E 467 
 
 1 THE 
 
 M2 L6 
 
 Copy 1 
 
 LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES 
 
 OF 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL M C CLELLAE 
 
 WHICH INCLUDES A 
 
 COMPLETE SUMMARY 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS REPORT. 
 
 WRITTEN BY A GENTLEMAN WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM THROUGH HIS CAMPAIGNS. 
 
 <•»- 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 MARTIN & RANDALL. 
 
 NO. 29 SOUTH SIXTH STREET. 
 1864. 
 

 * UG 17 1915 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1864, hy 
 
 MARTIN & RANDALL, 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, in and for the Eastern 
 
 District of Pennsylvania. 
 

 LIFE OF 
 MAJOR-GENERAL MTLELLAK 
 
 It is no easy task to write the life of a distinguished man ; espe- 
 cially one whose great services have been so recent as General McClel- 
 lan's. But when a public servant who has done all in his power for 
 his country, has been badly treated by the men who, for the time, are 
 at the head of the government ; when every sacrifice and effort he 
 made was only misrepresented and ridiculed ; he deserves, at the 
 hands of his fellow- citizens, not only an appreciation of his merit, but 
 a reward for his high virtues. We think the American people are in- 
 clined to give it. General McClellan has labored long and well ; he 
 did the best that was possible, whilst at the head of the army. He 
 never led his troops to certain defeat, as Hooker and Burnside did ; he 
 never got so tangled up as to be unable to unravel his struggling ranks, 
 as Pope did ; he never bragged or blustered or promised what could 
 not be performed ; and more than all, whilst at the head of affairs, he 
 carried on war as a Christian and true soldier — neither fighting with 
 women and children, nor interfering with any domestic institution of 
 the country in which he fought. He secured the love of his soldiers 
 and the praise of his country. We think we are right in saying that 
 that country and those soldiers still love their old commander. 
 
 General MeClellan's Early Life. 
 
 General McClellan is a native of the city of Philadelphia. He is 
 the son of Dr. George McClellan, a distinguished physician whose 
 reputation extended all over the Union. George Brixton McClellan 
 was born on December 3d 1826. His early education was given him 
 in Philadelphia, and he spent a short time at the Pennsylvania Univer- 
 sity, leaving it at the age of sixteen to enter the Military Academy at 
 
 (3) 
 
4 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 West Point. On July 1st 184G, he graduated from the academy, 
 standing number two in his class, and at once received a commission 
 as brevet second lieutenant of engineers. 
 
 He goes to Mexico. 
 
 He had just graduated, when the Mexican War broke out, and with 
 scarcely time to bid good-bye to his friends, he was off for the battle- 
 field. His bravery and ability in that war are well known. For gal- 
 lantry at Vera Cruz, he was highly commended in official reports. At 
 Cerro Gordo, he also received the praise of his commanding officers. 
 For bravery at Contreras and Churubusco, he was made a brevet first 
 lieutenant ; and at Molino del Rey was offered the additional brevet of 
 captain, which was at first declined, but subsequently, having at 
 Chepultepec won the admiration of all, he was again offered the brevet, 
 and accepted it. He came out of that war a captain. His gallant 
 conduct well foreshadowed his subsequent celebrity. 
 
 When peace was declared, he returned to West Point, to instruct the 
 cadets in the bayonet exercise, and whilst there he translated from the 
 French the " Manual of Bayonet Exercise/' which at once became the 
 text-book of the service. He was afterwards continually sent upon 
 important missions. In 1851, he superintended the construction of 
 Fort Delaware ; in 1852, explored the Red River ; and in 1853, was in 
 Washington Territory, where he surveyed a route for the Pacific Rail- 
 way, for which he was highly complimented by the Secretary of War. 
 The next year he spent in thoroughly investigating the railway system 
 of the United - States, with a view to the construction of the Pacific 
 Railroad. Full reports of these investigations were published by him. 
 
 In March 1855, McClellan received his commission as a captain of 
 cavalry, and the next year made his famous trip to Europe, in company 
 with Majors Delafield and Mordecai, to watch the operations in tho 
 Crimean War. The report of this mission was also published, and has 
 had a wide circulation. It added not a little to his increasing fame. 
 
 On January 16th 1857, however, McClellan, tired of a military life 
 in which there was no prospect of any active operations, resigned his 
 commission, and at once was made vice-president and executive officer 
 of the Illinois Central Railroad, then in process of construction. For 
 three years he filled this responsible position; completing the railroad, 
 and then giving up his place, was made general superintendent, and 
 subsequently president, of the eastern division of the Ohio and Missis- 
 sippi Railroad, running between Cincinnati and St. Louis. In all of 
 these positions, he showed that remarkable tact as a disciplinarian and 
 commander which subsequently distinguished him on a larger field. 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 5 
 
 The War breaks out. 
 
 The war broke out in 1861, and found McClellan residing at Cincin- 
 nati, in a comfortable home, and with a salary of ten thousand dollars 
 a year. His country called him, however, and he obeyed. Sacrificing 
 home, comforts, everything, he returned to a military life. Governor 
 Curtin offered him the chief command in Pennsylvania, but before 
 McClellan heard of the offer, he was given a commission as major- 
 general of Ohio troops, which he promptly accepted, and with scarcely 
 a day's notice, proceeded to organize the nine months' troops of that 
 state, then rendezvousing at Cincinnati. On May 10th, 1801, Mr. Lin- 
 coln created a department in the West, and gave General McClellan 
 chief command of the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. This re- 
 instated McClellan into the army, and the people began to look to him 
 as their leader. It was but a little while before the public danger was 
 so imminent that, in him alone was any reliance placed. 
 
 His Services in "Western Virginia. 
 
 On May 26th, 1861, the Confederates in Western Virginia burned 
 two bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and threatened others. 
 General McClellan' acted promptly, and at once ordered an advance 
 into Virginia. One column moved upon Parkersburg, the other upon 
 Bellair. As he advanced, General McClellan issued a proclamation to 
 the people of Western Virginia, which at once marked out that course 
 of humane warfare which he has adhered to ever since. To fight only 
 against the enemy, and not to injure the country through which he 
 passed, and to allow no interference with slaves, were his maxims. In 
 this proclamation, dated on May 2Gth, he says to the Union men of that 
 section : — 
 
 "The General Government cannot close its ears to the demands you 
 have made for assistance. I have ordered troops to cross the river. 
 They come as your friends and your brothers — as enemies only to the 
 armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your homes, your families, 
 and your property are safe under our protection. All your rights shall 
 be religiously respected. 
 
 " Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce 
 you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized by inter- 
 ference with your slaves, understand one thing clearly — not only will 
 we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, 
 with an ii'on hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on their part." 
 
 At the same time, he issued an address to his troops, characterized 
 by the same humane spirit exhibited in all his actions. It was the 
 first of the series of addresses which, for pure patriotism and manly 
 language, have won the admiration of his fellow-citizens. 
 
6 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 "Address to the Volunteer Army. 
 
 '•Head-quarters, Department of the Ohio, 
 "Cincinnati, May 2<6th, 18G1. 
 
 "Soldiers: — You arc ordered to cross the frontier, and enter upon 
 the soil of Virginia. Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, 
 to protect the majesty of the law, and to rescue our brethren from the 
 grasp of armed traitors. You aro to act in concert with the Virginia 
 troops, and to support their advance. 
 
 "I place under the safeguard of your honor the persons and pro- 
 perty of the Virginians. I know that you will respect their feelings 
 and all their rights. Preserve tho strictest discipline : remember that 
 each one of you holds in his keeping the honor of Ohio and of the 
 Union. 
 
 " If you are called upon to overcome armed opposition, I know that 
 your courage is equal to the task ; but remember that your only foes 
 arc the arnied traitors, — and show mercy even to them when they are 
 in your power, for many of them are misguided. "When, under your 
 protection, the loyal men of Western Virginia have been enabled to 
 organize and arm, they can protect themselves, and you can then return 
 to your homes, with the proud satisfaction of having preserved a gal- 
 lant people from destruction. " George B. McClellan, 
 
 " Major-General Commanding." 
 
 The Battle of Philippi. 
 
 On May 30th, General McClellan's advance reached Grafton, the 
 enemy evacuating it without opposition. On June 2d, McClellan ad- 
 vanced beyond Grafton, and approached Philippi. Here he fought a 
 short but decisive battle, in which the enemy was defeated and driven 
 from the field. It was the first victory of the war. So gratifying was 
 it to the people of Western Virginia, that tho state convention, then in 
 session at Wheeling, passed an unanimous resolution, thanking General 
 McClellan for his gallant action. 
 
 On June 20th, General McClellan assumed personal command of his 
 forces in Western Virginia, and on the 23d issued a second proclama- 
 tion from his head-cpuarters at Grafton. It breathes the same spirit aa 
 the first one : — 
 
 " Tho army of this department, headed by Virginia troops, is rapidly 
 occupying all Western Virginia. This is done in co-operation with 
 and in support of such civil authorities of the state as are faithful to 
 the Constitution and laws of the United States. The proclamation 
 issued by me, under date of May 26th 1861, will be strictly maintained. 
 Your houses, families, property, and all your rights will be religiously 
 respected. We are enemies to none but armed rebels, and those volun- 
 tarily giving them aid. All officers of this army will be held respon- 
 sible for the most prompt and vigorous action in repressing disorder 
 and punishing aggression by those under their command." 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 7 
 
 And in an address to his soldiers at the same time, he pursues the 
 same idea : — 
 
 " You are here to support the government of your country, and to 
 protect the lives and liberties of your brethren, threatened by a rebel- 
 lious and traitorous foe. No higher or nobler duty could devolve on 
 you, and I expect you to bring to its performance the highest and no- 
 blest qualities of soldiers, discipline, courage, and mercy. 
 
 " I call upon the officers of every grade to enforce the highest dis- 
 cipline, and I know that those of all grades, privates and officers, Arill 
 display in battle cool heroic courage, and will know how to show mercy 
 to a disarmed enemy. Bear in mind that you are in the couutry of 
 friends, not of enemies — that you are here to protect, not to destroy. 
 Take nothing, destroy nothing, unless you are ordered to do so by your 
 general officers. Kemember that I have pledged my word to the people 
 of Western Virginia that their rights in person and property shall be 
 respected. I ask every one of you to make good this promise in its 
 broadest sense. 
 
 " We have come here to save, not to upturn. I do not appeal to tho 
 fear of punishment, but to your appreciation of the sacredness of the 
 cause in which we are engaged. Carry into battle the conviction that 
 you are right and that God is on our side. Your enemies have violated 
 every moral law ; neither God nor man can sustain them. They have 
 without cause rebelled against a mild and paternal government ; they 
 have seized upon public and private property ; they have outraged tho 
 persons of Northern men, merely because they came from the North, 
 and of Southern Union men, merely because they loved the Union ; 
 they have placed themselves beneath contempt, unless they can retrieve 
 some honor on the field of battle. 
 
 " You will pursue a different course ; you will be honest, brave, and 
 merciful ; you will respect the right of private opinion ; you will pun- 
 ish no man for opinion's sake. Show to the world that you differ from 
 our enemies in these points of honor, honesty, and respect for private 
 opinion, and that we inaugurate no reign of terror wherever we go." 
 
 The Battle of Rich Mountain. 
 
 Immediately upon issuing these addresses, General McClellan ordered 
 an advance of his troops, driving the enemy before him. They num- 
 bered two thousand men, under Colonel Pegram, and took refuge in a 
 range of mountains known as the " Laurel Hills." Hero they in- 
 trenched themselves upon the precipitous side of Kich Mountain. 
 McClellan attacked them on July 11th, and after a short engagement, 
 by a gallant charge carried their works. The enemy fled, leaving their 
 dead and wounded, all their camp equipage and guns, behind them, 
 and another force at Beverly, a town near by, who were outflanked by 
 this manoeuvre, at once abandoned that place. Pegram afterwards 
 surrendered unconditionally to General McClellan, finding he could 
 not elude the vigilance of the Federal pursuit. MeClellan's loss in 
 this contest was but twenty killed and fifty wounded, and he captured 
 
8 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 one thousand prisoners and several cannon. Generals Rosccrans and 
 Kellcy gave him efficient aid in this battle. This was the second 
 victory of the war. 
 
 On July 14th, General Garnett, who still kept up an opposition in 
 Western Virginia, was attacked and routed at Carrick's Ford, his bag- 
 gage and one gun captured, and he killed. This completed the de- 
 struction of the enemy in that section, and never since then have they 
 appeared there. These brilliant victories were not unappreciated by 
 the people. Everywhere the newspapers were tilled with the highest 
 praise of McClellan's ability and promptness. His successes had been 
 the only ones in the war. His pacification of Western Virginia was 
 complete. On July 19th, he closed his campaign, with a third address 
 to his soldiers, in which their successes are thus summed up : — 
 
 " I am more than satisfied with you. You have annihilated two 
 armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched 
 in mountain fastnesses and fortified at their leisure. You have taken 
 five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thousand 
 prisoners, including more than forty officers. One of the second com- 
 manders of the rebels is a prisoner, the other lost his life on the field 
 of battle. You have killed more than two hundred and fifty of the 
 enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipage. All this has 
 been accomplished with the loss of but twenty brave men killed and 
 sixty wounded on your part." 
 
 Three days after this, the disastrous battle of Bull Run was fought. 
 General McDowell was sent out from Washington at the head of all 
 the troops there, to drive the enemy under Beauregard from Manassas 
 Junction. As usual with the Administration, they hurried and pressed 
 McDowell until he consented to go before he was prepared. His col- 
 umns marched from Alexandria. At the very outset, the plan, owing 
 to some unforeseen occurrences, had to be changed. The columns got 
 entangled on the road. At Blackburnc's Ford, across Bull Run, the 
 enemy were found. One of the highest Federal officers was so intoxi- 
 cated as to be unable to perform his duty. The enemy were stronger 
 than supposed, and were found in unexpected positions. Several miles 
 beyond Ccntreville, the battle began ; for awhile all seemed well. The 
 enemy retreated before the Federal advance, but it was only to allure 
 them into an ambush, where masked batteries opened upon them, and 
 their fate was sealed. A panic ensued. All efforts to rally the troops 
 were vain. A few stood firm, but such was the confusion caused by 
 the rushing to and fro of frightened horses and teams over which the 
 teamsters had no control, that all discipline was broken up. The 
 ranks fell back. Rumor added to rumor made the retreat a rout. 
 Everything was lost in the great idea of safety. A rushing tide of 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, 9 
 
 wagons, horses, cannon, and troops set towards Centreville. There was 
 no checking it, and pell-mell into the town it rushed, where the panic 
 was only checked hy some brave Germans drawn up in line across the 
 road, who stopped the fugitives, and made them turn their faces once 
 more against the enemy. The Confederates did not expect this retreat. 
 They were astonished at it, and gained no advantage from it. The 
 Federal army, however, was broken up. All organization was gone. 
 An undisciplined crowd of soldiers roaming about Centreville, and a 
 huge park of broken wagons, frightened horses, and disabled cannon 
 outside, was all that was left. A few short hours had shattered a mag- 
 nificent army. The North was in consternation, and the President 
 knew of but one man to whom to turn for rescue. All eyes pointed to 
 the hero of Western Virginia, whose recent victories were filling so 
 large a space in the public mind, as the only general fitted for the 
 task. The Administration was not long in availing itself of him. 
 
 General McClellan ordered to Washington and given 
 command of the Army. 
 
 Bull Run was fought on the 21st of July. On the 22d General Mc- 
 Clellan received an order to proceed at once to Washington, and give 
 General Rosecrans command of his column in Western Virginia. He 
 did so, and, having made the necessary orders for earthworks and for- 
 tifications necessary to hold the conquered territory in that section, bade 
 his brave little army good-bye, and early on the morning of the 23d 
 left for Washington. On his way he passed through Philadelphia, 
 where a spontaneous reception awaited him at the railroad depot. 
 After a very brief speech, however, counselling action not words, Ge- 
 neral McClellan hurried to Washington. He arrived there on the 
 afternoon of the 26th. Early the next morning he was given command 
 of all the troops forming the Army of the Potomac. The condition iu 
 which he found the army is best told by himself. He says : — 
 
 "When I assumed command in Washington, on the 27th of July 
 1861, the number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 
 infantry, less than 1000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with nine im- 
 perfect field batteries of thirty pieces. 
 
 "On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organization of 
 General McDowell still existed, and the troops were stationed at and in 
 rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyan, 
 Roach's Mills, Cole's Mills, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with 
 a detachment at the Theological Seminary. 
 
 " There were no troops south of Hunting creek, and many of the 
 regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac, 
 seldom in the best positions for defence, and entirely inadequate in 
 numbers and condition to defend the long line from Fort Corcoran to 
 Alexandria. 
 
10 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 "On the Maryland side of the river, upon the heights overlooking 
 the Chain Bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose commanders 
 were independent of each other. 
 
 " There were no troops on the important Tallcytown road, or on the 
 roads entering the city'tfrom the south. 
 
 " The camps were located without regard to purposes of defence or 
 instruction, the roads were not picketed, and there was no attempt at 
 an organization into brigades. 
 
 " In no quarter were the dispositions for defence such as to offer a 
 vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, either in the 
 position and numbers of the troops, or the number and character of the 
 defensive works. Earthworks, in the nature of tttes de poni, looked 
 upon the approaches to the Georgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long 
 Bridge and Alexandria, by the Little River turnpike, and some simple 
 defensive arrangements were made at the Chain Bridge. With the 
 latter exception, not a single defensive work had been commenced on 
 the Maryland side. 
 
 " There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from 
 heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column 
 almost without resistance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets 
 of Washington were crowded with straggling officers and men, absent 
 from their stations, without authority, whose behavior indicated the 
 general want of discipline and organization." 
 
 His Plans. 
 
 General McClellan's first object, therefore, was to completely reorga- 
 nize this army. This he at once set about, and his triumphant success 
 is one of the greatest laurels of his fame. He found the city of Wash- 
 ington in the wildest disorder. He changed it to one of the quietest 
 cities on the continent. Day and night he labored, and at length gra- 
 dually saw order emerging from the chaos in which Bull Bun had left 
 everything. On August 4th he was able to prepare his plan of future 
 operations, and, at the urgent solicitation of the President, he commit- 
 ted it to writing. It begins with some ideas of the state of civil war, 
 which should have been noticed by the party now misruling us. His 
 plans arc thoroughly developed in it, and it may be regarded as the 
 basis of all his subsequent operations. The document, though rather 
 long, is well worthy a perusal. 
 
 " The object of the present war differs from those in which nations 
 are engaged, mainly in this : that the purpose of ordinary war is to 
 conquer a peace, and make a treaty on advantageous terms ; in this 
 contest it has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently nume- 
 rous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation. We have not only 
 to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display 
 such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, 
 especially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter im- 
 possibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course impera- 
 tive. Had we been successful in the recent battle (Manassas), it is 
 possible that wo might have been spared the labor and expense of a 
 great effort. 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 11 
 
 " Now we have no alternative. Their success will enable the politi- 
 cal leaders of the rebels to convince the mass of their people that we 
 are inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all their 
 resources. The contest began with a class, now it is with a people — ■ 
 our military success can alone restore the former issue. 
 
 " By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong places, 
 and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as to private property and 
 unarmed persons, and a lenient course as to private soldiers, we may 
 well hope for a permanent restoration of a peaceful Union. But in the 
 first instance the authority of the Government must be supported by 
 overwhelming physical force. 
 
 " Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively demand 
 that the military action of the Government should be prompt and 
 irresistible. 
 
 " The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field, and it seems 
 proper for us to make the first great struggle there. But while thus 
 directing our main efforts, it is necessary to diminish the resistance 
 there offered us, by movements on other points, both by land and 
 water. 
 
 "Without entering at present into details, I would advise that a 
 strong movement be made on the Mississippi, and that the rebels be 
 driven out of Missouri. 
 
 "As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially 
 united with us, I would advise a movement through that state into 
 Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that 
 region, and of seizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the East. 
 
 " The possession of those roads by us, in connection with the move- 
 ment on the Mississippi, would go far towards determining the evacua- 
 tion of Virginia by the rebels. In the mean time all the passes into 
 Western Virginia from the east should be securely guarded, but I 
 would advise no movement from that quarter towards Richmond, unless 
 the political condition of Kentucky renders it impossible or inexpe- 
 dient for us to make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee through 
 that state. Every effort should, however, be made to organize, equip, 
 and arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order to 
 render the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other operations. 
 
 "At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to protect and 
 reopen the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Baltimore and Fort Monroe 
 should be occupied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in our 
 possession. 
 
 " The importance of Harper's Ferry and the lino of the Potomac in 
 the direction of Leesburg will be very materially diminished, so soon 
 as our force in this vicinity becomes organized, strong, and efficient, 
 because no capable general will cross the river north of this city, when 
 we have a strong army here ready to cut off his retreat. 
 
 " To revert to the West. It is probable that no very large additions 
 to the troops now in Missouri will be necessary to secure that state. 
 
 " I presume that the force required for the movement down the Mis- 
 sissippi will be determined by its commander and the President. If 
 Kentucky assumes the right position, not more than 20,000 will be 
 needed, together with those that can be raised in that state and East- 
 ern Tennessee, to secure tho latter region and its railroads, as well as 
 ultimately to occupy Nashville. 
 
12 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 " The Western Virginia troops, with not more than five to ten thou- 
 sand from Ohio and Indiana, should, under proper management, suf- 
 fice for its protection. 
 
 " When -we have reorganized our main army here, 10,000 men ought 
 to be enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Po- 
 tomac ; 5000 -will garrison Baltimore ; 3000 Fort Monroe ; and not 
 more than 20,000 will be necessary, at the utmost, for the defenco of 
 Washington. 
 
 " For the main army of operations I urge the following composition : 
 
 250 regiments of infantry, say 225,000 men. 
 
 100 field batteries, 600 guns 15,000 " 
 
 28 regiments of cavalry 25,500 
 
 5 regiments engineer troops 7,500 
 
 
 Total 273,000 " 
 
 " The force must be supplied -with the necessary engineer and pon- 
 toon trains, and with transportation for everything save tents. Its 
 general line of operations should be so directed that water transporta- 
 tion can be availed of from point to point, by means of the ocean and 
 the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of the plan of opera- 
 tions will be the employment of a strong naval force to protect the 
 movement of a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable 
 body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either 
 creating diversions and rendering it necessary for them to detach 
 largely from their main body in order to protect such of their cUies 
 as may be threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on 
 their coast at any favorable places that opportunity might offer. This 
 naval force should also co-operate with the main army in its efforts to 
 seize the important seaboard towns of the rebels. 
 
