in MS - • lUl ■HB efls 2&g rafMIfi Sfrjr &A 991 ANALYSIS OF PA LEY'S PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By &JYLE GRICE. THE FOURTH EDITION. Ut ea ratione et distributions sub unoaspectu PONERE NTUR. ClCERONIS FrAGMENTA. Camforfoge ; Printed b y An d forb. flower; and for j. deighton, and j. nicholson ; and sold by crosby and co. pater noster row, and t. coxder, bucklersbury, london. 1802. [Price Two Shillings, and I Sixpence, .} MORAL PHILOSOPHY, L LS the Science, which teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it. B.l.c 1, The Rules of Life may be deficient, or ill applied. These Rules are the Law — of Honour — of the Land, — of Scripture. The First being constructed b} r people of fashion to facilitate their intercourse with one another, favours whatever indigencies of the passions does notinterrupt that intercourse. B. Kc.2. It regulates the duties only betwixt equals. Omits those to the Supreme Being, and inferiors. The Second omits duties which are not objects of com- pulsion. B. 1. c. 3. s. 1. Permits to go unpunished crimes which cannot be de- fined. S. 2. If otherwise, it would be inconsistent with freedom. The Tftird con tains General Rules of Piety. B. 1. c. 4. Particular instances useless because innumerable. It presupposes a knowledge of Natural Justice. The object of the Scriptures is to enforce practice by new sanctions, and a greater certainty. Hence they do not supersede the use of this Science, nor, their end being considered, are they imperfect. Moral Sense, B. 1. c. 5. Whether it exists cannot be found by experiment. Arguments for its existence. 1st. We approve or disapprove certain actions with* out deliberation. A ( 4 ) 2d. This approbation or disapprobation is 'uniform and universal. Against it, 1st. This uniformity of sentiment does not pervade all nations. 2d. Approbation of particular conduct arises from a sense of its advantages. The idea continues when the motive no longer exists. Receives strength from authority, imitation, &c. The efficacy of imitation is most observable in chil- dren. 3d. There are no maxims universally true, but bend to circumstances. 4th. There can be no idea withoutan object, and in- stinct is inseparable from the idea of the object. No dependence on the Moral Sense in reasoning,be- cause scarcely distinguishable from prejudice and habit. Could carry with it no authority, because every man would be his own judge. Human Happiness. Happy is a relative term. B. 1. c. 6. Happiness does not consit in 1st. Pleasures of Sense, Because they are of short duration at the time ; Because they cloy by repetition ; Because eagerness for intense delights takes away re- lish for others. These objections are valid independent of loss of health> &c. 2d.. In exemption from evils which are without, as labour, &c ( 5 ) Because the mind must be employed. Hence pain is sometimes a relief to the uneasiness of vacuity. 3d. In greatness or elevated station, Because the highest in rank are not happiest, and so in proportion. Because superiority, where there is no competition, is seldom contemplated. Happiness is to be judgedof by theapparenthappiness of mankind, which consists in 1st. The exercise of the social affections. 2d. The exercise of the faculties of body or mind for an engaging end. Because there is no happiness without something to hope for. Those pleasures are most valuable, which are most productive of engagement in the pursuit. Therefore endeavours after happiness in a future state produce greatest happiness in this world. 3d. In a prudent constitution of habits. Habits of themselves are much the same, because what is habitual becomes nearly indifferent ; Therefore those habits are best, which allow of indul- gence in the deviation from them. Hence that should not be chosen as a habit, which ought to be refreshment. Hence by a perpetual change the stock of happiness is soon exhausted. 4th. In health. Because necessary for the enjoyment of every pleasure. Because itself is a pleasure, perhaps the solehappiness of some animals. A a ( fl ) From the above account follow two conclusions. 1st. Happiness appears to'be pretty equally distributed. 2d. Vice has no advantage over Virtue with respect to this world's happiness, VIRTUE is " The doing good to mankind,, in obedience to the will "of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." B. l. c.7. It may be divided into duties towards God, towards others, and towards ourselves. General Observations. 1st. Mankind act more from habit than reflection. B.l. c.7. We know it from experience. This mode of acting best suits the exigencies of life. Therefore Virtue consists in forming proper habits. Hence whatever tends to a good habit is to be done for that reason, and vice versa* 2d. The Christian religion has not ascertained the precise quantity of virtue necessary to Salvation; Because impossible to be expressed or limited. Hence rewards and punishments will be in proportion to oar deeds. These Genera! Posit ions may be advanced. 1st. A state of happiness cannot be expected by those who are conscious of no moral or religious rule ; Because, if so, religion, both natural and moral, would be useless. £d. By those, who reserve to themselves the practice ©f any particular siu : ( 7 ) Because all commands stand alike on the authority of God. Because such allowance would tolerate every vice. Because Scripture excludes such hope. 3d. A state of unprofitableness will be punished ; Because so laid down in Scripture. 4th. Where a question of conduct is doubtful, we are bound to take the safe side; Because whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Moral Obligation. Moralists all coincide in prescribing the same rules of conduct, but differ in the reasons why we are obliged to pursue such conduct. B. 2. c. 1. A man is obliged when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another. B. 2. c. 2. Why am I obliged to keep my word ? B. 2. c. 3. Because urged by a violentmotive (fear of punishment after death) resulting from the command of another, (God.) N. B. Punishments after death taken for granted. B.2.C 3.s. 2. To inquire what is our duty is to inquire what is the will of God. B. 2.C.4. Which may $6 found. 1st. By his express declaration in scripture. 2d. By the light of nature. By which inquiring into the tendency of an action to promote or diminish the general happiness, we find the will of God. B.2. c.4. N. B. Actions are to be considered here in the abstract. Note, c. 6. ( 8 ) The Divine Benevolence. God wishes the happiness of man, B. 2. e. 5. For he did not wish man's misery; Because he might have made every object - offensive^ which he has not. He was not indifferent about it ; Because, if so, all things came by chance. The world is full of contrivances, which shew design. These contrivances for beneficial purposes ; Liable to evil, but not constructed for that purpose* Utility. Whatever is expedient is right. B. 2. c. 6. The utility of a moral rule constitutes the obligation of it. This is to be judged of by General Rules. B. 2. c. 7* Because actions are expedient or not according to their general consequences. B. 2. c. 8. Of Right. Eight and obligation are reciprocal. B. 2. c. 9 Therefore right signifies " consistent with the will of Uod." C. 9- and i.r Bight is a quality of persons or of actions. C. 9* Rights of persons are Natural or Adventitious, Alien- able, or Unalienable, Perfect or Imperfect. C. 10. Natural Rights would belong to a man, although no civil government subsisted, asrighttolife, &c. Adventitious would not, as right of a General over his soldiers, 8cc. Some Rights are alienable, as of property, &f the truth. Oaths. C. 16. Forms of oaths vary in different countries. S. 1 • The signification is the same, viz. the calling of God to witness. S. fi Our Saviour's words concerning oaths relate not to judicial, but wanton oaths. S. 3. Oaths receive their obligations from a belief that God will punish perjury, which we have reason to think he will. S. 4. 1. Because the perjurer implies a disbelief of God% power, or contempt of it. ( 17 ) 2. Because perjury violates a superior confidence,and therefore it is hurtful in its general consequences. Hence a Quaker's word, if broken, incurs the guilt of perjury. Promissory oaths are not binding where the promise would not be. Vide, B. 3. c. 5. An oath is designed for the security of the impose^ therefore it is just " jurare in animum imponentis" Oaths in Evidence. C. 17. The witness swears to speak the whole truth : Therefore to conceal part is perjury. This oath is not binding in some cases according to the law of the land, that is, animus imponentis. Oath of Allegiance. C. 18. Ascertains not the extent of the subject's obedience, but the person to whom it is due. The oath excludes 1. All intention to support the claim of another. C. All design, at the time, of deposing the reigning tfrince. 5. All opposition from private views. It permits 1. Resistance to the King, if beneficial to the com- munity. 2. Disobedience to unlawful commands. 3. Does not require allegiance after he is deposed. Oath against Simony. C. 20. Was meant to restrain the patron of apiece of prefer- ment from being influenced in his choice of a presentee by a bribe, or any benefit to himself. ( is ) The law determines what isSimoniaeal contract; 1st. Purchasing a benefice already vacant. 2d. A clergyman purchasing the next turn of a be- nefice for himself directly or indirectly. 3d. The procuring of any preferment by ceding to the patron any right or portion of profit; 4th. A bond to resign upon demand. Oath to observe local Statutes. C. 21. The animus irrponentis, that is, the measure of the Juror's duty, seems to be satisfied, when nothing is omitted, but what from change of circumstances the founder,it may be presumed, would have dispensed with. To come within this rule, the inconveniency must be manifest by being unlawful,impracticable,or prejudicial to the end of the institution. Subscription to Articles of Religion. C* 22* The Subscriber's assent is governed bv the same rule of interpretation as oaths are, that is, the animus impo- nentis. The imposer, whose intention is to be satisfied,is the legislature of the 13th Eliz. It is impossible that the legislature could expect the assent of ten thousand men> and that in perpetual suc- cession, to many hundreds of controverted propositions^ The intention was to exclude from offices in the church, 1. All abettors of popery. 2. Anabaptists, at that time a powerful party on the Continent. 3. The Puritans, who werehostil Which are justifiable because beneficial in theft gene- ra] consequences, in diffusing wealth, &c, Polygamy 4 C. 6. May be judged to be ( against the will of God, Because he has created very nearly equal numbers of each sex. And because --it is hurtful iftits general consequence?; For 1st. It distracts the affections. £d. It dissolves the vigour of the faculties,, ,3d. It debases half the creation. 4th. It provides less for the children* It produces no benefit, in population. The words of Christ, " whosoever putteth away kte " wife, and marrieth another, committed!' adultery," imply a prohibition of it. It is retained only where Christianity is not professed. . Divorce,- C. 7- By Divorce is meant the dissolution of the Marriage^ contract at the will of the husband. If it be by mutual consent, it is equally liable to ob- jection. Except on account of the duties/which parents ow r e to their children, there is no reason in nature why mar- riage should not be dissoluble like. other contracts. General consequences require that, it should be in- dissoluble ; ( 27 ) 1. Because it tends to preserve concord between the parties. 2d. Because new objects of desire would continually be sought after, if men could at will be released from tlie matrimonial tie. The Law of Nature admits of an exception in favour of the injured party in cases of adultery, desertion, &c. By no means in case of peevishness, &c. though no£ trivial reasons ; because the unhappiness of one pair must be sacrificed to general consequences. The Scripture allows divorce only in case of adultery. So does the Law of the Land. Inferior causes mayj ustify the separation of the parties, if the care of the children does not require that they should live together. In cases of tyranny in the husband,the law provides a divorce a mensa et thoro. In these cases the marriage is not dissolved, because the general consequences would be hurtful. Sentences, which release the parties a vinculo matri- monii, do not dissolve a marriage ; but declare that it never existed. Marriage, C. 8. t Is a religious ceremony from custom only. Which part should give the dowry has been settled by fashion. As it is at present, it secures to them that assiduity and respect, which are wanted to compensate for the inferiority of their strength. What duties the vow creates are expressed in the ceremony. D ( 28 ) It is witnessed before G od ; therefore, if broken, in- curs the greatest guilt of a violated oath. Obedience on the part of the wife is ordered, because it is necessary that one party should submit. He may conscientiously marry, who wishes and ex- pects to entertain an affection for his wife. The Marriage vow is violated, 1st. By adultery. 