% .** *A%f/h° *«„ .** S'' •* qV g „ „ »'° '* V- V n * • •* €♦ wm : f % ^ •*• *^ ^0, & •\o & * °* c* .0 4 s ' \> v A' ^ - <<* ^0* A o 4-' ^v^ ^ ^ A \ <. ***** : .^KV j 5 ^ : ^^^^ : ^ : -^^« ^; v V "$ w «&*? Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress ■: http://www.archive.org/details/pantheisticdilemOOshel >v Pantheistic Dilemma! and Other Essays in Philosophy and Religion BY HENRY C. SHELDON Professor in Boston University THE METHODIST BOOK CONCERN NEW YORK CINCINNATI Copyright, 1920, by HENRY C. SHELDON ©CLA5-66983 I TO STUDENTS WHOM I HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE OP INSTRUCTING IN THE SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY THIS VOLUME IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED CONTENTS ESSAY PAQB I. Pantheistic Dilemmas 11 II. A Study in the Philosophy Styled Pragmatism 37 III. Prominent Features in the Philoso- phy of Henri Bergson 67 IV. The Notion of a Changing God 105 V. Attempts to Dispense with the Soul 119 VI. Doctrinal Values Contributed by the Reformation 145 VII. John Henry Newman as Roman Cath- olic Apologist 187 VIII. The Truth and the Error of Mysti- cism 221 IX. Bahaism Historically and Critically Considered 273 Index 353 PREFACE Most of the themes considered in this vol- ume are associated with important issues in the intellectual and religious world of to-day. Bahaism may appear to be an exception, but it has a measure of interest as being a most ambitious scheme of religious syncretism which has found adherents and propagators in this country. It affords, moreover, a natural occa- sion to test the claims of the Mohammedanism from which it originated and to which it ac- cords a certain preference among religious ante- cedents. In the composition of the essays the aim has been twofold: on the one hand exposition, and on the other criticism or valuation. The author would express the hope that the former aim has been executed with such fairness that even the reader who is not in full sympathy with the manner in which the second aim is fulfilled in some instances may still find not a little which is suited to command his approval. I) o 4» ESSAY I PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS % ,.o s •2- •y I > ESSAY I PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS If it be any true interest, any demand of a rational system, to conserve reality both to God and to man, both to the Supreme Spirit and to human souls, then pantheism is justly barred from acceptance. An insuperable di- lemma confronts it, in that it must sacrifice God in his proper character if it retains man in his full reality, and must sacrifice man as he is known in consciousness if it will insist upon a God defined as absolutely all-inclusive. In saying this much we do not mean to imply that pantheism must make a decisive choice between just two alternatives. While it is im- possible for it to achieve both of the speci- fied ends, it is quite conceivable that by its definitions and reasonings it should at once sacrifice each of them very largely. Within a given system it can blur, mutilate, and in part abolish the proper reality of both God and man. And it is just to this result that it more commonly gravitates. The fundamental thesis of pantheism is the absolute oneness of being. If this being, over against which there is no second, be called God, 13 14 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS then the pantheistic affirmation is that God is the sole entity, the all-inclusive reality. It follows that what are called finite beings, bodies and souls, either have only an imag- inary existence or else are to be rated as liter- ally modes of God, forms into which the sole- existing substance is somehow differentiated. In a crude type of pantheism they might be called parts of God; but pantheistic speculators distinguished by any considerable degree of caution or subtlety generally feel the need of guarding against the notion that God is sub- ject to division or is to be construed as an aggregate. They prefer, therefore, to speak of bodies and souls, so far as they concede to them any reality, as modes or limited expres- sions of the one absolute Being or of his attri- butes. This has a certain verbal advantage, though a very serious demand still remains for showing how finite modes are compatible with an infinite subject. The general assump- tion is that a relation of commensurability must exist between modes and their subject. A word needs to be added relative to that form of speculation which denies all reality to the universe — viewed as the sphere of the manifold, the individual, and the finite — rating it in its entirety as nothing else than an empty deceiving appearance. Some writers ■/ PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 15 have been inclined to deny the propriety of including this way of thinking under panthe- ism, preferring to classify it as a species of monistic idealism. But the exception seems to us destitute of any good basis. No less than those who style finite entities modes of God those who deny the reality of the finite construe God as the sole Being. Their system is most unmistakably a pan-theism, only it happens to be of an acosmistic or world-denying type. In the major elaborations of pantheistic theory some variety of interest has generally obtained. Those who have taken the theme in hand have not consulted exclusively the demands of speculative thinking. Either they have not wished or have not been able to put aside all the ancestral forms of representa- tion. In certain connections they have prac- ticed a species of accommodation, adopting what has been styled the exoteric form of discourse as opposed to the purely philosophic or esoteric form. This remark unquestionably applies to the most distinguished exponent of Oriental pantheism, to Sankara (otherwise Sankarakarya), the great oracle of the or- thodox Vedanta philosophy. In the view of some very earnest students it applies also to the most noted representative of Occidental pantheism, Spinoza. In our discussion we pur- 16 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS pose to deal in particular with the views of these two writers, believing that in so doing we shall cover the points of principal sig- nificance in our theme. Sankara of India, who is supposed to have written in the ninth Christian century, rivals the most emphatic of pantheistic writers in his endeavor to exclude all limitation and multiplicity from God, or the absolute Being, whom he commonly designates by the name Brahman, but also characterizes as the Self. Of this Being he affirms, "Simple nondifferen- tiated intelligence constitutes its nature; just as a lump of salt has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste, nor any other taste." 1 For it there is no distinction of exist- ence and thought. 2 It cannot be viewed as a substratum for any quality. In fact it is totally without attributes, 3 and totally ex- clusive of relations, so that it can neither be consistently regarded as a subject for self- consciousness nor operative as a cause. 4 Brah- man, it is true, is described by different categories, such as absolute existence, absolute 1 Commentary on the Vedanta Sutras, in Sacred Books of the East, Oxford edition, vol. xxxviii, p. 157. 2 Ibid., p. 166. 3 In Sacred Books of the^ East, vol. xxxiv, p. 327, xxxviii, pp. 202, 203. 