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CHINA, JAPAN 
 
 AND THE U. S. A. 
 
 Present-day Conditions 
 
 in the Far East 
 
 and Their Bearing on 
 
 the Washington 
 
 Conference 
 
 by 
 
 JOHN DEWEY 
 
 Professor ot Philosophy at 
 Columbia University 
 
 New Republic Pamphlet No. I 
 
 Published by the 
 REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO., INC 
 
 421 West Twenty-first Street 
 
 . New York City 
 
 I 9 2 I 
 

 
 Copyright 192 1 
 Republic Publishing Co. Inc. 
 
 '0)CU630332 
 
 m 12 1951 
 
 ^Vtk-^" 
 
CHINA, JAPAN and the U. S. A. 
 
 Introductory Note 
 
 The articles following are reprinted as they were 
 written in spite of the fact that any picture of con- 
 temporary events is modified by subsequent in- 
 crease of knowledge and by later events. In the 
 main, however, the writer would still stand by 
 what zvas said at the time. A few foot notes 
 have been inserted where the text is likely to 
 give rise to misapprehensions. The date of 
 zvriting has been retained as a guide to the reader. 
 
 On Two Sides of the Eastern Seas 
 
 IT is three days' easy journey from Japan to China. It is 
 doubtful whether anywhere in the world another journey 
 of the same length brings with it such a complete change 
 of political temper and belief. Certainly it is greater than the 
 alteration perceived in journeying directly from San Francisco 
 to Shanghai. The difference is not one in customs and modes 
 of life; that goes without saying. It concerns the ideas, beliefs 
 and alleged information current about one and the same fact: 
 the status of Japan in the international world and especially 
 its attitude toward China. One jfinds everywhere in Japan a 
 feeling of uncertainty, hesitation, even of weakness. There 
 is a subtle nervous tension in the atmosphere as of a country 
 on the verge of change but not knowing where the change will 
 take it. Liberalism is in the air, but genuine liberals are en- 
 compassed with all sorts of difficulties especially in combining 
 their liberalism with the devotion to theocratic robes which 
 the imperialisic militarists who rule Japan have so skilfully 
 thrown about the Throne and the Government. But what one 
 senses in China from the first moment is the feeling of the all- 
 pervading power of Japan which is working as surely as fate 
 to its unhesitating conclusion — the domination of Chinese pol- 
 itics and industry by Japan with a view to its final absorption. 
 It is not my object to analyze the realities of the situation 
 
 [3] 
 
or to inquire whether the universal feeling in China is a col- 
 lective hallucination or is grounded in fact. The phenomenon 
 is worthy of record on its own account. Even if it be merely 
 psychological, it is a fact which must be reckoned with in both 
 its Chinese and its Japanese aspects. In the first place, 
 as to the differences in psychological atmosphere. Everybody 
 who knows anything about Japan knows that it is the land of 
 reserves and reticences. The half-informed American will tell 
 you that this Is put on for the misleading of foreigners. The 
 informed know that it is an attitude shown to foreigners only 
 because It is deeply engrained In the moral and social tradition 
 of Japan; and that, if anything, the Japanese are more likely 
 to be communicative — about many things at least — to a sym- 
 pathetic foreigner, than to one another. The habit of re- 
 serve Is so deeply embedded In all the etiquette, convention 
 and daily ceremony of living, as well as in the ideals of strength 
 of character, that only the Japanese who have subjected them- 
 selves to foreign influences escape it — and many of them re- 
 vert. To put it mildly, the Japanese are not a loquacious 
 people; they have the gift of doing rather than of gab. 
 
 When accordingly a Japanese statesman or visiting diplo- 
 matist engages in unusually prolonged and frank discourse set- 
 ting forth the aims and procedures of Japan, the student of 
 politics who has been long In the East at once becomes alert, 
 not to say suspicious. A recent illustration Is so extreme that 
 it will doubtless seem fantastic beyond belief. But the student 
 at home will have to take these seeming fantasies seriously if 
 he wishes to appreciate the present atmosphere of China. 
 Cables have brought fragmentary reports of some addresses 
 of Baron Goto in America. Doubtless in the American at- 
 mosphere these have the effect of reassuring America as to 
 any improper ambitions on the part of Japan. In China, they 
 were taken as announcements that Japan has about completed 
 its plans for the absorption of China, and that the lucubration 
 preliminary to operations of swallowing are about to begin. 
 The reader Is forgiven In advance any scepticism he feels about 
 both the fact itself and the correctness of my report of the 
 behef In the alleged fact. His scepticism will not surpass what 
 I should feel in his place. But the suspicion aroused by such 
 statements as this and the recent interview of Foreign Minister 
 
 [4] 
 
tJchida arid Baron Ishii must be noted as evidences of the uni^ 
 versal belief in China that Japan has one mode of diplomacy 
 for the East and another for the West, and that what is said 
 in the West must be read in reverse in the East. 
 
 China, whatever else it is, is not the land of privacies. It 
 is a proverb that nothing long remains secret in China. The 
 Chinese talk more easily than they act — especially in politics. 
 They are adepts in reveaUng their own shortcomings. They 
 dissect their own weaknesses and failures with the most extra- 
 ordinary reasonableness. One of the defects upon which they 
 dwell is the love of finding substitutes for positive action, of 
 avoiding entering upon a course of action which might be ir- 
 revocable. One almost wonders whether their power of self- 
 criticism is not itself another of these substitutes. At all events, 
 they are frank to the point of loquacity. Between the opposite 
 camps there are always communications flowing. Among of- 
 ficial enemies there are "sworn friends." In a land of per- 
 petual compromise, etiquette as well as necessity demands that 
 the ways for later accommodations be kept open. Consequent- 
 ly things which are spoken of only under the breath in Japan 
 are shouted from the housetops in China. It would hardly be 
 good taste in Japan to allude to the report that influential 
 ♦Chinese ministers are in constant receipt of Japanese funds 
 and these corrupt ofiicials are the agencies by which political 
 and economic concessions were wrung from China while Eu- 
 rope and America were busy with the war. But in China no- 
 body even takes the trouble to deny it or even to discuss it. 
 What is psychologically most impressive is the fact that it is 
 merely taken for granted. When it is spoken of, it is as one 
 mentions the heat on an unusually hot day. 
 
 In speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan 
 about Japan itself, one must refer to the economic situation 
 because of its obvious connection with the international situa- 
 tion. In the first place, there is the strong impression that 
 Japan is over-extended. Even in normal times, Japan relies 
 more upon production for foreign markets than is regarded 
 in most countries as safe policy. And there is the belief that 
 Japan must do so, because only by large foreign sellings — 
 large in comparison with the purchasing power of a people 
 still having a low standard of life — can it purchase the raw 
 
 [s] 
 
materials — and even food — it has to have. But during the 
 war, the dependence of manufacturing and trade at home upon 
 the foreign market v/as greatly increased. The domestic in- 
 crease of wealth, though very great, is still too much in the 
 hands of the few to affect seriously the internal demand for 
 goods. Item one, which awakens sympathy for Japan as be- 
 ing in a somewhat precarious situation. 
 
 Another item concerns the labor situation. Japan seems to 
 feel itself in a dilemma. If she passes even reasonably decent 
 factory laws (or rather attempts their enforcement) and regu- 
 lates child and women's labor, she will lose that advantage 
 of cheap labor which she now counts on to offset her many 
 disadvantages. On the other hand, strikes, labor difficulties, 
 agitation for unions, etc., are constantly increasing, and the 
 tension in the atmosphere is unmistakable. The rice riots are 
 not often spoken of, but their memory persists, and the fact 
 that they came very near to assuming a directly political aspect. 
 Is there a race between fulfillment of the aspirations of the 
 military clans who still hold the reins, and the growth of 
 genuinely democratic forces which will forever terminate those 
 aspirations? Certainly the defeat of Germany gave a blow to 
 bureaucratic militarism in Japan which in time will go far. 
 Will it have the time required to take effect on foreign policy? 
 The hope that it will is a large factor in stimulating liberal 
 sympathy for a Japan which is beginning to undergo the throes 
 of transition. 
 
 As for the direct international situation of Japan, the feel- 
 ing in Japan is that of the threatening danger of isolation. 
 Germany is gone; Russia is gone. While those facts simplify 
 matters for Japan somewhat, there is also the belief that in 
 taking away potential allies, they have weakened Japan in the 
 general game of balance and counter-balance of power. Par- 
 ticularly does the removal of imperialistic Russia relieve the 
 threat on India which, was such a factor in the willingness of 
 Great Britain to make the offensive-defensive alliance. The 
 revelation of the militaristic possibilities of America is another 
 serious factor. Certainly the new triple entente cordiale of 
 Japan, Italy and France is no adequate substitute for a re- 
 alignment of international forces in which a common under- 
 standing between Great Britain and America is a dominant 
 
 [6] 
 
factor. This factor explains, if it does not excuse, some of 
 the querulousness and studied discourtesies with which the 
 Japanese press for some months treated President Wilson, 
 the United States in general and its relation to the League of 
 Nations in particular, while it also throws light on the ardor 
 with which the opportune question of racial discrimination was 
 discussed. (The Chinese have an unfailing refuge in a sense 
 of humor. It was interesting to note the delight with which 
 they received the utterance of the Japanese Foreign Minister, 
 after Japanese success at Paris, that "his attention had re- 
 cently been called" to various press attacks on America which 
 he much deprecated). In any case there is no mistaking the 
 air of tension and nervous overstrain which now attends all 
 discussion of Japanese foreign relations. In all directions, 
 there are characteristic signs of hesitation, shaking of old be- 
 liefs and movement along new lines. Japan seems to be much 
 in the same mood as that which it experienced in the early 
 eighties before, toward the close of that decade, it crystallized 
 its Institutions through acceptance of the German constitution, 
 militarism, educational system, and diplomatic methods. So 
 that, once more, the observer gets the Impression that substan- 
 tially all of Japan's energy, abundant as that is, must be de- 
 voted to her urgent problems of readjustment. 
 
 Come to China, and the difference Is incredible. It almost 
 seems as If one were living in a dream; or as if some new 
 Alice had ventured behind an International looking-glass where- 
 in everything Is reversed. That we In America should have 
 little Idea of the state of things and the frame of mind in 
 China is not astonishing — especially in view of the censorship 
 and the distraction of attention of the last few years. But 
 that Japan and China should be so geographically near, and 
 yet every fact that concerns them appear in precisely opposite 
 perspective, is an experience of a life time, Japanese liberal- 
 ism? Yes, it is heard of, but only In connection with one form 
 which the longing for the miraculous dens ex machina takes. 
 Perhaps a revolution In Japan may Intervene to save China 
 from the fate which now hangs over her. But there Is no sug- 
 gestion that anything less than a complete revolution will 
 alter or even retard the course which is attributed to Japanese 
 diplomacy working hand In hand with Japanese business Inter- 
 
 [7] ■ 
 
ests and militarism. The collapse of Russia and Germany? 
 These things only mean that Japan has in a few years fallen 
 complete heir to Russian hopes, achievements and possessions 
 in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, and has had opportunities 
 in Siberia thrown into her hands which she could hardly have 
 hoped for in her most optimistic moments. And now Japan 
 has, with the blessing of the great Powers at Paris, become 
 also the heir of German concessions, intrigues and ambitions, 
 with added concessions, wrung (or bought) from incompetent 
 and corrupt officials by secret agreements when the world was 
 busy with war. If all the great Powers are so afraid of Japan 
 that they give way to her every wish, what is China that she 
 can escape the doom prepared for her? That is the cry of 
 helplessness going up all over China. And Japanese propa- 
 gandists take advantage of the situation, pointing to the action 
 of the Peace Conference as proof that the Allies care nothing 
 for China, and that China must throw herself into the arms 
 of Japan if she is to have any protection at all. In short, 
 Japan stands ready as she stood ready in Korea to guarantee 
 the integrity and independence of China. And the fear that 
 the latter must, in spite of her animosity toward Japan, accept 
 this fate in order to escape something worse swims in the 
 sinister air. It is the exact counterpart of the feeling current 
 among the liberals in Japan that Japan has alienated China 
 permanently when a considerate and slower course might have 
 united the two countries. If the economic straits of Japan are 
 alluded to, it is only as a reason why Japan has hurried her 
 diplomatic coercion, her corrupt and secret bargainings with 
 Chinese traitors and her industrial Invasion. While the western 
 world supposes that the military and the Industrial party In 
 Japan have opposite ideas as to best methods of securing Japa- 
 nese supremacy In the East, It is the universal opinion in China 
 that they two are working in complete understanding with one 
 another, and the differences that sometimes occur between the 
 Foreign Office In Tokyo and the Minstry of War (which is 
 extra-constitutional in Its status) are staged for effect. 
 
 These are some of the aspects of the most complete transfor- 
 mation scene that It has ever been the lot of the writer to ex- 
 perience. May it turn out to be only an extraordinary psy- 
 chological experience! But In the interests of truth it must 
 
 [8] 
 
be recorded that every resident of China, Chinese or American, 
 with whom I have talked in the last four weeks has volunteered 
 the beUef that all the seeds of a future great war are now deeply 
 implanted in China. To avert such a calamity they look to the 
 League of Nations or to some other force outside the immediate 
 scene. Unfortunately the press of Japan treats every attempt 
 to discuss the state of opinion in China or the state of facts 
 as evidence that America, having tasted blood in the war, now 
 has its eyes on Asia with the expectation later on of getting its 
 hands on Asia. Consequently America is interested in trying 
 to foster ill-will between China and Japan. If the pro-Ameri- 
 can Japenese do not enlighten their fellow-countrymen as to the 
 facts, then America ought to return some of the propaganda 
 that visits its shores. But every American who goes to Japan 
 ought also to visit China — if only to complete his education. 
 
 May, 1919. 
 
 II 
 
 Shantung, As Seen From Within 
 
 I. 
 
 AMERICAN apologists for that part of the Peace Treaty 
 which relates to China have the advantage of the il- 
 ' lusions of distance. , Most of the arguments seem 
 strange to anyone who lives in China even for a few months. 
 He finds the Japanese on the spot using the old saying about 
 territory consecrated by treasure spent and blood shed. He 
 reads in Japanese papers and hears from moderately liberal 
 Japanese that Japan must protect China, as well as Japan, 
 against herself, against her own weak or corrupt government, 
 by keeping control of Shantung to prevent China from again 
 ahenating that territory to some other power. 
 
 The history of European aggression in China gives this ar- 
 gument great force among the Japanese, who for the most 
 part know nothing more about what actually goes on in China 
 than they used to know about Korean conditions. These con- 
 siderations, together with the immense expectations raised 
 among the Japanese during the war concerning their coming 
 
 [9] 
 
domination of the Far East and the unswerving demand of ex- 
 cited public opinion in Japan during the Versailles Conference 
 for the settlement that actually resulted, give an ironic turn 
 to the statement so often made that Japan may be trusted to 
 carry out her promises. Yes, one is often tempted to say, that 
 is precisely what China fears, that Japan will carry out her 
 promises, for then China is doomed. To one who knows the 
 history of foreign aggression in China, especially the technique 
 of conquest by railway and finance, the irony of promising to 
 keep economic rights while returning sovereignty lies so on 
 the surface that it Is hardly Irony. China might as well be 
 offered Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on a silver platter as 
 be offered sovereignty under such conditions. The latter is 
 equally metaphysical. 
 