2d. By behaviour, which knowingly renders the life of the other miserable. The Law of the Land makes the consent of the Pa- rents necessary, under certain restrictions. Duty of Parents, C. 9- Is of great importance in the dtass of duties from its general consequences. Admits of definite rules, which may be explained under the heads of 1st. Maintenance, Because somebody must maintain the children, and parents have no right to burthen others. Nature indicates it in the person of the mother* The Scriptures order it. 2d. Education ^ Because necessary for the child's well-being in So«* ciety. A reasonable provision for the child's happiness in respect to outward condition, which requires three things. 1st. A situation suited to his reasonable expectations and habits. 2d. A provision for that situation. ( 29 ) (These articles must vary with the condition of the Parent.) Hence children should be preserved in that class in which they were born., or in which others of similar ex- pectations are accustomed to be placed. Hence a parent is justified in making a difference in his children, according as they stand in greater or less need of his fortune from circumstances. After their exigencies, the expectations of children may be satisfied according to primogeniture. This point, together with general expediency, makes the difference of claim between legitimate children and bastards. Still a parent is bound to provide for a bastard. After a provision for exigencies, a parent may pro- portion his childrens' shares according to their beha- viour. Disinherison, nearly absolute, is justifiable only in case of utter incapability of managing an inheritance. The third thing required in a provision for the child's happiness, is a probable security for his virtue. This may be attained, 1st. By impressing on his mind the idea of account- able ?i ess. 2d. By shewing a good example. 3d. By correcting his early inclinations, and dis- posing of him in a situation least dangerous to his par- ticular character. The Rights of Parents, C. 10. b. 3.^. 3. (That is, such as may be enforced by coercion) result from their duties, D 3 ( 30 ) A parent has a right to that authority, which is ne- cessary in the exercise of his duties. Hence a Guardian has the same. Parents have a right to choose professions for their children ; Because it is necessary to determine before they can judge for themselves. In competition of commands the wife here also owes obedience to her husband. Parents have no right over the lives of their children, or to sell them into slavery. They exceed their authority when they consult their own interest at the expence of their childrens' happiness. Duty of Children, C. II. May be considered, 1st. During childhood. Here the childrens' submission must be implicit. §d. After they have attained to manhood, and con- tinue in their parent's family. Beside the general duty of gratitude to parents, they are bound to observe the regulations of the family. 3d. After they have attained to manhood, and have left their father's family. In this state the duty to parents is simply the duty of filial gratitude, which just so much exceeds other obli- gations, by how much a'parent has been a greater bene- factor than anv other friend. It requires of children to endeavour by every means to promote their parents' comfort, and to contribute to their support, if they stand in need of it. A Parent has no right to destroy his childrens' hap-> piness. ( 31 ) He lias therefore no right to oppose his childrens marriage where they have a real inclination, or to force them upon one which they dislike. In this latter case the child ii}ust become guilty of prevarication ; and parental, like all human authority, must cease, where obedience is criminal. Nor has the Parent aright to compel a child to choose a profession, to which he may be averse. In every case the child is bound by gratitude to try earnestly, and with sincerity, to conquer his own inch-? nations, before he may act for himself. A parent has no right to interfere, where a trust i$ reposed personally in the son. Vide 8. 3. p. 2. c. 11. The duty of children is commanded by God. Duties to Ourselves. B. 4. This division is retained for the sake of method. Whether in a state of nature we may defend the most insignificant perfect right by any extremity, is very doubtful. B. 4. c. 1. Because we cannot so easily balance between the ge- neral consequences of yielding, and the particular effect of resistance,which the person attacked is bound to do. This right is suspended by the establishment of civil society. Hence the individual injured is bound to submit to public arbitration. Where it may be necessary for our preservation, all extremities are justifiable. This is evident in a state of nature, nor is the case al- tered in civil society. ( 32 ) Because, by supposition, the Jaws cannot interpose to protect, nor can they compel restitution. The defence of chastity seems tQ justify the same ex- tremities. In other cases the law of the land is our best guide. Hence Homicide, in England, is justifiable ; 1st. In preventing the commission of a crime, which -when committed would be punishable with death. 2d. In necessary endeavours to carry the law iiito execution. N. B. The rights of war are not here taken into th§ account. Drunkenness. C. 2. Casual excesses incur all, in some degree,of the guilt and danger, which attend habitual drunkenness. We compute the guilt of it from its bad effects, which consist, 1st. In its betraying most constitutions into extrava- gances of anger, or sins of lewdness. 2d. It disqualifies men from the duties of their station. 3d. It is attended with expences, which can seldom he spared. 4th. Itcreatesuneasinesstothe family of the drunkard. oth. It shortens life. These consequences may not all meet in the same subject ; but the great mischief of example is sure always to ensue. It is forbidden in the Scriptures. The guilt of any action of a drunken man bears th£ same proportion to the guilt of the like in a sober man, that the probability of its being the consequence of drunkenness bears to certainty. JJ ) Suicide, JR. 4. c. 3. Restson this question: — " Mayeveiy man who pleases €C to destroy his life-, innocently do so r" Whatever rule or limit for suicide is assigned, must lead to a toleration of it in all cases, in which there is danger of its being committed. The general consequences of such toleration would be; 1st. The loss to the community of many valuable lives. 2d. The affliction of many families, and consternation of all. 3d. The throwing off an opportunity of meliorating our condition in a future state* Every case must also be aggravated by particular consequences. Scripture implies the sin of Suicide. 1st. By speaking of human life as a term prescribed to us. 2d. By inculcating patience as a great virtue* 3d. By the conduct of the Apostles. The above does not argue against the right of a State over the lives of its subjects ; Because the State receives this power not from the consent of collected individuals, but from the will of God. B. 3. c.4. Duties tozcards God, B. 5* Signify duties, of which God is the object. Silent Piety, acceptable as it is to God, does not su- persede the external duties ; which may be divided into Worship and Reverence. ( 34 ) Worship is made up of adoration, thanksgiving and prayer. Prayer comprises them all. Of the Duty and Efficacy of Prayer, as it appears from the light of Nature. C. 2. It is probable God expects those intreaties from us, which we naturally use to every being on whom we de- pend* The same maybe said of Thanksgiving. Prayer is necessary to keep up a sense of God's agency. The duty of Prayer depends on its efficacy ; Which the perfect wisdom of the Deity does not ar- gue against: For he may withhold a favour unless requested by- prayer ; 1st. Because, ori that very account, it may produce good effects on the person. 2d. Because it may encourage devotion. 3d. Because prayer has a tendency to amend the peti- tioner himself. It is not necessary to devotion that the petitioner should know the circuit of causes by which his prayers, may prevail. We have no proof that inexorability is a part of that perfect wisdom, which is explained to consist in bring- ing about the most beneficial ends by the most beneficial means. To say God must act by one, or any rule, is to assert what is beyond our comprehension. ( 35 ) It is no objection to the efficacy of prayer thai the effects of it are not always obvious ; Because it is beneficial that they should not be. The custom of employing one person to intercede for many is justifiable ; For the happiness of many often depends on the good offices, and why may it not on the intercessions of one individual ? Of the Duty of Prayer as represented in Scripture- C. 3. The Scriptures not only affirm the propriety of prayer in general, but furnish precepts which justify particular topics and modes of prayer. They teach the duty and efficacy of prayer in general: Also of prayer for particular favours by name ; Of prayer for public national blessings ; Of intercession for others ; Of the repetition of unsuccessful intreaties. Private Prayer, Family Prayer, Public Worship. C. 4. Each has its use, and therefore does not supersede the others. Private prayer enables men to state wants, which cannot be the subject of public prayer. S. 1 . It is generally accompanied with more actual and so- lemn thoughts, which make a lasting impression. It is particularly sanctioned by our Saviour. Family Prayer, S. 2. Is particularly useful from its influence upon the members of a family. ( 35 ) Public Worship. S> 3. ■ By this means a great part of mankind are instructed in religiousknowledge, who would otherwise not be. As the general consequences of the example are good, every individual is bound by the General Rule to attend. Public worship has also these advantages : 1st. It has a tendency to unite mankind together,ancf to enlarge the generous affections. £d. It promotes'humility in the higher, and proper dignity in the lower class of mankind, by placing them under the impression of considering their equal relation to the Deity. Of Forms of Prayer in Public Worship. C. 5. Liturgies not being enjoined or forbidden in Scripture must be judged of by their expediency. A Liturgy, 1st. Prevents absurd or extravagant addresses to God, £d. It prevents the confusion of extempore prayer.. 3d. It supplies, in some measure, the imperfections of the deliverer. Joint prayer, which is the end of a congregation, Without a Liturgy, is impossible. Our Saviour authorises afixed form of prayer by ap- pointing the Lord's prayer. The properties required in a Liturgy are, 1st. That it be compendious. Brevity may be studied too much, for it is necessary, that the attention/which slumbered in one part, may be recalled in another., ( 37 ) <2d. That it express just conceptions of the divine attributes ; Because by it the popular notions of God are formed. 3d. That it recites such wants as the congregation are likely to feel, and no other. Upon this principle our State prayers are too long. 4th. That it contain as few controverted propositions as possible. The Use of Sabbatical Institutions. C. 6. That seasons should be set apart for Religious Wor- ship is founded on the reasons that make Worship a duty. That they be at stated intervals, and be observed by all at the same time, is easiest and best for the commu- nity. The day appointed may be Sunday, as well as any other day. This reasoning refers only to the time occupied in di- vine service. The manner ofthe Christian Sabbath is to be defended upon its general expediency. 1st. It contributes better to the happiness of the labo- ' rious part of mankind, than any casual indigencies of leisure. (Nothing is lost by this interruption of public in- dustry.) 