4 Ibid., vol. xxxiv, pp. 330, 357. \> PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 17 knowledge, and absolute blessedness; but, as a modern Vedantist explains, these terms have no qualitative reference; they stand for essence and the three are one intrinsically, though diversified to our point of view. 5 How thor- oughly Sankara abolishes all inner distinctions in the Absolute may be judged by this state- ment from the pen of another expositor: "Brahman may, from a lower standpoint, be conceived as 'with attributes,' but the ultimate truth remains that he is really without at- tributes. Besides, the conception of the Abso- lute in the strict sense leaves hardly any room for attributes. Impose any attributes and you at once make the Absolute non-abso- lute, that is, destroy its very nature by making limited that which is without limits." 6 In sustaining his contention that the dis- tinctionless Brahman is being in its totality Sankara adopts the bold expedient of denying the real existence of the world. All distinct selves or souls, as well as all bodily forms, are declared to belong to the sphere of Maya or illusion. They are but dreamlike products resulting from nescience. The following state- 6 Swami Vivekananda, The Science and Philosophy of Religion, p. 82. 6 Prahu Dutt Shastri, The Doctrine of Maya in the Philos- ophy of the Vedanta, p. 129. 18 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS merits will indicate how unequivocally the Vedantist philosopher applied this point of view: "During the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious distinct ex- istence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all distinction." "Scriptural passages declare that for him who sees that everything has its self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world, with its actions, agents, and results, is non-existent." "All the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the • difference of the soul and the highest Self is not real, but is due to the limiting adjuncts, namely, the body and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by nescience." 7 As is logically dictated by these propositions, Sankara affirms that the individual soul attains to its true goal by passing beyond all sense of individuality and coming to actualize the truth of its identity with Brahman. Thus the false notion of concrete and plural existence will be effectually vanquished. Modern expositors of Vedantism, like Vivekananda and Shastri, differ here in no respect from Sankara. The above presents in its cardinal features 7 In Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxxiv, pp. 318, 323, 281, 282. PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 19 the real system of the noted Hindu thinker. But, as was indicated, he was constrained in various connections to practice accommoda- tion. Conforming to the style of representa- tion frequently occurring in the ancient oracles of his religion and practically requisite to satisfy the religious needs of the people in general, he sometimes spoke of Brahman as if he were actually the creator of the world and held a real relation to men and things. His fundamental conviction, however, is in no wise ambiguous. The Brahman who fashions and dwells in the world, to whom he some- times refers as the lower Brahman 8 — other- wise denominated Isvara — is plainly nothing more than a makeshift conception. He is simply a phantom of the religious imagi- nation which fulfills a certain utilitarian func- tion. Judged by certain lines of statement Spinoza represents a type of pantheism not a little in contrast with that of Sankara. While he agrees with the Hindu thinker in affirming one sole-existing substance, he does not define this as totally void of attributes. On the contrary, he assigns to it an infinity of at- tributes, though he specifies only two — thought and extension. But, in spite of this fact, he 8 Ibid., vol. xxxiv, p. 61; vol. xxxviil, pp. 203, 390. 20 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS gives place to a series of statements which argue for a distinctionless Absolute very much like that of Sankara. His maxim that "all determination is negation" 9 suggests that the Absolute is not to be qualified by any pred- icates. Again he makes the explicit declaration that God is a "Being absolutely indetermin- ate." 10 Furthermore, commenting on terms applied to God by certain writers, he squarely denies that such characteristics as omniscience and wisdom can appropriately be ascribed to him. 11 With equal resoluteness he rules out intellect and will from the eternal essence of God, affirming that what is in God has no more correspondence with these terms as applied to human endowments than the heav- enly constellation styled the Dog has with a barking animal. 12 Thus, notwithstanding his formal affirmation of attributes, Spinoza is seen to lean conspicuously toward the theory of an indeterminate or distinctionless Absolute. The posited attributes are brought under sus- picion of describing nothing really pertaining to God as the absolute Being. A second apparent contrast between Spinoza 9 Epist. 50. 10 Epist. 41, otherwise 36. 11 Short Treatise, cited by E. E. Powell, Spinoza and Re- ligion, pp. 202, 203. 12 Ethics, Part I, prop. 17, scholium. See also Epist. 36. .«? PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 21 and Sankara relates to the reality of the world, the aggregate of limited or finite beings. That the former meant in all seriousness to affirm such reality is not to be doubted. Still, it cannot well be denied that he laid down premises which logically blocked the road to the given affirmation. In so far as he postu- lated an absolutely indeterminate Being he provided no competent basis or background for a manifold world. Such a Being is barren of all power of production, and could not be a subject for any differentiation without con- tradicting its nature. Furthermore, what he says of God's infinite attributes may be re- garded as excluding the possibility of the origination of the finite beings which he char- acterizes as modes of those attributes — modes of thought and extension; for, he makes this unequivocal affirmation: "All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite; or, in other words are eternal and infinite through the said attribute." 13 Now, according to Spinoza, there is nothing contingent in the universe. Whatever follows from anything follows by necessity. What place is there, then, for the finite, if the attributes of God can only give rise to the infinite? The philos- "Ibid.. Part I, prop. 21. 22 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS opher, it is true, predicates an unlimited series of finite things, one thing conditioning another, and so on to infinity. But the addi- tion of one finite thing to another never results in a true infinite. Hence it is only by a tour de force that Spinoza can bring in the finite, and he falls little short of confessing the vio- lent shift when he says: "The finite must follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered in some way modified." 