 A visit to Shantung and a short residence in its capital city, 
 Tslnan, made the conclusions, which so far is I know every 
 foreigner in China has arrived at, a living thing. It gave a 
 vivid picture of the many and intimate ways In which economic 
 and political rights are Inextricably entangled together. It 
 made one realize afresh that only a President who kept him- 
 self innocent of any knowledge of secret treaties during the 
 war, could be naive enough to believe that the promise to re- 
 turn complete sovereignty retaining only economic rights Is a 
 satisfactory solution. It threw fresh light upon the contention 
 that at most and at worst Japan had only taken over German 
 rights, and that since we had acquiesced In the latter's arroga- 
 tions we had no call to make a fuss about Japan. It revealed 
 the hoilowness of the claim that pro-Chinese propaganda had 
 wilfully misled Americans into confusing the few hundred 
 square miles around the port of Tslng-tao with the Province 
 of Shantung with Its thirty millions of Chinese population. , 
 
 As for the comparison of Germany and Japan one might sup- 
 pose that the objects for which America nominally entered the 
 war had made. In any case, a difference. But aside from this 
 consideration, the Germans exclusively employed Chinese In 
 the railway shops and for all the minor positions on the rail- 
 way Itself. The railway guards (the difference between police 
 and soldiers is nominal in China) were all Chinese, the Germans 
 merely training them. As soon as Japan invaded Shantung and 
 took over the railway, Chinese workmen and Chinese military 
 
 [lo] 
 
guards were at once dismissed and Japanese imported to take 
 their places. Tslnan-fu, the inland terminus of the ex-German 
 railway, is over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao. When the 
 Japanese took over the German railway business office, they 
 at once built barracks, and today there are several hundred 
 soldiers still there — where Germany kept none. Since the ar- 
 mistice even, Japan has erected a powerful military wireless ^ 
 within the grounds of the garrison, against of course the una- 
 vaihng protest of Chinese authorities. No foreigner can be 
 found who will state that Germany used her ownership of port 
 and railway to discriminate against other nations. No Chinese 
 can be found who will claim that this ownership was used to 
 force the Chinese out of business, or to extend German eco- 
 nomic rights beyond those definitely assigned her by treaty. 
 Common sense should also teach even the highest paid propa- 
 gandist in America that there is, from the standpoint of China, 
 an immense distinction between a national menace located half 
 way around the globe, and one within two days' sail jover an 
 inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy, especially 
 as the remote nation has no other foothold and the nearby 
 one already dominates additional territory of enormous strate- 
 gic and economic value — namely, Manchuria. 
 
 These facts bear upon the shadowy distinction between the 
 Tsing-tao and the Shantung claim, as well as upon the solid 
 distinction between German and Japanese occupancy. If there 
 still seemed to be a thin wall between Japanese possession of 
 the port of Tsing-tao and usurpation of Shantung, it was 
 enough to stop off the train in Tslnan-fu to see the wall crumble. 
 For the Japanese wireless and the barracks of the army of 
 occupation are the first things that greet your eyes. Within 
 a few hundred feet of the railway that connects Shanghai, via 
 the important center of Tientsin, with the capital, Peking, you 
 see Japanese soldiers on the nominally Chinese street, guarding 
 their barracks. Then you learn that If you travel upon the 
 ex-German railway towards Tsing-tao, you are ordered to show 
 your passport as if you were entering a foreign country. And 
 as you travel along the road (remembering that you are over 
 two hundred miles from Tsing-tao) you find Japanese soldiers 
 at every station, and several garrisons and barracks at Impor- 
 tant towns on the line. Then you realize that at the shortest 
 
 [II] 
 
possible notice, Japan could cut all communications between 
 southern China (together with the rich Yangste region) and the 
 capital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway 
 at the north of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at 
 its good pleasure upon Peking. 
 
 You are then prepared to learn from eye-witnesses that when 
 Japan made its Twenty-one Demands upon China, machine guns 
 were actually in position at strategic points throughout Shan- 
 tung, with trenches dug and sandbags placed. You know that 
 the Japanese liberal spoke the truth, who told you, after a 
 visit to China and his return to protest against the action of his 
 government, that the Japanese already had such a military hold 
 upon China that they could control the country within a week, 
 after a minimum of fighting, if war should arise. You also 
 realize the efficiency of official control of information and 
 domestic propaganda as you recall that he also told you that 
 these things were true at the time of his visit, under the Terauchi 
 cabinet, but had been completely reversed by the present Hara 
 ministry. For I have yet to find a single foreigner or Chinese 
 who is conscious of any difference of policy, save as the end 
 of the war has forced the necessity of caution, since other 
 nations can now look China-wards as they could not during 
 the war. 
 
 An American can get an idea of the realities of the present 
 tion If he imagines a foreign garrison and military wireless in 
 Wilmington, with a railway from that point to a fortified sea- 
 port controlled by the foreign power, at which the foreign na- 
 tion can land, without resistance, troops as fast as they can be 
 transported, and with bases of supply, munitions, food, uni- 
 forms, etc., already located at Wilmington, at the sea-port and 
 several places along the line. Reverse the directions from south 
 to north, and Wilmington will stand for Tslnan-fu, Shanghai 
 for New York, Nanking for Philadelphia with Peking standing 
 for the seat of government at Washington, and Tientsin for 
 Baltimore. Suppose in addition that the Pennsylvania road is 
 the sole means of communication between Washington and the 
 chief commercial and industrial centers, and you have the frame- 
 work of the Shantung picture as it presents itself daily to the 
 inhabitants of China. Upon second thought, however, the 
 parallel is not quite accurate. You have to add that the same 
 
 [12] 
 
foreign nation controls also all coast communications from, say, 
 Raleigh southwards, with railway lines both to the nearby coast 
 and to New Orleans. For (still reversing directions) this cor- 
 responds to the position of Imperial Japan in Manchuria with 
 its railways to Dairen and through Korea to a port twelve 
 hours sail from a great military center in Japan proper. These 
 are not remote possibilities nor vague prognostications. They 
 are accomplished facts. 
 
 Yet the facts give only the framework of the picture. What 
 is actually going on within Shantung? One of the demands of 
 the "postponed" group of the Twenty-one Demands was that 
 Japan should supply military and police advisers to China. 
 They are not so much postponed but that Japan enforced specific 
 concessions from China during the war by diplomatic threats 
 to reintroduce their discussion, or so postponed that Japanese 
 advisers are not already installed in the police headquarters of 
 the city of Tslnan, the capital city of Shantung of three hundred 
 thousand population where the Provincial Assembly meets and 
 all the Provincial officials reside. Within recent months the 
 Japanese consul has taken a company of armed soldiers with 
 him when he visited the Provincial Governor to make certain 
 demands upon him, the visit being punctuated by an ostentatious 
 surrounding of the Governor's yamen by these troops. Within 
 the past few weeks, two hundred cavalry came to Tslnan and 
 remained there while Japanese officials demanded of the Gover- 
 nor drastic measures to suppress the boycott, while It was threat- 
 ened to send Japanese troops to police the foreign settlement 
 if the demand was not heeded. 
 
 A former consul was Indiscreet enough to put Into writing 
 that if the Chinese Governor did not stop the boycott and the 
 students' movement by force if need be, he would take matters 
 into his own hands. The chief tangible charge he brought 
 against the Chinese as a basis of his demand for "protection" 
 was that Chinese store-keepers actually refused to accept Japan- 
 ese money In payment for goods, not ordinary Japanese 
 money at that, but the military notes with which, so as 
 to save drain upon the bullion reserves, the army of occupation 
 Is paid. And all this, be it remembered, is more than two hun- 
 dred miles from Tsing-tao and from eight to twelve months 
 after the armistice. Today's paper reports a visit of Japanese 
 
 [13] 
 
to the Governor to inform him that unless he should prevent 
 a private theatrical performance from being given in Tsinan 
 by the students, they would send their own forces into the set- 
 tlement to protect themselves. And the utmost they might 
 need protection from, was that the students were to give some 
 plays designed to foster the boycott! 
 
 Japanese troops overran the Province before they made any 
 serious attempt to capture Tsing-tao. It is only a slight exag- 
 geration to say that they "took" the Chinese Tsinan before 
 they took the German Tsing-tao. Propaganda in America has 
 justified this act on the ground that a German railway to the 
 rear of Japanese forces would have been a menace. As there 
 were no troops but only legal and diplomatic papers with which 
 to attack the Japanese, it is a fair inference that the "menace" 
 was located in Versailles rather than in Shantung, and concerned 
 the danger of Chinese control of their own territory. Chinese 
 have been arrested by Japanese gendarmes in Tsinan and sub- 
 jected to a torturing third degree of the kind that Korea has 
 made sickeningly familiar. The Japanese claim that the injuries 
 were received while the men were resisting arrest. Consider- 
 ing that there was no more legal ground for arrest than there 
 would be if Japanese police arrested Americans in New York, 
 almost anybody but the pacifist Chinese certainly would have 
 resisted. But official hospital reports testify to bayonet wounds 
 and the marks of flogging. In the interior where the Japanese 
 had been disconcerted by the student propaganda they raided a 
 High School, seized a school boy at random, and took him to 
 a distant point and kept him locked up several days. When 
 the Japanese consul at Tsinan was visited by Chinese officials 
 in protest against these illegal arrests, the consul disclaimed 
 all jurisdiction. The matter, he said, was wholly in the hands 
 of the military authorities in Tsing-tao. His disclaimer was em- 
 phasized by the fact that some of the kidnapped Chinese were 
 taken to Tsing-tao for "trial." 
 
 The matter of economic rights in relation to political domi- 
 nation will be discussed later in this article. It is no 
 pleasure for one with many warm friends in Japan, who has 
 a great admiration for the Japanese people as distinct from the 
 ruling mihtary and bureaucratic class, to report such facts as 
 have been stated. One might almost say, one might positively 
 
 [14] 
 
say from the standpoint of Japan itself, that the worst thing 
 that can be charged against the policy of Japan in China for the 
 last six years is its immeasurable stupidity. Na nation has ever 
 misjudged the national psychology of another people as Japan 
 has that of China. The alienation of China is widespread, deep, 
 bitter. Even the most pessimistic of the Chinese who think that 
 China is to undergo a complete economic and political domina- 
 tion by Japan do not think it can last, even without outside inter- 
 vention, more than half a century. 
 
 Today, at the beginning of a new year, (1920) the boycott is 
 much more complete and efficient than in the most tense days of 
 last summer. Unfortunately, the Japanese policy seems to be un- 
 der a truly Greek fate which drives it on. Concessions that would 
 have produced a revulsion of feeling in favor of Japan a year 
 ago will now merely salve the surface of the wound. What 
 would have been welcomed even eight months ago would now 
 be received with contempt. There is but one way in which 
 Japan can now restore herself. It is nothing less than complete 
 withdrawal from Shantung, with possibly a strictly commercial 
 concession at Tsing-tao and a real, not a Manchurian. Open 
 Door. 
 
 According to the Japanese-owned newspapers published in 
 Tsinan, the Japanese military commander in Tsing-tao recently 
 made a speech to visiting journalists from Tokyo in which he 
 said: "The suspicions of China cannot now be allayed merely 
 by repeating that we have no territorial ambitions in China. We 
 must attain complete economic domination of the Far East. But 
 if Chino-Japanese relations do not improve, some third party will 
 reap the benefit. Japanese residing in China incur the hatred of 
 the Chinese. For they regard themselves as the proud citizens 
 of a conquering country. When the Japanese go into partner- 
 ship with the Chinese they manage In the greater number of 
 cases to have the profits accrue to themselves. If friendship 
 between China and Japan is to depend wholly upon the govern- 
 ment it will come to nothing. Diplomatists, soldiers, merchants, 
 journalists should repent the past. The change must be com- 
 plete." But it will not be complete until the Japanese withdraw 
 from Shantung leaving their nationals there upon the footing of 
 other foreigners in China. 
 
 [15] 
 
2. 
 
 In discussing the return to China by Japan of a metaphysical 
 sovereignty while economic rights are retained, I shall not repeat 
 the details of German treaty rights as to the railway and the 
 mines. The reader is assumed to be famihar with those facts. 
 The Germen seizure was outrageous. It was a flagrant case of 
 Might making Right. As von Buelow cynically but frankly told 
 the Reichstag, while Germany did not intend to partition China, 
 she also did not intend to be the passenger left behind in the 
 station when the train started. Germany had the excuse of 
 prior European aggressions, and in turn her usurpation was the 
 precedent for further foreign rape. If judgments are made on 
 a comparative basis, Japan is entitled to all of the white-washing 
 that can be derived from the provocations of European im- 
 perialistic powers, including those countries that in domestic 
 policy are democratic. And every fairminded person will recog- 
 nize that, leaving China out of the reckoning, Japan's proximity 
 to China gives her aggressions the color of self-defence in a way 
 that cannot be urged in behalf of any European power. 
 
 It is possible to look at European aggressions in, say, Africa 
 as incidents of a colonization movement. But no foreign policy 
 in Asia can shelter itself behind any colonization plea. For 
 continental Asia is, for practical purposes, India and China, 
 representing two of the oldest civilizations of the globe and 
 presenting two of its densest populations. If there is any such 
 thing in truth as a philosophy of history with its own inner and 
 inevitable logic, one may well shudder to think of what the 
 closing acts of the drama of the intercourse of the West and 
 East are to be. In any case, and with whatever comfort may 
 be derived from the fact that the American continents have not 
 taken part in the aggression and hence may act as a mediator 
 to avert the final tragedy, residence in China forces upon one 
 the realization that Asia is, after all, a large figure in the future 
 reckoning of history. Asia is really here after all. It is not 
 simply a symbol in western algebraic balances of trade. And in 
 the future, so to speak, it Is going to be even more here, with 
 its awakened national consciousness of about half the population 
 of the whole globe. 
 
 Let the agreements of France and Great Britain made with 
 
Japan during the war stand for the measure of western con- 
 sciousness of the reality of only a small part of Asia, a conscious- 
 ness generated by the patriotism of Japan backed by its powerful 
 army and navy. The same agreement measures western un- 
 consciousness of the reality of that part of Asia which lies with- 
 in the confines of China. An even better measure of western 
 unconsciousness may be found perhaps in such a trifling incident 
 as this: — An Enghsh friend long resident in Shantung told me 
 of writing indignantly home concerning the British part in the 
 Shantung settlement. The reply came, complacently stating that 
 Japanese ships did so much in the war that the Allies could not 
 properly refuse to recognize Japan's claims. The secret agree- 
 ments themselves hardly speak as eloquently for the absence of 
 China from the average western consciousness. In saying that 
 China and Asia are to be enormously significant figures in future 
 reckonings, the spectre of a military Yellow Peril is not meant 
 nor even the more credible spectre of an industrial Yellow Peril. 
 But Asia has come to consciousness, and her consciousness of 
 herself will soon be such a massive and persistent thing that it 
 will force itself upon the reluctant consciousness of the west, 
 < and lie heavily upon its conscience. And for this fact, China and 
 the western world are indebted to Japan. 
 
 These remarks are more relevant to a consideration of the 
 relationship of economic and political rights in Shantung than 
 they perhaps seem. For a moment's reflection will call to mind 
 that all pohtical foreign aggression in China has been carried 
 out for commercial and financial ends, and usually upon some 
 economic pretext. As to the immediate part played by Japan 
 in bringing about a consciousness which will from the present 
 time completely change the relations of the western powers to 
 China, let one little story testify. Some representatives of an 
 English missionary board were making a tour of inspection 
 through China. They went into an interior town in Shantung. 
 They were received with extraordinary cordiality by the entire 
 population. Some time afterwards some of their accompanying 
 friends returned to the village and were received with equally 
 surprising coldness. It came out upon inquiry that the in- 
 habitants had first been moved by the rumor that these people 
 were sent by the British government to secure the removal of 
 the Japanese. Later they were moved by indignation that they 
 had been disappointed. 
 
 [17] 
 
It takes no forcing to see a symbol In this Incident. Part of 
 it stands for the almost incredible ignorance which has rendered 
 China so Impotent nationally speaking. The other part of it 
 stands for the new spirit which has been aroused even among 
 the common people in remote districts. Those who fear, or 
 who pretend to fear, a new Boxer movement, or a definite gen- 
 eral anti-foreign movement, are, I think, mistaken. The new 
 consciousness goes much deeper. Foreign policies that fail to 
 take It Into account and that think that relations with China 
 can be conducted upon the old basis will find this new conscious- 
 ness obtruding in the most unexpected and perplexing ways. 
 
