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 TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, 
 
 A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE ROMAN ART OF WAR, 
 
 BY WILLIAM pUNCAIir, 
 
 PROrESSOa of philosophy in the UBTITEIISITT of ABERDEEN. 
 
 LIFE OF QAIUS JULIUS C^SAR, 
 
 LEONARD SCHMITZ, LL.D., F.R.S.E., 
 
 PKINCIPAL OF THE HIGH SCHOOL OF EDINBURGH, AUTHOR OF HISTORY OF GREECE, HISTORY OF ROME, ETft 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 DERBY & JACKSON, 119 NASSAU ST., 
 
 1858. 
 
c^f. 
 
 
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 LIFE OF CAIUS JULIUS CiESAR. 
 
 Caius Julius C^sar, the son of C. Julius Csesar and Aurelia, was born B. C. 100, 
 on tlie twelfth of Quintilis, afterward called Julius in honour of this Caesar. His aunt 
 Julia was the wife of Caius Marius. In his seventeenth year he married Cornelia, the 
 daughter of Cinna, by whom he had a daughter, Julia. This connection with Marius 
 and Cinna, the two great opponents of the dictator Sulla, exposed him to the resent- 
 ment of the opposite faction. Sulla is said to have spaced his life with great reluc- 
 tance. He first served under M. Thermus in Asia, and distinguished himself at the 
 capture of Mitylene (B. C. 80 or 79). In the following year he served under P. Ser- 
 vilius Isauricus in Cilicia. The news of Sulla's death brought him back to Rome, 
 B..C. 78. After his unsuccessful impeachment of Dolabella for maladministration in 
 his province, he retired to Rhodes, and for a time became the pupil of the rhetorician 
 Molo, whose instruction Cicero had attended, probably a year or two before Caesar's 
 visit, B. C. 75. 
 
 About B. C. 69, being elected one of the military tribunes, he procured an enactment 
 &a- the restoration of L. Cinna, his wife's brother, and of those partisans of M. Lepi- 
 dus who after his death had joined Sertorius in Spain. The following year he was 
 quEestor in Spain, and on his return to Rome, he was elected curule sedile for B. C. 65. 
 The oflRce of aedile gave Cassar an opportunity of indulging his taste for magnificence 
 and display, by which he secui'ed the favour of the people. Caesar, who was now 
 five-and-thirty years of age, had enjoyed no opportunity of distinguishing himself in a 
 military capacity; while Cn. Pompeius, who was only six years older, was spreading 
 his name and the terror of the Roman arms throughout the East. By a judicious 
 application of money among the poorer voters, and of personal influence among all 
 classes, he obtained the Pontificatus Maximus (B. C. 63), or headship of the college of 
 Pontifices, a place to which an official residence in the Sacra Via was attached. This 
 union of civil and religious functions in the same person, at least in the higher and more 
 profitable places, was part of the old Roman polity. 
 
 At the time of the debate on the conspiracy of Catiline (B. C. 63), Caesar was praetor 
 designatus (praetor elect for the following year), and accordingly spoke in his place in 
 the senate. He was the only person who ventured to oppose the proposition for put- 
 ting the conspirators to death : he recommended their property to be confiscated, and 
 that they should be dispersed through the different municipia of Italy, and kept under 
 a strict surveillance. 
 
 An affair which happened during his praetorship (B. C. 62) caused no little scandal 
 at Rome. While the ceremonies in honour of the Bona Dea were performing in the 
 house of Caesar, at which women only could be present, the profligate P. Clodius, put- 
 ting on a woman's dress, contrived to get admission to these mysterious rites. On the 
 affair being discovered, Csesar divorced his wife Pompeia, whom* he had married after 
 
iv LIFE OF CAIUS JULIUS CiESAR. 
 
 the death of Cornelia ; and Clodius, after being brought to a public trial for an offence 
 against religion, only escaped by bribing the jury. From naotives of policy, Caesar 
 did not break with Clodius : he probably saw that he could make him a useful tool 
 against Cicero. 
 
 The year 61 B. C. was spent by Csesar in his province of Southern Spain, where he 
 speedily restored order, and he hurried back to Rome before his successor came to can- 
 vass for the consulship. The aristocratical party saw that it was impossible to prevent 
 Caesar's election ; their only chance was to give him a colleague who should be a 
 check upon him. Their choice of Bibulus was singularly unfortunate. Bibulus, after 
 unavailing efforts to resist the impetuosity of his colleague, shut himself up in his 
 house, and Ccesar acted as sole consul, B. C. 59. He had contrived to render ineffec- 
 tual all opposition on the part of his opponents. Pompeius was dissatisfied because 
 the senate delayed about confirming all his measures in the Mithridatic war and during 
 his command in Asia : Crassus, who was the richest man in the state, and second only 
 to Pompey in influence with the senatorial faction, was not on good terms with Pom- 
 peius. If Csesar gained over only one of these rivals, he made the other his enemy ; 
 he determined, therefore, to secure them both. He began by courting Pompeius, and 
 succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation between him and Crassus. It was agreed 
 that there should be a general understanding among the three as to the course of policy. 
 To cement their alliance more closely, Csesar gave Pompeius his daughter Juha in 
 marriage. He himself also took a new wife on the occasion, Calpurnia, the daughter 
 of L. Piso, whom he nominated one of the consuls for the ensuing year, B. C. 58. 
 This union of Pompeius, Crassus, and Csesar, destroyed the credit of Pompeius, threw 
 disunion among the aristocrats, and put the whole power of the state into the hands of 
 one vigorous and clear-sighted man. 
 
 One of the most important measures of Caesar's consulship was an agrarian law for 
 the division of some public lands in Campania among the poorer citizens, which was 
 carried by intimidation. Clodius, the enemy of Cicero, was, through Caesar's influence 
 and the help of Pompeius, adopted into a plebeian family, and thus made capable of 
 holding the office of tribune. Clodius, the next year, was elected a tribune, and drove 
 Cicero into exile, B. C. 58. 
 
 The Roman consuls, on going out of office, received the government of a province 
 for one year. Caesar's opponents unwisely made another efTort against him ; they pro- 
 posed to give him the superintendence of the roads and forests. Vatinius, one of his 
 creatures, forthwith procured a law to be passed, by which he obtained for Cssar the 
 province of Gallia Cisalpina, or North Italy, and Illyricum, for five years; and the 
 senate, fearing the people might grant still more, not only confirmed the rheasure, but 
 added the province of Gallia Transalpina. "From this moment," remarks Schlosser, 
 " the history of Rome presents a striking parallel to the condition of the French repub- 
 lic during Bonaparte's first campaigns in Italy. In both cases we see a weak repub- 
 lican administration in the capital involved in continual broils, which the rival factions 
 are more interested in fostering than in securing the tranquillity and peace of the 
 empire. In both cases we find a province of the distracted republic occupied by a 
 general with unlimited power — the uncontrolled master of a territory which, in extent 
 and importance, is equal to a mighty kingdom — a man of superior understanding, des- 
 perate resolves, and, if circumstances rendered it necessary, of fearful cruelty — a man 
 who, under the show of democratical opinions, behaved like a despot, governed a prov- 
 ince at his pleasure, and established an absolute control over his soldiers by leading 
 them to victory, bloodshed, and pillage." {-{, 
 
 The Gallic provinces at this time subject to Rome, were Gallia Citerior, or Cisal- 
 
LIFE OF CAIUS JULIUS CESAR. v 
 
 pine Gaul ; and WKa Ulterior, or tlie southern part of Transalpine Gaul, also called 
 emphatically Provincia, whose capital was Narbo, now Narbonne. The Provincia 
 extended from the Mediterranean to the Cebenna mountains, and included the modern 
 provinces of East Languedoc, Provence, and Dauphine. On the north it joined the 
 Allobroges, then lately subjected to Rome. When Caesar, in his Commentaries, 
 speaks of Gaul, which he divides into Aquitania, Celtica, and Belgica, he means the 
 Gaul which was then independent, and which he conquered, exclusive of the Provincia 
 already subject to Rome. Csesar's campaigns in Gaul, which are the most eventful 
 periods of his life, belong to the history of Rome. They comprise the time from the 
 beginning of B. C. 58 to B. C. 51. During this period he stopped the Helvetii, who 
 were emigrating from their native country, a part of modern Switzerland, with the 
 intention of settling in the southern part of Gaul. He totally defeated Ariovistus, a 
 powerful German chief, with immense slaughter. Some of the fugitives escaped 
 across the Rhine in boats, and Ariovistus among them. The two sons of Ariovistus 
 and one daughter were killed in the flight, and another daughter was taken prisoner. 
 
 The campaign of 57 B. C. was against the Belgic Gauls, a powerful race of German 
 origin, who had been long settled in the country between the Rhine and the Sequana 
 (Seine). The war was conducted with his usual vigour and success, though the 
 resistance of some of the Belgic tribes, especialy the Nervii, was most desperate. In 
 this campaign, Caesar advanced north of the Axona, a branch of the Seine. Crassus, 
 the son of Crassus with whom Caesar had made a coalition, being detached by Caesar 
 across the Sequana into Western Gaul, received the submission of the Aulerci, Unelli, 
 and Veneti, and other maritime people on the coasts of the Atlantic; and, as the sea- 
 son was growing late, the army went into winter-quarters in the country of the Car- 
 nutes, Turones, and other parts of Central Gaul. Ccesar set off, according to his 
 custom, for Cisalpine Gaul, where his friends flocked from Rome to congratulate him 
 on his successes. The senate, on receiving from the victorious general the usual 
 official letters, ordered fifteen days of public thanksgiving to the gods, a period never 
 granted before for any other general. 
 
 His third campaign, 56 B. C, was against the Western Gauls, of whom the Veneti 
 were a powerful commercial, seafaring people, who had numerous ships in which they 
 traded with Britain and other countries. Having recovered from the alarm of Caesar's 
 conquests, they arrested the officers of Crassus, and refused to give them up until 
 their own hostages were restored. All the neighbouring maritime tribes made common 
 cause with the Veneti. Caesar immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the 
 Ligeris, and sent also to collect ships on the coast of the Pictones and Santones, wlio 
 were friends with Rome. He directed the fleet to attack the Veneti by sea, while he 
 marched against them by land. A great naval battle, which lasted all day, ended with 
 the destruction of the fleet of the Veneti, to the number of above two hundred ships, 
 Caesar put to death all the senators or chief men of the Veneti, and sold the rest as 
 slaves. After the defeat of the Veneti, he marched against the Morini and Menapii, 
 and placed his troops for the winter among the Aulerci, Lexovii, &c. 
 
 The following year, 55 B. C, the campaign was carried on against the Germans 
 upon the Mosa and the Rhine, and they were defeated with great slaughter, probably 
 near Coblenz, at the junction of the Moselle and the Rhine. After this battle, Caesar 
 constructed a bridge over the Rhine in ten days, when he marched across and ravaged 
 the country of the Sicambri. He recrossed the Rhine after spending eighteen days on 
 German ground. 
 
 He next made his first expedition into Britain. In this year Caesar's period of 
 government was extended for five years by a senatus consultum. 
 
vi LIFE OF CAIUS JULIUS C2ESAR. 
 
 The next year, 54 B. C, after making an excursion into Illyricum, he returned 
 into Gaul, where he had ordered a fleet to assemble at Fortius Ttius for a second 
 attempt upon Britain. On his return from Britain, owing to the bad harvest and 
 scarcity of provisions, he dispersed his legions in various parts of the country for the 
 winter, a measure which proved nearly fatal to the Roman arms. He himself 
 remained in Belgic Gaul. The Eburones revolted and attacked the camp of Titurius 
 Sabinus and L. Cotta, who had one legion and five cohorts with them. The Romans, 
 against Cotta's opinion, made an effort to retire to the next Roman garrison, but they 
 were attacked on their march and cut to pieces. The Eburones, under their king 
 Ambiorix, next attacked the camp of Quintus Cicero, brother to the orator, who was 
 stationed with one legion in the country of the Nervii. Quintus made a brave defence, 
 and was finally relieved by Caesar. The following year, 53 B. C, which was the 
 sixth of his government, symptoms of general disaffection manifested themselves 
 throughout Gaul. This was a year of desultory though destructive warfare. CfEsar 
 crossed the Rhine again from the country of the Treviri. This movement led to no 
 result, and he withdrew his army. He then ravaged the country of the Eburones, and 
 having put his legions to winter among the Treviri, Lingones, and Senones, repaired 
 to Cisalpine Gaul. The disturbances at Rome, in consequence of the murder of P. 
 Clodius, made him turn his attention toward that quarter. He raised troops in every 
 part of the Cisalpine province. The Gauls now thought the time was come for one 
 great effort while Cassar was engaged in Italy. The Carnutes massacred all the 
 Romans whom they found in the town of Genabum. Vercingetorix, a young man of 
 one of the first families of the Arverni, was placed at the head of a confederacy of the 
 whole of Celtic Gaul. Coesar, hearing the news, set off in the middle of winter for 
 Gaul north of the Alps, and took Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum. He 
 also took Avaricum, garrisoned by the Gauls, who made a courageous defence. But 
 the great event of this campaign was the siege of Alesia, now a village called Saint 
 Reine, and also Alise, near Flavigny, and Semur, in North Burgundy. For this cele- 
 brated siege we must refer to Caesar's own account. Caesar found himself besieged in 
 his own lines, having to fight Vercingetorix who had retired within the town, and the 
 confederates from without. Alesia finally surrendered, and Vercingetorix, several 
 years later, walked before the triumphal car of the conqueror; after which he was put 
 to death in prison. Caesar's eighth and last campaign in Gaul (51 B. C.) is related by 
 Hirtius, who has continued his ' Commentaries' by writing an eighth or supplementary 
 book. During the winter, which followed this campaign, he endeavoured to conciliate 
 the principal inhabitants of Gaul by rewards, and treated the people with kindness; 
 and, by rendering the Roman yoke light, he pacified Gaul, exhausted by its long and 
 unfortunate struggle. In the spring 50 B. C, he set off for North Italy, where he 
 was received with great rejoicings. On his return to Belgic Gaul, he reviewed his 
 troops, and soon after returned to the north of Italy, where the dissensions between 
 him and the senate had begun which led to the civil war. This was the ninth and 
 last year of Caesar's government of the Gauls. 
 
 Caesar's connection with Pompeius had dissolved by the death of Julia without any 
 surviving offspring, and by the growing jealousy with which his success in Gaul and 
 his popularity with his army had filled all the aristocratical party. His object now 
 was to obtain the consulship a second time, and a special enactment had been already 
 passed enabling, him to stand for the consulship in his absence. But Pompeius pre- 
 vailed upon the senate to require him to give up the command of the army and come 
 to Rome in person to be a candidate. Caesar, who was at Ravenna, in his province of 
 Gallia Cisalpina, sent Curio to Rome with a letter expressed in strong terms, in which 
 
LIFE OF CAIUS JULIUS C^SAR. vii 
 
 he proposed to give up his array and come to the city, if Pompeius would also give up 
 the command of the troops which he had. The senate made a decree that Ceesar 
 should give up his army by a certain day, or be considered an enemy to the state. 
 The tribunes, M. Antoniiis and Q. Cassius, the friends of Cfesar, attempted to oppose 
 the measure; but their opposition was treated with contempt, and thus they gained a 
 good excuse for hurrying to Cassar with the news. Upon receiving the intelligence, 
 Caesar crossed the Rubicon, a small stream which formed the southern limit of his 
 province, and directed his march toward the south, B. C. 49. Rome was filled with 
 confusion ; councils were divided and hesitating ; and Pompeius, who was the com- 
 mander-in-chief on the side of the senate, was unprovided with troops to oppose the 
 veterans of the Gallic wars. Domitius, who had thrown himself into Corfinium to 
 defend the place, was given up to Ceesar by his soldiers, who joined the invading army. 
 The alarm now became still greater, and Pompeius, with a large part of the senate 
 and his forces, hurried to Brundisium, whence he succeeded in crossing the sea to 
 Dyrrachium in Epirus. Csesar, who had reached Brundisium before Pompeius left it, 
 advanced to Rome, and took possession of the public money, which the other party in 
 their hurry had left behind. His next movement was into Spain, where Afranius and 
 Petreius, who were on the side of Pompeius, were at the head of eight legions. After 
 reducing this important province, Csesar on his return took the town of Massilia, the 
 siege of which had been commenced on his march to Spain. 
 
 The title of " dictator" was assumed on his return to Rome, and he nominated him- 
 self and Servilius consuls for the following year, B. C. 48. The campaign of this 
 year, which is described in the third book of the " Civil Wars," comprises the opera- 
 tions of Caesar and Pompeius at Dyrrachium, and the subsequent defeat of Pompeius 
 on the plain of Pharsalus, in Thessaly. After his defeat, Pompeius fled to Egypt, and 
 on his landing, was treacherously murdered by Achillas, the commander of the troops 
 of the young king Ptolemaeus, and L. Septimius, a Roman, who had served under 
 Pompeius in the war with the pirates. 
 
 Caesar arrived in Egypt shortly after the death of Pompeius. The disputes in the 
 royal family of Egypt and the interference of Caesar brought on a contest between the 
 Romans and the king's troops, which ended in a new settlement of the kingdom by the 
 Jloman general. Here he formed his intimacy with Cleopatra, the young queen of 
 Egypt. Early in the year B. C. 47, he marched into Pontus, and defeated Phar- 
 naces. He returned to Italy in the autumn, by way of Athens. At Brundisium he 
 was met by Cicero, who was glad to make peace with him. On his return to Rome, 
 he was named dictator for one year, and consul for the following year, with M, Lepi- 
 dus. During the winter he crossed over into Africa, where the party of Pompey had 
 rallied under Scipio ; gained a complete victory at the battle of Thapsus, and was 
 again at Rome in the autumn of B. C. 46. In B. C. 45, Caesar was sole consul, and 
 dictator for the third time. During the greater part af this year he was absent in 
 Spain, where Cn. Pompeius, son of Pompeius the Great, had raised a large force. 
 The great battle of Munda, in which thirty thousand are said to have fallen on the side 
 of Pompeius, terminated the campaigns of Caesar. Pompeius was taken after the bat-' 
 tie, and his head was carried to Caesar, who was then at Hispalis. 
 
 On his return to Rome, Caesar was created consul for ten years and dictator for life. 
 On the ides (15th) of March, B. C. 44, he was assassinated in the senate-house. After 
 his death he was enrolled among the gods, under the appellation of divos ivlivs, as 
 appears from his medals. 
 
 The ene.rgy of Caesar's character, his personal accomplishments and courage, his 
 talents for war, and his capacity for civil affairs, render him one of. the most remark- 
 
viji ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 able Kien of any age. Thougli a lover of pleasure, and a man of licentious habits, he 
 never neglected vi'hat was a matter of business. As a writer and an orator, he has 
 received the highest praise from Cicero ; and his " Commentaries," written in a plain, 
 perspicuous style, are a model of their kind. His projects were vast and magnificent. 
 He reformed the Roman calendar, under the direction of Sosigenes. He established 
 public libraries, and gave to the learned Varro the care of collecting and arranging the 
 books. The three books of the " Civil Wars" were written by Csesar ; but the single 
 books on the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish wars, respectively, are generally 
 attributed to another hand. The fragments of various other works of Caesar's have 
 been collected by his editors. 
 
 ADYEETISEMENT. 
 
 The following translation of Cffisar's Commentaries was done from the celebrated 
 edition of the late Dr. Clarke, printed for J. Tonson, in 1712. All possible care has 
 been taken to render it exact, and to preserve the distinctness and perspicuity of 
 expression for which the original is so justly famous. The reader will perceive that 
 the very turn and manner of Cssar have been copied with the utmost attention; 
 and though the success may not always answer expectation, yet candour will induce 
 him to make great allowances when he considers the inimitable beauty of the Latin, 
 and the difficulty of expressing ancient maniaers and transactions in modem language. 
 It was at first intended to accompany the translation with notes, explaining what was 
 difficult and obscure in the Roman art of war. But, as a few loose, scattered remarks 
 would have contributed little toward giving the reader a distinct idea of what was 
 necessary to be known on this head, there is substituted in their place a discourse con- 
 cerning the military customs of the sncients, in which all that is curious and most 
 interesting relating to these matters is fully and copiously explained. Besides the 
 ancient authors, Rollin, Folard, Orrery, Feuquiere, Machiavel, Montesquieu, and sev- 
 eral other moderns, have been consulted, and all such .passages selected as tended to 
 throw light upon this branch of the Roman antiquities. ' As the author, by his situation 
 in life, is necessarily a stranger to the practical part of war, he pretends not to otFer 
 anything of his own upon the subject. If he has collected with care from the writers 
 before mentioned, and disposed the materials they furnished, in such a manner as suffi- 
 ciently to display the proficiency and improvements of the ancients in military knowl- 
 edge, he has compassed all he intended, and the reader will have no cause to complain. 
 The ancient names of places are retained in the translation, as well to avoid giving too 
 modern a turn to the author by a contrary practice, as because they are sufficiently 
 familiar to an English ear, being constantly made use of by all historians w^ho treat of 
 those times in our language. But, as the following work may perhaps fall into the 
 hands of persons little acquainted with ancient" geography — and who would, therefore, 
 be at a loss in comparing Csesar's descriptions with the present face of the country — 
 the reader will find at the end of the book a Geographical Index, in which the ancient 
 names of places, as near as can be discovered with any certainty, are explained by the 
 modern. It may be just proper to mention, that besides the seven books of the Gallic 
 War, and the three of the Civil, written by Cassar himself, the Supplements of A. 
 Hirtius Pansa are likewise inserted in the following translation, consisting of one 
 additional book to the Gallic War, and three books of the Alexandrian, African, and 
 Spanish Wars_^« 
 
A DISCOURSE 
 
 CONCERIflWt* 
 
 THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. 
 
A DISCOURSE 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 :^ 
 
 CHAP I. 
 
 OF THE UNDERTAKING AND DECLARATION 
 OF WAR. 
 
 I. The Romans, from small beginnings and 
 an almost contemptible original, rose by de- 
 grees to be sovereigns of the world. If we in- 
 quire into the causes of this, we shall find, that 
 nothing so much contributed to it, as the ex- 
 cellence of their military discipline. War is 
 a profession of the greatest importance to so- 
 ciety. The security of our lives, liberties, pro- 
 perties, and indeed of all that is dear and valua- 
 ble among men, depends in a manner entirely 
 on it. Good and wholesome laws may esta- 
 blish peace and unity within, and if executed 
 with vigour, will prevent the inroads of vice 
 and corruption ; but are by no means sufficient 
 to screen a state from powerful neighbours, or 
 secure it against the assaults of the ambitious 
 and aspiring. Hence in the most peaceful 
 times, it has ever been esteemed a maxim of 
 sound policy, to cultivate the science of arms 
 with the same application, as when -we are 
 threatened with war and invasions. For how- 
 ever little we may ourselves be disposed to dis- 
 turb the tranquillity of the nations around us, 
 yet the experience of all ages makes it abun- 
 dantly evident, that the most powerful and pre- 
 vailing argument to keep those quiet, from 
 whom we have reason to apprehend any dan- 
 ger, is by letting them see that we are prepared 
 to receive them, and capable of making them 
 repent of their rashness, should they unjustly 
 seek a pretence of falling upon us. In all 
 ■wise states, therefore, the profession of a| 
 
 soldier has ever been held in honour : nor do 
 we read any part of ancient history with greater 
 pleasure, than that by which we learn, how 
 free nations have defended themselves against 
 the attempts of encroaching tyrants, and wh_en 
 roused to a thorough exertion of their strength, 
 overthrown in the end that very power, which 
 once threatened to crush them. It is not in- 
 deed to be denied, that the military virtues of 
 a free people, have not always been confined 
 to self-defence, and the avenging themselves 
 of their enemies. Ambition, and a conscious- 
 ness of superiority, have sometimes prompted 
 even these to aspire at universal dominion. 
 This is remarkably exemplified in the history 
 of the Roman commonwealth, from whose con- 
 stitution, and love of liberty, one would natu- 
 rally expect a very different spirit. Who more 
 likely to become the great patrons and defend- 
 ers of the common rights and privileges of 
 mankind than a people, whose prevailing pas- 
 sion was an abhorrence of slavery ; and who, 
 in a long series of struggles with the naticftis 
 around them, were never weary of fighting in 
 defence of that liberty, which is the birthright 
 and inheritance of every reasonable creature 1 
 And yet we find, that no sooner were they se- 
 cure of their own freedom, than a thirst of rule 
 took possession of their minds, and they forci- 
 bly imposed that yoke upon others, which they 
 had disdained to submit to themselves. The 
 superiority of their military discipline enabled 
 them by degrees to accomplish this unjust de- 
 sign. Trained up in a continued succession 
 of wars, and equally attentive to their own 
 victories and defeats, they were daily imp'ov- 
 
 3 
 
THE ROMAN 
 
 ing themselves in the art of conquest, and 
 attained at length to so great a mastery in it, 
 that no nation was able to withstand their at- 
 tacks. It cannot therefore but be an agreeable, 
 as well as useful inquiry, to trace out the mili- 
 tary customs of a people so renowned for their 
 knowledge in the art of war. And as it is my 
 design, to present the public with a new trans- 
 lation of the Commentaries of Ctesar, who was 
 confessedly the greatest general Eome ever 
 produced, I imagine a discourse of this nature 
 may not be improperly prefixed to that work. 
 
 II. Let us then take a view of the conduct 
 of the Romans, from their first engaging in a 
 war, through all the different branches of its 
 management, until they at last bring it to a 
 
 appy period. This will naturally lead us to 
 consider the ceremonies attending the declara- 
 tion of war ; the manner of levying troops, 
 and forming a Roman army ; the precautions 
 used in marches and encampments ; their or- 
 der of battle, conduct in sieges, and the ma- 
 chines and other contrivances made use of in 
 the attack and defence of places. Under these 
 several heads may be comprehended every 
 thing that is material and important upon this 
 subject. It is not, however, my design, to 
 enter into grammatical niceties, or a minute 
 detail of particular criticisms, but only to give 
 a general idea of the military customs of the 
 Romans, intermixed with such remarks as may 
 serve to lay open the policy of their first con- 
 trivance,and show their natural tendency to 
 that superiority and universal dominion, which 
 they at length procured the commonwealth. 
 
 III. The ceremonies relating to the decla- 
 ration of war were instituted by Numa Pom- 
 pilius, the second king of Rome. Romulus, 
 the founder of that colony, was, during the 
 whole course of his reign, engaged in perpetual 
 contests with his neighbours. The necessity he 
 was under, at his first setting out, of procuring 
 wives for his subjects, by the rape of the Sa- 
 bine virgins, exasperated all the nations round 
 about, and begot no small jealousy of the new 
 colony, which seemed to be founded on max- 
 ims of violence and injustice. We are not 
 therefore to wonder, if this drew on him a series 
 of wars, which continued almost without inter- 
 mission to the end of his life. Thus the Ro- 
 mans, who were originally in a great measure 
 a band of fugitives and outlaws, improving their 
 natural fierceness by having their arms con- 
 stantly in their hands, gradually grew to be a 
 
 brave and warlike people. Numa, who suc- 
 ceeded Romulus, being a prince of a pacific 
 temper, set himself to check this martial ar- 
 dour, and form them to religion, and a respect 
 for the gods. In order to stifle that impetuous 
 desire of war, which he found so prevalent 
 among them, he established certain cere- 
 monies, which were always to precede the 
 commencing of hostilities, and committed them 
 to the care of a college of heralds, called 
 Feciales. The chief or head of this society had 
 the name of Pater Patratus; and it was his pe- 
 culiar office to make peace, or denounce war, 
 Livy, indeed, seems to consider him as a 
 temporary minister : for, in his account of the 
 treaty concluded with the Albans, before the 
 triple combat of the Horatii and Curiatii, he 
 makes one of the Feciales choose a Pater Pa- 
 tratus, on purpose to perform that ceremony. 
 But as I have no design to enter into a con- 
 troversy of this nature, little important in itself, 
 and not easy to be decided, I shall content my- 
 self with observing, that the officer here men- 
 tioned, whether constant or temporary, was one 
 who had a father and son both alive. Hence 
 this title of Pater Patratzis, which may be in- 
 terpreted to imply a more perfect kind of father, 
 as they seem to have imagined him to be, whose 
 own father was still living, after he himself had 
 been a father for some time. Such a one, it 
 was believed, would be an equitable and mo- 
 derate judge in affairs of this kind, and not 
 over forward to plunge his country into a war, 
 in which so many lives that must be dear to him, 
 would unavoidably be exposed to hazard. 
 
 IV. And indeed the ceremonies themselves, 
 as instituted by Numa, seem peculiarly calcu- 
 lated to render the Romans cautious and cir- 
 cumspect, in a matter of so great importance. 
 For before they entered upon a war with any 
 state, the college of heralds were to commis- 
 sion the Pater Patratus, to go and demand 
 satisfaction in the name of the Roman peo- 
 ple. Accordingly this officer, clothed in the 
 habit of his order, set forward for the ene- 
 my's country ; and entering the frontiers, pro- 
 claimed aloud the cause of his arrival, calling 
 all the gods to witness that he came to de- 
 mand satisfaction, and imprecate the divine 
 vengeance on himself and country, if he said 
 any thing contrary to truth. When he came 
 to the chief city of the enemy, he again re- 
 peated the same declaration, adding fresh 
 oaths and imprecations, and withal desired 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 satisfuction. If his demands were granted, 
 he returned immediately to Rome, and all 
 thoughts of war were laid aside. But if they 
 required time to consider, he gave them ten 
 days, and then came again to hear their reso- 
 lution. This he did, in some cases, three 
 times ; but if, after thirty days, nothing was 
 done towards an accommodation, he called 
 gods and men to witness the refusal, and ex- 
 pressly denounced, that the Romans would 
 now think themselves sufficiently authorized 
 to take such measures as the case required, 
 in order to do themselves justice. Upon his 
 return to Rome, he repaired to the senate, 
 attended by the whole college of heralds ; 
 having there made a report of his embassy, 
 declared the legality of the war. The affair 
 was then debated among the Fathers : and if 
 the majority of voices were for war, the same 
 officer was sent back to the enemy's frontiers, 
 ■^Jiere, in presence of at least three persons, 
 he pronounced the usual declaration, throwing 
 a spear at the same time into their territories, 
 in token of defiance. 
 
 V, These institutions continued long in 
 force at Rome, even during the times of the 
 commonwealth ; and it must be owned, were 
 admirably well contrived to answer Numa's 
 great design, of habituating the Romans to 
 peace, and blunting the edge of their martial 
 fury. For as a certain space of time was 
 necessarily to intervene, between the injury 
 received and the commencing of hostilities : 
 this left room for reason and reflection, and 
 gave them an opportunity of weighing ma- 
 turely all the consequences of the step they 
 were about to take. The imprecations too to 
 be denounced by the herald against himself 
 and country, if he advanced any thing contrary 
 to truth, would naturally make them very 
 cautious in their demands, and extremely 
 attentive to the equity and justice of them. 
 Add to all this, the great probability of ad- 
 justing matters amicably, and obtaining a 
 reasonable satisfaction, which cannot by any 
 means be expected, where the parties fly im- 
 mediately to arms, and by mutual acts of 
 hostility exasperate one another. One would 
 think, that a state under the check of so 
 many restraints against oppression, could not 
 easily break out into violent or unjust wars. 
 Accordingly we find, not only the ancient his- 
 torians, but even many modern writers of 
 name and reputation, extolling the modera- 
 2 
 
 tion and disinterestedness of the Romans ; 
 their faith in treaties ; steady adherence to 
 their allies ; and care to have equity on their 
 side in all their undertakings. It is, however, 
 methinks, a sufficiently obvious reflection that 
 a people, who by degrees accomplished the 
 conquest of the universe, and forced all na- 
 tions to submit to their dominion, must in 
 many instances have been the aggressors. For 
 although in the first beginnings of their state, 
 they were perhaps often unjustly attacked by 
 their neighbours, out of envy and jealousy ; 
 yet it is certain, that their power at last be- 
 came so very formidable, that no nation was 
 willing to enter the lists with them. We find 
 them, notwithstanding, still pushing on their 
 conquests, still engaged in new wars, and ex- 
 tending the limits of their empire. Now 
 both reason and experience tell us, that in a 
 controversy between states of unequal strength, 
 the weaker will submit to many insults and 
 hardships, rather than draw upon themselves 
 a war which they foresee must end in the 
 subversion of their liberties. And indeed if 
 we examine narrowly into the conduct of the 
 Romans, we shall find, that their reputation 
 of justice is owing rather to an exact obser- 
 vance of certain outward forms, and the par- 
 tiality of their historians, than any steady 
 adherence to the principles of equity. For as 
 their power and dominion increased, and they 
 became conscious of their superiority, they 
 readily gave way to the dictates of ambition, 
 and were never at a loss in contriving some 
 ground of quarrel with those nations, whom, 
 in their plan of universal conquest, they had 
 resolved to bring next under subjection. 
 But as all their attempts of this kind were 
 preceded by complaints of injuries received, 
 pretended grievances, and formal declarations 
 of war ; this gave a colour of justice to their 
 undertakings, and effectually deceived the 
 people ; who, convinced that they had equity 
 on their side, followed their generals with an 
 assured confidence, imagining themselves 
 under the immediate protection of the gods. 
 Add to this, that the historians, partly misled 
 by the same notions, partl}"^ through a national 
 and almost unavoidable partiality, have vied 
 with one another in extolling the equity and 
 moderatioji of the Romans, and varnishing 
 over such parts of their behaviour, as seemed 
 most liable to exception. The merit of these 
 writers, and the veneration paid them by sue- 
 
THE ROMAN 
 
 Deeding ages, have given a kind of sanction 
 and authority to their opinions. It looks Hke 
 presumption to contradict authors of so esta- 
 blished a reputation : and being accustomed to 
 admire them from our infancy, we are easily 
 led to believe, that we cannot do better than 
 blindly give in to their sentiments. It is only 
 upon this principle I am able to excuse some 
 late writers of great name, who, in treating of 
 the Roman commonwealth, have not scrupled 
 to adopt the prejudices of the ancient historians, 
 and represent that people as patterns of equity 
 and justice in all their proceedings. 
 
 VI. As nothing is of greater importance in 
 history, than to form a right judgment of events 
 and their causes, and penetrate into the real 
 character of states and nations, I shall take 
 some pains to set this matter in a true light ; 
 and to that end shall lay before the reaaer a 
 short view of the transactions between the 
 Romans and Carthaginians. It is well known, 
 that these last were characterized by the Ro- 
 mans, as a faithless and perfidious people, re- 
 gardless of oaths, and whom no ties or treaties 
 could blind. They even went so far as to make 
 Punic faith serve only as another expression for 
 insincerity. Who would imagine, after such a 
 representation of things, that in all the Punic 
 wars tlie Romans were the aggressors ; and that, 
 in the two last especially, they forced the Car- 
 thaginians into them by the most flagrant acts 
 of injustice] But let truth and an impartial 
 account of facts determine. The occasion of 
 the first Punic war was as follows. A body 
 of Campanian soldiers, known in history by 
 the name of Mamertines, and who had served 
 under Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, upon 
 the death of that prince retired to Messina ; 
 •where, being received as friends, they treach- 
 erously massacred one part of the inhabitants, 
 expelled the rest, and seizing upon the lands, 
 houses, and even wives of those unfortunate 
 men, remained sole masters of that important 
 city. Some time after this, the people of 
 Rhegium, to screen themselves from the in- 
 sults of the Carthaginians, whose fleets ap- 
 peared frequently ofl their coast, applied to the 
 Roman senate for a garrison. A legion of 
 four thousand men, raised in Campania, and 
 commanded by Decius Jubellius, was appointed 
 to that service. At first they behaved suita- 
 bly to the intention of those who employed 
 them : but at length, tempted by the wealth 
 of the place, emboldened by the example of 
 
 the Mamertines, and strengthened by their aid, 
 they acted the same perfidious and cruel part 
 towards the Rhegians, which the other had 
 acted towards the people of Messina. 
 
 VII. As these two cities were parted only 
 by the narrow strait which separates Italy from 
 Sicily, and were not insensible of the odium 
 the}' had brought upon themselves by their 
 treachery, they entered into a strict confederacy 
 mutually to support each other in their usurpa- 
 tions. This alliance subsisted for some time. 
 But at length the Romans, having disengaged 
 themselves from the many wars, in which they 
 were entangled, turned their thoughts towards 
 the punishment of their perfidious legion. 
 Rhegium was invested, and after an obstinate 
 resistance taken by assault. All that remained 
 alive of the garrison, amounting to about 
 three hundred, were carried to Rome, beaten 
 with rods, and then publicly beheaded in the 
 Forum. The destruction of this confederate 
 city produced a mighty change in the affairs 
 of the Mamertines. While aided by their 
 friends at Rhegium, they had not only lived 
 fearless of danger, but had often made inroads 
 into the territories of the Carthaginians and 
 Syracusans, putting many of their towns and 
 villages under contribution. The case was 
 now greatly altered ; for being attacked by 
 Hiero, praetor of Syracuse, they were over- 
 thrown in battle, and their army almost totally 
 cut off. Humbled and reduced by so terrible 
 a blow, they thought themselves no longer in 
 a condition to defend Messina ; and differing 
 in opinion about what measures to pursue, one 
 party surrendered the citadel to the Cartha- 
 ginians, whilst another sent ambassadors to 
 implore the protection of the Romans. 
 
 VIII. The affair was debated in the senate ; 
 where, being considered in all its lights, it gave 
 no small perplexity to the Fathers. On the 
 one hand they thought it dishonourable, and 
 altogether unworthy of the Roman virtue, 
 to undertake the defence of traitors, whose 
 perfidy was exactly the same with that of 
 the Rhegians, which they had lately punished 
 with so exemplary a severity. But then 
 again it was of the utmost consequence to stop 
 the progress of the Carthaginians ; who, not 
 satisfied with their conquests in Africa and 
 Spain, had also made themselves masters of 
 Sardinia, and the adjacent isles on the coast 
 of Italy ; and would certainly get all Sicily 
 into their hands, if they should be suffered to 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 posses thumselves of Messina. From thence, 
 into Italy, the passage was very short : and it 
 was in some measure to invite an enemy to come 
 over, to leave him that entrance open. These 
 reasons, though strong, could not prevail with 
 the senate to declare in favour of the Mam- 
 ertines ; and accordingly motives of honour and 
 justice prevailed over those of interest and po- 
 licy. But the people were not so scrupulous. 
 In an assembly held on this subject, it was re- 
 solved that the Mamertines should be assisted ; 
 and Appius Claudius, one of the consuls, 
 was ordered to conduct an army into Sicily for 
 that purpose. Appius, to learn the true 
 state of things, went over in person to Messina, 
 and conducted himself so happily, as by some 
 means to persuade the Carthaginian officer to 
 evacuate the citadel. This so highly offended 
 the people of Carthage, that they condemned 
 their officer to be crucified as a traitor and a 
 coward. At the same time they invested the 
 place by sea and land, and entering into an 
 alliance with Hiero the new king of Syracuse, 
 were joined by his troops. Meanwhile Ap- 
 pius, having by an artful stratagem eluded the 
 vigilance of the Carthaginian admiral, crossed 
 the strait with all his forces, and attacking the 
 Syracusans and Carthaginians one after an- 
 other, compelled them to abandon the siege. 
 
 IX. Such was the beginning of the first 
 Punic war, in which I think it evidently ap- 
 pears, that the Romans were the aggressors. 
 For they undertook the defence of a traitorous 
 and perfidious set of men, against a people with 
 whom they were in alliance and amity. I deny 
 not that reasons of state, and the maxims of 
 policy, plead strongly in their behalf on this 
 occasion. It was certainly not their interest 
 to suffer the Carthaginians to become too 
 powerful, or get entire possession of an island 
 that lay so contiguous to Italy. But if we ex. 
 amine their conduct by the rules of strict justice, 
 it will be found no easy matter to vindicate it. 
 And in fact we have seen, that the senate ab- 
 solutely declared against aiding the Mamer- 
 tines, as inconsistent with honour, and the dig- 
 nity of the Roman name. Whether they acted 
 sincerely upon this occasion, or only to save 
 appearances, is not my business to determine. 
 It is enough that the thing itself serves to 
 justify the Carthaginians, and exempt them 
 from the charge of having been the first ag- 
 gressors in this war. Nor indeed do the Ro- 
 man writers throw the blame of it upon them, 
 
 but generally allow, that jealousy, and an ap. 
 prehension of each other's growing power, em- 
 broiled the two states upon the present occa< 
 sion. 
 
 X. But let U3 now pass to the second Punic 
 war. Here it is that the charge of insincerity 
 seems to lie heaviest against the Carthaginians. 
 The Romans, exasperated by the losses they 
 had received, gave a free vent to their hatred, and 
 spared no endeavours to blacken their ad- 
 versaries, and lay the whole blame of the war 
 upon them. And indeed they have contrived 
 to give a specious colour to this accusation, by 
 representing the taking of Saguntum as the 
 cause of the quarrel. For to consider only the 
 first appearance of this step ; Hannibal, con- 
 trary, as they pretend, to the express tenor 
 of treaties and without any formal declaration 
 of war, falls upon a city in alliance with the 
 Romans. But as Polybius has very judicious- 
 ly observed, the taking of Saguntum is to be 
 looked upon as the beginning, not the cause 
 of the war : and if we trace matters to their 
 source, we shall find that the Carthaginians 
 were provoked to this step, by a series of the 
 most unjustifiable injuries on the side of the 
 Romans. Soon after the conclusion of the 
 peace of Sicily, the mercenaries who had serv- 
 ed in the armies of Carthage revolting, brought 
 that state to the very brink of destruction. The 
 Sardinians, taking advantage of these troubles, 
 shook off the Carthaginian yoke, and expelled 
 all their garrisons out of the island. Things 
 continued for some time in this situation, until 
 at length the Carthaginians, having quelled 
 the rebellion in Africa, prepared to recover 
 possession of Sardinia. The Romans, who 
 during all the foregoing troubles of Carthage 
 had behaved with great justice and mode- 
 ration, now seeing that people like to regain 
 their former strength, pretended a jealousy of 
 the new preparations, and declared war against 
 them. The Carthaginians, unable at that time 
 to enter the lists with so powerful an adversary, 
 were forced to submit to a second treaty ; by 
 which they gave up Sardinia to the Romans, 
 and obliged themselves to an additional pay- 
 ment of twelve hundred talents. 
 
 XI. This injustice of the Romans may be 
 considered as the first and principal cause of 
 the second Punic war. For Hamilcar, sur- 
 named Barcha, highly exasperated on account 
 of a treaty, which necessity alone had com- 
 pelled the Carthaginians to submit to, resolved 
 
8 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 to break with Rome the first favourable op. 
 portunity ; and accordingly directed all his 
 views to the success of that enterprise. How 
 deeply he resented the injury of which we 
 speak, appears by his making Hannibal swear 
 upon the altar, at the age of nine years, that 
 he would ever be an irreconcilable enemy to 
 the Romans. During his command in Spain 
 he brought the greatest part of that country 
 under the power of the Carthaginians ; but 
 falling in battle before he had completed the 
 conquest of it, Asdrubal his son-in-law succeed- 
 ed him, and continued the war with success. 
 This alarmed the Romans, who thinking it a 
 necessary piece of policy to check the growing 
 power of a rival state, obliged Asdrubal to enter 
 into a new treaty, in which it was stipulated, 
 that he should attempt no conquest beyond 
 the Iberus. How this may appear to others I 
 cannot say, but to me it carries the idea of a 
 fresh insult, as the Romans hereby claimed a 
 manifest superiority over the Carthaginians, 
 and assumed the power of setting bounds to 
 their empire : a point upon which they were 
 always so very nice themselves, that no ex- 
 cuse can be offered for their disregarding it 
 in their conduct towards others. 
 
 XH. Hannibal succeeded Asdrubal in the 
 command of the army ; and having in a very 
 short time completed the reduction of Spain, 
 began to think seriously of avenging the many 
 wrongs done his country by the Romans. 
 To that end he contrived a pretence of quarrel 
 with the Saguntines, that by attacking their 
 city, he might give occasion to a rupture be- 
 tween the two states. For though Saguntum 
 lay on this side the Iberus, and therefore was 
 within the plan of conquest permitted to the 
 Carthaginians by the Romans ; yet these last, 
 as if repenting of the concession they had made 
 to their adversaries, concluded an alliance 
 with the Saguntines soon after the signing of 
 the treaty with Asdrubal. Now as by an article 
 of that treaty, neither state was to make war 
 upon the allies of the other, the Romans pre- 
 tended that Saguntum, though on this side the 
 Iberus, could not be attacked without violating 
 the peace. On the other hand the Carthagi- 
 nians maintained, that the very alliance with 
 the Saguntines was a violation of the treaty, as 
 being no other than a mean artifice to wrest the 
 power of making war upon the Saguntines out 
 of their hands, after it had been expressly con- 
 ceded to them by that article, which permitted 
 
 the conquest of all the nations of Spain on thii 
 side the Iberus. I think it needless to enter into 
 a discussion of this nice point, because the 
 taking of Saguntum ought to be considered 
 rather as the beginning of the quarrel, than the 
 cause of the war. The Carthaginians were 
 determined upon hostilities ; and it appears by 
 the above deduction, that the Romans, by a 
 continued series of insults and provocations, 
 had given them but too just ground to come 
 to that extremity. Polybius himself, a great 
 admirer of the Romans, and who endeavours 
 on all occasions to represent their conduct in 
 the most favourable light, though he blames 
 the attempt upon Saguntum as an infraction 
 of the treaty, is yet forced to acknowledge 
 thus much. " It would be a great mistake," 
 says that judicious historian, " to consider the 
 taking of Saguntum by Hannibal as the real 
 cause of the second Punic war. It was the 
 beginning, but not the cause of it. The regret 
 of the Carthaginians for the loss of Sicily ; 
 the violence and injustice of the Romans, in 
 seizing Sardinia, and imposing a new tribute ; 
 and lastly, the success of the Carthaginian 
 armies in Spain, which inspired that state with 
 courage and alarmed their adversaries ; these 
 were the real causes of the rupture. If we con- 
 sider only the siege of Saguntum, we cannot 
 avoid throwing the whole blame upon the 
 Carthaginians, whose attack of that city was 
 a manifest violation of the treaty with Asdru- 
 bal. For though the Saguntines were not in 
 alliance with Rome at the time of the conclu- 
 sion of that treaty, it is evident the Romans 
 did not thereby divest themselves of the liberty 
 of making new alliances. In this view of 
 things, therefore, the Carthaginians would be 
 altogether inexcusable. But if we go back 
 to the times when Sardinia was forcibly seized, 
 and a new tribute imposed, it must be con. 
 fessed," adds the historian, " that the conduct 
 of the Romans in these two points cannot be 
 justified." 
 
 XIII. Thus we see that Polybius throws the 
 whole blame of the second Punic war upon 
 the Romans ; and I believe every thinking 
 man will be of the same opinion ; which ought 
 to make us cautious of giving too easy credit 
 to the representations of their historians, when 
 they charge their enemies with infidehty and 
 breach of faith, and bestow such magnificent 
 eulogiums of justice and moderation upon their 
 own commonwealth* For allowing the Car« 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 9 
 
 thaginians to have been the first in breaking 
 the peace, it may with reason be asked, whe- 
 ther the notorious injustice of the Romans, 
 previously committed, did not justify them in 
 no longer observing a treaty concluded in all 
 the forms ; and whether it was not a legitimate 
 reason for entering into a war. I cannot how- 
 ever but observe, that Poly bias seems to be 
 a little too severe in his censure of the Car- 
 thaginians for attacking Saguntum. It will 
 surely admit of debate, whether the article re- 
 lating to the allies of both states could be ex- 
 tended any farther than to the alliance actually 
 subsisting at the time of the signing of the 
 treaty. If we extend it to all alliances what- 
 soever, either made or to be made, this seems 
 mutually to invest them with a power of pro- 
 hibiting each other from engaging in any war : 
 because either of them contracting an alliance 
 with that people against whom war was intend- 
 ed, rendered them thereby sacred and invio- 
 lable. But allowing the reflection of Polybius 
 to be just, that the two states by that treaty 
 did not absolutely divest themselves of the 
 liberty of making new alliances : it seems yet 
 pretty evident that the Romans did so, in re- 
 spect of all the nations lying on this side the 
 Iberus. For by giving up to the Carthagi- 
 nians the entire conquest of those countries, 
 they plainly bound themselves not to come 
 under any engagement inconsistent with that 
 article. The alliance therefore with the Sagun- 
 tines, as it tended to divest the Carthaginians 
 of a power expressly conceded to them by the 
 treaty, ought to be considered as a direct vio- 
 lation of it ; and the Romans might with equal 
 justice have contracted amity with all the other 
 nations of Spain yet unsubdued, and thereby 
 utterly deprived the Carthaginians of the power 
 of making war in that country. 
 
 XIV. But it is now time to take a view of 
 the causes that gave rise to the third Punic 
 war; in which, I believe, it will be abundantly 
 manifest, that the Romans proceeded without 
 the least appearance of justice. Among the 
 conditions of the peace granted by Scipio to 
 the Carthaginians, there was one which im- 
 poited, that they should not make war without 
 the consent of the Romans. Masinissa, king 
 of Numidia, taking advantage of this article, 
 made daily encroachments upon their territories 
 and dispossessed them of several towns and 
 districts. He was himself in great favour with 
 the Romans, on account of the many services 
 2* 
 
 he had done them in the second Punic war ; 
 and being no stranger to their hatred and jeal- 
 ousy of the Carthaginians, imagined they 
 would not be displeased at his attempts to 
 weaken the power of a rival state. The event 
 showed that he was not mistaken in his judg- 
 ment. The Carthaginians not daring to do 
 themselves justice, applied to the Romans for 
 redress. But all their solicitations were to no 
 purpose. Commissioners indeed set out for 
 Africa, to examine the pretensions of the par- 
 ties, and bring matters to an issue. These find- 
 ing Masinissa already possessed of the territo- 
 ries in question, chose rather to leave the affair 
 undecided than either oblige the king to aban- 
 don his conquests, or declare expressly against 
 the Carthaginians. The same conduct was ob- 
 served in two following deputations : whence it 
 was generally believed, that the commissioners 
 acted in a manner by order of the senate, aaiJ 
 had received private instructions to favoar 
 Masinissa, who, by this delay, had an oppor- 
 tunity of establishing himself in his usurpations, 
 
 KV. It was upon occasion of the last of 
 these deputations that the elder Cato, who 
 was one of the commissioners, observing the 
 flourishing condition of Carthage, and its great 
 power and riches, notwithstanding the many 
 losses it had sustained, could not help consi- 
 dering it as a very dangerous rival to his coun- 
 try. Accordingly at his return, he declared in 
 the senate, that Rome could never be safe, so 
 long as Carthage should subsist. Nay, so deeply 
 had this apprehension rooted itself in his mind, 
 that in order to keep alive in his countrymen 
 a sense of their danger, he never spoke upon 
 public affairs, but he always concluded his 
 opinion with this sentence, Carthage must be- 
 destroyed. — And indeed the Romans, naturally 
 averse to that city, and mindful of the many 
 calamities they had suffered from it, were easily 
 persuaded to come into this design. Nor was 
 it long before an opportunity offered itself. 
 
 The Carthaginians, exasperated to the last 
 degree by the continual encroachments of Ma- 
 sinissa, and seeing no hopes of redress from 
 the senate, had recourse to arms. A battle 
 was fought, in which they were defeated, their 
 camp taken, and their whole army cut to pieces. 
 The Romans resolving to take advantage of 
 this blow, and of the pretence furnished by the 
 quarrel with Masinissa, declared war in form- 
 All the endeavours of the Carthaginians to 
 mollify them were without effect. They even 
 C 
 
10 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 made an absolute surrender of their city and 
 territories ; and, in obedience to the orders of 
 the senate, sent three hundred of their principal 
 nobility as hostages, and delivered up without 
 fraud all their arms. But these acts of sub- 
 mission were enjoined, only in the view of 
 weakening, and rendering them incapable of 
 resistance. For the Romans still peremptorily 
 demanding that they should abandon their city 
 and give it up to be demolished, compelled 
 them at last to arm in their own defence. 
 
 XVI. I thought it necessary to be thus 
 particular in my account of the wars between 
 these two states, because they best serve to 
 show what credit is due to the pompous ac- 
 counts we meet with in historians, of the sin- 
 cerity and inviolable justice of the Romans. 
 For here, if any where, we may expect to 
 find samples of that equity and moderation. 
 Here we may look for a conduct altogether 
 clear and void of reproach. It is certain 
 that the Romans always valued themselves in 
 a particular manner upon their good faith, and 
 exact observance of treaties with the Cartha- 
 ginians. This evidently appears by the ad- 
 'Vantageous testimony Csesar gives of his 
 countrymen in this respect, in that famous 
 speech of his in Sallust, upon occasion of 
 ■the conspiracy of Catiline. " Bellis Punicis 
 omnibus, cum ssepe Carthaginienses, et in 
 pace, et per inducias, multa nefanda facinora 
 fecissent ; nunquam ipsi per occasionem talia 
 fecere ; magis quod se dignum foret, quam 
 quod in illis jure fieri posset, quserebant." 
 ^' Although in all the Punic wars, the Car- 
 thaginians, both in peace, and during truces, 
 ■were guilty of many abuses and violations of 
 their engagements ; the Romans, how invi- 
 ting soever the opportunity might be, could 
 yet never be prevailed upon to retaliate the 
 like usage. They were more attentive to 
 their own glory, than to the revenge they 
 might have justly taken on such perfidious 
 enemies." We find likewise a great many 
 reflections to the same purpose sprinkled up 
 and down the writings of Cicero ; from all 
 which it is easy to judge, how irreproachable 
 they thought their conduct on this head, and 
 what a pattern of justice and moderation. But 
 if, notwithstanding all these favourable repre- 
 sentations, it still appears so very liable to 
 ■exceptions, how much less can it be justified 
 with regard to other states'! And, indeed, 
 were I lb enter into a particular detail, I 
 
 could easily evince, that it was no other than 
 a continued train of insults and provocations 
 designedly calculated to exasperate such states 
 as were most obnoxious, and force them to have 
 recourse to arms. It will doubtless appear 
 wonderful to the reader, how, amidst such a 
 series of oppressive conduct, the Romans still 
 found means to preserve, in some measure, the 
 reputation of justice and equity. But this, 
 as we have before intimated, was chiefly 
 owing to their observance of certain outward 
 forms. They never failed to contrive some 
 ground of complaint against those nations 
 they intended to attack ; to send deputies to 
 demand satisfaction ; and to make formal de- 
 claration of war by a herald, previous to the 
 commencing of hostilities. It must indeed 
 be owned, that it required no small art and 
 policy, so to involve and entangle themselves 
 with all the nations of the then known world, 
 that they could at pleasure find some specious 
 pretence of quarrel, when their interest re- 
 quired them to break with any state. This 
 gave a colour of justice to all their undertak- 
 ings, inspired their armies with assurance and 
 confidence, inviolably attached to them their 
 old friends, and procured them new allies 
 at pleasure. And as it seems to have been 
 one of their master-strokes in politics, and 
 the principal engine by which they pushsd 
 on their conquests, it may not be amiss to 
 give the reader some little insight into their 
 artful conduct in this respect, that he may 
 the better comprehend the motives and ten- 
 dency of it. 
 
 XVII. Although I cannot bring myself to 
 think, with some modern writers, of pretend- 
 ed depth and penetration, that Numa Pom- 
 pilius had a political view in the several re- 
 ligious regulations he established at Rome ; 
 yet I am ready enough to allow, that many of 
 his institutions were afterwards, by the prudent 
 management of the senate, converted into 
 maxims of state, and rendered ver}' serviceable 
 in the administration of the government. Of 
 this nature particularly were the ceremonies 
 relating to the declaration of war. Nothing 
 is of greater consequence to an ambitious re- 
 public, which aims at universal dominion, and 
 a gradual subjection of all nations, than to 
 prevent such a general confederacy against 
 her, as might not only put a stop to her con- 
 quests, but even threaten her in her turn with 
 destruction. This the senate effected by their 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 11 
 
 singular address and conduct, in the several 
 wars in which they were engaged. For they 
 always found means to colour them over with 
 such a specious pretence of justice, as gave 
 no umbrage to the neighbouring states, nor 
 6egot any jealousy of a power which seemed 
 to have nothing in view but the redressing of 
 its own wrongs, or those of other nations in 
 alliance with it. That strong bent towards 
 religion, and the worship of the gods, which 
 Numa introduced among the people, and 
 which the senate carefully cheribhed for many 
 generations, helped greatly to forward this 
 persuasion. Men were not apt to distrust a 
 religious republic, where virtue was held in 
 honour, and vice of every kind discounte- 
 nanced. Let me add, that in the early ages 
 of this state, this was more than mere pretence. 
 They were really distinguished by their pro- 
 bity, by a steady adherence to justice, and 
 a faithful observance of treaties. Most of 
 their wars were defensive, or undertaken for 
 the sake -of their allies. And though in after 
 times, in proportion as their power increased, 
 they gave way to the dictates of ambition and 
 became less scrupulous in their conduct ; yet 
 as they never departed from those outward 
 observances, by which the appearance of jus- 
 tice is maintained, and took care to signalize 
 themselves from time to time, by such par- 
 ticular instances of moderation, as could not fail 
 to make a deep impression ; their reputation for 
 equity and good faith continued still the same. 
 XVIII. Observe, I beseech you, the differ- 
 * ent sentiments entertained of the Romans and 
 Carthaginians, at the time of the rupture be- 
 tween the two states. The Romans, though 
 they had gradually'' subjected all the nations 
 of Italy, and raised themselves to a very formi- 
 dable pitch of greatness, were yet so far from 
 being considered as an ambitious republic, 
 against whom it was necessary for other states 
 to be upon their guard, that the fame of their 
 virtue and justice seems at this time to have 
 been at the highest ; insomuch that foreign na- 
 tions, instead of dreading their power, courted 
 their alliance and amity. It was otherwise 
 with the Carthaginians. They had been less 
 ^ careful to conceal their ambition, or cover their 
 breach of treaties under a pretence of injuries. 
 Hence their designs became suspected, all 
 their actions- were viewed in their worst light, 
 and the general prejudice against them was so 
 strong, that every tt?ig laid to their charge 
 
 by their enemies found a ready belief. By 
 this means it happened, that though in the in- 
 terval between the first and second Punic wars, 
 the Romans acted without the least regard to 
 justice and the faith of treaties, yet very little 
 notice was taken of the complaints of the Car- 
 thaginians : and when, in consequence of re- 
 peated insults and provocations, they were at 
 last obliged to have recourse to arms, the whole 
 blame of the war, though so manifestly flowing 
 from the injurious behaviour of the Romans, 
 was nevertheless charged upon the perfidy of 
 the Carthaginians. 
 
 XIX. After the entire conquest of Italy, 
 and the reduction of the greatest part of Si. 
 cily in the first Punic war, it required a more 
 refined policy in the Romans, to extend the 
 limits of their empire, and at the same time keep 
 up the reputation of their integrity. They were 
 not immediately surrounded with those nations, 
 which it was their interest to attack; and there- 
 fore could not easily provoke them to such acts 
 of hostility, as might justify a declaration of 
 war. And should they upon slight pretences 
 transport an array out of their own territories, 
 to fall upon a distant prince, their design of 
 conquest would be visible, and beget a general 
 alarm. Besides, their power was become so very 
 formidable, that foreign states did not care to 
 contend with them, and therefore industriously 
 avoided giving them any just ground of com. 
 plaint. In this situation they took upon them- 
 selves the title of patrons and protectors of all na. 
 tions, and by contracting alliances with weaker 
 states, found means to fall upon the stronger at 
 pleasure,without seeming themselves to have any 
 particular interest in the quarrel. It was upon this 
 principle that they attached themselves to the 
 Saguntines and iEtolians, which afterwards fur. 
 nished them with such a plausible colour for the 
 Carthaginian and Macedonian wars. To know 
 the full reach and value of this policy, we need 
 only reflect, that though the second Punic war 
 was unexceptionably just on the part of the Car- 
 thaginians ; yet the Romans, by diverting the 
 attention of the public from the usurpation of 
 Sardinia, and fixing it upon the fate of Sagun- 
 tura, threw the whole odium of that war upon 
 their adversaries, whilst themselves were con- 
 sidered as a humane generous people, actuated 
 merely by a concern for their allies. 
 
 XX. And here it is particularly deserving 
 of our notice, that amongst the many wars in 
 which they were engaged, after the conclusion 
 
12 
 
 THE ROMAiN 
 
 of that with Hannibal, we hardly meet with 
 any that can be deemed personaL It was al- 
 ways, at least in appearance, to support the 
 cause of some of their allies, or prevent their 
 being crushed by a powerful neighbour. One 
 would be apt to think, that they had it not so 
 much in view to aggrandize themselves, as to 
 prevent the growth of any dangerous power, 
 from which weaker states might be exposed 
 to suffer. Upon the conclusion of the first 
 Macedonian war, they proclaimed liberty to 
 all the states of Greece. This action, so 
 magnificent in appearance, was in reality a 
 refined stroke of policy. The Greeks were a 
 warlike people, well disciplined, and capable 
 of bringing great armies into the field. Had 
 they suspected the Romans of a design upon 
 their liberties, and united in their own defence, 
 they must have been invincible. But this 
 seeming grant of freedom effectually lulled 
 them asleep, and by the artful conduct of the 
 Romans, gave birth to infinite divisions among 
 them ; which ending commonly in an appeal 
 to Rome, furnished the senate with frequent 
 opportunities of taking part in their quarrels. 
 Thus they insensibly grew to be rulers and 
 dictators over them, and by slow impercep- 
 tible steps accomplished their subjection. 
 
 XXI. Their ambassadors to foreign princes, 
 and such as had not yet felt the weight of 
 their power, commonly delivered themselves in 
 such a haughty magisterial way, as could not 
 fail to draw upon them some indignity or ill 
 treatment, and thereby furnish a sure pretence 
 of war, when the interest of the commonwealth 
 rendered such a step necessary. If a people 
 at any time had given them umbrage, and 
 afterwards repenting of their rashness, sur- 
 rendered up the principal offenders; they 
 would often refuse to punish them, choosing 
 rather to consider the whole nation as guilty, 
 and reserve to themselves an useful vengeance. 
 When they saw two nations engaged in war, 
 although they were not in alliance, nor had 
 any contest with either of them, they would 
 nevertheless appear upon the stage of action, 
 and affected always to side with the weakest. 
 It was an ancient custom, says Dionysius of 
 Halicarnassus, for the Romans to grant suc- 
 cour to all who came to implore it. If princes 
 of the same blood were at variance for the 
 crown, they seldom failed to make themselves 
 parties in the dispute ; and if one of them was 
 a minor, declared in his favour, proclaiming 
 
 themselves his guardians, in quality of pro- 
 tectors of the world. When subjects, oppress, 
 ed and tyrannised jver by their sovereigns, 
 were provoked to renounce their allegiance, 
 they immediately indulged them the title of 
 ally, declaring themselves the professed ene- 
 mies of tyranny and lawless power. 
 
 XXII. These were the arts and policies, 
 by which the Romans so entangled themselves 
 with all nations, that they could with pleasure 
 engage in a war with any state, and colour it 
 over with such an appearance of justice, as 
 not only prevented any general confederacy 
 against them, but even warmly engaged their 
 allies in the support of their usurpations. 
 Nor were they less politic in the choice of 
 their wars, and in the manner of conducting 
 and bringing them to a period. For as their 
 power was very formidable, and they had con- 
 trived to draw many nations over to their in- 
 terest ; whatever state took up arms against 
 them, found it impossible to make any long 
 resistance, and was in the end forced to ac- 
 cept of such conditions of peace as they 
 thought fit to propose. For this reason war 
 was seldom declared against them, but them- 
 selves always made it, at a season, with a 
 people, and in such a manner as best suited 
 their interest. If they were opposed by 
 several enemies at the same time, they grant- 
 ed a truce to the weakest, who thought 
 themselves happy in obtaining it, considering 
 it as a great advantage, that their ruin was at 
 least suspended. They never engaged in far- 
 distant wars, till they had first made an 
 alliance with some power contiguous to the 
 enemy they invaded, who might unite his 
 troops to the army they sent ; and as this was 
 never considerable with regard to numbers, 
 they always had another in that province 
 which lay nearest the enemy, and a third, in 
 Rome, ever ready to march at a minute's 
 warning. In this manner they hazarded but 
 a small part of their forces at once, and 
 found it easy to repair any loss they might 
 sustain, whilst their enemy was often ruined 
 by a single battle. It was this consideration 
 that inspired Hannibal with the resolution of 
 attacking them in Italy itself, the centre of 
 their dominions. He was sensible that a blow 
 struck there, must effectually weaken them ; 
 whereas distant defeats, so long as the capital 
 remained unmolested, and was at liberty to 
 send a fresh supply of troops to recruit the 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 13 
 
 army, were, properly speaking, little other 
 than so many lessons of prudence to their 
 generals, who soon found themselves in a 
 condition to renew the war with greater forces, 
 and more circumspection. Accordingly we 
 find, that when the same Hannibal after- 
 ■^ards offered his service to Antiochus, in his 
 intended war against the Romans, there was 
 no principle he inculcated more earnestly, than 
 the necessity of sending an army into Italy, 
 and cutting them off from those continual re- 
 sources, by which, in any other method of at- 
 tack, they found themselves invincible. 
 
 XXXIII. But nothing gives us a greater 
 idea of the address and policy of this people, 
 than the manner in which they terminated 
 their wars, when they had at last brought them 
 to the point they desired. They sent the gar- 
 risons out of the strong holds ; had the horses 
 and elephants delivered up to them ; and if 
 their enemies were powerful at sea, obliged 
 them to burn their ships, and sometimes re- 
 move higher up in the country. If the prince 
 they had overcome was possessed of numerous 
 armies, and surrounded with warlike nations, 
 one of the articles of the treaty was, that he 
 should not make war with any of the allies of 
 the Romans, but submit his differences to ar- 
 bitration. And as they never refused their al- 
 liance to any people who bordered on a pow- 
 erful prince, this condition inserted in a treaty 
 of peace, cut him off from all opportunities of 
 making war, or employing his troops, and there- 
 by deprived him of a military power for the 
 time to come. Nay, they even bereaved their 
 very allies of this force. The instant any con- 
 test broke out amongst them, they sent ambas- 
 sadors who obliged them to conclude a peace. 
 It was in this manner they terminated the wars 
 between Attains and Prusias ; and whoever is 
 in the least acquainted with their histor}', must 
 be sensible, that they all along adhered strictl}' 
 to this policy. The result was, that they alone 
 were possessed of warlike and veteran armies, 
 whilst those of other nations degenerated into 
 a raw unpractised rabble. When any state 
 composed too formidable a body, from its situa- 
 tion or union, they never failed to divide it. 
 The republic of Achaia was formed by an as- 
 sociation of free cities. The senate declared, 
 that every city should be governed by its own 
 laws, independent on the general authority. 
 Macedonia was surrounded with inaccessible 
 mountaine The senate divided it into four 
 
 parts ; declared those free ; prohibited them 
 every kind of alliance among themselves by 
 marriage ; carried off all the nobles into Ita- 
 ly ; and by that means reduced this power to 
 nothing. 
 
 XXIV. These customs of the Romans were 
 not certain particular incidents which hap- 
 pened by chance; but so many invariable prin- 
 ciples, from which, in a long course of years, 
 they never deviated. The maxims they put 
 in practice against the greatest monarchs, were 
 exactly the same with those they had em- 
 ployed in their infant state, against the little 
 cities which stood round them. They made 
 Eumenes and Masinissa contribute to the sub- 
 jection of Philip and Antiochus, as they had 
 before employed the Latins and Hernici to 
 subdue the Volscians and the Tuscans. They 
 obliged the Carthaginians and the kings of 
 Asia to surrender their fleets to them, in like 
 manner as they had forced the citizens of An- 
 tium to give up their little vessels. And in- 
 deed it is surprising to consider, that during 
 the course of that long and mighty prosperity 
 which attended the Roman arms, and in which 
 it is so usual for mankind to forget themselves 
 the senate continued to act all along with the 
 same depth of judgment, and the same steady 
 views to the public interest. They were not 
 dazzled by their good fortune, nor moved to 
 precipitate their enterprises before the proper 
 season. Observe, I entreat you, the wisdom 
 and policy of their conduct. After the defeat 
 of Antiochus, they were possessed of Africa, 
 Asia, and Greece, without having a single city 
 in those countries, that could be called imme- 
 diately their own. They seemed to conquer with 
 no other view but to bestow. But then they 
 obtained so complete a sovereignty, that when- 
 ever they engaged in war with any prince, 
 thev oppressed him, as it were, with the weight 
 of the whole universe. The time proper for 
 seizing upon the conquered countries was 
 not yet come. Had the Romans kept the 
 cities they took from Philip, the Greeks would 
 have seen at once into their designs. Had 
 they, after the second Punic war, or that with 
 Antiochus, possessed themselves of lands in 
 Africa and Asia, they could never have pre- 
 served conquests so slightly established. It 
 was the interest of the senate to wait till all 
 nations were accustomed to obey as free and 
 as confederate, and to let them blend and lose 
 themselves insensibly in the Roman com- 
 
14 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 monwealth before they should attempt reduc- 
 ing them to the condition of subjects. After 
 overcoming a nation, they contented themselves 
 with weakening it, and imposing such condi- 
 tions as consumed it insensibly. If it recovered, 
 they depressed it still more, and it became 
 subject, without a possibility of dating the era 
 of its subjection. This was indeed a slow way 
 of conquering, but founded in the deepest policy. 
 Rome, by steady adherence to these maxims, 
 gradually increased in strength ; and having 
 at length got the better of all opposition, se- 
 curely took possession of the sovereignty of 
 the universe. 
 
 CHAP. H. 
 
 OF THE BIANNER OF LEVYING TROOPS, AND 
 FORMING A ROMAN ARMY. 
 
 I. The levies, during the times of the com- 
 monwealth, to which period we chiefly con- 
 fine ourselves, were commonly made by the 
 consuls. Every year they issued out an edict, 
 commanding all who had reached the military 
 age, to appear in the field of Mars, or in the 
 capital. Two legions composed a consular 
 army ; and as there were two consuls, it was 
 usual to raise four legions yearly. The age for 
 serving in the army was from seventeen to 
 forty-five. None but citizens were admitted ; 
 and all of that rank within the age prescribed 
 by law, were obliged to be present on the day 
 prefixed, under pain of a fine. To fail in this 
 respect was long criminal during the common- 
 wealth. The people being assembled, the con- 
 suls began, by nominating the military tribunes, 
 twenty-four in number, six to every legion. 
 Of these, fourteen were chosen out of the body 
 of the knights, and the rest from among the 
 people. The first were required to have 
 served at least five years, and the others ten. 
 They were divided to the four legions in this 
 manner. Of the fourteen youngest tribunes, 
 four were assigned to the first legion, three to 
 the second, four to the third, and three to the 
 last. Of the ten eldest, two to the first and 
 third legions, and three to the second and last. 
 II. The four and twenty tribunes thus chosen 
 and appointed, every tribe was called out by 
 lot, and ordered to divide into its proper cen- 
 turies. Four men, as much alike in all circum- 
 
 stances as cci..id be found, being presented out 
 of the century on whom the lot fell, the tri- 
 bunes of the first legion chose one, then the tri- 
 bunes of the second another, the tribunes of the 
 third legion a third, and the remaining person 
 fell to the tribunes of the fourth. After this four 
 more were drawn out. And now the right of 
 choosing first belonged to the tribunes of the 
 second legion ; in the next four to the tribunes 
 of the third legion ; then to the tribunes of the 
 fourth legion ; and so continually, those always 
 choosing last in every turn, who chose first 
 the time before. From this manner of choos^_ 
 ing the soldiers, one by one, the several large 
 bodies into which they were formed, obtained 
 the name of legions, from the Latin word legere, 
 to chooge ; and the levy itself was called de- 
 lectus, choice. No soldier was admitted under 
 the height of five Roman feet and ten inches, 
 except in an extreme want of troops, which 
 would not allow of choosing. It is observed, 
 that the men of the first cohorts of each legion 
 were not under six feet high, which amounts 
 to five feet ten inches of our measure, the 
 Roman foot making eleven inches and six hun- 
 dred and four decimal parts of an inch English. 
 III. The horse were chosen out of the body 
 of the Equites, into which order, after the in- 
 stitution of the Census by Servius Tullius, all 
 were admitted who were worth four hundred 
 sestertia. They had a horse and ring given 
 them at the public charge, and formed a third 
 and middle order between the senate and the 
 people. They are known in history under the 
 name of Roman knights, and were obliged to 
 appear on horseback, as often as the state had ^ 
 occasion for their service. Thus there was 
 always a sufficient number of cavalry in readi- y 
 ness, and it belonged to the censors to reviev/ 
 them, and furnish what was necessary to conV- * 
 plete the legions. It is indeed hard to con- 
 ceive, that all the Roman horse in the army 
 should be knights ; and therefore many 
 learned men are of opinion, that, after the siege 
 of Veil, there were two sorts of cavalry in the 
 Roman armies : one, whom the public supplied 
 with horses, and who were said to serve equo 
 publico; the other, who furnished themselves, ( 
 and served eguo privato. The former they 
 allow to have been of the order of knights, the 
 latter not. But Grsevius has abundantly de- 
 monstrated, by the course of history, that from . \_ 
 the beginning of the Roman state, till the time 
 of Marius, no other horse entered the legions 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 15 
 
 but the true and proper knights, except in the 
 midst of public confusion, when order and dis- 
 cipline were neglected. After that period, 
 the military affairs being new modelled, the 
 knights thought not fit to expose themselves 
 abroad in the legions, as they had formerly 
 done, but generally kept at home to enjoy 
 their estates, and to have a hand in the 
 transactions of the city, leaving their places 
 in the army to be supplied by foreign horse. 
 Or if they ever made campaigns themselves, 
 they held some post of honour and command. 
 Hence, under the emperors, a man might be 
 a knight and have the honour of a public 
 horse, without ever engaging in the public 
 cause, or so much as touching arms : which 
 consideration made some princes lay aside the 
 custom of allowing the knights a horse, and 
 leave them only the gold ring to distinguish 
 their order, as Pliny the elder affirms to have 
 been done in his time, 
 
 IV. When the levies were completed, the 
 tribunes of every legion obliged the soldiers, 
 one by one, to take the military oath. The 
 form in this case was, to "choose out a soldier, 
 ^ who repeated the oath aloud. By this oath he 
 engaged to hazard his life for the common- 
 wealth, to obey his general, and not to quit 
 the army without leave. In pronouncing it 
 he held up his right hand, raising the thumb 
 of it upright ; after which all the soldiers of 
 each legion declared that they swore the 
 same thing, but without repeating the form. 
 • This was not a mere ceremony, but a very so- 
 lemn act of religion, and so essential to the 
 military state, that no man was deemed a sol- 
 dier nor allowed to strike or kill an enemy, if 
 he had not taken the customary oath. We 
 ' have a remarkable example of this in the be- 
 haviour of Cato the Censor. A legion, in 
 which the son of that illustrious senator served, 
 being dismissed by the consul who commanded 
 in Macedonia, young Cato chose to continue 
 with the army. His father, thereupon, wrote 
 immediately to the consul, to desire, if he 
 thought fit to suffer his son to remain in the 
 service, that he would make him take a new 
 oath, because being discharged from the for- 
 mer, he had no longer any right to join in 
 battle against the enemy. We find, likewise, 
 that among the Greeks the military oath was 
 accounted inseparable from the state of a sol- 
 dier. And Xenophon in his history of Cyrus 
 the Great, informs us, that that prince ex- 
 
 ceedingly applauded the action of an cifficer, 
 who having raised his arm to strike an enemy, 
 upon hearing the retreat sounded, stopped 
 short, regarding that signal as an order to 
 proceed no farther. 
 
 V. After administering the military oath, 
 the next care of the tribunes was to form the 
 troops into legions. The exact number of 
 soldiers in such a battalion was not always the 
 same. Romulus fixed it at three thousand 
 foot, and three hundred horse. It afterwards 
 rose to four, five, and six thousand. Under 
 the consuls it was commonly four thousand 
 two hundred foot, and three hundred horse. 
 This was the number in the time of Poly- 
 bius, and here I shall fix it. In order 
 thoroughly to comprehend the nature of the 
 legion, so famous in history, we must be. 
 gin with observing that the whole infantry 
 of which it vi'as composed, was divided into 
 four orders, Velites, Hastati, Principes, and 
 Triarii. The Velites were young, active 
 soldiers, and formed the light-armed troops 
 of the Roman commonwealth : They had 
 their name d volando, or d velocitn.te, from 
 their swiftness and expedition. They were 
 not divided into companies, nor had any fixed 
 post assigned them in a day of battle, but 
 hovered in loose order before the army, oi 
 were disposed among the cavalry and heavy, 
 armed troops, as occasion required. The 
 Hastati were so called, because they used 
 in ancient times to fight with spears, which 
 were afterwards laid aside as incommodious. 
 These were taken out in the next age to the 
 Velites, and formed the first line in a day of 
 battle. The Principes were generally men of 
 middle age, in the prime and vigour of life, 
 whence probably they took their name. Their 
 post in an engagement was the second line. 
 The Triarii were old soldiers of distinguished 
 valour, who had served long and acquired 
 great experience. They had their name from 
 their post in the field of battle, forming the 
 third line or reserve. They are likewise some- 
 times called Pilani, from their weapon the 
 Pilum. 
 
 VI. These several divisions formed twelve 
 hundred men a piece in the three first orders, 
 and six hundred in the last, amounting in all 
 to four thousand two hundred, the entire in- 
 fantry of a legion. Each body, the Velites 
 excepted, was subdivided into ten parts or 
 maniples, consisting of a hundred and twenty 
 
16 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 in the Hastati and Principes, and of sixty in 
 the Triarii. Every maniple made two centu- 
 ries of companies. Anciently, and at its first 
 institution by Romulus, the century had a 
 hundred men, from which it took its name. 
 But afterwards, it consisted only of sixty in the 
 hastati and principes, and of thirty in the 
 triarii. Three maniples, one of the hastati, 
 another of the principes, and a third of the 
 triarii, composed a cohort. Every legion, 
 therefore, consisted of ten cohorts, besides the 
 twelve hundred velites, who, as we have al- 
 ready observed, were divided into distinct com- 
 panies. The number of legions kept on foot 
 was different according to the different exigen- 
 cies of the state. During the commonwealth, 
 four legions were usually levied every year, and 
 divided between the two consuls. But in case 
 of necessity, the number was augmented, and 
 we sometimes meet with eighteen in Livy. 
 
 VII. We have observed that every maniple 
 was divided into two centuries or companies. 
 Over each of these presided an officer, called 
 a centurion. To determine the point of prior- 
 ity between them, they were created at two 
 different elections. Those of the first elec- 
 tion, as the most honourable, always took the 
 precedency of their fellows, and therefore com- 
 manded the right hand orders, as the others 
 did the left. He who commanded the first 
 century of the first maniple of the triarii, 
 called also pilam, was the most considerable 
 of all the centurions, and had a place in 
 the counsel of war with the consul and prin- 
 cipal officers. He bore the name of pri- 
 inipilus, or primipili centitrio ; and was called 
 likewise primipibis prior, to distinguish him 
 from the centurion who commanded the second 
 century of the same maniple, who had the title 
 of primipilus posterior. This distinction of 
 prior and posterior had place also in all the 
 other maniples. The centurion who com- 
 manded the first century of the second mani- 
 ple of the triarii was called secnndi pili cen- 
 turio s and so on to the tenth, who was called 
 decimi pili centurio. The same order was 
 observed among the hastati and principes. 
 The first centurion of the principes was called 
 priimis princeps, or primi principis centurio. 
 The second, secjindus princeps, &c. and so on 
 to the last. So likewise among the hastati, 
 primus hastatus, or primi hastati centurio, 
 Secundus hastatus, &c. through all the differ- 
 ent orders. As it belonged to the militairv 
 
 tribunes to appoint the centurions, so these 
 last chose vexillarii, or ensigns, two to every 
 maniple. They had likewise officers under 
 them, called succentur-iones, or optiones, and 
 who were in the nature of our lieutenants. 
 Polybius mentions them under the name of 
 tergiductors, their post being in the rear of 
 the company. 
 
 VIII. The cavalry required to a legion 
 was three hundred. They were divided into 
 ten turmsR, or troops, thirty to a troop. Every 
 troop consisted of three decurix, or bodies of 
 ten men. Over each of these was a captain, 
 called decuno. He that was first elected 
 commanded the whole troop, and had the title 
 of prxfectus. The decurions had every one 
 his optio, or deputy, under him, who, in like 
 manner as in the foot, were called tergiduc. 
 tors. These squadrons often occur in history 
 under the name of alx, because they always 
 formed the wings of the legion. At the time 
 the Romans warred against the lesser nations 
 of Italy, their horse was incomparably supe. 
 rior to that of their enemies, for which reason 
 they were composed of none but the most con- 
 siderable among the citizens, being, as we have 
 observed, selected wholly out of the order of 
 the knights. W^hen they alighted, no infantry 
 was more formidable, and they very often turn, 
 ed the scale of victory. It must be owned, how- 
 ever, that their cavalry were but few, in pro. 
 portion to their foot ; and though they served 
 well enough for their Italian wars, yet they 
 became fully sensible of this inconvenience 
 when they had to do with Hannibal. It was 
 chiefly by the superiority of his cavalry, and 
 his manner of using it, that he gained so many 
 victories over them. Accordingly, they applied 
 themselves seriously to the improvement of 
 this part of their strength, not only by inter, 
 mixing platoons of foot with their cavalry and 
 training them particularly to that service, but 
 likewise by taking foreign horse into their pay, 
 Numidians, Gauls, and Germans. 
 
 IX. Besides the troops already mentioned, 
 there were always in the Roman armies a 
 number of soldiers, of a more eminent degree, 
 known by the title of evorati. They were 
 such as had served out the legal time, and 
 been distinguished by particular marks of fa- 
 vour, as a reward of their valour. It was 
 usual for the consuls, especially in important 
 wars, to invite a great number of these into the 
 service, by circular letters despatched for that 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 17 
 
 purpose. The reputation of a general was 
 what chiefly induced them to grant their at- 
 tendance, and therefore it was considered as a 
 paiticular mark of honour. In the field they 
 usually guarded the chief standard, being ex- 
 cused from all the military drudgery of stand- 
 ing on the watch, labouring in the works, or 
 other servile employments. They had like- 
 wise the privilege of using the vitis or rod, 
 which was the badge of the centurion's office, 
 and indeed were in all respects rather superior 
 to the centurions. It was very common, when 
 any general of an established reputation, and 
 who had long distinguished himself in the ser- 
 vice of his country, was appointed to the man- 
 agement of a difficult war, to see great numbers 
 of these flock to his standard, and offer them- 
 selves anew to dangers and fatigues, in hopes 
 of gaining fresh laurels, under the auspices of 
 a commander who had often in their youth led 
 them to honour and victory. Thus it happened 
 to Paulus ^milius, when he was charged with 
 the conduct of the Macedonian war. And thus 
 also to the younger Scipio Africanus, when, af- 
 ter a series of disgraces before Numantia, the 
 Romans cast their eyes upon him, as alone 
 capable of restoring the reputation of their arms. 
 X. But to return to the legions. The of- 
 ficers next in dignity to the centurions were the 
 military tribunes, of whom we have already 
 given some account. They owed their name 
 ind institution to Romulus, who having divi- 
 ded the whole body of the citizens into three 
 tribes, appointed an officer over each, with 
 the title of tribune. The number afterwards 
 increased to six in every legion. During the 
 infancy of the commonwealth they were no- 
 minated by the consuls ; and afterwards, partly 
 by the consuls, partly by the people. Their 
 business was to decide all controversies in the 
 army ; to give the word to the watch ; to see 
 that the soldiers observed discipline, obeyed 
 orders, and did their duty ; and to take care 
 of the works and camp. None could attain this 
 dignity, who had not served in the army five 
 years ; and of the twenty-four that were annu- 
 ally chosen, ten at least must have served ten 
 years. Care was also taken to distribute them 
 in such a manner, that in each legion the most 
 experienced were united with those who were 
 younger, in order to instruct and form them 
 for commanding. By this means the legions 
 were always provided with able officers, which 
 could not fail of having an excellent eflfect up- 
 3 
 
 on the troops, as it naturally tended to inspire 
 them with valour, and beget an esteem and 
 confidence in their commanders. During the 
 campaign, which lasted six months, they com- 
 manded the legion by turns, two at a time, foi 
 two months together. The order in which 
 they were to command was decided by lot. 
 
 XI. The troops we have hitherto been ('< - 
 scribing, maj- properly be termed the natural 
 forces of the republic, as consisting wholly of 
 her own citizens. They were indeed the origi- 
 nal armies of Rome, and all along constituted 
 her main strength. But this political common- 
 wealth, when she began to extend her dominion 
 over Italy, instead of reducing the vanquished 
 nations to slavery, indulged them the title of 
 allies, and the free enjoyment of their own 
 laws, upon condition of supplying her in her 
 wars with a certain proportion of men. These 
 were called the allied troops, and as to number, 
 were equal to the natural forces in foot, and 
 double in horse. The manner of levying 
 them was this. The consuls, while they were 
 employed in completing the legions at Rome, 
 gave notice to the allied states what number 
 of forces they would have occasion for, and 
 appointed a time and place of rendezvous. The 
 states accordingly convened their men, and 
 choosing out the desired number, gave them 
 an oath, and assigned them a commander-in- 
 chief, and a paymaster-general. When they 
 arrived in the camp, they were divided into 
 two great bodies, termed alx, or corima, from 
 their position in the army. For the Romans 
 always reserved the centre to themselves, placing 
 the confederates, half on the right, and half 
 on the left wings. And because they were 
 more numerous than the natural forces, care 
 was taken farther to separate them, by se- 
 lecting a third part of the horse, and a fifth 
 of the foot, and posting them near the con- 
 sul's person, under the name of extraordi- 
 narii. It is not certainly known how the 
 smaller bodies of the confederate forces were 
 commanded. Most probably the Romans mar- 
 shalled them according to their own disci- 
 pline, and assigned them officers of the same 
 nature with those of the legions. This seems 
 to follow from the manner in which they 
 fought, it appearing evidently by the course 
 of history, that, both as to their arms and 
 order of battle, they differed in nothing 
 from the troops of the republic. We are as- 
 sured, however, that the two alx, or great di- 
 D 
 
18 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 visions of the allies, had each a prefect appoint- 
 ed them by the Roman consul, who governed 
 in the same manner as the legionary tribunes. 
 In aftertimes, all the states of Italy were ad- 
 mitted to share the freedom of the city, and 
 their forces incorporated with those of the re- 
 public. From this period, therefore, the name 
 of the allies ceased, and in their stead the aux- 
 iliary troops were procured. These were sent 
 by foreign states and princes, at the desire of 
 the Roman senate, or generals, and were 
 allowed a set pay from the republic ; whereas 
 the allies received no consideration for their 
 service, but a distribution of corn. 
 
 XII. Over these armies of the Roman peo- 
 ple, the two consuls presided, who were the 
 standing generals of the republic. They were 
 created yearly, and in the field possessed an 
 unlimited authority : the senate reserving to 
 themselves only the power of making peace, 
 and decreeing war, unless upon extraordinary 
 occasions. The annual change of generals was 
 doubtless in some cases an obstacle to the 
 advancement of affairs ; but the danger of 
 infringing on the public liberty, by continuing 
 the same man longer in the command of all 
 the forces of the state, obliged them to over- 
 look this inconvenience, from the apprehen- 
 sion of a much greater. The necessity of 
 affairs, the distance of places, and other reasons, 
 reduced the Romans at length to continue 
 their generals in the command for several 
 years together, under the name of proconsuls 
 or proprsBtors. And as these generals had 
 often a great extent of country to defend, and 
 were obliged to employ different bodies of 
 troops in different places, they found it neces- 
 sary to have officers under them, of a more 
 extensive authority than the military tribunes. 
 This gave rise to the institution of the Legati, 
 who commanded in chief under the general, 
 and managed all affairs by his permission. 
 We find them sometimes at the head of one 
 legion, sometimes of three or four, and some- 
 times of only part of a legion. Their office 
 was accounted very honourable, insomuch that 
 the greatest men of the state, and even such 
 «s had been consuls and dictators, did not 
 disdain to accept of it. The great Fabius, as 
 is well known, was his son's lieutenant; 
 and Scipio Africanus served in the same ca- 
 pacity under the consul his brother. The 
 number was according to the general's plea- 
 sure, on whom alone the choice depended ; 
 
 and it appears, that they comaanded under 
 him, and received his orders, as lieutenant- 
 generals in our armies serve under the gene- 
 ralissimo. In the absence of the consul, or 
 proconsul, they had the honour of using 
 the fasces, and were intrusted with the same 
 charge as the oflicer whom they repre- 
 sented. 
 
 XIII. Having thus sufficiently explained 
 how the armies of the Roman people were 
 formed, and the different degrees of rank and 
 military service that prevailed in them, it is 
 time to consider a little more particularly 
 wherein their strength consisted, and to what 
 they were indebted for that superiority, which 
 rendered them victorious over the troops of 
 all other nations. The first thing that offers 
 itself to our observation here is, the nature and 
 form of the legion ; whose contrivance was so 
 admirable, that Vegetius thinks nothing less 
 than a god could inspire the idea of it. The 
 soldiers of which it was composed, were armed 
 with weapons of a heavier and stronger kind 
 than those of other nations, as we shall have 
 occasion to show more at large in the next 
 chapter. But because some things must be 
 done in war, which a heavy body is not able 
 to execute, it was therefore made to include 
 within itself a band of light forces, which 
 might issue from it in order to provoke the 
 enemy to battle, or draw back into it in case 
 of necessity. It was likewise strengthened 
 with cavalry, and with spearmen and slingers, 
 to pursue those who fled, and complete the 
 victory. The troops were all of different ex- 
 perience and standing in the service, and 
 so mixed together in the cohorts that no party 
 of Roman forces was without a sufficient 
 number of veterans, to give life and vigour 
 to its operations. The number of men in a 
 legion seems likewise to have been the effect 
 of a wise policy. For these amounting to 
 four thousand five hundred, formed a con- 
 siderable body of troops, animated by one and 
 the same spirit, and who, from their mutual 
 relation among themselves, would take a near 
 interest in each other's preservation. They 
 were in effect men of the same regiment, and 
 had all that zeal and concern for one another, 
 which is usual among those lesser divisions 
 of our troops. 
 
 XIV. The Marquis de Feuquire, in hia 
 Memoirs, observes, that, the ^ regiments of 
 which modern armies consist, are not sufficient- 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 19 
 
 ly strong in the numbet of men. He thinks 
 it might do well to form them of several 
 battalions; because such a multitude of differ- 
 ent bodies, without any immediate tie among 
 themselves, seems directly contrary to that 
 union and subordination, which constitutes 
 the great beauty of military discipline. It is 
 certain that troops always exert themselves 
 more in behalf of those of the same regiment, 
 than where the party for which they are en- 
 gaged belong to a different division. This the 
 Romans were fully sensible of, and had an 
 eye to it particularly in the constitution of their 
 legion. It was doubtless of great advantage 
 to them in a day of battle, that their lines 
 were made up of a few large bodies, linked 
 together by the strongest military ties, and 
 nearly interested in each other's preservation. 
 Nor did the number of men in these bodies 
 render them unwieldy or unmanageable ; be- 
 cause being judiciously disposed into cohorts, 
 they could be commanded with the same ease, 
 and were no less nimble in their operations, 
 than if they had formed so many independent 
 battalions. And here it is worthy of notice, 
 that in drawing up the army, the troops were 
 so disposed, as tended wonderfully to their 
 mutual support and encouragement. For as 
 the Romans commonly fought in three lines, 
 so in every one of these lines, the soldiers 
 were always so posted, as to be sustained by 
 others of the same legion. This was owing 
 to the manner of forming the lines, not by en- 
 tire legions, but by the different military 
 orders that composed the legions. The Has- 
 tati were placed in the first line, the Principes 
 in the second, and the Triarii in the third. 
 By this means the Hastati of every legion 
 were supported by the Principes of the same 
 legion, and these again by the Triarii. What 
 spirit and confidence this must add to the 
 troops, and how effectually in would tend to 
 preserve them from slaughter, when any 
 particular line was broken, will be evident 
 upon the least reflection. It is found by ex- 
 perience, that soldiers never fight better, nor 
 exert a greater share of courage, than when 
 they know themselves to be well supported ; 
 and if at last they are obliged to give way, 
 yet still the retreat is managed with less 
 terror and confusion. The Romans, in case of 
 a repulse, retired through the intervals of the 
 lines behind them ; and these consisting of 
 men of the same legion, advanced imme. 
 
 diately to their relief, and doubtless would 
 do every thing in their power to preserve their 
 fellows. This kept up the spirits of those 
 that fled, prevented their throwing away their 
 arms, and encouraged them to rally and renew 
 the charge. - 
 
 XV. There was also another advantage in 
 the constitution of the legion, arising from the 
 several military orders of which it was com- 
 posed, with their division into maniples and 
 companies. For these being very numerous, 
 and differing in point of rank and superiority, 
 opened a large field for preferment, and 
 thereby excited an incredible ardour and emu- 
 lation among the troops. A private soldier, 
 after passing through the different military 
 orders, came to be a centurion among the 
 Hastati ; and rising from one maniple to ano- 
 ther, was at length promoted into the rank 
 of the Principes. Thence, by a like gradation, 
 he reached the order of the Triarii ; and in 
 time attained the dignity of Primipilus. Nor 
 was he even obliged to stop here. For as 
 military merit was every thing at Rome, it 
 seldom failed to raise those who possessed it, 
 in any eminent degree, to the first dignities 
 of the state. The manner too in which pro- 
 motions were made, seems wonderfully calcu- 
 lated for the advancement of true bravery. 
 Every higher order of ofiicers created those 
 next below them, and so in train continually, 
 through all the different steps of the service. 
 As therefore the persons on whom the choice 
 depended, had the best opportunities of 
 knowing the merits of the several competi- 
 tors, and were likely to be determined by 
 that alone, in a matter that so nearly concern- 
 ed their own honour and safety, it is natural 
 to suppose, that every one would endeavour 
 to recommend himself by such qualifications, 
 as rendered him truly worthy of the place to 
 which he aspired. This progressive choice 
 of officers, which established so just a subor- 
 dination in the army, and gave a great as- 
 cendant to the principal commanders, con. 
 tributed more than any thing to the perfection 
 of military discipline. It is worth while to 
 observe how gradually the Romans proceeded 
 herein. The people, or state, elected the two 
 consuls ; the consuls chose the military tri 
 bunes ; the military tribunes, the centurions : 
 and the centurions, their vexillarii and tergi- 
 ductors. This method opened the fairest 
 prospect to valour, and tended to beget that 
 
20 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 spirit among the troops, which is of all others 
 the happiest that can be raised in an army, an 
 emulation to surpass each other in deserving 
 honours. 
 
 XVI. What we have hitherto said regards 
 chiefly the form and structure of the legion. 
 Let us now consider the quality of the troops 
 of which it was composed. None but citizens 
 were admitted into this body, and of all these 
 the tribunes had their choice, from seventeen 
 .to forty-five years of age. We are to observe, 
 however, that it was not every citizen whom 
 they judged worthy of this honour. By the 
 institution of the Censics, the whole Eoman 
 people were divided into distinct classes, found- 
 ed on a valuation of their estates. Those of 
 the sixth and lowest class, consisting of the 
 poorer citizens, useful only by stocking the 
 commonwealth with children, were not allowed 
 to serve in the army. The Romans were for 
 having soldiers, whose real interest in the pre- 
 servation of the state, would prompt them to 
 act with zeal in its defence. They had every 
 one their portion of land, and for the most part 
 lived in the country, to improve and cultivate 
 it with their own hands. Thus accustomed 
 to the toil of husbandry, to endure sun, rain, 
 and hail, to handle heavy instruments, dig 
 trenches, and carry burdens ; when they entered 
 the service they only changed their arms and 
 tools, and came with bodies inured to labour, 
 and seasoned to all the fatigues of the field. 
 Besides, as war was the proper profession of 
 this people, and what they were all obliged to 
 engage in, as soon as they reached the age for 
 bearing arms, military exercises made an es- 
 sential part of their education. They were 
 trained up in them from their infancy, and 
 had a space of ground within the city, called 
 the Campus Martins, where, as if actually in 
 the field, they formed themselves to all the 
 branches of the service. After their fatigues 
 they plunged into the Tiber, to accustom 
 themselves to swimming, and cleanse away 
 the dust and sweat. Hence the Romans were 
 never obliged, on any sudden emergency, to 
 commit the honour and safety of the state to a 
 raw undisciplined multitude. They had always 
 a sufficient number of men in readiness, trained 
 and habituated to war, for the forming and re- 
 cruiting their armies. 
 
 XVII. In reading the history of ancient 
 commonwealths, we can hardly forbear fancy- 
 ing, that we peruse the annals of a tet of men 
 
 altogether diflferent from ourselves. The pro. 
 digious fortune to which the Romans attained, 
 seems incredible to us. We are amazed to see 
 that republic, from an obscure inconsiderable 
 village, rising insensibly to power, extending 
 her dominion over Italy, and at last rendering 
 herself mistress of the universe : to behold her 
 citizens, even those of weight and authority in 
 the administration, serving as private men in 
 her armies ; and to find that soldiers, who in 
 our days are the dregs of every nation, were 
 in that commonwealth made up of the very 
 same people, who, at home, in times of peace, 
 created magistrates, enacted laws, and obliged 
 the senate itself to submit to their decisions. 
 Nor is it less a matter of wonder when we 
 consider the number and greatness of her 
 armies. It is evident, by experience, with re- 
 spect to modern times, than a European prince, 
 who has a million of subjects, cannot, without 
 destroying himself, keep up and maintain above 
 ten thousand men. But when we look into 
 the affairs of ancient states, especially those of 
 Sparta, Athens, and Rome, the case appears 
 to be quite otherwise. We there find, that this 
 proportion between the soldiers and the rest of 
 the people, which is now as one to a hun- 
 dred, could not in them be less than as one to 
 eight. Rome was yet confined within very 
 narrow bounds, when the Latins having re- 
 fused to succour her with the troops which had 
 been stipulated, ten legions were presently 
 raised in the city alone. And if we examine 
 the histories of Athens and Sparta, we shall 
 there meet with instances no less surprising, 
 of powerful and numerous armies, when com- 
 pared with the extent of their territories. 
 
 XVIII. To account, in some measure, for 
 so wonderful a revolution in the course of hu. 
 man affairs, it behooves us to call to mind, that 
 the founders of ancient commonwealths had 
 taken care to make an equal distribution of 
 lands, and that the several portions were al. 
 lotted to individuals, upon condition of serv. 
 ing the state in her wars. This circumstance 
 alone raised a nation to power, gave strength 
 to its armies, and made it a well regulated 
 society. By this it became equally the interest 
 of every member of the commonwealth, and 
 that a very great interest too, to exert him- 
 self in defence of his country, Romulus, 
 after assigning one part of the Roman territory 
 to the expenses of religious worship, and an. 
 other to the uses of the state, divided the re- 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 21 
 
 mamder into thirty portions, to answer to the 
 thirty Curix. Under the commonwealth, in 
 proportion as the public domain increased, it 
 was the constant practice of the senate, for 
 several ages, to allot part of the conquered 
 lands to the use of the poor citizens, and share 
 it equally among them. This was what at 
 first enabled Rome to soar above its humble 
 condition ; and the people were strongly sen- 
 sible of it, even in their corrupted state. We 
 find them constantly struggling for an agrarian 
 law, and contriving means to check the artifices 
 of those who endeavoured to elude it. The 
 avowed patrons of liberty considered this law 
 as the main bulwark of the state, and were ever 
 sounding in the ears of the senate, the mis- 
 chiefs to which they exposed themselves by 
 the violation of it. Tell me, would Tiberius 
 Gracchus say to the nobles, which is the most 
 valuable character, that of a citizen, or of a 
 perpetual slave 1 Who is most useful, a 
 soldier, or a man entirely unfit for war ? Will 
 you, merely for the sake of enjoying a few 
 more acres of land than your fellow-citizens, 
 quite lay aside the hopes of conquering the 
 test of the world, or be exposed to see your- 
 selves dispossessed, by the enemy, of those 
 very lands which you refuse us 1 
 
 XIX. And in fact we find, that in propor- 
 tion as the Romans deviated from this great 
 and original principle of government, affairs 
 began to wear the very same face, under 
 which they appear in our days. The avarice 
 of some, and the lavish profuseness of others, 
 occasioned the land to become the property of 
 a few. Immediately arts were introduced, to 
 supply the reciprocal wants of the rich and 
 poor ; by which means but very few soldiers 
 or citizens were to be seen. For the revenues 
 of the lands, that had before been employed 
 to support the latter, were now wholly be- 
 stowed on slaves and artificers, who adminis- 
 tered to the luxury of the new proprietors. But 
 it was impossible that people of this cast should 
 be good soldiers, they being cowardly and ab- 
 ject, already corrupted by the luxury of cities, 
 and often by the very art they professed. Be- 
 sides, as they might reap the fruits of their in- 
 dustry in every clime, and could not properly 
 call any country their own, they had no suf- 
 ficient tie to bind them to its defence. Nor 
 was this revolution peculiar to the republic 
 of Rome. Sparta before her had experienced 
 the like vicissitude. Lycurgus left no less 
 3* 
 
 than thirty thousand citizens behind him, who 
 in the time of Agis and Cleomenes were 
 reduced to seven hundred, scarce an eighth 
 part of whom was possessed of lands. The 
 rest were no more than a cowardly populace. 
 These two kings undertook to revive the an- 
 cient laws on this occasion, and from that time 
 Lacedemonia recovered its former power, and 
 again became formidable to all the states of 
 Greece. Had Tiberius and Caius Gracchus 
 equally succeeded in their design of reform 
 ing the Roman commonwealth, the loss of 
 liberty, and all the miseries consequent upon 
 it, might have been prevented. But their 
 untimely fate discouraging others from engaging 
 in the same cause, Rome soon after, instead of 
 being defended by, became a prey to, her own 
 legions. Nor ought we to wonder, if men who 
 had no property in the state, and might hope 
 more from its overthrow than preservation, 
 were easily induced to conspire its ruin. 
 
 XX. But the equal distribution of lands, 
 was not that alone which gave strength to the 
 armies of Rome. There were other circum- 
 stances, peculiar to the times and constitution 
 of that republic, which contributed not a little 
 to its grandeur. The trade of a soldier was 
 not then, as m our days, a slavery for life, at- 
 tended with infinite fatigue, and scarce any 
 profit. As the art of exactly fortifying places 
 was httle known, and less practised, national 
 quarrels were decided by battle, and one 
 gained, often put an end to the war. Hence 
 the service was, properly speaking, little more 
 than so many summer campaigns. The ar- 
 mies were renewed yearly, and for several ages 
 never kept the field during the winter. A 
 battle commonly was attended with the con- 
 quest of an entir.! province or kingdom; and 
 the pillage got in over-running the enemy's 
 country, was often Tiot only sufficient to enrich 
 the conquerors, but sometimes even served to 
 aggrandize their posterity. At the close of the 
 campaign, the soldiers were dismissed, every 
 one to his own home, to look after his domes- 
 tic affairs, and cultivate his inheritance. Thus 
 there were many inducements to a military life : 
 the short duration of the service, the prospect 
 of wealth and affluence, to which it often con- 
 ducted ; the necessity of defending their own 
 possessions ; and the hope of acquiring new 
 ones from the enemy. For as we have already 
 observed, it was the constant practice of the 
 senate, for several ages to assign part of the 
 
32 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 conquered lands to the use of the poor citizens ; 
 either dividing it among those who had no pa- 
 trimony of their own, or granting an additional 
 allowance to such whose inheritance was but 
 scanty. In our times the condition of a soldier 
 is very different. National quarrels are not 
 now decided by battles, but most commonly 
 by sieges, which spins out the war to an im- 
 moderate length, and occasions an infinite loss 
 of men. Towns are seldom taken by storm, 
 or abandoned to be plundered, but ,given up 
 by capitulation, and the inhabitants left in the 
 quiet possession of their properties. A country 
 exposed to pillage redeems itself by contribu- 
 tions, no part of which comes into the hands 
 of the private men, whose pay at the same 
 time is so small, that the meanest occupation 
 yields a far greater income. Thus the miseries 
 of hunger, heat, and cold, which are insepa- 
 rable from a military life, the certainty of 
 blows, and the uncertainty of plunder, render 
 the usual parts of war full of sufferings 
 and dangers, and of little or no profit to the 
 soldiers. 
 
 XXI. Indeed in the latter times of the com- 
 monwealth, war began to partake of those 
 inconveniences, with which it is attended in 
 the present age. But then the encourage- 
 ments they had to face the dangers of the ser- 
 vice, and the high honours to which it paved 
 the way, made all difficulties vanish and dis- 
 appear. For as the Romans devoted them- 
 selves entirely to the profession of arms, and 
 considered it as the only study worthy their 
 care, they omitted no methods to recommend 
 and place it in esteem. Innumerable rewards 
 and distinctions were invented, suited to the 
 different stations of men, and the several kinds 
 of valour in which they might render them- 
 selves conspicuous. Magistracies and dignities 
 were almost always conferred, according to the 
 reputation of the candidate for bravery in war. 
 And at the same time that military merit never 
 failed to promote the person in whom it was 
 lodged, no one was capable of civil employ- 
 ment in the commonwealth, who had not served 
 in the army at least ten years. We are not 
 therefore to wonder, that amidst so many in- 
 centives, which rendered the life of a soldier 
 not only honourable, but in some measure 
 necessary, multitudes flocked to the service 
 and strove with emulation to be admitted into 
 the legions. Interest and ambition are the 
 two ruling principles of human life; and as 
 
 both conspired to urge the Romans to war, it 
 was easy for them to find armies, and to in- 
 crease and multiply them at pleasure. But 
 in our days, none of those motives operate 
 upon the minds of men. The condition of a 
 common soldier is of all others the most des- 
 picable ; and even with regard to officers of 
 the first rank, long service is so far from 
 being a recommendation to state-preferment, 
 that they are on that very account, in the 
 judgment of many, the less fit for civil em- 
 ployments. 
 
 XXII. But what chiefly contributed to 
 the strength and greatness of the Roman 
 armies, was the custom established by Romu- 
 lus, of incorporating the vanquished nations, 
 and admitting them to the privileges of citi- 
 zens. Without this it would have been im- 
 possible for Rome to raise herself to that 
 height of grandeur, to which in time she at- 
 tained. The spirit of her citizens, the bravery 
 of her troops, and the admirable discipline of 
 her armies, might have enabled her to subject 
 the nations around her, and extend her sway 
 over a considerable part of Italy ; but in pro- 
 portion as she advanced in conquest, she would 
 have become sensible of her own weakness ; 
 and the difficulty of maintaining herself in 
 her new territories, when they grew large 
 enough to employ the whole natural forces of 
 the commonwealth, would have either made 
 her drop all thoughts of farther empire, or 
 forced her to have recourse to mercenary 
 troops, which have always in the end proved 
 the ruin of those states, who were imprudent 
 enough to venture upon so dangerous an ex- 
 pedient. This is remarkably exemplified in 
 the history of Athens, Sparta, and Carthage. 
 The two first of these cities acquired consi- 
 derable dominion and authority in Greece, and 
 for some time maintained themselves in the 
 possession of that power, to which their 
 valour, and abilities in war had raised them. 
 But as the number of citizens in either state 
 seldom exceeded thirty thousand, and they 
 were unacquainted with the policy of incor- 
 porating the vanquished nations, it was impos- 
 sible for them to enlarge their territories in 
 any extensive degree. For great conquests 
 require great armies to maintain them, which 
 cities so constituted as Athens and Sparta, 
 were not able to furnish. Accordingly we 
 find, that when ambition prompted them to 
 undertakings beyond their strength, they 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 23 
 
 were so far from being able to increase their 
 dominions, that their very conquests proved 
 their ruin, and they sunk under the weight of 
 their own greatness. For the countries they 
 had brought under subjection, not consider- 
 ering themselves as part of the state, but rather 
 as tributaries and slaves, were glad of an op- 
 portunity of shaking off the yoke ; and there- 
 fore seldom failed to revolt, when they saw 
 them engaged in any difficult war. By this 
 means they were not only deprived of a con- 
 siderable part of the revenues, at a time when 
 they stood most in need of money and sup- 
 plies ; but obliged likewise to divide their 
 forces, which was a great check upon their 
 designs, and in the end so weakened them, 
 that they were no longer able to maintain 
 themselves in that grandeur and reputation 
 they had acquired. 
 
 XXIII. The case of Carthage was indeed 
 somewhat different. That commonwealth, by 
 its riches and commerce, was able to set great 
 armies on foot, and make extensive conquests. 
 But as the genius of the citizens was turned 
 more to traffic than war, and as they never 
 admitted the conquered nations to the privi- 
 leges of natural subjects, they were under a 
 necessity of employing mercenary troops, 
 both for enlarging their territories, and hold- 
 ing the vanquished countries in obedience. 
 Hence the many shocks and convulsions to 
 which that state was liable. For as her 
 armies had no other tie to the republic, but 
 that of their pay, they were easily induced to 
 throw off their allegiance, when any more ad- 
 vantageous prospect offered itself. Their re- 
 volt more than once brought Carthage to the 
 very brink of destruction. Instead of con- 
 tributing to secure the tranquillity of the tri- 
 butary countries, they often spirited them up 
 to rebellion ; and, which is indeed a neces- 
 sary consequence of employing mercenary 
 troops, upon any sudden reverse of fortune, 
 they were ever ready to abandon the service. 
 Thus the Carthaginians, though absolute mas- 
 ters at sea, possessed of immense territo- 
 ^ ries, and able to set on foot numerou,s armies, 
 were in reality rather a rich than a powerful 
 republic. They were successful indeed for a 
 time against a number of barbarous states and 
 nations, without discipline or experience in 
 war ; but when they came to enter the lists 
 with a brave and a military people, their un- 
 dertakings almost, always miscarried. Witness 
 
 their many attempts upon Syracuse, the ex- 
 tremity to which they were reduced by 
 Agathocles ; and the ease with which they 
 were in a manner totally driven out of Sicily, 
 by Pyrrhus. Indeed in their first and second 
 war with the Romans, they make a very con- 
 siderable figure in history, whether we regard 
 the greatness of their victories, or the strength 
 of their armies. But the riierit of that seems 
 rather owing to the abilities of their generals, 
 than to the intrinsic power of the common- 
 wealth itself. Accordingly, in the third Punic 
 war, when they had neither a Hamilcar, nor 
 a Hannibal at the head of their troops, they 
 in a very short time fell a prey to their 
 enemies. 
 
 XXIV. But now the Romans, by the 
 admirable policy of incorporating the van- 
 quished nations, avoided all the inconveni- 
 ences to which the above-mentioned cities 
 were liable, and built their greatness upon a 
 sure foundation. The forces of the state in- 
 creased with their territories, insomuch that 
 it is amazing to consider, in how short a time, 
 from small beginnings, they rose to an incre- 
 dible multitude of citizens. The conquered 
 provinces were so far from being an incum- 
 brance upon them, by exhausting their strength 
 in guards and garrisons, that, on the contrary, 
 they became real parts of the Commonwealth, 
 and contributed greatly to her power, by 
 augmenting her revenues, and adding to the 
 number of her subjects. Thus, in proportion 
 as Rome grew in greatness, and stood in need 
 of mighty armies to support the weight of her 
 enterprises, she found within herself an inex- 
 haustible stock of men and riches, and without 
 having recourse to mercenary troops, could 
 furnish more than sufficient to answer all the 
 demands of the state. Polybius, when he 
 comes to speak of the war with the Italic 
 Gauls, takes occasion to describe the mighty 
 preparations made by the Romans, to oppose 
 that formidable enemy. We there find, that 
 the forces of the commonwealth, at that time, 
 amounted to about seven hundred thousand 
 foot, and seventy thousand horse. Compare 
 this account with the histories of Athens and 
 Sparta, and it will soon appear, what a disad- 
 vantage these two states lay under, for want 
 of such an institution as that of Romulus. 
 For as they never admitted the vanquished 
 nations to the right of citizens, but always re- 
 duced them to the condition of tributaries, the 
 
24 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 multitude of their conquests served only to 
 enlarge their territories, without adding to 
 the number of their natural subjects. Hence 
 even in the most flourishing period of their 
 greatness, they could seldom bring into the 
 field above thirty thousand men. Rome, on 
 the other hand, by a contrary policy, increased 
 daily in the multitude of her citizens, and 
 in time was enabled to furnish out armies, 
 adequate to the conquest of the universe. 
 
 CHAP. ni. 
 
 OF THE AKJIS A]NT) DISCIPLINE OF THE 
 ROaiANS. 
 
 I. It is generally allowed among the writers 
 upon the art of war, that as in many other 
 things, so particularly in their arms, the Ro- 
 mans excelled all other nations. I shall not 
 here confine myself to the usual distinction 
 into offensive and defensive, but rather de- 
 scribe them according to the several military 
 orders of which the legions were composed. 
 By the velites we are to understand all the 
 light-armed troops of the commonwealth, of 
 whatever rank and denomination. They were 
 equipped with bows, slings, javelins, a Spanish 
 sword, a buckler, and a helmet. The bow is 
 of very remote antiquity, and has been used 
 by almost all nations. Crete in particular 
 was famous for its excellent archers. It does 
 not seem to have been much regarded by the 
 Romans in the earliest times of the republic, 
 and when it was afterwards introduced, was 
 confined chiefly to the auxiliary troops. We 
 find, however, in the description of battles, fre- 
 quent mention made of the sagittarii ; and it 
 appears, that they sometimes contributed not a 
 little to the victory. The sling was also an 
 instrument of war much used by many na- 
 tions. The Baleareans especially, who in- 
 habited the islands now called Majorca and 
 Minorca, are beyond all others celebrated for 
 their expertness at this weapon. They were 
 so attentive in exercising their youth in the use 
 of it, that they did not give them their food in a 
 morning till they hit a mark. These Baleareans 
 were much employed in the armies of the Car- 
 thaginians and Romans, and greatly contributed 
 to the gaining of victories. Livy mentions some 
 cities of Achaia, particularly Egium, Patrse, 
 and Dymas, whose inhabitants were still more 
 dextrous at the sling than the Baleareans. 
 
 They threw stones farther, and with greater 
 force and certainty, never failing to hit what 
 part of the face they pleased. Their slings dis. 
 charged stones with so much force, that nei. 
 ther buckler nor head-piece could resist their 
 impetuosity. Instead of stones, they some- 
 times charged the sling with balls of lead, which 
 it carried much farther, and with greater im- 
 petuosity. The javelin, or hasta, was the 
 proper missive weapon of the velites. It was 
 a kind of dart not unlike an arrow, the wood of 
 which was generally three feet long, and one 
 inch thick. The point was four inches long, 
 and tapered to so fine an end, that it bent at 
 the first stroke in such a manner, as to be use- 
 less to the enemy. Every man carried seven 
 of them to battle. The Spanish sword was for 
 a close encounter. The Romans judged this 
 weapon the fittest for execution, as having both 
 edge and point. It was short, of excellent 
 temper, and in shape not unlike a Turkish 
 scimitar, only sharper at the point. Livy tells 
 us, that though it was principally intended for 
 stabbing, it would yet serve likewise to cut off 
 arms, legs, and heads at a blow. The buckler 
 or parma, was of a round form, about three 
 feet in diameter, and made of wood, covered 
 with leather. The helmet, called galea, or 
 galerus, was a light casque for the head, gene, 
 rally made of the skin of some wild beasts, to 
 appear the more terrible. 
 
 II. The arms of the hastati, prlncipes, and 
 triarii, were in a great measure the same ; 
 for which reason we shall not divide them in 
 our description, but speak of them altogether. 
 Those most deserving our notice are the sword, 
 the scutum, the pibnn, the galea, and the lorica. 
 The sword was the same as that of the velites, 
 and therefore requires not any particular de- 
 scription here. It was usual with the Romans 
 to wear it on the right side, that they might 
 be the more at liberty to manage their shields. 
 In ancient monuments however we sometimes 
 meet with it on the left. The scutum was a 
 buckler of wood, oblong, and bending inward 
 like a half cylinder. Its parts were joined to. 
 gether with little plates of iron, and the whole 
 was covered with a bull's hide. An iron ring 
 went round it without, to keep off blows; and 
 another within, to hinder it from taking any 
 damage by lying on the ground. In the 
 middle was an iron boss, or vmbo, jutting out, 
 very serviceable to glance off stones and darts, 
 and sometimes to press violently upon the 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 25 
 
 enemy, and drive all before them. It appears 
 that these bucklers were large enough to cover 
 almost the whole body. Polybius makes them 
 four feet long, and two and a half broad. And 
 in Livy we meet with soldiers who stood on the 
 guard, sometimes sleeping with their head laid 
 on their. shield, having fixed the other part of 
 it on the earth. Some make the scutmn the 
 same with the clypeus: but this is evidently a 
 mistake ; since in the institution of the census, 
 by Servius Tullius, we find the clypeus given 
 to those of the first class, and the scutum to 
 those of the second. In fact, the scutum was 
 long and square, and came at last to be the 
 only shield of the heavy-armed troops. The 
 clypeus was of a smaller size, and quite round, 
 belonging more properly to other nations, 
 though for some time used by the Romans. 
 
 III. The pilum was a missive weapon, which 
 in a charge they darted at the enemy. It 
 was commonly four-square, but sometimes 
 round; composed of a piece of wood about 
 three cubits long, and a slip of iron of the 
 same length, hooked and jagged at the end. 
 They took abundance of care in joining the 
 two parts together, and did it so artificially, 
 that it would sooner break in the iron itself, 
 than in the joint. Every man had two of these 
 pila, which they discharged at the enemy be- 
 fore they came to close fight. When they had 
 neither time nor room they threw it upon the 
 ground, and charged the enemy sword in hand. 
 Marius, in the Cimbrian war, contrived these 
 pila after a new fashion. For whereas before 
 the head was fastened to the wood with two 
 iron pins, he suffered one of them to remain 
 as it was, and pulling out the other, put a 
 weak wooden peg in its place. By this means, 
 when it stuck in the enemy's shield it did not 
 stand outright as formerly : but the wooden 
 peg breaking, the javelin hung down, and 
 sticking fast by its crooked point, drew after 
 it the shield. Next to the pilum we mentioned 
 the galea. This was a head-piece, or morion, 
 coming down to the shoulders. It was either 
 of iron or brass, open before, and leaving the 
 face uncovered. Some of them were so con- 
 trived, that they might be let down, on occa- 
 sion, to cover the face. Upon the top was the 
 crista, or crest, in adorning of which the 
 soldiers took great pride. In the time of Poly- 
 bius they wore plumes of feathers, dyed of 
 various colours, to render them beautiful to 
 their friends, and terrible to their enemies. 
 
 The officers in particular were extremely cu 
 rious and splendid in their crests, which were 
 usually worked in gold and silver, and so con- 
 trived as to represent animals of various kinds, 
 lions, leopards, tigers, and griffins. If we 
 might speak of those of foreign commanders, 
 the crest of king Pyrrhus, as very singular, 
 would deserve our notice. It was made, ac- 
 cording to Plutarch's description, of two goats' 
 horns. Alexander the Great, as he is repre- 
 sented on ancient medals, wore a crest of the 
 same nature. 
 
 IV. We come now to the lorica, which was 
 a- defensive armour for the body, as the galea 
 was for the head and neck. In our language 
 it is called the cuirass, and was generally made 
 of leather, covered with plates of iron in the 
 form of scales, or iron rings twisted within one 
 another in the form of chains. These are 
 what we call coats of mail, in Latin, lorica ha- 
 ■mis conserta, or hamata. Sometimes the cui- 
 rass consisted of thongs, with which the soldi&r 
 was girt from the arm-pits to the waist, and 
 whence probably it took the name of lorica, 
 from lorum, a thong or strap of leather. We 
 find likewise that it was oftentimes a sort of 
 linen cassock, made with many folds, which 
 resisted, or very much broke the force cf 
 blows. Amongst the Greeks this piece of ar- 
 mour had the name of thorax, and was made 
 either of iron or brass, in two pieces, which 
 were fastened upon the sides by buckles. 
 Alexander left the cuirass only the two pieces 
 which covered the breast, that the fear of be- 
 ing wounded on the back, which had no de- 
 fence, might prevent the soldiers from flying. 
 Some of these cuirasses were of so hard a metal, 
 as to be absolutely proof against weapons. 
 Zoilus, an excellent artist in this way, offered 
 two of them to Demetrius Poliorcetes. To 
 show the excellency of them, he caused a dart 
 to be discharged from a catapulta, at the dis- 
 tance of only twenty-six paces ; which, though 
 it struck the cuirass with the utmost violence, 
 yet made no impression, and scarce left the 
 least mark behind it. After all it must be 
 owned, that the thorax of the Greeks was 
 much less capable of motion, agility, and 
 force ; whereas the girts of leather, succes- 
 sively covering each other, left the Roman 
 soldier entire liberty of action, and fitting him 
 like a vest, defended him against darts. The 
 poorer soldiers, who were rated under a thou- 
 sand drachms, instead of the lorica, wore a 
 £ 
 
26 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 pectorale, or breastplate of thin brass, about 
 twelve inches square ; and this, with what has 
 been already described, and greaves and gaunt- 
 lets upon their legs and arms, which were 
 common likewise to the rest, rendered them 
 completely armed. 
 
 V. What we have hitherto said regards only 
 the foot. It is now time to speak of the 
 cavalry, who at first were but very indifferently 
 armed, either for offence or defence. They 
 used only a round shield, with a helmet on 
 their head, and a couple of javelins in their 
 hand, great part of the body being left without 
 defence. But as soon as they found the many 
 inconveniences to which they were hereby ex- 
 posed, they began to arm themselves like the 
 Grecian horse, or much in the manner of their 
 own foot, only their shield was a little shorter 
 and squarer, and their lance or javelin thicker, 
 with spikes at each end, that if one miscar- 
 ried, the other might be serviceable. It is 
 remarkable, and what indeed we are hardly 
 able to comprehend, that amongst the ancients, 
 the horse had neither stirrups nor saddle. 
 Education, exercise, and habit, had accustomed 
 them not to want those aids, and even not 
 to perceive that there was any occasion for 
 them. There were some horsemen;- such as 
 the Numidians, who did not know so much as 
 the use of bridles to guide their horses : and 
 who, notwithstanding, by their voice only, or 
 the use of the heel or spur, made them ad- 
 vance, fall back, stop, turn to the right or left ; 
 in a word, perform all the evolutions of the 
 best disciplined cavalry. Sometimes, having 
 two horses, they leaped. from one to the other, 
 even in the heat of battle, to ease the first when 
 fatigued. These Numidians, as well as the 
 Parthians, were never more terrible than when 
 they seemed to fly through fear and cowardice. 
 For then, facing suddenly about, they dis- 
 charged their darts or arrows upon the enemy, 
 and often put them to flight with great slaugh- 
 ter. The Romans were more than once sur- 
 prised by these unexpected attacks, and on 
 some occasions suffered considerably. But 
 they at last found out a method of securing 
 themselves, by holding their targets over their 
 heads, and forming what historians call the 
 testudo. It was to this invention that Marc 
 Antony owed the preservation of his army, 
 when miscarrying in his expedition against the 
 Parthians, he found himself obliged to retreat 
 into Syria before a great body of their horse. 
 
 VI. These were the arms with which the 
 Romans conquered the world : and I believe 
 it will be readily owned, that they were admi- 
 rably well calculated both for defending them- 
 selves, and offending their enemies. Polybius, 
 in more places than one, gives them the ad- 
 vantage in this respect over all other nations, 
 and expressly affirms, that the many victories 
 they obtained over the Gauls was owing en- 
 tirely to the superiority of their arms. It is 
 true the cutting sv/ords of that people terrified 
 them greatly at first, and was the cause of a 
 fatal overthrow. But they soon learnt from 
 experience what a contemptible weapon that 
 was, when employed in close fight against 
 troops substantially armed for defence : for the 
 Gauls, to give force and vigour to their blows, 
 were obliged to avoid too near an approach to 
 the enemy, that they might have room to wield 
 their swords. Their first ranks therefore only 
 could do execution, because the Romans, 
 knowing their safety to lie in close fight, ad- 
 vanced continually undercover of their shields, 
 and crowded upon them in such manner, that 
 they left them not sufficient space for the free 
 use of their weapons. It is besides observed, 
 that the swords of the Gauls were of so ill a 
 temper, as after two or three strokes to stand 
 bent in their hands, and thereby become wholly 
 useless to them, if they had not time to straight- 
 en them on the ground with their feet. This 
 was not to be expected in the heat of fight 
 against an enemy that pressed so hard ; so 
 that the Romans closing in with them, stabbed 
 them in the face and breast with their pointed 
 swords, and made terrible slaughter. The 
 Chevalier Folard is astonished, that under all 
 these disadvantages, his countrymen should 
 obtain so many victories over the Romans. 
 He can hardly forbear fancying, that, had 
 they so far improved by their defeats, as to 
 change the fashion of their weapons, and arm 
 themselves after the manner of their adver- 
 saries, we should not have heard so much 
 of the boasted exploits and conquests of 
 that people. Be that as it will, it is certain 
 the Gauls wanted neither bravery, nor military 
 conduct, and, if we except the single article 
 of their arms, showed themselves on many 
 occasions no way inferior to the Romans. 
 
 VII. But let us now compare their arms 
 with those of the Greeks. Here, it must be 
 owned, the advantage does not appear so ma- 
 nifest. Many are rather of opinion, that the 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 27 
 
 Greeks excelled the Romans in this respect. 
 The Earl of Orrer}' particularly, in his Trea- 
 tise of the Art of War, wonders much that 
 the Romans, who borrowed most of their wea- 
 pons, whether offensive or defensive, from 
 the Greeks, did not also follow their example 
 in furnishing some of their infantry with long 
 pikes, which he observes are the best offen- 
 sive arms, either to charge or defend, and of 
 excellent use against horse. It is well known 
 that the Macedonian phalanx, to which Philip 
 and Alexander were indebted for most of their 
 victories, fought always with this weapon. 
 One would therefore be apt to think, that an 
 experience so much in its favour, could not 
 have failed of recommending it powerfully to 
 the Romans. And yet it is certain, that after 
 making trial of it for some time, they laid it 
 aside as incommodious, ordering the hastati, 
 who at first were equipped with it, and thence 
 took their name, to arm themselves after the 
 fashion of the rest of the legionary foot. This 
 could not arise from any scrupulous attach- 
 ment to their own customs, or dislike of foreign 
 manners; because no people were ever less 
 tenacious in this respect, or showed a greater 
 readiness to adopt the institutions of other na- 
 tions, when they saw any real benefit likely 
 to accrue from them. The principal reason 
 seems to have been, that they found the use 
 of the weapon incompatible with that of the 
 shield. For as it necessarily required to be 
 managed with both hands, those who fought 
 with it were obliged to lay aside the buckler ; 
 which piece of armour appeared to the Romans 
 of greater consequence than the pike, because 
 this last was in some measure supplied by the 
 sword and javelin. If we might judge of things 
 by the event, the Romans reasoned very justly 
 on this occasion ; since without the assistance 
 of the pike, they not only gained greater and 
 more numerous victories than the Macedonian 
 phalanx, but even beat that very phalanx it- 
 self, so formidable by the use of this wea- 
 pon. As this is a very curious and interesting 
 subject, and capable of furnishing many useful 
 reflections in relation to the ancient art of war, 
 it will not, I believe, be disagreeable to the 
 reader, if we enlarge a little upon it. 
 
 VIII. The Macedonian phalanx was a body 
 of sixteen thousand men, armed with pikes, 
 four and twenty feet long, which historians de- 
 scribe under the name of sarissx. This corps 
 was generally divided into ten battalions, each 
 
 consisting of sixteen hundred men, a hun- 
 dred in front, and sixteen deep. To form 
 some idea of their strength and order of battle, 
 we need only reflect upon what passed a few 
 centuries ago in Europe, when Italy was a 
 continual theatre of war, by reason of the dif- 
 ferent pretensions of France, Spain, and the 
 Emperor. The battalions of Switzerland were 
 then in gi-eat reputation, and generally looked 
 upon as the best infantry in the world, chiefly 
 on account of the many victories they had 
 gained by the pike. They were forced at 
 first to have recourse to this weapon, in order 
 to secure themselves against the ambition of 
 the German princes, who were daily making 
 attempts upon their liberty. For these princes 
 being rich, and able to bring into the field a 
 numerous cavalry, the Switzers, whose whole 
 strength, on the contrary, lay in their foot, saw 
 themselves under a necessity of contriving 
 arms, that might defend them against the 
 enemy's horse. None appeared so proper for 
 this purpose as the pike ; and so successful 
 were they, by the perfection they attained to 
 in the use of it, and their admirable orders and 
 discipline, that with fifteen or twenty thousand 
 foot, they would often venture to attack a vast 
 body of horse, and generally came off victo- 
 rious. From that time the pike became fa- 
 mous, and was introduced into all the armies 
 of Europe. We find that they usually had 
 one half of their infantry shot, and the other 
 half pikes ; and it is particularly deserving of 
 our notice, that for several ages, the chief de- 
 pendence of the general in a day of battle 
 seems to have been upon the pikes. By de- 
 grees the musket began to prevail over the 
 pike ; yet gained ground so very slowly, that 
 it is not much above half a century, since we 
 find one third of the infantry still pikes. 
 
 IX. But though the pike was found to be 
 of admirable service in engagements with 
 horse, experience constantly made it appear, 
 that it was by no means sufficient against a 
 resolute and well-armed infantry. For as 
 this weapon required to be managed with both 
 hands, and therefore necessarily excluded 
 the use of the target, those who carried it 
 were left altogether without defence, if, in 
 the course of an engagement, the enemy 
 should chance to get within their pikes. 
 Hence the generals who were acquainted 
 witiT. this weakness in the Swiss battalions, 
 and could bring their troops to press the 
 
28 
 
 THE ROMAiN 
 
 charge vigorously, seldom failed of defeating 
 them with great slaughter. We have a re- 
 markable example of it in the case of Count 
 Carmignola, general to Philip Viconti, Duke 
 of Milan. That brave officer being sent 
 against a body of eighteen thousand Switzers, 
 with only six thousand horse, and a few foot, 
 advanced boldly to the encounter ; but though 
 the attack was resolute and well conducted, 
 he was repulsed with considerable loss. Car- 
 mignola quickly perceived the advantage 
 which the enemy had in their foot over his 
 horse. As he was a man of determined 
 courage, and rather roused than dispirited by 
 the check he had lately received, he soon ral- 
 lied his men, and led them on again to the 
 charge. When he came within a certain 
 distance, he ordered his cavalry to dismount ; 
 and engaging the Switzers smartly in that 
 posture, put them all to the rout, and most 
 of them to the sword. Only three thou- 
 sand were left, who, finding themselves past 
 remedy, threw down their arms. It will 
 be proper to take notice on this occasion, 
 that the cavalry led by Carmignola were all 
 men at arms, and therefore completely pro- 
 vided both for offence and defence. Now 
 such a body of troops was well enough able 
 to deal with the Switzers, if they but once 
 got close up with them, and came to use 
 their swords. For then the enemy being 
 without defensive arms, and deriving no as- 
 sistance from their pikes, whose very length 
 Tendered them unserviceable, were exposed 
 to unavoidable slaughter. Considering, there- 
 fore, the advantages and disadvantages on 
 both sides, it will appear, that they who have 
 no defensive arms are without remedy, if 
 the enemy charges but home, and passes 
 their pikes. This cannot miss to happen in 
 an engagement with resolute troops : be- 
 cause battles always advancing, and the par- 
 ties on each side pressing on perpetually, 
 they must of necessity come so near at last, 
 as to reach one another with their swords ; 
 and though some few perhaps may be killed 
 or tumbled down by the pikes, yet those that 
 are behind, still pressing on, are sufficient to 
 carry the victory. 
 
 X. From these reasons it will be easy to 
 conceive, why Carmignola overcame, with so 
 great a slaughter of the Switzers, and so little 
 of his own army. Nor is this example sin- 
 gular in its kind. We meet with many others 
 
 in history, all tending to demonstrate, that 
 an infantry, armed with swoius and bucklers, 
 have great advantages over the pike. When 
 Gonsalva was besieged in Barletta by the 
 French, a detachment of Spanish foot was 
 sent out of Sicily, and landed in the kingdom 
 of Naples, with orders to march to his relief. 
 Monsieur d'Aubigny had notice of their ap- 
 proach, and went to meet them with his men 
 at arms and a body of about four thousand 
 Switzers. These last pressed upon them 
 with their pikes, and at first put them into 
 some disorder ; but the Spaniards, by the 
 help of their bucklers, and the agility of their 
 bodies, having at length got under the pikes 
 of the Switzers and so near that they could 
 come at them with their swords, defeated 
 them with great slaughter, and very little 
 loss on their own side. Every one knows 
 what terrible havoc was made of the Switzers, 
 at the battle of Ravenna, and all upon the 
 same account, the Spanish foot having got 
 to them with their swords : nay, it is certain 
 they must have been all cut to pieces, had 
 they not been happily rescued by the French 
 horse, and yet the Spaniards, drawing them- 
 selves into close order, bravely sustained the 
 assaults of the cavalry, and retired without 
 loss. It appears therefore, that though the 
 pike be excellent against horse, it is yet insuf- 
 ficient in an encounter with foot ; whereas 
 an army judiciously armed for offence and 
 defence, at the same time that it can very 
 well deal with cavalry, is likewise an over- 
 match for a body of pikes. 
 
 XI. And hence it was that the Macedonian 
 phalanx, which seems to have been just such 
 an order of battle as the battalions of Switzer- 
 land, experienced likewise the same fate, when 
 it came to encounter the warlike and well-armed 
 troops of the Romans. Historians ascribe 
 the defeat of it to several causes ; the advan- 
 tageous disposition of the Roman troops, who 
 fought in separate bodies, yet so drawn up 
 that they could unite and join upon occasion : 
 the artful conduct of the generals, in drawing 
 it into rugged and uneven places, where it 
 could not preserve itself entire, but became 
 disjointed and broken: the opportunity this 
 gave of charging it in the openings and 
 void spaces, whereby it was totally disunited, 
 and being attacked in front and rear, fell 
 an easy prey to its enemies. These things 
 doubtless contributed in part to the overthrow 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 29 
 
 of which we speak ; but the principal defect of 
 the phalanx lay in its disadvantageous armour 
 and order of battle. In reality, the pikes of 
 the two first ranks only were serviceable in an 
 engagement ; those of the rest scarce availed 
 any thing. The men of the third rank could 
 not see what passed in the front, nor had any 
 command of their long pikes, which were en- 
 tangled and locked up between the files, with- 
 out a possibility of moving them to the right 
 or left. Hence the Romans found no great 
 difficulty in surmounting an obstacle, formi- 
 dable indeed in appearance, but at bottom very 
 trifling. They had only to gain upon the pikes 
 of the two first ranks, that they might join the 
 enemy, and fight hand to hand. This they 
 were enabled to do by the help of their large 
 bucklers, with which they bore up the pikes 
 of the Macedonians, and forcing their way 
 under, reached them with their swords. All 
 resistance then was at an end. The phalanx, 
 unprovided for defence, and rather embar- 
 rassed than aided by their pikes, could no 
 longer stand the furious charge of the Romans, 
 who made dreadful havoc with their pointed 
 swords. We find at the battle of Pydna, where 
 Paulus ^milius gained so complete a victory 
 over Perseus, that no less than twenty thou- 
 sand Macedonians were slain with the loss of 
 only one hundred men on the side of the Ro- 
 mans, This agrees so exactly with what we 
 have above related of the Switzers, that it is 
 impossible not to ascribe it to the same cause, 
 namely, the insufficiency of the pike, when 
 opposed to an infantry armed with swords 
 and bucklers. 
 
 XIL We come now to speak of the military 
 discipline of the Romans, to which, no less 
 than to their arms, they were indebted for 
 their many victories and conquests. If we 
 compare this with other nations, we do not 
 find that they surpassed the Gauls in number 
 or boldness, the Germans in stature, the Span- 
 iards in strength of body, the Africans in stra- 
 tagem, or the Greeks in learning and the arts 
 of civil life. Nay, it is evident from history, 
 that they were inferior in all these respects. 
 But as to what regards the use and exercise 
 of arms, the choice of soldiers, and the train- 
 ing them up in all the duties of war ; here in- 
 deed lay their chief excellence, and by this 
 they were enabled to baffle all the advantages 
 of their enemies, whether derived from nature 
 or education. We have already observed, that 
 4 
 
 none were admitted into the legions till they 
 had reached their seventeenth year. But 
 though this was the age for entering the ser- 
 vice, it was not then that they began to learn. 
 For as war was the darling study of the Ro- 
 mans, they habituated their youth to it from 
 their infancy, and carefully instructed them in 
 all its branches, having set apart the Field of 
 Mars for this purpose, which was a kind of 
 military school within the city. We are not 
 however to imagine, that they looked upon 
 this early institution as sufficient, or were less 
 assiduous in exercising their men, after they 
 were admitted into the service. They knew 
 that constant practice alone makes troops ex- 
 pert, and brings them to the habit of applying 
 their knowledge with readiness upon all oc- 
 casions. Hence not only among the young 
 soldiers, but even among those of oldest stand- 
 ing in the army, the military exercises were con- 
 tinued without intermission. These exercises 
 had a threefold tendency : to inure the men 
 to labour, and render them robust and active : 
 to instruct them in the use of their arms, and 
 lastly, to teach them the necessary evolutions, 
 and how to preserve their ranks and orders, 
 in marches, battles, and encampments. 
 
 XIII. As to the first, the Romans took 
 great pains to form theiryouth to be nimble in 
 running, active to leap, strong to throw the 
 bar and to wrestle, which are all necessary 
 qualifications in a soldier. For running and 
 nimbleness fit them to get possession of a 
 place before the enemy, to fall upon them on 
 a sudden in their quarters, and to pursue them 
 with more execution in a rout ; activity enables 
 them with greater ease to avoid blows, leap a 
 ditch, or climb a bank ; and strength mates 
 them carry their arms better, strike better, and 
 endure the shock better. Swimming was 
 likewise considered as an essential part of a 
 military education. Armies are not sure of 
 bridges wherever they come, nor are boats 
 always to be had ; so that if men cannot swim, 
 they will necessarily be deprived of several 
 conveniences, and lose many fair opportuni- 
 ties of action. One principal reason why 
 the Romans made choice of the Campus 
 JMartius to exercise their youth in was, its 
 nearness to the Tiber, into which they plunged 
 after their fatigues, to accustom themselves 
 to swimming, and cleanse away the dust and 
 sweat. But of all their exercises of this kind, 
 none was pursued with greater attention, than 
 
30 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 the inuring the troops to the military pace ; 
 that is, to walk twenty miles, and sometimes 
 four and twenty, in live hours. This habituat- 
 ed the soldiers to a certain stated and regular 
 progress in their marches, taught them to keep 
 close together, and prevented their exposing 
 themselves scattered and dispersed to the 
 enemj'. They were obliged likewise on these 
 occasions, to carry burdens of threescore pound 
 weight, which not only accustomed them to 
 hear fatigue, but was found serviceable in 
 many other respects. For whether it might 
 be necessary in an expedition to take along 
 with them several days' provisions, or to carry 
 a certain quantity of water through a desert 
 and sandy country, or to provide a number of 
 stakes for the execution of any particular en- 
 terprise ; against all these exigencies they had 
 prepared themselves by the practice of which 
 we speak : and hence great dangers were 
 many times avoided, and great victories many 
 times obtained. 
 
 XIV. The second particular we mentioned 
 in the Roman exercises was, the instructing 
 the men in the use of their arms. Here also 
 we meet with many proofs of the industry and 
 sagacity of that people. They set up a great 
 post about six feet high, suitable to the stature 
 of a man, and fastened it so strongly, that no 
 blows might he able to batter or shake it. 
 This he soldiers were wont to assail with all 
 the instruments of war, as if it had been in- 
 deed a real enemy. Sometimes they would 
 aim their blows at the head, sometimes strike 
 it on the face, then on the sides, legs, before 
 and behind, now retreating, and then advanc- 
 ing again ; during all which they were taught 
 to proceed with so much caution, that in 
 directing their-weapon against their adversary, 
 they should not meanwhile lay themselves 
 open to wounds. By this contrivance they 
 learned how to place their blows aright, and 
 became dextrous and nimble, both at defend- 
 ing themselves, and offending their enemies. 
 They were instructed rather to thrust than to 
 cut with their swords ; because thrusts are 
 more mortal, harder to he defended, and he 
 that makes them is not so easily discovered, 
 and is readier to double his thrust than his 
 blow. We must not here forget, that in these 
 exercises they made use of helmets, shields, 
 and swords, double the weight of common 
 weapons. This made them ready and alert 
 in battle, which they found so far from being 
 
 attended with any unforeseen encumbrances, 
 that it was rather an ease from the fatigue of 
 ordinary duty. Nor let any one wonder that 
 the Romans were so extremely attentive to 
 these little things, since, according to the 
 manner of fighting then used, in which the 
 troops encountered hand to hand, every small 
 advantage was of great importance. They 
 were besides sensible, that experience in this 
 kind makes men bold and courageous ; for no 
 one fears to do that which he thinks he 
 understands. A soldier who had often made 
 trial of himself in these imaginary combats, 
 grew impatient to come to action in good 
 earnest, that he might the better judge of his 
 own proficiency, and have an opportunity of 
 putting that in practice, which he had so well 
 learned in theory. Hence battles were not 
 what they dreaded, but what they desired ; 
 and generals often found it more difficult to 
 restrain their men from fighting, and check 
 the ardour of their courage, where prudence 
 obliged them to decline the onset, than to 
 prevail upon them to face the enemy, when 
 they judged it necessary to come to an en- 
 gagement. 
 
 XV. But it is not sufficient to inure men 
 to labour, to make them strong, swift, and ex- 
 pert at the use of their weapons ; they must 
 learn likewise to keep their ranks well, to 
 obey orders, and follow the directions and 
 signals of their commanders. This was the 
 third Jaranch of the Roman exercises, about 
 which they were no less solicitous than about 
 the other two. I shall not here enter into a 
 minute detail of the common evolutions, the 
 opening and closing of the files, doubling 
 their ranks, turning to the right, and left, 
 marchings, wheelings, &c. because they dif- 
 fered but a little from the practice of the 
 present age. Their manner of forming too in 
 order of battle, their conduct in an attack or 
 repulse, with the general disposition of their 
 marches, will come in more properly under 
 other heads of this discourse. Let it suffice 
 for the present to observe, that they exercised 
 their men without intermission in all these 
 different branches of the service, and by the 
 force of constant habit brought them to that 
 degree of expertness, that they could practise 
 without hurry and confusion in the heat of 
 fight, what they had been so thoroughly 
 trained to in the field. Above all, it was their 
 particular care to accustom the troops to rally 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 31 
 
 and recover their order readily when broken. 
 To this end, besides distinguishing the several 
 companies by peculiar ensigns, every man had 
 his fixed and invariable post in the battalion, 
 and was taught, by long practice, to know, in 
 a manner habitually, the number of his file, 
 his place in that file, his right and left-hand 
 man, where he belonged to the front rank, 
 and, both these and his file-leader, where he 
 belonged to the other ranks. Nay, so very 
 curious were the Romans in this point, that to 
 imprint these things the deeper upon the 
 minds of the soldiers, they caused thorn to be 
 engraven in great characters upon their hel- 
 mets and bucklers. 
 
 XVI. Nor were they less careful in train- 
 ing up the cavalry, whom they taught par- 
 ticularly to ride well, and sit fast when they 
 came to a charge. To this end they had 
 horses of wood, upon which they were exer- 
 cised, vaulting upon them, sometimes with 
 their arms, and sometimes without, very neatly 
 and exactly, without any assistance ; so that, 
 upon a signal from their captain, they were 
 immediately on horseback, and upon another 
 signal, as soon upon the ground. As they 
 fought in squadrons, like the cavalry of our 
 time, their evolutions were much the same 
 with those in use at present, allowing only the 
 difference of armour ; and among the horse, 
 as well a.s the foot, were carried on without 
 intermission. Indeed, there is nothing more 
 admirable in the whole Roman discipline than 
 the continual exercise to which the troops 
 were kept, either within or without the camp ; 
 insomuch that they were never idle, and had 
 scarce any respite from duty. The new raised 
 soldiers performed their exercises regularly 
 twice a day, and the old ones once : for it 
 was not, in the opinion of this people, length 
 of service that constituted warlike and veteran 
 troops, but the uninterrupted habit and prac- 
 tice of arms ; nor did they consider an unex- 
 ercised soldier, after what number of cam- 
 paigns you will, as any other than a novice in 
 the profession. Accordingly, they were con- 
 stant and indefatigable in training their men 
 to all the different operations of the field. 
 They obliged them to make hasty marches of 
 a considerable length, laden with their arms 
 and several palisades, and that often in steep 
 and craggy countries. They habituated them 
 always to keep their ranks, even in the midst 
 of disorder and confusion, and never to lo.se 
 
 sight of their standards. They made them 
 charge each other in mock battles, of which 
 the ofiicers, generals, and even the consul 
 himself were witnesses, and in which they 
 thought it for their glory to share in person. 
 When they had no enemy in the field, the 
 troops were employed in considerable works, 
 as well to keep them in exercise, as for the 
 public utility. Such in particular were the 
 highways, called for that reason ylsi militares, 
 which still subsist, and are the fruits of that 
 wise and salutary custom. 
 
 XVII. How much the Romans relied upon 
 this manner of training and employing their 
 troops, appears evidently from the conduct of 
 their senate and generals, during a course of 
 several ages ; for in all their difficulties and 
 straits, this was that to which they had im- 
 mediale recourse, as their surest refuge, and 
 the only means by which they could hope 
 to extricate themselves. Did they think them- 
 selves exposed to any danger, or were they 
 desirous to repair some loss 1 It was a 
 constant practice among them to invigorate 
 and give new life to their mihtary disciphne. 
 Are they engaged in a war with the Latines, 
 a people no less martial than themselves 1 
 Manlius reflects upon the best method of 
 strengthening the command in the field, and 
 puts to death his own son, for conquering 
 without his orders. Are they defeated before 
 Numantial Scipio ^•Emilianus immediately 
 removes the several blandishments which had 
 enervated them. Have the Roman legions 
 passed under the yoke in Numidia 1 Metel- 
 lus wipes away the ignominy the instant he 
 has obliged them to resume their ancient in- 
 stitutions. Marius, that he may be enabled 
 to vanquish the Cimbri and the Teutones, 
 begins by diverting the course of rivers ; 
 and Sylla employs in such hard labour his 
 soldiers, who were terrified at the war which 
 was carrying on against Mithridates, that they 
 sue for battle to put an end to their hardships. 
 Publius Nasica made the Romans build a fleet 
 of ships at a time when they had no occasion 
 for such a force. In a word, industry, dili- 
 gence, and a perseverance in all kind of mili 
 tary toils, was the very characteristic of this 
 people ; they dreaded idleness more than an 
 enemy. 
 
 XVIII. These men thus inured were gene- 
 rally healthy and vigorous. We do not find, 
 by historians, that the Roman armies, which 
 
32 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 ■waged war in so great a variety of climates, 
 fell often a prey to diseases ; whereas, in the 
 present age, we daily see armies, without once 
 engaging, perish and melt away, if I may use 
 the expression, in a single campaign. Nor 
 can I forbear taking notice, that the dexterity 
 and address the soldiers attained, by means of 
 their continual exercises, served not only to 
 render them skilful and active in the duties of 
 the field, but inspired them likewise with 
 boldness and intrepidity. In the battles fought 
 in our age, every single soldier has very little 
 security and confidence, except in the multi- 
 tude ; but among the Romans, every indivi- 
 dual, more robust and of greater experience in 
 war, as well as more inured to the fatigues of 
 it than his enemy, relied upon himself only. 
 He was naturally endued with courage, or, 
 in other words, with that virtue which a sen- 
 sibility of our own strength inspires. To the 
 same admirable discipline too were they in- 
 debted for a certain haughtiness and opinion 
 of superiority, which made them rank them- 
 selves above the troops of all other nations, 
 and despise the service of any foreign prince 
 or state, compared with that of their country. 
 Desertions are very common among us, for 
 this reason, because the soldiers are the dregs 
 of every nation, and not one of them possesses, 
 or thinks himself possessed of a certain advan- 
 tage, which renders his condition preferable 
 to that of his adversaries. But among the Ro- 
 mans they were less frequent, it being scarce 
 possible that soldiers, raised from among a 
 people naturally so imperious and aspiring, 
 and so sure of commanding over others, should 
 demean themselves to such a degree as to 
 cease to be Romans, We may likewise ob- 
 serve, as a necessary consequence of their 
 being so carefully trained, that it was next to 
 Impossible in a battle, how unfortunate soever, 
 but some troops must rally in one part or other 
 of it, or the enemy be defeated in some quarter 
 of the field, either of which was often sufficient 
 to secure the victory. And indeed we find 
 every-where in history, that whenever the 
 Romans happened to be overpowered in the 
 beginning, whether by numbers or the fierce- 
 ness of the onset, they seldom failed at last to 
 wrest the victory out of the enemy's hands. 
 
 XIX, There are still many other particulars 
 that might be mentioned to the advantage of 
 the Roman discipline : their strict regulations 
 with resrard to all the different branches of the 
 
 service; their admirable policy in making 
 motives of honour and shame operate strongly 
 upon the troops ; their steady adherence to the 
 received maxims of war, so as never, on any 
 occasion, to abate of the rigour of military 
 severity, where the soldiers were found to 
 have neglected their duty, abandoned their 
 post, thrown away their arms, or surrendered 
 themselves to the enemy. History abounds 
 with examples of this kind. As their armies 
 were for the most part but small, the com- 
 mander had a better opportunity of knowing 
 the several individuals, and could more easily 
 perceive the various faults and misdemeanors 
 committed by the soldiery, against which care 
 was taken to provide immediately. Nor were 
 they so tenacious of their own customs as not 
 to pay a due attention to those of other na- 
 tions, which they adopted without hesitation, 
 wherever they appeared attended with any 
 real benefit. In their war with Pyrrhus, they 
 improved themselves in the knowledge of posts 
 and encampments ; in that with Hannibal, they 
 learned the true use of cavalry, and how to 
 apply address and stratagem in the conduct 
 of a campaign. If any nation boasted, either 
 from nature or its institution, any peculiar 
 advantage, the Romans immediately made use 
 of it. They employed their utmost endeavours 
 to procure horses from Numidia, bow-men 
 from Crete, slingers from the Balearean isles, 
 and ships from the Rhodians : so that it may 
 with justice be said of them, that no nation in 
 the world ever prepared for war with so much 
 wisdom, and carried it on with so much in- 
 trepidity. 
 
 XX, Thus have we endeavoured to give 
 some account of the arms and discipline of the 
 Romans, and to point out their excellency over 
 those of other nations. How much they 
 were indebted to them for their grandeur and 
 successes, appears evidently from this : that so 
 long as their armies adhered strictly to these 
 primitive institutions, they were invincible ; 
 but in proportion as they deviated from them, 
 became like other men. When they began to 
 look upon their armour as too weighty and 
 cumbersome, and their discipline as attended 
 with too many restraints, and of course to re- 
 lax in these two important articles, they gra- 
 dually sunk into a level with the troops of 
 their enemies, and at last so totally degenera- 
 ted, that we find not in their behaviour the least 
 traces of their original bravery. I know it is a 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 33 
 
 maxim of long standing, that money is the sin- 
 ews of war. How far this may suit the con- 
 stitution of the present age, I will not pretend 
 to say ; but it seems by no means to agree with 
 antiquity. I am sure the whole current of his- 
 tory is against it. Had this been the case, 
 Cyrus could never have prevailed against 
 Croesus, nor the Greeks against the Persians, 
 nor the Romans against the Carthaginians. 
 It is true money is requisite for the carrying 
 on of a war, but not principally, and in the first 
 place. Good soldiers and good discipline are 
 of infinitely greater avail. Where these are, 
 it will be easy to find money ; but money is not 
 always sufficient to procure them. Had not 
 the Romans done more in their wars with their 
 iron than their gold, the treasure of the whole 
 world would not have been sufficient for them, 
 considering their great enterprises abroad, and 
 their no less difficulties at home. But having 
 good and well disciplined troops, they were 
 never in want of money ; for those who were 
 afraid of their armies, strove with emulation to 
 supply them. Nay, it is remarkable, that their 
 most celebrated victories, and those which re- 
 quired the gieatest exertion of strength, were 
 gained during the period of their poverty. It 
 was then that they subdued the Samnites, 
 forced Pyrrhus to quit Italy, and cut in pieces 
 the mighty armies of the Carthaginians. After 
 they became possessed of the treasures of the 
 universe, they had, for the most part, only 
 weak and effeminate nations to deal with, 
 and were so far from increasing in real power, 
 that by the concurrent testimony of all his- 
 torians, they are to be considered from that 
 time as upon the decline. Livy, in that fa- 
 mous question relating to the Greeks and Ro- 
 mans, where he endeavours to determine what 
 would have been the event, had Alexander the 
 Great turned his arms against Italy, observes, 
 that in war there are three things funda- 
 mentally necessary ; good soldiers, good 
 officers, and good fortune : and then arguing 
 whether Alexander or the Romans were more 
 considerable in these three points, concludes 
 without the least mention of money. It is well 
 known that the Spartans, so long as they ad- 
 hered to their primitive institutions and 
 poverty, were the most powerful people of all 
 Greece, and never proved unsuccessful in their 
 wars, till they became possessed of great riches 
 and revenues. I conclude therefore, that it was 
 by the bravery of their troops, the advantage 
 4* 
 
 of their arms, and the excellence of their disci- 
 pline, that the Romans rendered themselves 
 victorious over all nations : and, accordingly, 
 we find, that when they ceased to have the su- 
 periority in these, the revenues of the whole 
 world were not sufficient to defend them. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF THE SPIRIT AND BEAVEHY OF TKE 
 ROMAN TROOPS. 
 
 I. Although military discipline, and the 
 continual exercise of arms, naturally conduce 
 to make a people bold, daring, and intrepid ; 
 yet there is something so peculiar in the spirit 
 and character of the Romans, that I flatter 
 myself it will not be unacceptable to the 
 reader, to offer a few reflections on this subject 
 and give some insight into those institutions 
 and maxims of conduct, which chiefly con- 
 tributed to exalt their courage, and animate 
 their bravery. -Two things here naturally 
 present themselves to our consideration. First, 
 the admirable principles upon which the com- 
 monwealth was founded. Secondly, the suc- 
 cession of great men that for several ages pre- 
 vailed in it, and who supported, invigorated, 
 and, from time to time, gave new life to these 
 principles. Among the principles of the Ro- 
 man polity, none seems to have taken deeper 
 root, than the fear of the gods, and a venera- 
 tion for religion. This perhaps, at first sight, 
 may not be thought so immediately to concern 
 a martial people ; but if we examine the effect 
 of it upon their armies, and the many valuable 
 purposes it was made to serve in war, we shall 
 have reason to conclude that, of all their insti- 
 tutions, not one contributed more to the gran- 
 deur of the state. For hence in particular it 
 was, that the military oath was held so sacred 
 among the troops, and became an inviolable 
 bond of fidelity and subjection. The soldiers, 
 however displeased and enraged, did not dare 
 to quit their generals so long as this tie was 
 supposed to remain in force : nay, so very ten- 
 der and scrupulous were they, that even in 
 their greatest impatience to be discharged, 
 they would yet never admit of any interpreta- 
 tion, that carried in it the least strain or ap- 
 pearance of deceit. We have a remarkable 
 example of this, in their behaviour to Quinc« 
 
34 
 
 TH£ ROMAN 
 
 tius Cincinnatus, after the defeat of Appius 
 Herdonius, That Sabine had seized the Capi- 
 tol, with four thousand men. The danger 
 was imminent, and required speedy redress ; 
 but the Tribunes, who were then pushing the 
 Terentian law, in order to force the senate to 
 a compliance, opposed the levies. The people 
 however, partly by promises, partly by remon- 
 strating on the danger of the city, were at 
 length prevailed upon to take an oath of 
 fidelity to the consuls ; and marching against 
 Herdonius, soon recovered possession of the 
 Capitol. Publius Valerius, to whom the 
 charge of the attack fell, chancing to be 
 slain, Quinctius Cincinnatus was immediately 
 chosen in his room ; who, to keep the troops 
 employed, and leave them no room to think of 
 their law Terentilla, ordered them out upon 
 an expedition against the Volsci, alleging, that 
 the oath that they had taken to the late consul 
 obliged them to follow him. The tribunes, to 
 evade the engagement, pretended that the oath 
 bound them only to the person of Valerius, and 
 so was buried with him in his tomb. But the 
 people, more sincere, and plain-hearted, could 
 not resolve to shelter themselves under so frivo- 
 lous a distinction, and therefore prepared every 
 man to take arms, though very unwillingly. 
 " Nondum (says Livy) hsec, quse nunc tenet 
 seculum, negligentia deum venerat, nee inter- 
 pretando sibi quisque jusjurandum, et leges 
 aptas faciebat." " That neglect of the gods, 
 which so much dishonours the present age, was 
 not known in those days, nor had men learned 
 the pernicious art of interpreting the laws of 
 religion according to their own purposes." 
 
 II. I could produce many instances of the 
 like nature, all tending to show, how servicea- 
 ble religion was, to the governing of armies, 
 the uniting of the people, and the keeping 
 \hem in due subjection to their officers and 
 magistrates ; insomuch that should it fall into 
 dispute, whether Rome was more indebted to 
 Romulus or Numa, I am clearly of opinion that 
 Numa would have the preference. For where 
 religion is once fixed, military discipline may 
 be easily introduced : but where religion is 
 wanting, discipline is not brought in without 
 great difliculty ; and never can be carried to 
 perfection. If we inquire into the nature of 
 the religion professed by the Romans, we find 
 that it ran much upon the answers of oracles, 
 divinations, soothsayings, sacrifices, and innu- 
 merable other ceremonies, that argue more of 
 
 superstition, than any ^ st knowledge of the 
 deity. But absurd as this religion may appear, 
 it had nevertheless a wonderful influence upon 
 the minds of men, and was often made use of 
 with success, to inspire courage in battles and 
 dangers. It is well known that all their niili- ^y 
 tary expeditions were preceded by the augu- 
 ries and auspices : and according to the omens 
 that offered on these occasions, did the people 
 judge of the issue. Hence their wisest and 
 best generals, by a strict regard to these ob- 
 servances, and accommodating the ceremonies 
 of religion to their own designs, generally found 
 means to give a favourable turn to the omens ; 
 which greatly contributed to exalt the courage 
 of their troops, and made them face the enemy 
 with confidence. On the contrary, it is ob- 
 served, that where the usual forms were ne- 
 glected, and generals affected to act in con-'^ 
 tempt of the auspices, they seldom succeeded 
 in their designs. This may well enough be 
 accounted for, without allowing any real in- 
 fluence to these ceremonies, or supposing that 
 the flight and chirping of birds could in the 
 least affect future events. Nothing in truth 
 can be more trifling, than the pretended pre-j 
 sages of which we speak ; but as they were) 
 firmly believed by the bulk of the army, where 
 at any time they appeared unfavourable, it 
 could not fail of casting a great damp upon 
 the spirits of the soldiers. And yet this does 
 not seem to me to have been the principal 
 cause of those miscarriages, that were usually 
 observed to follow a neglect of the auspices. 
 The ignorance and incapacity of the generals 
 will much better account for them ; nor need 
 we a stronger proof of this incapacity, than 
 the contempt with which they afifected to treat 
 religion. W^ar is necessarily attended with 
 so much uncertainty, and requires such a mul- 
 titude of different attentions, that a prudent 
 general will be far from neglecting any advan- } 
 tages, which he sees may be drawn from the 
 established prejudices of those under his com- 
 mand ; much less will he turn those very pre- 
 judices to his own hurt, by an ill-judged con- 
 tempt ; and the general who is so indiscreet 
 as to act in this manner, plainly discovers 
 himself unfit for the conduct of any great en- 
 terprise. I know it is asserted by some, that 
 religion checks the natural fierceness and ob- 
 stinacy of men, and renders them poor-spirited 
 and abject ; but whoever talks in this manner, 
 shows himself little conversant in the history 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 35 
 
 of mankind. Consider the Romans in the 
 best times of the republic, the English under 
 Queen Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwell, the 
 French in the age of Henry the Fourth, the 
 United Provinces in that of Philip the Second, 
 and the Swedes under Gustavus Vasa, and 
 then tell me, whether the most flourishing and 
 formidable periods of nations, be not those 
 ■when a spirit of religion has strongly taken 
 possession of the minds of the people. 
 
 III. Next to a veneration for religion, love 
 of their country was the prevailing character- 
 istic of the Romans. This virtue naturally 
 rouses men to great designs, and begets vigour 
 and perseverance in the execution of them ; 
 and as it had taken a deeper root among the 
 people of whom we speak, than in any other 
 nation mentioned in history, no wonder we 
 here meet with so many instances of magna- 
 nimity, public spirit, fortitude, and all the vir- 
 tues that tend to form a race of heroes. It is 
 certain that the constitution of the Roman 
 commonwealth was peculiarly fitted to nourish 
 this spirit. The people had many ties and 
 obligations to the state, many endearing con- 
 nections to inspire the love of it. They chose 
 the senators, by whose counsels the republic 
 was governed, the magistrates, by whom jus- 
 tice was administered, and the generals who 
 conducted and terminated their wars ; so that 
 the public successes were in a manner their 
 own work. Hence the principle of which we 
 speak became so strong in them, that they 
 were ready to sacrifice every other considera- 
 tion to it, whether of interest or ambition. No 
 hazards, no suflferings appeared great where 
 their country stood in need of their assistance. 
 We find, even in the disputes between the 
 different orders of the state, where the passions 
 of men are wont most strongly to be engaged, 
 and where particular animosities are but too 
 apt to get the better of reason, that the consi- 
 deration of the public safety was always suffi- 
 cient to calm their resentments, and bring 
 them to temper and moderation. How violent 
 soever the contest might be, however much 
 the parties appeared exasperated against one 
 another, they were yet sure to unite, when 
 any danger from without threatened the com- 
 i^onwealth. This is evident through the 
 whole course of the Roman history, and re- 
 quires not to be illustrated by particular exam- 
 ples. I shall therefore only add, that a prin- 
 ciple so powerful and universally diffused, as 
 
 it could not fail of having many desirable ef- 
 fects upon the people, so did it in a particular 
 manner tend to render them brave and reso- 
 lute; for courage being of indispensable neces- 
 sity to the defence of our country, wherever 
 the love of that predominates, there we arc 
 sure to find the other likewise. 
 
 IV. But if the Romans are remarkable for 
 the love they bore the country, they are no 
 less so when we consider how passionately 
 fond they were of liberty. This spirit sub- 
 sisted from the very foundation of the state. 
 Though Rome was at first governed by kings, 
 these kings were far from being absolute : for 
 besides the authority enjoyed by the senate, 
 the people too had a considerable share in the 
 administration, since to their assemblies were 
 committed the creation of magistrates, the en- 
 acting of laws, and the resolving upon peace 
 or war. Indeed, under Tarquin the Proud, 
 the government degenerated into a real 
 tyranny ; but this, instead of extinguishing 
 served only to rouse the love of liberty ; and 
 the behaviour of Brutus, who puts his own 
 sons to death, for attempting to establish the 
 royal authority, made so strong an impression 
 upon the minds of the people, that. they hence- 
 forward considered slavery as the greatest of 
 evils, and bent all their thoughts to the pre- 
 serving and enlarging the freedom they had 
 acquired. I need not here say how much li- 
 berty tends to ennoble the mind, and how ne- 
 cessary it is to the prosperity and greatness of 
 a state. It is well known that Athens, so long 
 as it continued under the tyranny of Pisistra- 
 tus and his descendants, made scarce any 
 figure in Greece : and whereas, soon after their 
 expulsion, it rose to so astonishing a pitch of 
 grandeur, as not only to baffle all the efforts 
 of the Persians, but even to render itself formi- 
 dable to that mighty empire. And if we look 
 into the history of the Roman commonwealth, 
 we find, that in proportion as liberty increased, 
 and the people got from under the dominion 
 of the nobles, they became inspired with a 
 more elevated courage, a more unwearied for- 
 titude, and pushed their conquests with greater 
 rapidity. Nay, in the very infancy of their 
 freedom, when Tarquin was endeavouring to 
 recover his lost authority, they gave manifest 
 indications of that spirit, for which they are so 
 justly admired by succeeding ages. It is upon 
 this occasion that we read of the astonishing 
 valour of Horatius Codes, the intrepid firmness 
 
36 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 of Scffivola, and the masculine boldness of 
 Clelia ; insomuch that Porsenna, king of the 
 Ciusians, who had undertaken the reinstating 
 of Tarquin, admiring their bravery, would not 
 any longer disturb them in the enjoyment of 
 a liberty to which their merit gave them so 
 just a title, and which he found them so reso- 
 lutely bent to defend. 
 
 v. And here I cannot but observe, that 
 this passionate desire of freedom gave rise to 
 a peculiar circumstance in the Roman consti- 
 tution, which, though seemingly inconsis- 
 tent with the prosperity of the state, was yet 
 in reality one of the principal causes of its 
 grandeur, as it more than any thing contri- 
 buted to exalt the character of the people, and 
 produce among them the most finished mo- 
 dels in every species of merit. What I mean 
 is, those continual dissensions between the 
 nobles and commons, of which we meet with 
 so frequent mention in the early ages of the 
 commonwealth. Two bodies at Rome divi- 
 ded the whole authority : the senate and the 
 people. A mutual jealousy, founded on the 
 one side upon a desire of governing, on the 
 other, upon that of keeping themselves free 
 and independent, raised between them con- 
 tentions and quarrels, which ended not but 
 with the republic itself. These contests, 
 though attended with many inconveniences, 
 procured notwithstanding a considerable ad- 
 vantage to the state, in forming a number of 
 persons of distinguished merit, and perpetua- 
 ting a succession of them in the common- 
 wealth. The patricians, who were obstinately 
 bent to keep to themselves alone the com- 
 mands, the honours, the magistracies, as they 
 could not obtain them but by the suffrages of 
 the plebeians, were obliged to use their ut- 
 most endeavours to prove themselves worthy 
 by superior qualities, by real and repeated 
 services, by illustrious actions of which their 
 adversaries themselves were witnesses, and to 
 which they could not refuse their esteem and 
 applause. This necessity of depending on 
 the judgment of the people for admission to 
 posts, obliged the young patricians to acquire 
 all the merit capable of gaining the suffrages 
 of the judges, who examined them rigorously, 
 and were not inclined to have a remiss indul- 
 gence for the candidates, as well out of love 
 to the honour and welfare of the state, as out 
 of an hereditary jealousy of the patrician 
 order The plebeians on their side, in as- 
 
 piring to the highest dignities of the state, 
 were forced to prepare themselves so as to 
 convince their brethren, that they had all 
 the qualities necessary to fill them with 
 honour. Proofs were to be given of a dis- 
 tinguished valour, of a wise and prudent con- 
 duct, of a capacity to discharge all the func- 
 tions of government, and to pass with repu- 
 tation through the several offices, which led 
 by degrees to the highest. It was needful to 
 have no .>nly the military virtues, and ability 
 to conduct an army ; but the talent of ha- 
 ranguing the senate and people, of reporting 
 the great affairs of state, of answering foreign 
 ambassadors, and entering with them into 
 the nicest and most important negotiations. 
 By all these obligations, imposed by ambi- 
 tion on the plebeians, to qualify them for 
 the posts to which they aspired, they wer^- 
 under the necessity of making proof of an\^ 
 accomplished merit, at least equal to that of 
 the patricians. 
 
 VI. These were some of the advantages . 
 arising from the sharp contests between the 
 senate and the people, from whence resulted 
 a lively emulation between the two orders, and 
 a happy necessity of displaying talents, which 
 perhaps by a continual concord and peace 
 would have lain dormant and fruitless : just 
 as, if I may use the comparison, from a steel 
 struck with a flint, sparks of fire fly out, which 
 without that violence would remain for ever 
 concealed. This is not all. It was by means 
 of these contests that the public liberty was 
 improved and settled, without which the com- 
 monwealth would never have become great 
 and flourishing. By the revolution which ex 
 pelled Tarquin the Proud, the commons of 
 Rome were delivered from a tyrant, but not 
 from tyranny. The particians still held them 
 under subjection ; and though, while their 
 fears of Tarquin's return were alive and strong, 
 they behaved with great lenity and modera- 
 tion, yet no sooner were they informed of that 
 prince's death, than the weight of oppression 
 "was renewed, and fell as heavy upon the 
 people as ever. The Valerian law, to permit 
 appeals from the sentence of the magistrates 
 to the people assembled, was not sufficient to 
 protect the plebeians from injustice and cru- 
 elty. They found it necessary to have magis- 
 trates of their own body, to screen them from 
 the tyranny of the great, and therefore ex- 
 torted from the senate a consent to the esta- 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 37 
 
 blishment of the tribunitian power. The in- 
 stitution of the Comitita Tributa, and the 
 practice of bringing into judgment, before 
 those assemblies, the most exalted of the no- 
 bles, upon accusations of treason against the 
 people, was another bulwark against the over- 
 flowings of ambition. The pubhcation of the 
 laws of the twelve tables, gave some check to 
 the abuse of that prerogative, which the pa- 
 tricians tenaciously kept, of being the sole 
 judges in civil causes ; and on many other 
 occasions we find, that the commons, urged 
 by oppression to fury, exerted their natural 
 strength in such a manner as proclaimed them 
 sovereign masters of the administration, and 
 gradually extended their privileges^ 
 
 VII. But the commonwealth of Rome was 
 never truly a free state, till after the publication 
 r of the Licinian laws, those laws which, in their 
 .^onsequences, made merit alone the ordinary 
 scale whereby to ascend to the highest offices ; 
 and which, by admitting the plebeians to a rea- 
 sonable share of what was purchased with 
 their blood, delivered them from that servile 
 subjection to the wealthy nobles in which 
 their indigence had so long detained them. 
 From this period, the Roman people, when 
 they made laws, or elected magistrates for the 
 execution of them, were generally speaking, 
 free from all undue influence ; not overawed, 
 as before, by the rich and the great, nor con- 
 strained by any force, but that of reason and 
 natural justice, in the most absolute subjection 
 to which is the most perfect freedom. No 
 citizen who had showed superior talents and 
 virtue, stood excluded, on account of the low 
 degree of his birth, from the dignities of the 
 state ; and hence proceeded an emulation 
 among the individuals to surpass each other 
 in deserving honours. Indeed the haughty 
 patricians, as, when vanquished by the ple- 
 beians, they had given ground with an an- 
 gry reluctance, and retired fighting, so they 
 afterwards, from time to time, showed a strong 
 disposition to renew their unrighteous sove- 
 reignty : but their efforts were faint and inef- 
 fectual ; and at length acquiescing in what 
 they could not undo, there ensued domestic 
 peace and union, and an established liberty. 
 Union at home gave new strength to the 
 state, and liberty seems to have inspired the 
 people with a nobler spirit, a more exalted 
 courage, and a greater ardour to enlarge the 
 bounds of their empire. For, whereas, before, 
 
 during the space of four hundred years, they 
 had not pushed their conquests beyond a few 
 leagues round the city ; we find that from that 
 period, in the course of seventy years, they, 
 by a series of victories, made themselves mas 
 ters of all Italy. And though destitute of 
 naval strength and naval skill, their next en- 
 terprise was against a rival republic beyond 
 the continent ; a republic that with greater 
 riches, and more ample territories than theirs, 
 had possession of the absolute dominion of the 
 sea. The boldness of the undertaking, and 
 the amazing constancy with which they sup- 
 ported it, in spite of the most terrible adversi- 
 ties, are not to be paralleled in the history of 
 any other nation ; but the Roman legions were, 
 at that time, legions of free citizens, whose 
 predominant passion was glory, and who placed 
 the highest glory in facing every danger, and 
 surmounting every difficulty, to preserve their 
 liberty, and extend their empire. 
 
 VIII. The love of glory is indeed a natural 
 consequence of liberty, and if to this we join 
 that remarkable disregard of wealth, which 
 prevailed for so many ages among this people, 
 we shall have reason to conclude, that these 
 likewise contributed not a little, towards form- 
 ing in them that firm and intrepid bravery, 
 which makes a distinguishing part of their 
 character. For the love of glory pushes men 
 on to great actions, and a disregard of wealth 
 prevents their being biassed by mean sordid 
 views, or shaken by the low considerations of 
 self-interest. It is certain that glory was the 
 main spring of all those noble and illustrious 
 undertakings, which have rendered the Ro- 
 mans so famous. By this motive, the republic, 
 after liberty prevailed, made an incredible pro- 
 gress in a short time. The frequent exam- 
 ples of patriotism, and of an inviolable at- 
 tachment to the public good of which Rome 
 was witness in those critical times, and which 
 she rewarded in so eminent a manner, kindled, 
 not only in the patr.cians, but likewise among 
 the plebeians, that noble fire of emulation and 
 glory, which dares all things, and influenced 
 all along the whole nation. Greedy of praise, 
 they reckoned money as nothing, and valued 
 it only to disperse it. They were content with 
 moderate fortunes, says Sallust, but desired 
 glory without measure. Accordingly we find, 
 that for four hundred years after the building 
 of Rome, the city was in very great poverty : 
 and of this the probable cause seems to be, that 
 
THE ROMAN 
 
 poverty was no impediment to preferment. 
 Virtue was the only thing required in the 
 election of magistrates, and the distribution of 
 offices ; and wherever it was found, let the 
 person, or family, be ever so poor, he was sure 
 to be advanced, Quinctius Cincinnatus was 
 taken from the plough, and raised to the of- 
 fice of dictator, though his estate did not ex- 
 ceed four acres of land. Fabricius and Atilius 
 Regulus are likewise examples of this kind ; 
 and indeed the Roman history everywhere 
 abounds with them. 
 
 IX. The thirst of glory usually produces 
 that of dominion. It appears noble to be mas- 
 ters, to command others, to compose laws, 
 to be feared and obeyed. This passion, natu- 
 ral to mankind, was more strong and active 
 in the Romans, than in any other people. 
 One would think, at seeing the air of authori- 
 ty that they very early assume, that they 
 already believed themselves destined to become 
 one day lords of the universe. Nay, it ap- 
 pears from many indications in their history, 
 that this notion subsisted from the foundation 
 of the state. The answers and interpretations 
 of the augurs frequently glanced this way. A 
 head was found in digging for the foundations 
 of the Capitol. This was given out to imply 
 the eternity of their empire, and that the city 
 to which that temgb; belonged, was to become 
 the head of the universe. We see likewise 
 in the speech of Coriolanus to the deputies 
 of the senate, upon occasion of his investing 
 Rome with an army of Volscians, that the 
 conceit of universal dominion not only strongly 
 prevailed in his time, but was carefully che- 
 rished among the people. Nor was it with- 
 out reason that the senate contrived to raise 
 and propagate this persuasion, as it tended 
 wonderfully to exalt the courage of the citi- 
 zens, and not only animated them in the pur- 
 suit of conquest, but kept them firm and steady 
 under the severest strokes of adversity. Thus 
 at the same time that poverty and a disregard 
 of wealth rendered them modest, the love of 
 glory and dominion inspired them with magna- 
 nimity. When put into command, and placed 
 at the head of armies, kings appeared but little 
 before them ; nor was any danger, difficulty, 
 or opposition able to dismay them : but when 
 their commissions expired, and they returned 
 to a private station, none so frugal, none so 
 humble, none so laborious, so obedient to the 
 magistrates, or respectful to their superiors as 
 
 they ; insomuch that one would think it im- 
 possible the same minds should be capable of 
 such strange alterations. 
 
 X. From these distinguishing characteris- 
 tics of the Roman people, it will be easy to 
 perceive, how courage and a sense of honour 
 came to be so prevalent in their armies. And 
 here I cannot but observe, that the military 
 rewards were wonderfully calculated to pro- 
 mote this spirit ; since without being consi- 
 derable for their intrinsic value, they were 
 extremely coveted by the troops, because 
 glory, so precious to that warlike people, was 
 annexed to them. A very small crown of 
 gold, and generally a crown of laurel or oak- 
 leaves, became inestimable to the soldiers, who'N^ 
 knew not any marks more excellent than those 
 of virtue ; nor any distinction more noble than 
 that which flows from glorious actions. These 
 monuments of renown were to them real: 
 patents of nobility, and descended to their pos- 
 terity as a precious inheritance. They were, 
 besides, sure titles to rise to places of honour 
 and advantage, which were granted only to 
 merit, and not procured by intrigue and cabal. 
 We have already had occasion to take notice 
 of the large field there lay for promotion in the 
 Roman armies, and that such as distinguished 
 themselves by their valour had reason to hope 
 for every thing. What an agreeable prospect 
 for an inferior officer, to behold at a distance 
 the chief dignities of the state and army, as 
 so many rewards to which he could aspire ! 
 
 XL And indeed, if any thing be capable 
 of inspiring man with bravery, and a martial 
 ardour, to pass through a succession of dif- 
 ferent honours, and to be entitled to a number 
 of military rewards, which were all considered 
 as so many standing monuments of renown, 
 seems to bid fairest for it. I cannot better 
 represent the effect this had upon the troops, 
 than by the following relation, from which the 
 reader may form some idea of what a Roman 
 soldier was. When the war against Perseus, 
 the last king of Macedonia, was resolved upon 
 at Rome, amongst the other measures taken 
 for the success of it, the senate decreed, tha*, 
 the consul charged with that expedition, shoulv 
 raise as many centurions and veteran soldiei 
 as he pleased, out of those who did not excee 
 fifty years of age. Twenty-three centurions 
 who had been Primipili, refused to take arms, 
 unless the same rank was granted them, which 
 they had in preceding campaigns. As it was 
 
ART OF WAR 
 
 39 
 
 impossible to gratify them all, and they per- 
 sisted obstinately in their refusal, the affair was 
 brought before the people. After Popilius, who 
 had been consul two years before, had pleaded 
 the cause of the centurions, and the consul his 
 own, one of the centurions, who had appealed 
 to the people, having obtained permission to 
 speak, expressed himself to this effect. 
 
 XII. " I am called Spurius Ligustinus of 
 the Crustumine tribe, descended from the Sa- 
 bines. My father left me a small field and 
 cottage, where I was born, brought up, and 
 now live. As soon as I was at age to marry, 
 he gave me his brother's daughter to wife. 
 She brought me no portion but liberty, chastity, 
 and a fruitfulness sufficient for the richest 
 houses. We have six sons, and two daugh- 
 ters, both married. Of my sons four have 
 taken the robe of manhood, the other two are 
 still infants. I began to bear arms in the 
 consulship of P. Sulpicius and C Aurelius, 
 and served two years as a private soldier in 
 the army sent into Macedonia against King 
 Philip. The third year, T. Quintius Fla- 
 niininus, to reward me for my services, made 
 me captain of a century in the tenth maniple 
 of the Hastati. I served afterwards as a vo- 
 lunteer in Spain under Cato ; and that general, 
 ■who is so excellent a judge of merit, made me 
 first centurion of the first maniple of the 
 Hastati, In the war against the ^tolians 
 and King Antiochus, I rose to the same 
 rank amongst the Principes. I afterwards 
 made several campaigns, and in a very few 
 years have been four times Primipihts: I 
 have been four and thirty times rewarded by 
 the generals, have received six civic crowns, 
 have served two and twenty campaigns, and 
 am above fifty years old. Though I had not 
 completed the number of years required by 
 the law, and my age did not discharge me. 
 substituting four of my children in my place, 
 I should deserve to be exempt from the neces- 
 sity of serving. But by all I have said, I 
 only intend to show the justice of my cause. 
 For the rest, as long as those who levy the 
 troops shall judge me capable of bearing arms, 
 I shall not refuse the service. The tribunes 
 may rank me as they please; that is their 
 business : mine is to act, that none be ranked 
 above me for valour; as all the generals under 
 whom I have had the honour to serve, and 
 all my comrades can witness for me, I have 
 hitherto never failed to do. For you, centu- 
 
 rions, notwithstanding your appeal ; as even 
 during your youth you have never done any 
 thing contrary to the authority of the magis- 
 trates and senate, in my opinion, it would be- 
 come your age, to show yourselves submissive 
 to the senate and consuls, and to think every 
 station honourable, that gives you opportunity 
 to serve the republic." 
 
 XIII. It is easy to discern in this speech, 
 the spirit and magnanimity of a true Roman ; 
 and particularly a certain boldness and con- 
 fidence, derived from a sense of his many 
 services, and the rewards and honours with 
 which they had been attended. And if this 
 be so conspicuous in the inferior officers, whai; 
 may we not expect in those of a more eminent 
 degree ? If civic and mural crowns, collars, 
 chains, bracelets, and such like, were sufficient 
 to rouse these sentiments of heroism among 
 the lower order of troops, what would not the 
 prospect of a triumph effect in the mind of 
 the general ; This honour was granted only 
 to dictators, consuls, and prsetors. After the 
 general had distributed a part of the spoils to 
 the soldiers, and performed some other cere- 
 monies, the procession began, and entered the 
 city through the triumphal port, to ascend to 
 the capitol. At the head of it were the 
 players upon musical instruments, who made 
 the air resound with t' ?ir harmony. They 
 were followed by the beasts that were to be 
 sacrificed, adorned with fillets, and flowers, 
 many of them having their horns gilt. After 
 them came the whole booty, and all the spoils, 
 either displayed upon carriages, or borne upon 
 the shoulders of young men in magnificent 
 habits. The names of the nations conquered 
 were written in great characters, and the cities 
 that had been taken represented. Sometimes 
 they added to the pomp extraordinary an' 
 mals, brought from the countries subjected, 
 as bears, panthers, lions, and elephants. But 
 what most attracted the attention and curi- 
 osity of the spectators, were the illustrious 
 captives, who walked in chains before the vic- 
 tor's chariot ; great officers of state, generals 
 of armies, princes, kings, with their wives and 
 children. The consul followed upon a mag- 
 nificent chariot, drawn by four horses, and 
 robed with the august habit of triumph, his 
 head encircled with a crown of laurel, holding 
 also a branch of the same tree in his hand, 
 and sometimes accompanied with his young 
 children sitting by him. Behind the chariol 
 
40 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 marched the whole army, the cavalry first, 
 . then the infantry. All the soldiers were 
 crowned with laurel, and those who had re- 
 ceived particular crowns, and other marks of 
 honour, did not fail to show them on so great 
 a solemnity. They emulated each other in 
 celebrating the praises of their general, and 
 sometimes threw in expressions, sufficiently 
 offensive, of raillery and satire against him, 
 which savoured of the military freedom ; but 
 the joy of the ceremony entirely blunted their 
 edge, and abated their bitterness. When the 
 procession arrived at the capitol, the consul, 
 immediately upon his entering the temple, 
 made this very remarkable prayer to the god : 
 — " Filled with gratitude and with joy, I re- 
 turn you thanks, O most good and most great 
 Jupiter, and you queen Juno, and all the 
 other gods, the guardians and inhabitants of 
 this citadel, that to this day and hour you 
 have vouchsafed, by my hands, to preserve 
 and guide the Roman republic happily. Con- 
 tinue always, I implore you, to preserve, guide, 
 protect, and favour it in all things." This 
 prayer was followed by sacrificing the victims, 
 and a magnificent feast, given in the capitol, 
 sometimes by the public, and sometimes by 
 the person himself who triumphed. It must 
 be allowed, that this was a glorious day for a 
 general of an army ; and it is not surprising 
 that all possible endeavours should be used to 
 deserve so grateful a distinction, and so splen- 
 did an honour. Rome had not any thing more 
 majestic and magnificent than this pompous 
 ceremony, which seemed to raise the person 
 in favour of whom it was granted, above the 
 condition of mortals. 
 
 XIV. The Romans, in war, knew how to 
 make use of punishments, as well as rewards. 
 The steadiness of a dictator, with respect to 
 his general of horse, who could not be saved 
 from death but by the entreaties and urgent 
 prayers of all the people : the inexorable se- 
 verity of the consul I\Ianlius to his own son, 
 whom he unmercifully put to death, though 
 victorious, for fighting contrary to his orders ; 
 these examples made a terrible impression of 
 fear upon the people, which became for ever 
 the firm bond of military discipline. "Where- 
 fore never was it observed in any nation so 
 inviolably as among the Romans, nor did any 
 thing contribute so much to render them vic- 
 torious over all their enemies. How should 
 they have been otherwise than victorious with 
 
 troops formed as we have seen, and above all 
 guided in their operations by principles the 
 most proper to make conquerors 1 One of 
 which was, not to know any other end of wa. 
 but victory, and for its sake to surmount, by 
 an indefatigable perseverance, all the obstacles 
 and all the dangers by which it can be re- 
 tarded. The greatest misfortunes, the most 
 desperate losses, were incapable of daunting 
 their courage, or making them accept a base 
 and dishonourable peace. To grant nothing 
 by compulsion, was a fundamental law of the 
 Roman policy, from which the senate never 
 departed; and in the most melancholy junc- 
 tures, weak counsels, instead of prevailing, 
 were not so much as heard. As far back as 
 Coriolanus, the senate declared, that no agree- 
 ment could be made with the Volsci, so long 
 as they remained on the Roman territory. 
 They proceeded in the same manner with 
 Pyrrhus. After the bloody battle of Cannse, 
 wherein above fifty thousand of the Romans 
 lay dead on the field, it was resolved no pro- 
 posal of peace should be listened to. The 
 consul Varro, who had been the occasion of 
 the defeat, was received at Rome as if he had 
 been victorious, because in so great a misfor- 
 tune he had not despaired of the Roman 
 affairs. Thus, instead of disheartening the 
 people by an unseasonable instance of severity, 
 these generous senators taught them, by their 
 example, to bear up against ill fortune, and 
 assume in adversity the haughtiness with 
 which others are inspired by prosperity. 
 
