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THE CRISIS OF THE NAVAL WAR 
 
^ 
 
A Mine Exploding. 
 
The Crisis of the 
 Naval War 
 
 By 
 ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET 
 
 Viscount Jelligoe of Sgapa 
 
 G.C.B., O.M., G.G.V.O. 
 
 With 8 Plates and 6 Charts 
 
 NEW yatr YORK 
 GEORGE H. DORAN GOMPANY 
 
v4 ^ 
 
 ,q) fO.\ 
 
 
 
^0 
 The OflScers and Men 
 
 of our 
 
 Convoy, Escort, Patrol and Mines weeping Vessels 
 
 and their 
 
 Comrades of the Mercantile Marine 
 
 by whose splendid gallantry, heroic self-sacrifice, and 
 
 unflinching^ endurance the submarine 
 
 danger was defeated 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Owing to the peculiar nature and demands of naval 
 .warfare, but few dispatches, corresponding to those de- 
 scribing the work and achievements of our great armies, 
 were issued during the progress of the war. In a former 
 volume I attempted to supply this defect in the historical 
 records, which will be available for future generations, so 
 far as the Grand Fleet was concerned, during my period 
 as its Commander-in-Chief. The present volume, which 
 was commenced and nearly completed in 1918, was to 
 have been published at the same time. My departure 
 on a Naval mission early in 1919 prevented me, however, 
 from putting the finishing touches to the manuscript until 
 my return this spring. 
 
 I hesitated as to the publication of this portion of what 
 is in effect one complete narrative, but eventually decided 
 not to depart from my original purpose. There is some 
 reason to believe that the account of the work of the Grand 
 Fleet gave the nation a fuller conception of the services 
 which the officers and men of that force rendered in cir- 
 cumstances which were necessarily not easily appreciated 
 by landsmen. 
 
 This second volume, dealing with the defeat of the 
 enemy's submarine campaign, the gravest peril which ever 
 threatened the population of this country, as well as of 
 the whole Empire, may not be unwelcome as a statement 
 
 vu 
 
viii Introduction 
 
 of facts. They have been set down in order that the 
 sequence and significance of events may be understood, 
 and that the nation may appreciate the debt which it 
 owes, in particular, to the seamen of the Royal Navy and 
 the Mercantile Marine, who kept the seas during the 
 unforgettable days of the intensive campaign. 
 
 This book, therefore, gives the outline of the .work 
 accomplished by the Navy in combating the unrestricted 
 submarine warfare instituted by the Central Powers in 
 February, 1917. It would have been a labour of love to 
 tell at greater length and in more detail how the 
 menace was gradually overcome by the gallantry, endur- 
 ance and strenuous work of those serving afloat in ships 
 flying the White or the Red Ensigns, but I had not the 
 necessary materials at my disposal for such an exhaustive 
 record. 
 
 The volume is consequently largely concerned with 
 the successive steps taken at the Admiralty to deal with 
 a situation which was always serious, and which at times 
 assumed a very grave aspect. The ultimate result of all 
 Naval warfare must naturally rest with those who are 
 serving afloat, but it is only just to the Naval ofiicers and 
 others who did such fine work at the Admiralty in 
 preparing for the sea effort, that their share in the 
 Navy's final triumph should be known. The writing of 
 this book appeared also to be the only way in which I could 
 show my keen appreciation of the loyalty and devotion to 
 duty of the Naval Staff, of the many clever, ingenious 
 and audacious schemes developed and carried through for 
 the destruction of submarines and the safeguarding of 
 ocean-borne trade, and of the skilful organization which 
 brought into being, and managed with such success, that 
 
Introduction ix 
 
 great network of convoys by which the sea communica- 
 tions of the AlHes were kept open. The volume shows 
 how the officers who accompanied me to the Admiralty 
 from the Grand Fleet at the end of 1916, in association 
 with those already serving in Whitehall and others who 
 joined in 1917, with the necessary and valuable assistance 
 of our comrades of the Mercantile Marine, gradually pro- 
 duced the measures by which the Sea Service conquered 
 the gravest danger which has ever faced the Empire. 
 
 There were at times inevitable set-backs as the enemy 
 gained experience of our methods, and new ones had then 
 to be devised, and we were always most seriously handi- 
 capped by the strain imposed upon the Fleet by our 
 numerous military and other commitments overseas, and 
 by the difficulty of obtaining supplies of material, owing 
 to the pre-occupation of our industries in meeting the 
 needs of our Armies in equipment and munitions; but, 
 generally speaking, it may be said that in April, 1917, 
 the losses reached their maximum, and that from the fol- 
 lowing month and onwards the battle was being slowly 
 but gradually won. By the end of the year it was becom- 
 ing apparent that success was assured. 
 
 The volume describes the changes carried out in the 
 Admiralty Staff organization; the position of affairs in 
 regard to submarine warfare in the early part of 1917 ; 
 and the numerous anti-submarine measures which were 
 devised and brought into operation during the year. 
 The introduction and working of the convoy system is 
 also dealt with. The entry of the United States of 
 America into the war marked the opening of a new phase 
 of the operations by sea, and it has been a pleasure to 
 give particulars of our cordial co-operation with the 
 
X Introduction 
 
 United States Navy. The splendid work of the patrol 
 craft and minesweepers is described all too briefly, and I 
 have had to be content to give only a brief summary of 
 the great services of the Dover and Harwich forces. 
 
 Finally, an effort has been made to suggest the range 
 and character of the work of the Production Departments 
 at the Admiralty. It is impossible to tell this part of the 
 story without conveying some suggestion of criticism since 
 the output never satisfied our requirements. I have en- 
 deavoured also to indicate where it seemed to me that 
 changes in organization were not justified by results, so 
 that in future years we may benefit by the experience 
 gained. But I would not like it to be thought that I did 
 not, and do not, realize the difficulties which handicapped 
 production, or that I did not appreciate to the full the 
 work done by all concerned. 
 
 It is unfortunate that attempts to draw attention to 
 the lessons taught us by the war are regarded by many 
 people either as complaints of lack of devotion to the 
 country's interests on the part of some, or as criticisms 
 of others who, in the years before the war or during the 
 war, were responsible for the administration of the Navy. 
 In anticipation of such an attitude, I wish to state em- 
 phatically that, where mention is made of apparent 
 shortcomings or of action which, judged by results, did 
 not seem to meet a particular situation, this is done solely 
 in order that on any future occasion of a similar character 
 — and may the day be long postponed — the nation may 
 profit by experience. 
 
 Those who are inclined to indulge in criticism should 
 ever bear in mind that the Navy was faced with problems 
 which were never foreseen, and could not have been fore- 
 
Introduction xi 
 
 seen, by anyone in this country. Who, for instance, 
 would have ever had the temerity to predict that the 
 Navy, confronted by the second greatest Naval Power in 
 the world, would be called upon to maintain free com- 
 munications across the Channel for many months until 
 the months became years, in face of the naval forces of 
 the enemy established on the Belgian coast, passing 
 millions of men across in safety, as well as vast quantities 
 of stores and munitions? Who would have prophesied 
 that the Navy would have to safeguard the passage of 
 hundreds of thousands of troops from the Dominions to 
 Europe, as well as the movement of tens of thousands of 
 labourers from China and elsewhere? Or who, moreover, 
 would have been believed had he stated that the Navy 
 would be required to keep open the sea communications 
 of huge armies in Macedonia, Egypt, Palestine, Meso- 
 potamia and East Africa, against attack by surface vessels, 
 submarines and mines, whilst at the same time protecting 
 the merchant shipping of ourselves, our Allies, and 
 neutral Powers against similar perils, and assisting to 
 ensure the safety of the troops of the United States when 
 they, in due course, were brought across the Atlantic? 
 Compare those varied tasks vdth the comparatively modest 
 duties which in pre-war days ^were generally assigned to 
 the Navy, and it will be seen how much there may be to 
 learn of the lessons of experience, and how sparing we 
 should be of criticism. Wisdom distilled from events 
 which were unforeseeable should find expression not in 
 criticisms of those who did their duty to the best of their 
 ability, but in the taking of wise precautions for the 
 future. 
 
 Little mention is made in this volume of the work of 
 
xii Introduction 
 
 the Grand Fleet during the year 1917, but, although that 
 Fleet had no opportunity of showing its fighting power, it 
 must never be forgotten that without the Grand Fleet, 
 under the distinguished officer who succeeded me as 
 Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1916, all effort would 
 have been of no avail, since every operation by sea, as well 
 as by land, was carried out under the sure protecting shield 
 of that Fleet, which the enemy could not face. 
 
 I am conscious of many shortcomings in the book, 
 but it may prove of interest to those who desire to know, 
 something of the measures which gradually wore down 
 the German submarine effort, and, at any rate, it is the 
 only record likely to be available in the near future of the 
 work of fighting the submarines in 1917. 
 
 June, 1920. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER ^''^^^ 
 
 1. Admiralty Organization : the Changes in 1917 . 1 
 
 2. Submarine Campaign in the Early Part of 1917 32 
 
 3. Anti-Submarine Operations .... 53 
 
 4. The Introduction of the Convoy System . . 102 
 
 5. The Convoy System at Work . . . .119 
 
 6. The Entry of the United States : Our Naval 
 
 Policy Explained 153 
 
 7. Patrol Craft and Mines weeping Services . .182 
 
 8. The Dover Patrol and the Harwich Forces . 197 
 
 9. The Sequel 223 
 
 10. " Production " at the Admiralty during 1917 . 228 
 
 11. Naval Work 247 
 
 12. The Future 252 
 
 Appendices .....••• 261 
 
 Index • • • ^21 
 
LIST OF PLATES 
 
 A Mine Exploding Frontispiece 
 
 A German Submarine of the U-C Type 
 
 A German Submarine of the later Cruiser Class 
 
 A Smoke Screen for a Convoy . 
 
 The Dummy Deck-house of a Decoy Ship . 
 
 A Convoy Zigzagging ..... 
 
 A Convoy with an Airship .... 
 
 Drifters at Sea ...... 
 
 A Paddle Minesweeper .... 
 
 A German Mine on the Surface . 
 
 Two Depth Charges after Explosion . 
 
 The Tell-tale Oil Patch .... 
 
 A Submarine Submerging .... 
 
 Periscope of Submerged Submarine Travelling at Slow 
 Speed ...... 
 
 A Submarine Submerged .... 
 
 FACING PAGE 
 
 48 
 
 48 
 80 
 80 
 128 
 128 
 160 
 192 
 192 
 224 
 224 
 256 
 
 256 
 256 
 
LIST OF CHARTS 
 
 (CONTAINED IN THE POCKET AT THE END OF THE BOOK) 
 
 A. Approach Areas and Typical Routes. 
 
 B. Typical Approach Lines. 
 
 C. Barred Zones Proclaimed by the Germans. 
 
 D. Patrol Areas, British Isles. 
 
 E. Patrol and Mines weeping Zones in the Mediterranean. 
 
 F. Showing French and British Ports within Range of the 
 
 German Bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge. 
 
The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION; THE CHANGES IN 1917 
 
 It is perhaps as well that the nation generally remained 
 to a great extent unconscious of the extreme gravity of 
 the situation which developed during the Great War, when 
 the Germans were sinking an increasing volume of mer- 
 chant tonnage week by week. The people of this country 
 as a whole rose superior to many disheartening events and 
 never lost their sure belief in final victory, but full know- 
 ledge of the supreme crisis in our history might have 
 tended to undermine in some quarters that confidence in 
 victory which it was essential should be maintained, and, 
 in any event, the facts could not be disclosed without 
 benefiting the enemy. But the position at times was 
 undoubtedly extremely serious. 
 
 At the opening of the war we possessed approxi- 
 mately half the merchant tonnage of the world, but 
 experience during the early part of the struggle revealed 
 that we had not a single ship too many for the 
 great and increasing oversea military liabilities which we 
 were steadily incurring, over and above the responsibility 
 of bringing to these shores the greater part of the food for 
 a population of forty-five million people, as well as nearly 
 all the raw materials which were essential for the manufac- 
 ture of munitions. The whole of our war efforts, ashore 
 
2 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 as well as afloat, depended first and last on an adequate 
 volume of merchant shipping. 
 
 It is small wonder, therefore, that those who watched 
 from day to day the increasing toll which the enemy took 
 of the country's sea-carrying power, were sometimes filled 
 with deep concern for the future. Particularly was this 
 the case during the early months of unrestricted submarine 
 warfare in 1917. For if the menace had not been 
 mastered to a considerable extent, and that speedily, not 
 only would the victory of the Allies have been imperilled, 
 but this country would have been brought face to face with 
 conditions approaching starvation. In pre-war days the 
 possibility of these islands being blockaded was frequently 
 discussed; but during the dark days of the unrestricted 
 submarine campaign there was ample excuse for those 
 with imagination to picture the implication of events 
 which were happening from week to week. The 
 memories of those days are already becoming somewhat 
 dim, and as a matter of history and a guide to the future, 
 it is perhaps well that some account should be given, how- 
 ever inadequate, of the dangers which confronted the 
 country and of the means which were adopted to avert the 
 worst consequences of the enemy's campaign without 
 ceasing to exert the increasing pressure of our sea power 
 upon his fighting efficiency, and without diminishing our 
 military efforts overseas. 
 
 The latter points were of great importance. It was 
 always necessary to keep the Grand Fleet at a strength 
 that would ensure its instant readiness to move in waters 
 which might be infested by submarines in large numbers 
 should the Germans decide upon some operation by the 
 High Sea Fleet. The possibility of action between the 
 fleets necessitated the maintenance of very strong 
 destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet. 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 3 
 
 Similarly our oversea military expeditions, with the 
 consequent large number of merchant ships in use as 
 transports or supply ships, required a considerable force 
 of destroyers and other small craft. These commitments 
 greatly reduced the means at our disposal for dealing with 
 the hostile submarines that were attempting to prevent 
 the import of food and raw materials into the country. 
 
 Readers of books, and particularly books deaUng with 
 war, show a natural avidity for what may be described as 
 the human side of a contest as well as for the dramatic 
 events. But, whether it be prosecuted by sea or by land, 
 war is largely a matter of efficient and adequate organiza- 
 tion. It is a common saying that we muddle through 
 our wars, but we could not afford to muddle in face of 
 the threat which the enemy's unrestricted submarine 
 campaign represented. It is impossible, therefore, to 
 approach the history of the successful efforts made by sea 
 to overcome this menace without describing in some detail 
 the work of organization which was carried out at the 
 Admiralty in order to enable the Fleet to fulfil its new 
 mission. In effect those responsible for the naval policy 
 of the country conducted two wars simultaneously, the 
 one on the surface, and the other under the surface. The 
 strategy, tactics and weapons which were appropriate to 
 the former, were to a large extent useless in the contest 
 against mines and submarines which the enemy employed 
 with the utmost persistency and no little ingenuity. Even 
 in the Russo-Japanese war, where the mine was little used, 
 it exerted a marked influence on the course of the war ; 
 the Germans based their hopes of victory in the early days 
 of the struggle entirely on a war of attrition, waged against 
 men-of-war, as well as merchant ships. The submarine, 
 which was thrown into the struggle in increasing numbers, 
 represented an entirely new development, for the sub- 
 
4 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 marine is a vessel which can travel unseen beneath the 
 water and, while still unseen, except for a possible momen- 
 tary glimpse of a few inches of periscope, can launch a 
 torpedo at long or short range and with deadly accuracy. 
 In these circumstances it became imperative to organize 
 the Admiralty administration to meet new needs, and to 
 press into the service of the central administration a large 
 number of officers charged with the sole duty of studying 
 the new forms of warfare which the enemy had adopted 
 and of evolving with scientific assistance novel methods of 
 defeating his tactics. 
 
 Whilst the enemy's campaign against merchant 
 shipping always gave rise to anxiety, there were certain 
 periods of greatly increased activity. During the summer 
 months of 1916 the losses from submarine attack and 
 from submarine-laid mines were comparatively slight, and, 
 in fact, less than during the latter half of 1915, but in the 
 autumn of 1916 they assumed very serious proportions. 
 This will be seen by reference to the following table, which 
 gives the monthly losses in British, neutral and Allied 
 mercantile gross tonnage from submarine and mine attack 
 alone for the months of May to November inclusive : 
 
 May ... 122,793 September... 229,687 
 
 June ... 111,719 October ... 852,902 
 
 July ... 110,757 November... 327,245 
 
 August ... 160,077 
 
 Another disturbing feature was the knowledge that we 
 were not sinking enemy submarines at any appreciable 
 rate, whilst we knew that the Germans had under con- 
 struction a very large number of these vessels, and that 
 they were thus rapidly adding to their fleet. It was a 
 matter also of common knowledge that our output of 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 5 
 
 new merchant ships was exceedingly small, and I, in 
 common with others, had urged a policy of greatly 
 increased mercantile ship construction. These facts, 
 combined with the knowledge that our reserves of food 
 and essential raw materials for war purposes were very 
 low, led me, when commanding the Grand Fleet, to the 
 inevitable conclusion that it was essential to concentrate 
 all our naval efforts so far as possible on the submarine 
 menace, and to adopt the most energetic measures for the 
 protection of our sea communications and the destruction 
 of the enemy's submarines. Although it was not easy 
 to see the exact means by which this could be achieved, it 
 appeared necessary as a first step to form an organization 
 having as its sole duty the study of the question, com- 
 prising such officers as would be most likely to deal 
 effectively with the problem, supported by the necessary 
 authority to push forward their ideas. Another necessity 
 was the rapid production of such material as was found 
 to be required for anti-submarine measures. 
 
 With these ideas in my mind I had written letters 
 to the Admiralty on the subject, and was summoned to 
 a conference in London on November 1 by Mr. Balfour, 
 the First Lord. The whole question of the submarine war- 
 fare was fully discussed with Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry 
 Jackson (then First Sea Lord) during the two days spent in 
 London. I had at that time formed and expressed the view 
 that there was very little probability of the High Sea Fleet 
 putting to sea again to risk a Fleet action until the new 
 submarine campaign had been given a thorough trial. 
 With the High Sea Fleet ** in being " we could not afford 
 to deplete the Grand Fleet of destroyers, which could 
 under other conditions be employed in anti-submarine 
 work, and therefore the probable German strategy in these 
 circumstances was to keep the Fleet " in being." At 
 
6 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 the same time the situation appeared so serious that I 
 went so far as to suggest that one Grand Fleet flotilla 
 of destroyers might under certain conditions be withdrawn 
 for anti-submarine duties in southern waters. 
 
 The misgivings which I entertained were, of course, 
 shared by all those in authority who were acquainted with 
 the facts of the case, including the Board of Admiralty. 
 
 On November 24 Mr. Balfour telegraphed offering 
 me the post of First Sea Lord, and in the event of 
 acceptance requesting me to meet him in Edinburgh to 
 discuss matters. After consultation with Sir Charles 
 Madden, my Chief of Staff, I replied that I was prepared 
 to do what was considered best for the Service. 
 
 During the conference with Mr. Balfour in Edin- 
 burgh on November 27, 1916, and after I had agreed 
 to go to the Admiralty, he informed me of the consequent 
 changes which he proposed to make in flag officers' appoint- 
 ments in the Grand Fleet. Amongst the changes he 
 included Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, who would be relieved 
 of his post as second in command of the Grand Fleet 
 and commander of the 1st Battle Squadron, as he had 
 practically completed his term of two years in command. 
 I thereupon asked that he might be offered the post of 
 Second Sea Lord, and that Commodore Lionel Halsey, 
 who had been serving as Captain of the Fleet, might 
 be offered that of Fourth Sea Lord. In my view it 
 was very desirable that an officer with the great 
 experience in command possessed by Sir Cecil Burney 
 should occupy the position of Second Sea Lord under 
 the conditions which existed, and that one who had 
 served afloat during the war in both an executive and 
 administrative capacity should become Fourth Sea Lord. 
 I also informed Mr. Balfour of my desire to form an 
 Anti-Submarine Division of the War Staff at the 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 7 
 
 Admiralty, and asked that Rear- Admiral A. L. Duff, 
 C.B., should be offered the post of Director of the 
 Division, with Captain F. C. Dreyer, C.B., my Flag 
 Captain in the Iron Duke, as his assistant. 
 
 All these appointments were made. 
 
 Although I arrived in London on November 29, I 
 did not actually take office as First Sea Lord until 
 December 5, owing to an attack of influenza. On that 
 day I relieved Sir Henry Jackson, but only held office 
 under Mr. Balfour for two or three days, as the change 
 of Government took place just at this period, and Sir 
 Edward Carson came to the Admiralty in place of Mr. 
 Balfour. 
 
 This book is intended to record facts, and not to 
 touch upon personal matters, but I cannot forbear to 
 mention the extreme cordiality of Sir Edward Carson's 
 relations with the Board in general and myself in 
 particular. His devotion to the naval service was obvious 
 to all, and in him the Navy possessed indeed a true and 
 a powerful friend. 
 
 The earliest conversations between the First Lord 
 and myself had relation to the submarine menace, and 
 Sir Edward Carson threw himself wholeheartedly into 
 the work. This was before the days of the unrestricted 
 submarine campaign, and although ships were frequently 
 torpedoed, very large numbers were still being sunk by 
 gun-fire. The torpedo did not come into general use 
 until March, 1917. 
 
 One of the most pressing needs of this period of attack 
 by gun-fire was consequently a great increase in the 
 number of guns for use in defensively armed merchant 
 vessels, and here Sir Edward Carson's assistance was of 
 great value. He fully realized the urgent necessities of the 
 case, and jvas constant in his efforts to procure the neces- 
 
8 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 sary guns. The work carried out in this connection is 
 given in detail in Chapter III (p. 68). 
 
 During Sir Edward's tenure of office the reorganiza- 
 tion of the Naval Staff was taken in hand. Changes from 
 which great benefit resulted were effected in the Staff 
 organization. Sir Edward very quickly saw the necessity 
 for a considerable strengthening of the Staff. In addition 
 to the newly formed and rapidly expanding Anti-Sub- 
 marine Division of the Naval Staff, he realized that the 
 Operations Division also needed increased strength, and 
 that it was essential to relieve the First Sea Lord of the 
 mass of administrative work falling upon his shoulders, 
 which had unfortunately been greatly magnified by the 
 circumstances already described. 
 
 It is as well at this point to describe the conditions 
 in regard to Staff organization that existed at the 
 Admiralty at the end of 1916, and to show how those 
 conditions had been arrived at. 
 
 Prior to 1909 there was no real Staff, although the 
 organization at the Admiralty included an Intelligence 
 Department and a Mobilization Division. The Director 
 of Naval Intelligence at that time acted in an advisory 
 capacity as Chief of the Staff. Indeed prior to 1904 
 there were but few naval officers at the Admiralty 
 at all beyond those in the technical departments of the 
 Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes and the 
 members of the Board itself. The Sea Lords were even 
 without Naval Assistants and depended entirely on the 
 help of a secretary provided by the civilian staff at the 
 Admiralty. 
 
 In 1910 a new branch was formed termed the 
 Mobilization and Movements Department under a 
 Director. This branch jvas a first step towards an 
 Operations Division. 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 9 
 
 Under Mr. Churchill's regime at the Admiralty in 
 1911 a more regular Staff organization was introduced 
 and a Chief of the War Staff, acting under the First Sea 
 Lord, was appointed. The organization introduced during 
 his term of office is thus shown graphically : 
 
 CHIEF OF STAFF 
 
 I i I 
 
 Director of Director of Director of 
 
 Operations Division. Intelligence Division. Mobilization Division. 
 
 In addition to other duties, the Mobilization Division was 
 charged with the responsibility for the supply of fuel to 
 the Fleet, from the Staff point of view. 
 
 In the organization introduced in 1911 the duties of 
 the Chief of the Staff were defined as being of an 
 advisory nature. He possessed no executive powers. 
 Consequently all orders affecting the movements of ships 
 required the approval of the First Sea Lord before issue, 
 and the consequence of this over-centralization was that 
 additional work was thrown on the First Sea Lord. The 
 resultant inconvenience was not of much account during 
 peace, but became of importance in war, and as the war 
 progressed the Chief of the Staff gradually exercised 
 executive functions, orders which were not of the first 
 importance being issued by the Staff in accordance with 
 the policy approved generally by the First Sea Lord. 
 The fault in the organization appeared to me to lie 
 in non-recognition of the fact that the First Sea Lord 
 was in reality the Chief of the Naval Staff, since he was 
 charged with the responsibility for the preparation and 
 readiness of the Fleet for war and for all movements. 
 Another anomaly existing at the Admiralty, which was 
 not altered in the 1911 reorganization of the War Staff, 
 was that the orders to the Fleet jyere not drafted and 
 
10 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 issued by the War Staff, but by the Mihtary Branch of 
 the Secretary's Department. 
 
 The system was only workable because the very able 
 civil servants of the Military Branch were possessed of 
 wide Admiralty experience and worked in the closest co- 
 operation with the naval officers. Their work was of the 
 most strenuous nature and was carried out with the 
 greatest devotion, but the system was manifestly wrong 
 in principle. 
 
 On the outbreak of war the necessity for placing the 
 War Registry (a part of the Military Branch) directly 
 under the Chief of the Staff became apparent, and this 
 was done. 
 
 In December, 1916, when I took up the post of First 
 Sea Lord, the Admiralty War Staff was still being worked 
 on the general lines of the organization introduced by 
 Mr. Churchill in 1911, but it had, of course, expanded 
 to a very considerable extent to meet war conditions, and 
 a most important Trade Division, which dealt with all 
 questions connected with the Mercantile Marine, had 
 been formed at the outbreak of war under the charge of 
 Captain Richard Webb. This Division, under that very 
 able officer, had carried out work of the greatest national 
 importance with marked success. 
 
 The successive changes in the Staff organization 
 carried out during the year 1917 were as follows : 
 
 In December, 1916, an Anti-Submarine Division of 
 the Staff was formed. This Division did not, for some 
 reason, appear in the Navy List as part of the Staff 
 organization until some months had elapsed, although it 
 started work in December, 1916. The officers who 
 composed the Division were shown as borne on the books 
 of H.M.S. President. 
 
 The Division relieved the Operations Division of the 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 ii 
 
 control of all vessels, including aircraft, which were en- 
 gaged in anti-submarine offensive and defensive work, and 
 took over also the control of mine-sweeping operations. 
 The Division was also charged with the duty of examining 
 and perfecting all experimental devices for combating 
 the submarine menace and of producing fresh schemes 
 for the destruction of enemy submarines. This organiza- 
 tion is open to the criticism that matters concerning 
 operations and material came under the same head, but 
 they were so closely allied at this stage that it was deemed 
 advisable to accept this departure from correct Staff 
 organization. The personnel of the Division came with 
 me from the Grand Fleet, and at the outset consisted of 
 one flag officer — Rear- Admiral A. L. Duff, C.B. — two 
 captains, four commanders, three lieutenant-commanders, 
 and two engineer officers, in addition to the necessary 
 clerical staff. The small staff of four officers already at 
 the Admiralty engaged in anti-submarine experimental 
 work, which had done much to develop this side of war- 
 fare, was absorbed. The new Division worked directly 
 under me, but in close touch with the then Chief of the 
 War Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver. 
 
 In the early spring of 1917 the illogical nature of the 
 War Staff organization became apparent, in that it had 
 no executive functions, and as the result of discussions 
 between Sir Edward Carson and myself the decision was 
 taken that the duties of the Naval Staff (the term decided 
 upon in place of that of War Staff) should be made 
 executive, and that the First Sea Lord should assume 
 his correct title as Chief of the Naval Staff, as he had, 
 in fact, already assumed the position. 
 
 At the same time the operational work of the Staff 
 was grouped under two heads, the first mainly concerned 
 with operations against the enemy's surface vessels, and 
 
12 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 the second with the protection of trade and operations 
 against the enemy's under- water warfare, whether the 
 means he employed were submarines or mines. 
 
 The officer, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, K.C.B., 
 charged with the supervision of the first-named work was 
 styled Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (D.C.N.S.), and 
 the officer connected with the second, Rear- Admiral 
 A. L. Duff, C.B., was given the title of Assistant Chief 
 of the Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.). 
 
 The duties of Director of the Anti-Submarine Division 
 of the Staff, hitherto carried out by Admiral Duff, were 
 at this time taken over by Captain W. W. Fisher, C.B., 
 who was brought down from the Grand Fleet for the 
 purpose. Captain Dreyer, who had been Admiral Duff's 
 original assistant, had in the meantime been appointed 
 Director of Naval Ordnance, and had been succeeded by 
 Captain H. Walwyn, D.S.O. 
 
 The Mine-Sweeping Division of the Staff was also 
 formed, and the importance of the question of signal 
 communications was recognized by forming a Signal 
 Section of the Staff. 
 
 The adoption of the title of Chief of the Naval Staff 
 by the First Sea Lord necessarily made the functions of 
 the Staff executive instead of advisory. 
 
 The Staff organization at this period is shown 
 graphically below. 
 
 C. N. S. 
 
 D. C. N. S A. C. N. S. 
 
 Opera- Mobiliza- Signal Intelli- Trade Convoys Anti-Sub- Mine- 
 tions tion Section, gence Division. Section, marine Sweeping 
 
 Division. Division. Division. Division. Division. 
 
 Home Foreign 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 13 
 
 Stress was laid in a Staff memorandum issued by me 
 on the fact that the various divisions were on no account 
 to work in watertight compartments, but were to be in 
 the closest touch with one another. The dotted line 
 connecting the D'.C.N.S. and the A.C.N.S. in the graph 
 was defined as indicating that there should be the fullest 
 co-operation between the different portions of the Staff. 
 
 In the summer of 1917 the growth of the convoy 
 system necessitated further expansion of the Naval Staff, 
 and a Mercantile Movements Division was added. The 
 duties of this division were to organize and regulate the 
 movements of convoys of merchant ships. A staff of 
 officers had been by this time sent abroad to the ports 
 from which convoys were directed to sail, and the Mer- 
 cantile Movements Division, acting in close touch with 
 the Ministry of Shipping, arranged the assembly and 
 movements of the convoys and their protection. 
 
 The organization of the portion of the Staff under the 
 A.C.N.S. at this stage is shown below. 
 
 A. C. N. S. 
 I 
 
 I I I I 
 
 Director of Director of Director of Director of 
 
 Mercantile Trade Anti-Sub- Mine-Sweeping 
 
 Movements Division. marine Division. 
 
 Division. (Captain R.N.) Division. (Captain R.N.) 
 
 (Captain R.N.) \ (Captain R.N.) | 
 
 I Staff. I Staff. 
 
 ~| Staff. 
 
 Convoy Movements 
 
 Section. Section. 
 
 The portion of the organization under the A.C.N.S. 
 comprised the following numbers in December, 1917 : 
 
 Mercantile Movements Division, 36 Officers, with a 
 clerical staff. 
 
 Trade Division, 43 Officers, with a clerical staff of 10 
 civilians. 
 
14 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Anti-Submarine Division, 26 Officers, with a clerical 
 staff. 
 
 Mine-Sweeping Division, 8 Officers, with a clerical 
 staff. 
 
 Of this number practically the whole of the Mercantile 
 Movements and Anti-Submarine Divisions were added 
 during the year 1917, whilst large additions were also 
 made to the Trade Division, owing to the great increase 
 of work. 
 
 During the first half of the year 1917 the Operations 
 Division of the Naval Staff received a much needed 
 increase of strength by the appointment of additional 
 officers, charged, under the Director of the Operations 
 Division, with the detailed preparation of plans for opera- 
 tions. Further additions to this branch of the Staff were 
 made in the latter half of the year. 
 
 Matters were in this position with the reorganization 
 of the Naval Staff in hand and working towards a definite 
 conclusion when, to the intense regret of those who had 
 been privileged to work with him. Sir Edward Carson 
 left the Admiralty to become a member of the War 
 Cabinet. 
 
 Before leaving the subject of work at the Admiralty 
 during Sir Edward Carson's administration, mention 
 should be made of the progress made in the difficult task 
 of providing officers for the rapidly expanding Fleet. The 
 large programme of small craft started in the early part 
 of 1917 involved the eventual provision of a great number 
 of additional officers. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, the 
 Second Sea Lord, took this matter in hand with con- 
 spicuous success, and the measures which he introduced 
 tided us over a period of much difficulty and made pro- 
 vision for many months ahead. Sir Cecil Burney, by 
 reason of his intimate knowledge of the personnel — the 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 15 
 
 result of years of command afloat — was able to settle also 
 many problems relating to personnel which had been the 
 cause of dissatisfaction in the past. 
 
 Sir Edward Carson, on leaving the Admiralty, was 
 succeeded by Sir Eric Geddes as First Lord. Sir Eric 
 had been brought into the Admiralty in May, 1917, in 
 circumstances which I will describe later.* One of his 
 first steps as First Lord which affected Admiralty 
 organization was the appointment of a Deputy First Sea 
 Lord. This appointment was frankly made more as a 
 matter of expediency than because any real need had 
 been shown for the creation of such an office. It is un- 
 necessary here to '^nter into the circumstances which led 
 to the appointment to which I saw objections, owing to 
 the difficulty of fitting into the organization an officer 
 bearing the title of Deputy First Sea Lord. 
 
 Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss — who had come 
 to England for the purpose of conferring with the 
 Admiralty before taking up the post of British Com- 
 mander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean — was selected by 
 the First Lord as Deputy First Sea Lord. 
 
 Shortly after assuming office as First Lord, Sir Eric 
 Geddes expressed a wish for a further consideration of the 
 question of Admiralty organization. To this end he 
 appointed a joint War Office and Admiralty Committee 
 to compare the two organizations. 
 
 Having received the report of the Committee, the First 
 Lord and I both formulated ideas for further reorganiza- 
 tion. My proposals, so far as they concerned the Naval 
 Staff, were conceived on the general lines of an extension 
 of the organization already adopted since my arrival at the 
 Admiralty, but I also stated that the time had arrived 
 when the whole Admiralty organization should be divided 
 
 * Vide Chapter X. 
 
ij6 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 more distinctly into two sides, viz., the Operational side 
 and the Materiel or Administrative side, and indicated 
 that the arrangement existing in the time of the old Navy- 
 Board might be largely followed, in order that questions 
 of Operations and Materiel should be quite clearly 
 separated. This, indeed, was the principle of the Staff 
 organization which I had adopted in the Grand Fleet, 
 and I was anxious to extend it to the Admiralty. 
 
 This principle was accepted — although the term 
 "Navy Board" was not reinstituted — the Admiralty 
 Board being divided into two Committees, one for Opera- 
 tions and one for Materiel, the whole Board meeting at 
 least once a week, as required, to discuss important ques- 
 tions affecting both sides. Whilst it was necessary that 
 the Maintenance Committee should be kept acquainted 
 with the requirements in the shape of material needed for 
 operations in which the Fleet was engaged — and to the 
 Deputy Chief of Naval Staff was assigned this particular 
 liaison duty — I was not in favour of discussing questions 
 affecting ordinary operations with the whole Board, since, 
 in addition to the delay thereby involved, members of the 
 Maintenance Committee could not keep in sufficiently 
 intimate touch with such matters, and opinions might 
 be formed and conclusions expressed on an incom- 
 plete knowledge of facts. Questions of broad policy 
 or of proposed major operations were, of course, in 
 a different category, and the above objections did not 
 apply. 
 
 The further alterations in Naval Staff organization 
 were not adopted without considerable discussion and 
 some difference of opinion as to detail, particularly on the 
 subject of the organization of the Operations Division of 
 the Naval Staff, which I considered should embrace the 
 Plans Division as a sub-section in order to avoid over- 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 17 
 
 lapping and delay. In my view it was undesirable for a 
 body of officers not working under the authority of those 
 in close touch with the daily operations of the Fleet to 
 put forward plans for operations which necessarily involved 
 the use of the same vessels and material, as such a pro- 
 cedure must inevitably lead to impracticable suggestions 
 and consequent waste of time ; the system which I 
 favoured was that in use in the Army, where the Opera- 
 tions Section of the Staff dealt also with the working 
 out of plans. 
 
 The Admiralty Staff organization necessarily differed 
 somewhat from that at the War Office, because during the 
 war the Admiralty in a sense combined, so far as Naval 
 operations were concerned, the functions both of the War 
 Office and of General Headquarters in France. This was 
 due primarily to the fact that intelligence was necessarily 
 centred at the Admiralty, and, secondly, because the 
 Admiralty acted in a sense as Commander-in-Chief of all 
 the forces working in the vicinity of the British Isles. It 
 was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand 
 Fleet to assume this function, since he could not be pro- 
 vided with the necessary knowledge without great delay 
 being caused, and, further, when he was at sea the other 
 commands would be without a head. The Admiralty 
 therefore necessarily assumed the duty, whilst supplying 
 each command with all the information required for 
 operations. The general lines of the Staff organizations 
 at the War Office and at General Headquarters in France 
 are here given for the sake of comparison with the Naval 
 Staff organization. 
 
 1. — The British War Office, 
 
 The approximate organization is shown as concisely as 
 possible in the following diagram : 
 
i8 
 
 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 CHIEF OF IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF 
 
 Director of Staff Duties. 
 
 7 
 
 r 
 
 I 
 
 staff War Or- 
 
 duties ganiza- 
 Organiza- tion of 
 tion and forces, 
 training. 
 
 General Signals 
 questions and com- 
 of train- munica- 
 ing. tions. 
 
 Director of Military 
 Operations. 
 
 Director of Military 
 Intelligence. 
 
 Intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 Espion- 
 age. 
 
 The 
 Press. 
 
 Operations on all fronts. 
 
 The other important departments of the War 
 Office on the administration side are those of the Ad- 
 jutant-General and the Quartermaster-General, the 
 former dealing with all questions relating to the personnel 
 of the Army under the various headings of organization, 
 mobilization, pay and discipline, and the latter with all 
 questions of supply and transport. 
 
 A Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff was 
 attached to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. His 
 main duty was to act as a liaison between the General Staff 
 and the administrative departments of the War Office. 
 
 The whole organization of the British War Office 
 is, of course, under the direction and control of the 
 Secretary of State for War. 
 
 2. — The Staff Organization at General Headquarters in 
 France. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIELD MARSHAL 
 
 
 
 
 Chief 
 
 o[ 
 
 
 Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 
 
 the 
 
 Adjutant-General 
 
 Quartermaster- 
 
 
 
 General 
 
 Staff. 
 
 (Personnel, 
 
 General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Discipline, etc.). 
 
 (Transport and 
 Supply, etc.). 
 
 o.s.' 
 
 (a) 
 
 
 
 
 G. S. (6) 
 
 
 (Operations) 
 
 
 
 (Staff Duties)'' 
 
 
 Plans 
 
 and 
 
 Exe- 
 
 
 
 War Organiza- 
 
 
 cution 
 
 In- 
 
 
 
 
 tions and 
 
 
 telligence. 
 
 
 
 
 Establishments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Liaison between 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 G. S. (a) and | 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Administrative] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Services. 
 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 19 
 
 ATTACHED TO GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 (But not Staff Officers.) 
 
 Artillery Adviser Engineer-in-Chief. Inspector of 
 
 (Advises Chief of Advises as in case of Training. 
 
 General Staff on Artillery. 
 
 Artillery matters 
 and operations). 
 
 I 
 Advises Administrative 
 Departments as 
 necessary. 
 
 N.B. — The Inspector of Training works in consultation with the Chief of 
 the General Staff. 
 
 It will be seen that whilst at the War Office the liaison 
 between the General Staff and the administrative side was 
 maintained by a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in 
 the organization in the field the same function was per- 
 formed by the Staff Officer known as G.S. (6). 
 
 It will also be seen that neither at General Head- 
 quarters nor in the case of an Army command does the 
 Chief of the General Staff exercise control over the 
 administrative side. 
 
 After some discussion the Admiralty organizations 
 shown in the Tables A and B on page 20 were adopted, 
 and I guarded as far as possible against the objection to 
 keeping the Plans Division separate from the Operations 
 Division by the issue of detailed orders as to the conduct 
 of the business of the Staff, in which directions were given 
 that the Director of the Plans Division should be in close 
 touch with the Director of the Operations Division before 
 submitting any proposals to the Deputy Chief of Naval 
 Staff or myself. 
 
 During the remainder of my service at the Admiralty 
 the organization remained as shown in Tables A and B 
 on p. 20. It was not entirely satisfactory, for reasons 
 already mentioned and because I did not obtain all 
 the relief from administrative work which was so desir- 
 able. 
 

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Admiralty Changes in 1917 21 
 
 Early in 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty, 
 the following announcement appeared in the Press : 
 
 The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announce- 
 ment : — 
 
 The Letters Patent for the new Board of Admiralty having 
 now been issued, it may be desirable to summarize the changes 
 in the personnel of the Board and to indicate briefly the altera- 
 tions in organization that have been decided upon. 
 
 Acting Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver now brings to a 
 close his long period of valuable service on the Naval Staff and 
 will take up a sea-going command, being succeeded as D.C.N.S. 
 by Rear-Admiral Sydney Fremantle. Rear-Admiral George 
 P. W. Hope has been selected for the appointment of Deputy 
 First Sea Lord, formerly held by Admiral Wemyss, but with 
 changed functions. Commodore Paine, Fifth Sea Lord and 
 Chief of Naval Air Service, leaves the Board of Admiralty in 
 consequence of the recent creation of the Air Council, of which 
 he is now a member, and formal effect is now given to the 
 appointment of Mr. A. F. Pease as Second Civil Lord, which 
 was announced on Thursday last. 
 
 In view of the formal recognition now accorded, as ex- 
 plained by the First Lord in his statement in the House of 
 Commons on the 1st November, to the principle of the division 
 of the work of the Board under the two heads of Operations 
 and Maintenance, the Members of the new Board (other than 
 the First Lord) may be grouped as follows : — 
 
 Operations. Maintenance. 
 
 First Sea Lord Second Sea Lord. 
 
 and (Vice-Admiral Sir H. L. Heath.) 
 
 Chief of Naval Staff. 
 (Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss.) 
 
 Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. Third Sea Lord. 
 
 (Rear-Admiral S. R. Fremantle.) (Rear-Admiral L. Halsey.) 
 
 Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. Fourth Sea Lord. 
 
 (Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff.) (Rear-Admiral H. H. D. 
 
 Tothill.) 
 
22 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Deputy First Sea Lord. Civil Lord, 
 
 (Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope.) (Right Hon. E. G. Pretyman, 
 
 M.P.) 
 
 Controller. 
 (Sir Ao G. Anderson.) 
 
 Second Civil Lord. 
 (Mr. A. F. Pease.) 
 
 Financial Secretary. 
 (Right Hon. T. J. Macnamara, M.P.) 
 
 Permanent Secretary. 
 (Sir O. Murray.) 
 
 The principle of isolating the work of planning and direct- 
 ing naval war operations from all other work, in order that 
 it may receive the entire attention of the Officers selected for 
 its performance, is now being carried a stage further and 
 applied systematically to the organization of the Operations 
 side of the Board and that of the Naval Staff. 
 
 In future the general distribution of duties between the 
 Members of the Board belonging to the Naval Staff will be 
 as follows : — 
 
 First Sea Lord and Chief Naval policy and general direc- 
 OF Naval Staff tion of operations. 
 
 Deputy Chief of Naval War operations in Home 
 Staff Waters. 
 
 Assistant Chief of Naval Trade Protection and anti- 
 Staff submarine operations. 
 
 Deputy First Sea Lord .. General policy questions and 
 
 operations outside Home 
 Waters. 
 
 The detailed arrangements have been carefully worked out 
 so as to relieve the first three of these officers of the necessity 
 of dealing with any questions not directly connected with the 
 main operations of the war, and the great mass of important 
 paper work and administrative detail which is inseparably and 
 necessarily connected with Staff work, but which has hitherto 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 23 
 
 tended to compete for attention with Operations work generally 
 will under the new organization be diverted to the Deputy- 
 First Sea Lord. 
 
 The grouping of the Directors of the Naval Staff Divisions 
 will be governed by the same principle. 
 
 The only two Directors that will work immediately under 
 the First Sea Lord will be the Director of Intelligence Division 
 (Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall) and the Director of Training 
 and Staff Duties (Rear-Admiral J. C. Ley), whose functions 
 obviously affect all the other Staff Divisions alike. 
 
 Under the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff will be grouped 
 three Directors whose duties will relate entirely to the planning 
 and direction of operations in the main sphere of naval 
 activity, viz. : — 
 
 Director of Operations Division Captain A. D. P. Pound. 
 
 {Home) 
 Director of Plans Division . . Captain C. T. M. Fuller, 
 
 C.M.G., D.S.O. 
 Director of Air Division . . Wing Captain F. R. Scarlett, 
 
 D.S.O. 
 
 together with the Director of Signals Division, Acting-Captain 
 R. L. Nicholson, D.S.O., whose duties relate to the system of 
 Fleet communications. 
 
 Under the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff will be grouped 
 four Directors, whose duties relate to Trade Protection and 
 Anti-Submarine Operations, viz : — • 
 
 Director of Anti-Submarine Captain W. W. Fisher, C.B. 
 
 Division 
 Director of Mine-sweeping Captain L. G. Preston, C.B. 
 
 Division 
 Director of Mercantile Move- Captain F. A. Whitehead. 
 
 ments Division 
 Director of Trade Division . . Captain A. G. Hotham. 
 
 Under the Deputy First Sea Lord there will be one Director 
 of Operations Division (Foreign) — Captain C. P. R. Coode» 
 D.S.O. 
 
24 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 The chief change on the Maintenance side of the Board 
 relates to the distribution of duties amongst the Civil Members. 
 The continuance of the war has caused a steady increase in 
 the number of cases in which necessary developments of 
 Admiralty policy due to the war, or experience resulting from 
 war conditions give rise to administrative problems of great 
 importance and complexity, of which a solution will have to be 
 forthcoming either immediately upon or very soon after the 
 conclusion of the war. The difficulty of concentrating attention 
 on these problems of the future in the midst of current adminis- 
 trative work of great urgency may easily be appreciated, and 
 the Civil Lord has consented to take charge of this important 
 matter, with suitable naval and other assistance. He will, 
 therefore, be relieved by the Second Civil Lord of the adminis- 
 tration of the programme of Naval Works, including the 
 questions of priority of labour and material requirements 
 arising therefrom and the superintendence of the Director of 
 Works Department. 
 
 It has further been decided that the exceptional labour 
 and other difficulties now attending upon the execution of the 
 very large programme of urgent naval works in progress have 
 so greatly transformed the functions of the Director of Works 
 Department of the Admiralty that it is desirable, whilst these 
 abnormal conditions last, to place that Department under the 
 charge of an expert in the rapid execution of large engineering 
 works. 
 
 The Army Council have consented, at the request of the 
 First Lord of the Admiralty, to lend for this purpose the ser- 
 vices of Colonel Alexander Gibb, K.B.E., C.B., R.E., Chief 
 Engineer, Port Construction, British Armies in France. 
 Colonel Gibb (of the Firm of Easton, Gibb, Son and Com- 
 pany, which built Rosyth Naval Base) will have the title of 
 Civil Engineer-in-Chief, and will be assisted by the Director 
 of Works, who retains his status as such, and the existing Staff 
 of the Department, which will be strengthened as necessary. 
 
 Another important change has reference to the organization 
 of the Admiralty Board of Invention and Research, and has 
 the object at once of securing greater concentration of effort 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 25 
 
 in connection with scientific research and experiment, and 
 ensuring that the distinguished scientists who are giving their 
 assistance to the Admiralty are more constantly in and amongst 
 the problems upon which they are advising. 
 
 Mr. Charles H. Merz, M.Inst.C.E., the well-known Electrical 
 Consulting Engineer, who has been associated with the Board 
 of Invention and Research (B.I.R.) since its inception, has 
 consented to serve as Director of Experiments and Research 
 (unpaid) at the Admiralty to direct and supervise all the 
 executive arrangements in connection with the organization of 
 scientific Research and Experiments. Mr. Merz will also be a 
 member of the Central Committee of the B.I.R. under the 
 presidency of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher. The functions 
 of the Central Committee will, as hitherto, be to initiate, in- 
 vestigate, develop and advise generally upon proposals in 
 respect to the application of Science and Engineering to Naval 
 Warfare, but the distinguished scientific experts at present 
 giving their services will in future work more much closely 
 with the Technical Departments of the Admiralty immediately 
 concerned with the production and use of apparatus required 
 for specific purposes. 
 
 The general arrangements in regard to the organization of 
 scientific research and experiment will in future come under 
 the direct supervision of the First Lord. 
 
 Possibly by reason of the manner in which the 
 announcement was made, the Press appeared to assume 
 that the whole of this Admiralty organization was new. 
 Such was not the case. Apart from the changes in the 
 personnel of the Board itself and a slight rearrangement 
 of their duties and those due to the establishment of an 
 Air Ministry (which had been arranged by the Cabinet 
 before December, 1917), there were but slight alterations 
 in the organization shown in Table A, as will be seen by 
 comparing it with Table C on p. 27, which indicates 
 graphically the organization given in the Admiralty 
 communique. 
 
26 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 It will be seen that the alterations in Naval Staff 
 organization were as follows : 
 
 (a) The new Deputy First Sea Lord — Rear- 
 Admiral Hope — who since the spring of 1917 had 
 been Director of the Operations Division, was given 
 the responsibility for operations in foreign waters, 
 with a Director of Operations (foreign) under him, 
 and was also definitely charged with the administra- 
 tive detail involving technical matters. The special 
 gifts, experience and aptitude of this particular officer 
 for such work enabled him, no doubt, to relieve the 
 pressure on the First Sea Lord for administrative 
 detail very materially. 
 
 (h) The Operations Division was separated into 
 two parts (home and foreign), with a Director for 
 each, instead of there being a Deputy Director for 
 home and an Assistant Director for foreign work, 
 both working under the Director. This was a 
 change in name only, as the same officer continued 
 the foreign work under the new arrangement. 
 
 (c) The Director of the Intelligence Division and 
 the Director of Training and Staff Duties were shown 
 as working immediately under the First Sea Lord 
 and Chief of the Naval Staff. 
 
 (d) A Director of the Air Division was intro- 
 duced as a result of the Naval Air Service having 
 been separated from the Admiralty and placed under 
 the Air Ministry. A larger Admiralty Staff organiza- 
 tion for aerial matters thus became necessary, since 
 the Staff could no longer refer to the Naval Air 
 Service. 
 
 There were no other changes in the Staff organization. 
 As regards the general Admiralty organization, there 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 
 
 27 
 
 was no change except that caused 
 by the disappearance of the separ- 
 ate Naval Air Service, the addition 
 of a Second Civil Lord, and some 
 reorganization of the Board of 
 Invention and Research which had 
 been under discussion for some 
 months previously. 
 
 It is probable that in 1918 the 
 Chief of the Naval Staff had more 
 time at his disposal than was the 
 case in 1917, owing to the changes 
 in organization initiated in the 
 later year having reached some 
 finality and to the fact that the 
 numerous anti-submarine measures CJ 
 put in hand in 1917 had become ^ 
 effective in 1918. 1 
 
 The future Admiralty Naval ^ 
 Staff organization, which was in 
 my mind at the end of 1917, was a 
 development of that shown in 
 Table A, p. 20, subject to the 
 following remarks : 
 
 In the organization then 
 adopted the personality and experi- 
 ence during the war of many of the 
 officers in high positions were of 
 necessity considered, and the 
 organization to that extent adapted 
 to circumstances. This resulted in 
 somewhat overloading the staff at 
 the head, and the principle on 
 which the Board of Admiralty 
 
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28 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 works, i.e., that its members are colleagues one of another, 
 and seniority in rank does not, theoretically, give greater 
 weight in council, was not altogether followed. Thus the 
 Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, the Assistant Chief of 
 the Naval Staff, and the Deputy First Sea Lord were, 
 by the nature of their duties, subordinate to the Chief of 
 the Naval Staff and yet were members of the Board. The 
 well-known loyalty of naval officers to one another tended 
 to minimize any difficulties that might have arisen from 
 this anomaly, but the arrangement might conceivably give 
 rise to difficulty, and is best avoided if the Board system 
 is to remain. 
 
 The situation would be clearer if two of the three 
 officers concerned were removed altogether from the 
 Board, viz., the Deputy First Sea Lord and the Assistant 
 Chief of the Naval Staff, leaving only the Deputy Chief 
 of the Naval Staff as a member of the Board to act in 
 the absence of the Chief of the Naval Staff and to relieve 
 him of the administrative and technical work not 
 immediately connected with operations. 
 
 The work of the two officers thus removed should, 
 under these conditions, be undertaken by officers who 
 should preferably be Flag Officers, with experience in 
 command at sea, having the titles of Directors of Opera- 
 tions, whose emoluments should be commensurate with 
 their position and responsibilities. 
 
 I did not consider it advisable to carry out this altera- 
 tion during the war, and it was also difficult under the 
 hour to hour stress of war to rearrange all the duties of 
 the Naval Staff in the manner most convenient to the 
 conduct of Staff business, although its desirability was 
 recognized during 1917. 
 
 It may be as well to close this chapter by a few 
 remarks on Staff work generally in the Navy. In the first 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 29 
 
 place it is necessary in the Navy to give much weight to 
 the opinions of speciaUst officers, and for this reason 
 it is desirable that they should be included in the Staff 
 organization, and not "'attached" to it as was the case 
 with our Army in pre-war days. The reason for this is 
 that in the Army there is, except in regard to artillery, 
 httle "specialization." The training received by an 
 officer of any of the fighting branches of the Army at 
 the Staff College may fit him to assist in the planning and 
 execution of operations, provided due regard is paid to 
 questions of supply, transport, housing, etc. 
 
 This is not so in a navy. A ship and all that she con- 
 tains is the weapon, and very intimate knowledge of the 
 different factors that go to make a ship an efficient weapon 
 is necessary if the ship is to be used effectively and if 
 operations in which the ship takes so prominent a part 
 are to be successfully planned and executed, or if a sound 
 opinion is to be expressed on the training necessary to 
 produce and maintain her as an efficient weapon. 
 
 The particular points in which this specially intimate 
 knowledge is required are : 
 
 (a) The science of navigation and of handling 
 ships of all types and classes. 
 (h) Gunnery, 
 (c) Torpedoes and mines. 
 
 It is the case at present (and the conditions are not 
 likely to alter) that each one of these subjects is a matter 
 for specialist training. Every executive officer has a 
 general knowledge of each subject, but it is not possible 
 for any one officer to possess the knowledge of all three 
 which is gained by the specialist, and if attempts are 
 made to plan operations without the assistance of the 
 specialists grave errors may be made, and, indeed, such 
 
30 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 errors .were made during the late war, perhaps from this 
 cause. 
 
 In my view, therefore, it is desirable that specialist 
 officers should be included in a Naval Staff organization 
 and not be merely "attached" to it. It may be said 
 that a Staff can take the advice of specialist officers who 
 are attached to it for that purpose. But there is a danger 
 that the specialist advice may never reach the heads of 
 the Staff. Human nature being what it is, the safest 
 procedure is to place the specialist officer where his voice 
 must be heard, i.e. to give him a position on the Staff, 
 for one must legislate for the average individual and for 
 normal conditions of work. 
 
 The Chief of a Staff might have specialist knowledge 
 himself, or he might assure himself that due weight had 
 been given to the opinions of specialists attached to a 
 Staff ; but, on the other hand, it is possible that he might 
 not have that knowledge and that he might ignore the 
 opinions of the specialists. The procedure suggested is 
 at least as necessary when considering the question of 
 training as it is in the case of operations. 
 
 In passing from this point I may say that I have heard 
 the opinion expressed by military Staff officers that the 
 war has shown that artillery is so all important that it 
 would be desirable to place the Major-General of the Royal 
 Artillery, now attached to General Headquarters, on the 
 Staff for operational matters. 
 
 Finally, great care should be exercised to prevent the 
 Staff becoming larger than is necessary, and there is some 
 danger that the ignorant may gauge the value of the Staff 
 by its size. 
 
 Von Schellendorff says on this subject : 
 
 " The principle strictly followed throughout the German 
 Service of reducing all Staffs to the smallest possible dimensions 
 
Admiralty Changes in 1917 31 
 
 is moreover vindicated by restricting every Staff to what is 
 absolutely necessary, and by not attaching to every Army, 
 Army Corps and Divisional Staff representatives of all the 
 various branches and departments according to any fixed 
 rule. 
 
 " There cannot be the slightest doubt that the addition of 
 every individual not absolutely required on a Staff is in itself 
 an evil. In the first place, it unnecessarily weakens the strength 
 of the regiment from which an officer is taken. Again it in- 
 creases the difficulty of providing the Staff with quarters, which 
 affects the troops that may happen to be quartered in the same 
 place ; and these are quite ready enough, as it is, occasionally 
 to look with a certain amount of dislike — though in most cases 
 it is entirely uncalled for — on the personnel of the higher Staffs. 
 Finally, it should be remembered — and this is the most weighty 
 argument against the proceeding — that idleness is at the root 
 of all mischief. When there are too many officers on a Staff 
 they cannot always find the work and occupation essential for 
 their mental and physical welfare, and their superfluous energies 
 soon make themselves felt in all sorts of objectionable ways. 
 Experience shows that whenever a Staff is unnecessarily 
 numerous the ambitious before long take to intrigue, the 
 litigious soon produce general friction, and the vain are never 
 satisfied. These failings, so common to human nature, even 
 if all present, are to a great extent counteracted if those con- 
 cerned have plenty of hard and constant work. Besides, the 
 numbers of a Staff being few, there is all the greater choice in 
 the selection of the men who are to fill posts on it. In forming 
 a Staff for war the qualifications required include not only 
 great professional knowledge and acquaintance with service 
 routine, but above all things character, self-denial, energy, 
 tact and discretion." 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1917 
 
 The struggle against the depredations of the enemy sub- 
 marines during the year 1917 was two-fold; offensive in 
 the direction of anti-submarine measures (this was partly 
 the business of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval 
 Staff and partly that of the Operations Division) ; 
 defensive in the direction of protective measures for trade, 
 whether carried in our own ships or in ships belonging 
 to our Allies or to neutrals, this being the business of 
 the Trade and Mercantile Movements Divisions. 
 
 Prior to the formation of the Mercantile Movements 
 Division the whole direction of trade was in the hands 
 of the Trade Division of the Staff. 
 
 The difficulty with which we were constantly faced 
 in the early part of 1917, when the effective means of 
 fighting the submarine were very largely confined to the 
 employment of surface vessels, was that of providing a 
 sufficient number of such vessels for offensive operations 
 without incurring too heavy risks for our trade by the 
 withdrawal of vessels engaged in what might be termed 
 defensive work. There was always great doubt whether 
 any particular offensive operation undertaken by small 
 craft would produce any result, particularly as the numbers 
 necessary for success were not available, whilst there was 
 the practical certainty that withdrawal of defensive vessels 
 would increase our losses; the situation was so serious 
 in the spring of 1917 that we could not carry out experi- 
 
 32 
 
Submarine Campaign : Early Part of 1917 33 
 
 ments involving grave risk of considerably increased 
 losses. 
 
 On the other hand, the sinking of one enemy sub- 
 marine meant the possible saving of a considerable number 
 of merchant ships. It was difficult to draw the line be- 
 tween the two classes of operations. 
 
 The desire of the Anti-Submarine Division to obtain 
 destroyers for offensive use in hunting flotillas in the 
 North Sea and English Channel led to continual requests 
 being made to me to provide vessels for the purpose. 
 I was, of course, anxious to institute offensive operations, 
 but in the early days of 1917 we could not rely much on 
 depth-charge attack, owing to our small stock of these 
 charges, and my experience in the Grand Fleet had 
 convinced me that for success in the alternative of hunt- 
 ing submarines for a period which would exhaust their 
 batteries and so force them to come to the surface, a large 
 number of destroyers was required, unless the destroyers 
 were provided with some apparatus which would, by sound 
 or otherwise, locate the submarine. This will be realized 
 when the fact is recalled that a German submarine could 
 remain submerged at slow speed for a period which would 
 enable her to travel a distance of some 80 miles. As this 
 distance could be covered in any direction in open waters 
 such as the North Sea, it is obvious that only a very 
 numerous force of destroyers steaming at high speed 
 could cover the great area in which the submarine might 
 come to the surface. She would, naturally, select the 
 dark hours for emergence, as being the period of very 
 limited range of vision for those searching for her. In 
 confined waters such as those in the eastern portion of the 
 English Channel the problem became simpler. Requests 
 for destroyers constantly came from every quarter, such 
 as the Commanders-in-Chief at Portsmouth and Devon- 
 
34 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 port, the Senior Naval Officer at Gibraltar, the Vice- 
 Admiral, Dover, the Rear-Admiral Commanding East 
 Coast, and the Admiral at Queenstown. The vessels they 
 wanted did not, however, exist. 
 
 Eventually, with great difficulty, a force of six 
 destroyers was collected from various sources in the 
 spring of 1917, and used in the Channel solely for hunt- 
 ing submarines ; this number was really quite inadequate, 
 and it was not long before they had to be taken for convoy 
 work. 
 
 Evidence of the difficulty of successfully hunting sub- 
 marines was often furnished by the experiences of our 
 own vessels of this type, sometimes when hunted by the 
 enemy, sometimes when hunted in error by our own 
 craft. Many of our submarines went through some 
 decidedly unpleasant experiences at the hands of our own 
 surface vessels and occasionally at the hands of vessels 
 belonging to our Allies. On several such occasions the 
 submarine was frequently reported as having been sunk, 
 whereas she had escaped. 
 
 As an example of a submarine that succeeded not 
 only in evading destruction, but in getting at least even 
 with the enemy, the case of one of our vessels of the " E " 
 class, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight, may be cited. 
 This submarine ran into a heavy anti-submarine net, and 
 was dragged, nose first, to the bottom. After half an 
 hour's effort, during which bombs were exploding in her 
 vicinity, the submarine was brought to the surface by 
 her own crew by the discharge of a great deal of water 
 from her forward ballast tanks. It was found, however, 
 that the net was still foul of her, and that a Zeppelin 
 was overhead, evidently attracted by the disturbance in 
 the water due to the discharge of air and water from the 
 submarine. She went to the bottom again, and after 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 35 
 
 half an hour succeeded in getting clear of the net. Mean- 
 while the Zeppelin had collected a force of trawlers and 
 destroyers, and the submarine was hunted for fourteen 
 hours by this force, assisted by the airship. During this 
 period she succeeded in sinking one of the German 
 destroyers, and was eventually left unmolested. 
 
 For a correct appreciation of submarine warfare it 
 is necessary to have a clear idea of the characteristics 
 and qualities of the submarine herself, of the numbers 
 possessed by the enemy, and of the rate at which they 
 were being produced. It is also necessary, in order to 
 understand the difficulty of introducing the counter 
 measures adopted by the Royal Navy, to know the length 
 of time required to produce the vessels and the weapons 
 which were employed or which it was intended to employ 
 in the anti-submarine war. 
 
 The German submarines may be divided into four 
 classes, viz. : Submarine cruisers, U-boats, U.B. -boats, 
 U.C. -boats. There were several variations of each class. 
 
 The earlier suhynarine cruisers of the " Deutschland " 
 class were double-hulled vessels, with a surface displace- 
 ment of 1,850 tons, and were about 215 feet long; they 
 had a surface speed of about 12 knots and a submerged 
 speed of about 6 knots. They carried two 5.9-inch guns, 
 two 22 pounders, two torpedo tubes, and 12 torpedoes. 
 They could keep the sea for quite four months without 
 being dependent on a supply ship or base. 
 
 The later submarine cruisers were double-hulled, 275- 
 320 feet long, had a surface speed of 16-18 knots, and 
 a submerged speed of about 7 to 8 knots. They carried 
 either one or two 5.9-inch guns, six torpedo tubes, and 
 about 10 torpedoes. They had a very large radius of 
 action, viz., from 12,000 to 20,000 miles, at a speed of 
 6 knots. A large number (some 30 to 40) of these boats 
 
36 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 were under construction at the time of the Armistice, but 
 very few had been completed. 
 
 There were two or three types of TJ-hoats. The 
 earUer vessels were 210 to 220 feet long, double-hulled, 
 with a surface displacement of about 750 tons, a surface 
 speed of 15 to 16 knots, and a submerged speed of about 
 8 knots. They carried one or two 4.1-inch guns, four 
 to six torpedo tubes, and about 10 torpedoes. 
 
 Later vessels of the class were 230 to 240 feet long, 
 and of 800 to 820 tons surface displacement, and carried 
 six torpedo tubes and 16 torpedoes. Some of them, fitted 
 as minelayers, carried 36 mines, and two torpedo tubes, 
 but only two torpedoes. A later and much larger class of 
 minelayers carried a 5.9-inch gun, four torpedo tubes, 42 
 mines, and a larger number of torpedoes. The earlier 
 TJ-hoats could keep the sea for about five weeks without 
 returning to a base or a supply ship ; the later TJ-hoats had 
 much greater sea endurance. 
 
 The smaller TJ.B.-hoats were single-hulled, and about 
 100 feet long, had a surface speed of 7 to 9 knots and 
 a submerged speed of about 5 knots, and carried one 
 22-pounder gun, two torpedo tubes and four torpedoes. 
 These boats could keep the sea for about two weeks with- 
 out returning to a base or supply ship. A later class 
 were double-hulled, 180 feet long, with greater endurance 
 (8,000 miles at 6 knots), a surface speed of 13 knots and 
 a submerged speed of 8 knots; they carried one 4.1-inch 
 gun, five tubes and 10 torpedoes. 
 
 The earliest TJ.C.-hoats were 111 feet long, with a 
 surface displacement of 175 tons, a surface speed of 6>^ 
 knots, and a submerged speed of 5 knots. They carried 
 12 mines, but no torpedo tubes, and as they had a fuel 
 endurance of only 800 miles at 5K knots, they could 
 operate only in southern waters. 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 37 
 
 The later V.C. -boats were 170 to 180 feet long, 
 double-hulled, had a surface speed of 11 to 12 knots and a 
 submerged speed of about 7 knots, carried 18 mines, three 
 torpedo tubes, five torpedoes, and one 22-pounder gun, 
 and their fuel endurance was 8,000 to 10,000 miles at a 
 speed of 7 to 8 knots. 
 
 At the end of February, 1917, it was estimated that 
 the enemy had a total of about 130 submarines of all 
 types available for use in home waters, and about 20 in 
 the Mediterranean. Of this total an average of between 
 one-half and one-third was usually at sea. During the 
 year about eight submarines, on the average, were added 
 monthly to this total. Of this number some 50 per cent, 
 were vessels of the mine-laying type. 
 
 All the German submarines were capable of prolonged 
 endurance submerged. The U-boats could travel under 
 water at the slowest speed for some 48 hours, at about 
 4 knots for 20 hours, at 5 knots for about 12 hours, and 
 at 8 knots for about 2 hours. 
 
 They were tested to depths of at least 180 feet, but 
 many submerged to depths exceeding 250 feet without 
 injury. They did not usually lie on the bottom at depths 
 greatly exceeding 20 fathoms (120 feet). 
 
 All German submarines, except possibly the cruiser 
 class, could dive from diving trim in from 30 seconds to 
 one minute. The V.B. class had particularly rapid diving 
 qualities, and were very popular boats with the German 
 submarine officers. Perhaps the most noticeable features 
 of the German submarines as a whole were their excellent 
 engines and their great strength of construction. 
 
 Prior to the month of February, 1917, it was the 
 usual practice of the enemy submarine in the warfare 
 against merchant ships to give some warning before 
 delivering her attack. This was by no means a universal 
 
38 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 rule, particularly in the case of British merchant vessels, 
 as is evidenced by the attacks on the Lusitania, Arabic, 
 and scores of other ships. 
 
 In the years 1915 and 1916, however, only 21 and 
 29 per cent, respectively of the British merchant ships 
 sunk by enemy submarines were destroyed without 
 warning, whilst during the first four months of the 
 unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 the figure rose 
 to 64 per cent., and ,went higher and higher as the months 
 progressed. 
 
 Prior to February, 1917, the more general method 
 of attack on ships was to "bring them to " by means 
 of gun-fire ; they were then sunk by gun-fire, torpedo, or 
 bomb. This practice necessitated the submarine being on 
 the surface, and so gave a merchant ship defensively armed 
 a chance of replying to the gun-fire and of escaping, and 
 it also gave armed decoy ships a good opportunity of 
 successful action if the submarine could be induced to 
 close to very short range. 
 
 The form of attack on commerce known as "unre- 
 stricted submarine warfare " was commenced by Germany 
 with the object of forcing Great Britain to make peace by 
 cutting off her supplies of food and raw material. It has 
 been acknowledged by Germans in high positions that the 
 German Admiralty considered that this form of warfare 
 would achieve its object in a comparatively short time, 
 in fact in a matter of some five or six months. 
 
 Experienced British naval officers, aware of the extent 
 of the German submarine building programme, and above 
 all aware of the shadowy nature of our existing means of 
 defence against such a form of warfare, had every reason 
 to hold the view that the danger was great and that the 
 Allies were faced with a situation fraught with the very 
 gravest possibilities. 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 39 
 
 The principal doubt was as to the abiUty of the enemy 
 to train submarine crews with sufficient rapidity to keep 
 pace with his building programme. 
 
 However, it was ascertained that the Germans had evi- 
 dently devoted a very great number of their submarines 
 to training work during the period September, 1915, to 
 March, 1916, possibly in anticipation of the unrestricted 
 warfare, since none of their larger boats was operating 
 in our waters between these months ; this fact had a 
 considerable bearing on the problem. 
 
 As events turned out it would appear either that 
 the training given was insufficient or that the German 
 submarine officer was lacking in enterprise. 
 
 There is no doubt whatever that had the German 
 craft engaged in the unrestricted submarine warfare 
 been manned by British officers and men, adopting 
 German methods, there would have been but few Allied 
 or neutral merchant ships left afloat by the end of 1917. 
 
 So long as the majority of the German submarine 
 attacks upon shipping were made by gun-fire, the method 
 of defence was comparatively simple, in that it merely 
 involved the supply to merchant ships of guns of sufficient 
 power to prevent the submarine engaging at ranges 
 at which the fire could not be returned. Whilst the 
 method of defence was apparent, the problem of supply- 
 ing suitable guns in sufficient numbers was a very different 
 matter. It involved arming all our merchant ships with 
 guns of 4-inch calibre and above. In January, 1917, only 
 some 1,400 British ships had been so armed since the 
 outbreak of war. 
 
 It will be seen, therefore, that so long as ships sailed 
 singly, very extensive supplies of guns were required to 
 meet gun attack, and as there was most pressing need 
 for the supply of guns for the Army in France, as well 
 
40 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 as for the anti-aircraft defence of London, the prospect 
 of arming merchant ships adequately was not 
 promising. 
 
 When the enemy commenced unrestricted submarine 
 warfare attack by gun-fire was gradually replaced by 
 attack by torpedo, and the problem at once became 
 infinitely more complicated. 
 
 Gun-fire was no longer a protection, since the sub- 
 marine was rarely seen. The first intimation of her 
 presence would be given by the track of a torpedo coming 
 towards the ship, and no defence was then possible beyond 
 an endeavour to manoeuvre the ship clear of the torpedo. 
 Since, however, a torpedo is always some distance ahead 
 of the bubbles which mark its track (the speed of the 
 torpedo exceeding 30 knots an hour), the track is not, as 
 a rule, seen until the torpedo is fairly close to the ship 
 unless the sea is absolutely calm. The chance of a ship 
 of low speed avoiding a hit by a timely alteration of 
 course after the torpedo has been fired is but slight. 
 Further, the only difficulty experienced by a submarine 
 in hitting a moving vessel by torpedo-fire, once she has 
 arrived in a position suitable for attack, lies in estimating 
 correctly the course and speed of the target. In the case 
 of an ordinary cargo ship there is little difficulty in guess- 
 ing her speed, since it is certain to be between 8 and 
 12 knots, and her course can be judged with fair accuracy 
 by the angle of her masts and funnel, or by the angle 
 presented by her bridge. 
 
 It ,will be seen, then, how easy was the problem before 
 the German submarine officers, and how very difficult was 
 that set to our Navy and our gallant Mercantile Marine. 
 
 It will not be out of place here to describe the methods 
 which were in force at the end of 1916 and during the 
 first part of 1917 for affording protection to merchant 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 41 
 
 shipping approaching our coasts from the direction of the 
 Atlantic Ocean. 
 
 The general idea dating from the early months of the 
 war was to disperse trade on passage over wide tracts 
 of ocean, in order to prevent the successful attacks which 
 could be so easily carried out if shipping traversed one 
 particular route. To carry out such a system it was neces- 
 sary to give each vessel a definite route which she should 
 follow from her port of departure to her port of arrival ; 
 unless this course was adopted, successive ships would 
 certainly be found to be following identical, or practically 
 identical, routes, thereby greatly increasing the chance of 
 attack. In the early years of the war masters of ships 
 were given approximate tracks, but when the unrestricted 
 submarine campaign came into being it became necessary 
 to give exact routes. 
 
 The necessary orders were issued by officers stationed 
 at various ports at home and abroad who were designated 
 Shipping Intelligence or Reporting Officers. It was, of 
 course, essential to preserve the secrecy of the general 
 principles governing the issue of route orders and of the 
 route orders themselves. For this reason each master 
 was only informed of the orders affecting his own ship, 
 and was directed that such orders should on no account 
 fall into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 The route orders were compiled on certain principles, 
 of which a few may be mentioned : 
 
 (a) Certain definite positions of latitude and 
 longitude were given through which the ship was 
 required to pass, and the orders were discussed with 
 the master of each vessel in order to ensure that 
 they were fully understood. 
 
 (h) Directions were given that certain localities 
 
42 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 in which submarines were known to operate, such as 
 the approaches to the coast of the United Kingdom, 
 were, if possible, to be crossed at night. It was 
 pointed out that when the speed of the ship did 
 not admit of traversing the whole danger area at 
 night, the portion involving the greatest danger 
 (which was the inshore position) should, as a rule, 
 be crossed during dark hours. 
 
 (c) Similarly the orders stated that ships should, 
 as a rule, leave port so as to approach the dangerous 
 area at dusk, and that they should make the coast at 
 about daylight, and should avoid, as far as possible, 
 the practice of making the land at points in general 
 use in peace time. 
 
 (d) Orders were definite that ships were to zigzag 
 both by day and at night in certain areas, and if kept 
 waiting outside a port. 
 
 (e) Masters were cautioned to hug the coast, as 
 far as navigational facilities admitted, when making 
 coastal passages. 
 
 The orders (6), (c) and (d) were those in practice in 
 the Grand Fleet when circumstances permitted during 
 my term in that command. 
 
 A typical route order from New York to Liverpool 
 might be as follows : 
 
 " After passing Sandy Hook, hug the coast until 
 dark, then make a good offing before daylight and steer 
 to pass through the following positions, viz : 
 
 Lat. 38° N. 
 
 Long. 68° W. 
 
 Lat. 41° N. 
 
 Long. 48° W. 
 
 Lat. 46° N. 
 
 Long. 28° W. 
 
 Lat. 51° 30' No 
 
 Long. 14° W. 
 
 Thence make the coast 
 
 near the Skelligs approxi- 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 43 
 
 mately at dayligHt, hug the Irish coast to the Tuskar, 
 up the Irish coast (inside the banks if possible), and across 
 the Irish Channel during dark hours. Thence hug the 
 coast to your port ; zigzag by day and night after passing, 
 Long. 20° W." 
 
 Sometimes ships were directed to cross to the English 
 coast from the south of Ireland, and to hug the English 
 coast on their way north. 
 
 The traffic to the United Kingdom was so arranged 
 in the early part of 1917 as to approach the coast in four 
 different areas, which were known as Approach A, B, 
 C, and D. 
 
 Approach A was used for traffic bound towards 
 the western approach to the English Channel. 
 
 Approach B for traffic making for the south of 
 Ireland. 
 
 Approach C for traffic making for the north of 
 Ireland. 
 
 Approach D for traffic making for the east coast 
 of England via the north of Scotland. 
 
 The approach areas in force during one particular 
 period are shown on Chart A (in pocket at the end of the 
 book). They were changed occasionally when suspicion 
 was aroused that their limits were known to the enemy, 
 or as submarine attack in an area became intense. 
 
 The approach areas were patrolled at the time, so far 
 as numbers admitted, by patrol craft (trawlers, torpedo- 
 boat destroyers, and sloops), and ships with specially 
 valuable cargoes were given directions to proceed to a 
 certain rendezvous on the outskirts of the area, there to 
 be met by a destroyer or sloop, if one was available for 
 the purpose. The areas were necessarily of considerable 
 
44 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 length, by reason of the distance from the coast at which 
 submarines operated, and of considerable width, owing 
 to the necessity for a fairly wide dispersion of traffic 
 throughout the area. Consequently, with the com- 
 paratively small number of patrol craft available, the 
 protection afforded was but slight, and losses were 
 correspondingly heavy. In the early spring of 1917, 
 Captain H. W. Grant, of the Operations Division at 
 the Admiralty, whose work in the Division was of great 
 value, proposed a change in method by which the traffic 
 should be brought along certain definite " lines " in each 
 approach area. Typical lines are shown in Chart B. 
 
 The idea was that the traffic in, say. Approach Route 
 B, should, commencing on a certain date, be ordered 
 by the Routeing Officer to pass along the line Alpha. 
 Traffic would continue along the line for a certain period, 
 which was fixed at five days, when it would be automatic- 
 ally diverted to another line, say Gamma, but the traffic 
 along Gamma would not commence until a period of 24 
 hours had elapsed since discontinuance of the use of the 
 line Alpha. This was necessary in order to give time for 
 the patrol craft to change from one line to the other. 
 During this period of 24 hours the arrangement for 
 routeing at the ports of departure ensured that no traffic 
 would reach the outer end of any of the approach lines, 
 and consequently that traffic would cease on line Apha 
 24 hours before it conomenced on line Gamma. After a 
 further period of five days the line would again change 
 automatically. 
 
 It was necessary that Shipping Intelligence Officers 
 should have in their possession the orders for directing 
 traffic on to the various lines for some considerable time 
 ahead, and the masters of ships which were likely to be 
 for some time at sea were informed of the dates between 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 45 
 
 which the various hnes .were to be used, up to a date 
 sufficient to cover the end of their voyage. There was, 
 therefore, some danger of this information reaching the 
 enemy if a vessel were captured by a submarine and the 
 master failed to destroy his instiiictions in time. There 
 was also some danger in giving the information to 
 neutrals. 
 
 However, the system, which was adopted, did result 
 in a reduction of losses during the comparatively short 
 time that it was in use, and the knowledge that patrol 
 craft on the line would be much closer together than 
 they would be in an approach area certainly gave con- 
 fidence to the personnel of the merchant ships, and those 
 who had been forced to abandon their ship by taking to 
 the boats were afforded a better chance of being picked 
 up. 
 
 Various arrangements tvere in existence for effecting 
 rapidly a diversion of shipping from one route to another 
 in the event of submarines being located in any particular 
 position, and a continual change of the signals for this 
 purpose was necessary to guard against the possibility of 
 the code being compromised by having fallen into enemy 
 hands, an event which, unfortunately, was not infrequent. 
 
 Elaborate orders were necessary to regulate coastal 
 traffic, and fresh directions were continually being issued 
 as danger, especially danger from mines, was located. 
 Generally speaking, the traffic in home waters was 
 directed to hug the coast as closely as safe navigation 
 permitted. Two reasons existed for this, (a) in water of 
 a depth of less than about eight fathoms German sub- 
 marines did not care to operate, and (h) under the 
 procedure indicated danger from submarine attack was 
 only likely on the side remote from the coast. 
 
46 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Here is an example of the instructions for passing up 
 Channel : 
 
 From Falmouth to Portland Bill. — Hug the coast, 
 following round the bays, except when passing Torbay. 
 (Directions followed as to the procedure here.) 
 
 From Portland Bill to St. Catherines. — Pass close 
 south of the Shambles and steer for Anvil Point, thence 
 hug the coast, following round the bays. 
 
 And so on. 
 
 As it was not safe navigationally to follow round the 
 bays during darkness, the instructions directed that ships 
 were to leave the daylight route at dusk and to join the dark 
 period route, showing dimmed bow lights whilst doing so. 
 
 Two "dark period routes " were laid down, one for 
 vessels bound up Channel, and another for vessels bound 
 down Channel, and these routes were some five miles apart 
 in order to minimize the danger of collision, ships being 
 directed not to use their navigation lights except for 
 certain portions of the route, during which they crossed 
 the route of transports and store ships bound between 
 certain southern British ports (Portsmouth, Southampton 
 and Devonport) and French ports. 
 
 Routes were similarly laid down for ships to follow 
 when navigating to or from the Bristol Channel, and 
 for ships navigating the Irish Sea. 
 
 Any system of convoy was at this time out of the 
 question, as neither the cruisers to marshal the convoy 
 to the submarine area, nor the destroyers to screen it 
 when there, were available. 
 
 There was one very important factor in the situation, 
 viz., the comparative rate at which the Germans could 
 produce submarines and at which we could build vessels 
 suitable for anti-submarine warfare and for defence of 
 commerce. The varying estimates gave cause for grave 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 47 
 
 anxiety. Our average output of destroyers was four to 
 five per month. Indeed, this is putting the figure high ; 
 and, of course, we suffered losses. The French and 
 Itahans were not producing any vessels of this type, 
 .whilst the Japanese were, in the early part of 1917, not 
 able to spare any for work in European waters, although 
 later in the year they lent twelve destroyers, which gave 
 valuable assistance in the Mediterranean. The United 
 States of America were not then in the war. Conse- 
 quently measures for the defence of the Allied trade 
 against the new menace depended on our own production. 
 
 Our suhmarines were being produced at an average rate 
 of about two per month only, and — apart from motor 
 launches, which were only of use in the finest weather 
 and near the coast — the only other vessels suitable for 
 anti-submarine work that were building at the time, 
 besides some sloops and P-boats, were trawlers, which, 
 whilst useful for protection patrol, were too slow for most 
 of the escort work or for offensive duties. The Germans' 
 estimate of their own submarine production was about 
 twelve per month, although this figure was never realized, 
 the average being nearer eight. But each submarine 
 was capable of sinking many merchant ships, thus 
 necessitating the employment of a very large number of 
 our destroyers ; and therein lay the gravity of the situa- 
 tion, as we realized at the Admiralty early in 1917 that 
 no effort of ours could increase the output of destroyers 
 for at least fifteen months, the shortest time then taken 
 to build a destroyer in this country. 
 
 And here it is interesting to compare the time 
 occupied in the production of small craft in Great Britain 
 and in Germany during the war. 
 
 In pre-war days we rarely built a destroyer in less 
 
48 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 than twenty-four months, although shortly before the war 
 efforts were made to reduce the time to something like 
 eighteen to twenty months. Submarines occupied two 
 years in construction. 
 
 In starting the great building programme of destroyers 
 and submarines at the end of 1914, Lord Fisher increased 
 very largely the number of firms engaged in construct- 
 ing vessels of both types. Hopes were held out of the 
 construction both of destroyers and of submarines in 
 about twelve months; but labour and other difficulties 
 intervened, and although some firms did complete craft 
 of both classes during 1915 in less than twelve months, 
 by 1916 and 1917 destroyers averaged about eighteen 
 months and submarines even longer for completion. 
 
 The Germans had always built their small craft rapidly, 
 although their heavy ships were longer in construction 
 than our own. Their destroyers were completed in a 
 little over twelve months from the official date of order 
 in pre-war days. During the early years of the war it 
 would seem that they maintained this figure, and they 
 succeeded in building their smaller submarines of the 
 U.B. and U.C. types in some six to eight months, as 
 U.B. and U.C. boats began to be delivered as early as 
 April, 1915, and it is certain that they were not ordered 
 before August, 1914. 
 
 The time taken by the Germans to build submarines 
 of the U type was estimated by us at twelve months, 
 and that of submarine cruisers at eighteen months. 
 German submarine officers gave the time as eight to ten 
 months for a U-boat and eighteen months for a sub- 
 marine cruiser.* 
 
 * It is to be observed that Captain Persius in a recent article gives a 
 much longer period for the construction of the German submarines. It is'not 
 stated whether he had access to official figures, and his statement is not in 
 agreement with the figures given by German submarine officers. 
 
'v^mmim».,mt^^ 
 
 A German Submarine of the U-G Type (Minelayer). 
 
 A German Submarine of the later Cruiser Glass. 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 49 
 
 It is of interest to note here the rate of ship produc- 
 tion attained by some firms in the United States of 
 America during the .war. 
 
 As I mention later,* the Bethlehem Steel Company, 
 under Mr. Schwab's guidance, produced ten submarines 
 for us in five months from the date of the order. Mr. 
 Schwab himself informed me that towards the end of 
 the war he was turning out large destroyers in six weeks. 
 The Ford Company, as is well known, produced sub- 
 marine chasers of the " Eagle " type in even a shorter 
 period, but these vessels were of special design and 
 construction. 
 
 I have dealt so far with the question of anti-submarine 
 measures involving only the use of destroyers and other 
 small surface craft. There were, of course, other methods 
 both in use and under consideration early in 1917 when 
 we took stock of the situation. 
 
 For some time we had been using Decoy vessels, and 
 with some success ; it was possible to increase the number 
 of these ships at the cost of taking merchant ships off the 
 trade routes or by building. A very considerable increase 
 was arranged. 
 
 The use of our own suhmarines offensively against 
 enemy submarines had also been tried, and had met with 
 occasional success, but our numbers were very limited 
 (the total in December, 1916, fit for oversea or anti- 
 submarine work was about forty). They were much 
 needed fbr reconnaissance and offensive work against 
 surface men-of-war in enemy waters, and only a few were 
 at the time available for anti-submarine operations, and 
 then only at the cost of other important services. 
 
 The hydrophone had been in the experimental stage 
 and under trial for a considerable period, but it had not 
 
 * Vide Chapter^vi, p. 157. 
 
50 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 so far developed into an effective instrument for locating 
 submarines, and although trials of the different patterns 
 which had been devised were pushed forward with energy, 
 many months elapsed before it became a practicable 
 proposition. 
 
 One of the best offensive measures against the enemy 
 submarines, it was realized, was the mine, if laid in 
 sufficiently large numbers. Unfortunately, in January, 
 1917, we did not possess a mine that was satisfactory 
 against submarines. 
 
 Our deficiency in this respect was clearly shown in 
 the course of some trials which I ordered, when one of 
 our own submarines was run against a number of our 
 mines, with the result that only about 38 per cent, of 
 the mines (fitted, of course, only with small charges) 
 exploded. The Germans were well aware that our mines 
 were not very effective against submarines. 
 
 We possessed at the time mines of two patterns, and 
 whilst proving unsatisfactory against submarines, they 
 were also found to be somewhat unreliable when laid 
 in minefields designed to catch surface vessels, owing 
 to a defect in the mooring apparatus. This defect was 
 remedied, but valuable time was lost whilst the necessary 
 alterations were being carried out, and although we 
 possessed in April, 1917, a stock of some 20,000 mines, 
 only 1 ,500 of them were then fit for laying. The position, 
 therefore, was that our mines were not a satisfactory anti- 
 submarine weapon. 
 
 A new pattern minef which had been designed on the 
 model of the German mine during Sir Henry Jackson's 
 term of office as First Sea Lord in 1916, was experi- 
 mented with at the commencement of 1917, and as soon 
 as drawings could be prepared orders for upwards of 
 100,000 were placed in anticipation of its success. There 
 
Submarine Campaign: Early Part of 1917 51 
 
 were some initial difficulties before all the details were 
 satisfactory, and, in spite of the greatest pressure on manu- 
 facturers, it was not until November, 1917, that mines 
 of this pattern were being delivered in large numbers. 
 The earliest minefields laid in the Heligoland Bight in 
 September and October, 1917, with mines of the new pat- 
 tern met with immediate success against enemy sub- 
 marines, as did the minefields composed of the same type 
 of mine, the laying of which commenced in November, 
 1917, in the Straits of Dover. 
 
 When it became possible to adopt the system of bring- 
 ing merchant ships in convoys through the submarine zone 
 imder the escort of a screen of destroyers, this system be- 
 came in itself, to a certain extent, an offensive operation, 
 since it necessarily forced the enemy submarines desirous 
 of obtaining results into positions in which they themselves 
 were open to violent attack by depth charges dropped by 
 destroyers. 
 
 During the greater part of the year 1917, however, 
 it was only possible to supply destroyers with a small 
 number of depth charges ^ which was their principal 
 anti-submarine weapon ; as it became feasible to increase 
 largely the supply of these charges to destroyers, so the 
 violence of the attack on the submarines increased, and 
 their losses became heavier. 
 
 The position then, as it existed in the early days of 
 the year 1917, is described in the foregoing remarks. 
 
 The result measured in loss of shipping (British, 
 Allied, and neutral) from submarine and mine attack in 
 the first half of the year was as follows in gross tonnage : 
 
 January 
 
 324,016 
 
 April 
 
 ... 870,359 
 
 February . . . 
 
 500,573 
 
 May 
 
 ... 589,754 
 
 March 
 
 555,991 
 
 Jun^ 
 
 ,.. 675,154 
 
52 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Because of the time required for production, it was 
 a sheer impossibihty to put into effect any fresh devices 
 that might be adopted for deaUng with submarine war- 
 fare for many months, and all that could be done was 
 to try new methods of approach to the coast and, as 
 the number of small craft suitable for escort duty 
 increased, to extend gradually the convoy system already 
 in force to a certain extent for the French coal trade 
 and the Scandinavian trade. 
 
 In the chapters which follow the further steps which 
 were taken to deal with the problem, and the degree of 
 success which attended them, will be described. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 
 
 The previous chapters have dealt with the changes in 
 organization carried out at the Admiralty during the 
 year 1917 largely with the object of being able to deal 
 more effectively with the submarine warfare against 
 merchant ships. Mention has also been made of the sub- 
 marine problem with which the Navy had to deal ; 
 particulars of the anti-submarine and other work carried 
 out will now be examined. 
 
 A very large proportion of the successful anti-sub- 
 marine devices brought into use during 1917, and 
 continued throughout the year 1918, were the outcome 
 of the work of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval 
 Staff, and it is but just that the high value of this 
 work should be recognized when the history of the war 
 comes to be written by future historians. As has been 
 stated in Chapter I, Rear- Admiral A. C. Duff, C.B., 
 was the original head of the division, with Captain F. C. 
 Dreyer, C.B., Commander Yeats Brown, and Com- 
 mander Reginald Henderson as Kis immediate assistants. 
 Captain H. T. Walwyn took the place of Captain 
 Dreyer on March 1, 1917, when the latter officer became 
 Director of Naval Ordnance. When Adnairal Duff was 
 appointed Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, with a seat 
 on the Board, in May, 1917, Captain W. W. Fisher, 
 C.B., became head of the division, which still remained 
 one of the divisions of the Staff working immediately 
 
 53 
 
54 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 under the A.C.N.S. It is to these officers, with their 
 most zealous, clever and efficient staff, that the 
 institution of many of the successful anti-submarine 
 measures is largely due. They were indefatigable in 
 their search for new methods and in working out and 
 perfecting fresh schemes, and they kept their minds open 
 to new ideas. They received much valuable assistance 
 from the great civilian scientists who gave such ready 
 help during the war, the function of the naval officers 
 .working with the scientists being to see that the effort 
 was being directed along practical lines. They were also 
 greatly indebted to Captain Ryan, R.N., for the exceed- 
 ingly valuable, work carried out by him at the experimental 
 establishment at Hawkcraig. Many brilliant ideas were 
 due to Captain Ryan's clever brain. 
 
 I doubt whether the debt due to Admiral Duff and 
 Captain Fisher and their staff for their great work can 
 ever be thoroughly appreciated, but it is certainly my 
 duty to mention it here since I am better able to speak 
 of it than any other person. In saying this I do not 
 iWish to detract in the least from the value of the part 
 performed by those to jvhose lot it fell to put the actual 
 schemes into operation. Without them, of course, 
 nothing could have been accomplished. 
 
 When the Anti-Submarine Division started in 
 December, 1916, the earlier devices to which attention 
 was devoted were : 
 
 (1) The design and manufacture of howitzers 
 firing shell fitted to explode some 40 to 60 feet under 
 water with which to attack submarines ^when 
 submerged. 
 
 (2) The introduction of a more suitable pro- 
 jectile for use against submarines than that supplied 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 55 
 
 at the time to the guns of destroyers and patrol 
 craft. 
 
 (3) The improvement of and great increase in 
 the supply of smoke apparatus for the screening of 
 merchant ships from submarines attacking by gun- 
 fire, i'^j 
 
 (4) A great increase in the number of depth 
 charges supplied to destroyers and other small 
 craft. 
 
 (5) The development of the hydrophone for 
 anti-submarine work, both from ships and from 
 shore stations. 
 
 (6) The introduction of the ''Otter" for the 
 protection of merchant ships against mines. 
 
 (7) A very great improvement in the rapidity of 
 arming merchant ships defensively. 
 