2d. It leaves an opportunity for religious medita- tion. 3d. It give happiness to the brute creation* . E S ( 38 ) Of the Scripture account of Sabbatical Institutions. C. 7. The Jewish Sabbath was first instituted in the wilder- ness. For it is never mentioned till then, and Ezekieland Nehemiah speak of it as being so. The Historian in Gen. c. 2. writing after it was insti- tuted, there gives the reason of its institution. The Jews abstained from every kind of work, and permitted their slaves and cattle to rest ; they sacrificed double sacrifice,and held holy convocations on this day. Two questions concern the Christian Moralist : 1st. " Whether the command by which the Jewish Sabbath was institutedextends to christians ?" It appears not ; For it seems to have been part of the peculiar law of the Jewish policy ; Because it was first immediately directed to the Jewish people alone. The Sabbath is described as a si$n between God and the people of Israel. It is in its nature a ceremonial institution, like other seasons appointed by the Levitical law. If it be binding on christians, it must bind as to the day, &c. which are not regarded. The observance of the Sabbath is not one of the arti- cles enjoined by the apostles in Acts \ 5th chap. St. Paul mentions it as a Jewish ritual. The two objections to the command's not being of universal obligation are ; 1st. The reasons given for it in the fourth command- ment. ( X) ) 2d. Its being one of the decalogue. These are of no weight : The first ; because different reasons were given to ac- count for different circumstances in the command ; The second • because in the Scriptures, positive du- ties, which are of partial, and natural which are of universal obligation, are indiscriminately enumerated. The second question is, "' Whether Christ delivered " any new command upon the subject, or wh ether anv " day was appropriated to the service of religion bv the and shall -come forth J " they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, " and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection ( of damnation ;" he had pronounced a message of in* estimable importance. A future state had never before been discovered, be- cause it never had beenproved ; and no man can prove this point, but the teacher who testifies by miracles, that his doctrine comes from God, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE. B. G Of the Origin of Civil Government, C. 1. VTOVERNMENT at first was either Patriarchal or Military. The order of domestic life by its manner supplied the foundation, and by the dispositions, which it generates, assisted the formation of civil government. § 1. It also furnishes the first steps of the process,by which empires have been reared. A parent would naturally retain great part of his au- thority, after his children were grown up, and had formed families of their own. It isnot likely, that this association, ofwhichhewas the centre of union, should altogether be dissolved upon his death. They would still feel connected by the same habits of intercourse and affection, andby their common interests. ( 44 ) Experiencing inconveniences from the absence of that authority of their ancestor, they might be induced to siipply his place by choice of a formal succession. Or might imperceptibly transfer their obedience to one of the same family, whom the parent in his life time had in some degree made partaker of his authority. Or lastly, the prospect of those inconveniences might prompt the first ancestor to appoint a succession, which they would receive with submission. Thus a tribe or clan became incorporated * A second source of personal authority results from the military arrangements. § 2. In wars men from necessity arrayed themselves under one leader, whose superiority, if he had led them with success, would not terminate with the reasons, for which it was conferred. This advantage,if it were added to the authority of a patriarchal chief, might extend, or if in the power of an ambitious and able individual, might supersede the pa- triarchal authority. The causes, which have introduced hereditary domi- nion into reception, are chiefly the following : The influence of association, which communicates to the son a portion of the respect, which was wont to be paid to the father ; The mutual jealousy of other competitors ; The greater envy with which all behold the exalta- tion of an equal, than the continuance of acknowledged authority ; The adheience of those who can preserve their own importance only by supporting the succession of the reigning prince'* children \ ( 45 ) The experienced inconveniences of election to su] preme power. Thus far the incorporation and power of clans or tribes. Two or three of those clans were frequently, we may suppose, united by marriage, conquest, mutual defence, common distress, &c. and hence empires. The early histories of all nations confirm the account of the origin of civil government. This history affords a presumption, that the earliest governments were monarchies. Ilozo subjection to Civil Government is maintained. C. 2. Since in all cases the physical strength resides in the ^governed, the question is, by what motives the many are induced to submit to the few. No single reason will account for this general submis- sion of men to civil government : every man has his mo- tive, though not the same. The subjects of a state may be divided into three dis- tinctions of characters. 1st. They who obey from prejudice, i. e. from opi- nion, which is not foundedupon argument. These men are determined by an opinion of right in their governors (whatever it may be) which opinion is founded upon prescription. The whole course of civil life favours this prejudice, for all civil rights are founded on prescription. In all hereditary monarchies the prescriptive title has been more or less corroborated and augmented by an application to the religious principles of men. Hence the title of Sacred Majesty, &c. &c. F % ( 46 ) * 2d. They who obey from reason. 3d. They who obey from self-interest. These men are kept in order by a satisfaction in then: own enjoyments ; or principally by fear of the bad con- sequences to themselves by resistance, which has been called opinion of power. From the above principles the following cautions may be suggested to governors. 1st. To treat the general opinion with deference, be- cause the very existence of civil authority depends on opinion. 2d. That as opinion of right is for the most part founded on custom, the slightest innovation in thecustom of government diminishes the stability of government. 3d. Government may be too secure. Wherever this security arises from the opinion of right being predomi- nant, it is abated merely by breaking the custom. 4th. That the physical strength does reside in the governed; and since ignorance of union and want of communication is the chief preservative to civil govern- ment, it is necessary to prevent combinations of men, who are allied by the same motives and interests. The Duty of Submission to Civil Government explained. C.3. Political writers usually resolve the duty of submis- sion to civil government into the obligation of fidelity in the performance of promises, by making a compact between the citizen and state the ground of the relation between them. This compact is twofold. 1st. An express compact by the primitive founders of ( 47 ) the state, who are supposed to have consented to be bound by the resolutions of the majority convened for the purpose of settling a future form of government. This transaction has been called the Social Compact. 2d. A tacit or implied compact by all succeeding members of the state, who by accepting its protection, consent to be bound by its laws. This account has been founded on a false supposition. No such original convention of the people ever was held, or could be held in any country, anterior to the existence of government in that country. Savages could not deliberate on topics, which the re- finements of civil life alone could suggest. The establishment of the United States of America was only an imitation of the social compact. The settling the constitution, the qaalilications of the constituents, the mode of electing representatives, and many important parts, were taken from old forms of government, and supposed to be already settled. The unconstrained consent of all to be bound by the decision of a majority was wanting. With regard to the implied compact, all the parties stipulating must possess the liberty of assent, or refusal ■ which cannot be affirmed of the subject of civil gover ' ment. Allegiance founded on the circumstance of nativ't - as also the right of prohibiting subjects to depart out of the realm, are irreconcilable with this idea. Td prove the possession or acceptance of land to be promise of allegiance, we must prove the right of t^ primitive inhabitant to the soil. If this compact be a mere fiction, it is useless toanrue ( 48 ) from it; but it has been regarded as a reality, and only deserves an answer, because The theory leads to conclusions unfavourable to the Improvement and peace of society. 1st. There must have been many points settled at the general convention called the " fundamentals of the u constitution/' with which the legislature has no right to interfere, and which from their number and kind must embarrass the legislature. 2d. The subject being bound by the compact must abide by the form of government, which he finds esta- blished^ be it ever so absurd, inconvenient, or unjust. 3d. Every violation of the compact on any part must absolve the obligation of the others. From the indefinite nature of many of the obligations this must render every form of government liable to perpetual change. The only real ground to be assigned for the subject's obligation is — " The will of God as collected from " expediency." u It is the will of God that the happiness of human c< life be promoted." " Civil society conduces to that end." " Civil societies cannot be upheld, unless, in each, H the interest of the whole society be binding on every " part and member of it." This conducts us to the conclusion, that — " So long " as the interests of the whole society require it,it is the "zcillofGod, (which en// determines our duty) that ? the established governmentbeobeyed," and no longer. On. this principle the justice of every particular case of -resistance is reduced to a computation of the quan- (49 ) tity of danger and grievance on one side, and of the pro- bability and expence of redressing it on the other. On this point every man is a judge for himself. For the decision cannot be referred to those whose conduct has provoked the question. The danger of error and abuse is no objection to the rule of expediency, because every rule is liable to the same or greater; and all rules which bind the con- science, must depend on private judgement. Some important inferences result from substituting public expediency, in place of implied compacts, Sec. 1. It may be a duty at one time to resist government, as it is at another toobey it ; viz. to resist, whenever, in our opinion, more advantage than mischief will accrue to the community from resistance. 2. The lawfulness of resistance does not depend alone on the grievance sustained, but on the probable expence and event of the contest. 3. Irregularity in the first foundation, or subsequent injustice in getting possession ofthe supreme poweiyire not sufficientreasons for resistance after the government is once settled. 4. Not every invasion of the constitution, or neglect of duty in the supreme magistrate, justifies resistance, unless the consequences resulting from them are such as to outweigh the evils of civil disturbance. Nevertheless every violation should be watched with jealousy, and resented as such, because security is weakened by every encroachment. 5. No usage or authority whatsoever is so binding, that it ought to be continued, when it may be changed with advantage to the community. The order of succession, and some other points which ( 50 ) are represented as the principles of the constitution, are o be approached with awe, as it is of importance that the form and usage of governing shall be acknowledg- ed and understood, as well by governors as the go- verned . (5. Though the rights of all men are equal ^expediency renders the civil obligations of a free people, and thfc subjects of absolute monarchies different. Because, 1st. The same act of the. prince is not the same grievance/where it is agreeable to the constitution and where it is not; 2d. Because redress is not equally attainable. 