 One might fairly say, still speaking comparatively, that it is 
 part of the bad luck of Japan that her proximity to China, and 
 the opportunity the war gave her to outdo the aggressions of 
 European powers, have made her the first victim of this dis- 
 concerting change. Whatever the motives of the American 
 Senators in completely disassociating the United States from the 
 peace settlement as regards China, their action Is a permanent 
 asset to China, not only In respect to Japan but with respect to 
 all Chinese foreign relations. Just before our visit to Tslnan, 
 the Shantung Provincial Assembly had passed a resolution of 
 thanks to the American Senate. More significant is the fact 
 that they passed another resolution to be cabled to the English 
 Parliament, calling attention to the action of the American 
 Senate and inviting similar action. China In general and 
 Shantung In particular feels the reinforcement of an external 
 approval. With this duplication, its national consciousness has 
 as it were solidified. Japan Is simply the first object to be 
 affected. 
 
 The concrete working out of economic rights In Shantung 
 will be Illustrated by a single case which will have to stand as 
 typical. Po-shan is an interior mining village. The mines were 
 not part of the German booty; they were Chinese owned. The 
 Germans, whatever their ulterior aims, had made no attempt 
 at dispossessing the Chinese. The mines, however, are at the 
 end of a branch line of the new Japanese owned railway — 
 owned by the government, not by a private corporation, and 
 guarded by Japanese soldiers. Of the forty mines, the Japanese 
 have worked their way. In only four years. Into all but four. 
 Different methods are used. The simplest Is, of course, dis- 
 crimination in the use of the railway for shipping. Downright 
 
 [i8] 
 
refusal to furnish cars while competitors who accepted Japanese 
 partners got them, is one method. Another more elaborate 
 method is to send but one car when a large number is asked for, 
 and then when it is too late to use cars, send the whole number 
 asked for or even more, and then charge a large sum for 
 demurrage in spite of the fact the mine no longer wants them 
 or has cancelled the order. Redress there is none. 
 
 Tsinan has no special foreign concessions. It is, however, a 
 "treaty port" where nationals of all friendly powers can do 
 business. But Po-shan is not even a treaty port. Legally speak- 
 ing no foreigners can lease land or carry on any business there. 
 Yet the Japanese have forced a settlement as large in area as 
 the entire foreign settlement in the much larger town of Tsinan. 
 A Chinese refused to lease land where the Japanese wished to 
 relocate their railway station. Nothing happened to him directly. 
 But merchants could not get shipping space, or receive goods by 
 rail. Some of them were beaten up by thugs. After a time, they 
 used their influence with their compatriot to lease his land. Im- 
 mediately the persecutions ceased. Not all the land has been 
 secured by threats or coercion; some has been leased directly 
 by Chinese moved by high prices, in spite of the absence of any 
 legal sanction. In addition, the Japanese have obtained control 
 of the electric light works and some pottery factories, etc. 
 
 Now even admitting that this is typical of the methods by 
 which the Japanese plant themselves, a natural American re- 
 action would be to say that, after all, the country is built up 
 industrially by these enterprises, and that though the rights of 
 some individuals may have been violated, there is nothing to 
 make a national, much less an international fuss about. More 
 or less unconsciously we translate foreign incidents into terms 
 of our own experience and environment, and thus miss the 
 entire point. Since America was largely developed by foreign 
 capital to our own economic benefit and without political en- 
 croachments, we lazily suppose some such separation of the 
 economic and political to be possible in China. But it must be 
 remembered that China is not an open country. Foreigners can 
 lease land, carry on business, and manufacture only in accord 
 with express treaty agreements. There are no such agreements 
 in the cases typified by the Po-shan incident. We may pro- 
 foundly disagree with the closed economic policy of China, or 
 we may believe that under existing circumstances it represents 
 
 [19] 
 
the part of prudence for her. That makes no difference. Given 
 the frequent occurrence of such economic invasions, with the 
 backing of soldiers of the Imperial Army, with the overt aid 
 of the Imperial Railway, and ivith the refusal of Imperial offi- 
 cials to intervene, there is clear evidence of the attitude and 
 intention of the Japanese government in Shantung. 
 
 Because the population of Shantung is directly confronted 
 with an immense amount of just such evidence, it cannot take 
 seriously the professions of vague diplomatic utterances. What 
 foreign nation is going to intervene to enforce Chinese rights in 
 such a case as Po-shan? Which one is going effectively to call 
 the attention of Japan to such evidences of its failure to carry 
 out its promise? Yet the accumulation of precisely such seem- 
 ingly petty incidents, and not any single dramatic great wrong, 
 will secure Japan's economic and political domination of 
 Shantung. It is for this reason that foreigners resident in 
 Shantung, no matter In what part, say that they see no sign 
 whatever that Japan is going to get out; that, on the contrary, 
 everything points to a determination to consolidate her position. 
 How long ago was the Portsmouth treaty signed, and what 
 were Its nominal pledges about evacuation of Manchurian 
 territory? 
 
 Not a month will pass without something happening which 
 will give a pretext for delay, and for making the surrender of 
 Shantung conditional upon this, that and the other thing. Mean- 
 time the penetration of Shantung by means of railway discrimi- 
 nation, railway military guards, continual nibblings here and 
 there, will be going on. It would make the chapter too long to 
 speak of the part played by manipulation of finance In achieving 
 this process of attrition of sovereignty. Two incidents must 
 suffice. During the war, Japanese traders with the connivance 
 of their government gathered up Immense amounts of copper 
 cash from Shantung and shipped It to Japan against the protests 
 of the Chinese government. What does sovereignty amount to 
 when a country cannot control even its own currency system? 
 In Manchuria the Japanese have forced the Introduction of 
 several hundred million dollars of paper currency, nominally, 
 of course, based on a gold reserve. These notes are redeemable, 
 however, only In Japan proper. And there Is a law in Japan 
 forbidding the exportation of gold. And there you are. 
 
 Japan itself has recently afforded an object lesson in the actual 
 
 [20] 
 
connection of economic and political rights in China. It is so 
 beautifully complete a demonstration that it was surely un- 
 conscious. Within the last two weeks, Mr. Obata, the Japanese 
 minister in Peking, has waited upon the government with a 
 memorandum saying that the Foochow incident was the cul- 
 minating result of the boycott; that if the boycott continues, 
 a series of such incidents is to be apprehended, saying that the 
 situation has become "intolerable" for Japan, and disavowing 
 all responsibility for further consequences unless the govern- 
 ment makes a serious effort to stop the boycott. Japan then 
 immediately makes certain specific demands. China must stop 
 the circulation of handbills, the holding of meetings to urge the 
 boycott, the destruction of Japanese goods that have become 
 Chinese property — none have been destroyed that are Japanese 
 owned. Volumes could not say more as to the real conception 
 of Japan of the connection between the economic and the political 
 relations of the two countries. Surely the pale ghost of 
 "Sovereignty" smiled ironically as he read this official note. 
 President Wilson after having made in the case of Shantung a 
 sharp and complete separation o£ economic and political rights, 
 also said that a nation boycotted is within sight of surrender. 
 Disassociation of words from acts has gone so far in his case 
 that he will hardly be able to see the meaning of Mr. Obata's 
 communication. The American sense of humor and fair-play 
 may however be counted upon to get its point. 
 
 January, 1920. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Hinterlands in China 
 
 NE of the two Presidents of China — it is unnecessary 
 to specify which — recently stated that a renewal of 
 the Anglo-Japanese alliance meant a partition of 
 China. In this division, Japan would take the north and Great 
 Britain the south. Probably the remark was not meant to be 
 taken literally in the sense of formal conquest or annexation, 
 but rather symbolically with reference to the tendency of poli- 
 
 [21] 
 
cies and events. Even so, the statement will appear exagger- 
 ated or wild to persons outside of China, who either believe 
 that the Open Door policy is now irrevocably established or 
 that Japan is the only foreign Power which China has to fear. 
 But a recent .visit to the south revealed that in that section, 
 especially in Canton, the British occupy much the same position 
 of suspicion and dread which is held by the Japanese in the 
 north. 
 
 Upon the negative side, the Japanese menace is negligible 
 in the province of Kwantung, in which Canton is situated. 
 There are said to be more Americans in Canton than Japan- 
 ese, and the American colony is not extensive. Upon the posi- 
 tive side the history of the Cassell collieries contract is instruc- 
 tive. It illustrates the cause of the popular attitude toward the 
 British, and quite possibly explains the bitterness in the remark 
 quoted;. The contract is noteworthy from whatever stand- 
 point it is viewed, whether that of time, of the conditions it 
 contains or of the circumstances which accompany it. 
 
 Premising that the contract delivers to a British company 
 a monopoly of the rich coal deposits of the province for a 
 period of ninety years and — quite incidentally of course — the 
 right to use all means of transportation, water or rail, wharves 
 and ports now in existence, and also to "construct, manage, 
 superintend and work other roads, railways waterways as may 
 be deemed advisable" — which reads like a monopoly of all 
 further transportation facilities of the province — first take up 
 the time of the making of the contract. It was drawn in April, 
 1920 and confirmed a few months later. It was made, 
 of course, with the authorities of the Kwantung province, sub- 
 ject to confirmation at Peking. During this period, Kwantung 
 province was governed by military carpet-baggers from the 
 neighboring province of Kwangsei, which was practically alone 
 of the southern provinces allied with the northern government, 
 then under the control of the Anfu party. It was matter of 
 common knowledge that the people of Canton and of the prov- 
 ince were bitterly hostile to this outside control and submitted 
 to it only because of military coercion. Civil strife for the ex- 
 pulsion of the outsiders was already going on, continually gain- 
 ing headway, and a few months later the Kwangsei troops were 
 defeated and expelled from the province by the forces of Gen- 
 
 [22] 
 
eral Chen, now the civil governor of Kwantung, who received 
 a triumphal ovation upon his entrance into Canton. At this 
 time the present native government was established, a change 
 which made possible the return of Sun Yat Sen and his followers 
 from their exile in Shanghai. It is evident, then, that the col- 
 lieries contract giving away the natural resources of the people 
 of the province, was knowingly made by a British company 
 with a government which no more represented the people of the 
 province than the military government of Germany represented 
 the people of Belgium during the war. 
 
 As to the terms of the contract, the statement that it gave 
 the British company a monopoly of all the coal mines in the 
 province, was not literally accurate. Verbally, twenty-two dis- 
 tricts are enumerated. But these are the districts along the 
 lines of the only railways in the province and the only ones soon 
 to be built, Including the as yet uncompleted Hankow-Canton 
 railway. Possibly this fact accounts for the anxiety of the 
 British partners In the Consortium that the completion of this 
 line be the first undertaking financed by the Consortium. The 
 document also includes what is perhaps a novelty In legal docu- 
 ments having such a momentous economic importance, namely, 
 the words "etc." after the districts enumerated by name. 
 
 For this concession, the British syndicate agreed to pay the 
 provincial government the sum of $1,000,000 (silver of 
 course). This million dollars Is to bear six per cent Interest 
 to the company, and capital and interest are to be paid back 
 to the company by the provincial government out of the divi- 
 dends (If any) It Is to receive. The nature of these "divi- 
 dends" Is set forth in an article which should receive the care- 
 ful attention of promoters elsewhere as a model of the possi- 
 bilities of exploiting contracts. The ten million capital is di- 
 vided equally into "A" shares and "B" shares. The "A" shares 
 go unreservedly to the directors of the company, and three mil- 
 lions of the "B" shares are to be allotted by the directors of 
 the company at their discretion. The other two million are 
 again divided into equal portions, one portion representing the 
 sum advanced by the company to the province and to be paid 
 back as just specified, while the other million — one-tenth of the 
 capitalization — is to be a trust fund the dividends of which are 
 to go for the "benefit of the poor people of the province" and 
 
 [23] 
 
for an educational fund for the province. But before any divi- 
 dends are paid upon the "B" shares, eight per cent dividends 
 are to be paid upon the "A" shares and a dollar a ton royalty 
 upon all coal mined. Those having any familiarity with the 
 coal business with its usual royalty of about ten cents a ton can 
 easily calcuate the splendid prospects of the "poor people" and 
 the schools, prospects which represent the total return to the 
 provinces of a concession of untold worth. The contract also 
 guarantees to the company the assistance of the provincial gov- 
 ernment in expropriating the owners of all coal mines which 
 have been granted to other companies but not yet worked. 
 These technical details make dry reading, but they throw light 
 upon the spirit with which the British company undertook Its 
 predatory negotiations with a government renounced by the 
 people It professed to govern. In comparison with the rela- 
 tively crude methods of Japan in Shantung, they show the ad- 
 vantages of wide business experience. 
 
 As for the circumstances and context which give added men- 
 ace to the contract, the following facts are significant. Hong 
 Kong, a British crown colony, lies directly opposite the river 
 upon which Canton Is situated. It is the port of export and 
 Import for the vast districts served by the mines and railways 
 of the province. It is unnecessary to point out the hold upon 
 all economic development which is given through a monopolistic 
 control of coal. It is hardly too much to say that the enforce- 
 ment of the contract would enable British interests in Hong 
 Kong to control the entire industrial development of the most 
 flourishing of the provinces of China. It would be a compara- 
 tively easy and Inexpensive matter to provide the main land 
 with a first class modern harbor and port near Canton. But 
 such a port would tend to reduce the assets of Hong Kong to 
 the possession of the most beautiful scenery in the world. There 
 is already fear that a new harbor will be built. Many persons 
 think that the concession of building such railways etc., "as 
 are deemed advisable for the purpose of the business of the 
 company and to improve those now existing" Is the object of 
 the contract, even more than the coal monopoly. For the Brit- 
 ish already own a considerable part of the mainland. Including 
 part of the railway connecting the littoral with Canton. By 
 building a cross-cut from the British owned portion of this rail- 
 
 [24] 
 
way to the Hankow-Canton line, the latter would become vir- 
 tually the Hankow-Hong Kong line, and Canton would be a 
 way-station. With the advantages thus secured, the project 
 for building a new port could be indefinitely blocked. 
 
 During the period in which the contract was being secured, 
 a congress of British Chambers of Commerce was held in 
 Shanghai. Resolutions were passed in favor of abolishing 
 henceforth the whole principle of special nationalistic conces- 
 sions, and of cooperating with the Chinese for the upbuilding 
 of China. At the close of the meeting the Chairman announced 
 that a new era for China had finally dawned. All of the Brit- 
 ish newspapers in China lauded the wise action of the Chambers. 
 At the same time, Mr. Lamont was in Peking, and was setting 
 forth that the object of the Consortium was the abolition of 
 further concessions, and the uniting of the financial resources 
 of the banks in the Consortium for the economic development 
 of China itself. By an ironical coincidence, the Hong Kong- 
 Shanghai Bank, which is the financial power behind the contract 
 and the new company, is the leading British partner in the 
 Consortium. It is difficult to see how the British can hence- 
 forth accuse the Japanese of bad faith if any of the banking 
 interests of that country should enter upon independent ne- 
 gotiations with any government in China. 
 