 (8) The extended and organized use of air craft 
 for anti-submarine work. 
 
 (9) A great development of the special service or 
 decoy ship. 
 
 (10) The introduction of a form of net protection 
 for merchant ships against torpedo fire. 
 
 Other devices followed, many of which were the out- 
 come of work in other Admiralty Departments, par- 
 ticularly the Departments of the Director of Naval 
 Ordnance and the Director of Torpedoes and Mines, 
 working in conjunction with the Anti-Submarine or 
 the Operations Division of the Naval Staff. Some 
 of the new features were the development of depth- 
 charge throwers, the manufacture and use of fast coastal 
 motor-boats for anti-submarine work, the production 
 of mines of an improved type for use especially against 
 submarines, very considerable developments in the use 
 
56 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 of minefields, especially deep minefields, including 
 persistent mining in the Heligoland Bight and the lay- 
 ing of a complete minefield at varying depths in the 
 Straits of Dover; also, after the United States entered 
 the war, the laying of a very extensive minefield right 
 across the northern part of the North Sea. The provision 
 of " flares " for illuminating minefields at night, and a 
 system of submarine detection by the use of electrical 
 apparatus were also matters which were taken up and 
 pressed forward during 1917. During the year the 
 system of dazzle painting for merchant ships was brought 
 into general use. 
 
 On the operational side of the Naval Staff the work 
 of dealing with enemy submarines before they passed 
 out of the North Sea was taken in hand by organized 
 hunting operations by destroyers and other patrol craft, 
 and by the more extended use offensively of our own 
 submarines, as vessels became available. 
 
 Considerable developments were effected in the 
 matter of the control of mercantile traffic, and much 
 was done to train the personnel of the mercantile marine 
 in matters relating to submarine warfare. 
 
 Taking these subjects in detail, it will be of interest 
 to examine the progress made during the year. 
 
 Howitzers 
 
 The howitzer as a weapon for use against the sub- 
 marine when submerged was almost non-existent at the 
 beginning of 1917, only thirty bomb-throwers, on the 
 lines of trench-mortars, being on order. By April of 
 that year designs for seven different kinds of bomb- 
 throwers and howitzers had been prepared and approved, 
 and orders placed for 1,006 weapons, of which number 
 the first 41 were due for delivery in May. By the end 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 57 
 
 of May the number of bomb-throwers and howitzers on 
 order had been increased to 2,056, of eight different 
 patterns. Over 1,000 of these weapons fired a bomb or 
 shell carrying a burster exceeding 90 lbs. in weight, and 
 with a range varying between 1,200 and 2,600 yards. 
 Later in the war, as we gained experience of the value 
 of this form of attack, heavier bombs were introduced 
 for use in the existing bomb-throwers and howitzers. 
 The howitzer as an anti-submarine weapon was handi- 
 capped by the comparatively small weight of the bursting 
 charge of its shell. This applied more particularly to 
 the earlier patterns, and to inflict fatal injury it was 
 necessary to burst the shell in close proximity to the 
 submerged submarine. This weapon, although not very 
 popular at first, soon, however, proved its value, when 
 employed both from patrol craft and from merchant ships. 
 
 One curious instance occurred on March 23, 1918, 
 of a merchant ship being saved by a 7.5-inch howitzer. 
 A torpedo was seen approaching at a distance of some 
 600 yards, and it appeared certain to hit the ship. A 
 projectile fired from the howitzer exploded under water 
 close to the torpedo, deflected it from its course, and 
 caused it to come to the surface some 60 yards from the 
 ship ; a second projectile caused it to stop, and appar- 
 ently damaged the torpedo, which when picked up by 
 an escorting vessel was found to be minus its head. 
 
 Delivery of howitzers commenced in June, 1917, and 
 continued as follows : 
 
 ^if sr ™— "S 
 
 acmauy issuea. ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ 
 
 July 24, 1917 ... 35 ... 48 
 
 October 1, 1917 92 ... 167 
 
 December 10, 1917 377 ... 422 
 
58 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 The slow rate of delivery, in spite of constant 
 pressure, which is shown by these figures gives some 
 idea of the time required to bring new devices into 
 existence. 
 
 Projectile for Use Against Submarines 
 
 In January, 1917, the Director of Naval Ordnance 
 was requested by the Anti-Submarine Division of the 
 Naval Staff to carry out trials against a target represent- 
 ing the hull of a German subrnarine, so far as the details 
 were known to us, to ascertain the most suitable type 
 of projectile amongst those then in existence for the 
 attack of submarines by guns of 4.7-inch calibre and 
 below. 
 
 The results were pubhshed to the Fleet in March, 
 1917. They afforded some useful knowledge and demon- 
 strated the ineffectiveness of some of the shells and fuses 
 commonly in use against submarines from 12-pounder 
 guns, the .weapon with which so many of our patrol 
 craft were armed. The target at which the shell was 
 fired did not, however, fully represent a German sub- 
 marine under the conditions of service. The trials were 
 therefore continued, and as a result, in June, 1917, a 
 further order was issued to the Fleet, giving directions as 
 to the type of projectile to be used against submarines 
 from all natures of guns, pending the introduction of 
 delay action fuses for the smaller guns; this was the 
 temporary solution of the difficulty until a new type of 
 shell evolved from the experience gained at the trials 
 could be produced and issued. The trials, which were 
 exhaustive, were pressed forward vigorously and con- 
 tinuously throughout the year 1917, and meanwhile more 
 accurate information as to the exact form of the hull and 
 the thickness of the plating of German submarines became 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 59 
 
 available. Early in 1918 the first supplies of the new 
 fuses were ready for issue. 
 
 Smoke Apparatus 
 
 The earlier smoke apparatus for supply to merchant 
 ships was designed towards the end of 1916. 
 
 One description of smoke apparatus consisted of an 
 arrangement for burning phosphorus at the stem of a 
 ship; in other cases firework composition and other 
 chemicals ,were used. A dense smoke cloud was thus 
 formed, and, with the wind in a suitable direction, a 
 vessel could hide her movements from an enemy sub- 
 marme or other vessel, and thus screen herself from 
 accurate shell fire. 
 
 In another form the apparatus was thrown overboard 
 and formed a smoke cloud on the water. 
 
 The rate of supply of sets of the smoke apparatus to 
 ships is shown by the following figures : 
 
 April 1,1917 1,372 sets 
 
 July 8, 1917 2,568 „ 
 
 October 5, 1917 8,445 „ 
 
 November 26, 1917 ... 8,976 
 
 Depth Charges 
 
 Depth charges, as supphed to ships in 1917, were of 
 two patterns : one. Type D, contained a charge of 800 lb. 
 
 T J'^'"^" ^""^ ^^^ ''*^^'"' '^^^^ ^*' "^^^^^^^ ^20 lb. of 
 1 .N.T. At the commencement of 1917 the allowance 
 to ships was two of Type D and two of Type D*, and 
 the supply was insuflScient at that time to keep up the 
 stock required to maintain on board four per destroyer 
 the number for which they were fitted, or to supply all 
 trawlers and other patrol craft with their allowance. The 
 great value of the depth charge as a weapon against sub- 
 
6o The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 marines, and the large number that .were required for 
 successful attack, became apparent early in 1917, and 
 the allowance was increased. Difficulty was experienced 
 throughout the year in maintaining adequate stocks 
 owing to the shortage of labour and the many demands 
 on our industries made by the war, but the improve- 
 ment is shown by the fact that while the average output 
 per week of depth charges was only 140 in July, it had 
 become over 500 by October, and that by the end 
 of December it was raised to over 800, and was still 
 increasing very rapidly. As a consequence, early in 1918 
 it was found possible to increase the supply very largely, 
 as many as 30 to 40 per destroyer being carried. 
 
 Improvements in the details of depth charges were 
 effected during 1917. One such improvement was the 
 introduction of a pistol capable of firing at much greater 
 depths than had been in use before. The result was 
 that all vessels, whether fast or slow, could safely use 
 the 800-lb. depth charge if set to a sufficient depth. This 
 led to the abolition of the Type D* charges and the 
 universal supply of Type D. 
 
 In spite of the difficulties of dropping depth charges 
 so close to submarines as to damage them sufficiently 
 to cause them to come to the surface, very good results 
 were obtained from their use when destroyers carried 
 enough to form, so to speak, a ring round the assumed 
 position at which the submarine had dived. In order to 
 encourage scientific attack on submarines, a system of 
 depth charge ' ' Battle Practice ' ' was introduced towards 
 the end of 1917. 
 
 It is as well to correct a common misapprehension 
 as to the value of depth charges in destroying submarines. 
 
 Many people held very exaggerated ideas on this 
 subject, even to the extent of supposing that a depth 
 
Anti-Submarlne Operations 6i 
 
 charge would destroy a submarine if dropped within 
 several hundred yards of her. This is, unfortunately, 
 very far indeed from being the case ; it is, on the 
 contrary, necessary to explode the charge near the 
 submarine in order to effect destruction. Taking the 
 depth charge with 300 lb. weight of explosive, ordinarily 
 supplied to destroyers in 1917, it was necessary to explode 
 it within fourteen feet of a submarine to ensure destruc- 
 tion ; at distances up to about twenty-eight feet from the 
 hull the depth charge might be expected to disable a 
 submarine to the extent of forcing her to the surface, 
 when she could be sunk by gun-fire or rammed, and 
 at distances up to sixty feet the moral effect on the crew 
 would be considerable and might force the submarine to 
 the surface. 
 
 A consideration of these figures will show that it 
 was necessary for a vessel attacking a submarine with 
 depth charges to drop them in very close proximity, and 
 the first obvious difficulty was to ascertain the position 
 of a submarine that had dived and was out of sight. 
 
 Unless, therefore, the attacking vessel was fairly 
 close to the submarine at the moment of the latter diving 
 there was but little chance of the attack being successful. 
 
 Hydrophones 
 
 The Hydrophone, for use in locating submerged sub- 
 marines, although first evolved in 1915, was in its infancy, 
 so far as supply to ships was concerned, at the commence- 
 ment of 1917. Experiments were being carried out by the 
 Board of Invention and Research at Harwich, and by 
 Captain Ryan, R.N., at Hawkcraig, and although very 
 useful results had been obtained and a considerable number 
 of shore stations as well as some patrol vessels had been 
 fitted with hydrophones, which had a hstening range of 
 
6« The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 one or two miles, all the devices for use afloat 
 suffered from the disadvantage that it was not possible 
 to use them whilst the ship carrying them was moving, 
 since the noise of the vessel's own machinery and of 
 the water passing along the side prevented the noise 
 made by other vessels being located. What was required 
 was a listening instrument that could be used by a 
 ship moving at least at slow speed, otherwise the ship 
 carrying the hydrophone was herself, when stopped, an 
 easy target for the submarine's torpedo. It .was also 
 essential, before an attack could be delivered, to be able 
 to locate the direction of the enemy submarine, and prior 
 to 1917 all that these instruments showed was the presence 
 of a submarine somewhere in the vicinity. 
 
 Much research and experimental work was carried 
 out during the year 1917 under the encouragement and 
 supervision of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval 
 Staff. Two hydrophones were invented in the early part 
 of 1917, one by Captain Ryan, R.N., and one by the 
 Board of Invention and Research, which could be used 
 from ships at very slow speed and which gave some 
 indication of the direction of the sound; finally, in the 
 summer of 1917, the ability and patience of one inventor, 
 Mr. Nash, were rewarded, and an instrument was devised 
 termed the "fish" hydrophone which to a considerable 
 extent fulfilled the required conditions. Mr. Nash, whose 
 invention had been considered but not adopted by the 
 Board of Invention and Research before he brought it to 
 the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, laboured 
 under many difficulties with the greatest energy and per- 
 severance ; various modifications in the design were 
 effected until, in October, 1917, the instrument was 
 pronounced satisfactory and supplies were put in 
 hand? 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 63 
 
 The next step was to fit the "fish" hydrophone in 
 certain auxiliary patrol vessels as well as some destroyers, 
 *' P" boats and motor launches, to enter and train men 
 to work it, and finally to organize these vessels into 
 "submarine hunting flotillas," drill them, and then set 
 them to their task. 
 
 This work, which occupied some time, was carried out 
 at Portland, where a regular establishment was set up 
 for developing the "fish " hydrophone and for organizing 
 and training the " hunting flotillas " in its use. A con- 
 siderable amount of training in the use of the hydrophone 
 was required before men became efficient, and only those 
 with a very keen sense of hearing were suited to the 
 work. The chances of the success of the hunting flotillas 
 had been promising in the early experiments, and the 
 fitting out of patrol craft and organizing and drilling 
 them, proceeded as rapidly as the vessels could be ob- 
 tained, but largely owing to the slow production of 
 trawlers it was not until November that the first hunting 
 flotilla fitted with the "fish" hydrophone was actually 
 at work. The progress made after this date is illustrated 
 by the fact that in December, 1917, a division of drifters, 
 with a "p" boat, fitted with this "fish" hydxophone 
 hunted an enemy submarine for seven hours during dark- 
 ness, covering a distance of fifty miles, kept touch with 
 her by sound throughout this period, and finished by 
 dropping depth charges in apparently the correct position, 
 since a strong smell of oil fuel resulted and nothing further 
 could be heard of the submarine, although the drifters 
 listened for several hours. On another occasion in the 
 same month a division of drifters hunted a submarine for 
 five hours. The number of hydrophones was increased as 
 rapidly as possible until by the end of the year the system 
 was in full operation within a Umited area^ and only 
 
64 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 required expansion to work, as was intended, on a large 
 scale in the North Sea and the English Channel. 
 
 Meanwhile during 1917 directional hydrophones, 
 which had been successfully produced both by Captain 
 Ryan and by the Board of Invention and Research, 
 had been fitted to patrol craft in large numbers, and 
 "hunting flotillas" were operating in many areas. A 
 good example of the working of one of these flotillas 
 occurred off Dartmouth in the summer of 1918, when 
 a division of motor launches fitted with the Mark II 
 hydrophone, under the general guidance of a destroyer, 
 carried out a successful attack on a German submarine. 
 Early in the afternoon one of the motor launches dropped 
 a depth charge on an oil patch, and shortly afterwards 
 one of the hydrophones picked up the sound of an 
 internal combustion engine ; a line of depth charges was 
 run on the bearing indicated by the hydrophone. The 
 motor launches and the destroyer remained listening, 
 until at about 6.0 p.m. a submarine came to the surface 
 not far from Motor Launch No. 135, which fired two 
 rounds at the submarine before the latter submerged. 
 Other motor launches closed in, and depth charges 
 were dropped by them in close proximity to the wash 
 of the submarine. Oil came to the surface, and more 
 depth charges were dropped in large numbers on the 
 spot for the ensuing forty-eight hours. Eventually 
 objects came to the surface clearly indicating the 
 presence of a submarine. Further charges were dropped, 
 and an obstruction on the bottom was located by means 
 of a sweep. This engagement held peculiar interest 
 for me, since during my visit to Canada in the 
 winter of 1919 the honour fell to me of presenting to 
 a Canadian — Lieutenant G. L. Cassady, R.N.V.R. — 
 at Vancouver the Distinguished Service Cross awarded 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 65 
 
 him by His Majesty for his work in Motor Launch 
 No. 135 on this occasion. 
 
 Motor Launches were organized into submarine hunt- 
 ing flotillas during the year 1917. These vessels were 
 equipped with the directional hydrophone as soon as its 
 utility was established, and were supplied with depth 
 charges. In the summer of 1917 four such hunting 
 flotillas were busy in the Channel ; the work of one 
 of these I have described already, and they certainly con- 
 tributed towards making the Channel an uneasy place 
 for submarine operations. 
 
 These results were, of course, greatly improved on 
 in 1918, as the numbers of ships fitted with the "fish" 
 and other hydrophones increased and further experience 
 was gained. 
 
 The progress in supply of hydrophones is shown by 
 the following table : 
 
 Shark Fin Fish 
 Type. Type. 
 
 
 Supply of 
 
 Directional 
 
 Date. 
 
 General Service 
 
 Mark I and 
 
 1917. 
 
 Portable Type. 
 
 Mark II. 
 
 July 81 ... 
 
 ... 2,750 
 
 500 
 
 August 31 
 
 ... 2,750 
 
 700 
 
 September 30 
 
 ... 2,750 
 
 850 
 
 October 81 
 
 ... 3,500 
 
 1,000 
 
 December 31 
 
 ... 3,680 
 
 1,950 
 
 870 37 
 
 Hydrophone Stations and Training Schools 
 
 At the beginning of 1917 four shore hydrophone 
 stations were in use. During the year eight additional 
 stations were completed and several more were nearing 
 completion. The first step necessary was a considerable 
 increase in the instructional facilities for training listeners 
 both for the increased number of shore stations and 
 
66 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 for the large number of vessels that were fitted for 
 hydrophone work during the year. 
 
 The greater part of this training took place at the 
 establishment at Hawkcraig, near Rosyth, at which 
 Captain Ryan, R.N., carried out so much exceedingly 
 valuable work during the war. I am not able to give 
 exact figures of the number of ofl[icers and men who were 
 instructed in hydrophone work either at Hawkcraig or 
 at other stations by instructors sent from Hawkcraig, 
 but the total was certainly upwards of 1,000 officers and 
 2,000 men. In addition to this extensive instructional 
 work the development of the whole system of detecting 
 the presence of submarines by sound is very largely due 
 to the work originally carried out at Hawkcraig by 
 Captain Ryan. 
 
 The first hydrophone station which was established 
 in the spring of 1915 was from Oxcars Lighthouse in 
 the Firth of Forth ; it was later in the year transferred 
 to Inchcolm. Experimental work under Captain Ryan 
 continued at Hawkcraig during 1915, and in 1916 a 
 section of the Board of Invention and Research went 
 to Hawkcraig to work in conjunction with him. This 
 station produced the Mark II directional hydrophone of 
 which large numbers were ordered in 1917 for use in 
 patrol craft. It was a great improvement on any 
 hydrophone instrument previously in use. Hawkcraig 
 also produced the directional plates fitted to our sub- 
 marines, as well as many other inventions used in detect- 
 ing the presence of submarines. 
 
 In addition to the work at Hawkcraig an experimental 
 station under the Board of Invention and Research 
 was established near Harwich in January, 1917. The 
 Mark I directional hydrophone was designed at this 
 establishment in 1917, and other exceedingly valuable 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 67 
 
 work was carried out there connected with the detection of 
 submarines. 
 
 At Malta an experimental station, with a hydrophone 
 training school, was started in the autumn of 1917, 
 and good work was done both there and at a hydrophone 
 station established to the southward of Otranto at about 
 the same time, as well as at a hydrophone training school 
 started at Gallipoli at the end of the year. 
 
 " Otters " and Paravanes 
 
 The '* Otter " system of defence of merchant ships 
 against mines was devised by Lieutenant Dennis Burney, 
 D.S.O., R.N.,* and was on similar lines to his valuable 
 invention for the protection of warships. The latter 
 system had been introduced into the Grand Fleet in 
 1916, although for a long period considerable opposi- 
 tion existed against its general adoption, partly on 
 account of the difficulties experienced in its early days 
 of development, and partly owing to the extensive 
 outlay involved in fitting all ships. However, this oppo- 
 sition was eventually overcome, and before the end of 
 the war the system had very amply justified itself by 
 saving a large number of warships from destruction by 
 mines. It was computed that there were at least fifty 
 cases during the war in which paravanes fitted to war- 
 ships had cut the moorings of mines, thus possibly saving 
 the ships. It must also be borne in mind that the cutting 
 of the moorings of a mine and the bringing of it to the 
 surface may disclose the presence of an hitherto unknown 
 minefield, and thus save other ships. 
 
 Similarly, the "Otter" defence in its early stages 
 was not introduced without opposition, but again all 
 difficulties were overcome, and the rate of progress in its 
 
 *A son of Admiral Sir Cecil Burney. 
 
68 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 use is shown in the following statement giving the number 
 of British merchant ships fitted with it at different periods 
 of 1917 : 
 
 By July 1, 95 ships had been fitted. 
 
 By September 1, 294 ships had been fitted. 
 
 By December 1, 900 ships had been fitted. 
 
 The system was also extended to foreign merchant 
 ships, and supplies of '* Otters " were sent abroad for this 
 purpose. 
 
 A considerable number of merchant ships were 
 known to have been saved from destruction by mine by 
 the use of this system. 
 
 Defensive Arming of Merchant Ships 
 
 The defensive arming of merchant ships was a matter 
 which was pressed forward with great energy and 
 rapidity during the year 1917. The matter was taken 
 up with the Cabinet immediately on the formation of 
 the Board of Admiralty presided over by Sir Edward 
 Carson, and arrangements made for obtaining a consider- 
 able number of guns from the War Office, from Japan, 
 and from France, besides surrendering some guns from 
 the secondary and anti-torpedo boat armament of our 
 own men-of-war, principally those of the older type, 
 pending the manufacture of large numbers of guns for 
 the purpose. Orders for some 4,200 guns were placed 
 by Captain Dreyer, the Director of Naval Ordnance, 
 with our own gun makers in March, April and May, 
 1917, in addition to nearly 3,000 guns already on order 
 for this purpose ; 400 90-m.m. guns were obtained from 
 France, the mountings being made in England. Special 
 arrangements were also made by Captain Dreyer for 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 
 
 69 
 
 the rapid manufacture of all guns, including the pro- 
 vision of the material and of extra manufacturing 
 plant. 
 
 These orders for 4,200 guns and the orders for 2,020 
 howitzers placed at the same time brought the total 
 number of guns and howitzers under manufacture in 
 England for naval and merchant service purposes in 
 May, 1917, up to the high figure of 10,761. 
 
 At the end of the year 1916 the total number of 
 merchant ships that had been armed since the commence- 
 ment of the war (excluding those which were working 
 under the White Ensign and which had received offen- 
 sive armaments) was 1,420. Of this number, 83 had 
 been lost. 
 
 During the first six months of 1917 armaments were 
 provided for an additional 1,581 ships, and during the 
 last six months of that year a further total of 1,406 ships 
 were provided with guns, an aggregate number of 2,987 
 ships being thus furnished with armaments during the 
 year. This total was exclusive of howitzers. 
 
 The progress of the .work is shown by the following 
 
 figures : 
 
 Number of guns that had been 
 Date. provided for British Merchant 
 
 Ships excluding Howitzers. 
 
 January 1, 1917 
 
 April 1, 1917 
 July 1, 1917 
 October 1, 1917 
 January 1, 1918 
 
 1,420 
 2,181 
 3,001 
 3,763 
 4,407 
 
 The figures given include the guns mounted in ships 
 that were lost through enemy action or from marine 
 risks. 
 
 It should be stated that the large majority of the 
 
70 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 guns imanufactured during 1917 were 12-pounders or 
 larger guns, as experience had shown that smaller weapons 
 were usually outranged by those carried in submarines, and 
 the projectiles of even the 12-pounder were smaller than 
 was desirable. Of the 2,987 new guns mounted in 
 merchant ships during the year 1917 only 190 were 
 smaller than 12-pounders. 
 
 Aircraft for Anti-Submarine Work 
 
 Anti-suhmarine work hy aircraft was already in 
 operation round our coasts by the beginning of 1917, 
 and during the year the increase in numbers and improve- 
 ment in types of machines rendered possible considerable 
 expansion of the work. Closer co-operation between 
 surface vessels and aircraft was also secured, and as 
 the convoy system was extended aircraft were used both 
 for escort and observation work, as well as for attack on 
 submarines. For actual escort work airships were 
 superior to heavier-than-air machines owing to their 
 greater radius of action, whilst for offensive work against 
 a submarine that had been sighted the high speed of the 
 seaplane or aeroplane was of great value. 
 
 In 1916 and the early part of 1917 we were but ill 
 provided with aircraft suitable for anti-submarine opera- 
 tions at any considerable distance from the coast, and 
 such aircraft as we possessed did not carry sufficiently 
 powerful bombs to be very effective in attacking sub- 
 marines, although they were of use in forcing these vessels 
 to submerge and occasionally in bringing our surface craft 
 to the spot to press home the attack. 
 
 The Royal Naval Air Service, under Commodore 
 Godfrey Paine, devoted much energy to the provision 
 of suitable aircraft, and the anti-submarine side of the 
 Naval Staff co-operated in the matter of their organiza- 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 71 
 
 tion ; with the advent of the large ' ' America ' ' type 
 of seaplane and the Handley-Page type of aeroplane, 
 both of which carried heavy bombs, successful atta.cks 
 on enemy submarines became more frequent. They 
 were assisted by the airships, particularly those of the 
 larger type. 
 
 Improvements which were effected in signalling 
 arrangements between ships and aircraft were instru- 
 mental in adding greatly to their efficiency, and by the 
 early summer of 1917 aircraft had commenced to play 
 an important part in the war against submarines and 
 in the protection of trade. 
 
 Thereafter progress became rapid, as the following 
 figures show : 
 
 In June, 1917, aeroplanes and seaplanes patrolling 
 for anti-submarine operations covered 75,000 miles, 
 sighted 17 submarines, and were able to attack 7 of 
 them. 
 
 In September, 1917, the distance covered by anti- 
 submarine patrols of aeroplanes and seaplanes was 91,000 
 miles, 25 submarines were sighted, of .which 18 were 
 attacked. 
 
 In the four weeks ending December 8, 1917, in spite 
 of the much shorter days and the far less favourable fly- 
 ing weather experienced, the mileage covered was again 
 91,000 miles; 17 submarines were sighted, of which 11 
 were attacked during this period. 
 
 As regards airships the figures again show the 
 increased anti-submarine jvork carried out : 
 
 In June, 1917, airships engaged in anti-submarine 
 patrol covered 53,000 miles, sighted and attacked 1 
 submarine. 
 
 In September, 1917, they covered 83,000 miles, and 
 sighted 8 submarines, of which 5 were attacked. 
 
72 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 In the four weeks ending December 8, 1917, they 
 covered 50,000 miles, sighted 6 submarines, and attacked 
 5 of them. 
 
 The airships were more affected by short days, and 
 particularly by bad weather, than the heavier than air 
 craft, and the fact that they covered practically the same 
 mileage in the winter days of December as in the summer 
 days of June shows clearly the development that took 
 place in the interval. 
 
 During the whole of 1917 it was estimated that our 
 heavier than air craft sighted 135 submarines and attacked 
 85 of them, and our lighter than air craft sighted 26 and 
 attacked 15. The figures given in Chapter IX of the 
 number of submarines sunk during the war by aircraft 
 (viz. 7 as a minimum), when compared with the number 
 of attacks during 1917 alone suggest the difficulties of 
 successful attack. 
 
 In September, 1917, as extensive a programme as 
 was consistent with manufacturing capabilities, in view of 
 the enormous demands of the Army, was drawn up by the 
 Naval Staff for the development of aircraft for anti- 
 submarine operations during 1918. 
 
 The main developments were in machines of the large 
 *' America" type and heavy bombing machines for 
 attacking enemy bases, as well as other anti-submarine 
 machines and aircraft for use with the Grand Fleet. 
 
 Included in the anti-submarine operations of aircraft 
 during 1917 were the bombing attacks on Bruges, since 
 the German submarines and the shelters in which they 
 took refuge were part of the objective. 
 
 These attacks were carried out from the aerodrome 
 established by the Royal Naval Air Service at Dunkirk. 
 During 1917 the Naval Air Forces of the Dover Com- 
 mand, which included the squadrons at Dunkirk, jvere 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 73 
 
 under the command of Captain C. L. Lambe, R.N., and 
 the operations of this force were of a very strenuous 
 character and of the utmost value. 
 
 Bombing operations prior to the year of 1917 had 
 been carried out by various types of machines, but the 
 introduction of the Handley-Page aeroplanes in the 
 spring of 1917 enabled a much greater weight of bombs 
 — viz. some 1,500 lbs. — to be carried than had hitherto 
 been possible. These machines were generally used for 
 night bombing, and the weight of bombs dropped on 
 the enemy bases in Belgium rose with great rapidity as 
 machines of the Handley-Page type were delivered, as 
 did the number of nights on which attacks were made. 
 It was no uncommon occurrence during the autumn of 
 1917 for six to eight tons of bombs to be dropped in 
 one night. I have not the figures for 1918, but feel no 
 doubt that with the great increase in aircraft that became 
 possible during that year this performance was constantly 
 exceeded. 
 
 Special Service or Decoy Ships 
 
 The story of the work of these vessels constitutes a 
 record of gallantry, endurance and discipline which 
 has never been surpassed afloat or ashore. The 
 earliest vessels were fitted out during the year 1915 
 at Scapa, Rosyth, Queenstown and other ports, and 
 from the very first it was apparent that they would 
 win for themselves a place in history. The earliest 
 success against an enemy submarine by one of these 
 vessels was achieved by the Prince Charles, fitted 
 out at Scapa, and commanded by Lieutenant Mark- 
 Wardlaw, an officer on the Staff of Admiral Sir Stanley 
 Colville, then Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and 
 Shetlands. In the early months of 1917 it jvas decided 
 
74 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 to augment greatly the force of these special service vessels, 
 and steps were taken to organize a separate Admiralty 
 Department for the work. Special experience was 
 needed, both for the selection of suitable ships and for 
 fitting them out, and care was taken to select officers 
 who had been personally connected with the work during 
 the war; the advice of successful commanders of decoy 
 ships was also utilized. At the head was Captain 
 Alexander Farrington, under whose directions several 
 ships had been fitted out at Scapa with great ingenuity 
 and success. Every class of ship was brought into the 
 service : steam cargo vessels, trawlers, drifters, sailing 
 ships, ketches, and sloops specially designed to have the 
 appearance of cargo ships. These latter vessels were known 
 as " convoy sloops '* to distinguish them from the ordinary 
 sloop. Their design, which was very clever, had been 
 prepared in 1916 by Sir Eustace T. D'Eyncourt, the 
 Director of Naval Construction. The enemy submarine 
 commanders, however, became so wary owing to the 
 successes of decoy ships that they would not come to the 
 surface until they had inspected ships very closely in the 
 submerged condition, and the fine lines of the convoy 
 sloops gave them away under close inspection. 
 
 In the early spring of 1917 the Director of Naval 
 Construction was asked whether the *' P " class of patrol 
 boats then under construction could be altered to work 
 as decoy vessels, as owing to their light draught they 
 would be almost immune from torpedo attack. 
 
 A very good design was produced, and some of the 
 later patrol boats were converted and called " P Q's." 
 These vessels had the appearance of small merchant ships 
 at a cursory glance. They would not, however, stand 
 close examination owing, again, to their fine lines, but 
 being better sea boats than the "P's," by reason of 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 75 
 
 their greater freeboard, the design was continued, and 
 they met with considerable success against submarines 
 (especially in the Irish Sea) by ramming and depth 
 charge tactics, the submarines when submerged probably 
 not realizing when observing the " P Q.'s" through a 
 periscope the speed of which they were capable. 
 
 During 1917, when the unrestricted submarine war- 
 fare was in progress, many of the decoy vessels were 
 fitted with torpedo tubes, either above water or sub- 
 merged, since, as the submarine commanders became 
 more wary, they showed great dislike to coming to the 
 surface sufficiently close to merchant ships to admit of 
 the gun armament being used with certainty of success. 
 A torpedo, on the other hand, could, of course, be used 
 effectively against a submarine whilst still submerged. 
 The use also became general of casks or cargoes of wood 
 to give additional flotation to decoy ships after being 
 torpedoed, so as to prolong their life in case the submarine 
 should close near enough to allow of effective gunfire. 
 
 Another ruse adopted was that of changing the disguise 
 of a decoy ship during the night, so that she could not be 
 identified by a submarine which had previously made an 
 attack upon her. In all cases of disguise or of changing 
 disguise it was essential that the decoy ship should assume 
 the identity of some class of vessel likely to be met with 
 in the particular area in which she was working, and 
 obviously the courses steered were chosen with that 
 object in view. 
 
 Again, since for success it was essential to induce 
 the submarine to come within close range so that the decoy 
 ship's gunfire should be immediately effective, it was 
 necessary that her disguise should stand the closest possible 
 examination through the periscope of a submarine. Ger- 
 man submarine commanders, after a short experience of 
 
76 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 decoy ships, were most careful not to bring their vessels 
 to the surface in proximity to craft that were appar- 
 ently merchant ships until they had subjected them to 
 the sharpest scrutiny at short range through the periscope, 
 and the usual practice of an experienced submarine 
 commander was to steer round the ship, keeping sub- 
 merged all the time. 
 
 Not only was it essential that there should be no 
 sign of an armament in the decoy ship, or a man-of-war- 
 like appearance in any respect, but when the " panic " 
 signal was made to lead the submarine commander to think 
 that his attack had succeeded, precautions had to be taken 
 against the presence of more than the ordinary number of 
 men in the boats lowered and sent away with the supposed 
 whole ship's company ; also the sight of any men left on 
 board would at once betray the real character of the decoy 
 ship and result in the disappearance of the submarine and 
 the probable sinking of the disguised craft by torpedo fire. 
 
 During the late summer of 1917 it became evident 
 that the submarine commanders had become so suspicious 
 of decoy craft that the chances of success by the larger 
 cargo vessels were not sufiicient to justify any further 
 addition to existing numbers in view of the increasing 
 shortage of shipping ; a considerable fleet of steamers build- 
 ing for this purpose was therefore diverted to trade 
 purposes. The number of smaller vessels, particularly 
 sailing craft, was, however, increased especially in 
 Mediterranean waters where they had not been previously 
 operating on an extensive scale. 
 
 It is impossible to close these remarks on this class 
 of vessel without testifying once more to the splendid 
 gallantry, self-sacrifice, skilful resource and magnificent 
 disciphne shown by those on board. This is illustrated 
 by descriptions of a few typical actions fought during 1917. 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 77 
 
 The first which I relate took place on February 17, 
 1917, when a decoy vessel, a steamship armed with five 
 12-poimder guns, commanded by that most gallant officer, 
 Captain Gordon Campbell, R.N., was torpedoed by a 
 submarine in a position Lat. 51.34 N., Long. 11.23 W. 
 
 Captain Campbell saw the torpedo coming and 
 manoeuvred to try and avoid being hit in the engine- 
 room, but as he purposely always selected a very slow 
 ship for decoy work his attempt was only partially success- 
 ful and the engine-room began to fill. No signal for 
 assistance was made, however, as Captain Campbell 
 feared that such a signal might bring another vessel on 
 the scene and this would naturally scare the submarine 
 away. The usual procedure of abandoning the ship in 
 the boats with every appearance of haste was carried 
 out, only sufficient hands remaining hidden on board to 
 work the guns. The periscope of the submarine was 
 next sighted on the quarter within 200 or 300 yards, 
 and she came slowly past the ship still submerged and 
 evidently examining the vessel closely through the peri- 
 scope. She passed within a few yards of the ship, then 
 crossed the bow and came to the surface about 200 yards 
 off and passed down the port side again close to. Captain 
 Campbell waited until every gun would bear before giving 
 the signal for " action." The decoy ship's true character 
 was then revealed ; concealed gunports were thrown open ; 
 colours were hoisted, and a hot fire opened from all guns. 
 The submarine was hit at once and continued to be hit 
 so rapidly that it was evidently impossible for her to 
 submerge. She sank in a very short time. One officer and 
 one man were picked up. A signal was then made for 
 assistance and help arrived within a couple of hours. The 
 decoy ship was rapidly filling, but efforts were made to 
 tow her into port, and with the greatest difficulty, and 
 
78 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 entirely owing to the splendid manner in which all hands 
 stuck to the work, she was brought into Berehaven with 
 her stern under water thirty-six hours later and beached. 
 The great restraint shown by Captain Campbell, in with- 
 holding fire as the submarine passed her in a submerged 
 condition, and the truly wonderful discipline and steadiness 
 and ingenuity which baffled so close an examination of 
 the ship were the outstanding features of this great exploit. 
 
 On April 22, 1917, a decoy ship known as " Q22," 
 a small sailing vessel with auxiliary power, armed with 
 two 12-pounder guns, and commanded by Lieutenant 
 Irvine, R.N.R., while in a position about fifty miles south 
 of Kinsale Head, sighted a submarine on the surface which 
 opened fire immediately at a range of about 4,000 yards. 
 The fire was accurate and the decoy ship was hit fre- 
 quently, two men being killed and four wounded in a 
 few minutes and the vessel considerably damaged. As 
 further concealment appeared useless the guns were then 
 unmasked and the fire returned with apparently good 
 results, several hits being claimed. The enemy's fire 
 then fell off in accuracy and she increased the range, 
 and after about one and a half hours' fighting the light 
 became too bad to continue the action. It was thought 
 that the submarine was sunk, but there was no positive 
 evidence of sinking. 
 
 On April 80, 1917, a decoy ship— H. M.S. Prize — a 
 small schooner with auxiliary power, armed with two 
 12-pounder guns and commanded by Lieutenant W. E. 
 Sanders, R.N.R., a New Zealand officer, sighted, when 
 in position Lat. 49.44 N., Long. 11.42 W., a sub- 
 marine about two miles away on the port beam at 
 8.30 P.M. At 8.45 P.M. the submarine opened fire on 
 the Prize and the " abandon ship " party left in a small 
 boat. The submarine gradually approached, continuing 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 79 
 
 to pour in a heavy fire and making two hits on the 
 Prize which put the motor out of action, wrecked the 
 wireless office, and caused much internal damage besides 
 letting a great deal of water into the ship. 
 
 The crew of the Prize remained quietly hidden at 
 their concealed guns throughout this punishment, which 
 continued for forty minutes as the submarine closed, 
 coming up from right astern, a position no doUbt which 
 she considered one of safety. When close to she sheered 
 off and passed to the port beam at a distance of about 
 one hundred yards. At this moment Lieutenant Sanders 
 gave the order for " action." The guns were exposed and 
 a devastating fire opened at point blank range, but not 
 before the submarine had fired both her guns, obtaining 
 two more hits, and wounding several of the crew of the 
 Prize. The first shell fired from the Prize hit the foremost 
 gun of the submarine and blew it overboard, and a later 
 shot knocked away the conning tower. The submarine 
 went ahead and the Prize tried to follow, but the damage to 
 her motor prevented much movement. The firing con- 
 tinued as the submarine moved away, and after an interval 
 she appeared to be on fire and to sink. This occurred 
 shortly after 9.0 p.m., when it was nearly dark. The 
 Prize sent her boats to pick up survivors, three being 
 taken out of the water, including the commander and one 
 other officer. The prisoners on coming on board ex- 
 pressed their willingness to assist in taking the Piize into 
 port. It did not at this time seem likely that she would 
 long remain afloat, but by great exertion and good seaman- 
 ship the leaks were got under to a sufficient extent to 
 allow of the ship being kept afloat by pumping. The 
 prisoners gave considerable help, especially when the ship 
 caught fire whilst starting the motor again. On May 2 
 she met a motor launch off the coast of Ireland and was 
 
8o The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 towed into port. In spite of the undoubted great damage 
 to tlie submarine, damage confirmed by the survivors, who 
 were apparently blown overboard with the conning 
 tower, and who had no thought other than that 
 she had been sunk, later intelligence showed that she 
 succeeded in reaching Germany in a very disabled condi- 
 tion. This incident accentuated still further the recur- 
 rent difficulty of making definite statements as to the 
 fate of enemy submarines, for the evidence in this case 
 seemed absolutely conclusive. The commander of the sub- 
 marine was so impressed with the conduct of the crew of 
 the Prize that when examined subsequently in London 
 he stated that he did not consider it any disgrace to have 
 been beaten by her, as he could not have believed it 
 possible for any ship's company belonging to any nation 
 in the world to have been imbued with such discipline as 
 to stand the shelling to which he subjected the Prize 
 without any sign being made which would give away her 
 true character. 
 
 Lieut. -Commander Sanders was awarded the Victoria 
 Cross for his action and many decorations were given 
 to the officers and ship's company for their conduct in 
 the action. It was sad that so fine a commander and so 
 splendid a ship's company should have been lost a little 
 later in action with another submarine which she engaged 
 unsuccessfully during daylight, and which followed her in 
 a submerged condition until nightfall and then torpedoed 
 her, all hands being lost. 
 
 It was my privilege during my visit to New Zealand 
 in 1919 to unveil a memorial to the gallant Sanders which 
 was placed in his old school at Takapuna, near Auckland. 
 
 On June 7, 1917, a decoy ship, the s.s. Pargust, 
 armed with one 4-inch gun, four 12-pounder guns and 
 two torpedo tubes, commanded by Captain Gordon 
 
A Smoke Screen for a Convoy. 
 
 The Dummy Deck-house of a Decoy Ship. 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 8i 
 
 Campbell, R.N., who had meanwhile been awarded the 
 Victoria Cross, was in a position Lat. 51.50 N., Long. 
 11.50 W., when a torpedo hit the ship abreast the 
 engine-room and in detonating made a hole through 
 which water poured, filling both engine-room and boiler- 
 room. The explosion of the torpedo also blew one of 
 the boats to pieces. The usual procedure of abandoning 
 ship was carried out, and shortly after the boats had 
 left, the periscope of a submarine was sighted steering for 
 the port side. The submarine passed close under the stern, 
 steered to the starboard side, then recrossed the stern to 
 the port side, and when she w^as some fifty yards off on the 
 port beam her conning tower appeared on the surface and 
 she steered to pass round the stern again and towards one 
 of the ship's boats on the starboard beam. She then came 
 completely to the surface within one hundred yards, and 
 Captain Campbell disclosed his true character, opened 
 fire with all guns, hitting the submarine at once and con- 
 tinuing to hit her until she sank. One officer and one man 
 were saved. The decoy ship lost one man killed, and one 
 officer was wounded by the explosion of the torpedo. 
 
 As in the case of the action on February 17 the dis- 
 tinguishing feature of this exploit was the great restraint 
 shown by Captain Campbell in withholding his fire 
 although his ship was so seriously damaged. The gallantry 
 and fine discipline of the ship's company, their good 
 shooting and splendid drill, contributed largely to the 
 success. The decoy ship, although seriously damaged, 
 reached harbour. 
 
 On July 10, 1917, a decoy ship, H.M.S. Glen, a small 
 schooner with auxiliary power and armed with one 
 12-pounder and one 6-pounder gim, commanded by Sub- 
 Lieutenant K. Morris, R.N.R., was in a position about 
 forty miles south-west of Weymouth when a submarine 
 
82 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 was sighted on the surface some three miles away. She 
 closed to within two miles and opened fire on the Glen. 
 The usual practice of abandoning ship was followed, the 
 submarine closing during this operation to within half 
 a mile and remaining at that distance examining the Glen 
 for some time. After about half an hour she went ahead 
 and submerged, and then passed round the ship at about 
 200 yards distance, examining her through the periscope, 
 finally coming to the surface about 50 yards off on the 
 port quarter. Almost immediately she again started to 
 submerge, and fire was at once opened. The submarine 
 was hit three or four times before she turned over on her 
 side and disappeared. There was every reason to believe 
 that she had sunk, although no one was on deck when 
 she disappeared. No survivors were rescued. 
 
 The feature of this action was again the restraint 
 shown by the commanding officer of the Glen and the 
 excellent discipline of the crew. 
 
 On August 8, 1917, the decoy ship H.M.S. Dunmven, 
 in Lat. 48.0 N., Long. 7.37 W., armed with one 4-inch 
 and four 12-pounder guns and two torpedo tubes, com- 
 manded by Captain Gordon Campbell, V.C., R.N., 
 sighted a submarine on the surface some distance off. The 
 submarine steered towards the ship and submerged, and 
 soon afterwards came to the surface some two miles off 
 and opened fire. The Dunraveny in her character of a 
 merchant ship, replied with an after gun, firing inten- 
 tionally short, made a smoke screen, and reduced speed 
 slightly to allow the submarine to close. 
 
 When the shells from the submarine began to fall 
 close to the ship the order to abandon her was 
 given, and, as usual with the splendidly trained ship's 
 company working under Captain Campbell, the operation 
 was carried out with every appearance of disorder, one 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 83 
 
 of the boats being purposely left hanging vertical with 
 only one end lowered. Meanwhile the submarine closed. 
 Several shells from her gun hit the after part of the 
 Dunraven, causing a depth charge to explode and setting 
 her on fire aft, blowing the officer in charge of the after 
 gun out of his control station, and wounding severely the 
 seaman stationed at the depth charges. The situation 
 now was that the submarine was passing from the port to 
 the starboard quarter, and at any moment the 4-inch maga- 
 zine and the remaining depth charges in the after part of 
 the Dunraven might be expected to explode. The 4-inch 
 gun's crew aft knew the imminence of this danger, but 
 not a man moved although the deck beneath them was 
 rapidly becoming red hot; and Captain Campbell was 
 so certain of the magnificent discipline and gallantry of 
 his crew that he still held on so that the submarine might 
 come clearly into view on the starboard side clear of the 
 smoke of the fire aft. In a few minutes the anticipated 
 explosion occurred. The 4-inch gun and gun's crew were 
 blown into the air just too soon for the submarine to be 
 in the best position for being engaged. The explosion 
 itself caused the electrical apparatus to make the ' ' open 
 fire " signal, whereupon the White Ensign was hoisted and 
 the only gun bearing commenced firing; but the sub- 
 marine submerged at once. 
 
 Fifteen minutes later a torpedo hit the ship, and 
 Captain Campbell again ordered "abandon ship" and 
 sent away a second party of men to give the impression 
 that the ship had now been finally abandoned although 
 her true character had been revealed. Meanwhile he had 
 made a wireless signal to other ships to keep away as he 
 still hoped to get the submarine, which, now keeping 
 submerged, moved round the ship for three quarters of 
 an hour, during which period the fire gained on the 
 
84 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Dunraven and frequent explosions of ammunition took 
 place. 
 
 The submarine then came to the surface right astern 
 where no guns could bear on her, and recommenced her 
 shellfire on the ship, hitting her frequently. During this 
 period the officers and men still remaining on board 
 gave no sign of their presence, Captain Campbell, by 
 his example, imbuing this remnant of his splendid ship's 
 company with his own indomitable spirit of endurance. 
 The submarine submerged again soon afterwards, and 
 as she passed the ship Captain Campbell from his sub- 
 merged tube fired a torpedo at her, which just missed. 
 Probably the range was too short to allow the torpedo to 
 gain its correct depth. She went right round the ship, 
 and a second torpedo was fired from the other tube, which 
 again missed. This torpedo was evidently seen from the 
 submarine, as she submerged at once. The ship was 
 sinking, and it was obviously of no use to continue the 
 deception, which could only lead to a useless sacrifice of 
 life; wireless signals for assistance were therefore made, 
 and the arrival of some destroyers brought the action to a 
 conclusion. The wounded were transferred to the 
 destroyers and the ship taken in tow, but she sank whilst 
 in tow forty-eight hours later. 
 
 This action was perhaps the finest feat amongst the 
 very many gallant deeds performed by decoy ships 
 during the war. It displayed to the full the qualities of 
 grim determination, gallantry, patience and resource, 
 the splendid training and high standard of discipline, 
 which were necessary to success in this form of warfare. 
 Lieutenant Charles G. Bonner, R.N.R., and Petty-Officer 
 Ernest Pitcher, R.N., were awarded the V.C. for their 
 services in this action, and many medals for conspicuous 
 gallantry were also given to the splendid ship's company. 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 85 
 
 Captain Campbell, as will be readily realized, met 
 with great success in his work, and he was the first to 
 acknowledge how this success was due to those who 
 worked so magnificently under his command, and he 
 also realized the magnitude of the work performed by 
 other decoy ships in all areas, since he knew better than 
 most people the difficulties of enticing a submarine to 
 her doom. 
 
 On September 17, 1917, in position Lat. 49.42 N., 
 Long. 13.18 W., the decoy ship Stonecrop, a small 
 steamer commanded by Commander M. Blackwood, 
 R.N., armed with one 4-inch, one 6-pounder gun and 
 some stick-bomb throwers and carrying four torpedo tubes, 
 sighted a submarine, which opened fire on her at long 
 range, the fire being returned by the 6-pounder mounted 
 aft. After the shelling had continued for some time 
 the usual order was given to " abandon ship," and a 
 little later the periscope of the submarine was sighted 
 some distance away. The submarine gradually closed, 
 keeping submerged, until within about a quarter of a 
 mile, when she passed slowly round the ship, and finally 
 came to the surface at a distance of about 500 yards on 
 the starboard quarter. She did not close nearer, so the 
 order was given to open fire, and hitting started after 
 the third round had been fired and continued until the 
 submarine sank stern first. No survivors were picked 
 up, but all the indications pointed to the certainty of 
 the destruction of the submarine. 
 
 'Patrol Gunboats 
 
 Mention may here be made of another vessel of a special 
 class designed in 1917. In the early summer, in con- 
 sequence of the shortage of destroyers, of the delays in 
 the production of new ones, and the great need for more 
 
86 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 small craft suitable for escorting merchant ships through 
 the submarine zone, arrangements were made to build a 
 larger and faster class of trawler which would be suitable 
 for convoy work under favourable conditions, and which to 
 a certain extent would take the place of destroyers. 
 Trawlers could be built with much greater rapidity than 
 destroyers, and trawler builders who could not build 
 destroyers could be employed for the work, thus supple- 
 menting the activities of the yards which could turn out 
 the bigger craft. 
 
 Accordingly a 13-knot trawler was designed, and a 
 large number ordered. Great delays occurred, however, 
 in their construction, as in that of all other classes of 
 vessel owing to the pressure of various kinds of war work 
 and other causes, and only one was delivered during 1917 
 instead of the twenty or so which had been promised, whilst 
 I believe that by July, 1918, not more than fourteen had 
 been completed instead of the anticipated number of 
 forty. I was informed that they proved to be a most 
 useful type of vessel for the slower convoys, were excel- 
 lent sea boats, with a large radius of action, were a great 
 relief to the destroyers, and even to light cruisers, for 
 convoy work. It is understood that some fifty were 
 completed by the end of the war. 
 
 Net Protection for Merchant Ships 
 
 This idea originated in 1915 or 1916 with Captain 
 Edward C. Villiers, of the Actseon Torpedo School ship. 
 Experiments were carried out by a battleship at Rosyth, 
 in the first instance, and later at Scapa. They were at 
 that time unsuccessful. 
 
 At the end of 1916 I gave directions for a reconsidera- 
 tion of the matter, and fresh trials were made; 
 but early in 1917 there seemed to be no prospect of 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 87 
 
 success, and the trials were again abandoned. However, 
 Captain Villiers displayed great confidence in the idea, 
 and he introduced modifications, with the result that 
 later in the year 1917 directions were given for fresh 
 trials to be undertaken. At the end of the year success 
 was first obtained, and this was confirmed early in 1918, 
 and the device finally adopted. A curious experience 
 during the trials was that the vessel carrying them out 
 was actually fired at by a German submarine, with the 
 result that the net protection saved the ship from being 
 torpedoed. It is not often that an inventor receives such 
 a good advertisement. 
 
 Depth Charge Throwers 
 
 The first proposal for this device came from Ports- 
 mouth, where the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral the 
 Hon. Sir Stanley Colville, was indefatigable in his efforts 
 to combat the submarine ; throwers manufactured by 
 Messrs. Thorny croft, of Southampton, were tried and 
 gave good results. The arrangement was one by which 
 depth charges could be projected to a distance of 40 yards 
 from a vessel, and the throwers were usually fitted one 
 on each quarter so that the charges could be throwTi out 
 on the quarter whilst others were being dropped over 
 the stern, and the chances of damaging or sinking the 
 submarine attacked were thus greatly increased. 
 
 As soon as the earliest machines had been tried orders 
 were placed for large numbers and the supplies obtained 
 jvere as follows : 
 
 Deliveries commenced in July, 1917. 
 By September 1, 30 had been delivered. 
 By October 1, 97 had been delivered. 
 By December 1, 288 had been delivered. 
 
88 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Coastal Motor Boats 
 
 At the end of 1916 we possessed 13 fast coastal motor 
 boats, carrying torpedoes, and having a speed of some 
 86 knots. They had been built to carry out certain 
 operations in the Heligoland Bight, working from 
 Harwich, but the preliminary air reconnaissance which 
 it had been decided was necessary had not been effected 
 by the end of 1916 owing to bad weather and the lack 
 of suitable machines. 
 
 When winter set in it became impossible, with the 
 type of aircraft then existing, to carry out the intended 
 reconnaissance, and early in 1917 I abandoned the idea 
 of the operations for the winter and sent the boats to 
 the Dover Command for Sir R. Bacon to use from 
 Dunkirk in operations against enemy vessels operating 
 from Ostend and Zeebrugge. They quickly proved their 
 value, and it became evident that they would also be 
 useful for anti-submarine work. A large number were 
 ordered, some for anti-submarine work and some for cer- 
 tain contemplated operations in enemy waters, including a 
 night attack on the enemy's light cruisers known to 
 lie occasionally in the Ems River, an operation that it was 
 intended to carry out in the spring of 1918. A daylight 
 operation in this neighbourhood, which was carried out 
 during 1918, did not, from the published reports, meet 
 with success, the coastal motor boats being attacked by 
 aircraft, vessels against which they were defenceless. The 
 new boats were of an improved and larger type than the 
 original 40-feet boats. Delays occurred in construction 
 owing principally to the difficulty in obtaining engines 
 by reason of the great demand for engines for aircraft, 
 and but few of the new boats were delivered during the 
 year 1917. 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 89 
 
 Mining Operations 
 
 The policy which was carried out during 1917 in 
 this respect, so far as the supply of mines admitted, 
 aimed at preventing the exit of submarines from 
 enemy ports. Incidentally, the fact that we laid 
 large numbers of mines in the Heligoland Bight rendered 
 necessary such extensive sweeping operations before any 
 portion of the High Sea Fleet could put to sea as to 
 be very useful in giving us some indication of any move- 
 ment that might be intended. In view of the distance 
 of the Grand Fleet from German bases and the short 
 time available in which to intercept the High Sea Fleet 
 if it came out for such a purpose as a raid on our coasts, 
 or on convoys, the information thus gathered would have 
 proved of great value. 
 
 In planning mining operations in the Heligoland 
 Bight, it was necessary to take into consideration certain 
 facts. The first was the knowledge that the Germans 
 themselves had laid minefields in some portions of the 
 Bight, and it was necessary for our minelayers to give 
 such suspected areas a wide berth. Secondly , it was 
 obvious that we could not lay minefields in areas very near 
 those which we ourselves had already mined, since we 
 should run the risk of blowing up our own ships ;with our 
 own mines. 
 
 Mining operations had necessarily to be carried out 
 at night, and as there were no navigational aids in the 
 way of Hghts, etc., in the Heligoland Bight, the position 
 in which our mines were laid was never known vvdth 
 absolute accuracy. Consequently an area in which we 
 had directed mines to be laid, and to which a minelayer 
 had been sent, could not safely be approached within a 
 distance of some five miles on a subsequent occasion. 
 
go The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 The use in mining operations of the device known 
 as "taut ,wire" gear, introduced by Vice- Admiral 
 Sir Henry Ohver, was of great help in ensuring 
 accuracy in laying minefields and consequently in 
 reducing the danger distance surrounding our own 
 minefields. 
 
 As our mining operations increased in number we 
 were driven farther and farther out from the German 
 ports for subsequent operations. This naturally increased 
 the area to be mined as the Heligoland Bight is bell- 
 mouthed in shape, but it had the advantage of making 
 the operations of German minesweepers and mine- 
 bumpers more difficult and hazardous as they had to work 
 farther out, thus giving our light forces better chances 
 of catching them at work and engaging them. Such 
 actions as that on November 17, 1917, between our light 
 forces and the German light cruisers and minesweepers 
 were the result. We did not, of course, lay mines in 
 either the Danish or Dutch territorial waters, and these 
 waters consequently afforded an exit for German vessels 
 as our minefields became most distant from German 
 bases. 
 
 Broadly speaking, the policy was to lay mines 
 so thoroughly in the Heligoland Bight as to force 
 enemy submarines and other vessels to make their 
 exits along the Danish or Dutch coasts in territorial 
 waters. 
 
 At the end of the exit we stationed submarines to 
 signal enemy movements and to attack enemy vessels. 
 We knew, of course, that the enemy would sweep other 
 channels for his ships, but as soon as we discovered the 
 position of these channels, which was not a very difficult 
 matter, more mines were laid at the end. In order to 
 give neutrals fair warning, certain areas which included 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 91 
 
 the Heligoland Bight were proclaimed dangerous. In 
 this respect German and British methods may be con- 
 trasted : We never laid a minefield which could possibly 
 have been dangerous to neutrals without issuing a warning 
 stating that a certain area (which included the minefield) 
 was dangerous. The Germans never issued such a warning 
 unless the proclamation stating that half the Atlantic 
 Ocean, most of the North Sea, and nine-tenths of the 
 Mediterranean were dangerous could be considered as 
 such. It was also intended, as mines became available, 
 to lay more deep minefields in positions near our own 
 coast in which enemy submarines were known to work ; 
 these minefields would be safe for the passage of surface 
 vessels, but our patrol craft would force the submarines to 
 dive into them. This system to a certain extent had 
 already been in use during 1915 and 1916. 
 
 Schemes were also being devised by Admiral of the 
 Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, who devoted much of his time 
 to mining devices, by which mines some distance below 
 the surface would be exploded by an enemy submarine 
 even if navigating on the surface. 
 
 Such was the policy. Its execution was difficult. 
 
 The first difficulty lay in the fact that we did not 
 possess a thoroughly satisfactory mine. A percentage only 
 of our mines exploded when hit by a submarine, and they 
 failed sometimes to take up their intended depth when 
 laid, betraying their presence by appearing on the 
 surface. 
 
 Energetic measures were adopted to overcome this 
 latter defect, but it took time and but few mines were 
 available for laying in the early months of 1917. 
 
 The result of our minelaying efforts is shown in the 
 following table : 
 
92 
 
 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Year. 
 
 1915 
 
 1916 
 
 First quarter of 1917 
 Second ,, ,, 
 
 Third 
 
 Mines laid 
 in the Heligoland 
 Bight. 
 
 . 4,498 
 
 . 1,679 
 
 4,865 
 
 6,386 
 
 3,510 
 
 Deep mines laid 
 
 off our own coasts 
 
 to catch submarines. 
 
 983 
 2,573 
 
 13,843 
 
 In the Straits of Dover, Thames Estuary and off the 
 Belgian coast we laid 2,664 mines in 1914, 6,337 in 1915, 
 9,685 in 1916, and 4,669 in the first three quarters of 1917. 
 
 These last mines were laid as fast as the alterations, 
 made with a view to increasing their efficiency, could be 
 carried out. 
 
 During the early part of the year 1917 the new pattern 
 of mine, known as the ** H " Type, evolved in 1916, had 
 been tried, and although not perfectly satisfactory at the 
 first trials, the success was sufficient to warrant the placing 
 of orders for 100,000 mines and in making arrangements 
 for the quickest possible manufacture. This was done 
 by the Director of Torpedoes and Mines, Rear-Admiral 
 the Hon. Edward Fitzherbert, under the direction of the 
 then Fourth Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey. 
 
 Deliveries commenced in the summer of 1917, but by 
 the end of September only a little over 1,500 were ready 
 for laying. Some 500 of these were laid in September 
 in the Heligoland Bight and were immediately successful 
 against enemy submarines. More were laid in the Bight 
 during October, November and December, and the re- 
 mainder, as they were produced, were prepared for laying 
 in the new minefield in the Straits of Dover. In the 
 fourth quarter of the year a total of 10,389 mines was 
 laid in the Heligoland Bight and in the Straits of Dover. 
 
 During this last quarter delivery of " H " pattern 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 93 
 
 mines was as follows : In October 2,350, November 5,800, 
 December 4,800; total 12,450. So that it will be seen 
 that the mines were laid as fast as delivery was made. 
 
 The great increase in projected minelaying operations 
 during the year 1917 made it necessary also to add con- 
 siderably to the number of minelaying vessels. 
 
 In January, 1917, the only vessels equipped for this 
 service were four merchant ships and the Flotilla Leader 
 Abdielf with a total minelaying capacity of some 1,200 
 mines per trip. It was not advisable to carry out mine- 
 laying operations in enemy waters during the period near 
 full moon owing to the laibility of the minelayers bein^ 
 seen by patrol craft. Under such conditions the position 
 of the minefield would be known to the enemy. As the 
 operation of placing the mines on board occupied several 
 days, it was not possible to depend on an average of more 
 than three operations per ship per month from the larger 
 minelayers. Consequently, with the intended policy in 
 view, it was obvious that more minelayers must be 
 provided. 
 
 It was inadvisable to use merchant ships, since every 
 vessel was urgently required for trade or transport pur- 
 poses, and the alternative was to fit men-of-war for 
 minelaying. The only old vessels of this type suitable for 
 mining in enemy waters were ships of the " Ariadne '* 
 class, and although their machinery was not too reliable, 
 two of these vessels that were seaworthy were converted 
 to minelaj^ers. In addition a number of the older light 
 cruisers were fitted with portable rails on which mines 
 could be carried when minelaying operations were con- 
 templated, in place of a portion of the armament which 
 could be removed ; a flotilla of destroyers, with some fur- 
 ther flotilla leaders, were also fitted out as minelayers, and 
 several additional submarines were fitted for this purpose. 
 
94 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 For a projected special scheme of minelaying in 
 enemy waters a number of lighters were ordered, and 
 some of the motor launches and coastal motor boats 
 were fitted out and utilized for mining operations on the 
 Belgian coast towards the end of 1917. 
 
 By the end of that year 12 Hght cruisers, 12 destroyers 
 and flotilla leaders and 5 submarines had been fitted for 
 minelaying. Two old cruisers had been added to the 
 minelaying fleet and several other vessels were in hand 
 for the same purpose. The detailed plans of the arrange- 
 ments were prepared and the work of fitting out mine- 
 layers carried out under the supervision of Admiral R. N. 
 Ommanney, C.B., whose services in this matter were of 
 great value. The rapidity with which ships were 
 added to the minelaying fleet was largely due to his 
 efforts. 
 
 On the entry of the United States of America into 
 the war a further development of mining policy became 
 feasible. The immense manufacturing resources of the 
 United States rendered a large production of mines an 
 easy matter, with the result that as soon as the United 
 States Navy produced a reliable type of mine the idea of 
 placing a mine barrage across the northern part of the 
 North Sea which had been previously discussed became 
 a matter of practical politics. With this end in view a still 
 further addition to the minelaying fleet became necessary, 
 and since the mining would be carried out at leisure in 
 this case and speed was no great necessity for the mine- 
 layer owing to the distance of the minefields from enemy 
 waters, an old battleship was put in hand for conversion. 
 
 With the enormous increase in the number of mines 
 on order the problem of storage became of importance, 
 including as it did the storage of the very large number, 
 some 120,000, required for the northern barrage. 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 95 
 
 The Third Sea Lord, Admiral Lionel Halsey, took 
 this matter in hand with characteristic energy, and in 
 conjunction with United States naval officers made all the 
 necessary arrangements. 
 
 The United States mines were stored in the vicinity 
 of Invergordon, and the British mines intended for use 
 in the northern barrage were located at Grangemouth, 
 near Leith, where Rear- Admiral Clinton Baker was in 
 charge, as well as in other places, whilst those for use in 
 the Heligoland Bight and Channel waters were stored at 
 Immingham and other southern depots. 
 
 The laying of the North Sea mine barrage was not 
 accomplished without very considerable delay, and many 
 difficulties were encountered. It was originally antici- 
 pated that the barrage would be completed in the spring 
 of 1918, but owing to various defects in both British 
 and United States mines which made themselves apparent 
 when the operations commenced, due partly to the great 
 depth of water as well as to other causes, a delay of 
 several months took place; and, even when near com- 
 pletion, the barrage was not so effective as many had hoped 
 in spite of the great expenditure of labour and material 
 involved. I have not the figures of the number of sub- 
 marines that the barrage is thought to have accounted for, 
 but it was known to be disappointing. 
 
 Flares 
 
 In the late summer of 1917 flares were experimented 
 with; they were intended to be used from kite balloons 
 with the object of sighting submarines when on the surface 
 at night. Previously searchlights in destroyers had been 
 used for this purpose. The flares were not much used, 
 however, from kite balloons omng to lack of opportunitj, 
 but trials which were carried out with flares from patrol 
 
96 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 craft, such as trawlers and drifters, demonstrated that they 
 would be of value from these vessels, and when the 
 Folkestone-Grisnez minefield was laid in November and 
 December, 1917, it was apparent that the flares would be 
 of use in forcing submarines to dive at night into the 
 minefield to escape detection on the surface and attack by 
 gunfire. 
 
 Manufacture on a large scale .was therefore com- 
 menced, and during 1918 the flares were in constant use 
 across the Straits of Dover. 
 
 Electrical Submarine Detector 
 
 The existence of this very valuable device was due to 
 the work of certain distinguished scientists, and experi- 
 ments were carried out during 1917. It was brought to 
 perfection in the late autumn, and orders were given to 
 fit it in certain localities. Some difl^iculty was experienced 
 in obtaining the necessary material, but the work was well 
 in hand by the end of the year, and quickly proved its 
 value. 
 
 Submarine Against Submarine 
 
 Prior to the year 1917 the only areas in which our 
 own submarines operated against enemy vessels of the 
 same type was in the North Sea, or occasionally in the 
 vicinity of the Hebrides. Grand Fleet submarines were 
 used in the northern areas during 1916, and Harwich 
 submarines operated farther south, but the number of 
 underwater craft available was insufficient for any ex- 
 tended method of attack. Early in 1917, when our 
 mercantile losses were very heavy, some submarines were 
 withdrawn from the Harwich and Humber districts and 
 formed into a flotilla off the coast of Ireland for this form 
 of operation. Some risk had to be accepted in thus re- 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 97 
 
 ducing our submarine strength in southern waters. At 
 the same time some Grand Fleet submarines were 
 organized into a watching patrol in the area off the 
 Shetland Islands, through which enemy submarines were 
 expected to pass. The watch off the Horn Reef and in the 
 Heligoland Bight, which had previously been in force, 
 was also maintained. 
 
 A little later the submarine flotilla off the Irish coast 
 was strengthened, and a regular patrol instituted near 
 the North Channel between Ireland and Scotland. The 
 next step was the withdrawal of some " C " Class sub- 
 marines from coastal work on our east coast to work in 
 the area between England and Holland near the North 
 Hinder Lightship, a locality much frequented by enemy 
 submarines on passage. Still later some submarines were 
 attached to the Portsmouth Command, where, working 
 under Sir Stanley Colville, they had some striking suc- 
 cesses ; others went to the Dover Command. The latter 
 were fitted mth oeculting lights on top of the conning- 
 tower, and were moored at night to buoys in the Dover 
 Net Barrage, in places where enemy submarines were 
 likely to pass, in order that they might have a chance of 
 torpedoing them. A division of submarines was also sent 
 to Gibraltar, to operate against enemy cruiser submarines 
 working in that vicinity or near the Canaries. Successes 
 against enemy submarines were also obtained in the latter 
 locality. 
 
 Finally, the arrival of some United States submarines 
 enabled the areas in which this form of attack was in 
 force to be still further extended, after the American per- 
 sonnel had been trained to this form of warfare. There was 
 a great increase in the number of enemy submarines 
 sunk by this method of attack during 1917 as compared 
 with previous years; the number of vessels sunk does 
 
 H 
 
98 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 not, however, convey a complete appreciation of the 
 effect of this form of anti-submarine warfare. The great 
 value of it lay in the feeling of insecurity that it bred 
 in the minds of the enemy submarine commanders. The 
 moral effect of the constant apprehension that one is 
 being " stalked" is considerable. Indeed, the combina- 
 tion of our aircraft and our submarine patrols led to our 
 vessels reporting, regretfully, that it was very seldom that 
 German submarines were found on the surface in day- 
 light, and towards the end of 1917 quite a large pro- 
 portion of the attacks on merchant ships took place at 
 night. 
 
 The work for our own vessels was very arduous indeed. 
 It was only on rare occasions that it was possible to 
 bring off a successful attack on a submarine that had 
 been sighted, the low underwater speed of submarines 
 making it difficult to get into position when the enemy 
 was only sighted at short range, which was naturally 
 usually the case. 
 
 In order to obviate this difficulty directions were given 
 in 1917 to design a special type of submarine for this form 
 of warfare, and I believe that the first vessel was completed 
 by the autumn of 1918. 
 
 This account of the development of anti-submarine 
 measures during 1917 would not be complete without 
 mention of the work of the Trade Division of the Staff, 
 of which Captain Richard Webb, C.B., was the Director 
 until September. 
 
 This Division was either partly or wholly responsible 
 for : 
 
 (1) The great increase in the rapidity of placing 
 the armaments on board merchant ships. 
 
 (2) The establishment of schools of instruction 
 for captains and officers of the Mercantile Marine. 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations 99 
 
 This training scheme was begun at Chatham Bar- 
 racks in February, 1917, by Commander E. L. B. 
 Lockyer, acting under Captain Webb, and later was 
 extended to Portsmouth, Cardiff and Greenock. Its 
 success was so marked, and its benefit in assisting 
 officers to handle their ships in the manner best calcu- 
 lated to save them from submarine attack so great, 
 that the Admiralty was continually being pressed by 
 shipowners and by the officers of the Mercantile 
 Marine to extend the instruction to more and more 
 ports. This was done so far as possible, our principal 
 difficulty being to provide officers capable of giving 
 the instruction required. 
 
 (8) The provision of wireless plant and operators 
 to the Mercantile Marine. This was another matter 
 taken up with energy during 1917, and with excellent 
 
 results. 
 
 (4) The drilling of guns crews for the merchant 
 ships. Men were invited to go through a course 
 of drill, and large numbers responded and were 
 instructed at the Royal Naval Depot at the Crystal 
 Palace. 
 
 All these matters were additional to the important 
 work upon which the Trade Division was constantly 
 employed, which included all blockade questions, the 
 routeing of merchant ships, examination of ships, etc. 
 
 In addition to the instructional anti-submarine course 
 for masters and officers, gunnery courses for cadets and 
 apprentices were started at Portsmouth, Chatham and 
 Devonport. A system of visits to ships by officer in- 
 structors for the purpose of affording instruction and for 
 inspection, as well as for the purpose of lecturing, was 
 instituted, and arrangements were made for giving in- 
 
rob The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 struction in signalling. Some idea of the work carried 
 out will be gathered from the following figures showing 
 the instructional work carried out during the year 1917 : 
 
 Masters 1,929 
 
 Officers 2,149 
 
 Number of cadets and apprentices 
 
 passed through the gunnery course 543 
 
 Number of merchant seamen trained 
 
 in gunnery at the Crystal Palace . . . 3,964 
 
 Number of ships visited by officer 
 
 instructors ... ... ... 6,927 
 
 Numbers attending these lectures : 
 
 Masters 1,361 
 
 Officers 5,921 
 
 Number of officers and men instructed 
 
 in signalling 10,487 
 
 The keenness shown by officers and men of the mer- 
 chant service contributed in a marked degree to the success 
 of the courses instituted ; just one example may be given. 
 I visited the Royal Naval Depot at the Crystal Palace 
 early in 1918, and amongst other most interesting scenes 
 witnessed a large number of men of the merchant ser- 
 vice at gun drill. I questioned several of them as to their 
 experiences, and many of the men had had their ships 
 torpedoed under them three, four or five times. Amongst 
 the gun crews was a steward who had been through this 
 experience four times. On my asking why he, as a 
 steward, should be going through the gunnery course, he 
 replied that he hoped that by so doing he might stand 
 a chance of getting his own back by assisting to sink a 
 submarine. 
 
 The knowledge which I possessed of the measures in- 
 
Anti-Submarine Operations loi 
 
 troduced during the year 1917 to combat the German 
 submarine warfare, and the continual increase in the 
 efficiency of the anti-submarine work which I knew would 
 result from increased production of anti-submarine 
 vessels and weapons, led me in February, 1918, to state 
 that in my opinion the submarine menace would be "held" 
 by the autumn of the year 1918. The remark, which 
 was made at what I understood to be a private gathering, 
 was given very wide publicity, and was criticized at the 
 time, but it was fulfilled, as the figures will indicate. 
 
 As a matter of interest relative to this chapter, a small 
 chart (C) is included in the pocket at the end ; it shows the 
 barred zone declared by the Germans as the area in which 
 all ships would be sunk without warning. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM 
 
 The question of the introduction of convoys for the 
 protection of merchant ships was under consideration at 
 various times during the war. The system had been 
 employed during the old wars and had proved its value 
 in the case of attack by vessels on the surface, and it was 
 natural that thoughts should be directed towards its re- 
 introduction when the submarine campaign developed. 
 There is one inherent disadvantage in this system 
 which cannot be overcome, although it can be mitigated 
 by careful organization, viz. the delay involved. Delay 
 means, of course, a loss of carrying power, and when ton- 
 nage is already short any proposal which must reduce its 
 efficiency has to be very carefully examined. The delay 
 of the convoy system is due to two causes, (a) because the 
 speed of the convoy must necessarily be fixed by the speed 
 of the slowest ship, and (h) the fact that the arrival of a 
 large number of ships at one time may cause congestion 
 and consequent delay at the port of unloading. However, 
 if additional safety is given there is compensation for this 
 delay when the risk is great. One danger of a convoy 
 system under modern conditions should be mentioned, 
 viz. the increased risk from attack by mines. If ships 
 are sailing singly a minefield will in all probability sink 
 only one vessel — the first ship entering it. The fate of 
 that ship reveals the presence of the field, and with 
 adequate organization it is improbable that other vessels 
 will be sunk in the same field. In the case of a convoy 
 
 102 
 
The Introduction of the Convoy System 103 
 
 encountering a minefield, as in the case of a fleet, several 
 ships may be sunk practically simultaneously. 
 
 During the year 1916, whilst I was still in command 
 of the Grand Fleet, suggestions as to convoys had been 
 forwarded to the Admiralty for the better protection of 
 the ocean trade against attack by surface vessels ; but it 
 was pointed out to me that the number of cruisers avail- 
 able for escort work was entirely insufficient, and that, 
 consequently, the suggestions could not be adopted. This 
 objection was one that could only be overcome by remov- 
 ing some of the faster merchant ships from the trade 
 routes and arming them. To this course there was the 
 objection that we were already — that is before the inten- 
 sive campaign began — very short of shipping. 
 
 Shortly after my taking up the post of First Sea Lord at 
 the Admiralty, at the end of 1916, the question was 
 discussed once more. At that time the danger of attack 
 by enemy raiders on shipping in the North Atlantic was 
 small; the protection needed was against attack by 
 submarines, and the dangerous area commenced some 
 300-400 miles from the British Islands. It was known 
 that unrestricted submarine warfare was about to com- 
 mence, and that this would mean that shipping would 
 usually be subjected to torpedo attack from submarines 
 when in a submerged condition. Against this form of 
 attack the gun armament of cruisers or armed merchant 
 ships was practically useless, and, however powerfully 
 armed, ships of this type were themselves in peril of being 
 torpedoed. Small vessels of shallow draught, possessing 
 high speed, offered the only practicable form of protec- 
 tion. Shallow draught was necessary in order that the 
 protecting vessels should themselves be comparatively 
 immune from successful torpedo fire, and speed was essen- 
 tial for offensive operations against the submarines. 
 
104 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Convoy sailing was, as has been stated, the recognized 
 method of trade protection in the old wars, and this 
 was a strong argument in favour of its adoption in 
 the late war. It should, however, be clearly understood 
 that the conditions had entirely changed. Convoy sailing 
 for the protection of merchant ships against torpedo 
 attack by submarines was quite a different matter from 
 such a system as a preventive against attack by surface 
 vessels and involved far greater difficulties. In the days of 
 sailing ships especially, accurate station keeping was not 
 very necessary, and the ships comprising the convoy sailed 
 in loose order and covered a considerable area of water. 
 On a strange vessel, also a sailing vessel, being sighted, 
 the protecting frigate or frigates would proceed to investi- 
 gate her character, whilst the ships composing the convoy 
 closed in towards one another or steered a course that 
 would take them out of danger. 
 
 In the circumstances with which we were dealing in 
 1917 the requirements were quite otherwise. It was 
 essential for the protection of the convoy that the ships 
 should keep close and accurate station and should be 
 able to manoeuvre by signal. Close station was enjoined 
 by the necessity of reducing the area covered by the con- 
 voy ; accurate station was required to ensure safety from 
 collision and freedom of manoeuvre. It will be realized 
 that a convoy comprising twenty to thirty vessels occupies 
 considerable space, even when steaming in the usual 
 formation of four, five or six columns. Since the number 
 of destroyers or sloops that could be provided for screen- 
 ing the convoy from torpedo attack by submarines was 
 bound to be very limited under any conditions, it was 
 essential that the columns of ships should be as short as 
 possible ; in other words, that the ships should follow one 
 another at close intervals, so that the destroyers on each 
 
The Introduction of the Convoy System 105 
 
 side of the convoy should be able as far as possible tc 
 guard it from attack by submarines working from the 
 flank, and that they should be able with great rapidity 
 to counter-attack a submarine with depth chaises should a 
 periscope be sighted for a brief moment above the surface, 
 or the track of a torpedo be seen. In fact, it was neces- 
 sary, if the protection of a convoy was to be real protec- 
 tion, that the ships composing the convoy should be 
 handled in a manner that approached the handling of 
 battleships in a squadron. The diagram on p. 107 shows 
 an ideal convoy with six destroyers protecting it, disposed 
 in the manner ordered at the start of the convoy system. 
 
 How far this ideal was attainable was a matter of 
 doubt. Prior to 1917 our experience of merchant ships 
 sailing in company had been confined to troop transports. 
 These vessels were well officered and well manned, carried 
 experienced engine-room staffs, were capable of attaining 
 moderate speeds, and were generally not comparable to 
 ordinary cargo vessels, many of which were of very slow 
 speed, and possessed a large proportion of officers and men 
 of limited sea experience, owing to the very considerable 
 personnel of the Mercantile Marine which had joined the 
 Royal Naval Reserve and was serving in the Fleet or in 
 patrol craft. Moreover, even the troop transports had not 
 crossed the submarine zone in company, but had been 
 escorted independently ; and many naval officers who had 
 been in charge of convoys, when questioned, were not 
 convinced that sailing in convoy under the conditions 
 mentioned above was a feasible proposition, nor, more- 
 over, were the masters of the transports. 
 
 In February, 1917, in order to investigate this aspect 
 of the question, a conference took place between the 
 Naval Staff and the masters of cargo steamers which 
 were lying in the London docks. The masters were 
 
io6 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 asked their opinion as to how far their ships could be 
 depended on to keep station in a convoy of 12 to 20 
 vessels. They expressed a unanimous opinion that it 
 was not practicable to keep station under the conditions 
 mentioned, the difficulty being due to two causes : (1) 
 the inexperience of their deck officers owing to so many 
 of them having been taken for the Royal Naval Reserve, 
 and (2) the inexperience of their engineers, combined 
 with the impossibility of obtaining delicate adjustments 
 of speed by reason of the absence of suitable engine-room 
 telegraphs and the poor quality of much of the coal used. 
 When pressed as to the greatest number of ships that 
 could be expected to manoeuvre together in safety, the 
 masters of these cargo steamers, all experienced seamen, 
 gave it as their opinion that two or possibly three 
 was the maximum number. The opinions thus expressed 
 were confirmed later by other masters of merchant 
 ships who were consulted on the subject. It is to 
 the eternal credit of the British Merchant Marine, which 
 rendered service of absolutely inestimable value to the 
 Empire throughout the war, that when put to the test 
 by the adoption of the convoy system, officers and men 
 proved that they could achieve far more than they them- 
 selves had considered possible. At the same time it should 
 be recognized how severe a strain was imposed on officers, 
 particularly the masters, of vessels sailing in convoy. 
 
 The matter was kept constantly under review. In 
 February, 1917, the Germans commenced unrestricted 
 submarine warfare against merchant ships of all nation- 
 alities, and as a consequence our shipping losses, as well 
 as those of Allied and neutral countries, began to 
 mount steadily each succeeding month. The effect of 
 this new phase of submarine warfare is best illustrated 
 by a few figures. 
 
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The Introduction of the Convoy System 109 
 
 During the last four months of 1916 the gross tonnage 
 lost by submarine attack alone gave the following monthly 
 average: British, 121,500; Allies, 59,500; neutrals, 
 87,500; total, 268,500. 
 
 In the first four months of 1917 the figures became, 
 in round numbers : 
 
 
 British. 
 
 Allies. 
 
 Neutrals. 
 
 Total. 
 
 January . 
 
 104,000 
 
 62,000 
 
 116,000 
 
 282,000 
 
 February . 
 
 256,000 
 
 77,000 
 
 131,000 
 
 464,000 
 
 March 
 
 283,000 
 
 74,000 
 
 149,000 
 
 506,000 
 
 April * . . . 
 
 ... 513,000 
 
 133,000 
 
 185,000 
 
 831,000 
 
 NOTE.- 
 
 —In neither case is the loss of fishin 
 
 g craft included. 
 
 It will be realized that, since the losses towards the end 
 of 1916 were such as to give just cause for considerable 
 anxiety, the later figures made it clear that some method 
 of counteracting the submarines must be found and found 
 quickly if the Allied cause was to be saved from disasterr 
 
 None of the anti-submarine measures that had been 
 under consideration or trial since the formation of the 
 Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff in December, 
 1916, could hy any possibility mature for some months, 
 since time was necessary for the production of vessels and 
 more or less complicated materiel, and in these circum- 
 stances the only step that could be taken was that of 
 giving a trial to the convoy system for the ocean trade, 
 although the time was by no means yet ripe for effective 
 use of the system, by reason of the shortage of destroj^ers, 
 sloops and cruisers, which was still most acute, although 
 the situation was improving slowly month by month as 
 new vessels were completed. 
 
 Prior to this date we had already had some experience 
 of convoys as a protection against submarine attack. The 
 coal trade of France had been brought under convoy in 
 
 * The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917. 
 
no The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 March, 1917. The trade between Scandinavia and North 
 Sea ports was also organized in convoys in April of the 
 same year, this trade having since December, 1916, been 
 carried out on a system of "protected sailings." It is 
 true that these convoys were always very much scattered, 
 particularly the Scandinavian convoy, which was composed 
 largely of neutral vessels and therefore presented excep- 
 tional difficulties in the matter of organization and 
 handling. The number of destroyers which could be 
 spared for screening the convoys was also very small. 
 The protection afforded was therefore more apparent 
 than real, but even so the results had been very good in 
 reducing the losses by submarine attack. The protection 
 of the vessels employed in the French coal trade was 
 entrusted very largely to trawlers, as the ships composing 
 the convoy were mostly slow, so that in this case more 
 screening vessels were available, although they were not 
 so efficient, being themselves of slow speed. 
 
 For the introduction of a system of convoy which 
 would protect merchant ships as far as their port of 
 discharge in the United Kingdom, there were two re- 
 quirements : (a) A sufficient number of convoying cruisers 
 or armed merchant ships, whose role would be that of 
 bringing the ships comprising the convoy to some selected 
 rendezvous outside the zone of submarine activity, where 
 it would be met by the flotilla of small vessels which would 
 protect the convoy through the submarine area. It was 
 essential that the ships of the convoy should arrive at this 
 rendezvous as an organized unit, well practised in station- 
 keeping by day, and at night, with the ships darkened, 
 and that the vessels should be capable also of zigzagging 
 together and of carrying out such necessary movements as 
 alterations of course, etc. ; otherwise the convoy could not 
 be safely escorted through the danger area, (b) The 
 
The Introduction of the Convoy System iii 
 
 other essential was the presence of the escorting flotilla in 
 sufficient strength. 
 
 It has been mentioned that there was an insufficient 
 number of vessels available for use as convoying cruisers. 
 It was estimated that about fifty cruisers or armed 
 merchant ships would be required for this service if the 
 homeward-bound trade to the British Isles alone was con- 
 sidered. An additional twelve vessels would be necessary 
 to deal with the outward-bound trade. At the time only 
 eighteen vessels were available, and these could only be 
 obtained by denuding the North Atlantic entirely of 
 cruisers. 
 
 The situation in regard to destroyers or other fast 
 vessels presented equal difficulties. Early in February, 
 1917, we had available for general convoy or patrol work 
 only fourteen destroyers stationed at Devonport and 
 twelve sloops at Queenstown, and owing to repairs and 
 the necessity of resting officers and men periodically, only 
 a proportion of these were available at any one time. 
 A number of these vessels were required to escort troop 
 transports through the submarine danger zone. During 
 the month of February six sloops were diverted from their 
 proper work of minesweeping in the North Sea and added 
 to the patrol force at Queenstown, and eight destroyers 
 were taken from the Grand Fleet and sent to southern 
 waters for patrol and escort duty. There were obvious 
 objections to this weakening of the North Sea forces, but it 
 was necessary in the circumstances to ignore them. 
 
 This total of forty destroyers and sloops represented 
 the whole available force at the end of February. Simul- 
 taneously a careful investigation showed that for the 
 institution of a system of convoy and escort for homeward- 
 bound Atlantic trade alone to the United Kingdom, our 
 requirements would be eighty-one destroyers or sloops and 
 
112 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 forty-eight trawlers (the latter vessels being only suitable 
 for escorting the slow 6-7-knot ships of the trade from 
 Gibraltar to the United Kingdom). For the outward 
 Atlantic trade from the United Kingdom our estimated re- 
 quirements were forty-four additional destroyers or sloops. 
 The deficiency in suitable vessels of this class is best 
 shown by the following table, which reveals the destroyer 
 position at different periods during the year 1917 : 
 
 
 g 
 ';5 
 
 o 
 
 fen 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
 a 
 
 i 
 
 ■2 
 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 S 
 a 
 
 hi 
 
 
 co5 
 
 c 
 c 
 a 
 -a 
 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 
 a 
 a 
 05 
 
 a 
 2 
 
 a 
 
 <a 
 
 a 
 
 s 
 
 a 
 a 
 
 a 
 1 
 
 January. 
 Flotilla Leaders . 
 
 Modern destroyers 
 
 Destroyers of River class 
 and earlier construction 
 
 P boats 
 
 10 
 97* 
 
 2 
 45 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 18 
 
 11 
 
 5 
 
 14 
 6 
 
 13 
 
 16 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 10 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 15 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 8 
 
 June. 
 Flotilla Leaders . 
 
 Modern destroyers 
 
 Destroyers of River class 
 and earlier construction 
 
 P boats 
 
 10 
 95* 
 
 3 
 23 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 29 
 
 10 
 6 
 
 38 
 5 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 8 
 
 7 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 29 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 32t 
 
 5 
 
 29 
 8 
 
 November. 
 Flotilla Leaders . 
 
 Modern destroyers 
 
 Destroyers of River class 
 and earlier construction 
 
 P boats 
 
 11 
 
 101* 
 
 4 
 
 24 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 26 
 
 10 
 6 
 
 37 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 8 
 31 
 
 12 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 30 
 1 
 
 
 11 
 
 4 
 
 29 
 
 35t 
 
 10 
 
 32 
 8 
 
 * Includes destroyers detached for protection work in other commands, 
 t Includes United States destroyers. 
 
The Introduction of the Convoy System 113 
 
 There was the possible alternative of bringing only a 
 small portion of the trade under convoy by taking all 
 the available fast small craft from patrol duty and utilizing 
 them to escort this portion of the trade, but it was felt 
 that as this would leave the whole of the remaining trade 
 entirely without protection, and no fast patrol craft 
 would be on the trade routes to pick up the crews of any 
 merchant ships that might be sunk by submarines, the step 
 ,was not justified. 
 
 The next point for consideration was the possibility 
 of obtaining destroyers or sloops from other sources with 
 which to increase the forces for trade protection. The 
 only commands on which it was possible to draw further 
 were the Grand Fleet, the Harwich and Dover forces, 
 the destroyers of old types working on the East Coast, or 
 the destroyers and "P" boats protecting our cross- 
 Channel communications west of the Dover Command. 
 
 It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or 
 Dover flotillas materially, as we were already running 
 the gravest risks from the inadequacy of these forces to 
 deal with enemy destroyers and submarines operating in 
 southern waters from Zeebrugge or from German ports, 
 and in addition the Harwich Force furnished the sole 
 protection for the weekly convoy running between the 
 Thames and Dutch ports, besides being much required 
 for reconnaissance and offensive operations in the Heligo- 
 land Bight so far as it could be spared for this purpose. 
 However, the emergency was such that destroyers 
 were taken from Harwich, as the force obtained new 
 vessels of a faster and more powerful type. The destroyers 
 on the East Coast and in the Portsmouth Command were 
 already inadequate to afford proper protection to the trade 
 and the cross-Channel communications, as evidenced by 
 our losses. Here again, however, in order to meet the 
 
114 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 very serious situation, some destroyers were eventually 
 transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at the 
 expense of still less protection and fewer opportunities 
 for offensive action against submarines. There remained 
 only the Grand Fleet destroyers on which we could draw 
 yet further. It had always been held that the Grand 
 Fleet required a total force of one hundred destroyers 
 and ten flotilla leaders for the double purpose of 
 screening the ships from submarine attack when at sea 
 and of countering the enemy's destroyers and attacking 
 his heavy ships with torpedo fire in a fleet action. We 
 had gradually built the destroyer force of the Grand Fleet 
 up to this figure by the early spring of 1917, although, 
 of course, it fell far short of requirements in earlier months. 
 It was well known to us that the High Sea Fleet would 
 be accompanied by at least eight flotillas, or eighty-eight 
 destroyers, when proceeding to sea at its selected 
 moment, and it was quite probable that the number 
 might be much higher, as many more vessels were 
 available. At our average moment, even with a nominal 
 force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders, 
 we could not expect that more than seventy destroyers 
 and eight leaders would be present with the Fleet, since, 
 in addition to those absent refitting, a considerable 
 number were always engaged on trade protection or anti- 
 submarine work in northern waters which could not join 
 up in time to accompany the Fleet to sea. When the 
 Scandinavian convoy was started in April, 1917, one 
 flotilla leader and six destroyers from the Grand Fleet 
 M^ere used for its protection ; other vessels in northern 
 waters also depended on Grand Fleet destroyers for 
 protection. Any further transference, therefore, of 
 destroyers from the Grand Fleet to southern waters for 
 trade protection was a highly dangerous expedient, involv- 
 
The Introduction of the Convoy System 115 
 
 ing increased risk from submarine attack on the heavy 
 ships in the event of the Fleet proceeding to sea, as well as 
 disadvantages in a Fleet action. The necessity, however, 
 was so great that the risk had to be faced, and for some 
 months of 1917 from eight to twelve Grand Fleet 
 destroyers were used for trade protection in the Atlantic, 
 principally from Irish ports, in addition to those protecting 
 trade in the North Sea. 
 
 It is interesting to note the number of persons who 
 claim to have been the first to urge the Admiralty to 
 adopt convoys as a method of protecting merchant ships 
 against submarine attack. The claimants for this dis- 
 tinction are not confined to Great Britain ; the great 
 majority of them are people without any knowledge of 
 the sea and naval matters, certainly none of them pos- 
 sessed any knowledge of the number of vessels needed 
 to afford protection to the ships under convoy, nor of the 
 vessels which we could produce for the purpose at the 
 time. 
 
 Possibly the facts related above may serve to show 
 that convoys were commenced by Admiralty direction, 
 and that they were started as soon as and extended 
 as rapidly as the necessary protecting vessels could be 
 provided. Those who argued then, or who have argued 
 since, that we should have reduced the number of 
 destroyers with the Grand Fleet will not, I think, meet 
 with any support from those who served in that Fleet, 
 especially from the officers upon whom lay the responsi- 
 bility for countering any move of the High Sea Fleet. 
 
 The entry of the United States into the war early 
 in April eased the situation somewhat. First it was hoped 
 that the United States Navy would assist us with de- 
 stroyers and other small craft, and secondly it was a fact 
 that the great majority of the material imported into 
 
ii6 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 countries contiguous to Germany came from the United 
 States. There was reason to anticipate that steps would be 
 taken by the United States authorities in the direction of 
 some form of rationing of these countries, and in these 
 circumstances it was justifiable to reduce gradually the 
 strength of our blockading squadron of armed merchant 
 vessels known as the 10th Cruiser Squadron. By this 
 means we could at once provide additional vessels to act 
 as convoying cruisers. 
 