7. The interest of "the whole is bindingon every part : As an individual cannot, neither can a province or colony justly pursue their private interest by a measure which shall appear to diminish the sum of public pros- perity. This rule must decide the question of right between Great Britain and her revolted colonies. Of the duty of civil obedience) as stated in the Holy Scriptures. C. 4. As to the extent of our civil rights and obligations, Christianity has left us, where she found us. Only two passages have been alledged in the contro- versy, viz. Romans xiii. v. 1 — 7. andl. Peter luv. 13— m To comprehend the proper import of them, we must reflect that civil obedience involves two questions : 1st. Whether to obey government be a moral duty and obligation upon the conscience at all. 2d. How far and to what cases that obedience ought *o extend. ( 51 ) From shewing the end, and the necessity of civil sub- jection, or explaining the social compact, or alledging- the dictates of nature herself, we may infer, that — "Obedience to the state is a relative duty, for the transgression of which we shall be accountable at the tribunal of divine justice, whether the magistrate be able to punish us for it, or not;" but — The extent of this obedience requires definition and discrimination ; for if public expedience be the founda- tion, it is also the measure, of civil obedience. The person who revolts must compare the peril and expence of his enterprize with the effects it was intend- ed to produce, and must make choice of the alternative by which not his own present relief or profit, but the whole and permanent interest of the state is likely to be best promoted. This distinction is to be made with regard to the two passages above quoted from Scripture ; they inculcate the duty, they do not describe the extent. Witt) the same absolute form of expression, the same Apostles inculcate the observance of domestic duties of servants, children, &c. Yet no one can doubt,that the obedience of the above characters ought sometimes to be limited. This distinction vindicates these passages of Scripture from any explanation in favour of unlimited passive obe- dience. But if we consider that the first Christians privately cherished an opinion, that their conversion to Christia- nity exempted tnem as of right from the authority of the Roman Sovereign, we have more satisfactory proof of the Apostles' meaning. 8 G ( 52 ) Neither the Scriptures, nor any subsequent history, attest these sentiments ; butsupply circumstances,which render the opinion probable. The Jews doubted the lawfulness of submission to the Roman yoke, and the Christians being of the same na- tion, were apt,from the affinity of the two religions, to intermix the doctrines of both. Again, as appears from St. Peter, some might under- stand the liberty, unto which they were called, as ai* emancipation from any authority merely human. St. Paul has said, " Whoever resisteth the power, re- sisted* the ordinance of God.'* This phrase, " the ordinance of God," cannot au- thorize any superstitious ideas of the regal character. The expression is as applicable to one kind of govern- ment as another. It is not affirmed of the supreme magistrate only, but of every inferior officer of the state. The right of kings is the law of the land, and is or- dained by God, only by virtue of that decree by which he sanctions every law of society, which promotes the general welfare. According to the idea of the origin and constitution of princes, St, Peter denominates them," the ordinance* a of man." Of Civil Liberty. C. 5. " Civil liberty is the not being restrained by any law, "but what conduces in a greater degree to the public " welfare." To do what we will, is natural liberty ,but this libertj can only exist in a state of solitude : "< A3 ) For in society the liberty of the individual would be checked by the opposition of other mens' wills. Civil liberty is augmented by the very laws, which restrain it : Because the individual gains more by the limitation of other mens' wills, than he suffers by the diminution of his own. The above definition of liberty intimates ; 1st. That restraint is an evil. 2d. That this evil ought to be overbalanced by some public advantage. 3d. That the proof of this advantage lies upon the legislature. 4th. That a law being found to produce no sensible good is a sufficient reason for repealing it. This maxim might be remembered in a review of many laws in this country, especially — The game laws, The poor laws. The laws against papists and dissenters. According to this account of civil liberty it follows, That every nation possesses some, no nation perfect liberty. That it is not to be totally lost or won by any one event or change whatever ; That the freedom or slavery of nations, or of the same nation at different times, is intelligible only in a com- parative sense. Hence the distinction between personal and civil li- berty. A citizen of the freest republic may be imprisoned for his crimes ; Q 3 ( 54 ) But his civil liberty is not invaded, so long as his con- finement is the effect of a beneficial public plan. It is not the rigour, but the inexpediency of laws, which makes them tyrannical. Another common idea of civil liberty places it not merely in the exemption from noxious laws, but in the security from the danger of having any such hereafter. Thus the late revolution deprived the Swedes of their liberty ; though they are governed by the same or more just laws than before. Thus the act of our parliament, which in the reign of Henry VIII. gave the king's proclamation the force of law, may be called a forfeiture of our liberty, though no proclamations were ever issued. Thus a mild government under a despotic prince cannot be called civil libertv. The various definitions, which have been framed of civil liberty, all are adapted to the same idea; but labour under one inaccurracy, viz. they describe not so much liberty itself, as the various safeguards and preservatives of liberty. , Therefore those definitions ought to be rejected, which disturb the public content, by making that essential to our freedom, which is not attainable in experience. Both ideas lead to this conclusion, that that people, government, and constitution, is the freest, which makes the best provision for the enacting of expedient and salutary laws. Of different Forms of Government. C. 6. In every governmentthere necessarily exists a power, from which there is no appearand which is omnipotent. The person or assembly, in whom this power iesides ; is called the sovereign power of the state. ( 55 ) It is called also the legislature of the state. A government receives its denomination from the form of the legislature, which form is likewise what we mean by the constitution of a country. There are three principal forms of government, from an intermixture of which all actual governments are com- posed. 1. Absolute Monarchy. 2. An Aristocracy, the members of which fill up by election the vacancies of their own body, or succeed by inheritance, or some personal right. 3. A Republic. The advantages of the first are unity of council, acti- vity, and secrecy, military energy, exclusion of popular and aristocratical contention, and of the intrigues of am- bition. The mischiefs are tyranny and its concomitant- ignorance in the governors of the peoples' interest. The advantage of aristocracy consists in the wisdom attained by experience and education. The mischiefs are dissensions among the rulers, and partial laws to the oppression of the poor. The advantages of a republic are, exemption from needless restrictions, equal laws, public spirit, fruga- lity, averseness to war, the opportunity of calling forth the faculties of the best citizens. The evils are, dissension, tumult, faction, the ty- ranny of the majority, the confusion and clamour of an assembled multitude, delay of public counsels, the in- trigues of demagogues, &c. &c. Hence in a mixed government, which is composed pf two or more simple forms, their separate advantages and evils are to be cultivated or provided against. ( 66 ) Sometimes a quality results from the conjunction of two simple forms of government which belongs not to the separate existence of either : thus corruption may spring up, where the supreme power is divided between an executive magistrate and a popular council. An hereditary monarchy is preferable to an elective monarchy. Experience has shewn this. For the interests and passions of the electors exclude the consideration of the qualities of the competitors ; The assembly of the popular choice interrupts regu^ lar industry ; The king elected regards his opponents as enemies ; Plans of improvement are seldom brought to matu- rity, where the crown devolves by chance. Aristocracies are of two kinds ; first, where the power of the nobility belongs to them in their collective capa- city alone. This is the constitution of Venice. 2d. Where the nobles are severally invested with great personal power and immunities, This is the constitution of Poland. Of these two forms of government the first is more tolerable. For however profligate each member may be in his private designs, not having the end to gain, they are cot likely to unite in any specific act of oppression : or if they did, their power is confined ; the tyranny does not extend to so many places at the same time, as it may be carried on by the dominion of a numerous nobility over their vassals. Of all dominations this is the most odious ( 57 ) The people of Europe have more than once delibe- rately exchanged it for the miseries of despotism. E. G. Denmark in^the middle of the last century. The late revolution in Sweden owed its success to the same cause. In England the depression of the Barons under the house of Tudor. The lesson from this is, that a mixed government which admits a patrician order ought jealously to cir- cumscribe its privileges and immunities. The following are by no means inconsiderable ad- vantages in a democratic constitution, i. e. when the people partake of the legislature. 1st. The direction which it gives to the education and pursuits of the superior orders of the community, and consequently its important share in forming the public manners. Ambition of political dignity will awaken respectable characters to the improvement of their intellectual fa- culties. 2. Popular election procures to the common people courtesy from their superiors, in whom it generates settled habits of condescension and respect, 3. The satisfaction which the people in free govern- ments derive from the knowledge and agitation of poli- tical subjects. A gratification by no means unimportant, for it sup- plies a substitute perhaps for drinking, gaming, scandal, and obscenity. It has been a received opinion, that a Republican form of governments suits only a small state from the con- siderations. ( 58 ) That unless the people in every district be admitted to a share in the national representation, the govern- ment is not, as to them, a republic : Xhat the elections are managed by the intrigues of a few : That the interest of the constituent becomes too small ; of the representative too great: The connection between them is difficult: All appeal to the people is impossible from their num- bers : • The factions and unanimity of the senate are equally dangerous : The mechanism too complicated. Much of this reason is done away by the contrivance of a federal republic, such as that of America, It is yet to be tried, To what limits it can safely enlarge its dominions : How far it is capable of uniting the liberty of a com- monwealth with the safety of a powerful empire. Whether dissensions will not arise from want of a common superior : No record to judge by. Of the British Constitution. C. 7. By the Constitution of a country is meant so much of its law as relates to the designation and form of the le- gislature. Therefore the terms constitutional and unconstituti- onal, mean legal and illegal. In Englandthe system of public jurisprudence is made up of acts of parliament, of decisions of courts of law^ and of immemorial usage : ( o9 > Consequently these are the principles, of which the English Constitution itself consists. It is founded on no higher original, than that which gives force to the laws of the realm. An act of Parliament in England can never