 By the time the scene of action was transferred to Peking 
 In order to secure the confirmation of the central government, 
 the Anfu regime was no more, and as yet no confirmation has 
 been secured. The new government at Canton has declined to 
 recognize the contract as having any validity. An official of 
 the Hong Kong government has told an official of the Canton 
 government that the Hong Kong government stands behind the 
 enforcement of the contract, and that Kwantung province is a 
 British Hinterland. Within the last few weeks the Governor 
 of Hong Kong and a leading Chinese banker of Hong Kong 
 who is a British subject have visited Peking. Rumors were rife 
 in the south as to the object of the visit. British sources pub- 
 lished the report that one object was to return Weihaiwei to 
 China — in case Peking agreed to turn over more of the Kwan- 
 tung mainland to Hong Kong as a quid pro quo. Chinese opin- 
 ion In the south was that one main object was to secure the 
 Peking confirmation of the Cassell contract, in which case 
 
 [25] 
 
$900,000 more would be forthcoming, $100,000 having been 
 paid down when the contract was signed with the provincial 
 government. Peking does not recognize the present Canton 
 government but regards it as an outlaw. The crowd that 
 signed the contract is still in control of the neighboring prov- 
 ince of Kwangsei and they are relied upon by the north to effect 
 the military subjugation of the seceded province. Fighting 
 has already, indeed, begun, but the Kwangsei militarists are 
 badly in need £)f money; if Peking ratifies the contract, a large 
 part of the funds will be paid over to them — all that isn't lost 
 by the wayside to the northern militarists.* Meantime British 
 news agencies keep up a constant circulation of reports tending 
 to discredit the Kwantung government, although all Impartial 
 observers on the spot regard It as altogether the most promis- 
 ing one in China. 
 
 These considerations not only throw light on some of the diffi- 
 culties of the functioning of the Consortium, but they give an In- 
 dlspenslble background for judging the actual effect of the renew- 
 al of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. By force of circumstances each 
 government, even against its own wish, will be compelled to wink 
 at the predatory policies of the other; and the tendency will be to 
 create a division of spheres of influence between the north and 
 south in order to avoid more direct conflicts. The English Hberals 
 who stand for the renewal of the alliance on the ground that 
 it will enable England to exercise a check on Japanese policies, 
 are more naive than was Mr. Wilson with his belief in the sep- 
 aration of the economic and political control of Shantung. 
 
 It cannot be too often repeated that the real point of friction 
 between the United States and Japan is not in California but 
 in China. It is silly — unless it is calculated — for English au- 
 thorities to keep repeating that under no circumstances does 
 the alliance mean that Great Britain would support Japan in 
 a war with the United States. The day the aUIance Is renewed, 
 the hands of the militarists In Japan will be strengthened and 
 the hands of the liberals — already weak enough — be still fur- 
 ther weakened. In consequence, all the sources of friction In 
 China between the United States and Japan will be Intensified. 
 I do not believe In the predicted war. But should it come, the 
 
 * Since the text was written, the newspapers have stated that the Peking Gov- 
 ernment has officially refused to validate the agreement. 
 
 [26] 
 
first act of Japan — so everyone in China believes — will be to 
 seize the ports of northern China and its railways in order to 
 make sure of an uninterrupted supply of food and raw ma- 
 terials. The act would be justified as necessary to national 
 existence. Great Britain in alliance with Japan would be in 
 no position to protest in anything but the most perfunctory 
 way. The guarantee of such abstinence would be for Japan 
 the next best thing to open naval and financial support. With- 
 out the guarantee they would not dare the seizure of Chinese 
 ports. In recent years diplomatists have shown themselves ca- 
 pable of unlimited stupidity. But it is not possible that the 
 men in the British Foreign Office are not aware of these ele- 
 mentary facts. If they renew the alliance they knowingly take 
 the responsibility for the consequences. 
 May 24, 1921. 
 
 IV 
 
 A Political Upheaval in China 
 
 EVEN in America we have heard of one Chinese revolu- 
 tion, that which thrust the Manchu dynasty from the 
 throne. The visitor in China gets used to casual refer- 
 ences to the second revolution, that which frustrated Yuan Shi 
 Kai's aspirations to be emperor, and the third, the defeat in 19 17 
 of the abortive attempt to put the Manchu boy emperor back 
 into power. And within the last few weeks the (September 1920) 
 fourth upheaval has taken place. It may not be dignified by 
 the name of the fourth revolution, for the head of the state 
 has not been changed by it. But as a manifestation of the 
 forces that shape Chinese political events, for evil and for 
 good, perhaps this last disturbance surpasses the last two "revo- 
 lutions" in significance. 
 
 Chinese politics in detail are highly complicated, a mess of 
 personalities and factions whose oscillations no one can follow 
 who does not know a multitude of personal, family and pro- 
 vincial histories. But occasionally something happens which 
 simplifies the tangle. Definite outlines frame themselves out 
 of the swirling criss-cross of strife, intrigue and ambition. So, 
 
 [27] 
 
at present, the complete collapse of the Anfu clique which 
 owned the central government for two years marks the end of 
 that union of internal militarism and Japanese foreign influence 
 which was, for China, the most marked fruit of the war. When 
 China entered the war a "War Participation" army was formed. 
 It never participated; probably it was never meant to. But 
 its formation threw power wholly into the hands of the mili- 
 tary clique, as against the civilian constitutionalists. And in 
 return for concessions, secret agreements relating to Manchuria, 
 Shantung, new railways, etc., Japan supplied money, munitions, 
 instructors for the army and a benevolent supervision of for- 
 eign and domestic politics. The war came to an unexpected 
 and untimely end, but by this time the offspring of the marriage 
 of the militarism of Yuan Shi Kai and Japanese money and 
 influence was a lusty youth. Bolshevism was induced to take 
 the place of Germany as a menace requiring the keeping up 
 of the army, and loans and teachers. Mongolia was persuaded 
 to cut her strenuous ties with Russia, to renounce her inde- 
 pendence and come again under Chinese sovereignty. 
 
 The army and its Japanese support and instruction was, ac- 
 cordingly, continued. In place of the "War Participation" 
 army appeared the "Frontier Defense" army. Marshal Tuan, 
 the head of the military party, remained the nominal political 
 power behind the presidential chair, and General Hsu (com- 
 monly known as little Hsu, in distinction from old Hsu, the 
 president) was the energetic manager of the Mongolian ad- 
 venture which, by a happy coincidence, required a bank, land 
 development companies and railway schemes, as well as an 
 army. About this military centre as a nucleus gathered the 
 vultures who fed on the carrion. This flock took the name of 
 the Anfu Club. It did not control the entire cabinet, but to 
 it belonged the Minister of Justice, who manipulated the po- 
 lice and the courts, persecuted the students, suppressed liberal 
 journals and imprisoned inconvenient critics. And the Club 
 owned the ministers of finance and communications, the two 
 cabinet places that dispense revenues, give out jobs and make 
 loans. It also regulated the distribution of intelligence by mail 
 and telegraph. The reign of corruption and despotic ineffi- 
 ciency, tempered only by the student revolt, set in. In two 
 years the Anfu Club got away with two hundred millions of 
 
 [28] 
 
public funds directly, to say nothing of what was wasted by 
 incompetency and upon the army. The Allies had set out to 
 get China into the war. They succeeded in getting Japan into 
 control of Peking and getting China, politically speaking, into 
 a seemingly hopeless state of corruption and confusion. 
 
 The militaristic or Pei-Yang party was, however, divided in- 
 to two factions, each called after a province. The Anwhei 
 party gathered about little Hsu and was almost identical with 
 the Anfus. The Chili faction had been obliged, so far as Peking 
 was concerned, to content itself with such leavings as the Anfu 
 Club tossed to it. Apparently it was hopelessly weaker than 
 its rival, although Tuan, who was personally honest and above 
 financial scandal, was supported by both factions and was the 
 head of both. About three months ago there were a few signs 
 that, while the Anfu Club had been entrenching itself in Peking, 
 the rival faction had been quietly establishing itself in the 
 provinces. A league of Eight Tuchuns (mihtary governors of 
 the provinces) came to the assistance of the president against 
 some unusually strong pressure from the Anfu Club. In spite 
 of the fact that the military governor of the three Manchurian 
 provinces, Chang Tso Lin, popularly known as the Emperor 
 of Manchuria, lined up with this league, practically nobody ex- 
 pected anything except some manoeevering to get a larger share 
 of the spoils. 
 
 But late in June the president invited Chang Tso Lin to 
 Peking. The latter saw Tuan, told him that he was surrounded 
 by evil advisers, demanded that he cut loose from little Hsu 
 and the Anfu Club, and declared open war upon little Hsu — 
 the two had long and notoriously been bitter enemies. Even 
 then people had great difficulty in believing that anything would 
 happen except another Chinese compromise. The president 
 was known to be sympathetic upon the whole with the Chili 
 faction, but the president, if not a typical Chinese, is at least 
 typical of a certain kind of Chinese mandarin, non-resistant, 
 compromising, conciliating, procrastinating, covering up, evad- 
 ing issues, face-saving. But finally something happened. A 
 mandate was issued dismissing little Hsu from office, military 
 and civil, dissolving the frontier defense corps as such, and 
 bringing It under the control of the Ministry of War (usually 
 armies In China belong to some general or Tuchun, not to the 
 
 [29] 
 
country). For almost forty-eight hours it was thought that 
 Tuan had consented to sacrifice little Hsu and that the latter 
 would submit at least temporarily. Then with equally sensa- 
 tional abruptness Tuan brought pressure to bear on the presi- 
 dent. The latter was appointed head of a national defense 
 army, and rewards were issued for the heads of the chiefs of 
 the Chili faction, nothing, however, being said about Chang 
 Tso Lin, who had meanwhile returned to Mukden and who 
 still professed allegiance to Tuan. Troops were mobilized; 
 there was a rush of officials and of the wealthy to the conces- 
 sions of Tientsin and to the hotels of the legation quarter. 
 
 This sketch is not meant as history, but simply as an indi- 
 cation of the forces at work. Hence it is enough to say that 
 two weeks after Tuan and little Hsu had intimidated the presi- 
 dent and proclaimed themselves the saviors of the Republic, 
 they were in hiding, their enemies of the Chili party were in 
 complete control of Peking, and rewards from fifty thousand 
 dollars down were offered for the arrest of little Hsu, the ex- 
 ministers of justice, finance and communications, and other lead- 
 ers of the Anfu Club. The political turnover was as complete 
 as it was sensational. The seemingly impregnable masters of 
 China were impotent fugitives. The carefully built up Anfu 
 Club, with its military, financial and foreign support, had crum- 
 bled and fallen. No country at any time has ever seen a po- 
 litical upheaval more s.udden and more thoroughgoing. It was 
 not so much a defeat as a dissolution like that of death, a total 
 disappearance, an evaporation. 
 
 Corruption had worked inward, as it has a way of doing. 
 Japanese-bought munitions would not explode; quartermasters 
 vanished with the funds with which stores were to be bought; 
 troops went without anything to eat for two or three days; 
 large numbers, including the larger part of one division, went 
 over to the enemy en masse; those who did not desert had no 
 heart for fighting and ran away or surrendered on the slightest 
 provocation, saying they were willing to fight for their country 
 but saw no reason why they should fight for a faction, especially 
 a faction that had been selling the country to a foreign nation. 
 In the manner of the defeat of the Anfu clique at the height 
 of its supremacy, rather than in the mere fact of its defeat, lies 
 the credit side of the Chinese political balance sheet. It is a strik- 
 
 [30] 
 
ing exhibition of the oldest and best faith of the Chinese — the 
 power of moral considerations. Public opinion, even that of 
 the coolie on the street, was wholly against the Anfu party. 
 It went down not so much because of the strength of the other 
 side as because of its own rottenness. 
 
 So far the results are to all appearances negative. The most 
 marked is the disappearance of Japanese prestige. As one of 
 the leading men in the War Office said: "For over a year 
 now the people have been strongly opposed to the Japanese 
 government on account of Shantung. But now even the gen- 
 erals do not care for Japan any more." It is hardly logical to 
 take the easy collapse of the Japanese-supported Anfu party as 
 a proof of the weakness of Japan, but prestige is always a 
 matter of feeling rather than of logic. Many who were in- 
 timidated to the point of hypnotism by the idea of the ir- 
 resistible power of Japan are now freely laughing at the in- 
 efficiency of Japanese leadership. It would not be safe to pre- 
 dict that Japan will not come back as a force to be reckoned 
 with in the internal as well as external politics of China, but 
 it is safe to say that never again will Japan figure as superman 
 to China. And such a negation is after all a positive result. 
 
 And so in its way is the overthrow of the Anwhei faction of 
 the militarist party. The Chinese liberals do not feel very 
 optimistic about the immediate outcome. They have mostly 
 given up the idea that the country can be reformed by political 
 means. They are sceptical about the possibility of reforming 
 even politics until a new generation comes on the scene. They 
 are now putting their faith in education and in social changes 
 which will take some years to consummate themselves visibly. 
 The self-styled southern republican constitutional party has not 
 shown itself in much better light than the northern militarist 
 party. In fact, its old leader Sun Yat Sen now cuts one of the 
 most ridiculous figures in China, as shortly before this upheaval 
 he had definitely aligned himself with Tuan and little Hsu.* 
 
 * This was written of course several mionths before Sun Yat Sen was rein- 
 stated in control of Canton by the successful revolt of his local adherents against 
 the southern militarists who had usurped power and driven out Sun Yat Sen and 
 his followers. But up to the time when I left China, in July of tliis year, it was 
 true t^Pt the liberals of northern and central China who were bitterly opposed to 
 the Peking Govrenment, did not look to the Southern Government with much hope. 
 The common attitude was a "plague upon both of your houses" and a desire for 
 a new start. The conflict between North and South looms much larger in the 
 United States than it did in China. 
 
 [31] 
 
This does not mean, however, that democratic opinion thinks 
 nothing has been gained. The demonstration of the inherent 
 weakness of corrupt militarism will itself prevent the develop- 
 ment of any militarism as complete as that of the Anfus. As 
 one Chinese gentleman said to me: "When Yuan Shi Kai was 
 overthrown, the tiger killed the lion. Now a snake has killed 
 the tiger. No matter how vicious the snake may become, some 
 smaller animal will be able to kill him, and his life will be 
 shorter than that of either lion or tiger." In short, each suc- 
 cessive upheaval brings nearer the day when civilian supremacy 
 will be established. This result will be achieved partly because 
 of the repeated demonstrations of the uncongeniality of military 
 despotism to the Chinese spirit, and partly because with every 
 passing year education will have done its work. Suppressed 
 liberal papers are coming to life, while over twenty Anfu sub- 
 sidized newspapers and two subsidized news agencies have gone 
 out of being. The soldiers, including many officers in the An- 
 whei army, clearly show the effects of student propaganda. 
 And it is worth while to note down the name of one of the 
 leaders on the victorious side, the only one whose troops did 
 any particular fighting, and that against great odds in num- 
 bers. The name is Wu Pei Fu. He at least has not fought 
 for the Chili faction against the Anwhei faction. He has pro- 
 claimed from the first that he was fighting to rid the country of 
 military control of civil government, and against traitors who 
 would sell their country to foreigners. He has come out 
 strongly for a new popular assembly, to form a new constitu- 
 tion and to unite the country. And although Chang Tso Lin 
 has remarked that Wu Pei Fu as a military subordinate could 
 not be expected to intervene in politics, he has not as yet found 
 it convenient to oppose the demand for a popular assembly. 
 Meanwhile the liberals are organizing their forces, hardly ex-' 
 pecting to win a victory, but resolved, win or lose, to take ad- 
 vantage of the opportunity to carry further the education of 
 the Chinese people in the meaning of democracy. 
 
 August, 1920. 
 
 [S!!] 
 
Divided China 
 
 IN January 1920 the Peking government Issued an 
 edict proclaiming the unification of China. On May 
 5 th Sun Yat Sen was formally inaugurated in Canton 
 as president of all China. Thus China has within six months 
 been twice unified, once from the northern standpoint and once 
 from the southern. Each act of "unification" is in fact a sym- 
 bol of the division of China, a division expressing differences 
 of language, temperament, history, and political policy as well 
 as of geography, persons and factions. This division has been 
 one of the outstanding facts of Chinese history since the over- 
 throw of the Manchus ten years ago and it has manifested itself 
 in Intermittent civil war. Yet there are two other statements 
 which are equally true, although they flatly contradict each 
 other and the one just made. One statement is that so far as 
 the people of China are concerned there is no real division on 
 geographical lines, but only the common division occurring ev- 
 erywhere between conservatives and progressives. The other 
 is that Instead of two divisions in China, there are at least 
 five, two parties in both the north and south, and another 
 In the central or Yangtse region,* each one of the five spHt- 
 ting up again m.ore or less on factional and provincial lines. 
 And so far as the future is concerned, probably this last state- 
 ment is the most significant of the three. That all three state- 
 ments are true Is what makes Chinese politics so difficult to un- 
 derstand even in their larger features. 
 
