire — a desire to continue my Joy. I withdraw my Attention from my surroundings for the motive of dwelling on the Emotion of Gladness. As thought is taken from 90 • AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. the material world, this is Abstraction. As it is with the intention of considering on my gladness, it is for the sake of Introspection. The first step in Eeflection is taken. I analyze my gladness into its Percept-elements. I re-combine these Percept-elements by Synthesis. The effect of their combination I identify as my own Emotion. This identification completes the act of simple Eeflec- tion. Closely following this act of Eeflection, ensnes the activity of Memory. This Memory is induced by the material surroundings. I remember the walk I took with my friend through these woods a year ago, I remember the several Percepts gained that time. I remember the Percept gained by the sound of her laugh, I remem- ber the Touch-Percept — the touch of her hand. I recall the Color- Percept which came from the gown she wore, the Odor from the flowers in her hair. I remember the taste of the sup of water she handed me at the spring. Thus by the Faculty of Memory the Intellect receives the various forms of Eepresented knowledge. jSTaturally the Sensibility responds to the Intellectual Activity. An Emotion is effected by this Memory. I do not remember the gladness I felt with my friend that day. Emotions, as has been said, are not remembered. Yet, as I remember, an Emotion of pleasure comes to me as an effect of the Memory. Then, touching this Memory, is an exercise of the Judgment which asserts: My friend is not with me to-day. An Emotion of Sadness is effected by that assertion. Now the Emotion of Pleasure at the Memory of what I had, and the Emotion of Sadness at the knowledge of what I miss, are co-existent in the Sensibility. We have all heard of the mingled Emotions of pleasure and pain. Whether or not these Emotions do really mingle or there is a recurring order of precedence I am unable to say. Yet it is certain that in this case, tlie Emotion of Sorrow and Joy are sufficiently co-existent for me to consider them comparatively. As I compare the gladness from RECAPITULA TION. 91 Memoiy with the Sadness from Judgment, wishing to decide how thejf differ, which is more transient, which more intense — this is Double Eefiection or Comparison. Through a series of Judgments a conclusion is reached as to which Emotion is more intense and lasting. The process of reach- ing this final Judgment, the method of deducing a conclusion from | a preceding Major or Minor premise, is Reasoning — or a phase y^ of Intellectual activity through the Faculty named Reason. ■ If the final Judgment in the Process of Reasoning — ^which Pro- cess was made possibly by Reflective Comparison — assert that the Emotion of Sorrow is more intense, the Imagination is induced to act. The ready Construction of the beautiful Ideal by the Imag- ination IS a convenient solace for the barrenness of the Real. So Imagination constructs a scene in which my friend and I are together in more pleasant, happier companionship, surrounded by a different, more beautiful landscape, more congenially occupied than I have ever experienced. In this imaginative Construction there is no elemental Percept but has been before experienced. Yet the Combination and Relation of these elemental Percepts, is the original creative work of the Imagination. Here Intellect acts through its Represntative Faculty — Imagination. ]Sratu.ral it is, when the Construction is complete, that the Sensibility should experience an Emotion of something like Joy — ^though the scene is purely ideal. In the Mind where the Sensibility is subservient to the Intellect, that Intellect proceeds, through Reason, to render a decision as to the likelihood of the realization of this ideal. If this process of Reasoning be logical, it will take a Syllogistic form. The Major Premise of this Syllogism may be something like this: Those friends from whom we fail to secure any message have likely passed out of this phase of life. 92 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. As the conclusion of a Syllogism has certainty proportionate to that of the Major Premise, the final Judgment will here assert that my friend has probably passed from this pha^e of life. Such a Judgment induces a Fear. This Emotion of Fear is not that my friend has possibly fallen into the sleep of Death. Eeason has asserted that it is possibly true. The Emotion named fears it is possibly true. Then Hope comes, that somehow, somewhere, we may look again into each other's eyes. These Emotions of Hope and Fear are that phase of Sensibility called Ethical. Then Eeason, hand in hand -n-ith Faith, guides me to know why, whence, and by -n-hom I may so hope. This knowledge induces an Emotion of G-ratitude to the Giver of every good and perfect gift. This Emotion arising from a con- templation by reason of our relation to a Supreme Being is a Eeligious Emotion. The