 Vice-Admiral W. S. Sims had arrived in this country 
 in March, 1917, after passing through an exciting experi- 
 ence, the ship in which he crossed (the United States 
 steamer St. Louis) being mined outside Liverpool. He 
 came to visit me at the Admiralty immediately after his 
 arrival in London, and from that day until I left the 
 Admiralty at the end of the year it was my privilege and 
 pleasure to work in the very closest co-operation with him. 
 My friendship with the Admiral was of very long standing. 
 We had during many years exchanged views on different 
 naval subjects, but principally on gunnery questions. I, 
 in common with other British naval officers who had the 
 honour of his acquaintance, had always been greatly struck 
 by his wonderful success in the post of Inspector of Target 
 Practice in the United States Navy. That success was 
 due not only to his intimate knowledge of gunnery, but 
 also to his attractive personality, charm of manner, 
 keen sense of humour, and quick and accurate grasp of 
 any problem with which he was confronted. It was for- 
 tunate indeed for the Allied cause that Admirf^l Sims 
 should have been selected to command the United States 
 forces in European waters, for to the qualities mentioned 
 above he added a habit of speaking his mind with 
 absolutely fearless disregard of the consequences. This 
 characteristic has led him on more than one occasion into 
 
The Introduction of the Convoy System 117 
 
 difficulty, but in the circumstances with which .we had to 
 deal in 1917 it was just the quality that was needed. It 
 was a very difficult matter for those in authority in the 
 United States, separated as they were by 8,000 miles of 
 sea from the theatres of war, to realize the conditions in 
 European waters, for the Admiralty was not concerned 
 only with the North Sea and Atlantic, and the 
 terse and straightforward reports of Admiral Sims, 
 and his convincing statements, went a long way towards 
 bringing home to the United States people at that time 
 the extreme gravity of the situation and the need for 
 immediate action. He was consistently backed up by that 
 great ambassador, the late Mr. W. H. Page, who also 
 honoured me with his confidence, and to whom I spoke 
 perfectly freely on all occasions. 
 
 The assistance from the United States that it was 
 hoped was now in sight made the prospect of success 
 following on the adoption of the convoy system far more 
 favourable, and preparations were put in hand for the 
 institution of an ocean convoy system on a large scale. 
 In order to gain some experience of the difficulties attend- 
 ing the working of cargo ships, directions were given for 
 an experimental convoy to be collected at Gibraltar. The 
 necessary officers were sent out to Gibraltar with orders 
 to assemble the convoy, to instruct the masters in the work 
 that lay before them, and to explain to them the system 
 of sailing, the manner in which the convoy would be 
 handled, and the protection that would be afforded. This 
 naturally took time, and the convoy did not arrive in 
 England until after the middle of May. The experience 
 gained showed, however, that the difficulties apprehended 
 by the officers of the Mercantile Marine were not insuper- 
 able, and that, given adequate protection by cruisers and 
 small fast craft, the system was at least practicable. 
 
ii8 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 It was accordingly decided to put it into operation at 
 once, and to extend it as rapidly as the increase in the 
 numbers of our destroyers and sloops permitted. 
 
 The North Atlantic homeward-bound trade was 
 brought under convoy in May, 1917, and the Gibraltar 
 homeward-bound trade in July, but for some months it 
 was impossible to provide for the institution of a complete 
 convoy system. At first some 40 per cent, of the home- 
 ward-bound trade was convoyed. Then the system was 
 gradually extended to include first 60 per cent., then 
 80 per cent., and finally 100 per cent, of the homeward 
 Atlantic trade and the trade from Gibraltar, trawlers 
 being used as escorts for the Gibraltar trade, as the 
 majority of the ships therein engaged were slow. But 
 trawlers are unsatisfactory escort vessels. 
 
 In the early stages of the convoy system difficulties 
 were experienced from the fact that all the available 
 destroyers and most of the sloops were used as escorts, 
 with the result that the ships not under convoy were left 
 with but little protection. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE CONVOY SYSTEM AT WORK 
 
 As has been mentioned in Chapter II., the first ships 
 to be brought under a system of convoy were those 
 engaged in the French coal trade and in the trade between 
 Scandinavia and the United Kingdom. 
 
 In the case of the French coal trade, commencing in 
 March, 1917, the steamships engaged in the trade were 
 sailed in groups from four different assembly ports, viz. : 
 
 Southend to Boulogne and Calais. 
 St. Helens to Havre. 
 Portland to Cherbourg. 
 Penzance to Brest. 
 
 Between Southend and Boulogne and Calais the pro- 
 tection was given by the vessels of the Dover Patrol in 
 the course of their ordinary duties, but for the other three 
 routes special escort forces were utilized, and daily convoys 
 were the rule. 
 
 Owing to the great demand for coal in France, sail- 
 ing vessels were also used, and sailed under convoy from 
 several of the south-west ports. 
 
 A large organization was required to deal with the 
 trade, and this was built up under the supervision 
 of Captain Reginald G. H. Henderson, C.B., of 
 the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, working 
 under Vice-Admiral (then Rear- Admiral) Sir Alexander 
 Duff, head of the Division, in conference with the Com- 
 
 119 
 
120 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 manders-in-Chief, Portsmouth and Plymouth, under 
 whose direction and protection the convoys were run. The 
 immunity of this trade, carried out in the infested waters of 
 the Enghsh Channel, from successful attack by submarines 
 was extraordinary. No doubt the small size of the vessels 
 concerned and their comparatively shallow draught were a 
 contributory cause to this immunity. The figures for the 
 period March to August, 1917, show that 8,825 vessels 
 crossed the Channel under convoy, and that only fourteen 
 were lost. 
 
 The history of the Scandinavian and East Coast 
 convoys dates back to the autumn of 1916, when heavy 
 losses were being incurred amongst Scandinavian ships 
 due to submarine attack. Thus in October, 1916, the 
 losses amongst Norwegian and Swedish ships by sub- 
 marine attack were more than three times as great as 
 the previous highest monthly losses. Some fear existed 
 that the neutral Scandinavian countries might refuse to 
 run such risks and go to the extreme of prohibiting 
 sailings. Towards the end of 1916, before I left the Fleet, 
 a system of " protected " sailings was therefore intro- 
 duced. In this system the Commander-in-Chief, Grand 
 Fleet, fixed upon a number of alternative routes between 
 Norway and the Shetland Islands, which were used by 
 all vessels trading between Scandinavia and Allied 
 countries. The particular route in use at any given 
 moment was patrolled by the local forces from the 
 Orkneys and Shetlands, assisted when possible by 
 small craft from the Grand Fleet. The Admiral 
 Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands was placed 
 in charge of the arrangements, which were carried 
 out by the Senior Naval Officer at Lerwick, in the Shet- 
 land Islands. At this period the intention was that the 
 shipping from Norway should sail at dusk, reach a certain 
 
The Convoy System at Work 121 
 
 rendezvous at dawn, and thence be escorted to Lerwick. 
 The shipping from Lerwick sailed at dawn under pro- 
 tection, dispersed at dark, and reached the Norwegian 
 coast at dawn. Difficulties, of course, arose in the event 
 of bad weather, or when the slow speed of the ships pre- 
 vented the passage of about 180 miles being made in 
 approximately twenty-four hours, and by April, 1917, it 
 was evident that further steps were necessary to meet these 
 difficulties, which were again causing heavy losses. Early 
 in April, then, by direction from the Admiralty, a con- 
 ference was held at Longhope on the subject. Admiral 
 Sir Frederick Brock, Commanding the Orkneys and Shet- 
 lands, presided, and representatives from the Admiralty 
 and the Commands affected were present, and the adoption 
 of a complete convoy system to include the whole trade 
 between the East Coast and Norway was recommended. 
 This proposal was approved by the Admiralty and was 
 put into force as soon as the necessary organization had 
 matured. Escorting vessels had with difficulty been 
 provided, although in inadequate numbers. The first 
 convoys sailed towards the end of April, 1917. 
 
 The system may be described briefly as follows. 
 The convoys all put into Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands, 
 both on the eastward and westward passages, so that 
 Lerwick acted as a junction for the whole system. From 
 Lerwick, convoys to Scandinavia left in the afternoon 
 under the protection of two or three destroyers, and, with 
 some armed patrol vessels in company up to a certain 
 stage, made the Norwegian coast at varying points, and 
 there dispersed, and the destroyers then picked up the 
 west-bound convoy at a rendezvous off the Norwegian 
 coast shortly before dark, and steered for a rendezvous 
 between Norway and the Shetland Islands, where an 
 escort of armed patrol vessels joined the convoy at daylight 
 
122 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 to assist in its protection to Lerwick. From Lerwick con- 
 voys were dispatched to various points on the coast of the 
 United Kingdom ; those making for southern ports on the 
 East Coast were escorted by a force composed of some of 
 the old "River " class or of 30-knot class destroyers, and 
 trawlers belonging to the East Coast Command based 
 on the Humber, and those making for more northerly 
 ports or ports on the West Coast were escorted merely 
 by armed patrol vessels, as the danger of submarine attack 
 to these convoys was not so great. 
 
 The main difficulty was the provision of the destroyers 
 required for the proper protection of the convoys, and 
 to a lesser degree the provision of armed patrol vessels 
 of the trawler, whaler, or drifter types. 
 
 The conference held early in April, 1917, had reported 
 that whilst stronger protection was naturally desirable, the 
 very least force that could give defence to the convoys 
 between Lerwick and the East Coast ports would be a 
 total of twenty-three destroyers and fifty trawlers, whilst 
 for each convoy between Lerwick and Norway at least 
 two destroyers and four trawlers were needed. The de- 
 stroyers for the latter convoys were provided by the Grand 
 Fleet, although they could ill be spared. The total 
 number so utilized was six. It was only possible to 
 provide a force of twenty old destroyers and forty-five 
 trawlers for the East Coast convoys instead of the numbers 
 recommended by the conference, and owing to the age 
 of a large majority of these destroyers and the inevitable 
 resultant occasional breakdown of machinery, the number 
 available frequently fell below twenty, although it was 
 really marvellous how those old destroyers stuck to the 
 work to the eternal credit of their crews, and particularly 
 the engineering staffs. The adoption of the system, how- 
 ever, resulted during the comparatively fine summer 
 
The Convoy System at Work 123 
 
 weather in a considerable reduction in the number of 
 merchant ships lost, in spite of the fact that great difficulty 
 was experienced in keeping the ships of the convoys to- 
 gether, particularly at night, dawn frequently finding the 
 convoy very much scattered. 
 
 It became obvious, however, that with the approach 
 of winter the old destroyers of the 30-knot class would 
 have the greatest difficulty in facing the heavy weather, 
 and very urgent representations were made by Sir 
 Frederick Brock for their replacement by more modern 
 vessels before the winter set in. All that could be 
 effected in this direction was done, though at the expense 
 of some of the Channel escorts. Urgent requests for 
 good destroyers were being received at the Admiralty from 
 every Command, and it was impossible to comply with 
 them since the vessels were not in existence. 
 
 Certain other steps which may be enumerated were 
 taken in connection with the Scandinavian traffic. 
 
 The convoys received such additional protection as 
 could be given by the airships which were gradually 
 being stationed on the East Coast during the year 1917, 
 and decoy ships occasionally joined the convoys in order 
 to invite submarine attack on themselves. This pro- 
 cedure was indeed adopted on all convoy routes as they 
 were brought into being, the rule being for the decoy 
 ship to drop behind the convoy in the guise of a straggler. 
 
 Some of our submarines were also detailed to work 
 in the vicinity of convoy routes in order that they might 
 take advantage of any opportunity to attack enemy 
 submarines if sighted ; due precautions for their safety 
 were made. 
 
 Among the difficulties with which the very energetic 
 and resourceful Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and 
 Shetlands had to contend in his working of the convoys 
 
124 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 was the persistent mining of the approach to Lerwick 
 Harbour by German submarines; a second difficulty 
 was the great congestion that took place in that harbour 
 as soon as bad weather set in during the autumn of 
 1917. The weather during the latter part of 1917 was 
 exceptionally bad, and great congestion and consequent 
 delay to shipping occurred both at Lerwick and in the 
 Norwegian ports. As the result of this congestion it 
 became necessary to increase largely the number of ships 
 in each convoy, thereby enhancing the difficulty of 
 handling the convoy. 
 
 At the commencement it had been decided to limit 
 the size of a Scandinavian convoy to six or eight vessels, 
 but as the congestion increased it became necessary to 
 exceed this number considerably, occasional convoys 
 composed of as many as thirty to forty ships being 
 formed. A contributory cause to the increase in the 
 size of convoys was due to the fact that the trade between 
 Lerwick and the White Sea, which had been proceeding 
 direct between those places during the first half of 1917, 
 became the target of persistent submarine attack 
 during the summer, and in order to afford them pro- 
 tection it was necessary in the autumn to include these 
 ships also in the Scandinavian convoy for the passage across 
 the North Sea. Between the coast of Norway and the 
 White Sea they proceeded independently, hugging terri- 
 torial waters as far as possible. 
 
 It will be realized that the institution of the convoy 
 system of sailing for the Scandinavian trade necessitated 
 an extensive organization on the Norwegian as well as 
 on the British side of the North Sea. For this reason 
 Captain Arthur Halsey, R.N., was appointed in March, 
 1917, as Naval Vice-Consul at Bergen, and the whole 
 of the arrangements in regard to the working of the 
 
The Convoy System at Work 125 
 
 convoys, the issue of orders, etc., from the Norwegian 
 side came under him and his staff, to which additions were 
 made from time to time. The position was pecuUar in 
 that British naval officers were working in this manner 
 in a neutral country, and it says much for the discretion 
 and tact of Captain Halsey and his staff and the courtesy 
 of the Norwegian Government officials that no difficulties 
 occurred. 
 
 Steps were also taken to appoint officers at British 
 ports for the work of controlling the mercantile traffic, 
 and as the organization became perfected so the condi- 
 tions gradually improved. 
 
 By the end of September the bad weather prevalent 
 in the North Sea had caused great dislocation in the 
 convoy system. Ships composing convoys became much 
 scattered and arrived so late off Lerwick as to prevent 
 them proceeding on their passage without entering 
 harbour. Owing to the overcrowding of Lerwick Har- 
 bour the system of changing convoy escorts without 
 entering harbour had been introduced, and the delays 
 due to bad weather were causing great difficulties in 
 this respect. The question of substituting the Tyne for 
 Lerwick as the collecting port was first discussed at this 
 period, but the objections to the Tyne as an assembly 
 port were so strong as to prevent the adoption of the 
 proposal. 
 
 The system of convoy outlined above continued in 
 force from April to December, 1917, during which period 
 some 6,000 vessels were convoyed between Norway and 
 the Humber with a total loss of about seventy ships. 
 
 There was always the danger that Germany would 
 attack the convoys by means of surface vessels. The 
 safeguard against such attacks was the constant presence 
 of forces from the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. In 
 
126 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 view of the fact, however, that the distance of the convoy 
 routes from the Horn Reef was only between 300 and 
 350 miles, and that on a winter night this distance could 
 almost be covered at a speed of 20 knots during the 
 fourteen or fifteen hours of darkness that prevailed, it 
 will be seen that unless the convoys were actually accom- 
 panied by a force sufficient to protect them against opera- 
 tions by surface vessels, there was undoubted risk of suc- 
 cessful attack. It was not possible to forecast the class of 
 vessels by which such an attack might be carried out or 
 the strength of the attacking force. The German decision 
 in this respect would naturally be governed by the value 
 of the objective and by the risk to be run. Admiral 
 S cheer in his book states that on one occasion, in April, 
 1918, the German battle-cruisers, supported by the battle- 
 ships and the remainder of the High Sea Fleet, attempted 
 such an attack, but found no convoy. It was always 
 realized by us that an attack in great force might be made 
 on the convoy, but such risk had to be accepted. 
 
 The movements of the ships of the Grand Fleet were 
 a matter for the Commander-in-Chief, provided always 
 that no definite orders were issued by the Admiralty or 
 no warning of expected attack was given to the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, and, prior to the first attack on the 
 Scandinavian convoy, no special force of cruisers or light 
 cruisers accompanied the convoy to guard it against attack 
 by surface vessels, although a strong deterrent to attack 
 lay in the frequent presence of forces from the Grand Fleet 
 to the southward of the convoy routes, which forces would 
 seriously threaten the return of any raiding German 
 vessels. As the enemy would naturally make the north- 
 ward passage by night we could hardly expect to sight 
 his ships on the outward trip. 
 
 The first attack took place at daylight on October 
 
The Convoy System at Work 127 
 
 17. The convoy on this occasion consisted of twelve 
 ships, two British, one Belgian, one Danish, five 
 Norwegian and three Swedish, and was under the 
 anti-submarine escort of the destroyers Mary Rose 
 and Strongbow, and two trawlers, the Elsie and 
 P. Fannon. At dawn, shortly after 6,0 a.m., two strange 
 vessels were sighted to the southward, and were later 
 recognized as German light cruisers. They were chal- 
 lenged, but replied by opening fire at about 6.15 a.m., 
 disabling the Strongbow with the first salvo fired. The 
 Mary Rose steamed gallantly at the enemy with the 
 intention of attacking with torpedoes, but was sunk by 
 gunfire before she could achieve her object. The enemy 
 vessels then attacked the convoy, sinking all except 
 the British and Belgian vessels, which escaped un- 
 damaged. The Strongbow, shelled at close range, 
 returned the fire, using guns and torpedoes, but was 
 completely overwhelmed by the guns of the light cruisers 
 and sank at about 9.30 a.m. The trawler Elsie effected 
 very fine rescue work amongst the survivors both from 
 the Strongbow and ships of the convoy, whilst under fire 5 
 and both trawlers reached Lerwick. The enemy sheered 
 off soon after 8.0 a.m. Most unfortunately neither the 
 Strongbow nor the Mary Rose succeeded in getting a 
 wireless signal through to our own vessels to report 
 the presence of enemy ships, otherwise there can be little 
 doubt that they would have been intercepted and sunk. 
 We had in the North Sea, during the night before the 
 attack and during the day of the attack, a particularly 
 strong force of light cruisers comprising four or possibly 
 five* squadrons (a total of not less than sixteen vessels), all 
 to the southward of the convoy route, and had the informa- 
 
 * At this distance of time I do not recollect whether the number of 
 squadrons was four or five. — J. 
 
128 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 tion of the attack come through from the destroyers, these 
 vessels would have been informed at once and would have 
 had an excellent chance of intercepting the enemy. The 
 extreme difficulty of preventing the egress of raiders from 
 the North Sea at night, even when so large a force is cruis- 
 ing, was well illustrated by this incident, although a little 
 reflection on the wide area of water to be covered, together 
 with a knowledge of the distance that the eye can cover on 
 a dark night (some 200 to 300 yards), would show how 
 very great are the chances in favour of evasion. 
 
 This disaster to the Scandinavian convoy was bound to 
 bring into prominence the question of affording to it pro- 
 tection against future attacks by surface vessels, for neces- 
 sarily the protection against surface vessels differed from 
 that against submarines, a point which was sometimes 
 overlooked by those who were unfamiliar with the demands 
 of the two wars which were being waged — the one on the 
 surface and the other under the surface. It was very 
 difficult to furnish efficient protection against the surface 
 form of attack from the resources of the Grand Fleet if 
 the practice of running a daily convoy was continued, be- 
 cause it was impossible to forecast the strength or exact 
 character — battle-cruisers, cruisers or destroyers — of the 
 attack ; and the first step was to reduce the number of 
 convoys and to increase correspondingly the number of 
 ships in each convoy. A telegram was sent to the 
 Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands on 
 October 26 asking whether the convoys could be con- 
 veniently reduced to three per week. A reply was 
 received on the 29th to the effect that the convoy could 
 be run every third day under certain conditions; the 
 important conditions were the use of the Tyne instead 
 of the Humber as a collecting port, and the provision of 
 eight extra trawlers and nine modern destroyers. Sir 
 
^ 
 
 A Convoy Zigzagging 
 
 {Taken from the Air.) 
 
 A Convoy with an Airship. 
 
The Convoy System at Work 129 
 
 Frederick Brock stated that he was assuming cruiser 
 protection to the convoys and that the details would need 
 to be worked out before the change could be made. He 
 suggested a conference. He was requested on October 31 
 to consult the Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of 
 England as to the practicability of using the Tyne as a 
 convoy collecting port. Meanwhile Sir F. Brock had 
 prepared a scheme for giving effect to his proposals, and 
 on November 5 he sent copies of this scheme to the Vice- 
 Admiral Commanding East Coast of England and other 
 officers concerned for their consideration. 
 
 In forwarding proposals to the Admiralty on November 
 22, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet stated 
 that the destroyers asked for could not be provided from 
 the Grand Fleet. Amongst other reasons it was pointed 
 out that the destroyers required for screening the light 
 cruisers protecting the convoys would have to be supplied 
 from that source, thus bringing an additional strain 
 on the Grand Fleet flotillas. He suggested the provision 
 of these vessels from other Commands, such as the 
 Mediterranean, and pointed out the manifest advantages 
 that would result from providing a force for this convoy 
 work that would be additional to the Grand Fleet flotillas. 
 Consideration of the proposals at the Admiralty showed 
 once again the great difficulty of providing the 
 destroyers. It was impossible to spare any from the 
 Mediterranean, where large troop movements needing 
 destroyer protection were in progress, and other Com- 
 mands were equally unable to furnish them. Indeed, the 
 demands for destroyers from all directions were as 
 insistent as ever. The unsuitability of the Tyne as a 
 collecting port was remarked upon by the Naval Staff, as 
 well as other objections to the scheme as put forward 
 from Scapa. In order to decide upon a workable scheme, 
 
 J 
 
130 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 directions were given that a conference was to assemble 
 at Scapa on December 10. An ofHcer from the Naval 
 Staff was detailed to attend the conference, to point out 
 the objections which had been raised and, amongst other 
 matters, to bring to notice the advantage of the Firth of 
 Forth as a collecting port instead of the Tyne. 
 
 Meanwhile steps had been taken to furnish as much 
 protection as possible from Grand Fleet resources to the 
 convoys against attack by enemy surface vessels. 
 
 The conference of December 10 came to the conclu- 
 sion that the Firth of Forth was the best assembly place, 
 and that the port of Methil in that locality would offer 
 great advantages. The conference made recommendations 
 as to the provision of destroyers as soon as they were 
 available, and, amongst other matters, mentioned the' 
 necessity for an increase in the minesweeping force at 
 Rosyth to meet a possible extension of enemy mine- 
 laying when the new system was in operation. 
 
 On December 12 a second attack on the convoy took 
 place. In this instance the attack was carried out by four 
 German destroyers. Two convoys were at sea, one east- 
 bound and one west-bound, the east-bound convoy being 
 attacked. It was screened against submarine attack by two 
 destroyers — ^the Pellew and Partridge — and four armed 
 trawlers, and comprised six vessels, one being British and 
 the remainder neutrals. The attack took place in approxi- 
 mately Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 8.50 E., and the action 
 resulted in the Partridge, the four trawlers, and the whole 
 of the convoy being sunk, and the Pellew was so severely 
 damaged as to be incapable of continuing the action. At 
 the time of this attack a west-bound convoy was at sea to 
 the westward of the other convoy, and two armoured 
 cruisers — the Shannon and Minotaur — with four de- 
 stroyers were acting as a covering force for the convoys 
 
The Convoy System at Work 131 
 
 against attack by surface vessels. A wireless signal from 
 the Partridge having been intercepted, this force steamed 
 at full speed for the scene of the action, the destroyers 
 arriving in time to pick up 100 survivors from the convoy 
 and trawlers, but not in time to save the convoy. The 
 3rd Light Cniiser Squadron, also at sea, was some 85 
 miles to the southward and eastward of the convoy when 
 attacked, but neither this force nor the ShannorCs force 
 succeeded in intercepting the enemy before he reached 
 port. The short hours of daylight greatly facilitated his 
 escape. 
 
 On receipt of the report of the meeting of Decem- 
 ber 10, and in view of the attack of December 12, the 
 question of the interval between convoys was specially 
 considered in its relation to the ability of the Grand Fleet 
 to furnish protection against surface attack. It was 
 decided that for this reason it would only be possible to 
 sail convoys from Methil every third day so as to avoid 
 having two convoys at sea at a time, a situation with 
 which the Grand Fleet could not deal satisfactorily. The 
 organization then drawn up actually came into effect on 
 January 20, 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty, 
 and was continvied \^dth certain modifications to the end 
 of the war. The principal modification was an increase 
 of the interval between convoys, first, to four, and later 
 to five days in order to relieve the strain on the Grand 
 Fleet arising from the provision of covering forces ; the 
 disadvantage of the resultant increased size of the convoys 
 had to be accepted. Under the new system the 
 Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland at Rosyth — 
 Admiral Sir Cecil Burney — became responsible for the 
 control of the Scandinavian convoys, the Admiralty 
 selecting the routes. 
 
 The introduction of the convoy system for the Atlantic 
 
132 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 trade dates from the early days of May, 1917, when the 
 prospect — for it was only then a prospect — of increas- 
 ing assistance from the U.S. Navy in regard to 
 destroyers and other small craft for escort duty as 
 well as convoy cruisers for ocean work, made the system 
 possible. Action taken with the U.S. authorities for the 
 introduction of a system by which the trade from that 
 country in neutral shipping was controlled enabled the 
 ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron to be gradually with- 
 drawn from blockade duties and utilized as ocean convoy 
 cruisers. Even with assistance from the U.S. Navy in 
 the shape of old battleships and cruisers, the use of the 
 10th Cruiser Squadron, the withdrawal of the 2nd Cruiser 
 Squadron of five ships from the Grand Fleet, the use of the 
 ships of the North American and West Indies Squadron 
 and of some of our older battleships from the Mediter- 
 ranean, there was still a shortage of convoy cruisers; this 
 deficiency was made up by arming a number of the faster 
 cargo vessels with 6-inch guns for duty as convoy cruisers. 
 These vessels usually carried cargo themselves, so that no 
 great loss of tonnage was involved. 
 
 On May 17 a committee was assembled at the 
 Admiralty to draw up a complete organization for a 
 general convoy system.* This committee had before it 
 the experience of an experimental convoy which arrived 
 from Gibraltar shortly after the commencement of the 
 committee's work, as well as the experience already gained 
 in the Scandinavian and French coal trade convoys, and 
 the evidence of officers such as Captain R. G. Henderson, 
 R.N., who had made a close study of the convoy question. 
 On June 6 the report was completed. This valuable 
 
 * The committee was composed of the following officers : 
 Captain H. W. Longden, R.N. Fleet Paymaster H. W. E. Manisty, R.N. 
 Commander J. S. Wilde, R.N. Lieutenant G. E. Burton, R.N., and 
 Mr/N. A. Leslie, of the Ministry of Shipping. 
 
The Convoy System at Work 133 
 
 report dealt with the whole organization needed for the 
 institution of a complete system of convoy for homeward 
 and outward trade in the Atlantic. In anticipation of 
 the report steps had already been taken to commence 
 the system, the first homeward bound Atlantic convoy 
 starting on May 24. A necessary preliminary for the 
 successful working of the convoys was a central organiza- 
 tion at the Admiralty. This organization — termed the 
 Convoy Section of the Trade Division of the Naval Staff 
 — worked directly under Rear- Admiral A. L. Duff, who 
 had recently been placed on the Board of Admiralty with 
 the title of Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.), 
 and who was in immediate control of the Anti-Submarine, 
 Trade and Minesweeping Divisions of the Staff. Fleet 
 Paymaster H. W. E. Manisty was appointed as Organiz- 
 ing Manager of Convoys, and the Convoy Section, com- 
 prising at first some ten officers, soon increased to a total 
 of fifteen, and was in immediate touch with the Ministry 
 of Shipping through a representative, Mr. Leslie. His 
 function was to make such arrangements as would ensure 
 co-operation between the loading and discharging of car- 
 goes and convoy requirements, and generally to co- 
 ordinate shipping needs with convoy needs. 
 
 The organizing manager of the convoys and his staff 
 controlled the assembly, etc., of all convoys and vessels. 
 
 The routeing of the convoys and their protection, both 
 ocean and anti-submarine, was arranged under the 
 superintendence of the A.C.N.S. 
 
 In addition to the central Admiralty organization, an 
 officer with the necessary staff was appointed to each 
 convoy port of assembly at home and abroad. This 
 officer's duties comprised the collection and organization 
 of the convoy and the issue of sailing orders and necessary 
 printed instructions to the masters of the vessels, seeing 
 
134 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 that they were properly equipped for sailing in company, 
 and forwarding information to the Admiralty of the 
 movements of the convoy. 
 
 An essential feature of the system was the appoint- 
 ment of a convoy commodore. This officer was quite 
 distinct from the commanding officer of the vessel form- 
 ing the ocean escort, but acted under his orders when in 
 company. The duty of the convoy commodore, whose 
 broad pennant was hoisted in one of the ships, was, subject 
 to instructions from the commanding officer of the 
 escorting vessel, to take general charge of the convoy. 
 
 The convoy commodores were either naval officers, 
 admirals or captains on the active or retired lists, or 
 experienced merchant captains. The duties were most 
 arduous and responsible, but there was no lack of volun- 
 teers for this work. Many of the cOnvoy commodores had 
 their ships sunk under them. The country has every 
 reason for much gratitude to those who undertook this 
 difficult and very responsible task* 
 
 By July we had succeeded in increasing the strength 
 of the anti-submarine convoy escorting force to thirty- 
 three destroyers (eleven of which belonged to the United 
 States Navy) and ten sloops, with eleven more destroyers 
 for the screening of troop transports through the sub- 
 marine zone and for the protection of the convoys east- 
 ward from the Lizard, the position in which the other 
 screening force left them. We had remaining twelve 
 sloops, which, with trawlers, were engaged in protecting 
 that considerable portion of the trade making for the 
 south of Ireland, which we could not yet bring under 
 convoy. It was intended to absorb these sloops for 
 convoy protection as soon as circumstances permitted. 
 
 At this stage it was considered that a total of thirty- 
 three more destroyers or sloops was needed to complete 
 
The Convoy System at Work 135 
 
 the homeward convoy system. The Admiralty was 
 pressed to weaken yet further the Grand Fleet destroyer 
 force in order to extend the convoy system, but did not 
 consider such a course justified in view of the general naval 
 situation. 
 
 In arranging the organization of the Atlantic convoy 
 system it was necessary to take into consideration certain 
 other important matters. Amongst these were the 
 following : 
 
 1. The selection of ports of assembly and frequency 
 of saihng. During the latter half of 1917 the general 
 arrangements were as follows for the homeward trade : 
 
 Port of Assembly. Frequency of Sailing. Destination. 
 
 Gibraltar Every 4 days. Alternately to 
 
 E. &W. c'ts. 
 
 Sierra Leone ,, 8 ,, Either coast. 
 
 Dakar ,, 8 ,, Either coast. 
 
 Hampton Roads (U.S.A.) ,, 4 ,, Alternately to 
 
 E. & W. c'ts. 
 
 New York ,, 8 ,, Ditto. 
 
 Halifax, N.S ,, 8 ,, West coast. 
 
 Sydney (Cape Breton) ... ,, 8 ,, Alternately to 
 
 E. &W. c'ts. 
 
 Each port served a certain area of trade, and vessels 
 engaged in that trade met at the port of assembly for 
 convoy to the United Kingdom or to France. 
 
 The total number of merchant ships sailing thus in 
 convoy every eight days in September, 1917, was about 
 150, in convoys comprising from 12 to 80 ships, and the 
 total escorting forces comprised : 
 
 50 ocean escort vessels (old battleships, cruisers, armed ; 
 merchant ships and armed escort ships), 
 
13^ The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 90 sloops and destroyers, 
 
 15 vessels of the " P" class (small destroyers), 
 
 50 trawlers, 
 in addition to a considerable force for local escort near 
 Gibraltar, consisting of sloops, yachts, torpedo boats, 
 XJ.S. revenue cruisers, U.S. tugs, etc. 
 
 At this period (September, 1917) outward convoys 
 were also in operation, the arrangement being that the 
 outward convoy was escorted by destroyers or sloops to 
 a position 300 to 400 miles from the coast clear of the 
 known submarine area, and there dispersed to proceed 
 independently, there being insufficient ocean escort 
 vessels to take the convoy on; about twelve more were 
 needed for this work. The escorting vessels used for the 
 outward convoys were destroyers or sloops which were due 
 to proceed to sea to meet a homeward convoy, the routine 
 being that the outward convoy should sail at such a time 
 as would ensure the homeward convoy being met by the 
 escort without undue delay at the rendezvous, since any 
 long period of waiting about at a rendezvous was impossible 
 for the escorting vessels as they would have run short of 
 fuel. It was also undesirable, as it revealed to any 
 submarine in the neighbourhood the approach of a 
 convoy. 
 
 It will be realized by seamen that this procedure 
 (which was forced upon us by the shortage of escorting 
 vessels) led to many difficulties. In the first place 
 the homeward convoys were frequently delayed by bad 
 weather, etc., on passage across the Atlantic, and, owing 
 to the insufficient range of the wireless installations, it was 
 often not possible for the commodore to acquaint the 
 Admiralty of this delay in time to stop the sailing of the 
 outward convoys. Again, outward convoys were often 
 delayed by bad weather, resulting in the homeward con- 
 
The Convoy System at Work 137 
 
 voy not being met before entering the submarine zone. As 
 the winter drew near this was a source of constant anxiety, 
 since so many of the vessels outward bound were in ballast 
 (empty), and their speed was consequently quickly reduced 
 in bad weather. The ships under these conditions became 
 in some cases almost unmanageable in a convoy, and the 
 responsibilities of the escorts were much intensified. 
 
 In September, 1917, the following was the position in 
 respect to outward bound convoys : 
 
 Port of Assembly. Frequency of Sailing. Destination. 
 
 Lamlash Every 4 days. Atlantic ports. 
 
 Milford Haven ... ,, 4 ,, Gibraltar. 
 
 Queenstown ,, 4 ,, Atlantic ports. 
 
 Falmouth ,, 8 ,, Gibraltar. 
 
 Plymouth ,, 4 ,, Atlantic ports. 
 
 About 150 vessels sailed every eight days in convoys 
 varying in strength from 12 to 30 ships. 
 
 There was still a good deal of Atlantic trade that 
 was not sailing under convoy. This comprised trade 
 between Gibraltar and North and South America, between 
 the Cape, South America and Dakar, and the coastal 
 trade between North and South America. It was 
 estimated that an additional twenty-five to thirty ocean 
 escorts and eleven destroyers would be needed to include 
 the above trade in convoy. . 
 
 The Mediterranean trade is dealt with later. 
 
 The question of speed was naturally one of great 
 importance in the convoy system. As has been stated 
 earlier, the speed of a convoy like that of a squadron or 
 fleet is necessarily that of the slowest ship, and in order 
 to prevent delay to shipping, which was equivalent to 
 serious loss of its carrying power, it was very necessary 
 that convoys should be composed of ships of approximately 
 
138 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 the same speed. In order to achieve this careful 
 organization was needed, and the matter was not made 
 easier by the uncertainty that frequently prevailed as to 
 the actual sea speed of particular merchant ships. Some 
 masters, no doubt from legitimate pride in their vessels, 
 credited them with speeds in excess of those actually 
 attained. Frequently coal of poor quality or the 
 fact that a ship had a dirty bottom reduced her 
 speed to a very appreciable extent, and convoy commo- 
 dores had occasionally to direct ships under such conditions 
 to drop out of the convoy altogether and make their 
 passage alone. Obviously this action was not taken lightly 
 owing to the risk involved. Decision as to the sea speed 
 of convoys was taken by the convoy officer at the collect- 
 ing port, and he based this on the result of an examination 
 of the records in the different ships. As a rule convoys 
 were classed as " slow " and " fast." Slow convoys com- 
 prised vessels of a speed between 8 and 12|^ knots. Fast 
 convoys included ships with a speed between 12 J- and 
 16 knots. Ships of higher speed than 16 knots did not 
 as a rule sail in convoys, but trusted to their speed and 
 dark hours for protection in the submarine area. The 
 Gibraltar convoy (an exception to the general rule) 
 contained ships of only 7 knots speed. 
 
 With the introduction of convoys the provision 
 of efficient signal arrangements became a matter of 
 importance. The issue of printed instructions to each 
 master and the custom introduced of assembling the 
 masters to meet the captain of the escorting cruiser before 
 sailing, so that the conduct of the convoy might be 
 explained, had the effect of reducing signalling to a 
 minimum, but it was necessary that each ship should have 
 a signalman on board, and the provision of the number 
 of signalmen required was no easy matter. A good wire- 
 
The Convoy System at Work 139 
 
 less installation ,was essential in the escorting cruiser and 
 in the Commodore's ship in order that the course of the 
 convoy could be diverted by the Admiralty if the known 
 or suspected presence of submarines rendered it necessary, 
 and also for the purpose of giving to the Admiralty early 
 information of the position of a convoy approaching the 
 coast, so that the escorting destroyers could be dispatched 
 in time. 
 
 Fortunately for us, German submarines constantly 
 used their wireless installations when operating at sea, and 
 as a consequence our wireless directional stations were 
 able to fix their positions by cross bearings. This 
 practice on the part of the enemy undoubtedly went far 
 to assist us both in anti-submarine measures and in 
 diverting trade to a safe course. 
 
 The introduction of the convoy system rendered the 
 provision of anti-submarine protection at ports of assembly 
 a matter of great importance, owing to the very large 
 number of vessels that were collected in them. Some of 
 the ports were already in possession of these defences, but 
 amongst those for which net protection was prepared and 
 laid during 1917 were Halifax, Sydney (Cape Breton), 
 Falmouth, Lamlash, Rosslare (on the south-east coast 
 of Ireland), Milford Haven, Sierra Leone and Dakar. 
 This involved extensive work, and was undertaken and 
 carried out with great rapidity by Captain F. C. Lear- 
 month and his staff, whose work in the production of net 
 defences during the war was of inestimable value, not only 
 to ourselves, but to our Allies, for whom large supplies 
 of net defences were also provided. The U.S.A. also 
 adopted our system of net defence for their harbours on 
 entry into the war. Many anxious months were passed 
 at the Admiralty and at the ports named until the anti- 
 submarine defences were completed. 
 
140 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 The escort of the convoys through the submarine 
 zone imposed very heavy ,work upon the destroyers, 
 sloops and other screening vessels. This was due partly 
 to the fact that there were not sufficient vessels to admit 
 of adequate time being spent in harbour to rest the crews 
 and effect necessary repairs, and partly to the nature of 
 the work itself and the weather conditions under .which 
 so much of it was carried out. It will be realized by 
 those who have been at sea in these small craft that 
 little rest was obtainable in the Atlantic between the west 
 coast of Ireland and the mouth of the Channel and 
 positions 300 to 400 miles to the westward, except in 
 the finest weather. When to this is added the constant 
 strain imposed by watching for the momentary appear- 
 ance of a periscope or the track of a torpedo, and the 
 vigilance needed, especially on dark and stormy nights, 
 to keep touch with a large convoy of merchant ships 
 showing no lights, with the inevitable whipping up of 
 occasional stragglers from the convoy, some idea may 
 be gathered of the arduous and unceasing work accom- 
 plished by the anti-submarine escorts. 
 
 It had been my practice during 1917 to call for 
 returns from all commands of the number of hours that 
 vessels of the destroyer and light cruiser type were 
 actually under way per month, and these returns showed 
 how heavy was the strain on the destroyers, particularly 
 those engaged in convoy work. 
 
 For several months, for instance, the destroyers in 
 the flotillas stationed at Devonport were under way on an 
 average for just under 50 per cent, of the month. 
 
 This meant that several destroyers in these flotillas 
 averaged quite 60 per cent, or even 70 per cent, of their 
 time under way, as other vessels of the flotilla were laid up 
 during the periods under review for long refits due to 
 
The Convoy System at Work 141 
 
 collision or other damage, in addition to the necessary 
 four-monthly refit. 
 
 Anyone familiar with the delicate nature of the 
 machinery of destroyers — which needs constant attention 
 — ^and the conditions of life at sea in them will appreciate 
 the significance of these figures and the strain which the 
 conditions imposed on those on board as well as on the 
 machinery. 
 
 It was evident in November, 1917, that the personnel 
 and the machinery, whilst standing the strain in a wonder- 
 ful manner, were approaching the limit of endurance, and 
 anxiety was felt as to the situation during the winter. 
 
 Reports came in from the Grand Fleet indicating that 
 the work of the destroyers engaged in protecting the 
 ships of the Scandinavian convoy was telling heavily on 
 the personnel, particularly on the commanding officers, 
 and one report stated that the convoy work produced far 
 greater strain than any other duty carried out by 
 destroyers. No mean proportion of the officers were 
 suffering from a breakdown in health, and since the whole 
 of the work of the Devonport, Queenstown and North 
 of Ireland flotillas consisted of convoy duty, whilst only 
 a portion of the Grand Fleet destroyers was engaged in 
 this work, the opinions expressed were very disquieting 
 in their relation to the work of the southern flotillas. 
 
 However, the destroyers held on here as elsewhere, 
 but it is only just to the splendid endurance of the young 
 officers and the men who manned them to emphasize as 
 strongly as I can the magnificent work they carried out in 
 the face of every difficulty, and without even the incentive 
 of the prospect of a fight with a foe that could be seen, 
 this being the compensation given in their work to the 
 gallant personnel of the Dover, Harwich and Grand 
 Fleet flotillas. The convoy flotillas knew that their only 
 
142 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 chance of action was mth a submarine submerged, a form 
 of warfare in which the result was so very frequently 
 unknown and therefore unsatisfactory. 
 
 Under the new conditions the Admiralty took upon 
 itself responsibility for the control of the ships of the 
 Mercantile Marine in addition to its control of the move- 
 ments of the Fleet. Indeed the control of convoys was 
 even more directly under the Admiralty than was the 
 control of the Fleet. In the latter case the proper system 
 is for the Admiralty to indicate to the Commander- 
 in-Chief, Grand Fleet, or to other Commands the 
 objective, and to supply all the information possible 
 regarding the strength of the enemy, his intentions 
 and movements and such other information as can 
 be of use to the Commander-in-Chief, but to leave the 
 handling of the force to the Commander-in-Chief con- 
 cerned. This is the course which was usually followed 
 during the late war. It was my invariable practice when 
 at the Admiralty. 
 
 In the case of convoys, however, a different system 
 was necessary owing to the difficulty of transmitting 
 information, the great delay that would be caused were 
 this attempted, and the impossibility of control being 
 exercised over all convoys at sea except by the Admiralty. 
 Consequently the actual movements of convoys for the 
 greater part of their passage were directed by the Naval 
 Staff. Owing to ships not showing lights at night, 
 convoys were diverted clear of one another by wireless 
 signal if they were getting into dangerous proximity ; they 
 were directed to alter course as necessary to avoid areas in 
 which submarines had been located, and occasionally it 
 became necessary to alter the destination of some ships 
 as they approached home waters. The movements of all 
 convoys .were "plotted" from day to day, indeed from 
 
The Convoy System at Work 143 
 
 hour to hour, on a large-scale chart at the Admiralty, and 
 it was easy to see at a glance the position of all the ships 
 at any given time. 
 
 As the convoy approached home waters the ships 
 came within the areas of the Commanders-in-Chief, Coast 
 of Ireland, Devonport, and Portsmouth, and the Vice- 
 Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol, and were taken 
 in charge by one or other of them. At each port a staff 
 existed which kept a constant record of the movements of 
 ships passing through or working in the Command, and 
 enabled the Commander-in-Chief to take instant action 
 if occasion arose. 
 
 The success of the convoy system in protecting trade 
 is best shown by the figures relating to the year 1917 on 
 the succeeding page (p. 144). In considering these figures 
 the loose station-keeping of the ships in the Scandinavian 
 convoj^ must be borne in mind. A large proportion of 
 the ships in this convoy were neutrals, and it was naturally 
 not possible to bring these vessels under discipline as was 
 the case with convoys composed of purely British ships. 
 Consequently there was much straggling, and the losses 
 were proportionately heavier than in most of the Atlantic 
 convoys. The comparatively heavy losses in the Gibraltar 
 convoys were probably due to these convoys traversing two 
 dangerous submarine zones. The extraordinary im- 
 munity of the French coal trade convoy from serious 
 losses is remarkable and is probably due to the short pas- 
 sage which enabled most of the distance to be traversed at 
 night and to the ships being of light draught. 
 
 The table on the following page would not be complete 
 were no reference made to the heavy losses which were 
 experienced during the year amongst ships which were 
 unescorted through the danger zones, owing to the fact 
 that no escorting vessels were available for the work. 
 
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The Convoy System at Work 145 
 
 There were naturally loud complaints of these losses, but 
 these were inevitable in the absence of escorting vessels, 
 and no one realized the dangers run more than those 
 responsible for iBnding protection; every available vessel 
 was not only working at highest possible pressure, but, as 
 has been mentioned, breakdowns from overwork amongst 
 escorting craft were causing very considerable anxiety. 
 
 The following figures show the dangers which were 
 run by unescorted vessels : 
 
 Losses amongst British merchant 
 steamships in 1917 by submarine 
 attack, under separate escort, under 
 Period. convoy or unescorted. 
 
 Ships under Ships „, . 
 
 separate under '^^ , 
 
 escort. convoy, ^^^^^orted. 
 
 Quarter ending June 30 17 26 158 
 
 Quarter ending September 30 ... 14 29 148 
 
 October and November 12 23 90 
 
 In considering the above table it should be pointed 
 out that a large proportion of the losses shown under the 
 heading "Ships unescorted" took place amongst ships 
 which had either dispersed from a convoy or which were 
 on their way to join up with a convoy at the port of 
 assembly. It was unfortunately quite impossible to provide 
 escorts for all ships either to their ports of discharge or from 
 their loading ports to the ports of assembly for the convoy, 
 as we had so few vessels available for this work. Thus, 
 in the month of November, 1917, out of 18 vessels 
 engaged in the main oversea trade that were lost, 6 
 were in convoy, 5 had left or had not joined their 
 convoy, and 2 were not joining a convoy and were 
 unescorted. 
 
 November was the month of smallest British losses 
 during the period of unrestricted warfare in 1917, and it 
 
 K 
 
146 
 
 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 is of interest to examine the losses for that month. The 
 total number of ships lost was 51. As many as 1,197 
 vessels entered or left home waters in overseas trade 
 exclusive of the Mediterranean trade. Of this aggregate 
 87.5 per cent, were in convoy, and the total number 
 of these vessels sunk (13) was divided amongst the 
 following trades : North America, 1 ; Gibraltar, 5 ; 
 West Africa and South America, 1 ; the Bay of Biscay, 
 Portugal and Spanish ports west of Gibraltar, 5 ; Scan- 
 dinavian, 1. In the same month there were 2,159 cross- 
 Channel sailings and ten losses, nine of these vessels 
 being unescorted. 
 
 Particulars of the locahty of the total British losses 
 of 51 ships for the month of November are as follows : 
 
 East Coast north of St. Abb's 
 
 1 
 
 East Coast between St. Abb's and Yarmouth 
 
 4 
 
 East Coast, Yarmouth to the Downs 
 
 ... 4* 
 
 English Channel 
 
 ... 21t 
 
 Bristol Channel ... 
 
 4 
 
 Irish Sea 
 
 2 
 
 Bay of Biscay ... 
 
 .. 2 
 
 South of Cape St. Vincent ... 
 
 1 
 
 Mediterranean 
 
 .. 11 
 
 East of Suez ... 
 
 .. It 
 
 *2 by mine. t 7 by mine. J By min 
 
 e. 
 
 In order to give some idea of the great volume of 
 traffic on the East Coast and the consequent difficulty 
 of affording proper protection, it may be mentioned that 
 in the month of October, 1917, the number of vessels 
 passing between Spurn Head (River Humber) and 
 St. Abb's Head (to the northward) was 740 going north 
 and 920 going south. Of this total only 223 of the 
 
The Convoy System at Work 147 
 
 northward- and 413 of the southward-bound vessels were 
 in convoy or under escort, the total losses being eleven, 
 all amongst the unaccompanied ships. 
 
 iMention should be made here of the very serious 
 situation which arose during the year 1917 owing to 
 the success attending the attacks by enemy submarines 
 on oil tankers bringing oil fuel to the United Kingdom 
 for the use of the Fleet. A great many of these tank 
 vessels were of great length and slow speed and presented 
 the easiest of targets to the torpedo attack of a submerged 
 submarine. So many vessels were sunk that our reserve 
 of oil fuel became perilously low. Instead of a reserve 
 of some five or six months we w^ere gradually reduced 
 to one of about eight w^eeks, and in order to economize 
 expenditure of fuel it actually became necessary at one 
 time to issue directions that the speed of oil-burning war- 
 ships was to be limited except in cases of the greatest 
 urgency. Such an order in war w^as a matter of much 
 gravity; the great majority of our light cruisers and 
 destroyers were fitted to burn oil fuel only, as well 
 as our latest and most powerful battleships. The crisis 
 was eventually overcome by drawing upon every source 
 (including the Grand Fleet) for destroyers to escort the 
 tankers through the submarine danger areas, and by the 
 assistance given us by the Ministry of Shipping in bring- 
 ing supplies of oil fuel to this country in the double 
 bottoms of merchant ships. By the end of 1917 the 
 situation had greatly improved. 
 
 The losses of shipping during 1917 were particularly 
 heavy in the Mediterranean. Apart from the fact that 
 the narrow waters of that sea render difficult a policy 
 of evasion on the part of merchant shipping and give 
 great advantages to the submarine, it was thought that 
 the heavy losses in the early part of the year were 
 
148 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 partly due to the method of routeing the ships then in 
 force, and in reply to representations made to the French 
 Admiralty this system was altered by the French Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. It should be noted that the Mediter- 
 ranean outside the Adriatic was under French naval 
 control in accordance with the agreement entered into 
 with France and Italy. The cordial co-operation of the 
 French Admiralty with us, and the manner in which our 
 proposals were met, form very pleasant memories of my 
 term of office at the Admiralty. During the greater 
 part of the year 1917 Admiral Lacaze was Minister of 
 Marine, whilst Admiral de Bon held office as Chief of the 
 Naval Staff during the whole year. Nothing could exceed 
 the courtesy extended to me by these distinguished officers, 
 for whom I conceived great admiration and respect. 
 
 The result of the altered arrangement was a decided 
 but temporary improvement, and the losses again became 
 serious during the summer months. I then deemed it 
 desirable that the control of the traffic should be placed in 
 the hands of officers stationed at Malta, this being a central 
 position from which any necessary change in the arrange- 
 ments could be made more rapidly and with greater facility 
 than by the French Commander-in-Chief, who was also 
 controlling fleet movements and who, for this reason alone, 
 was not in a position to act quickly. 
 
 A unified command in the Mediterranean would 
 undoubtedly have been the most satisfactory and efficient 
 system to adopt, but the time was not ripe for proposing 
 that solution in 1917, and the alternative was adopted of 
 British control of the traffic routes throughout the whole 
 Mediterranean Sea subject to the general charge of the 
 French Commander-in-Chief which was necessary in 
 such an eventuality arising as an attempted " break out " 
 of the Austrian Fleet. 
 
The Convoy System at Work 149 
 
 Accordingly, with the consent of the French and 
 Itahan Admiralties, Vice- Admiral the Hon. Sir Somerset 
 Gough-Calthorpe, K.C.B., was dispatched to the Mediter- 
 ranean as British Commander-in-Chief ; he was in control 
 generally of all British Naval forces in the Mediterranean, 
 and especially in charge of all the arrangements for the 
 protection of trade and for anti-submarine operations, the 
 patrol vessels of all the nationalities concerned being placed 
 under his immediate orders for the purpose, whilst 
 the whole of the Mediterranean remained under the 
 general control of Vice- Admiral Gauchet, the French 
 Commander-in-Chief. Admiral Calthorpe was assisted by 
 French and Italian officers, and the Japanese Government, 
 which had previously dispatched twelve destroyers to the 
 Mediterranean to assist in the protection of trade, also gave 
 to Admiral Calthorpe the control of these vessels. 
 
 In the requests which we addressed to the Japanese 
 Admiralty I always received great assistance from 
 Admiral Funakoshi, the Naval Attache in London. His 
 co-operation was of a close and most cordial nature. 
 
 The services of the Japanese destroyers in the Medi- 
 terranean were of considerable value to the Allied cause. 
 A striking instance of the seamanlike and gallant conduct 
 of their officers and men was furnished on the occasion 
 of the torpedoing of a British transport by an enemy 
 submarine off the coast of Italy, when by the work of 
 the Japanese escorting destroyers the great majority of 
 those on board were saved. 
 
 Admiral Calthorpe on leaving England was charged 
 with the duty of organizing convoys in the Mediterranean 
 on the lines of those already in force in other waters as 
 soon as the necessary vessels were available, and a con- 
 ference of Allied officers sat at Malta soon after his arrival, 
 when a definite scheme of convoy was prepared. There 
 
150 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 had always, however, been a great scarcity of fast patrol 
 vessels in the Mediterranean for this work. Divided 
 control of the forces in that area was partly responsible 
 for this. The Austrian destroyers were considered by the 
 Italian Admiralty to be so serious a menace in the Adriatic 
 as to render it necessary to keep in that sea the great 
 majority of the Italian destroyers as well as several French 
 vessels of this class. The situation at the eastern end of 
 the Mediterranean necessitated a force of some eight 
 British destroyers being kept in the ^gean Sea to deal 
 with any Turkish vessels that might attempt to force the 
 blockade of the Dardanelles, .whilst operations on the 
 Syrian coast engaged the services of some French and 
 British destroyers. Continual troop movements in the 
 Mediterranean also absorbed the services of a considerable 
 number of vessels of this type. 
 
 Consequently there was a great shortage of fast small 
 craft for escort and mercantile convoy work. It was 
 estimated that the escort force required for the protection 
 of a complete system of convoy in the Mediterranean was 
 approximately 290 vessels, the total number available 
 being about 215. 
 
 In spite, then, of the success of Admiral Calthorpe's 
 work, the result was that convoys were not started in the 
 Mediterranean until October, and they were then but 
 inadequately protected, and losses were heavy, both from 
 this cause and from the fact already mentioned — that the 
 Mediterranean is a sea which, by reason of its confined 
 nature, is particularly suited for operations by submarines 
 against trade. Its narrowness at various points, such as 
 the Straits of Gibraltar, the Malta Channel, the Straits 
 of Messina, and the passages to the ^gean cause such 
 convergence of trade as to make it a very simple matter 
 for a submarine to operate .with success. Evasion by 
 
The Convoy System at Work 151 
 
 change of route is almost impossible. Operations designed 
 to prevent the exit of submarines from the Adriatic were 
 difficult, because the depth of water in the Straits of 
 Otranto militated against the adoption of effective mining 
 and the laying of an effective net barrage. 
 
 For the above reasons the Admiralty was always very 
 averse to the sending of a large volume of our Far East- 
 ern trade through the Mediterranean, and strongly urged 
 the Cape route instead ; but the shortage of shipping, 
 combined with the increased length of the Cape route, 
 influenced the Ministry of Shipping to press strongly for 
 the Mediterranean as opposed to the other route. A 
 "through" convoy from England to Port Said was 
 started in October, and by the end of November two 
 ships had been sunk out of the thirty-five that had been 
 under convoy. The return convoy, Port Said to 
 England, was only started in December. 
 
 The losses of British merchant steamships per 
 quarter in the Mediterranean during 1917 is shown 
 below : 
 
 Quarter ending June 80 ... ... ... 69 
 
 ,, ,, September 80 ... ... 29 
 
 October and November ... ... ... 28 
 
 It is impossible to close this chapter describing the 
 convoys without mention being made of the fine work 
 accomplished by those upon whose shoulders fell the task 
 of organizing and working the whole system. I cannot 
 hope that I have succeeded in conveying to readers of 
 this volume an adequate conception of the great and 
 marvellously successful performance that it was or a full 
 appreciation of ^vhat immense difficulties the staff had 
 to contend ^th. They were very completely realized by 
 
152 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 me, who saw them appear day by day and disappear under 
 treatment. 
 
 The head of the organization jvas, of course, Rear- 
 Admiral A. L. Duff, the member of the Board and Staff 
 immediately responsible also for the whole anti-submarine 
 organization. Only those who witnessed Admiral Duff's 
 work at the Admiralty during 1917 can realize the 
 immense debt that the country owes to his untiring ability, 
 patience, energy and resource. Capt. R. G. Henderson, 
 who had been associated with the convoy system from its 
 start, was an invaluable assistant, as also was Commander 
 I. W. Carrington. Capt. Richard Webb, the Director 
 of the Trade Division, and Capt. Frederic A. Whitehead, 
 the Director of the Mercantile Movements Division, took 
 an important share in the work of organization, whilst the 
 work of Convoy Manager was carried through with quite 
 exceptional skill by Paymaster-Commander H. W. E. 
 Manisty. These officers were assisted by most capable 
 staffs, and the Ministry of Shipping, without whose 
 assistance the work could not possibly have been success- 
 fully carried out, co-operated most cordially. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES ; OUR NAVAL POLICY 
 
 EXPLAINED 
 
 The entry of the United States of America into the jvar 
 in April, 1917, had an important although not an imme- 
 diate effect upon our Naval policy. That the effect was 
 not immediate was due to the fact that the United States 
 Navy was at the time indifferently provided with the par- 
 ticular classes of vessels which were so greatly needed for 
 submarine warfare, viz. destroyers and other small surface 
 craft, submarines and light cruisers; further, the United 
 States mercantile fleet did not include any considerable 
 number of small craft which could be usefully employed 
 for patrol and escort duty. The armed forces of the United 
 States of America were also poorly equipped with aircraft, 
 and had none available for Naval work. According to our 
 knowledge at the time the United States Navy, in April, 
 1917, possessed twenty-three large and about twenty-four 
 small destroyers, some of which were unfit to cross the 
 Atlantic ; there were about twelve submarines capable of 
 working overseas, but not well suited for anti-submarine 
 work, and only three light cruisers of the " Chester " class. 
 On the other hand about seven armoured cruisers were 
 available in Atlantic waters for convoy duties, and the 
 Navy included a fine force of battleships, of which fourteen 
 were in full commission in April. 
 
 At first, therefore, it was clear that the assistance 
 .which could be given to the Allied Navies would be but. 
 
 153 
 
154 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 slight even if all available destroyers were sent to European 
 waters. This ,was, presumably, well known to the members 
 of the German Naval Staff, and possibly explains their 
 view that the entry of the United States of America :would 
 be of little help to the Allied cause. The Germans did 
 not, however, make sufficient allowance for the productive 
 power of the United States, and perhaps also it was 
 thought in Germany that public opinion in the United 
 States would not allow the Navy Department to send over 
 to European waters such destroyers and other vessels of 
 value in anti-submarine warfare as were available at once 
 or would be available as time progressed. The German 
 Staff may have had in mind the situation during the 
 Spanish-American War when the fact of Admiral 
 Cervera's weak and inefficient squadron being at large was 
 sufficient to affect adversely the naval strategy of the 
 United States to a considerable extent and to paralyze the 
 work of the United States Navy in an offensive direction. 
 Very fortunately for the Allied cause a most dis- 
 tinguished officer of the United States Navy, Vice- 
 Admiral W. S. Sims, came to this country to report 
 on the situation and to command such forces as were 
 sent to European waters. Admiral Sims, in his earlier 
 career before reaching the flag list, was a gunnery officer 
 of the very first rank. He had assimilated the ideas of 
 Sir Percy Scott of our own Navy, who had revolutionized 
 British naval gunnery, and he had succeeded, in his 
 position as Inspector of Target Practice in the United 
 States Navy, in producing a very marked increase in 
 gunnery efficiency. Later when in command, first of a 
 battleship, then of the destroyer flotillas, and finally as 
 head of the United States Naval War College, his close 
 study of naval strategy and tactics had peculiarly fitted 
 him for the important post for which he was selected, and 
 
Entry of the United States 155 
 
 he not only held the soundest views on such subjects 
 himself, but was able, by dint of the tact and persuasive 
 eloquence that had carried him successfully through his 
 gunnery difficulties, to impress his views on others. 
 
 Admiral Sims, from the first moment of his arrival 
 in this country, was in the closest touch with the 
 Admiralty in general and with myself in particular. His 
 earliest question to me was as to the direction in which 
 the United States Navy could afford assistance to the 
 Allied cause. My reply was that the first essential was 
 the dispatch to European waters of every available 
 destroyer, trawler, yacht, tug and other small craft of 
 sufficient speed to deal with submarines, other vessels of 
 these classes following as fast as they could be produced ; 
 further that submarines and light cruisers would also be 
 of great value as they became available. Admiral Sims 
 responded wholeheartedly to my requests. He urged the 
 Navy Department with all his force to send these vessels 
 and send them quickly. He frequently telegraphed to the 
 United States figures showing the tonnage of merchant 
 ships being sunk week by week in order to impress on the 
 Navy Department and Government the great urgency of 
 the situation. I furnished him with figures which even we 
 ourselves were not publishing, as I felt that nothing but the 
 knowledge given by these figures could impress those who 
 were removed by 8,000 miles of sea from the scene of 
 a Naval war unique in many of its features. 
 
 Meanwhile the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in 
 North American waters, Vice-Admiral Sir Montague 
 Browning, had been directed to confer with the United 
 States Navy Department and to point out our immediate, 
 requirements and explain the general situation. 
 
 On April 6 the United States declared war on Grer- 
 many. On April 13 jve received infonnation from Wash- 
 
156 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 ington that the Navy Department was arranging to 
 co-operate with our forces for the protection of trade in 
 the West Atlantic should any enemy raiders escape from 
 the North Sea, that six United States destroyers would 
 be sent to European waters in the immediate future, and 
 that the United States would undertake the protection 
 of trade on the west coast of Canada and North America 
 as well as in the Gulf of Mexico. It was further indicated 
 that the number of United States destroyers for European 
 waters would be increased at an early date. The vital 
 importance of this latter step was being constantly urged 
 by Admiral Sims. 
 
 When Mr. Balfour's mission left for the United States 
 in April, Rear- Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, the 
 naval representative on the mission, was requested to 
 do all in his power to impress on the United States 
 Navy Department the very urgent necessity that existed 
 for the immediate provision of small craft for anti- 
 submarine operations in European waters and for the 
 protection of trade. 
 
 He was informed that the position could not be con- 
 sidered satisfactory until the number of trawlers and sloops 
 available for patrol and escort duty was greatly increased 
 and that a total of at least another hundred destroyers was 
 required. 
 
 It was pointed out that difficulty might arise from the 
 natural desire of the United States Government to retain 
 large numbers of small craft for the protection of ship- 
 ping in the vicinity of the United States coast, but it 
 was at the same time indicated that our experience showed 
 that the number of submarines that the Germans could 
 maintain on the western side of the Atlantic was very 
 small, and that the real danger therefore existed in 
 European .waters. 
 
Entry of the United States 157 
 
 Admiral de Chair was asked amongst other matters 
 to emphasize the assistance which United States sub- 
 marines could render on the eastern side of the Atlantic, 
 where they would be able to undertake anti-submarine 
 operations, and he was also directed to endeavour to 
 obtain assistance in the production of mines, and the 
 provision of ships for minelaying work. Great stress 
 ,was, of course, laid upon the very important question of 
 a large output of merchant ships and the necessity for 
 repairing and putting into service the German merchant 
 ships interned in U.S. ports was urged; directions were 
 also given to Admiral de Chair to ascertain from Mr. 
 Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel Company, and other 
 firms, to what extent they could build for the British 
 Navy destroyers, sloops, trawlers and submarines, and the 
 rapidity of such production. 
 
 The need for sloops was so great that I sent a 
 personal telegram to Mr. Schwab, w^hose acquaintance I 
 had made in October, 1914, on the occasion of the loss 
 of the Audacious, begging him to build at once a hundred 
 of these vessels to our order. I felt certain from the 
 experience we had gained of Mr. Schwab's wonderful 
 energy and power, as illustrated by the work accomplished 
 by him in providing us in 1915 with ten submarines built 
 in the extraordinarily short period of five months, that 
 he would produce sloops at a very rapid rate and that 
 there w^ould be no delay in starting if he undertook the 
 work. The drawings had already been sent over. Haw- 
 ever he was not able to undertake the work as the U.S. 
 Government decided that his yards would all be required 
 for their own work. This was unfortunate, as I had hoped 
 that these vessels would have been built in from four to six 
 months, seeing that the drawings w^ere actually ready ; they 
 would have been invaluable in the latter part of 1917. 
 
158 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Whilst the mission jvas in the United States constant 
 communications passed on these subjects, the heavy losses 
 taking place in merchant ships were stated, and every 
 effort was made to impress upon the Navy Department 
 the urgency of the situation. 
 
 The tenor of our communications will be gathered 
 from these quotations from a personal telegram sent by 
 me to Admiral de Chair on April 26, viz. : 
 
 " For Rear-Admiral de Chair from First Sea Lord. 
 
 " You must emphasize most strongly to the United States 
 authorities the very serious nature of the shipping position. 
 We lost 55 British ships last week approximately 180,000 tons 
 and rate of loss is not diminishing. 
 
 ****** 
 
 " Press most strongly that the number of destroyers sent 
 to Ireland should be increased to twenty-four at once if this 
 number is available. 
 
 " Battleships are not required but concentration on the 
 vital question of defeat of submarine menace is essential. 
 
 " TJrge on the authorities that everything should give way 
 to the submarine menace and that by far the most important 
 place on which to concentrate patrols is the S.W. of Ireland. 
 ****** 
 
 " You must keep constantly before the U.S. authorities 
 the great gravity of the situation and the need that exists for 
 immediate action. 
 
 " Our new methods will not be effective until July and the 
 critical period is April to July." 
 
 It was very necessary to bring home to the United 
 States Navy Department the need for early action. 
 Admiral Sims inforaied me — as soon as he became aware 
 of the heavy losses to merchant shipping that were taking 
 place — that neither he nor anyone else in the United States 
 had realized that the situation was so serious. This jvas, 
 of course, largely due to the necessity which we were under 
 
Entry of the United States 159 
 
 of not publishing facts which would encourage the enemy 
 or unduly depress our own people. Further, he informed 
 me that an idea was prevalent in the United States that 
 the moral of the German submarine crews had been com- 
 pletely broken by their losses in submarines. This im- 
 pression was the successful result of certain action on our 
 part taken with intent to discourage the enemy. What- 
 ever may have been the case later in the year, we had, 
 however, no evidence in the spring of 1917 of deterioration 
 of moral amongst German submarine crews, nor was there 
 any reason for such a result. It was therefore necessary 
 to be quite frank with Admiral Sims ; we knew quite well 
 that we could not expect new measures to be effective for 
 some few months, and we knew also that we could not 
 afford a continuance of the heavy rate of loss experienced 
 in April, without a serious effect being produced upon 
 our w^ar effort. We were certainly not in the state of 
 panic which has been ascribed to us in certain quarters, 
 but we did want those who were engaged in the war on the 
 side of the Allies to understand the situation in order that 
 they might realize the value that early naval assistance 
 would bring to the Allied cause. There is no doubt that 
 great difficulty must be experienced by those far removed 
 from the theatre of war in understanding the conditions in 
 the war zone. This was exemplified at a time when we had 
 organized the trade in convoys and the system was showing 
 itself effective in greatly reducing losses from submarine 
 attack. We were pressing the United States to strengthen 
 our escorting forces as far as possible in order to extend the 
 convoy system, when a telegram arrived from Washington 
 to the effect that it was considered that ships which were 
 armed were safer when sailing singly than when in convoy. 
 It has also been stated that the Admiralty held the view 
 at this time that no solution of the problem created by 
 
i6o The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 the enemy's submarine campaign was in sight. This is 
 incorrect. We had confidence in the measures — most of 
 them dependent on the manufacture of material — which 
 were in course of preparation by the time the United 
 States entered the war, but our opinion was that there 
 was no immediate solution beyond the provision of 
 additional vessels for the protection of shipping, and the 
 reason for this view was that time was required before other 
 measures could be put into effective operation ; this is 
 evident from the final paragraph of my telegram to 
 Admiral de Chair, dated April 26, which I have quoted. 
 
 The first division of six United States destroyers, 
 under the command of Lieut. -Commander T. K. Taussig, 
 arrived in British waters on May 2, and they were most 
 welcome. It was interesting to me personally that 
 Lieut. -Commander Taussig should be in command, as 
 he, when a sub-lieutenant, had been wounded on the 
 same day as myself during the Boxer campaign in China, 
 and we had been together for some time subsequently. 
 
 At about this time our advice was sought by the 
 United States Navy Department as to the best type of 
 anti-submarine craft for the United States to build ; on 
 this subject a very short experience in the war theatre 
 caused Admiral Sims to hold precisely similar views to 
 myself. As a result of the advice tendered a great build- 
 ing programme of destroyers, large submarine-hunting 
 motor launches and other small craft was embarked upon. 
 Although the completion of these vessels was delayed 
 considerably beyond anticipated dates, they did, in 1918, 
 exercise an influence on the submarine war. 
 
 The Germans made one great mistake, for which 
 we were thankful. As already mentioned, it was 
 anticipated that they would send submarines to work 
 off the United States coast immediately after the declara- 
 
Xfl 
 
 A 
 
Entry of the United States i6i 
 
 tion of war by that country. Indeed we were expecting 
 to hear of the presence of submarines in the West Atlantic 
 throughout the whole of 1917. They did not appear 
 there until May, 1918. The moral effect of such action 
 in 1917 would have been very great and might possibly 
 have led to the retention in the United States of some of 
 the destroyers and other small craft which were of such 
 assistance in European waters in starting the convoy 
 system. Admiral Sims was himself, I think, anxious on 
 this head. When the Germans did move in this direction 
 in 1918 it was too late ; it was by that time realized in 
 the United States that the enemy could not maintain 
 submarines in sufficient numbers in their waters to exercise 
 any decisive effect, although the shipping losses might be 
 considerable for a time, and consequently no large change 
 of policy was made. 
 
 As is well known, Admiral Sims, vidth the consent of 
 the United States Navy Department, placed all vessels 
 which were dispatched to British waters under the British 
 flag officers in whose Command they were working. This 
 sftep, which at once produced unity of command, is 
 typical of the manner in which the two navies, under the 
 guidance of their senior officers, worked together through- 
 out the war. The destroyers operating from Queenstown 
 came under Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly ; Captain Pringle, 
 the senior United States officer on the spot, whose services 
 were ever of the utmost value, was appointed as Chief 
 of the Staff to Sir Lewis Bayly, whilst on the occasion 
 of Sir Lewis Bayly, at my urgent suggestion, consent- 
 ing to take a few days' leave in the summer of 1917, 
 Admiral Sims, at our request, took his place at Queens- 
 town, hoisting his flag in command of the British and 
 United States naval forces. The relations between the 
 officers and men of the two navies in this Command were 
 
i62 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 of the happiest possible nature, and form one of the 
 pleasantest episodes of the co-operation between the two 
 nations. The United States officers and men very quickly 
 realized the strong personality of the Commander-in-Chief 
 at Queenstown, and became imbued with the same feelings 
 of great respect and admiration for him as were held by 
 British officers and men. Also he made the officers feel 
 that Admiralty House, Queenstown, was their home when 
 in port, and saw that everything possible was done for 
 the comfort of the men. The very high standard of 
 duty set by Sir Lewis, and very fully sustained by him, 
 was cheerfully and willingly followed by the United 
 States force, the personnel of which earned his warmest 
 admiration. I think it will be agreed in years to come 
 that the comradeship between the two navies, first 
 initiated in the Queenstown Command, went very far 
 towards cementing the bonds of union between the two 
 great English-speaking nations. 
 
 This was the first step in co-operation. The next was 
 taken when the United States Navy Department, as the 
 result of a request made by us to Admiral Sims, sent to 
 Gibraltar a detachment of three light cruisers and a 
 number of revenue cutters as patrol and escort vessels, 
 placing the whole force under the British senior naval 
 officer at Gibraltar, Rear- Admiral Heathcote Grant. 
 Here again the relations between the two navies were 
 of the happiest nature. Finally, later in the year, I 
 discussed with Admiral Sims the desirability of a small 
 force of United States battleships being sent to reinforce 
 the Grand Fleet. 
 
 When the project was first mentioned my object in 
 asking for the ships was that they might relieve some of 
 our earlier "Dreadnoughts," which at that time it was 
 desired to use for another purpose. I discussed the matter 
 
Entry of the United States 163 
 
 also with Admiral Mayo, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
 United States Atlantic Fleet, during his visit to this 
 country in August, 1917, and with Admiral Benson, the 
 Chief of Operations in the United States Navy Depart- 
 ment, when he came over later in the year. Admiral 
 Benson gave directions that four coal-burning battleships 
 should be sent over. We were obliged to ask for coal- 
 burning battleships instead of the more modern vessels 
 with oil-fired boilers owing to the great shortage of oil 
 fuel in this country and the danger of our reserves being 
 still further depleted. These vessels, under Rear- Admiral 
 Hugh Rodman, arrived in British waters early in Decem- 
 ber, 1917, and formed a division of the Grand Fleet. The 
 co-operation afloat was now complete, and all that was 
 needed was further co-operation between the British 
 Admiralty and the United States Navy Department. 
 
 This had already formed the subject of discussions, 
 first between Admiral Sims and myself, and later with 
 Admirals Mayo and Benson. 
 
 During the summer of 1917 Admiral Sims had been 
 invited to attend the daily meetings of the naval members 
 of the operations side of the Board, an invitation which 
 he accepted, and his co-operation was of great value ; but 
 we both felt it desirable to go a step farther, and I had 
 suggested the extreme desirability of the United States 
 Navy Department sending officers of experience of 
 different ranks to work in the Admiralty, both on the 
 operations and material side, officers upon whom the 
 Navy Department could rely to place before us the views 
 of the Department and to transmit their view of the 
 situation as the result of their work and experience at 
 the Admiralty. We had pressed strongly for the adop- 
 tion of this course. Admiral Benson, after discussions, 
 assented to it, and the officers on the material side com- 
 
164 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 menced work in the Admiralty towards the end of 1917, 
 whilst those on the operations side joined the War Staff 
 early in 1918. 
 
 It was felt that this course would complete the 
 co-operation between the navies of the two countries 
 and, further, that the United States Navy Department 
 would be kept in the closest possible touch with the British 
 Admiralty in all respects. 
 
 It is particularly to be remembered that even before 
 we had established this close liaison the whole of the 
 United States naval forces in British waters had been 
 placed under the command of British naval officers. 
 This step, so conducive to good results owing to the unity 
 of command which was thus obtained, won our 
 highest admiration, showing as it did a fine spirit of 
 self-effacement on the part of the senior American naval 
 officers. 
 
 The visits of Admirals Mayo and Benson to this 
 country were productive of very good results. The 
 exchange of information which took place w'as most 
 beneficial, as was the experience which the admirals 
 gained of modern naval warfare. Moreover, the utterly 
 baseless suggestion which had, unfortunately, found 
 expression in some organs of the Press of the United 
 States that we were not giving the fullest information to 
 the Navy Department was completely disproved. 
 
 When Admiral Mayo arrived in England he informed 
 me that the main objects of his visit as Commander-in- 
 Chief of the Atlantic Fleet were : 
 
 (1) To ascertain our present policy and plans. 
 
 (2) To inquire as to the changes, if any, that 
 were contemplated in the immediate or more distant 
 future. 
 
Entry of the United States 165 
 
 (3) To ascertain .what further assistance it was 
 desired that the United States should provide from 
 resources then available or likely to be soon available, 
 and the measures that the United States should take 
 to provide future forces and material. 
 
 Papers were prepared under my direction for Admiral 
 Mayo giving full information of our immediate needs, of 
 past procedure and of future plans. As to our needs, the 
 main requests were : 
 
 (1) An increase in the number of destroj^ers, in 
 order to enlarge the convoy system and to provide 
 better protection for each convoy. An additional 
 55 destroyers were stated to be required for this 
 service. 
 
 (2) An increase in the number of convoy cruisers 
 for the same reason. The total addition of cruisers 
 or old battleships was given as 41. 
 
 (3) An increase in the number of patrol craft, 
 tugs, etc., for anti-submarine work. 
 
 (4) The rapid building of merchant ships. 
 
 (5) The supply of a large number of mines for 
 the proposed barrage in the North Sea, and assist- 
 ance towards laying them by the provision of United 
 States minelaying vessels. 
 
 (6) Aircraft assistance in the shape of three large 
 seaplane stations on the coast of Ireland, with some 
 36 machines at each station. 
 
 (7) The provision of four coal-burning battleships 
 of the "Dreadnought" type to replace Grand 
 Fleet "Dreadnought" battleships which it was 
 desired to use for other purposes. 
 
 Admiral Mayo was informed that some 100,000 mines 
 
i66 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 would be required from the Americans for forming and 
 maintaining that portion of the North Sea Barrage which 
 it was suggested should be laid by them, in addition to 
 the large number that it was proposed that we ourselves 
 should lay in the barrage, and that as the barrage would 
 need patrolling by a large number of small craft, great 
 help would be afforded if the United States could provide 
 some of these vessels. It was estimated at that time that 
 the barrage would absorb the services of some 250 small 
 vessels in order that a sufficient number might be kept 
 constantly on patrol. 
 
 It may be of interest to give the history of the North 
 Sea Barrage so far as I can recollect it. Our views on 
 such a scheme were sought by the United States Navy 
 Department in the spring of 1917. Owing to various 
 military circumstances, even at that time we had no pros- 
 pect of obtaining mines in adequate numbers for such 
 work for at least nine to twelve months, nor could we 
 provide the necessary craft to patrol the barrage. Our 
 view was that such mines as became available during the 
 last months of 1917 would be more effective if laid nearer 
 to the German North Sea naval bases, and in the Straits 
 of Dover, than at such a distance from these bases as 
 the suggestion involved. Apart from our desire to stop 
 the submarines near their bases, the pros and cons 
 of the scheme were as follows : 
 
 The advantages were : 
 
 (1) That, except for the difficulty of preventing 
 the submarines from using Norwegian territorial 
 waters for egress, a North Sea Barrage would 
 be a menace to submarines using the Kattegat 
 exit as well as those coming from North Sea bases. 
 
 (2) That the enemy would be unable to sweep up 
 
Entry of the United States 167 
 
 the minefield, owing to its distance (over 200 miles) 
 from his bases. 
 
 The disadvantages were : 
 
 (1) The immense number of mines required — 
 some 120,000, excluding reserves — and the improb- 
 ability of producing them in Great Britain. 
 
 (2) The great depth of water in .which many of 
 them were to be moored, a depth in which no mines 
 had ever been successfully laid before; time would 
 be required to devise arrangements that would enable 
 the mines to be laid at such depths. 
 
 (3) The very large number of patrol craft that 
 would be needed to force submarines to dive into 
 that portion of the minefield which was safe for 
 surface vessels and the difficulty of maintaining them 
 at sea in bad North Sea weather. 
 
 (4) The difficulty of preventing egress by the sub- 
 marines in Norwegian territorial waters, in which, 
 even if mines were laid, they would have to be 
 moored at such a depth as not to constitute a danger to 
 vessels on the surface. 
 
 Shortly after the subject was broached to us we 
 learned that the United States Navy had devised a mine 
 that it was expected would be satisfactory for the purpose 
 of the barrage. An experienced mining officer was at 
 once sent over by us to inspect the mine and to give to 
 the United States officers such assistance as was possible 
 due to his great knowledge of mining under war 
 conditions. 
 
 When he arrived in the United States the mine was 
 still in the experimental stage, but later he reported that 
 it promised to be successful, and in view of the great 
 manufacturing resources in America, it appeared that a 
 
i68 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 considerable proportion of the mines for the barrage could 
 be provided by the United States Navy. Our own efforts 
 to produce a mine suitable for very great depths were also 
 proving successful and anticipations as to manufacture 
 were optimistic. Accordingly plans were prepared for 
 a barrage across the North Sea, which were given to 
 Admiral Mayo before he left England on his return to 
 the United States. Without seriously relaxing our 
 mining operations in the Heligoland Bight, and without 
 interfering with our mine barrage on the Folkestone — 
 Grisnez line, we anticipated at this time that we could 
 provide mines for our portion of the North Sea Barrage 
 by the time that the United States supply of mines was 
 in readiness to be laid. 
 
 Admiral Mayo was also furnished with papers dealing 
 at length with our naval policy at the time and the 
 intended future policy, both in home waters and abroad. 
 Papers were given him relating to our air policy, to 
 the attitude of neutral countries, to the Belgian coast 
 problem, to the blockade, to the defence of trade (includ- 
 ing one on the convoy system), to such subjects as the 
 defensive armament of merchant ships with guns, smoke 
 apparatus and mine defence gear, the instruction of 
 the personnel in their use, and the system of issuing 
 route instruction to merchant ships. An important state- 
 ment was also supplied giving a detailed account of our 
 anti-submarine policy, both at the time and in the future. 
 
 These papers gave the fullest information on the 
 naval problem, and were intended to put the United 
 States Naval Department in a position to appreciate the 
 whole position and its many embarrassments, though jve 
 realized that these could be appreciated only by those 
 who, like Admiral Sims, were in daily contact with the 
 problems. It will possibly be of further interest if 
 
Entry of the United States 169 
 
 mention is made of some of the points to which attention 
 was drawn. 
 
 Admiral Mayo, for instance, was informed that 
 British naval policy was being directed in 1917, as during 
 the remainder of the war, to exerting constant economic 
 pressure upon the enemy with a view to forcing him to 
 come to terms. We also endeavoured to prevent the 
 enemy from interfering with the conduct of the war by 
 ourselves and our Allies. In the effective pursuit of that 
 policy the duty of the Navy involved : 
 
 (1) The protection of the sea communications of 
 the Allied armies and the protection of British and 
 Allied trade. 
 
 (2) The prevention of enemy trade in order to 
 interfere with his military operations and to exert 
 economic pressure. 
 
 (3) Resistance to invasion and raids. 
 
 It was pointed out that the question at issue in each 
 case was the control of sea communications, and in order 
 to attain that control permanently and completely the 
 enemy's naval forces both above and below water had to 
 be destroyed or effectually masked. As the weaker 
 German Fleet not unnaturally refused decisive action and 
 as its destruction had hitherto not been achieved, we 
 had adopted a policy of guarding an area between our 
 vital communications and the enemy's ports, and of 
 guarding the areas through which the trade and transports 
 passed ; these were the only methods of frustrating attacks 
 made either by surface vessels or by submarines which 
 succeeded in reaching open .waters. It was pointed out 
 that a combination of these two methods had been in force 
 during the wars of the eighteenth century, blockades 
 being combined with the convoy system and the patrol 
 
170 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 of local areas by frigates, etc. History, in fact, was 
 repeating itself. 
 
 We mentioned that a close blockade of the German 
 North Sea and Baltic ports presented insuperable diffi- 
 culties under the conditions of modern warfare, and the 
 alternative of controlling the Dover and Norway — 
 Scotland exits to the North Sea had been adopted. The 
 former protected the communications of the armies in 
 France, whilst the two combined covered the maritime 
 communications of the world outside the North Sea and 
 Baltic, and if they could be effectively guarded our first 
 two objects would be attained. 
 
 So far as the Dover exit was concerned we stated 
 that the narrowness of the waters, with the consequent 
 risk to the enemy from our mines and torpedoes, had so 
 far acted as a deterrent to his capital ships ; we had to 
 depend on the light forces at Harwich and Dover to deal 
 with any enemy surface craft attacking the southern area 
 from German ports. 
 
 We pointed out that the control of the Norway — 
 Scotland exit depended upon the presence of the Grand 
 Fleet at Rosyth or at Scapa. This fleet ensured the 
 safety of all the vessels engaged in protecting trade and 
 in hunting submarines outside the North Sea. 
 
 Mention was made of the fact that the enemy could 
 not open the sea routes for his own war ships without 
 risking a serious action, and that so far he had shown no 
 inclination to run that risk. The Battle of Jutland having 
 been fought in the previous year, any future movement of 
 the High Sea Fleet into the North Sea would probably 
 be merely with the object of drawing our capital ships into 
 prepared areas so as to bring about a process of attrition 
 by mines and torpedoes. Such a movement had been 
 carried out on August 19, 1916. The reasons which had 
 
Entry of the United States 171 
 
 led to the adoption of the Orkney — Faroe — Iceland 
 blockade line were also explained. 
 
 It jvas pointed out that in the early stages of the war, 
 the foregoing general dispositions had sufficed to protect 
 the Allies' communications and to throttle those of the 
 enemy outside the Baltic. Although enemy cruisers in 
 foreign waters and a few raiding vessels which had evaded 
 the blockade had inflicted losses on trade, losses from such 
 causes could not reach really serious proportions so long 
 as the enemy trusted to evasion and refused to face the 
 Grand Fleet. The danger of serious loss from attack by 
 raiding surface craft had also been greatly minimized by 
 the adoption of the convoy system. But as the enemy's 
 submarines increased in size, efficiency and numbers, the 
 situation had been modified, for evasion by submarines 
 of the command exercised by the Grand Fleet was easy, 
 and our vital sea communications could be attacked by 
 them without the risk of a fleet action. 
 
 So far as the protection of trade was concerned, the 
 effect therefore of the submarine campaign had been to 
 remove the barrier established by the Grand Fleet and 
 to transfer operations to the focal areas and approach 
 routes. 
 
 As the situation developed, a policy of dealing with 
 the submarines by armed patrol craft and decoy ships in 
 these areas had therefore been put into force. Merchant 
 ships had been armed as rapidly as possible, and in addition 
 efforts had been made to intercept the submarines en 
 route to these areas both in the vicinity of German waters 
 and farther afield. 
 
 The great area covered by the approach routes and 
 the increasing radius of submarine operations had made 
 the provision of a sufficient number of patrol vessels 
 a practical impossibility and had led to a general adoption 
 
172 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 of the convoy system as rapidly as the supply of fast small 
 craft made this possible. 
 
 The methods of attacking German submarines before 
 they could reach open .waters, by extensive mining in 
 the Heligoland Bight, with the exception of Dutch and 
 Danish territorial waters, were also mentioned. 
 
 As regards future naval policy it was pointed out that 
 the enemy submarine campaign was the dominating 
 factor to such an extent that any sustained increase in 
 the then rate of sinking merchant ships might eventually 
 prove disastrous. 
 
 Mention was made of the fact that the enemy was 
 still producing submarines faster than the Allies were 
 destroying them; the policy of coping with submarines 
 after they reached the open sea had not as yet been 
 sufficiently effective to balance construction against 
 losses, even in combination with the extensive minefields 
 laid in the Heligoland Bight. 
 
 The future poHcy was therefore being directed towards 
 an attempt at a still more concentrated and effective 
 control in the areas between the enemy's ports and our 
 trade routes, and it was proposed to form some descrip- 
 tion of block or barrage through which the enemy sub- 
 marines would not be able to pass without considerable 
 risk. Four forms had been considered : 
 
 (1) A method of blocking either mechanically 
 or by mines all the exits of the submarines from 
 their North Sea or Baltic bases. 
 
 (2) A barrage of mines at different depths, 
 from near the surface of the sea to near the 
 bottom. 
 
 (8) A combination of deep mines with a patrolling 
 force of surface craft and aircraft whose object would 
 
Entry of the United States 173 
 
 be to force the submarines under the surface into 
 
 the minefield. 
 
 (4) A force of surface craft and aircraft patroUing 
 
 an area of sufficient extent to prevent submarines 
 
 coming to the surface to recharge their batteries 
 
 during the hours of darkness. 
 Admiral Mayo was informed that in our opinion the 
 first scheme as given above, viz. that of absolutely sealing 
 the exits, was the only radical cure for the evil, but that 
 there were very great difficulties to be overcome before 
 such an operation could be successfully carried out. He 
 was shown the plan that had been prepared for a 
 mechanical block of all the enemy North Sea bases, and 
 he entirely concurred in the impracticability of carrying 
 it out. Such a plan had been advocated by some officers 
 and by other people; it was, of course, most attractive 
 in theory and appealed strongly to those who looked at 
 the question superficially. When, however, a definite 
 operation came to be worked out in detail the difficulties 
 became very apparent, and even enthusiastic supporters 
 of the idea were forced to change their views. It was 
 not a matter for surprise to me that the idea of sealing 
 the exits from submarine bases was urged by so many 
 people on both sides of the Atlantic. It was, of course, 
 the obvious counter to the submarine campaign, and it 
 appealed with force to that considerable section which 
 feels vaguely, and rightly, that offensive action is needed, 
 without being quite so clear as to the means by which 
 it is to be carried out. 
 
 In this particular case I informed the clever and able 
 officers to whom the planning of the operation was 
 entrusted that they were to proceed on the assumption that 
 we intended to seal the enemy's ports somehow, and that 
 they were to devise the best possible scheme, drawing up 
 
174 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 all the necessary orders for the operations. This was done 
 in the most complete detail and with great care and 
 ingenuity, but at the end there was no difference of 
 opinion whatever as to the inadvisability of proceeding 
 ,with the operations. 
 
 It is to be observed in connexion with this question 
 that sealing the North Sea bases would not have been a 
 complete cure, since submarines could still make their 
 exit via the Kattegat, where we could not block channels 
 without violating the neutrality of other nations. 
 
 The final conclusion arrived at was to use a combina- 
 tion of the last three alternatives provided that a satis- 
 factory type of mine could be produced in sufficient 
 numbers and a sufficient supply of small craft provided 
 by ourselves and the United States. 
 
 Full details were given to Admiral Mayo of the 
 proposed North Sea Barrage on a line totalling 230 miles 
 in length, which was divided into three parts. Areas A, 
 B and C, of which Area A only would be dangerous to 
 surface vessels. 
 
 It was estimated that Area A would require 86,800 
 mines, and it was proposed that this area should be mined 
 by the United States forces with United States mines. 
 
 It was proposed that the British should mine Area B, 
 the requirements being 67,500 mines, and that the United 
 States should mine Area C, for which 18,000 United 
 States mines would be required. 
 
 The reasons governing the selection of the mine bar- 
 rage area were fully given, and the advantages arising 
 from the use of the United States pattern of mine instead 
 of the British mine for Areas A and C were stated. 
 
 Admiral Mayo was also informed of our intention 
 to establish a mine barrage in the Channel, on the 
 Folkestone — Grisnez line, as soon as mines were available, 
 
Entry of the United States 175 
 
 with a strong force of patrol vessels stationed there, whose 
 duty it would be to compel enemy submarines to dive into 
 the minefield. He was further made acquainted with 
 our intended policy of still closer minelaying in the 
 Heligoland Bight. 
 
 Although Admiral Mayo was not actually informed of 
 the details of the future policy which it was hoped to 
 adopt in the Adriatic for the improvement of the Otranto 
 Barrage, various schemes were at the time being worked 
 out between the British, French and Italian Admiralties, 
 having as their object the prevention or obstruction of 
 the exit of enemy submarines from the Adriatic, in the 
 same way as it was hoped to obstruct German submarines 
 from making their exit from the North Sea without 
 incurring heavy losses. The great depth of water in the 
 southern part of the Adriatic constituted the main 
 difficulty facing us in the solution of this problem. 
 In August, 1917, it was, however, definitely decided to 
 establish a barrage of nets and mines across the Straits 
 of Otranto, and the work was put in hand. This became 
 eflPective during 1918. 
 
 The paper on Naval Air Policy showed the aim of 
 the Admiralty to be : 
 
 To provide in sufficient numbers a type of airship 
 which would be able to scout with the Grand Fleet, and, 
 in this respect, to perform the duty of light cruisers. 
 Airship stations had been established on the East Coast 
 for this purpose. 
 
 To provide also a type of airship for coastal patrol 
 work and for the escort of merchant ships in convoy. 
 For these airships stations had been established on the 
 East, South and West Coasts and at Scapa. 
 
 To provide a sufficient supply of kite balloons for the 
 
176 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 work of the Grand Fleet. Fleet kite balloon stations had 
 already been established at Rosyth and Scapa, and the 
 resources of the latter station were supplemented by a 
 kite balloon ship. It was intended also to provide kite 
 balloons for flotillas or single vessels engaged in submarine 
 hunting or in convoy work. A large number of kite 
 balloon stations for anti-submarine work had been or were 
 being established round the coast for this work. 
 
 As to the future programme of rigid airships, Admiral 
 Mayo was told that it was under consideration to con- 
 struct three new rigid stations, also that three new 
 stations for the use of non-rigids for anti-submarine work 
 were to be established, while it was also proposed to 
 provide sufficient resources to allow of a number of kite 
 balloons being worked in vessels between the North of 
 Scotland and Norway and to the eastward of the English 
 Channel. 
 
 Admiral Mayo was also informed that it was proposed 
 to provide sufficient " heavier than air " craft of various 
 types for the Fleet, both to insure adequate air recon- 
 naissance and to drive off hostile aircraft. The Grand 
 Fleet was at the time already provided with three sea- 
 plane carriers, and the Furious and other special vessels 
 were being fitted to carry aircraft. Many of the armoured 
 vessels and light cruisers of the Fleet had also been fitted 
 to carry aircraft, whilst the Harwich light cruiser force 
 possessed one seaplane carrier ; two carriers were devoted 
 to anti-submarine work, and three were employed in the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 It was further stated that machines for naval 
 reconnaissance were working from several East Coast 
 stations, and that lighters to carry seaplanes for more 
 extended reconnaissance and offensive work were under 
 construction. The work carried out by our naval aircraft 
 
Entry of the United States 
 
 177 
 
 off the Belgian coast, comprising the duty of keeping the 
 coast under constant observation, of spotting the gunfire 
 of ships, of fighting aircraft and bombing objectives of 
 importance, were also mentioned, as well as the work in 
 the Mediterranean, where there were four bases in the 
 JEgean. 
 