 By the good fortune of circumstances we were in Canton 
 when the inauguration occurred. Peking and Canton are a 
 long way apart In more than distance. There is little exchange 
 of actual news between the two places; what filters through 
 Into either city and gets published consists mostly of rumors 
 
 * Since the writing of this and the former chapter there are some signs that 
 Wu Pei Fu wants to set up in control of the middle districts. 
 
 [33] 
 
tending to discredit the other city. In Canton, the monarchy 
 is constantly being restored in Peking; and in Peking, Canton 
 is Bolshevized at least once a week, while every other week 
 open war breaks out between the adherents of Sun Yat Sen, and 
 General Chen Kwang Ming, the civil governor of the province. 
 There is nothing to give the impression — even in circles which 
 accept the Peking government only as an evil necessity — that 
 the pretensions of Sun Yat Sen represent anything more than 
 the desires of a small and discredited group to get some slight 
 power for themselves at the expense of national unity. Even 
 in Fuklen, the province next north of Kwantung, one found lit- 
 tle but gossip whose effect was to minimize the importance of 
 the southern government. In foreign circles in the north as 
 well as in liberal Chinese circles upon the whole, the feeling is 
 general that bad as the de facto Peking government may be, it 
 represents the cause of national unity, while the southern gov- 
 ernment represents a perpetuation of that division of China 
 which makes her weak and which offers the standing invitation 
 to foreign Intrigue and aggression. Only occasionally during 
 the last few months has some returned traveller timidly ad- 
 vanced the opinion that we had the "wrong dope" on the south, 
 and that they were really trying "to do something down there." 
 Consequently there was little preparation on my part for the 
 spectacle afforded in Canton during the week of May 5th. 
 This was the only demonstration I have seen in China during 
 the last two years which gave any evidence of being a spon- 
 taneous popular movement. New Yorkers are accustomed to 
 crowds, processions, street decorations and accompanying en- 
 thusiasm. I doubt if New York has ever seen a demonstration 
 which surpassed that of Canton in size, noise, color or spon- 
 taneity — In spite of tropical rains. The country people flocked 
 in in such masses, that, being unable to find accommodation 
 even in the river boats, they kept up a parade all night. Guilds 
 and localities which were not able to get a place in the regular 
 procession organized minor ones on their own account on the 
 day before and after the official demonstration. Making all pos- 
 sible allowance for the intensity of Cantonese local loyalty and 
 the fact that they might be celebrating a Cantonese affair rather 
 than a principle, the scene was sufficiently Impressive to revise 
 one's preconceived ideas and to make one try to find out what 
 
 [34] 
 
It is that gives the southern movement its vitality. 
 
 A demonstration may be popular and still be superficial in 
 significance. However one found foreigners on the ground — 
 at least Americans — saying that in the last few months the 
 men In power in Canton were the only officials in China who 
 were actually doing something for the people instead of filling 
 their own pockets and magnifying their personal power. Even 
 the northern newspapers had not entirely omitted reference to 
 the suppression of licensed gambling. On the spot one learned 
 that this suppression was not only genuine and thorough, but 
 that it meant a renunciation of an annual revenue of nearly 
 ten million dollars on the part of a government whose chief 
 difficulty Is financial, and where — apart from motives of per- 
 sonal squeeze — It would have been easy to argue that at least 
 temporarily the end justified the means in retaining this source 
 of revenue. English papers throughout China have given 
 much praise to the government of Hong Kong because it has 
 cut down Its opium revenue from eight to four millions an- 
 nually with the plan for ultimate extinction. Yet Hong Kong 
 Is prosperous. It has not been touched by civil war, and It only 
 needs revenue for ordinary civil purposes, not as a means of 
 maintaining Its existence In a crisis. 
 
 Under the circumstances, the action of the southern govern- 
 ment was hardly less than heroic. This renunciation Is the 
 most sensational act of the Canton government, but one soon 
 learns that it is the accompaniment of a considerable number 
 of constructive administrative undertakings. Among the most 
 notable are attempts to reform the local magistracies through- 
 out the province, the establishment of municipal government in 
 Canton — something new In China where local officials are all 
 centrally appointed and controlled — based upon the American 
 Commission plan, and directed by graduates of schools of po- 
 litical science In the United States; plans for Introducing local 
 self-government throughout the province; a scheme for intro- 
 duction of universal primary education in Canton to be com- 
 pleted in three steps. 
 
 These reforms are provincial and local. They are part of 
 a general movement against centralization and toward local au- 
 tonomy which is gaining headway all over China, a protest 
 against the appointment of officials from Peking and the man- 
 
 [35] 
 
agement of local affairs in the interests of factions — and pocket- 
 books — whose chief interest in local affairs is what can be ex- 
 tracted in the way of profit. For the only analogue of pro- 
 vincial government in China at the present time is the carpet 
 bag government of the south in the days following our civil 
 war. These things explain the restiveness of the country, in- 
 cluding central as well as southern provinces, under Peking 
 domination. But they do not explain the setting up of a new 
 national, or federal government, with the election of Mr. Sun 
 Yat Sen as its president. To understand this event it is neces- 
 sary to go back into history. 
 
 In June, 19 17, the parliament in Peking was about to adopt 
 a constitution. The parliament was controlled by leaders of the 
 old revolutionary party who had been at loggerheads with Yuan 
 and with the executive generally. The latter accused them of 
 being obstructionists, wasting time in discussing and theorizing 
 when the country needed action. Japan had changed her tactics 
 regarding the participation of China in the war, and having got 
 her position established through the Twenty-one Demands, saw 
 a way of controlling Chinese arsenals and virtually amalgamat- 
 ing the Chinese armies with her own through supervising China's 
 entrance into the war. The British and French were pressing 
 desperately for the same end. Parliament was slow to act, and 
 Tang Shao Yi, Sun Yat Sen and other southern leaders were 
 averse, since they regarded the war as none of China's business 
 and were upon the whole more anti-British than anti-German — 
 a fact which partly accounts for the share of British journals in 
 the present press propaganda against the Canton government. 
 But what brought matters to a head was the fact that the con- 
 stitution which was about to be adopted eliminated the military 
 governors or tuchuns of the provinces, ajid restored the supre- 
 macy of civil authority which had been destroyed by Yuan Shi 
 Kai, in addition to introducing a policy of decentralization. 
 Coached by members of the so-called progressive party which 
 claimed to be constitutionalist and which had a factionalist in- 
 terest in overthrowing the revolutionaries who controlled the 
 legislative branch if not the executive, the military governors 
 demanded that the president suspend parliament and dismiss 
 the legislators. This demand was more than passively supported 
 by all the Allied diplomats in Peking with the honorable cxcep- 
 
 [36] 
 
tion of the American legation. The president weakly yielded 
 and issued an edict dispelling parliament, virtually admitting in 
 the document the illegality of his action. Less than a month 
 afterwards he was a refugee in the Dutch legation on account 
 of the farce of monarchical restoration staged by Chang Shun 
 — who at the present time is again coming to the front in the 
 north as adjutant to the plans of Chang Tso Lin, the present 
 "strong man" of China. Later, elections were held and a new 
 parliament elected. This parliament has been functioning as 
 the legislature of China at Peking and elected the president, 
 Hsu Shi Chang, the head of the government recognized by the 
 foreign Powers — in short it is the Chinese government from an 
 international standpoint, the Peking government from a do- 
 mestic standpoint. 
 
 The revolutionary members of the old parliament never recog- 
 nized the legality of their dispersal, and consequently refused to 
 admit the legal status of the new parliament, called by them the 
 bogus parliament, and of the president elected by it, especially 
 as the new legislative body was not elected according to the 
 rules laid down by the constitution. Under the lead of some of 
 the old members, the old parliament, called by its opponents the 
 defunct parliament, has led an intermittent existence ever since. 
 Claiming to be the sole authentic constitutional body of China, 
 it finally elected Dr. Sun president of China and thus prepared 
 the act of the fifth of May, already reported. 
 
 Such is the technical and formal background of the present 
 southern government. Its attack upon the legality of the Peking 
 government is doubtless technically justified. But for various 
 reasons its own positive status is open to equally grave doubts. 
 The terms "bogus" and "defunct," so freely cast at each other, 
 both seem to an outsider to be justified. It is less necessary to 
 go into the reasons which appear to invalidate the position of the 
 southern parliament because of the belated character of its final 
 action. A protest which waits four years to assert itself in posi- 
 tive action is confronted not with legal technicalities but with 
 accomplished facts. In my opinion, legality for legality, the 
 southern government has a bare shade the better of the technical 
 argument. But in the face of a government which has foreign 
 recognition and which has maintained itself after a fashion for 
 four years, a legal shadow is a precarious poHtical basis. It is 
 
 [37] 
 
wiser to regard the southern government as a revolutionary gov- 
 ernment, which in addition to the prestige of continuing the 
 revolutionary movement of ten years ago has also a considerable 
 sentimental asset as a protest of constitutionalism against the 
 military usurpations of the Peking government. 
 
 It Is an open secret that the southern movement has not re- 
 ceived the undivided support of all the forces present in Canton 
 which are opposed to the northern government. Tang Shao Yi, 
 for example, was notable for his absence at the time of the In- 
 auguration, having found it convenient to visit the graves of 
 his ancestors at that time. The provincial governor. General 
 Chen Kwang Ming, was In favor of confining efforts to the 
 establishment of provincial autonomy and the encouragement 
 of similar movements in other provinces, looking forward to an 
 eventual federal, or confederated, government of at least all 
 the provinces south of the Yangtse. Many of his generals 
 wanted to postpone action until Kwantung province had made a 
 military alliance with the generals in the other southwestern 
 provinces, so as to be able to resist the north should the latter 
 undertake a military expedition. Others thought the technical 
 legal argument for .the new move was being overworked, and 
 while having no objections to an out and out revolutionary 
 movement against Peking, thought that the time for it had not 
 yet come. They are counting on Chang Tso Lin's attempting 
 a monarchical restoration and think that the popular revulsion 
 against that move would create the opportune time for such a 
 movement as has now been prematurely undertaken. However 
 in spite of reports of open strife freely circulated by British and 
 Peking government newspapers, most of the opposition elements 
 are now loyally suppressing their opposition and supporting the 
 government of Sun Yat Sen. A compromise has been arranged 
 by which the federal government will confine its attention to 
 foreign affairs, leaving provincial matters wholly in the hands 
 of Governor Chen and his adherents. There is still room for 
 friction however, especially as to the control of revenues, since 
 at present there are hardly enough funds for one administration, 
 let alone two. 
 
 [38] 
 
2. 
 
 THE members of the new southern government are 
 strikingly different in type from those one meets else- 
 where whether in Peking or the provincial capitals. 
 The latter men are literally mediaeval when they are not late 
 Roman Empire, though most of them have learned a little mod- 
 ern patter to hand out to foreigners. The former are educated 
 men, not only in the school sense and in the sense that they 
 have had some special training for their jobs, but in the sense 
 that they think the ideas and speak the language current among 
 progressive folk all over the world. They welcome inquiry and 
 talk freely of their plans, hopes and fears. I had the opportunity 
 of meeting all the men who are most influential in both the local 
 and federal governments; these conversations did not take the 
 form of interviews for publication, but I learned that there are 
 at least three angles from which the total situation is viewed. 
 
 Governor Chen has had no foreign education and speaks no 
 English. He is distinctively Chinese In his training and outlook. 
 He Is a man of force, capable of drastic methods, straight- 
 forward Intellectually and physically, of unquestioned integrity 
 and of almost Spartan life in a country where official position 
 is largely prized for the luxuries it makes possible. For example, 
 practically alone among Chinese provincial officials of the first 
 rank he has no concubines. Not only this, but he proposed to 
 the provincial assembly a measure to disenfranchise all persons 
 who have concubines. (The measure failed because it is said 
 Its passage would have deprived the majority of the assembly- 
 men of their votes.) He is by all odds the most impressive of 
 all the officials whom I have met in China. If I were to select 
 a man likely to become a national figure of the first order in the 
 future, it would be, unhesitatingly, Governor Chen. He can 
 give and also command loyalty — a fact which in Itself makes 
 him almost unique. 
 
 His views In gist are "as follows: The problem of problems 
 in China is that of real unification. Industry and education are 
 held back because of lack of stability of government, and the 
 better elem'cnts in society seclude themselves from all public 
 effort. The question is how this unification Is to be obtained. 
 In the past It has been tried by force used by strong individuals. 
 Yuan Shi Kal tried and failed; Feng Kuo Chang tried and 
 
 [39] 
 
failed; Tuan Chi Jui tried and failed. That method must be 
 surrendered. China can be unified only by the people them- 
 selves, employing not force but the methods of normal poHtical 
 evolution. The only way to engage the people in the task is to 
 decentralize the government. Futile efforts at centralization 
 must be abandoned. Peking and Canton alike must allow the 
 provinces the maximum of autonomy; the provincial capitals 
 must give as much authority as possible to the districts, and the 
 districts to the communities. Officials must be chosen by and 
 from the local districts and everything must be done to encour- 
 age local initiative. Governor Chen's chief ambition is to in- 
 troduce this system into Kwantung province. He beheves that 
 other provinces will follow as soon as the method has been de- 
 monstrated, and that national unity will then be a pyramid built 
 out of the local blocks. 
 
 With extreme self-government in administrative matters, 
 Governor Chen will endeavor to enforce a policy of centralized 
 economic control. He says in effect that the west has developed 
 economic anarchy along with political control, with the result 
 of capitalistic domination and class struggle. He wishes to avert 
 this consequence in China by having government control from 
 the first of all basic raw materials and all basic industries, mines, 
 transportation, factories for cement, steel, etc. In this way the 
 provincial authorities hope to secure an equable industrial 
 development of the province, while at the same time procuring 
 ample revenues without resorting to heavy taxation. Since al- 
 most all the other governors in China are using their power, in 
 combination with the exploiting capitalists native and foreign, 
 to monopolize the natural resources of their provinces for priv- 
 ate profit, it is not surprising that Governor Chen's views are 
 felt to be la menace to privilege and that he is advertised 
 all over China as a devout Bolshevist. His views have 
 special point in view of British efforts to get an economic 
 stranglehold upon the province — efforts which are dealt with 
 in a prior chapter. 
 
 Another type of views lays chief stress upon the internal polit- 
 ical condition of China. Its adherents say in effect: Why make 
 such a fuss about having two governments for China, when, in 
 point of fact, China is torn into dozens of governments? In the 
 north, war is sure to break out sooner or later between Chang 
 
 [40] 
 
Tso Lin and his rivals. Each military governor is afraid of his 
 division generals. The brigade generals intrigue against the 
 division leaders, and even colonels are doing all they can to 
 further their personal power. The Peking government is a 
 stuffed sham, taking orders from the military governors of the 
 provinces, living only on account of jealousies among these gen- 
 erals, and by the grace of foreign diplomatic support. It is 
 actually bankrupt, and this actual state will soon be formally 
 recognized. The thing for us to do is to go ahead, maintain 
 in good faith the work of the revolution, give this province the 
 best possible civil administration; then in the inevitable ap- 
 proaching debacle, the southern government will be ready to 
 serve as the nucleus of a genuine reconstruction. Meantime we 
 want, if not the formal recognition of foreign governments, at 
 least their benevolent neutrality. 
 