14 The relevant question is, What is to modify the infinite attribute which necessarily operates to produce only the in- finite? Surely, not finite things, usurping the field and counteracting the intrinsic demands of the infinite. Nowhere do we find the modification relieved of its enigmatic appear- ance. The phrases "in so far as" and "in some way" rather evade than satisfy the demand for explanation. They are quite unsuitable in a system which professes to leave nothing at loose ends. 15 Thus, though his intention was in a quite different direction, Spinoza provided certain foundations for the doctrine of the illusory character of the world proclaimed by the Vedantist philosophy. "Ethics, Part I, prop. 28, dem. 1B Compare Powell, Spinoza and Religion, pp. 180, 141; John Caird, Spinoza, pp. 165, 166. PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 23 In criticizing these forms of pantheism we may properly consider their shortcomings, on the one hand, from the standpoint of rational or metaphysical demands, and, on the other, from the viewpoint of religious and ethical requirements. Sankara's assumption of an indeterminate Absolute may in a way justify his negation of the world, since the perfectly indeterminate affords logically no basis for the production or evolution of anything. But the world is here, and this tremendous fact is not to be disposed of by any easygoing theoretical ex- pedient. The warrant for calling it an empty mirage, a dream, an illusion is in no wise apparent. What test of the illusory can the illusory itself apply? Now, the mind of the individual man is, according to the Vedantist theory, just as much of an illusion as is any- thing in the world that can be named. When the philosopher, therefore, pronounces the world an illusion, if he speaks as an individual, it is a case of a nonentity pronouncing judg- ment. Obviously, a judgment of that kind is a mere burlesque, just a section of the whole deceptive phantasm in which the universe consists. On the other hand, if the philosopher assumes not to speak as an individual, what proof can he offer that he has transcended the &. A 24 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS character and status of an individual, and is qualified to give forth a message as one who has actually experienced the truth that the distinctionless Brahman alone exists? That would involve both the slipping out of the state of apparent individuality into oneness with the distinctionless Brahman and the slipping back into the state of apparent indi- viduality. The second transition would be required as a logical prerequisite to serving as a witness. The distinctionless Brahman would have neither motive nor ability to serve as a witness to the ghostly unrealities that figure as individual men. So the philosopher must come back into his phantom state, and his message on identity with Brahman becomes a message of a phantom to fellow-phantoms, a message by the very conditions incapable of establishing anything. It can be urged, doubt- less, that he might carry back from the expe- rience in which he transcended the sense of individuality an impression of identity with the sole-existing Self. Suppose this, however, to be granted, what basis of rational confidence has been gained? What is the impression of an individual, or of a few individuals, derived through trancelike, or otherwise peculiar, expe- riences, and sought after with an intensity of zeal involving serious exposure to self-hypno- PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 25 tism — what is such an impression worth as compared with the insistent overwhelming im- pression of men generally as to the real existence of individuals and of the world theater upon which they must of necessity move and act? If the dream hypothesis is to be applied, the ground for applying it to the fancied discovery of identity with Brahman, as against the opposed theory of real individuals and a real world, is as a thousand to one. Another baffling difficulty confronts the Vedanta pantheism. When asked for an ex- planation of the illusory world, the vast sphere of deceptive appearances, its advocates fail to give a satisfactory reply. They cannot tell how, over against the indeterminate distinc- tionless Absolute, the world phantom, with all its lying appearance of individuality and man- ifoldness, got onto the field. Sometimes they excuse themselves from all obligation to at- tempt an explanation. Thus the modern Vedantists, whom we have cited, inform us that the law of causality applies only within the sphere of appearances, that it is entirely foreign to the transcendent sphere of absolute being, and therefore it is impertinent to ask for any explanation of the world of deceitful appearances. This may be a very convenient makeshift; but it does not serve to commend 26 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS the philosophy in behalf of which it is offered. It justifies the conclusion that in the absolute sphere there is no safeguard against the in- trusion of a measureless freak. Either Brah- man must be powerless to exclude the phantom world which proclaims a constant he against the truth of his sole existence, or he must wish that it should be on hand and serve as an instrument of falsehood. In the one case a dualism is affirmed which denies the funda- mental assumption of the Vedanta system, and in the other a self-contradiction is imputed to the absolute Being which cancels the idea of his perfection. In short, the Vedanta pantheism encounters rational objections that are plainly insuperable. Against Spinoza's system it can also be shown that it is far from being invulnerable in a rational or metaphysical point of view. In respect of method it is chargeable with arbitrariness. Easygoing assumption is a dis- tinguishing characteristic. Proceeding from the maxim that a clear idea is self-evidencing, Spinoza starts with the idea of substance as being of this nature, and by a purely deductive process attempts to draw out the whole sys- tem of reality. The achievement is a long way from corresponding to the ambitious attempt. From the mere idea of substance there is no PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 27 available pathway to the actual. In reaching that goal Spinoza does not travel by the way he assumes to pursue. For example, the attributes thought and extension, which he makes descriptive of reality, are not derived by him from the idea of substance. They are manifestly imported from the empirical realm, the one from the inner domain of consciousness, and the other from the domain of experience through the senses. From the indeterminate Absolute, which, it has been seen, he assumed in at least some connections, he could not and did not get away by a straightforward method. Remark has already been made on the con- fusion which attaches to Spinoza's exposition of finite things as respects their essential rela- tions. He derives them from the infinite attributes of God, while yet he affirms that the infinite attributes can properly give origin only to the infinite. A question may also be raised as to whether the definition of finite things as modes or modifications of the divine attributes 16 is altogether agreeable to the requirements of strict philosophical discourse. In the sphere of reality modes hold relation to a subject rather than to the attributes of a subject. If we are to speak of them as modes of an attribute it is only in the sense that they ls Ethics, Part I, prop. 25, coroll. 28 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS qualify the subject in a particular point of view. We find Spinoza expressing the judgment that the idea of partition or possible subdi- vision is foreign to the infinite. It is in no wise made up of parts. 