 The extensive anti-submarine patrol work round the 
 British Isles and in the Mediterranean was touched upon, 
 there being " heavier than air " stations at the time at 
 
 Houton Bay. 
 
 Dundee. 
 
 South Shields. 
 
 Bembridge. 
 
 Calshot. 
 
 Portland. 
 
 Killingholme. 
 
 Yarmouth. 
 
 Felixstowe. 
 
 Westgate. 
 
 Dover. 
 
 Newhaven. 
 
 Cherbourg. 
 
 Plymouth. 
 
 Newlyn. 
 
 Scilly. 
 
 Fishguard. 
 
 Steps were being taken to extend the number of 
 stations as soon as possible, the new programme including 
 stations at such places as 
 
 Padstow. 
 Wexford. 
 Queenstown. 
 Berehaven. 
 Loch Foyle. 
 
 Loch Ryan (or in the 
 
 Hebrides). 
 Shetlands. 
 Peterhead. 
 
 In the event of the United States being in a position 
 to co-operate in the work, it was recommended that the 
 three main seaplane stations in Ireland should be taken 
 over by the Americans, and equipped, manned and 
 controlled entirely by United States personnel. 
 
 M 
 
178 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 In regard to the convoy system a full description of 
 the whole organization was given, with the results up to 
 date, and details of the vessels available and still needed 
 for its protection. 
 
 Full information was afforded on the subject of the 
 arming of merchant ships and fitting other defensive 
 measures to them, and the routeing system in use for 
 merchant ships was described in detail. 
 
 In the remarks on our anti-submarine warfare it was 
 pointed out that anti-submarine measures were carried 
 out both on the surface, under water, and in the air. 
 
 The surface measures were described as follows : 
 
 In twelve of the twenty-two areas into which the 
 waters round the United Kingdom were divided, regular 
 hunting flotillas were at work, comprising trawlers and 
 motor launches fitted with hydrophones. Before the 
 institution of the convoy system a few fast vessels, such 
 as destroyers or '' P " boats, had been formed into 
 hunting flotillas, but the convoy work had necessitated the 
 withdrawal of all these vessels, and the work of the flotillas 
 had suffered in consequence, the speed of trawlers being 
 too slow to offer the same prospect of success in such 
 anti-submarine measures. The flotillas of motor launches 
 which had been formed were of considerable utility in 
 fine weather, but they could only operate in comparatively 
 smooth water. 
 
 At the time of Admiral Mayo's visit a force of 
 thirty-two trawlers to work with about six sloops or 
 destroyers was being organized as vessels became avail- 
 able, to operate in the North Sea with a view to engaging 
 enemy submarines on passage in those waters. 
 
 It was also pointed out to Admiral Mayo that the 
 coast patrol vessels which were not actually in the hunting 
 flotillas were all engaged in anti-submarine work and 
 
Entry of the United States 179 
 
 did frequently cpme iuto action against the German 
 submarines. 
 
 Finally Admiral Mayo was informed that the convoy 
 system itself was looked upon as an offensive measure 
 since the German submarines would, in order to attack 
 vessels under convoy, be forced into contact with the 
 fast craft engaged in the work of escort and thus place 
 themselves in positions in which they could themselves 
 be successfully attacked. 
 
 Admiral Mayo, during his stay in European waters, 
 inspected some of our naval bases and paid a visit to the 
 Grand Fleet. 
 
 He crossed to France in order that he might see the 
 work being carried out at French ports by vessels of the 
 United States Navy, and while returning from this visit 
 he honoured the British Navy by accompanying Sir 
 Reginald Bacon and myself in H.M.S. Broke to witness 
 a bombardment of Ostend by the monitor Terror, On 
 this occasion Admiral Mayo's flag was hoisted in the 
 Broke and subsequently presented to him as a souvenir 
 of the first occasion of a United States Admiral having 
 been under fire in a British man-of-war. It is satisfactory 
 to record that subsequent aerial photographs show^ed that 
 much damage to workshops, etc., had been caused by 
 this bombardment. 
 
 The Admiral and his Staff very quickly established 
 themselves in the high regard of British naval officers, and 
 it was with much regret that we witnessed their return 
 to the United States. My own associations with the 
 Admiral had led to a feeling of great friendship. He left 
 behind him his Chief of Staff, Captain Jackson, who to 
 our great regret had been seriously injured in a motor 
 accident. 
 
 Admiral Benson's visit took place later in the year. 
 
i8o The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 I had written to him urging him to come across so that 
 he might have first-hand knowledge of the state of affairs 
 and of the policy being followed. During his visit the 
 same questions were discussed as with Admiral Mayo, 
 and important action was taken in the direction of closer 
 naval co-operation between the Allies by the formation 
 of an Allied Naval Council consisting of the Ministers 
 of Marine and the Chiefs of the Naval Staff of the Allied 
 Nations and of the United States. This proposal had 
 been under discussion for some little time, and, indeed, 
 naval conferences had been held on previous occasions. 
 The first of these during my tenure of office at the 
 Admiralty was on January 23 and 24, 1917, and another 
 was held during the visit of Admiral Mayo and at 
 the instigation of the Government of the United States 
 on September 4 and 5, 1917. On this latter occasion 
 important discussions had taken place, principally on the 
 subject of submarine warfare, the methods of dealing 
 with it in home waters and in the Mediterranean, and 
 such matters as the provision of mercantile shipping for 
 the use of our Allies. 
 
 There was, however, no regular council sitting at 
 specified intervals, and it was this council which came 
 into being in the early part of December. Its functions 
 were to watch over the general conduct of the naval war 
 and to insure co-ordination of the effort at sea as well 
 as the development of all scientific operations connected 
 with the conduct of the war. 
 
 Special emphasis was laid upon the fact that the 
 individual responsibility of the respective Chiefs of the 
 Naval Staff and of the Commanders-in-Chief at sea 
 towards their Governments as regards operations in hand 
 as well as the strategical and technical disposition of the 
 forces placed under their command remained unchanged ; 
 
Entry of the United States i8i 
 
 this proviso .was a necessity in naval warfare, and was very 
 strongly insisted upon by the Admiralty. 
 
 The attention of the Council was directed at the 
 earliest meetings to the situation in the Mediterranean, 
 where naval forces from the British Empire, France, 
 Greece, Italy, Japan and the United States were work- 
 ing, and where the need for close co-operation was most 
 urgent. The real need in the Mediterranean, as was 
 frequently pointed out, was the inclusion of the naval 
 forces of all the Allied nations under one single com- 
 mand. In 1918 strong efforts were made to carry out 
 this policy, and indeed the actual Admiralissimo was 
 selected, but the attempt failed in the end. 
 
 Both these distinguished American officers were 
 reminded, as indeed they must have seen for themselves, 
 that the successful combating of the submarine danger 
 depended largely on the manufacture of material, and 
 that the resources of this country, with its great fleet 
 and its large and increasing armies, were so seriously 
 taxed that the execution of the plans of the Admiralty 
 were being constantly and gravely delayed. The 
 Admiralty was, indeed, seriously embarrassed by diffi- 
 culties in the adequate supply of mines and other means 
 of destroying submarines as well as of fast craft of various 
 descriptions. The Admiralty, as was pointed out, were 
 doing not what they would like to do, but what they 
 could do, both in the way of offensive and defensive 
 action. The supplies of raw material and labour con- 
 trolled in large measure the character and extent of the 
 operations at sea. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES 
 
 It is difficult to give an idea of the truly magnificent 
 3vork achieved by the patrol and minesweeping services 
 during the year 1917 without showing how these services 
 expanded after the outbreak of war in 1914. 
 
 When war was declared the only vessels immediately 
 available for the work consisted of seven torpedo gunboats 
 manned by officers and men of the Royal Navy, and 
 fourteen trawlers manned by fishermen. All these 
 vessels were fitted for regular minesweeping work, and 
 the crews of the trawlers formed a part of what was known 
 as the " Trawler Reserve." Other trawlers, exceeding 
 eighty in number, became, however, almost immediately 
 available at the outbreak of war under the organized 
 Trawler Reserve which had been set up a year or 
 two preceding the outbreak of war. Men belonging to 
 this reserve had been trained in the work of minesweeping 
 and were paid a small retaining fee. 
 
 As soon as the German methods of indiscriminate 
 minelaying and submarine attacks upon merchant ships 
 commenced, a great expansion of this force became 
 necessary. The matter was handled energetically by the 
 Admiralty at the time, and by the end of 1914 over 700 
 vessels (yachts, trawlers and drifters) were employed on 
 patrol and minesweeping duties, and the Admiralty had 
 also commenced to build vessels of the trawler type 
 specially for this work. 
 
 182 
 
Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 183 
 
 By the commencement of 1917 there were in use 
 some 2,500 yachts, trawlers and drifters, the great 
 rnajority of them manned by fishermen or men of the 
 R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. and officered by trawler or drifter 
 skippers or officers of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., many 
 of them having temporary commissions in these 
 services. 
 
 Early in the war the coast of the United Kingdom 
 had been divided into areas for purposes of patrol and 
 minesweeping, and each area was under the command 
 of a naval officer on either the active or retired list. 
 
 The Chart D shows the respective areas at one 
 period. No very important changes took place in the 
 delimitation of the areas during the war, and the chart 
 may therefore be considered generally representative of 
 the organization. Chart E shows the zones into which 
 the Mediterranean was divided. 
 
 In December, 1917, the number of vessels of different 
 classes actually appropriated to various areas is given on 
 the next page in Table A for the British Isles and 
 Table B for the Mediterranean. 
 
 It will be seen that the total number of British patrol 
 and minesweeping craft, exclusive of the stationary boom 
 defence vessels, was at this time 3,084. Of this number 
 473 were in the Mediterranean, 824 were in the English 
 Channel between The Nore and Falmouth, 557 Were in 
 Irish waters or on the west coast of England, and the 
 remaining 1,230 were on the east coast of England and 
 the east and west coasts of Scotland and the Orkneys and 
 Shetlands. 
 
 The .work of these vessels was almost entirely of an 
 anti-submarine or miresweeping nature. 
 
 The trawlers were engaged in patrol duty, convoy 
 escort service, and minesweeping. The drifters worked 
 
i84 
 
 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 TABLE A; AUXILIARY PATROLS IN HOME WATERS. 
 
 Area 
 No. 
 
 CO 
 
 CO 
 
 3 
 a 
 
 1 
 
 CO 
 
 c 
 a 
 
 1 
 
 to 
 
 1' 
 
 S3 
 
 o 
 
 i 
 
 42 
 a 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 2 
 
 CJ C/5 
 
 2 • 
 
 si 
 
 § 2 
 
 qc," 
 |q 
 
 I 
 
 II 
 IV 
 V 
 VI 
 VIII 
 IX 
 
 ^( 
 
 XI 
 XII 
 
 XIII 
 
 XIIlA 
 
 XIV 
 
 XV 
 
 XVI 
 
 XVII 
 
 XVIII 
 
 XIX 
 
 XX 
 
 XXI 
 
 XXII 
 
 5 
 6 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 1 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 44 
 119 
 27 
 26 
 51 
 51 
 93 
 16 
 53 
 30 
 29 
 70 
 
 35 
 
 18 
 
 14 
 
 6 
 
 27 
 54 
 44 
 
 6 
 46 
 19 
 
 9 
 26 
 10 
 31 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 15 
 10 
 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 1 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 15 
 
 12 
 
 8 
 
 24 
 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 33 
 
 31 
 
 26 
 5 
 2 
 
 4 
 19 
 21 
 14 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 12 
 
 6 
 12 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 6 
 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 22 
 72 
 10 
 12 
 
 9 
 25 
 25 
 27 
 
 28 
 
 42 
 
 101 
 
 22 
 18 
 25 
 
 31 
 
 15 
 19 
 41 
 6 
 59 
 13 
 16 
 68 
 31 
 11 
 
 4 
 11 
 14 
 
 2 
 
 112 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 1 
 
 19 
 
 30 
 10 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 11 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 14 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 8 
 
 13 
 9 
 8 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 19 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 
 60 
 15 
 
 20 
 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 83 
 
 10 
 
 23 
 25 
 
 5 
 
 13 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 2 
 
 1 
 3 
 
 TABLE B; AUXILIARY PATROLS IN THE 
 MEDITERRANEAN ZONES. 
 
 I 
 
 VI 
 
 VIII 
 
 V 
 
 X 
 
 7 
 1 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 2 
 1 
 
 9 
 12 
 61 
 51 
 
 47 
 
 22 
 4 
 
 ; 
 
 19 
 42 
 21 
 18 
 17 
 12 
 
 11 
 
 116 
 25 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 7 
 
 — 
 
 5 
 5 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 185 
 
 drifting nets fitted with mines as an anti-submarine 
 weapon, and also in the case of the Dover area they laid 
 and kept efficient a barrage of mine nets off the Belgian 
 coast. Some were also fitted with hydrophones and 
 formed hunting flotillas, and some were engaged in mine- 
 sweeping duties, or in patrolling swept channels. At 
 Fleet bases a small number were required to attend on 
 the ships of the Fleet, and to assist in the work of the 
 base. The whalers, being faster vessels than the trawlers, 
 were mostly engaged on escort duty or on patrol. The 
 motor launches were employed for anti-submarine work, 
 fitted with hydrophones, and worked in company with 
 drifters and torpedo-boat destroyers, or in minesweeping 
 in areas in which their light draught rendered it advan- 
 tageous and safer to employ them instead of heavier 
 draught vessels to locate minefields, and in the Dover 
 area they were largely used to work smoke screens for 
 operations on the Belgian coast. 
 
 As the convoy system became more general, so the 
 work of the small craft in certain areas altered from 
 patrol and escort work to convoy duty. These areas were 
 those on the East Coast and north-west of Scotland 
 through which the Scandinavian and East Coast trade 
 passed, and those in the Channel frequented by the vessels 
 employed in the French coal trade. The majority of 
 these ships were of comparatively slow speed, and trawlers 
 possessed sufficient speed to accompany them, but a 
 few destroyers of the older type formed a part of the 
 escorting force, both for the purpose of protection and 
 also for offensive action against submarines attacking the 
 convoys, the slow speed of trawlers handicapping them 
 greatly in this respect. 
 
 The difficulty of dealing with submarines may be 
 gauged by the enormous number of small craft thus 
 
i86 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 employed, but a consideration of the characteristics of a 
 submarine and of the great volume of traffic passing up 
 and down our coasts will assist in a realization of the 
 varied and difficult problems set to the British Navy. 
 
 For instance, the total number of vessels passing 
 Lowestoft during the month of April, 1917, was 1,837 
 British and Allied and 208 neutral, giving a daily average 
 of 62 British and Allied and 7 neutral ships; and as 
 Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has mentioned in his book, 
 " The Dover Patrol, 1915-17 " (page 51), an average of 
 between 80 to 100 merchant vessels passed Dover daily 
 during 1917. A study of these figures gives some idea 
 of the number of targets offered daily to ordinary sub- 
 marines and minelaying submarines in two of the areas off 
 our coasts. When it is borne in mind that the Germans 
 had similar chances of inflicting heavy losses on our mer- 
 cantile marine all round the coasts of the United Kingdom, 
 and that it was obviously impossible to tell where an under- 
 water attack would take place, it will be realized that 
 once submarines reached our coasts, nothing short of an 
 immense number of small craft could deal satisfactorily 
 ynth the situation, and afford any degree of protection 
 to trade. Minelaying by submarines was a particularly 
 difficult problem with which to deal ; the enemy frequently 
 changed his methods, and such changes when discovered 
 involved alterations in our own procedure. Thus for 
 some time after the commencement of minelaying by 
 submarines, the whole of the mines of one submarine 
 would be laid in a comparatively small area. It was 
 fairly easy to deal with this method as a dangerous area 
 :was proclaimed round the spot where a mine was dis- 
 covered, and experience soon showed the necessary extent 
 of area to proclaim. Later the submarines laid mines in 
 groups of about six. This necessitated the proclamation 
 
Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 187 
 
 of more than one area, and was naturally a more difficult 
 problem. At a further stage the submarines scattered 
 their mines in even smaller numbers, and the task of 
 ensuring a safe channel was still further increased. The 
 most difficult artifice to deal with, however, was the 
 introduction by the Germans of a delay action device in 
 their mines, which caused them to remain at the bottom 
 for varying periods after being laid. The ordinary mine- 
 sweep, the function of which was to catch the mooring 
 rope of the mine and drag the mine clear of the channel, 
 was, of course, ineffective against the mine on the bottom, 
 and there was no guarantee that mines might not be 
 released from the bottom and rise to a depth at ^vhich they 
 were dangerous, after the channel had been swept and 
 reported clear. To deal with this danger a chain-sweep 
 to work on the bottom was introduced, but its use pre- 
 sented many difficulties, especially over a rocky bottom. 
 
 When a regular swept and buoyed channel was in 
 use the enemy had little difficulty in deciding on the 
 positions in which to lay mines by reason of the presence 
 of the buoys. This fact constituted the principal disad- 
 vantage in the use of a buoyed channel, but in certain 
 places where the traffic was heavy the procedure ,was 
 inevitable, and it greatly simplified the work of the patrol 
 craft and minesweepers ; the only precautions possible 
 lay in the use of alternative marked channels, and in the 
 laying of defensive deep minefields outside the channel 
 in which enemy submarines might compass their own 
 destruction. As rapidly as our supply of mines admitted, 
 this latter device was adopted in positions where the mine- 
 fields could not constitute a danger to our own submarines. 
 False buoyed channels with mined areas round them could 
 also be laid in which to catch the submarine. Another 
 device was that of altering the position of light vessels 
 
i88 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 and buoys jvith the object of putting a submarine on to a 
 shoal. 
 
 The situation with which our patrol and mine- 
 sweeping craft had to deal having now been stated, it 
 remains to speak of the magnificent manner in which they 
 accomplished their task. 
 
 I regret very deeply that, in spite of a strong desire to 
 undertake the task, I have neither the information nor the 
 literary ability to do justice to the many deeds of indi- 
 vidual gallantry, self-sacrifice and resource performed by 
 the splendid officers and men who manned the small craft. 
 No words of mine can adequately convey the intense 
 admiration which I felt, and which I know was shared 
 by the whole Navy, for the manner in which their arduous 
 and perilous work was carried ouL These fine seamen, 
 though quite strange to the hazardous work which they 
 were called upon to undertake, quickly accustomed them- 
 selves to their new duties, and the nation should ever be full 
 of gratitude that it bred such a race of hardy, skilful and 
 courageous men as those who took so great a part in 
 defeating the greatest menace with which the Empire 
 has ever been faced. 
 
 There are, however, just two cases in 1917, typical 
 of many others, which I cannot forbear from mentioning. 
 The first occurred off the East Coast of England. 
 
 On August 15 the armed fishing craft Nelson and 
 Ethel and Millie were attacked by gunfire by a German 
 submarine on the surface at a range of four to five 
 miles. 
 
 The submarine first concentrated her fire on the 
 Nelson, which immediately slipped her trawl and went 
 to action stations. The third shot from the submarine 
 pierced the trawler's bows, and, having established the 
 range, the submarine poured a well-directed fire into 
 
Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 189 
 
 the Nelson, under which she rapidly began to settle 
 down. 
 
 The seventh shot struck the skipper, Thomas Crisp, 
 D.S.C., R.N.R., taking off both his legs and partly 
 disembowelling him. 
 
 In spite of the terrible nature of his injuries he 
 retained consciousness and gave instructions to the mate, 
 who was his son, to send a message by carrier pigeon to 
 the senior officer of his base reporting that he was engaged 
 with the enemy ; he then bade him fight to the last. 
 
 The Nelson, armed with one small gun, replied to 
 the enemy's fire until the heavy heel which she had 
 assumed made it impossible to bring the gun to bear. 
 As she was then on the point of sinking the mate decided 
 to abandon her and take to the boat, and begged his father 
 to give them leave to carry him. This, however, 
 the old man sternly refused to do, and ordered his son 
 to throw him overboard. 
 
 The nature of his wounds being such that he would 
 have died if he had been moved, they deemed it best, 
 after consultation, to leave him w^here he lay. Accord- 
 ingly, yielding to his reiterated order to abandon the 
 ship, they left this most gallant seaman lying in his blood, 
 and embarked in the boat as the Nelson sank. 
 
 The submarine in the meanwhile concentrated her 
 fire on the Ethel and Millie, and having eventually sunk 
 her, made the survivors of the crew prisoners, and steamed 
 away. 
 
 The crew of the Nelson were rescued by a man-of-war 
 after being in their boat for forty-four hours. 
 
 The second case occurred in the Adriatic, On the 
 night in question our drifter patrol in the Straits of 
 Otranto was attacked by a force of Austrian light cruisers. 
 The drifters were each armed with a 8-pounder gun, and 
 
igo The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 the light cruisers with 4-inch and 6-inch guns. The 
 drifters were, of course, quite unable to defend them- 
 selves. Nevertheless the indomitable skipper, I. Watt, of 
 the drifter Gowan Lea, when summoned to surrender by 
 an Austrian light cruiser which was firing at his craft, 
 shouted defiance, waved his hat to his men, and ordered 
 them to open fire with the 3-pounder gun. His orders 
 were obeyed, and, surprising to relate, the light cruiser 
 sheered off, and this fine seaman with his gallant ship's 
 company brought the Gowan Lea into port in safety. 
 
 Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, in his most interesting 
 narrative of the work of the Dover Patrol, has brought 
 to light many individual instances of work gallantly per- 
 formed ; it is much to be hoped that before recollection 
 fades, those who can speak of the actions of individuals 
 in other areas will tell their countrymen something of 
 the great deeds performed. 
 
 A feature of the patrol service of much interest was 
 the manner in which a large number of retired officers, 
 including many of flag rank — who had reached mature 
 age — ^volunteered for service in the yachts and other small 
 craft engaged in the work. The late Admiral Sir Alfred 
 Paget was one of the first, if not the first, to come for- 
 ward, and in order to avoid any difficulty in the matter 
 of rank, this fine veteran proposed to sink his Naval 
 status and to accept a commission as captain of the Royal 
 Naval Reserve. Sir Alfred, in common with many other 
 officers w^ho took up this work, was over sixty, but age 
 did not deter these gallant seamen from facing the hard- 
 ship and discomfort of service in small craft in the North 
 Sea and elsewhere. To name all the officers who under- 
 took this duty, or who were in charge of patrol areas, 
 would be impossible, and it may seem invidious to 
 mention names at all; but I cannot forbear to speak of 
 
Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 191 
 
 some of those with whom I came most frequently into 
 contact during 1917. Sir James Startin, K.C.B., who 
 was the hfe and soul of the patrols and minesweepers 
 .working from Granton, was frequently at sea in decoy 
 ships fitted out there, as well as in minesweepers, etc., and 
 together with his son won the Albert Medal for saving 
 life during the war; Admiral J. L. Marx, C.B., D.S.O., 
 served also in a decoy ship ; Admiral John Denison, 
 D.S.O., was in charge first at Falmouth and later at 
 Kingstown; Admiral T. P. Walker, D.S.O., had his 
 yacht sunk under him ; Admiral Sir Charles Dare, 
 K.C.M.G., C.B., won great distinction in command of 
 the patrols, etc., working from Milford Haven; and 
 Eear-Admiral C. H. Simpson's Peterhead trawlers, 
 splendidly manned, took a heavy toll of enemy sub- 
 marines. A large number of retired Naval officers below 
 the rank of admiral served in minesweepers and patrol 
 craft, and in command of various areas, and their work 
 was of the greatest possible value. A few of those with 
 whom I came into personal contact during the year 1917 
 were the late Captain F. Bird, C.M.G., D.S.O., who 
 was most conspicuous in command of the drifters of the 
 Dover Patrol; Captain W. Vansittart Howard, D.S.O., 
 who commanded the Dover Trawler Patrol with such 
 ability; Commander Sir George Armstrong, Bart., who 
 so successfully inspired the minesweeping force working 
 from Havre; and Commander H. F. Cayley, D.S.O., 
 whose services in the Harwich minesweeping force, 
 working under his brother, Rear-Admiral C. G. Cayley, 
 were invaluable. 
 
 So much for the patrol craft. The great work carried 
 out by the minesweepers can be best judged by quoting 
 a few figures for 1917, during which year the mine 
 menace attained its maximum intensity, owing to the 
 
192 
 
 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 large increase in the number of German submarine 
 minelayers. 
 
 During the year 1916 the average number of mines 
 swept up per month was 178. 
 
 Statistics for 1917 show the following numbers of 
 mines swept up per month : 
 
 January 
 
 
 250 
 
 February ,.. 
 
 
 880 
 
 March 
 
 
 473 
 
 April 
 
 
 515 
 
 May 
 
 
 360 
 
 June 
 
 
 470 
 
 July 
 
 
 404 
 
 August 
 
 
 352 
 
 September 
 
 
 418 
 
 October ... 
 
 
 237 
 
 November 
 
 
 184 
 
 December 
 
 
 188 
 
 making the average per month in 1917 355 mines. 
 
 It will be noticed how rapidly the figures rose in the 
 early part of the year, and how great was the diminu- 
 tion in the figures for the later months. This decrease 
 was due to the fact that the extension of anti-submarine 
 mea^sures was beginning to take effect, and the destruc- 
 tion of German submarines, and especially of sub- 
 marine minelayers of the U.C. type, was becoming 
 considerable. 
 
 The heavy work involved a great strain on the mine- 
 sweeping service, and the greatest possible credit is due 
 to the personnel of that service for the fine response made 
 to the call for additional exertions and heavier risks. 
 
 At the same time the organizing work achieved at 
 
A Paddle Minesweeper. 
 
 A German Mine on the Surface. 
 
Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 193 
 
 Headquarters by the minesweeping section of the Naval 
 Staff should not be forgotten. At the head of this 
 section was Captain Lionel G. Preston, C.B. ; he had 
 succeeded to the post of Head of the Minesweeping Ser- 
 vice early in 1917, after two and a half years of strenuous 
 and most successful minesweeping work in the Grand 
 Fleet flotillas, and he at once grappled with the task of 
 dealing with the large number of mines then being laid 
 by German submarines. 
 
 Instructions were issued to fit all patrol craft round 
 the coast for minesweeping work in addition to their 
 patrol duties, and they were used for sweeping as re- 
 quired. Many drifters were also fitted for minesweeping 
 in addition to the trawlers hitherto employed ; and 
 although there was some prejudice against these vessels 
 on account of their slower speed, they proved to be of 
 great assistance. Every available small craft that could 
 be fitted for the work was pressed into the service, in- 
 cluding a considerable number of motor launches. 
 
 There was unfortunately great delay in the building 
 of the " Hunt " class of minesweeper, which was the type 
 ordered in 1916 and repeated in 1917, and in spite of 
 very large additional orders for this class of vessel having 
 been placed early in 1917 (a total of 100 extra vessels 
 being ordered), the number completed during that year 
 was only sixteen, together with a single paddle 
 sweeper. Consequently we were dependent for the largely 
 increased work on improvised craft, and the very greatest 
 credit is due to all who were concerned in this arduous 
 and dangerous duty that the waters were kept compara- 
 tively clear of mines, and that our losses from this cause 
 were so small when the immense number of mines swept 
 up is considered. 
 
 Fortunately the enemy lost very heavily in submarines 
 
194 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 of the U-C, or minelaying type, largely because they 
 yvere .working of necessity in waters near our coast, so 
 that our anti-submarine measures had a better chance, 
 since they were easier to locate and destroy than sub- 
 marines working farther afield. By the commence- 
 ment of 1918 the average number of mines swept up 
 monthly showed a very remarkable decrease, the average 
 for the first two months of that year being only 159 per 
 month, eloquent testimony to the efficiency of the anti- 
 submarine measures in operation during 1917. I have no 
 information as to the figures for the remaining months 
 of 1918. 
 
 The record of minesweeping work would not be com- 
 plete without figures showing the damage caused by 
 mines to minesweeping vessels. 
 
 During the last six months of 1916 the average number 
 of these craft sunk or damaged by mines per month was 
 5.7, while for the first six months of 1917 the figures rose 
 to ten per month. For the second six months of 1917 
 the figures fell to four per mionth, a reduction even on 
 the losses towards the end of 1916, in spite of the fact 
 that more mines were being dealt with. This reduction 
 may have been due to improvements effected in 
 organization as the result of experience. 
 
 Similarly the total number of merchant ships sunk or 
 damaged by mines, which during the first six months of 
 1917 totalled 90, dropped in the second six months to 49. 
 
 By far the greater proportion of mines swept up were 
 laid in Area 10 — i.e. the Nore, Harwich and Lowestoft 
 area. This part of the coast was nearest to the German 
 submarine base at Zeebrugge, and as the greater part of 
 the east coast traffic passed through the area it naturally 
 came in for a great deal of minelaying attention. Out 
 of some 2,400 mines swept up in the first half of 1917, 
 
Patrol Craft and Minesweeping Services 195 
 
 over 800 came from Area 10 alone. The greatest num- 
 ber of casualties to merchant ships from mines during 
 this same period also occurred in Area 10, which in this 
 respect was, however, rivalled by Area 8 — the Tyne. 
 Many ships also struck mines in Areas 11 and 12 in the 
 English Channel, and in both of these areas a considerable 
 number of mines were swept up. 
 
 In addition to the daily risks of being themselves 
 blown up which were run by the vessels engaged 
 in this work, many very gallant deeds were performed 
 by individual officers and men of the minesweeping 
 force, who were one and all imbued with the idea 
 that their first duty was to keep a clear channel 
 for traffic regardless of the consequence to themselves. 
 I miust leave to abler pens than mine the task of recording 
 in fitting phrase some of the courageous actions of our 
 small craft which will be looked upon as amongst the most 
 glorious episodes of the Naval part of the Great War, and 
 content myself to mention only one case, that of the 
 trawler Grand Duhe, working in the Milford area in May, 
 1917. In this instance a flotilla of minesweepers was 
 employed in sweeping when two mines exploded in the 
 sweep towed by the second pair of minesweeping trawlers 
 in the flotilla. The wire parted and one of the two 
 trawlers proceeded to heave in the " kite," the contrivance 
 employed to keep the sweep at the required depth. When 
 hove short up it was discovered that a mine was foul of 
 the wire and that it had been hauled up against the ship's 
 side. Just beneath the surface the circular outline of a 
 second mine could also be detected entangled in the wire 
 and swirling round in the current beneath the trawler's 
 counter. In the circumstances, since any roll of the 
 ship might suffice to strike one of the horns of either 
 mine and detonate the charges, the officer in charge of 
 
196 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 the trawler chose the best course open to him in view of 
 his responsibihty for the lives of those under his command, 
 and ordered the trawler to be abandoned. 
 
 The senior officer of the division of minesweepers 
 thereupon called for a volunteer, and accompanied by the 
 engineman, boarded the abandoned trawler, and disre- 
 garding the imminent probability of an explosion caused 
 by the contact of the ship and the mine, cut the sweep 
 and kite wires. The mines fell clear without detonating, 
 and by means of a rope passed to another trawler they 
 were towed clear of the spot. 
 
 It is appropriate to close this chapter by giving a 
 synopsis of the losses amongst our patrol escort and mine- 
 sweeping vessels between the commencement of the ,war 
 and the end of 1917 due (1) to enemy action, and 
 (2) to the increased navigational dangers incidental to 
 service afloat under war conditions. 
 
 Under the first heading — enemy action — the losses 
 were 8 yachts, 6 motor launches, 8 motor boats, 150 
 trawlers, 59 drifters, and 10 paddle minesweepers; and 
 the losses due to navigational risks were 5 yachts, 55 
 trawlers, 7 motor launches, 8 motor boats, 30 drifters, 
 and 1 paddle minesweeper, whilst the total loss of life was 
 
 197 officers and 1,782 men. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE DOVER PATROL AND THE HARWICH FORCES 
 
 Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has given* a most 
 valuable record of the varied work carried out in the 
 Straits of Dover and on the Belgian coast during the 
 period of his command. There is little to be added to 
 this great record, but it may be of interest to mention 
 the general Admiralty policy which governed the Naval 
 operations in southern waters during the year 1917, and 
 the methods by which that policy was carried out. 
 
 The policy which was adopted in southern waters, and 
 especially in the Straits of Dover, was that, so far as the 
 means at our disposal admitted, the Straits should be 
 rendered impassable for enemy ships of all kinds, from 
 battleships to submarines, with a view to protecting the 
 cross-Channel communications of our Army in France, 
 of affording protection to trade in the Channel, and 
 preventing a military landing by the Germans either 
 in the south of England or on the left flank of the 
 Allied Army in France. So long as the Belgian coast 
 ports remained in German possession, the Naval force 
 that could be based there constituted a very serious menace 
 to the cross-Channel traffic. This really applied more 
 to destroyers than to submarines, and for this reason : 
 submarines have an infinitely larger radius of action than 
 destroyers, and if the Belgian coast ports had not been 
 in German occupation, the additional 210 miles from the 
 
 *"The Dover Patrol, 1915-1917." (Hutchinson & Co., 1919.) 
 
 197 
 
igS The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Ems would not have been a matter of serious moment to 
 them, and if sighted on the longer passage they could 
 submerge. The case was quite different with destroyers 
 or other surface vessels ; in the first place they were open 
 to attack by our vessels during the passage to and from 
 the Ems, and in the second the additional distance to be 
 traversed was a matter for consideration, since they carried 
 only limited supplies of fuel. 
 
 A fact to which the Admiralty frequently directed 
 attention was that, although annoyance and even serious 
 inconvenience might be caused to the enemy by sea and 
 air operations against Ostend and Zeebrugge, no 
 permanent result could be achieved by the Navy alone 
 unless backed up by an advance on land. The Admiralty 
 was heart and soul for an audacious policy, providing the 
 form of attack and the occasion offered a reasonable pros- 
 pect of success. Owing to the preoccupations of the Army, 
 we had to be satisfied with bombardments of the ports 
 by unprotected monitors, which had necessarily to be 
 carried out at very long ranges, exceeding 25,000 yards, 
 and necessitating direction of the fire by aircraft. 
 
 Bruges, about eight miles from the sea, was the real 
 base of enemy submarines and destroyers, Zeebrugge and 
 Ostend being merely exits from Bruges, and the use of 
 the latter could only be denied to the enemy by land 
 attack or by effective blocking operations at Ostend and 
 Zeebrugge, for, if only one port was closed, the other 
 could be used. 
 
 Neither Zeebrugge, Ostend, nor Bruges could be 
 rendered untenable to the enemy with the guns available 
 during 1917, although Ostend in particular, and Zee- 
 brugge to a lesser extent, could be, and were frequently, 
 brought under fire when certain conditions prevailed, 
 and some temporary damage caused. Indeed, the fire 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 199 
 
 against Ostend was so effective that the harbour fell into 
 disuse as a base towards the end of 1917. We were 
 arranging also in 1917 for mounting naval guns on shore 
 that would bring Bruges under fire, after the enemy had 
 been driven from Ostend by the contemplated operation 
 which is mentioned later. When forced to abandon this 
 operation, in consequence of the military advance being 
 held up by the weather, these guns were mounted in 
 monitors. 
 
 In the matter of blocking the entrance to the ports 
 of Zeebrugge and Ostend, the fact had to be recognized 
 that effective permanent blocking operations against de- 
 stroyers and submarines were not practicable, mainly 
 because of the great rise and fall above low water at 
 ordinary spring tides, which is 14 feet at Ostend and 13 
 feet at Zeebrugge for about half the days in each month. 
 Low water at Ostend also lasts for one hour. Therefore, 
 even if block-ships were sunk in the most favourable 
 position the operation of making a passage by cutting 
 away the upper works of the block-ships was not a diffi- 
 cult matter, and the Germans are a painstaking people. 
 This passage could be used for some time on each side 
 of high water by vessels like destroyers drawing less 
 than 14 feet, or submarines drawing, say, 14 feet. 
 The block would, therefore, be of a temporary and not a 
 permanent nature, although it would undoubtedly be a 
 source of considerable inconvenience. At the same 
 time it was realized that, although permanent blocking 
 was not practicable, a temporary block would be of 
 use, and that the moral effect alone of such an operation 
 would he of great value. These considerations, together 
 with the abandonment of the proposed landing on the 
 Belgian coast, owing to unfavourable military conditions, 
 led to the decision late in 1917 to undertake blocking 
 
200 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 operations concurrently with an attack on the vessels 
 alongside the Mole at Zeebrugge. 
 
 In order to carry out the general policy mentioned, the 
 eastern end of the Straits of Dover had been heavily mined 
 at intervals during the war, and these mines had proved 
 to be a sufficient deterrent against any attempt on the 
 part of surface vessels larger than destroyers to pass 
 through. Owing to the rise of tide enemy destroyers 
 could pass over the minefields at high water without risk 
 of injury, and they frequently did so pass. Many 
 attempts had been made to prevent the passage of enemy 
 submarines by means of obstructions, but without much 
 success ; and at the end of 1916 a " mine net barrage " — 
 i.e. a series of wire nets of wide mesh carrying mines — 
 was in process of being placed by us right across the 
 Straits from the South Goodwin Buoy to the West Dyck 
 Bank, a length of 28 miles, it being arranged that the 
 French would continue the barrage from this position to 
 the French coast. The construction of the barrage was 
 much delayed by the difficulty in procuring mooring 
 buoys, and it was not completed until the late summer 
 of 1917. Even then it was not an effective barrier owing 
 to the tidal effects, as submarines were able to pass over 
 it during strong tides, or to dive under the nets as an 
 alternative ; it was not practicable to use nets more than 
 60 feet deep, whilst the depth of water in places exceeded 
 120 feet. 
 
 Deep mines were laid to guard the water below the 
 net, but although these were moored at some considerable 
 distance from the barrage, trouble was experienced owing 
 to the mines dragging their moorings in the strong tide- 
 way and fouling the nets. One series had to be entirely 
 swept up for this reason. Many devices were tried with 
 the object of improving this barrage, and many clever 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 201 
 
 brains were at work on it. And all the time our drifters 
 with their crews of gallant fishermen, with Captain Bird 
 at their head, worked day after day at the task of keeping 
 the nets efficient. 
 
 In spite of its deficiencies the barrage was believed to 
 be responsible for the destruction of a few submarines, 
 and it did certainly render the passage of the Straits more 
 difficult, and therefore its moral effect was appreciable. 
 Towards the end of 1917, however, evidence came into 
 our possession showing that more submarines were actually 
 passing the Straits of Dover than had been believed to 
 be the case, and it became a question .whether a proportion 
 of the drifters, etc., required for the maintenance of the 
 nets of the barrage should be utilized instead for patrol 
 work in the vicinity of the mine barrage then being laid 
 between Folkestone and Cape Grisnez. This action was 
 taken, drifters being gradually moved to the new area. 
 
 In April, 1916, a net barrage, with lines of deep mines 
 on the Belgian side of the nets, had also been laid along 
 the Belgian coast covering the exits from the ports of 
 Ostend and Zeebrugge as well as the coast between those 
 ports. These nets were laid at a distance of some 24,000 
 yards from the shore. This plan had proved most success- 
 ful in preventing minelaying by submarines in the Straits 
 of Dover, and the barrage was maintained from May to 
 October, but the weather conditions had prevented its 
 continuance from that date. 
 
 The operation was repeated in 1917, the barrage being 
 kept in position until December, when the question of 
 withdrawing the craft required for its maintenance for 
 patrol work in connection with the minefield laid on the 
 Folkestone-Grisnez line came under discussion. 
 
 The Belgian coast barrage being in the nature of a 
 surprise was probably more useful as a deterrent to sub- 
 
202 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 marine activity in 1916 than in 1917. In both years a 
 strong patrol of monitors, destroyers, minesweepers, 
 drifters for net repairs, and other vessels was maintained 
 in position to the westward of the barrage to prevent in- 
 terference with the nets by enemy vessels and to keep 
 them effective. 
 
 These vessels were patrolling daily within 13 or 14 sea 
 miles of the two enemy destroyer and submarine bases, 
 and although occasionally attacked, were not driven off 
 in spite of the superior destroyer force which the enemy 
 could always bring to bear. In 1917 actions between 
 our vessels and those of the enemy, and between our own 
 and enemy aircraft, were of very frequent occurrence. 
 The Germans also introduced a new weapon in the form 
 of fast motor boats controlled by a cable from the shore 
 and guided by signals from aircraft, these boats being 
 heavily loaded in the fore part with explosives which 
 detonated on contact with any vessels attacked. On only 
 one occasion in four attacks were the boats successful in 
 hitting their mark, and the monitor Terror, which was 
 struck in this instance, although considerably damaged 
 in her bulge protection, was successfully brought back to 
 port and repaired. 
 
 Whilst our monitors were on patrol near the barrage, 
 as well as on other occasions, every favourable opportunity 
 was taken of bombarding the bases at Zeebrugge and 
 Ostend. In the former case the targets fired at were 
 the lock gates, and in the latter the workshops, to which 
 considerable damage was frequently occasioned, as well 
 as to vessels lying in the basin. 
 
 These bombardments were carried out in 1917 at 
 distances exceeding 25,000 yards. The long range was 
 necessary on account of the net barrage, and also because 
 of the rapidity with which the " Knocke " and " Tirpitz " 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 203 
 
 shore batteries obtained the range of monitors attacking 
 them, one hit on an unprotected monitor being sufficient 
 to sink her. 
 
 They were also invariably carried out under the pro- 
 tection of a smoke screen ; in the autumn of 1917 the 
 enemy commenced to start a smoke screen himself as soon 
 as we opened fire, thus interfering with our observation of 
 fire even from aircraft, but in spite of this much damage 
 resulted from the bombardments. Our observation of fire 
 being necessarily carried out by aircraft, and the enemy 
 attempting similar measures in his return gunfire, resulted 
 in aerial combats over the monitors being a frequent 
 occurrence. 
 
 The carefully organized arrangements made by Ad- 
 miral Bacon for these coastal bombardments excited my 
 warm admiration. He left nothing to chance, and every- 
 thing that ingenuity could devise and patient preparation 
 could assist was done to ensure success. He received 
 assistance from a staff which, though small in number, 
 was imbued with his own spirit, and he brought to great 
 perfection and achieved wonderful success in methods of 
 warfare of which the Navy had had no previous experience. 
 
 During the year 1917 aerial bombing attacks were 
 persistently carried out on the German naval bases in 
 Belgium by the Royal Naval Air Force at Dunkirk, 
 which came within the sphere of the Dover Command. 
 These attacks had as their main object the destruction of 
 enemy vessels lying in these bases, and of the means for 
 their maintenance and repair. The attacks, under the 
 very skilful direction of Captain Lambe, R.N., were as 
 incessant as our resources and the weather admitted, 
 and our gallant and splendidly efficient airmen of the 
 R.N.A.S. were veritable thorns in the sides of the Ger- 
 mans. Our bombing machines as well as our fighting 
 
204 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 aircraft were often required to attack military instead 
 of naval objectives, and several squadrons of our fighting 
 machines were lent to the military for the operations 
 carried out during the year on the Western Front ; they 
 did most excellent work, and earned the high commenda- 
 tion of Sir Douglas Haig.* But we were still able to work 
 against naval objectives. Zeebrugge, for instance, was 
 bombed on seven nights during April and five nights dur- 
 ing May, and during September a total weight of 86 tons 
 of bombs was dropped on enemy objectives by the Dun- 
 kirk Naval aircraft, and we had good reason to be satisfied 
 with the results achieved. During this same month 
 18 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 43 driven down. 
 Attacks upon enemy aerodromes were very frequent, and 
 this form of aerial offensive undoubtedly exercised a very 
 deterrent influence upon enemy aerial activity over Eng- 
 land. Two submarines also were attacked and were 
 thought to be destroyed, all by our machines from Dun- 
 kirk. To Commodore Godfrey Paine, the Fifth Sea Lord 
 at the Admiralty, who was in charge of the R.N.A.S., 
 and to the staff assisting him our thanks were due for 
 the great work they accomplished in developing new and 
 efficient types of machines and in overcoming so far as was 
 possible the difiiculties of supply. The amount of bomb- 
 ing work carried out in 1917 cannot, of course, compare 
 with that accomplished during 1918, when production had 
 got into its stride and the number of machines available 
 was consequently so very much larger. 
 
 Whether it was due to our aerial attacks on Bruges 
 that the German destroyers in the autumn months 
 frequently left that base and lay at Zeebrugge cannot be 
 known, but they did so, and as soon as we discovered this 
 fact by aerial photographs, plans .were laid by Sir Reginald 
 
 ♦ Now Earl Haig* 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 205 
 
 Bacon for a combined naval and aerial night operation. 
 The idea was for the aircraft to bomb Zeebnigge heavily 
 in the vicinity of the Mole, as we ascertained by trial that 
 on such occasions the enemy's destroyers left the Mole 
 and proceeded outside the harbour. There we had our 
 coastal motor boats lying off waiting for the destroyers 
 to come out, and on the first occasion that the operation 
 was carried out one German destroyer was sunk and 
 another believed to have been damaged, if not also sunk, 
 by torpedoes fired by the coastal motor boats, to which 
 very great credit is due for their work, not only on this, 
 but on many other occasions ; these boats were manned by 
 a very gallant and enterprising personnel. 
 
 Numerous other operations against enemy destroyers, 
 torpedo boats and submarines were carried out during the 
 year, as recounted in Sir Reginald Bacon's book, and 
 in the autumn, when supplies of the new pattern mines 
 were becoming available, some minelaying destroyers 
 were sent to Dover; these vessels, as well as coastal 
 motor boats and motor launches, were continually laying 
 mines in the vicinity of Zeebrugge and Ostend with 
 excellent results, a considerable number of German de- 
 stroyers and torpedo boats working from Zeebrugge being 
 known to have been mined, and a fair proportion of them 
 sunk by these measures. 
 
 In addition to the operations carried out in the 
 vicinity of the Belgian coast, the Dover force constantly 
 laid traps for the enemy destroyers and submarines in 
 waters through which they were known to pass. 
 
 Lines of mined nets laid across the expected track of 
 enemy vessels was a device frequently employed ; sub- 
 marines, as has been stated, were used on the cross- 
 Channel barrage to watch for the passage of enemy sub- 
 marines and destroyers, and everything that ingenuity 
 
2o6 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 could suggest was done to catch the German craft if they 
 came out. 
 
 Such measures were supplementary to the work of 
 the destroyers engaged on the regular Dover Patrol, the 
 indomitable Sixth Flotilla. 
 
 A great deal depended upon the work of these de- 
 stroyers. They formed the principal, indeed practically 
 the only, protection for the vast volume of trade passing 
 the Straits of Dover as well as for our cross-Channel 
 communications. When the nearness of Zeebrugge and 
 Ostend to Dover is considered (a matter of only 72 and 
 62 miles respectively), and the fact that one and some- 
 times two German flotillas, each comprising eleven large 
 and heavily armed torpedo-boat destroyers, were usually 
 based on Bruges, together with a force of large modern 
 torpedo boats and a very considerable number of sub- 
 marines, it will be realized that the position was ever one 
 of considerable anxiety. It was further always possible 
 for the enemy to send reinforcements of additional flotillas 
 from German ports, or to send heavier craft with mine- 
 sweepers to sweep a clear channel, timing their arrival to 
 coincide with an intended attack, and thus to place the 
 German forces in a position of overwhelming superiority. 
 
 Our own Dover force at the commencement of 1917 
 consisted of one light cruiser, three flotilla leaders, 
 eighteen modern destroyers, including several of the old 
 " Tribal " class, eleven old destroyers of the 80-knot class 
 (the latter being unfit to engage the German destroyers), 
 and five " P " boats. Of this total the average number 
 not available at any moment may be taken as at least 
 one-third. This may seem a high estimate, but in addi- 
 tion to the ordinary refits and the time required for boiler 
 cleaning, the vessels of the Dover Patrol working in very 
 dangerous, foggy and narrow waters suffered heavy 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 207 
 
 casualties from mines and collisions. The work of the 
 Dover force included the duty of escorting the heavy traffic 
 between Dover and Folkestone and the French ports, 
 this being mostly carried on during daylight hours owing 
 to the prevalence of submarine-laid mines and the neces- 
 sity for sweeping the various channels before the traffic 
 — which included a very large troop traffic — was allowed 
 to cross. An average of more than twenty transports 
 and hospital ships crossed the Straits daily during 1917, 
 irrespective of other vessels. The destroyers which were 
 engaged during daylight hours in this work, and those 
 patrolling the barrages across the Straits and off the 
 Belgian coast, obviously required some rest at night, and 
 this fact reduced the number available for duty in the dark 
 hours, the only time during which enemy destroyer attacks 
 took place. 
 
 Up to the spring of 1917 the examination service of 
 all vessels passing the Straits of Dover had been carried 
 out in the Downs. This led to a very large number of 
 merchant ships being at anchor in the Downs at night, and 
 these vessels were obviously open to attack by enemy craft 
 of every description. It was always a marvel to me that 
 the enemy showed such a lack of enterprise in failing to 
 take advantage of these conditions. In order to protect 
 these vessels to some extent, a light cruiser from Dover, 
 and one usually borrowed from Harwich, together with a 
 division of destroyers either from Dover, or borrowed also 
 from Harwich, were anchored off Ramsgate, and backed 
 by a monitor if one was available, necessitating a division 
 of strength and a weakening of the force available for 
 work in the Straits of Dover proper. 
 
 The result of this conflict of interests in the early part 
 of the year was that for the patrol of the actual Straits 
 in the darkness of night on a line some 30 miles in length, 
 
2o8 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 the number of vessels available rarely if ever exceeded six 
 — viz. two flotilla leaders and four destroyers, with the 
 destroyers resting in Dover (four to six in number) with 
 steam ready at short notice as a reserve. 
 
 An attack had been made on the Dover Patrol in 
 October, 1916, which had resulted in the loss by us of 
 one destroyer and six drifters, and serious damage to 
 another destroyer. A consideration of the circumstances 
 of this attack after my arrival at the Admiralty led me to 
 discuss with Sir Reginald Bacon the question of keeping 
 such forces as we had in the Straits at night concentrated 
 as far as possible. This disposition naturally increased 
 the risk of enemy vessels passing unobserved, but ensured 
 that they would be encountered in greater, although not 
 equal, force if sighted. 
 
 Steps were also taken to reduce the tempting bait 
 represented by the presence of so many merchant ships in 
 the Downs at night. Sir Reginald Bacon proposed that 
 the portion of the examination service which dealt with 
 south-going ships should be moved to Southend, and the 
 transfer was effected as rapidly as possible and without 
 difficulty, thereby assisting to free us from a source of 
 anxiety. 
 
 During the early part of 1917 the enemy carried out 
 a few destroyer raids both on English coast towns in the 
 vicinity of Dover and the French ports of Dunkirk and 
 Calais. As a result of these raids, which, though regret- 
 table, were of no military importance, a good deal of ill- 
 informed criticism was levelled at the Admiraltj^ and the 
 Vice-Admiral commanding at Dover. To anyone con- 
 versant with the conditions, the wonder was not that the 
 raids took place, but that the enemy showed so little 
 enterprise in carrying out — with the great advantages he 
 possessed — operations of real, if not vital, military value. 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 209 
 
 The only explanation is that he foresaw the moral effect 
 that his tip - and - run raids would produce ; and he 
 considered that the effect of the resulting agitation 
 might be of no inconsiderable value to himself; the 
 actual damage done was almost negligible, apart from 
 the loss of some eight lives, which we all deplored. It is 
 perhaps natural that people who have never experienced 
 war at close quarters should be impatient if its conse- 
 quences are brought home to them. A visit to Dunkirk 
 would have shown what war really meant, and the bearing 
 of the inhabitants of that town would have taught a 
 valuable lesson. 
 
 The conditions in the Straits have already been men- 
 tioned, but too much emphasis cannot be laid on them. 
 The enemy who possessed the incalculable advantage of 
 the initiative, had at his disposal, whenever he took heart 
 to plan an attack, a; force of at least twenty-two 
 very good destroyers, all unfortunately of higher speed 
 than anything we could bring against them, and more 
 heavily armed than many of our destroyers. This force 
 was based within seventy miles of Dover, and as the Ger- 
 mans had no traffic of any sort to defend, was always 
 available for offensive operations against our up and down 
 or cross-Channel traffic. Our Dover force was inferior 
 even at full strength, but owing to the inevitable absence 
 of vessels under repair or refitting and the manifold duties 
 imposed upon it, was bound to be in a position of marked 
 inferiority in any night attack undertaken by the Germans 
 against any objective in the Straits. 
 
 The enemy had a great choice of objectives. These 
 were : first, the traffic in the Channel or the destroyers 
 watching the Straits (the most important military 
 objective) ; second, the merchant ships anchored in the 
 Downs; third, the British monitors anchored off 
 
210 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 Dunkirk; fourth, the French ports, Dunkirk, Boulogne 
 and Calais, and the British port of Dover; and fifth, the 
 British undefended towns of Ramsgate, Margate, Lowes- 
 toft, etc., which German mentality did not hesitate to 
 attack. 
 
 A glance at Chart F will show how widely separated 
 are these objectives and how impossible it was for the 
 small Dover force to defend them all simultaneously, 
 especially during the hours of darkness. Any such 
 attempt would have led to a dispersion of force which 
 would have been criminal. The distance from Dunkirk 
 along the French coast to Calais, thence to Dover 
 and along the English coast to the North Foreland is 
 60 miles. The distance at which an enemy destroyer 
 can be seen at night is about a quarter of a mile, 
 and the enemy could select any point of the 60 miles 
 for attack, or could vary the scene of operations by 
 bombarding Lowestoft or towns in the vicinity, which 
 were only 80 miles from Zeebrugge and equally vulner- 
 able to attack, since the enemy's destroyers could leave 
 their base before dark, carry out their hurried bombard- 
 ment, and return before daylight. In whatever quarter 
 he attacked he could be certain of great local superiority 
 of force, although, of course, he knew full well that the 
 first sign of an attack would be a signal to our forces to 
 try to cut him off from his bases. Therein lay the reason 
 for the tip-and-run nature of the raids, which lasted 
 for a few minutes only. The enemy realized that we 
 should endeavour to intercept his force as soon as it had 
 disclosed its presence. The Germans had naturally to 
 take the risk of encountering our vessels on the way to 
 his objectives, but at night this risk was but slight. 
 
 As it was obviously impossible to prevent bombard- 
 ments by stationing destroyers in adequate force for 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 211 
 
 the protection of each town, the only possible alterna- 
 tive, unless such bombardments were ignored, was to 
 give the most vulnerable points protection by artillery 
 mounted on shore. This was a War Office, not an 
 Admiralty, responsibihty ; but as the War Office had not 
 the means available, the Admiralty decided to take the 
 matter in hand, and in the spring of 1917 some 6-inch 
 naval guns taken from our reserves were mounted in the 
 vicinity of the North Foreland. Further, an old monitor, 
 which was of no use for other work owing to her 
 machinery being unfit, was moored to the southward of 
 Ramsgate, and her guns commanded the Downs. Search- 
 lights were also mounted on shore, but more reliance was 
 placed on the use of star shells, of which the earliest 
 supplies were sent to these guns. The result was imme- 
 diately apparent. German destroyers appeared one night 
 later on off the North Foreland and opened fire, 
 which was returned by the monitor and the shore guns. 
 The enemy immediately withdrew, and never appeared 
 again in 1917 in this neighbourhood. 
 
 Meanwhile efforts had been made to increase the 
 strength of the Dover force, and by the end of June it 
 stood at 4 flotilla leaders, 29 modern destroyers (includ- 
 ing *' Tribal" class), 10 old 30-knotters, and 6 "P" 
 boats. The increase in strength was rendered possible 
 owing to the relief of destroyers of the " M " and " L " 
 classes at Harwich by new vessels recently completed and 
 by the weakening of that force numerically. The flotilla 
 leaders were a great asset to Dover, as, although they were 
 coal-burning ships and lacked the speed of the German 
 destroyers, their powerful armament made it possible for 
 them to engage successfully a numerically greatly 
 superior force. This was clearly shown on the occasion 
 of the action between the Broke and Swift and a 
 
212 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 German force of destroyers on the night of April 20-21, 
 1917. 
 
 The flotilla leaders on that ocdasion were, as was 
 customary, patrolling at the Dover end of the cross- 
 Channel barrage. The enemy's destroyers were in two 
 detachments. One detachment, consisting apparently of 
 four boats, passed, it was thought, round the western 
 end of the barrage at high tide close to the South Good- 
 win Buoy, and fired a few rounds at Dover. The other 
 detachment of two boats went towards Calais, and the 
 whole force seems to have met at a rendezvous prior to its 
 return to its base. 
 
 The Broke and Swift intercepted them on their 
 return, and after a hot engagement succeeded in sinking 
 two of the enemy vessels, one being very neatly rammed 
 by the Broke (Captain E. R. G. R. Evans, C.B.), and the 
 second sunk by torpedoes. Some of the remaining four 
 boats undoubtedly suffered serious damage. Our flotilla 
 leaders were handled with conspicuous skill, and the enemy 
 was taught a lesson which resulted in his displaying even 
 greater caution in laying his plans and evincing a greater 
 respect for the Dover force for many months. 
 
 The success of the Broke and Swift was received with 
 a chorus of praise, and this praise was undoubtedly most 
 fully deserved, but once again an example was furnished 
 of the manner in which public attention becomes riveted 
 upon the dramatic moments of naval warfare whilst the 
 long and patient labour by which the dramatic moments 
 are brought about is ignored. 
 
 Thus in this case but little attention was drawn to 
 the years of arduous work performed by the Sixth Flotilla 
 in the Straits of Dover by day and by night, in dense 
 fogs, heavy gales and blinding snowstorms, in waters 
 which were constantly mined, and in the face of an enemy 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 213 
 
 who was bound to be in greatly superior force whenever 
 he chose to attack. 
 
 Little thought was given either to the wonderful and 
 most gallant work carried out by the drifters of the 
 Patrol, manned largely by fishermen, and practically 
 defenceless against attack by the German destroyers. 
 
 The careful organization which conduced to the 
 
 successful action was forgotten. Sir Reginald Bacon has 
 
 told the story of all this work in his book, and I need not 
 
 repeat it. But let it be added that victory depends less 
 
 on such enheartening incidents, welcome as they are, than 
 
 on the patient and usually monotonous performance of 
 
 duty at sea by day and by night in all weathers, and on 
 
 the skill in organization of the staff ashore in foreseeing 
 
 and forestaUing enemy activity on a hundred and one 
 
 occasions of which the public necessarily knows nothing. 
 
 It has been stated that reliable information reached 
 
 us in the autumn of 1917 that enemy submarines were 
 
 passing the Straits of Dover in much greater numbers 
 
 than we had hitherto beheved to be the case, and the 
 
 inefiiciency of the net barrage in preventing the passage 
 
 was apparent. 
 
 Early in the year (in February) Sir Reginald Bacon 
 had put forward a proposal for a deep minefield on the 
 line Folkestone— Cape Grisnez, but confined only to the 
 portion of the line to the southward of the Varne 
 Shoal. 
 
 ^ It was known that enemy submarines as a rule made 
 this portion of their passage submerged, and the mine- 
 field was designed to catch them. 
 
 The proposal was approved after personal discussion 
 with Admiral Bacon, and directions were given that the 
 eariiest supplies of the new pattern mines were to be 
 allocated for this service; these mines commenced to 
 
214 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 become available early in the following November, and 
 were immediately laid. 
 
 Admiral Bacon suggested later the extension of 
 the minefield to the westward of the Varne Shoal, so as 
 to make it a complete barrier across the Channel. This 
 was also approved and measures were taken to provide the 
 necessary mines. 
 
 The question of illuminating at night the area covered 
 by the deep minefield was also discussed at length with 
 Sir Reginald Bacon. Various proposals were considered, 
 such as the use of searchlights on Cape Grisnez and at 
 Folkestone, together with the provision of small light- 
 ships fitted with searchlights and moored at intervals 
 across the Channel, and also the use of flares from patrol 
 craft. Flares had already been experimented with from 
 kite balloons by the Anti-Submarine Division of the War 
 Staff, and they were found on trial to be efficient when 
 used from drifters, and of great use in illuminating the 
 patrol area so that the patrol craft might have better 
 opportunities for sighting submarines and the latter be 
 forced to dive into the minefields. 
 
 A committee had been meanwhile appointed by the 
 First Lord to consider the question of the Dover Barrage 
 in the light of the information we then possessed as to 
 the passage of enemy submarines through the Straits of 
 Dover. This committee visited Dover on several occa- 
 sions, and its members, some of whom were naval officers 
 and some civilian engineers, were shown the existing 
 arrangements. 
 
 The committee, which considered at first the question 
 of providing an obstruction, ended by reporting that the 
 existing barrage was inefficient (a fact which had become 
 apparent), and made proposals for the establishment of 
 the already approved minefield on the Folkestone — 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 215 
 
 Grisnez line. I do not recollect that any definite new 
 ideas were evolved as the outcome of the labours of this 
 committee ; some ideas regarding the details of the mine- 
 field, particularly as to the best form of obstruction that 
 would catch submarines or other vessels on the surface, 
 were put forward, as also some proposals for erecting 
 towers in certain positions in the Straits. I do not think 
 that these latter ever matured. The manner in which the 
 minefield should be illuminated at night was discussed by 
 the committee, and arrangements were made for the 
 provision of the vessels proposed by Admiral Bacon. 
 
 Some disagreement arose on the subject of the pro- 
 vision of the necessary number of vessels for patrolling 
 the minefield with a view to forcing the submarines to 
 dive. In my view a question of this nature was one to be 
 left in the hands of the Vice-Admiral at Dover, with 
 experience on the spot, after I had emphasized to him the 
 extreme importance attached to the provision of an ample 
 number of patrol craft at the earliest possible moment. 
 Interference by the Admiralty in such a detail of a flag 
 officer's command would in my opinion have been danger- 
 ous and incorrect, for so long as a flag officer retains the 
 confidence of the Board he must be left to work his com- 
 mand in the manner considered best by him after having 
 been informed of the approved general policy, since he is 
 bound to be acquainted with the local situation to a far 
 greater extent than any officer serving at the Admiralty 
 or elsewhere. I discussed the matter personally with Sir 
 Reginald Bacon, and was satisfied that he was aware of 
 the views held by me and of the necessity for providing 
 the patrol craft even at the expense of other services, as 
 soon as he could make the requisite arrangements. 
 
 Sir Reginald Bacon's three years' experience at Dover 
 was a great asset in dealing with this matter, as with 
 
2i6 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 other questions connected with the Command, more 
 especially the difficult and embarrassing operations on 
 the Belgian coast. His ingenuity, originality, patience, 
 power of organization and his methodical preparations for 
 carrying out operations jvere always a great factor in 
 ensuring success. These qualities were never shown more 
 clearly than during the preparations made for landing a 
 force of some 14,000 officers and men with tanks, artillery 
 and transport on the coast of Belgium under the very 
 muzzles of the German heavy coast artillery. It was 
 estimated that the whole force would be put on shore 
 in a period of twenty minutes. The scheme is described 
 in full in Chapter IX. of the first volume of Sir 
 Reginald Bacon's book on the Dover Patrol. He 
 had put the proposal before Admiral Sir Henry 
 Jackson, my predecessor, who had expressed his 
 concurrence so far as the naval portion of the scheme 
 was concerned, and provided that the army made the 
 necessary advance in Flanders. When the scheme was 
 shown to me shortly after taking office as First Sea 
 Lord I confess that I had some doubts as to the 
 possibility of manoeuvring two monitors, with a pontoon 
 550 feet in length secured ahead of and between the bows 
 of the monitors, but in view of the immense importance 
 of driving the Germans from the Belgian coast and the 
 fact that this scheme, if practicable, promised to facilitate 
 greatly such an operation, approval was given for the con- 
 struction of a pontoon, and after witnessing the first trials 
 of the pontoon secured between two monitors which were 
 themselves lashed together, I became convinced that this 
 part of the operation was perfectly feasible. The remaining 
 pontoons were therefore constructed, and preparations 
 commenced in the greatest secrecy for the whole operation. 
 The next matter for trial jyas the arrangement 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 217 
 
 devised by Sir R. Bacon for making it possible for tanks 
 to mount the sea wall. These trials were carried out with 
 great secrecy against a model of the sea wall built at the 
 Headquarters of the Tank Corps in France, and were 
 quite successful. It was necessary to see actual photo- 
 graphs of the tanks mounting the coping at the top of 
 the sea wall to be convinced of the practicability of the 
 scheme. A matter of great importance was the necessity 
 for obtaining accurate information of the slope of the 
 beach at the projected landing places in order that the 
 practicability of grounding the pontoon could be ascer- 
 tained. This information Sir R. Bacon, with his charac- 
 teristic patience and ingenuity, obtained by means of 
 aerial photographs taken at various states of tide. 
 
 Finally, to gain exact knowledge of the rise and fall 
 of the tide, Admiral Bacon employed a submarine which 
 submerged in the vicinity of Nieuport and registered the 
 height of water above her hull for a period of twenty -four 
 hours under conditions of spring and neap tides. 
 
 The preparations for the landing involved much colla- 
 boration with the military authorities, and Sir Reginald 
 Bacon was frequently at G.H.Q. for the purpose. As soon 
 as it was decided that the 1st Division was to provide the 
 landing party, conferences took place between Admiral 
 Bacon and General Sir Henry Rawlinson (now, Lord 
 Rawlinson), and I took the opportunity of a visit paid 
 by Sir H. Rawlinson to London to confer with him 
 myself. Subsequently a conference took place at the War 
 Office at which Sir Douglas Haig was present. 
 
 There was entire unanimity between the Navy and 
 Army over the proposed operation, and we greatly 
 admired the manner in which the Sister Service took up 
 the work of preparing for the landing. Secrecy was 
 absolutely vital to success, as the whole scheme was 
 
2i8 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 dependent on the operation being a surprise, more par- 
 ticularly in the selection of the landing place. Admiral 
 Bacon describes in his book the methods by .which 
 secrecy was preserved. As time passed, and the atrocious 
 weather in Flanders during the summer of 1917 prevented 
 the advance of our Army, it became more and more 
 difficult to preserve secrecy ; but although the fact that 
 some operation of the kind was in preparation gradually 
 became known to an increasing number of people, it is 
 safe to say that the enemy never realized until long after 
 the operation had been abandoned its real nature or the 
 locality selected for it. 
 
 Some officers with experience of the difficulties 
 encountered during the landings at Gallipoli expressed 
 doubts of the practicability of the operation in the face 
 of the heavy fire from large guns and from machine guns 
 which might be expected, but the circumstances were so 
 different from those at Gallipoli that neither Sir Reginald 
 Bacon nor I shared these doubts. The heavy bombard- 
 ment of the coast batteries by our own shore guns, which 
 had been greatly strengthened for the purpose, the rapidity 
 of the landing, the use of a dense smoke screen, the fact 
 of the landing being a complete surprise, the use of tanks 
 for dealing with hostile machine guns, the interruption 
 to the enemy's shore communications by heavy artillery 
 fire, and the bombardment by monitors of the coast well 
 to the eastward of the landing place as a feint, were all new 
 factors, and all promised to assist towards success. 
 
 Of the supreme importance of the operation there 
 could be no question. Ever since 1914 the Navy had 
 been pressing for the recapture of the ports on the Belgian 
 coast, and they could only be taken by means of a com- 
 bined operation. Sir John French* himself had in the 
 
 * Now Field-Marshal Viscount French. 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 219 
 
 early days of the war pointed out the great importance of 
 securing the coast, but circumstances beyond his control 
 were too powerful for him. 
 
 It was in these circumstances that the decision to 
 undertake the operation was made, and when it became 
 necessary to abandon it owing to the inability of the Army 
 to co-operate the intense disappointment felt by all those 
 who had worked so hard to ensure its success can be 
 realized. 
 
 The Harwich force, consisting of the 5th Light 
 Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla of destroyers, was the 
 only other British force stationed in south-eastern waters 
 if we except the local craft at the No re. The 5th Light 
 Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla were under the com- 
 mand of Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Sir Reginald 
 Tyrwhitt, an officer whose vessels were, if we except 
 the Dover patrol, more frequently in contact with 
 the enemy than any other British force in Home waters. 
 Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt had several functions to perform : 
 
 (1) It was always hoped that he would be able 
 to join forces with the Grand Fleet should events 
 foreshadow a meeting with the High Sea Fleet. 
 
 (2) We depended very largely on him for recon- 
 naissance work in the southern part of the North 
 Sea and into the German Bight. 
 
 (3) It fell to his lot as a rule to provide the 
 covering force for aerial operations carried out from 
 seaplane carriers in southern waters. 
 
 (4) His force was best placed to cut off any enemy 
 light craft that might be located in southern waters 
 and to attack Zeppelins at sea on their return from 
 raids over England. 
 
220 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 (5) He was called upon almost weekly to cover 
 the passage of the convoy of merchant ships between 
 the Thames and Holland known as the " Dutch 
 Convoy." 
 
 (6) He was constantly called upon the provide 
 reinforcements for the Dover Patrol or to assist in 
 operations carried out by the latter force. 
 
 These miscellaneous duties involved a great deal of 
 work for the Harwich force and particularly for the 
 destroyers. 
 
 The necessity for continually providing reinforcements 
 from the Harwich force for the Dover Patrol was a stand- 
 ing handicap to Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt's operations; 
 he took the matter philosophically, although I always 
 realized how difficult it made his work at times, and 
 whenever, as was frequent, combined operations were 
 carried out by the two forces, the greatest harmony pre- 
 vailed between the Commands. 
 
 At the commencement of 1917 the Harwich force 
 comprised 8 light cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders and 45 
 destroyers. During the year new vessels were either 
 added to. it or replaced older craft which were withdrawn 
 for other services, and at the end of the year the force 
 included 9 light cruisers, 4 flotilla leaders and 24 
 destroyers. 
 
 The force was constantly operating in the outer waters 
 of the Heligoland Bight to seaward of our minefields. 
 The objects of the presence of our ships in these waters, 
 in addition to reconnaissance work and aerial operations, 
 were : 
 
 (a) To intercept any enemy light forces which 
 might be intending to operate off our coasts or which 
 might be on passage between German ports. 
 
The Dover Patrol and Harwich Forces 221 
 
 (h) To surprise and attack enemy minesweeping 
 vessels. 
 
 (c) To destroy Zeppelins either on reconnaissance 
 or raiding work. 
 
 (d) To capture enemy merchant ships trading 
 between Dutch and German ports, or neutrals with 
 contraband trading to Germany. 
 
 The opportunities that were given to the force under 
 heading (a) were exceedingly rare during the year 1917, 
 when even the light forces of the High Sea Fleet were 
 content to remain almost constantly in port except when 
 engaged in the operations in the Baltic, and excepting 
 also on the two occasions on which attacks were made on 
 the Scandinavian convoy ; but a portion of the Harwich 
 force succeeded on one occasion in intercepting a flotilla 
 of German destroyers en route to Zeebrugge from German 
 ports with the result that one destroyer was seriously 
 damaged and forced into the Dutch port of Ymuiden and 
 another either sunk or badly damaged. 
 
 Forces from Harwich also succeeded in capturing or 
 sinking twenty-four merchant ships trading between 
 Antwerp and Dutch ports and Germany during the year, 
 but the main result of the operations of this force was 
 shown in the refusal of the enemy to risk his vessels 
 except under cover of darkness in the area in which the 
 Harwich force worked. 
 
 The duty of protecting the Dutch convoy imposed a 
 heavy strain upon the Harwich force. During the year 
 1917, 520 eastbound and 511 westbound vessels were con- 
 voyed between Dutch and British ports with the loss of- 
 only four ships by submarine attack, one by destroyer 
 attack, and one by mine. The price paid by the force for 
 this success was the loss of four destroyers by mines, and 
 
222 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 one by collision, and the damage of three destroyers by 
 mine or torpedo, and of five destroyers and one light cruiser 
 by collision. The frequent collisions were due to the condi- 
 tions under which the traffic was carried out at night 
 without lights, and to the prevalence of fogs. The pro- 
 cedure adopted by the force was frequently changed as 
 it necessarily became known to the Germans. 
 
 The extraordinarily small losses in the convoys were 
 a very great tribute to the handling of the protecting 
 force and to the organization in Holland for arranging 
 sailings, when it is borne in mind that it was almost 
 impossible to prevent leakage of information to German 
 agents once the time of sailing was given out, and that 
 the convoys were open to attack from destroyers and sub- 
 marines operating either from Zeebrugge or from the 
 Ems or other German ports. The orders of course eman- 
 ated from the Admiralty, and of all the great work 
 achieved by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, the Deputy 
 Chief of the Naval Staff, during his service at the Admir- 
 alty in the year 1917 and indeed in the two preceding 
 years, the success attending the work of this convoy was 
 certainly not the least. 
 
 It is difficult to put into words the great admiration 
 which I felt for Sir Henry Oliver's work throughout the 
 war. Our association commenced during my command 
 of the Grand Fleet, but became of course much closer at 
 the Admiralty, and during my service there his assistance 
 was of immense help to me and of incalculable value to 
 the nation. 
 
 It was fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that he 
 held such important Staff appointments during the most 
 critical periods of the war. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE SEQUEL 
 
 The foregoing, chapters have been devoted to describing 
 the measures that jvere devised or put into force or that 
 were in course of preparation during the year 1917 to 
 deal with the unrestricted submarine warfare against 
 merchant shipping adopted by Germany and Austria in 
 February of that year. It now remains to state, so 
 far as my information admits, the effect of those 
 measures. 
 
 British anti-submarine measures were almost non- 
 existent at the commencement of the war. Sir Arthur 
 Wilson, when in command of the Channel Fleet in the 
 early days of the submarine, had experimented with nets 
 as an anti-submarine measure, and shortly before the 
 war submarines were exercised at stalking one another in 
 a submerged condition ; also the question of employing a 
 light gun for use against the same type of enemy craft 
 when on the surface had been considered, and some of our 
 submarines had actually been provided with such a gun of 
 small calibre. Two patterns of towed explosive sweeps had 
 also been tried and adopted, but it cannot be said that we 
 had succeeded in finding any satisfactory anti-submarine 
 device, although many brains were at work on the subject, 
 and therefore the earliest successes against enemy sub- 
 marines were principally achieved by ramming tactics. 
 Gradually other devices were thought out and adopted; 
 these comprised drift and stationary nets fitted with 
 
 223 
 
224 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 mines, the depth charge, decoy ships of various natures, 
 gunfire from patrol craft and gunfire from armed 
 merchant ships, as well as the numerous devices 
 mentioned in Chapter III. 
 
 Except at the very commencement of the war, when 
 production of craft in Germany was slow, presumably as 
 a result of the comparatively small number under construc- 
 tion when war broke out, the British measures failed until 
 towards the end of 1917 in sinking submarines at a rate 
 approaching in any degree that at .which the Germans 
 were producing them. 
 
 Thus Germany started the war with 28 submarines; 
 five were added and five were lost during 1914, leaving 
 the number still 28 at the commencement of 1915. 
 
 During 1915, so far as our knowledge went, 54 
 were added and only 19 were lost, the total at the 
 commencement of 1916 being therefore 63. 
 
 During 1916 it is believed that 87 submarines 
 were added and 25 lost, leaving the total at the 
 commencement of 1917 at 125. 
 
 During 1917 our information was that 78 submarines 
 were added and 66 lost, leaving the total at the end of 
 the year at 137. 
 
 The losses during 1917, given quarterly, indicate 
 the increasing effectiveness of our anti-submarine 
 measures. These losses, so far as we know them, were : 
 
 First quarter ... 10 Third quarter ... 20 
 
 Second quarter ... 12 Fourth quarter ... 24 
 
 During 1918, according to Admiral Scheer*, 74 sub- 
 marines were added to the fleet in the period January to 
 October. The losses during this year up to the date of 
 
 * " Germany's High Sea Fleet in tlie World War " (page 335). 
 
Two Depth Charges after Explosion. 
 
 (Taken from the Air.) 
 
 The Tell-tale Oil Patch. 
 
 [Taken from the Air.) 
 
The Sequel 225 
 
 the Armistice totalled 70, excluding those destroyed by 
 the Germans on the evacuation of Bruges and those blown 
 up by them at Pola and Cattaro. Taken quarterly the 
 losses were : 
 
 First quarter ... 18 Third quarter ... 21 
 
 Second quarter ... 26 Fourth quarter (to 
 
 date of Armistice) 6 
 
 It will be seen from the foregoing figures for 1917 
 and 1918 that the full result of the anti-submarine 
 measures inaugurated in 1917 and previous years was 
 being felt in the last quarter of 1917, the results for 1918 
 being very little in advance of those for the previous half- 
 year. 
 
 According to our information, as shown by the 
 figures given above, the Germans had completed by 
 October, 1918, a total of 326 submarines of all classes, 
 exclusive of those destroyed by them in November at 
 Bruges, Pola and Cattaro. 
 
 Admiral von Capelle informed the Reichstag Com- 
 mittee that a total of 810 was ordered before and during 
 the war. It follows from that statement that over 400 
 must have been under construction or contemplated at the 
 time of the Armistice. 
 
 It is understood that the number of submarines 
 actually building at the end of 1918 was, however, only 
 about 200, which perhaps was the total capacity of the 
 German shipyards at one time. 
 
 At the risk of repetition it is as well to repeat here 
 the figures giving the quarterly losses of merchant ships 
 during 1917 and 1918, as they indicate in another 
 and effective way the influence of the anti-submarine 
 measures. 
 
226 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 These figures are : 
 
 
 1917 
 
 1918 
 
 
 British. 
 
 Foreign. 
 
 Total. 
 
 British. 
 
 Foreign. 
 
 Total. 
 
 1st quarter 
 2nd quarter 
 3rd quarter 
 4th quarter 
 
 911,840 
 
 1,361,870 
 
 952,938 
 
 782,887 
 
 707,533 
 875,064 
 541,535 
 489,954 
 
 1,619,373 
 2,236,934 
 1,494,473 
 1,272,843 
 
 697,668 
 630,862 
 512,030 
 *83,952 
 
 445,668 
 331,145 
 403,483 
 *93,582 
 
 1,143,336 
 962,007 
 915,513 
 
 ♦177,534 
 
 ♦Month of October only. 
 
 The dechne of the losses of British shipping was pro- 
 gressive from the second quarter of 1917 ; in the third 
 quarter of 1918 the reduction in the tonnage sunk became 
 very marked, and suggested definitely the approaching 
 end of the submarine menace. 
 
 The fact that during the second quarter of 1918 the 
 world's output of tonnage overtook the world's losses was 
 another satisfactory feature. The output for 1917 and 
 1918 is shown in the following table : 
 
 
 United 
 Kingdom 
 Output. 
 
 Dominions, 
 Allied and 
 
 Neutral 
 Countries. 
 
 Total for 
 World. 
 
 1917 
 
 1st quarter 
 2nd quarter 
 3rd quarter 
 4th quarter 
 
 1918 
 
 1st quarter 
 2nd quarter 
 3rd quarter 
 4th quarter, Oct. only 
 
 246,239 
 249,331 
 248,283 
 419,621 
 
 320,280 
 442,966 
 411,395 
 136,100 
 
 340,807 
 435,717 
 426,778 
 571,010 
 
 550,037 
 800,308 
 972,735 
 375,000 
 
 587,046 
 685,048 
 675,061 
 990,631 
 
 870,317 
 1,243,274 
 1,384,130 
 
 511,100 
 
 It will be noticed that by the last quarter of 1918 the 
 output of shipping in the United Kingdom alone had 
 overtaken the losses of British shipping. 
 
 It is not possible to give exact information as to the 
 
The Sequel 227 
 
 particular means by which the various German submarines 
 were disposed of, but it is believed that of the 186 vessels 
 mentioned as having been lost by the Germans at least 
 thirty -five fell victims to the depth charge, large orders 
 for which had been placed by the Admiralty in 1917, and 
 it is probably safe to credit mines, of which there was a 
 large and rapidly increasing output throughout 1917, with 
 the same number — thirty-five — a small proportion of these 
 losses being due to the mines in the North Sea Barrage. 
 Our own submarines accounted for some nineteen. 
 
 Our destroyers and patrol craft of all natures sank at 
 least twenty by means of gunfire or the ram, and some 
 four or five more by the use of towed sweeps of various 
 natures. Our decoy ships sank about twelve ; four 
 German submarines are known to have been sunk by 
 being rammed by men-of-war other than destroyers, four 
 by merchant ships, and about ten by means of our nets. 
 It is fairly certain that at least seven were accounted for 
 by aerial attack. Six were interned, some as the result 
 of injury after action with our vessels. 
 
 The total thus accounted for is 156. It was always 
 difficult to obtain exact information of the fate of sub- 
 marines, particularly in such cases as mine attack, and 
 the figures, therefore, do not cover the whole of the 
 German losses which we estimated at 185. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 " PRODUCTION " AT THE ADMIRALTY DURING 1917 
 
 The anti-submarine measures initiated during the 
 year 1917 and continued throughout the year 1918, as 
 well as those in force in the earlier years of the war, 
 depended very much for their success on the work carried 
 out by the Admiralty Departments responsible for design 
 and production, and apart from this these departments, 
 during the year 1917, carried out a great deal of most 
 valuable work in the direction of improving the efficiency 
 of the material with which the vessels of the Grand Fleet 
 and other warships were equipped. 
 
 Early in 1917 certain changes were made in the Naval 
 Ordnance Department. When Captain Dreyer took up the 
 post of Director of Naval Ordnance in succession to Rear- 
 Admiral Morgan Singer on March 1, the opportunity 
 was seized of removing the Torpedo Department, which 
 had hitherto been a branch of the Naval Ordnance 
 Department, from the control of the Director of Naval 
 Ordnance, and Rear- Admiral Fitzherbert was appointed 
 as Director of Torpedoes and Mines, with two assistant 
 Directors under him, one for torpedoes and the other for 
 mines. It had for some time been apparent to me that 
 the torpedo and mining work of the Fleet required a larger 
 and more independent organization, and the intention to 
 adopt a very extensive mining policy accentuated the 
 necessity of appointing a larger staff and according it 
 
 greater independence. The change also relieved the 
 
 228 
 
"Production" during 1917 229 
 
 D.N.O. of some work and gave him more liberty to 
 concentrate on purely ordnance matters. 
 
 Captain Dreyer, from his experience as Flag Captain 
 in the Iron Duke, was well aware of the directions in 
 which improvement in armament efficiency was necessary, 
 and a variety of questions were taken up by him with 
 great energy. 
 
 Some of the more important items of the valuable work 
 achieved by the Naval Ordnance Department during the 
 year 1917, in addition to the provision of various anti- 
 submarine measures mentioned in Chapter III, were : 
 
 (1) The introduction of a new armour-piercing 
 shell of far greater efficiency than that previously 
 in use ; the initial designs for these shells were pro- 
 duced in the drawing office of the Department of the 
 Director of Naval Ordnance. 
 
 (2) The introduction of star shell. 
 
 (3) The improvement of the arrangements made, 
 after our experience in the Jutland action, for 
 preventing the flash of exploding shell from being 
 communicated to the magazines. 
 
 Taking these in order, the New Armour-piercing Shell 
 would have produced a very marked effect had a Fleet 
 action been fought in 1918. Twelve thousand of these 
 new pattern shell had been ordered by November, 
 1917, after a long series of experiments, and a con- 
 siderable number were in an advanced stage of con- 
 struction by the end of the year. With our older 
 pattern of shell, as used by the Fleet at Jutland and in 
 earlier actions, there was no chance of the burst of the 
 shell, when fired at battle range, taking place inboard, 
 after penetrating the side armour of modern German 
 capital ships, in such a position that the fragments might 
 
230 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 be expected to reach and explode the magazines. A large 
 proportion of the shell burst on the face of the armour, 
 the remainder while passing through it. In the case of the 
 new shell, which was certainly twice as efficient and which 
 .would penetrate the armour without breaking up, the 
 fragments would have a very good chance of reaching the 
 magazines of even the latest German ships. 
 
 The greatest credit was due to the Ordnance Depart- 
 ment and to our enterprising manufacturers for the feat 
 which they achieved. We had pressed for a shell of this 
 nature as the result of our experience during the Jutland 
 action, and it was badly wanted. 
 
 We had experienced the need for an efficient Star Shell 
 both in the Grand Fleet and in southern waters, and after 
 the Jutland action the attention of the Admiralty had been 
 drawn by me to the efficiency of the German shell of this 
 type. In the early part of 1917, during one of the 
 short night bombardments of the south coast by 
 German destroyers, some German star shell, unexploded, 
 reached the shore. Directions were at once given 
 to copy these shell and not to waste time by trying to 
 improve upon them, a procedure dear to technical minds 
 but fatal when time is of the first importance. Success 
 was soon attained, and star shell were issued during 1917 
 to all our ships, the vessels of the Dover and Harwich 
 patrol force and the shore battery at the North Foreland 
 being the first supplied. 
 
 Important experiments were carried out in 1917 on 
 board H.M.S. Vengeance to test the Anti- flash arrange- 
 ments with which the Fleet had been equipped as the 
 result of certain of our ships being blown up in the Jutland 
 action. Valuable information was obtained from these 
 
"Production" during 1917 231 
 
 experiments and the arrangements were improved 
 accordingly. 
 
 The work of the Torpedo and Mining Department was 
 also of great value during 1917. The principal task lay 
 in perfecting the new pattern mine and arranging for its 
 production in great numbers, in overcoming the difficultiesf 
 experienced with the older pattern mines, and in arrang- 
 ing for a greatly increased production of explosives for 
 use in mines, depth charges, etc. 
 
 These projects were in hand when the new organization 
 involving the appointment of an Admiralty Controller 
 was adopted. 
 
 The circumstances in which this great and far- 
 reaching change in organization was brought about were 
 as follows. In the spring of 1917 proposals were made 
 to the Admiralty by the then Prime Minister that some of 
 the work carried out at that time by the Third Sea Lord 
 should be transferred to a civilian. At first it was under- 
 stood by us that the idea was to re-institute the office of 
 additional Civil Lord, which office was at the time held 
 by Sir Francis Hop wood (now Lord Southborough), 
 whose services, however, were being utilized by the 
 Foreign Office, and who had for this reason but little time 
 to devote to Admiralty work. To this proposal no 
 objection was raised. 
 
 At a later stage, however, it became evident that the 
 proposal was more far reaching and that the underly- 
 ing idea was to place a civilian in charge of naval material 
 generally and of all shipbuilding, both naval and mer- 
 cantile. Up to the spring of 1916 mercantile shipbuilding 
 had been carried out under the supervision of the Board 
 of Trade, but when the office of Shipping Controller was 
 instituted this work had been placed under that Minister, 
 
232 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 who was assisted by a committee of shipbuilders termed 
 the " Shipbuilding Advisory Committee." Statistics show 
 that good results as regards mercantile ship production 
 were not obtained under either the Board of Trade or the 
 Shipping Controller, one reason being that the supply 
 of labour and material, .which were very important 
 factors, was a matter of competition between the claims 
 of the Navy and those of the Mercantile Marine, 
 and another the fact that many men had been withdrawn 
 from the shipyards for service in the Army. There was 
 especial difficulty in providing labour for the manufacture 
 of machinery, and at one time the Admiralty went so far 
 as to lend artificers to assist in the production of engines. 
 The idea of placing the production of ships for both 
 services under one head appealed to and was sup- 
 ported by the Admiralty. The next step was a pro- 
 posal to the Admiralty that Sir Eric Geddes, at that time 
 the head of the military railway organization in France 
 with the honorary rank of Major-General, should become 
 Admiralty Controller. This would place him in charge 
 of all shipbuilding for both services as well as that 
 portion of the work of the Third Sea Lord which related 
 to armament production. I was requested to see Sir 
 Eric whilst attending a conference in Paris with a view to 
 his being asked to take up the post of Admiralty Con- 
 troller. This I did after discussing the matter with some 
 of the heads of the War Office Administration and mem- 
 bers of General Headquarters in France. 
 
 I learned from Sir Eric Geddes that he felt capable of 
 undertaking the work on the understanding that he was 
 assured of my personal support; he said that experience 
 in his railway work in France had shown the difiSculty 
 of taking over duties hitherto performed by officers, 
 and stated that it could not have been carried through 
 
"Production" during 1917 233 
 
 .without the strong support of the Commander-in-Chief; 
 for this reason he considered he must be assured of 
 my support at the Admiralty. In view of the import- 
 ance attached to combining under one administration the 
 work of both naval and mercantile shipbuilding for the 
 reasons already stated, and influenced in some degree by 
 the high opinion held of Sir Eric Geddes by the Prime 
 Minister, I came to the conclusion that his appointment 
 would be of benefit to Admiralty work, and therefore 
 gave him the assurance and said that I would do my best 
 to smooth over any difficulties .with the existing Admiralty 
 officials, whether naval or technical. 
 
 In these circumstances Sir Eric Geddes was offered 
 the post of Admiralty Controller by Sir Edward Carson, 
 then First Lord, and accepted it. It was arranged that 
 a naval officer should continue to hold the post of Third 
 Sea Lord and that he should be jointly responsible, so far 
 as the Navy was concerned, for all design work on its 
 technical side, whether for ships, ordnance material, mines, 
 torpedoes, etc., etc., whilst the Controller became entirely 
 responsible for production. It was obvious that goodwill 
 and tact would be required to start this new organization, 
 which was decidedly complicated, and that the post of 
 Third Sea Lord would be difficult to fill. At the request 
 of Sir Eric Geddes Rear- Admiral Lionel Halsey, C.B., 
 who at that time was Fourth Sea Lord, was asked if he 
 would become Third Sea Lord in the new organization. 
 He consented and was appointed. When the detailed 
 organization, drawn up to meet the views of Sir E. 
 Geddes, was examined by the naval officers responsible 
 for armament work, strong objections were raised to that 
 part of the organization which affected their responsibility 
 for the control and approval of designs and of inspection. 
 
 Sir Eric held the view that inspection should come 
 
234 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 under the officials in charge of production and that the 
 designing staff should also be under him, the designs 
 being drawn up to meet the views of the naval officers 
 and finally approved by them. Personally I saw no 
 danger in the proposals regarding design, because the 
 responsibility of the naval officer for final approval was 
 recognized; but there was a certain possibility of delay 
 if the naval technical officer lost control over the design- 
 ing staff. I fully agreed with the criticisms on the subject 
 of inspection, the argument being that only naval officers 
 accustomed to use the ordnance material could know the 
 dangers that might arise from faulty inspection, and that 
 the producer had temptations in his path, especially under 
 war conditions, to make inspection subservient to rapidity 
 of production. Sir Eric Geddes finally waived his objec- 
 tions. He informed me that he based his arguments 
 largely on his experience at the Ministry of Munitions, 
 with which he had been associated earlier in the war. The 
 contention of the naval officers at the Admiralty was that 
 even if the organization proposed was found to be work- 
 able for the Army, it would not be satisfactory for the 
 Navy, as in our case it was essential that the responsibility 
 for approval of design and for inspection should be inde- 
 pendent of the producer, whether the producer was a 
 Government official or a contractor. Apart from ques- 
 tions of general principle in this matter, accidents to 
 ordnance material in the Navy, or the production of 
 inferior ammunition, may involve, and have involved, 
 the most serious results, even the complete loss of battle- 
 ships with their crews, as the result of a magazine 
 explosion or the bursting of a heavy gun. I could not 
 find that the organization at the Ministry of Munitions 
 had, even in its early days, placed design, inspection and 
 production under one head ; inspection and design had 
 
"Production*' during 1917 235 
 
 each its own head and were separate from production. 
 In any case in 1918 the Ministry of Munitions reverted 
 to the Admiralty system of placing the responsibility for 
 design and inspection under an artillery expert who was 
 neither a manufacturer nor responsible for production. 
 
 The matters referred to above may appear unim- 
 portant to the civilian reader, but any question relating 
 to the efficiency of its material is of such paramount 
 importance to the fighting efficiency of the Navy that 
 it is necessary to mention it with a view to the avoidance of 
 future mistakes. 
 
 The new organization resulted in the creation of 
 a very large administrative staff for the purpose of 
 accelerating the production of ships, ordnance material, 
 mines, etc. Indeed, the increase in numbers was so great 
 that it became necessary to find additional housing room, 
 and the offices of the Board of Education were taken over 
 for the purpose. The personnel of that portion of the 
 Admiralty dealing with design, inspection and production 
 at different dates, as well as the Staff organization, is 
 given in the appendices. It was felt that the increase in 
 staff, though it involved, of course, very heavy expendi- 
 ture, would be justified if it resulted in increased rapidity 
 of production. It will be readily understood that such 
 an inmiense change in organization, one which I had 
 promised to see through personally, and which was 
 naturally much disliked by all the Admiralty depart- 
 ments, threw a vast volume of extra work on my shoulders, 
 work which had no connexion with the operations of war, 
 and this too at a period when the enemy's submarine 
 campaign was at its height. I should not have undertaken 
 it but for the hope that the change would result in greatly 
 increased production, particularly of warships and mer- 
 chant ships. 
 