meeting with my friend in the after-time will be pictured by the Imagination, and the scene so constructed contains various Concepts or Class-Ideas formed from the repetition combination of elemental Percepts of past experience. I think in that meeting My Soul will know and feel the sorrows and joys that have touched the Soul of my friend. Knowing hers, each ■will for a moment become mine, and this Emotion is the Ethical Emotion of Sympathy. Eeason concludes that in that more perfect noontide, our Souls will meet in continued and perfect Sympathy, and Eeason says: That will be Love. Here you half-love your friend, because you half-know her thoughts. There Soul will lean to Soul in perfect sympathy. Hope and Fear now struggle, saying: '^Tt will, it will not be true." I have endeavored to give what seems to me a natural, reasonable Mental Experience. It has taken me some time to tell it, it would RECAPITULA TION. 93 take a reader some time to read it — but how quickly such, mental activity as here described would take place! All of it, from the first Intuitive knowledge "I exist," on through the various Percepts or Sensations of Presentation, the Eepresentation by Memory and Imagination, the Emotions arising therefrom, the Eeflection and Comparison, the Complex forms of Knowledge received by Judg- ment, Concept, Eeason, the repetition of Intellectual and Emo- tional activity — ^all may in an active mind take place in no longer time than it requires for a bird to flutter from a tree-top to the ground. 94 AN OUTLINE OF BfENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER XXIV. Questions for Review. 1. Name the three divisions of Mental Powers. 2. Define Sensibility, or Emotion. 3. What is an Emotion? 4. What objection to the term, "Feeling?" 5. State preference between terms Emotion and Sensation. 6. Wherein lies pleasure and pain? 7. What significance has personal likes and dislikes of the same Sensation? 8. What is meant b}^ Influence of Surroundings? 9. Eplain Intensity of Emotion. 10. Name four chief classes of Emotions. 11. What are Egoistic Emotions? 12. What is Appetite? 13. State office of Instinct. 14. Compare Instinct with Intuition. 15. Define Impulse. 16. What Mental activity represses demands of Appetite? 17. Define Aesthetic Emotions. 18. Compare Aesthetic with Egoistic Emotions. 19. Define Aestheticism. 20. Define Admiration. 21. Define Awe. 22. What objection to the expression: Intuitions of Beauty. 28. Explain the expression: Aesthetic Appetites. 24. "Wliat branches of study cultivate Aestheticism? Q UES TIONS FOR RE VIE W. 95 25. State characteristics of crude Standards of Beauty. 26. Define Ethical Emotions. 27. What two considered elements constitute a Moral View? 28. Name eight Ethical Emotions. 29. Group them in contrasting pairs. 30. JSTame the scale of terms expressing Pleasurable Emotions. 31. Name series of Painful Emotions. 32. Define Pride. 33. State some natural causes of said Emotion. 34. Define the two extremes of Pride. 35. Define Hope. 36. Analyze Hope. 37. Define Eear. 38. Contrast Hope with Eear. 39. Define Sympathy. 40. What form of Knowledge induces Sympathy? 41. Define Lore. 42. Give material illustration of relation between Love and Sym- pathy. 43. Define Antipathy. 44. Define Hate. 45. Define Jealousy. 46. Define Envy. 47. 'State some natural causes of Envy. 48. Define Pity. 49. Define Eeligious Emotions. 50. Name main forms of knowledge inducing Emotion. 51. Trace line of thought from Intuition of Being to a Eeligious Emotion of Hope. 52. Name Mental adtivity which changes Ethical Awe and Pear to Eeligious Awe and Fear. 96 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 53. Contrast Love for God with Love for Man. 54. Analyze the Emotion of Eeligious Gratitude. 55. State generally accepted Relation between Intellectuality and Sensibility. 56. Define Excitability. 57. Kame forms of knowledge which retain it. 58. What Thought-Conflict is now current? 59. iSTame two main classes of thinkers. 60. Define Materialism. 61. Define Idealism. 62. State the Thought-relation between Paganism and Christi- anity. 6-3. State the Mediatory office of the Christ between Materialism and Idealism. 64. Define Pathos. 65. Define Humor. 66. Define Comedy. 67. Define Tragedy. 68. Define Wit. 69. Analyze Eidicule. 70. State the comparative value effect of Intellect and Sensi- bility in Art. 71. ISTame four classes of Individual Temperament. 72. Define each. 73. State general trend of instruction desirable for each. 74. What is meant by a well-balanced mind? 75. Wliat is meant by an Emotional Nature? 76. Trace line of Mental Activity from Intuition of Being to an Aesthetic Emotion. 77. What general Mind-Power maintained distinctiveness of Percepts? Q UES TIONS FOR RE VIE W. 97 78. State Mental activity necessary for complete consideration of an Aesthetic Emotion. •79. Trace a line of Mental activity through Cause and Effect which shall involve the exercise of all Intellectual Faculties. 