 " It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads has intro- 
 duced a new and very important element into war, by the great facilities 
 thus given for concentrating at particular positions largo masses of 
 troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and 
 lines of operations. 
 
 " It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations 
 suggested, and such others as the particular ease may require. Wo 
 must endeavor to seize places on the railways in the rear of the ene- 
 my's points of concentration, and we must threaten their seaboard 
 cities, in order that each state may be forced, by the necessity of its 
 own defence, to diminish its contingent to the Confederate army. 
 
 " The proposed movement down the Mississippi will produce import- 
 ant results in this connection. That advance and the progress of the 
 main army at the East will materially assist each other by diminishing 
 the resistance to be encountered by each. 
 
 " The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all questions con- 
 nected with cotton is too well understood by the President and cabinet 
 to need any illustration from me. 
 
 "There is another independent movement that has often been sug- 
 gested, and which lias always recommended itself to my judgment ; I 
 refer to a movement from Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian 
 territory upon Red river and Western Texas, for the purpose of pro- 
 tecting and developing the latent Union and free-state sentiment well 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 13 
 
 known to predominate in Western Texas, and which, like a similar 
 sentiment in Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately orgauize 
 that section into a free state. How far it will be possible to support 
 this movement by an advance through New Mexico from California, is 
 a matter which I have not sufficiently examined to be able to express a 
 decided opinion. If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, as 
 bringing into play the resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific 
 states, as well as identifying them with our cause, and connecting the 
 bond of Union between them and the General Government. 
 
 " If it is not departing too far from my province, I will venture to 
 suggest the policy of an ultimate alliance and cordial understanding 
 with Mexico ; their sympathies and interests are with us — their anti- 
 pathies exclusively agaiust our enemies and their institutions. I think 
 it would not be difficult to obtain from the Mexican Government the 
 right to use, at least during the present contest, the road from Guaymas to 
 New Mexico ; this concession would very materially reduce the obstacles 
 of the column moving from the Pacific ; a similar permission to use 
 their territory for the passage of troops between the Panuco and the 
 Rio Grande would enable us to throw a column ol troops by a good 
 road from Tampicd, or some of the small harbors north of it, upon and 
 across the Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot. 
 
 " To what extent, if- any, it would be desirable to take into servico 
 and employ Mexican soldiers, is a question entirely political, on which 
 I do not venture to offer an opinion. 
 
 " The force I have recommended is large ; the expense is great. It 
 
 is possible that a smaller force might accomplish the object in view, 
 
 but I understand it to be the purpose of this great nation to re-establish 
 
 the power of its Government, and restore peace to its citizens, in the 
 
 .shortest possible time. 
 
 " The question to be decided is simply this : Shall we crush the re- 
 bellion at one blow, terminate the war in one campaign, or shall we 
 leave it as a legacy for our descendants ? 
 
 " When the extent of the possible line of operation is considered, 
 the force asked for for the main army under my command cannot bo 
 regarded as unduly large; every mile we advance carries us further 
 from our base of operations, and renders detachm-ents necessary to cover 
 our communications, while the enemy will be constantly concentrating 
 as he falls back. I propose, with the force which I have requested, not 
 only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to 
 occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and 
 New Orleans ; in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's 
 country, and crush the rebellion iu its very heart. 
 
 " By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, the diffi- 
 culties of transportation will be materially diminished. It is perhap's 
 unnecessary to state that, in addition to the forces named in this memo- 
 randum, strong reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses 
 that may occur. 
 
 " In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of the treasury 
 may be lessened by making only partial payments to our troops, when 
 in the enemy's country, and by giving the obligations of the United 
 States for such supplies as may there be obtained. 
 
 " George B. McClellan, 
 
 " Major-General." 
 
14 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 In this document is found General McClellan's plan of operations. 
 Had the Administration given him what he desired, instead of meanly 
 higgling about it; had they allowed him to control his subordinates; 
 and had they adopted his ideas on the negro and other vexed questions, 
 who can say that General McClellan would not have been successful? 
 
 As soon as the fright occasioned by Bull Kun had worn off, the Ad- 
 ministration began urging a second forward movement. McClellan 
 was asked how many men he required, and in the latter part of Octo- 
 ber he gave his answer, specifying the number necessary for the column 
 of active operations, and the number required to garrison Washington 
 and its neighboring defences. These numbers were as follows : — 
 
 Column of active operations .... 150,000 men, 400 guns. 
 Garrison of the city of Washington . . 35,000 " 40 " 
 To guard the Potomac to Harper's Perry 5000 " 12 " 
 To guard the lower Potomac .... 8000 " 24 " 
 Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis, . 10,000 " 12 " 
 
 Total effective force required .... 208,000 men, 488 guns. 
 
 Or, making allowances for sickness, the total number required was in 
 round numbers two hundred and forty thousand. The enemy were 
 known to have concentrated one hundred and fifty thousand men 
 around Richmond and at Manassas. 
 
 The forward movement was not pressed, however, the army being 
 notoriously too weak in October to attempt it. General McClellan still* 
 labored on at the organization of his forces. As fast as new regiments 
 arrived from the North, they were sent to camps of instruction. When 
 sufficiently advanced, they were brigaded, and sent to the south bank 
 of the river. He also built a line of earthworks around Washington, 
 which made it almost impregnable. The latter months of 1801 were 
 among the busiest of his life. During that time his army steadily in- 
 creased in efficiency and numbers. Its effective strength for different 
 periods is given below : — 
 
 October 15th 1801 133,201 
 
 December 1st 1861 169,452 
 
 January 1st 1862 191,480 
 
 February 1st 1802 190,800 
 
 March 1st 1862 193,142 
 
 Organization of the Army. 
 
 The organization of the army was first into brigades of four or fivi 
 regiments each, and then into divisions, each of three brigades. The 
 artillery was in the proportion of two and one-half pieces to a thou 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 15 
 
 6find infantry soldiers. The cavalry was one regiment to each division 
 of infantry, and in addition an independent force of from eight to ten 
 thousand. 
 
 On October 15th, the different divisions were as follows : — 
 
 Cavalry under General George Stoneman. 
 
 Artillery under General II. J. Hunt. 
 
 Infantry. General Porter's City Guard, acting as the provost-mar- 
 shal's force of Washington. 
 
 Banks's Division of three brigades, commanded by Generals Amber- 
 crombie, Stiles, and Gordon. 
 
 McDowell's Division — Generals Kcyes, Wadsworth, and King. 
 
 Heintzeknan's Division — Generals Richardson, Sedgwick, and Jame- 
 son. 
 
 Fitz-John Porter's Division — Generals Morell, Martindale, and But- 
 terfield. 
 
 Franklin's Division — Generals Kearney, Slocum, and Newton. 
 
 Stone's Division — Generals Gorman, Lander, and Baker. 
 
 Buell's Division — Generals Couch, Graham, and Peck. 
 
 McCall's Division — Generals Meade, Seymour, and Reynolds. 
 
 Hooker's Division of two brigades, under Generals Birney and 
 Sickles. 
 
 Smith's Division — Generals Stevens, Hancock, and Brooks. 
 
 Blenkcr's Independent German Brigade. 
 
 Dix's Division of ten regiments, at Baltimore. 
 
 On March 8th, 1862, these divisions were made up into army coijis. 
 
 The First Corps, under McDowell, consisted of the divisions of Frank- 
 lin, McCall, and King. 
 
 The Second Corps, under Sumner, consisted of the divisions of Rich- 
 ardson, Blenker, and Sedgwick. 
 
 The Third Corps, under Hcintzelman, consisted of the divisions of 
 Fitz-John Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton. 
 
 The Fourth Corps, under Kcyes, consisted of the divisions of Couch, 
 Smith, and Casey. 
 
 The Fifth Corps, under Banks, had two divisions under Williams 
 and Shields. 
 
 [The casualties of the service between October and March made 
 many changes in the commanders of the divisions, hence the discrepan- 
 cies between this latter list and the first one.] 
 
 The Position of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 The military history of the Army of the Potomac, after General Mc- 
 Clellan assumed its command, begins about the middle of October 1801. 
 
1G LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 The main body was then in the immediate vicinity of "Washington, 
 •with detachments on the north hank of tho Potomac, as far down as 
 Liverpool Point and as far up as Williamsport. On October 19th Ge- 
 neral McCall, who was posted at Langley, on the south side of tho 
 river above Washington, was ordered to make a reconnoissance to 
 Drainsville. He did so, and occupied tho town. This frightened the 
 enemy on the Potomac above, and they at once withdrew from Lees- 
 burg. On the 20th, their retreat being rumored, General McClellan's 
 adjutant-general sent the following telegram to General Stone at 
 Poolesville : — 
 
 "General McClellan desires me to inform you that General McCall 
 occupied Drainsville yesterday, and is still there. Will send out 
 heavy reconnoissances to-day in all directions from that point. The 
 general desires that you will keep a good look-out upon Leesburg, to 
 see if this movement has the effect to drive them away- Perhaps a 
 slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move 
 them." 
 
 McClellan not responsible for the Defeat at Ball's Bluff. 
 
 By this request, McClellan merely wished General Stone to make 
 some display of an intention to cross the Potomac, and also to watch 
 the enemy more closely than usual. McClellan says in his report : " I 
 did not direct him to cross, nor did I intend that he should cross tho 
 river in force for the purpose of fighting." At eleven o'clock on the 
 morning of the 20th General Stone received the order, and in the evening 
 he sent an answer which indicated that he had done what was expected. 
 Stone telegraphed: "I made a feint of crossing at this place (Pooles- 
 ville) this afternoon, and at the same time started a reconnoitring 
 party towards Leesburg from Harrison's Island." McClellan of course 
 thought the movement was over, and recalled McCall from Drainsville. 
 What was his surprise to hear from General Stone on the morning of 
 the 21st, "The enemy have been engaged opposite Harrison's Island; 
 our men are behaving admirably ;" and in the evening the startling 
 announcement, " I am occupied in preventing further disaster, and try- 
 ing to get into a position to redeem. We have lost some of our best 
 commanders — Baker dead, Cogswell a prisoner or secreted." 
 
 McClellan at once ordered McCall to be in readiness to march back 
 to Drainsville, and Banks to send aid to Stone from Harper's Ferry, 
 and on the 22d he went himself to Poolesville, and did everything pos- 
 sible to rescue the remnants of Baker's brave troops. McClellan clearly 
 is not to blame for this disaster, and the manly testimony of General 
 Stone before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, on January 5th 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 17 
 
 1862, fully exonerates hiin. He was asked various questions about the 
 reconnoissance to Ball's Bluff, which resulted in the disaster. 
 
 Question. "Did this reconnoissance originate with yourself, or had 
 you orders from the general-in chief to make it ?" 
 
 To which he replied : "It originated with myself — the reconnois- 
 sance." 
 
 Question. "The order did not proceed from General McClellan?" 
 
 Answer. " I was directed the day before to make a demonstration ; 
 that demonstration was made the day previous." 
 
 Question. "Did you receive an order from the general-in-chief to 
 make the reconnoissance V 
 
 Answer. "No, sir." 
 
 General McClellan made Commander-in-chief. 
 
 On November 1st 1861, Licutenant-General Scott retired from the 
 command of the Federal armies, and General McClellan was at once 
 made Commander-in-chief. This gave him a more enlarged sphere of 
 action, and he speedily formed his plans for carrying on the war on an 
 extensive scale all over the Union. He suggested and put in execution 
 the famous Burnside expedition to North Carolina, which early in 1862 
 effected a landing on the coast and captured the eastern section of "the 
 state. General Butler's expedition was sent to New Orleans at his 
 instance, and the capture of that city was owing to the full and explicit 
 instructions given by McClellan in a letter dated February 23d 1862. 
 General Halleck was ordered to the West, and the brilliant victories at 
 Forts Donelson and Henry, early in 1862, were planned by McClellan 
 and achieved almost under his supervision. Everywhere, whilst he 
 was at the head of the army, the Federal arms were successful. "Whilst 
 he controlled matters in his own way, and the Administration did not 
 interfere with his plans, General McClellan secured victory after vic- 
 tory, and was rapidly conquering the enemy. Partisan jealousy, how- 
 ever, prompted by envy of his successes, and opposition to his humane 
 plans of warfare, soon drove him from the command — with what sad 
 results the people well know. 
 
 General McClellan's Mode of treating the Enemy. 
 
 In his instructions to all of these high officers on assigning them 
 their duties, General McClellan still adhered to his original ideas about 
 slaves and private property. On January 7th 1862 he wrote to Burn- 
 side, then about sailing for North Carolina : — 
 
 "I would urge great caution in regard to proclamations. In no case 
 would I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation with the naval com- 
 mander, which should say as little as possible about politics or the 
 negro; merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the 
 preservation of the Union, and upholding the laws of the General Go- 
 
18 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 vernment, and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, 
 as far as possible, bo protected in their persons and property." 
 
 To General Ilalleck, at St. Louis, ho -wrote on November 11th 
 1861 :— 
 
 " In regard to the political conduct of affairs, you -will please labor 
 to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adjacent states 
 that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the 
 power of our National Government, and to restore to the nation the 
 blessings of peace and good order." 
 
 On November 7th 1861, he wrote to General Buell, at Louisville, 
 commanding the department of the Ohio : — 
 
 " You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for 
 which we are lighting ; that issue is the preservation of the Union and 
 the restoration of the full authority of the General Government over all 
 portions of our territory. We shall most readily suppress this rebellion, 
 and restore the authority of the Government, by religiously respecting 
 the constitutional rights of all. I know that I express the feelings and 
 opinion of the President when I say that we are fighting only to pre- 
 serve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of tho 
 General Government. 
 
 " The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic 
 institutions will in no manner be interfered with, and that they will 
 receive at our hands every constitutional protection. I have only to 
 repeat that you will in all respects carefully regard the local institu- 
 tions of the region in which you command, allowing nothing but the 
 dictates of military necessity to cause you to depart from the spirit of 
 these instructions." 
 
 And again, on November 11th, he wrote about military arrests to 
 Buell :— 
 
 " Preserve the strictest discipline among the troops, and while em- 
 ploying the utmost energy in military movements, be careful so to treat 
 the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing 
 between us and the rebels. 
 
 " I mean by this that it is the desire of the Government to avoid un- 
 necessary irritation by causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. 
 Where there is good reason to believe that persons are actually giving 
 aid, comfort, or information to the enemy, it is of course necessary to 
 arrest them ; but I have always found that it is the tendency of subor- 
 dinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it 
 well to direct that no arrests shall be made except by your order or 
 that of your generals, unless in extraordinary cases, always holding 
 the party making the arrest responsible for the propriety of his course. 
 It should be our constant aim to make it apparent to all that their pro- 
 perty, their comfort, and their personal safety will be best preserved 
 by adhering to the cause of the Union." 
 
 Had these principles been adhered to by the Administration after- 
 ward, there would not now have been that rancor in the South which 
 leads to reprisals and raids. 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 19 
 
 The Potomac Blockade. 
 
 During the latter part of 1861, various newspapers and a large party 
 in the North had been urging another forward movement, and by Janu- 
 ary 1862 they had won the Administration over to their views. Simon 
 Cameron ceased to be Secretary of War, and was succeeded by Edwin 
 M. Stanton, who brought with him none of the requirements of the 
 position, but who continually overruled the conduct of military men. 
 The Confederates had blockaded the lower Potomac, and there was 
 great anxiety on General McClellan's part to have them driven away. 
 The army could not do it, except by great loss ; the navy easily could. 
 As early as August 12th 1861, before the enemy had planted their bat- 
 teries there, McClellan wrote to Secretary Welles that they intended to 
 erect batteries on the lower Potomac, and urging " that the strongest 
 possible naval force be at once concentrated near the mouth of Aquia 
 Creek, and that the most vigilant watch be maintained day and night." 
 The navy department, however, with that tardiness which characterizes 
 all its movements, failed to send the force, and the enemy erected the 
 batteries unopposed. The army was powerless to prevent it. General 
 Barnard, the chief engineer, after a reconnoissance made by him in 
 September, reported that the erection of batteries "cannot be pre- 
 vented" by the army ; and it was the opinion of high naval officers, as 
 cited in General McClellan's report, that " had an adequate force of 
 strong and well-armed vessels been acting on the Potomac from the be- 
 ginning of August, it would have been next to impossible for the rebels 
 to have constructed or maintained batteries upon the banks of the 
 river." If the navy department did not clear the river, the only way 
 for the army to do it was by manoeuvring. It did so. The movement 
 out to Manassas early in 1862, caused the enemy hastily to abandon 
 their works, and the Potomac was opened without tho loss of a man. 
 
 A Forward. Movement. 
 
 Scarcely had 1862 begun, when the Administration urged upon 
 General McClellan to push forward. He cheerfully complied with the 
 President's request for a plan of operations, and very soon after Mr. 
 Stanton's entrance to office, McClellan communicated to him his writ- 
 ten plan : To proceed to the lower Chesapeake, land at Urbanna, on 
 the south bank of the Rappahannock, push across the country to West 
 Point, at the head of York river, and thence towards Richmond. This 
 began the disagreement between McClellan and the Administration. 
 Mr. Lincoln had a different plan, and on January 31st he issued his 
 order, which was this : — 
 
20 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, 
 after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into 
 an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a 
 
 Si 'int upon the railroad southwest-ward of what is known as Manassas 
 unction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, 
 and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. 
 
 "Abraham Lincoln." 
 
 This order to advance against Manassas Junction was issued without 
 consultation with General McClellan. That it would have involved a 
 great loss of life, and probably a defeat, no one can doubt. McClellan 
 wished to go around Manassas. He could secure its evacuation far 
 easier and with less loss of life in that way. The subsequent evacua- 
 tion on his march to the Peninsula, proved the wisdom of his plan, and 
 the failures of all subsequent commanders of the Army of the Potomac 
 to make any impression upon the enemy at Richmond, by that route, 
 and the defeats of Pope, Hooker, and Burnside when they attempted 
 it, prove, more than any argument can do, the justice of the remon- 
 strance which McClellan at once made against the President's order. 
 
 On February 3d, General McClellan sent a long communication to 
 Mr. Lincoln, which embodied his reasons for the route by Urbanna and 
 his objections to the attack upon Manassas Junction. In this he makes 
 some remarks upon the great labors performed since he assumed com- 
 mand of the army, which can well be pardoned when every one was 
 crying at him to move forward. He says : — 
 
 " I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on 
 Saturday, July 27th 1861, six days after the battle of Bull Run. 
 
 " I found no army to command ; a mere collection of regiments cow- 
 ering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirit- 
 ed by the recent defeat. 
 
 " Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern 
 approaches to the capital by means of defensive works ; nothing what- 
 ever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the 
 northern side of the Potomac. 
 
 " The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled, and dispirited ; 
 they were not even placed in military positions. The city was almost 
 in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. 
 
 " Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to 
 me; that task the honorable Secretary knows was given to me with- 
 out solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will 
 be best shown by the past and the present. 
 
 "The capital is secure against attack, the extensive fortifications 
 erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it 
 against a numerous army, the enemy have been held in check, the 
 state of Maryland is securely in our possession, the detached counties 
 of Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, and all apprehension 
 of trouble in Delaware is at an end: the enemy are confined to the po- 
 sitions they occupied before the disaster of the 21st July. More than 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 21 
 
 all this, I have now under my command a well-drilled and reliahle 
 army, to which the destinies of the country may he confidently commit- 
 ted. This army is young and untried in battle ; but is animated by 
 the highest spirit, and is capable of great deeds. 
 
 " That so much has been accomplished and such an army created in 
 so short a time, from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the 
 highest glories of the Administration and the nation.'" 
 
 He then goes on with his argument, which is conclusive against the 
 Manassas route and in favor of the one by Urbanna. A third one by 
 Fortress Monroe (the route ultimately taken) had been suggested, but 
 General McClellan objected to it on the ground that it would not per- 
 mit the same celerity and brilliancy of results as the ono by Urbanna. 
 Still if ordered to go to Fortress Monroe he would do so, although he 
 preferred the Urbanna route. This communication produced some 
 effect on the President. He gave up the Manassas route, but ordered 
 the movement up the Peninsula from Fortress Monroe. 
 
 Previous to making the movement, General McClellan went to Har- 
 per's Ferry, and on the 8th and 9th of March made such dispositions 
 of troops as compelled the enemy to abandon the Baltimore and Ohio 
 Railroad, and that road was at once opened to traffic, remaining so 
 until Pope, by his mismanagement in the summer of 1862, allowed the 
 enemy to seize it. On General McClellan's return from Harper's 
 Ferry, the President sent for him and renewed his expressions of dis- 
 satisfaction at the route by the lower Chesapeake. Somebody outsido 
 had been at work, but a conversation with McClellan again made Mr. 
 Lincoln apparently acquiesce in the choice. 
 
 General McClellan trammelled. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln did it but apparently, however, for without consultation 
 with General McClellan, he very soon afterwards issued an order for 
 the formation of army corps, and another in which he commanded that 
 no more than fifty thousand troops should be moved to the lower Poto- 
 mac until the blockade of the Potomac was raised, and that the move- 
 ment should be made in ten days, or by the 18th of March. There is 
 but little use of commenting upon these orders. They certainly showed 
 Mr. Lincoln's ignorance of military matters. General McClellan was 
 in favor of forming army corps, and intended to do so, as he says him- 
 self, as soon as the movements in the field familiarized men sufficiently 
 with the evolutions of large bodies. There were no officers in the army 
 experienced enough to have taken command of so large a force as an 
 army corps, and McClellan wished some little time to choose those most 
 competent. But army corps were at once formed, however. The other 
 order needs little comment, as we know that the enemy hastily abandoned 
 
22 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 the Potomac blockade, as soon as the movement to the Peninsula began. 
 To go with fifty thousand troops to Fortress Monroe, and begin offen- 
 sive operations, would have been useless. These -were not the only 
 interferences with McClellau's plans. They became more and more 
 frequent, as we shall quickly see. 
 
 The Confederates evacuate Manassas. 
 