236 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 The success of this new organization can only be 
 measured by the results obtained, and by this standard, 
 if it were possible to eliminate some of the varying and 
 incalculable factors, ,we should be able to judge the extent 
 to which the change was justified. It was a change for 
 which, under pressure, I bore a large share of responsi- 
 bility, and it involved replacing, in the middle of a great 
 war, an organization built up by experts well acquainted 
 with naval needs by one in which a considerable proportion 
 of the personnel had no previous experience of the work. 
 The change was, of course, an experiment ; the danger lay 
 in the fact that, until technical and Admiralty experience 
 has been gained, even men of the greatest ability in other 
 walks of life may find it difficult to produce satisfactory 
 results even if there are no limits imposed on the size of 
 the Staff which assists them. 
 
 The question of production is best examined under 
 various headings and the results under the old Admiralty 
 organization compared with those under the new, although 
 comparison is admittedly difficult owing to changing 
 conditions. 
 
 Warship Production 
 
 Under the Admiralty organization existing up to 
 May, 1917, the Third Sea Lord — as the Controller was 
 termed when changes were introduced by Mr. Churchill 
 in 1912 — was head of the Departments of the Director 
 of Naval Construction and Engineer in Chief, and of that 
 part of the work of the Director of Naval Ordnance which 
 dealt with the design and production of guns and gun 
 mountings. Under the new organization a civilian Con- 
 troller became responsible for production, the Third Sea 
 Lord being associated with him on technical matters of 
 design. 
 
 A special department for .warship production and 
 
"Production" during 1917 237 
 
 repairs was set up under a Deputy Controller, the Third 
 Sea Lord having no authority over this department 
 except by his association with the Controller. 
 
 Under the old organization it had been the custom 
 during the war for the Third Sea Lord to give to the 
 Board and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet 
 a personal forecast of the anticipated dates of completion 
 of all warships under construction. My experience whilst 
 in command of the Grand Fleet had been that this 
 personal forecast was generally fairly accurate for six 
 months ahead. 
 
 As an example it may be stated that in the first four 
 months of 1917 the delivery of destroyers was within one 
 of the forecast made in October, 1916, four vessels of 
 the class being slightly behind and three ahead of the 
 forecast. Of thirteen " E " class submarines forecasted 
 in October, 1916, for delivery by March, 1917, all except 
 two were delivered by April ; of twelve " K " class sub- 
 marines forecasted for delivery in the same period, all 
 except three were delivered by April, 1917. It should 
 be stated that these "K " class submarines were vessels 
 of a new type, involving new problems of some difficulty. 
 
 On the other hand there was considerable delay in 
 the completion of a number of the thirty "P" 
 boats forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery during the 
 first seven months of 1917, and the April forecast showed 
 that only twenty out of the thirty would be delivered 
 during that period. There was also some delay in the 
 delivery of twin screw minesweepers, twenty of which 
 were shown in the forecast of October, 1916, as due for 
 delivery in the first six months of 1917. The April, 
 1917, forecast showed that six had been delivered or 
 would complete in April, ten more would complete within 
 the estimated period, and the four remaining would be 
 
238 
 
 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 overdue and would not be delivered until July or 
 August. 
 
 These figures show the degree of reliance which could 
 be placed on the personal forecasts of the Third Sea Lord 
 under the old organization. It is, of course, a fact that 
 accurate forecasts do not necessarily mean that the rate 
 of production is satisfactory, but only that the forecast 
 is to be depended on. We were never at all satisfied with 
 the rate of production, either under the old or the new 
 organization. Accuracy of forecast was, however, of 
 great use from the Staff point of view in allotting new 
 ships to the various commands and in planning operations. 
 
 To turn now to the figures given by the Admiralty 
 Controller under the new organization. The table below 
 shows the forecasts (" F ") given in June, 1917, and the 
 deliveries (" D ") of different classes of warships month 
 by month during the period of July to November of that 
 year : 
 
 Class of 
 
 July. 
 
 Aug. 
 
 Sept. 
 
 Oct. 
 
 INov. 
 
 Deficit in 
 
 Vessel. 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 5 months. 
 
 Flotilla Leaders 
 
 andlT.B.D's. 
 Submarines '■ ; '. 
 Sloops 
 "P." Boats 
 
 5 
 2 
 3 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 5 
 
 7 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 
 8 
 4 
 2 
 5 
 
 8 
 5 
 4 
 3 
 
 5 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 
 5 
 3 
 3 
 3 
 
 5 
 3 
 1 
 2 
 
 6 
 6 
 3 
 1 
 
 6 
 1 
 7 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 11 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 Amongst vessels which were classed as auxiliaries 
 the figures were : 
 
 Class of 
 
 July. 
 
 Aug. 
 
 Sept. 
 
 Oct. 
 
 Nov. 
 
 Deficit in 
 
 Vessel. 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 F 
 
 DT 
 
 F 
 
 D 
 
 5 months. 
 
 Minesweepers . 
 Trawlers 
 
 5 
 25 
 
 3 
 18 
 
 4 
 23 
 
 4 
 14 
 
 3 
 30 
 
 1 
 13} 
 
 3 
 27 
 
 2 
 
 28 
 
 2 
 33 
 
 
 24 
 
 7 
 41 
 
 It will be seen from these figures that the forecast 
 of June was inaccurate even for the three succeeding 
 
"Production" during 1917 239 
 
 months, and that the total deficit in the five months was 
 considerable, except in the case of T.B.D.'s and " p *' 
 boats. 
 
 The most disappointing figures were those relating to 
 submarines, trawlers and minesweepers. The case of the 
 submarines may be put in another way, thus : 
 
 In the June forecast twenty-six submarines were 
 forecasted for delivery during the period July to the end 
 of December, the dates of three, however, being some- 
 what uncertain ; of this total of twenty-six, only nine 
 were actually delivered. Of the remainder, seven were 
 shown in a November forecast as delayed for four months, 
 two for five months, and one for nine months. 
 
 The attention of the Production Departments was 
 continually directed to the very serious effect which the 
 delay was producing on our anti-submarine measures, 
 and the First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, was informed of 
 the difficult position which was arising. In the early 
 part of December I pointed out to the Third Sea 
 Lord and the Admiralty Controller, Sir Allan Anderson, 
 that it was obviously impossible for the Naval 
 Staff to frame future policy unless some dependence could 
 be placed on the forecast of deliveries. The Controller 
 in reply stated that accurate forecasts were most difficult, 
 and proposed a discussion with the Third Sea Lord and 
 myself, but I had left the Admiralty before the discussion 
 took place. 
 
 The delays, as will be seen from the tables given, 
 were most serious in the case of vessels classed as 
 auxiliaries. Sir Thomas Bell, who possessed great experi- 
 ence of shipbuilding in a private capacity, was at the 
 head of the Department of the Deputy Controller for 
 Dockyards and Shipbuilding, and the Director of War- 
 ship Production was a distinguished Naval constructor. 
 
240 
 
 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 The Deputy Controller of Auxiliary Shipbuilding was 
 an officer lent from the War Office, whose previous 
 experience had lain, I believe, largely in the railway 
 world; some of his assistants and staff were, however, 
 men with experience of shipbuilding. 
 
 When I became First Sea Lord at the end of 1916 
 the new building programme, which had received the 
 sanction of the Cabinet, was as follows : 
 
 8 Flotilla leaders. 
 65 T.B.D.'s. 
 
 34 Sloops. 
 
 48 Screw minesweepers. 
 
 16 Paddle 
 
 500 Trawlers. 
 60 Submarines. 
 4 Seaplane carriers. 
 60 Boom defence vessels. 
 
 During the early part of 1917 it was decided to sub- 
 stitute 56 screw minesweepers and 8 paddle sweepers for 
 the approved programme of this class of vessel and to add 
 another 50 screw minesweepers to meet the growing mine 
 menace, as well as to substitute 115 drifters for 50 of the 
 trawlers, and to request the Canadian Government to 
 build 36 trawlers and 100 drifters mainly for use in 
 Canadian waters. It was also decided to lay down 36 
 mercantile decoy ships and 12 tugs, and to build 56 
 motor skimmers on the lines of the coastal motor boats, 
 which were then showing their value off the Belgian coast. 
 The programme therefore, in May, 1917, was as follows : 
 
 Flotilla leaders 
 
 8 
 
 T.B.D.'s 
 
 . 65 
 
 Patrol boats . 
 
 6 
 
 Sloops 
 
 . 34 
 
 Minesweepers (screw) 
 
 . 56 
 
 ,, (paddle) 
 
 8 
 
 Additional twin-screw minesweepers 
 
 50 
 
"Production" during 1917 
 
 241 
 
 Submarines 
 
 60 
 
 Trawlers 
 
 .. 450 
 
 Drifters 
 
 .. 115 
 
 Canadian trawlers 
 
 .. 86 
 
 ,, drifters 
 
 .. 100 
 
 Boom defence vessels ... 
 
 .. 60 
 
 Mercantile decoy ships 
 
 .. 36 
 
 Seaplane carriers 
 
 4 
 
 Tugs 
 
 .. 12 
 
 Motor skimmers 
 
 ir 1 •! • • 11' 111 
 
 • 1 
 
 Meanwhile intelligence had been received which 
 indicated that Germany was building such a considerable 
 number of light cruisers as to jeopardize our supremacy 
 in this class of vessel, and it was decided by the Board 
 that we ought to build eight more light cruisers even 
 at the cost of appropriating the steel intended for the con- 
 struction of six merchant ships. 
 
 Further, the German submarine programme was 
 developing with great rapidity, and our own submarines 
 of the " L " class were taking a very long time to build. 
 It was therefore proposed to substitute eighteen additional 
 " H " class submarines for four of the " L " class, as 
 the vessels of the " H " class were capable of more 
 rapid construction, thus making the total number of 
 submarines on order 74. Approval was also sought for 
 the addition of 24 destroyers and four " P " boats 
 to the programme, bringing the number of destroyers 
 on order up to a total of 89. 
 
 The programme was approved, a slight change being 
 made in the matter of the seaplane carriers by fitting out 
 one of the "Raleigh" class of cruisers as a seaplane 
 vessel in order to obtain an increased niunber of vessels 
 of this type more rapidly than by building. Later in the 
 Q 
 
242 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 year the cruiser Furious ,was also converted into a sea- 
 plane carrier, and she carried out much useful work in 
 1918. 
 
 Mercantile Shipbuilding 
 
 A greatly increased output of merchant ships had 
 been anticipated under the new organization, which 
 placed mercantile construction under the Admiralty Con- 
 troller instead of under the Ministry of Shipping. It was 
 expected that the difficulties due, under the previous 
 arrangement, to competing claims for steel and labour 
 would vanish with very beneficial results. 
 
 It was, as previously stated, mainly with this object 
 that the Admiralty had agreed to the change. The start 
 was promising enough. After a review of the situation 
 hopes were held out that during the second half of 1917 
 an addition of about 1,000,000 tons of shipping from the 
 shipyards within the United Kingdom would be effected. 
 This figure, indeed, was given to the House of Commons 
 by the Prime Minister on August 16, 1917. 
 
 On comparing this figure with that of the first half 
 of the year (a total of about 484,000 tons) there was 
 distinct cause for gratification ; it is right to state that 
 Admiralty officials who had previously been watching 
 mercantile shipbuilding regarded the estimate as very 
 optimistic. Further, it was anticipated by the then 
 Admiralty Controller, Sir Eric Geddes, that during the 
 year 1918, with some addition to the labour strength, a 
 total output of nearly two million tons was possible, pro- 
 vided steel was forthcoming, whilst with considerably 
 greater additions to the labour strength and to the supply 
 of steel, and with the help of the National Shipyards 
 proposed by the Controller, the total output might even 
 reach three million tons. 
 
 The actual results fell very short of these forecasts. 
 
"Production" during 1917 243 
 
 The total output for the second half of the year was 
 only 620,000 tons, the monthly totals in gross tonnage 
 for the whole year being : 
 
 January 
 
 .. 46,929 
 
 July 
 
 81,188 
 
 February 
 
 .. 78,436 
 
 August 
 
 . 100,900 
 
 March 
 
 .. 115,654 
 
 September .. 
 
 60,685 
 
 April 
 
 67,536 
 
 October 
 
 . 145,844 
 
 May ... 
 
 68,083 
 
 November . . 
 
 . 158,826 
 
 June ... 
 
 .. 108,397 
 
 December . . 
 
 . 112,486 
 
 In January, 1918, the total dropped to 58,568 tons, 
 and in February was only 100,038 tons. In March it was 
 announced that Lord Pirie would take the position of 
 Controller General of Merchant Shipbuilding. The sub- 
 sequent results in the direction of output of merchant 
 ships do not properly come within the scope of this book, 
 which is intended to deal only with work during the year 
 1917, but it may be of interest to give here the outj)ut 
 month by month. It was as follows : 
 
 January 
 February 
 March 
 April 
 May ... 
 June ... 
 
 58,568 
 100,038 
 161,674 
 111,533 
 197,274 
 134,159 
 Total for the year 
 
 July ... 
 August 
 September 
 October 
 November 
 December 
 ... 1,534,110 
 
 141,948 
 124,675 
 144,772 
 136,000 
 105,093 
 118,276 
 
 It will be seen that the results for 1918 were an 
 improvement on those for 1917, the exact figure for that 
 year being 1,163,474 tons; these results, however, fell 
 very short of the optimistic estimates given in July, 1917. 
 
 Mercantile Repair Work 
 
 The Controller's Department undoubtedly succeeded 
 in the work of improving the arrangements for the repair 
 
244 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 of merchant ships. This is shown by an analysis of the 
 total number of vessels that completed repairs during 
 various months. 
 
 In August, 1917, the number was 382, with a 
 tonnage of 1,183,000. In November the figure became 
 542 ships, with a tonnage of 1,509,000. There remained 
 under repair at the end of August 326 ships, and at the 
 end of November 350 ships, these figures indicating that 
 the greater number of completions was not due to the 
 smaller number of vessels being damaged or the damages 
 being less in extent. 
 
 Considerable credit is due to the Department for this 
 successful acceleration of repair work which naturally had 
 a great influence on the shipping situation. 
 
 Armament Production 
 
 It was not, I think, realized either by the Government 
 or by the civilians brought into the Admiralty during the 
 year 1917 that there was a very great difference between 
 the Admiralty and the War Office organizations in the 
 matter of production of material, nor was it recognized 
 that naval officers are by their training and experience 
 better fitted to deal with such matters on a large scale 
 than are military officers, except perhaps officers in the 
 Artillery and Royal Engineers. Whatever may be the 
 case in the future, the Navy in pre-war days was so much 
 more dependent on material than the Army as to make 
 questions relating to naval material of fffir greater import- 
 ance that was the case with military material. This fact 
 is apt to be forgotten by those writers on naval affairs 
 who think that an intimate knowledge of questions 
 relating to naval material and its use is of little importance. 
 I trust that this belief will never become general in the 
 service, for the naval officer who is not familiar with the 
 
"Production" during 1917 245 
 
 design and production of material is handi<;apped when 
 he conies to use it. 
 
 Ignorance of the great experience of the Admiralty 
 in handling problems of production and of the past success 
 of Admiralty methods in this respect gave rise to a good 
 deal of misconception. The fact that it had been necessary 
 to form a separate Ministry (that of Munitions) to deal 
 with the production of war material for the Army probably 
 fostered the idea that matters at the Admiralty should be 
 altered in a similar direction. 
 
 The post of Deputy Controller of Armament Pro- 
 duction was created under the new organization, and 
 all matters concerning the production of guns, gun- 
 mountings, projectiles, cordite, torpedoes, mines, para- 
 vanes and all other war material was placed under him. 
 I have dealt earlier in this chapter with the questions of 
 design and inspection over which some disagreement 
 arose. 
 
 I w^as not conscious that the new organization suc- 
 ceeded in speeding up armament production during 1917, 
 and during the latter part of the year I was much con- 
 cerned with the delays in ordnance production as revealed 
 during 1917 and as exposed by the forecasts for 1918. 
 
 It is very possible, on the other hand, that in the case 
 of mines the results were good. The old Admiralty 
 organization had not been equipped to deal with such 
 an immense number of mines as were on order, and 
 although a large organization for their production was 
 started by Sir Lionel Halsey, when Fourth Sea Lord, 
 with the assistance of Admiral Fitzherbert and Captain 
 Litchfield-Speer, it had not been sufficiently long at 
 work for an opinion to be given as to whether the 
 results in production would have been as good as under 
 the D.C.A.P. 
 
2^6 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 In considering the whole question of production 
 during the year 1917 it should be borne in mind that 
 very extensive orders were placed in the early part of 
 that year for guns, gun-mountings, mines, warships of 
 the smaller class and patrol craft, and that if we compare 
 only the actual output for 1917 with that of previous 
 years without taking the above fact into account, we 
 might form an incorrect impression as to the success of 
 the organization for production. For instance, in the 
 last quarter of 1917, 1,515 guns of all calibres were 
 delivered, as against 1,101 in the first quarter; in the 
 month of November 1,335 mines of all natures and 2,078 
 depth charges were filled, as compared with 625 mines 
 and 542 depth charges in July. These figures were the 
 result of the large orders placed early in the year, and it 
 was not until 1918 that the full fruits of the orders placed 
 in 1917 became apparent. The figures for that year, how- 
 ever, are not at my disposal. 
 
 One great advantage which resulted from the new 
 organization, viz., the creation of a Directorate of 
 Materials and Priority, must be mentioned. This 
 Directorate controlled the distribution of all steel for all 
 services and produced a very beneficial effect on the issue 
 of supplies of steel to shipbuilders. The growth of the 
 Admiralty Organization for Production at different stages 
 is shown in the appendices. The immense increase in 
 staff which resulted from the institution of the office of 
 Admiralty Controller is exhibited in the lists of staff in 
 1918 as compared with the staff in the early part of 1917. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 NAVAL WORK 
 
 The main effort of the Navy during the year 1917 was 
 directed towards the defeat of the enemy's submarines, 
 since the Central Powers confined their naval effort almost 
 entirely to this form of warfare, but many other problems 
 occupied our attention at the Admiralty, and some of 
 these may be mentioned. 
 
 Considerable discussion took place in the early part 
 of the year on the subject of the policy to be pursued in 
 the Eastern theatre of war, and naval opinion on the 
 possibility of effecting a landing in force at different points 
 was invited and given. It need only be said here that 
 the matter was brought forward more than once, and that 
 the situation from the naval point of view was always 
 clear. The feasible landing places so far as we were con- 
 cerned were unsuited to the military strategy at that 
 period; the time required to collect or build the great 
 number of lighters, horse boats, etc., for the strong force 
 required was not available, and it was a sheer impossibility 
 to provide in a short period all the small craft needed for 
 an operation of magnitude, whilst the provision of the 
 necessary anti-submarine defences would have taxed our 
 resources to the utmost and have prevented essential work 
 of this nature in other theatres. 
 
 The work of the Navy, therefore, off the coast of 
 Palestine was confined to protecting the left flank of the 
 advancing army and assisting its operations, and to 
 
 247 
 
248 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 establishing, as the troops advanced, bases on the coast 
 at which stores, etc., could be landed. This task was 
 effectively carried out. 
 
 The anchorages on this coast are all entirely open to 
 the sea, and become untenable at very short notice, so 
 that the work of the Navy was always carried out under 
 considerable difficulty. Nor could the ships working on 
 the flank be adequately guarded against submarine 
 attack, and some losses were experienced, the most im- 
 portant being the sinking of Monitor Ml5 and the 
 destroyer Staunch by a submarine attack off Deir el Belah 
 (nine miles south of Gaza) in November. 
 
 The Navy continued its co-operation with the Army 
 in the Salonika theatre of war, assisted by the Royal 
 Naval Air Service, and bombardments were continually 
 carried out on military objectives. Similarly in the 
 Adriatic our monitors and machines of the R.N,A.S. 
 assisted the military forces of the Allies ; particularly was 
 this the case at the time of the Austrian advance to the 
 Piave, where our monitors did much useful work 
 in checking enemy attempts to cross that river. 
 
 Off the Gallipoli Peninsula the Naval watch on the 
 mouth of the Dardanelles was continued; extensive new 
 minefields were laid during the year, and were effective 
 in sinking the Breslau and severely damaging the Goehen 
 when those vessels attempted a sortie on January 20, 1918. 
 The R.N.A.S. during the year carried out many long 
 distance reconnaissance and bombing operations over 
 Constantinople and the vicinity. 
 
 In the Red Sea Naval operations were carried out in 
 conjunction with friendly Arabs, and the Arabian coast 
 cleared of Turkish forces. 
 
 In the White Sea during the latter part of 1917 the 
 whole of the Naval work fell upon British Naval forces 
 
Naval Work 249 
 
 when the Russian ships, which had co-operated hitherto, 
 had come under the influence of the political situation. 
 Our force in these waters consisted largely of trawlers 
 engaged in minesweeping and escort work. The latter 
 duty imposed a very heavy strain on officers and men, 
 involving as it did the safe conduct during the year of 
 no fewer than one thousand ships carrying stores and 
 munitions for the Russian military forces. 
 
 I71 the Baltic the situation became very difficult owing 
 first to the Russian revolution and, finally, to the Russian 
 debacle. Our force in these waters consisted of seven 
 submarines. It became evident at the beginning of 
 October, 1917, that the Germans were intending to carry 
 out some operations in the Baltic against Russia, and the 
 question of affording assistance was at once considered by 
 the Naval Staff. It was surmised that but little depend- 
 ence could be placed on the Russian Baltic Fleet (events 
 showed this surmise to be accurate), and in order to keep 
 our control over the North Sea and ensure the safety of 
 our communications with France it was obvious that for 
 any action we might decide to take we should be obliged 
 to divide the Grand Fleet, sending such portion of that 
 Command into the Baltic as could successfully engage 
 the High Sea Fleet if encountered, as well as to secure 
 the return passage via the Great Belt, and retaining a 
 sufficient force to deal with such German vessels as might 
 attempt operations in the North Sea or Channel during 
 our raid into the Baltic. 
 
 There were many ways in which the Germans might 
 seriously hamper, if not entirely prevent, the return of 
 our fleet from the Baltic unless we secured the exits. 
 The Great Belt could easily be closed by block-ships at 
 its narrowest points, and extensive minefields could be 
 laid. It was obvious, therefore, that to secure the exit 
 
250 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 a strong force would foe required, and that it would 
 necessarily occupy a position where it .would be open to 
 serious attack. 
 
 The initial operation of gaining access to the Baltic 
 via the Great Belt, though not impossible, was difficult, 
 involving as it did sweeping passages through very 
 extensive minefields, and even when our ships were 
 in the Baltic fairly constant sweeping would be 
 necessary. 
 
 Finally, the whole operation would be complicated by 
 the question of fuel supply, especially to the destroyers 
 and other small craft with a limited radius of action, 
 since we could not depend upon Russian sources of supply. 
 These were amongst the considerations which made it 
 clear that the operation was not one that I could recom- 
 mend. The Russian naval view is given in the following 
 statement which appeared in the Russian Press in 
 October : 
 
 The Naval General Staff categorically denies the rumours 
 circulated in Petrograd on the 8th and 9th instant, to the 
 effect that the British or French Fleet had broken through to 
 the Baltic Sea. 
 
 At the same time it is pointed out that it would be a physical 
 impossibility for the Allies' Fleet to come in from the western 
 entrance, because it would be necessary to pass through the 
 Sound or through one of the two Belts. 
 
 Entry to the Sound through Danish or Swedish waters 
 could not also be affected owing to the fact that these waters in 
 part are only 18 feet deep, while large-sized vessels would 
 require at least 30 feet of water. 
 
 As regards the entry to the Belts, this would be an ex- 
 tremely hazardous undertaking as parts of the routes are under 
 control of the Germans who have constructed their own 
 defences consisting of mines and batteries. 
 
 In these circumstances, according to the opinion of our 
 naval experts, an entrance into the Baltic by the Allies' 
 
Naval Work 251 
 
 Fleets could only be undertaken after gaining possession of 
 these waters and the adjacent coast ; and then only with the 
 co-operation of land forces. 
 
 The Germans had an easy task in the Baltic, as the 
 Russian resistance was not of a serious nature ; our sub- 
 marines attacked on every possible occasion, and scored 
 some successes against German vessels. Towards the end 
 of the year it became necessary to consider the action to 
 be taken in regard to our submarines, as the German 
 control of the Baltic became effective, and the demobili- 
 zation of the Russian fleet became more and more 
 pronounced. Many schemes for securing their escape 
 from these waters were discussed, but the chances of 
 success were so small, and the submarines themselves 
 possessed so little fighting value owing to their age, that 
 eventually instructions were sent to the senior officer to 
 destroy the submarines before they could fall into German 
 hands. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE FUTURE 
 
 It is natural that the task of recounting the facts in the 
 foregoing chapters should cause one's thoughts to turn 
 to the future. The Empire has passed through a period 
 of great danger, during which its every interest was 
 threatened, and it has come successfully out of the ordeal, 
 but to those upon whom the responsibility lay of initiating 
 and directing the nation's policy the serious nature of the 
 perils which faced us were frequently such as to justify the 
 grave anxiety which sprang from full knowledge of events 
 and their significance. 
 
 An international organization is in process of being 
 brought into existence which, if it does not entirely 
 prevent a recurrence of the horrors of the four and a half 
 years of war, will, it is hoped, at least minimize the chances 
 of the repetition of such an experience as that through 
 which the world has so recently passed. But the League 
 of Nations is still only a skeleton to be clothed with 
 authority and supported by the public opinion of the 
 world if it is to be a success. It is in its infancy, and so 
 far the most optimistic have not advanced beyond 
 hopes in its efficiency ; and if the lessons of the past are 
 correctly interpreted, as they were interpreted by our 
 forefathers in their day, those upon whom responsibility 
 lies in future years for the safety and prosperity of the 
 Empire will see to it that, so far as lies in their power, 
 whatever else may be left undone, the security of the 
 
 252 
 
The Future 253 
 
 sea communications of the Empire is ensured. Not one 
 of us but must have realized during the war, if he did 
 not realize it before, that the all-important thing upon 
 which we must set our minds is the ability to use the 
 sea communications of the far-flung Empire, which is 
 only united by the seas so long as we can use them. But 
 while governments may realize their duty in this matter, 
 and set out with good intentions, it is, after all, upon the 
 people who elect governments that the final responsibility 
 lies, and therefore it is to them that it is so necessary to 
 bring home in season and out of season the dangers that 
 confront us if our sea communications are imperilled. 
 
 The danger which confronted the British peoples was 
 never so great in any previous period as it was during 
 the year 1917 when the submarine menace was at its 
 height, and it may be hoped that the lessons to be learned 
 from the history of those months will never be forgotten. 
 The British Empire differs from any other nation or 
 empire which has ever existed. Our sea communications 
 are our very life-blood, and it is not greatly exaggerating 
 the case to say that the safety of those communications 
 is the one consideration of first-class importance. Upon 
 a solid sense of their security depends not only our 
 prosperity, but also the actual lives of a large proportion 
 of the inhabitants. There is no other nation in the world 
 which is situated as the people of these islands are situated ; 
 therefore there is no other nation to whom sea power is 
 in the least degree as essential as it is to us. Four out 
 of five of our loaves and most of our raw materials for 
 manufacture must come to us by sea, and it is only by 
 the sea that we can hold any conomercial intercourse with 
 the Dominions, Dependencies and Crown Colonies, which 
 together make up what we call the Empire, with a 
 population of 400,000,000 people. 
 
254 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 What, then, are we to do in the future to ensure the 
 safety of the communications between these islands and 
 the rest of the Empire ? As a matter of course we should 
 be in a position to safeguard them against any possible 
 form of attack from whatever quarter it may come. So 
 far as can be seen there is no present likelihood of the 
 transport of food or raw materials being effected in any- 
 thing but vessels which move upon the surface of the sea. 
 It is true that, as a result of the war, people's thoughts 
 turn in the direction of transport, both of human beings 
 and of merchandise, by air or under the water, but there 
 is no possible chance, for at least a generation to come, 
 of either of these methods of transport being able to 
 compete commercially with transport in vessels sailing 
 on the sea. Therefore the problem of guarding our com- 
 munications resolves itself into one of securing the safety 
 of vessels which move upon the surface of the sea, what- 
 ever may be the character of the attack. 
 
 I do not desire to enter into any discussion here as 
 to the method by which these vessels can be protected, 
 except to say that it is necessary for us to be in a position 
 of superiority in all the weapons by which their 
 safety may be endangered. At the present time 
 there are two principal forms of attack : (1) by vessels 
 which move on the surface, and (2) by vessels which move 
 under water. A third danger — namely, one from the air 
 — is also becoming of increasing importance. The war 
 has shown us how to ensure safety against the first two 
 forms of attack, and our duty as members of a great 
 maritime Empire is to take steps to maintain effective 
 forces for the purpose. 
 
 In order to carry out this duty it will be greatly to our 
 advantage if the matter can be dealt with by all the con- 
 stituent parts of the Empire. A recent tour of the 
 
The Future 255 
 
 greater part of the British Empire has shown me that 
 the importance of sea power is very fully realized by the 
 great majority of our kith and kin overseas, and that 
 there is a strong desire on their part to co-operate in what 
 is, after all, the concern of the whole Empire. It seems 
 to me of the greatest possible importance that this matter 
 of an Empire naval policy and an Empire naval organiza- 
 tion should be settled at the earliest possible moment, 
 and that it should be looked at from the broadest point 
 of view. 
 
 I do not think that we in this country can 
 claim to have taken into sufficient account the very 
 natural views and the very natural ambitions which 
 animate the peoples overseas. We have, in point 
 of fact, looked at the whole question too locally, whilst 
 we have been suggesting to the Dominions that they are 
 inclined to make this error, and unless we depart from 
 that attitude there is a possibility that we shall not reap 
 the full benefit of the resources of the Empire, which 
 are very great and are increasing. In war it is not only 
 the material which counts, but the spirit of a people, and 
 we must enlist the support, spontaneous and effective, of 
 every section of the King's Dominions in the task of sea 
 defence which lies before us, consulting fully and un- 
 reservedly the representatives of our kith and kin, and 
 giving them the benefit of whatever instructed advice we, 
 with ancient traditions and matured knowledge, may 
 possess. 
 
 In framing our future naval policy it is obvious that 
 we must be guided by what is being done abroad. We 
 are bound to keep an absolutely safe margin of naval 
 strength, and that margin must exist in all arms and in 
 all classes of vessels. At the moment, and no doubt for 
 some time to come, difficulties in regard to finance will 
 
256 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 exist, but it would seem to be nothing more than common 
 sense to insist that the one service which is vital to our 
 existence should be absolutely the last to suffer for need 
 of money. During a period of the greatest financial 
 pressure it may be necessary to economize somewhat in 
 the construction of new ships, and in the upkeep of certain 
 of our naval bases which the result of the war and 
 consequent considerations of future strategy may suggest 
 to be not of immediate importance, although even here 
 it may well be necessary to develop other naval bases to 
 meet changed conditions; but we cannot afford to fall 
 behind in organization, in the testing and development 
 of new ideas, or in the strength of our personnel 
 or in its training. A well trained personnel and a care- 
 fully thought out organization cannot by any possibility 
 be quickly extemporized. 
 
 It is the height of economic folly to stint experimental 
 research, for it is in times of stress that the value of past 
 experimental work is shown. In the matter of organiza- 
 tion we must be certain that adequate means are taken 
 to ensure that the different arms which must co-operate 
 in war are trained to work together under peace con- 
 ditions. A modern fleet consists of many units of 
 different types — battleships, battle-cruisers, light cruisers, 
 destroyers and submarines. Before I relinquished the 
 command of the Grand Fleet, large sea-going submarines 
 of high speed, vessels of the " K " class, had been built 
 to accompany the surface vessels to sea. It is very 
 essential that senior officers should have every opportunity 
 of studying tactical schemes in which various classes of 
 ships and kinds of weapons are employed. In consider- 
 ing the future of the Navy it is impossible to ignore 
 aircraft. There are many important problems which the 
 Navy and the Air Service ought to work out together. A 
 
A Submarine Submerging. 
 
 Periscope of Submerged Submarine Travelling at Slow Speed. 
 
 :5ȣZ5!5SLlfeii 
 
 A Submarine Submerged. 
 
 (Taken from the Air.) 
 
The Future 257 
 
 fleet without aireraft will be a fleet without eyes, and 
 aircraft will, moreover, be necessary, not only for recon- 
 naissance work, but for gun-spotting, as well as, possibly, 
 for submarine hunting. Air power is regarded by many 
 oflScers of wide practical experience as an essential com- 
 plement to sea power, whatever future the airship and 
 aeroplane may have for independent action. A captain 
 who is going to fight his ship successfully must have 
 practised in time of peace with all the weapons he will 
 employ in action, and he must have absolute control over 
 all the elements constituting the fighting power of his 
 ship. In a larger sense, the same may be said of an 
 admiral in command of a fleet ; divided control may mean 
 disaster. The advent of aircraft has introduced new and, 
 at present, only partially explored problems into naval 
 .warfare, and officers commanding naval forces vvdll require 
 frequent opportunities of studying them. They must be 
 worked out wdth naval vessels and aircraft acting in close 
 association. With the Air Service under separate control, 
 financially as well as in an executive and administrative 
 sense, is it certain that the Admiralty will be able to 
 obtain machines and personnel in the necessary numbers 
 to carry out all the experimental and training work that 
 is essential for efficiency in action? Is it also beyond 
 doubt that unity of command at sea, which is essential 
 to victory, will be preserved? In view of all the possi- 
 bilities .which the future holds now that the airship and 
 aeroplane have arrived, it is well that there should be no 
 doubt on such matters, for inefficiency might in conceiv- 
 able circumstances spell defeat. 
 
 Then there is the question of the personnel of the 
 fleet. It would be most unvnse to allow the strength of 
 the trained personnel of the Navy to fall below the limit 
 of reasonable safety, because it is upon that trained 
 
258 The Crisis of the Naval War 
 
 personnel that the success of the enormous expansions 
 needed in war so largely depends. This was found during 
 the late struggle, when the personnel was expanded from 
 150,000 to upwards of 400,000, throwing upon the pre-war 
 nucleus a heavy responsibility in training, equipment and 
 organizing. Without the backbone of a highly trained 
 personnel of sufficient strength, developments in time of 
 sudden emergency cannot possibly be effected. In the 
 late war we suffered in this respect, and we should not 
 forget the lesson. 
 
 In future wars, if any such should occur, trained 
 personnel will be of even greater importance than it was 
 in the Great War, because the advance of science 
 increases constantly the importance of the highly trained 
 individual, and if nothing else is certain it can surely be 
 predicted that science will play an increasing part in war- 
 fare in the future. Only those officers and men who 
 served afloat in the years immediately preceding the open- 
 ing of hostilities know how great the struggle was to gain 
 that high pitch of efficiency which the Navy had reached 
 at the outbreak of war, and it was the devotion to duty 
 of our magnificent pre-war personnel that went far to 
 ensure our victory. It is essential that the Navy of the 
 future should not be given a yet harder task than fell 
 to the Navy of the past as a result of a policy of starving 
 the personnel. 
 
 There is, perhaps, just one other point upon which I 
 might touch in conclusion. I would venture to suggest 
 to my countrymen that there should be a full realization 
 of the fact that the Naval Service as a whole is a highly 
 specialized profession. It is one in which the senior 
 officers have passed the whole of their lives, and during 
 their best years their thoughts are turned constantly in 
 one direction — namely, how they can best fit the Navy and 
 
The Future 259 
 
 themselves for possible war. The country as a whole has 
 probably but little idea of the great amount of technical 
 knowledge that is demanded of the naval officer in these 
 days. He must possess this knowledge in addition to the 
 lessons derived from his study of war, and the naval officer 
 is learning from the day that he enters the Service until 
 the day that he leaves it. 
 
 The Navy, then, is a profession which is at least as 
 highly specialized as that of a surgeon, an engineer, or 
 a lawyer. Consequently, it would seem a matter of 
 common sense that those who have not adopted the Navy 
 as a profession should pay as much respect to the pro- 
 fessional judgment of the naval officer as they would to 
 that of the surgeon or the engineer or the lawyer, each 
 in his own sphere. Governments are, of course, bound 
 to be responsible for the policy of the country, and policy 
 governs defence, but, both in peace and in war, I think 
 it will be agreed that the work of governments in naval 
 affairs should end at policy, and that the remainder should 
 be left to the expert. That is the basis of real economy 
 in association with efficiency, and victory in war goes to 
 the nation which, under stress and strain, develops the 
 highest efficiency in action. 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendices 
 
 Frequent references have been made in this volume to the organiza- 
 tion and development of the staff at the Admiralty, on whom the duty 
 devolved of initiating and directing naval operations, both those con- 
 cerned with the war on the surface and those connected with the 
 mining and submarine campaigns conducted by the enemy. It has 
 been thought that it will tend to render the references to staff organiza- 
 tion more intelligible if complete statements are appended of (a) the 
 Staff as it existed towards the end of October, 1916, (b) after the re- 
 organization which took place in the early months of 1917, (c) as it 
 existed towards the end of December, 1917, and (rf) as it was towards 
 the end of November, 1918. Similar^ the Staff of the Admiralty 
 Departments engaged in the work of Design, Inspection and Production 
 is also shown. 
 
 It may be suggested also that these lists have a personal interest 
 to the large number of officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Marine, 
 as well as to the civilians, who rendered conspicuous service to the 
 country at the Admiralty during the last two years of the war. The 
 lists may also prove useful in future years when the staff organization 
 of the Admiralty is discussed in the light of new conditions. 
 
 The lists do not include members of the Board of Admiralty other 
 than those on the " Operations " side, or many Admiralty Depart- 
 ments not engaged in Staff work or in the " Materiel " Departments. 
 
(a) ADMIRALTY, END OF OCTOBER, 1916. 
 
 First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Hemr Jackson, e.c.b. 
 
 ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF. 
 
 CMefofthe War Staff. Vice-Admiral (act.) Sir Hemr F. Oliver, k.c.b.. m.v.o. 
 
 AssiatarU to the Chief oj the War Staff. Captain Arthur de K. L. May. 
 
 Staff Clerk W. H. Hancock, Esq. (act.) 
 
 OPEEATIONS DIVISION. 
 
 Director of the Operations Division Bear Admiral Thomas Jackson, o.b., m.v.o. 
 
 Assistant Directors of the Operations Division Captain Hemr W. Grant. 
 
 Lleut.-Col. Walter T. C. Jones, d.s.O., b.m.l.i. 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 
 Captain A. G. Allgood (ret.). 
 
 A. F. Beal. 
 
 E. P. Glutton (ret.). 
 
 C. Q. S. Eeles (ret.). 
 
 W. M. Kerr. 
 
 C. Seymour. 
 
 H, J. L. W. K. Wlllcox. 
 
 Charles D. Boper (temp.). 
 
 Staff Clerk G. J. EJckman. Esq. 
 
 2 Second Division Clerks. 
 
 1 Confidential Shorthand Writer. 
 
 Commander Baymond Fitzmaurlce, d.s.o. 
 Frederic G. S. Peile. 
 Charles 0. Dix, d.s.o. 
 F. Bowden-Smlth (ret.). 
 E. V. Brooke- Webb (re<.>. 
 8. V. S. C. Messnm (ret.). 
 T. W. Stirling (emerg.). 
 Leonard Boblnson (act.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 J. P. Gibbs. 
 
 11 Assistant Clerks. 
 
 2 Accoimtant Clerks. 
 
 3 Extra Clerks. 
 
 INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. 
 Director of the Intelligence Division... Captain William E. EaU. o.b.. AdC. 
 Assistant Directors of the Intelligence Division^... Captain Eaymond A. Nugent (temp.). 
 
 Captain Thomas E. Wardle, d.s.o. 
 
 Captain ... Herbert W. W. Hope. 
 
 Commander Vivian E. Brandon. 
 Francis G. G. Chilton. 
 Colpoys C. Walcott 
 
 (ret.). 
 Lewis D. Penfold 
 
 (ret.). 
 Ernest F. Gregory. 
 Gerald C. Dickens. 
 
 Commander \ Henry F, C. Caven- 
 (Mmerg.) S dish. 
 
 Commander \ Lord Herschell, 
 R.N.V.R. I M.v.o. 
 
 Eon. William 
 
 Oozens-Hardy, e.g. 
 
 Staff Clerks — 
 
 Hugh Broadbent. Esq. 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 LieiU.-Com. Walter T. Bagot. 
 
 James F. Houstoun. 
 Arthur W. Wood (ret.). 
 
 Lieut RogCT?sV. de^Halpert 
 
 (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Eng. Com.... Percy Wheater. 
 Major Frank V. Temyle, 
 
 B.M.L.I. 
 
 Walter Sinclair. 
 
 B.M.L.I. 
 
 Captain ...Percy E. Heyeock, 
 
 B.M.A. 
 
 Cecil E. S. Wright. 
 
 B.M.L.I. 
 
 Bernard F. Trench, 
 
 B.M.L.I. 
 
 J. C. Farmer, b.m.l.i. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 Cartographer — 
 
 O. Brickenden, Esq. 
 U Second Division Clerks. 
 
 264 
 
 Captain \ Charles B. Mullins, 
 R.M.L.I. S Cuthbert E. Binns. 
 LietU.-Com.X „ tj„»«* 
 Il.N.r.R. ;H. Paget. 
 lAeuLR.N.R. Alastalr P. Hadow. 
 Lieut. 1 Arthur E. Watts. 
 
 R.N.V.R. )F. Eomer. 
 Lieut. \0. P. Serocold. 
 
 R.N.r.R. /Henry Howard. 
 Naval Instr. Guy V. Eayment, B. a. 
 Fleet Pavm. Charles J. E. Eotter. 
 
 Ernest W. C. Thring. 
 
 O. Betton Eoberts. 
 Asst. Pavm. Lloyd Hirst. 
 Asst. Pavm. 1 William H. 
 
 R.N.V.R. I Oeman. 
 
 Midshipman George H. Carbutt. 
 
 1 Confidential Shorthand Writer. 
 
 1 Assistant Clerk. 1 Extra Clerk. 
 
 2 Boy Clerks, 29 Women Clerks. 
 6 Draughtsmen. 
 
Appendix 
 
 265 
 
 2%e foUotoing gentlemen have been appointed or lent for temporary service during the War : 
 Sir P. W. Baker- Wllbraham. Bt., ix.b., F. CavendJsh-Bentinck, H. N. Dickson, m.a.. d.bc Ebos 
 2nd Ueut. R. L. Hobson (London Rrgl.), T. W. H. Inakip, Esq.. k.o.. 2nd Lieui. 8. S. Q. Leeaon' 
 Maior E. J. Lugard (Indian Army, retd.1. Capi. P. Phlpps, E. G. 0. Poole, J. Bandall and H. Bussell' 
 Esqra. 
 
 TRADE DIVISION. 
 
 Acting Director of Trade Division-. .Captain Riohard WebD, o.b., b.n. 
 Acting Assistant Director of Trade Diinsion- . . Captain Horace W. Longden. 
 
 Captain Sidney R. Drury Lowe, o.m.g. 
 
 W. H. D. Margesson (ret.). 
 B. H. Smith iret.). 
 T. H. Foster (ret.). 
 Philip Walter (ret.). 
 
 Commander Thomas Fiaher. 
 
 A. H. Tarleton, si.v.o. (emerg.). 
 
 Sir caiarles L. Cust, Bt. e.o.v.o., 
 
 O.B., c.M.G.. c.i.B. (ret.). 
 Maxwell H. Anderson (act.) (ret.). 
 Oscar v. de Satge (ret.). 
 John Kiddle. 
 
 ^"rS'I^- W. Kenrick. e.d. (ret). 
 
 Lieut.- Com. 
 
 John O. Wyatt (ret.). 
 Walter P. Koe (ret.). 
 John W. Pugh (ret.). 
 William Gimnan, 
 W. E. Amold-Forster, 
 
 Hugh C. Amold-Forster. 
 W. H. Stewart. 
 F. H. McConnlck-Goodhart. 
 L. McCormick-Goodhart. 
 ..T*homas H. Hawkins, e.m.l.i. 
 Fleet Pavm, ...H. W. Eldon Manlsty. o.m.g. 
 
 Alfred B. Parker. 
 Asst. Paym. Harold B. Tufflll. 
 B.N.R. W. A. J. Boxford. 
 
 Lieut.-Com, 
 R.N.V.S. 
 
 Lieut. 
 (Emerg.) 
 
 Lieut.R.N.R 
 
 Lieut. ] 
 
 R.N.VM. J 
 
 Lieut.-Col. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Staff Clerk... J. T. Cotton, Esq. (act.). 
 S Second Division Clerks (one lent). 
 1 Accountant Clerk (lent). 
 
 2 Clerical Assistants. 
 18 Temporary Clerks. 
 14 Women Clerks. 
 
 The followi/ng have been appointed for temporary service during the War j 
 
 H. S. Mo3s Blundell, LL.d., Esq. 
 
 (unpaid). 
 Sir Frederick Bolton (unpaid). 
 E. Bums-Pye. Esq. (unpaid). 
 Mrs. C. H. Campbell (unpaid). 
 
 A. H. Charteris, Esq. 
 
 H. 0. Ctonberbatch, Esq.(«»paid). 
 
 G. D. Hardlnge-Tyler. Esq. 
 
 W. E. Hargreavea, Esq. (unpaid). 
 
 Clive Lawrence, Esq., 
 
 Barrister-(U-Law. 
 Lieui. E. Maclay 
 
 (The Cameroniana). 
 The Earl of Sandwich (unpaid). 
 
 SIGNAL SECTION. 
 
 Bead of Signal Section Captain Christopher R. Payne. 
 
 Naval Staff. 
 
 Commander Basil E. Reiiiold. 
 
 Eyerard J. Hardman-Jones. 
 Staff Pavm. John E. A. Brown. 
 
 4 Hired Extra Clerks. 
 
 Asst. Poi/m.... Edward W. H. Travis. 
 Wt. Writer ...Hartington Ratcllffe. 
 2 Chief Writers (1 pensd.). 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 I 49 Women Clerks. 
 
 MATERIEL DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OP THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL EQXnPMENT. 
 Director of Naval Equipment... Captain Clement Greatorex, O.B., m.v.o., r.n. 
 
 (Is also Naval Assistant to Third Sea Lord.) 
 Assistant Directors of Naval Equipment... Captain Henry L. Cochrane, r.n. 
 
 Captain Christopher P. Metcalfe, d.s.o. (for Salvage 
 work) (ret.). 
 Salvage Officer in Home Waters... Captain H. Pomeroy. 
 
 Eng. Captain... (Retd.) Henry B. Teed. Carpenter Lieutenant... Thomas L. Soper. 
 1 Dockyard Clerk, 2nd grade, 1 Tempy. Clerk. 3 Women Clerks, 1 Boy Clerk, 
 
 Superintendents of Conlract-buiU Ships. 
 
 Cavtain Brian H F -Rftrttelnt m v o (^°' Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the Clyde. 
 Laptam Brian H. i< . Barttelot, m.v.o. 1 Address— 3. Clyde View, Partick, Glasgow. 
 
 /-For Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the Tyne, 
 
 Captain Laurence E. Power, o.b., J Thames, Mersey, at Barrow-ln-Fumess, and at Simderland. 
 
 M.v.o., AdC j Address — i, Eslington Terrace, Jesmond. Newcastle-on- 
 
 Tyne. 
 
 Superintendent of Torpedo Boat Destroyers building by Contract. 
 
 Captain Cyril Asser, e.n. Address — 47, Victoria Street. S.W. 
 
 Commander George H. H. Holden (ret.). 
 Commander Vernon S. Rashlelgh. 
 Commander Sydney B. Boyd-Richardson. 
 Commander Frank P. Rose, d.s.o. 
 
 Commander James H. Dathan'(re<.). 
 Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe. 
 Commander R.N.R. James W. Gracey (act.), 
 Lieut.-Com. George M. Skinner. 
 
266 
 
 Appendix 
 
 DEPAKTMENT OP THE DIHECTOB OF NAVAL CONSTEUCTION. 
 IHreetoT of Naval Construction. 
 E. H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt. Esq., o.b. 
 Superintendent of Construction Accounts and | Assistant Directors of Naval CoristrucUon 
 Contract Work. W. J. Berry, Esq. 
 
 W. H. Whiting. Esq., o.b. W. H. Gard. Esq., o.b.. slv.o. 
 
 H. Pledge, Esq. (act). 
 I A. E. Bichards, Esq. 
 
 SuperirUendmt of Admiraltu Experiment Works... :r. E. Froude, Esq., o.b., ixj>., f.e.s. 
 Senior Constructive Ojffker (re-entered for itmpy. service durino the War). ..J. A. Yates, Esq. 
 
 Chief Constructors. 
 
 E. L. Attwood (act.). 
 8. E. Boyland (act.). 
 W. H. Carter lact.). 
 T. Dally. 
 A. W. Johns {act.). 
 
 G. H. Ball. 
 
 G. Bulkeley (act.). 
 
 C. I. E. Campbell (act.). 
 
 8. V. Goodall (act.). 
 
 C. E. Goodyear. 
 
 A. H. Gould (ret.) 
 
 (tempy.). 
 O. Hannaford (act.), 
 E. B. Haries (act.). 
 A. J. Hobson. 
 J. 0. Joughin (act.). 
 
 0. F. Munday (act.). 
 J. H. Narbeth. m.v.o. 
 
 E. A. J. Pearce (act.). 
 P. L. Pethlck, 
 
 Esqra. 
 
 Constrtictors. 
 
 0. W. Kenidge (act.). 
 
 W. J. Martin. 
 
 T. L. Mathias (act.). 
 
 F. L. Mayer (act.). 
 O. A. Payne. 
 J. Eogers. 
 
 W. 6. Sanders (act.). 
 C. Scott (act.). 
 A. W. Watson (act.). 
 L. Woollard (act.). 
 
 Esqrs. 
 
 Temporary Constructor, 
 T. B. Abell. Esq. 
 
 Assistant Ccnstructors, Mrst Class. 
 
 A. Adams. 
 
 T. H. Bentley. 
 
 C. M. Carter. 
 
 E. B. Charig. 
 
 G. H. Child. 
 
 P. Hlckey. 
 
 C. J. W. Hopkins. 
 
 J. Iniies. 
 0. 8. LilUcrap. 
 J. McQueen. 
 8. Payne. 
 E. F. Spanner. 
 A. G. W. Stantan. 
 L. O. Williamson. 
 Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Constructors, Znd Class. 
 
 F. T. Blackman. 
 A. P. Cole, 
 W. A. D. Forbes. 
 E. W. li. Gawn. 
 
 Temporary Assistant Constructors. 
 
 A. Akester, b.sc. 
 J. Angus, b.sc. 
 C. W. Blon, B.8C. 
 E. L. Champness, B.sc. 
 P. C. Cocks. 
 
 D. A. Coskery, B.sc. 
 W. J. Craig. 
 J. L. Davies. 
 
 D. L. Evans, B.sc. 
 
 E. Fairley. 
 
 T. Graham, b.sc. 
 
 W. E. Hockaday. 
 E. K. McMUlan. 
 M. M. Parker. 
 G. McL. Paterson, b.a. 
 A. P. Patterson, b.sc. 
 P. G. Eouse, B.A. 
 
 H. 8. Pengelly. 
 F. C. C. Eogers. 
 P. Sutcllffe, 
 
 Ebqts 
 
 J. H. Sowden, b.8o.. 
 T. E. Sowden, B.sc. 
 F. W. Thome. 
 J. C. M. Wilson, 
 
 Esqrs. 
 
 Temporary Actvna Assisting Constructors. 
 
 G. Chase. I W. J. Laughton. H. Phllpot. A. Warren. 
 
 W. H. Eastfiott. P. J. Parmiter. P. Skeens. ; 8. E. Wells. 
 
 H. E. Hodge. G. Penney. A. Taylor.^ G. H. Whiteway, 
 
 G. Hunnlsett. | A. F. Perkins. 8. P. Thorn. Esqrs. 
 
 Inspecting OMcer of Smiths' Work.-.'E. T. Pearson, Esq. 
 Surveyor. ..O. E. Eawbone, Esq. (Lent from Board of Trade). 
 
 Curator of Dramngs...'W. J. Moore, Esq. 
 Examiner of Construction Accounts. ..Geoige H. Taylor, Esq. 
 Confidential Clerks to D.N.C....J. Lufiman and S. W. E. Pippett (act.). Esqrs, 
 Technical Clerk.. ..W. H. Malpas, Esq. 
 Clerical Assistant to S.C.W....U. J. Wright. Esq. (act.). 
 32 First Class and 91 Second Class Draughtsmen. 3 Second and 6 Third Grade Dockyard Clerks, 1 
 Hired Writer, 13 Hired Extra Clerks, 21 Women Clerks, 6 Boy Clerics, 1 Interpreter (tempy.) 4 Modellers. 
 The following gentleman has been re-entered for temporary service — 
 W. O. Thomas, Esq. (Inspecting Officer retd.) 
 Superintending Electrical Engineer.... C. H. Wordingham, Esq., m.i.c.e., m.i.m.e.. m.i.e.e. 
 Electrical Engineers, Higher Orade....A. D. Constable, m.i.e.e., William McClelland, a.m.le.e. and E. T, 
 
 Williams, hj.e.e. (act.), Esqrs. 
 Electrical Engineers... .M^ Melville Ackery, m.i.e.e.. J. B. Beddoe (act.), F. P. Fletcher, a.m.i.c.e, 
 A.H.i.Q.E. (act.), F. C. Forster. m.i.e.e.. A. G. Newington. m.i.e.e.. and W.P. Scott, a.m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs. 
 First Assistant Electrical Engineere....'W. H. Chatten (act.), H. H. E. Green, a.m.i.e.e.. and J. Shaw 
 
 (act.). Esqrs. 
 Tempy. Asst. Electrical Engineers.... V. Morton, a.m.i.e.e.. and E. W. Willis, a.m.i.e.e.. Esqrs. 
 
 Examiner of Electrical Accounts.... "E. E. Eogers, Esq. (act.) 
 2 Second Assistant Electrical Engineers (act.). 8 First Class, 7 Second Class, and 5 Temporary Draughts- 
 men, 6 Tempy. Clerks, 6 Women Clerlis and 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 I DEPARTMENT OF THE ENGINEEE IN CHIEF. 
 
 Ertgineer-in- Chief of the Fleet.. .Eng. Vice-Admiral Sir Henry J. Oram, k.o.b,. f.b.S. 
 Deputy Engineer-in-Chief.. .Eng. Bear-Admiral G. G. Goodwin, o.b. 
 Eng. Bear-Admiral William J. Anstey. 
 
 I Eng. Bear-Admiral Edouard Gaudln. 
 Eng. Captain Francis H. Lister (Lent Priority Section). 
 Eng. Captain Charles W. J. Bearblock (Ump.). 
 Eng. Captain Edward A. Short (ret.) (temp.) 
 
Appendix 
 
 267 
 
 Enoineer Inspectors. 
 Eng. Cavtain... John H. Jenkln. 
 Eng- Captain... Arthur S. Crisp. 
 Eng. Oommemder John McLaurin. 
 Eng. Commander David J. Carruthera. 
 Eng. Commander Oharlea G. Ware. 
 Eng. Commander Arthur E. Hyne. 
 Eng. Commander Francis A. Gordon (lempv.). 
 Eng. Commander Lionel M. Hobbs Uent from R.N. 
 
 CoU., Oreenunch). 
 Eng. Commander Thomaa G. Procter, 
 
 Engineer Inspectors — continued. 
 Eng- Commander William H. Ilam. 
 Eng. Commander John Hamilton. 
 Eng. Commander Joseph J. Klrwin. 
 Eng. Commander Ernest Nlbbs (act.). ' 
 Eng. Commander James J. Sareent {act.). 
 
 Engineer lAeulenani- Commanders. 
 
 Leonard W. Curgenven. 
 William 8. Mann. 
 Harold A. Brown. 
 Ernest A. Archard. 
 Bertram W. Knott. 
 
 Walter W. Lock. 
 Frederick J. Pedrick. 
 Stanley C. Church. 
 George Preece (temp.), 
 Jesse H. ELarrlaon. 
 
 Engineer Lieutenant. 
 Frederick E. G. Turner. 
 
 Civilian Engineer-Overseers W. G. Gibbons. C. Grey. W. Letty, W. G. Mathews and M. Ord 
 
 Esqrs. 
 ExamMiers of Engineering Acc<yunis... Ed-wia Gedye, and W. J. Stallion. Esqrs. iact). 36 Draughts- 
 men. 10 Tempy. Draughtsmen. 1 Dockyard Clerk (Third Grade). 3 Hired Writers. 
 4 Extra Clerks, 8 Tempy. Clerks. 11 Women Clerks and 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF DOCKYARDS. 
 Director of Dockyards and Dockyard Work... Sir James B. Marshall, e.c.b. 
 
 Superintendent of Dochuard Branch — 
 H. J. Webb, Esq. 
 
 Manager, Constructive Department — 
 
 F. B. OUia, Esq. (tempy.) {For special 
 service.) 
 
 Chief Construdora — 
 
 Q. M. Apsey {tempy.). 
 
 E. R. Bate. Esq. {add'l.). 
 
 C. H. Croxford. Esq. (act.) (tempy.). 
 
 Constructors — 
 
 P. Bryant, Esq. 
 W. T. Davis. Esq. (tempy.). 
 Q. F. Ludford (act.). 
 H. B. Wood (act.). 
 
 For Special Service — 
 
 Eng. Bear-Admiral Robert Mayston. o.B. 
 (ret.) (tempy.). 
 
 Eng. Bear-Admiral Charles Budd (ret.). 
 
 Engineer Assistant to Director of Dockyards- 
 Eng. Captain John W. Ham. 
 
 Engineer Assistants — 
 
 Eng. Commander Samuel P. Ferguson. 
 E. R. Langmald, Esq. 
 Chief Engineer...'!!. E. Elvy, Esq. (lent from EaulbowKne Dockyard). 
 Examiners of Dockyard Work — 
 T. H. Harries, E. A. Lakey, J. D. Glbby (act.), J. Ellis, W. L. Coles. F. Sanders. 
 O. Henwood (act.), P. J. Fletcher (act.), and J. A. Page (act), Esqrs. 
 
 First Assistant Electrical Engineer... "E. L. Brain. Esq. (act). 
 
 ClericalAssistantsi. ^- ^- I^^eridge. Esq. 
 LtericaiA.ssistant8-^ ^ ^ Stanbury, Esq. (act.). 
 
 Visiting Inspectors of Timber. ..Vf. H. Hooper and Alfred James. Esqrs. 
 1 Dockyard Clerk (First Grade). 2 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade). 7 Dockyard 
 Clerks (Third Grade), and 9 Hired Writers. 
 
 DOCKYARD EXPENSE ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT. 
 (68. Victoria Street, S.W.) 
 Inspectors of Dockyard Expense Accounts... W. G. Roff, Esq., i.s.o. 
 Assistant to ditto... J. Ryan,|Esq. 
 Expense Accounts OMcer...F. W. W. Burrell. Esq. 
 Deptftv Expense Accounts OMcer...Q. T. Jones, Esq. 
 Assistant Expense Accounts Officer... 1!. Piatt. Esq. (for Stocktaking Duties). 
 
 T. Jennings, Esq. (for Stocktaking Duties), and 
 J. A. Jeffery, Esq. (act.) 
 F. Hall, Esq. (lent). 
 Examiner of Accounts... B.. Haggis. Esq. 
 Assistant Examiner of Accounts... J. E. Horswell, Esq, 
 2 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade). 6 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade). 3 Hired Writers 
 1 Assistant Clerk, 3 Tempy. Clerks and a Women Clerks. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL ORDNANCE. 
 
 Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes... Rear-Admiral Morgan Singer. o.B. 
 Assistant-Director of Torpedoes. ..Captain Philip W. Dumas, c.v.c, c.b. 
 Assistant-Director of Naval Ordnance.. .Captain Herbert R. Norbury. 
 
268 
 
 Appendix 
 
 Assistants to Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes. 
 
 Commander C3iarles A. Scott. 
 Commander Frederic E. B. G. Schreiber. 
 Commander Edward O. Cochrane. 
 Commander James S. C. Salmond. 
 Commander Wet.) Malcolm K. Grant. 
 Commander Isham W. Gibson, m.v.o. 
 Commander Bernard W. M. Falrbairn. 
 Lieut.-Com. Kenneth B. M. Churchill. 
 Acting Com. Archibald Gilbert Uempv.). 
 
 Acting Commander Gerard B. Eiley {ret.) (tempv.). 
 Acting Commander Carlton C. Sherman (ret.) 
 
 (tempv.). 
 Commr. B.N.V.R. John G. Henderson {act.). 
 Lieut. Walter E. Gilbert. 
 Lieut. Willie D. Kilroy, e.n.v.b. (tempi/.). 
 Lieut. Herbert O. Mock, e.n.v.r. (tempv.). 
 Svb.-Lieut. W. H. J. Elridge. e.n.v.e. (tempv.). 
 
 Lieutenant... Patrick P. Coleman. 
 
 C7ii«/ GMW«ers...Fredericl£ J. Payne, Malcolm A. McKenzie. 
 
 Gunner... CS) Leonard Eepton, W. Thorogood, Walter P. Williamson. 
 
 Eng. Rear-Admiral Ernest F. Ellis, c.b. (ret). 
 Eng. Captain Thomas Thome (tempv.). 
 Eng. Commander Henry Wall. 
 Eng. Commander Edward O. HefEord. 
 
 Engineer Inspectors. 
 
 Eng. Commander William Hart. 
 
 Eng. Commander Alfred E. Kempt. 
 
 Eng. lAeut. Commander Frederick L. Eobertson, 
 
 Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance. ..Commander (act.) John A. Duncan, o.b. 
 
 Assistants to Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance... Commander Digby St. A. P. Weston (ret.). 
 
 Commander Henry G. E. Bevan (ret.). 
 Commander (act.) Leslie J. L. Hammond (ret.). 
 Captain Freeman C. N. Bishop, b.h.a. 
 
 The following getdleman has been lent for special service during (he War. ..3. Storey, Esq. 
 Ncneal oMcers employed on Inspection and Experimental Ordnance Duties. 
 Under Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance : — 
 Inspector of Steel... Commander Harold G. Jackson (ret.). 
 Assistant Inspectors of Steel. 
 
 Admiral (ret.) Sir Edmund 8. Poe, G.o.v.O., k.c.b. 
 
 Major-General E. Wace. c.B. (tempv.). 
 
 Captain H. E. Evans, e.n. (ret.). 
 
 Captain William H. M. Daniell, e.n. (ret.). 
 
 Captain Claude W. M. Plenderleath. e.n. (ret.). 
 
 Commander Henry Thompson (ret.). 
 
 Commander Charles K. McCallum (ret.). 
 
 Commander John E. Bray (ret.). 
 
 Commander T. S. Gooch (Emergy.). 
 
 Commander A. H. Tremayne (ret.). 
 
 Commander Eeginald C. Brenton (Emergv.)(tempv). 
 
 Lommander W. F. Cabome, o.b., e.n.r. (ret.). 
 
 lAeut.-Com. Arthur W. Tomlinson. 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Frank E. Willis. 
 
 Lieut-Corn. Hugh J. Orr (ret.). 
 
 Cieut.-Com. Llewellyn E. H. Llewellyn (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. John G. M. McHardy (ret.). 
 
 lAeut.-Com. Albert D. Grant (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Eobert F. Veasey (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Alister W. McDonald (ret.). 
 
 The following gentlemen have also been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 
 H. B. Halls, C. J. Hill. A. E. Lee, L. T. Jarvis, J. W. Capstick. C. E. Moss, 
 
 W. E. C. Hockin, E. Carey-Brenton, T. W. Sheppard. Esors. 
 
 Lent from Home OMce. 
 H Topham, 8. E. Bennett A. C. Lowe, G. C. Sumner, E. L. Mecklin, C. F. Hunter, W. H. Mead, 
 W. Turner. F. Bowen, A. A. Hepburn, C. H. Taylor. C. E. Plumbe. P. W. Cockshott, A. Fother- 
 ingham, L. D. Hooper, H. T. Eingdove, and W. C. Evans, Esqis. 
 
 Under War OMce. 
 Lieut- Com. John A. L. Hay. I Captain Nathaniel F. Trotman, r.m.a. 
 
 Lieut-Corn. Archibald 0. GooWen (ret.). I 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Halptx B. Bodilly (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. William H. Callwell (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Henry L. Cheston (Emergy.) (act.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Frederick J. Davis, e.d., b.n.e. (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. W. E. Compton (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. W. G. H. Cree (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. H. J. G. Lawrence (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. J. H. C. Ogilvy (ret.). 
 
 Lieut. Henry S. H. Ellis (ret.). 
 
 Lieut. Eobert J. Sweet (ret.). 
 
 Lieut. B.N.R. Beauchamp H. Venner (ret.). 
 
 Colonel J. E. J. Jocelyn, b.a. (ret.) (tempv.). 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel T. English. e.e. (ret.) (tempv.). 
 
 Lieut-Col. G. Mackinlay, b.a. (ret.) (tempv.). 
 
 Lieut.-Col. E. L. Haines (ret.) (tempv.). 
 
 Major Charles A. Bishop, e.m.a. 
 
 Captain G. B. Macpherson Grant (tempy.). 
 
 Captain Alfred D. B. Godlray. R.if.A. 
 
 Eng. Capt. H. W. Metcalfe (rd.). 
 
 The following gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 J. L. Capes, H. .J'ackson, A. McPherson, and P. E. Coursey, Esqrs. 
 
 Superintending Cto-fc... Thomas G. Anderson, Esq. 
 Deputy Superintending Clerk... W. P. Daniels, Esq. (act.). 
 Assistant Superintending Clerks.. .F. Morrison. S. W. Smith (act.) and G. Stevens (act.). Esqrs. 
 Second Division Clerk. Dockyard Clerks (including Acting) First Grade 1. Second Grade 9, Third Grade 
 9 , Temporary Clerks and Boys 43, Draughtsmen 7. 
 
Appendix 269 
 
 Superintendenl of Ordnance Stores.. .GaDlaiii Barrlagtou H. Ohevalller. r.m. (retired). 
 Assistant Superintendenl of Ordriarice Stores.. .B.. Fathers. 
 
 Frederick Ward (act.). 
 G. E. Woodward (act.), Eaars. 
 Superintending Clerk.. .A. MoFarlane. Kaq. (act.). 
 Naval Ordnance Store OMcer...W. A. Mortimer (act.). Esa. 
 
 DepiUu Ordnance Store OMaers T. W. Midiner (detached /or Special Duly). W. H. Eowe (act.), N. Thomas, 
 
 and W. Vaughan, Esars. 
 
 Assistant Ordnance Store Officers J. A. W. Billard (act.), G. C. Cuscna (act.). W. E. Eylea (act.), 
 
 O. H. Murray (act.), and A. T. Reed (act.), Esqrs. 
 Examiner of Naval Ordnance Work-.-W. D. Evans. Esq. (act.). 
 
 1 Ordnance Depot Olerk. First Grade. 
 
 4 Ordnance Depdt Clerka, First Grade (j.ct.). 
 
 13 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act.). 
 
 6 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade. 
 
 7 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade (act). 
 1 Hired Writer. 
 
 la Temporary Hired Extra Clerks. 
 
 14 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 
 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers. 
 
 Actinj Assistant Ordnance Store OMcer...Sheffleld...G. Swift, Esq. 
 Chief Analyst... SheMeld... John C. W. Hiimfrey Esq. 
 
 Nora. — Offlcers of the Naval Ordnance Department serving at Woolwich and at the Ports are not 
 given. 
 
 Aia DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Director of Air Services Bear-Admiral Charles L. Vaughan-Lee. 
 
 Civil Assistant W. 6. Perrin, Esq. 
 
 Private Secretary Paymaster (act.) G. H. Thomson. 
 
 Superintendent of Aircraft Construction Captain Murray P. Sueter, c.b. 
 
 (Commodore 1st Class.) 
 
 Naval Assistant Coptom A. V. Vyvyan, d.s.o. 
 
 Asst. Supts. of Aircraft Construction CaptainT). T. Norris. 
 
 Captain A. J. Davies. 
 
 Wing Commander R. H. Clark-Hall.' 
 
 Asst. Supt. of Engines Wim Commander (E) W. Briggs (act.). 
 
 Personnel Captain Captein H. Edwards, p.8.o._ 
 
 Inspecting Captain of Air Training Wing Commander H. D. Briggs. ' 
 
 Captain Lord Dunhoyne. 
 
 Military Liaison Officer Lieut. 3. E. Pike, r.f.c. 
 
 Commander A. D. Warrington-Morris. 
 
 Wing Commanders. 
 3. L. Forbes. I C. R. 3. Randall. I H. L. Woodcock. 
 
 R. C. S. Hunt. I J. W. Seddon. I 
 
 Sauadron Commanders. 
 P. F. M. Fellowes. 1 J. D. Mackworth. I H. A. Williamson. 
 
 C. H. K. Edmonds, d.s.o. | I 
 
 Flight Commanders. 
 3. W. K. Allsop. I H. A. Michell. I S. V. Sippe, d.s.o. 
 
 J. Bird (act.). \ R. C. M. Pink. I 
 
 Lieutenant-Commander J. I. Harrison. 
 
 Engineer-Commander Francis Ranken (ac<.). 
 
 Eng.-Ueui.-Commander A. Leamon-Berry. 
 
 Engineer-Lieutenant R- Stansmore. 
 
 W. A. C. Sandford-Thompson. 
 
 F. A. Brock. 
 W. A. Bums. 
 
 G. W. Cranfleld. 
 
 A. 0. French-Brewster. 
 
 Flight Lieutenants. 
 
 L. H. Hardstafif. 
 L. J. Killmayer. 
 W. C. Michie. 
 E. J. O. Roberts. 
 
 E. v. Sassoon. 
 M. E. A. Wright. 
 
 Flight Sub-Lieut D. W. Gray, 
 
 F. P. Reeves, 
 
 Warrant OMcers (Ist grade), 
 F. W. ScarfE. 
 
270 
 
 Appendix 
 
 L. C. Abbott. 
 J. V. Collins. 
 H. a. Cooper. 
 W. T. Curtlss. 
 
 Warrant OMcers {2nd grade). 
 
 W. N. Pormby. 
 J. H. Hobbs. 
 O. Layzell-Apps. 
 J. S. Matthias. 
 
 0. Y. Mitchell. 
 
 J. Ormsby. 
 
 W. G. J. Wardle. 
 
 W. A. Bristow. 
 Lord Erskine. ; 
 
 Ideut.-Commaiider!!, B.N.V.R. 
 
 G. Holmes. 
 C. F. Jenkln. 
 
 F. C n. Sinclair. 
 
 C. R. Abbott. 
 M. H. P. Allen, 
 C. R. Andrews. 
 P. T. Armstrong. 
 J. Arthur. 
 T. M. Barlow. 
 T. B. Barrington. 
 W. O. Bentley. 
 B. B. Berkley. 
 
 A. L. Bligh. 
 T. S. R. Blunt. 
 J. P. Bourke. 
 J. S. Buchanan. 
 
 F. A. Bumpus. 
 
 G. Caird. 
 
 J. D. Carmichael. 
 
 B. C. Carter. 
 G. H. Childs. 
 
 E. H. Cockshott. 
 J. Craig. 
 
 J. 6. T. Crawford. 
 J. G. Currle. 
 J. K. Curwen. 
 
 C. R. D'Arcy. 
 H. I. Dear. 
 H. Dodd. 
 
 J. G. Dothie 
 J. W. Eckford. 
 J. P. Elsden. 
 A. T. Evans. 
 A. W. Farrer. 
 
 A. C. Baker. 
 J. G. M. Bevan. 
 E. C. Blake. 
 E. Butt. 
 0. A. Crow. 
 J. W. C. Dobbyn. 
 
 Lieutenants, B.N.V.R. 
 
 W. R. Flint. 
 3. Flower. 
 J. M. Fraser. 
 
 A. S, Gendle. 
 
 R. D. N. Gillmorc. 
 R. S. Goddard. 
 
 D. Gordon. 
 W. C. Grant. 
 
 J. E. A. Greatorex. 
 
 B. T. Hamilton. 
 J. F. Hedley. 
 
 H. A. Hetherington. 
 S. R. Hill. 
 
 E. Hogg. 
 
 r. C. B. Hooke. 
 W. H. Horden. 
 E. C. Horsley 
 D. C. M. Hume. 
 A. J. Hurst. 
 A. G. lonides. 
 
 C. Kent. 
 
 A. Landells. 
 W. A. I,awrence. 
 H. B. Leach. 
 G. E. Lygo. 
 G. McAlpine. 
 W. L. Marsh. 
 T. A. Monckton,' 
 S. R. Mullard. 
 W. H. Mulville. 
 
 Sub-Licuteiwnts. R.N. V.B. 
 
 H. Eves. 
 
 J. D. Greenwood. 
 A. R. Griggs. 
 J. H. Hagon. 
 E. H. Haworth. 
 G. Hazelton. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant... A. Berry. 
 Ch. Gunner. ..A. Baynton. 
 
 C. J. Murfitt. 
 G. C. Neilson. 
 T. F. Korbury. 
 T. L. Oliver. 
 T. A. Parker. 
 R. M. N. Perks 
 
 F. E. Pollard. 
 W. J. Polybank. 
 O. H. Powell. 
 L. S. M. Pyke. 
 
 G. M. T. Rees. 
 A. Robertson. 
 F. E. Rogers. 
 
 E. S. Saunders. 
 J. C. Savage. 
 K. Secretan. 
 R. G. Shire. 
 
 N. Sladden. 
 
 A. F. H. Smallpiece. 
 
 S. P. Smyth. 
 
 S. E. Spencer. 
 
 C. A. W. Taylor. 
 
 A. K. Toulmln-Smlth. 
 
 S. M. Udale. 
 
 J. B. Vernon. 
 
 H. N. Warburton. 
 
 A. H. White. 
 
 W. S. Whitelaw. 
 
 F. C. Williams. 
 H. E. Wimperis. 
 
 M. J. H. Mol3Tieux. 
 
 A. P. Reed. 
 
 B. Thomson. 
 T. M. Wilson. 
 N. H. Wood. 
 
 C. H. Wright. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Deputy Su/perintending Clerk... ^. W. Griffin, Esq. 
 Chief Examiner... J. H. Jones, Esq. {act.). 
 
 (Lent from Inland Revenue.) 
 Examiner... G. B. Pledger, Esq. (act). 
 
 (Lent from Inland Revenue.) 
 Inspector of Aircraft Armament... "R. D. Dow, Esq. 
 
 2 Minor Staff Clerks (act.). 
 
 4 Second Division Clerks (2 serving mth Army). 
 
 3 Assistant Clerks (1 serving with Army). 
 1 Extra Clerk, Ist Class. 
 
 1 Tempy. Accountant Clerk, 1st Class. 
 
 2 Asst. Inspectors of Aircraft Armament. 
 31 Temporary Clerks. 
 Improvers. 
 
 8 Temporary Women Clerks, Higher Grade. 
 73 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 
 7 Boy Clerks. 
 Civilian Technical Assistant... 'HAiris Booth. Esq. 
 Asst. Technical Adviser... "S. Bolas. Esq. {tempy.). 
 
 A. J. S. Pippard, Esq. 
 
 P. E. Cowlln, Esq. 
 
 9 Draughtsmen. 
 
 Note. — The OJUeers of the Royal Naval Air Service are not shown. 
 
ib) ADMIRALTY, APRIL, 1917. 
 
 First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, a.c.B., &c. 
 
 ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF. 
 
 Chief of the War Staff. Vice-Admiral (act.) Sir Henry F. Oliver, K.c.r.. m.v.o. 
 
 Assistant to the Chief of the War Staff... Captain Arthur de K. L. May. 
 
 Staff Cleric W. H. Hancock, Esq. (act.). 
 
 OPERATIONS DIVISION. 
 
 Directors of the Operations Division Rear Admiral Thomaa Jackson, o.b., m.v.o. 
 
 Captain George P. W. Hope, o.b., AdC. 
 Assistant Directors of the Operations Division... Captain Henry W. Grant. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. Walter T. C. Jones, D,S.o., e.m.l.i. 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 
 Commander Frederic G. S. Peile. 
 Charles C. Dis, d.s.o. 
 F. Bowden-Smith (ret.). 
 S. V. S. C. Messmn (ret.). 
 T. W. Stirling (emerg.). 
 Leonard Boblnson (act.). 
 Hugh A. Williamson (ad.). 
 
 Captain. 
 
 ..A. G. Allgood (ret.) 
 A. F. Beal. 
 E. P. Glutton (ret.). 
 O. G. S. Eeles (ret.). 
 W. M. Kerr. 
 C. Seymour. 
 H. J. L. W. K. Willcox. 
 Charles D. Eoper (temp.). 
 Herbert Macl. Edwards (temp.) 
 
 Staff Clerk... G. J. Rlckman, Esq. 
 2 Second Division Clerks. 
 1 Confidential Shorthand Writer. 
 
 ^'{?\- ^ ^/•^'•■JFjtzstephen J. F. French 
 
 Col. R.M.A. > 
 Lieut. -Com. J. P. Gibbs. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 11 Assistant Clerks. 
 
 2 Accountant Clerks. 
 
 3 Extra Clerks. 
 
 Director of the Intelligence 
 Assistant Directors of the 
 
 Captain Herbert W. W. Hope. 
 
 Argentine H. Aling- 
 
 ton. 
 Rupert S. Gwatkin- 
 Willlams (ret.). 
 Commander Vivian R. Brandon. 
 Francis G. G. Chilton. 
 Colpoys C. Walcott 
 
 (ret.). 
 Ernest P. Gregory. 
 Gerald C. Dickens. 
 Morris E. Cochrane, 
 
 D.s.o. (ret). 
 John Casement. 
 Geoffrey B. Spicer- 
 
 Simson, D.s.o. 
 Reginald A. Norton 
 (temp.). 
 Commander \ Henry F. C. Caven- 
 (Emerg.) } dish. 
 Commander \Lord Herschell, 
 B.lf.V.B. t K.C.V.O. 
 
 Eon. William 
 Cozens-Hardy, k.o. 
 O. P. Seroccld. 
 ' Lord Abinger. 
 
 INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. 
 Divisim... Captain William R. Hall, c.B..AdC. 
 Inttlligence Division... Captain Raymond A. Nugent (tcmv.). 
 Captain Thomas E. Wardle, d.s.o. 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 Lieut.-Com. Walter T. Bagot. 
 Arthur W. Wood 
 (ret.). 
 
 Eno. Com....Percy Wheater. 
 
 Mai.dk Bt.\FiiLTik V. Temple. 
 
 Lt.-Col. I R.M.L.I. 
 
 Major Walter 
 
 B.M.L.I. 
 
 Percy R. 
 
 R.M.A. 
 
 Sinclair. 
 Heycock, 
 
 m^Mti } Arthur Peel, e.m.l.i. 
 Wright, 
 
 Bt. Mai 
 Captain 
 
 .Cecil E. S. 
 
 E.M.L.I. 
 
 Bernard F. 
 
 B.H.L.I. 
 
 J. G 
 
 E.M.L.I. 
 
 Trench, 
 Farmer, 
 
 itSl. } ^^'^ ^- Mullins. 
 
 Lieut.-Com. \ „ p,™pf 
 R.N.V.R. /".Paget. 
 
 Lieut. R.N.R. AlastalrP. Hadow. 
 
 Lieut. \ Arthur E. Watts. 
 R.N.r.B. ' F. Eomer. 
 
 Hyde Kennard. 
 
 RN^Jt. ^ ^^"^ ^- So^^'"^- 
 Naval Instr. Guy V. Rayment. b.a . 
 Fleet Paym. Charles J. E. Rotter. 
 
 O.B. 
 
 Ernest W. C. Thring. 
 C. Betton Roberts. 
 
 Asst. Paym. Lloyd Hirst. 
 
 Asst. Paym. \ William H. 
 R.N.V.B. ' Osrcan. 
 
 Midshipman George H. Carbutt. 
 
 271 
 
272 
 
 Appendix 
 
 staff Clerks... 
 
 Hugh Broadbeut. Esq. 
 W. G. Johns, Esq. (act). 
 A. Backhouse, Esq. (.ad.). 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 Cartographer... 
 
 C. Brickenden, Esq. 
 6 Second Division Clerks. 
 1 Confidential Shorthand Writer. 
 
 1 Assistant Clerk, 3 Extra Clerks. 
 
 2 Boy Clerks, 37 Women Clerks. 
 6 Draughtsmen. 
 
 The following gentlemen have been appointed or lent for temporary service during the War : 
 Sir P. W. Baker-Wilbraham. Bt.. ll.b., P. Cavendlsh-Bentinck, A. Cecil, H. N. Dickson, M.A., D.sc, 
 G. H. Fitzmaurlce, Esqrs., 2nd Lieut. E. L. Hobson (London Regt.), T. W. H. Inskip, Esq., K.c. 
 2%d Lieut. S. S. G. Leeson, H. Leveson, Esq.. Major E. J. Lugard (Indian Army, ret.), T. G. F. 
 Palmer, Dr. C. Copland Perry, J. Eandall, H. Russell, and E. N. Schiller, Esqrs. 
 
 TRADE DIVISION. 
 
 Acting Director of Trade Division. ..Captain Richard Webb, C.B., r.n. 
 Acting Assistant Director of Trade Division... Captain Horace W. Longden. 
 
 Captain W. H. D. Margesson (ret). 
 
 B. H. Smith (ret.). 
 T. H. Foster (ret.). 
 Philip Walter (ret.). 
 Reginald L. Crlchton (ret). 
 
 Commander Thomas Fisher. 
 
 A. H. Tarletou, m.v.o (emerg.). 
 
 Sir Caiarles L. Cust, Bt, k.o.v.c, c.b., 
 
 o M.G., o.i.E. (ret). 
 Maxwell H. Anderson (act.) (ret). 
 Oscar V. de Satge (rei.). 
 John Kiddle. 
 
 Walter P. Roe (ret-.), (act). 
 Hush B. Mulleneux. 
 Edward B. Compton (ret). 
 Andrew L. Strange. 
 
 ^"n!b. }h- W. Kenrick. r.d. (ret). 
 Lieift.-Com. John O. Wyatt (ret). 
 
 John W. Push (ret). 
 
 Francis J. Alexander (ret). 
 
 Lieiit.-Com. 
 BJf.V.R. 
 
 ( William Ginman, 
 
 j W. E. Arnold-Forster (temporarily 
 
 \ detached). 
 
 Lieut Lionel A. Cazalet (tempy.). 
 
 William A. WlUock (tempy.). 
 
 ^%terg.). } Hugh 0. Arnold-Forster. 
 Lieta.B.N.'lt. W. H. Stewart. 
 
 Lieiu. 
 R.N.r.B. 
 
 Eng. Com. 
 lAeut.-Col. 
 Fleet Paym. 
 
 Staff Pavm. 
 Svb.-Limt 
 
 B.N.r.R. 
 Asst. 
 
 Paym. 
 B.N.R. 
 
 F. H. McCormlck-Goodhart. 
 
 L. McCormlck-Goodhart. 
 
 John B. D. Joce. 
 
 Arthur N. Plelden. 
 ...Henry C. Rush (ret). 
 
 Thomas H. Hawkins, k.m.l.i. 
 
 H. W. Eldon Manisty, c.m.o. 
 
 Alfred R. Parker. 
 
 John Siddalls (tempy.). 
 I Henry J. R. Maitland. 
 ^Alexander R. Mollison. 
 ) Harold B. Tufflll. 
 [ W. A. J. Boxford. 
 } Joseph H. Wilson. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Staff Clerk... J. T. Cotton. Esq. (acting). 
 3 Second Division Clerks (one lent). 
 1 Accountant Clerk (lent). 
 
 2 Clerical Assistants. 
 18 Temporary Clerks. 
 14 Women Clerks. 
 
 The following have been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 
 H S. BIoss Blundell, ll.d., Esq. 
 
 (unpaid). 
 Sir Frederick Bolton (unpaid). 
 B. Bums-Pye. Esq. (unpaid). 
 Mrs. C. H. Campbell (unpaid). 
 A. H. Charteris. Esq. 
 
 H. C. Cumberbatch, Esq. (un- 
 paid). 
 Allan Deacon, Esq. (unpaid). 
 G. D. Hardinge-Tyler, Esq. 
 W. E. Hargreaves, Esq. (unpaid)- 
 
 Clive Lawrence, Esq., 
 
 Barrister-at-Lavj. 
 Lieut. E. Maclay (The Camer- 
 
 onians). 
 The Earl of Sandwich (unpaid). 
 
 ANTI-SUBMARINE DIVISION. 
 
 Director. . .Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, c.B. 
 
 Secretary...!. D. M. Cavanagh. 
 Assistant Directors... Captain H. Walwyn, d.s.o. 
 
 Claude Seymour, d.s.o. 
 
 Commander... (S) I. W. Carrington. 
 (S.B.) G. B. Lewes. 
 (Q) E. H. Russell. 
 (G) Reginald G. H. Henderson. 
 
 Captain of Mine Sweeping. 
 
 Staff. 
 
 Commander... A. M. Yeats-Brown. 
 Lieut.-Com. (T) H. L. Hltchlns. 
 
 (N) L W. Clayton. 
 Eng.-Com. E. W. Riley. 
 Captain L. G. Preston, c.b. 
 
 Commander... Everard J. Hardman-Jones. 
 Capt. <t Bt. Mai. R.M.A. Stephen C, Wace 
 Staff Paym. ...John E. A. Brown. 
 
 4 SQrec} Extra Clerks, 
 
 SIGNAL SECTION. 
 Bead of Signal Section... Captain Christopher R. Payne. 
 Naval Staff. 
 
 Paymaster Edward W. H. Travis (a£t.). 
 Wt Writer. ...Hartlngton Ratcliffe. 
 2 Chief Writers (1 peusd.). 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 I 49 Women Clerks. 
 
Appendix 
 
 273 
 
 MATERIEL DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 DEPABTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAIj EQUIPMENT. 
 Director of Naval Equipment... Captain Clement Greatorex, o.b., m.v.o., b.k. 
 {Is also Naval Assistant to Third Sea Lord). 
 
 Assistant Directors 0/ Naval EQuipmenl... Captain Alan G. Hotham, b.n. 
 
 Captain Christopher P. Metcalfe, 
 Salvage work) (ret.). 
 Salvage Officer in Home Waters... Captain H. Pomeroy. 
 
 Eng. Captain... (Betd.) Henry E. Teed. Carpenter Lieutenant... Thomas L. Boper. 
 1 Dockyard Clerk (2nd grade). 1 Tempy. Clerk. 3 Women Clerks. I Boy Clerk. 
 
 D.s.o. {for 
 
 Superintendents of Contract-built Ships. 
 
 n^^t^i^ Ti-j,« rr 1? •o„,^^^^^^ ^ „ ., » « I For Contract Work (not Inolwdlng Destroyers) on the Clyde. 
 Gaptam Brian H. P. Barttelot. c.b.. m.t.o. \ Address— 3. nivda View. Partick. Glaseow. 
 
 Address — 3, Clyde View, Partick, Glasgow. 
 For Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the Tyne, 
 Thames, Mersey, at Barrow-in-Purness, and at Sunder- 
 land. 
 Address — 1, Eslington Terrace, Jesmond, Newcastle-on- 
 
 Tyne. 
 Superintendent of Torpedo Boat Destroyers building by Contract. 
 
 Captain Cyril Asser, b.n. Address — 47, Victoria Street, 8.W. 
 
 Bear- Admiral Laurence E. Power, o.b., 
 
 M.v.o, 
 
 Captain Stephen H. Radclifle. 
 Commander George H. H. Holden (ret.). 
 
 Vernon 3. Rasbleigb. 
 
 Sydney B. Boyd-Richardson. 
 
 Frank F. Rose, d.s.o. 
 
 Commander James H. Datlian {ret.). 
 
 Lewis G. E. Oabbe. 
 Commander B.N.B. Jamea W. Gracey {act.). 
 Lievi.-Com. Guybon O. C. Damant {ret.). 
 Lieut. B.N.R. George J. Wheeler. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 Director of Naval Construction. 
 
 Sir Eustace H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt. k.o.b. 
 
 Assistant Directors of Naval Construction. 
 W. J. Berry, Esq. 
 W. H. Gard, Esq.. c.b.. m.v.o. 
 H. Pledge, Esq. {act.). 
 A. E. Richards, Esq. 
 
 Superintendent of Construction Accounts and 
 Contract Work. 
 W. H. Whiting, Esq., c.b. 
 
 Superiniendent of Admiralty Experiment Works. .."R. E. Froude, Esq.. o.b., ll.d., f.h.s. 
 Senior Constructive OMcer {re-entered for tempy. service during the War). ..J. A. Yates, Esq. 
 
 Chief Constructors. 
 E. L. Attwood {act.). I C. F. Munday (oci.). 
 
 S. E. Boyland {act.). 
 W. H. Carter {act.). 
 T. Dally. 
 A. W. Johns {act.). 
 
 J. H. Narbeth, M.v.o. 
 E. A. J. Pearce {act.). 
 P. L. Pethlck, Esqrs. 
 
 G. H. Ball. 
 G. Bulkeley {act.). 
 C. I. R. Campbell {act) 
 S. V. Goodall {act.). 
 C. E. Goodyear. 
 
 A. H. Gould {ret.) 
 
 {tempy.). 
 C. Hannaford {act.). 
 
 B. B. Harries {act.). 
 A. J. Hobson. 
 J. C. Joughin {act.). 
 
 Constructors. 
 
 C. W. Kerridge {ad.). 
 
 W. J. Martin. 
 
 T. L. Mathias {act.). 
 
 F. L, Mayer {act.). 
 
 O. A. Payne. 
 
 J. Rogers. 
 
 W. G. Sanders {act.). 
 
 0. Scott {act.). 
 
 L. D. Stansfeid {act.), 
 
 A. W. Watson {act.). 
 
 L. Woollard {ad.), Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Constructors, First Class. 
 
 A. Adams. 
 C. M. Carter. 
 
 E. B. Charig. 
 G. H. Child. 
 
 F. HIckey. 
 
 0. J. W. Hopkins. 
 
 J. Innea. 
 O. S. Llliicrap. 
 E. F. Spanner, 
 A. G. W. Stantaa. 
 L. C. Williamson, 
 Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Constructors, Second Class. 
 V. G. Shepheard. 
 
 A. P. Cole. 
 G. McCloghrie. 
 H. May. 
 D. E. J. OfTord. 
 
 Temporary Constructor. 
 T. B. Abell, Esq. : 
 
 A. Akester, b.so. 
 J. Angus, B.so. 
 C. W. Bion. B.so. 
 W. T. Butterwick. 
 
 E. L. Champness, b.so 
 
 F. C. Cocks. 
 
 Temporary 
 D. A. Coskery, B.so. 
 W. J. Craig. 
 J. L. Davles. 
 D. L. Evans, B.so. 
 R. Falrley. 
 T. Graham, B.so. 
 
 Constructors. 
 
 W. B. Hoekaday. 
 
 A. Klmberley. 
 
 E. K. McMillan. 
 
 M. M. Parker. 
 
 G. McL. Paterson, b.a. 
 
 A. P. Patterson, b.so. 
 
 F. C. C. Rogers. 
 F. Sutcllfle. Esqrs. 
 
 P. G. Rouse, B.A. 
 J. H. Sowden, B.so. 
 T. E. Sowden. B.so. 
 F. W. Thome. 
 J. C. M. Wilson, 
 
 Esqrs. 
 
274 
 
 Appendix 
 
 O. caiase. 
 W. H. Eastcott. 
 H. E. Hodge. 
 O. Hunnlsett. 
 
 Temporary Aclina Assistant Construdors. 
 
 W. J. Laughton. H. Phllpot. 
 
 P. J. Parmiter. F. Skeens. 
 
 Q. Penney. A. Taylor. 
 
 A. E. Perkins. S. E. Thom. 
 
 A. Warren. 
 S. E. Wells. 
 G. H. Whitewar. 
 
 Esqrs. 
 
 Inspecting Officer of Smiths' Work...E. T. Pearson, Esq. 
 Survevor...O. E. Rawbone, Esq. {Lent from Board of Trade). 
 Curator ofDrawings...\f. J. Moore, Esq. 
 Examiner of Construction .iccownfs... George H. Taylor. Esq. 
 Confidential Clerks to D.N.C....J. Luffman and S. W. E. Plppett (ad.). Esqrs. 
 Technical Clerk... "W. H. Malpaa. Esq. 
 Clerical Assistant to 8. C, Tr....E. J. Wright, Esq. {ad.). 
 32 First Class and 91 Second Class Draughtsmen, 3 Second and 6 Third Grade Dockyard Clerks. 1 Hired 
 Writer, 13 Hired Extra Clerks, 21 Women Clerks, 5 Boy Clerks, 1 Interpreter (temp.), 4 Modellers. 
 