80. Trace a line of Mental activity through Cause and Effect which shall involve the exercise of all the Intellectual Faculties giving Emotion likely to be aroused by the separate exercise of each phase of Intellectuality. 7 — M.S. 98 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTEE XXV. Extracts from Writers. I give here a few brief quotations from various writers on Sen- sibility. The quotations are not selected with any thought of logical sequence. I put them down as they come to me, knowing they will be of interest to the student, and hoping that somehow sometime they will be of definite service to him. "Desire is a secondary feeling, preceded by. enjoyment." — Hew- ett. "Pathos is Aesthetic Sorrow." — Hill. -'Pleasure and Pain is the result of the interaction of Ideas." — Herbert. "Wlien a Sensation goes out specifically for a particular object of known gratification, the appetite is then lost in a desire." — Hickok. "Egoistic Emotions are Prospective, Immediate, Eetrospective." — Baldwin. "Beauty is that form of expression of idea, thought, or design which affords a universal, disinterested, and necessary feeling of satisfaction." — Schuyler. "No man ever desired happiness in the general or abstract." — Porter. "Good and evil as bearing on others call forth altruistic Emo- tions." — Baldwin. EXTRACTS FROM WRITERS. 99 ''Knowledge Emotions are the delights we experience when we discern truth." — Bain. "Amid all mysteries, there remains one absolute certainty — we are ever in the presence of the infinite and eternal energy." — Her- bert Spencer. "There are two kinds of laughter, one physical and sensuous, the other intellectual."— Mirart. "A thing of beauty is a Joy forever." — Keats. "The real essence of the comical is a reaction from the serious." — Bain. "Before religious feeling acquires the distinctness of a notion, it must assume at least these postulates: 1. There is Order in Things. 2. ']."'his Order is one of Intelligence. 3. All Intelligence is One in kind." — Brinton. "Appetites are Mental cravings for objects to satisfy bodily needs." — MoCosh. "True Emotion is the radical impulse to seek and enjoy truth." — Garvey. "Self-love is that form of love in which the subject and object are identical." — Schuyler. "The desires and their opposites form the transition from know- ing to willing." — Bowne. "The state of indifference is not an exercise of Sensibility, but simply a want of it." — Haven. "The impulses of blind feeling is known as Instinct." — ^Hickok. "The tendency to laugh results from a feeling of superiority in ourselves or a contempt for others." — Hobbs. "We can not cause a blush by any action of the body. It is the Mind which must be affected." — Burgess. 100 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. "The appetite is presentatire, the instinct regulative." — Hop- kins. "Xothing is more deceitful than general laws for our feelings." — Lessing. "Sensibility' — Quick Emotion or Sympathy.'^ — ^Webster. "In conducting your understanding, love knowledge with a great love." — Sidney Smith. THE WILL. 101 CHAPTER XXVI. The Will. The "Will is the Mind^s Power to choose between alternatives. The Will controls all Mental activity, directs the various Mental faculties. It is a current idea that in the realm of Sensibility the Will takes no part. Will does choose between Emotions, and the duration of their existence. The activity of the Will is apparent restraint of Emotion. What is called the passivity of the Will seems to be apparent in the apparent indulgence of Emotion. Emotion seems to overcome the Will, and the Will is called passive, yet there is no reason why we may not consider the indulgence of Emotion as much active permission from the Will, as restraint of Emotion is active prohibition by the Will. The activity of the Will is called Volition. A single act of the Will is sometimes called a Volition. The expressions voluntary and involuntary action, are used, but they really refer to the two phases of activity of the motor mechan- ism. Involuntary physical action is considered to be action which is independent of the mandate of the Will. Voluntary physical action is considered to express the choice of the Will. But in mental activity there is no such thing as involuntary action. The Will con- trols all mental activity. This brings us to the consideration of a question. If all physical action or activity of the motor mechanism is but the expression of thought, and all thought is mental activity, and all mental activity 102 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. is controlled by the Will, can there then be an}^ involuntary action even of the Motor Mechanism? Of course a decision can be made only by consideration of the Proposition: "AW physical activity is the expression of thought." Instinctive action for the gratification of natural appetite is men- tioned as voluntary action. Instinctive action for the gratifica- tion of appetite can be only the consequence of consciousness of certain Sensations, Vhich Sensations are cognized nerve-affection — which nerve-affections are the expression of bodily needs. Kow, there is no reason why the Will is not awake simultaneously with the consciousness. Will surely is a birth-right, hence we at least have no proof that Instinct or the impulse expressive of In- stinct is Involuntary Action. 