 Dr. Sun still embodies in himself the spirit of the revolution 
 of 191 1. So far as that was not anti-Manchu it was In essence 
 nationalistic, and only accidentally republican. The day after 
 the inauguration of Dr. Sun, a memorial was dedicated to the 
 seventy-two patriot heroes who fell In an abortive attempt in 
 Canton to throw off the Manchu yoke, some six months before 
 the successful revolt. The monument is the most instructive 
 single lesson which I have seen In the political history of the 
 revolution. It is composed of seventy-two granite blocks. Upon 
 each is engraved: Given by the Chinese National League of 
 Jersey City, or Melbourne, or Mexico, or Liverpool, or Singa- 
 pore, etc. Chinese nationalism is a product of Chinese migra- 
 tion to foreign countries; Chinese nationalism on foreign shores 
 financed the revolution, and largely furnished its leaders and 
 provided its organization. Sun Yat Sen was the incarnation 
 of this nationalism, which was more concerned with freeing 
 China — and Asia — from all foreign domination than with 
 particular political problems. And In spite of the movement of 
 events since that day, he remains essentially at that stage, being 
 closer in spirit to the nationalists of the European irredentist 
 type than to the spirit of contemporary young China. A convinced 
 republican, he nevertheless measures events and men in the 
 concrete by what he thinks they will do to promote the in- 
 dependence of China from foreign control, rather than by what 
 they will do to promote a truly democratic government. This 
 
 [41] 
 
is the sole explanation that can be given for his unfortunate 
 coquetting a year ago with the leaders of the now fallen Anfu 
 Club. He allowed himself to be deceived into thinking that 
 they were ready to turn against the Japanese if he would give 
 them his support; and his nationaUst imagination was inflamed 
 by the grandiose schemes of little Hsu for the Chinese subjuga- 
 tion of Mongolia. 
 
 More openly than others, Dr. Sun admits and justifies the 
 new southern government as representing a division of China. 
 If, he insists, it had not been for the secession of the south in 
 19 17, Japan would now be in virtually complete control of all 
 China. A unified China would have meant a China ready to 
 be swallowed whole by Japan. The secession localized Japanese 
 aggressions, made it evident -that the south would" fightt^rather 
 than be devoured, and gave a breathing spell in which public 
 opinion in the north rallied against the Twenty-one Demands 
 and against the military pact with Japan. Thus it saved the in- 
 dependence of China. But, while it checked^ Japan, it did not 
 checkmate her. She still expects with the assistance of Chang 
 Tso Lin to make northern China her vass^al. The support which 
 foreign governments in general and the United States in par- 
 ticular are giving Peking is merely playing into the hands of the 
 Japanese. The independent south affords the only obstacle 
 which causes Japan to pause in her plan of making northern 
 China in effect a Japanese province. A more than usually au- 
 thentic rumor says that upon the occasion of the visit of the 
 Japanese consul general to the new president (no other foreign 
 official has made an official visit), the former offered from his 
 government the official recognition of Dr. Sun as president of 
 all China, if the latter would recognize the Twenty-one De- 
 mands as an accomplished fact. From the Japanese standpoint 
 the offer was a safe one, as this acceptance of Japanese claims 
 is the one thing impossible to the new government. But mean- 
 time the offer naturally confirms the nationalists of Dr. Sun's 
 type in their belief that the southern split is the key to maintain- 
 ing the political independence of China; or, as Dr. Sun puts it, 
 that a divided China is for the time being the only means to an 
 ultimately independent China. 
 
 These views are not given as stating the whole truth of the 
 situation. They are ex parte. But they are given as setting 
 
 [42] 
 
 I 
 
forth in good faith the conceptions of the leaders of the south- 
 ern movement and as requiring serious attention if the situation 
 of China, domestic and international, is to be understood. Upon 
 my own account, and not simply as expressing the views of 
 others, I have reached a conclusion quite foreign to my thought 
 before I visited the south. While it is not possible to attach 
 too much importance to the unity of China as a part of the 
 foreign policy of the United States, it is possible to attach al- 
 together too much importance to the Peking government as a 
 symbol of that unity. To borrow and adapt the words of one 
 southern leader, while the United States can hardly be expected 
 to do other than recognize the Peking as the de facto govern- 
 ment, there is no need to coddle that government and give it 
 face. Such a course maintains a nominal and formal unity while 
 in fact encouraging the military and corrupt forces that keep 
 China divided and which make for foreign aggression. 
 
 In my opinion as the outcome of two years' observation of 
 the Chinese situation, the real interests of both China and the 
 United States would be served if, in the first place, the United 
 States should take the lead in securing from the diplomatic body 
 in Peking the serving of express notice upon the Peking govern- 
 ment that in no case would a restoration of the monarchy be 
 recognized by the Powers. This may seem in America like an 
 unwarranted intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign 
 country. But in fact such intervention is already a fact. The 
 present government endures only in virtue of the support of 
 foreign Powers. The notice would put an end to one kind of 
 Intrigue, one kind of rumor and suspicion, which Is holding in- 
 dustry and education back and which Is keeping China In a state 
 of unrest and Instability. It would establish a period of com- 
 parative quiet in which whatever constructive forces exist may 
 come to the front. The second measure would be more extreme. 
 The diplomacy of the United States should take the lead In 
 making It clear that unless the promises about the disbanding 
 of the army, and the Introduction of general retrenchment are 
 honestly and Immediately carried out, the Powers will pursue 
 a harsh rather than a benevolent policy toward the Peking gov- 
 ernment, Inslstlrig upon Immediate payment of Interest and loans 
 as they fall due and holding up the government to the strictest 
 meeting of all Its obligations. The notification to be effective 
 
 [43] 
 
might well include a virtual threat of withdrawal of recognition 
 in case the government does not seriously try to put its profuse 
 promises into execution. It should also include a definite dis- 
 couragement of any expenditures designed for military conquest 
 of the south. 
 
 Diplomatic recognition of the southern government is out of 
 the question at present. It is not out of the question to put on 
 the financial screws so that the southern government will be al- 
 lowed space and time to demonstrate what it can do by peaceful 
 means to give one or more provinces a decent, honest and pro- 
 gressive civil administration. It is unnecessary to enumerate 
 the obstacles in the way of carrying out such a policy. But in 
 my judgment it is the only policy by which the Great Powers 
 will not become accomplices in perpetuating the weakness and 
 division of China. It is the most straightforward way of meet- 
 ing whatever plans of aggression Japan may entertain. 
 
 May, 1 92 1. 
 
 VI 
 
 Federalism in China 
 
 ^' I ^ HE newcomer in China in observing and judging events 
 E usually makes the mistake of attaching too much sig- 
 JL nificance to current happenings. Occurrences take 
 place which in the western world would portend important 
 changes — and nothing important results. It is not easy to loosen 
 the habit of years; and so the visitor assumes that an event 
 which is striking to the point of sensationalism must surely be 
 part of a train of events having a definite trend ; some deep-laid 
 plan must be behind it. It takes a degree of intellectual patience 
 added to time and experience to make one realize that even 
 when there is a rhythm in events the tempo is so retarded that 
 one must wait a long time to judge what is really going on. 
 Most political events are like daily changes in the weather, 
 fluctuations back and forth which may seriously affect individ- 
 uals but which taken one by one tell little about the movement 
 of the seasons. Even the occurrences which are due to human 
 
 [44] 
 
Intention are usually sporadic and casual, and the observer errs 
 by reading into them too much plot, too comprehenlsve a scheme, 
 too farsighted a plan. The aim behind the event Is likely to 
 be only some Immediate advantage, some direct increase of 
 power, the overthrow of a rival, the grasping at greater wealth 
 by an Isolated act, without any consecutive or systematic looking 
 ahead. 
 
 Foreigners are not the only ones who have erred, however, 
 In judging the Chinese political situation of the last few years. 
 Beginning two years ago, one heard experienced Chinese with 
 political affiliations saying that it was Impossible for things to 
 go on as they were for more than three months longer. Some 
 decisive change must occur. Yet outwardly the situation has 
 remained much the same not only for three months but for two 
 years, the exception being the overthrow of the Anfu faction a 
 year ago. And this occurrence hardly marked a definite turn in 
 events, as it was, to a considerable extent, only a shifting of 
 power from the hands of one set of tuchuns to another set. 
 Nevertheless at the risk of becoming a victim of the fallacy 
 which I have been setting forth, 1 will hazard the remark that 
 the last few months have revealed a definite and enduring trend — 
 that through the diurnal fluctuations of the strife for personal 
 power and wealth a seasonal political change in society Is now 
 showing Itself. Certain lines of cleavage seem to show them- 
 selves, so that through the welter of striking, picturesque, sen- 
 sational but meaningless events, a definite pattern Is revealed. 
 
 This pattern is indicated by the title of this chapter — a move- 
 ment toward the development of a federal form of government. 
 In calling the movement one toward federalism, there is, how- 
 ever, more of a jump Into the remote future than circumstances 
 justify. It would be more accurate, as well as more modest, to 
 say that thercTs a well defined and seemingly permanent trend 
 toward provincial autonomy and local self-government accom- 
 panied by a hope and a vague plan that In the future the more 
 or less Independent units will recombine into the United or 
 Federated States of China. Some who look far into the future 
 anticipate three stages; the first being the completion of the 
 present secessionist movement; the second the formation of 
 northern and southern confederations respectively; the third a 
 reunion into a single state. 
 
 [45] 
 
To go into the detailed evidence for the existence of a definite 
 and lasting movement of this sort would presume too much on 
 the reader's knowledge of Chinese geography and his acquaint- 
 ance with specific recent events. I shall confine myself to quite 
 general features of the situation. The first feature is the new 
 phase which has been assumed by the long historic antagonism 
 of the north and the south. Roughly speaking, the revolution 
 which established the republic and overthrew the Manchus rep- 
 resented a victory for the south. But the transformation during 
 the last five years of the nominal republic into a corrupt oligarchy 
 of satraps or military governors or feudal lords has represented 
 a victory for the north. It is a significant fact, symbolically at 
 least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun or military 
 governor in China — in some respects the only powerful one who 
 has survived the vicissitudes of the last few years — namely Chang 
 Tso Lin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian prov- 
 inces. The so-called civil war of the north and south is not, 
 however, to be understood as a conflict of repubhcanism located 
 in the south and militarism in the north. Such a notion is directly 
 contrary to facts. The "civil war" till six or eight months ago 
 was mainly a conflict of military governors and factions, part 
 of that struggle for personal power and wealth which has been 
 going on all over China. 
 
 But recently events have taken a different course. In four of 
 the southern provinces, tuchuns who seemed all powerful have 
 toppled over, and the provinces have proclaimed or tacitly as- 
 sumed their independence of both the Peking and the former 
 military Canton governments — the province in which Canton 
 situated being one of the four. I happened to be in Hunan, the 
 first of the southerly provinces to get comparative independ- 
 ence, last fall, not long after the overthrow of the vicious despot 
 who had ruled the province with the aid of northern troops. 
 For a week a series of meetings were held in Changsha, the 
 capital of the province. The burden of every speech was "Hunan 
 for the Hunanese." The slogan embodies the spirit of two 
 powers each aiming at becoming the central authority; it is a 
 conflict of the principle of provincial autonomy, represented by 
 the politically more mature south, with that of militaristic cen- 
 tralization, represented by Peking. 
 
 As I write, in early September (1921), the immediate issue is 
 
 [46] 
 
obscured by the fight which Wu Pei Fu is waging with the Hunan- 
 ese who with nominal independence are in aim and interest alhed 
 with the south. If, as is likely, Wu Pei Fu wins, he may take 
 one of two courses. He may use his added power to turn against 
 Chang Tso Lin and the northern militarists which will bring 
 him into virtual alliance with the southerners and establish him 
 as the antagonist of the federal principle. This is the course 
 which his earlier record would call for. Or he may yield to the 
 usual official lust for power and money and try once more the 
 Yuan Shi Kai policy of mihtary centralization with himself as 
 head, after trying out conclusions with Chang Tso Lin as his 
 rival. This is the course which the past record of military 
 leaders Indicates. But even if Wu Pei Fu follows precedent 
 and goes bad, he will only hasten his own final end. This is not 
 prophecy. It is only a statement of what has uniformly hap- 
 pened In China just at the moment a military leader seemed to 
 have complete power in his grasp. In other words, a victory 
 for Wu Pei Fu may either accelerate or may retard the develop- 
 ment of provincial autonomy according to the course he pursues. 
 It cannot permanently prevent or deflect it. 
 
 The basic factor that makes one sure that this trend toward 
 local autonomy Is a reality and not merely one of those meaning- 
 less shif tings of power which confuse the observer. Is that It Is 
 In accord with Chinese temperament, tradition and circumstance. 
 Feudalism Is past and gone two thousand year ago, and at no 
 period since has China possessed a working centralized govern- 
 ment. The absolute empires which have come and gone in the 
 last two millenniums existed by virtue of non-interference and a 
 religious aura. The latter can never be restored; and every 
 episode of the repuoiic demonstrates that China with Its vast 
 and diversified territories. Its population of between three hun- 
 dred and fifty and four hundred million, Its multitude of lan- 
 guages and lack of communications. Its enormous local attach- 
 ments sanctified by the family system and ancestral worship, 
 cannot be managed from a single and remote centre. China 
 rests upon a network of local and voluntary associations cement- 
 ed by custom. This fact has given it its unparallelled stability 
 and Its power to progress even under the disturbed political con- 
 ditions of the past ten years. I sometimes think that Americans 
 with their own traditional contempt for politics and their spon- 
 
 [47] 
 
taneous reliance upon self-help and local organization are the 
 ones who are naturally fitted to understand China's course. 
 The Japanese with their ingrained reliance upon the state have 
 continually misjudged and misacted. The British understand 
 better than we do the significance of local self-government; but 
 they are misled by their reverence for politics so that they can- 
 not readily find or see government when it does not take political 
 form. 
 
 It is not too much to say that one great cause for the over- 
 throw of the Manchus was the fact that because of the pressure 
 of international relations they attempted to force, especially in 
 fiscal matters, a centralization upon the provinces v/holly for- 
 eign to the spirit of the people. This created hostility where 
 before there had been indifference. China may possibly not 
 emerge from her troubles a unified nation, any more than a 
 much smaller and less populous Europe emerged from the break- 
 up of the Holy Rom.an Empire, a single state. Indeed one often 
 wonders, not that China is divided, but that she is not much 
 more broken up than she is. But one thing is certain. What- 
 ever progress China finally succeeds in making will come from 
 a variety of local centres, not from Peking or Canton. It will 
 be effected by means of associations and organizations which 
 even though they assume a political form are not primarily 
 political in nature. 
 
 Criticisms are passed, especially by foreigners, upon the pres- 
 ent trend of events. The criticisms are more than plausible. 
 It is evident that the present weakness of China is due to her 
 divided condition. Hence it is natural to argue that the present 
 movement being one of secession and general disintegration will 
 increase the weakness of the country. It is also evident that 
 many of China's troubles are due to the absence of any efficient 
 administrative system; it is reasonable to argue that China 
 cannot get even railways and universal education without a 
 strong and stable central government. There is no doubt about 
 the facts. It is not surprising that many friends of China deeply 
 deplore the present tendency while some regard it as the final 
 accomplishment of the long predicted breakup of China. But 
 remedies for China's ills based upon ignoring history, psychology 
 and actual conditions are so Utopian that it is not worth while 
 to argue whether or not they are theoretically desirable. The 
 
 [48] 
 
remedy of China's troubles by a strong, centralized government 
 Is on a par with curing disease by the expulsion of a devil. The evil 
 of sectionalism is real, but since it is real it cannot be dealt with by 
 trying a method which implies its non-existence. If the devil is 
 really there, he will not be exorcized by a formula. If the trouble 
 is internal, not due to an external demon, the disease can be cured 
 only by using the factors of health and vigor which the patient 
 already possesses. And in China while these factors of recuper- 
 ation and growth are numerous, they all exist in connection with 
 local organizations and voluntary associations. The increasing 
 volume of the cry that the "tuchuns must go" comes from the 
 provincial and local interests which have been insulted and violat- 
 ed by a nominally centralized but actually chaotic situation. After 
 this negative work is completed, the constructive rebuilding of 
 China can proceed only by utilizing local interests and abilities. 
 In China the movement will be the opposite of that which oc- 
 curred in Japan. It will be from the periphery to the centre. 
 