 ■ 
 
 On March 9th, information was brought to Washington, from various 
 sources, that the Confederates were abandoning all their positions at 
 Manassas, Centreville, and the upper and lower Potomac. Their with- 
 drawal so quickly was anticipated by no one, and at that time the 
 roads between Alexandria and Manassas were in such bad condition 
 that General McClellan was deprived of the opportunity for inflicting 
 damage usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face 
 of a powerful adversary. As McClellan intended soon to embark his 
 troops for the Peninsula, he saw no advantage to be gained by follow- 
 ing the enemy from Manassas, but as a march from Alexandria to that 
 place and back would not delay the movement, and would familiarize 
 the troops with the rigors of an active campaign, new to all of them, 
 and possibly be of use in harassing the enemy's rear, on the evening 
 of March 9th he ordered an advance. At noon on March 10th, the 
 cavalry entered the enemy's works, and found the stores and barracks 
 still burning. McClellan denies the stories- of quaker guns and weak 
 defences at Manassas, which were so extensively circulated at that 
 time. These falsehoods have long since been refuted, but his remarks 
 upon them are so dignified and manly that the reader must pardon 
 their insertion: — 
 
 " Summaries showing the character and results of the secret service 
 force accompany this report, and I refer to them for the facts they 
 contain, and as a measure of the ignorance which led some journals 
 at that time and persons in high office unwittingly to trifle with the 
 reputation of an army, and to delude the country with quaker gun 
 stories of the defences and gross understatements of the numbers of the 
 enemy." 
 
 From the reports of the secret service force, on March 8th, the 
 strength of the enemy on that day was estimated at 115,500 men, with 
 300 field-guns, and 2G to 30 siege-guns. This was exclusive of the 
 forces at Kichmond and Yorktown. Of the strength of the defences 
 around Manassas, there can be no doubt. A close examination of them 
 made by the engineers after the evacuation, developed the following 
 facts : — 
 
 " The works at Centreville consisted of two lines, one facing east 
 and the other north. The former consisted of seven works, viz. : one 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 23 
 
 bastion fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries ; all contain- 
 ing embrasures for forty guns, and connected by infantry parapets and 
 double caponieres. It extended along the crest of the ridge, a mile 
 and three-quarters from its junction with the northern front to ground 
 thickly wooded, and impassable to an attacking column. 
 
 " The northern front extended about one and one-fourth miles to 
 Great Rocky run, and thence three-fourths of a mile further to thickly- 
 wooded, impassable ground in the valley of Cub run. It consisted of 
 six lunettes and batteries with embrasures for thirty-one guns, con- 
 nected by an infantry parapet in the form of a cremaillere line with 
 redans. At the town of Centreville, on a high hill commanding the 
 rear of all the works within range, was a large hexagonal redoubt with 
 ten embrasures. 
 
 " Manassas station was defended in all directions by a system of 
 detached works, with platforms for heavy guns arranged for marine 
 carriages, and often connected by infantry parapets. This system 
 was rendered complete by a very large work, with sixteen embrasures, 
 which commanded the highest of the other works by about fifty feet. 
 
 " From this it will be seen that the positions selected, by the enemy 
 at Centreville and Manassas were naturally very strong, with impass- 
 able streams and broken ground, affording ample protection for their 
 flanks, and that strong lines of intrenchments swept all the available 
 approaches." 
 
 There have been enough defeats at heavy works since the evacua- 
 tion of Manassas, to prove McClellan's wisdom in not attacking these, 
 but compelling their evacuation by a flank movement. Ever since 
 McClellan, by his turning Manassas Junction, compelled its evacua- 
 tion, it has been in possession of the Federal troops. For a few days 
 Pope lost it, but McClellan, replaced in command, quickly regained it. 
 The people very well know all these facts. ♦ 
 
 The reconnoissances sent to Manassas Junction did not stop there, 
 however. They followed the enemy all the way to the Rappahannock, 
 harassing the rear. As the Confederates retired across the stream, 
 they blew up the bridge after them. They never recrossed until bad 
 management in the summer of 1862 enticed them over. 
 
 '.-> - 
 
 The Army embarks for the Peninsula. 
 
 On the 15th of March, the main body of the Army of the Potomac 
 returned from Manassas to Alexandria, preparatory to embarking for 
 Fortress Monroe. The route by Urbanna was given up, but the Pe- 
 ninsula was only selected by a council of war of the commanders of 
 army corps, and accepted by General McClellan because the authorities 
 guaranteed that certain conditions would be complied with. These 
 conditions were, 
 
 " 1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neutralized. 
 
 " 2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate 
 
24 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and 
 Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and 
 
 "3d, That a naval auxiliary force can be had, to silence, or aid in 
 silencing, the enemy's batteries on York river. 
 
 " That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to 
 give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace." 
 
 Generals Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell thought that, for the 
 protection of Washington, "with the forts on the right bank of the 
 Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a cover- 
 ing force, in front of tho Virginia line, of 25,000 men would suffice ;" 
 and General Sumner was of opinion that " a total of 40,000 men for 
 the defence of the city would suffice." 
 
 Tho President having guaranteed these conditions, General McClel- 
 lan at once began his movement, and with it commenced new difficulties 
 with the Administration. On March 19th, he wrote to the Secretary 
 of War :— 
 
 " It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the 
 full co-operation of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it 
 the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be 
 forced to carry in front several strong positions, which, by their aid, 
 could be turned without serious loss of either time or men." 
 
 That the navy did not co-operate, that it failed to neutralize the Mer- 
 rimac, rendered no assistance at Yorktown, and did not open the James 
 river, will be seen as we progress. 
 
 General McClellan then embarked his troops for Fort Monroe. The 
 transports came to Alexandria slowly, and instead of being able to 
 carry the army en masse, it had to go by divisions. It was two weeks 
 before all had sailed. 
 
 General McClellan's Force curtailed. 
 
 The President had promised McClellan all his army. But scarcely 
 had any of it sailed to the Peninsula, when he began to curtail it. On 
 March 31st, Mr. Lincoln wrote to McClellan: "This morning I felt 
 constrained to order Blenker's division to General Fremont." This, 
 at one stroke, cut off ten thousand men, and of it McClellan says : — 
 
 " To this I replied, in substance, that I regretted the order, and 
 could ill afford to lose ten thousand troops which had been counted upon 
 in forming my plan of campaign, but as there was no remedy, I would 
 yield, and do the best I could without them. In a conversation with 
 the President, a few hours afterwards, I repeated verbally the same 
 thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker's division had been given 
 to General Fremont from any pressure other than the requirements of 
 the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the Pre- 
 sident's nositive and emphatic assurance that I might be confident that 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 25 
 
 no more troops beyond these ten thousand should in any event be taken 
 from me, or in any way detached from my command." 
 
 " The President's positive and emphatic assurance" amounted to 
 nothing, however. Five days afterward, when at Fortress Monroe, his 
 troops matching to attack Yorktown, and he anxiously awaiting the 
 arrival of General McDowell's corps to assist in the attack, McClellan 
 received the following despatch, dated April 4th, and signed by Adju- 
 tant-General Thomas : — 
 
 "By direction of the President, General McDowell's army corps has 
 been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the 
 general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War." 
 
 Of this order General McClellan remarks in his report : — 
 
 " The President having promised, in an interview following his order 
 of March 31st, withdrawing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my 
 command, that nothing of the sort should be repeated — that I might 
 rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no further deduc- 
 tions from the force upon which it's operations had been planned — 1 
 may confess to having been shocked at this order, which, with that of 
 the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, removed nearly 60,000 men from 
 my command, and reduced my force by more than one-third, after its 
 task had been assigned ; its operations planned ; its fighting begun. 
 To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for 
 impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to 
 withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had 
 been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different, and a 
 less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations 
 impossible. It was a fatal error." 
 
 Even tills was not enough. General Wool had been ordered to give 
 General McClellan a division of ten thousand troops. But how it was 
 complied with, the following extract from McClellan's report tells : — ■ 
 
 " During the night of April 3d I received a telegram from the Adju- 
 tant-General, of the army, stating that, by the President's order, I was 
 deprived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his 
 command, and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanc- 
 tion. 
 
 " This order left mo without any base of operations under my own 
 control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it." 
 
 It is no wonder that, after these troops had been withdrawn, General 
 McClellan wrote a little tartly, and to Secretary Stanton telegraphed, 
 on April 7th, with some irony : — 
 
 " I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole 
 force and material of the Government will be as fully and as speedily 
 under my command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had 
 not been created. 
 
 " Since my arrangements were made for this campaign, at least fifty 
 thousand men have been taken from my command." 
 
26 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 To the President, on the same day, he telegraphed that he could 
 muster but eighty-five thousand uieu. 
 
 The Defences of Washington. 
 
 The reasons given for the withdrawal of so large a body of troops 
 were that Washington was endangered. We will briefly examine this 
 assertion, for we think General McClellan left it amply protected. Not 
 only did his advance up the Peninsula keep the enemy so much engaged 
 that they could detach no force against Washington, but had they done 
 so, there were enough men in the iutrenehments to resist any assault. 
 General McClellan, when he sailed for the Peninsula, left at Washing- 
 ton, exclusive of any force which he intended to take with him, 67,428 
 men and 85 cannon. This is reported in a letter from him to the adju- 
 tant-general, dated April 1st 1862. The matter had previously been 
 referred to a military commission, who reported that fifty-five thousand 
 men were amply sufficient to defend the capital. A correspondence 
 upon the subject has already been made public, which fully exonerates 
 McClellan, and shows that the President had no reason for withdraw 
 ing McDowell and Blenkcr from the Peninsular expedition. 
 
 The Advance begins. 
 
 General McClellan, as quickly as possible, landed his troops at Port- 
 ress Monroe, and began the advance against Yorktown. New difficul- 
 ties, however, interposed. He had been promised that the navy 
 would co-operate, and that the Merrimac would be neutralized. As- 
 sistant Secretory of the Navy Fox testified before the Committee on 
 the Conduct of the War : " General McClellan expected the navy to 
 neutralize the Merrimac, and I promised that it should be done." And 
 General Keys testified, that before he would consent to the Peninsula 
 line of operations, he asked two questions of the navy department: 
 First, whether the Merrimac was neutralized ; and second, whether 
 the navy could co-operate efficiently with the army to break through 
 the enemy's lines at Yorktown and Gloucester Point. General Keyes 
 says : " To both of these, answers were returned in the affirmative." 
 
 The navy, however, did not co-operate at Yorktown. General McClel- 
 lan says in his report : — 
 
 " On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James river was declared by the 
 naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the com- 
 bined influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the Confede- 
 rate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag 
 Officer Gpldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron 
 in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as Ids highest 
 ami most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimac ; and 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 27 
 
 as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, 
 he did not feel aide to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable 
 force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All 
 this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me, and ma- 
 terially affected my plans. 
 
 "At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy 
 prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after 
 our land batteries had partially silenced the works. 
 
 Yorktown captured. 
 
 Unaided by the navy, and deprived of one-third of his command, he 
 sat down to the siege of Yorktown. On April 17th he began his ap- 
 proaches, and with such success that on May 4th the enemy evacuated 
 all their works and retreated up the Peninsula, leaving their heavy 
 guns and camp equipage behind them. In seventeen days General 
 McClellan overcame one of the strongest lines of fortifications ever 
 built on this continent, and did so with little loss of men or material. 
 
 During and previous to the siege, a correspondence was kept up 
 between McClellan and President Lincoln, and Lincoln at last con- 
 sented to detach one of McDowell's divisions to reinforce him. General 
 Franklin's division of ten thousand men was ordered to embark and 
 join the army in front of Yorktown. It arrived too late, however, to 
 be of any service in the siege. 
 
 Early on the morning of May 4th 18G2, the enemy abandoned their 
 works at Yorktown, and hastily retreated up the Peninsula. The 
 army was at once ordered to follow, and then began the famous advance 
 on Richmond by which General McClellan penetrated to within four 
 miles of the city. Great difficulties were encountered in the march. 
 General McClellan says : — 
 
 V In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious 
 difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical 
 information as to the country in advance. Correct local maps were not 
 to be found, and the country, though known in its general features, we 
 found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only 
 maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be 
 had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, 
 and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. 
 This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of 
 the state of Virginia, through which my military operations have ex- 
 tended. Reconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trust- 
 worthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, 
 possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no com- 
 prehensive topographical information." 
 
 Besides this, the roads were narrow and tortuous ; the country 
 thickly wooded ; the soil of such a character that a few hours' rain 
 
28 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 produced such deep mud that no carriages could be dragged through 
 it ; and altogether the obstacles were so great that no one unacquainted 
 with that section can conceive of them. 
 
 Battle of Williamsburg. 
 
 Still the enemy were pursued from Yorktown. Early on the 4th of 
 May, General Stoneman, with the advance, marched after them. Ho 
 was closely followed by the divisions of Hooker, Casey, Couch, and 
 Kearney, and Generals Sumner and Heintzelman were sent to the front 
 to take charge of the operations, whilst General McClellan embarked 
 Franklin's, Porter's, Richardson's, and Sedgwick's divisions from York- 
 town, to sail up the river and flank the enemy. 
 
 The land forces caught up with the retreating columns at Williams- 
 burg. Here there were heavy intrenchments commanding all the roads. 
 General Stoneman reached Williamsburg at noon on the 4th, and began 
 the attack at once. Smith, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes soon 
 arrived and became engaged. The battle was kept up all day. Dur- 
 ing the night Generals Hooker and Kearney arrived, and the contest 
 was again begun early on the morning of the 5th. General Hancock, 
 who commanded a brigade of Smith's corps, made a most brilliant 
 charge. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited the onset of the enemy, 
 and then turned upon them. After some terrific volleys of musketry, 
 he charged with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force, 
 killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men, he himself 
 losing only 31 men. After fighting all day, night again put an end to 
 the operations, and the troops slept upon their arms. Under cover of 
 the darkness the enemy abandoned their works at Williamsburg, leav- 
 ing their wounded and numerous, cannon behind them. The Federal 
 army at once marched in and took possession. The loss at this battle 
 was, killed, 456, wounded, 1400, missing, 372, total, 2228. 
 
 The Victory at West Point. 
 
 Whilst the battle at Williamsburg was raging, the division of Gene- 
 ral Franklin was sent up the York river to West Point. Here the 
 enemy appeared in force, and endeavored to prevent a landing, but 
 after a short contest they were driven off. The Federal loss was 49 
 killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing: total, 194. Sedgwick, Richard- 
 son, and Porter immediately landed and joined Franklin, and a junc- 
 tion was at once effected with the victorious troops at Williamsburg. 
 
 These brilliant victories following so closely the evacuation of York- 
 town, won the admiration of the entire country. Praises for General 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 29 
 
 McClellan were upon every tongue. With less force than the enemy, 
 ho had repeatedly defeated them. Shorn of part of his army, his 
 plans interfered with, and his actions trammelled, he had been most 
 successful. A discomfited enemy was retreating before him, and he 
 was rapidly hastening forward to shut them up in their capital. No- 
 thing he could do, however, could satisfy the powers at Washington. 
 Success only inflamed the jealousies which rankled in the hearts of 
 those who saw a young and brave commander winning such great 
 fame. Instead of trusting in McClellan's ability, the Administration 
 continued to thwart his plans. 
 
 The Pursuit up the Peninsula. 
 
 The army at once advanced up the Peninsula in pursuit of the enemy. 
 On May 10th the head-quarters were at Roper's Church, nineteen miles 
 beyond Williamsburg, and almost at the same time, General Stoneman, 
 with the advance, captured White House, on the Pamunkey. On May 
 lGth the head-quarters reached White House, and a permanent supply 
 depot was at once established. On the 19th the head-quarters moved 
 to Tunstall's Station, nineteen miles from Richmond, and the advanco 
 guard reached the Chickahominy river at a point but ten miles from 
 Richmond. The enemy quickly retreated before these rapid advances, 
 and on May 21st the entire army was marching towards the Chicka- 
 hominy : General Sumner in the centre, with one corps ; Generals 
 Heintzelman and Keyes on the left, with two corps ; and Generals 
 Porter and Franklin with two corps on the right. 
 
 Commencement of the Siege of Richmond. 
 
 Richmond is situated on the James river, and is surrounded by a 
 country partly hilly and partly swampy and wooded. On the north 
 and east, the Chickahominy, a deep and sluggish stream flowing through 
 swampy bottom lands in many cases a mile wide, protects it. At Me- 
 chanicsville, north of Richmond, this river is about four miles from 
 the town. At Bottom's Bridge, east of Richmond, it is about ten miles 
 distant. It had been General McClellan's intention to attack Rich- 
 mond from the James river, where no swamps protected it, but the 
 failure of the navy to clear the James river until after the capture of 
 Yorktown, and the positive instructions of the President (as will be 
 seen below) to keep to the north and east of Richmond, to effect a junc- 
 tion with McDowell (who, by the way, was never sent to join him), 
 prevented it. General McClellan was compelled, therefore, to attack 
 the city from the Chickahominy, notwithstanding its disadvantages. 
 
30 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 His line of operations extended along that stream from Mechanicsville 
 to Bottom's Bridge, a distance of about nine miles. 
 
 The enemy having destroyed all the bridges across the Chicka- 
 hominy, General McClellan at onco set to work to build others, and 
 nearly all of his army, in the lirst days of the siege, was employed at 
 that labor. On the enemy's side, precipitous hills, strongly fortified, 
 rose up from the edge of the swamp which bordered the stream, and 
 the artillery did all that was possible to interfere with the bridge 
 builders. 
 
 Reinforcements asked for. 
 
 To meet the casualties of the siege, and to guard his communica- 
 tions, General McClellan felt more and more the need of the forces 
 which had been withheld from him. He knew the enemy would fight 
 desperately, and that ho would need every available man to make a 
 successful attack. He informed the authorities at Washington of his 
 necessities, and of the consequences if they continued to withhold 
 General McDowell's corps from him. On May 10th, he telegraphed 
 to Secretary Stanton, from Williamsburg: — 
 
 " From the information reaching me from every source, I regard it 
 as certain that the enemy will meet us with all his forces on or near 
 the Chickahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have, 
 and are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well-disciplined 
 troops from the South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards 
 have much reduced our numbers, and will continue to do so. I shall 
 fight the rebel army with whatever force I may have, but duty requires 
 me to urge that every effort be made to re-enforce me without delay 
 with all the disposable troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we concen- 
 trate all our forces, as far as possible, to fight the great battle now im- 
 pending, and to make it decisive. 
 
 " It is possible that the enemy may abandon Richmond without a 
 serious struggle ; but I do not believe he will, and it would be unwise 
 to count upon anything but a stubborn and desperate defense — a life 
 and death contest. I see no other hope for him than to fight this battle, 
 and we must win it. I shall fight them whatever their force may be, 
 but I ask for every man that the department can send me. No troops 
 should now be left unemployed. Those who entertain the opinion that 
 the rebels will abandon Richmond witho\it a struggle, are, in my judg- 
 ment badly advised, and do not comprehend their situation, which ia 
 one requiring desperate measures. 
 
 " I beg that the President and Secretary will maturely weigh what I 
 say, and leave nothing undone to comply with my request. If I am 
 not reinforced, it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly 
 double my numbers, strongly intrenched. I do not think it will be at 
 all possible for me to bring more than seventy thousand men upon the 
 field of battle." 
 
 On May 14th General McClellan, receiving no reply from the Secre- 
 tary of War, telegraphed to the President : — 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 31 
 
 " I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating 
 that, in my opinion, the enemy were concentrating all their available 
 force to iiglit this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought ta 
 be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these 
 telegraphs." ********** 
 
 "Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened 
 my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle 
 against the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the utmost, and 
 with them I must attack in position, probably intrenched, a much 
 larger force, perhaps double my numbers." * * 
 
 " I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your excellency that 
 the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the 
 Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be re-enforced 
 without delay by all the disposable troops of the Government. I ask 
 for every man that the War Department can send me. Any commander 
 of the re-enforcements whom your excellency may designate will be 
 acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed 
 to you on that subject." 
 
 This urgent telegram brought a reply from Washington, permitting 
 General McDowell to join General McClellan, but so clogged was the 
 order by conditions, that it lost half its efficiency. On May 18th Secre- 
 tary Stanton telegraphed : — 
 
 " The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely ; and 
 it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more 
 time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahan- 
 nock by the way of the Potomac and York river, than by a land march. 
 In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Rich- 
 mond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to 
 march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping 
 himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, 
 so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right 
 wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this com- 
 munication' as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the 
 north of EicJunoyid." ******** 
 
 " He will move with between thirty-five and forty thousand men. 
 * * * **** ***** * 
 
 " At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward to co- 
 operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, 
 not to uncover the city of Washington, and you will give no order, 
 either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position 
 to cover this city. * * ** * * *** 
 
 " The President desires that General McDowell retain the command 
 of the department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which 
 he moves forward." 
 
 The instructions given to General McDowell were : — 
 
 " Upon being joined by General Shields's division, you will move upon 
 Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg 
 railroad, co-operating with the forces under General McClellan, now 
 threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York rivers. 
 
 " While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communication be- 
 
32 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENEHAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 tween your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will 
 hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capital of the 
 nation against a sudden dash of any large hody of the rebel forces." 
 
 Of the mode in which General McDowell was ordered to join him, 
 General McClellan remarks: — 
 
 " The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to 
 secure the junction ; and as the order for General McDowell's march 
 was soon countermanded, I incurred groat risk, of which the enemy 
 finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of the campaign. Had 
 General McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached by the 
 James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the 
 Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body in- 
 stead of being necessarily divided by that stream." 
 
 General McClellan was of course much gratified at finding General 
 McDowell was to be sent to him, even though the movement was so 
 clogged as to impair its usefulness. But in the last days of May, Stone- 
 wall Jackson made his famous raid into the Shenandoah Valley, driving 
 Banks before him to Harper's Ferry, and so frightening the people at 
 Washington that the President was afraid to send McDowell forward. 
 The President telegraphed to General McClellan on the afternoon of 
 May 24th :— 
 
 " In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been 
 compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The 
 enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are 
 trying to throw General Fremont's force, and part of General McDow- 
 ell's, in their rear." 
 
 He gets no Reinforcements. 
 
 This at once scattered all hopes which rested upon General McDow- 
 ell's arrival, and as soon as General McClellan received the above des- 
 patch he replied to the President that he would make his calculations 
 accordingly. Previously to being informed that General McDowell 
 could not join him, the President (also on May 24th) telegraphed : — 
 " Itcish you to move cautiously and safely." Commenting upon both 
 despatches, General McClellan writes : — 
 
 " It then only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at 
 my disposal, and to avail myself of all artificial auxiliaries to compen- 
 sate as much as possible for the inadequacy uf men. I concurred fully 
 with the President in the injunction contained in his telegram of the 
 24th, that it was necessary with my limited force to move ' cautiously 
 and safely.' In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, 
 and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundation, it became 
 necessary to construct between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville 
 eleven new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log-way ap- 
 proaches. 
 