'Some writers on Mental Science mention the hypnotic state and all physical activit}'' performed therein, as a state of utter inaction of the Will;, and involuntary action of the body. If I understand anything of Hypnotism, this activity does not express the action of the normal will of the Mind to which the body is servant. Yet, the peculiar physical activity of the hypnotized person is the direct expression of the Will of the Hypnotizer. The person who induces the hypnotic state and removes the individuality of his Subject's, substituting his own mentality — ^\\^hich, of course, in- cludes his Will. IsTow, whether to call that physical action whioli is obedient to the Will of another Involuntary Action or not, is merely a choice of terms. iCertainly Will is exercised. Again, somnambulism and the physical activity performed therein is mentioned as Involuntary Action. I see no reason for saj'ing the W'ill is inactive during sleep-walking. To my mind, it is much more likely that reason is dormant or incomplete. When the somnambulist turns in his walk of sleep, takes his seat, or in THE WILL. 103 any way changes his physical activity, it does seem to me that Will is involred. There is a healthy hut spasmodic action of the muscles which is seemingly involuntary. Yet Physiology often speaks of a sympa- thetic action of the muscular system. If such action as seems in- voluntary is sympathetic, the original activity is very likely ohedient to the Will. This Will-induced activity induces a spas- modic and sympathetic activity of other muscles. While the sec- ondary muscular motion is not the direct and exclusive effect of the Will, it is indirect and sympathetic — hence is voluntary through sympathy. Physical convulsions, so involuntary, so opposite to the healthy Will of the afflicted one, is of course a diseased condition of the motor mechanism. Yet we might call the aifliction merely an ex- pression of a diseased Mind, a deranged Will. On this proposition we have the Mind-healers, or Christian Scientists of to-day. These Mind-healers believe of course in the inlluence of healthy pure thought on diseased impure thought to first heal the sick Intellect, Sensibility and Will — thus produc- ing the effect of a healthy activity of the Motor Mechanism, as a necessary expression of healthy Mentality. I am not prepared or inclined to discuss the doctrine of Mind- healing. Yet its claims are theoretically scientific, though of course human limitations prevent complete demonstration of this theory. The activity of the Will is always preceded by an action of the Judgment. A Judgment preceding and inducing the activity of the Will, is called a Motive. Do not confuse the Motive of the Will with the choice or decision made by the Will. A motive is the cause of an inclination, but after 104 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. the mc-lination comes the climax, the choice, or the decision of the ^Vill. A recurring motive or contiauous similarity of motives may be termed Disposition; Disposition indulged into decisions is Charac- ter. A habit is the physical expression of a recurring motive. It i= interesting to note the freedom or restraint of the Will. That series of Judgments preceding a choice by the "Will is called delib- eiation. The Judgments of Deliberation assert present conditions, and by the law, that the same causes produce the same effects, assert a condition certain to result from certain action. Freedom of the TTill is that activity of the Will which chooses fi'om the basis of a single preceding Judgment. A restrained "Will chooses from the basis of conflicting Judgments or conditions. Do not misunderstand the statement in regard to a series of Judgments preceding an action of the Will. Deliberation precedes that Eictivity of the Will in choosing between certain physical activities. Yet back of this series of Judgments is the action of the Will wiuch controlled Mental Energy and directed Attention into the line of Eeasoning. ''Act, Eeason," says the Will. Reason, obedient, forms her series of Judgments, which process, in relation to the Will-action to follow, is called Deliberation. The final Judgment becomes a motive, and the basis of this motive the Will declares, '"'Because this is true," or in order to secure '"thai deduced condition, lift that hammer, oh, hand of my body, and strike now wltile the iron is hot." Will and Desire are frequently confused. Appetite says to the starving child: '"'You are hungry." Desire says: "You wish to steal that loaf of bread." Will says — after De- liberation: "Thou shalt not steal." If social and moral considera- THE WILL. 105 tions did not constitiite a restraining Judgment, how