 XV. One thing, indeed, has been gene- 
 rally considered, as tending greatly to obstructvj 
 the conquests of the Roman people : I mean 
 the two limited space of the consulship, which 
 often afforded not the general time to finish a 
 war he had begun, a good part of the year 
 being sometimes spent in preparations. This 
 inconvenience was afterwards remedied, as 
 far as possible, by prolonging the command to 
 the general, as proconsul, and sometimes con- 
 tinuing him in the consulship itself. But this 
 was practised sparingly in the wiser ages of 
 the republic : the danger of infringing the 
 public liberty, making the frequent change of 
 generals appear necessary to the safety of the 
 state. If the generals had been long conti- 
 nued at the head of the armies, they might 
 have been able to usurp all the authority, and 
 become masters of the government, as hap. 
 pened under Caesar, in the latter end of the 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 41 
 
 commonwealth. We are likewise to call to 
 mind, that these annual commands were well 
 enough suited to the earlier times of Rome, 
 when wars seldom lasted above one campaign ; 
 and though perhaps they might not be without 
 their inconveniences afterwards, yet they had 
 this one manifest advantage attending them, 
 that thereby a number of great generals was 
 formed in the state, and the Romans were not 
 often reduced to the necessity of placing all 
 their hopes in the abilities of a single person. 
 For this quick circulation of authority, by 
 raising many in their turns to the highest 
 offices of the republic, excited an incredible 
 emulation among individuals, to qualify them- 
 selves for the conduct of armies ; and at the 
 same time furnished them with frequent op- 
 portunities of acquiring experience in supreme 
 command, which is one of the most requisite 
 accomplishments in a great general. 
 
 XVI. Thus every thing at Rome .led to 
 great conquests : the constitution of the gov- 
 ernment ; the admirable political principles 
 on which it was founded ; the nature of the 
 troops ; the ability of the generals ; and above 
 all, the steadiness of the senate, in attachment 
 to the ancient maxims of the state. This last 
 particular leads me to the second thing I 
 mentioned, as the cause of that noble spirit 
 which we so much admire in the Roman 
 armies, namely, the succession of great men 
 that for several ages prevailed in the common- 
 wealth, and who supported, invigorated, and 
 from time to time gave new life to the funda- 
 mental principles of the constitution. Happy 
 is the state that is blessed with this privilege ! 
 and it was the good fortune of the Romans to 
 enjoy it in a supreme degree. It were endless 
 to recount all the names that history furnishes 
 oil this subject; I shall therefore content ray- 
 self with mentioning only two, Manlius Tor- 
 quatus and Valerius Corvinus ; the one famed 
 for his severity, the other for his clemency. 
 Manlius commanded with rigour, excused his 
 soldiers from no labour, and never remitted 
 any punishment. Valerius, on the other side, 
 used them with as much gentleness and fa- 
 miliarity. Manlius, to support the vigour of 
 military discipline, executed his own son. Vale- 
 rius acted upon principles so different, that he 
 is said never to have offended any man. Yet, 
 in this great diversity of conduct, the effects 
 were the same, both as to the enemy, the com- 
 monwealth, and themselves : for none of their 
 
 soldiers ever declined fighting, none of them 
 rebelled, none so much as disputed their or- 
 ders, though the discipline of Manlius was so 
 severe, that afterwards all excessive and ar- 
 bitrary commands were from him called Jlfan- 
 liana imperia. If Manlius be considered as he 
 is represented by historians, we find him to 
 have been very valiant, pious to his father and 
 country, and submissive to his superiors. This 
 appears by his defence of his father, at the haz- 
 ard of his own life, against a tribune who ac- 
 cused him ; by his readiness to offer himself to 
 single combat with a Gaul, where he thought 
 the honour of his country concerned ;'and by 
 his first applying to the consul for leave, be- 
 fore he would accept the challenge. Now 
 when a man of this constitution arrives at 
 command, he desires that all men may be as 
 punctual as himself: and being naturally brave 
 he commands brave things, and when they are 
 once commanded, requires that they be exe- 
 cuted exactly ; this being a certain rule, that 
 where great things are commanded, strict obe- 
 dience must be exacted ; in which case mild- 
 ness and gentleness will not always prevail. 
 But where a man has not this greatness and 
 magnificence of mind, he is by no means to 
 command extraordinary things, and may there- 
 fore safely exercise the virtue of clemency ; 
 with which ordinary punishments are com- 
 patible enough, because they are not imputed 
 to the prince, but to the laws and customs of 
 the place. Manlius then was a severe man, 
 and kept up the Roman discipline exactly ; 
 prompted first by his own nature, and then by 
 a strong desire to have that obeyed, which his 
 own inclination had constrained him to com- 
 mand. Valerius Corvinus, on the other hand, 
 might exercise his gentleness without incon- 
 venience, because he commanded nothing ex- 
 traordinary, or contrary to the customs of the 
 Romans at that time ; for, as those customs 
 were good, and not very troublesome to ob- 
 serve, he was seldom necessitated to punish of- 
 fenders, because there were but few of that 
 sort ; and where they were, their punishment 
 was imputed to the laws, and not to his cruelty.. 
 Hence, Valerius had an opportunity, by his 
 gentleness, to gain both affection and authority 
 in the army, which was the cause, that the 
 soldiers, being equally obedient to the one as 
 the other, though their tempers and discipline 
 were so very different, they could yet do the 
 same things, and their actions have the came 
 G 
 
42 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 effects. I shall only add, that could a state be 
 so happy, as to have alwaj's persons succeeding 
 one another within a reasonable time, who, 
 however different in inclination and temper, 
 would yet by their examples renew the laws, 
 restrain vice, and remove every thing that 
 tended to its ruin or corruption, that state must 
 be immortal. 
 
 XVII. In thus ascribing the bravery and 
 successes of the Romans, to the excellent prin- 
 ciples of their constitution, and the great men 
 by whom these principles were supported, I 
 do no more than follow the opinion of their 
 own writers upon this subject. Sallust tells 
 us, " that after much reading and reflection 
 upon the causes of the growth and grandeur 
 of the Romans, he found reason to conclude, 
 that the distinguished virtue of a few citizens 
 had effected all that mighty run of prosperity." 
 Cicero too, in his reflection upon that verse of 
 the poet Ennius, 
 
 Moribus antiquis res stat Romana, virisque, 
 
 makes the same observation. " It is," says he, 
 " the union of these two advantages, which has 
 produced all the grandeur of Rome : on the 
 one hand, the good manners, the wise political 
 principles established from the beginning : on 
 the other, a succession of great men, formed 
 upon these principles, and employed by a state 
 in the administration of affairs. Before our 
 times, that happy union was always the same, 
 and these two advantages ever existed to- 
 gether ; otherwise a republic so powerful and 
 extensive as ours could not have subsisted so 
 long with honour, nor so constantly kept up 
 its reputation amongst all nations." I omit 
 the complaints Cicero subjoins to the de- 
 generacy of the age in which he lived, and 
 of the total decay of ancient manners. Every 
 one knows, that these soon after occasioned 
 the ruin of the republic. Meanwhile it may 
 not be improper to observe that these two ad- 
 vantages were not only the chief causes of the 
 Roman greatness, but likewise produced that 
 slow and gradual increase of power, so ne- 
 cesssary to lay a solid foundation of strength, 
 and support the weight of their many and ex- 
 tensive conquests. 
 
 XVIII. For there never was an empire, 
 either more flourishing, or more extensive than 
 the Roman. From the Euphrates and Tanais, 
 to Hercules' pillars, and the Atlantic ocean, 
 all the lands and all the seas, were under 
 
 their obedience. It is astonishing to consider, 
 that the nations which at present make king- 
 doms so considerable, all Gaul, all Spain, al- 
 most the whole island of Great Britain, Illy- 
 ria, to the Danube, Germany, to the Elbe, 
 Africa to the frightful and impassable deserts, 
 Greece, Thrace, Syria, Egypt, all the king- 
 doms of Asia Minor, and those between the 
 Euxine and Caspian seas, with many others, 
 became Roman provinces, almost all before 
 the end of the republic. I have often won- 
 dered to observe in historians a certain affec- 
 tation of ascribing the successes of the Ro- 
 mans to fortune, as if that, rather than valour 
 and wisdom, had been the occasion of their 
 prosperit}'. To me it evidently appears, through 
 the whole course of their history, that the unu- 
 sual pitch of grandeur to which they arrived, 
 was the necessary result of the talents and 
 accomplishments of which they were possessed, ? 
 whether they are considered with regard to 
 moral virtues, or to a political government, or 
 to martial merit and the art of war. For as 
 Livy observes, in the preface to his history, 
 there never was a republic more religious, or 
 more abounding in good examples, or where 
 avarice and luxury gained ground so late, or 
 where simplicity and poverty were so much 
 and so long held in honour. All the debates 
 and transactions of the senate, show, to a de- 
 monstration, how much wisdom of counsel, 
 love of the public, steadiness to the maxims of 
 the state, lenity and moderation with regard 
 to the conquered nations, prevailed in that au- 
 gust assembly. Courage, boldness, intrepi- 
 dity in the midst of the greatest dangers, an in- 
 vincible patience in the hardest labours, an in- 
 exorable firmness to maintain the military dis- 
 cipline in its utmost rigour, a settled resolution 
 to conquer or die, a greatness of soul, and a 
 constanc}^ proof against all misfortunes, have 
 at all times constituted the character of the 
 Romans, and rendered them in the end victo- 
 rious over all other nations. Cyrus and Alex- 
 ander, it is true, founded great empires ; but 
 the qualities proper for the execution of such 
 a design, being confined to the persons of these 
 two illustrious conquerors, and not inherited 
 by their descendants, the grandeur to which 
 they gave a beginning, did not support itself 
 long with any reputation. It was very differ- 
 ent with the Romans. Their empire was not 
 founded, nor raised to the state of grandeur it 
 attained by the rare endowments, or rapid con- 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 43 
 
 quests, of a single person. The Roman peo- 
 ple themselves, the body of the state, formed 
 that empire by slow degrees, and at several 
 times. The great men that helped, each in 
 their tim?, to establish, enlarge, and preserve 
 it, had all different characters, though in the 
 main they followed all the same principles ; 
 and hence the empire itself was both more 
 extensive, and of longer duration, than any 
 that had ever gone before it. 
 
 CHAP.V. 
 
 OF MARCHES. 
 
 I. What we have hitherto seen, relating to 
 the raising of troops, their divisions, and sub- 
 divisions, armour, discipline, and exercises, is 
 in a manner only the mechanism of war. There 
 are other still more important cares, which 
 constitute what is called the higher detail of 
 the service, and depend more immediately 
 upon the general's ability and experience. 
 To him it belongs to settle the general dis- 
 position of marches ; to encamp the troops 
 advantageously ; to draw them up in order of 
 battle, provide against the exigencies of the 
 field ; pursue with caution, or retreat with 
 judgment ; and lastly, in conducting an attack 
 or defence, to put in practice all the arts, 
 stratagems, and address, that long experience 
 in the service, and a consummate knowledge 
 of all the parts of war, are jointly able to 
 sugg«?.i?> I shall offer some reflections upon 
 the practice of the Roman generals in all 
 these great points of military conduct, and 
 begin with that which follows immediately 
 after the rendezvous of the troops, I mean, the 
 marching of an army. This subject naturall}'^ 
 divides itself into three branches; the gene- 
 ral order of marches in advancing against 
 an enemy ; the knowledge and choice of 
 posts ; and lastly, the disposition and con- 
 duct of a retreat. We shall speak of each in 
 order. 
 
 II. The marching against an enemy sup- 
 poses many preliminary cares in the general, 
 and many previous steps taken, in order to 
 his own safety, and the success of his de- 
 signs. I shall suppose the plan of the war 
 settled, as likewise the manner of acting, and 
 measures concerted accordingly. Yet still it 
 is incumbent upon a wise commander, before 
 
 he puts his troops in motion, to provide every 
 thing necessary for their accommodation and 
 subsistence ; to acquire an exact knowledge of 
 the country through which he marches ; to \ 
 inform himself of the number and quality of 
 the enemy's forces; to penetrate, if possible, 
 into his designs ; to study the character of the 
 generals employed against him ; and, by a 
 wise foresight, to be prepared for all the 
 events and contingencies that may happen in 
 the course of a campaign. Now though these 
 things come not so properly under fixed , 
 rules, but depend in a great measure upon 
 the ability and prudence of the commander 
 in chief; yet we find every where in history, 
 that the Romans had many regulations about 
 them, and always treated them with particu- 
 lar attention. To begin with the care of 
 provisions, which is of principal account in an 
 army, it appears to have been the constant 
 practice, to furnish the soldiers with a certain 
 proportion of corn, which they were obliged 
 to carry along with them in their marches. 
 This, on extraordinary occasions, amounted to 
 four bushels, or a month's allowance, and 
 seldom was less than what might serve for 
 fifteen or twenty days. They chose rather to 
 give them corn than bread, because it was 
 lighter, and might therefore be carried with 
 greater ease. Indeed this put them to the 
 trouble of grinding and baking it themselves; 
 but then they were used to it, and could upon 
 occasion make it into I know not what variety 
 of dishes. Besides the common bread, they 
 made a kind of soft boiled food of it, very 
 agreeable to the troops : they mingled it with 
 milk, roots, and herbs, and made pancakes of 
 it upon a small plate laid over the fire, or 
 upon hot ashes, as was anciently the manner 
 of regaling guests, and is still practised 
 throughout the east, where these kind of 
 thin cakes are much preferred to our best 
 bread. Their drink was answerable to this 
 diet, being no more than a mixture of vinegar 
 and water. It was called posea, could at all 
 times be easily procured, and was particu- 
 larly serviceable to quench the thirst immedi- 
 ately. 
 
 III. I have heard it observed, that nothing 
 gives greater difficulty to military men, in the 
 reading of ancient history, than the article of 
 provisions, Cato's maxim, that the war 
 feeds the war, holds goods in plentiful 
 countries, and with regard to small armies : 
 
44 
 
 THE R OMAN 
 
 vet still it is more generally true, that tl.e 
 war does not furnish provisions upon com- 
 mand, or at a fixed time. They must be pro- 
 vided both for the present and the future. 
 We do not however find, that either the 
 Greeks or Romans had the precaution to 
 provide magazines of forage, to lay up pro- 
 visions, to have a commissary -general of stores, 
 or to be followed by a great number of car- 
 riages. But then we are to consider, that 
 in the wars of the Greeks against each other, 
 their troops were little numerous, and accus 
 tomed to a sober life ; that they did not re- 
 move far from their own countr}', and almost 
 always returned regularly every winter ; so 
 that it is plain, it was not difficult for them to 
 have provisions in abundance, especially the 
 Athenians, who were masters at sea. The 
 same may be said of the Romans. The care 
 of subsisting the troops was infinitely less 
 weighty with them, than it is at present with 
 most of the nations of Europe. Their armies 
 ■were much less numerous, and they had a 
 much smaller number of cavalry. A consular 
 army consisted of near seventeen thousand 
 foot, to which they had not above eighteen 
 hundred horse. In our days, to seventeen 
 thousand foot, we have often more than six 
 thousand horse. What a vast diflference must 
 this make in the consumption of forage and 
 provisions ! Let me add, that the sober 
 manner of life in the army, confined to mere 
 necessaries, spared them an infinite multitude 
 of servants, horses, and baggage, which now 
 exhaust our magazines, starve our armies, re- 
 tard the execution of enterprises, and often 
 render them impracticable. Nor was this the 
 manner of living only of the soldiers, but 
 likewise of the officers and generals. Not 
 only consuls and dictators in the early ages of 
 the commonwealth, but even emperors them- 
 selves ; Trajan, Adrian, Pescennius, Severus, 
 Paobus, Julian, and many others, not only 
 lived without luxury, but contented them- 
 selves with boiled fiour or beans, a piece of 
 cheesfe or bacon, and made it their glory to 
 level themselves, in this respect, with the 
 meanest of the soldiers. It is easy to con- 
 ceive how much this must contribute to di- 
 minish the train of an army, to support the 
 taste of frugality and simplicity amongst the 
 troops, and banish all luxury and idle show 
 from the camp. 
 
 IV. But though the care of provisions was 
 
 less burdensome to the ancients, we find that 
 both it, and all other accommodations proper 
 for the march of an army, were not less at- 
 tended to by their generals. Xenophon, who 
 was himself a soldier, and whose writings 
 abounds with maxims of war, is frequent in 
 his reflections upon this article. One of the 
 principal instructions he makes Cambyses 
 king of Persia give his son Gyrus, who after- 
 wards became so glorious, was not to em- 
 bark in any expedition, till he had first in- 
 formed himself, whether subsistence were 
 provided for the troops. In his account of 
 the behaviour of the same Cyrus, after his 
 arrival in the camp of his uncle Cyaxares, he 
 enters into an immense detail, with respect to 
 all the necessaries of an army. That prince 
 was to march fifteen days, through countries 
 that had been destroyed, and in which there 
 were neither provisions nor forage. He 
 ordered enough of both for twenty days to be 
 carried, and that the soldiers, instead of 
 loading themselves with baggage, should ex- 
 change that burden for an equal one of pro- 
 visions, without troubling themselves about 
 beds and coverlets for sleeping, the want of 
 which their fatigues would supply. They 
 were accustomed to drink wine ; and as a 
 sudden and total disuse of it might be attend- 
 ed with ill consequences, he ordered them to 
 carry a certain quantity with them, and to use 
 themselves by degrees to do without it, and 
 be contented with water. He advised them 
 also to carry salt provisions along with them, 
 hand-mills for grinding corn, and medicines 
 for the sick ; to put into every carriage a 
 sickle and a mattock, and upon every beast of 
 burden an axe and a scythe ; and to take care 
 to provide themselves with a thousand other 
 necessaries. He carried also along with him, 
 smiths, shoemakers, and other workmen, with 
 all manner of tools used in their trades. For 
 the rest, he declared publicly that whoever 
 would charge himself with the care of send- 
 ing provisions to the camp, should be honoured 
 and rewarded by himself and his friends ; 
 and even supplied with money for that service, 
 provided they would give security, and en- 
 gage to follow the army. 
 
 V. The reader will here be pleased to ob- 
 serve, that as I am now entered upon the 
 higher detail of war, I shall not so entirely 
 confine myself to the Romans, as not from 
 time to time to mention the practices of other 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 45 
 
 nations, where they any way tend to illustrate 
 the point in hand. For as the Roman writers 
 upon this subject are but few, and have not 
 entered very circumstantially into matters, we 
 are often at a loss with regard to some of the 
 most important parts of their discipline. This 
 however we may be certain of, that as they 
 excelled particularly in the art of war, and 
 readily adopted the improvements of other 
 nations, the more we know of the progress 
 and attainments of the ancients in this re- 
 spect, the better we shall be able to judge of 
 the uncommon proficiency of the. Romans. 
 We have already seen some of their wise 
 precautions with regard to the subsistence and 
 accommodation of the troops ; for which they 
 provided no less by fixed and general regula- 
 tions, than Cyrus does in the particular in- 
 stance recorded by Xenophon. I shall only 
 add, that history abounds with examples of this 
 prudent care and foresight in their generals. 
 .Paulus ^milius would not set out for Mace- 
 donia, till he had fully settled every thing re- 
 lating to provisions. Cassar, in all his wars, 
 was extremely attentive to the safety of his cnn- 
 voys, and the keeping up a free communication 
 with those countries whence he received his 
 supplies. We find that he regularly distributed 
 corn to the army, and always took care, before 
 the time for a new distribution arrived, to have 
 it brought to the camp by means of his allies : 
 or if he chanced to be disappointed here, so 
 contrived his march, as to pass by some great 
 town, where he could readily be furnished 
 with whatever he stood in need of. 
 
 VI. But besides the care of provisions, it is 
 further incumbent upon a wise general, to ac- 
 quaint himself thoroughly with the nature of 
 the country through which he is to march. I 
 take it for granted that the Romans omitted 
 none of the usual and obvious methods for this 
 purpose : that they furnished themselves with 
 guides ; interrogated the natives ; and, where 
 such were to he had, procured exact maps of 
 the country, delineating the towns, their num- 
 ber and distance, the roads and mountains, the 
 rivers, the fords; and the nature and qualities 
 of them all. But what particularly deserves 
 our notice in the Roman policy ; they scarce 
 ever entered into a war with any distant state, 
 till they had first contracted an alliance with 
 some contiguous power, who might unite his 
 forces to theirs in the intended invasion. This 
 practice was attended with numberless advan- 
 
 tages. They had hereby timely notice of the 
 enemy's designs; they were made acquainted 
 with the number and quality of his forces : and 
 when they approached with their army, were 
 not only plentifully supplied with all kind of 
 military stores, but joined by a considerable 
 body of troops perfectly acquainted with the 
 country, and able to inform them where they 
 might make their impress;?»i with greatest 
 probability of success. Thus when they in- 
 vaded Philip king of Macedonia, they took 
 care to secure the friendship of the ^tolians, 
 whose troops were of unspeakable service to 
 them in that war. In their expedition against 
 Antiochus they made use of the same policy, 
 having previously contracted amity with seve- 
 ral of the petty princes and states of Asia 
 Minor. Every one knows what use Casar 
 made of the pretended alliance with the -^du- 
 ans ; and that it was one of the principal en- 
 gines by which he completed the reduction of 
 Gaul. Indeed nothing can fall out more for- 
 tunately for an army, about to invade a coun- 
 try to which they are strangers, than to act in 
 conjunction with troops contiguous to the ter- 
 ritories they attack : because as by this means 
 they make war with all the advantage of 
 natives, they are not only the better enabled to 
 guard against ambuscades and surprises, but 
 can in their turn make use of all those strata- 
 gems and favourable opportunities of action, 
 which the particular nature of the country fur- 
 nishes. Whoever therefore considers the 
 artful conduct of the Romans in this respect, 
 will find himself necessitated to own, that de- 
 signs concerted with so much wisdom and 
 foresight merited all the success with which 
 they were for the most part attended. 
 
 VII. These preliminary cares settled, it is 
 now time to put the troops in motion. The 
 Romans were very exact in the order of their 
 marches. In the morning, at the first sound- 
 ing of the trumpet, every one took down his 
 tent, and began to make up his baggage ; 
 at the second sounding, every one loaded his 
 baggage; and at the third, the legions moved 
 out of their quarters, and put themselves in the 
 form and order they were that day to march 
 in. But none were to take down their tents, 
 till the consul and military tribunes had first 
 taken down theirs ; whether for the greater 
 respect, or because their tents and baggage 
 being larger than the rest, it was necessary 
 they should be the first at work, that their 
 
46 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 baggage might be in a readiness to march at 
 the third sound of the trumpet, as well as that 
 of the private soldier. For commanders, who 
 give rules to all the rest, ought to be very ex- 
 act in observing them themselves ; since, if 
 they break their own orders, they encourage 
 others to do the like ; example always ope- 
 rating more strongly than precept. Hence 
 that constant care in the Roman generals, to 
 be themselves patterns to the troops, with re- 
 gard to all the duties of the service ; nor do we 
 meet with any thing in their whole discipline, 
 more truly deserving of imitation, or better 
 calculated to promote submission and obedi- 
 ence in the army. For when soldiers find the 
 general keeps strictly to the rules he gives, 
 they are the more careful to observe them 
 likewise ; concluding, that as he therein 
 grants no indulgence to himself, he certainly 
 will not do it to others : nay, they implicitly 
 believe such orders good and necessary, be- 
 cause he that gave them is so punctual an 
 observer of them. 
 
 VIII. As to the particular form and dis- 
 position of the Roman march, we meet with 
 very little on that subject in ancient anthors. 
 In the general it appears, that whether they 
 marched in a friend's or enemy's country, 
 whether they believed the enemy near or far 
 off, they proceeded with the same care and 
 circumspection : and this certainly was a very 
 wise policy. For a general may be mistaken 
 in his intelligence or intelligencers ; nay, 
 may think those friends, who want but an 
 advantageous opportunity of declaring them- 
 selves foes : so that all imaginable caution 
 ought to be observed, in all times, and in all 
 places. To which let me add, that were there 
 nothing else as a motive to it, but the keeping 
 up exactly the military discipline, yet for that 
 reason singly, it ought constantly to be done. 
 The method followed most commonly by the 
 Romans in their marches seems to have been 
 this. They had always some troops of horse 
 scouting abroad, in order to discover the 
 roads. After them followed the right wing, 
 with all its carriages immediately in the rear. 
 Then came a legion, with its carriages ; after 
 that another ; and so a third, a fourth, &c. in 
 order. Last of all came the left wing and its 
 baggage, with a party of horse in their rear. 
 If, during the march, the army happened to 
 be assaulted in the front or in the rear, they 
 caused all their carriages to withdraw to the 
 
 right wing or the left, as they found it con- 
 venient, and most agreeable to the nature of 
 the place ; and then, when they were cleared 
 and disencumbered of their baggage, all of 
 them unanimously made head against the 
 enemy. If they were assaulted in the flank, 
 they drew their carriages on that side where 
 they were like to be most safe, and then ad- 
 dressed themselves to the fight. 
 
 IX. This, I say, was the most common 
 order of their marches : for as to any fixed 
 and standing rule, none could possibly be 
 established; because the form must vary, ac- 
 cording to the country you are in, and the 
 enemy you have to do with. Julius Cassar, 
 when he marched against the Nervians, so 
 long as he thought the enemy at a distance, 
 proceeded exactly according to the disposi- 
 tion here described. But upon a nearer ap- 
 proach, he changed it entirely. For then 
 all the cavalry were sent before. After them 
 followed six legions, without baggage ; and 
 last of all, the carriages, guarded by two new 
 raised legions. This was an excellent me- 
 thod, as he was sure the enemy could only at- 
 tempt him in the van ; but might be of ill con- 
 sequence, where the rear of the army was lia- 
 ble to be attacked. One thing the Romans 
 particularly attended to, and that was, that the 
 troops did not straggle or march unequally, 
 some too fast, others too slow, which very 
 much weakens an army, and exposes it to 
 great disorder. Hence their care, in training 
 up their men, to inure them to the military 
 pace : that is, to the walking over a certain 
 stated piece of ground within a fixed and 
 limited time. This, as we have already 
 observed, amounted to twenty miles in five 
 hours, which made the usual day's march of a 
 Roman army. To accustom the soldiers to it, 
 three times a month, the foot as well as horse 
 were obliged to take this march. Upon ex- 
 traordinary occasions they were wont to march 
 four and twenty miles in the same space of 
 time. By an exact calculation of what Caesar 
 relates of a sudden march, which he made at 
 the time he besieged Gergovia, we find that 
 in four and twenty hours he marched fifty 
 miles. This he did with the utmost expedi- 
 tion. In reducing it to less than half, it 
 makes the usual rate of an extraordinary 
 day's march. 
 
 X. It is remarkable with regai i to modern 
 wars, that they not only impoverish the princes 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 47 
 
 that are overcome, but even the conquerors 
 themselves : for as one loses his country, so 
 the other loses his money. In ancient times 
 ^he case was otherwise ; it appearing that the 
 conqueror always enriched himself by the war. 
 The reason of this difference seems to be, that 
 in our times no public account is taken of the 
 plunder ; or indeed rather, that the barbarous 
 custom of pillaging the conquered countries, 
 is not now so much practised as formerly. 
 Amongst the Romans, all the spoil was de- 
 livered in and appropriated to the public, 
 which afterwards distributed it as it saw cause. 
 To this purpose they had their questors, in 
 whose hands all the pillage and taxes were 
 deposited, of which the general disposed as 
 he thought good, for the payment of his 
 soldiers, the curing of the wounded or sick, 
 and discharging the other necessities of the 
 army. It is true the consul had power to 
 give the plunder of a town to his soldiers, and 
 he frequently did it ; but that liberty never 
 bred any disorder. For when a town was 
 taken, or an army defeated, all the spoil was 
 brought into a public space, and distributed 
 man by man, according to every one's merit. 
 This custom made the soldiers more intent 
 upon victory than plunder. The practice of 
 the Roman legions was, to break and disorder 
 an enemy, but not to pursue ; for they never 
 went out of their ranks upon any occasion 
 whatever. Only the horse, the light armed 
 troops, and what other soldiers were not of 
 the legions, followed the chase. But had the 
 plunder of the field belonged to whoever 
 could catch it, it would have been neither 
 reasonable nor possible to have kept the le- 
 gions to their ranks, or to have exposed them 
 to so many dangers. Hence it was, that upon 
 a victory, the public was always enriched. 
 For when a consul entered in triumph, he 
 brought with him great riches into the trea- 
 sury of Rome ; consisting of taxes, contribu- 
 tions, ransoms, and plunder. The Romans 
 had likewise another custom well contrived 
 for the preservation of discipline ; and that 
 was, to deposit a third part of every soldier's 
 pay, with the ensigns of their respective com- 
 panies, who never restored it, till the war was 
 at an end. This served two very excellent 
 purposes ; first every soldier had a stock of 
 his own, which without this precaution would 
 have been squandered away, as they were 
 most of them young and profuse. Secondly, 
 
 knowing their stocks to be in their ensign's 
 hands, they were the more careful to defend 
 and keep by him, whether in the camp, in the 
 field of battle, or upon a march. This cus- 
 tom contributed much to their valour, and is 
 necessary to be observed by any general, who 
 would reduce his soldiers to the discipline of 
 the Romans. 
 
 XI. Among the various orders of the Ro- 
 man marches, one particularly deserves our 
 notice, which is frequently mentioned by 
 historians, and which they term forming the 
 army itineri et prxlio. It was, when the line 
 of march was so contrived, as to correspond 
 exactly with the line of battle ; or, to express 
 myself a little more clearly, when the columns 
 of horse and foot were disposed in such a 
 manner, that, upon the sudden appearance of 
 an enemy, they could fall immediately into an 
 order proper for fighting. There is not per- 
 haps any thing in the science of arms more 
 subtle and useful than this, and the Romans 
 seem to have made it their particular study. 
 I do not at present recollect in any of their 
 historians, a minute and circumstantial account 
 of a march of this kind, where the disposition 
 of the columns is exactly marked, and the 
 manner in which they formed in order of 
 battle, upon the approach of the enemy. 
 What most readily occurs to my memory, is 
 the fine march of Hamilcar against Spendius, 
 which has been so judiciously explained by 
 the Chevalier Folard, in his admirable com- 
 ment upon Polybius. As the whole art of 
 War furnishes nothing more complete in its 
 kind, whether we regard the boldness of the 
 attempt, or the well concerted motions by 
 which it was accomplished, I am satisfied I 
 shall do the reader a particular pleasure, in 
 laying a full and distinct account of it before 
 him. 
 
 XII. Upon the conclusion of the first Punic 
 war, the Carthaginian mercenaries revolting, 
 chose Matho and Spendius for their leaders. 
 Hanno was sent against them with an army ; 
 but receiving a considerable check, the rebels 
 blocked up Carthage on every side, and pos- 
 sessed themselves of all the passes leading to 
 the peninsula on which it stood. In this exi- 
 gence, the Carthaginians had recourse to 
 Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, who had 
 given eminent proof of his abilities when he 
 commanded their armies in Sicily. Accord- 
 ingly he took the field with ten thousand 
 
48 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 men, and seventy elephants ; but was for 
 some time at a loss how to meet with the 
 enemy upon equal ground. For besides the 
 other places of advantage which the merce- 
 naries had seized, Hanno had suffered them to 
 get possession of the only bridge by which 
 the river Bagradas was passable to those who 
 were to travel from Carthage into the con- 
 tinent. This river had not many fords, and 
 the few it had were so well watched, that it 
 was not easy for even a single man to get 
 over without being seen. As for the bridge 
 itself, the enemy guarded it with the utmost 
 care, and had built a town close by it, for the 
 more commodious lodgings of the troops that 
 were appointed to that service. Hamilcar 
 having in vain tried all means possible to 
 force a passage, at length bethought himself 
 of an expedient to gain one by stealth. He 
 had observed, that upon blowing of certain 
 winds, the mouth of the Bagradas used to be 
 choked up with sand and gravel, which 
 formed a kind of bar across, and rendered it 
 fordable. Remaining therefore in his camp 
 between the sea and the mountains, he waited 
 the opportunity of these winds ; which no 
 sooner arrived, than marching suddenly in the 
 night, he passed the stream unperceived, and 
 the next morning appeared in the plain, to the 
 great astonishment both of the Carthaginians 
 and the enemy. 
 
 XIII. Hamilcar by this step put all to the 
 hazard. Had he failed in his attempt against 
 Spendius, his whole army must inevitably have 
 been destroyed ; for a retreat was now become 
 impossible. But nMther was the danger less 
 great to his country by continuing inactive ; 
 and therefore he wisely considered, that in 
 such an extremity it was better to try some 
 way where fortune and his own ability in war 
 offered a prospect of success, than by a timor- 
 ous diffident conduct expose himself to the 
 same ruin, without a single effort to evade it. 
 He was now upon the other side the Bagradas. 
 The plains were favourable to him, because 
 he had a considerable body of horse. The 
 river itself too was of no small advantage, as 
 it served to secure his baggage, and cover one 
 of his flanks. Spendius was advancing to 
 meet him at the head of ten thousand men. 
 Besides these he understood that a detach- 
 ment of fifteen thousand was marching with 
 all diligence from Utica ; and as i' was their 
 
 business to come upon his flank and reai 
 rather than to join Spendius, he made no 
 doubt of their proceeding accordingly. Upon 
 these considerations he regulated his order of 
 battle, and the disposition of his march. To 
 make head against Spendius, he placed his 
 elephants in the first line, and immediately 
 behind them his cavalry, intermixed with 
 platoons of light armed foot. The heavy- 
 armed infantry formed the third line, in order 
 to oppose the detachment he expected upon 
 his rear, from Utica. By this disposition he 
 was enabled to make head on all sides. For 
 as he made no doubt but his first line of ele- 
 phants, of which Spendius was totally unpro- 
 vided, would be sufficient to break the body 
 he commanded ; and that the cavalry, aided 
 by the light armed foot, falling in immediately, 
 would serve to complete the rout : so his third 
 line, consisting of the flower of his African 
 infantry, he thought himself strong enough 
 likewise to deal with the rebels from Utica. 
 
 XIV. Each of these lines marched in four 
 columns, the columns of cavalry following 
 immediately behind the elephants, and those 
 of the infantry immediately behind the cavalry. 
 The distance between the columns was equal 
 to the space they were to occupy in the line 
 of battle. By this disposition, upon the first 
 appearance of the enemy, the army could form 
 in an instant. For the columns being com- 
 manded to halt, and wheel at once into their 
 place in the line, were in order of battle 
 presently. Hamilcar continuing his march, 
 perceived, as the enemy approached, that the 
 detachment from Utica, instead of coming in 
 upon his rear, had actually joined Spendius, 
 and formed a second line of foot behind that 
 he commanded. As he had foreseen that 
 this might happen, his order of march was con- 
 trived to furnish a speedy remedy. It now 
 became necessary to change his whole dis- 
 position, and oppose a strong front of infantry 
 to the enemy, with the elephants at the head 
 of all, according to the usual custom. To 
 that end the columns were ordered to halt, and 
 the elephants forming in front, the cavalry 
 meanwhile fell back between intervals of the 
 foot, ranging themselves in two divisions be- 
 hind the two extremities of the line of infantry, 
 which was formed in an instant by the wheel- 
 ing of the columns. The rebels deceived by 
 th » artful motion, and mistaking the retreat 
 
ART OF WAE. 
 
 49 
 
 of the cavalry for a real flight, advanced 
 briskly to the attack, broke through the ele- 
 phants, and charged the Carthaginian foot. 
 Meanwhile the cavalry, which, as we have 
 already observed, had ranged itself in two 
 columns behind the two wings of the infantry, 
 wheeling to the right and left from the rear, 
 appeared all on a sudden in the same line with 
 the foot, covering the flanks of the Carthagi- 
 nian army, and considerably overwinging the 
 enemy. The rebels, astonished at this extra- 
 ordinary motion, quickly fell into disorder, 
 and at last betook themselves to flight. Ha- 
 milcar pursued them with his horse and ele- 
 phants ; and following them quite to the town 
 and bridge, easily got possession of that im- 
 portant pass. 
 
 XV. From this recital it appears, to what 
 a degree of perfection the ancients had arrived 
 in the science of marches, which is a capital 
 article in the grand operations of war. And 
 though the instance here given be of an African 
 commander, and therefore does not so imme- 
 diately regard the Eoman people, yet if we 
 consider, that these last are allowed to have 
 excelled all nations in the knowledge of 
 arms, and that they often regulated their 
 marches upon this plan, it seems reasonable 
 to believe, that had their historians entered 
 into particular details of this kind, we should 
 have met with many examples of military con- 
 duct in their generals, no less surprising than 
 that now before us. Indeed, as it frequently 
 happens in war, that the enemy, though not 
 actually in sight, is yet hourly expected, this 
 wa}' of ordering an army seems very neces- 
 sary ; and the general who excels in it, and is 
 at the same time sufficiently on his guard 
 against surprises, will seldom or ever be worst- 
 ed. I have often admired, in reading Cse- 
 sar's Commentaries, the consurnmate prudence 
 and circumspection of that great man, espe- 
 cially in relation to surprises. Though he was 
 the ablest general of his time, and commanded 
 the finest army that perhaps ever appeared in 
 the world, yet he always proceeded with the 
 utmost caution, and was extremely careful of 
 believing any thing too easily, that was not 
 reasonably to be supposed. If a great number 
 of the enemy was beaten and pursued by a few 
 of his men, if a few of them attacked a greater 
 party of his, if they ran unexpectedly, and 
 without any visible cause, on these occasions 
 he was always very much upon his guard, and 
 
 never fancied his enemy so weak, as not to 
 understand his own business. It seems in the 
 general a good rule, the weaker and more 
 careless an enemy appears to be, the more to 
 apprehend and dread him. In cases of this 
 kind, an experienced commander will comport 
 himself in two different manners. He will 
 fear the enemy in his own thoughts, and order 
 his affairs accordingly ; but in his words and 
 outward behaviour, he will affect to despise 
 him. This last way gives courage to the 
 soldiers, and makes them confident of victory. 
 The other keeps the general upon his guard, 
 and renders him less liable to be circumvented ; 
 for to march through an enemy's country is 
 more dangerous, and requires a greater address 
 and foresight than to fight a pitched battle. 
 
 XVI. We proceed now to the second par- 
 ticular mentioned on the head of marches, 
 namely, the knowledge and choice of posts. 
 As this will again fall under our notice in the 
 next chapter, concerning encampments, we 
 need say the less of it here. It has however 
 a strict and necessary connexion with the 
 marching of an army. For whether we are to 
 retreat or advance, or which way so ever our 
 route lies, it often happens, that the safety of 
 the army depends upon seizing some advan- 
 tageous posts that command the country 
 through which we march. The Romans ap- 
 plied themselves with particular attention to 
 this part of war, and we meet with several 
 very early traces of it in their history. Livy 
 relates an example of this kind in the person 
 of Publius Decius, who being a military tri- 
 bune in the army which the consul Cornelius 
 commanded against the Samnites, and finding 
 the consul and army falling by accident into a 
 vale, where they might have been encompas- 
 sed and cut oflf by the enemy : " Do you see, 
 (said he to Cornelius,) that eminence which 
 commands the enemy's camp 1 There lies our 
 hope. It is a post that may serve to extricate 
 us out of our present danger, if we are careful 
 only to seize it quickly, and avail ourselves of 
 the blindness of the Samnites, who have ne- 
 glected it." The historian had before in- 
 formed us, that Decius observed a hill over the 
 enemy's camp, not easily to be ascended by 
 those who were completely armed, but to those 
 lightly armed, accessible enough. The con- 
 sul ordered him to take possession of it with 
 three thousand men. He obeyed the order, 
 secured the Roman army, and designing ta 
 H 
 
50 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 march away in the night, and save both him- 
 self and his party, addressed himself in these 
 words to some of his companions : " Follow 
 me, fellow-soldiers, that whilst we have yet 
 light, we may explore where the enemy keeps 
 his guards, and which way we may make our 
 retreat." Accordingly he went out in person 
 upon this design, and habited like a soldier, 
 that the enemy might not know his rank in the 
 army, took an exact view of the ground, and 
 the situation of their camp. Whoever atten- 
 tively considers this relation, will find how 
 useful and necessary it is for a commander to 
 be acquainted with the nature of coasts and 
 countries, and that not only in a general, 
 but in an exquisite and more particular way. 
 Had not Decius understood those things very 
 well, he could not so suddenly have discerned 
 the advantage of that hill, and of what im- 
 portance it would be to the preservation of 
 the Roman army. Neither could he have 
 judged, at that distance, whether it was acces- 
 sible or not : and when he had possessed him- 
 self of it, and was to draw off afterwards, as 
 the enemy environed him on every side, he 
 could never have found out the best way for 
 his retreat, nor have guessed so well where the 
 snemy kept his guards.. Fabius Maximus is 
 another example of a consummate knowledge 
 this way. He commanded the Roman army six 
 months against Hannibal, and by a series of 
 well-concerted motions, and a judicious choice 
 of posts, conducted himself so happily, that 
 during all that time he never suffered any con- 
 siderable disaster, nor could be compelled to 
 fight against his will, though the artful Car- 
 thaginian left no stratagem untried, to draw 
 him to an engagement, or entangle him in an 
 ambuscade. But of all the Roman generals, 
 none seems to have been a greater master in 
 this part of war than Julius Cfssar. We meet 
 with many instances of it in his Commentaries, 
 particularly in that famous campaign in Spain, 
 where b}' a happy choice of posts, and an ex- 
 quisite address in improving the advantages 
 the nature of the country afforded, he com- 
 pelled a veteran army to surrender themselves 
 prisoners of war, without striking a blow. 
 
 XVn. The third and last particular we 
 mentioned in relation to marches, was the dis- 
 position and conduct of a retreat. This is, 
 without dispute, the nicest point in the whole 
 business of war. For besides all the attentions 
 requisite in ordinary marches, you are under the 
 
 disadvantage of being continually pressed by 
 an enemj', commonly superior in force, and 
 flushed with success. The finest retreat we 
 meet with in ancient history, is that of the ten 
 thousand Greeks under the conduct of Xeno- 
 phon, who has left us a particular account of 
 that famous expedition. We there see that 
 the hollow square, which was invented pur- 
 posely for a retreat, is very incommodious 
 when the enemy is directly in your rear. Xeno- 
 phon says so in express terms, and that the 
 Greeks were obliged to discontinue that order, 
 and march in two columns, with a body of re- 
 serve of six hundred men, who were not con- 
 fined to the space between the columns, so as 
 to complete the figure of the square, but formed 
 sometimes the van, sometimes the rear, filed 
 off by the two flanks where the columns were 
 obliged to approach, or posted themselves in 
 the interval when they extended to the right 
 and left ; in a word, without being tied down 
 to any fixed post, ran wherever their assistance 
 was wanted. What surprises most in this re- 
 treat is, that upon a computation of the way 
 made by the troops, which Xenophon regu- 
 larly sets down, we find their day's marches 
 one with another, to fall but little short of 
 twenty-four miles. Our armies seldom advance 
 half the way, even when they have no enemy 
 upon their hands, nor any of those other dis- 
 advantages the Greeks laboured under. We 
 find likewise in the Roman history, several ex- 
 amples of well-conducted retreats, in which 
 their generals have happily extricated them- 
 selves out of dangers that seemed to threaten 
 their armies with unavoidable destruction. 
 Quintus Lutatius having the Cambri upon his 
 heels, and being arrived at a river ; that the 
 enemy might give him time to pass, pre- 
 tended a resolution to fight them, pitched his 
 camp, intrenched himself, set up his standard, 
 and set out parties of horse to provide forage. 
 The Cambri believing he meant to encamp 
 there, came and encamped by him, and divided 
 themselves into several parties, to go in quest 
 of provisions. Lutatius having notice of this, 
 seized the opportunity so favourable to his de- 
 sign, and throwing bridges over the river, passed 
 it before the enemy could have time to disturb 
 him. Lucius Minucius a Roman consul was 
 in Liguria with an army, and shut up by the 
 enemy between two mountains, insomuch that 
 he could not disengage himself. Being sen- 
 sible of the danger he was in, he sent certain 
 
A.KT OF WAR. 
 
 51 
 
 NumiJians which he had in his army, upon 
 small ill-conditioned horses, towards the places 
 where the enemy had their guard. At first 
 sight they put themselves into a posture to de- 
 fend the passes : but when they observed the 
 Numidians in ill order, and ill-mounted in re- 
 spect of themselves, they began to despise 
 them, and to he more remiss in their guard ; 
 which was no sooner perceived by the Numi- 
 dians, than clapping spurs to their horses, and 
 charging them suddenly, they passed on in 
 spite of all opposition, and by the mischief and 
 devastation they made every where in the 
 countr}', constrained the enemy to give free 
 passage to the whole army. I shall mention 
 only one instance more, and that is the retreat 
 of Marc Antony, v/hen he was pursued into 
 Syria by -a great body of Parthian horse. He 
 observed that every morning by break of day 
 they were upon his back as soon as he moved, 
 and continued skirmishing and molesting him 
 quite through the march. In order to deceive 
 them, and obtain some respite, he resolved 
 not to remove before noon ; which the Par- 
 thians observing, concluded he could not stir 
 that day, and returned to their posts, insomuch 
 that he had an opportunity of marching all the 
 rest of the day without interruption. But this 
 was only a temporary expedient, calculated 
 for present relief; and therefore to screen 
 himself from the arrows of the Parthians, with 
 which the army was greatly incommoded, he 
 made use of the following device, practised 
 often by the Romans on other occasions. He 
 ordered the soldiers, when the enemy came 
 near them, to cast themselves into the figure 
 of the testudo, so that their targets should close 
 altogether above their heads, and defend them 
 from the missive weapons discharged at them. 
 In this case the first rank stood upright on 
 their feet, and the rest stooped lower and low- 
 er by degrees, till the last rank kneeled down 
 upon their knees ; so that every rank covering 
 with their targets the heads of all in the rank 
 before them, they represented a tortoise-shell, 
 or a sort of pent-house. By this contrivance 
 he made good his retreat, and arrived in Syria, 
 without considerable loss. 
 
 XVIII. Before I conclude this chapter, it 
 will naturally be expected I should explain 
 what was the practice and discipline of the 
 Romans, when they had finished the day's 
 march, and were arrived near the place of en- 
 campment. In this case the military tribunes 
 
 and centurions appointed for that service ad- 
 vanced before all the rest diligently to view 
 and consider the situation of the place. When 
 they had chosen the ground, they began by 
 marking the general's quarter with a white flag 
 or streamer, and distinctly set out its bounda- 
 ries. Then the quarters of the several tri- 
 bunes were appointed, and afterwards those 
 of the legions, all with distinct flags of several 
 colours. Every legion, as well of the allies 
 as of the Romans, had their portion of ground 
 assigned and marked out, for drawing the line 
 round the camp, which was set about immedi- 
 ately, part of the troops continuing meanwhile 
 under arms, to defend those that were at work 
 upon the intrenchment, in case of any sudden 
 surprise. All this was finished in a very short 
 space, the Romans being remarkably expert 
 in it by constant practice ; for they never al- 
 tered the figure of their camp, nor omitted to 
 fortify it in all the forms, though but for one 
 night's continuance. But this naturally leads 
 me to the subject of the next chapter. 
 
 CHAP.VI. 
 
 OF ENCAIMPMENTS. 
 
 I. OxE of the most necessary and beneficial 
 parts of the military art is, to know how to en- 
 camp well, and to practise it constantly. No 
 wonder therefore that the Romans, among 
 whom military discipline was carried to such 
 a degree of perfection, and who exacted the 
 most rigorous submission to all the laws and 
 rules of it, were particularly attentive to this 
 article. And indeed the armies of that people, 
 though still in the territory of Rome, and 
 though they had only one night to pass in a 
 place, encamped nevertheless in all the forms, 
 with no other difference than that the camp 
 was less fortified there, perhaps, than in the 
 enemy's country. It was always of a square 
 form, contrary to the custom of the Greeks, 
 who made theirs round. The ditch and ram- 
 part, which consisted of four equal sides, was 
 equally distributed to be Raised by the two Ro- 
 man legions, and the two legions of the allies 
 who perfected it without intermission. If the 
 enemy were near, part of the troops continued 
 under arms, whilst the rest were employed in 
 throwing up the intrenchments. They begaa 
 by digging trenches of greater or less depth 
 
52 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 according to the occasion. They were at least 
 eight feet broad by six deep : but we often find 
 them twelve feet in breadth, sometimes more, 
 to fifteen or twenty. Of the earth dug out of 
 the trenches, and thrown up on the side of 
 the camp, they formed the rampart, and to 
 make it the firmer, mingled it with turf cut in 
 a certain size and form. Sometimes they drove 
 double rows of stakes into the earth, leaving 
 so much of the length above ground, as the 
 height of the work was to be of; and then in- 
 terweaving them with twigs, in the manner of 
 basket-work, filled the space between with the 
 earth rising out of the ditch. This was an ex- 
 peditious and safe way of forming the line, and 
 appears to have been always practised, when 
 they encamped in places where these mate- 
 rials were to be found. Upon the brow of 
 the rampart the palisades were planted. Po- 
 lybius, speaking of the order given by Q. Fla- 
 minius to his troops, to cut stakes against there 
 should be occasion for them, oflfers several 
 very curious remarks upon this subject ; and 
 as that judicious historian, who was himself 
 an expert warrior, seems to lay great stress 
 upon the conduct of the Romans in this point, 
 I shall beg leave to lay some of his observations 
 before the reader. 
 
 II. This custom, says Polybius, which is 
 easy to put in practice amongst the Romans, 
 passes for impossible with the Greeks. 'I'hey 
 can hardly support their own weight upon 
 their marches, whilst the Romans, notwith- 
 standing the buckler which hangs at their 
 shoulders, and the javelins, which they carry 
 in their hands, load themselves also with stakes 
 or palisades, which are very diflTerent from 
 those of the Greeks. With the latter those 
 are best, which have many strong branches 
 about the trunk. The Romans, on the con- 
 trary, leave but three or four at most upon it, 
 and that only on one side. In this manner a man 
 can carry two or three bound together, and 
 much more use may be made of them. Those 
 of the Greeks are more easily pulled up. If 
 the stake be fixed by itself; as its branches are 
 strong, and in great number, two or three 
 soldiers will easily pull i-t away, and thereby 
 make an opening for the enemy, without 
 reckoning that the neighbouring stakes will be 
 loosened, because their branches are too short 
 to be interwoven with each other. But this is 
 not the case with the Romans. The branches 
 of their palisades are so strongly inserted into 
 
 each other, that it is hard to distinguish the 
 stake they belong to : and it is as little practi- 
 cable to thrust the hand through these branches 
 to pull up the palisades ; because, being well 
 fastened and twisted together, they leave no 
 opening, and are carefully sharpened at their 
 ends. Even though they could be taken hold 
 of, it would not be easy to pull them out of 
 the ground, and that for two reasons. The 
 first is, because they are driven in so deep, 
 that they cannot be moved : and the second, be- 
 cause their branches are interwoven vrith each 
 other in such a manner, that one cannot be 
 stirred without several more. Two or three 
 men might unite their strength in vain to draw 
 one of them out, which however if they ef- 
 fected, by drawing a great while to and fro 
 until it was loose, the opening it would leave 
 would be almost imperceptible. These stakes 
 therefore have three advantages. They are 
 every where to be had ; they are easy to carry ; 
 and are a secure barrier to a camp, because 
 very difficult to break through. In my opi- 
 nion, adds the historian, there is nothing prac- 
 tised by the Romans in war, more worthy of 
 being imitated. 
 
 III. The form and distribution of the seve- 
 ral parts of the Roman camp, admits of great 
 difficulties, and has occasioned man)' disputes 
 amongst the learned. The following descrip- 
 tion is taken chiefly from Pol3'bius, who of all 
 the ancients is the most full and explicit upon 
 this article. He speaks of a consular army, 
 which in his time consisted of two Roman le- 
 gions, and two legions of the allies. A Roman 
 legion contained four thousand two hundred 
 foot, and three hundred horse. A legion of 
 the allies was equal to the number of infantry, 
 and generally double in cavalry. Altogether 
 therefore, Romans, and allies, they made 
 eighteen thousand six hundred men. After 
 the place for the camp was marked out, which 
 was always chosen for its convenience in re- 
 spect to water and forage, a part of it was al- 
 lotted for the general's tent, called otherwise 
 the prxtorium, because the ancient Latins 
 styled all their commanders prstores. The 
 ground pitched upon for this purpose was 
 generally higher than the rest of the camp, that 
 he might with the greater ease see all that 
 passed, and despatch the necessary orders. A 
 flag was planted upon it, and round that a 
 square space marked out in such a manner 
 that the four sides were a hundred feet distant 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 53 
 
 from the flag, and the ground occupied by the 
 consul about four acres. Near this tent were 
 erected the altar, on which the sacrifices were 
 offered, and the tribunal for dispensing jus- 
 tice. The two Roman legions had each six 
 tribunes, which made twelve in all. Their 
 tents were placed in a right line parallel 
 to the front of the prsetorium, at the dis- 
 tance of fifty feet. In the space of fifty feet 
 were the horses, beasts of burden, and the 
 whole equipage of the tribunes. Their tents 
 were pitched in such a manner, that they 
 had the prastorium in the rear, and in the 
 front all the rest of the camp. The tents of the 
 tribunes, at equal distance from each other, 
 took up the whole breadth of the ground upon 
 which the two Roman legions were encamped. 
 IV. Between the tents of the legions and 
 tribunes, a space of a hundred feet in breadth 
 was left, which formed a large street, called 
 principia, that ran across the whole camp, and 
 divided it into two parts, the upper and lower. 
 Beyond this street, were placed the tents of 
 the legions. The space which they occupied 
 was divided in the midst, into two equal parts, 
 by a street of fifty feet broad, which extended 
 the whole length of the camp. On each side 
 of this street, in so many several lines, were 
 the quarters of the horse, the triarii, the prin- 
 cipes, and the hastati. The velites had no 
 distinct quarters, but were variously mingled 
 with the rest of the foot, four hundred and 
 eighty of them being joined to the hastati, a 
 like number to the principes, and two hundred 
 and forty to the triarii. To form a distinct 
 idea of the Roman camp, we must call to mind 
 that the cavalry of each legion was divided 
 into ten troops, thirty men to a troop ; and that 
 the triarii, principes, and hastati, were like- 
 wise severally divided into ten maniples, of a 
 hundred and twenty men each, except those 
 of the triarii, which consisted only of half that 
 number. In conformity to this distribution, 
 the lines on which these several bodies en- 
 camped, were each divided into ten squares, 
 extending length-wise from the tents of the 
 tribunes. These squares were a hundred 
 feet every way, except in the lines of the 
 triarii, where, because of the smaller number 
 of troops, they were only fifty feet broad by a 
 hundred long, and may therefore more properly 
 be termed half squares. Across the middle 
 of these lodgments, between the fifth and sixth 
 squares, ran a street of fifty feet broad, cutting 
 
 the line at right angles, and extending from 
 one side of the camp to the other. It was 
 called quintana, because it opened beyond the 
 fifth maniple. 
 
 V. The order and disposition of the seve- 
 ral lines was as follows. On each side of the 
 middle street, that ran according to the length 
 of the camp, the cavalry of the two legions 
 were quartered facing each other, and sepa- 
 rated by the whole breadth of the street. As 
 there were ten squares on each side, and every 
 square lodged thirty horse, the twenty together 
 contained just six hundred, which made the 
 entire cavalry of two legions. Adjoining to 
 the cavalry the triarii were quartered, a mani- 
 ple behind a troop of horse, both in the same 
 form. They joined as to the ground, but faced 
 differently, the triarii turning their backs 
 upon the horse. And here, as we have al- 
 ready observed, because the triarii were less 
 in number than the other troops, the ground 
 assigned to each maniple was only half as 
 broad as long. Fronting the triarii on each 
 side, was a street of fifty feet broad, running 
 parallel to that between the quarters of the 
 horse. On the opposite side of the street was 
 the line of the lodgments belonging to the 
 principes. Behind the pnncipes the hastati 
 were quartered, joining as to the ground, but 
 fronting the other way. 
 
 VI. Thus far we have described the quarters 
 of the two Roman legions. It remains that we 
 dispose of the allies. Their infantry equalled 
 that of the Romans, and their cavalry was 
 twice the number. In removing for the 
 extraordinarii a fifth part of the foot, or six- 
 teen hundred and eighty men, and a third of 
 the horse, or four hundred men, there remain- 
 ed in the whole seven thousand five hundred 
 and twenty men, horse and foot, to quarter. 
 These were disposed upon the two wings of 
 the legions, being separated from the hastati 
 on each side, by a street of fifty feet. The 
 cavalry were directly opposite to the hastati 
 upon a breadth of a hundred and thirty-three 
 feet, and something more. Behind them, and 
 on the same line, the infantry were encamped 
 upon a breadth of two hundred feet. The 
 prxfecti were lodged at the sides of the tri- 
 bunes, over against their respective wings. At 
 the head of every troop and maniple, were the 
 tents of the captains of horse and centurions. 
 On the right side of the prstorium stood the 
 quaestorium, assigned to the qusestor, or trea- 
 
54 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 surer of the arm}'', and hard by the forum. 
 This last served not only for the sale of com- 
 modities, hut also for the meeting of councils 
 and giving audience to ambassadors. On the 
 other side of the prastorium were lodged the 
 legati, or lieutenant-generals. On the right 
 and left, still in the same line with the prae- 
 torium, and directly behind the praefects of the 
 allies, were the quarters of the extraordinary 
 cavalry, evocatorum, and of the other volun- 
 teer Roman horse, selectorum. All this cav- 
 alry faced on one side towards the forum and 
 place of the qusestor, and on the other towards 
 the lodgments of the legati. They not only 
 encamped near the consul's person, but com- 
 monly attended hioi upon marches, that they 
 might be at hand to execute his orders. The 
 extraordinary and volunteer Roman foot ad- 
 joined to the horse last spoken of, forming the 
 extremities of the line towards the two sides 
 of the camp. Above this line was a street 
 of a hundred feet broad, extending the whole 
 breadth of the camp, and beyond that the 
 quarters of the extraordinary horse of the 
 aUies, facing the prjEtorium, treasury, and the 
 tents of the legati. The extraordinary foot 
 of the allies were directly behind their horse, 
 fronting the intrenchment and upper extremity 
 of the camp. The void spaces that remained 
 on both sides were allotted to strangers and 
 allies, who came later than the rest. 
 
 VII. Between the ramparts and the tents, 
 there was an open place or street of two hun- 
 dred feet in breadth, which was continued 
 all along the four equal sides of the camp. 
 This interval was of very great use, either for 
 the entrance or departure of the legions. For 
 each body of troops advanced into that space 
 by the street before it, so that marching thither 
 dijOferent ways, they were in no danger of 
 crowding and breaking each other's ranks. 
 Besides which, the cattle, and whatever was 
 taken from the enemy was placed there, where 
 a guard was kept during the night. Another 
 considerable advantag,e of it was, that in the at- 
 tacks by night, neither fire nor dart could do 
 any great execution in the camp ; the soldiers 
 being at so great a distance, and under cover 
 of their tents. But the principal intention of 
 it seems to have been, for the drawing up of 
 the troops who were to defend the line, and to 
 ■ leave sufficient room for the cavalry to scour 
 it. My Lord Orrery, however, is of opinion, 
 that it was rather too narrow to ansiver both 
 these services. If it was only designed for the 
 
 foot, they lost the benefit of their horse, which 
 experience teaches us to be of singular use 
 on such occasions. For whatever foot storm 
 a line, must enter it in great confusion and 
 disorder, and can very hardly indeed resist 
 small squadrons of horse, who are ready to re- 
 ceive them, and charge them all along the in- 
 side of the line. For these reasons he consi- 
 ders the narrowness of this space as a defect 
 in the Roman method of encamping, and 
 thinks that a breadth of three hundred feet at 
 least ought to have been allowed for the de- 
 fence and scouring of the line. It is probable 
 the Romans would have done so, had they 
 not found the other sufficient ; and we have 
 this to say in their favour, that though their 
 camps were frequently attacked, we meet with 
 but few instances in history of their being 
 forced. 
 
 VIII. The gates were only four in num- 
 ber, one to each side. Livy says so in ex- 
 press terms. " Ad quator portas exercitum 
 instruxit, ut, signo dato, ex omnibus portubus 
 eruptionem facerent." " He drew up his 
 men facing the four gates, that upon a signal 
 given, the army might sally from all the 
 several gates at once." These are afterwards 
 called by the same author, the extraordinary, 
 the right principal, the left principal, and the 
 quEBstorian. They have also other names, 
 about which it is not a little difficult to re- 
 concile authors. It is believed that the ex- 
 traordinary gate was so called, because near 
 the place where the extraordinary troops en- 
 camped ; and that it Was the same as the 
 praetorian, which took its name from its 
 nearness to the praetorium. The gate oppo- 
 site to this, at the other extremity of the 
 camp, was called Porta Decumana, because 
 near the ten maniples of each legion ; and 
 without doubt is the same with the qusestorian, 
 mentioned by Livy in the place above cited. 
 As to the right and left principals, they had 
 their name from being on the right and left 
 of the camp, fronting the street called prin- 
 cipia. I shall conclude this description of 
 the Roman camp with observing, that when 
 a consular army consisted of more than four 
 legions, they were lodged still in the same 
 order, only the figure of the camp was a long 
 square in proportion to the additional forces 
 which were to be contained in it. When both 
 the consular armies were united, they took 
 up the ground of two such perfect squares. 
 
 IX. A wonderful order was observed night 
 
ART OF WAE. 
 
 55 
 
 and day througliout the camp, in respect to 
 the watchword, sentinels and guards ; and it 
 was in this its security and quiet consisted. 
 To render the guard more regular and less 
 fatiguing, the night was divided into four 
 parts or watches, and the day into four 
 stations. There seems to have been assigned 
 one company of foot, and one troop of horse 
 to each of the four gates every day. The 
 Roman discipline was extremely strict in this 
 particular, punishing with an exemplary se- 
 verity such as deserted their post, or aban- 
 doned their corps of guard. Polybius takes 
 notice of the excellent effects of this disci- 
 pline, upon occasion of the siege of Agri- 
 gentum in Sicily, during the first Punic war. 
 The Roman guards had dispersed themselves 
 a little too far in quest of forage. The Car- 
 thaginians laying hold of the opportunity, 
 made a vigorous sally from the town, and 
 had well nigh forced the camp ; when the 
 soldiers, sensible of the extreme penalty they 
 had incurred by neglecting their duty, re- 
 solved to repair the fault by some remarka- 
 ble behaviour; and accordingly rallying to- 
 gether,they not only sustained the shock of 
 the enemy, to whom they were far inferior 
 in number, but in the end made so great a 
 slaughter among them, as compelled them to 
 retreat into the town, though they were upon 
 the very point of carrying the Roman lines. 
 The night guards were four out of every 
 manipulus, who continued on duty three 
 hours, and were then relieved by those next 
 in turn. To keep the soldiers alert they had 
 the circuitio vigilnm, or patrols, performed 
 commonly four times in the night by some of 
 the horse. Upon extraordinary occasions, 
 the tribunes and lieutenant-generals, and 
 sometimes the general himself, made these 
 circuits in person, and took a strict view of 
 the watch in every part of the camp. 
 
 X. What we have hitherto said, regards 
 only the plan, disposition, and well ordering 
 of the Roman camp. But there are many 
 other particulars to be taken into considera- 
 tion, in encamping an army to advantage : 
 the choice of the ground ; the convenience of 
 provision and forage ; the security of convoys ; 
 and the precautions needful to prevent sur- 
 prise, or the being taken at a disadvantage. 
 We cannot however here enter into a particu- 
 lar detail of the Roman practice, with relation 
 to these several articles ; because not being 
 
 subject to any fixed and invariable rules, they 
 depend in a manner entirely upon the pru- 
 dence and discretion of the general, who must 
 therein be guided by the nature of the coun- 
 try, the posture of the enemy, and his own 
 strength. Two things in particular they were 
 more than ordinarily attentive to ; health, and 
 safety. The first they endeavoured to secure, 
 by avoiding all morasses and fenny places, or 
 where the wind was cold and unwholesome ; 
 which unwholesomeness they did not so much 
 compute from the situation of the place as 
 from the appearance and complexion of the 
 inhabitants. Exercise contributes greatly to 
 health, and therefore the Romans took care 
 to keep their troops always employed, either 
 in casting up new works round the camp, or 
 in hunting after provision and forage, or in 
 performing those several exercises, that tend 
 to render the body robust and active. It is 
 observed in our days, that the immoderate 
 labour soldiers are obliged to undergo, de- 
 stroys our armies : and yet.it was by incredible 
 labour that the Romans preserved themselves. 
 The reason of the difference I take to be this : 
 their fatigues were continual and without re- 
 spite : whereas our men were perpetually shift- 
 ing from the extremes of labour to the extremes 
 of idleness, than which nothing can be more 
 destructive. Who could believe, that there 
 was nothing, even to cleanliness, of which par- 
 ticular care was not taken in the Roman camp. 
 As the great street situated in the front of the 
 prcetorium was much frequented by the officers 
 and soldiers, who passed through it to receive 
 and carry orders, and upon their other occa- 
 sions ; a number of men were appointed to 
 sweep and clean it every day in winter, and 
 to water it in summer to prevent the dust. 
 
 XL But besides health, safety was lilje- 
 wise another important consideration with the 
 Romans. To this end, in choosing a place of 
 encampment, they always had a particular eye 
 for the convenience of water, provisions, and 
 forage. We see evidently in Cassar's Com- 
 mentaries, that there was nothing about which 
 he was more solicitous, than the contriving 
 his marches in such manner, as to have his 
 camp seated near some navigable river, and a 
 country behind hfin, whence he could be 
 easily, and at a reasonable rate, supplied with 
 every thing necessary for the subsistence of 
 his arm}'. Other inconveniences may find a 
 remedy in time, but hunger, the longer it lasts 
 
56 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 tlie more infallibly it destroys. And hence it 
 was, that where the above-mentioned advan- 
 tages could not be obtained, the Romans 
 made it their first care, after fortifying their 
 camp, to lay in such a quantity of all neces- 
 sary stores, as might be sufficient for the time 
 of their continuance in it. Nor were they 
 less attentive to the strength of their camp, and 
 the precautions necessary for its defence. 
 This is a part of the art ofivar in which they 
 incontestably excelled all nations. Constant 
 practice made them expert in it ; for they never 
 quartered their troops in towns and open 
 villages, but always in standing camps, which 
 were carefully intrenched and fortified, in pro- 
 portion to the danger to which they fancied 
 themselves exposed. And here we may ob- 
 serve, that whereas the Greeks chose always 
 to encamp where there was some river, or 
 wood, or bank, or other natural rampart to 
 defend them ; the Romans, on the contrary, 
 stood not so much on the strength of situation, 
 as on their own ways of fortifying. Hence 
 the Grecian camps were often without in- 
 trenchments, and varied in their form, accord- 
 ing to the nature of the place : but among 
 the Romans one constant method was invio- 
 lably observed, nor would they ever lodge in a 
 camp, that was not surrounded with a ditch 
 and a rampart. 
 
 XII. The practice of intrenched and forti- 
 fied camps was attended with many solid and 
 desirable advantages. The army was hereby 
 kept safe, and freed from the danger of having 
 any of its quarters beat up, by surprise or a 
 sudden attack. It was eased of the trouble 
 of keeping many and great guards, since a 
 few serves the turn of all, when all are at 
 hand in case of an attempt. It could never 
 be compelled to fight against its will, than 
 which no greater misfortune can befall an 
 army. In fine, as the success of arms is 
 uncertain, it had always a secure retreat in 
 case of the worst. These things considered, 
 it will not appear wonderful, that the Romans 
 were so strict in this article, and considered 
 the custom of fortifying camps regularly, as 
 one of the most essential parts of military dis- 
 cipline. In the war with the Gauls, the com- 
 manders of the Roman army were reproached 
 with having omitted thiswise precaution, and 
 the loss of the battle of Allia was in part 
 attributed to it. Hence it was, that to avoid 
 the like misfortune for the time to come, it 
 
 became in a manner an established law 
 amongst them, never to hazard a battle until 
 they had finished their camp. Paulus iEmi- 
 lius, in the second Macedonian war, suspended 
 and arrested the ardour of his whole army to 
 attack Perseus, for no other reason, but be- 
 cause they had not formed their camp. The 
 fortified camp, in case of a disaster, put a stop 
 to the enemy's victory, received the troops 
 that retired in safety, enabled them to renew 
 the battle with more success, and prevented 
 their being entirely routed ; whereas without 
 the refuge of a camp, an army, though com- 
 posed of good troops, was exposed to a final 
 defeat, and to being inevitably cut in pieces. 
 I may add to all these advantages that an 
 intrenched camp, by reason of the open air, 
 the healthiness of its situation, which always 
 must be minded, and the cleanliness which 
 may and ought to be kept in it, is exceedingly 
 less subject to infection and sickness, than 
 villages and strong towns; insomuch that 
 some great captains have concluded, an army 
 would be likelier preserved, and kept sound 
 and untainted three months in a well seated 
 and regulated camp, than three weeks in the 
 ordinary villages and country towns. 
 
 XIII. I have the longer and more parti- 
 cularly insisted on the practice of intrenched 
 camps, because it appears evident from his- 
 tory, that the Romans owed as many of their 
 victories to their ability in this part of war, as 
 to their other excellent military discipline and 
 valour. It would be almost endless to enu- 
 merate, what kingdoms and provinces they 
 kept in obedience by their standing camps ; 
 and how often they warded off dangers, and 
 brought their wars to a fortunate issue by the 
 same proceeding. For having first wearied 
 out their enemies by safe and beneficial de- 
 lays, they would, on some great advantage, 
 give them battle and defeat them ; which 
 artful method of making war they neither 
 could have effected, nor rationally attempted, 
 but by their thoroughly knowing how to en- 
 camp advantageously, by constantly practising 
 it, and by a timely providing of food and 
 forage. Vegetius observes, that one of the 
 principal causes of the ruin of the Roman em- 
 pire was, that they had lost the art of fortify- 
 ing their camp : by which negligence they 
 were easily overwhelmed by the barbarian 
 horse. And indeed when, under the empe- 
 rors, they had ascertained the limits of their 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 57 
 
 dominion, resolving to extend their conquest 
 no farther, but to rest satisfied with maintain- 
 ing the possession of what they had acquired : 
 it is well known, that they effectually accom- 
 plished this design by means of the standing 
 camps, which they kept upon the Euphrates, 
 the Danube, and the Rhine. And so long as 
 this method was followed, the bordering na- 
 tions found it impossible to break through 
 the Roman barriers, or hurt the tranquillity of 
 their empire. But when, in process of time 
 the military discipline began to decline, and 
 the art of encamping, in particular, was lost, 
 or grew into disuse ; the Romans, by aban- 
 doning the banks of these several rivers, 
 opened a free passage to the barbarians, who, 
 meeting now with no resistance, poured in 
 upon them like a torrent, and easily over- 
 whelmed a feeble race of men, whom luxury, 
 and an undisturbed peace of many ages, had 
 rendered utterly unfit for war. 
 
 XIV. And here, as it falls so naturally in 
 my way, and has a strict connexion with my 
 subject, I cannot forbear observing, that in the 
 last age, the French, who had many excellent 
 commanders, if not the most in any one nation, 
 and to whom the art of -war owes much of its 
 present improvement, began to revive, and 
 with great benefit to themselves, this almost 
 obsolete part of it. For when the Prince of 
 Orange, the Imperialists under the Count de 
 Souches, and the Flemish forces were united ; 
 the Prince of Conde, one of the greatest cap- 
 tains that any age has produced, being sent to 
 oppose them, would not give them battle, 
 but encamped himself advantageously on the 
 French frontiers, so that they were justly afraid 
 to enter them, and leave him at their backs. 
 By this management he kept them long at bay, 
 and when he found his opportunity, gave them, 
 at Seneff, so considerable a blow, that the 
 French, from having been on the defensive, 
 became afterwards the assaulters, and closed 
 that campaign with taking some of the enemy's 
 towns. The Marshal de Turenne also, who 
 was sent general to the war in Germany, and 
 who in the military art had hardly a superior, 
 having there to do with Count de Montecu- 
 culi, one of the greatest captains of his time, 
 would still, by intrenched camps, when the 
 Germans were the strongest, preserve himself 
 and army, spin out the war, and cover those 
 territories and places he had won while he 
 himself had been the most powerful. 
 6* 
 
 XV. And here it is particularly worthy of 
 notice, that when, upon the Marshal de Tu 
 rerwie's death, the French king sent the Prince 
 of Conde to command in his stead, he also, 
 by intrenched encampments, weathered that 
 storm ; whicli in itself was so threatening, not 
 only by the sudden loss of so great a captain, 
 but also by the Germans being led by the 
 Count de Montecuculi, and the Duke of Lor- 
 raine, two persons as considerable as the very 
 forces they headed. I say, it particularly de- 
 serves our observation, that two such justly 
 celebrated commanders as the Prince of Con- 
 de and Monsieur Turenne, should observe 
 the very same methods in managing the same 
 war ; whereas, usually, when one general suc- 
 ceeds another, in heading the same army, and 
 ordering the same war ; the last comer judges 
 it a kind of diminution to his own skill, to 
 tread in the very paths of his predecessor. 
 But as the Prince of Conde observed a quite 
 different conduct on this occasion, we may 
 thence naturally gather the three following 
 particulars. First, that he judged himself 
 so justly secure in his own reputation, that it 
 could receive no diminution by his following 
 the steps of the dead general, more especially 
 as he had done the like before, and success- 
 fully, in Flanders. Secondly, that a wise and 
 great captain will rather, by imitating his pre- 
 decessor, confirm that course to be the best 
 which he knows to be so in itself, than try 
 new methods of war, whereby out of a mere 
 hope to do the like thing by a different way, 
 he may hazard his reputation, his army, and 
 the country he is to cover and protect. 
 Thirdly., what two such generals have prac- 
 tised, all circumstances considered, amounts to 
 little less than a demonstration, that by camps 
 intrenched and well posted, a country may be 
 best secured, an invading enemy best resisted, 
 and in time, all advantages being judiciously 
 taken, defeated, or made to retire. 
 
 XVI. These examples, ancient and modern, 
 sufiiciently evince the benefit of this practice, 
 and with what judgment the Romans made it 
 an essential part of their military discipline. I 
 shall only add, as an indisputable argument 
 in its favour, that the great Caesar himself has 
 given his sanction to it, by constantly following 
 it in his wars with the Gauls. He had to do 
 with a brave and warlike nation, passionately 
 fond of liberty, and therefore extremely averse 
 to the Roman yoke. To keep them in awe, 
 
58 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 he established standing camps in different 
 parts of the country, where the soldiers were 
 quartered in large bodies, and surrounded 
 with strong intrenchments. This he thought 
 the likeliest method to prevent insurrections, 
 or suppress them speedily when they should 
 happen, as the troops would be always in 
 readiness to march, and in condition to act. 
 It was likewise the best security against 
 treachery and surprise. Accordingly we find, 
 that all the efforts of the Gauls to recover 
 their liberty were without effect, the Roman 
 camps standing as so many bulwarks, against 
 which, though they made frequent attacks, 
 they were yet never able to prevail. 
 
 .! CHAP. VII. 
 
 y 
 
 OP BATTLES. 
 
 I. HiviiS^G raised our troops, armed and 
 disciplined them, put them upon the march, 
 and lodged them in a camp, it is now time to 
 draw them out into the field, that we may see 
 how they acquitted themselves on a day of bat- 
 tle. It is in this view military merit appears 
 in all its extent. To know whether a gene- 
 ral were worthy of that name, the Romans 
 examined the conduct he observed on this 
 critical occasion. They did not expect suc- 
 cess from the number of troops, which is often 
 a disadvantage, but from his prudence and 
 valour, the cause and assurance of victory. 
 They considered him as the soul of his army, 
 that directs all its motions, whose dictates 
 every thing obeys, and upon whose good or 
 bad conduct the issue of the battle depends. 
 The first consideration, and that which de- 
 mands the greatest force of judgment, is, to ex- 
 amine whether it be proper or not to come to 
 an engagement, and to balance exactly the ad- 
 vantages with the disadvantages. The blind 
 temerity of Varro, notwithstanding his col- 
 league's remonstrances, and the advice of Fa- 
 bius, drew upon the republic the unfortunate 
 battle of Cannse ; whereas a delay of a few 
 weeks would probably have ruined Hannibal 
 for ever. Perseus, on the contrary, let slip the 
 occasion of fighting the Romans, in not taking 
 the advantage of the ardour of his army, and at- 
 tacking them instantly after the defeat of their 
 horse, which had thrown their troops into dis- 
 order and consternation. Cssar had been lost 
 after the battle of Dyrrhachium, if Pompey had 
 
 known how to improve his advantage. Great'' 
 enterprises have their decisive moments. The 
 important point lies, in wisely resolving what 
 to choose, and in seizing the present occasion 
 which never returns when once neglected. 
 
 II. But not to insist any longer upon this, 
 which rests entirely in the breast of the gene- 
 ral ; we shall suppose the resolution to fight ' 
 taken, and proceed to examine what precau- 
 tions the Romans made use of, in order to se- 
 cure the victory. These may in general be 
 reduced to two. First, the inspiring their 
 troops with courage and confidence. Secondly, 
 the ranging them judiciously in order of battle. 
 To inspire their troops with confidence, they 
 began by consulting the gods, and endeavour- 
 ing to incline them in their favour. 'I'hey 
 consulted them either by the flight or singing 
 of birds, by the inspection of the entrails of 
 the victims, by the manner in which the sa- 
 cred chickens pecked their corn, and by things 
 of the like nature. They laboured to render 
 them propitious by sacrifices, vows, and pray- 
 ers. Many of the generals, especially in the 
 earlier times, discharged these duties with 
 great solemnity and sentiments of religion ; 
 and would never hazard an engagement, until 
 by some favourable omens they had brought 
 the troops to believe that the gods were on 
 their side. Paulus JSmilius, before he gave 
 Perseus battle, sacrificed twenty oxen succes- 
 sively to Hercules, without finding any fa- 
 vourable sign in all those victims. It was not 
 until the one-and-twentieth, that he believed 
 he saw something which promised him the 
 victory. This attention to religion was highly 
 necessary among a people strongly addicted 
 to superstition, and over whom the omens of 
 which we speak, however trifling in themselves, 
 had yet a powerful influence. Hence the 
 generals who neglected this precaution, had 
 often but too just cause to repent of their fol- " 
 ly : as it tended greatly to dispirit the troops, 
 and begot an ill opinion of their conduct ; in- 
 somuch that we seldom find them successful 
 in their undertakings. The wisest and best- 
 commanders chose always to comply with the 
 prejudices of the vulgar ; and even where they 
 despised these ceremonies in their hearts, affect- 
 ed yet a greater veneration for them in public. 
 
 III. After having paid these duties to the 
 gods, they applied themselves to men, and the \, 
 general exhorted his soldiers. It seems to 
 have been an established custom with all na- 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 59 
 
 tions among the ancients, to harangue their 
 troops before a battle ; nor can we deny that 
 the custom was very reasonable in itself, and 
 might contribute greatly to the victory. When 
 an army is upon the point of engaging an en- 
 emy, what can be more proper, than to oppose 
 the fear of a seemingly approaching death with 
 the most powerful reasons, and such as, if 
 not capable of totally extinguishing it, may 
 yet in some measure allay and overcome it. 
 ^ Such reasons are the kive of our country, the 
 ^obligation to defend it at the price of our 
 blood, the remembrance of past victories, the 
 necessity of supporting the glory of our nation, 
 the injustice of a violent and cruel enemy, the 
 dangers to which the fathers, mothers, wives, 
 and children of the soldiers are exposed : these 
 motives, I say, and many of the like nature, 
 represented from the mouth of a general, be- 
 loved and respected by his troops, may make a 
 very strong impression upon their minds. Not, 
 as Cyrus, in Xenophon, observes, that such 
 discourses can in an instant change the dis- 
 position of the soldiers, and from timorous and 
 abject as they might be, make them imme- 
 diately bold and intrepid : but they awaken, 
 they rouse the courage nature had before given 
 them, and add a new force and vivacity to it. 
 y To judge rightly of this custom of haranguing 
 the troops, as constantly practised among the 
 Romans, we must go back to the ages wherein 
 they lived, and consider their manners with 
 particular attention. Their armies were com- 
 / posed of the same citizens, to whom in the 
 ^' city, and in time of peace, it was customary to 
 communicate all the affairs of the state. The 
 general did no more in the camp, or in the 
 field of battle, than he would have been obliged 
 to do in the rostrum or tribunal of harangues. 
 He did his troops honour, and attracted their 
 confidence and affection in imparting to them 
 his designs, motives and measures. Add to 
 this, that the sight of the generals, officers, 
 and soldiers assembled, communicated a re- 
 ciprocal courage and ardour to them all. 
 Everj' one piqued himself at that time upon 
 the goodness of his aspect and appearance, 
 and obliged his neighbour to do the same. 
 The fear of some was abated or entirely ban- 
 ished by the valour of others. The disposition 
 of particular persons became that of the whole 
 body, and gave affairs their aspect. 
 
 IV. Let me observe here, that there were 
 fnany occas.ons, besides battles, when it was 
 
 necessary to excite the good will and zeal of 
 the soldier ; if, for instance, a difficult and 
 hasty march was to be made, to extricate the 
 army out of a dangerous situation, or obtain 
 one more commodious ; if courage, patience, 
 and constancy were required for supporting 
 famine, and other distresses, painful to nature : 
 if some difficult, dangerous, but very important 
 enterprise was to be undertaken ; if it waa 
 necessary to console, encourage, and re-ani- 
 mate the troops after a defeat ; if a hazardous, 
 retreat was to be made in view of the enemy, 
 in a country he was master of: in fine, if only 
 a generous effort was wanting to terminate a 
 war, or some important undertaking. Upon 
 these and the like occasions, the generals never 
 failed to speak in public to the army, in order 
 to sound their dispositions by their acclamations 
 more or less strong ; to inform them of their 
 reasons for such and such conduct, and con- 
 ciliate them to it ; to dispel the false reports, 
 which exaggerated difficulties, and discou- 
 raged them : to let them see the remedies pre- 
 paring for the distresses they were under, and 
 the success to be expected from them ; to 
 explain the precautions it was necessary to 
 take, and the motives for taking them. It was 
 the general's interest to flatter the soldier, in 
 making him the confidant of his designs, 
 fears, and expedients, in order to engage him 
 to share in them, and act in concert, and 
 from the same motives with himself. The 
 general in the midst of soldiers, who, as well 
 as himself, were all not only members of the 
 state, but had a share in the authority of the 
 government, was considered as a father in tbe 
 midst of his family. 
 
 V. It may not be easy to conceive how he 
 could make himself heard by the troops: but 
 if we call to mind, that the armies of the Ro- 
 man people were not very numerous, that dif- 
 ficulty will in a great measure vanish. Besides, 
 I pretend not to say that the generals were heard 
 distinctly, or in any other manner than the ora 
 tors in the public assemblies. All people did not 
 hear : yet the whole people were informed, 
 the whole people deliberated and decided ; 
 and none of them complained of not having 
 heard. It sufficed that the most ancient, the 
 most considerable, the principals of companies 
 and quarters were present at the harangue, of 
 which they afterwards gave an account to the 
 rest. On the column of Trajan, the emperor 
 is seen haranguing the troops from a tribunal 
 
60 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 of turf, raised higher than the soldiers' heads, 
 with the principal officers around him upon 
 the platform, and the multitude forming a cir- 
 cle at a distance. The great men at Rome 
 accustomed themselves from their youth to 
 speak upon occasion with a strong and clear 
 voice ; and as these harangues were made in 
 the camp to the soldiers quiet and unarmed, it 
 is not easy to conceive in how little room a 
 great number of them could stand upright, 
 when they pressed close to each other. I insist 
 the longer upon this, because many blame the 
 historians of antiquity, for the supposititious 
 harangues, as they call them, which they have 
 inserted in their works. It must indeed be 
 owned, that the discourses made by generals 
 on the occasions of which we speak, were not 
 always exactly the same as historians have re- 
 peated them. For the most authors, writing 
 in the time when the art of eloquence was 
 highly in esteem, have endeavoured, in adorn- 
 ing and enlarging the harangues they record, 
 to leave proofs to posterity, that they were not 
 less excellent orators than historians. But 
 the fact itself, that generals frequently spoke 
 in public to their troops, is evident beyond 
 dispute. Cffisar, whose Commentaries are a 
 plain and naked relation of what he himself 
 performed at the head of his army, furnishes 
 many examples of this kind. When he marched 
 against Ariovistus, a sudden consternation 
 seizing the soldiers, which was like to be at- 
 tended v.ith very disagreeable effects, he as- 
 sembled them, reprehended them in a long 
 and severe speech, and thereby put a stop to 
 the growing evil. In like manner, upon occa- 
 sion of a considerable check received before 
 Gergovia, owing to the too forward valour of 
 the troops, and their neglect of his injunctions, 
 he judged it necessary to call them together, 
 expostulate with them upon their ill-timed 
 bravery, and fortify them against any damp 
 their late disaster might have thrown upon 
 their spirits. I could easily produce other 
 instances of the same kind, but these are 
 abundantly sufficient to evince the point in 
 question. 
 
 VI. When the armies were numerous, and 
 upon the point of giving battle, the ancients 
 had a very simple and natural way of ha- 
 . ranguing the men. The general on horse- 
 back rode through the ranks, and spoke 
 something to the several bodies of troops, in 
 order to animate them. Where he had to do 
 
 with different nations, as very often happened, 
 he addressed those of his own language in 
 person, and made known his views and de- 
 signs to. the rest by interpreters. Hannibal ■ 
 acted in this manner at the battle of Zama in 
 Africa. He thought incumbent on him to ex 
 hort his troops : and as every thing was dif 
 ferent among them, language, customs, laws, 
 arms, habits, and interests, so he made use of 
 different motives to animate them. To the 
 auxiliary troops he proposed an immediate 
 reward, and an augmentation of their pay out 
 of the booty that should be taken. He in- 
 flamed the peculiar and natural hatred of the 
 Gauls against the Romans. As for the Ligu- 
 rians, who inhabited a mountainous and bar- 
 rerr country, he set before them the fertile 
 valleys of Italy, as the fruit of their victory. 
 He represented to the Moors and Numidians, 
 the cruel and violent government of Masinissa, 
 to vchich they would be subjected, if over- 
 come. In this manner he animated these 
 different nations, by the different views of 
 hope and fear. As to the Carthaginians, he 
 omitted nothing that might excite their valour, 
 and addressed himself to them in the warmest 
 and most pathetic terms. He put them in 
 mind of their country, their household gods, 
 the tombs of their ancestors, the terror and 
 consternation of their fathers and mothers, 
 their wives and children ; in fine, that the 
 fate of Carthage depended upon that battle, 
 the event of which would either ruin and re- 
 duce her into perpetual slavery, or render her 
 mistress of the universe, every thing being 
 extreme which she had either to hope or 
 fear. This is a very fine discourse ; but how 
 did he make these different nations under- 
 stand it ? Livy informs us : he spoke to the 
 Carthaginians himself, and ordered the com- 
 manders of each nation to repeat to their re- 
 spective troops what he had said. In this 
 manner the general sometimes assembled the 
 officers of his army, and after having ex- 
 plained what he desired the troops might be 
 told, he sent them back to their several bri- 
 gades or companies, in order to report what 
 they had heard, and animate them for the 
 battle. Arrian observes this particular of 
 Alexander the Great, before tne famous battle 
 of Arbela. 
 
 VII. After inspiring the troops with resolu- 
 tion and confidence, and disposing them to act 
 courageously against the enemy, the next 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 61 
 
 care of the general was, to range them judi- 
 ciously in order of battle. The manner of 
 drawing up the infantry in three lines, con- 
 tinued long in use among the Romans, and 
 with uniformity enough. The hastati were 
 placed in the front, in thick and firm ranks ; 
 the princlpes behind them, but not altogether 
 so close ; and after them the triarii, in so 
 wide and loose an order, that upon occasion, 
 they could receive both the princlpes and 
 hastati into their body, in any distress. The 
 velites, and in latter times, the bowmen, and 
 slingers, were not drawn up in this regular 
 manner, but disposed of either before the front 
 of the hastati, or scattered up and down among 
 the void spaces of the same hastati, or some- 
 times placed in two bodies in the wings ; but 
 wherever they were fixed, these light soldiers 
 began the combat, skirmishing in flying par- 
 ties with the first troops of the enemy. If 
 they prevailed, which very seldom happened, 
 they prosecuted the victory ; but upon a re- 
 pulse, they fell back by the flanks of the army, 
 and rallied again in the rear. When they 
 were retired, the hastati advanced against 
 the enemy ; and in case they found themselves 
 overpowered, retiring softly towards the prin- 
 cipes, fell into the intervals of their ranks, 
 and, together with them, renewed the fight. 
 But if the princlpes and hastati, thus joined, 
 were too weak to sustain the fury of the bat- 
 tle, they all fell back into the wider intervals 
 of the triarii, and then altogether being united 
 into a firm mass, they made another effort, 
 much more impetuous than any before. If 
 this assault proved ineffectual, the day was 
 entirely lost as to the foot, there being no far- 
 ther reserves. This way of marshalling the 
 foot, was exactly like the order of trees, which 
 gardeners call the qnincunx ; as appears from 
 the beautiful comparison between them in Vir- 
 gil's second Georgic. And as the reason of 
 that position of the trees is not only for beauty 
 and figure, but that every particular tree may 
 have room to spread its roots and boughs, with- 
 out entangling and hindering the rest; so in 
 this ranking of the men, the army was not only 
 set out to the best advantage, and made the 
 greatest show, but every particular soldier had 
 free room to use his weapons, and to with- 
 draw himself between the void spaces behind 
 him, without occasioning any confusion or 
 disturbance. 
 
 VIII. The stratagem of rallying thus three 
 
 times, has been reckoned almost the whole 
 art and secret of the Roman discipline ; and it 
 was almost impossible it should prove unsuc- 
 cessful, if duly observed. For fortune, in 
 every engagement, must have failed them 
 three several times, before they could be 
 routed ; and the enemy must have had the 
 strength and resolution to overcome them in 
 three several encounters, for the decision of 
 one battle ; whereas most other nations, and 
 even the Grecians themselves, drawing up their 
 whole army as it were in one front, trusted 
 themselves and fortunes to the success of a 
 single charge. The Roman cavalry was posted 
 at the two corners, of the army, like the wings 
 on a body ; and fought sometimes on foot, 
 sometimes on horseback, as occasion required, 
 in the same manner as our dragoons. The 
 confederate, or auxiliary forces, composed the 
 two points of the battle, and covered the whole 
 body of the Romans. As to the stations of the 
 commanders, the general commonly took up 
 his post near the middle of the army, between 
 the princlpes and the triarii, as the fittest 
 place to give orders equally to all the troops. 
 The legati and tribunes were usually posted 
 by him; unless the former were ordered to 
 command the wings, or the others some par- 
 ticular part of the army. The centurion stood 
 every man at the head of his century, to lead 
 them up ; though sometimes, out of courage 
 and honour, they exposed themselves in the 
 van of the army, or were placed there for par- 
 ticular reasons by the general : as Sallust re- 
 ports of Catiline, that he posted all his choice 
 centurions, with the evocati, and the flower of 
 the common soldiers, in the front of the battle. 
 But the primipili, or chief centurions, had the 
 honour to stand with the tribunes near the 
 general's person. The common soldiers were 
 placed in several ranks, at the discretion of 
 the centurions, according to their age, strength, 
 and experience, every man having three feet 
 square allowed him to manage his arms in ; 
 and it was religiously observed in their disci- 
 pline, never to abandon their ranks, or break 
 their order upon any account. 
 
 IX. But besides the common methods of 
 drawing up a Roman army, which are suffi- 
 ciently explained by every historian of any 
 note ; there were several other very singular 
 methods of forming their battle into odd 
 shapes, according to the nature of the body 
 they were to oppose. Of this kind was the 
 
62 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 cuneus, when the army was ranged in the 
 figure of a wedge, the most proper to pierce 
 and break the order of the enemy. This was 
 otherwise called capitt porcimim, which it in 
 some measure resembled. And here I beg 
 leave to observe, that this last name seems to 
 confirm the conjecture of the Chevalier Fo- 
 lard, who maintains that the cuneiis was no 
 other than the column, or a battalion drawn up 
 with a small front and great depth. The tri- 
 angular order he looks upon as childish and 
 absurd, and such as never was nor could 
 be practised with success, because of the ex- 
 treme weakness of the angles. The authors, 
 however, who give that form to the cuntus, 
 have invented another order of battle in op- 
 position to it, which they term the forfex. 
 This was when the army was drawn up in the 
 figure of a pair of shears, as it were on purpose 
 to receive the cnnens, in case the enemy should 
 make use of that disposition. For while he 
 endeavoured to open, and as it were to cleave 
 their squadrons with his wedge, by keeping 
 their troops extended like the shears, and re- 
 ceiving him in the middle, they not only hin- 
 dered the damage designed to their own men, 
 but commonly cut the adverse body in pieces. 
 The globns was when the soldiers cast them- 
 selves into a circular order, upon an appre- 
 hension of being surrounded. Ccesar, in the 
 fifth book of his Commentaries, speaks of this 
 disposition as very proper in cases of danger 
 and extremity. The turn's represented an ob- 
 long square, after the fashion of a tower, with 
 very few men in a file, and the ranks extended 
 to a great length. This seems of very ancient 
 original, as being mentioned in Homer. The 
 last order I shall take notice of is the serra or 
 saw; when the first companies in the front of 
 the army, beginning the engagement, some- 
 times proceeded, and sometimes drew back ; 
 so that by the help of a large fancy, one 
 might find some resemblance between them 
 and the teeth of that instrument. 
 
 X. It was usual enough among the Ro- 
 mans, to raise great cries, and to strike their 
 swords against their bucklers, as they advanced 
 to charge an enemy. This noise, joined to 
 that of the trumpets, was very proper to sup- 
 press in them, by a kind of stupefaction, all 
 fear of danger, and to inspire them with a 
 courage and boldness, that had no view but 
 Tictory, and defied death. But though such 
 shoutings were allowed, nay, even encouraged 
 
 as useful, going towards the enemy, y>it s deep 
 silence was observed by the soldiery, when 
 they were about to engage, that the orders of 
 the officers, and the words of command, might 
 be clearly heard, and punctually obeyed. It 
 is observed that the Greeks went always si- 
 lently to battle, alleging for it, that they had 
 more to do than to say to their enemies. But 
 the shoutmgs of which we speak, is in reality a 
 kind of doing, as it stirs up the men, and often 
 damps the enemy. The troops marched some- 
 times softly and coolly to the charge, and some- 
 limes, when they apj roached the eneni}', they 
 sprung forward with impetuosity as fast as they 
 could move. Great men have been divided 
 in opinion upon these different methods of at- 
 tacking. It seems however to be generally 
 agreed, that where two armies engage in a 
 plain field, a commander ought never to allow, 
 much less order, his men to receive the charge, 
 but still to meet the enemy in giving it. Pom- 
 pey in the decisive battle of Pharsalia, by the 
 advice of Triarius, commanded his soldiers to 
 receive Csesar's assault, and to undergo the 
 shock of his army, without removing from the 
 place whereon they stood, as by this means 
 Caisar's men would be disordered in their ad- 
 vance, and Pompey's by not moving, keep 
 their order. But Caesar himself observes upon 
 it, that according to his judgment, the ad- 
 vice was against all reason ; because there i3 
 a certain keenness and alacrity of spirit na- 
 turally planted in every man, who is inflamed 
 with a desire to fight, and therefore no com- 
 mander should repress or restrain it, but rather 
 increase and set it forward. The event jus- 
 tified Csesar's opinion, and showed that it was 
 well-grounded. 
 
 XL Hitherto we have contented ourselves 
 with general observations : but as it is impos- 
 sible from these alone, to give any tolerable 
 idea of the address and ability of a commander 
 in a day of battle, because his conduct must 
 vary according to circumstances ; I shall now 
 beg leave to lay before the 'eader, an account 
 of some celebrated actions of antiquity, taken 
 from the descriptions of such historians, as be- 
 ing themselves military men, have traced them 
 with the utmost exactness, and distinctly ex- 
 plained the reasons of the several steps taken. 
 The first instance of this kind that we meet 
 with in history, is the famous battle of Thym- 
 bra, between Croesus and Cyrus, which trans- 
 ferred the empire of Asia from the Assyrians 
 
 / 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 63 
 
 of Babylon to the Medes and Persians. 
 Though this action does not so immediately 
 and strictly regard the subject we are upon, as 
 having no relation to the Roman history, I 
 shall yet give a particular description of it 
 here, not only because it is the drst pitched 
 f battle, of which we have any full and circum- 
 stantial account, but because Cyrus being 
 looked upon as one of the greatest captains of 
 antiquity, those of the profession may be glad 
 to trace him in all his steps, through this im- 
 portant engagement ; and the rather, as what 
 we shall present them with on this subject, is 
 taken from Xenophon, one of the greatest com- 
 manders, as well as finest writers, of the age 
 in which he lived. 
 
 XII. In Cyrus's army the companies of foot 
 consisted of a hundred men each, exclusive of 
 the captain. Each company was subdivided 
 into four parts, which consisted severally of 
 four and twenty men, not including the person 
 who commanded the platoon. Each of these 
 subdivisions was again divided into two files, 
 consisting, in consequence, of twelve men. 
 Every ten companies had a particular supe- 
 rior officer to command them, who sufficiently 
 answers to what we call a colonel. Over ten 
 of these again was another superior com- 
 mander, whom we shall term a brigadier. When 
 Cyrus came at the head of the thirty thousand 
 Persians, who had been sent to the aid of 
 his uncle Cyaxares, he made a considerable 
 change in the arms of his troops. Until then, 
 two thirds of them made use only of javelins 
 and bows, and therefore could not fight but at 
 a distance from the enemy. Instead of these, 
 Cyrus armed the greatest part of them with 
 cuirasses, bucklers, and swords or battle-axes, 
 and left only a few of his soldiers in light 
 armour. The Persians did not know at that 
 time what it was to fight on horseback. 
 Cyrus, who was convinced that nothing was 
 of so great importance towards the gaining of 
 a battle as cavalry, was sensible of the great 
 inconvenience he laboured under in that re- 
 spect, and therefore took wise and early pre- 
 cautions to remedy that evil. He succeeded 
 in his design, and by little and little formed 
 a body of Persian cavalry, which amounted to 
 ten thousand men, and were the best troops 
 in his army. 
 
 XIII. Xenophon has not acquainted us 
 with the precise number of troops on both 
 tides, but as this may be in some sort collected 
 
 by putting together certia. scattered passages 
 of our author, we shall endeavour to fix it in 
 the best manner we can. Cyrus's army 
 amounted in the whole to a hundred and 
 ninety-six thousand men, horse and foot. 
 Of these there were seventy thousand natural 
 born Persians, viz. ten thousand cuirassiers of 
 horse, twenty thousand cuirassiers of foot, 
 twenty thousand pikeraen, and twenty thou- 
 sand light-armed soldiers. The rest of the 
 army, to the number of one hundred and 
 twenty-six thousand men, consisted of a hun- 
 dred thousand Median, Armenian, and Ara- 
 bian foot, and twenty-six thousand horse of 
 the same nations. Besides these troops, Cyrus 
 had three hundred chariots of war, armed with 
 scythes, each chariot drawn by four horses 
 abreast, covered with trappings that were shot- 
 proof; as were also the horses of the Persian 
 cuirassiers. He had likewise ordered a great 
 number of chariots to be made of a larger size, 
 upon each of which was placed a tower of 
 about eighteen or twenty feet high, in which 
 were lodged twenty archers. Each chariot 
 was drawn upon wheels by sixteen oxen 
 yoked in abreast. Ther-s was moreover a con- 
 siderable number of camels, upon each of 
 which were two Arabian archers, back to 
 back ; so that one looked towards the head, and 
 the other towards the tail of the camel. 
 
 XIV. Croesus's army was above twice as 
 numerous as that of Cyrus, amounting in all 
 to four hundred and twenty thousand men, 
 of which sixty thousand were cavalry. The 
 troops consisted chiefly of Babylonians, Ly- 
 dians, Phrygians, Cappadocians, of the na- 
 tions about the Hellespont, and of Egyp- 
 tians, to the number of three hundred and 
 sixty thousand men. The Egyptians alone 
 made a body of one hundred and twenty 
 thousand. They had bucklers that covefed 
 them from head to foot, very long pikes, and 
 short swords, but very broad. The rest of 
 the army was made up of Cyprians, Cilicians, 
 Lycaonians, Paphlagonians, Thracians, and 
 lonians. The army in order of battle was 
 ranged in one line, the infantry in the centre, 
 and the cavalry on the two wings. All the 
 troops, both foot and horse, were thirty men 
 deep ; but the Egyptians, who, as we have 
 taken notice, were a hundred and twenty 
 thousand in number, and who were the prin- 
 cipal strength of Croesus's infantry, in the 
 centre of which they were posted, were di- 
 
64 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 vided into twelve large bocnes or square bat- 
 talions, of ten thousand men each, which had 
 a hundred men in front, and as many in depth, 
 with an interval or space between every bat- 
 talion, that they might act and fight independ- 
 ent of, and vvithout interfering with one an- 
 other. Crcssus would gladly have persuaded 
 them to range themselves in less depth, that 
 he might make the wider front. For the 
 armies being in an immense plain, which gave 
 room for extending their wings to right and 
 left, he was in hopes by this means of sur- 
 rounding and hemming in the enemy. But 
 he could not prevail with the Egyptians to 
 change the order of battle to which they had 
 been accustomed. His army, as it was thus 
 drawn out into one line, took up near forty 
 stadia, or five miles in length. 
 
 XV. Araspes, who under pretence of dis- 
 content had retired to Croesus's army, and had 
 received particular orders from Cyrus, to ob- 
 serve well the manner of that general's ranging 
 his troops, returned to the Persian camp the 
 day before the battle. Cyrus in drawing up 
 his army, governed himself by the disposition 
 of the enemy, of which that young Median 
 Nobleman had given him an exact account. 
 The Persian troops had been generally used 
 to engage four and twenty men deep, but 
 Cyrus thought fit to change that disposition. 
 It was necessary for him to form as wide a 
 front as possible, without too much weaken- 
 ing his phalanx, to prevent his army's being 
 inclosed and hemmed in. His infantry was 
 excellent, and most advantageously armed 
 with cuirasses, partizans, battle-axes, and 
 swords ; and provided they could join the 
 enemy in close fight, there was but little 
 reason to believe the Lydian phalanx, that 
 were only armed with light bucklers and 
 javelins, could support the charge. Cyrus 
 therefore thinned the files of his infantry one 
 half, and ranged them only twelve men deep. 
 The cavalry vsras drawn out on the two wings, 
 the right commanded by Chrysantes and the 
 left by Hystaspes. The whole front of the 
 army took up but thirty-two stadia, or four 
 miles in extent, and consequently was at each 
 end near four stadia, or half a mile short of 
 the enemy's front. Behind the first line, at a 
 little distance, Cyrus placed the spear men, 
 and behind them the archers. Both the one 
 and the other were covered by the soldiers in 
 their front, over whose heads they could fling 
 
 their javelins, and shoot their arrows at the 
 enemy. 
 
 XVI. Behind all these he formed another 
 line, to serve for the rear, which consisted of 
 the flower of his army. Their business was 
 to have their eyes upon those that were placed 
 before them, to encourage those that did their 
 duty,to sustain and threaten those that gave 
 way, and even to kill those as traitors that 
 persisted openly in flying ; by that means to 
 keep the cowards in awe, and make them 
 have as great a terror of the troops in the ^ 
 rear as they could possibly have of the enemy. 
 Behind the army were placed those moving 
 towers which I have already described. These 
 formed a line equal and parallel to that of the 
 army, and did not only serve to annoy the 
 enemy by the perpetual discharges of the 
 archers that were in them, but might likewise 
 be looked upon as a kind of moveable forts or : 
 redoubts, under which the Persian troops 
 might rally, in case they were broken and 
 pushed by the enemy. Just behind these 
 towers were two other lines, which also were '' 
 parallel and equal to the front of the army : 
 the one was formed of the baggage, and the 
 other of the chariots which carried the women, 
 and such other persons as were unfit for 
 service. To close all these lines, and to 
 secure them from the insults of the enemy, 
 Cyrus placed in the rear of all two thousand 
 infantry, two thousand horse, and the troop 
 of camels, which was pretty numerous. Cy- 
 rus's design in forming two lines of the bag- 
 gage was, not only to make his army appear 
 the more numerous, but likewise to oblige the 
 enemy, in case they were resolved to sur- 
 round him, as he knew they intended, to 
 make the longer circuit, and consequently to 
 weaken their line, by stretching it out so far. 
 We have still the Persian chariots of war, 
 armed with scythes, to speak of. These were 
 divided into three bodies of a hundred each. 
 One of these bodies,commanded by Abradatas, 
 king of Susiana, was placed in the front of 
 the battle, and the other two upon the flanks 
 of the army. 
 
 XVII. When the two armies were in sight 
 of each other, and the enemy had observed 
 how much the front of theirs exceeded that 
 of Cyrus, they made the centre of their army 
 halt whilst the two wings advanced projecting 
 to the right and left, with the design to 
 inclose Cyrus's army, and begin their attack 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 65 
 
 on every side at the same time. This move- 
 ment did not at all alarm Cyrus, because he 
 expected it ; but observing that many of his 
 officers, and even Abradates himself, dis- 
 covered some uneasy apprehensions ; these 
 troops disturb you, says he : believe me they 
 will be the first routed, and to you Abradates 
 I give that as a signal, for falling upon the 
 enemy with your chariots. When the two 
 detached bodies of the Lydians were suffi- 
 ciently extended, Croesus gave the signal to 
 his main body to march up directly to the 
 front of the Persian army, whilst the two 
 wings that were wheeling round upon their 
 flanks, advanced on each side ; so that Cyrus's 
 
 ' army was inclosed on three sides ; and, as 
 Xenophon expresses it, looked like a small 
 square drawn within a great one. In an in- 
 stant, on the first sigrral Cyrus gave, his troops 
 faced about on every side, keeping a profound 
 silence in expectation of the event. The prince 
 himself, at the head of some horse, briskly fol- 
 lowed by a body of foot, fell upon the forces 
 that were marching to attack his right flank, 
 and put them in great disorder. The chariots 
 then driving furiously upon the Lydians, com- 
 pleted the defeat. In the same moment the 
 troops of the left flank, knowing by the noise 
 that Cyrus had begun the battle on the right, 
 advanced to the enemy ; and immediately 
 
 j the squadron of camels was made to advance 
 likewise, as Cyrus had ordered. The enemy's 
 cavalry did not expect this, and their horses 
 at a distance, as soon as they were sensible 
 of the approach of those animals, whose smell 
 they cannot endure, began to snort and prance, 
 to run foul upon and overturn one another, 
 *hrowing their riders, and treading them 
 under their feet. Whilst they were in this 
 confusion, a small body of horse, commanded 
 by Artageses, pushed them very warmly to 
 prevent their rallying ; and the chariots armed 
 with the scythes falling furiously upon them, 
 they were entirely routed, with a dreadful 
 slaughter. 
 
 XVIII. This being the signal which Cyrus 
 had given Abradates for attacking the front 
 of the enemy's army, he drove like lightning 
 upon them with all his chariots. Their first 
 rank was not able to stand so violent a 
 charge, but gave way and were dispersed. 
 Having broken and overthrown them, Abra- 
 dates came up to the Egyptian battalions, 
 which being covered with their bucklers, 
 
 and marching in such close order that the 
 chariots had not room to pierce amongst 
 them, gave him much more trouble, and would 
 not have been broken had it not been for the 
 violence of the horses, that trode upon them. 
 It was a most dreadful spectacle to see the 
 heaps of men and horses, overturned chariots, 
 broken arms, and all the direful eflfects of the 
 sharp scythes, which cut every thing in 
 pieces that came in their way. But Abra- 
 ,dates' chariot having the misfortune to be 
 overturned, he and his men were killed, after 
 they had signalized their valour in a very ex- 
 traordinary maner. The Egyptians then, 
 marching forward in close order and covered 
 with their bucklers, obliged the Persian in- 
 fantry to give way, and drove them beyond 
 their fourth line, as far as to their machines. 
 There the Egyptians met with a fresh storm 
 of arrows and javelins, that were poured upon ' 
 their heads from the rolling towers : and the 
 battalions of the Persian rear-guard advancing 
 sword in hand, hindered their archers and 
 spearmen from retreating any farther, and 
 obliged them to return to their charge. 
 
 XIX. Cyrus in the meantime having put 
 both the horse and foot to flight on the left 
 of the Egyptians, did not amuse himself in 
 pursuing the runaways, but pushing on di- 
 rectly to the centre, had the mortification to 
 find his Persian troops had been forced to 
 give way ; and rightly judging that the only 
 means to prevent the Egyptians from gaining 
 farther ground would be to attack them behind, ' 
 he did so, and fell upon their rear. The cavalry 
 came up at the same time, and the enemy was 
 pushed with great fury. The Egyptians be- 
 ing attacked on all sides, faced about every 
 way, and defended themselves with wonderful 
 bravery. Cyrus himself was in great danger ; 
 his horse, which a soldier stabbed under the 
 belly, sinking under him, he fell in the midst 
 of his enemies. Here was an opportunity, 
 says Xenophon, of seeing how important it is 
 for a commander to have the affection of his 
 soldiers. Officers and men, equally alarmed 
 at the danger in which they saw their leader, 
 ran headlong into the thick forest of pikes to 
 rescue and save him. He quickly remounted 
 another horse, and the battle became more 
 bloody than ever. At length Cyrus admiring / 
 the valour of the Egyptians, and being con V 
 cerned to see such brave men perish, offers 
 them honourable conditions, if they would sum 
 K 
 
66 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 render, letting them know at the same time 
 that all their allies had abandoned them. The 
 Egyptians accepted the conditions, after which 
 the Persians meeting with no farther opposi- 
 tion, a total rout of the enemy ensued. 
 
 XX. It is allowed that Cyrus's victory was 
 chiefly owing to his Persian cavalry, which 
 was a new establishment, and entirely the 
 fruit of that prince's care and activity in form- 
 ing his people, and perfecting them in a part 
 of the military art, of which till his time they 
 had been utterly ignorant. The chariots 
 armed with scythes did good service, and the 
 use of them was ever after retained among the 
 Persians. The camels too were not unser- 
 viceable in the battle, though Xenophon makes 
 no great account of them, and observes, that 
 in his time they made no other use of them, 
 than for carrying the baggage. I shall not 
 undertake here to enlarge upon Cyrus's merit. 
 It is sufficient to observe, that in this affair 
 we see all the qualities of a great general shine 
 out in him. Before the battle, an admirable 
 sagacity and foresight in discovering and dis- 
 concerting the enemy's measures ; an infinite 
 exactness in the detail of affairs, in taking care 
 that his army should be provided with every 
 thing necessary, and all his orders punctually 
 obeyed at the time prefixed ; a wonderful ap- 
 plication to gain the hearts of his soldiers, and 
 to inspire them with confidence and ardour. 
 In the heat of action, what a spirit and ac- 
 tivity ! what a presence of mind in giving 
 orders as occasion requires ! what courage and 
 intrepidity, and at the same time what hu- 
 manity towards the enemy, whose valour he 
 respects, and whose blood he is unwiUing to 
 shed ! I have met with but one objection to 
 the manner in which he drew up his troops in 
 order of battle, namely, no troops to cover his 
 flanks, to sustain his armed chariots, and to 
 oppose the two bodies of troops which Croesus 
 had detached to fall upon the flanks of his 
 army. But it is very possible that such a cir- 
 cumstance might escape Xenophon in describ- 
 ing the battle ; though it must be owned, that 
 the fall of Abradates, which was immediately 
 followed by the attack of the Persian infantry, 
 hardly leaves room for such a conjecture. 
 
 XXI. I shall now present the reader with 
 the description of two battles in which the 
 Romans were concerned, those of Cannse and 
 Zama, distinguished by the importance of their 
 consequences, and the abilities of the generals 
 
 who commanded in them. Hannibal having 
 defeated the Romans in there successive en« 
 gagements, and desirous of bringing them to 
 another general action, that by one decisive 
 blow he might put an end to the war, removed 
 his camp to the neighbourhood of Cannas, an 
 open champaign country, and fit for cavalry 
 to act in, in which he was greatly superior to 
 the enemy. The Romans, headed by the con- 
 suls Paulus ^milius and Varro, followed him 
 thither, where after some disputes Paulus was 
 obliged to give way to the obstinacy of his 
 colleague, who was resolutely bent upon 
 fighting. The two armies were very unequal 
 as to number. There was in that of the Ro- 
 mans, .including the allies, four-score thousand 
 foot, and something more than six thousand 
 horse; and in that of the Carthaginians, forty 
 thousand foot, all well disciplined and inured 
 to war, and ten thousand horse. Varro at 
 day-break, having made the troops of the great 
 camp pass the Aufidus, drew them up imme- 
 diately in battle, after having joined them 
 with those of the little camp. The whole in- 
 fantry were upon one line, closer and of greater 
 depth than usual. The cavalry was upon the 
 two vi'ings ; that of the Romans on the right, 
 defended by the Aufidus; and that of the allies 
 on the left wing. The light-armed troops 
 were advanced in the front of the battle to some 
 distance. Paulus ^milius commanded the 
 right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and 
 Servilius GeminuS; the consul of the preceding 
 year, was in the centre. 
 
 XXII. Kannibal immediately drew up his 
 army in one line. He posted his Spanish and 
 Gallic cavalry on the left, sustained by the 
 Aufidus, to oppose the Roman horse ; and 
 upon the same line, half his heavy-armed 
 African infantry : then the Spanish and Gallic 
 infantry, which properly formed the centre ; on 
 their right, the other half of the African in- 
 fantry ; and lastly the Numidian horse, who 
 composed the right wing. The light-armed 
 troops were in the front, facing those of the 
 Romans. Asdrubal had the left, Hanno the 
 right ; Hannibal, having his brother with him, 
 reserved the command of the centre to himself. 
 The African troops might have been taken for 
 a body of Romans, so much did they resemble 
 them by their arms, which they had gained in 
 the battles of Trebia and Thrasymenus, and 
 which they now employed against those who 
 had suffered them to be taken from them. 
 
ART OF WAR 
 
 67 
 
 The Spaniards and Gauls had shields of the 
 same form ; but their swords were very dif- 
 ferent. Those of the former were equally 
 proper for cutting and thrusting, whereas those 
 of the Gauls cut only with the edge, and at a 
 certain distance. The soldiers of those two 
 nations, especially the Gauls, had a dreadful 
 aspect, in consequence of their extraordinary 
 stature. The latter were naked from their 
 belts upwards. The Spaniards wore linen 
 habits, the extreme whiteness of which exalted 
 by a border of a purple colour, made a sur- 
 prisingly splendid appearance. Hannibal, 
 who knew how to take his advantages as a 
 great captain, forgot nothing that could con- 
 duce to the victory. A wind peculiar to that 
 region, called in the country vulturnus, blew 
 always at a certain period. He took care to 
 { draw up in such a manner, that his army, 
 facing the noith, had it in their backs, and the 
 enemy fronting the south, had it in their faces ; 
 so that he was not in the least incommoded 
 with it, whereas the Romans, whose eyes it 
 filled with dust, scarce saw before them. From 
 hence we may judge how far Hannibal carried 
 his attention, which nothing seems to escape. 
 XXIII. The two armies marched against 
 each other, and began the chaige. After that 
 of the light-armed soldiers on both sides, which 
 was only a prelude, the action began by the 
 two wings of the cavalry on the side of the 
 Aufidus. Hannibal's left wing, which was an 
 old corps, to whose valour he was principally 
 indebted for his successes, attacked that of the 
 Romans with so much force and violence, that 
 they had never experienced the like. This 
 charge was not made in the usual manner of 
 attacks of cavalry, by sometimes falling back, 
 and sometimes returning to the assault; but 
 in fighting man to man, and very near, be- 
 cause they had not room enough to extend 
 themselves, being pent up on one side of the 
 river, and on the other by the infantry. The 
 shock was furious, and equally sustained on 
 both sides ; and whilst it was still doubtful to 
 which side the victory would incline, the 
 Roman horse, according to a custom usual 
 enough in their corps, and which was some- 
 times successful, but was now very ill ap- 
 plied, dismounted and fought on foot. When 
 Hannibal was informed of this, he cried out : 
 I am as well pleased with them in that pos- 
 ture, as I should be to have them all delivered 
 up to me to be bound hand and foot. Accor- 
 
 dingly, after having defended themselves with 
 the utmost valour, most of them fell upon the 
 spot. Asdrubal pursued those that fled, and 
 made a great slaughter of them, 
 
 XXIV. Whilst the horse was thus engaged, 
 the infantry of both armies advanced also 
 against each other. The battle began at first 
 in the centre. As soon as Hannibal perceived 
 that his left wing began to have the advantage, 
 he made the Gauls and Spaniards move that 
 were in the main body, and whom he com- 
 manded in person. In proportion as he ad- 
 vanced, he rounded his front in form of a half 
 moon, with its convex side towards the 
 enemy. At first the opposite centre of the 
 Romans charged them. After some resistance 
 the Spaniards and Gauls began to give way, 
 and to lose ground. The rest of the Roman 
 infantry also moved on in order to take them 
 in flank. They fell back according to the 
 orders they had received, continuing to fight, 
 and regained the ground where they had at 
 first been drawn up in battle. The Romans, 
 seeing that the Spaniards and Gauls con- 
 tinued to retreat, continued also to pursue 
 them, Hannibal, well pleased to see every 
 thing succeed according to his design, and 
 perceiving the moment was come for acting 
 with all his forces, gave orders, that his 
 Africans should wheel to the right and left 
 upon the Romans, These two bodies, which 
 were fresh, well armed, and in good order, 
 having wheeled about suddenly, towards the 
 space or hollow, into which the Romans had 
 thrown themselves in disorder and confu- 
 sion, charged them on both sides with 
 vigour, without giving them time to look 
 about them, or leaving them ground to form 
 themselves. 
 
 XXV. In the mean time the Numidian 
 cavalry on the right wing was engaged also 
 with the enemy opposite to them, namely, the 
 cavalry of the allies of the Romans. Though 
 they did not distinguish themselves in this 
 battle, and the advantage was equal on both 
 sides, they were however very useful : for 
 they found the enemies which they had in 
 their front sufficient employment, to prevent 
 them from having time to assist their own 
 people. But when the left wing, where As- 
 drubal commanded, had routed, as we have 
 said, the whole horse of the right wing of the 
 Romans, and had joined the Numidians, the 
 cavalry of the allies did not wait to be attacked 
 
68 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 by them, but fled with the utmost precipita- 
 tion. It is said, that Asdrubal then did a 
 thing, which no less shows his prudence, 
 than it contributed to the success of the bat- 
 tle. As the Numidians were very numerous, 
 and never did their duty better than when an 
 enemy fled, he ordered them to pursue the 
 Romans to prevent their rallying, andied on 
 the Spanish and Gallic horse to the charge, 
 to support the African infantry. Accordingly 
 he fell upon the Roman foot in the rear, 
 which being attacked at the same time in the 
 flanks, and surrounded on all sides, was en- 
 tirely cut to pieces, after having acted prodi- 
 gies of valour. 
 
 XXVI. The battle of Zama, between Han- 
 nibal and Scipio, is one of the most memora- 
 ble recorded in history; the disposition on 
 both sides being the masterpiece of two of the 
 greatest generals that ever the world produced. 
 Scipio drew up his troops in the following 
 manner : — He posted the hastati in the front 
 line, leaving intervals between the cohorts. 
 In the second line he placed the' principes, 
 with their cohorts not behind the spaces of 
 the first line, as was the custom of the Ro- 
 mans, but behind the cohorts of that front 
 line, in order to leave openings for the ele- 
 phants of the enemy, which were very nume- 
 rous. The triarii formed the third line, in the 
 same order, and served as a body of reserve. 
 He placed LaeUus on the left wing, with the 
 Italian cavalry, and Masinissa on the right, 
 with his Numidians. In the spaces of the 
 first line he placed the light-armed soldiers, 
 and ordered them to b^gin the battle in such 
 a manner, that if they could not sustain the 
 charge of the elephants, they should retire ; 
 such of them as were most speedy, behind the, 
 whole army, through the spaces that divided 
 it in right lines ; and those who should find 
 themselves too much pressed, through the 
 spaces between the lines on the right and left, 
 in order to leave those animals a passage, in 
 which they would be exposed to the darts 
 discharged upon them on all sides. As to Han- 
 nibal, in order to give the enemy more terror, 
 he placed in the front his fourscore elephants, 
 a number which he never had before in any 
 battle. In the first line he posted the auxiliary 
 troops of the Ligurians and Gauls, with the 
 Baleareans and Moors, who amounted in all to 
 twelve thousand men. The second line, in 
 which the principal force of the army consist- 
 
 ed, was composed of Africans and Cartha- 
 ginians. He posted the troops he had brought 
 with him from Italy in the third line, and placed 
 them above a stadium from the second line. 
 The Numidian cavalry were upon the left 
 wing, and the Carthaginian upon the right. 
 
 XXVII. Every thing being ready for the 
 battle, and the Numidian cavalry on both 
 sides having long skirmished, Hannibal gave 
 orders for the elephants to move against the 
 enemy. The Romans immediately made the 
 trumpets sound, and at the same time raised 
 such great cries, that the elephants which ad- 
 vanced against the right of the Romans, turned' 
 back, and put the Moors and Numidians that 
 formed Hannibal's left into disorder. Masi- 
 nissa seeing their confusion, easily put them 
 entirely to the rout. The rest of the elephants 
 advanced between the two armies into the 
 plain, and fell upon the light armed Romans, a 
 great number of whom they crushed to death, 
 notwithstanding the continual shower of darts 
 discharged upon them from all sides. At length 
 being terrified, sonie of them ran through the 
 spaces Scipio had prudently left, and others in 
 their flight returned upon their own right 
 wing, pursued by the Roman horse, who with 
 their spears drove them quite out of the field 
 of battle. LeeHus took this instant for charg- 
 ing the Carthaginian cavalry, who turned about 
 and fled full speed. He pursued them warmly, 
 whilst Masinissa did the same on his side. 
 
 XXVIII. The army of the Carthaginians 
 was uncovered on the right and left by its 
 cavalry. The infantry then on both sides ad- 
 vanced slowly and in good order, except that 
 which Hannibal had brought from Italy, 
 which formed the third line, and continued in 
 its first post. When they were near each 
 other, the Romans raising great cries, accord- 
 ing to their custom, and striking their swords 
 upon their shields, charged the enemy with 
 vigour. On the sides of the Carthaginians, 
 the body of foreign troops that formed the 
 front line, also raised great cries, but con- 
 fused, and dissonant from each other, because 
 they were of different nations. As they could 
 use neither swords nor javelins, but fought 
 hand to hand, the strangers at first had some 
 advantage over the Romans by their agility 
 and boldness, and wounded a great number. 
 However, the latter having the superiority by 
 their good order, and the nature of their arms, 
 gained ground, supported by the second lin^ 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 who followed, and incessantly encouraged 
 them to fight with valour ; whereas the stran- 
 gers being neither followed nor assisted by the 
 Carthaginians, whose inaction on the contrary 
 intimidated them, lost courage, gave way, 
 and believing themselves openly abandoned 
 by. their own troops, fell, in retiring, upon 
 their second line, and attacked it in order to 
 open themselves a passage. The latter found 
 themselves obliged to defend their lives cou- 
 rageously : so that the Carthaginians attacked 
 by the strangers, contrary to their expecta- 
 tion, saw they had two enemies to fight, their 
 own troops and the Romans. Quite out of 
 their senses, and in a manner transported with 
 fury, they made a great slaughter of both, and 
 put the hastati into disorder. Those who 
 commanded the principes having made their 
 troops advance, rallied them without diffi- 
 culty. The greatest part of the strangers and 
 Carthaginians fell in this place, partly cut in 
 pieces by one another, and partly b}"^ the Ro- 
 mans. Hannibal would not suffer those that 
 fled to mingle with those who remained, lest 
 full of terror as they were, and covered with 
 wounds, they might induce disorder among 
 those who had received no blow hitherto : he 
 even ordered the front rank to present their 
 pikes, which obliged them to retire along the 
 wings into the plain. 
 
 XXIX. The space between the two armies 
 being then covered vyith blood, and with the 
 dead, Scipio was in perplexity enough ; for he 
 did not know how to make his troops move in 
 good order, over that confused heap of arms 
 and dead bodies, still bleeding and lying upon 
 each other. He ordered the wounded men 
 to be carried behind the army ; the retreat to 
 be sounded for the hastati, who were pursu- 
 ing the enemy; posted theai opposite to the 
 centre of the Carthaginians in expectation of 
 a new charge ; and made the principes and 
 triarii advance on both wings. When they 
 were upon the same front with the hastati, a 
 new battle began between the two armies. 
 The infantry alternately gave way, and re- 
 turned to the charge with great courage and 
 vigour. As number, resolution, and arms 
 were equal on both sides, and they fought 
 with such obstinacy that they fell in their 
 posts rather than gave way, the fate of the 
 battle was long doubtful, and it could not be 
 conjectured which side would remain masters 
 of the field. Things being in this state, Lae- 
 7* 
 
 lius and Masinissa, after having pursued the 
 enemy's cavalry a considerable time, returned 
 very opportunely for attacking the infantry 
 in the rear. This last charge decided the 
 victor}% A great number of the Cartha- 
 ginians were killed upon the field of battle, 
 where they were surrounded on all sides. 
 Many of them having dispersed in the plains 
 round about, were cut off by the Roman 
 cavalry that occupied all the country. The 
 Carthaginians left above twenty thousand 
 dead upon the spot, as well of their own 
 citizens as allies. Almost as many were 
 taken, with a hundred and thirty ensigns and 
 standards, and eleven elephants. Hannibal 
 escaped with a small number of horse to 
 Adrumetum, after having tried, both before 
 and during the battle, all possible means for 
 obtaming the victory. The Romans lost only 
 fifteen hundred men. 
 
 XXX. Having thus given an account of 
 some of the most memorable battles of anti- 
 quity, explained the conduct of the generals, 
 and laid open the reasons of that conduct; I 
 shall conclude this chapter with a few general 
 remarks, tending still further to illustrate this 
 great branch of war, and which in some mea- 
 sure offer themselves in consequence of what 
 has been already said. The first is, that , 
 though most nations had a certain fixed and 
 particular form of giving battle, yet they 
 never adhered to it so closely, as not to vary 
 when circumstances required it. The draw- 
 ing up an army to the very best advantage, is 
 doubtless a great furtherance to the gaining 
 of the victory. But the doing so depends 
 much, not only on the wisdom and skill of 
 the general, the nature of the ground, and 
 the quality of his own forces, but also on those 
 of his enemies, and on the disposition of him 
 who commands them. Hence the greatest 
 captains of older times, whose military know- 
 ledge and practice the moderns so justly 
 value, always acted herein according to their 
 own judgment, without confining themselves 
 to any standing rules. We have seen that 
 Cyrus being to fight against Croesus in a large 
 plain, where he found the enemy taking 
 measures to surround him, drew up his men, 
 but twelve deep in file, whereas formerly the 
 file was twenty-four deep. By this means he 
 augmented the front of his army double, pre- 
 vented his being too much over-winged by 
 Croesus, and won the victory. It is observable 
 
70 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 too of Scipio at the battle of Zama, that he 
 placed the battalioVis of his several h'nes di- 
 rectly behind one another, and not facing 
 the intervals of the lines before them, as was 
 the common custom. His design in this was, 
 to give free issue to the elephants, whose 
 shock might otherwise have disordered his 
 men, and rendered them incapable of making 
 any resistance. Cssar, at the battle of Phar- 
 salia against Pompey, quite altered the man- 
 ner of the Roman embattling. For having 
 found that Potiipey exceedingly out-numbered 
 him in horse, he covered one of his flanks 
 ■with a little river, and drew all his cavalry to 
 the other flank ; among the squadrons where- 
 of he placed bodies of his best infantry, and 
 there began the battle. By this means having 
 all his horse in one wing, and those accom- 
 panied with select legionary foot, he soon 
 routed that half of Pompey's horse which 
 opposed all his, and then falling into the flanks 
 and rear of his enemy, gained the victory. 
 
 XXXI. The drawing up the army in seve- 
 ral lines, as the nature of the ground, and the 
 number of the forces would allow, is what 
 was most peculiar to the Roman discipline, 
 and has been found so consonant to reason and 
 experience, that it is established as a standing 
 maxim of war at this day. In effect these 
 lines are so many armies ; and the second line 
 being entire, though the first should be broken, 
 often recovers the day ; especially if the se- 
 cond line be at so just a distance from the 
 first, as not to be disordered by it when over- 
 thrown ; and also so near, that some battalions 
 of the second line can come up timely enough 
 to redress any beginnings of a breach in the 
 first, without too much discomposing itself. 
 It has likewise been often observed, that who- 
 ever in a battle keeps together a body of men, 
 that are not led to fight until all the enemy's 
 squadrons have fought, rarely misses to carry 
 away the victory ; and that he who has the 
 last reserves, is the likeliest in the end to have 
 the honour of the day. One signal illustration 
 of this truth among many I shall instance. At 
 the battle of Dreux in France, where the con- 
 stable Montmorency, and Francis Duke of 
 Guise, the greatest captains of that age, com- 
 manded the royalists ; and Lewis, Prince of 
 Conde, and the Admiral Chatillon the pro- 
 testants ; the two last defeated all the forces 
 they saw, took the constable prisoner, passed 
 over the bellies of thi Switzers, who made al- 
 
 most a miraculous resistance, and concluded 
 they had therefore won the victory. In the 
 meanwhile the Duke of Guise, who led the 
 left wing of the French king's army, either by 
 design, as his enemies said, or as an act of 
 high conduct, so covered his troops with the 
 village of Blainville, and the trees and shrubs 
 about it, that he was not so much as seen by 
 the protestants : nor moved from thence, until 
 the constable was taken prisoner, the Marshal 
 de St. Andre killed, and all those forces which 
 were considered by the Protestants as the 
 whole army of the royalists, entirely routed, 
 and so confusedly flying, that he was in no 
 danger of having his squadrons disordered by 
 the runaways of his own party. But then ad- 
 vancing with his troops, which were entire, he 
 soon turned the fortune of the day, took the 
 Prince of Conde prisoner, and overthrew all that 
 opposed him. For it is a tedious and diflicultj 
 if not an impossible task, to put into good order 
 again an army that has newly fought, so as to 
 bring it suddenly to renew the charge ; some be- 
 ing busied about the pillage and prisoners they-' 
 had taken, or are pursuing ; others being loth to 
 return to new dangers ; and all in effect being 
 so heated and disordered, that they do not, or 
 will not hear the commands of their superiors. 
 XXXII. One thing among the Komans 
 particularly deserves our notice, and that is, 
 that though they strove with incredible emu- 
 lation to obtain the first posts in the army, yet 
 that ambition once gratified, they did not dis- 
 dain to accept of inferior oflices after the high- 
 er, and to serve under those over whom they 
 had commanded. It is amazing to consider 
 what a multitude of consular senators fell in 
 the battle of Cannje. We have seen that Fa- 
 bius, who had been thrice consul, and dictator, 
 served as lieutenant under his own son ; and 
 that the great Scipio accepted the same cha- 
 racter from his brother. Nor are these to be 
 considered as instances singular in their kind, 
 for it was in reality the common practice. 
 Hence it was always in the power of a Roman 
 general, to have expert, vigilant, and valiant 
 commanders, at the head of those several larger 
 divisions, of which an army is usually com- 
 posed in a day of battle: men of judgment, 
 authorit}', and presence of mind, to remedy all 
 disorders, and to improve all advantages in the 
 critical moments, than which there is nothing 
 of greater importance in general engagements, 
 as the least delay or remissness is but too often 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 71 
 
 irreparable. I believe it will readily be al- 
 lowed, that the most able and consummate 
 general, neither is nor can be of himself suffi- 
 cient to redress all disorders, and lay hold of 
 all advantages in an instant, when armies are 
 once engaged. The utmost he can do is, to 
 choose well the field of battle, to draw up his 
 army according thereto to most advantage, to 
 give his general orders with prudence and 
 foresight, and to give the best orders wherever 
 he is in person ; but he cannot be everywhere, 
 nor send his orders timely enough to every 
 place to have them successfully obeyed. And 
 therefore it is indisputably necessary, that he 
 have under him expert chief officers, at the 
 head of all the great divisions of the army, 
 who may supply what is impossible for him 
 singly to command. For he can be well 
 obeyed to the time he sends his troops to the 
 charge ; after that, those only who lead them, 
 and are with them, can actuate them according 
 to the general orders, or as the occasion re- 
 quires ; which those under him must have the' 
 judgment to lay hold of as it were in the 
 twinkling of an eye, so short are the moments 
 to acquire the victory ! 
 
 XXXIII. The placing the best men in the 
 wings of an army, is yery ancient, and seldom 
 has been omitted, but to the loss of those who 
 were guilty of such an omission. The reason 
 is, that the troops on the wings are not wedged 
 in, as the troops in the main battle are ; but 
 are at liberty to take all advantages, which 
 accident, the good conduct of the commander 
 in chief, or the ill conduct of the enemy, 
 throw in their way : nor can a general so 
 much as rationally hope to fall into the flank 
 and rear of his enemy, but by attacking one 
 of his wings ; because he cannot over-wing 
 him, but only by falling upon one of his out- 
 ward flanks. Hence an able commander 
 chooses always to begin the battle on that 
 side where he judges himself the strongest, 
 and the enemy the weakest ; advancing with 
 those troops as expeditiously as he can, whilst 
 the rest of the army moves as slowly as they 
 may. For if this first impression be success- 
 ful, he may fall into the flank and part of the 
 T^ear of the enemy, while the residue of the 
 whole army is marching to attack them in 
 front: but then the motion of the army must 
 be quicker, as soon as ever they see that the 
 advanced wing is successful. Such was the 
 conduct of Epaminondas, at the famous battle 
 
 of Leuctra and Mantinea, Such too was the 
 method followed by Julius Cagsar, when he 
 fought against Ariovistus and the Germans. 
 Hannibal, so justly celebrated for his skill in 
 drawing up an army, at the famous battle of 
 Cannae, placed, as we have seen, all his best 
 men in his two wings, and his worst men in 
 the centre ; whereby, when the Romans came 
 to the charge, who had placed their choicest 
 men in their main battle, they soon pierced 
 into the body of Hannibal's army, which was 
 the very thing he designed they should do ; 
 for then with his two wings, in which were 
 the flower of all his troops, he immediately 
 wheeled upon the Romans, and totally de- 
 feated them. 
 
 , XXXIV. After the battle was fought, and 
 the victory apparently won, the great danger 
 was, as it still is, to pursue with too much, 
 ardour, without regard to what passed in the 
 rest of the army. Hence that custom so in- , 
 violably observed among the Romans, of never 
 suffering the legions to follow the chace, or 
 break their ranks upon any occasion whatever. 
 Only the horse, the light-armed men, and 
 what soldiers were not of the legions, were 
 sent upon this service ; and the pursuit was 
 conducted with so much caution, that a cer- 
 tain number of squadrons always followed in 
 good order, ready to fall upon and break the 
 enemy anew, should they rally and face about. 
 How many victories seemingly won, have in 
 an instant been lost, for want of care in these 
 two particulars of such high concernment, 
 which therefore ought never to be omitted. 
 It is certain that nothing more encourages 
 flying enemies to rally, and fight again, than 
 the seeing a disorderly pursuit of them. For 
 in such a pursuit, all the advantages of the 
 prevailing party immediately vanish, if the 
 chased do but turn about ; such an evidence 
 of restored valour, too often daunting those 
 who are to oppose it ; nor can any thing more 
 deter the flying party from such a step, than 
 to see several bodies in good order following 
 close behind them, and ready to make them 
 repent of their confidence, should they venture 
 upon any further opposition. And though 
 brave officers will not cease pressing, promis- 
 ing, and even threatening their men that fly, 
 to face about ; yet the private soldier, who 
 sees those bodies ready to fall on, concludes 
 it is safer to run than to resist, and therefore 
 is too often deaf to all oratory or menaces of 
 
73 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 that nature : for when once terror has seized 
 the minds of the troops, they hear no 
 counsels but those which their own fears sug- 
 
 CHAP.VIII. 
 
 OF THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF PLACES. 
 
 I. What we have to offer upon this sub- 
 ject falls naturally under three general heads. 
 First, The manner of fortifying towns in use 
 among the ancients. Secondly, The machines 
 of war employed by them in sieges. Thirdly, 
 The nature and conduct of an attack and de- 
 fence. As to the first, how far soever we 
 look back into antiquity, we find amongst the 
 Greeks and Romans, cities fortified in a regu- 
 lar manner, with their fosses, curtains, and 
 towers. Vitruvius, in treating of the construc- 
 tion of places of war in his time, says, that 
 the towers ought to project beyond the walls, 
 in order that when the enemy approaches, 
 the defenders upon the .right and left may 
 take them in flank : that they ought to be round, 
 and faced with many stones, because such as 
 are square, are soon beat down by the ma- 
 chines of war and battering rams, which easily 
 break their angles : and that near the towers 
 the wall should be cut within-side the breadth 
 of the towers, and the ways broke in this man- 
 ner only be joined and continued by beams 
 laid upon the two extremities, without being 
 made fast with iron, that in case the enemy 
 should make himself master of any part of the 
 wall, the besieged might remove this wooden 
 bridge, and thereby prevent his passage to the 
 other parts of the wall, and into the towers. 
 The best towns of the ancients were situated 
 upon eminences. They inclosed them some- 
 times within two or three walls and ditches. 
 Berosus cited by Josephus, informs us that 
 Nebuchadnezzar fortified Babylon with a triple 
 inclosure of brick walls, of a surprising strength 
 and height. Polybius, speaking of Syringa, 
 the capital of Hyrcania, which Antiochus be- 
 sieged, says, that city was surrounded with 
 three ditches, each forty-five feet broad, and 
 twenty-two deep. Upon each side of these 
 was a double intrenchment, and behind all, a 
 strong wall. The city of Jerusalem, says Jo- 
 sephus, was surrounded by a triple wall, ex- 
 cept on the sides of the valleys, where there 
 
 To these they nad added many other works, 
 one of which, continues the historian, had it 
 been completed, would have rendered the city 
 impregnable. The stones of which it waa 
 built, were thirty feet long by fifteen broad, 
 which made it so strong, that it was in a man- 
 ner impossible to sap or shake it with machines. 
 The whole was flanked with towers from space 
 to space of extraordinary solidity, and built 
 with wonderful art. 
 
 II. The ancients did not generally support 
 their walls on the inside with earth, in the man- 
 ner of the talus or slope, which made the at- 
 tacks more dangerous. For though the ene- 
 my had gained some footing upon them, he 
 could not assure himself of taking the city. 
 It was necessary to get down, and to make use 
 of the ladder by which he had mounted ; and 
 that descent exposed the soldier to very great 
 danger. Vitruvius however observes, that 
 there is nothing renders a rampart so strong, 
 as when the walls both of the curtain and 
 towers are supported by earth. For then 
 neither rams, mines, nor any other machines 
 can shake them. The places of war of the an- 
 cients were not always fortified with stone 
 walls. They were sometimes inclosed within 
 good ramparts of earth, of great firmness and 
 solidity. The manner of coating them with turf 
 was not unknown to them, nor the art of sup- 
 porting the earth with strong fascines, made fast 
 by stakes, and of arming the top of the rampart 
 with a ruff or fraise of palisades, and the foot 
 of the parapet, or pas de souris with another. 
 They often planted palisades also in the ditch, 
 to defend themselves against sudden attacks. 
 They made walls also with beams crossed over 
 one another, with spaces between them in 
 manner of a chequer, the void parts cf which 
 they filled up with earth and stones. Such al- 
 most were the walls of the city of Bourges, 
 which CiEsar, in the seventh book of his wars 
 with the Gauls, describes as follows. The walls 
 of Bourges, and almos't all those of the country, 
 were made of pieces of wood forty feet in length, 
 laid along the earth, at the distance of two 
 feet from each other, and crossed over by others 
 of equal length and at equal distance, with 
 their ends to the front of the wall. The spaces 
 on the inside were filled up with earth and 
 fascines, and on the outside with solid stones. 
 He adds, that the work by this disposition 
 was agreeable to the eye, and very strong; 
 because the wood was of great force against 
 the ram. and the stones atrainst fire : besides 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 73 
 
 which, the thickness of the wall, which was 
 generally forty feet, or the length of the beams, 
 made it next to impossible either to make a 
 breach in it, or throw it down in any manner. 
 
 III. What I shall say in the sequel, when 
 I come to explain the manner of attacking 
 and defending pjaces, will show more distinctly 
 what kind of fortifications those of the ancients 
 were. It is pretended that the moderns excel 
 them very much in this point. But as the 
 method of attack and defence is entirely dif- 
 ferent, no just comparison can be made. The 
 use of muskets, bombs, cannons, and other fire- 
 arms since the invention of gunpowder, has 
 occasioned many alterations in the way of 
 conducting sieges, the duration of which has 
 been very much abridged of late. But these 
 changes are not so considerable as many ima- 
 gine, and have added nothing either to the 
 merit or capacity of generals. The moderns 
 have imagined nothing that the ancients could 
 use, and have not used. We have borrowed 
 from them the breadth and depth of fosses, the 
 thickness of walls, the towers to flank the cur- 
 tains, the palisades, the intrenchments within 
 the ramparts, and towers, the advantage of 
 many flanks, in multiplying of which consists 
 the chief improvement of modern fortification, 
 and which fire-arms make the more easy to 
 execute. These are the remarks of men of 
 ability and judgment, who to a profound 
 knowledge of the manner in which the an- 
 cients made war, unite a perfect experience of 
 the modern practice of it. 
 
 IV. But let us how proceed to the machines 
 made use of by the ancients in their sieges. 
 The principal of these were, the tortoise; the 
 catapulta, the balista, the ram, and moving 
 towers. The tortoise was a machine com- 
 posed of very strong and solid timber- work. 
 The height of it, to the uppermost beam, 
 which sustained the roof, was twelve feet. The 
 base was square, and each of its fronts twenty- 
 five feet. It was covered with a kind of 
 quilted mattress made of raw hides, and pre- 
 pared with different drugs, to prevent its being 
 set on fire by combustibles. This heavy ma- 
 chine was supported upon four wheels, and had 
 the name of tortoise from its serving as a very 
 strong covering and defence, against the enor- 
 mous weight thrown down on it : those under 
 it being safe in the same manner as a tortoise 
 under her shell. It was used both to fill up 
 the ditch, and for sapping. For the filling up 
 
 of the ditch, it was necessary to join several 
 of them together in a line, and very near one 
 another. Diodorus Siculus, speaking of the 
 siege of Halicarnassus by Alexander the Great, 
 says, that he first caused three tortoises to ap- 
 proach, in order to fill up the ditch, and that 
 afterwards he planted his rams upon the space 
 filled up, to batter the wall. This machine is 
 often mentioned by authors. There were, 
 without doubt, tortoises of difierent forms and 
 sizes. Some indeed are of opinion, that be- 
 cause of its enormous weight, it could not be 
 moved from place to place on wheels, but was 
 pushed forwards on rollers. Under these roll- 
 ers the way was laid with strong planks, to fa- 
 cilitate its motion, and prevent its sinking into 
 the ground, from whence it would have been 
 very difficult to have removed it. The ancients 
 have observed, that the roof had a thicker co- 
 vering of hides, hurdles, sea-weed, &c. than 
 the sides, as it was exposed to much greater 
 shocks from the weight thrown upon it by 
 the besieged. It had a door in front, which 
 was drawn up by a chain as far as was neces- 
 sary, and covered the soldiers at work in fill- 
 ing up the ditch. 
 
 V. The musculus, though very little under- 
 stood by modern authors, who have repre- 
 sented it variously, was undoubtedly a kind of 
 tortoise, very low, and with a sharp roof. Such 
 was that of Cagsar at the siege of Marseilles. 
 It was sixty feet in length, and was moved 
 forward to the walls upon rollers, where it was 
 fixed over the part of the ditch filled up. The 
 tower of brick which he built there, commu- 
 nicated with this musculus and the trenches 
 Caesar says the planks of the roofs were co- 
 vered with bricks and mortar, over which hides 
 were laid to prevent the mortar from dissolv- 
 ing by the water which the besieged might 
 pour down upon it ; and to secure it from 
 stones and fire, it was again covered over with 
 thick quilted mattresses properly prepared. 
 All this was hone under mantles, after which 
 it was thrust forward on a sudden from the 
 tower to the walls. Besides this, there was 
 another kind of musculus, that was used for 
 leveUing the ground, and laying the planks on 
 which the tortoises and moving towers were 
 to advance to the ditch. They were like this, 
 of greater length than breadth, and equal in 
 breadth to the way they were to level. There 
 were several other machines intended to covel 
 the soldiers, called crates, plutei, x)i«ea5, whicb 
 
74 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 I shall not undertake to describe here, to 
 avoid prolixity. They may be comprised in 
 general under the name of mantles or sheds. 
 
 VI. The catapulta and balista were intend- 
 ed for discharging darts, arrows, and stones. 
 They were of different sizes, and consequently 
 produced more or less effect. Some were 
 used in battles, and might be called field- 
 pieces ; others were employed in sieges, which 
 was the use most commonly made of them. 
 The balistffi must have been the heaviest and 
 most difficult to carry, because there was al- 
 ways a greater number of catapulta3 in the 
 armies. Livy, in his description of the siege 
 of Carthage, says, that there were a hundred 
 and twenty great, and more than two hundred 
 small catapultaj taken, with thirty-three great 
 balistse, and fifty-two small ones. Josephus 
 mentions the same difference amongst the Ro- 
 mans, who had three hundred catapultae, and 
 forty balistse, at the siege of Jerusalem. 
 These machines had a force which it is not 
 easy to comprehend, but which all good 
 authors attest. Vegetius says, that the balis- 
 tse discharged darts with so much rapidity 
 and violence, that nothing could resist their 
 force. Athenius tells us, that Agesistratus 
 made one of little more than two feet in length, 
 which shot darts almost five hundred paces. 
 These machines were not unlike our cross- 
 bows. There were others of much greater 
 force, which threw stones of three hundred 
 weight, upwards of a hundred and twenty-five 
 paces. We find surprising effects of them in 
 Josephus, The darts of the catapults, he 
 tells us, destroyed abundance of people. The 
 stones from the balistse beat down the battle- 
 ments, and broke the angles of the towers ; 
 nor was there any phalanx so deep, but one 
 of these stones would sweep a whole file of it 
 from one end to the other. Folard, in his 
 Commentary upon Polybius, says their force 
 was very near equal to that of artillery. 
 
 VII. The ram was composed of a large long 
 beam, armed at one end with iron in the form 
 of a ram's head, and of the same bigness with 
 the beam. This piece of wood was suspended 
 by chains in xquUibrio, in order to be set in 
 motion with the greater ease. A hundred 
 men, more or less, worked it by main strength, 
 to strike it against a wall or rampart, in order 
 to beat them down after having shaken them 
 by repeated blows. Care was taken to clothe 
 this bean: with wet leather, to prevent its fe- , 
 
 ing set on fire. It was slung under a kind of 
 moving tortoise or gallery, which covered 
 more than half of it, in order to shelter those 
 who worked the ram from the stones and darts 
 of the besieged. The effects of this machine 
 were prodigious. As it was one of those that 
 did most hurt, many methods were contrived 
 to render it useless. Fire was darted upon 
 the roof that covered, and the timber that sup- 
 ported it, in order to burn them with the ram. 
 To deaden its blows, sacks of wool were let 
 down against the place at which it was level- 
 led. A machine was also made use of against 
 it, called the wolf, by way of opposition to the 
 ram, with which they endeavoured to grapple 
 it, in order to draV it to themselves, or break 
 it. Josephus relates a surprising action of a 
 Jew, who at the siege of Jotophat, threw a 
 stone of uncommon size upon the head of the 
 ram with such violence, that he loosened it 
 from the beam, and made it fall down. He 
 leaped afterwards from the top of the wall to 
 the bottom, took the head from the midst of 
 the enemy, and carried it back with him. He 
 received five arrows in his body ; and notwith. 
 standing those wounds boldly kept his post, 
 till, through loss of blood and strength, he fell 
 from the wall, and the ram's head with him, 
 with which he would never part. 
 
 VIII. The moving towers were made of an 
 assemblage of beams and strong planks, not 
 unlike a house. To secure them against the 
 fires thrown by the besieged, they were covered 
 with raw hides, or with pieces of cloth made 
 of hair. Their height was in proportion to 
 their base^ They were sometimes thirty feet 
 square, and sometimes forty or fifty. They 
 were higher than the walls or even towers of 
 the city. They were supported upon several 
 wheels according to mechanic principles, by 
 the means of which the machine was easily 
 made to move, how great soever it might be. 
 The town was in great danger, if this tower 
 could approach the walls ; for it had stairs 
 from one story to another, and included differ- 
 ent methods of attack. At bottom it had a 
 ram to batter the wall, and on the middle story 
 a draw-bridge, made of two beams with rails 
 of basket work, which let down easily upon 
 the wall of the city, when within reach of it. 
 The besiegers passed upon this bridge to make 
 themselves masters of the wall. Upon the 
 higher stories were soldiers armed with par- 
 tizans and missive weapons, who kept a per- 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 75 
 
 petual discharge upon the works. When af- 1 
 fairs were in this posture, a place seldom held 
 out long : for what could those hope who had 
 nothing to confide in but the height of their 
 ramparts, when they saw others suddenly ap- 
 pear which commanded them"! The people 
 of Namur demanded to capitulate, when Ces- 
 sar's tower, of which they had made a jest 
 whilst at a distance, was seen to move towards 
 them very fast. They believed this a prodigy, 
 says Caesar, and were astonished that men of 
 our size should think of carrying so vast and 
 heavy a machine to their walls. Their depu- 
 ties observed, that the Romans were doubtless 
 assisted by the gods in- their wars, since they 
 could make machines of so enormous a size 
 advance so swiftly. It is indeed no wonder they 
 were surprised, as they had neither seen nor 
 heard of any such thing before, and as this 
 tower seemed to advance by enchantment and 
 of itself, the mechanic powers that moved it 
 being imperceptible to those of the place. 
 These towers were sometimes surrounded with 
 corridors or galleries at each story, to prevent 
 t'leir being set on fire ; and indeed nothing 
 better could have been invented for this pur- 
 pose, as the galleries were filled with troops 
 armed with missive weapons, who made their 
 discharges from behind the parapets, if we may 
 so term them, and were always ready to pull 
 out the darts of fire, and extinguish all other 
 combustibles thrown against the tower : so 
 that it was impossible for the fire to make the 
 least progress, the remedy being always at 
 hand. These corridors were built upon beams 
 that projected five or six feet beyond the tower, 
 •several of which kind are still to be seen upon 
 Trajan's column. 
 
 IX. Having thus described the principal 
 machines made use of by the ancients in 
 sieges, I now proceed to the attack and de- 
 fence of places, which I shall treat in as brief 
 a manner as possible, confining myself to the 
 most essential parts. When cities were ex- 
 tremely strong and populous, they were sur- 
 rounded with an intrenchment on the side 
 next the town, and another on that towards 
 the country. These were called lines of cir- 
 cumvallation and contravallation. The be- 
 siegers pitched their camp between these two 
 fines. Those of contravallation were against 
 the besieged city, the others against attempts 
 from without. When it was foreseen that the 
 siege would be of long duration, it was often 
 
 changed into a blockade, and then the two 
 lines in question were solid walls of strong 
 masonry, flanked with towers at proper dis- 
 tances. There is a remarkable example of 
 this at the siege of Platsea by the Lacedsemo- 
 nians and Thebans, of which Thccydides 
 has left us a very particular account. The 
 two surrounding lines were composed of 
 two walls sixteen feet distant, and the soldiers 
 lay in that space, which was divided into 
 quarters: so that it might have been taken 
 for only one wall with high towers from dis- 
 tance to distance. These towers occupied 
 the whole interval, in order to enable the 
 besiegers to defend themselves at the same 
 time against those within and those without. 
 The quarters of the soldiers could not be 
 gone round without crossing the towers, and 
 the top of the wall was skirted with a parapet 
 of osier. There was a ditch on each side, the 
 earth of which had been used to make bricks 
 for the wall. In this manner Thucydides de- 
 scribes these two surrounding walls, which were 
 of no great circumference, the city being very 
 small. This siege, or rather blockade, was 
 very famous among the ancients, and the 
 more on account of the surprising escape of 
 the garrison, notwithstanding all these for- 
 tifications. For this purpose they applied 
 ladders to the inward wall. After they had 
 got upon the platform, and seized the two 
 adjoining towers, they drew up the ladders, and 
 let them down on the other side of the out- 
 ward wall, by which they descended to the 
 bottom, drawing up in line of battle as fast as 
 they came down. In this manner, by the 
 favour of a dark night, they got safe to 
 Athens. 
 
 X. The camp of the Roman army before 
 Numantia, took up a much greater extent of 
 ground. That city was four and twenty 
 stadia in circumference, that is to say a league. 
 Scipio, when he invested it, caused a line of 
 circumvallation to be drawn, which inclosed 
 more than twice the ground the city stood 
 upon. When this work was finished, another 
 line was thrown up against the besieged, at 
 a reasonable distance from the first, composed 
 of a rampart of eight feet thick by ten high, 
 which was strengthened with strong pali- 
 sades. The whole was flanked with towers 
 of a hundred feet from each other. It is not 
 easy to comprehend in what manner the Ro- 
 mans completed these immense works ; a 
 
76 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 line of circumvallation of more than two 
 leagues in compass ! but nothing is more cer- 
 tain than the fact. He also erected four posts 
 on the banks of the river Dueera, contiguous 
 to the lines : and contrived a stoccado or chain 
 of floating beams, pierced through cross-wise 
 ■with long stakes pointed with iron, to prevent 
 barks from entering, and divers from getting 
 any intelligence of what was doing in the 
 cam p. 
 
 XI. Caesar's circumvallation before Alesia, 
 was formed of fascines instead of turf, with its 
 parapet and fraise made of large stakes, whose 
 branches were cut in points, and burnt at the 
 ends, like stag's horns. They seemed like 
 wings at the foot of the parapet, or like the 
 oars of a galley inclining downwards. Of the 
 same nature are the fraises of the moderns, 
 that are far from being so well imagined, and are 
 smooth-pointed palisades, bending downwards 
 to prevent scaling. The moderns fix them in 
 the same manner at the bottom of the parapet, 
 where they form a kind of cincture very 
 agreeable to the eye. The battlements men- 
 tioned by Csesar were like the modern em- 
 brazures for cannon. Here the archers were 
 placed. Upon the parapet of the towers, field 
 balistse were planted to flank the works. 
 Towers were not always of wood, but some- 
 times of earth covered with turf, or strength- 
 ened with fascines. 'J'hey were much higher 
 than the rest of the intrenchment, and some- 
 times had towers of wood raised upon them 
 for battering the places that commanded the 
 camp. Some authors have believed, that these 
 intrenchments and works of the ancients in 
 the field, were perpendicular ; but that opinion 
 is very absurd. These had a platform with its 
 tains, or slope, and sometimes banquettes, in 
 the form of steps for ascending; besides which, 
 at the towers, they were ways made to go up. 
 All this was indispensably necessary in Cte- 
 sar's lines, as they were very high, to prevent 
 the earth from falling away. 
 
 Xn. Thus much for the two lines of cir- 
 cumvallation. We proceed now to the ground 
 inclosed between the two fosses, which is far 
 the most curious part of this celebrated block- 
 ade, and will be best explained in Caesar's 
 own words. " As the soldiers were employed 
 at the same time to fetch wood and provisions 
 from a considerable distance, and to work at 
 the fortifications, and the enemy often sallied 
 at several gates to interrupt them ; Caesar 
 
 found it necessary to make some addition to 
 his lines, that they might not require so many 
 men to guard them. He therefore took trees 
 of no great height, or large branches, which 
 he caused to be made sharp at the ends, and 
 running a trench of five feet deep before the 
 lines, he ordered them to be put into it, and 
 made fast at bottom, so that they could not be 
 pulled up. This trench was again filled up 
 in a such a manner that nothing but the tops 
 of the branches appeared, of which the points 
 must have run into those who should have 
 endeavoured to pass them. As there were 
 five rows of them interwoven in a manner with 
 each other, they wei>e unavoidable. In the 
 front of these he caused pits of three feet 
 deep to be dug, in the form of the quincunx. 
 In those pits he fixed strong stakes, burnt and 
 sharpened at the top, which rose only four 
 inches above the level of the ground, into 
 which they were planted three feet deeper 
 than the pits for the sake of firmness. The 
 pits were covered over with bushes to deceive 
 the enemy. There were eight rows of them, 
 at the distance of three feet from each other. 
 In the front of all he sowed the whole space 
 between the pits and the advanced ditch, 
 with crows-feet of an extraordinary size, which 
 the soldiers called spurs." The other line, to 
 prevent succours from without, was entirely 
 the same with this. 
 
 XIII. Though trenches, oblique lines, 
 mines, and other the like inventions, seem 
 neither often nor clearly expressed in authors, 
 we can hardly suppose with reason, that they 
 were not in use amongst the Greeks and 
 Romans. Is it probable, that with the ancients, 
 whose generals, among their other excellent 
 qualities, had in an imminent degree that of 
 taking great care to spare the blood and lives 
 of their soldiers, approaches were made in 
 besieging without any precautions against the 
 machines of the besieged, whose ramparts 
 were so well provided, and defence so bloody "! 
 Though there were no mention of this in any 
 of the historians, who might possibly in the 
 description of sieges omit this circumstance, 
 as well known to all the world ; we should 
 not conclude that such <ible generals either 
 did not know, or neglected things, on the one 
 side so important, and on the other so easy ; 
 and which must naturally have entered the 
 thoughts of every man, ever so little versed 
 in attacking places. But several historian* 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 77 
 
 speak of them ; of which one shall suffice for 
 all the rest : this is Polybius, where he relates, 
 the siege of the city Echinna by Philip. 
 He concludes the description of it with these 
 words : " To cover from the arrows of the 
 besieged, as well those that went from the 
 camp to the works, as those who returned 
 from the works to the camp, trenches were 
 drawn from the camp to the tortoises, and 
 those trenches covered at top." Long before 
 Philip, Demetrius Poliorcetes, had used the 
 same method at the siege of Rhodes. Dio- 
 dorus Siculus tells us, that famous warrior 
 caused tortoises, and galleries cut in the earth, 
 or covered mines, to be made, for communi- 
 cation with the batteries of rams ; and ordered 
 a trench, with blinds over head, to cover and 
 secure the troops, in going and coming from 
 the towers and tortoises. The seamen and 
 marines were appointed for this service : the 
 work was four stadia in length, that is to say, 
 five hundred paces. 
 
 XIV. But though their approaches were 
 not entirely like those of the moderns, nor so 
 deep in the earth, the fire from our works 
 being of a quite different nature from that of 
 the catap-uUie and balistse, though surprisingly 
 violent, yet it is certain from the above ac- 
 counts, and others that might be produced in 
 great number, that they went under cover 
 from their camp to their batteries, and used 
 more or less precaution, according to the 
 strength and valour of the besieged, and the 
 number of their machines, by which they 
 regulated the form of their approaches or 
 trenches. These were of two sorts. The 
 first were composed of a blind of hurdles or 
 strong fascines, placed on the side of each 
 other, without any space between them ; so 
 that they formed a kind of wall of five or six 
 feet high, with loop-holes cut from space to 
 space, between the fascmes or through the 
 hurdles. To support this blind, it is supposed 
 they planted forked pieces of wood in the 
 ground, upon which long poles were laid 
 cross-wise, with the fascines or hurdles made 
 fast to them. The other kind of approaches 
 was very different from the former, and con- 
 sisted of several trenches or galleries of com- 
 munication covered at top, drawn in a right 
 line from the camp to the works, or to the 
 parallels, not much unlike ours. The galleries 
 of communication were cut ten or twelve feet 
 troad in the earth. The workmen threw up 
 8 
 
 the earth on both sides, which they supported 
 with fascines, and covered the space with hur- 
 dles and earth laid upon poles and rafters. 
 The whole length of these galleries in the 
 earth, they cut loop-poles through the sides 
 and issues to go out at. On the sides of 
 those covered trenches or communications were 
 esplanades, or places of arms which extended 
 the whole front of the attack. These places 
 were spacious, and capable of containing a 
 great body of troops in order of battle ; for 
 here they were posted to support their towers, 
 tortoises, batteries of rams, balistas, and cata- 
 pultas, against the sallies of the besieged. 
 
 XV. The first parallel trench, next the 
 body of the place, was drawn along the side of 
 the fosse, and served as a communication to 
 the battering towers and tortoises of the be- 
 siegers. This sort of communications to the 
 moving towers were sometimes covered at top 
 by a blind of hurdles and fascines ; because as 
 they ran along the side of the counterscarp, 
 they were exposed to the downright discharges 
 of the towers and ramparts of the besieged. 
 Loop-holes were cut in the sides of them, 
 through which the besiegers battered without 
 intermission the works. These covered lines 
 served besides for filling up the fosses, and 
 had passages of communication with the bat- 
 tering tortoises cut in them, which tortoises 
 were pushed forward upon the part of the fosse 
 filled. When the walls of a place were not 
 high, these trenches were not covered with 
 blinds, either at top or in front, but only with 
 a parapet of the earth dug out of them, like 
 those of the moderns. At some distance from 
 this parallel another was cut behind it, which 
 left a space between them of the nature of our 
 esplanades or places of arms. Here the bat- 
 teries of balistas and catapultas were erected, 
 which differed only from ours in being higher. 
 There was sometimes a third upon the same 
 parallel line. These places of arms contained 
 all the troops that guarded the works. The 
 lines communicated by the galleries or trenches 
 covered at top. 
 
 XVL It is certain therefore the use of 
 trenches was well known to the ancients, with- 
 out which they could have formed no siege. 
 The trenches are often mentioned in authors 
 by the Latin word aggeres, which does not al- 
 ways signify cavaliers or platforms. The ca- 
 valiers were mounts of earth, on which ma- 
 chines were planted, and were thrown up in 
 
78 
 
 THE ROMAN 
 
 the following manner. The work was begun 
 at a small distance from that side of the fosse 
 next the country. It was carried on under the 
 cover of mantles, or moving sheds, of consi- 
 derable height, behind which the soldiers 
 wjorked in security from the machine of the 
 besieged. This sort of mantles or galleries 
 were not always composed of hurdles and fas- 
 cines, but of raw hides, mattresses, or of a cur- 
 tain made of strong cables, the whole suspended 
 between very high masts fixed in the ground, 
 which broke the force of whatever was dis- 
 charged against it. The work was continued 
 to the height of these suspended curtains, 
 which were raised in proportion with it. At 
 the same time the void spaces of the platform 
 were filled up with stones, earth, and other 
 materials ; whilst some were employed in le- 
 velling and beating down the earth, to make it 
 firm, and capable of sustaining the weight of 
 the towers and machines to be planted upon it. 
 From these towers and batteries of balistas and 
 catapultas, a hail of stones, arrows, and large 
 darts were discharged upon the ramparts and 
 works of the besieged. 
 
 XVII. The terrace which Alexander the 
 Great caused to be raised against the rock of 
 CoriaensE was very surprising. That rock, which 
 was supposed impregnable, was two thousand 
 five hundred paces high, and seven or eight 
 hundred round. It was excessively steep on 
 all sides, having only one path hewn out of 
 the rock, by which no more than one man 
 could ascend without difficulty. It was besides 
 surrounded with a deep abyss, which served 
 instead of a fosse, and which it was necessary 
 lo fill up, in order to approach it. All these 
 difiiculties were not capable of discouraging 
 Alexander, to whose valour and fortune no- 
 thing appeared impossible. He began there- 
 fore by ordering the high fir-trees, that sur- 
 rounded the place in great numbers, to be cut 
 down, in order to use them as stairs to descend 
 into the fosse. His troops worked night and 
 day in filling it up. Though the whole army 
 were employed in their turns at this work, 
 hey could do no more than thirty feet a day, 
 i.id something less a night, so difiScult was 
 the work. When it was more advanced, and 
 began to come nearer the due height, they 
 drove piles into both sides of the fosse at pro- 
 per distances from each other, with beams iaid 
 across, in order to support the weight to be 
 laid on it. They then formed a kind of floor 
 
 or bridge of wickv^r and fasci les, which they 
 gpvered with earth to equal the height of the 
 side of the fosse, so that the army could ad- 
 vance on a way even with the rock. Till then 
 the barbarians had derided the undertaking, 
 believing it utterly impracticable : but when 
 they saw themselves exposed to the darts of 
 the enemy, who worked upon their terrace be- 
 hind the mantles, they began to lose courage, 
 demanded to capitulate, and soon after sur- 
 rendered the rock to Alexander. 
 
 XVIII. The fining up of the fosses was 
 not always so difficult as in this instance, but 
 never failed to require great precautions and 
 labour. The soldiers worked under cover in 
 the tortoises, and other the like machines. The 
 fosses were filled up with stones, the trunks 
 of trees, and fascines, the whole mingled with 
 earth. It was necessary that these works 
 should be of great solidity, to bear the prodi- 
 gious weight of the machines planted upon 
 them, which would have made them fall in, 
 if this kind of causeway had been composed 
 only of fascines. If the fosses were full of 
 water, they began by drawing it off, either en- 
 tirely or in part, by different drains which they 
 cut for that purpose, 
 
 XIX. Whilst the works were carrying on, 
 the besieged were not idle. They ran many 
 mines under the fosse to the part of it filled up, 
 in order to carry off" the earth, which they 
 handed from man to man into the city. This 
 hindered the work from advancing, the be- 
 sieged carrying off" as fast as the besiegers laid 
 on. They used also another more effectual 
 stratagem, which was to cut large cavities 
 underneath the works of the enemy, ^fter 
 having removed some of the earth without its 
 being discovered, they supported the rest with 
 props or large beams, which they smeared over 
 with grease and other combustibles. They 
 then filled up the void space between the props 
 with dry wood, and such things as would soon- 
 est burn, and set them on fire. Hence, when 
 the props gave way, the whole fell into a kind 
 of gulf, with the tortoises, battering rams, and 
 the men employed in working them, 
 
 XX. The besiegers used the same artifice 
 to make the walls of places fall down. When 
 Darius besieged Chalcedon, the walls were so 
 strong, and the place so well provided of all 
 necessaries, that the inhabitants were in no 
 pain about the siege. The king did not make 
 any approaches to the walls, nor lay waste tliB 
 
ART OF WAR. 
 
 79 
 
 country ; he lay still, as if he expected a con- 
 siderable reinforcement. But whilst the peo. 
 pie of Chalcedon had no other thought than 
 that of guarding their walls, he opened, at the 
 distance of three quarters of a league from the 
 city, a mine, which the Persians carried on as 
 far as the market-place. They judged them- 
 selves directly under it, from the roots of the 
 olive-trees which they knew grew there. They 
 then opened their mine, and entering by that 
 passage, took the place, whilst the besieged 
 were still employed in keeping guard upon 
 the walls. In the same manner, A. Servilius 
 the dictator took the city Fidenae, having 
 caused several false attacks to be made on dif- 
 ferent sides, whilst a mine carried on as far 
 as the citadel, opened him a passage there for 
 his troops. Another dictator, the celebrated 
 Camillus, could not terminate the long siege 
 of Veil but by this stratagem. He undertook 
 to run a mine as far as the citadel of that place ; 
 and that the work might not be discontinued, 
 nor the troops discouraged by the length of it, 
 he divided them into six brigades, who re- 
 lieved each other every six hours. The work 
 being carried on night and day, it extended at 
 length to the citadel, and the city was taken. 
 At the siege of Athens, by Sylla, it is asto- 
 nishing to consider the mines and countermines 
 used on both sides. The miners were not long 
 before they met and fought furiously under 
 ground. The Romans having cut their way 
 as far as the wall, sapped a great part of it, 
 and supported it in a manner in the air on 
 props of wood, to which they set fire without 
 loss of time. The wall fell suddenly into the 
 fosse with an incredible noise and ruins, and 
 all that were upon it perished. 
 
 XXI. The mines from the camp to the in- 
 side of a place were long used before the in- 
 vention of sapping, and consisted at first in 
 only running the mine from the camp to the 
 wall, and from thence a considerable way into 
 the place, underneath some large temple, or 
 other great building little frequented in the 
 night. When they came thither they cut a 
 large space, which they propped up with large 
 timbers. They then opened a passage of the 
 whole breadth of this space, for entering the 
 place in great numbers, whilst the soldiers ad- 
 vanced into it through the mine, with the ut- 
 most diligence. The other kind of mines for 
 sapping the foundation of a wall, were opened 
 very near the camp to avoid being discovered, 
 
 and were carried under the fosse to the foot of 
 the wall, when they were enlarged to the right 
 and left foundations. This latter part was 
 made very large, to receive the great number 
 of workmen, and long in proportion to the ex- 
 tent of the wall to be thrown down. This 
 being done, they began to sap at bottom, and 
 as the stones were pulled out, and the work 
 advanced, they propped the superstructure 
 with timbers four feet high, which were fixed 
 under the bottom stones of the foundation. 
 As soon as the work was finished, they laid 
 faggots and other combustibles between the 
 props ; and after they had set them on fire 
 they quitted that part of the mine, and repassed 
 the fosse, to avoid being stifled with the smoke ; 
 besides which, there was reason to fear, that 
 the wall in falling would break into the mine, 
 and bury all under in its ruins. 
 
 XXII. The ancients used several methods 
 to defend themselves against the enemy after 
 the breach was made. Sometimes, but not so 
 frequently, they made use of trees cut down, 
 which they extended along the whole front of 
 the breach very near each other, in order that 
 the branches might mingle together ; they tied 
 the trunks very firmly to one another, so that 
 it was impossible to separate these trees, which 
 formed an impenetrable fence, behind which a 
 multitude of soldiers were posted, armed with 
 pikes and long partizans. Sometimes the 
 breaches were made so suddenly, either by 
 saps above, or under ground, or by the violent 
 blows of the rams, that the besieged often 
 found their works laid open when they least 
 thought of it. They had recourse on such 
 occasions to a very simple refuge, in order to 
 gain time to look about them, and to intrench 
 behind the breach. They threw down upon 
 the ruins of the wall a prodigious quantity of 
 dry wood, and other combustible matter, to 
 which they set fire. This occasioned so vio- 
 lent a flame, that it was impossible for the be- 
 siegers to pass through it, or approach the 
 breach. The garrison of Haliartus in Boeotia 
 thought of this remedy against the Romans. 
 
 XXIII. But the most useful method was to 
 erect new walls behind the breaches, which 
 are now called retirades, or retrenchments. 
 These works generally were not parallel with 
 the ruined walls, but described a kind of semi- 
 circle towards the place, of which the two 
 ends joined the two sides of the wall that re- 
 mained whole. They did not omit to cut a 
 
80 
 
 THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. 
 
 very large deep ditch before this ■work, in or- 
 der that the besiegers might be under the ne- 
 cessity of attacking it with no less difBculty, 
 and all the machines employed against the 
 strongest walls. Sylla having beat down great 
 part of the walls of the pirxiim with his bat- 
 tering rams, caused the breach to be imme- 
 diately attacked, where so furious a tattle en- 
 sued, that he was obliged to sound a retreat. 
 The besieged, improving the opportunity this 
 gave them, immediately ran a second wall be- 
 hind the breach. Sylla perceiving it, made his 
 machines advance to batter it, rightly judging, 
 that being newly built, it could not resist their 
 violence. The effect answered with no great 
 difficulty, and he immediately ordered the as- 
 sault to be given. The action was warm and 
 vigorous, but be was at last repulsed with loss, 
 and obliged to abandon his design. History 
 abounds with examples of this kind. 
 
 XXIV. Having thus given some account 
 of the fortifications of the ancients, described 
 the principal machines made use of by them in 
 their sieges, and explained their conduct in 
 the Attack and Defence of Places ; I might 
 here, agreeably to what I have done in the 
 chapter upon Battles, entertain the reader 
 with a description of some of the most cele- 
 
 brated sieges of antiquity, in order to give him 
 the juster idea of this part of war. B ut as this 
 would too much swell the Discourse, and is 
 besides rather curious than useful, because of 
 the great changes that have been introduced 
 by the invention of artillery and gunpowder, 
 I shall content myself with referring to the 
 historians themselves, where these sieges are ^ ; 
 related at large. Thucydides, Polybius, Livy, '; 
 and Josephus furnish abundant examples of 
 this kind. The most curious and remarkable 
 are those of Platsea by the Lacedaemonians 
 and Thebans ; of Syracuse by the Athenians : 
 of Lilybaeum, Syracuse, Carthage, and Nu- 
 
 mantia by the Romans ; but, above all, of Alesja. 
 
 by Julius Cajsar, and of Jerusalem by Titus 
 Vespasian. These two last are so minutely 
 and circumstantially . described ; the one by 
 Caesar, who formed and conducted it; the 
 other by Josephus, who was an eye-witness 
 of all that passed, that whoever peruses them 
 attentively will meet with every thin°; that is 
 worth knowing upon this subject, and be 
 enabled to form a clear and comprehensive 
 judgment of the high degree of perfection to 
 which the ancients, and in particular the Ro- 
 mans, had carried this important branch of 
 the Art of War. 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTAHIES 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 8* 
 
 M 
 
 81 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 I. Description and division of Gaul.— 11. Design by ll^e Helvetians of invading it. — ^III. Preparations. — V. Dif- 
 ficulties. — VII. Marcli. — VIII. CcEsar's resolution to hinder it. — X. He attacks and defeats tliem at the river 
 Arar. — ^Xl. Their embassy to Csesar, and his answer. — SIV. Ccesar reduced to great straits for want of cornj 
 by the perfidy of Dumnorix the .Eduan ; whom nevertheless he pardons. — XVII. Csesar defeats the Helvetians 
 in a second battle. — XXI. They surrender,and are obliged to return to their own country.— XXII. The Gauls 
 congratulate CcESar upon his victory. — XXIII. And complain to him of the irruption of the Germans into Gaul, 
 under Ariovistus. — XXIV. Cffisar's embassy to Ariovistus. — ^XXVII. His answer. — ^XXVIII. Csesar leads his 
 army against Ariovistus. — ^XXX. The consternation that seizes his troops. — ^XXXI. He animates them by a 
 speecli.— XXXiri. Interview between Ccesar and Ariovistus. — ^XXXVII. Brealis off by the approach of the 
 German cavalry. — XXXVIII. Perfidy and cruelty of Ariovistus. — ^XXXIX. Ceesar and Ariovistus prepare for 
 battle. — Manner of fighting in use among the German horse. — XLI. Csesar defeats the Germans with great 
 slaughter, obliges them to pass the Rhine ; and by one battle puts an end to the war. 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 I. The whole country of Gaul is divided into 
 three parts: of p^hich the Belgians inhabit 
 one ; the Aquitains another ; and a people 
 called in their own language Celts, in ours 
 Gauls, the third. These all differ from each 
 other in their language, customs, and laws. 
 The Gauls are divided from the Aquitains by 
 the river Garonne, and by the Marne and the 
 Seine from the Belgians. Of all these na- 
 tions the Belgians are the most warlike; as 
 being farthest removed from the culture and 
 refinements of the province, and but little re- 
 sorted to by merchants, who furnish the means 
 of luxury and voluptuousness. They are also 
 situated next to the Germans, who inhabit be- 
 yond the Rhine', with whom they are conti- 
 nually engaged in war. For this reason like- 
 wise the Helvetians are distinguished by their 
 bravery beyond the rest of the Gauls ; because 
 they are almost constantly at war with the 
 Germans, either for the defence of their own 
 territories, or acting themselves as the ag- 
 gressors. One of these divisions, that which 
 we have said was possessed by the Gauls, 
 begins at the river Rhine, and is bounded by 
 the Garonne, the Ocean, and the territories of 
 the Belgians. It touches also, towards the 
 Helvetians and Sequani, upon the river Rhine, 
 extending itself northward. The country of 
 the Belgians, commencing from the remotest 
 confines of Gaul, stretches as far as the lower 
 Rhine, running all the way between the 
 north and east. Aquitain extends from the 
 Garonne to the Pyrenean mountains, and that 
 part of the ocean which borders upon Spain. 
 Its situation is north-west. 
 
 II. Orgetorix was by far the richest and 
 most illustrious of the Helvetians. This no- 
 bleman, in the consulship of M. Messala and 
 M. Piso, prompted by an aspiring ambition, 
 formed a confederacy of the principal men of 
 the state ; and persuaded the people to quit 
 their country in a body, representing, " That 
 as they surpassed all the nations around them 
 in valour, it would be easy for them to gain 
 the entire sovereignty of Gaul." He the 
 sooner brought them into this design, because 
 the Helvetians, by tlie nature of their situa- 
 tion, are every where confined within very 
 narrow territories : on one side by the Rhine, 
 a broad and deep river, which separates their 
 country from that of the Germans ; on the 
 other by Mount Jura, a high ridge of hills, 
 which runs between them and the Sequani ; 
 lastly, by the Lake Lemanus, and the river 
 Rhone, which is the boundary on the side of 
 the Roman province. By this means it hap- 
 pened, that they could nqt so easily enlarge 
 their territories, or make conquests on the 
 neighbouring states ; which, to men of a war- 
 like spirit, and fond of fighting, was abundant 
 cause of discontent : for being a numerous 
 people, and of great fame for their bravery, 
 they thought themselves much too strained in 
 a country, which was but two hundred and 
 forty miles in length, and about one hundred 
 and eighty in breadth. 
 
 III. Urged by these considerations, and still 
 more by the authority and persuasions of Or- 
 getorix, they resolved to provide every thing 
 necessary for an expedition ; to buy up a 
 great number of wagons and carriage-horses : 
 
 83 
 
84 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 'o.form large magazines of corn, that they 
 might have sufficient to supply them in their 
 march ; to establish peace and amity with the 
 neighbouring states. They imagined two 
 years would be sufficient for these prepara- 
 tions, and obliged themselves by a law to be- 
 gin their march on the third. The whole ma- 
 nagement of this design was committed to 
 Orgetorix, who undertook an embassy to the 
 neighbouring states. On this occasion he 
 persuaded Casticus, the son of Cataman- 
 tales, of the nation of the Sequani, whose 
 father had for many years enjoyed the sove- 
 reignty over that people, and been styled friend 
 and ally by the senate of Rome, to possess 
 himself of the supreme authority in his own 
 country, which his father had held before him. 
 He likewise persuaded Dumnorix the ^duan, 
 the brother of Divitiacus, who was at that time 
 the leading man in his own state, and greatly 
 beloved by the people, to attempt the same 
 among the .■Eduans : and the more to secure 
 him to his interest, gave him his daughter in 
 marriage. He told them, " That they might 
 with the greatest facility accomplish their 
 designs ; as he was himself assured of attain- 
 ing the supreme authority in his own state, 
 which was without dispute the most powerful 
 and considerable of all Gaul ; and would then 
 employ his whole interest and forces, to esta- 
 blish them in their respective sovereignties." 
 Moved by these considerations, they recipro- 
 cally bound themselves by a solemn oath ; 
 not doubting, when they had once attained 
 the chief sway in their several states, with the 
 united forces fi three such powerful and 
 mighty nation/, to render themselves masters 
 of all Gaul. SfThe Helvetians having notice 
 of this design, obliged Orgetorix, according to 
 the custom of their country, to answer to the 
 charge brought against him in chains: and 
 had he been found guilty, the law condemned 
 him to be burnt alive. On the day appointed for 
 his trial, he assembled all his slaves and do- 
 mestics, amounting to ten thousand men ; and 
 all his clients and debtors, of which the num- 
 ber was very great : by their means he rescued 
 himself out of the hands of his judges. While 
 the people, provoked at this contempt of 
 the laws, were preparing to support their 
 authority by force, and the magistrates had 
 assembled a great number of men for that 
 purpose, Orgetorix died; nor are the Hel- 
 
 vetians without suspicion of his havin^Tnadfi 
 away with himself. 
 
 IV. After his death, the Helvetians still 
 continued to prosecute, with the same dili- 
 gence, the design they had formed of quitting 
 their country. When they had completed 
 their preparations, they set fire to all their 
 towns, to the number of twelve; to their 
 boroughs and villages, which amounted to 
 four hundred ; and to their other private 
 buildings. They likewise burnt all their 
 corn, except what they had resolved to carry 
 along with them ; that, having no hope of re- 
 turning to their own country, they might be 
 the more disposed to confront air dangers. 
 Each man had orders to carry out with him 
 provisions for three months. The Rauraci, 
 Tulingians, and Latobrigians, neighbouring 
 nations, being persuaded to follow the same 
 counsel, likewise set fire to thei/ towns and 
 villages, and joined with them in the ex- 
 pedition. The Boians too, who had formerly 
 inhabited beyond the Rhine, and passing over 
 into Noricum, had settled in that country, and 
 possessed themselves of Noreia, its capital 
 city, were associated into the design. 
 
 V. There were only two ways by which 
 they could march out of their own country. 
 One through the territories of the Sequani, 
 between Mount Jura and the Rhone, narrow 
 and difficult, insomuch that, in some places a 
 single file of wagons could hardly pass. The 
 impending mountain was besides very high 
 and steep, so that a handful of men was suf- 
 ficient to stop them. The other lay through 
 our province, far easier and readier ; because 
 the Rhone, which flows between the con- 
 fines of the Helvetians and Allobrogians, a 
 people lately subjected to the Romans, was 
 in some places fordable ; and Geneva, a 
 frontier town of the Allobrogians, adjoining 
 to the territories of the Helvetians, had a 
 bridge belonging to this last people. They 
 therefore doubted not, either of persuading 
 the Allobrogians, who as yet seemed to bear 
 no great affection to the people of Rome, or 
 at least of obliging them by force, to grant 
 them a passage through their territories. Every 
 thing being now ready for the expedition, 
 they appointed a day for their general ren- 
 dezvous on the banks of the Rhone. The 
 day fixed on was the twenty-eighth of March, 
 in tltt IJonsulship of L, Piso and A. Gabinius. 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 93 
 
 what business, either Coesar, or the people of 
 Rome, could have in his division of Gaul, 
 which belonged to him by right of conquest." 
 This answer being reported to Caesar, he 
 again sent an embassy to him to this effect : 
 « Tliat since, notwithstanding the great obli- 
 gations he lay under both to himself and the 
 people of Rome, in having, during his consul- 
 ship, been declared king and ally by the se- 
 nate; he yet manifested so little acknowledg- 
 ment to either, as even to refuse an interview, 
 and decline treating of affairs that regarded 
 the common interest ; these were the parti- 
 culars he required of him : First, not to bring 
 any more Germans over the Rhine into Gaul. 
 Secondly, to restore the hostages be had taken 
 from the ^duans, and permit the Sequani like- 
 wise to do the same. Lastly, to forbear all in- 
 juries towards t*he ^duans, and neither make 
 war upon them nor their allies. That his com- 
 pliance with these conditions would establish 
 a perpetual friendship and amity between him 
 and the people of Rome. But if he refused 
 conditions so just, as the senate had decreed 
 in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, 
 that whoever had the charge of the province 
 of Gaul, should, as far as was consistent with 
 the interests of the commonwealth, defend the 
 ..■Eduans and the other allies of the people of 
 Rome ; he thought himself bound not to over- 
 look their just complaints." 
 
 XXVII. To this Ariovistus replied : " That 
 by the laws of war, the conqueror had a 
 right to impose what terms he pleased upon 
 the conquered : that in consequence of this, 
 the people of Rome did not govern the van- 
 quished by the prescriptions of another, but 
 according to their own pleasure : that if he 
 did not intermeddle with the Roman con- 
 quests, but left them to the free enjoyment of 
 their rights, no more ought they to concern 
 themselves in what regarded him. That the 
 ^duans having tried the fortune of war, had 
 been overcome and rendered tributary, and it 
 would be the highest injustice in Caesar to 
 offer at diminishing his just revenues: that he 
 was resolved not to part with the hostages 
 the JEduans had put into his hands ; but 
 would nevertheless engage, neither to make 
 war upon them nor their allies, provided they 
 observed the treaty he had made with them, 
 and regularly paid the tribute agreed upon ; 
 if otherwise, the title of friends and allies of 
 the people of Rome would be found to stand 
 
 them but in little stead : that as to Caesar's 
 menace of not overlooking the complaints of 
 the iEduans, he would have him to know, no 
 one had ever entered into a war with Ariovistus, 
 but to his own destruction : that he might 
 when he pie- "d bring it to a trial, and would, 
 he doubted riot, soon be made sensible what 
 the invincible Germans, trained up from their 
 infancy in the exercise of arms, and who for 
 fourteen years together had never slept under 
 a roof, were capable of achieving." 
 