17 Nevertheless he records this plain declaration: "The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God" 18 He also says, "The intellectual love of the mind toward God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself." 19 Thus he crosses his own path in construing the relation of the finite to the infinite. Another item in Spinoza's system calls for adverse comment. In one connection he re- pudiates the notion that man necessarily exists as being an absurdity. 20 On the other hand, as will be more fully shown further on, he affirms that God acts by the sole necessity of his nature. The inevitable inference is that whatever exists, since nothing can exist apart from God's action, is grounded in absolute necessity. It looks as though Spinoza at this point had inadvertently lapsed into the the- istic conception of a free Creator. Each finite thing, it is true, according to the view of 17 Ethics, Part I, prop. 13; also prop. 15, scholium. u Ibid., Part II, prop. 11, coroll. 19 Ibid., Part V, prop. 36. 20 Ibid., Part II, prop. 10. PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 29 Spinoza, is conditioned by its antecedent, and in this respect is contrasted with God. But as no antecedent is in the least degree con- tingent, a necessity as unqualified as the very being of God must be regarded as running through the whole line of finite things. That the system of Spinoza has been built up with a good degree of ingenuity and is capable of impressing the reviewer by its architectonic character may be admitted. But judged by any normal philosophical criterion, it affords only a dubious foundation for pan- theistic theory. Aside from phases of self- contradiction it moves too exclusively in the region of abstractions to afford any trust- worthy ground for conviction respecting the actual. It remains to apply the religious and ethical tests to the systems which have been con- sidered. That in their premises and logical implications they leave no place for religion, as commonly understood, is perfectly evident. They cancel the relationships which religion in that sense always recognizes. As Professor Bowne has remarked, "Religion demands the mutual otherness of the finite and the infinite in order that the relation of love and obedience may obtain." 21 21 Personalism, p. 284. 30 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS In any pantheistic scheme the mutual other- ness of the finite and the infinite is given no place except by an illogical makeshift. Ve- dantism excludes it by its most fundamental proposition, namely, the affirmation of the proper identity of the so-called individual self with Brahman, or the one true and really existent Self. Following its instructions, the religious man is bound to consider the anni- hilation of any and every sort of relationship, through identity with the distinctionless Brah- man, as the ideal goal. Meanwhile the great task is to purge his mind of the fiction that existence pertains to himself or to anything else as individual. If in the fulfillment of this task he pays any tribute to a higher power, or seeks aid therefrom, he simply associates him- self with that which his philosophy pronounces an empty illusion. To call upon Brahman would be sheer nonsense, for Brahman recog- nizes no object, and, besides, the man himself is as good as Brahman, is in fact, unqualifiedly Brahman, if he would only recognize the truth. As for his sins it is a perfect anomaly to enter- tain any religious concern for them. They are all in the sphere of Maya, the realm of de- ceptive appearances. 22 In that sphere, too, if 22 Vivekananda, The Science and Philosophy of Religion, pp. 57, 100, 101, 105. A PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 31 we may trust a recent exposition of Vedantism by a zealous champion, everything is strictly determined; not a shred of freedom exists. 23 Man attains to freedom only in genuine knowl- edge of his identity with Brahman, and on the plane of that experience he is quite above the antithesis between virtue and vice. 24 So it would seem that he has no occasion to reckon himself a moral subject at any stage of his career, since in the sphere of Maya he is under compulsion to do exactly as he does, and outside of that sphere he is exempt from all law and obligation. The fact that religion and morals are found capable of surviving under such a system is not due to the merits of the system, but rather to man's innate religiousness and the persistent demands of his ethical consciousness. Disci- ples of the Vedanta pantheism cannot escape the working of these potent sources of influ- ence, and are compelled very largely to take religion and morals in that exoteric or accom- modated sense which is necessarily repudiated in any strict construction of their philosophy. 23 Ibid., pp. Ill, 112. We have not noticed that Sankara emphasizes this point, but it is quite certain that Vivekananda designs to figure as an orthodox Vedantist. 24 Vivekananda, The Vedanta Philosophy. An Address at Harvard University, p. 23. 32 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS As for the great mass of the people of India, whatever may be their formal position, they practically ignore the characteristic postulates of the Vedanta system. The system of Spinoza, strictly construed, leaves no place for a sense of fellowship or practical relationship with God. What incen- tive can there be to approach, or to have any dealing with a God who is declared to possess neither intellect nor will, 25 and who entertains no designs in connection with the universe, final causes being "mere human fig- ments"? 26 As for love, the philosopher, it is true, speaks in terms of the "intellectual love" of God as exercised toward men. 27 But what kind of a love can he mean to denote? The very phrase intellectual love is strangely inap- propriate to a Being to whom intellect is de- nied. 28 Then, too, the God whom he depicts, as has just been observed, is without will. More than that he is void of emotion as under- stood by us. Pleasure and pain are foreign to him, 29 neither can it be said that he desires aught of any man, or that anything is pleasing 2B Ethics, Part I, prop. 17, scholium; prop. 32, coroll. 1. 26 Ibid., Part I, appendix; Part IV, pref. "Ibid., Part V, prop. 36. 28 Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der Neueren Philosophic, vol. i, p. 563. »Ethics, Part V, prop. 17. PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 33 or displeasing to him. 30 We submit that it must be a very particular kind of love which is exercised by a will-less, emotionless Being. To all human apprehension it must appear colder than a moonbeam, and might just as well be called by any other name so far as invit- ing to confidence and fellowship is concerned. The moral indifference characteristic of God in this system is not the least ground of chal- lenge. Not only is he neither pleased nor displeased with anything, but he is no less the author of evil than of good. He acts by the sole necessity of his nature, having no option as to the manner or order in which he brings things into existence, 31 and leaving no option whatever to any rank of creatures. "Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature." 32 It follows that what is most vile and criminal in the judgment of men, in so far as it actually occurs, is based in the nature of God; that to ascribe a moral charac- ter to him is meaningless; that man at his best is nothing more than a spiritual autom- aton to whom no responsibility can rationally be imputed. 30 Epist. 