differently the Will woTild decide. ISTow and then, behind conventional bars, the "Will pants for lib- erty to choose, to say what we think, to act as we believe. Or, speak- ing in a psychical sense, the Judgment, "It is good so to speak," and the Judgment, "It is bad so to speak," are contrasted, and the Will must decide which is the preferable motive. Choosing its mo- tive the Will then proceeds to dictate the line of action; yet fre- quently in the choice of motive there is a struggle between the Judgment's inclination and estimate of effects. Knowing, Feeling, Willing, is the order of Mental Activity. Through the various In- tellectual Faculties we know. Through Emotion we feel. Through Will we choose between the various forms of knowledge, the ex- pression, or non-expression of emotions, the direction of the atten- tion to said emotions. Some writer places an Emotion named desire between a judg- ment and the changing of that judgment into a motive. The ques- tion to be decided is: "Shall I go to Kew York?" The Will per- mits Eeason to form a series of Judgments somewhat as follows: New York has many beautiful sights. All people of New York may see those sights. Therefore if I visit New York I will see beautiful sights. Now, here must ensue a desire to see beautiful sights, which one may call xiesthetic Appetite. Lacking this Aesthetic Appetite, the Judgment just mentioned does not become a motive of the choice my Will makes when it declares: I shall go to New York. Yet I suggest that that indi- vidual disposition is likely to influence the plane in which the Judgment acts — that is, the primary Judgment on account of Aestheticism would not be asserted by a mind of a disposition to be moved more by desire of money than of beauty. 106 AN dUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. To repeat: A series of Judgments constitute Deliberation; this Deliberation induces Desire; this Desire is the Motire inclining the Will's decision; the decision made, the physical or mental activity- ensues. Eecurring Motives constitute Disposition; Disposition in- dulged forms Character. Character makes Eeputation? Not always. THE WILL AND THE INTELLECT. 107 CiHAPTEK XXVII. The Will and The Intellect. It is not necessary to state in detail the influence of the Will over Eeason, Eeflections^ Judgments, Concepts. The same general laws remain: All Mental Activity represents the choice of the Will. The Concentration of the Attention on any channel of thought depends on the emphasis and completeness of the choice — commonly called Determination. The relief from any phase of Mental activity is secured by the command of the Will to the exercise of other Faculties — the choice of the special Faculty depending on the co-ordination of the Will with Judgment. A ^student of Logic acquires a Mental habit of forming syllo- gisms in order to assert the most insignificant conditions. The Eeasoning Powers become wearied and the Will forces the Atten- into another channel of thought. It is almost impossible to pro- duce any mental activity which does not involve a series of Judg- ments, yet the mind may be relieved if the Judgments are Primary or Intuitive, asserting propositions so simple and axiomatic as to be no tax on the Eeasoning Powers. Eeflection is perhaps the most intricate form of intellectual activity, and the Attention is more easily diverted from its processes than from any other phase of Mental action. Yet an exertion of the Will or an Energy of Will can bring the desired effect. It is so hard to discuss these separate phases of Intellectual activity without conveying the Idea of Divi- sibility. Yet in tbe Construction of the Imagination, for instance — does not the Ideal consist of elements which are Memories of Per- 108 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. cepts or Memories of Concepts? Does not Judgment assert their relation, and Beason conclude as to the combinations of Percepts and Concepts into a wliole — and does not each phase of mental activity present the choice or direction of the "Will? Language requires us to discuss them as separate Mental Powers — any one of which may act alone, but thought must hold them together in re- ciprocity and interaction. The Will co-operates with the Intellect. Yet, what phase of knowledge shall be received, or, in other words, what Intellectual Faculties shall be exercised, and the duration of their activity, is determined exclusively by the choice or decision of the Will. As has been said, physical action expresses the command of the Will. The connection between the mandate of the Will and the execution of the Act is very subtle. How does the decision of the Will to lift the arm communicate itself to the muscles of the arm, so as to cause the arm to lift? Who can tell? Physiology discusses it at length. Let that go either to a conjectural explanation or physiological laA^'s, and let us turn our Attention to the control of the Will over the Presentative action of the Intellect. How far a cultivated Will may enhance or restrain the action of the five Sense-Faculties, is the question before us. There is an art of not seeing and not hearing that is valuable at times. If one must walk through a city's slums where the air is thick with curses, and space is crowded with hideous sights — the stern resolve not to see and to hear may prevent those Emotions of Pain caused by the responsiveness of Sensibility to repelling sights and sounds. "I can not help but see and hear what is around me," one is likely to say, but this seeing and hearing is not so much impressi- bility of the Mind as it is the indecision of the Will. Kow let us trace from the verv beginning the j\Iental elements which I have THE WILL AND THE INTELLECT. 