 XXVIII. At the same time that Caesar re- 
 ceived this answer, ambassadors also arrived 
 from the ^'Eduans and Treviri. From the 
 JSduans, to complain : " That the Harudes 
 who had lately come over into Gaul, were 
 plundering their territories ; insomuch, that 
 even by their submissions and hostages they 
 were not able to obtain peace of Ariovistus." 
 From the Treviri, to inform him : " That a 
 hundred cantons of the Suevians, headed by 
 two brothers, Nassua and Cimberius, were 
 arrived upon the banks of the Rhine, with de- 
 sign to cross that river." Cassar, deeply af- 
 fected with this intelligence, determined to 
 undertake the war without delay, lest this 
 new band of Suevians, joining the old 
 forces of Ariovistus, should enable him to 
 make a greater resistance. Having therefore 
 with all diligence provided for the subsistence 
 of his army, he advanced towards him by great 
 marches, 
 
 XXIX. The third day he was informed 
 that Ariovistus approached with all his forces 
 to take possession of Vesontia, the capital of 
 the Sequani : and that he had already got 
 three days' march beyond his own territories. 
 Caesar judged it by all means necessary to 
 prevent him in this design, as the town itself 
 was not only full of all sorts of warlike am- 
 munition, but likewise strongly fortified by 
 nature, and commodiously situated for carry- 
 ing on the war. For the river Doux forming 
 a circle round it, as if described with a pair 
 of compasses, leaves only an interval of six 
 hundred feet, which is also inaccessible by 
 reason of a very high and steep mountain, 
 whose roots are washed on each side by the 
 river. This mountain is shut in with a wall, 
 which, forming a citadel, joins it to the town. 
 Hither Caesar marched day and night without 
 intermission; and having possessed himself of 
 the place, put a garrison into it. 
 
 XXX. V\^hile he tarried here a few days^ 
 
94 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 to settle the order of his convoys and supplies, 
 the curiosity of our men, and the talk of the 
 Gauls, (who proclaimed on all occasions the 
 prodigious stature of the Germans, their in- 
 vincible courage, and great skill in arms : in- 
 somuch that in the frequent encounters with 
 thetn they had- found it impossible to with- 
 stand their very looks,) spread such a sudden 
 terror through the whole army, that they were 
 not a little disturbed by the apprehensions it 
 occasioned. This fear first began amongst the 
 military tribunes, the officers of the allies, and 
 others that had voluntarily followed Cajsar 
 from Kome; who being but little acquainted 
 with military afliiirs, lamented the great dan- 
 ger to which they fancied themselves exposed. 
 Some of these, upon various pretences, de- 
 sired leave to return. Others, out of shame, 
 and unwilling to incur the suspicion of cow- 
 ardice, continued in the camp. But these 
 last, incapable of putting on a cheerful coun- 
 tenance, and at times even unable to suppress 
 their tears, skulked in their tents, either be- 
 moaning their fate, or discoursing with their 
 companions upon the common danger. Wills 
 were made all over the camp, and the con- 
 sternation began to seize even those of more 
 experience, the veteran soldiers, the centu- 
 rions, and the officers of the cavalry. Such 
 among them as affected a greater show of re- 
 sohxtion, said it was not the enemy they 
 feared, but the narrow passes and vast forests 
 that lay between them and Ariovistus, and 
 the difficulty tliere would be in furnishing the 
 army with provisions. Some even told Caesar, 
 that when he gave orders for marching, the 
 army, attentive to nothing but their fears, 
 would refuse to obey. 
 
 XXXI. Cffisar observing the general con- 
 sternation, called a council of war ; and having 
 summoned all the centurions of the army to be 
 present, inveighed against them with great 
 severity ; for presuming to inquire, or at all 
 concern themselves, which way, or on what 
 design they were to march. " Ariovistus, ' he 
 told them, " during his consulship, had ear- 
 nestly sought the alliance of the Roman peo- 
 ple. Why, therefore, should any one imagine, 
 he would so rashly and hastily depart from his 
 engagements'? That, on the contrary, he was 
 himself firmly persuaded, that as soon as he 
 came to know his demands, and the equal con- 
 ditions he was about to propose to him, he 
 would be very far from rejecting either his 
 
 friendship, or that of the people of Kome. But 
 if urged on by madness and rage, he was re- 
 solved upon war, what, after all, had they to 
 be afraid of] Or why should they distrust 
 either their own bravery, or his care and con- 
 duct ? That they were to deal with enemies 
 of whom trial had been already made in the 
 memory of their fathers, when, by the victory 
 of C. Marius over the "iteutones and Cimbri, 
 the army itself acquired no less glory than the 
 general who commanded it : that trial "had 
 likewise been lately made of them in Italy in 
 the servile war, when they had also the ad- 
 vantage of being exercised in the Roman dis- 
 cipline ; on which occasion it appeared, how 
 much resolution and constancy were able to 
 effect : since they had vanquished in the end 
 those very enemies, armed and flushed with 
 victory, whom at first they had without cause 
 dreaded even unarmed. | In fine, that they were 
 the very same Germans, with whom the Hel- 
 vetians had so often fought, not only in their 
 own country, but in Germany itself, and for 
 the most part came off* victorious, though they 
 had by no means been a match for our army : 
 that if the defeat and flight of the Gauls gave 
 uneasiness to any, these would readily find, 
 upon inquiry, that Ariovistus confining him- 
 self many months to his camp and fastnesses, 
 and declining a general action, had thereby 
 tired out the Gauls with the length of the war ; 
 who despairing at last of a battle, and begin- 
 ning to disperse, vyere thereupon attacked and 
 routed, rather by conduct and craft, than the 
 superior valour of the Germans. But though a 
 stratagem of this kind might take with rude and 
 uncultivated people, yet could not even the Ger- 
 man himself hope that it would avail against a 
 Roman army : that as to those who sheltered 
 their cowardice under the pretence of narrow 
 passes, and the difficulty of procuring provi- 
 sions, he thought it argued no small presump- 
 tion in them, either to betray such a distrust of 
 their general's conduct, or oflTer to prescribe to 
 him what he ought to do : that these things 
 fell properly under his care : that the Sequani, 
 Leuci, and Lingonfis were to furnish 'him with 
 provisions : that the corn was now ripe in the 
 fields ; and that themselves would soon be 
 judges as to what regarded the ways. That 
 the report of the army's refusing to obey him, 
 gave him not the least disturbance ; because 
 he very well kajew, that no general had ever 
 been so far slig.ited by his soldiers, whose ill 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 95 
 
 L' 
 
 success, avarice, or other crimes, had not justly 
 drawn t!iat misfortune upon him : that in all 
 these respects he fancied himself secure, as 
 the whole course of his life would witness for 
 his integrity, and his good fortune had shown 
 itself in the war against the Helvetians : that 
 he was therefore resolved to execute without 
 delay, what he otherwise intended to have put 
 off a little longer ; and would give orders for 
 decamping the very next night, three hours 
 before day, that he might as soon as possible 
 know, whether honour and a sense of duty, or 
 an ignominious cowardice had the ascendant 
 in his army : nay, that should all the rest of 
 the troops abandon him, he would, neverthe- 
 less, march with the tenth legion alone, of 
 whose fidelity and courage he had no manner 
 of doulit, and which would serve him for his 
 Prsetorian guard." Cjesar had always princi- 
 pally favoured this legion, and placed his chief 
 confidence in it, on account of its valour. 
 
 XXXII. This speech made a wonderful 
 change upon the minds of all, and begot an 
 uncommon alacrity and eagerness for the war. 
 The tenth legion in particular, returned him 
 thanks, by their tribunes, for the favourable opi- 
 nion he had expressed of them, and assured him 
 of their readiness to foUovs^ him. Nor were the 
 other legions less industrious, by their tribunes 
 and principal centurions, to reconcile them- 
 selves to Caesar ; protesting they had never 
 either doubted or feared, nor ever imagined 
 that it belonged to them, but to the general, 
 to direct in matters of war. Having accepted 
 of their submission, and informed himself, by 
 means of Divitiacus, in whom of all the Gauls 
 he most confided, that by taking a circuit of 
 above forty miles, he might avoid the narrow 
 passes, and lead his army through an open 
 country, he set forward three hours after mid- 
 night, as he had said ; and after a march of 
 seven days successively, understood by his 
 scouts, that he was within four and twenty 
 miles of Ariovistus's camp. 
 
 XXXIII. Ariovistus being informed of his 
 arrival, sent ambassadors to acquaint him : 
 « That he was now willing to accept of an in- 
 terview, as they were now come nearer one 
 another, and he believed it might be done with- 
 out danger." Caesar did not decline the pro- 
 posal, imagining he was now disposed to listen 
 to reason, since he offered that of his own ac- 
 cord, which he had before refused at his re- 
 quest : neither was he without hope, that in 
 
 regard of the benefits he had received, both 
 from himself and the people of Rome, he 
 would, upon knowing his demands, desist from 
 his obstinacy. The fifth day after was ap- 
 pointed for the interview. Meantime, as am- 
 bassadors were continually passing and repas- 
 sing, Ariovistus, under pretence that he was 
 afraid of an ambuscade, demanded : "That Cje- 
 sar should bring no infantry with him to the 
 conference : that they should both come at- 
 tended by their cavalry only : that otherwise he 
 could not resolve to give him a meeting." 
 Caesar, unwi^ing to drop the design of the in- 
 terview, but neither caring to trust his safety 
 to the Gauls, thought ths best way was, to dis- 
 mount all the Gallic cavalry, and give their 
 horses to the soldiers of the tenth legion, whO" 
 had the greatest share of his confidence ; that, 
 in case of danger, he might have a guard on 
 which he could rely. This being done ac- 
 cordingly, one of the soldiers of that legion 
 said pleasantly enough : " That Caesar had 
 done even more than he had promised ; that he 
 had only given them hopes of becoming his 
 Prffitorian guard ; and now he had raised them 
 to the rank of horse." 
 
 XXXIV. There was a large plain, and in' 
 the midst of it a rising ground of considerable 
 height, equally distant from both camps. At 
 this place, by appointment, the conference 
 was held. Caesar stationed the legionary 
 soldiers, whom he had brought with him, on 
 the horses of the Gauls, two hundred paces 
 from the mount. Ariovistus did the same 
 with the German cavalry. The conversation 
 was on horseback, each being accompanied by 
 ten friends, or principal officers, for so Ario- 
 vistus had desired., When they were come to 
 the place, Ca3sar beg3n,'T)y'pu tti n g him in mind 
 of the favours he had received both from him- 
 self and the people of Rome: "That he had 
 been styled friend and ally by the senate ; that 
 very considerable presents had been sent him ; 
 that these honours, conferred by the Romans 
 on very few, and only for signal services to the 
 state, had yet been bestowed on him, not on 
 account of any just claim on his side, but 
 merely by the favour of Caesar, and the bounty 
 of the senate." He told him likewise, " of 
 the just and ancient alliance between the Ro- 
 mans and the ^duons; i-f the many honoura- 
 ble decrees of the senate in their favour : that 
 they had always held the first rank and autho- 
 rity in Gaul, even before their alliance with 
 
96 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 Rome : that it was tbe constant maxim of the 
 Roman people, not only to defend their friends 
 and allies in the possession of their just rights, 
 Dut likewise to study the enlargement of their 
 honour, interest, and dignity ; that it could 
 never therefore be supposed they would sub- 
 mit to see them stripped of those privileges 
 ■which had belonged to them before they were 
 received into their friendship." In fine, he 
 concluded with repeating the same demands 
 which he had before made by his ambassadors : 
 " That he would not make war upon the 
 ^duans or their allies ; that he would restore 
 their hostages ; that if he could not oblige 
 any of the Germans to repass the Rhine, at 
 least he would suffer no more of them to come 
 into Gaul." 
 
 XXXV. Ariovistus spoke little to Caesar's 
 demands, but enlarged greatly on his own vir- 
 tues : " That he had crossed the Rhine, not of 
 his own motion, but invited and entreated by 
 the Gauls themselves ; that the great hopes 
 and expectations thej' had given him had been 
 his only inducement to quit his country and 
 relations ; that he had settlements in Gaul as- 
 signed by the Gauls themselves, hostages vo- 
 luntarily sent, and a tribute in consequence of 
 the rights of war, it being the constant prac- 
 tice of conquerors to impose that mark of sub- 
 jection on those they had subdued : that he 
 had not made war upon the Gauls, but the 
 Gauls upon him ; that though all their several 
 states had united against him, and brought up 
 their forces with design to crush him, he had 
 yet found means to vanquish and disperse them 
 in one battle ; that if they were again resolved 
 to try the fortune of war, he was ready and 
 prepared to receive them, but if they rather 
 chose peace, it was unjust in them to refuse 
 a tribute which they had hitherto voluntarily 
 paid ; that the friendship of the people of 
 Rome ought to be an honour and security to 
 him, not a detriment, nor had he courted it in 
 any other view ; but if by their alliance he 
 must submit to lose his trilyutes and his right 
 over the people he had subdued, he was no less 
 willing to give it up, than he had been am- 
 bitious to obtain it : 'that he had indeed 
 brought over a multitude of Germans into 
 Gaul, yet not with any design of disturbing 
 the countrj^, but merely for his own security, 
 as appeared by his not coming but at the re- 
 quest of the natives, and his not attacking them, 
 but defending himself: that his arrival in Gaul 
 
 was prior to that of the Romans, whose army 
 had never till that time passed the boundaries 
 of their own province. What could they 
 mean by coming into a country that belonged 
 to him ■? Or why should they concern them- 
 selves with a part of Gaul that was no less 
 his property, than the province itself was that 
 of the people of Rome 1 If it would not be al- 
 lowable in him to make any attempt upon 
 their possessions, neither could they without 
 injustice, disturb him in the enjoyment of his 
 rights. That as to the pretence of alliance 
 between the Romans and ^duans, he was not 
 a barbarian, nor so wholly a stranger to the 
 affairs of the world as not to know, that neither 
 had the .^duans assisted the Romans in the 
 late war against the Allobrogians, nor re- 
 ceived any assistance from them in their many 
 conflicts with himself and the Sequani. That 
 he ought to be jealous of Csesar's pretended 
 regard to the ^duans, and had but too much 
 reason to suspect that the continuance of the 
 Roman army in Gaul could be with no other 
 design than that of oppressing him. That if 
 he did not therefore depart, and withdraw hi& 
 troops out of those parts, he would no longer 
 look upon him as a friend, but an enemy. 
 That he was well assured, should he even slay 
 him in battle, he should do a pleasure to many 
 of the nobles and great men at Rome, who 
 had explained themselves to him by couriers, 
 and whose favour and friendship he might pro- 
 cure by his death : but that if he would retire, 
 and leave him in the undisturbed possession 
 of Gaul, he would not only amply reward 
 him, but engage, at his own cost and hazard, 
 to put an end to any war Csesar should think 
 fit to undertake." 
 
 XXXA''!. Many reasons were offered by 
 Cffisar, in return to this speech, why he could 
 not depart from his first demands : " That 
 neither his own honour, nor that of the people 
 of Rome, would suffer him to abandon allies, 
 who had deserved so well of the common- 
 wealth ; that it no way appeared to him 
 wherein Ariovistus had a juster claim to the 
 possession of Gaul than the Romans : that 
 the Averni and Ruteni had been subdued by 
 Q. Fabius Maximus, who yet contented with 
 their submission, had neither reduced thei 
 country into a province, nor subjected it to 
 tribute: that jf antiquity of title was to decide 
 the Romans had an undoubted right to the so 
 vereignty of Gaul : if, on the contrary, th 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 97 
 
 iecree of the senate was to take place, Gaul 
 must remain free, and subject only to its own 
 laws." 
 
 XXXVII. Whilst these things passed at 
 the interview, Caesar was informed that Ario- 
 vistus's cavalry were drawing nearer the mount, 
 and had even assaulted the Romans with 
 stones and darts. Csesar immediately broke 
 off the conference, retreated to his own men, 
 and strictly charged them to forbear all acts 
 of hostility towards the enemy. He did not 
 fear the success of an action, with that chosen 
 legion, against the German cavalry ; but he 
 was willing to maintain a conduct perfectly 
 clear, and not give the enemy the least handle 
 to assert, that they had been treacherously 
 drawn into an ambuscade by a pretended con- 
 ference. When it was known in the camp, 
 with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved 
 at the interview ; that he had ordered the 
 Romans to depart out of Gaul ; that his ca- 
 valry had fallen upon Caesar's guard; and 
 that an end had thereby been put to the con- 
 ference, a much greater alacrity and desire of 
 fighting spread themselves through the whole 
 army. 
 
 XXXVIII. Two days after, Ariovistus sent 
 ambassadors to propose a renewal of the ne- 
 gotiation begun; and that he would either 
 again appoint a day for a conference, or de- 
 pute some one to bring the treaty to a conclu- 
 sion. Caesar saw no reason for granting a se- 
 cond interview ; more especially when he con- 
 sidered that the time before, the Germans 
 could not be restrained from falling upon our 
 men. Neither was he inclined to send any of 
 his principal officers ; it seeming too great a 
 venture, to expose them to the perfiJy of these 
 barbarians. He therefore cast his eye upon 
 C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius 
 Caburus, a young man of great merit and po- 
 liteness, whose father had been made free of 
 the city by C. Valerius Flaccus. His singu- 
 lar integrity, and knowledge of the language 
 of the Gauls, which Ariovistus, by reason of 
 long stay in those parts, spoke readily, fitted 
 him in a particular manner for this embassy : 
 and as he was likewise one towards whom it 
 would no way avail the Germans to use any 
 treachery, he thought him less liable to an in- 
 sult of that kind. M. Mettius was joined in 
 commission with him, who was allied to Ario- 
 vistus by the rights of hospitality. Their in- 
 structions were, to hear the Germans' propo- 
 
 sals, and carry back a report of them to Caesar, 
 But no sooner were they arrived in Ariovistus's 
 camp, than in presence of the whole army, call- 
 ing out to know their business, and whether 
 they were come as spies, he commanded them 
 to be put in irons, without suffering them to 
 make any reply. 
 
 XXATX. The same day he came forward 
 with all his forces, and lodged himself under 
 a hill, about six miles from our camp. The 
 day after he went two miles beyond it, to cut 
 off Caesar's communication with the ^duans 
 and Sequani, from whom he received all his 
 provisions. Csesar, for five days continually, 
 drew up his men in order of battle before the 
 camp, that if Ariovistus had a mind, he might 
 not be without an opportunity of coming to 
 an engagement. The Germans kept all that 
 time within their lines ; only we had daily 
 skirmishes with their cavalry, whose manner 
 of fighting was this. They had about six 
 thousand horse, who chose a like number out 
 of the foot, each his man, and all remarka- 
 ble for strength and agiljty. These conti- 
 nually accompanied them in. battle, and served 
 them as a rear-guard, to which, when hard 
 pressed, they might retire; if the action be- 
 came dangerous, they advanced to their 
 relief: if any horseman was considerably 
 wounded, and fell from his horse, they gathered 
 round to defend him : if speed was required, 
 either for a hasty pursuit, or sudden retreat, 
 they were become so nimble and alert by conti- 
 nual exercise, that laying hold of the manes 
 of their horses, they could run as fast as they. 
 
 XL. Caesar finding that Ariovistus declined 
 a battle, thought it necessary to provide for 
 the freedom of his convoys. With this view 
 he marked out a place for a camp, six hundred 
 paces beyond that of the enemy, whither he 
 marched with his whole army drawn up in 
 three lines. The first and second lines had 
 orders to continue under arms, and the third 
 to employ themselves in fortifying the camp. 
 Ariovistus sent sixteen thousand light-armed 
 foot, and all his horse, to alarm our men, and 
 hinder the work. But Caesrir remained firm 
 to his first design, ordering the two lines that 
 continued under arms to > .e[> off the enemy, 
 and the third to go on with the intrenchments. 
 The work being finished, he left two legions 
 there, with part of the auxiliaries, and carried 
 back the other f >'.:r n: iiis former camp. The 
 next day he assembled all. his troops from 
 O 
 
98 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 both camps, drew them up according to cus- 
 tom and offered the enemy battle ; but they 
 still refusing to come to an engagement, he re- 
 tired again about noon. Ariovistus then de- 
 tached part of his forces to attack the lesser 
 camp. A sharp coufiict ensued, that lasted 
 till night. At sun-set Ariovistus thought pro- 
 per to sound a retreat, after many wounds 
 given and received. Csesar inquiring of the 
 prisoners, why Ariovistus so obstinately re- 
 fused an engagement, found, that it was the 
 custom among the Germans, for the women 
 to decide, by lots and divination, when it was 
 proper to hazard a battle ; and that these had 
 declared the army could not be victorious, if 
 they fought before the new moon. 
 
 XLI. The day after, Caesar having left a 
 sufficient guard in his two camps, ranged all 
 the auxiliary troops before the lesser camp, plac- 
 ing them directly in view of the enemy for the 
 greater show, because the number of legionary 
 soldiers was but inconsiderable, compared with 
 that of the Germans. Then advancing at the 
 head of all his forces in three lines, he marched 
 quite up to the enemy's camp. Upon this 
 the Germans, compelled by necessity, appeared 
 before the intrenchments, and having distri- 
 buted their troops by nations, and disposed 
 them at equal distances one from another, the 
 Harudes, Marcomani, Tribocci, Vangiones, 
 Nemetes, Sedusians, and Suevians, encompass- 
 ed the whole army with a line of carriages, to 
 take away all hopes of safety by flight. The 
 women mounted upon these carriages,weeping 
 and tearing their hair, conjured the soldiers, 
 as they advanced to battle, not to suffer them 
 to become slaves to the Romans. Csesar hav- 
 ing appointed a lieutenant and questor to 
 each legion, to serve as witnesses of every 
 man's courage and behaviour, began the battle 
 in person at the head of the right wing, 
 observing the enemy to be weakest on that 
 side. The signal being given, our men char.ged 
 so briskly, and the enemy advanced so swiftly 
 and suddenly to meet them, that the Romans 
 not having time to throw their darts, betook 
 themselves immediately to their swords : but 
 the Germans quickly casting themselves into 
 a phalanx, according to the custom of their 
 country, sustained the shock with great firm- 
 ness. Many of our soldiers leaped upon the 
 phalanx, tore up the bucklers of the enemy with 
 their hands, and wounded those that lay under 
 them. Their left wing was soon routed and 
 put to flight ; but on the right they had the 
 
 advantage, and were like to overpower the Ro- 
 mans by their number. Young Crassus, who 
 commanded the cavalry, and was more at liberty 
 than those immediately engaged in the fight, 
 observing this, made the third line advance 
 to support them. Upon this the battle was re- 
 newed, and the enemy every where put to 
 the rout ; nor did ■ they cease their flight till 
 they had reached the banks of the Rhine, 
 about fifty miles distant from the place of 
 combat. There only a few escaped, some by 
 swimming, others by boats. Of this 1 st num- 
 ber was Ariovistus, who, embarking in a small 
 vessel he found by the edge of the river, got 
 safe to the other side : all the rest were cut to 
 pieces in the pursuit, by our cavalry. Ario- 
 vistus had two wives, one a Suevian, whom 
 he had brought with him from Germany : the 
 other a Norican, sister to King Vocian, whom 
 he had married in Gaul ; both perished in this 
 flight. Of his two daughters, one was killed, 
 the other taken prisoner. C. Valerius Pro- 
 cillus, whom his keepers dragged after them in 
 their flight, bound with a trijile chain, fell in 
 with CfEsar in person as he was pursuing the 
 German cavalry. Nor was the victory itself 
 more grateful to that general, than his good 
 fortune in recovering out of the hands of the 
 enemy, a man the most distinguished for his 
 probity of the whole province of Gaul, his in- 
 timate and familiar friend ; and to find the joy 
 and success of that day no way diminished or 
 clouded by the loss of a person he so highly 
 esteemed. Procillus told him, that lots had 
 been thrice drawn in his own presence, to 
 decide, w^hether he should be burnt alive upon 
 the spot, or reserved for another time, and 
 that the lot, three times favourable, had pre- 
 served his life. Mettius was likewise recovered 
 and brought. 
 
 XLII. This battle being reported beyond 
 the Rhine, the Suevians, who were advanced 
 as far as the banks of that river, thought pro- 
 per to return to their own country ; but re 
 treating in disorder and confusion, they were 
 attacked by the Ubians, a people bordering 
 upon the Rhine, and many of them cut to 
 pieces. Caesar having in one campaign put 
 an end to two very considerable wars, went 
 into winter quarters somewhat sooner than the 
 season of the year required. He distributed 
 his army among the Sequani, left Labienus 
 to command in his absence, and sent out him- 
 self for Cisalpine Gaul, to preside in the as- 
 sembly of the states. 
 
CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 L The confederacy of the Belgians against the people of Rome.— III. The Khemi submit upon the approach of 
 Csesar. — IV. And inform him of the strengtli and desisns of tlie confederates. — VI. Caesar passes the Axona 
 with his army. — VII. Bibrax, a town belonging to the Khemi, assaulted by the Belgians. — VIII. Cjesar relieves 
 it, and obliges the Belgians to retire.— IX. The armies drawn up on both sides, but without coming to an en- 
 gagement. — XL TheBelgians,despairingofsuccess,decampandreturnhome.— XII. OcEsarattacks their rear, 
 and makes great slaughter. — XIII. He then marches against tlie Suessiones, and obliges them to submit. — 
 XIV. — Advancing next into the country of the Bellovaci, he pardons them at the intercession of Divitiacus. — 
 XVI. — The Ambiani surrender, but the Nervians stand on their defence. — XXIIt. They are defeated, however, 
 in a long and bloody engagement, and almost all cut off. — XXIX. Csesar prepares to attack the Atuatici.— 
 SXXI. They submit.— XXXIII.— But falling treacherously upon the Romans during the night.— XXXIV. Are 
 manr of them cut to pieces, and the rest sold for slaves. 
 
 100 
 
CJESAR'S CO 
 
 ENTARIES 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL 
 
 BOOK III 
 
 I. CjESAR, upon his departure for Italy, sent 
 Sergias Galba with the twelfth legion, and 
 part of the cavalry, against the Nantuates, 
 Veragrians and Seduni, whose territories ex- 
 tended from the confines of the Allobrogians, 
 the Lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, all 
 the way to the top of the Alps. His design 
 in this expedition was to open a free passage 
 over those mountains to the Roman merchants, 
 who had hitherto travelled them with great 
 danger, and subject to many grievous exac- 
 tions. Galba, whose orders also were to put 
 the legion into winter quarters in those parts, 
 if he saw it necessary, after some successful 
 encounters, and making himself master of 
 several forts, was addressed by ambassadors 
 from all nations round. Having settled the 
 terms of peace, and received hostages for 
 their fidelitj', he resolved to quarter two co- 
 horts among the Nantuates, and himself, with 
 the other cohorts, to winter in a town of the 
 Veragrians, called Octodurus. This town, 
 which is situated in the midst of a valley, 
 upon a plain of no great extent, is bounded 
 on all sides by very high mountains. As it 
 was divided into two parts by a river, he left 
 one part to the Gauls, and assigned the 
 Other to his legion for their winter-quarters, 
 commanding it to be fortified with a ditch and 
 rampart. 
 
 n. After many days spent here, and that 
 orders had been givea for the bringing in of 
 corn to supply the camp, he was suddenly 
 informed by his spies, that the Gauls had 
 abandoned in the night that part of the city 
 allotted to them, and that the impending 
 11 
 
 mountains were covered with great multi- 
 tudes of the Veragrians and Seduni. Many 
 reasons conspired to induce the Gauls to this 
 sudden resolution of renewing the war, and 
 falling upon our men. First, the small num- 
 ber of the Roman troops, who were therefore 
 despised by the enemy, as not amounting in 
 all to one legion : two entire cohorts having 
 been detached, and even of those that re- 
 mained with Galba, many being gone out in 
 quest of provisions ; and then their persuasion, 
 that by reason of the inequality of the ground, 
 where it would be easy for them to pour upon 
 us from the top of the mountains, and over- 
 whelm us with their darts, our men would not 
 be able to stand the very first assault. Add 
 to all this, their inward regret at seeing 
 their children torn from them under the nam? 
 of hostages, and that they firmly believed it 
 to be the design of the Romans, in seizing 
 the summits of the mountains, not only to 
 open a free passage over the Alps, but to se- 
 cure to themselves the perpetual possession of 
 those parts, and annex them to the adjoining^ 
 province. 
 
 HI. Upon this intelligence, Galba, who 
 had neither completed the fortifications of his 
 camp, nor laid in sufficient stores of corn and 
 other prov "sions, as little apprehending an in- 
 surrection <f this kind, among a people that 
 had submi ted and given hostages, having 
 speedily assembled a council of war, began 
 to ask their advice in the present exigence. 
 As the danger which threatened them was 
 sudden and unexpected,j^nd as they saw the 
 mountains on e\ery side covered with niutti 
 Q 113 
 
Ill 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 ludes of armed soldiers, insomuch that there i 
 was no room to hope, either for succours, or 
 any convoys of provision, because the enemy 
 were in possession of all the avenues to the 
 camp ; some believing the case to be altoge- 
 ther desperate, proposed to abandon the bag- 
 gage, and attempt by a sally the recovery of 
 their old quarters. But the greater number 
 were for reserving this expedient to the last 
 extremity, and in the meantime to wait the de- 
 cision of fortune, and in the best manner they 
 were able, defend the camp. 
 
 IV. After a short space, and even before 
 there was sufficient time for the putting in exe- 
 cution what had been resolved on, the enemy, 
 at a signal given, came rushing upon us from 
 all parts, and began the assault by a shower 
 of stones and darts. Our men at first made a 
 brave and vigorous resistance, plying them 
 with their javelins from the ramparts, whence 
 not a single weapon was discharged in vain ; 
 and as any part of the camp appeared hard 
 pressed for want of men to defend it, thither 
 they ran, and made head against the assailants. 
 But in this the Gauls had greatly the advan- 
 tage, that when fatigued with the length of 
 the fight, they found themselves under a ne- 
 cessity to retire, fresh men succeeded in their 
 place, whereas on our side, by reason of the 
 small number of troops, no resource of this 
 kind was left ; so that not only such as were 
 wearied with fighting were yet obliged to con- 
 tinue in their posts, but we could not even per- 
 mit the wounded to retire, or for a moment to 
 abandon the charge. 
 
 V. The battle had now lasted upwards of 
 six hours without intermission, insomuch, that 
 the Romans not only found their strength 
 greatly exhausted, but even began to be in 
 want of weapons, wherewith to annoy the 
 enemy. The Gauls, on the other hand, urged 
 the combat with greater fury than ever, and 
 meeting with but a faint resistance, fell to de- 
 molishing the rampart and filling up the ditch. 
 All was giving way before them, when P. 
 Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, 
 the same, who, as we have related above, re- 
 ceived so many wounds in the battle against 
 the Nervians; as likewise C. Voluse-nus, a 
 military tribune, one equally distinguished for 
 bis conduct and bravery, came to Galba, and 
 represented : That the only refuge now left, 
 was by a sudden sally, to put all upon the 
 issue of a bold attack. Accordingly^ Galba, 
 
 calling the centurions together, by them gave 
 immediate notice to the soldiers to keep for 
 some time only on the defensive, and having 
 provided themselves with the weapons thrown 
 at them by the enemy, and a little recovered 
 their strength, upon a signal given, to sally 
 out of the camp, and place all their hopes of 
 safety in their valour. These orders were ex- 
 actly followed : and the Romans rushing fu- 
 riously upon the enemy from all parts, neither 
 gave them time to comprehend the meaning 
 of so unexpected an attack, nor to recover out 
 of the confusion into which it had thrown 
 them. Thus fortune changing sides, they every 
 where surrounded and put to the sword the 
 Gauls, who had so lately entertained hopes 
 of mastering our camp. Of thirty thousand 
 armed troops, which number, as it appeared 
 afterwards, were present in this assault, more 
 than ten thousand perished in the field. The 
 rest fled in great terror and confusion, and 
 were even forced to abandon the summits 
 of the mountains. The Romans seeing the 
 enemy entirely disperse'd, and obliged every 
 where to throw down their arms, quitted 
 the pursuit, and retired within their intrench- 
 ments. 
 
 YI. After this battle, Galba, unwilling a 
 second time to expose himself to the incon- 
 stancy of fortune, and besides, considering that 
 he had met with an opposition he little expected, 
 when he first resolved to winter in these parts ; 
 above all, finding himself in great want of corn 
 and forage, the next day set fire to the town, 
 and began his march back into the province. 
 As there was no enemy in the field to disturb 
 or oppose him in his retreat, he brought the 
 legion safe into the country of the Nantuates, 
 and thence into the territories of the Allobro- 
 gians, where he put them into winter quarters. 
 
 YII. The insurrection being thus entirely- 
 quelled, Csesar, for many reasons, believed 
 that Gaul was now restored to a state of tran- 
 quillity. The Belgians had been overcome, 
 the Germans quelled, and the Seduni, and 
 other inhabitints of the Alps, forced to submit. 
 He therefore, in the beginning of winter, ven- 
 tured upon a progress into Illyricum, from a 
 desire he had to visit those nations, and ac- 
 quaint himself with the country, when all on 
 a sudden a new war broke out in Gaul. The 
 occasion of it was as follows : the seventh le- 
 gion, commanded by young Crassus, was quar> 
 tered among the Andes, a people bordering 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 115 
 
 upon the ocean. As there was great scarcity 
 of corn in these parts, Crassus sent some of- 
 ficers of the cavalry and miUtary tribunes to 
 solicit a supply from the neighbouring states. 
 Of this number were T. Terrasidius, sent to 
 the Eusubians, M. Trebius Gallus, to the Cu- 
 riosolitae, and Q. Velanius, and T. Silius, to 
 the Venetians. 
 
 VIII. This last state is by far the most 
 powerful and considerable of all the nations 
 inhabiting along the sea coast ; and that not 
 only on account of their vast shipping, where- 
 with they drive a mighty traffic to Britain, 
 and their skill and experience in naval affairs, 
 in which they greatly surpass the other mari- 
 time states ; but because lying upon a large 
 and open coast, against which the sea rages 
 with great violence, and where the havens, 
 «eing few in number, are all subject to their 
 jurisdiction ; they have most of the nations 
 that trade in those seas tributaries to their state, 
 A.mong them the revolt began, by detaining 
 Silius and Velanius, as by this means they 
 hoped to recover' the hostages they had put 
 into the hands of Crassus. The neighbouring 
 states, moved by their authority and example, 
 as the Gauls are in general very sudden and 
 forward in their resolves, detained for the same 
 reason Trebius and Terrasidius, and speedily 
 despatching ambassadors from one to another, 
 Ihey, by their princes, entered into a confede- 
 racy of acting in all things with common con- 
 sent, and alike exposing themselves to the 
 ame issue of fortune, earnestly soliciting at the 
 same time the other provinces, rather to stand 
 op in defence of that liberty they had received 
 of their ancestors, than tamely submit to the 
 ignominious yoke of the Romans. \AI1 the 
 nations upon the sea coast coming readily into 
 this alliance, they jointly sent ambassadors to 
 Crassus, to acquaint him : " That if he ex- 
 pected to have his officers restored, he must 
 first send them back their hostages." 
 
 IX. Caesar having intelligence of these 
 things from Crassus, and being then at a great 
 distance from Gaul, ordered in the meantime, 
 that a number of galleys should be built upon 
 the Loire, a river which runs into the ocean ; 
 and that mariners, rowers, and pilots should 
 be drawn together from the province. These 
 orders being executed with great despatch, he 
 himself, as soon as the season of the year per- 
 mitted, came to the army. The Venetians, and 
 ither states in alliance with them, having no- 
 
 tice of his arrival, and reflecting at the same 
 time upon the greatness of their crime, in de- 
 taining and loading with irons ambassadors, a 
 name ever looked upon amongst all nations 
 as sacred and inviolable, began to make pre- 
 parations proportioned to the danger that 
 threatened them, more especially to provide 
 themselves with all kinds of warlike stores, 
 and that with so much the greater alacrity and 
 confidence, as the nature and situation of the 
 country gave them good hopes of being able to 
 defend themselves./ They knew that the 
 passes by land werl every where cut asunder, 
 by the many friths' and arms of the ocean that 
 run up in those parts ; and that the approach 
 by sea was not less difficult, on account of the 
 small number of harbours and the little know- " 
 ledge the Romans had of the coast. Neither 
 did they imagine it possible for our army to 
 continue long in that country, by reason of 
 the great scarcity of corn ; and should even 
 all these expectations deceive them, they had 
 still a mighty confidence in the strength and 
 number of their shipping. The Romans, they 
 were sensible, had but a very inconsiderable 
 fleet ; and were besides perfect strangers to 
 the ports, islands, and shallows of the coast, 
 where the chief weight of the war was like to 
 fall. At the time they foresaw that our pilots, 
 accustomed only to the navigation of the 
 Mediterranean, a sea bounded and shut in on 
 all sides by the continent, must needs find 
 themselves greatly at a loss, when they came 
 to enter the vast and open spaces of the wide 
 Atlantic ocean. In consequence of these re- 
 flections, and the resolutions formed upoa 
 them, they sat about fortifying their towns,, 
 and_ conveying all their corn into places of 
 strength, ordering as many ships as could be 
 got together to rendezvous in the Venetian 
 ports; it appearing, that Caesar intended to- 
 begin the war by attacking that state. They 
 likewise brought over to their alliance the 
 Osismians, Lexovians, Nannetes, Ambiani^ 
 Merini, Diablintes, and Menapians, and des- 
 patched ambassadors into Britain, which lies 
 over against their coast, to solicit assistance 
 from thence. 
 
 X. All these difficulties before mentioned 
 attended the prosecution of this war : but Cae- 
 sar was urged by many considerations to- un- 
 dertake and carry it on with vigour : the in- 
 sult offered to the commonwealth in detaining 
 the Roman kiiights ; a revolt and insurrcctiop 
 
116 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 after submission, and hostages given ; the con- 
 federacy of so many slates : above all his fear, 
 lest by neglecting to oppose these first com- 
 motions, he should give encouragement to the 
 other provinces of Gaul to follow the exampl 
 Keflecting, therefore, upon the genius an 
 temper of the Gauls, fond of revolutions, and 
 ever forward and ready to engage in new 
 wars, and considering at the same time, that 
 it was the natural bent and disposition of man- 
 kind to aspire after liberty, and abhor the 
 yoke of servitude, he determined, before the in- 
 fection should spread wider, to divide his army, 
 and distribute it into the several provinces of 
 Gaul. 
 
 XI. Pursuant to this design, T. Labienus, 
 his lieutenant, was sent with the cavalry to 
 Treves, whose territory extends along the 
 banks of the Rhine. To him he gave it in 
 charge, to take a progress to Rheims, and the 
 other Belgian states, in order to retain them 
 in obedience, as likewise to oppose the Ger- 
 mans, should they attempt by force the pas- 
 sage of the river ; a report then prevailing, that 
 they had been invited over by the Belgians. 
 P. Crassus, with twelve legionary cohorts, 
 and a great body of horse, had orders to march 
 into Aquitain, to prevent the arrival of any 
 supplies from that quarter, and the junction 
 of the forces of so many powerful nations. 
 Q. Titurius Sabinus, at the head of three le- 
 gions, entered the country of the Unellians, 
 Curiosolitte, and Lexovians, to find emplo}'- 
 ment for the troops that had been drawn to- 
 gether in those parts. To young Brutus he 
 gave the command of the fleet, and of all the 
 vessels from Gaul, which he had ordered to be 
 fitted out by the Santones, Pictones and other 
 provinces that continued in obedience, strongly 
 recommending to him at the same time, to use 
 .the greatest despatch, and sail with all expe- 
 dition for the Venetian coast. He himself, at 
 >the head of the land army, set out upon his 
 march thither. 
 
 XII. The situation of most of the towns in 
 those parts is such, that standing upon the 
 edges of promontories, or upon points of land 
 that run out into the sea, there is no ap- 
 proaching them Vi'ith an army at high water, 
 which happens always twice in twelve hours. 
 Neither is it possible for a fleet to draw near ; 
 because, upon the recess of the tide, the ships 
 Would be in danger of being dashed against 
 the shallows and banks of sand. Both these 
 
 reasons therefore concurred to secure their 
 towns from assault ; and if at any time, by 
 the greatness of the works carried on against 
 them, and huge artificial mounts, that served 
 to prevent the ingress of the sea, and were 
 raised to a height nearly equalling their walls, 
 they saw themselves reduced to an extremity, 
 then, by bringing up their ships, of which 
 thej' had always a great number in readiness, 
 they easily found means to carry off their ef- 
 fects, and withdraw into the nearest towns, 
 where they again defended themselves by the 
 same advantages of situation as before, i In 
 this manner did they elude all Caesar's at- 
 tempts during a great part of the summer, and 
 that with so much the more success, because 
 our fleet was kept back by tempests, and 
 found the navigation extremely dangerous 
 in that vast and boundless ocean, where the 
 tides are great, and the havens both few in 
 number, and at a considerable distance one 
 from another. 
 
 XIII. For the Venetian ships were built 
 and fitted out in this manner : Their bottoms 
 were somewhat flatter than ours, the better 
 to adapt themselves to the shallows, and sus- 
 tain without danger the regress of the tides. 
 'J'heir prows were very high and erect, as 
 likewise their sterns, to bear the hugeness of 
 the billows, and the violence of tempests. 
 The body of the vessel was entirely of oak, to 
 stand the shocks and assaults of that tempes- 
 tuous ocean. The benches of the rowers were 
 made of strong beams of about a foot in breadth, 
 and fastened with iron nails an inch thick. 
 Instead of cables, they secured their anchors 
 with chains of iron 5 and made use of skins, 
 and a sort of pliant leather, by way of sails, 
 either because they wanted canvass, and were 
 ignorant of the art of making sail-cloth, or 
 which is more probable, because they imagined 
 that canvass sails were not so proper to bear 
 the violence of tempests, the rage and fury 
 of the winds, and to govern ships of that 
 bulk and burthen. Between our fleet, and 
 vessels of such a make, the nature of the en- 
 counter was this ; that in agility, and a ready 
 command of oars, we had indeed the advan- 
 tage, but in other respects, regarding the 
 situation of the coast, and the assaults of 
 storms, all things ran very much in their 
 favour; for neither could our ships inju:e 
 them with eur beaks, so great was their 
 strength and firmness; nor could we easily 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 117 
 
 throw in our darts, because of their height 
 above us ; which also was the reason, that 
 we found it extremely difficult to grapple the 
 enemy, and bring them to close fight. Add 
 to all this, that v/hen the sea began to rage, 
 and they were forced to submit to the plea- 
 sure of the winds, they could both weather 
 the storm better, and more securely trust them- 
 selves among the shallows, as fearing nothing 
 from the rocks and cliffs upon the recess of 
 the tide. The Romans, on the other hand, 
 had reason to be under a continual dread of 
 these and such like accidents. 
 
 XIV. Cffisar having taken many of their 
 towns, and finding that he only fatigued his 
 army to no purpose, because he could neither 
 prevent the retreat of the enemy, nor force 
 their garrisons to a surrender, resolved to wait 
 the arrival of his fleet ; which being accord- 
 ingly come up, was no sooner descried by the 
 Venetians, than about two hundred and twenty 
 of their best ships, well equipped for service, 
 and furnished with all kind of weapons, stood 
 out to sea, and drew up in order of battle, 
 against us. Neither Brutus, who commanded 
 the fleet, nor the centurions and military tri- 
 bunes who had the charge of particular ves- 
 sels, knew what course to take, or in what 
 manner to conduct the fight ; for they were 
 no strangers to the strength and firmness of 
 the Venetian shipping, which rendered them 
 proof against our beaks ; and when they had 
 even raised turrets upon the decks, yet being 
 still overtopped by the lofty sterns of the 
 enemy, the Romans could not with any ad- 
 vantage throw in their darts ; whereas those 
 sent by the Gauls, coming from above, de- 
 scended with great violence on our men. In 
 \ this exigence, a particular kind of instrument, 
 ^■'used by the mariners, proved of signal service, 
 in giving a favourable issue to the combat. 
 They had provided themselves with long poles, 
 armed at one end' with long scythes, not unlike 
 those made use of in attacking the walls of 
 towns. With these they laid hold of the ene- 
 my's tackle, and drawing off the galley bj^ the 
 extreme force of oars, cut asunder the ropes 
 ^hat fastened the sail-yards to the mast. These 
 giving way, the sail-yards necessarily came 
 down; insomuch, that as all the hopes and 
 expectations of the Gauls depended entirely 
 on their sails and rigging, by depriving them 
 of this resource we at the same time rendered 
 their vessels wholly unserviceable. The rest 
 11* 
 
 depended altogether upon the valour of the 
 troops, in which the Rom.ins had greatly the 
 advantage; and the rather, because they 
 fought within view of Caesar and the whole 
 army, so that not a single act of bravery could 
 pass unobserved ; for all the adjoining hills 
 and eminences which afforded a near prospect 
 of the sea, were covered with our men. 
 
 XV. The enemy's sail yards being, as we 
 have said, cut down, and' many of their ships 
 singly surrounded by two or three of ours at 
 a time, the Romans used their utmost endea- 
 vours to board them ; which the Venetians 
 observing, and that we had already made our- 
 selves masters of a great part of their fleet, as 
 they could fall upon no expedient to prevent 
 so great a misfortune, they began to think of 
 providing for their safety by flight. Accordingly 
 they tacked about, in order to have the ad- 
 vantage of the wind, when all of a sudden so 
 dead a calm ensued, that not a vessel could 
 stir out of its place : nor could any thing 
 have fallen out more opportunely towards put- 
 ting at once a final period to the war ; for the 
 Romans attacking their ships one after ano- 
 ther, took them with ease, insomuch, that of 
 all that vast number that came out against us, 
 but a very few, under favour of the night, es- 
 caped to land, after a conflict that continued 
 from nine in the morning till sun-set. 
 
 XVI. This battle put an end to the war with 
 the Venetians, and all the nations upon the 
 sea coast. For as the entire body of tjieir 
 youth, and all those also of more advanced 
 age, who were capable of serving their coun- 
 try by their credit and counsels, were present 
 in the action, and as they had hkewise drawn 
 together their whole naval strength ; such as 
 survived this defeat, having neither any place 
 of refuge whereunto to retire, nor means left 
 of defending their towns, surrendered them- 
 selves and their all to Cassar's mercy. But 
 he thought it necessary to proceed against 
 them with the greater severity, that he might 
 impress upon the mind of the Gauls for the fu- 
 ture, a more inviolable regard to the sacred 
 character of ambassadors. Having therefore 
 caused all their senators to be put to death, he 
 ordered the rest to be sold for slaves. 
 
 XVII. During these transactions against 
 the Venetians, Q. Titurius Sabinus entered 
 the territories of the Unellians, at the head of 
 the troops put under his command by Cffisar. 
 Viridovix was invested with the supreme au« 
 
118 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 thority in these parts, and had been appointed 
 general in chief by all the states concerned in 
 the revolt : out of which he had drawn toge- 
 ther a very numerous and powerful army. 
 Nay, but a very few days before, the Aulerci, 
 Eburovices, and Lexovians, having massacred 
 their senate, because they refused to engage 
 in the war, had shut their gates against the 
 Romans, and joined themselves to Viridovix. 
 Besides all this, he had very much strength- 
 ened his army by the great numbers that 
 flocked to him from all parts of Gaul ; men of 
 desperate fortunes, or accustomed to live by 
 robbery, whom the hopes of plunder, and love 
 of war had drawn off from the daily labours 
 of their calling and the cares of agriculture. 
 XVIII. Sabinus kept close within his camp, 
 which was situated in a manner every way 
 advantageous, while Viridovix, who had posted 
 himself at the distance of about two miles, 
 daily drew out his men, and offered him bat- 
 tle. This behaviour of the Roman general 
 not only drew upon him the contempt of the 
 enemy, but occasioned also some murmuring 
 among his own troops, and filled the Gauls 
 with so high a conceit of his fear, that they 
 even adventured to come up to his very trench- 
 es. The reason of his acting in this manner 
 was, that he thought it not justifiable in a lieu- 
 tenant, in the absence of the commander in 
 chief, to hazard a battle with so superior an 
 army, unless upon terms of Rvident advantage. 
 XIX. Having confirmed them in this be- 
 lief, that his reserve was the effect of fear, he 
 made choice of a certain Gaul from among 
 the auxiliaries, a man of address, and every 
 way qualified for carrying on his design. Him 
 he persuaded, by great rewards, and still greater 
 promises, to go over to the enemy, instructing 
 him at the same time in the part he was to 
 act. This Gaul, coming to their camp as a 
 deserter, laid before them the fear of the Ro- 
 mans, and the extremities to which Cassar 
 was reduced in the war against the Vene- 
 tians ; nor did he fail to insinuate, that there 
 was great reason to believe Sabinus intended 
 the next night privately to dravv off his army, 
 and march to Caesar's assistance^ No sooner 
 was this heard by the Gauls, than they all 
 cried out with one voice, that they ought not to 
 lose so fair an occasion of success, but to go 
 and attack the Roman camp. Many reasons 
 concurred to fix them in this resolution. The 
 reserve of Sabinus for some days past ; the in- 
 
 telligence from the deserter, confirming ceir 
 belief of his fear ; the want of provisions, of 
 which they had taken no great care to lay ia 
 a sufficient stock ; the hopes conceived from 
 the Venetian war ; and, in fine, that readiness 
 with which men are apt to believe what falls 
 in with their expectations and wishes. Urged 
 by these considerations, they would not suffer 
 Viridovix and the rest of the general officers 
 to dismiss the council before they had obtained- 
 their consent for the taking up of arms, and 
 falling upon the Roman camp. The proposal 
 being at last agreed to, they provided them- 
 selves with fascines and hurdles, to fill up the 
 ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a 
 certain victory, 
 
 XX. The Roman camp stood upon an emi- 
 nence, which rose with a gentle ascent, for 
 the space of about a mile. Hither the Gauls 
 advanced with so much haste, in order to come 
 upon our troops unprepared, that by that time 
 thev were arrived, they had run themselves 
 quite out of breath. Sabinus having encour- 
 aged his men, whom he saw eager to engage, 
 gave the word of onset. As the enemy were 
 very much encumbered with the loads of fas- 
 cines they had brought to fill up the ditch, he 
 ordered a sudden sally from the two several 
 gates of the camp, and so well did it succeed, 
 by reason of the advantage of the ground, the 
 inexperience and weariness of the Gauls, the 
 bravery of the Roman troops, and their ability 
 acquired in former battles, that the enemy 
 could not sustain the very first charge of our 
 men, but immediately betook themselves to 
 flight. The Romans, who were fresh and vi- 
 gorous, pursuing them under all these disad- 
 vantages, put great numbers to the sword, and 
 the rest being followed by the cavalry, very 
 few escaped the slaughter. Thus at one and 
 the same time, Sabinus had an account of the 
 defeat of the Venetians by sea, and Caesar of 
 the victory obtained by Sabinus at land. All 
 the several states in Ihose parts readily sub- 
 mitted to Titurius : for as the Gauls are very 
 prompt and forward to undertake a war, so 
 are they^ of a disposition that easily relents, 
 and gives way to the strokes of adversity. 
 
 XXI. Much about the same time P. Cras- ' 
 sus arrived in Aquilain, a country, which as 
 we have before observed, for extent of terri- 
 tor}', and number of inhabitants, is deservedly 
 counted a third part of Gaul. This general 
 understanding that he was to conduct a war 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 119 
 
 in those parts, where but a few years before 
 L, Valerius PrEeconinus had beeii slain, and 
 his army put to the rout, and whence L. 
 Manilius, the preconsul, had been driven with 
 the loss of his baggage, soon became sensible 
 that he must act with more than ordinary cir- 
 cumspection and vigour. Having therefore 
 made provision of corn, assembled his aux- 
 iliary troops and cavalry, and strengthened his 
 army with a choice body of volunteers, drawn 
 together by name from Toulouse, Carcaso, and 
 Narbonne, which states make up tha-t part of 
 the Roman province that lies the nearest to 
 Aquitain, he advanced with all his forces into 
 the territories of the Sotiates. These, upon 
 the first notice of his arrival, having levied a 
 great army, and attacking him in his march 
 with the whole body of. their cavalry, in which 
 their chief strength consisted, were neverthe- 
 less repulsed and pursued by our men. But all 
 on a sudden their infantry appearing in a val- 
 ley, where they had been designedly placed in 
 ambush, fell furiously upon the Romans, disor- 
 dered with the pursuit, and renewed the fight. 
 
 XXII. The battle was long and obstinate. 
 For the Sotiates, proud of their former victo- 
 ries, imagined that the fate of all Aquitain 
 depended singly on their bravery. The Ro- 
 mans, on the other hand, were ambitious of 
 showing what they could achieve under a 
 young leader, in the absence of their general, 
 and unsupported by the rest of the legions. 
 At length, however, the enemy, overpowered 
 with wounds, betook themselves to flight, and 
 a great slaughter ensuing, Crassus marched 
 immediately and invested their capital, where 
 meeting with a brave resistance, he was forced 
 to make his approaches by towers and man- 
 telets. The enemy sometimes sallying out, 
 sometimes carrying on their mines to our very 
 works, (in which kind of service the Aquitains 
 are particularly skilful, as inhabiting a country 
 that abounds in veins of copper,) when they 
 saw that the diligence of the Romans enabled 
 them to surmount all these difficulties, sent 
 ambassadors to Crassus, and requested .they 
 might be admitted to a surrender : which be- 
 ing accordingly agreed to, they, in obedience 
 to his desire, delivered up their arms. 
 
 XXIII. But while the Romans were wholly 
 intent upon the execution of the treaty, Adia- 
 tomus, who commanded in chief, endeavoured 
 to escape on the other side of the town, with 
 a body of six hundred sworn friends, who, 
 
 in the language of the country, are called Sol- 
 durians. Their condition and manner of life 
 is this: To live in a perfect community of 
 goods with those to whom they have engaged 
 themselves in friendship ; if any misfortune 
 befalls them, to share in it, or make away with 
 themselves ; nor is there a single instance of 
 any one upon record, who, upon the death of 
 him to whom he had vowed a friendship, re- 
 fused to submit to the same fate. Adiatomus, 
 as we have said, endeavouring to make his 
 escape with his body of friends, and the alarm 
 being given on that side of the works, the 
 soldiers immediately ran to arms, when a furi- 
 ous combat ensued, in which he was at last 
 repulsed, and driven back into the town. He 
 obtained, however, from Crassus, the same 
 conditions of surrender as had been granted to 
 the rest of the inhabitants. 
 
 XXIV. Crassus having received their arms 
 and hostages, led his troops into the territories 
 of the Vocatians and Tarusatians. But now, 
 the Gauls, roused by the unexpected progress 
 of the Romans, who had in a few days after 
 their arrival made themselves masters of a 
 town strongly fortified both by art and nature, 
 began to send ambassadors into all parts, to 
 join in a mutual league, to ratify their engage- 
 ments by an exchange of hostages, and to levy 
 troops. Ambassadors were likewise despatched 
 to all the states of hither Spain that bordered 
 upon Aquitain, to solicit a supply of troops 
 and leaders : upon whose arrival, they imme- 
 diately took the field with great confidence, 
 and a numerous and well appointed army. 
 None were suffered to command but such as 
 had served under Sertorius. and were there- 
 fore accounted men of consummate ability 
 and experience in the art of war. These, ac- 
 cording to the custom of the Romans, made it 
 their study to choose a cemp to advantage, to 
 secure themselves by lines and intrenchments, 
 and to intercept our convoys. Crassus, per- 
 ceiving their design, as his own army was not 
 strong enough to admit of sending out detach- 
 ments, and as the Gauls could upon all occa- 
 sions employ numerous parties, possess them- 
 selves of the passes, and at the same time have 
 a sufficient number of troops to guard the 
 camp, by which means he foresaw he must 
 soon be reduced to great straits for want of 
 provisions, while the enemy would be every 
 day growing more powerful, he, for all these 
 reasons, resolved not to delay coming to aa 
 
120 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 engagement. Having laid his design before 
 a council of war, and finding them unanimous 
 in their approbation of it, he appointed the 
 next day for the engagement. 
 
 XXV. Early in the morning he drew all 
 his forces out of the camp, and disposing them 
 in two lines, with the auxiliary troops in the 
 centre, stood expecting what resolution the 
 enemy would take. But the Gauls, though 
 they believed they might safely hazard a battle, 
 on account of their numbers, their former re- 
 nown in war, and the handful of men they 
 were to oppose; yet thought it would be still 
 better, by seizing the passes, and intercepting 
 our convoys, to secure the victory without ex- 
 pense of blood : and should the want of pro- 
 visions at length force the Romans to think 
 of a retreat, they might then fall upon them, 
 embarrassed in their march, encumbered with 
 their baggage, and dejected by their misfor- 
 tunes. This resolution being approved by 
 all their leaders, they kept within their camp, 
 though our men appeared before them in or- 
 der of battle. 
 
 XXVI. Crassus, perceiving their design, 
 and that this delay served rather to abate the 
 courage of the enemy, and add fresh spirits 
 to his own men, among whom a universal 
 cry arose, that he ought no longer to put off 
 the engagement, but march directly to their 
 camp ; having encouraged his troops, he re- 
 solved to give way to their present ardour, 
 and accordingly led them to the assault. 
 There some were employed in filling up the 
 ditch, others in driving the enemy with their 
 darts from the works ; while the auxiliaries, 
 in whom Crassus had no great confidence, 
 yet that they might appear to have some share 
 at least in the engagement, were appointed to 
 carry stones and darts to them that fought, 
 and to supply materials for raising the mount. 
 At the same time the enemy fought with 
 great constancy and resolution, and made no 
 small havoc with their darts, which came 
 upon us from above. During this warmth 
 of opposition, the cavalry, having taken a 
 compass round the camp, came and told Cras- 
 sus that the intrenchments were not fortified 
 with the same care in all parts, and that it 
 would be easy to force an entrance by the 
 postern gate. 
 
 XXVII. Crassus, having axhorted the of- 
 ficers of the cavalrj' to encourage their men 
 by great rewards and promises, insti ,';ted 
 
 them in the part they were to act. They, in 
 consequence of the orders they had received, 
 drawing out four cohorts, which, having been 
 left to guard the camp, were quite fresh and 
 fit for action, and fetching with them a large 
 compass, that they might not be seen from 
 the enemy's camp ; while the eyes and minds 
 of all were intent upon the combat, fell 
 suddenly upon that part of the intrenchments 
 of which we have spoken above ; and having 
 forced their way through, were actually got 
 within the camp before they were so much 
 as seen by the enemy, or any apprehension 
 e7itertained of what they were about. Upon 
 this, a great uproar being heard on that side, 
 our men redoubled their efforts, and, as always 
 happens to troops aniiyated with the hopes of 
 victory, began to push the Gauls with greater 
 fury than ever. The enemy, thus surrounded 
 on all sides, and without hopes of retrieving 
 their affairs, endeavoured to make their escape 
 over the rampart, and save themselves by 
 flight. But being pursued by the cavalry, who 
 soon came up with them in these open and 
 level plains ; of fifty thousand men that had 
 been drawn together out of Spain and Aqui- 
 tain, scarce a fourth part escaped ; nor did 
 the horse return to the camp until very late 
 in the evening, after they had quite tired them- 
 selves with the slaughter. 
 
 XXVIII. Upon the report of this defeat, 
 the greatest part of Aquitain immediately 
 submitted to Crassus, and of their own ac- 
 cord sent him hostages. Of this number 
 were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Preciani, 
 Vocates, Tarusates, Blusates, Gariles, Ausci, 
 Garumni, Siburzates, and Cocasates. Only 
 a few nations, and those the most remote, 
 relying on the season of the year, because the 
 winter was at hand, neglected to take this 
 step. 
 
 XXIX. Much about the same time Csesar, 
 though the summer was now almost spent, 
 yet because all the rest of Gaul being sub- 
 dued, the Morini and Menapians were still 
 in arms, and had not sent ambassadors to treat 
 about a peace, resolved to lead his army 
 against them, hoping he should soon be able 
 to put an end to that war. Their manner of 
 opposing him was very different from that of 
 the other Gauls. For, understanding that 
 the most powerful nations, when it came to 
 a battle, had always been overthrown and put 
 to rout ; and inhabiting themselves m a 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 121 
 
 country that abounded in woods and marshes, 
 they retired thither with all their effects. 
 Caesar commg to the entrance of the wood, 
 began to intrench himself: and although no 
 enemy in the meantime appeared, yet no 
 sooner had our men dispersed themselves in 
 order to set about fortifying the camp, than on 
 a sudden they came pouring upon us from all 
 parts of the wood, and charged with great 
 briskness. The Romans immediately flew to 
 their arms, and drove them back with consi- 
 derable slaughter ; but adventuring a little too 
 far into the wood lost some men. 
 
 XXX. Caesar spent the remaining days in 
 cutting down the wood; and to screen his 
 men from any sudden and unexpected attack, 
 ordered the trees that had been felled to be 
 
 placed on each side the army, that they 
 might serve as a barricade against the at- 
 tempts of the enemy. Having with incredi- 
 ble despatch advanced a great way into the 
 wood in a few days, insomuch that all their 
 cattle and baggage fell into our hands, they 
 themselves retired into the thicker and more 
 covered spaces of the forest. The season 
 growing bad, we were forced to intermit the 
 work : and the rains soon became so violent 
 and continual that the soldiers could no longer 
 endutfi to lie in their tents. Wherefore Cae- 
 sar, having laid waste their lands, and set fire 
 to their towns and houses, led back his army, 
 and disposed it into winter quarters among 
 the Aulerci, Lexovians, and other states, whom 
 he had last subdued. 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL 
 
 BOOKIV. 
 
 123 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 I. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German nations expelled by the Suevians, come over into Gaul. — II. The 
 manners and way of life of the Suevians. — III. And of the Ubians. — IV. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri drive 
 the Menapians from their habitations. — V. Caesar, knowing the wavering and unsetiledtemperof the Gauls, 
 repairs early in the spring to the array. — "Vt. Embassy of the Germans to Csesar, and his answer. — IX. An 
 action between the cavalry, in which the Germans have the ad vantage.— X. But are afterwards driven from 
 their camp with great slaughter.— XIII. And pursued by Caesar, who makes a bridge over the Rhine for thai 
 purpose. — ^XVI. Caesar lays waste the territories of the Sigambri. — ^XVII. And having freed the Ubians from 
 the servitude under which they lived, returns into Gaul. — XVIII. He then passes over into Britain. — ^XXII. 
 And lands his army witli great difficulty, the natives making a vigorous opposition. — XXIV. They are de- 
 feated at length, and send ambassadors to sue for peace.— XXVI. Caesar's fleet almost entirely ruined by a 
 storm, which induces the Britons to revolt. — ^XXIX. Their way of fighting from their chariots. — XXX. which 
 disconcerts the Romans at first. — ^XXXI. But being againputtoflight, they obtain peace. — ^XXXII. Aftorwiiich 
 Caesar returns into Gaul.— XXXIII. And marching against the Morini, whom the hope of plunder teu>pt«d \o 
 fall upon some of his detached parties, obliges them to submit. 
 
 iS4 
 
CJESAR'S CO 
 
 ENTARIES 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL. 
 
 BOOK IV, 
 
 I. The following winter, being that in which 
 Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls, 
 the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German nations, 
 passed the Rhine in a great body, not far 
 from its mouth. The cause of their taking 
 this step was, that being much exposed to the 
 hostilities of the Suevians, they had for many 
 years been harassed with continual wars, and 
 hindered from cultivating their lands. 
 
 II. The Suevians are by far the most war- 
 like and considerable of all the German na- 
 tions. They are said to be composed of a 
 hundred cantons, each of which sends yearly 
 into the field a thousand armed men. The 
 rest, who continue in their • several districts, 
 employ themselves in cultivating their lands, 
 that they may furnish a sufficient supply both 
 for themselves and for the army. These 
 again take up arms the following campaign, 
 and are succeeded in the care of the lands by 
 the troops that served the year before. Thus 
 they live in the continual exercise both of 
 agriculture and war. They allow of no such 
 thing as property, or private possession in the 
 distribution of their lands ; their residence, 
 for the sake of tillage, being confined to a 
 single year. Corn is not much in use among 
 them, because they prefer a milk or flesh diet, 
 and are greatly addicted to hunting. Thus 
 the quality of their food, their perpetual exer- 
 cise, and free unconfined manner of life, (be- 
 cause being from their childhood fettered by 
 no rules of duty or education, they acknow- 
 ledge no law but will and pleasure,) contribute 
 to make them strong, and of an extraordinary 
 stature. They have likewise accustomed 
 
 12 
 
 themselves, though inhabiting a climate na- 
 turally very cold, to bathe in their rivers, and 
 clothe themselves only with skins, which, as 
 they are very small, leave great part of their 
 body quite uncovered. Merchants indeed 
 resort to them, but rather to purchase their 
 spoils taken in war, than import any goods 
 into the country ; for even beasts of carriage, 
 in which the Gauls take so much delight, 
 that they are ready to purchase them at any 
 price, are yet very little valued by the Ger- 
 mans, when brought among them. And 
 though those of their own country are both 
 small and very ill shaped, yet by daily exer- 
 cise they make them capable of all kinds of 
 service. Their cavalry often dismount in 
 time of action, to fight on foot ; and their 
 horses are so trained, that they stir not from 
 the place where they are left, but wait the 
 return of their riders, who betake themselves 
 to them again in case of necessity. Nothing 
 is more dishonourable, in their account, or 
 more opposite to their customs, than the use 
 of horse-furniture ; and therefore, however few 
 themselves, they scruple not to attack any 
 number of their enemies whom they see so 
 equipped. They suflTer no wine to be imported 
 into their territories, as imagining that it both 
 enervates the mind, and unfits the body for 
 exercise and labour. It is accounted much to 
 the honour of the nation, to have the country 
 for a great way round them waste and unin- 
 habited ; for by this they think is intimated, 
 that the united force of many states has been 
 found insufficient to withstand their single 
 valour. And hence it is, that on one side, 
 125 
 
126 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 the country is said to lie desolate for the space 
 of six hundred miles. 
 
 III. On the other side they are bounded by 
 the Ubians, heretofore a flourishing and potent 
 people, and somewhat more civilized than the 
 other German nations; because inhabiting 
 along the banks of the Rhine, they are much 
 resorted to by merchants ; and have besides, 
 by bordering upon the states of Gaul, given 
 into many of their customs. The Suevians 
 having tried the strength of this people in many 
 wars, and finding them too numerous and potent 
 to be driven out of their territories, prevailed 
 yet so far as to impose a tribute upon them, and 
 very much reduce and weaken their power. 
 
 IV. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri, of whom 
 we have spoken above, were likewise engaged 
 in this quarrel ; and after withstanding the 
 power of the Suevians for many years, were 
 nevertheless at length driven from their terri- 
 tories. Having wandered over many regions 
 of Germany during the space of three years, 
 they arrived at last upon the banks of the 
 Rhine, towards those parts inhabited by the 
 Menapians, who had houses, lands, and villa- 
 ges on both sides of the river. But alarmed 
 at the approach of so prodigious a multitude, 
 they abandoned all their habitations beyond 
 the Rhine ; and having disposed their troops 
 on this side the river, set themselves to oppose 
 the passage of the Germans. These having 
 tried every expedient ; and finding they could 
 neither force the passage, because of their want 
 of shipping ; nor steal over privately by rea- 
 son of the guards kept by the Menapians, 
 counterfeited a retreat into their own country, 
 and after three days' march, suddenly turned 
 back ; when their cavalry, recovering all this 
 ground in the space of one night, easily over- 
 powered the Menapians, little expecting or 
 prepared for such a visit ; for having been ap- 
 prized by their scouts of the departure of the 
 Germans, they had returned, fearless of danger, 
 to their habitations beyond the Rhine. These 
 being all put to the sword, and their shipping 
 seized before the Menapians on this side had 
 
 ntelligence of their approach, they passed 
 the river ; and seizing all their towns and 
 houses, supported themselves the rest of the 
 winter with the provisions there found. 
 
 V. CiEsar being informed of these things, 
 and dreading the levity of the Gauls, who are 
 very changeable in their counsels, and fond 
 af novelties ; determined to trust nothing to 
 
 their resolves. For it is the custom of that 
 people to stop travellers even against their 
 will, and inquire of them what they have 
 heard or know relating to any affair ; and in 
 their towns, upon the arrival of a foreign mer- 
 chant, they gather round him in crowds, and 
 oblige him to tell what country he comes from, 
 and how things stood at his departure. Moved 
 by these reports, they often enter upon the 
 most important deliberations, and concert mea- 
 sures they soon have cause to repent, as being 
 founded wholly on vain rumours, and answers 
 feigned for the most part designedly to please 
 them, Caesar, who was aware of this custom, 
 fearing the war, if neglected, might become 
 formidable, made all the haste he could to 
 join the army. Upon his arrival he found, 
 that things were fallen out exactly as he had 
 foreseen. Some of the states of Gaul had sent 
 ambassadors to the Germans, inviting them to 
 leave the banks of the Rhine, and assuring 
 them that all their demands should be readily 
 complied with. The Germans, allured by 
 these hopes, were already extending their in- 
 cursions on all sides, and had penetrated into 
 the territories of the Eburones and Condru- 
 sians, both which nations are under the pro- 
 tection of the Treviri. Caesar having assembled 
 the chiefs of the Gauls, dissembled his know- 
 ledge of their secret designs ; and endeavouring 
 rather to win them over, and confirm them 
 in their alliance with the people of Rome, de- 
 manded a certain number of cavalry of them, 
 and prepared to march against the Germans. 
 
 VI. Having provided himself with corn, and 
 drawn together a select body of horse, he be- 
 gan his march towards those parts where he 
 understood the Germans then w^ere. When he 
 was come within a few days ' journey of thei» 
 camp, ambassadors arrived from them, who ad- 
 dressed him to this effect : — " That the Ger- 
 mans had no design of being the first to begin 
 a war with the people of Rome ; but neither, 
 if they were attacked, would they decline having 
 recourse to arms : that it was the custom of 
 their nation, handed down to them by their 
 ancestors, rather to oppose the efforts of their 
 enemies, than expect relief from remon- 
 strances ; but thus far they were however 
 willing to own, that it was against their incli- 
 nation they were come into those parts, having 
 been driven from their habitations ; that if 
 the Romans were disposed to accept of their 
 friendship, they might become very useful 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 127 
 
 and serviceable allies, and would rest satisfied 
 either with such lands as they should think 
 proper to assign them, or in the quiet posses- 
 sion of those they had already obtained by 
 force of arms ; that they yielded in valour to 
 the Suevians alone, for whom the immortal 
 gods themselves were not an equal match ; but 
 knew of no other nation under heaven ablg.to 
 resist the efforts of their bravery." Caesa 
 made such a reply as best suited his present 
 views, but the conclusion of his speech was to 
 this purpose : — " That he could enter into no 
 treaty of friendship with them so long as they 
 continued in Gau! ; that men who had been 
 unable to defend their own territories were not 
 likely to gain countries by force from others ; 
 that there were no uncultivated lands in Gaul, 
 sufficient to satisfy so great a multitude, with- 
 out invading the properties of others ; but that, 
 if they pleased, they might incorporate them- 
 selves with the Ubians, whose ambassadors 
 were then in his camp, to complain of the in- 
 juries of the Suevians, and request his aid 
 against their encroachments ; this he promised 
 to obtain for them of the Ubians." The am- 
 bassadors replied, they would report this to their 
 countrymen, and in three days return with an 
 answer ; requesting in the meantime, that he 
 would not advance with his army. But this 
 Caasar refused, as knowing, that a few days 
 before they had sent a great body of cavalry 
 over the Meuse, to forage and plunder in the 
 territories of the Ambivariti. He therefore 
 concluded, that they only waited the return 
 of this party, and with that view were for in- 
 terposing delays. 
 
 VII. The Meuse rises in the mountains of 
 Vause, in the territories of the Lingones, and 
 leceiving a certain branch of the Rhine, called 
 the Vahal, forms with it the island of the Ba- 
 tavians, about forescore miles below which it 
 discharges itself into the sea. The Rhine it- 
 self takes its rise in the territories of the Le- 
 pontians, who inhabit the Alps ; and after a 
 long and rapid course through the country of 
 the Nantuates, Helvetians, Sequani; Medio- 
 matrici, Treboci, and Treviri, divides itself, as 
 it approaches nearer the sea, into several chan- 
 nels, and forming a great number of very 
 large islands, inhabited for the most part by 
 fierce and savage nations, some of whom are 
 .reported to feed only on fish and the eggs of 
 birds, it at last discharges itself into the ocean 
 by many different mouths. 
 
 VIII. Caesar being now only twelve miles 
 distant from the enemy, was met upon his way 
 by the ambassadors on the day appointed. 
 They were very earnest in their requests that 
 he would advance no farther ; but not being 
 able to prevail, entreated, that he would send 
 to the cavalry, who made the advance-guard, 
 to^*estrain them from beginning* the fight; 
 ^d in the meantime permit them to send am- 
 bassadors to the Ubians ; from whose senate 
 and magistrates, if they could obtain the con- 
 ditions offered them by Csesar, under the sanc- 
 tion of a solemn oath, they declared themselves 
 ready to accept them ; requiring only that he 
 would allow them the space of three days to 
 bring matters to <.a final issue. But Csesar, 
 imagining all these proffers to have no other 
 tendency than the delay of a few days, until 
 their cavalry should arrive, told them, never- 
 theless, that he would advance that day 
 only four miles farther, for the sake of water ; 
 but desired their chiefs to attend him the day 
 after, that he might know their demands. 
 Meantime he sent orders to the officers of the 
 cavalry, who were gone before, not to attack 
 the enemy ; and in case they should be attacked 
 themselves, only to maintain their ground 
 until he should come up with the rest of the 
 army. 
 
 IX. But the enemy, upon seeing our horse 
 advance, whose number amounted, to five thou- 
 sand, whereas they themselves did not exceed 
 eight hundred, by reason of the absence of those 
 who had been sent to forage beyond the Meuse 
 yet falling suddenly upon the Romans, whc 
 had no apprehension of their design, because 
 they knew their ambassadors had been with 
 Csesar a little before, and obtained a day's 
 truce, they easily put them into disorder. And 
 when our men, recovering a little, began to 
 make resistance, they, according to custom, 
 dismounted, and stabbing our horses under the 
 belly, and by that means overthrowing many 
 of the riders, in a very short time put the res*, 
 to flight ; and so great was the consternation, 
 that they continued driving them before them, 
 until at last they came within sight of the ar- 
 my. In this skirmish we lost seventy four 
 men, and among them Piso of Aquitain, a 
 man of distinguished valour and illustrious de- 
 scent, whose grandfather had been sovereign 
 magistrate in his own state, and been honoured 
 by the senate of Rome with the title of friend. 
 This brave officer, seeing his brother surround 
 
128 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 ed by the enemy, ran to his assistance, and 
 rescued him ; but his own horse being wounded, 
 and he overthrown, the enemy fell upon him, 
 against whom nevertheless he made a brave 
 resistance ; till at last, surrounded on all sides, 
 he fell overpowered with wounds. Which his 
 brother perceiving, who was by this time out 
 of danger,*Snd had got to a considerable dis- 
 tance, setting spurs to his horse, he rushed 
 among the thickest of the enemy, and was 
 slain. 
 
 X. After this battle, Caesar resolved neither 
 to give audience to their ambassadors, nor 
 admit them to terms of peace, seeing they had 
 treacherously applied for a truce, and after- 
 wards of their own accoi^ broken it. He 
 likewise considered, that it would be down- 
 right madness to delay coming to an action 
 until their army should be augmented, and 
 their cavalry join them ; and the more so, 
 because he was perfectly well acquainted with 
 the levity of the Gauls, among whom they had 
 already acquired a considerable reputation by 
 this successful attack, and to whom it there- 
 fore behoved him by no means to allow time 
 to enter into measures against him. Upon all 
 these accounts he determined to come to an 
 engagement with the enemy as soon as possi- 
 ble, and communicated his design to his ques- 
 tor and lieutenants. A very lucky accident 
 fell out to bring about Cesar's purpose ; for 
 the day after, in the morning, the Germans, 
 persisting in their treachery and dissimulation, 
 came in great numbers to the camp : all their 
 nobility and princes making part of their em- 
 bassy. Their design was, as they pretended, 
 to vindicate themselves in regard to what had 
 happened the day before ; because, contrary 
 to engagements made and come under at 
 their own request, they had fallen upon our 
 men ; but their real motive was to obtain if 
 possible another insidious truce. Caesar, over- 
 joyed to have them thus in his power, ordered 
 them to be secured, and immediately drew his 
 forces out of the camp. The cavalry, whom 
 he supposed terrified with the late engage- 
 ment, were commanded to follow in the rear. 
 
 XI. Having drawn up his army in three 
 lines, and made a very expeditious march of 
 eight miles, he appeared before the enemy's 
 camp before they had the least apprehension 
 of his design. All things conspiring to throw 
 them into a sudden consternation, which was 
 not a little increased by our unexpected ap- 
 
 pearance, and the absence of iheir own of- 
 ficers ; and hardly any time left them either 
 to take counsel, or fly to arms, they were ut- 
 terly at a loss what course to take, whether to 
 draw, out their forces and oppose the enemy, 
 or content themselves with defending the 
 camp, or in fine to seek for safety in flight. 
 As this fear was evident from the tumult and 
 uproar we perceived among them, our soldiers, 
 instigated by the remembrance of their treache- 
 rous behaviour the day before, broke into the 
 camp. Such as could first provide them- 
 selves with arms made a show of resistance, 
 and for some time maintained the fight amidst 
 the baggage and carriages. But the women 
 and children (for the Germans had brought 
 all their families and effects with them over 
 the Rhine) betook themselves to flight on all 
 sides. Caesar sent the cavalry in pursuit of 
 them. 
 
 XII. The Germans hearing the noise 
 behind them, and seeing their wives and 
 children put to the sword, threw down their 
 arms, abandoned their ensigns, and fled out 
 of the camp. Being arrived at the confluence 
 of the Rhine and the Meuse, and finding it 
 impossible to continue their flight any farther ; 
 after a dreadful slaughter of those that pre- 
 tended to make resistance, the rest threw 
 themselves into the river ; where, what with 
 fear, weariness, and the force of the current, 
 they almost all perished. Thus our army, 
 without the loss of a man, and with very few 
 wounded, returned to their camp, having put 
 an end to this formidable war, in which the 
 number of the enemy amounted to four 
 hundred and thirty thousand. Caesar of- 
 fered those whom he had detained in his 
 camp liberty to depart ; but they, dreading 
 the resentment of the Gauls, whose lands 
 they had laid waste, chose rather to continue 
 with him, and obtained his consent for that 
 purpose. 
 
 XIII. The war with the Germans being 
 ended, Caesar for many reasons resolved to 
 carry his army over the Rhine. But what 
 chiefly swayed with him was, that as he found 
 the Germans were easily prevailed upon to 
 transport their forces into Gaul, he thought it 
 might be of no small service to alarm them 
 upon their own account, by letting them see, 
 that the Romans wanted neither ability nor 
 resolution to pass the Rhine with an army. 
 Add to all this, that the cavalry of the Usipetes 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 129 
 
 »nd Tenchtheri, who as we have related above, 
 Qad passed the Meuse for the sake of forage 
 and plunder, and by that means escaped the 
 disaster of the late fight, upon hearing of the 
 defeat of their countrymen, had repassed the 
 Rhine, retired into the territories of the Sicam- 
 brians, and joined their forces to theirs. And 
 upon Cfflsar's sending deputies to require, that 
 these troops, which had presumed to make 
 war upon him and the Gauls, might be deliv- 
 ered up, he had received for answer : — " That 
 the Rhine was the boundary of the Roman 
 empire ; that if he thought it unjustifiable in 
 the Germans to pass over into Gaul without 
 his leave, upon what pretence could he claim 
 ,any power or authority beyond the Rhine 1" 
 
 XIV. But the Ubians, who alone of all the 
 nations beyond the Rhine had sent ambassa- 
 dors to Caesar, entered into an alliance with 
 him, and given him hostages, earnestly en- 
 treated him to come over to their assistance, 
 they being very hard pressed by the Suevians : 
 Or, if the aifairs of the commonwealth would 
 not allow of his being there in person, that he 
 would only order his army to cross the Rhine, 
 which would both be sufficient for their present 
 support, and also secure them for the time to 
 come. Because such was the reputation and 
 opinion conceived of a Roman army, even 
 amongst the remote German nations, from 
 their defeating Ariovistus, and the success of 
 the last battle, that their friendship and name 
 would alone be a sufficient defence. They 
 promised likewise a great number of ships for 
 the transporting of the army." 
 
 XV. Ca3sar, for all these reasons above- 
 mentioned, determined to cross the Rhine. 
 But to make use of shipping appeared to him 
 neither safe, nor suitable to the dignity of the 
 Roman name. Wherefore, although he under- 
 stood that the making of a bridge would be 
 attended with very great difficulties, on ac- 
 count of the breadth, depth, and rapidity of 
 the river, yet was he of opinion, that in this 
 manner alone ought he to carry over his army, 
 or lay aside the design altogether. The form 
 therefore and contrivance of the bridge was 
 thus : — two beams, each a foot and a half thick, 
 sharpened a little toward the lower end, and of 
 a length proportioned to the depth of the river, 
 were joined together at the distance of about 
 two feet. These were sunk into the river by 
 engines, and afterwards strongly driven with 
 rammers, not perpendicularly, but inclined ac- 
 
 '3* 
 
 cording to the direction of the stream. Di- 
 rectly opposite to these, at the distance of forty 
 feet lower down, we:- placed two other beams 
 joined together like the former, but sloping 
 against the current of the river. These stakes 
 were kept firm by a large beam, extended from 
 one to the other, and which being two feet in 
 thickness, exactly filled the interval of the 
 two stakes, and was strongly fastehed at either 
 end with iron nails, so contrived, that the vio- 
 lence of the stream served only to bind the 
 work faster together. This being continued 
 through the whole breadth of the river, he or- 
 dered planks to be laid across, which for the 
 greater convenience of passing, were further 
 covered with hurdles. Towards the lower part 
 of the stream other stakes were sunk in the 
 form of buttresses, which supported the bridge 
 against the violence of the current ; and above, 
 at some distance, there were others ; that if 
 trunks of trees or vessels should be sent down 
 the river by the enemy, to destroy the work, 
 the shock might be broken by these defences, 
 and the bridge thereby secured from damage. 
 
 XVI. The bridge being finished within ten ^ 
 days from the time they began to fetch the 
 materials, Caesar led over his army ; and leav- 
 ing a strong guard on each side of the river, 
 marched directly, into the territories of the 
 Sicambri. Meantime ambassadors arriving 
 from several states to desire peace, and court 
 his alliance, he gave them a very favourable 
 reception, and appointed them to send host- 
 ages. The Sicambri, when they understood 
 that the bridge was begun, by advice of the 
 Usipetes and Tenchtheri, who had taken shel- 
 ter among them, resolved upon a retreat, and 
 having abandoned their territories, and carried 
 off all their effects, withdrew into the neigh- 
 bouring woods and deserts. 
 
 XVII. Caesar, after a short stay in their 
 country, having burned all their houses and 
 villages, and cut down their corn, marched 
 into the territories of the Ubians. As he had 
 promised these last his assistance against the 
 attempts of the Suevians, he understood from 
 them that the Suevians, being informed by 
 their spies, of the bridge built upon the Rhine, 
 had, according to their custom, called a coun- 
 cil, and despatched orders into all parts for 
 the people to forsake their towns, and convey 
 their wives, children, and effects into the 
 woods, commanding, at the same time, that all 
 such as were able to bear arms should meet 
 
130 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 at the place of general rendezvous, which they 
 had appointed towards the middle -of the 
 country, resolving there to wait the arrival of 
 the Romans, and give them battle. Csesar, 
 upon this intelligence, having accomplished all 
 he intended in carrying his army over the 
 Rhine, by spreading a universal terror among 
 the Germans, taking vengeance of the Sicam- 
 bri, and setting the Ubians at liberty, after a 
 stay if only eighteen days beyond the Rhine, 
 thinking he had done enough both for his own 
 reputation and the service of the republic, 
 led back his army into Gaul, and broke the 
 bridge, 
 
 XVIII. Though but a small part of the 
 summer now remained, for in those regions, 
 Gaul, stretching very much to the north, the 
 winters begin early, Csesar, nevertheless, re- 
 solved to pass over into Britain, having cer- 
 tain intelligence, that in all his wars with the 
 Gauls, the enemies of the commonwealth had 
 ever received assistance from thence. He in- 
 deed foresaw, that the season of the year would 
 not permit him to finish the war ; yet he thought 
 it would be of no small advantage, if he should 
 but take a view of the island, learn the nature 
 of the inhabitants, and acquaint himself with 
 the coast, harbours, and landing-places, to all 
 which the Gauls were perfect strangers : for 
 almost none but merchants resort to that island, 
 nor have even any knowledge of the country 
 except the sea coast, and the parts opposite to 
 Gaul. Having therefore called together the 
 merchants from all parts, they could neither 
 inform him of the largeness of the island, nor 
 what or how powerful the nations were that 
 inhabited it, nor of their customs, art of war, 
 or the harbours fit to receive large ships. For 
 these reasons, before he embarked himself, he 
 thought proper to send C. Volusenus with a 
 galley, to get some knowledge of these things, 
 commanding him, as soon as he had informed 
 himself in what he wanted to know, to return 
 with all expedition. He himself marched with 
 his whole army into the territories of the Mo- 
 rini, because thence was the nearest passage 
 into Britain. Here he ordered a great many 
 ships from the neighbouring ports to attend 
 him, and the fleet he had made use of the year 
 before in the Venetian war. 
 
 XIX. Meanwhile the.Britons, having notice 
 of his design, by the merchants that resorted to 
 their island, ambassadors from many of their 
 -states came %> Csesar, with an offer of hosta- 
 
 ges, and submission to the authority of tha 
 people of Rome. To these he gave a favoura- 
 ble audience, and exhorted them to continue 
 in the same mind, sent them back into their 
 own country. Along with them he despatched 
 Comius, whom he had constituted king of the 
 Atrebatians, a man in whose virtue, wisdom, 
 and fidelity he greatly confided, and whose 
 authority in the island was very considerable. 
 To him he gave it in charge, to visit as many 
 states as he could, and persuade them to enter 
 into an alliance with the Romans, letting them 
 know at the same time that Gtesar designed as 
 soon as possible to come over in person to their 
 island. Volusenus having taken a view of the 
 country, as far as was possible for one who had 
 resolved not to quit his ship, or trust himself 
 in the hands of the barbarians, returned on the 
 fifth day and acquainted Caesar with his dis- 
 coveries. 
 
 XX. While Csesar continued in those parts, 
 for the sake of getting ready his fleet, deputies 
 arrived from almost all the cantons of the 
 Morini, to excuse their late war with the 
 people of Rome, as proceeding wholly from a 
 national fierceness, and their ignorance of the 
 Roman customs, promising likewise an entire 
 submission for the future. This fell out very 
 opportunely for Csesar, who was unwilling 
 to leave any enemies behind him, nor would 
 the season of the year have even allowed him 
 to engage in a war ; besides, he judged it by no 
 means proper so far to entangle himself in 
 these trivial affairs, as to be obliged to post- 
 pone the expedition into Britain. He there- 
 fore ordered them to send him a great number 
 of hostages, and upon their being delivered, 
 received them into his alliance. Having got 
 together about eighty transports, v/hich he 
 thought would be sufficient for the carrying 
 over two legions, he distributed the galleys he 
 had over and above to the questor, lieutenants, 
 and officers of the cavalry. There were, be- 
 sides, eighteen transports detained by contrary 
 winds at a port about eight miles off, which he 
 appointed to carry over the cavalry. The rest 
 of the army, under the command of Q. Tituri- 
 us Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, were 
 sent against the Menapians, and those cantons 
 of the Morini which had not submitted. P. 
 Sulpicius Rufus had the charge of the harbour 
 where he embarked, with a strong garrison to 
 maintain it. 
 
 XXI. Things being in this manner settled, 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 131 
 
 and the wind springing up fair, he weighed 
 anchor about one in the morning, ordering the 
 cavalry to embark at the other port, and fol- 
 low him. But as these orders were e»3cuted 
 but slowly, he himself, about ten in the morn- 
 ing, reached the coast of Britain, where he 
 saw all the cliffs covered with the enemy's 
 forces. The nature of the place was such, 
 that the sea being bounded by steep moun- 
 iains, the enemy might easily launch their ja- 
 velins upon us from above. Not thinking this 
 therefore a convenient landing-place, he re- 
 solved to lie by till three in the afternoon, and 
 wait the arrival of the rest of his fleet. Mean- 
 while, having called the lieutenants and mili- 
 tary tribunes together, he informed them of 
 what he had learned from Volusenus, instructed 
 them in the part they were to act, and par- 
 ticularly exhorted them to do every thing with 
 readiness, and at a signal given agreeable to 
 the rules of military discipline, which in sea 
 affairs especially required expedition and des- 
 patch, because of all others the most changea- 
 ble and uncertain. Having dismissed them, 
 and finding both the wind and tide favourable, 
 he made the signal for weighing anchor, and 
 after sailing about eight miles farther stopped 
 over against a plain and open shore. 
 
 XXII. But the barbarians perceiving our 
 design, sent their cavalry and chariots before, 
 which they frequently make use of in battle, 
 and following with the rest of their forces, en- 
 deavoured to oppose our landing; and indeed 
 we found the difficulty very great on many ac- 
 counts ; for our ships being large, required a 
 great depth of water ; and the soldiers, who 
 were wholly unacquainted with the places, and 
 had their hands embarrassed and loaden with 
 a weight of armour, were at the same time to 
 leap from the ships, stand breast high amidst 
 the waves, and encounter the enemy, while 
 they, fighting upon dry ground, or advancing 
 only a little way into the water, having the 
 free use of all their limbs, and in places which 
 they perfectly knew, could boldly cast their 
 darts, and spur on their horses, well inured to 
 that kind of service. All these circumstances 
 serving to spread a terror among our men, 
 who were wholly strangers to this way of 
 fighting, they pushed not the enemy with the 
 same vigour and spirit as was usual for them in 
 combats upon dry ground. 
 
 XXIII. Ccesar observing this, ordered some 
 galleys, a kind of shipping less common with 
 
 the barbarians, and more easily governed and 
 put in motion, to advance a little from the 
 transports towards the shore, in order to set 
 upon the enemy in flank, and by means of 
 their engines, slings, and arrows, drive them to 
 some distance. This proved of considerable 
 service to our men, for what with the surprise 
 occasioned by the make of our galleys, the 
 motion of our oars, and the playing of the en- 
 gines, the enemy were forced to halt, and in a 
 little time began to give back. But our men 
 still demurring to leap into the sea, chiefly be- 
 cause of the depth of the water in those parts ; 
 the standai-d-bearer of the tenth legion, having 
 first invoked the gods for success, cried out 
 aloud : " Follow me, fellow-soldiers, unless you 
 will betray the Koman eagle into the hands of 
 the enemy ; for my part, I am resolved to dis- 
 charge my duty to Csesar and the common- 
 wealth." Upon this he jumped into the sea, 
 and advanced with the eagle against the ene- 
 my : whereat, our men exhorting one another 
 to prevent so signal a disgrace, all that were 
 in the ship followed him, which being per- 
 ceived by those in the nearest vessels, they 
 also did the like, and boldly approached the 
 enemy. 
 
 XXIV. The battle was obstinate on both 
 sides ; but our men, as being neither able to 
 keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor fol- 
 low their respective standards, because leap- , 
 ing promiscuously from their ships, every one 
 joined the first ensign he met, were thereby 
 thrown into great confusion. The enemy, on 
 the other hand, being well acquainted with the 
 shallows, when they saw our men advancing 
 singly from the ships, spurred on their horses, 
 and attacked them in that perplexity. In one 
 place great numbers would gather round a 
 handful of the Romans ; others falling upon 
 them in flank, galled them mightily with their 
 darts, which Caesar observing, ordered some 
 small boats to be manned, and ply about with 
 recruits. By this means the foremost ranks of 
 our men having got firm footing, were followed 
 by all the rest, when falling upon the enemy 
 briskly, they were soon put to the rout. But 
 as the cavalry were not yet arrived, we could / 
 not pursue or advance far into the island, 
 which was the only thing wanting to render 
 the victory complete. 
 
 XXV. The enemy being thus vanquished 
 in battle, no sooner got together after their 
 defeat, than they despatched ambassa;ior3 to 
 
133 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 -Caesar to sue for peace, ofiering hostages, and 
 an entire submission to his commands. Along 
 with these ambassadors came Comius, the 
 Atrebatian, whom Csesar, as we have related 
 above, had sent before him into Britain. The 
 natives seized him as soon as he landed, and 
 though he was charged with a commission 
 from Csesar, threw him into irons. But upon 
 their late defeat, they thought proper to send 
 him hack, throwing the blame of what had 
 happened upon the multitude, and begged of 
 (/£Esar to excuse a fault proceeding from ig- 
 norance. Cfflsar, after some complaints of 
 their behaviour, in that having of their own 
 accord sent ambassadors to the continent to 
 sue for peace, they had yet without any rea- 
 son begun a war against hjm, told them at last 
 he would forgive their fault, and ordered them 
 to send a certain number of hostages. Part 
 were sent immediately, and the rest, as living 
 at some distance, they promised to deliver in 
 a few days. Meantime they disbanded their 
 troops, and the several chiefs came to Cssar's 
 camp, to manage their own concerns, and 
 those of the states to which they belonged. 
 
 XXVI. A peace being thus concluded four 
 days after Caesar's arrival in Britain, the eigh- 
 teen transports appointed to carry the cavalry, 
 of whom we have spoken above, put to sea 
 with a gentle gale. But when they had so 
 near approached the coast as to be even with- 
 in view of the camp, so violent a storm all on 
 a sudden arose, that being unable to hold on 
 their course, some were obliged to return to 
 the port whence they set out, and others 
 driven to the lower end of the island, westward, 
 not without great danger ; there they cast an- 
 chor, but the waves rising very high, so as 
 to fill the ships with water, they were again in 
 the night obliged to stand out to sea, and make 
 for the continent of Gaul. That very night 
 it happened to be full moon, whan the tides 
 upon the sea coast always rise highest, a thing 
 at that time wholly unknown to the Romans. 
 Thus at the one and the same time, the gal- 
 leys which Cassar made use of to transport his 
 men, and which he had ordered to be drawn 
 up on the strand, were filled with the tide, and 
 the tempest fell furiously upon the transports 
 that lay at anchor in the road : nor was it pos- 
 sible for our men to attempt any thing for their 
 preservation. Many of the ships being dashed 
 to pieces, and the rest having lost their an- 
 chors tackle, and rigging, which rendered 
 
 them altogether unfit for sailing, a general con- 
 sternation spread itself through the camp, for 
 there were no other ships to carry back the 
 troops, nor any materials to repair those that 
 had been disabled by the tempest. And as it 
 had been all along Caesar's design to winter 
 in Gaul, he was wholly without corn to sub- 
 sist the troops in those parts. 
 
 XXVII. All this being known to the Bri- 
 tish chiefs, who after the battle had repaired 
 to Caesar's camp, to perform the conditions of 
 the treaty, they began to hold conferences 
 among themselves j and as they plainly saw 
 that the Romans were destitute both of caval- 
 ry, shipping, and corn, and easily judged, from 
 the smallness of the camp, that the number of 
 their troops was but inconsiderable ; in which 
 notion they were the more confirmed, because 
 Caesar having brought over the legions with- 
 out baggage, had occasion to inclose but a 
 small spot of ground ; they thought this a 
 convenient opportunity for taking up arms, 
 and, by intercepting the Roman convoys, to 
 protract the afl!air till winter ; being confidently 
 persuaded, that by defeating these troops, or 
 cutting off their return, they should effectually 
 put a stop to all future attempts upon Britain. 
 Having therefore entered into a joint confede- 
 racy, they by degrees left the camp, and be- 
 gan to draw the islanders together : but Cssar, 
 though he was not yet apprized of their de- 
 sign, yet guessing in part at their intentions, 
 by the disaster which had befallen his fleet, 
 and the delays formed in relation to the hos- 
 tages, determined to provide against all events. 
 He therefore had corn daily brought into his 
 camp, and ordered the timber of the ships that 
 had been most damaged to be made use of in 
 repairing the rest, sending to Gaul for what 
 other materials he wanted. As the soldiers 
 were indefatigable in this service, his fleet was 
 soon in a condition to sail, having lost only 
 twelve ships. 
 
 XXVIII. During these transactions, the 
 seventh legion being sent out to forage, ac- 
 cording to custom, as part were employed in 
 cutting down the corn, and part in carrying it 
 to the camp, without suspicion of attack, news 
 were brought to Caesar, that a greater cloud 
 of dust than ordinary was seen on that side 
 where the legion was. Csesarjsupecting how 
 matters went, marched with the cohorts that 
 were upon guard, ordering two others to suc- 
 ceed in their room, and all the soldiers in the 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 133 
 
 camp to arm and follow him as soon as possi- 
 ble. When he was advanced a little way from 
 the camp, he saw his men overpowered by 
 the enemy, and with great difficulty able to 
 sustain the fight, being driven into a small 
 compass, and exposed on every side to the 
 darts of their adversaries. For as the harvest 
 was gathered in every where else, and only 
 one field left, the enemy, suspecting that our 
 men would come thither to forage, had hid 
 themselves during the night in the woods, 
 and waiting till our men had quitted their arms, 
 and dispersed themselves to fall a reaping, they 
 suddenly attacked them, killed some, put the 
 rest into disorder, and began to surround them 
 with their horses and chariots. 
 
 XXIX. Their way of fighting with their 
 chariots is this : first, they drive their chariots 
 on all sides, and throw their darts, insomuch, 
 that by the very terror of the horses,, and noise 
 of the wheels, they often break the ranks of 
 the enemy. When they have forced their 
 way into the midst of the cavalry, they quit 
 their chariots, and fight on foot : meantime 
 the drivers retire a little from the combat, 
 and place themselves in such a manner as 
 to favour the retreat of their countrymen, 
 should they be overpowered by the enemy. 
 Thus in action they perform the part both of 
 nimble horsemen, and stable infantry ; and by 
 continual exercise and use have arrived at 
 that expertness, that in the most steep and 
 difficult places they can stop their horses upon 
 a full stretch, turn them which way they 
 please, run along the pole, rest on the harness, 
 and throw themselves back into their chariots 
 with incredible dexterity. 
 
 XXX. Our men being astonished and con- 
 founded with this new way of fighting, Caesar 
 came very timely to their relief; for upon his 
 approach the enemy made a stand, and the 
 Romans began to recover from their fear. 
 This satisfied Csesar for the present, who not 
 thinking it a proper season to provoke the en- 
 emy, and bring on a general engagement, 
 stood facing them for some time, and then led 
 back the legions to the camp. The continual 
 rains that followed for some days after, both 
 kept the Romans within their intrenchftients, 
 and withheld the enemy from attacking us. 
 Meantime the Britons despatched messengers 
 into all parts, to make known to their coun- 
 trymen the small number of the Roman troops, 
 and the favourable opportunity they had of 
 
 making immense spoils, and freeing their coun- 
 try for ever from all future invasions, by storm- 
 ing the enemy's camp. Having by this means 
 got together a great body of infantry and cav- 
 alry, they drew towards our intrenchments. 
 
 XXXI. Cffisar, though he foresaw tha* 
 the enemy, if beaten, would in the same man- 
 ner as before escape the danger by flight ; yet 
 having got about thirty horse, whom Comius, 
 the Atrebatian, had brought over with him 
 from Gaul, he drew up the legions in order 
 of battle before the camp ; and falling upon the 
 Britons, who were not able to sustain the 
 shock of our men, soon put them to flight. 
 The Romans pursuing them as long as their 
 strength would permit, made a terrible slaugh- 
 ter, and setting fire to their houses and vil- 
 lages a great way round, returned to the 
 camp. 
 
 XXXII. The same day ambassadors came 
 from the enemy to Csesar, to sue for peace. 
 Ccesar doubled the number of hostages he had 
 before imposed upon them, and ordered them 
 to be sent over to him into Gaul, because the 
 equinox coming on, and his ships being leaky, 
 he thought it not prudent to put off his return 
 till winter. A fair wind offering, he set sail 
 a little after midnight, and arrived safe in Gaul. 
 Two of his transports not being able to reach 
 the same port with the rest, were driven into 
 a haven a little lower in the country. 
 
 XXXIII. In these two vessels were about 
 three hundred soldiers, who having landed, 
 and being upon their march to the camp, the 
 Morini, who had submitted to Csesar upon his 
 setting out for Britain, drawn by the hopes of 
 plunder, surrounded them at first with only a 
 few men, and ordered them to lay down their 
 arms under pain of being put to the sword. 
 But they, casting themselves into an orb, stood 
 upon their defence, when all on a sudden six 
 thousand more of the enemy appeared, roused 
 by the noise of the combatants. Caesar having 
 notice of what passed, sent all his cavalry to 
 the assistance of the Romans : meanwhile our 
 men withstood all the attacks of the enemy, 
 and bravely maintained the fight for upwards 
 of six hours, having slain great numbers of the 
 Morini, while on their side only a few were 
 wounded ; but no sooner did our cavalry ap- 
 pear, than the enemy, throwing down theii 
 arms, betook themselves to flight, and were 
 almost all slain in the pursuit. 
 
 XXXIV. The day after, Csesar sent T 
 
134 
 
 CiESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 
 
 Labienus with the legions returned out of 
 Britain, against the rebellious Morini, who 
 being deprived, by the drought, of the benefit 
 of their marshes, which had served them for 
 shelter the year before, almost all fell into his 
 power. Meantime, Q. Titurius, and L. Cotta, 
 who had been sent against the Menapians, 
 having laid waste their territories with fire 
 and sword, and plundered their habitations, 
 
 returned to Caesar, not being able to come up 
 with the Menapians themselves, who had re- 
 tired into impenetrable forests. Csesar quar- 
 tered all his troops among the Belgians. Only 
 two of the British states sent hostages into 
 Gaul, the rest neglecting to perform the con- 
 ditions of the treaty. For these successes a 
 thanksgiving of twenty days was decreed by 
 the senate. 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 1^ 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 I. Caesar, leaving orders with his lieutenants in Gaul to build a fleet, sets out for Italy and Illyricum, where ha 
 puts a stop to the incursions of the Pirustse. — 11. Returning thence into Gaul, lie marches against the Treviri, 
 and quiets the disturbances in that province. — IV. Dumnorix withdrawing from the Roman camp with the 
 .fflduan cavalry, is pursued and slain. — VII. Csesar passes over into Britain. — VIII. And forces the enemy 
 from the woods in which they had taken shelter.— IX. But understanding that his fleet had suffered greatly 
 by a storm, he quits the pursu't of the Britons, repairs his fleet, fortifies his camp, and then returns against 
 the enemy. — ^X. A description of Britain, and its inhabitants. — XI. Oaesar defeats the Britons in various en- 
 counters.— XIV. Passes the Thames.— XIX. Returns into Gaul. — XX. And because of the great scarcity of 
 corn, distributes his legions among the several states. — ^XXI. Tasgetius slain among the Carnutes. — ^XXII. 
 Ambiorix and Cativulcus excite several states to revolt.- XXIII. Ambiorix by an artful speecli persuades 
 Titurius to quit his camp, and attacking him in his march, cuts him off with his whole party.— XXX. Being 
 afterwards joined by the Nervians, he falls upon Cicero's camp. — XXXV. The noble emulation of Pulfio 
 and Varenus.— XXXVII. Csesar marches to Cicero's relief. — ^XLI. The Gauls quit the siege, and advance 
 to meet him.— XIJI. Csesar defeats them in battle.— XLIV. And, to prevent their continual revolts, resolves 
 to pass the winter in Gaul.— XLV. The Senones, Treviri, and other states, bear the Roman yoke with im- 
 patience.— XLVII. Indutiomarus attacks Labienus's camp.— XLIX But being slain in the attempt, the Gauls 
 separate, and tranquillity is in a great measure restored. 
 
 lac 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 I. lis the consulship of Lucius Domitius, and 
 Appius Claudius, Caesar leaving his winter 
 quarters to go into Italy, as was his yearly cus- 
 tom, gave orders to his lieutenants, who had 
 the charge of the legions, to huild as many 
 ships as possible during the winter, and to re- 
 pair such as were old. He prescribed the 
 form and manner of building, ordering them 
 to be somewhat lower than was usual in the 
 Mediterranean, for the convenience of em- 
 harking and landing his men, which he judged 
 the more necessary, as he had observed, that 
 hy reason of the frequent returns of the tide, 
 there was less depth of water upon the British 
 coast. He likewise commanded them to be 
 built broader than ordinary, that they might 
 receive the greater number of horses and car- 
 riages, and to be contrived for lightness and 
 expedition, to which the lowness of their decks 
 greatly contributed. He sent to Spain for the 
 materials necessary in building and equipping 
 them ; and having finished the diet of Cisal- 
 pine Gaul, set out for Illyricum, upon advice, 
 that the Pirustoe were laying waste the pro- 
 vince by their incursions. When he arrived 
 there, he ordered the several states to furnish 
 their contingents, and appointed a place of 
 general rendezvous. 'J'he report of this no 
 sooner spread among the Pirustse, than they 
 sent ambassadors to inform him, that nothing 
 had been done against the province by public 
 authority, and that they were ready to make 
 what satisfaction he required. Caesar, pleased 
 with their submission, ordered them to bring 
 him hostages, and named the day by which 
 Ihey were to be delivered, threatening them 
 13 
 
 with a fierce war in case of disobedience. 
 These being accordingly brought by the day 
 prefixed, he appointed arbitrators between the' 
 contending states, to estimate the damages, 
 and determine what reparation was to be 
 made. 
 
 n. Having despatched these affairs, and 
 held a general diet of the province, he returned 
 again into Cisalpine Gaul, and thence went to 
 the army. Upon his arrival, he visited all the 
 quarters of the legions, and found, that by the 
 singular diligence of the soldiers, notwith- 
 standing the greatest scarcity of materials, no 
 less than six hundred transports, such as we 
 have described above, and twent3'-eight gal- 
 leys, were in such forwardness, that in a few 
 days they would be ready to be launched. 
 Having praised his soldiers, and those whom 
 he had set over the works, he gave them what 
 further instructions he thought necessary, and 
 ordered the whole fleet to rendezvous at port 
 Itius, whence he knew lay the most commo- 
 dious passage to Britain, it being there not above 
 thirty miles distant from the continent. Leav- 
 ing what soldiers he thought necessary for this- 
 purpose, he advanced at the head of four le- 
 gions, without baggage, and eight hundred 
 horse, into the country of the Treviri, because 
 they neither appeared at the general diets of 
 Gaul, nor submitted to the orders of ihe com- 
 monwealth ; and were, besides, reported' to be 
 soliciting the Germans beyond the Rhine. 
 
 HL This state is by far the most powerful 
 
 of all Gaul in horse ; they have likewise a 
 
 very strong and numerous infantry ; and as we 
 
 have before observed, bordered upon the 
 
 T 137 
 
138 
 
 ■CESAR'S 
 
 Rhine. Two of their principal men, Indutio- 
 marus and Cingetorix, were at this time con- 
 petitors for the supreme authority. Cingeto- 
 rix, as soon as he heard of the arrival of Ccesar 
 and the legions, came to him, and assured him, 
 that he and all his party would continue firm 
 to their duty, and never abandon the interest 
 of the Romans : at the same time, he informed 
 him of all that had passed among the Treviri. 
 But Indutiomarus drawing together great 
 numbers of horse and foot, and securing such 
 as were unable to bear arms, in the forest of 
 Arden, which extends from the Khine quite 
 across the country of Treves, to the terri- 
 tories of the Rhemi, resolved to try the for- 
 tune of war. But soon after, as several of the 
 leading men of the state, partly out of attach- 
 ment to Cingetorix, partly terrified by the ap- 
 proach of the Roman army, catne to Cassar to 
 solicit in their own behalf, since they found 
 themselves incapable of effectually serving 
 their country, Indutiomarus fearing a uni- 
 ^versal defection, sent likewise ambassadors to 
 ihim to acquaint him, " That he had chosen to 
 «tay at home, and forbear coming to the Ro- 
 man camp, with no other view but to keep the 
 ■state in its duty, lest, in the absence of the no- 
 bility, the people might have been drawn in- 
 •to some rash step : that the whole country was 
 now at his command, and he ready, with Cas- 
 •ear's permission, to attend him in person, and 
 put his own concerns, as well as those of the 
 state, under his protection." Though Csesar 
 well understood the reason of his present sub- 
 mission, and by what considerations he had 
 ibeen deterred from the prosecution of his first 
 design, yet unwilUng to waste the whole sum- 
 mer in the country of Treves, when every thing 
 was in readiness for his expedition into Britain, 
 she ordered Indutiomarus to attend him with two 
 hundred hostages. These being accordingly 
 brought, and among them the son, and all the 
 nearest relations of Indutiomarus, whom he 
 had specified by name, Caesar encouraged and 
 exhorted him to continue firm in his duty. 
 Nevertheless, assembling all the principal men 
 of Treves, he reconciled them one after ano- 
 ther to Cingetorix, as well on account of his 
 ■singular merit, as because he thought it of the 
 greatest importance to establish thoroughly 
 the authority of a man, of whose steady and in- 
 violable attachment he had such convincing 
 proof. Indutiomarus highly resented this pro 
 
 ceeding, which tended so much to the diminu- 
 tion of his power ; and as he had all along 
 been an enemy to the Romans, this new af- 
 front provoked him stiil more. 
 
 IV. These affairs being settled, Caesar ar- 
 rived with his legions at the port of Itius. 
 There he found, that about forty of his ships, 
 built in the country of the Belgians, having 
 been attacked by a storm, and disabled from 
 continuing their voyage, had been obliged to 
 put back. The rest were all equipped and 
 rigged, ready to obey the first signal. All the 
 cavalry of Gaul, about four thousand in num- 
 ber, and the prime nobility of the several states, 
 met him likewise, by order, at this place. His 
 design was, to leave only a few of these nobles 
 behind him in Gaul, on whose fidelity he could 
 rely, and to take the rest with him to Britain 
 as hostages, the better to prevent any commo- 
 tions during his absence. 
 
 V, Dumnorix, the ^duan, of whom we 
 have spoken above, was one of those that at- 
 tended him on this occasion. Him in parti- 
 cular he resolved to carry along with him, as 
 he knew him to be a lover of novelties, ambi- 
 tious, enterprising, and of great interest and 
 authority among the Gauls. Besides all this, 
 he had publicly said in an assembly of the 
 ^Eduans, that Caesar had invested him with 
 the sovereignty of their state ; which resolu- 
 tion, though by no means pleasing to the 
 iEduans, they yet durst not send ambassadors 
 to Caesar, either to oppose or get reversed ; 
 nor was Cajsar otherwise informed of the mat- 
 ter, but by those whom he had placed about 
 Dumnorix, to have an eye over his conduct. 
 Dumnorix, at first, earnestly petitioned to be 
 left in Gaul, sometimes pretending he was 
 unused to sailing, and afraid of the sea, some- 
 times urging religious engagements, which re- 
 quired him to stay at home. But finding all 
 his endeavours to no purpose, he began to so- 
 licit the chiefs of the Gauls, discoursing them 
 apart, and advising them not to leave the con- 
 tinent. The more to awaken their fears, he 
 told them : " That Csesar had his particular 
 reasons for carrying with him all the nobility 
 of Gaul ; because not daring to despatch 
 them in their own country, he was in hopes 
 of finding a favourable opportunity to execute 
 his cruel purpose in Britain." He therefore 
 exhorted them to join in a mutual alliance, 
 and oblige themselves by a solemn oath, to 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 139 
 
 pursue with common consent such measures 
 as should appear necessary for the preserva- 
 tion of Gaul. 
 
 VI. Though Cffisar was fully informed of 
 these practices, yet in consideration of his 
 singular regard for the ^duans, he contented 
 himself with endeavouring to check and tra- 
 verse his designs, determined, notwithstand- 
 ingjto continue inflexible, and at all hazards 
 prevent any misfortune to himself and the 
 commonwealth, from a spirit, which he found 
 every day growing more hardy and intrepid. 
 Being therefore detained in this place a! out 
 five and twenty days, during which the north- 
 west wind, very common on that coast, hin- 
 dered him from sailing, he studied by the 
 ways of gentleness and persuasion, to keep 
 Dumnorix in his duty, without neglecting 
 however to watch all his motions. At last, 
 the wind springing up fair, he ordered the 
 horse and foot to embark. As this uni- 
 versally engaged the attention of the camp, 
 Dumnorix unknown to Caesar, drew off the 
 -5]duan cavalry, and began his march home- 
 ward. CiEsar being informed of it, imme- 
 diately put a stop to the embarkation, and 
 postponing every other consideration, ordered 
 out a strong party of horse to pursue and bring 
 him back. If he made resistance, or refused 
 to obey, they had orders to kill him ; for he 
 judged, that a man who slighted his personal 
 authority, would not pay any great regard to 
 his commands in hia absence. When they 
 had overtaken him, he refused to return, and 
 defending himself sword in hand, implored 
 the assistance of his followers, often calling 
 out, that he was free, and the subject of a free 
 state. The Romans, according to the orders they 
 had received, surrounded and slew him, upon 
 which all the J3duan cavalry returned to Cassar, 
 
 VII. This affair concluded, and Labienus 
 being left in Gaul with three legions, and 
 two thousand horse to defend the port, pro- 
 vide corn, have an eye upon the transactions 
 of the continent, and take measures accord- 
 ingly, Ccesar weighed anchor about sun-set 
 with five legions, and the same number of 
 horse he had left with Labienus, and advanc- 
 ing with a gentle south wind, continued his 
 course till midnight, when he found himself 
 becalmed ; but the tide still driving him on, 
 at day-break he saw Britain on his left. 
 When again following the return of the tide, 
 he rowed with all his might, to reach that | 
 
 part of the island which he had marked out 
 the summer before, as most convenient for 
 landing ; and on this occasion the diligence of 
 the soldiers cannot be enough commended, 
 who, labouring incessantly on the oar, urged 
 the transports and ships of burden so swiftly, 
 that they equalled the course of the galleys. 
 The whole fleet reached the coast of Britain 
 about noon ; nor did any enemy appear in 
 view. But as Caesar afterwards understood 
 from the prisoners, though a great army of 
 Britons had repaired to the coast, yet terrified 
 by the vast number of ships, which, together 
 with those of the last year's expedition, and 
 such as had been fitted out by particular per- 
 sons for their own use, amounted to upwards 
 of eight hundred, they retired hastily from 
 the shore, and hid themselves behind the 
 mountains. 
 
 VIII. Caesar having landed his army, and 
 chosen a proper place for his camp, as soon 
 as he understood from the prisoners where 
 the enemy's forces lay, leaving ten cohorts 
 upon the coast, together with three hundred 
 horse, to guard the fleet, he set out about 
 midnight in quest of the enemy, being under 
 the less concern for his ships, because he had 
 left them at anchor upon a smooth and open 
 shore, under the charge of Q. Atrius. After 
 a march of twelve hours, during the night, he 
 came within sight of the enemy, who, having 
 posted themselves behind a river, with their 
 cavalry and chariots, attacked us from the 
 higher ground, in order to oppose our pas- 
 sage ; but being rcjiulsed by our horse, they 
 retreated towards the woods, into a place 
 strongly fenced both by nature and art, and 
 which, in all probability, had been fortified 
 before on occasion of some domestic war ; for 
 all the avenues were secured by strong bar- 
 ricadoes of felled trees. They never sallied 
 out of the wood but in small parties, thinking 
 it enough to defend the entrance against our 
 men. But the soldiers of the seventh legion 
 advancing under cover of their shields, and 
 having cast up a mount, forced the intren(h- 
 ments with little loss, and obliged the enemy 
 to abandon the wood. CaDsar forbid all pur- 
 suit, both because he was unacquainted with 
 the nature of the country, and the day being 
 far spent, he resolved to employ the rest of 
 it in fortifying the camp. 
 
 IX. Early the next morning he divided his 
 troops, both horse and foot, into three bodiesj 
 
140 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 und sent them out in pursuit of the enemy. 
 They were advanced but a little way, and just 
 come within sight of the rear of the Britons, 
 when a party of horse from Atrius came to 
 Cassar, and informed him, " That a dreadful 
 storm arising the night before, had fallen vio- 
 lently upon the fleet, and driven almost all the 
 ships ashore ; that neither anchors nor cables, 
 nor all the address of the mariners and pilots, 
 had been able to resist the fury of the tempest, 
 which had done unspeakable damage to the 
 fleet, by reason of the ships running foul of 
 one another." Caesar, upon this intelligence, 
 recalls his legions and cavalry, commanding 
 them to give over their pursuit. He himself 
 returns to his ships, and finds every thing ac- 
 cording to the reports and letters he had re- 
 ceived, forty of them being entirely destroyed, 
 and the rest so damaged, that they were hard- 
 ly repairable. He therefore set all the carpen- 
 ters of the army to work, and wrote for others 
 to Gaul, ordering Labienus at the same time, 
 with the legions under his command, to build 
 what ships he could. He thought it likewise 
 safest, though a work of great labour and dif- 
 ficulty, to draw all his ships on shore, and in- 
 close them within the fortifications of his camp. 
 Ten days were spent in the service, during 
 which the soldiers had no intermission of fa- 
 tigue, not even in the night. The ships being 
 in this manner secured, and the camp strongly 
 fortified, he left the same troops to guard it as 
 before, and returned to the place where he had 
 quitted the pursuit of the enemy. Upon his 
 arrival he found the forces of the Britons con- 
 siderably increased. The chief command and 
 administration of the war, was, by common 
 consent, conferred upon Cassibelanus, whose 
 territories were divided from the maritime 
 states by the Thames, a river eighty miles dis- 
 tant from the sea. This prince had hitherto 
 been engaged in almost continual wars with 
 his neighbours ; but the terror of our arrival 
 making the Britons unite among themselves, 
 they intrusted him with the whole conduct of 
 the war. 
 
 X. The inland parts of Britain are inhabit- 
 ed by those, whom fame reports to be the na- 
 tives of the soil. The sea coast is peopled 
 with the Belgians, drawn thither by the love 
 of war and plunder. These last, passinc" over 
 from different parts and settling in the country, 
 still retain the names of the several states 
 whence they are descended. The island is 
 
 well peopled, full of houses, built after the 
 manner of the Gauls, and abounds in cattle. 
 They use brass money, and iron rings of a 
 certain weight. The provinces remote from 
 the sea produce tin, and those upon the coast 
 iron ; but the latter in no great quantity. Their 
 brass is all imported. "'All kinds of wood grow 
 here the same as in Gaul, except the fir and 
 beech-treer They think it unlawful to feed 
 upon hares, pullets, or geese ; yet they breed 
 them up for their diversion and pleasure. 
 The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, 
 and the cold less intense. The island is trian- 
 gular, one of its sides facing Gaul. The ex- 
 tremity towards Kent, whence is the nearest 
 passage to Gaul, lies eastward : the other 
 stretches south-west. This side extends about 
 five hundred miles. Another side looks to- 
 wards Spain, westward. Over against this 
 lies Ireland, an island esteemed not above 
 half as large as Britain, and separated from 
 it by an interval equal to that between Britain 
 and Gaul. In this interval lies the isle of 
 Mona, besides several other lesser islands, of 
 which some write, that in the time of the win- 
 ter solstice, they have night for thirty days to- 
 gether. We could make out nothing of this 
 upon inquiry, only discovered by means of our 
 hour-glasses, that the nights were shorter than 
 in Gaul. The length of this side is computed 
 at seven hundred miles. The last side faces 
 the north-east, and is fronted by no part of the 
 continent, only towards one of its extremities 
 it seems to eye chiefly the German coast. It 
 is thought to extend in length about eight 
 hundred miles. Thus the whole island takes- 
 in a circuit of two thousand miles. The in- 
 habitants of Kent, which lies wholly on the 
 sea coast, are the most civilized of all the 
 Britons, and differ but little in their manner 
 from the Gauls. The greater part of those 
 within the country never sow their lands, but 
 live on flesh and milk, and go clad in skins. 
 All the Britons in general paint themselves 
 with woad, which gives a bluish cast to the 
 skin, and makes them look dreadful in battle. 
 They are long haired : and shave all the rest 
 of the body except the head and upper lip. 
 Ten or twelve of them live together, having 
 their wives in common, especially brothers, 
 or parents and children amongst themselves ; 
 but the issue is always ascribed to him who 
 first espoused the mother. 
 
 XI. The enemy's horse, supported by their 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 141 
 
 chariots, ■vigorously charged our cavalry on 
 their march, yet we everywhere had the better, 
 and drove them to their own woods and hills ; 
 but after making great slaughter, venturing to 
 continue the pursuit too far, we lost some men. 
 Some time after, sallyi^ig unexpectedly from 
 the woods, and falling suddenl}' upon our 
 men while employed in fortifying their camp, 
 a sharp conflict ensued between them and the 
 advanced guard. Csesar sent two cohorts to 
 their assistance, whom the Britons charging 
 in separate parties, so surprised with their new 
 manner of lighting, that they broke through, 
 routed them, and returned without loss. Q. 
 Laberius Durus, a military tribune, was slain 
 on this occasion ; but some fresh cohorts com- 
 ing up, the Britons were at last repulsed. 
 
 XII. By this action which happened within 
 view of the camp, and of which the whole 
 army were spectators, it evidently appeared, 
 that our heavy armed legions, who could 
 neither pursue those that retired, nor durst 
 venture to forsake their standards, were by no 
 means a fit match for such an enemy : nor 
 could even the cavalry engage without great 
 danger, it I^ing usual for the Britons to coun- 
 terfeit a retreat, until they had drawn them a 
 considerable way from the legions, when sud- 
 denly quitting their chariots, they charged 
 them on foot, and by this unequal manner of 
 fighting, made it alike dangerous to pursue or 
 retire. Add to all this, that they never fought 
 in a body, but in small parties, and with con- 
 siderable intervals between. 'J'hey had like- 
 wise their detachments so placed, as easily to 
 protect their flying troops, and send fresh sup- 
 plies where needful. 
 
 XIII. The next day they stationed them- 
 selves among the hills, at a distance from our 
 camp, and appeared only in small bodies, nor 
 seemed so forward to skirmish with our cavalry 
 as the day before. But about noon, Csesar 
 ordering out three legions to forage, with all 
 the cavalry, under the command of C. Tre- 
 bonius, his lieutenant, they fell suddenly upon 
 the foragers on all sides, and even attacked the 
 legions and standards. Our men vigorously 
 returning the charge, repulsed them, and the 
 cavalry finding themselves supported by the 
 foot, continued the pursuit till they had utterly 
 broken them ; insomuch, that great numbers 
 being slain, they could neither find an oppor- 
 tunity to rally, descend from their chariots, or 
 (ace about to make resistance. After this defeat 
 
 13* 
 
 the auxiliary troops, which had come in from 
 all parts, returned severally to their own homes ; 
 nor did the enemy, from this time, appear any 
 more against us with their whole forces, 
 
 XIV. Csesar perceiving their design, marched 
 towards the Thames, to penetrate into the king- 
 dom of Cassibelanus. This river is fordable 
 only in one place, and that not without great 
 difficulty. When he arrived, he saw the enemy 
 drawn up in great numbers on the other side. 
 They had likewise secured the banks with sharp 
 stakes, ahd driven many of the sam.e kind into 
 the bottom of the river, yet so as to be covered 
 by the water. Caesar having intelligence of this, 
 from the prisoners and deserters, sent the caval- 
 ry before, ordering the legions to follow close 
 after, which they did with so much expedition 
 and briskness, though nothing but their heads 
 were above the water, that the enemy, unable 
 to sustain their charge, quitted the banks, and 
 betook themselves to flight. 
 
 XV. Cassibelanus, as we have before inti- 
 mated, finding himself unable to keep the field, 
 disbanded all his other forces ; and retaining 
 only four thousand chariots, watched our mo- 
 tions, always keeping at some distance from 
 us, and sheltering himself in woods and inac- 
 cessible places, whither he had likewise made 
 such of the inhabitants, with their cattle, retire, 
 as lay upon our route: and if at any time our 
 cavalry ventured upon a freer excursion into 
 the fields, to plunder and lay waste the country ; 
 as he was perfectly acquainted vs'ith all the 
 roads and defiles, he would sally from the 
 woods with some of the chariots, and fall upon 
 our men, dispersed and in disorder. These 
 freriuent alarms obliged us to be much upon 
 our guard ; nor would Csesar sufl!er the cavalry 
 to remove to any distance from the legions, or 
 to pillage and destroy the country, unless 
 where the foot was at hand to sustain them. 
 
 XVI. Meantime the Trinobantes, one of the 
 most powerful states in those parts, send am- 
 bassadors to CsBsar, Of this state was Man- 
 dubratius, who had fled for protection to CjEsar 
 in Gaul, that he might avoid the fate of his 
 father Imanuentius, whom Cassibelanus had 
 put to death. The ambassadors promised obe- 
 dience and submission in the name of the pro- 
 vince : and withal entreated him to defend 
 Mandubratius against the violence of Cassi- 
 belanus, and restore him to the government of 
 their state. Csesar ordered them to deliver 
 forty hostages, and furnish his army with corn ; 
 
143 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 sending back at the same time Mandubratius. 
 They yielded to his demands without delay, 
 sent the appointed number of hostages, and 
 suppHed him with corn, 
 
 XVII. The protection granted to the Trino- 
 bantes, securing them from the insults of the 
 soldiers ; the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancal- 
 ites, Bibroci, and Cassi send ambassadors to 
 Cassar, and submit. From them he had intelli- 
 gence, that he was not far from the capital of 
 Cassibelanus, which was situated amidst woods 
 and marshes, and whither great numbers of 
 men and cattle were retired. A town among 
 the Britons is nothing more than a thick wood, 
 fortified with a ditch and rampart, to serve as 
 a place of retreat against the incursions of their 
 enemies. Thither he marched with his legions ; 
 and though the place appeared to be extremely 
 strong, both by art and nature, he nevertheless 
 resolved to attack it in two several quarters. 
 The enemy, after a short stand, were obliged 
 at last to give way, and retire by another part 
 of the wood. Vast numbers of cattle were 
 found in the place; and many of the Britons 
 were either made prisoners, or lost their lives 
 in the pursuit, 
 
 XVIII, While these things passed beyond 
 the Thames, Cassibelanus despatched messen- 
 gers to Kent, which, as we have before ob- 
 served, was situated along the sea coast. This 
 country was then under the government of 
 four kings, Cingetorix, Carnilius, Taximagu- 
 lus, and Segonax, who had orders to draw all 
 their forces together, and fall suddenly upon 
 the naval camp of the Romans, But our men 
 sallying upon them as they approached, made 
 great slaughter of their troops, took Cingeto- 
 rix, one of their leaders, prisoner, and returned 
 safe to the camp, Cassibelanus, upon the 
 news of this battle, discouraged by so many 
 losses, the devastation of his territories, and 
 above all, the revolt of the provinces, sent am- 
 bassadors to Cfflsar to sue for peace, by the 
 mediation of Comius of Arras, 
 
 XIX. Ccesar designing to pass the winter in 
 Gaul because of the frequent commotions in 
 that country ; and reflecting that but a small 
 part of the summer remained, during which it 
 would be easy to protract the war : demanded 
 hostages, and appointed the yearly tribute 
 which Britain was to pay to the Romans. At 
 the same time he strictly charged Cassibelanus 
 to offer no injury to Mandubratius or the 
 Trinobantes. Having received the hostages. 
 
 he led his troops back to the sea-side, where 
 he found his fleet repaired. Orders were im- 
 mediately given to launch it ; and because the 
 number of prisoners was exceeding great, and 
 several ships had been destroyed by the tem- 
 pest, he resolved to carry over his men at two 
 embarkations. Happily it so fell out, notwith- 
 standing the great number of ships, and their 
 frequent passing and repassing, that not one 
 perished either this or the preceding year, 
 which had any soldiers on board : whereas 
 those sent empty to him from the continent, 
 as well the ships concerned in the first em- 
 barkation, as others built afterwards by Labie- 
 nus, to the number of sixty, were almost all 
 driven back or lost. CjBsar having waited for 
 them a considerable time to no purpose, and 
 fearing to lose the proper season for sailing, as 
 the time of the equinox drew near, chose to 
 stow his men on board the few ships he had ; 
 and taking the opportunity of an extraordinary 
 calm, set sail about ten at night, and by day- 
 break brought his whole fleet safe to the con- 
 tinent of Gaul. 
 
 XX. Having laid up his fleet, and held a 
 general assembly of the Gauls at S*marobriva ; 
 as the crop had been very indifferent this year, 
 by reason of the great droughts, he was oblig- 
 ed to quarter his legions otherwise than in for- 
 mer winters, and canton them one by one in 
 the several provinces of Gaul. One legion he 
 quartered on the Morini, under the command 
 of C. Fabius ; another among the Nervians, 
 under Q. Cicero ; a third with the ^duans, 
 under L. Roscius ; and a fourth in the country 
 of the Rhemi, on the borders of the Treviri, 
 under Labienus. Three were sent into Bel- 
 gium, over whom he appointed three com- 
 manders; M. Crassuc, his questor, L, Muna- 
 tius Plancus, and C. Trebonius. The eighth 
 and last, which Caesar had newly raised on 'the 
 other side of the Po, was sent, together with 
 five cohorts, among the Eburones, between the 
 Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambiorix and 
 Cativulcus reigned. At the head of this 
 body were two commanders, Q. Titurius Sa- 
 binus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta. By this 
 distribution of his legions, he thought he had 
 found an easy remedy against the scarcity of 
 corn ; and yet they all lay within the com- 
 pass of a hundred miles, except that under L, 
 Roscius, for which he was in no pain, as being 
 quartered in a very quiet and friendly country. 
 He resolved however not to leave Gaul till he 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 143 
 
 had received advice from all his lieutenants, 
 and was assured that their quarters were esta- 
 -lished, fortified, and secured. 
 ■ XXL Among the Carnutes lived Tasgetius, 
 a man of distinguished birth, and whose an- 
 cestors had been possessed of the sovereignty 
 in that state. Coesar had restored him to the 
 dignity of his forefathers, in consideration of 
 his virtue and affection to him, and the many 
 signal services he had done him in all his wars. 
 It was now the third year of his reign, when 
 his enemies, many of whom were of his own 
 state, conspiring against him, openly assassi- 
 nated him. The affair was laid before Ca3sar; 
 who fearing lest the great number concerned 
 in the plot might draw the state into a revolt, 
 ordered L. Plancus, with a legion from Bel- 
 gium, to march speedily into the country of the 
 Carnutes, fix his winter quarters, in that pro- 
 vince, and seizing all who had been concerned 
 in the murder of Tasgetius, send them pri- 
 soners to him. Meantime he was informed 
 by his lieutenants and questors to whom he 
 had committed the care of the legions, that they 
 were severally arrived at their appointed quar- 
 ters, and had fortified themselves in them. 
 
 XXII. About fifteen days after the arrival 
 of the legions in their winter quarters, a sud- 
 den insurrection and revolt broke out among 
 the Eburones, by the secret practice of Am- 
 biorix and Cativulcus. These two princes had 
 been to meet Sabinus and Cotta on their 
 frontiers, and in a friendly manner had sup- 
 plied them with corn : but now, instigated by 
 
 " Indutiomarus of Treves, they excited their 
 people to take up arms : and having surprised 
 some soldiers that were gone to cut wood, 
 came with a great body of troops to attack the 
 Roman camp. Our men immediately flew to 
 arms, ascended the ramparts, and sending out 
 a detachment of Spanish horse, put their cav- 
 alry to rout. Upon this, despairing of success, 
 
 ' they drew off their men from the attack ; and, 
 according to their custom, demanded a con- 
 ference ; pretending they had something to say, 
 which concerned the common interest, and 
 might serve to put an end to their present 
 differences. 
 
 XXIII. Accordingly C. Arpinius, a Roman 
 knight, the friend of Q. Titurius, and Q. Ju- 
 nius of Spain, who had frequently before been 
 sent by Csssar to Ambiorix, were deputed, to 
 treat. Ambiorix addressed them in words to 
 this effect : " That he had in no sort forgot 
 
 the many obligations he lay under to Caesar, 
 who had freed him from the tribute he had 
 been wont to pay the Atuatici ; and who had 
 restored him his son and nephew, whom that 
 people, after receiving them as hostages, had 
 treated as slaves : that the hostilities he had 
 just committed were not the effect of his own 
 private animosity to the Romans, but in con- 
 sequence of a resolution of the state ; where 
 the government was of such a nature that the 
 people had as much power over him, as he 
 over the people : that even the state itself had 
 been in a manner forced into this war, by a 
 sudden confederacy of all Gaul : that he could 
 appeal to his own weakness for the truth of 
 what he said, being not so very unskilled in 
 affairs as to imagine, that the forces of the 
 Eburones were a match for the power of the 
 Romans ; that it was a project formed by all 
 the states of Gaul in common, who had agreed 
 to storm in one day, the very day on which he 
 spoke, all the quarters of the Roman army ; so 
 that no one might be able to succour another : 
 that it was not easy for Gauls to resist the im- 
 portunity of those of their own rtetion, espe- 
 cially in a proposal to act in concert for the re- 
 covery of their liberty ; but that, after having 
 performed what the common voice of his coun- 
 try demanded, he thought he might now listen 
 to that of gratitude : that he found himself 
 compelled by his attachment to Caesar, and by 
 his friendship for Sabinus, to give notice of 
 the extreme danger to which the legion was 
 exposed : that a great body of Germans had 
 actually passed the Rhine, and would be there 
 in two days at furthest : that Sabinus and 
 Cotta were to consider, whether it would not 
 be proper to retire with their troops, before the 
 neighbouring states could be apprized of their 
 design ; and go and join Labienus, or Cicero, 
 who were neither of them distant much above 
 fifty miles. That as far as regarded himself, 
 he engaged by all that was sacred to secure 
 their retreat through his territories ; and under- 
 took it the more readily, as he should thereby 
 not only discharge his duty to his country, in 
 delivering it from the inconvenience of winter- 
 ing the Romans, but at the same time mani- 
 fest his gratitude to Csesar," Having made 
 this speech, he withdrew. 
 
 XXIV. Arpinius and Junius reported what 
 they had heard to the lieutenants; who, alarmed 
 at the suddenness of the thing, thought the 
 information not to be neglected, though it came 
 
144 
 
 CtESAR'S 
 
 from an enemy : nor were they a little moved 
 by this consideration, that it appeared to them 
 altogether incredible, that the Eburones, a 
 weak and inconsiderable state, should of their 
 own accord presume to take up arms against 
 the Romans. They therefore laid the matter 
 before a council of war, where a warm debate 
 arose. L. Arunculeius, with a great number 
 of military tribunes, and centurions of the first 
 rank, were against undertaking any thing has- 
 tily, or quitting their winter quarters, before 
 they had received orders to that purpose from 
 Cffisar. They alleged : " That having strongly 
 fortified their camp, they were able to defend 
 themselves, even against all the forces of the 
 Germans : that the late attempt of the Gauls 
 was a sufficient proof of this, whom they had 
 not only withstood with courage, but repulsed 
 with loss : that they had provisions in abund- 
 ance, and might therefore securely wait the 
 arrival of relief from Caesar and the neigh- 
 bouring legions : in fine, that nothing could 
 be more dishonourable, or argued greater want 
 of judgment, than in affairs of the highest mo- 
 ment, to take measures upon the information 
 of an enemy." Titurius, on the other hand, 
 exclaimed ; " That it would be then too late 
 to think of retiring, when the enemy, in greater 
 numbers, and strengthened by the accession 
 of the Germans, should come up against them ; 
 or when the quarters next them should have 
 received some signal check : that the time for 
 deliberation was short: that Caesar, he made 
 no question, was gone into Italy, it not be- 
 ing likely that either the Carnutes would 
 have formed the design of assassinating Tas- 
 getius, or the Eburones in so contemptuous a 
 manner assaulted the Roman camp, had they 
 not been assured of his departure : that the 
 information of an enemy weighed not with 
 him, but the real circumstance of things. The 
 Rhine was not far off. The Germans were 
 much exasperated by the death of Ariovistus, 
 and their late frequent defeats, Gaul burned 
 with impatience to throw off the Roman yoke, 
 avenge the many losses they had sustained, 
 and recover their former glory in war, of which 
 now scarce a shadow remained. In short, who 
 could imagine that Ambiorix, without a cer- 
 tainty of being supported, would have em- 
 barked in so dangerous an enterprise 1 That 
 his opinion was in all respects safe ; because, 
 if no such confederacy had been formed, they 
 had nothing to apprehend in marching to the 
 
 nearest legion ; if, on the contrary, all Gaul 
 and Germany were united, expedition alone 
 could save them from destruction : whereas, 
 by following the advice of Cotta and those 
 who were against a retreat, though the dan- 
 ger perhaps might not prove immediate, yet 
 were they sure in the end of perishing by 
 famine." The dispute continued for some 
 time ; Cotta, and the principal officers, strongly 
 opposing the march of the troops. At last Sa- 
 binus raising his voice, that he might be heard 
 by the soldiers without : " Be it so then, (says 
 he,) since you seem so resolved : I am not he 
 among you who is most afraid of death. But, 
 if any misfortune happens, those who hear me 
 will know whom to blame. In two days,did 
 not you oppose it, we might easily reach the 
 quarters next us ; and there, in conjunction 
 with our fellow-soldiers, confront the common 
 danger ; whereas, by keeping the troops sepa- 
 rate and at a distance, you reduce them to the 
 necessity of perishing by sword or famine." 
 
 XXV, The council was then going to rise : 
 but the officers, surrounding their generals, 
 conjured them not to put all to hazard by their 
 dissension and obstinacy. They told them, 
 " That whatever resolution was taken, whether 
 to go or stay, the danger was by no means 
 great, provided they acted with union among 
 themselves ; but their disagreement threatened 
 the troops with inevitable destruction." The 
 debate continued till midnight : when at length 
 Cotta, vanquished by importunity, yielded to 
 the opinion of Sabinus. Orders were given 
 for marching by break of day. The remainder 
 of the night was none of it employed in sleep ; 
 each man being taken up in choosing what 
 things to carry along with him, and what of 
 his winter necessaries to leave behind. In 
 short, they did every thing to make their stay 
 more dangerous ; and by their fatigue and 
 want of rest, incapacitate themselves for a 
 vigorous defence upon their march. At 
 day-break they left their camp, not like men 
 acting by the advice of an enemy, but as if 
 Ambiorix had been their particular friend ; 
 marching in a very extended column, and fol- 
 lowed by a great train of baggage. 
 
 XXVI. The enemy judging from the hurry 
 and motion in the camp, that the Romans intend- 
 ed to leave it, placed themselves in ambuscade 
 in two bodies in a wood ; where, well sheltered 
 and covered from view, they waited, at about 
 two miles distance, their arrival ; and when 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 145 
 
 he greatest part of the army had entered a 
 arge valley, suddenly appearing on both sides 
 of it, they attacked them at the same time in 
 front and rear, and obliged them to fight in a 
 place of great disadvantage. 
 
 XXVII. Then at length Titurius, like 
 one who had neglected all the necessary pre- 
 cautions, unable to hide his concern, ran up 
 and down among the troops, and began to dis- 
 pose them in order of battle, but with an air 
 so timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he 
 had no hopes of success ; as happens for the 
 most part to those who leave all to the last mo- 
 ment of execution. But Cotta, who had fore- 
 seen that this might happen, and had there- 
 fore opposed the departure of the troops, 
 omitted nothing in his power for the common 
 safety ; calling to and encouraging the men 
 like an able general, and at the same time 
 fighting with the bravery of a common soldier ; 
 and, because the great length of the column 
 rendered it difficult for the lieutenants to re- 
 medy all disorders, and repair expeditiously 
 enough to the places where their presence was 
 necessary, orders w^ere given to quit the de- 
 fence of the baggage, and form into an orb. 
 This disposition, though not improper in these 
 circumstances, was nevertheless attended with 
 very unhappy consequences ; for being consi- 
 dered as the effect of terror and despair, it dis- 
 couraged our men, and augmented the confi- 
 dence of the enemy. Besides, as unavoida- 
 bly happens on such occasions, many of the 
 soldiers quitting their ensigns, hastened to 
 fetch from the baggage what they had most of 
 value, and filled all parts with uproar and 
 lamentation. 
 
 XXVIII. The Gauls meanwhile conducted 
 themselves with great prudence : their offi- 
 cers proclaimed through the ranks " That not 
 a man should stir from his post ; that the 
 booty was theirs, and every thing belonging 
 to the Romans must certainly fall into their 
 hands ; but that all depended upon securing 
 the victory." Our men were not inferior to 
 the enemy, either in valour, number, or way 
 of fighting. Though they had neither gene- 
 ral, nor fortune on their side, they hoped still 
 by their bravery to surmount all difficulties ; 
 and whenever any of the cohorts sallied out, 
 so as to join the enemy, hand to hand, a con- 
 siderable slaughter of the Gauls ensued. This 
 being perceived by Ambiorix, he ordered his 
 men to cast their darts at a distance, to avoid 
 
 ! a close fight, retire hefore the Romans when- 
 ever they advanced, and puisue them as they 
 returned to their standards : in which way of 
 fighting they were become so expert, by the 
 lightness of their arms, and daily exercise, that 
 it was impossible to do them any hurt. These 
 orders were exactly followed ; insomuch that 
 when any cohort left the orb, and came for- 
 ward to attack the enemy, they retreated and 
 dispersed in a moment : meanwhile it uncovered 
 its own flanks, and exposed them to the darts 
 on either side. The danger was still greater 
 when they returned ; for then not only the 
 troops that stood next them, but those who had 
 retired before them, surrounded and charged 
 them on all hands. If, on the contrary, they 
 chose to continue in their post, neither could 
 their valour any thing avail them, nor was it 
 possible for men standing so close together, to 
 avoid the darts of so great a multitude. And 
 yet, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, 
 and the many wounds they had received, they 
 still maintained their ground ; and though 
 much of the day was now spent, the fight 
 having continued from sun-rise till two in the 
 afternoon, they did nothing in all that time 
 unworthy the dignity of the Roman name. At 
 length T. Balventius, who the year before had 
 been made first centurion of a legion, a man 
 of distinguished courage, and great authority 
 • among the troops, had both his thighs pierced 
 with a dart. Q. Lucanius, an officer of the 
 same rank, endeavouring to rescue his son, 
 whom he saw surrounded by the enemy, was 
 killed after a brave resistance. And L. Cotta, 
 the lieutenant, encouraging the several co- 
 horts aftd companies, received a blow on the 
 mouth from a sling. 
 
 XXIX. So many misfortunes quite dispi- 
 rited Titurius; who perceiving Ambiorix at a 
 distance animating his troops, sent On. Pom- 
 pey, his interpreter, to- beg quarters for him- 
 self and his soldiers. Ambiorix replied, " That 
 he was ready to grant him a conference if he 
 desired it. That he hoped to prevail with the 
 multitude to spare the Romans ; and that as 
 to Sabinus himself, he gave his word no hurt 
 should be done him." Sabinus communicated 
 this answer to Cotta, proposing that they 
 should leave the battle, and go and confer 
 with Ambiorix, from whom he was in hopes 
 of obtaining quarter both for themselves 
 and their men. Cotta absolutely refused to 
 treat with an armed enemy, and persisted in 
 U 
 
146 
 
 C JESAR'S 
 
 that resolution. Sabinus ordered tlie military 
 tribunes and principal centurions that were 
 about his person to follow him, and when he 
 drew near to Ambiorix, being commanded to 
 lay down his arms, obeyed ; charging those 
 that were with him to do the same. Mean- 
 while, as they were treating about the condi- 
 tions, Ambiorix spinning out the deliberations 
 on purpose, he washy degrees surrounded and 
 slain. Then the Gauls, according to their 
 custom, raising a shout, and calling out vic- 
 tory, charged our troops with great fury, and 
 put them into disorder. L. Gotta, fighting 
 manfully, was slain, with the greatest part 
 of the soldiers. The rest retreated to the camp 
 they had quitted in the morning ; of whom L. 
 Petrosidius, the standard-bearer, finding him- 
 self sore pressed by the enemy, threw the eagle 
 within the intrenchments, and was killed 
 fighting bravely before the camp. Those that 
 remained, with much ado, sustained the at- 
 tack till night ; but finding themselves with- 
 out hope, they killed one another to the last 
 man. A few who escaped out of the fight, 
 got by different ways to Labienus's camp, and 
 brought him the news of this sad event. 
 
 XXX. Ambiorix, elated with this victory, 
 marched immediately at the head o his cav- 
 alry into the country of the Atuatici, which 
 bordered upon his territories ; and travelling 
 day and night without intermission, left orders 
 for the infantry to follow him. Having in- 
 formed them of his success and roused them to 
 arms, he the next day arrived among the Ner- 
 vians, and urged them not to lose the favoura- 
 ble opportunity of freeing themselves for ever 
 from the yoke of slavery, and avenging the 
 injuries they had received from the Komans. 
 He told them, " That two of their lieutenants 
 had been slain, and a great part of their army 
 cut to pieces : that it would be an easy matter 
 suddenly to attack and destroy the legion 
 quartered in their country under Gicero : and 
 that he was himself ready to assist them 
 in the enterprise." By this speech he easily 
 drew in the Nervians. 
 
 XXXI. Accordingly, having forthwith de- 
 spatched messengers to the Centrones, Grudii, 
 Levaci, Pleumosians, and Gorduni, who are 
 all subject to their state, they assembled what 
 forces they could, and came unexpectedly upon 
 Cicero's quarters, who as yet had heard no- 
 thing of the fate of Titurius. Here likewise 
 it unavoidably fell out, that the soldiers sent 
 
 to cut wood for firing and the fortifications of 
 the camp, were intercepted by the sudden ar- 
 rival of their cavalry. Having put all these 
 to the svyord, the Eburones, Atuatici, and 
 Nervians, with their allies and tributaries, 
 amounting to a formidable army, came and at- 
 tacked the camp. Our men immediately flew 
 to arms, ascended the rampart, and with great 
 difficulty sustained the day's assault; for the 
 enemy placed all their hopes in despatch, and 
 firmly believed that if they came off conquer- 
 ors on this occasion, they could not fail of 
 victory every where else. 
 
 XXXII. Cicero's first care was to write to 
 Csesar, promising the messengers great re- 
 wards if they carried his letters safe. But as 
 all the ways were beset by the enemy's troops, 
 his couriers were continually intercepted. 
 Meanwhile of the materials brought for forti- 
 fying the camp a hundred and twenty towers 
 were built, during the night, with incredible 
 despatch, and the works about the rampart 
 completed. Next day the enemy, with a much 
 greater force than before, attacked the camp, 
 filled the ditch, but were again repulsed by 
 our men. This continued for several days to- 
 gether. The night was wholly employed in 
 repairing the breaches made by day, insomuch 
 that neither the sick nor wounded were per- 
 mitted to rest. Whatever might be of use 
 to resist the next day's assault, was prepared 
 with great diligence during the night. Stakes 
 were hardened in the fire, palisades planted 
 in great numbers, towers raised upon all parts 
 of the rampart, and the whole strengthened 
 with a parapet and battlements. Cicero him- 
 self, though much out of order, would take no 
 rest, even during the night ; so that the soldiers 
 were obliged to force him from time to time to 
 take some repose. 
 
 XXXIII. Meantime such of the Nervian 
 chiefs and leaders, as had any intimacy or 
 friendship with Cicero, desired a conference. 
 This being agreed to, they addressed him in 
 the same strain as Ambiorix had before used 
 towards Sabinus : " That all Gaul was in arms : 
 that the Germans had passed the Rhine : that 
 Caesar and the rest of the troops were besieged 
 in their winter quarters." They told him 
 likewise of the fate of Sabinus ; and, to gain 
 credit, produced Ambiorix ; adding, « That it 
 was in vain to expect relief from those who 
 were themselves in the utmost distress : that 
 they meant not however any injury to Cicero 
 
COMMENTARIES, 
 
 ■47 
 
 and the people of Rome, but merely to prevent 
 their wintering in the country, and establish- 
 ing that practice into a custom : that he was 
 therefore at liberty to leave his quarters with- 
 out molestation and retire in safety where he 
 pleased." To this Cicero only answered : 
 " That it was not usual with the people of 
 Rome to accept conditions from an armed 
 enemy : but if they would lay down their arms, 
 he promised to interpose his mediation, and 
 permit them to send ambassadors to Cssar, 
 from whose justice they might reasonably ex- 
 pect redress." 
 
 XXXIV. The Nervians, driven from this 
 hope, surrounded the camp with a line, whose 
 rampart was eleven feet high, and ditch fif- 
 teen feet deep. They had learned something 
 of this in former wars with Csesar, and the 
 prisoners they had made gave the further in- 
 structions. But being unprovided of the tools 
 necessary in this kind of service, they were 
 obliged to cut the turf with their swords, dig 
 up the earth with their hands, and carry it in 
 their cloaks. And hence it will be easy to form 
 some judgment of their number; for in less 
 than three hours they completed a line of fif- 
 teen miles in circuit. The following days were 
 employed in raising towers, proportioned to 
 the height of our rampart, and in preparing 
 scythes, and wooden galleries, in which they 
 were again assisted by the prisoners. 
 
 XXXV. On the seventh day of the attack, 
 a very high wind arising, they began to throw 
 red hot balls of clay, and burning javelins upon 
 the barracks of the Romans, which, after the 
 manner of the Gauls, were thatched with straw. 
 These soon took fire, and the flames were in a 
 moment spread by the wind into all parts of 
 the camp. The enemy falling on with a mighty 
 shout, as if already secured of victory, ad- 
 vanced their towers and galleries, and prepared 
 to scale the rampart. But such was the con- 
 stancy and presence of mind of the soldiers, that 
 though the flames surrounded them on every 
 side, and they were oppressed with the multi- 
 tude of the enemy's darts; though they saw 
 their huts, their baggage, and their whole for- 
 tunes in a blaze ; yet not only did they con- 
 tinue firm in their posts, but scarce a man of- 
 fered so much as to look behind him ; so in- 
 tent were they on fighting and repelling the 
 enemy. This was much the hardest day for 
 our troops : but had nevertheless this fortunate 
 issue, that far the greatest number of the en- 
 
 emy were on that day wounded or slain ; foi 
 as they had crowded close up to the rampart, 
 those behind prevented the front ranks from 
 retiring. The flames abating by degrees, and 
 the enemy having brought forward one of 
 their towers to the very foot of the rampart, 
 the centurions of the third cohort drew off 
 their men a little, beckoning to the Gauls, 
 and challenging them to enter : but as not a 
 man would run the hazard, they attacked them 
 on all sides with stones, drove them from the 
 tower, and set it on fire. 
 
 XXXVI. In this legion were two centu- 
 rions of distinguished valour, 1'. Pulfio, and 
 L. Varenus, who stood fair for being raised 
 to the first rank of their order. These were 
 perpetually disputing with one another the 
 pre-eminence in courage, and at every year's 
 promotion contended with great eagerness for 
 precedence. In the heat of the attack before 
 the rampart, Pulfio addressing Varenus, 
 " What hinders you now, (says he,) or what 
 more glorious opportunity would you desire of 
 signalizing your bravery 1 This, this is the day 
 for determining the controversy betw-een us." 
 At these words he sallied out of the camp, 
 and rushed amidst the thickest of the Gauls. 
 Nor did Varenus decline the challenge ; but 
 thinking his honour at stake, followed at some 
 distance. Pulfio darted his javelin at the 
 enemy, and transfixed a Gaul that was coming 
 forward to engage him : who falling dead of 
 the wound, the multitude advanced to cover 
 him with their shields, and all poured their 
 darts upon Pulfio, giving him no time to re- 
 tire. A javelin pierced his shield, and stuck 
 fast in his belt. This accident entangling 
 his right hand, prevented him drawing his 
 sword, and gave the enemy time to surround 
 him. Varenus, his rival, flew to his assis- 
 tance, and endeavoured to rescue him. Im- 
 mediately the multitude quitting Pulfio, as 
 fancying the dart had despatched him, all 
 turned upon Varenus. He met them with his 
 sword drawn, charged them hand to hand, and 
 having laid one dead at his feet, drove back 
 the rest; but, pursuing with too much eager- 
 ness, stept into a hole, and fell down. Pulfio 
 in his turn hastened to extricate him ; and 
 both together, after having slain a multitude 
 of the Gauls and acquired infinite applause, 
 retired unhurt within the intrenchments. Thus 
 fortune gave such a turn to the dispute, that 
 each owed his life to his adversary ; nor was 
 
148 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 it possible to decide, to which of them the 
 prize of valour was dae. 
 
 XXXVII. As the defence every day be- 
 came more difficult and hazardous, chiefly by 
 the great multitude of killed and wounded, 
 which considerably lessened the number of de- 
 fendants, Cicero sent letter upon letter to in- 
 form Caesar of his danger. Many of these 
 couriers falling into the enemy's hands, were 
 tortured to death within view of our soldiers. 
 There was at that time in the Roman camp a 
 Nervian of distinction, by name Vertico, who 
 in the beginning of the siege had fled to Cicero, 
 and given ample proofs of his fidelity. This man, 
 by the hopes of liberty, and a promise of great 
 rewards, engaged one of his slaves to carry a 
 letter to Cffisar. Having concealed it in his 
 javelin, and passed through the camp of the 
 Gauls without suspicion, as being himself of 
 that nation, he arrived safe at Ctesar's quarters, 
 who by this means was informed of the danger 
 of Cicero and the legion. 
 
 XXXVIII. Caasar, receiving the letter 
 about five in the afternoon, immediately des- 
 patched a messenger to M. Crassus, who was 
 quartered among the Bellovaci, twenty-five 
 miles off, ordering him to draw out his legion 
 at midnight, and march with all the expedition 
 he could to join him. Crassus, according to 
 his orders, came along with the courier. He 
 sent likewise to C. Fabius, directing him to 
 lead his legion into the country of the Atre- 
 batians, which lay in the way to Cicero. He 
 wrote to Labienus, if it could be done with 
 safety, to meet him upon the frontiers of the 
 Nervians. He himself in the meantime assem- 
 bled about four hundred horse from the 
 nearest garrisons, resolving not to wait for 
 the rest of the army, which lay at too great a 
 distance. 
 
 XXXIX. At nine in the morning he had 
 notice from his scouts of the arrival of Cras- 
 sus. That day he marched twenty miles, 
 leaving Crassus with a legion at Samarobriva, 
 where he had deposited the baggage, hostages, 
 public papers, and had all the provisions which 
 had been laid up for the winter. Fabius, in 
 consequence of his instructions, having made 
 all the haste he could, met him with his le- 
 gion. Labienus, who had been informed of 
 the death of Sabinus, and the destruction of 
 the troops under his command, and who saw 
 all the forces of Treves advancing against him, 
 fearing lest, if he should quit his quarters, 
 
 the enemy might construe it as a flight, and 
 that it would be impossible for him to sustain 
 their attack, especially as they were flushed 
 with their late success, wrote to Csesar in- 
 forming him of the danger that would attend 
 the quitting his camp, of the disaster that hap- 
 pened among the Eburones ; and that all the 
 forces of the Treviri, both horse and foot, were 
 encamped within three miles of him. 
 
 XL. Caesar approving his reasons, though 
 he thereby found himself reduced from three 
 to two legions, was yet sensible that all de- 
 pended upon expedition. He makes forced 
 marches ; and reaching the territories of the 
 Nervians, learned from some prisoners the 
 state of the siege and the danger the legion 
 was in. Immediately he engages a Gaulish 
 horseman, by the promise of great rewards, to 
 carry a letter to Cicero. It was wrote in 
 Greek characters, that if it fell into the ene- 
 my's hands, it might not be intelligible to 
 them. The messenger had orders, in case he 
 found it impracticable to penetrate himself 
 into the Roman camp, to tie the letter to a 
 javelin, and throw it in. In this letter Cajsar 
 sent Cicero word that he was already on the 
 march to relieve him, and would be up very 
 soon : exhorting him in the meantime, to de- 
 fend himself with his wonted bravery. The 
 Gaul, dreading a discovery, tlirew the letter into 
 the camp as had been ordered ; but the javeiln 
 by accident sticking in a tower, remained 
 there two days unpcrceived. On the third, a 
 soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to 
 Cicero, who immediately read it in full as- 
 sembly, and diffused the common joy through 
 the whole camp. On the same time they 
 perceived the smoke of the villages fired by 
 Caesar in his march, which put the arrival of 
 the succours beyond all doubt, 
 
 XLI. The Gauls having notice of it also by 
 their scouts, thought proper to quit the siege ; 
 and go to meet Csesar. Their army consisted 
 of about sixty thousand men. Cicero, now at 
 liberty, applied again to Vertico for the slave 
 spoken of above ; and having admonished 
 him to use the utmost diligence and circum- 
 spection, despatched him with a letter to 
 Caesar, informing him that the enemy had 
 raised the siege, and were advancing against 
 him with all their forces. Caesar received the 
 letter about midnight, communicated the con- 
 tents to his army, and exhorted them to meet 
 the enemy with courage. Next day he de« 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 14d 
 
 camped early, and after a march of about four 
 miles, discovered the Gauls on the other side 
 of a large valley, with a river in front. It was 
 dangerous to engage so great a force upon 
 unequal ground. Knowing therefore that the 
 siege of Cicero's camp was raised, and having 
 no longer any reason to be in a hurry, he en- 
 camped in the most convenient spot he could 
 find, and completed his intrenchments. His 
 army consisting of no more than seven thou- 
 sand men, without baggage, required at best 
 but a very small camp ; yet he purposely con- 
 tracted it as much as possible, to inspire the 
 enemy with the greater contempt of him. 
 Meantime, sending out scouts on all sides, he 
 endeavoured to find where he might cross the 
 valley with most safety. 
 
 XLII. The rest of the day passed in slight 
 skirmishes between the cavalry near the 
 brook ; but the main body of the army on 
 both sides kept within their lines : the Gauls, 
 in expectation of more forces, which were not 
 j'et come up; Caesar, that by pretending fear, 
 he might draw the enemy on this side the 
 valley, and engage them before his camp ; or, 
 if that could not be effected, that having dis- 
 covered the passes, he might be enabled to 
 cross the valley and rivulet with less danger. 
 Early next morning the enemy's cavalry coming 
 up to our camp, charged our horse ; who by 
 Caesar's orders, purposely gave ground, and 
 retired behind the works. At the same time 
 he caused the ramparts to be raised higher, 
 the gates to be barricaded, and cautioned the 
 soldiers, in the execution of these orders, to 
 run up and down tumultuously, and affect an 
 air of timidity and concern. The enemy, in- 
 vited by all these appearances, crossed the 
 valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous 
 post. Our men meanwhile retiring from the 
 rampart, they approached stjll nearer, cast 
 their darts on all sides within the trenches, 
 and sent heralds round the camp to proclaim, 
 that if any of the Gauls or Romans had a mind 
 to come over to them, they should be at liberty 
 to do so till nine o'clock, after which no quarter 
 would be granted. Nay, so far did they carry 
 their contempt, that thinking they could not 
 break in by the gates, (which to deceive them, 
 were stopped up with single rows of turf,) 
 some began to scale the rampart, others to fill 
 up the ditch. But then, Caesar, sallying by 
 all the gates at once, and charging them briskly 
 with his cavalry, put them so precipitately to 
 U 
 
 flight, that not a man offered to make the 
 least resistance. Great numbers of thera 
 were slain, and the rest obliged to throw down 
 their arms. 
 
 XLIII. Not caring to pursue them far, on 
 account of the woods and marshes that lay in 
 his way ; and finding that considerable execu- 
 tion had been done upon the spot, he the 
 same day joined Cicero with all his forces ; 
 where, beholding the towers, galleries, and 
 other works of the Gauls, he could not help 
 being struck with admiration. He then re- 
 viewed Cicero's legion, and found that not 
 a tenth man had escaped without wounds, 
 which gave him a just idea of the greatness 
 of the danger to which they had been ex- 
 posed, and of the vigorous defence they had 
 made. He bestowed great commendations 
 on the legion, and its commander; and ad- 
 dressed himself to the military tribunes by 
 name ; of whose valour Cicero made honour- 
 able mention. He learned particularly from 
 the prisoners all the circumstances of the 
 unhappy affair of Sabinus and Cotta : and 
 calling the soldiers together next day, gave 
 them an account of the whole transaction, 
 comforted them, confirmed their courage, and 
 told them, that a disaster occasioned by tho 
 imprudence and rashness of the lieutenant, 
 ought to give them the less disturbance ; 
 as by the favour of the immortal gods, and 
 their valour, vengeance had followed so sud- 
 denly, that neither had the joy of the ene- 
 my for the victory continued any time, nor 
 their grief for the loss remained long without 
 allay. 
 
 XLIV. Meantime the report of Caesar's 
 victory flew with incredible speed, through the 
 country of the Rhemi, to Labienus. For 
 though he lay at the distance of fifty miles 
 from Cicero's camp, whither Caesar did not 
 arrive till past three in the afternoon, yet be- 
 fore midnight a shout was raised at the gates 
 of his camp ; by which the Rhemi signified 
 to him Caesar's victory, and their own con- 
 gratulation on that success. The report of 
 this being carried to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, 
 who the next day had determined to attack 
 Labienus's camp, made off in the night, and 
 retired with all his forces into his own coun- 
 try. Caesar sent back Fabius with his legion 
 to his former quarters, resolving to winter 
 himself near Samarobriva, with three legions, 
 distributed in three different cantonments ; and 
 
150 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 as all Gaul was in motion, to continue with 
 the army in person. For the defeat and death 
 of Sabinus spreading every where, almost all 
 the states of Gaul were meditating a revolt ; 
 and with this view sent messengers and depu- 
 ties into all parts, to concert measures, and 
 contrive where to begin the war. Nay, they 
 held assemblies by night in desert places ; inso- 
 much, that during the whole winter, scarce a 
 day passed, but CiEsarhad intelligence of some 
 new resolves or insurrections of the Gauls. 
 Among the rest, L. Roscius, his lieutenant, 
 •who commanded the thirteenth legion, sent 
 him word that great numbers of Gauls from 
 the several states of Armorica, had assembled 
 to attack him, and advanced within eight miles 
 of his camp ; but upon hearing of Csesar's vic- 
 tory, had separated so hastily, that their re- 
 treat had all the appearance of a flight. 
 
 XLV. But Caesar summoning the principal 
 noblemen of every state to attend him ; partly 
 by menaces, making them sensible he was no 
 stranger to their designs ; partly by exhorta- 
 tions, found means to keep the greatest part 
 of Gaul in its duty. The Senones, however, 
 a potent state, and of great authority among 
 the Gauls, formed the design of publicly assas- 
 sinatiijg Cavarinus, whom Csesar had given 
 them for a king ; whose brother, Moritasgus, 
 had held the sovereignty at Caesar's arrival in 
 Gaul, and whose ancestors had long been in 
 possession of the same dignity. But he having 
 intelligence of the plot, thought proper to fly ; 
 whereupon, pursuing him to the very frontiers, 
 they drove him from his palace and throne: 
 and sending ambassadors to Caesar to justify 
 their conduct, upon his ordering their whole 
 senate to repair to him, they refused to sub- 
 mit. So powerful was this example amongst 
 the barbarians, that some at last were found 
 of courage enough to begin the war ; and so 
 great a change did it produce in the inclina- 
 tions of all, that except the ^duans and Rhe- 
 mi, who had been always particularly distin- 
 guished and favoured by Caesar ; the first, on 
 account of their ancient and inviolable fidelity 
 to the people of Rome ; the last, for their late 
 services in the Gallic war ; scarce was there 
 a single state in all Gaul that did not incur 
 suspicion. Nor is this, in truth, so much to 
 be wondered at; as for many other reasons, 
 so particularly for this : that a people famed 
 above all nations for their military virtues. 
 
 could not with patience bear to see taemselves 
 so far stripped of their former renown, as to be 
 forced to submit to the yoke of the Romans, 
 
 XLVI. Indutiomarus and the Treviri ceased 
 not, during the whole winter, to send ambas- 
 sadors over the Rhine ; soliciting the German 
 states ; offering them money ; and urging, 
 that a great part of our army having already 
 been cut off, much the least considerable re- 
 mained. But no part of that country could 
 be persuaded to come into their designs : be- 
 cause having twice before tried their fortune 
 with the Romans, in the war with Ariovistus, 
 and in the defeat of the Tenchtheri, they were 
 resolved, they told them, to run no more haz- 
 ards. Indutiomarus, disappointed of this hope, 
 was no less active in drawing forces together, 
 soliciting recruits from the neighbouring states, 
 providing horses, and encouraging even out- 
 laws and convicts, by the promise of great re- 
 wards, to engage in his service. And so great 
 an authority had he by this means acquired in 
 Gaul, that ambassadors flocked from all parts, 
 some publicly, others in a private manner, to 
 request his protection and friendship, 
 
 XLVII. Finding himself thus voluntarily- 
 applied to ; on one side, by the Senones and 
 Carnutes, impelled by a consciousness of the 
 guilt they had incurred ; on the other, by the 
 Nervians and Atuatici, who were preparing 
 for a war with the Romans ; and that if he 
 once took the field, forces would not be want- 
 ing ; he called an assembly of the states in arms. \; 
 This, according to the custom of the Gauls, 
 implies an actual commencement of war ; and, 
 by a standing law, obliges all their youth to 
 appear at the diet, in arms ; in which they are 
 so extremely strict, that whosoever has the 
 misfortune to come last, is put to death in sight 
 of the multitude, with all manner of torments. 
 In this assembly, Cingetorix, the head of the 
 opposite faction, and son-in-law of Indutio- 
 marus, who, as we have related above, had de- 
 clared for Caesar, and still continued firm to 
 him, was proclaimed a public enemy, and his 
 estate confiscated. After which Indutiomarus 
 acquainted the council, that the Senones, Car- 
 nutes, and several other states of Gaul had 
 solicited his assistance ; that he accordingly 
 intended to join his forces with theirs, taking 
 his route through the territories of the Rhe- 
 mi, and giving up their lands to be plundered ; 
 but that before he began his march, he 
 
COMiMENTARIES. 
 
 151 
 
 was desirous of mastering the camp of Labie- 
 nus. To that end he ga»e the necessary di- 
 rections. 
 
 XLVIII. Labienus, whose camp, both by 
 the nature of the ground, and the fortifications 
 he had added, was extremely strong, feared no- 
 thing, either for himself or the legion ; but 
 nevertheless was intent how he might give 
 the enemy some considerable blow. Having 
 there been informed by Cingetorix and his ad- 
 herents, of the speech made by Indutiomarus 
 in the council of Gaul, he sent deputies to the 
 neighbouring states, solicited cavalry from all 
 parts, and appointed them a day of rendezvous. 
 Meantime Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, 
 appeared almost every day within sight of the 
 camp ; one while to examine its situation ; 
 another, to intimidate Labienus, or invite him 
 to a conference. On these occasions, it was 
 usual for the enemy to cast their darts over 
 the rampart. Labienus kept his men within 
 the works, and used all the methods he could 
 think of to make the Gauls believe he was 
 afraid of them. 
 
 XLIX. Indutiomarus approaching the 
 trenches every day with greater contempt than 
 before, Labienus received into his camp, by 
 night, all the cavalry he had sent for from the 
 neighbouring states ; and was so careful to re- 
 strain his men within their lines, by guards 
 planted at all the outlets, that it was impossi- 
 
 ble for the Treviri to get intelligence of the 
 reinforcement he had received. Meantime 
 Indutiomarus, according to custom, came up 
 to the camp, and continued there the greater 
 'part of the day. The cavalry discharged 
 their darts over the rampart, and in oppro- 
 brious language challenged our men to fight. 
 The Romans making no answer, they retired 
 towards night, but dispersed and without or- 
 der. Then Labienus, ordering a sudden sally 
 with all the cavalry, strictly cautioned and 
 charged his men, that as soon as they had put 
 the Gauls to flight, (which happened accord- 
 ing to his expectation,) they should all single 
 out Indutiomarus, nor offer to wound a man 
 of the enemy, till they saw him slain: for he 
 was unw^illing that any delay, occasioned by 
 the slaughter of the rest, should give him an 
 opportunity to escape. He promised great re- 
 wards to the man that should kill him ; and 
 sent the cohorts after to sustair, the horse. 
 The design succeeded ; for as all wore intent 
 upon Indutiomarus alone, he was overtaken 
 and slain in passing a river, and his head 
 brought back to the camp. Our cavalry, in 
 their return, put all to the sword that came in 
 their way. Upon the news of this defeat, the 
 forces of the Eburones and Nervians returned 
 home, and Gaul was somewhat quieter the 
 rest of the winter. 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL. 
 
 BOOKVI 
 
 14* • 153 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 I Caesar, apprehending greater commotions in Gaul, augments his forces.— II. He reduces the Nerviansby a 
 sudden invasion. — ^III. And admits the Senones, Carnutes, and Menapians to a surrender. — VI. Labieaus, 
 pretending fear, suddenly attacks and routs the Treviri. — IX. Csesar passes the Rhine a second time. — ^X. 
 The Suevians prepare to oppose the Romans.— XI. The manners ofthe Gauls and Germans described.— XII. 
 The .SJfluans and Sequani at the head of two opposite factions in Gaul. The Sequani declining in power, 
 the Rhemi substitute themselves in their place.— XIII. Description ofthe Druids. — XV. The religion of the 
 Gauls.^X VI. The Gauls and Germans diflfer much as to their manners and customs. — ^XXIII. The Hercynian 
 Forest.— XXIV. A bull with one horn.— XXV. Wild asses.— XXVI. Buffaloes.— XXVII. Csesar, fearing the 
 want of provisions, repasses the Rhine, and marches against Ambiorix. — XXVIII. The great power of for- 
 tune.— XXIX. Ambiorix disbands his troops, and counsels them to provide for their own safety. — XXX. Cje- 
 sar divides his army, and marches in person in quest of Ambiorix.— XXXI. Is obliged to proceed with great 
 circumspection in ravaging Oie country.— XXXII. The Sicambri cross the Rhine, and fall upon Cicero's camp. 
 -f-XXXV. The astonishing bravery of Sextius Baculus upon this occasion. — XXXVII. The Romans suffer 
 some loss. — ^XXXVTII. The Germans at length relinquish the attack, and return home.— XL. Caesar lays 
 waste the country ofthe Eburones. Ambiorix narrowly escapes being taken.— XLI. Caesar returns to Italy. 
 
 154 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 
 L C^SAR, for many reasons, expecting greater 
 commotions in Gaul, ordered his lieutenants, 
 M. Silanus, C, Antistus Reginus, and T. Sex- 
 tius, to levy troops. At the same time, he de- 
 sired of Cn. Ponl'pey, the proconsul, that since 
 he was himself detained by public affairs at 
 Rome, he would set on foot the legion he had 
 enlisted in Cisalpine Gaul, during his consul- 
 ship, and send it to him ; for he considered it 
 as of the utmost importance towards securing 
 a proper respect from the Gauls for the time 
 to come, to give them such an idea of the power 
 of Italy, as might convince them that it was not 
 only able speedily to repair any losses sustained, 
 but even to bring a greater force into the field. 
 Friendship and the good of the commonwealth 
 equally determined Pompey to yield to this re- 
 quest ; and the levies being completed with 
 great diligence by the lieutenants, three new 
 legions were formed and brought into Gaul 
 before the end of winter. Thus having doubled 
 the number of cohorts lost under Titurius, 
 he soon made the enemy sensible both by his 
 expedition and the strength of the reinforce- 
 ment, of what they had to apprehend from the 
 power and discipline of the Romans. 
 
 II. Indutiomarus being slain, as we have 
 related above, the Treviri conferred the com- 
 mand on his relations. They persisted like- 
 ; wise in soliciting the Germans, and making 
 them offers of money. But not being able to 
 prevail with those that lay nearest them, they 
 applied to some of the more remote states ; and 
 finding them inclined to treat, entered into a 
 solemn engagement with them, giving hosta- 
 ges for the .-security of the money stipulated, 
 
 and associating Ambiorix into the confederacy. 
 Csesar, informed of these things, and finding 
 that he was threatened with war on all sides: 
 that the Nervians, Atuatici, and Menapians, 
 with all the Germans on this side the Rhine, 
 were actually in arms ; that the iSenones re- 
 fused to attend him according to orders, and 
 were tampering with the Carnutes and other 
 neighbouring states; and that the Treviri 
 were soliciting the Germans by frequent em- 
 bassies ; he judged it would be necessary to 
 open the campaign early. Accordingly, with- 
 out waiting till the winter was at an end, he 
 drew together the four nearest legions, and 
 fell unexpectedly into the territories of the 
 Nervians, before they could either assemble 
 in a body, or find means to save themselves by 
 flight. Having carried off a great number of 
 men and cattle, enriched his soldiers with the 
 booty, and laid waste the country, he com- 
 pelled them to submit and give hostages; 
 and then led back his legions to their winter- 
 quarters. 
 
 III. Early in the spring, having summoned 
 a general assembly of Gaul, pursuant to his 
 design ; as all the other states but the Senones, 
 Carnutes, and Treviri, appeared, looking 
 upon this as the beginning of a revolt, and 
 willing to postpone every thing else, he ad- 
 journed the diet to Paris. This city was upon 
 the borders of the Senones, and had been 
 united with them about an age before; but was 
 thought to have no share in their present re- 
 volt. Having declared the adjournment to the 
 assembly, he the same day set out with his 
 legions ap-ainst the Senones, and by grea't 
 155 
 
156 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 marches reached their territories. Acco, who 
 was at the head of the confederacy, hearing 
 of his approach, ordered the multitude to shel- 
 ter themselves in the towns; but before that 
 could be done, the Romans appeared. This 
 obliged them to change their measures, and 
 send deputies to Caesar, to implore forgiveness. 
 They were seconded by the JSduans, the old 
 and faithful allies of the Romans, at whose re- 
 quest CiEsar readily pardoned them ; and the 
 rather, because the summer being now come, 
 he had no mind to spend the season for action 
 in proceeding formally against the guilty. 
 He ordered them to send a hundred hostages, 
 whom he committed to the custody of the 
 jEduans. The Carnutes too, at the interces- 
 sion of the Rhemi, under whose protection 
 they were, having sent deputies and hostages, 
 obtained the same conditions. Ccesar then 
 went to the assembly of the states, put an end 
 to the diet, and ordered the Gauls to provide 
 him cavalry. 
 
 IV. Tranquillity being restored in these 
 parts, Cffisar turned all his thoughts to the 
 management of the war with Ambiorix and 
 the Treviri. He ordered Cavarinus to attend 
 him with the cavalry of the Senones, to pre- 
 vent any new commotions in his absence, 
 either in consequence of the resentment of 
 that prince, or the hatred he had incurred of 
 the state. And having thus settled all things 
 to his mind, as he knew Ambiorix was deter- 
 mined not to hazard a battle, he set himself to 
 watch his other designs. 
 
 V. The Menapians, whose territories bor- 
 der upon those of the Eburones, are secured 
 by woods and morasses on every side ; and 
 v/ere the only people of Gaul, who had not 
 sent ambassadors to Csesar to desire a peace. 
 He knew Ambiorix was in good intelligence 
 with them ; and that by means of the Treviri, 
 he had also entered into an alliance with the 
 Germans. He therefore thought it best to 
 deprive him of these resources, before he at- 
 tacked him in person ; lest despairing of being 
 able to defend himself, he should either retire 
 among the Menapians, or throw himself into 
 the arms of the Germans beyond the Rhine. 
 This resolution being taken, he sent the bag- 
 gage of the whole army to Labienus, in the 
 country of the Treviri, ordered him a reinforce- 
 ment of two legions, and marched himself 
 against the Menapians with five legions, who 
 carried nothing with them but their arms. 
 
 That nation trusting to their situation, instead 
 of assembling forces, retreated to their woods 
 and morasses, and carried all their effects 
 along with them. Csesar divided his forces 
 with C. Fabius his lieutenant, and M. Cras- 
 sus his questor, and having speedily finished 
 his bridges, entered their country in three bo- 
 dies, set all their houses and villages on fire, 
 and carried off such numbers of men and cattle, 
 that the Menapians were at last constrained 
 to sue for peace. He granted it on condition 
 they sent him hostages, and engaged not to 
 admit Ambiorix, or any one from him, into 
 their territories ; threatening to treat them as 
 enemies if they did. These things settled, he 
 left Coraius of Arras there, with a body of 
 horse, to keep them in awe, and set out him- 
 self against the 'J'reviri. 
 
 VI. Whilst Ctesar was thus employed, the 
 Treviri, having drawn together a great num- 
 ber of horse and foot, were preparing to attack 
 the legion, which had wintered in their terri- 
 tories, under Labienus. They were now ad- 
 vanced within two days' march of the lieute- 
 nant's camp, when they learned that he had 
 received a reinforcement of two legions from 
 Cajsar. Upon this, encamping at about fifteen 
 miles' distance, they resolved to wait for the 
 auxiliaries they expected from Germany. La- 
 bienus, having intelligence of their design, and 
 hoping their rashness might furnish him with 
 an opportunity of fighting, left the baggage 
 under a guard of five cohorts ; and with the 
 twenty-five remaining, and all his cavalry^ 
 marched towards the enemy, and pitched his 
 camp a6out a mile from them. 
 
 Vn. Between Labienus and the enemy was 
 a river, with steep banks, and difficult to pass. 
 And indeed neither was Labienus himself 
 minded to try the passage, nor did he expect 
 the enemy would offer at such an attempt. 
 The hope of being joined by the auxiliaries 
 grew stronger in the camp of the Gauls every 
 day. Labienus declared publicly in a coun- 
 cil of war, " That as the Germans were said 
 to be upon the march, he was determined not 
 to expose himself and the army to danger, but 
 would decamp early next morning." This 
 was soon carried to the enemy ; for as our cav- 
 alry consisted mostly of Gauls, it was natural 
 for some of them to favour their countrymen. 
 Labienus, assembling the military tribunes and 
 principal centurions during the night,laid before 
 them his real design : and the better to betray 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 157 
 
 the enemy into a suspicion of his being afraid, 
 gave orders for decamping with more noise 
 and tumult than was usual in a Roman army. 
 By this means his march had all the appear- 
 ance of a flight; and the enemy, whose camp 
 was so very near, had notice of it before day- 
 break from their spies. 
 
 VIII. Scarce had our rear got without the 
 trenches, when the Gauls encouraging one 
 another not to lose a fair prey, or stay in ex- 
 pectation of the Germans, at a time the Ro- 
 mans were retreating in such a panic : and 
 considering it as an indignity, with so great a 
 superiority of forces, to forbear attacking a 
 handful of men already put to flight and en- 
 cumbered with their baggage, resolved to pass 
 the river, and engage the Romans, notwith- 
 standing the disadvantage of the ground. La- 
 bienus, who had foreseen this, that he might 
 draw them all over the river, continued the 
 feint of his march, and went on quietly. Then 
 sending the baggage a little before, and order- 
 ing it to be placed upon a rising ground : — 
 " Behold, fellow-soldiers," says he, " the op- 
 portunity you so much desired : you have the 
 enemy at a disadvantage, and in a place where 
 they cannot sustain the onset: show only 
 under my command the valour you have so 
 often manifested to our general ; think him 
 present and that he sees and observes you." 
 At the same time he ordered them to face about, 
 and form in line of battle ; and detaching a few 
 troops of horse to guard the baggage, drew up 
 the rest on the two wings. Oar men gave a 
 sudden shout, and threw their javelins. The 
 enemy, contrary to their expectation, seeing 
 those whom they imagined put to flight, 
 marching against them with.displayed banners, 
 could not sustain the very first shock ; but be- 
 taking themselves immediately to flight, took 
 refuge in the nearest woods. Labienus pur- 
 suing with his cavalry, put many of the enemy 
 to the sword, and took a great number of pri- 
 soners ; insomuch that within a few days the 
 whole state was obliged to submit: for the 
 Germans, who were coming to their assistance, 
 upon hearing of their defeat, returned home. 
 The relations of Indutiomarus, who had been 
 the authors of the revolt, chose likewise to re- 
 tire with them, and abandon their country. 
 Cingetoris, who had always continued faith- 
 ful to the Romans, was thereupon invested with 
 the' supreme authority. 
 
 £X. Caesar after his arrival in Treves, from 
 
 among the Menapians, resolved for two rea- 
 sons to pass the Rhine : one, because the Ger- 
 mans had assisted the Treviri against the Ro- 
 mans ; the other to deprive Ambiorix of a 
 retreat into those parts. In consequence of 
 this resolution, he set about making a bridge' 
 on the river, but somewhat higher up than be- 
 fore. As the form and manner was known, 
 the soldiers, by their extraordinary diligence, 
 finished the work in a few days. Leaving a 
 strong guard on the side of Treves, to prevent 
 any sudden insurrection in that country, he 
 carried over the rest of his army. The Ubians, 
 who had before submitted and given hostages 
 sent ambassadors to him to vindicate their 
 conduct, and assure him, that they had nei- 
 ther sent troops to the assistance of the Tre- 
 viri, nor in any instance departed from their 
 engagements. They urged and requested that 
 he would spare' their territories, and not, out 
 of a general hatred to the Germans,involve 
 the innocent in the punishment of the guilty. 
 If he desired more hostages they told him they 
 were ready to send them. Caesar finding, upon 
 inquiry, that the supplies had been sent by the 
 Suevians, accepted the submission of the Ubi- 
 ans ; and preparing to march against the 
 Suevians, informed himself of the ways and 
 accesses to their country. 
 
 X. A few days after, he had intelligence 
 from the Ubians, that the Suevians were 
 drawing their forces to a general rendezvous, 
 and had sent orders to all the nations under 
 their jurisdiction, to furnish their contingents 
 of horse and foot. Upon this, having furnished 
 himself with provisions, and chosen a proper 
 place for his camp, he ordered the Ubians to 
 retire into their towns, with their cattle and 
 effects ; hoping that so unskilful and barbarous 
 an enemy might easily be drawn, by the 
 want of provisions, to fight in a place of dis- 
 advantage. He further enjoined the Ubians 
 to send spies into all parts, to learn the designs 
 and motions of the Suevians^ They readily 
 complied ; and in a few days brought him 
 back word, " That the Suevians, upon certain 
 information of the arrival of the Roman ar- 
 my, had retired to the remotest part of the 
 country, with all their own forces, and those 
 of their allies : that there they had resolved 
 to wait the coming up of the Romans, at the 
 entrance of a forest of immense extent, 
 called Bacenis, which reached a great way 
 into the country, and served as a barrier be- 
 
158 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 tween the Cherusci and Suevians, to prevent 
 their mutual incu ions." 
 
 XI. On this occai n it may not be impro- 
 per to say somewhat of the manners of the 
 Gauls and Germans, and the difference of 
 customs between these two nations. A spirit 
 of faction prevails throughout Gaul, and that 
 not only in their several states, districts, and 
 villages, but almost in every private family. 
 The men of greatest esteem and consideration 
 among them, are commonly at the head of 
 these factions, and give what turn they think 
 proper to all public deliberations and counsels. 
 This custom is of long standing, and seems 
 designed to secure those of lower rank from 
 the oppression of the powerful : for the leaders 
 always take care to protect those of their party, 
 otherwise they would soon lose all their au- 
 thority. This equally obtains through the 
 ■whole continent of Gaul, the provinces being 
 in general divided into two factions. 
 
 XII. When Cassar arrived in the country, 
 the ^Eduans were at the head of one faction, 
 and the Sequani of the other. These last be- 
 ing the weaker, because the ^Eduans had long 
 bore the greatest sway, and had a number of 
 considerable states in their dependence, they 
 united with Ariovistus and the Germans, whom 
 by great presents and promises they drew ovor 
 the Rhine to their assistance. This alliance 
 made them so powerful, that having worsted 
 their adversaries in several battles, and killed 
 almost all their nobility, they forced the states 
 dependent upon the ^duans to have recourse 
 to them for protection ; obliged the ^duans 
 themselves to give the children of their prin- 
 cipal nobility as hostages, swear publicly not 
 to attempt any thing against the Sequani, and 
 resign up to their possession a part of their ter- 
 ritories ; and by this means rendered them- 
 selves in a manner sovereigns of all Gaul. 
 Divitiacus, in this necessity, applied to the se- 
 nate of Rome for relief, but without effect. 
 CiEsar's arrival soon changed the face of af- 
 fairs. The ^Eduan -hostages were sent back, 
 their former clients restored, and new ones pro- 
 cured them by Cesar's interest ; it appearing, 
 that such as were under their protection, en- 
 joyed a more equal and milder lot : by all 
 which, their fortune and authority being con- 
 siderably enlarged, the Sequani were obliged 
 to resign the sovereignty. The Rhemi suc- 
 ceeded in their place; and, as they were 
 knowt, to be in the same degree of favour with 
 
 Caesar, such as could not get over their old 
 animosity to the ^duans, put themselves 
 under their protection. The Rhemi were ex- 
 tremely attentive to the interests of their clients, 
 and thereby both preserved their old authority, 
 and that which they had newly acquired. 
 Such therefore was the then situation of Gaul, 
 that the ^Eduans possessing indisputably the 
 first rank, the Rhemi were next in considera- 
 tion and dignity. 
 
 XIII. Over all Gaul, there are only two 
 orders of men, in any degree of honour and 
 esteem : for the common people are little bet- 
 ter than slaves, attempt nothing of themselves, 
 and have no share in the public deliberations. 
 As they are generally oppressed with debt, 
 heavy tributes, or the exactions of their supe- 
 riors, they make themselves vassals to the 
 great, who exercise over them the same juris- 
 diction as masters do over slaves. The two 
 orders of men, with whom, as we have said, 
 all authority and distinctions are lodged, are 
 the Druids and nobles. The Druids preside 
 in matters of religion, have the care of public 
 and private sacrifices, and interpret the will of 
 the gods. They have the direction and edu- 
 cation of the youth, by whom they are held 
 in great honour. In almost all controversies, 
 whether public or private, the decision is left 
 to them: and if any crime is committed, any 
 murder perpetrated ; if any dispute arises 
 touching an inheritance, or the limits of ad- 
 joining estates; in all such cases, they arc the 
 supreme judges. They decree rewards and 
 punishments ; and if any one refuses to submit 
 to their sentence, whether magistrate or private 
 man, they interdict him the sacrifices. This 
 is the greatest punishment that can be inflicted 
 among the Gauls ; because such as are under 
 this prohibition, are considered as impious and 
 wicked : all men shun them, and decline their 
 conversation and fellowship, lest they should 
 suffer from the contagion of their misfortunes. 
 They can neither have recourse to the law for 
 justice, nor are capable of any public office. 
 The Druids are all under one chief, who pos- 
 sesses the supreme authority in that body. 
 Upon his death, if any one remarkably excels 
 the rest, he succeeds ; but if there are several 
 candidates of equal merit, the affair is deter- 
 mined by plurality of suffrages. Sometimes 
 they even have recourse to arms before the elec- 
 tion can be brought to an issue. Once a year 
 they assemble at a consecrated place in the terri- 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 159 
 
 tories of the Carnutes, whose country is sup- 
 posed to be in the middle of Gaul. Hither 
 such as have any suits depending, flock from 
 all parts, and submit implicitly to their decrees. 
 Their institution is supposed to come originally 
 from Britain, whence it passed into Gaul ; and 
 even at this day, such as are desirous of being 
 perfect in it, travel thither for instruction. The 
 Druids never go to war, are exemj ted from 
 taxes and military service, and enjoy all man- 
 ner of immunities. These mighty encourage- 
 ments induce multitudes of their own accord 
 to follow that profession; and many are sent 
 by their parents and relations. They are 
 taught to repeat a great number of verses by 
 heart, and often spend twenty years upon this 
 institution ; for it is deemed unlawful to com- 
 mit their statutes to writing ; though in other 
 matters, whether public or private, they make 
 use of Greek characters. They seem to me 
 to follow this method for two reasons : to hide 
 their mysteries from the knowledge of the vul- 
 gar ; and to exercise the memory of their 
 scholars, which would be apt to lie neglected, 
 had they letters to trust to, as we find is often 
 the case. It is one of their principal maxims 
 that the soul never dies, but after death passes 
 from one body to another ; which, they think, 
 contributes greatly to exalt men's courage, by 
 disarming death of its terrors. They teach 
 likewise many things relating to the stars and 
 their motions, the magnitude of the world and 
 our earth, the nature of things, and the power 
 and prerogatives of the immortal gods. 
 