he pro- perly called unconstitutional. In a lower sense it may : viz, when it militates against the spirit of other salutary laws. As when a Parliament of Henry VIII. gave the King's proclamation the authority of law. " Principles of the constitution/ and other similar expressions often used, seem to refer to some distant aera, when the scheme of our government w r as formerly planned and settled. No such plan was ever formed. The Constitution of England hath grown out of occa- sion and emergency. Thus the great Charter and the Bill of Rights were partial modifications of the Constitution ; they did not give it a ne\y original, In the British Constitution there exists a wide dif- ference between the actual state of government, and the theorv ; though the one results from the other. Thus the King is invested with absolute personal im- punity, with the power of conferring by charter the privilege of sending representatives into one house of parliament, and of placing whom he will in the other. These prerogatives, which seem to make him despotic, are dwindled to mere ceremony. In their stead has arisen a sure and commanding in-* fluence from the enormous patronage placed in the &$-« posal of the executive magistrate. H ( 60 ) Upon questions of reform therefore, the change ought not to be adventured upon without a cool, sober, com- prehensive discernment of the consequences. For inpolitics the most important effects have for the most part been incidental and unforeseen: the direct consequences are often the least important. Thus Elizabeth and her successor encouraged trade, by wise laws. They were not conscious, that at the same time they encouraged a consciousness of strength and indepen- dence, which could not long endure the dominion of ar- bitrary princes. The mutiny Act was made an annual bill merely from the expediency of retaining a controul over the most dangerous prerogative of the crown, the command of a Standing army. It has altered the whole frame of the British Consti- tuticnf A standing army has become essential to the safety and administration of government. Parliament by discontinuing this provision can en- force its resolutions on any subject. A contest between the King and Parliament must dis- solve the constitution. Lastty, the nomination of all employments in the pub- lic service was conferred on the crown from the obvi- ous propriety, that & master should chuse his own ser- vants. It has added an influence, which has changed the character of the constitution : For patronage is power. ( 61 ) There is one end of civil government peculiar to & good government ; the happiness of its subjects. There is another essential end, but common to it with many bad ones ; its own preservation. Many things in the English, as in every constitution* are to be vindicated solely as provisions for its perma- nency. They are, however, of subordinate considera- tion to the value of the constitution itself. The Government of England is formed by a combina- tion of the three regular species of government ; the Monarch}*-, residing in the King ; the Aristooxacy,in the House of Lords ; and the Republic, in the House of Commons. Such a scheme is intended to unite the advantages of the several simple forms, and to exclude the ineonve-. niences, as enumerated in the preceding chapter. JTh.e subject may be considered by remarking the ex- pedients, by which the British Constitution provides; 1st. For the interests of its subjects : 2d. For its own preservation. The contrivances for the first are the following : Every citizen is capable of becoming a member of the senate, and every senator has the right of propounding whatever law he pleases. Every district has the privilege of choosing represen- tatives informed of their interest. The right of voting for representatives being annex,, edto different qualifications in different places, each or- der and profession of men in the community become "virtually represented. The elections are so connected with the influence of landed property, that a considerable number of men of H 2 ( 62 ) great estates must be returned to parliament ; and are also so modified,, that men the most eminent in their profession are the most likely to prevail* Their number, fortune, and various interests, and above all the temporary duration of their power, are se- curities forthe freedom of their judgment. - The representatives are so mixed with their consti- tuents, that they cannot impose a burthen, in which they do not themselves share. The proceedings of parliament, and parliamentary conduct of each member, are known by the people at large. Political importance depends so far upon public fa- vour, that a member cannot more effectually raise him- self to eminence, than by contriving salutary laws. From all the above it may be presumed, that wise counsels will receive the approbation of the majority ^f the House of Commons. For the advantage of monarchy the executive govern- ment is committed to an hereditary King. In the defence of the empire ; in the maintenance of its dignity ; in the advancement of its trade by treaties ; and in providing for the administration of municipal justice, the interest of the king and people usually coin- cides : in this part the regal office is therefore trusted with ample power. In the articles of taxation and punishment, when thei interests are different, the safety of the people is strictly guarded by the constitution. Every law to levy money must originate in the Houses $f Commons. Th§ application of the public supplies is watched,aiwl ( 63 ) is under certain regulations ; the expenditure of tlietfi is accounted for in the House. With respect topitnishment, the guilt of the offender must be pronounced by twelve men of his own order, by a jury, and the punishment of each crime is fixed. Illegal imprisonment is completely provided against by the Habeas corpus Act. In a charge of Treason, where government is a party in the prosecution, the subject is assisted in his defence by extraordinary indigencies: viz. A copy of his in- dictment, a list of the witnesses to be produced, and of the jury to be ifnpannelled, ten days before trial : he is permitted to make his defence by counsel, and above all, two witnesses are required to convict him. 3d. The constitution provides for its own preserva- tion, by what has been called the balance of the consti- tution, which consists in two contrivances — a balance of power and a balance of interest. By the balance of power, there is no power possessed by one part of the legislature, which it can abuse with- out being checked by the other. If laws subversive of regal government are framed, the King can interpose his negative. The Parliament can check any arbitrary application of this negative by refusing supplies of money. H The King can do no wrong :" but they who con- cur and assist in any illegal command, are subject to prosecution and cannot plead his pardon. No act of the crown can be legal, till authenticated by the subscription of some of its great officers. The power of the crown over the military, and tor ( 64 ) declare war, can be checked by the Parliament's refu- sing supplies. The influence of favoritism is subdued by the neces- ^Ity of choosing men most capable of managing the state. By thebalanceof interest is meantthis :—- that the re- spective interest of the three estates are so adjusted^ that whichever shall attempt any encroachment, the other two will unite in resisting it. The proper use and design of the House of Lords is, 1st. To enable the King by his right of the peerage to reward the servants of the public at a small expenee to the nation* 2d. To fortify the stability of the regal government, 3d. To stem the progress of popular fury. Occasions may arise, in which the commonwealth inay be saved by the reluctance of the nobility, who have separate prejudices and interests, to adopt the ca- prices, or to yield to the vehemence of the people. If their privileges be restrained, there can be little inconvenience to the people from the increase of their number :— -the same quantity of power divided amongst Jnore hands. The admission of a small number of ecclesiastics into the house of Lords is an equitable compensation to the Clergy, who are a body of considerable property, num- ber, and influence, for their exclusion from the House of Commons. If they should be obsequious, they are properly put in that house, where frequent resistance to Government is not expected. i 65 ) ■ No sufficient reason evident for exempting the per- sons of members of either House of Parliament from ar- rest for debt. When extended to domestics and retainers, it be- comes an absurd sacrifice of equal justice to imaginary dignity. There is nothing in the British Constitution so remark- able, as the irregularity of the popular representation. The House of Commons consists of 548 members, of whom 200 are elected by 700 constituents. In one part of the kingdom a person may be one in twenty, who choose two representatives, in another he inay have no representative at all. It may be said, that one half of the House of Com- mons obtain their seats in that assembly by the election of the people, the other half by purchase, or by the no- mination of the proprietors of great estates. This incongruity in the constitution strikes most forcibly at first sight : before we adventure upon refor- mation, we ought to be assured, that the magnitude of the evil will justify the danger of the experiment. We wave all controversy with those who wish to al- ter iXwform of the government ; as the republican. With those who insist upon representation as a natu- ral right. It is a natural right so far onh T , as it conduces to the public utility, i. e. to the establishment of good laws, and as it secures to the people the just administration of them. These effects depend on the abilities and dispositions of the national counsellors. Wherefore if men most likely to know and promote ( M > the public interest are returned to Parliament, it signi- fies little, who return them. In the House of Commons are found the most eonsU derable landholders, and merchants of the kingdom ; the heads of the army, navy, law ; the occupiers of great offices in the state ; together with many individuals eminent for their knowledge, eloquence, and activity. Does any scheme of representation promise to collect together more wisdom, or to produce firmer integrity ? If we attend to effects, there is a just excuse for those points of the present representation, which appear at first view absurd. No order or assembly of men whatever can long maintain their place and authority, of which the mem- bers do not individually possess a great share of personal importance. The present arrangement secures a great weight of property to the House of Commons. The constitution of ihe small boroughs contributes to this effect ; as the appointment is generally annexed tq certain great inheritances. Elections purely popular are in this respect uncertain. It has been observed, that conspicuous abilities are most frequently found with t\\e representatives of small boroughs ; this is natural. They are most likely to become purchasers, who by their talents can make the best of the bargain. The opulent patron, who gives a seat, finds his own interest consultedby the reputation and abilities of the person, whom he nominates. If certain of the nobility hold the appointment of ( 67 ) some representative, it serves to maintain a beneficial al- liance between the two branches of the legislature. If a few boroughs lie at the disposal of the crown, whilst their number is known and small, they may be tolerated with little danger. The present representatives, after all these deduc- tions, are so connected with the mass of the community, thatthe will of the people, when determined and per- manent, generally prevails. The diminution of the influence of the crown is the chief design of the various schemes for a reform in Par-* liament. The more obvious and safe way of attaining the same end would be to reduce the patronage of the Crown. Many wise and virtuous politicians think it a neces- sary ingredient in the British Constitution, which gives cohesion to the whole. If the measures of government were opposed from no- thing but principle, the government ought to have no- thing but rectitude to support them. Faction, envy, a willingness to thwart ambition, love of shewing power, might induce a great party to draw to themselves the whole government, or wantonly