109 called the Art of not Seeing. First, before I enter the city's slums, the Sensibility must have a positive aversion to such hideous sights. The Emotion must be one of utter repugnance to such sights. This Eepugnance or Aversion is the direct Antipode to Appetite (Aes- thetic) or Desire. This Eepugnance or Aversion is a mental Im- possibility without previous experience of Sense-Contact with Sim- ilar scenes. This Sense-Contact produced an Emotion of Pain which may be called Disgust, Aversion, or Eepugnance. ISTow, of course I do not remember this Emotion — as Emotions are not remembered. But by the law of association, active throug'h the propositions of Judg- ment asserting similar surroundings, I remember the previous scenes which induced these Emotions. As I remember the scenes, the Emotion returns as an effect of Memory. Understand, this Memory and its consequent Emotion was induced by the knowledge of certain details in city slums; my Judgment asserts that the scenes I am about to witness are similar to those I have seen. Then Judgment asserts one of the Primary Propositions: Similar Causes produce Similar Effects. Hence the Conclusion: I shall experience the same Emotion which I felt in viewing those scenes of the Past. Here the Will feels an inclination urging it to decide to turn the feet away from this quarter of the city. But other considerations asserted by Judg- ment deny the liberty of the Will to choose to turn away, and assert the circumstantial necessity for the Will to choose to go on. Understand, the word necessity does not cancel the volition of the action. The choice of the Will to do what is necessary to be done is expressed by the physical activity of a man who walks to the prison where he is ordered, instead of being dragged there by the guards. 110 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. So as I go on into the hideousness, note the choice of the Will. Do not consider that the Will says, "I will not see — I will not hear." The Will says, rather, 'T command Memory, or Imagination, or Eeflection, or Reason, to be active instead of the Sense-Faculties of seeing and hearing."' Plainly the Will says, "The Attention shall he directed to other things." As we say, ordinarily: 'T[ will t hink of something else.'"' The Will here acts co-ordinate with the Eepre- sentative Power of the ]\Iind — to the exclusion of undesirable Pre- sentative ActiYity. Just here, Co-ordinate with Concepts and Eeason. the Will chooses the class of scenes for Memory to produce or Imagination to construct. From a knowledge of that law which says, Opposites are always associated in thought, the co-ordinate action of the Will and Imagination chooses not to think of most beautiful sights and loving words, but chooses that middle quality and nature of scene which will not suggest the forms about to be presented either by similarity or by contrast. With the Will's decision for Memory to represent a scene of an evening spent at a menagerie — we will say — I go down into the alley, and steadily recall the past to the ex- clusion of the present. I again see the lion — his tawny mane, his cushioned paw tapping the bars of his cage. I hear the shriek of the cockatoo, and see the gleam of his crimson crest. The monkey is there with the grin on his face, the twist in his tail — the flash of the snow-white pelican — all these sights and sounds are before me, as with bent head I walk oblivious of the bleared faces in the doorway, the riotous gibbering, the dirty children tumbling about my feet. All this I miss if I succeed in concentration of Attention in such channel as I desire. Yet, may be I fail in part. ^ly Ment-al activity may so vacillate between the Presented and Eepresented Images, that the lion's THE WILL AND THE INTELLECT. HI paw holds a liquor flask, the cockatoo has a dirty cap on his head, and a curse drops from the beak of the pelican. Now let us explain the difference between the man who sees and hears nothing and he who half-sees and hears them. Of him who sees and hears all, I say nothing, as such Percepts are certainly the effect of voluntary activity. Now the fact that he sees and hears in part may be due to several causes. First, the Emotions caused by such sights and sounds may be of both pleasure