 The follovmg gentleman Jios been re-entered for temporary service — 
 W. O. Thomas, Esq. {Inspecting Officer retd.). 
 
 Superintending Electrical Engimeer...C. H. Wordlngham, Esq., M.I.O.B., u.i.u.1!., U.I.E.E. 
 Electrical Engineers, Higher Grade... A. D. Constable, m.i.e.b.. William McClelland, A.U.I.K.E., and 
 
 E. T. Williams. u.i.e.e. (act.), (Esqrs.). 
 Electrical Engineers... B.. Melville Ackery, u.i.e.e., J. S. Beddoe (ad.), F. P. Fletcher, A.uj.o.e.. a.ii.i.e.e. 
 (ad.). F. C. Forster. U.I.E.E.. A. G. Newington. h.i.e.b.. and W. P. Scott. A.H.I.E.B. {act.). Esqrs. 
 First Assistant EUcMcal Ertgirteers ...W. H. Chatten (acl.). H. H. E. Green, a.u-i.b.e.. and J. Shaw 
 
 A.u.i.E.E. (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Tempv. Asst, Electrical Engineers... F. Morton, a.uj.e.e., and E. W. WUlls, a.ilI.e.e., EsqrB. 
 
 Examiner of Eledrical Accounts... "E. E. Eogers, Esq., a.u.i.b.e. {ad.). 
 
 Clerk in Charge... J. Hall. Esq. 
 
 2 Second Assistant Electrical Engineers (ad.), 8 First Class, 7 Second Class, and 6 Temporary Draughts- 
 men, 6 Tempy. Clerks. 6 Women CJlerks and 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 DEPAETMENT OF THE ENGINEER IN CHIEF. 
 Engi/neer-in-Chief of Oie Fleet ...Eng. Vice-Admiral Sir Henry J. Oram. k.o.b.. f.k.b. 
 Deputy Engineer-in-Chief ...Eng. Rear-Admiral G. G. Goodwin, o.b. 
 Eng. Bear-Admiral William J. Ajistey, o.b. 
 
 ( Eng. Bear-Admiral Edouard Gaudin. 
 
 J Erw. Captain Francis H. Lister (Lent Priority Sedion). 
 
 J Eng. Captain Charles W. J. Bearblock (temp.). 
 
 \ Eng. Captain Edward A. Short (ret.) (temp.). 
 
 Assistant Engineers-in- Chief 
 
 Engineer Inspectors. 
 Eng. Captain Percy D. Martell (ad.) (tempy.). 
 Eng. Commander John McLaurin. 
 
 David J. Carruthers. 
 
 Caiarles G. Ware. 
 
 Arthur E. Hyne. 
 
 Francis A. Gordon (tempy.). 
 
 Lionel M. Hobbs (lent from B. N. 
 Coll., Cfreenwich). 
 
 Thomas G. Proctor. 
 
 William H. Hanu 
 
 John Hamilton. 
 
 Joseph J. Kirwin. 
 
 Engineer inspectors— continued. 
 
 Eng. Commander Frederick W. Marshall. 
 
 Ernest Nibbs (ad.). 
 
 James J. Sargent (ad.). 
 
 George Preece (tempy.). 
 
 Engineer Lieutenant-Commanders. 
 
 William S. Mann. Stanley C. Church. 
 
 Bertram W. Knott. Jesse H. Harrison. 
 
 Walter W. Lock. George Vlllar. 
 
 George W. Odam. Harry H. Carter. 
 
 Frederick J. Pedrick. Edwin F. St. John. 
 Engineer Lieutenant Frederick E. G. Turner. 
 John S. Orr. 
 
 Civilian Engineer-Overseers ...W. G. Gibbons. C. Grey. W. Letty. W. G. Mathews and M. Ord, 
 Esqrs. 
 
 Examiners of Engineering Accounts. . .Edwin Gedye, and W. J. Stallion. Esqrs. (ad.), 35 Draughts 
 men, 10 Tempy. Draughtsmen. 1 Dockyard Clerk (Third Grade). 8 Hired Writers, 4 
 Extra Clerks. 8 Tanpy. Clerks. 11 Women Clerks and 2 Boy ClOTks. 
 
Appendix 275 
 
 DEPAETMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF DOCKYARDS. 
 Director of Dockyards and Dockyard Work. ..Sir Janies B. Marshall, k.c.b. 
 
 For Special Service — 
 
 Superintendent of the Dockyard Branch — 
 H. J. Webb. Esq. 
 
 Martaoer Constructive Department — 
 
 E, B. OlUs. Esq. (tempy.). (For Special 
 service.) 
 
 Chief Constructors — 
 
 G. M. Apsey (tempy.). 
 
 E. R. Bate, Esq. (add'l.). 
 
 0. H. Croxford, Esq. (act.) (tempy.). 
 
 Constructors — 
 
 F. Bryant, Esq. 
 W. T. Davis. Esq. (tempy.). 
 
 G. F. Ludford (act.). 
 J. McQueen (act.). 
 H. B. Wood (act.). 
 
 Eng. Rear-Admiral Robert Maystou, 
 (ret.) (tempy.). 
 
 Eng. Rear-Admiral Charles Rudd. 
 Engineer Assistant to Director of Dockyards — 
 
 Engineer Assistants — 
 
 Eng. Commander Samuel H. Ferguson. 
 Perclval C. W. Howe. 
 T. E. Elvy, Esq. 
 E. E. Langmaid, Esq. 
 Chief Engineer... T. E. Elvy. Esq. (lent from HauTbowline Dockyard). 
 Eteamvners of Dockyard Work. 
 T. H. Harries. E. A. Lakey. J. D. Gibby (ad.). J. Ellis. W. L. Coles. F. Sanders. 
 O. Henwood (act.). F. J. Fletcher (act.), and J. A. Fage (act.), Esqrs. 
 First Assistant Electrical Engineer... "E. L. Brain. Esq. (act.). 
 
 Cleric Assistants (g; l-iZ^^^-Aact.). 
 Visiting Inspectors of Timber... W. H. Hooper and Alfred James, Esqrs. 
 1 Dockyard Clerk (First Grade), 2 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade). 7 Dockyard Clerks 
 (Third Grade), and 9 Hired Writers. 
 
 PRIORITY SECTION. 
 
 Director... Vice- Admiral Arthvir Y. Moggridge. 
 Assistant Director (Naval)... Engineer Captain F. H. Lister, e.n. 
 Assistant Director (Civil)... M. F. Gauntlett. Esq.. c.i.e.. i.c.s. (temply. lerU from India Ojffice}. 
 Eng. Rear-Admiral Charles W. Gregory (ret.). 
 James M. Thompson (ret). 
 Albert E. L. Westaway (ret.) (Bristol). 
 Eng.-Capt. Jasper W. A. Parrott (ret.). 
 William A. Howlett (ret.). 
 Joseph Langmaid (ret.). 
 Assistant Examiner, 1st Grade (act.)...C. W. BaDey. Esq. (lent from Contract Department). 
 1 Assistant Clerk. 1 Improver, and 10 Women Clerks. 
 
 The foUowina gentlemen have been appointed or lent from other Departments for temporary service during 
 
 the War 
 
 J. T. Gwynn. i.o.s.. c.h.b. Kendall, i.c.s. (India OMce). 
 G. B. Sansom, (Foreign OMce), and E. L. Winter, i.c.s.. Esqs. 
 
 DOCKYARD EXPENSE ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT. 
 
 (68. Victoria Street, S.W.) 
 
 Inspector of Dockyards Expense Accounts... W. G. Roff. Esq.. i.s.o. 
 
 Assistant to ditto... J. Ryan. Esq. 
 
 Expense Accounts Officer. .."F. W. W. Burrell. Esq. 
 
 Deputy Expense Accounts Officer... G. T. Jones, Esq. 
 
 Assistant Expense Accounts Officer.. .T. Piatt, Esq. (for Stocktaking Duties). 
 
 T. Jennings, Esq. (for Stocktaking Duties), and 
 J. A. Jeffrey, Esq. (act.). 
 F. Hall, Esq. (lent). 
 Examiner of Accounts... 'EL. Haggis, Esq. 
 Assistant Examiner of Accounts... J. E. Horswell, Esq. 
 2 Dockyard Clerks, Second Grade, 6 Dockyard Clerks, Third Grade, S Hired Writers, 
 1 Assistant Clerk, 8 Tempy. Clerks and 6 Women Clerks. , 
 
276 
 
 Appendix 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL ORDNANCE. 
 
 Director of Naval Ordnance... Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, c.b. 
 Assistant Director of Naval Ordnance.... Captain Herbert R. Norbury. 
 
 Asisistants to Director of Naval Ordnance. 
 
 Commander Charles A. Scott. 
 
 Edward O. Cochrane. 
 
 Isbam W. Gibson, m.v.o. 
 
 Bernard W. M. Fairbairn. 
 
 Archibald Gilbert (act). 
 Commr. R.N.V.R. John G. Henderson (act.). 
 
 lAeut.-Com. Kenneth B. M. Churchill. 
 lAeut. Walter R. Gilbert. 
 
 Willie D. Kllroy, k.n.v.e. (tempy.). 
 
 Herbert O. Mock, b.n.v.b. (tempy.). 
 Sub-Lieut. W. H. J. Elridge, e.n.v.b. itempy.). 
 
 Lieutenant... VredeAck J. Payne. 
 Chief (?M»ner... Malcolm A. MacKenzle 
 
 Eng. Rear-Admwal Ernest G. Ellis, c.b. {ret.) 
 Eng. Captain Thomas Thome (tempy.). 
 Eng. Commander Henry Wall. 
 
 Edward O. Hefford. 
 
 Inspectors. 
 
 Eng. Commander William Hart. 
 
 Alfred R. Kempt. 
 Vernon A. A. Ter Veen. 
 Frederick L. Robertson (act.). 
 
 Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance... Commander (act.) John A. Duncan, o.B. 
 Assistants to Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance. ..Commander Digby St. A. P. Weston (ret.). 
 
 Commander Henry G. R. Bevan (ret.). 
 Commander (act.) Leslie J. L. Hammond (ret.). 
 Captain Freeman C. N. Bishop, b.m.a. 
 The foUomng gentleman has been lent for special service during the War. ..3. Storey, Esq. 
 
 Naval OMcers employed on Inspection and Experimental Ordnance Duties. 
 
 Under Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance : — 
 Inspector of Steel... Commander Harold G. Jackson (ret.). 
 Acting Inspector of Steel... Lieul.-Com, Llewellyn E. H. Llewellyn (ret.) 
 
 Assistant Inspectors of Steel. 
 
 Admiral (ret.) Sir Edmund S. Poe, G.c.v.o., k.o.b, 
 Major-Oeneral R. Wace, o.B., r.a. (tempy.). 
 Captain H. R. Evans, e.n. (ret.). 
 
 William H. M. Daniell, b.n. (ret.). 
 Claude W. M. Plenderleath, b.n. (ret.), 
 William H. F, Taylor, e.n. (ret.). 
 Commander Henry Thompson (ret.). 
 
 Charles K. McCallum (ret.). 
 
 John E. Bray (ret.). 
 
 T. S. Gooch (Emergy.). 
 
 A. H. Tremayne (ret.). 
 
 Reginald C. Brenton (Emergy.) 
 
 (tempy.). 
 Commander B.N.B. W. F. Caborne, o.B., b.d. (ret.). 
 Lieut. -Com. Arthur W. Tomlinson. 
 
 Frank R. Willis. 
 
 Hugh J. Orr (ret.). 
 
 John G. M. McHardy (ret.). 
 
 Robert F. Veasey (ret). 
 
 Alister W. McDonald (ret). 
 
 Lieul.-Com. Ralph B. Bodllly (ret.). 
 
 William H. Callwell (ret.). 
 
 Henry L. Cheston (Emergy.) (act). 
 
 Frederick J. Dayis, e.d., b.n.b. (ret.). 
 
 W. E. Compton (ret.). 
 
 W. G. H. Cree (ret.). 
 
 H. J. G. Lawrence (ret.). 
 
 J. H. C. OgUvy (ret.). 
 Lieut Henry S. H. FJlis (ret). 
 
 Robert J. Sweet (ret). 
 Lieut. B.N R. Beauchamp H. Venner (ret.). 
 Lieut r vV.r.JB. TomM. Chambers. 
 Colonel (temp. Brig.-Gen.) Cooper Penrose, b.e. 
 Colonel J. R. J. Jocelyn, e.a. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Lieut-Col. T. English, e.b. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 
 G. Mackinlay, e.a. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 R. L. Haines (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Major Charles A. Bishop, b,m.a. 
 Captain C. B. Macpherson Grant (tempy.). 
 Captain Alfred D. B. Godfray, b.m.a. 
 Eng. Capt. H. W. Metcalfe (ret). 
 
 The followimg gentlemen have also been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 
 H. B. Halls, O. J. Hill. A. E. Lee, L. T. Jards, J. W. Capstick, C. E. Moes. 
 W. R. O. Hockln, R. Carey-Brenton, T. W. Sheppard. Esqrs. 
 
 Lent from Home OMce. 
 
 H. Topham, S. R. Bennett, A. C. Lowe, G. C. Sumner, E. L. Mecklln, C. F. Hunter, W. H. Mead, 
 W. Turner, F. Bowen, A. A. Hepburn, C. H. Taylor, C. E. Plumbe, F. W. Cockshott, A. Fotheringham, 
 L. D. Hooper, H. T. Ringdove, and W. C. Evans, Esqrs. 
 
 Under War Office. 
 
 I Captain Nathaniel F. Trotman, b.m.a. 
 
 i.-Com. John A. L. Hay. 
 lAeut.-Com. Archibald C. Goolden (ret)^ 
 
 I 
 
Appendix 277 
 
 The follencing gentlemen have been awovaied for temporary service during the War : 
 J. L. Capes, H. Jackson, A. McPherson, and P. E. Coiireey, Esqrs. 
 
 Superintending Clerk... 'Ihomas 0. Anderson, Esq. 
 Deputy Superintending Clerk. ..W. P. Daniels, Esq. {act.). 
 Aisistant Superintending Clerks. ..V. Morrison, 8. W. Smith (act.), and G. Stevens (act.), Esqrs. 
 Second Division Clerk. Dockyard Clerks (including AcHng) First Grade 1, Second Grade 9, Third Grade 9, 
 Temporary Clerks and Boys 43, Draughtsmen 7. 
 
 Superintendent of Ordnance Stores. ..Captain Barrington H. Chevallier, h.n. ireKred). 
 Assistant Superintendents of Ordnance Stores. ..B.. Fathers. 
 
 Frederick Ward (act.). 
 G. E. Woodward {act.), Esqrs. 
 Supermtending Clerk.. .A. McFarlane, Esq. [act.) 
 Naval Ordnance Store OMcer...Vf. A. Mortimer (act.). Esq. 
 
 Deputy Ordnance Store Officers ...T. W. Mldmer (detached for Special Duty). W. H. Bowe (act.), N. Thomas, 
 and W. Vaughan, Esqrs. 
 ssislant Ordnance Store OMcers ...J. A. W. Ballard (act.), G. C. Cusens (act.), W. E. Eyles (act.) 
 C. H. Murray and A. T. Reed (act.), Esqrs. 
 Examiners of Naval Ordnance Work...'W. D. Evans (ad.), and P. J. Payne, Esqrs. (act.) 
 
 1 Ordnance Depot Clerk, First Grade. 
 4 Ordnance Depot Clerks, First Grade (act.). 
 18 Ordnance Depot Clerlfl!, Second Grade (ocf.). 
 
 6 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade. 
 
 7 Ordnance Depot Clerks. Third Grade (act.). 
 1 Hired Writer. 
 
 13 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks. 
 
 14 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 
 6 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers. 
 
 Acting Assistant Ordnance Store Officer... SheMeld...G. Swift, Esq. 
 Cftie/ Analyst... Sheffield. ..Joha 0. W. Humfrey. Esq. 
 
 The folloioing have been appointed for special temporary service : 
 Dr. C. Welzmann. 
 Dr. Ida S. Maclean. Dr. J. O. Gavrowsky, H. Davies. E. G. Bainbridge, and H. Spiers, Esqrs. 
 
 Note — OIBoerg of the Naval Ordnance Department serving at Woolvrich and at the Port3 are not shown. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF TORPEDOES AND MINING. 
 
 Director of Torpedoes and Mining ■« Rear-Admiral The Eon. Edward S. Fitzherbert. 
 
 Secretary ,.. Paymaster (act.) PaulS. Strickland. 
 
 Assistant Director (T) I Assistant Director (M). 
 
 Captain Algernon H. C. Candy. | Captain F. Shirley LItchfield-Speer, d.s.o. 
 
 Assistant Director (P) Captain Vernon H. S. Haggard. 
 
 Naval Staff. 
 
 Captain Claude G. R. Brandon (ret.). 
 
 Gordon C. Eraser (ret.) 
 
 Bryan G. Godfrey-Faussett, o.v.O., c.m.g., (ret.). 
 Commander Evan C. Bunbury. 
 
 Geoffrey C. Candy. 
 
 Thomas R. Fforde. 
 
 Malcolm K. Grant (ret.). 
 
 Walter Q. Rigg, d.s.o. (act.) (ret.). 
 
 Gerard B. Riley (ret.). 
 
 James S. C. Salmond. 
 
 Frederic E. E. G. Schreiber. 
 
 Carlton C. Sherman (ret \ 
 lAeut.-Commr Bertram Vlgne. 
 
278 
 
 Appendix 
 
 Liewtenant Patrick P. Coleman. 
 
 Benjamin B. C. E. Jameson. 
 
 Alfred J. Parkes. 
 
 Eng. Commr Charles J. M. Wallace. 
 
 Ch. Gunner James Wood. 
 
 Gunner Leonard Repton. 
 
 Walter Thorogood. 
 
 Walter F. Williamson. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Demiiy Smerintending Clerk 1p_ j,. Couratln. Esq. 
 lact.) J 
 
 }w. Pearce. Esq. 
 
 lact.) 
 
 Inspector of Mines and Mining 
 Gear 
 
 ' AIR DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Director of Air Services (Fifth Sea Lord) Commodore Godfrey M. Paine, o.b., mv.o. 
 
 Private Secretary Paymaster C. A. Shove. 
 
 Naval Assistant Captain A. V. Vyvyan, D.S.O. 
 
 Assi. Supt. for Airships CaptainD. T. Korrls. 
 
 Armament Captain Captain A. J. Davies. 
 
 Asst. Supt. for Engines Wing Commander (E) W. Briggs (act.) 
 
 Personnel Captain Captain John D. Edwards, O.b. 
 
 Personnel Commander Wing Com. R. C. 8. Hunt. 
 
 Captain Lord Dunboyne. 
 
 Military Liaison OMcer Lieut. J. E. Pike, e.f.o. 
 
 Commander A. D. Warrington-Morris (act.). 
 
 J. L. Forbes. 
 A. M. liOngmore. 
 J. D. Mackworth. 
 
 P. E. T. Hewlett. 
 
 D. H. Hyde-Thomson. 
 
 J. Bird (act.). 
 F. A. Brock. 
 
 F. G. Brodribb. 
 
 G. W. Cranfleld. 
 
 Wing Coramanders. 
 A. OgiMe. 
 C. R. J. Randall. 
 
 SQuadron Commanders. 
 T. D. Mackle. 
 O. E. Maude. 
 
 Flighi Commanders. 
 
 E. H. Dunning, d.s.o. 
 J. 1. Harrison. 
 
 T. Hinshelwood. 
 
 F. W. Lucas. 
 
 Francis Ranken iaet.). 
 H. L. Woodcock. 
 
 The Master of Serapill. 
 
 W. C. Mlchle. 
 E. J. C. Roberts. 
 8. V. Sippe. D.S.O. ' 
 N. B. Tomllnson. 
 
 Engineer-Lieutenants R. Stansmore. 
 
 W. A. C. Sandford-Thompson. 
 
 0. T. Freeman, d.s.o. 
 D. M. B. Galbraith, d.s.o. 
 P. A. Johnston. 
 
 L. C. Abbott. 
 G. H. Brown. 
 J. E. Catt. 
 J. V. Collins. 
 H. G. Cooper. 
 
 T. B. Barrlngton. 
 W. A. Bristow. 
 J. Craig. 
 Lord Ersklne. 
 J. M. Eraser. 
 
 Flight Lieidenants. 
 
 L. J. Killmayer. R. A. Reid. 
 
 G. V. Leather. F. W. Strong. 
 
 R. F. S. Leslie. M. E. A. Wright. 
 
 Flight Suh.-Lieut T. P. M. Alexander. 
 
 Warrant OMcer s (\st grade). 
 F. W. Scarff. 
 
 Warrant OMcer s {.2nd Grade). 
 W. T. Curtis. 
 A. Dealdn. 
 J. Hobbs. 
 F. J. Hooper. 
 C. Layzell-Apps. 
 
 Commander R.N.V.B. 
 G. Holmes. 
 
 Lieut.-Commanders, R.N.V.R. 
 C. W. Gamble. 
 R. W. Hogarth. 
 C. F. Jenkln. 
 A. Landells. 
 Q. McAIplne. 
 
 J. S. Mathias. 
 C. Y. Mitchell. 
 J. H. Ormsby. 
 A. B. Redstone. 
 W. G. J. Wardie. 
 
 T. A. Monckton. 
 P. O. H. Sinclair. 
 P. C. Williams. 
 H. E. Wimpeila 
 
Appendix 
 
 279 
 
 0. R. Abbott. 
 M. H. P. Allen. 
 O. R. Andrews. 
 J. Arthur. 
 F. A. Baldwin. 
 T. M. Barlow. 
 W. O. Bentley. 
 
 A. L. Bligh. 
 J. P. Bourke. 
 J. S. Buchanan. 
 
 F. A. Bumpus. 
 W. Burklnshaw. 
 E. E. W. Butt. 
 
 G. Calrd. 
 
 J. D. Carmlchael. 
 
 B. C. Carter. 
 
 E. H. Cockshott. 
 J. G. T. Crawford. 
 6. Crawley. 
 
 J. K. Curwen. 
 
 C. B. D'Arcy. 
 
 F. E. E. Davis. 
 H.Dodd. 
 
 J. G. Dothle. 
 A. J. Dronsfleld. 
 J. P. Elsden. 
 A. T. Evans. 
 H. Eves. 
 E. B. Falkner. 
 A. W. Farrer. 
 S. J. V. FiU. 
 S. Flower.' 
 P. Garton. 
 
 A. S. Gendle. 
 
 E. D. N. Gillmore. 
 
 B. 8. Goddard. 
 
 •J. G. M Bevan. 
 S. O. Blake. 
 8. D. Claris. 
 O. A. Crow. 
 W. B. Daniels. 
 A. L. Davis. 
 P. M. Dawson. 
 T. A. Ellis. 
 J, D. Greenwood. 
 
 8. B. P. Carter. 
 
 LUtUenanU. R.N.VM. 
 
 D. Gordon. 
 Q. M. Gordon. 
 W. O. Grant. 
 
 J. E. A. Greatorex. 
 J. W. Griggs. 
 Bm. L. G. Guest. 
 
 B. T. Hamilton. 
 G. Hazelton. 
 
 J. F. Hedley. 
 8. B. HUl. 
 
 E. Hogg. 
 
 T. C. B. Hooke. 
 W. H. Horden. 
 H. G. Home. 
 E. C. Horsley. 
 H. Howard. 
 
 D. 0. M. Hume. 
 A. J. Hurst. 
 
 A. G. lonldes. 
 W. B. Jones. 
 
 C. Kent. 
 
 W. A. Lawrence. 
 H. B. Leach. 
 G. W. Lester. 
 G Llghtfoot. 
 A. B. Low. 
 W. L. Marsh. 
 J. J. Meakln. 
 S. B. Mullard. 
 C. J. Murfltt. 
 G. H. Murphy. 
 Q. C. Neilsoru 
 T. F. Norbury. 
 T. L. Oliver. 
 A. Orr. 
 T. A. Parker. 
 
 Sub-LiexUenants. R.N.V.R. 
 
 T. H. HarknesB. 
 G. A. Harrison. 
 
 E. H. Haworth. 
 E. A. Hoghton. 
 
 A. H. Horsfleld. 
 C. B. Lymn. 
 
 J. T. Matthews. 
 
 B. H, Methold. 
 
 M. J. H. Molyneaux. 
 
 Asst, Pavms. R.N.R. 
 
 A. E. Penn. 
 
 E. M. N. Perkfl. 
 W. E. Plalster. 
 
 F. E. Pollard. 
 W. J. Polybank. 
 O. H. Powell. 
 L. 8. M. Pyke. 
 A. P. Reed. 
 
 G. M. T. Bees. 
 J. D. K. Eestler. 
 
 F. B. Elgby. 
 
 A. Bobertson. 
 E. C. St. John. 
 
 E. 8. Saunders. 
 J. C. Savage. 
 K. Secretan. 
 H. Shaw. 
 
 G. G. Shepherd. 
 
 B. G. Shire. 
 N. Sladden. 
 
 C. A. Slater. 
 
 A. F. H. Smallpieoe: 
 
 F. H. Spragg. 
 J. E. Steele. 
 C. Suckling. 
 
 P. J. H. Summer. 
 
 C. A. W. Taylor. 
 
 A. K. Toulmin-Smlth. 
 
 E. F. Turner. 
 
 8. M. Udale. 
 
 E. C. Walker. 
 
 H. N. Warburton. 
 
 A. H. White. 
 
 W. S. Whltelaw. 
 
 H. 0. Woodward. 
 
 A. D. Newbury. 
 G. C. Palsh. 
 E. H. Pollett. 
 H. G. R. Bees, 
 W. B. Sinclair. 
 T. M. Wilson. 
 N. H. Wood. 
 C. H. Wright. 
 
 G. F. Green. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Deputy Superinfending Clerk. ..'E. W. GrifiBin, Esq. 
 Chief Examiner... J. H. Jones. Esq. (act.). 
 
 {Lent from Inland Revenxie.) 
 Examiner... O. E. Pledger. Esq. (act.). 
 
 {Lent from InUmd Revenue.) 
 Inspector of Aircraft Armament... H. D. Dow, Esq. 
 
 2 Minor Staff Clerks (act.). 
 
 i Second Division ClerliS (2 serving vnth Army). 
 
 3 Assistant Clerks (1 serving toith Army). 
 1 Extra aerk, 1st Class. 
 
 1 Tempy. Accoimtant Clerk. 1st Class. 
 
 2 Asst. Inspectors of Aircraft Armament. 
 31 Temporary Clerks. 
 
 Improvers. 
 
 3 Temporary Women Clerks. Higher Grade. 
 73 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 
 7 Boy Clerks. 
 Civ-Uian Technical Assistant... 'EsniB Booth, Esq. 
 Asst. Technical Adviser... "B. Bolas, Esq. {tempy.). 
 F. E. Cowlln, Esq. 
 H. B. Howard, Esq. 
 A. J. S. Pippard. Esq. 
 9 Draughtsmen. 
 
 The foTtowing have teen appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 Major L. N. G. Filon, p.R.a. J A. Berry, Esq. 
 
 NOTH, — The Offlcers of the Royal Naval Air Service and of the Air Stations are not shown. 
 
(c) ADMIRALTY, END OF DECEMBER, 1917. 
 
 First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sir Eosslyn E. Wemyss. K.O.B.. o.m.g., m.V-o. 
 
 THE NAVAL STAFF. 
 
 Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff ViK-Admvral {aci.) Sir Henry F. Oliver, e.c.b.. m.v.o. 
 
 Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff Bear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff. c.b. 
 
 Depuiv First Sea Lord Bear-Admiral George P. W. Hope, o.b. 
 
 Secretary to A.C.N.8 Fleet Paym. (act.) John D. M. Cavanagh. 
 
 Staff Clerk W. H. Hancock. Esq. (act.). 
 
 OPERATIONS DIVISION. 
 
 Director of ffte Operations Dimsion (Home) Captain A. D. P- Pound. 
 
 Deputy Director of the Operations Division Captain Henry W. Grant, c.b. 
 
 Assistant Directors of the Operations Division Captain Charles P. E. Coode. d.s.o. 
 
 lAeut.-Col. Walter T. C. Jones, d.b.o., e.mx.i. 
 
 Naval and 
 
 Captain ... A. G. Allgood {ret.). 
 
 A. F. Beal. 
 
 R. P. Clutton {ret.). 
 
 O. G. S. Eeles {ret.). 
 
 Cecil H. Pllcher. 
 
 Charles D. Roper {temp.). 
 Commander Kenneth G. B. Dewar. 
 
 F. Bowden-Smith {ret). 
 
 S. V. S. C. Messum {ret.). 
 
 T. W. Stirling {emera.). 
 
 Leonard Robinson {act.) 
 Commr. B.N.B. Duke of Sutherland. 
 Wing. Commr. Hugh A. WiUlamson. 
 Lieut.-Com. Hon. Joseph M. Kenworthy {temp.). 
 
 ^Coi Bm'a'}'^^^^^^^^ J. F. French. 
 
 Staff Clerk.. .F. H. Bailey. Esq. {act). 
 2 Second Divisions Clerics. 
 1 Confidential Shorthand Writer. 
 
 Marine Staff. 
 
 Lieut.-Com. J. P. Gibbs. 
 
 ^«^--^^- } Herbert Ingram. 
 
 Lie%ct.B.N.r.B. Sidney T. Morris. 
 
 Harold I. Dear. 
 
 Charles P. Yeomans. 
 
 Leonard E. Lander. 
 
 Wilfred A. Johnson. 
 
 Thomas C. Spurway. 
 Fit. Svb-Lieut. Stanley F. Ingram. 
 
 ^"^N^'b. } Cyril S..Goddard. 
 
 "^'b'nvb'. l^™"^ ^- ^'^'^• 
 
 CivU Staff. 
 
 11 Assistant Clerics. 
 
 2 Accountant Clerics. 
 
 3 Extra Clerl£S. 
 
 PLANS DIVISION. 
 
 Director of Plans 
 
 Assistant Directors of Plans 
 
 Naval Staff. 
 Commander James S. McL. Ritchie. 
 Alfred F. B. Carpenter. 
 Lieutenant Charles W. L. Meynell. 
 
 ..Bear-Admiral Roger J. B. Keyes, c.b.. c.m.g., m.v.o., d.s.o. 
 ..Captain Cyril T. M. Fuller, o.m.g.. D.s.o. 
 Captain Godfrey P. Orde, b.m.l.i. 
 
 I Civil Staff. 
 
 Staff Clerk... A. Bacidiouse, Esq. {act.). 
 
 Additimal Officers borne temporarily for the Naval Staff were shown in the November " List " 
 under ' President.' 
 
 280 
 
Appendix 
 
 281 
 
 INTELLIQENCE DIVKION. 
 
 DirecioT of the Intelligence Division... Rear-Admiral Sir W. EeginalU Hall, K.c.M.a., o.b. 
 Assistant Directors of the Intelligence Division... Captain Kaymond A. Nusent. 
 
 Cavtain Henry K. EJtson. 
 
 Cat/tain ...William M. James. 
 Commander Vivian B. Brandon. 
 Francis G. G. Chilton. 
 Colpoys C. Walcott 
 
 {ret.). 
 Morris E. Cochrane, 
 
 D.S.O. (ret.). 
 Geoffrey B. Spicer- 
 
 Siniaon, d.s.o. 
 Walter C. Lucas, 
 (Staff OMcer 2nd 
 Grade.) 
 Alfred O. Dewar (ret.). 
 R. O. Orme-Webb. 
 Commander \Lord Herschell, 
 R.N.r.R. i K.O.V.O. 
 
 Hon. William 
 Cozens-Hardy, k.c. 
 
 C. P. Serocold. 
 
 B. J. B. Hlppisley. 
 George G. Eady. 
 
 Commander 1 Norman Craig, k.c, 
 R.N.r.R. 5 M.P. 
 
 D. C. Calthrop (act.). 
 A, G. Denniston. 
 
 W. Dudley Ward, 
 
 M.P. 
 
 E. F. Wood. 
 H. Paget. 
 
 Cecil N. B. Wright. 
 E. A. Gardner 
 (temvv.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Walter T. Bagot. 
 
 Arthur W. Wood (ret. ). 
 Boger V. de Halpert 
 (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. IP E. Adcock. 
 R.N.r.R. JN. de Grey. 
 James Bandall. 
 
 Eng. Com. Percy Wheater. ' 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 
 Maj. <b Bt. \Fiaxik V. Temple, 
 Lt.-Col. I R.M.L.r. 
 
 Percy B. Heycock, 
 
 R.M.A. 
 
 Major Walter Sinclair, 
 
 R.M.L.I. 
 
 Bernard E. Trench, 
 
 R.H.L.I. 
 
 Arthur Peel, r.m.l.i. 
 
 (Staff Offlcer 2nd 
 Grade.) 
 Cecil E. S. Wright, 
 
 R.M.L.r. 
 
 Charles B. Mullins, 
 
 R.M.L.I. 
 
 Capt. ... 
 
 .J. C. Farmer, k.m.l.i. 
 
 Lieut Edward S. Williams. 
 
 Andrew H. M. Haggard. 
 F. B. Belfleld (act.). 
 
 Lieut. 
 R.N.r.R. 
 
 Arthur E. Watts. 
 
 F. Eomer. 
 Hyde Kennard. 
 Prank C. Tiarks. 
 Prank Birch. 
 
 A. P. Stevenson. 
 Henry M. Howard. 
 A. D. Knox. 
 E. Harrison. 
 E. C. J. Green. 
 E. Bullough. 
 
 G. L. N. Hope. 
 I/. A. Wllloughby. 
 Lionel E. Wix. 
 W. P. Clarke. 
 Dudley P. N. 
 
 Fitzgerald. 
 Frederick S. Le B, 
 Smith. 
 John P. Curwen. 
 Denys Bond. 
 Herbert A. Morrah. 
 Douglas L. Savory. 
 
 Lieut. 1 Benjamin 8. P. 
 R.N.V.R. I Phillips. 
 
 Neville Forbes. 
 
 Burton S. E. Cope. 
 
 J. D. Beazley. 
 
 E. C. Qulggin. 
 
 G. S. Bawson. 
 
 Desmond 
 MacCarthy (unpaid). 
 
 Harold G. S. Dillon. 
 
 Eeginald J. Hope. 
 
 Charles W. L. Manby. 
 
 Walter H. Bruford. 
 
 Herbert T. Sullivan. 
 
 ^^*"!>jf,f-}FrankE.Bowen. 
 Naval Instr. Guy V. Bayment, 
 
 B.A. 
 
 Fleet Paym. Charles J. E. Botter. 
 
 Ernest W. C. Thring. 
 WUliam H. Eves. 
 
 Staff Paym. John N. Fletcher. 
 Lloyd Hirst (act.). 
 
 ^Y/jf!'"'}CyrilCox. 
 
 Sub.-IAeut. 
 B.N.r.R. 
 
 Asst. Paym. 
 R.N.R. 
 
 Asst. Paym. 
 R.N.r.R. 
 
 SchVmr. 
 Lieut, (act.). 
 
 Midshipman 
 
 \ J. Simson. 
 
 j Sam B. Williamson. 
 
 }h. Foster. 
 
 J. P. Lougbnan. 
 
 I William H. 
 
 f Osman, 
 
 William Cawthera. 
 
 P.J. L. Bobertson. 
 
 P. B. Swanston. 
 
 I Frederick Bush. 
 George H. Carbut. 
 
 Staff Clerks — 
 
 Hush Broadbent, Esa. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Cartographer — 
 
 C. Brlckenden, Esq. 
 4 Second Division Clerks. 
 1 Confidential Shorthand Writer. 
 
 1 Assistant Clerk, 7 Tempy. Clerks. 
 1 Supervising Asst. Clerk (act.). 
 4 Boy Clerks, 76 Women Clerks. 
 10 Draughtsmen. 
 
 Tlie following have been appointed or lent for temporary service dv/rvno the War : 
 
 W. H. Anstle. m.a. (Lent from Dartmouth College). Esq.. Sir P. W. Baker- Wilbraham, PL, ll.b., L. W. 
 Baskcomb. H. E. B. Boulton, Esqrs., 2nd Lietd. R. N. Eudmose Brown, lAeut. Calder, A Cecil, 
 E. Bussell Clarke. C. S. Cocks, o.M.a.. Esqrs., Hon. G. Colville (unpaid). Lieut. Dickie, H. N. Dickson, 
 M.A., D.80., C. B. B. Ellis (Lent fron Local Govt. Board). Esqrs.. G. H. Fitzmaurice. c.b., cji.g.. 
 H. E. Ford. Esqrs., 2nd Lieut. W. L. Eraser, J. W. Goodwin, A. C. Grant Duff, Cecil Hanbury 
 (unpaid). Esqrs., Miss H. Haines (unpaid). Capt. E. H. Handley. 2nd. Lieut. B. L. Hobson (London 
 Regt.). G. W. C. Hunt. Esq.. Lieut. J. H. Inksip. B.F.C., T. W. H. Inskip. k.c, H. W. Lawrence. 
 Esqrs., 2nd Lieui. S. S. G. Leeson. E. Lewin, Esqrs.. Capt. Lock. Major E. J. Lugard (Indian 
 Army ret.). The Earl of Lytton. Capt. E. H. Molyneux, Lord Monk-Bretton, o.b.. Rev. W. 
 Montgomery, m.a.. Miss Max Muller (unpaid). E. Nevlll, B. D. Norton, Esqrs., Rev. W. O. G. 
 Oesterley. 2nd Lieut. Orr, Capt. E. F. Quid, G. W. Prothero, H. Eackham. m.a., H. Bussell, E. 0, 
 Trench, Esqrs., Capt. H. B. Usher, Lieut. V. N. E. H. Vincent, B. Vaughan-Wi'liams, K.c. (unpaid), 
 G. Young, M.v.o, Esqrs. 
 
282 
 
 Appendix 
 
 TRADE DIVISION. 
 Director of Trade Division... CaptaiM Alan G. Hotham. 
 Acting Assistant Director of Trade Division. ..Captain Horace W. Longden. c.m.G. 
 Secretary to D. T.D.... Staff Pay m. John Siddalls. 
 
 Captain W. D. H. Margesson (ret.). 
 
 T. H. Foster, (ret.). 
 
 Philip Walter (ret). 
 
 Reginald L. Crichton (ret.). 
 Commander Maxwell H. Anderson (act.) (ret.). 
 
 William C. Castle (act.). 
 
 Edward B. Compton (ret.). 
 
 Sir Charles L. Cust. Bt., k.c.v.o., 
 
 C.B., C.M.G., o.i.E. (ret.). 
 
 Oscar V. de Satge (ret.). 
 
 Uiomas Fisher. 
 
 Walter P. Koe (ret). 
 
 Andrew L. Strange. 
 
 A. H. Tarleton. m.v.o. (emerg.). 
 
 Francis C. Vaughan (tempy.). 
 
 Henry de B. Tapper (tempy.). 
 
 Robert 0. Wilson, D.s.o. 
 
 ( William Ginman. 
 
 < W. E. Arnold-Forster (temporarily 
 
 {, detached). 
 
 I Hugh C. Arnold-Forster. 
 
 Lieut.-Com. 
 B.N.V.R. 
 
 Lieut. 
 (Emerg.) 
 
 Lieut.R.N.B. W. H. Stewart. 
 
 Lieut. 
 B.N.V.R. 
 
 IF. H. McCormick-Goodhart, 
 /li. McCormlck-Goodhart. 
 
 John B. D. Joce. 
 Eugene A. Lang. 
 Arthur N. Fielden. 
 John McK. Robertson. 
 ..Henry C. Rush (ret.). 
 ..Thomas H. Hawkins, o.ir.a., R.M.t.r. 
 Fleet Paym. Graham Hewlett. 
 Staff Paym. Cunningham Prior. 
 
 William R. Scotland. 
 Staff Paym. 1 Harold B. TufEll. 
 
 R.N.B. fw. A. J. Boxford (ad.). 
 ~\ Henry J. R. Maltland. 
 } Alexander B. Mollison. 
 ) Arthur Bright-Smith. 
 
 Eng. Com. 
 Lieut.-Coh , 
 
 Sub.-Lieut. 
 R.N.r.B. 
 
 Asst Paym. 
 R.N.R. 
 
 Asst. Paym. 
 R.N.r.R. 
 
 } Joseph H. Wilson. 
 
 ) Sholto G. Douglas. 
 >Hugh S. Klngsford. 
 j Frederick J. J. Shirley. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 15 Temporary Clerics. 
 
 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 3 Higher Grade Women Clerks. 
 35 Women Clerks. 
 
 The following have been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 
 2 Second Division Clerks. 
 
 1 Accountant Clerk (lent). 
 
 2 Clerical Assistants. 
 
 H. S. Moss Blundell, Esq., o.b.b.. 
 
 LL.0. (unpaid). 
 Sir Frederick Bolton (uyipaid). 
 E. Burns-Pye, Esq. (unpaid). 
 
 Mrs. C. H. Campbell (unpaid). 
 H. C. Cumberbatch, Esq. (un- 
 
 Alian Deacon, Esq. (unpaid). 
 
 J. J. Fenton, Esq. 
 G. D. Hardtoge-Tyler. Esq. 
 W. E. Hargreaves, Esq. (unpaid). 
 J. Heron Lepper. Esq. 
 
 SIGNAL DIVISION. 
 Acting Director of Signal Division... Commander... "810110.16. L. Nicholson, D.s.o. 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Gerald B. Villiers. 
 
 Lieut Francis P. O. Bridgeman. 
 
 Frederick W. Boswell. 
 Lieut R.N.V.R. W. Cleveland-Stevens. 
 
 Frederick W. Atterbury, 
 Lionel W. Huntingdon. 
 Majffr R.M.A. Stephen 0. Wace. 
 Gapt. (act Major) R. M. Edward Gillespie, D 
 (Staff Offr. 2 Grade) 
 Fleet Pavm....J6hn"E. A. Brown (act.). 
 Staff Paym. Jolm L. Syson. 
 
 Alexander C. Home (act). 
 Edward W. H. Travis (act.). 
 George H. Russell (a^t). 
 
 6 Hired Extra Clerlss. 
 
 Naval Staff. 
 
 Paym. R.N.R. John W. Sells. D.s.o. (act.). 
 Sub-Lieut R.N.V.R. Brian Rhys. 
 
 William C. Phelps. 
 Gordon C. Young. 
 John R. N. Charter. 
 Laurence 0. Robinson. 
 Harold 8. Parnell. 
 •s-o- William G. Willmot. 
 
 James L. A. Huggan. 
 John L. P. Lambe. 
 Wt Teleg. ...JohaR. Barnes. 
 Wt ITriter,... John G. Attersoll (act.). 
 
 2 Chief Writers (1 pensd.). 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 I 154 Women Clerks. 
 
 AISTTI-SUBMARINE DIVISION. 
 
 Director of the Anii- Submarine Division Captain William W. Fisher, K.V.O., R.N. 
 
 Assistant-Director of the Anti-Submarvne Division Captain Claude Seymour, d.s.o., e.n. 
 
 Secretary to D.A.S.D. 
 Captain (act.) A. M. Yeats-Brown, d.s.o. 
 Commander ...John W. Carrington, d.s.o. 
 
 George B. Lewis. 
 
 Edward H. Russell. 
 
 Lionel H. Hordern. 
 
 Leveson G. B. A. Campbell, d.s.o. 
 
 Henry L. Hitchins. 
 Eng. Captain Henry W. Metcalfe (ret), 
 Eng. Com. ...Edgar W. Riley. 
 Temp. Eng. Lieut.-Com. Thomas Curr (act.). 
 £rieu(.-<7om....i3tepb«i S. English. 
 
 .Staff Paym. (act.) Marcus Blake. 
 Lieut.-Com. ...Archibald M. Willoughby (emerg.). 
 Lieut.-Com. B.N.V.R. Louis C. Bemacchl (act.). 
 Tacy M. W. Wallls (act.). 
 Lieutenant ...Anthony H. Goatley. 
 
 Colin A. G. Hutchison (temp.). 
 Lieut R.N.V.R. William L. Preece. 
 
 Henry V. M. Haszard. 
 Cecil A. V. Roper. 
 Pakenham W. A. H. M. Beatty. 
 Donald H. Morris. 
 Staff Paym. (ac<.)... Gordon Franklin. 
 Sub-Lieut R.N.V.R....Fsial McG. Moffat. 
 
Appendix 
 
 283 
 
 staff Clerk... 
 
 1 Clerical Ajsslstant. 
 6 Temporary Clerks. 
 
 Civa staff. 
 
 W. G. Johns, Esq. (act.). 
 
 W. E. Hale. Esq. {act.). 
 
 I 6 Women Clerks. 
 
 I 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 MINESWEEPINa DIVKiON. 
 
 Director of Minesweepina Cavtain Lionel Q. Preston, c.b. 
 
 Captain (act.) Harry F. Cayley. d.s.o. {ret.) {Liaison Officer). 
 
 Commander Henry M. J. Bundle (act.). 
 lAeut.-Com. Graham C. Glen, D.8.0. 
 Thomas O. MacGill. 
 
 2 Temporary Clerks. 
 
 lAeutenant Charles H. Powell, r.n.v.r. 
 Gerald M. Morse, r.n.v.r. 
 Staff Pavm. Reginald B. Ford {ad), r.n.r. 
 2 Women Clerks. 
 
 MEKCANTILE MOVEMENTS DIVISION. 
 
 Director of Mercantile Movements... Captain Frederic A. Whitehead. 
 Secreiary... Staff Paym. {act.) Pauls. Strickland. 
 
 Captain Bertram H. Smith {ret.). 
 Captain B.A.N. George P. Hyde. 
 Commander Hugh B. Mulleneuz. 
 
 John Kiddle. 
 
 Cuthbert D. Longstaflf. 
 Commander R.N.R. Herbert W. Kenrick, R.T>.{ret.). 
 Lieut.-Com. Claude B. E^7ans. 
 Lieut-Corn. R.N.R. Cecil E. Pllklngton. 
 Lieutenant R.N.R. James R. Harding. 
 Lieutenant R.N.V.R. Frederick C. Lldstone. 
 Stib-Lieut. R.N.V.R. Philip S. Knowles. 
 
 Fleet Pavm. H. W. Eldon Manlsty. o.M.a. 
 
 {Organisina Manager of Convoy.) 
 Commander Reginald C. L. Owen {ret.). 
 Commander RJf.V.R. Henry D. King, D.s.o.. v.d 
 
 Rollo Appleyard. 
 Lieut.-Com. John O. Wyatt {ret.). 
 Lieutenant CJeoffrey B. Burton. 
 Lieutenant R.N.VJt. Hubert M. Eisdell. 
 Geoffrey F. Gilbert. 
 Alan P. Herbert. 
 
 Staff Paym. John M. Hodge. 
 
 As3t. Paym. R.N.R. Philip K. Hutchinson. 
 
 Asst. Paym. R.N.V.R. 
 
 Robert W. Carroll. 
 
 Robert P. White. 
 
 C. Robtans. 
 
 Robert H. B. St. John. 
 
 Hubert G. Hiclnnan. 
 
 Thomas Sherratt. 
 
 N. A. Leslie. Esq. 
 
 Captain Herbert M. Edwards. 
 Commander Frederic G. 8. Peile. 
 
 Captain ...Cathcart R. Wason. CM.G. {Captain of 
 Naval Tugs). 
 
 Commander... 'Saitley R. G. Moore. 
 
 Norman B. Youel {ret.). 
 
 Staff Paym Eyre S. Duggan {act.). 
 
 1 Minor Staff Clerk. 6 Temporary Clerks. 1 Boy Clerk. 12 Women Clerks. 
 
 TRAINING DIVISION. 
 Director of Training... Rear-Admiral James C. Ley. c.v.o. 
 
 MATERIEL DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL EQUIPMENT. 
 
 Director of Naval Equipment. ..Captain Edward M. Phillpotts, O.B., AdC. 
 Assistant Director of Naval Eauipment... Captain Humphrey T. Walwyn. D.s.o. 
 
 Captain Alexander Farrlngton. 
 
 Claude G. R. Brandon {ret.). 
 
 Commander ...George H. H. Holden {ret.). 
 Frank F. Rose, d.s.o. 
 Sydney B. Boyd-Richardson. 
 Allck Stokes. 
 
 Edmund L. B. Lockyer, d.s.o. 
 (ret.) {aet.). 
 
 Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe. 
 
 Lieut..Cam. } John W. Williams, d.s.o. 
 
 R.N.R. 
 
 Lieut. R.N.R.. Arthur P. Croxford. 
 
 Lieut. iNorman Wilkinson {tempv.). 
 
 R.N.V.R. > Charles Thomas {tempy.). 
 G. Payne {tempy.), 
 Hubert A. Yockney. 
 Cecil King. 
 Oswald R. Moser. 
 
 Engineeer Capt. Henry R. Teed (ret.). 
 Carp. Lieut. ...Thomas L. Soper. 
 
 Carpenter Joseph S. Legg. 
 
 10 Lieutenants R.N.V.R. for work at Outports. 
 I Dockyard Clerk. 2nd Grade. 1 Higher Grade Woman Clerk. 15 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 2 Modellers. 1 Woman Modeller. 
 
284 
 
 Appendix 
 
 SALVAGE SECTION. 
 
 Assistant Director of Naval Equipment (for Salvage)... Cavtavn Christopher P. Metcalfe, d.s.o. irel.) 
 Commander ... James H. Dathan (re<.). | Staff Paym. ...Arthur W. B. 
 
 3 Women Clerks. 
 
 Salvage OMcers. 
 
 Commander 
 B.N.R. 
 
 I James W. Qracey iact). 
 ' Ivo J. Kay (act). 
 
 Charles K. Borissow (act.) (tempy.). 
 (And as Chief Salvage OMcer 
 in Mediterranean). 
 George J. Wheeler (act.) (tempy.). 
 \ Herbert R. Malet (act.) (tempy.). 
 R.N.V.R. /David W. McGuffle (act.)(tempy.). 
 Assistant Salvage OMcers — 
 
 Lieut.-Com Guybon C. C. Damant (ret.). 
 
 (Tempy. Assistam,t Salvage 
 OMcer). 
 
 Commander 
 
 Lieut. B.N.B. 
 
 ..George Davis (tempy.). 
 James O. Ingram (act.) (tempy.). 
 
 Lieut. B.N.V.R. Cecil H. Biashopp (tempv.). 
 Gilbert E. George (tempy.). 
 John E. McQueen (tempy.). 
 John E. P. Glhney (tempy.). 
 James Smith (tempy.). 
 Gerrard L. V. Jones. 
 
 Eng. Lieut.- 
 Com. 
 
 Eng. Lieut Charles F. Smith (tempy.). 
 
 }... Joseph H. Vine (act.) (tempy.). 
 
 Naval Salvage Adviser... 'E. W. Young, Esq., M.I.M.H. 
 
 Superintendents of Contract-built Ships — 
 
 Bear-Admiral John P. E. Green, o.b 
 
 Per Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the 
 Clyde 
 Address — Broomhall. Broomhlll Drive, Partick, Glasgow. 
 For Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the 
 Tyne. ITiames, Mersey, at Barrow-in-Purnesj, and 
 at Sunderland. 
 Address — 4, Osborne Villas, Osborne Avenue, Newcastle- 
 1^ on-Tyne. 
 Captain Superintendent of Torpedo Boat Destroyers buildJim by Contract. 
 
 Captain Cyril Asser. Address— 47. Victoria Street, S.W.I. 
 
 Rear-Admiral Alfred E. A. Grant 
 
 DEPARTMENT OP THE CONTROLLER. 
 
 Controller... Sir Alan Garrett Anderson, k.b.b 
 Civil Assistant.. .J. A. C. Champion, Esq. 
 
 Seoretariat. 
 Secretary... "R. R. Scott, Esq., o.s.r.. Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty (act.). 
 Principal Clerk.. .J. B. Abraham, Esq. (act.). 
 Assistant Principal Clerks... S. T. Blackwell, Esq. (act.). 
 
 J. A. C. Champion, Esq. (act.). 
 0. W. Loveridge, Esq. (act.). 
 Staff Clerks. .."E. J. Tozer, Esq., Alfred Wotton, Esq. (act.). 
 2 Acting Minor Staff Clerks, 2 Second Division Clerks, 1 Acting Second Grade, 1 Acting Third Grade 
 Dockyard Clerks. 13 Tempy. Clerks, and 88 Women Clerks. 
 The foUoumg have been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 A. C. Clauson, K.o. (unpaid), and A. Gilbert, Esqrs. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 Director of Naval Construction.... Sir Eustace H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, k.c.b. 
 
 Deputy Director of Naval Construction... Vf. H. Gard, Esq., o.b., m.v.o. (ac/.). 
 
 Assistant Directors of Naval Construction... T. Dally, Esq. (act.) (Superintendent of Naval 
 
 Construction), A. W. Jolms, Esq., (act), J. H. Narbeth, Esq., m.v.o. (act.), 
 
 H. Pledge, Esq., A. E. Richards. Esq. 
 
 SuperirUendent of Admiralty Experiment Works... B,. E. Froude, Esq., C.B., ix.D.. F.B.s. 
 
 Chief Constructors. 
 
 E. L. Attwood (act.) 
 S. E. Boyland (act.). 
 
 F. Bryant (act.). 
 A. J. Hobson (act.). 
 
 C. W. Knight (act.). 
 C. F. Munday (cuit.). 
 O. A. Payne (act.). 
 P. L. Pethick, Esqra. 
 
 Constructors. 
 
 G. A. Basaett (act.) 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 C. M. Carter (act.). 
 E. B. Charlg (act.). 
 Q. H. (3iild (act.), 
 a. V. Qoodall (act.) 
 
 (Tempy. detached). 
 C. Hannaford (act.). 
 
 E. B. Harries (act.). 
 
 F. Hickey (act.) 
 
 G. J. W. Hopkins (act.) 
 A. E. Horley (act). 
 
 C. W. Serridge (act.). 
 
 F. M. Lee (act.). 
 C. S. Lilllcrap (act.). 
 W. J. Martin. 
 T. L. Mathlas (act.). 
 F. L. Mayer (act.). 
 E. D. Meryon (act.) 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 A. NichoUs (cKt.). 
 W. G. Sanders (act.). 
 A. W. Watson (act.). 
 L. O. Williamson (act.). 
 L. WooUard (act.). 
 
 Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Constructors, First Class. 
 
 T. H. Bentley 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 
 A. (3annon 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 E. S. Curphey 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 W. Froude (Haslar). 
 
 6. Hackney 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 W. E. Noble 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 R. P. Pether: 
 P. C. C. Rogers. 
 W. H. Wallond. Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Constructors, Znd Clasi. 
 
 G. McCloghrie. 
 R. J. Monk. 
 J. E. P. Moon. 
 F. C. C. Rogers. 
 
 V. G. Shepheard. 
 
 S. N. Trevan. 
 
 K. H. Watkins. Esqrs^ 
 
Appendix 
 
 285 
 
 Temporary Assistant Constructors. 
 
 A. G. Akeater. b.SO. 
 J. Angus, B.SO. 
 0. W. Blon. B.SO. 
 
 E. L. Champness, b.so. 
 
 F. C. Cocks. 
 
 Q. Chase. 
 J. S. Clark. 
 W. H. Eastcott. 
 O. Hunnisett. 
 
 D. A. Coskerr, b.so. 
 J. L. Uavlee, 
 D. L. Evans. B.so. 
 T. Graham, b.so. 
 W. B. Hockaday. 
 
 A. E. Kimberley. 
 M. M. Parker. 
 G. McL. Paterson, 
 
 B.so. 
 A. P. Patterson, b.so. 
 
 Temporary Acting Assistant Constructors. 
 
 W. L. Laughton. 
 P. J. Parmiter. 
 G. E. Peach. 
 G. Penney. 
 
 A. P. Perkins. 
 H. Philpot. 
 F. Skeens. 
 A. Taylor, 
 
 I F. J. A. Pound. 
 
 I P. G. Kouse, B.A. 
 
 I J. H. Sowden. B.ao. 
 
 1 T. E. Sowden, b.so. 
 
 i J. C. M. Wilson, Esqrs. 
 
 S. F. Thorn. 
 
 A. Warren. 
 
 G. H. Whiteway, Esqrs. 
 
 Temporary Assistant... 'R. W. Dana, Esq., m.a. 
 Inspectvna OMcer of Smiths' Work...'E. T. Pearson, Esq. 
 Curator of Dramnos...'W. J. Moore, Esq. 
 Confidential Clerk to D.N.C....J. Luffman, Esq. 
 Technical Clerk to D.N.C.-.W. H. Malpas, Esq. 
 56 Principal and 285 Assistant Overseers. 
 27 First Class and 114 Second Class Draughtsmen, 1 First {acting) and 1 Third Grade Dockyard Clerks 
 10 men and 17 Women Typists and Clerks, 1 Boy Clerk. 4 Modellers, and 2 Sunprinters. 
 Superintending Electrical Engineer. ...C. H. Wordingham, Esq., m.i.c.e., m.i.m.e., m.i.e.e. 
 Electrical Engineers, Higher Grade. ..A. D. Constable, m.i.e.e., and E. T. Williams, m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs. 
 Electrical Engineers. — H. Melville Ackcry. m.i.e.e., J. S. Beddoe, a.m.i.e.h. (act.), F. P. Fletcher, 
 A.M.I.O.B.. A.M.I.B.B. (ad.), P. C. Forster, m.i.e.e., W. P. Scott, a.m.i.b.e. (act.), and R. Wightman, Esqrs. 
 First Assistant Electrical Engineers.... W. H. Chatten (ac<.), H. H. E. Green, a.m.i.e.e.. and J. Shaw, 
 
 A.M.i.E.E. (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Tempy. Asst. Electrical Engineers.... F. Morton, a.m.i.e.e., and R, W, Willis, a.m.i.e.e., Esqrs, 
 
 Second Assistant Electrical Engineers (ad.), 8 First Class, 7 Second Class, and 5 Temporary 
 
 Draughtsmen, G Tempy. Clerks, 5 Women Clerks and 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ENGINEER IN CHIEF. 
 
 Engineer-in-Ghief of the Fleet... Eng. Vice-Admiral George G. Goodwin, o.b 
 Deputy Engineer-in- Chief and Superintendent of Naval Enaineervng — 
 Eng. Bear-Admiral Edouard Gaudin. 
 
 Assistant Engin.ers-in-Chief {l,-^- ^^ ^ScTaurin^"'"'"' '^"'''•'' 
 Eng. Captain Edward A. Short (ret.) (temp.). 
 Engineer Inspectors, 
 
 Eng. Captain... Hibyid J. Carruthers. 
 
 Eng. ConiTnaTider... Fiedetick W. Marshall. 
 Arthur E. Hyne. 
 Joseph J. Kirwin. 
 Lionel M. Hobbs. 
 John Hamilton. 
 Thomas G. Proctor. 
 William S. Mann. 
 Robert Beeman. 
 James P, Shaw. 
 
 Eng. Lieut.-Commander... Sta,nle7 C. Church. 
 
 Engineer Commanders. 
 James J. Sargent. 
 Jesse H. Harrison. 
 Em^t Nibbs. 
 
 Engineer Lieutenant- Commanders. 
 Lurtram W. Knott. 
 Frederick J. Pedrick. 
 Walter W. Lock. 
 Harold B. Tostevin, D.s.o. 
 George W. Odam. 
 Edwin F. St. John (ret.). 
 Harry H. Carter. 
 John S. Orr. 
 Edwin Williamson," 
 Lawrence Turner; 
 Engineer iiewt.. Brian J. H. Wilkinson. 
 
 Civilian Engineer-Overseers... W. Letty and M. Ord, Esqrs. 
 Examiner of Dockyard JForA;...E. Page, Esq. (act.). 
 Examiners of Engineering Accoimts...T. J. Hartnell (act.) and J. F. W. Hetterley (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 10 1st Class Draughtsmen, 21 2nd Class Draughtsmen, 14 Temporary Draughtsmen. 
 2 Dockyard Clerks. 1 Hired Writer, 5 Temporary Clerks. 2 Extra Clerks, 22 Women 
 Clerks. 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OP THE DEPUTY CONTROLLER FOR DOCKYARDS AND 
 SHIPBUILDING. 
 
 Deputy Controller... Sit Thomas Bell, k.b.b 
 Director of Dockyards and Repairs... Rear Admiral Laurence E. Power, o.b., c.v,o. 
 Detmtv Director of Dockyards and Repairs. ..H. R. Bate, Esq, 
 Superintendent of Dockyard Branch — Assistant Director of Dockyards and Repairs — 
 
 H, J. Webb, Esq. Eng. Captain Robert B. Dixon, r.n. 
 
 Electrical Engineering Assistant... W. McClelland, Esq., m.i.e.e. 
 Secretary to D.C.D.S....F. C. Routly. Esq. 
 
286 Appendix 
 
 MaTiager, Constructive Bevartmmit — 
 
 F. B. 0111s, Esq. (tempy). (For special 
 service.) 
 
 Chief Conskudors — 
 
 G. M. Apsey, Esq. (tempy.). 
 
 C. H. Croxford, Esq. {act.) {tempy.). 
 C. G. Hall. Esq. {act.) {t^mpy.). 
 
 Constructors — 
 
 W. T. Davis. Esq. {tempy.). 
 G. F. Ludford. Esq. {act.). 
 J. McQueen. Esq. (act.). 
 n. B. Wood. Esq. {act.). 
 
 For Special Service — 
 
 Eng. Rear-Admiral Eobert Mayston. o.b. 
 
 {ret.) {tempy.) 
 Eng. Rear- Admiral Charles Budd. 
 Eng. Captain Albert E. Tompkins {ret.), r.n. 
 Eng. Captain Q, W. Murray {ret.), b.n. 
 
 Engineer Assistants — 
 
 Eng. Commander Samuel P. Ferguson. 
 
 Eng. I/ieut.-Commander 3. G. Budge. 
 
 T. E. Elvy. Esq. {Lent from HauTbovMne 
 
 Dockyard.) 
 E. B. Langmaid, Esq. 
 Examiners of Dockyard Work — 
 T. H. Harris. E. A. Lakey. J. D. Gibby {act.). J. Ellis. W. L. Coles. F. Sanders. 
 O. Henwood {act.), F. J. Fletcher {act.), J. A. Fage {act.), and J. H. Martin {act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Electrical Engineer Higher Grade...'!. Edge, Esq. {tempy). 
 
 Electrical Engineers... J. S. Beddoe. a.m.i.e.e. {act.) and A. E. Frankling {ad.), Esqrs. 
 
 First Assistant Electrical Engineers... H. P. Blake {act.), E. L. Brain {act.), 
 
 J. Macey {act.) and J. H. Ward {act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Clerical Assistant.. .G. C. Stanbury, Esq. {act). 
 
 Senior Visiting Inspector of Timber... W. H. Hooper, Esq. 
 
 Visiting Inspector of Timber... Allied James. Esq. 
 
 3 Dockyard Clerks (First Grade). 6 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade), 1 Senior Draughtsman. 
 
 6 Flrgfc Class Draughtsmen, 14 Second Class Draughtsmen. 14 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade), 
 
 3 Hired Writers, 4 Temporary Clerks. 22 Female Clerks, and Boys. 
 
 WARSHIP PRODUCTION SECTION. 
 
 LONDON STAFF. 
 
 Director of Warship Production... W. J. Berry, Esq., c.B. 
 
 Deputy Director of Warship Production... Engineer Captain J. G. Liversidge, e.n. 
 
 Assistant Director of Warship Production... "E. A. Pearoe, Esq. 
 
 Superintendent of Warship Production.. .W. H. Carter, Esq. 
 
 Senior Engineer Assistant . .Engineer Captain P. D. Martell. b.n. 
 
 Senior Constructive Officer. ..J. A. Yates. Esq. 
 Superintendent of Warship Electrical Work. ..J. McCaffery, Esq. 
 Secretary to Director of Warship Production... "R. J. Wright, Esq. 
 Constructors... A. Adams {ad.), G. Bulkeley {ad.), C. E. Goodyear, J. C. Joughin {ad.), 
 E. F. Spanner {ad.) and L. D. Stansfleld {act.), Esqrs. 
 Engineer Assistants... Engineer Commander W. A. Wilson, c.m.g., R.n. 
 Engineer Commander F. A. Gordon, r.n., W. J. Stallion {ad.), Esq.. W. G. Mathews {tempy.). Esq. 
 Electrical Engineers... A. J. Foord {ad.), A. Moore {ad.), Esqrs. 
 Assistant Constructors... W. Butterwick {tempy.), W. J. CJraig, B.so. {tempy.), E. Fairley {tempy.), 
 E. McMillan {tempy.), D. E. J. Offord. J. W. Westlake {iempy.), Esqrs. 
 Financial Inspectors... "E. Gedye. R. C. Knight {tempy.), Esqrs. 
 Engineer Inspectors {tempy. )...'R. N. Brown. G. Burton. L. H. Forsyth, W. A. Guthrie, Esqrs.. Lieut. 
 H. W. Gill. D. A. McFarlane, C. Tillotson, T. H. Mathews, D. Hutcheon, S. H. Warren. E. H. Pollett, 
 li. .J._Nobb3, Esqrs. 
 
 Inspecting Officer. ..Vf. C. Thomas {ret.). Esq. 
 
 First Assistant Eledrlcal Engineers... C. R. Jowett {ad.), C. H. Klyne {act), 
 
 E. F. Kill {act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Examiners of Accounts ...E. E. Rogers {tempy.), G. Taylor {tempy.), and 
 
 W. E. Vaiistone {act), Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Examiners of Accounts... 'S.Ba.tt {act), J. Boulden (act). W. Bray {act). W. J. Case {act), 
 
 P. G. Gay {act), A. H. HolUa {act). S. W. R. Pippett {act), G. E. Wilson {act). Esqrs. 
 2 Dockyard Clerks {act) (First Grade), 4 Dockyard Clerlis {ad.) (Second Grade), 7 Draughtsmen, 
 2 Dockyard Clerlsa {ad.) (Third Grade), 32 Temporary Clerks (female), and 
 14 Temporary (3lerl£S (male). 
 
 OUTDOOR STAFF. 
 
 Clyde. 
 
 Warship Produdion Superintendent... K, J. Blandford, Esq. {Address... 105. West George Street, Glasgow. 
 
 Deputy Warship Production Superintendent... V. W. Searle, Esq. 
 Warship Produdion Inspectors... A. C. Beard. P. J. Berry, J. Bryant, W. E. Head, W. T. Hoskin. 
 W. B. Hugman, F. G. McCulloch, F. W. Robson, Esqrs. 
 Warship Production Inspectors {Engineer)... 3. Appleby, W. Bugg, D. McMillan, M. Munro, Esqra. 
 
Appendix 287 
 
 Xjtnb. 
 
 Warship Production Suverinlendent...A. M. Worthlngton, Esq. (^rfdres*...* Milburn House,' Newcastle- 
 
 on-Tyne). 
 
 Deputy Warship Production Superintendent... J. luues. Esq. 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors... "E,. J. F. Leatherby. J. J. N. Batey, A. 8. Blatch/ord, A. E. Moore. 
 
 J. W. Ttimer, J. Sampson, Esqrs. 
 Warship Production Itupectors {Enoimeer3)...P. Cowe. J. Eindlay, T. McBride, C. Stuart, Esqre. 
 
 Mebsey. 
 
 Warship ProducHon Superintendent... M. P. Payne, Esq. (Address.. .233. Eoyal Liver Buildings, Liverpool). 
 
 Deputy Warship Production Superintendent... P. Wright. Esq. 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors. ..W. J. Bunday. E. A. Gawden. H. W. M. Harrison, 
 
 T. M. Taylor, Esqrs, 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors lEngineer)...^. Gould, J. Howelle, C. Verity, Esqrs. 
 
 London and Sotithern District. 
 
 Warship Production Superintendent... 3. W. Dippy, Esq., Admiralty (Block V.). 
 
 Manchestee, Sheffield, and Leeds Distmot. 
 
 Engineer Inspector. ..B. Anthony, Esq. 
 
 BraMiNGHAM. Coventry, and Leicester District. 
 
 Engineer Inspector... 'S. H. Peters, Esq. 
 
 8 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade), 9 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade). 
 
 DEPAETMBNT OF THE DEPUTY CONTKOLLER FOE, AUXILLARY SHIP- 
 BUILDING. 
 
 Deputy Controller, 
 Major-aeneral A. S. Collard, C.B., E.E. 
 Director of Auxiliary Shipbuilding. 
 Deputy Director of AuxiliaTV Shipbuilding... A. W. Sampson, Esq. 
 Assistant Directors of Auxiliary Shipbuilding... T. A. Abell, Esq., T. W. Davis, Esq., E. M. Gillies, Esq. 
 Peter Stoble, Esq.. Dr. H. A. Treadgold and Lieut.-Col. E. W. E. PInkney, d.s.o., a.s.o. 
 Depuiy Assistant Directors of Auxiliary Shipbuilding. ..Major F. L. Pickersgill, b.f.a.. Henry 
 A. Butt, Esq., C. Scott, Esq. 
 Directors of Ship Repairs... G. S. F. Edwards, Esq. and H. M. Grayson, Esq. 
 Assistant Directors of Ship Repairs.. .H. E. Parlett. Esq. (act.) and A. W. Davidson, Esq. 
 DeptUv Assistant Director of Ship Repairs.. .J. W. Jack, Esq. (act.). 
 Inspectors of Shipping...^. L. J. Willson, Esq. {act.) ; Carp. Licut.-Com. (ret.) George Hickey, e.n.. 
 Carp. IAeut.-Com. {ret.) Eobert G. Withell, E.N., Carp. Lieut, {ret.) George Beeves, K.N.. 
 Carp, Lieut, {ret.) John E. Elstone, e.n. and Ch. Carp. George Sim, e.n. 
 Outport Staff.. .li Senior Inspectors and 21 Inspectors of Sliipping. 
 Chief Inspector of Auxiliary Shipbuilding. ..H. Wawn, Esq. 
 Assistant Inspectors of Auxiliary Shipbuilding... J. Catto, J. W. Donovan, Esars. 
 23 District Superintendents with Deputies. 
 Technical Assistants... J. H. Bell, W. H. Benoy, W. Bradney {tempy.), J. E. Cole (iempy.). G. Fuller, 
 E. Graham {tempy.). H. G. Hodge. E. E. Oldershaw {tempy.). Blanchard Peskett, T. C. Eolland 
 (tempy.), Henry Sanderson, O. P. Sanderson, D. S. Smith (tempy.). Allan Stevenson, W. L. Stuart 
 {tempy.), Alexander Urwin {iempy.), F. Walker, and S. E. Wells, Esqrs. 
 Technical Assistant Engineers... Beoiamin Allen (tempy.), H. T. Backhouse, John Barr (tempy.), H. P. 
 Claridge, Norman A. Collard (tempy.). John Denny (tempy.), W. Howie, John G. Johnstone, W. M. 
 Morison, F. G. Postle. J. E. Eobb, J. Eobertson, G. C. Thompson. J. W. Thompson, and F. L. 
 Williams. Esqrs. 
 Tempy. Assistant Engineers... Fiedeiick Bolton, J. T. Carr, Thomas C. O. Chant, J. (3ollie. A. Drew, 
 H. E. Farmer, F. B. Gripper, A. E. Hurse. J. Bi'kwood, G. F. Mackay. J. Mitchell, J. O. Morgan. 
 Lieut. W. T. Nash, e.n.v.e., C. F. H. Nlghthigale. W. Robson. C. M. Skinner, P. Thomas, W. F. 
 Ware, J. B. Whyte, C. T. WiUdnson, and J. S. Young, Esqrs. 
 
 Adminitlrative Officers... JjTnien H. E. Blake. F. F. Hopkins, John E. K. MacKenjsie. 
 
 J. Q. M. Smith, and W. H. Sykes, Esqrs. 
 Administrative Assist<mts...T. A. Lawrenson, A. Pickersgill. C. W. Ward, Esqrs., and 
 Capt. W. Eoss-Brown, E.a.A. 
 Superintendent of Shipyard Extensions... Major G. W. Brims. ii.c.. e.f.a. 
 Tempy. Clerical Assistant... "W. Wlnstanley. Esq. 
 Assistant Superintendent of Forgings...'B.. F. W. Flower. Esq. 
 Tempy. Assistants... Capt. 0. E. G. Beadle, e.q.a., Capt. T. B. CouU, Major J. W. Hamilton, P. M. 
 Lang, Esq., Capt. J. Kobinson, Lieut. Thomas Y. Stout, r.h.t.b., and Capt. E. H. S. White, 
 
288 Appendix 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DEPUTY CONTROLLER FOR ARMAMENT PRODUCTION. 
 
 Deputy Controller. ..Sir Vincent L. Raven, k.b.e. 
 Secretary...^. H. Pettifor. Esq. 
 Naval Assistant... Eng. Com. Arthur E. Lester, d.s.o., k.n. 
 Civilian Assistants to D.C.A.P....D. T, Heap, Esq. and Eveleigh Nash, Esq. 
 Director of Production. G-uns, Mountings a/nd Sights.. .1,. I. G. Leveson, Esq. 
 Deputy Director of ProdwMon, Guns. Moimtings and Sights. ..B.. S. Rowell. Esq. 
 Assistant Directors of Production, Chins. Mountings and Sights.. .V,. 1. Glascodine, Esq.. and 
 Major W. Klrke Smith, D.s.o. 
 Deputy Assistant Directors of Production. Chins, Mountings and Sights.. .Chas A. Baker. Esq. and 
 
 C. J. S. Orton, Esq. 
 
 Director of Production... Torpedoes <fc Mimes... A. H. Hall, Esq. 
 
 Deputy Director of Production.. .Torpedoes & Mines... Commander Carlton C. Sherman, r.n. (act.) (ret.). 
 
 Assistant Director of Production... Torpedoes and Mines... H. A. D. Acland, Esq. 
 
 Paravane Section... tAeut.-Commr. W. H. McConnell, e.n.v.r. 
 
 Technical Adviser to R.A.M....B. T. Heap, Esq. 
 
 Director of Production... Ammunition... G. E. Woodward. Esq. 
 
 Deputy Director of Production.. .Ammunition.. .Major F. L. Watson, m.o. 
 
 Assistant Director {act.) of Production.. .Ammunition. ..lAeut, H. S. H. Ellis, r.n. {ret.). 
 
 Deputy Assistant Director of Production... Ammunition... "E. S. Rayner, Esq. 
 
 AIRSHIP PRODUCTION. 
 
 Director of Airship Production. ..IE,. CGivan.'E&ci. 
 Airship Section... Wing Capt. Edward A. D. Masterman, r.n. 
 Wing Commr. Harold L. Woodcock, r.n. 
 Comtnander J. Malcolm Eraser. r.n.v.R. 
 Airship Engine Section... Eng. Commr. Leslie Robins, r.n. 
 
 Eng. Lieut. Frederick R. G. Turner, r.n. 
 Eng. Lieut. Rey G. Parry, D.s.o., r.n. 
 Hydrogen Section... Lieut. Commr. Sidney R. Lowcock. r.n.v.R. 
 JAeut. Charles A. Slater, r.n.v.r. 
 Lieut. Alfred H. White, r.n.v.R. 
 Lieut. John B. Butler, r.n.v.R. 
 Lieut. Cecil Lightfoot. r.n.v.r. 
 Electric and WIT Section... Heut. Arthur Price Reed, r.n.v.R. 
 Lieut. Arthur J. Osborne, r.n.v.R. 
 Airship Constructor... C I. R. Campbell, Esq. 
 Assistant Constructors... K. B. W. Evans. 8. A. McCarthy. L. J. Bartlett, S. Payne, H. May, 
 A. P. Cole, P. SutclifEe, Esqrs. 
 Costs... A. E. Wigfield, Esq. 
 Airship Production and Inspection. ..T. Turton Jones Esq. 
 
 Flight Lieut. M. Bartlett. 
 Lieut. E. H. Haworth, r.n.v.R. 
 Lieut. J. D. Greenwood, r.n.v.R. 
 Sub. Lieut. D, Greenwood, r.n.v.R. 
 Administrative Staff OMcer... Major S. Robinson. 
 Civil Assistant to D.A.P....B. Page, Esq. 
 Chief Draughtsman... C.'WsXe.'EBQ.. 
 
 District Progress Engineers... C. F. Dowding. Esq., London; W. S. Edwards, Esq.. Brimingham; J. H. 
 HoUis. Esq., Glasgow : C. Q. Howsin, Esq., Manchester : J. S. Orton, Esq., Barrow ; A. H. EomanB. 
 Keq.. SheMeld ; Major F. W. Yates, r.b., Grantham : and Captain H. Wilson Young. Newcastle-on' 
 Tyne. 
 
 SHIPYARD LABOUR DEPARTMENT. 
 Director of Ihe Shipyard Labour Department... Sir Lynden Macassey, Esq., k.b.b., k.c. 
 
 Assistant Directors... G. P. Morrish, Esq. (General Div.). 
 J. R. Bond, Esq. {Technical Div.). 
 C. J. Spencer {Devour Div.). 
 
 Vice-Admiral W. De Salis, m.v.o. {Substitution Div.). 
 Major R. Williams {Priority and Transfer Div.), 
 
 Secretary... H. E. A. Elliott. Esq., i.c.s. [act). I Intelligence Officer. ..C. F. Farrar. 
 
 Asst. Secretary... B. F. James, Esq. | Establishment Officer... B.. Watson. Esq. 
 
Appendix 289 
 
 SubslUniion Division. 
 Eng. Capt. Wet.) Jasper W. A. Parrotfc. 
 
 General Division. 
 
 Superintendent of General Section... W. Wrench Lee, Esq. 
 Superintendent of Negotiation Section... B.. S. Eatcllffe, Esq. 
 Liaison Section... B. Wicks, Esq. 
 
 Labour Division. 
 
 Superintendent Legal Division... "R. H. Fox. Esq. 
 
 Legal Assistants... G. H. W. Johnson, Esq., E. F. Elngwood, Esq. 
 
 Technical Division, 
 
 Chief Technical Inspector. ..A. McDermott Service, Esq. 
 Inspector of Women's Work... Lady Gertrude Crawford. 
 
 Priority and Transfer Division. 
 Assistant (1st Class)... Lieutenant A. L. Stenhoiise. 
 
 The following have also been appointed, or lent from other Departments for temporary service 
 during the War : 
 
 W. Adam, J. J. Blddleatone, W. Clough, W. Graham, P. Gray. H. L. Heywood. J. B. Hill, Austin 
 Kendall, W. Knowles, Esqs., Miss E. L. Macassey, W. S. Eatclifle. H. A. Sharpe. 
 Esqs.. Miss K. Toogood, C. H. Yeatman, Esq. 
 
 Distrid Directors. 
 A. L. Ayre (Glasgow). 
 J. E. Baker (Barrow). 
 J. H. Brewerton (Southampton). 
 A. W. Chantler (Belfast). 
 Lt.-Col. W. Cooper (Liverpool). 
 Lt.-Col. A. Gadle (London). 
 Eng. Bear-Adml. (ret.) C. W. 
 
 Gregory (Leeds). 
 H. G. Jekin (Bull). 
 Eng. Capt. (ret.) J. Langmald 
 
 (Birmingham). 
 H. H. McClure (Newcastle). 
 J. Gordon (Cardiff). 
 Eng. Rear-Adml. (ret.) A. E. L. 
 
 Westaway (Bristol). 
 
 Shipyard Technical Officers. 
 Eng. Rear-Adml. (ret.) J. H. 
 
 Adams (Dundee). 
 3. D. McD. Barbour (Liverpool). 
 R. L. Botham (Cardiff). 
 H. Bucknall (Newcastle). 
 S. G. D. Cuer (Liverpool). 
 A. Dudgeon (Glasgow). 
 J. Duncan (Aberdeen). 
 E. C. Farquhar (Glasgow). 
 J. Grigg (Glasgow). 
 J. D. Guthrie (Bristol). 
 Johnston Hughes (Belfast). 
 J. P. James (Liverpool). 
 G. Johnson (London). 
 J. Laldman (Newcastle). 
 Q. M. Mackay (Sunderland). 
 J. D. 0. Mackenzie (Glasgow). 
 
 D. M. McKay (Glasgow). 
 
 E. J. Mills (Newcastle). 
 
 F. Moorsom (Cardiff). 
 1. E. Seath (Glasgow). 
 
 Superintendents of Shipyard Labour. 
 Lient.-Colonel W. Cooper (Mersey). 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. Gadie. 
 Eng. Capt. (ret.) J. Langmald (Birmingham). 
 A. L. Ayre (Glasgow). 
 J. E. Baker (Barrow). 
 J. H. Brewerton (Southampton). 
 H. G. Jeken (Bull). 
 H. W. Johnson (Cardiff), 
 
 Local Areas, 
 
 P. W. Sturdy (StocJdon). 
 0. B. Thomas (Leith). 
 P. Webster (Glasgow). 
 G. P. Wells (Hull). 
 J. Wilson (Bristol). 
 
 Engineer Technical Officers. 
 
 W. T. Andrews (London). 
 J. Bonthrone (Liverpool). 
 E. Boucher (London). 
 J. H. Chambers (Belfast). 
 A. Cordiner (Hull). 
 
 C. H. Doidge (Hull). 
 
 E. Edwards (Birmingham). 
 J. W. Elliott (Manchester). 
 L. T. 6. Evans (London). 
 
 D. Gray (Leeds). 
 
 J. E. Hamilton (Barrow). 
 
 G. A. Hart (Leeds). 
 
 S. B. B. Hebb (Hartlepool). 
 
 C. E. Henzell (Leeds). 
 
 G. S. Home (Manchester). 
 
 C. A. Bowarth (Glasgow). 
 
 G. B. Johnston (Glasgoiv). 
 
 A. MacDonald (Glasgow). 
 
 G. N. McVicar (Glasgow). 
 
 W. Murdoch (Sunderland). 
 
 G. B. Nicholson (Cardiff). 
 
 J. P. Phillips (Newcastle). 
 
 J. S. Eeid (Glasgow). 
 
 G. B. Eichards (Birmingham). 
 
 A. Eobertson (Glasgow). 
 
 H. M. Sayers (London). 
 
 S. J. Sewell (Leeds). 
 
 Eng. Rear-Adml. (ret.) E. J. Tench 
 
 (Southampton), 
 G. Turner (Bristol). 
 W. H. Warwick (Leeds). 
 
 T. Warde (Liverpool). 
 T. Yorston (Newcastle). 
 
 Labour Regulation OMcers. 
 
 P. Black (London), 
 
 H. Blair (Belfast), 
 
 J. Co.": (Birmingham). 
 
 W. G. Cruickshank (Glasgow). 
 
 J. Cunningham (Belfast), 
 
 J. Evans (Liverpool). 
 
 W. H. Fisher (Liverpool). 
 
 W. M. Gibson (London). 
 
 T. Griffiths (Liverpool). 
 
 H. Haddon (Cardiff). 
 
 The Earl of Hardwicke (London). 
 
 T. D Heppel (London). 
 
 P. A. Herd (Birmingham). 
 
 M. Hodgson (Newcastle). 
 
 E. B. Holt (Newcastle). 
 
 W. J. Jackson (Glasgow). 
 
 H. W. Johnson (Cardiff). 
 
 A. W. E. Kewley (Newcastle). 
 
 A. G. Lawrence (London). 
 
 J. M. Llthgow (Glasgow), 
 
 A. Magnay (Newcastle). 
 
 W. Marsh (Southampton). 
 
 W. Nelson (Southampton). 
 
 E. W. Owen (Liverpool). 
 
 G. H. Pearson (Newcastle). 
 
 W. Eamsden (Liverpool). 
 
 J. D. Eees (Cardiff). 
 
 S. Shaw (Leeds). 
 
 G. C. Steel (Newcastle). 
 
 E. Towart (Glasgow). 
 
 E. J. Waters (Newcastle). 
 
 W. J. White (Newcastle). 
 
 W. P. Williams (Bristol), 
 
 J. C. Wood (Glasgow), 
 
 Superintendents of Shipyard Labour — contd. 
 J. M. Lithgow (Glasgow). 
 H. H. McClure (2^.^. CoosO. 
 
 Deputy Chief Labour Organising OMcers. 
 M. Hodgson (^''.i;. Coa^«. 
 W. Nelson (Southampton), 
 
 Transfer Officer 
 E. J. Walters (N,E, Coast), 
 
290 Appendix 
 
 MATBBIAIiS AND PEIORITY DEPABTMBNT. 
 
 Director of Materials and Priority... Lieui.-Gol. R. 8. Home. 
 Personal Assistant to Director. ..Lieut. T. G. Robertson, e.n.v.b. 
 Assistant Directors.. .Eng. Capt. John A. Richards i.act.). 
 
 3. Rogers, Esq. {acting Chief Constructor). 
 M. Kissane, Esq. 
 F. Smith, Esq. 
 
 lAeut-.Com. A. M. MacRobert, e.n.v.b. 
 Deputy Assistant Directors... Eng. Com. Henry C. Anstey (act.) [emergy.). 
 Capt. J. H. Skelton. 
 Capt. James Caldwell. 
 Adrian Lumley, Esq. 
 Administrative and Technical Assistants... Lieut. L. Nicoll. Sub. Lieui. W. E. Sugden b.n.v.r.. 
 Sec. Lieut. A. Milner. Sec. Lieut. G. H. M. Thompson, Sec. Lieut. F. H. Saunders, R.E., 
 Sec. Lieut. A. G. Mavor. E.H., J. P. Powell, E. Juniper, D. Cameron, R. C. Hawthorn 
 R. Butler. 8. J. Arkwright, C. McQueen, R. P. Padbury, Hawkins Turner. H. G. Brodie. Esqrs. 
 Statistical Assistants... H.. L. Tutill. Esq. 
 
 Assistant Paymaster. ..G. H. Clemetson. 
 Examiner of Accounts... G. W. Brown {act.). 
 9 Tempy. Clerks. 56 Tempy. Women Clerks and Typists. 
 
 STATISTICS DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Director of Statistics... Lieut.- Col. J. G. Beharrell, D.S.o. 
 Deputy Director. ..Lieui. H. Macrae. 
 Heads of Sections. ..Lieut. J. C. M. Butterworth. 
 2nd Lieut. J. Hambly. 
 J. N. Brunton, Esq. 
 A. E. Kirkus, Esq. 
 W. D. Duffleld, Esq. 
 C. Collins. Esq. 
 Asst. Paym. iJ.^.JJ.... William H. Anstice. 
 
 FINANCE DIVISION 
 
 Assistant Accounfant-General...A. Cunnison, Esq. (act.). 
 Superintending Clerk. ..A. H. M. Pox, Esq. {act.). 
 Deputy Accounts OMcers in charge of Branches... W. J. Hean. Esq. (act.) ; R. G. Peirce. Esq. (ac<.). 
 Deputy Accounts OMcers. ..'B.. B. Bain, Esq. (act.) : G. H. Court. Esq. (act.) 
 W. J. S. Greenland. Esq. (act.). 
 Assistant Accounts Officers. ..Vi. H. Westlake, Esq. : H. E. Denny, Esq. (act.) (lent from 
 Inland Revenue) ; P. E. Johnson, Esq. (lent from Inland Revenue). 
 Assistant Expense Accounts Officer (lent by Inspector of Dockyard Expense Accounts)... 'P. Hall. Esq. 
 Assistant Auditors (lent from, Natio'nal Insurance Audit Department)... A. J. Camm. A. E. Codd. 
 H. Foulds. L. H. Gibson. E. G. Kench. A. Page. Esqrs. 
 Supervising Assistant Clerks, 1 Assistant Clerk. 1 Hired Accountant Clerk, 10 Temporary Clerica 
 Assistants, 7 Temporary Assistant Accountants, 24 Temporary Men Clerks, 2 Higher Grade Women 
 Clerks, 70 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists, and 15 Improvers and Boy Clerks. 
 (With the exception of the Asst. Expense Accounts OMcer. the Staff of this Divison was 
 also shoivn under the Dept. of the Accountant-General.) 
 
 COSTINGS INVESTIGATION DIVISION. 
 
 Advisor upon Costs of Produ^tionX . ,, ,„.,. „„ t^„„ „„. . „, , 
 
 Assistant Account General M" ^- Whmney. Esq., f.c.a. {a£t.). 
 
 Deputy. ..v. W. Papworth, Esq.. a.s.a.a. (Acting Superintending Clerk). 
 Heads of Sections... C. D. Britten, Esq.. a.c.a. 
 W. Elles Hill, Esq.. A.O.A. 
 F. N. Kideon, Esq. F.C.A. 
 C. H. Oldfield, Esq., a.c.a. 
 H. F. Palmer, Esq., a.c.a. 
 
 C. J. Sturt. Esq.. A.S.A.A. (Acting Assistant Accounts OMcer). 
 Assistant Auditors (lent from National Insurance Audit Dept.)... J. A. Clarkson, A.S.A.A. : W. L. Earamelli, 
 
 A.S.A.A., S. Whincup, a.s.a.a.. Esqrs. 
 Superintending Accountants... H. A. Blackford, a.c.a. : D. M. Butcher, A.S.A.A. ; B. H. Nickson, A.C.A. : 
 W. J. Phillips, A.S.A.A. : B. G. Pocock, a.s.a.a. : M. Price, f.o.a. ; P. W. Rumble, 
 A.g.A.A. : C. W. Weston, a.c.a. : H. G. Wilson, f.c.a., Esqrs, 
 
Appendix 
 
 291 
 
 Accountants... M. E. Baker, a.o.a. f A. B. Bayley, a.o.a. ; N. Bell, o.A. ; B. L. Biggs, a.c.a. : W. H, 
 Cooper, a.s.a.a. ; J. Dickson, o.a. ; H. V. Edwards, a.o.a. : F. Egliagton, a.o.a. : 
 A. Fielding, a.o.a. : H. Garman. a.o.a. ; E. G. Greenshlelds, o.A. : C. T. Grimes. a.c.a. : 
 A. Hoaking, a.s.a.a. ; B. 0. Howard, a.s.a.a. ; J. A. Lewcock, a.s.a.a. : H. Luker, 
 A.S.A.A. ; W. E. Manaell, a.s.a.a. ; W. J. Morton. a.s.a.a. ; G. T. Needham. a.o.a. : 
 C. V. Oldfleld. a.o.a. ; J. Potter, a.s.a.a. : 8. Smith, a.o.a. ; J. S. Stuart, a.s.a.a. 
 E. M. Taylor, a.o.a. : R. S. Tewson, a.o.a. : H. Tweedale, a.o.a. ; P. H. Walker, 
 A.S.A.A. ; 0. C. Wlllson, f.s.a.a. ; E G. Wolfe, a.o.a. ; T. C. Whittaker, a.s.a.a., Esqrs 
 
 01 Temporary Assistant Accountants, 1 Temporary Man Clerk, 20 Temporary Women Clerks, 5 Boy 
 Clerks, 91 Third Grade Clerks and Recorders. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL ORDNANCE. 
 
 Director of Naval Ordnance. ..Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, o.B. 
 Assistant-Director of Naval Ordnance. ..Captain Joseph C. W. Henley. 
 AssiMants to Director of Naval Ordnance. 
 
 Commander Charles A. Scott. 
 
 Edward O. Cochrane. 
 Isham W. Gibson, m.v.o, 
 Bernard W. M. Falrbairn. 
 Archibald Gilbert (act.). 
 Edward G. de S. Jukes-Hughes. 
 (G) Stanley T. H. Wilton. 
 
 Com,mander (G) Gerald F. Longhurst, D.a.o.itemp 
 Commr. R.N.V.B. John G. Henderson (act.). 
 Lieut. Walter R. Gilbert. 
 
 Willie D. Kllroy. r.n.v.r. (tempy.). 
 Sub-Lieut. W. H. J. Elridge. e.n.v.r Itempv.) 
 Chief Gunner Herbert D. Jehan. 
 Commissioned Armourer Ernest Addy. 
 
 LicuYenani... Frederick J. Payne. 
 
 Malcolm A. McKenzie. 
 
 Engineer Inspectors. 
 
 Eng. Captain Thomas Thome {tempy. ). 
 Henry Wall. 
 
 Eng. Commander William Hart. 
 
 Eng. Commander WalteJ G. Heppel. 
 
 Frederick C. R. Paton (tempy.). 
 
 Frederick Robertson {act.). 
 Eng. Lieut.-Com. Stanley W. Cooke. 
 
 Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance 
 Assistants to Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance . 
 