 XIV. The other order of men is the nobles, 
 whose whole study and occupation is war. 
 Before Caesar's arrival in Gaul, they were al- 
 most every year at war either offensive or de- 
 fensive ; and they judge of the power and 
 quality of their nobles, by the vassals, and the 
 number of men he keeps in his pay ; for they 
 are the only marks of grandeur they make any 
 account of. j 
 
 -XV. The whole nation of the Gauls is ex- 
 tremely addicted to superstition ; whence, in 
 threatening distempers and the imminent dan- 
 gers of war, they make no scruple to sacrifice 
 men, or engage themselves by vow to such 
 sacrifices ; in which they make use of the min- 
 istry of the Druids : for it is a prevalent opin- 
 ion among them, that nothing but the life of 
 man can atone for the life of man ; insomuch 
 that they have established even public sacri- 
 fices of this kind. Some prepare hug: Co- 
 
 lossuses, of osier twigs, into which they put 
 men alive, and setting fire to them, those with- 
 in expire amidst the flames. They prefer for 
 victims such as have been convicted of theft, 
 robbery, or other crimes ; believing them the 
 most acceptable to the gods : but when real 
 criminals are wanting, the innocent are often 
 made to suffer. Mercury is the chief deity 
 with them : of him they have many images, 
 account him the inventor of all arts, their 
 guide and conductor in their journeys, and the 
 patron of merchandise and gain. Next to him 
 are Apollo and Mars, and Jupiter, and Mi- 
 nerva. Their notions in regard to him are 
 pretty much the same with those of other na- 
 tions. Apollo is their god of physic ; Minerva 
 of works and manufactures ; Jove holds the 
 empire of heaven ; and Mars presides in war. 
 To this last, when they resolve upon a battle, 
 they commonly devote the spoil. If they 
 prove victorious, they offer up all the cattle 
 taken, and set apart the rest of the plunder in 
 a place appointed for that purpose ! and it is 
 common in many provinces, to ?ee these monu- 
 ments of offerings piled up in consecrated 
 places. Nay, it rarely happens that any one 
 shows so great a disregard of religion, as either 
 to conceal the plunder, or pillage the public 
 oblations ; and the severest punishments are 
 inflicted upon such offenders. 
 
 XVI, The Gauls fancy themselves to be 
 descended from the god Pluto ; which, it 
 seems, is an established tradition among the 
 Druids. For this reason they compute the 
 time by nights, not by days ; and in the ob- 
 servance of birth days, new moons, and the 
 beginning of the year, always commence the 
 celebration from the preceding night. In one 
 custom they differ from almost all other na- 
 tions ; that they never suffer their children to 
 come openly into their presence, until they are 
 of age to bear arms ; for the appearance of a 
 son in public with his father, before he has 
 reached the age of manhood, is accounted dis- 
 honourable. 
 
 XVII. Whatever fortune the woman brings, 
 the husband is obliged to equal it with his own 
 estate. This whole sum, with its annual pro- 
 duct, is left untouched, and falls always to the 
 share of the survivor. The men have power 
 of life and death over their wives and children ; 
 and when any father of a family of illustrious 
 rank dies, his relations assemble, and upon 
 the least ground of suspicion, put even his 
 
160 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 wives to the torture like slaves. If they are 
 found guilty, iron and fire are employed to 
 torment and destroy them. Their funerals are 
 magnificent and sumptuous, according to their 
 quality. Every thing that was dear to the 
 deceased, even animals, are thrown into the 
 pile : and formerly, such of their slaves and 
 clients as they loved most, sacrificed them- 
 selves at the funeral of their lord. 
 
 XVIII. In their best regulated states, they 
 nave a law, that whoever hears any thing re- 
 lating to the public, whether by rumour or 
 otherwise, shall give immediate notice to the 
 magistrate, without imparting it to any one 
 else ; for the nature of the people is such, that 
 rash and inexperienced men, alarmed by false 
 reports, are often hurried to the greatest extre- 
 mities, and take upon them to determine in 
 matters of the greatest consequence. The 
 magistrates stifle things improper to be known, 
 and only communicate to the multitude what 
 they think needful for the service of the com- 
 monwealth ; nor do the laws permit to speak 
 of state affairs, except in public council. 
 
 XIX. The Germans difTer widely in their 
 manners from the Gauls : for neither have they 
 Druids to preside in religious affairs, nor do 
 they trouble themselves about sacrifices. They 
 acknowledge no gods but those that are ob- 
 jects of sight, and by whose power they are 
 apparently benefited ; the sun, the moon, fire. 
 Of others they know nothing, not even by re- 
 port. Their whole life is addicted to hunting 
 and war ; and from their infancy they are 
 inured to fatigue and hardships. They esteem 
 •those most, who continue longest strangers to 
 ■women ; as imagining nothing contributes so 
 much to stature, strength and vigour of body : 
 but to have any commerce of this kind before 
 the age of twenty is accounted in the highest 
 degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to con- 
 ceal an irregularity this way ; because they 
 bathe promiscuously in rivers, and are clothed 
 in skins, or short mantles of fur, which leave 
 the greatest part of their bodies naked. 
 
 f XX. Agriculture is little regarded among 
 them, as they live mostly on milk, cheese, and 
 the flesh of animals. Nor has any man lands 
 of his own, or distinguished by fixed bounda- 
 ries. The magistrates, and those in authority, 
 portion out yearly to every canton and family, 
 such a quantity of land, and in what part of 
 the country they think proper ; and the year 
 following remove them to some other spot. 
 
 Many reasons are assigned for this practice ; 
 lest seduced by habit and continuance, they 
 should learn to prefer tillage to war ; lest a 
 desire of enlarging their possessions should 
 gain ground, and prompt the stronger to expel 
 the weaker ; lest they should become curious 
 in their buildings, in order to guard against 
 the extremes of heat and cold ; lest avarice 
 should get footing amongst them, whence 
 spring factions and discords : in fine, to pre- 
 serve contentment and equanimity among 
 the people, when they find their possessions 
 nothing inferior to those of the most powerful. 
 
 XXI. It is accounted honourable for estates 
 to have the country all around them lie waste 
 and depopulated : for they think it an argu- 
 ment of valour to expel their neighbours, and 
 suffer none to settle near them ; at the same 
 time that they are themselves all the safer, as 
 having nothing to apprehend from sudden in- 
 cursions. When a state is engaged in war, 
 either offensive or defensive, they make choice 
 of magistrates to preside in it, whom they arm 
 with a power of life and death. In time of 
 peace there are no public- magistrates ; but 
 the chiefs of the several provinces and clans 
 administer justice, and decide differences 
 within their respective limits. Robbery has 
 nothing infamous in it, when committed with- 
 out the territories of the state to which they 
 belong : they even pretend that it serves to 
 exercise their youth and prevent the growth 
 of sloth. When any of their princes in this 
 case offers himself publicly in council as a 
 leader, such as approve of the expedition, 
 rise up, profess themselves ready to follow 
 him, and are applauded by the whole multi- 
 tude. They who go back from their engage- ^ 
 ment are looked upon as traitors and deserters, 
 and lose all esteem and credit for the time 
 to come. The laws of hospitality are held 
 inviolable among them. All that fly to thera 
 for refuge, on whatever account, are sure of 
 protection and defence ; their houses are 
 open to receive them, and they plentifully 
 supply their wants. 
 
 XXII. Formerly the Gauls exceeded the 
 Germans in bravery, often made war upon 
 them, and as they abounded in people beyond 
 what the country could maintain, sent severa 
 colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly the more 
 fertile places of Germany, in the neighbour 
 hood of the Hercynian forest, (which I find 
 mentioned by Eratosthenes, and other Greek 
 
COMMExSTARIES, 
 
 161 
 
 writers, under the name of Orcinia,) fell to 
 the share' of the Volcse, who settled in those 
 parts, and have ever since kept possession. 
 They are in the highest reputation for justice 
 and bravery, and no less remarkable than the 
 Germans for poverty, abstinence, and patience 
 of fatigue, conforming exactly to their cus- 
 toms, both in habit and way of living. But the 
 neighbourhood of the Roman province, and an 
 acquaintance with traffic, has introduced luxury 
 and abundance among the Gauls, whence 
 becoming by little and little an unequal match 
 for the Germans, and being worsted in many 
 battles, they no longer pretend to compare 
 with them in valour. 
 
 XXIII. The Hercynian forest, of which 
 we have been just speaking", is about nine days, 
 journey in breadth ; for as the Germans are 
 ignorant of the use of measures, there is no 
 other way of computing it. It begins from 
 the confines of the Helvetians, Nemetes, and 
 Rauraci ; and following directly the course of 
 the Danube, extends to the territories of the 
 Anartes and Dacians. Thence turning from 
 the river to the left, it runs through a multi- 
 tude of different regions ; and though there 
 are many in the country, who have advanced 
 six days' journey into this forest, yet no one 
 pretends to have reached the extremity of it, 
 or discovered how far it extends. Many dif- 
 ferent species of animals, unknown in other 
 countries, harbour here ; the most remarkable 
 of which,* and that best deserve* to be men- 
 tioned, are these. 
 
 XXIV. There is a bull that nearly resembles 
 a stag, with only one horn rising from the 
 middle of his forehead, taller and straighter 
 than those of our cattle, and which at top di- 
 vides into many large branches. The males 
 and females are shaped alike, and have horns 
 the same in size. 
 
 XXV. Here are likewise a kind of wild 
 asses, shaped and spotted like goats, but of a 
 larger size ; without horns, or joints in their 
 legs, that never lie down to sleep, nor can 
 raise themselves, if by any accident they are 
 overthrown. They lean against trees, which 
 serve to support them when they sleep. Hence 
 the huntsmen, after having discovered their 
 tiaunts, either loosen the roots of the trees, or 
 
 aw them almost quite off; so that when the 
 animal, according to custom, reclines against 
 them, they immediately give way, and both 
 fall down together. 
 
 15 
 
 XXVI. A third species of animals are the 
 uri, nearly equalling the elephant in bulk ; 
 but in colour, shape, and kind, resembling a 
 bull. They are of uncommon strength and 
 swiftness, and spare neither man nor beast that 
 comes in their way. They are taken and slain 
 by means of pits dug on purpose. This way 
 of hunting is frequent among the youth, and 
 serves to inure them to fatigue. They who 
 kill the greatest number, and produce their 
 horns in public, as a proof, are in high repu- 
 tation with their countrymen. It is found 
 impossible to tame them, or conquer their 
 fierceness, though takenever so young. Their 
 horns, both in largeness, figure, and kind, dif- 
 fer much from those of our bulls. The na- 
 tives preserve them with great care, tip their 
 edges with silver, and use them instead of cups 
 on their most solemn festivals. 
 
 XXVII. Caesar understanding from the 
 Ubian scouts, that the Suevians were retired 
 into their woods ; and fearing the want of pro- 
 visions, because, as we have already observed, 
 the Germans are hut little addicted to agri- 
 culture, resolved not to advance any further. 
 But to keep the enemy still under some awe 
 of his return, and prevent their sending suc- 
 cours to Gaul, having repassed the Rhine, he 
 only broke down about two hundred feet of 
 his bridge, on the. German side; and to se- 
 cure the rest, built at the extremity a tower 
 of four stories, where he left a garrison of 
 twelve cohorts, and strengthened the place 
 with all manner of works. Young C. Vol- 
 catius Tullus had the charge of the fort and 
 garrison. He himself, as soon as the corn be- 
 gan to be ripe, marched against Ambiorix ; 
 taking his way through the forest of Arden, 
 which is much the largest in all Gaul, and 
 reaches from the banks of the Rhine, and the 
 confines of Treves, quite to the Nervians, 
 through a space of more than five hundred 
 miles. L. Minucius Basilus was sent before, 
 with all the cavalry, in hopes that the quick- 
 ness of his march, and the opportunity cf some 
 lucky conjuncture, might enable him to do 
 something considerable. He had orders to 
 light no fires in his camp, the better to con- 
 ceal his approach from the enemy ; and Caesar 
 assured him, he would follow with all expe- 
 dition. Basilus exactly followed his instruc- 
 tions ; and coming suddenly and unexpectedly 
 upon the Gauls, surprised great numbers of 
 them in the field. Being informed by them 
 
 Y 
 
162 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 of the place whither Ambiorix had retired, 
 with a few cavalry, he marched directly 
 against him. 
 
 XXVIII. But as fortune has a considerable 
 share in all human concerns, so particularly 
 in those of war. For as it was a very extra- 
 ordinary chance, that he should thus come 
 upon Ambiorix unprepared, and surprise him 
 with his personal arrival, before he had the 
 least notice of it from fame or report ; so was 
 it an equal effect of fortune, that the Gaul 
 himself, after having lost his arms, horses, 
 and chariots, should yet find means to escape. 
 This was principally owing to the situation 
 of his house, which was surrounded with a 
 wood ; it being customary among the Gauls, 
 in order to avoid the heats, to build in the 
 neighbourhood of woods and rivers. By this 
 means his attendants and friends possessing 
 themselves of a: defile, sustained for a time the 
 attack of our cavalry ; during which, one of 
 his servants having provided him with a 
 horse, he escaped into the woods. Thus 
 fortune remarkably played her part, both in 
 bringing him into the danger and delivering 
 him out of it. 
 
 XXIX. Ambiorix, after his escape, made 
 no attempt to draw his forces together ; nor 
 is it known whether he acted in this manner 
 out of choice, as not thinking it safe to hazard 
 a battle ; or because he thought he should 
 not have sufficient time, being surprised by the 
 sudden arrival of the cavalry, and believing 
 that all the rest of the army followed. Des- 
 patching, therefore, messengers privately 
 through the country, he counselled every one 
 to provide for his own safety ; upon which 
 some took refuge in the forest of Arden, and 
 some in the adjoining morasses. Those who 
 lived upon the sea-coast, hid themselves in 
 the islands formed by the tide at high water ; 
 and many abandoning their country altogether, 
 trusted themselves and their all to the faith 
 of foreigners. Cativulcus, who, jointly with 
 Ambiorix, was king of the Eburones, and had 
 associated with him in all his designs, being 
 of a very advanced age, and unable to bear 
 the fatigues of war or flight, after many im- 
 precations against Ambiorix, who had been 
 the prime contriver of the revolt, poisoned 
 himself with an extract of yew, a tree very 
 common in Gaul and Germany. The Segni 
 and Condrusi, originally German nations, 
 whose territories lay between those of Treves 
 
 and the Eburones, sent ambassadors to CcEsar, 
 to entreat " That he would not consider them 
 as enemies, nor look upon all the Germans on 
 this side the Rhine as equally- obnoxious: 
 that they had harboured no thoughts of war, 
 nor been any ways aiding to Ambiorix." Cs- 
 sar finding it to be so by the answers of the 
 prisoners, ordered them to deliver up such of 
 the Eburones as had fled to them for refuge ; 
 and promised, upon that condition, not to mo- 
 lest their territories. 
 
 XXX, Then dividing his army into three 
 bodies, he sent all the baggage to Atuatuca, 
 a castle situated almost in the heart of the 
 country of the Eburones, where Titurius and 
 Arunculeius had been quartered during the 
 winter. This place he chose, as for other 
 reasons, so likewise because the fortifications, 
 raised the year before, were still entire, which 
 would lessen the labour of his soldiers. He 
 left the fourteenth legion to guard the bag- 
 gage, being one of the three lately levied 
 in Italy, and brought thence into Gaul. Q. 
 Tullius Cicero had the charge both of the le- 
 gion and fort, which was further strengthened 
 with an additional guard of two hundred horse. 
 The army being thus divided, he sent T. La- 
 bienus, with three legions, towards the sea 
 coast, and the provinces that border upon the 
 Menapians ; C. Trebonius, with a like number 
 of legions, to lay waste the country adjoining 
 to the Atuatici ; and resolved to march him- 
 self with the other three towards the Scheld, 
 which flows into the Meuse, and to the ex- 
 tremities of the forest of Arden, whither he 
 was informed Ambiorix had retired with a few 
 horse. He promised, at his departure, to re- 
 turn in seven days ; the legion he had left in 
 garrison being provided with corn only for 
 that time : and exhorted Labienus and Trebo- 
 nius, if they found it consistent with the public tf 
 advantage, to return likewise with their le- 
 gions within the same space ; that joining 
 counsel together, and taking their measures 
 from the conduct of the enemy, they mighl 
 resolve where next to carry the war. 
 
 XXXI. There was, as we have already 
 observed, no formed body of troops, no garri- 
 son, no fortified town to defend by arms ; but 
 a multitude dispersed on all sides. Wherever 
 a cave, or a thicket, or a morass offered them 
 shelter, thither they retired. These places 
 were well known to the natives ; and great 
 care and caution was required on our part 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 163 
 
 not for the security of the whole army, (which 
 had no clanger to fear whilst in a body, from 
 enemies dispersed and full of terror ;) but for 
 the preservation of each individual. And yet 
 even this regarded not a little the whole army : 
 for the desire of plunder drew many of the 
 men to a great distance ; and the woods, full 
 of defiles and hidden ways, hindered them from 
 keeping together in a body. If Csesar meant 
 to terminate the war altogether, and extirpate 
 this race of perfidious men, the soldiers must 
 be divided into small parties, and detached on 
 all sides. If, on the contrary, he kept his men 
 together, as the rules of war and the Koman 
 discipline required, the enemy were sheltered 
 by their situation, nor wanted boldness to form 
 ambuscades, and cut off stragglers. Amidst 
 these difficulties, all possible precautions were 
 taken ; and although the soldiers were eagerly 
 bent upon revenge, yet Caesar chose rather 
 not to push the enemy too far, than expose 
 his men to danger. He therefore sent mes- 
 sengers to the neighbouring states, inviting 
 them all bj' the hopes of plunder, to join the 
 destruction of the Eburones ; choosing rather 
 to expose the lives of the Gauls in the woods, 
 than of the legionary soldiers ; and hoping, by 
 the multitude employed against them, totally 
 to extirpate the name and memory of a state, 
 whose revolt had rendered them so obnoxious. 
 Accordingly great numbers flocked suddenly 
 thither from all parts. 
 
 XXXII. Thus were the Eburones attacked 
 on all sides ; and the havoc continued till the 
 seventh day, which Caesar had appointed for 
 returning to his camp and baggage. It then 
 evidently appeared what influence fortune has 
 over war, and how many accidents spring from 
 her interposition. The enemy being dispersed 
 and full of terror, as we have related above, 
 there remained no body of troops in the field, 
 to give any the least ground of fear. A report 
 spread among the Germans beyond the Rhine, 
 that the territories of the Eburones were given 
 up to plunder, and all without distinction in- 
 vited to share the spoil. The Sicambri, who 
 inhabit upon the Rhine, and had afforded a 
 retreat to the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, as 
 mentioned above, assembled immediately a 
 body of two thousand horse, passed the river 
 in barks about thirty miles below Caesar's 
 bridge and fort, and advanced directly towards 
 the territories of the Eburones. Many of those 
 
 that fled, and had dispersed themselves up and 
 down the country, fell into their hands , as 
 likewise abundance of cattle, of which the 
 barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured 
 by this success, they advanced farther. Neither 
 woods nor morasses proved any obstacles to 
 men, trained up from their infancy to wars and 
 incursions. Inquiring of the prisoners con- 
 cerning Caesar, they understood that he was a 
 great way off, and had left the country with 
 his whole army. One in particular addressing 
 them : " Why, says he, do you lose time in 
 pursuit of so slight and trifling a booty, when 
 fortune offers one of so much greater value ? 
 In three hours you may reach Atuatuca, where 
 the Romans have deposited all their wealth. 
 The garrison is hardly sufficient to line the 
 rampart, much less to sally out of their in- 
 trenchments." Urged by this hope, they left 
 their present booty in a place of safety, and 
 marched directly to Atuatuca, being conducted 
 by the captive who had given them the in- 
 formation. 
 
 XXXIII. Cicero, who hitherto had kept his 
 soldiers strictly within the camp, according to 
 Caesar's orders, nor suffered so much as a ser- 
 vant to straggle beyond the lines ; seeing the 
 seventh day arrive, began to despair of Caesar's 
 return, who, as he had heard, marched farther 
 into the country, and had sent him no notice 
 of his route. Wherefore, tired with the con- 
 tinual murmurs of the soldiers, who complained 
 of his patience, and told him they were kept 
 like men besieged ; and not suspecting that 
 any accident could befall him, within the small 
 extent of three miles, especially as the enemy, 
 opposed by nine legions, and a very numerous 
 cavalry, were in a manner totally dispersed 
 and cut off; he sent out five cohorts to forage 
 in an adjoining field, separated from the camp 
 only by a single hill. A great many sick men 
 had been left behind by Caesar, of whom about 
 three hundred, that were now pretty well re- 
 covered, joined the detachment. These were 
 followed by almost all the servants of the camp, 
 together with a vast number of carts and car- 
 riage-horses. 
 
 XXXIV. In that very instant, as fortune 
 would have it, the German cavalry arrived ; 
 and without discontinuing their course, en- 
 deavoured to force an immediate entrance by 
 the Decuman gate. As their march had been 
 
 >3>ered by a wood, they were not discovered 
 
104 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 till they were just upon the camp ; insomuch 
 that the sutlers, who kept their booths under 
 the rampart, had not time to retire within the 
 intrenchments. Our men were so surprised 
 at this sudden and unexpected attack, that 
 the cohort upon guard could scarce sustain the 
 first onset. The enemy spread themselves on 
 all sides to find a place of entrance. The 
 Romans with difficulty defended the gates ; 
 the rampart securing them every where else. 
 The whole camp was in an uproar, every one 
 inquiring of another the cause of the confusion ; 
 nor could they determine which way to ad- 
 vance the standards, or where to post them- 
 selves. Some reported the camp was already 
 taken ; others, that the Germans, having de- 
 stroyed Cfflsar and his army, were come victo- 
 rious, to storm their trenches. The greater 
 number, full of imaginary fears, when they 
 considered the place in which they were en- 
 camped, called to mind the fate of Cotta and 
 Titurius, who perished in that very fort. This 
 universal consternation being perceived by the 
 barbarians, confirmed them in the belief of 
 what the prisoners had told them, that there 
 was scarce any garrison within to defend the 
 camp. They renewed their endeavours to 
 force the intrenchments, and mutually exhorted 
 one another, not to let so fair a prize escape 
 out of their hands. 
 
 XXXV. Among the sick in garrison was 
 P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first 
 rank, of whom mention has been made in 
 former battles, and who had not tasted food 
 for five days. This officer, anxious for his own 
 safety, and that of the legion, rushed unarmed 
 out of his tent. He saw the enemy at hand, 
 and the danger extreme. Snatching the first 
 arms that offered, he posted himself in the 
 gate of the camp. The centurions of the co- 
 hort upon guard followed the example, and for 
 a while sustained the enemy's charge. Sex- 
 tius expired under a number of wounds, and 
 was with difficulty carried off by the soldiers. 
 This short delay give the rest time to resume 
 their courage ; so far at least, as to mount the 
 rampart, and make a show of defending them- 
 selves. 
 
 XXXVI. Meantime our foragers return- 
 ing, heard the noise at the camp. The cavalry 
 advancing before, were soon apprized of the 
 danger. Here was no fortification to shelter 
 the frighted troops. The new levies, inex- 
 perienced in matters of war, fixed their eyes 
 
 upon the tribunes and centurions, waiting their 
 orders. Not a man was found so hardy and 
 resolute as not to be disturbed by so unexpected 
 an accident. The Germans perceiving our -^ 
 ensigns at a distance, gave over the attack of 
 the camp, imagining at first that it was Caesai 
 and the legions, which the prisoners had in- 
 formed them were marched farther into the 
 country. But. soon observing how few they 
 were, they surrounded and fell upon them on 
 all sides. 
 
 XXX Vn. The servants of the camp fled 
 to the nearest rising ground; whence being 
 immediately driven, they threw themselves 
 amongst the ranks of the cohorts, and thereby 
 increased their terror. Some were, for drawing 
 up in form of a wedge, and forcing their way 
 through the enemy : for as the camp was so 
 very near, they imagined, that if some fell, the 
 rest at least must escape. Others were for 
 retiring to an eminence, and all sharing there 
 the same fate. The veteran soldiers, who had 
 marched but with the detachment, could by 
 no means reUsh this proposal : wherefore mu- 
 tually encouraging one another, and being led 
 by C. Trebonius, a Roman knight, under whose 
 command they were, they broke tlirough the 
 midst of the enemy, and all to'a man arrived 
 safe in the camp. The servants and cavalry, 
 following them, and seconding their retreat, 
 were likewise, by their bravery, preserved. 
 But the troops who had retired to the hill, 
 being inexperienced in military affairs, could 
 neither persist in the resolution they had 
 taken of defending themselves from the higher 
 ground, nor imitate that brisk and vigorous 
 effort which they saw had been so serviceable 
 to their companions : but endeavouring to gain 
 the camp,quitted the advantage of their situa- 
 tion. The centurions, some of whom had been 
 selected from veteran legions, and on account 
 of their bravery promoted to higher stations 
 among the new levies, fought resolutely to 
 maintain the glory they had acquired, and en- 
 deavoured to sell their lives as dear as they 
 could. Their valour obUging the enemy to 
 fall back a little, part of the troops, contrary 
 to expectation, reached the camp. The rest 
 were surrounded and cut to pieces by the har- 
 barians. 
 
 XXXVni. The Germans, despairing to 
 carry the camp, as they saw our men now pre- 
 pared to defend the works, repassed the Rhine 
 with the booty they had deposited in the woods. 
 
COMMEIfTARIES. 
 
 165 
 
 But so great was the terror of the Romans even 
 after their retreat, that C. Volusenus arriving 
 in the camp the same night with the cavalry, 
 could not persuade them that Csesar and the 
 army were safe. For the fear had taken so 
 thorough a possession of their minds, that, as 
 if bereft of understanding, they persisted in be- 
 lieving the infantry was wholly destroyed, 
 and that the cavalry alone had escaped : it 
 seeming to them altogether incredible, that the 
 Germans would have dared to attack the camp, 
 had no misfortune befallen the Roman army. 
 But Caesar's arrival soon put an end to their 
 fears. 
 
 XXXIX. Upon his return, being informed 
 of what had happened, he only complained of 
 the sending out the cohorts to forage : observ- 
 ing, " That in war nothing ought to be left to 
 fortune, whose power appeared evidently in 
 the sudden arrival of the enemy, and much 
 more in their coming up unperceived to the 
 very gates of the camp." But nothing in this 
 whole affair appeared to him more wonderful, 
 than that the Germans, having crossed the 
 Rhine with design to plunder the territories of 
 Ambiorix, should, by falling upon the Roman 
 camp, do him a most acceptable service. 
 
 XL. Csesar marched a second time to ha- 
 rass the enemy, and having drawn a great 
 number of troops together from the neigh- 
 bouring states, sent them into all parts upon 
 this service. All the houses and villages were 
 set on fire ; the plunder was universal ; the 
 vast number of men and horses not only dt'- 
 stroyed great quantities of corn, but the rains 
 
 and advanced seasons made havoc of all that 
 was left ; insomuch that if any of the enemy 
 escaped for the present, it seemed yet likely, 
 that after the retreat of the army, they must 
 perish by famine. As the cavalry were divided 
 into many parties, they often came to places 
 where the prisoners not only informed them 
 they had seen Ambiorix flying, but that he 
 could even yet be scarce out of view. The 
 hope of coming up with him made them leave 
 nothing unattempted, as imagining they would 
 thereby gain the highest favour with Csesar, 
 whose good fortune wanted only this to ren- 
 der it complete. But all their endeavours were 
 fruitless ; for he still found means to hide him- 
 self in the woods and morasses ; whence re- 
 moving privately in the night, he escaped 
 into other regions, accompanied with only four 
 horsemen, in whom alone he durst confide. 
 
 XLI. Csesar, having destroyed the whole 
 country, led back his army into the territories 
 of the Rhemi, with the loss of only two cohorts. 
 There he summoned a general assembly of 
 Gaul, to examine into the affair of the Sen- 
 ones and Carnutes : and having passed a se- 
 vere sentence against Acco, the contriver of 
 the revolt, ordered him to be executed on the 
 spot. Some fearing a like fate, fled ; whom 
 having banished by a decree of the diet, he 
 quartered two legions in Treves, two among 
 the Lingones, and the remaining six at Agen- 
 dicum, in the country of the Senones, And 
 having provided the army with corn, he went, 
 pursuant to his design, into Italy, to hold the 
 assemblies of Cisalpine Gaul. 
 
 16* 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL. 
 
 BOOK VIL 
 
 167 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 I. The Gauls concer, measures for renewing the war. — 11. The Carnutes massacre a number of Roman citizens 
 at Genabum. — VI. Vercingetorix excites his followers to a revolt, and by the consent of many nations is de- 
 clared generalissimo of the league. — Vlll. Csesar suddenly invades Auvergne.— X. Vercingetorix invests 
 Gergovia, whilher he is followed by Cffisar. — XI. Csesar makes himself master of A'^ellaunodunum and Gena- 
 bum.— XII. Vercingetorix quits the siege of Gergovia. Ca'sar possesses himself of Noviudunum, puts Vercin- 
 getorix's cavalry to flight, and invests A varicum.— XIII. By advice of Vercingetorix, the Biturigians set fire 
 to their towns, that they may not furnish subsistence to the Romans. — XVI. Csesar in great straits for want 
 of corn.— XVII. The two armie^mear each other, but without coming to a battle.— XIX. Vercingetorix, ac- 
 cused of treason, clears himself —XXI. Caesar continues the siege of Avaricum. — XXII. The construction of 
 the walls of towns among the Gauls.— XXIII. Avaricum, after a resolute defence, is at last taken by storm. — 
 XXVIII. Vercingetorix consoles his men by a speech. — XXIX. And prepares with greater force to renew the 
 war. — XXX. Csesar quits the intestine divisions of the JEduans. — ^XXXII. Sets out upon his march towards 
 Auvergne.— XXXIII. Passes the AUier by a feint.— XXXIV. And arriving before Gergovia, seizes an emi- 
 nence near the town.— XXXV. The jEduans form the design of a revolt from the Romans.— XXXVIII. But 
 by Caesar's prudence and diligence, are in some measure prevented.— XLI. Csesar carries three of the ene- 
 my's camps bef ire Gergovia.— XLIV. The Romans pressing the attack too far, are repulsed with great slaugh- 
 ter.— XLIX. Caesar reprehends the temerity of his soldiers.— I . And resolves to retire into the country of the 
 .ffiduans.— LIV. Labienus, after a successful expedition against the Parisians, returns to Csesar with all his* 
 forces.- LVII. The revolt of the .ffiduans followed by that of almost all Gaul.— LVIII. Preparation for war. 
 
 LiX. The Gauls,under the conduct of Vercingetorix, attack Ctesar in the territory of the Lingones.— LXI. 
 
 But are routed with great slaughter.- LXII. Cffisar pursues them as far as Alesia.— LXIII. Description of 
 that town.— LXIV. The Gauls defeated in an engagement between the cavalry.— LXV. Vercingetorix sends 
 away all his horse. — LXVI. Csesar surrounds Alesia with lines of circumvallation and contravallation.^ 
 LXIX. The Gauls, drawing their forces together, endeavour to raise the siege.— LXXI. Critognatus's speech 
 to the garrison of Alesia.- LXXII. The Gauls within and without the town prepare to attack the Romans. 
 — LXXIII. A battle of the horse, in which the Romans have the advantage.— LXXIV. The Gauls make several 
 attempts upon the Roman lines, but are always repulsed with loss.— LXXXI. At length the Romans, sal- 
 lying from the inlrenchments, defeat the Gauls with great slaughter. — LXXXII. Alesia surrenders. — 
 Lx£s;iII. The .ffiduans and Arverni submit. Csesar sends his army into winter quarters 
 
 168 
 
HIS WARS IN GAUL 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 I. Cjesah, having quieted the commotions in 
 Gaul, went, as he designed, into Italy, to pre- 
 side in the assembly of the states. There he 
 was informed of the death of P. Clodius : and 
 understanding further, that the senate had 
 passed a decree, ordering all the youth of 
 Italy to take up arms, he resolved to levy 
 troops over the whole province. The report 
 of this soon spread into farther Gaul : and the 
 Gauls themselves, forward to encourage such 
 rumours, added of their own accord what the 
 case seemed to require : — " That -Caesar was 
 • detained by a domestic sedition, and could 
 not, while these disorders continued, come to 
 head the army." Animated by this opportu- 
 nity, they, who before lamented their subjec- 
 tion to the Romans, now began with more 
 freedom and boldness to enter upon measures 
 of war. The leading men of the nation, con- 
 certing private meetings among themselves, 
 in woods and remote places, complained of 
 the death of Acco ;. remonstrated that such 
 might one time or other be their own fate ; 
 and after bemoaning the common fortune of 
 their country, endeavoured by all manner of 
 promises and rewards, to draw over some to 
 begin the war, and with the hazard of their 
 own lives, pave the way to the liberty of Qaul. 
 .1 But chiefly they thought it incumbent upon 
 them, before their secret conferences should 
 be discovered, to cut off Csesar's return to the 
 army. This appeared abundantly easy ; be- 
 cause neither would the legions, in the absence 
 of thsir general, dare to quit their winter 
 quarters : nor was it possible for the general 
 t) join the legions, without a body of troops 
 
 to guard him. In fine, they concluded it was 
 better to die bravely in the field, than not re- 
 cover their former glory in war, and the lib- 
 erty they had received from their ancestors. 
 
 II. Such were the debates in the private 
 councils of the Gauls : when the Carnutes,. 
 declaring their readiness to submit to any dan- 
 ger for the common safety, offered to be the 
 first in taking up arms against the Romans. 
 And because the present giving of hostages 
 might endanger a too early discovery of theif 
 designs, they proposed, that the other states 
 should bind themselves by a solemn oath, in 
 presence of the military ensigns, which is the 
 most sacred obligation among the Gauls, not 
 to abandon them during the course of the war. 
 This offer of the Carnutes was received with 
 universal applause, the oath required was 
 taken by all present : and the time for action 
 being fixed, the assembly separated, 
 
 .III. When the appointed day came, the 
 Carnutes, headed by Cotuatus and Conetod- 
 unus, men of desperate resolution, flew, upon 
 a signal given, to'Genabum; massacred the 
 
 j Roman citizens settled there on account of 
 trade ; among the rest, C. Fusius Cotta, a 
 
 \ Roman knight of eminence, whom Csesar had 
 appointed to superintend the care of provi- 
 sions ; and plundered their effects. The fame 
 
 ! of this soon spread into all the provinces of 
 Gaul. For when any thing singular and ex- 
 traordinary happens, they publish it from place 
 to place by outcries, which being successively 
 repeated by men stationed on purpose, are car- 
 ried with incredible expedition over the wholo^ 
 country. And thus it was on the present ol- 
 Z 189- 
 
170 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 casion. For what had been done at Genabum 
 about sun-rise, was known before nine at night 
 in the territories of the Avcrni, a distance of 
 one hundred and sixty miles. 
 
 VI. Fired by this example, Vercingctorix, 
 the son of Celtillus, of the nation of the Aver- 
 ni, a young nobleman of great power and in- 
 terest, whose father had presided over Celtic 
 Gaul, and for aiming at the sovereignty been 
 put to death by his countrymen, calling his 
 clients and followers together, easily persuadjed 
 them to a revolt. His design being discovered, 
 the people immediately flew to arms ; and 
 Gobanitio his uncle, with the other princip&l 
 men of the state, dreading the consequences 
 of so rasn an enterprise, united all their au- 
 thority against him, and expelled him the city 
 Gergovia. Yet still he adhered to his former 
 resolution, and assembling all the outlaws and 
 fugitives he could find, engaged them in his 
 service. Having by this means got together 
 a body of troops, he brought all to v'hom he 
 applied himself to fall in with his views ; 
 pressed them to take up arms for the common 
 liberty ; and finding his forces greatly in- 
 creased, quickly drove those out of the ter- 
 ritories of Auvergne, who had so lately ex- 
 pelled him the city Gergovia. Upon this he 
 was saluted king by his followers : and des- 
 patching ambassadors into all parts, exhorted 
 them to continue firm to the confederacy. The 
 Senones, Parisians, Pictones, Cadurci, Tur- 
 ones, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andes, and all the 
 other nations bordering upon the ocean, readily 
 came into the alliance, and with unanimous 
 consent declared him generalissimo of the 
 league. Armed with this authority, he de- 
 manded hostages of the several states ; ordered 
 them to furnish a certain number of men ftn- 
 mediately; appointed what quantity of arms 
 each was to prepare, with the time by which 
 they must be in readiness ; and, above all, 
 appHed himself to have on foot a numerous 
 cavalry. To the most extreme diligence, he 
 joined an extreme rigour of command ; and by 
 the severity of his punishments, obliged the 
 irresolute to declare themselves : for in great 
 faults the criminals, after having been tortured, 
 were burned alive ; and for lighter offences, or- 
 dering the ears of the guilty to be cut off, or 
 one of their eyes put out, he sent them, thus 
 mutilated, home, to serve as an example to the 
 rest, and by the rigour of their sufferings to 
 lieep others in awe. 
 
 V. Having, hy the terror of these punish 
 ments, speedily assembled an army, he sent Lu- 
 terius of Quercy, a bold and enterprising man, 
 with part of the forces, against the Ruthoni , 
 and marched himself into the territories of the 
 Biturigians. The Biturigians, upon his arri- 
 val, despatched ambassadors to the j3i^duans, 
 under whose protection they were, to demand 
 succours against the enemy. "The ^duans, by 
 advice of the lieutenants Cssar had left with 
 the army, ordered a supply of horse and foot to 
 the assistance of the Biturigians. This body of 
 troops, advancing to the banks of the Loire, 
 which divides the Biturigians from the ^du- 
 ans, halted there a few days ; and not daring to 
 pass that river, returned again to their own 
 country. The reason of this conduct, according 
 to the report made to our lieutenants, was an 
 apprehension of treachery from the Biturigians : 
 for that people, as they pretended, had formed 
 the design of surrounding them be3'ond the 
 Loire, on one side with their own troops, on the 
 other with those of Auvergne. Whether this 
 was the rejil cause of their return, or whether 
 they acted perfidiously in the affair, is what we 
 have not been able to learn with certainty, and 
 therefore cannot venture to affirm. The Bitu- 
 rigians, on their departure, immediately joined 
 the forces of the Averni. 
 
 VL These things being reported to Csesar, 
 in Italy ; as "the troubles in Rome were in a 
 great measure quieted by the care and vigi- 
 lance of Pompey, Ije set out immediately for 
 Transalpine Gaul. Upon his arrival there, 
 he found it extremely difficult to resolve after 
 what manner to rejoin the army. For should 
 he order the legions to repair to the province, 
 he foresaw they would be attacked on their 
 march in his absence : and should he himself 
 proceed to the quarters of the legions, he was 
 not without apprehensions of danger, even 
 from those states that seemingly continued 
 faithful to the Romans. 
 
 VII. In the meantime, Luterius of Quercy, 
 who had been sent into the territories of the 
 Rutheni, brought over that state to the alli- 
 ance of the Averni ; advancing thence among 
 the Nitobrigians and Gabali, he received host- 
 ages from both nations, and having got .to- 
 gether a numerous body of troops, drew to- 
 wards Narbonne, to attack the Roman pro- 
 vince on that side. Csesar being informed of 
 his design, thought it first and principally in- 
 cumbent upon him, to provide for the security 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 171 
 
 af the province. With this view he flew to 
 Narbonne ; confirmed the wavering and timo- 
 rous ; placed garrisons in the towns of the 
 Rutheni subject to the Komans ; also in those 
 of the Volscians, Tolosatians, and other states 
 bordering upon the enemy : and having thus 
 taken effectual measures against Luterius, 
 ordered part of the provincial forces, with the 
 recruits he had brought from Italy, to rendez- 
 vous upon the frontiers of the Helvians, whose 
 territories adjoin to those of the Averni. 
 
 VIII. These dispositions being made, and 
 Luterius checked and forced to retire, because 
 he did not think it advisable to venture among 
 the Roman garrisons, Csesar advanced into 
 the country of the Helvians. Although the 
 mountains of the Sevennes, which separate the 
 Helvians from Auvergne, by the great depth 
 of the snow in that extreme rigorous season, 
 threatened to obstruct his march ; yet having 
 cleared away the snow, which lay to the depth 
 of six feet, and, with infinite labour to the 
 soldiers, opened a passage over the mountains, 
 he at length reached the cbnfines of the Averni. 
 As they were altogether unprepared, regard- 
 ing the Sevennes as an impenetrable barrier, 
 impassable at that season even to single men, 
 he ordered the cavalry to spread themselves 
 on all sides, and strike as universal a terror 
 
 ■^nto the enemy as possible. Fame and mes- 
 sengers from the state soon informed Vercin- 
 getorix of the disaster befallen his country. 
 All the Averni gathered round him in a body, 
 and with looks full of dismay, conjured him 
 to regard their fortunes, and not abandon them 
 to the ravages of the Roman army ; more es- 
 pecially, as he now saw the whole war pointed 
 against them. Vercingetorix, moved by their 
 entreaties, put his army upon the march, and 
 quitting the territories of the Biturigians, 
 drew towards Auvergne. 
 
 IX. This Coesar had foreseen ; and after a 
 'stay of two days in those parts, set out under 
 
 pretence of fetching a reinforcenuetit. He 
 left 3'oung Brutus to command in his absence ; 
 charged him to disperse the cavalry as wide 
 as he could ; and promised to return, if possi- 
 ble, within three days. Then deceiving the 
 Romans themsolyes, that he might the better 
 impose upon the Gauls, he posted by great 
 journeys to Vienne. There he found the new 
 levied cavalry whom he had sent thither some 
 time before ; and travelling day and night 
 without intermission, through the country of 
 
 the iGduans, to prevent, by his expedition, 
 any designs they might form against him, he at 
 length reached the confines of the Lingones, 
 where two of his legions wintered. Thence 
 sending immediately to the rest, he drew them 
 altogether into a body, before the Averni could 
 be apprized of his arrival. 
 
 X. Vercingetorix, upon notice of this, led 
 back his army into the territories of the Bituri- 
 gians ; and marching thence, resolved to invest 
 Gergovia, a town belonging to the Boii, where 
 they had been settled by Csesar after the de- 
 feat of the Helvetians, and made subject to the 
 ^duan state. This step greatly perplexed 
 the Roman general: if he continued encamped 
 with his legion in one place during the rest 
 of the winter, and abandoned the subjects of 
 the JEduans to the attempts of the enemy, he 
 had reason to apprehend that the Gauls, seeing, 
 him afford no protection to his friends, would 
 universally give in to a revolt ; if, on the con- 
 trary, he took the field early, he risked the 
 want of provision and forage, by the great 
 difficulty of procuring convoys. Resolving 
 however, at all hazards, not to submit to an 
 aflfront, that must for ever alienate the hearts 
 of his allies, he pressingly enjoined the ^Eduans 
 to be very careful in supplying him with pro- 
 visions : and despatching messengers to the 
 Boii, to inform them of his approach, exhorted 
 them to continue firm to their duty, and sus- 
 tain with courage the assaults of the enemy. 
 Meanwhile leaving two legions and the bag- 
 gage of the whole army at Agendicum, he set 
 out upon his march to their relief. 
 
 XI. Arriving the next day before Vellauno- 
 dunum, a city of the Senones, that he might 
 leave no enemy behind him capable of obstruct- 
 ing his convoys, he resolved to besiege it, and 
 in two days completed his circumvallation. On 
 the third, deputies came from the town to treat 
 about a surrender ; when, ordering them to de- 
 liver up their arras, horses, and six hundred 
 hostages, he left C. Trebonius, one of his 
 lieutenants, to cause the articles to be put in 
 execution ; and continuing his march with 
 all diligence, advanced towards Genabum. 
 The Carnutes, to whom this city belonged, 
 were drawing troops together for its defence ; 
 imagining that the siege of Vellaunodunum, 
 of which they had just then received intelli- 
 gence, would be a work of some time. Csesar 
 reached the place in two days, encamped before 
 it, and finding it began to be late, deferred the 
 
172 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 assault till next morning. Meanwhile he 
 gave the necessary orders to his men ; and 
 because the town had a bridge over the Loire, 
 by which the inhabitants might endeavour to 
 escape in the night, he obliged two legions to 
 continue under arms. A little before mid- 
 night, the Genabians, as he had foreseen, stole 
 silently out of the city, and began to pass the 
 river. Notice being given of this by his 
 spies, he set fire to the gates, introduced the 
 legions whom he had kept in readiness for 
 that purpose, and took possession of the place. 
 Very few of the enemy escaped on this occa- 
 sion; because the narrowness of the bridge 
 and passages obstructed the flight of the mul- 
 titude. Caesar ordered the town to be plun- 
 dered and burnt, distributing the spoil among 
 the soldiers : and crossing the Loire with his 
 whole army, advanced into the territories of 
 the Biturigians. 
 
 XIL Vercingetorix, upon notice of his ap- 
 proach, quitted the siege of Gergovia, and 
 marched directly to meet him. Csesar, mean- 
 while, had sat down before Noviodunum, a 
 city of the Biturigians, that lay upon his route. 
 The inhabitants sending deputies to the camp, 
 to implore forgiveiipss and safety, that he might 
 the sooner accomplish his designs, in which 
 expedition had hitherto availed him so much, 
 he ordered them to deliver up their arms, 
 horses, and a certain number of hostages. 
 Part of the hostages had been already sent ; 
 the other articles of the treaty were upon the 
 point of execution ; and even some centurions 
 and soldiers had entered the place, to search 
 for arms and horses, when the enemy's cavalry, 
 who were a little advanced before the rest of 
 the army, appeared at a distance. Immedi- 
 ately the besieged, upon this prospect of relief 
 setting up a shout, flew to arms, shut the 
 gates, and manned the walls. The centurions 
 in the town, judging from the noiss among the 
 Gauls, that they had some new project in view, 
 posted themselves, with their swords drawn, 
 It the gates ; and getting all their men to- 
 gether, retreated without loss to the camp. 
 Csesar ordering the cavalry to advance, fell 
 upon the enemy's horse ; and finding his troops 
 hard pressed, sustained them with some squad- 
 rons of Germans, whom, to the number of 
 about four hundred, he had all along retained 
 in his service. The Gauls, unable to stand 
 their charge, at length betook themselves to 
 flight, and were driven, with great slaughter, 
 
 to the main body of their armj'. Upon this 
 the people of Noviodunum, terrified anew by 
 the defeat of their friends, seized all who hads^ 
 been instrumental in breaking the capitulation, 
 sent them prisoners to Caesar's camp, and 
 delivered up the town. These aflairs des- 
 patched, Caesar directed his march towards 
 Avaricum. As this was the strongest and 
 most considerable city of the Biturigians, and 
 situate in the finest part of the country, he 
 easily persuaded himself, that by the reduction 
 of it, he should bring the whole nation under 
 subjection. 
 
 XIIL Vercingetorix, after so many suc- 
 cessive losses, at Vellaunodunum, Genabum, 
 Noviodunum, calling a general council of his 
 followers, represented : " That it was neces- 
 sary to resolve upon a very different plan of 
 war, from that which hitherto had been pur- 
 sued ; and above all things make it their en- 
 deavour to intercept the Roman convoys and 
 foragers : that this was both a sure and prac- 
 ticable scheme, as they themselves abounded 
 in horse, and the season of the year greatly 
 favoured the design : that the ground as yet 
 affording no produce, the enemy must una- 
 voidably disperse themselves in the villages 
 for subsistence, and give them daily opportu- 
 nities of cutting them oflf by means of their 
 cavalry. That where life and liberty were at 
 stake, property and private possession ought 
 to be neglected : that therefore the best reiplu- 
 tion they could take was, to set all their housTss 
 and villages on "fire, from the territories of the 
 Boii, to wherever the Romans might extend 
 their quarters for the sake of forage : that they . 
 themselves had no reason to apprehend scar- 
 city, as they would be plentifully supplied by 
 those states, whose territories should become 
 the seat of the war ; whereas the enemy must 
 be either reduced to the necessity of starving, 
 or making distant and dangerous excursions 
 from their camp ; that it equally answered the 
 purpose of the Gauls, to cut the Roman army 
 to pieces, or seize upon their baggage and 
 convoys ; because, without these last, it would 
 be impossible for them to carry on the war : 
 that they ought to set fire even to the towns 
 themselves, which were not strong enough by 
 art or nature, to be perfectly secure against 
 all danger; as by this means they would nei- 
 ther become places of retreat to their own 
 men, to screen them from military service ; 
 nor contribute to the support of the Romans 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 173 
 
 Dy the supplies and plunder they might fur- 
 nish. In fine, that though these things were 
 indeed grievous and terrible, they ought yet 
 tOf esteem it still more terrible and grievous, 
 to see their wives . and children dragged into 
 captivity, and themselves exposed to slaugh- 
 ter, which was the unavoidable lot of the van- 
 quished." 
 
 XIV. This proposal being approved by all, 
 upwards of twenty cities of the Biturigians 
 were burnt in one day. The like was done 
 in other states. Nothing but conflagrations 
 were to be seen over the whole country. And 
 though the natives bore this desolation with 
 extreme regret, they nevertheless consoled 
 themselves with the hope, that an approaching 
 and certain victory would soon enable them 
 to recover their losses. A debate arising in 
 council about Avaricum, whether it would be 
 proper to defend or set it on fire, the Bituri- 
 gians, falling prostrate at the feet of the rest 
 of the Gauls, implored : " That they might 
 not be obliged to burn, with their own hands, 
 one of the finest cities of all Gaul, which was 
 both the ornament and security of their state ; 
 more especially as the town itself, almost 
 wholly surrounded by a river and morass, and 
 affording but one very narrow approach, was, 
 from the nature of its situation, capable of an 
 easy defence." Their request prevailed ; 
 Vercingetorix, though he at first opposed, 
 afterwards coming into the design ; partly 
 moved^.by the entreaties of the Biturigians, 
 partly by the compassion of the multitude. A 
 chosen garrison was immediately put into the 
 place. 
 
 XV. Vercingetorix followed Caesar by easy 
 marches, and chose for his camp a place sur- 
 rounded with woods and marshes, about fifteen 
 miles distant from Avaricum.^j There he had 
 hourly intelligence by his scouts, of all that 
 passed before the town ; and sent his orders 
 from time to time to the garrison. Meanwhile 
 he strictly watched our convoys and foragers; 
 set upon our dispersed parties, who were 
 obliged to fetch provisions from a great dis- 
 tance ; and, in spite of all endeavours to pre- 
 vent it, by choosing such times and routes, as 
 were most likely to deceive his vigilance, very 
 much incommoded them by his attacks. 
 
 XVI. Cassar encamping on that side of 
 the town, where the intermission of the river 
 and morass formed, as w.e have said,, a narrow 
 approach ; began to raise a mount, bring for- 
 
 61 
 
 ward his battering engines, and prepare two 
 towers of assault ; without troubling himself . 
 about lines of circumvallation, which the na- 
 ture of the ground rendered impossible. Mean- 
 while he was continually soliciting the /Edu- 
 ans and Boii for corn : but received no great 
 supplies from either ; partly occasioned by the 
 negligence of the .^Eduans, who were not 
 hearty in the affair ; partly by the want of 
 ability in the Boii, who possessing only a small 
 and inconsiderable territory, soon consumed 
 all the produce of their own lands. But though 
 the army laboured under the greatest scarcity 
 of corn, through the inability of the Boii. the 
 want of inclination in the .(Eduans, and the^ 
 universal devastation of the country ; though 
 they were even for many days altogether with- 
 out bread, and had nothing to appease their 
 extreme hunger, but the cattle brought from 
 distant villages ; yet not an expression was 
 heard over the whole camp, unworthy the ma- 
 jesty of the Roman name, or the glory they 
 had acquired by former victories. Nay, when 
 Cassar visited the different quarters of the le- 
 gions in person, and offered to raise the siege, 
 if they found the famine insupportable, they 
 all with one voice requested him not to do it, 
 adding : " That during the many years they 
 had served under him, they never yet had met 
 with any check or undertaken aught in which 
 they had not succeeded : that they could not 
 but look upon it as inglorious, to relinquish a 
 siege they had once begun ; and had rather 
 undergo the greatest hardships, than not re- 
 venge the blood of the Roman citizens, perfi- 
 diously massacred by the Gauls, at Genabum." 
 The same 'they said to the centurions and 
 military tribunes, entreating them to report 
 their sentiments to Csesar. 
 
 XVII. And now the towers began to ap- 
 proach the wall ; when Cassar was informed 
 by some prisoners, that Vercingetorix havino- 
 consumed all the forage round him, had re- 
 moved his camp nearer to Avaricum, and was 
 gone himself at the head of the cavalry, and 
 the light-armed troops accustomed to fight in 
 their intervals, to form an ambuscade for the 
 Romans in a place where it was supposed 
 they would come next day to forage. Upon 
 this intelligence, setting out about mid- 
 night in great silence, he arrived next morn- 
 ing at the enemy's camp. But they, having 
 had timely notice of his approach by their 
 scouts, instantly conveyed their baggage and 
 
174 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 carriages into a thick wood, and drew up in 
 order of battle upon an open hill. Caesar then 
 ordered all the baggage to be brought toge- 
 ther into one place, and the soldiers to prepare 
 for an engagement, 
 
 XVIII. The hill itself where the enemy 
 stood rising all the way with an easy ascent, 
 was almost wholly surrounded by a morass, 
 difficult and dangerous to be passed though not 
 above fifty feet over. Here the Gauls, confiding 
 in the strength of their post, and haying broke 
 down all the bridges over the morass, appeared 
 with an air of resolution. They had formed 
 themselves into different bodies, according to 
 their several states ; and planting select detach- 
 ments at all the avenues and fords, waited with 
 determined courage, that if the Romans should 
 attempt to force their way through, they might 
 fall upon them from the higher ground, while 
 entangled in the mud. To attend only to the 
 nearness of the two armies, they seemed as if 
 ready to fight us on even terms ; but, when the 
 advantage of their situation was considered, 
 all this ostentation of bravery was easily dis- 
 cerned to be mere show and pretence. Never- 
 theless, the Romans, full of indignation, that 
 the enemy should dare to face them with so 
 small a space between, loudly demanded to be 
 led to battle. Csesar checked their ardour for 
 the present, and endeavoured to make them 
 sensible, that in attacking an army so strongly 
 posted, the victory must cost extremely dear, 
 and be attended with the loss of many brave 
 men. To this he told them he was the more 
 averse, because, finding them prepared to face 
 every kind of danger for his glory, he thought 
 he could not be too tender of the lives of those 
 who merited so highly at his hands. Having 
 by this speech consoled the soldiers, he led 
 them back the same day to their camp, and 
 applied himself wholly to the carrying on of 
 the siege. 
 
 XIX. Vercingetorix, upon his return to the 
 camp, was accused by the army of treason. 
 The removal of his quarters nearer to those of 
 the enemy ; his departure at the head of all 
 the cavalry ; his leaving so many troops with- 
 out a commander in chief: and the opportune 
 and speedy arrival of the Romans during his 
 absence : all these, they said, could not easily 
 happen by chance, or without design ; and 
 give great reason to believe, that he had rather 
 owe the sovereignty of Gaul to Ccesar's 
 grant, than to the favour and free choice of 
 
 his countrymen. To this charge he replied ; 
 « That the removal of his camp was occasioned 
 by the want of forage, and done at their own 
 express desire : that he had lodged himself 
 nearer to the Romans, on account of the ad- 
 vantage of the ground, which secured him 
 against all attacks ; that cavalry were by no 
 means wanted in a morass, but might have 
 been extremely serviceable in the place to 
 which he had carried them ; that he purposely 
 forebore naming a commander in chief at his 
 departure, lest the impatience of the multitude 
 should have forced him upon a battle; to 
 which he perceived they were all strongly in- 
 clined, through a certain weakness and effemi- 
 nacy of mind, that rendered them incapable of 
 long fdligue ; that whether accident or intelli- 
 gence brought the Romans to their camp, they 
 ought to thank, in the one case, fortune, in the 
 other, the informer, for giving them an oppor- 
 tunity of discovering from the higher ground 
 the inconsiderable number, and despising the 
 feeble efforts of the enemy ; who, not daring to 
 hazard an engagement, ignominiously retreated 
 to their camp ; that for his part, he scorneo 
 treacherously to hold an authority of Csesar 
 which he hoped soon to Ukerit by a victory, al- 
 ready in a manner assured, both to himself an(i 
 the rest of the Gauls : that he was willing even 
 to resign the command, if they thought the 
 honour done to him by that distinction too 
 great for the advantages procured by his con- 
 duct. And," added he, " to convince you of 
 the truth and sincerity of my words, hear the 
 Roman soldiers themselves." He then produced 
 some slaves, whom he had made prisoners a 
 few days before in foraging, and by severity and 
 hard usage brought to his purpose. These, ac- 
 cording to the lesson taught them beforehand, 
 declared : " That they were legionary soldiers : 
 that urged by hunger, they had privately sto- 
 len out of the camp, to search for corn and 
 cattle in the fields : that the whole army la- 
 boured under the like scarcity, and was reduced 
 to so weak a condition, as no longer to be 
 capable of supporting fatigue : that the general 
 had therefore resolved, if the town held out 
 three days longer, to draw off his men from 
 the siege." » Such (said Vercingetorix) are the 
 services you receive from the man whom you 
 have not scrupled to charge with treason. To 
 him it is owing, that without drawing a sword, 
 you see a powerful and victorious army almost 
 wholly destroyed by famine ; and effectual 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 175 
 
 care taken, that, when necessity compels them 
 to seek refuge in a shameful flight, no state 
 shall receive them into its territories." 
 
 XX. The whole multitude set up a shout ; 
 and striking, as their manner was, their lances 
 against their swords, to denote their approba- 
 tion of the speaker, declared Vereingetorix a 
 
 ^consummate general, whose fidelity ought not 
 to be questioned, and whose conduct deserved 
 the highest praises. They decreed that ten 
 thousand men, chosen out of all the troops, 
 should be sent to reinforce the' garrison of 
 Avaricum ; it seeming too hazardous to rely 
 upon the Biturigians alone for the defence of 
 a place, whose preservation, they inaagined, 
 would necessarily give them the superiority in 
 the war. 
 
 XXI. And indeed, though the siege was 
 carried on by our men with incredible bravery, 
 yet were all their efforts in a great measure 
 rendered ineffectual, by the address and con- 
 trivances of the Gauls. For they are a people 
 of singular ingenuity, extremely quick of ap- 
 prehension, and very happy in imitating what 
 they see practised. They not only turned 
 aside our hooks with ropes, and after having 
 seized them, drew them into the town with 
 engines ; but likewise set themselves to under- 
 mine the mount : in which they the more suc- 
 ceeded, because the country abounding with 
 iron mines, they are perfectly skilled in that 
 whole art. At the same time they raised 
 towers on all parts of the wall, covered them 
 carefully with raw hides ; and continuing their 
 sallies day and night, either set fire to the 
 moun.t, or fell upon the workmen. In pro- 
 portion as our towers increased in height, by 
 the continual addition to the mount, in like 
 manner did they advance their towers upon 
 their walls, by raising one story perpetually 
 over another ; and counterworking our mines 
 with the utmost diligence, they either filled 
 them up with great stones, or poured melted 
 pitch into them, or repulsed the miners with 
 long stakes, burnt and sharpened at the 
 end ; all which very much retarded the ap- 
 proaches, and kept us at a distance from the 
 place. 
 
 XXII. The fortified towns among the 
 Gauls have their walls mostly built in the 
 following manner : — Long massy beams of 
 wood are placed upon the ground, at the 
 equal distance of two feet one from another, 
 and so as to constitute by their length the 
 
 thickness of the wall. These being again 
 crossed over by others, which serve to bind 
 them together, have their intervals on the 
 inside filled up with earth, and on the outside 
 with large stones. The first course thus com- 
 pleted and firmly joined, a second is laid over 
 it ; which allowing the same openings between 
 the beams, rests them not immediately upon 
 those of the order below, but dispose them 
 artfully above their intervals, and connects 
 them, as before, with interjacent earth and 
 stones. In this manner the w*rk is carried 
 on to a proper height, and pleases the eye by 
 its uniform variety, the alternate courses. of 
 stones and beams running in even lines, ac- 
 cording to their several orders. Nor is it less 
 adapted to security and defence. For the 
 stones are proof against fire, and the whole 
 mass is impenetrable to the ram ; because 
 being strongly bound together by continual 
 beams, to a depth of forty feet, it can neither 
 be disjointed nor thrown down. 
 
 XXIII. Such were the obstacles we met 
 with in the siege. But the soldiers, though 
 obliged to struggle during the whole time, 
 with cold, dirt, and perpetual rains ; yet by 
 dint of labour, overcame all difficulties, and 
 at the end of twenty -five days, had raised a 
 mount three hundred and thirty feet broad, 
 and eighty feet high. When it was brought 
 almost close to the walls, Caesar, according to 
 custom, attending the works, and encouraging 
 the soldiers to labour without intermission, a 
 little before midnight it was observed to 
 smoke, the enemy having undermined and 
 fired it. At the same time they raised a 
 mighty shout, and sallying vigorously by two 
 several gates, attacked the works on both 
 sides. Some threw lighted torches and dry 
 wood from the walls upon the mount, others 
 pitch and all sorts of combustibles ; so that it 
 was hard to determine on which side to make 
 head against the enemy, or where first to apply 
 redress. But as Ctesar kept always two le- 
 gions upon guard in the trenches, besides 
 great numbers employed in the works, who- 
 relieved one another by turns; his troops were 
 soon in a condition, some to oppose those that 
 sallied from the town, others to draw off the 
 towers, and make openings in the mount ; 
 whilst the whole multitude ran to extinguish 
 the flames. 
 
 XXIV. The fight continued with great 
 obstinacy during the remaining part of the 
 
176 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 night ; the enemy still entertained hopes of 
 victory; and persisted with the more firmness, 
 as they saw the mantles that covered the 
 towers burnt down, and the Romans unable 
 to rescue them for want of shelter. At the 
 same time fresh troops were continually sent 
 to supply^ the place of those that were fatigued ; 
 the besieged believing, that the safety of 
 Gaul entirely depended upon the issue of 
 that critical moment. And here I cannot 
 *brbear mentioning a remarkable instance of 
 intrepidity, t« which I was myself a witness 
 on this occasion. A certain Gaul, posted be- 
 fore the gate of the city, threw into the fire 
 balls of pitch and tallow, to feed it. This man 
 being exposed to the discharge of a Roman 
 battery, was struck through the side with a 
 dart, and expired. Another striding over his 
 body, immediately took his place. .He also 
 was killed in the same manner. A third 
 succeeded : to the third a fourth, nor was this 
 dangerous post left vacant till the fire of 
 the mount being extinguished, and the enemy 
 repulsed on all sides, an end was put to the 
 conflict. 
 
 XXX. The Gauls having tried all methods 
 of defence, and finding that none of them 
 succeeded, consulted next day about leaving 
 the town, in concert with, and even by the 
 order of Vercingetorix. This they hoped 
 easily to effect in the night, as that general's 
 camp was not far off, and the morass between 
 them and the Romans would serve to cover 
 their retreat. Night came, and the besieged 
 were preparing to put their design in execu- 
 tion ; when suddenly the women running out 
 into the street, and casting themselves at 
 their husbands' feet, conjured them with many 
 tears, not to abandon to the fury of an en- 
 raged enemy, them and their common chil- 
 dren, whom nature and weakness rendered in- 
 capable of flight. But finding their entreaties 
 ineffectual, (for in extreme danger fear often 
 excludes compassion,) they began to set up 
 a loud cry, and inform the Romans of the 
 intended flight. This alarmed the garrison, 
 who, apprehending the passages would be 
 seized by our horse, desisted from their resolu- 
 tion. 
 
 XXVI. Next day Caesar brought forward 
 the tower, and gave the necessary directions 
 about the works. A heavy rain chancing 
 just then to fall, he thought it a favourable 
 opportunity for effecting his design ; as he 
 
 observed the wall to be less strictly guarded. 
 Wherefore ordering the soldiers to abate a 
 little of their vigour, and having instructed 
 them in what manner to proceed, he exhorted 
 the legions, who advanced under cover of the 
 machines, to seize at last the fruits of a victory 
 acquired by so many toils. Then promising 
 rewards to those who should first scale the\j 
 town, he gave the signal of attack. The 
 Romans rushed suddenly upon the enemy 
 from all parts, and in a moment possessed 
 themselves of the walls. 
 
 XXVII. The Gauls terrified at this new 
 manner of assault, and driven from their 
 towers and battlements, drew up triangle- 
 wise in the squares and open places, that on 
 whatever side our men should come to attack 
 them, they might face in order of battle. But, 
 observing that we still kept upon the walls, 
 and were endeavouring to get possession of 
 their whole circuit, they began to fear they 
 should have no outlet to escape by ; and 
 throwing down their arms, ran tumultuously 
 to the farthest part of the town. There 
 many fell within the city, (he narrbwness of 
 the gates obstructing their flight; others were 
 slain by the cavalry without the walls , nor ' 
 did any one for the present think of plunder. 
 The Romans, eager to revenge the massacre 
 at Genabum, and exasperated by the obstinate 
 defence of the place, spared neither old men, . 
 women, nor children ; insomuch that of all 
 that multitude, amounting to about forty 
 thousand, scarce eight hundred, who had quit- 
 ted the town on the first alarm, escaped safe 
 to Vercingetorix's camp. They arrived there 
 late in the night, and were received in great 
 silence ; for Vercingetorix, fearing lest their 
 entrance in a body, and the compassion it 
 would naturally raise among the troops, might 
 occasion some tumult in the camp, had ' sent 
 out his friends, and the piincipal noblemen of 
 each province, to meet them by the way, and 
 conduct them separately to the quarters of 
 their several states. 
 
 XXVIII. Next day having called a council^ 
 he consoled and exhorted the troops, not to 
 he too much disheartened, or cast down by 
 their late misfortune : " That the Romans had 
 not overcome by bravery, or in the field ; but 
 by their address and skill in sieges, with which 
 part of war the Gauls were less acquainted : 
 that it was deceiving themselves to hope for 
 success in every measure they might think tt 
 
COMMENTARIES, 
 
 177 
 
 pursue : that himself, as they all knew, had 
 never advised the defence of Avaricum, and 
 could not but impute the present disaster to 
 the imprudence of the Biturigians, and the 
 too easy compliance of the rest : that he hoped, 
 however, soon to compensate it by superior 
 advantages, as he was using his utmost en- 
 deavours to bring over the other states which 
 
 fhad hitherto refused their concurrence, and 
 
 t to join one general confederacy of all Gaul, 
 against whose united strength, not the whole 
 earth would be able to prevail : that he had 
 even in a great measure effected his design, 
 and in the meantime only required of them, 
 
 f for the sake of the common safety, that they 
 would set about fortifying their camp, the 
 better to secure them from the sudden attacks 
 of the enemy." This speech was not unpleas- 
 ing to the Gauls : and the rather, as not- 
 withstanding so great a blow, Vercingetorix 
 seemed to have lost nothing of his courage : 
 neither withdrawing from public view, nor 
 shunning the sight of the multitude. They 
 even began to entertain a higher opinion of 
 his prudence and foresight, as from the first he 
 had advised the burning of Avaricum, and at 
 last sent orders to abandon it. And thus, bad 
 
 . success^ which usually sinks the reputation of 
 a commander served only to augment his 
 
 • credit, and give him greater authority among 
 
 '■ 4^e troops. At the same time they were full 
 
 of hopes, from the assurances he had given 
 
 them, of seeing the other states accede to the 
 
 ,"' alliance. And now, for the first time, the 
 
 Gauls set about fortifying their camp ; being 
 
 /o humbled by their late misfortune, that 
 though naturally impatient of fatigue, they 
 resolved to refuse no labour imposed upon 
 them by their general. 
 
 XXIX. Nor was Vercingetorix less active 
 on his side to bring over the other provinces 
 
 ■ of Gaul to the confederacy, endeavouring to 
 gain the leading men in each by presents 
 and promises. For this purpose he made 
 choice of fit agents, who by their address, or 
 particular ties of friendship, were most likely 
 to influence those to whom they were sent. 
 He provided arms and clothing for the troops 
 that had escaped from Avaricum : and to re- 
 pair the loss sustained by the taking of that 
 place, gave orders to the several states, to 
 furnish a certain number of men, and send them 
 to the camp by a day prefixed. At the same 
 time he commanded all the archers, of which 
 16* 
 
 there were great numbers in Gaul, to be 
 sought out and brought to the army. By these 
 measures he soon replaced the men whom he 
 lost at the siege of Avaricum. Meanwhile 
 Theutomatus, the son of Ollovico, and king of 
 the Nitobrigians, whose father had been styled 
 friend and ally by the senate of Rome, came 
 and joined him with a great body of horse, 
 which he had raised in his own territories, and 
 in the province of Aquitain. 
 
 XXX. Csesar finding great plenty of corn 
 and other provisions at Avaricum, stayed there 
 several days to refresh his men, after the fa- 
 tigue and scarcity they had so lately under- 
 gone. Winter was now drawing towards a 
 period; and, as the season itself invited him 
 to take the field, he resolved to march against 
 the enemy, either to draw them out of the 
 woods and marshes, or besiege them in their 
 fastnesses. While he was full of these 
 thoughts, deputies arrived from the Jilduans, 
 to beg his interposition and authority, for set- 
 tling the differences of their state. " Every 
 thing there," they told him, " thieatened an 
 intestine war. For whereas it had all along 
 been the custom to be governed by a single 
 magistrate, who possessed the supreme power 
 for the space of one year ; they had now two 
 disputing for that title, each pretending his 
 election was according to law : that the one 
 was Convictolitanis, an illustrious and popular 
 young nobleman ; the other Cotus, of an an- 
 cient family, great authority, and powerful re- 
 lations, whose brother Videliacus had exer- 
 cised the same office the year before : that the 
 whole state was in arms, the senate divided, 
 and each party backed by their clients among 
 the people ; nor had they any other hopes 
 of escaping a civil war, but in his care and 
 timely endeavours to put an end to the con- 
 troversy." 
 
 XXXI. Although Cfesar was sensible it 
 would greatly prejudice his affairs, to quit the 
 pursuit of the war, and the enemy ; yet re- 
 flecting on the mischiefs that often arise from 
 divisions, and desirous if possible to prevent 
 so powerful a state, in strict amity with the 
 people of Rome, and which he had always in a 
 particular, manner cherished and befriended, 
 from having recourse to the method of vio- 
 lence and arms, which might drive the party 
 that least confided in his friendship, to seek 
 the assistance of Vercingetorix ; he resolved 
 to make it his first care, to put a stop to the 
 
 3 A 
 
178 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 progress of these disorders. And because, by 
 the constitution of the ^Eduans, it was not 
 lawful for the supreme magistrate to pass be- 
 yond the limits of the state ; that he might 
 not seem to detract from their privileges, he 
 resolved to go in person thither, and summoned 
 the senate and two candidates to meet him at 
 Decise. The assembly was very numerous ; 
 ■when finding upon inquiry, that Cotus had 
 been declared chief magistrate by his own 
 brother, in presence of only a few electors 
 privately called together, without regard to 
 time or place, and even contrary to the express 
 laws of the state, which forbid two of the same 
 family, while yet both alive, either to hold the 
 supreme dignity, or so much as sit together in 
 the senate ; he obliged him to resign in fa- 
 vour of Convictolitanis, who, upon the expira- 
 tion of the office of the preceding magistrate, 
 had been elected, in all the forms, by the 
 priests. 
 
 XXXII. This sentence being passed ; and 
 having exhorted the .(Eduans to lay aside 
 their quarrels and divisions, and apply them- 
 selves solely to the business of the present 
 war ; to expect with confidence the full re- 
 compense of their services, as soon as the re- 
 duction of Gaul was completed ; and to send 
 him immediately all their cavalry, with ten 
 thousand foot, to form a chain of posts for the 
 security of his convoys ; he divided his army 
 into two parts. Four legions, under the con- 
 duct of Labienus, were sent against the Se- 
 nones and Parisians. Six, headed by himself 
 in person, marched along the banks of the 
 Allier, towards the territories of the Averni, 
 with design to invest Gergovia. Part of the 
 cavalry followed the route of Labienus ; part 
 remained with Csesar. Vercingetorix having 
 notice of this, broke down all the bridges upon 
 the Allier, and began his march on the other 
 side of the river. 
 
 XXXIII. As both armies were continually 
 in view, encamped almost over against each 
 other, and the enemy's scouts so stationed, 
 that it was impossible for the Romans to make 
 a bridge for carrying over their forces ; Caesar 
 began to be uneasy lest he should be hin- 
 dered the greatest part of the summer by the 
 river ; because the Allier is seldom fordable 
 till towards autumn. To prevent this incon- 
 venience, he encamped in a place full of 
 woods, over against one of those bridges 
 which Vercingetorix had caused to be broken 
 
 down ; and remaining there privately next day, 
 with a good body of troops, formed by draught- 
 ing every fourth cohort, that the number of ' 
 legions might still appear complete ; he sent 
 forward. the rest of the army with all the bag- 
 gage as usual, ordering them to march as far 
 as they could. When by the time of the 
 day, he judged they might be arrived at the 
 place of their encampment, he set about re- 
 building the bridge, making use of the old piles, 
 \vhose lower part the enemy had left standing. 
 Having soon completed the work, marched 
 over the troops he had with him, and chosen a 
 proper place for his camp, he recalled the rest 
 of the forces. Vercingetorix, upon intelligence 
 of this, advanced before by long marches, that 
 he might not be obliged to fight against his 
 will, 
 
 XXXIV. Caesar, after five days' march, 
 came before Gergovia, where he had a slight 
 engagement with the enemy's horse ; and, 
 having taken a view of the place, which he 
 found situated upon a very high mountain, all 
 whose approaches were extremely difficult, he 
 not only despaired of reducing it by storm, but 
 resolved even to forbear investing it until he 
 had secured the necessary supplies for his 
 army. Vercingetorix meanwhile was encamped 
 near the town upon the hill, where he had 
 disposed the forces of the several states around 
 him, in different divisions, separated from one 
 another by moderate intervals. As his army 
 possessed all the summits of the mountain, 
 whence there was any prospect into the plains 
 below, they made a very formidable appear- 
 ance. Every morning by day-break, the 
 chiefs of each state, who composed his council, 
 assembled in his tent, to advise with him, or 
 receive his orders : nor did he suffer a single 
 day to pass without detaching some cavalry, 
 intermixed with archers, to skirmish with the 
 Romans, that he might make trial of the spirit 
 and courage of his men. There was a rising 
 ground, that joined to the foot of the moun- 
 tain on which the town stood, excellently well 
 fortified by nature, as being very steep on all 
 sides, and of extreme difficult access. This 
 hill, though of such importance to the enemy, v 
 that by our getting possession of it, we could 
 in a great measure deprive them of water and 
 forage, was yet but very indifferently guarded, 
 Caesar therefore leaving his camp about mid- 
 night, before any assistance could arrive from 
 the town, dislodged the enemy, seized the hill 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 179 
 
 and having placed two legions upon it to de- 
 fend it, drew a double ditch, twelve feet deep, 
 from the greater to the lesser camp, that the 
 so-ldiers might pass and repass in safety, even 
 single and without a guard. 
 
 XXXV. While things were in this posture 
 before Gergovia, Convictolitanis the jSlduan, 
 to whom, as we have related above, Csesar 
 had adjudged the supreme magistracy, being 
 strongly solicited by the Averni, and at length 
 gained over by their money, addressed him- 
 self to some young nobleman, the chief of 
 whom werejjitavicus and his brothers, of the 
 most distinguished family of the province. 
 With these he shared the reward he had re- 
 ceived, and exhorted them to consider : " That 
 they were subjects of a free state, and born to 
 command : that liberty and victory were re- 
 tarded by the ^duans alone, whose authority 
 restrained the other states, and whose concur- 
 rence in the common cause would take from 
 the Romans all possibility of supporting them- 
 selves in Gaul : that though he was himself 
 under some obligation to Csesar, at least so 
 far as a just and equitable decision deserved 
 that name, he thought he owed still more to 
 his country, and could see no reason why the 
 ^duans should rather have recourse to the 
 Roman general, in what regarded their laws 
 and customs, than the Romans in the like 
 case to the ^duans." The representations 
 of the magistrate, and the rewards he bestowed, 
 soon prevailed ; they even offered to become 
 the chief conductors of the enterprise ; and 
 nothing was wanting but to consult of pro- 
 per means for accomplishing the design, as it 
 was easily foreseen that the state would not be 
 induced without great difficulty to engage in 
 so dangerous a war. At last it was agreed, 
 that Litavicus should have the command of 
 the ten thousand foot appointed to join Csesar; 
 that he should begin his march ; that his 
 brothers should be sent before to the Roman 
 camp ; and that the rest of the project should 
 be then executed, according to a plan pre- 
 viously concerted among them. 
 
 XXXVI. Litavicus having received the 
 command of the army; when he was within 
 about thirty miles of Gergovja, suddenly called 
 the troops together, and addressing them 
 with tears: "Whither, fellow-soldiers," said 
 he, " are we going] All our cavalry, all our 
 nobility are slain. Eporedorix and Virdu- 
 marus, men of the first quality in the state, 
 
 being accused by the Romans of treason, are 
 put to death without trial. Learn these things 
 of those who have escaped this general mas- 
 sacre ; for as to me, overwhelmed as I am with 
 grief for the loss of my brothers and kinsmen, 
 I have neither strength nor voice to utter our 
 calamities." He then produced some whom 
 he had beforehand instructed for that purpose, 
 and who joining in the same story, told the 
 multitude, " That the greatest part of the 
 ^duan cavalry had been put to the sword, 
 under pretence of holding intelligence with 
 the Averni; and that themselves had escaped 
 only in the crowd, by withdrawing during the 
 general slaughter." Upon this the whole 
 army called aloud to Litavicus, entreating 
 him to provide for their safety. '< As if," said 
 he, "there was room for counsel; or any 
 choice left, but that of marching directly to 
 Gergovia, and joining the Averni, Can we 
 doubt, after so black an instance of Roman 
 perfidy, but that they are already on their way 
 to complete the massacre ] Let us there- 
 fore, if aught of spirit or courage remains in 
 our breasts, revenge the death of our country- 
 men, so undeservedly slain, and put these in- 
 human spoilers to the sword." He then pre- 
 sented some Roman citizens, who had taken 
 the opportunity of their march, for conducting 
 a large convoy of corn and provisions to the 
 camp. Instantly the convoy was plundered, 
 the Romans themselves put to death with tlje 
 most cruel torments, and messengers des- 
 patched through all the territories of the ^du- 
 ans, to spread the same forgery of the massacre 
 of their cavalry and princes, and thereby rouse 
 them to a like vengeance. 
 
 XXXVII. Eporedorix the JEduan, a young 
 nobleman of distinguished birth, and great in- 
 terest in the state ; as likewise Virdumarus, 
 of equal age and authority, though not so 
 well descended ; whom Csesar, upon the re- 
 commendation of Diviaticus, had raised from 
 a low condition to the highest dignities ; were 
 both at this time in the Roman camp, having 
 come along with the cavalry, at Csesar's ex- 
 press desire. Between these two was a com- 
 petition for greatness ; and in the late dispute 
 about the magistracy, the one had declared 
 warmly for Convictolitanis, the other for 
 Cotus. Eporedorix getting notice of Lita- 
 vicus's design, came about midnight to Caesar's 
 tent, discovered the whole plot, and entreated 
 him to obviate the mischievous counsels of a 
 
180 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 few young noblemen, and not suffer the state to 
 fall off from the alliance of the Romans, 
 which he foresaw must happen, should so 
 many thousand men once join the enemy. 
 For it was by no means probable, that either 
 their own relations would neglect their safety, 
 or the state itself make light of so great a part 
 of its forces. 
 
 XXXVIII. This piece of intelligence gave 
 Caesar extreme concern, because he had always 
 manifested a particular regard to the jf)duans. 
 He therefore drew out immediately four legions 
 without baggage, together with all the cav- 
 alry ; and because the affair seemed to depend 
 wholly upon despatch, would not even take 
 time to contract his camp, but left C. Fabius, 
 his lieutenant, with two legions, to defend it 
 against the enemy. Finding that Litavicus's 
 brothers, whom he ordered to be seized, had 
 some time before gone over to Vercingetorix, 
 he began his march, exhorting the soldiers to 
 bear the fatigue cheerfully in so pressing a 
 conjuncture. They followed with great alac- 
 rity, and advancing about five and twenty miles 
 from Gergovia, came at last within sight of the 
 ^duans. Cfesar immediately detached the 
 cavalry against them, to retard and stop their 
 march : but with strict charge to abstain from 
 bloodshed. He ordered Eporedorix and Vir- 
 dumarus, whom they believed slain, to ride up 
 and down among the squadrons, and call to 
 their countrymen. As they were soon known, 
 and Litavicus's forgery thereby discovered, the 
 -iEduans stretched out their hands, made signs 
 of submission, and throwing down their arms, 
 began to beg their lives. Litavicus with his 
 clients, who, by the customs of the Gauls, can- 
 not without infamy abandon their patrons, 
 even in the greatest extremities of fortune, es- 
 caped safe to Gergovia. 
 
 XXXIX. Caasar having despatched messen- 
 gers to the J^duans, to inform them that his 
 lenity and regard for their state, had prevailed 
 witn him to spare troops, whom by the right 
 of war he might have put to the sword ; after 
 allowing the army three hours' rest during the 
 night, marched back to Gergovia. About 
 half way he was met by a party of horse, sent 
 by Fabius, to give him notice of the danger that 
 threatened his camp. They told him, " That 
 the enemy had attacked it with all their forces, 
 and by sending continual supplies of fresh 
 men, were like in the end to overpower the 
 Romans,, whose fatigue admitted of no relax- 
 ation, because the vast extent of ground they 
 
 had to defend, obliged them to be perpetually 
 upon the rampart : that the multitude of ar- 
 rows and darts discharged by the Gauls, had 
 wounded many of the soldiers, notwithstand- 
 ing the protection received from the engines, 
 which yet had been of good service in beating 
 off the assailants : that Fabius, upon the retreat 
 of the enemy, had closed up all the gates of 
 the camp but two, carried a breastwork quite 
 round the rampart, and made preparation fbr 
 sustaining a like assault the next day." Caesar 
 informed of these things, hastened his march 
 with all diligence, and seconded by the usual 
 ardour of the troops, arrived in the campTje- 
 fore sun-rise. 
 
 XL. While these things passed at Gergovia, 
 the ^duans, upon receipt of the first des- 
 patches from Litavicus, staid not for confirma- 
 tion of the report ; but prompted, partly by 
 avarice, partly by revenge, and many by a na- 
 tive rashness, to which the Gauls in general are 
 extremely addicted, being' ready to catch up 
 every flying rumour as a certain truth, flew 
 immediately to arms, plundered the Roman 
 citizens of their effects, slaughtered their per- 
 sons, or dragged them into servitude, Convic- 
 tolitanis fomented to the utmost this fury, 
 which had already taken but too fast hold of 
 the multitude ; that by plunging them into some 
 desperate act of violence, he might render a re- 
 treat the more difficult and shameful. At his 
 instigation, they obliged M. Aristius, a military 
 tribune, who was upon his way to join the ar- 
 my, to quit Cabillorium, promising not to mo- 
 lest him in his journey. The same they did 
 by several Roman merchants, who stopped there 
 on account of traffic ; and attacking them treach- 
 erously on the road, stripped them of their 
 baggage, invested day and night those that 
 made resistance ; and many being killed on 
 both sides, drew together a great number of 
 men to effect their design. Meanwhile coming 
 to understand, that all their troops were in 
 Caesar's power : they ran to Aristius, assured 
 him that nothing had been done by public au- 
 thority, ordered informations to be brought 
 against those who had been concerned in pil- 
 laging the Romans, confiscated the estates of 
 Litavicus and his brothers, and sent ambassa- 
 dors to Caesar to excuse what happened. 
 All this they did with a view to the recovery 
 of their troops : but conscious of guilt ; loth 
 to part with the plunder; in which great num- 
 bers had shared ; and dreading the punish 
 ment so gross an -outrage deserved ; they be« 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 ISl 
 
 gaii privately to concert measures of war, and 
 by their ambassadors solicited other states to 
 join them. Though Csesar was not ignorant 
 of these practices, he spoke with the greatest 
 mildness to the ^duan deputies, assuring 
 them of the continuance of his favour, and 
 that he would not consider as the crime of the 
 whole nation, what was owing only to the im- 
 prudence and levity of the multitude. Appre- 
 hending, however, a universal revolt of Gaul, 
 and that he might be surrounded by the forces 
 of all the states at once, he began to think of 
 retiring to Gergovia, and drawing his whole 
 army again into a body ; yet in such a manner, 
 that a retreat occasioned by the fear of an in- 
 surrection, might not carry with it the appear- 
 ance of a flight. 
 
 XLI. While he was full of these thoughts, 
 an opportunity seemed to offer of acting 
 against the enemy with success. For coming 
 into the lesser camp, to take a view of the 
 works, he observed a hill, that for some days 
 before was scarce to be seen for the multitudes 
 that covered it, now quite naked and destitute 
 of troops. Wondering what might be the 
 cause, he inquired of the deserters, who flocked 
 daily in great numbers to the Roman camp. 
 They all agreed with our scouts, that the back 
 ' of the hill was almost an even ground, but nar- 
 row and woody in that part, where the passage 
 lay to the other side of the town : that the en- 
 emy were mightily afraid of losing this post, 
 C because the Romans, who had already pos- 
 sessed themselves of one hill, by seizing the 
 other likewise, would in a manner quite sur- 
 round them ; and being masters of all the out- 
 lets, might entirely cut off their forage: that 
 Vercingetorix had therefore drawn all his forces 
 on that side, with design to fortify the passage. 
 XLII. Ccesar, upon this intelligence, des- 
 patched some squadrons of cavalry thither 
 about midnight, ordering them to ride up and 
 down the place, with as much noise as pos- 
 sible. At day-break he drew a great number 
 of mules and carriage horses out of the camp, 
 sent away their usual harness, and furnishing 
 the grooms and wagoners with helmets, that 
 they might resemble horsemen, commarided 
 them to march quite round the hill. With 
 these he joined a few cavalry, who, for the 
 greater show, were to expatiate a little more 
 freely ; and the whole detachment had orders 
 to move towards the same parts, taking a very 
 large circuit. All these dispositions were seen 
 
 from the town, which commanded a full view 
 of the Roman camp, though the distance was 
 too great to distinguish objects with certainty. 
 At the same time Caesar, the more effectually 
 to deceive the enemy, detached a legion to- 
 wards the same eminence, and when it was ad- 
 vanced a little way, stationed it at the foot of 
 the hill, affecting to conceal it in the woods. 
 This increased the jealousy of the Gauls, to 
 such a degree, that they immediately carried 
 all their forces thither to defend the post. Cse- 
 sar seeing their intrenchments abandoned, 
 made his soldiers cover the military ensigns and 
 standards, and file off in small parties from the 
 greater to the lesser camp, that they might not 
 be perceived from the town. He tben opened 
 his design to his lieutenants, whom he had ap- 
 pointed to command the several legions, coun- 
 selling them above all things to moderate the 
 ardour of the soldiers, that the hope of plun- 
 der, or desire of fighting, might not carry them 
 too far. He represented particularly the dis- 
 advantage of the ground, against which there 
 was no security but in despatch ; and told 
 them, that it was not a regular attack, but a 
 sudden onset, to be pursued no farther than 
 opportunity served. These precautions taken, 
 he fave the signal to engage, and at the same 
 time detached the ^duans by another ascent, 
 to charge the enemy on the right. 
 
 XLIII. The wall of the town,had no breaks 
 or hollows intervened, was about twelve hun- 
 dred paces distant from the plain below, meas- 
 uring in a direct line from the foot of the 
 mountain. The circuit the troops were 
 obliged to take, to moderate the steepness of 
 the ascent, added still to this space upon the 
 march. Half way up the hill, as near as the 
 nature of the ground would allow, the Gauls 
 had run a wall of large stones six feet high, 
 the better to defend themselves against our 
 attacks. All between this and the plain was 
 left quite void of troops by the enemy ; but 
 the upper part of the hill, to the very walls of 
 the town, was crowded with the camps of their 
 several states. The signal being given, the 
 Romans immediately mounted the hill, scaled 
 the outward wall, and possessed themselves of 
 three of the enemy's camps. Such too was 
 the expedition wherewith they carried them, 
 that coming suddenly upon Theutomatus 
 king of the Nitobrigians, as he was reposing 
 himself in his tent about noon, he very nar- 
 rowly escaped bein^ taken ; for he was obliged 
 
182 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 to fly away half naked, and had his horse 
 wounded under him. 
 
 X^LIV. Csesar having succeeded as far as 
 jis design required, ordered a retreat to be 
 sounded ; and the tenth legion, which fought 
 near his person, obeyed. The other legions, 
 ot heaving the signal, because separated from 
 he general by a large valley, were yet com- 
 manded to halt by the lieutenants and military 
 tribunes, according to the instructions given 
 by Ccesar in the beginning. But elated with 
 the hopes of a speedy victory, the flight of the 
 enemy, and the remembrance of former suc- 
 cesses, they thought nothing impracticable to 
 their valour, nor desisted from the pursuit, till 
 they had reached the very walls and gates of 
 the town. Upon this a great cry arising from 
 all parts, those that were farthest from the 
 place of assault, terrified by the noise and tu- 
 mult, and imagining the enemy already within 
 the gates, quitted the town with precipitation. 
 The women throwing their money and clothes 
 from the walls, with naked breasts and ex- 
 tended arms, conjured the Romans to spare 
 their lives, and not, as at Avaricum, sacrifice 
 all to their resentment, without distinction of 
 age or sex. Some being let down by their 
 hands from the wall, delivered themselves up 
 to our soldiers. L. Fabius, a centurion of the 
 eighth legion, was that day heard to say, that 
 he had not yet forgot the plunder of Avari- 
 cum, and was resolved no man should enter 
 the place before him. Accordingly, having, 
 with the assistance of three of his company, 
 got upon the town wall, he helped them one 
 after another to do the like. 
 
 XLV. Meanwhile the troops, who, as we 
 have related above, were gone to defend the 
 post on the other sidfe of the town ; incited by 
 the cries of the combatants, and the continual 
 accounts brought that the enemy had entered 
 the place ; sending all the cavalry before to 
 stop the progress of the Romans, advanced in 
 mighty crowds to the attack. In proportion 
 as they arrived, they drew up under the wall, 
 and augmented the number of those who 
 fought on their side. As they soon became 
 formidable by their multitude, the women, who 
 a little before had implored the compassion of 
 the Romans, now began to encourage their 
 own troops, showing their dishevelled hair, 
 and producing their children, according to the 
 custom of the Gauls. The contest was by no 
 means equal, either in respect of numbers, or 
 
 of the ground : and the Romans, already fa. 
 tigUed with the march and length of the com- 
 bat, were little able to sustain the attack of 
 fresh and vigorous troops. 
 
 XLVI. Cffisar, observing the disadvantage 
 of the ground, and the continual increase of 
 the enemy's troops, began to be apprehensive 
 about the event; and sending T. Sextius, 
 his lieutenant, whom he had left to guard the 
 lesser camp, ordered him to bring forth the 
 cohorts with all expedition, and post 'them at 
 the foot of the hill, upon the enemy's right; 
 that if our men should give way, he might de- 
 ter the Gauls from pursuing them. He him- 
 self advancing a little with the tenth legion, 
 waited the issue of the combat. 
 
 XLVII. While the conflict was maintained 
 with the utmost vigour on both sides ; the en- 
 emy trusting to their post and numbers, the 
 Romans to their courage ; suddenly the ^du- 
 ans, whom Caesar had sent by another ascent 
 on the right, to make a diversion, appeared on 
 the flank of our men. As they were armed af- 
 ter the manner of the Gauls, this sight greatly 
 terrified the Romans ; and though they ex- 
 tended their right arms in token of peace, yet 
 still our men fancied it a stratagem to deceive 
 them. At the same time L. Fabius the cen- 
 turion, and those who had got upon the wall 
 with him, being surrounded and slain, were 
 thrown down by the enemy from the battle- 
 ments. M. Petreius, a centurion of the same 
 legion, who had endeavoured to force the gates, 
 finding himself overpowered by the enemy, 
 and despairing of safety because he was al- 
 ready covered with wounds, turning to his 
 soldiers that had followed him, said ; " As I 
 find it impossible to preserve both myself and 
 you, I will at least do my best to further your 
 escape, whom I have brought into this danger 
 through too eager a desire of glory. Take 
 advantage therefore of the present opportu- 
 nity." Then throwing himself upon the ene- 
 my, he killed two, drove the rest from the 
 gate, and seeing his men run to his assistance : 
 " In vain," says he, " do you endeavour to 
 preserve my life. My blood and strength for- 
 sake me. Go therefore, while you may, and 
 rejoin your legion." Continuing still to fight, 
 he expired soon after, preserving his followers 
 with the loss of his own life. 
 
 XL VIII. Our men thus pressed on ^1 
 sides, were at length driven from the place, 
 with the loss of forty-six centurions ; but the 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 183 
 
 tenth legion, which had been posted a little 
 more advantageously to cover their retreat, 
 checked the impetuous pursuit of the Gauls : 
 being sustained by the cohorts of the thirteenth 
 legion, who had quitted the lesser camp 
 under Sextius, and possessed themselves of 
 an eminence. The legions having gained 
 the plain, immediately halted, and faced about 
 towards the enemy ; but Vercingetorix draw- 
 ing off his troops from the foot of the hill, 
 retired within his intrenchments. The 
 Romans lost that day about seven hundred 
 men. 
 
 XLIX. Caesar assembling the army next 
 day, severely blamed the temerity and avarice 
 of the soldiers ; " That they had taken upon 
 themselves to judge how far they were to pro- 
 ceed, and what they were to undertake ; re- 
 garding neither the signal to retreat, nor the 
 orders of their officers. He explained the 
 disadvantage of the ground, and reminded 
 them of his own conduct at the siege of Ava- 
 ricum, when having surprised the enemy with- 
 out a general, and without cavalry, he had ra- 
 ther chosen to give up a certain victory, than 
 by attacking them in a difficult post, hazard an 
 inconsiderable loss : that as much as he ad- 
 mired the astonishing courage of men, whom 
 neither the intrenchments of several camps, 
 nor the height of the mountain, nor the walls 
 of the town should check; so much did he 
 blame the licentiousness and arrogance of 
 soldiers, who thought they knew more than 
 their general, and could see better than him 
 the way to conquest : that he looked upon obe- 
 dience and moderation in the pursuit of 
 booty, as virtues no less essential to a good 
 soldier, than valour and magnanimity." 
 
 L. Having made this speech, and in the end 
 exhorted his soldiers not to be discouraged by 
 their late misfortune, nor ascribe that to the 
 bravery of the enemy, which was entirely ow- 
 ing to the disadvantage of the ground : as he 
 still persisted in his design of retiring, he drew 
 out his legions, and formed them in order of 
 battle upon the plain. But Vercingetorix not 
 thinking proper to descend ; after a small and 
 successful skirmish between the cavalry, Caesar 
 returned again to his camp. The like he did 
 the following day: when thinking he had 
 done enough to confirm the courage of his own 
 men, and abate the pride of the Gauls, he de- 
 camped towards the territories of the ^du- 
 ans. As the enemy made no attempt to pur- 
 
 sue him, he arrived the third day on the banks 
 of the Allier, and having repaired the bridge, 
 passed over with his whole army. 
 
 LI. Here he was informed by Eporedorix 
 and Virdumarus, that Litavicus was gone 
 with all the cavalry to solicit the ^duans ; and 
 it would be therefore necessary for themselves 
 to set out, in order to prevent his designs, arid 
 confirm the state in their attachment to the 
 Romans. Though Cassar was' by this time 
 abundantly convinced of the perfidy of the 
 ^duans, and plainly foresaw that their depar- 
 ture would only hasten their revolt, he yet did 
 not think proper to detain them, that he might 
 give no ground of offence, nor betray any suS' 
 picion of distrust. At parting, he briefly ena 
 merated the services he had done the ^duans 
 " How low -and depressed he had found them 
 shut up in their towns, deprived of their lands 
 without troops, tributaries to their enemies 
 and obliged to submit to the ignominious de 
 mand of hostages : to what power and great 
 ness they were now raised by his favour, so as 
 not only to have recovered their former con 
 sideration in Gaul, but even to exceed in dig 
 nity and lustre all that appeared most flou 
 rishing in the ancient annals of their state.' 
 With this charge he dismissed them. 
 
 LH. Noviodunura was a town belonging 
 to the JGduans, advantageously situated upon 
 the banks of the Loire. Here Caesar had 
 lodged all the hostages of Gaul, his provisions, 
 his military chest, and great part of his own 
 and his army's baggage. Hither also he'had 
 sent many horses, brought up in Italy and 
 Spain for the service of the war. When Epo- 
 redorix and Vird^imarus arrived at this place, 
 and were informed of the disposition of the 
 state: " That Litavicus had been received with 
 great marks of favour at Bihracte, the capital 
 city of the province ; that Convictolitanis, the 
 chief magistrate, and almost all the senate 
 were gone thither to meet him : that ambas- 
 sadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix, 
 to conclude a treaty of peace and alliance;" 
 they thought the present favourable oppcrtu. 
 nity was by no means to be neglected. Having 
 therefore put the garrison of Noviodunum, 
 with all the Romans found in the place to 
 the sword ; they divided the money and 
 horses between them, ordered the hostages to 
 be conducted to Bibracte ; and not thinking 
 themselves strong enough to defend the town, 
 set it on fire, that it might not be of any ser- 
 
184 
 
 CAESAR'S 
 
 vice to the Romans. Al! the corn they coulJ, 
 in so short a time, they carried away in barks ; 
 and burnt the rest, or threw it into the river. 
 Then drawing together the forces of the 
 neighbouring parts they lined the banks of the 
 Loire with troc^ps : and to strike greater terror, 
 began to scour the country with their cavalry ; 
 hoping to cut ofi' Csesar's convoys, and oblige 
 him, through want of provisions, to return into 
 the Koman province. Tliis appeared the 
 easier, as the Loire was considerably swelled 
 by the melting of the snow, and gave little room 
 to think that it could be any where forded. 
 
 LIII. Upon advice of these proceedings, 
 Caesar thought it necessary to use despatch ; 
 and if he must build a bridge, endeavour to 
 come to an action with the enemy, before they 
 had drawn more forces together. For he did 
 not even then think it necessary to" return to 
 the Roman province ; not only as the retreat 
 itself would be inglorious, and the mountains 
 of the Sevennes, and the badness of the ways, 
 were almost insuperable obstacles; but chiefly, 
 because he was extremely desirous to rejoin 
 Labienus, and the legions under his command. 
 Wherefore marching day and night with the 
 utmost diligence, contrary to all men's expec- 
 tation, he arrived upon the banks of the Loire ; 
 and his cavalry very opportunely finding a 
 ford, which however took the soldiers up to 
 the shoulders, he placed the horse higher up 
 to break the force of the stream, and carried 
 over his army without loss ; the enemy being 
 so terrified by his boldness, that they forsook 
 the banks. As he found a great deal of corn 
 and cattle in the fields, the army was plenti- 
 fully supplied, and he directed his march to- 
 wards the country of the Senones. 
 
 LI V. Whilst Caesar was thus employed, La- 
 bienus leaving the levies which had lately ar- 
 rived from Italy,«t Agendicum, to guard the 
 baggage, marched with four legions to Lutetia, 
 ; a city of the Parisians, situated in an island 
 of the Seine. Upon notice of his approach, 
 the enemy drew a great army together from the 
 neighbouring slates. The chief command was 
 given to Camulogenus, an Aulercian, who 
 though in a very advanced age, was yet urged 
 to accept of that honour, on account of his 
 singular knowledg^in the art of war. This 
 general observing there was a large morass, 
 whose waters ran into the Seine, and obstructed 
 all the passages round about, encamped there, 
 to hinder the Romans from passing the river. 
 
 Labienus at first endeavoured to force a pas- 
 sage, filling up the moress with hurdles and 
 mould, to give firm footing to the army. But 
 finding the attempt too difficuk, he privately 
 quitted his camp about midnight, and re- 
 turned towards Melodunum. This city be- 
 longs to the Senones, and is also situated in ■ 
 an island of the Seine, as we before said of Lu- 
 tetid. He found there about fifty boats, which 
 he speedily drew together, and manned them 
 with his soldiers. The inhabitants terrified at 
 this new manner of attack, and being too few 
 to defend the place because the greater part 
 of them had joined the army of Camulogenus, 
 yielded upon the first summons. Having re- 
 paired the bridge which the enemy had cut 
 down some days before, he crossed the Seine 
 there ; and following the course of the river, 
 marched back towards Lutetia. The enemy 
 having intelligence of this, by those who es- 
 caped from Melodunum, set fire to Lutetia, 
 broke down its bridges, and covering them- 
 selves with the morass, encamped on the op- 
 posite bank of the Seine, over against La- 
 bienus. 
 
 LV. It was now known that Caesar had \ 
 departed from Gergovia. The revolt of the ^ 
 ^duans, and the universal insurrection of 
 ■Gaul, were every where spread abroad by the 
 voice of fame. The Gauls on all occasions 
 gave out, that Caesar finding his march ob- 
 structed by the Loire, and being reduced to 
 great straits for want of corn, had been forced 
 to take the route of the Roman province. At 
 the same time the Bellovaci, naturally prone 
 to throw off- the yoke, upon hearing of the 
 defection of the .^duans, began to raise forces, 
 and openly prepare for war. Labienus per- 
 ceiving so great a change in the posture of 
 aflfairs, soon saw the necessity of pursuing 
 other measures ; and that it was not now 
 his business to make conquests, or give the ~- 
 enemy battle, but to secure his retreat to 
 Agendicum. On the one side he was pressed 
 by the Bellovaci, reputed the most warlike 
 people of all Gaul ; on the other by Ca- 
 mulogenus, with a numerous and well ap- 
 pointed army. Add to all this, the baggage 
 of the troops, and the detachment appointed 
 to guard it, were separated from the legions 
 by a great river. So many difficulties sur- 
 rounding him at once, he saw no way to ex- 
 tricate himself but by his valour and presenct 
 of mind. 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 185 
 
 LVI. Accordingly in the evening he called 
 a council of war ; and having exhorted the 
 officers to execute his orders with vigour and 
 despatch, distributed the fifty boats he had 
 brought from Melodunum to as many Roman 
 knights, commanding them to fall down the 
 river about nine at night, without noise, four 
 miles below Lutetia, and there wait his 
 coming. Five cohorts, such as appeared 
 least fit for service, were left to guard the 
 camp. The other five of the same legion, 
 with all the baggnge, had orders to march up 
 the river at midnight, with much tumult and 
 bustle, which was further increased by means 
 of some small barks sent the same way, that 
 made a mighty noise with their oars. He 
 himself setting out soon after, with three 
 legions, advanced silently to the boats that 
 waited for him. There he surprised the ene- 
 my's scouts, who were stationed along the 
 river, and had been prevented by a sudden 
 storm fiom discerning his approach. The 
 whole army was quickly carried over by the 
 care and diligence of the Roman knights, to 
 whom that affair had been given in charge. 
 Almost at the same instant the enemy had 
 notice, that an unusual tumult was heard in 
 the Roman camp ; that a strong detachment 
 had marched up the river, on which side like- 
 wise a great noise of oars was heard ; and that 
 a little below they were passing the river in 
 boats. This intelligence made the Gauls con- 
 clude, that the legions, alarmed at the revolt 
 of the ^duans, were endeavouring to cross 
 the Seine in three different places, for which 
 reason they likewise divided their army into 
 three bodies. For leaving one party to guard 
 the passage over against our camp, and de- 
 taching another towards Metiosedum, with 
 orders to advance to the place where the 
 boats had stopped, they marched with the 
 rest of their forces against Labienus. By 
 day-break our troops had passed the river, 
 and the enemy's army appeared in view. La- 
 bienus exhorting his men to remember their 
 wonted bravery, the many victories they had 
 gained, and even to fancy themselves in the 
 immediate presence of CjEsar, under whose 
 conduct they had so often been successful, gave 
 the signal of battle. At the very first charge, 
 the seventh legion, which formed the right 
 wing of the Roman army, broke the enemy's 
 left and put it to rout. But the right wing 
 of the Gauls, which was engaged with the 
 17 
 
 twelfth legion, and where Camulogenus was 
 present in person to encourage his men, 
 though the first ranks were destroyed hy the 
 Roman javelins, still maintained its ground 
 with the utmost bravery, and seemed deter- 
 mined to conquer. The dispute was long 
 and dubious ; when the tribunes of the seventh 
 legion, having notice how matters went,- faced 
 about, and attacked the enemy's rear. Even 
 then not a man offered to fly ; but at last be- 
 ing surrounded on all sides, they were cut to 
 pieces with their general. The party left 
 behind to watch our camp, hearing the noise 
 of the battle, flew to the assistance of their 
 countrymen, and posted themselves on a hill : 
 but not being able to sustain the assault of 
 the victorious Romans, they soon mingled 
 with the rest of the fugitives, and were cut to 
 pieces by the cavalry, those only excepted who 
 sheltered themselves in the woods and moun- 
 tains. After this victory, Labienus re- 
 treated to Agendicum, where he had left 
 the baggage of the whole army ; and from 
 thence, with all his forces, went and joined 
 CsBsar. 
 
 LVIL The revolt of the^iEduans gave new 
 strength to the confederacy. Deputies were 
 immediately despatched into all parts. In- 
 terest, money, and authority were employed in 
 their turns, to procure the concurrence of the 
 states that still continued quiet. The hostages 
 seized at Noviodunum, enabled the ^duans 
 to compel such as were refractory. They 
 sent to require of Vercingetorix, that he would 
 come and concert with them measures for 
 carrying on the war; and in particular in- 
 sisted on being at the head of the league. 
 But this demand meeting with opposition, a 
 general assembly of Gaul was held at Bi- 
 bracte, whither the deputies of all the con- 
 federated nations repaired, and after taking 
 the affair into consideration, confirmed Ver- 
 cingetorix in the title of generalissimo. The 
 Rhemi, Lingones, and Treviri were not pre- 
 sent at this assembly ; the two first, because 
 they had resolved to continue faithful to the 
 Romans ; and the Treviri on account of their 
 great distance, and the employment found 
 them by the Germans ; which was the reason 
 that they took no part at all in this war, nor 
 lent their assistance to either side. The 
 ..Eduans were greatly mortified at seeing 
 themselves excluded from the chief com- 
 mand : they complained of . this change in 
 2 B 
 
186 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 their fortune, and began t^ regret the loss of 
 Cesar's favour. But as they were already 
 too far engaged in the revolt, they durst 
 not think of detaching themselves from the 
 confederacy. It was not however without 
 reluctance, that Eporedorix and Virdu- 
 marus, two young noblemen of the greatest 
 hopes, consented to take orders from Vercin- 
 getorix. 
 
 LVIII. As he was now invested with the 
 supreme command, he enjoined the several 
 states to send hostages, appointed a day for 
 that purpose, and ordered all the cavalry, to 
 the number of fifteen thousand, to assemble 
 with the utmost expedition. He said, " He 
 was sufficiently provided with infantry, as he 
 had no mind to refer the decision of the war 
 to fortune, or hazard an uncertain engage- 
 ment ; but abounding in horse, judged it the 
 easier and safer way, to intercept the Roman 
 convoys and foragers : that in the meantime 
 they must resolve to destroy their corn, set fire 
 to their houses, and patiently submit to a 
 present and private loss, which was to be re- 
 warded with liberty and perpetual empire." 
 Having thus settled the plan of the war, he 
 commanded the ^duans and Segusians, who 
 border upon the Roman province, to raise ten 
 thousand foot : to these he joined eight hun- 
 dred horse, and put them under the conduct 
 of Eporedorix's brother, with orders to attack 
 the Allobrogians. At the same time he com- 
 missioned the Gabali, and the nearest cantons 
 of Auvergne, to make an irruption into the 
 territories of the Helvians : and the Rutheni 
 and Cadurci, into those of the Volcae Areco- 
 mici. He neglected not, however, by mes- 
 sengers and private emissaries, to sound the 
 disposition of the Allobrogians, whose minds 
 he hoped were not yet thoroughly reconciled 
 to the Roman yoke ; endeavouring to gain 
 the leading men by presents, and the state 
 by an offer of the sovereignty of the Roman 
 province. 
 
 LIX. To oppose all these attacks, two and 
 twenty cohorts were drawn together, which 
 L. Caesar, lieutenant-general, levied in the 
 province ; and with them prepared to make 
 head on all sides. The Helvians venturing 
 to come to an engagement with the enemy, 
 were defeated, and forced to shelter them- 
 selves in their walled towns, after having 
 lost C. Valerius Donaturus, the son of Cab- 
 urus, a man of principal rank in their state, 
 
 and several other persons of distinction. The 
 Allobrogians placing detachments at proper 
 distances along the banks of the Rhone, 
 guarded all the accesses to their country with 
 great diligence and care. C8esar,as he found 
 the enemy superior in cavalry, and that his 
 communication with Italy and the province 
 was cut off, so as to deprive him of all hopes 
 of succour from that quarter, had recourse to 
 the German nations beyond the Rhine, which 
 he had subdued in the preceding campaigns, 
 and obtained from them a supply of horse, 
 with some light-armed foot, accustomed to 
 fight amongst them. Upon their arrival, per- 
 ceiving that they were but indifferently 
 mounted, he took the horses from the mili- 
 tary tribunes, centurions, Roman Knights, and 
 volunteers, and distributed them among the 
 Germans. 
 
 LX. Whilst these things passed, the ene- 
 my's forces from Auvergne, and the cavalry 
 of all the confederate states of Gaul, met at 
 the general rendezvous, and formed a very 
 numerous army. Caesar marching through 
 the frontiers of the Lingones, into the country 
 of the Sequani, to be the nearer at hand to 
 succour the Roman province ; Vercingetorix 
 lodged himself at about ten miles distance, in 
 three several camps : and having assembled 
 the officers of the cavalry, told them ; " That 
 the season of victory was at length arrived, 
 when they saw the Romans obliged to aban- 
 don Gaul, and seek a retreat in the province : 
 that this indeed served to secure liberty for the 
 present, but was insufficient to future ease and 
 tranquillity, as they would doubtless return 
 with greater forces than before, and persist in 
 the design of making war. It was therefore 
 best to attack them now, while they marched 
 encumbered with their baggage. If the in- 
 fantry faced about, in order to assist the 
 horse, they would thereby be enabled to ad- 
 vance ; but, if, as was more likely, they aban- 
 doned the baggage, to provide for their own 
 safety, they would be deprived of every con- 
 venience, and return covered with ignominy 
 and reproach : for as to the enemy's cavalry, 
 it was not once to be imagined, that any of 
 them would so much as stir from the body of 
 the army. That to encourage them the more, 
 and strike the greater terror into the enemy, 
 he was resolved to have the whole army 
 under arms before the camp." These words 
 were followed by the acclamations of all 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 187 
 
 the cavalry, who proposed taking an oath 
 never to return to their homes, nor visit their 
 parents, wives, and children, if they did not 
 twice pierce through the Roman army from 
 one end to another. 
 
 LXI. The proposal being approved, and the 
 oath administered to all, Vercingetorix next 
 day divided his cavalry into three bodies ; 
 two of which appeared upon the flanks of 
 the Roman army, while the third began to 
 charge and harass it in front. Nolice of this 
 being given to Cassar, he also formed his horse 
 in three divisions, ordering them to advance 
 against the enemy. They made head on all 
 sides at once, the infantry meanvs'hile con- 
 tinuing quietly under arms, with the baggage 
 placed in the centre. Wherever the Romans 
 gave way, or appeared hard pressed by the 
 enemy, thither Caesar sent detachments from 
 the legions ; which both checked the progress 
 of the Gauls, and confirmed the courage 
 of our men, as they thus saw themselves 
 sure of being supported. At last the Ger- 
 mans on the right, having seized an emi- 
 nence, drove the enemy before them, and pur- 
 sued them with great slaughter as far as the 
 river, where Vercingetorix was posted with 
 the infa^ntry. The rest of the Gauls perceiving 
 the defeat of their countrymen, and apprehen- 
 sive of being surrounded, betook themselves 
 likewise to flight. A dreadful slaughter en- 
 sued on all sides. Three ^duan noblemen 
 of the first distinction were brought prisoners 
 to Caesar ; Cotus, general of the cavalry, who, 
 the year before, had been competitor with 
 Convictolitanis for the supreme magistracy ; 
 Cavarillus, who, after Litavicus's revolt, had 
 been appointed to command the infantry : and 
 Eporedorix, who was generalissimo of the 
 ^duan troops in the war against the Seijuani, 
 before Caesar's arrival in Gaul. . 
 
 LXII. Vercingetorix, upon this total rout 
 of the Gaulish cavalry, drew off his troops, 
 whom he had formed in order of battle before 
 the camp, and immediately retreated towards 
 Alesia, a town belonging to the Mandubii, 
 ordering the baggage to follow him with all 
 expedition. Csesar leaving his on a neigh- 
 bouring hill, under a guard of two legions, 
 pursued the enemy as far as day would per- 
 mit, cut three thousand of their rear to pieces, 
 and arrived on the morrow before Alesia. 
 After examining the situation of the town ; as 
 b.6 saw the enemy much daunted by the de- 
 
 feat of their cavalry, which was the part of 
 their strength in which they chiefly confided, 
 he exhorted his soldiers not to be discouraged 
 at the labour they must undergo, and resolved 
 to invest the place. 
 
 LXIII. The city of Alesia was situated on 
 the top of a very high hill, so as not to be 
 taken without a formal siege. The bottom 
 of the hill was washed on the two sides by 
 two rivers. Before the town was a plain, ex- 
 tending about three miles in length ; but 
 every where else a ridge of hills, whose sum- 
 mits were nearly upon a level, ran round the 
 place at a moderate distance. Under the 
 walls, on the side facing the east, lay all the 
 forces of the Gauls encamped ; who filled that 
 whole space, and were defended by a ditch, 
 and a rampart six feet high. The line of 
 contravallation begun by the Romans, took 
 in a circuit of eleven miles. The camp was 
 conveniently situated, and strengthened with 
 three and twenty redoubts, in which sentinels 
 were placed by day, to give notice of any 
 sudden irruption, and a strong guard by night 
 to defend them in case of assault. 
 
 LXIV. Whilst the Romans were employed 
 in these works, Vercingetorix ventured on 
 another engagement of the horse, in the plain 
 between the hills, which, we have said, ex- 
 tended about three miles in length. The con- 
 test was sharply maintained on both sides ; 
 but our men at length beginning to give 
 ground, Caesar detached the Germans to their 
 assistance, and drew up the legions in order of - 
 battle before the camp, that he might be ready 
 to oppose any sudden irruption of the enemy's 
 infantry. The sight of the legions revived 
 the courage of our men : the enemy were put 
 to flight ; and crowding upon one another in 
 their retreat, so obstiucted the gites of the 
 camp, that it became in a manner impossible 
 to enter. The Germans pursued them to their 
 intrenchments, where a very great slaughter 
 ensued. Some quitting their horses endea- 
 vour to pass the ditch, and get over the ram- 
 part. • Cajsar, perceiving their disorder, or- 
 dered the legions, whom he had drawn out 
 before the camp, to advance a little. This 
 motion no less alarmed the Gauls within the 
 rampart ; who believing the whole body of 
 the Roman army was coming to attack them, 
 sounded to arms. Some in their fright fled 
 into the town ; upon which, Vercingetorix, 
 fearing the camp would be abandoned, or- 
 
188 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 dered the gates to be shut. At length the 
 Germans, having slain great numbers of the 
 enemy, and taken a multitude of horse, re- 
 turned from the pursuit. 
 
 LXV. Vercingetorix, before our line was 
 completed, resolved to dismiss his cavalry by 
 night. At parting he enjoined them, " To re- 
 pair severally to their respective states, and 
 assemble all the men capable of bearing arms. 
 He set forth the many services he had done 
 them, and conjured them not to neglect his 
 safety, or abandon to the cruelty of the enemy, 
 one who had deserved so well of the common 
 liberty. He told them, that if they were re- 
 miss in the execution of his orders, no less 
 than eighty thousand chosen men must perish 
 with him: that by computation, he had scarce 
 corn for thirty days : and that even with the 
 utmost economy it could be made to hold out 
 but a very little longer." After giving these 
 instructions, he dismissed them quietly about 
 nine at night, on the side where the Roman 
 line was not yet i5nished. He then ordered 
 the people of the town to bring in all their 
 corn, threatening them with death in case of 
 disobedience. As there was a great number 
 of cattle in the place, which had been driven 
 thither by the Mandubians, he distributed 
 them to the soldiers, man by man, resolving 
 to deliver out the corn sparingly and by mea- 
 sure. At the same time he made all his 
 forces enter the town : and having thus settled 
 the plan of his defence, waited for the ex- 
 pected succours. 
 
 LXVI. Ccesar having notice of these things 
 from the prisoners and deserters, constructed 
 his lines in the following manner. He made 
 a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular 
 sides, giving it the same breadth at the bottom 
 as at top. All the other works were four hun- 
 dred feet farther off the town than this ditch. 
 As his lines included so great a space, and 
 therefore could not be alike guarded in all 
 parts, he judged this precaution necessary, 
 to secure them against sudden sallies by night, 
 and screen the workmen from the enemy's 
 darts by day. Observing this distance, he 
 made two other ditches, fifteen feet broad, 
 and as many deep ; and filled the innermost, 
 which lay in a low and level ground, with 
 water from the river. Behind these was a 
 rampart of twelve feet high, strengthened with 
 a parapet and battlements : and to prevent the 
 enemy from getting over, a frieze ran along 
 
 the foot of the parapet, made of long stakes, 
 with their branches cut in points, and burnt at 
 the end like a stag's horn. The whole work 
 was flanked with redoubts, eighty feet distant 
 one from another. 
 
 LXVn. But as the soldiers were employed 
 at the same time to fetch wood and provi- 
 sions, and to work at the fortifications, which 
 considerably lessened the number of troops 
 left to defend the camp, many of them being 
 at a distance on these services ; and as the 
 Gauls, besides, often sallied at several gates, 
 with design to interrupt the works ; for all 
 these reasons, CaBsar judged it necessary to 
 make some addition to his lines, that they 
 might not require so many men to guard them. 
 He therefore took trees of no great height, or 
 large branches, which he caused to be made 
 sharp at the ends ; and running a trench of 
 five feet deep before the lines, he ordered them 
 to be put into it, and made fast at bottom, so 
 that they could not be pulled up. This trench 
 was again filled up in such a manner, that 
 nothing but the branches of the head appeared, 
 of which the points must have run into those 
 who should have endeavoured to pass them. 
 As there were five rows of them, interwoven 
 in a manner with each other, they were una- 
 voidable. The soldiers called them cippi. In 
 the front of these he caused pits of three feet 
 deep to be dug in form of the quincunx, and 
 something narrower at bottom than at top. 
 In these pits he fixed strong stakes, about the 
 thickness of a man's thigh, burnt and sharpened 
 at the top, which rose only four inches above 
 the level of the ground, into which they were 
 planted three feet deeper than the pits, for the 
 sake of firmness. The pits were covered over Y 
 with bushes to deceive the enemy. ' There 
 were eight rows of them, at the distance of 
 three feet from each other. They were called 
 lilies, from the resemblance they bore to that 
 flower. In the front of all, he sowed the 
 whole space between the pits and the advanced 
 ditch with crows-feet of an extraordinary size, 
 which the soldiers called spurs. 
 
 LXVIII. These works completed, he drew 
 another line, of fourteen miles in compass, con- 
 structed in the same manner as the former, 
 and carried through the most even places he 
 could find, to serve as a barrier against the 
 enemy without ; that if the Gauls should at- 
 tack the camp in his absence, they might not 
 be able to surround it with the multitude of their 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 189 
 
 troops, or charge with equal vigour in all parts. 
 At the same time to prevent the danger his 
 men might be exposed to, by being sent in 
 quest of provisions and forage, he took care to 
 lay in a sufficient stock of both for thirty days. 
 LXIX. Whilst these things passed before 
 Alesia, a general council being held of the prin- 
 cipal noblemen of Gaul, it was not thought 
 proper to assemble all that were able to bear 
 arms, as Vercingetorix desired, but to order 
 each nation to furnish a contingent ; lest the 
 confusion inseparable from so great a multi- 
 tude, should bring on a scarcity of provisions, 
 or render the observance of military discipline 
 impracticable. The ^duans, with their vas- 
 sals the Segusians, Ambivareti, Aulerci, Bran- 
 novices, and Brannovii, were rated at thirty- 
 five thousand. A like number was demanded 
 from the Ayerni, in conjunction with their de- 
 pendants, the Gadurci, Gabali, and Velauni. 
 The Senones, Sequani, and Biturigians, San- 
 tones, Rutherni, and Carnutes, were ordered 
 each to furnish twelve thousand ; the Bellovaci, 
 ten thousand ; the Lemovices, the same num- 
 ber ; the Pictones, Turoni, Parisians, and 
 Suessiones, each eight thousand ; the Am- 
 biani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorians, Nervians, 
 Morini, Nitobrigians, and Aulerci Cenomani, 
 each five thousand ; the Atrebatians, four 
 thousand ; the Bellocasians, Lexovians, and 
 Aulerci Eburovices, each three thousand ; the 
 Eauraci and Boii, thirty thousand ; the mari- 
 time and Armorican states, of which number 
 are the Curiosolites, Rhedones, Caletes, Osis- 
 mians, Lemovices, Venetians, and Unellians, 
 each six thousand. The Bellovaci alone re- 
 fused to furnish the troops required, pretend- 
 ing it was their design to wage an independent 
 ■war with the Romans, without being subject 
 to the control of any one : however, at the re- 
 quest of Comius, for whom they had a great 
 respect, they sent a body of two thousand men. 
 LXX. This Comius, as we have related 
 above, had been singularly faithful and ser- 
 viceable to Caesar, in his Britannic expedition ; 
 in consideration of which, his state had been 
 exempted from all tribute, restored to the full 
 enjoyment of its laws and privileges, and even 
 enlarged, by having the country of the Morini 
 added to its territories. But such was the pre- 
 sent unanimity of the Gauls, in the design of 
 vindicating their liberty, and recovering their 
 wonted reputation in war, that neither benefits 
 received, nor the strides ties of friendship, 
 17* 
 
 could make any impression upon their minds ; 
 but all with«one consent flew to arms, and 
 contributed largely to the support of the wan-. 
 The country of the -iEduans was the general 
 rendezvous of the army, which amounted to 
 eight thousand horse, and two hundred and 
 forty thousand foot. Four commanders in 
 chief were appointed ; Comius of Arras, Vir- 
 dumarus and Eporedorix the JEduans, and 
 Vergasillaunus of Auvergne, cousin-german to 
 Vercingetorix. To these were added a select 
 number of officers, chosen from among the 
 several states, \o serve by way of a council of 
 war. The whole army advanced towards Ale- 
 sia, full of courage and confidence, and satis- 
 fied that the Romans would not sustain the 
 very sight of so prodigious a multitude; es- . 
 pecially in an encounter attended with so much 
 hazard, where they must be exposed to a vigo- 
 rous sally from the town, at the same time 
 that they saw themselves surrounded with such 
 numbers of horse and foot. 
 
 LXXI. Meanwhile the troops shut up in 
 Alesia, having consumed all their provisions, 
 finding the day appointed for the arrival of ^ 
 succours expired, and knowing nothing of what 
 was transacted among the .^duans, summoned 
 a council of war, to debate upon what was re- 
 quisite in the present exigence. Various 
 opinions were proposed : some advised a sur- 
 render ; others were for sallying while yet ^ 
 their strength would permit : among the rest, 
 Critognatus, a man of the first rank and 
 authority in Auvergne, addressed the assembly 
 in a speech, which for its singular and detest- 
 able inhumanity, deserves a particular mention 
 in this place. " I shall not," says he, " take 
 notice of the opinion of those who endeavour 
 to shelter an ignominious servitude, under the 
 plausible name of a surrender ; such should 
 neither be reckoned Gauls, nor suffered to 
 come to this council. Let me rather apply 
 myself to them who propose a general sally : 
 for here, as all of you seem to think, we meet 
 with something worthy of our ancient virtue. 
 And yet I am not afraid to say, that it is at the 
 bottom weakness, and not courage, that in- 
 spires such thoughts, and renders us unable to 
 support want a few days. It is easier to find 
 those who will voluntarily rush on death, than 
 such as can patiently endure pain. I shall not 
 however, be against this proposal, which I con- 
 fess has something generous in it, if only our 
 own lives were at stake. But in this delibera- 
 
190 
 
 CJESAR'S 
 
 tion, we must keep all Gaul in view, whom we 
 have called to our assistance. How would it 
 dfcpiril our relations, and friends, to see eighty 
 thousand of their countrymen slaughtered in 
 one place, and be obliged to fight in the midst 
 of their dead bodies ! Deprive not then of 
 vour assistance those, who, to save you, have 
 exposed themselves to the greatest dangers ; 
 nor through an inconsiderate temerity, and 
 mistaken valour, destroy at once all the ex- 
 pectations of Gaul, and plunge her into per- 
 petual servitude. If the expected succours are 
 not arrived exactly at the appointed time, 
 ought you therefore to suspect the fidelity and 
 constancy of your countrymen 1 And can you 
 think that it is for amusement only, that the 
 Romans labour on those lines towards the 
 country 1 Though you hear not from your 
 friends, because all communication is hindered ; 
 yet you may learn the approach of the succours 
 from your enemies themselves ; who, through 
 fear of them work day and night, without 
 ceasing, on those fortifications. What then 
 should I propose 1 What hut to do as our 
 ancestors did in the war with the Teutones 
 and Cimbri, much less interesting than that 
 we are now engaged in. Compelled to shut 
 themselves up in their towns, and reduced to 
 a distress equal to that we now experience, 
 rather than surrender to their enemies, they 
 chose to sacrifice to their subsistence the bodies 
 of those whom age incapacitated for war. Had 
 we no such precedent to follow, yet still I 
 should esteem it glorious, in so noble a cause 
 as that of liberty, to institute and give one to 
 posterity. For where had we ever a war upon 
 our hands like that we are now engaged in 1 
 The Cimbri, after laying waste Gaul, and 
 spreading desolation through the whole coun- 
 try, withdrew however their forces at length, 
 and repaired to other regions, leaving us the 
 full enjoyment of our laws, customs, lands, 
 and liberties. But the Romans,instigated by 
 envy, and jealous of a people so renowned 
 and powerful in war, aim and intend nothing 
 less than to establish themselves in our cities 
 and territories, and reduce us to perpetual ser- 
 vitude. This has ever been the object of all 
 their wars. If you are unacquainted with what 
 passes in diflTerent countries, cast your eyes 
 upon the adjoining Gaul, which, reduced into 
 the form of a province, stripped of its laws and 
 privileges, and subjected to the arbitrary sway 
 of the conqueror, groans under an endless 
 
 yoke of slavery." When all had delivered 
 their opinions, a resolution was taken, that 
 such as by age or sickness were unfit for war, 
 should be obUged to quit the town, and every 
 expedient be tried, rather than give into the 
 proposal of Critognatus : but if necessity urged, 
 and relief was long deferred, they determined 
 upon submitting to his advice preferably to 
 peace or a surrender. The Mandubii, to 
 whom the city belonged, were driven thence 
 with their wives and childipn. When they 
 came to the Roman lines, they with tears pe- 
 titioned to be received as slaves, and saved 
 from perishing miserably by famine. But 
 Caesar having planted guards along the ram- 
 part, refused to admit them into his camp. 
 
 LXXII. Meanwhile Comius, and the other 
 general oificers, on whom the chief command 
 had been conferred, arrived before Alesia with 
 all their forces, and encamped on a hill with- 
 out the town, not above five hundred paces 
 from the Roman lines. The next day they 
 drew out their cavalry, and covered the whole 
 plain under the hill, which, as we have already 
 said, extended three miles in length. The 
 infantry were stationed at some distance on 
 the heights, yet so as to lie concealed from the 
 view of the Romans. As Alesia commanded 
 a full prospect of the plain 'below, the succours 
 were soon discovered by the besieged, who as- 
 sembling in crowds, congratulated each other ; 
 and testified a universal joy. Immediately 
 they came forth with all their forces, posted 
 themselves before the town, and having filled 
 up the nearest ditch with earth and fascines, 
 prepared for a vigorous sally, and every thing 
 else that might happen. 
 
 LXXIII. Caesar, having disposed his whole 
 army on both sides the works, that in case of 
 need, every soldier might know his post, and 
 be ready to maintain it, ordered the cavalry to 
 sally out upon the enemy, and begin the charge. 
 The camp, running along a ridge of a rising 
 ground, commanded a view of the plain on all 
 sides ; and the soldiers, to a man, with deep 
 attention, waited the issue of the combat. 
 The Gauls had interspersed among the cavalry 
 some archers and light-armed troops, to sustain 
 them in case of need, and check the impetu- 
 osity of our horse. Several of the Romans 
 being wounded by these at the first charge, 
 were obliged to quit the battle. The Gauls 
 now believing they had the advantage, and 
 seeing our men overpowered by numbers, set 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 91 
 
 np a universal shout, as well within as with- 
 out the place, to give new life to their troops. 
 As the action passed in the view of both ar- 
 mies, who were, of course, witnesses to the 
 valour or cowardice of the combatants, the de- 
 sire of applause, or fear of ignominy, spurred 
 on' each side to exert their utmost bravery. 
 After a conflict that lasted from noon till near 
 sun-set, victory all the while continuing doubt- 
 ful, the Germans, in close order, charged furi- 
 ously the enemy on one side, and forced them 
 to give ground. Their flight leaving the arch- 
 ers exposed, they were all surrounded and cut 
 to pieces. The success was equal in other 
 parts of the field, where our men pursuing the 
 runaways to their camp, gave them no time to 
 rally. The troops who had quitted Alesia, 
 despaiWng now almost of victory, turned dis- 
 consolate to the town. 
 
 LXXIV. After the interval of a day, which 
 was wholly spent in providing a great num- 
 ber of fascines, scaling ladders, andiron hooks ; 
 the Gauls issuing from their camp at midnight, 
 in great silence, attacked the Roman lines, on 
 the side of the plain. They began with set- 
 ting up a sudden shout, to advertise the be- 
 sieged of their arrival ; threw their fascines into 
 the ditch ; endeavoured by a discharge of 
 stones, darts and arrows, to drive our men 
 from the rampart ; and practised every thing 
 necessary to rentier the storm successful. At 
 the same time Vercingetorix, hearing their 
 cries, sounded to arms, and led forth his men 
 to the attack. The Romans, whose posts had 
 been allotted them some days before, flew to 
 the works, and with slings, darts, bullets, and 
 engines, prepared on purpose, struck a terror 
 into the assailants. As the parties could not 
 see one another by reason of the darkness, 
 many wounds were received on both sides, and 
 a great number of darts discharged from the 
 engines. But M. Antonius and C. Trebonius, 
 who commanded on the one side that was most 
 pressed by the enemy, took care to draw out 
 parties from the more distant redoubts, and 
 send them where their assistance was chiefly 
 wanted. 
 
 LXXV. While the Gauls kept at a dis- 
 tance from our lines, they did great execution 
 by the multitude of their darts ; but in propor- 
 tion as they approached, they either entangled 
 themselves unawares among the caltrops, or 
 tumbling into the wells, were wounded by the 
 pointed stakes, or were pierced by the darts 
 
 discharged from the towers and ramparf. After 
 many wounds given and received ; finding, 
 when day appeared, that they had not forced 
 any part of the lines, and fearing to be taken 
 in flank by some troops that were sallying from 
 the redoubts on the eminence, they retreated 
 to their camp. Meanwhile the besieged, after 
 much time spent in preparing for a sail}', and 
 filling up the advanced ditch, finding that their 
 countrymen were retired, before they could 
 so much as approach the works, returned into 
 the town without effecting any thing. 
 
 LXXVI. The Gauls thus twice repulsed 
 with great loss, consult what new measure they 
 are to pursue : and advising with those who 
 knew the ground, learned from them the 
 strength and situation of the upper camp. 
 North of the town was a hill of too great a com- 
 pass to be taken into the circumvallation ; in- 
 somuch that the Romans had been obliged to 
 post themselves on its ascent, in a very disad- 
 vantageous situation, because their camp was 
 commanded by its summit. C. Antistius Re- 
 ginus, and C. Caninuis Rebilus, lieutenant- 
 generals, guarded this quarter with two legions. 
 The enemy's generals, after informing them- 
 selves of the nature of the country by their 
 scouts, selected five and fifty thousand of their 
 best troops, concerted privately among them- 
 selves the plan and manner of acting, appointed 
 the time for the assault about noon, and as- 
 signed the command of the detachment to Ver- 
 gasillaunus of Auvergne, one of the four prin- 
 cipal leaders, and a near relation of Vercinge- 
 torix. Vergasillaunus leaving his camp in the 
 evening, finished his march by day-break ; and 
 concealing his troops behind a hill, ordered his 
 soldiers to refresh themselves after the fatigue. 
 As soon as it was noon, he approached the 
 quarters of the two legions. At the same time 
 the cavalry advanced into the plain, and the 
 whole army drew out before the camp. 
 
 LXXVII. Vercingetorix observing these 
 motions from the citadel of Alesia, led forth 
 his troops ; carrying along with him the fas- 
 cines, long poles, covered galleries, hooks, and 
 other instruments he had prepared for the as- 
 sault. The fight was maintained on all sides 
 at once ; nor did the Gauls leave any thing 
 unattempted, but flocked continually to those 
 parts of the works which appeared to be the 
 weakest. The Roman forces having so many 
 works to guard, were dispersed in different 
 places, and scarce sufficed for the defence of 
 
192 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 them all. What mostly contributed to disturb 
 them was, the cries of the combatants behind, 
 ■which informed them that their safety depended 
 on the valour of others. For such is the con- 
 stitution of the human mind, as always to 
 aggrandize absent objects, and magnify the 
 danger that is out of sight. 
 
 LXXVIII. CsBsar chose a post from whence 
 he could see every thing, and then sent rein- 
 forcements where necessary. Both parties 
 called to mind, that now was the time for 
 making the greatest effort. The Gauls had 
 no hopes of safety, but in forcing the Roman 
 lines. Our men again were sensible, that 
 if they came off victorious on this occasion, all 
 their labours would be at an end. The chief 
 stress of the battle lay at the higher fortifica- 
 tions, where Vergasillaunus charged with his 
 detachment ; because the small eminence, 
 which commanded the declivity of the hill, 
 gave the enemy great advantage. Some were 
 employed in throwing darts ; others advanced 
 to the attack, under cover of their shields ; 
 fresh men still succeeding in the room of those 
 that were fatigued. The earth they threw up 
 against our lines not only enabled them to as- 
 cend the rampart, but entirely frustrated the 
 design of the works the Romans had made in 
 the ground. In fine, our men had neither 
 strength nor weapon left to make resistance. 
 
 LXXrX. Caesar observing the danger they 
 were in, sent Labienus, with six cohorts, to 
 their assistance ; ordering him if he found 
 himself unable to defend the works, to sally 
 out upon the enemy ; yet this only in case of 
 extremity. He himself went in person to the 
 rest of the troops, exhorting them to bear up 
 courageously under their present fatigue, and 
 representing, that the fruit of all their former 
 victories depended upon the issue of that cri- 
 tical day and hour. The troops within the 
 place, despairing to force the intrenchments 
 on the side of the plain, because of the great 
 strength of the works, attacked them in the 
 more steep and difficult places, whither they 
 brought all the instruments prepared for the 
 assault. They soon drove our men from the 
 towers, by a discharge of darts, levelled the 
 way with earth and fascines, and began to cut 
 down the rampart and breastwork with their 
 hooks. 
 
 LXXX. CiEsar first sent young Brutus, 
 with six cohorts ; after him, C. Fabius lieu- 
 tenant-general, with seven mo-re ; and, last of 
 
 all, as the dispute grew very warm, marched 
 himself in person at the head of the whole de- 
 tachment. Having, by this means, restored 
 the battle, and forced the enemy to retire, he 
 hastened to the side where Labienus was en- 
 gaged. He drew four cohorts from the near- 
 est fort, ordered part of the cavalry to follow 
 him, and charged the rest to take a circuit 
 round the outward works, and fall upon the 
 enemy's rear, Labienus finding that neither 
 the rampart nor ditch were sufficient to stop 
 the progress of the enemy, drew together about 
 thirty-nine cohorts from the nearest forts, and 
 sent to inform Csesar of his design. Caesar -■' 
 immediately quickened his march, that he 
 might be present at the action. 
 
 LXXXL His arrival being known from 
 the colour of his garments, by which Ire used "/" 
 to distinguish himself in the day of battle ; and 
 the troops and cohorts he had ordered to fol- 
 low him, appearing ; all which were easily 
 discerned from the higher ground ; the enemy 
 began the charge. A mighty shout was raised 
 on both sides, which being catched by those 
 on the rampart, was carried quite round the 
 lines. Our men, having cast their darts, fell 
 upon the Gauls sword in hand. At the same 
 time the cavalry appeared unexpectedly in 
 their rear ; fresh cohorts flocked continually 
 to our assistance : the enemy took flight, and, 
 in their retreat, were encountered by our horse : 
 a dreadful slaughter ensued. Sedulius, chief 
 and general of the Lemovices, was slain on the 
 spot ; Vergasillaunus of Auvergne, was made 
 prisoner in the pursuit ; seventy -four colours 
 were taken, and brought to Csesar ; and, out 
 of so great a multitude, very few regained 
 the Gaulish camp. The rout and slaughter \^ 
 being observed from the town, the besieged, '-^ 
 despairing of success, drew off their troops from 
 the attack. Instantly, upon the report of this 
 disaster, the Gauls abandoned their camp ; 
 and had not our troops been wearied out by the 
 continual fatigue of the day, and the frequent 
 reinforcements they were obliged to furnish, 
 the enemy's whole army might have been ex- 
 terminated. At midnight Cassar detached the 
 cavalry to pursue them, who, falling in with 
 their rear, slew some, and took a great number 
 of prisoners. The rest escaped to their several 
 habitations. 
 
 L XXXII. Next day, Vercingetorix as- 
 sembling a council, represented to the be« 
 sieged : " That he had undertaken that war 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 193 
 
 not from a motive of private interest, but to 
 recover the common liberty of Gaul : and that 
 since there was a necessity of yielding to for- 
 tune, he was willing to become a victim for 
 their safety, whether they should think proper 
 to appease the anger of the conqueror by his 
 death or to deliver him up alive." A deputation 
 immediately waited on Caesar to receive his 
 orders. ITe insisted on the surrender of their 
 arms, and the delivering up of all their chiefs. 
 Having accordingly seated himself at the head 
 of his lines, before the camp, their leaders 
 were brought, Vercingetorix delivered up, and 
 their arms thrown into the ditch. Reserving 
 the .^duans and Averni, as a means to re- 
 cover those two potent nations, he divided the 
 rest of the prisoners among his soldiers, giving 
 to each one. 
 
 LXXXIII. These affairs despatched, he 
 marched into the territories of the .^duans, 
 where he received the submission of their 
 state. There he was addressed by the ambas- 
 sadors of the Averni, who prcaiised an entire 
 
 obedience to his commands. He exacted a 
 great number of hostages ; sen! his legions in- 
 to winter quarters ; and restored about twenty , 
 thousand captives to the ^duans and Averni. 
 T. Labienus, with two legions and the cavalry, 
 was quartered among the Sequani jointly with 
 M. Sempronius Rutilus. C. Fabius, and L. 
 Minutius Basilus, were ordered, with two le- 
 gions, into the country of the Rhemi, to de- 
 fend it against the attempts of the Bellovaci, 
 their neighbours. C. Antistius Reginus had 
 his station assigned him among the Ambiva- 
 reti ; T. Sextius among the Biturigians ; and 
 C. Caninius Rebilus among the Rutheni; 
 each with one legion. Q. TulHus Cicero, and 
 P. Sulpicius, were placed at Cabillo and Ma- 
 tisco upon the Arar, in the country of the 
 ^duans, to have the care of provisions. He 
 himself resolved to winter at Bibracte. The 
 senate being informed of these things by Cse- 
 sar's letters, a procession of twenty days was 
 decreed. 
 
 sc 
 
PANSA'S CONTINUATION 
 
 CESAR'S COMMENTAIIIES 
 
 WARS IN GAUL. 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 Pansa's Preface.— I. The Gauls form a resolution to renew the war.— II. Caesar falls unexpectedly upon the 
 Biturigians, and compels them to submit.— IV". He afterwards disperses the Carnutes by the terror of his 
 arms.— V. The Bellovaci prepare for war.— VI. Their designs.— VII. Caesar endeavours to draw them to an 
 en^a^ement, by inspiring them with a contempt of his small numbers.— VIII. But as they carefully avoid a 
 baUle, he resolves to fortify his camp.— XI. The Bellovaci intercept the Roman foragers.— XII. Daily skir- 
 mishes within view of the two camps.— XIII.— The Bellovaci artfully counterfeit a retreat.— XVI. And falling 
 upon the Romans from an ambuscade, after an obstinate fight, are entirely dispersed.— XVII. The Bellovaci 
 and other states submit.— XX. Csesar divides his army.— XXI. Caninius and Fabius relieve Duracius, besieged 
 by Dumnacus in Limo. — XXIV. Caninius pursues Drapes and Luterius.— XXV. Pabius obliges the Carnutes 
 and other states to submit.— XXVI. Drapes and Luterius possess themselves of Uxellodunum.— XXVII. Ca- 
 ninius invests the town.— XXVIII. Intercepts a convoy escorted by Luterius.— XXIX. Attacks and carries the 
 camp of Drapes.— XXX. And joining llie forces under Fabius, returns to the siege of Uxellodunum.— XXXI. 
 Caesar repairs to the camp of Caninius.— XXXIII. And depriving the besieged of water, compels the town to 
 surrender.— XXXVII. He sends his army into winter quarters.- XXXVIII. Comius defeated in an engage- 
 ment of horse, surrenders to Antony.— XLI. The year following, Gaul being in perfect quiet, Caesar goes into 
 Italy.— XLIL Where he is received with the highest demonstrations of respect.— XLIII. He returns to the 
 army, where he learns the designs lonasd against him at Rome.- XLVI. And thereupon sets out again for 
 Italy. 
 
 196 
 
A CONTINUATION 
 
 OF 
 
 CESAR'S CO 
 
 ENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS WARS IN GAUL. 
 
 BY A. HIRTIUS PANSA. 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 
 IiT consequence of your repeated importunities, ] 
 Balbus, I have at last been prevailed with I 
 to engage in a very delicate work ; fearing 
 lest my daily refusals should be construed 
 rather to flow from idleness, than any sense 
 of the difficulty of the undertaking. I there- 
 fore here present you with a continuation of 
 •Csesar's Commentaries of his Wars in Gaul', 
 though not in any respect to be compared with 
 what he himself wrote on the same subject, 
 nor with the Memoirs of the civil war, which 
 he likewise left behind him imperfect, and 
 which I have in the same manner carried 
 down from the traHsactions at Alexandria, to 
 the end, I will not say of our civil dissensions, 
 which are like to have no end, but of Csesar's 
 life. I would have all who read these pieces, 
 know with how much reluctance I engaged in 
 this design ; that I may be the more easily 
 acquitted of the charge of arrogance and folly, 
 for presuming to insert my writings among 
 those of Csesar. It is universally agreed, 
 that the most elaborate compositions of 
 others, fall far short of the elegance of these 
 Commentaries. He indeed intended them 
 only as memoirs for future historians ; but 
 they are every where in such high esteem, as 
 serves rather to discourage other writers, than 
 furnish them for the attempt. This circum- 
 stance the more commands our admiration, 
 because while the rest of the world can judge 
 only of the beauty and correctness of the 
 work, we besides know with what ease and 
 despatch it was composed. Caesar not only 
 18 
 
 possessed the talent of writing in the highest 
 perfection, but was likewise best able to un- 
 fold the reasons of those military operations of 
 which he was himself the contriver and direc- 
 tor. On the contrary, it was my misfortune 
 to be present neither in the Alexandrian nor 
 African wars ; and though I had many of the 
 particulars relating to both from his own 
 mouth, yet we give a very different attention 
 to things, when we hear them only through 
 an admiration of their novelty and greatness, 
 and when with a view of transmitting them 
 to posterity. But I forbear any further apolo- 
 gies, lest in enumerating the reasons why my 
 work ought not to be compared with that of 
 Caesar, I fall under the suspicion of flattering 
 myself, that in the judgment of some, it may 
 not seem altogether unworthy of that honour. 
 Adieu. 
 
 I. Gatji, being wholly reduced, Caesar was 
 desirous that his troops might enjoy some 
 repose during the winter, especially after so 
 long and fatiguing a campaign, in which 
 there had been no intermission from the toils 
 of war ; but he soon understood, that several 
 states were meditating a revolt, and contriving 
 all at once to take up arms. The cause assigned 
 for this conduct was not improbable ; for 
 though the Gauls were by this time fully sen- 
 sible, that it was impossible for them to resist 
 the Roman army entire, by any forces they could 
 bring into the field ; yet still they thought, that 
 if many states revolted together, and set on foot 
 197 
 
198 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 as many different wars, the Komans would 
 have neither time nor troops to subdue them 
 all ; and that though some among them must 
 be sufferers, their lot would be the more sup- 
 portable, as the delay occasioned by that di- 
 version, might procure the liberty of the whole 
 nation. 
 
 II. Caesar, to stifle this opinion in its birth, 
 left M. Antony the questor to command in his 
 winter quarters ; and setting out the last of 
 December from Bibracte, with a guard of 
 cavalry, went to the camp of the thirteenth 
 legion, which he had placed among the 
 Biturigians, not far from the territories of the 
 iEduans. To this he joined the eleventh 
 legion, whose quarters lay nearest ; and leav- 
 ing two cohorts to guard the baggage, 
 marched with the rest of the army into the 
 most fertile parts of the country of the 
 Biturigians ; who having large territories, 
 and abounding in towns, had not been awed 
 by the presence of a single legion, from 
 forming confederacies, and preparing for 
 war. 
 
 III. Caesar by his sudden and unexpected 
 arrival, as was natural to suppose, found them 
 unprepared and dispersed up and down the 
 fields ; insomuch that they were easily sur- 
 prised by the horse, before they could retreat 
 into their towns. For he had expressly forbid 
 setting fire to the houses, the usual sign of an 
 invasion, that he might neither alarm the ene- 
 my by the conflagration, nor expose himself to 
 the want of corn and forage, if he should ad- 
 vance far into the country. Having made 
 many thousands of the Biturigians prisoners, 
 such as could escape the first coming of the 
 Romans, fled in great terror to the neighbour- 
 ing states, relying either upon private friend- 
 ship, or the ties of a mutual confederacy. But 
 all was to no purpose : for Caesar, by great 
 marches, soon reached their places of retreat, 
 and making every province anxious for its 
 own safety, left them no time to think of giving 
 shelter to others. This diligence confirmed 
 the well-affected in their duty, and obliged 
 the wavering to hearken to conditions of 
 peace. The like offers were made to the 
 Biturigians ; who seeing that Caesar's cle- 
 mency left the way still open to his friend- 
 ship, and that the neighbouring states, upon 
 delivery of hostages, had been pardoned and 
 received into protection, resolved to follow the 
 example. Caesar, to recompense the fatigue 
 
 and labour of his soldiers, who, in the winter 
 season, through difficult ways, and during the 
 most intense colds, had followed him with in- 
 credible patience and constancy ; promised 
 a reward of two hundred sesterces to every 
 private man, and two thousand to every centu- 
 rion : and having sent back the legions to their 
 winter quarters, returned again to Bibracte, 
 after an absence of forty days. 
 
 IV. Whilst he was there employed in the 
 distribution of justice, ambassadors arrived 
 from the Biturigians, to implore his assistance 
 against the Carnutes, who were laying waste 
 their country. Upon this intelligence, though 
 he had not rested above eighteen days, he im- 
 mediately sent for the sixth and fourteenth 
 legions, which he had quartered along the 
 Arar, for the convenience of provisions, as has 
 been related in the foregoing book. With 
 these two legions he marched against the Car- 
 nutes ; who hearing of his approach, and 
 dreading the same calamities which others had 
 been made to suffer, abandoned their towns 
 and villages, consisting mostly of little cottages 
 run up in haste, to defend them from the cold, 
 (for most of their cities had been destroyed in 
 the late war,) and fled different ways. Caesar 
 unwilling to expose his soldiers to the severity 
 of the storms, which commonly rage with 
 the greatest violence at that season, fixed his 
 camp at Genabum ; and lodged his men, partly 
 in the huts lately built by the Gauls, partly 
 in the old houses, whose walls v/ere still 
 standing, and which he ordered to be thatched 
 with straw, that t ey might afford the better 
 shelter to the troops. But he sent the cav- 
 alry and the auxiliary foot into all parts where 
 he understood the enemy were retired ; nor 
 without success ; for they commonly returned 
 loaden with spoil. The Carnutes, distressed 
 by the difficulty of the season, the sense of 
 their danger, (because being driven from their 
 habitations, they durst not continue long in 
 any place for fear of our parties,) and finding 
 no protection in the woods against the extreme 
 severity of the weather ; were at length dis- 
 persed on all sides with great loss, and scat- 
 tered among the neighbouring states. 
 
 V. Cfflsar thinking it sufficient in that diffi- 
 cult season, to have dispersed the troops that 
 began to assemble, and prevented their re- 
 kindling the war ; and being likewise well 
 assured, as far as human prudence could de- 
 termine, that it would be impossible for them, 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 199 
 
 during the en&uing summer, to raise up any 
 very dangerous war ; left C. Trebonius, with 
 the two legions he had brought along with 
 him, to winter at Genabum. Meanwhile, 
 understanding by frequent embassies from the 
 Rhemi, that the Bellovaci, the most distin- 
 guished for bravery of all the Belgian and 
 Gallic nations, with some of the neighbouring 
 states, under the conduct of Correus, general 
 of the Bellovaci, and Comius the Atrebatian, 
 •were raising an army, and drawing their forces 
 to a general rendezvous with design to invade 
 the territories of the Suessiones, a people sub- 
 ject to the jurisdiction of the Rhemi; he 
 thought that both honour and interest required 
 him to undertake the defence of allies, who 
 had deserved so well of the commonwealth. 
 He therefore drew the eleventh legion again 
 out of its winter quarters; wrote to C. Fabius, 
 to march the two legions under his command 
 into the country of the Suessiones, and ordered 
 Labienus to send one of those he was charged 
 with. Thus, as far as the convenience of 
 winter quarters, and the nature of the war 
 would allow, he employed the legions alter- 
 nately in expedition, giving himself, mean- 
 while,no intermission from fatigue. 
 
 VI. With these forces he marched against 
 the Bellovaci, and encamping within their ter- 
 ritories, dispersed his cavalry on all sides to 
 make prisoners, from whom he might learn the 
 enemy's designs. The horse, in consequence 
 of this commission, brought him back word, 
 that the lands and houses were in a manner 
 quite abandoned, and that the few prisoners 
 they had found, after a most diligent search, 
 were not left to cultivate the ground, but to 
 serve as spies. Caesar inquiring of these, 
 whither the Bellovaci were retired, and what 
 might be their designs, found : " That all of 
 them capable of bearing arms, had assembled 
 in one place, and been joined by the Ambians, 
 Aulerci, Caletes, Vellocasians, and Atreba- 
 tians : that they had chosen for their camp, a 
 rising ground, surrounded with a difficult 
 morass, and disposed of their baggage in re- 
 mote woods : that a great many of their chiefs 
 were concerned in the war, but the principal 
 authority rested in Correus, because he was 
 known to bear an implacable hatred to the Ro- 
 man name ; that a few days before, Comius had 
 left the camp to solicit aid of the Germans, 
 who were their nearest neighbours, and 
 abounded in troops : that it had been resolved 
 
 among the Bellovaci, with consent of all the 
 generals, and at the earnest desire of the peo- 
 ple, if Csesar came at the head of only three 
 legions, as was reported, to offer him battle ; 
 lest they should be afterwards obliged to fight 
 upon harder and more unequal terms, when 
 he had got his whole army together : but if he 
 brought greater forces along with him, to con- 
 tinue within their camp, intercept his corn and 
 convoys, and cut off his forage ; which in that 
 s^Son of the year was extremely scarce, and 
 very much dispersed." 
 
 VII. These things being confirmed by the 
 testimony of all the prisoners, Csesar, who found 
 their designs full of prudence, and remote 
 from the usual temerity of barbarians, resolved 
 by all manner of ways to draw them into a con- 
 tempt of his numbers, that he might the more 
 easily bring them to an engagement. He had 
 with him the seventh, eighth, and ninth le- 
 gions, all veterans of approved valour ; and 
 though the eleventh was not of equal standing, 
 nor had attained the same reputation of bra- 
 very, they were yet chosen youth of great 
 hopes, who had served under him eight cam- 
 paigns. Calling therefore the army together, 
 he laid before them the advices he had re- 
 ceived, and exhorted the soldiers to preserve 
 their wonted courage. At the same time, to 
 draw the enemy to an engagement, by an ap- 
 pearance of onl3' three legions, he so contrived 
 the order of his march, that disposing the 
 seventh, eighth, and ninth legions, in front ; 
 the baggage, which, as in a hasty expedition, 
 was but moderate, behind them ; and the 
 eleventh legion in the rear of all ; no more 
 troops were in view, than what the Gauls 
 themselves had determined to hazard an ac- 
 tion against. The army, thus drawn up, formed 
 a kind of square, and arrived before the ene- 
 my's camp much sooner than expected. 
 
 VIII. When the Gauls perceived the le- 
 gions advancing suddenly against them in or- 
 der of battle, with a steady pace, they altered 
 the resolution which had been reported to Cae- 
 sar; and either fearing the success of the bat- 
 tle, surprised at so sudden an approach, or 
 willing to know our further designs, drew up 
 before their camp, without descending from 
 the higher ground. Cassar though desirous to 
 come to an engagement, yet surprised at the 
 multitude of the enemy, and reflecting on the 
 advantage of their situation ; as being sepa- 
 rated from him by a valley, still more con 
 
200 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 siderable for its depth than breadth ; contented 
 himself for the present to encamp directly over 
 against them. He threw up a rampart twelve 
 feet high, strengthened by a proportionable 
 breast-work ; and secured it by two ditches, 
 each fifteen feet deep, with perpendicular 
 sides. He likewise raised several turrets of 
 three stories, and joined them to each other 
 by galleries, having little parapets of osier be- 
 fore, that the works might be defended by a 
 double range of soldiers ; one of which fitt- 
 ing from the galleries, and secured by their 
 height, would, with more boldness and advan- 
 tage, launch their darts against the enemy ; 
 the other, though nearer danger, and planted 
 upon the rampart itself, were yet screened by 
 the gallerias from the impending darts. All 
 the entrances to the camp were secured by 
 strong gates, over which he placed very high 
 towers. 
 
 IX. He had a twofold design in these for- 
 tifications : one, by the greatness of the works, 
 to make the enemy believe him afraid, and 
 thereby increase their presumption and confi- 
 dence ; the other to enable him to defend his 
 camp with a few troops, when it was necessary 
 to go far in quest of corn and forage. Mean- 
 time there happened frequent skirmishes be- 
 tween the two camps, carried on for the most 
 part with arrows at a distance, by reason of a 
 morass that separated the combatants ; some- 
 times indeed the auxiliary Gauls and Germans 
 crossed the morass, and pursued the enemy : 
 sometimes again the enemy having the advan- 
 tage, passed in their turn, and drove back our 
 men. And as we daily sent our parties to for- 
 age, who were obliged to disperse, and scatter 
 themselves from house to house over the whole 
 country, it now and then fell out, as was una- 
 voidable in these circumstances, that our fora- 
 gers were surprised and cut to pieces by their 
 detachments. These losses, though very in- 
 cotisiderable to us, as being mostly confined to 
 some carriages and servants, yet strangely 
 swelled the hopes of the barbarians ; and the 
 more, as Comius, who had gone to fetch the 
 German auxiliaries, was now returned with a 
 body of horse. And though the humber was 
 not great, they not making in all above five 
 hundred, the enemy were nevertheless might- 
 ily encouraged by this supply. 
 
 X. Cffisar, after a stay of many days, find- 
 ing that the fenemy still kept within their camp, 
 which was advantageously situated with a mo- 
 
 rass in front; and considering, at the same 
 time, that he could neither force the intrench- 
 ments without great loss, nor inclose them 
 with works with so small an army, wrote to 
 Trebonius, to send, with all diligence, for the 
 thirteenth legion, which was quartered among ' 
 the Biturigians, under the care of T. Sextius ; 
 and with that, and the two legions under hia 
 own command, make what haste he could to 
 join him. Meanwhile he detached the cavalry 
 of Rheims, of the Lingones, and the other 
 provinces of Gaul, of which he had great num- 
 bers in his camp, to guard by turns the fora- 
 gers, and protect them from the sudden in- 
 cursions of the enemy. 
 
 XI. This was done every day ; but custom, 
 by degrees, relaxing their diligence, as fre- 
 quently happens in things of long continuance ; 
 the Bellovaci, who had observed the daily sta- 
 tions of our horse, placed a chosen body of foot 
 in ambush in a wood, and sent their cavalry 
 thither next day, to draw our men into the 
 snare, and then attack them, surrounded on 
 every side. This ill fortune fell upon the cav- 
 alry of Rheims, whose turn it was that day 
 to guard the foragers : for these, suddenly dis- 
 covering the enemy's cavalry, and despising 
 their small numbers, pursued with Such, eager- 
 ness, that they were at length surprised and 
 surrounded by the foot. This threw them 
 into confusion, and obliged them to retreat 
 hastily with the loss of Vertiscus their gene- 
 ral, and the chief man of their state : who, 
 though so far advanced in years that he could 
 hardly sit on horseback, yet, according to the 
 custom of the Gauls, would neither decline the 
 command on account of his age, nor suflfer 
 them to fight without him. The enemy were 
 animated and encouraged by this success and 
 the death of the chief and general of the 
 Rhemi : our men on the other hand, were cau- 
 tioned by their loss, carefully to examine the 
 ground before they took their posts, and pur- 
 sue a retreating enemy with more reserve. 
 
 XII. Meanwhile the daily skirmishes be- 
 tween the two camps, at the fords and passes 
 of the morass, still continued. In one of these, 
 the Germans, whom Cjesar had brought from 
 beyond the Rhine, that they might fight in- 
 termingled with the cavalry, boldly passing 
 the morass in a body, put all that made resis- 
 tance to the sword, and pursued the rest with 
 great vigour. Fear not only seized those who 
 fought hand to hand, or were wounded at a 
 
COMMENTARIES 
 
 201 
 
 distailce ; but even the more remote parlies, 
 who were posted to sustain the others, shame- 
 tully betook themselves to flight; and, being 
 driven from height to height, ceased not to 
 continue the route, until they had reached 
 their very camp ; nay, some, quite confounded 
 by their fear, fled a great way beyond it. Their 
 danger spread so universal a terror among the 
 troops, that it appeared hard to say, whether 
 they were more apt to be elated by a trifling ad- 
 vantage, or depressed by an inconsiderable loss. 
 
 XIII. After a stay of many days in this 
 camp ; upon information that C. Trebonius 
 was approaching with the legions, the gen- 
 erals of the Bellovaci, fearing a siege like that 
 of Alesia, sent away by night all whom age 
 or infirmities rendered unfit for service ; and 
 along with them the baggage of the whole 
 army. But before this confused and numer- 
 ous train could be put in order, (for the Gauls 
 even in their sudden expeditions, are always 
 attended with a vast number of carriages,) day- 
 light appeared ; and the enemy were obliged 
 to draw up before their camp, to hinder the 
 Romans from disturbing the march of their 
 baggage. Csesar did not think proper to at- 
 tack them in so advantageous a post, nor was he 
 willing to remove his legions to such a distance, 
 as might give them an opportunity of re- 
 treating without danger. Observing therefore 
 that the two camps were divided by a very 
 dangerous morass, the difficulty of passing 
 which might greatly retard the pursuit, and 
 that beyond the morass there was an eminence, 
 which in a manner commanded the enemy's 
 camp, and was separated from it only by a 
 small valley, he laid bridges over the morass, 
 passed his legions, and quickly gained the sum- 
 mit of the hill, which was secured on each 
 side by the steepness of the ascent. Thence 
 he marched his legions, in order of battle, to 
 the extremest ridge, and posted them in a 
 place where his engines could play upon the 
 enemy's battalions. 
 
 XIV. The Gauls, confiding in the strength 
 of their post, resolved not to decline a bat- 
 tle if the Romans should attack them on 
 the hill ; and not daring to make their troops 
 tile oif, for fear of being charged when sepa- 
 rated and in disorder, continued in the same 
 posture. Ccesar perceiving their obstinacy, 
 kept twenty cohorts already drawn up ; and 
 marking out a camp in the place where he 
 ►hen stood, ordered it to be fortified immedi- 
 
 18* 
 
 ately. The works being finished, he drew up 
 his legions before the rampart, and assigned 
 the cavalry their several posts, where they were 
 to wait, with their horses ready bridled. The 
 Bellovaci seeing the Romans prepared for the 
 pursuit, and finding it impossible to pass the 
 night, or continue longer in that place without 
 provisions, fell upon the following stratagem 
 to secure their retreat. They collected .and 
 placed at the head of their line all the fascines 
 in the camp, of which the number was very 
 great, (for, as has been already observed, the 
 Gauls commonly sit upon these, when drawn 
 up in order of battle,) and towards night, upon 
 a signal given, set fire to them all at once. 
 The flame blazing out on a sudden, with great 
 violence, covered their forces from the view of 
 the Romans ; and the Gauls laying hold of 
 that opportunity retreated with the utmost dili- 
 gence. 
 
 XV. Though Caesar could not percei%'e 
 the enemy's departure, because of the flames, 
 yet suspecting that this was only a contrivance 
 to cover their flight, he made the legions ad- 
 vance, and detached the cavalry to pursue 
 them. Meanwhile, apprehending an ambus- 
 cade, and that the enemy might perhaps con- 
 tinue in the same post, to draw our men into a 
 place of disadvantage, he took care to follow 
 slowly with the foot. The cavalry not daring 
 to enter that thick column of flame and smoke, 
 or if any had the courage to adventure it, be- 
 ing unable to discern the very heads of their 
 horses, thought proper to retire for fear of a 
 surprise, and left the Bellovaci at full liberty 
 to escape. Thus by a flight, which equally 
 spoke their fear and address, they retreated 
 ten miles without loss, and encampt d in a place 
 of great advantage. Thence, by frequent am- 
 buscades of horse and foot, they often attacked 
 and cut to pieces the Roman foragers. 
 
 XVI. Caesar having received many losses- 
 of this kind, understood at last by a certain 
 prisoner, that Correus, general of the Bello- 
 vacf, had chosen six thousand of his best foot, 
 and a thousand horse, to form an ambuscade 
 in a place abounding in corn and grass, and 
 where it was therefore presumed the Romans 
 would come to forage. Upon this intelligence, 
 he drew out a greater number of legionaries 
 than usual; sent the cavalry, who formed the 
 ordinary guard of the foragers, before; inter- 
 mixed them with platoons of light-armed foot, 
 and advanced himself as near as possible with 
 
 2D 
 
202 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 the legions. The enemy, who lay in ambush, 
 tiaving chosen for the place of action a plain 
 of about a mile every way, and environed on 
 all sides with thick woods, or a very deep riv- 
 er, which enclosed it as in a toil, disposed 
 their forces all around. Our men who knew 
 their design, and advanced armed and resolved 
 for battle, because the legions were behind to 
 sustain them, entered the plain troop by troop. 
 Upon their arrival, Correus thinking that now 
 was the proper time for action, appeared first 
 with a few of his men, and fell upon the near- 
 est squadrons. Our men resolutely sustained 
 the attack, nor flocked together in crowds, as 
 frequently happens among the cavalry on oc- 
 casion of sudden surprise, when the very num- 
 ber of combatants throws all into confusion. 
 The squadrons fighting thus in good order, 
 and preserving a proper distance, to prevent 
 their being taken in flank ; suddenly the rest of 
 the Gauls broke from the woods, and advanced 
 ito the aid of those who fought under Correus. 
 The contest was carried on with great heat, 
 and continued for a long time with equal ad- 
 vantage on both sides : when at last the foot 
 advancing slowly in order of battle from the 
 woods, obliged our men to give way. Upon 
 this the light-armed infantry, who, as we have 
 observed, had been sent before the legions, 
 marched up speedily to their assistance ; and 
 placing themselves in the intervals of the squa- 
 drons, continued the fight. The contest again 
 became equal. At length, as was natural in 
 an encounter of this kind, those who had sus- 
 tained the first charge of the ambuscade, began 
 for this very reason to have the superiority, 
 because the enemy had gained no advantage 
 over them. Meanwhile the legions approached, 
 and both sides had notice at the same time 
 that Csesar was advancing with his forces in 
 order of battle. Our troops, animated by this 
 hope, redoubled their eflforts ; lest by pushing 
 the enemy too slowly, the legions should have 
 time to come in for a share of the victory. The 
 enemy, on the contrary, lost courage, and fled 
 diflFerent ways. But in vain : for the very dif- 
 ficulties of the ground, by which they hoped 
 to have ensnared the Romans, served now to 
 «ntangle themselves. Being at last vanquish- 
 ed and repulsed, with the loss of the best part 
 of their men, they fled in great terror whither 
 ■chance directed ; some towards the woods, 
 •some towards the river. The Romans urged 
 the pursuit with great keenness, and put many 
 
 to the sword. Meanwhile Correus, whose 
 resolution no misfortune could abate, would 
 neither quit the fight, and retire to the woods, 
 nor accept of any offers of quarter from our 
 men ; but fighting on to the last with invinci- 
 ble courage, and wounding many of the vic- 
 torious troops, constrained them at length to 
 transfix him with their javelins. 
 
 XVII. After this action, Csesar coming up 
 just as the battle was ended, and naturally 
 supposing that the enemy, upon intelligence 
 of so considerable a defeat, would immediate- 
 ly abandon their camp, which was not above 
 eight miles distant from the place of slaugh- 
 ter ; though he saw his march obstructed by 
 the river, he passed it notwithstanding, and ad- 
 vanced with his forces against them. But the 
 Bellovaci, and the other states in their alli- 
 ance, hearing of their disaster by some of the 
 runaways, who though wounded, found means 
 to escape under cover of the woods ; and find- 
 ing that every thing was against them, their 
 general slain, their cavalry and the flower of 
 their infantry destroyed, and the Romans 
 doubtless upon the march to attack them ; 
 speedily assembling a council by sound of trum- 
 pet, demanded, with great cries, that ambassa- 
 dors and hostages might be sent to Caesar. 
 
 XVIII. This proposal being approved by 
 all, Comius the Atrebatian fled to the Ger- 
 mans, whose assistance he had obtained in the 
 war. The rest immediately despatched am- 
 bassadors to Cffisar, and requested ; " That he 
 would regard their present sufferings as a suf- 
 ficient punishment for their revolt ; since they 
 were such, as his humanity and clemency 
 would never have suffered him to inflict upon 
 them, had he compelled them to submit entire, 
 and without fighting ; that their power was ut- 
 terly broken by the late defeat of their cavalry ; 
 that several thousand of their best infantry 
 were destroyed, scarcely enough being left to 
 bring them news of the disaster ; that yet in so 
 great a calamity, it was no small advantage to 
 the Bellovaci, that Correus, the author of the 
 war, who had stirred up the multitude to revolt, 
 was killed : because while he lived, the head- 
 strong populace would always have had more 
 authority in the state than the senate." Their 
 ambassadors having ended their speech, C«b 
 sar put them in mind ; " That the year before, 
 the Bellovaci had, in conjunction with the 
 other states of Gaul, taken up arms against 
 the Romans; that, of all the confederates. 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 203 
 
 thoy had persisted with the greatest obstinacy 
 in their revolt nor been induced by the sub- 
 mission of the rest to hearken to reason ; that 
 nothing was easier than to lay the blame of 
 their misconduct upon the dead ; but they 
 would find it difficult to make him believe, 
 that a single man could have so much influ- 
 ence, as, in spite of the opposition of the no- 
 bility and senate, and the efforts of all good 
 men, to stir up and support a war, by the mere 
 authority of the multitude ; that, however, he 
 would be satisfied for the present with the 
 punishment they had brought upon them- 
 selves." 
 
 XIX. Next night the deputies returned 
 with Cffisar's answer,' and hostages were im- 
 mediately sent to the Roman camp. The de- 
 puties of the other states, who only waited the 
 event of this treaty, immediately flocked to 
 Caesar, gave hostages, and submitted to his 
 commands. Comius alone would not hear of 
 treating, from a particular distrust of the Ro- 
 mans, For the year before, while Cassar was 
 employed in the affairs of Cisalpine Gaul, La- 
 bienus understanding that Comius was solicit- 
 ing several states to rebel, and join in a con- 
 federacy against the Romans, thought it might 
 be allowed him to use perfidy towards the per- 
 fidious. And because he expected to be re- 
 fused, should he send for him to the camp ; that 
 he might not by an unsuccessful attempt put 
 him upon his guard, he employed C. Voluse- 
 nus Quadratus to kill him, under pretence of 
 an interview ; furnishing him with some chosen 
 centurions for that purpose. When the inter- 
 view began, and Volusenus, by way of signal, 
 had taken Comius by the hand ; one of the 
 centurions, as if surprised at a step so unusual, 
 attempted to kill him, but Comius's friends 
 hastily interposing, he was prevented ; how- 
 
 ■ ever, the first blow wounded him severely on 
 the head. Both sides immediately drew, not 
 so much with a design to engage, as to retire ; 
 our men because they believed Comius mortally 
 wounded ; the Gauls, because discovering the 
 intended treachery, they apprehended the 
 danger to be greater than as yet appeared. 
 From that time Comius determined never to 
 be in the same place with any Roman. 
 
 XX. Cfflsar having thus subdued the most 
 warlike nations of Gaul, and finding no state 
 disposed to take up arms, or make resistance, 
 but that only some few had left their towns 
 and possessions, to avoid presen subjection, 
 
 resolved to divide his army into several bo- 
 dies. M. Antony the questor, with the eleventh 
 legion, had orders to continue with him. C. 
 Fabius was sent, at the head of twenty-five 
 cohorts, into the remotest parts of Gaul ; be- 
 cause he understood some states were in arms 
 on that side, whom C. Caninius Rebilus, his 
 lieutenant, who commanded in those provinces, 
 was scarcely strong enough to oppose with 
 only two legions. He then sent for T. La- 
 bienus, and ordered the twelfth legion, which 
 he commanded, into Gallia Togata, to pro- 
 tect the Roman colonies there, that they might 
 not suffer by the incursions of the barbarians, 
 as had happened the year before to the Ter- 
 gestini, whose territories had been plundered 
 by a sudden and unexpected invasion. He 
 himself marched to ravage and lay waste the 
 territories of Ambiorix ; for finding it impossi-J 
 ble to lay hold on that perfidious Gaul, whose 
 fear prompted him to fly continually before 
 him, he thought it behoved him, in regard to 
 his own dignity, so effectually to ruin the 
 country, by destroying his towns, cattle, and 
 subjects, as might render him odious to his 
 followers, if any still remained, and deprive 
 him of all hope of being restored to his pos- 
 sessions. Having spread his legions and aux- 
 iliaries over the whole country of Ambiorix, 
 destroyed all with fire and sword, and either 
 killed or made prisoners an infinite number of 
 people, he despatched Labienus, with two le- 
 gions, against the Treviri ; whose country, 
 bordering upon Germany, and exercised in 
 continual wars, differed little from the tem- 
 per and fierceness of that nation ; nor ever 
 submitted to his commands, unless enforced 
 by the presence of an army. 
 
 XXI. Meantime C. Caninius, lieutenant- 
 general, understanding by letters and messen- 
 gers from Duracius, who had always continued 
 faithful to the Romans, even in the defection 
 of many of his own state, that great numbers of 
 the enemy were assembled in the territories 
 of the Pictones ; marched towards the town 
 of Limo. Upon his arrival there, having 
 certain information from some prisoners, thnt 
 Duracius was shut up and besieged in Limo, 
 by a great army of Gauls, under the conduct 
 of Dumnacus, general of the Andes, as he 
 was not strong enough to attack the enemy, 
 he encamped in a place of great advantage. 
 Dumnacus, hearing of his approach, turned 
 all his forces against the legions, and resolved 
 
204 
 
 PAIN^A'S 
 
 to invest the Roman camp. But after many 
 days spent in tiie attack, and the loss of a 
 great number of men, without any impression 
 n>ade upon the intrenchments, he returned 
 again to the siege of Limo. 
 
 XXII. At the same time, C. Fabius, having 
 brought over many states to their duty, and 
 confirmed their submission by receiving host- 
 ages, upon intelligence sent him by Caninius, 
 of the posture of affairs among the Pictones, 
 marched immediately to the assistance of 
 Duracius. Dumnacus hearing of his arrival, 
 and concluding himself lost, should he at the 
 same time be obliged to make head against an 
 enemy without, and sustain the efforts of the 
 townsmen within, suddenly decamped with 
 all his forces, resolving not to stop till he had 
 got on the other side of the Loire, which, by 
 reason of its largeness, could not be passed 
 without a bridge. Fabius, though he had 
 neither as yet come within sight of the ene- 
 my, nor joined forces with Caninius ; yet in- 
 structed by those who were well acquainted 
 with the country, easily conjectured the route 
 the Gauls would take. Wherefore directing 
 his march towards the same bridge, he or- 
 dered the cavalry to keep before the legions ; 
 yet so, that without too much fatiguing their 
 horses, they might return and encamp with 
 them again at night. The cavalry followed 
 the enemy as directed ; came up with their 
 rear ; and attacking them flying, dismayed 
 and encumbered with their baggage, killed 
 great numbers, gained a considerable booty, 
 and returned in triumph to the camp. 
 
 XXIII. The night following, Fabius sent 
 the cavalry before, with orders to engage the 
 enemy, and keep the whole army employed, 
 till he himself should come up with the 
 legions. Q. Atius Varus, a prudent and ex- 
 perienced officer, who had the charge of the 
 detachment, desirous to execute the commands 
 of his general with success, exhorted his men ; 
 and coming up with the enemy, disposed some 
 squadrons in the most convenient places, and 
 engaged the Gauls with the rest. The enemy's 
 cavalry made a resolute stand, being supported 
 by their foot, who halting in a body, advanced 
 to the assistance of their own men. The con- 
 flict was sharp on both sides. For the Ro- 
 mans, despising enemies whom they had over- 
 come the day before, and remembering that 
 the legions were coming up to join them ; 
 
 partly ashamed to give way, partly eager to 
 bring the battle to a speedy issue by their 
 own valour alone, fought with great bravery 
 against the enemy's foot. And the Gauls, 
 who had no apprehension of the approach of 
 more forces, because none other had appeared 
 the day before, fancied they had now a favoura- 
 ble opportunity of cutting off our cavalry. As 
 the fight continued with great obstinacy for a 
 considerable time, Dumnacus advanced with 
 the foot, in battle array, to sustain the horse; 
 when suddenly the legions, marching in close 
 order, appeared within view of the enemy. 
 This sight discomposed the Gallic squadrons, 
 and producing a universal confusion through 
 the whole army, which spread even to the 
 baggage and carriages, they with great up- 
 roar and tumult betook themselves to a pre- 
 cipitate flight. But our horse, who a little 
 before had fought against an enemy who 
 vigorously opposed them, now elated with the 
 joy of victory, surrounded them with great 
 cries, and urged the slaughter as far as the 
 strength of their horses to pursue, and the 
 vigour of their right hands to destroy, were 
 able to bear them out. Upwards of twelve 
 thousand perished on this occasion, partly in 
 the battle, partly in the pursuit ; and the 
 whole baggage was taken. 
 
 XXIV. After this rout, Drapes, of the na- 
 tion of the Senones, (who upon the first re- 
 volt of Gaul had drawn together a band of 
 desperate men, invited slaves to join him by 
 the hopes of liberty, assembled all the fugi- 
 tives he could find, received even public 
 robbers into his service, and with that profli- 
 gate crew intercepted the Roman convoys 
 and baggage,) having rallied about five thou- 
 sand runaways, directed his march towards 
 the province ; being joined by Luterius of 
 Quercy, who as we have seen in the foregoing 
 book, had attempted an invasion on that side 
 at the first breaking out of the war. Caninius, 
 having notice of this design, marched in pur- 
 suit of them with two legions, to prevent any 
 alarm in those parts, and hinder the province 
 from falling a prey to the ravages of a desperate 
 and needy crew. 
 
 XXV. Fabius, with the rest of his army, 
 marched against the Carnutes, and other 
 states, whose forces had served under Dum- 
 nacus, in the late action : for he made no doubt 
 of finding them humbled by so great a blow 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 205 
 
 and was unwilling, by any delay, to give 
 Dumnacus an opportunity of rousing them to 
 a continuance of the war. In this expedition, 
 Fabius had all the success he could desire ; 
 the several states submitting immediately upon 
 his approach. For the Carnutes, who though 
 often harassed, had never yet made mention 
 cf peace, now surrendered, and gave hostages ; 
 and the other states, inhabiting the more re- 
 mote parts of Gaul, bordering upon the ocean, 
 and known by the name of Armorica, influ- 
 enced by their authority, and the arrival of 
 Fabius and his legions, readily accepted the 
 terms he offered them. Dumnacus, expelled his 
 territories, and forced to wander and hide him- 
 self in lurking holes, at length escaped into the 
 farthest parts of Gaul. 
 
 XXVI. But Drapes and Luterius, under- 
 standing that Caninius was in pursuit of them 
 with the legions; and sensible that having an 
 army at their heels, they could not, without 
 certain destruction, make an irruption into the 
 province, nor safely indulge themselves in the 
 liberty of plundering and ravaging the coun- 
 try ; halted in the territories of the Cadurci. 
 As Luterius, during his prosperity, had borne 
 considerable sway in the state, been always in 
 great reputation with the multitude, as the au- 
 thor of new and enterprising counsels : he seiz- 
 ed upon Uxellodunum, a town strongly fortifi- 
 ed by nature, which had formerly been under 
 his patronage ; and prevailed with the inhabi- 
 tants lo join his and Drapes's forces. 
 
 XXVII. Caninius soon arrived before the 
 place, which he found surrounded on every 
 side with steep rocks, so very difficult of access, 
 that it was hardly possible for armed troops to 
 ascend them even where there were no oppo- 
 Bers. But knowing that there was a vast quan- 
 tity of baggage in the town, which could not 
 be conveyed away so privately as to escape the 
 legions, much less the cavalry, he divided his 
 army into three bodies ; and encamping on 
 three remarkable eminences, resolved gradu- 
 ally, and as the number of his troops would al- 
 low, to carry a line of circumvallation quite 
 round the town, which the garrison perceiv- 
 ing, began to dread the fate of their country- 
 men at Alesia, especially Luterius, who had 
 Deen present at that formidable siege, and 
 therefore advised them to lay in store of corn. 
 Accordingly, they resolved with unanimous 
 consent to leave part of the forces to defend 
 Nhe town, and march out with the rest to fetch 
 
 provisions. This resolution being taken, the 
 following night, Luterius and Drapes, leaving 
 two thousand men in the place, marched at the 
 head of all the rest. These, in a few days, 
 drew together a vast quantity of corn in the 
 territories of the Cadurci, who partly stood in- 
 clined to assist them in their present exi- 
 gence, partly were unable to hinder their car- 
 rying it off. Sometimes they attacked our 
 posts by night, which made Caninius delay 
 the circumvallation of the town, fearing he 
 would not be able to defend the line, or man 
 it sufficiently in all parts. 
 
 XXVIII. Luterius and Drapes having got 
 a great quantity of corn, took up their quarters 
 about ten miles from the town, that they might 
 convey it thither by degrees. Each chose his 
 particular part: Drapes stayed behind with 
 part of the army to guard the camp ; Luterius 
 set forward with the convoy. Having disposed 
 parties along the road for the greater security, 
 he began his march towards the town about 
 four in the morning, by narrow ways, through 
 the woods. But our sentinels hearing a noise, 
 and intelligence being brought by the scouts of 
 what was doing, Caninius speedily drew some 
 cohorts together from the nearest posts, and 
 fell upon the convoy about day-break; who, 
 surprised at so unexpected an attack, retreated 
 towards their guard. Our men perceiving 
 this, fell with redoubled fury upon the escort, 
 giving quarter to none. Luterius escaped 
 with a few followers, but returned not to the 
 camp. 
 
 XXIX. Caninius having succeeded in this 
 action, understood from the prisoners that 
 Drapes was encamped about ten miles off, with 
 the rest of the army. This being confirmed 
 from many hands ; as he supposed it would be 
 easy to overwhelm them, after the terror oc- 
 casioned by the defeat of one of their leaders, 
 he thought it very fortunate that none of the 
 fugitives had retreated towards the camp, to 
 inform Drapes of the disaster. As there was 
 therefore no hazard in the attempt, he ordered 
 all the cavalry, with the German infantry, who 
 were of remarkable swiftness, to advance be- 
 fore ; and having distributed one legion into 
 his three camps, followed them with the other, 
 without baggage. As he drew near the ene- 
 mj' he was informed by his scouts, whom he 
 had sent before, that the Gauls, according to 
 custom, had pitched their camp at the foot of 
 a mountain by the river-side, and that the Ger- 
 
206 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 man foot, and cavalry, coming suddenly and 
 unexpectedly upon them, had begun the fight. 
 Upon this intelligence, he brought forward 
 the legion in order of battle, and giving the 
 signal of onset, soon possessed himself of the 
 higher ground. The Germans, and cavalry, 
 encouraged by the ensigns of the legions, re- 
 doubled their efforts. The cohorts threw^ 
 themselves in crowds upon the enemy, and 
 having either slain or made them all prisoners, 
 obtained a considerable booty. Drapes him- 
 self was taken in the battle. 
 
 XXX. Caninius, after so fortunate an ac- 
 tion, in which scarce any of his soldiers had 
 been wounded, returned to the siege of Uxel- 
 lodunum. Having got rid of the enemy with- 
 out, who had obliged him to augment his gar- 
 risons, and postpone the works about the 
 place, he now resumed them with great dili- 
 gence, and was the next day joined by Fabius 
 and his forces, who undertook one side of the 
 town. 
 
 XXXI. Meantime Caesar, leaving M. An- 
 tony the questor, with fifteen chariots, in the 
 country of the Bellovaci, to prevent any new 
 insurrections among the Belgians ; marched 
 himself into other states, to enjoin hostages, 
 and allay their fears. When he arrived among 
 the Carnutes, by whom the war was first be- 
 gun, as Csesar has mentioned in the preceding 
 book ; observing that they in a particular 
 manner dreaded his resentment, from a con- 
 sciousness of their guilt ; that he might the 
 sooner free them from their fears, he desired 
 them to deliver up to justice Guturvatus, the 
 prime mover and incendiary of that war ; who, 
 though he hid himself even from his own 
 countrymen, yet being diligently sought after 
 by a whole people, was soon brought to Cse- 
 sar's camp. Caesar, contrary to his natural 
 clemency, was constrained to give him up to 
 punishment by his soldiers, who imputed to 
 Guturvatus all the losses they had sustained, 
 and all the dangers they had been exposed to 
 during the war. Accordingly he was scourged 
 and beheaded. 
 
 XXXII. Here he was informed, by fre- 
 quent advices from Caninius, of the defeat of 
 Drapes and Luterius, and the resolution taken 
 by the garrison of Uxellodunum. Though he 
 despised them on account of the smallness of 
 their number, he yet thought their obstinacy 
 deserved the severest chastisement : that Gaul 
 might not run into a persuasion, that not 
 
 strength, but constancy, had been wanting, to 
 enable them to resist the Romans ; which 
 might perhaps induce other states, who had 
 the advantage of strong towns, to assert their 
 liberty ; it being universally known in Gaul, 
 that only one year of his government remain-'' 
 ed ; during which, if they could hold but out, 
 they had no further danger to apprehend. 
 Leaving therefore the two legions he had then 
 with him to the care of Q. Calenus his lieuten- 
 ant, with orders to follow him by easy march- 
 es ; he himself, at the head of all the cavalry, 
 hastened to Uxellodunum, to forward the 
 siege begun by Caninius. 
 