 " The entire army could probably have been thrown across the Chicka- 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 38 
 
 hominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force 
 on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right 
 and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut 
 by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the 
 Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after 
 our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation 
 not furnishing a single day's supplies in advance, the troops must have 
 gone without rations, and the animals without forage, and the army 
 would have been paralyzed. 
 
 " It is true I might have abandoned my communications and pushed 
 forward towards Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy 
 and the consequent fall of the city for a renewal of supplies ; but the 
 approaches were fortified, and the town itself was surrounded with a 
 strong line of intrenchments, requiring a greater length of time to re- 
 duce than our troops could have dispensed with rations. 
 
 " Under these ch'cumstances, I decided to retain a portion of the army 
 on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed. 
 
 " It will be remembered that the order for the- co-operation of Goneral 
 McDowell was simply suspended, not revoked, and therefore I was not 
 at liberty to abandon the northern approach." 
 
 His army labored on, and the bridges approached completion. A 
 ftorm came, however, and so much water fell that the Chickahominy 
 was raised higher than had been known for twenty years before. This 
 demolished a great part of the labor, and carried away some of the 
 bridges. In many cases the structures had to be renewed. 
 
 The correspondence was still kept up between Washington and the 
 camp. On May 25th, Lincoln replied to McClellan's telegraph ac- 
 knowledging the receipt of the one withdrawing McDowell. McDowell 
 had been sent off to the Shenandoah valley, where Fremont and Banks, 
 by their mismanagement and inattention to McClellan's instructions,, 
 given them before he sailed for the Peninsula, had permitted Stonewall 
 Jackson to do about as he pleased. The President's telegram caused 
 McClellan to give up all hope of aid. The President said : — 
 
 "If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be en- 
 tirely helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwill- 
 ingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding 
 McDowell's forces from you. 
 
 " Please understand this, and do the best you can with tho forces 
 you have." 
 
 Again, on the same day, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed : — 
 
 " I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or 
 give up the job, and come to the defence of Washington. Let me hear 
 from you instantly." 
 
 He heard from General McClellan "instantly." Mr. Lincoln was 
 evidently too frightened to know that Jackson's real design was not to 
 attack Washington, but to keep McDowell from going to Richmond. 
 
34 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln, when in his fright he withheld McDoavcII, had done just 
 what Jackson wished. General McClellan's reply was : — 
 
 "Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near 
 when 1 .shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is pro- 
 bably to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. All the information 
 obtained from balloons, deserters, prisoners, and contrabands, agrees in 
 the statement that the mass of the rebel troops are still in the imme- 
 diate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it!" 
 
 General McClellan, at that time, had two corps across the Chicka- 
 hominy, within six miles of Richmond, and believed a battle to be im- 
 minent. The correspondence with Washington was still kept up. On 
 May 2Gth, Mr. Lincoln heard that Banks was safe, and breathed more 
 freely. Washington being out of danger, he again began to press 
 McClellan on to Richmond, but he said nothing more about sending 
 McDowell. On the 26th, he telegraphed : — 
 
 "Can you not cut Aquia Creek Railroad? Also, what impression 
 have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of 
 Richmond ? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city ?" 
 
 To which General McClellan replied at once, I " have cut the Vii» 
 ginia Central Railroad in three places between Hanover Court House 
 and the Chickahominy. * * * Hope soon to be in shelling distance." 
 And on the same day, the fright about Jackson being over, McClellan 
 gently reminded Mr. Lincoln that a return to his original instructions 
 about affairs in the Shenandoah valley would save future trouble. He 
 says : — 
 
 " I would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to General 
 Banks of March 16th, to General Wadsworth of same date, and to my 
 letter of April 1st to the adjutant-general. I cannot but think that a 
 prompt return to the principles there laid down would relieve all pro- 
 bability of danger." 
 
 The Battle of Hanover Court House. 
 
 On May 26th, General McClellan received intelligence that a con- 
 siderable force of the enemy was in the neighborhood of Hanover 
 Court House, twenty miles north of Richmond, and on the right flank 
 of the Federal army. He resolved to cut them off, and entrusted the 
 task to General Fitz-John Porter. Early on the 27th, General Porter 
 moved his corps, and his advance, at about noon, found the enemy near 
 Hanover Court House. A brilliant engagement ensued, in which 
 Porter gained a complete victory, capturing 750 prisoners and several 
 cannon. He also cut both the railroads leading out of Richmond to 
 Fredericksburg and the Shenandoah valley, and destroyed large quan- 
 tities of supplies. On the 29th, his victorious troops returned to camp, 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 35 
 
 having lost but 53 killed and 344 wounded and missing. This was 
 one of the most successful engagements of the war. It cut two great 
 lines of the enemy's communications, and was a complete offset to the 
 disasters of Banks in the Shenandoah valley. 
 
 Whilst the victory at Hanover Court House was still in abeyance, 
 General McClellan, on the night of May 27th, telegraphed to Stanton : — 
 
 " I will do all that quick movements can accomplish, but you must 
 send me all the troops you can, and leave to me full latitude as to 
 choice of commanders. It is absolutely necessary to destroy the rebels 
 near Hanover Court House before I can advance." 
 
 And on the 28th, as soon as tho victory was sure, he again tele, 
 graphed to Stanton : — 
 
 " It is the policy and duty of the Government to send mo by water 
 all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington 
 is in no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent 
 up to bring down Jackson's command. * * * The real issue is in the 
 battle about to be fought in front of Richmond. All our available 
 troops should be collected here ; not raw regiments, but the well-drilled 
 troops. It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before us ; if 
 any regiments of good troops remain unemployed, it will be an irre- 
 parable fault committed." 
 
 On the same day, Mr. Lincoln replied to these telegrams :- 
 
 " I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle 
 before you, and will aid you all I can, consistently with my view of 
 due regard to all points." 
 
 The result of the battle of Hanover Court House was to entirely 
 clear the road between Fredericksburg, where McDowell had been sta- 
 tioned, and the right flank of the Army of the Potomac. This in- 
 formation was at once communicated to the President, and the proffer 
 of aid made on the 28th gave renewed hopes that McDowell would be 
 sent to assist the army. He did not come, however. 
 
 The Battle of Fair Oaks. 
 
 Immediately upon the arrival of General McClellan's advance at the 
 Chickahominy, he made preparations to cross a large force over the 
 river. On May 23d, General Reyes's corps crossed the stream and en- 
 camped, and on the 25th it moved out and took a position at the Seven 
 Pines, about seven miles from Richmond. General Heintzelman, with 
 his corps, crossed on the same day, and encamped in the rear of Gene- 
 ral Reyes. On the 28th, General Casey's division, of Reyes's corps, 
 was advanced to Fair Oaks, a short distance in front of the Seven, 
 Pines. Skirmishes were constantly had with the enemy during all of 
 these advances. During the day and night of the 30th, a severe storm 
 
36 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 occurred, the rain falling in torrents, and rendering labor on the rifle 
 pits necessary to protect the advance, and on the bridges across the 
 river, impracticable. The roads 'were almost impassable, and the rapidly 
 rising river threatened the destruction of the bridges. 
 
 The enemy, taking advantage of the swelling stream, and thinking 
 that by a sudden attack they could destroy the left wing, which w*s 
 cut off by the flood from aid, and 'which they supposed weaker than it 
 really was, on the 31st of May, concentrated almost their entire force 
 for an attack on the troops at Fair Oaks. At noon, the attack was 
 made upon Casey's division, overwhelming numbers advancing in front 
 and on both flanks at the same time. The division fought bravely 
 against the enemy, but was compelled to fall back upon General Couch's 
 troops, just in the rear, at Seven Pines. Here a stand was made, and 
 General Heintzelman hurried his men forward as quickly as the muddy 
 roads would allow. During May 31st, the battle raged fiercely, the 
 enemy slowly pushing back the Federal troops towards the river, but 
 gaining each foot of ground only by a desperate contest. There was 
 something in store for them, however, that they did not expect. 
 
 General Sumner, with his corps, as soon as the battle commenced, 
 was ordered to cross from the other side of the Chickahominy, and aid 
 Heintzelman and^Keyes. After incredible exertions, he succeeded in 
 crossing the swollen river, and just before dark, appeared with one 
 division and a battery upon the field. The line of his march brought 
 him upon the enemy's left flank, and this sudden attack, with the 
 wounding of their commander, Jo. Johnston, brought them to a stand- 
 still. 
 
 During the night, both armies rested upon their arms, and early 
 the next morning the Federal troops were ordered to attack. In front 
 and flank they fell upon the enemy, who soon gave way. A charge 
 was at once ordered, and their retreat became more and more rapid. 
 The Excelsior Brigade and Generals French's and Heintzelman's 
 troops gallantly charged upon the retreating enemy, who fled in con- 
 fusion, throwing down their arms and clothing in the flight. They 
 were pursued to Fair Oaks, and on the following day the enemy were 
 driven a mile beyond it, where earthworks w r ere constructed to protect 
 the advance. 
 
 The enemy were completely foiled in their attempt to cut off the 
 Federal left, and their defeat cost them 6783 killed and wounded, 
 General McClellan captured nearly a thousand prisoners. His loss 
 was 5737.' In his report, McClellan fully exonerates General Casey^s 
 livision from all blame. 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 37 
 
 The Floods. 
 
 Some enemies of McClellan have said that after the battle, had he 
 chosen, he could easily have pursued the enemy into Richmond, and 
 captured the town. General McClellan completely refutes this. He 
 says : — 
 
 " On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two 
 of our bridges nearly completed ; but the rising waters flooded the log- 
 way approaches and made them almost impassable, so that it was only 
 by the greatest efforts that General Sumner crossed his corps, and par- 
 ticipated in that hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally 
 useless after this corps had passed, and others on a more permanent 
 plan were commenced. 
 
 " On my way to head-quarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I at- 
 tempted to cross the bridge where General Sumner had taken over his 
 corps on the day previous. At the time General Sumner crossed, this 
 was the only available bridge above Bottom's bridge. I found the 
 approach from the right bank for some 400 yards submerged to the 
 depth of several feet, and on reaching the place where the bridge had 
 been, I found a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get 
 my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's bridge, six 
 miles below, as the only practicable crossing. 
 
 " The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also over- 
 flowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries es- 
 tablished upon commanding heights on the opposite side. These bat- 
 teries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numerous 
 rifle-pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had 
 the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a 
 sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage 
 could have been secured. 
 
 " The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair 
 Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle, was to march 
 the troops from Mechanicsville and other points, on the left bank of 
 the Chickahominy down to Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Wil- 
 liamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about 
 twenty-three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time, this 
 march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days, 
 by which time the enemy would have been secure within his intrench- 
 me'nts around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting the two wings 
 of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with 
 the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five 
 miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I pre- 
 sume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected 
 with the Army of the Potomac." 
 
 These floods had raised the Chickahominy higher than had been 
 known for twenty years. Bridges were carried away, and the roads 
 were in a horrible condition. All who accompanied that army to the 
 Peninsula will remember the deep mud and continuous rains. On 
 June 2d, General McClellan telegraphed to Mr. Stanton : " We have 
 
38 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 had a terrible time with our communications — bridges and causeways 
 built with great care having been washed away by the sudden freshets, 
 leaving us almost cut off from communication. All that human labor 
 can do is being done to accomplish our purpose." Mr. Lincoln, 
 knowing the difficulties of McClellan's position, felt equal anxiety. 
 On the next day he answered : — 
 
 " With these continuous rains, I am very anxious about the Chicka- 
 hominy — so close in your rear, and crossing your line of communication. 
 Please look to it." 
 
 To which General McClellan at once replied : " As the Chickahominy 
 has been almost the only obstacle in my way for several days, your 
 excellency may rest assured that it has not been overlooked." 
 
 The floods continued. Almost continually for two weeks the rain 
 fell in torrents. The men labored up to their waists in water. More 
 superhuman exertions never were made by any army, to overcome the 
 obstacles interposed by nature. Still, however, they progressed, and 
 by the 25th of June, completed the bridges. General McClellan, as 
 will be seen presently, was ready at once to move. 
 
 The battle of Fair Oaks, and the personal examination of the diffi- 
 culties of the position made by various high officials who visited the 
 field afterward, did more than all the solicitations of General McClel- 
 lan could accomplish. The Administration, when it was almost too 
 late, consented to send reinforcements. But still they did it tardily 
 and with niggard hand. The correspondence between Washington 
 and the camp best tells the story : — 
 
 General McClellan gets a few Reinforcements. 
 
 On June 4th McClellan telegraphed to Stanton : — 
 
 " Please inform me at once what reinforcements, if any, I can count 
 upon having at Fortress Monroe, or White House, within the next three 
 days, and when each regiment may be expected to arrive. It is of the 
 utmost importance that I should know this immediately. * * 
 
 * * * After the losses in our last battle, I trust that I 
 will no longer be regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at least 
 one more desperate battle to light." 
 
 On June 5th Stanton answered : — 
 
 " I will send you five new regiments as fast as transportation can take 
 them ; the first is to start to-morrow from Baltimore." 
 
 On June 7th McClellan replied, no doubt pleased that Stanton ap- 
 peared to be working with him. He said, " I am glad to learn that 
 you are pressing forward reinforcements so vigorously." 
 
 On June 10th McClellan was informed that General McCall, with 
 about 10,000 men, a part of McDowell's corps, would be sent to him. 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 39 
 
 Acknowledging it gratefully, McClellan on that day sent the following 
 to Stanton : — 
 
 " I am completely checked hy the weather. The roads and fields are 
 literally impassable for artillery : almost so for infantry. The Chick- 
 ahominy is in a dreadful state ; we have another rain-storm on our 
 hands. 
 
 " I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit ; but 
 there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the 
 season is altogether abnormal. 
 
 " In view of these circumstances, I present for your consideration the 
 propriety of detaching largely from Halleck's army to strengthen this ; 
 for it would seem that Ilalleck has now no large organized force in 
 front of him, while we have. If this cannot be done, or even in con- 
 nection with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a heavy column 
 from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better 
 conform to military principles to strengthen this army. And even al- 
 though the reinforcements might not arrive in season to take part in 
 the attack on Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and they 
 would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements. 
 
 " I wish to be distinctly understood that, whenever the weather per- 
 mits, I -will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger 
 force would enable me to gain much more decisive results." 
 
 On June 22d, Stanton answered : — 
 
 " M'Call's force was reported yesterday as having embarked, and on 
 its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's 
 force also, to join you as speedily as possible. 
 
 " It is clear that a pretty strong force is operating with Jackson for 
 the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as 
 fast as possible, the new levies. 
 
 " Be assured, general, that there never has been a moment when my 
 desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, 
 and strength, since the hour we first met ; and whatever others may 
 say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, 
 any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or 
 more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will 
 soon be achieved by your arms." 
 
 This remarkable friendliness on the part of Mr. Stanton was never 
 of much use to McClellan however. He received McCall's troops — but 
 that was all. It was not until the fierce contests and miraculous vic- 
 tories of the seven days' fights had saved the army, that Mr. Lincoln 
 (still too late) sent McClellan the troops he should have had before he 
 attempted the seige of Yorktown. 
 
 On June 13th General McCall arrived in camp, and on the 14th 
 General Stuart, with the enemy's cavalry, made the famous raid 
 around the army, which exposed General McClellan's weakness and 
 gave the enemy the information which enabled them to compel his 
 subsequent retreat. But even with the arrival of McCall there were 
 new difficulties. McDowell sent a telegraph to McClellan asking that 
 
-40 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 McCall be so placed that he could command him. This -would at once 
 have broken up all discipline. To have had two commanders in front 
 of Richmond would have been certain defeat. General McClellan can 
 therefore well be excused for sending the following to Stanton as soon 
 as he received McDowell's request: — 
 
 " It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops 
 are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him re- 
 questing that McCalPs division might be placed so as to join him im- 
 mediately on his arrival. 
 
 " That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops 
 come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not 
 feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, 
 General McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for 
 the purpose of increasing his command. 
 
 "If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but 
 would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be re- 
 sponsible for the results." 
 
 The Attack on Richmond begun. 
 
 On June 25th the bridges were completed across the Chickahoniiny, 
 and General McClellan at once began his attack upon Richmond. His 
 design was to march against the enemy's fortifications in front of New 
 bridge and carry them. To do this, on June 25th, General Hooker 
 was advanced to seize the ground in front of what is known as the " Old 
 Tavern." On that day he drove the enemy for some distance, although 
 he was resisted stubbornly, and at night bivouacked in their camp, 
 earthworks being thrown up along the entire line in order to hold it. 
 The 26th and 27th of June were selected as the days for a grand attack 
 upon Richmond. The failure of reinforcements and the floods, however, 
 fated that it should be otherwise. The people at Washington had 
 faltered so long, and had given McClellan such meagre aid, that his 
 attack upon Richmond was destined to be baulked. On June 20th he 
 had about 90,000 men fit for duty, whilst on the same day his secret 
 service force reported the enemy's strength at 180,000. The enemy, 
 knowing his weakness, had sent Stonewall Jackson to outflank him, 
 and thus began one of the most wonderful series of battles upon record. 
 
 Jackson outflanks McClellan. 
 
 The first intimation General McClellan had of Jackson's purpose was 
 from a deserter who came into camp on June 24th. This deserter in- 
 formed McClellan that Jackson was manoeuvring to get around his 
 right wing, and intended to attack him on the 28th. At first the st< iry 
 was not believed, but subsequent events soon confirmed its truth. On 
 the evening of June 25th McClellan became fully convinced that Jack- 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 41 
 
 eon was coming. He at once telegraphed the news to Stanton. The 
 attack of Richmond was over ; defence was now to be looked to : — 
 
 " I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The 
 rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including Jackson and 
 Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if 
 these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men 
 to hold their position and repulse any attack. 
 
 " I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no 
 way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the 
 necessity of reinforcements, that this was the decisive point, and that 
 all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. 
 I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the 
 honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, 
 can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the 
 action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is 
 a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders ; it must 
 rest where it belongs. 
 
 " Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence con- 
 firming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beaure- 
 gard's arrival. I shall probably bo attacked to-morrow, and now go to 
 the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that 
 side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for reinforcements." 
 
 Commenting upon this, General McClellan says in his report : — 
 
 " On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our 
 final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned 
 my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of 
 supply. 
 
 " The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which 
 had been reiterated to my superior officers from the inception and 
 through the progress of the Peninsula campaign." 
 
 The Seven Days' Battles begin. 
 
 The story of the siege of Richmond is over, and now begins the 
 history of one of the grandest movements ever planned by a military 
 leader. General McClcllan's army was threatened by double his force. 
 How he saved it we will soon see. The people well know that jealousies 
 at Washington endangered it, and had there been a leader of less skill 
 than McClellan at its head, it would have been sacrificed. There is 
 not a shadow of doubt that the administration is responsible for McClcl- 
 lan's failure to take Richmond. They deprived him of the flower of his 
 army, and defeat was the consequence. 
 
 The history of this great retreat is best told in General McClcllan's 
 own words. In his report, he gives it as follows : — 
 
 " Up to the 2oth of June, the operations against Richmond had been 
 conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and north-cast. 
 The reasons (the President's anxiety about covering Washington from 
 Fredericksburg, McDowell's promised co-operation, partial advanco, 
 
42 LIFE OP MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 and immediate withdrawal) which compelled the choice of this line of 
 approach, and our continuance upon it, have been alluded to abovo. 
 
 "Preparations to change Base. 
 
 " The superiority of the James river route, as a lino of attack and 
 supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that sub- 
 ject had been early given, and need not be repeated here. The dissi- 
 pation of all hope of the co-operation by land of General McDowell's 
 forces, doomed to be occupied in the defence of Washington, their ina- 
 bility to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy 
 and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from 
 the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate change 
 of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from the evening of the 26th, 
 every energy of the army was bent. But such a change of base in the 
 presence of a powerful enemy is one of the most difficult undertakings 
 in war. I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, 
 and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance, and "to 
 fight the series of battles now inevitable, whether retreating from vic- 
 tories or marching through defeats ; and, in short, I had no doubt 
 whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way 
 through to the James river, and get a position whence a successful ad- 
 vance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct 
 through the next seven days justified my faith. On the same day, 
 General Van Vliet, chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, 
 by my orders telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, quartermaster, to the 
 White House, as follows: — 
 
 " ' Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions 
 and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and 
 send them to Savage Station, by way of Bottom's Bridge. If you are 
 obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get 
 oil". You must throw all our supplies up the James river as soon as 
 possible, and accompany them yourself, with all your force. It will 
 be of vast importance to establish our depots on James river, without 
 delay, if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every 
 movement, so long as the wires work ; after that you must exercise 
 your own judgment.' 
 
 " All these commands were obeyed. So excellent were the disposi- 
 tions of the different officers in command of the troops, depots, and 
 gunboats, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, 
 that almost everything was saved, and but a small amount of stores 
 destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. Gene- 
 ral Stoneman's communications with the main army being cut off, he 
 fell back upon the White House, and then to Yorktown, when the 
 White House was evacuated. On the 26th, orders were sent to all the 
 corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be pre- 
 pared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day 
 to the left bank of the river. General Franklin received instructions 
 to hold General Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, 
 and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of 
 General Porter, to move it at once to his assistance, without further 
 orders. At noon on the 26th, the approach of the enemy, who had 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 43 
 
 crossed above Meadow Bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets 
 at that point, and at 12.30 p. m., they vrere attacked and driven in. All 
 the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Me- 
 chanicsville withdrawn. 
 
 "The Battle at Mechanicsville. 
 
 " Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve, in rear of the line, 
 and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's_ divi- 
 sion, were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, 
 toward Shady Grove church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three 
 brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regi- 
 ments relieved a portion of Reynolds's line just at the close of the action. 
 The position of dur troops was a strong one, extending along the left 
 bank of Beaver Dam creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, and 
 the right in thick wood beyond the upper road from Mechanicsville to 
 Coal Harbor. The lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison's 
 Mills. Seymour's brigade held the left of the line from the Chckahom- 
 iny to beyond the mill, partly in woods and partly in cleared ground, 
 and Reynolds's the right, principally in the woods, and covering the 
 upper road. The artillery occupied positions commanding the roads and 
 the open ground across the creek. Timber had been felled, rifle-pits 
 dug, and the position generally prepared with a care that greatly con- 
 tributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was diffi- 
 cult along the whole front, and impracticable for artillery, except by the 
 two roads where the main efforts of the enemy were directed. At 3 p. m., 
 he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skirmishers, and soon 
 attacked our whole line, making, at the same time, a determined attempt 
 to force the passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted 
 by General Reynolds. After a severe struggle, he was forced to retire 
 with very heavy loss. A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmish- 
 ing, was maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed 
 his troops for another effort at the lower road about two hours later, 
 which was likewise repulsed by General Seymour, with heavy slaugh- 
 ter. The firing ceased, and the enemy retired about 9 p. m., the action 
 having lasted six hours. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops were 
 engaged on this day. The portion of the enemy encountered were 
 chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed the 
 Meadow Bridge and Mechanicsville. The information in my possession 
 soon after the close of this action, convinced me that Jackson was really 
 approaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam creek, 
 although as successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the 
 air, and was too far from the main army to make it available to retain 
 it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan's 
 imd Gaines's houses over the Chickahominy during the night, with 
 as many wagons of the Fifth corps as possible, and to withdraw the 
 corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its 
 flanks would be reasonably secure, and it would be within supporting 
 distance of the main army. General Porter carried out my orders to 
 ftiat effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practi- 
 cable, to withdraw the Fifth corps to the right bank of the Chickahom- 
 iny. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, 
 placed us between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to in- 
 
44 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 tercept the movement to James river, by crossing the Chickahominy in 
 the vicinity of* Jones's Bridge, before -we could reach Malvern Hill with 
 our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the Fifth corps, 
 reinforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the 
 bridge heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy 
 guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of 
 the James river as our line of supplies, in lieu of the Pamunky. Tho 
 greater part of the heavy guns and the wagons having been moved to 
 the right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of with- 
 drawing the troops from Beaver Dam creek was commenced shortly 
 before daylight, and successfully executed. Meade's and Griffin's bri- 
 gades were the first to leave the ground ; Seymour's brigade covered 
 the rear, with the horse batteries of Captain Robertson and Tidball ; 
 but the withdrawal was so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of tho 
 preceding day so complete, that although the enemy followed the retreat 
 slowly and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the 
 rear line in force till about noon of the 27th, when we were prepared 
 to receive him. About this time, General Porter, believing that Gene- 
 ral Stoneman would be cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back 
 on the White House, and afterward rejoin the army as best he could. 
 
 " The Battle of Gaines's Mill. 
 
 " On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdrawal of his 
 troops from Mechanicsville to the selected position already mentioned, 
 General Porter telegraphed as follows: — 
 
 " ' I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin's, or some 
 other command, be held ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close 
 that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in 
 position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but relying 
 on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I 
 expect to get back and hold the new line.' 
 
 " This shows how closely Porter's retreat was followed. Notwith- 
 standing all the efforts used during the entire night to remove the 
 heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege-guns were still in position 
 at Gaines's house after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. 
 The new position of the Fifth corps was about an arc of a circle, cov- 
 ering; the approaches to the bridges which connected our right wing 
 with the troops on the opposite side of the river. Morrill's division 
 held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the left bank of the 
 Gaines's mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the Chicka- 
 hominy, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, 
 and extending into open ground on the right toward New Coal Harbor. 
 In the line, General Butterficld's brigade held the extreme left, General 
 Martindale's joined his right, and General Griffin, still further to the 
 right, joined the left of General Sykes's division, which, partly in woods 
 and partly in open ground, extended in rear of Coal Harbor. Each bri- 
 gade had in reserve two of its own regiments. MeCall s division haying 
 been engaged the day before, was formed in a second line in rear of the 
 first, Meade's brigade on the left near the Chickahominy, Reynolds'* 
 brigade on the right covering the approaches from Coal Harbor and 
 Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge, and Seymour's in reserve to tho 
 second line. Still further in the rear, General P. St. George Cooke, 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 45 
 
 •with five companies of the Fifth regular cavalry, two squadrons of the 
 First regulars, and three squadrons of the Sixth Pennsylvania cavalry 
 (Lancers), was posted behind a hill in rear of the position and near the 
 Chickahominy, to aid in watching the left flank and defending the slope 
 to the river. The- troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery 
 on the commanding ground, and in the intervals between the divisions 
 and brigades. Besides the division batteries, there were Robertson's 
 and Tidball's horse batteries, from the artillery reserve ; the latter 
 posted on the right of Sykes's division, and the former on the extreme 
 left of the line, in the valley of the Chickahominy. Shortly after noon, 
 the enemy was discovered approaching in force, and it soon became 
 evident that the entire position was to be attacked. His skirmishers 
 advanced rapidly, and soon the firing became heavy along our whole 
 front. At two p. M. General Porter asked for reinforcements. Slocum's 
 division, of the Sixth corps, was ordered to cross the left bank of the 
 river, by Alexander's Bridge, and proceed to his support. General 
 Porter's first call for reinforcements, through General Barnard, did not 
 reach me, nor his demand for more, through the same officer. By three 
 p. M. the engagement had become so severe, and the enemy were so 
 greatly superior in numbers, that the entire second line and reserves 
 had been moved forward to sustain the first line against repeated and 
 desperate assaults along our whole front. At 3.30 p. m. Slocum's divi- 
 sion reached the field, and was immediately brought into action at the 
 weak points of our line. On the left the combat was for the strip of 
 woods running almost at right angles to the Chickahominy in front of 
 Adams's house, or between that and Gaines's house ; the enemy several 
 times charged up to this wood, but were each time driven back with 
 heavy loss. The regulars of Sykes's division on the right also repulsed 
 several strong attacks. But our own loss, under the tremendous fire of 
 such greatly superior numbers, was very severe, and the troops, most of 
 whom had been under arms more than two days, were rapidly becoming 
 exhausted by the masses of fresh men constantly brought against them. 
 When General Slocum's division arrived on the ground it increased 
 General Porter's force to some thirty-five thousand, who were probably 
 contending against about seventy thousand of the enemy. The line 
 was severely pressed in several points, and as its being pierced at any 
 one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable for General Porter, who 
 was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slocum's division, 
 and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threat- 
 ened. About five p. m., General Porter having reported his position as 
 critical, French's and Meagher's brigades, of Richardson's division 
 (Third corps), were ordered to cross to his support. The enemy at- 
 tacked again, in great force, at six p. m., but failed to break our lines, 
 although our loss was very heavy. About seven p. m., they threw fresh 
 troops against General Porter with still greater fury, and finally re- 
 gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided by the confu- 
 sion that followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the Fifth 
 cavalry, and followed as it was by more determined assaults on the 
 remainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused a general retreat from 
 our position to the hill in the rear overlooking the bridge. French's 
 and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving before them the strag- 
 glers who were thronging toward the bridge. These brigades advanced 
 boldly to the front, and by their example as well as by the steadiness 
 
46 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 of their bearing, reanimated our own troops and warned the enemy 
 that reinforcements had arrived. It was now dark. The enemy, 
 already repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, and hearing the 
 shouts of fresh troops, failed to follow up their advantage. This gave 
 an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Generals French 
 and Meagher, and they again advanced up the hill, ready to repulse 
 another attack. During the night our thinned and exhausted regiments 
 were all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all had 
 reached the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed the 
 rear guard, and about six o'clock on the morning of the 28th, crossed 
 the river, destroying the bridge behind them. Although we were 
 finally forced from our first line after the enemy had been repeatedly 
 driven back, yet the object sought for had been obtained. The enemy 
 had been held at bay, our siege-guns and material were saved, and the 
 right wing had now joined the main body of the army. The number 
 of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three of 
 which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal. 
 Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this im- 
 portant arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not 
 until the last successful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were 
 driven from their pieces or struck down, and the guns captured. 
 
 " So threatening were the movements of the enenry on both banks of 
 the Chickahominy, that it was impossible to decide, until the afternoon, 
 where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were 
 seen during the day near the old tavern, on Franklin's right, and 
 threatening demonstrations were frequently made along the entire line 
 on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a consid- 
 erable force in position to meet them." 
 
 The enemy, however, decided to make the attack on Gaines's Mill, as 
 has been seen, and every available man from the front of the old tavern 
 had been sent to reinforce Porter. General McClellan continues : — 
 
 " The operations of this day proved the numerical superiority of the 
 enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the west 
 bank of the Chickahominy, which had already turned our right, and 
 was in position to intercept the communications with our depot at the 
 White House, he was also in large force between our army and Rich- 
 mond. I therefore effected a junction of our forces. This might pro- 
 bably have been executed on either side of the Chickahominy, and if 
 the concentration had been effected on the left bank, it is possible wo 
 might, with our entire force, have defeated the enemy there ; but at 
 that time they held the roads leading to the White House, so that it 
 would have been impossible to have sent forward supply trains in ad- 
 vance of the army in that direction, and the guarding of those trains 
 would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle we would 
 have been compelled to fight, if concentrated on that bank of the river. 
 Moreover, we would at once have been followed by the enemy's forces 
 upon the Richmond side of the river, operating upon our rear, and if, 
 in the chances of war, we had been ourselves defeated in the effort, we 
 would have been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably 
 to Fortress Monroe. And as both our flank and rear would then have 
 been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 47 
 
 of the army itself, might have been lost. The movements of the enemy 
 showed that they expected this, and as they themselves acknowledge, 
 they were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction. I, there- 
 fore, concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river. During 
 the night of the 26th, and morning of the 27th, all our wagons, heavy 
 guns, &c, were gathered there. It may be asked why, after the con- 
 centration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a 
 large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond, I did not, instead 
 of striking for James river, fifteen miles below that place, at once march 
 directly on Richmond ? It will be remembered that at this junction 
 the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that 
 he would sever our communication with the supply depot at the White 
 House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we 
 had advanced directly on Richmond, it would have required consider- 
 able time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our 
 men would have been destitute of food, and even if Richmond had fallen 
 before our arms, the enemy would have still have occupied our supply 
 communications between that place and the gunboats and turned the 
 disaster into victory. If on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated 
 all his forces at Richmond during the progress of the attack and we had 
 been defeated, we must, in all probability, have lost our trains before 
 reaching the flotilla. The battles which continued day after day in the 
 progress of our flank movement to the James river, with the exception 
 of the one at Gaines's Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing 
 engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all. 
 
 " The Movement to James River. 
 
 " On the evening of the 27th of June, I assembled the corps com- 
 manders at my head-quarters, and informed them of my plans, its rea- 
 sons, and my choice of route and method of execution. General Keyes 
 was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across 
 the White Oak Swamp Bridge, and to seize strong positions on the oppo- 
 site side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and 
 trains. This was executed on the 28th by noon. Before daybreak on 
 the 28th, I went to Savage's Station, and remained there during the 
 day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of 
 the army. Orders were given to the different commanders to load their 
 wagons with ammunition and provisions and the necessary baggage of 
 the officers and men, and to destroy all property which coidd not be 
 transported with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those 
 of the sick and wounded who could not be transported, a proper com- 
 plement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations 
 and medical stores. The large herd of 2500 beef cattle was, by the 
 chief commissary, Colonel Clarke, transferred to the James river, with- 
 out loss. On the morning of the 28th, while General Franklin was 
 withdrawing his command from Golding's Farm, the enemy opened 
 upon General Smith's division from Garnctt's Hill, from the valley 
 above, and from Gaines's Hill on the opposite side of the Chickahom- 
 iny, and shortly afterward two Georgia regiments attempted to carry 
 the works about to be vacated ; but this attack was repulsed by the 
 Twenty-third New York and the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
 on picket, and a section of Mott's battery. Porter's corps was moved 
 
48 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 across White Oak Swamp during the day and night, and took up 
 positions covering the roads leading from Richmond toward the White 
 Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. McCall's division was ordered on tho 
 night of the 28th to move across the swamp, and take a proper position 
 to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains. During the same 
 night the corps of Sumner and Ileintzelnian, and the division of Smith, 
 were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old intrench- 
 ments and curving to the right, so as to cover Savage's Station. Gene- 
 ral Slocum's division of Franklin's corps was ordered to Savage's Sta- 
 tion in reserve. The were ordered to hold the position until dark of 
 the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then to 
 fall back across the swamp and unite with the remainder of the army. 
 
 " The Letter to Secretary Stanton. 
 
 " On the night of the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of 
 War: — 
 
 "Head-quarters Armf of the Potomac, \ 
 " Savage's Station, j 
 
 " June 28th 1862—12.20 a. m. 
 
 " I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river — 
 the right bank — we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank, 
 our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish ; 
 but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I 
 brought my last reserves into action. "The loss on both sides is terrible. 
 I believe it will prove to be the most terrible battle of the war. The sad 
 remnants of my men behave as men ; those battalions who fought most 
 bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. The regulars 
 were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle in 
 company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty> 
 thousand, or even ten thousand, fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could 
 take Richmond ; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to 
 cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. If 
 we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one 
 nsed blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle be- 
 cause my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible 
 for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his 
 heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed 
 to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the Govern- 
 ment must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You 
 must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once. I 
 shall draw back to this side of the Chiekahominjr, and I think I can 
 withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we 
 have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to 
 what I have already said, I oidy wish to say to the President that I 
 think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my 
 force was too weak — I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been 
 too plainly proven. If, at this instant, I could dispose often thousand 
 fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow. I know that a tew 
 thousand more men would have changed the battle from a defeat to a 
 victory. As it is, the Government must not, and cannot, hold me re- 
 sponsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night — I have seen too 
 mauy dead aud wounded comrades to feel otherwise, than that the 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 49 
 
 Government has not sustained the army. If you do not do so now, the 
 game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe 
 no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have 
 done your best to sacrifice this army. 
 
 "G. B. McCl.ELLAN. 
 
 " To Hon. E. M. Stanton. 
 
 " The head-quarters camp at Savage's Station was broken up early 
 on the morning of the 29th, and moved across the White Oak Swamp. 
 As the essential part of the day's operations was the passage of the 
 trains across the swamp, and their protection against attack from the 
 direction of New Market and Richmond, as well as the immediate and 
 secure establishment of our communications with the gunboats, I passed 
 the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of the troops, 
 and securing the uninterrupted movement of the trains. In the after- 
 noon I instructed General Keyes to move during the night to James 
 river, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, to secure our 
 extreme left flank. General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, 
 and prolong the line towards the right. The trains were to be pushed 
 on towards James river in rear of this corps, and placed under the 
 protection of the gunboats as they arrived. A sharp skirmish with 
 the enemy's cavalry early this day, on the Quaker road, showed that 
 his efforts were about to be directed towards impeding our progress to 
 the river, and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary. 
 
 " Battle of Allen's Farm. 
 
 "General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 29th, at 
 daylight, and marched his command to Orchard Station, halting at Al- 
 len's Field, between Orchard and Savage's Station. The divisions of 
 Richardson and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the railroad, 
 facing towards Richmond. Richardson holding the right, and Sedg- 
 wick joining the right of Heintzelman's corps. The first line of Rich- 
 ardson's division was held by General French, General Caldwell sup- 
 porting in the second. A log building in front of Richardson's division 
 was held by Colonel Brooks, with one regiment (Fifty-third Pennsyl- 
 vania Volunteers), with Hazzard's battery, on an elevated piece of 
 ground, a little in rear of Colonel Brooks's command. At 9 a. m., the 
 enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of General Sedgwick, 
 but were repulsed. The left of General Richardson was next attacked, 
 the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of Colonel Brooks ; 
 Captain Hazzard's battery, and Captain Pettit's battery, which after- 
 wards replaced it, were served with great effect, while the Fifty-third 
 Pennsylvania kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling 
 them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack 
 three times, but were as often repulsed. 
 
 " Battle of Savage's Station. 
 
 " General Slocum arrived at Savage's Station at an early hour on the 
 
 28th, and was ordered to cross White Oak Swamp, and relieve General 
 
 Keyes's corps. As soon as General Keyes was thus relieved, he moved 
 
 towards James river, which he reached in safety with all his artillery 
 
 4 
 
50 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 and baggage early on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position 
 below Turkey Creek Bridge. During the morning General 1 rauklin 
 heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing 
 the Ohickahominy in largo force, and advancing toward Savage's Sta- 
 tion. Ho communicated this information to General Sumner, at Allen's 
 farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's Station. A little after 
 noon General Sumner united his forces with those of General Franklin, 
 and assumed command. On reaching Savage's Station, Sumner's and 
 Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of battle, in the large open 
 field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods, 
 and the right extending down to the railroad. General Brooks, with 
 his brigade, held the woods to the left of the field, where he did excel- 
 lent service, receiving a wound, but retaining his command. General 
 Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front. 
 At four p. m., the enemy commenced his attack in largo force, by the 
 Williamsburg road. It was gallantly mot by General Burns's brigade, 
 supported and reinforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the 
 New York Sixty-ninth. Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries again doing 
 good service. Osborne's and Bramhall's batteries also took part effecf- 
 lvely in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy until 
 between eight and nine p. M., when the enemy were driven from the 
 field. Immediately after the battle, orders were repeated for all the 
 troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, which we accomplished 
 during the night in good order. By midnight all the troops were on 
 the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge, General French, with his brigade, 
 acting as rear-guard, and at five a. m., on the 30th, all had crossed, and 
 the bridge was destroyed. 
 
 " On the afternoon of the 29th, I gave to the corps commanders their 
 instructions for the operations of the following day. As stated before, 
 Porter's corps was to move forward to James river, and with the corps 
 of General Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, in a line 
 perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Rich- 
 mond, opening communication with the gunboats, and covering the 
 passage of the supply trains which we pushed forward as rapidly as 
 possible upon Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps were pressed 
 onward and posted so as to guard the approaches from Richmond, as 
 well as the crossings of White Oak Swamp, over which the army 
 had passed. General Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White 
 Oak Swamp Bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that 
 point. His command consisted of his own corps, with General Rich- 
 ardson's division, and General Naglee's brigade', placed under his orders 
 for the occasion. General Slocum's division was on the right of the 
 Charles City road. On the morning of the 30th I again gave the corps 
 commanders within reach instructions for posting their troops. I found 
 that, notwithstanding all the efforts of my personal staff and other 
 officers, the roads were blocked by wagons, and there was great difficulty 
 in keeping the trains in motion. The engineer officers whom I had sent 
 forward on the 28th to reconnoitre the woods, had neither returned nor 
 sent in any reports or guides, and Generals Keyes and Porter had 
 been delayed, one by losing the road, the other in repairing an old road, 
 had not been able to send me any information. We then knew of but 
 one road for the movement of the troops and our immense trains. It 
 was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road as 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 51 
 
 well as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover 
 the movement of the trains in the rear. I then examined the whole 
 line from the swamp to the left, giving final instructions for the posting 
 of troops, and the obstructions of the roads towards Richmond ; and all 
 corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until the trains 
 had passed, after which a more concentrated position was to be taken 
 up neaf James River. Our force was too small to occupy and hold the 
 entire line from the White Oak Swamp to the river, exposed as it was, 
 to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part of the swamp, 
 or across the Chickahominy below the swamp. Moreover, the troops were 
 then greatly exhausted, and required rest in a more secure position. I ex- 
 tended my examinations of the country as far as Haxall's, looking at 
 ■all the approaches to Malvern, which position I perceived to be the 
 key to our position in this quarter, and was thus enabled to expedite 
 very considerably the passage of the trains, and to rectify the positions 
 of the troops. 
 
 " Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the different corps com- 
 manders to inform them what I had done on the left, aud to bring me 
 information of the condition of affairs on the right. I returned from 
 Malvern to Haxall's, and having made arrangements for instant com- 
 munication from Malvern by signals, went on board of Captain Rod- 
 gers's gunboat lying near, to confer with him in reference to the condition 
 of our supply vessels, and the state of things on the river. It was his 
 opinion that it would be necessary for the army to fall back to a position 
 below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern shore 
 that it would not be possible to bring up the transports, should the 
 enemy occupy it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest 
 suitable point. Upon the termination of the interview, I returned to 
 Malvern Hill, and remained there till shortly before daylight. 
 
 " Battle of Nelson's Farm or Glendale. 
 
 " On the morning of the 30th, General Sumner was ordered to march 
 with Sedgwjck's division to Glendale (Nelson's farm). General McCall's 
 division (Pennsylvania reserves) was halted during the morning on 
 the New Market road, just in advance of the point where the road 
 turns off to Quaker Church. This line was formed perpendicularly to 
 the New Market road, with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's 
 on the left, and Reynolds's brigade, commanded by Colonel S.*G. Sim- 
 mons, of the Fifth Pennsylvania, in reserve ; Randall's regular battery 
 on the right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the centre, and 
 Deitrich's and Kanerhun's batteries, of the Artillery reserve, on the 
 left — all in front of the infantry line. The country in General McCall's 
 front was an open field, intersected toward the right by the New Mar- 
 ket road and a small strip of timber parallel to it. The open front was 
 about eight hundred yards ; its depth about one thousand yards. On 
 the morning of the 30th, General Heintzelman ordered the bridge at 
 Brackett's Ford to be destroyed, and trees to be felled across that road 
 and the Charles City road. General Slocum's division was to extend 
 to the Charles City road. General Kearney's left to connect with 
 General Slocum's left. General McCall's position was to the left of the 
 Long Bridge road, in connection with General Kearney's left, and 
 General Hooker was on the left of General McCall. Between 12 and 1 
 
52 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 o'clock tho enemy oponed a fierce cannonade npon the divisions of 
 Smith and Richardson, and Naglec's brigade, at White Oak Swamp 
 bridge. This artillery fire was continued by the enemy through the 
 day, and he crossed some infantry below our position. Richardson's 
 division suffered severely. Captain Ayres directed our artillery with 
 great effect. Captain Hazzard's battery, after losing many cannoneers, 
 and Captain Hazzard being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. 
 It was replaced bv Pettit's battery, which partially silenced the enemy's 
 •runs. General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly 
 driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak 
 Swamp. At 2 o'clock in the day, the enemy were reported advancing 
 in force by the Charles City road, and at 2J o'clock the attack was made 
 down the road on General Slocum's left, but was checked by his artil- 
 lery. After this the enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions 
 of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General McCall, whose division, 
 after severe fighting, was compelled to retire. 
 
 "General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into 
 tho open field. Several batteries were in position, and began to fire 
 into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Captain De Russy's 
 battery was placed on the right of General Sumner's artillery, with 
 orders to shell the woods. General Burr's brigade was then advanced 
 to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back ; other troops began to 
 return from the White Oak Swamp. Later in the day, at the call of 
 General Kearney, General Taylor's First New Jersey brigade, Slocum's 
 division, was sent to occupy a portion of General McCall's deserted po- 
 sition, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back tho 
 enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves 
 with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 
 o'clock at night, General Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his 
 corps, and soon after daylight both of the divisions, with General Slo- 
 cum's division and a portion of General Sumner's command, reached 
 Malvern Hill. On the morning of the 30th, General Sumner, in obe- 
 dience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendalc, and upon a call from 
 General Franklin for reinforcements, sent him two brigades, which re- 
 turned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near 
 Glendalc. General Sumner says of this battle : — 
 
 " ' The battle of Glendalc was the most severe action since the battle 
 of Fair Oaks. About three o'clock r. M., the action commenced, and 
 after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy Avas routed at 
 all points, and driven from the field.' 
 