and effectually to obstruct the business of the nation. Government must possess an influence to counteract these motives ; to produce not a bias of the passions, bufc a neutrality. Our own national history affords ground for these ap- prehensions. Till the reign of Charles I. the King carried his mea- sures by intimidation: after the restoration three sue* ( 68 > ceeded, and has since the revolution been methodically pursued, the more successful expedient of influence. The assemblies of the colonies in America possessed much of the constitution of our House of Commons. The King had no influence among them. To this cause, among others, we may attribute the changes, that have taken place. These examples will have weight with those, who consider stability among the first perfections of any go- vernment. This apology for influence relates not to ajustifi cation of bribery, nor does it require any sacrifice of personal probity. In political, above all other subjects, the wisest judg- ment may be held in suspence. There are subjects of apparent indifference. This occurs frequently in personal contests. These cases cpmpose the province of influence. The only doubt is what influence shall be admitted. If the influence of the crown is removed, another would succeed. If motives of gratitude and expectation be with- drawn, others equally irrelevant to the merits of the question will succeed in their place. The success of influence in matters of indifference does not prove, that the consent of parliament could be procured to measures evidently detrimental. There is more reason to fear, that without influence the prerogative could not support itself. From all the above we may conclude, that an inde- pendent parliament is incompatible with the existence of monarchy. \ X 69 ) Of the Administration of Justice. C. 8. The first maxim of a free state is that the laws be made by one set of men and administered by another, that the legislative and judicial authorities be kept separate : Because then general laws are made by one body of men without seeing whom they may affect, and must be applied by the other, let them affect whom they will. In this country the legislative and judicial functions are effectually divided. This fundamental rule of civil jurisprudence is vio- lated in cases of attainder or confiscation, in bills of pains and penalties, and in all ex post facto laws, in which parliament exercises the double office of legisla- ture and judgment. Experience has shewn, that in these instances the valuable rule nad better never been infringed. The escape of one delinquent cannot produce so much harm, as ma}' arise from the infraction of a rule, on which the existence of civil liberty essentially depends. The next security forthe impartial administration of justice is the independence of the judges, especially in decisions to which government is a party. The judges not unfrequently become arbiters between the King and people ; thev ought therefore to be inde- pendent of either. This policy dictated that improvement in our consti- tution, by which the judges, though appointed by the King, can be removed by an address from both houses of Parliament. Their salaries ought to be such as may render their situation respectable, and desirable by men q\ eminence, and secure their integritv, " I % ( 70 ) A third precaution to be observecUin the formation of a court of judicature is, that the number of judges be small. For beside the violence and tumult inseparable from large assemblies, judges when they are numerous, divide the shame of an unjust determination ; whereas each should be responsible in his separate and particu- lar reputation. This has been exemplified in the trans- ferring of the trial of parliamentary elections from the House of Commons to a select committee. An even number of judges, is preferable to an odd one, and four seems better than any other, as there must be a majority of three to one. A fourth requisite in the constitution of a court of justice is, that it be held apertisforibiis. Something is gained to the public by appointing two Or three courts of concurrent jurisdiction, that it may be in the option of the suitor, to which he will resort. But lastly, one supreme tribunal is necessary, by whose final sentence all other courts should be bound. This preserves an uniformity in the decisions of infe- rior courts, and maintains to each its proper limits. There are two kinds of judicature, the one, where the office of judge is permanent in the same person ; the other, where the judge is determined by lot at the time of trial. The advantage of the former is the knowledge and readiness of experience : the defect, the possibility (as he is known beforehand) of secret management, The advantage of the latter is indifFerency: the de- fect, the w r arjt of legal science^, which may produce uni- formity. The construction of English courts of law in which ( 71 ) causes are tried by the jury with the assistance of a judge, combines both the two with peculiar success. Everv deviation from this mode of trial, such as sum- nary convictions before justices of the peace, and courts of conscience, ought to be watched with vigi- lance. The trial by jury is sometimes inadequate to the ad- ministration of equal justice. This takes place chiefly in disputes in which some no- pular passion intervenes ; as Where an order of men are obnoxious from their pro- fession, as are officers of the revenue, &c. or where the interest of one of the party may be in common with the general interests of the jurors, as in contests between landlords and tenants, Sec. Or, lastly, where the minds are inflamed by political or religious dissensions. Causes of this kind might be better removed from the neighbourhood of the parties. The experiment of leaving it to the judges only is too big with public danger. The situation of the courts of judicature presents an alternative of difficulties. If there were only a few courts, and those in the me- tropolis, the consequence would be great expence in the conveyance to it, and prolixity of proceeding. If domestic tribunals be erected in each neighbour- hood, there is danger of ignorance and partiality in the judge of the supreme tribunal. Oar itinerary courts are relieved from both these ob- jections, and there becomes one law of the land in every part of the kingdom. C 72 ) Next to the constitution of courts of justice, the max* mis which ought to guide them, are to be considered. . The chief point of enquiry here is, how far, and for what reasons, or whether at all, it is expedient to adhere to precedents ; or whether it be necessary forjudges to attend to any other consideration, than the apparent and particular equit}' of the case before them. Precedents ought not to be incontrovertible, because this would give the sentence of judges all the authority which w r e ascribe to the most solemn acts of the legisla- ture : yet the general security requires, that such pre- cedents should not be overthrown without the detection of manifest error. 1. That the discretion of judges maybe bound by a positive rule. £. And principally, that the subject, where his legal interest is concerned, may know beforehand, how to act, and what to expect. (The superintendence of parliament could not con* troul abuses of judicial discretion, if there was no ac- knowledged standard of what is right.) Without this knowledge the spirit of litigation piust prevail, and the worst property of slavery would be en- tailed on the subject, no assurance of his rights, or knowledge of his duty. However, from adherence to precedents two incon- veniences arise : — The hardship of particular determination, and the in tricacy of the law, as a science. To the first we may answer, that uniformity is of more importance than equity, in proportion as. general ( 73 ) uncertainty would be a greater evil than particular in- justice. The second is attended with no greater inconveni- ence, than that of erecting the law into a separate pro- fession. To a thinking mind this question frequently occurs ; Why, since the maxims of natural justice are few and evident, do there arise so many doubts and controver j sies in their application? If a system of morality, con- taining both the precepts of revelation, and deductions of reason maybe comprised in one moderate volume, what need of those tomes of statutes and reports. In answer to this it is to be observed. 1. That treatises of morality always suppose facts to be ascertained, and the intention likewise of the parties to be laid open. The discussion of these facts and the discovery of these intentions remain to exercise the enquiry of courts of justice, wherein the arbitration must proceed upon rules of evidence and maxims of credibility, with which the morality has no concern. ( 1. There exist a number of cases in which the law of nature prescribes nothing except that some certain rule be adhered to, which has been introduced by an act of the legislature, or by custom. Thus in the descent of lands, &c. from in testate^ pro- prietors, whether the kindred of the grandmother, or great grandmother, shall be preferred in the succession ; whether sons shall be preferred to daughters or the el- der to the younger, and in various other questions which relate to the right or acquisition of property. ( 74. ) Many things are in their nature indetirminatt, as the age of legal discretion. Other things are perfectly arbitrary, as the time which should be assigned and limited for defendants to plead to the complaints alleged against them, and almost all those rules which constitute what is called the prac- tice of the court. 3. In contracts between merchant, servant, &c. whe- ther expressed or implied, which involve a great num- ber of conditions, natural justice can only refer to the custom of the court .try. 4. As the law r s of nature require, that the just engage- ments which a man enters into, should continue in force beyond his own life, the private rights of persons frequently depend upon what has been transacted in times remote from the present. Thus in questions between lords of manors and their tenants ; the King, and those who claim royal franchises ; in tracing boundaries, 8cc. old covenants must be re- ferred to, concerning the existence or conditions of which doubts must perpetually occur. 5. The quantity or extent of an injury is often dubi- ous and undefined, and cannot be ascertained by any rule which the law of nature supplies, as when a man may have suffered in his person by any assault,or in the comfort of his life by the seduction of his wife or daugh- ter, See. fj. Controversies arisein the interpretations of written laws, originating in some contingency which the com- poser of the law did not foresee. . 7. In the deliberations of courts of justice on every new question, a difficulty arises between the attention ( 75 ) which is due to the truth and justice of the cause be- tween the parties, and to the consequence of the prin- ciple which the precedent establishes. Finally ; one principal source of disputation must be " the competition of opposite analogies" Questions arise continually, which resemble others^ wh£re the point of law is fixed, only in part. It is in the reconciliation of different analogies that the contention of the bar is carried on : as in the dis- pute concerning literary and other property. The few questions referred to superior courts shew, that doubtful and obscure points of law are not so nume- rous as they are apprehended to be. There are two peculiarities in the judicial constitution of this country, which do not carry with them that evi- dence of their propriety, which recommends every other part of the system. 