 XXXIII. He arrived before the town, un- 
 expected either by his own troops, or those ot 
 the enemy ; saw the circumvallation complet- 
 ed ; and that there was no qutting the siege 
 without dishonour ; but understanding from 
 the deserters, that the place was well stored 
 with provisions, he resolved, if possible, to 
 cut off their water. Uxellodunum stood up- 
 on a steep rock, surrounded almost on every 
 side by a very deep valley, through which ran 
 a river. There was no possible way of turn- 
 ing the course of this stream ; because it flow- 
 ed by the foot of the rock in so low a channel, 
 that ditches could not be sunk deep enough 
 to receive it. But the descent was so difficult 
 and steep, that the townsmen, in coming to 
 and returning from it, lay greatly exposed to 
 our troops, who might wound and kill them at 
 pleasure. This being known to Csesar, he 
 posted his archers and slingers, with some en- 
 gines, over against the places of easiest access, 
 and thereby hindered their approach to the 
 river. This obliged the whole multitude to 
 water at one place, close under the walls of the 
 town, whence issued a very plentiful fountain 
 on the side where the river intermitted its cir- 
 cuit, and left an opening of about three hun- 
 dred feet. The whole army were desirous to 
 deprive the besieged of this resource ; but 
 Csesar alone discovered the means of affecting 
 it. He brought forward his galleries, and be- 
 gan a terrace over against the mountain, with 
 much danger to the soldiers, incredible fatigue, 
 and a continued series of fighting. For the 
 garrison rushing furiously upon us from the 
 higher ground, charged without danger, and 
 wounded great numbers of our men, as they 
 advanced obstinately to the combat ; yet with- 
 out deterring them from bringing forward their 
 machines, and by their works and assiduity 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 207 
 
 surmounting the difficulties of the ground. At 
 the same time they carried on their mines, 
 from the terrace and galleries, quite to the foun- 
 tain ; a kind of work in which they proceeded 
 without danger or suspicion, A terrace was 
 raised sixty feet high, and a tower of ten 
 stories placed upon it; not indeed to equal 
 the height of the walls, for which no works 
 were sufficient ; but to command the top of the 
 spring. From this tower we were continually' 
 playing our engines upon all the accesses to 
 the fountain, which made it extremely dan- 
 gerous to water at the place ; insomuch that 
 not only cattle and beasts of carriage, but 
 great numbers of people perished by thirst. 
 
 XXXIV. The enemy, terrified at this dis- 
 aster, filled several barrels with tallow, pitch, 
 and dry wood ; and having set them on fire, 
 rolled them down upon the works. At the 
 same time they charged the Romans with 
 great fury, that the anxiety and danger of the 
 battle might hinder them from extinguishing 
 the flames. The conflagration soon became 
 general ; for whatever was rolled down from 
 above, being stopped by the machines and ter- 
 race, communicated the flame to that part. 
 But our soldiers, though engaged in a danger- 
 ous kind of fight, because of the inequality 
 of the ground, yet bore all with great firm- 
 ness and resolution. For the action was 
 in a conspicuous place, within view of our ar- 
 my, and great shouts were raised on both 
 sides. Thus every one was the more ardent 
 to signalize himself, and brave the flames and 
 darts of the enemy, as his bravery would be 
 better known, and have the testimony of many 
 witnesses. 
 
 XXXV. Caesar seeing many of his soldiers 
 wounded, ordered the cohorts to ascend the 
 mountain on all sides, and, as if preparing to 
 scale the walls, raise a mighty shout. This 
 alarmed the inhabitants, who not knowing 
 what passed in other parts, recalled their 
 troops from the attack, and disposed them 
 along the walls. Thus our men, being relieved 
 from the battle, soon found means to extin- 
 guish or put a stop to the flames. But as the 
 besieged still continued to defend themselves 
 with great obstinacy, and notwithstanding the 
 loss of the greatest part of their number by 
 thirst, persisted in their first resolution ; Cae- 
 sar at last contrived to drain or avert the 
 spring by mines. Upon this the fountain 
 suddenly becoming dry, so effectually deprived 
 
 the besieged of all hopes of safety, that they 
 imagined it an event brought about, not by 
 human counsels, but by the will of the gods : 
 and therefore, compelled by necessity, imme- 
 diately surrendered themselves. 
 
 XXXVI. Csesar conscious that his cle- 
 mency was known to all, and no way fearing 
 that his severity on this occasion would be im- 
 puted to any cruelty of nature ; as he perceived 
 there would be no end of the war, if other 
 states, in diflferent parts of Gaul, should, in 
 like manner, form the design of a revolt; re- 
 solved, by a signal example of punishment, to 
 defer them from all such projects. He there- 
 fore cut oflf the hands of all whom he found 
 in arms ; granting them their lives, that their 
 punishment might be the more conspicuous. 
 Drapes who, as we have said, had been made 
 prisoner by Caninius; either out of indigna- 
 tion at finding himself a captive, or dreading a 
 severe fate, put an end to his life, by abstain- 
 ing from food. At the same time, Luterius, 
 who had escaped out of the battle, falling in- 
 to the hands of Epasnactus of Auvergne, (for, 
 by continually moving from place to place, he 
 was obliged to confide in many, because he 
 could stay no where long without danger, and 
 knew the little reason he had to expect favour 
 from Csesar,) was, by him, a great favourer of 
 the Roman people, delivered, without hesita- 
 tion, bound, to Csesar. 
 
 XXXVII. In the meantime Labienus en- 
 gaged the cavalry of the Treviri with success : 
 and having killed a considerable number on 
 the spot, as likewise many Germans, who were 
 always ready to join against the Romans, 
 made the greatest part of their chiefs prison- 
 ers ; and, among the rest, Surus the ^duan, 
 a nobleman of distinguished birth and valour, 
 and the only one of that nation, who had con- 
 tinued until then in arms. Upon notice of 
 this victory, Caesar, who saw his affairs in a 
 flourishing condition in Gaul, and that his last 
 campaigns had completed the subjection of 
 the whole country ; resolved upon a journey 
 to Aquitain, where he had never yet been in 
 person, though P. Crassus had in part re- 
 duced it to his obedience. He therefore set out 
 for that country with two legions, designing 
 to spend there the rest of the campaign. This 
 expedition was attended with the desired suc- 
 cess : for all the states of Aquitain sent am- 
 oassadors to him, and delivered hostages. He 
 then went with a guard of cavalry to Nar- 
 
208 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 bonne, and distributed his army into winter 
 quarters, under the care of his lieutenants. 
 M. Antony, C. Trebonius, P. Vatinius, and 
 Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium, with 
 four legions. Two were sent into the country 
 of the ^/Eduans, whom he knew to be the most 
 powerful people in Gaul ; two into that of the 
 Turones, bordering upon the Carnutes, to hold 
 the maritime states in awe : and the remaining 
 two were stationed among the Lemovices, not 
 far from Auvergne, that none of the provinces 
 of Gaul might be destitute of troops. He re- 
 mained some days at Narbonne, held all the 
 usual assemblies of the province, decided the 
 differences subsisting among the people, re- 
 compensed those who had distinguished them- 
 selves by their faithful services ; (for he had 
 ■a wonderful faculty of discerning how men 
 stood affected in the general revolt of Gaul, 
 which he had been able to sustain, merely by 
 the fidelity and assistance of the province ;) 
 and having despatched all these affairs, re- 
 paired to the legions in Belgium, and took up 
 his winter quarters at Nometocenna. 
 
 XXXVin. Here he was informed that 
 Comius of Arras had had an engagement with 
 his cavalry. For, after the arrival of Antony 
 in his winter quarters, as the Atrebatians, 
 awed by his presence, continued in their duty 
 to Csesar ; Comius, who, ever since the wound 
 above-mentioned, had kept a watchful eye 
 upon all the motions of his countrymen, that, 
 in case of war, he might be ready to offer 
 them his counsel and assistance ; finding that 
 the state now submitted quietly to the Romans, 
 applied his troops to support himself and his 
 followers by plunder; and often carried off 
 the convoys that were going to the Roman 
 winter quarters. 
 
 XXXIX. Among those who commanded 
 under Antony, in his winter quarter.s, was C. 
 Volusenus Quadratus, an officer of the first 
 rank among the horse. Him Antony sent in 
 •pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. Volusenus, 
 -to his natural bravery, which he possessed in 
 an eminent degree, added a particular hatred 
 of Comius, which induced him the more readi- 
 ly to accept of this commission. Accordingly, 
 having planted his ambuscades, he found 
 means frequently to engage the enemy, and 
 always came off victorious. At last, a very 
 warm dispute ensuing; and Volusenus, 
 through an eager desire of making Comius 
 prisoner, urging the chase with only a few at- 
 
 tendants, while Comius, by a hasty retreat, 
 drew him a considerable 'xay from his party 
 suddenly, the latter, invoking the assistance 
 of his followers, called upon them to revenge 
 the wound he had treacherously received from 
 the Romans ; and turning short upon our de- 
 tachment, advanced without precaution to- 
 wards Volusenus. All his cavalry did the 
 same, and soon put our small party to flight. 
 Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, ran furi- 
 ously against Quadratus, and drove his lance 
 through his thigh. Our men, seeing their 
 commander wounded, instantly faced about, 
 and forced the enemy to give ground. In 
 this last attack, the Gauls, after a considerable 
 slaughter, were entirely routed by the vigor 
 ous charge of oar cavalry. Some were trod- 
 den to death in the pursuit, others made pri- 
 soners ; but Comius escaped by the swiftness 
 of his horse, Volusenus being dangerously 
 wounded, almost beyond hope of recovery, 
 was carried back to the camp. Comius, either 
 satisfied with the revenge he had taken, or 
 apprehensive he must at least be ruined, as he 
 continually lost some of his men, sent a depu- 
 ation to Antony, offering to retire wher- 
 ever he should order him, to submit to what- 
 ever should be imposed on him, and to git^ 
 hostages for the performance of these condi- 
 tions ; he only requested, that so much regard 
 might be shown to his just fears, as not to have 
 it insisted on that he should appear before any 
 Roman. Antony, conscious that his appre- 
 hensions were but too well grounded, excused 
 him, took hostages, and granted him peace. 
 
 Ca;sar, I know, assigns a distinct book to 
 each of his several campaigns. But I have 
 not judged it necessary to pursue this method ; 
 because the ensuing year, under the consul- 
 ship of L. Paulus, and C. Marcellus, fur- 
 nishes nothing memorable transacted in Gaul. 
 However, that none may be ignorant where 
 Csesar and his army were during this time, I 
 have subjoined a short account to the present 
 commentary. 
 
 XL. Caesar, during the time of his winter 
 quarters in Belgium, made it his whole study 
 to ingratiate himself with the Gauls, and de- 
 prive them of all pretence or colour for a re- 
 volt. For there was nothing he more earnestly ^ 
 desired, than to leave Gaul peaceably dispos- 
 ed at his departure ; lest, when he was about 
 to withdraw his army, any sparks of rebellion 
 should remain, which would infallibly rekindle 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 209 
 
 into a war, were the Roman troops once re- 
 moved. Wherefore, by treating the several 
 states with respect, Uberally rewarding their 
 chiefs, and abstaining from the imposition of 
 new burdens, he easily prevailed with the 
 Gauls, wearied and exhausted by long unsuc- 
 cessful wars, to embrace the ease and quiet at- 
 tendant on their present submission. 
 
 XLI. The winter being over, contrary to 
 his custom, he posted, by long journeys, into 
 Italy, to visit the municipal towns and colonies 
 of Cisalpine Gaul, and engage their interest 
 in favour of M. Antony, his questor, who was 
 then a candidate for the priesthood. He the. 
 more warmly interested himself in this affair, 
 not only as it was in behalf of a man united 
 to him by the strictest ties of friendship, but 
 as it likewise gave him an opportunity of op- 
 posing a small faction, who aimed to diminish 
 Caesar's credit, by repulsing Antony. Al- 
 though he heard upon the road, before he 
 reached Italy,, that Antony had been made 
 augur, he still thought it incumbent upon him 
 to visit the municipal towns and colonies of 
 the province ; in order to thank them for the 
 zeal they had shown in behalf of his friend, 
 and to recommend them his own petition for 
 the consulship of the ensuing year. For his 
 enemies every where boasted^ that L. Lentul- 
 us and C. Marcellus had been chosen consuls, 
 in the view of despoiling him of all his hon- 
 ours and dignities; and that Sergius Galba 
 had been excluded, though much the strong- 
 est in the number of votes, because of his 
 known intimacy with Caesar, and having 
 served under him as lieutenant. 
 
 XLII. He was received every where with 
 incredible honours, and the warmest testimo- 
 nies of the people's affection. For this was the 
 first time he had appeared among them since 
 the total reduction of Gaul. Nothing was 
 omitted that could contribute to the ornament 
 of the gates, ways, and places through which 
 he was to pass. The people, with their chil- 
 dren, came out to meet him ; sacrifices were 
 offered in all parts ; tables, richly spread, 
 were placed in the public squares and temples : 
 and so great was the magnificence displayed 
 by the rich, such the eagerness of the poor to 
 express their satisfaction, that every thing 
 wore the face of a most splendid triumph. 
 
 XLIII. Caesar, having visited the several 
 provinces of Cisalpine Gaul, returned, in all 
 haste, to the army at Nemetocenna; and or- 
 19 
 
 dering the legions to quit their winter quarters, 
 and rendezvous in the territories of the Tre- 
 viri, went thither and reviewed them in per- 
 son. He gave the government of Cisalpine 
 Gaul to Labienus, the better to reconcile him 
 to his demand of the consulship; and marched 
 the army from place to place, that by the mo- 
 tion and change of air, he might prevent any 
 sickness getting among the troops. Although 
 he often heard, that Labienus was strongly so- 
 licited by his enemies ; and was, for certain, 
 informed, that some were labouring, by means 
 of the senate's authority, to deprive him of part 
 of his army ; yet neither did he credit any re- 
 ports to Labienus's disadvantage, nor could be 
 induced to set himself in opposition to the au- 
 thority of the senate. For he made no doubt 
 of obtaining his demand by the free suffrage^ 
 of the fathers ; and the rather, because C. 
 Curio, tribune of the people, having under- 
 taken the defence of Csesar's cause and digni- 
 ty, had often proposed in the senate ; " That 
 if Caesar's army gave umbrage to any, as Pom- 
 pey was no less formidable to the true friends 
 of liberty, both should be ordered to dismiss 
 their troops, and return to a private condition, 
 which would entirely free the commonwealth 
 from all apprehensions of danger." Nor did 
 he only propose this, but even began to put it 
 to the vote. But the consuls and Pompey's 
 friends interposed, which hindered the senate 
 from coming to any resolution. 
 
 XLIV. This was an authentic testimony 
 from the whole senate, and agreeable to what 
 had passed on a former occasion. For when 
 Marcellus who strove to render himself con- 
 siderable by opposing Caesar, had proposed, 
 the year before, contrary to the law of Pompey 
 and Crassus, to recall Caesar before his com- 
 mission was expired, the overture was reject- 
 ed by a very full house. But this, instead of 
 discouraging Caesar's enemies, only pushed 
 them on to new attempts, that they might, at 
 length, bring the senate into their measures. 
 
 XLV. A Senatus Consiiltinn soon after 
 passed, that one legion from Pompey, and an- 
 other from Caesar, should be sent to the Par- 
 thian war. But it was visibly their design to 
 take both legions from Caesar alone. For 
 Pompey offered the first legion for that ser- 
 vice, which he had lent some time before to Cae- 
 sar, having raised it in his province. But 
 Cffisar, though now fully satisfied of the ill de- 
 signs of his enemies, readily sent back Pom* 
 2 E 
 
210 
 
 PANSA'S COMMENTARIES. 
 
 pey's legion ; and in compliance with the de- 
 cree of the senate, ordered the fifteenth, one 
 of his own number, which was then in hither 
 Gaul, to be delivered to their commissioners ; 
 and sent the thirteenth into Italy to replace it, 
 and supply the garrison whence it had been 
 drawn. He then put his army into winter 
 quarters. C. Trebonius, with four legions, 
 was ordered into the country of the Belgians ; 
 and C. Fabius, with the like number, was 
 placed among the ^duans. For thus he 
 thought Gaul was most likely to be kept in 
 subjection ; if the Belgae, the most renowned 
 for their valour, and the ^duans, the most 
 
 considerable for their authority, we e awed by 
 the presence of two armies, 
 
 XL VI. After this he returned into Italy, 
 where he understood, that the two legions he 
 had sent, in conformity to the decree of the 
 senate, to be employed in the Parthian war, 
 had been delivered, by the Consul Marcellus, 
 to Pompey, and were by him still detained in 
 Italy. Although by this it was abundantly 
 evident, that they were preparing to take up 
 arms against him, he yet resolved to suffer 
 any thing, while any hope remained of adjust- 
 ing their differences by the methods of peace 
 .rather than those of violence and war. 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 211 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 Different opinions in the senate in relation to Caesar's letter. — III. The origin and causes of the opposition 
 formed against him. — IV. Tlie senate's severe decree, and flight of Csesar's friends. — V. War against Csesar 
 resolved on. — VI. Csesar harangues his troops. --VII. Pnmpey sends proposals of peace. — VIII. Caesar's an- 
 swer. — IX. Pompey sends proposals a second time. — X. Which not pleasing Caesar, he prepares for war.— 
 XI. Caesar makes himself master of Iguvium and Auximum. — XII. Which so alarms his enemies at Rome, 
 that they hastily quit the city, and retire to Capua. — XIII. Cssar by his expedition, obliges many of the towns 
 in Italy to submit. — XXIII. Pompey, after the reduction of Corfinium hy Ctesar, withdraws with his troops to 
 Brundusium. — XXIV. Caesar besieges him there. — XXVI. He escapes by sea, after which the town surren- 
 der. — XXVIII. Caesar cannot pursue him for want of a fleet. — XXIX. Valerius and Curio, partisans of Caesar, 
 drive Cotta from Sardinia, and Cato from Sicily. Varus compels Tubero to desist from !iis design upon 
 Africa. — XXX. Ccesar's speech to the senate. — XXXI. Which producing no effect, he sets out for Transal- 
 pine Gaul. — XXXII. The people of Marseilles shut their gates against Caesar. — XXXIV. Who commands 
 Brutus and Trebonius to besiege the place. — ^XXXV. Fabius seat before into Spain. — XXXIX. Ca?sar follows, 
 and comes up with Afranius andPetreius at Lerida. — XLI. A skirmisli, with almost equal advantage on both 
 sides. — XLVI. A sudden storm having broke down his bridges, Ccesar is shut up between two rivers. — XI. VIII. 
 And reduced to great straits for want of provisions. — LI. He extricates himself at length, and surprises the 
 enemy's foragers. — LII. Brutus defeats the people of Marseilles in a sea-fight. — LIII. Cissar obtains the su- 
 periority near Lerida. — LIV. Many states declare for him. — LV. Afi-anius and Petreius remove towards 
 Celtiberia.— LVI. Caesar pursues them with his cavalry.— L VII. Then drawing out the legions, continues 
 to urge them in their retreat. — LXIV. He cuts off their provisions.— LXVI. Afranius and Petreius's men talk 
 with. Caesar's about a surrender. — LXVII. Petreius interrupts the conference. — LXVIII. And obliges the 
 soldiers to take an oath of fidelity to their generals. — LXX. Wlto, finding both their provisions and forage 
 intercepted, resolve to return to Lerida. — LXXI. Caesar follows, and greatly molests them in their march.^ 
 LXXIII. At length, water, forage, and every thing failing them, they are forced to sue for peace, and accept 
 of Caesar's terms. 
 
 212 
 
THE SUPPLEMENT 
 
 DIONYSIUS VOSSIUS TO CESAR'S FIRST BOOK 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
 I THINK it needless to say any thing here, in 
 opposition to those who pretend, that the fol- 
 lowing Commentaries, concerning the Civil 
 War, were not penned by Csesar himself. We 
 have not only the express testimony of Sue- 
 tonius to the contrary, but the very style suffi- 
 ciently declares, that Csesar alone could be the 
 author of the work. There is room however 
 to suspect, from the abrupt manner in which 
 the subject is introduced, that the beginning 
 of this first book is wanting : for history takes 
 notice of several previous facts, of which no 
 mention is made here. I have therefore col- 
 lected out of Plutarch, Appian, and Dion, as 
 much as was necessary to connect this and the 
 former Commentary, and fancy it will not be 
 disagreeable to the reader, to offer it here by 
 way of Preface. 
 
 Gaul being wholly reduced, Caesar, upon 
 his arrival in Lombardy, thought proper, for 
 many reasons, to send deputies to Rome, to 
 demand the consulship, and a prolongation of 
 his command. Pompey, who, though averse to 
 Caesar's interest, had not yet openly declared 
 against him, neither furthered nor opposed 
 his request. But the consuls Marcellus and 
 Lentulus, who had already joined the party of 
 his enemies, resolved by every method in their 
 power to frustrate the design. Marcellus scru- 
 pled not to add other injuries to that of which 
 we speak. For Csesar had lately planted a 
 colony at Novocomum in Cisalpine Gaul ; and 
 Marcellus, not satisfied with stripping the in- 
 habitants of the privilege of Roman citizens, 
 Bcized one of their chief magistrates at Rome, 
 ordered him to be scourged, and then dis- 
 19* 
 
 missed him to carry his complaints to Caesar, 
 an ignominy from which all free citizens were 
 expressly exempted by the laws. While af- 
 fairs were in this train, C. Curio, tribune of 
 the people, came to Caesar in Gaul. This no- 
 bleman, after many attempts, in behalf of the 
 commonwealth, and to promote Caesar's inter- 
 est ; finding at length all his endeavours with-- 
 out effect, fled from Rome, to avoid the ma- 
 lice of his enemies, and informed Caesar of all 
 that was transacted against him. Caesar re- 
 ceived him with great marks of respect, as 
 well on account of his rank in the common- 
 wealth, as the many services he had done him- 
 self and the state ; and thanked him for the 
 signal zeal he had shown in his cause." But 
 Curio advised him, since his enemies were 
 now openly preparing for war, to draw his 
 army together without delay, and rescue the 
 commonwealth from the tyranny of an as- 
 piring faction. Caesar, though fully satisfied 
 of the truth of Curio's report, resolved to sacri- 
 fice all other considerations to the public tran- 
 quillity, that no man might justly charge him 
 with being the author of a civil war. He there- 
 fore only petitioned by his friends, that, the 
 government of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, 
 with the command of two legions, might be 
 continued to him, in all which his principal 
 aim was, by the equity of his demands, to in- 
 duce his enemies to grant peace to the com- 
 monwealth. These offers appeared so reason- 
 able, that even Pompey himself knew not how 
 to oppose them. But the consuls still continu- 
 ing inflexiblej Caesar wrote a letter to the 
 senate, wherein, after briefly enumerating his 
 213 
 
214 
 
 SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 exploits and services, he requested them not to 
 deprive him of the benefit of the people's favour, 
 who had permitted him to sue for the consul- 
 ship in his absence. He protested his readi- 
 ness, if such was the resolution of the senate 
 and people of Rome, to dismiss his army, 
 provided Pompey did the same : but could by 
 no means resolve, so long as he continued in 
 command and authority, to divest himself of 
 troops, and lay himself open to the injuries of 
 his enemies Curio was commissioned to 
 
 carry this letter, who travelling with incredible 
 despatch, reached Rome in three days (a dis- 
 tance of a hundred and sixty miles,) before the 
 beginning of January, and ere the consuls 
 could get any thing determined relating to 
 Csesar's command. Curio, upon his arrival, 
 refused to part with the letter, resolving not to 
 deliver it but in full senate, and when the tri- 
 bunes of the people were present : for he was 
 apprehensive, should he do otherwise, that the 
 consuls would suppress it. 
 
CESAR'S CO 
 
 ENTARIES 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 I. CassAii's letter being delivered to the con- 
 suls, the tribunes, with much difficulty, pro- 
 cured it a reading in the senate ; but could by 
 no means prevail to have his demands brought 
 under deliberation. The consuls proposed to 
 debate upon the state of the republic. " Len- 
 tulus promised to stand by the senate and the 
 people, if they would deliver their sentiments 
 with freedom and courage ; but if they re- 
 garded Caesar, and affected to court his friend- 
 ship, as had been the practice for some time 
 past, he knew, he told them, what he had to 
 do, and was determined to disclaim their 
 authority ; not doubting but he would find a 
 ready admittance to the favour and protection 
 of Caesar." Scipio spoke much to the same 
 purpose : " That Pompey was firmly bent not 
 to abandon the republic, if he found the sena- 
 tors read}' to support him ; but if they cooled, 
 or were remiss in their resolves, it would be 
 in vain for them to expect his aid, if they saw 
 cause afterwards to apply for it." This 
 speech of Scipio, as the senate was held in the 
 city, and Pompey resided in the suburbs, was 
 considered as coming from Pompey's own 
 mouth. Some were for following milder 
 counsels, of which number was M. Marcellus, 
 who gave it as his opinion : " That it was 
 not proper to enter upon the present delibera- 
 tion, till troops were raised over all Italy, and 
 an army got ready, under whose protection 
 the senate might proceed with freedom and 
 safety in their debates."' " Callidius was for 
 sending Pompey to his government, to take 
 away all occasion of discord; because Caesar 
 had reason to fear, as two of his legions had 
 
 been taken from him, that Pompey retained 
 them in the neighbourhood of Rome, with a 
 view to employ them against him." M. Ru- 
 fus nearly agreed with Callidius. But they 
 were all severely reprimanded by the consul 
 Lentulus, who expressly refused to put Cal- 
 lidius's motion to the vote. Marcellus, awed 
 by the consul's reprimand, retracted what he 
 had said. Thus the clamours of Lentulus, the 
 dread of an army at the gates of Rome, and 
 the menaces of Pompey's friends, forced the 
 greater part of the senate, though with the 
 utmost reluctance and dislike, into a compli- 
 ance with Scipio's motion : " That Caesar 
 should be ordered to disband his army before 
 a certain day then fixed ; and that in case of 
 disobedience, he should be declared an enemy 
 to the republic." M. Antonius and Q. Cas- 
 sius, tribunes of the people, opposed their 
 negative to this decree. Immediately a de- 
 bate arose, upon the validity of their inter- 
 position. Many severe speeches were made 
 against them ; and the more warm and pas- 
 sionate any one appeared, the more was he 
 applauded by Csesar's enemies. 
 
 II. In the evening the senate rose ; and 
 Pompey sending for all those of his party, com- 
 mended the forward; confirmed them in their 
 resolutions ; reproved and animated the more 
 moderate. Multitudes of veterans who had 
 formerly served under him, flocked to him 
 from all parts, allured by the expectation of 
 rewards and dignities. A great number of 
 officers belonging to the two legions lately re- 
 turned by Caesar, had likewise orders to attend 
 him. Rome was filled with troops. Curio 
 215 
 
316 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 assembled the tribunes to support the decree 
 of the people. On the other hand, all the 
 friends of the consuls, all the partizans of 
 Pompey, and of such as bore any ancient 
 grudge to Caesar, repaired to the senate : by 
 whose concourse and votes the weaker sort 
 were terrified, the irresolute confirmed, and 
 the greater part deprived of the liberty of 
 speaking their mind freely. L. Piso the cen- 
 sor, and L. Roscius the pretor, offered to 
 go and acquaint Caesar with the state of 
 affairs, demanding only six days for that 
 purpose. Some were for sending deputies 
 to him, to inform him of the senate's disposi- 
 tion. 
 
 III. But all these proposals were rejected, 
 because the consul, Scipio, and Cato, de- 
 clared against them. Cato was incited by the 
 remembrance of an old quarrel, and the dis- 
 appointment he had sustained in standing 
 candidate for the pretorship with Caesar. 
 Lentulus was oppressed v^ith debt, and flat- 
 tered himself with the command of armies, 
 the government of provinces, and the largesses 
 of the kings for whom he should procure the 
 title of allies and friends of the Roman people. 
 He was besides wont to boast, among those of 
 his own party, that he doubted not of becom- 
 ing a second Sylla, in whom the whole autho- 
 rity of the commonwealth should centre. 
 Scipio entertained the same hope of commands 
 andgovernments, which he expected to- share 
 with his son-in-law Pompey ; added to this his 
 dread of a prosecution ; his vanity and self-con- 
 ceit ; and the flatteries and applauses of his 
 friends, who at that time bore a considerable 
 sway in the commonwealth and courts of jus- 
 tice. Pompey himself, instigated by Caesar's 
 enemies, and not able to endure an equal dig- 
 nity, was now entirely alienated from him, and 
 had joined with their common adversaries, 
 most of whom Caesar had contracted during his 
 affinity with Pompey. Beside, the fraudulent 
 step he had taken, in detaining, for the pur- 
 poses of his own ambition, the two legions 
 destined to serve in Asia and Syria, deter- 
 mined him to use all his endeavours to bring 
 on a civil war. 
 
 IV. Thus nothing but tumult and violence 
 vfas to be seen in the public debates. Caesar's 
 friends had no time given them to inform him 
 of what passed. Even the tribunes themselves 
 were not exempt from danger, nor durst they 
 have recourse to that right of intercession, 
 
 which Sylla had left them, as the last bulwark 
 of liberty ; insomuch that the seventh day af- 
 ter entering upon their office, they saw them- 
 selves obliged to provide for their safety ; 
 whereas in former times, the most turbulent 
 and seditious tribunes never began to appre- 
 hend themselves in danger, till towards the 
 eighth month of their administratinn. Re- 
 course was had to that rigid and ultimate de- 
 cree which was never used but in the greatest 
 extremities, when the city was threatened with 
 ruin and conflagration : " That the consuls, 
 the pretors, the tribunes of the people, and 
 the proconsuls that were near Rome, should 
 take care that the commonwealth received no 
 detriment." This decree passed the seventh 
 of January ; so that during the first five days 
 in which it was permitted the senate to assem- 
 ble, after Lentulus's entrance upon the con- 
 sulship, (for two days are always appro- 
 priated to the holding of the comitia,) the 
 most severe and rigorous resolutions were 
 taken, both in relation to Caesar's government, 
 and the tribunes of the people, men of eminent 
 worth and dignity. The tribunes imme 
 diately quitted the city, and fled to Caesar, 
 who was then at Ravenna, waiting an answer 
 to his late demands, whose equity he hoped 
 would dispose all parties to entertain thoughts 
 of peace. 
 
 V. The following days the senate assem- 
 bled without the city, where Pompey con- 
 firmed everything he had before intimated by 
 the mouth of Scipio. He applauded the re- 
 solution and courage of the senators, acquainted 
 them with the state of his forces, that he had 
 ten legions already in arms, and was besides 
 well informed, that Caesar's troops were by 
 no means satisfied with their general ; nay, 
 had even refused to support and follow him. 
 It was then proposed in the senate, that troops 
 should be raised over all Italy ; that Faustus 
 Sylla should be sent propretor into Mauri- 
 tania ; that Pompey should be supplied with 
 money out of the public treasury, and that 
 king Juba should be declared friend and ally 
 of the people of Rome : but Marcellus op- 
 posed the last of these ; and Philippus, tri- 
 bune of the people, would not agree to the 
 propretorship of Sylla. The other motions 
 were approved by the senate. The affair of 
 the provinces was next decided ; two of 
 which were consular, the rest pretorian. Syria 
 fell to the share of Scipio, and Gaul fell to L 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 217 
 
 Domitius. Philippus and Marcellus were set 
 aside, through the private views of the prevail- 
 ing party. The rest of the provinces were as- 
 signed to men of pretorian rank ; who waited 
 not to have their nomination confirmed by 
 the people, as had been the custom in former 
 years, but after taking the usual oath, departed 
 for their several commands in a military habit. 
 The consuls left the city, a thing unheard of 
 till that time, and Uctors were seen walking 
 before private men in the forum and capitol, 
 contrary to the express practice of former ages. 
 Troops were levied over all Italy, arms en- 
 joined, money demanded of the colonies and 
 free towns, and even taken from the very tem- 
 ples ; in fine, neither divine nor human rights 
 were regarded. 
 
 VI. Csssar having intelligence of these pro- 
 ceedings, addressed himself to his troops ; 
 " He took notice of the many injuries he had 
 received on all occasions from his enemies, who 
 had alienated Pompey from him, by filling him 
 with an envy and jealousy of his reputation, 
 though he had done every thing in his power 
 to promote his glory, and favour his advance- 
 ment to the highest dignities. He complained 
 of the new precedent introduced into the com- 
 monwealth, in checking, and hindering by 
 arms, the opposition of the tribunes, which of 
 late years had been restored to its wonted force. 
 That Sylla, who had almost annihilated the 
 tribuneship, had yet left it the liberty of oppo- 
 sition ; whereas Pompey who valued himself 
 upon the re-establishment of that office, de- 
 prived it now of a privilege it had always en- 
 joyed. That the decree enjoining the magis- 
 trates to provide for the safety of the common- 
 wealth, which implied an order to the Roman 
 people to repair to arms, was never wont to be 
 used but on occasion of dangerous laws, sedi- 
 tious measures pursued by the tribunes, or a 
 general secession of the people, when they 
 possessed themselves of the temples and places 
 of strength; crimes, which in former ages had 
 been expiated by the fate of Saturninus and 
 the Gracchi. That at present nothing of this 
 kind had been attempted, nor so much as 
 thought of; no law promulged, no endeavour 
 used to seduce the people, no appearance of 
 revolt or disaffection. He therefore conjured 
 them to defend against the malice of his ene- 
 mies, the honour and reputation of a general, 
 under whom they had served nine years with 
 so much advantage to the commonwealth, 
 
 gained so many battles, and subdued all Gaul 
 and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth 
 legion, who were present, and whom he had 
 sent for in the beginning of the troubles, (ttie 
 rest not being yet arrived,) cried out, that they 
 were determined to maintain the honour of 
 their general, and to revenge the wrongs done 
 to the tribunes. 
 
 VII. Being assured of the good will of the 
 soldiers, he marched with that legion to Rim- 
 ini, where he was met by the tribunes of the 
 people, who had fled to him for protection. 
 He ordered the other legions to quit their win- 
 ter quarters, and follow him with all expedi- 
 tion. While he was at Rimini, young L. Cae- 
 sar, whose father was one of his lieutenants, 
 came to him ; and after acquainting him with 
 the occasion of his journey, added, that he had 
 a private message to him from Pompey, " who 
 was desirous of clearing himself to Caesar, that 
 he might not interpret those actions as de- 
 signed to affront him, which had no other aim 
 but the good of the commonwealth : that it had 
 been his constant maxim, to prefer the interest 
 of the republic to any private engagement : 
 that it was worthy of Caesar, to sacrifice his 
 passion and resentment to the same noble mo- 
 tive; and not prejudice the com man wealth, 
 by pushing too far his revenge against his pri- 
 vate enemies." He added something more to 
 the same purpose, mingled with excuses for 
 Pompey. The pretor Roscius joined likewise 
 in the negotiation, declaring he was commis- 
 sioned so to do. 
 
 VIII. Though all this tended little to re- 
 dress the injuries of which Caesar complained, 
 yet considering these as proper persons by 
 whom to transmit his thoughts, he ! egged of 
 them, that as they had not scrupled to bring 
 Pompey's demands to him, they would like- 
 wise carry back his proposals to Pompey ; that, 
 if possible, so small a labour might put an end 
 to mighty differences, and deliver all Italy 
 from the fear of a civil war. He told them 
 " That the interest of the commonwealth had 
 always been dearer to him than life ; but he 
 could not help grieving at the malice of his 
 enemies, who had frustrated the good inten- 
 tions of the Roman people in his favour, by 
 cutting off six months from his command, and 
 obliging him to return to Rome to sue for the 
 consulship, though a law had been made dis- 
 pensing with his personal attendance ; that 
 he had yet, for the sake of the commonwealth, 
 
 2 F 
 
218 
 
 CAESAR'S 
 
 patiently submitted to this assault upon his ho- 
 nour; that even his proposal of disbanding 
 the armies on both sides, which he had made 
 by a letter to the senate, had been rejected: 
 that new levies were making over all Italy : 
 that two legions, which had been taken from 
 him, under pretence of the Parthian war, were 
 still retained in the service of his enemies : 
 that the whole state was in arms. What 
 could all this aim at but his destruction ? That, 
 nevertheless, he was ready to agree to any pro- 
 posal, and expose himself to any danger, for 
 the sake of his country. Let Pompey go to 
 his government : let all the armies be disband- 
 ed : let every body throughout Italy lay down 
 their arms : let every thing that participates 
 of terror and force be removed : let the elec- 
 tions of magistrates be made with perfect free- 
 dom ; and let the republic be administered by 
 the authority of the senate and people. And 
 the better to settle all these articles, and cor- 
 roborate them with the sanction of an oath, 
 let either Pompey himself draw nearer, or suf- 
 fer Cajsar to approach him ; as all their differ- 
 ences may be most easily terminated by a con- 
 ference." 
 
 IX. Roscius and L. Csesar, having received 
 this answer, departed for Capua, where they 
 found Pompey and the consuls, and laid be- 
 fore them Cjesar's proposals. After delibera- 
 ting upon the affair, they sent a reply, in 
 writing, by the same messengers, the purport 
 of which was : " I'hat Csesar should quit Rim- 
 ini, return to Gaul, and disband his army ; 
 which conditions performed, Pompey would 
 go into Spain. In the meantime, till Ca-sar 
 gave the security for the performance of what 
 he had promised, neither Pompey nor the con- 
 suls would discontinue the levies." 
 
 X. It was, by no means, a fair proposal, 
 that Caesar should be obliged to quit Rimini 
 and return to Gaul, while Pompey held pro- 
 vinces and legions that were none of his : that 
 he should dismiss his army, whilst the other 
 was levying troops: and, that only a general 
 promise of going into Spain should be given, 
 without fixing a day for his departure ; bv 
 which evasion, was he to be found in Italy, 
 even at the expiration of Csesar's consulship, 
 he could not yet be charged with breach of 
 faith. His forbearing too to appoint a time for 
 a conference, and declining to approach nearer, 
 gave little reason to hope for a peace. He there- 
 fore sent Antony to Arretiunr with five co- 
 
 horts ; remained himself at Rimini, with two, 
 where he resolved to levy troops ; and seizing 
 Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, left a cohort 
 in each for a garrison. 
 
 XI. Meantime being informed that Ther- 
 mus the pretor had entered Iguvium, with five 
 cohorts, and was endeavouring to fortify the 
 town ; as he knew the inhabitants to be well 
 inclined to his interest, he detached Curio 
 thither, with three cohorts, drawn from Lisau- 
 rum and Rimini. Upon this. Therm us, who 
 could not confide in the townsmen, retired 
 with his cohorts, and quitted the place : but his 
 troops abandoning him in his march, returned 
 severally to their own homes. Curio was 
 received into the place with great demonstra- 
 tions of joy : which being reported to Cassar, 
 as he found he had the good will of the colo- 
 nies and free towns, he drew the cohorts of 
 the thirteenth legion out of garrison, and 
 marched to Auximum, which Attius held with 
 a body of troops, and whence he had despatched 
 senators to levy forces over all Picenum. Cae- 
 sar's arrival being known, the chief citizens of 
 Auximum went in a body to Attius Varus, and 
 told him : " That it did not belong to them to 
 determine on which side justice lay ; but that 
 neither they, nor the other municipal towns, 
 could endure to see their gates shut against 
 Cffisar, who by his great actions had deserved 
 so well of the commonwealth : that therefore 
 he would do well to consult his own safety 
 and reputation," Attius, moved by this speech, 
 drew off his garrison and fled. But some of 
 Caesar's first ranks pursuing him, obliged him 
 to stop ; and a battle ensuing, he was deserted 
 by his men. Some of the troops returned 
 home ; the rest wejit over to Caesar, and 
 brought along with them L. Pupius, first cen- 
 turion of the legion, who had formerly held 
 the same rank in Pompey's army, Caesar 
 commended Attius's soldiers ; dismissed Pu- 
 pius , returned thanks to the inhabitants of 
 Auximum ; and promised to retain always a 
 grateful remembrance of their attachment. 
 
 XII. These things being reported at Rome, 
 the consternation was so great over the whole 
 city, that when the consul Lentulus came to 
 the treasury, to deliver out the mone}' to Pom- 
 pey, in consequence of the decree of the se- 
 nate, he scarce waited the opening of the inner 
 door, but precipitately left the place, upon a 
 false rumour, that Ctesar was approaching, 
 and some of his cavalry already in view. He 
 
COMMENTARIES, 
 
 219 
 
 was soon followed by his colleague Marcellus, 
 and the greater part of the magistrates. Pom- 
 pey had left the town the day before, and was 
 upon his way to Apulia, where he had quar- 
 tered the legions he had received from Csesar. 
 The levies were discontinued within the city, 
 and no place appeared secure on this side 
 Capua. Here, at last, they took courage and 
 rallied, and began to renew their levies in the 
 colonies round about, which had been sent 
 thither by the Julian law. Lentulus sum- 
 moned into the forum the gladiators whom 
 Cffisar had ordered to be trained up there, 
 gave them their liberty, furnished them with 
 horses, and commanded them to folIo<v him. 
 But being afterwards admonished by his 
 friends that tliis step was universally con- 
 demned, he dispersed them into the neighbour- 
 ing town of Campania, to keep garrison there. 
 XIII. Cansar meanwhile leaving Auximum, 
 traversed the whole country of Picenum ; 
 where he was joyfully received in all parts by 
 the inhabitants, who furnished his army with 
 every thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, 
 a town founded by Labienus, and built at hi-s 
 own expense, sent deputies to him, with an 
 offer of their submission and services. He 
 demanded a certain number of soldiers, which 
 were sent immediately. Meantime the twelfth 
 legion joined him ; and with these two he 
 marched to Asculum, a town of Picenum. 
 Here Lentulus Spinther commanded with ten 
 cohorts ; who, hearing of Caesar's approach, 
 quitted the place with his troops, who almost 
 all deserted him upon the march. Being left 
 with only a few, he fell in with Vibullius 
 Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum 
 to encourage his followers in those parts. Vi- 
 bullius understanding from him the state of 
 affairs in Picenum, dismissed Lentulus, and 
 took the soldiers under his command. He 
 likewise drew together from the neighbouring 
 provinces as many as he could meet with of 
 Pompey 's levies: among the rest, Ulcilles 
 Hirus, who was flying, with six cohorts, from 
 Camerinum, where they had been quartered. 
 Out of all these he formed thirteen cohorts, 
 with which he posted, by great journeys, to 
 Corfiiiium, where Domitius Ahenobarbus com- 
 manded ; whom he informed that Csesar was ap- 
 proaching with two legions. Domitius had al- 
 ready got together, with great expedition, 
 twenty cohorts from Alba, the country of the 
 Marsi, Peligni, and the neighbouring provinces. 
 
 XIV. Cesar having made himself master 
 of Asculum, and obliged Lentulus to retire, 
 ordered the soldiers who had deserted him, to 
 be sought after, and new levies to be made. 
 He remained only one daj' there, to settle what 
 related to provisions, and then pursued his 
 march to Corfinium. Upon his arrival there, 
 he found five cohorts, whom Domitius had de- 
 tached from the garrison, employed in break- 
 ing down a bridge about three miles distant 
 from the town. But Caesar's advanced parties 
 attacking them, they quickly abandoned the 
 bridge, and retired to Corfinium. Cssar hav- 
 ing passed with his legions, halted before the 
 town, and encamped under the walls. 
 
 XV. Upon this, Domitius engaged b}' great 
 rewards, persons well acquainted with the 
 country, to carry letters into Apulia to Pompey, 
 wherein he earnestly requested him to come 
 to his aid. He told him, " That it would be 
 easy, in that close country, to shut up Csesar 
 between two armies, and cut off his provisions : 
 that unless this course was followed, he him- 
 self, with above thirty cohorts, and a great num- 
 ber of senators and Romaa knights, would be 
 exposed to imminent danger." Meanwhile, 
 having encouraged his men, he disposed en- 
 gines along the walls, appointed every one his 
 particular post, and, the more to animate them, 
 promised each soldier four acres of land out of 
 his own estate, and, in proportion, to every 
 centurion and volunteer. 
 
 XVI. Meantime Cssar was informed that 
 the people of Sulmona, a town seven miles dis- 
 tant from Corfinium, desired to put themselves 
 under his protection, but were restrained by 
 Q. Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, 
 who held them in subjection with a garrison, 
 of seven cohorts. He therefore despatched M. 
 Antony thither, with five cohorts of the sev- 
 enth legion, whose ensigns were no sooner des- 
 cried from the walls of Sulmona, than the 
 gates were thrown open, and the whole people 
 in a body, both soldiers and townsm.en, came 
 out to congratulate Antony on his arrival. Lu- 
 cretius and Attius endeavoured to escape over 
 the wall : but Attius being taken, and brought 
 to Antony, requested that he might be sent to 
 Csesar. Antony returned the same day, bring- 
 ing along with him the cohorts and Attius. 
 Csesar joined these cohorts to his army, and 
 set Attius at liberty. 
 
 XVII. Caesar resolved to employ the three 
 first days in stronc'y fortifying his camp, m 
 
220 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 procuring corn from the neighbouring towns, 
 and waiting the arrival of the rest of his forces. 
 During this space, the eighth legion joined 
 him, with two and twent}' cohorts of new lev- 
 ies from Gaul, and about three hundred horse 
 from the king of Noricum. This obliged him 
 to form a second camp on the other side of the 
 town, under the command of Curio. The re- 
 maining days were spent in drawing a line 
 with redoubts round the place, which work 
 was nearly completed when the messengers, 
 that had been sent to Pompey, returned. 
 
 XVIII. Domitius, perusing the despatches, 
 thought proper to dissemble the contents, and 
 declared, in council, that Pompey would 
 speedily come to their assistance. Meantime 
 he exhorted them to behave with courage, and 
 provide every thing necessary for a vigorous 
 defence. He conferred, however, privately 
 with a few of his most intimate friends, and, 
 in concert with them, determined upon flight. 
 But as his looks and speech were found to 
 disagree ; as he behaved not with his usual 
 composure and firmness ; and was observed, 
 contrary to custom, to be much in secret con- 
 ference with his friends ; avoiding public ap- 
 pearances, and councils of war : it was not pos- 
 sible for the truth to remain any longer con- 
 cealed. For Pompey had wrote back, " That 
 he could not put all to hazard for his sake ; 
 that he had neither advised nor consented to 
 his shutting himself up in Corfinium ; that he 
 must therefore endeavour to extricate himself 
 as well as he could, and come and join him 
 with all his forces." But as Csesar had in- 
 vested and carried his lines round the place, 
 this retreat was now become impracticable. 
 
 XIX. Domitius's design being discovered, 
 the soldiers who were at Corfinium began to 
 assemble in the evening, and, by means of 
 their tribunes, centurions, and other officers, 
 made known their thoughts to one another : 
 " That they were besieged by Csesar, who had 
 already, in a manner completed his works : 
 that their general, Domitius, in whose pro- 
 mises of assistance they had placed their chief 
 hope, abandoning all concern for their safety, 
 was contriving to escape privately by flight : 
 that it was therefore incumbent upon them to 
 look also to their own preservation." The 
 Marsi at first opposed this resolution, and pos- 
 sessed themselves of the strongest part of the 
 town; nay, the dispute was so warm, that it 
 almost came to be decided by the sword. But 
 
 shortly after, being made acquainted Mvit\ 
 Domitius's intended flight, of which before they 
 had no knowledge ; they all, in a body, sur- 
 rounded Domitius, secured his person, and 
 sent deputies to Cajsar: "That they were 
 ready to open their gates, receive his orders, 
 and deliver Domitius alive." 
 
 XX. Though Caesar was fully sensible of 
 how gieat importance it was to get possession 
 of the town immediately, and join the garrison 
 to his own army ; lest by largesses, promises 
 of speedy relief, or false reports, any change 
 should be produced ; as in war great revolu- 
 tions often arise from very trifling causes : yet, 
 fearing that if he introduced his soldiers in the 
 dark, they would take that opportunity to 
 plunder the town, he sent back the deputies, 
 with thanks for their proffer, resolving to have 
 the walls and gates watched with great care. 
 To that end he disposed- his men along the 
 works, not at a certain distance, as usual, but 
 in one continued rank, so as to touch each 
 other, and completely invest the town. He 
 ordered -the military tribunes, and oflicers of 
 the cavalry, to patrol about the works, and not 
 only be on their guard against sallies, but even 
 take care to prevent the escape of particular 
 persons. And indeed so alert and vigilant 
 were our soldiers, that not a man closed his 
 eyes that night ; each expecting the event with 
 impatience, and carrying his thoughts from 
 one thing to another : what would be the fate 
 of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of 
 Lentulus, and the other illustrious persons in 
 the place : in fine, what was like to be the issue 
 of so complicated a scene. 
 
 XXI. About the fourth watch of the night, 
 Lentulus Spinther called from the wall to the 
 guard, and desired to be conducted to Csesar. 
 His request being granted, he came out of 
 the town, attended by some of Domitius's 
 soldiers, who never left him till they had, con- 
 ducted him intcWCaesar's presence. " He begged 
 him to spare his life, and pardon the injuries he 
 had done him, in consideration of their former 
 friendship. He owned the many obligations 
 he had laid him under, in procuring him an 
 admission into the college of priests, obtaining 
 for him the government of Spain, after the ex- 
 piration of the pretorship, and supporting him 
 in the demand of the consulship." Csesar in- 
 terrupted him by saying : "That he was not 
 come out of the bounds of his province, with 
 an intent to injure any body ; but to repel the 
 
COMMENTARIES 
 
 221 
 
 injuries done him by iiis enemies ; to revenge 
 the wrongs of the tribunes ; and to restore to 
 tlie Roman people, who were oppressed by a 
 small faction of the nobles, their liberties and 
 privileges.'' Lentulus, encouraged by this 
 speech, asked leave to return into the town, 
 " where, he said, the assurances he had ob- 
 tained of his own safety, would contribute not 
 a little to the consolation of others, some of 
 whom were so terrified, that they were ready 
 to take desperate resolutions," Leave being 
 granted, he departed for the tovi'n. 
 
 XXII. As soon as it was light, CsBsar order- 
 ed before him all the senators, senators' sons, 
 military tribunes, and Roman knights. There 
 were of senatorian rank, L. Domitius, P. 
 Lentulus Spinther L. Vibullius Rufus, ?extus 
 Quintilius Varus, questor, L. Rubrius ; also 
 Domitius's son, and many young men of 
 quality, with a great number of Roman knights, 
 and some decurions, or senators of the neigh- 
 bouring municipal towns, who had been nent 
 for b}' Domitius. As soon as they appeared, 
 he gave .order to secure them from the insults 
 of the soldiery ; and, addre.'-sing them in a few 
 words, remonstrated : " 1 hat they had made a 
 very ill requital for the many signal services 
 received at his hands." After which, he set 
 them at liberty. He likewise restored to Domi- 
 tius six millions of sesterces, which that gene- 
 ral had brought with him to Corfinium, and 
 deposited in the hands of the two treasurers of 
 the town, who surrendered it to Cssar. As 
 this was public money, assigned by Pompey to 
 pay the forces with, Caesar might justly have 
 seized it; but he was willing to show himself 
 generous, as well as merciful. He ordered 
 Domitius's soldiers to take the usual oath to 
 him, decamped that ver}' day ; made the ordi- 
 nary march ; and after staying in all seven days 
 before Corfinium, arrived in Apulia, through 
 the territories of the A'larrucini, Frentani, and 
 Larinates. 
 
 XXHL Pompe}% having intelligence of 
 what passed at Corfinium, retreated from Lu- 
 ceria, to Canusium, and from thence to Brun- 
 dusium. He ordered all the new levies to 
 join him, armed the shepherds and slaves, fur- 
 nished them with horses, and formed a body 
 of about three hundred cavalry. Meanwhile 
 the pretor L, Manlius flying from Alba, with 
 six cohorts; and the pretor Rutilus liupus, 
 from Tarracina, with three ; saw Cesar's cav- 
 alry at a distance, commanded by Bivius Cu- 
 20 
 
 rius : upon which, the soldiers immediately 
 abandoned the two pretors, and joined the 
 troops under the conduct of Curius. Several 
 other parties, flying different ways, fell in, some 
 with the foot, others with the horse. Cn- 
 Magius of Cremona, Pompey's chief engineer, 
 being taken on his way to Brundusium, was 
 brought to Caesar, who sent him back to Pom- 
 pey with this message : " That as he had not 
 yet obtained an interview, his design was to 
 come to Brundusium, there to confer with him 
 in relation to the common safety ; because they 
 soon would be able to despatch, in a personal 
 treaty, what, if managed by the intervention of 
 others, could not be hindered from running 
 into a tedious negotiation." 
 
 XXIV. Having di&missed him with these 
 instructions, he arrived before Brundusium 
 with six legions, three of which were composed 
 of veteran soldiers, and the rest of new levies 
 drawn together upon his march ; for as to Do- 
 mitius's troops, he had sent them directly from 
 Corfinium to Sicily. He found the consuls 
 were gone to Dyrrhachium with great part of 
 the army, and that Pompey remained in Brun- 
 dusium with twenty cohorts. Nor was it cer- 
 tainly known whether he continued there with 
 design to keep possession of Brundusium, that 
 he might be master of the whole Adriatic Sea, 
 the extreme parts of Italy, and the country 
 of Greece, in order to make war on both 
 sides the gulf; or for want of shipping to trans- 
 port his men. Fearing, therefore, that it was 
 his intention to keep footing in Italy, he re- 
 solved to deprive him of the advantages he 
 might receive from the port of Brundusium. 
 The works he contrived for this purpose were 
 as follows: He carried on a mole on either 
 side the mouth of the haven where the entrance 
 was narrowest, and the water shallow. But as 
 this work could not be carried quite across the 
 port, by reason of the great depth of the sea, 
 he prepared double floats of timber, thirty feet 
 square, which were each secured by four 
 anchors from the four corners, to enable them 
 to resist the fury of the waves. These, extend- 
 ing all the way between the two moles, were 
 covered over with earth and fascines, that the 
 soldiers might pass and repass with ease, and 
 have firm footing to defend thern. The front 
 and sides were armed with a parapet of hur- 
 dles, and every fourth float had a tower of two 
 stories, the better to guard the work from fire 
 and the shocks of the vessels. 
 
222 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 XXV. Against these preparations, Pom- 
 pey made use of several large ships which he 
 found in the port of Brundusium : and having 
 fitted them with towers of three stories, which 
 he filled with a great number of engines and 
 darts, let them loose upon Cssar's floats, to 
 break through the staccado, and interrupt the 
 works. Thus daily skirmishes happened with 
 darts, arrows, and slings, at a distance. Amidst 
 these hostilities, Csesar's thoughts were still 
 bent upon peace ; and though be could not 
 but wonder that Magius, whom he had sent 
 with proposals to Pompey, was not yet re- 
 turned with an answer ; and even saw his de- 
 signs and undertakings retarded by his fre- 
 quent offers of this kind ; he nevertheless still 
 persevered in these peaceful resolutions. Ac- 
 cordingly, he despatched Caninius Rebilus, 
 one of his lieutenants, a relation and intimate 
 friend of Scribonius Libo, to confer with him 
 on this subject. He charged him to exhort 
 that nobleman to think seriously of peace, and, 
 if possible, procure an interview between him 
 and Pompey. Could this be effected, he 
 showed there was the greatest ground to be- 
 lieve that peace would soon be concluded on 
 reasonable terms ; the honour and reputation of 
 which would in a manner wholly redound to 
 Libo, if, by his mediation, both parties should 
 be prevailed with to lay down their arms. 
 Libo, after conferring with Caninius, waited 
 on Pompey ; soon after he returned with this 
 answer ; that the consuls were absent, without 
 whom Pompey had no power to treat of an ac- 
 commodation. Thus Ca;sar having often tried 
 in vain to bring about a peace, thought it now 
 time to drop that design, and bend all his 
 thoughts to war. 
 
 XXVI. Cajsar having spent nine days 
 about his works, had now half finished the 
 staccado, when the ships employed in the first 
 embarkation, being sent back by the consuls 
 from Dyrrhachium, returned to Brundusium. 
 Pompey, either alarmed at Csesar's works, or 
 because from the first he had determined to 
 relinquish Italy, no sooner saw the transports 
 arrive, than he prepared to carry over the rest 
 of his forces. And the better to secure himself 
 against Ctesar, and prevent his troops from 
 breaking into the town during the embarka- 
 tion, he walled up the gates, barricaded the 
 streets, or cut ditches across them, filled with 
 pointed stakes, and covered with hurdles and 
 earth. The two streets which led to the port, 
 
 and which he left open for the passage ol hv«- 
 men, were fortified with a double palisado of 
 very strong well sharpened stakes. These 
 preparations being made, he ordered the 
 soldiers to embark with great silence, having 
 placed on the walls and towers some select 
 archers and slingers, who were to wait till all 
 the troops had got aboard, and then retire, 
 upon a signal given, to some small ships that 
 waited them at a convenient distance. 
 
 XXVII. The people of Brundusium, pro- 
 voked by the affronts they, had received from 
 Pompey, and the insults of his soldiers, wished 
 well to Csesar's cause ; and having notice of 
 Pompey's intended departure while the soldiers 
 were busied with the care of embarking, found 
 means to signify it from the tops of their 
 houses. Cfflsar, upon this intelligence, or- 
 dered scaling ladders to be prepared, and the 
 soldiers to repair to their arms, that he might 
 not lose any opportunity of acting. Pom- 
 p.ey weighed anchor a little before night, and 
 gave the signal for recalling the soldiers that 
 were upon the walls, who repaired with all 
 expedition to the ships prepared for them. 
 Meantime the scaling ladders are applied to 
 the walls, and Caesar's troops enter the town. 
 But being informed by the Brundusians of the 
 snares and ditches provided for them by the 
 enemy, they were obliged to take a great cir- 
 cuit, which gave Pompey time enough to put 
 to sea. Two transports only, impeded by Cas- 
 sar's mole, were taken with the troops on 
 board. 
 
 XXVIII. Though Cffisar was fully sensi- 
 ble, that to finish the war at a blow, he must 
 pass the sea immediately, and endeavour to 
 come up with Pompey, before he could draw 
 his transmarine forces together ; yet he dreaded 
 the delay and length of time that such a pro- 
 ject might require : because Pompey having 
 carried with him all the ships on the coast, 
 rendered the present execution of the design 
 impracticable. He must therefore wait the 
 arrival of ships from Picenum, Sicily, and the 
 remoter coasts of Gaul, which was a tedious 
 business, and, at that season of the j'ear, 
 subject to great uncertainty. It appeared 
 likewise of dangerous consequence, to suffer 
 a veteran army, and the two Spains, one of 
 which was wholly devoted to Pompey, to 
 strengthen themselves in his rival's interest ; 
 to let them grow powerful by levies of horse 
 and foot, and leave Gaul and Italy open to 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 223 
 
 their attacks in his absence. He determined, 
 therefore, to lay aside, for the present, the 
 design of pursuing Pompey, and turn all his 
 houghts towards Spain. He ordered the 
 magistrates of the municipal towns to assem- 
 ble all the vessels they could, and send them 
 to Brundusium. He sent Valerius, one of 
 his lieutenants, into Sardinia, with one legion, 
 and the propretor Curio into Sicily with 
 three, ordering him, as soon as he had mas- 
 tered Sicily, to pass over with his army into 
 Africa. 
 
 XXIX. M. Cotta commanded in Sardinia; 
 M. Cato in Sicily ; and Africa had fallen by lot 
 to Tubero. The inhabitants of Cagliari, hear- 
 ing of Valerius's commission, of their own ac- 
 cord, before he had left Italy, drove Cotta out 
 of their city ; who terrified by the unanimous 
 opposition he met with from the province, fled 
 into Africa. In Sicily, Cato applied himself with 
 great diligence to the refitting of old ships, 
 and building of new. He sent his lieutenant 
 to raise forces in Lucania, and the country of 
 the Brutians, and ordered the states of Sicily to 
 furnish him with a certain number of horse 
 and foot. When these preparations were al- 
 most completed, being informed of Curio's 
 arrival, he called his chief officers together, 
 and complained, " That he was betrayed and 
 abandoned by Pompey, who, without any 
 previous preparation, had involved the com- 
 monwealth in an unnecessary war ; and upon 
 being questioned by himself and others in the 
 senate, had assured them, that he was abun- 
 dantly able to sustain it." Having thus de- 
 clared his mind, he quitted the province, which 
 by this means submitted without trouble to 
 Curio, as Sardinia had before done to 
 Valerius. Tubero arriving in Africa, found 
 Attius Varus in possession of that province, 
 who, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum, 
 as we have shown above, had fled into those 
 parts, and, with the consent of the natives, 
 taken upon him the command. Here he had 
 found means to levy tvro legions, by his 
 knowledge of the people and country, where 
 he had been governor some years before, 
 after the expiration of his pretorship. Tubero 
 coming before Utica with his fleet, was forbid 
 the harbour and town ; nor could he even ob- 
 tain leave for his son to land, though he had 
 a fit of sickness upon him, but was obliged to 
 weigh anchor and be gone. 
 
 that his troops might enjoy some repose, can. 
 toned them in the nearest towns, and set out 
 himself for Rome. There he assembled the 
 senate, and after complaining of the injuries of 
 his enemies, told them, " That he had never 
 aifected extraordinary honours, but waited 
 patiently the time prescribed by the laws, to 
 solicit for a second consulship, to which every 
 Roman citizen had a right to aspire : that the 
 people, with the concurrence of their tribunes, 
 (in spite of the attempts of his enemies, and 
 the vigorous opposition of Cato, who en- 
 deavoured, according to custom, to spin out 
 the time in speaking.) had permitted him to 
 stand candidate though absent, and that even 
 in the consulship of Pompey ; who, if he dis- 
 approved of the decree, why did he let it 
 pass "? But if he allowed it, why now oppose 
 the execution 1 He set before them his 
 moderation, in voluntarily proposing that both 
 parties should lay down their arms, by which 
 he must have been himself divested of his 
 government and command. He displayed the 
 malice of his enemies, who sought to impose 
 terms on him, to which they would not submit 
 themselves; and chose rather to involve the 
 state in a civil war than part with their armies 
 and provinces. He enlarged upon the injury 
 they had done him, in taking away two of his 
 legions, and their cruelty and insolence, in 
 violating the authority of the tribunes. He 
 spoke of his many offers of peace, his frequent 
 desire of an interview, and the continual re- 
 fusals he had received. For all these reasons, 
 he requested and conjured them to undertake 
 the administration of the republic, jointly with 
 him. But if they declined it through fear, he 
 had no intention to force so great a burden 
 upon them, and would take the whole charge 
 alone. That in the mean time it would be 
 proper to send a deputation to Pompey, to 
 treat of an accommodation : nor was he fright- 
 ed at the difficulty Pompey had started some 
 time before in the senate; that to send depu- 
 ties was to acknowledge the superiority of him 
 to whom they were sent, and a sign of timidi- 
 ty in the sender. That this was a little low 
 way of thinking; and that, in the same man- 
 ner as he had endeavoured at a superiority in 
 action, he would also strive to be superior in 
 justice and equity." 
 
 XXXI. The senate liked the proposal of 
 a deputation to Pompey; "but the great 
 
 XXX. These affairs despatched, Caesar, | difficulty was, to find deputies ; every one, out 
 
224 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 of fear, refusing to charge himself with that 
 commission. For Pompey, at his departure 
 from Rome, had declared in the senate, 
 " That he would esteem those who stayed be- 
 hind, as no less guilty than those in Ccesar's 
 camp." Thus three days were spent in de- 
 hates and excuses. The tribune L. Metellus 
 had likewise been suborned by Csesar's ene- 
 mies to traverse his design, and hinder what- 
 ever he should propose. Which Cssar 
 coming to understand, and that he only 
 wasted his time to no purpose ; he set out 
 from Rome, without effecting what he intend- 
 ed, and arrived in farther Gaul. 
 
 XXXII. Here he was informed, that 
 Pompey had sent into Spain Vibullius Rufus, 
 the same who, a few days before, had been 
 made prisoner at Corfinium, and set at libertjr^ 
 by Caesar ; that Domitius was gone to take 
 possession of Marseilles, with seven galleys, 
 which he had fitted out at Igilfum and 
 Cosanum, and manned with his slaves, freed- 
 men, and labourers ; that the deputies of the 
 above-mentioned state, young men of the first 
 quality, Twhom Pompey, at his departure from 
 Rome, had exhorted not to suffer the memory 
 of his past services to their country to be 
 blotted out by those lately received from 
 Ceesar,) had been sent before, to prepare the 
 way for his reception. In consequence of 
 their remonstrances, the inhabitants of Mar- 
 seilles shut their gates against Csesar, and 
 summoned to their assistance the Albici, a 
 barbarous people, who had long been under 
 their protection, and inhabited the adjoining 
 mountains. They brought provisions from 
 the neighbouring country and castles, re- 
 fitted their navy, and repaired their walls and 
 gates. 
 
 XXXIII. Caesar sending for fifteen of the 
 principal men of the city, exhorted them not 
 to be the first to begin the war, but to be swayed 
 rather by the authority of all Italy, than the 
 will of one particular person. He forgot not 
 such other considerations as seemed most 
 likely to bring them to reason. The deputies 
 returning into the town, brought back this 
 answer from the senate : " That they saw the 
 Romans divided into two parties, and it did 
 not belong to them to decide such a quarrel : 
 that at the head of these parties were Pom- 
 pey and Csesar, both patrons of their city, the 
 one having added to it the country of the 
 Volcae Arecomici anc! I? ilvians ; the other 
 
 after the reduction of Gaul, considerably aug- 
 mented its territories and revenues; that as 
 they were therefore equally indebted to both, 
 it became them not to aid the one against the 
 other ; but to remain neuter, and grant 
 neither an admittance into their city nor 
 port." 
 
 XXXIV. Whilst these things were in 
 agitation, Domitius arrived at Marseilles with 
 his fleet, and being received into the town, 
 was appointed governor, and charged with 
 the whole administration of the war. By his 
 order, they sent out their fleet to cruise round 
 the coasts ; seized and brought in all the 
 merchant vessels they could find, and made 
 use of the nails, rigging, and timber of such 
 as were unfit for service, to repair the rest. 
 They deposited in public granaries all the 
 corn that was to be found in the city, and se- 
 cured whatever else they thought might be 
 serviceable to them in case of a siege. Caesar, 
 provoked at these preparations, brought three 
 legions before the town, began to erect towers 
 and galleries, and gave orders for building 
 twelve galleys at Aries, which being finished, 
 launched, and brought to Marseilles, within 
 thirty days from the cutting of the wood they 
 were composed of, he put them under the 
 command of D. Brutus, and having directed 
 the manner of the siege, left the care of it to 
 C. Trebonius, his lieutenant. 
 
 XXXV. During these orders and prepara- 
 tions, he sent C. Fabius before him into 
 Spain, with three legions that had wintered 
 about Narbonne, charging him to secure with 
 all diligence the passage of the Pyrenean 
 Mountains, which was at that time guarded 
 by a party of Afranius's army. His other 
 legions, whose quarters were more remote, had 
 orders to follow as fast as they could. Fabius, 
 according to his instructions, having made 
 great despatch, forced the passes of the 
 Pyrenees, and by long marches came up with 
 Afranius's army. 
 
 XXXVI. Pompey had then three lieuten- 
 ants in Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro. 
 The first of these was at the head of three le- 
 gions, and governed the nearer Spain. The 
 other two had each two legions, and comman- 
 ded, the one from the Castilian Forest to the 
 Anas ; the other from the Anas, quite through 
 Lusitania, and the territories of the Vettones. 
 These three lieutenants, upon the arrival of 
 Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 225 
 
 Spain, as we have seen above, consulted to- 
 gether, and agreed, that Petreius should join 
 Afranius with his two legions, and that Var- 
 ro should stay and secure farther Spain. These 
 resolutions being taken, Petreius levied horse 
 and foot in Lusitania, and Afranius in Celti- 
 beria, and the barbarous nations bordering 
 upon the ocean. When the levies were com- 
 pleted, Petreius speedily joined Afranius, 
 through the territories of the Vettones ; and 
 both resolved to make Lerida the seat of the 
 war, because the country lay convenient for 
 their purpose. 
 
 XXXVII. We have already observed that 
 Afranius had three legions, and Petreius two. 
 Besides these, there were about eighty cohorts, 
 some light, some heavy armed, and five thou- 
 sand horse, raised in both provinces. C-esar 
 had sent his legions before him into Spain, 
 with six thousand auxiliary foot, and three 
 thousand horse, who had served under him in 
 all his former wars, and he was furnished with 
 the like number from Gaul, all chosen troops. 
 For hearing thatPompey was coming with his 
 whole force through Mauritania into Spain, he 
 sent circular letters to all the Gallic states, in- 
 viting by name those of the most known and 
 approved valour, and in particular a select 
 body of mountaineers from Aquitain, where it 
 borders upon the Roman province. At the 
 same time he borrowed money from the mili- 
 tary tribunes and centurions, which he distri- 
 buted among the soldiers. This policy was 
 attended with two great advantages : it bound 
 the officers to him by the obligation of interest, 
 and the soldiers by the tie of gratitude. 
 
 XXXVII. Fabius, by letters and messen- 
 gers, endeavoured to sound the disposition of 
 the neighbouring states. He had laid two 
 bridges over the Sicoris, four miles distant 
 from each other, for the convenience of forag- 
 ing, having consumed all the pasture on this 
 side the river. Pompey's generals did the 
 same, with much the like view, which occa- 
 sioned frequent skirmishes between the horse. 
 Two of Fabius's legions, which was the ordi- 
 nary guard of the foragers, passing one day ac- 
 cording to custom, and the cavalry and car- 
 riages following, the bridge broke down on a 
 sudden, by the violence of the winds and 
 floods, and separated them from the rest of the 
 army. Afranius and Petreius perceiving it, by 
 the fascines and hurdles that came down with 
 the stream ; detached immediately four le- 
 20* 
 
 gions, with all their cavalry, over the bridge 
 that lay between the town and their camp, and 
 marched to attack Fabius's legions. Upon 
 this L. Plancus, who commanded the escort, 
 finding himself hard pressed, seizing a rising 
 ground, and forming his men into two divi- 
 sions, posted them back to back, that he 
 might not be surrounded by the enemy's 
 horse. By this disposition, though inferior in 
 number, he was enabled to sustain the furious 
 charge of their legions and cavalry. During 
 the course of the battle, the ensigns of two le- 
 gions were perceived at a distance, which 
 Fabius had sent by the farther bridge to sus- 
 tain his party, suspecting what might happen, 
 and that Pompey's generals might seize the 
 opportunity offered them by fortune, to fall 
 upon our men. Their arrival put an end to 
 the engagement, and both parties returned 
 to their respective camps. 
 
 XXXIX. Two days after, Cassar arrived 
 in the camp with nine hundred horse, which 
 he had kept for a body guard. He began by 
 re-establishing in the night the bridge which 
 had been broken down, and was not j^et quite 
 repaired. Next day he took a view of the 
 country, and leaving six cohorts to guard the 
 bridge, the camp, and the baggage, marched 
 with all his forces in three lines to Lerida, and 
 stopped near Afranius's camp, where he re- 
 mained some time under arms, and offered him 
 battle on an even ground. Afranius drew out 
 his troops, and formed them before his camp, 
 half way down the hill. Cnesar, finding thai 
 he declined an engagement, resolved to encamp 
 within four hundred paces of the foot of the 
 mountain ; and to hinder his troops from being 
 alarmed or interrupted in their works, by sud- 
 den incursions from the enemy, ordered them 
 not to throw up a rampart, which must have 
 appeared and betrayed them at a distance, but 
 to cut a ditch in front, fifteen feet broad. The 
 first and second lines continued in order of 
 battle, as had been resolved from the beginning, 
 and the third carried on the work behind them 
 unperceived. Thus the whole was completed, 
 before Afranius had the least suspicion of his 
 design to encamp there. 
 
 XL. In the evening Csesar retreated with 
 his legions behind the ditch, and passed the 
 whole night under arms. Next day he car- 
 ried the intrenchment quite round his camp, 
 and because materials for a rampart must have 
 been fetched from a great distance, he con 
 2 G 
 
226 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 tented himself for the present with a naked 
 ditch, as the day before, allotting a legion to 
 each side of the camp, and keeping the rest of 
 the troops under arms, to cover those that 
 worked. Afranius and Petreius, to alarm our 
 men and disturb the works, advanced with their 
 troops to the foot of the mountain, and threat- 
 ened to give battle. But Caesar, trusting to 
 the three legions under arms, and the defence 
 of the ditch, still persisted in his design. At 
 last, after a short stay, and without daring to 
 come forward into the plain, they retreated 
 again to their camp. The third day, Caesar 
 added a rampart to his camp, and brought into 
 it the six cohorts, with the baggage which he 
 had left in his former camp. 
 
 XLI. Between the city of Lerida, and the 
 hill where Petreius and Afranius were en- 
 camped, was a plain of about three hundred 
 paces, in the midst of which was a rising 
 ground, which Csesar wanted to take possession 
 of; because, by that means, he could cut off the 
 enemy's communication with the town and 
 bridge, and render the magazines they had in 
 the town useless. In this hope, he drew out 
 three legions, and having formed them in or- 
 der of battle, commanded the first ranks of one 
 of them to run before, and gain the place. Afra- 
 nius perceiving his design, despatched the co- 
 horts that were upon guard before the camp, 
 a nearer way to the same eminence. The 
 contest was sharply maintained on both sides : 
 but x\franius's party, who first got possession 
 of the post, obliged our men to give ground, 
 and being reinforced by fresh supplies, put 
 them at last to rout, and forced theni to fly for 
 shelter to the legions. 
 
 XLII. The manner of fighting of Afranius's 
 soldiers was, to come forward briskly against 
 an enemy, and boldly take possession of some 
 post, neither taking care to keep their ranks, 
 nor holding it necessary to fight in a close com- 
 pact body. If they found themselves hard 
 pushed, they thought it no dishonour to retire 
 and quit their posts, following in this the custom 
 of the Lusitanians, and other barbarous nations, 
 as it almost always happens, that soldiers give 
 in to the manners of the country where they 
 have long been used to make war. This man- 
 ner of fighting, however, as it was new and 
 unexpected, disordered our men, who seeing 
 the enemy come forward, without regard to 
 their ranks, were apprehensive of being sur- 
 rounded, and yet not think themselves at 
 
 liberty to break their ranks, or abandon their 
 ensigns, or quit their post, without some very 
 urgent cause. The first ranks therefore being 
 put into disorder, the legion in that wing 
 gave ground, and retired to a neighbouring 
 hill. 
 
 XLIII. Caesar, contrary to his expectation, 
 finding the consternation like to spread through 
 the whole army, encouraged his men, and led 
 the ninth legion to their assistance. He soon 
 put a stop to the vigorous and insulting pur- 
 suit of the enemy, obliged them to turn their 
 backs, and pushed them to the very walls of 
 Lerida. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, 
 elated with success, and eager to repair the 
 loss we had sustained, followed the runaways 
 with so much heat that they were drawn into 
 a place of disadvantage, and found themselves 
 directly under the hill where the town stood, 
 whence when they endeavoured to retire, the 
 enemy again facing about, charged vigorously 
 from the higher ground. The hill was rough, 
 and steep on each side, extending only so far 
 in breadth as was sufficient for drawing up 
 three cohorts; but they could neither be rein- 
 forced in flank, nor sustained by the cavalry. 
 The descent from the town was indeed some- 
 thing easier for about four hundred paces, 
 which furnished our men with the means of 
 extricating themselves from the danger into 
 which their rashness had brought them. Here 
 they bravely maintained the fight, though 
 with great disadvantage to themselves, as well 
 on account of the narrowness of the place, as 
 because being posted at the fool of the hill, 
 none of the enemy's darts fell in vain. Still 
 however they supported themselves by their 
 courage and patience, and were not disheart- 
 ened by the many wounds they received. The 
 enemy's forces increased every moment, fresh 
 cohorts being sent from the camp through the 
 town, who succeeded in the place of those 
 that were fatigued. Caesar was likewise 
 obliged to despatch small parties to maintain the 
 battle, and bring off such as were wounded. 
 
 XLIV. The fight had now lasted five hours 
 without intermission, when our men, oppressed 
 by the multitude of the enemy, and having 
 spent all their darts, attacked the mountain 
 sword in hand, and overthrowing such as op- 
 posed them, obliged the rest to betake them- 
 selves to flight. The pursuit was continued tc 
 the very walls of Lerida, and some out of feai 
 took shelter in the town, which gave our men 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 227 
 
 an opportunity of making good their retreat. 
 At the same time the cavalry, though posted 
 disadvantageously in a bottom, found means 
 by their valour to gain the summit of the moun- 
 tain, and riding between both armies, hindered 
 the enemy from harassing our rear. Thus 
 the engagement was attended with various 
 turns of fortune. Caesar lost about seventy 
 men in the first encounter, among whom was 
 Q. Fulginius, first centurion of the Hastati of 
 the fourteenth legion, who had raised himself 
 by his valour to that rank, through all the in- 
 ferior orders. Upwards of six hundred were 
 wounded. On Afranius's side was slain T. 
 Caecilius, first centurion of a legion ; also four 
 centurions of inferior degree, and above two 
 hundred private men. 
 
 XLV. Yet such were the circumstances of 
 this day's action, that both sides laid claim to 
 the victory ; the Afranians, because, though 
 allowed to be inferior in number, they had long 
 sustained our attack, kept possession of the 
 eminence which occasioned the dispute, and 
 obliged our men at first to give ground : 
 Caesar's troops, because they had maintained 
 a fight of five hours, with a handful of men, 
 and in a very disadvantageous post; because 
 they had attacked the mountain sword in 
 hand, because they had driven their adversa- 
 ries from the higher ground, and compelled 
 them to take shelter in the town. Meantime 
 Afranius fortified the hillock which had been 
 the subject of dispute, with a great number 
 of works, and posted there a large body of 
 troops. 
 
 XLVI. Two days after, a very unfortunate 
 accident happened. For so great a storm 
 arose, that the water was never known to be 
 higher in those parts ; and the snow came 
 down in such quantities from all the mountains 
 round about, that the river overflowed its 
 banks, and in one day broke down both the 
 bridges Fabius had built over it. Caesar's 
 army was reduced to great extremilies on 
 this occasion. For his camp, as we have be- 
 fore observed, was between the Sicoris and 
 Cinga, two rivers that were neither of them 
 fordable, and necessarily shut him up with- 
 in the space of no more than thirty miles. By 
 this means, neither could the states that had 
 declared for him supply him with provisions, 
 nor the troops that had been sent beyond the 
 rivers to forage, return, nor the large convoys 
 he expected from Gaul and Italy get to his 
 
 camp. Add to all this, that it being near the 
 time of harvest, corn was extremely scarce : , 
 and the more, as before Caesar's arrival, \ 
 Afranius had carried great quantities of it to 
 Lerida ; and the rest had been consumed by 
 Caesar's troops. The cattle, which was the 
 next resource in the present scarcity, had been 
 removed to places of security, on the breaking 
 out of the war. The parties sent out to forage 
 and bring in corn, were perpetually harassed 
 by the Spanish infantr}', who being well ac- 
 quainted with the country, pursued them every 
 where. The rivers themselves did not im- 
 pede them, because they were accustomed to 
 pass them on blown-up skins, which they al. 
 ways brought with them into the field. Afran- 
 ius, on the contrary, abounded in all things. 
 He had large magazines of corn already laid 
 up, was continually receiving fresh supplies 
 from the province, and had plenty of forage. 
 The bridge of Lerida furnished all these con- 
 veniences without danger, and opened a free 
 communication with the country beyond the 
 river, from which Caesar was wholly excluded. 
 
 XLVII. The waters continued several 
 days. Cassar endeavoured to re-establish his 
 bridges, but could not get the better of the 
 obstacles occasioned by the swelling of the 
 river, and the enemy's forces stationed on the 
 opposite bank. They found it the easier to 
 prevent his design, as the river was deep and 
 rapid, and they could discharge their darts all . 
 along the bank, on that particular spot where 
 our men were at work : whereas it was ex- 
 tremely difficult on our side to struggle with 
 the force of the stream, and, at the same time, 
 guard ourselves against the assaults of the 
 enemy. 
 
 XL VIII. Meanwhile Afranius was inform- 
 ed that a large convoy, which was on its way 
 to join Caesar, had been obliged to halt at the 
 river side. It consisted of archers from Ro. 
 vergue, Gaulish horse, vs'ith many carts and 
 much baggage, according to the custom of 
 the Gauls, and about six thousand men of 
 all sorts, with their domestics and slaves ; but 
 without discipline or commander, every one 
 following his own choice, and all marching in 
 perfect security, as if they had nothing more to 
 apprehend than in former times. There were 
 likewise many young gentlemen of quality, 
 senators' sons, and Roman knights, with the 
 deputies of the states of Gaul, and some of 
 Caesar's lieutenants ; who were all sto,oped 
 
228 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 short by the river. Afranius set out in the 
 night, with three legions, and all his cavalry ; 
 and sending the horse before, attacked them 
 when they least expected it. The Gaulish 
 squadrons, forming with great expedition, be- 
 gan the fight. While the contest was upon 
 equal terms, the Gauls, though few in number, 
 bore up against the vast multitude of the ene- 
 my; but seeing the legions advance, and hav- 
 ing lost some of their men, they retreated to 
 the neighbouring mountains. This delay 
 saved the convoy ; for during the skirmish, 
 the rest of the troops gained the higher 
 ground. We lost that day about two hundred 
 archers, a few troopers, and some servants and 
 baggage. 
 
 XLIX. All this served to enhance the 
 price of provisions, a calamity inseparable 
 from present scarcity, and the prospect of fu- 
 ture want. Corn was already at fifty denarii 
 a bushel, the soldiers began to lose their 
 strength, and the evil increased every moment. 
 Nay, so great was the change produced in a 
 few days, and such the alteration of fortune, 
 that while our men were in the utmost want 
 of all kind of necessaries, the enemy had 
 plenty of every thing, and were accounted vic- 
 torious. Csesar left nothing untried to remove 
 the present scarcity : he dismissed all the use- 
 less mouths, and applied to the states that had 
 declared for him, desiring them to send him 
 cattle where they wanted corn, 
 
 L. These things were greatly exaggerated 
 by Afranius, Petreius, and their friends, in 
 the letters they sent, upon this occasion, to 
 Rome. Nor was fame backward in adding 
 to the account; insomuch that the war ap- 
 peared to be almost at an end. These cou- 
 riers and letters having reached Home, there 
 was a great concourse of people at Afranius's 
 house, many congratulations passed, and mul- 
 titudes of the nobility flocked out of Italy to 
 Pompey ; some to carry the first accounts of 
 this grateful news ; others, that they might 
 not be so late as to subject them to the re- 
 proach of having waited for the event of 
 things. 
 
 LI. Affairs being in this extremity, and all 
 the passes guarded by Afranius's parties, with- 
 out a possibility of repairing the bridges ; Cae. 
 sar ordered the soldiers to build some light 
 boats, in imitation of those he had formerly 
 Been in Britain, whose keel and ribs were of 
 wood, and the rest of wicker, covered with 
 
 leather. When he had got a sufficient num. 
 ber, he sent them by night in wagons, twen- 
 ty-two miles off" from his camp. In these he 
 embarked a good number of soldiers, and sent 
 them over the river; took possession unex. 
 pectedly of a hill adjoining to the bank on 
 the other side ; threw up a fortification be- 
 fore the enemy thought of hindering him; 
 posted a legion in this fortification ; and then 
 threw a bridge over the Sicoris in two days. 
 By this means he recovered his foragers, se 
 cured the convoy, and opened a passage foi 
 future supplies. The same day he detached 
 a great part of his cavalry over the river ■ 
 who, falling unexpectedly upon the enemy's 
 foragers, dispersed up and down, without a 
 suspicion of danger, made a considerable cap- 
 ture of men and horses ; and observing some 
 Spanish cohorts on the march to their assist- 
 ance, skilfully divided themselves into two 
 bodies ; one to secure the booty ; the other, 
 to receive and return the enemy's charge. 
 One of their cohorts, which had rashly sep- 
 arated from the rest, and advanced too far be. 
 fore the main body, was surrounded and cut 
 to pieces by our men, who returned over the 
 same bridge to the camp, without loss, and en- 
 riched with a considerable booty. 
 
 LII. Whilst these things passed at Lerida, 
 the people of Marseilles, by the advice of L. 
 Domitius, equipped seventeen galleys, eleven 
 of which were covered. To these they added 
 a multitude of smaller vessels, that they might 
 strike a terror into our fleet by their very num. 
 ber; and manned them with archers, and the 
 mountaineers we have already mentioned, 
 whom they encouraged to perform their part 
 by great rewards and promises. Domitius de- 
 sired some of these ships, and filled them with 
 the shepherds and labourers he had brought 
 thither with him. Thus furnished and equip, 
 ped, they sailed with great confidence, in quest 
 of our fleet, which was commanded by Deci- 
 mus Brutus, and rode at anchor at an island 
 over against Marseilles. Brutus was much in- 
 ferior to the enemy in number of ships ; but 
 Csesar had manned them with his best sol- 
 diers, chosen out of all the legions, and head- 
 ed by centurions of distinguished bravery, who 
 had petitioned him for this service. These had 
 provided themselves with hooks and grappling, 
 irons, and a great number of darts, javelins, and 
 offensive weapons of all sorts. Thus prepared, 
 upon nolc'os of the enemy's arrival, they stood 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 229 
 
 out to sea, and attacked their fleet. The con- 
 flict was sharp and vigorous. For the moun- 
 taineers, a hardy race, habituated to arms, and 
 trained up in war, scarce yielded to the Ro- 
 mans in bravery ; and, having but just parted 
 from Marseilles, still retained a lively sense of 
 the promises so lately made them. The shep- 
 herds too, animated by the hopes of liberty, and 
 fighting under the eye of their master, did 
 wonders to merit his approbation. The 
 townsmen themselves, confiding in the nim- 
 bleness of their ships, and the skill of their pi- 
 lots, eluded the shocks of our vessels, and baf- 
 fled all their attempts. As they had abundance 
 of sea-room, they extended their line of bat- 
 tle, in order to surround our fleet, or attack 
 our ships singly with a number of theirs, or in 
 running along-side, sweep away a range of 
 oars. If they were compelled to come to a 
 closer engagement, setting aside the skill and 
 address of their pilots, they relied wholly on 
 the bravery of their mountaineers. Our men 
 were but indifierently provided with rowers 
 and pilots, who had been hastily taken out of 
 some merchant ships, and knew not so much 
 as the names of the tackle. They were incom- 
 moded too by the weight and lumpishness of 
 their vessels, which being built in haste, of 
 unseasoned timber, were not so ready at tack- 
 ing about. But when an opportunity offered of 
 coming to close fight, they would boldly get 
 between two of the enemy's ships ; and grap- 
 pling them with their hooks, charge them on 
 each side, board them, and cut to pieces the 
 mountaineers and shepherds that defend them. 
 In this manner they sunk part of their vessels, 
 took some with all the men on board, and 
 drove the rest into the haven. In this engage- 
 ment, the enemy had nine galleys sunk or 
 taken. 
 
 LIII. The report of this battle reaching 
 Lerida, and Caesar having finished his bridge 
 over the Sicoris, affairs soon began to put on 
 a new face. The enemy dreading the courage 
 of 0!ir horse, durst not disperse about the 
 country as formerly ; but either foraged in the 
 neighbourhood of the camp, that they might 
 the sooner make good their retreat ; or, by a 
 long circuit, endeavoured to avoid our parties : 
 and upon receiving any check, or even des- 
 crying our cavalry at a distance, they would 
 throw down their trusses, and fly. At last, 
 they were reduced to omit foraging several 
 days together, and resolved to pursue it 
 
 only by night, contrary to the general custom 
 of war. 
 
 LIV. In the mean time the Oscenses and 
 Calagurritani jointly sent deputies to Csesar, 
 with an offer of their submission and services. 
 The Tarraconenses, Jacitani, and Ausetani, 
 and not many days after, the Illurgavonenses, 
 who inhabit along the banks of the Iberus, 
 followed their example. He only required 
 them to supply him with corn, to which they 
 readily agreed ; and having got together a 
 great number of carriage.horses, brought it to 
 his camp. A cohort of the Illurgavonenses, 
 hearing of the resolution taken by their state, 
 deserted from the enemy, and came over to 
 Cajsar's camp. The change was sudden and 
 great ; for, the bridge being finished, provisions 
 secured, this rumour of Pompey's march 
 through Mauritania extinguished, and five con- 
 siderable states having declared in his favour; 
 a great number of distant provinces renounced 
 their engagements with Afranius, and entered 
 into new ones with Csesar. 
 
 LV. These things having struck a terror into 
 the enemy ; that he might not be always 
 obliged to send his cavalry so far about to fo. 
 rage, the bridges lying about seven miles from 
 his camp, he bethought himself of draining the 
 river, by turning some of its water into canals 
 thirty feet deep, so as to make it fordable. 
 The work being almost completed, Petreius 
 and Afranius grew extremely apprehensive 
 of being entirely cut off" from their provisions 
 and forage, because Csesar was very strong in 
 cavalry. They therefore thought proper to quit 
 a post that was no longer tenable, and to carry 
 the war into Celtiberia. What contributed still 
 further to confirm them in this resolution was, 
 that of the two contrary parties, concerned in 
 the late war, those who had declared for Sertori- 
 us, still trembled at the name of the conqueror, 
 and dreaded his power, though absent ; and 
 those who had attached themselves to Pom- 
 pey, continued to love him for the many ser- 
 vices he had done them : but Caesar's name was 
 hardly known among these barbarians. Here 
 they expected considerable reinforcements of 
 horse and foot ; and doubted not, by taking 
 the advantage of places, to be able to protract 
 the war till winter. In order to execute this 
 plan, they collected all the boats to be found 
 on the Iberu^, and ordered them to be brought 
 to Octogesa, a city on that river, about twenty 
 miles from their camp. Here they commanded 
 
230 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 a bridge of boats to be built ; and, having 
 sent two legions over the Sicoris, fortified 
 oheir camp with a rampart of twelve feet. 
 
 LVI. Csesar, having notice of this by his 
 scouts, laboured day and night at his drains 
 with the utmost diligence ; and had already so 
 far diminished the water of the Sicoris, that 
 the cavalry could, with some difficulty, pass, 
 over : but it took the infantry as high as the 
 shoulders, who had therefore both the depth 
 of the river and the rapidity of the stream to 
 struggle with. Meanwhile it was known, that 
 the bridge over the Iberus was almost finish- 
 ed, and Ciesar's ford in great forwardness. 
 This was a fresh motive to the enemy to quick- 
 en their march : wherefore, leaving two aux- 
 iliary cohorts, for a garrison, at Lerida, they 
 crossed the Sicoris with all their forces, and 
 joined the two legions they had sent over be- 
 fore. CiEsar had now no other remedy left 
 but to harass and fatigue them with his cav- 
 alry : for if he went with his whole army over 
 his bridge, he lengthened his march prodi- 
 giously, and gave Afranius time enough to get 
 to the Iberus, Accordingly the horse having 
 forded the river, came up with Petreius and 
 A.franius's rear, who had decamped about mid- 
 night : and making a motion to surround 
 them, began to stop and retard their march. 
 
 LVII. At day-break we discovered from 
 the hills near the camp, that the enemy's rear 
 was greatly harassed by our cavalry. Some- 
 times they obliged them to halt, and disor- 
 dered their ranks: at other times, the enemy 
 facing about, charged with all their cohorts 
 at once, and forced our men to give ground ; 
 who, wheeling again as soon as they began to 
 march, failed not to renew the attack. At this 
 sight, the legionary soldiers, running up and 
 down the camp, complained that the enemy 
 would escape out of their hands, and the war 
 necessarily be prolonged. They addressed 
 themselves to the centurions and military tri- 
 bunes, and desired them to beg of Csesar not 
 to spare them ; that they feared neither dan- 
 ger nor fatigue, and were ready to pass the 
 river as the horse had done. Cassar, moved 
 by their alacrity and entreaties, though he saw 
 some danger in exposing his army to the ra- 
 pidity of a deep river, judged it yet proper to 
 attempt and make trial of the passage. Hav- 
 ing therefore withdrawn from every company 
 such as were weak of body^ or of less courage 
 than the rest ht left then: in the camf with 
 
 a legion, and all the baggage. The rest of 
 the army happily passed the river, by the as- 
 sistance of a double line of cavalry, placed 
 above and below them. Some of the infantry 
 were carried away by the violence of the cur- 
 rent ; but they were picked up and saved by 
 the horse below them ; so that ifo one man 
 was lost. Having passed the river without 
 loss, he drew up his army in order of battle, 
 and began to pursue the enemy in three lines : 
 and such was the ardour of the soldiers, that 
 notwithstanding the army was obliged to make 
 a circuit of six miles, notwithstanding the time 
 necessarily lost in crossing the river, they got 
 up at the ninth hour of the day to the enemy, 
 who had set out at midnight. 
 
 LVIII. When Afranius and Petreius per- 
 ceived them at some distance, being with rea- 
 son intimidated, they suspended their march, 
 baited on an eminence; and formed in order 
 of battle. Caesar would not hazard an action 
 with his troops, thus fatigued, and halted like- 
 wise in the plain. On this the enemy re. 
 sumed their march, and he the pursuit ; which 
 obliged them to encamp earlier than they de- 
 signed. Hard by was a range of mountains, 
 and about five miles farther, the ways were 
 difficult and narrow. The enemy retired 
 among these mouritains, to avoid the pursuit 
 of the cavalry ; and having placed parties in 
 all the passes, to stop Csesar's army, hoped, 
 by this means, to continue their march to the 
 Iberus, without fear or danger. This was 
 their great affair, and what before all things 
 they should have endeavoured to effect; but, 
 being fatigued by a long march, and their 
 continual skirmishes with Csesar's cavalry, 
 they deferred it till next day. Csesar like- 
 wise encamped on a hill that lay near him. 
 
 LIX. About midnight, the cavalry having 
 surprised some of the enemy, who had adven- 
 tured a little too far from their camp in quest 
 of water ; CfEsar was informed by them, that 
 Pompey's lieutenants were decamping without 
 noise. Immediately he ordered the alarm to 
 be sounded, and gave his army the signal to 
 march. The enemy, finding they should be 
 pursued, kept still ; being afraid of a noctur. 
 nal flight, wherein they would have had great, 
 ly the disadvantage, on account of their heavy 
 baggage which they had with them, and the 
 superiority of Caesar's cavalry. Next day, 
 Petreius went privately out with a party of 
 horse, a take a view of the country. Caesar 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 231 
 
 likewise detached a squadron for the same pur- 
 pose, under the command of Decidius Saxa. 
 Both made the like report in their several 
 camps ; that for five miles together, the coun- 
 try was level and open, but after that rough 
 and mountainous ; and that whoever should 
 first get possession of the defiles, might easily 
 prevent the other army from approaching 
 them. 
 
 LX. Upon this, a council of war was held 
 by Petreius and Afranius, to deliberate about 
 the time of beginning their march. The 
 greater number were for setting out by night, 
 in hopes of reaching the defiles before Caesar 
 could have notice of their departure. Others 
 argued against the possibility of decamping 
 privately, by the alarm given in Caesar's 
 camp the night before : " That the enemy's 
 cavalry were continually patrolling in the 
 night, and had beset all the ways and passes : 
 that a nocturnal engagement was to be avoided, 
 because, in a civil war, the soldiers were more 
 apt to listen to their fears, than the obligations 
 of the military oath : that shame and the pre- 
 sence of the centurions and the tribunes, the 
 great instruments of obedience and military 
 duty, could have their proper eflfect only in the 
 light, which rendered it of infinite importance 
 to wait the approach of day ; that in case of 
 a disaster, yet the bulk of the army would es- 
 cape, and be able to possess themselves of the 
 post in question." This opinion prevailed in 
 the council, and they resolved to set out the 
 next morning by break of day. 
 
 LXI. Csesar having taken a view of the 
 country, decamped as soon as it was light, 
 taking a considerable circuit, and observing no 
 particular route ; for the direct way to tlie 
 Iberus and Octogesa lay in the rear of the 
 enemy's camp. He was therefore obliged to 
 march through valleys and precipices, and over 
 steep rocks, which the soldiers could not climb, 
 but by disencumbering themselves of their 
 arms, and returning them afterwards to one 
 another. But not a man murmured at these 
 difficulties, in hope of seeing a speedy end of 
 all their labours, if they could but gain the 
 Iberus before the enemy, and intercept their 
 provisions. As in this march we pursued at 
 first an opposite course, and seemed to turn 
 our backs upon the enemy, Afranius's soldiers 
 who observed us from their camp, came forth 
 with joyful looks, and insulted us on our sup- 
 posed flight, imagining the want of provisions 
 
 obliged us to return to Lerida. Their generals 
 applauded themselves upon their resolution of 
 not decamping, and were confirmed in the no- 
 tion of our retreat, as they saw we had neither 
 horses nor carriages ; whence they concluded 
 the scarcity must be exceeding great. But 
 when they saw us, after some time, turn to 
 the righl, and that our advanced guard had 
 already gained the ground beyond their camp, 
 there was not a man so tardy or indolent, as 
 not to perceive the necessity of decamping 
 and opposing our march. Immediately they 
 ran to arms, and leaving a few cohorts to guard 
 the camp, sallied in a body, pursuing their way 
 directly to the Iberus. 
 
 LXII. All depended upon despatch, and 
 getting the first possession of the defiles and 
 mountains. Our troops were retarded by the 
 difficulties of the way, and Afranius's by the 
 continual attacks of Caesar's c-avalry. But 
 such was the situation of the Afranians, that 
 even supposing them to gain the hills first, 
 they could only secure their own retreat, with- 
 out a possibility of preserving their baggage, 
 and the cohorts left to guard the camp ; be- 
 cause Caesar's army getting between, cut them 
 off from all communication with their own 
 men. Caesar arrived first at the place in ques- 
 tion ; and having found a plain beyond the 
 rocks, formed his men in order of battle against 
 the enemy. Afranius, who now saw our 
 army in his front, at the same time that his 
 rear was continually harassed by the cavalry, 
 halted on an eminence, from whence he 
 detached four Spanish cohorts, to take posses- 
 sion of the highest mountain thereabouts ; or- 
 dering them to make all the despatch they 
 could to seize it, that he might get thither 
 himself with the rest of his forces, and chang- 
 ing his route, march them over the hills to 
 Octogesa. The Spaniards wheeling oblique- 
 ly, to take possession of the place, were per- 
 ceived by Cffisar's cavalry ; who charged them 
 furiously, broke them at the first onset, sur- 
 rounded, and cut them in pieces in sight of 
 both armies. 
 
 LXIII. Caesar had now an opportunity of 
 giving the enemy an eflTectual blow ; whose 
 army, in the present consternation it was under, 
 would, he was sensible, make but a faint re- 
 sistance ; more especially as it was surrounded 
 on all sides by the cavalry, and would be 
 obliged to fight on equal ground. He was 
 pressed, on all hands, to give the signal. The 
 
232 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 lieutenants, centurions, and military tribunes, 
 got round him, urging him not to delay the 
 engagement : " Tliat the soldiers were all 
 eager for a battle ; whereas, on the contrary, 
 the Afranians had given many marks of fear : 
 that they had neither dared to support their 
 own detachment, nor offered to descend from 
 the hill, nor been able to withstand the very 
 first charge of our cavalry ; that they had 
 brought their ensigns all into one place, where 
 they crowded confusedly round them, without 
 observing ranks or order : that if he was afraid 
 to attack them on the eminence, he would soon 
 have an opportunity of more equal ground, as 
 Afranius would be obliged to remove for want 
 of water." 
 
 LXIV. Csesar was in hopes of terminating 
 the affair without bloodshed, or a battle ; be- 
 cause he had intercepted the enemy's provi- 
 sions. Why therefore, even supposing the 
 event to be prosperous, should he unneces- 
 sarily lose any of his men 1 Why should he 
 expose to wounds, soldiers who had so well 
 deserved of him 1 Why, in fine, should he 
 tempt fortune 1 especially as it redounded no 
 less to the honour of a good general, to gain 
 the victory by his conduct, than by the force 
 of his arms. He was also touched with com- 
 passion for Afranius's soldiers ; who, after all, 
 were fellow-citizens, and whom he must have 
 slaughtered, when he could equally succeed 
 without touching their lives. This resolution 
 Was not at all relished by the army ; who, in 
 their discontent, openly declared, that since 
 Caesar did not lay hold of so favourable an op- 
 portunity, nor let them fight when they had a 
 mind, they would not fight when he had a 
 mind. But nothing could shake him. Nay, 
 he ever retreated a little, to give Afranius and 
 Petreius'. liberty to regain their camp, which 
 they did. He then posted troops on the moun- 
 tains, to guard the defiles, and came and en- 
 camped as near the enemy as possible. 
 
 LXV. The day after, Pompey's lieutenants, 
 disturbed at finding their provisions cut off, 
 and all the ways to the Iberus intercepted, 
 consulted what was proper to be done. They 
 had it still in their power to return to Lerida, 
 or march to Tarraco. But while they were 
 debating this matter, notice was brought them, 
 that our cavalry had fallen upon their parties 
 sent out in quest of water. Upon this intelli- 
 gence, they formed several posts of horse and 
 foot intermixed with legionary cohorts ; and 
 
 began to throw up a rampart from the camp 
 to the place where they watered, that the sol- 
 diers might pass and repass under cover, with- 
 out fear, and without a guard. Afranius and 
 Petreius divided this work between them, 
 and went to give directions about it in per- 
 son. 
 
 LXVI. In their absence, their soldiers 
 found frequent opportunities of conversing with 
 our men, and sought out every one his fellow- 
 citizen and acquaintance. They began bj 
 thanking them for having spared them the 
 day before, owning they were indebted to them 
 for their lives. Afterwards they asked them, 
 if they might trust to Csesar's honour; testify- 
 ing much grief at being obliged to fight with 
 their countrymen and relations, with whom 
 they were united by the strictest ties. At last 
 they stipulated even for their generals, whom 
 they would not seem to betray : and promised, 
 if the lives of Petreius and Afranius were 
 granted them, to change sides. At the same 
 time they sent some of their principal officers 
 to negotiate with Csesar : and these prelimina- 
 ries to an accommodation being settled, the 
 soldiers of both armies went into one another's 
 tents, so that the two camps were now in a 
 manner one. A great number of centurions 
 and military tribunes came to pay their court 
 to Coesar, and beg his protection. The Span- 
 ish chiefs, who had been summoned to attend 
 Afranius, and were detained in the camp as 
 hostages, followed their example. Every man 
 sought out his acquaintance and friend, who 
 might recommend and procure him a favoura- 
 ble reception from Cfesar. Things were car- 
 ried to such a length, that Afranius's son, a 
 young gentleman, treated with Ctesar, by the 
 mediation of Sulpicius, to desire he would give 
 his word for his life, and that of his father. 
 The joy was general ; they mutually con 
 gratulated each other ; the one, in that they 
 had escaped so imminent a danger ; and 
 the other, in that they had brought to a 
 happy conclusion so important an enter- 
 prise, without striking a blow. CsBsar, in 
 the judgment of all, was upon the point of 
 amply reaping the fruits of his wonted 
 clemency, and every body applauded his late 
 conduct. 
 
 LXVn. Afranius, having notice of what 
 passed, quitted the work he was engaged in, 
 and returned to the camp ; prepared, as it 
 would seem, to bear with an equal mind 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 233 
 
 ■whatever should happen. But Petreius was 
 not wanting to himself. He armed his 
 slaves ; and joining them to a pretorian co- 
 hort of target-bearers, and some Spanish horse, 
 his dependants, whom he always kept about 
 him to guard his person ; he instantly flew to 
 the rampart, broke off the conferences of the 
 soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and 
 put all of them. he could find to the sword. 
 The rest flocked together ; where, alarmed at 
 the danger to which they saw themselves ex- 
 posed, they wrapped their cloaks round their 
 left arms, drew their swords, and, trusting 
 to the nearness of their camp, defended them- 
 selves against the Spanish target-bearers and 
 cavalry, till they had retreated to our ad- 
 vanced guard, who screened them from any 
 further assault. 
 
 LXVIII. After this he went through the 
 whole camp, begging his troops, with tears, 
 to have pity on him, and Pompey their gene- 
 ral ; and that they would not deliver them 
 both up to the cruel vengeance of their ene- 
 mies. Every one upon this flocks to the 
 head-quarters. There Petreius proposes to 
 the army to bind themselves by a new oath, 
 not to abandon nor betray their commanders, 
 nor to act separately, but all in concert, for 
 the common good. He himself took this oath 
 first, and then exacted it of Afranius, after- 
 wards of the military tribunes and centurions, 
 and lastly of all the companies, man by man. 
 At the same time an order was issued that all 
 who had any of Csesar's soldiers in their tents 
 should signify it, that they might be put to 
 death in the sight of the whole army. But 
 the majority, detesting this bloody order, care- 
 fully hid those who were under their protec- 
 tion, and procured them means to escape in 
 the night. .However, the terror they had 
 been thrown into by their generals, the 
 severity shown in punishing, and the new oath 
 they had been obliged to take, defeated, for 
 the present, all hopes of a surrender, changed 
 the soldiers' minds, and reduced the war to its 
 former state. 
 
 LXIX. Csesar ordered diligent search to 
 be made after such of the enemy's soldiers as 
 had come to his camp during the time of con. 
 ference, and carefully sent them back. Some 
 military tribunes and centurions voluntarily 
 chose to stay with him ; whom he afterwards 
 treated with great distinction ; promoting the 
 centurions to higher ranks, and honouring the 
 2. 
 
 Roman knights with the office of military 
 tribunes. 
 
 LXX. The Afranian troops were destitute 
 of forage, and could not water without much 
 difficulty. The legionary soldiers had, in- 
 deed, some provisions, because they had been 
 ordered to bring two and twenty days' corn 
 with them from Lerida ; but the Spanish in 
 fantry and auxiliaries had. none; for they 
 neither had opportunities of supplying them- 
 selves, nor were their bodies inured to carry 
 heavy burdens. Accordingly, they every day 
 deserted in shoals to Caesar. In this ex- 
 tremity, of the two expedients proposed, that 
 of returning to Lerida appeared the safest, as 
 they had still some provisions in that city, and 
 might there concert what further measures to 
 pursue. Tarraco was at a greater distance, and 
 they would of course be exposed to more ac- 
 cidents by the way. This resolution being 
 taken they decamped. Csesar sent the caval- 
 ry before, to harass and retard them in their 
 march ; and followed himself with the rest of 
 the army. The cavalry gave the enemy no 
 respite, being continually engaged with their 
 rear. 
 
 LXXI. The manner of fighting was thus : 
 — Some light-armed cohorts formed the rear- 
 guard, which, in a plain, halted from time to 
 time, and made head against ot#cavalry. When 
 they fell in with an eminence, the very nature 
 of the ground furnished them with the means 
 of defending themselves, because those who 
 were first could cover them behind. But 
 when a valley or descent came in the way, the 
 van could give no assistance to the rear, and 
 our cavalry annoyed them with their darts 
 from the higher ground, which put them in 
 imminent danger. In this • case, the le- 
 gions were obliged to halt, and endeavour 
 to drive back the cavalry a good way, after 
 which they ran down the valley precijiitalely, 
 until they came to the opposite eminence. 
 For their cavalry, of which they had n. ..m- 
 siderable number, was so terrified by ' l r "' 
 success informer skirmishes, that, far i. ■ i I.. 
 ing of any service, they were forced to place 
 it in the centre to secure it; and if aiy of 
 them chanced to straggle from the mai-i b. i^y, 
 they were immediately taken by <'.\;ir'? 
 horse. 
 
 LXXII. During these continual skirmishes, 
 in which the enemy were often obliged to halt, 
 in order to disengage their rear, it is easy to 
 2 H 
 
234 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 perceive that their march could not be very 
 expeditious. This was in fact the case ; so 
 that after advancing four miles, finding them- 
 selves greatly incommoded by the cavalry,they 
 halted on an eminence, and drew a line be. 
 fore them, as it were to encamp, but did not 
 unload their beasts of burden. When they 
 saw that Caesar had marked out his camp, 
 pitched his tents, and sent his cavalry to for. 
 age ; suddenly, towards noon, they resumed 
 their march briskly, hoping to be rid of the 
 cavalry which had so much incommoded them. 
 But Caesar set out immediately with his legions, 
 leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, 
 and sent orders to his cavalry to return with all 
 diligence. The cavalry returned according- 
 ly, and having overtaken the enemy before 
 the close of day, attacked, their rear so vigor- 
 ously, that they were almost routed, a great 
 number of soldiers, and even some centurions, 
 being slain, Caesar's whole army came up, 
 and threatened them with an immediate at- 
 tack. 
 
 LXXIII. As they could then neither 
 choose a proper place for a camp, nor 
 continue their march, they were forced to 
 halt where they were, far from any water, 
 and on very disadvantageous ground. Csesar 
 did not offer to attack them, for the reasons 
 mentioned befc% ; he would not even permit 
 any tents to be pitched that day, that he 
 might be the readier to pursue with all his 
 forces, should they attempt to escape either by 
 night or by day. The Afranians perceiving the 
 disadvantage of their situation, employed the 
 whole night in throwing up intrenchments, 
 and disposed their camp directly fronting ours. 
 The same they did the following day, from 
 sun-rise till evening. But the farther they 
 extended their camp, and produced their lines, 
 in order to better their position, the farther 
 they went from water, and to avoid one in- 
 convenience, fell into another. The first 
 night nobody went out of the camp for water, 
 and the next day the whole army was obliged 
 to do it in order of battle, so that they could 
 not forage that day. Csesar wanted to hum- 
 ble them by these misfortunes, and reduce 
 them by want and necessity rather than force. 
 He began, however, to draw lines round the 
 camp, the better to check their sudden sallies 
 and irruptions, to which he foresaw they would 
 be obliged to have recourse at last. Want, 
 
 and the desire of marchmg with less difficulty, 
 soon constrained them to kill all the beasts of 
 burden. 
 
 LXXIV. Two days were spent in forming 
 and executing those resolutions ; on the third, 
 Cffisar had considerably advanced his works. 
 Afranius and Petreius, sensible of the conse- 
 quences, drew all their forces out of the camp, 
 and formed them in order of battle. Csesar 
 previously called in his workmen, assembled 
 his cavalry, and put his army in a condition to 
 receive them, for he was aware of the hurt his 
 reputation might sustain, if, contrary to the 
 opinion of the troops, and the earnest expecta- 
 tions of all, he should still seem to decline an 
 engagement. However, for the reasons al- 
 ready mentioned, he resolved to keep only 
 upon the defensive ; and the rather, because 
 the distance between the two camps was so 
 small, that should he even put his adversaries 
 to rout, he could not flatter himself with the 
 hopes of a complete victory. In fact, from 
 camp to camp was not above two thousand 
 feet ; the armies were posted on each side of 
 this space, which was left void for the mu- 
 tual charge and assault of the soldiers. On 
 supposition therefore of a battle, the nearness 
 of their camp furnished an easy retreat to the 
 vanquished. For this reason he resolved to 
 wait the enemy's charge, and nit enter the 
 first into action. 
 
 LXXV. Afranius's troops were langed in 
 two lines, consisting of five legions, and the 
 cohorts wont to be stationed in the wings, 
 formed a body of reserve. Caesar's army was 
 upon three lines ; in the first of which were 
 posted four cohorts, detached out of each of 
 the five legions ; in the second three ; and in 
 the third the like number, all from their re- 
 spective legions : the archers and slingers 
 were disposed in the midst, and the cavalry 
 on the two wings. The armies being drawn 
 up in this manner, each general kept firm to 
 his resolution ; Caesar, not to engage, unless 
 forced to it ; and Afranius, to prevent the 
 progress of our works. In this posture they 
 continued till sun-set, when both armies re- 
 turned to their several camps. The next day, 
 Ca3sar prepared to finish his lines ; and Pom- 
 pey's lieutenants, as their last resource, en- 
 deavoured to find a fordable place in the Si- 
 coris. But Caesar, penetrating their design, 
 sent his light-armed Germans, with part of 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 235 
 
 his cavalry, over the river, and posted many 
 good bodies' of troops along the banks, at a 
 small distance from one another. 
 
 LXXVI. At last, having no hope left, and 
 being in want of every thing, wood, water, 
 forage, corn, they demanded an interview, 
 and . that it might be, if possible, in some 
 place out of the sight of the soldiers. Cse- 
 ear denied the last part of their request, but 
 offered to grant them a public interview ; 
 whereupon Afranius, having given his son for 
 a hostage, went to the place appointed by Csb- 
 sar, where, in the presence of both armies, he 
 addressed him to this effect : " That it was no 
 just matter of blame, either in him or his sol- 
 diers, to have preserved their fidelity to their 
 general, Pompey ; but that they had now suf- 
 ficiently acquitted themselves of their duty, 
 and suffered enough in his cause, by the want 
 of all kind of necessaries : that like wild 
 beasts caught in a toil, they were deprived of 
 the most common enjoyments, having their 
 bodies oppressed by want, and their minds 
 overwhelmed with ignominy, that they there- 
 fore acknowledged themselves vanquished, 
 and besought and conjured him, not to make 
 a rigorous use of his victory, but to spare the 
 lives of his unhappy countrymen." This 
 speech was delivered with all possible marks 
 of humility and submission. 
 
 LXXVII. Cffisar replied, « That he of all 
 mankind, had least reason to complain, or im.- 
 plore compassion : that all the rest had fully 
 done their duty ; himself, in forbearing to at- 
 tack him, with all the advantages of time and 
 place, that the way to an accommodation might 
 be the more open ; his army. In returning un- 
 touched, the men that were in their power, 
 after injuries received, and the massacre of 
 their comrades : in fine, even his own troops, 
 in endeavouring to conclude a peace, whereon 
 they thought their safety depended. Thus all 
 orders had shown an inclination to treat, while 
 Afranius and Petreius alone opposed an ac- 
 commodation, refusing both interview and 
 truce, and barbarously murdering those whom 
 the faith of a conference had enticed to their 
 camp : that it had therefore happened to them, 
 as frequently happens to men of obstinacy and 
 arrogance, and they were forced to have re- 
 course to those conditions, and earnestly so- 
 licit the very same terms, which not long be- 
 fore they had despised. However, he would 
 not take advantage of their present submis- 
 
 sion, or the favourable circumstances in which 
 he found himself, to demand any thing tend- 
 ing to the increase of his own power, but only 
 that they would disband those troops which 
 they had now for so many years kept on foot 
 against him. For with what other view had 
 six legions been sent into Spain ; a seventh 
 levied there, so many powerful navies equipped, 
 so many able and experienced officers sent 
 overl These mighty preparations could not 
 be meant against Spain, or to supply the 
 wants of the province, which having enjoyed 
 a long run of peace, had no occasion for such 
 extraordinary forces. Their real aim was to 
 pave the way to his destruction ; to effect 
 which, a new species of power had been in- 
 troduced into the commonwealth, and the 
 same man appointed to command in Italy, at 
 the gates of Rome, and hold for so many years, 
 though absent, the government of the two 
 most potent provinces of the republic. For 
 this reason the magistrates were stripped of 
 their prerogatives, and not suffered to take 
 possession of their provinces, at the expiration 
 of the pretorship or consulship, as had always 
 been the custom : but particular governors 
 were sent, by the choice and management of 
 a faction. For this reason even the excuse 
 of old age was disallowed ; and those who had 
 merited a discharge by their past services, 
 were compelled to take arms again, to com- 
 plete the number of their troops. In fine, for 
 this reason, he alone had been denied that jus- 
 tice, which was never refused to any general 
 before him ; that after having successfully 
 served the commonwealth, he should be allowed 
 to return home, and disband his own army, 
 with some marks of honour, or at least without 
 ignominy. All which, nevertheless, he had 
 hitherto borne, and still resolved to bear with 
 patience ; nor was it now his design, to take 
 from them their soldiers, and enlist them, as it 
 would be easy for him to do, but to prevent 
 their employing them against him. Therefore, 
 as he had already intimated, they must resolve 
 to quit Spain, and disband their forces, in 
 which case he would injure no man. This waa 
 his final resolution, and the only condition of 
 peace they were to expect." 
 
 LXXVIII. These conditions were agreea- 
 ble to Afranius's soldiers, who, instead of 
 being punished, as they feared, were in some 
 sort rewarded by the discharge procured them. 
 They plainly showed their satisfaction. Fo~ 
 
236 
 
 CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 
 
 while the place and time of their dismission 
 were debating, they signified by their gestures 
 and cries from the rampart, where they stood, 
 that they desired to be disbanded immediately ; 
 because no sufficient security could be given 
 for the performance of what was put off till 
 another time. After some discussion of that 
 article by Csesar and Afranius, it was re- 
 gulated, that those who had houses or posses- 
 sions in Spain, should be discharged on the 
 spot ; and the rest near the Var, a river be- 
 tween Gaul and Italy. C£esar,on his side, de- 
 clared that he would hurt nobody, nor force 
 any one to take on in his service. 
 
 LXXIX. Caesar undertook to find them in 
 corn until they got to the Var. He even pro- 
 mised to restore to them all they had lost in 
 the war, that could be known again : himself 
 ndemnifying his own soldiers, who hereby lost 
 
 part of their booty. By this conduct he ac- 
 quired their confidence to such a degree, that 
 he was arbiter of all the disputes they had, 
 either among themselves, or with their com- 
 manders. The soldiers being ready to mutiny 
 about their pay, because Petreius and Afranius 
 affirmed it was not yet due, the matter was 
 referred to Ca;sar, who determined it to the 
 satisfaction of both parties. About a third of 
 the army was disbanded during the two days 
 they continued here, after which the rest set 
 out for the Var in this order. Two of Caesar's 
 legions marched at the head, the others in the 
 rear, and the vanquished troops in the middle. 
 Q. Fufius Calenus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, 
 presided over the march. In this manner they 
 continued their route to the Var, where the 
 remainder of the troops were disbande44 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 *!• 
 
 237 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 Trebomus continues the s'ege of Marseilles. — III. Nasidius arrives witli a fleet to the relief of the town. — 
 IV. The inhabitants repair their fleet, and join it to that of Nasidius. — V. A sea fight between Brutus and the 
 people iS' Marseilles. — VI. In which the latter are defeated. — VIII. Trebonius raises a prodigious tower 
 against the town. — IX. Likewise a musculus of uncommon size. — X. By which a tower belonging to the 
 enemy is overthrown.— XI. Upon this the besieged demand a truce. — XIII. Which they afterwards break, 
 and in a sudden sally burn Trebonius's works. — XIV. Trebonius, with wonderful expedition, raises a new 
 and amazing terrace.— XV. Upon which the besieged again treat of a surrender. —XVI. Bleanwhile M. Varro, 
 in farther Spain, prepares to oppose Caesar. — XVII. Caesar summons a general assembly of the stales at 
 Corduba. — XVII. Varro, deserted by his troops, goes over to Caesar. — XIX. Caesar having reduced Spain, ar- 
 rives before Marseilles.— XX. The Marseillians surrender. L. Domitius escapes by sea.— XXI. About the 
 same time, C. Curio sets out f:)r Africa.— XXII. Where, at first, he wars successfully against Varus.— XXIV. 
 But afterwards. Varus having received supplies from king Juba, he rashly ventures a battle, where, after 
 some advatlages in the beginning, by means of his cavalry, he is at last cut off with his whole army. 
 
 838 
 
CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 r. While these things passed in Spain, Tre- 
 bonius, Csesar's lieutenant, who had been left 
 to carry on the siege of Marseilles, raised 
 terraces for two different attacks, and ap- 
 proached with his towers and galleries. One 
 of the attacks was on the side of the port ; the 
 other, towards the mouth of the Rhone, which 
 empties itself into the sea, bordering upon 
 Spain and Gaul. For Marseilles is washed by 
 the sea on three sides, and can be approached 
 by land only on the fourth ; of which that part 
 where the citadel stands, being very strong by 
 nature, because of a deep valley that runs 
 before it, requires a long and difficult siege. 
 For the completing of these works, 'J'rebonius 
 drew together, from all parts of the province, 
 a great number of workmen and beasts of 
 carriage ; ordered wood and osiers to be 
 brought ; and having prepared all things ne. 
 cessary, raised a terrace eighty feet high. 
 
 II. But so well was the town provided 
 with all the requisites of war, and so great 
 was the multitude of machines to annoy the 
 besiegers, that no mantles were sufficient to 
 withstand their violence. For they had 
 wooden bars, twelve feet in length, armed at 
 the point with iron, which were shot with such 
 force from their balistis, that they pierced four 
 rows of hurdles, and entered a considerable 
 way into the ground. To resist the violence 
 of these batteries, the besiegers made use of 
 galleries, whose roofs consisted of pieces of 
 wood of about a foot in thickness, strongly 
 compacted together. Under this cover, the 
 materials necessary for raising the terrace 
 were conveyed : and a tortoise, sixty feet long 
 
 composed of strong beams, and armed with 
 every thing necessary to defend it against fire 
 and stones, went before, to level the ground. 
 But in spite of all endeavours, the greatness 
 of the works, the height of the wall and towers, 
 and the multitude of machines made use of 
 by the besieged, greatly retarded the ap- 
 proaches. Besides, the mountaineers made 
 frequent sallies, and set fire to the towers and 
 mount: which though our men easily sustain, 
 ed, driving them back with great loss into the 
 town, yet failed not very much to incommode 
 the works. 
 
 III. In the mean time L. Nasidius, sent by 
 Pompey to the assistance of Domitius and the 
 Marseillians, with a fleet of sixteen ships, 
 some of which were strengthened with beaks 
 of brass, passed the straits of Sicily unknown 
 to Curio, landed at Messana, and raised so 
 great a terror in the place, that being aban. 
 doned by the senate and principal inhabitants, 
 he found means to carry off one of their gal- 
 lies ; and joining it to his own fleet, steered 
 directly for Marseilles, having despatched 
 a frigate before, to apprize Domitius and 
 the inhabitants of his coming, and press 
 them to hazard a second engagement with 
 Brutus, when they should be reinforced by 
 his fleet. 
 
 IV. The Marseillians, after their defeat, had 
 drawn as many old ships out of the docks as 
 they had lost in the engagement; and repair- 
 ed and rigged them'with wondrous expedition. 
 They were likewise well provided with row. 
 ers and pilots ; and had prepared a number of 
 fishing barks, which they filled with archers 
 
 239 
 
240 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 and engines, and strengthened with roofs, to 
 shelter the rowers from the enem3''s darts. 
 The fleet being equipped in this manner, the 
 Marseillians, animated by the prayeVs and 
 tears of their old men, matrons,and virgins, to 
 exert themselves in defence of their country 
 in so pressing a conjuncture ; embarked with 
 no less confidence and assurance, than they 
 had before their late defeat. For such is the 
 weakness of the human mind, that things 
 dark, hidden, and unknown, always produce 
 in us a greater degree of confidence or terror ; 
 as happened in the present case ; for the arri- 
 val of Nasidius had filled all men with an un- 
 common share of hope and eagerness. The 
 wind springing np fair, they set sail, and ren- 
 dezvoused at Tauroenta, a castle belonging to 
 the town, where Nasidius lay with his fleet. 
 Here they put their ships in order, armed 
 themselves with courage for a second encoun. 
 ter, and entering readily intu all the measures 
 proposed by Nasidius, left to him the com- 
 mand of the left wing, and stationed them- 
 selves upon the right. 
 
 V. Brutus sailed to meet them, with his 
 fleet considerably increased ; for besides the 
 ships which Cssar had caused to be built at 
 Aries, he had also joined to it six more, taken 
 from the Marseillians, which he had refitted 
 and rigged since the late action. Wherefore 
 exhorting his men to despise an enemy, who 
 had not been able to resist them w'hen entire 
 and unvanquished, he advanced against them 
 full of resolution and confidence. It was easy 
 to discern from Trebonius's camp, and the emi- 
 nences around it, what passed in the town. 
 All the youth that were left, the old men, the 
 women, children, and even the guards upon 
 the walls, extending their hands to heaven, or 
 repairing to the temples, and prostrating them- 
 selves at the altars, besought the gods to grant 
 them victory. Nor was there a man among 
 them who did not believe, that their safety 
 depended wholly on the issue of that day's ac- 
 tion. For the choice of their youth, and the 
 most considerable men of their city, were all on 
 board the fleet : insomuch, that in case of any 
 disaster, they had no resource left ; but should 
 they obtain the victory , they were in hopes of pre- 
 serving their city, either by their own forces, or 
 the reinforcements they expected from without. 
 
 VI. Accordingly, in the engagement, they 
 behaved with the most determined courage. 
 The remembrance of what* their wives and 
 
 children had represented to them at their de* 
 parture served to exalt their bravery ; in a 
 full persuasion, that this was the last opportu- 
 nity they should have of exerting themselves 
 in defence of their country ; and that if ihey 
 fell in the engagement, their fellow-citizens 
 could not long survive tJem, as their fate 
 must be the same upon the taking of the town. 
 Our ships being at some distance from each 
 other, both gave the enemy's pilots an oppor- 
 tunity of showing their address in working 
 their vessels, and flying to the assistance of 
 their friends, when they were laid hold on by 
 our grappling hooks. And indeed, when it 
 came to a close fight, they seconded the moun- 
 taineers with wonderful resolution, and, in 
 bravery, seemed to yield but little to our men. 
 At the same time, a great quantity of darts, 
 poured incessantly from their smaller frigates, 
 wounded a great many of our rowers, and such 
 of the soldiers as were without shelter. Two 
 of their galleys fell upon that of Brutus, which 
 was easily distinguished by its flag ; but though . 
 they attacked him on both sides, he extricated 
 himself with such agility and address, as in a 
 short time to get a little before ; which made 
 them run foul of each other so violently, that 
 they were both considerably shattered ; one 
 in particular had its beak broken, and was in a 
 manner totally crushed ; which being observed 
 by those of our fleet that lay nearest, they 
 suddenly fell upon and sunk them, before they 
 could recover out of their disorder. 
 
 VII. In this encounter, the ships under 
 Nasidius were of no mannei of service to the 
 Marseillians, but quickly retired out of the 
 fight. For as they were neither animated by 
 the sight of their country, nor the entreaties of 
 their relations, they were not very forward to 
 expose their lives to hazard, but escaped with- 
 out hurt from the combat. The Marseillians 
 had five ships sunk, and four taken. One es. 
 caped to the coast of hither Spain, with those 
 of Nasidius. Of the rest that remained, one 
 was immediately despatched to Marseilles, to 
 carry thither the news of the defeat. As soon 
 as it drew near the town, all the inhabitants 
 flocked out to know what had passed ; and 
 being informed of it, appeared no less dejected 
 than if the city had been taken by storm. 
 However, they still continued their prepara- 
 tions for the defence of the place with as much 
 diligence as ever. 
 
 VIII rhe legionaries, who had the charge 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 241 
 
 of the works on the right, perceived, that a 
 tower of brick, built at a little .distance from 
 the walls, would be of great service to shelter 
 them from the frequent sallies of the enemy. 
 At first they made it very low and small, to 
 guard against sudden incursions. Hither they 
 retired in case of danger : here they defended 
 themselves against the most obstinate attacks 
 of the enemy; nay, even assaulted them in 
 their turn, repulsed, and pursued them. This 
 tower was of a square form, thirty feet every 
 way, allowing for the thickness of the walls, 
 which might be about five feet. Afterwards, 
 (being instructed by experience, which is the 
 best of teachers,) they plainly perceived, that 
 the higher it was carried, the more serviceable 
 it would prove. The manner of effecting it was 
 thus : When the work was raised to the height 
 of one story, they laid a floor over it, the ex- 
 tremities of whose beams were concealed in 
 the thickness of the wall ; that they might not, 
 by appearing on the outside, be liable to be 
 set on fire. Thence they continued the wall 
 directly upwards, as far as their galleries and 
 mantles would allow. Here they, laid two 
 beams crosswise, whose extremities almost 
 reached the angles of the wall, for supporting 
 the floor, which was to serve as a roof to the 
 whole. Over these beams they laid the joists 
 of the roof, and boarded them with planks. 
 The roof was so contrived as to project a little 
 beyond the wall, in order to suspend from 
 it what might be necessary to shelter the 
 workmen, while employed in completing the 
 story. This floor was paved with tiles and 
 clay, to render it proof against fire, and had 
 besides a covering of strong mattresses, to 
 break the force of stones and darts. At the 
 same time they suspended from the beams of 
 the roof, that projected beyond the wall, cur- 
 tains made of strong cables, woven to the depth 
 of four feet, and which went round the three 
 sides of the tower that were exposed to the en. 
 gines of the enemy; having experienced on 
 former occasions, that this kind of cover was 
 impenetrabh to any dart or engine whatever. 
 When this part of the tower was finished, 
 roofed, and sheltered from the enemy's blows, 
 they removed their mantles to another, and 
 by means of engines elevated the roof 
 entire from the first story, as far as the cur- 
 tains would allow. There, secure from all 
 insult, they laboured at the wall, elevating the 
 roof a second time, and thereby enabling 
 
 themselves both to continue the work, and lay 
 the interjacent floors. In this manner they 
 proceeded from story to story, mounting them 
 one upon another, till, without danger or 
 wounds, they had completed the number of 
 six, leaving loop-holes in convenient places, 
 for the engines to play through. 
 
 IX. When, by means of this tower, they 
 thought they had sufficiently provided for 
 the security of the works around it, they re- 
 solved to build a gallery sixty feet long, of 
 wood, two feet in thickness, to extend from 
 the brick tower to the tower of the enemy, 
 and the very walls of the tov^n. The form of 
 the gallery was this : — First, two beams of 
 equal length were laid upon the ground, at 
 the distance of four feet from one another; 
 and in these were fixed little pillars five feet 
 high, joined at the top by beams designed to 
 support the roof of the gallery. Over these 
 were laid rafters, two feet square, fastened 
 strongly with nails and plates of iron. The 
 upper part of the roof was composed of square 
 laths, four inchps thick, which were placed 
 at a small distance one from another, to bear 
 the tiles that were to be laid upon them. 
 Thus was the whole finished with a sloping 
 roof, which being partly composed of tiles and 
 mortar, was proof against fire, and had be. 
 sides a covering of hides, to hinder the mor. 
 tar from being washed away by spouts of wa- 
 ter. Over all we threw strong mattresses, to 
 screen the hides from fire and stones. This 
 work was finished close by the brick tower, 
 under cover of four mantles, and immediately 
 carried forward upon rollers, in the manner 
 ships are launched, till it unexpectedly reach, 
 ed the very tower of the enemy. 
 
 X. The Marseillians astonished at so threat- 
 ening and unlooked-for a machine, pushed 
 forward with levers the largest stones they 
 could find, and tumbled them from the top of 
 the wall upon the galler}'. But the strength 
 of the wood resisted the violence of their blows, 
 so that they fell to the ground without doing 
 any hurt. Observing this, they changed their 
 design, and poured down upon us burning bar- 
 rels of pitch and tallow. But these likewise 
 rolled along the roof without damage, and 
 falling upon the ground, were afterwards 
 thrust away with forks and long poles. Mean- 
 while our soldiers, under protection of the 
 gallery, were endeavouring with their levers 
 to undermine the enemy's tower. The gal. 
 21 
 
242 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 lery itself was defended by the tower of brick, 
 whence our engines played without inter- 
 mission ; insomuch that the enemy, driven 
 from their tower and walls, were at last obliged 
 to abandon their defence. By degrees the 
 tower being undermined, part of it fell down, 
 and the rest was so shaken that it could not 
 stand long. 
 
 XI. Upon this the enemy, alarmed at so 
 unexpected a misfortune, discouraged by the 
 downfall of the tower, awed by such a testi- 
 mony of the wrath of the gods, and dreading 
 the plunder and devastation of their city, came 
 forth in the habit of suppliants, and with out- 
 stretched hands, besought the compassion of 
 the army and generals. At this new and un- 
 expected sight, all acts of hostility ceased, and 
 the soldiers, laying aside their ardour for the 
 fight, were eager to hear and get acquainted 
 with the proposals of the enemy, who arriving 
 in presence of the army and generals, threw 
 themselves at their feet, requesting them to 
 suspend all further operations till Cesar's 
 arrival. They told them : " That as the works 
 were now completed, and the tower destroyed, 
 they were sensible the city could no longer 
 hold out, and therefore meant not to defend it : 
 that in the mean time, no prejudice could arise 
 to the besiegers from this respite, because, if 
 they refused to submit upon Cssar's coming, 
 he would have it in his power to treat them as 
 he pleased. They added, that if the whole 
 tower should be brought down, it would be 
 impossible to hinder the soldiers from yielding 
 to the desire of plunder, by breaking into and 
 pillaging the town." This, and much more 
 of the same nature, (for the Marseillians are 
 a learned people,) they urged in a very moving 
 and pathetic strain. 
 
 XII. The generals, moved by these remon. 
 strances, drew off the soldiers from the works, 
 discontinued the attack, and contented them- 
 selves with posting guards in convenient places. 
 Compassion occasioned a kind of truce till 
 Caesar's arrival ; so that on neither side were 
 any acts of hostility committed, but every thing 
 was quiet and secure, as if the siege had been 
 at an end. For Csesar had earnestly recom. 
 mended it to Trebonius, by letter, to preveat, 
 if possible, the city's being taken by storm, lest 
 the soldiers, irritated by their revolt, and the 
 resistance they had found, should put all the 
 youth to the sword, as they threatened to do. 
 Nay, they were even then hardly restrained 
 
 from breaking into the town, and loudly mur. 
 mured against Trebonius for delaying a con- 
 quest which they looked upon as certain. 
 
 XIII. But the Marseillians, a nation with- 
 out faith, aimed at nothing further in all this, 
 than to find a time and opportunity to deceive 
 us, and put in practice the treacherous purpose 
 they had formed. For after some days, our 
 men suspecting no danger, but relying upon 
 the good faith of the enemy, while some were 
 retired to their tents, others laid down to rest 
 in the trenches, overpowered by the long fatigue 
 they had undergone, and all the arms laid up 
 and removed out of sight, suijdenly they sal- 
 lied from the town, and the wind being high, 
 and favourable to their design, set fire to the 
 works. The flame in a moment spread itself 
 on all sides, insomuch that the battery, the 
 mantles, the tortoise, the tower, the machines, 
 and the gallery were entirely destroyed, before 
 it was possible to discover whence the disaster 
 arose. The suddenness of the accident made 
 our men immediately run to their arms, where 
 every one took what came first to hand. Some 
 sallied out upon the enemy, but were checked 
 by the arrows and darts poured upon them 
 from the town ; insomuch that the Marseillians, 
 sheltered by their walls, burnt without any 
 difficulty the tower of brick and the gallery. 
 Thus the labour of many months was destroyed 
 in an instant, by the treachery of an enemy, 
 and the violence of the wind. Next day they 
 made the same attempt, favoured by the same 
 wind, and with yet greater assurance, against 
 the tower and terrace of the other attack. 
 They approached them boldly, and threw 
 plenty of fire upon them ; but our men, grown 
 wise by their late misfortune, had made all. 
 necessary preparations for their defence, so 
 that after losing many men, they were obliged 
 to retreat into the city, without effecting their 
 purpose. 
 
 XIV. Trebonius immediately resolved to 
 repair his loss, in which he found himself 
 warmly seconded by the zeal of the soldiers. 
 They saw the works, which had cost so much 
 labour and toil, destroyed by the perfidy of a 
 people, who made no scruple of violating the 
 most sacred engagements : they saw that their 
 credulity had been abused, and that they were 
 become the jest of their enemies, which griev- 
 ed and provoked them at the same time. But 
 it was still difficult to determine whence they 
 might be supplied with wood, to repair all 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 243 
 
 these works. There was none in the neighbour- 
 hood of Marseilles, the trees having been all 
 cut down for a great way round. They resolved 
 therefore to raise a terrace of a new kind, and 
 such as history no where mentions before 
 that time. They raised two walls of brick, 
 each six feet thick, and distant from one ano- 
 ther, nearly the breadth of the former mount. 
 Over these they laid a floor, and to render it 
 firm, besides its being supported on either side, 
 placed pillars underneath between the walls, 
 to bear it up where it was weakest, or had a 
 greater stress of weight to support. There 
 were moreover cross beams, which rested upon 
 niches in the wall; and to render the several 
 floors proof against fire, hurdles were laid over 
 them, which were afterwards covered with clay. 
 The soldiers, thus sheltered over head by the 
 roof, on the right and left by walls, and before 
 by a breast-work, brought the necessary mate- 
 rials without danger, and by the eagerness with 
 which they laboured, soon completed the 
 whole, kaving overtures in convenient places 
 to sally out upon occasion. 
 
 XV. The enemy seeing we had repaired, in 
 so short a time, what they imagined must have 
 cost us the labour of many days ; that there 
 was now hope left, either of deceiving us, 
 or sallying out upon us with success ; that all 
 the approaches to the city by land, might 
 in like manner be shut up by a wall and 
 towers, so as to render it impossible for them 
 to appear upon their works, our walls over- 
 topping and commanding theirs, that they 
 could neither discharge their javelins, nor 
 make any use of their engines, in which their 
 principal hope lay : and that they were now 
 reduced to the necessity of fighting us upon 
 equal terms, though conscious of their great 
 inferiority in point of valour ; they were forced 
 to have recourse again to the same conditions 
 of truce they had so ill observed before, 
 
 XVI. M. Vafro,- in farther Spain, having 
 early notice of what passed in ItJly, and be- 
 ginning to distrust the success of Pompey's 
 affairs, spoke in a very friendly manner to 
 CsBsar. He said, « That he was indeed under 
 particular obligations to Pompey, who had 
 made him his lieutenant-general, but at the 
 same time was no less indebted to Caesar : 
 that he was not ignorant of the duty of a lieu- 
 tenant, employed by his general in an office 
 of trust ; but that he likewise knew his own 
 strength, and the attachment of the whole 
 
 province to Csesar." After this manner he 
 talked in all companies, nor declared expressly 
 for either side. But when he afterwards under- 
 stood, that Csesar was detained by the siege 
 of Marseilles ; that the armies of Petreius and 
 Afranius had joined, and daily grew stronger 
 by the arrival of new succours ; that there was 
 room to hope for every thing ; that the hither ^ 
 province had unanimously declared in their 
 favour ; that Caesar himself was reduced to 
 great straits at Lerida, of all which Afranius 
 wrote largely, magnifying his own a'dvantages, 
 he began to alter with fortune. He raised 
 troops over the whole province; added thirty 
 auxiliary cohorts to the two legions he had 
 already under his command; formed great 
 magazines of corn to supply Marseilles, and 
 the armies under Afranius and Petreius ; or- 
 dered the Gaditani to furnish him with ten 
 ships of war ; caused a considerable number to 
 be b^ilt at Hispalis ; sent all the money and 
 ornaments he found in the temple of Hercules 
 to Cales ; left there a garrison of six cohorts, 
 under the command of Caius Gallonius,. a 
 Roman knight, the friend of Domitius, who 
 had sent him hither to look after an in- 
 heritance of his ; conveyed all the arms, public 
 and private, to Gallonius's house ; spoke every 
 where disadvantageously of Csesar ^ declared 
 several times from his tribunal, that Csesar had 
 been worsted, and that many of his soldiers 
 had gone over to Afranius, as he was well as- 
 sured by undoubted testimonies : by all which, 
 having struck a terror into the Roman citizens 
 of that province, he obliged them to promise 
 him one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, 
 twenty thousand weight of silver, and one 
 hundred and twenty thousand bushels of 
 wheat. The states well affected to Caesar he 
 loaded with heavy contributions ; confiscated 
 W^e effects of such as had spoken against the 
 commonwealth ; quartered soldiers upon them ; 
 harassed them with arbitrary judgments ; and 
 in fine, obliged the whole province to take an 
 oath of fidelity to himself and Pompey. Hear- 
 ing of what had passed in hither Spain, he 
 prepared for war. His design was, to shut 
 himself up with his two legions in Cales, 
 where all the provisions and shipping lay, be- 
 cause he very well understood, that the whole 
 province was in Caesar's interest ; for he judged 
 it would be easy in that island, with the ships 
 and provisions he had, to draw out the war 
 into length. 
 
244 
 
 CiESAirS 
 
 XVII. CsEsar, though called upon b}' many 
 and necessary affairs to return to Italy, re- 
 solved, however, not to leave Spain, till he 
 had entirely quelled the war in that province ; 
 for he knew that hither Spain had many obli- 
 gations to Pompey, and that most of the in- 
 habitants were strongly in his interest. Hav- 
 ing therefore detached two legions into farther 
 Spain, under the command of Q. Cassius, 
 tribune of the people, he himself advanced, 
 by great journeys, at the head of six hundred 
 horse. He sent orders before to the magis- 
 trates, and the principal men of every state, to 
 meet him by a certain day at Cordova. All 
 obeyed; every state sent his deputies; nor 
 was there a single Roman citizen of any con- 
 sideration, who did not repair thither on this 
 occasion. The very senate of Cordovia, of 
 their own proper motion, shut their gates 
 against Varro, stationed guards and sentinels 
 along the walls, and detained two cohorts, 
 called Calonicse, which chanced to march that 
 way, that they might serve to protect the town. 
 At the same time those of Carmona, the most 
 considerable state in the province, drove out 
 of their city three cohorts, which Varro had 
 left to garrison the citadel, and shut their gates 
 against them. 
 
 XVIII. This determined Varro to make 
 all possible despatch, that he might reach 
 Cales as soon as possible, lest his march 
 should be intercepted ; so great and apparent 
 was the affection of the province to Caesar. 
 When he was advanced a little way, he re- 
 ceived letters from Cales, which informed 
 him, " That as soon as Caesar's edict was 
 known, the principal men of Cales, with the 
 tribunes of the cohorts he had left in garrison, 
 had conspired to drive Gallonius from the city, 
 and preserve the town and island for Css^; 
 that this project being formed, they had wariWd 
 Gallonius to retire of his own accord, while he 
 yet might with safety ; threatening, if he did 
 not, to come to some immediate resolution 
 against him : that Galloniusj terrified by eo 
 general a revolt, had accordingly left Cales." 
 Upon this intelligence, one of the two legions, 
 known by the name of Vernacula, took up 
 their ensigns in Varro's presence, quitted the 
 camp, and marched directly to Hispalis, where 
 they sat down in the market-place and clois- 
 ters, without committing the least act of vio- 
 lence, which so wrought upon the Roman 
 citizens residing in the town, that every one 
 
 was desirous of accommodating them in theii 
 houses. Varro, astonished at these proceed- 
 ings, turned back with design to reach Italn^a, 
 but was informed that the gates were shut. 
 At last, finding himself surrounded on all 
 sides, and the ways every where beset, he 
 wrote to Caesar that he was ready to resign 
 the legion under his command, to whomsoever 
 he should order to receive it. Caesar sent 
 Sextus Caesar to take the command ; and 
 Varro, having resigned the legion accordingly, 
 came to him at Cordova. After giving him 
 an account of the state of the province, he 
 faithfully resigned all the public money he 
 had in his hands, and informed him of the 
 quantity of corn and shipping he had pre- 
 pared. 
 
 XIX, Caesar, assembling the states at Cor- 
 dova, returned thanks severally to all who 
 had declared in his favour : to the Roman citi- 
 zens, for having made themselves masters of 
 the town in his name ; to the Spaniards, for 
 driving out Pompey's garrisons ; to the people 
 of Cales, for having frastrated the designs of 
 his enemies, and asserted their own liberty ; 
 to the military tribunes and centurions sent 
 thither to guard the place, for having con- 
 firmed them in their resolutions by their ex- 
 ample. He remitted the tribute imposed by 
 Varro upon the Roman citizens ; restored 
 their estates to those who had been deprived 
 of them for speaking their thoughts freely; 
 distributed rewards to a great many, both in 
 public and private, and gave all room to hope 
 for like favours in the issue. After a stay of 
 two days at Cordova, he went to Cales, where 
 he restored to the temple of Hercules all the 
 treasures and ornaments which had been car- 
 ried off, and lodged in private houses. He 
 committed the government of the province to 
 Q. Cassius, assigned him four legions for that 
 purpose ; and embarking for Tarraco on board 
 the fleet which Varro had obliged the Gadi- 
 tani to fifrnish, arrived there in a few days. 
 There he found deputies from almost all the 
 states of the province, and having, in like 
 manner as 'at Cordova, both publicly and pri- 
 vately rewarded some states, he left Tarraco, 
 came by land to Narbonne, and thence to 
 Marseilles. There he was informed of the 
 law touching the dictatorship, and that M, 
 Lepidus the pretor had named him to that 
 office. 
 
 XX. The Marseillians, overwhelmed wit* 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 245 
 
 a profusion of calamities, reduced to the ut- 
 most distress by famine, worsted in two differ- 
 ent engagements by sea, weakened by contin- 
 ual sallies, assaulted by a heavy pestilence, 
 occasioned by the length of the siege, and 
 their constant change of diet, (for they were 
 obliged to feed upon old meal and musty 
 barley, which had been long treasured up in 
 their magazines against an accident of this 
 kind,) their tower being overthrown, a great 
 part of their walls undermined, and no pro- 
 spect of relief from armies or the provinces, 
 which were now all reduced under Ctesar's 
 power, they resolved to surrender in good 
 earnest. But some days before, Domitius, 
 who was apprized of their intentions, having 
 prepared three ships (two of which he assigned 
 to his followers, and embarked in person on 
 board the third,) took occasion during a storm 
 to make his escape. Some of Brutus's galleys, 
 which he had ordered to keep constantly 
 cruising before the port, chancing to get sight 
 of him, prepared to give chase. That in which 
 Domitius was, escaped under favour of the 
 tempest ; but the two others, alarmed at seeing 
 our galleys so near them, re-entered the port. 
 Cffisar spared the town, more in regard to its 
 antiquity and reputation, than any real merit 
 it Qpuld plead. He obliged the citizens how- 
 ever to deliver up their arms, machines, and 
 ships of war, whether in the port or arsenal ; 
 to surrender all the money in their treasury ; 
 and to receive a garrison of two legions. Then 
 sending the rest of the army into Italy, he 
 himself set out for Rome. 
 
 XXI. About the same time, C. Curio 
 sailed from Sicily into Africa, with two of the 
 four legions which had been put under his 
 command by Csesar, and five hundred horse ; 
 having conceived the highest contempt of the 
 troops headed by P. Attius Varus. After 
 two days and three nights sailing, he landed 
 at a place called Aquilaria. This place is 
 about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, 
 and has a very convenient harbour for ships in 
 the summer time, sheltered on each side by a 
 promontory. L. Csesar, the son, waited for 
 him at Clupea, with ten galleys, which P. 
 Attius had taken in tne war against the pi- 
 rates, and repaired at Uti&a, for the service of 
 the present war. But terrified at the number 
 of ships Curio brought with him, he stood in 
 for the cost ; where, running his galley on 
 shore, he left her, and went by land to Adru- 
 22 
 
 metum. C. Ccjifidius Longus commanded in 
 that town, with one legion : and here also the 
 rest of the fleet repaired after CaBsar's flight. 
 M. Rufus the questor pursuing them, with 
 twelve galleys, which Curio had brought with 
 him from Africa, to guard the traiisports ; 
 when he saw Caesar's own galley upon the 
 strand, he towed her oflT, and returned with 
 the fleet to Curio. 
 
 XXII. Curio ordered him to sail directly 
 for Utica, and followed himself with the land 
 army. After a march of two days, he arrived 
 at the river Bagradas, where he left C. Cani- 
 nius Rebilus with the legions, and advanced 
 before with the cavalry, to take a view of the 
 Cornelian camp, which was judged to be a 
 situation extremely advantageous. It is a high 
 rock, jutting out into the sea, steep and rough 
 on both sides, but with an easier descent where 
 it fronts Utica. It lies little more than a mile 
 from TTtica in a direct line ; but as there is a 
 fountain about half way, which runs towards 
 the sea, and overflowing the plain, forms a 
 morass ; to avoid this, in marching to Utica, 
 it is necessary to take a compass of six miles. 
 When he had taken a view of this post, he 
 went next and examined Varus's camp, which 
 was under the walls of the town, towards the 
 gate named the Gate of War. The situatioji 
 of it was extremely advantageous ; for on the 
 one side it was covered by the city of Utica 
 itself, and on the other by a kind of theatre, 
 which stood without the walls, the works 
 round which took up so much room, that they 
 rendered the approach to the camp extremely 
 difficult. At the same time he saw all the 
 ways crowded with people, who, out of fear of 
 being pillaged, were carrying their most valu- 
 able effects into the city. He detached the 
 cavalry against them to disperse them, and 
 likewise have an opportunity of making some 
 booty. Upon which. Varus ordered six hun. 
 dred Numidian horse to advance to their assis- 
 tance, which he further strengthened with 
 four hundred foot, sent by Juba, a few days 
 before, to reinforce the garrison of Utica. 
 This king inherited from his father an aflec- 
 tion for Pompey, and besides personally 
 hated Curio ; who, during his tribuneship 
 had published a law to deprive him of his 
 kingdom. The Numidian cavalry soon came 
 to blows with ours ; but were not able to stand 
 their first charge, retreating to their camp, 
 with the loss of a hundred and twenty men. 
 
246 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 Meantime, upon the arrival of Curio's fleet 
 he ~?3ered proclamation to be made among 
 the merchant ships, which were at Utica, to 
 the number of two hundred, that he would 
 treat them as enemies, if they did not imme- 
 diately -repair to the Cornelian camp. Upon 
 this proclamation, they instantly weighed an- 
 chor, and leaving Utica, sailed whither they 
 were ordered ; by which means the army was 
 plentifully supplied with every thing they 
 stood in need of. 
 
 XXIII. These things despatched, Curio 
 repaired to his camp at Bagrada, where, with 
 the joint acclamations of the whole army, he 
 was saluted by the name of Imperator. Next 
 day he led his army towards Utica, and en- 
 camped not far from the town. But before he 
 had finished his entrenchments, he was in- 
 formed by some parties of horse, who were 
 upon the scout, that a powerful body of horse 
 and foot had been sent by the king of Utica : 
 at the same time a great cloud of dust began 
 to appear, and soon after the enemy's van was 
 in view. Curio, astonished at a motion so un- 
 expected, sent the cavalry before to sustain 
 their first charge, and keep them in play : he, 
 meanwhile, drawing off the legions from the 
 works, with all possible expedition, formed 
 them in order of battle. The horse engaged, 
 according to orders; and with such success, 
 that before the legions could be duly drawn 
 up, the whole reinforcement sent by the king, 
 who marched without order or apprehension 
 of danger, falling into confusion, at last betook 
 themselves to flight. The cavalry, wheeling 
 nimbly along the shore, escaped, with little 
 loss, into the town ; but great numbers of the 
 infantry were cut to pieces. 
 
 XXIV. Next night, two centurions of the 
 nation of the Marsi, with twenty-two private 
 soldiers, deserted from Curio, and went over 
 to Attius Varus. These, either believing the 
 thing themselves, or desirous to carry grate- 
 ful tidings to Varus, (for we easily believe 
 what we wish, and readily hope that others 
 will fall into our way of thinking,) assured 
 him, that the whole army was extremely 
 averse to Curio, and would infallibly revolt, if 
 he would but advance, and come to a confer- 
 ence with them. Accordingly Varus drew 
 out his legions next day. Curio did the same ; 
 and the two arniies stood facing one another in 
 order of battle, with a small valley between 
 them. 
 
 XXV. Sextus Quintilius Varus, who, as 
 we have related above, had been made prison- 
 er at Corfinium, was now in the enemy's army : 
 for Csesar having granted him his liberty, he 
 had retired into Africa. Curio had brought 
 over with him from Sicily the very same le- 
 gions, who had revolted some time before to 
 Csesar at the siege of Corfinium : so that ex- 
 cepting a few centurions who had been chang- 
 ed, the officers and companies were the same 
 as had formerly served with this very Quin- 
 tilius. He made use of this handle to debauch 
 the army of Curio ; " and began with putting 
 the soldiers in mind of their former oath to 
 Domitius, and to himself, that general's ques. 
 tor ; he exhorted them not to carry arms against 
 the old companions of their fortune, who had 
 shared with them in all the hazards of that 
 siege ; nor fight in defence of that party, who 
 treated them ignominiously, and as deserters." 
 To these considerations, he added offers of a 
 liberal recompense, if they would follow his for- 
 tune and that of ^ttius. But his speech made 
 no impression upon Curio's troops, so that 
 both armies retired to their respective camps. 
 
 XXVI. But an uncommon panic soon 
 spread itself over Curio's camp, which the 
 various discourses of the soWieis served only 
 to increase. For every one had his opinion, 
 and added the suggestions 4!ff his own fear to 
 that which he heard from others. These re- 
 ports spreading from one to many, and receiv- 
 ing additions in every new relation, there ap- 
 peared to be several authors of the same 
 notions : " That in a civil war it was lawful for 
 every soldier to choose what side he pleased ; 
 that the same legion, who a little before 
 had fought on the side of the enemy, might, 
 without scruple, return again to the same 
 cause, since Caesar's conferring favours upon 
 his enemies, ought not to render them un- 
 mindful of prior and greater obligations : that 
 even the municipal towns were divided in 
 their affection, and sided some with one party, 
 some with another." These discourses pro- 
 ceeded not from the Marsi and Peligni alone, 
 hut ran like a torrent through the whole camp 
 However, some of th% soldiers blamed theii 
 companions for this so great freedom of talk 
 and others, who affected to appear more di 
 ligent than the rest, enlarged in their account* 
 of it to the officers. 
 
 XXVII. For these reasons, Curio summon 
 ing a council of war, began to deliberate 
 
COMMltNTARIES. 
 
 247 
 
 about the proper remedies for this evil. Some 
 were for attacking, at all hazards, the camp of 
 Varus, in order to find employment for the 
 soldiers, whose idleness they considered as the 
 cause of all the present alarms. Besides, it 
 was better, they said to trust to valour, and 
 try the fortune of a battle, than see themselves 
 abandoned by their men, and delivered up to 
 ihe barbarity of the enemy. Others were for 
 retiring, during the night, to the Cornelian 
 camp, where they would have more time to 
 cure the infatuation of the soldiers : and 
 whence, in case of a disaster, they could, with 
 more safety and ease, make good their retreat 
 into Sicily, by means of the great number of 
 ships they were there provided with. Curio 
 relished neither of these notions : the one, he 
 thought, argued cowardice ; the other, a rash 
 boldness : to retreat, would have all the ap- 
 pearance of a shameful flight ; to attack, they 
 must resolve to fight in a place of disadvan- 
 tage. « With what hope," said he, " can we 
 attack a camp fortified by nature and art 1 
 And what advantage can we draw from an 
 attempt, whence we shall be obliged to retire 
 with loss 1 Does not success always secure to 
 a general the affection of his troops, whereas ill 
 fortune is evermore followed with contempt 1 
 And what would a decampment imply but an 
 ignominious flight, an absolute despair of all 
 things, and an unavoidable alienation of the 
 whole army 1 That we ought not to let the 
 modest think we distrust them, nor the inso- 
 lent that we fear them ; because the know- 
 ledge of our fear only augments the presump- 
 tion of the one, and an apprehension of being 
 suspected, abates the zeal of the other. But 
 if what is reported of the discontent of the 
 army be true, which I am yet unwilling to be- 
 lieve, at least to the degree some pretend ; we 
 ought, for that reason, rather to hide and dis- 
 semble our fears, than by an unreasonable 
 discovery of them, to add strength to the evil ; 
 that, as in some cases, it was necessary to con- 
 ceal the wounds of the body, that the enemy 
 might not conceive hope from our misfortunes ; 
 so also ought we to hide the indisposition of an 
 army : that by retreating in the night, as some 
 proposed, they would only furnish a fairer oc- 
 casion to the ill-affected to execute their pur- 
 pose : for fear and shame are powerful re- 
 straints by day, but night entirely divests them 
 of their force : that he was neither so rash, as 
 to attack a camp without hopes of success ; 
 
 nor so blinded by fear, as to be at a loss what 
 measures to pursue : that he thought it his 
 duty to examine things to the bottom ; and 
 as he had called them together to deliberate 
 upon the present state of affairs, doubted not, 
 with their assistance, to take such measures as 
 would be attended with success." 
 
 XXVIII. He then dismissed the council ; 
 and assembling the soldiers, put them in mind 
 of what advantage their steadiness and zeal 
 had been to Cjesar at Corfinium, and how ser- 
 viceable towards the conquest of the greatest 
 part of Italy. " It was you," said he, " that 
 gave the example, and all the municipal towns 
 soon followed : their submission to Caesar was 
 your work ; and therefore it is not without 
 reason, that he is so particularly attached to 
 you, and that Pompey hates you sincerely. It 
 was you that obliged him to quit Italy, with- 
 out being forced to it by the loss of a battle. 
 Cassar, who ranks me in the number of his 
 dearest friends, has committed my safety to 
 your care, with Sicily and Africa, without 
 which it would be impossible to defend either 
 Rome or Italy. ' You are now in the presence 
 of those who exhort you to abandon us : and 
 indeed what could be more desirable to them, 
 than at the same time to ensnare us, and 
 fix upon you the stain of an infinite crime 1 
 What worse opinion could an enraged enemy 
 testify of you, than to suppose you capable of 
 betraying those, who own themselves indebted 
 to you for all ; and of throwing yourselves into 
 the power of a party, who consider you as the 
 authors of all their misfortunes 1 Are you 
 strangers. to Caesar's exploits in Spain 1 Two 
 armies defeated ! Two generals overcome ! 
 Two provinces brought under subjection ! And 
 all this in the space of forty days! Isit likely that 
 those, who, with forces unbroken, could not 
 stand their ground, will be able to resist, now 
 they are vanquished 1 And will you who fol- 
 lowed Caesar before fortune declared in his 
 favour, now return to the vanquished, when 
 fortune has already decided the quarrel, and 
 you are upon the point of obtaining the re- 
 ward of your services 1 They charge you with 
 having abandoned and betrayed them, con- 
 trary to the faith of oaths. But is it indeed 
 true, that you abandoned Domitius 1 Or did 
 he not rather meanly abandon you, at a titae 
 when you were ready to suffer every thing for 
 his sake 1 Did he not, unknown to you, re- 
 solve to seek his safety in flight 1 And were 
 
248 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 you not, after feeing tlius basely betrayed by 
 him, indebted to Cssar's goodness for your 
 preservation 1 How could your oath bind you 
 to one, who after throwing away the ensigns 
 of his authority, and divesting himself of his 
 otfice, surrendered himself a private man and 
 a captive into the power of another 1 The new 
 engagement you were then brought under 
 alone subsists at present, and ought quite to 
 obliterate that, which the surrender of your 
 general, and his loss of liberty, have made 
 void. But though I doubt not of your being 
 satisfied with Cassar, you may perhaps have 
 taken offence at me. And, indeed, I have no 
 thought of mentioning any services I may 
 have done you ; which, as yet, come far short 
 of my intentions, and your expectations : but 
 you are not ignorant, that the rewards of mili- 
 tary service come not till after the conclusion 
 of the war; and I believe you little doubt 
 what the issue of this will be. Nor need I, 
 on this occasion, decline taking notice of the 
 diligence I have used, the progress already 
 made, and the good fortune that has hitherto 
 attended me. Are you dissatisfied that I have 
 landed my army safe in Africa, without the 
 loss of a single ship 1 That I dispersed the 
 enemy's fleet at the first onset 1 That within 
 the space of two days I have twice defeated 
 their cavalry 1 That I forced two hundred 
 of their merchantmen to quit the port of 
 Utica and join me 1 And that I have reduced 
 them to a situation where it is impossible for 
 them to receive any supplies either by land or 
 sea "? Can you think of abandoning a cause 
 conducted by such leaders, and attended with 
 such success ; to follow the fortune of those 
 who so ignominiously delivered up Corfinium, 
 relinquished Italy, surrendered Spain, and have 
 already sustained considerable losses in the 
 African war ? I never pretended to more than 
 being a follower of Caesar : it was you that 
 honoured me with the title of Iraperator, which 
 I am ready this moment to resign, if you think 
 me unworthy of the favour. Restore me my 
 former name, that it may not be said I was 
 honoured, to be covered afterwards with the 
 greater ignominy." 
 
 XXIX. These remonstrances made such 
 an impression upon the soldiers, that they fre- 
 quently interrupted him while he was speaking, 
 and appeared deeply touched at his suspecting 
 their fidelity. As he retired, they all gathered 
 round him, exhorting him not to be discour- 
 aged, or scruple to hazard a battle, and make 
 
 trial of iheir fidelity and bravery. This be- 
 haviour of the troops wrought so great a change 
 in the minds of the officers, that Curio with the 
 joint concurrence of them all, resolved to 
 give battle the first opportunity that offered. 
 Accordingly, drawing out his men next day, ia 
 the same place he had done for some time past, 
 he ranged them in order of battle. Attius 
 Varus did the same ; that if an opportunity of- 
 fered, either of corrupting the soldiers, or 
 fighting to advantage, he might be in readiness 
 to lay hold of it. " 
 
 XXX. Between the two armies lay a val- 
 ley, as we have observed above, not indeed con- 
 siderable for its breadth, but steep and dif- 
 ficult of ascent. Both sides waited till the other 
 should pass it, that they might engage to more 
 advantage. Curio observing that all the horse 
 on Varus's right wing, together with the light- 
 armed foot, had ventured down into this val- 
 ley, detached his cavalry against them, with 
 two cohorts of Marrucinians ; whose firstsliock 
 the enemy were not able to sustain, but re- 
 turned full speed to their own men, leaving the 
 light-armed foot behind, who were surrounded 
 and cut to pieces in the sight of Varus's army ; 
 which, fronting that way, was witness to the 
 flight of the one, and the slaughter of the 
 other. Upon this Rebilus, one of Caesar's 
 lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him 
 from Sicily, on account of his consummate 
 knowledge in the art of war ; " Vl^hy," says 
 he, " do you delay seizing the favourable mo- 
 ment 1 You see the enemy struck with terror." 
 Curio made no answer, only desired his soldiers 
 to remember what they had promised the day 
 before, and marching the first, commanded 
 them to follow him. The valley was so steep 
 and difficult, that the first ranks could not as- 
 cend, but with the assistance of those that came 
 after. But the Attinian army was so dispirited 
 with fear, and the flight and slaughter of their 
 troops, that they never thought of making re- 
 sistance, fancying themselves already sur- 
 rounded by our cavalry ; so that before we 
 could arrive within reach of the dart, the whole 
 army of Varus fled and retreated to their camp. 
 
 XXXI. In this flight, one Fabius Pelignus, 
 a centurion of the lowest rank in Curio's army, 
 as he was pursuing the fugitives, called with a 
 loud voice to Varus as if he had been one of 
 his own men, who wanted to admonish him of 
 something. Varus hearing himself named 
 several times, turned and stood still, demand- 
 ing who he was, and what he wanted. Fabius 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 249 
 
 aimed a blow at his breast with his sword, and 
 would certainly have killed him, had not Varus 
 warded it off with his shield. Fabius himself 
 was soon after surrounded and slain. Mean- 
 while, the multitude of fugitives so closed up 
 the gates of the camp, and pressed upon one 
 another in such a manner, that more were 
 crowded to death, than fell either in the battle 
 or pursuit. Nay, the camp itself was very 
 near being taken ; because great numbers, in- 
 stead of stopping there to defend it, made di- 
 rectly for the town. But both the nature of 
 the ground, and the fortifications themselves, 
 prevented the assault ; and the rather, as 
 Curio's soldiers being armed only for battle, 
 had brought with them none of the necessary 
 tools to force a camp. Curio brought back 
 his army without the loss of a man, Fabius ex- 
 cepted. Of the enemy, about six hundred were 
 killed, and a thousand wounded. After Curio 
 had drawn off his men, all the wounded quit- 
 ted the camp, and retired into the city, as did 
 a great many others, who, overcome by fear, 
 sheltered themselves there also under the 
 same pretence. Varus observing this, and 
 that a universal dread had seized the army, 
 left only a trumpet in the camp, with a few 
 tents for show, and, about midnight, silently 
 entered the town with all his forces. 
 
 XXXII, Next day Curio resolved to be- 
 siege Utica, and draw a line of circumvallation 
 round it. There was in the town a multitude 
 of men unfit for the fatigues of war, through a 
 long enjoyment of peace. The inhabitants 
 themselves were strongly attached to Caesar, 
 for ancient favours received from him. The 
 senate was composed of people greatly differ- 
 ing in their tempers, and the losses already 
 sustained spread terror through all ranks. A 
 surrender was publicly talked of, and all con- 
 curred in soliciting Varus not to ruin them by 
 his obstinacy and perverseness. While these 
 things were in agitation, messengers sent by 
 king Juba arrived, who informed them of the 
 approach of his army, and exhorted them to 
 defend the city ; which contributed not a little 
 to confirm their wavering minds. 
 
 XXXIII. Curio received the same news, but 
 for some time would not believe it, so greatly 
 did he confide in his good fortune. Besides, 
 Csesar's success in Spain was already known 
 in Africa; whence he concluded it improba- 
 ble that Juba would attempt any thing against 
 him. But when he was for certain iirformed 
 
 22* 
 
 of his being within twenty-five miler of Utica 
 with his whole army, he retired from before 
 the town to the Cornelian camp, laid in great 
 quantities of corn and wood, began to fortify 
 himself, and sent directly to Sicily for the ca- 
 valry, and the two legions he had left there. 
 The camp itself was very advantageous for 
 protracting the war, being strong both by na- 
 ture and aA, near the sea, and abounding in 
 water and salt, great quantities of which had 
 been carried thither from the neighbouring salt- 
 pits. Neither ran he any hazard of being 
 straitened for wood and corn, as the country 
 abounded in trees and grain. He resolved, 
 therefore, with the consent of the whole army, 
 to wait here the arrival of the rest of the troops, 
 and make preparation for continuing the war. 
 
 XXXIV. This resolution being taken, and 
 meeting with general approbation, some of the 
 townsmen, who had deserted to Curio,informed 
 him, that the war in which Juba was engaged 
 with the Leptitani, having obliged him to re- 
 turn into his own kingdom, he had only sent 
 his lieutenant Sabura, with a small body of 
 forces, to the assistance of the Uticans. Upon 
 this intelligence, to which he too hastily gave 
 credit, he changed his design, and resolved to 
 give battle. The fire of youth, his courage, 
 good success, and self-confidence, contributed 
 greatly to confirm him in this resolution. Urged 
 by these considerations, about the beginning of 
 the night, he sent all his cavalry towards the 
 enemy's camp, which was upon the river Bag- 
 radas, and where Sabura, of whom we have 
 spoken before, commanded in chief. But the 
 king followed with all his forces, and was not 
 above six miles behind him. The cavalry 
 which Curio had detached, marched all night, 
 and coming unexpectedly upon the enemy, at- 
 tacked them before they were ready to re- 
 ceive the charge : for the Numidians, accord- 
 ing to the custom of that barbarous country, 
 were encamped without order or rule. Fall- 
 ing upon them therefore, in this confusion, and 
 oppressed with sleep, they slew great numbers, 
 and obliged the rest to fly in the utmost con- 
 sternation ; after which they returned to Curio 
 with the prisoners they had taken. 
 
 XXXV, Curio had set out with all his for- 
 ces about the fourth watch of the night, leav- 
 ing only five cohorts to guard his camp. After 
 a march of six miles he was met by his cavalry, 
 who informed him of all that had passed. He 
 asked the prisoners, who commanded at Bag- 
 
 2K 
 
250 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 radas 1 They answered, Sabura. Upon this, 
 ■without making any further inquiries, for fear 
 of being detained too long, he turned to the 
 troops next to him, and said, " Do you not see, 
 fellow-soldiers, that the report of the prisoners 
 corresponds exactly with the intelligence given 
 by the deserters 1 Juba is not with the army. 
 It must consist of but a few troops, since they 
 were not able to withstand the Aarge of a 
 small body of horse. Haste, therefore, in the 
 pursuit of glory, booty, and victory." What 
 the cavalry had done was indeed considerable, 
 because they were but few in number in com- 
 parison of the Numidians ; but as vanity always 
 makes us believe our merit to be greater than 
 it is, they themselves boasted immoderately 
 of the action, and endeavoured to enhance 
 the value of it. They made a mighty parade 
 of the booty. The prisoners too, as well in- 
 fantry as cavalry, marched in procession be- 
 fore them. And indeed the whole army 
 imagined, that to delay the battle, was no 
 other than to delay the victory ; so that the 
 ardour of the troops perfectly seconded Curio's 
 hopes. He therefore hastened his march, 
 ordering the horse to follow, that he might 
 as soon as possible come up with the frighted 
 enemy. But as they were fatigued with their 
 late march, they found themselves unable to 
 keep pace with the army ; but stopped, some 
 in one place, some in another ; which, how- 
 ever, retarded not Curio's hopes. 
 
 XXXVI. Juba having notice from Sabura 
 of the action in the night, detached to his as- 
 sistance two thousand Spanish and Gallic 
 horse, of his ordinary guard, with that part of 
 the infantry in which he put the greatest con- 
 fidence. Himself followed leisurely with the 
 rest of the troops, and about forty elephants, 
 suspecting that Curio, who had sent the caval- 
 ry before, could not be far off with his army. 
 Sabura drew up his horse and foot, ordering 
 them to give ground upon the enemy's attack, 
 and, as through fear, counterfeit a flight. 
 Meanwhile he told them, that he would give 
 the signal of battle when he saw proper, 
 and direct their motions as the case might re- 
 quire. 
 
 XXXVIT. Curio, flattered with new hopes, 
 and imagining, by the enemy's motions, 
 that they were preparing for flight, made his 
 troops come down from the mountain into the 
 plain ; and advancing still farther, though 
 his army was already very much fatigued, 
 
 having marched upwards of sixteen miles, 
 halted at last to give the men breath. That 
 moment Sabura sounded the charge, led on 
 his men in order of battle, and went from rank 
 to rank to animate the troops ; but he suffer- 
 ed only the cavalry to come to blows, keeping 
 the infantry at a distance within sight. Curio 
 was not wanting on his side, but exhorted his 
 men to place all their hopes in their valour. 
 And indeed neither the infantry, though 
 fatigued with their march, nor the cavalry, 
 though few in number, and spent with toil, 
 showed any want of valour, or backward, 
 ness to fight; though the last in particular 
 did not exceed two hundred, the rest having 
 stopped by the way. These, wherever they 
 attacked the enemy, obliged them to s^ive 
 ground, but they could neither pursue far, 
 nor drive their horses on with impetuosity. 
 On the other hand, the Numidian cavalry 
 began to surround our men, and charge them 
 in the rear. When the cohorts advanced 
 against them, they fell back, and by the 
 quickness of their retreat, eluded the charge, 
 but immediately returning, they got behind 
 our men, and cut them off from the rest of 
 the army. Thus it was equally dangerous for 
 them to maintain their ranks, or advance to 
 battle. The enemy's forces increased con- 
 tinually, by the reinforcements sent from the 
 king; ours, on the contrary, were disabled by 
 fatigue. Neither could our wounded men re- 
 tire, or be sent to any place of safety, the 
 whole army being invested by the enemy's 
 horse. These despairing of safety, as is usual 
 for men in the last moments of life, either 
 lamented their own fate, or recommended 
 their relations to their fellow-soldiers, if any 
 should be so fortunate as to escape that 
 danger. The whole army was filled with 
 consternation and grief. 
 
 XXXVIII. Curio perceiving the general 
 alarm, and that neither his exhortations nor 
 prayers were regarded, ordered the troops to 
 retire with the standards to the nearest 
 mountains, as the only resource in the present 
 exigence. But the cavalry detached by 
 Sabura had already seized them. All hope 
 being now lost, some were slain while en- 
 deavouring to fly ; others threw themselves 
 upon the ground, partly in despair, partly 
 unable to make any efforts for their own 
 safety. At this moment, Cn. Domitius, who 
 commanded the horse, addressing Curio, en- 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 251 
 
 treated him to regain his camp with the few 
 cav^alry that remained, promising not to aban- 
 don him. "Can I," says Curio, " look Csesar 
 in the face, after having lost an army he had 
 committed to my charge]" So saying, he 
 continued fighting till he was slain. Very 
 few of the cavalry escaped, those only excepted 
 who had stopped to refresh their horses ; for 
 perceiving at a distance the rout of the whole 
 army, they returned to their camp. All the 
 infantry were slain to a man. 
 
 XXXIX. When this disaster was known, 
 M. Rufus the questor, whom Curio had left 
 to guard the camp, entreated his men not to 
 lose courage. They begged and requested 
 him to reconduct them into Sicily ; which he 
 promised, and ordered the masters of the 
 transports to have their ships in readiness at 
 night along the shore. But fear had so uni- 
 versally seized the minds of the soldiers, that 
 some cried out Juba was arrived with his 
 troops ; some that Varus approached with the 
 legions, the dust of whose march they pre- 
 tended to discern ; and others, that the enemy's 
 fleet would be upon them in an instant; though 
 there was not the least ground for these re- 
 ports. The consternation thus becoming 
 general, each man thought only of his own 
 
 safety. Those who were already embarked, 
 sailed immediately, and their flight drew after 
 it that of the transports ; so that only a very 
 few small frigates obeyed the summons, and 
 came to the general rendezvous. The disor- 
 der was so great upon the shore, every one 
 striving who should first embark, that many 
 boats sunk under the crowd, and others were 
 afraid to come near the land. 
 
 XL. Thus only a few soldiers and aged 
 men, who either through interest or compas- 
 sion were received on board, or had strength 
 enough to swim to the transports, got safe to 
 Sicily. The rest, deputing their centurions 
 to Varus by night, surrendered to him. Juba, 
 coming up next day, claimed them as his 
 property, put the greSiter number to the sword, 
 and sent a few of the most considerable, 
 whom he had selected for that purpose, into 
 Numidia. Varus complained of this violation 
 of his faith ; but durst not make any resistance. 
 The king made his entrance into the city on 
 horseback, followed by a great number of 
 senators, among whom were Servius Sulpicius, 
 and Licinius Damasippus. Here he stayed a 
 few days, to give what orders he thought 
 necessary; and then returned, with all is 
 forces, into his kingdom. 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 253 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 i Caesar reserves some jaigments given upon persons for bribery at elections.— II. He sets out for Brundu 
 sium. — III. F.nnpey's m'lgluy preparations f >r war. — IV. Casar embarks and arrives at tlie Promontory of 
 Ceraimimn. — VI. His tleel returning from Brundusium is intercepted by the enemy. — VII. M. Octavius, one 
 of Pompey's adlierents, laying siege to Salona, is obliged, by a sudden sally of tlie inliabilants, to abandon 
 his lines.— VIII. Cffisar's embassy to Pompey with proposals of peace.— IX. Ca?sar makes himself master of 
 Oricuni.- X. Also of ApoUonia, and the whole country round about.— XI. Ca'sar and Pompey encamp over 
 against each other on the banks of the river Apsus.— XII. Ca'sar's transp(.>rts sailing from Biiindusium, put 
 back inuuediately for fear of the enemy.— XIII. Pompey's fleet reduced to great straits.- XIV.— Conferences 
 set on fool about a peace, which come to notliing.— XV. Bibulus, admiral of Pompey's Heel, dies.— XVI. Pom- 
 pey's answer to Cxsar's propiosals of peace.— XVII. The conferences about a peace renewed, but witlioiit ef- 
 fect.— XVIII. A commotion in Rome.— XXI. Libo, one of Pompey's followers, blocks up the port of Brundu- 
 simn wiUi a fleet.— XXU. But by the valour and conduct of Antony, is forced to quit his priijoct.— XXIII. An- 
 tony and Kaleuus transport Ccesar's troops to Greece, wuh wonderful good success.— XXVII. Pompey, to 
 avoid being shut up between two armies, retires to Asparagium. — XX\I1I. Scipio, a parlizau of Pompey, be- 
 haves very tyrannically inAsia.— XXLX. The motions of Csesar's lieutenants in ThossaIy,iEtoIia, and Mace- 
 donia.— XXXIV. Young Ponipey burns Caesar's fleet in the port of Oricuiu.— XXXV. Ca?sar cuts otl'Pompey's 
 commimicationwilhDyrrhachium.— XXXVI. And besieges him in his camp— XXXIX. Many attempts and 
 dispositions on both sides, with%-arious turns of fortune. — XL. Ca?sar's troops, distressed for want of corn, 
 make bread of a certain root,- XLIII. Pompey repulsed in a sally.— XLVII. Kalenus, one of Caesar's lieute- 
 nants, possesses himself of several towns in Achaia.— XLVIIl. Ca-sarotfers Pompey battle. —XLIX. Another 
 embassy, with proposals of peace, which are rejected.— L. Pompey distressed for want of forage, resolves to 
 break through Caesar's lines.— LI. Roscillus and ..^Igus, disgusted at some check they had received from 
 Caesar, revolt to Pompey.— LIL Pompey breaks through Caesar's lines; after making great slaughter of his 
 troops. — LXI. Ciesar desists from lite design of inclosing Pompey, and makes n speeclt to his men.— LXII. 
 Csesar retires to Asparagium, and is followed by Pompey.— LXV. Thence to ApoUonia.— LXVII. And then to 
 Gomphi, a town of Thessaly, which, refusing to open hs gates, is uiken by assault the first day.— LXVIIT. 
 Metropolis submits, and their e.xample is followed by other Thessalian states.— LXIX. Pompey arrives in 
 Thessaly, elated with his success, and confident of victory.— LiX. Ciesar resolves to give battle. His reso- 
 lution with respect to his cavalry.— LXXII. Pompey likewise resolves to give battle, and boasts of an assured 
 victory.— LXXIII. The disposition of Pompey's army.— LXXIV. The disposition of Caesar's.— LXXV. Caesar'g 
 speech to his soldiers.— LXX\1. The battle of Pliarsalia, in which Cssar obtains a complete victory.— 
 LXXVII. Ccesar makes himself master of Pompey's camp.— LXXVIII. Where he finds great ricltes.- LXXIX. 
 f ouipey's ttiglil.— LXXX. Cs-sar pursues Pompey's troops, and obliges tliom to surrender.— LXXXI. Tlie 
 number of men killed on each side.— LXXXII. Meanwhile, Lxlius. a follower of Pompey, blocks up the port 
 ofBrundusium with a fleet.— LXXXIIl. And Cassius burns some slupsin Sicily belonging to Ctesar.- LXXXIV. 
 Caesar pursues Pompey.— LXXXV. Pompey flying to Pelusium, is nuirdered thereby some of king Ptolemy's 
 court.- LXXXVl. Some prodigies that happened on the day of C;ssar'.'» victories.— LXXXA^II. Ca'-sar pur- 
 gu'ng Pompey to Alexatulria, hears there the news of his deatli.— LX5XVIII. And is unexpiectodly entangled 
 in a new war. 
 
 S64 
 
CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
 BOOKIII 
 
 I. C^sah, as dictator, hoIJing the Comilia, 
 Julius Csesar, and P. Servilius, were chosen 
 consuls; for this was the year in which he 
 could be elected to that magistracy, consistent 
 with the laws. This affair being despatched, 
 as Cffisar saw public credit at a stand over all 
 Italy, because nobody paid their debts ; he 
 ordered that arbiters should be chosen, who 
 should make an estimate of the possessions of 
 all debtors, and should convey them in payment 
 to their creditors, at the price they bore before 
 the war. The regulation he thought best cal- 
 culated to restore public credit, and prevent 
 the apprehension of a general abolition of debts, 
 which is but too common a consequence of wars 
 and civil dissensions. At the same time, in 
 consequence of an address of the people, he re- 
 established the praetors and tribunes, who had 
 been deprived upon a charge of bribery, at a 
 time when Pornpey awed the city by his le- 
 gions. These decisions were so little con- 
 formable to law, that sentence was often pro- 
 nounced by a party of judges different from 
 those who attended the pleadings. As these 
 had made him an offer of their service in the 
 beginning of the war, he accounted the obliga- 
 tion the same as if he had actually accepted of 
 their friendship ; but thought it better their res- 
 toration should seem to flow from the people, 
 than appear a mere act of bounty in him, that 
 he might neither be charged with ingratitude 
 to his foUovyers, nor accused of invading the 
 prerogatives of the people. 
 
 II. All this business, with the celebration 
 of the Latin festivals, and the holding of the 
 comitiafor elections, took him up eleven days. 
 
 at the end of which he abdicated the dictator- 
 ship, and immediately set out from Rome, in 
 order to reach Brundusium, where he had or- 
 dered twelve legions, with all the cavalry, to 
 rendezvous. But he had scarce ships to carry 
 over twenty thousand legionary soldiers, and 
 six hundred horse, which alone hindered him 
 from putting a speedy end to the war. Be- 
 sides, the legions were considerably weakened 
 by their many losses in the Gallic war, and 
 the long and painful march from Spain ; and 
 an unhealthful autumn in Apulia, and about 
 Brundusium, with the change of so fine a cli- 
 mate as that of Gaul and Spain, had brought a 
 general sickness among the troops. 
 
 III. Pompey having had a whole year to 
 complete his preparations, undisturbed by 
 wars, and free from the interruption of an 
 enemy, had collected a mighty fleet from 
 Asia, the Cyclades, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, 
 Bilhynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, 
 and had given orders for the building of ships 
 in all parts. He had exacted great sums from 
 the people of Asia and Syria ; from the kings, 
 tetrarchs, and dynasties of those parts ; from 
 the free states of Achaia, and from the corpora- 
 tions of the provinces subject to his com- 
 mand. He had raised nine legions of Roman 
 citizens ; five he had brought with him from 
 Italy ; one had been sent him from Sicily, con- 
 sisting wholly of veterans, and called Gemella, 
 because composed of two ; another from 
 Crete and Macedonia, of veteran soldiers like- 
 wise, who, having been disbanded by former 
 generals, had settled in those parts : and two 
 more from Asia, levied by the care of Len- 
 255 
 
256 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 tulus. Besides all these, he had great numbers 
 from Thessaly, Bceotia, Achaia, and Epirus; 
 whom, together with Antony's soldiers, he 
 distributed among the legions by way of re- 
 cruits. He expected also two legions that 
 Metellus Scipio was to bring out of Syria, 
 He had three thousand archers, drawn to- 
 gether from Crete, Lacedemon, Pontus, Syria, 
 and other provinces ; six cohorts of slingers ; 
 and two of mercenaries. His cavalry amounted 
 to seven thousand ; six hundred of which 
 came from Galatia, under Dejotarus ; five 
 hundred from Cappadocia, under Ariobarzanes ; 
 and the like number had been sent him out 
 of Thrace, by Cotus, with his son Sadalis at 
 their head. Two hundred were from Mace- 
 donia, commanded by Eascipolis, an officer of 
 great distinction ; five hundred from Alexan- 
 dria, consisting of Gauls and Germans, left 
 there by A. Gabinius, to serve as a guard to 
 king Ptolemy ; and now brought over by young 
 Pompey in his fleet, together with eight hun- 
 dred of his own domestics. Tarcundarius 
 Castor and Donilaus furnished three hundred 
 Gallogrsecians : the first of these came himself 
 in person ; the latter sent his son. Two hun- 
 dred, most of them archers, were sent from 
 Syria, by Comagenus of Antioch, who lay 
 under the greatest obligations to Pompey. 
 There were likewise a great number of Darda- 
 niains and Bessians, partly volunteers, partly 
 mercenaries ; with others from Macedonia, 
 Thessaly, and the adjoining states and pro- 
 vinces; who altogether made up the number 
 mentioned above. To subsist this mighty army, 
 he had taken care to amass vast quantities of 
 corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cy- 
 rene, and other countries : resolving to quarter 
 his troops, during the winter, at Dyrrhachium, 
 Apollonia, and the other maritime towns, to 
 prevent Ca3sar's passing the sea ; for which 
 purpose, he ordered his fleet to cruise perpetu- 
 ally about the coasts. Young Pompey com- 
 manded the Egyptian squadron ; D. Laelius and 
 C. Triarius the Asiatic ; C. Cassius the Syrian ; 
 C. Marcellus and C. Coponius the Ehodian ; 
 Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius the Libur- 
 nian and Achaian ; but the chief authority 
 was vested in M. Bihulus, who was admiral of 
 the whole, and gave his orders accordingly. 
 
 IV. CfEsar, upon his arrival atBrundusium, 
 harangued his troops, and told them : " That 
 as they were now upon the point of seeing an 
 end of all their toils and dangers, they ought 
 
 not to scruple at leaving their servants and 
 baggage behind them in Italy, that they might 
 embark with less confusion, and in greater 
 numbers ; putting all their hopes in victory, 
 and the generosity of their general." The 
 whole army testified their approbation of what 
 was proposed, and called out that they were 
 ready to submit to his orders. Accordingly 
 having put seven legions on board, as we have 
 before observed, he set sail the fourth of Jan- 
 uary, and arrived next day at the Ceraunian 
 mountains : where, having found, among 
 the rocks and shelves, with which that coa.st 
 abounds, a tolerable road ; and not daring to 
 go to any port, as he apprehended they were 
 all in the enemy's possession ; he landed his 
 troops at a place called Pharsalus, whither he 
 brought his fleet, without the loss of a single 
 ship. 
 
 V. Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus 
 were at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships : 
 and Bibulus had a hundred and ten at Cor- 
 cyra. But the first durst not hazard an en- 
 gagement, though Csesar was escorted by no 
 more than twelve galleys, only four of which 
 had decks ; and Bibulus had not time to re- 
 assemble his sailors and soldiers, who were 
 dispersed in full security ; for no news of 
 Cajsar's approach had reached those parts, till 
 his fleet was seen from the continent. 
 
 VI. Csesar having landed his troops, sent 
 the fleet back the same night to Brundusium, 
 to bring over his other legions and cavalry. 
 Fufius Kalenus, lieutenant-general, had the 
 charge of this expedition, with orders to use 
 the utmost despatch. But setting sail too late, 
 he lost the benefit of the wind, which offered 
 fair all night, and fell in with the enemy. For 
 Bibulus hearing at Corcyra of Csesar's arrival, 
 forthwith put to sea, in hopes of intercepting 
 some of the transports ; and meeting the fleet 
 as it returned empty, took about thirty ships, 
 which he immediately burned, with all that 
 were on board ; partly to satisfy his own ven- 
 geance for the disappointment he had received ; 
 partly to deter the rest of the troops from at- 
 tempting the passage. He then stationed 
 his fleet along the coast, from Salona to Ori- 
 cum, guarded all places with extraordinary 
 care, and even lay himself aboard, notwith- 
 standing the rigour of the winter ; declining 
 no danger nor fatigue, and solely intent upon 
 intercepting Ccesar's supplies. 
 