 " The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army 
 reached Malvern Hill about four p. m. At about this time the enemy 
 began to appear in General Porter's front, and at five o'clock advanced 
 in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a 
 skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while, 
 with his infantry, and some artillery, he attacked Colonel Warren's 
 brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear 
 on the enemy, which, with the infantry of Colonel Warren's command, 
 compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel 
 Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and 
 helped to drive back the enemy. It was very late at night before my 
 aids returned to give me the results' of the day's fighting along the 
 whole line, and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear from 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 53 
 
 General Franklin before sending orders to Generals Sumner and Heint- 
 zelman, I received a letter from the latter that General Franklin was 
 falling back, whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn, of my staff, with orders 
 to verify this, and if it were true, to order in Generals Sumner and 
 Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers 
 sent from General Franklin's headquarters, with the information that 
 he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and 
 Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were given as 
 to the movement which was to commence on the right. The orders met 
 their troops already en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to 
 General Franklin as to the route he was to follow. General Barnard 
 then received full instructions for posting the troops as they arrived. 
 I then returned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern soon after day- 
 break. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the 
 entire circuit of the position and then returned to Haxall's, whence I 
 went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and 
 its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting com- 
 menced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel 
 anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity. 
 
 " Battle of Malvern Hill. 
 
 " The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy 
 on the 1st of July, was with the left and centre of our lines resting on 
 Malvern Hill, while the right curved backward through a wooded 
 country toward a point below Haxall's, on James river. Malvern Hill 
 is an elevated plateau, about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a 
 mile in area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging roads 
 running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the 
 ground slopes gradually to the north and east to the woodland, giving 
 clear range for artillery in those directions. Toward the north-west the 
 plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James 
 river. From the position of the enemy, his most obvious line of attack 
 would be from the direction of Richmond and the White Oak Swamp, 
 and would almost of necessity strike in upon the left wing. Here, 
 therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and col- 
 lecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left 
 of the line — Sykes's division on the left, Morrell's on the right, with 
 the artillery of' his two divisions advantageously posted, and the artil- 
 lery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated 
 fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his 
 front or left. Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded 
 in getting two of his siege-guns in position on the highest part of the 
 hill. Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter's ; next came 
 Kearney and Hooker ; next Sedgwick and Richardson ; next Smith and 
 Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes's corps, extending by a backward 
 curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania Reserve corps was held 
 in reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One 
 brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left, on the low ground, to pro- 
 tect that flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. 
 The line was very strong along the whole front of the upper plateau, 
 but thence to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. This 
 information was imperative, as an attack would probably be made upon 
 
54 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 our left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the 
 timber, and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, command- 
 ing the flotilla on James River, placed his gun-boats so as to protect our 
 flanks, and to command the approaches from Richmond. Between nine 
 and ten a. m., the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing 
 with his artillery and skirmishers, as far to the right as Hooker's divf- 
 sion. About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving 
 toward our right, within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's 
 corps, but beyond the range of artillery. Arrangements were at once 
 made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter ; but though the 
 column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disap- 
 peared and was not again heard of. The presumption is, that it retired 
 by the rear, and participated in the attack afterwards made on our left. 
 About three p. m., a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearney's left and 
 Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on 
 Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, 
 and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground until 
 the advancing column was within short musket-range, when they sprang 
 to their feet and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the 
 attacking force, and drove them in disorder back on their own ground. 
 This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of 
 our lines some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick 
 clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire. Shortly 
 after four o'clock, the firing ceased along the whole front, but no dis- 
 position was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from the 
 field. Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's 
 division, was stationed upon Couch's right by General Porter, to whom 
 he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the 
 General, and everything held in readiness to meet the coming attack. 
 At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with 
 the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward 
 his columns of attack, to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade formed 
 under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space, and 
 charged our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and 
 steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to 
 shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In 
 several instances our infantry withheld their fire, until the attacking 
 columns, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our 
 artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then 
 poured in a single volley, and dashed forward with the bayonet, cap- 
 turing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confu- 
 sion from the field. About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were accumu- 
 lating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent 
 with their brigades as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw 
 any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops, to reinforce that 
 part of the line, and hold the positions. These brigades relieved such 
 portions of Porter's corps and Couch's division, as had expended their 
 ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward, to 
 Teplace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy per- 
 sisted in his efforts to take the positions so tenaciously defended, but 
 despite his vast numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were re- 
 pulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, 
 though it was not until after nine o'clock that the artillery ceased its 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 55 
 
 fire. During the whole battle, Commodore Rodgers added greatly to 
 the discomfiture of the enemy, by throwing shells among his reserves 
 and advancing columns." 
 
 The losses of General McClellan's army during these severe contests 
 were : Killed, 1582 ; wounded, 7709 ; missing, 5958. Total, 15,249. 
 General McClellan thus gives his reasons for retiring from Malvern 
 to Haxall's or Harrison's Landing : — 
 
 " Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete victory, 
 it was nevertheless necessary to fall back still further, in order to reach 
 a point where our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As 
 before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gun- 
 boat flotilla, this could only be done below City Point. Concurring in 
 his opinion, I selected Harrison's Bar as the new position of the army. 
 The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage, and ammunition, made 
 it imperative to reach the transports immediately." 
 
 The army was at length saved, and communication reopened with 
 the North. President Lincoln seemed to be tmly grateful to McClellan 
 for saving the troops ; Stanton, no doubt angered at the just censure 
 cast upon him in the letter of June 28th, never afterward corresponded 
 with McClellan. On July 3d Mr. Lincoln telegraphed a kind despatch. 
 He says: — 
 
 " I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best 
 you could. All accounts say that better fighting was never done. Ten 
 thousand thanks for it." 
 
 And on July 5th he again telegraphed his congratulations: — 
 
 " A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of 12 and 1 
 p. m. yesterday, gave me. Be assured, the heroism and skill of your- 
 self and officers and men, is and for ever will be appreciated. 
 
 " If you can hold your present position, we shall hive the enemy 
 yet." 
 
 The President was evidently aware that General McClellan could 
 not attack the enemy from Harrison's Landing, unless he was rein- 
 forced. In a letter sent to McClellan on July 4th, he says as much, 
 and then adds: " To reinforce you so as to enable you to assume the 
 offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible." 
 
 General McClellan Writes to the President. 
 
 We now corne to the famous letter which General McClellan wrote 
 to President Lincoln, giving him some ideas of moderate and humane 
 warfare, which will be endorsed by every conservative citizen of the 
 Union. The letter was not written in a hurry. It was the fruit of 
 long observation of the war, and was not sent to the President until he 
 expressed a desire to receive it. 
 
56 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 On June 20th 18G2, General McClellan telegraphed to Mr. Lincoln 
 the following : — 
 
 "I would be glad to have permission to lay before your excellency, 
 by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs 
 throughout the whole country." 
 
 Lincoln, on the next day, replied : — 
 
 "If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from 
 the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have 
 your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the 
 whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them." 
 
 General McClellan, however, had no opportunity to send the great 
 letter until after the army had somewhat recovered from the fatigues of 
 the Seven Days' battles. It was written on July 7th, and is as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 " Head-quarters Army of the Potomac, 
 " Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7th 1862. 
 " Mr. President : You have been fully informed that the rebel 
 army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attack- 
 ing our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. 
 I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in 
 view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency, for your 
 private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state 
 of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of 
 this army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These 
 views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind 
 and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned ; it is the cause of free 
 institutions and self government. The Constitution and the Union 
 must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and 
 blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be 
 seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor 
 foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation 
 of the laws of the United States upon the people of every state. 
 
 " The time has come when the Government must determine upon a 
 civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national 
 trouble. 
 
 " The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such 
 civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national 
 affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised 
 by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, 
 sufficient even for tho present terrible exigency. 
 
 "This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it 
 should be regarded ; and it should be conducted upon the highest prin- 
 ciples known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking 
 to the subjugation of the people of any state, in any event. It should 
 not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and po- 
 litical organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political execu- 
 tions of persons, territorial organ ization of states, or forcible abolition 
 of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. 
 
 " In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons 
 should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military 
 
LIFE OP MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 57 
 
 operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid 
 or receipted for ; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes ; 
 all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor 
 by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests 
 should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist ; 
 and oaths, not required by enactments, constitutionally made, should 
 be neither demanded nor received. 
 
 " Military government should be confined to the preservation of 
 public order and the protection of political rights. Military power 
 should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either 
 by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for 
 repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the 
 act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The 
 right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service 
 claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to 
 compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be 
 extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the 
 slaves within a particular state, thus working manumission in such 
 state ; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly 
 even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a ques- 
 tion of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, 
 and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would 
 receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply im- 
 
 Eress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly 
 oped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. 
 " Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle 
 shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces 
 will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially 
 upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy 
 of the government must be supported by concentrations of military 
 power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, 
 
 f>osts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly col- 
 ected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Con- 
 federate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political struc- 
 ture which they support would soon cease to exist. 
 
 " In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you 
 will require a commander-in-chief of the army, one who possesses 
 your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to 
 execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to 
 the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that 
 place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you 
 may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served 
 superior. 
 
 " I may be on the brink of eternity ; and as I hope for forgiveness from 
 my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and 
 from love for my country. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 George B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. 
 
 The Army at Harrison's Landing. 
 General McClellan's army remained for about a month at Harrison's 
 
58 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 Landing. It rapidly recovered from the effects of the Seven Days' 
 Battles, and its commander desired to prepare for a speedy advance 
 against Richmond by the James river route. Again his wishes were 
 destined to be thwarted. A new idol, in the shape of General Pope, 
 had been set up by the men at Washington, and they were boAving down 
 at his feet with too great fascination to see that he would be their ruin. 
 McClellan hoped again to advance to the attack of the enemy's capital ; 
 and to prepare for it, captured Malvern Hill from the enemy. 
 
 General Halleck was about this time made commander-in-chief at 
 Washington, and nearly all the correspondence subsequent to the arri- 
 val of the array at Harrison's Landing was with him. General McClel- 
 lan was sent some four thousand new troops, and was led to believe 
 he should have additional aid to enable him to begin his advance. 
 The current, however, set against him. General Pope was at Washing- 
 ton, in daily intercourse with the Administration, and the united influ- 
 ence of McClellan's enemies 60on procured an order for his recall from 
 the Peninsula, his virtual removal from the command, and the annexa- 
 tion of his army to that of General Pope. 
 
 The Army ordered to Alexandria. 
 
 On August 3d 1862, General McClellan received the following from 
 General Halleck. Until it reached him he was in complete ignorance 
 of the intention of the Government to withdraw his troops and give up 
 the Peninsular attack upon Richmond. 
 
 "It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to 
 Armia creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, cover- 
 ing the movement the best you can." 
 
 General McClellan proceeded to obey this order with all possible 
 rapidity, but he was firm in his conviction that the withdrawal of the 
 army at that time would have the most disastrous effect upon the Fede- 
 ral cause. The future proved that he was right. How earnestly he 
 remonstrated against the order will be seen from the following, which 
 was sent to Halleck on August 4th : — 
 
 " Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it 
 has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced 
 that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia creek will prove disas- 
 trous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are 
 necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement 
 as this, and while they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration 
 may be given to my statements. 
 
 " This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold 
 a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act 
 in any direction ; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider 
 onr communications as now secure. 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 59 
 
 " We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet 
 the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched 
 fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us practically within ten miles 
 of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from 
 this point twenty-five miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can 
 supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within 
 twelve miles of Richmond. 
 
 " At Aquia creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, 
 with land transportation all the way. 
 
 ****** 
 
 " It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point 
 to Burnside's force, to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict 
 defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry ; to those portions 
 of the army of the west not required for a strict defensive there. Here, 
 directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion ; it is here 
 that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will 
 determine the fate of the nation. 
 
 " All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, 
 and every available man brought here ; a decided victory here, and the 
 military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what 
 partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere ; here is the true defence 
 of Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of 
 the Union should be decided. 
 
 " Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that 
 I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my coun- 
 try, knowing that no ambitious or. selfish motives have influenced me 
 from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my 
 life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded. 
 . " If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey your 
 orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the movement, which I 
 can clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, 
 whatever skill I may possess. Whatever the result may be — and may 
 God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings — I shall at least 
 have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, 
 and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my 
 country." 
 
 All General McClellan's arguments were unavailing. Every effort 
 he made was unsuccessful. On August 5th, he received a peremptory 
 order from Halleck, and there was no further opportunity for remon- 
 strance. The words of Ilallcck's despatch were these : — 
 
 " You cannot regret the order of withdrawal more than I did tho 
 necessity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be ex- 
 pected to execute it with all possible promptness. It is believed that 
 it can be done now without serious danger. This may not be so, if 
 there should be any delay." 
 
 General McClellan promptly, though with a heavy heart, began his 
 retreat. His route was across the lower Chickahominy, through 
 Williamsburg, to Yorktown. The enemy soon found out what was 
 going on, and made their dispositions accordingly. All happened as 
 
60 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 McClellan had predicted. On August 9th, the following despatch from 
 Halleck, at Washington, gave the first news of the series of disaster 
 which ultimately engulphed not only Pope's forces, but the Army of tho 
 Potomac also : — 
 
 " I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of 
 Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and 
 move forward to the Potomac. You must send reinforcements instantly 
 to Aquia creek." 
 
 General Pope's Disasters. 
 
 The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on August 9th, and with 
 it began General Pope's disastrous retreat. The authorities at Wash- 
 ington became alarmed. Telegram after telegram was sent to McClel- 
 lan/ to hurry his march. Every exertion was made by him and his 
 generals to hasten it. On August 14th the retreat down the Peninsula 
 was begun, and on the lGth tho rear-guard evacuated Harrison's Land- 
 ing. General McClellan and his staff were among the last to leavo, 
 and all turned their backs upon Richmond with despondency. Tho 
 march, led by Fitz-John Porter, was hurried to Yorktown, and by the 
 20th of August the entire force was ready to embark from Yorktown 
 and Fortress Monroe, for Alexandria. It was at this period that the 
 ill-will of the Administration towards McClellan appeared in the 
 brightest colors. The following two weeks saw him first treated with 
 contumely, but at last hailed as a savior. 
 
 Constantly, since March, the Army of the Potomac had been labor- 
 ing. It had fought severe battles, and gained many victories. Tho 
 troops had submitted to exposure, sickness, and even death, without a 
 murmur. No army ever deserved the commendation of the Government 
 more than the Army of the Potomac. General McClellan thought that 
 such exertions might at least be recognized by a kind word from Wash- 
 ington. On August 18th, he telegraphed to Halleck : — 
 
 " Please say a kind word to my army that I can repeat to them in 
 general orders in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, 
 West Point, Hanover Court House, and on the Chickahominy, as well 
 as in regard to the seven days and the recent retreat. 
 
 "No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say 
 nothing about me. Merely give my men and officers credit for what 
 they have done. It will do you much good, and will strengthen you 
 much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to 
 what they have accomplished. They deserve it." 
 
 It would not have taken ten minutes for Halleck to have written a 
 general order, thanking the troops for their exertions. But no! he 
 could not do this. He issued no order, and never even replied to 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLBLLAN. 61 
 
 McClellan's suggestion. Such are the thanks brave troops in this 
 country get from the politicians whom they serve. 
 
 General McClellan removed from Command. 
 
 The dark days of our history came. Pope was overwhelmed by the 
 eDemy. He was attacked and defeated ; almost annihilated. He sent 
 bragging despatches to Washington announcing victories, and tho de- 
 luded President believed them. McClellan arrived at Alexandria. One 
 corps after another was detached from his army to join Pope. Tele- 
 gram after telegram was sent by him to Washington, imploring the 
 Administration to allow him to do something. He scarcely received a 
 civil answer. On the 24th, he telegraphed to Halleck : " Please in- 
 form me exactly where Pope is and what doing. Please define my po- 
 sition and duties." Halleck's answer was : " You ask me for informa- 
 tion which I cannot give." 
 
 The world moved on. A general order was issued which kept 
 McClellan at Alexandria, to direct " that portion of the Army of the 
 Potomac which has not been sent forward to General Pope's command." 
 Every soldier, wagon, and horse in McClellan's camp was sent forward. 
 He alone was not allowed to go. No wonder he chafed. He heard the 
 roar of the .artillery ; knew that incompetent hands were destroying 
 the finest army ever massed on this continent ; but was chained down 
 to Alexandria, without the liberty of sharing the dangers of his com- 
 rades. He implored permission to go out to the battle-field, and be 
 once more with them. On the 27th, he telegraphed to Halleck : — 
 
 " I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, un- 
 less I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to 
 my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do 
 not wish to act in the dark." 
 
 No satisfactory reply. 
 
 On the 29th, he telegraphed to Lincoln : — 
 
 " No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish mo 
 to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know 
 what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey 
 whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may 
 at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer." 
 
 Still nothing satisfactory. 
 
 On August 30th, to Halleck : — 
 
 "I have no sharpshooters, except the guard around my camp. I 
 have sent off" every man but those, and will now send them with tho 
 train, as you direct. I will also send my only remaining squadron of 
 cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have 
 every man of the Army of the Potomac who is within my reach." 
 
62 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 And again, immediately afterwards : — 
 
 " I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have expe- 
 rienced to-day in listening to the distant .sound of the firing of my men. 
 As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that, if there ia 
 a probability of the conllict being renewed to-morrow, I may be per- 
 mitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my 
 own men, if nothing more ; they will fight none the worse for my be- 
 ing with them. If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the com- 
 mand even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share 
 their fate on the field of battle." 
 
 To this he got an answer, but such an answer ! It was sent at nine 
 o'clock on the morning of the 31st. " I cannot answer," said Halleck, 
 " without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, by his 
 orders, of the department !" 
 
 General Pope utterly defeated. 
 
 A change soon came over the dream. On the morning of August 
 31st, all were confident of Pope's ability, but the enemy attacked and 
 defeated him, and the poor, wearied, sacrificed soldiers, without disci- 
 pline or order or thought for anything but safety, in a disorganized 
 mass streamed back to the intrenchments at Washington. How they 
 welcomed the brown earthworks built by McClellan a year before! 
 How they implored once more to be placed under their old leader ! 
 They had no confidence in any one else. Pope was gone no one knew 
 whither. Many of their beloved generals had been killed or captured. 
 Their arms and baggage were lost. They had nothing to eat. With 
 torn clothing and weary limbs, they gladly welcomed even the slightest 
 rest after their severe, unrequited labors. The army was entirely de- 
 feated. 
 
 At Washington all were in consternation. Every moment the fright- 
 ened politicians expected to hear the enemy's cannon booming from Ar- 
 lington, or their troops thundering across the Long Bridge. There was 
 but one hope of safety, and they knew of but one man to turn to for 
 salvation. How could they do it after they had treated him so shame- 
 fully ? But with such people nothing is easier than to salve over 
 wrongs. Honor has no place in their souls. At nine o'clock on the 
 morning of the 31st, Halleck had told McClellan he "could not answer." 
 What a change came by ten o'clock in the evening. Then a despatch 
 was sent by Halleck : " I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with 
 your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out." But thirteen 
 months before, Lincoln had sent just such an imploring despatch to 
 Western Virginia. And one after another, the great and little men 
 who had before held their heads so high were bowed down with sor- 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 63 
 
 row. McClellan did assist Halleck. In one hour he answered his des- 
 patch, promised to assist him ; but did it with a withering rebuke : 
 "To speak frankly — and the occasion requires it — there appears to be 
 a total absence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army." 
 How quickly did Halleck avail himself of the ability he once spurned 
 and how grandly does McClellan appear, forgetting his private wrongs, 
 and thinking only of the salvation of the country ! He thus modestly 
 tells how ho was recalled to command : — 
 
 General McClellan replaced in command. 
 
 " On the 1st of September I went into Washington, where I had an 
 
 interview with the general-in-chief, who instructed me, verbally, to 
 
 take command of its defences, expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the 
 
 works and their garrisons, and prohibiting me from exercising any 
 
 control over the troops actively engaged in front under General Pope." 
 ********** * 
 
 " On the morning of the 2d the President and General Halleck came 
 to my' house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had 
 returned from the front ; that our affairs were in a bad condition ; that 
 the army was in full retreat upon the defences of Washington ; the roads 
 filled with stragglers, &c. He instructed me to take steps at once to 
 stop and collect the stragglers ; to place the works in a proper state of 
 defence, and to go out to meet and take command of the army, when it 
 approached the vicinity of the works, then to place the troops in the 
 best position — committing everything to my hands. 
 
 " I immediately took steps to carry out these orders. * * 
 
 " In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front." 
 
 How the poor discomfited soldiers welcomed their old leader has be- 
 come history. The shouts that rent the air on that day, as he rode out to 
 meet them, were heard in Washington, and taught the politicians whom 
 the soldier loved. The people throughout the country echoed it, and 
 the fanatics were too frightened even to murmur. Their idol. Pope — 
 the hero of a week — disappeared unnoticed. 
 
 General McClellan reorganizes the Army. 
 
 Without a moment's delay General McClellan proceeded to reorganize 
 the army. On September 2d he took command, and from that time 
 until the battles in Western Maryland, every one relied upon him. By 
 superhuman exertions he collected the scattered regiments ; fed and 
 clothed the men, remoimted the cavalry, and once more was ready to 
 sally forth against the enemy. There was not a moment to be lost. 
 
 He marches to "Western Maryland. 
 
 On September 3d, General McClellan received information that the 
 enemy, emboldened by the defeat of General Pope, were making their 
 
64 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL MoCLELLAN. 
 
 way to the Potomac, for an invasion of the North. He made his ar- 
 rangements as quickly as possible. Ilis troops were at once ordered to 
 move out towards Leesburg and Frederick. On September 7th, he left 
 Washington with his staff. Day by day, up to the 14th of September, 
 his army was moving towards South Mountain, and on that day they 
 were at the foot of it, with the enemy above them holding the passes. 
 
 The administration, having had a week's repose after their fright, 
 again began to meddle. On September 10th, fearing that Colonel Miles 
 with his garrison at Harper's Ferry would be cut off, McClellan urged 
 Halleck to order him to withdraw. There was then ample opportunity 
 for him to retreat in safety. But Halleck had resumed his surliness, 
 and would not order the withdrawal. The result was that Miles's com- 
 mand was captured. On September 16th Halleck began to intermeddle. 
 He telegraphed to McClellan: "I think you will find that the wholo 
 force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river ; I fear now, 
 more than ever, that they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below, and 
 turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington." Halleck had 
 the same craven fears which produced so many disasters before. 
 