 Another objection to the present tendency has force especially 
 from the foreign standpoint. As already stated, the efforts of 
 the Manchu dynasty in its latter days to enhance central power 
 were due to international pressure. Foreign nations treated 
 Peking as if it were a capital like London, Paris or Berlin, and 
 in its efforts to meet foreign demands It had to try to become 
 such a centre. The result was disaster. But foreign nations still 
 want to have a single centre which may be held responsible. 
 And subconsciously, if not consciously, this desire is responsible 
 for much of the objection of foreign nationals to the local 
 autonomy movement. They well know that It Is going to take a 
 long time to realize the ideal of federation, and meantime where 
 and what Is to be the agency responsible for diplomatic relations, 
 the enforcing of Indemnities and the securing of concessions? 
 
 In one respect the secessionist tendency is dangerous to China 
 herself as well as inconvenient to the powers. It will readily 
 stimulate the desire and ability of foreign nations to Interfere 
 In China's domestic affairs. There will be many centres at 
 which to carry on Intrigues and from which to get concessions 
 Instead of one or two. There Is also danger that one foreign 
 nation may line up with one group of provinces, and another 
 foreign nation with another group, so that international friction 
 will Increase. Even now some Japanese sources and even such 
 
 [49] 
 
an independent liberal paper as Robert Young'^s Japan Chronicle 
 are starting or reporting the rumor that the Cantonese experi- 
 ment is supported by subsidies supplied by American capitalists 
 in the hope of economic concessions. The rumor was invented 
 for a sinister purpose. But it illustrates the sort of situation 
 that may come into existence if there are several political centres 
 in China and one foreign nation backs one and another nation, 
 another. 
 
 The danger is real enough. But it cannot be dealt with by 
 attempting the impossible — namely checking the movement to- 
 ward local autonomy, even though disintegration ma*y tem- 
 porarily accompany it. The danger only emphasizes the funda- 
 mental fact of the whole Chinese situation; that its essence is 
 time. The evils and troubles of China are real enough, and 
 there is no blinking the fact that they are largely of her own 
 making, due to corruption, inefficiency and absence of popular 
 education. But no one who knows the common people doubts 
 that they will win through if they are given time. And in the 
 concrete this means that they be left politically alone to work out 
 their own destiny. There will doubtless be proposals at the Pacific 
 Conference to place China under some kind of international 
 tutelage. This chapter and the events connected with the tend- 
 ency which it reports will be cited as showing this need. Some 
 of the schemes will spring from motives that are hostile to 
 China. Some will be benevolently conceived in a desire to save 
 China from herself and shorten her period of chaos and con- 
 fusion. But the hope of the world's peace, as well as of China's 
 freedom, lies in adhering to a policy of Hands Off . Give China 
 a chance. Give her time. The danger lies in being in a hurry, 
 in impatience, possibly in the desire of America to show that 
 we are a power in international affairs and that we too have a 
 positive foreign policy. And a benevolent policy of supporting 
 China from without, instead of promoting her aspirations from 
 within, may in the end do China about as much harm as a policy 
 conceived in malevolence. 
 
 July, 192 1. 
 
 [50] 
 
yn 
 A Parting of the Ways for America 
 
 1 
 
 ■^HE realities of American policy in China and toward 
 China are going to be more seriously tested in the fu- 
 ture than they ever have been in the past. Japanese 
 papers have been full of protests against any attempt by the 
 Pacific Conference to place Japan on trial. Would that Ameri- 
 can journals were full of warnings that America is on trial at 
 the Conference as to the sincerity and intelligent goodwill behind 
 her amiable professions. The world will not stop with the 
 Pacific Conference; the latter, however important, will not arrest 
 future developments, and the United States will continue to be 
 on trial till she has established by her acts a permanent and 
 definite attitude. For the realities of the situation cannot be ex- 
 hausted in any formula or in any set of diplomatic agreements, 
 even if the Conference confounds the fears of pessimists and 
 results in a harmonious union of the powers in support of China's 
 legitimate aspirations for free political and economic growth. 
 
 The Conference, however, stands as a symbol of the larger 
 situation; and its decisions or lack of them will be a considerable 
 factor in the determination of subsequent events. Sometimes 
 one is obliged to fall back on a trite phrase. We are genuinely 
 at a parting of the ways. Even if we should follow in our old 
 path, there would none the less be a parting of the ways, for 
 we cannot consistently tread the old path unless we are ani- 
 mated by a much more conscious purpose and a more general 
 and intelligent knowledge of affairs than have controlled our 
 activities in the past. 
 
 The ideas expressed by an English correspondent about the 
 fear that America is soon to be an active source of danger in 
 the Far East are not confined to persons on foreign shores. The 
 prevailing attitude in some circles of American opinion is that 
 called by President Hibben cynical pessimism. All professed 
 radicals and many liberals believe that if our course has been 
 better in the past it has been due to geographical accidents com- 
 bined with indifference and with our undeveloped economic status. 
 Consequently they believe that since we have now become what is 
 
 [51] 
 
called a world-power and a nation which exports instead of im- 
 porting capital, our course will soon be as bad as that of any of 
 the rest of them. In some quarters this opinion is clearly an 
 emotional reaction following the disillusionments of Versailles. 
 In others, it is due to adherence to a formula : nothing in inter- 
 national affairs can come out of capitalism and America is em- 
 phatically a capitalistic country. Whether or not these feelings 
 are correct, they are not discussable ; neither an emotion nor an 
 absolute formula is subject to analysis. 
 
 But there are specific elements in the situation which give 
 grounds for apprehension as to the future. These specific ele- 
 ments are capable of detection and analysis. An adequate reali- 
 zation of their nature will be a large factor in preventing cynical 
 apprehensions from becoming actual. This chapter Is an attempt 
 at a preliminary listing, inadequate, of course, as any preliminary 
 examination must be. While an a priori argument based on a 
 fatalistic formula as to how a "capitalistic nation" must conduct 
 itself does not appeal to me, there are nevertheless concrete facts 
 which are suggested by that formula. Part of our comparatively 
 better course in China In the past is due to the fact that we have 
 not had the continuous and close alliance between the State 
 Department and big banking interests which is found in the 
 case of foreign powers. No honest well-informed history of 
 developments In China could be written in which the Russian 
 Asiatic Bank, the Foreign Bank of Belgium, the French Indo- 
 China Bank and Banque Industrielle, the Yokohama Specie 
 Bank, the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank, etc., did not figure promi- 
 nently. These banks work in the closest harmony, not only with 
 railway and construction syndicates and big manufacturing In- 
 terests at home, but also with their respective foreign oflices. 
 It is hardly too much to say that legations and banks have been 
 In most important matters the right and left hands of the same 
 body. American business interests have complained in the past 
 that the American government does not give to American trad- 
 ers abroad the same support that the nationals of other states 
 receive. In the past these complaints have centred largely about 
 actual wrongs suffered or helieved to have been suffered by 
 American business undertakings carried on In a foreign country. 
 With the present expansion of capital and of commerce, the 
 same complaints and demands are going to be made not with 
 
 [52] 
 
reference to grievances suffered, but with reference to further- 
 ing, to pushing American commercial interests in connection 
 with large banking groups. It would take a credulous person 
 to deny the influence of big business in domestic politics. As 
 we become more interested in commerce and banking enterprises 
 what assurance have we that the alliance will not be transferred 
 to international politics? 
 
 It should be noted that the policy of the open door as affirmed 
 by the great powers — and as frequently violated by them — 
 even if it be henceforth observed in good faith, does not ade- 
 quately protect us from this danger. The open door policy is 
 not primarily a policy about China herself but rather about the 
 policies of foreign powers toward one another with respect to 
 China. It demands equality of economic opportunity for dif- 
 ferent nations. Were it enforced, it would prevent the granting 
 of monopolies to any one nation : there is nothing in it to render 
 impossible a conjoint exploitation of China by foreign powers, 
 an organized monopoly in which each nation has its due share 
 with respect to others. Such an organization might conceivably 
 reduce friction among the great powers, and thereby reduce the 
 danger of future wars — as long as China herself is impotent 
 to go to war. The agreement might conceivably for a consid- 
 erable time be of benefit to China herself. But it is clear that 
 for the United States to become a partner in any such arrange- 
 ment would involve a reversal of our historic policy in the Far 
 East. It might be technically consistent with the open door 
 policy, but it would be a violation of the larger sense in which 
 the American people has understood and praised that ideal. He 
 is blind who does not see that there are forces making for such 
 a reversal. And since we are all more or less blind, an opening 
 of our eyes to the danger is one of the conditions of its not be- 
 ing realized. 
 
 One of the forces which is operative is indicated by the phrase 
 that an international agreement on an economic and financial 
 basis might be of value to China herself. The mere suggestion 
 that such a thing is possible is abhorrent to many, especially to 
 radicals. There seems to be something sinister In it. So it is 
 worth explaining how and why it might be so. In the first place, 
 it would obviously terminate the particularistic grabbing for 
 "leased" territory, concessions and spheres of influence which 
 
 [53] 
 
has so damaged China. At the present time, the point of this 
 remark lies in its implied reference to Japan, as at one time it 
 might have applied to Russia. Fear of Japan's aims in China 
 is not confined to China; the fear is widespread. An interna- 
 tional economic arrangement may therefore be plausibly present- 
 ed as the easiest and most direct method of relieving China of 
 the Japanese menace. For Japan to stay out would be to give 
 herself away; if she came in, it would subject Japanese activities 
 to constant scrutiny and control. There is no doubt that part 
 of the fear of Japan regarding the Pacific Conference is due 
 to a belief that some such arrangement is contemplated. The 
 case is easily capable of such presentation as to make it appeal 
 to Americans who are really friendly to China and who haven't 
 the remotest interest in her economic exploitation. 
 
 The arrangement would, for example, automatically eliminate 
 the Lansing-Ishii agreement with its embarrassing ambiguous 
 recognition of Japan's special interests in China. 
 
 The other factor is domestic. The distraction and civil wars 
 of China are commonplaces. So is the power exercised by the 
 military governors and generals. The greater one's knowledge, 
 the more one perceives how intimately the former evil is de- 
 pendent upon the latter. The financial plight of the Chinese 
 government, its continual foreign borrowings which threaten 
 bankruptcy in the near future, depend upon militaristic domina- 
 tion and wild expenditure for unproductive purposes and 
 squeeze. Without this expense, China would have no great 
 difficulty henceforth in maintaining a balance in her budget. The 
 retardation of public education whose advancement — especially 
 in elementary schools — is China's greatest single need is due to 
 the same cause. So is the growth in official corruption which is 
 rapidly extending into business and private life. 
 
 In fact, every one of the obstacles to' the progress of China 
 is connected with the rule of military factions and their struggles 
 with one another for complete mastery. An economic interna- 
 tional agreement among the great powers can be made which 
 would surely reduce and possibly eliminate the greatest evils 
 of "militarism." Many liberal Chinese say in private that they 
 would be willing to have a temporary international receivership 
 for government finance, provided they could be assured of its 
 nature and the exact date and conditions of its termination — 
 
 [54] 
 
a proviso which they are sensible enough to recognize would be 
 extremely difficult of attainment. American leadership in form- 
 ing and executing any such scheme would, they feel, afford the 
 best reassurance as to its nature and terms. Under such cir- 
 cumstances a plausible case can be made out for proposals which, 
 under the guise of traditional American friendship for China, 
 would in fact commit us to a reversal of our historic policy. 
 
 There are radicals abroad and at home who think that our 
 entrance into a Consortium already proves that we have entered 
 upon the road of reversal and who naturally see in the Pacific 
 Conference the next logical step. I have previously stated my 
 own belief that our State Department proposed the Consortium 
 primarily for political ends, as a means of checking the pohcy 
 pursued by Japan of making unproductive loans to China m 
 return for which she was getting an immediate grip on China s 
 natural resources and preparing the way for direct admimstra- 
 tive and financial control when the day of reckomng and fore- 
 closure should finally come, I also said that the Consortium 
 was between two stools, the financial and the political and that 
 up to the present its chief value had been negative and prevent- 
 ive, and that jealousy or lack of interest by Japan and Great 
 Britain in any constructive policy on the part of the Consortium 
 was likely to maintain the same condition. I have seen no reason 
 thus far to change my mind on this point, nor in regard to the 
 further belief that probably the interests of China in the end 
 will be best served by the continuation of this deterrent function. 
 But the question is bound to arise: why continue the Consortium 
 if it isn't doing anything? The pressure of foreign powers in- 
 terested in the exploitation of China and of impatient American 
 economic interests may combine to put an end to the present 
 rather otiose existence led by the Consortium. The two stools 
 between which the past action of the American government has 
 managed to swing the Consortium may be united to form a sin- 
 gle solid bench. 
 "At the risk of being charged with credulous guUibdity, or 
 something worse, I add that up to the present time the Amen- 
 can phase of the Consortium hasn't shown perceptible signs of 
 becoming a club exercised by American finance over Chma s 
 economic integrity and independence. I believe the repeated 
 statements of the American representative that he himself and 
 
 [55l 
 
the interests he represents would be glad if China proved her 
 ability to finance her own public utilities without resorting to 
 foreign loans. This belief is confirmed by the first public ut- 
 terance of the new American minister to China who in his ref- 
 erence to the Consortium laid emphasis upon its deterrent func- 
 tion and upon the stimulation it has given to Chinese bankers 
 to finance public utilities. And it is the merest justice to Mr. 
 Stevens, the American representative, to say that he represents 
 the conservative investment type of banker, not the "promotion" 
 type, and that thus far his great concern has been the problem 
 of protecting the buyer of such securities as are passed on by 
 the banks to the ultimate investor — so much so that he has 
 aroused criticism from American business interests impatient 
 for speedy action. But there is a larger phase of the Consor- 
 tium concerning which I think apprehensions may reasonably 
 be entertained. 
 
 Suppose, if merely by way of hypothesis, that the American 
 government is genuinely interested in China and in making the 
 policy of the open door and Chinese territorial and administra- 
 tive integrity a reality, not merely a name, and suppose that it 
 is interested in doing so from an American self-interest sufficient- 
 ly enlightened to perceive that the political and economic ad- 
 vancement of the United States is 'best furthered by a policy 
 which is identical with China's ability to develop herself freely 
 and independently: what then would be the wise American 
 course? In short, it would be to view our existing European 
 interests and issues (due to the war) and our Far Eastern in- 
 terests and issues as parts of one and the same problem. If 
 we are actuated by the motive hypothetically imputed to our 
 government and we fail in its realization, the chief reason will 
 be that we regard the European question and the Asiatic prob- 
 lem as two different questions, or because we identify them from 
 the wrong end. 
 
 Our present financial interest in Europe is enormous. It in- 
 volves not merely foreign governmental loans but a multitude 
 of private advances and commitments. These financial entan- 
 glements affect not merely our industry and commerce but our 
 politics. They involve much more immediately pressing con- 
 cerns than to our Asiatic relations, and they involve billions 
 where the latter involve millions. The danger under such con- 
 
 [56] 
 
ditlons that our Asiatic relations will <be sacrificed to our Euro- 
 pean is hardly fanciful. 
 