 VII. After the departure of the Liburnian 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 257 
 
 galleys, M. Octavius, with the squadron under 
 his command, sailed from Illyricum, and came 
 before Salona. Having spirited up the Dal- 
 matians, and other barbarous nations in those 
 parts, he drew Issa to revolt from Ceesar. 
 But finding that the council of Salona was 
 neither to be moved by promises nor threats, 
 he resolved to invest the town. Salona is 
 built upon a hill, and advantageously situated 
 for defence ; but as the fortifications were very 
 inconsiderable, the Roman citizens, residing 
 there, immediately surrounded the place with 
 wooden towers ; and finding themselves too 
 few to resist the attacks of the enemy, who 
 soon overwhelmed them with wounds, betook 
 themselves to their last refuge, by granting 
 liberty to all slaves capable of bearing arms, 
 and cutting off the women's hair, to make 
 cords for their engines. Octavius perceiving 
 their obstinacy, formed five different camps 
 round the town, that they might at once suffer 
 all the inconveniences of a siege, and be ex- 
 posed to frequent attacks. The Saloninns, 
 determined to endure any thing, found them- 
 selves most pressed for want of corn ; and 
 therefore sent deputies to Caesar to solicit 
 a supply, patiently submitting to all the other 
 hardships they laboured under. When the 
 siege had now continued a considerable time, 
 and the Octavians began to be off their guard, 
 the Salonians, finding the opportunity favour- 
 able, about noon, when the enemy were dis- 
 persed, disposed their wives and children upon 
 the walls, that every thing might have its 
 wonted appearance ; and sallying in a body 
 with their enfranchised slaves, attacked the 
 nearest quarters of Octavius. Having soon 
 forced these, they advanced to the next ; 
 thence to a third, a fourth, and so on through 
 the rest ; till having driven the enemy from 
 every post, and made great slaughter of their 
 men, they at length compelled them, and 
 Octavius their leader, to betake themselves to 
 their ships. Such was the issue of the siege. 
 As winter now approached, and the loss had 
 been very considerable ; Octavius, despairing 
 to reduce the place, retired to Dyrrhachium, 
 and joined Pompey, 
 
 VIII. We have seen that L. Vibullius 
 Riifus, Pompey's chief engineer, had fallen 
 twice into Caesar's hands, and been as often 
 set at liberty ; the first time at Corfinium, the 
 next in Spain. Having been therefore twice 
 'ndebted to him for his life, and being also 
 23 
 
 much in Pompey's esteem, Caesa-r thought 
 him a proper person to negotiate between 
 them. His instructions were ; " That it was 
 now time for both to desist from their obstinacy, 
 and lay down their arms, without exposing 
 themselves any more to the precarious events 
 of fortune. That the losses they had already 
 sustained ought to serve as lessons and cau- 
 tions, and fill them with just apprehensions 
 with regard to the future. That Pompey had 
 been forced to abandon Italy, had lost Sicily 
 and Sardinia, the two Spains, with about a 
 hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens, 
 who had perished in these countries. That 
 himself too had been a considerable sufferer 
 by the death of Curio, the destruction of the 
 African army, and the surrender of his forces 
 at Corey ra. That it was therefore incumbent 
 on them to show some regard to the sinking 
 state of the commonwealth, having sufficiently 
 experienced, by their own misfortunes, how 
 prevalent fortune was in war. That the pre- 
 sent moment was the most favourable in this 
 respect ; because, not having yet tried one 
 another's strength, and considering them as 
 equals, there would be more likelihood of 
 agreeing on terms : whereas, if one of them 
 once got the superiority, he would exact every 
 thing from the other, and give up nothing. 
 That as hitherto they had been unable to settle 
 the conditions of peace, they ought to refer 
 them to the decision of the senate and people 
 of Rome ; and, in the meantime, to obtain a 
 free and unbiassed judgment, both swear to 
 disband their armies in three days' time. That 
 when they were once divested of their national 
 and auxiliary forces, in which their whole 
 confidence lay, they would find themselves 
 under a necessity of submitting to the decree 
 of the senate and people. In fine, that to give 
 Pompey a proof of his readiness to perform 
 these proposals, he would give immediate or- 
 ders for the discharge of all his forces, both 
 in garrison and in the field.' 
 
 IX. Vibullius hav-ng received these in- 
 structions, thought it necessary to give Pom- 
 pey speedy notice of Uresar's arrival, that he 
 might be provided against that event, before 
 he laid open the commission he was charged 
 with. Accordingly, journeying day and night, 
 and frequently changing horses, for the greater 
 expedition, he at length got to Pompey, and 
 infiirmed him that Caesar was approaching 
 with all his forces. Pompey was at that 
 2L 
 
258 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 time in Candavia, from whence he was march- 
 ing through Macedonia, to his winter quarters 
 at Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. Concerned 
 at this unexpected news, he hastened his 
 march to Apollonia, to prevent Csesar's mak- 
 ing himself master of the sea-coasts. Mean- 
 while Cffisar, having landed his forces, marched 
 the same day to Oricum. Upon his arrival 
 there, L. Torquatus, who commanded in the 
 town for Pompey, with a garrison of Parth- 
 inians, ordered the gates to be shut, and the 
 Greeks to repair to their arms, and man the 
 walls. But they refusing to fight against the 
 authority of the people of Rome, and the in- 
 habitants, of their own accord, endeavouring 
 to admit Csesar, Torquatus, despairing of re- 
 lief, opened the gates, and surrendered both 
 himself and the town to Cssar, who readily 
 granted him his life. 
 
 X. Caesar having made himself master of 
 Oricum, marched directly to Apollonia. Upon 
 the report of his arrival, L. Staberius, who 
 commanded in the place, ordered water to be 
 carried into the castle, fortified it with great 
 care, and demanded hostages of the towns- 
 men. They refused to comply ; declaring 
 they would not shut their gates against the 
 consul of the Roman people, nor presume to 
 act in contradiction to the judgment of the 
 senate, and of all Italy. Staberius finding it 
 in vain to resist, privately left the place ; upon 
 which, the Apollonians sent deputies to Cae- 
 sar, and received him into the town. Bulli- 
 denses, Amantiani, with the rest of the neigh- 
 bouring countries, and all Epirus, followed 
 their example; acquainting Caesar, by their 
 ambassadors, that they were ready to execute 
 his commands. 
 
 XI. Meanwhile Pompey, having notice of 
 what passed at Oricum and Apollonia, and 
 being apprehensive for Dyrrhachium, marched 
 day and night to reach the place. At the 
 same time it was reported that Caesar was not 
 far off; which meeting with the more credit, 
 because of their hasty march, put the whole 
 army into such consternation, that many aban- 
 doning their colours in Epirus and the neigh- 
 bouring states, and others throwing down their 
 arms, every thing had the appearance of a 
 precipitate flight. But upon Pompey's halt- 
 ing near Dyrrhachium, and ordering a camp 
 to be formed ; as the army had not even then 
 recovered its fright, Labienus advanced before 
 the rest, and swore never to abandoE his gen- 
 
 eral, but to share in whatever lot fortune 
 should assign him. The other lieutenants did 
 the same, as likewise the military tribunes and 
 centurions, whose example was followed by 
 the whole army. Caesar, finding that he was 
 prevented in his design upon Dyrrhachium, 
 pursued his march more leisurely, and en- 
 camped on the river Aspus, in the territories 
 of the Apollonians ; that he might protect the 
 possessions of a state, which had so warmly 
 declared in his favour. Here he resolved to 
 pass the winter in tents, and wait the arrival 
 of the rest of his legions out of Italy. Pompey 
 did the like, and having encamped on the 
 other side of the Aspus, assembled there all 
 his legions and auxiliaries. 
 
 XII. Kalenus having embarked the legions 
 and cavalry at Brundusium, according to the 
 instructions he had received, put to sea with 
 his whole fleet; but had not sailed very far 
 till he was met by letters from Cffisar, inform- 
 ing him that all the Grecian coasts were 
 guarded by the enemy's fleet. Upon this, he 
 recalled his ships, and returned again into the 
 liarbour. Only one continued its route, which 
 carried no soldiers, nor was subject to the or- 
 ders of Kalenus, but belonged to a private 
 commander. This vessel arriving before 
 Oricum, fell into the hands of Bibulus, who, 
 not sparing the very children, put all on board 
 to death, both freemen and slaves. So much 
 did the safety of the whole army depend upon 
 a single moment. 
 
 XIII. Bibulus, as we have related above, 
 lay at Oricum, with his fleet ; and as he de- 
 prived Caesar of all supplies by sea, so was he, 
 in like manner, greatly incommoded by Caesar 
 at land : who, having disposed parties along 
 the coast, hindered him from getting water or 
 wood, or coming near the shore. This was 
 attended with many inconveniences, and threw 
 him into great straits ; insomuch that he was 
 obliged to fetch all his other necessaries, as 
 well as wood and water, from the island of 
 Corcyra ; and once, when foul weather pre- 
 vented his receiving refreshments from thence, 
 the soldiers were necessitated, for want of 
 water, to collect the dew, which, in the night, 
 fell on the hides that covered their ships. Yet 
 he bore all these difGculties with surprising 
 firmness, and continued resolute in his design 
 of not unguarding the coast. But at last, be- 
 ing reduced to the above-mentioned extremity, 
 and Libo having joined him, they called from 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 259 
 
 on boarJ to M. Aciliis and Stalius Marcus, 
 two of Cffisar's lieutenants, one of whom 
 guarded the walls of Oricum, and the other 
 the sea-coasts; that they wanted to confer 
 with Csesar about affairs of the greatest con- 
 sequence, if they could but have an opportuni- 
 ty. To gain the more credit, they let fall 
 some expressions that seemed to promise ac- 
 commodation ; and in the meanwhile demand- 
 ed and obtained a truce ; for Marcus and 
 Acilius believing their proposals to be serious, 
 knew how extremely grateful they would be 
 to Csesar, and doubted not but Vibullius had 
 succeeded in his negotiation. 
 
 XIV. Ceesar was then at Buthrotum, a 
 town over against Corcyra ; whither he was 
 gone, with one legion, to reduce some of the 
 more distant states, and supply himself with 
 corn, which then began to be scarce. Here, 
 receiving letters from Acilius and Marcus, 
 with an account of Libo and Bibulus's de- 
 mands, he left the legion, and returned to 
 Oricum. Upon his arrival, he invited them 
 to a conference. Libo appeared, and made 
 an apology for Bibulus : « That being natur- 
 ally hasty, and bearing a personal grudge to 
 Csesar, contracted during the time of his ed- 
 ileship and questorship, he had, for that rea- 
 son, declined the interview; to prevent any 
 obstructions from his presence to the success 
 of so desirable and advantageous a design : 
 that Pompey was, and ever had been inclined 
 to lay down his arms, and terminate their dif- 
 ference by an accommodation ; but as yet had 
 not sent him sufficient powers to treat; which, 
 however, he doubted not soon to receive, as 
 the council had intrusted him with the whole 
 administration of the war: that if he would 
 therefore make known his demands, they 
 would send them to Pompey, who would soon 
 come to a resolution upon their representations. 
 In the meantime, the truce might continue, 
 and both parties abstain from acts of hostility, 
 till an answer could be obtained." He added 
 something about the justice of their cause, and 
 their forces, both natural and auxiliary ; to 
 which Caesar neither at that time returned any 
 answer, nor do we now think it of importance 
 enough to be transmitted to posterity. Csesar's 
 demands were : " That he might have leave to 
 send ambassadors to Pompey ; and that they 
 would either stipulate for their return, or un- 
 dertake themselves to convey them in safety : 
 that with regard to the truce ; such were the 
 
 present circumstances of the war, that their 
 fleet kept back his supplies and transports, and 
 his forces deprived them of water and access 
 to the shore. If they expected any abatement 
 on his side, they must likewise abate in guard- 
 ing the coast ; but if they still persisted in 
 their former vigilance, neither would he yield 
 in what depended on him : that, notwithstand- 
 ing, the accommodation might go forward 
 without any obstruction from this mutual de- 
 nial." Libo declined receiving Caesar's am- 
 bassadors, or undertaking for their safe return, 
 and chose to refer the whole matter to Pom- 
 pey ; yet insisted on the truce. Caesar perceiv- 
 ing that the only aim of the enemy was to ex- 
 tricate themselves out of their present straits 
 and danger, and that it was in vain to entertain 
 any hopes of peace, turned all his thoughts to 
 the vigorous prosecution of the war. 
 
 XV. Bibulus having kept at sea for many 
 days, and contracted a dangerous illness by 
 the cold and perpetual fatigue, as he could 
 neither have proper assistance on board, nor 
 would be prevailed upon to quit his post, he at 
 last sunk under the weight of his distemper. 
 After his death, nobody succeeded in the com- 
 mand of the whole fleet ; but each squadron 
 was governed, independently of the rest, b}' its 
 particular commander. 
 
 XVI. When the surprise occasioned by 
 Caesar's sudden arrival was over, Vibullius, in 
 presence of Libo, L. Lucceius, and Theo- 
 phanes, who were among Pompey'smost inti- 
 mate counsellors, resolved to deliver the com- 
 mission he had received from Cffisar. But 
 scarce had he begun to speak, when Pompey 
 interrupted him, and ordered him to proceed 
 no further. " What," says he, " is my life or 
 country to me, if I shall seem to be beholden 
 to Cassar for them 1 And will it be believed 
 that I am not indebted to him for them, if he^ 
 by an accommodation, restores me to Italy ]"* 
 Cassar was informed of this speech, after the 
 conclusion of the war, by those who were pre- 
 sent when it was delivered : he still continued,, 
 however, by other methods, to try to bring 
 about an accommodation. 
 
 XVII. As the two camps were only se- 
 parated by the river Apsus, the soldiers had fre- 
 quent discourse among themselves ; and it was- 
 settled by mutual consent, that no act of hos- 
 tility should pass during the conferences^ 
 Caesar taking advantage of this opportunity, 
 sent P. Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to for- 
 
260 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 ward to the utmost an accommodation ; and 
 to demand frequently with a loud voice, 
 " Whether it might not be permitted to 
 citizens, to send deputies to their fellow citizens 
 about peace : that this had never been denied 
 even to fugitives and robbers, and could much 
 less be opposed, when the only design was to 
 prevent the effusion of civil blood." This and 
 much more he said, with a submissive air, as 
 became one employed to treat for his own and 
 the common safety. He was heard with great 
 silence by both parties, and received this 
 answer from the enemy : " That A. Varro 
 had declared he would next day appear at an 
 interview, whither the deputies of both parties 
 might come in perfect security, and mutually 
 make known their demands." The hour of 
 meeting was likewise settled ; which being 
 come, multitudes on both sides flocked to the 
 place ; the greatest expectations were formed ; 
 and the minds of all seemed intent upon peace. 
 T. Labienus, advancing from the crowd, began 
 in a low voice to confer with Vatinius, as if to 
 •settle the articles of the treaty. But their dis- 
 ■course was soon interrupted by a multitude of 
 darts that came pouring in on all sides. Vati- 
 ■nius escaped the danger, by means of the sol- 
 diers, who protected him with their shields ; 
 but Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tibur- 
 tCfs, centurions, and some private men, were 
 wounded. Labienus then lifted up his voice, 
 and cried : " Leave off prating of an accom- 
 modation ; for you must not expect peace, till 
 you bring us Caesar's head." 
 
 XVin. About the same time, M. Coelius 
 Rufus, pretor at Rome for foreign affairs, 
 having undertaken the cause of the debtors, 
 on his entrance into his office, ordered his 
 tribunal to be fixed near that of the city pretor, 
 C. Trebonius, and promised to receive the 
 jomplaints of such as should appeal to him, in 
 regard to the estimation and payments, made 
 in consequence of Csesar's late regulation. But 
 such was the equity of the decree, and the 
 humanity of Trebonius, who, in so nice and 
 critical an affair, thought it necessary to con- 
 duct himself with the utmost clemency and 
 moderation, that no pretence of appeal could 
 be found. For to plead poverty, personal loss- 
 es, the hardness of the times, and the difficulty 
 of bringing their effects to sale, is usual enough 
 even with reasonable minds : but to own them- 
 selves indebted, and yet aim at keeping their 
 possessions entire, would have argued a total 
 
 v/ant both of honesty and shame. Accordingly 
 not a man was found who had made any such 
 demand. Cmlius's whole severity, therefore, 
 was pointed against those, to whom the in- 
 heritance of the debtor was adjudged ; and 
 having once embarked in the affair, that he 
 might not seem to have engaged himself to no 
 purpose in an unjustifiable cause, he published 
 a law, by which he allowed the debtors six 
 years for the discharge of their debts, which 
 they were to clear at equal payments, without 
 interest. 
 
 XIX. But the consul Servilius, and the 
 rest of the magistrates opposing the law, when 
 he found it had not the effect he expected, he 
 thought proper to drop that design; and in 
 the view of inflaming the people, proposed two 
 new laws ; the one, to exempt all the tenants 
 in Rome from paying rents ; the other, for a 
 general abolition of debts. This bait took 
 with the multitude, and Cojlius at their head, 
 came and attacked C. Trebonius on his tri- 
 bunal, drove him thence, and wo«nded some 
 about him. The consul Servili:iis reported 
 these things to the senate, who interdicted to 
 Coelius the functions of his office. In conse- 
 quence of this decree, the consul refused him 
 admittance into the senate, and drove him out 
 of his tribunal, when he was going to ha- 
 rangue the people. Overwhelmed with shame 
 and resentment, he openly threatened to carry 
 his complaints to Csesar; but privately gave 
 notice to Milo, who had been banished for the 
 murder of Clodius, to come into Italy, and 
 join him with the remains of the gladiators, 
 which he bought formerly to entertain the 
 people with, in the shows he gave them. With 
 this view he sent him before to Turinum, to 
 solicit the shepherds to take arms, and went 
 himself to Casilinum : where hearing that his 
 arms and ensigns had been seized at Capua, 
 his partisans at Naples, and their design of be- 
 traying the city discovered ; finding all his 
 projects defeated, the gates of Capua shut 
 against him, and the danger increased every 
 moment, because the citizens had taken arms, 
 and began to consider him as a public enemy ;' 
 he desisted from the project he had formed, 
 and thought proper to change his route. 
 
 XX. In the meantime Milo, having des- 
 patched letters to all the colonifs and free 
 towns, intimating that what he did was in vir- 
 tue of Pompey's authority, who had sent him 
 orders byBibulus, endeavoured to draw over the' 
 
 i 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 261 
 
 debtors to his party. But not succeeding in 
 his design, he contented himself with setting 
 some slaves at liberty, and with them marched 
 to besiege Cosa, in the territory of Turinum. 
 Q. Paedius the ])retor, with a garrison of one 
 legion, commanded in the town : and here Milo 
 was slain by a stone from a machine on the 
 walls, Coelius giving out that he was gone 
 to Caesar, came to Thurium, where endeavour- 
 ing to debauch theinhabitants, and corrupt by 
 promises of money the Spanish and Gaulish 
 horse, whom Caesar had sent thither to garri- 
 son the place, they slew him. Thus these 
 dangerous beginnings, that by reason of the 
 multiplicity of affairs wherewith the magistrates 
 were distracted, and the ticklish situation of 
 the times, threatened great revolutions, and 
 alarmed all Italy, were brought to a safe and 
 speedy issue, 
 
 XXI. Libo leaving Oricum, with the fleet 
 under his command, consisting of fifty sail, 
 came to Brundusium, and possessed himself of 
 an island directly facing the harbour, judging 
 it of more consequence to secure a post, by 
 which our transports must necessarily pass, 
 than guard all the coasts and havens on the 
 other side. As his arrival was unexpected, he 
 surprised and burned some transports, and 
 carried off a vessel loaded with corn. The 
 consternation was great among our men, inso- 
 much that having landed some foot, with a 
 party of archers, in the night, he defeated our 
 guard of cavalry, and had so far the advantage, 
 by the commodiousness of his post, that he 
 wrote Pompey word, he might draw the rest 
 of the navy on shore, and order them to be ca- 
 reened ; for he alone, with his squadron, would 
 undertake to cut off Caesar's supplies, 
 
 XXII. Antony was then at Brundusium, 
 who confiding in the valour of the troops, or- 
 dered some boats belonging to the fleet to be 
 armed with hurdles and galleries, and having 
 filled them with chosen troops, disposed them 
 in several places along the shore.' At the 
 same time, he sent two three-benched galleys, 
 which he had caused to be built at Brundu- 
 sium, to the mouth of the harbour, as if with 
 design to exercise the rowers Libo perceiving 
 them advance boldly, and hoping he might be 
 able to intercept them, detached five quadrire- 
 mes for that purpose. At their approach, our 
 men rowed towards the harbour, whither the 
 enemy, eager of the pursuit, inconsiderately 
 followed them ; for now Antony's armed 
 
 23* 
 
 boats, upon a signal given, came pouring upon 
 them from all parts, and on the very first onset 
 took a quadrireme, with all the soldiers and 
 sailors on board, and forced the rest to an 
 ignominious flight. To add to this disgrace, 
 the cavalry, which Antony had posted all 
 along the coast, hindered the enemy from 
 watering ; which reduced them to such straits, 
 that Libo was forced to quit the blockade of 
 Brundusium, and retire with his fleet. 
 
 XXIII. Several months had now passed ; 
 the winter was almost over; meantime, neither 
 the ships nor legions were yet arrived, which 
 Caesar expected from Brundusium. He could 
 not help thinking that some opportunities had 
 been lost, as it was certain the wind had 
 many times offered fair, and there was a ne- 
 cessity of trusting to it at last. The longer 
 the delay in sending over the troops, the more 
 vigilant and alert were the enemy in guarding 
 the coast, and the greater their confidence to 
 hinder the passage ; nay, Pompey in his letters 
 frequently reproached them, that as they had 
 not prevented the first embarkation, they ought 
 at least to take care that no more of the troops 
 got over ; and the season itself was becoming 
 less favourable, by the approach of milder wea- 
 ther, when the enemy's fleet would be able to 
 act and extend itself. For these reasons, Cae- 
 sar wrote sharply to his lieutenants at Brun- 
 dusium, charging them not to omit the first 
 opportunity of sailing, as soon as the wind of- 
 fered fair, and to steer for the coast of Apol- 
 lonia, which they could approach with less 
 danger, as it was not so strictly guarded by 
 the enemy, who were afraid of venturing on a 
 coast so ill provided with havens. 
 
 XXIV. The lieutenants, roused and em- 
 boldened by these letters, and encouraged by 
 the exhortations of the troops themselves, who 
 professed they were ready to face any danger 
 for Caesar's sake, embarked under the direction 
 of M. Antony and Fufius Kalenus, and setting 
 sail with the wind at south, passed Apollonia 
 and Dyrrhachium next day. Being descried 
 from the continent, C. Coponius, who com- 
 manded the Rhodian squadron at Dyrrhach- 
 ium, put out to sea, and the wind slackening 
 upon our fleet, it was near falling into the 
 hands of the enemy : but a fresh gale springr 
 ing up at south, saved us from that danger. 
 Coponius however desisted not from the pur- 
 suit, hoping by the labour and perseverance 
 of tha mariners, to surmount the violence of 
 
262 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 the tempest ; and though we had passed 
 Dyrrhachium with a very hard gale, still con- 
 tinued to follow us. Our men, apprehensive 
 of an attack, should the wind again chance to 
 slacken, seized an advantage fortune threw in 
 their way, and put into the port of NyphEBum, 
 ahout three miles beyond Lissus. This port is 
 sheltered from the south-west wind, but lies 
 open to the south ; but they preferred the 
 hazard they might be exposed to by the tem- 
 pest, to that of fighting. At that instant, by 
 an unusual piece of good fortune, the wind, 
 which for two days had blown from the south, 
 changed to the south west. This was a sud- 
 den and favourable turn ; for the fleet so lately 
 in danger from the enemy, was sheltered in 
 a safe commodious port : and that which 
 threatened ours with destruction, was in its 
 turn exposed to the utmost peril. By this 
 unexpected change, the storm, which protected 
 our fleet, beat so furiously on the Rhodian gal- 
 leys, that they were all, to the number of six- 
 teen, broken to pieces against the shore. Most 
 of the soldiers and mariners perished among 
 the rocks : the rest were taken up by our men, 
 and sent by Caesar's orders to their several 
 homes. 
 
 XXV. Two of our transports, unable to 
 keep up with the rest, were overtaken by the 
 night : and not knowing where the fleet had 
 put in, cast anchor over against Lissus. Ota- 
 cilius Crassus, who commanded in the place, 
 sent out some boats and small vessels to attack 
 them : at the same time he urged them to sur- 
 render, promising quarter to such as would 
 submit. One of these vessels carried two hun- 
 "dred and twenty new-raised soldiers ; the 
 other less than two hundred veterans. On this 
 occasion appeared, how great a defence against 
 danger results from firmness of mind. The 
 new levies, frighted at the number of their 
 adversaries, and fatigued with sea-sickness, 
 surrendered on promise of their lives. Bui 
 when they were brought to Otacilius, regard- 
 less of the oath he had taken, he ordered them 
 all to be cruelly slain in his pi-esence. The 
 veterans, on the contrary, though they had both 
 •the storm and a leaky vessel to struggle with, 
 abated nothing of their wonted bravery : but 
 having spun out the time til! night under pre- 
 tence of treating, obliged the pilot to run the 
 vessel ashore, where finding an advantageous 
 (post, they continued the remainder of the night. 
 At day-break, Otacilius detached against them 
 
 about four hundred hcnia*, who guarded tha 
 part of the coast, and pursued them sv,'ord in 
 hand ; but they defended themselves with great 
 bravery, and having slain some of the enemy, 
 rejoined, without loss, the rest of the troops. 
 
 XXVI. Upon this the Eoman citizens in- 
 habiting Lissus, to whom Cssar had before 
 made a grant of the town, after fortifying it 
 with great care, opened their gates to Antony, 
 and furnished him with every thing he stood 
 in need of. Otacilius, dreading the conse- 
 quences of this revolution, quitted the place, 
 and fled to Pompey. Antony having landed 
 his troops,which consisted of three veteran le- 
 gions, one new raised, and eight hundred 
 horse, sent most of the transports back again 
 to Brundusium, to bring over the rest of the 
 foot and cavalry ; retaining, nevertheless, some 
 ships of Gaulish structure, that if Pompey, 
 imagining Italy destitute of troops, should at- 
 tempt to run thither, as was commonly ru- 
 moured, Csesar might be able to follow him 
 At the same time he gave Caesar speedy notice 
 of the number of forces he had brought over 
 with him, and the place where he had landed. 
 
 XXVII. This intelligence reached Csesar 
 and Pompey much about the same time ; for 
 both had seen the fleet pass Apollonia and 
 Dyrrhachium, and had in consequence directed 
 their march that way ; but neither knew, for 
 some days, into what harbour it had put. 
 On the first news of Antony's landing, the two 
 generals took different resolutions ; Caesar, to 
 join him as soon as possible ; Pompey, to op- 
 pose his march, and, if possible, draw him in- 
 to an ambuscade. Both quitted their camps 
 on the Apsus about the same time ; Pompey, 
 privately, during the night; Caesar, publicly, 
 by day. But Caesar, who had the river to cross, 
 was obliged to fetch a compass, that he might 
 come at a ford. Pompey, on the other hand, 
 having nothing to obstruct his march, advanced 
 by great journeys against Antony ; and, under- 
 standing that he was not far off", posted his 
 troops on an advantageous ground, ordering 
 them to keep within their camp, and light no 
 fires, that his approach might not be perceived. 
 But Antony, being informed of it by the 
 Greeks, would not stir out of his lines, and 
 sending immediate notice to Caesar, was joined 
 by him next day. On advice of Caesar's ar- 
 rival, Pompe}', that he might not be shut up 
 between two armies, quitted the place, and 
 coming with all his forces to Asparagium, a 
 
COMMENTA.tlES. 
 
 263 
 
 town belonging to the Dyrrhachians, encamp- 
 ed there on an advantageous ground. 
 
 XXVIII. About the same time Scipio, 
 notwithstanding some checks he had received 
 near Mount Amanus, assumed the title of 
 emperor, after which he exacted great sums 
 of money from the neighbouring states and 
 orinces ; obliged the farmers of the revenue 
 3 pay the two^^ears' taxes, which lay in their 
 .lands, and advance a third by way of loan, and 
 •ent orders to the whole province for levying 
 .cavalry. Having got a sufficient number to- 
 gether, he quitted the Parthians, his nearest 
 enemies,who not long before had slain M. Cras- 
 sus, and held Bibulus invested; and march- 
 ed out of Syria with his legions and cavalry. 
 When he arrived in Asia Minor, he found the 
 whole country filled with terror on account 
 of the Parthian war; and the soldiers them- 
 selves declared, that they were ready to march 
 against an enemy, but would never bear arms 
 against a consul, and their fellow-citizens. 
 To stifle these discontents, he made consider- 
 able presents to the troops, quartered them in 
 Pergamus and other rich towns, and gave up 
 the whole country to their discretion. Mean- 
 while the money demanded of the province 
 was levied with great rigour, and various pre- 
 tences were devised, to serve as a ground to 
 new exactions. Slaves and freemen were sub- 
 ject to a capitation tax. Imports were laid 
 upon pillars and doors of houses. Corn, sol- 
 diers, mariners, arms, engines, carriages, in a 
 word, every thing that had a name, furnished 
 a sufficient handle for extorting money. 
 Governors were appointed not only over towns, 
 but over villages and castles ; and he that 
 acted with the greatest rigour and cruelty, 
 Was accounted the worthiest man and best citi- 
 zen. The province swarmed with lictors, 
 overseers, and collectors, who, besides the 
 sums imposed by public authority, exacted 
 money likewise on their own account, colour- 
 ing the iniquitous demands with a pretence 
 that they had been expelled their country and 
 native homes, and were in extreme want of 
 every thing. Add to all these calamities, im- 
 moderate usury, an evil almost inseparable 
 from war; for so great sums are then exacted, 
 beyond what a country is able to furnish, they 
 ere obliged to apply for a delay, which at any 
 price is still accounted a favour. Thus the 
 debts of the province increased considerably 
 
 during these two years. Nor were the Eo 
 man citizens the only sufferers on this occasion ; 
 for certain sums were demanded of every state 
 and corporation, as a loan upon the senate'.s 
 decree ; and the farmers of the revenue were 
 ordered to advance the next year's tribute, in 
 like manner as when they first entered upon 
 office. Besides all this, Scipio gave orders 
 for seizing the treasures of the temple of Di- 
 ana at Ephesus, with all the statues of that 
 goddess. But when he came to the temple, 
 attended by many persons of senatorian rank, 
 he received letters from Pompey, desiring him 
 to lay aside all other concerns, and make what 
 haste he could to join him, because Caesar 
 had passed into Greece with his whole army. 
 In consequence of this order, he sent back 
 the senators wTio had been summoned to at- 
 tend him at Ephesus, made preparations for 
 passing into ?fIacedonia, and began his march 
 a few days after. Thus the Ephesian trea- 
 sures escaped being plundered. 
 
 XXIX. Caesar having joined Antony's 
 army, and recalled the legion he had left at 
 Oricum to guard the sea-coast, judged it 
 necessary to advance farther into the country, 
 and possess himself of the more distant pro- 
 vinces. At the same time deputies arrived 
 from Thessaly and ^tolia with assurances ol 
 submission from all the states in those parts, 
 provided he would send troops to defend them. 
 Accordingly he despatched L. Cassius Longi- 
 nus, with a legion of new levies, called the 
 twenty-seventh, and two hundred horse, into 
 Thessaly ; and C. Calvisssius Sabinus, with five 
 cohorts, and some cavalry, into JEtolia; charg- 
 ing them in a particular manner, as those pro- 
 vinces lay the nearest to his camp, that they 
 would take care to furnish him with corn. He 
 likewise ordered Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with 
 the eleventh and twelfth legions, and five 
 hundred horse, to march into Macedonia : 
 for Menedemus, the principal man of that 
 country, having come ambassador to Caesar, 
 had assured him of the affection of the pro- 
 vince. 
 
 XXX. Calvisius was well leceived by the 
 jEtolians, and having driven the enemy's gar- 
 risons from Calydon and Naupactum, possess- 
 ed himself of the whole country. Cassius arriv- 
 ing in Thessaly with his legion, found the 
 state divided into two factions. Egesaretus, 
 a man in years, and of established credit, fa- 
 
264 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 vered Pompey ; Petreius, a young nobleman 
 of the first rank, exerted his whole interest in 
 behalf of Cssar. 
 
 XXXI. About the same time Domitius ar- 
 rived in Macedonia ; and while deputies were 
 attending him from all parts, news came that 
 Scipio approached with his legions, which 
 spread a great alarm through the countrj' ; as 
 fame, for the most part, magnifies the first ap- 
 pearances of things. Scipio, without stopping 
 any where in Macedonia, advanced by great 
 marches towards Domitius ; but being come 
 within twenty miles of him, suddenly changed 
 his route, and turned off to Thessaly, in quest 
 of Cassius Longinus. This was done so ex- 
 peditiously, that he was actually arrived with 
 his troops, when Cassius received the first 
 notice of his march : for to make the more de- 
 spatch, he had left M. Favonius at the river 
 Haliacmon, which separates Macedonia from 
 Thessaly, with eight cohorts, to guard the bag- 
 gage of the legions, and ordered him to erect 
 a fort there. At the same time, king Cotus's 
 cavalry, which had been accustomed to make 
 inroads into Thessaly, came pouring upon 
 Cassius's camp ; who, knowing that Scipio 
 was upon his march, and believing the caval- 
 ry to be his, retired in a fright to the moun- 
 tains that begirt Thessaly, and thence directed 
 his course towards Ambracia. Scipio prepar- 
 ing to follow him, received letters from M. 
 Favonius, that Domitius was coming up with 
 his legions, nor would it be possible for him to 
 maintain the post he was in, without his assis- 
 tance. Scipio, upon his intelligence, changed 
 his resolution, gave over the pursuit of Cas- 
 sius, and advanced to the relief of Favonius. 
 As he marched day and night without inter- 
 mission, he arrived so opportunely, that the 
 dust of Domitius's army, and his advanced par- 
 ties, were descried at the same time. Thus 
 Domitiusi's care preserved Cassius, and Sci- 
 pio's diligence Favonius. 
 
 XXXII. Scipio continued two days in his 
 camp upon the Haliacmon, which ran between 
 him and th^ army of Domitius, put his troops 
 in motiop on the third, and by day-break ford- 
 ed the river. Early next morning he drew 
 up his troops in order of battle at the head of 
 his camp. Domitius was not averse to an en- 
 gagement ; but as between the two camps 
 there was a plain of six miles, he thought that 
 the fittest place for a field of battle, and 
 drew up his men at some distance from Sci- 
 
 pio's camp. Scipio would not stir from his 
 post ; yet hardly could Domitius restrain his 
 men from advancing to attack him through a 
 rivulet with steep banks, that ran in the front 
 of the enemy's camp, and opposed their passage. 
 Scipio observing the keenness and alacrity oi 
 our troops, and fearing that next day he should 
 either be forced to fight against his will, or 
 ignominiously keep within his camp ; after 
 great expectations raised, by too hastily cross- 
 ing the river, he saw all his projects defeated; 
 and decamping in great silence during the 
 night, returned to his former station, beyond 
 the Haliacmon, and posted himself on a ris- 
 ing ground, near the river. A few days after, 
 he formed an ambuscade, of cavalry, by night, 
 in a place where our men were wont to for- 
 age : and when Q. Varus, who commanded 
 the horse under Domitius, came next day, ac- 
 cording to custom ; suddenly the enemy rose 
 from their lurking holes : but our men brave- 
 ly sustained the attack, soon recovered their 
 ranks, and in their turn vigorously charged 
 the enemy. About fourscore fell on this oc- 
 casion ; the rest betook themselves to flight ; 
 and our ^en returned to their camp, with the 
 loss of only two of their number. 
 
 XXXIII. After his rencounter, Domitius, 
 hoping to draw Scipio to a battle, feigned to 
 decamp for want of provisions ; and having 
 made the usual signal for retreating, after 
 a march of three miles, drew up the cavalry 
 and legions in a convenient plain, shrouded 
 from the enemy's view. Scipio, preparing to 
 follow, sent the horse and light-armed infantry 
 before to explore his route, and examine the 
 situation of the country. When they were 
 advanced a little way, and their first squadrons 
 had come within reach of our ambush ; be- 
 ginning to suspect something from the neigh- 
 ing of the horses, they wheeled about, in order 
 to retreat; which the troops that followed ob- 
 serving, suddenly halted. Our men, finding 
 that the ambush was discovered, and knowing 
 it would be in vain to wait for the rest of the 
 army, fell upon the two squadrons that were 
 most advanced. M. Opimius, general of 
 the horse to Domitius, was amongst these, but 
 somehow found means to escape. All the 
 rest were either slain, or made prisoners. 
 
 XXXIV. Cffisar having drawn off his gar- 
 risons from the sea-coast, as we have related 
 above, left three cohorts at Oricum to defend 
 fcba town, and committed to their charge the 
 
COMMENTARIES 
 
 265 
 
 galleys he had brought out of Italy. Acilius, 
 one of his lieutenants, had the command of 
 these troops ; who, for the greater security, 
 caused the ships to be drawn up into the har- 
 bour behind the town, and made them fast to 
 the shore. He likewise sunk a transport in 
 the mouth of the haven, behind which another 
 rode at anchor, on whose deck a tower was 
 erected, facing the entrance of the port, and 
 filled with troops, to be ready in case of sur- 
 prise. Young Pompey, who commanded the 
 Egyptian fleet, having notice of this, came to 
 Oricum ; weighed up the vessel that had been 
 sunk in the mouth of the harbour ; and, after 
 an obstinate resistance, took the other, which 
 had been placed there by Acilius, to guard 
 the haven. He then brought forward his 
 fleet, on which he had raised towers, to fight 
 •with the greater advantage; and having sur- 
 rounded the town on all sides, attacked it by 
 land with scaling ladders, and by sea from the 
 towers, sending fresh men continually in the 
 place of those that were fatigued, and thereby 
 obliged us to yield, through weariness and 
 wounds. At the same time he seized an emi 
 nence, on the other side of the town, which 
 seemed a kind of natural mole, and almost 
 formed a peninsula over against Oricum ; and 
 by means of this neck of land, carried four 
 small galleys, upon rollers, into the inner part 
 of the haven. Thus the galleys, that were 
 made fast to the land, and destitute of troops, 
 being attacked on all sides, four were carried 
 off, and the rest burned. This affair des- 
 patched, he left D. Lselius, whom he had 
 taken from the command of the Asiatic fleet, 
 to prevent the importation of provisions from 
 Biblis and Amantia ; and sailing for Lissus, 
 attacked and burned the thirty transports 
 which Antony had left in that haven. He 
 endeavoured likewise to take the town ; but 
 the Roman citizens of that district, aided by 
 the garrison Caesar had left, defended it so 
 well, that at the end of three days, he retired 
 without effecting his purpose, having lost some 
 men in the attempt. 
 
 XXXV. Cassar being informed that Pom- 
 pey was at Asparagium, marched thither with 
 his army ; and having taken the capital of the 
 Parthiuians by the way, where Pompey had 
 a garrison ; arrived the third day in Mace- 
 donia, and encamped at a small distance from 
 the enemy. The next day he drew out all 
 his forces, formed them before his camp, and 
 
 offered Pompey battle. Finding that he kept 
 within his lines, he led back his troops, and 
 began to think of pursuing other measures. 
 Accordingly, on the morrow, by a long circuit, 
 and through very narrow and difficult ways, 
 he marched, with all his forces, to Dyrrha- 
 chium; hoping either to oblige Pompey to 
 follow him thither, or cut off his communica- 
 tion with the town, where he had laid up all 
 his provisions, and magazines of war ; which 
 happened accordingly. For Pompey, at first, 
 not penetrating his design, because he coun- 
 terfeited a route different from what he really 
 intended, imagined he had been obliged to 
 decamp for want of provisions ; but being af- 
 terwards informed of the truth, by his scouts, 
 he quitted his camp next day, in hopes to pre- 
 vent him by taking a nearer way. Caesar, 
 suspecting what might happen, exhorted his 
 soldiers to bear the fatigue patiently ; and al- 
 lowing them to repose during only a small 
 part of the night, arrived next morning at 
 Dyrrhachium, where he immediately formed 
 a camp, just as Pompey 's van began to appear 
 at a distance. 
 
 XXXVI, Pompey, thus excluded from 
 Dyrrhachium, and unable to execute his first 
 design, came to a resolution of encamping on 
 an eminence, called Petra, where was a toler- 
 able harbour, sheltered from some winds. 
 Here he ordered part of his fleet to attend 
 him, and corn and provisions to be brought 
 him from Asia, and the other provinces sub- 
 ject to his command. Ccesar, apprehending 
 the war would run into length, and despairing 
 of supplies from Italy, because the coasts were 
 so strictly guarded by Pompey's fleet; and^ 
 his own galleys, built, the winter before, ini 
 Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were not yet arrived-, 
 despatched L. Canuleius, one of his lieuten- 
 ants, to Epirus, for corn. And because that 
 country lay at a great distance from his camp, 
 he built granaries in several places, and wrote 
 to the neighbouring states to carry their corn 
 thither. He likewise ordered search to be 
 made for what corn could be found in Lissus, 
 the country of the Parthinians, and the other 
 principalities in those parts. This amounted 
 to very little ; partly occasioned by the soil,, 
 which is rough and mountainous, and obliges 
 the inhabitants often to import grain ; partly 
 because Pompey, foreseeing Cjesar's wants, 
 had, some days before, ravaged the country of 
 the Parthinians, plundered their houses, and, 
 2M 
 
266 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 Dy means of his cavalry, carried off all their 
 corn. 
 
 XXXVII. For these reasons, Cassar 
 formed a project which the very nature of 
 the country suggested. All round Pompey's 
 camp, at a small distance, were high and steep 
 hills. Ca3sar took possession of those hills, and 
 built forts upon them ; resolving, as the na- 
 ture of the ground would allow, to draw lines 
 of communication from one fort to another, 
 and inclose Pompey within his works. His 
 views herein were ; first, to facilitate the pas- 
 sage of his convoys, which the enemy's cav- 
 alry, which was very strong and fine, would 
 no longer cut off; next, to distress this very 
 cavalry, for want of forage; and lastly, to 
 lessen the great reputation and high idea en- 
 tertained of Pompey, when it should be re- 
 ported all over the world, that he had suffered 
 himself to be blockaded, and, as it were, im- 
 prisoned by Caesar's works ; and durst not 
 hazard a battle to set himself at liberty, 
 
 XXXVIII. Pompey v.'ould neither leave 
 the sea and Dyrrhachium, where he had all 
 his magazines and engines of war, and whence 
 he was supplied with provisions by means of 
 his fleet; nor could prevent the progress of Cse- 
 sar's works, without fighting, which, at that 
 <iime, he was determined against. He could do 
 Qothing therefore but extend himself, by taking 
 «s many hills, and as large a circuit of countrj' 
 as possible, to give his adversary the more 
 trouble, and divide his forces. This he did, 
 by raising twenty-four forts, which took in a 
 circumference of fifteen miles, wherein were 
 arable and pasture lands, to feed his horses 
 and beasts of burden. And as our men had 
 carried their circumvallation quite round, by 
 drawing lines of communication from fort to 
 fort, to prevent the sallies of the enemy, and 
 guard against the attacks in the rear; in like 
 manner, Pompey's me.n had surrounded them- 
 selves with lines, to hinder us from breaking 
 in upon them, and charging them behind. 
 They even perfected their works first, because 
 they had more hands, and a less circuit to in- 
 close. V7hen CtBsar endeavoured to gain any 
 place, Pompey, though determined not to op- 
 pose him with all his forces, nor hazard a gen- 
 eral action, failed not, however, to detach 
 parties of archers and slingers ; who wounded 
 great numbers of our men, and occasioned 
 such a dread of their arrows, that almost all 
 the soldiers furnished themselves with coats of 
 
 mail, or thick leather, to guard against the 
 danger. 
 
 XXXIX. Both parties disputed every post 
 with great obstinacy : Cajsar, that he might 
 inclose Pompey within as narrow a space as 
 possible ; and Pompey, that he might have 
 liberty to extend himself; which occasioned 
 many sharp skirmishes. In one of these, Ceb- 
 sar's ninth legion having possessed themselves 
 of an eminence, which they began to fortify, 
 Pompey seized the opposite mount, with a re- 
 solution to hinder their works. As the access 
 on one side was very easy, he sent first some 
 archers and slingers, and afterwards a strong 
 detachment of light-armed foot, plying us, at 
 the same time, wii'^ his military engines; 
 which obliged our me /to desist ; as they found 
 it impossible at once to sustain 'the enemy's 
 charge, and go forvvard with their works. Cae- 
 sar, perceiving that his men were wounded 
 from all sides, resolved to quit the place and re- 
 tire. But as the descent, by which he must re- 
 treat, was pretty steep, the Pompeians charged 
 him briskly in drawing off, imagining he gave 
 way through fear. Pompey went so far as to 
 say, That he consented to be accounted a gene- 
 ral of no merit, if Ccssar's men got off without 
 considerable loss. Caesar, concerned about the 
 retreat of his men, ordered hurdles to be fixed 
 on the ridge of the hill fronting the enemy ; be- 
 hind which he dug a moderate ditch, and rend 
 ered the place 'as inaccessible as he could, on 
 ail sides. When this was done, he began to 
 file off the legionary soldiers, supporting them 
 by some light-armed troops, posted on their 
 flanks, who, with arrows and stones, might re- 
 pulse the enemy. Pompey's troops failed not 
 to pursue them, with great outcries and fierce 
 menaces, overturned the hurdles, and used 
 them as bridges to get over the ditch. Which 
 Cffisar observing, and fearing some disaster 
 might ensue, should he seem to be driven from 
 a post, which he quitted voluntarily ; when his 
 forces were got half down the hill, encourag- 
 ing them by Antony, who had the command 
 of that legion, he gave the signal to face 
 about, and fall on the enemy. Immediately 
 the soldiers of the ninth legion, forming them- 
 selves into clo e order, launched their darts ; 
 and advancing briskly up the hill against the 
 enemy, forced them to give ground, and at 
 last betake themselves to flight ; which was 
 not a little incommoded by the hurdles, pali- 
 sades, and ditch, Cajsar had thrown up to stop 
 
■:OJVIMEI*TARIES. 
 
 267 
 
 their purs^A But our men who sought only 
 to secure their retreat, having killed several 
 of the enemy, and lost only five of their own 
 number, retired without the least disturbance, 
 and inclosing' some other hills within their 
 lines, completed the circumvallation. 
 
 XL. This method of making war was new 
 and extraordinary ; as well in regard to the 
 number of forts, the extent of the circumvalla- 
 tion, the greatness of his works, and the 
 manner of attack and defence, as on other ac- 
 counts. For whoever undertakes to invest 
 another, is, for the most part, moved thereto, 
 either by some previous defeat he has sustained, 
 the knowledge of his weakness, to take ad- 
 vantage of his distress, to profit by a superi- 
 ority of forces ; or, in fine, to cut oflfhis provi- 
 sions, which is the most ordinary cause of 
 these attempts. But Csesar, with an inferior 
 force, besieged Pompey, whose troops were 
 entire, in good order, and abounded in all 
 things. For ships arrived every day, from all 
 parts, with provisions ; nor could the wind 
 blow from any quarter, that was not favoura- 
 ble to some of them; whereas Csesar's army, 
 having consumed all the corn round about, 
 was reduced to the last necessities. Never- 
 theless the soldiers bore all with singular pa- 
 tience ; remembering, that though reduced to 
 the like extremity the year before, in Spain, 
 they had yet, by their assiduity and perseve- 
 rance, put an end to a very formidable war. 
 They called to mind too their sufferings at 
 Alesia, and their still greater distresses before 
 Avaricum; by which, however, they triumphed 
 over mighty nations. When barley or pulse 
 was given them instead of corn, they took it 
 cheerfully ; and thought themselves regaled 
 when they got any cattle, which Epirus fur- 
 nished them with in great abundance. They 
 discovered in the country a root, called chara, 
 which they pounded and kneaded with milk, 
 so as to make a sort of bread of it. This fur- 
 nished a plentiful supply; and when their ad- 
 versaries reproached them with their want, 
 by way of answer to their insults, they threw 
 their loaves at them. 
 
 XLI. By this time, the corn began to ripen, 
 and the hopes of a speedy supply supported 
 the soldiers under their present wants. Nay, 
 they were often heard to say one to another, 
 that they would sooner live on the bark of 
 trees, than let Pompey escape. For they were, 
 informed from time to time, by deserters, that 
 
 their horses were almost starved, and the rest 
 of their cattle actually dead ; that the troops 
 themsel "es were very sickly ; partly occasioned 
 by the narrow space in which they were in- 
 closed, the number and noisome smell of dead 
 carcases, and the daily fatigue to which they 
 were unaccustomed, partly by their extreme 
 want of water. For Cfesar had either turned 
 the course of all the rivers and brooks that 
 ran into the sea, or dammed up theii currents. 
 And as the country was mountainous, inter- 
 mixed with deep valleys, by driving piles into 
 the earth, and covering them with mould, he 
 stopped up the course of the waters. This 
 obliged the enemy to search for low and marshy 
 places, and to dig wells, which added to their 
 daily labour. The wells too, when discovered, 
 lay at a considerable distance from some parts 
 of the army, and were soon dried up by the 
 heat. Cassar's army, on the contrary, was 
 very healthy, abounded in water, and had 
 plenty of all kinds of provisions, corn excepted, 
 which they hoped to be soon supplied with, as 
 the season was now pretty far advanced, and 
 harvest approached. 
 
 XLII. In this method of making war, new 
 stratagems were every day put in practice by 
 both generals. Pompey's soldiers, observing 
 by the fires the place where our cohorts were 
 upon guard, stole thither privately by night, 
 and pouring upon them a flight of arrows, re- 
 tired instantly to their camp, Vv'hich obliged 
 our men to have fires in one place, and keep 
 guard in another. 
 
 XLIII. Meanwhile P. Sylla, whom Ctesar 
 at his departure had left to command the 
 camp, being informed of what passed, came to 
 the assistance of the cohort, with two legions. 
 His arrival soon put the Pompeians to flight, 
 who could not stand the very sight and shock 
 of his troops ; but seeing their first rinks bro- 
 ken, took to their heels, and quitted the place. 
 Sylla checked the ardour of his men, whom 
 he would not suffer to continue the pursuit too 
 far ; and it was the general belief, that had 
 he pursued the enemy warmly, that day might 
 have put an end to the war. His conduct, 
 however, cannot be justly censured ; for the 
 difference is great between a lieutenant and 
 a general ; the one is tied up to act according 
 to instructions; the other, free from restraint, 
 is at liberty to lay hold of all advantages. Sylla, 
 who was left by Cssar to take care of the 
 camp, was satisfied TFJth having disengaged 
 
268 
 
 CiESAK'is 
 
 his own men, and had no intention to hazard 
 a general action, which might have been at- 
 tended with ill consequences, and would have 
 looked like arrogating the part of a general. 
 The Pompeians found it no easy matter to 
 make good their retreat ; for having advanced 
 from a very disadvantageous post to the sum- 
 mit of the hill, they had reason to fear our men 
 ■would charge them in descending, and the 
 rather, as it was very near sunset, for they 
 had protracted the affair almost till night, in 
 hopes of accomplishing their design. Thus 
 Ponipey, compelled by necessity, immediately 
 took possession of an eminence, at such a dis- 
 tance from our fort, as to be secure from darts 
 and military engines. Here he encamped, 
 threw up an intrenchment, and drew his forces 
 together to defend the place. 
 
 XLIV. At the same time we were engaged 
 in two other places ; for Pompey attacked 
 several castles together to divide our forces, 
 and hinder the forts from mutually succouring 
 one another. In one of these, Volcatius Tul- 
 lus, with three cohorts, sustained the charge 
 of a whole legion, and forced them to retire. 
 In the other, the Germans, sallying out of their 
 intrenchments, slew several of the enemy, and 
 returned again without loss. 
 
 XLV. Thus there happened no less than 
 six actions in one day ; three near Dyrrhachium, 
 and three about the lines. In computing 
 the number of the slain, it appeared that Pom- 
 pey lost two thousand men, with several vol- 
 unteers and centurions, among whom was 
 Valerius Flaccus, the son of Lucius, who had 
 formerly been prsetor of Asia. We gained 
 six standards, with the loss of no more than 
 twenty men iij all the attacks ; but in the fort, 
 not a soldier escaped being wounded ; and 
 four centurions belonging to one cohort, lost 
 their eyes. As a proof of the danger they 
 had been exposed to, and the efforts they had 
 sustained, they brought and counted to CjBsar 
 about thirty thousand arrows that had been 
 shot into the fort, and showed him the centu- 
 rion Scffiva's buckler, which was pierced in 
 two hundred and thirty places. Csesar, as a 
 reward for his services both to himself and 
 the republic, presented him with two hundred 
 thousand asses, and advanced him directly 
 from the eighth rank of captains to the first ; it 
 appearing that the preservation of the fort was 
 chiefly owing to his valour. He also distri- 
 butfd military rewards among the other offi- 
 
 cers and soldiers of that cohort, and assigned 
 them double pay, and a double allowance of 
 corn. 
 
 XL VI. Pompey laboured all night at his 
 fortifications, raised redoubts the following 
 days, and having carried his works fifteen feet 
 high, covered that part of his camp with man- 
 telets. Five days after, taking advantage of 
 a very dark night, he walled up the gates of 
 his camp, rendered all the avenues impracti- 
 cable ; and drawing out his troops in great si- 
 lence about midnight, returned to his former 
 works. 
 
 XLVII. ^Etolia, Acarnania, and Amphilo- 
 chis having been reduced by Cassius Lon- 
 ginus, and Calvisius Sabinus, as we have re- 
 lated above; Caesar thought it expedient to 
 pursue his conquests, and attempt to gain 
 Achaia. Accordingly he despatched Fufius 
 Kalenus thither, ordering Sabinus and Cassius 
 to join him, with the cohorts under their com- 
 mand. Rutilius Lupus, Pompey's lieutenant 
 in Achaia, hearing of their approach, resolved 
 to fortify the isthmus, and thereby hinder Fu- 
 bius from entering the province. Delphos, 
 Thebes, and Orchomenus, voluntarily submit- 
 ted to Kalenus ; some states he obtained by 
 force, and sending deputies to the rest endea- 
 voured to make them declare for Csesar. These 
 negotiations found sufficient employment for 
 Fufius. 
 
 XLVIII. Csesar meanwhile drew up his 
 army every day, offering Pompey battle upon 
 equal ground; and, to provoke him to accept 
 it, advanced so near his camp, that his van was 
 within engine-shot of the rampart, Pompey, 
 to preserve his reputation, drew out his legions 
 too, but posted them in such a manner, that 
 his third line touched the rampart, and the 
 whole army lay under cover of the weapons 
 discharged from thence. 
 
 XLIX. Whilst these things passed in 
 Achaia and at Dyrrhachium, and it was now 
 known that Scipio was arrived in Macedonia, j 
 Caesar still adhering to his former views of 
 peace, despatched Clodius to him, an intimate j 
 friend of both, whom he had taken into hisj 
 service upon Scipio's recommendation. At 
 his departure, he charged him with letters and* 
 instructions to this effect : " That he had tried 
 all ways to bring about a peace ; but he believed 
 he had hitherto miscarried, through the fault 
 of those to whom his proposals were addressed, 
 because they dreaded presenting them to 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 269 
 
 Pompey at an improper time : that he knew 
 Scipio's authority to be such, as not only pri- 
 vileged him to advise freely, but even to en- 
 force his counsels, and compel the obstinate 
 to hearken to reason : that he was possessed 
 of an independent command, and had an army 
 at his disposal to give weight to his interposi- 
 tion : that in employing it for so desirable an 
 end, he would gain the indisputable praise of 
 having restored quiet to Italy, peace to the 
 provinces, and saved the empire." Clodius 
 reported this commission to Scipio, and at first 
 met with a favourable reception, but was af- 
 terguards denied audience : for Favonius hav- 
 ing sharply reprimanded Scipio, as we learned 
 afte' the conclusion of the war, the negotiation 
 was discontinued, and Clodius returned to 
 Caesar without success. 
 
 L. Cffisar, the more effectually to shut up 
 Pompey's horse at Dyrrhachium, and hinder 
 them from foraging, blocked up the two nar- 
 row passes, of which we have spoken, with 
 strong works, and raised forts to defend them. 
 Pompey finding his cavalry rendered by this 
 means unserviceable, conveyed them some 
 days after by sea to his camp again. Forage 
 was so scarce, that they were forced to have 
 recourse to the leaves of trees, and the roots 
 of green reeds, bruised ; for the corn sown 
 within their lines was all consumed ; nor had 
 they had any supplies but what came a long 
 way about by sea, from Corcyra and Acarna- 
 nia; and even this was so inconsiderable, that 
 to increase the quantity, they were forced to 
 mix it with barley, and by these contrivances 
 support their horses. At last, all expedients 
 being exhausted, and the horses dying daily, 
 Pompey thought it time to attempt to force 
 the barricade, and set himself at liberty. 
 
 LI. Among the cavalry in Caesar's camp 
 were two brothers, Allobrogians by birth, 
 named Roscillus and ^gus, the sons of Ad- 
 bucillus, who had long held the chief sway in 
 his own state ; men of singular bravery, and 
 who had been of signal service to Caesar in all 
 his Gallic wars. For these reasons he had 
 raised them to the highest offices in their own 
 country, got them chosen into the senate he- 
 fore they were of age, given them lands in 
 Gaul taken from the enemy, besides pecuniary 
 rewards to a great value, insomuch that from 
 very moderate beginnings they had risen to 
 vast wealth. These men were not only highly 
 
 noured by Caesar on account of their bravery, 
 24 
 
 but in great esteem with the whole army. 
 But presuming on Caesar's friendship, and 
 foolishly elated with their prosperity, they used 
 the troopers ill, defrauded them of their pay, 
 and secreted all the plunder to their own use. 
 The Gaulish cavalry, offended at these pro- 
 ceedings, went in a body to Ctesar, and openly 
 complained of the two brothers ; adding, 
 among other accusations, that, by giving in 
 false musters, they received pay for more 
 men than they had. Caesar not thinking it a 
 proper time for animadversion, and regarding 
 them greatly on account of their valour, de- 
 clined all public notice of the aflfair, and con- 
 tented himself with reprimanding them in 
 private, admonishing them to expect every 
 thing from his friendship, and to measure their 
 future hopes by the experience of what he 
 had already done for them. This rebuke, 
 however, disgusted them greatly, and very 
 much lessened their credit with the whole army, 
 which they easily perceived, as well from the 
 raillery they were often forced to bear, as in 
 consequence of the secret reproaches and sense 
 of their own minds. Thus prompted by shame, 
 and perhaps imagining they were not cleared, 
 but reserved to a more favourable opportunity, 
 they resolved to desert, to try their fortunes 
 elsewhere, and search for new friendships. 
 Having imparted their design to a few of their 
 clients, whom they judged fit instruments for 
 so black a treason, they first attempted to 
 murder C. Volusenus, general of the cavalry, 
 (as was afterwards known, when the war was 
 over,) that by so signal a piece of service they 
 might the more effectually recommend them- 
 selves to Pompey's favour. But finding that 
 design attended with great hazard, and that 
 no favourable opportunity offered for putting 
 it in execution, they borrowed all the money 
 they could, imder pretence of reimbursing the 
 troops, and making restitution; and having 
 bought up a great number of horses, went 
 over to Pompey, with those whom they had 
 made acquainted with their design. As they 
 were persons of noble birth, liberally educated, 
 came with a great train of horses and ser- 
 vants, had been highly honoured by Caesar, 
 and were universally esteemed on account of 
 their valour, Pompey carried them ostenta- 
 tiously over all the camp, triumphing in this 
 new and unusual acquisition ; for till then, 
 neither horse nor foot-soldier had deserted 
 from Caesar to Pompey ; whereas scarce a 
 
270 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 day passed without some desertion from Pom- 
 pey's army, especially among the new levies 
 in Epirus, ^■Etolia, and those countries that 
 had declared for Caesar. The brothers being 
 well acquainted with the condition of Ceesar's 
 camp, what was wanting to complete the for- 
 tifications, where the foible of the lines lay, the 
 particular times, distance of places, strength 
 and vigilance of the guards, with the temper 
 and character of the officers wtto commanded 
 in every post, made an exact report of all to 
 Pompey, 
 
 LII. Upon this intelligence, having already 
 formed the design of forcing CiBsar's lines, he 
 ordered the soldiers to make coverings of 
 osier for their helmets, and provide themselves 
 with fascines. This done, he embarked by 
 night, in boats and small barks, a great num- 
 ber of light-armed troops and archers, with 
 the fascines for filling up Caesar's trenches ; 
 and having drawn together sixty cohorts 
 from the greater camp and forts, led them 
 about midnight towards that part of the 
 enemy's lines nearest the sea, a good distance 
 from the main camp. Thither likewise he des- 
 patched the barks, on board of which were 
 the light-armed troops and fascines, together 
 with all the galleys that lay at Dyrrhachium, 
 giving each their particular instructions. Len- 
 tulus Marcellinus the questor, with the ninth 
 legion, had charge of this part of the fortifica- 
 tions : and as his health was but infirm, 
 Csesar had joined Fulvius Posthumus with 
 him in the command. 
 
 LIII. This place was guarded by a ditch, 
 fifteen feet broad, with a rampart towards the 
 enemy, ten feet high, and of equal thickness. 
 Behind this, at the distance of six bundled 
 feet, was another rampart, somewhat lower 
 than the fo'rmer, and fronting the contrary 
 way. Csesar, apprehending an attack from 
 the sea, had' raised this double rampart, some 
 days before, that he might be able to defend 
 himself against the enemy, should they charge 
 him on both sides at once. But the extent of 
 the c.ircumvallation, and the continued labour 
 of so many days, in inclosing a space of 
 eighteen miles, had not allowed us time to 
 finish the work. Accordingly, the line of com- 
 munication, which ran along the sea-side, 
 and was to have joined these two ramparts, 
 was not yet completed. This Pompey was in- 
 formed of by the AUobrogian brothers, which 
 Droved of fatal consequence to us. P'or 
 
 while some cohorts of the ninth legion were 
 upon guard, near the sea, suddenly the Pom- 
 pcians arrived about day-break, and surprised 
 them with their unexpected appearance. Al 
 the same time the ttoops that came by sea 
 launched their darts against the outwar^i 
 rampart and began to fill up the ditch with 
 fascines ; while the legionary soldiers, planting 
 their scaling-ladders against the inner works, 
 and plying those that defended them with 
 darts and engines, spread a general terror 
 over that part of the camp, which was stil} 
 increased by the multitude of archers that 
 came pouring upon them from all sides. Thfc 
 osiers they had bound round their helmets- 
 contributed greatly to defend them from the 
 stones thrown down from the rampart, whict 
 were the only weapons we had. At last, all 
 things going against us, and our resistanc* 
 becoming every moment more languid, th* 
 enemy discovered the defect before spoken ot 
 in our lines ; and landing their rnen between 
 the two ramparts, where the line of commu- 
 nication towards the sea remained unfinished, 
 they attacked our soldiers in the rear, and 
 obliged them to abandon both sides of the 
 works. 
 
 LIV. Marcellinus hearing of this disorder, 
 detached some cohorts to sustain the flying 
 troops : but as the rout was becoming general, 
 they could neither persuade them to rally, nor 
 were able themselves to withstand the enemy's 
 charge. The like happened to a second de- 
 tachment; insomuch that the several supplies 
 sent, by catching the general terror, served 
 only to add to the confusion and danger ; for 
 the multitude of runaways rendered the retreat 
 the more difficult. In this action, the eagle- 
 bearer of the pinth legion finding himself 
 dangerously wounded, and that his strength 
 began to fail, called to some troopers who 
 passed by, and said : " I have preserved to 
 the last moment of my life, with the greatest 
 care, this eagle, with which I have been in- 
 trusted ; and, now I am dying, I return it to 
 Caesar, with the same fidelity. Carry it to 
 him, I beseech you: nor suflTer Ccesar's arms 
 to experience, in losing it, an ignominy, with 
 which they have been hitherto unacquainted." 
 Thus the eagle was preserved ; but all the 
 centurions of the first cohort were slain, ex- 
 cept the first of the Principes. 
 
 LV. And now the Pomp,eians, having 
 made great slaughter of our men, approached 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 271 
 
 the quarters of Marcellinus, to the no small 
 
 terror of the rest of the cohorts ; when Mark 
 
 ■t' 
 Antony, who commanded in the nearer re- 
 doubts, upon notice of what passed, was seen 
 descending from the higher ground, at the head 
 of twelve cohorts. His arrival put a stop to the 
 enemy's progress, and by enabling our men to 
 recover from their extreme terror, restored them 
 to their wonted courage. Soon after Cassar ar- 
 rived in person, with some troops, being ap- 
 prised of the attack by the smoke of the forts, 
 the usual signal on these occasions; and per- 
 ceiving the loss he had sustained, and that 
 T^ompey had forced the lines, being able to 
 forage, and having an easy communication 
 with the sea ; he quitted his former project, 
 ■which had proved unsuccessful, and encamp- 
 ed as near Pompey as he could. 
 
 LVI. When the intrenchments were finish- 
 ed, Csesar had notice from his scouts, that a 
 certain number of the enemy's cohorts', which 
 to them appeared a complete legion, were re- 
 tired behind a wood, and seemed to be on 
 their march to the old camp. The situation of 
 f.he two armies was this : some days before, 
 when Cffisar's ninth legion was sent to oppose 
 a body of Pompcy's troops, they thought pro- 
 per to intrench themselves upon an opposite 
 hill, and form a camp there. This camp bor- 
 dered upon a wood, and was not above four 
 hundred paces from the sea. But afterwards, 
 for certain reasons, Csesar removed a little be- 
 yond that post ; and Pompey, a few days after, 
 took possession of it. But as his design was 
 to place several legions there ; leaving the 
 inner rampart standing, he surrounded it with 
 greater works. Thus the smaller camp, in- 
 closed within one of larger circumference, 
 served by way of a castle or citadel. He like- 
 wise carried an intrenchment from the left 
 angle of the camp to the river, through a space 
 of about four hundred paces, which enabled 
 him to water freely and without danger. 
 But he too, soon after, changed his mind, for 
 reasons which it is not needful to repeat here; 
 and abandoned the place, which thereby was 
 left several days without troops, though the 
 fortifications remained entire. Hither the 
 scouts reported they saw the standard of a 
 legion carried which was likewise cpnfirmed 
 by those who were stationed in the higher 
 forts. The place was about five hundred 
 paces distant from Pompey's new camp. 
 Cajsar, desirous to repair the loss he had sus- 
 
 tained, and hoping he might be able to sur- 
 prise this legion, left two cohorts in his in- 
 trenchments, to prevent any suspicion of his 
 design ; and with thirty-three more, amongst 
 which number was the ninth legion, which 
 had lost many centurions and soldiers, march- 
 ed by a differentroute, as privately as he could, 
 against the legion which Pompey had lodged 
 in the lesser camp. Neither was he deceived 
 in his first Conjecture : for he arrived before 
 Pompey could have notice of his design; and 
 though the intrenchments were strong, yet 
 charging the enemy briskly with his left wing, 
 where he himself commanded in person, he 
 quickly drove them from the rampart. But 
 as the gates were secured by a barricade, 
 they still maintained the fight here for some 
 time, our men endeavouring to break in, and 
 the enemy to defend the camp. T. Pulcia, who 
 betrayed the army of C. Antony, as we have 
 related above, gave signal proofs of his valour 
 on this occasion. But our men, at last, pre- 
 vailed ; and having cut down the barricade, 
 broke first into the greater camp, and after- 
 wards into the fort within it, whither the le- 
 gion had retired, some of whom v/ere slain, en- 
 deavouring to defend themselves. 
 
 LVII. But fortune, whose, influence is very 
 great, as in other things, so particularly in 
 war ; often effects mighty changes from the 
 most trifling causes: as happened upon this 
 occasion. For the cohorts of CfBsar's right 
 wing being unacquainted with the situation 
 of the camp, and mistaking the rampart which 
 led to the fiver for one of its sides, marched 
 on that way in quest of a gate ; but perceiving 
 at length their error, and that nobody defend- 
 ed the intrenchment, they immediately mount- 
 ed the rampart, and were followed by the 
 v/hole cavalry. This delay saved the enemy : 
 for Pompey, having notice of what passed, 
 brought up the fifth legion to sustain his 
 party ; so that at one and the same instant, 
 his cavalry approached ours, and his troons 
 were seen advancing in order of battle, by 
 those who had taken possession of the camp : 
 which quickly changed the face of affairs. 
 For Pompey's legion, encouraged by the hope 
 of speedy succours, sallied by the Decuman 
 port, and briskly charged our cohorts. On 
 the other hand, Cfesar's cavalry, who had en- 
 tered, by a narrow breach in the rampart, fore- 
 seeing that a retreat would be extremely diffi- 
 cult, began betimes to think of flying. The right 
 
272 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 wing, which had no communication with the 
 left, observing the consternation of the cavalry, 
 and fearing they should be overpowered within 
 the camp, retired the same way they had en- 
 tered. Many, to avoid being engaged in the nar- 
 row passes, threw themselves from the ram- 
 part, which was ten feet high, into the ditch; 
 where the first ranks being trodden to death, 
 their bodies afforded a safe passage to those 
 that followed. The left wing, who from the 
 rampart whence they had driven the enemy, 
 saw Pompey advancing against them, and 
 their own men flying ; fearing to be entangled 
 in the defiles, as they had the enemy upon 
 them, both within and without the camp, re- 
 treated the same way they came. Nothing was 
 to be seen but consternation, flying, and dis- 
 order: insomuch that all Casar's efforts to ral- 
 ly his troops were fruitless^ If he seized any 
 by the arm, they struggled till they got away. 
 If he laid hnid of the colours, they left them in 
 his hands. Not a man could be prevailed on to 
 face about. 
 
 LVIII. In this calamity, what saved the ar- 
 my from entire destruction was, that Pompey, 
 apprehending an ambuscade, ^probably because 
 the success was beyond his hopes, as a little 
 before he had seen his men worsted and put to 
 flight,) durst not, for some time, approach the 
 intrenchm.ents ; and his cavalry were retarded 
 in the pursuit by CiEsar's troops, who were 
 possessed of all the gates and defiles. Be that 
 as it will, a small matter proved of very great 
 consequence to both parties : for the intrench- 
 ment between the camp and the river, stopped 
 the course of Cossar's victory, when he had al- 
 ready forced Pompey's lines : and the same, by 
 retarding the pursuit of his enemy, saved the 
 army from destruction. 
 
 LIX. In these two actions, Cssar lost nine 
 'hundred and sixty private men, thirty oflicers, 
 rand several knights of note, as Flavins Tuti- 
 .canus Gallus, a senator's son; C. Felginus, 
 .of Placentia ; A. Gravius, of Puteoli ; and M. 
 Sacrativir, of Capua. But the greatest part 
 of these died without wounds, being trodden 
 to death in the ditch, about the works, and on 
 the banks of the river, occasioned by the flight 
 and terror of their own men. He lost also 
 thirty-two colours. Pompey was saluted em- 
 peror on this occasion ; a title which he bore 
 ever after, and suffered himself to be accosted 
 by : but neither in the letters which he wrote, 
 nor in his consular ensigns, did he think 
 
 proper to assume the laurel. The prVsoneiB 
 were delivered up to Labienus at his own 
 request; and this deserter, brutal and cru- 
 el as usual, diverted himself with insultiny 
 them in their calamity ; and asked them sar 
 castically, if it was usual for veterans to run 
 away ; after which, he caused them all to be 
 put to death. 
 
 LX. This success gave such confidence 
 and spirit to the Pompeian party, that they 
 now no longer took any concern about the 
 conduct of the war, but began to consider 
 themselves as already victorious. They never 
 reflected on the inconsiderable number of our 
 troops, the disadvantage of the ground, the 
 narrow passes we were engaged in, by their 
 having first possession of the camp, the double 
 danger, both within and without the fortifica- 
 tion, and the separation of the two wings of 
 the army, which hindered them from mutually 
 succouring one another. They forgot that 
 the advantage they had gained, was not the 
 effect of a brisk and vigorous attack; and that 
 our men had suffered more by crowding upon 
 one another in the narrow passes, than by the 
 sword of the enemy. In fine, they never call- 
 ed to mind the uncertain chance of war, and 
 upon what minute causes good or bad success 
 often depends ; how a groundless suspicion, a 
 panic terror, or a religious scruple, has fre- 
 quently been productive of the most fatal 
 events; when either by the misconduct of a 
 general, or the terror of a tribune, some false 
 persuasion has been suffered to take root in an 
 army. But as if the victory had been purely 
 the effect of their valour, and no change of 
 fortune was to be apprehended, they every 
 where proclaimed and made public the success 
 of this day. 
 
 LXI. Csesar, seeing all his former projects 
 disconcerted, resolved to submit to fortune, 
 and entire!}' change the manner of the war. 
 He therefore called in all his forces from the 
 forts, gave up the design of inclosing Pompey, 
 and having assembled his army, addressed 
 them as follows : " That they ought not to be 
 discouraged, or give way to consternation, upon 
 what had lately happened, but oppose their 
 many successful engagements to one slight 
 and inconsiderable check. That fortune had 
 already befriended them greatly, in the re- 
 duction of Italy without bloodshed; in the 
 conquest of the two Spains, though defended 
 by warlike troops, under the conduct of skil- 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 273 
 
 ful and experienced leaders; and in the sub- 
 jection of the neighbouring provinces, whence 
 they could be plentifully supplied with corn. 
 In fine, they ought to call to mind, how hap- 
 pily they had passed into Greece, through the 
 midst of the enemy's fleets, though possessed 
 of all the coasts and havens. If they were 
 not successful in every thing, they must en- 
 deavour, by prudence, to overcome the disap- 
 pointments of fortune ; and attribute their late 
 disaster to the caprice of that goddess rather 
 than to any fault on their side. That he had 
 led them to an advantageous ground, and put 
 them in the possession of the enemy's camp, 
 after driving them from all their works. If 
 either some sudden consternation, the mistak- 
 ing their way, or any other mishap, had 
 snatched an apparent and almost certain victo- 
 ry out of their hands, they ought to exert their 
 Utmost endeavours to repair that disgrace, 
 which would turn their misfortune to a bene- 
 fit, as happened at Gergovia, where those who 
 at first dreaded to encounter the enemy, de- 
 manded' earnestly in the end to be led to 
 battle." Having made this speech, he con- 
 tented himself with stigmatizing, and reducing 
 to private men, some of the standard bearers ; 
 for the whole army were so grieved at their 
 loss, and so desirous of expunging the stain 
 their glory had received, that there was no 
 occasion either for the tribunes or the centu- 
 rions to remind them of their duty; nay, they 
 even undertook to punish themselves by the 
 severest impositions, and demanded with great 
 outcries to be led against the enemy ; being 
 seconded by some centurions of the first rank, 
 who, touched with their remonstrances, were 
 for continuing in the post they then possessed, 
 and putting all to the hazard of a battle. But 
 Cffisar did not think it prudent to expose to 
 an action troops that had been just worsted, 
 and in whom might remain too deep impres- 
 sions of their late fright. He was for allow- 
 ing them time to recover themselves ; and 
 having quitted his works, thought it needful 
 *.o provide for the security of his convoys. 
 
 LXII. Accordingly, after proper care 
 taken of the sick and wounded, and as soon as 
 night approached, he sent all the baggage 
 privately towards Apollonia, under a guard 
 of one legion, with orders not to halt till they 
 tad reached the place. This aflfair despatch- 
 ed, he made two legions remain in the camp, 
 and marching out all the rest about three in 
 24* 
 
 the morning at several gates, i rdered them to 
 follow the same route the baggage had taken. 
 Soon after, that this departure might not have 
 the appearance of a flight, and yet be known 
 to the enemy as late as possible, be ordered 
 the usual signal to be given, and setting out 
 with the rest of his forces, lost sight of the 
 camp in a moment. Pompey hearing of his 
 retreat, prepared to follow him without delay, 
 and hoping to surprise the army in its march, 
 whilst encumbered with baggage, and not yet 
 recovered from its consternation, drew out all 
 his troops, and sent out all his cavalry before 
 to retard our rear, which, however, he could 
 not overtake, because Csesar marching without 
 baggage, had got a. great way before him. But 
 when we came to the river Genusus, we found 
 the banks so steep and difScult, that before all 
 the men could get over, Pompey's cavalry 
 came up, and fell upon our hindmost batta- 
 lions. CsEsar sent his horse to oppose them, 
 intermixed with some light-armed troops ; 
 who charged with that vigour and success, 
 as to put them all to rout, and leave a con- 
 siderable number dead upon the field, and 
 return without loss to the main body of their 
 army, 
 
 LXIII. Having completed the intended 
 march of that day, and brought his army over 
 the Genusus, he took up his quarters in his 
 old camp at Asparagium, suflfering none of the 
 soldiers to stroll without the rampart, and 
 charging the cavalry, who had been sent out 
 under pretence of foraging, to return imme- 
 diately to the Decuman port. Pompey like- 
 wise having completed that day's march, 
 encamped at his old post at Asparagium, 
 where the troops having nothing to do, be- 
 cause the works were still entire ; some made 
 long excursions in quest of wood and forage; 
 others who had come almost without any bag- 
 gage, by reason the march was undertaken 
 on a sudden, enticed by the nearness of their 
 former camp, laid down their arms in their 
 tents, quitted the intrenchments, and went to 
 fetch what they had left behind them. This 
 rendering them unable to pursue, as Ctesar 
 had foreseen; about noon, he gave the signal 
 for decamping, led forth his troops, and 
 doubling that day's march, gained eight miles 
 upon Pompey, who could not follow him by 
 reason his troops were dispersed. 
 
 LXIV. Next day Cffisar decamped again 
 at three in the morning, having sent away his 
 2N 
 
274 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 baggage over night, that if he should find 
 himself under a necessity of fighting, he 
 might have his army clear of all encumbrance. 
 The same he did the following days ; by which 
 means, though he had very difficult ways to 
 pass, and some great rivers to cross, he suf- 
 fered no loss during the whole march. For 
 Pompey, after the first day's hinderance, 
 endeavouring in vain by long and forced mar- 
 ches to overtake Csesar, gave over the pursuit 
 on the fourth, and began to think of taking 
 other measures. 
 
 LXV. Cffisar Was under a necessity of 
 going to Apollonia, to leave his wounded 
 there, to pay his army, confirm his friends in 
 their duty, and garrison the towns that had 
 submitted. But he took no longer time to 
 these aflfairs, than the importance of his other 
 engagements would allow. For fearing that 
 Pompey might surprise Domitius Calvinus, he 
 put himself in full march to join him. The 
 scheme he proceeded on was this : that if 
 Pompey took the same route, he must leave 
 the sea, the forces he had at Dyrrhachium, 
 with all his ammunition and provision ; which 
 would bring them upon equal terms ; if he 
 passed into Italy, Cffisar purposed to join 
 Domitius, and march to its defence by the 
 coast of lUyricum ; in fine, should he fall upon 
 Apollonia and Oricum, and endeavour to 
 exclude him from the sea coast ; in that case 
 he reckoned to oblige him, by attacking Metel- 
 lus Scipio, to leave every thing to succour him. 
 CsBsar therefore despatched couriers to Do- 
 mitius, to acquaint him with his design ; 
 and leaving four cohorts at Apollonia, one 
 at Lissus, and three at Oricum, with the sick 
 and wounded, began his march through 
 Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, on his side, 
 guessing Csesar's design, made what haste he 
 could to join Scipio, that if Caesar should 
 march that way, he might prevent his being 
 overpowered ; but should he still keep near 
 Corcyra, and the sea, because of the legions 
 and cavalry he expected from Italy ; in that 
 case, he purposed to fall upon Domitius with 
 all his forces. 
 
 LXVI. For these reasons both generals 
 studied despatch, as well to afford timely 
 succour to their friends, as not to miss an op- 
 portunity of distressing their enemies. But 
 CiEsar had turned off to Apollonia ; whereas 
 Pompey took the nearest way through Can- 
 davia for Macedonia. It happened, too, very 
 
 unfortunately, that Domitius, who for several 
 days had been encamped near Scipio, quilted 
 that station for the convenience of provisions, 
 and was upon his tjiarch to Heraclea Sentica, 
 a city of the Candavians ; so that chance 
 seemed to throw him directly in Pompey's 
 way, which Cajsar had not then the least 
 knowledge of. Pompey, too, having sent 
 letters through all the states and provinces, 
 relating to the action at Dyrrhachium, with 
 representations that far exceeded the truth ; a 
 rumour began to prevail, that Csesar had been 
 defeated with the loss of almost all his forces, 
 and was forced to fly before Pompey. These 
 reports raised him many enemies on his march, 
 and induced some states to throw off their 
 allegiance; whence it happened, that the 
 couriers mutually sent by Csesar and Domitius, 
 were all intercepted. But the Allobrogians 
 in the train of ^iigus and Roscillus, who, as 
 we have seen before, had deserted from Csesar 
 to Pompey, meeting some of Domitius's scouts ; 
 either out of ancient custom, because they had 
 served together in the Gallic wars ; or from 
 a motive of vain-glory; informed them of all 
 that had passed ; of Pompey's victory, and 
 Caesar's retreat. Advice being given of this 
 to Calvinus, who was not above four hours' 
 march from the enem}^ he avoided the danger 
 by a timely retreat, and joined Csesar near 
 ^ginium, a town on the borders of Thessaly. 
 LXVII. After the junction of the two 
 armies, Csesar arrived at Gomphi, the first 
 town of Thessaly, as you come from Epirus. 
 A few months before, the inhabitants had of 
 their own accord sent ambassadors to Csesar, 
 to make an offer of what their country afford- 
 ed, and petition for a garrison. But the re- 
 port of the action at Dyrrhachium, with many 
 groundless additions, had by this time reached 
 their ears. And therefore Androsthenes, 
 pretor of Thessaly, choosing rather to be the 
 companion of Pompey's good fortune, than as- 
 sociate with Csesar in his adversity, ordered all 
 the people, whether slaves or free, to assemble 
 in the town ; and having shut the gates against 
 Caesar, sent letters to Scipio and Pompey to 
 come to his assistance, intimating, " That the 
 town was strong enough to hold out if they 
 used despatch, but by no means in condition 
 to sustain along siege." Scipio, on advice of 
 the departure of the armies from Dyrrhachium, 
 was come to Larissa with his legions ; and 
 Pompey was yet far enough distant from 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 275 
 
 Thessaly. Ccesar having fortified his camp, or- 
 dered mantelets, hurdles, and scaling-ladders to 
 be prepared for a sudden attack ; and then ex- 
 horting his men, represented, " Of how great 
 consequence it was to render themselves mas- 
 ters of an opulent city, abounding in all things 
 needful for the supply of their wants, and 
 by the terror of whose punishment other states 
 would be awed into submission ; and this, he 
 told them, must be done quickly, before any 
 succours could arrive." Accordingly, seizing 
 the opportunity offered by the uncommon ar- 
 dour of the troops, he attacked the town the 
 same day about three in the afternoon ; and 
 having made himself master of it before sun- 
 set, gave it up to be plundered. From Gomphi, 
 Csesar marched directly to Metropolis, and ar- 
 rived before they were acquainted with the 
 misfortune of their neighbours. 
 
 LXVIII. The Metropolitans at first fol- 
 lowing the example of Gomphi, to which they 
 were moved by the same reports, shut their 
 gat^.s and manned the walls. But no sooner 
 came they to understand the fate of their 
 neighbour city, by some prisoners vvhom Cse- 
 sar had produced for that end, than imme- 
 diately they admitted him into the town. He 
 suffered no hostilities to be committed, nor any 
 harm to be done them ; and so powerful was 
 the example from the different treatment of 
 these two cities, that not a single stale in 
 Thessaly refused to submit to Csesar, and re- 
 ceived his orders, except Larissa ; which was 
 awed by the numerous army of Metellus Sci- 
 pio. As the country was good and covered with 
 corn, which was near ripe, Csesar took up his 
 quarters there, judging it a proper place to 
 wait for Pompey in, and render the theatre of 
 the war. 
 
 LXIX, A few days after, Pompey arrived 
 in Thessaly, and joining Metellus Scipio, ha- 
 rangued both armies. He first thanked his 
 own for their late services, and then turning 
 to Scipio's troops, exhorted them to put in for 
 their share of the booty, which the victory 
 already obtained gave them the fairest pros- 
 pect of. Both armies being received into one 
 camp, he shared all the honours of command 
 with Scipio, ordered a pavilion to be erected 
 for him, and the trumpets to sound before it. 
 This increase of Pompey's forces, by the con- 
 junction of two mighty armies, raised the con- 
 tidence of his followers, and their assurance of 
 victory to such a degree, that all delays were 
 
 considered as a hinderance of their return to 
 Italy ; insomuch that if Pompey on any occa- 
 sion acted with slowness and circumspection, 
 they failed not to cry out, " That he indus 
 triously protracted an affair, for the despatch 
 of which one day was sufficient, in the view oi 
 gratifying his ambition for command, and hav- 
 ing consular and pretorian senators amongst 
 the number of his servants." Already they 
 began to dispute about rewards and dignities, 
 and fixed upon the persons who were annually 
 to succeed to the consulship. Others sued 
 for the houses and estates of those who had 
 followed Cffisar's party. A warm debate 
 arose in council in relation to L. Hirrus, 
 whom Pompey had sent against the Parthians, 
 whether, in the next election of pretors, he 
 should be allowed to stand candidate for that 
 office in his absence ; his friends imploring 
 Pompey to make good the promise he had made 
 him at his departure, and not suffer him to be 
 deceived by depending on the general's honour ; 
 while such as aspired to this office complain- 
 ed publicly, that a promise should be made 
 to any one candidate, when all were embarked 
 in the same cause, and shared the like dan- 
 gers. Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentu- 
 !«s Spinther, were openly quarrelling about 
 the high priesthood, which Cfesar was in pos- 
 session of. They even descended to personal 
 abuse ; and pleaded their several pretensions ; 
 Lentulus urging the respect due to his age; 
 Domitius, his dignity, and the interest he had 
 in the city ; and Scipio his alliance with Pom- 
 pey. Attius Rufus impeached L. Afranius 
 before Pompey, charging him with having 
 occasioned the loss of the army in Spain. 
 And L. Domitius moved in council, that after 
 the victory, all the senators in Pompey's 
 army and camps, should be appointed judges, 
 and empowered to proceed against those who 
 had stayed in Italy, or who had appeared 
 cool, or shown any indifference to the cause ; 
 and that three billets should be given to these 
 judges, ' one for acquittance, another for 
 condemnation, and a third for a pecuniary 
 fine. In a word, nothing was thought on but 
 honours, or profit, or vengeance; nor did they 
 consider by what methods they were to con- 
 quer, but what advantage they should make 
 of victory. 
 
 LXX. Csesar having provided for the sub- 
 sistence of his troops, who were now no longer 
 fatigued, and had sufficiently recovered from 
 
276 
 
 CiESAR'S 
 
 the consternation the different aci.rjns at Dyr- 
 rhachium had thrown them into; thought it 
 high time to make trial how Pompey stood 
 affected to an engagement. Accordingly he 
 drew out his men, and formed them in order 
 of battle ; at first near his own camp, and some- 
 what distant from the enemy: but perceiving 
 this had no effect upon Pompey, who still 
 maintained his post on the eminences, he each 
 day drew nearer, and by that conduct animated 
 and gave fresh courage to his soldiers. His 
 cavalry being much inferior to the enemy's in 
 number, he followed the method already men- 
 tioned ; of singling out the strongest and nim- 
 blest of his foot-soldiers, and accustoming 
 them to fight intermixed with the horse ; in 
 which way of combat they were become ver^' 
 expert by daily practice. This disposition, 
 joined to constant exercise, so emboldened 
 his cavalry, that though but a thousand in num- 
 ber, they would upon occasion sustain the 
 charge of Pompey's seven thousand, even in 
 an open plain, and appear not greatly dismay- 
 ed at their multitude: nay, they actually got 
 the better in a skirmish that happened be- 
 tween them, and killed ^gus the Allobrogian, 
 one of the two brothers who deserted to Pom- 
 pey, with several others of his party. 
 
 LXXI. Pompey, whose camp was on an 
 eminence, drew up his army at the foot of the 
 mountain, expecting, as may be presumed,that 
 Csesar would attack him in that advantageous 
 situation. But Csssar despairing to draw 
 Pompey to battle on equal terms, thought it 
 would be his best course to decamp, and be 
 always on the march ; in hopes, that by fre- 
 quent shifting his ground, he might the better 
 be supplied with provisions ; and that as the 
 enemy would not fail following him, in the 
 frequent marches he should make, he might 
 perhaps find an opportunity of attacking them, 
 and forcing them to fight : at least he was sure 
 of harassing Pompey's army, little accustom- 
 ed to these continued fatigues. Accordingly 
 the order for marching was given, and the 
 tents struck ; when Caesar perceived that 
 Pompey's army, which had quitted their in- 
 trenchments, had advanced farther towards 
 the plain than usual, so that he might engage 
 them at a less disadvantage : whereupon, ad- 
 dressing himself to his soldiers, who were just 
 ready to march out of their trenches : " Let 
 us no longer think," says he, " of marching; 
 now is the time for fighting, so long wished 
 for ; let us therefore arm ourselves with cour- 
 
 age, and not miss so favourable an opportunity." 
 This said, he immediately drew out his forces. 
 LXXII. Pompey likewise, as was after- 
 wards known, had resolved to offer battle, in 
 compliance with the repeated importunities 
 of his friends. He even said in a council of 
 war held some days before, that Caesar's army 
 would be defeated before his infantry came 
 to engage. And when some expressed their 
 surprise at this speech : " I know," says he, 
 " that what I promise appears almost incredi- 
 ble ; but hear the reasons on which I ground my 
 confidence, that j'ou may advance to battle 
 with the greater assurance. I have persuad- 
 ed the cavalry, and obtained their promise for 
 the performance, that as soon as the armies 
 are formed, they shall fall upon Cssar's right 
 wing, which they will easily be able to out- 
 flank and surround. This must infallibly oc- 
 casion the immediate rout of that wing, and 
 consequently of the rest of CiEsar's troops, 
 without danger or loss on our side. Nor will 
 the execution be attended with any difficulty, 
 as we are so much superior to them in horse. 
 Be ready therefore for battle ; and since the 
 so much desired opportunity of fighting is 
 come, take care not to fall short of the good 
 opinion the world entertains of your \alo'jr 
 and experience." Labienus spoke next, high- 
 ly applauding this scheme of Pompey, and ex- 
 pressing the greatest contempt of Csesar's 
 army ; '' Think not," says he, addressing him- 
 self to Pompey, " that these are the legions 
 which conquered Gaul and Germany. I was 
 present in all those battles, and can, of my 
 own knowledge, affirm, that but a very small 
 part of that army now remains: great numbers 
 have been killed, as must of necessity happen, 
 in such a variety of conflicts : many perished 
 during the autumnal pestilence in Apulia . 
 many are returned to their own habitations : 
 and not a few were left behind to guard Italy. 
 Have you not heard, that the cohorts in gar- 
 rison, at Brundusium, are made up of invalids? 
 The forces, which you now behold, are com- 
 posed of new levies, raised in Lombardy, and 
 the colonies beyond the Po; for the veterans, 
 in whom consisted the main strength of the 
 army, perished all in the two defeats at Dyrrha- 
 chium." Having finished this speech, he took 
 an oath, which he proffered to all that were 
 present, never to return to camp otherwise than 
 victorious. Pompey commended his zeal, took 
 the oath himself, and the rest followed his ex- 
 ample, without hesitation. After these en- 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 277 
 
 gagements, taken publicly in council, they all 
 departed, full of joy and expectation ; con- 
 sidering themselves as already victorious, and 
 relying entirely on the ability of their general ; 
 who, in an affair of that importance, they were 
 confident would promise nothing without an 
 assurance of success. 
 
 LXXIII. When Csesar approached Pom- 
 pey's camp, he found his army drawn up in 
 this manner : In the left wing were the two 
 legions delivered by Caesar, at the beginning 
 of the quarrel, in consequence of a decree of 
 the senate; one of w-hich was called the lira:, 
 the other the third legion ; and here Pompey 
 commanded in person. Scipio was in the 
 centre, with the legions he had brought out of 
 Syria. The Cilician legion, joined to the 
 Spanish cohorts, brought over by Afranius, 
 formed the right wing. These Pompey es- 
 teemed his best troops, distributing the less 
 expert between the wings and the main body. 
 He had in all a hundred and ten cohorts, 
 amounting to five and forty thousand ; besides 
 two cohorts of volunteers, who had served 
 under him in former wars ; and who, out of 
 affection to their old general, though their le- 
 gal time was expired, flocked to his standard 
 on this occasion, and were dispersed amongst 
 the whole army. His other seven cohorts were 
 left to guard the camp and the adjoining forts. 
 As the Enipeus, a river with very steep banks, 
 covered his right wing, he placed all his horse, 
 slingers, and archers in the left. 
 
 LXXIV. Csesar observing his ancient cus- 
 tom, placed the tenth legion in the right, and 
 the ninth in the left wing. As this last had 
 been considerably weakened by the general 
 actions at Dyrrhachium, he joined the eighth 
 to it in such manner, that they formed as it 
 were but one legion, and had orders mutually 
 to relieve each other. His whole army 
 amounted to fourscore cohorts, making in all 
 twenty-two thousand men ; besides two co- 
 horts left to guard the camp. Domitius Cal- 
 vinus was in the centre, Mark Antony on the 
 left, and P. Sylla on the right. Csesar took 
 his post opposite to Pompey, at the head of the 
 tenth legion. And as he had observed the 
 disposition of the enemy contrived to out- 
 flank his right wing, to obviate that inconve- 
 nience, he made a draught of six cohorts from 
 Mis rear line, formed them into a separate 
 body, and opposed them to Pompey's horse ; 
 instrictiag them in the part they were to act ; 
 
 and admonishing them, that the success of that 
 day would depend chiefly on their courage. At 
 the same time, he charged the whole army, and 
 in particular the third line, not to advance to bat- 
 tle without orders ; which, when he saw it pro- 
 per, he would give, by making the usual signal. 
 
 LXXV. When he was exhorting them to 
 battle, as military custom required, and re- 
 minding them of the many favours they had, 
 on all occasions, received at his hands, he 
 chiefly took care to observe, " That they had 
 themselves been witnesses of his earnest en- 
 deavours after peace ; that he had employed 
 Vatinius to solicit a conference with Labienus, 
 and sent A. Clodius to treat with Scipio ; that 
 he had pressed Libo, in the warmest manner, 
 at Oricum, to grant him a safe conduct for his 
 ambassadors; in a word, that he had left 
 nothing unattempted to avoid wasting the 
 blood of his soldiers, and to spare the common- 
 wealth the loss of one of her armies." After 
 this speech, observing his soldiers ardent for 
 the fight, he ordered the trumpets to sound a 
 charge. Among the volunteers ia Ctesar's 
 army was one Craslinus, a man of distinguished 
 courage, who the year before, had been first 
 centurion of the tenth legion. This brave 
 officer, as soon as the signal was given, calling 
 to those next him ; " Follow me," said he, 
 "you that were formerly under my command, 
 and acquit yourselves of the duty you owe to 
 your general. This one battle more will 
 crown the work, by restoring him to his proper 
 dignity, and us to the enjoyment of our 
 freedom." At the same time, turning to 
 Cassar: " General," says he, " this day you shall 
 be satisfied with my behaviour, and whether 
 I live or die, I will take care to deserve your 
 commendations." So saying he marched up 
 to the enemy, and began the attack at the head 
 of a hundred and twenty volunteers. 
 
 LXXVI. Between the two armies, there 
 was an interval sufficient for the onset: but 
 Pompey had given his troops orders to keep 
 their ground, that Csesar's army might have 
 all that way to run. This he is said to have 
 done by the advice of C. Triarius, that the 
 enemy's ranks might be broken and.themselve? 
 put out of breath, by having so far to run ; of 
 which disorder he hoped to make an advantage. 
 He was besides of opinion, that our javelins 
 would have less effect, by the troops continu- 
 ing in their post, than if they sprung for 
 ward at the very time they were launched , 
 
278 
 
 CESAR'S 
 
 and as the sokUers would have twice as far to 
 run as usual, they must be wearj' and breath- 
 less by the time they came up with the first 
 line. But herein Pompey seems to have acted 
 without sufficient reason ; because there is a 
 certain alacrity and ardour of mind, naturally 
 planted in every man, which is inflamed by 
 the desire of fighting ; and which an able ge- 
 neral, far from endeavouring to repress, will, 
 by all methods he can devise, foment and 
 cherish. Nor was it a vain institution of our 
 ancestors, that the trumpets should -sound on 
 every side, and the whole army raise a shout, 
 in order to animate the courage of their own 
 men, and strike terror into the enemy. Cse- 
 sar's soldiers entirely defeated Pompey's 
 hopes, by their good discipline and experience. 
 For, perceiving the enemy did not stir, they 
 halted, of their own accord, in the midst of 
 their career ; and having taken a moment's 
 breath, put themselves, a second time, in mo- 
 tion, marched up in good order, flung their 
 javelins, and then betook themselves to their 
 swords. Nor did Pompey's men act with less 
 presence of mind ; for they sustained our at- 
 tack, kept their ranks, bore the discharge of 
 our darts ; and having launched their own, 
 immediately had recourse to their swords. At 
 his instant, Pompey's horse, accompanied by 
 the archers and slingers, attacked Cresar's ; 
 and having cori«ielIed them to give ground, 
 began to extend themselves to the left, in 
 order to flank the infantry. Whereupon Csesar 
 gave the appointed signal to the six cohorts, 
 who fell on the enemy's horse with such fury, 
 that they not only drove them from the field of 
 battle, but even compelled them to seek refuge 
 in the highest mountains. The archers and 
 slingers, deprived of their protection, were 
 soon after cut to pieces. Meanwhile the six 
 cohorts, not content with this success, wheeled 
 round upon the enemy's left wing, and be- 
 gan to charge it in the rear: whereupon 
 CsBsar, perceiving the victory so far advanced, 
 to complete it, brought up his third line, 
 which till then had not engaged. Pompey's 
 infantry being thus doubly attacked, in front 
 by fresh troops, and in rear, by the victorious 
 cohorts, could no longer resist, but fled to 
 their camp. Nor was Ctesar mistaken in his 
 conjecture, when, in exhorting his men, he de- 
 clared that victory would depend chiefly on the 
 SIX cohorts, which formed the body of reserve, 
 and were stationed to oppose the enemy's 
 
 horse ; for by them were their . tihy defeated, 
 their archers and slingers cut to pieces, and 
 their left wing surrounded and forced to 
 fly. 
 
 LXXYII. Pompey seeing his cavalry 
 routed, and that part of the army on which 
 he chiefly depended put into disorder, des- 
 paired of being able to restore the battle, and 
 quitted the field. Repairing immediately to 
 his camp, he said aloud, to the centurions, who 
 guarded the pretorian gate, so as all the 
 soldiers might hear him : " Take care of the 
 camp, and defend it vigorously in case of an 
 attack. I go to visit the other gates, and 
 give orders for their defence." This said, he 
 retired to his tent, despairing of success, yet 
 waiting the event. Ca;sar having forced the 
 Pompeians to seek refuge in their camp, and 
 not willing to allow them time to- recover 
 from their consternation, exhorted his troops 
 to make the best of their present victory, and 
 vigorously attack the enemy's intrenchments. 
 Though the battle had lasted till noon, the 
 weather being extremely hot ; yet, prepared 
 to encounter all difficulties, they cheerfully 
 complied with his orders. The camp was 
 bravely defended, for some time, by the co- 
 horts left to guard it ; and particularly by a 
 great number of Thracians, and other bar- 
 barians, who made a very stout resistance ; for 
 as to such troops as had there sought refuge 
 from the field of battle, they were in too great 
 a consternation to think of any thing more 
 than a safe retreat. It was not, however, pos- 
 sible for the troops posted on the rampart, 
 long to stand the multitude of darts continually 
 poured upon them ; which, in the end, obliged 
 them to retire covered with wounds, and under* 
 the conduct of their tribunes and centurions, 
 seek shelter in the mountains adjoining to the 
 camp. 
 
 LXXVIII. On entering Pompey's camp, 
 we found tables ready-covered, sideboards 
 loaded with plate, and tents adorned with 
 branches of myrtle ; that of L. Lentulus, 
 with some others, was shaded with ivy. Every 
 thing gave proofs of the highest luxury, and 
 an assured expectation of victory ; whence 
 it was easy to see, that they litile dreamed of 
 the issue of that day, since, intent only on 
 voluptuous refinements, they pretended, with 
 troops immersed in luxury, to oppose Csesar's 
 army accustomed to fatigue, and inured to th 
 want of necessaries. 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 279 
 
 LXXXI. Pompey finding our men had 
 forced liis intrenchments, mounted his horse, 
 quitted liis armour for a habit more suitable 
 to his ill fortune, and withdrawing by the 
 •Decuman port, rode full speed to Larissa. 
 Nor did he stop there ; but continuing his 
 flight day and night, without intermission, he 
 arrived at the sea-side, with thirty horse, and 
 went on board a little bark ; often complaining, 
 << That he had been so far deceived in his 
 opinion of his followers, as to see those very 
 men, from whom he expected victory, the first 
 to fly, and in a manner betray him into the 
 hands of his enemies." 
 
 LXXX. Caesar having mastered the ene- 
 my's camp, requested his soldiers not to leave 
 the victory imperfect, by busying themselves 
 about the plunder. Finding them ready to 
 obey, he began a line of circumvalhition round 
 the mountain. The Pompeians quickly aban- 
 doned a post, which, for want of water, was not 
 tenable, and endeavoured to reach the city of 
 Larissa: whereupon Cssar, dividing his array, 
 left one part in Pompey's camp, sent back 
 another to his own camp, and having, with 
 four legions, taken a nearer road than that 
 by which the enemy passed, he found means 
 to intercept them, and, after six miles march, 
 drew up in order of battle. But the Pom- 
 peians once more found protection from a 
 mountain, at the foot of which ran a rivulet. 
 Though Cffisar's troops were greatly fatigued, 
 by fighting the whole day, before night he 
 had flung up some works, sufficient to pre- 
 vent the enemy from having any communi- 
 cation with the rivulet. As by this step 
 they were cut off from all hopes of relief, or 
 of escaping, they sent deputies to treat about 
 a surrender. Affairs continued in this situa- 
 tion all that night, of which some few sena- 
 tors, who had accompanied them, took the 
 advantage to make their escape. At break of 
 day, they all, by Caesar's order, came down 
 into the plain, and delivered up their arms; 
 humbly imploring his goodness, and suing for 
 mercy. Caesar spoke to them with great 
 mildness, and to alleviate their apprehensions, 
 cited various instances of his clemency, which 
 he had, on so many occasions, made evident. 
 In fact, he gave them their lives, and forbade 
 his soldiers to offer them any violence, or to 
 take any thing from them. He then sent for 
 the legions, which had passed the night in 
 camp, to relieve those that had accompanied 
 
 him in the pursuit ; and being determined lo 
 follow Pompey, began his march, and arrived 
 the same day at Larissa. 
 
 LXXXL This battle cost Cygsar no moro 
 than two hundred soldiers : but he lost thirty 
 centurions, men of singular courage. Among 
 these latter was Crastinus, whose gallantry 
 and intrepidity, in marching up to battle, has 
 been taken notice of. This brave officer, 
 fighting, regardless of danger, received a 
 wound in the mouth, from a sword. Nor was 
 he deceived in promising himself Crcsar's ap- 
 probation, who was thoroughly sensilile of his 
 merit, and greatly applauded his behaviour in 
 this action. On Pompey's side, there fell 
 about fifteen thousand : but upwards of four 
 and twenty thousand were taken prisoners: 
 for the cohorts that guarded the fcjrts, sur- 
 rendered to Sylla; though many escaped into 
 the adjacent countries. One hundred and 
 eighty colours were taken, and nine eagles. 
 L. Domitius, flying towards the mountains^ 
 and growing faint through the fatigue, was 
 overtaken and killed by some horsemen. 
 
 LXXXIL About this time D, Lselius ar- 
 rived with his fleet at Brundusium, and pos- 
 sessed himself of the island over against the 
 harbour, as Libo had done before. Vatinius 
 who commanded in the place, having equipped 
 several boats, endeavoured to entice some of 
 Lf£lius's ships within the haven, and took a 
 five-benched galley, with two smaller vessels, 
 that had ventured too far into the port; then 
 disposing his cavalry along the shore, he pre- 
 vented the enemy from getting fresh water 
 But Laelius having chosen a more convenient 
 season of the year for sailing, brought water 
 in transports from Corcyra and Dyrrhachium; 
 still keeping to his purpose, from which 
 neither the disgrace of losing his ships nor 
 the want of necessaries could divert him, 
 till he received intelligence of the battle of 
 Pharsalia. 
 
 LXXXIIL Much about the same time Cas- 
 sius arrived in Sicily, with the Syrian, Phoeni- 
 cian, and Cilician fleets. And as Caesar's fleet 
 was divided into two parts, in one of which P. 
 Sulpicius the pretor commanded at Vibo, in 
 the straits ; in the other M. Pomponius at 
 Messana ; Cassius was arrived at Messana 
 with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of 
 his coming. And finding him unprepared, 
 without guards, order, or discipline, he took 
 the opportunity of a favourable wind, ani 
 
280 
 
 CAESAR'S 
 
 sent several fire-ships against him, which con- 
 sumed his whole fleet, thirty-five in number, 
 twenty of which were decked. The terror 
 occasioned by this blow was so great, that 
 though there was an entire legion in garrison 
 at Messana, they durst scarce look the enemy 
 in the face ; and would doubtless have de- 
 livered up the town, had not the news of 
 Caesar's victory reached them, by means of 
 the cavalry stationed along the coast. Cas- 
 sius then sailed for Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, 
 which finding at anchor near the shore by 
 reason the consternation was become general 
 over the whole island ; he put the same 
 stratagem in practice as before. For taking 
 the advantage of a favourable wind, he made 
 forty fire-ships advance against them, and 
 the flame catching hold on both sides, 
 quickly reduced five galleys to ashes. The 
 conflagration continuing to spread, roused the 
 indignation of some veteran soldiers, who 
 had been left to guard the ships. Accordingly 
 they went on board, weighed anchor, and, 
 attacking the enemy, took two quinqueremes, 
 in one of which was Cassius himself; but he 
 escaped in a boat. Two three-benched galleys 
 were sunk ; and soon after he was informed 
 of the defeat at Pharsalia, by some of Pompey 's 
 own followers ; for hitherto he had regarded 
 it as a false report, spread about by Ca;sar's 
 lieutenants and friends. Upon this intelligence 
 he quitted Sicily, and retired with his fleet, 
 
 LXXXIV. Caesar laying all other thoughts 
 aside, determined to pursue Pompey, whither- 
 soever he should retire, to prevent his drawing 
 together fresh forces, and renewing the war. 
 He marched every day as far as the body of 
 cavalry he had with him could hold out, and 
 was followed, by shorter marches, by a single 
 legion. Pompey had issued a proclamation 
 at Amphipolis. enjoining all the youth of the 
 province, whether Greeks or Romans, to join 
 him in arms. But whether this was with in- 
 tent to conceal his real design of retreating 
 much farther, or to try to maintain his ground 
 in Macedonia, if nobody pursued him, is hard 
 to determine. Here he lay one night at an- 
 chor, sending to what friends he had in the 
 town, and raising all the money he possibly 
 could. But being informed of Gcesar's approach, 
 he departed with all expedition, and came in a 
 few days to Mitylene. Here he was detained 
 two days by the badness of the weather ; and 
 having increased his fleet witS a few galleys 
 
 sailed to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus. There 
 he wad informed, that the Antiochians, and 
 Ri man citizens tradin-g hither, had with joint 
 consent seized the castle, and sent deputies to 
 such of his followers as had taken refuge in 
 the neighbouring states, not to come near Anti- 
 och at their peril. The same had happened a 
 Rhodes to L. Lentulus, the consul of the fore- 
 going year, to P. Lentulus a consular senator 
 and to some other persons of distinction ; who, 
 following Pompey in his flight, and arriving at 
 that island, were refused admittance into the 
 town and harbour, and received an order to with- 
 draw immediately, which they were necessi- 
 tated to comply with ; for the time of Csesar's 
 approach had now reached the neighbouring 
 states. 
 
 LXXXY. Upon this intelligence Pompey 
 laid aside his design of going into Syria, seized 
 all the money he found in the public bank, 
 borrowed as much more as he could of his 
 friends, sent great quantities of brass on board 
 for military uses ; and having raised two thou- 
 sand soldiers, amongst the public officers, mer- 
 chants, and his own servants, sailed for Pelu- 
 sium. Here, by accident, was king Ptolemy, 
 a minor, warring with a great army against his 
 sister Cleopatra ; whom, some months before, 
 by the assistance of his friends, he had ex- 
 pelled the kingdom, and was then encamped 
 not far distant from her. Pumpej' sent to de- 
 mand his protection, and a safe retreat in Alex- 
 andria, in consideration of the friendship that 
 had subsisted between him and his father. 
 The messengers, after discharging their com- 
 mission, began to converse freely with the 
 king's troops, exhorting them to assist Pompey 
 and not despise him in his adverse fortune. 
 Among these troops were many of Pompey's 
 old soldiers, vs'homGabinius, having draughted 
 out of the Syrian army, had carried to Alex- 
 andria, and, upon the conclusion of the war, 
 left there with the young king's father. The 
 king's ministers, who had the care of the go- 
 vernment during his minority, being informed 
 of this, either out of fear, as they afterwards 
 pretended, lest Pompey should dt-bauch the ai 
 my, and thereby render himself master of .Atex- 
 andria and Egypt ; or despising his low condi- 
 tion, (^as friends, in bad fortune, often turn ene- 
 mies,) spoke favourably to the deputies in 
 public, and invited Pompey to court ; but 
 privately despatched Achillas, captain of the 
 king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 281 
 
 L. Scptimius, a military tribune, with orders 
 to murder him. They accosted him with an 
 air of frankness, especially Septimius, who 
 had served under him as a centurion in the 
 war with the pirates ; and inviting him into the 
 boat, treacherously slew him, L. Lentulus 
 was likewise seized by the king's command, 
 and put to death in prison. 
 
 LXXXVI. When Caesar arrived in Asia 
 he found that T. Ampius, having formed the 
 design of seizing the treasurer of the Ephesian 
 Diana, and summoned all the senators in the 
 province to bear witness to the sum taken, had 
 quitted that project upon Caesar's approach 
 and betaken himself to flight. Thus was the 
 temple of Ephesus a second time saved from 
 plunder by Csesar. It was remarked in the 
 temple of Minerva at Elis, that the very day 
 Caesar gained the battle of Pharsalia, the im- 
 age of victory, which before stood fronting 
 the statue of the goddess, turned towards the 
 portal of the temple. The same day, at An- 
 tioch, in Syria, such a noise of fighting and 
 trumpets was heard two several times, that 
 the inhabitants ran to arms and manned their 
 walls. The like happened at Ptolemais. 
 At Pergamus, in the inner recesses of the 
 temple, called by the Greeks Adyta, where 
 none but priests are allowed to enter, the 
 sound of cymbals was heard. And in the 
 Temple of Victory, at Trallis, where a statue 
 was consecrated to Caesar, a palm sprouted be- 
 tween the joining of the stones that arched 
 the roof. 
 
 LXXXVII. Cfflsar, after a short stay in 
 Asia, hearing that Pompey had been seen at 
 Cyprus, and thence conjecturing that he was 
 for Egypt, because of the interest he had in 
 that kingdom, and the advantages it would af- 
 ford him, left Rhodes, with a convoy of ten 
 Rhodian galleys and a few others from Asia, 
 having on board two legions, one of which he 
 ordered to follow him from Thessaly, the other 
 detached from Fufius's army in Achaia ; and 
 eight hundred horse. In these legions were 
 no more than three thousand two hundred 
 men : the rest, fatigued with the length of the 
 march, or weakened with wounds, had not 
 been able to follow him. But Caesar depen- 
 ding on the reputation of his former exploits, 
 scrupled not to trust the safety of his person to 
 a feeble escort, believing no place would dare 
 to attempt any thing against him. At Alex- 
 andria he was informed of Pompey's death : 
 25 
 
 and upon landing, was accosted in a clamorous 
 manner by the soldiers, whom Ptolemy had 
 left to garrison the city : and he observed that 
 the mob appeared dissatisfied to see the fasces 
 carried before him, which they interpreted 
 a degradation of the sovereign authority. 
 Though this tumult was appeased, yet each 
 day produced some fresh disturbance, and 
 many of the Roman soldiers were murdered 
 in all parts of the city. 
 
 LXXX VIII. For these reasons he sent into 
 Asia for some of the legions which he had 
 raised out of the remains of Pompey's army : 
 being himself necessarily detained by the 
 Etesian winds, which are directly contrary to 
 any passage by sea from Alexandria. Mean- 
 time, considering the difference between Pto- 
 lemy and his sister, as subject to the cogniz- 
 ance of the Roman people, and of him as con- 
 sul ; and the rather, because the alliance with 
 Ptolemy, the father, had been contracted during 
 his former consulship ; he gave the king and 
 Cleopatra to understand, that it was his plea- 
 sure they should dismiss their troops, and in- 
 stead of having recourse to arms, come and 
 plead their cause before him. 
 
 LXXXIX. Pothinus the eunuch, governor 
 to the young king, had the chief management 
 of aflfairs during his minority. This minister 
 complained bitterly to his friends, that the king 
 should be summoned to plead his cause before 
 Caesar : afterwards finding among those that 
 sided with the king, some who were disposed 
 to enter into his views, he privately sent for 
 the army from Pelusium to Alexandria, and 
 conferred the chief command upon Achillas, the 
 same we have spoken of before : inciting him 
 by letters and promises, both in the king's 
 name and his own, to execute such orders as he 
 should receive from him. Ptolemy, the father, 
 by his will had appointed the eldest of the two 
 sons, and his elder daughter, joint heirs of the 
 kingdom. For the more certain accomplish- 
 ment of his design, he in the same will im- 
 plored the protection of the Roman people ; 
 adjuring them by all the gods, and the treaties 
 he had made at Rome, to see it put in execution. 
 A copy of this will was sent by ambassadors tc 
 Rome, to be deposited in the public treasury; 
 but the domestic troubles preventing it, it was 
 left in the hands of Pompey. The original 
 signed and sealed, was kept at Alexandria. 
 
 XC. While this affair was debated before 
 Cffisar, who passionately desired to terminate 
 20 
 
282 
 
 CjaSAR'S 
 
 the matter amicably, and to the satisfaction of 
 both parties, he was informed that the king's 
 army, with all the cavalry, were arrived at 
 Alexandria. Caesar's forces were by no means 
 sufficient to give them battle without the town ; 
 and therefore the only course left was to 
 secure the most convenient posts within 
 the city, till he should get acquainted with 
 Achillas's designs. Meantime he ordered all 
 the soldiers to their arms, and admonished the 
 king, to send some persons of the greatest 
 authority to Achillas, to forbid his approach. 
 Discorides and Serapion, who had both been 
 ambassadors at Rome, and in great credit with 
 Ptolemy, the father, were deputed to this 
 ofEce. But no sooner did they come before 
 Achillas, than without giving them a hearing, 
 or enquiring after the message they brought, 
 he ordered them to be seized and put to death. 
 One was killed upon the spot ; and the other, 
 having received a dangerous wound, was car- 
 ried off for dead by his attendants. Upon 
 hearing this, Csesar took care to secure the 
 king's person, the authority of whose name 
 would authorise his proceedings, and occasion 
 Achillas and his associates to be esteemed se- 
 ditious and rebellious. 
 
 XCI. Achillas's army was far from being 
 contemptible, whether we regard their num- 
 ber, courage, or experience in war. It amounted 
 to twenty thousand effective men, many of 
 whom were originally Romans, brought into 
 the country by Gabinius, when he came to 
 settle Auletes on the throne ; and who, 
 having afterwards married and settled in 
 Alexandria, were devoted to the Ptolemean 
 interest. Their were also some brigades 
 raised in Syria and Cilicia, together with a 
 considerable number of renegade slaves, who 
 had deserted their masters, and found protec- 
 tion in Egypt, by entering into the service. 
 If any of these was seized by his master, their 
 companions flocked to his rescue, regarding 
 his safety as a common cause, because they 
 ■were all embarked in the like guift. These 
 would often take upon them to put to death 
 the king's ministers, to plunder the rich, for 
 the sake of increasing their pay, to invest the 
 royal palace, to banish some, and send for others 
 home, with other liberties of the like nature, 
 which the Alexandrian army claims by a 
 kind of prescription. Besides these, he had 
 likewise two thousand horse, who, during the 
 late troubles, and the wars that ensued, had 
 
 had opportunities of inuring themselves to 
 arms. These had restored Ptolemy the father 
 to his kingdom, killed Bibulus's two sons, 
 warred against the Egyptians with success, 
 and acquired a thorough experience in military 
 affairs. 
 
 XCII. Achillas trusting to the valour of 
 his troops, and despising the handful of men 
 that followed Caesar, quickly make himself 
 master of Alexandria, the palace only excepted, 
 where Csesar thought proper to make his 
 stand, and which he attacked briskly, though 
 without effect. But it was on the side of the 
 harbour that the greatest efforts were made. 
 On that, in effect, the victory depended. Be- 
 sides two and tvyenty constant guard-ships, 
 there were in the port fifty galleys, from three 
 to five banks of oars, which the year before 
 had been sent to Pompey's assistance, and were 
 returned since the battle of Pharsalia. Had 
 Achillas been once master of these vessels,' he 
 might have cut Csesar off from all communi- 
 cation with the ocean, and consequently from 
 all hopes of receiving supplies of victuals or 
 forces. Thus the Egyptians, in hopes of a 
 complete victory, and the Romans to avoid 
 a certain ruin, exerted themselves with in- 
 credible vigour. At length Caesar carried his 
 point, and not only set fire to the vessels 
 above-mentioned, but to all that were in the 
 arsenals, after which he passed some troops 
 into the Isle of Pharos. 
 
 XCIII. The Pharos is a tower of prodigious 
 height and wonderful workmanship, built in 
 an island, from whence it takes its name. 
 This island, lying over against Alexandria, 
 makes a haven, and is joined to the continent 
 by a causeway of nine hundred paces, and by 
 a bridge. Here dwell several Egyptians, who 
 have built a town, and live by pillaging the 
 ships that are thrown upon their coast, either 
 by mistake or tempest. As it is situate at the 
 entrance of the port, which is but narrow, it 
 absolutel}' commands it. Caesar knowing the 
 importance of this post, whilst the enemy were 
 engaged in the assault, landed some troops 
 there, seized the tower, and put a garrison 
 into it ; thereby securing a safe reception for 
 the supplies he had sent for on all sides. In the 
 other quarters of the town, the fight was main- 
 tained with equal advantage, neither party 
 losing ground, because of the narrowness of 
 the passes, which enabled them easily to sup- 
 port themselves. After a few men killed on 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 283 
 
 Doth sides, Csesar having secured the most 
 necessary places, fortified them in the night. 
 In this quarter was a small part of the king's 
 palace, where Csesar was lodged upon his first 
 arrival ; and adjoining thereto a theatre, that 
 served instead of a citadel, and had a commu- 
 nication with the port and other arsenals. 
 These works he increased afterwards, that 
 they might serve instead of a rampart, to pre- 
 vent his being obliged to fight against his will. 
 Meantime Ptolemy's youngest daughter, hop- 
 ing the throne would be vacant, fled from the 
 
 palace to Achillas, and joined with him in 
 the prosecution of the war. But they soon 
 disagreed about the command, which increased 
 the largesses to the soldiers, each party en- 
 deavouring to gain them by large presents. 
 During these transactions, Pothinus, Ptole- 
 my's governor, and regent of the kingdom, 
 being discovered in a clandestine correspond- 
 ence with Achillas, whom he encouraged to 
 the vigorous prosecution of his erxterprise 
 Caesar ordered him to be put to death. Su 
 was the commencement of the Alexandrian wai 
 
PANSA'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR. 
 
 25* 285 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 . 'Jaesar prepares for war.— n. As likewise the Alexandrians.— III. Arsinoe, Ptolemy's daughter, possesse* 
 herself of the supreme authority. — IV. Scheme of the Alexandrians, to deprive the Romans of water.— V. Cae 
 sar's speech to his soldiers. They fall to diggingof wells, and thereby find water.— VI. Caesar having brought 
 his transports to Alexandria, has the advantage in several naval encounters.— XIII. And afterwards makes 
 himself master of some forts that commanded the port. — XIV. But attempting some others is repulsed, and 
 narrowly escapes by swimming.— XV. "Which loss, serves only the more to animate his soldiers.— XVI. Cae- 
 sar, at the request of the Alexandrians, sends them their king, Ptolemy, who immediately becomes his ene- 
 my.— XVII. Caesar's fleet has the disadvantage in an engagement.— XVllI. Mithridates, Caesar's friend, having 
 made himself master of Pelusium, advances towards Alexandria, at the head of a great body of troops. — 
 XIX. The king's forces, endeavouring to oppose him, are repulsed, with loss.— XX. Caesar marching to the 
 assistance of Mithridates, and Ptolemy, at the same time, to reinforce his troops, they come to a battle, with 
 all their forces, in which the king is entirely defeated. — XXII. Caesar storms the enemy's camp ; and the king 
 himself, endeavouring to make his escape, is drowned.— XXIII. Caesar admitting the Alexandrians to a sur- 
 render, restores tranquillity to Egypt.— XXIV. And settles the kingdom npon Cleopatra, and her brother. — 
 XXV. Meantime Domitius Calvinus, one of Caesar's generals, loses a battle against Pharnaces, in Armenia 
 the Lesser.— XXXII. At the same time Gabinius receives a considerable check in lUyricum, which had been 
 gallantly defended by Q. Cornificius.— XXXIV. But this loss is afterwardsrepairedby the bravery of Vatinius, 
 who recovers Tllyricum to the obedience of Caesar. — XXXVIII. About the same time, commotions arise in 
 Spain, occasioned by the extortions of Cassius Longinus.— XLII. Cassius is wounded by the conspirators. 
 — XLin. After which he behaved still more tyrannically,— XLIV. Whence new disturbances arise. — L. 
 Which are appeased at last, by the arrival of Lepidu, and the death of Cassius.— LII. Caesar restores his 
 affairs in Syria.— LIII. As likewise in Cilicia and Cappadocia.— LIV. And in Gallo-graecia.— LV. He af- 
 terwards treats of peace, with Pharnaces in Pontus.— LVI. And finding him not faithful to his engage- 
 ments, resolves to make war upon him. — LIX. Pharnaces rashly hazarding a battle, is totally routed, and 
 his army cut to pieces.— LXII. Pontus being thus speedily recovered, and tranquillity restored to all the 
 Asiatic provinces, Cassar returns to Italy. . 
 
 966 
 
PANSA'S C 
 
 ENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR. 
 
 I. The war thus commencing at Alexandria, 
 Caisar sent to Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia, for 
 his fleet ; to Crete, for archers ; and to Mal- 
 chus, king of the Nabatheans, for cavalry. He 
 likewise ordered military engines to be pro- 
 vided, corn to be brought, and forces despatched 
 to him with all diligence. Meanwhile, he was 
 daily employed in augmenting his works ; and 
 such parts of the town as appeared less tena- 
 ble, were strengthened with tortoises and 
 mantelets. Openings were made in the walls, 
 through which the battering rams might play ; 
 and whatever houses were thrown down, or 
 taken by force, were brought within the in- 
 trenchments. For Alexandria is in a manner 
 secure from fire, because the inhabitants use 
 no wood in their buildings, the houses being 
 all vaulted, and roofed with tile or pavement. 
 Cfflsar's principal aim was, to enclose with 
 works the smallest part of the town, separated 
 from the rest by a morass towards the south. 
 For thus the army would lie closer together, 
 be subject to one command, and could read- 
 ily despatch relief where it was most wanted. 
 Above all, he by this means made sure of 
 water and forage, which was of so much the 
 more consequence, as he was but ill provided 
 of the one, and wholly destitute of the other. 
 The morass, on the contrary, served abundantly 
 to supply him with both. 
 
 II. Nor were the Alexandrians remiss on 
 their side, or less active in the conduct of their 
 affairs. They had sent deputies and commis- 
 sioners into all parts, where the power and ter- 
 ritories of Egypt extend, with orders to levy 
 troops They had carried vast quantities of 
 
 darts and engines into the town, and drawn to- 
 gether an innumerable multitude of soldiers. 
 Yet not contented with all these preparations, 
 they established work-shops in every part of 
 the city, for the making of arms, and enlisted 
 all the slaves that were of age, the richer citi- 
 zens paying and maintaining them. With these 
 they guarded the remoter parts of the town ; 
 while the veteran cohorts, exempt from all 
 other service, were quartered in the squares 
 and open places ; that on whatever side an at- 
 tack should be made, they might be at hand 
 to give relief, and march fresh and entire to 
 the charge. All the avenues and passes were 
 shut up by a triple wall, built of square stones, 
 and carried to the height of forty feet. The 
 lower parts of the town were defended by very 
 high towers of ten stories : besides which, they 
 had likewise contrived a kind of moving 
 towers, which consisted of the same number of 
 stories, and being fitted with ropes and wheels, 
 could, by means of horses, as the streets of 
 Alexandria were quite even and level, be 
 conveyed wherever their service was neces- 
 sary. The city abounding in every thing, and 
 being very rich, furnished ample materials for 
 these several works ; and as the people were 
 extremely ingenious, and quick of apprehen- 
 sion, they so well copied what they saw done 
 by us, that our men seemed rather to imi- 
 tate them. They even invented many things 
 themselves, and at once invested our works and 
 defended their own. Their chiefs every where 
 represented : « That the people of Rome were 
 endeavouring by degrees to steal into the pos- 
 session of Egypt ; that a few years before 
 287 
 
288 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 Gabinius had come thither with an army ; that 
 Pompey had chosen it for the place of his re- 
 treat ; that Caesar was now among them with a 
 considerable body of troops, and notwithstand- 
 ing his rival's death, made no oilers to return ; 
 that if they did not therefore find means to 
 expel him, they would soon, from a kingdom, 
 be reduced to a Roman province ; that no 
 time was to be lost in^this attempt, because 
 the season of the year having put a stop to 
 navigation, he could receive no supplies from 
 beyond sea." 
 
 III. Meanwhile, a division arising between 
 Achillas, who commanded the veteran army, 
 and Arsinoe, the youngest daughter of king 
 Ptolemy, as has been demonstrated above ; 
 while they mutually endeavoured to supplant 
 one another, each striving to engross the su- 
 preme authority ; Arsinoe, by the assistance 
 of the eunuch Ganymed, her governor, at 
 length prevailed, and caused Achillas to be 
 slain. After his death, being possessed of 
 the whole power without a rival, she raised 
 Ganymed to the command of the army ; who, 
 on his entrance into that high office, augment- 
 ed the allowance of the troops, and with 
 equal diligence discharged all other parts of 
 his duty. 
 
 IV. Alexandria is almost quite hollow under- 
 neath, occasioned by the many aqueducts to 
 the Nile, that furnish private houses with 
 water ; where being received in cisterns, it 
 settles by degrees, and becomes perfectly clear. 
 This is preserved for the use of the master 
 and his family ; for the water of the Nile be- 
 ing extremely thick and muddy, is apt to breed 
 many distempers. The common people, how- 
 ever, are forced to be contented with it, be- 
 cause there is not a single spring in the whole 
 city. The river was in that part of the town 
 where the Alexandrians were masters. Hence 
 Ganymed conceived that a way might be 
 found to deprive the Romans of water ; be- 
 cause being distributed into several streets, 
 for the more easy defence of the works, they 
 made use of that which was preserved in the 
 cisterns of private houses. With this view he 
 began a great and difficult work ; for having 
 stopped up all the canals by which his own 
 cisterns were supplied, he drew vast quantities 
 of water out of the sea, Ly the help of wheels 
 and other engines, pouring it continually into 
 the canals of Caesar's quarter. The cisterns 
 in the nearest houses soon began to taste salter 
 
 than ordinary, and occasioned great wonder 
 among the men, who could not think from 
 what cause it proceeded. They were even 
 ready to disbelieve their senses, when those 
 who were quartered a little lower in the town, 
 assured them that they found the water the 
 same as before. This put them upon compar- 
 ing the cisterns one with another, and by trial 
 they easily perceived the diflerence. But in 
 a little time the water in the nearest houses 
 became quite unfit for use, and that lower down 
 grew daily more tainted and brackish ; upon 
 which such a terror eusued among the troops, 
 that they fancied themselves reduced to the 
 last extremity. Some complained of Caesar's 
 delay, that he did not order them immediately 
 to repair to their ships. Others dreaded a yet 
 greater misfortune, as it would be impossible 
 to conceal their design of retreating from the 
 Alexandrians, who were so near them ; and no 
 less so to embark in the face of a vigorous 
 and pursuing enemy. There were besides a 
 great number of the townsmen in Caesar's 
 quarter,' whom he had not. thought proper to 
 force from their houses, because they openly 
 pretended to be in his interest, and to have 
 quitted the party of their fellow-citizens. But 
 to offer here at a defence either of the sincerity 
 or conduct of these Alexandrians, would be 
 only labour in vain, since all who know the 
 genius and temper of the people, must be satis- 
 fied that they are the fittest instruments in the 
 world for treason. 
 
 V. Caesar laboured to remove his soldiers' 
 fears, by encouraging and reasoning the case 
 with them, " They might easily," he told 
 them, " find water, by digging wells, as all 
 sea-coasts naturally abounded with fresh 
 springs : that if Egypt was singular in this re- 
 spect, and difi*ered from every other soil ; yet 
 still, as the sea was open, and the enemy with- 
 out a fleet, there was nothing to hinder their 
 fetching it at pleasure in their ships, either from 
 Parsetonium on the left, or Pharos on the right; 
 which two places lying different v?ays, the wind 
 could neither exclude them from both at the 
 same time ; that a retreat was on no account to 
 be thought of, not only bj' those who had a 
 concern for their honour, but even by such as 
 regarded nothing but life; that it was with the 
 utmost difficulty they could defend themselves 
 behind their works ; but if they once quitted 
 that advantage, neither in number nor situa- 
 tion would they be a match for the enemy : 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 289 
 
 that to embark woulJ require much time, and 
 be attended with great danger, especially 
 where it must be managed by little boats: 
 that the Alexandrians, on the contiary, were 
 nimble and active, and thoroughly acquainted 
 with the streets and buildings : that flushed 
 with so manifest an advantage, they would not 
 fail to run before, seize all the advantageous 
 posts, possess themselves of the tops of the 
 houses, and, by annoying them in their 
 retreat, effectually prevent their getting on 
 board ; that they might therefore think no 
 more of retiring, but place all their hopes of 
 safety in victory." Having by this speech re- 
 assured his men, he • ordered the centurions to 
 lay aside all other cares, and apply them- 
 selves day and night to the digging of wells. 
 The work once begun, they pushed it on so 
 vigorously that the very first night abundance 
 of fresh water was found. Thus with labour 
 on our side, the mighty projects and pain- 
 ful attempts of the Alexandrians were entirely 
 frustrated. 
 
 VI. During these transactions, the thirty- 
 seventh legion, composed of Pompey's vete- 
 rans that had surrendered to Cssar, embarking 
 by order of Domitius Calvinus, with arms, 
 darts, provisions, and military engines, arrived 
 upon the coast of Africa, a little above Alex- 
 andria. An easterly wind, which continued 
 to blow for several da3's together, hindered 
 their being able to gain the port; but all along 
 that coast it is very safe riding at anchor. Be- 
 ing detained, however, longer than they ex- 
 pected, and pressed with want of water, they 
 gave notice of it to CaBsar by a despatch sloop. 
 Caesar, that he might himself be able to de- 
 termine what was best to be done, went on 
 board one of the ships in the harbour, and or- 
 dered the whole fleet to follow. He took none 
 of the land forces with him, because he was 
 unwilling to leave the works unguarded dur- 
 ing his absence. Being arrived at that part 
 of the coast known by the name of Cherronesus, 
 he sent some mariners on shore to fetch 
 water. Part of these venturing too far into 
 the country for the sake of plunder, were 
 intercepted by the enemy's horse. From them 
 the Egyptians learned that Caesar himself was 
 on board, without any soldiers. Upon this in- 
 formation, they thought fortune had thrown a 
 fair occasion in their way, of attempting some- 
 thing with success. They therefore manned 
 all the ships that were in condition to sail,and 
 
 met Csesar on his return. He declined fight- 
 ing that day for two reasons ; because he had 
 no soldiers on board, and it was past four in 
 the afternoon. The night, he was sensible, 
 must be highly advantageous to his enemies, 
 who were perfectly acquainted with the coast: 
 and he would himself be deprived of the 
 benefit of encouraging his men, which could 
 not be done with any effect in the dark, 
 where courage and cowardice must remain 
 equally unknown. He therefore drew all his 
 ships towards the shore, where he imagined 
 the enemy would not follow him. 
 
 VH. There was one nhodian galley_ in 
 Caesar's right wing, considerably distant from 
 the rest. This being observed by the enemy, 
 they came forward with four decked ships, 
 and several open barks, to attack her. Csesar 
 was obliged to advance to her relief, that 
 he might not suffer the disgrace of seeing one 
 of his galleys sunk before his eyes ; though^ 
 had he left her to perish, she seemed to de- 
 serve it for her rashness. The attack was 
 sustained with great courage by the Khodians> 
 who though at all times distinguished by their 
 valour and experience in engagements at sea> 
 yet exerted themselves in a particular manner 
 on this occasion, that they might not draw 
 upon themselves the charge of having occasion- 
 ed a misfortune to the fleet. Accordingly, they 
 obtained a complete victory, took one four- 
 benched galley, sunk another, disabled a thirds 
 and slew all that were on board, besides a 
 great number belonging to the other shipa 
 Nay, had not night interposed, Caesar would 
 have made himself master of their whole fleet. 
 During the consternation that followed upon 
 this occasion, Caesar finding the contrary winds 
 to abate, took the transports in tow, and ad- 
 vanced with the victorious fleet to Alexandria^ 
 
 Vni. The Alexandrians, disheartened .it 
 this loss, as finding themselves now worsted^ 
 not by the superior valour of the soldiers, but 
 by the skill and ability of the mariners, re- 
 tired to the tops of their houses, and blocked 
 up the entrance of their streets, as fearing our 
 fleet might attack them even by land. But 
 soon after, Ganymed assuring them in council, 
 that he would not only restore the vessels they 
 had lost, but even increase their number ; they 
 began to repair their old ships with great ex- 
 pectation and confidence, and resolved to apply 
 more than ever to the putting their fleet in 
 a good condition. And although they had 
 2 P 
 
290 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 lost above a hundred and ten ships in the port 
 and arsenal, yet did not all this discourage 
 them ; because, by making themselves masters 
 at sea, they saw they would have it in their 
 power to hinder Cassar's receiving any rein- 
 forcements or supplies. Besides, being natu- 
 rally mariners, born upon the sea-coast, and 
 exercised from their infancy in naval affairs, 
 they were desirous to return to that wherein 
 their true and proper strength lay, remember- 
 ing the advantages they had formerly gained, 
 even with their little ships. They therefore 
 applied themselves with all diligence to the 
 equipping a fleet. 
 
 IX. Vessels were stationed at all the mouths 
 of the Nile, for receiving and gathering in 
 the customs. Several old ships were likewise 
 lodged in the king's private arsenals, where 
 they had remained unrigged for many years. 
 These last they refitted, and recalled the for- 
 mer to Alexandria. To supply themselves 
 with oars, they uncovered the porticoes, Aca- 
 demies, and public buildings, and made use 
 of the planks they furnished. Their natural 
 ingenuity, and the abundance of all things to 
 be met with in the city, supplied every want. 
 In fine, they had no long navigation to pro- 
 vide for, and were only solicitous about pre- 
 sent exigencies, foreseeing they would have no 
 occasion to fight but in the port. In a few 
 days, therefore, contrary to all expectation, 
 they had fitted out twenty-two quadriremes, 
 and five quinqueremes. To these they added 
 a great number of small open barks ; and em- 
 ploying the rowers in the harbour, to practise 
 and exercise themselves, put a sufficient num- 
 ber of soldiers on board, and prepared every 
 thing necessary for an engagement. Caesar had 
 nine Khodian galleys (for of the ten which were 
 sent, one was shipwrecked on the coast of 
 Egypt ; eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, 
 and twelve out of Asia. Of these ten were 
 quadriremes and five quinqueremes. The rest 
 were of an inferior bulk, and for the most part 
 without decks. Yet trusting to the valour of 
 his soldiers, and knowing the strength of the 
 enemy, he prepared for an engagement. 
 
 X. When both sides were come to have 
 sufficient confidence of their own strength, 
 Cffisar sailed round Pharos, and formed in 
 line of battle over against the enemy. The 
 Rhodian galleys were in his right wing, and 
 those of Pontus in his left. Between these 
 he left a space of four hundred paces, to serve 
 
 for the extending and working the vessels. 
 This disposition being made, he drew up the 
 rest of the fleet as a reserve, giving them the 
 necessary orders, and distributing them in such 
 manner, that every ship followed that to which 
 she was appointed to give succour. The Alex- 
 andrians came forth with great confidence, 
 and drew up their fleet, placing their twenty- 
 two quadriremes in front, and disposing the 
 rest behind them in a second line, by way of 
 reserve. They had besides a great number of 
 boats and smaller vessels, that carried fire 'and 
 combustible weapons, with design to fright us 
 by their number, cries, and flaming darts. 
 Between the two fleets were certain flats, se- 
 parated by very narrow channels, and which 
 are said to be on the African coast, as being 
 in that division of Alexandria which belongs 
 to Africa. Both sides waited which should 
 first pass these shallows, because whoever en- 
 tered the narrow channels between them, in 
 case of any misfortune, would find it very dif- 
 ficult either to retreat, or work the ships to 
 advantage. 
 
 XI. Euphranor commanded the Rhodian 
 fleet, who for valour and greatness of mind 
 deserved rather to be ranked among the Ro- 
 mans than the Grecians. The Rhodians had 
 raised him to the post of Admiral, on account 
 of his known courage and experience. He 
 perceiving Csesar's design, addressed him to 
 this effect: " You seem afraid of passing the 
 shallows first, lest you should be thereby forced 
 to come to an engagement, before the rest of 
 the fleet can be brought up. Leave the matter 
 to us, we will sustain the fight, and I hope too 
 without disappointing your expectations, until 
 the whole fleet gets clear of the shallows. It 
 is both dishonourable and afflicting, that they 
 should so long continue in our sight with an 
 air of triumph." Ctesar encouraging him in 
 his design, and bestowing many praises upon 
 him, gave the signal for engaging. Four 
 Rhodian ships having passed the shallows, the 
 Alexandrians gathered round and attacked 
 them. They maintained the fight with great 
 bravery, disengaging themselves by their art 
 and address, and working their ships with so 
 much skill, that notwithstanding the inequality 
 of number, none of the enemy were suffered 
 to run alongside, or break their oars. Mean- 
 time the rest of the fleet came up : when, on 
 account of the narrowness of the place, art be- 
 coming useless, the success depended wholly 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 291 
 
 upon valour. The Alexandrians and Romans 
 who were in the town, laying aside all thoughts 
 of attack, and defence, mounted the tops of 
 the houses, and all the eminences that could 
 give a view of the fight, addressing the gods 
 by vows and prayers for victory. 
 
 XII. The event of the battle was by no 
 means equal. A defeat would have deprived 
 us of all resource either by land or by sea; 
 and even victory itself would not much bet- 
 ter our condition. The Alexandrians, on the 
 contrary, by a victory, gained every thing ; 
 and if defeated, might yet again have recourse 
 to fortune. It was likewise a matter of the 
 highest concern, to see the safety of all depend 
 upon the bravery of a few, whose want of 
 courage would expose their whole party to 
 destruction. This Csesar had often represented 
 to his troops during the preceding days, that 
 they might be thereby induced to fight with 
 the more resolution, when they knew the 
 common safety to depend upon their bravery. 
 Every man said the same to his comrade, 
 companion, and friend, requesting him not to 
 disappoint the expectation of those who had 
 chosen him preferably to others for the de- 
 fence of the common interest. Accordingly 
 they fought with so much resolution, that nei- 
 ther the art nor address of the Egyptians, a 
 maritime and seafaring people, could stand them 
 in any stead, nor the multitude of their ships be 
 of service to them ; nor the yalour of those 
 selected for this engagement, stand in com- 
 petition with the determined courage of the 
 Somans. In this action a quinquereme was 
 taken, and a bireme, with all the soldiers and 
 mariners on board, besides three sunk, with- 
 out any loss on our side. The rest fled to- 
 wards the tovyn, sheltering themselves under 
 the mole and forts, whither we durst not pur- 
 sue them. 
 
 XIII. To deprive the enemy of this re- 
 source for the future, Caesar thought it by all 
 means necessary, to render himself master of 
 the mole and island; for having already in 
 a great measure completed his works within 
 the town, he was in hopes of being able to de- 
 fend himself both in the island and city. 
 This resolution being taken, he put into boats 
 and small vessels ten cohorts, a select body of 
 light-armed infantry, and such of the Gallic 
 cavalry as he thought most for his purpose, and 
 sent them against the island ; whilst at the 
 same tinie, to occasion a diversion, he attacked 
 
 it on the other side with his fleet, promising 
 great rewards to those who should first render 
 themselves masters of it. At first the attack 
 was brisk, and the defence vigorous : for they 
 both annoyed our men from the tops of the 
 houses, and gallantly maintained their ground 
 along the shore ; which being steep and craggy, 
 our men could find no way of approach ; all 
 the more accessible avenues being skilfully de- 
 fended by small boats, and five galleys, pro- 
 perly stationed for that purpose. But when, 
 after examining the approaches, and sounding 
 the shallows, a few of our men got upon the 
 shore, and were followed by others, who pushed 
 the islanders, without intermission, the Pha- 
 rians at last betook themselves to flight. 
 Upon this, abandoning the defence of the 
 port, they quitted their ships, and retired into 
 the town, to provide for the security of their 
 houses. But they could not long maintain their 
 ground there : though to compare small things 
 with great, their buildings resemble those of 
 Alexandria, and their towers were high, and 
 joined together so as to form a kind of wall ; 
 and our men had neither ladders, fascines, nor 
 any weapons for assault. But fear often de- 
 prives men of counsel and strength, as hap- 
 pened upon this occasion. Those who had 
 ventured to oppose us on even ground, terri- 
 fied by the loss of a few men, and the general 
 rout, durst not face us from a height of thirty 
 feet ; but throwing themselves from the mole, 
 into the sea, endeavoured to gain the town, 
 though above eight hundred paces distant. 
 Many, however, were slain, and about six 
 hundred taken. 
 
 XIV. CfEsar giving up the plunder to the 
 soldiers, ordered the houses to be demolished; 
 but fortified the castle at the end of the bridge 
 next the island, and placed a garrison in it. 
 This the Pharians had abandoned ; but the 
 other, towards the town, which was con- 
 siderably stronger, was still held by the 
 Alexandrians. Csesar attacked it next day ; 
 because, by getting possession of these two 
 forts, he would be entirely master of the port, 
 and prevent sudden excursions and piracies. 
 Already he had, by means of his arrows and 
 engines, forced the garrison to abandon the 
 place, and retire towards the town. He had 
 also landed three cohorts, which was all the 
 place would contain ; and disposed the rest of 
 his troops abroad to sustain them. He then 
 fortified t,\\e bridge on the side of the en- 
 
293 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 emy, built an arch across the entrance of the 
 port, and filled it up, in such a manner, with 
 stones, that not the smallest boat could pass. 
 When the work was almost finished, the 
 Alexandrians sallied, in crowds, from the 
 town, and drew up, in an open place over 
 against the intrenchment we had cast up at 
 the head of the bridge. At the same time, 
 the vessels, which they had been wont to make 
 pass under the bridge, to set fire to our ships 
 of burden, were ranged along the mole. Our 
 men fought from the bridge and the mole ; 
 the enemy from the area, over against the 
 bridge, and from their ships, by the side of the 
 mole. While Caesar, attentive to what passed, 
 was exhorting his troops,a number of rowers 
 and mariners, quitting their ships, threw them- 
 selves upon the mole ; partly out of curiosity, 
 partly to have a share in the action. At first, 
 with stones and slings, they forced the ene- 
 my's ships from the mole ; and seemed to do 
 still greater execution with their darts. But 
 when, some time after, a few Alexandrians 
 found means to land and attack them in flank ; 
 as they had left their ships without order or 
 discipline, so they soon began to fly with pre- 
 cipitation. 'J'he Alexandrians, encouraged by 
 this success, landed in great numbers, and 
 vigorously pushed our men, who were by this 
 time in great confusion. Those that remained 
 in the galleys perceiving this, drew up the 
 ladders, and put off from the shore, to prevent 
 the enemy's boarding them. The three co- 
 horts, who were at the head of the mole, to 
 guard the bridge, astonished at this disorder, 
 the cries they heard behind them, and the 
 general rout of their party ; unable, besides, to 
 bear up against the multitude of darts which 
 came pouring upon them, and fearing to be 
 surrounded, and have their retreat cut off, by 
 the departure of their ships, abandoned the 
 defence of the bridge, and ran with all the 
 speed they could, towards the galleys. Some 
 getting on board the nearest vessels, overloaded 
 and sunk them. Part making head against 
 the enemy, and uncertain what course to take, 
 were cut to pieces by the Alexandrians. 
 Others, more fortunate, got to the ships that 
 rode at anchor ; and a few, by the help of 
 their bucklers, swam to the nearest vessels. 
 Coesar endeavouring to re-animate his men, 
 and lead them back to the defence of the 
 works, was exposed to the same danger with 
 the rest: when finding them universally to 
 
 give ground, he retreated to his own galley ; 
 whither such a multitude followed, and crowded 
 after him, that it was impossible either to work 
 or put her off. Foreseeing what must happen, 
 he flung himself into the sea, and swam to a 
 ship that lay at some distance. Hence des- 
 patching boats to succour his men, he, by 
 that means, preserved a small number. His 
 own ship, sunk by the multitude that crowded 
 into her, perished with all that were on board. 
 We lost, in this action, about four hundred 
 legionary soldiers, and somewhat above that 
 number of sailors and rowers. The Alexan- 
 drians secured the fort by strong works, and a 
 great number of engines ; and having cleared 
 away the stones with which Caesar had 
 blocked up the port, enjoyed henceforward a 
 free and open navigation. 
 
 XV. Our men, instead of being disheartened 
 at this loss, seemed rather roused and animated 
 by it. They were making continual sallies 
 upon the enemy, to destroy or check the pro- 
 gress of their works ; fell upon them as often 
 as they had an opportunity ; and never failed 
 to intercept them, when they ventured to. ad- 
 vance beyond their fortifications. In short, 
 the legions were so bent upon fighting, that 
 they even outstripped the orders and exhorta- 
 tions of Cffisar. They were inconsolable for 
 their late disgrace, and impatient to come to 
 blows with the enemy ; insomuch that he 
 found it rather necessary to restrain and 
 check their ardour, than incite them to ac- 
 tion. 
 
 XVr. The Alexandrians, perceiving that 
 success confirmed the Romans, and that ad- 
 verse fortune only animated them the more ; 
 as they knew of no medium between these, on 
 which to ground any further hopes, resolved, 
 either by the advice of the friends of their 
 king who were in Csesar's quarter, or of their 
 own motion ; or, perhaps, on an intimation 
 from the king himself, suggested to him by 
 secret emissaries, to send ambassadors to Cae- 
 sar to demand their king. They represented, 
 " That the people, weary of subjection to a 
 woman, of living under a precarious govern- 
 ment, and submitting to the cruel laws of the 
 tyrant Ganymed, instead of obeying their own 
 lawful king, desired nothing so much as to 
 have him amongst them : that in granting their 
 request, he would pave the way to an alliance, 
 and extinguish all the fears and objections 
 that had hitherto obstructed it." Though Cte- 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 293 
 
 sar knew the nation to be false and perfidious, 
 seldom speaking as they really thought, he 
 iudged it best, however, to comply with their 
 desire. He even flattered himself, that his 
 condescension in sending back their king at 
 their request, would prevail on them to be 
 faithful; or, as was more agreeable to their 
 character, if they only wanted the king to 
 head their army ; at least it would be more for 
 his honour and credit, to have to do with a 
 monarch, than with a band of slaves and 
 fugitives. Accordingly he sent Ptolemy to 
 them, exhorting him " to lake the government 
 into his own hands, and consult the welfare of 
 so fair and illustrious a kingdom, defaced by 
 hideous ruins and conflagrations. That he 
 would make his subjects sensible of their 
 duty, preserve them from the destruction that 
 threatened them, and act with fidelity towards 
 himself and the Romans, who put so much 
 confidence in him, as to send him amongst 
 armed enemies." Then taking him by the 
 hand, he told him he was at liberty to depart. 
 But the young prince, thoroughly versed in 
 the art of dissimulation, and no way degener- 
 ating from the character of his nation, entreat- 
 ed Csesar with tears not to send him back ; 
 for that his company was to him preferable to 
 a kingdom. Caesar moved at his concern, 
 dried up his tears ; and telling him if these 
 were his real sentiments they would soon 
 meet again, dismissed him. The king, like a 
 wild beast, escaped out of confinement, car- 
 ried on the war with such acrimony against 
 Caesar, that the tears he shed at parting, 
 seemed to have been tears of joy. Ctesar's 
 lieutenants, friends, centurions, and soldiers, 
 were not a little pleased at this ; because, 
 through his easiness of temper, he had suf- 
 fered himself to be imposed upon by a child ; 
 as if in truth Caesar's behaviour on this occa- 
 sion had been the effect of easiness of temper, 
 and not of the most consummate prudence. 
 
 XVII. When the Alexandrians found that 
 the restoration of their king had neither ren- 
 dered their own party stronger, nor the Ro- 
 mans weaker; that the troops despised the 
 youth and weakness of their king ; and that 
 their affairs were no way bettered by his pre- 
 sence ; they were greatly discouraged : the ra- 
 ther, because a report ran, that a great body of 
 troops was marching by land from Syria and 
 Cilicia to Caesar's assistance, of which he had 
 not as yet himself received information. This, 
 26 
 
 however, did not hinder their design of inter- 
 cepting the convoys that came to him by sea. 
 To this end having equipped some ships, they 
 ordered them to cruise before the Canopic 
 branch of the Nile, by which they thought it 
 most likely our supplies would arrive. Caesar, 
 who was informed of it, sent likewise his 
 fleet to sea, under the command of Tiberius 
 Nero, The Rhodian galleys made part of 
 this squadron, headed by Euphranor their ad- 
 miral, without whom he had little hopes of 
 success from any maritime expedition. But 
 fortune, which often reserves the heaviest 
 disasters for those who have been loaded with 
 her highest favours, encountered Euphranor 
 upon this occasion, with an aspect very dif- 
 ferent from what she had hitherto worn. For 
 when our ships were arrived at Canopus, and 
 the fleets drawn up on each side had begun 
 the engagement, Euphranor, according to 
 custom, having made the first attack, and 
 pierced and sunk one of the enemy's ships; 
 as he pursued the next a considerable way, 
 without being sufficiently sustained by those 
 that followed him, he was surrounded by tho 
 Alexandrians. None of the fleet advanced to 
 his relief, either out of fear for their own 
 safety, or because they imagined he would 
 easily be able to extricate himself by his 
 courage and good fortune. Accordingly he 
 alone behaved well in this action, and being 
 abandoned by all the rest, perished with his 
 victorious galley. 
 
 XVIII. About the same time Mithridates 
 of Pergamus, a man of illustrious descent, 
 distinguished for his bravery and knowledge 
 in the art of war, and who bore a very high 
 place in the friendship and confidence of 
 Caesar ; having been sent, in the beginning of 
 the Alexandrian war, to raise succours in Syria 
 and Cilicia, arrived by land at the head of a 
 great body of troops, which his diligence, and 
 the affection of these two provinces, had ena- 
 bled him to draw together in a very short time. 
 He conducted them first to Pelusium, a city 
 which joins Syria to Egypt. Achillas, who 
 was perfectly well acquainted with its impor- 
 tance, had seized and put a strong garrison into 
 it. For Egypt is considered as defended on all 
 sides by strong barriers ; towards the sea by 
 the Pharos, and towards Syria by Pelusium, 
 which are accounted the two keys of that 
 kingdom. He attacked it so briskly with a 
 large body of troops, fresh men continually 
 
294 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 succeeding in the place of those that were 
 fatigued ; and urged the assault with so much 
 firmness and perseverance, that he carried it 
 the same day, and placed a garrison in it. 
 Thence he pursued his march to Alexandria, 
 reducing all the provinces through which he 
 passed, and conciliating them to Caesar, by 
 that authority which always accompanies 
 victory. 
 
 XIX. Not far from Alexandria lies Delta, 
 the most celebrated province of Egypt, which 
 borrows its name from the Greek letter so call- 
 ed. For the Nile, dividing the two channels, 
 which gradually run off as they approach the 
 sea, into which they at last discharge them- 
 selves, at a considerable distance from one 
 another, leaves an intermediate space in form 
 of a triangle. The king, understanding that 
 Mithridates approached this place, and know- 
 ing he must pass the river, sent a great body 
 of troops against him, sufficient, as he thought, 
 if not to overwhelm and crush him, at least to 
 stop his march; for though he earnestly de- 
 sired to see him defeated, yet he thought it a 
 great point gained, to hinder his junction with 
 Csesar. The troops that first passed the river, 
 and came up with Mithridates, attacked him 
 immediately, that they might alone have the 
 honour of the victory. Mithridates at first 
 confined himself to the defence of his camp, 
 which he had with great prudence fortified ac- 
 cording to the custom of the Romans : but ob- 
 serving that they advanced insolently and 
 without caution, he sallied upon them from all 
 parts, and put a great number of them to the 
 sword ; insomuch that but for their knowledge 
 of the places, and the neighbourhood of the 
 vessels in which they had passed the river, 
 they must have been all destroyed. But re- 
 covering by degrees from their terror, and 
 ioining the troops that followed them, they 
 again prepared to attack Mithridates. 
 
 XX. Mithridates sent to inform Caesar of 
 what had happened. The king was likewise 
 informed on his side. Thus much about the 
 same time, Ptolemy set out to crush Mithri- 
 dates, and Caesar to relieve him. The king 
 made use of the more expeditious conveyance 
 of the Nile, where he had a large fleet in readi- 
 ness. Cfesar declined the navigation of the 
 river, that he might not be obliged to fight 
 the enemy's fleet; and coasting along the Af- 
 rican shore, found means to join the victorious 
 
 troops of Mithri(j tes, before Ptolemy could 
 attack him, 
 
 XXI. The king had encamped in a very 
 dangerous place, being an eminence surround- 
 ed on all sides by a plain. Three of its sides 
 were secured by various defences. One ad- 
 joined to the Nile, the other was steep and 
 inaccessible, and the third was defended by a 
 morass. Between Ptolemy's camp and Caesar'a 
 route lay a narrow river with very high banks, 
 which discharged itself into the Nile. This 
 river was about seven miles from the king's 
 camp ; who understanding that Cssar directed 
 his march that way, sent all his cavalry, with 
 a choice body of light-armed foot, to hinder 
 Caesar from passing, and maintain an unequal 
 fight from the banks, where courage had no op- 
 portunity to exert itself, and cowardice ran no 
 hazard. Our men, both horse and foot, were 
 extremely mortified, that the Alexandrians 
 should so long maintain their ground against 
 them. Wherefore the German cavalry, dis- 
 persing in quest of a ford, some found means 
 to swim the river where the banks were low- 
 est ; and the legionaries at the same time cut- 
 ting down several large trees, that reached 
 from one bank to another, and throwing them 
 into the water, by their help got to the other 
 side. The enemy, unable to sustain the first 
 charge, betook themselves to flight ; but in 
 vain : for very few returned to the king, being 
 almost all cut to pieces in the pursuit. 
 
 XXII. Caesar, upon this success, judging 
 that his sudden approach must strike great 
 terror into the Alexandrians, advanced towards 
 their camp with his victorious army. But 
 finding it well intrenched, strongly fortified by 
 nature, and the ramparts crowded with armed 
 soldiers, he did not think proper to attack it 
 at that time, as his troops were very much fa- 
 tigued, both by their march and the late battle ; 
 and therefore encamped at a small distance 
 from the enemy. Next day he attacked a 
 fort, in a village not far off, which the king 
 had joined to his camp by a line of communica- 
 tion, with a view of keeping possession of the 
 village. He employed his whole army in this 
 assault; not because it would have been dif- 
 ficult to carry it with a few forces ; but with 
 design of falling immediately upon the enemy's 
 camp during the alarm the loss of this fort 
 must give them. Accordingly the Romans, 
 in continuing the pursuit of those that fleJ 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 295 
 
 from the fort, arrived at last before the Alex- 
 andrian camp, where a furious battle ensued. 
 There were two approaches by which it 
 might be attacked : one by the plain, of which 
 we have spoken before ; the other by a nar- 
 row pass, between their camp and the Nile. 
 The first, which was much the easiest, was de- 
 fended by a numerous body of their best troops ; 
 and the access on the side of the Nile gave 
 the enemy great advantages in distressing and 
 wounding our men ; for they were exposed to 
 a double shower of darts : in front from the 
 rampart ; behind, from the river ; where the 
 enemy had stationed a great number of ships, 
 furnished with archers and slingers, that kept 
 a continual discharge. Caesar observing that 
 his troops fought with the utmost ardour, and 
 yet made no great progress, on account of the 
 disadvantage of the ground ; as he saw they 
 had left the highest part of their camp un- 
 guarded, because, being sufficiently fortified by 
 nature, they had all crowded to the other at- 
 tacks, partly to have a share in the action, 
 partly to be spectators of the issue ; he order- 
 ed some cohorts to wheel round the camp, 
 and gain that ascent: appointing Carsulenus 
 to command them, a brave officer, and well 
 acquainted with the service. When they had 
 reached the place, where they found but very 
 few to defend it, our men attacked them so 
 briskly, that the Alexandrians, terrified by 
 the cries they heard behind them, and seeing 
 themselves attacked both in front and rear, 
 fled in the utmost consternation on all sides. 
 Our men, animated by the confusion of the 
 enemy, entered the camp in several places at 
 the same time, and running down from the 
 higher ground, put a great number of them to 
 the sword. The Alexandrians, endeavouring to 
 escape, threw themselves in crowds over the 
 rampart next the river. The foremost tum- 
 bling into the ditch, where they were crushed 
 to death, furnished an easy passage for those 
 that followed. The king made his escape 
 the same way: but by the crowd that followed 
 him, the ship to which he fled was overloaded 
 and sunk. 
 
 XXIII. After this speedy and successful ac- 
 tion, Caesar, in confidence of so great a victory, 
 marched the nearest way by land to Alexan- 
 dria with his cavalry, and entered triumphant 
 into that part of the town possessed by the 
 enemy. He was not mistaken in thinking, 
 that the Alexandrians, upon hearing of the 
 
 issue of the battle, would give over all thoughts 
 of war. Accordingly as soon as he was arrived, 
 he reaped the just fruit of his valour and 
 magnanimity. For the Alexandrians, throw- 
 ing down their arms, abandoning their works, 
 and assuming the habit of suppliants, came 
 forth to surrender themselves to Csesar, pre- 
 ceded by all those sacred symbols of religion 
 with which they were wont to mollify their 
 offended kings. Csesar accepting their sub- 
 mission, and encouraging them, advanced 
 through the enemy's works into his own 
 quarter of the town, where he was received 
 with the universal congratulations of his 
 party, who were no less overjoyed at his ar- 
 rival and presence, than at the happy issue of 
 the war. 
 
 XXIV. Csesar having thus made himself 
 master of Alexandria and Egypt, lodged the 
 government in the hands of those to whom 
 Ptolemy had bequeathed it by will, appoint- 
 ing the people of Rome his executors, and 
 requesting them to confirm his choice. For 
 the eldest of his two sons being dead, he 
 settled the kingdom upon the youngest, in 
 conjunction with his sister Cleopatra, who* 
 had always continued faithful to the Romans. 
 The younger Arsinoe, in whose name Gany- 
 med, as we have seen, reigned for some time, 
 he thought proper to banish the kingdom, that 
 she might not raise any new disturbance, be- 
 fore the king's authority should be firmly es- 
 tablished. Things thus settled, he carried 
 the sixth legion with him into Syria, leaving 
 the rest to support the authority of the king 
 and queen, who neither stood well in the af- 
 fections of their subjects, on account of their 
 attachment to Caesar, nor could be supposed 
 to have given any fixed foundation to their 
 power, in an administration of only a few days' • 
 continuance. It was also for the honour and 
 interest of the republic, that if they continued 
 faithful, our forces should protect them ; if 
 otherwise, would be in a condition to restrain 
 them. Having thus settled the kingdom, he 
 marched by land into Syria. 
 
 XX v. While these things passed in Egypt, 
 king Dejotarus applied to Domitius Calvinus, 
 to whom Caesar had intrusted the government 
 of Asia and the neighbouring provinces, be- 
 seeching him, <' Not to suffer Pharnaces to 
 seize and lay waste the Lesser Armenia, which 
 was his kingdom ; or Cappadocia, which be- 
 longed to Ariobarzanes ; because unless they 
 
•296 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 were delivered from these insults, it would be 
 impossible to execute Caesar's orders, or raise 
 the money they stood engaged to pay." 
 Domitius, who was not only sensible of the 
 necessity of money to defray the expenses of 
 the war, but likewise thought it dishonourable 
 to the people of Rome and Caesar, as well as 
 infamous to himself, to suffer the dominions 
 of allies and friends to be usurped by a foreign 
 prince, " That he must withdraw immediately 
 out of Armenia and Cappadocia, and no longer 
 insult the majesty and right of the Roman 
 people, engaged in a civil war." But believ- 
 ing that his deputation would have greater 
 weight, if he was ready to second it himself at 
 the head of an army, he repaired to the 
 legions which were then in Asia, ordering 
 two of them into Egypt, at Cassar's desire, 
 and carrying the thirty-sixth along with him. 
 To this Dejotarus added two more, which he 
 had trained up for several years, according to 
 our discipline, and a hundred horse. The 
 like number of horse were furnished by Ario- 
 barzancs. At the same time, he sent P. Sex- 
 tius to C. Plffitorius the questor, for the legion 
 which had been lately levied in Pontus ; and 
 Quinctius Patisius into Cilicia, to draw thence 
 a body of auxiliary troops. All these forces 
 had orders to rendezvous, as soon as possible at 
 Comana. 
 
 XXVI. Meanwhile his ambassadors re- 
 turned, with Pharnaces' answer : « That he 
 had quitted Cappadocia ; but kept possession 
 of the Lesser Armenia, as his own, by right 
 of inheritance : however, he was willing to 
 ■submit all to the decision of Csesar, to whose 
 commands he would pay immediate obedience." 
 C. Domitius, sensible that he had quitted 
 'Cappadocia, not voluntarily, but out of neces- 
 sity : because he could more easily defend 
 Armenia, which lay contiguous to his own 
 kingdom, than Cappadocia, which was more 
 remote ; and because believing, at first, that 
 Domitius had bro-jght all the three legions 
 •along with him, upon hearing that two were 
 gone to Csesar, he seemed more determined 
 o keep possession ; insisted " upon his quit- 
 ting Armenia likewise, the reason, in both ca- 
 ses, being the same ; nor was it just to demand 
 that the matter should be postponed till Csesar's 
 return, unless things were put in the condition 
 in which they were at first." Having returned 
 his answer, he advanced towards Armenia, 
 with the forces above mentioned, directing his 
 
 march along the hills. For from Pontus, 
 by way of Comana, runs a wocdy ridge of 
 hills, that extends as far as Armenia the Less, 
 dividing it from Cappadocia. The advanta- 
 ges he had in view, by such a march were, 
 that he would thereby effectually prevent all 
 surprises, and be plentifully furnished with 
 provisions from Cappadocia. 
 
 XXVIL Meantime Pharnaces was per- 
 petually sending ambassadors to Domitius with 
 presents, and to treat of peace. All these he 
 firmly rejected, telling the deputies; « That 
 nothing was more sacred with him, than the 
 majesty of the Roman people, and the rights 
 of their allies." After a long march, he 
 reached Nicopolis, a city of Armenia the Less, 
 situated in a plain, having mountains, however, 
 on its two sides, at a considerable distance. 
 Here he encamped, about seven miles from the 
 town. Between his camp and Nicopolis, lay 
 a difficult and narrow pass, where Pharnaces 
 placed a chosen body of foot, and all his horse, 
 in ambuscade. He ordered a great number 
 of cattle to be dispersed in the pass, and the 
 townsmen and peasants to show themselves; 
 that if Domitius entered the defile as a friend, 
 he might have no suspicion of an ambuscade 
 when he saw the men and flocks-dispersed, 
 without apprehension, in the fields ; or if he 
 should come as an enemy, that the soldiers, 
 quitting their ranks to pillage, might fall an 
 easy prey to his troops. 
 
 XXVHL While this design was going for- 
 ward, he never ceased sending ambassadors 
 to Domitius, with proposals of peace and amity, 
 as fancying by this means, the most easy to 
 insnare him. The expectation of peace kept 
 Domitius in his camp, so that Pharnaces, dis- 
 appointed of his hopes, and fearing the ambus- 
 cade might be discovered, drew off his troops. 
 Next day Domitius approached Nicopolis, and 
 encamped near the town. While our men 
 were working at the trenches, Pharnaces drew 
 up his army in order of battle, forming his 
 front into one line, according to the custom of 
 the country, and securing his wings with a 
 triple body of reserves. Domitius ordering part 
 of the troops to continue under arms before 
 the rampart, completed the fortifications of 
 his camp. 
 
 XXIX. Next ni<;ht, Pharnaces having in- 
 tercepted the couriers who brought Domitius 
 an account of the posture of affairs at Alexan- 
 dria, understood that Csesar was in great dan 
 
C OMMENTARIES. 
 
 297 
 
 eer, and requested Domitius to send him suc- 
 cours speedily, and came himself to Alexandria 
 by the way of Syria. Pharnaces, upon this 
 •.ntelligence, imagined that protracting the 
 time would be equivalent to a victory ; be- 
 cause Domitius, he supposed, must very soon 
 depart. He therefore dug two ditches, four 
 feet deep, at a moderate distance from each 
 other, on that side where lay the easiest ac- 
 cess to the town, and our forces might, with 
 most advantage, attack him ; resolving not to 
 advance beyond them. Between these, he 
 constantly drew up his army, placing all his 
 cavalry upon the wings without them, which 
 greatly exceeded ours in number, and would 
 otherwise have been useless. 
 
 XXX. Domitius, more concerned at 
 Csesar's danger than his own, and believing 
 he could not retire with safety, should he now 
 desire the conditions he had rejected, or 
 march away without any apparent cause ; drew 
 his forces out of the camp, and ranged them 
 in order of battle. He placed the thirty-sixth 
 legion on the right, that of Pontus on the left, 
 and those of Dejotarus in the main body ; 
 drawing them up with a very narrow front, 
 and posting the rest of the cohorts to sustain 
 the wings. The armies, thus drawn up on 
 each side, they prepared for battle ; and the 
 signal being given at the same time by both 
 parties, the engagement began. The con- 
 flict was sharp and various : for the thirty-sixth 
 legion falling upon the king's cavalry, that 
 was drawn up without the ditch, and charged 
 them so successfully, that they drove them to 
 the very walls of the town, passed the ditch, 
 and attacked their infantry behind. But on 
 the other side, the legion of Pontus having 
 given way ; the second line, which advanced 
 to sustain them, fetching a compass round the 
 ditch, in order to attack the enemy in flank, was 
 overwhelmed and borne down by a shower of 
 darts, in endeavouring to pass it. The legions 
 of Dejotarus scarce made any resistance ; so 
 that the victorious right wing, and main body 
 of the king's army, fell upon the thirty-sixth 
 legion, which yet made a brave stand ; and 
 though surrounded by the forces of the ene- 
 my, with wonderful presence of mind, cast 
 themselves into an orb, and retired to the foot 
 of a mountain, whither Pharnaces did not 
 think fit to pursue them, because of the dis- 
 advantage of the place. Thus the legion of 
 Tontus being almost wholly cut off, with 
 36* 
 
 great part of those of Dejotarus, the thirty- 
 sixth legion retreated to an eminence, with 
 the loss of about two hundred and fifty men. 
 Several Roman knights, of illustrious rank, 
 fell in this battle. Domitius, after this defeat, 
 rallied the remains of his broken army, and 
 retreated, by safe ways, through Cappadocia, 
 into Asia. 
 
 XXXI. Pharnaces, elated with this success, 
 and hoping that Caesar would never be able 
 to extricate himself at Alexandria, entered 
 Pontus with all his forces. There acting as 
 conqueror and king, and promising himself a 
 happier destiny than his fathe jie ravaged 
 their towns, seized the effects of the Roman 
 citizens and natives, inflicted punishments 
 worse than death, upon such as were dis- 
 tinguished by their age or beauty ; and 
 having made himself master of all Pontus, 
 as there was no one to oppose his progress, 
 boasted, that he had recovered his father's 
 kingdom. 
 
 XXXII. About the same time, we received 
 a considerable check in lUyricum ; which 
 province, Q. Cornificius, Cssar's questor, had 
 defended the preceding months, not only 
 without insult, but even with honour, and a 
 conduct worthy of praise. Csesar had sent 
 him thither, the summer before, with two 
 legions ; and though it was of itself little 
 able to subsist an army, and at that time in 
 particular aFmost totally rUined by the neigh- 
 bourhood of so many wars ; yet by his pru- 
 dence, vigilance, and uncommon care, he de- 
 fended and kept possession of it. For he made 
 himself master of several forts, built on emi- 
 nences, whose advantageous situation tempted 
 the inhabitants to make descents and inroads 
 upon the country ; and gave the plunder of 
 them to his soldiers : which, though but in- 
 considerable, yet as they were no strangers 
 to the distress and ill condition of the pro- 
 vince, did not cease to be grateful ; the rather, 
 as it was the fruit of their own valour. And 
 when, after the battle of Pharsalia, Octavius 
 had retreated to that coast with a large fleet ; 
 Cornificius, with some vessels of the Judertiniy 
 who had always continued faithful to the com- 
 monwealth, made himself master of the greatest 
 part of his ships, which joined to those of iha 
 Judertini, rendered him capable of sustaining 
 even a naval engagement. And while Caesar, 
 victorious, was pursuing Pompey to the re- 
 motest parts of the earth ; upon advice tha* 
 
 2 Q 
 
298 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 the enemy had, for the most part, retired into 
 Illyricum, on account of itd neighbourhood to 
 Macedonia, and were there uniting into a 
 body, he wrote to Gabinius, " To repair di- 
 rectly thither, with the new-raised legions, 
 and join Cornificius, that in case of any 
 danger to the province, they might be the 
 better able to protect it ; but if less forces suf- 
 ficed, to march into Macedonia, which he 
 foresaw would never be free from commotions, 
 so long as Pompey lived." 
 
 XXXIII. Gabinius, whether he imagined 
 the province better provided than it really was, 
 or depended much upon the auspicious fortune 
 of Cffisar, or confided in his own valour and 
 abilities, having often terminated, with success, 
 difficult and dangerous wars ; marched into 
 Illyricum, in the middle of winter, and the 
 most difficult season of the year : where, not 
 finding sufficient subsistence in the province, 
 which was partly ruined, partly ill-affected ; 
 and having no supplies by sea, because the 
 season of the year had put a stop to naviga- 
 lion ; he found himself compelled to carry on 
 the war, not according to his own inclination, 
 but as necessity allowed. As he was there- 
 fore obliged to. lay siege to forts and castles, 
 in a very rude season, he received many checks, 
 and fell under such contempt with the barba- 
 rians, that retiring to Salona, a maritime city, 
 inhabited by a set of brave and faithful Ro- 
 mans, he was attacked upon his march ; and 
 ■after the loss of two thousand soldiers, thirty- 
 eight centurions, and four tribunes, got to 
 Salona with the rest ; where his wants con- 
 tinually increasing, he died a few days after. 
 His misfortunes and sudden death gave Octa- 
 vius great hopes of mastering the province. 
 But fortune, whose influence is so great in 
 matters of war, joined to the diligence of Cor- 
 nificius, and the valour of Vatinius, soon put 
 an end to his triumphs. 
 
 XXXIV. For Vatinius, who was then at 
 Brundusium, having intelligence of what 
 passed in Illyricum, by letters from Cornifi- 
 cius, who pressed him to come to the assistance 
 of the province, and informed him, that Oc- 
 tavius had leagued with the barbarians, and, 
 in several places, attacked our garrisons, partly 
 by sea, with his fleet, partly by land, with 
 the troops of the barbarians : Vatinius, I say, 
 upon notice of these things, though extremely 
 weakened by sickness, insomuch that his 
 strength af body no way answered !'» resolu- 
 
 tion and greatness of mind ; yet by his valouj, 
 surmounted all opposition, the force of his dis- 
 temper, the rigour of the season, and the dif- 
 ficulties of a sudden preparation. For having 
 himself but a very few galleys, he wrote to 
 Q. Kalenus, in Acliaia, to furnish him with a 
 squadron of ships. But these not co-Diing 
 with that despatch which the danger our army 
 was in required, because Octavius pressed hard 
 upon them ; he fastened beaks to all the barks 
 and ves'sels that lay in the port, whose number 
 was considerable enough, though they were not 
 sufficiently large for an engagement, join- 
 ing these to what galleys he had, and put- 
 ting the veteran soldiers aboard, whercot he 
 had a great number, who had been left sick at 
 Brundusium, when the army went over to 
 Greece, he sailed for Illyricum ; where ha- 
 ving subjected several maritime states that had 
 declared for Octavius ; and neglecting such as 
 continued obstinate in their revolt, because 
 he would suffer nothing to retard his design of 
 meeting the enemy ; he came up with Octavius 
 before Epidaurus; and obliging him to raise 
 the siege, which he was carrying on with 
 great vigour, by sea and land, joined the garri- 
 son to his own forces. 
 
 XXXV. Octavius, understanding that Va- 
 tinius's fleet consisted mostly of small harks, 
 and confiding in the strength of his own, stop- 
 ped at the Isle of Tauris, Vatinius followed 
 him thither, not imagining he would halt at 
 that place, but because he was determined to 
 pursue him wherever he went. Vatinius, who 
 had no suspicion of an enemy, and whose 
 ships were moreover dispersed by a tempest, 
 perceived, as he approached the isle, a vessel 
 filled with soldiers, that advanced towards him 
 with full sails. Upon this, he gave orders for 
 furling the sails, lowering the sail-yards, and 
 arming the soldiers : and hoisting a flag, as a 
 signal for battle, intimated to the ships that 
 followed to do the same. Our men prepared 
 themselves in the best manner their sudden 
 surprise would allow, while Octavius advanced, 
 in good order, from the port. The two fleets 
 drew up. Octavius had the advantage as to 
 disposition, and Vatinius in the bravery of his 
 troops. 
 
 XXXVI. Vatinius finding himself inferior to 
 the enemy, both in the number and largeness 
 of his ships, resolved to commit the affair to for- 
 tune, and, therefore, in his own quinquer«mej 
 attacked Octavius in his four-benched galley 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 299 
 
 Tht.she did with such violence, and the shock 
 was so great, that the beak of Octavius's gal- 
 ley was broke. The battle raged with great 
 fury likewise in other places, but chiefly round 
 the two admirals : for as the ships on each side 
 advanced to ^stain those that fought, a close 
 and furious conflict ensued in a very narrow 
 sea, where the nearer the vessels approached, 
 the more had Vatinius's soldiers the advantage. 
 For, with admirable courage, they leaped into 
 the enemy's ships, and forcing them, by this 
 means, to an equal combat, soon mastered them 
 by their superior valour. Octavius's galley 
 was sunk. Many others were taken, or suf- 
 fered the same fate. The soldiers were partly 
 slain in the ships, partly thrown overboard in- 
 to the sea. Octavius got into a boat, which 
 sinking under the multitude that crowded 
 after him, he himself, though wounded, swam 
 to his brigantine ; where being taken up, and 
 night having put an end to the battle, as the 
 wind blew very strong, he spread all his sails 
 and fled. A few of his ships, that had the 
 good fortune to escape, followed him. 
 
 XXXVII. Vatinius, seeing the enemy en- 
 tirely defeated, sounded a retreat, and entered 
 victorious the port whence Octavius had sailed 
 to fight him, without the loss of a single 
 vessel. He took, in this battle, one quinque- 
 reme, two triremes, eight two-benched galleys, 
 and a great number of rowers. The next day 
 was employed in repairing his own fleet, and 
 the ships he had taken from the enemy : after 
 which, he sailed for the island of Issa, ima- 
 gining Octavius would retire thither after his 
 defeat. In this island was a flourishing city, 
 well affected to Octavius, which, however, 
 surrendered to Vatinius, upon the first sum- 
 mons. Here he understood that Octavius, 
 attended by a few small barks, had sailed, 
 with a fair wind, for Greece, whence he in- 
 tended to pass on to Sicily, and afterwards to 
 Africa. Vatinius having, in so short a space, 
 successfully terminated the affairs of Illyricum, 
 restored the province, in a peaceable condi- 
 tion, to Cornificius, and driven the enemy's 
 fleet out of those seas, returned victorious to 
 Brundusium, with his army and fleet in good 
 condition. 
 
 XXXVtII. V^niile Cffisar besieged Pom- 
 pey at Dyrrhachium, triumphed at Pharsalia, 
 and carried on the war, with so much danger, 
 at Alexandria, Cassius Longinus, who had 
 been left in S^ain as pro-pretor of the farther 
 
 province ; either through his natural disposi 
 tion, or out of a hatred he had contracted to the 
 province, because of a wound he had treacher- 
 ously received there, when questor, drew upon 
 himself the general dislike of the people. 
 He discerned this temper among them, partly 
 from a consciousness that he deserved it, partly 
 from the manifest indications they gave of 
 their discontent. To secure himself against 
 their disaffection, he endeavoured to gain the 
 love of the soldiers ; and having, for this pur- 
 pose, assembled them together, promised them 
 a hundred sesterces a man. Soon after, hav- 
 ing made himself master of Medobriga, a 
 town in Lusitania, and of Mount Hermiaius, 
 whither the Medobrigians had retired ; and 
 being, upon that occasion, saluted imperator, 
 by the army, he gave them another hundred 
 sesterces each. These, accompanied with other 
 considerable largesses, in great number, seemed, 
 for the present, to increase the good-will 
 of the army, but tended gradually and im- 
 perceptibly to the relaxation of military dis- 
 cipline. 
 
 XXXIX. Cassius having sent his army 
 into winter-quarters, fixed his residence at 
 Cordova, for the administration of justice. 
 Being greatly in debt, he resolved to pay it 
 by laying heavy impositions upon the province ; 
 and, according to the custom of prodigals, 
 made his liberalities a pretence to justify the 
 most exorbitant demands. He taxed the rich 
 at discretion, and compelled them to pay, 
 without the least regard to their remonstrances ; 
 frequently improving light and trifling offences, 
 as a handle for all manner of extortions. All 
 methods of gain were pursued, whether 
 great and apparent, or mean and sordid. 
 None that had any thing to lose could es- 
 cape accusation ; insomuch that the plunder 
 of their private fortunes was aggravated by 
 the dangers they were exposed to from pre- 
 tended crimes. 
 
 XL. Thus Longinus, acting the same part 
 when pro-consul which he had done when 
 questor, drew upon himself the like con- 
 spiracies against his life. Even his own de- 
 pendants concurred in the general hatred ; who, 
 though the ministers of his rapine, yet hated 
 the man by whose authority they committed 
 those crimes. The odium still increased upon 
 his raising a fifth legion, which added to the 
 expense and burden of the province. The 
 cavalry was augmented to three thousand, with 
 
30 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 costly ornaments and equipage ; nor had the 
 people any respite from his extortions. 
 
 XLI. Meanwhile he received orders from 
 CaBsar, to transport his army into Africa, and 
 march through Mauritania, towards Numidia, 
 because king Juba had sent considerable 
 succours to Pompey, and was preparing to 
 send more. . These letters filled him with an 
 insolent joy, by the opportunity they offered 
 him of pillaging new provinces and a wealthy 
 kingdom. He therefore hastened into Lusi- 
 tania, to assemble his legions, and draw to- 
 gether a body of auxiliaries ; appointing cer- 
 tain persons to provide corn, ships, and money, 
 that nothing might retard him at his return ; 
 which was much sooner than expected ; for 
 when interest called, Cassius wanted neither 
 industry nor vigilance. 
 
 XLII. Having got his army together, and 
 encamped near Cordova, he made a speech 
 to the soldiers, wherein he acquainted them 
 with the orders he had received from Caesar, 
 and promised them a hundred sesterces each, 
 when they should arrive in Mauritania. The 
 fifth legion, he told them, was to remain in 
 Spain. Having ended his speech, he returned 
 to Cordova. The same day, about noon, as 
 he went to the hall of justice, one Minutius 
 Silo, a client of L. Racilius, presented him 
 ■with a paper, in a soldier's habit, as if he had 
 some request to make. Then retiring behind 
 Racilius, (^who walked beside Cassius,) as if 
 waiting for an answer, he insensibly drew near ; 
 and a favourable opportunity offering, seized 
 Cassius with his left hand, and wounded him 
 twice with a dagger in his right. The noise 
 this occasioned was as a signal to the conspir- 
 ators, who all rushed upon him in a body. 
 Munatius Plancus killed the lictor, that was 
 next Longinus ; and wounded Q. Cassius his 
 lieutenant. T. Vasius, and L. Mergilio, se- 
 conded their countryman Plancus; for they 
 were all Italians. L. Licinius Squillus flew 
 upon Longinus himself, and gave him several 
 slight wounds as he lay upon the ground. By 
 this time, his guards came up to his assistance, 
 ■ (for he always had a body of veterans, armed 
 with darts, to attend him,) and surrounded the 
 rest of the conspirators, who were advancing 
 to complete the assassination. Of this number 
 were Calphurnius Salvianus, and Manilius 
 Tusculus. Cassius was carried home ; and 
 Minutius Silo, stumbling upon a stone, as he 
 endeavovired to make his escape, was taken 
 
 and brought to him. Racilius retired to the 
 neighbouring house of a friend till he should 
 have certain information of the fate of Cassius 
 L. Laterensis not doubting but he was des- 
 patched, ran, in a transport of joy, to the 
 camp, to congratulate the second and the new- 
 raised legions upon it, who, he knew, bore a 
 particular hatred to Cassius ; and who, im- 
 mediately upon this intelligence, placed him 
 on the tribunal, and proclaimed him pretor. 
 For there was not a native of the province, 
 nor a soldier of the new-raised legion, nor a 
 person, who by long residence was natural- 
 ised to the province, of which kind the second 
 legion consisted, who did not join in the gene- 
 ral hatred of Cassius. Meantime Laterensia 
 was informed that Cassius was still alive ; at 
 which, being rather grieved than disconcerted, 
 he immediately so far recovered himself as to 
 go and wait upon him. By this time, the 
 thirtieth legion having notice of what had 
 passed, marched to Cordova, to the assistance 
 of their general. The twenty-first and fifth 
 followed their example. As only two legions 
 remained in the camp, the second, fearing they 
 should be left alone, and thereby have theii 
 sentiments known, did the same. But the 
 new-raised legion continued firm, nor could be 
 induced by any motives of fear, to stir from its 
 place. Cassius ordered all the accomplices of 
 the conspiracy to be seized, and sent back the 
 fifth legion to the camp, retaining the other 
 three. By the confession of Minutius, he 
 learned, that L. Racilius, L. Laterensis, and 
 Annius Scapula, a man of great authority and 
 credit in the province, and equally in his con- 
 fidence with Laterensis and Racilius, wer 
 concerned in the plot : nor did he long defe. 
 his revenge, but ordered them to be put to 
 death. He delivered Minutius to be racked 
 by his freed-men ; likewise Calphurnius Sal- 
 vianus ; who, turning evidence, increased the 
 number of the conspirators ; justly, as some 
 think; but others pretend that he was forced. 
 L. Mergilio was likewise put to the torture. 
 Squillus impeached many others, who were all 
 condemned to die, except such as redeemed 
 their lives by a fine ; for he pardoned Cal- 
 phurnius for ten, and Q. Sextius for fifty 
 thousand sesterces ; who though deeply guilty, 
 yet having, in this manner, escaped death, 
 showed Cassius to be no less covetous than 
 cruel. 
 
 XLHL Some days after, he received let' 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 301 
 
 ters from Csesar, with an account of Pompey's 
 defeat and flight ; which news equally affected 
 him with joy and sorrow. Caesar's success 
 feave him pleasure ; but the conclusion of the 
 war would put an end to his- rapines ; insomuch 
 that he was uncertain which to wish for, vic- 
 tory, or an unbounded licentiousness. When 
 he was cured of nis wounds, he sent to all 
 who were indebted to him, in any sums, and 
 insisted upon immediate payment. Such as 
 were taxed too low, had orders to furnish 
 larger sums. Such Roman citizens as had 
 been levied in the several colonies of the pro- 
 vince, and were alarmed at the thoughts of a 
 foreign expedition, obtained their discharge 
 for a certain sum. This brought in a vast re- 
 venue, but greatly increased the general ha- 
 tred. He afterwards reviewed the army, sent 
 the legions and auxiliaries, designed for 
 Africa, towards the straits of Hercules, and 
 went himself to Seville, to examine the condi- 
 tion of the fleet. He stayed there some time, 
 in consequence of an edict he had published, 
 ordering all who had not paid the sums in 
 which they were amerced, to repair to him 
 thither ; which created a universal murmuring 
 and disconteftt. 
 