 On September 13th General McClellan intercepted an order from 
 General Lee to General D. II. Hill, which fully disclosed the enemy's 
 plans. Their entire force was on the north bank of the Potomac, and 
 from the order he learned that it was their intention to capture Har- 
 per's Ferry and fight a battle in Western Maryland. Without any 
 delay the proper dispositions were made, and the Federal troops ad- 
 vanced to drive the enemy from South Mountain, and, if possible, save 
 the garrison of Harper's Ferry. 
 
 The Battle of South Mountain. 
 
 A range of high hills, known as the South Mountain, crosses Mary- 
 land, just west of Frederick, and on it the Confederates had established 
 themselves. General McClellan determined to drive them out. Ho 
 divided his army into two columns, with a third in reserve. The left, 
 under Franklin, was to attack Crampton's Gap through the mountain, 
 and, if possible, relieve Harper's Ferry. The right was to carry Tur- 
 ner's Gap on the road from Frederick to Hagerstown, and was led by 
 Burnside, Sumner, and Hooker. 
 
 On September 14th General Franklin pushed rapidly forward with 
 his column on the road to Crampton's Gap. The enemy were sheltered 
 behind a stone wall at the base of the mountain. They were attacked, 
 and steadily forced up the slope until they reached some of their bat- 
 teries, where they made a stand. From here, after an engagement of 
 throe hours, they were driven by a gallant charge of portions of Smith's 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 65 
 
 and Slocum's divisions, and fled down the opposite side of the moun- 
 tain. General Franklin thus gained the crest of the hill, and quickly 
 descended into the valley on the opposite side, his advance firing 
 minute-guns to inform the beleaguered garrison of Harper's Ferry of his 
 approach. Night overtaking the troops, they bivouacked in the valley. 
 At eight o'clock the next morning Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry to 
 the enemy. He had previously withdrawn to the Virginia side of the 
 river. Had he not withdrawn, but waited a few hours, Franklin could 
 have released him. In this gallant battle General Franklin captured 
 four hundred prisoners and one cannon. His loss was 115 killed and 
 410 wounded. 
 
 Whilst Franklin was attacking and capturing Crampton's Gap, Burn- 
 side and Hooker marched against Turner's Gap, further northward. 
 At daylight on the 14th the movement of the troops began. Three dif- 
 ferent columns advanced up the side of the hill and soon drove the ene- 
 my, who appeared to be in small force, from the top. The Confederates 
 brought reinforcements, however, and at two o'clock made a fierce attack 
 to retake it. They formed columns on both of the Federal flanks. 
 The troops resisted as well as possible, and General Meade was sent 
 with a strong force to outflank the enemy and get in their rear. In 
 addition to this, General McClellan brought up reinforcements. At 
 about four o'clock he ordered a general advance of the whole line to 
 take the enemy's batteries posted in the gaps and open gorges on the 
 western side of the hill. It was responded to with enthusiasm. The 
 enemy made a desperate resistance, but were routed everywhere. At 
 seven o'clock they made a second effort to regain the lost ground, and 
 •until nine o'clock kept up a lively fire. They were successfully re- 
 pulsed, however. In this battle General Reno was killed. 
 
 Meanwhile, Meade was not idle. He attacked the enemy at five 
 o'clock, north of Turner's Gap, and gradually drove them up the hill. 
 He then turned towards the Gap, and marched along the summit. The 
 contest was very severe, but Meade soon reached the top of the hill 
 near his companions who had attacked the Gap in front. 
 
 He was completely successful. Turner's Gap was captured, and at 
 nine o'clock the enemy were in full retreat down the western side of 
 the mountain. On the night of the 14th, the Federal troops bivouacked 
 on the field, ready to renew the contest the next morning, if the enemy 
 made any resistance. They retreated a short distance, however, and 
 took up the position on Antictam creek, where was fought the famous 
 battle which crowns McClellan's fame. 
 
 In the battle of South Mountain, fifteen hundred prisoners were 
 captured. The number of troops engaged was about 30,000 on each 
 5 
 
66 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 side. McClellan's loss was 312 killed, 1256 wounded and missing: 
 total 1568. The news of the victory was at once sent to Washington, 
 and Lincoln telegraphed the following answer : — 
 
 " Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with 
 you ; destroy the rebel army, if possible." 
 
 The Battle of Antietam. 
 
 The position which the enemy had taken upon their retreat from 
 South Mountain, was a very strong one. They were on the west bank 
 of Antietam creek, occupying high grounds with steep and difficult 
 ascents. The creek was deep, sluggish, and with scarcely a ford. It 
 was crossed by four bridges : one near the mouth, the second and third 
 on roads leading to Sharpsburg, and the fourth, two and half miles 
 above, on the road from Frederick to Williamsport. The enemy ap- 
 peared to have chosen the ground leisurely, and it was well fortified and 
 defended by batteries. Their force was 97,445. General McClellan's 
 army numbered 87,164. 
 
 On September 15th, after the battle of South Mountain, General 
 McClellan's troops crossed the mountain top, marched down into the 
 valley, and advanced to the enemy's position at Antietam creek. They 
 did not reach the creek until late, however, and General McClellan 
 made a rapid examination of the enemy's position. The day was too 
 far spent for an attack, and the supply and ammunition trains were at 
 once ordered forward, to supply the troops for the impending contest. 
 The different corps were also ordered to take the proper positions to 
 make an attack the next morning. All that afternoon and night the 
 troops were moving to their allotted places, and it was after sunrise on 
 the 16th, before some of them were in position. 
 
 General McClellan's plan of attack was to advance his right wing 
 across the upper Antietam, driving the enemy's flank back ; the wing 
 then turning southward to attack the enemy's centre. As soon as this 
 was accomplished, the left wing was to advance and attack the enemy 
 in front, carrying a high-backed country bridge which spanned the 
 creek on one of the roads to Sharpsburg. The enemy held Sharpsburg, 
 and the two opposing lines were formed in curves, one enclosing the 
 other, with the Antietam flowing between. The Confederates were 
 on the inner and smaller curve ; General McClellan's troops on the 
 larger. The right wing was composed of Generals Mansfield's, Sum- 
 ner's, and Hooker's corps. General Porter's corps formed the centre. 
 The left was held by Burnside's corps. Still further to the left, but 
 too far distant to be engaged in the battle, though they played an im- 
 portant part in the contest, by holding largo bodies of the enemy in 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 07 
 
 that quarter in check, -were General Couch's troops. The remainder 
 of General Franklin's corps was in reserve. Morell's and Humphrey's 
 divisions had not yet arrived ; they were marching forward from 
 Frederick, which is east of the South Mountain. 
 
 On the morning of September 16th, the enemy began the contest by 
 a severe cannonade, which was replied to by the Federal artillery, and 
 continued more or less continuously during the entire day. There was 
 very little infantry fighting, however, and the morning was spent in 
 reconnoitring and hurrying forward the proper ammunition supplies. 
 
 The battle of South Mountain had completely exhausted the ammu- 
 nition. At two o'clock in the afternoon, General McClellan found 
 himself in readiness to move, and ordered General Hooker's corps on 
 the right to cross the upper Antietam, at one of the bridges and a ford ; 
 attack, and, if possible, turn the enemy's flank. The enemy's wing 
 fell back before Hooker's advance, making some resistance in various 
 places ; and at night the corps bivouacked on ground won from it. 
 General Mansfield's corps crossed tho Antietam immediately after 
 General Hooker's, and encamped a mile in his rear. 
 
 The Battle begins. 
 
 Scarcely had the 17th of September dawned, when the battle of An- 
 tietam began. General Hooker's skirmishers first became engaged, 
 and soon the whole corps was in action, driving the enemy out of the 
 woods in which they had taken shelter, and back towards Sharpsburg. 
 The contest was obstinate, and as the troops advanced, tho opposition 
 became more determined and the numbers of the enemy greater. 
 General Hooker sent for Mansfield's corps, which was promptly brought 
 to his aid; but scarcely had it fired a shot at the enemy, when its 
 gallant leader fell mortally wounded, and the command fell upon Gene- 
 ral Williams. Many of Mansfield's regiments were new ones, but 
 they fought like veterans. 
 
 At seven o'clock the battle raged fiercely, and a severe contest was 
 had for a strip of woods traversed by outcropping ledges of rock. For 
 two hours each party endeavored to drive the other out of the timber. 
 General Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps was sent for, and 
 hastened across the Antietam. At nine o'clock his troops appeared, 
 and relieved- General Williams's exhausted regiments. At once, an 
 assault was ordered upon the enemy's line, behind tho rocks in tho 
 timber, and they were driven almost out. Sedgwick and Dana were 
 seriously wounded, and carried from the field. But a moment after- 
 wards, Hooker was severely wounded in the foot, and was borne to the 
 rear. General Meade succeeded Hooker ; and Howard took Sedgwick's 
 
G8 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 place. The repulse of the enemy gave an opportunity for rearranging 
 the Federal lines, which were more or less in confusion, and for a time 
 there was a lull. 
 
 Whilst Sedgwick was advancing to Hooker's aid, General French, 
 with the other division of Sumner's corps, crossing after Sedgwick, 
 attacked the enemy further to the left. One of his brigades was com- 
 posed of new troops. All, new men and old, advanced steadily, how- 
 ever, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and encountering their in- 
 fantry at a group of houses. Tho Confederates were soon driven from 
 this shelter into a corn-field behind, and out of that to a sunken road, 
 which formed a natural rifle-pit. Here the contest raged for some time. 
 Soon the enemy endeavored to turn French's left flank, but were re- 
 pulsed with a loss of three hundred prisoners. They then attempted 
 to turn his right, but this was checked, and they made no further effort 
 to regain their lost ground. The troops, after four hours' continuous 
 fighting, rested on their arms, behind the crest of a hill they had won. 
 
 General Richardson, with the third division of Sumner's corps, had 
 followed French across the Antietam, and attacked the enemy further 
 to the left. The division formed in a ravine, and advanced up a hill 
 some distance to the left of the group of houses General French had at- 
 tacked. The enemy were met in a continuation of the corn-field in 
 which French's men fought, and were driven into the sunken road be- 
 yond. Meagher's brave Irish brigade distinguished itself here, its 
 leader having a horse shot under him. The ground on which these 
 troops fought was very irregular, and the enemy several times attempted 
 to cut Richardson off from French, but were always foiled. After some 
 time, seeing a favorable opportunity, one of Richardson's brigades got 
 a foothold in the sunken road, charged along it, and captured numerous 
 prisoners. This broke up that defence, and the Confederates abandoned 
 all parts of the road, retreating into another corn-field beyond. 
 
 The Federal troops in this quarter having driven the enemy back at 
 all points, it was not long before they were reinforced, and advanced 
 to recapture the lost ground. The attack was very severe, and in en- 
 deavoring to save some guns, General Richardson fell, mortally 
 wounded. General Hancock succeeded him'. The enemy, however, 
 did not gain any ground, and Hancock, though his line was weak, was 
 confident he could hold it. There was no other attempt made to drive 
 Hancock back. 
 
 About one o'clock, Smith's and Slocum's divisions of Franklin's corps 
 arrived on the field, having been sent to reinforce the right wing. 
 This was rendered necessary by the severe losses suffered by Hooker's 
 and Sumner's corps. As Franklin's divisions arrived, the enemy made 
 
LIFE OP MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 69 
 
 a severe attack upon the wearied Federal troops on the extreme right. 
 The aid was most opportune, for it repulsed the attack, but even with 
 Franklin's help the right wing was too weak to do much execution. 
 General Sumner, the senior officer in command, directed further offen- 
 sive operations to be postponed, as the repulse of Franklin would have 
 been perilous. " 
 
 Whilst these successful advances were being made on the right, 
 General Porter, on the east bank of the Antietam, did good execution 
 with his artillery, and also .prevented the enemy from sending any 
 flanking parties across the creek to attack the rear of the right wing. 
 During the battle General McClellan rode to all parts of the field. He 
 was everywhere, cheering and animating the troops, and directing the 
 contest. In the middle of the afternoon, finding that the weakness of 
 the right wing was extreme, he sent two brigades of Porter's corps to 
 reinforce Sumner. Sumner, however, was opposed to making any fur- 
 ther advance on the right. His troops were too wearied to do it, and 
 assuring McClellan that the ground already captured could be held, the 
 two brigades were returned to General Porter. The enemy made no 
 further attack on the right, and the victory in that quarter was secure. 
 
 General Burnside attacks on the left. 
 
 As soon as the Federal right, was sufficiently advanced, General 
 McClellan ordered Burnside to attack and capture the high-backed 
 bridge in his front. There was a great deal of delay in making this 
 advance, and McClellan reflects on Burnside for it. In his report he 
 
 says : — 
 
 "Early on the morning of the 17th I ordered General Burnside to 
 form his troops, and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his 
 front, and to await further orders. 
 
 " At eight o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant "Wilson, 
 topographical engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of 
 the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg 
 and its rear. 
 
 " After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I despatched 
 an aid to ascertain what had been done. The aid returned with the 
 information that but little progress had been made. I then sent him 
 back with an order to General Burnside to assault the bridge at once, 
 and carry it at all hazards. The aid returned to me a second time with 
 the report that the bridge was still in the possession of the enemy. 
 Whereupon I directed Colonel Sackett, inspector-general, to deliver to 
 General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without 
 a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of 
 the bayonet ; and I ordered Colonel Sackett to remain with General 
 Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly. 
 
 " After these three hours' delay, the bridge was carried at one o'clock 
 by a brilliant charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania vol- 
 
70 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 unteors. Other troops were then thrown over, and the opposite bank 
 occupied, the enemy retreating to the heights beyond. 
 
 "A halt was then made by General Burnside's advance until three 
 p. m., upon hearing which, I directed one of my aids, Colonel Key, to 
 inform General Burnside that I desired him to push forward his troops 
 with the utmost vigor, and carry the enemy's position on the heights ; 
 that the movement was vital to our success ; that this was a time when 
 we must not stop for loss of life, if a great object could thereby be ac- 
 complished. That if, in his judgment, his attack would fail, to inform 
 me so at once, that his troops might be withdrawn and used elsewhere 
 on the field. Pie replied that he would sQon advance, and would go up 
 the hill as far as a battery of the enemy on the left would permit. Upon 
 this report I again immediately sent Colonel Key to General Burnside 
 with orders to advance at once, if possible to flank the battery, or storm 
 it and carry the heights ; repeating that if he considered the movement 
 impracticable, to inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. The 
 advance was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven from the guns, 
 the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of the troops even reached 
 the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this time it was nearly dark, and 
 strong reinforcements just then reaching the enemy from Harper's 
 Ferry, attacked General Burnside's troops on their left flank, and forced 
 them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge. 
 
 " If this important movement had been consummated two hours 
 earlier, a position would have been secured upon the heights, from 
 which our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the ene- 
 my's line, and turned their right and rear ; our victory might thus 
 have been much more decisive. 
 
 The bridge was captured byJUrook's and Rodman's brigades, assisted 
 by Wilcox's division. The contest was severe and bloody, but the 
 enemy were finally driven off, and the hills beyond captured. At 
 nightfall, the Federal troops securely held all points, and the great 
 battle was ended. Of this memorable contest, General McClellan 
 says : — 
 
 " Night closed the long and desperately-contested battle of the 17th. 
 Nearly two hundred thousand men and five hundred pieces of artillery 
 were for fourteen hours engaged in this memorable battle. We had 
 attacked the enemy in a position selected by the experienced engineer 
 then in person directing their operations. We had driven them from 
 their line on one flank, and secured a footing within it on the other. 
 The Army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident 
 to previous reverses, had achieved a victory over an adversary invested 
 with the prestige of recent success. Our soldiers slept that night con- 
 querors on a field won by their valor and covered with the dead and 
 wounded of the enemy." 
 
 The losses of the Federal army in the battle were, killed, 2010 ; 
 wounded, 941G ; missing, 1043 ; total, 12,469. 2700 of the enemy's 
 dead were buried upon the field. The trophies of the battle captured 
 by McClellan were, thirteen cannon, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 71 
 
 15,000 stand of arms, and 6000 prisoners. Not a single gun or color 
 •was lost by General McClellan's army. 
 
 The Enemy retreat across the Potomac. 
 
 The enemy, on the 18th, the day after the battle, being so severely 
 punished, retreated across the Potomac, leaving much baggage behind 
 them. McClellan's supplies were exhausted, and the Administration 
 failed to send him ammunition. His regiments scarcely had a cart- 
 ridge to fire. He had taken the army to Antietam so hurriedly, that 
 even the necessary clothing had not been procured. Constant march- 
 ing for two weeks, and severe fighting for three days, the last the day 
 of the bloodiest battle -which had yet occurred in the war, so wearied 
 the troops that they were unablo to pursue the enemy. As it was, 
 they had accomplished wonders. Utterly defeated when Pope com- 
 manded them, they had poured into the intrenchmcnts of "Washington, 
 a disorganized mass ; McClellan, when no one else in the land could 
 stay the tide of destruction, took charge of them. In two days he be- 
 gan his march against the enemy. In ten more days seized the South 
 Mountain, and bore back the invader. In three more defeated him, 
 seized his cannon, captured thousands of his army, and compelled him 
 to flee for safety, very much as Pope's army had done scarcely three 
 weeks before. General McClellan did all this, and now that the enemy 
 were defeated, his gallant and victorious, though weary and exhausted, 
 army, deserved rest. 
 
 McClellan and Halleck. 
 
 The fanatics at Washington gave McClellan very little thanks for his 
 victory. Though he had saved them, they were only waiting to once 
 more sting their benefactor. This crops out in every despatch. On 
 September 19th, General McClellan thus modestly announced his vic- 
 tory to Halleck : — 
 
 " I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed from the 
 
 Jiresence of the enemy, who has been driven across the Potomac. No 
 ears need now be ascertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I shall 
 at once occupy Harper's Ferry." 
 
 All the thanks he got for saving the meddlers at Washington, was 
 contained in Halleck's surly answer of the following day : — 
 
 " We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your own move- 
 ments and those of the enemy. This should not be so. You should 
 keep me advised of both, so far as you know them." 
 
 Such a despatch as this, sent to a victorious general, by those who, 
 had he been defeated, would have been hurled from their capital, well 
 
72 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL MoCLELLAN. 
 
 deserved an indignant reply. McClellan lost not an hour in answering 
 it as it deserved : — 
 
 " Your telegram of to-day is received. I telegraphed you 3 r esterday 
 all I knew, and had nothing more to inform you of until this evening. 
 * * * I regret that you find it necessary to couch every des- 
 patch I have the honor to receive from you in a spirit of fault-finding, 
 and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commenda- 
 tion of the recent achievements of this army, or even to allude to 
 them." 
 
 The Exhaustion of the Federal Army. 
 
 General McClellan, in his report, thus describes the condition of his 
 irmy after Antietam. and the great deeds it had achieved : — 
 
 " It will bo remembered that at the time I was assigned to the com- 
 mand of the forces for the defence of the national capital, on the 2d 
 day of September 1862, the greater part of all the available troops 
 were suffering under the disheartening influences of the serious defeat 
 they had encountered during the brief and unfortunate campaign of 
 General Pope. Their numbers were greatly reduced by casualties, 
 their confidence was much shaken, and they had lost something of that 
 " esprit du corps" which is indispensable to the efficiency of an army. 
 Moreover, they had left behind, lost, or worn out the greatest part of 
 their clothing and camp equipage, which required renewal before they 
 could be in proper condition to take the field again. 
 
 ■** The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into 
 Maryland was received in Washington on the 4th of September, and 
 the Army of the Potomac was again put in motion, under my direction, 
 on the following day, so that but a very brief interval of time was 
 allowed to reorganize or procure supplies. 
 
 " The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam fought 
 by this army a few days afterwards, with the reconnoissances imme- 
 diately following, resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers, many 
 regimental and company officers, and a large number of enlisted men, 
 'amounting in the aggregate to fifteen thousand two hundred and 
 twenty. Two army corps had been sadly cut up, scattered, and some- 
 what demoralized in the action on the 17th. 
 
 " In General Sumner's corps alone, forty-one commissioned officers 
 and eight hundred and nineteen enlisted men had been killed ; four 
 general officers, eighty-nine other commissioned officers, and three thou- 
 sound seven hundred and eight enlisted men had been wounded, be- 
 sides five hundred and forty-eight missing; making the aggregate loss 
 in this splendid veteran corps, in this one battle, five thousand two 
 hundred and nine. 
 
 " In General Hooker's corps, the casualties of the same engagement 
 amounted to two thousand six hundred and nineteen. 
 
 " The entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable over- 
 work, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep and rest, previous 
 to the last battle. 
 
 "When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, the means 
 of transportation at my disposal were inadequate to furnish a single 
 day's supply of subsistence in advance. 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 73 
 
 " Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom hud fought like 
 veterans, but the morale of others had been a good deal impaired in 
 those severely contested actions, and they required time to recover, as 
 well as to acquire the necessary drill and discipline. 
 
 " Under these circumstances, I did not feel authorized to cross the 
 river with the main army over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit 
 of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, 
 and thereby place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise 
 above a fording stage, between my army and its base of supply. 
 
 "I telegraphed on the 22d to the gcneral-in-chief as follows: — 
 
 " ' As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this 
 army should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary, to secure its 
 efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, 
 and officers appointed to supply the numerous existing vacancies. 
 There are instances where captains are commanding regiments, and 
 companies are without a single commissioned officer.' " 
 
 A forward Movement urged. 
 
 Notwithstanding the exhaustion of the Federal army, it had scarcely 
 buried its honored dead upon the bloody field of Antietam, before the 
 radicals were again hounding it on to Richmond. The same general 
 who idled away three months before Corinth, and then allowed the 
 enemy to escape, was unwilling that McClellan's troops, after such 
 great achievements, should have three days' rest. The President, who 
 subsequently allowed general after general to linger and pause as long 
 as he pleased, when commanding the Army of the Potomac, and who 
 permitted officer after officer in the West to move as -slowly as he chose, 
 needed no hasty footsteps from any one but McClellan. It was only 
 McClellan's army that was to " move on.' ; No other. 
 