1. The rule, w r hich requires that juries should be unanimous in their verdict. To expect that twelve men promiscuously taken should be unanimous on a point confessedly dubious is absurd. The effects are not so detrimental as the rule is unrea- sonable. For in criminal prosecutions it operates on the side of riiercy : in civil cases it adds weight to tbe direction of the judge, as the jury will naturally close their disputes by a subscription to the opinion of the bench. ■ However there would be more assurance that the conclusion is founded in reasons of apparent truth a of crime is perpetrated, is deemed a reason for ag ring the punishment. Thus of this kind are sheep-stealing, the stealing of cloth from tenters, &c. &c. From the justice of an omniscient God, we may ex- pect a gradation of punishment proportioned to the guilt abstracted from any foreign consideration. This cannot be expected from the government of man, whose authority over his fellow creatures is limited by defects of power and knowledge. There are two methods of administering penal justice. The first method assigns capital punishments to few ©flfences, and inflicts it invariably, K % ( 78 ) The second assigns it to many kinds of offences, but inflicts it only upon a few examples of each kind. The latter method has been long adopted in thiscoun- try. The preference of this to the former method is found- ed on the consideration, that the selection of proper ob- jects for capital punishments depends on circumstances, which cannot be ascertained with thatexactness,which is requisite in legal description. Hence although it be necessary, that the whole au- thority of the legislature should fix by precise rales the limit to which punishment may be extended, yet the mitigation of punishment may be entrusted without danger to the executive magistrate, whose discretion will operate on the circumstances* If judgment of death were reserved for a few species Of crimes only, many crimes of dangerous example would go unpunished. If there were no power of relaxation, some would undergo this punishment, when it was neither deserved, nor necessary. By the latter expedient used in England: few actually puffer death, while the dread and danger of it hangs over man v. The wisdom of this mode excuses the multiplicity of capital offences in the English code. Privately stealing from the person is a crime, the leaking of which capital,can hardly be defended on the abovenien tidied principles. For it excludes every degree of force, and might be yreyented by common circumspection. ( 79 ) The prerogative of pardon is properly reserved to the chief magistrate. It is too high a power fur many hands, or for any in* ferior officer in the state. The King can best collect advice, and is removed $t the greatest distance from private motives. The exercise of this power i& as much a judicial act as the trial of the prisoner. Consequently any partiality In the exercise of it is as heinous as corruption in a judge. -Aggravations, which ought to guide the magistrate in the selection of objects for condign punishment, are principally these three : repetition ; cruelty ; combina- tion. In crimes perpetrated by a multitude, it is proper to separate ia the punishment the ringleader from his fol- lowers. This casts an obstacle in the way of such confedera- cies. Injuries effected by terror and violence ought chiefly to be repressed, because their extent is unlimited : be- cause no private precaution can protect the subject against them : because they endanger life and safety, as well as property : because they render the condition of society wretched by a sense of personal insecurity. These reasons do not apply to fraud, which circum- spection can prevent, Sec. In estimating the comparative malignancy of crimes of violence, regard is to be had not only to the mis- chief of the crime, but the fright occasioned b}- the attack. This consideration places a difference between breaking into a dwelling house by day and by night : this differ* ( 80 ) ence obtains in the punishment of the offence by the law of Moses, and in the codes of most countries. Of injuries which are effected without force, the most noxious are forgeries, counterfeiting or diminishing the coin, and the stealing of letters in the course of their conveyance. Though these seem to effect property alone, yet their general consequences, if they became frequent, would tend to lay waste human existence. They who regard the divine rule of life for life, and blood for blood, may perceive with respect to the ef- fects of action a great resemblance between certain atro- cious frauds, and those crimes which attack personal safety. There appears a substantial! difference between the forging of bills of exchange, &c. where credit is given merely to the signature, and between the forging of bonds, &c. where deceit might be precluded by proper circumspection m the parties. The law however makes no difference, Perjury is a crime, the general consequences of which might be put upon a level with the most flagitiout fraud. The obtaining of money by secret threats deserves to be reckoned among the worst species of robbery. The frequency of capital executions in this country owes its necessity to three caqses 5 much liberty, great cities, and the want of punishment short of death pos- sessing a sufficient degree of terror. With respect to the first, the jealousies with which a free people watch their liberties, will not permit the &;Qtttjoul, which is exercised with success in arbitrary. ( 81 ) goverhments, such as the master of a family rendering an account of all his inmates, the patrol of soldiers in the streets, &c. &c. With respect to the second, great cities present easier opportunities and incentives to libernitism, enable them to collect in confederacy, afford concealment, &c, &c* 3. Transportation which is the sentence second in the order of severity, answers the purpose of example very imperfectly. Because it is a slight punishment to those who have no home. Because the punishment is unobserved and unknown. This casm in the scale of punishment produces two great imperfections. 1. It extends the same punishment to crimes of dif- ferent magnitude. 2. Punishments separatedby awide interval are assign- ed to crimes hardly distinguished in their guilt. The end of punishment is twofold, amendment and example. In the first little has been efFected,criminals generally returning more hardened. Pardons at the point of death might now and then have great effect, but cannot be often repeated. Of the reforming punishments, solitary imprison- ment promises the most success. As aversion to labour is the cause, from which half the vices of low life proceed, punishments should be contrived with a view to the conquering of this dispo- sition. A portion of the prisoner's earnings by labour should ( S3 ) befeft to his use, and confinement might be measured by quantity of work. The principal question is, what to do with ■criminal*; after enlargement. It is worth the attention of all, who wish well to the country, to consider what means will best answer the two great purposes of employment and dispersion. Torture is applied to extort confessions -of guilt, ort0 prolong the pains of death* The question by torture iseqtiivocaiin itsefTeets;pain operating in like manner upon the innocent and guilty. False accusations tftay be extracted from the One* W&ft fv&tn the other. Barbarous spectacles tend either to harden and de- prave the public fee lings, or sink mens 7 abhorrence of the crime in their commisseration of the criminal. That mode of •ptmishment is preferable, which alig- nments the horror of the punishment without impairing the public sensibility. Infamous punishments are to be confined tooffences tmiVersaMy detested, tmd to offenders sensible of shame. Thecertainty of punishment is of more consequence: than the severity. Criminals en^co ftrage themselves more with the chance t>f escape, than^mpare the irwits of their criiiie with the probable pain of punishment. Those -contrivances directed towards the restraint of 'Crimes are most effectual, which facilitate the convic- tion of criminals. Upon this principle, the scrupulousness of juries in ^esn^nding proofs of a crime, of which its nature and seeresy scarcely admit, is injurious to society. ( 83 ) It encourages villany by confessing the impossibility of bringing villains to justice. Two maxims are generally the cause of these injudi- cious acquittals. 1st. " That circumstantial evidence falls short of po- sitive proof." This is untrue ; a concurrence of well authenticated circumstances being a stronger ground of assurance than positive testimony unconfirmed by circumstances. 2d. " That it is better for ten guilty to escape, than that one innocent should suffer." But the security of civil life being protected by the dread of punishment, the misfortune of an individual cannot be put in competition with this object. Though every care should be taken of each indivi- dual, yet courts of justice ought not to be deterred by every appearance of danger. Of Religious Establishments and of Toleration, C. 10. A religious establishment is no part of Christianity,it is only the means of inculcating it. No commands were delivered by Christ for establish- ing any form of church government, with a view of fixing a constitution for succeeding ages to be adopted every where, and at all times by Christians. This reserve is sufficiently accounted for by two rea- sons. 1st. That no precise constitution could be framed, adapted equally to the church in its primitive state, with the condition it was to assume, when become a national religion. 2dly. That a particular designation of offices among ( 84 )■ his primitive ministers might, by interfering with the civil policy, have obstructed the progress of the religion itself. The authority therefore of a church establishment is founded upon its utility, "' nsa scheme of instruction/* The notion of a religious establishment comprehends three things. 1st. A clergy. 2d. A legal provision for their maintenance. 3d. Confining that provision to the teachers of a par- ticular sect of Christianity. In defending ecclesiastical establishments, the first and fundamental question is, — Whether Christianity ean be maintained, unless a'class of men be set apart from other employments by public authority, to the Study and teaching of religion.* and the conducting of public worship? A clergy is necessar}^ because it is an historical re-* ligion, and requires a peculiar and very comprehensive branch of knowledge, the dead languages, Jewish his- tory, &c. and because the ordinary office of public /teaching requires qualifications not usually to be met with amidst the offices of civil life. To obtain these qualifications,study, preparation, lei- sure,, and a peculiar education are necessary. 2d. Whether their maintenance should depend or* the will of their hearers, or be assigned by law ? To the scheme of voluntary contributions there aie the following objections : That they depend on caprice, therefore no peraxar ment maintenance. ( 35 ) That people might be tempted to prefer their interest to religion. That the ministry would be degraded by the idea of begging. 3d. Whether this provision shall be confined to one sect in preference to all others of irreconcileable opi- nions ? This question is dependent upon another, viz. How find by whom shall ministers be appointed r If our species of patronage be retained, a test is ne- cessaiy to prevent discordancy of opinions between the t eacher and congregation. If the appointment be in the hands of the separate parishes, there would be endless disputes among the different sects about the choice of the minister. Kit bein the state,a national religion commences im- mediately. The le^al maintenance of a clergy, without a le°;al preference of one sect to another, seems practicable only in a mode said to have been adopted in North America. Every man is obliged to contribute towards the main- tenance of religion, but the choice pf the sect, to whose ministers he contributes, is left to himself. To this mode are the following inconveniences : 1st. That it is incompatible with the first requisite of an ecclesiastical establishment, the division of thecQun* try into parishes of a commodious extent. 