36. 31 Ethics, Part I, prop. 33. 32 Ibid., Part I, prop. 29. 34 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS How do pantheists justify the necessitation of moral evil which is involved in their scheme? Let one of their number testify. "From the point of view of pantheism," he says, "all change, evolution, progress, retrogression, sin, pain, or any other good or evil is local, finite, partial, while the infinite coordination of such infinitesimal movements makes one eternal peace." 33 The peace noted in the citation doubtless is to be identified with the peace of the all-inclusive Being, in other words with the peace of God. But is that a worthy con- ception of God which builds up his peace on the given basis? Does it not, in fact, assimilate his character altogether too much to that of a supreme devil to suppose that the sinking of the Lusitania and a thousand other atroc- ities perpetrated in the recent world war were necessary or contributory to his peace? Plainly, a God who is either indifferent to such evils or has his bliss enhanced by them is not truly a moral being. To invest moral evils with ability to increase the sum of the good and the perfect in the universe is to negate them as evils and to falsify the spontaneous and persistent testimony of man's moral intelligence. The claim of pantheism to be favorable to 33 J. A. Picton, Pantheism, Its Story and Significance, pp. 32, 33. > PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS 35 religious sentiment on the ground of its great emphasis on the divine immanence ought not to deceive anyone. Undoubtedly, the convic- tion that God is near helps to foster that sentiment. But a nearness which passes over into identity, which cancels the sense of per- sonal relationships, which obliterates the mu- tual otherness of the finite and the infinite, must in the long run rather paralyze than vitalize religious feeling. Quite possibly the sentimentalist may find a passing gratification in the thought of a Deity who sleeps in the plant, dreams in the animal, and awakens in man. But well-poised reflective piety cannot rest satisfied with a God who is sunk in slum- ber, or wanders in the vagaries of dreams, or has no better knowledge of himself than is contained in the fragmentary and contradictory thoughts of men about him. That sort of near- ness truly interpreted means nothing better than remoteness and indifference. To secure the most healthful and efficient emphasis on the divine immanence it is only necessary to have recourse to a wisely constructed theism. The effect of pantheism in negating or radically obscuring the personality of God is an injury to religion for which, so far as we can discover, it offers no real compensation. Its attempt to cover up the injury by speak- 36 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS ing of God as the suprapersonal does not mend the matter. Personality, as including self-consciousness and self-determination, is the highest category that can be named. There- fore to deny personality to God is practically to assimilate him to the infrapersonal. From this lowered conception no escape can be made by the use of any such fanciful and arbitrary epithet as "suprapersonal.'* ESSAY II A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY STYLED PRAGMATISM ESSAY II A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY STYLED PRAGMATISM Some years ago an American professor re- marked that he had discovered thirteen varie- ties of pragmatism. This makes a rather be- wildering list, but it seems not to be exhaustive, since some pragmatists disclaim adherence to any one of the specified varieties. The responsibility for introducing the term "pragmatism" into the philosophical vocab- ulary seems to be chargeable to Charles S. Pierce, who in 1878 employed it to designate a method for making our ideas clear. As used by him it stood for a much less radical de- parture in philosophical theory than it has come to denote in recent years. 1 Forbearing any attempt to distinguish and to characterize all the types of pragmatism, we purpose to take account mainly of the views of three representatives of the new philosophy, namely, William James, F. C. S. Schiller, and John Dewey, the first named having been connected with Harvard Univer- sity, the second with Oxford, and the third iHibbert Journal, October, 1908, pp. Ill, 112. 40 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS with the University of Chicago and later with Columbia University. It is our conviction that in the writings of these three men, together with those of their disciples who substantially agree with them, we find about all that is significant in pragmatism as a peculiar and innovating system. The tenor of thinking on the part of these three representatives cannot be said to be identical. James was less of a stickler for a closed system, exhibited more hospitality for antecedent thought in religious and theolog- ical lines, than has been characteristic of Dewey and his school; he was more compre- hensive and less consistent. Schiller has ex- pressed, at least in some connections, a larger appreciation of the office of metaphysics than can be credited to either James or Dewey. Leading champions of pragmatism have been disposed to claim a large degree of originality for their scheme. They concede, however, that some approaches to it were made in former times. Professor James recognizes that contributions were furnished by Socrates, Aris- totle, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. "But these forerunners of pragmatism used it in frag- ments: they were a prelude only. Not until in our time has it generalized itself, become conscious of a universal mission, pretended to PRAGMATISM 41 a conquering destiny." 2 Schiller, who prefers the title of humanism to that of "pragmatism," finds in particular a forerunner in Protag- oras. "Our only hope of understanding knowl- edge," he says, "our only chance of keeping philosophy alive by nourishing it with the realities of life, lies in going back from Plato to Protagoras, and ceasing to misunderstand the great teacher who discovered the measure of man's universe." 3 In attempting to define pragmatism we may notice, as a general feature, its pronounced affiliation with evolution theory. It might be said to have come upon the stage as a kind of philosophical annex to Darwinism. The static and the fixed it is strongly inclined to repudiate as alien to reality. The all-inclusive flux of Heraclitus lies much nearer to its way of thinking than the eternal and unchanging ideas affirmed by Plato. Not all the schools, however, are equally dogmatic on this point. Coming to enumerate the more specific features of pragmatism, we begin with its attitude toward metaphysics. That a strain of disparagement enters into this attitude is quite clearly evidenced by the pronounced hostility 2 Pragmatism, p. 50; Longmans, Green & Co., New York. 3 Studies in Humanism, pref ., xiv, xv. 42 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS shown to absolutist systems, or the systems which treat the supposition of an Absolute Being as a necessary philosophical postulate and accord to the conception of the Absolute a principal function in construing the universe. Doubtless in their polemic against absolutist systems pragmatists have often had in mind a rather ultra type of speculation, a theory which ascribes such an inclusive role to the universal as to threaten to take away all standing ground from the individual and the particular. However, they make it evident that they are ready to criticize any type of philosophy which takes any considerable ac- count of the conception of the Absolute. "The notion of absolute reality," says Schiller, "is doubly pernicious: (1) as reducing our reality to unreality in comparison to a higher reality, and (2) as making the ideal of reality seem unattainable." 