 To make this abstract statement concrete, the firm of bankers, 
 J. P. Morgan & Co., which is most heavily involved in European 
 indebtedness to the United States, is the firm which is the lead- 
 ing spirit in the Consortium for China. It seems almost inevi- 
 table that the Asiatic problem should look like small potatoes 
 in comparison with the European one, especially as our own in- 
 dustrial recuperation is so closely connected with European re- 
 lations, while the Far East cuts a negligible figure. To my mind 
 the real danger to set out upon selfish exploitation of China : 
 intelligent self-interest, tradition and the fact that our chief asset 
 in China is our past freedom from a predatory course, dictate 
 a course of cooperation with China. The danger is that China 
 will be subordinated and sacrificed because of primary preoccu- 
 pation with the high finance and politics of Europe, that she will 
 be lost in the shufile. 
 
 The European aspect of the problem can be made more con- 
 crete by reference to Great Britain in particular. That country 
 suffers from the embarrassment of the Japanese alliance. She 
 has already made it sufficiently clear that she would like to 
 draw America into the alliance, making it tripartite, since that 
 would be the easiest way of maintaining good relations with 
 both Japan and the United States. There is no likelihood that 
 any such step will be consummated. But British diplomacy is 
 experienced and astute. And by force of circumstances our 
 high finance has contracted a sort of economic alliance with 
 Great Britain. There is no wish to claim superior virtue for 
 America or to appeal to the strong current of anti-British sen- 
 timent. But the British foreign office exists and operates apart 
 from the tradition of liberalism which has mainly actuated Eng- 
 lish domestic politics. It stands peculiarly for the Empire side 
 of the British Empire, no matter what party is in the saddle 
 in domestic affairs. Every resource will be employed to bring 
 about a settlement at the Pacific Conference which, even though 
 it includes some degree of compromise on the part of Great 
 Britain, will bend the Asiatic policy of the United States to the 
 British traditions in the Far East, instead of committing Great 
 Britain to combining with the United States in making a reality 
 of the integrity of China to which both countries are nominally 
 
 [57] 
 
committed. It does not seem an extreme statement to say that 
 the immediate issues of the Conference depend upon the way 
 in which our financial commitments in Europe are treated, either 
 as reasons for our making concessions to European policy or 
 on the other hand as a means of securing an adherence of the 
 European powers to the traditional American policy. 
 
 A publicist in China who is of British origin and a sincere 
 friend of China remarked in private conversation that if the 
 United States could not secure the adherence of Great Britain 
 to her Asiatic policy by persuasion (he was deploring the Japan- 
 ese alliance) she might do so by buying it — through remission 
 of her national debt to us. It is not necessary to resort to the 
 measure so baldly suggested. But the remark at least suggests 
 that our involvement in European, especially British, finance and 
 politics may be treated in either of two ways for either of two 
 results. 
 
 THAT the Chinese people generally speaking has a less 
 antagonistic feeling toward the United States than to- 
 wards other powers seems to me an undoubted fact. 
 The feeling has been disturbed at divers times by the treatment 
 of the Chinese upon the Pacific coast, by the exclusion act, by 
 the turning over of our interest in the building of the Peking- 
 Canton (or Hankow) railway to a European group, by the 
 Lansing-Ishii agreement, and finally by the part played by 
 President Wilson in the Versailles decision regarding Shantung. 
 Those disturbances in the main, however, have made them dubi- 
 ous as to our skill, energy and intelligence rather than as to our 
 good-will. Americans, taken individually and collectively, are 
 to the Chinese — at least such was my impression — a rather sim- 
 ple folk, taking the word in its good and its deprecatory sense. 
 In noting the Chinese reaction to the proposed Pacific Confer- 
 ence, it was interesting to see the combination of an almost un- 
 limited hope that the United States was to lead in protecting 
 them from further aggressions and in rectifying existing evils, 
 with a lack of confidence, a fear that the United States would 
 have something put over on it. 
 
 Friendly feeling is of course mainly based upon a negative 
 
 [58] 
 
fact, the fact that the United States has taken no part in "leas- 
 ing" territories, estabhshing spheres and setting up extra-na- 
 tional post-offices. On the positive side stands the contribu- 
 tion made by Americans to education, especially medical, and 
 that of girls and women, and to philanthropy and relief. Po- 
 litically, there are the early service of Burlinghame, the open 
 door policy of John Hay (though failure to maintain it in fact 
 while securing signatures to it on paper is a considerable part 
 of the Chinese belief in our defective energy) and the part 
 played by the United States in moderating the terms of the set- 
 tlement of the Boxer outbreak, in addition to a considerable 
 number of minor helpful acts. China also remembers that we 
 were the only nation to take exception to the treaties embody- 
 ing the Twenty-one Demands. While our exception was chiefly 
 made on the basis of our own interests which these treaties might 
 injuriously affect, a sentiment exists that the protest was a pledge 
 of assistance to China when the time should be opportune for 
 raising the whole question. And without doubt the reservation 
 made on May i6, 19 15, by our State Department is a strong 
 card at the forthcoming Conference if the Department wishes 
 to play it. 
 
 From an American standpoint, the open door principle rep- 
 resents one of the only two established principles of American 
 diplomacy, the other being, of course, the Monroe Doctrine. 
 In connection with sentimental or idealistic associations which 
 have clustered about it, it constitutes us in some vague fashion 
 in both the Chinese and American public opinion a sort of guar- 
 dian or at least spokesman of the interests of China in relation 
 to foreign powers. Although, as was pointed out in a former 
 chapter, the open door policy directly concerns other nations in 
 their relation to China rather than China herself, yet the viola- 
 tion of the policy by other powers has been so frequent and so 
 much to the detriment of China, that American interest, prestige 
 and moral sentiment are now implicated in such an enforcement 
 of it as will redound to the advantage of China. 
 
 Citizens of other countries are often irritated by a suggestion 
 of such a relationship between the United States and China. 
 It presents itself as a proclamation of superior national virtue 
 under cover of which the United States aims to establish its 
 influence in China at the expense of other countries. The irri- 
 
 [59] 
 
tation is exasperated by the fact that the situation as it stands 
 is an undoubted economic and political asset of the United States 
 in China. We may concede without argument any contention 
 that the situation is not due to any superior virtue but rather to 
 contingencies of history and geography — in which respect it is 
 not unlike many things that pass for virtues with individuals. 
 The contention may be admitted without controversy because it 
 is not pertinent to the main issue. The question is not so much 
 how the state of affairs came about as what it now is, how it is to 
 be treated and what consequences are in flow from it. It is 
 a fact that up to the present an intelligent self-interest of Ameri- 
 ca has coincided with the interests of a stable, independent and 
 progressive China. It is also a fact that American traditions 
 and sentiments have gathered about this consideration so that 
 now there is widespread conviction in the American people of 
 moral obligations of assistance and friendly protection owed by 
 us to China. At present, no policy can be entered upon that 
 does not bear the semblance of fairness and goodwill. We have 
 at least so much protection against the dangers discussed in the 
 prior chapter. 
 
 Among Americans in China and presumably at home there is 
 a strong feeling that we should adopt for the future stronger 
 and more positive policies than we have maintained in the past. 
 This feeling seems to me fraught with dangers unless we make 
 very clear to ourselves in just what respects we are to continue 
 and make good in a more positive manner our traditional policy. 
 To some extent our past policy has been one of drifting. Radi-. 
 cal change in this respect may go further than appears upon 
 the surface in altering other fundamental aspects of our policy. 
 What is condemned as drifting is in effect largely the same thing 
 that is also praised as non-interference. A detailed settled pol- 
 icy, no matter how "constructive" it may appear to be, can 
 hardly help involving us in the domestic policies of China, an 
 affair of factions and a game which the Chinese understand and 
 play much better than any foreigners. Such an involvement 
 would at once lessen a present large asset in China, aloofness 
 from internal intrigues and struggles. 
 
 The specific protests of Chinese in this country — mainly Can- 
 tonese — against the Consortium seem to me mainly based on 
 misapprehension. But their general attitude of opposition nev- 
 
 [60] 
 
ertheless conveys an important lesson. It is based on a belief 
 that the effect of the Consortium will be to give the Peking gov- 
 ernment a factitious advantage in the internal conflict which is 
 waging in China, so that to all intents and purposes it will mark 
 a taking of sides on our part. It is well remembered that the 
 effect of the "reorganization" loan of the prior Consortium — 
 in which the United States was not a partner — was to give 
 Yuan Shi Kai the funds which seated him and the militarist 
 faction after him, firmly in the governmental saddle. Viewing 
 the matter from a larger point of view than that of Canton vs. 
 Peking, the most fundamental objection I heard brought by 
 Chinese against the Consortium was in effect as follows : The 
 republican revolution in China has still to be wrought out; the 
 beginning of ten years ago has been arrested. It remains to 
 fight it out. The inevitable effect of increased foreign financial 
 and economic interest in China, even admitting that its industrial 
 effect was advantageous to China, would be to create an interest 
 in stabilizing China politically, which in effect would mean to 
 sanctify the status quo, and prevent the development of a revo- 
 lution which cannot be accomplished without internal disorders 
 that would affect foreign investments unfavorably. These con- 
 siderations are not mentioned for the sake of throwing light 
 on the Consortium: they are cited as an illustration of the 
 probability that a too positive and constructive development of 
 our tradition of goodwill to China would involve us in an inter- 
 ference with Chinese domestic affairs injurious to China's wel- 
 fare, to that free and independent development in which we 
 profess such interest. 
 
 But how, it will be asked, are we to protect China from for- 
 eign depredations, particularly those of Japan, how are we to 
 change our nominal goodwill into a reality, if we do not enter 
 much more positive and detailed policies? If there was in 
 existence at the present time any such thing as a diplomacy of 
 peoples as distinct from a diplomacy of governments, the ques- 
 tion would mean something quite different from what it now 
 means. As things now stand the people should profoundly dis- 
 trust the politicians' love for China. It is too frequently the 
 reverse side of fear and incipient hatred of Japan, colored per- 
 haps by anti-British feeling. 
 
 There should be no disguising of the situation. The aggres- 
 
 [6i] 
 
sive activities of other nations in China, centering but not ex- 
 hausted at this time in Japan, are not merely sources of trouble 
 to China but they are potential causes of trouble in our own 
 international relationships. We are committed by our tradi- 
 tion and by the present actualities of the situation to attempting 
 something positive for China as respects her international status, 
 to live up to our responsibility is a most difficult and delicate 
 matter. We have on the one side to avoid getting entangled 
 in quasi-imperialistic European policies in Asia, whether under 
 the guise of altruism, of putting ourselves in a position where 
 we can exercise a more effective supervision of their behavior, 
 or by means of economic expansion. On the other side, we 
 have to avoid drifting into that kind of covert or avowed an- 
 tagonism to European and Japanese imperialism which will only 
 increase friction, encourage a combination especially of Great 
 Britain and Japan — or of France and Japan — against us, and 
 bring war appreciably nearer. 
 
 We need to bear in mind that China will not be saved from 
 outside herself. Even if by a successful war we should relieve 
 China from Japanese encroachments, from all encroachmerts, 
 China would not of necessity be brought nearer her legitimate 
 goal of orderly and prosperous internal development. Apart 
 from the question of how far war can now settle any funda- 
 mental issues without begetting others as dangerous, China of 
 all countries is the one where settlement by force, especially by 
 outside force, is least applicable, and most likely to be enormous- 
 ly disserviceable. China is used to taking time to deal with her 
 problems: she can neither understand not profit by impatient 
 methods of the western world which are profoundly alien to 
 her genius. Moreover a civilization which is on a continental 
 scale, which is so old that the rest of us are parvenus in com- 
 parison, which is thick and closely woven, cannot be hurried in 
 its development without disaster. Transformation from within 
 it its sole way out, and we can best help China by trying to see 
 to it that she gets the time she needs in order to effect this trans- 
 formation, whether or not we like the particular form it as- 
 sumes at any particular time. 
 
 A successful war in behalf of China would leave untouched 
 her problems of education, of factional and sectional forces, of 
 political immaturity showing itself in present incapacity for or- 
 
 [62] 
 
ganlzation. It would ahcct A^f industrial growth undoubtedly, 
 but in all human probability for the worse, increasing the likeli- 
 hood that she would enter upon an industrialization which 
 would repeat the worst evils of western industrial life, without 
 the immunities, resistances and remedial measures which the 
 West has evolved. The imagination cannot conceive a worse 
 crime than fastening western industrialism upon China before 
 she has developed within herself the meaning of coping with 
 the forces which it would release. The danger is great enough 
 as it Is. War waged in China's behalf by western powers and 
 western methods would make the danger practically irresistible. 
 In addition we should gain a permanent interest in China which 
 is likely to be of the most dangerous character to ourselves. If 
 we were not committed by it to future imperialism, we should 
 be luckier than we have any right to hope to be. These things 
 are said against a mental protest to admitting even by implica- 
 tion the prospect of war with Japan, but it seems necessary to 
 say them. 
 
 These remarks are negative and vague as to our future 
 course. They imply a confession of lack of such wisdom as 
 would enable me to make positive definite proposals. But at 
 least I have confidence in the wisdom and goodwill of the Amer- 
 ican and other peoples to deal with the problem, if they are 
 only called into action. And the first condition of calling wis- 
 dom and goodwill into effective existence is to recognize the 
 seriousness of the problem and the utter futulity of trying to 
 force its solution by impatient and hurried methods. Pro-Jap- 
 anese apologetics is dangerous; it obscures the realities of the 
 situation. An irritated anti-Japanism that would hasten the 
 solution of the Chinese problem merely by attacking Japan is 
 equally fatal to discovering and applying a proper method. 
 
 More specifically and also more generically, proper publicity 
 Is the greatest need. If, as Secretary Hughes has Intimated, 
 a settlement of the problems of the Pacific is made a condition 
 of arriving at an agreement regarding reduction and limitation 
 of armaments, It is likely that the Conference might better never 
 be held. In eagerness to do something which will pass as a set- 
 tlement, either China's — and Siberia's — interests will be sacri- 
 ficed in some unfa^ compromise, or Irritation and friction will 
 be increased — and in the end so will armaments. In any literal 
 
 [63] 
 
sense, it is ridiculous to suppose that the problems of the Pacific 
 can be settled in a few weeks, or months — or years. Yet the 
 dicussion of the problems, in separation from the question of 
 armament, may be of great use. For it may further that pub- 
 licity which is a pre-condition of any genuine settlement. This 
 involves the public in diplomacy. But it also involves a wider 
 publicity, one which will enlighten the world about the facts of 
 Asia, internal and international. 
 
 Scepticism about Foreign Offices, as they are at present con- 
 ducted, is justified. But scepticism about the power of public opin- 
 ion, if it can be aroused and instructed, to reshape Foreign Office 
 policies means hopelessness about the future of the world. Let 
 everything possible be done to reduce armament, if only to se- 
 cure a naval holiday on the part of the three great naval powers, 
 and if only for the sake of lessening taxation. Let the Con- 
 ference on Problems devote itself to discussing and making 
 known as fully and widely as possible the element and scope 
 of those problems, and the fears — or should one call them 
 hopes? — of the cynics will be frustrated. It is not so important 
 that a decision in the American sense of the Yap question be 
 finally and forever arrived at, as it is that the need of China 
 and the Orient in general for freer and fuller communications 
 with the rest of the world be made clear — and so on, down or 
 up the list of agenda. The commercial open door is needed. 
 But the need is greater that the door be opened to light, to 
 knowledge and understanding. If these forces will not create 
 a public opinion which will in time secure a lasting and just set- 
 tlement of other problems, there is no recourse save despair of 
 civilization. Liberals can do something better than predicting 
 failure and impugning motives. They can work for the opened 
 door of open diplomacy, of continuous and intelligent inquiry, 
 of discussion free from propaganda. To shirk this responsi- 
 bility on the alleged ground that economic imperialism and or- 
 ganized greed will surely bring the Conference to failure is 
 supine and snobbish. It is one of the factors that may lead the 
 United States to take the wrong course in the parting of the ways. 
 
 October, 192 1. 
 
 [64] 
 
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