 General McClellan made the greatest exertions to prepare his army 
 for a forward movement. His men were without clothing — his cavalry 
 without horses. He could get neither. The people at Washington 
 wished him to move, but would not send him the supplies. The cor- 
 respondence between Washington and the camp shows plainly that the 
 principal object of the radicals was not to make McClellan move, but 
 to drive him from the army. When, subsequently, he did march for- 
 ward, they rewarded him for his alacrity by removing him from com- 
 mand. 
 
 Day after day Halleck sent McClellan despatches, urging him for- 
 ward, and McClellan's invariable answer was that as soon as he was 
 sent the supplies, which were absolutely necessary for his army, he 
 would march. The supplies did not reach him, and when he did go, 
 he was without the greater portion of them. 
 
 On October 6th Halleck sent McClellan the following despatch : — 
 
 " I am instructed to telegraph you as follows : ' The President directs 
 
71 LIFE OF MAJOK-GENEIIAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him 
 south. Your army must move now, -while the roads are good. If you 
 cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover 'the 
 latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If 
 you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 
 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line be- 
 tween Washington and the enemy, but docs not order it. He is very 
 desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immedi- 
 ately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river ; 
 also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary 
 that the plan of your operations be positively determined on, before 
 orders are giving for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am 
 directed to add, that the Secretary of War and the gencral-in-chief fully 
 concur with the President in these instructions.' " 
 
 The only thing the Administration adhered to in this despatch was 
 the urgency for a forward movement. The promise of reinforcements 
 was very conveniently forgotten. Of the condition of his army when 
 urged forward, and the embarrassment about supplies, McClellan thus 
 writes : — 
 
 " At the time I received the order of October 6, to cross the river and 
 attack the enemy, the army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a 
 large part of our troops were in want of shoes, blankets, and other in- 
 dispensable articles of clothing, notwithstanding all the efforts that had 
 been made since the battle of Antictam, and even prior to that date, to 
 refit the army with clothing, as well as horses. I at once consulted 
 Avith Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, who believed that the 
 necessary articles could be supplied in about three days. Orders were 
 immediately issued to the different commanders who had not already 
 spnt in their requisitions, to do so at once, and all the necessary steps 
 ■u ere forthwith taken by me to insure a prompt delivery of the supplies. 
 The requisitions were forwarded to the proper department at Washing- 
 ton, and I expected that the articles would reach our depots during the 
 three days specified ; but day after day elapsed, and only a small por- 
 tion of the clothing arrived. Corps commanders, upon receiving notice 
 from the quartermasters that they might expect to receive their sup- 
 plies at certain dates, sent the wagon trains for them, which, after wait- 
 ing, were compelled to return empty. Several instances occurred where 
 these trains went back and forth from the camps to the depots as often 
 as four or five different times, without receiving their supplies, and 1 
 was informed by one corps commander that his wagon train had tra- 
 velled over one hundred and fifty miles, to and from the depots, before 
 he succeeded in obtaining; his clothing;. 
 
 "The corps of General Franklin did not get its clothing until after 
 it had crossed the Potomac, and was moving into Virginia. General 
 Reynolds's corps Avas delayed a day at Berlin, to complete its supplies, 
 and General Porter only completed his on reaching the vicinity of Har- 
 per's Ferry. 
 
 " I made every exertion in my power, and my quartermasters did 
 the same, to have these supplies hurried forward rapidly ; and I was 
 repeatedly told that they had filled the requisitions at Washington, and 
 that the supplies had been forwarded. But they did not come to us, 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 75 
 
 and of course were inaccessible to the army. I did not fail to make 
 frequent representations of this condition of things to the general-in- 
 ehiefj and it appears that he referred the matter to the Quartermaster- 
 General, who constantly replied that the supplies had been promptly 
 ordered. Notwithstanding this, they did not reach our depots." 
 
 On October 11th McClellan telegraphed to Halleck : — 
 
 " We have been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for 
 this army, and Colonel Ingalls has received advices that it has been 
 forwarded by railroad ; but owing to bad management on the roads, or 
 'from some other cause, it comes in very slowly, and it will take a much 
 longer time than was anticipated to get articles that are absolutely in- 
 dispensable to the army, unless the railroad managers forward supplies 
 more rapidly." 
 
 And the next day he telegraphed : — 
 
 " It is absolutely necessary that some energetic means be taken to 
 supply the cavalry of this army with remount horses." 
 
 Again, on October 15th : — 
 
 " I am using every possible exertion to get this army ready to move. 
 It was only yesterday that a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at 
 Ilagerstown. It is being issued to the troops as rapidly as possible." 
 
 When Stuart made his raid around the army on October 11th, 
 McClellan could mount but eight hundred men to follow him. 
 On October 21, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan : — 
 
 " Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He 
 directs mo to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 
 Gth instant." 
 
 The Army moves forward. 
 
 Half supplied and without horses, General McClellan began his for- 
 ward movement on October 2Gth. He gave up all hope of procuring 
 what was necessary. His line of march was down the east side of the 
 Blue Ridge, towards Warrenton. So quickly did he advance that he 
 got ahead of the enemy in the Shenandoah valley, and cut off their 
 march to Richmond. On October 27th, all General McClcllan's -army 
 had crossed the Potomac. On November Gth his advance reached 
 Warrenton, and he was making every preparation to attack the enemy, 
 who were to the west of him, and who were not only cut off from 
 Richmond, but had a large portion of their supplies intercepted. Again, 
 however, and for the last time, the Administration interfered with 
 McClellan, and the country has come to the sad conclusion that it was 
 the most unfortunate act ever done by the Lincoln government. 
 
 & 
 
7G LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL MrCLELLAN. 
 
 General MeClellan removed from Command. 
 
 On November 5th, the following order was issued at Washington, 
 and despatched by special messenger to General MeClellan, reaching 
 him at Warrenton on November 7th : — 
 
 " War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, 
 " Washington, November 5th 18C2. 
 " General Orders No. 182. 
 
 " By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered 
 that Major-General MeClellan be relieved from the command of the 
 Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take command 
 of that army. t 
 
 " By order of the Secretary of War, 
 
 " E. D. Townsend, 
 
 "Assistant Adjutant-General." 
 
 Accompanying this order was the following direction from General 
 Halleck :— 
 
 " On the receipt of the order of the President sent herewith, you will 
 immediately turn over your command to Major-General Burnside, and 
 repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting, on your arrival at that place, 
 by telegraph for further orders." 
 
 The drama was ended. MeClellan turned over the command to 
 Burnside, and, like the noble Grecian, when popular tumult had for 
 the time ostracised him, he went into exile. He did nothing which the 
 purest patriot would not have done. He recognised the government of 
 his country by obeying its mandate. His army was in tears, and never 
 before parted from an officer with the regret it felt for him. MeClellan 
 went to Trenton, and reported for orders ; and, conscious that he has 
 twice been the savior of his country, he modestly wears the laurels a 
 grateful people give him, and which no fanatical Administration can 
 take away. He is a citizen now, and is beloved by every citizen of this 
 land whose income is not drawn from the miseries of his country, or 
 whose daily bread does not depend upon the nod of the men who mis- 
 rule us. 
 
 And his army — what has been its history ? Driven upon Fredericks- 
 burg in December, thousands were murdered, and Burnside was re- 
 moved from command. Driven upon Chaneellorsville in May, thou- 
 sands were again murdered, and Hooker lost his command. Again, in 
 18G3, it had to stem a Northern invasion, this time on Northern soil, 
 and only by sheer good luck successfully did it ; and now as we are 
 writing (March 12th), General Meade is being rewarded for his services 
 by cabals to drive him from command. The poor Army of the Potomac 
 is encamped to-day upon the very spot where MeClellan left it seventeen 
 months ago ! It has lost fifty thousand men, and is not an inch nearec 
 Richmond. And what has become of the men who allowed themselves 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENEHAL McCLELLAN. . 77 
 
 to be ruled by tbe radicals ? Mr. Lincoln's cabinet is divided against 
 itself, and is the scene of the fiercest dissension. Halleck, the tool in 
 1862, is the spurned sycophant in 1864. Stanton, who lorded it two 
 years ago, finds the rebellion as active and fearful as ever. The people 
 of the North, each night and morning, send up to Heaven a fervent 
 prayer to be rid of the wretched fanatics who have destroyed the Union, 
 violated tho Constitution, and are now leaving no effort unemployed to 
 overthrow republicanism, and set up a despotism. General McClellan 
 is well out of it. 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 General McClellan, since his retirement, has lived in strict privacy 
 near Orange, in New Jersey. Whenever he appeared at all in public, 
 it was to be greeted with an enthusiasm and affection not even accorded 
 to the President of the United States. Every machination of fanati- 
 cism is used to overthrow him, but all fail. He is to-day as much 
 beloved by the people as he was when at the head of the army ; and 
 far more honored than any man, civilian or soldier, who claims any 
 share of the popular esteem. 
 
 The character we have developed in tho preceding pages has won the 
 highest admiration not only of the patriotic in America, but of every 
 anxious spectator of the American war in foreign lands. In organizing 
 and combining the largest armies for the great war in which the Union 
 was suddenly plunged, General McClellan exhibited the highest wis- 
 dom. He secured the love of his soldiers ; the fear of his enemy. He 
 was humane and tolerant, and waged war only against armed men, 
 never against the unarmed and defenceless. He mad.e no raids to 
 destroy private property ; burned no towns ; employed no mercenaries ; 
 incited no slaves to revolt. Ho had tho clearest perception of the 
 magnitude of the rebellion, and of the humane warfare which alone 
 could quell it. He displayed the highest skill in conducting the Army 
 of the Potomac, in advanco and retreat, in success or disaster. He 
 inspired the most earnest devotion in his companions in arms. With 
 the most exemplary patience he bore the reproaches and disfavor of 
 the Administration. Every falsehood, invented to injure him, has 
 recoiled upon its instigators. And now a private citizen, he is tho first 
 in the hearts of the people, for that high office — once, and we trust 
 again to be, the reward of virtue — which, as he has neither sought it, 
 the nation trusts he will not decline it. 
 
 THE END. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 What General McClellan thinks of the Army of tho 
 
 Potomac. 
 
 Tho closing pages of 'General McClellan's great report embrace so 
 much sound military doctrine and good advice that we must give them. 
 We throw them into the form of an appendix. 
 
 Of the formation and direction of armies General McClellan says : — 
 
 " To my mind the most glaring defect in our armies is the absence of 
 system in the appointment and promotion of general and other officers, 
 and the want of means for the theoretical instruction of the mass of offi- 
 cers. The expansion of the army was so great and so rapid at the com- 
 mencement of the existing war that it was perhaps impossible, in the 
 great scarcity of instructed officers, to have adopted any other course 
 than that which was pursued ; but the time has arrived when measures 
 may bo initiated to remedy existing defects, and provide against their 
 recurrence. I think that the army should be regarded as a permanent 
 one, that is to say, its affairs should be administered precisely as if all 
 who belonged to it had made it their profession for life ; and those rules 
 for promotion, &c, which have been found necessary in the best foreign 
 armies to excite honorable emulation, produce an esprit du corps and 
 procure efficiency, should be followed by us. All officers and soldiers 
 should be made to feel that merit — that is to .say, courage, good con- 
 duct, the knowledge and performance of the duties of their grade, and 
 fitness to exercise those of a superior grade — will insure to them ad- 
 vancement in their profession, and can alone secure it for them. Mea- 
 sures should be adopted to secure the theoretical instruction of staff 
 officers at least, who should, as far as possible, be selected from officers 
 having a military education, or who have seen actual service in the 
 field. The number of cadets at the Military Academy should be at once 
 
 (79) 
 
80 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 
 
 increased to the greatest extent permitted by the capacity of the insti- 
 tution. The regular army should be increased and maintained complete 
 in numbers and efficiency. 
 
 "A well-organized system of recruiting and of depots for instruction 
 should be adopted, in order to keep the ranks of the regiments full, and 
 supply promptly the losses arising from battle or disease. This is es- 
 pecially necessary for the artillery and cavalry arms of the service, 
 which, from the beginning of the war, have rendered great services, 
 and which have never been fully appreciated by any but their com- 
 rades. We need also large bodies of well-instructed engineer troops. 
 
 " In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should 
 be left to professional soldiers. A statesman may, perhaps, be more 
 competent than a soldier to determine the political objects and direction 
 of a campaign ; but those once decided upon, everything should be left 
 to the responsible military head, without interference from civilians. 
 In no other manner is success probable. The meddling of individual 
 members of committees of Congress with subjects which, from lack of 
 experience, they are of course incapable of comprehending, and which 
 they are too apt to view through the distorted medium of partisan or 
 personal prejudice, can do no good, and is certain to produce incalcu- 
 lable mischief." 
 
 Of political interference he says : — 
 
 " I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President for the 
 constant evidence given me of his sincere personal regard, and his de- 
 sire to sustain the military plans which my judgment led me to urge 
 for adoption and execution. I cannot attribute his failure to adopt some 
 of those plans, and to give that support to others which was necessary 
 to their success, to any want of confidence in me ; and it only remains 
 for me to regret that other counsels came between the constitutional 
 commander-in-chief and the general whom he had placed at the head 
 of his armies — counsels which resulted in the failure of great campaigns. 
 
 " If the nation possesses no generals in service competent to direct its 
 military affairs without the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner 
 it finds them and places them in position the better will it be for its 
 fortunes." 
 
 Of the objects and ends of the war he speaks thus : — 
 
 "After a calm, impartial, and patient consideration of the subject — 
 a subject which demands the closest thought on the part of every true 
 lover of his country — I am convinced that by the proper employment 
 of our resources it is entirely possible to bring this war to a successful 
 military issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary to the rc-cstab- 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. 81 
 
 lishment of the Union is the entire defeat or virtual destruction of the 
 organized military power of the Confederates ; and that such a jjesult 
 should he accompanied and followed hy conciliatory measures ; and 
 that by pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possi- 
 ble to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union, a re-union by 
 which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both 
 parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other." 
 
 And as a fitting conclusion to his great report he thus epitomizes the 
 history of the Army of the Potomac : — 
 
 "I have not sought to defend the army. which I had the honor to 
 oommand, nor myself, against the hostile criticisms once so rife. It has 
 seemed to me that nothing more was required than such a plain and 
 truthful narrative to enable those whose right it is to form a correct 
 judgment on the important matters involved. This report is, in fact, 
 the history of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 "During the period occupied in the organization ofi» that army, it 
 served as a barrier against the advance of a lately victorious enemy, 
 while the fortifications of the capital were in progress ; and under the 
 discipline which it then received it acquired strength, education, and 
 some of that experience which is necessary to success in active opera- 
 tions, and which enabled it afterwards to sustain itself under circum- 
 stances trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred 
 along the lines, conducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops 
 to the realities of war. 
 
 " The army grew into shape but slowly ; and the delays which at- 
 tended on the obtaining of arms, continuing late into the winter of 
 1861-18G2, were no less trying to the soldiers than to the people of tho 
 country. Even at the time of the organization of the Peninsula cam- 
 paign, some of the finest regiments were without rifles ; nor were tho 
 utmost exertions on the part of the military authorities adequate to 
 overcome the obstacles to active service. 
 
 "When, at length, the army was in condition to take the field, the 
 Peninsula campaign was planned, and entered upon with enthusiasm 
 by officers aud men. Had this campaign been followed up as it was 
 designed, I cannot doubt that it would have resulted iu a glorious tri- 
 umph to our arms, and the permanent restoration of the power of the 
 government in Virginia and North Carolina, if not throughout the re- 
 volting states. It was, however, otherwise ordered, and instead of re- 
 porting a victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the heroism 
 of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition into an enemy's country, 
 there to abandon one and originate another and new plan of campaign, 
 
82 LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McLELLAN. 
 
 which might and would have heen successful if supported with appre- 
 ciation of its necessities, but which failed because of the repeated failure 
 of promised support at the most critical, and, as it proved, the must 
 fatal moments. That heroism surpasses ordinary description. Its il- 
 lustration must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm re- 
 flection, when the nation shall be looking back to the past from the 
 midst of peaceful days. 
 
 " For me, now, it is sufficient to say that my comrades were victors on 
 every field save one, and there the endurance of but little more than a 
 single corps accomplished the object of the fighting, and, by securing 
 to the army its transit to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and 
 barren victory. 
 
 " The army of the Potomac was first reduced by the withdrawal from 
 my command of the division of General Blenkcr, which was ordered to 
 the Mountain Department, under General Fremont. We had scarcely 
 landed on the Peninsula when it was further reduced by a dispatch 
 revoking a previous order giving me command at Fortress Monroe, and 
 under which I had expected to take ten thousand men from that point 
 to aid in our operations. Then, when under fire before the defences of 
 Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of General McDow- 
 ell's corps of about 35,000 men. This completed the overthrow of the 
 original plan of the campaign. About one-third of my entire army (five 
 divisions out of fourteen, one of the nine remaining being but little 
 larger than a brigade) was thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid 
 advance which I had planned, aided by a flank movement up the York 
 river, it was only left to besiege Yorktown. That siege was success- 
 fully conducted by the army, and when these strong works at length 
 yielded to our approaches, the troops rushed forward to the sanguinary 
 but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus opened an almost unre- 
 sisted advance to the banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond lay 
 before them, surrounded with fortifications, and guarded by an army 
 larger than our own ; but the prospect did not shake tho courage of the 
 brave men who composed my command. Relying still on the support 
 which tho vastness of our undertaking and the grand results depend- 
 ing on our success seemed to insure us, we pressed forward. Tho 
 weather was stormy beyond precedent ; the deep soil of the Peninsula 
 was at times one vast morass ; tho Chickahominy rose to a higher 
 stage than had been known for years before. Pursuing the advance, 
 the crossings were seized, and the right wing extended to effect a junc- 
 tion with reinforcements now promised and earnestly desired, and 
 upon the arrival of which the complete success of the campaign seemed 
 clear. The brilliant battle of Hanover Court-house was fought, which 
 
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN. S3 
 
 opened the way for the first corps, with the aid of which, had it come, 
 we should then have gone into the enemy's capital. It never came. 
 The bravest army could not do more, under such overwhelming disap- 
 pointment, than the Army of the Potomac then did. Fair Oaks attests 
 their courage and endurance when they hurled hack, again and again, 
 the vastly superior masses of the enemy. But mortal man could not 
 accomplish the miracles that seemed to have been expected of them. 
 But one course was left — a flank march in the face of a powerful enemy 
 to another and better base — one of the most hazardous movements in 
 war. The Army of the Potomac, holding its own safety, and almost the 
 safety of our cause, in its hands, was equal to the occasion. The seven 
 days arc classical in American history ; those days in which the noble 
 soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an outnumbering enemy 
 by day, and retreated from successive victories by night, through a 
 week of battle, closing the terrible series of conflicts with the ever 
 memorable victory of Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and 
 shattered, the entire eastern army of the Confederacy, and thus secured 
 for themselves a place of rest and a point for a new advance upon the 
 capital from the banks of the James. Richmond was still within our 
 grasp, had the Army of the Potomac been reinforced and permitted to 
 advance. But counsels, which I cannot but think subsequent events 
 proved unwise, prevailed in Washington, and we were ordered to 
 abandon the campaign. Never did soldiers better deserve the thanks 
 of a nation than the Army of the Potomac for the deeds of the Peninsula 
 campaign, and although that meed was withheld from them by the 
 authorities, I am persuaded they have received the applause of the 
 American people. 
 
 " The Army of the Potomac was recalled from within sight of Rich- 
 mond, and incorporated with the Army of Virginia. The disappoint- 
 ments of the campaign on the Peninsula had not damped their ardor 
 nor diminished their patriotism. They fought well, faithfully, gal- 
 lantly, under General Pope ; yet were compelled to fall back on Wash- 
 ington, defeated and almost demoralized. 
 
 " The enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his own capital, poured 
 his troops northward, entered Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and 
 even Washington itself. Elated by his recent victories, and assured 
 that our troops were disorganized and dispirited, he was confident that 
 the seat of war was permanently transferred to the loyal States, and 
 that his own exhausted soil was to be relieved from the burden of sup- 
 porting two hostile armies. But he did not understand the spirit which 
 animated the soldiers of the Union. I shall not, nor can I living, forget 
 that when I was ordered to the command of the troops for the defence 
 
84 LIFE OF MAJOR GENERAL MoCLELLAN. 
 
 of the capital, the soldiers, with whop I had shared bo much of the 
 anxiety and pain and Buffering of thenar, had not lis! the'ir confidence 
 in me as their eommander. They sprang to my call with all thru 
 anoient vigor> discipline, and courage. I led them infe) Maryland. 
 Fifteen days after they had fallen back defeated before^Washirigton, 
 thej vanquished the enemy on thejrugged height of South Mountain, 
 pursued him to the hard-fought licld of Antietam, and drove him, 
 broken and disappointed across the Potomac into Virginia. 
 
 '•The army had needof.rest. After the terrible experiences ofbattlte 
 and marches, with scarcely an interval of repose, which they had gone 
 through from the time of leaving for the Peninsula ; the return toWash- 
 ington, the defeat in Virginia; the victory at South Mountain; and 
 again at Antietam, it was not surprising that they wore in a largo 
 degree destitute of the absolute necessaries to effective duty. Sloes 
 were worn out; blankets were lost; clothing was in rags: in -hurt, the 
 army was unfit for active service, and an interval for rest and equip, 
 ment was necessary. When the slowly forwarded supplies came to us 
 
 I led the army across the river, renovated, refreshed, in g 1 order and 
 
 discipline, and followed the retreating foe to a position where I was 
 confident of decisive victory, when, in the midst of the movteaierit, while 
 my advance guard was actually in contact with the enemy, I was 
 removed from my command. 
 
 "1 am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign with lids brave 
 army was crowned with a \ ictory which saved the nation from the 
 greatest peril it had then undergone I have not accomplished my 
 purpose if, by this report, the Army of the Potomac is not placed high 
 on the roll of the historic armies of the world. Its deeds ennoble the 
 nation to which it belongs? Always ready for hattle, always firm, Btead- 
 fast, and trustworthy, I never called on it in vain; nor will ftfe 
 nation ever have cause to attrihute its want of success, under myself, or 
 under other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that 
 noble body of American soldiers. 
 
 " No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the 
 commanding general to the private, any lack of devotion to the sfervice 
 of the United States Government, and to the cause of the Constitution 
 and the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffei 
 ing, danger, and through the very shadow of death. Their comri 
 plead on all the fields where we fought, have scarcely more claim to the 
 honor of a nation's reverence than their pturvivora- to the justice of a 
 nation's trratiludc." 
 
 LlBRftR V OF COMGRESS, 
 
 
 XUE ZSV. 
 
L1BRA RY OF CONGRESS 
 
 009 232 294 4 ^