 XLIV. In the mean time, L. Titius, a mili- 
 tary tribune of the new-raised legion, sent 
 him notice of a report, that the thirtieth legion, 
 one of those he was carrying with him to 
 Africa, had mutinied at Ilurgis, killed some 
 of the centurions that opposed them, and were 
 gone over to the second legion, who marched 
 another way towards the straits. Upon this 
 intelligence, he set out, by night, with five 
 cohorts of the twenty-first legion, and came 
 up with them in the morning. He stayed 
 there that day, to consult what was proper to 
 be done, and then went to Carmona, where 
 he found the thirtieth and twenty-first legions, 
 with four cohorts of the fifth, and all the 
 cavalry assembled. Here he learned, that 
 the new-raised legion had surprised four co- 
 horts, near Obucula, and forced them along 
 with them to the second legion ; where all 
 joining, they had chosen T. Thorius, an 
 Italian, for their general. Having instantly 
 called a council, he sent Marcellus to Cor- 
 dova, to secure that town, and Q. Cassius, 
 his lieutenant, to Seville. A few days after, 
 news was brought that Cordova had revolted, 
 and that Marcellus, either voluntarily, or 
 through force, (for the reports were various,) 
 
 had joined them ; as likewise the two cohorts 
 of the fifth legion, that were in garrison there. 
 Cassius, provoked at these mutinies, decamped, 
 and the next day came to Segovia upon the 
 river Xenil. There, summoning an assembly 
 to sound the disposition of the troops, he 
 found that it was not out of regard to him 
 but to Caesar, though absent, that they con- 
 tinued faithful, and were ready to undergo 
 any danger for the recovery of the province. 
 
 XLV. Meantime Thorius marched the 
 veteran legions to Cordova ; and that the re- 
 volt might not appear to spring from a se- 
 ditious inclination in him or the soldiers ; as 
 likewise to oppose an equal authority to that 
 of Q. Cassius, who was drawing together a 
 great force, in Csesar's name ; he publicly gave 
 out, that his design was to recover the province 
 for Pompey. Nay, perhaps he was really in- 
 fluenced by a love for Pompey, whose name 
 was dear to those legions that had served under 
 Varro. Be this as it will, Thorius at least 
 made it his pretence ; and the soldiers were 
 so infatuated wiih the thought, that they had 
 Pompey's name inscribed upon their bucklers. 
 The citizens of Cordova, men, women, and 
 children, came out to meet the legions ; beg- 
 ging they would not enter Cordova as ene- 
 mies, seeing they joined with them in their 
 aversion to Cassius, and only desired they 
 might not be obliged to act against Csesar. 
 
 XL VI. The soldiers, moved by the prayers 
 and tears of so great a multitude, and seeing 
 they stood in no need of Pompey's name and 
 memory, to spirit up a revolt against Cassius, 
 as he was equally odious to the partisans of 
 both parties ; neither being able to prevail 
 with Marcellus, or the people of Cordova, to 
 declare against Cssar ; they erased Pompey's 
 name from their bucklers, chose Marcellus 
 their commander, joined the citizens of Cor- 
 dova, and encamped near the town. Two 
 days after Cassius encamped on an eminence, 
 on this side the Baetis, about four miles from 
 Cordova, and within view of the town ; whence 
 he sent letters to Bogud, in Mauritania, and 
 M. Lepidus, pro-consul of Hither Spain, to 
 come to his asistance as soon as possible, for 
 Caesar's sake. Meanwhile he ravaged the 
 country, and set fire to the buildings round 
 Cordova. 
 
 XLVII. The legions under Marcellus, pro- 
 voked at this indignity, ran to him, and 
 begged to be led against the enemy, thai 
 
302 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 they might have an opportunity of fighting 
 them before they could have time to destroj^, 
 with fire and sword, the rich and noble pos- 
 sessions of the Cordovans. Marcellus, though 
 averse to battle, which, whoever was victorious, 
 must turn to Cesar's detriment ; yet unable 
 to restrain the legions, crossed the Bsetis, and 
 drew up his men. Cassius did the same, 
 upon a rising ground : but as he would not 
 quit his advantageous post, Marcellus per- 
 suaded his men to return to their camp. He 
 had already begun to retire, when Cassius, 
 knowing himself to be stronger in cavalry, fell 
 upon the legionaries with his horse, and' made 
 a considerable slaughter in their rear, upon 
 the banks of the river. This check making 
 Marcellus sensible of the mistake he had com- 
 mitted, in passing the river, he removed his 
 camp to the other side, where both armies fre- 
 quently drew up, but did not engage, on ac- 
 count of the inequality of the ground. 
 
 XLVIII. Marcellus was stronger in foot, 
 for he commanded veteran soldiers, of great 
 experience in war. Cassius depended more 
 on the fidelity than the courage of his troops. 
 The two camps being very near each other, 
 Marcellus seized a spot of ground, where he 
 built a fort, very convenient for depriving the 
 enemy of water. Longinus apprehending he 
 should be besieged, in a country where all 
 were against him, quitted his camp in the night, 
 and, b}' a quick march, reached Ulla, a town 
 on which he thought he could rely. There he 
 encamped so near the walls, that both by the 
 situation of the place (for Ulla stands on an 
 eminence ) and the defences of the town, he 
 was on all sides secure from an attack. Marcel- 
 lus followed him, and encamped as near the 
 town as possible. Having taken a view of the 
 plac«, he found himself reduced, by necessity, 
 to do what was most agreeable to his own in- 
 clination ; and neither engage Cassius, which 
 the ardour of his soldiers would have forced 
 him to, had it been possible ; nor suffered him 
 by his exertions, to infest the territories of 
 other states, as he had done those of Cordova. 
 He therefore raised redoubts in proper places, 
 and continued his works quite round the town, 
 enclosing both Ulla and Cassius within his 
 lines. But before they were finished, Cassius 
 sent out all his cavalry : who he imagined 
 might do him great service, by cutting off Mar- 
 cellus's provisions and forage ; and could only 
 be a useless encumbrance upon him, by con- 
 
 suming his provisions, if he was shut up in his 
 camp. 
 
 XLIX. A few days after, king Bogud 
 having received Cassius's letters, came ana 
 joined him with all his forces, consisting of 
 one legion, and several auxiliary cohorts. For 
 as commonly happens in civil dissensions, 
 some of the states of Spain at that time favoured 
 Cassius, but a yet greater number, Marcellus 
 Bogud came up to the advanced works of 
 Marcellus, where many sharp skirmishes hap- 
 pened with various success ; however, Mar- 
 cellus still kept possession of his works. 
 
 L. Meanwhile Lepidus, from the higher 
 province, with thirty-five legionary cohorts, 
 and a great body of horse and auxiliaries, came 
 to Ulla, with design to adjust the differences 
 between Cassius and Marcellus. Marcellus 
 submitted, without hesitation, but Cassius kept 
 within his works, either because he thought his 
 cause the justest, or from an apprehension that 
 his adversary's submission had prepossessed 
 Lepidus in his favour. Lepidus encamped 
 with Marcellus, at Ulla, prevented a battle, in- 
 vited Cassius into his camp, and engaged his 
 honour to act without prejudice. Cassius hesi- 
 tated long, but at last desired that the circum- 
 vallation should be levelled, and free egress 
 given him. The truce was not only concluded, 
 but the works demolished, and the guards 
 drawn off; when king Bogud attacked one 
 of Marcellus's forts, that lay nearest to his 
 camp, unknown to any, (unless perhaps Lon- 
 ginus, who was not exempt from suspicion on 
 this occasion,) and slew a great number of his 
 men. And had not Lepidus interposed, much 
 mischief would have been done. 
 
 LL A free passage being made for Cassius, 
 Marcellus joined camps with Lepidus ; and 
 both together marched for Cordova, while 
 Cassius retired to Carmona. At the same 
 time, Trebonius, the pro-consul, came to take 
 possession of the province. Cassius having 
 notice of his arrival, sent his legions and cav- 
 alry into winter quarters, and hastened, with 
 all his effects, to Melaca, where he embarked 
 immediately, though it was the winter season ; 
 that he might not, as he pretended, come into 
 the power of Marcellus, Lepidus, and Trebo- 
 nius: as his friends gave out, to avoid passing 
 throug'i a province, great part of which had 
 revolted from him ; but as was more generally 
 believed, to secure the money he had amass 
 ed by his numberless extortions. The wind 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 303 
 
 favouring him as far as could be expected at 
 that season of the year, he put into the Iberus, to 
 avoid sailing in the night; and thence contin- 
 uing his voyage, which he thought he might do 
 with safety, though the wind blew consider- 
 ably fresher, he was encountered by such a 
 storm, at the mouth of the river, that neither be- 
 ing able to return, because of the stream, nor 
 stem the fury of the waves, the ship, and all 
 that were in her, perished. 
 
 LII. CEBsar arriving in Syria from Egypt, 
 and understanding by those who attended him 
 there, from Rome, and the letters he received 
 at the same time, that the government there 
 was upon a very bad footing, and all the affairs 
 of the commonwealth managed indiscreetly : 
 that the contests of the tribunes were produc- 
 ing perpetual seditions, and the remissness of 
 the ofBcers of the legions destroying military 
 discipline ; all which required his speedy pres- 
 ence to redress them ; thought it yet first in- 
 cumbent upon him, to settle the state of the 
 provinces through which he passed ; that 
 freeing them from domestic conventions, and 
 the fear of a foreign enemy, the laws might 
 have a free course. This he hoped soon to effect 
 in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia, because these pro- 
 vinces were not involved in war. In Bithynia 
 and Pontus indeed he expected more trouble, 
 because he understood Pharnaces still continu- 
 ed in Pontus, and was not likely to quit it ea- 
 sily, being flushed with the victory he had ob- 
 tained over Domitius Calvinus. He made a 
 short stay in most states of note, distributing 
 rewards both publicly and privately to such as 
 deserved them, determining old controversies, 
 and receiving into his protection the kings, 
 princes, and potentates, as well of the provinces 
 as of the neighbouring countries. And having 
 settled the necessary regulations for the defence 
 of the country, he dismissed them, fully satis 
 fied with himself and the republic. 
 
 LIII. After a stay of some days in those 
 parts, he named Sextus Cjesar, his friend and 
 relation, to the command of Syria, and the 
 legions appointed to guard it ; and sailed him- 
 self for Cilicia, with the fleet he had brought 
 from Egypt. He summoned the states to as 
 semble at Tarsus, the strongest and finest city 
 of the province ; where having settled every 
 thing that regarded either it or the neighbour- 
 ing countries, his Avarlike ardour would not 
 suffer him to tarry longer; but marchin 
 through Cappadocia with the utmost expe- 
 
 dition, where he stopped two days at Mazaca, 
 he arrived at Comana, renowned for the an- 
 cient and sacred temple of Bellona, where she 
 is worshipped with so much veneration, that 
 her priest is accounted next in power and dig- 
 nity to the king. He conferred this dignity 
 on Lycomedes of Bithynia, descended of the 
 ancient kings of Cappadocia, who demanded 
 it in right of inheritance ; his ancestors having 
 lost it upon occasion of the sceptre'-s being 
 transferred to another line. As for Ariobar- 
 zanes, and his brother Ariarates, who had both 
 deserved well of the commonwealth, he con- 
 firmed the first in his kingdom, and put the 
 other under his protection ; after which, he 
 pursued his march with the same despatch. 
 
 LIV. Upon his approaching Pontus, and 
 the frontiers of Gallo-grsecia ; Dejotarus, tet- 
 rarch of that province, (whose title, however, 
 was disputed by the neighbouring tetrarchs,) 
 and king of the Lesser Armenia, laying aside 
 the regal ornaments, and assuming the habit not 
 only of a private person, but even of a criminal, 
 came in a suppliant manner to Caisar, " To beg 
 forgiveness, for obeying and assisting Pompey 
 at a time when Caesar could afford him no pro- 
 tection : urging, that it was his business to 
 obey the governors who were present, with 
 out pretending to judge of the disputes of 
 the people of Rome." Csesar, after putting 
 him in mind " of the many services he had 
 done him, and the decrees he had procurec' 
 in his favour when co-nsul ; that his defectio.i 
 could claim no excuse from want of informa- 
 tion, because one of his industry and pru- 
 dence could not but know who was master of 
 Italy and Rome, where the senate, the people, 
 and the majesty of the republic resided ; who 
 in fine was consul after Marcellus and Len- 
 tulus ; told him, that he would, notwithstand- 
 ing, forgive his present fault, in consideration 
 of his past services, the former friendship that 
 had subsisted between them, the respect due 
 to his age, and the solicitation o those who in- 
 terceded in his behalf; adding, that he would 
 refer the controversy relating to the tetrarchate 
 to another time." He restored him the royal 
 habit, and commanded him to join him with 
 all his cavalry, and the legion he had trained 
 up after the Roman manner. 
 
 LV. When he was arrived in Pontus, and 
 had drawn all his forces together, whicb were 
 not very considerable either for their i amber 
 c discipline , (for except the sixth legion. 
 
304 
 
 PANSA'S- 
 
 composed of veteran soldiers, which he had 
 brought with him from Alexandria, and which 
 bj' its many labours and dangers, the length 
 of its marches and voyages, and the frequent 
 wars in which it had been engaged, was re- 
 duced to less than a thousand men ; he had 
 only the legion of Dejotarus, and two more 
 that had been in the late battle between Do- 
 mitius and Pharnaces :) ambassadors arrived 
 from Pharnaces, " To entreat that Csesar 
 would not look upon him as an enemy, he 
 being ready to submit to all his commands.'' 
 Particularly they represented : " That Phar- 
 naces had granted no aid to Pompey, as De- 
 jotarus had done, whom he had nevertheless 
 pardoned." Caesar replied, "That Pharnaces 
 should meet with the utmost justice, if he per- 
 formed his promises : but at the same time ad- 
 monished the ambassadors in gentle terms, to 
 forbear mentioning Dejotarus, and not to over- 
 rate the having refused aid to Pompey. He 
 told them, he was always ready to forgive the 
 suppliant, but would never look upon private 
 services to himself, as an atonement for pub- 
 lic injuries done the province: that Pharna- 
 ces's refusal of aiding Pompey had turned 
 chiefly to his own advantage, as he had there- 
 by avoided all share in the disaster of Phar- 
 salia : that he was, however, willing to forgive 
 the injuries done to the Roman citizens in 
 Pontus, because it was now too late to think 
 of redressing them ; as he could neither restore 
 life to the dead, nor manhood to those he had 
 deprived of it, by a punishment more intolera- 
 ble to the Romans than death itself. But 
 that he must quit Pontus immediately, send 
 back the farmers of the revenues, and restore 
 to the Romans and their allies what he un- 
 justly detained from them. These things per- 
 formed, he might then send the presents which 
 successful generals were wont to receive from 
 their friends :" (for Pharnaces had sent him a 
 golden crown.) With this answer he dismiss- 
 ed the ambassadors. 
 
 LVI. Pharnaces promised every thing : 
 but hoping that Csesar, who was in haste to be 
 gone, would give easy credit to whatever he 
 said, that he might the sooner set out upon 
 more urgent affairs ; (for every body knew 
 that his presence was much wanted at Rome,) 
 lie performed but slowly, wanted to protract 
 the day of his departure, demanded other con- 
 ditions, and, in fine, endeavoured to elude his 
 engagements. Caesar, perceiving his drift, 
 
 did now, out of necessity, what he was usually 
 wont to do through inclination, and resolved to 
 decide the affair as soon as possible by a battle. 
 
 LVII. Ziela is a town of Pontus, well for- 
 tified, though situated in a plain. For a na- 
 tural eminence, as if raised by art, sustains 
 the walls on all sides. All around are a great 
 number of large mountains, intersected by 
 valleys. The highest of these, famed bv the 
 victory of Mithridates, the defeat of Triarius, 
 and the destruction of our army, is not above 
 three miles from Ziela. and has a ridge that 
 almost extends to the town. Here Pharnaces 
 lodged himself, with all his forces, repairing 
 the fortifications of a camp which had proved 
 so fortunate to his father. 
 
 LVni. Caesar encamped about five miles 
 from the enemy ; and observing that the val- 
 leys which defended the king's camp would 
 likewise defend his own, at the same distance, 
 if the enemy, who were much nearer, did not 
 seize them before him ; he ordered a great 
 quantity of fascines to be brought within the 
 intrenchments. This being quickly performed, 
 next night, at the fourth watch, leaving all 
 the baggage in the camp, he set out with the 
 legions ; and arriving at day-break, unsuspect- 
 ed by the enemy, possessed himself of the 
 same post where Mithridates had defeated 
 Triarius. Hither he commanded all the fas 
 cines to be brought, employing the servants of 
 the army for that purpose, that the soldiers 
 might not be called oflf from the works ; be- 
 cause the valley, which divided the eminence 
 where he was intrenching himself from the 
 enemy, was not above a mile over. 
 
 LIX. Pharnaces perceiving this next morn- 
 ing, ranged all his troops, in order of battle, 
 before his camp. But the approach towards 
 us was so dangerous, that Csesar concluded it 
 to be no more than a review-; or done with de- 
 sign to retard his works, by keeping a gseat 
 number of his men under arms ; or perhaps 
 for ostentation, to show that he trusted no less 
 to his army than the advantage of his post. 
 Therefore keeping only his first line in order 
 of battle, he commanded the rest of the army 
 to go on with the works. But Pharnaces 
 either prompted by the place itself, which had 
 been so fortunate to his father; or induced by 
 favourable omens, as we were afterwards told ; 
 or despising the small number of our men that 
 were in arms ; for he took all that were em- 
 ployed in carrying mat(?rials to the works t 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 305 
 
 le soldiers ; or confiding in his veteran army, 
 who valued themselves upon having defeated 
 the twenty-second legion ; and at the same 
 time, contemning our troops, whom he had 
 worsted, under Domitius ; was determined 
 upon a battle, and to that end began to cross the 
 valley. Caesar, at first, laughed at his ostenta- 
 tion, in crowding his army in so narrow a place, 
 where no enemy, in his right senses, would 
 have ventured ; while, in the mean time, Phar- 
 naces continued his march, and began to ascend 
 the steep hill on which Csesar was posted 
 
 LX, Caesar, astonished at his incredible 
 rashness and confidence, and finding himself 
 suddenly and unexpectedly attacked, called 
 off his soldiers from the works, ordered them 
 to arms, opposed the legions to the enemy, and 
 ranged his troops in order of battle. The 
 su denness of the thing occasioned some ter- 
 ror at first ; and the chariots, armed with 
 scythes, falling in with our ranks before they 
 were completed, disordered them considerably : 
 however, the multitude of darts discharged 
 against them, soon put a stop to their career. 
 The enemy's army followed them close, and 
 began the battle with a shout. Our advan- 
 tageous situation, but especially the assistance 
 of the gods, who preside over all the events of 
 war, and more particularly those where hu- 
 man conduct can be of no service, favoured 
 us greatly on this occasion. 
 
 LXI. After a sharp and obstinate conflict, 
 victory began to declare for us on the right 
 wing, where the sixth legion was posted. The 
 enemy there was totally overthrown, but in 
 the centre and left the battle was long and 
 doubtful : however, with the assistance of the 
 same gods, we at last prevailed there also, and 
 drove them, with the utmost precipitation, 
 down the hill, which they had so easily as- 
 cended before. Great numbers being slain, 
 and many crushed, by the flight of their own 
 troops, such as had the good fortune to escape, 
 were nevertheless obliged to throw away 
 their arms; so that having crossed the valley, 
 and got upon the opposite ascent, they could 
 yet, because unarmed, derive no benefit from 
 the advantage of the ground. Our men,flushed 
 with victory, made no scruple to follow them, 
 atd even attack their camp ; which they soon 
 27 
 
 forced, notwithstanding the resistance made 
 by the cohorts left by Pharnaces to guard it. 
 Almost all the whole army was cut to pieces 
 or made prisoners. Pharnaces himself escaped, 
 with a few horse ; and had not our soldiers 
 been detained some time, by the assault of the 
 camp, he must certainly have fallen alive into 
 Caesar's hands. 
 
 LXIL Though Caesar was accustomed to 
 victory, yet the present success gave him no 
 small joy ; because he had so speedily put an 
 end to a very great war. The remembrance 
 too of the danger to which he had been ex- 
 posed, enhanced the pleasure, as he had ob- 
 tained an easy victory in a very difficult con- 
 juncture. Having thus recovered Pontus, and 
 abandoned the plunder of the enemy's camp to 
 the soldiers, he set out next day, with a guard 
 of light horse. The sixth legion had orders to 
 return to Italy, to receive the honours and re- 
 wards they had merited : the auxiliary troops 
 of Dejotarus were sent home : and Caelius 
 Vincinianus was left with two legions to pro- 
 tect the kingdom of Pontus. 
 
 LXIII, Through Gallo-graecia and Bithy- 
 nia he went into Asia, settling all the con- 
 troversies of the provinces as he passed, and 
 establishing the limits and jurisdictions of the 
 several kings, states, and tetrarchs. Mithri- 
 dates of Pergamus, who had so speedily and 
 successfully served him in Egypt, as we have 
 related above, a man of royal descent and 
 education, (for Mithridates, king of all Asia, 
 out of regard to his birth, had carried him 
 along with him when very young, and kept 
 him in his camp several years,) was appointed 
 king of Bosphorus, which had belonged lo 
 Pharnaces. And thus were the provinces of 
 the Roman people screened from the attempts 
 of barbarous and hostile kings, by the interpo- 
 sition of a prince steadily attached to the in- 
 terests of the republic. To this was added 
 the tetrarchate of Gallo-graecia, which be- 
 longed to him of right, though it had been pos- 
 sessed for some years by Dejotarus. Thus 
 Caesar, staying nowhere longer than the neces- 
 sity of affairs required, and having settled all 
 things relating to the provinces with the ut- 
 most success and despatch, returned to Italy 
 much sooner than was expected, 
 2R 
 
PANSA'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 AFRICAN WAR 
 
 SOT 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 t. Caesar sets out for Africa.— III. And lands at Adrumetum.— IV. He treats with Considius about the surrender 
 of that town ; but in vain. — V. Thence he removes his camp to Ruspina.— VI. And again to Leptis, which he 
 immediately takes possession of.— VII. Here he draws together his axixiliary troops.— VIII. And afterwards 
 returns to Ruspina, to provide himself with corn. — IX. Whence preparing to sail in quest of his transports, 
 they unexpectedly appear before the port.— XI. Skirmishes between Caesar and Labienus, near Ruspina.— 
 XVII. Petreius and Piso advance \x> support Labienus, but they are nevertheless all repulsed.— X\ III. The 
 number of Labienus's troops, and his presumption.— XIX. Scipio joins Labienus. Caesar fortifies his cam.p.— 
 XXI. Young Pompey, by Cato's advice, prepares for war, but without success. — XXII. Caesar suffers greatly 
 for want of corn.— XXIIL King Juba, marching to tjhe assistance of Scipio, is forced to return, to defend his 
 own kingdom against Bogud.— XXIV. Caesar resolving to fight the enemy, draws troops together from all 
 
 parts. XXV. The manner of training Scipio's elephants.— XXVI. One of Caesar's ships taken by the 
 
 enemy.— XXVII. Labienus attacks Leptis in vain.— XXV III. Scipio draws out his troops. Caesar keeps 
 within his camp.— XXIX. A great number of Numidians and Getulians desert to Caesar.- XXX. The town of 
 Acilia demands a garrison from Caesar, and is immediately invested by the enemy. — XXXI. Caesar receives 
 a supply of troops and corn by sea.— XXXII Abody of Getulians, sent out as scouts, by Scipio, desert to 
 Caesar.— XXXni. Cato sends supplies to Scipio. The city of Tisdra demandsagarrisonofCaesai*.— XXXIV. 
 Caesar makes choice of a new camp, and strengthens it with works ; which the enemy advancing to retard, 
 are repulsed with great slaughter.— XXXVIII. Upon which, Caesar draws out his army, but the enemy keep 
 within their camp.— XL. The siege of Acilia raised.— XLI. The surprising fortitude of one of Caesar's centu- 
 rions, taken prisoner by Scipio ; and the cruelty of that general.— XLII. The great mischief done by a sud- 
 den stormof rain.— XLin. King Juba arrives in Scipio's camp, at the head of a great body of troops.— XLI V. 
 Caesar having dislodged Labienus, seizes the hill on which he was posted.— XLV. Caesar's works for the se- 
 curity of his camp.— XL VI. Juba and Labienus, attacking a party of Caesar's men as they returned from the 
 works, are repulsed with great slaughter.— XL VIL Two legions arrive to Caesar's aid.— XLVIII. Caesar's 
 steadiness in maintaining military discipline.— XI/IX. The Getulians, revolting from Juba, oblige him to 
 divide his forces. — L. Caesar feigns a design upon Uzita, whence a great many persons of illustrious rank 
 join him. — LI. Juba's pride. — LII. Both armies drawn up. — LIII. The order of battle, on each side.— LIV. 
 After a few skirmishes between the horse, both retire to their camps. — LV. Some of Caesar's ships burned 
 by the enemy, and others taken. — LVI. Caesar embarking in person, follows the enemy, defeats them, and 
 returns to his camp. — LVII. Caesar in want of corn.- LVIII. Which compels him to leave his camp. Scipio 
 pursues him.— LIX. He possesses himself of Zeta, a town beyond the enemy's camp.— LX. The enemy, at- 
 tacking him as he returns, laden with plunder, are repulsed.— LXI. Difficulty of fighting with the Numidians: 
 Caesar's contrivance for that purpose. — LXII. The town of Vacca, demanding a garrison of Caesar, is plun- 
 dered by king Juba.— LXin. The enemy declining a battle, Caesar decamps, and repulses the troops, sent to 
 set upon him in his march. — LXIV. But, not caring to besiege Sarsura, he returns to his old cimp. — LXV. 
 The Thabenenses demand Caesar's protection.— LXV. Caesar receives fresh succours.— LXVII. A battle of 
 the cavalry,in which Caesar has the advantage.— LXVIII. The enemy still declining an engagement, Caesar be- 
 sieges Thapsus.-LXIX. Scipio attempts to relieve it.— LXX. Caesar encouraging his men, and finding them 
 full of alacrity, attacks the enemy.— LXXIL The surprising bravery of a private soldier.— XXItL Scipio's 
 army defeated, and almost totally cut off.— LXXIV. Caesar marches for Utica.— LXXV. Whither Scipio's 
 cavalry had retired — LXXVI. Cato kills himself Utica surrenders —LXXVII. Casar, in his march to 
 Utica, possesses himself of Usceta and Adrumetum.— LXXVIII. He pardons the Uticans.— LXXIX. Juba 
 flying to Zama, is refiised admittance.— LXXX. Zama, and several of the king's generals, surrender to 
 Caesar.— LXXXI. Considius surrenders Tisdra, and Vergilius, Thapsus.— LXXXII. The death of Juba and 
 Petreius.— LXXXIIl. Also of Faustus and Afranius.— LXXXIV. And of Scipio.— LXXXV. Caesar convert* 
 Juoa'fl kingdom into a province.— LXXXVI. And returns to Rome. 
 
 808 
 
PAIVSA'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE AFRICAN WAR, 
 
 I C^SAR setting out from Rome, advanced by i 
 moderate journeys towards Sicily ; and con- 
 tinuing his march without intermission, arrived 
 on the nineteenth of December at Lilybseum. 
 Designing to embarli immediately, though he 
 had only one legion of new levies, and not 
 quite six hundred horse, he ordered his tent to 
 be pitched so near the sea-side, that the waves 
 lowed up to the very foot of it. This he did 
 with a view to take away all hopes of delay, 
 and keep his men in readiness at a day or an 
 hour's warning. The wind at that time proving 
 contrary, he nevertheless suffered none of the 
 soldiers or mariners to come on shore, that 
 he might lose no opportunity of sailing ; the 
 rather, because the inhabitants of the province 
 were perpetually talking of the mighty forces 
 of the enemy ; a cavalry not to be numbered ; 
 four legions headed by Juba, together with a 
 great body of light armed troops ; ten legions 
 under the command of Scipio ; a hundred and 
 twenty elephants, and fleets in abundance. 
 Yet all these reports alarmed him not, nor 
 aught abated his resolution and confidence. 
 Meantime the number of galleys and transports 
 increased daily ; the new levied legions flocked 
 in to him from all parts ; among the rest the 
 fifth, a veteran legion, and about two thousand 
 horse. 
 
 II. Having got together six legions, and 
 about two thousand horse, he embarked the 
 legions as fast as they arrived, in the galleys, 
 and the cavalry in the transports. Then send- 
 ing the greatest part of the fleet before, with 
 orders to sail for the island of Aponiana, not 
 far from Lilybajum ; he himself continued a 
 27* 
 
 little longer in Sicily, to expose to public sale 
 some confiscated estates. Leaving all other 
 affairs to the care of Allienus the pretor, who 
 then commanded in the island ; and strictly 
 charging him to use the utmost expedition in 
 embarking the remainder of the troops ; he 
 set sail the twenty-seventh of December, and 
 soon came up with the rest of the fleet. As 
 the wind veas favourable, and afforded a quick 
 passage, he arrived the fourth day within sight 
 of Africa, attended by a few galleys : for the 
 transports, being mostly dispersed and scat- 
 tered by the winds, were driven different ways. 
 Passing Clupea and Neapolis vyith the fleet, 
 he continued for some time to coast along the 
 shore, leaving many towns and castles behind 
 him. 
 
 III. When he came before Adrumetum, 
 where the enemy had a garrison, commanded 
 by C. Considius, and where Cn. Piso ap- 
 peared upon the shore, towards Clupea, with 
 the cavalry of Adrumetum, and about two 
 thousand Moors ; having stopped a while, 
 facing the port, till the rest of the fleet should 
 come up, he landed his men, though their 
 number at that time did not exceed three 
 thousand foot, and a hundred and fifty horse. 
 There, encamping before the town, he con- 
 tinued quiet in his intrenchments, without of- 
 fering any act of hostility, or suffering his men 
 to plunder the country. Meantime the in- 
 habitants manned the walls, and assembled 
 in great numbers before the gates, to defend 
 the town, whose garrison amounted to two 
 legions. Caesar having taken a view of the 
 place, and thoroughly examined its situation 
 309 
 
310 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 on all sides, returned to his camp. Some 
 blamed his conduct on this occasion, and 
 charged him with a considerable oversight, 
 in not a{ pointing a place of rendezvous to 
 the pilots and captains of the fleet, or at least 
 not delivering them sealed instructions, ac- 
 cording to his usual custom ; which being 
 opened at a certain time, might have directed 
 them where to assemble. But in this Caesar 
 acted not without design : for as he knew of 
 no port in Africa that was clear of the ene- 
 my's forces, and where the fleet might ren- 
 dezvous in security, he chose to rely en- 
 tirely upon fortune, and land where occasion 
 oflered. 
 
 IV. In the mean time, L. Plancus, one 
 of CsBsar's lieutenants, desired leave to treat 
 with Considius, and try, if possible, to bring 
 him to reason. Leave being granted ac- 
 cordingly, he wrote him a letter, and sent it 
 into the town by a messenger. When the 
 messenger arrived, and presented the letter, 
 Considius demanding whence it came, and 
 being told from Cassar, the Roman general, 
 answered : that he knew no general of the 
 Koman forces but Scipio. Then commanding 
 the messenger to be immediately slain in his 
 presence, he delivered the letter, unopened, 
 to a trusty partisan, with orders to carry it 
 dir&ctly to Scipio. 
 
 V. Caesar had now continued a day and 
 a night before the town, without receiving 
 any answer from Considius ; the rest of the 
 forces were not yet arrived ; his cavalry was 
 very inconsiderable ; the troops he had wirti 
 him were mostly new levies, and not sufficiently 
 numerous to invest the place : neither did he 
 think it advisable, upon his first landing, to 
 expose the army to wounds and fatigue; more 
 especially, as the town was strongly fortified, 
 extremely difficult of access, and the garrison 
 full of spirits, in expectation of a great body 
 of horse, who were said to be upon their march 
 to join them. For all these reasons, he de- 
 termined not to attempt a siege ; lest while he 
 pursued that design, the enemy's cavalry 
 should come behind and surround him. But 
 as he was drawing off his men, the garrison 
 made a sudden sally ; and Juba's horse, whom 
 he had sent to receive their pay, happening 
 just then to come up, they jointly took posses- 
 sion of the camp Caesar had left, and began to 
 harass his rear. This being perceived, the 
 legionaries immediately halted ; and the cav- 
 
 alry, though few in number, boldly charged 
 the vast multitude of the enemy. On this 
 occasion it was, that less than thirty Gallic 
 horse, by an incredible and astonishing eflibrt 
 of valour, repulsed two thousand Moors, and 
 drove them quite within the town. Having 
 thus compelled the enemy to retire, and shel- 
 ter themselves behind their walls, Caesar re- 
 sumed his intended march : but observing 
 that they often repeated their sallies, renewing 
 the pursuit from time to time, and again 
 flying when attacked by the horse ; he posted 
 some veteran cohorts, with part of the cavalry, 
 in the rear, to cover his retreat, and so pro- 
 ceeded slowly on his march. The farther he 
 advanced from Adrumetum, the less eager 
 were the Numidians to pursue. Meantime, 
 deputies arrived from the several towns and 
 castles on the road, offering to furnish him 
 with corn, and receive his commands. Towards 
 the evening of that day, which was the first of 
 January, he reached Ruspina, and there fixed 
 his camp. 
 
 VI. Thence he removed, and came before 
 Leptis, a free city, and governed by its own 
 laws. Here he was also met by deputies 
 from the town, who came, in the name of the 
 inhabitants, to make an offer of their submis- 
 sion and services. Whereupon, placing; cen- 
 turions and a guard before the gates, ro pre- 
 vent the soldiers from entering, or offering 
 violence to any of the inhabitants, he himself 
 encamped towards the shore, not far distant 
 from the town. Hither by accident arrived 
 some of the galleys and transports, by whom 
 he was informed, that the rest of the fleet, 
 uncertain what course to pursue, had been 
 steering for Utica. This obliged him to keep 
 with the army near the sea, and avoid march- 
 ing into the inland provinces, that he might 
 be at hand to join his troops upon their 
 arrival. He likewise sent the cavalry back to 
 their ships, probably to hinder the country 
 from being plundered, and ordered fresh water 
 to be carried to them on board. Meanwhile 
 the rowers, who were employed in this ser- 
 vice, were suddenly and unexpectedly attacked 
 by the Moorish horse, who killed some, and 
 wounded many with their darts. For the 
 manner of these barbarians is to ie in am- 
 bush with their horses among the valleys, 
 and suddenly launch upon an enemy ; they 
 seldom choosing to engage hand to hand in 
 a plain. 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 311 
 
 VII. In the mean time, Csesar despatched 
 letters and messengers into Sardinia and the 
 neighbouring provinces, with orders, as soon 
 as the letters came to hand, to send supplies of 
 men, corn, and warlike stores ; and having 
 unloaded part of the fleet, detached it with 
 Rabirius Posthumus, into Sicily, to bring over 
 the second embarkation. At the same time 
 he ordered out ten galleys, to get intelligence 
 of the transports that had missed their way, 
 and maintain the freedom of the sea. C. Sal- 
 lustius Crispus, the pretor, was likewise sent 
 out at the head of a squadron, to seize Cercina, 
 then in the hands of the enemy, because he 
 heard there was a great store of corn in that 
 island : in giving these orders and instructions, 
 he used all possible endeavours to leave no 
 room for excuse or delay. Meanwhile having 
 informed himself, from the deserters and na- 
 tives, of the condition of Scipio and his fol- 
 lowers ; and understanding that the}' were at 
 the whole charge of maintaining Juba's cav- 
 alr}' ; he could not but pity the infatuation of 
 men, who thus rather chose to be tributaries 
 to the king of Numidia, than securely en- 
 joy their fortunes at home with their fellow 
 citizens. 
 
 VIII, The third of January he decamped ; 
 and leaving six cohorts at Leptis, under the 
 command of Sascrna, returned with the rest 
 of the forces to Ruspina, whence he had come 
 the day before. Here he deposited the bag- 
 gage of the army ; and marching out with a 
 light body of troops to forage, ordered the 
 inhabitants to follow with their horses and 
 carriages. Having by this means got together 
 a great quantity of corn, he came back to 
 Ruspina. His design was, as far as I can 
 judge, that by keeping possession of the mari- 
 time cities, and providing them with garrisons, 
 he might secure a retreat for his fleet. 
 
 IX. Leaving therefore P. Saserna, the bro- 
 ther of him who commanded at Leptis, to take 
 charge of the town, with one legion, and or- 
 dering all the wood that could be found to be 
 carried into the place, he set out from Rus- 
 pina with seven cohorts, part of the veteran 
 legions who had behaved so well in the fleet 
 under Sulpicius and Vatinius ; and marching 
 directly for tlje port, which lies at about two 
 miles' distance, embarked with them in the 
 evening, without imparting his intentions to 
 the army, who were extremely inquisitive con- 
 cerning the general's design. His departure 
 
 occasioned the utmost sadness and consterna- 
 tion among the troops; for being few in num. 
 ber, mostly new levies, and those not all suf- 
 fered to land; they saw themselves exposed 
 upon a foreign coast, to the mighty forces of a 
 crafty nation, supported by an innumerable 
 cavalry. Nor had they any resource in their 
 present circumstances, or expectation of safety 
 in their own conduct; but derived all their 
 hope from the alacrity, vigour, and wonderful 
 cheerfulness that appeared in the general's 
 countenance : for he was of an intrepid spirit, 
 and behaved with undaunted resolution and 
 confidence. On his conduct, therefore, they 
 entirely relied, and promised themselves to a 
 man, that under so able and experienced a 
 leader, all difficulties would vanish before 
 them. 
 
 X. Cffisar having continued the whole night 
 on board, about day-break prepared to set 
 sail : when, all on a sudden, the part of the 
 fleet that had given so much concern, ap- 
 peared unexpectedly in view. Wherefore, 
 ordering his men to quit their ships imme- 
 diatelj', and receive the rest of the troops in 
 arms upon the shore, he made the new fleet 
 enter the port with the utmost diligence ; and 
 landing all the forces, horse and foot, returned 
 again to Ruspina. Here he established his 
 camp ; and taking with him thirty cohorts, 
 without baggage, advanced into the country 
 to forage. 'J'hus was Caesar's purpose at 
 length discovered : that he meant, unknown 
 to the enemy, to have sailed to the assistance 
 of the transports that had missed their way, 
 lest they should unexpectedl}' fall in with the 
 African fleet. Nor would he even impart his 
 design to his own soldiers left behind in gar- 
 rison ; from an apprehension, that when they 
 came to reflect upon their own weakness, and 
 the strength of the enemy, they might too 
 much give way to fear. 
 
 XI. Cjesar had not marched above three 
 miles from his camp, when he was informed 
 by his scouts, and some advanced parties of 
 horse, that the enemy's forces were in view. 
 At the same time a great cloud of dust began 
 to appear. Upon this intelligence, Caesar or- 
 dered all his horse, of which he had at that 
 time but a very small number, to advance, as 
 likewise his archers, only a few of whom bad 
 followed him from the camp ; and the legions 
 to march after him in order of battle, while he 
 went forward at the head of a small parLv, 
 
312 
 
 PANSA S 
 
 Soon after, having discovered the enemy at 
 some distance, he commanded the soldiers to 
 repair to their arms, and prepare for battle. 
 Their number in all did not exceed thirty co- 
 horts, with about four hundred horse, and the 
 archers. 
 
 XII. Meanwhile the enemy, under the com- 
 mand of Labienus, and the two Pacidii, drew 
 up, with a very large front, consisting mostly 
 of horse, whom they intermixed with light 
 armed Numidians and archers ; forming them- 
 selves in such close order, that CiBsar's army 
 at a distance mistook them all for infantry ; 
 and strengthening their right and left with 
 many squadrons of horse. Csesar drew up his 
 army in one hne, obliged to it by the smallness 
 of his numbers ; covering his front with the 
 archers, and placing his cavalry in the two 
 wings, with particular instructions not to suffer 
 themselves to be surroundod by the enemy's 
 numerous horse ; for he imagined that he was 
 to have to do only with infantry. 
 
 XIII. As both sides stood in expectation of 
 the signal, and Caesar chose to continue with- 
 out stirring from his post, as being sensible, 
 that with such few troops, against so great a 
 force, he must depend more on conduct and 
 contrivance than strength ; on a sudden, the 
 enemy began to extend themselves, spread out 
 upon the hills, on every side, and prepared to 
 surround our horse, who were hardly able to 
 maintain their ground against them. Mean- 
 while both the main bodies advancing to en- 
 gage, the enemy's cavalry, intermixed with 
 some light-armed Numidians, suddenly sprung 
 forward, and attacked the legions with a 
 shower of darts. Our men, preparing to re- 
 turn the charge, their horse retreated a little, 
 while the foot continued to maintain their 
 ground, till the others having rallied, came on 
 again, with fresh vigour, to sustain them. 
 
 XIV. Caesar perceiving that his ranks were 
 in danger of being broken by this new way of 
 fighting, (for our foot, in pursuing the enemy's 
 horse, as they retreated, being forced' to ad- 
 vance a considerable way beyond their colours, 
 were flanked by the light-armed Numidians ; 
 while, at the same time, they could do but lit- 
 tle execution against the cavalry, by reason of 
 the quickness wherewith they retired,) gave 
 express orders, that no soldier should advance 
 above four feet beyond the ensigns. Mean- 
 while Labienus's cavalry, confiding in their 
 numbers, endeavoured to surround those of 
 
 Caesar; who, being few in number, and over- 
 powered by the multitude of the enemy, were 
 forced to give ground a little, their horses be- 
 ing almost ail wounded. The enemy, encour- 
 aged by this, pressed on more and more ; so 
 that in an instant, the legions being surrounded, 
 on all sides, were obliged to cast themselves 
 into an orb, and fight, as if inclosed with 
 barriers. 
 
 XV. Labienus, with his head uncovered, 
 advanced on horseback to the front of the 
 battle, to encourage his men. Sometimes ad- 
 dressing Ccesar's legions : " So ho ! you raw 
 soldiers there !" says he, " why so fierce 1 Has 
 he infatuated you too with his words 1 Truly 
 he has brought you into a fioe condition ! I 
 pity you sincerely." Upon this, one of the 
 soldiers : " I am none of your raw warriors, 
 but a veteran of the tenth legion." " Vl^here's 
 your standard 1 " replied Labienus. " I'll soon 
 make you sensible who I am," answered the 
 soldier. Then pulling off his helmet, to dis- 
 cover himself, he threw a javelin with all his 
 strength at Labienus, which wounding his 
 horse severely in the breast : " Know, Labie- 
 nus," says he, " that this dart was thrown by a 
 soldier of the tenth legion." However, the 
 whole army was not a little daunted, especially 
 the new levies; and began to cast their eyes 
 upon Caesar, minding nothing, for the pre- 
 sent, but to defend themselves from the ene- 
 my's darts. 
 
 XVI. Caesar meanwhile perceivmg the ene- 
 my's design, endeavoured to extend his or- 
 der of battle as much as possible, directing 
 the cohorts to face about alternately to the 
 right and left. By this means, he broke the 
 enemy's circle with his right and left wings , 
 and attacking one part of them, thus separated 
 from the other, with his horse and foot, at 
 last put them to flight. He pursued them bus 
 a little way, fearing an ambuscade, and re- 
 turned again to his own men. The same wa? 
 done I y the other division of Caesar's hor& 
 and fo •* ; so that the enemy being driven back 
 on all ■jides, he retreated towards his camp, in 
 order of battle. 
 
 XVII. Meantime M. Petreius, and Cn. 
 Piso, with eleven hundred select Numidian 
 horse, and a considerable body oi foot, arrived 
 to the assistance of the enemy : who recovering 
 from their terror, upon this reinforcement, and 
 again resuming courage, fell upon the rear 
 of the legions, as they retreated, and endea- 
 
(;OMMENTARTES. 
 
 313 
 
 vourcd to hinder them from reaching their 
 camp. Caasar perceiving this, ordered his 
 men to wheel about, and renew the battle. 
 As the enemy still pursued their former plan, 
 and avoided a close engagement, Caesar, con- 
 sidering that tlie horses had not yet recovered 
 the fatigue of their late voyage ; that they 
 were besides weakened with thirst, weariness, 
 and wounds, and of course unfit for a vigorous 
 and long pursuit, which even the time of the 
 day would not allow, ordered both horse and 
 foot to fall at once briskly upon the enemy, and 
 not slacken the pursuit till they had driven 
 them quite beyond the farthest hills, and 
 taken possession of them themselves. Accord- 
 ingly, upon a signal given, the enemy fight- 
 ing in a faint and careless manner, he sud- 
 denly charged them with his horse and foot: 
 who in a moment driving them from the field, 
 and over the adjoining hill, kept possession of 
 that post for some time, and then retired slowly, 
 in order of battle, to their camp. The enemy, 
 who, in tliis last attack, had been very rudely 
 handled, thought proper likewise to do the 
 same. 
 
 XVIII. The action being over, a great 
 number of deserters, of all kinds, flocked to 
 Caesar's camp, besides multitudes of horse and 
 foot, that were made prisoners. By them we 
 learned, that it was the design of the enemy 
 to have astonished our raw troops, with their 
 new and uncommon manner of fighting ; and 
 after surrounding them with their cavalry, to 
 have cut them to pieces, as they Lad done 
 Curio ; and that they had marched against us 
 expressly with that intention. Labienus had 
 even said, in the council of war, that he 
 would lead such a numerous body of troops 
 against us, as should fatigue us with the very 
 slaughter, and defeat us even in the bosom of 
 victory ; for he relied more on the number 
 than the valour of his troops. He had heard 
 of the mutiny of the veteran legions at Rome, 
 and their refusal to go into Africa ; and was 
 likewise well assured of the fidelity of his 
 troops, who had served three years under him 
 in Africa. He had a great number of Numi- 
 dian cavalry and light-armed troops, besides 
 the Gallic and German horse, whom he had 
 drawn togetlier, out of the remains of Pom- 
 pey's army, and carried over with him from 
 Brundusium; he had likewise the freed men 
 raised in the country, and trained to fight on 
 horseback: and the multitude of J uba's for- 
 
 ces, his hundred and twenty elephants, his in 
 numerable cavalry and legionaries, amounting 
 to above twelve thousand. Emboldened by 
 the hope such mighty forces raised in him, on 
 the fourth of January, six days after Cajsar's 
 arrival, he came against him, with sixteen 
 hundred Gallic and German horse; nine hun- 
 dred under Petreius, eight thousand Numidians, 
 four times that number of light-armed foot, 
 with a multitude of archers and slingers. The 
 battle lasted from eleven till sun-het, during 
 which Petreius, receiving a dangerous wound, 
 was obliged to quit the field. 
 
 XIX. Meantime Caesar fortified his camp 
 with much greater care, reinforced the guards, 
 and threw up two intrenchments ; one from 
 Ruspina quite to the sea, the other from his 
 camp to the sea likewise ; to secure the com- 
 munication, and receive supplies without dan- 
 ger. He landed a great number of darts ana 
 military engines, armed part of the mariners, 
 Gauls, Rhodians, and others, that, after the 
 example of the enemy, he might have a num- 
 ber of light-armed troops, to intermix with his 
 cavalry. He likewise strengthened his army 
 with a great number of Syrian and Iturean 
 archers, whom he drew from the fleet into his 
 camp ; for he understood, that within three 
 days Scipio was expected, with all his forces, 
 consisting of eight legions, and four thousand 
 horse. At the same time, he established 
 work-shops, made a great number of darts and 
 arrows, provided himself with leaden bullets 
 and palisades, wrote to Sicily for hurdles and 
 wood to make rams, because he had none in 
 Africa, and likewise gave orders for sending 
 corn ; for the harvest, in that country, was 
 like to be inconsiderable, the enemy having 
 taken all the labourers into their service the 
 year before, and stored up the grain i; i a few 
 fortified towns, after demolishing the rest, 
 forcing the inhabitants into the garrisoned 
 places, and laying waste the whole country. 
 
 XX. In this necessity, by soothing the 
 people, he obtained a small supply, and hus- 
 banded it with care. Meantime he was very 
 exact in visiting the works, and relieving the 
 guards. Labienus sent his sick and wounded, 
 of which the number was very considerable, 
 in wagons, to Adrumetum. Meanwhile Cae- 
 sar's transports, unacquainted with the coast, 
 or where their general had landed, wandered 
 up and down, in great uncertainty ; and being 
 attacked, one after another^ by the enemy's 
 
1^14 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 coasters, were, for the most part, either taken 
 or burned. Ccesar being informed of this, 
 stationed his fleet along the coast and islands, 
 for the secunt}' of his convoys. 
 
 XXI. Meanwhile M. Cato,who commanded 
 m Utica, never ceased urging and exhorting 
 young Pompey, in words to this effect : •' Your 
 fattier, when he was at your age, and observed 
 the commonwealth oppressed by wicked and 
 daring men, and the honest party either slain 
 or driven, by banishment, from their country 
 and relations ; incited by the greatness of his 
 mind, and the love of glory, though then very 
 young, and only a private man, had yet the 
 courage to rally the remains of his father's 
 army, and deliver Rome from the yoke of 
 slavery and tyranny under which it groaned. 
 He also recovered Sicily, Africa, Numidia, 
 Mauritania, with amazing despatch; and, 
 by that means, gained an illustrious and ex- 
 tensive reputation among all nations, and 
 triumphed at three-and-twenty, while but a 
 Roman knight. Nor did he enter upon the 
 administration of public affairs, distinguished 
 by the shining exploits of his father, or the 
 fame and reputation of his ancestors, or the 
 honours and dignities of the state. You, on 
 the contrary, possessed of these honours, and 
 the reputation acquired by your father ; suf- 
 ficiently distinguished by your own industry 
 and greatness of mind ; will you not bestir 
 yourself, join your father's friends, and vindi- 
 cate your own liberty, that of the common- 
 wealth, and of every good and honest man?" 
 The youth, roused by the remonstrances 
 of that grave and worthy senator, got to- 
 gether about thirty sail, of all sorts, of 
 which some few were ships of war, and sailing 
 from Utica to Mauritania, invaded the king- 
 dom of Bogud. And leaving his baggage be- 
 hind him, with an army of two thousand men, 
 partly freemen partly slaves, some armed some 
 not, approached the town of Ascurum, in 
 which the king had a garrison. The inhabitants 
 suffered him to advance to the very walls and 
 gates ; when, sallying out, all on a sudden, 
 they drove him quite back to his ships. This ill 
 success determined him to leave that coast, nor 
 did he afterwards land in any place, but steered 
 directly for the Balearean Isles. 
 
 XXII. Meantime Scipio, leaving a strong 
 garrison at Utica, began his march, with the 
 forces we have described above, and encamped 
 
 Petreius and Labienus, lodging all the forces 
 in one camp, about three miles distant from 
 Csesar's. Their cavalry were making con- 
 tinual excursions to our very works, intercepted 
 those who ventured too far in quest of wood 
 or water, and obliged us to keep within our 
 intrenchments. This soon occasioned a great 
 scarcity of provisions among Caesar's men, 
 because no supplies had yet arrived from 
 Sicily or Sardinia. The season too was dan- 
 gerous for navigation, and he did not possess 
 above six miles, every way, in Africa, which 
 also greatly straitened him for want of forage. 
 The veteran soldiers and cavalry, who had 
 been engaged in many wars, both by sea 
 and land, and often struggled with wants 
 and misfortunes of this kind, gathering sea- 
 weed and washing it in fresh water, by 
 that means subsisted their horses and cat- 
 tle. 
 
 XXIII. "While things were in this situation, 
 king Juba, being informed of Cassar's diffi- 
 culties, and the few troops he had with him, 
 resolved not to allow him time to remedy his 
 wants, or increase his army. Accordingly he 
 left his kingdom, at the head of a great body 
 of horse and foot, and marched to join his 
 allies. Meantime, P. Silius, and king Bo- 
 gud, having intelligence of Juba's march, 
 joined their forces, entered Numidia, and lay- 
 ing siege to Cirta, the most opulent city in 
 the country, carried it in a few days, with two 
 others belonging to the Getulians. They had 
 offered the inhabitants leave to depart in safety, 
 if they would peaceably deliver up the towns ; 
 but these conditions being rejected, they were 
 taken by storm, and the citizens all put to 
 the sword. They then fell to ravaging the 
 country, and laying all the cities under con- 
 tribution : of which Juba having intelligence, 
 though he was upon the point of joining 
 Scipio and the other chiefs, he determined to 
 return to the relief of his own kingdom, rather 
 than run the hazard of being driven from it 
 while he was assisting others, and perhaps, 
 after all, miscarry too in his designs against 
 Csesar. He therefore retired with his troops, 
 leaving only thirty elephants behind him, 
 and marched to the relief of his own cities 
 and territories. 
 
 XXIV. Meanwhile Csesar, knowing that 
 the province still doubted of his arrival, and 
 imagined that not himself in person, but some 
 
 first at Adrumetum ; when after a stay of a of his lieutenants had come over with the for- 
 few days, setting out in the night, he joined ' ees lately sent, despatched letters to all the 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 315 
 
 several states, to inform them of his presence. 
 Upon this many persons of rank fled to his 
 camp, complaining of the barbarity and cruelty 
 of the enemy. Hitherto he had continued 
 quiet in his post ; but touched with their fears, 
 and a sense of their sufferings, he resolved to 
 take the field as soon as the weather would 
 permit, and he could draw his troops together. 
 He immediately despatched letters into Sicily, 
 to Allienus and Rabirius Posthumus the pre- 
 tors, that without delay or excuse, either of 
 the w-inter or the winds, they must send over 
 the rest of the troops, to save Africa from ut- 
 ter ruin ; because without some speedy re- 
 medy, not a single house would be left stand- 
 ing, nor any thing escape the fury and ravages 
 of the enemy. But such was his impatience, 
 and so long did the time appear, that from the 
 day the letters were sent, he complained with- 
 out ceasing of the delay of the fleet, and had 
 his eyes night and day turned towards the sea. 
 Nor ought we to wonder at his behaviour on 
 this occasion : for he saw the villages burned, 
 the country laid waste, the cattle destroyed, 
 the towns plundered, the principal citizens ei- 
 ther slain or put in chains, and their children 
 dragged into servitude under the name of host- 
 ages, nor could he, amidst all this scene of 
 misery, afford any relief to those who implored 
 his protection, because of the small number 
 of his forces. He kept the soldiers, however, 
 at work upon the iilLrenchments, built forts 
 and redoubts, and carried on his line quite to 
 the sea. 
 
 XXV. Meanwhile Scipio made use of the 
 following contrivance for tsaining and disci- 
 plining his elephants. He drew up two parties 
 in order of battle ; one of slingers, who were 
 to act as enemies, and discharge small stones 
 against the elephants; and fronting them, the 
 elephants themselves, in one line, with his 
 whole army behind them in battle-array ; that 
 when the enemy, by their discharge of stones, 
 had frightened the elephants, and forced them 
 to turn upon their own men, they might again 
 be made to face the enemy, by the vollies of 
 stones from the army behind them. The work, 
 however, went on but slowly, because these 
 animals, after many years' teaching, are often 
 no less prejudicial to those who bring them 
 in»^ the field, than to the enemy against whom 
 they were intended. 
 
 XXVI. "Whilst the two generals v/ere thus 
 employed near Ruspina, C. Virgilius Pretor- 
 
 ius, who commanded in Thapsus, a maritime 
 city, observing some of Csesar's transports that 
 had missed their way, uncertain where he had 
 landed or held his camp ; and thinking that a 
 fair opportunity offered of destroying them, 
 manned a galley that was in the port with 
 soldiers and archers, and joining with it a few 
 armed barks, began to pursue Cesar's ships. 
 Though he was repulsed on several occasions, 
 he still pursued his design, and at last fell in 
 with one, on board of which were two young 
 Spaniards, of the name of Titus, who were tri- 
 bunes of the fifth legion, and whose father had 
 been made a senator by Csesar. There was 
 with them a centurion of the same legion, T. 
 Salienus by name, who had invested the house 
 of M. Messala, Coesar's lieutenant, at Mes- 
 sana, and expressed himself in very seditious 
 language; nay even seized the money and or- 
 naments destined for Csesar's triumph, and foi 
 that reason dreaded his resentment. He, con- 
 scious of his demerits, persuaded the young 
 men to surrender themselves to Virgilius, by 
 whom they were sent, under a strong guard to 
 Scipio, and three days after put to death. It 
 is said that the elder Titus begged of the cen- 
 turions who were charged w^ith the execution, 
 that he might be first put to death ; which be- 
 ing easily granted, they both suffered accord- 
 ing to their sentence. 
 
 XXVII. The cavalry that mounted guard 
 in the two camps were continually skirmishing 
 with one another. Sometimes, too, the Ger- 
 man and Gallic cavalry of Labienus entered 
 into discourse with those of Cffisar. Mean- 
 time Labienus, with a party of horse, endea- 
 voured to surprise the town of Leptis, which 
 Saserna guarded with three cohorts ; but was 
 easily repulsed, because the town was strongly 
 fortified, and well pi'ovided with warlike en- 
 gines : but at several times he renewed the at- 
 tempt. One day, as a strong squadron of 
 the enemy had posted themselves before the 
 gate, their officer being slain by an arrow dis- 
 charged from a scorpion, the rest were terrified 
 and took flight ; by which means the town was 
 delivered from any further attempts. 
 
 XXVni. At the same time Scipio daily 
 drew up his troops in order of battle, about 
 three hundred paces from his camp ; and after 
 continuing in arms the greatest part of the day, 
 retreated again to his camp in the evening. 
 This he did several times, no one meanv,hile 
 offering to stir 2ut of Cassar's camp, or approach 
 
316 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 his forces ; which forbearance and tranquillity 
 gave such a contempt of Cesar and his army, 
 that drawing out all his forces, and his thirty 
 elephants, with towers on their backs, and ex- 
 tending his horse and foot as wide as possible, 
 he approached quite up to Cesar's intrench- 
 ments. Upon this Cesar quietly, and without 
 noise or confusion, recalled to his camp all 
 that were gone out either in quest of forage, 
 wood, or to work upon the fortifications : he 
 likewise ordered the cavalry that were upon 
 guard, not to quit their post until the enemy 
 were within reach of dart ; and if they persisted 
 to advance, to retire in good order within the 
 intrenchments. The rest of the cavalry were 
 enjoined to hold thenjselves in readiness upon 
 the first notice. These orders were not given 
 by himself in person, or after viewing the dis- 
 position of the enemy from the rampart; but 
 sitting in his tent, and informing himself of 
 their motions by his scouts, such was his con- 
 summate knowledge in the art of war, that he 
 gave all necessary directions by his officers. 
 He very well knew, that, whatever confidence 
 the enemy might have in their numbers, they 
 would yet never dare to attack the camp of a 
 general, who had so often repulsed, terrified, 
 and put them to flight ; who had frequently 
 pardoned and granted them their lives; and 
 whose very name had weight and authority 
 enough to intimidate their army. He was be- 
 sides well intrenched with a high rampart and 
 deep ditch, the approaches to which were 
 rendered so diflScult by the sharp spikes which 
 he had disposed in a very artful manner, that 
 they were even sufficient of themselves to 
 keep off" the enemy. He was likewise well 
 provided with military engines, and all sorts 
 of weapons necessary for a vigorous defence, 
 which compensated in some measure for the 
 fewness of his troops, and the inexperience of 
 his new levies. His forbearance therefore 
 did not proceed from fear, or any distrust of 
 the valour of his troops ; but because he was 
 unwilling to purchase a bloody victory over 
 the shattered remains of his dispersed ene- 
 mies, after such a seiies of great actions, con- 
 quests, and triumphs; and therefore resolved 
 to bear their insults and bravadoes, till the 
 arrival of his veteran legions by the second 
 embarkation. 
 
 XXIX. Scipio, after a short stay before 
 the intrenchments, as if in contempt of Cesar, 
 withdrew slowly to his camp ; and having 
 
 called his s.. jdiers together, enlarged upon the 
 terror and despair of the enemy : when en- 
 couraging his men, he assured them of a com- 
 plete victory in a short lime. Cesar made his 
 soldiers again return to their works, and under 
 pretence of fortifying his camp, inured the 
 new levies to labour and fatigue. Meantime 
 the Numidians and Getulians deserted daily 
 from Scipio's camp. Part returned home ; 
 part came over to Cesar, because they un- 
 derstood he was related to C. Marius, from 
 whom their ancestors had received considera- 
 ble favours. Of these he selected some of dis- 
 tinguished rank, and sent them home, with 
 letters to their countrymen, exhorting them to 
 levy troops for their own defence, and not 
 listen to the suggestions of his enemies. 
 
 XXX. While these things pass near Rus- 
 pina, deputies from Acilla, and all the neigh- 
 bouring towns, arrived in Cesar's camp, with 
 offers of submission, and to supply him with 
 corn and other necessaries, if he would send 
 garrisons to protect them from the enemy. 
 Cesar readily complied with their demands, 
 and having assigned a garrison, sent C. Mes- 
 sius, who had been edile, to command in Acilla. 
 Upon intelligence of this, Considius Longus, 
 who was at Adrumetum with two legions 
 and seven hundred horse, leaving a garrison 
 in that city, posted to Acilla at the head of 
 eight cohorts: but Messius having accom- 
 plished his march with great expedition, arrived 
 first at the place. When Considius therefore 
 approached, and found Cesar's garrison in 
 possession of the town, not daring to make 
 any attempt, he returned again to Adrumetum. 
 But some days after, Labienus having sent 
 him a reinforcement of horse, he found him- 
 self in a condition to renew the siege. 
 
 XXXI. Much about the same time, C. 
 Sallustius Crispus, who, as we have seen, had 
 been sent a few days before to Cercinia with 
 a fleet, arrived in that island. Upon which 
 C. Decimus, the questor, who, with a strong 
 party of his own domestics, had charge of the 
 magazines erected there, went on beard a 
 small vessel and fled. Sallustius meanwhile 
 was well received by the Cercinates, and find- 
 ing great store of corn in the island, loaded 
 all the ships then in the port, whose number 
 was very considerable, and despatched them 
 to Cesar's camp. At the same time Allienus, 
 the proconsul, put on board the transports 
 at Lilybeum the thirteenth and fourteenth 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 317 
 
 legions, with eight hundred Gallic horse, and 
 a thousand archers and slingers, and sent them 
 over into Africa. This fleet meeting with a 
 favourable wind, arrived in four days at Rus- 
 pina, where Ccesar had his camp. Thus he 
 experienced a double pleasure on this occasion, 
 receiving at one and the same time, both a 
 supply of provisions, and a reinforcement of 
 troops ; which animated the soldiers, and de- 
 livered them from the apprehensions of want. 
 Having landed the legions and cavalry, he 
 allowed them some time to recover from the 
 fatigue and sickness of their voyage, and then 
 distributed them into the forts, and along the 
 works. 
 
 XXXII. Scipio and the other generals 
 were ' greatly surprised at Caesar's conduct, 
 and could not conceive how one, who had 
 always been forward and active in war, should 
 all of a sudden change his measures ; which 
 they therefore suspected must proceed from 
 some very powerful reasons. Uneasy and 
 disturbed to see him so patient, they made 
 choice of two Getulians, on whose fidelity they 
 thought they could rely ; and promising them 
 great rewards, sent them under the name of de- 
 serters, to get intelligence of Csesar's designs. 
 When they were brought before him, they 
 begged they might have leave to speak without 
 offence ; which being granted : " It is now a 
 long time, great general," said they, " since 
 many of us Getulians, clients of C. Marius, 
 and almost all Roman citizens of the fourth 
 and sixth legions, have wished for an oppor- 
 tunity to come over to you ; but have hitherto 
 been prevented by the guards of Numidian 
 horse. Now we gladly embrace the occasion, 
 being sent by Scipio under the name of de- 
 serters, to discover what ditches and traps you 
 have prepared for his elephants, how you in- 
 tend to oppose these animals, and what dis- 
 positions you are making for battle." Cassar 
 commended them, rewarded them liberally, and 
 sent them to the other deserters. We had soon 
 a proof of the truth of what they had advanced; 
 for next day a great many soldiers of these le- 
 gions mentioned by the Getulians, deserted to 
 Caesar's camp. 
 
 XXXin. Whilst affairs were in this pos- 
 ture at Ruspina, M. Cato, who commanded 
 in Utica, was daily enlisting freed men, Afri- 
 cans, slaves, and all that were of age to bear 
 irms, and sending them without intermission 
 to Scipio's camp. Meanwhile deputies from 
 28 
 
 the town of Tisdra came to Csesar, to inform 
 him, that some Italian merchants had brought 
 three hundred thousand bushels of corn into 
 that city ; and to demand a garrison, as well 
 for their own defence as to secure the corn. 
 Cffisar thanked the deputies, promised to send 
 the garrison they desired ; and having en- 
 couraged them, sent them back to their fellow- 
 citizens. Meantime P. Sitius entered Nu- 
 midia with his troops, and made himself master 
 of a castle situated on a mountain, where 
 Juba had laid up a great quantity of pro- 
 visions, and other things necessary for carry- 
 ing on the war. 
 
 XXXIV. CiEsar having increased liis forces 
 with two veteran legions, and all the cavalry 
 and Ught-armed troops that had arrived in 
 the second embarkation, detached six trans- 
 ports to Lilybseum, to bring over the rest of 
 the army. On the twenty-seventh of January, 
 ordering the scouts and lictors to attend him 
 at six in the evening, he drew out all the le- 
 gions at midnight, and directed his march 
 towards Ruspina, where he had a garrison, 
 and which had first declared in his favour 
 no one knowing or having the least suspicion 
 of his design. Thence he continued his 
 route, by the left of the camp, along the sea, 
 and passed a little declivity, which opened 
 into a fine plain, extending fifteen miles, and 
 bordered upon a chain of mountains of mode- 
 rate height, that formed a kind of theatre. 
 In this ridge were some hills that rose higher 
 than the rest, where forts and watch-towers 
 had formerly been erected, and at the far- 
 thest of which Scipio's out-guards were 
 posted. 
 
 XXXV. Cssar having gained the ridge, 
 began to raise redoubts upon the several 
 eminences, which he executed in less than 
 half an hour. When he was near the last, 
 which bordered on the enemy's camp, and 
 where, as we have said, Scipio had his out- 
 guard of Numidians, he stopped a moment; 
 and having taken a view of the ground, and 
 posted his cavalry in the most commodious 
 situation, he ordered the legions to throw up 
 an intrenchment along the middle of the ridge, 
 from the place at which he was arrived, to 
 that whence he set out. This being observed 
 by Scipio and Labienus, they drew all their 
 cavalry out of the camp, formed them in order 
 of battle; and advancing about a thousand 
 paces, posted their infantry by way of a second 
 
318 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 line, somewhat less than half a mile from their 
 camp. 
 
 XXXVI. Ceesar, unmoved by the appear- 
 ance of the enemy's forces, encouraged his 
 men to go on with the work. But when he 
 perceived that they were within fifteen hun- 
 dred paces of the intrenchment, and that their 
 design was to interrupt and disturb the soldiers, 
 and oblige him to draw them off from the 
 work ; he ordered a squadron of Spanish 
 cavalry, sustained by some light-armed infantry, 
 to attack the Numidian guard upon the nearest 
 eminence, and drive them from that post. 
 They easily possessed themselves of the place, 
 the Numidians being partly killed, and partly 
 made prisoners. This being perceived by La- 
 bienus, that he might the more effectually 
 succour the fugitives, he wheeled off almost 
 the whole right wing of the horse. Caesar 
 waited till he was at a considerable distance 
 from his own men, and then detached his left 
 wing to intercept his return. 
 
 XXXVII. In the plain where this hap- 
 pened was a large villa, with four turrets, 
 which prevented Labienus from seeing that 
 he was surrounded. He had therefore no ap- 
 prehension of the approach of Caesar's horse, 
 till he found himself charged in the rear ; 
 which struck such a sudden terror into the 
 Numidian cavalry, that they immediately be- 
 took themselves to flight. The Gauls and 
 Germans who stood their ground, being sur- 
 rounded on all sides, were entirely cut off. 
 This being perceived by Scipio's legions, who 
 were drawn up in order of battle before the 
 camp, they fled in the utmost terror and con- 
 fusion. Scipio and his forces being driven 
 from the plain and the hills, Caesar sounded a 
 retreat, and ordered all the cavalry to retire 
 behind the works. W^hen the field was cleared, 
 he could not forbear admiring the huge bodies 
 of the Gauls and Germans, who, partly in- 
 duced by the authority of Labienus, had fol- 
 lowed him out of Gaul ; partly had been 
 drawn over by promises and rewards. Some 
 being made prisoners in the battle with Curio, 
 and, having their lives granted them, con- 
 tinued faithful, out of gratitude. Their bodies, 
 of surprising shape and largeness, lay scat- 
 tered all over the plain. 
 
 XXXVIII. Next day, Csesar drew all his 
 forces together, and formed them, in order of 
 battle, upon the plain. Scipio, discouraged 
 »y so unexpected a check, and the numbers 
 
 of his wounded and slam, kept within his lines. 
 Caesar, with his army in battalia, marched 
 along the roots of the hills, and gradually ap- 
 proached his trenches. The legions were, by 
 this time, got within a mile of Uzita, a town 
 possessed by Scipio, whence he had his water, 
 and other conveniences for his army. Re- 
 solving therefore to preserve it, at all hazards, 
 he brought forth his whole army, and drew 
 them up, in four lines, forming the first of ca- 
 valry, supported by elephants, with castles on 
 their backs. Ca3sar, believing that Scipio ap- 
 proached with design to give battle, continued 
 where he was posted, not far from the town. 
 Scipio meanwhile, having the town in the cen- 
 tre of his front, extended his two wings, where 
 were his elephants in full view of our army. 
 
 XXXIX. When Caesar had waited till 
 sun-set, without finding that Scipio stirred 
 from his post ; who seemed rather disposed to 
 defend himself by his advantageous situation, 
 than hazard a battle in the open field ; he did 
 not think proper to advance farther that day, 
 because the enemy had a strong garrison of 
 Numidians in the town, which besides covered 
 the centre of their front ; and he foresaw 
 great difficulty in forming, at the same time, 
 an attack upon the town, and opposing their 
 right and left, with the advantage of the 
 ground ; especially as the soldiers had con- 
 tinued under arms, and fasted since morning. 
 Having therefore led back his troops to their 
 camp, he resolved next day to extend his lines 
 nearer the town. 
 
 XL. Meantime Considius, who besieged 
 eight mercenary cohorts of Numidians and 
 Getulians in Acilla, where C. Messius com- 
 manded ; after continuing long before th£ 
 place, and seeing all his works burned and 
 destroyed by the enemy ; upon the report of 
 the late battle of the cavalry, set fire to his 
 corn, destroyed his wine, oil, and other stores , 
 and abandoning the siege of Acilla, divided 
 his forces with Scipio, and retired, through the 
 kingdom of Juba, to Adrumetum. 
 
 XLI. Meanwhile one of the transports be- 
 longing to the second embarkation, in which 
 were Q. Cominius, and L. Ticida, a Roman 
 knight, being separated from the rest of the 
 fleet, in a storm, and driven to Thapsus, was 
 taken by Virgilius, and all the persons on 
 board sent to Scipio. A three-benched gal- 
 ley likewise, belonging to the same fleet, 
 being forced, by the winds, to jEgimuriim 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 319 
 
 "vas intercepted, by the squaJrcn under Varus 
 and M. Octavius. In this vessel were some 
 veteran soldiers, with a centurion, and a few 
 new levies ; whom Varus treated respectfully, 
 and sent, under a guard, to Scipio. When 
 they came into his presence, and appeared 
 before his tribunal : " I am satisfied," said he, 
 " it is not by your own inclination, but at the 
 instigation of your wicked general, that you 
 impiously wage war on your fellow-citizens, 
 and on the honestest part of the republic. If, 
 therefore, now that fortune has put you in 
 our power, you will take this opportunity to 
 unite with the good citizens, in the defence 
 of the common-weal, I not only promise you 
 your life, but you may expect to be rewarded. 
 Let me know what you think of the proposal." 
 Scipio having ended his speech, and expecting 
 a thankful return to so gracious an offer, 
 permitted them to reply : when the centurion, 
 who on this occasion was spokesman, thus 
 addressed him : " Scipio," says he, " (for I 
 cannot give you the appellation of general,) 
 I return you my hearty thanks for the good 
 treatment you are willing to show to pri- 
 soners of war ; and perhaps I might accept of 
 your kindness, were it not to be purchased 
 at the expense of a horrible crime. What .' 
 shall I carry arms, and fight against Cajsar, 
 my general, under whom I have served as 
 centurion ; and against his victorious army, 
 to whose renown I have so many years en- 
 deavoured to contribute by my valour 1 It 
 is what I will never do ; and even advise you 
 not to push the war any further. You know 
 not what troops you have to deal with, nor 
 the difference betwixt them and yours ; of 
 which, if you please, I will give you an in- 
 disputable instance. Do you pick out the 
 best cohort you have in 3'our army : and give 
 me only ten of my comrades, which are now 
 your prisoners, to engage them. You shall 
 see, by the success, what you are to expect 
 from your soldiers." When the centurion 
 had made this reply, Scipio, incensed at his 
 boldness, and resenting the affront, made a 
 sign to some of his officers to kill him on the 
 spot, which was immediately put in execution. 
 At the same time ordering the other veteran 
 soldiers to be separated from the new levies : 
 ' Carry away," said he, " these villains, pam- 
 pered with the blood of their fellow-citizens." 
 Accordingly they were conducted without the 
 rampart, and cruelly massacred. The new- 
 
 raised soldiers were distributed among his le- 
 gions; and Cominius and Ticida forbid to 
 appear in his presence. Ca3sar, concerned 
 for this misfortune, broke, with ignominy, the 
 oflicers, whose instructions being to secure 
 the coast, and advance to a certain distance 
 into the main sea, to protect and facilitate the 
 approach of the transports, had been negli- 
 gent on that important station. 
 
 XLII. About this time, a most incredible 
 accident befell Caesar's army. For the Plei- 
 ades being set, about nine at night, a terrible 
 storm arose, attended with hail of an uncom- 
 mon size. But what contributed to render 
 this misfortune the greater, was, that Cffisar 
 had not, like other generals, put his troops into 
 winter quarters ; but was every three or four 
 days changing his camp, to gain ground on the 
 enemy ; which keeping the soldiers continually 
 employed, they were utterly unprovided of 
 any conveniences to protect them from the 
 inclemency of the weather. Besides, neither 
 officer nor soldier had been permitted to take 
 their equipages or utensils with them, nor 
 so much as a vessel, or a single slave, when 
 they parted from Sicily ; and so far had they 
 been from acquiring or providing themselves 
 with any thing in Africa, that by reason of 
 the great scarcity of provisions, they had even 
 consumed their former stores. Impoverished 
 by these accidents, very few of them had 
 tents : the rest had made themselves a kind 
 of covering, either by spreading their clothes, 
 or with mats and rushes. But these being 
 soon penetrated by the storm and hail, the 
 soldiers had no resource left, but wandered 
 up and down the camp, covering their heads 
 with their bucklers, to shelter them from the 
 weather. In a short time the whole camp 
 was under water, the fires extinguished, and 
 all their provisions washed away or spoiled. 
 The same night, the shafts of the javelins be- 
 longing to the fifth legion, of their own ac- 
 cord, took fire. 
 
 XLIII. In the meantime king Juba, having 
 received advice of the horse-engagement with 
 Scipio, and being earnestly solicited by letters, 
 from that general, to come to his assistance, 
 left Sabura at home, with part of the army, 
 to carry on the war against Sitius ; and ima- 
 gining his name and presence sufficient to 
 free Scipio's troops from the dread they had 
 of Ccesar, began his march, with three legions, 
 eight hundred horse, a body of Numidian ca 
 
320 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 valry, great numbers of light-armed infantry, 
 and thirty elephants. When he arrived, he 
 lodged himself, with all his forces, in a se- 
 parate camp, at no great distance from that of 
 Scipio. Caesar's army had, for some time 
 pastjbeen possessed with no small terror of 
 Juba's forces ; and the report of his approach 
 had increased the inquietude, and produced a 
 general suspense and expectation among the 
 troops. But his arrival, and the appearance 
 of his camp, soon dispelled all these apprehen- 
 sions, and they as much despised the king of 
 Mauritania, now he was present, as they had 
 feared him, when at a distance. It was easy 
 to be seen, however, that the reinforcement 
 brought by the king, greatly raised the cou- 
 rage and confidence of Scipio. For next day, 
 drawing out all his own and the royal forces, 
 with sixty elephants, he ranged them, in or- 
 der of battle, with great ostentation, advanced 
 a little beyond his intrenchments, and after a 
 short stay, retreated to his camp. 
 
 XLIV. Caesar, knowing that Scipio had re- 
 ceived all the supplies he expected, and 
 judging he would no longer decline coming to 
 an engagement, began to advance along the 
 ridge with his forces, extend his lines, secure 
 them with redoubts, and possess himself of the 
 eminences between him and Scipio. The 
 enemy, confiding in their numbers, seized a 
 neighbouring hill, and thereby prevented the 
 progress of our works. Labienus had formed 
 the design of securing this post, and as it lay 
 nearest his quarters, soon got thither. Caesar 
 had the same project in view : but before he 
 could reach the place, was necessitated to 
 pass a broad and deep valley, of rugged de- 
 scent, broken with caves, and beyond which 
 was a thick grove of olives. Labienus per- 
 ceiving that Caesar must march this way, and 
 having a perfect knowledge of the country, 
 placed himself in ambush, with the light- 
 armed foot, and part of the cavalry. At the 
 same time, he disposed some horse behind 
 the hills, that when he should fall unexpectedly 
 upon Caesar's foot, they might suddenly ad- 
 vance from behind the mountain. Thus the 
 enemy, attacked in front and rear, surrounded 
 with danger on all sides, and unable either to 
 retreat or advance, would, he imagined, fall an 
 easy prey to his victorious troops. Caesar, 
 who had no suspicion of the ambuscade, sent 
 his cavalry before ; and arriving at the place, 
 Labienus's men, either forgetting or neglecting 
 
 the orders of their general, or fearing to hi 
 trampled to death in the ditch by our cav- 
 alry, began to issue in small parties from the 
 rock, and ascend the hill. Caesar's horse pur- 
 suing them, slew some, and took others pri- 
 soners: then making towards the hill, drove 
 thence Labienus's detachment, and immedi- 
 ately took possession. Labienus, followed by 
 a small party of horse, escaped with great dif- 
 ficulty. 
 
 XLV. The cavalry having thus cleared the 
 mountain, Caesar resolved to intrench him- 
 self there, and distributed the work to the le- 
 gions. He then ordered two lines of commu- 
 nication to be drawn from the greater camp, 
 across the plain on the side of Uzita, which 
 stood between him and the enemy, and was 
 garrisoned by a detachment of Scipio's army, 
 These lines were so contrived, as to meet at 
 the right and left angles of the town. His 
 design in this work was, that when he ap- 
 proached the town with his troops, and began 
 to attack it, these lines might secure his 
 flanks, and hinder the enemy's horse from sur- 
 rounding him, and compelling him to aban- 
 don the siege. It likewise gave his men more 
 frequent opportunities of conversing with the 
 enemy, and facilitated the means of desertion 
 to such as favoured his cause ; many of whom 
 had already come over, though not without 
 great danger to themselves. He wanted also, 
 by drawing nearer the enemy, to see how they 
 stood inclined to a battle. Add to all these 
 reasons, that the place itself being very low, 
 he might there sink some wells ; whereas be- 
 fore he had a long and troublesome way to 
 send for water. While the legions were em- 
 ployed in these works, part of the army stood 
 ready drawn up before the trenches, and had ' 
 frequent skirmishes with the Numidian horse 
 and light-armed foot. 
 
 XLVI. In the evening, when Caesar was 
 drawing off his legions from the works, Juba, 
 Scipio, and Labienus, at the head of all theii 
 horse and light-armed foot, fell furiously upon 
 his cavalry : who, overwhelmed by the sudden 
 and general attack of so great a multitude, 
 were forced to give ground a little. But the 
 event was very different from what the enemy 
 expected : for Caesar, leading back his legions 
 to the assistance of his cavalry, they immedi- 
 ately rallied, turned upon the Numidians, and 
 charging them vigorously whilst they were 
 dispersed and disordered with the pursuit, drove 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 321 
 
 them with great slaughter to the king's camp. 
 And had not night intervened, and the dust 
 raised by the wind obstructed the prospect, 
 Juba and Labienus woukl both have fallen 
 into Caesar's hands, and their whole cavalry 
 and light-armed infantry been cut off. Mean- 
 while Scipio's men, of the fourth and sixth 
 legions, left him in crowds, some deserting to 
 Caesar's camp, others flying to such places as 
 were most convenient for them. Curio's 
 horse likewise, distrusting Scipio and his 
 troops, followed the same counsel. 
 
 XLVII. While these things passed near 
 Uzita, .the ninth and tenth legions sailing in 
 transports from Sicily, when they came before 
 Ruspina, observing Cajsar's ships that lay at 
 anchor about Thapsus, and fearing it might be 
 the enemy's fleet stationed there to intercept 
 them, they imprudently stood out to sea ; and 
 after being long tossed by the winds, provisions 
 and water failing them, at last arrived at 
 Caesar's camp. 
 
 XLVIII. Soon after they were landed, 
 Caesar calling to mind their licentious beha- 
 viour in Italy, and the rapines of some of their 
 officers, seized the pretence furnished by C. 
 Avienus, a military tribune of the tenth legion, 
 who, when he set out from Sicily, filled a ship 
 entirely with his own equipage and attend- 
 ants, without taking on board one single 
 soldier. Wherefore, summoning all the mili- 
 tary tribunes and centurions to appear before 
 his tribunal next day, he addressed them in 
 these terms : " I could have wished that those, 
 whose insolence and former licentious charac- 
 ter have given me cause of complaint, had 
 been capable of amendment, and of making a 
 good use of my mildness, patience, and moder- 
 ation. But since they know not how to con- 
 fine themselves within bounds, I intend to 
 make an example of them, according to the 
 law of arras, in order that others may be taught 
 a better conduct. You, C. Avienus, when 
 you was in Italy, instigated the soldiers of the 
 Roman people to revolt from the republic : 
 you have been guilty of rapines and plunders 
 in the municipal towns ; and you have never 
 been of any real service, either to the com- 
 monwealth, or to your general ; lastly, in lieu 
 of soldiers, you have crowded the transports 
 with your slaves and equipage ; so that, 
 through your fault, the republic fails in 
 soldiers, who at this time are not only useful, 
 but necessary. For all these causes, I break 
 28* 
 
 you with ignominy, and order you to leave 
 Africa this very day. In like manner, I break 
 you, A. Fonteius, because you have behaved 
 yourself as a seditious officer, and as a bad 
 citizen. You, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, C. Clusi- 
 nus, have attained the rank of centurions 
 through my indulgence, and not through your 
 own merit; and since you have been invested 
 with that rank, have neither shown bravery in 
 war, nor good conduct in peace. Instead of 
 endeavouring to act according to the rules of 
 modesty and decency, your whole study has 
 been to stir up the soldiers against your general. 
 I therefore think you unworthy of continuing 
 centurions in my army ; I break you, and or- 
 der you to quit Africa as soon as possible." 
 Having concluded this speech, he delivered 
 them over to some centurions, with orders to 
 confine them separately on board a ship, al- 
 lowing each of them a single slave to wait on 
 them. 
 
 XLIX. Meantime the Getulian deserters, 
 whom Caesar had sent home with letters and 
 instructions, as we have related above, arrived 
 among their countrymen : who, partly swayed 
 by their authority, partly by the name and 
 reputation of CaBsar, revolted from Juba ; and 
 speedily and unanimously taking up arms, 
 scrupled not to act in opposition to their king. 
 Juba having thus three wars to sustain, was 
 compelled to detach six cohorts from the army 
 destined to act against Caesar, and send*them 
 to defend the frontiers of his kingdom against 
 the Getulians. 
 
 L. Caesar having finished his lines of com- 
 munication, and pushed them so near the 
 town, as to be just without reach of dart, in- 
 trenched himself there. He caused warlike 
 engines in great numbers to be placed in the. 
 front of his works, wherewith he played per- 
 petually against the town ; and to increase the 
 enemy's apprehensions, drew five legions out 
 of his other camp. This opportunity gave se- 
 veral persons of rank in both armies a desire 
 to see and converse with their friends, which 
 Caesar foresaw would turn to his advantage. 
 For the chief officers of the Getulian horse, 
 with other illustrious men of that nation, whose 
 fathers had served under C. Marius, and from 
 his bounty obtained considerable estates in 
 their country, but after Sulla's victory had 
 been made tributaries to King Hiempsal ; 
 taking the opportunity of the night, when the 
 fires were lighted, with their horses and ser- 
 2 T 
 
322 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 vants, to the number of about a thousand, came 
 over to Cesar's camp near Uzita. 
 
 LI. As this accident could not but disturb 
 Scipio and his followers, they perceived, much 
 about the same time, M. Aquinius in discourse 
 with C Saserna. Scipio sent him word, that 
 he did not do well to correspond with the 
 enemy. Aquinius paid no attention to this 
 reprimand, but pursued his discourse. Soon af- 
 ter one of Juba's guards came to him, and told 
 him in the hearing of Saserna, The king for- 
 bids you to continue this conversation. He no 
 sooner received this order than immediately he 
 retired, for fear of offending the king. One 
 cannot wonder enough at this step in a Roman 
 citizen, who had already attained to considera- 
 ble honours in the commonwealth ; that 
 though neither banished his country, nor 
 stripped of his possessions, he should pay a 
 more ready obedience to the orders of a for- 
 eign prince, than those of Scipio; and choose 
 rather to behold the destruction of his party, 
 than return into the bosom of his country. 
 Nor was Juba's arrogance confined to M. 
 Aquinius, a new man and an inconsiderable 
 senator ; but reached even Scipio himself, a 
 man of illustrious birth, distinguished honours, 
 and high dignity in the state. For as Scipio, 
 before the king's arrival, always wore a purple 
 coat of mail, Juba is reported to have told him, 
 that he ought not to wear the same habit as 
 he did'. Accordingly Scipio changed his pur- 
 ple robe for a white one, submitting to the 
 caprice of a haughty barbarian monarch. 
 
 LII. Next day they drew out all their forces 
 from both carrips ; and forming them on an 
 eminence not far from Csesar's camp, continued 
 thus in order of battle. CiEsar likewise drew 
 out his men, and disposed them in battle array 
 before his lines; not doubting but the enemy, 
 who exceeded him in number of troops, and 
 had been so considerably reinforced by the arri- 
 val of king Juba, would advance to attack him. 
 Wherefore, having rode through the ranks, en- 
 couraged his men, and given them the signal 
 of battle, he stayed expecting the enemy's 
 charge. For he did not think it advisable to 
 remove far from his lines ; because the enemy, 
 having a strong garrison in Uzita, which was 
 opposite to his right wing, he could not ad- 
 vance beyond that place, without exposing his 
 flank to a sally from the town. Besides, the 
 access to Scipio's army was rough and diificult, 
 
 and would have disordered his troops before 
 they gave the onset. 
 
 LIII. And here it may not be improper to 
 describe the order of battle of both armies. 
 Scipio's troops were drawn up in this manner: 
 he posted his own legions, and those of Juba, 
 in the front ; behind them the Numidians, as 
 a body of reserve ; but in so very thin ranks, 
 and so far extended in length, that to see 
 them at a distance, you would have taken the 
 main battle for a simple line of legionaries, 
 which was doubled only upon the wings. 
 The elephants were placed at equal distances 
 on the right and left, and sustained by the 
 light-armed troops and auxiliary Numidians. 
 All the bridled cavalry were on the right ; 
 for the left was covered by the town of Uzita, 
 nor had the cavalry room to extend themselves 
 on that side. Accordingly he stationed the 
 Numidian horse, with an incredible multitude 
 of light-armed foot, about a thousand paces 
 from his right, towards the foot of a mountain, 
 considerably removed from his own and the 
 enemy's troops. His design in this was, that 
 during the progress of the battle, the cavalry 
 having room to extend themselves, might 
 wheel round upon Cssar's left, and disorder 
 it with their darts. Such was Scipio's disposi- 
 tion. Caesar's order of battle, to describe it 
 from left to right, was as follows : the ninth 
 and seventh legions formed the left wing ; 
 the thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-eighth, and 
 twenty-sixth, the main body ; and the thirtieth 
 and twenty-ninth the right. His second line 
 on the right, consisted partly of the cohorts of 
 those legions we have already mentioned, partly 
 of the new levies. His third line was posted 
 to the left, extending as far as the middle le- 
 gion of the main body, and so disposed, that 
 the left wing formed a triple order of battle. 
 The reason of this disposition was, because his 
 right wing being defended by the works, it 
 behoved him to make his left the sironger, 
 that they might be a match for the numerous 
 cavalry of the enemy ; for which reason he 
 had placed all his horse there, intermixed with 
 light-armed foot ; and as he could not rely 
 much upon them, had detached the fifth legion 
 to sustain them. The archers were dispersed 
 up and down the field, but principally on the 
 two wings. 
 
 LIV. The two armies thus facing one an- 
 other in order of battle, with a space of no 
 
COMMENTARIES, 
 
 323 
 
 more than three hundred paces between, con- 
 tinued so posted from morning till night with- 
 out fighting, of which perhaps there never was 
 an instance before. But when Caesar began 
 to retreat within his lines, suddenly all the 
 Numidian and Getulian horse without bridles, 
 who were posted behind the enemy's army, 
 made a motion to the right, and began to ap- 
 proach Csesar's camp on the mountain ; while 
 the regular cavalry under Labienus continued 
 in their post, to keep our legions in check. 
 Upon this, part of Cajsar's cavalry, with the 
 light-armed foot, advancing hastily, and with- 
 out orders, against the Getulians, and ven- 
 turing to pass the morass, found themselves 
 unable to deal with the superior multitude of 
 the enemy ; and being abandoned by the 
 light-armed troops, were forced to retreat in 
 great disorder, after the loss of one trooper, 
 twenty-six light-armed foot, and many of their 
 horses wounded. Scipio, overjoyed at this 
 success, returned towards night to his camp. 
 But as fortune's favours are seldom permanent 
 to those engaged in the trade of war, the 
 day after a party of horse, sent by CjEsar to 
 Leptis in quest of provisions, falling in unex- 
 pectedly with some Numidian and Getulian 
 stragglers, killed or made prisoners about a 
 hundred of them. Caesar, meanwhile, omitted 
 not every day to draw out his men, and labour 
 at the works : carrrying a ditch and rampart 
 quite across the plain, to prevent the incur- 
 sions of the enemy. Nor was Scipio less 
 active in forwarding his works, and securing 
 his communication with the mountain. Thus 
 both generals were busied about their intrench- 
 ments, yet seldom a day passed, without some 
 skirmish between the cavalry. 
 
 LV. In the meantime, Varus, upon notice 
 that the seventh and eighth legions had sailed 
 from Sicily, speedily equipped the fleet he 
 had brought to winter at Utica ; and manning 
 ■t with Getulian rowers and mariners, went 
 out a cruising, and came before Adrumetum 
 with fifty-five ships. Cjesar, who knew 
 nothing of his arrival, sent L. Cispius, with a 
 squadron of twenty-seven sail, to cruise about 
 Thapsus, for the security of his convoys ; 
 and likewise despatched Q. Aquila to Adru- 
 metum, with thirteen galleys, upon the same 
 errand. Cispius soon reached the station ap- 
 pointed to him : but Aquila being attacked by 
 a storm, could not double the cape, which 
 bliged him to put into a creek at some ^"^- 
 
 tance, that afforded convenient shelter. The 
 rest of the fleet anchored before Leptis, where 
 the mariners went on shore, some to refresh 
 themselves, others to buy provisions in the 
 towns, and left their ships quite defenceless 
 Varus having notice of this from the deserters, 
 and resolving to take advantage of the enemy's 
 negligence, left Adrumetum about nine at 
 night, and arriving early next morning with his 
 whole fleet before Leptis, burned all the 
 transports that were out at sea, and took, 
 without opposition, two five-benched galleys, 
 in which were none to defend them. 
 
 LVL Caesar had an account brought him 
 of this unlucky accident, as he was inspecting 
 the works of his camp. Whereupon he im- 
 mediately took horse, went full speed to Leptis, 
 which was but two leagues distant, and going 
 on board a brigantine, ordered all the ships in 
 the port to follow him, and, in this manner, 
 put to sea. He soon came up with Aquila, 
 whom he found dismayed and terrified at the 
 number of ships he had to oppose ; and con- 
 tinuing his course, began to pursue the enemy's 
 fleet. Meantime Varus, astonished at Caesar's 
 boldness and despatch, tacked about with 
 his fleet, and made the best of his way for 
 Adrumetum. But Caesar, after four miles 
 sail, came up with him, recovered one of his 
 galleys, with the crew and a hundred and 
 thirty men, left to guard her: and took a 
 three-benched galley belonging to the enemy, 
 with all the soldiers and mariners on board. 
 The rest of the fleet doubled the cape, and 
 made the port of Adrumetum. Caesar could 
 not double the cape with the same wind, but 
 keeping the sea all night, appeared early 
 next morning before Adrumetum. He set 
 fire to all the transports without the haven, 
 took what galleys he found there, or forced 
 them into the harbour ; and having waited 
 some time to offer the enemy battle, returned 
 again to his camp. On board the ship he 
 had taken was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, 
 and P. Ligarius Afranianus, the same vi'ho had 
 prosecuted the war against him in Spain, and 
 who, instead of acknowledging the conqueror's 
 generosity, in granting him his liberty, had 
 joined Pompey in Greece ; and after the 
 battle of Pharsalia, had gone into Africa to 
 Varus, there to continue in the service of the 
 same cause. Cassar, to punish his perfidy and 
 breach of oath, gave immediate orders for his 
 «yecution. But he pardoned P. Vestriu?, 
 
324 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 because his brother had paid his ransom at 
 Rome, and he made it appear, that being 
 taken in Nasidius's fleet, and condemned to 
 die. Varus had saved his life, since which, 
 no opportunity had offered of making his 
 escape. 
 
 LVII. It is usual for the people of Africa 
 to deposit their corn privately in vaults, under 
 ground, to secure it in time of war, and guard 
 it from the sudden incursions of an enemy. 
 Caesar, having intelligence of this from a spy, 
 drew out two legions, with a party of cavalry, 
 at midnight, and sent them about ten miles off; 
 whence they returned, loaded with corn, to 
 the camp. Labienus being informed of it, 
 marched about seven miles, through the moun- 
 tains Cffisar had passed the day before, and 
 there encamped with two legions ; where ex- 
 pecting that Ctesar would often come the same 
 ■way in quest of corn, he daily lay in ambush, 
 with a great body of horse and light-armed 
 foot. Caesar having notice of this from the 
 deserters, suffered not a day to pass, till the 
 enemy, by repeating the practice often, had 
 abated a little of their circumspection. Then 
 issuing unexpectedly one morning, by the De- 
 cuman port, with eight veteran legions, and a 
 party of horse, he ordered the cavalry to march 
 before ; who coming suddenly upon the enemy's 
 light-armed foot, that lay in ambush among 
 the valleys, slew about five hundred, and put 
 the rest to flight. Meantime Labienus ad- 
 vanced, with all his cavalry, to support the 
 run-avvays, and was on the point of overpower- 
 .'ng our small party with his numbers, when 
 suddenly CaBsar appeared with the legions, in 
 order of battle. This sight checked the ardour 
 of Labienus, who thought proper to sound a 
 retreat. The day after, Juba ordered all the 
 Numidians who had deserted their post and 
 fled to their camp to be crucified. 
 
 LVIII. Meanwhile Ctesar, being straitened 
 for want of corn, recalled all his forces to the 
 camp ; and having left garrisons at Leptis, 
 Ruspina, and Acilla, ordered Cispius and 
 Aquila to cruise with their fleets, the one be- 
 fore Adrumelum, the other before Thapsus, 
 and set fire to his camp at Uzita, he set out, in 
 order of battle, at three in the morning, dis- 
 posed his baggage in the left, and came to 
 Agar, a town that had been often vigorously 
 attacked by the Getulians, and as valiantly 
 defended by the inhabitants. There encamping 
 in the plain before the town, he went, with 
 
 part of his army, round the country in quest 
 of provisions ; and having found store of barley, 
 oil, wine, and figs, with a small quantity of 
 wheat, after allowing the troops some time to 
 refresh themselves, he returned to his camp. 
 Scipio meanwhile hearing of Caesar's departure 
 followed him along the hills, with all his for- 
 ces, and posted himself about six miles off, in 
 three different camps. 
 
 LIX. The town of Zeta lying on Scipio'g 
 side of the country, was not above ten miles 
 from his camp; but might be about eighteen 
 from that of Cassar. Scipio had sent two le- 
 gions thither to forage ; which Caesar having 
 intelligence of from a deserter, removed his 
 camp from the plain to a hill, for the greater 
 security ; and leaving some troops to guard it, 
 marched at three in the morning, with the rest 
 of his forces, passed the enemy's camp, and 
 possessed himself of the town. Scipio's le- 
 gions were gone fiirther into the country to 
 forage ; against whom setting out immediately, 
 he found the whole army come up to their 
 absistance, which obliged him to give over the 
 pursuit. He took, on this occasion, C. Mutius 
 Reginus, a Roman knight, Scipio's intimate 
 friend, and governor of the town ; also P. 
 Atrius, a Roman knight likewise, of the pro- 
 vince of Utica, with twenty-two camels, be- 
 longing to king Juba. Then leaving a garri- 
 son in the place, under the command of Op- 
 pius, his lieutenant, he set out upon his retura 
 to his own camp. 
 
 LX. As he drew near Scipio's camp, by 
 which he was necessitated to pass, Labienus 
 and Afranius, who lay in ambuscade among 
 the nearest hills, with all their cavalry and 
 light-armed infantry, started up and attacked 
 his rear. Caesar, detaching his cavalry to re- 
 ceive their charge, ordered the legions to throw 
 all their baggage into a heap, and face about 
 upon the enemy. No sooner was this order 
 executed, than upon the first charge of the le- 
 gions, the enemy's horse and light-armed foot 
 began to give way, and were, with incredible 
 ease, driven from the higher ground. But 
 when Caesar, imagining them sufficiently de- 
 terred from any further attempts, began to 
 pursue his march, they again issued from the 
 hills ; and the Numidians, with the light-armed 
 infantry, who are wonderfully nimble, and ac- 
 custom themselves to fight intermixed with 
 the horse, with whom they keep an equal pace, 
 either in advancing or retiring, fell a second 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 325 
 
 time upon our foot. As they repeated this often, 
 pressing upon our rear when we marched, 
 and retiring when we endeavoured to engage, 
 always keeping at a certain distance, and. with 
 singular care avoiding a close fight, as holding 
 it enough to wound us with their darts ; Caesar 
 plainly saw that their whole aim was, to oblige 
 him to encamp in that place where no water 
 was to be had ; that his soldiers, who had tasted 
 nothing from three in the morning till four in 
 the afternoon, might perish with hunger, and 
 the cattle with thirst. Sun-set now ap- 
 proached ; when Cfesar, finding he had not 
 gained a hundred paces complete in four hours, 
 and that, by keeping his cavalry in the rear, 
 he lost many horse, ordered the legions to fall 
 behind, and close the march. Proceeding 
 thus, with a slow and gentle pace, he found 
 the legions fitter to sustain the enemy's charge. 
 Meantime the Numidian horse, waeeling round 
 the hills, to the right and left, threatened to 
 inclose Ccesar's forces with their numbers, 
 while part continued to harass his rear : and 
 if but three or four veteran soldiers faced 
 about, and darted their javelins at the enemy, 
 no less than two thousand of them would take 
 to flight ; but suddenly rallying, returned to 
 he fight, and charged the legionaries with 
 their darts. Thus Ceesar, one wki/e marching 
 forward, one while halting, and going on but 
 slowly, reached the camp safe, about seven 
 that evening, having only ten men wounded. 
 Labienus too retreated to his camp, after hav- 
 ing thoroughly fatigued his troops with the 
 pursuit ; in which, besides a great number 
 wounded, his loss amounted to about three 
 hundred men. And Scipio withdrew his le- 
 gions and elephants, whom, for the greater 
 terror, he had ranged before his camp within 
 view of Caesar's army. 
 
 LXI. Caesar having such an enemy to deal 
 with, was necessitated to instruct his soldiers, 
 not like a general of a veteran army, which 
 had been victorious in so many battles ; but 
 like a fencing-master, training up his gladia- 
 tors : with what foot they must advance or re- 
 tire ; when they were to oppose and make 
 good their ground, when to counterfeit an at- 
 tack ; at what place, and in what manner, to 
 launch their javelins. For the enemy's light- 
 armed troops gave wonderful trouble and dis- 
 quiet to our army ; because they not only 
 deterred the cavalry from the encounter, by 
 killing their horses with their javelins, but 
 
 likewise wearied out the legionary soldiers by 
 their swiftness ; for as often as these heavy 
 armed troops advanced to attack them, they 
 evaded the danger by a quick retreat. This 
 gave Cffisar no small trouble ; because as often 
 as he engaged with his cavaliy, without being 
 sustained by the infantry, he found himself by 
 no means a match for the enemy's horse, sup- 
 ported by their light-armed foot : and as he 
 had no experience of the strength of their le- 
 gions, he foresaw still greater difiiculties when 
 these should be united, as the shock must then 
 be wonderful. The number too, and size of 
 the elephants greatly increased the terror of 
 the soldiers ; far which, however, he found a 
 remedy, in causing some of those animals to 
 be brought over from Italy, that his men might 
 be accustomed to the sight of them, know their 
 strength and courage, and in what part of the 
 body they ■were most likely to be wounded. 
 For as the elephants are covered with trap- 
 pings and ornaments, it was necessary to in- 
 form them what parts of the body remained 
 naked, that they might direct their darts 
 thither. It was likewise needful to familiarize 
 his horses to the cry, smell, and figure of these 
 animals ; in all which he succeeded to a won- 
 der ; for the soldiers quickly came to touch 
 them with their hands, and to be sensible of 
 tlieir tardiness ; and the cavah'y attacked them 
 with blunted darts, and by degrees, brought 
 their horses to endure their presence. For 
 these reasons already mentioned, Cajsar was 
 not without his anxieties, and proceeded with 
 more slowness and circumspection than usual 
 abating considerably of his wonted expedition 
 and celerity. K"or ought we to wonder; for 
 in Gaul his troops had been accustomed to 
 fight in a champaign country, against an open 
 undesigning enemy, who despised artifice, and 
 valued themselves only on their bravery. But 
 now he was to habituate his soldiers to the 
 arts and contrivances of a crafty enemy, and 
 teach them what to pursue, and what to avoid. 
 The sooner, therefore, to instruct them in these 
 matters, he took care not to confine his legions 
 to one place, but, under pretence of foraging, 
 engaged them in frequent marches and counter- 
 marches ; knowing well that the enemy would 
 take care not to lose sight of him. Three days 
 after, he drew up his forces with great art and 
 marching past Scipio's camp, waited ^iiim in 
 an open plain ; but seeing that he still declined 
 a battle, he retreated to his camp in the evening. 
 
326 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 LXII. Meantime ambassadors arrived from 
 the town of Vacca, bordering upon Zeta, of 
 which we have observed Csesar had pos- 
 sessed himself. They requested and entreated 
 that he would send them a garrison, promising 
 to furnish many of the necessaries of war. At 
 the same time, by an uncommon piece of 
 good fortune for Csesar, a deserter informed 
 him, that Juba had, by a quick march, reached 
 the town, massacred the inhabitants, and 
 abandoned the place itself to the plunder of 
 his soldiers. Thus was Cessar's garrison pre- 
 vented from setting out, and by that means 
 saved from destruction. 
 
 LXIII. Cfesar having reviewed his army 
 the eighteenth of February, advanced next 
 day, with all his forces, five miles beyond his 
 camp, and remained a considerable time in 
 order of battle, two miles from Scipio's. When 
 he had waited sufficiently long to invite the 
 enemy to an engagement, finding them still 
 decline it, he led back his troops. Next day 
 he decamped, and directed his march towards 
 Sassura, where Scipio had a garrison of Nu- 
 midians, and a magazine of corn. Labienus 
 being informed of this motion, fell upon his 
 rear, with the cavalry and light-armed troops : 
 and having made himself master of part of the 
 baggage, was encouraged to attack the legions 
 themselves, believing they would fall an easy 
 prey, under the load and encumbrance of a 
 march. But Csesar, from a foresight of what 
 might happen, had ordered three hundred 
 men out of each legion, to hold themselves in 
 readiness for action. These being sent against 
 Labienus, he was so terrified at their approach, 
 that he shamefully took to flight, great num- 
 bers of his men being killed or wounded. The 
 legionaries returned to their standards, and 
 pursued their march. Labienus still followed 
 us at a distance along the summit of the moun- 
 tains, and kept hovering on our right. 
 
 LXIV. Cfesar arriving before Sassura, took 
 it in presence of the enemy, who durst not 
 advance to its relief; and put to the sword the 
 garrison which had been left there by Scipio, 
 under the command of P. Cornelius, who, 
 after a vigorous defence, was surrounded and 
 slain. Having given all the corn in the place 
 to the army, he marched next day to Tisdra, 
 where Considius was with a strong garrison, 
 and his cohort of gladiators. Caesar having 
 taken a view of the town, and being deterred 
 from besieging it for want of corn, set out inv- 
 
 mediately, and, after a march of four miles, en- 
 camped near a river. Here he stayed about 
 four days, and retreated to his former camp at 
 Agar. Scipio did the same, and retreated to 
 his old quarters. 
 
 LXV. Meantime the Thabenenses, a nation 
 situated in the extreme confines of Juba's 
 kingdom, along the sea-coast, and who had 
 been accustomed to live in subjection to that 
 monarch, having massacred the garrison left 
 there by the king, sent deputies to Caesar to 
 inform him of what they had done, and to beg 
 he would take under his protection a city 
 which deserved so well of the Roman people. 
 Cfesar, approving their conduct, sent M, Cris- 
 pus, the tribune, with a cohort, a party of arch- 
 ers, and a great number of warlike engines, 
 to charge himself with the defence of Thabena. 
 
 LXVL At the same time the legionary 
 soldiers, who, either on account of sickness, or 
 for other reasons, had not been able to come 
 over into Africa with the rest, to the number 
 of four thousand foot, four hundred horse, and 
 a thousand archers and slingers, now arrived 
 all together. With these, and his former 
 troops, he advanced into a plain eight miles 
 distant from his own camp, and four from that 
 of Scipio, where he waited the enemy in order 
 of battle. 
 
 LXVH. The town of Tegea was below 
 Scipio's camp, where he had a garrison of 
 four hundred horse. These he drew up on 
 the right and left of the town ; and bringing 
 forth his legions, formed them in order of 
 battle, upon a hill somewhat lower than his 
 camp, and which was about a thousand paces 
 distant from it. After he had continued a con- 
 siderable time in this posture, without ofTering 
 to make any attempt, CaBsar sent some squad- 
 rons of horse, supported by his light-armed 
 infantry, archers, and slingers, to charge the 
 enemy's cavalry, who were posted before the 
 town. Our men advancing upon the spur, 
 Placidius began to extend his front, that he 
 might at once surround and give us a warm 
 reception. Upon this Caesar detached three 
 hundred legionaries to our assistance, while 
 at the same time Labienus was continually 
 sending fresh reinforcements, to replace those 
 that were wounded or fatigued. Our cavalry, 
 who were only four hundred in number, not 
 being able to sustain the charge of four thou- 
 sand, and being besides greatly incommoded 
 /b/ the light-armed Numidians, began at last 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 327 
 
 o give ground ; which Caesar observing, de- 
 tached the other wing to their assistance; who 
 joining those that were like to be overpowered, 
 they fell in a body upon the enemy, put them 
 to flight, slew or wounded great numbers, 
 pursued them three miles quite to the moun- 
 tains, and then returned to their own men. 
 Csesar continued in order of battle till four 
 in the afternoon, and then retreated to his 
 camp without the loss of a man. In this 
 action Placidius received a dangerous wound 
 in the head, and had many of his best officers 
 either killed or wounded. 
 
 LXVIII. When he found that the enemy 
 were by no means to be prevailed with to fight 
 him upon equal terms, and that he could' not 
 encamp nearer them for want of water, in 
 consideration of which alone, not from any 
 confidence in their numbers, the Africans had 
 dared to despise him ; he decamped the four- 
 teenth of April at midnight, marched sixteen 
 miles beyond Agar to Thapsus, where Ver- 
 gilius commanded with a strong garrison, and 
 there fixed his camp. The very first day he 
 began the circumvallation, and raised redoubts 
 in proper places, as well for his own security, 
 as to prevent any succours from entering the 
 town. This step reduced Scipio to the ne- 
 cessity of fighting, to avoid the disgrace of 
 abandoning Vergilius and the Thapsitani, 
 who had all along remained firm to his party ; 
 and therefore following Caesar without delay, 
 he posted himself in two camps, eight miles 
 from Thapsus. 
 
 LXIX. Between a morass and the sea was 
 a narrow pass of about fifteen hundred paces, 
 by which Scipio hoped to throw succours into 
 the place. But Caesar, from a foresight of 
 what might hapjjen, had the day before raised 
 a very strong fort at the entrance of it, where 
 he left a triple garrison ; and Encamping with 
 the rest of his troops in form of a half moon, 
 carried his works round the town. Scipio, 
 disappointed of his design, passed the day and 
 night following a little above the morass ; but 
 early next morning advanced within a small 
 distance of our fort, where he began to in- 
 trench himself about fifteen hundred paces 
 from the sea. Caesar being informed of this, 
 drew off his men from the works ; and leaving 
 Asprenas the proconsul, with two legions, to 
 guard the camp and the baggage, marched 
 all the rest of his forces with the utmost ex- 
 pedition to the place where the enemy were 
 
 posted. He left part of the fleet before 
 Thapsus, and ordered the rest to make as 
 near the shore as possible towards the ene 
 my's rear, observing the signal he should give 
 them, upon which they were toiaise a sudden 
 shout, that the enemy, alarmed and disturbed 
 by the noise behind them, might be forced to 
 face about. 
 
 LXX. When Caesar came to the place, he 
 found Scipio's army in order of battle before 
 the intrenchments, the elephants posted in 
 the two wings, and part of the soldiers em- 
 ployed in fortifying the camp. Upon sight of 
 this disposition, he drew up his army in three 
 lines, placed the second and tenth legions on 
 the right wing, the eighth and ninth in the 
 left, five legions in the centre, covered his 
 flanks with five cohorts posted over against 
 the elephants, disposed the archers and slingers 
 in the two wings, and intermingled the light- 
 armed troops with his cavalry. He himself 
 on foot went from rank to rank, to rouse the 
 courage of the veterans, putting them in mind 
 of their former bravery, and animating them 
 by his soothing address. He exhorted the 
 new levies to emulate the bravery of the vete- 
 rans, and endeavour by a victory to attain the 
 same degree of glory and renown. 
 
 LXXI. As he ran from rank to rank, he 
 observed the enemy very uneasy, hurrying 
 from place to place, one while retiring behind 
 the rampart, another coming out again in 
 great tumult and confusion. As the same 
 was observed by many others in the army, his 
 lieutenants and volunteers begged him to 
 give the sign of battle, as the immortal gods 
 promised him a certain victory. While he 
 hesitated with himself, and strove to repress 
 their eagerness and desires, as being unwilling 
 to yield to the importunity of men, whose 
 duty it was to wait his orders; on a sudden a 
 trumpet, in the right wing, without his leave, 
 and compelled by the soldiers, sounded a 
 charge. Upon this all the cohorts ran to battle, 
 in spite of the endeavours of the centurions, 
 who strove to restrain them by force, but to 
 no purpose. Csssar perceiving that the ar- 
 dour of his soldiers would admit of no re- 
 straint, giving good-fortune for the word, 
 spurred on his horse, and charged the ene- 
 my's front. On the right wing the archers 
 and slingers poured their javelins without in- 
 termission upon the elephants, and by the 
 noise of their slings and stones, so terrified 
 
328 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 these unruly animals, that turning upon their 
 own men, they trode them down in heaps, 
 and rushed through the gates of the camp, 
 that were but half finished. At the same 
 time the Mauritanian horse, who were in the 
 same wing with the elephants, seeing them- 
 selves deprived of their assistance, betook 
 themselves to flight. Whereupon the legions, 
 wheeling round the elephants, soon mastered 
 the enemy's intrenchments. Some few that 
 made resistance were slain : the rest lied with 
 all expedition to the camp they had quitted 
 the day before. 
 
 LXXII. And here we must not omit tak- 
 ing notice of the bravery of a veteran soldier 
 of the fifth legion. For when an elephant, 
 which had been wounded in the left wing, 
 and roused to fury by the pain, ran against an 
 unarmed sutler, threw him under his feet, and 
 leaning on him with his whole weight, bran- 
 dishing his trunk, and raising hideous cries, 
 crushed him to death; the soldier could not 
 refrain from attacking the animal. The ele- 
 phant, seeing him advance with his javelin in 
 his hand, quitted the dead body of the sutler, 
 and seizing him with his trunk, wheeled him 
 round in the air. But the soldier, amidst all 
 the danger, losing nothing of his courage, 
 ceased not with his sword to strike at the 
 elephant's trunk, who at last overcome with 
 the pain, quitted the prey, and fled to the rest 
 with hideous cries. 
 
 LXXIII. Meanwhile the garrison of Thap- 
 sus, either designing to assist their friends, 
 or abandon the town, sallied by the gate next 
 the sea, and wading navel deep in the water, 
 endeavoured to reach the land. But the ser- 
 vants and followers of the camp, attacking 
 them with darts and stones, obliged them 
 to return again to the town. Scipio's camp 
 meanwhile being forced, and his men flying 
 on all sides, the legions instantly began the 
 pursuit, that they might have no time to rally. 
 When they arrived at their former camp, by 
 means of which they hoped to defend them- 
 selves, they began to think of choosing a 
 commander, to whose authority and orders 
 they might submit ; but finding none on 
 whom they could rely, they threw down 
 their arms and fled to Juba's quarters. This 
 being likewise possessed by our men, they re- 
 tired to a hill ; where despairing of safety, 
 they endeavoured to soften their enemies, 
 saluting them by the name of brethren. But 
 
 this stood them in little stead : for the veterans, 
 transported with rage and anger, were not only 
 deaf to the cries of their enemies, but even 
 killed or wounded several citizens of dis- 
 tinction in their own army, whimi they up- 
 braided as authors of the w ar. Of this num- 
 ber was Tullius Rufus the questor, whom a 
 soldier knowingly ran through with a javelin ; 
 and Pompeius Rufus, who was wounded with 
 a sword in the arm, and would doubtless have 
 been slain, had he not speedily fled to Caesar 
 for protection. This made several Roman 
 knights and senators retire from the battle, 
 lest the soldiers, who after so signal a victory 
 assumed an unbounded license, should be in- 
 duced by the hopes of impunity to wreak their 
 fury on them likewise. In short, all Scipio's 
 soldiers, though they implored the protection 
 of Caesar, were yet in the. very sight of that 
 general, and amidst his entreaties to his men 
 to spare them, universally, and without ex- 
 ception, put to the sword. 
 
 LXXIV. Cffisar having made himself mas- 
 ter of the enemy's three camps, killed ten 
 thousand of them, and put the rest to flight, 
 retreated to his own quarters, with the loss of 
 no more than fifty men, and a few wounded. 
 In this way he appeared before Thapsus, and 
 ranged all the elephants he had taken in the 
 battle, amounting to sixty-four, v.'ilh their 
 ornaments, trappings, aijd castles, in full view 
 of the place. He wast in hopes by this evi- 
 dence of his success to induce Vergilius to 
 surrender. He even called and invited him 
 to submit, reminding him of his clemency and 
 mildness ; but no answer being given, he re- 
 tired from before the town. Next day, after 
 returning thanks to the gods, he assembled 
 his army before Thapsus, praised his soldiers 
 in presence of the inhabitants, rewarded the 
 victorious, and from his tribunal extended his 
 bounty to every one, according to their merit 
 and services. Setting out thence immediately, 
 he left the proconsul C. Rebellius, with three 
 legions, to continue the siege, and sent Cn. 
 Domitius with two, to invest Tisdra, where 
 Considius commanded. Then ordering M. 
 Messala to go before with the cavalry, he 
 began his march to Utica. 
 
 LXXV. Scipio's cavalry, who had escaped 
 out of the battle, taking the road of Utica, 
 arrived at Parada ; hut being refused admit- 
 tance by the inhabitants, who heard of Ce- 
 sar's victory, they forced the gates, lighted a 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 329 
 
 great fire in the middle of the forum, and 
 threw all the inhabitants into it, without dis- 
 tinction of age or sex, with their effects ; 
 avenging in this manner, by an unheard of 
 cruelty, the affront they had received. Thence 
 they marched directly to Utica, M. Cato, 
 some time before, distrusting the inhabitants 
 of that city, because of the privileges granted 
 them by the Julian law, had disarmed and 
 expelled the populace, obliging them to dwell 
 without the warlike gate, in a small camp en- 
 vironed with a slight intrenchment, round 
 which he had planted guards, while at the 
 same time he held the senators under con- 
 finement. The cavalry attacked their camp, as 
 knowing them to be well-wishers to Cs^iar, and 
 to avenge, by their destruction, the shame of 
 their own defeat. But the people, animated by 
 Cassar's victory, repulsed them with stones and 
 clubs. They therefore threw themselves into 
 the town, killed many of the inhabitants, and 
 pillaged their houses. Cato, unable to prevail 
 with them to abstain from rapine and slaughter, 
 and undertake the defence of the town, as he 
 was not ignorant what they aimed at, gave 
 each a hundred sesterces to make them quiet. 
 Sylla Faustus did the same out of his own 
 money ; and marching with them from Utica, 
 advanced into the kingdom of Juba. 
 
 LXXVI. A great many others that had 
 escaped out of the battle, fled to Utica. These 
 Cato assembled, with three hundred more who 
 had furnished Scipio with money for carrying 
 on the war, and exhorted them to set their 
 slaves free, and, in conjunction with them, 
 defend the town. But finding that though 
 part assembled, the rest were terrified and de- 
 termined to fly, he gave over the attempt, and 
 furnished them with ships to facilitate their 
 escape. He himself, having settled all his 
 affairs with the utmost care, and commended 
 his children to L. Caesar, his questor, without 
 the least indication which might give cause of 
 suspicion, or any change in his countenance 
 and behaviour, privately carried his sword 
 into his chamber when he went to sleep, and 
 stabbed himself with ir. But the wound not 
 proving mortal, and the noise of his fall 
 creating a suspicion, a physician, with some 
 friends, broke into his chamber, and endea- 
 voured to bind up the wound ; which he no 
 sooner was sensible of, than tearing it open 
 ■with his own hands, he expired, with undaunted 
 resolution and presence of mind. The Uticans, 
 29 
 
 though they hated his party, yet in con- 
 sideration of his singular integrity, his be- 
 haviour so different from that of the other 
 chiefs, and the wonderful fortifications he had 
 directed to defend their town, interred him 
 honourably. L. Caesar, that he might procure 
 some advantages by his death, assembled the 
 people, and after haranguing them, exhorted 
 them to open their gates, and throw them- 
 selves -upon Caesar's clemency, from which 
 they had the greatest reason to hope the best. 
 This advice being followed, he came forth to 
 meet Caesar. Messala having reached Utica, 
 according to his orders, placed guards at the 
 gates. 
 
 LXXVII. Meanwhile Caesar leaving Thap- 
 sus, came to Usceta, where Scipio had laid 
 up great store of corn, arms, darts, and other 
 warlike provisions, under a small guard. He 
 soon made himself master of the place, and 
 marched directly to Adrumetum, which he 
 entered without opposition. He took an ac- 
 count of the arms, provisions, and money in 
 the town ; pardoned Q. Ligarius, and C. 
 Considius ; and leaving Livineius Regulus 
 there, with one legion, set out the same day 
 for Utica. L. Caesar meeting him by the 
 way, threw himself at his feet, and only 
 begged for his life. Caesar, according to his 
 wonted clemency, easily pardoned him : as he 
 did likewise Caecina, C. Ateius, P. Atrius, L. 
 CoUa, father and son, M. Eppius, M. Aquinius, 
 Calo's son, and the children of Damasippus. 
 He arrived at Utica in the evening by torch- 
 light, and continued all that night without the 
 town. 
 
 LXXVHI. Next morning early he entered 
 the place, summoned an assembly of the peo- 
 ple, and thanked them for the affection they 
 had shown to his cause. At the same time, 
 he censured severely, and enlarged upon the 
 crime of the Roman citizens and merchants, 
 and the rest of the three hundred, who had 
 furnished Scipio and Varus with money ; but 
 concluded with telling them that they might 
 show themselves without fear, as he was de- 
 termined to grant them their lives, and con 
 tent himself with exposing their effects to 
 sale ; yet so, that he would give them notice 
 when their goods were to be sold, and the 
 liberty of redeeming them upon payment of 
 a certain fine. The merchants, half dead with 
 fear, and conscious that they merited death, 
 hearing upon what terms life was oflfered 
 2U 
 
330 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 them, greedily accepted the condition, and en- 
 treated Csesar that he would impose a certain 
 sum in gross upon all the three hundred. Ac- 
 cordingly he amerced them in two hundred 
 thousand sesterces, to be paid to the republic, 
 at six equal payments, within the space of 
 three years. They all accepted the condition, 
 and considering that day as a second nativity, 
 joyfully returned thanks to Csesar. 
 
 LXXIX. Meanwhile king Juba, who had 
 escaped from the battle with Petreius, hiding 
 himself all day in the villages, and travelling 
 only by night, arrived at last in Numidia. 
 When he came to Zama, his ordinary place of 
 residence, where were his wives and children, 
 with all his treasures and whatever he held 
 most valuable, and which he had strongly for- 
 tified at the beginning of the war ; the in- 
 habitants, having heard of Csesar's victory, 
 refused him entrance, because upon declaring 
 war against the Romans, he had raised a 
 mighty pile of wood in the middle of the 
 forum, designing, if unsuccessful, to massacre 
 all the citizens, fling their bodies and effects 
 upon the pile, then setting fire to the mass, 
 and throwing himself upon it, destroy all 
 without exception, wives, children, citizens, 
 and treasures, in one general conflagration. 
 After continuing a considerable time before 
 the gates, finding that neither threats nor en- 
 treaties would avail, he at last desired them to 
 deliver him his wives and children, that he 
 might carry them along with him. But re- 
 ceiving no answer, and seeing them deter- 
 mined to grant him nothing, he quitted the 
 place, and retired to one of his country seats 
 with Petreius and a few horse. ■ 
 
 LXXX. Meantime the Zamians sent am- 
 bassadors to Caesar at Utica, to inform him 
 what they had done, and to request his assis- 
 tance against Juba, who was drawing his forces 
 together to attack them. They assured him 
 of their submission, and resolution to defend 
 the town for him. Csesar commended the 
 ambassadors, and sent them back to acquaint 
 their fellow-citizsns, that he was coming him- 
 self to their relief. Accordingly setting out 
 the next day from Utica, with his cavalry, he 
 directed his march towards Numidia. Many 
 of the king's generals met him on the way, 
 and sued for pardon: to all whom, having 
 given a favourable hearing, they attended him 
 to Zama. The report of his clemency and 
 taildness spreading into all parts, the whole 
 
 Numidian cavalry flocked to him at Zama, 
 and were there delivered of their fears. 
 
 LXXXI. During these transactions, Con- 
 sidius, who commanded at Tisdra, with his 
 own retinue, a garrison of Getulians, and a 
 company of gladiators, hearing of the defeat 
 of his party, and terrified at the arrival of 
 Domitius and his legions, abandoned the town ; 
 and privately withdrawing, with a few of the 
 barbarians, and all his money, took his way 
 towards Numidia. The Getulians, to render 
 themselves masters of his treasures, murdered 
 him by the way, and fled every man where he 
 could. Meantime C. Vergilius, seeing him- 
 self shut up by sea and land, without power of 
 making a defence ; his followers all slain or 
 put to flight ; M. Cato dead by his own hands 
 at Utica; Juba despised and deserted by his 
 own subjects; Sabura and his forces defeated 
 by Sitius ; Ctesar received without opposition 
 at Utica : and that of so vast an army, nothing 
 remained capable of screening him or his chil- 
 dren ; thought it his most prudent course to 
 surrender himself and the city to the procon- 
 sul Canlnius, by whom he was besieged. 
 
 LXXXII. At the same time king Juba, 
 seeing himself excluded from all the cities of 
 his kingdom, and that there remained no hopes 
 of safety ; having supped with Petreius, pro- 
 posed an engagement, sword in hand, that 
 they might die honourably. Juba, as being 
 the stronger, easily got the better of his ad- 
 versary, and laid him dead at his feet ; But en- 
 deavouring afterwards to run himself through 
 the body, and wanting strength to accomplish 
 it, he was obliged to have recourse to one of 
 his slaves, and, by his entreaties, prevailed 
 upon him to perform that mournful office. 
 
 LXXXIII. In the meantime, P. Sitius, 
 having defeated the army of Sabura, Juba's 
 lieutenant, and slain the general, and march- 
 ing with a few troops through Mauritania, to 
 join Caesar, chanced to fall in with Faustus 
 and Afranius, who were at the head of the 
 party that had plundered Utica, amounting in 
 all to about fifteen hundred men, and design- 
 ing to make the best of their way to Spain. 
 Having expeditiously placed himself in am- 
 buscade during the night, and attacking them 
 by day-break, he either killed or made them 
 all prisoners, except a few that escaped from 
 the van. Afranius and Faustus were taken 
 among the rest, with their wives and children : 
 but some few days after, a mutiny arising 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 331 
 
 among the soldiers, Faustus and Afranius were 
 slain. Csesar pardoned Pompeia, the wife of 
 Faustus, with her children, and permitted her 
 the free enjoyment of all her effects. 
 
 LXXXIV. Meanwhile Scipio, with Da- 
 masippus, and Torquatus, and Plsetorius Rus- 
 tianus, having embarked on board some gal- 
 leys, with a design to make for the coast of 
 Spain; and being long and severely tossed 
 by contrary winds, were at last obliged to put 
 into the port of Hippo, where the fleet com- 
 manded by P. Sitius chanced at that time to be. 
 Scipio's vessels, which were but small and few 
 in number, were easily surrounded and sunk, 
 by the larger and more numerous ships of 
 Sitius ; on which occasion Scipio, and all 
 those whom we have mentioned above, as 
 having embarked with him, perished. 
 
 LXXXV. Meanwhile Ctesar, having ex- 
 posed the king's effects to public sale at Zama, 
 and confiscated the estates of those, who, 
 though Roman citizens, had borne arms against 
 the republic ; after conferring rewards upon 
 such of the Zamans as had been concerned in 
 the design of excluding the king, he abolished 
 all the royal tribunes, converted the kingdom 
 into a province ; and appointing Crispus Sal- 
 lustius to take charge of it, with the title of 
 proconsul, returned again to Utica. There 
 he sold the estates of the officers that had 
 served under Juba and Petreius, fined the 
 people of Thapsus twenty thousand sesterces, 
 and the company of Roman merchants there 
 
 thirty thousand ; fined likewise the inhabitants 
 of Adrumetum in thirty thousand, and their 
 company in fifty thousand ; but preserved the 
 cities and their territories from insult and 
 plunder. Those of Leptis, whom Juba had 
 pillaged some time before, and who, upon 
 complaint made to the senate by their deputies, 
 had obtained arbitrators and restitution, were 
 enjoined to pay yearly three hundred thousand 
 pounds of oil ; because, from the beginning 
 of the war, in consequence of a dissension 
 among their chiefs, they had made an alliance 
 with the king of Numidia, and supplied him 
 with arms, soldiers, and money. The people 
 of Tisdra, because of their extreme poverty, 
 were only condemned to pay annually a cer- 
 tain quantity of corn. 
 
 LXXXVr. These things settled, he em- 
 barked at Utica on the thirteenth of June, 
 and three days after arrived at Carales, in 
 Sardinia. Here he condemned the Sulcitani 
 in a fine of one hundred thousand sesterces, 
 for receiving and aiding Nasidius's fleet ; and 
 instead of a tenth, which was their former 
 assessment, ordered them now to pay an eighth 
 to the public treasury. He likewise confiscated 
 the estates of some who had been more active 
 than the rest, and weighing from Carales on 
 the twenty-ninth of June, coasted along the 
 shore, and, after a voyage of twenty-eight 
 days, during which he was several times 
 obliged to put into port, by contrary winds, 
 arrived safe at Rome. 
 
PANSA'S COMMENTARIES 
 
 SPANISH WAR. 
 
 29* 333 
 
THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 , The commencement of the Spanish war.— II. Csesar marches to attack Cordova.— III. At the same tima 
 throws succours into Ulia, besieged by Pompey. — IV. The attempt upon Cordova obliges Pompey to raise 
 the siege of Ulia.— V. Pompey advancing to the relief of Cordova, CcEsar attaclis Alegua, whither he is fol- 
 lowed by Pompey. — YII. Both intrench themselves in mountainous places, of difficult access. — IX. Pompey 
 attacliing a fort belonging to Caesar, is repulsed.— X. Cresar continues the siege of Ategua. — XI. Repulses a 
 sally from the town. — XIII. Various skirmishes between the two armies.- XV. Cruelty of the townsmen. — 
 XVI. Csesar repulses them in a second sally.— XVII. XiiUius treats with Ccesar about a surrender. — XVIII. 
 Continuation of the siege. — XIX. The town surrenders.— XX. Pompey removes his camp towards Ucubis. — 
 XXII. Behaviour of the Bursavolenses. — XXUI. Ccesar and Pompey both encamp near Ucubis, where some 
 skirmishes happen.— XXV. Single combat of Turpio and Niger.— XXVI. Great numbers of the enemy 
 desert to Casar. Some of Pompey's letters intercepted.— XXVII. Both parties encamp in the plain of 
 Munda. — XXVIII. A great battle ensues. — XXXI. In which Pompey is totally defeated. — XXXII. Caesar be- 
 sieges the runaways in Munda. — XXXIII. Attacks and makes himself master of Cordova. — XXXV. Likewise 
 of Hispalis ; whence he is expelled, and again recovers it. The Mundenses, under the pretence of a surren 
 der, preparing to attack our men, are themselves put to the sword. — XXXVII. Carteia surrenders to Csesar. 
 Pompey makes his escape. — XXXIX. Pompey is slain. — XL. Some of Csesar's ships burned. — XLI. Csesai'r 
 troops take possession of Munda, and afterwards invest Ursao. — XLII. Casoar's speech to the people r 
 Hispalis. 
 
 834 
 
PANSA'S CO 
 
 ENTARIES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE SPANISH WAR 
 
 I. Phauivaces being vanquished, and Africa 
 reduced, those who escaped fled into Spain, to 
 young Cn. Pompey ; who having got posses- 
 sion of the farther province, whilst Caesar was 
 employed in distributing rewards in Italy, en- 
 deavoured to strengthen himself by engaging 
 the several states to join him : and partly by 
 entreaty, partly by force, soon drew together a 
 considerable army, with which he began to 
 lay waste the country. In this situation of 
 things, some states voluntarily sent him sup- 
 plies, others shut the gates of their towns 
 against him ; of which, if any chanced to fall 
 into his hands by assault, how well soever a 
 citizen might have deserved of his father, yet 
 if he was known to be rich, some ground of 
 complaint was never wanting, under pretence 
 of which to destroy him, that his estate might 
 fall a prey to the soldiers. Thus the enemy, 
 encouraged by the spoils of the vanquished, 
 increased daily, in number and strength ; in- 
 
 Cces 
 
 ar s interest 
 
 somuch that the states ir 
 
 were continually sending messengers into 
 
 Italy, to press his immediate march to their 
 
 relief. 
 
 II. Cfflsar, now a third time dictator, and 
 nominated also a fourth time to the same dig- 
 nity, hastening, with all diligence, into Spain, 
 to put an end to the war, was met upon the 
 way by the ambassadors of Cordova, who had 
 deserted from the camp of Cn. Pompey. They 
 informed him that it would be an easy matter 
 to make himself master of the town by night, 
 because the enemy as yet knew nothing of 
 his arrival in the province, the scouts sent out 
 by Cn. Pompey to inform him of Ctesar' «o- 
 
 proach having been all made prisoners. They 
 alleged besides many more other very pro- 
 bable reasons ; all which so far wrought upon 
 him, that he sent immediate advice of his ar- 
 rival to Q. Pedius, and Q. Fabius Maximus, 
 his lieutenants, to whom he had left the com- 
 mand of the troops in the province, ordering 
 them to send him all the cavalry they 
 had been able to raise. He came up with 
 them much sooner than they expected, and 
 was joined by the cavalry, according to his 
 desire. 
 
 III. Sextus Pompey, the brother of Cnieus, 
 commanded at this time at Cordova, which 
 was accounted the capital of the province. 
 Young Cnieus Pompey himself was employed 
 in the siege of Ulia, which had now lasted 
 some months. The besieged having notice 
 of Cffisar's arrival, sent deputies to him, who 
 passed unobserved through Pompey's camp, 
 and requested v/ith great earnestness, that he 
 would come speedily to their relief. Csesar, 
 who was no stranger to the merit of that peo- 
 ple, and their constant attachment to the Ro- 
 mans, detached about nine at night eleven 
 cohorts, with a like number of horse, under 
 the command of L. Julius Paciecus, a good 
 officer, well known in the province, and who 
 was besides perfectly acquainted with the 
 country WheK. he arrived at Pompey's 
 quarters, a dreadful tempest arising, attended 
 with a violent wind, so great a darkness 
 ensued, that it was difficult to distinguish 
 even the person next you. This accident 
 proved of great advantage to Paciecus ; for be- 
 ing arrived at Pompey's camp, he ordered the 
 335 
 
336 
 
 P ANSA'S 
 
 the cavalry to advance two by two, and march 
 directly through the enemy's quarters to the 
 town. Some of their guards calhng to know 
 •who passed, one of our troopers bid them be 
 silent, for they were just then endeavouring 
 by stealth to approach the wall, in order to 
 get possession of the town ; and partly by this 
 answer, partly by favour of the tempest, which 
 hindered the sentinels from examining things 
 diligently, they were suffered to pass without 
 disturbance. When they reached the gates, 
 upon a signal given, they were admitted ; and 
 both horse and foot raising a mighty shout, 
 after leaving some troops to guard the town, 
 sallied in a body upon the enemy's camp ; who 
 having no apprehension of such an attack, 
 were almost all like to have been made pri- 
 soners. 
 
 IV. Ulia being relieved, Cssar, to draw 
 Pompey from the siege, marched towards Cor- 
 dova ; sending the cavalry before, with a select 
 body of heavy-armed foot ; who as soon as 
 they came within sight of the place, got up 
 behind ^e troopers, without being perceived 
 by those of Cordova. Upon their approach 
 to the walls, the enemy sallied in great num- 
 bers, to attack our cavalry ; when the infantry 
 leaping down, fell upon them with such fury, 
 that out of an almost infinite multitude of men, 
 very few returned to the town. This so alarmed 
 Sextus Pompey, that he immediately sent 
 letters to his brother, requesting him to come 
 speedily to his relief, lest Caesar should make 
 himself master of Cordova before his arrival. 
 Thus Cn. Pompey, moved by his brother's let- 
 ters, quitted the siege of Ulia, which was upon 
 the point of surrendering, and began his march 
 towards Cordova. 
 
 V. Csesar arriving at the river Baetis, which 
 he found too deep to be forded, sunk several 
 baskets of stones in it ; and raising a bridge 
 upon them, supported by double beams, carried 
 over his forces in three bodies. Pompey ar- 
 riving soon after with his troops, encamped 
 directly over against him. Cssar, to cut off 
 his provisions and communication with the 
 town, ran a line from his camp to the bridge. 
 Pompey did the same ; insomuch that a struggle 
 arose between the two generals, which should 
 first get possession of the bridge ; and this 
 daily brought on small skirmishes, in which 
 sometimes the one, sometimes the other party 
 had the better. At last the dispute becoming 
 more general, they came to a close fight, 
 
 though upon very disadvantageous ground . 
 for both sides striving earnestly to obtain the 
 bridge, they found themselves as they ap- 
 proached straitened for want of room, and 
 extending themselves towards the river side, 
 many fell headlong from the banks Thus 
 the loss was pretty equal ; for on either side 
 lay heaps of slain: and Caesar, for many days, 
 used all possible endeavours to bring the 
 enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that 
 he might bring the war to a conclusion as soon 
 as possible. 
 
 VI. But finding that they carefully avoided 
 a battle, with a view to which chiefly he had 
 quitted the route of Ulia ; he caused great 
 fires to be lighted in the night, repassed the 
 river with all his forces, and marched towards 
 Ategua, one of their strongest garrisons. 
 Pompey having notice of this from the de- 
 serters, retreated the same day to Cordova, by 
 a very narrow and difficult road, with a great 
 number of carriages and machines of war. 
 CiEsar began his attack upon Ategua, and 
 carried lines quite round the town ; of which 
 Pompey having intelligence, set out upon his 
 march the same daj^ But Caesar had taken 
 care beforehand to secure all the advantageous 
 posts, and possess himself of the forts ; partly 
 to shelter his cavalry, partly to post guards of 
 infantry for the defence of his cam>p. The 
 morning of Pompey 's arrival was so foggy, 
 that he found means, with some cohorts and 
 troops of cavalry, to hem in a party of Caesar's 
 horse, and fell upon them in such a manner, 
 that very few escaped slaughter. 
 
 VII. The following night Pompey set fire 
 to his camp, passed the river Salsus, and 
 marching through the valleys, encamped on a 
 rising ground, between the towns of Ategua 
 and Ucubis. Caesar meanwhile continued 
 his approaches, cast up a mount, and brought 
 forward his machines. The country all 
 around is mountainous, and seems formed for 
 war. The river Salsus runs through the plains, 
 and divides them from the mountains, which 
 all lie upon the side of Ategua, at about two 
 miles distance from the river. Pompey's camp 
 was upon these mountains, within view of both 
 the towns, but nearer to Ategua ; to which he 
 could however send no relief, though his army 
 consisted of thirteen legions. Of these he 
 chiefly relied on four : two Spanish ones, which 
 had deserted from Trebonius ; one formed out 
 of the Roman colonies in those parts, and a 
 
JOMMENTARIES. 
 
 337 
 
 fourth, which he had brought with him from 
 Africa. The rest were for the most part 
 made up of fugitives and deserters. As to 
 light-armed foot and cavalry, we far exceeded 
 him both in the number and goodness of the 
 troops. 
 
 VIII. But what proved principally service- 
 able to Pompey's design of drawing out the 
 war into length, was the nature of the country, 
 full of mountains, and extremely well adapted 
 to encampments. For almost the whole pro- 
 vince of Farther Spain, though of an extremely 
 fertile soil, and abounding in springs, is never- 
 theless very difficult of access. Here too, on 
 account of the frequent incursions of the na- 
 tives, all the places remote from great towns, 
 are fortified with towers and castles, covered, 
 as in Africa, not with tiles, but with earth. 
 On these they place sentinels, whose high 
 situation commands an extensive view of 
 the country on all sides. Nay, the greatest 
 part of the towns of this province are built on 
 mountains, and places exceedingly strong by 
 nature, the approaches to which are extremely 
 difficult. Thus sieges are rare and hazardous 
 in Spain, it not being easy to reduce their 
 towns by force, as happened in the present 
 war. For Pompey, having established his 
 camp between Ategua and Ucubis, as related 
 above, and within view of both towns, CcEsar 
 found means to possess himself of an eminence 
 very conveniently situated, and only about 
 four miles from his own camp, on which he 
 built a fortress. 
 
 IX. Pompey, who, from the nature of the 
 ground, was covered by the same eminence, 
 and besides at a sufficient distance from Cesar's 
 quarters, soon became sensible of the impor- 
 tance of this post : and as Caesar was separated 
 from it by the river Salsus, he imagined that 
 the difficulty of sending relief would prevent 
 his attempting any thing of that kind in its 
 defence. Relying on this persuasion, he set 
 out about midnight, and attacked the fort, 
 which had been very troublesome to the be- 
 sieged. The enemy upon their approach, set- 
 ting up a shout, discharged the javelins, in 
 great numbers, and wounded multitudes of our 
 men : but those in the fort making a vigorous 
 resistance, and despatching messengers to the 
 greater camp to inform Caesar of what had 
 happened, he hastened to their relief, with 
 three legifms. His approach struck the 
 enemy with terror: many were slain, and a 
 
 great number made prisoners ; nay, multituue.s 
 in their flight threw away their arms ; inso- 
 much that above four-score shields were found 
 which they had left behind them. 
 
 X. The day after Arguetius arrived from 
 Italy, with the ' cavalry, and five standards 
 taken from the Saguntines : but was forced to 
 quit his post by x\sprenas, who likewise brought 
 a reinforcement from Italy to Caesar. The 
 same night Pompey set fire to his camp, and 
 drew towards Cordova. A king named Indus, 
 who was bringing some troops to Caesar, with 
 a party of cavalry, following the pursuit of the 
 enemy too briskly, was made prisoner, and 
 slain by the Spanish legionaries. Next day 
 our cavalry pursued those who were employed 
 in carrying provisions from the town to Pom- 
 pey's camp, almost to the very walls of Cordova, 
 and took fifty prisoners, besides horses. The 
 same day, Q. Marcius, a military tribune in 
 Pompey's army, deserted to us. At midnight, 
 the besieged fell furiously upon our works, 
 and by all the methods they could devise, 
 threw fire and combustible matter inro the 
 trenches. When the attack was ended, C. 
 Fundanius, a Roman knight, quitted the enemy, 
 and came over to us. 
 
 XI. Next day, two Spanish legionaries, 
 who pretended they were slaves, were made 
 prisoners by a party of our horse; but being 
 brought to the camp, they were known bv the 
 soldiers, who had formerly served under Fabius 
 and Pedius, and deserted from Trebonius, 
 who would grant no quarter, but massacred 
 them immediately. At the same time, some 
 couriers, sent from Cordova to Pompey, enter- 
 ing our camp by mistake, were seized, had 
 their hands cut off, and then were dismissed. 
 About nine at night, the besieged, according 
 to custom, spent a considerable time in casting 
 fire and darts upon our soldiers, and wounded 
 a great number of men. At day-break they 
 sallied upon the sixth legion, who were busy 
 at the works, and began a sharp contest, in 
 which, however, our men got the better, though 
 the besieged had the advantage of the higher 
 ground : and fifty of their horse, who had be- 
 gun the attack, being vigorously opposed on 
 ourside, notwithstanding all the inconveniences 
 we fought under, were obliged to retire into 
 the town, with many wounds. 
 
 XII. Next day Pompey began a line from 
 the camp to the river Salsus; and a small 
 party of our horse, being attacked by a much 
 
 2X 
 
338 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 greater body of the enemy, were driven from 
 their post, with the loss of three of their num- 
 ber. The same day, A. Valgius, the son of 
 a senator, whose brother was in Pompey's 
 camp, mounted his horse and went over to the 
 enemy, leaving all his baggage behind him. 
 A spy, belonging to Pompey's second legion, 
 was taken and slain. At the same time, a 
 bullet was shot into the town, with this inscrip- 
 tion : That notice should be given by the 
 signal of a buckler, when Caesar advanced to 
 storm the town. This encouraging some to 
 hope that they might scale the walls, and 
 possess themselves of the town without danger, 
 they fell the next day to sapping them, and 
 thfew down a considerable part of the outv^'ard 
 •wall. They then endeavoured to mount the 
 breach, but were made prisoners, and after- 
 wards employed by the garrison to make an 
 offer of surrendering the town to Csesar, on 
 condition that he would suffer them to march 
 out with their baggage. The answer was, 
 that it had been always his custom to give, 
 not accept of conditions : which being reported 
 to the garrison, they set up a shout, and be- 
 gan to pour their darts upon our men from 
 the whole circuit of the wall ; which gave 
 reason to believe that the garrison intended 
 ;hat day to make a vigorous sally. Where- 
 fore surrounding the town with our troops, 
 the conflict was for some time maintained 
 with groat violence, and one of our batteries 
 threw down a tower belonging to the enemy, 
 in which were five of their men and a boy, 
 whose office it was to observe the battery, 
 
 XIII. After this, Pompey erected a fort on 
 the other side of the Salsus, in which he met 
 with no interruption from our men, and gloried 
 not a little in the imagination of having pos- 
 sessed himself of a post so near us. Also 
 the following day, extending himself in like 
 manner still farther, he came up with our 
 out-guard of cavalry ; and charging them 
 briskly, obliged several squadrons, and the 
 light-armed foot, to give ground ; many of 
 whom, by reason of the smallness of their num- 
 bers, incapable of any vigorous opposition, 
 were trodden down by the enemy's horse. This 
 passed within view of both camps, and not 
 a little animated the Pompeians, to see our 
 men pushed so far ; but being afterwards rein- 
 forced by a party from our camp, they faced 
 about with design to renew the fight. 
 
 XIV. In all battles of the horse this is 
 
 found to hold ; that when the troopers dis- 
 mount with design to charge the infantry, the 
 match evermore proves unequal, as happened 
 on the present occasion. For a select body 
 of the enemy's light-armed foot, coming unex- 
 pectedly upon our horse, they alighted to 
 sustain the charge. Thus in a very little time, 
 from a horse it became a foot skirmish, and 
 again from a foot, changed to a horse encounter, 
 in which our men were driven back to their 
 very lines ; but being there reinforced, about a 
 hundred and twenty-three of the enemy were 
 slain, several forced to throw down their arms, 
 many wounded, and the rest pursued quite to 
 their camp. On our side, a hundred and 
 eleven men were slain, besides twelve foot 
 soldiers and five troopers wounded. 
 
 XV. Towards the evening of the same day, 
 the fight, as usual, was renewed before the 
 walls ; and the enemy having thrown many 
 darts, and a great quantity of fire from the 
 battlements, proceeded afterwardii to an action 
 of unexampled cruelty and barbarity : for 
 in the very sight of our troops they fell to 
 murdering the citizens, and tumbling them 
 headlong from the walls ; an instance of in- 
 humanity of which no parallel is to be found 
 in the history of the most savage nations. 
 
 XVI. When night came on, Pompey sent 
 a messenger, unknown to us, to exhort the 
 garrison to make a vigorous sally about mid- 
 night, and set fire to our towers and mount. 
 Accordingly having poured upon us a great 
 quantity of darts and fire, and destroyed a 
 considerable part of the rampart, they opened 
 the gate which lay over against, and within 
 view of Pompey's camp, sallied out with 
 all their forces, carrying with them fascines 
 to fill up the ditch ; hooks and fire to destroy 
 and reduce to ashes the barracks, which the 
 soldiers had built mostly of reeds to defend 
 them from the winter; and some silver and 
 rich apparel to scatter among the tents, that 
 while our men should be employed in securing 
 the plunder, they might fight their way through, 
 and escape to Pompey ; who, in expectation 
 that they would be able to efTect their design, 
 had crossed the Salsus with his army, where 
 he continued all night in order of battle, to 
 favour their retreat. But though our men had 
 no apprehension of this design, their valour 
 enabled them to frustrate the attempt, and 
 repulse the enemy, with many wounds. They 
 even made themselves masters of the spoil 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 J39 
 
 their arms, and some prisoners, who were put 
 to death next day. At the same time a de- 
 serter from the town informed us, that Junius, 
 who was employed in the mine when the citi- 
 jens were massacred, exclaimed against it as 
 a cruel and barbarous action, which ill suited 
 the kind treatment they had received, and was 
 a direct violation of the laws of hospitality. 
 He added many things besides, which made 
 such an impression upon the garrison, that 
 they desisted from the massacre. 
 
 XVII. The next day Tullius, a lieutenant- 
 general, accompanied by C Antonius of Lusi- 
 tania, came to Caesar, and addressed him to 
 this effect : " Would to heaven I had rather 
 been one of your soldiers, than a follower of 
 C. Pompey, and given those proofs of valour 
 and constancy in obtaining victories for you, 
 rather than in suffering for him. The only 
 advantage we reap from following his banners 
 are doleful applauses ; being reduced to the 
 condition of indigent citizens, and by the 
 melancholy fate of our country ranked among 
 its enemies ; who having never shared with 
 Pompey in his good fortune, find ourselves 
 yet involved in his disgrace ; and after sus- 
 taining the attack of so many armed legions, 
 employing ourselves day and night in works 
 of defence, exposed to the darts and swords 
 of our fellow-citizens: vanquished, deserted 
 by Pompey, and compelled to give way to the 
 superior valour of your troops, find ourselves 
 at last obliged to have recourse to your 
 clemency, and implore that you will not 
 show 3'ourselves less placable to fellow- 
 citizens, than you have so often been to 
 foreign nations." " I am ready," returned 
 Caesar, " to show the same favour to citizens 
 which vanquished nations have always re- 
 ceived at rny hands." 
 
 XVIII. The ambassadors being dismissed, 
 when they arrived at the gate of the town, 
 Tiberius Tullius observing that C. Antony 
 did not follow him, returned to the gate and 
 laid hold of him, upon which drawing a poniard 
 from his breast, he wounded him in the hand, 
 and in this condition they both fled to Cssar. 
 At the same time the standard-bearer of the 
 first legion came over to our camp, and re- 
 ported that the day when the skirmish hap- 
 pened between the horse, no less than thirty- 
 five of his company fell ; but it was not allowed 
 to mention it in Pompey's camp, or so much 
 »s own the loss of one man. A slave, whose 
 
 master was in Caesar's camp, and who had left 
 his wife and son in the city, cut his maslei'g 
 throat, and deceiving the guards, escaped 
 privately to Pompey's camp ; whence, by 
 means of a bullet, on which he inscribed his 
 intelligence, he gave us notice of the prepara- 
 tions made for the defence of the place. When 
 we had read the inscription, those who were 
 employed to throw the bullet returning to the 
 city, two Lusitanian brothers deserted, and 
 informed us, that Pompey in a speech made 
 to his soldiers had said : That as he found it 
 impossible to relieve the town, he was resolved 
 to withdraw privately in the night, and retire 
 towards the the sea ; to which one made an- 
 swer, that it was better to hazard a battle, 
 than take refuge in flight ; for which he was 
 immediately killed. At the same time some 
 of his couriers were intercepted, who were en- 
 deavouring to get into the town. Caesar sent 
 the letters to the inhabitants, and one of the 
 messengers begging his life, he granted it, 
 with promise of further reward, if he would 
 set fire to the enemy's wooden turret. The 
 enterprise was not without difficulty : he under- 
 took it, however, but was slain in the attempt. 
 The same night a deserter informed us that 
 Pompey and Labienus were greatly offended 
 at the massacre of the citizens. 
 
 XIX. About nine at night, one of our 
 wooden towers, which had been severely bat- 
 tered by the enemy's engines, gave way as far 
 as the third story. At the same time a sharp 
 action happened near the walls, and the be- 
 sieged, assisted by a favourable wind, burned 
 the remaining part of that tower and another. 
 Next morning a matron threw herself from 
 the wail, and came over to our camp, reporting, 
 that the rest of her family had intended the 
 same, but were apprehended and put to death : 
 likewise a letter was thrown over, in which 
 was written ; " Minutius to Caesar : Pompey 
 has abandoned me ; if you will grant me my 
 life, I promise to serve you with the same 
 fideUty and attachment I have hitherto mani- 
 fested towards him." At the same time the- 
 deputies who had been sent before to Cffisar 
 by the garrison, now waited on him a second 
 time, offering to deliver up the town next day,, 
 upon a bare grant of their Uves ; to which he 
 replied that he was Caesar, and would perform 
 his word. Thus having made himself mastei 
 of the place the nineteenth of February, u, 
 was saluted emperor by the army. 
 
340 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 XX. Pompey, being informed by some de- 
 serters that the town had surrendered, re- 
 moved his camp towards Ucubis, where he 
 began to build redoubts, and secure himself 
 with lines. Csesar also decamped and drew 
 near him. At the same time a Spanish le- 
 gionary soldier deserting to our camp, in- 
 formed us, that Pompey had assembled the 
 people of Ucubis, and given it them in charge 
 to inquire diligently who favoured his party, 
 who that of the enemy. Some time after, 
 the slave, who, as we have related above, had 
 murdered his master, was taken in a mine and 
 burnt alive. About the same time eight Span- 
 ish centurions came over to Csesar ; and in a 
 skirmish between our cavalry and that of the 
 enemy, we were repulsed, and some of our 
 light-armed foot wounded. The same night 
 we took four of the enemy's spies. One, 
 as being a legionary soldier, was beheaded, 
 but the other three, who were slaves, were 
 crucified. 
 
 XXI. The day following, some of the 
 ■enemy's cavalry and light-armed infantry de- 
 serted to us ; and about eleven of their horse 
 falling upon a party of our men that were sent 
 to fetch water, killed some, and took others 
 prisoners ; amongst which last were eight 
 troopers. Next day Pompey beheaded seventy- 
 four persons as favourers of Ceesar's cause, 
 ordering the rest, who lay under the same 
 suspicion, to be carried back to the town, 
 of whom a hundred and twenty escaped to 
 Csssar. 
 
 XXII. Some time after, the deputies of 
 Bursavola, whom Caesar had taken prisoners 
 in Ategua, and sent along with his own am- 
 bassadors to their city, to inform them of the 
 massacre of the Ateguans, and what they had 
 to apprehend from Pompey, who suffered his 
 soldiers to murder their hosts, and commit all 
 manner of crimes with impunity, arriving in 
 the town, none of our deputies, except such as 
 were natives of the place, durst enter the city, 
 though they were all Roman knights and sen- 
 ators. But after many messages backward and 
 forward, when the deputies were upon their 
 return, the garrison pursued and put them all 
 to the sword, except two, who escaped to Cse- 
 sar, and informed him of what had happened. 
 'Some time after, the Bursavolenses sending 
 spies to Ategua, to know the truth of what 
 had happened, and finding the report of our 
 deputies confirmed, were for stoning to death 
 
 him who had been the cause of the murder of 
 the deputies, and were with difficulty restraiued 
 from laying violent hands upon him, which 
 in the end proved the occasion of their own 
 destruction. For having obtained leave of 
 the inhabitants to go in person to Caesar and 
 justify himself, he privately drew together 
 some troops ; and when he thought himself 
 strong enough, returned in the night, and was 
 treacherously admitted into the town ; where 
 he made a dreadful massacre of the inhabi'* 
 tants, slew all the leaders of the opposite 
 party, and reduced the place under his obe- 
 dience. Soon after, some slaves who had 
 deserted informed us, that he had sold all the 
 goods of the citizens, and that Pompey suffered 
 none of his soldiers to quit the camp but 
 unarmed, because since the taking of Ategua, 
 many despairing of success, fled into Be- 
 thuria, having given over all expectation of 
 victory ; and that if any deserted from our 
 camp, they were put among the light-armed 
 infantry, whose pay was only sixteen asses a 
 day. 
 
 XXIII. The day following Csesar removed 
 his camp nearer to Pompey's, and began to 
 draw a line to the river Salsus. Here, while 
 our men were employed in the work, some of 
 the enemy fell upon us from the higher ground, 
 and as we were in no condition to make re- 
 sistance, wounded great numbers, obliging us, 
 contrary to custom, to retreat. This being 
 perceived, two centurions of the fifth legion 
 passed the river, and restored the battle ; 
 when urging the enemy with astonishing bra- 
 very, one of them fell "overwhelmed by the 
 multitude of darts discharged from above. 
 The other continued the combat for some 
 time; but seeing himself in danger of being 
 surrounded, as he was endeavouring to make 
 good his retreat, he stumbled and fell. His 
 death being known, the enemy flocked to- 
 gether in still greater numbers, upon which 
 our cavalry passed the river, and drove them 
 quite back to their intrenchments ; but pursu- 
 ing them with too much heat, were surrounded 
 by their cavalry and light-armed foot : where, 
 but for the most astonishing efforts of bravery, 
 they must all unavoidably have been made 
 prisoners ; for thej' "were so hemmed in by 
 the enemy's lines, that they wanted room to ■ 
 defend themselves. Many were wounded on 
 our side in these two encounters, and among i 
 the rest Clodius Aquitius ; but as the fight i 
 
COMMENTARIES 
 
 341 
 
 was carried on mostly at a distance, only the 
 two centurions, of whom mention has been al- 
 ready made, and whom the desire of glory ren- 
 <3ered regardless of their own safety, were killed. • 
 
 XXIV. Next day both parties withdrawing 
 from Soricaria, we continued our works. But 
 Pompey, observing that our fort had cut off 
 his communication with Aspavia, which is 
 about five miles distant from Ucubis, judged 
 it necessary to come to a battle. Yet he did 
 not offer it upon equal terms, but chose to 
 draw up his men upon a hill, that he might 
 have the advantage of the higher ground. 
 Meanwhile both sides endeavouring to possess 
 themselves of an eminence that lay extremely 
 convenient, we at last got the better of the 
 Pompeians, and drove them from the plain. 
 The slaughter was very great, and would have 
 been still greater, had they not been protected 
 by the mountain rather than their valour. 
 Night came on very opportunely to favour their 
 escape ; without which our men, though few 
 in number, would have entirely cut off their 
 retreat. Pompey lost on this occasion three 
 hundred and twenty-four light-armed foot, and 
 about a hundred and thirty-eight legionary 
 soldiers, besides those whose armour and spoils 
 we carried off. Thus the death of the two 
 centurions, which happened the day before, 
 was fully revenged. 
 
 XXV. The day after, Pompey's horse ad- 
 vanced according to their usual custom to our 
 lines ; for only the cavalry durst venture to 
 draw up on equal ground. They therefore 
 began to skirmish with our men who were at 
 work, the legionaries calling out to us at the 
 same time to choose our field of battle, with de- 
 sign to make us believe that they desired 
 nothing so much as to come to blows. Upon 
 this invitation our men quitted the eminence 
 where they were encamped, and advanced a 
 great way into the plain, desiring no ad- 
 vantage of ground. But none of the enemy 
 had the boldness to present themselves, An- 
 tistius Turpio excepted ; who, presuming on 
 his strength, and fancying no one on our side 
 a match for him, offered us defiance. Upon 
 this ensued a combat not unlike that recorded 
 of Memnon and Achilles. For Q. Pompeius 
 Niger, a Roman knight, born in Italy, quitting 
 his rank, advanced to the encounter. The 
 fieifce air of Antistius having engaged the 
 attention of all, the two armies drew up to be 
 spectators of the issue of this challenge, and 
 
 30 
 
 expressed no less impatience than if the whole 
 fortune of the war had depended upon it; and 
 the wishes on both sides for success were 
 equal to the anxiety and concern each felt 
 for his own combatant. They advanced into 
 the plain with great courage, having each a 
 resplendent buckler of curious workmanship. 
 And doubtless the combat would have been 
 soon decided, had not some light-armed foot, 
 drawn up near the lines, to serve as a guard to 
 the camp, because of the approach of the 
 enemy's horse * * * Our horse in retreating 
 to the camp, being warmly pursued by the 
 enemy, suddenly faced about with great cries ; 
 which so terrified the Pompeians, that they 
 immediately betook themselves to flight, and 
 retreated to their camp with the loss of many 
 of their men. 
 
 XXVI. Csesar, to reward the valour of the 
 Cassian troops, presented them with thirteen 
 thousand sesterces, distributed ten thousand 
 more among the light-armed foot, and gave 
 Cassius himself two golden chains. The 
 same day, A. Bebius, C. Flavius, and A. 
 Trebellius, Roman knights of Asti, with their 
 horses richly caparisoned and adorned with 
 silver, came over to Csesar, and informed him, 
 that all the rest of the Roman knights in 
 Pompey's camp had, like them, conspired to 
 come and join him, but that a discovery being 
 made of their design, by a slave, they had 
 been all seized, themselves excepted, who 
 during the confusion found means to escape. 
 The same day letters were intercepted, sent 
 by Pompey to Ursao, importing : " That 
 hitherto he had all the success against the 
 enemy he could desire, and would have ended 
 the war much sooner than was expected, 
 could he have brought them to fight him 
 upon equal terms : that he did not think it 
 advisable to venture new -levied troops on a 
 plain : that the enemy defending themselves 
 with their lines, seemed inclinable to draw out 
 the war to length, investing city after city, 
 and thence supplying themselves with provi- 
 sions ; that he would therefore endeavour to 
 protect the towns of his party, and bring the 
 war to as speedy an issue as possible . that he 
 would send them a reinforcement of some co- 
 horts, and made no doubt of forcing Csesar in a 
 shost time to an engagement, by cutting off 
 his provisions." 
 
 XXVII. Some time after, as our men 
 were carelessly dispersed about the works, a 
 
342 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 few horse were killed, who had gone to a 
 forest of olives to fetch wood. Several slaves 
 deserted at this time, and informed us, that 
 ever since the action at Soritia on the seventh 
 of March, the enemy had been under continual 
 alarms, and appointed Attius Varus to guard 
 the lines. The same day Pompey decamped, 
 and posted himself in an olive-wood over 
 against Hispalis. Csesar, before he removed, 
 waited till midnight, when the moon began 
 to appear. At his departure he ordered fire 
 to be set to the fort of Ucubis, which the ene- 
 my had abandoned, and that the whole army 
 should rendezvous in the greater camp. He 
 afterwards laid siege to Ventisponte, which 
 surrendered ; and marching to Carruca, en- 
 camped over against Pompey, who had burned 
 the city, because the garrison refused to open 
 the gates to him. A soldier who had mur- 
 dered his brother in the camp, being intercepted 
 by our men, was scourged and put to death. 
 CsEsar, stil! pursuing his march, arrived in the 
 plains of Munda, and pitched his camp op- 
 posite to that of Pompey. 
 
 XXVIII. Next day as Caesar was preparing 
 to set out with the army, notice was sent him 
 by his spies, that Pompey had been in order of 
 battle ever since midnight. Upon this intel- 
 ligence he ordered the standard to be erected. 
 Pompey had taken this resolution in conse- 
 quence of his letter to the inhabitants of Ursao, 
 who were his firm adherents, in which he told 
 them that Cassar refused to come down into 
 the plain, because his army consisted mostly of 
 new-levied troops. This had greatly con- 
 firmed the city in its allegiance, which there- 
 fore serving as a sure resource behind him, he 
 thought he might hazard a battle without 
 danger ; and the rather, as he was very ad- 
 vantageously encamped : for, as we observed 
 before, this country is full of hills, which run 
 in a continued chain, without any considerable 
 breaks or hollows. 
 
 XXIX. But we must by no means omit an 
 accident which fell out about this time. The 
 two camps were divided from one another by a 
 plain about five miles in extent, insomuch that 
 Pompey by his situation enjoyed a double de- 
 ^fence. On one side, the town seated on an 
 eminence ; on the other, the nature of the 
 ground where the camp stood : for across.'this 
 valley ran a rivulet, which rendered the ap- 
 proach of the mountain extremely difficult, 
 because it formed a deep morass on the right. 
 
 Caesar made no do;c.bt but the snemy would 
 descend into the plain and come to a battle, 
 and his whole army were of the same mind ; 
 the rather because the plain would give their 
 cavalry full room to act, and the day was so 
 serene and clear, that the gods seemed to have 
 sent it on purpose to bring on an engagement. 
 Our men rejoiced at the favourable opportu- 
 nity : some, however, were not altogether ex- 
 empt from fear, when they considered that 
 their all was at stake, and the uncertainty of 
 what might be their fate an hour after. He 
 advanced, however, to the field of battle, fully 
 persuaded that the enemy would do the same ; 
 but they durst not venture above a mile from 
 the town, being determined to shelter them- 
 selves under its walls. Our men still con- 
 tinued before them in order of battle ; but al- 
 though the equality of the ground sometimes 
 tempted them to come and dispute the victory, 
 they nevertheless still kept their post on the 
 mountain, in the neighbourhood of the town. 
 We doubled our speed to reach the rivulet, 
 without their stirring from the place where 
 they stood. 
 
 XXX. Their army consisted of thirteen 
 legions : the cavalry was drawn up on the 
 wings, with six thousand light-armed infantry, 
 and about the same number of auxiliaries. We 
 had only eighty heavy armed cohorts, and 
 eight thousand horse. When we came to the 
 extremity of the plain, as the ground was very 
 disadvantageous, it would have been dangerous 
 for us to advance farther, becau.se the enemy 
 were ready to charge us from the eminences : 
 and therefore, that we might not rashly en- 
 tangle ourselves, Csesar had taken care to 
 mark beforehand how far we might advance 
 with safety. The army when commanded to 
 halt, murmured greatly, as if they had been 
 kept back from a certain victory. The delay, 
 however, served to enliven the enemy, who 
 fancied that our troops were afraid of coming 
 to blows. They therefore had the boldness 
 to advance a little way, yet without quitting 
 the advantage of their post, the approach to 
 which was extremely dangerous. The tenth 
 legion, as usual, was on the right ; the third 
 and fifth on the left, with the auxiliary troops 
 and cavalry. At length the batile began with 
 a shout. 
 
 XXXI. But though our men were superior 
 to the enemy in courage, they nevertheless 
 defended themselves so well by the advantage 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 343 
 
 of the higher ground, the shouts were so loud, 
 and the discharge of darts on both sides so 
 great, that we almost began to despair of vic- 
 tory. For the first onset and clamour, with 
 which an enemy is most apt to be dismayed, 
 were pretty equal in the present encounter. 
 All fought with equal valour ; the place was 
 covered with arrows and darts, and great num- 
 bers of the enemy fell. We have already ob- 
 served that the tenth legion was on the right, 
 which, though not considerable for the number 
 of men, was nevertheless formidable on ac- 
 count of its courage ; and so pressed the enemy 
 on that side, that they were obliged to draw 
 a legion from the right wing to reinforce the 
 left, and prevent its being taken in flank. 
 Upon this motion, our cavalry on the left fell 
 upon Pompey's right wing, weakened by the 
 departure of the legion : but they defended 
 themselves with so much bravery and resolu- 
 tion, as to stand in need of no new troops to 
 support them. Meanwhile the clashing of 
 armour, mingled with the shouts of the com- 
 batants, and the groans of the dying and 
 •wounded, terrified the new-raised soldiers ; 
 for, asEnnius says, they fought hand to hand, 
 foot to foot, and shield to shield. But though 
 the enemy fought with the utmost vigour, they 
 were obliged to give ground, and retire to- 
 wards the town. The battle was fought on 
 the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were 
 entirely routed and put to flight ; insomuch 
 that not a man could have escaped, had they 
 not sheltered themselves in the place whence 
 they advanced to the charge. The enemy 
 lost on this occasion upwards of thirty thousand 
 men, and among the rest Labienus and Attius 
 Varus, whose funeral obsequies were per- 
 formed upon the field of battle. They had 
 likewise three thousand Roman knights killed, 
 partly of Italy, partly of the province. About 
 a thousand were slain on our side, partly foot, 
 partly horse ; and five hundred wounded. 
 We gained thirteen eagles and standards, and 
 made seventeen ofllcers prisoners. Such was 
 the issue of this action. 
 
 XXII. The remains of Pompey's army 
 retreating to Munda, with design to defend 
 themselves in that town, it became necessary 
 to invest it. The dead bodies of the enemy, 
 heaped together, served instead of a rampart. 
 and their javelins and darts were fixed up as 
 palisades. Upon these we hung their buck- 
 lers to supply the place of a breast-work, and 
 
 fixing the heads of the dt-ceased upon swords 
 and lances, planted them all around the work, 
 to strike the greater terror into the besieged, 
 and keep awake in them a sense of our bravery. 
 Amidst these mournful objects did they find 
 themselves shut in, when our men began the 
 attack, which was managed chiefly by the 
 Gauls. Young Valerius, who had escaped to 
 Cordova with some horse, informed Sextus 
 Pompey of what had happened ; who, upon 
 receipt of the mournful news, distributing 
 what money he had about him to th'e troopers, 
 left the town about nine at night, under pre- 
 tence of going to find out Caesar, to treat of an 
 accommodation. On the other side Cn. 
 Pompey, attended by a few horse and foot, 
 took the road of Carteia, where his fleet lay, 
 and which was about a hundred and seventy 
 miles distant from Cordova. When he was 
 arrived within eight miles of the place, he 
 sent P. Calvitius, his camp-marshal, before, to 
 fetch a litter to carry him to the town, be- 
 cause he found himself out of order. The 
 litter came, and when he entered the town, 
 those of his party waited on him privately, to 
 receive his orders about the management of 
 the war. As they assembled round the place 
 in great crowds, Pompey, quitting his litter, 
 put himself under their protection. 
 
 XXXIII. Caesar, after the battle, seeing 
 the circumvallation of Munda completed, 
 marched to Cordova. Those of the enemy 
 who had escaped the slaughter, possessing 
 themselves of a bridge upon the approach of 
 our men, called out to them with an air of de- 
 rision, What ! we are no more than a handful 
 of men escaped from the battle, and shall we 
 be allowed no place of retreat 1 Immediately 
 the/ prepared to defend the bridge. Csesar 
 passed the river, and encamped on the other 
 side. Scapula, who had stirred up the freed- 
 men to a revolt, escaping after the battle to 
 Cordova, when he found himself besieged, as- 
 sembled all his followers, ordered a funeral 
 pile to be erected, and a magnificent supper 
 served up ; when, putting on his richest dress, he 
 distributed his plate and ready money among 
 his domestics, supped cheerfully, anointed him- 
 self once and again, and last of all, ordered 
 one of his freedmen to despatch him, and 
 another to set fire to the pile. 
 
 XXXIV. Caesar had no sooner encamped 
 before the place, than a division arose among 
 the inhabitants, between those who favoured 
 
344 
 
 PANSA'S 
 
 Caesar, and those who were in the interest of 
 Pompey, attended with so rude a clamour, 
 that it reached our camp. During the contest, 
 some legions, composed partly of fugitives, 
 partly of slaves manumitted by Pompey, came 
 and surrendered themselves to Casar, But 
 the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the 
 place, and with that view possessed them- 
 selves of the walls and some towers, in spite 
 of all the opposition they met with ; which 
 obliged the other party to send deputies to 
 Csesar for aid. Upon this, those who escaped 
 out of the battle set fire to the place, and our men 
 entering at the same time, slew about twenty- 
 two thousand of them, besides those who were 
 slain without the walls ; and thus became mas- 
 ters of the town. Whilst Csesar was employed 
 n this siege, those who were blocked up at 
 Munda made a sally, but were driven back 
 into the town with considerable loss. 
 
 XXXV. Thence Csesar marched to His- 
 palis, which sent deputies to sue for pardon, 
 and obtained it. Though the citizens assured 
 him that they were able to defend the town 
 with their own forces, he nevertheless thought 
 it proper to send Caninius, his lieutenant, 
 thither with some troops, and encamped him- 
 self before the place. There was in the town 
 a strong party of Pompeians, who, displeased 
 to see Caesar's troops received within the walls, 
 deputed secretly one Philo, a zealous partisan 
 of Pompey, and well known in Lusitania, to 
 beg assistance of Cecilius Niger, surnamed 
 The Barbarous, who lay encamped near Le- 
 nius, with a strong army of Lusitanians. These 
 approached the town towards night, got over 
 the walls, surprised the sentinels and garrison, 
 shut the gates, and began to defend the place. 
 
 XXXVI. During these transactions, de- 
 puties arrived from Carteia, with accounts of 
 their having secured Pompey ; hoping by this 
 service to atone for their former fault of shut- 
 ting the gates against Caesar. Meantime the 
 Lusitanians in Hispalis still continued p Uag- 
 ing the town, which, though known to Caesar, 
 did not yet determine him to press it too hard, 
 lest they should in despair set fire to the town, 
 and destroy the walls. It was resolved in 
 council to suffer the Lusitanians to escape in 
 the night Tjy a sally, yet so that the thing 
 might not appear designed. In this sally, 
 they set fire to the ships that were in the river 
 Baetis, and while our men were employed in 
 extinguishing the flames, endeavoured to get 
 
 oiT; but being overtaken by the cavalry, were 
 mostly cut to pieces. 'J'hence he marched to 
 Asta, which submitted. Munda having been 
 now a long while besieged, many of those who 
 had escaped out of the battle, despairing of 
 safety, surrendered tons; and being formed 
 into a legion, conspired among themselves, 
 that, upon a signal given, the garrison should 
 sally out in the night, while ihey at the same 
 time should begin a massacre in the camp. 
 But the plot being discovered, they were next 
 night, at the changing of the third watch, all 
 put to death without the rampart. 
 
 XXXVII. The Carteians, while Caesar was 
 employed in reducing the other towns upon 
 his route, fell into a dissension about young 
 Pompey. There were two parties in . the 
 town, one that had sent the deputies to Csesar, 
 and another in the Pompeian interest. These 
 last prevailing, seized the gates, and made a 
 dreadful slaughter of their adversaries. Pom- 
 pey himself was wounded in the fray, but 
 escaping to his ships, fled with about thirty 
 galleys. Didius, who was at Cadiz, wilh Cae- 
 sar's fleet, hearing of what had happened, im- 
 mediately sailed in pursuit of them, stationing 
 at the same time some cavalry and infantry 
 along the coast, to prevent his getting off by 
 land. Pompey had departed with so much 
 precipitation from Carteia, that he took no time 
 to furnish himself wilh water, which obliging 
 him to stop by the way, Didius came up with 
 him after four days' sailing, took some of his 
 ships, and burned the rest. 
 
 XXXVIII. Pompey, with a few followers, 
 escaped to a place strongly fortified by na- 
 ture; of which the troops sent in pursuit of 
 him having certain intelligence by their scouts, 
 followed day and night. He was wounded 
 in the shoulder and left leg, and had besides 
 strained his ancle, all which greatly retarded 
 his flight, and obliged him to make use of a 
 litter. A Lusitanian having discovered the 
 place of his retreat, he was quickly surrounded 
 by our cavalry and cohorts. Seeing him- 
 self betrayed, he took refuge in a post naturally 
 strong, and which could easily be defended 
 by a few men, because the approach to it 
 was extremely difficult. We attempted to 
 storm it, but were repulsed, and vigorously 
 pursued by the enemy ; and meeting with no 
 belter success, after several trials, we at length 
 resolved to lay siege to the place, it seeming 
 too hazardous to force it. Accordingly a ter- 
 
COMMENTARIES. 
 
 345 
 
 face was raised, and lines drawn round the 
 place ; which the enemy perceiving, thought 
 proper to betake themselves to flight. 
 
 XXXIX. Pompey, as we have observed 
 above, being lame and wounded, was in no 
 condition to make a speedy retreat; and the 
 rather, because the place was such, that he 
 could use neither horse nor litter. He saw 
 his people driven from the fort, massacred on 
 all sides, and himself left without resource. 
 In this extremity he fled to a cave, where he 
 could not easily be discovered, unless he was 
 betrayed by the prisoners. Here he was slain, 
 and his head brought to Cagsar, the twelfth of 
 April, just as he was setting out for Hispalis, 
 and afterwards exposed to the view of the peo- 
 ple. 
 
 XL. After the death of young Pompey, 
 Didius, proud of his success, hauled some of 
 his vessels ashore to be refitted, and retired 
 himself to a neighbouring fort. The Lusita- 
 nians who had escaped from the battle of 
 Munda, rallying in great bodies, found them- 
 selves strong enough to make head against 
 him. Though the preservation of the fleet was 
 what principally engaged his attention, he was 
 yet necessitated to make frequent sallies, to 
 check the insolence of the enemy. These daily 
 skirmishes gave an opportunity of projecting 
 an ambuscade ; for which purpose they divided 
 their troops into three bodies. Didius sallied 
 according to custom ; when, upon a signal 
 given, one of the parties advanced to set fire 
 to the fleet, and another counterfeiting a re- 
 treat, drew him insensibly into the ambuscade, 
 where he was surrounded and slain with 
 most of his followers, fighting valiantly. Some 
 escaped in boats which they found on the 
 coast ; others made for the galleys by swim- 
 ming, and weighing anchor, stood out to sea. 
 A great many saved themselves in this manner, 
 but the Lusitanians got all the baggage. Cae- 
 sar meanwhile returned from Cales to Hispalis. 
 XLI. Fabius Maximus, whom he had left 
 to continue the siege of Munda, carried on the 
 approaches with great success ; insomuch that 
 the enemy seeing themselves shut up on all 
 sides, resolved to attempt a sally ; but were 
 repulsed with great loss. Our men seized 
 this opportunity to get possession of the town, 
 and made all the rest prisoners. Thence they 
 drew towards TJrsao, a town exceedingly strong 
 both by nature and art, and capable of resisting 
 an enemy. For there is not so much as a 
 30* 
 
 rivulet within eight miles of the place, nM 
 any spring, but that which supplies the town. 
 Add to all this, that the wood necessary for 
 building towers and other machines, v/as to be 
 fetched from a distance of six miles ; becauoe 
 young Pompey, to render the siege more diffi- 
 cult, had cut down all the wood round the place; 
 which obliged our men to bring all tlie materials 
 for carrying on the siege from Munda. 
 
 XLII. During these transactions at Munda 
 and Ursao, Csesar, who was returned from 
 Cales to Hispalis, assembled the citizens, and 
 made the following speech : " That when he 
 was advanced to the questorship, he had chosen 
 their province preferably to all others, and 
 during his continuance in that office, done 
 them every service in his power : that during 
 his pretorship, he had obtained for them of the 
 senate the abolition of the taxes imposed by 
 Metullus, declared himself their patron, pro- 
 cured their deputies a hearing at Rome, and 
 made himself many enemies, by undertaking 
 the defence both of their private and public 
 rights. In fine, that when he was consul, he 
 had, though absent, rendered the province all 
 the services in his power ; that instead of mak- 
 ing a suitable return for so many favours, they 
 had always discovered the utmost ingratitude, 
 both towards him and the people of Rome ; as 
 well in the last war as the preceding. You," 
 says he, " though no strangers to the law of 
 nations, and the rights of Roman citizens, have 
 yet, like barbarians, often violated the sacred 
 persons of Roman magistrates. You attempted 
 in open day, in the public square, to assas- 
 sinate Cassius, You have been always such 
 enemies to peace, that the senate could never 
 suffer the province to be without legions. You 
 take favours for offences, and insults for bene- 
 fits, are insolent and restless in peace, and 
 cowardly and effeminate in war. Young Pom- 
 pey, though only a private citizen, nay a fu- 
 gitive, was received among you, and suffered 
 to assume the ensigns of magistracy. After 
 putting many citizens to death, you still fur- 
 nished him with forces, and even urged him to 
 lay waste the country and province. Against 
 whom do you hope to be victorious? Can you be 
 ignorant, that upon the supposition of mv over- 
 throw, the people of Rome have still ten legions 
 capable not only of making head against you, 
 but of bringing the whole earth under subjec- 
 tion 1" 
 
 2Y 
 
AN 
 
 INDEX 
 
 OP 
 
 ANCIENT AND MODERN GEOGRAPHY 
 
 TO 
 
 CiESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 
 
 ■ The words in Roman Letters denote the ancient names, and those in Ilalic, the modern. 
 
 AcARNANiA, a region of Epinis, Carnia. 
 Achaia, sometimes taken for all Greece ; but most 
 commonly for a part of it only, in Peloponnesus, 
 Romania Alta. 
 Acilla, or AchoUa, a city of Africa, unknown. 
 Aclium, a promontory of Epirus, now called the 
 Cape of Tigalo, famous fur a naval victory gained 
 near it, by Augustus, over M. Antony. 
 
 Addua, the Adda, a river that rises in the Alps, and 
 parting the dutchy of Milan from the state of Venice, 
 falls into the Po, above Cremona. 
 Adduasdubis, a river of Burgundy, the Doux. 
 Adriatic Sea, the Gulf of Venice, at the bottom of 
 which that city is situate. 
 Adrumetmn, a town in Africa, Mahometta. 
 MA\i\, the Aulunois, a people of Gaul, near Autun, 
 in the country now called Lower Burgundy. 
 
 .ffigean Sea, the Archipelago, a part of the Mediter 
 ranean, which lies between Greece, Asia Minor, and 
 the Isle of Crete, 
 .ffigimurus, an island in the African Sea, Galeita. 
 .ffiginium, a town of Thessaly. 
 .ffigyptus, Egypt, one of the most ancient, fertile, 
 and celebrated kingdoms in Africa. 
 
 .ffimilia Via, a Roman road in Italy, from Rimini to 
 Aquileia, and from Pisa to Dertona. 
 .ffitolia, a country of Greece, Despolato. 
 Africa, one of the four great continents into which 
 the earth is divided. 
 Agar, a town in Africa, unknown. 
 Agendicum, a city of the Senones, Sens. 
 Alba, a town ofLatium in Italy, Albano. 
 Albici, a people of Gaul unknown : some make them 
 the same with the Vivarois. 
 
 Albis, the Elbe, a large and noble river in Germany, boli. 
 
 Alexandria, a city of Egypt, Scanderia. It was built 
 by Alexander the Great, 330 years Ijufjre Christ. 
 
 Aliso, by some supposed t j be the town now called 
 Iselburg ; or, according to Junius, Wesel, in the dutchy 
 of Cleves ; but more probably Elsen. 
 
 AUobroges, an ancient people of Gallia Transalpina 
 who inhabited that country which is now called Dau^ 
 phiny, Savoy and Piedmont. 
 
 Alps, a ridge of high mountains, which separate 
 France and Germany fr-nn Italy. That part i f ih'em 
 which separates Dau phiny from Piedmont, had the 
 name of the Cotlian Alps. 
 
 Alsatia, a province of Germany, in the upper circla 
 of the Rhine. Alsace. 
 Amagetobria, a city of Gaul, unknown. 
 Amantia, a town in Macedonia,. Por/o JRaguseo. 
 Amanus, a mountain of Syria, Scaiiderona. 
 Amani Pylae, or Amanicse PortcS, Straits of Scander- 
 onat. 
 Ambarri, a people of Gaul, uncertain. 
 Ambialites, a people of Gaul, of Lambelle in Bre- 
 tagne. Others take the word to be only a different 
 name for the Ambiani. 
 Ambiani, or Ambianenses, the people of Amiens. 
 Ambianum, a city of Belgium, Amiens. 
 Ambibari, a people of Gaul, those of Ambie in Nor 
 mandy. 
 Ambivareti, a people of Gaul, the Vivarais. 
 Ambivariti, an ancient people of Brabant, between 
 the Rhine and the Maese. 
 Ambracia, a city of Epirus, Arta. 
 Ambrones, an ancient people, who lived in tha« 
 country which is now called the Canton of Berne, in 
 Switzerland. 
 Amphilochia, a region of Epirus, Anfilocha. 
 Amphipolis, a city of Macedonia, Cristopoti or Eitu 
 
 which has its s jurce in the Giant's mountains, in 
 Silesia, on the confines of Bohemia, and passing 
 through Bohemia, upper and lower Saxony, falls into 
 the North Sea at Ritzbuttel, about sixty miles below 
 Hamburgh. 
 
 Alemanni, a people of ancient Germany, who inha- 
 bited between the Maine, the Rhine, and the Danube, 
 and from whom the French still give this name to all 
 the Germans. 
 
 Alemannia, the country inhabited by the Alemanni. 
 
 Alesia, or Alexia, a town of the Mandubians, Alise. 
 
 Anartes, a people of Germany, Wallachians, Ser 
 vians, or Bulgarians. 
 
 Anas, a river of Spain, the Guadiana or Rio Roy 
 dera. 
 
 Ancalites, a people of Britain, of the Hundred of 
 Henley, in Oxfordshire. 
 
 Anchialos, a city of Thrace, near the Euxine Sea, 
 now called Kenkis. 
 
 Ancona, a city of Italy, Ancona. 
 
 Andes, Angers, in France, the capital of the dutchy 
 of Anjou. 
 
 347 
 
348 
 
 INDEX OF THE 
 
 Andes, a people of Gaul, the ancient inhabitants of 
 the Dulcliy of Aiij'Ui. 
 
 Audoniaduiium Liugonum, a large and ancient city 
 of Cliampague, at the source of the river Marne, L-jn- 
 gres. 
 
 Angrivarii, an ancient people of lower Germany, 
 who dwelt between the Ems and the Weser, below the 
 Lippe. 
 
 Ansibarii, or Ansivarii, an ancient people of lower 
 Germany, of and about tlie town of A/tsestaet, or Ani- 
 alin. 
 
 Anlioch, Atiiachia.au ancient and famous city, once 
 the capital of Syria, or rather of ihe East. It is situate 
 on two rivers, the Orontes and the Phaspar, not far 
 from the Mediterranean. 
 
 Apamea, ^l;)fi;/ii, a city of Bithynia, builiby Nicome- 
 des, the sou of Prusias. 
 
 Apenniiie Alps, part of the Alps so called, which run. 
 from the other Alps through the middle of Italy. 
 
 AppoUonia, a city of Macedonia, Piergo. 
 
 Aponiana, an island near the promontory of Lily- 
 DEeiun, in Sicily. 
 
 Appia Via, the Appian highway, which led from 
 Kome into Campania, and from the sea to Bi^undusium. 
 
 Apsus, a river of Macedonia, the Aspro. 
 
 Apulia, a region of Italy, la Puglia. 
 
 Aquilaria, a town of Africa, near Clupea. 
 
 Aquileia, f.irmerly a famous and consideraole city 
 of Italy, not far from the Adriatic, now litile more than 
 a heap of ruins, Aqt/ilegia. 
 
 Aquitain, a third pan of Ancient Gaul, now contain- 
 ing Guiemie, Gascony, &c. 
 
 Aquitani, the people inhabiti"g Aquitain. 
 
 Arar, or Araris, a river of Gaul, the Saone. 
 