4 Professor James declares that the "radical empiricism which he advo- cates treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction," 5 and that he finds "no reason for even suspecting the exist- ence of any reality of a higher denomination than that distributed and strung along, a flowing sort of reality which we finite beings 4 Studies in Humanism, p. 217. 6 Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 41, 42, PRAGMATISM 43 swim in." 6 An opinion quite in accord with this is given by H. H. Bawden in the state- ment, "The only absolute required is the con- crete process of experience itself." 7 Professor Dewey shows in his repudiation of the ultimate as an object of inquiry how perfectly unrecon- ciled he is to the idea of the Absolute. "Philoso- ophy," he says, "will have to surrender all pretension to be peculiarly concerned with ultimate reality"; and he scores Bergson for deeming it "necessary to substitute an ulti- mate and absolute flux for an ultimate and absolute permanence." 8 It should be noticed that Schiller, in spite of his repudiation of the idea of the Absolute, admits the legitimacy of making ultimates an object of inquiry, and so lays a basis for a pretty high valuation of metaphysics, the chief concern of which is precisely with ultimates. Quite in contrast with many of his fellow pragmatists he declares in a relatively late product of his pen: "It is futile to bid us confine ourselves to this present world of phenomena, and to assure us that we have no interest to raise the question of God and 6 A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 212, 213. 7 The Principles of Pragmatism, p. 39. 8 Creative Intelligence, Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude, pp. 53, 54, Henry Holt & Co., New York. 44 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS of our future. The routine of practice and the world of phenomena, the sphere of positive science, are not self-supporting, self-sufficing, and self-explaining. They point beyond them- selves to a reality which underlies them, back to a past from which they are descended, and forward to a future they foreshadow. . . . Meta- physics must exist as the science of ultimate problems, if not of ultimate solutions." 9 Instead of applying to a given notion the metaphysical test of compatibility with the other factors which must be recognized in a comprehensive and harmonious system, a sys- tem which takes serious account of ultimates, pragmatism emphasizes the test of practical consequences. In case of disputed questions it brings forward, says Professor James, the inquiry, "what difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true ? If no practical differ- ence can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other being right." 10 From this point of view he asserts that pragmatism is in affinity both 9 Riddles of the Sphinx, revised edition, 1910, pp. 12, 149. "Pragmatism, pp. 45, 46. PRAGMATISM 45 with utilitarianism and positivism. 11 Schiller and others equally exalt the criterion of prac- tical consequences. It would seem, then, that its advocates are inclined to define pragmatism as rather a method than a precise scheme of philosophical conceptions. This, of course, is not equal to saying that, as a matter of fact, they swing clear of theories or dogmas. The admission of Schiller is worth noting, that "methods may be turned into metaphysics by accepting them as ultimate." 12 In the second place, we consider the con- ception which pragmatists take of the think- ing or cognitive process and of its relation to reality. This feature has received special emphasis in the school of Dewey. In the view of this school the relation in question is much more than one of correspondence. That such is the fact Professor James has also asserted, but in a way which might not command full assent from his pragmatist brethren. "I maintain," he says, "a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of associates, plays the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of consciousness; while in a different context the same undi- vided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content.' In a n Ibid., p. 53. 12 Humauism, p. 19, 46 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing. And, since it can figure in both groups simultaneously, we have every right to speak of it as subjective and objective both at once." 13 An out-and-out affirmation, like this, of the substantial identity of thought and thing, of the knowing subject and of the object, we have not found to be characteristic of the school of Dewey. Their recurring thesis is, rather, that the thought or cognitive activity of the human subject is continuously a power to modify reality. In accordance with this standpoint, the title of one of their books is given as "Creative Intelligence." Knowing, they maintain, is not an indifferent or colorless operation, but is, rather, fraught with purpose, and is efficient to work transformation in the world. Of this transformation there is both abundant need and distinct opportunity for its effectuation, since the world as it confronts us is at once only partially rational and to a large extent plastic. The following sentences will serve to illus- trate the manner in which Professor Dewey puts these points: "Experience in its vital form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it is characterized by projection, by 13 Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 9, 10. PRAGMATISM 47 reaching forward into the unknown." 14 "Knowledge is always a matter of the use that is made of experienced natural events, a use in which given things are treated as indications of what will be experienced under different conditions." 15 "A world already, in its intrinsic structure, dominated by thought is not a world in which, save by the contra- diction of premises, thinking has anything to do." 16 "It is the business of that organic adaptation involved in all knowing to make a certain difference in reality." 17 "The change in the environment made by knowing is not a total and miraculous change. Transformation, readjustment, reconstruction all imply prior existences: existences which have characters and behaviors of their own which must be accepted, consulted, humored, manipulated and made light of, in all kinds of differing ways in the different contexts of different problems." 18 In exposition of an identical standpoint Professor A. W. Moore has remarked: "Con- cerning the place and function of thinking in experience (or in the world) the pragmatist became convinced that not only do all will "Creative Intelligence, p. 7. 16 Ibid., p. 47. 16 Ibid., p. 27. "Essays in Honor of William James, p. 69. 18 Ibid., p. 78. 48 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS and purpose involve ideas, but that all ideas are volitional and purposive, and therefore ideas cannot be true or false entirely inde- pendent of their purposive and volitional char- acter." 