 Commander {act.) John A. Duncan, o.B. 
 Commander Henry G. R. Bevan {ret.). 
 Commander Ralph G. Dlnwiddy. 
 Commander Leslie J. T>. Hammond {ret.). 
 Commander {act.) John A. L. Hay. 
 Captain Freeman C. N. Bishop, b.m.a. 
 A. H. Dodd. Esq. 
 Examiner of Oun- Mounting Accounts. ..A. H. Duffield, Esq. {act.). 
 Examiner of Oun- Mounting Worlc.'W. E. D. Helmer, Esq. (act.) {tempy.). 
 The following gerJleman has been lent for special service during the War... J. Storey, Esq. 
 Naval OMcers employed on Inspection and Experimental Ordnance Duties, 
 
 Under Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance : — 
 Inspector of Steel... Commander Harold G. Jackson {ret). 
 Deputy Inspector of Steel. ..Colonel J. R. J. Jocelyn, b.a. {ret.). 
 Civilian Inspector of Steel... Lieut. D. E. Horwood. 
 Acting Inspector of Steel... Commander (act.) Hewelljm E. H. Llewellyn {ret.). 
 
 Assistant Inspectors of Steel. 
 
 Admiral {ret.) Sir Edmund S. Poe, o.o v.o., k.c.b. 
 Major-General R. Wace, c.b., b.a. {tempy.). 
 Captain H. R. Evans, u.N. {ret). 
 
 William H. M. Daniell. e.n. {ret.). 
 Claude W. M. Plenderleath, b.n. {ret) 
 William H. F. Taylor, r.n. {ret). 
 Commander Henry Thompson (ret). 
 
 Charles K. McCallum {ret). 
 
 John E. Bray {ret). 
 
 T. S. Gooch {Emerg.). 
 
 A H. Tremayne (ret). 
 
 Reginald C. Brenton (Emerg.). 
 Commander B.N.R. W. F. Cabome. c.b., b.d. (ret). 
 Lieut-Corn. Arthur W. Tomlinson. 
 
 Frank R. Willis. 
 
 Hugh J. Orr (ret). 
 
 John G. M. McHardy (ret). 
 
 Robert P. Veasey (ret). 
 
 Alister W. McDonald (ret). 
 
 Ralph B. Bodilly (ret). 
 
 William H. Callwell (ret). 
 
 Henry L. Cheston (Emerg.) (act). 
 
 Frederick J. Davis, r.d., r.n.r. (ret). 
 
 W. E. Compton (ret). 
 
 W. G. H. Gree (ret). 
 
 Lieui.-Com. John H. C. Ogilvy (ret). 
 
 Robert A. C. Montagu (ret). 
 Lieut. Robert J. Sweet (ret.). 
 Lieut B.N.R. Beauchamp H. Venner {ret). 
 Lieut. R.N.V.R. Tom M. Chambera 
 Colonel (temp. Brig.-Gen.) Cooper Penrose, k.e. 
 Colonel C. L. Robinson (ret) (tempy.). 
 
 W. H. Williams, c.m.g. 
 
 H. D. Olivier. 
 
 D. A. Mills. E.B. (ret). 
 
 A. L. Mein, r.e. (ret). 
 
 M. H. Pmcell, r.e. (ret.). 
 
 W. Huckisson, c.m.g., r.e. (ret). 
 Bt Col. S. v. Thornton, r.a. (tempy.). 
 Bt Col. H. O. Nelson, r.a. (tempy.). 
 Lieut.-Col. G. Mackinlay, r.a. (ret) (tempy.). 
 
 F. H. Eliott. C.S.I., i.A. (ret.) (tempy.), 
 Allan Wadmore (tempy.). 
 A. Tracery (tempy.). 
 Major & Bt. Lt Col. Frederick L. Dibblee, r.m.a 
 Major Charles A. Bishop, e.m.a. 
 
 R. E. Fitzgerald-Lombard (ret). 
 Captain G. B. Macpherson Grant (tempv.). 
 Captain Alfred D. B. Godfray, b.u.a. 
 Captain A. J. Beckett, b.b. 
 
 Gunner (ret.) Richard W. Lawrence. 
 
292 Appendix 
 
 The fottowvng gentlemen have also been, appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 
 G. B. Bowell, J. W. CapsMck. E. H. Deane. T. I. Drever, S. E. Fox, H. B. Halls. C. J. Hill. W. R. 0. 
 Hockin. Dr. C. H. Ivinson, L. T. Jarvls, A. Johnson, J. L. Kitto. E. Lake. A. E. Lee. Louis 
 Mackenzie. E. Maslin. C. H. Moore. C. E. Moss, A. S. Napier. E. Percival. D. Plcton Prichard. 
 G. Weston Eamsey. C. Seaman, T. W. Sheppard. J. W. Slater, R. L. Trench Watson, G. Tumman, 
 A. Warey. G. H. Wells and H. Wise. Esqrs. 
 
 Lent from Home Office. 
 
 H. Topham, S. E. Bennett. A. 0. Lowe. G. C. Sumner. E. L. Mecklin. C. P. Hunter, W. H. Mead. 
 W. Turner, P. Bowen, A. A. Hepburn, C. H. Taylor. C. E. Plumbe. P. W. Cockshott, A. Pother- 
 ingham, L. D. Hooper, H. T. Eingdove, and W. 0. Evans, Esqrs. 
 
 E. H. C. Newby, Esq., Deputy Cashier (act.), under the Inspector of Steel, SheflSeld 
 (lent from the National Health Insurance Commn.). 
 
 Under War Office. 
 Gomdr. Archibald C. Goolden (act.) (ret.). I Major (Tempy. Lieut.'Col.) Nathaniel P. 
 
 Major B.M.A. Henry K. Stephens. | Trotman, r.m.A. 
 
 The following gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 J. L. Capes, H. Jackson, A. McPherson. and P. E. Coursey. Esars. 
 
 Superintending Clerk... Thomas G. Anderson, Esq. 
 
 Deputy Superintending Clerk.. .W. P. Daniels. Esq. (.act.). 
 
 Assistant Superintending Clerks. ..A. C. Jones (act.). P. Morrison. S. W. Smith (act.) and 
 
 G. Stevens (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 1 Second Division Clerk. Dockyard Clerks (including Acting) First Grade 1, Second Grade 8. Third 
 
 Grade 8. Temporary Clerks and Boys 38. Draughtsmen 7. 
 
 Superintendent of Ordnance Stores... Captain Herbert R. Norbury, e.n. 
 Deputy Superintendent of Ordnance Stores. ..B.. Fathers. Esq., i.S.o. (act.). 
 Assistant Superintendents of Ordnance Stores.. .A. MoFarlane (act.). 
 
 G. E. Woodward (act.), Esqrs. 
 Naval Ordnance Store Officers. ..W. A. Mortimer (act.). W. Eowe (act.). N. Thomas (act.). 
 W. Vaughan (act.), and E. W. Wharhirst, Esqrs. 
 
 Deputy Ordnance Store OMcers...W. E. Eyles (act.). H. G. Hibberd (act.). 
 
 C. H. Murray (act), and A. T. Eeed, (act.). Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Ordnance Store OMoers... A. H. Beard (act.), W. E. Harrison (act.). J. A. Keightley (act.). 
 E. W. Lambe (act.). G. Sansford (act.), E. H. Priddon (act.), 
 and E. L. Toumay, Esqrs. 
 
 Examiners of Naval Ordnance Work-..^. D. Evans (act.) and P. J. Payne, Esqrs. (act.). 
 
 1 Ordnance Depot Clerk, First Grade. 
 
 8 Ordnance Depot Clerks, First Grade (act.), 
 
 5 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act.). 
 
 3 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade. 
 
 5 Ordnance Depot Clerks, Third Grade (act.). 
 
 1 Assistant Clerk. 
 23 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks. 
 31 Temporary Women Clerlis. 
 
 3 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers. 
 
 Acting Assistant Ordnance Store OMcer... Sheffield. ..G. Swift, Esq. 
 Chief Analyst. ..Sheffield.. .John 0. W. Humfrey, Esq. 
 
 The following have been appointed for special temporary service : 
 Dr. C. Weizmann. 
 Dr. Ida S. Maclean, H. Davies. E. G. Bainbridge. and H. Spiers, Esqrs. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OP THE DIEECTOE OF TOEPEDOES AND MINING. 
 
 Director of Torpedoes and Miming Rear-Admiral The Hoh. Edward S. Fitzherbert. 
 
 Secretary 
 
 Assistant Director (T). I Assistant Director (M), 
 
 Captain Algernon H. C. Candy. | Captain F. Shirley Litchtleld-Speer, c.m.g., d.s.o 
 
 Assistant Director (P) Captain Vernon H. S. Haggard. 
 
Appendix 
 
 293 
 
 Naval 
 Rear Admiral.-.'R. S. Phlpps-Hornby, o.M.a. 
 
 (tempy.) 
 Captain Gordon C. Fraser {ret.). 
 
 Bryan G. Godfrey-Faussett, o.v.o. 
 o.M.o. (ret.). 
 Commander ...Evan 0. Bunbury. 
 
 Geoffrey 0. Candy. 
 
 Thomas E. Fforde. 
 
 Malcolm K. Grant (ret.}. 
 
 Robert W. Dalgety, d.s.o. 
 
 Gerard B. Riley (ret.). 
 
 (T) Archibald A. Lovett-Cameron. 
 
 Robert J. Howard (act.) (ret.). 
 Lieul.-Commr. Charles O. Alexander. 
 
 Bertram Vlgne. 
 Lieutenant ...Patrick P. Coleman. 
 
 sm. 
 
 Lieutenant Rodolph H. P. de Salis, d.s.c. 
 
 Alfred .J. Parkes. 
 
 Harry Simpson. 
 Limt. ]E. W.Taylor. 
 
 iJ.2V.F.iJ.' Robert J. Carruthers. D.s.o. 
 
 John R. K. Warneford. 
 
 Eng. Capt P. J. Moore (ret.). 
 
 (Asst. Inspector of Mines). 
 Eno. Cowimr.... Charles J. M. Wallace. 
 
 Edward O. Hefford. 
 
 Alfred B. Kempt. 
 
 Vernon A. A. Ter Veen. 
 Ch. Ounner ...James Wood. 
 Gunner Leonard Repton. 
 
 Walter Thorogood. 
 
 Walter P. Williamson. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Deputy Superintending Clerk (act.) P. E. Couratin, Esq. 
 
 Inspector of Mines & Mining Gear W. Pearce, Esq. 
 
 1 Dockyard Clerk. First Grade (act.). 
 
 2 Dockyard Clerks, Second Grade (act.). 
 1 Dockyard Clerk. Third Grade. 
 
 1 Dockyard Clerk. Third Grade (af^t.). 
 
 2 Draughtsmen. 
 
 5 Temporary Clerks. 
 
 ToEPEDO Store Division. 
 
 Superintendent of Torpedo Stores Frederick Ward. Esq. 
 
 Assistant Superintendent of Torpedo Stores T. W. Midmer. Esq. 
 
 Torpedo Store Officer J. W. Ballard. Esq. (act.). 
 
 Deputy Torpedo Store Officers G. C. Cusens (act.) and W. E. Fuller (act.) Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Torpedo Store Officers W. Evans (act.) (tempy.) and F. Stokes (act.) Esqrs. 
 
 2 Torpedo Depot Clerks, First Grade (act.) 
 
 3 Torpedo Depot Clerks. Second Grade (act.). 
 13 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks. 
 
 11 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 5 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers. 
 
 AIR DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Chief of Naval Air Services (Fifth Sea Lord) Commodore Godfrey M. Paine, c.b.. m.v.o. 
 
 Asst.Oiief of Air Services and Naval Asst. to Fifth Sea}^^^^^^ ^^^1^^^ y^ vyvyan. d.s.o. 
 
 Civil Assistant to C.N. A.S W. A. T. Shorto. Esq. (Lent Controller's 
 
 Secretary to C.N.A.S. 
 
 A. T. Shorto. 
 Dept.) 
 F. G. C. Young. Esq. (act.) (lent) 
 Staff Pavm. C. A. Shove. 
 
 to C.N.A.S Wimg Captain H. D. Brlggs. 
 
 Captain Supt. for Airships Wing Captain E. M. Maitland. D.s.o. 
 
 Asst. Supt. for Engines Wing Commander (E) W. Briggs (act.). 
 
 Personal Captain Coptem John D. Edwards, o.b. 
 
 Personal Commander Squadron Commander J. W. O. Dalgliesh. 
 
 Armament Captain Captain (act.) Eon. Arthur Stopford. 
 
 Commander H. T. A. Bosanquet. 
 
 A. D. Warrington-Morris. 
 
 F. A. Brock (act.). 
 J. L. Forbes. 
 A. M. Longmore. 
 
 J. Bird (act.). 
 
 D. Hyde-Thomson. 
 
 T. A. Batchelor. 
 6. W. Cranfleld. 
 W. P. Groves (act.) 
 
 Wing Commanders. 
 
 J. D. Mackworth. 
 Francis Ranken (act.). 
 
 Sguadron Commanders. 
 
 1. D. Mackle. 
 
 The Master of Sempill. 
 
 Flight Commanders. 
 
 R. F. S. Leslie, d.s.o. 
 F. W. Lucas. 
 R. E. Penny. 
 
 E. D. M. Robertson. 
 H. L. Woodcock. 
 
 J. P. Wilson, D.s.c. 
 
 E. J. C. Roberts. 
 
 Enavrteer-Lieutenant F. W. Scarfl (act.). 
 
294 
 
 Appendix 
 
 T. P. M. Alexander. 
 
 B, P. Chase. 
 
 M. J. G. Day. 
 
 D. Gill. 
 
 W. H. Greer. 
 
 Flight Lieutenants. 
 K. B. S. Grelg. 
 H T. Jones. 
 S. Nixon. 
 G. G. Ommanney. 
 J. B. M. Pritcliard. 
 
 E. A. Held. 
 G. G. Simpson, D.s.c. 
 E. E. Soar, d.s.o. 
 D. C. Waylen. 
 A. W. Williams. 
 
 Observer Lieut 
 
 Flight Svb-Lieuts. 
 
 E. B. H. Allen. 
 G. H. Brown. 
 J. E. Catt. 
 G. F. Cole. 
 J. Coles. 
 J. V. Collins. 
 
 A. W. Farrer. 
 G. Holmes. 
 
 C. E. Abbott. 
 
 M. H. P. Allen. 
 
 C. E. Andrews. 
 
 J. Craig. 
 
 J. K. Curwen. 
 
 F. E. B. Davis {act.). 
 
 S. T. Dockray. 
 
 S. Flower. 
 
 J. M. Fraser. 
 
 C. W. Gamble. 
 
 L. C. Abbott. 
 C J. E. Alsford. 
 
 F. A. Baldwin. 
 H. Batsford. 
 E. C. Blake. 
 
 J. P. Bourke. 
 E. J. P. Briggs. 
 W. Burkinshiaw. 
 J. B. Butler. 
 E. B. W. Butt. 
 
 D. Cameron-Swan. 
 J. D. Carmlchael. 
 W. H. Clegg. 
 
 J. W. Cole. 
 T. A. Cotton. 
 J. E. Craig. 
 J. G. T. Crawford. 
 
 G. Crawley. 
 S. Curtis. 
 
 C. E. D'Arcy 
 A. L. Davis. 
 P. M. Davoon. 
 H. Dodd. 
 
 A. J. Dronsfleld. 
 J. P. Blsden. 
 W. G. Evans. 
 H. Eves. 
 
 N. Fawkes. 
 P. L. E. Fraser. 
 N. E. Fuller. 
 J. E. Glbb 
 
 E. D. N. GlMmoie. 
 
 D. Goad. 
 
 Q. M. Gordon. 
 
 T. B. Grant. 
 
 W. 0. Grant. 
 
 J. E. A. Greatorex. 
 
 J. D. Greenwood. 
 
 J. W. Griggs. 
 
 Hon. L. G. W. Quest. 
 
 B. D. Hallam. 
 
 E. F. Turner. 
 
 S. F. Freeman. 
 
 A. V/. Kay. 
 P. C. C. Passman. 
 H. J. Eoach. 
 Warrant OMcers {2nd grade). 
 H. G. Cooper. 
 W. T. Curtis. 
 A. Deakln. 
 A. H. Ellis. 
 J. Hobbs. 
 F. J. Hooper. 
 
 Commander, R.N.V.R. 
 C. H. Meares. 
 
 Lieut.-Commander, R.N.R. 
 
 J. Hills. 
 
 Lievt.- Commanders, R.N.V.R. 
 
 B. T. Hamilton. 
 J. HUls. 
 
 E. W. Hogarth. 
 E. Hogg. 
 
 C. Kent. 
 
 S. E. Lowcock. 
 G. McAlpine. 
 T. A. Monckton. 
 C J. Murfltt. 
 T. F. Norbury. 
 
 lAeutenants, R.N.V.R. 
 J. E. Harland. 
 E. H. Haworth. 
 G. Hazelton. 
 J. F. Hedley. 
 S. E. Hemmingway. 
 S. E. Hill. 
 J. B. Homer. 
 T. C. B. Hooke. 
 H. E. Home. 
 E. C. Horsley. 
 H. Howard. 
 
 D. C. M. Hume. 
 A. J. Hurst. 
 
 K. H. Kennedy-Skipton. 
 
 A. J. S. Kennett. 
 
 W. H. M. Knox. 
 
 W. A. Lawrence. 
 
 C. Layzell Apps. 
 
 G. W. Lester. 
 
 M. V. E. Leveaux, 
 
 C. Lightfoot. 
 
 A. E. Low. 
 W. Makower. 
 
 B. Mansbridge. 
 M. Marsden. 
 W. L. Marsh. 
 O. H. Mason. 
 J. T. Matthews. 
 
 E. T. Methold. 
 T. B. Meyer. 
 
 M. J. H. Molyneux.l 
 J. W. Moore. 
 
 C. G. More. 
 N. P. Morris. 
 W. A. Morrison. 
 S. E. Mullard. 
 N. D. Newall. 
 A. D. Newbury. 
 T. L. Oliver. 
 
 E. E. Ollerenshaw. 
 J. H. Ormsby. 
 
 C. Y. Mitchell. 
 C. W. Pidcock. 
 A. B. Redstone. 
 V/. Eenshaw. 
 A. Shires. 
 
 J. E. Steele. 
 
 G. C. Neilson. 
 W. B. Plalster. 
 G. M. T. Eees. 
 J. D. K. Eestler. 
 J. C. Savage {act.). 
 C. F. Steele. 
 F. C. Williams. 
 H. E. Wimperis. 
 
 A. J. Osbom. 
 G. L. T. Owen. 
 T. A. Parker. 
 D. E. Parry-Jones. 
 W. J. Polybank. 
 O. H. Powell. 
 L. S. M. Pyke. 
 J. Eee. 
 A. P. Eeed. 
 
 A. E. Eeed. 
 
 F. B. Eigby. 
 
 B. V. Eoche. 
 K. Secretan. 
 W. Shearer. 
 
 G. G. Shepherd. 
 
 F. C. H. C. Sinclair. 
 N. Sladden. 
 
 C. A. Slater. 
 
 A. F. H. Smallpiece. 
 H. Spink. 
 
 F. H. Spragg. 
 A. M. Steele. 
 C. Suckling. 
 
 J. A. C. Sumner. 
 P. J. H. Sumner. 
 E. St. C. Talboys. 
 E. L. Taylor. 
 A. K. Toulmin-Smith. 
 
 G. L. Tyser. 
 E. G. Walker. 
 
 H. N. Warburton. 
 W. G. J. Wardle. 
 H. A. Watts. 
 P. Westacott. 
 A. H. White. 
 G. Wilder. 
 N. H. Wood. 
 T. M. Wilson. '5 
 H. C. Wright. ': 
 
Appendix 
 
 295 
 
 F. A. Barton. 
 
 A. Berry. 
 
 B. S. Cain. 
 
 H. Churchman. 
 R. E. Cook. 
 
 A. B. Davies. 
 
 B. M. J. Davia. 
 
 Staff PaymoKler. R.N.R S. B. F. Carter. 
 
 Svb- Lieutenants. R.N. V.R. 
 
 II. A. Evans. E. A. Hoghton. 
 
 T. P. Francis. E. C. Hubbard. 
 
 S. GilflUan. J. hoele. 
 
 D. Greenwood. D. P. Luclcing. 
 
 J. H. Grills. W. B. Sinclair. 
 
 G. Harris. 
 H. W. Hern. 
 
 C. R. Sldnner. 
 
 Asst. Pavms. R.N.R. 
 
 Q. P. Green. 
 
 Asst. Paym. R.N.V.R.. 
 
 Wt. Teleg. R.N.R 
 
 2nd tiieut 
 
 N. C. I. PuBhe. 
 
 T. F. regard. 
 
 S. E. S. McLeod. 
 
 A. Berry. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 Griffin and 
 
 Deputy Superintending Clerks... 'E. W. 
 
 W. A. Medrow (act.) Esqrs. 
 Chief Examiner. ..J. H. Jones, Esq. (act.) 
 
 (Lent from Inland Revenue). 
 Examiner. ..G. R. Pledger, Esq. (ad.) 
 
 (Lent from Inland Revenue.) 
 Inspector of Aircraft Arm<iment...'R. D. Dow, Esq. 
 
 2 Minor Staff Clerks (act). 
 
 4 Second Division Clerks (2 serving with 
 Army). 
 
 3 Assistant Clerks (1 serving with Army). 
 1 Extra Clerk, ist Class. 
 
 1 Tempy. Accountant Clerk. Ist Class. 
 
 2 Asst. Inspectors of Aircraft Armament. 
 31 Temporary Clerks. 
 
 3 Temporary Women Clerks, Higher Grade. 
 73 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 
 7 Boy Clerks. 
 
 4 Draughtsmen. 
 
(d) ADMIRALTY, END OF NOVEMBER, 1918. 
 
 First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff. Admiral Sir Eosslyn E. Wemyss, k.c.b., o.M.a., m.v.o. 
 
 THE NAVAL STAFF. 
 
 Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Vice-Admiral (act.) Sydney E. Fremantle, C.B.. m.v.o. 
 
 Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander L. Duff, k.c.b. 
 
 Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Rear- Admiral Herbert G. W. Hope, o.b. 
 
 OPEEATIONS DIVISION. 
 
 Directors of the Operations Division Captain Charles P. E. Coode, d.s.o. 
 
 Captain Alfred D. P. E. Pound. 
 Deputy Directors of the Operations Division Captain Bernard St. G. Collard, d.s.o. 
 
 Captain Arthur de K. L. May. 
 Assistant Directors of the Operations Division Captain Henry E. E. Aylmer. 
 
 Lieut. -Col. Walter T. C. Jones, d.s.o., r.m.l.I. 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 
 Captain. 
 
 Commander. . 
 
 ...E. P. Glutton {ret). 
 Guy M. Marston {act.). 
 George T. C. P. Swabey. d.s.o. 
 Herbert C. J. Grant Wet.). 
 
 George P. B. Edward-Collins. 
 Hugh T. England. 
 Leonard Robinson (act.). 
 Henry P. H. Wakefield. 
 Thomas F. P. Calvert. 
 
 Commr. R.N.R. The Duke of Sutherland. 
 G. Hamilton (ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com Melville A. Hawes. 
 
 Major R.A.F. Harold I. Dear. 
 
 Ueut. R.N.V.R. Sidney T. Morris. 
 
 Captain R.A.F. Cyril S. Goddard. 
 
 Thomas C. Spurway. 
 Charles J. Turner. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Staff Clerk in Charge F. E. Bailey, Esq. (act.). 
 
 (And for Gunnery and Torpedo Division.) 
 
 1 Minor Staff Clerk (act.). 
 1 Second Division Clerk. 
 3 Assistant Clerks. 
 
 1 Confidential Shorthand Writer. 
 1 Accountant Clerk. 
 10 Temporary Clerks. 
 4 Women Clerks. 
 
 Cartographer... A. F. Gibson, Esq. 
 
 PLANS DIVISION. 
 Director of Plans Captain Cyril T. M. Fuller, c.m.g., d.s.o. 
 
 / Captain Ragnar M. Colvin. 
 
 Assistant Directors of Plans -( Captain Kenneth G. B. Dewar. 
 
 I Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter v.o. 
 
 Commander Alfred H. Taylor. 
 
 Henry T. Dorling, d.s.o. 
 Colonel R.A.F. Cecil J. L'Estrange-Malone 
 Lieutenant Charles W. L. Meynell. 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 
 Lieut. R.N.V.R. Hugh Micklem. 
 
 Li.-Col Lewis S. T. Halliday, v.C, o.b., e.m. 
 
 Major Godfrey P. Orde, b.m.l.i. 
 
 Paym. Lieut.-Commr. Ernest D. G. Colles (act.). 
 
 296 
 
Appendix 
 
 297 
 
 OMl Staff. 
 Staff Clerk ...A. Backhouse, Esq. (act.). 
 4 Temporary Clerks. 4 Women Clerks. 
 
 NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. 
 Director of Naval Intelligence. . .Rear- Admiral Sir W. Eeginald Hall, K.o.M.a., o.b. 
 Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence... Captain Raymond A. Nugent, o.m.q. 
 Assistant Directors of Naval Intelligence... Captain William M. James. 
 
 Captain Raymond Fitzmaitrice, D.s.o. 
 
 Captain Vivian R. Brandon {act.). 
 
 Lieut.-Col. Walter Sinclair, r.m.l.i. 
 
 lAeut.-Col. Arthur Peel, r.m.l.i. 
 
 Commandant Intelligence School Mai.-Gen. 3. F. Daniell, o.m.q., r.m.l.i. 
 
 Civil Assistant Hugh Broadbent, Esq. 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 Commander Morris E. Cochrane, Major Cecil E. S. Wright 
 
 R.M.L.I. 
 
 Charles B. Mulllns, 
 
 R.M.L.I. 
 
 Chandos E. W. Hill, 
 
 R.M.L.I. 
 
 K. A. Marriott, D.s.o., 
 
 K.M.A. (re<.).l 
 J. C. Farmer, r.m.l.i. 
 J. W. Seigne, r.m.l.i. 
 
 D.s.o. (ret.). 
 
 Geoffrey B. Spicer- 
 Simson, d.s.o. 
 
 Walter C. Lucas. 
 
 Malcolm H. S. Mac- 
 Donald, D.s.o. 
 
 Arthur W. Wood 
 (act.) (ret.). 
 
 Lionel E. H. Eoyle. 
 
 Bernard Buxton, 
 D.s.o. 
 
 Wilfrid A. Thompson 
 
 Geoffrey S. P. Nash. 
 
 George H. Lang, 
 D.s.o. 
 
 Walter T. Bagot(ac<.) . 
 
 Commander \ Lord Herschell. 
 B.N.r.R.) K.c.v.o. 
 
 C. P. Serocold, o.b.e. 
 A. G. Dennlston, 
 
 O.B.E. 
 
 Lieut.- Com. Roger V. de Halpert 
 (ret.). 
 
 Lievt.-Com.\-i, t, a^„ t, ., „ 
 
 RN y R /^- j63. Adcock, o.b.e. 
 
 James Randall, o.b.e. 
 Prank C. Tiarks 
 
 (act.). 
 William E. Clarke 
 
 (act.) . 
 H. Paget, O.B.E. 
 Cecil N. R. Wright. 
 
 E. A. Gardner. 
 
 F. L. Bu-ch. 
 James A. Dawes, m.p. 
 W. T. Dltcham. 
 Norman Craig, e.g., 
 
 m.p. 
 Henry M. Howard 
 (act.). 
 
 Eng. Capt.... Feicy Wheater (act.) 
 ^Sf'^-'ljohnL. Deacon. 
 
 Lieut Edward S. Williams. 
 
 Andrew H. M. Hag- 
 gard. 
 
 F. B. Belfleld. 
 Kenneth P. Collier. 
 
 Lieut. R.NR. Wilfred A. Atwell 
 (tempi/.). 
 
 Lieut. \ Arthur E. Watts. 
 R.N.V.R.i P. Romer. 
 
 A. P. Stevenson. 
 
 A. D. Knox. 
 
 E. Harrison. 
 
 E. C. J. Green. 
 
 E. Bullough. 
 
 G. L. N. Hope. 
 
 L. A. Willoughby. 
 
 Lionel E. Wix. 
 
 Dudley F. N. Fitz- 
 gerald. 
 
 Frederick S. Le B. 
 Smith. 
 
 John P. Curwen. 
 
 Denys Bond. 
 
 Benjamin S. P. 
 Phillips. 
 
 Neville Forbes. 
 
 Burton S. R. Cope. 
 
 J. D. Beazley. 
 
 E. C. Qulggin. 
 
 Desmond MacCarthy. 
 
 Harold G. S. Dillon. 
 
 Walter H. Bruford. 
 
 Spencer S. G. Leeson. 
 
 Darrell Wilson. 
 
 Gabriel S. Woods." 
 
 Gilbert Waterhouse. 
 
 Henry R. Bowlby. 
 
 John Hooper. 
 
 Lieut. 1 H. H. Anderson. 
 B.N.V.R.iR. P. Keigwln. 
 
 G. L. Lawrence. 
 
 O. T. H. Rishbeth. 
 
 J. S. Blake-Reed. 
 
 Alexander H. Smith. 
 
 John P. Toye. 
 
 Douglas G. Pugh. 
 
 Henry W. C. Tinker. 
 
 Maurice H. L. Met- 
 calfe. 
 
 John E. Bevan (act.). 
 
 J. C. Forster (act.). 
 Capt. R.M. G. W. Carew-Hunt. 
 
 G. H. Dimimett. 
 
 G. L. Bickersteth. 
 
 *^f^f)^-}FrankE.Bowen. 
 Capt. R.M. IS. O. K. Christie. 
 (unattached) iC. W. Hardlsty. 
 C. T. Onions. 
 R. Orr-Paterson. 
 J. D. Steel. 
 Lieut. R.M. Gordon H. Robinson. 
 Instr. iGuy V. Rayment. 
 
 Commr. ' b.a. 
 Paym. I Charles J. E. Rotter 
 
 Capt. I O.B. (act.). 
 Paym. jErnestW. C. Thring. 
 
 Commr. J William H. Eves. 
 Paym. 1 John N. Fletcher. 
 
 Lt.-Com. (Lloyd Hirst (ad.). 
 
 ^S. '-Herbert S. Burgess 
 
 R.N.R. 
 
 (act.). 
 
 S«6-£im<. \Sam B WUiiamflon. 
 R.N.V.R. (Montague L. W. 
 J Pnce. 
 
 l2'L«Jff-;.?obertP.P.C. 
 R.N.R. . 
 
 Robertson. 
 Swans ton. 
 _- Mackesou. 
 
 llSad.).}^^^^i''I^Bush. 
 
 Midshipman Harry P. Green- 
 wood ttempy.). 
 
 Paym. \ P. J. L. 
 Sub-IAeut. (V. R. S'n 
 R.N.V.R. J G. P. Ma 
 
 Additional Officers borne temporarily for the Naval Staff, were shown in the Navy Ust under ' President.' 
 
 Staff Clerks— 
 
 A. Q, T. Turner, Esq. (act.). 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 Cartographer — 
 
 C. Brickenden, Esq., m.b.e. 
 2 Second Division Clerks. 
 1 Confidential Shorthand Writer. 
 
 2 Assist. Clerks, 7 Temp. Clerks, 
 
 1 Supervising Asst. Clerk (act). 
 7 Boy Clerks, 91 Women Clerks. 
 
 22 Draughtsmen. 
 
 2 Photographersj 
 
298 
 
 Appendix 
 
 The followmg have been appointed or lent for temporary service during the War : — 
 
 The Hon. Mrs. Adam (unpaid), W. H. Anstie. m.a. (Lent from Dartmouth College), Esq.. Sir P. W. 
 Baker-Wilbraham. Bt. ll.b.. Lieut. J. M. Ball, Miss Barlow (unpaid). Rev. P. M. Barnard. 
 L-ieut. E. G. Barnes. L. W. Baskcomb, Esq., Miss Beevor (unpaid), Lieut. E. J. Bolton, H. E. B. 
 Boulton. P. B. Bourdillon (unpaid), Esqs., 2nd Lieut. E. N. Eudmose Brown. T. Bruce (unpaid). 
 Esq.. Capt. L. W. W. Buxton. 2nd Lieut. W. M. Calder. C. W. Campbell (unpaid), Esq.. Miss Cecil 
 (unpaid), A. Cecil. C. S. Cheston (unpaid), W. J. Childs (unpaid), C. S. Cocks, c.m.g., Esqs.. E. G. 
 ColUngwood (unpaid), Esq., Lieut. W. E. Colllnson, Capt. E. J. F. Cullinan, O. M. Dalton (unpaid), 
 Esq., 2nd Lieut. A. C. Dickie, H. N. Dickson, c.b.e., m.a., d.sc. Esq., Miss E. Dodd, Mrs. Dugdale 
 (unpaid), J. M. Dyer (unpaid), Esq., Rev. G. Edmundson (unpaid), C. B. E. Ellis (Lent from Local 
 Govt. Board), M. Fanshawe (unpaid), E. Fetterlein, C. P. Fisher (unpaid), G. H. Fitzmaurice. 
 OB.. C.M.G., H. E. Ford, Esqs., Lieut. W. L. Eraser, Lieut. D. H. Fuller, Mrs. A. M. Gerard, J. L. 
 Gerrard (unpaid), L. Giles (vjnpaid), Esqs.. Mrs. Goldschmid (unpaid), Mrs. Gooch (unpaid), J. W. 
 Goodwin. Esq., Dr. E. C. Gough. Miss Grahame. A. C. Grant Duff. Esq.. Miss Graseman (unpaid), 
 Lieut. B. M. Gunning. Capt. E. D. Hanly. Capt. S. G. Harvey. Professor J. B. Henderson (unpaid), 
 Lieut. E. L. Hobson (London Regt.), Miss K. Horsefall. Mrs. Howarth (unpaid), O. J. Howarth 
 (unpaid), J. B. Hutton. Esqs.. Lieut. J. H. Inltsip, R.A.F., H. B. Irving. Esq.. Miss M. E. Jenkin. 
 F. W. Kell (unpaid), Esq.. Capt. J. Kennaway. W. S. Kennedy. H. W. Lawrence. E. Lewin. E. 
 Lobel (unpaid), Esqs.. Capt. D. H. Loch. Major E. J. Lugard. c.b.e.. d.s.o. (Indian Army, retd.), 
 J. E. Moreton Macdonald. (unpaid) Esq., Professor A. A. Macdonell (unpaid), H. Macfarlane 
 (unpaid), J. Macfarlane (unpaid), H. W. Harden (unpaid), Esqs.. Lieut. K. C. Marlowe. Capt. 
 E. H. Molyneux. D. Montgomerie. Esq.. Rev. W. Montgomery, m.a., Mrs. Moon (unpaid), Mrs. Stuart 
 Moore (unpaid). L. G. Collison Morley (unpaid), D. Morrison (unpaid), E. Nevill, E. D. Norton 
 Esqs.. Miss M. V. Nugent, Miss D. G. N. O'Connor, Lady Alexandra Paget (unpaid), H. J. Patqp 
 (unpaid), Lieut. V. N. Peel, G. W. Prothero, Esq., Lieut. F. W. Eix, Miss M. I. Eobertson. E. Eussell. 
 Esq.. Miss Salter (unpaid). Dr. F. E. Sandbach, Miss C. A. Simmins, Lord Stanmore, Professor 
 W. B. Stevenson (unpaid) C. G. Stone (unpaid), Esq.. Lieut. F. N. Stringfield, P. Studer (unpaid), 
 Esq.. Capt. W. H. Tapp. Miss Taylor (unpaid), E. C. Trench. Esq., E. Vaughan-WlUiams, e.g. 
 (unpaid), Esq., Lieut. A. Ventura, B. C. Wallis (unpaid), Esq.. Rev. A. E. Ward, Miss 'Wen)y(unpaid}, 
 Miss E. M. Welsford, 
 
 TEADE DIVISION. 
 
 Director of Trade Division Captain Alan G. Hotham. 
 
 Assistant Director of Trade Division ...Captain Charles T. Hardy. 
 Secretary to D.T.D Paym, Commr. (act.) John Siddalls. 
 
 Captain W. H. D. Margesson (ret.). 
 
 Philip Walter (ret.). 
 Frederick K. C. Gibbons (ret.). 
 Lawrence L. Dundas, c.m.g, 
 Hubert G. Alston, c.b. 
 Thomas Fisher (act.) 
 
 Commander Sir Charles L. Cust, Bt.,- e.c.v.c 
 O.B., c.m.g., CLE. (ret.). 
 Oscar V. de Satge (rei.). 
 A. H. Tarleton, m.v.o. (emerg.). 
 Francis E. Wrottesley. 
 Francis H. L. Lewin. 
 Guy E. Livingstone (ret.). 
 Hugh W. Innes Lilllngston (ret.). 
 
 ^^j*^*^^} Walter H. Wilkes, e.d. (ret.). 
 <^^~*^} William Ginman (act.). 
 
 ieut.-Com. j ^ 
 R.N.r.R. \ L.'^ 
 
 Ueut.- 
 R. 
 
 E. Arnold-Forster (temporarily 
 detached). 
 McCormick-Goodhart (act). 
 
 Lieut. 1 F. H. McCormick-Goodhart 
 
 R.N.V.R. ' Eugene A. Lang. 
 
 John McK. Eobertson. 
 Arthur Bright-Smith. 
 Albert P. Mecklenburg, m.c. (act.) 
 Eng. Capt. ....Henry C. Eush (act.) (ret.). 
 Lieut.-Col. ...Thomas H. Hawkins, c.m.g., b.m.l.i. 
 Paym. Capt. Graham Hewlett (act.). 
 Paym. "\ Cunningham Prior. 
 
 Lieut- > William E. Scotland. 
 
 Commr. ) Geoffrey T. Smyth. 
 
 George W. Watson. 
 
 I Paym. 
 
 Lieut.- 
 
 Commr. 
 
 R.N.R. 
 Paym. 
 
 Lieut. 
 
 R.N.R. 
 Sub-Lieut, 
 Paym. 
 
 Sub- 
 
 R. 
 Paym. 
 
 Sub-Lt. 
 R.N.r.R. 
 
 .J. 
 
 ym. ■) 
 ub-Lt. \ 
 ..N.R. ) 
 
 '■] 
 
 W. A. J. Boxford (act.). 
 
 Joseph H. Wilson. 
 
 Voltlein St. J. Van der Byl. 
 
 Stanley G. Wood. 
 
 W. J. Gadd. 
 
 Thomas Bawden-Provis. 
 
 S. Johnstone Douglas. 
 Hugh S. Kingsford. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Staff CUrk. 
 2 Second Division Clerks. 
 4 Clerical Assistants. 
 18 Temporary Clerks. 
 
 ...C. Brown, Esq. (act.) 
 
 S Boy Clerks. 
 
 4 Higher Grade Women Clerka 
 33 Women Clerks. 
 
 The folloioing have been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 
 H. S. Moss Blundell. Esq.. c.b.e., 
 ix.D. (unpaid). 
 
 Sir Frederick Bolton (unpaid). 
 G. D. Hardinge-Tyler, Esq. 
 
 W. E. Hargreaves, Esq. (unpaid}, 
 J. Heron Lepper, Esq. 
 
Appendix 
 
 299 
 
 SIGNAL DIVISION. 
 Acting Director of Sianal Division Captain... 'RicharA L. Nicholson, d s.o. {acl.)i 
 
 Naval Staff. 
 
 Captain John A. Slee (act.) {Head of WIT 
 
 Board). 
 Commander ...Gerald B. Villiers. 
 Lieut.-Oom. ...Edward L. B. Oliphant. 
 
 B.N.V.B >^- Cleveland-Stevens {act.). 
 
 Lieut Frederick W. Boswell. 
 
 InetU. iJ.^.F.iJ... .Frederick W. Atterbury. 
 
 Lionel W. Huntington. 
 Major B.ilf.^... .Stephen C. Wace. 
 Major II.M.... lSdwa.id Gillespie, d.s.o. 
 Capt. R.M ...Arthur J. Mellor. 
 Paym. Com.. ..John E. A. Brown (.act.). 
 Paym. i<.-Com... .Bernard A. S. Bromley. 
 
 Paym. £/.-(7om.... Alexander 0. Home (.act.). 
 
 Edward W. H. Travis (act.). 
 George R. Russell (ad.). 
 Paym. Lt.-R.N.R....John W. Sells, d.s.c. 
 Gerald T. E. Cockerill. 
 
 Sub-Lt. R.N.V.R Laurence C. Robinson. 
 
 George H. Lindsay. 
 Russell Williams. 
 John F. H. Grant. 
 Faytn. Sub-Lt. JJ.A^.F.B.... Alfred Banner. 
 
 William G. Willmott. 
 James L. A. Huggan. 
 Brian Rhys. 
 John C. F. Davidson. 
 Ralph C. Seal. 
 Sydney R. Gilbert. 
 Gilbert Race. 
 
 2 C!hief Writers (pensd.). 
 
 6 Hired Extra Clerks. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 6 Higher Grade Women Clerks. 
 
 2 Women Clerks. 
 
 ANTI-SUBMARINE DIVISION. 
 Bireetor of the Anti- Submarine Division Captain William W. Fisher. c.B.. M.v.o., r.n. 
 
 .1 • I 1 n- , .cjt. J 1- r, 1. ■ TV- • • / CajJtom Forster D. Arnold Fo 
 Assistant- Directors of the Anti- Submarine Dimsion\ ^^^/^^ Qg^jjj -q^ pucher, r.n. 
 
 (Captain Forster D. Arnold Forster, c.m.g., e.n 
 l( 
 
 Associates for Experiment and Research. 
 
 Professor W. H. Bragg, o.b.b.. p.r.s. 
 Philip V. Hunter. Esq., m.i.e.e. 
 
 Naval Staff. 
 
 Captain John W. Carrington, D.3.0 
 
 Commander ...George B. Lewis. 
 
 John R. Middleton, d.s.o. 
 Edward H. Russell. 
 James S. McL. Ritchie. 
 Henry L. Hitchins. 
 Henry R. Sawbridge. 
 Lionel H. Hordem (ret.). 
 Maurice C. Bomford. 
 Claude C. Dobson, d.s.o. 
 Charles D. Bumey, c.m.g. {act.). 
 
 lAeut.-Com. ...Ernest R. Cloag. 
 
 Stephen S. English. 
 
 Harold W. Morey. 
 
 Charles V. L. Norcock {ret.). 
 
 Eng. Captoin... Henry W. Metcalfe {ret.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. 1 Louis C. Bemacchl (act.). 
 R.N.r.R. /Tacy M. W. Wallis {act.). 
 
 Lieut James L. L. Sloan. 
 
 Valentine G. O. Shortridge. 
 
 Lieut. \ 
 
 R.N.r.R.f 
 
 Paym. Lieut- \ 
 Commr. {act.)f. 
 
 Paym. Lieut.X 
 R.N.R. I 
 
 Sub-Lievi. I 
 R.N.V.R. J 
 
 Cecil A. V. Roper. 
 Lancelot E. Gaunt. 
 Reginald W. Jones. 
 Leonard Cowtan-Hatton. 
 Frederic Bacon. 
 Joseph Flrmlnger. 
 Harold S. Sharp. 
 H. Russell-Jones. 
 Roger M. Lucey. 
 Thomas V. Hughes. 
 
 Gordon Franklin. 
 
 Henry J. Crane (ac<.). 
 Stanley V. Moon {act.) 
 
 Oliver Holmes. 
 George W. Bjiight. 
 Raoul S. B. Sergent. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Staff Clerks . 
 
 fW. G. Johns, Esa. iact.).^ 
 • IW. R. Hale. Esq. {act). 
 
 2 Clerical Assistants. 
 7 Temporary Clerks, 
 
 9 Women Clerks. 
 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 Chief Designer... A. E. H. Pew. Esq. 
 6 Draughtsmen. 4 Inspectors. 3 Tracers. 
 
300 
 
 Appendix 
 
 The followmg have been appointed or lent for Service during the War : 
 S. R. Blades Esq.. Malcolm H. Ersklne. M. A., Bev. E. Moreton Prichard, C. P. Scott, Esq. {U.S.A.). 
 
 Experimental Station, Parkeston Quay, Harwich. 
 
 Research Staff. 
 Resident Director \ Colonel A. S. Eve, o.b.e,, 
 
 of Research ! f.r.s., d.so. 
 
 Deputy Resident \A. O. Rankine, Esq., 
 
 Director of Research I d.SC. 
 C. V. Drysdale, Esq., d.so. 
 F. B. Young. Esq., e.a., m.SO. 
 A. LI. Hughes. Esq., d.so. 
 R. W. Boyle, Esq., d.so. 
 H. Gerrard, Esq., m.sc. 
 L. S. Hartshorn, Esq.. b.so. 
 E. L. Hopwood. Esq., m.so. 
 J. H. Powell, Esq.. m.so. 
 W. P. Rawlinson. Esq.. m.sc. 
 
 A. B. Wood, Esq., m.so. 
 
 H. R. Rivers-Moore. Esq.. b.so. 
 
 B. S. Smith. Esq. 
 J. T. Irwin, Esq. 
 
 Capt. A. J. lonides, e.a.f., b.a. 
 Gapt A. J. Roberts, b.a.f. 
 Lieut. A. R. Wells, B.so. 
 A. J. JoUey, Esq. 
 
 E. E. Brooks, Esq., b.so. 
 
 R. S. J. Spilsbury, Esq.. b.so. 
 W. Place. Esq.. b.so. 
 A. Craig. Esq. 
 
 F. P. Burch. Esq. 
 
 W. Jevons, Esq., m.so. 
 
 Sub-Lieut. G. F. Partridge, b.n.v.b., b.sc. 
 
 J. Anderson, Esq. 
 
 Capt. J. C. Manson, Can. Eng. 
 
 Capt. R. H. S. Boulding, r.m., b.sc. 
 
 J. R. Milne, Esq., d.so. 
 
 Lieut. W. Kerr, b.so. 
 
 G. Williamson, Esq., m.sc. 
 
 D. G. Dunbar, Esq. 
 
 Lieut. E. S. Bieler, o.r.A., b.a. 
 Lieut. G. A. Wallace, b.m. 
 Capt. H. C. B. Brown, b.a. 
 
 Executive Staff. 
 
 Superintendent Major J. H. W. Gill, R.E. 
 
 Electrical Eng. and 1 Capt. C. G. R. Cosens, 
 Technical Assistant i b.b. 
 
 Lieut. E. Lucas, r.n.v.e. 
 
 Lieut. C. R. Wylie, e.n.v.r. 
 
 Lieut. D. V. Hotchkiss, r.n.v.b. 
 
 Lieut. H. Hamilton, r.n.v.b. 
 
 C. Menkens, Esq. (Works Manager). 
 
 O. Le M. Knight, Esq. 
 
 Wt. Shipu>right E. O. Staddon. 
 
 W. W. Burgess, Esq. {Technical Assist.). 
 
 A. L. Orchard, Esq. 
 
 A. L. Turner. Esq. 
 
 Eng. Lieut, (act.) H. J. Lyle. r.n.r. 
 
 W. F. Yates, Esq. 
 
 E. F. Kent, Esq. 
 
 MINESWEEPING DIVISION. 
 
 Director of Mvnesweeping Captain Lionel G. Preston, o.b. 
 
 Assistant Director of Mi/nesweeping Commander Henry M. J. Rundle, o.b.e. {act.) 
 
 Captain Hugh S. Curry, d.s.o. 
 
 Captain {act.) Harry F. Cayley. d.s.o. {ret.) 
 
 {Liaison OMcer). 
 Com. R.N.R. ...Reginald Salmon, d.s.o. {act.) 
 
 (tempy.). 
 Lieut. \ Charles H. Powell. 
 
 R.N.r.R. 
 
 2 Temporary Clerks. 
 
 Lieut. 1 Arthur Scott-Elliott. 
 
 R.N.V.R. /John W. Wooding. 
 Louis N. Sanderson. 
 
 ""cZm:}^'^^^'^ B. Ford. {act.). 
 Temp. Sig. Boatswain George J. Dore {act.). 
 3 Women Clerks. 
 
 MERCANTILE MOVEMENTS DIVISION. 
 
 Director of Mercantile Movements.. .Captain Frederic A. Whitehead. 
 Secretary to D.M.M....Paym. Lieut.-Commr. (act.) Paul S. Stricldand. 
 
 Captai/n Bertram H. Smith. 
 
 Walter J. C. Lake. 
 Commander ...John Kiddle. 
 
 Cuthbert D. Longstaff. 
 Capt. iJ.^.B.... Hubert W. Kenrick, o.b.e., e.d. 
 
 {act.) {ret.). 
 Meut.-Com. ...Claude B. Evans. 
 Lieut. R.N.R. James R. Harding. 
 Lieut. R.N.V.R....Aithui H. Churchill {tempy). 
 
 Paym. Capt. ...H. W. Eldon Manisty, o.m.g. {act.) 
 (Organising Manager of Convoy.) 
 ComrrMnder ...Harold V. Dundas. 
 Com. B.^.F.iJ.... Henry D. King, d.s.o., v.D. 
 
 Rollo Appleyard. 
 Meut.-Com... .SoYm O. Wyatt (ret.). 
 
 Roland A. Clark. 
 Lieut.'Com. R.N.R.... ^i&mY McConkey. 
 
 lAeut Geoffrey E. Biurton. 
 
 Ueut. R.N.R. William L. Wilson. 
 
 Lieut. R.N.V.R. ...Hubert M. Eisdell. 
 
 Thomas R. Westray. 
 
 Geoffrey F. Gilbert. 
 
 Alan P. Herbert. 
 
 H. E. Ashley Sparks. 
 
 Eng.-Commr Francis J. Sutton. 
 
 Eng.-Lieut. George S. McKenzie. 
 
 Paym. Lt.-Com. ...John M. Hodge. 
 Paym. Lt. R.N.R. Philip K. HutcMnson (act.). 
 Paym. Sub-Lt. I Hubert G. Hickman. 
 R.N.r.R. 'Robert W. Carroll. 
 
 W. J. Gregory. 
 
 Thomas Sherratt. 
 
 Clifton Robbins. 
 
 Robert P. White. 
 
 William A. Harris. 
 
 Captain Cathcart R. Wason, o.M.a. (Capt. 
 
 of Naval Tuns). 
 Commander ...Hartley R. G. Moore. 
 
 John Horton (act.). 
 Paym. Lt.-Com. R.N.R... .Cyril Cox. 
 
 1 Minor Staff Clerk, 10 Tempy, Clerks, 1 Boy Clerk. 12 Women Clerks. 
 
Appendix 301 
 
 AIR DIVISION. 
 
 Director of Air Division Tempy. Brig. Gen. Robert M, Groves, o.B., D.s.o.. A.F.O., r.a.f. 
 
 Civil Assistant to D. A. D W. A. Medrow, Esq., m.b.e. 
 
 Lieut.-Gol C. H. K. Edmonda, D.8.O., b.a.f. 
 
 Tempy. Lieut.-Col. Lawrence H. Strain, d.s.o.,r.a.f. 
 Tempy. Major ...Reginald E. Nicoil, b.a.f. 
 
 S. J. Rutland, d.s.o., r.a.f. 
 
 William 0. Michle, b.a.f. 
 Tempy. Major Reginald F. Maitland, b.a.f. 
 
 Henry A. J. Wilson, b.A-F. 
 
 Tempy. Captain.... Ala.n M. Waistell. d.s.o., r.a.f. 
 H. Sherwood, b.a.f. 
 P. S. Hargreaves. b.a.f. 
 Leonard E. Lander, r.a.f. 
 R. Talboys, b.a.f. 
 
 8 Temporary Women'ClerkB. 
 
 GTTNNERY AND TORPEDO DIVISION. 
 
 Director of Naval Artillery and Torpedo Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, c.b. 
 
 Assistant Directors of Naval Artillery and Torpedo Captain Norton A. Sulivan. 
 
 Captain Howard J. Kennard. " 
 
 Naval Staff, 
 
 Commander... WiUied A, Egerton. 
 (.For Civil Staff see under Operations Divisions.) 
 
 TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION. 
 
 Director of Training and Staff Duiies... Captain Herbert W. Richmond, b.n. 
 Deputy Director of Training and Staff Duties. ..Lieut.-Col. Sir Rhys Williams, Bt., D.s.o., K.c. 
 Assistant Director of Training and Staff Duties. ..Captain Guy P. Bigg-Wither, b.n. 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 
 Commander... Altiei C. Dewar {ret), b.n. 
 
 Commander... WaXtei P. Koe, b.n. 
 
 Major JJ.itf.^... .Edward W. Harding. 
 
 CHIEF CENSOR'S DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Chief Censor. 
 Commodore Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Bart, o.B 
 
 Assistants to Chief Censor. 
 
 Com)nander Ernest H. Rideout, R.N. I Paym. Commr. Edward H. Shearme, o.b.e., b.n. 
 
 I Paym. Commr. {act.) Charles F. Webber, b.n. 
 
 Attached to Chief Censor. 
 Lieutenant Stephen D. Neal, R. N. V. R., Official Naval Photographer. 
 Sub.-Lieutenant Frederick W. Engholm, R.N.V.R., OMdal Naval Cinemalographer. 
 
 For Duty at Press Bureau'. 
 
 Captain The Hon. Sir Seymour Fortescue, k.o.v.o. 
 
 O.M.G., E.N. 
 
 Captain Richard Sullivan, b.n. 
 Commander Andrew W. Davies, o.b.e., b.n. 
 Commander Bertie W. H. Greenfield, b.n. 
 Commander {ad.) Henry A. B. Shrubb, b.n. 
 
 Lieut.- Commander The Hon. D'Arcy Lambton, b.n. 
 Lieut.-Commander Stuart D. Blair, k.n. 
 Lieutenant Charles B. Scholefield, b.n.v.b. 
 Lieutenant George H. Cundell. b.n.v.b. 
 Lievttenant Henry J. Mason, b.n.v.b. 
 
 For Duly at the War Office. 
 Commander Harold G. Grenfell, b.n. I Major Roland M. Byne, o.b.e., b.m. 
 
 Paymaster Lieutenant {ac<.)... Herbert H. Sergent. R.N.R. 
 
303 
 
 Appendix 
 
 NAVAL PUBLICITY DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Director of Naval Publicity ... Rear-Admiral Sir Guy E. A? Gaunt. e.o.m.Q., g.b. 
 
 Naval and Marine Staff. 
 
 Commander Colpoys 0. Walcott iret.). 
 
 R. Orme Webb Wet). 
 Com. B.N.V.B...F. W. Belt, D.s.o. (ad.). 
 Lieut.-Commr. \J. M. Gilliland. 
 
 B.N.r.R. J G. B. Beer. 
 Lieut. B.N.B. ...E. H. Gordon. 
 Lieut. B.N.V.B. H. T. Sullivan 
 
 J. St. V. Crowder. 
 
 W. D. Barnitt. 
 
 R. H. Smith. 
 
 D. Maxwell. 
 
 Major B.M. 
 
 Lieut. B.M. . 
 
 Paym. Lieut.- 
 Commr. 
 B.N.V.B. 
 
 Paym. Lieut.- 
 B.N.B. 
 
 ..F. E. Dood. 
 
 H. McEvoy. 
 
 C. Pears. 
 ..Gordon H. Robinson. 
 
 Hughes. 
 
 |-Collingwood J. 
 
 1 J. P. Loughnan {act.). 
 /H. Foster {act.). 
 
 {For Civil Staff see under Intelligence Division.) 
 
 The following have been appointed or lent for temporary service during the War : 
 Captain P. Connard, C. Hanbury, Esq., Sir J. Lavery, a.b.a.. Glyn Philpot, R. G. Roberts. 
 H. P. Wyatt • Esqrs. 
 
 MATERIEL DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OP THE CONTROLLER. 
 
 Third Sea Lord and Controller... Commodore Charles M. de Bartolom^. c.b. 
 Civil Assistant... J. A. C. Champion, Esq., o.b.b. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION. 
 Director of Naval Construction... Sir Eustace H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, k.c.b. 
 Deputy Director of Naval Construction...^. H. Gard, Esq., C.B., m.v.o {act). 
 Assistant Directors of Naval Construction.. .T. Dally, Esq., c.b.e. {act.) {Superintendent of Naval 
 Construction). A. W Johns, Esq. {act.), J. H. Narbeth, Esq., m.v.o. {act.), 
 H. Pledge, Esq.. c.b.e., A. E. Richards, Esq. 
 Superintendent of Admiralty Experiment Works. ..B,. E. Froude, Esq., c.b., ll.d., f.r.3. 
 
 Chief Constructors. 
 
 Assistant Constructors, First Class. 
 
 E. L. Attwood, o.B.E. 
 {act.). 
 
 S. E. Boyland, c.b.e. 
 {act.). 
 
 F. Bryant, o.b.b. {act.). 
 A. J. Hobson {act.). 
 
 C. F. Munday. 
 M. P. Payne {act.). 
 O. A. Payne {act.). 
 P. L. Pethict:, Esqrs. 
 
 Constructors. 
 
 G. A. Bassett {act.). 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 C. M. Carter, m.b.b. 
 
 {act.). 
 E. B. Charig {act.). 
 G. H. Child {act.). 
 S. V. Goodall, M.B.E. 
 {act.). 
 
 {Tempy. detached). 
 C. Hannaford {act). 
 
 B. B. Harries {act). 
 ¥. Hlckey (act). 
 
 C. J. W. Hopkins (act). 
 A. E. Horley (act). 
 
 C, W. Kerridge (act). 
 
 A. G. Akester, b.so. 
 J. Angus, b.so. 
 C. W. Bion, b.so. 
 E. L. Champness, B.so. 
 P, C. Cocks. 
 
 T. H. Bentley 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 
 E. S. Curphey 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 
 W. Froude (Haslar). 
 
 G. Hackney. 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 
 W. H. Wallond. Esqrs. 
 
 F. M. Lee (act). 
 
 C. S. Lillicrap, m.b.e. 
 
 (act). 
 W. J. Martin. 
 T. L. Mathias (act). 
 E. D. Meryon (act). 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 A. Nicholls (act). 
 W. E. Noble (act). 
 R. P. Pether (act.). 
 
 (Overseeing). 
 W. G. Sanders (act). 
 A. W. Watson (act). 
 L. C. Williamson (act). 
 L. Woollard, Esqrs. 
 
 Temporary Constructor... V. F. Hill, Esq. (Overseeing) 
 Temporary Assistant Constructors. 
 
 D. A. Coskery, b.so. ] Capt R. S. Johnson. 
 
 Assistant Constructors, Second Class. 
 P. T. Blackman. j G. McCloghrie. 
 
 W. A. D. Forbes. J. E. P. Moon. Esqrs. 
 
 R. W. L. Gawn. 1 
 
 J. L. Davies. 
 R. Pairley. 
 T. Graham, b.so. 
 W. R. Hockaday. 
 
 A. E. Kimberley. 
 
 M. M. Parker. 
 
 G. McL. Paterson, b.sc. 
 
 A. P. Patterson, B.so. 
 jP. G. Rouse. B.A. 
 J. H. Sowden, b.sc 
 T. E. Sowden. B.so. 
 J. CM. Wilson. Esqrs. 
 
Appendix 
 
 303 
 
 Temvorarv Acting AsaisUmi Constructors. 
 
 G. H. A. Smith. 
 
 A. Taylor. 
 
 S. F. Thorr 
 
 A. Warren. 
 
 G. H. Whlteway. Esqrg. 
 
 T. Burch. E. J. Horawell. P. J. Parmlter. 
 
 G. Chase. W. H. Humphrey. G. B. Peach. 
 
 J. S. Clark. P. Huanlsett. G. Penney. 
 
 W. H. Easfccotfc. J. C. W. Hutson. A. F. Perkins. 
 
 F. T. W. Harris. W. J. Laughton. i H. Phllpot. 
 
 W. E. Macey. I 
 
 Temporary Assistant... 'R. W. Dana, Esq., o.b.e., m.A. 
 Inspectina OMcer of Ship Filling Work...S. A. Truscott, Esq 
 Inspecting OMcer of Smiths' Work...'E. T. Pearson. Esq. 
 Curator of Drawings... W- J. Moore, Ebq. 
 Confidential Clerks lo D.N.C....J. Luffman. Esq. 
 
 F. O. Bamfbrd, Esq. (act.). 
 Technical Clerk to D.N.C....Vf. H. Malpas. Esq. 
 54 Principal and 302 Assistant Overseers. 
 t20 First Class and Oi Second Class Draughtsmen, 1 First and 1 Third Grade Dockyard Clerks, 9 Blen 
 and 30 Women Typists and Clerks, 1 Boy Clerk, 4 Modellers, and 2 Sunprinters. 
 
 DEPAETMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING. 
 
 Director of Electrical Engineering... G. H. Wordlngham, Esq.. o.b.e., m.i.o.e., m.i.m.e., m.i.e.e. 
 Assistant Directors of Electrical Engineering... A., D. Constable, o.b.e., mi.e.e. {act.) and 
 
 E. T. Williams, m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Electrical Engineers, Higher Grade.. .'P. P. Fletcher, o.b.e., a.m.I.e.b. (ad.), and 
 
 R. Wightman, a.u.i.e.e. (ad.), Esqrs. 
 
 Electrical Engineers, Lower Grade.. .'S. Melville Ackery, m.i.e.e., F. C. Forster, m.i.e.e., H. R. Green, 
 
 A.M.I.E.B., (ant). W. P. Scott, a.m.i.e.e. (act.) and H. H. Stratton, a.m.i.e.e. (act), Esqrs. 
 
 Tempv. Electrical Engineers. ..X Dimmack. m.i.e.e., a.m.i.m.b.. J. Brodie, F Morton, a.m.i.e.e., 
 
 J. Shepherd, m.i.o.e.. m.i.e.e., J. M. L. Slater, R. W. White, and A. E. Wilson. Esqrs. 
 
 First Assistant Elecl/rical Engineers... A.. W. Abraham (ad.), E. C. Allen (ael.), F. Amor (ad.), G. W. Braby 
 
 (act), W. H. Chatten (act), W. M. Couch (act). E. E. J. Marks (act), T. Pedrick (ad.), J. Shaw, a.m.i.e.e. 
 
 (act). W. J. Spencer (act), and L. A. Tippen (act). Esqrs. 
 Tempy. First Assistant Electrical Engineers.... M. R. Gardner, P. L. Gill, a.m.i.e.e., T. D. Trees and W. 
 
 Simpson, Esqrs. 
 
 Technical Secretary... 'F. Morton, a.m.i.e.e., Esq. 
 
 10 Principal Electrical Overseers, 108 Assistant Electrical Overseers. 
 
 9 First Class, 4 Second Class, and 12 Temporary Draughtsmen, 5 Women Tracers. 
 
 8 Tempy. Clerks. 11 Women Clerks and 3 Boy Clerks. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ENGINEER-IN-CHIEP. 
 
 Engineer-in- Chief of the Fled...Eng. Vice-Admiral Sir George G. Goodwha, k.C.b. 
 Deputy Engineer-in-Chief and Superintendent of Naval Engineering — 
 Eng. Rear-Admiral Edouard Gaudin, o.b. 
 Assistant Enaineers-in- Chief ! ^^- C'^vlain Charles W. J. Bearblock. C.B. (Umpy.). 
 ^ssutani angineers-m-vniej ^^^^ Captain John Mcl,aurin. 
 
 Eng. Ca-ptain Edward Short (ret) (temp.). 
 
 Engineer Inspectors. 
 
 Eng. Captain David J. Camithers. 
 
 Frederick W. Marshall. 
 
 Charles C. Sheen, o.b. 
 Eng. Commander Arthur E. Hyne. 
 
 Joseph J. Kirwin, o.b.e. 
 
 John Hamilton. 
 
 Thomas G. Proctor. 
 
 William S. Mann. 
 
 Robert Beeman. 
 
 Jesse H. Harrison. 
 
 Ernest Nibbs. 
 
 Frederick J. Pedrick. 
 
 Alfred Turner. 
 
 James Legate. 
 
 Edwin F. St. John (ret.) (act.) 
 Eng. Lieut.-Gom....l3.a.Told B. Tostevin, d.s.o. 
 
 Engineer Lieutenant- Commanders. 
 George W. Odam. 
 John S. Orr. 
 Edwin Williamson. 
 Lawrence Turner. 
 Augustus Shackle. 
 Sydney R. Dight. 
 Herbert A. Slade. 
 George B. Allen. 
 
 Tempy. Eng. Lieut-Commanders. 
 Frank Hucks. 
 Alick R. Kyle (act). 
 John McD. Scott (act). 
 Engineer Lieutenant Brian J. H. Wilkinson. 
 Lieut. (E.).. .Edward R. Micklem. 
 Lieut. B.iV.F.iJ.... Charles H. Hayward. 
 
 Examiners of Marine Engineering Woi-k...B.. Goodchlld (act), J. Hocking (act). J. G. Newton (act.) 
 J. F. M. Parkinson (act), F. Russell (act), A. J. Smith (act), Esqrs. 
 
 Examiner cf Dockyard Work...'E. Fage, Esq. (act.) 
 Examiner of Engineering Accounts... J. F. W. Hetterley (act), Esq. 
 Confidential Clerk to E.-in-C....V/. J. Pask, Esq. (act). 
 10 1st Class Draughtsmen. 21 2nd Class Draghtsmen. 14 Temporary Draughtsmen. 2 Dockyard Clerks, 
 1 Hhed Writer, 5 Temporary Clerks. 2 Extra Clerks. 22 Women Clerks. 2 Boy Clerks. 
 
 Admiralty, Engineering Laboratory, City and Guilds (Engineering) College. Exhibition Road, S.W.7. 
 Superintendents. . .Eng. Commander Charles J. Hawkes. R.N. 
 Chief Designer... K. W. Newman, Esq. | Testing Engineer... 3. Aitkin, Esq. 
 
 Metallurgist... F. H. Hudson, Esq. 
 (There were a number of Associates for Experiments and Research), 
 
304 Appendix 
 
 BNGINEEE OVERSEERS AND STAFF. 
 
 At Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth & Go., Walker Yard, Newcastle-on-Tyne (for H.M.S. " Eaglet "). 
 Eng. Capt. W. J. Maudlino. R.N. 
 
 Sunderland, Middlesbrough and Hartlepool Districts. 
 Eng. Capt. B. B. Garde, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Doxford & Son. Sunderland 
 Eng. Lieut.. ..C. J. Brown, r.n. (ret.). 
 10 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
 London District, I. 
 Eng. Capt. T. S. Guyer, R.N. Address— 6, Laasa Road Eltham. S.E.9. 
 6 Civil Assistants. 
 
 At Pawflsld Shipbuildmg Co., Govan, and Messrs. A. Stephens, lAnthouse. 
 
 Eng. Capt. G. G. Knight, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Fairfield, Govan, 
 11 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
 Barrow-in-Furness district (and Machinery Depot, Carlisle and Mobecambe). 
 
 Eng. Capt. R. B. Avers, M.V.O., R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Vickers & Co.. Barrow. 
 Eng. lAeut. J. W. Tomlin, e.n. 
 Artif. Eng. G. E. Peckham, r.n. 
 8 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
 At Messrs. Palmers S. & E. Co., Jarrow-on-Tyne. 
 Eng. Capt. W. Wallis. R.N. 
 
 5 Civil Assistants. 
 
 At Messrs. Beardmore & Co., Dalmuir. and Messrs. Denny & Co., Dumbarton. 
 
 Eng. Capt. T. H. Pounds, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Beardmore & Co., Dalmuir. 
 Eng. Lwut.-Com. H. Leverett, r.n. 
 9 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
 Glasgow District. 
 Eng. Capt. J. R. Pedriok, R.N. Address — 62. Robertson Street, Glasgow. 
 3 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Leeds District. 
 Eng. Capt. G. E. Bench, R.N. Address — Quebec Chambers, Quebec Street, Leeds. 
 Oh. Artif. Eng. J. Dornan, r.n. 
 6 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
 Midland District. 
 Eng. Capt. W. J. Kent, R.N. Address — 71, Temple Row, Birmingham. 
 Eng. Capt. A. C. Darley, r.n. 
 Eng. Lieut.- Com. A. F. R. Northcott, r.n. 
 Eng. Lieut. A. Sandy, r.n. 
 Act. Artif. Eng. V. W. Stephens, e.n. 
 25 Civil Assistants and 4 Clerks. 
 
 Southampton District. 
 Eng. Capt. J. H. H. Ireland. M.V.O., R.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Thornycroft & Co, 
 Woolston, Southampton. 
 Eng. Lieut. M. J. Speer. r.n. 
 Eng. Lieut. A. Sherriff, r.n. 
 Eng. Lieut. R. F. Pearne, r.n. 
 11 Civil Assistants and 3 Clerks. 
 
 At Messrs. Hawthorn, Leslie & Co., St. Peters Works, Newcastle-on-Tyne. 
 Eng. Capt. F. Main. R.N. 
 
 7 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Derbt, Nottingham, and Loughborough Districts (and Machinery Depots, Derby 
 and Birkenhead). 
 Eng. Capt. V. E. Snook. R.N. 
 
 Eng. Lieut. J. A. ResTiolds, r.n. 
 Eng. Ideut. C. E. Walton, r.n. 
 8 Civil Assistants and 8 Clerks. 
 
 At Messrs. Babcock & Wilcox, Renfrew. 
 Eng. Capt. H. E. H, Ash, R.N. 
 
 Artif. Eng. J. H. Carter, r.n. 
 i C!ivil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
Appendix 305 
 
 Scotland District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. J. H. Watson, R.N. Address— 02. Robertson Street, Glasgow. 
 Ena. Com. J. Maxwell. 
 Eng. Lieut. D. E. McFarlane. k.n. 
 Ena. Lieut. F. A. Drury. r.n. 
 Ch. Arlif. Eng. W. Shakespeare, r.n. 
 11 Civil Assistants and 3 Clerks. 
 
 At Parsons' Sleam Turbine Co. and North Eastern Marine Eng. Co., Wallsend-on-Tyne. 
 
 Eng. Capt. C. H. Hill, R.N. Address— c/o Messrs. Parsons' M.S.T. Co., Wallacnd-on-Tyne. 
 4 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Ipswich District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. W. J. Render, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Vickers, Ltd., Ipswich Works, Ipswich. 
 4 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Isle of Wight and Portsmouth District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. A. V. Blake, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. J. S. White & Co., East Cowes, Isle of Wight. 
 4 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 EoiNBURaH District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. G. C. Bath, M.V.O.. R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Brown Bros., Eosebank Ironworks, 
 Edinburgh. 
 2 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 At Messrs. Yarrow & Co., Scotsloun. 
 
 Eng. Capt. E. S. Silk, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Yarrow & Co., Scotstoun. 
 Act. Artif. Eng. J. H. Smith, r.n. 
 2 Civil Assistants. 
 
 North of England District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. 3. W. Irish, R.N. Address — 21, Collingwood Buildings, Newcastle-on-Tyne. 
 7 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
 Belfast District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. E. Edwards, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Harland & WolS, Belfast. 
 Eng. Lieut. W. J. Hambly, R.N. {ret.). 
 Eng. lAeut. A. T. Lloyd, r.n. {ret.). 
 4 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Greenock District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. W. C. S. P. Bartwell, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Scotts, S. & E., Co., Greenock. 
 6 Civil Assistants. 
 
 At Wallsend Slipway & Eng. Co., and Messrs. Swan, Hunter, & Wioham Richardson, Wallsend-on-Tyne. 
 Eng. Capt. G. F. Thompson, R.N. Address — Wallsend Slipway Co., Wallsend-on-Tyne. 
 Ch. Artif. Eng. M. R. Oliver, r.n. 
 7 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Manchester District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. E. E. Bond. C.M.G., D.S.O., R.N. Address— 37, Arcade Chambers, St. Mary'f 
 
 Gate, Manchester. 
 
 Eng. Lieut. T. Williams, b.n. 
 
 H. Watson, r.n. 
 
 Ch. Artif. Eng. E. Booth, r.n. 
 
 5 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Liverpool District. 
 
 Eng. Capt. T. B. Buddy, R.N. Address — c/o Messrs, Cammell Laird & Co , Birkenhead. 
 Eng. Lieut. R. T. Rider, r.n. 
 9 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 At Messrs. J. Brown & Co., Clydebank. 
 
 Eng. Commr. A. T. H. Stone. R.N. 
 
 Artif. Eng. A. Astbury, e.n. 
 J. B. Gibbs, R.N. 
 E. W. Oldreive, r.n. 
 3 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
3o6 Appendix 
 
 At Messrs. Armstrong, WhUwarth & Co.. Elswich, Newcastle-on-Tyne. {For Submarines. 
 Eng. Commr. B, Spence, B.S.O., B.N. 
 
 3 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Sheffield District. 
 Eng. Commr. Mark Bundle, B.S.O., B.N. Address — 123, Surrey Street. Sheffield. 
 Eng. Lieut.-Com. H. Batey, b.n. 
 L. Jackson, r.n. 
 8 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 LiNOOtN, Hull, and Grimsbt Districts. 
 Eng. Capt. T H. Turner, B.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Euston, Proctor & Co., Lincoln 
 Eng. Lieut. W. C. Williams, r.n. 
 
 C. Marchant, r.n. 
 Artif. Eng. J. M. Bolley, r.n. 
 2 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
 Rugby District. 
 Eng. Commr. J. L. Kiniber, B.N. Address — c/o Messrs. Willans & Bobinson, Ltd., Eugby 
 Eng. Lieut. G. Davison, r.n. 
 3 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 Af Messrs. Armskong, Whitworth & Co.. Naval Yard, Walker-on-Tyne (for Machinery Depot). 
 Eng. Commr. T. Soper, b.n. 
 Artif. Eng. W. Williams, b.n. 
 
 At Messrs. Viclcers, Barrow-in-Furness {for Submarines). 
 
 Eng. Commr. H. W. Grant, B.N. 
 
 Tempy. Eng. Lieut. P. S. Oram, r.n. 
 
 5 Civil Assistants and 2 Clerks. 
 
 London District, II. 
 
 W. Letty, Esq. Address — 126. Wrottesley Eoad. Harlesden, N.W.IO. 
 6 Civil Assistants and 1 Clerk. 
 
 London District, III. 
 M. C. Ord, Esq. Address — 276. Trinity Road, Wandsworth, S.W.18. 
 9 Civil Assistants and 3 Clerks. 
 
 F. T. Wellard, Esq., Principal Boiler Overseer. Address — 172, Eotton Park Road, Edgbaston 
 Birmiugham. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OE NAVAL ORDNANCE. 
 
 Director of Naval Ordnance Captain Henry R. Crooke. 
 
 Assistant-Director of Naval Ordnance... Captain Joseph C. W. Henley. 
 Assistants to Director of Naval Ordnance. 
 
 Commander Bernard W. M. Falrbaim. 
 
 Eustace R. D. Long. 
 William B. C. Ross {ad.). 
 (G) Stanley T. H. Wilton. 
 (G) Gerald P. Longhurst, d.s.o 
 (G) John C. Hamilton. 
 Philip W. Douglas. 
 Archibald Gilbert {act.). 
 
 Commr. B.N.V.B. John G. Henderson {act). 
 Lieut.-Com. Dennis E. Eahilly. 
 Lieutenant Frederick J. Payne. 
 
 Malcolm A. McKenzle. 
 Ueut. B.N.r.B. Willie D. KJlroy {tempv-). 
 William D. S. Faulkner. 
 Lieut. B N.V.B. ...Michael P. B. Dalton. 
 
 Chief (?wiw«r... Herbert D. Jehan. 
 Commissioned Armourer... Ernest Addy. 
 
 Engineer Inspectors. 
 
 Eng. Captain Henry Wall, o.m.g. I Eng. Commander . . .Frederick C. E. Paton {temp.). 
 
 Eng. Commander ...Willia.m E»Tt. F. Leslie Robertson. 
 
 Walter G. Heppel. I Eng. Lieut.-Com. ...Stanley W. Cooke. 
 
 Examiner of Gun-Mounting Accounts... A. H. Duffield, Esq. {a^t.). 
 Examiner of Gun- Mounting Work...Vf. E. D. Helmer, Esq. {act.) (tempy.). 
 Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance — Commander (act.) John A. Duncan, 03. 
 Assistant Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance... Commander (act) John A. L. Hay. 
 Assistants to Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance... Commander Henry G. R. Bevan (ret.). 
 
 Commander Ralph G. Dinwlddy. 
 Commander Leslie J. L. Hammond (ret.). 
 Commander John E. Bray (ret.). 
 Commander Reginald O. B. Carey- Brenton (emergy. 
 Commander Percy Harvey (ret.). 
 Major Freeman C. N. Bishop, r.m.A. 
 
Appendix 
 
 307 
 
 The foUowina gentlemen have been lent for special service dur'ma the War — G. A. Becks, W. Pcttlt, and 
 
 J. Storey, m.b.b., Esqrs. 
 
 Naval OMcers employed on Inspection and Experimental Ordnance DvMea. 
 
 Under Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance : — 
 
 Inspector of Steel... Commander Harold G. Jackson {ret.). 
 
 Acli/na Inspector of Steel... Commander [act.) Llewellyn E. H. Llewellyn (ret.). 
 
 Depviy Inspectors of Steel... Colonel J. R. J. Jocelyn. b.a. (ret.) Uempy.) 
 Colonel W. H. Williams, c.m.q. 
 Commander Hugh J. Orr (ret.). 
 Commander Henry Thompson (ret.). 
 lAeut.-Com. Arthur W. Tomlinson? 
 Lieut.-Com. Frank R. Willis. 
 Lieut.-Com: John G. M. McHardy (ret.) 
 Lieut.-Com. Robert P. Veasey (ret). 
 Major B. M. A. Charles A. Bishop 
 Major R.M.A. Alfred D. B. Godfray. 
 H. Topham, m.b.b., Esq. 
 W. R. C. Hocking, Esq. 
 
 Head of Inspection of High Explosive Section. ..Ihomas J. G. Gough, Esq. 
 
 Assistant Inspectors of Steel. 
 
 Major-General J. T. J. Johnson, o.b. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 
 Charles L. Gordon, b.m.l.i. (tem.py). 
 
 A. E. Marchant, o.b. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 
 W. Huckisson, o.M.a., r.b. (ret.) 
 
 (tempy.). 
 
 Brig.-General H. S. Fitzgerald, o.b. (tempy.). 
 
 C. Greville Harston, Canadian Forces 
 
 (tempy.). 
 O. M. R. Thackwell, e.e. (ret.) 
 (tempy.). 
 
 Captain H. R. Evans, r.n. (ret), (tempy.). 
 
 William H. F. Taylor, b.n. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 N. G. Maoalister, e.n. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Roland Berkeley, b.n. (tempy.). 
 George F. S. Knowling (ret.) (tempy.). 
 
 Commander Charles K. McCallum (ret) (tempy.). 
 T. S. Gooch (emergy.). 
 A. H. Tremayne (ret.) (tempy.). 
 
 Commander, R.N.B. W. F. Caborne. o.b., e.d. (ret.) 
 (tempy.). 
 
 Lieut.-Com. Alister W. McDonald (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Ralph B. Bodilly (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Henry L. Cheston (emergy.) (tempy.). 
 Frederick J. Davis, b.d., r.n.b. (ret) 
 
 (tempy.). 
 W. E. Compton (ret.) (tempy.). 
 W. G. H. Cree (ret.) (tempy.). 
 John H. C. Ogilvy (tempy.). 
 
 Lieut. William Pollington (r«<.) (tempy.). 
 George R. Frew (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Robert J. Sweet (ret) (tempy.). 
 
 Lieut. B.N.B. Beauchamp H. Venner (ret) (tempy.). 
 Eng. Capt William J. Brown (ret) (tempy.). 
 Eng. Com. H. F. Davies, r.n. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Eng. Lieut.-Com. T. F. Brown (ret) (tempy.). 
 
 Colonel (temp. Brig.-Gen.) Cooper Penrose, r.b. 
 
 (tempy.). 
 Colonel 0. L. Robinson (ret.) (tempy.) 
 H. D. Olivier (tempy.). 
 D. A. Mills. R.B. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 A. L. Mein. b.e. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 M. H. Purcell, r.b. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 C. E. Nairnes, o.b., b.e. (ret) (tempy.). 
 W. F. Hawkins, b.e. (ret) (tempy.). 
 R. A. Inglis, o.M.a. (ret) (tempy.). 
 J. V. Jeffreys, r.b. (tempy.). 
 St Cot 8. V. Thornton, b.a. (tempy.) 
 H. O. Nelson, b.a. (tempy.). 
 lAeut-Col. F. H. Eliott, o.s.L., I. A. (ret.) (tempy.). 
 Altan Wadmore (tempy.). 
 A. Tracey (tempy.). 
 H. C. Evans, b.m.l.i. (tempy.). 
 P. C. Searle (Indian Army) (ret) (tempy.). 
 Major & Bt Lt-Col. Frederick L. Dlbblee, e.m.a. 
 Major R. E. Fitzgerald-Lombard (ret.). 
 
 E. Nash, B.A. (ret) (tempy.). 
 Captain G. B. Macpherson Grant (tempy.), 
 A. J. Beckett, r.e. (tempy.). 
 C. A. Pettit, K.o.T.L.i. (tempy.). 
 T. S. Bowen (Welsh Regt) (tempy.). 
 G. E. B. Bairnsfather, o.r.e., r.n. 
 (tempy.). 
 lAeut D. E. Horwood, B.A. (emergy.). 
 C. W. Wedekind, r.b. (tempy.). 
 Chief Gvrnner William J. Bonsey (tempy.). 
 Albert G. T. Brown (tempy.) 
 Gunner (ret) Richard W. Lawrence. 
 
 George E. Cock (tempy.). 
 Daniel J. O'Leary (tempyi 
 Frederick J. Luscombe (tempy.). 
 James C. Hartnett (tempy.). 
 John B. Cobb (tempy.). 
 
 The following gentlemen have also been appointed for temporary service during the War : 
 R. W. Archer, H. A. Armstrong. E. H. Belgrove, P. J. Bell, A. T. Binnie, G. B. Bowell, Prof. T. J. 
 Bromwich, f.b.s., C. B. Buchan, H. Burrell, F. Cameron, A. G. Cameron, E. B. Cole, b.sc, 
 J. F. Cunningham, H. W. H. Darlaston, E. H. Deane, A. H. Dodd, J. A. Doran, F. J. East. 
 H. R. Felix, J, Ford. S. E. Fox, E. Froude. R. P. Gibson. H. C. A. Goodall, G. F. Green, A. P. 
 Grenfell, L. T. Jarvis. A. Johnson, J. L. Kitto, K. M. W. Knights, E. Lake, J. L. Lambe, 
 A. E. Lee, A. L'Estrajnge, A. H. McConnell, E. Maslin, J. Maxwell, E. Moffatt, W. N. Moles- 
 worth. C. H. Moore, A. S. Moss-Blundell. F. G. Murray. W. Musk. A. S. Napier. T. J. C. Palm. 
 W. Pay, R. Percival, D. Picton Prichard, G. Weston Ramsey, G. H. S. Rollison, T. W. 
 Sheppard, S. Sherman, J. W. Slater, R. W. Smith, E. H. Sumner, R. L. Trench Watson, G, 
 Tumman. R. H. Voice, A. Wasey. G. H. Wells, J. Winn, H. Wontner-Smith, C. H. Wright 
 and J. H. Wright. Esqrs. 
 
3o8 Appendix 
 
 Lent from Borne Offke, 
 
 E. Bennett, A. C. Lowe, G. C. Sumner, E. L. Mecklin, C. F. Hunter, W. H. Mead, W. Turner, A. A. 
 Hepburn, C. H. Taylor, C. B. Plumbe, A. Fotheringham, H. T. Eingrose. and W. C. Evans, 
 Esqrs. 
 
 E. H. C. Newby, Esq., Deputy Cashier (act.) under the Inspector of Steel, Sheffield, 
 
 (lent from the National Insurance Commn.). 
 
 G. Trice, Esq., Act. Asst. Cashier under the Inspector of Steel, Sheffield. 
 
 Under War OMce. 
 
 Comdr. Archibald C. Goolden {act.) (ret.). I Major (Tempy. Lieut.-Col.) Nathaniel P. 
 Major R.M.A. Henry K. Stephens. | Trotman, e.m.A. 
 
 The following gentleman has been appointed for temporary service during the War . 
 H. Jackson. 
 
 Superintending Clerk... Ihomas G. Anderson, Esq., o.b.b. 
 
 Deputy Superintending Clerk. ..W. P. Daniels, Esq. (act.). 
 
 Assistant Superintending Clerks... A. C. Jones (act.), G. D. McFarlane (act.), S. W. Smith (act.), G. Stevens 
 (act.), and C. H. Webb, Esqrs. 
 
 Dockyard Clerks (including acting)... "eiiBt Grade 3, Second Grade 6, Temporary Clerks and Boys 123, 
 Draughtsmen 17, Computers 7. 
 
 Superintendent of Ordnance Stores... Captain Herbert E. Norbury, b.n. 
 
 Depuiy Superintendent of Ordnance Stores... 'H.. Fathers, Esq., i.s.o. (act.). 
 
 Assistant Superintendents of Ordnance Stores. ..A. McFarlane, Esq., o.b.b. (act.). 
 
 W. A. Mortimer. Bsq. (act.). 
 E. W. Wharhirst, Esq. (act.). 
 
 Naval Ordnance Store Officers... 3. Hutt, m.b.e. (act.), W. H. Eowe (ad.), N. Thomas (act.), and 
 W. Vaughan (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Deputy Ordnance Store OMcers...W. E. Eyles (act.), H. G. Hibberd, m.b.e. (act.), 
 C. H. Miuray (act), A. T. Eeed (act.), E. L. Tournay (act.), and 
 J. A. Vignaux (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Ordnance Store Officers. ..W. Baker (act.), A. H. Beard (act.), E. J. Fuller (act.), 
 
 H. Harrison (act.), W. E. Harrison (act.), W. A. Jordan, 
 L. A. Keightley (act), E. W. Lambe (act), W. Martin 
 (act), B. T. Matthews (act). C. A. Noise (act.). H. E. 
 Priddon (act), H. D. Bobbins (act), G. Sansford (act.). 
 and H. Weale (act), Esqrs. 
 
 Temporary Assistant Ordnance Store Officers. ..A. J. Atkins, Esq., Capt. H. E. Batty, F. Graham 
 
 Brown. E. Durrant, W. Hoather, Esqrs., Capt. H. 
 G. Laing, H. F. Miller, Esq., Capt C. D. Marshall 
 S. Smith, and C. Uppleby, Esqrs. 
 
 Chief Examiner of Naval Ordnance Work...F. J. Payne, Esq. (act). 
 
 Examiners of Naval Ordnance Work...'W. D. Evans (act.), O. Harrison (act)., and 
 
 C. Vinson (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 9 Ordnance Depot Clerks, First Grade (act). 
 
 7 Ordannce Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act). 
 
 1 Ordnance Depot Clerk, Third Grade. 
 
 1 Ordnance Depot Clerk. Third Grade (act). 
 79 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks. 
 57 Temporary Women [Clerks. 
 15 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers. 
 
 Acting Deputy Ordrmnce Store Officer — Sheffield.. .G. Swift, Esq. ■ ,; 
 
 Acting Assistant Ordnance Store Officer — Sheffield... 3. Cheadle, Esq. 
 
 Chief Analyst — Sheffield...Jo)in C. W. Humfrey, Esq. 
 
 Note. — Officers of the Naval Ordnance Department serving at Woolwich and at the Ports are not shown; 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE DIEECTOE OP TOEPEDOES AND MINING. 
 
 Director of Torpedoes and Mining Captain Frederick L. Field, c.b., AdC. 
 
 Assistant Director of Mining Captain Herbert N. Garnett, c.M.a. 
 
 Assistant Director of Torpedoes Captain Algernon H. C. Candy. 
 
 Assistant Director Electrical Section ...Captain John K. Im Thum. 
 Assistant Director of Paravanes Captain (act.) George L. Massey. 
 
Appendix 
 
 309 
 
 Naval Staff. 
 
 Vice- Admiral ...R. S. Phlpps- Hornby, o.M.o. 
 (tempi/.). 
 
 Captain Bryan G. Godfrey-Faiissctt, 
 
 O.V.O., o.M.o. iret.). 
 Captain (act.) ...Edgar R. Morant, d.s.o. 
 Commander Geoffrey C. Candy. 
 
 Thomas R. Pforde. 
 
 Archibald A. Lovett-Cameron. 
 
 Edward W. MacKichan. 
 
 William B. Mackenzie (6). 
 
 Stephen D. Tillard. 
 
 Brian Egerton. 
 
 Ralph Leatham. 
 
 Eric L. Wharton. 
 
 Malcolm K. Grant (ret.). 
 
 Gerard B. Riley (ret.). 
 
 Robert J. Howard (ret.). 
 
 Robert W. Dalgety, d.s.o. (ret.). 
 
 Noel A. Marshall (act.) (ret.). 
 Lieut.-Commr. ...Bettiam Vigne. 
 
 Lieiit.-Commr. .. .'Rodolpli H. F. de Sails, d.s.o. 
 
 George F. S. Bowles (emergy.) 
 (act.). 
 TAeutenanl Patrick P. Coleman. 
 
 Harry Simpson. 
 Lieut. R.N.R. ...Cyril Smith. 
 Lieut. B.N.r.R.Thoma,s J. Gibson. 
 
 Edward W. Taylor. 
 
 Norman W. Prangnell. 
 Ena. Commr Edward O. Hefford. 
 
 Alfred R. Kempt. 
 Lt.-Col. R.M. ...Chetwode G. C. Crawley. 
 
 S'ltr.B.l^'^-l^M.Lawson. 
 (Far duty with D.D.M.) 
 Gh. Gunner James Wood. 
 
 Leonard Repton. 
 
 Walter Thorogood. 
 
 Walter F. Williamson. 
 
 Captain of Defensive Mining... Captain Gordon C. Fraser (ret.), 
 to... Commander H. Strickland (ret.). 
 Lieut.- Com. Francis T. Hewson. 
 
 Seakohlight Party. 
 
 Warrant Electrician- ..Albert B. Williams. 
 George Haysom. 
 
 Warrant Electrician. . .Sy^ey H. Brown (act.). 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 
 Superintending Clerk (act.) P. E. Couratin, Esq., m.b.e. 
 
 Deputy Superintending Clerk (act.) F. Morrison, Esq. 
 
 Assistant Superintending Clerks (act.) H. Beeman and E. Elliss, Esqrs. 
 
 Examiner of Torpedo Tubes (act.) B. Woollard, Esq. 
 
 2 Dockyard Clerks, First Grade (act.), 6 Draughtsmen, 2 Women Tracers. 6 Temporary Men Clerks, 
 28 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists, 1 Boy Clerk. 
 
 The following gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service during the War : — 
 Inspectors of Wireless Telegraphy in Auxiliary Patrol Vessels. ..3. L. Capes and P. R. Coursey. Esqrs. 
 
 Lent by War OMce for Special Duty... Captain A. M. Low, r.a.f. 
 
 TJie followvng gentlemen have been appointed for temporary service : — 
 
 Supervising Inspectors... F. C. Asbury and Lieut. C. L. Treleaven. 
 
 Chief Inspectors... Dr. J. W. Capstick, Lieut. E. Edwards and Lieut. J. T. Jenkins. 
 
 Inspectors...!). S. Ainslie, W. B. Ball, F. B. Cooley, T. A. Daniel, R. T. Elworthy, H. R. Foreman, H. 
 
 Holmes. H. J. C. Ireton. L. H. Kirby, J. McKellar, Lieut. J. McQueen, V. F. Murray, W. W. E 
 
 Ross, A. R. Self, W. G. Spencer, and J. F. T. Yoimg, Esqrs. 
 
 MINES INSPECTION STAEF. 
 
 Bead OMce — 47, Victoria Street, S.W.I. 
 
 Head of Mines Inspection Dept. (E.M.I.D.) Eng. Captain William R. Parsons, c.b.e., e.n. 
 
 Chief Inspector of Mines William S. Pearce. 
 
 Secretary to B.M.I.D Miss E. M. Richards, Aest. Principal, w.r.n.s. 
 
 Technical Staff. 
 
 Charge Inspectors... "W. A. Stephens. C. Souness, J. K. Green and R. S. Brown. 
 Assistant Inspectors... Lieut. R.N.V.R. J. Stephens. G. Vincett. H. M. Andrews, and Ovmner (T) E. A, 
 
 McGill (ret.). 
 
 Examiner of Mining Accounts (aci.)...W. H. Collins. Esq. 
 
 2 Draughtswomen, 4 Typists, and 6 Lady Clerks 
 
 Divisional Inspectors 
 
 A. C. Flint, Esq. (Portsmouth). W. 
 
 J. T. Finnie, Esq.. (North of England). W. 
 
 E. S. Atherton, Esq. (Yarks.). C. 
 
 J. Ormond. Esq. (Lincoln). J. 
 J. Ward, Esq. (Colchester). 
 
 J. Marsden, Esq. (Birmingham). H. 
 J. Marshall, Esq. (Birmingham). 
 
 Eng. Capt. (ret.) J. K. C. Moore, r.n. (Bath). \ J. 
 