and pain. Why any one can find pleasure in hearing harshness and seeing misery can be answered in various ways. One explanation only I will su.ggest — which is: Such sights emphasize the good furtune of our own condition by contrast. (As the Emotion of Pleasure a Desire for a repetition of the Cause.) Why such Sen- sations produce Painful Emotions is easily understood. Here we see the Sensibility intervenes between the action of the Intellect and the Will constituting a doubtful or Double Inclina- tion — a Desire of seeing, and an aversion from seeing. This does not prevent a positive choice by the Will, because there must be a positive choice before the physical activity. Yet this choice merely extends to the placing the Faculties in Sense-Contact with the scenes. The Double Inclination prevents the choice between Presenta- tive and Eepresentative activity. So among the scenes the alternatives to see or not to see, backed by a temporary Inclinaftion results in the vacillating activity de- scribed. If one were to say to this half-observer: "You had a half- desire to witness such misery, caused by a half-pleasure at the sight of it," he would indignantly deny it, saying: "I can not help but see and hear." The optic nerve and the auditory nerve may be touched by sound-waves or rays of light. Yet it will be remem- 112 AN OUTLINE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. bered that a nerve-affection must be received and acknowledged by the Mind before it becomes a Percept or Sensation. This Percept of Sensation is only possible by the Attention directing Ilklental Energy to that plane of action. Mental Energy is so directed only by direct permission of the Will: the Will is moved by a Motive in the form of a Judgment, which Judg- ment says, "I shall find pleasure in them." As has been said before, one may voluntarily visit haunts of Misery, with high motives of philanthropy or other motives in which the AVill makes a full, free choice not necessary to consider. There is another phase of Double Inclination in which curiosity partly counteracts aversion. Curiosity is a desire to gain a single item of information or to experience Sensations hitherto un- known. Xow while the Sensibility may have been moved with dis- gust by Sense-Contact with similar scenes — if the Judgment assert the existence of any new detail, however insignificant, the desire to see this detail will intervene between the Judgment and the Volition — which Volition decides to see and hear all, rather than lose one detail. Yet so subtle are all these phases of Mental Activity, that the ob- server believes, or thinks he believes, himself an unwilling receiver of painful sensations. Again, the visitor to such haunts of ISiIisery will receive unwel- come Sensations, although at the beginning the "Will has made a decided choice not to see and hear. This may be caused by a faulty Memory or feeble Imagination. The Eeproduction or Construction is not in detail, and the bare outline of one scene is so quickly ex- hausted that the interval of time between a new Construction or Eeproduction finds the Will in a transitory state of making its decision so as to admit the Attention to receive and the Mind to cognize one or two Xerve-affections. The method suggested by 777^ WILL AND THE INTELLECT. 113 wMcli the Will prevents seeing and hearing, is precisely reversed when we wish to forget bitter scenes or not to imagine those which fill us with fear. To keep the Sense-Eacnlties busy is, according to the above principles, a clear way of driving away the goblins or of drowning Memories. The wide-eyed child in the chimney corner hugs her doll tight when the old nurse tells of the ghosts, and the sad-faced woman knits busily, or tends the flowers, dusts the books, and sweeps the floor, to shut out the memory of the dead man's face she looked at weeks ago. Of course the child does not know why she hugs her doll close, but the act is but a diminutive expression of poor Silas Mariner's weaving to forget his haunting loss. 8 — M. S. 114 AN OUTLIXE OF MEXTAL SCIEXCE. CHAPTEE XXVIII. The Will axd the Emotions. It is commonlT beliered that in the orerflo-n-ing of Emotion, "Will must be lost: but that the Will and the Intellect are not an- tagonistic. There is one difference between the relation of the Will to the Intellect and the relation of the Will to the Emotion. The Wni commands the Intellect, the Will permits the Emotion. Will says to Memory: 'Taeproduce." Will says to Emotion: ''Ton may Sympathize." Let us imagine the Will commanding the emo- tion of Lore, instead of permitting it. We say this: All Love begets Love. If I love John Smith, he will lore me. All men show favor to those they love. If John Smith love me, he will show favor to me. All influential men benefit their favorites. John Smith is an influential man. Therefore, if I love him, he "snll love me. If he love me, he will show me favor. His favor will benefit me. So, for motives of self -benefit, my Will says to Emotion: 'T