19 "If an idea is something more than a mere algebraic symbol, if it is the essence of an idea to so connect one experienced thing, or quale, or content, with another, that it may be maintained or eliminated, or in some degree altered, it would seem to follow that the strict difference in the character of ideas would be the difference in efficiency in effecting this kind of connection." 20 In the school of Dewey the transforming virtue of the thinking, knowing process is conceived to have its culmination in the shaping of human society toward a better ideal. Naturally, as this school negates all reference to any higher entity or more sig- nificant unity than society on its earthly theater, it feels called upon to stress the de- mand for concentrating thought and effort upon the interests of society taken in the specified range. It is inclined to retrench the conception of the separate status of the indi- vidual. Even his consciousness is far from being a private matter. At least Professor "Pragmatism and its Critics, pp. 14, 15, University of Chicago Press. 20 Ibid., p. 85. PRAGMATISM 49 Moore so affirms in defining the pragmatist point of view. "However private or indi- vidual," he says, "consciousness may be, it is never to be regarded as wholly or mainly the function of an individual mind or soul or of a single organism or brain." 21 Of a form of argumentation which he evidently regards as agreeable to the pragmatist creed, he re- marks, "It assumes that my consciousness is a function of a social process in which my body or brain or mind is only one factor. It presupposes that my thinking and feeling may be as truly a function of your brain or mind as of my own. My thinking of sending for you as a physician to treat my headache is as truly a function of your medically trained brain as of my own aching one. And your thinking as you diagnose my case is no less obviously a function of my head than of your own. . . . Your thinking literally belongs to me." 22 The third special feature of pragmatism is closely connected with the foregoing and lies in the conception that truth is something progressively shaped or remodeled on the basis of a utilitarian quest. What it amounts to is the expedient under the given conditions. "The true," says Professor James, "to put it 21 Ibid.. p. 230. 22 Ibid., p. 275. 50 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving." 23 "The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action." 24 "Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category dis- tinct from good and coordinate with it. The true is whatever proves to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons." 25 "Truths," contends Schiller, "must be used to become true, and (in the end) to stay true. . . . All meaning depends on pur- pose." 26 "In all actual knowing the question whether an assertion is true or false is decided uniformly and very simply. It is decided, that is, by its consequences, by its bearing on the interest which prompted to the assertion, by its relation to the purpose which put the question." 27 "All that truth has to do is to be an instrument in man's manipulation of his experience." 28 Truth, as rated by Pro- fessor Moore, is the working quality of an idea. 29 In some of these citations there is a sugges- 23 Pragmatism, p. 222. 24 Ibid., p. 202. 2B Ibid. p p. 7. 2B Humanism, p. 9. 27 Ibid., p. 154. 28 Riddles of the Sphinx, pp. 133, 134. 29 Pragmatism and its Critics, p. 86. PRAGMATISM 51 tion that truth is not a fixed matter, but rather something made to achieve a purpose, the only limitation being that it should be so made as to fit the existing conditions. Various pragmatist declarations unequivocally enforce this point of view. "Truth," says Professor James, "happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. . . . Truth for us is simply a collective name for verifying processes, just as 'health,' 'wealth,' 'strength,' etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made just as health, wealth, and strength are made in the course of expe- rience. . . . Truth grafts itself on previous truth, modifying it in the process, just as idiom grafts itself on previous idiom, and law on previous law." 30 "The truths of past ages," observes Schiller, "are at present recognized as errors; those of the present are on their way to be so recognized. ... If we adopt the humanist view that truth is essentially a valuation, a laudatory label wherewith we decorate the most useful conceptions which we have found up to date in order to control our experience, there is not the slightest reason why the steady flow of the stream of truths that pass away should inspire us with dismay." 31 30 Pragmatism, pp. 201, 218, 241. 31 Humanism, pp. 205, 211. 52 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS "Truth," claims Bawden, "is itself a growth changing from situation to situation." 32 Even such select truths as have been rated among the intuitions, or the primal elements and conditions of rational experience in the point of view of pragmatism are not exempt from contingency and uncertainty. Thus Pro- fessor James suggests that the common sense categories may have gained their supremacy by a process just like that by which the concep- tions due to Democritus, Berkely, or Darwin, achieved their triumph in more recent times; in other words, they may have been discovered by prehistoric geniuses, and then been passed along until, under the power of habit, they became controlling. 33 An equal suggestion of our destitution of any certified basal elements of truth is contained in this curious declaration : "Common sense is better for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophical criticism for a third; but whether either be truer absolutely, Heaven only knows." 34 Words not less adapted to negate the idea of ultimate and fixed ele- ments of thought have been penned by Schiller. "We never get back," he says, "to truths so fundamental that they cannot possibly be con- ceived as having been made. There are no 32 The Principles of Pragmatism, p. 204. ^Pragmatism, pp. 182, 183. 34 Ibid., p. 190. PRAGMATISM 53 a priori truths which are indisputable, as is shown by the fact that there is not, and never has been, any agreement as to what they are. All the a priori truths, moreover, which are commonly alleged, can be conceived as postulates suggested by a previous situation." 35 In the degree in which it discredits the possibility of going back to unassailable founda- tions, pragmatism naturally is inclined to place the emphasis upon the future outcome. In- quiry, it is urged, should take the forward direction, instead of concerning itself with origins or with ultimates lying back in the past. This aspect of the system is vigorously asserted by Professor James. He names as characteristic of pragmatism "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." 36 It recognizes that it has to deal with an unfinished edition of the universe, and that the best test which can be applied to theories is the reference to prospective results. "Design, free-will, the absolutist mind, spirit instead of matter, have for their sole meaning a better promise as to this world's outcome." 37 In a quite similar vein Schiller remarks: "Prag- 35 Humanism, p. 197. 36 Pragmatism, p. 54. 37 Ibid., p. 127. 54 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS matism is not a retrospective theory. Its significance does not lie in its explanation of the past so much as in its present attitude toward the future. . . . What it really concerns us to know is how to act with a view to the future." 