 E. R. Lewis. Esq. (South Wales). \ A. 
 
 J. Cleverley. Esq. (Manchester). W. 
 
 E. Chicken. Esq. (Manchester). R. 
 
 W. S. Gibson, Esq. (Glasgow). ' 
 
 of Area^. 
 
 , Salter. Esq. (East Scotland). 
 . Gill, Esq. (Oxford). 
 
 O. Hillsdon. Esq. (North-East London). 
 T. H. Elides, Esq. (South and South-West 
 London). 
 
 W. Oakley. Esq. (North and North-West 
 London). 
 Gladstone. Esq. (Eastbourne). 
 
 Grant, Esq. (Cray ford). 
 . Johnston, Esq. (Grangemouth). 
 
 J. Potter, Esq. (Immingham). 
 
310 
 
 Appendix 
 
 TORPEDO STORE DIVISION. 
 
 of Torpedo Stores Frederick Ward, Esq. 
 
 Assistant Suverintendeni of Torpedo Stores T. W. Midmer, Esq. 
 
 Torpedo Store Officers J. A. W. Ballard, Esq., m.b.e. (ad.). 
 
 G. 0. Cusens, Esq., m.b.b. (act.). 
 
 Deputy Torpedo Store Officers J. A. Jeffrey, Esq., {act.). 
 
 F. Stokes, Esq. (act.). 
 
 Assistant Torpedo Store Officers M^ Evans, Esq. (ad.) (tempy.). 
 
 J. Gray, Esq. (act.). 
 
 G. Heron, Esq. (act.). 
 
 W. F. Trenery, Esq. (act.). 
 
 Technical Assistant Eng. Lieut. Tfunca,!! P. Bauchop (tempy). 
 
 3 Torpedo Depot Clerks, First Grade (act.). 
 
 3 Torpedo Depot Clerks, Second Grade (act.). 
 
 2 Torpedo Depot Clerks, Third Grade (act.). 
 13 Temporary Hired Extra Clerks. 
 15 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 
 1 Established Woman Clerk (on loan from E.M.O.W.). 
 
 7 Boy Clerks and Boy Writers. 
 
 OflScers of the Paravane Department accommodated In the War College were shown under 
 
 H.M.S. Vernon. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OP THE DIRECTOR OP NAVAL EQUIPMENT. 
 
 Director of Naval Equipment Rear-Admiral Edward M. Phillpotts, c.B. 
 
 Assistant Director of Naval Equipment... Captain Percy Withers. 
 
 Captain Alexander Farrington. 
 
 Commander George H. H. Holden (ret). 
 
 Alick Stokes. 
 
 Henry F. H. Wakefield (tempy.). 
 
 John P. Champion, d.s.o. 
 
 (tempy.). 
 Lachian D. I. Mackinnon 
 
 (tempy.). 
 Edmund L. B. Lockyer, d.s.o. 
 
 (ret.) (act.). 
 
 Lieut.- Com. 
 R.N.R. 
 
 1 John W. Williams, d.s.o. 
 f Arthur P. Croxford (act.) 
 
 ^^B^N^VM. }Herbert O. Mock. 
 
 Lieutenant Alfred J. Parkes. 
 
 ^NVB }^^^ ^- Bateson. 
 
 Eng. Com Frank S. Moss. 
 
 Charles J. M. Wallace. 
 Shipwright Lt. Thomas L. Soper. 
 
 10 Lieutenants R.N.V.R. for work at Outports. 
 
 1 Dockyard Clerk (Second Grade), l Higher Grade Woman Clerk. 15 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 
 2 Modellers. 1 Woman Modeller. 
 
 SALVAGE SECTION. 
 Bead of SaJvage Secti(m...Hon. Captain Fred W. Young, o.b.e.. M.i.Mech.E., e.n.r. 
 
 Eng. Capt Henry R. Teed (ret.). 
 
 Commander James H. Dathan (ret.). 
 
 Commander \ Charles C. Talbot, e.d 
 
 R.N.R. J John Vigers, r.d. 
 Paym. Com. ...Arthur W. B. Messenger. 
 
 Naval Staff. 
 Lieut. 
 
 \ Harry Salmon (act). 
 R.N.V.R. /Edward Smith (act.). 
 
 ■P«|^;^/«'-}MatthewRush. 
 
 SiA-Lieiit. IPred Breary. 
 R.N.V.R. /William J. Perry. 
 
 Civil Staff. 
 Salvage Finance Officer... TreA. H. Lowe. Esq. 
 Salvage Accounts Officer... G. T. Jones, Esq. (act.). 
 G. Sudbury, Esq. (act.). 
 3 Second Grade Clerks, 5 Temporary Clerks, and 11 Temporary Women Clerks. 
 
 Salvage Officers. 
 
 Commander... Qnyhon C. C. Damant (act.) (ret.). 
 Commander ]. .Tames W. Gracey (act.). 
 RJif.R. ^Charles K. Borissow (act). 
 
 Ivo J. Kay (act). 
 
 George Davis (act). 
 
 George J. Wheeler (act). 
 
 ^™F^f. }Herbert R. Malet (act). 
 ^^RN°r" jc-liarles P. Smith (act). 
 &fr-}j«^«P^H. Vine (ac^). 
 
Appendix 
 
 311 
 
 Assistant Salvage OMcers. 
 
 ^'b!n!v!r. } Harry M. Turnor (act.). 
 Lieut. R.N. R. ...Alexander M. Tarver. 
 
 Peter McM. Cunningham. 
 
 Harold H. Hamilton. 
 
 William Price (act.). 
 
 Luut.R.N.V.R. Cecil H. Blsshopp. 
 Gilbert E. George. 
 John E. McQueen. 
 
 Lieut. R.N .V .R. :!o\m B. F. Gibney; 
 James Smith. 
 Leonard Elder. 
 Bobert Brooks. 
 Richard G. Whitford. 
 Robert Edmoiid. 
 Matthew G. Gibbs. 
 James Garrick. 
 
 Ena. Com. 
 R.N.R. 
 
 } WUllam H. Hewitt {ad.). 
 
 Superintendents of GmUract-built Ships — 
 
 Captain Cecil H. Fox. o.b.. 
 
 Captain William F. Slayter 
 
 1 For Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the 
 
 . < Clyde— 
 < Address — Broomhall Broomhill Drive. Partick, Glasgow 
 /"For Contract Work (not including Destroyers) on the 
 I Tyne. Thames. Mersey, at Barrow-in-Fumess. and 
 
 .-( at Sunderland. 
 
 Address — 4, Osborne Villas. Osborne Avenue. 
 1. Newcastle-on-Tyne. 
 
 Captain Superintendent of Torpedo Boat Destroyers building by Contract — 
 Captain Frank F. Rose, d.s.o. Address — 47. Victoria Street, S.W.I. 
 
 DEPAKTMENT OF THE DEPUTY CONTROLLER FOR DOCKYARDS AND SHIPBUILDING. 
 
 Deputy Controller... Sir Thomas Bell, e.b.e. 
 
 Director of Dockyards and Repairs... Rear Admiral Laurence E. Power, c.b., o.v.o. 
 
 Deputy Director of Dockyards and Repairs... 'E.. R. Bate. Esq.. c.b. 
 
 Superimiendent of Dockyard Branch — I Assistant Director of Dockyards and Repairs — 
 
 H. J. Webb, Esq.. o.b.e. I Eng. Captain Robert B. Dixon, c.b., r.u. 
 
 Electrical Engineering Assistant... W. McClelland, Esq. o.b.e., si.i.e.e. 
 
 Secretary to D.C.D.S. F. C. Routly, Esq. 
 
 Manager, Constructive Department — 
 
 F. B. Ollis, Esq. itempy.). (For special service) 
 Chief Constructors — 
 
 G. M. Apsey, Esq. (tempy.). 
 
 C. H. Croxford, Esq. (act.) (tempy.). 
 Commander W. T. Davis, e.n.v.b. (act.) (temp.). 
 C. G. Hall, Esq. (ad,.) (tempy.). 
 Constructors — 
 
 O. J. D. Bell, Esq., m.b.e. (act.). 
 G. F. Ludford, Esq. (act.). 
 J. McQueen, Esq. (act.). 
 H. B. Wood, Esq. (act.). 
 
 For Special Service — 
 
 ETig. Rear-Admiral Charles Rudd. 
 Ena. Capt. Albert E. Tompkins (ret.), r.n. 
 Eng. Capt. G. W. Murray (ret), n.N. 
 Eng. Capt. Arthur S. (3risp, r.n. 
 
 Engineer Assistants — 
 
 Eng. Commander Samuel P. Ferguson. 
 
 Eng. Commander James G. Budge. 
 
 T. E. Elvy, Esq., o.b.e. (Lent from Baulbow- 
 
 line Dockyard.) 
 E. R. Langmaid, Esq. 
 
 Examiners of Dockyard Work — 
 W. H. C. Coombe (act.). T. H. Harries, E. A. Lakey, J. D. Gibby (act.), J. Ellis, W. L. Coles. 
 F. Sanders. O. Benwood (act.), F. J. Fletcher (act.), J. A. Fage. m.b.e. (act.), W. J. Lewis (act.). 
 J. H. Martin (act.), and G. Moody (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 For Special Service. 
 Chief Administrative Officer... Major A. B. Wilson, r.m.l.i. 
 
 Electrical Engineers Higher Grade. ..T. Edge (tempy.), and J. S. Beddoe, u.b.e., a.m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs, 
 
 Electrical Engineers... I!,. L. Brain, m.b.e. (act.), and A. E. Franklin (act.). Esqrs. 
 First Assistant Electrical Engineers... B.. P. Blake (act.). G. R. Davis (act.), C. B. Irvine (act.), J. Macey (act.). 
 and A. H. Williams (act), Esqrs. 
 Clerical Assistant... G. C. Stanbury. Esq. (act). 
 Senior Visiting Inspector of Timber... Y^. H. Hooper, Esq. 
 Visiting Inspector of Timber... AUied James, Esq. 
 4 Dockyard Clerks (First Grade), 6 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade), 1 Senior Draughtsman. 8 First 
 Class Draughtsmen, 15 Second Class Draughtsmen, 17 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade), 2 Hired 
 Writers, 14 Temporary Clerks, 27 Female Clerks, 3 Female Tracers, and 10 Boys. 
 
 WARSHIP PRODUCTION SECTION. 
 
 LONDON STAFF. 
 
 Director of Warship Production. ..W. J. Berry, Esq.. c.b. 
 
 Deputy Director of Warship Production... Engineer Rear-Admiral J. G. Liversidge, r.n. (ret). 
 
 Assistant Director of Warship Productions... Eng. Captain P. D. MartelL b n., E. A. J. Pearce, Esq., o.b.e 
 
 Superintendent of Warship Production... W. H. Carter, Esq. 
 
 Senior Engineer Assistant... Engineer Captain (ret.) Jasper W. A. Parrott. 
 
 Superintendent of Warship Electrical Work... J. McOaffery, Esq., o.b.e. 
 
312 Appendix 
 
 Chief Examiner and Secretary to Director of Warship Production... 'R. J. Wright, Esq. 
 
 Constructors... A.. Adams (ad.), G. Bulkeley (act.), J. W. Dippy (act.), J. C. JougUn, m.b.e.. 
 
 F. L. Mayer (act.), and E. F. Spanner (act.), Esqrs. 
 
 Engineer Assistants... Engineer Captain W. A. Wilson c.m.g. (act.), e.n.. Engineer Commander William 
 
 H. Clarke, d.s.o., r.n.. Engineer Commander F. A. Gordon, r.n., E. A. Anthony, Esq., W. G. 
 
 Mathews (tempy.)., Esq. 
 
 Electrical Engineers ...A. J. Foord (act), A. J. Moore, a.m.i.e.e. (act.), Esqrs. 
 Assistant Constructors...!). E. J. Offord (2nd class), H. S. Pengelly (2nd class), V. G. Shepheard (2nd class), 
 J. W. Westlake (temvv. actg.), W. E. Saunders (tempy. actg.), W. -J. Craig, b.so. (tempy.), G. L. 
 Harvey (tempy.), W. J. Mares (tempy.), E. Macmillan (tempy.), and R. Whiting (iempi/.), Esqrs. 
 Financial Inspectors... "R. C. Knight (tempy.), W. J. Stallion (act), Esqrs. 
 Engineer Inspectors (tempy )...R. N. Brown. G. Burton, F. Fenton. L. H. Forsyth, W. Guthrie, Esqrs, 
 Lieut. H. W. Gill, E. Hood. C. Tillotson, D. Hutcheon, L. J. Nobbs, Esqrs. 
 Inspecting Officer... W. C. Thomas (ret.), Esq. 
 J'irsi ^ssistani Electrical Engineers... C. R. Jowett (act), C. H. Klyne (act.), E. E. Kill (act.), 
 H. D. Thompson, Esqrs. 
 Examiners of Accounts... J. T. Hartnell, Esq. (act), E. E. Rogers (tempy.), G. Taylor (tempy.), and 
 W. E. Vanstone (acO, Esqrs. 
 Assistant Examiners of Accounts. ..1. Batt (act), J. Boulden (act), W. Bray (act.), W. J. Care (act), 
 
 F. G. Gay (act), A. H. Hollis (act), S. W. E. Pippett (act), G. E. Wilson (act), Esqrs. 
 2 Dockyard Clerks (act) (First Grade), 5 Dockyard Clerks (act) (Second Grade), 8 Draughtsmen, 5 Dock- 
 yard Clerks (act) (Third Grade), 50 Temporary Clerks (female), and 28 Temporary Clerks (male) 
 
 OUTDOOR STAFF. 
 
 Clyde. 
 
 Warship Production Superintendent... S. E. Boyland, Esq. Address — 105, West George Street, Glasgow. 
 
 Deputy Warship Production Superintendent... V. W. Searle, Esq. 
 Warship Production Inspectors... A. C. Beard, F. J. Berry, J. Bryant, W. E. Head, W. T. Hoskin. 
 W. B. Hugman, F. G. McCuUoch, Esqrs. 
 Warship Produciicm Inspectors (Engineer)... J. Appleby, W. Bugg, D. McMillan, M. Munro. Esqrs. 
 Warship Production Inspectors (Electrical)... F. W. Robson and H. J. Stephens, Esqrs. 
 
 Tyne. 
 
 Warship Production Superint-endent... Address — " Milburn House," Newcastle-on-Tyne. 
 
 Deputy Warship Production Superintendent... J. Innes, Esq. 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors... lEi. J. P. Leatherby, J. J. N. Batey, A. S. Blatchford, A. E. Moore, 
 
 J. W. Turner, J. Sampson, Esqrs. 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors (Engineer)... P. Cowe, J. Findlay, T. McBride, C. Stuart, Esqrs. 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors (Electrical)... F,. E. Meams and E. Smith, Esqrs. 
 
 Mersey. 
 
 Warship Production Superintendent... Jj. D. Stansfleld, m.b.b., Esq. Address — 233, Royal Liver Buildings, 
 
 Liverpool. 
 
 Deputy Warship Production Superintendent... P. Wright, Esq. 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors... W. J. Bunday, E. A. Gawden, H. W. M. Harrison, T. M. Taylor, Esqrs. 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors (Engineer)... Q. Gould, J. Howells, C. Verity, Esqrs. 
 
 Warship Production Inspectors (Electrical).. .F. H. Auger and A. M. Fenner, Esqrs. 
 
 Warship Production Inspector (Engineers)... F. McFarlane, Esq. 
 
 London ahd Southern District. 
 Warship Production Superintendent... T,. E. Limming, Esq. 
 
 Manchester, Sheffield, and Leeds District. 
 Engineer Inspector... &. H. Warren, Esq. 
 
 BiRMmGHAM, Coventry, and Leicester District. 
 Engineer Inspector... B.. H. Peters, Esq. 
 
 3 Dockyard Clerks (Second Grade), 9 Dockyard Clerks (Third Grade), and 20 Temporary Clerks. 
 
 DIRECTORATE OF AUXILIARY VESSELS. 
 
 Director of Auxiliary Vessels A. W. Sampson, Esq. 
 
 Assistant Directors of Auxiliary Vessels Commander J. Bloomfield, O.B.E., r.n.v.e. 
 
 R. M. Gillies. Esq. 
 Deputy Assistant Directors of Auxiliary Vessels Major T. B. CouU, r.e. 
 
 C. Scott, Esq. 
 
 Capt. W. T. Turner, r.e. 
 Administrative Officer H. W. Butler, Esq. 
 
Appendix 
 
 313 
 
 H Teefimkal AsBietcmta. 
 
 lAeut. H. Ashworth. 
 G. C. Alward. 
 
 C. N. Ash. 
 W. H. Benoy. 
 
 D. F. Black. 
 H. G. Bone. 
 
 Major G. C. Bond, b.b. 
 
 Captain B. A. Brodle, b.e. 
 
 R. Cart. 
 
 R. Chalmers. 
 
 2nd Lieut. J. P. Duguid, r.e. 
 
 Major D. Dawson, b.e. 
 
 J. Dunsmnir. 
 
 J. V. Fuller. 
 
 W. Galbralth. 
 
 Lieut. W. Qammell. 
 
 Captain J. G. Harrison, r.e. 
 
 J. G. Hart. 
 
 H. E. Hodge. 
 
 Lieut. B. Q. Holmes, b.e. 
 
 A. Eylea. 
 
 M. H. McEwan. 
 
 Lieut. J. M. MacGUcbrist. 
 
 J. Miller. 
 
 T. R. Morrison. 
 
 J. M nnn . 
 
 Lieut. P. J. S. Murray, r.e. 
 
 Ena. Lieut.-Com. P. Page, e.n. 
 
 Lieut. E. Purdy, b.b. 
 
 Eng.-Lieut. J. Sampson, b.n. 
 
 H. Sheppard. 
 
 Lieut. R. A. Shott, b.e. 
 
 Mng. Svb-Lieut. O. W. L. Slater, r.n.k. 
 
 lAevi. J. W. Smith, b.e. 
 
 Captain D. Strang, r.e. 
 
 Lieut. E. A. Stow, b.b. 
 
 lAeut. S. Towiishend, b.e; 
 
 G. Watson. 
 
 S. R. Wells, 
 
 DEPARTMENT OP THE DEPUTY CONTROLLER FOR ARMAMENT PRODUCTION. 
 
 Deputy Controller. ..Sir Vincent L. Raven, k.b.e. 
 Secretary— W. H. Pettifor. Esq.. o.b.b. 
 Naval Assistant... Eng. Com. Arthur E. Lester, d.s.o., b.n. 
 Civil Assistant to D.C.A.P. ...'Eveldgh Nash. Esq. 
 Technical Assistant...!). T. Heap, Esq. AdministrativeJStaff OMcer... Major S. Robinson. 
 
 Chief Draughtsman.. .C. Wale. Esq. 
 Director of Production. Gums, Mountings and Sights...!,. !. G. Leveson, Esq. 
 Deputy Director of Production, Guns, Mountings and Siiihts...B.. S. Rowell, Esq. 
 Assistant Directors of Production. Guns. Mountings and Sights...!!,. T. Glascodine, Esq., and 
 Major D. Kirke^ Smith, d.s.o. 
 Deputy Assistant Director of Production, Guns, Mountings and Sights... C. J. S. Orton, Esq. 
 Technical Assistants — Guns. &e.. Division.. .3. Coulton, H. T. Dobbs, W. Methven (a^t.). 
 F. R. Roberts, Esqrs., and Lieut. R. H. E. M. P. de Lisle, e.n. 
 Director of Production — Torpedoes and Mines... A. H. Hall. Esq.. c.b.e. 
 Deputy Director of Production — Torpedoes and Mines... Commr. Carlton C. Sherman, c.b.e., b.n. (ad.) {ret.). 
 
 Assistant Director of Production — Torpedoes and Mines... ^. A. D. Acland. Esq. 
 Technical Assistants — Mine Division... W. A. Harris. A. I. Jack, L. King, C. S. Leathard, N. E. Noble. 
 
 and J. S. McLaren. Esqrs. 
 
 Assistant Director of Production — Mines — Group Section... Lieu^t. JR.N.V.B. Leslie G. Shadbolt. 
 
 Technical Assistants — Mines — Group Sections... W. E. O. Evans. G. V. Fowler, T. V Goodman 
 
 B. V. Hemsley. H. H. Ilett. G. W. Kettlewell. W. J. Scott. W. G. Smith, and J. Torrie. Esqrs. 
 
 Paravane Section... Lieut.-Commr. W. H. McConnell. o.b.e.. b.n.v.e. 
 
 Minesweeping Section... A. H. Norfolk. Esq. 
 
 Director of Production — Ammunition... Q. E. Woodward. Esq., o.b.e. 
 
 Deputy Director of Production — Ammunition. ..Lieut.-Com. H. S. H. Ellis, b.n. (ret). 
 
 A&sistant Directors of Production — Ammunition... 'F. S. MacNalty and A. H. Romans, Esqrs. 
 
 Deputy Assistant Directors of Production — Ammunition... W. F. Jesson and W. A. Reeve, Esqrs. 
 
 echnical Assistants — Ammunition Division... Lieut. C. J. Barton, b.f.a., E. B. Denbeigh, E. Knight 
 
 R. Maddock. and H. M. Rae, Esqrs. and Mrs. Wyat Hayward. 
 
 AlESHIP PBODUCnON. 
 
 Director of Production... E. C. Given. Esq. 
 
 Deputy Director... Captain J. Malcolm Eraser (act.), e.n.v.r. 
 Head of Supply Section... H. O. Boggan, Esq. 
 Administrative Staff OMcer... Lieut. (Tempy. Capt.) Frank Edwards, e.a.f. 
 Airship Engine Design. ..Eng. Commr. Leslie Robins, e.n. 
 
 Eng. Lieut.-Com. Frederick R. G. Turner, b.n. 
 Captain Rey G. Parry, d.s.o., b.a.f. 
 Captain Alexander McD. Steele, e.a.p. 
 Technical Assistant... F. Warren, Esq. 
 
 Armament... Lieut. (Tempy. Capt.) E. S. Peaice, r.a.f. 
 Electric and W/T Section... Capt. (Tempy. Major) Arthur Price-Reed, e.a.f. 
 Captain Arthur J. Osborne, b.a.f. 
 Captain E. G. Batt, e.a.f. 
 Lieut. (.Temvv. Gapt.) William B. Garrett, e.a.f. 
 
314 Appendix 
 
 Central Eydrogm Section... Major {Temvv. Lt.-Col.) Sidney R. Lowcock, e.a.f. 
 Major George M. T. Eees, r.a.f. 
 Cavtam Charles A. Slater, E.A.P. 
 Captain Alfred H. White, r.a.f. 
 Captain Cecil Llghtfoot, r.a.f. 
 Captain Lazarus S. M. Pyke, r.a.f. 
 Captain Arthur F. H. Smallpiece, r.a.f. 
 Captain John B. Butler, r.a.f. 
 Captain Reginald E. Ollerenshaw, r.a.f. 
 Lieut. Charles G. A. P. Spry, r.a.f. 
 Lieut. Stanley P. Elliott, r.a.f. 
 Lieut. Alfred C. Tapster, r.a.f. 
 Lieut. Bernard E. C. Davis, r.a.f. 
 Lieut. Harold Slaney, r.a.f. 
 2md Lieut. Andrew G. Allan, r.a.f. 
 Technical Assistant {Laboratory)... A. E. Griggs, Esq. 
 
 Airship Design Construetor...C. I. E. Campbell, Esq. 
 Assistant Constructors. ..A. P. Cole, Esq. 
 H. May. Esq. 
 F. Sutclifle, Esq. 
 Progress and Inspection... 1. Turton Jones, Esq. 
 
 Technical Assistants.. .Major Albert V. Thompson, R.A.F. 
 
 Captain (Tempy. Major) Harry Welch, r.a.f. 
 Captain Edwin H. Haworth, r.a.f. 
 Captain John D. Greenwood, r.a.f. 
 Lieui. David Greenwood, R.A.F. 
 2nd Lieut. Donald Y. Mattinson, r.a.f. 
 E. Adamson and C. F. Smith, Esqrs. 
 Works... Lieut. {Tempy. Capt.) John W. V. Paul, r.a.f. 
 Captain Perclval M. Davson, r.a.f. 
 Walter Sarel. Esq. 
 Costs... A. E. Wingfleld and S. F. Higgins. Esqrs. 
 Overseers. ..Eng. Commr. Bertram Harvey, r.n. 
 Assistant Constructors... B.. B. W. Evans, Esq. 
 J. L. Bartlett. Esq. 
 S. Payne, Esq. 
 
 District Progress Engineers D.C.A.P. Dept....Eng. Capt. W. H. Adams, r.n.. London; Eng. Capt. W 
 J. Black, R.N., Barrow-in-Furness ; Eng. Capt. E. Collingwood, r.n., Newcastle-on-Tyne ; 
 W. Clemence, Esq., Nottingham ; N. Clough. Esq., Manchester ; W. S. Edwards, Esq., Bir- 
 mingham : and J. H. Hollis, Esq., Glasgow. 
 
 FINANCE DIVISION. 
 
 Assistant Accountant General... A. Cimnison, Esq. {act). 
 Superintending Clerk... A. H. M. Fox, Esq. {act.). 
 Deputy Accounts Officers in charge of Branches... K. B. Bain, Esq. {ad.). G. H. Court, Esq. {act.), W. J. 
 
 Hean, Esq. {act), E. G. Peirce, Esq., m.b.e. {act.). 
 Deputy Accounts Officers... A. J. Camm, Esq. {act) {lent from National Insurance Audit Department), 
 
 H. E. Denny. Esq. {a£t) {lent from Inland Revenue), E. H. Gibson. Esq.. a.s.a.a. {act.) {lent 
 
 from National Insurance Audit Department), W. J. S. Greenland. Esq. {ad.), F. E. Johnson, 
 
 Esq. {act.) {lent from Inland Revenue). 
 Assistant Accounts Officers.. .G. J. Dear. Esq.. S. T. Pepler. Esq. {ad.), H. F, Skinner, Esq. {act), 
 
 E. Underwood, Esq. {act), E. H. Westlake. Esq. 
 Assistant Emense Accounts Officer. ..F. Hall, Esq. {lent by Inspector of Dockyard Expense Accounts). 
 Assistant Auditors {lent from National Insurance Audit Department)... A. E. Codd, Esq., H. Foulds, Esq., 
 
 E. G. Kench. Esq. 
 1 Supervising Assistant Clerk. 1 Assistant Clerk, 1 Hired Accomitant Clerk, 14 Temporary Clerical 
 
 Assistants. 6 Temporary Assistant Accountants, 39 Temporary Men Clerks, 2 Higher Grade 
 
 Women Clerks, 86 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists, and 18 Improvers and Boy Clerks. 
 
 Paymaster, Controller's Department. .Paym. Commr. Henry Homiman. e.n. 
 
 COSTINGS INVESTIGATION DIVISION. 
 
 Adviser upon Costs of Productions _ j, ^hlnney. Esq.. f.c.A. {act). 
 Assistant Accountant General > 
 
 Deputy... F. W. Papworth. Esq.. a.s.a.a. {Acting Superintending Clerk). 
 Assistant... 'B.. F. Palmer, Esq., m.b.e.. a.c.a. 
 Heads of Branches. ..C. D. Britten. Esq., a.c.a. 
 W. EUes Hill, Esq., .t.o.A. 
 W. L. Karamelli, Esq., a.s.a.a. {Acting Deputy Accounts Officer, lent from Nationa 
 
 Insurance Audit Dept). 
 F. N. Kidson, Esq., f.c.a. 
 C. H. Oldfleld, Esq., a.c.a. 
 Martin Price, Esq., f.c.a. 
 
Appendix 315 
 
 Assistant Auditors (lent from National Insurance Audit Dept.)...J. A. Clarkeon, a.r.a.a., 8. Whlncup 
 
 A.s.A.A.. Beqrs. 
 
 Superintmdvna Accountants...'^. Bell, o.a.. B. L. Biggs, a.c.a., E. A. Blackford, a.c.a., T>. M. Butcher 
 A.S.A.A., W. H. Cooper, a.s.a.a., H. V. Edwards, a.c.a., .J. A. Lewcock, a.h.a.a. : E. H. Nick- 
 son. A.O.A., C. V. Oldfleld. a.c.a., W. J. Phillips, a.s.a.a., P. W. Bumble, a.s.a.a.. B. 8. Teweon, 
 A.O.A., W. L. Threlford, f.o.a., J. M. Warren, a.s.a.a.. C. W. Weston, a.c.a.. C. C. Wlllson, 
 P.S.A.A.. H. G. Wilson, m.b.e., f.o.a., Esqrs. 
 
 Accountants... S. Allen, a.o.a.. P. W. Ardran. a.c.a.. G. Ashley, a.s.a.a., H. C. Barbour. c.A.. A. B. Bayley. 
 a.c.a., W. Benson. A. Birch, a.c.a.. H. M. Brittain. a.c.a.. H. Bruckshaw. W. E. Cox. a.o.a., 
 J. Dickson. O.A., P. Dixon, E. B. Dodd. J. B. Dunlop. c.A.. F. Egllngton. a.c.a.. H. EUett. 
 A.C.A.. A. Fielding, a.o.a.. H. Garman. a.c.a.. G. Gibson, a.c.a.. B. G. Greenshields, c.A.. J. P. 
 Griffiths. A.S.A.A.. C. T. Grimes, a.c.a.. P. T. Haslam, a.s.a.a., A. Hosklng. a.s.a.a.. B. C. 
 Howard, a.s.a.a.. T. A. Kitson. a.c.a.. H. Lees, a.c.a.. H. Luker. a.s.a.a.. W. E. Mansell, a.s.a.a.. 
 S. H. Mearns. a.o.a., W. J. Morton, a.s.a.a., B. Murray. c.A.. O. Myers, a.s.a.a.. G. T. Needham, 
 A.O.A., B. K. Norton, a.c.a.. H. Ogle, a.o.a.. C. A. Porter, a.c.a.. G. W. Boberts, a.c.a.. A. Boyle. 
 a.c.a.. S. Smith. A.O.A.. J. S. Stuart, a.s.a.a., E. M. Taylor, a.c.a.. A. E. Thomas, a.c.a. : H. 
 Trenchard, c.A., H. Tweedale, a.o.a., H. L. Tweedie. a.c.a.. P. H. Walker, a.s.a.a., G. Water- 
 worth, O.A., V. Watts, A.S.A.A.. T. C. Whittaker, a.s.a.a.. J. S. Wilson, a.c.a., E. G. Wolfe, a.c.a. 
 Esqrs. 
 
 Paym. Lieut.-Commr. B.N.R...- John P. Griffiths. 
 
 Paym. Sub-Lieut. R.N.R....IioheTt Ashworth, Charles Collins. Arthur Fltton. John L. Goodwin. 
 Bobert W. Hunton, Beginald F. Weekes. 
 
 69 Temporary Assistant Accountants, 2 Temporary Men Clerks. 34 Temporary Women Clerks 
 1 Assistant Clerk. 2 Boy Clerks. 107 Third Grade Clerks and Becorders. 
 
 DOCKYABD EXPENSE ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT. 
 
 (68. Victoria Street. S.W.I.) 
 
 Inspector of Dockyard Expense Accounts... J. Eyan. Esq.. o.b.e. 
 
 Assistant Inspector of Dockyard Expense Accounts... V. W. W. Burrell. Esq. 
 
 Expense Accounts OMcer...J. H. Jeffrey. Esq. (act). 
 
 Deputy Expense Accounts Officer. ..V. H. Hall, Esq. (act.). 
 
 Assistant Expense Accounts Officer. ..'W. A. Stevens, Esq. (act.) (for Stocktaking Duties), and 
 
 H. Haggis, Esq. (act). 
 
 Examiner of Accounts — J. E. Horswell, Esq. (act.). 
 
 Assistant Examiner of Accounts... C Band, Esq. (act.). 
 
 2 Dockyard Clerks Second Grade, 12 Dockyard Clerks Third Grade (6 acting). 2 Temporary Clerks, 
 
 12 Women Clerks, and 1 Boy Writer. 
 
 DEPAJRTMENT OP THE CONTBOLLEB-GENEBAL OF MEECHANT SHIP- 
 BTJILDING. 
 
 Controller-General.. . The Right Bon. Lord Pirrle. k.p. 
 
 Private Secretary... W. H. Sykes. Esq. 
 
 Personal Secretary... Misa Edmiston. 
 
 Diredor-Oeneral of Administration. ..Major-General A: S. Collard, c.b,. o.v.o.. e.e. 
 Personal Assistant... Capt. A. T. Marshall. 
 
 Secretary... W. A. T. Shorto. Esq.. o.b.e. 
 Personal Assistant... Capt A. Briggs. 
 
 Naval Assistant... Commr. P. S. Bising. e.n. (act.) (emergy.). 
 
 AdministraUve OMcers... Major H. S. Wescott (act.). Lieut W. J. Collins, F. F. Hopkins, and 
 
 E. Wotton, Esqrs. 
 
 Head of Statistical Section. . .Captain W. Gott. 
 
 Head of Personnel Section.. .'E. P. Evans, Esq. 
 
 Assistant to D.Q.A....Q. Spencer Hawes. Esq. 
 
 Directorate of Medical and Sanitary Services. 
 
 Deputy Director... Brevet lAeui.-Col. B. M. Carter. O.B.. I.M.S. 
 
 Deputy Assistant Director... Br. F. C. Blakiston. 
 
 Assistant to Controller General of Merchant Shipbuilding... C. J. 0. Sanders. Esq.. o.b.e. (lent). 
 Assistants ...T. G. Austin. G. Montgomery. L. Parker. W. H. Thomas. Esqrs. 
 
3i6 Appendix 
 
 Directorate of Merchant Shijibuilding. 
 
 Director... Lieut.- Col. J. Idthgow. M.O., r.g.a. 
 
 Personal Assistants ...D. R. Smith and A. Stevenson, Esqrg. 
 
 Directors... Major P. G. Denton, e.f.a.. Major F. L. Pickersgill, r.p.a., T. W. Davis, J. Fulton, 
 
 A. Hamilton, and P. Stobie, Esqrs. 
 
 Technical Assistants... Lieut. T. W. Cunningham, G. H. Bell, H. P. Claridge, J. Cole, 
 
 W. McA. Morrison, Esqrs., and Lieut. N. J. Biiller, m.q.c. 
 
 Chief Inspectors of Auonliary Shipbuilding. ..Major J. E. Muir, o.b.e., e.e., and D. Wavm, Esq. 
 
 InspectoTi — CaptaiM D. H. Young, r.e. 
 
 Directorate of Designs. 
 
 Deputy Director... Ti. Wilding, Esq. 
 
 Assistant Director... Piotessoi T. B. Abell. 
 
 Deputy Assistant Director... Lieut. A. M. Eobb. 
 
 Technical Assistants... Lieut. G. Knowles, e.e., and Lieut. S. G. West, r.e. 
 
 Directorate of Extensions. 
 
 Director... Major C. W. Brims, m.c. r.f.A. 
 
 Deputy Assistant Directors... Captain E. H. Emra and Lieut. C. W. Lucas. 
 
 Technical Assistants... Major F. H. Bowater, r.f.a., D. Eamshaw, Esq., A. Freeh, Esq., 
 
 Lieut. W. H. Hull. Lieut. E. G. S. Vaughan. 
 
 Administrative Officer. ..'N. Moore, Esq. 
 
 Resident Engineers... Maior 0. S. Berry. Captain J. W. Goldson, T. C. Ormiston Chant, and 
 
 C. M. Skinner. Esqrs. 
 
 Directorate of Engineering. 
 
 Assistant Director. ..Major G. E. Cockbum, o.b.e.. b.e. 
 
 Technical Assistants... Lieut. C. E. Street, J. E. Andrews, J. Cumming-Smith. H. E. Farmer, G. A. Garrett. 
 
 C. E. Lewis, A. L. Oubridge, A. Pendlebury, W. L. Stuart,' C. T. Wilkinson, J. P. N. Young, Esqrs. 
 
 Directorate of Ship Repairs {Home). 
 
 Director... Q. S. F. Edwards, Esq. 
 
 Deputy Director... Capt. G. W. Edwards. 
 
 Assistant Directors... A. W. Davidson and H. E. Parlett, o.b.e., Esqrs. 
 
 Technical and Administrative Assistants. . . J. W. Jack and J. T. Staples, Esqrs. 
 
 Administrative Officer ■•■Captain J. Robinson. 
 
 Directorate of Ship Repairs (Foreign). 
 
 Headquarters. 
 
 Director... Lt.- Col. H. M. Grayson, b.m. 
 
 Assistant Director... 'S. A. Lawrenson, Esq. 
 
 Technical Assistants... T. Drewry, Esq., Capt. T. C. Rolland, e.m., and H. S. Smaridge, Esq. 
 
 Administrative Officer — Lieut. W. H. Woods, e.n.r. 
 
 Paris — Assistant Director. ..Major W. J. Douglas, b.m. 
 
 Technical Assistants — Capt. F. W. D. Hamilton. W. Graham. J. MacLeod and P. E. Stewart. Esqrs. 
 
 Itaxt — Assistant Director... W. Murray Isdale, Esq. 
 
 Chief Inspector {North Italy)... C. Stewart, Esq. 
 
 Chief Inspector {South Italy)... J. L. Manson. Esq. 
 
 Technical Assistants... A. Cousins, E. J. Eobson, A. Rolland. and S. P. E. Watson, Esqrs. 
 
 Malta — Chief Surveyor... J. H. Barbour, Esq. 
 
 Buenos Atres — Assistant Director. ..Lieut. Bryan Laing. 
 
 South Apeioa — Deputy Director... F. W. Girdler Brown, Esq. 
 
 Directorate of Reinforced Concrete Construction. 
 
 Director. ..8. F. Staples, Esq. 
 
 Deputy Director... J J. E. Clark, Esq. 
 
 Technical Assistants... B.. A. Flinn, H. Gibbon, Esqrs., Dr. G. H. Salmon, Capt. J. de W. Waller, r.e. 
 
 Lieut. A. L. Palmer, r.n.v.r.. and 2md Lieut. J. T. Morris. 
 
 Directorate of Supplies. 
 
 Director... Major .7. W. Hamilton, r.p.a. 
 
 Assistant Directors... Major J. L. Marr. o.b.e., r.g.a., H. Cocks, W. G. Riddell, o.b.e., and J. C. Telford, 
 
 Esqrs. 
 Deputy Assistant Directors... J. Denny, G. F. Dowding, J. A. Muirhead, Esqrs., and Lieut. A. Milner. 
 Technical Assistants... Capt. G. B. Cross, e.e., Capt. E. H. S. White. F. A. Field. E. B. Irwin. W. C. Jones. 
 
 and G. L. Precious, Esqrs. 
 Administrative Officers... Capt. E. A. Blanch, e.p.a.. Lieut. H. S. Short, e.g. A., and N. C. Blanch, Esq. 
 Inspectors... Lieut. J. G. Mortimer, Lieut. J. Russell, 2nd Lieut. P. V. Brownhill, r.e., 2nd Lieut. F. G. 
 Cooney, b.e., 2nd Lieut. W. Copeland, r.e., W. Amot, H. E. Chaldecott, o.bj;., W. H. Cutten, 
 J. Dunlop, H. H. Earle, C. Fox-Dixon, and J I. Faton, Esqrs. 
 
Appendix 317 
 
 otter SectAon, 
 OMcer in Charge... Commander Edward A. Digby, b.n. 
 Assistants.. .Lieut. L. J. Beare. r.n.b., Lieut. John MacPhea. r.n.b., Lieut. J. Pluinpton, r.n.r., Lieut. 
 S. A. Smith, r.n.r., Lieut. Y. H. F. Wells, r.n.. Asst. Paymstr. A. H. Turpin. r.n.r.. D. A. 
 Bradley, C. Oookburn. and E. P. Burke, Esqrs. 
 
 Dazzle Section, 
 
 Senior Dazzle OMcer. ..Lt.-Comdr. Norman Wilkinson, o.b.b., b.n.v.r. 
 
 Assistants. ..Lieut. C. C. G. King, r.n.v.r.. Lieut. J. Jellicoe. b.n.v.r., lAeut. C. Clark, r.n.v.r.. Lieut. 
 S. Spurrier, b.n.v.r., lAeut. P. Mason. r.n.v.r.. Lieut. E. Wadsworth, r.n.v.r., Lieut. R. Kort- 
 right, R.N.V.R., Lieut. C. Taylor, r.n.v.r., Lieut. B. Jackson, r.n.v.r., Lieut. H. A. Yockney. 
 R.N.V.R., Lieut. R. M. Waylett, r.n.v.r., Lieut. C. W. Wyllie. r.n.v.r.. Lieut. B. Hook, b.n.v.r. 
 Lieut. C. Townsend, b.n.v.r., Lieut. C. Thomas, r.n.v.r.. lAeut. M. Smythe, r.n.v.r., Lieut. 
 C. Payne, b.n.v.r., Lieut. M. Dawson, b.n.v.r.. Lieut. R. Cleaver, r.n.v.r,. Lieut. P. Stone- 
 lake, R.N.V.R.. Meuii O. R. Moser, b.n.v.b., and A. Parkinson, Esq. 
 
 Information Section. 
 
 Director... T. Wareham Smith, Esq. 
 
 News Editor... F. Grundy, Esq. 
 Assistant... 2nd Lieut. A. P. Robbins." 
 
 Temporary Assistants, Clerks and Draughtsmen — 328. 
 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists — 28. 
 
 ADMIRALTY LABOUR DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Director of the Admiralty Labour Department — 
 
 Deputy Director of the Admiralty Labour Department... H. H. McClure, Esq. 
 Assistant Directors... Vice- Admiral W. De Salis, m.v.o. (Substitution Div.). 
 J. R. Bond, Esq. {Technical and Labour Div.). 
 Major J. C. Akerman {Labour Stipply and Housi/ng Div.). 
 Major W. T. David {Dilution JDiv.). 
 Secretary... n. E. A. Elliott, Esq., LC.S. | Establishment OMcer... 'E. M. Pearson, Esq. 
 
 Substitution Division. 
 
 Superintendent of General Section... W. Wrench Lee, Esq. 
 Superintendent of Negotiation Section... B.. S. Ratclifle, Esq., o.b.e. 
 Liaison Section... B. Wicks, Esq. 
 
 Labour amd Technical Division. 
 
 Superintendent of Labour Regulation... J. Evans, Esq. 
 Superintendent of Disputes Section... 3. D. McGregor, Esq. 
 Superintendent of Shipyard Section... John Barr, Esq. 
 Superintendent of Engineering Section. ..S. B. B. Hebb, Esq. 
 
 Legal Division. 
 
 Superintendent'of Legal Division... H. H. Fox, Esq. 
 Legal Assistant... Vetei Andersen, Esq. 
 
 Dilution Division. 
 
 Superintendent of Dilution Division... "W. G. Weekes, Esq. 
 Chief Technical Inspector. ..A. McDermot Service. Esq. 
 
 Labour Supply and Housing Division. 
 
 Administrative Assistants... A. H. Groom, Esq., A. C. Rldsdale, Esq., and 
 W. T. Wallace, Esq. 
 
 The following have also been appointed, or lent from other Departments, for temporary service 
 
 during the War — 
 E. B. Elwin, A. D. Parmer, P. Gray, m.b.e.. D. A. Hastings- Wilson, H. L. Heywood, J. B. Hill, Austin 
 Kendall, Esqrs., Lieut. G. Knowles, P. PickersgUl, Esq., Ueut. H. A. Sharpe, N. Sievwright. 
 P. Tiuner, Esqrs., Lieut. A. M. W. Wells, b.n.v.b., H. G. White, P. K. Wilson, C. H. Yeatman, 
 Esqrs. 
 
3i8 
 
 Appendix 
 
 District Dvrecfors. 
 
 J. E. Baker iBarrow). 
 
 R. L. Botham (Cardiff). 
 
 J. H. Brewerton {Southampton). 
 
 Lt.-Gol. W. Cooper (.Liverpool). 
 
 Lt.-Col. A. XJadle (London). 
 
 Eng. Bear-Adml. (ret.) C. W. 
 
 Gregory (Leeds). 
 R. B. Holt (Newcastle). 
 J. F. James (Belfast). 
 H. G. Jekin (Hull). 
 Eng. Capt. (ret.) J. Langmaid 
 
 (Birmvngham). 
 J. Gordon (Glasgow). 
 Eng. Rear-Adml. (ret.) A. E. L. 
 
 Westaway (Bristol). 
 
 Shipyard Technical OMcers. 
 
 W. Adam (Glasgow). 
 
 Eng. Rear-Adml. (ret.) J. H. 
 
 Adams (Dundee). 
 D. McD. Barbour (Liverpool). 
 R. Boucher (Norwich). 
 ^. Bucknall (Newcastle). 
 S. G. D. Cuer (Liverpool). 
 A. Dudgeon (Glasgow). 
 J. Duncan (Aberdeen). 
 R. 0. Farquliar (Glasgow). 
 J. Grigg (Glasgow). 
 J, D. Guthrie (Brisfoi). 
 Johnston Hughes (Belfast). 
 J. Laidman (Newcastle). 
 G. M. Mackay (iSwrndertoTid). 
 J. D. O. Mackenzie (Glasgow). 
 D. M. McKay (Glasgow). 
 R. J. Mills (Newcastle). 
 F. Moorsom (Cardiff). 
 T. B. Seath (Glasgow). 
 W. Y. Seath (Barrow). 
 F. W. Sturdy (Stockton). 
 C. B. Thomas (£ei«W. 
 
 iocal Areas. 
 
 P. Webster (Glasgow). 
 G. P. Wells (H«H). 
 J. Wilson (BmtoZ). 
 
 Engineer Technical OMcers. 
 
 W. T. Andrews (London). 
 A. Archer (Glasgow). 
 ,J. Bonthrone (Liverpool). 
 J. H. Chambers (Belfast). 
 A. Cordiner (Hm??). 
 A. Currie (Liverpool). 
 E. W. Dixon (Leeds). 
 
 C. H. Doidge (Sm??). 
 
 E. Edwards (Birmingham). 
 J. W. Elliott (Manchester). 
 L. T. G. Evans (London). 
 T. M. Gibson (Cardiff). 
 
 D. Gray (ieeds). 
 
 J. E, Hamilton (Barrow). 
 G. A. Hart (Leeds). 
 J. Hopkinson (/>i»erjJooH. 
 G. S. Home (Manchester). 
 C. A. Howarth (Glasgow). 
 G. B. Johnston (Glasgow). 
 A. J. Lawrence (Cardiff). 
 A. MacDonald (Glasgow). 
 G. N. Mc Vicar (Glasgow). 
 W. Murdoch (Swwderfond). 
 G. B. Nicholson (Cardiff). 
 J. F. Phillips (Newcastle). 
 J. S. Reid (Glasgow). 
 G. Beaufort-Richards 
 
 (Birmingham). 
 A. Robertson (Glasgow). 
 H. W. Sanders (Birmingham). 
 H. M. Sayers (iowdow). 
 S. J. Sewell (Leeds). 
 G. Turner (SrisioZ). 
 W. H. Warwick (ieetfe). 
 T. Warde (Liverpool). 
 1. Yorston (Newcastle). 
 
 Labour Regulation Officers. 
 
 A. J. Benson (Liverpool). 
 
 P. Black (London). 
 
 H. Blair (Belfast). 
 
 S. Bunton (Glasgow). 
 
 J. Cox (Birmmoftam). 
 
 W. G. Crulckshank (Glasgow). 
 
 J. Cunningham (Belfast). 
 
 S. R. Edmunds (Bristol). 
 
 W. M. Gibson (London). 
 
 H. Grainger (Newcastle). 
 
 T. Grifllths (J>ii;erpooZ). 
 
 H. Haddon (Cardiff). 
 
 The Earl of Hardwicke (London). 
 
 H. O. Hart (Londmi). 
 
 T. D. Heppel (London). 
 
 F. A. Herd (Birmingham). 
 M. Hodgson (Newcastle). 
 W. J. Jackson (Glasgow). 
 
 A. W. R. Kewley (Newcastle). 
 A. Magnay (Newcastle). 
 W. Marsh (Southampton). 
 W. C. Millard (HvU). 
 W. Nelson, m.b.b. (Southamp- 
 ton). 
 R. W. Owen (Liverpool). 
 
 G. H. Pearson (^etocostte). 
 W. Ramsden (Liverpool). 
 J. D. Rees (Cardiff). 
 
 R. N. Scott (Cardiff). 
 S. Shaw (ieeds). 
 G. C- Steel (Newcastle). 
 G. H. Stevens (Liverpool). 
 R. Towart (Glasgow). 
 E. J. Waters (Newcastle). 
 W. J. White (Newcastle). 
 W. P. Williams (BristoJ). 
 A. E. Wilson (Liverpool). 
 J. C. Wood (Glasgow). 
 
 MATERIALS A2SfD PRIORITY DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Director of Materials and Priority... G. E. Chadwyck-Healey, Esq. 
 
 Persmal Assistant to Director... S. Hawkins Turner, Esq. 
 
 Additional Personal Assistant to Director... Brig.-Gen, C. P. Triscott, c.b., o.m.g., d.s.o., k.a. (ret.) 
 
 Assistant Directors. ..Eng.Capt. John A. Richards, e.n. (act.). 
 
 John Rogers. Esq.. o.b.e., (acting Chief Constructor). 
 M. Bjssane. Esq.. O.B.B. 
 Frederick Smith, Esq.. o.b.e. 
 Alexander M. MacRobert, Esq. 
 
 Deputy Assistant Directors. ..Eng. Com. Henry C. Anstey, m.i.c.e., e.n. (act.) (emergy.). 
 Major J. H. Skelton, r.e. 
 Adrian Lumley, Esq. 
 Capt. R. B. Slacke, e.e. 
 J. P. Powell. Esq. 
 
 Administrative and Technical Assistants. ..Capt. Goldthorpe. Ldeut. L. Nicoll, r.e.. Capt. W. R. Parson 
 age, R.4.P.. Lieut. W. E. Sugden. e.n.v.e., Commr. John Howard Temple, E.N.V.R.. 2nd Lieut. 
 G. H. M. Thompson, Eng. Lieut.-Com. H. H. WiUdns, e.n.. D. Anderson. T. Aitchison, P. B. 
 Abberley. J. B. Ballingall, R. Butler. H. G. Brodie, G. W. Brown. W. T. Bearpark, J. H. Bre- 
 meld, W. E. Baker, H. S. Bowkett, J. Benstead, A. A. Buckton, D. Cameron, R. Cameron 
 H. J. Collard. T. F. Crossley, A. Dey, C. M. Duncan. J. Dobson, G. Embleton. J. F. Elliott, 
 R. J. Eyres, H. J. Gould. C. B. Guthrie. R. C. Hawthorne, E. G. Hartley. E. Irvine. B. Knowles. 
 W. J. MacKenzie, C. McQueen, W. G. Mann, P. H. Marquand, J. J. Morgan, G. L. Neal, J. H. 
 Osselton. R. P. Padbury. H. Parker. J. P. Powell. W. R. Poole, C. F. Partridge, Neil Ram 
 3ey. E. G. Richers. W. Rolland, T. Rees, A. Stanley, G. M. Stevenson, J. W. Simpson, M. Smith, 
 D. L. Stewart, H. Strain. H. B. Sinclair, W. D. Spraggon, C. R. Sutton. H. T. Thomas, D . 
 Thorburn, S. Topping, J. Warne. A. Wells, J. A. Williams, D. M. Wilson, E. Wilson. G. Walk- 
 land. M. Ward, and Arthur Willocks. Esqrs. 
 
 Chief Steel Su/perintendent...G. P. West. Esq. o.b.e. 
 
 I 
 
Appendix 
 
 319 
 
 District Bevresentativee — 
 
 Superintendents (Steel) — 
 G. W. Langford. Esq. ... 
 H. J. Eastcott, Esq., h.b.b. 
 T. Q. Rogers. Esq. 
 
 A. Hore. Esq 
 
 H. A. Clift. Esq. 
 W. H. Jago, Esq. 
 
 Deputy Superintendents (Steel) — 
 W. E. Black, Esq. 
 F. P. Chappie. Esq. 
 D. J. Suter, Esq. 
 T; Moore, Esq. 
 H. B. Dunlop, Esq. 
 
 .. Scotland 
 .. N.E. Coast 
 .. South Wales 
 .. Midlands 
 .. SheMeld 
 .. N.W. Coast 
 
 N.E. Coast 
 South Wales 
 Midlands 
 SheMeld 
 N.W. Coast 
 
 Superintendent (Tubes) — 
 
 A. W. Long. Esq Birmingham 
 
 Assistant Superintendents (Tubes) — 
 
 S. P. Eobbins, Esq Birmi/ngTiam 
 
 R. A. W. Ellicott, Esq. ... Glasgow 
 
 C. B. Barrable. Esq Swansea 
 
 C. C. Staines, Esq London 
 
 District Progress OMcers (Wire) — 
 
 A. Hewlett, Esq. Wioan 
 
 P. Sylvester, Esq Newcastle- 
 
 on-Tvne 
 
 P. Else, Esq SheMeld 
 
 E. Fellows, Esq. Birmingham 
 
 1 Second Grade Clerk, 2 First and 5 Second Class Draughtsmen, 1 Woman Clerk, 20 Temporary Clerks, 
 160 Temporary Women Clerks and Typists. 
 
 STATISTICS DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Director of Statistics... Lieut.-Col. J. G. Beharrell, D.s.o. 
 
 Deputy Director... Lieut. H. Macrae. 
 
 Heads of Sections.. .J. N. Bninton, Esq., o.b.e. 
 A. H. Butt, Esq. 
 C. Collins, Esq. 
 W. D. Dufaeld, Esq. 
 A. P. Evans, Esq. 
 2nd Lieut. J. Hambly. 
 R. C. Hopkins, Esq. 
 A. E. Kirkus, Esq., o.B.B. 
 
 Statistical Assistants... H. L. Tutill, Esq. 
 
 Paym. Svb-Lieut. B.iV.iJ.... William H. Anstice. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abdiel as minelayer, 93 
 Admiralty, the, American co-operation 
 at, 163, 164 
 and the control of convoys, 141 
 anomalies at, 9 
 lack of naval officers at, 8 
 naval air policy of, 175 
 official summary of changes in 
 
 personnel of Board, 21 
 over-centralization at, 9 
 " production " at, in 1917, 228 et 
 
 seq. 
 reorganization at, 8, 16, 21, 232 et 
 
 seq. 
 the Staff in October, 1916, 264 et 
 seq. ; in April, 1917, 271 et seq. ; 
 end of December, 1917, 280 et 
 seq. ; end of November, 1918, 296 
 et seq. 
 Admiralty Contioller, appointment of 
 
 an, 231 
 Admiralty Organization for Produc- 
 tion, growth of the, 246 
 Adriatic, the, Austrian destroyers in, 
 149 
 R.N.A.S. assists military forces of 
 Allies in, 248 
 ^Egean Sea, the, British destroyers in, 
 
 150 
 Aeroplane, the Handley-Page type of, 
 
 71, 73 
 Aeroplane stations, 177 
 Air Ministry, the, establishment of, 25 
 Air power as complement to sea power, 
 
 257 
 Aircraft, bombing attacks by, 72, 177, 
 203, 204, 205 
 for anti-submarine work, 55, 70 et 
 
 seq. 
 the eyes of a fleet, 198, 257 
 Airship stations, 175 
 V 
 
 Airships as protection for convoys, 123 
 Allied Naval Council, formation of, 180 
 America enters the war, 94, 109 (note), 
 
 115, 153 (see also United States) 
 American battleships and destroyers in 
 
 British waters, 160, 163 
 Anderson, Sir A. G., 22, 239 
 Anti-flash arrangements, improvements 
 
 of, 229, 230 
 Anti-submarine convoy escorting force, 
 
 the, strengthened, 134 
 Anti-submarine devices, 54, 70, 96 
 
 187, 223 
 Anti-submarine Division of Naval Staff. 
 
 Directors of, 7, 12, 119, 133 
 formation of, 6-7, 10, 14 
 Anti-submarine instructional schools, 
 
 98, 99 
 Anti-submarine operations, 53 et seq. 
 Anti-submarine protection for ports of 
 
 assembly, 139 
 Approach areas, and how protected, 
 
 43, 174 
 Arabian coast cleared of Turkish 
 
 forces, 248 
 Arabic, 38 
 
 Armament production, 244 
 Armed merchant ships, 7, 39, 55, 68, 
 
 98 
 Armour-piercing shell, an improved, 
 
 229 
 Armstrong, Commander Sir George, 
 
 191 
 Atlantic convoys, losses in, 143, 144 
 organization of system of, 131, 134 
 
 et seq. 
 Audacious, loss of, 157 
 Auxiliary patrols, deficiency in de- 
 liveries of, 238 
 in home waters and in Mediterra- 
 nean zones, 184 
 
 321 
 
322 
 
 Index 
 
 B 
 
 Bacon, Sir Reginald, 88 
 
 a daring scheme of, abandoned, 
 
 216-218 
 author's tribute to, 216 
 his book on the " Dover Patrol," 
 
 186, 190, 197 
 his proposal for Folkestone-Cape 
 
 Grisnez minefield, 213, 214 
 organizes coastal bombardments, 
 
 203 
 witnesses bombardment of Ostend, 
 179 
 Baker, Rear-Admiral Clinton, 95 
 Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., a mission to 
 the United States, 156 
 offers author post of First Sea 
 Lord, 6 
 Baltic, the, a difficult situation in, 249 
 Barrage, Folkestone-Cape Grisnez, 96, 
 201, 213, 215 
 four forms of, 172 
 ofl Belgian coast, 201 
 the Dover, 200, 214 
 the North Sea 56, 94, 95, 166, 168, 
 
 174 
 the Otranto, 175 
 Bayly, Admiral Sir Lewis, in command 
 
 at Queenstown, 161 
 Belgian coast, barrage ofl, 201 
 
 mining the, 92, 94, 185 
 Bell, Sir Thomas, 239 
 Benson, Admiral, and author, 163 
 
 visits England, 179 
 Bergen, Capt. Halsey's appointment to, 
 
 124 
 Bethlehem Steel Company, the, 49, 
 
 157 
 Bird, Captain F., of the Dover patrol, 
 
 191, 201 
 Blackwood, Commander M., 83 
 Blockade of German ports, difficulties 
 
 of, 170 et seq., 199 
 Board of Invention and Research, the 
 
 (B.LR.), 25, 27 
 Bomb-throwers and howitzers, 56 
 Bonnei, Lieutenant Charles G., 
 
 awarded the V.C., 84 
 Boxer campaign in China, the, 160 
 Breslau, loss of, 248 
 
 British and German production of sub- 
 marines, etc., compared, 46, 47 
 British Empire, the, importance of 
 security of sea communications 
 of, 253 
 British merchant steamships, losses 
 from submarines, 4, 38, 226 
 losses of unescorted, 143, 145 
 submarine sinks enemy destroyer, 
 35 
 Brock, Admiral Sir Frederick, 121, 123, 
 129 
 and the disaster to the Scandina- 
 vian convoy, 128 
 Broke, action with German destroyers, 
 211-212 
 conveys author to witness bom- 
 bardment of Ostend, 179 
 Brown, Commander Yeats, 53 
 Browning, Vice- Admiral Sir Montague, 
 confers with U.S. Navy Depart- 
 ment, 155 
 Bruges, aerial attacks on, 72, 204 
 as enemy base, 198, 206 
 enemy evacuation of, 225 
 proposed long-range bombardment 
 of, 199, 216-218 
 Burney, Admiral Sir Cecil, at Rosyth, 
 131 
 Second Sea Lord, 6, 14 
 Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, a clever 
 
 device of, 67 
 Burton, Lieutenant G. E., 132 (note) 
 
 Calais, enemy destroyer raids on, 208 
 Calthorpe, Admiral (see Gough-Cal- 
 
 thorpe) 
 Campbell, Captain Gordon, 82 
 awarded the V.C, 80-1 
 fights with submarines, 77, 81, 82 
 sinks an enemy submarine, 77 
 Canadian Government asked to build 
 vessels for use in Canadian 
 waters, 240 
 Cape Grisnez- Folkestone mine bar-j 
 
 rage, 96, 201, 213, 215 
 Capelle, Admiral von and submarine] 
 construction, 225 
 
Index 
 
 323 
 
 Cardifl, instructional anti-submarine 
 school at, 99 
 
 Carrington, Commander I. W., 152 
 
 Carson, Sir Edward, a tribute 
 to, 7 
 and the defensive arming ol mer- 
 chant ships, 68 
 becomes First Lord, 7 
 leaves the Admiralty, 14 
 offers post of Admiralty Controller 
 to Sir Eric Geddes, 233 
 
 Cassady, Lieut. G. L., awarded the 
 D.S.C., 64 
 
 Cattaro, Germans destroy their sub- 
 marines at, 225 
 
 Cayiey, Rear-Admiral C. G., 191 
 
 Cayley, Commander H. F., 191 
 
 Cervera, Admiral, and the Spanish- 
 American War, 154 
 
 Chain-sweep, a, introduction of, 
 187 
 
 Chatham, gunnery courses for cadets 
 and apprentices at, 99 
 instructional anti-submarine school 
 at, 99 
 
 Chief of the Staff, duties and responsi- 
 bilities of, 9, 11 
 
 Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, and 
 Staff organization, 9 
 
 Coal-ships, French, convoy of, 109, 119, 
 143, 144 
 
 Coastal motor boats, 55, 88, 205 
 
 Coastal traffic, regulation of : typical 
 instructions, 46 
 
 Colvilie, Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley, 
 73, 87, 97 
 
 Constantinople, bombing operations in 
 vicinity of, 248 
 
 Convoy commodores, appointment of, 
 133-4 
 
 Convoy Section of Trade Division of 
 Naval Staff, the, 133 
 
 " Convoy sloops," 74 
 
 Convoy system, the, a committee on, 
 at the Admiralty, 132 
 growth of, 13 
 
 introduction of, 102 et seq. 
 successful organization and work- 
 ing of, 151 
 the system at work, 119 ei seq. 
 
 Convoys, as protection against sub- 
 marine attack : success of, 
 109 
 enemy attacks on, 124, 126, 130 
 losses in homeward and outward 
 bound, 144 
 Coode, Captain C. P. R., 23 
 Crisp, Thomas, of the Nelson, 189 
 Cross-Channel sailings and losses, 146 
 Crystal Palace, Royal Naval Depot at, 
 99 
 author's visit to, 100 
 
 D 
 
 Dakar convoy, the, 137, 144 
 Dare, Admiral Sir Charles, 191 
 Dartmouth, a successful attack on an 
 
 enemy submarine off, 64 
 Dazzle painting for merchant ships, 
 
 system of, 56 
 De Bon, Admiral, 148 
 De Chair, Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley, 
 
 and the U.S. mission, 156-7 
 Decoy ships, 49, 55, 73, 223 
 
 and the convoy of merchant ship- 
 ping, 123 
 fitted with torpedo tubes, 75 
 number of enemy submarines sunk 
 
 by, 227 
 typical actions fought by, 76 et seq. 
 Delay action fuses, 58 
 Denison, Admiral John, 191 
 Depth charge throwers, 55, 87 
 Depth charges, 51, 55, 59, 223 
 
 enemy submarine victims to, 227 
 Deputy Controller of Armament Pro- 
 duction, appointment of a, 245 
 Desti'oyers, American, in British 
 waters, 160 
 and patrol craft, number of enemy 
 
 submarines sunk by, 227 
 available force in February, 1917 
 
 111 
 average output of British, 47 
 enemy flotilla of, intercepted, 221 
 essential to Grand Fleet, 2 
 fitted with " fish " hydrophones, 63 
 heavy strain on, 140, 141 
 hunting flotillas of, 178 
 
324 
 
 Index 
 
 Destroyers, inadequate number of 
 British, 6, 32, 33, 47, 83, 109 et 
 seq., 122, 129, 256 
 of the Dover Patrol, 206 
 time talcen in building, 47, 48 
 Devonport, gunnery courses for cadets 
 
 and apprentices at, 99 
 D'Eyncourt, Sir Eustace T., 74 
 Directional hydrophones, 64 
 Directorate of Materials and Priority, 
 
 creation of, 246 
 Dover, daily average of mercantile 
 marine passing, 186 
 enemy destroyer raids on, 208 
 Dover Patrol, the, 197 et seq. 
 an enemy attack on, 208 
 Sir Reginald Bacon's book on, 186, 
 
 190, 197 
 the Sixth Flotilla and its arduous 
 work, 206, 212 
 Dover, Straits of, inefficiency of the 
 barrage, 200, 214 
 minelaying in, 51, 56, 92, 200 
 passage of U-boats through, 200 
 213, 214 
 Dreyer, Captain F. C, 7, 53 
 
 and the defensive arming of mer- 
 chant ships, 68 
 appointed Director of Naval Ord- 
 nance, 12, 53, 228 
 energy of, 229 
 Drift nets, mines fitted to, 223 
 Drifters, work of, 183 et seq., 213 
 Duff, Reai'-Admiral A. L., 7, 11, 53 
 a tribute to, 54, 152 
 becomes A.C.N.S., 12, 133 
 Dunkirk, enemy destroyer raids on, 208 
 Royal Naval Force at, and their 
 work, 72, 203-4 
 Dunraven (decoy ship), a gallant fight 
 
 by, 82 
 Dutch convoy, the, 220, 221 
 
 E 
 
 East Coast and Norway, trade be- 
 tween, convoyed, 120, 121 
 
 East Coast, the, volume of trade on, 
 and difficulty of proper protec- 
 tion of, 146 
 
 Electrical submarine detector, the, 
 
 96 
 Elsie, 127 
 English coast towns, destroyer raids 
 
 on, 208 
 Escorts for merchant shipping, 109 el 
 
 seq., 119 et seq. 
 Ethel and Millie sunk by submarine 
 
 188-9 
 Evans, Captain E. R. G. R., of the 
 
 Broke, rams an enemy vessel, 212 
 
 Falmouth convoy, the, 137 
 losses in 1917, 144 
 
 Farrington, Captain Alexander, and 
 decoy ships, 74 
 
 " Fish " hydrophones, invention of, 62 
 
 Fisher, Lord, 25 
 
 destroyer programme of, 48 
 
 Fisher, Captain W. W., Director of 
 Anti-Submarine Division, 12, 23, 
 53 
 tribute to, 54 
 
 Fitzherbert, Rear-Admiral the Hon. 
 Edward, 92 
 appointed Director of Torpedoes 
 and Mines, 228, 245 
 
 " Flares," 95 
 
 for night illumination of mine- 
 fields, 56, 96 
 
 Folkestone-Cape Grisnez mine barrage, 
 96, 201, 213, 215 
 
 Ford Company, the (U.S.A.), 49 
 
 France, the Staff organization at 
 G.H.Q. in, 18 
 
 Fremantle, Rear-Admiral Sydney, 21 
 
 French, Sir John (Field-Marshal Vis- 
 count), 218 
 
 French Admiralty, the, cordial co- 
 operation with Allies, 147 
 
 French coal trade, the, convoy of, 109, 
 119, 143 
 losses in 1917, 144 
 
 Fuller, Captain C. T. M., 23 
 
 Funakoshi, Admiral, Japanese Naval 
 Attach^ in London, 149 
 
 Furious converted into a seaplane 
 carrier, 176, 242 
 
Index 
 
 325 
 
 Gallipoli, hydrophone training school 
 at, 67 
 naval work at, 248 
 Gauchet, Vice-Admiral, 149 
 Geddes, Sir Eric, becomes Admiralty 
 Controller, 232 
 becomes First Lord, 15 
 disappointing forecasts of, 242 
 General Headquarters in France, Stafl 
 
 organization at, 18 
 German Army, von Schellendorfl on 
 
 StafE work in, 30 
 German attacks on convoys, 130 
 
 campaign against merchant ship- 
 ping, 4 
 operations in the Baltic against 
 
 Russia, 249, 251 
 prisoners assist a decoy ship to port, 
 
 79 
 star shells, efficiency of, 230 
 submarine commanders and decoy 
 
 ships, 75, 76 
 submarine fleet at commencement 
 of war and subsequent additions, 
 224-5 
 view of entry of America into the 
 war, 154 
 Germans, the, a new weapon of, 202 
 destroy their submarines, 225 
 their choice of objectives for night 
 
 attacks, 209 
 their lack of enterprise, 160, 207, 
 
 208 
 tip-and-run raids by, 208 et seq. 
 Germany, America declares war on, 155 
 estimated total of submarines in 
 
 1917, 37 
 her submarine production, 38, 46, 
 
 47, 48 
 naval programme of, 241 
 submarine force of and her losses, 
 224, 227 
 Gibb, Colonel Alexander, 24 
 Gibraltar, an American detachment at, 
 163 
 an experimental convoy collected 
 at. 117 
 Gibraltar convoy, the, 137, 138, 145 
 a reason for heavy losses in, 143 
 
 Gibraltar convoy, the, losses in 1917? 
 144 
 
 Glen (decoy ship), 81 
 
 Goeben severely damaged, 248 
 
 Gough-Calthorpe, Vice-Admiral the 
 Hon. Sir Somerset, his Mediter- 
 ranean command, 148, 149, 150 
 
 Gowan Lea, 190 
 
 Grand Duke trawler, 195 
 
 Grand Fleet, the, changes in command 
 of, 6 
 destroyers and, 2 
 destroyers used for Atlantic trade, 
 115 
 
 Grant, Captain H. W., 44 
 
 Grant, Rear-Admiral Heathcote, his 
 command at Gibraltar, 162 
 
 Greenock, instructional anti-submarine 
 school at, 99 
 
 Gunnery courses for cadets and ap- 
 prentices, 99 
 
 H 
 
 Haig, Sir Douglas (Earl), commends 
 
 work of air force, 204 
 Halifax convoy, the, 135, 144 
 Hall, Rear- Admiral Sir Reginald, 23 
 Halsey, Captain Arthur, appointed 
 Naval Vice-Consul at Bergen, 124 
 Halsey, Commodore (Rear-Admiral) 
 Lionel, 6, 92, 95, 245 
 becomes Third Sea Lord, 21, 233 
 Hampton Roads and New York con- 
 voy, 135 
 losses in 1917, 144 
 Harwich, hydrophone station at, 66 
 Harwich force, the, and its commander 
 219 
 duties of, 209 ei seq. 
 intercepts a flotilla of German de- 
 stroyers, 221 
 Hawkcraig, hydrophone station at, 66 
 Heath, Vice-Admiral Sir H. L., 21 
 Heligoland Bight, mining of, 51, 56, 89, 
 90, 92, 175 
 proclaimed a dangerous area, 91 
 Henderson, Captain Reginald G. H., 
 53 
 a tribute to, 151 
 
326 
 
 Index 
 
 Henderson, Captain Reginald G. H., 
 and the convoy system, 119, 132 
 
 Homeward-bound convoys, losses in, 
 144 
 
 Hope, Rear-Admiral George P. W., ap- 
 pointed Deputy First Sea Lord, 
 21, 22, 26 
 
 Hopwood, Sir Francis (Lord South- 
 borough), 231 
 
 Hotham, Captain A. G., 23 
 
 Howard, Captain W. Vansittart, 191 
 
 Howitzers and bomb-throwers, 56 
 
 Hydrophone stations and training 
 schools, 65 et seq. 
 
 Hydrophones, 50, 55, 61 
 directional, 64 
 fitted to auxiliary patrols, 185 
 
 Irvine, Lieutenant, fights a sub- 
 marine, 78 
 
 Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry, 7 
 
 First Sea Lord, 5, 216 
 Jackson, Captain, injured in a motor 
 
 accident, 179 
 Japanese destroyers in the Mediterra- 
 nean, 47, 149 
 Jellicoe, Admiral (Viscount Jellicoe of 
 Scapa), a personal telegram to 
 Mr. Schwab, 157 
 
 a tour of the British Empire and 
 its lessons, 255 
 
 amicable relations with U.S. Navy, 
 155 et seq. 
 
 and merchant ship construction, 
 5 
 
 and the building programme of 
 1916, 240 
 
 and the Dover Patrol, 208 
 
 and the future naval policy, 252 et 
 seq. 
 
 and the reorganization at the Ad- 
 miralty, 231 et seq. 
 
 and the submarine menace, 32 et 
 
 Jellicoe, Admiral (Viscount Jellicoe of 
 Scapa), becomes First Sea Lord 
 and Chief of Naval Staff, 6, 10 
 12 
 
 confers with Mr. Balfour, 5 
 
 friendship with Admiral Mayo, 179 
 
 his admiration for the work of 
 Admiral Sir Henry Oliver 
 222 
 
 his proposals for Admiralty re- 
 organization, 15 et seq 
 
 on the convoy system, 102 et seq. 
 
 on the work of destroyers, 140 et 
 seq. 
 
 praises work and organization of 
 convoys, 151 
 
 relations with Admiral Sims, 116, 
 155 
 
 unveils a memorial to Lieut. -Com- 
 mander Sanders, 80 
 
 visits New Zealand, 80 
 
 witnesses bombardment of Ostend, 
 179 
 
 wounded in the Boxer campaign, 
 160 
 Jutland battle, and the shells used in, 
 229, 230 
 
 K 
 
 Kite balloons, 95, 175 
 
 Lacaze, Admiral, 148 
 Lambe, Captain C. L., and his com- 
 mand, 73, 203 
 Lamlash convoy, the, 137 
 
 losses in 1917, 144 
 League of Nations, the, 252 
 Learmonth, Captain F. C, 139 
 Lerwick as junction for convoy sys- 
 tem, 121 
 
 enemy mining of, 124 
 Leslie, N. A., 132 (note), 133 
 Ley, Rear-Admiral J. C, 23 
 Litchfleld-Speer, Captain, 245 
 Lockyer, Commander E. L. B., 99 
 Longden, Captain H. W. 132 (note) 
 
Index 
 
 327 
 
 Lowestoft, average daily number of 
 vessels passing, 186 
 bombardment of, 210 
 Lusilania, loss of, 38 
 
 M 
 
 Macnamara, Right Hon. T. J,, 22 
 Madden, Admiral Sir Charles, 6 
 Malta, hydrophone training school at, 
 
 67 
 Manisty, Fleet Paymaster H. W. E., 
 132 {note) 
 appointed Organizing Manager of 
 Convoys, 133, 152 
 Margate, bombardment of 210 
 Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant, decoy ship 
 
 of, 73 
 Marx, Admiral J. L., 191 
 Mary Rose, sinking of, 127 
 Mayo, Admiral, and author, 163 
 
 object of his visit to England, 
 
 164 
 visits Grand Fleet, 179 
 witnesses bombardment of Ostend, 
 179 
 Mediterranean, the, Japanese de- 
 stroyers in, 47, 149 
 narrow waters of, 147, 150 
 need of a unified command in, 181 
 shipping losses in 1917 in, 147, 148, 
 150, 151 
 Mercantile marine, daily average of, 
 passing Lowestoft and Dover, 186 
 schools of instruction for, 98 
 wireless for, 99 
 (See also Merchant ships) 
 Mercantile Movements Division, forma- 
 tion of, 13, 14 
 its head, 23, 152 
 Mercantile repair work, 243 
 
 shipbuilding, 242 
 Merchant ships, arming of, 7, 39, 55, 
 68, 98 
 convoying, 102 et seq. 
 losses of, 4, 38, 226 
 route orders for, 41 
 submarines and, 1 et seq, 
 (Cf. Mercantile marine) 
 Merz, Sir Charles H., 25 
 
 Milford Haven convoy, the, 137 
 
 losses in 1917, 144 
 Mine-cutters (see Paravanes) 
 Minelayers, fleet of, strengthened, 93 
 Minelaying, British and German 
 
 methods of, contrasted, 91 
 Minelaying by submarines, 93 
 
 difficulty of dealing with problem 
 of, 186 
 Mine net barrage, definition of, 200 
 Mines, American, 94, 167 
 
 British, number laid in 1915-17, 
 
 92 et seq. 
 number of submarines sunk by, 227 
 Mines and minefields, 50, 51 
 
 as protection against enemy sub- 
 marines, 50, 89 
 " H " type of, 92, 93 
 improved type of, 55, 92 
 inadequate supply of, 181 
 influence of, in Great War, 3 
 Minesweepers, delay in deliveries of, 
 
 193, 239 
 Minesweeping and patrol services, 182 
 
 et seq. 
 Minesweeping craft, damage caused by 
 mines to, 194 
 gallantry of officers and men of, 188, 
 195 
 Minesweeping Division, formation of 
 
 the, 12 
 Minesweeping, introduction of a chain- 
 sweep, 187 
 statistics for 1916, 1917, 192 
 Ministry of Munitions, formation of, 
 
 245 
 Minotaur, 130 
 
 Mobilization and Movements Depart- 
 ment, formation of, 8 
 Monitor M15, loss of, 248 
 Monitors, bombardment of enemy 
 
 ports by, 198 
 Morris, Sub-Lieutenant K., 81 
 Motor boats, coastal, 55, 88 
 
 launches as submarine hunters, 65, 
 178 
 fitted with hydrophones, 63, 178 
 in home waters and in the Medi- 
 terranean, 184 
 Murray, Sir O., 22 
 
 L 
 
328 
 
 Index 
 
 N 
 Nash, Mr., invents the " fish " hydro- 
 phone, 62 
 Naval Ordnance Department, the, 
 
 changes in, 228 
 Naval StafE and the movements 
 of convoj'^s, 142 
 confers with masters of cargo 
 
 steamers, 105 
 minesweeping section of, 193 
 Operations Division of, strength- 
 ened, 14 
 reorganization of, 8, 15 
 Navy, the, a specialized profession, 258 
 considerations on the future of, 252 
 
 et seq. 
 personnel of : importance of, 257 
 Staff work in, 29 
 work of, during 1917, 247 
 Nelson attacked and sunk, 188-9 
 Net barrage at Dover, 200 
 Net protection against torpedo fire, 55, 
 86 
 at ports of assembly, 139 
 Nets as an anti-submarine measure, 
 
 175, 223 
 New York and Hampton Roads con- 
 voy, 135 
 losses in 1917, 144 
 Nicholson, Captain R. L., 23 
 North Foreland, the, naval guns 
 mounted in vicinity of, 211 
 star shells supplied to, 230 
 North Sea barrage, the, 56, 94, 95, 168, 
 174 
 advantages and disadvantages of, 
 166-7 
 North Sea, the, convoy system at 
 
 work in, 120 et seq. 
 Norway convoy, the, 120, 121 
 
 Oil tankers, serious loss of, 146-7 
 Oliver, Vice- Admiral Sir Henry, 11, 21 
 
 and mining operations, 90 
 
 becomes D.C.N.S., 12 
 
 his valuable work, 222 
 Ommanney, Admiral R. N., an ap- 
 preciation of his services 94 
 
 Operations Division of Naval Staff 
 
 strengthened, 14 
 Ordnance production, delay in, 245 
 Ostend, bombardment of, 179, 198, 202 
 Otranto, hydrophone station at, 67 
 Otranto, Straits of, a drifter patrol at- 
 tacked by Austrian light cruisers, 
 189 
 mining the, 175 
 " Otter " mine destroyers, 55, 67 
 Outward-bound convoys, losses in, 144 
 Overseas trade, vessels sunk in 1917, 
 146 
 
 " P " BOATS, fitted with " fish " hydro- 
 phones, 63 
 hunting flotillas of, 178 
 P. Fannon, 127 
 Page, Mr. W. H., relations with author, 
 
 117 
 Paget, Admiral Sir Alfred, 190 
 Paine, Commodore Godfrey, 70, 204 
 
 joins the Air Council, 21 
 Palestine, work of the Navy off coast 
 
 of, 247 
 Paravanes, and their use, 67 
 Pargusl (decoy ship), 80 
 Partridge, sinking of, 130 
 Patrol craft and minesweeping services, 
 182 et seq. 
 a tribute to officers and men of, 
 
 188 
 as decoy vessels, 74 
 hydrophones for, 63 
 lack of British, 44 
 retired officers volunteer for work 
 
 in, 190-1 
 synopsis of losses among, 196 
 Patrol gunboats, 83 
 Pease, Mr. A. F., 21, 22 
 Pellew, damaged in action, 130 
 Persius, Captain, and the construction 
 of German submarines, 48 {note) 
 Personnel of the Navy, importance of, 
 
 257 
 Piave, the, Austrian advance to, 248 
 Pirie, Lord, becomes Controller-Gen- 
 eral of Merchant Shipbuilding, 
 243 
 
Index 
 
 329 
 
 Pitcher, Petty- Officer Ernest, awarded 
 V.C, 82 
 
 Plymouth convoy, the, 137 
 losses in 1917, 144 
 
 Pola, Germans destroy their subma- 
 rines at, 225 
 
 Portland, submarine-hunting flotillas 
 at, 63 
 
 Ports of assembly for Atlantic convoy 
 system, 135, 137, 139 
 
 Portsmouth, gunnery courses for cadets 
 and apprentices at, 99 
 instructional anti-submarine school 
 at, 99 
 
 Pound, Captain A. D. P., 23 
 
 Preston, Captain Lionel G., Head of 
 Minesweeping Service, 23, 193 
 
 Pretyman, Right Hon. E. G., 22 
 
 Prince Charles, success of, against an 
 enemy submarine, 73 
 
 Pringle, Captain, appointed Chief of 
 Staff to Sir Lewis Bayly, 161 
 
 Prize sinks a submarine, 78-9 
 
 Production of warships, etc., and fore- 
 casts of, 236 et seq. 
 
 Projectiles, anti-submarine, 58 
 
 " Protected sailings," system of, 110, 
 120 
 
 Q 
 
 Q-BOATs (see Decoy ships) 
 
 Q22 in action Avith a submarine, 78 
 
 Queenstown, amicable relations be- 
 tween British and U.S. Navies at, 
 161 
 
 Queenstown convoy, the, 137, 144 
 
 R 
 
 Ramsgate, bombardment of, 210 
 Rawlinson, General Sir Henry (Lord), 
 
 confers with Admiral Bacon, 217 
 Red Sea, naval operations in, 248 
 Rodman, Rear-Admiral Hugh, 163 
 Route orders, and principle on which 
 
 compiled, 41 et seq. 
 Royal Naval Air Service, the, activities 
 
 of, 70 
 bombs enemy bases. 203 
 
 Royal Naval Air Service, the, in the 
 Eastern theatre of war, 248 
 
 Russian Baltic Fleet, the, 249 
 demobilization of, 251 
 
 Russian Navy, the defection of, 248. 
 
 Russo-Japanese war, the, 3 
 
 Ryan, Captain, experimental work of, 
 54, 61, 62, 64, 66 
 
 St. Louis mined outside Liverpool, 116 
 Salonika, Navy co-operation with 
 
 Army in, 248 
 Sanders, Lieutenant W. E., actions 
 with submarines, 78, 80 
 awarded the V.C, 80 
 memorial to, 80 
 Scandinavian convoy, the, 110, 114 
 120 et seq. 
 enemy attacks on a, 126, 130 
 loose station-keeping of ships in, 143 
 losses in 1917, 144 
 Scapa, a conference at, 130 
 Scarlett, Wing-Captain F. R., 23 
 Scheer, Admiral, his work on the High 
 Sea Fleet, 224 
 on the convoy system, 126 
 Schellendorff, von, on German Army 
 
 Staffs, 30 
 Schwab, Mr., 49, 157 
 Sea, the, considerations on future safe- 
 guarding of, 252 et seq. 
 Seaplane, advent of " America " type 
 
 of, 71, 72 
 Seaplane carriers, 176 
 Seaplane stations, 177 
 Searchlights, 95 
 Shannon, 130 
 
 Shipbuilding Advisory Committee, 232 
 Shipbuilding programme of 1916, Brit- 
 ish, 240 
 Shipping (British, Allied and neutral), 
 
 losses in 1917, 51 
 Shipping Controller, appointment of a 
 
 231 
 Sierra Leone convoy, the, 135, 144 
 Signalling arrangements for convoys, 
 138 
 instruction in, 100 
 
330 
 
 Index 
 
 Simpson, Rear-Admiral C. H., 191 
 Sims, Vice- Admiral W. S., arrives in 
 London, 116 
 ensures unity of command, 161 
 his career, 154 
 
 hoists his flag at Queenstown, 161 
 in command of U.S. forces in 
 European waters, 116 
 Singer, Admiral Morgan, 228 
 Smoke screens, 55, 59, 203 
 Spanish- American War, the, 154 
 Special service or decoy ships, 73 el seq. 
 Specialist training in the Navy, 29 
 Speed, importance of, in convoy sys- 
 tem, 137 
 Star shells, introduction of, 229, 230 
 Startin, Admiral Sir James, the Albert 
 
 Medal for, 191 
 Staunch sunk by submarine, 248 
 Sionecrop (decoy ship) sinks a sub- 
 marine, 85 
 Slrongbow, sinking of, 127 
 Submarine attacks on decoy ships, 77 
 et seq. 
 campaign of 1917, the, 32 ei seq. 
 danger, the, difficulties of combat- 
 ing, 181, 185 
 detector, an electrical, 96 
 -hunting flotillas, 63, 178 
 warfare, oflensive and defensive 
 measures against, 32 et seq. 
 Submarines, British, delay in deliv- 
 eries of, 238, 239 
 estimated number of enemy sink- 
 ings by, 227 
 fitted as minelayers, 93 
 length of time taken in construction 
 
 of, 48 
 offensive use of, 49 
 operations against enemy sub- 
 marines, 96, 172 
 production of, 47 
 
 value of depth charges against, 60 
 Submarines, German, 33 et seq. 
 aircraft attacks on, 71 
 Allied losses by, 1916-17, 109 
 as minelayers, 186 
 devices for circumventing, 54, 70, 
 
 96, 187, 223 
 losses of, 224, 227 
 
 Submarines, German, rapid construc- 
 tion of, 48 
 success of, in the Mediterranean, 
 147, 150 
 
 Swift, action with German destroyers, 
 211-212 
 
 Sydney (Cape Breton) convoy, the, 135 
 
 Syrian coast, the, operations on, 151 
 
 Taussig, Lieut.-Commander T. K., 
 
 160 
 " Taut wire " gear, value of the device, 
 
 90 
 Terror, bombardment of Ostend by, 179 
 
 damaged, 202 
 Thames Estuaiy, mines laid in the, 92 
 Torpedo and Mining Department, the 
 
 valuable work of, 231 
 Torpedo, the, in general use, 7, 40 
 Tothill, Rear-Admiral H. H. D., 21 
 Trade Division of the Naval Staff, the, 
 
 10, 98, 99, 152 
 " Trawler Reserve," the, 182 
 Trawlers as minesweepers, 182 el 
 
 seq. 
 convoy work of, 86 
 delay in deliveries of, 238, 239 
 hunting flotilla work of, 178 
 Troop transports, escorts for, 105 
 Tyrwhitt, Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald, 
 
 and his command, 219 
 
 U 
 
 U-BOATS, various types of, 36 {see also 
 
 Submarines, German) 
 Unescorted ships, losses by submarine 
 
 attack in 1917, 143, 145 
 United Kingdom, the, approach areas 
 for traffic to, 43, 174 
 coast divided into areas for patrol 
 and minesweeping, 183 
 United States Navy, a detachment dis- 
 patched to Gibraltar, 162 
 co-operation with British Navy, 161 
 in 1917, 153 
 United States, the, a new type of mine 
 produced in, 94 
 
Inde: 
 
 331 
 
 United States, the, and the convoy 
 system, 159 
 declares war on Germany, 155 
 rate of ship production in, 49 
 (See also America) 
 " Unrestricted submarine warfare," 
 object of, 38 
 opening of, 106 
 
 Vengeance, experimental tests in, 230 
 Villiers, Captain Edward C, net pro- 
 tection device of, 86 
 
 White Sea, the, British naval work in, 
 248 
 
 Whitehead, Captain Frederic A., Di- 
 rector of Mercantile Movements 
 Division, 23, 152 
 
 Wilde, Commander J. S., 132 (note) 
 
 Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, anti-sub- 
 marine measures of, 91, 223 
 
 Wireless, importance of, in convoys, 
 138, 139 
 provided for the Mercantile Ma- 
 rine, 99 
 
 W 
 
 Warship production in 1917, 236 
 Watt, I., skipper of Gowan Lea, 190 
 Webb, Captain Richard, in charge of 
 
 Trade Division, 10, 98, 99, 152 
 Wemyss, Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn, be- 
 comes Deputy First Sea Lord, 15 
 Chief of Naval Staff, 21 
 Whalers and their work, 184, 185 
 
 Yachts, patrol work of, 183, 184 
 
 Zeebrugge, aerial bombing attacks 
 
 on, 204, 205 
 bombardment of, 198, 202 
 Zeppelin assists in a hunt for a 
 
 British submarine, 34, 35 
 
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PLAN OF 
 
 JUTLAND BATTLE 
 
 BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT 
 
 Kuig George V. (6Z) 
 
 The position of our Battle Cruisers at 6 O. P. M. is fixed 
 by a report from the Marlborough and confirmed at 
 6. 4. P. M. by a report from the Rear-Admiral 1st Battle 
 Squadron in the Colossus. 
 
 The position of the 5th Battle Squadron is fixed by 
 
 a report from the Marlborough at 6. 5. P. M. taken 
 
 in conjunction with the reports of the Rear-Admiral 
 
 5th Battle Squadron. 
 
 The courses of our Battle Cruisers are taken from 
 
 the report of the Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet 
 
 and from the Lion and Indomitable. 
 
 The position of the Enemy Battle Cruisers at 6. 7. P. M. 
 
 is fixed by a report from the Lion received at 6. 6. P. M.; 
 
 this gave the bearing; the distance is obtained by a 
 
 consideration of the ranges at which the Lion was firing. 
 
 Diaxfranv I. 
 
 The position of4he Enenry Battle Fleet is fixed at 6. 14. 
 P. M. from the Lion and at 6. 15. P. M. from the Barham; 
 the latter being signaJled by wirelcss.an interval of four 
 minutes being allowed between transmission and 
 receipt 
 
 Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Cruisers 
 are fixed by the bearings on which our Battle Cruisers 
 were firing and the ranges given, and by a consideration 
 of the German reports which show a 32 point turn 
 between 6.6. and 6. 15. P.M. 
 
 Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Fleet are 
 fixed by bearings and ranges given by the Marlborough 
 at 6. 17. P. M.,lron Duke aX. 6. 31. P. M. and Monarch 
 
 at 6.33. P. M. 
 
 The movements of the Defence, Warrior and Warspite are 
 fixed by reports and diagrams from the Warrior, Duke of 
 Edinburgh and the Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron. 
 
 ■ In studyingthis diagram it should be borne in mind that 
 only a few of the German ships were visible at a time du 
 to the smoke and mist. 
 
 d 
 
 Jjiorv (e-o) 
 
 1: ^'/ Liom(6-6l 
 
 Barhmn. (6-U) 
 
 £ar!umv (6l4J,j> 
 
 Barhanvfe ■ 7) Jl - 
 
 ■-?^. 
 
 
 
 :^i>iff George V (6-31) 
 
 __ alrwlnoHei^ll) 
 I 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 ' Ituanahlc sunlc {633) 
 I 
 
 I 
 I 
 (^Ir^i-vwibl^ (6 5) 
 
 Genrujui Bajttit Cruisers 
 6-30) 
 
 German Battle Cruisers 
 
 33) 
 
 lnvincihle(5-5Z)\ 
 
 Van- of German. Battle Fleet 
 (6 14.) 
 
Oriotv O^ 
 
 , . —■„■.. iron liuke. 
 
 Cmtrsr \tHith 
 
 DIAGRAM SHOWING 
 ORDER OF THE BATTLEFLEET 
 
 :in' MAY U)l() 
 
 Shims hark of llii" Inm Ditke" 
 
 rivi'l ill .ihifitv iiiif alieaii . 
 
 Ic.aihr.s afDivision.'i.n'lir,, wil in .sijtulc liii^ (ihnni . 
 
 "Ijiorvi" tJ'iirJc 
 
 P /llnrhamlVMI,., 
 
 -',' /ilai4hn,;;,,,h 17/ .i'';.. 
 
 "/ yBenbiiKVIIlK) 
 
 
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 //■rai*(<*^.. y 
 
 yOri..,i,\1l S>ft 
 
 , y Kui.i llfor,,- y W.Vi.in, 
 
 '^liiwUiitr)!' trtirk rhnj-t rvrttrtU that nj ^it.ni. 
 
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 thsla/tf nboid 5 mUr.t 
 
 It aUiorrrui-ds IhnlUiirvbort W Ini S llriir) 
 
 lYimi her, fli.itiuit^ tibunt S niilr-^ 
 
 W Uiktr /vco/y//» art rrliablr 'Liunti'Spm 
 
 intsiliuii' watUd fc« lU-x , and her tratk be 
 
 tiyrett j-?l} ttnti ^ p.m.. pptSHinably a^ 
 
 jr/i(pifn tluis: « 
 
 'Minntatirii 'reeitrit.i /wM.-rtT. <'" nut- firtire.iji 
 to give ejraet tli^titner.s. 
 
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