2d. That strifes and aninterested spirit of proselytism would arise, where the pecuniary success of the different ministers is made to depend on the number and wealth of their followers ( 86 ) Of a national religion a test is the immediate and in- dispensible consequence. Tests are liable to be unjustifiably extended, multi- plied, and continued. They check inquiry, violate liberty, ensnare the consciences of the clergy by tempting them to prevari- cate, and from the changes in men's opinions in reli- gion, come at length to contradict the actual sentiments of the church. If the division of the country into districts, with a minister to each, in which all churches agree, be a substantial part of a religious establishment, the ques- tion occurs,— Whether equality or distinction of orders among the clergy, conduces most to the ends of the in- stitution. In favour of our system are the following reasons : That it secures peace and subordination among the clergy : That it provides for each rank in civil life its corres- ponding minister : That it is an allurement to men of talents to enter in- to the church, and a stimulus to the industry of those who are in it. A national religion being established, how shall Dis- senters be treated I This question is preceded by another, — Whether the civil magistrate is justified in interfering in religious matters at all ? They who deduce civil government from some stipu- lation with its subjects contend, that religion was ex- cepted out of the social compact, and that in an affair ( 87 ) between God and a man's own conscience, no authority could be transferred from the latter to another. We, however, who derive it from the will of God, allow the magistate to interfere in every matter civil and religious, as far as it conduces in its general tendency to the common good. But religion pertaining to the interests of a life to come lies beyond the province of civil government. Laws, when they interfere even in religion, interfere only with temporals. My salvation is out of the power of man to affect,but even my life may be taken away on account of my reli- gion, because it may be taken away from any man for any reason that the legislature may deem conducive to the general good. As religion too can be construed to extend to all offices of life, its exemption from the controul of laws might afford a plea to exclude civil government from all au? thority over the subject. Still it is right <€ to obey God rather than man." In religious matters the right pf the magistrate to or- dain, and the obligation of the subject to obey, may be very different. This difference seldom happens in civil affairs. The law authorizes what it enjoins. But when laws, by exacting particular modes of wor- ship and tenets of faith, contradict what a man thinks has been declared by God to be true, whatever plea the state has to justify its edict, the subject has none to ex- cuse his compliance. The conclusion from the above proposition may be, that as to promote the salvation of men is to promote ( 88 ) public happiness, the supreme magistrate may and ought to enforce in any manner that religion, which he thinks most acceptable to God. But the clause in the above proposition, " general tendency," obliges the magistrate to reflect, 1st. Whether the religion he wishes to propagate, be best calculated to secure the eternal welfare of the subject. £d. Whether the means he employs will establish that religion. 3d. What will be the consequences of a general adop- tion of this inteference ? What degree then, and sort of interference of secular laws in religious matters will most benefit public happi- ness ? Our conclusions upon this head will be regulated by two maxims : 1st. That any form ofChristianity is better than no re- ligion. 2d. That the system of faith is best, which is truest. From the first it follows, that when the laws establish a national religion, they exercise a power and interfe- rence, which in their general tendency may benefit mar/kind. But which religion shall the magistrate establish, his own, or that which generally prevails ? Assuming it to be an equal chance,whether of the twp religions contains most truth, the latter should be esta-r Wished, if to teach the people their own religionbe^asieir and better, than to convert them to another. ( S9 ) tJpon these principles we must determine the case of dissenters. Toleration as far as it regards liberty of conscience, and secures men in the profession of theirr religion, is expedient* and their right, as it conduces to the propa- gation of truth. The confining a subject to the state religion is a need- less and grievous violation of natural liberty. Persecution never convinces, but forces men to pre- varicate, and disgraces Christianity. Serious books should be tolerated, but the circulation of ridicule and invective upon religious subjects may justly be restrained. Of complete toleration, that is, of admitting dissen- ters into offices and employments, doubts have been en- tertained ; For their opinions may be incompatible with the ne- cessary functions of civil government, and therefore justify their exclusion from employments. Even discordancies of religion,that not at all affect go- vernment, may render men unfit to act together in pub- lic stations i This assertion is altogether unfounded ; indeed there are no tenets in the religion of the several sects, that actually prevail, the quakers excepted, which incapa- citate men for the Service of the state. In two cases the testlaws are applied, and may be de- fended* 1st, Where two religions are contending for establish- ment, for one must have a decided superiority, in order to put an end to the contest. 2d. Where some disaffection towards the subsisting ( 90 ) government is connected with certain religious distinc- tions. The test is justifiable here upon the principle of inter- est; though it is not to the religion that the laws ob- ject, but to the religion as a mark of disaffection. But why does not the legislature direct his test against the political principles, rather than encounter them through the medium of religious tenets i To this there are two answer^. 1st. The laws fear not opinions, but inclinations,and political inclinations can certainly be detected only by the discovery of the religious creed with which they are wont to be connected. £d. That when men renounce their religion, they commonly quit all connexion with the members of the church they have left. The result of all is this,;— " That a comprehensive na- ** tional religion, guarded by a few articles of peace and "conformity, together with a legal provision for the r By their protection, they may promote industry, but without industry they can provide neither subsistence nor employment. All attempts to force trade by laws will be evaded ; their interference in trade is salutary only when they are intended to prevent frauds. The chief advantage to population from the interfe- rence of law, consists in the encouragement of agricuU ture, N 2 ( m ) For this purpose, the laws of property should be ad- justed to the following rules : 1st. a To give to the occupier all the power over the " soil which is necessary to its perfect cultivation." £d. "To assign the whole profit of every improvement " to the persons by whom it is carried on." Ijt is of little consequence in whose hands or to what extent land is, if it be rightly used. There existin this country conditions of tenure which condemn the land to perpetual sterility. The right of common precludes each proprietor from improving his estate, without the consentof many others. This is also usually embarrassed by manerial claims, But, secondly, agriculture is discouraged by every constitution of landed property, which admits to apar- ticipation of the profit, those who have no concern in the improvement. This objection is applicable to all such customs of manors, as subject the proprietor upon the death of the lord or tenant or the alienation of the estate, to a fine apportioned to the improved value of the land. But of all institutions none is so noxious as that of tithes; these are a tax upon industry, and upon that precise mode of cultivation, which it is the business of the state to relieve and remunerate. No measure of so great concern is so easy and bene- ficial as that of converting tithes into corn-rents, which would secure to the tithe holder an equivalent for his interest, and leave to industry its entire reward. ( 303 ) Of War, and of Military Establishments. Though the Christian scriptures describe wars as crimes or judgments, the profession of a soldier is no where forbidden or condemned. It is difficult to apply the principles of morality to the affairs of nations, because the " particular consequence " sometimes appears to exceed the value of the general ''rule." For instance, an adherence to a public treaty might enslave a whole people, &c. Yet if the rules of relative justice are to be violated in these cases ; if treaties are no longer binding than whilst they are convenient, and this opinion becomes general, almost the onlv method of averting or closing the cala- mities of war is lost. Together w r ith those maxims of universal equity, which are common to states and individuals^ there ex- ists also amongst sovereigns a system of artificial juris- prudence, under the name of the la w of nations. Its rules derive their moral force simply from the ge- neral duty of conforming to established regulations, but have all the virtue and obligation of a precept of na- tural justice. War may be considered with a view to its causes and to its conduct. The justifiable cause? of it are deliberate invasion of right, and the necessity of maintaining the balance of power. Whatever war has not for its motive, precaution, de- fence, or reparition, is unjustifiable. There are two lessons of rational and sober policy, which would exclude many of the motives of war. {. That princes should " place their glory, not in ex- ( 104 ) " tent of territory, but in raisiug the greatest portion of " happiness out of a given territory. 5 ' Enlargement of territory is not only not a just object, but most frequently is not desirable from sound policy. In two cases it may be of advantage both to the con- querors and conquered. 1st. Where an empire thereby reaches its natural boundaries. 2d. Where neighbouring states being severally too weak to defend themselves, can only be safe by a junc- tion of their strength, which conquest effects. II. Thftt "national honour should never be pursued " as distinct from national interest." It is often necessary to assert the honour of a nation*, for the sake of its interest. But points of honour must be estimated with a re- ference to utility. The conduct of war. Where thexause is justifiable, all the necessarv means are so too. But war authorizes no act of hostility, which is not Decessary,or conducive to the end and object of the war. And it respects those positive laws, which the custom of nations has sanctified, and which, being mutually conformed to, mitigate the calamities of war, without diminishing the power or safety of belligerent states. A standing army only can oppose a standing army. The discipline of a a standing army will always over- power newly-levied troops ; and though a militia with a great excess of numbers may sustain a flying war against regular troops, and though service may tran&r form it io effect into a standing army, yet it would be ( 105 ) liecessary for almost a whole nation to go out to war to repel an invader. i\ people too so unprepared must always have the 1 seat of war at home. Regular troops also provide for the public service at the least possible expence ; because they add more than any other to the bom mon strength, and take less from the national stock of productive industry. If the state depends upon a militia, arms must be put in the hands of the people at large. It seems doubtful, whether any government can be long secure amidst this general diffusion of the military character ; for every faction will find itself at the head of an army. " Nothing perhaps can govern a nation of armed citi- " zens, but that which governs an army — Despotism." The standing army should be directed by the prince, for success depends upon enterprize, secrecy, dispatch, and unanimity, which are almost incompatible with a popular council. He should likewise appoint and promote the officers; for a design is most likely to be best executed,when the person who issues the order chooses the instrument,and rewards the service. If in o-overnments like ours this department were id the hands of the democratic part of the constitution/the xeo-al prerogative would be overbalanced completely. The danger of a standing anriy is, that the separation of the soldiery from the restof thecommunity,and their dependence upon the will of the prince, give them an aspect, by no means favourable to public liberty. To diminish this danger, officers should betaken from I ( 106 ) the principal families of the country, be encouraged to establish in it families of their own, be admitted toseats in the senate, and to all the civil honours and privileges, that are compatible with their profession. Thus they would have such a share in the general rights of the people, that no personal views could in- duce them to assist in measures, which might enslave their posterity, kindred and country. -F I N I S. fefL ■ LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Hb BBMai 028 986 871 9 JH **•■■'•.■