38 It should not be overlooked, how- ever, that Schiller has elsewhere put no slight emphasis on the necessity and the utility of going back to ultimates. It remains to consider the attitude of prag- matists toward theology and religion. As respects theology a principal inquiry concerns their bearing toward the theistic postulate. Professor Dewey's exclusion from the phil- osophical domain of every thought reaching above or beyond the world flux, the stream of changes recognized by evolutionary science, logically implies agnostic unconcern in rela- tion to the great question of theism; and we have not discovered that he has departed from the demands of logical consistency by any show of practical interest in that question. How emphatically he dismisses what the name of God has commonly stood for in Christian thinking appears in the following statement: "Once admit that the sole verifiable or fruitful object of knowledge is the particular set of changes that generate the object of study, 88 Humanism, p. 198. PRAGMATISM 55 together with the consequences that then flow from it, and no intelligible question can be asked about what by assumption is outside." 39 Of Professor James it can truly be said that he was an interested and appreciative student of religion, and was not disposed to thrust theology entirely out of consideration. The genial warmth with which he could address him- self to the former theme is sufficiently attested by his book on The Varieties of Religious Experience. In relation to theological theory he admits that a good case can be made out for the hypothesis of God on the pragmatist basis of judgment by consequences. 40 He so qualifies, however, the force of this admission as to make it impossible to rate him as an advocate of the unequivocal theistic postulate. While he confesses a firm belief in the existence of superhuman powers which work toward ideal ends, and is ready to acknowledge among these a God relatively preeminent, he rejects the supposition of a perfect all-sufficient Deity. "The line of least resistance," he writes, "as it seems to me, both in theology and in philos- ophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all- 39 The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Es- says in Contemporary Thought, pp. 13, 14. ''"Pragmatism, p. 300. 56 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS embracing; the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once." 41 Evidently, the professor's position is adapted to raise the question whether a polytheistic conception may not claim tolerance. As a matter of fact, we find a Mormon apologist supporting his polytheistic scheme by reference to the pluralistic theory of Professor James. 42 In the writings of Schiller we find a valuation of the thought of God which vies, in not a few respects, with that of the stanchest theist. He defines him as transcendent nonmaterial Deity, the cause and upholder of the universe. He is also resolute in claiming for men personal immortality as their proper destiny. On the other hand, reacting from the radical abso- lutist systems in his neighborhood, he pro- nounces distinctly for the finitude of God, and postulates spirits who share with him the rank of unoriginated being, though having in him their supreme ruler and aim. 43 As respects the merits of the pragmatism thus far reviewed, we should be quite loath to speak in terms of wholesale disparagement. fl A Pluralistic Universe, p. 311. ^B. H. Roberts, New Witness for God, I, 468-470. ^Riddles of the Sphinx, revised edition, pp. 300ff. PRAGMATISM 57 It will not be difficult, however, to mention some points which tend to limit our apprecia- tion of this recent and very confident venture in the domain of philosophy. In the first place, we are fully persuaded that its opposition to a philosophical use of the idea of the Absolute passes the bounds of discretion. Doubtless it is true that this idea has sometimes been construed in such a way as to become a stumbling-block. One and another speculator interpreting the Ab- solute, not simply as the primary and inde- pendent being who is necessarily rated as the ground of all secondary being, but in strict- ness as the totality of being and experience, has given us a subject unmanageable and quite useless in any effort to explain the actual. Such misadventures, however, by no means justify a summary dismissal of the idea of the Absolute. If we may trust the testimony of human thinking in the past, that idea has come to stay. The inquisitive human mind cannot be expected perpetually to waive the question as to the ultimate and sufficient ground of the interrelation of things. Coming into contact with the flowing, it must be impelled to ask, "Whence the stream?" Being made aware of the dependent on every hand, it must be incited to ask, "Where and what is 58 PANTHEISTIC DILEMMAS that upon which dependence ultimately falls?" Being met by numberless tokens of a wide- reaching system, it must be rendered in- quisitive as to the principle or power which is adequate to unify the great whole and to conserve it in its character as a system. Ques- tions like these cannot be subjected to an effective veto. But, if they are to be answered even partially, an appeal must be made in some form to the idea of the Absolute. The test of practical consequences which pragmatism insists upon applying to ideas is undoubtedly a worthy and important test. But that fact is no sufficient justification for pitting it against metaphysics to the radical disparagement of the latter. The range of practical consequences is not to be unduly narrowed. The satisfaction of man's intel- lectual nature is a distinct utility, an end in- vested with great practical import. A com- prehensive view of the universe, which affords a relative rest to his inquiring spirit and is at the same time in harmony with his ethical and religious nature, is not to be tabooed as being a speculative or metaphysical concoction. It is none the less practical because it is meta- physical. Good metaphysics is a highly im- portant aid to good and salutary practice. Not a few of the views, it may be confessed, PRAGMATISM 59 which have been put forth in the name of metaphysics, are quite worthy of being con- signed to the scrap-heap. And so also are many of the views which have been exploited in the name of science, politics, and sociology. No more in the metaphysical than in other spheres does a list of miscarriages nullify the possibility of normal activity and fruitful achievement. An all-round view of the conditions of apply- ing the test of practical consequences, it strikes us, would lead pragmatists to be more tolerant of the supposition that the so-called categories are something else than chance products, more ready to admit that they be- speak the truth that man as a rational being has implicit in his mental furnishing certain viewpoints which can and must be applied to the subject-matter of experience. It is diffi- cult to see how a being destitute of this fur- nishing could be in a position to utilize con- sequences in the direction of a rational control of life. Consequences cannot be supposed to concatenate themselves into a series of lessons. In order to this result they must be conse- quences to a subject which is enough of a rational organism to have in itself, implicit in its constitution, somewhat of a standard, some initial means of interpreting and estimating