 Arduenne Silva, the forest of Ardairie in France, 
 reaching from the Khine to the city of Tournay, in the 
 Low Countries. 
 
 Arelate, or Arelatum, a city of Gaul, Aries. 
 
 Argentuaria, the castle oi Horburg, near the city of 
 Colmar, in upper Alsace. 
 
 Argentoratum, Strasbtirg, a city of Germany, an- 
 ciently the capital of the Tribocci, on the Rhine, now 
 the chief city of iVlsace, belonging to the French. 
 
 Argos, a noted city of Peloponnesus, of which Juno 
 vas tutelar goddess, Argo. 
 
 Ariminum, a city of Italy, iJ/win;'. 
 
 Armenia, a country of Asia, divided into the greater 
 and lesser, and now called Turcomania. 
 
 Armorici, the ancient people of Armorica, a part of 
 Gallia Celiica, now Bretagne. 
 
 Arretium, a city of Hetruria in Italy, Arezo. 
 
 Artesia,a province of ihe Spanish Netherlands,Jri'oj's. 
 
 Arverni, an ancient people of France, on the Loire, 
 whose chief city was Arvernum, now Clermont, the 
 capital oi Aurergne. 
 
 Asciburgum, a city of ancient Germany, between Ve- 
 tera and Gelduba. The present city of Aschafenburg, 
 inFranconia, is so called; but, by tlie situation, does 
 not seem to be this. 
 
 Asculum, a town of Italy. AscoU. 
 
 Ascurum, a maritime city of Mauritania, unknown. 
 
 Asparagium, a town in Macedonia, unknown. 
 
 Aspavia, a town in Hispania Bsetica, Espejo. 
 
 Assona, a riverof Champagne, in France, which runs 
 into the Oise, near Compegne, now called the Ai^ie. 
 
 Asta, a town in Hispania BcPtica, Massa de Asia. 
 
 Asta, Asti, the capital of ihe country of the same 
 name on the river Tanaro, in Piedmont. 
 
 Aetigi, or Astingi, a people of Andalusia in Spain. 
 
 Athens, one of the most ancient and noble cities of 
 Greece, the capital of .\tiica. 
 
 Athos, a mountain in Macedonia, in the province of 
 Jamboli, which runs into ihe Jigean Sea, like a penin 
 sula, and is ninety miles in compass. 
 
 Ategua, a town in Hispania Banica, Tehala Veja. 
 
 Atrebates, an ancient people of Gaul, whu lived in 
 that part of tlie Netlierlands which is now called Artois- 
 
 Attica, a country of Greece, between Achaia and Ma- 
 cedonia, famous on account of its capital, Athens. 
 
 Attuarii, a people of ancient Germany who inha- 
 bited between the Maese and the Khine, whose coun- 
 try is now a part of the dutchy of Giieldrcs. 
 
 Atuatuca, llie capital of the Eburones, now Tongres, 
 in Brabant. 
 
 Atuatuci, the inhabitants of those parts, the remains 
 of the Cimbri. 
 
 -A.varic.um, a city of Aquitain, the capital of the Bitu- 
 rigians, Bourges. 
 
 Augusta Nemetum, S;.);>e,anancient city ofGermany, 
 in the now upper circle of the Rhine, and on that river. 
 
 Augusta, KauRicoruni,--li?^s/, now a village only > 
 but a fomous pass in Switzerland, on ihe Khine, two 
 German miles from Basil. 
 
 Augusta Trevirorum, Triers, a very ancient city in 
 lower Germany,on the Moselle, said ti> liave been built 
 by Trebetas, the brother of Ninus, 1496 years before 
 Christ ; made a Koman colony in the time cif Augustus, 
 and afterwards the most famous city of Gallia Belgica. 
 Ii was for some time the seat of the western empire,now 
 only the seal of llie ecclesiastical elector of that name. 
 
 Augusta Yangionum, Worms, a city of Germany, 
 within the bounds of the palatinate, free and imperial 
 on the western hank of the Rhine. 
 
 Augusta Yindelicormn, Augsburg, a famous city of 
 Germany, and a place of great trade, a free imperial 
 cily, the capital of Suabia, on the Lech, not far fi-om 
 the Danube ; famous for the Augustan confession. 
 
 Augustodunum, Autuii, a very ancient cily of Bur 
 gundy, on the river Arroux. 
 
 Aulerci Ebrannovices, a people of Gaul, Morienne. 
 
 Aulerci Eburovices, a people of Gaul, the country 
 of Erereux, in Normandy. 
 
 Aulerci Cenomanni, a people of Gaul, the country 
 of Maine. 
 
 Aulerci Diahlintes, a people of Gaul, le Pcrche. 
 
 Ausci, a people of Gaul, those of Auchs or Aua;, in 
 Gascony. 
 
 Ausetani, a people of Spain, under ihe Pyrenjean 
 mountains. 
 
 Auximum, a town in Italy, Osimo, or O^/no. 
 
 Ajsona, a river of Belsic Gaul, the Aisne. 
 ^ B 
 
 Bacenis, a forest of ancient Gerniany, which parted 
 the Suevi from the Cherusci, by some supposed to be 
 the forests of Tlniri/igia, by others the Black Forest. 
 
 Bsetica, in the ancient geography, about a third part 
 of Spain, containing Andalusia, and a pari of Granada, 
 
 Bcetis, a river of Spain, now called Guadalquivir 
 
 Bagandae, an ancient people of Gaul, who twice re- 
 volted from the Romans, and were both limes defeased. 
 
 Bagrada, a river of Africa, near LUica, the il/e^rada. 
 
 Baleares, Insulce, several islands in the IMediter- 
 ranean Sea, formerly so called, of which Majorca and 
 Minorca are the chief 
 
 Basilea, Basil, a city of ancient Germany, now the 
 principalcity of all Switzerland, on the Rhine. 
 
 Batavia, the aucien-, inhabitants of the island of 
 Batavia. 
 
NAMES OF PLAQES. 
 
 349 
 
 Batavia, or Eatavorum Insula, Holland, a part of 
 which slill retains the name oi Beiuwe. 
 
 Belga;, the inliabitanls of Gallia Belgica. The origi- 
 nal Belgae were supposed to be of German extraction ; 
 but passing the Rhine, settled thenjselves in Gaul. 
 
 Belgia, Belgium, or Gallia Belgica, the Low Coun- 
 tries, or Netherlands. 
 
 Bellocassi, or Velocasses, a people of Gaul, inliabil- 
 ing the country oi Bayeus in Normandy. 
 
 Bellovaci, an ancient renowned people among the 
 Belgie, inhabiting the country now called Beauvaia in 
 France. 
 
 Bergea, a city of Macedonia, n iw called Veria. 
 
 Bessi, a people of Thrace, Bessarabia. 
 
 Belhuria, a region of Hispania Lusitanica, JSs^rcmo- 
 dura. 
 
 Betones, or Beroncs, a people of Hispania Tarraco- 
 nensis, Birones. 
 
 Bibracte, a town of Burgundy, now called Autun, 
 the capital of the Mdai. 
 
 Bibrax, a town of Kheims, Braine, or Bresne. 
 
 Bibroci, a people of Britain ; according to Camden, 
 the Hundred of Bray, in Berkshire. 
 
 Bigerriones, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the coun- 
 try now called Bigorrc, in Gascony. 
 
 Bilhynia, a country of Asia Minor, adjoining to 
 Troas, over against Thrace, Becsangial. 
 
 Biturigies, a people of Guienne, in France, of the 
 country oi Berry. 
 
 Bosoiia, a country in Greece ; parted from Attica by 
 Mount Citheron. Ithad formerly several other names, 
 and was famous fur its capital, Thebes ; but is now 
 called SlrarnuUpa. 
 
 Boii, an ancient people of Germany, who, passing 
 the Rhine, settled in Gaul, the Bourbonnois. 
 
 Boraui, an ancient people of Germany, supposed by 
 some to be the same as the Burii. 
 
 Bosphorani, a people bordering upon the Euxine 
 Sea, the Tartars. 
 
 Bosphorus,two straits of the sea so called; one Bos- 
 phorus Thrucius, now the Straits of ConstantinojAe ; 
 the other Bospliorus Cimmerius, now the Straits of 
 Caffa. 
 
 Brannovices, the people of Morienne, in France. 
 
 Braluspantium, a city of Gaul, belonging to the Bel- 
 lovaci, Beautais. 
 
 Britannia, Britain, an island containing England, 
 Scotland, and Wales. " 
 
 Bructeri, an ancient people of the Netherlands, in 
 East Friesland, afterwards called Broeckmoreland. 
 
 Brundusium, a city of Italy, Brindisi. 
 
 Bruiii. a people of Italy, the Calabrians. 
 
 Bucinnbantes, an ancient people of Germany, who 
 lived opposite to Mpttz. 
 
 Bulgaria, a part of the Lower Moesia, between Mount 
 Haemus and the Danube. 
 
 Bullis, a town in Macedonia, unknown. 
 
 Burii, an ancient people of Germany, who inhabited 
 the island o( Bornholm. 
 
 Bursavolenses, a people of Hispania Bastica, tliought 
 to be the same with the Ursaonenses. 
 
 Buthrotum, a city of Epirus, Butrinio or Botronto. 
 
 Byzantium, an ancient city of Thrace, called at seve- 
 ral times Ligos, Nova Roma, and now Constantinople. 
 Byzazyna, a city and province of Africa, within the 
 kingdom of Tunis. 
 
 c 
 
 Cabilionum, a city of ancient Gaul, Chalons sur 
 Sacne. 
 
 Cadetes, a people of Gaul, unknown. 
 Cadurci, a people of Gaul, inliabiling the country 
 of Cluei-cy. 
 CajcinHS, a river of Locris, in ancient Greece. 
 Ca;resii, a people of Belgic Gaul, inhabiting the coun- 
 try round Namur. 
 Cajsarea, the chief city of Cappadocia. 
 Cffisia Silva, the Ccesian Forest, supposed to be a 
 part of the Hercynian Forest, about the dutchy of 
 Cloves and Westphalia. 
 
 Galagurritani, a people of Hispania Tarraconensis, 
 inhabiting the province of Calahorra. 
 
 Caletcs, an ancient people of Belgic Gaul,inhabiting 
 the country called Le Pais de Caulx, in Normandy, 
 betwixt the Seine and the Sea. 
 
 Caletum, the town of Calais, in Picardy, over against 
 Dover. 
 Calydon, a city of jEtolia, ^y/o«. 
 Camerinum, a city of Umbria, in Italy, Camarino. 
 Campania, the pleasamest part of Italy, in the king- 
 dom of Naples, now called Terra di Luxori. 
 
 Canipi Canini, a place in the Milanese, in Italy, not 
 far from Belizona. 
 
 Campi Catalaunici, supposed to be the large plain, 
 
 which begins about two miles from Chalons surMarne. 
 
 Candavia, a country of Macedonia, Cunovia. 
 
 Caninefales, an ancient people of the lower part of 
 
 Germany, near Batavia, about where Gorckum, on 
 
 the B'laese, in South Holland, now is. 
 
 Canae, a poor village in Apulia, famous only for a 
 great overthrow of the Romans there by Hannibal. 
 
 Canopus, Bochir, a famous city of Egypt, whence the 
 Canopic branch of the Nile derived its name. 
 
 Cantabria, an ancient warlike people ol Spain, pro- 
 perly of the provinces of Guipiiscoa, and Biscay. 
 Cantiura, a part of England, the county ofKsnt. 
 Canusium, a city of Apulia in Italy, Cansoa. 
 Capitol, one of the seven hills in ancient Rome, oa 
 which the Romans had a famous f.rtress, founded by 
 Tarquinius Friscus, and perfected by Tarquinius Su- 
 perbus. 
 
 Cappadocia, a large country in Asia Minor, upon the 
 Euxine Sea. 
 Caprea, Caprese, an island on the coast of Campania. 
 Capua, Capoa. a city in the kingdom of Naples, in 
 the province di Lavoro. 
 Carales, a city of Sardinia, Caglia.ri. 
 Caralitani, the people of Cagliari, in Sardinia. 
 Carbill 1, a city of Spain, near Cordulja. 
 Carcaso, a city of Gaul, Carcassone. 
 Carmona, a town of Hispania B*tica, Carmone. 
 Carni, an ancient people, who inhabited a part of 
 Noricum, whose country is yet called Carnioli. 
 
 Carnutes, an ancient people of France, inhabiting 
 the territory yet called Charlrain. 
 Carpi, an ancient people near the Danube-. 
 Carucca, a town in Spain, uncertain. 
 Carteia, a town of Spain, Algeviza, or Tariffa. 
 Carthago, once the most famous city of Africa, the 
 rival of Rome, built by Queen Dido, about 70 years 
 after Ftome, according to some: but Justin will have 
 it built before Rome ; Appian bef ire the destruction 
 of Troy; and Vossiusbefjre Tyre itself 
 
 Carthago Nova : Carthagenia, a city of Murcia, in 
 
 Spain, built by Asdrubal, general of the Carthaginians. 
 
 Casilinum, a town in Italy, CasteUuzzo. 
 
 Caspian Sea, a vmsi lake between Persia, ireat Tar- 
 
 tary, Muscovy, and Georgia, said to be six hundred 
 
 miles long, and near as broad. 
 
350 
 
 INDEX OF THE 
 
 Cassandrea, a city of Macedonia, Cassandna. 
 
 Cassi, a people of ancient Britain, the Hundred of 
 Caishow, in Hertfordshire. 
 
 Castellmn Blenapiorum, Kessel, a town in Brabant, 
 OU the river Neerse, not far from tlie Maese. 
 
 Castra Posiliumiana, a town in Hispania Baetica, 
 Castro el Rio. 
 
 Castra Vetera, an ancient city in Lower Germany, 
 in tiie dutciiy of Cleves ; some say where Santon, 
 others where Byrthen now is. 
 
 Castulonenis Saltus, a city of Hispania Tarracon- 
 ensis, Castona la Vieja. 
 
 Catti, an ancient people of Germany, who inhabited 
 part of the country now called Hesse, and Tlmringia ; 
 from the mountains of Hartz, to the Weser and the 
 Rhine. 
 
 Catuaci, corrupted probably from Atuatici. Some 
 make them the same with the people of Douay, in 
 France. 
 
 Caturiges, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
 country of Embrun, or Ambrun, alias Charge?. 
 
 Cebenna Mons, the mountains of the Cevennes, in 
 Gaul, separating the Helvians from Auvergne. 
 
 Celeja, acity ofNoricumMediterianeum,nowCi7Zey. 
 
 Celtse, a people of Thrace, about the mountains of 
 Rhodope and Ha;mus. 
 
 Celtae, an ancient people of Gaul, in that part called 
 Gallia Comato, between the Garunma and Sequana, 
 from whom that country was lilsewise called Gallia 
 Celtica. 
 
 Celtiberi,an ancient people of Spain, descended from 
 the Celts, who settled about the river Iberus, or Ebro, 
 from whom the country was called Celtiberia, now Ar- 
 ragon. 
 
 Cenimagni, or Iceni, an ancient people of B ritain, 
 inhabiting the counties nf Suffolk, Noifolk, Cambridge- 
 shire, and Huntingdonshire. 
 
 Cenis Mons, that part of the Alps which separates 
 Savoy from Piedmont. 
 
 Cenni, an ancient people of Celtic extraction. 
 
 Cenomani, a people of Gallia Celtica, in the country 
 now called Le Manseau, next adjoining to that of the 
 Insubres. 
 
 Centrones, an ancient people of Flanders, about the 
 ci of Courtray, dependent on the Nervians. 
 
 Centrones, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
 country of Tarantaise. 
 
 Cerauni Montes, mountains of Epirus, Monti di 
 Chimera, 
 
 Cercina, an island on the coast of Africa, Chercara, 
 Cereare. 
 
 Cheronesus, a peninsula of Africa, near Alexandria. 
 
 Chersonesus Cimbrica. a peninsula on the Baltic, 
 now Jutland, part oi Hoist ein, Ditmars/i, and Slcsicic. 
 
 Cherusci, a greal and warlike people of ancient Ger- 
 many, between the Elbe and the Weser, about the 
 country now called Mansfield, part of the Dutchy of 
 Brunswick, and the dioceses of Hildesheim and Hal- 
 berstadt. 
 
 Chiavenna, the capital of a country of that name, on 
 the river Meir, wiili a strong castle, in Switzerland. 
 
 Chrysopolis, a city of Bithynia, now called Scutari, 
 opposite to Constantinople. 
 
 Cimbri, the Jutlanders, a very ancient northern 
 people, who inhabited Chersonesus Cimbrica. 
 
 Cimmerii, an ancient people near the Euxine Sea, 
 whence the Bosphorus Cimmerius, Tartars. 
 
 Cinga, a river of Spain, Cinca or Senga. 
 
 Cingulum, a town of Picenum in Italy, Cingoli. 
 
 Cirta, a town in Africa, Constantina, or Cpnsantina, 
 al. Tadel. 
 
 Clupea, a maritime city of Africa. Quipia. 
 
 Cocasaies, a people of Gaul; according to some the 
 Bazadois. 
 
 Coimbra, an ancient city of Portugal, once destroyed, 
 but not rebuilt, on the river Mendego. 
 
 Colchis, a country in Asia, near Pontus, including 
 the present Mingrelia, and Georgia. 
 
 Comana Pontica, a city of Asia Minor, Com or To- 
 bachzan. 
 
 Comana of Cappadocia, Arminacha. 
 
 Conipsa, a city of Italy, Conza, or Consa. 
 
 Concordia, an ancient city of the province o{ Friuli, 
 in Italy, now in ruins. 
 
 Condrusi, or Condrusones, an ancient people of 
 Belgium, dependent on the Treviri, whose country is 
 yet called Condrotz, between Liege and Namur. 
 
 Confluens Mosi et Rheni, Cobientz. 
 
 Corcyra, an island of Epirus, Corfu. 
 
 Corduba, a city of Hispania Btetica, Cordova. 
 
 Corflnium, a town belonging to the Peligni in Italy, 
 St. Pelino, al. Pentina, 
 
 Corinthus, a famous and rich cityof Achaia in Italy, 
 in the middle of the isthmus guing into Peloponnesus. 
 
 Cornelia Castra, a city of Africa, between Carthage 
 and Utica. 
 
 Corsica, a considerable island in the Mediterranean 
 Sea, near Sardinia, which still retains its name, and 
 at present belongs to France. 
 
 Cosanum, a city of Calabria, in Italy, Cassano. 
 
 Cremona, an ancient city of Gallia Cisalpina, 
 which retains its name to this day, and is the metro- 
 polis of the Cremonese, in Italy. 
 
 Creta, one of the noblest islands in the Mediterra- 
 nean Sea, now called Candia. 
 
 Ctesiphon, a town of Assyria, over against Seleucia. 
 
 Curiosolitse, a people of Gaul, inhabiting Cor- 
 noualle in Bretagne. 
 
 Cyclades, islands in the JEgean Sea, L'Isole dell' 
 Archipelago. 
 
 Cyprus, an island in the Blediterranean Sea, between 
 Syria and Cilicia, Cipro. 
 
 Cyrene, an ancient and once a fine city of Africa, 
 situate over against Matapan, the most southern cape 
 ofMorea, Cairoan. 
 
 Cyzicus, Chizico, formerly one of the largest citiea 
 of Asia Minor, in an island of the same name, on the 
 White Sea. 
 
 D 
 
 Dacia, an ancient country of Scythia, beyon 1 the 
 Danube, containing part of Hungary, Transylvania, 
 Wallachia, and Moldavia. 
 
 Dalmatia, a part of lUyricum, now called Sclavonia, 
 lying between Croatia, Bosnia, Servia, and the Adri- 
 atic Gulf. 
 
 Danube, the largest river in Europe, which has its 
 rise in Suabia, and after flowing through that country, 
 Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, Servia, Bulgaria, Mol- 
 davia, Bessarabia, and part of Tartary, taliing in its 
 course a great number of noted rivers, some say sixty, 
 falls into the Blacli or Euxine Sea, in two arms. 
 
 Dardania, the ancient name of a country in upper 
 M(Esia, which became afterwards a part of Dacia, 
 Rascia, and part of Servia. 
 
 Decetia, a town in Gaul, Decise, on the Loire. 
 
 Delphi, a city of Achaia, Delpho, al. Salona. 
 
 Delta, a very considerable province of Egypt, at the 
 mouth of the Nile, Errif. 
 
NAMES OF PLACES. 
 
 351 
 
 Diablintes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
 country called Le Perche; al Diableres in Bretagne ; 
 al. Xut/es 01 Brabant ; al. Lendout, over against Bri- 
 tain. 
 
 Dubis, a river of Burgundy, Le Doux. 
 
 Duratium, commonly supposed to be a city of Gaul, 
 in the province of Poitou ; but in fact Caesar uses Dur- 
 atius for the name of a nobleman of considerable rank. 
 
 Durocortorura, a city of Gaul, Rheiins. 
 
 Dyrrhachium, a cily of Macedonia, Durazzo,Drazzi. 
 
 E 
 
 Eburones, an ancient people of Germany, inhabiting 
 part of the country, now the bishopric of Liege, and 
 the country of Namur. 
 
 Eburovices, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country 
 of Evrtux, in Normandy. 
 
 Egypt, one of the most ancient, fertile, and cele- 
 brated kingdoms in Africa. 
 
 Elaver, a river of Gaul, the Allier. 
 
 Eleutheri, a people of Celtic Gaul, la Rouergue. 
 
 Elis, a city of Peloponnesus, Bete/d£re. 
 
 Elusates, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
 country oi Euse, in Gascony. 
 
 Ephesus, an ancient and celebrated city of Asia Mi- 
 nor, Efeso. 
 
 Epidaurus, a maritime city of Dalmatia, Ragusa. 
 
 Epirus, a country in Greece, between Macedonia, 
 Achaia, and tlie Ionian Sea, by some now called Al- 
 bania Inferior. 
 
 Essui, a people of Gaul, those of Seez ; but the word 
 seems rather a corruption from ^dui. 
 
 Eusubii, corrupted from XJnelli, or Lexovii, properly 
 the people of Lisieux, in Normandy. 
 
 Fanum, a city of Umbria, in Italy, Fano. 
 
 Fesole, an ancient city of Italy, in the Dutchy of 
 Florence, anciently one of the twelve considerable 
 cities of Hetruria. 
 
 Fini, an ancient people of Prussia. 
 
 Flavum, anciently reckoned the eastern mouth of 
 the Rhine, now called the Ulie, and is a passage out 
 of. the Zuyder Sea into the North Sea. 
 
 Forum Flaminii, a city of Umbria, three miles from 
 Fulginium, yet called Forflamine. 
 
 Forum Julium, Frejus, an ancient town on the coast 
 of Provence in France. 
 
 Fossa Mariana, a canal made by C. Marius, near 
 Marseilles, for the conveyance of ships from the sea, 
 into tlie Rhone. 
 
 Foss'* MarintE, a city of Gallia NarbonensiS, now 
 called Aigues Mortes. 
 
 Frentani, an ancient people of Italy, Abruzzo Capi- 
 tanata. 
 
 Frisii, the ancient inl^^bitants of Friesland. 
 
 G 
 
 Gabali, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
 •■ountry of Gii-audan. 
 
 Gades, Cadiz, an ancient and considerable city of 
 Spain. 
 
 Gaditani, the people of Gades, or Cadiz in Spain. 
 
 Galatia, a country of Asia Minor, lying between 
 Cappadocia, Pontus, and Paphlagonia; now called 
 Chiangare. 
 
 Gain, the people of ancient Gaul, now the French. 
 
 Gallia, the ancient and renowned country of Gaul, 
 now France. It was divided by the 'BiDaians into, 
 
 Gallia Cisalpina, Tonsa, or Togata, now Lombardtf, 
 between the Alps and the river Rubicon ; and 
 
 Gallia Transalpina, or Comata, comprehending 
 France, Holland, the Netherla7tds ; and farther subdi 
 vided into, 
 
 Gallia Belgica, now a part of Lower Germany and 
 the Netherlands ; with Picardy ; divided by Augustus, 
 into Belgica and Germania ; and the latter into prima 
 and secunda. 
 
 Gallia Celtica, now France, properly so called, di 
 vided by Augustus into Lugdunensis and Rothoma 
 gensis. 
 
 Gallia Aquitanica, now Gascony ; divided by Au- 
 gustus into prima, secunda, and terlia; and 
 
 Gallia Narbonensis, or Braccata, now Languedoc, 
 Dauphiny, and Provence. 
 
 Gallicia, a province of Spain, of a large extent, once 
 a kingdom, and comprehending old Castile, but now 
 a part of the kingdom of Leon. 
 
 Gallo-grsecia, a country of Asia Minor, the same as 
 Galatia. 
 
 Garites, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country 
 now called Gavre, Gavaraan. 
 
 Garoceli, or Graioceli, an ancient people of Gaul, 
 about Mount Ce?iis, or Mount Genevre : others place 
 them in the Val de Morienne. 
 
 Garumna, the Garonne, one of the largest cities of 
 France, which rising in the Pyrenees, flow-s through 
 Guienne, forms the vast bay of Garonne, and falls, by 
 two mouths, into the British Seas. 
 
 Garumni, an ancient people of Gaul, in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the Garonne. 
 
 Gebenna Mons, the mountains of the Cevennes, 
 which separated the Helvians from the Arverni. 
 
 GekUira, a fortress of the Ubii, on the Rhine, not im- 
 probal^ly the present village of Gelb, on that river, 
 eleven German miles from Neus. 
 
 Genabum, Orleans, an ancient town in Gaul, famous 
 for Uie massacre of the Roman citizens committed 
 there by the Carnutes. 
 
 Geneva, a city of Savoy, now a free republic, upon 
 the borders of Helvetia, at the going out of the Rhone 
 from the Lake Lemanus, anciently a city of the Al- 
 lobroges. 
 
 Genusus, a river of Macedonia, uncertain. 
 
 GepidsB, or Gepidi, an ancient northern people, sup- 
 posed to have dwelt about the mouth of the Vistula. 
 
 Gergovia, the name of two cities in ancient Gaul, 
 the one belonging to the Boii, the other to the Arver- 
 ni. Their situation is not certainly known. 
 
 Germania, Germany, one of the largest countries of 
 Europe, and the mother of those nations, which, in 
 the fall of the Roman empire, conquered all the rest. 
 
 Gesatae, a kind of militia among the ancient Germans. 
 
 Getae, an ancient people of Scythia, who inhabited 
 betwixt McEsia and Bacia, on each side of tlie Danube. 
 Some think their country the same with the present 
 Wallachia, or Moldavia. 
 
 Geiulia, a province in the kingdom of Morocco, in 
 Barbary. 
 
 Gomphi, a town in Thessaly, Gonfi. 
 
 Gorduni, a people of Belgium, the ancient inhabi- 
 tants of Ghent; according to others, of Courtray, 
 
 Gotini, an ancient people of Germany, who were 
 driven out of their country by Maroboduus. 
 
 Graecia, Greece, a large part of Europe, called by 
 the Turks Romelia, containing many countries, pro- 
 vinces, and islands, once the nursery of arts, learning, 
 and sciences. 
 
352 
 
 INDEX OF THE 
 
 Graioceli, tlie ancient inhabitants of Mount Cents. 
 See Naroceli. 
 
 Grudii, the ancient inhabitants about Louvain, or, 
 according to some, about Bruges. 
 
 Gugerni, a people of ancient Germany, who dwelt on 
 the right banks of the Rhine, between the Ubii and the 
 Eatavi. 
 
 Guitones, Gythones, an ancient people of Germany, 
 iahabiling about the Vistula. 
 
 H 
 
 Hfemus, a- mountain dividing Rloesi and Thrace, Ar- 
 gentaro. 
 
 Haliacmon, a river of Macedonia, uncertain. 
 
 Harudes, or Harudi, a people of Gallia Cellica, sup- 
 posed to have been originally Germans; and by some 
 to have inlttbiied about Constance, 
 
 Hellespont, Straits of Gallipolli, the famous straits 
 by Constantinople, dividing Europe from Asia, be- 
 tween Propontis and the ^gean sea. 
 
 Helvetia, Switzerland, now divided into thirteen 
 cantons. 
 
 Helvelii, the Switzers, ancient inhabitants of the 
 coiuUry of Switzerland. 
 
 Helvii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
 country now possessed by the Vivarois. 
 
 Heraclea, a city of Thrace, on the Euxine Sea, Pan- 
 tiro. 
 
 Heraclea Sentica, a town in Macedonia, Chesia. 
 
 Hercynia Silva, the Hercynian Forest, the largest 
 forest of ancient Germany, being reckoned by. Caesar 
 to have been sixty days' journey in length, and nine in 
 breadth. Many parts of it have been since cut down, 
 and many are yet remaining; of whicli among others, 
 is that called the Black Forest. 
 
 Hermanduri, an ancient people of Germany, particu- 
 larly in the country now called Misnia, in Upper Sax- 
 ony ; tltough ihey possessed a much larger tract of land, 
 according to some, all Bohemia, 
 
 Herminius Blons, a mountain of Lusitania, Monte 
 Armeno ; according to others, Monti delta Slrella. 
 
 Heriili, an ancient Northern people, who came first 
 out of Scandanavia, but afterwards inhabited the coun- 
 try now called Mecklenburgh, in lower Saxony, to- 
 wards the Baltic. 
 
 Hibernia, Ireland, a considerable island to the west 
 of Great Britain. 
 
 Hippo, Bona, a city of the province of Constantine, 
 in the liingdom of Tunis, in Africa, upon the Blediter- 
 ranean. 
 
 Hispalis, a city of Hispania Baetica, Seville. 
 
 Hispania, Spain, one of the most considerable king- 
 doms in Europe, divided by tlie ancients into Tarra- 
 conensis, Baetica, and Lusitania. 
 
 Hyrcania, a country of Asia : bordering on the Cas- 
 pian sea, 2'abarislon, Gorgian. 
 
 I 
 
 Jacetani, or Lacetani, a people of Spain, near the 
 Pyrenean mountains. 
 
 Jadertini, a people so called, from their capital Ja- 
 dera, a city oflllyricura, Zara. 
 
 Jazygje, or Jazygeis, a people of Sarmatia Europsea, 
 inhabiting about the countries now called Livonia, and 
 Prussia. 
 
 Iberus, a river of Hispania Tarraconensis, the Ebro. 
 
 Iccius, or Tiius Portus, a sea-port town of ancient 
 Gaul ; Boulogne, or, according to others, Calais. 
 
 Igilium, an island in the Tuscan Sea, il Giglio, 
 VhU du Lys. 
 
 Iguvium, a city of Umbria, in Italy, Guhio. 
 
 Ilerda, a city of Catalonia, in Spain, now called LerU 
 da, on the Segre. 
 
 lllurgavonensis, a people of Hispania Tarraconensis^ 
 near the Iberus. 
 
 lUyricum, formerly the country between Pannonia 
 to the north, and the Adriatic Sea to the south, divided 
 into Liburnia and Dalmatia. Il is now chiefly com- 
 prehended under Dal inatia and Sc/ai;onja, and bor- 
 dered by Panonia, Istria, Macedonia, and the Adriatic 
 Gulf; almost wholly under the respective dominions 
 of the Venetians and the Turks. 
 
 Illurgis, a town of Hispania Bcetica, Elera. 
 
 Insubbria, a country of Gallia Cisalpina, now the 
 duichies of Milan, Mantua, a.<'i\.^recia. 
 
 [onia, a country of Asia Minor, anciently inhabited 
 by a colony from Greece, Sarchan. 
 
 Issa, an island of the Adriatic Sea, Lissa. 
 
 Ister, that part of the Danube which passed by Illy- 
 ricum. 
 
 Istria, a country in Italy, now under the Venetians, 
 bordering on lUyricum, so called from the river Ister. 
 
 Isiropolis, a city of Lower Moesia, near the south en- 
 trance of the Danube, Prostraviza. 
 
 Isara, the /s«re, a river of France, which rises in 
 Savoy, and falls into the Rhone above Valence. 
 
 Isauria, a province anciently of Asia Minor, now a 
 part of Caramania, and suVjjeci to the Turks. 
 
 Italia, Italy, one of the most famous countries in 
 Europe, once the seat of the Roman empire, now under 
 several princes, and free commonwealths. 
 
 Iialica, a city of Hispania Bsetica, Sevila la Veja; 
 according to others, Alcala del Rio. 
 
 Itura;a, a country of Palestine, Bacar. 
 
 Jura, a mountain in Gallia Belgica, which separated 
 the S.^quani from the Helvetians, most of which is now 
 called Mount St. Claude. 
 
 Juvavia, formerly the capital of Noricum Mediterra- 
 nean, now Saltzburg. 
 
 L 
 
 Lacetani, a people of Spain, near the Pyreneanhilla. 
 
 Lacus Benacus, Lago di Guardo, a lake now be- 
 longing to the Venetians, between Verono, Brescia, 
 and Trent. 
 
 Larinates, the people of Larinum, a city of Italy, 
 Larino. 
 
 Larissa, the principal city of Thessaly, a province 
 of Macedonia, on the river Peneo. 
 
 Latini, the inhabitants of Latiura, an ancient part of 
 Italy, whence the Latin tongue is so called. 
 
 Latrobriges, a people of Gallia Belgica, between the 
 AH obroges and Helvetii, in the country now called 
 Lausanne. 
 
 Lazi, an ancient people of Sarmatia Europsea, ac- 
 cording to some, on the banks of the Paulus Maeotis, 
 but, according to others, towards the Caspise Portse, 
 near the Iberi. 
 
 Lamanus Lacus, the lake upon which Geneva stands, 
 made by the river Rhone, between Switzerland to the 
 north and Savoy to the south, commonly called the 
 Lake of Geneva. 
 
 Lemnos, an island in the Mgea.n Sea, now called 
 Stali7nane. 
 
 Lemovices, an ancient people of Gaul, le Limosin. 
 
 Lemovices Armorici,the people of St-Paul de Leon, 
 
 Lcnimn, a town in Lusitania, unknown. 
 
 Lepontii, a people of the Alps, near the valley of 
 Leventini. 
 
 Leptis, a town in Africa, Lebeda or Lepida, 
 
NAMES OF PLACES. 
 
 353 
 
 Levaci, a people of Brabant, not far from Louvain, 
 whose chief town is now called Leeio. 
 
 Leuf.i. a people of Gallia Belgica, where now Lorrain 
 's, well skilled in darting. Their chief city is now 
 called Foul. 
 
 Lexovii, an ancient people of Gaul, Lisieux in Nor- 
 mandy. 
 
 Liburni, an ancient people of lllyricum, inhabiting 
 part of the present Croato. 
 
 Ligeris, the Luire, one of the greatest and most cele- 
 brated rivers of France, said to take one hundred and 
 twelve rivers in its course ; it rises in Valey, and falls 
 into the Atlantic 40 miles below Nantes. 
 
 Hcruli, an ancient northern people, who came first 
 out of the Bay of Aquiiain, below Nantz. 
 
 Ligiiria, a part of ancient Italy, extending from the 
 Apennines to the Tuscan Sea, containing Ferrara, 
 and the territories of Genoa. , 
 
 Lilybeiim, the most western promontory of the is- 
 land of Sicily, where stood a city of the same name 
 now Cupo Boco. 
 
 Limo, or Limomum, a city of ancient Gaul, Poictiers. 
 
 Lingones, a people of Gallia Belgica, inhabiting in 
 and ahuut Lan.jres, in Champagne. 
 
 Lissup, an ancient city of Macedonia, Alessio. 
 
 Lacani, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the 
 country now called Balisicate. 
 
 Luceri, an ancient city of Italy, Lucera. 
 
 Lusitania, Portugal, a kingdom on the west of Spain, 
 formerly a part of it. 
 
 Lutetia, Paris, an ancient and famous city, the capi- 
 tal of all France, on the river Seine. 
 
 Lydia, an inland country of Asia Minor, formerly 
 governed by the famous Crresus, who was the last king 
 of it, Carasia. 
 
 Lygii, an ancient people of upper Germany, who in- 
 habited the country now called Silesia, and on the 
 borders of Poland. 
 
 M 
 
 Macedonia, a large country, of great antiquity and 
 fame, in Greece, containing several provinces, now 
 under the Turks. 
 
 Maeotis Palas, a vast lake in the north part of 
 Scythia, now calle'd 3Iarbianco, or 3Iare delta Tuna. 
 It is about six hundred miles in compass, and the 
 river Tanais disembogues itself into it. 
 
 Magetobria,or Amagetobria, a city of Gaul, uncertain. 
 
 Malaca, a city of Hispania Bsetica, Malaga. 
 
 Mandubii, an ancient people of Gaul, I'Anxois, in 
 Burgundy. 
 
 Marcomanni, a nation of the Suevi, whom Cluverius 
 places between the Rhine, the Danube, and the 
 Neckar ; who settled, however, under Maroboduus, in 
 Bohemia and Moravia. 
 
 Marrucini, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the 
 country now called Abruzzo. 
 
 Marsi, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the 
 count rv n.iw caile^l Ducato de Marsi. 
 
 IMassilia, Marseilles, a large and flourishing city of 
 Provence, in France, on the Mediterranean; said to 
 be very ancient, and, according to smie, built by the 
 Phoenicians ; but as Justin will have it by the Phocians, 
 in the time of Tarquinius, king of Rome. 
 
 Maslico, an ancient city of Gaul, Mascon, 
 
 ]\Iatrona, a river in Gaul, the Marne. 
 
 Mauritania, Barhary, an ancient large region of 
 Africa, divided into Coesariensis, Tingitatana, and Si- 
 tofensis. 
 
 Mazaca, a city of Cappadocia, Tisaria. 
 31 
 
 Mediomatrices, a people of Lorrain, on the Moselle, 
 about the city of Metz. 
 
 Mediterranean sea, the first discc^ered sea in the 
 world, still very famous, and much frequented, which 
 breaks in, from the Atlantic Ocean, between Spain and 
 Africa, by the Straits of Gibraltar, or Hercules' Pillar, 
 the ne plus ultra of the ancients. 
 
 Mediibrega, a city of Lusitania, Armenna. 
 
 Meldae, according to some, the people of the Meaicxt 
 but more properly corrupted from Belgoe. 
 
 Melodunum, an ancient city of Gaul, upon the Seine, 
 above Paris, Melun. 
 
 Blenapii, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, who 
 inhabited on both sides of tlie Rhine. Some take them 
 for the inhabitants of Cleves ; and others of Antwerp, 
 Ghent, &c. 
 
 Mesopotamia, a large country in the middle of Asia, 
 between the Tigris and the Euphrates, Diarbeck. 
 
 Slessana, an ancient and celebrated city of Sicily, 
 still known by the name o( Messina. 
 
 Metaurus, a river of Umbria, now called Metoro, in 
 the Dutchy of Urbino. 
 
 Mfctiiisedum, an ancient city of Gaul, on the Seine 
 below Paris, Corbeil. 
 
 Metropolis, a city of Thessaly, between Pharsalus 
 and Gomphi. 
 
 Blitylene, a city of Lesbos, 3Ietelin. 
 
 Mffisia, a country of Europe, and a province of the 
 ancient lllyricum, bordering on Panonia, divided into 
 the Upper, containing Bosnia and Servia, and the 
 Lower, called Bulgaria. 
 
 Mona, in Caesar, the Isle of Man ; in Ptolemy, An- 
 glesey. 
 
 Morini, an ancient people of the Low Countries, who 
 probably inhabited on the present coast of Boulogne, 
 on the confines of Picardy and Artois, because Caesar 
 ol.serves that from their country was the nearest pas- 
 sage to Britain. 
 
 Blossa, the Maese or Meuse, a large river of Gallia 
 Belgica, which falls into the German Ocean below the 
 Briel. 
 
 Mosella, the Moselle, a river which, running through 
 Lorrain, passes by Triers and falls into the Rhine at 
 Coblentz, famous for the vines growing in the neigh- 
 bourhood of it. 
 
 Munda, an ancient city of Spain, Mauda ; al Ronda 
 la Veja. 
 
 Mursa, a town and castle in Sclavonia, at the con- 
 flux of the Draw and Danube, now called Esseek, fa- 
 mous io' a bridge three miles over. 
 
 Mysia, a country of Asia Minor, not far from the 
 Hellespont, divided into Major and Minor. 
 
 N 
 
 Nabathaei, an ancient people of Arabia, uncertain. 
 
 N innetes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting 
 about Nantes. 
 
 Nantiiates, an ancient people of the north part of Sa- 
 voy, whose country is novif called Le Chablias. 
 
 Narbo, Narbonne, an ancient Roman cily, in Lan- 
 guedoc, in France, said to bo built a hundred and thir- 
 ty-eight years bef )rc the birth of Christ. 
 
 Narisci,the ancient people of the country now called 
 Nortgotc, in Germany, the capital of which is the fa- 
 mous city of Nuremburg. 
 
 Naupactus, an ancient and considerable city of 
 ^tolia, now cOiWi -Lf.epanto. 
 
 Neapolis, a city ^Lia\y, which still retains the name 
 of Naples. 
 
 3 Z 
 
354 
 
 INDEX OF THE 
 
 Neapolis, a city of Africa, between Clupea and Adru- 
 meUim, now called NupoU. 
 
 Nemetes, a people of ancient Germany, about the city 
 of Spires, on tlie Rhine. 
 
 Nenietocenna, a town of Belgium, not certainly 
 known ; accordin? to some, Arras. 
 
 Nenctcsarea, the capital of Pontus, on the river Ly- 
 cus, now called Tocat. 
 
 Nervii, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, thought 
 to have dwelt in the now diocese of Cambray. 
 
 Nessus, or Nestus, a river in Trace, Nesto, 
 
 Niceea, a city of Bithynia, now called Isnick, (axnoMS 
 for the first general council, anno 324, against Arianism. 
 
 Nicomedia, a city of Bithynia, where CoBstantine 
 the Great died, Comidia. 
 
 Nicopolis, a city of Armenia the Less, Gianich; like- 
 wise of Bulgaria, at the confluence of the Isicar, and 
 the Danube, commonly called Nigeholi. 
 
 Nilus, the Nile, a river of Egypt, famous for its an- 
 nual overflow. 
 
 Nitobriges, an ancient people of Gaul, I'Agenois. 
 
 Noreia, a city on the borders of lUyricum, about 
 nine German miles from Aquileia. 
 
 Noricas Alpes, that part of the Alps, which were in, 
 or bordering upon Noricum. 
 
 Noricum, anciently a large country, now containing 
 several, as a great part of Austria, Sliria, Carinthia, 
 part of Tyrol, Bavaria, &c. and divided into Noricum 
 Mediterraneum, and Ripense. 
 
 Noviodimum Belgarum, an ancient city of Belgic 
 Gaul, now called Noyon. 
 
 Noviodimum Biturigum, Neuvy or Neufvy, 
 
 Noviodunum ^duorum, Nevcrs. 
 
 Noviodunum Suessionum, Soissons al. Noion. 
 
 Novioraagmim, Spires, an ancient ciiy of Germany, 
 m the now upper circle of the Rhine, and on that river. 
 
 Numantia, a celebrated city of ancient Spain, fa- 
 moua for a gallant resistance against the Romans, in a 
 siege of fourteen years ; Almasan. 
 
 Numidia, an ancient and celebrated kingdom of 
 Africa, bordering on Mauritania ; Algiers, Tunis, Tri- 
 poli, 6rc. 
 
 Numicus, the Numico, a river of ancient Latium, in 
 Italy. 
 
 Nymphseum, a promontory of Macedonia, in the 
 confines of Sclavonia. 
 
 o 
 
 Obucula, a town in Hispania Bsetica, uncertain. 
 
 Ocelura, a town situated among the Alps, in Gaul, 
 Exilles. 
 
 Octodorus, a town belonging to the Veragrians, Mar- 
 tinao. 
 
 Octogesa, a city of Hispania Tarraconensis, Mequi- 
 ntnza. 
 
 Orchomenus, a town in Baeotia, Orcomeno. 
 
 Oricum, a town in Epirus, Oreo, or Orcha. 
 
 Oscenses, the people of Osca, a town in Hispania 
 Tarraconensis, now Huescar. 
 
 Osismii, an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain. 
 
 Padus, the Po, the largest river in Italy, which rises 
 in Piedmont, and dividing Lombardy into two parts, 
 falls into the Adriatic Sea, by many mouths. 
 
 Psemani, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica; ac- 
 cording to some, those of Luxeviburg ; according to 
 others, the people oi Pemont, near the Black Forest. 
 
 PalEeste, a town in Epirus, near Oricum. 
 
 Pannonia, a very large country, in the ancient divi- i 
 siun of Europe, divided into the Upper and Lower, and s 
 comprehended betwixt lUyricum, the Danube, and the f 
 mimntains Cithi. ^; 
 
 Parada, a town in Africa, not far from Utica. ' 
 
 Paraetonium, a maritime city of Africa, Alberton. 
 
 PiU'isii, an ancient people of Gaid, inhabiting the 
 country now called the Isle of France. 
 
 Panhia, a country in Asia, lying between Media, 
 Caramania, and the Hircanian Sea. 
 
 Parthiui, a people of Macedonia. 
 
 Peligni, a people of Italy, in Abruzzo. 
 
 Peloponnesus, the Morea, a famous, large, and fruit- 
 ful peninsula in Greece, now belonging to the Vene- 
 tians. 
 
 Pelusium, an ancient and celebrated city of Egypt, 
 Belbais. 
 
 Pergamus, an ancient and famous city of Mysia, 
 Pergamo. 
 
 Perinthus, a city of Thrace, about a day's journey 
 west of Constantinople, now in a decaying condition, 
 and called Heraclea. 
 
 Persia, one of the largest, most ancient, and cele- 
 brated kingdoms of Asia. It anciently contained many 
 countries, and now many provinces. 
 
 Petra, an ancient city of Macedonia, uncertain. 
 
 Petrogorii, a country in Gaul, Perigord. 
 
 Peucini, the inhabitants of the island of Peuce, in 
 one of the mouths of the Danube. 
 
 Pliarsalia, a part of Thessaly, famous for the battle 
 between Caesar and Pompey, which decided the fate of 
 the Roman Commonwealth. 
 
 Pharus, an isle facing the port of Alexandria, in an- 
 cient Egypt, Furion. 
 
 Phnsis, a large river in Colchis, now called Fasso, 
 which flows into the Euxine Sea. 
 
 Philippi, a city of Macedonia, on the confines of 
 Thrace, Filippo. 
 
 Philippopolis, a city of Thrace, near the river He- 
 brus, Filippopoli. 
 
 Fhrygia, two countries in Asia Minor, one called 
 Major, the other Minor. 
 
 Picenum, an ancient district of Italy, lying eastward 
 of Umbria ; the March of Ancona, according to others, 
 Piscara. 
 
 Picti, Picts, an ancient barbarous northern people, 
 who, by intermarriages became, in course oftime, one 
 nation with the Scots ; but are originally supposed to 
 have come out of Denmark or Scythia, to the Isles of 
 Orkney, and from thence into Scotland. 
 
 Pictones, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
 country of Poiiou. 
 
 Pirustee, an ancient people of Tllyricum, Albanesi. 
 
 Pisaurum, a city of Umbria in Italy, Pisaro. 
 
 Placentia, an ancient city of Gallia Cisalpina, near 
 the Po, now the metropolis of thedutchyof Piacenza; 
 which name it also bears. 
 
 Pleumossii, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, 
 subject to the Nervians, and inhabiting near Toumay. 
 
 Polentia, an ancient city near the Alps, though the 
 learned disagree as to the particular situation of it. 
 
 Pontus, an ancient kingdom of Asia Minor, between 
 Bithynia and Paphlagonia upon the Euxine Sea. 
 
 Pontus Euxinus, the Euxine or Black Sea, from the 
 iEgean along the Hellespont, to the Mseotic Lake, ba 
 tween Europe and Asia. 
 
 Posthumiana Castra, an ancient town in Hispania 
 Bfetica, now called Castro el Rio. 
 
 Praeciania, an ancient people of Gaul, Precius. 
 
NAMES OF PLACES. 
 
 855 
 
 Provincia Romana, or Romanorum, one of the south- 
 ern provinces of France, the first the Romans con- 
 quered and brought into the form of a province, 
 whence it obtained its name, which it still in some 
 degree retains, being called at this day Provence. 
 
 Prusa or Prusrjs, Bursa, a city of Bithynia, at the 
 foot of Olympus, built by Hannibal. 
 
 Ptolemais, an ancient city of Africa, St.JeanD'Acre. 
 
 Pyrenaei Montcs, the Pyrenees, or Pyrenean Moun- 
 tains, one of the largest chains of mountains in Europe, 
 which divided Spain from France, running from east 
 to west eighty-five leagues in length. 
 
 R 
 
 Ravenna, a very ancient city of Italy, near the coast 
 of the Adriatic Gulf, which still retains its ancient 
 name. In the decline of the Roman empire, it was 
 some time the seat of the emperors of the West; as it 
 was likewise of the Visi-Gothic kingdom. 
 
 Rauraci, a people of ancient Germany, near the 
 Helvetii, who inhabited near where Basil in Switzer- 
 land now is. 
 
 Rhedones, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting 
 about Rennes, in Bretagne. 
 
 Rhaetia, the country of the Orisons, on the Alps, 
 near the Hercynian Forest. 
 
 Rhemij the people of Rheims, a very ancient, fine, 
 and populous city of France, in the province of Cham- 
 pagne, on the river Vesle. 
 
 Rhenus, the Rhine, a great and famous river in Ger- 
 many, which formerly divided it from Gaul. It springs 
 out of the Rha-tian Alps, in the western borders of 
 Switzerland, and the northern of the Grisons, from 
 two springs which unite near Coire, and falls into the 
 Maese and the German Ocean, by two mouths, whence 
 Virgil calls it Rhenus bicornis. 
 
 Rhodanus, the Rhone, one of the most celebrated ri- 
 vers of France, which rises from a double spring in 
 Mont de la Fourche, a part of the Alps, on the borders 
 of Switzerland, near the springs of the Rhine, and 
 after a vast circuit through France, falls into the Me- 
 diterranean, by five mouths. 
 
 Rhodope, a famous mountain of Thrace, now called 
 Valiza. 
 
 Rhodus, Rhodes, a celebrated island in the Mediter- 
 ranean, upon the coast of Asia Minor, over against 
 Caria. 
 
 Rhyndagus, a river of Mysia, in Asia, which falls 
 into the Propontis. 
 
 Roma, i?o;?(e, once the seat of the Roman empire, 
 and the capital of the then known world, now the im- 
 mediate capital of Campagna di Roma only, on the 
 river Tiber, and the papal seat ; generally supposed 
 to have been built by Romulus, in the first year of the 
 seventh Olympiad. 
 
 Roxolani, a people of Scythia Europsea, bordering 
 upon the Alani : their country, anciently called Roxo- 
 lania, is now Red Russia, belonging to the crown of 
 Poland. 
 
 Ruspina, an ancient maritime city of Africa, Souse. 
 
 Rulheni, an ancient people of Gaul, la Rouergue. 
 
 S 
 
 Sabis, the Samhre, a river of the Low Countries, 
 which rises in Picardy, and falls into the Maese at 
 Namur. 
 
 Saguntini, the people of Sagimtum, a noble city of 
 ancient Spain, the memory of which is recorded with 
 honour, for the fidelity shown to its allies the Romans, 
 Mc xcdre. 
 
 Salassii, an ancient city of Piedmont, whose chief 
 town was where now Aosta is situate. 
 
 Salluvii, Sallyes, a people of Gallia Narbonensia, 
 about where Aix now is. 
 
 Salona, an ancient city of Dalmatia, and a Roman 
 colony ; the place where Dioclesian was born, and 
 whither he retreated, after he had resigned the impe- 
 rial dignity. 
 
 Salsum, a river of Hispania Bsetica, Rio Salado, or 
 Guadajos. 
 
 Samarobriva, Amiens, an ancient city of Gallia Bel- 
 gica, enlarged and beautified by the emperor Antoni- 
 nus Pius, now the chief city of Picardy, on the ri\er 
 Somme. 
 
 Santones, the ancient inhabitants of Guienne or 
 Xantoigne. 
 
 Sardinia, a great island in the Mediterranean, which 
 in the time of the Romans had forty-two cities, now 
 belonging to the Duke of Savoy, with the title of king. 
 
 Sarmatia, a very large northern couiitry, divided in- 
 to Sarmatia Asiatica, containing Tartary, Petigora, 
 Circassia, and the country of the Morduiia ; and Sar- 
 matia Europsea, containing Russia, part of Poland, 
 Prussia, and Lithuania. 
 
 Sarsura, a town in Africa, unknown. 
 
 Savus, the Save, a large river, which rises in upper 
 Carniola, and falls into the Danube at Belgrade. 
 
 Scaldis, the Scheldt, a noted river in the Low Coun- 
 tries, which rises in Picardy, and washing several of 
 the principal cities of Flanders and Brabant, in ita 
 course, falls into the German Ocean by two mouths,one 
 retaining its own name, and the other called the Honte^ 
 
 Scandavia, anciently a vast northern peninsula* 
 containing what is yet called Schonen, anciently Sca- 
 nia, belonging to Denmark ; and part of Sweden, Nor- 
 way, and Lapland. 
 
 Scythia, a large country, properly- Crim-Tartary, but 
 in history and geography greatly extended, and parti- 
 cularly divided into Scythia Asiatica, on either side 
 of Mount Imaus ; and Scythia Europsea, about the 
 Euxine Sea ; and the Mseotic Lake. 
 
 Seduni, an ancient people of Switzerland, Sion. 
 
 Sedusii, an ancient people of Germany, on the bor- 
 ders of Suabia. 
 
 Segni, an ancient German nation, neighbours of the 
 Condrusi, Zulpich. 
 
 Segontiaci, a people of ancient Britain, inhabiting 
 about Holshot in Hampshire. 
 
 Segovia, a city of Hispania Bsetica, Segovia la menos. 
 
 Segusiana, a people of Gallia Celtica, about where 
 now Lionois Forest is situate. 
 
 Senones, an ancient nation of the Celtse, inhabiting 
 about the Senonois, in Gaul. 
 
 Sequana, the Seine, one of the principal rivers of 
 France, arising in the dutchy of Burgundy, not far 
 from a town of the same name, and running through 
 Paris, and by Roan, forms at Candebec a great arm of 
 the sea. 
 
 Sequani, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica,. inha- 
 biting the country now called the Franche Comte, or 
 the Upper Burgundy. 
 
 Sesuvii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about 
 Seez. 
 
 Sibntzates, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting 
 the country oi Buck. 
 
 Sicilia, Sicily, a large island in the Tyrrhene Sea, 
 at the south-west point of Italy, formerly called the 
 store-house of the Roman empire, and the first pro 
 vince the Romans possessed oat of Italy 
 
 k 
 
356 
 
 INDEX OF THE 
 
 Sicoris, a river in Catalonia, the Segre. 
 
 Sigambri, or Sicambri, an ancient people of Lower 
 Germany, between the Maese and the Rhine, where 
 Guelderlmid is ; though by some placed on the banks 
 of the Maine. 
 
 Silicensis, a river of Hispania Bsuca, Rio de lasAl- 
 gamidas. Others think it a corruption from SinguU. 
 
 Sinuessa, a city of Campania, not far from the Save, 
 an ancient Roman colony, now in a ruinous condition; 
 Rocca di Mondragone. 
 
 Soricaria, a city of ancient Spain, unknown, 
 
 Soritia, an ancient town in Spain, unknown. 
 
 Sotiates, or Sontiates, an ancient people of Gaul, in- 
 habiting the country about Aire. 
 
 Sparta, a city of Peloponnesus, now called Miisithra, 
 said to be so ancient as the days of the Patriarch Jacob. 
 
 Spoletum, Spoleto, a city of great antiquity, of Um- 
 bria, in Italy, the capital of a dutchy of the same name, 
 on the river Te^no, where are yet some stately ruins 
 of ancient Roman and Gothic edifices. 
 
 Suessiones, an ancient people of Gaul, le Soissonnois. 
 
 Suevi, an ancient, great and warlike people of Ger- 
 many, v/ho possessed the greatest part of it, from the 
 Rhine to the Elbe, but afterwards removed from the 
 northern parts, and settled about the Danube, and some 
 marched into Spain, where they established a kingdom. 
 
 Sulcitani, an ancient people of Sardinia, unknown. 
 
 Sulmo, an ancient city of Italy, Sulmona. 
 
 Sunioi, an ancient people of the dutchy of Limburg, 
 where there is yet a place called Sunich, a name pro- 
 bably borrowed from them. 
 
 Syracusoe, Saragusa, once one of the noblest cities 
 of Sicily, said to be built by Archias, a Corinthian, 
 aoove seven hundred years before Christ. The Romans 
 besieged and took it during the second Punic war, on 
 which occasion the great Archimedes was killed. It 
 has been so entirely destroyed, that it has no remains 
 to show of its antiquity. 
 
 Syria, a large country of Asia, containing several 
 provinces, now called Souristan. 
 
 Syrtes, the Deserts of Barbary ; also two dangerous 
 sandy gulfs, in the Mediterranean, upon the coast of 
 Barbary, in Africa, called the one Syrtis magna, now 
 the Gicif of Sidra; the other Syrtis parva, now the 
 Gulf of Capes. 
 
 Tamesis, the Thames, a celebrated and well known 
 river of Great Britain. 
 
 Tanais, the Don, a very large river in Scythia, divid- 
 ing Asia from Europe. It rises in the province of Re- 
 san, in Muscovy, and flowing through the Crim-Tar- 
 tary, runs into the Maeotic Lake, near a city of the 
 same name, now in ruins, and in the hands of the 
 Turks. 
 
 Tarbelli, a people ofancient Gaul, near the Pyrenees, 
 inhabiting about A>js, and Bayorifie, in the country of 
 Labourd. 
 
 Tarracina, an ancient city of Italy, which still retains 
 the same name. 
 
 Tarraco, Tarragona, a city of Spain, which, in an- 
 cient time, gave name to that part of it called Hispania 
 Tarraconensis ; by some said to be built by the Scipios, 
 though others say before the Roman conquest, ami that 
 only enlarged it. It stands on the mouth of the river 
 Twlcis, now el FracoU, with a small haven on the Me- 
 diterranean. 
 
 Tarsus, Tarso, the metropolis of Cilicia, famous for 
 ibeing the birth-place of St. Paul. 
 
 Tarusates, a2 grta'ent people of Gaul, uncertain; 
 according to some, le Teursun. 
 
 Taurus, an island in the Adriatic Sea, unknown. 
 
 Taurois, the name of a castle near Marseilles. 
 
 Tauros Mons, the greatest mountain in all Asia, ex- 
 tending from the Indian to the .SIgean Sea, called by 
 different names in different countries, viz. Imaus, Cau- 
 casus, Caspius, Cerausius, and in. Scripture, Ararat. 
 Herbert says it is fifty English miles over, and fifteen 
 hundred long. 
 
 Tectosages, see Volcse, 
 
 Tegea, a city of Africa, unknown. 
 
 Tenchtheri, a people ofancient Germany bordering 
 on the Rhine, near Overyssel. 
 
 Tergestini, an ancient people inhabiting about 
 Arieste, in the confines of Islria and the Carni. 
 
 Terni, an ancient Roman colony, on the river Nare, 
 twelve miles from Spoletum. 
 
 Teutones, or T'eutoni, an ancient people bordering 
 on the Cimbri, the common ancient name for all the 
 Germans, whence they yet call themselves Teutsche, 
 and their country Teutschland. 
 
 Tliabena, a city of Africa, unknown. 
 
 Thapsus, a maritime city of Africa, uncertain. 
 
 Thebae, a city of Boeotia, in Greece, said to have been 
 built by Cadmus, destroyed by Alexander the Great, 
 but rebuilt, and now known by the name of Stives. 
 
 Thermopylae, a famous pass on the great mountain 
 Oeta, leading into Phocis, inAchaia, now called iJocca 
 di Lupa. 
 
 Thessaly, a country of Greece, formerly a great part 
 of Macedonia, now called Janna. 
 
 Thessalonica,the chief city ofMacedonia, now called 
 Salonichi. 
 
 Thracia, a large country of Europe, eastward from 
 Macedonia, commonly called Romania, bounded by 
 the Euxine and jEgean Seas. 
 
 Thurii, or Turii, an ancient people of Italy, Aorre 
 Trodogneto. 
 
 Tigurinas Pagus, a nation of the Helvetians, the an- 
 cient inhabitants of the canton of Zurich, in Switzer- 
 land. 
 
 Tisdra,or Tisdrus, an ancient city of Africa, CajVoaw. 
 
 Tolosa, TVioulouse, a city of Aquitain, of great anti- 
 quity, the capital of Languedoc, on the Garonne. 
 
 Toxandri, an ancient people of the Low Countries, 
 about Treda and Gertruydenburg; but, according to 
 some, of the diocese of Liege. 
 
 Tralles, an ancient people of Lydia, in Asia Minor, 
 Chara. 
 
 Treviri, the people of Treves, or Triers, a very an- 
 cient city of Lower Germany, on the Moselle, said to 
 have been built by Trebetas, the brother of Ninus. It 
 was made a Roman colony in the time of Augustus, 
 and became afterwards the most famous city of Gallia 
 Belgica. It was for some time the seat of the western 
 empire, but it is now only the seat of the Ecclesiastical 
 Elector named from it. 
 
 Tribocci, or Triboces, a people ofancient Germany, 
 inhabiting the country of Alsace. 
 
 Trinobantes, a people of ancient Britain, inhabitants 
 of the counties of Middlesex and Hertfordshire. 
 
 Troja, Troy, a city of Phrygia, in Asia Minor, near 
 Mount Ida, deflroyed by the Greeks after a ten years 
 siege. 
 
 Tubantes, an ancient people of Germany, about 
 Westphalia. 
 
 Tugiam, a city and canton of Helvetia, or Switzer- 
 land, now called Zug. 
 
NAMES OF PLACES. 
 
 35: 
 
 Tulingi, an ancient people of Germany, who inha- 
 bited about where Stulingen in Switzerland is. 
 
 Tungri, an ancient people inhabiting about where 
 Tongres, in Liege, now is. 
 
 Turones, an ancient people of l/iul, inhabiting about 
 Tours. 
 
 Tuscia, Tuscany, a very large and considerable re 
 gion of Italy, anciently called Tyrrhcnia, and Eiruria 
 
 Tyber, one of the most noted, though not largest ri- 
 vers of Italy, whicli rises in one of the Apennines, and 
 among other places, passing through Rome, falls into 
 the Tyrrhenian Sea at Ostia. 
 
 Tygris, a rapid river of Asia, which, in its course, 
 unites with the Euphrates. 
 
 Tyrus, Tyre, an ancient city of Phcenicia, upon the 
 Mediterranean, famous for its traffic and riches. 
 
 V 
 
 Vacca, a town in Africa, unknown. 
 
 Valialis, the Waal, tlie middle branch of the Rhine, 
 which, passing by Nimeguen, falls into the Maese, 
 above Gorcum. 
 
 Valencia, a city of Spain, which gives name to a 
 whole kingdom, about a mile from the Mediterranean, 
 supposed to be built by Junius Brutus. 
 
 Valencia, Valence, a city of Gallia Narbonensis, now 
 in Dauphiny, on the rivers Rhone and Isere. 
 
 Vangiones, an ancient people of Germany, about the 
 city of Worms. 
 
 Varus, the Var, a river in Gaul, that flows into the 
 Ligurian Sea. 
 
 Ubii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, who in- 
 habited about where Cologne and the dutchy of Juliers 
 now are. 
 
 Ucubis, a town in Hispania Baetica, Lucnbi. 
 
 Velauni, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about 
 Veial. 
 
 Vellaunodunum, a town in Gaul, about which geo- 
 graphers are much divided ; some making it Auxerre, 
 others Chasteau Lanclon, others Villeneuve in Lorrain, 
 others Veron. 
 
 Velocasses, an ancient people of Normandy, about 
 Rouen. 
 
 Veneti : this name was anciently given as well to the 
 Venetians, as to the people of Vannes, in Bretagne, in 
 Gaul, for which last it stands in Caesar. 
 
 Venetia, Venice, a noble city of Italy, built upon 
 sixty islands, joined together by five hundred bridges, 
 at the top of the Adriatic Gulf, the capital of a powerful 
 commonwealth. 
 
 Ventisponte, a town of Spain, unknown. 
 
 Veragri, a people of Gallia Lugdunensis, whose chief 
 town was Aguanimi, now St. Maurice. 
 
 Verbigenus, or Urbigenus Pagus, a nation or canton 
 of the Helvetians, inhabiting the country in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Orbe. 
 
 Vercelli Campi, the Plains of Vercella, famous for a 
 
 victory the Romans obtained there over the Cimbri. 
 
 The city of that nams is in Piedmont, on the river Se- 
 
 sia, on ttvs borders o. jedutcliy of Milan. 
 
 31* 
 
 Veromandui,a people of Gallia Belgica, whose coun 
 try, now a part of Picardy, is still called Vermandois. 
 
 Verona, a city of Lombardy, the capital of a province 
 of the same name, on the river Adige, said to be built 
 by the Gauls two hundred and eiglily-two years before 
 Christ, It has yet several remains of antiquity. 
 
 Vesontio, Besancon, the capital of tlie Sequani, now 
 the chief city of Burgundy. 
 
 Vettones, a people of Spain, inhabiting the province 
 oi Estremadura. 
 
 Vibo, a town in Italy, not far from the Sicilian Straits, 
 Bibona. 
 
 Vienna, a city of Narbonese Gaxi\,Vienne in Dauphiny. 
 
 Vindelici, an ancient people of Germany, inhabitants 
 .of the country of Vindelicia, otherwise called Ksetia 
 ^ecunda. 
 
 Vistula, the Weichsel, a famous river of Poland, 
 which rises in the Carpathian mountains, in upper Si- 
 lesia, and falls into the Baltic, not far from Dantzic, 
 by three mouths. 
 
 Visurgis, the Weser, a river of Lower Germany, 
 which rises in Francr>nia, and, among other places of 
 note, passing by Bremen, falls into the German Ocean, 
 not far from the mouth of the Elbe, between that and 
 the Ems. 
 
 UUa, or Ulia, a town in Hispania Boetica, in regard 
 to whose situation geographers are not agreed ; some 
 making it Monte major, others Vaena, others Vilia. 
 
 Umbria, a large country of Italy, on both sides of 
 the Apennines. 
 
 Unell), an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain. 
 
 Vocates, a people of Gaul, on the confines of the La 
 piu'denses. 
 
 Vocontii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting aboui 
 Die, in Dauphiny, and Vaison in the county of Venisse. 
 
 Vogesus Mons, the mountain of Vauge, in Lorrain, 
 or, according to others, de Faucilles. 
 
 Volcae Arecomici, and Teotosages, an ancient people 
 of Gaul, inhabiting tile Upper a.ni Lower Languedoc. 
 
 Ursao, a town of Hispania Baetica, Ossuna. 
 
 Usaea, a town of Africa, whose situation is not cer- 
 tainly known. 
 
 Usipetes, an ancient people of Germany, who fre- 
 quently clianged their habitation. 
 
 Utica, a city of Africa, famous for the death of Cato ; 
 Biserte. 
 
 TJxellodunum, a town in Gaul, whose situation is not 
 known; according to some Ussoldun, 
 
 Uzita, a town unknown. 
 
 X 
 
 Xantones, the same with the Santones, or people of 
 Xantonge. 
 
 z 
 
 Zama, a town in Africa, famous for the defeat of 
 Hannibal there by Scipio, now called Zamora, 
 
 Zetta, a maritime city of Africa, now Zerbi. 
 
 Ziela, or Zela, a city of Pontus, Arzila. 
 
 Zingitana, a part of ancient Africa, now included in 
 the kingdom of Algiers. 
 
AN 
 
 INDEX 
 
 OF 
 
 PERSONS AND THINGS. 
 
 r^- The NuKierals refer to the Book, the Figures to the Section. G. stands for the Wars in Gaul ; C. for tha 
 Civil Wars ; Al. for tlie Alexandrian ; Af. for the African ; Sp. for the Spanish War. 
 
 Acco, prince of the Senones, his conduct on Csesar's 
 approach, G. vi. 3. Condemned in a council of the 
 Gauls, ibid. 41. 
 
 Achillas, captain of Ptolemy guards, sent to kill Pom- 
 pey, C. iii. So. Appointed by Pothinus commander 
 of all the Egyptians' forces, ibid. 89. Heads an army 
 of twenty thousand veteran troops, ibid. 91. Va- 
 riance between him and Arsinoe, Ptolemy's sister, 
 Al. 3. 
 
 Acilla, demands a garrison from CEEsar, Af 30. Be- 
 sieged in vain by Considius, 30, 40. 
 
 Adiatomus, sallies upon Crassus at the head of a chosen 
 body of troops, G. iii. 23. 
 
 Adrumetum, held by Considius Longus with a garrison 
 of one legion, C. ii. 21. Caesar makes himself mas- 
 ter of it, Af. 77. 
 
 iEduans, complain to Caesar of the ravages committed 
 in their territories by the Helvetians, G. i. 9. Join 
 in a petition against Ariovistus, ibid. 23. At the 
 head of one of the two leading factions of Gaul, G. vi. 
 12. Caesar quiets an intestine commotion among 
 Ihem, G. vii. 30. And prevents their revolting from 
 the Romans, ibid. 35. Which nevertheless comes 
 to pass soon after, ibid. 52. 
 
 .Egimurus, a trireme belonging to Caesar, taken there 
 by Varus and Octavius, Af 41. 
 
 .Eginium, Domitius joins Caesar near that place, C. iii. 
 56. 
 
 MgviS and Roscillus, their perfidious behaviour to- 
 wards Caesar, C. iii. 21. 
 
 .Etolia, recovered from Pompey by the partizans of 
 
 Caesar, C. iii. 30. 
 Afranius, Pompey's lieutenant, his exploits in con- 
 junction with Petreius, C. i. 36. Carries the war in- 
 to Celtiberia, ibid. 55. Surrenders to Caesar, ibid. 
 76. Prevails with one of his slaves to despatch 
 him, Af 81. 
 
 .Africans, a crafty warlike people, Af 9. Their man- 
 ner of concealing their corn, ibid. 57. 
 Agar, defended with great bravery against the Getu- 
 
 lians, Af 18. 
 Agendicum, Caesar quarters four legions there, G. vi. 
 40. Labienus leaves his baggage in it under a guard 
 of new levies, and sets out for Lutetia, G. vii. 54. 
 Alba, Domitius levies troops in that neighbourhood, C. 
 
 1.13. 
 Albici, a kind of mountaineers taken into the service 
 of the Marseillians, C. i. 32. 
 
 Alces, a species of animals resembling in some re- 
 spects a goat, to be found in the Hercynian forest, 
 G. vi. 25. 
 Alesia, Caesar shuts up Vercingetorix there, G. vii. 62. 
 Surrounds it with lines of circumvallation and con- 
 travallation, ibid. 66. Obliges it to surrender, ibid. 
 82. 
 Alexandria, Caesar pursues Pompey thither, C. iii. 87. 
 Is une.^pectedly entangled in a war at that place, 
 ibid. 88. Difficulties Coesar had to encounter there 
 for want of water, Al. 4. Caesar enters the town 
 with his victorious army, and receives it into his 
 protection, ibid. 23. 
 Alexandrians, an acute and ingenious people, Al. 2. 
 But treacherous and without faith, ibid. 4. They pe- 
 tition Caesar to send them their king, ibid. 16. 
 AUier, Caesar eludes the vigilance of Vercingetorix, 
 
 and by an artifice passes that river, G. vii. 33. 
 AUobrogians, supposed to be not well affected to the 
 Romans, G. i. 5. Complain to Cjesar of the ravages 
 of the Helvetians, ibid. 9. 
 Alps, Caesar crosses them with five legions, G. i. 8. 
 Sends Galba to open a free passage over them to the 
 Roman merchants, G. iii. 1. 
 Amagetobria, famous for a defeat of the Gauls there by 
 
 Ariovistus, G. i. 23. 
 Amantia submits to Caesar, and sends ambassadors to 
 
 know his pleasure, C. iii. 10. 
 Amanus, a mountain in Asia near which Scipio sus- 
 tains some losses, C. iii. 28. 
 Ambarri, complain to Caesar of the ravages committed 
 
 in their territories by the Helvetians, G. i. 9. 
 Ambialites, join in a confederacy with the Veneti 
 
 against Caesar, G. iii. 9. 
 Ambiani furnish ten thousand men, to the general con- 
 federacy of the Belgians against Caesar, G. ii. 4. 
 Join with the Veneti in their revolt from the Romans, 
 G. iii. 9. Sue for peace, and submit themselves to 
 Caesar's pleasure, G. ii. 16. 
 Ambiorix, his artful speech to Sabinus and Cotta, G. 
 v. 23. Caesar marches against him, G. vi. 27. Ra- 
 vages and lays waste his territories, ibid. 31. En- 
 deavours in vain to get him into his hands, ibid. 40. 
 Ambivareti, ordered to furnish their contingent for 
 
 raising the siege of Alesia, G. vii. 69. 
 Ambivariti, the German cavalry sent to forage among 
 
 them, G. iv. 6. 
 Ambracia, Cassius directs his march towards that 
 
 place, C. iii. 31. 
 Amphilochi, reduced by Cassius Longinus, C. iii. 47. 
 35S 
 
PERSONS AND THINGS. 
 
 359 
 
 A.mphipolis, an edict ia Pompey's name published at 
 
 that place, G. iii. 84. 
 Anales, a people bordering upon the Hercyuian forest, 
 
 G. vi. 25. 
 Anas, a river bounding that part of Spain under the 
 
 government of Petreius, C. i. 36. 
 Ancalites, send ambassadors to CEesar, with an offer 
 
 of submission, G. v. 17. 
 Ancon, Cassar talres possession of it with a garrison 
 
 of one cohort, C. i. 10. 
 Andes, Caesar puts his troops into winter quarters 
 
 among them, G. ii. 36. 
 Anglesey, an island situated between Britain and Ire- 
 land, where the nigiit, during the winter, is said to 
 be a month long, G. v. 10. 
 Antiocliia, refuses to admit the fugitives after the bat 
 
 lie of Pharsalia, C. iii. 84. 
 Antony, obliges Libo to raise the siege of Brundusium, 
 C. iii. 22. And in conjunction with Kalenus, trans- 
 Dorts Caesar's troops to Greece, ibid. 24. 
 ApoUonia, Pompey resolves to winter there, C. iii. 3. 
 
 Caesar makes himself master of it, ibid. 10. 
 Aponiana, Ctesar orders his fleet to rendezvous near 
 
 that island, Af. 2. 
 Aspus, Caesar and Pompey encamp over against each 
 
 other on the banks of that river, C. iii. 11. 
 Apulia, Pompey quarters the legions Caesar had sent 
 
 him there, C. i. 14. 
 Aquilaria, Curio arrives there with the troops designed 
 
 against Africa, C. ii. 21. 
 Aquileia, Caesar draws together the troops quartered 
 
 there, G. i. 8. 
 Aquitains, reduced under the power of the Romans by 
 Crassus, G. iii. 21. Very expert in the art of mining, 
 ibid. 22. 
 Arar, the Helvetians receive a considerable check in 
 
 passing that river, G. i. 10. 
 Arden, Indutiomarus conceals the infirm and aged in 
 that forest, G. v. 3. Caesar crosses it in quest of Am- 
 biorix, G vi. 27. 
 Arecomici Volcas, Caesar plants garrisons among them, 
 
 G. vii. 7, 
 Ariminum, Caesar having sounded the disposition of 
 
 his troops, marches thither, C. i. 7. 
 Ariovistus, king of the Germans, his oppressive beha- 
 viour tov/ards the Gauls, G. i. 23. Caesar sends am- 
 bassadors to him demanding an interview, ibid. 26. 
 He is defeated and driven entirely out of Gaul, ibid. 
 41. 
 Aries, Caesar orders twelve galleys to be built there, 
 
 C. i. 34. 
 Armorici, assemble in great numbers to attack L. Fvos- 
 
 cius in his winter quarters, G. v. 44. 
 Arretium, Antony sent thither with five cohorts, C.i. 10. 
 Arsinoe, the daughter of Ptolemy, at variance with 
 Achillas, Al. 3. Caesar removes her out of Egypt, 
 ibid. 24. 
 Arverni, suddenly invaded, and their territories ra- 
 _ va^ed by Caesar, G. vii. 8. 
 Asculum, Caesar takes possession of it, C. i. 13. 
 Ascurum, attacked without success by young Pompey, 
 
 Af 21. 
 Asparagium, Pompey encamps near it with all his 
 
 forces, C. iii. 27. 
 Aspavia, Pompey's commuiiicat''->n with that place cut 
 
 oflfby Caesar's works, Sp. 24. 
 Asta, sen^ls ambassadors to Caesar with an offer of sub- 
 mission, Sp. 36. 
 Ategua, Caesar lays siege to the place, Sp. 6. Compels 
 it to surrender, ibid. 19. 
 
 Athens, contributes''iJp fit out a fleet for Pompey, C. iii 
 3. m 
 
 Atrebatians, furnish fifteen thousand men to the gene- 
 ral confederacy of Gaul, G. ii. 4. 
 
 Aluatuca, a strong castle, where Caesar deposits all his 
 baggage, when he sets out in pursuit of Ambiorix, 
 G. vi. 30. The Germans unexpectedly attack it, 
 ibid. 32. 
 
 Atuatuti, furnish twenty-nine thousand men to the 
 general confederacy of Gaul, G. ii. 4. Caesar obliges 
 them to submit, ibid. 29. Descendants of the Teu- 
 tones and Cimbri, ibid. 
 
 Avaricum, besieged by Caesar, G. vii. 12. And at last 
 taken by storm, ibid. 27. 
 
 Aulerci, reduced by P. Crassus, G. ii. 35. Massacre 
 their senate, and join Viridovix, G. iii. 17. Aulerci 
 Brannovices ordered to furnish their contingent to 
 the relief tf Alesia, G. vii. 69. Aulerci Cenomani 
 furnish five thousand, ibid. Aulerci Eburovices three 
 thousand, ibid. Aulerci Diablintes associate with 
 the Venetians in their revolt, G. iii. 9. 
 
 Ausci, submit to Crassus, and send hostages, G. iii. 28. 
 
 Auseiani, send ambassadors to Caesar, willi an offer 
 of suL mission, C. i. 54. 
 
 Auximum, Ctesar makes himself master of it, C. i. 11. 
 
 Axona, Caesar crosses ii. in his march against the Bel- 
 gians, G. ii. 6. 
 
 B 
 
 Bacenis, the Suevians encamp at the entrance of that 
 
 wood, resolving there to wait the approach of the 
 
 Romans, G. vi. 10. 
 
 Baculus, P. Sexlius, his remarkable bravery, G. vi. 35. 
 
 Baetis, Cassius encamps on the banks of that river, G. 
 
 46. 
 Bagradas, Curio arrives with his army at that river, 
 
 C. ii. 22. 
 Balearean Isles, young Pompey sails thither with his 
 fleet, Af 21. The inhabitants famous for their dex- 
 terity in the use of the sling, G. ii. 8. 
 
 Batavorum Insula, formed by the Meuse and the Waal, 
 G. iv. 7. 
 
 Belgians, the most v?arlike people of Gaul, G. i. 1. 
 Withstand the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, 
 G. ii. 4. Originally of German extraction, ibid. 
 Caesar obliges them to decamp, and return to their 
 several habitations, ibid. 11. 
 
 Bellocassians, furnish three thousand men to the re- 
 lief of Alesia, G. vii. 69. 
 
 Bellona, a famous and ancient temple of hers in Cap- 
 padocia, whose priest was next in authority to the 
 king, Al. 53. 
 
 Bellovaci, furnish a hundred thousand men to the gen- 
 eral confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4. Join in the 
 general defection under Vercingetor'x, G. vii. 55. 
 Again take up arms against Caesar, viii. 5. But are 
 compelled to submit and sue for pardim. 
 
 Berones, fly to the rescue of Cassius, threatened with 
 an assassination, Al. 42. 
 
 Bessi, make part of Pompey's army, C. iii. 3. 
 
 Bibracte, Caesar distressed for want of corn, marches 
 thither to obtain a supjily, G. i. 19. 
 
 Bibrax, attacked with great fury by the confederate 
 Belgians, G. ii. 7. 
 
 Bibroci, send ambassadors to Caesar to sue for peace, 
 G. <!. 17. 
 
 Bibulus, admiral of Pompey's fleet, takes some of Cae- 
 sar's transports, C. iii. 6. His cruelly towards the 
 prisoners that fell into his hands, ibid. 12. 
 
360 
 
 INDEX OF 
 
 Bigeri-onies, surrsnder and g \e hostages to Crassus, 
 G. iii. 23. ^'- 
 
 Biluri^iaus join with the Arverni in the general dcfec 
 tioii under Vercingetorix, G. vii. 5. 
 
 B.itjud, king of Mauriiauia, ids exploits in behalf of 
 Citsar, Al. 46. Invades Juba's kingdom, iii order to 
 oreale a diversion, At. '23. 
 
 Bjii, join with tlie Helvetian* in their expedition 
 against Gaul, G. i. 4. Attacks the Romans in flank, 
 ibid. 20. Ciesar allows them to settle among the iEdu- 
 ans, ibid. 1. 
 
 Bospliorus, Csesar invests Mithridates with the sover- 
 eignty of that country, Al. 63. 
 
 Branuovii, furnish their coulinger.'. to the relief of Ale- 
 sia, G. vii. 69. 
 
 Bratuspantium, submits and obtains pardon from Cte- 
 sar, G. ii. 14. 
 
 Bridge, built by Caesar over the Rhine, described, G. iv. 
 15. 
 
 Britain, Csesar's expedition thither, G. iv. 18. Descrip- 
 tion of the British r,oast, 21. The Romans land, in 
 spite of tlie vigorous opposition of the islanders, 22. 
 The Britons send ambassadors to Ciesar to desire a 
 peace, which they obtain on delivery of hostages, 
 24. They break the peace on hearing that Coesar's 
 fleet was destroyed by a storm, and set upon the Ro- 
 man foragers, 26. The manner of their fighting in 
 chariots ; they fall upon the Roman camp, but are 
 repulsed, and petition again for peace, 29. which Ca;- 
 ear grants them. Csesar passes over into their island 
 a second time, v. 7. Drives them from the woods 
 where they had taken refuge, 8. Describes their man- 
 ners and way of living, 10. Defeats tliem in several 
 encounters, U — IS. Grants them a peace, on the de- 
 livery of hostages, and agreeing to pay a yearly tri- 
 
 ' bute, 1. 9. 
 
 Brundusium, Pompey retires thither with his fo. ces, 
 C. i. 23. Cssar lays siege to it, 24. Pompey escapes 
 from it by sea, up in which the place immediately 
 surrenders to Caesar, 26. Libo blocks up the port 
 with a fleet, C. iii. 21. But by the valour and con- 
 duct of Antony, is obliged to retire, 22. 
 
 Brotherly love, a remarkable example of it, G. iv. 9. 
 Another in the conduct of the two Tici, Af. 26. 
 
 Brutus, appointed to command the fleet in the war 
 against the Vannes, G. iii. 11. Engages and defeats the 
 Venetians at sea, 14. Defeats the people of Marseilles 
 in a sea fight, C. i. 52. Engages them a second time 
 with the same good fortune, ii. 3. 
 
 Bullis, sends ambassadors to Caesar with an offer of 
 submission, C. iii. 10. 
 
 Bursavolenses, their conduct towards Cffisar and his 
 followers, Sp. 22. 
 
 C 
 
 Caeresi, join in the general confederacy of Belgium 
 against Caesar, G. ii. 4. 
 
 Ctesar takes post for Gaul, G. i. 6. Refuses the Helve- 
 tians a passage through the Roman province, ibid. 
 His answer to their ambassadors, 12. Defeats and 
 sends them back into their own country. Sends am- 
 bassadors to Ariovistus, 26. Calls a council of war: 
 his speech, 31. Begins his march, 32. His speech to 
 Ariovistus, 34. Totally routs the Germans, and 
 obliges them to repass the Rhine, 41. His war with 
 the Belgians, ii. 2. Reduces the Suessiones and 
 Bellovaci, 13. His prodigious slaughter of the Ner- 
 vians, 16—23. Obliges the Atuatuci to submit, 29. 
 Prepares for ;he war against the Venetians, iii. 9. De- 1 
 
 feats them in an engagement at sea, and totally sub- 
 dues them, 14. Is obliged to put his army into win- 
 ter quarters, before he can complete the reduction 
 of the Menapiaus and Moriiii, 211. IMarches to find 
 out the Germans ; his answer to their amijassadors, 
 iv. 5. Attacks them in their camp, and routs ihem, 
 10. Crosses the Rhine, and returns to Gaul, 13—17 
 His expedition into Britain described, IS Refits 
 his navy, 27. Comes to tlie assistance of his fora- 
 gers, whom the Britons had attacked, 28. Returns 
 to Gaul, 32. Gives orders for building a navy, v. 1 
 His preparations for a second expedition into Bri- 
 tain,2. Marches into the country of Treves to prevent 
 a rebellion, 3. Marches to Port Itius, and inviies all 
 the princes of Gaul to meet him there, 4. Sets sails 
 for Britain, 7. Describes the country and customs of 
 the inhabitants, 10. Fords the river Thames, and 
 puts Cassibelanus, Captain-general of the Britons, 
 to flight, 14. Imposes a tribute upon the Britons, and 
 returns into Gaul, 19. Routs the Nervians, and 
 relieves Cicero, 30. Resolves to winter in Gaul, 44. 
 His second expedition into Germany, vi. 9. His 
 description of the manners of the Gaids and Ger- 
 mans, 12, His return into Gaul, and vigorous pro- 
 secution of the war against Ambiorix, 27. Crosses 
 tlie mountains of the Cevennes in the midst of win- 
 ter, and arrives at Auvergne, which submits, vii. 8. 
 Takes and sacks Genabum, 11. Takes Noviodunum, 
 and marches from thence to Avaricum, 12. His 
 works before Alesia, 66. Withstands all the attacks 
 of ihe Gauls, and obliges the piece to surrender, 81. 
 Marches into the country of the Biturigians, and 
 compels them to submit, viii. 2. Demands Gutur- 
 vatus, who is delivered up and put to death, 31. 
 IMarches to besiege Uxellodunum, 32. Cuts oft' the 
 hands of the besieged at Uxellodunum, 36. J\]arches 
 to Corfinium, and besieges it, C. 1. 14. Which in a 
 short time surrenders, 22. He afterwards marched 
 through Abruzzo, and great part of the kingdom ot 
 Naples, 23. His arrival at Brundusium, and block- 
 ade of the haven, 24. Commits the siege of Mar- 
 seilles to the care of Brutus and Trebonius, 34. His 
 expedition to Spain, 35. His speech to Afranius, 77. 
 Comes to Marseilles, which surrenders, C. ii. 20. 
 Takes Oricum, iii. 9. Marches to Dyrrhachium to 
 cut offPompey's communication with that place, 35. 
 Sends Canuleius into Epirus for corn, 36. Besieges 
 Pompey in his camp; his reasons for it, 39. Enclos3S 
 Pompey's works w" iihin his fortifications ; a skirm- 
 ish between them, 39. His army reduced to great 
 straits for want of provisions, 40. Offers Pompey 
 battle, which he declines, 48. Sends Clodius to 
 Scipio, to treat about a peace, whose endeavours 
 prove ineffectual, 49. Joins Domiiius, storms and 
 takes the towns of Gomphus in Thessaly, in four 
 hours' time, 67. Gains an entire victory over Pom- 
 pey in the battle of Pharsalia, 76. Summons Ptole- 
 my and Cleopatra to attend him, S3. Burns the 
 Alexandrian fleet, 92. Conducts his transports safe 
 to Alexandria, Al. 6. Obtains a victory, takes two 
 ships, and sinks three, 12. Routs the Pharians, gains 
 the island and the town several taken and killed, 
 then fortifies the castle, gains the shore, stops up an 
 arch under the bridge, and begins to throw up a 
 rampart, 13. Marches to Ptolemy's camp, and de- 
 feats him, 22. Returns to Alexandria, and performs 
 Ptolemy the father's wil!,23. Defeats Pharnaces in a 
 great battle, 59. Passes over into Africa, Af 1. Has 
 several skirmishes with Labieuus near Ruspina, 12. 
 
PERSONS AND THINGS. 
 
 361 
 
 Irrecoverably defeats Scipio in the battle of Thapsus, 
 and cuts his whole army to pieces, 73. Converts 
 Juba'B kingdom into a province, and returns to 
 Kome, 85. Arrives in Spain, and lays siege to Cor- 
 dova, Sp. 2. Defeats young Pompey with great 
 slaughter in the plains of Munda, 31. 
 Calagurritani, send ambassadors to Caesar with an 
 
 offer of submission, C. i. 54. 
 Caletes, furnish ten thousand men in the general re- 
 volt of Belgium, G. ii. 4. 
 Camulogenus, appointed commander in chief by the 
 Parisians,G. vii. 54. Obliges Labienus to decamp 
 from before Paris, ibid. Is slain in disputing va- 
 liantly the victory with his enemy, 56. 
 Caninius sets Duracius at liberty, who had been shut 
 up in Limo by Dumnacus, G. viii. 21. Pursues 
 Drapes, 24. Lays siege to Uxellodunum, 27. 
 Canopus, Euphranor perishes in a sea-fight there, Al. 
 
 17. 
 Cantabrians, obliged by Afranius to furnish a supply 
 
 of troops, C. i. 36. 
 Caralilui, declare against Pompey, and expel Colta 
 
 with his garrison, C. i. 29. 
 Carmona, declares for Csesar, and expels the enemy's 
 
 garrison, C. ii. 17. 
 Carnutes,Caesar quarters some troops among them, G. 
 ii. 36. They openly assassinate Tasgetius, G. v. 21. 
 They send ambassadors to Caesar and submit, vi. 3. 
 Offer to be the first in taking up arms against the 
 Roman'jjvii. 2. Attack the Biturigians, but are dis- 
 persed and forced to lly by Ca;sar, viii. 4. 
 Carsulepus, detached to storm the highest part of the 
 
 enemy's camp which he firces, Al. 22. 
 Cassijsend ambassadors and subm'l to Casar, G. v. 17 
 Cassibelanus, chosen commander in chief of the con- 
 federate Britons, v. 9. Endeavours in vain to stop 
 the course of Caesar's conquests, 14. Is obliged to 
 submit, and accept of Caesar's terms, 19. 
 Cassius, Pompey's lieutenant, burns Caesar's fleet in 
 
 Sicily, C. iii. 83. 
 Cassius Longinus, his ill conduct in Spain, Al. 38. A 
 plot formed to assassinate him, 40. The conspira- 
 tors endeavour to put it in execution at Cordova, 42. 
 He is wounded as he lay on the ground by Squillus, 
 ibid. Upon his recovery, he orders all the assassins 
 to be seized, puts several to death, and compounds 
 with the rest for money, ibid. Behaves more tyran- 
 nically than ever, which occasions new disturban- 
 ces, 43. Is cast away in the mouth of the Iberus, 51. 
 Casticus, the sou of Catamantales, solicited by Orge- 
 
 torix to invade the liberty of his country, G. i. 3. 
 Calivulcus, lakes up arms against the Romans at the 
 instigation of Indmiomarus, G. v. 22. Poisons him- 
 self, vi. 29. 
 Cato, of Utica, the source of his hatred to Caesar, C. i. 
 3. Made pretor of Sicily, prepares for war, and ab- 
 dicates his province, 29. Excites young Pompey to 
 war, Af 21. Sends a reinforcement to Scipio, 33. 
 Kills himself, and is honourably buried by the Uli- 
 tans, 76. 
 Cavalry, their institution and manner of fighting 
 among the Germans, G. i. 39. iv. 2. And among the 
 Spaniards, Sp. 14. 
 Caturiges, oppose Caesar's passage over the Alps, G. i. 
 
 & 
 Cavarillus, taken and brought before Caesar, G. vii. 61. 
 Cavarinus, the Senones attempt to assassinate him, G. 
 V. 45. Caesar orders him to attend him with the ca- 
 valry of Senones, vi. 4. 
 
 Cevennes, mountains of, Caesar passes them in th« 
 midst of winter, though covered with snow six feet 
 
 deep,G. viii. 8. 
 Celtiberians, Afranius obliges them to furnish a supply 
 
 of troops, C. i. 36. 
 Celtillus, the father of 'Vercingetorix, assassinated by 
 
 the Arverni, G. vii. 4. 
 Chara, a root which served to subsist Csesar's army in 
 extreme necessity, C. iii. 40. Manner of preparing 
 it, ibid. 
 Chariots,manner of fighting with them among the Bri- 
 tons, G. iv. 29. Dexterity of the British charioteers, 
 ibid. Chariots armed with scythes in Pharnaces' 
 army, Al. 60. 
 Cicero, Quintus, attacked in his winter-quarters by 
 Ambiorix, G. v. 30. Informs Caesar of his distress, 
 who marches to relieve him, 37. Attacked unex- 
 pectedly by the Sigambri, who are nevertheless ob- 
 liged to retire, vi. 32. 
 Cingetorix, at the head of one of the factions among 
 the Treviri, and firmly attached to Caesar, G. v. 3. 
 Declared a public enemy, and his goods confiscated 
 by Indutiomarus, 47. 
 Cleopatra, engaged in a war with her brother Ptole- 
 my, C. iii. 85. She and her younger brother consti- 
 tuted king and queen of Egypt, Al. 24. 
 Clodius, sent by Caesar to Scipio, to treat about a 
 
 peace, but without effect, C. iii. 49. 
 Clusinas, a centurion, dismissed from Caesar's army 
 
 with ignominy, Af. 48. 
 Ccelius, Kufus, raises a sedition in Rome, C. iii. 18. la 
 expelled that city, then joins with MJlo, 19. He is 
 killed,20. 
 Combat, between Turpio and Niger, Sp. 25. 
 Comius, sent by Caesar into Britain to dispose the Bri. 
 tish states to submit. G. iv. 19. Persuades the Bello 
 vaci to furnish their contingent to the relief of Ale- 
 sia, vii. 69. His distrust of the Romans occasioned 
 by an attempt to assassinate him, viii. 19. Infests 
 the Romans greatly, and intercepts their convoys, 
 38. Attacks Volusenus Quadratus, and runs him 
 through the thigh, 39. Submits to Antony, on condl 
 tion of not appearing in the presence of any Roman, 
 ibid. 
 Cometodunus, heads the Carnutes in their revolt from 
 theRomans,and the massacre atGenabum,G. viii.3. 
 Considius, his cruel treatment of a messenger sent to 
 him with a letter by Plancus, Af. 4. Slain by the Ge- 
 tulians for the sake of his treasure, 81. 
 Constancy and firmness of Vercingetorix preserve 
 him in the chief command, and increase his author 
 ity even amidst losses sustained, G. vii. 28. 
 Convictolitanis, a division on his account among the 
 .ffiduans, G. vii. .30. Caesar confirms his election to 
 the supreme magistracy, 31. He persuades Litavi- 
 cus and his brothers to rebel, 35. 
 Cordova, Caesar summons the leading men of the 
 several states of Spain to attend him there, C.ii, 17. 
 Transactions of that assembly, 19. Caesar lays 
 siege to it, and obliges it to surrender, Sp. 33. 
 Corfinium, Caesar lays siege to it, C. i. 14. And obliges 
 
 it to surrender, 22. 
 Corn, the manner of concealing and securing it 
 
 among the Africans, Af. 57. 
 Comificius, Q. maintains Caesar's cause in Illyricum 
 
 with great reputation, Al. 32. 
 
 Correus, general of the Bellovaci, with six thousand 
 
 foot, and a thousand horse, lies in ambush for the 
 
 Roman foragers ; he attacks the Roman cavalry 
 
 3 A 
 
362 
 
 INDEX OF 
 
 with a small party, is routed and killed, G. viii. IG. 
 Colla, L. Arunculeius, dissents from Sabinus in rela- 
 tion to the advice given tliem oy Ambiorix, G. v. 24. 
 
 His beliaviour wlien attacked by tlie Gauls, 27. Is 
 
 slain Willi tlie greatest part of his men, after a brave 
 
 resistance, 29. 
 Cotuatus and Conetodunus, massacre all the Roman 
 
 merchants at Grenabum, G. vii. 3. 
 Cotus, a division on his account among the JEduans, 
 
 G. vii. 30. Obliged to desist from his pretensions to 
 
 the supreme magistracy, 31. 
 Counsel, the danger of deferring it to the very last, G. 
 
 V.27. 
 Crassus, P. his expedition into Aquitain, G. iii. 21. He 
 
 reduces the Sotiates, 22. Also other slates, obliging 
 
 them to give hostages. 2S. 
 Crastinus's character and courage at the battle of 
 
 Pharsalia, C. iii. 75. He is killed there, 76. 
 Crispus, C. Sallusiius, makes himself master of Cer- 
 
 cina, and sends a great quantity of corn thence to 
 
 CsBsar's camp, Af. 31. 
 Critognatus, his extraordinary speech and proposal to 
 
 the garrison of Alesia, G. vii. 71. 
 Curio, obliges Cato to abandon the defence of Sicily, 
 
 C. i. 39. Sails for Africa, and successfully attacks 
 
 Varus, ii. 21. His fine speech lo revive the courage 
 
 of his men, 28. Defeats Varus, 30. Giving too easy 
 
 credit to a piece of false intelligence, is cut off wiiii 
 
 his whole army, 34, 
 
 D 
 
 Dejotarus, complains to Domitius Calvinus of the hos- 
 tilities committed by Pharnaces, Al. 25. Addresses 
 Caesar in suppliant terms, and obtains pardon, 54. 
 Didius, pursues young Fompey, who is slain, and his 
 head brouglit to Csesar, Sp. 37. He falls into an am- 
 buscade, and is killed, 40. 
 DiviliacuB, the .Eduan, his attachment to the Romans 
 and Csesar, G. i. 16 CiEsar, for his sake, pardons his 
 brother Dumnorix, ibid. He complains to Csesar, in 
 behalf of the rest of the Gauls, of the cruelties txer- 
 cised by Ariovisius, 23. Advises Caesar to avoid the 
 defiles, by taking a ciroiit of forty miles, 32. JMarches 
 against the Bellovaci to create a diversion in fa- 
 vour of Ciesar, ii. 11. Intercedes for the Bellovaci, 
 and obtains their pardon from Caesar, 15. Goes to 
 Rome to implore aid of the senate, but witlwut eft'ect, 
 vi. 12. 
 Domitius Ahenobarbus, besieged by Csesar in Corfi- 
 nium, writes to Fompey for assistance, C. i. 15. 
 Seized by his own troops, who offer to deliver him 
 up lo Cresar, 19. Ccesar's generous behaviour to- 
 wards him, 22. He enters Marseilles, and is entrust- 
 ed with tlie supreme command, 34. Is defeated in a 
 sea-fighl by Decimus Brulus, 52. Escapes wiih great 
 difficulty a little before the surrender of Marseilles, 
 ii. 20. 
 Domitius Calvinus, sent by Caesar into Maredonia, 
 comes very opportunely to the relief of Cassius 
 Longinus, G. iii. 31. Gains several advantages over 
 Scipio, XS. Is unsuccessful against Pharnaces in 
 Armenia, Al. 25. 
 Drapes, in conjunction with Luterius, seizes Uxellodu- 
 nuni, G. viii. 26. His camp stormed, and himself 
 made prisoner, 29. He starves himself, 36. 
 Druids, priests so called, greatly esteemed in Gaul, 
 and possessed of many valuable privileges, G. vi. 13. 
 Dumnacus, besieges Duracius in Limo, G. viii. 21. Is 
 defeated by Fabius, 22. 
 
 Dumnorix, the brother off 'vitiacus, his character, O. 
 
 i. 15. He persuades the noblemen of Gaul not to gu 
 
 with Cxsar into Briluin, v. 5. He deserts, and ifl 
 
 killed for his obstiftacy, 6. 
 Duracius, besieged in Limo, by Dumnacus, general 
 
 of the Andes, C. vii. 21. 
 Dyrrhachium, Csesar endeavours to enclose Pompey 
 
 within his lines near tliai place, C. iii. 36. 
 
 E 
 
 Eburones, Caesar takes severe vengeance on them fop 
 
 their perfidy, G. vi. 29. 
 Eburovices, massacre their senate, and join with Vii^ 
 
 idovix, G. iii. 17. 
 Elephants, the way of exercising and training them, 
 
 Af. 25. Surprising courage of a soldier attacked by 
 
 an elephant, Af. 72. 
 Eleutheri, furnish troops to the relief of Alesia, G. vii. 
 
 69. 
 Ephesus, the temple of Diana there in danger of be- 
 ing stripped, C. iii. 28. 
 Eporedorix, treaclierously revolts from Caesar, G. vii. 
 
 51. 
 Etesian winds, detain Cxsar at Alexandria, which in* 
 
 volves him in a new war, C. 6S. 
 Eupbrauor, admiral of the Rhodian fleet, his valour 
 
 and magnanimity, Al. 11. 
 Excommunication, the dreadful consequences of it 
 
 among the Gauls, G. vi. 13. 
 F 
 Fabius, C. one of Caesar's lieutenants, sent into Spain, 
 Willi three legions, C. i. 35. Builds two bridges over 
 the Sicoris for the convenience of forage, 38. 
 Frustus Sylla, his death, Af. 83. 
 Fortune, her wonderful power and influence in 
 ters of war, G. vi. 28, 32. 
 
 G 
 
 Gabali, join the general confederacy of Vercingetorix, 
 
 and give hostages to Luterius of Quercy, G. vii, 7. 
 Gabinius, one of Csesar's lieutenants, receivesa con- 
 siderable loss in Ulyricum, A1.32. 
 
 Galba Sergius, sent against the Nantuates, Veragri- 
 ans, and Seduni,G. iii, 1, The barbarians attack his 
 camp unexpectedly, but are repulsed with great loa-i 
 ibid. 5. 
 
 Gauls, their country preferable to that of the Germans, 
 G. i. 23. Their manner of attacking towns, ii. 7. Of 
 greater stature than the Romans, 30. Quick and 
 hasty in their resolves, iii. 8. Forward in unaertak- 
 ing warSjbut soon fainting under niisforl^nes, 20. 
 Their manner of entering upon a war, v. 47. Their 
 manners, chiefs, druids, discipline, cavalry, religion, 
 origin, marriages, and funerals, vi. 13. Their coun- 
 try geographically described, i. 1. 
 
 Gaiiymed, made commander of the Egyptian army, Al. 
 3. Irritates people by his tyrannical behaviour, 16. 
 
 Gergovia, of the Arverni, Vercingelori-x expelled 
 thence by Gobanitio, G. vii. 4. The Romans attack- 
 ing it eagerly, are repulsed wiih great slaughter, 44. 
 Of the Boii, besieged in vain by Vercingetorix, 10. 
 
 Germans, habituated from their infancy to arms, G. i. 
 27. Their manner of training their cavalry, 39. 
 Their superstition, 40. Defeated by Caesar, 41. Their 
 manners, religion, and strength in wars, vi. 19. 
 Men of huge stature and strength, G. i. 32. Af. 30. 
 
 Getulians, desert in great numbers from Scipio to C«B- 
 sar, Af 32. 
 
 Gomphi, refusing to open its gates to Csesar, is taken 
 by assault, C. iii. 67. 
 
PERSON AND THINGS. 
 
 363 
 
 Gorduni, join with Ambiorix in his attack of Cicero's 
 
 camp, G. V. 31. 
 Graioceli, oppose Caesar's passage over the Alps, G. i. 
 
 8. 
 Grudii, join with Ambiorix in his attack of Cicero's 
 
 camp, G. V. 31. 
 
 H 
 
 Heliacmon, Scipio leaves Favonius with orders to 
 
 build a fort on that river, C. iii. 31. 
 Helvetians, the most warlike people of Gaul, G. i. 1. 
 
 Their design of abandoning their own country, 2. 
 
 Attacked with considerable loss near the river 
 
 Arar, 10. Vanquished and obliged to return home 
 
 by Csesar,21. 
 Helvians, Caesar marches into their territories, G. vii. 
 
 8. 
 Hercynian Forrest, its prodigious extent, G. vi, 23. 
 Hippo, Scipio attacked by P. Siiius, perishes there, Af. 
 
 84. 
 Hispalis, Caesar makes himself master of it, Sp. 35. 
 Human flesh, Critognatus advises the garrison of Ale- 
 
 sia to submit to eat it rather than surrender, G. vii. 
 
 71. 
 
 I 
 
 Jacetani, revolt from Afranius and submit to C<Esar; 
 C. i. 54. 
 
 Iguvium, forsakes Pompey, and submits to Caesar, C. i. 
 11. 
 
 lUurgavonenses, submit to Csesar, and supply him 
 with corn, C. i. 54. 
 
 Illyricum, Gabinius receives a considerable check 
 there, Al. 32. 
 
 Indutiomarus, at the head of a considerable faction 
 among the Treviri, G. v. 3. Endeavouring to make 
 himself master of Labienus's camp,is repulsed and 
 slain, 47. 
 
 Issa, revolts from Caesar at the instigation of Octavius, 
 C. iii. 7. 
 
 Italica, shuts its gates against Varro, C. 18. 
 
 Itius Portus, Caesar embarks there for Britain, G. v. 4. 
 
 Juba, king of the Numidia, strongly attached to Pom- 
 pey, C. ii. 22. Advances with a great army to the 
 relief of Utica, 32. Detaches a part of his troops to 
 sustain Sabura, 36. Is obliged to return and defend 
 his own kingdom against king Bogud, Af. 23. Joins 
 Scipio with a great body of troops, 43. Attacking a 
 party of Caesar's men, is repulsed with great loss, 
 46. His haughty behaviour towards Scipio, 51. Fail- 
 ing in an attempt upon his own life, prevails with a 
 slave to despatch him, 82. 
 
 Jura, the boundary of the Helvetians towards the Se- 
 quani, G. i. 2. 
 
 K 
 
 Kalenus Fufius, intercepted by Bibulus in returning 
 with the transports to Brundusium, C. iii. 6. Em- 
 barks with the troops for Greece, but understanding 
 that the enemy's fleet was on the coast, returns in- 
 stantly to Brundusium, 12. Ke-embarks some lime 
 after, and brings ail the troops safe to Caesar, 24. 
 Makes himself master of several towns in Achaia, 
 and endeavours by his ambassadors to bring over the 
 rest, 47. 
 
 L 
 
 Labienus, Titus, despatched by Caesar to take posses- 
 sion of the top of the mountain under which the 
 Helvetians were encamped, G. i 17. Detaches the 
 tenth legion to Caesar's assistance, ii. 26. Marches 
 
 ,at the head of the cavalry into the country of the 
 Treviri, iii. 11. Sallies upon Indutiomarus, who is 
 repulsed and slain with the greatest part of his 
 troops, V. 49. Counterfeiting fear, falls suddenly 
 upon the Treviri, and puts them to flight, vi. 6. Joins 
 Cxsar after a successful expedition against the Pari- 
 sians, vii. 54. Attempts to take off Comius, whom 
 he found plotting against Caesar, viii. 19. Joining 
 Pompey's party, obliges the army to take an oath of 
 fidelity to that general, C. iii. 11. Confers with Va- 
 tiniusin relation to a peace, 17. Insults the prisoners, 
 and puts them to death, 69. Vilifies Caesar's troops, 
 and extols the conduct of Pompey, 72. Has several 
 conflicts with Caesar near Ruspina, Af. 12. Attacks 
 Leptis, but without success, 27. Takes possession 
 of a hill, but is dislodged by Caesar, 44. Attacks 
 Caesar's men returning from their work, but is re- 
 pulsed with great slaughter, 46. Lying in ambush 
 for Caesar, is attacked and put to flight, 57. Is slain 
 in the battle of Munda, Sp. 31. 
 Leelius, one of Pompey's admirals, blocks up the port 
 
 of Brundusium, C. iii. 82. 
 Lentulus, the consul, ground of his opposition to Cae- 
 sar, C. i. 3. 
 Lepidus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, quiets the com- 
 motions in Spain, occasioned by the dissension be- 
 •tween Marcellus and Cassius, A1.50. 
 Leptis, sends ambassadors to Caesar with an offer of 
 
 submission, Af. 6. 
 Liberiy, all men naturally aspire after it, and abhor 
 
 servitude, G. iii. 10. 
 Libo, one of Pompey's admirals, blocks up the port of 
 
 Brundusium, C. iii. 21. 
 Lissus, abandons the party of Pompey, and opens ha 
 gates to Antony, C. iii. 26. Besieged in vain by young 
 Cneus Pompey, ibid. 34. 
 Lilavicus, his artful stratagem to draw off the .Slduans 
 
 from Caesar's alliance, G. vii. 36. 
 Lusitania, held by Varro for Pompey with two legions, 
 
 C. i. 36. 
 Luterius, in conjunction with Drapes, takes possession 
 of Uxellodunum, G. viii. 26. Is attacked at the head 
 of a large convoy, and put to flight, 28. Falling into 
 the hands of Epasnactus, is by him delivered bound 
 to Caesar, 36. 
 Lutetia, Labienus, marches thither with four legions, 
 G. vii. 54 
 
 M 
 
 Macedonia, Domitius and Scipio arrive much about 
 the same time m that country, C. iii. 31. 
 
 Mandubii, expelled Alesia, perish miserably between 
 the town and Caesar's lines, G. vi. 71. 
 
 Marcellus, the consul, endeavours to deprive Caesar of 
 his province before the time, G. viii. 44. 
 
 Marcellus, M. a partisan of Caesar, his dissension with 
 Cassius Longinus, Al. 44. 
 
 Marseilles, shuts its gates against Caesar, C. i. 32. Cae- 
 sar invests it, and commits the conduct of the siege 
 to Brutus and Trebonius, 34. The Marseillians are 
 defeated in a naval engagement by Brutus, 52. Tre- 
 bonius pushes the siege with great vigour, ii. 1. The 
 Marseillians sue for a truce, which they afterwards 
 break, 11. Again sue for peace; 15. The pUce sur- 
 renders to Caesar, 20. 
 
 Mediomatrici, furnish their contingent to the relief of 
 Alesia, G. vii. 69. 
 
 Menapians, furnish nine thousand men to'the general 
 confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4. Join with the peo- 
 
364 
 
 INDEX OF 
 
 pie of Yannes in their revolt Irom Caesar, iii. 9. 
 Caesar attacks them and makes some progress, but 
 the season being lar advanced is obliged to desist, 
 29. Tiiurius and Cotta destroy their territories 
 with fire and sword, iv. 31. Csesar at length obliges 
 iheni to submit, vi. 5. Originally settled on the 
 banks of he Uhine, till driven Ihence by the Usipe- 
 tes and Tenchtheri, iv. 4. 
 Metropolis, lieariug of the fate of Gomphi, surrenders 
 
 to Csesar, C. iii. 68. 
 Milo, endeavouring to raise disturbances in Italy, is 
 
 tilled, C. iii. 20. 
 Minerva, prodigies in her temple at Elis, on the day 
 
 of the battle of Pharsalia, C. iii. S6. 
 Mithridates, raises an army in Syria and Cilicia, and 
 marches into Egypt to Csesar's assistance, Al. IS. 
 Ptolemy endeavours in vain to prevent his junction 
 with Cssar, 20. 
 Morini, furnish five and twenty thousand men to the 
 general confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4. Join with 
 the people of Vannes in their revolt from Csesar, iii. 
 9. Caesar attacks them and makes swie progress, 
 but the season being far advanced is obliged to de- 
 sist, 29. Attacking the Romans, dispersed for the 
 sake of plunder, are repulsed with great slaughter, 
 iv. 34. 
 Munda, Ctesar encamps in the neighbourhood of that 
 city, Sp. 27. Battle of Munda, in which young Pom- 
 pey is totally defeated, 29. Cssar besieges the run- 
 aways in that place, 3i. Which at length is compell- 
 ed to surrender at discretion, 41. 
 Musculus, of prodigious length, made use of in the 
 siege of Marseilles, C. ii. 9. 
 N 
 Nantuates, Galba's expedition against them, C, iii. 1. 
 Narbonne, Luierius of Quercy make 3 ;in attempt upon 
 
 it, G. vii. 7. 
 Nasidius, L. a partisan of Pompey, comes to the relief 
 of Marseilles with a fleet, C. ii. 3. But is defeated 
 in a naval engagement by Brutus, 5. 
 Nervians, furnish fif'.y thousand men to the general 
 confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4. Their manners and 
 warlike spirit, 16. Their method of defending their 
 country from sudden incursions, 17. Defeated by 
 Caesar in a great battle, and almost totally cut ofl', 
 23. Attack Cicero's camp, but are repulsed, v. 30. 
 Again defeated and put to flight by Caesar, 42. Still 
 continuing their endeavours to shake oft" the yoke, 
 Cssar quells them by a sudden invasion, vi. 2. 
 Niger, Q. Pompeius, accepts the challenge of Antistius 
 lurpio, and advances into the field against him, Sp. 
 25. 
 Nitobrigians, Luterius of Qwercy compels them to 
 join in the general confederacy of Gaul, under Ver- 
 cingetori.v, G. vii. 7. 
 Noviodunum, of the Suessiones, surrenders to Ctesar, 
 G. ii. 15- Of the Biturigians, treacherously breaks 
 the capitulation made with Caesar, vii. 12. Of the 
 .Eduans, revolts from Cssar, and massacres all the 
 Romans in the place, 52. 
 Numidians, their manner of fighting described, Af. 13. 
 
 The difliculty of making head against them, 61. 
 Nymphaeum, a promontory and harbour where Cae- 
 sar's transports find shelter when pursued by C. 
 Caponius, C. iii. 24. 
 
 Octavius, M. a commander under Pompey, lays siege 
 to Salonse, but is repulsed by a sudden sally from 
 the town, C. iii. 7. Is defeated in a naval engagement 
 by Vatinius, near the isle of Tauris, Al. 35. 
 
 Octodurus, Galba resolves to take up his winter quar- 
 ters there, G, ii. 1. 
 Orchomenus, submits to Kalenus, one of Caesar's lieu- 
 tenants, C. iii. 47. 
 Orgelori.\, persuades the Helvetians to go in quest of 
 new habitations, G. i. 2 Is suspected of having 
 made away with himself, to avoid the ignominy of a 
 public trial, 5. 
 Oricum, Ctesar makes himself master of it, C. iii. 9. 
 Some of Csesar's galleys burnt there by young Pom- 
 pey, 34. 
 Osrenses, quit the pany of Afranius, and submit to 
 
 C»sar, C. i. 54. 
 Osisniians, reduced under the power of the Romans 
 by young P. Crassus, G. ii. 35. Join with the people 
 of Vannes, iii. 9. 
 
 P 
 Pacidius, e.xtends his front of cavalry, with design to 
 
 inclose Caesar's troops, Af. 67. 
 Psemani, join in the general confederacy of the Belgi- 
 ans, G. ii. 4. 
 Parada, Scipio's cavalry,in their retreat, seize and re- 
 duce it to ashes, Af. 75. 
 Parisians, join in the general confederacy of Gaul 
 
 imder Vercingetorix, G. vif. 4. 
 Pelusium, Pompey flying thither for refuge, is murder- 
 ed by Ptolemy's order, C. iii. 36. MithriJates march- 
 ing to the assistance of Caesar, attacks and makes 
 himself master of it, Al. IS. 
 Petra, Pompey encamps near that place, C. iii. 36. 
 Petreius, in conjunction with Yarro and Afranius, pre- 
 pares to defend Spain for Pompey. C. i. 36- Trans- 
 fers the war into Celiiberia, 55. Breaks olf the con- 
 ferences between his and Cwsar's troops, 67. Sur- 
 renders to Caesar, 76. Dies voluntarily by the hand 
 of Juba,Af. &2. 
 Pharnaces, slights the orders of Domitiue Calvinus, Al. 
 25. Defeats the Romans in a great battle, 30. Is de- 
 feated in his turn by Caesar with great slaughter, 69. 
 Pharsalia, a decisive battle fought there between Cae- 
 sar and Pompey, C. iii. 76. 
 Pharus, Caesar takes possession of it on account of its 
 
 commanding the port of Alexandria, C. iii. 93. 
 Picenum, Caesar overruns that whole region, and 
 
 obliges it to submit, C. i. 12. 
 Pirusise, send ambassadors to Caesar with offers of 
 
 submission, G. v. 1. 
 Pisaurum, Caesar takes possession of it with one co- 
 hort, C. i. 10. 
 Fleumosii, jointly with the Nerviansjfall upon Cicero's 
 
 camp, G. V. 31. 
 Pompey, his confidence and presumption before the 
 battle of Pharsalia, C. iii. 59. Is totally defeated jy 
 Caesar with the loss of his camp, 76. Flies into 
 Egypt, where he is murdered by order of king Ptole- 
 my, S5. 
 Pompey, Cn. the son, burns part of Caesar's fleet at 
 Oricum, C. iii. 34. Attacks Ascurum, but wiihott 
 success, Af. 21. Is totally defeated by Caesar, in the 
 plains of Munda, Sp. 2S. Beingretarded in his flight 
 by a wound he had received, is overtaken and slain 
 39. 
 Poihinus, administrator of Egypt for young Ptolemy, 
 
 involves him in a war with Caesar, C. iii. 89. 
 Prietorius, C. Yirgilius, an admiral under Pompey, 
 makes a capture of a vessel belonging to Caesar, Af 
 26. 
 Preciani, submit to Crassus, and give hostages, G. iii. 
 
 Procillus, C. Valerius, sent upon an embassy to Ario- 
 
PERSONS AND THINGS 
 
 365 
 
 vislus, G. I. 39. Recovered from the treacherous 
 Gerni'-tnB to the gieal jpy of Caesar, 41. 
 
 Ptolemy, king irf Egypt, defeated by Caesar in a great 
 battle, A 1. 2i 
 
 Pulfio, T. his contest with Varenus for the prize of va- 
 lour, G. V. 36. 
 
 Pyrenean mountains, divide Aquitain from Spiln, G. i. 
 1. 
 
 R 
 
 Bavenna, the tribunes fly thither to Caesar from Rome, 
 C. i. 4. 
 
 Rauraci, juin vi'ith the Helvetians in their expedition 
 in quest of new seltlemenis, G. i. 4. 
 
 Rebilus, lieutenant-general, his advice to Curio inlhe 
 battle against Varus, C. li. 30. 
 
 Bhedones, reduced under obedience to Caesar by 
 young Crassus, G. ii. 3.5. 
 
 Rhemi, refuse to join the Belgian confederacy, G. ii. 3. 
 Succeed the Sequani in their authority over the rest 
 of Gaul, vi. 12. 
 
 Roscillus and JE'jub, their perfidious behaviour to- 
 wards Cajsar, C. ii. 51. 
 
 Ruteni, reduced under the dominion of the Romans by 
 Q. Fabius iVlaximus, G. i. 36. 
 S 
 
 Sabinus, Q. Tilurius, by an artful stratagem engages 
 and defeats the Unellians and their confederates, 
 G. ili. 17. Is circumvented and cut off with his 
 whole army by Anibiorix, v. 2.3. 
 
 Sabura, commander of the Numidian troops under 
 King Juba, cuts off Curio with his whole army, C. 
 ii. 34. 
 
 Salonae, invested by M. Octavius, who, by a sudden 
 sally of the garri8on,is obliged to raise the siege, C. 
 iii. 7. 
 
 Samarobriva, Caesar holds a general assembly of the 
 states of Gaul there, G. v. 20. 
 
 Santones, furnish their contingent to the relief of Ale- 
 sia, G. vii. 69. 
 
 Sardinia, Valerius takespossessionof it for Caesar, C. 
 i. 29 
 
 Scipio, Fompey's lieutenant, behaves in a very tyran- 
 nical manner in Asia, C. iii. 28. Is very near sur- 
 prising Domititis in Macedonia, 31. Joins Petreius 
 and Labienus, encamps within three miles of Caesar, 
 Af 22. His manner of training his elephants, 2.5. 
 Draws up his troops in order of battle, with a view 
 to bring on an engagement with Caesa', 28. His 
 cruelty towards some of Caesar's soldiers who had 
 been made prisoners, 41. Vigorously attacks Cie- 
 sar's horse, but is repulsed with great slauzhter, 46. 
 Is totally defeated by Caesar in the battle of Thapsus, 
 70. Perishes in a sea-fight with P. Sitius,8t. 
 
 Seduni, Galba's e.vpedition against them, G. iii. 1. 
 
 Senones, submit with impatience to the Roman yoke, 
 G. V. 45. But are obliged at length to submit and 
 give hostages, vi. 3. 
 
 Sicily, abandoned by Cato, receives Curio, and sub- 
 mits to Cjpsar, C. i. 29. 
 
 Sicoris, Fabius makes two bridges over it, C. i. 38. 
 
 Sicambri, refuse to deliver up the Usipetes and Tench- 
 theri who had taken refuge among them, G iv. 13. 
 Caesar lays waste their territories, 16. They fall 
 unexpectedly upon Cicero's camp, but are repulsed, 
 vi. 32. 
 Silo Minuiius, stabs Cassius Longinus twice with a 
 
 dagger, Al. 42. 
 Silius, P. enters Xumidia, and storms a fort belonging 
 32 
 
 to king Juba, stored with ammunition and provision, 
 Af. 'Si. Defeats Sabura, Juba's lieutenant, and 
 makes Faueius and Afranius prisoners, S3. 
 
 Suevians, under the conduct of Nasua and Cimberiue, 
 endeavour to cross the Rhine, G. i. 28. Their man- 
 ners, way of living, and regulations with respect to 
 war, iv. 2. Their high reputation for bravery, 6. 
 Their pieparations to secure themselves and with- 
 stand Caesar, vi. 8. 
 
 Sulla, P. advances with two legions to the assistance 
 of a cohort, that had been attacked by the Pompe- 
 iaris, who are repulsed, C. iii. 43. 
 'i' 
 
 Tarbelli, submit and send hostages to Crassug, G. iii. 
 28. 
 
 T.;ru8ates, Crassus marches into their territories, G. 
 iii. 24. They submit and send hostages, 28. 
 
 Tauris, Vatinius attacks and defeats Octavius's fleet, 
 near that island, Al. 35. 
 
 Tenchtheri, in conjunction with the Usipetes, pass the 
 Rhine, G. iv 1. Expel the Menapians their own 
 territories, 4. Are defeated and almost totally cut 
 off by Caesar, 10. 
 
 Teutones, the Belgians alone refuse them entrance in- 
 to their territories, G. ii. 4. 
 
 Thapsus, a great battle there between Caesar and Sci- 
 pio, in which the latter was totally defeated, Af. 70. 
 
 Thebes, voluntarily submits to Kalenus, C. iii. 47. 
 
 Tigurinus, a canujn of the Helvetians so called, almost 
 totally cut off by Caesar, G. i. 10. 
 
 Tisdra, demands a garrison from Cajsar, Af 33. 
 
 Torquatus, L. a commander under Pompey, obliged to 
 abandon the defence of Oricum, C iii. 9. 
 
 Trebonius, C. his prodigious works before Marseilles, 
 C. ii. 1. 
 
 Treviri, complain to Caesar of the hardships they suf- 
 fered from the Germans, G. i. 28. Their cavalry 
 accounted the bravest and best disciplined in fraul, 
 ii. 24. Caesar quiets the domestic dissensions arista 
 among them, and espouses the parly of Cingetorix, 
 V. ''. They rebel against the Romans, but are de- 
 feated and brought back to their duty by Labienus, 
 vi 6- 
 
 Trinobantes, send ambassadors to Caesar with offers 
 of submission, and to request his protection fjr their 
 kins Mandubralius, G. v. 16. 
 
 Tvilingi, j'lin with the Helvetians in their expedition 
 in quest of new settlements, G. i. 4. 
 V 
 
 Vacca, petitions Caesar for a garrison, but is seized 
 and sacked by Juba before the tro ps arrive, Af. 62. 
 
 Valerius Flaccus, lakes possession of Sardinia for 
 Caesar, C. i. 29, 
 
 Varenus, his contest with Pulfio for the prize of va- 
 1 lur, G. V. 36. 
 
 Varro, M Pompey's lieutenant in Spain, prepares to 
 oppose Caesar, C. ii. 16. But teng fjrsaken by the 
 whole province, desists from his purpose, and sub- 
 mits, 18. 
 
 Varus Atlius, one of Pompey's officers, withdraw! 
 with his garrison from Auximum, C. i. 2. Passef 
 over into Africa, and seizes it for Pompey, 29. Co. 
 rio at first wars against him with success, ii. 22. 
 But receiving afterwards succours fr^m Juba, Curio 
 is totally defeated and slain, 34. Burns Caesar's 
 transports near Leptis, and takes two quinqueremes, 
 Af. 55. 
 Vatinius, defends the port of Brundusium against D. 
 
366 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Ltelius, C. ill 82. Defeats Octavius in a sea-fight 
 near Taurus, Al. 35. 
 
 Ubians, their country, manners, and way of life de- 
 scribed, G. iv. 3. 
 
 Venetians, reduf ' by young Crassus under the domi- 
 nion of the Roi .ans, G. ii 35. But soon after rebel, 
 and draw other states into the revolt, iii. 7. Power- 
 ful in their fleets and shipping, 8. Form and struc- 
 ture of their vessels, 13. They are totally defeated 
 in an engagement at sea, 14. 
 
 Veragrians, Galba's expedition against them, G. iii. 1. 
 
 Vercingetorix rouses the several states of Gaul against 
 the Romans, and with universal consent is declared 
 generalissimo of the league, G. vii. 4. Lays siege to 
 Gergovia, a town belonging to the Boii, 10. Clears 
 himself from the charge of treason, 9. Consoles 
 his followers upon the loss of Avuricura, 28. Not 
 being able to hinder Caesar's passmg the AUier, he 
 encamps under Gergovia, of the Averut, Si. Attacks 
 Cxsar with his cavalry, and is repulsed with great 
 loss, 59. He takes refuge in Alesia, 62. Dismisses 
 all his cavalry, with instructions to rouse their seve- 
 ral states, to his relief, 65. Prepares to assist his 
 countrymen by a vigorous sally, 72. Ts obliged at 
 last to surrender himself with the town to Csesar, 82. 
 
 Vergasillaunus, appointed one of the commanders of 
 the confederate forces for the relief of Alesia, G. yii. 
 
 70. Charged with the detachment destined to attack 
 the upper camp, 76. 
 
 Vergobret, tlie name given to the chief magistrate an- 
 nually chosen by the JJduaiis, G. i. 14, 
 
 VibuUius Rufus, sent by Pompey into the district of 
 Piceuum, C. i. 13. Made prisoner by Cwsar atCorfi- 
 nium, 22. Set at liberty, and alterwards sent into 
 Spain by Pompey, 32. 
 
 Virdumarus, revolts from Caesar, and sets fire to No- 
 viodunum, G. vii. 52. Appointed one of the com- 
 manders of the confederate forces for the relief of 
 Alesia, 70. 
 
 Viridovix, heads the Unellians against Sabinus, but is 
 defeated by an artful stratagem, G. iii. 17. 
 
 Volusenus, sent by Caesar to take a view of the British 
 coast, G. iv. IS. Antony sends him in pursuit o* 
 Comius, viii. 39. 
 
 Useliodunum, Caninins lays siege to it, G. viii. 27. 
 Ciesar, by depriving the besieged of water, forces the 
 town to surrender, 33. 
 
 z 
 
 Zama, shuts its gates against Juba, Af. 79. Surrenders 
 
 to Ctesar, 80. 
 Zieia, C»sar seizes and puts a garrison In it, Af- 69. 
 Ziela, Pharnaces totally defeated by Csesar near thai 
 
 place, Al. 57. 
 
 THE END. 
 
THE 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 * o/ 
 
 THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE 
 
 THE JUGURTHINE WAR. 
 
 BY C. CRISPUS SALLUSTIUS 
 
 TBAK9LATED 
 
 BY WILLIAM ROSE, A. M. 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 DERBY & JACKSON, 119 NASSAU ST, 
 
 1858. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 As the usefulness of translations of tlie classics is universally allowed, so 
 the difficulty of succeeding in them will be readily granted by all who have ever 
 attempted it. To translate a modern author of genius, into a modern language, 
 is no easy task, though so many of the modern languages resemble one another; 
 it must therefote be extremely difficult to translate any of the classical writers of 
 Greece or Rome into such a language as ours, the idioms and structure of which 
 are so very diffisrent from those of the Greek and Latin languages. But this is not 
 all ; the translator must not only find proper phrases to convey the images of his 
 author, but he must animate his images with the same spirit; for it is with trans- 
 lations as with painting ; if the air and spirit of the original are wanting, there can 
 be no true resemblance. 
 
 The translator of Salhist was very sensible of the difficulty of his undertaking, 
 and hopes the candid reader will make fair and equitable allowances for tke de- 
 fects that attend the execution of it. His great aim has been to preserve a due 
 medium between a verbal, and too bold and free a translation ; having made it 
 his first care to preserve the sentiment of his author; and his next, to adhere to his 
 words, as far as he was able to express them in an easy and natural manner. By 
 this method he flatters himself that he has, in some measure, answered both the 
 ends he proposed in translating Sallust; the first of which was, to furnish such 
 young gentlemen as have made a tolerable progress in the Latin tongue, with 
 such a version of him, as, at the same time that it had all the advantao-es of a literal 
 translation, should be free from that flatness which is inseparable from such, and 
 read with tolerable ease and fluency. His other view was to present such as are 
 not capable of reading Sallust himself, and yet are desirous of being acquainted 
 with the memorable transactions of which he gives an account, with such a trans- 
 lation of him as should have somewhat of the air of an original. 
 
 But here the reader will be apt to say: What occasion for a new translation 
 
 of Sallust ] Are there not several very good ones already 1 — The translator would 
 
 be far from derogating from the merit of any former translations of his author ; and 
 32* " ^ 3 
 
IV 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 in answer to this question, all he has to say is, that if his has but equal merit with 
 any of them, as he humbly apprehends it has, there will still be this additional 
 recommendation of it; that besides the neatness of the impression, it may be 
 purchased at an easier price than the others : a circumstance which, he imagines, 
 will plead strongly in his favour with the generality of readers. 
 
 He has nothing farther to add, but that if this his first essay meets with a 
 favourable reception from the public, it will be a powerful inducement to hira to 
 continue his labours in the same way ; by which means it will be in the power 
 of almost every parent to furnish his child with useful translations of the school 
 classics in a neat and elegant form, and at a very easy rate. 
 
A 
 
 SHORT ACCOUNT 
 
 OF 
 
 THE LIFE OF SALLUST. 
 
 Caius Crispus Sallustius was born at Amiternum, in the country of the Sabines, 
 in the year of Rome six hundred and sixty-eight, during the third consulship of L. 
 Cornelius Cinna, and the first of Cn. Papirius Carbo. He was descended from a 
 Plebeian family, as appears from his having been one of the tribunes of the people, 
 and from the many invectives against the nobility that are scattered up and down 
 his works. In his early years his inclination led him to the study of learning, to 
 which he applied with the greatest diligence, and made uncommon progress under 
 the care of Atteius Prsetextatus, called Philologus, one of the ablest grammarians 
 of the age. 
 
 It appears that he had turned his thoughts, in his younger days, to the wntmg 
 of history, for which he had, unquestionably, great talents ; but, as he himself in- 
 timates in his preface to the History of Catiline's Conspiracy, he was diverted from 
 this pursuit by the workings of ambition. It were to be wished, for the sake of 
 his character, that he had kept close to his original design, and not meddled with 
 the management of public affairs : his reputation would then have been free from 
 many of those stains with which it is now blemished. The Roman manners, 
 in the age wherein he lived, were extremely licentious and depraved ; corruption 
 prevailed in the state, and the most barefaced venality in all the courts of justice ; 
 the worthiest patriots, the best friends to liberty, suffered, while the basest parri- 
 cides were exalted ; the Patricians and Plebeians were engaged in the most violent 
 struggles ; and as the one or the other happened to prevail,, they oppressed the 
 opposite party with wanton rage and fury : so that, considering the degeneracy of 
 tne times, it is the less to be wondered at, if he caught the infection, and was, 
 borne away by such a torrent of corruption. 
 
 If we may credit the ancient declaimer, who, untler the name of Cicero, has 
 inveighed against Sallust, his youth was stained with the foulest acts of lewdness ; 
 and indeed the gross enormities of his more advanced years render it highly pro- 
 bable. We are told by M. Varro, an author worthy of credit, that he was caught 
 in adultery with Fausta, the daughter of Sylla, and severely whipped by her hus- 
 band Milo, who likewise obliged him to pay a considerable sum of money. There 
 are other charges against him, believed chiefly upon the authority of the above- 
 mentioned declaimer ; but we shall not detain the reader by enumerating them. 
 
 5 
 
VI THE LIFE OF SALLUST. 
 
 From his being qusestor, which was probably in the year of Rome six hundred 
 and ninety-three, he bore no public office till the year seven hundred and one, ai 
 which time he was made tribune of the people. In this office he improved the oppor- 
 tunity that was put into his hands of revenging himself upon Milo, the murderer 
 of Clodius, for the treatment he had received from him on the score of Fausta. 
 Having gained over to his interest two other tribunes, Q Pompeius Rufus, and 
 Munacius Plancus Bursa, he employed all the arts of party and faction to keep 
 up the ill humour of the populace against him ; haranguing continually, and terrify- 
 ing the city with forged stories of magazines of arms prepared by Milo, for massa- 
 cring his enemies, and burning the city. Nor was he less active in raising a clamour 
 against Cicero, whom he threatened with trials and prosecutions, in order to deter 
 him from pleading Milo's cause ; giving out upon all occasions, that Clodius was 
 indeed killed by Milo, but by the advice and contrivance of a greater man. 
 
 In the year seven hundred and three, he was expelled the Senate by the then 
 censors, Appius Claudius and Calpurnius Piso, on account of his lewd and profli- 
 gate life. The year following, however, he was restored to the dignity of senator 
 by Julius Caesar, and likewise made quaestor ; in which office he is charged with 
 great corruption, with making sale of every thing he could, and using it only as an 
 occasion of plunder. During Caesar's second dictatorship he was made praetor, an 
 honour which had like to have proved fatal to him. For endeavouring in vain to 
 quiet a sedition which arose among Caesar's troops in Campania, that were de- 
 signed for Africa, he went to Rome to give Caesar an account of it; and was 
 pursued by a considerable body of them, who would certainly have put him to 
 death, if they had overtaken him. Caesar, upon his arrival, calmed the commotion, 
 and passed over into Africa, with part of his army, taking Sallust along with him ; 
 whom, a few days after his landing, he sent with part of his fleet into the island of 
 Cercina, at that time in the possession of the enemy, being informed that there 
 was a great quantity of corn in it, of which he stood very much in need. C. De- 
 cimus, the quaestor, who had been left with a strong party to secure the corn, 
 upon the praetor's approach embarked in a small vessel, and made his escape. Sal- 
 lust met with a favourable reception from the natives, found great plenty of corn, 
 loaded his ships, and returned to Caesar. What other services he performed during 
 the course of the war, does not appear ; but it is certain he was closely attached to 
 Caesar's party and interest. 
 
 When the war in Africa was ended, Caesar bestowed upon him the government 
 of Numldia, which he plundered in the most inhuman manner. No one indeed 
 could be more rapacious than he was, during the course of his administration in 
 this province ; a reproach which falls the more heavily upon him, as he had inveighed 
 so keenly against corruption and corrupt magistrates, and bestowed so high en- 
 comiums on virtue and equitable government. With the spoils of his infamous 
 
THE LIFE OF SALLUST. Vll 
 
 magistracy he purchased a country-house at Tivoli, and one of the noblest dwell- 
 ings in Rome on the Quirinal mount, with beautiful gardens, which to this day is 
 called the gardens of Sallust. In what manner he spent the remainder of his days, 
 we have no account ; he died in the year of Rome seven hundred and nineteen. 
 
 Though Sallust's character as a man has been held in just abhorrence and detes- 
 tation, as an historian he has been ever highly admired by the best judges. His 
 talents for history were certainly very great; and where he pursues the thread of 
 it, he does it in the most perspicuous, agreeable, and instructive manner : his style 
 is clear and nervous ; his narration natural ; his descriptions beautiful ; his reflec- 
 tions carious and solid ; his speeches animated and persuasive ; and his characters 
 just and striking. After all, he is not without his faults, and those very great ones. 
 He is very apt to start from his subject, in order to display his own abilities, and to 
 run into digressions, which, however ingenious and entertaining, have an air of af- 
 fectation and self-sufficiency. His vanity appears clearly in his prefaces, which are 
 full of compliments to himself; and instead of being pertinent introductions to his 
 history, seem rather designed to represent the importance of his own character and 
 studies. They abound indeed with virtuous sentiments, and bitter invectives against 
 corrupt governors ; though these, by the way, seem rather to proceed from private 
 pique and resentment, than from a genuine abhorrence of corruption, or a truly pa- 
 triot zeal for the public good. 
 
 His history of the war with Jugurtha is a masterly performance ; but his par- 
 tiality to Caesar, and his treatment of Cicero, are unpardonable faults in the account 
 of Catiline's conspiracy. When he draws the characters of Cato and Caesar, he 
 considers them only as two great subjects in the service of a free state, and acquir- 
 ing fame by diflferent ways and qualities ; without once mentioning the most mate- 
 rial difference between them — that the one laboured earnestly, through the whole 
 course of his life, to preserve and reform the state, whilst the other did all in his 
 power to corrupt and destroy it. Did we know nothing more of Caesar than what 
 Sallust says of him, we should certainly take his character for a great and amiable 
 one. But he has only given us the fair side of it, if it may be properly said that it 
 had one, without representing him in his true colours ; as the friend and patron of 
 the abandoned, the depraved, and desperate ; as the promoter of public abuse and 
 corruption ; as one who took pleasure in embroiling and debauching the state ; and 
 as a monster of ambition. He put on, indeed, the guise of clemency, for which he 
 has been highly celebrated by his flatterers, as if it had been a real, and not an as- 
 sumed quality in him. But surely no one, who is acquainted with his character, will 
 assert, that he, who was guilty of the greatest cruelty in making war upon and en- 
 slaving his country, would have relinquished his mad schemes of ambition, if gentle 
 methods had failed him, rather than have recourse to acts of blood and vengeance. 
 After having seen how Marius and Sylla were hated for their personal cruelties, no 
 
viii THE LIFE OF SALLtJST. 
 
 x^'onder that he should put on the appearance of this, as well as of other virtues 
 But that clemency was not his natural character, we have the express testimony of 
 his friend Curio, who well knew him : Caelius too, one of his partisans, freely says 
 of him, in a letter to Cicero, that he meditated nothing but what was violent and 
 tragical, nor even spoke in any other strain. 
 
 As partiality has made Sallust bestow false colours upon the character of Caesar, 
 so prejudice has kept him from placing that of Cicero in a clear and full light. He 
 represents him indeed as an active, sensible, and diligent magistrate, allows him the 
 character of an excellent consul, but bestows no greater degree of praise upon him, 
 than what could not well be dissembled by an historian ; and even what he says of 
 him does not seem to come directly from the heart. But was no more than this 
 scanty measure of praise due to the immortal Cicero ? No greater tribute due from 
 an impartial historian to the saviour of his country ? "Was this doing full justice to 
 the superior abiUties, the undaunted courage, the unwearied diligence, and uncom- 
 mon sao-acitv, whereby Cicero baffled so desperate a conspiracy, and saved Rome 
 ,rom one of the greatest dangers that had ever threatened her 1 Is it not the duty 
 of an historian to throw distinguished lustre on distinguished merit, and to brighten 
 the character of a national deliverer? If so, then surely Sallust has fallen far short 
 of his, in the account he has given of Catiline's conspiracy, which for this reason 
 is a very defective performance. 
 
 Had Ccesar done what Cicero did, his conduct had been related in very different 
 strains, his praises copiously set before the reader, and his character represented in 
 the fullest lifht. We should then have seen that masterly address, wherewith both 
 senate and people were managed; that dexterity and artful management, whereby 
 orders of men, the most averse to each other, were united in the common interest 
 of their country ; and that vigilance, wherewith the secret machinations of the con- 
 spirators were watched in silence, and a sufficient force prepared to resist them, 
 before their black schemes were laid before the senate, amply displayed, and>finely 
 illustrated, together with a full account of the extraordinary honours which were 
 the rewards of such distinguished services. 
 
THE 
 
 CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE. 
 
 Meti who would act up to the dignity of their 
 nature, ought not to pass their lives in ob- 
 scurity, like the beasts of the field, formed with 
 bodies prone to the earth, and under necessary 
 subjection to their appetites. 
 
 Now our faculties are twofold ; those of the 
 soul, and those of the body ; the soul was de- 
 signed for sovereign command, the body for 
 subjection ; the former we enjoy in common 
 with the go^.9, the latter with the brute crea- 
 tion. So that to me it appears more agreeable 
 to nature, to pursue glory by the abilities of the 
 mind, than those of the body ; and as our lives 
 are but of short duration, it should be our study 
 to render our memory immortal. For the 
 splendour derived from riches and beauty is 
 short-lived and frail; virtue alone confers 
 immortality. 
 
 It has, however, been a great and long de- 
 bate, whether success in war is most owing to 
 liodily strength or mental abilities; for, as 
 counsel is necessary before we enter upon ac- 
 tion ; after measures are duly concerted, speedy 
 execution is equally necessary ; so that neither 
 of these being sufficient singly, they prevail 
 only by the assistance of each other. Accord- 
 ingly, kings of old (for this was the first title of 
 authority among men) applied themselves dif- 
 ferently, some, to strengthen their bodies by 
 exercise ; others, to improve their minds. Then, 
 indeed, ambition had no share in influencing 
 the conduct of men, every one was satisfied with 
 his own. But after Cyrus began in Asia, and 
 the Lacedaemonians and Athenians in Greece, 
 to conquer cities and nations, when the lust 
 ef power was thought a sufficient reason for 
 
 commencing a war, and glory was measured by 
 the extent of dominions, then it was discovered 
 by experience, that genius conduces most to 
 success. And if kings and rulers would exert 
 their abilities in peace, as they do in war, the 
 condition of human affairs would be much more 
 steady and uniform ; nor should we see so fre- 
 quent revolutions and convulsions in states, and 
 such universal confusion. For the same arts, 
 by which dominion was at first acquired, will 
 serve to secure it. But when, instead of in- 
 dustry, moderation, and equity, sloth, licen- 
 tiousness, and pride prevail, the fortune of a 
 state changes with its manners. And thus 
 power always passes from him who has least 
 merit, to him who has most. 
 
 It is to the powers of the mind we owe the 
 invention and advantages of agriculture, navi- 
 gation, and architecture, and indeed all the 
 other arts of life. Yet many there are in the 
 world, who, abandoned to sloth and sensuality, 
 without learning or politeness, pass their lives 
 much like travellers ; and who, in opposition to 
 the design of nature, place their whole happi- 
 ness in animal pleasure, looking upon their 
 minds as a heavy burden. The life and death 
 of such as these, are to me of equal value, 
 since there is no notice taken of either. He only 
 seems to me to be truly alive, and to enjoy his 
 rational nature, who, by engaging in an active 
 course of life, pursues the glory that is derived 
 from noble actions, or the exercise of some 
 honourable employment. Now, amidst a great 
 variety of occupations, nature has directed men 
 to different pursuits. 
 
 To act well for the state is glorious, and to 
 1 
 
CONSPIRACY 
 
 write well far it, is not without its merit. A 
 man may become illustrious in peace or in war ; 
 many have been applauded for performing he- 
 roic actions, many for relating them. And 
 though the character of the historian is not 
 reckoned so glorious as that of the hero ; yet, 
 to me it appears a very arduous task to write 
 history well ; since the style must be suited to 
 the subject. Besides, many look upon the cen- 
 sure of faults, as the effect of malice and envy ; 
 and when the glorious achievements of brave 
 and worthy men are related, every reader will 
 be easily inclined to believe what he thinks 
 he could have performed himself, but will treat 
 what exceeds that measure, as false and fabu- 
 lous. 
 
 As for me, like most others, I had, in my 
 younger days, a strong desire for a share in the 
 administration ;but found many obstructions in 
 my way : for, instead of modesty, justice, and 
 virtue, licentiousness, corruption, and avarice 
 flourished ; which, though my soul, as yet 
 untainted with evil habits, utterly abhorred ; 
 yet amidst such general depravity, my tender 
 years were caught by ambition ; and although 
 I avoided, in the general tenor of my conduct, 
 the corrupt practices of the age, yet, being fired 
 with the same ardour for preferment that 
 others were, I was thence exposed to envy and 
 reproach, as well as they. 
 
 As soon, however, as my mind was delivered 
 from the many crosses and dangers attending 
 this pursuit, and I had determined to retire, 
 during the remainder of my life, from the ad- 
 ministration, it was not my intention to waste 
 such valuable time in sloth and indolence, nor 
 to pass my days in agriculture, hunting, or the 
 like servile occupations ; but resuming my 
 former design, from which the cursed spirit of 
 ambition had diverted me, I resolved to employ 
 myself in writing such parts of the Roman his- 
 tory, as appeared to me to be most deserving of 
 being transmitted to posterity ; and this I chose 
 the rather, because my mind was neither influ- 
 enced by hope or fear, nor attached to any 
 party in the state : accordingly, I shall here, 
 with the utmost veracity, give a short account 
 of Catiline's conspiracy ; a memorable attempt, 
 both for the enormous wickedness of it, and the 
 danger it threatened. But before I enter di- 
 rectly upon the story, I shall give a short char- 
 acter of the man. 
 
 Lucius Catiliice was descended of an 
 illustrious family : he was a man of great vigour 
 
 both of body and mind ; but of a disposition 
 extremely profligate and depraved. From his 
 youth he took pleasure in civil wars, massacres, 
 depredations, and intestine broils: and in these 
 he employed his younger days. His body was 
 formed for enduring cold, hunger, and want of 
 rest, to a degree indeed incredible : his spirit 
 was daring, subtle, and changeable; he was 
 expert in all the arts of simulation and dissimu- 
 lation ; covetous of what belonged to others, 
 lavish of his own ; violent in his passions ; he 
 had eloquence enough, but a small share of 
 wisdom. His boundless soul was constantly 
 engaged is extravagant and romantic projects, 
 too high to be attempted. 
 
 Such was the character of Catiline; who, 
 after Sy lia's usurpation, was fired with a violent 
 desire of seizing the government ; and, provided '' 
 he could but carry his point, he v/as not at 
 all solicitous by what means. His spirit, na- 
 turally violent, was daily more and more 
 hurried to the execution of his designs, by his 
 poverty and the consciousness of his crimes * 
 both which evils he had heightened by the 
 practices above mentioned. He was encouraged 
 to it by the wickedness of the state, thoroughly 
 debauched by luxury and avarice ; vices equally 
 fatal, though of contrary natures. 
 
 Now that I have occasion to mention the 
 Roman manners, I am naturally led to look 
 back a little to past ages, and to give a short 
 account of the institutions of our ancestors, 
 both in war and peace ; how they governed the 
 state, and in what grandeur they left it ; and 
 how, by a gradual declension, it has fallen 
 from the highest degree of virtue and glory, to 
 the lowest pitch of vice and depravity. 
 
 The Trojans, as far as I can learn, who were 
 forced to fly from their native country, and wan- 
 dered up and down, without any fixed abode, 
 under the conduct of ^neas, were the founders 
 of Rome, together with the Aborigines, a bar- 
 barous race, subject to no laws, and restrained 
 by no authority, but altogether independent 
 and unaccountable. It is incredible how easily 
 these two nations, after they came to inhabit 
 the same city, formed into one people, though 
 differing in original, language, and manners. 
 Afterwards, when wholesome institutions, an 
 increase of territory and inhabitants, had ren- 
 dered their state suflSciently flourishing and 
 glorious ; their opulence, such is the hard fate 
 of almost all human affairs, became the object 
 of envy ; neighbouring princes and nations fell 
 
OF CATILINE. 
 
 3 
 
 cpon that'll in war, anil but few of their friends 
 came to their assistance ; the rest, struck with 
 terror, kept at a distance from the danger. 
 
 The Romans, however, fearless and undaun- 
 ted, equally upon their guard both within and 
 without the walls, acted with spirit and resolu- 
 tion ; concerted their measures ; encouraged 
 one another ; boldly faced the enemy ; and by 
 their arms protected their liberty, their country, 
 and their fauiilies : then, after having repelled 
 their own dangers, they carried assistance to 
 their confederates, and procured themselves 
 alliances, more by conferring than receiving 
 favours. 
 
 The form of their goverment was monar- 
 chical ; but monarchy circumscribed by laws : 
 a select number of men, whose bodies were in- 
 deed enfeebled with years, but their minds in 
 full vigour, formed a council for the direction 
 of public affairs ; they were called Fathers, 
 either on account of their age, or a similitude 
 of concern. Afterwards when the regal govern- 
 ment, which was established for maintaining 
 liberty and aggrandizing the state, degenerated 
 into pride and tyranny, they abolished it, and 
 created two magistrates with annual power ; 
 this they thought would be the most effectual 
 method to prevent that insolence, which a long 
 continuance of power generally inspires. 
 
 This change in the form of their govern- 
 ment produced a great alteration in their man- 
 ners ; every one now exerted the utmost of his 
 capacity in the service of his country, and was 
 ready to display his talents upon all occasions. 
 For under tyrants, the worthy are more exposed 
 to jealousy than the worthless, and great abili- 
 ties are always dreaded by them. It is incre- 
 dible to relate, how much the city increased in 
 a short time, after the recovery of its liberty, 
 so great was the ardour of its citizens for glory. 
 The youth, as soon as they were able to bear 
 arms, betook themselves to the camp, where 
 they were trained up to war by labour and prac- 
 tice ; and they took greater pleasure in fine ar- 
 mour and war horses, than in lewdness and 
 banqueting. To such men no toils were unu- 
 sual, no situation grievous, no enemies formi- 
 dable ; their resolution surmounted all dif- 
 ficulties. But their chief contest for glory was 
 with one another ; every one laboured to sig- 
 nalize himself in the viewr of his fellow-soldiers, 
 by striving to be the first in wounding the ene- 
 my, and sciiling the walls. This they reckoned 
 riches, this glory, and high rank. They were 
 33 
 
 fond of applause, but liberal of money; they 
 desired only a competent share of riches, but 
 boundless glory. I could relate upon what occa- 
 sions a handful of Romans has defeated mighty 
 armies; and what cities, strongly fortified 
 by nature, they have taken by assault; but this 
 would carry me too far from my undertaking. 
 
 Yet surely fortune bears sovereign influence 
 over every thing ; it is she that brightens or 
 obscures all things more from caprice and hu- 
 mour, than a regard to truth and justice. The 
 actions of the Athenians were, I am ready to 
 grant, sufficiently great and noble ; though not 
 to such a degree as fame has represented them ; 
 but as they had writers of great genius, their 
 achievements are celebrated throughout the 
 world as the greatest that ever were : and the 
 bravery of those who performed them, is reck- 
 oned just as great as the abilities of these 
 illustrious authors in extolling them. But the 
 Roman people wanted this advantage , because 
 their ablest men were the most employed in 
 the service of the state. None cultivated theii 
 minds without bodily application. The wor- 
 thiest men preferred doing to speaking; and 
 chose rather that others should commend their 
 virtuous actions, than they relate those of others^. 
 
 Good morals, therefore, were cultivated both 
 at home and abroad. A spirit of perfect har 
 mony and disinterestedness every where pre- 
 vailed. Laws had no greater influence in de- 
 termining them to the practice of justice and 
 equity, than natural disposition. The only quar- 
 rels, dissensions, and disputes they exercised, 
 VFere against the public enemy : all the contests 
 that subsisted among the citizens, were in vir- 
 tuous deeds. They were magnificent in their 
 oiTerings to the gods ; frugal in their families ; 
 and faithful to their friends. Bravery in war, 
 and equity and moderation in peace, were the 
 only means by %vhich they supported themselves 
 and the public affairs : and, as the clearest evi- 
 dence of these virtues, I find, that, in time of 
 war, such as engaged the enemy contrary to 
 orders, or continued in the field after a retreat 
 was sounded, were more frequently punished) 
 than those who abandoned their standards, or 
 quitted their posts ; and in peace, they conduct- 
 ed the administration more by the force of fa- 
 vours than of terror ; and, if they received an 
 injury, chose rather to forgive than revenge it 
 
 But when by probity and industry the state 
 was become powerful ; when mighty princes 
 were conquered in war ; barbarous nations ar>d 
 
4 
 
 CONSPIRACY 
 
 potent states reduces^ to obedience; when Car- 
 thage, that vied with Rome for the empire of the 
 world, was utterly demolished, and sea and land 
 lay every where open to her power ; then for- 
 tune began to exert her malice, and throw every 
 thing into confusion. Ease and riches, the grand 
 objects of the pursuit of others, depressed and 
 ruined those, who had, without regret, under- 
 gone toils and hardships, distresses and dan- 
 gers. First a love of money possessed their 
 minds; then a passion for power; and these 
 were the seeds of all the evils that followed. 
 For avarice rooted out faith, probity, and every 
 ■worthy principle ; and, in their stead, sub- 
 stituted insolence, inhumanity, contempt of 
 the gods, and a mercenary spirit. Ambition 
 obliged many to be deceitful, to belie with their 
 tongues the sentiments of their hearts ; to value 
 friendship and enmity not according to their 
 real worth, but as they conduced to interest ; 
 and to have a specious countenance, rather than 
 an honest heart. These corruptions at first grew 
 by degrees, and were sometimes checked by cor- 
 rection. At last, the infection spreading like a 
 plague, the state was entirely changed, and the 
 government, from being the most righteous and 
 equitable, became cruel and insupportable. 
 
 At first, indeed, the minds of men were more 
 influenced by avarice than ambition, a vice 
 which has some affinity to virtue ; for the de- 
 sire of glory, power, and preferment, is common 
 to the worthy and the worthless ; with this dif- 
 ference, that the one pursues them by direct 
 means ; the other, being void of merit, has re- 
 course to fraud and subtlety ; avarice has money 
 for its object, which no wise man ever coveted. 
 This vice, as if impregnated with deadly poison, 
 enervates both soul and body ; is always bound- 
 less and insatiable ; nor are its cravings les- 
 sened by plenty or want. But when Sylla had, 
 by fojrce of arms, made himself master of the 
 state, and, from fair beginnings, brought mat- 
 ters to a bloody issue, his victorious troops gave 
 themselves up to rapine and violence ; one 
 coveted a house, another lands : they observed 
 neither measure nor moderation, but exercised 
 the most enormous and inhuman outrages upon 
 the citizens. Besides, Sylla, to gain the affec- 
 tions of the army which he had commanded in 
 Asia, had, contrary to the rules of our ancestors, 
 allowed them too great latitude, and indulged 
 them in luxury : the warlike tempers of the 
 soldiers, who were now without employment, 
 became easily enervated, by their delicious quar- 
 
 ters, and a life of pleasure. There the Roman 
 troops first habituated themselves to lewdness 
 and drinking; to admire statues, pictures, and 
 sculpture ; to make spoil of them both publicly 
 and privately ;to plunder the temples of the 
 gods, and to ravage every thing both sacred 
 and profane. An army thus disposed, and victo- 
 rious too, was sure to leave nothing to the con- 
 quered. For success unhinges the minds of 
 wise men ; how then should they who were so 
 depraved, use their victory with moderation 1 
 
 When riches began to be held in high es- 
 teem, and attended with glory, honour, and 
 power ; virtue languished, poverty was deemed 
 a reproach, and innocence passed for ill-nature. 
 And thus luxury, avarice, and pride, all spring- 
 ing from riches, enslaved the Roman joulh ; 
 they wantoned in rapine and prodigality ; 
 undervalued thei,r own, and coveted what be- 
 longed to others ; trampled upon modesty 
 friendship, and continence ; confounded things 
 divine and human, and threw oflf all manner 
 of consideration and restraint. 
 
 To see the difference between modern and 
 ancient manners, one needs but take a view of 
 the houses of particular citizens, both in town 
 and country, all resembling, in magnificence, 
 so many cities ; and then behold the temples of 
 the gods, built by our ancestors, the most re- 
 ligious of all men. But they thought of no 
 other ornament for their temples, than devo- 
 tion ; nor for their houses, but glory : neither 
 did they take any thing from the conquered, 
 but the power of doing hurt. Whereas their 
 descendants, the most effeminate of all men, 
 have plundered from their allies, by the most 
 flagrant injustice, whatever their brave an- 
 cestors left to their conquered enemies ; as if 
 the only use of power was to do wrong-. 
 
 It is needless to recount other things, which 
 none but those who saw them will believe ; as 
 the levelling of mountains by private citizens, 
 and even covering the sea itself with fine edi- 
 fices. These men appear to me to have sported 
 with their riches, since they lavished ihem in 
 the most shameful manner, instead of enjoying 
 them with honour. Nor were they less addicted 
 to lewdness, and all manner of extravagant 
 gratifications : men prostituted themselves like 
 women ; women laid aside all regard to chas- 
 tity. To procure dainties for their tables, sea 
 and land were ransacked. They indulged to 
 sleep, before nature craved it ; the returns of 
 hunger and thirst were anticipated with luxury 
 
OF CATILINE. 
 
 5 
 
 Itnd cold an 1 fatigue were never so much as felt. 
 The Roman youth, after they had spent their 
 fortunes, were prompted by such depravations 
 to commit all manner of enormities; for their 
 minds, impregnated with evil habits, and unable 
 to resist their craving appetites, were violently 
 bent upon all manner of extravagances, and all 
 the means of supplying them. 
 
 In so great and debauched a city, Catiline 
 had always about him, what was no difficult 
 matter to find in Rome, bands of profligate and 
 flagitious wretches, like guards to his person. 
 For all those who were abandoned to gluttony 
 and voluptuousness, and had exhausted their 
 fortunes by gaming, feasting, and lewdness; 
 all who were overwhelmed by debts, contracted 
 to purchase pardon for their crimes ; add to this, 
 parricides and sacrilegious persons from all 
 quarters ; such as were convicted for crimes, or 
 feared conviction ; nay farther, all who lived by 
 perjury and shedding the blood of citizens; 
 lastly, all whom wickedness, indigence, or a 
 guilty conscience, disquieted, were united to 
 Catiline in the firmest bonds of friendship and 
 intimacy. Or if any person of an unblameable 
 character became familiar with him ; by daily 
 conversation, and the snares that were laid to 
 debauch him, he too soon resembled, and even 
 equalled, the rest. But what he chiefly courted 
 was the intimacy of young men : their minds 
 being soft and pliable, were easily ensnared. 
 Some of these he provided with harlots ; bought 
 horses and dogs for others, gratifying the fa- 
 vourite passion of each: in a word he spared no 
 expense, nor even his own honour, to engage 
 them heartily in his interests. Some there were, 
 I know, who thought that the youth who fre- 
 quented Catiline's house were guilty of unna- 
 tural lewdness ; but this rumour, I apprehend, 
 was more owing to other reasons, than that there 
 was any clear evidence of the fact. 
 
 As for Catiline himself; he had, when very 
 young, been guilty of many abominable acts of 
 lewdness; debauched a Vestal, and a young 
 lady of quality, with several other atrocious 
 crimes, in open contempt of all law and order ; 
 afterwards he conceived a passion for Aurelia 
 Orestilla, one who had nothing but her beauty 
 to recommend her; and because she scrupled 
 to marry him, on account of his having a san 
 who was arrived at years of maturity, it is be- 
 lieved as a certain fact, that he destroyed that 
 8or , and made his house desolate, to open a way 
 to this so infamous an alliance. And this in- 
 
 deed appears to me to have been the principal 
 cause that pushed him on to the execution of 
 the conspiracy. For his guilty soul, at enmity 
 with gods and men, could find no rest ; so vio- 
 lently was his mind torn and distracted by a con- 
 sciousness of guilt. Accordingly his counte- 
 nance was pale, his eyes ghastly, his pace, one 
 while quick, another slow ; and indeed in all 
 his looks there was an air of distraction. 
 
 As for the youth whom he had seduced in 
 the manner above related, they were trained up 
 to wickedness by various methods: he taught 
 them to be false witnesses, to forge deeds, to 
 throw off all regard to truth, to squander their 
 fortunes, and slight dangers : and after he had 
 stripped them of all reputation and shame, he 
 pushed them on to crimes still more heinous ; 
 and, even when no provocation was given, it 
 was their practice to ensnare and murder those 
 who had never injured them, as well as those 
 who had. For he chose to be cruel and mis- 
 chievous without any cause, rather than the 
 hands and spirits of his associates should lose 
 their vigour for want of employment. 
 
 Catiline, confiding in these friends and ac- 
 complices, formed a design to seize the govern- 
 ment : he found an additional encouragement 
 from the number of those who were oppressed 
 with debts throut,hout the state, and the disposi- 
 tion of Sy Ila's soldiers, who, having squandered 
 away what they had lately acquired, and calling 
 to remembrance their former conquests and de- 
 predations, longed for a civil war. Besides, 
 there was no army in Italy : Pompey was car- 
 rying on a war in the remotest parts of the 
 earth : he himself was in great hopes of obtain- 
 ing the consulship : the senate seemed careless 
 of the public;- and all things were quiet: a 
 conjuncture of circumstances extremely favour- 
 able to his designs. 
 
 Accordingly, about the first of June, in the 
 consulship of L. Cssar and C. Figulus, he first 
 applied himself to his accomplices : some he 
 encouraged, others he sounded ; acquainted 
 them how strongly he was supported ; how few 
 forces the government had to oppose him ; and 
 laid before them the great advantage that would 
 attend the conspiracy. Having sufficiently sift- 
 ed them, he called all those together who were 
 most necessitous and daring. 
 
 In this assembly were found of senatorial 
 rank, P. Lentulus Sura, P. Autronius, 1 . Cas- 
 sius Longinus, C. Cethegus, P. Sylla and S. 
 Sylla, the sons of Servius ; L. Vargunteius, Q. 
 
6 
 
 CONSPIRACY 
 
 Annius, M. Porcius Lcecca, L. Bestia, and Q. 
 Cartius; of the equestrian order, M. Fulvius 
 Nobilior, L. Statilius, P. Gabinius Capito, and 
 C. Cornelius, to whom were joined many from 
 the colonies and municipal towns, all men of 
 figure in their several countries. There were 
 likewise several noblemen engaged in this con- 
 spiracy, though not so openly ; men excited not 
 by want, or any pressing consideration, but by 
 the hopes of lawless power. Besides these, 
 almost all the youth, especially the youth of 
 quality, favoured Catiline's undertaking : even 
 those who had it in their power to live at their 
 ease, nay, splendidly and luxuriously, prefer- 
 ring uncertainties to certainties, and discord to 
 peace. Some there were at that time too, who 
 believed that M. Licinius Crassus was privy to 
 the design ; because he hated Pompey, who 
 was at the head of a great army ; to reduce 
 whose power, he would willingly have promoted 
 any interest whatever: besides, he hoped, if 
 the conspiracy succeeded, that he should find it 
 easy to make himself head of the conspirators. 
 Some time before this, a like conspiracy had 
 been formed by a few, among whom was Cati- 
 line, of which I shall give the best account I 
 am able. 
 
 In the consulship of L. Tullus and M. Lep- 
 idus, P. Autronius and P. Sylla, who were 
 chosen to succeed them, had been prosecuted 
 for bribery at elections, and punished. Not 
 long after, Catiline was likewise convicted of 
 bribery, and hindered from suing for the con- 
 sulship, because he could not declare himself a 
 candidate within the limited time. At this time 
 too, Cn. Piso, a young nobleman, extremely 
 bold, indigent, and factious, was instigated by 
 his poverty and depraved mora.ls to raise com- 
 motions in the state. Catiline, Autronius, and 
 he, entering into a combination about the fifth 
 of December, determined to murder the consuls 
 L. Torquatus and L. Cotta in the capitol, on 
 the first of January: upon which Catiline and 
 Autronius were to seize the consulship, and 
 send Piso with an army to take possession of 
 both the Spains, But their design being dis- 
 covered, they put oflT the assassination-plot to 
 the fifth of February ; at which time they pro- 
 posed not only to murder the consuls, but like- 
 wise most of the senators. And if Catiline had 
 not been too forward in giving the signal to his 
 associates, before the senate-house, there had 
 been that day the most bloody massacre Rome 
 haJ ever seen. But as no great number of the 
 
 conspirators had yet got together, the scheme 
 was frustrated. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, Piso, though he had 
 only the ofiice of quEestor, was afterwards sent 
 into Nether-Spain, in quality of propraetor, by 
 the interest of Crassus ; because he knew him 
 to be an irreconcileable enemy to Pompey. Nor 
 was the senate indeed averse to his having the 
 province, for they were desirous to have so tur- 
 bulent a citizen at a great distance from them; 
 besides, a great many, who wished well to the 
 interests of the state, looked upon him as a de- 
 fence to it, now the power of Pompey was be- 
 come formidable. But Piso, in his march to 
 his province, was murdered by some Spanish 
 horse he had in his army. Some there are who 
 ascribe his death to his haughty, arbitrary, and 
 tyrannical behaviour in his command, which 
 the Barbarians could not bear. Others allege, 
 that these soldiers assassinated Piso byPompey's 
 order, whose old followers they were, and de- 
 voted to his interest : that the Spaniards had 
 never attempted any such thing before, but had 
 often submitted patiently to the merciless orders 
 of their commanders. As for me, I shall leave 
 the matter undetermined ; and have now said 
 enough of the first conspiracy. 
 
 When Catiline saw those, whose names we 
 have already given, assembled together ; though 
 he had often conferred with them singly, yet, 
 judging it proper to address and encourage 
 them in a body, he withdrew with them into a 
 private part of the house, where none could 
 hear him but the conspirators, and there spoke 
 to them in the following manner: — 
 
 " If your bravery and fidelity were not well 
 known to me, the present opportunity had oc- 
 curred to no purpose; vain would all our great 
 hopes have been ; the power of seizing the go- 
 vernment had dropped into our hands in vain ; 
 nor should I, depending iipon dastardly and ir- 
 resolute associates, have hazarded certainties 
 for uncertainties. But as I have upon many 
 important occasions proved your bravery and 
 attachment to me, I have dared to engage in 
 an enterprise of the highest consequence and 
 the greatest glory. It is an additional encour- 
 agement to me, when I consider the harmony 
 of our desires and aversions, which is the firm- 
 est bond of friendship. 
 
 " Now the nature of my undertakingyou have 
 already heard severally ; and my ardour to put 
 it in execution increases daily, when I consider 
 what must be our future lot, unless we recover 
 
OF CATILINE. 
 
 our liberty. For since the government came 
 under the power and management of a few, 
 kings and princes have been tributary to them, 
 and nations have paid them taxes ; whilst all 
 the rest of us citizens, however worthy or brave, 
 noble or plebeian, have remained as a sorry 
 mob, without interest or authority, slaves to 
 those to whom we should be a terror, were 
 the state but in its due vigour. All sway, pre- 
 ferment, interest, and riches, are now in their 
 hands, or those of their favourites; to us they 
 have left nothing but dangers, repulses from 
 public dignities, the terror of tribunals, and the 
 buffetings of poverty. Which indignities, how 
 long will ye tamely submit to, ye bravest of 
 men 1 Is it not better to die in a brave attempt, 
 than to drag a wretched and infamous life, and 
 to lose it at last shamefully, after having been 
 the sport of other men's insolence ? But I take 
 gods and men to witness, that success is in our 
 hands : our bodies and minds are in full vigour ; 
 on the other hand, they are on the decline in 
 every respect, oppressed with j'ears and riches. 
 All that is necessary, is only to make the at- 
 tempt; when once the undertaking is set on 
 foot, every thing else will follow in course. Fur 
 who, that has the spirit of a man, can bear with 
 patience, that they should have such a super- 
 fluity of riches as to lavish them in raising 
 mighty edifices on the deep, and levelling moun- 
 tains, whilst we have not so much as the neces- 
 saries of life ; that they should be multiplying 
 their seats, whilst we have no fixed habitation ; 
 that though they are constantly buy ing pictures, 
 statues, and vessels of curious workmanship, 
 pulling down new houses, and building others ; 
 in short, though they waste and dissipate their 
 wealth by every extravagant method ; yet, by 
 all the efforts of profusion, they are unable to 
 exhaust it. As for us, we have poverty at home, 
 and debts abroad ; our condition is bad, our 
 expectation much worse: finally, what have 
 we left but a wretched life 1 Rouse then to 
 action ! Behold the object you have often wish- 
 ed for, behold liberty ! and in her train, riches, 
 glory, and honour, all full in your view! all 
 these rewards fortune has prepared for the con- 
 querors. But let the present conjuncture and 
 opportunity ; let your dangers, your poverty, 
 and the glorious spoils of war, animate you 
 more powerfully than any words of mine. As 
 tor me, use me as you please, either as a leader 
 or as a private soldier. I shall always be with 
 you, both in council and execution. But I hope 
 33* 
 
 to act as consul with you in this enterprise; if, 
 after all, I am not deceived in my opinion of 
 you, and you prefer not slavery to empire." 
 
 Upon hearing this harangue, bis associates, 
 who were all extremely wretched, destitute of 
 every thing, and even void of every honest 
 hope ; though they were pleased with the 
 thought of embroiling the state, and even look- 
 ed upon that as a great recompense; yet most 
 of them desired, that he would declare to them 
 upon what terms they were to engage in the 
 war, and what were to be their rewards ; what 
 strength they had to depend upon, and what 
 hopes of success. Then Catiline promised 
 them an abolition of their debts, the proscrip- 
 tion of the rich ; dignities, sacred and civil ; 
 plunder, and every other advantage that 
 the uncontrolled pleasures of conquerors in- 
 clude. Besides, he told them that Piso and 
 P. Sitius Nucerinus were both privy to his de- 
 sign ; the former with an army in Spain, the 
 other at the head of one in Mauritania. That 
 C. Antonius was candidate for the consulship, 
 whom he hoped to have for his colleague ; one 
 who was his intimate, and embarrassed with all 
 manner of difficulties ; and that in conjunction 
 with him he would begin the execution of his 
 design, as soon as they should enter upon their 
 office. After this he proceeded to inveigh bit- 
 terly against all men of worth ; commended his 
 own accomplices, and calling to every one by 
 his name, some he put in mind of their poverty, 
 others of their amours, several of their dangers 
 and disgraces, and many of the bootj' they had 
 got in consequence of Sylla's victor}'. Then, 
 perceiving all their spirits elevated, he pressed 
 them to take care of his interest at the next 
 election, and dismissed the assembly. 
 
 Some there were at that time, who said, that 
 Catiline, when he had ended his speech, and 
 proceeded to administer an oath to his asso- 
 ciates, presented them all round with a bowl of 
 human blood mixed with wine ; that, when 
 they had all fasted and sworn, as is usual in 
 solemn sacrifices,hedisclosedhis design to them; 
 and that he did this in order to engage them 
 more strictly to mutual faith, as each was privy 
 to the guilt of another in so horrible a fact. 
 But some believe that this, and much more, 
 was invented by those, who thought to allay 
 the odium which fell upon Cicero for putting 
 the conspirators to death, by aggravating their 
 crimes. But I could never meet with clear evi 
 dence for so extraordinary a fact 
 
CONSPIRACY 
 
 In this conspiracy was Q. Curius, a man of 
 no mean family, but loaded with crimes, and, 
 as a mark of disgrace, expelled the senate by 
 the censors. This man had an equal share of 
 levity and audaciousness; whatever he heard, 
 he disclosed ; nor could he even conceal his 
 own crimes: in a word, he neither considered 
 what he said or did. There had been, for a 
 long time, a criminal correspondence between 
 him and Fulvia, a lady of quality ; but finding 
 himself less agreeable to her than formerly, be- 
 cause his poverty would not sutfer him to be so 
 liberal; all on a sudden he began to tempt her 
 with great promises, boasting of seas and moun- 
 tains of wealth; sometimes he threatened to 
 kill her, if she would not be obsequious: in a 
 word, he behaved more haughtily than he had 
 ever done before. When Fulvia learned the 
 ground of this insolent behaviour, she did not 
 conceal what threatened so much danger to the 
 state; but, without mentioning her author, dis- 
 covered to many all that she had heard of Cati- 
 line's conspiracy. This discovery made the 
 people zealous to confer the consulship on M. 
 T. Cicero: for before this, most of the nobility 
 stormed through envy, and thought that the 
 consular dignity was in a manner profaned, if 
 a new man, however deserving, should be 
 raised to it. But when danger threatened, 
 pride and envy were dropped. 
 
 Accordingly, when the assembly for elections 
 was held, M. Tullius and C. Antonius were 
 declared consuls, which was a heavy blow to 
 the conspirators. Catiline's fury, however, was 
 not in the least abated ; he exerted himself 
 every day more and more ; provided magazines 
 of arms in all the most convenient places of 
 Italy ; borrowed money, either on his own cre- 
 dit or that of his friends, and conveyed it to 
 FsesulsB, to one Manlius, who first began the 
 war. At this juncture, he is said to have en- 
 gaged in his interest great numbers of all 
 ranks; and some women too, who had once 
 been able to support a vast expense by prosti- 
 tution ; but when age had lessened their gain, 
 though not their luxury, had contracted great 
 debts. By their means, he expected to bring 
 over to his party the city slaves to set fire to the 
 city, and either engage their husbands, or, in 
 case of refusal, have them slain. 
 
 Among these was Sempronia, a woman of a 
 masculine spirit, and who had often been en- 
 gaged in many daring and hardy enterprises. 
 In her person and family, in her husband and 
 
 children, she was abundar.tly happy ; well ac- 
 quainted with the Greek and Roman languages, j.^ 
 and had more charms in music and dancing than 
 became a virtuous woman, with many other ac- 
 complishments subservient to luxury. Indeed, 
 there was nothing she less valued than honour 
 and chastity ; and it is hard to say, whether 
 she spared her money or her reputation least. 
 So raging and violent was her lust, that she 
 made advances to men more frequently than 
 they did to her. She had often forfeited Iter 
 faith, perjured herself to avoid paying her debts, 
 been privy to murders; in a word, her extra- 
 vagance and indigence had carried her to the 
 utmost excesses of wickedness. Notwithstand- 
 ing all this, she had a great deal of wit, could 
 compose verses, was very facetious in conver- 
 sation, could talk modestly, tenderly, or satiri- 
 cally : in short, she excelled in humour and 
 pleasantry. 
 
 Having taken these measures, Catiline, not- 
 withstanding his late repulse, declared himself 
 a candidate for the consulship against the en- 
 suing year; in hopes, if he should be chosen, 
 of using Anthony as he pleased. Nor was he 
 inactive in the meantime, but contriving end- 
 less machinations for the destruction of Cicero, 
 who was not wanting in dexterity and subtilty 
 to defeat them. For, from the beginning of his 
 consulship, he had successfully employed Ful- 
 via, to engage, by force of promises, Q. Cu- 
 rius, whom we have already mentioned, to dis- 
 cover all Catiline's designs; and by promising 
 a province to his colleague, he had prevailed 
 upon him not to act against the state. Besides, 
 he had always about him a number of his friends 
 and clients to guard his person. When the day 
 of election came, Catiline, finding that neither 
 his suit for the consulship, nor his plots to cut 
 oflf Cicero in the field of Mars, had succeeded, . 
 determined upon open war, and to try the ut- 
 most extremities, since his secret attempts had 
 ended in disappointment and infamy. 
 
 x\ccordingly, he despatched C. Manlius to 
 Fffisulffi and the adjacent part of Etruria, one 
 Septimius of Camertes to the territory of 
 Picenum, and C. Julius into Apulia ; others 
 too he sent to different places, just as he thought 
 it subservient to his purpose. Meanwhile he 
 was making several efforts at Rome at once ; 
 laying fresh snares against the life of the consul ; 
 contriving to get fire to the city ; placing armed 
 men in convenient posts : he himself was con 
 stantly armed, and ordered his followers to be 
 
OF CATlx..rtfc. 
 
 
 
 so too ; was ever pressing them to be upon 
 their guard, and prepared for action ; day and 
 night he was in a hurry ; lived without sleep ; 
 and was nevertheless indefatigable under all 
 his t^^.'ls. At last, perceiving that his numer- 
 ous efforts were unsuccessful, he employed M. 
 Porcius Laecca to summon together the princi- 
 pal conspirators once more in (he dead of night; 
 and after having complained grievously of their 
 inactivity, he informed them that he had sent 
 Manlius to command a body of men, which he 
 had prepared to take up arms ; that he had 
 likewise despatched others to different places to 
 begin the war ; and that he himself longed 
 earnestly to go to the army, if he could but first 
 destroy Cicero, for that he greatly obstructed 
 all his measures. 
 
 jYow, when all the rest remained fearful and 
 irresolute, C. Cornelius, a Roman knight, and 
 L. Vargunteius, a senator, offered their service ; 
 they agreed to go that very night to Cicero's 
 house, with a few armed men, under pretence 
 of making him a visit, and to assassinate him 
 by surprise. Curius, as soon as he learned 
 what danger threatened the consul, despatched 
 Fulvia to acquaint him with the plot ; so that 
 •when they came, entrance was denied them, 
 and their black attempt frustrated. 
 
 Meanwhile Manlius was exciting the people 
 in Etruria to take arms ; who, both from their 
 poverty and their resentment of the injuries 
 done them under Sj'Ila's usurpation, when they 
 were deprived of their lands and all they had, 
 were of themselves desirous of innovations. 
 He likewise engaged robbers of all kinds, who 
 nere very numerous in that country, v/ith 
 some of Sylla's old soldiers too, who by their 
 debauchery and extravagance had squandered 
 away all their former acquisitions. 
 
 Cicero, upon hearing of these transactions, 
 was struck with so threatening an evil ; and not 
 being able any longer to defend the city against 
 the plots of the conspirators by his own private 
 management, nor being apprised of the strength 
 or views of Manlius's army, laid the matter be- 
 fore the senate, which already had been the 
 subject of public conversation. Whereupon the 
 senate, as was usual in cases of extreme danger, 
 passed a decree ' that the consuls should take 
 care the state suffered no detriment ;' by which 
 they were empowered (such is the policy of the 
 Roman government) to raise forces, make war, 
 exercise an unlimited jurisdiction over the citi- 
 zens and allies, and to bear sovereign command 
 
 both in the cilv and in the field ; none Oi y . -£. 
 things fall under their authority', Withc t a 
 special ordinance of the people, 
 
 A few days after, L. Lsenius, a senjti , read 
 a letter in the senate, v/hich he said was brought 
 him from Fffisulas ; acquainting him that u. 
 Manlius had taken arms about the latter end 
 of October, with a numerous body of men. T'o 
 this, some added, as is usual on such occasions, 
 accounts of omens and prodigies ; others related 
 that unusual cabals were held, arms carried to 
 different places, and that the slaves were arm- 
 ing in Capua and Apulia. Whereupon, by a 
 decree of ihe senate, Q. Marcius Rex was sent 
 to Fsesulse, and Q. Metellus Creticus to Apulia 
 and the adjacent parts: both these officers had 
 been commanders of armies, and were waiting 
 without the city for the honour of a triumph, 
 which was refused them by the malice of a 
 few, whose custom it was, to make sale of every 
 thing honourable and infamous. The preetors 
 too, Q. Pompeius Rufus and Q. Metellus Celer, 
 were sent, the one to Capua, the other to Pice- 
 num ; and power was given them to raise 
 forces, according to the exigency of the times 
 and the degree of danger. Besides, the senate 
 decreed, that if any one would make any dis- 
 covery concerning the conspiracy against the 
 state, he should have, if a slave, his liberty and 
 a hundred thousand sesterces ; if a freeman, his 
 pardon and two hundred thousand. It was 
 likewise decreed, that bands of gladiators should 
 be sent to Capua and the other municipal 
 towns, according to the strength of each ; and 
 that guards should be posted at Rome, in every 
 quarter, under the command of the inferior 
 magistrates. 
 
 With all these things the city was deeply 
 affected, and assumed a new face ; from the 
 highest jollity and riot, such as spring from a 
 lasting peace, sorrow of a sudden appeared 
 upon every countenance. There was nothing 
 but universal hurry and confusion ; no place 
 was thought secure ; no person fit to be trusted ; 
 they neither enjoyed peace, nor were at war ; 
 every one measured the public danger by their 
 private fears. The women, too, full of appre- 
 hensions of war, which the great power of the 
 state had formerly secured them against, gave 
 themselves up to sorrow and lamentation ; 
 raised their suppliant hands to heaven ; bewailed 
 their tender children ; were eager for news; 
 frighted at every thing ; and laying aside their 
 pride and pleasures, became anxious for thego. 
 
10 
 
 CONSPIRACY 
 
 selves and their country. Yet the cruel spirit 
 of Catiline persisted in the same desperate pur- 
 suit, notwithstanding the preparations that 
 were made to detVat his measures, and though 
 he himself stood arraiijned by L. Paulus, upon 
 the Plautian law ; nay, he even came to the 
 senate-hoiise, the better to dissemble his de- 
 sign ; as if, provoked by injurious representa- 
 tions, he only came to clear his character. As 
 soon lis he appeared, the consul Cicero, either 
 fearing some bad etfects from his presence, or 
 fired with indignation, made that flaming 
 speech, so useful to the state, which he after- 
 wards published. As soon as he had sat down, 
 Catiline, resolved to deny every article, with 
 downcast looks and suppliant voice, begged of 
 the fathers not to believe too hastily what was 
 alleged against him ; that such was his birth, 
 and such had been his conduct from his youth, 
 that he had reason to hope for a very favour- 
 able impression from the public ; and it was not 
 to be imagined, that one of the patrician order, 
 whose ancestors, as well as himself, had done 
 so many services to the Roman people, should 
 want to overturn the government ; while Cicero, 
 a stranger, and late inhabitant of Rome, was 
 so zealous to defend it. As he was going on 
 with his invectives against the consul, the se- 
 nate, raising a general outcry, called him traitor 
 and parricide. Upon which, abandoning him- 
 self to fury and despair, ' Since,' says he, ' I 
 am circumvented and driven headlong by my 
 enemies, I will quench the flame raised about 
 me, by the common ruin.' 
 
 Upon this, he rushed out of the assembly, 
 and went home ; where reflecting much with 
 himself, and considering that his designs 
 against the consul had proved unsuccessful, 
 and that it was impossible to set fire to the city, 
 by reason of the guards that were placed every 
 where ; he judged it most advisable to reinforce 
 liis army, and to make all necessary prepara- 
 tions for war, before the legions were raised ; 
 .and accordingly set out in the dead of night 
 for Manlius's camp, with a few attendants. 
 Before his departure, however, he gave in- 
 structions to Lentulas and Cethegus, and those 
 of his associates whom he knew to be most 
 daring and resolute, to strengthen the party by 
 all possible means ; to despatch the consul as 
 scon as they could ; to have every thing in 
 readiness for the intended massacre, the firing 
 jfthe city, and the other feats of war; pro- 
 
 mising, that he himself would, in a short time, 
 come to the city at the head of a great army 
 
 During these transactions at Rome, C. Man- 
 lius sent deputies to Q. Marcius Ees, with 
 orders to accost him in the following man- 
 ner: — 
 
 We call gods and men to witness, general, 
 that we have neither taken up arms against 
 our country, nor with a view to hurt any par- 
 ticular person, but to defend ourselves from in- 
 juries, wretched and needy as we are, through 
 the violence and cruelty of usurers ; most of 
 us deprived of our habitations, and all of our 
 reputation and fortunes ; none of us allowed 
 the protection of the laws, as our forefathers 
 were, nor so much as the liberty of our persons, 
 when nothing else is left us ; such has been the 
 cruelty of the usurers and prsetors. Your an- 
 cestors, out of compassion to the people of 
 Rome, have often relieved their wants by their 
 decrees ; and but lately, in our own times, on 
 account of the great pressure of debts, they 
 have obliged the creditors to compound, and 
 that with the approbation of every worthy man. 
 The people have often taken arms, and sepa- 
 rated from the senate, prompted either by a 
 passion for power, or the insolence of their 
 magistrates ; as for us, wc neither desire power 
 nor riches, which are the sources of all the wars 
 and contests among men ; liberty is our aim, 
 that liberty which no brave man will lose but 
 together with his life. Wherefore we conjure 
 you and the senate, to espouse the interests of 
 your wretched fellow-citizens, to restore to us 
 the protection of the laws, torn from us by the 
 iniquity of the prcetors ; and not reduce us to 
 the fatal necessity of studying to perish in such 
 a manner, as amply to revenge our own blood 
 on those who have oppressed us. 
 
 To this, Q. Marcius replied, ' That if they 
 had any petition to present to the senate, they 
 must forthwith quit their arms, and repair to 
 Rome as suppliants ; that such had been the 
 clemency and compassion of the senate and 
 people of Rome on all occasions, that no one 
 had ever applied to them in vain for relief.' 
 
 Now Catiline, in his way to the camp, sent 
 letters to several persons of- consular dignity, 
 and indeed to every one of distinguished merit ; 
 representing, ' That being beset with false ac- 
 cusations, and unable to resist the faction of his 
 enemies, he submitted to his fortune, and was 
 going a voluntary exile to Marseilles) ; not that 
 
OF CATILINE. 
 
 li 
 
 he was conscious of the horrid treason he was 
 charged with, but out of regard to the tran- 
 quillity of the fctaf.e, and to prevent any dis- 
 turbances that might arise from his op[jo.sition.' 
 But a letter of a quite dilferenl kin<l was 
 read ih the senate by Q. Catulus, which he 
 declared he had received from Catiline; a 
 copy of which here follows : 
 
 L. Catiline to Q. Catulus, health. 
 
 Your great friendship to me, which I have 
 BO often proved when in my greatest dangers, 
 inspires me with confidence to apply to you 
 upon this occasion. Wherefore, I shall not 
 offer you any defence of my present measures ; 
 as I am conscious of no guilt, I shall only make 
 a declaration of my innocence, fur the truth of 
 which I appeal to the gods. 
 
 Being provoked by injuries and false accu- 
 sations ; deprived of the rewards of my servi- 
 ces ; and disappointed of the dignity I sued 
 for ; I have, according to my usual practice, 
 undertaken the cause of the oppressed ; not 
 that I am urged to this by my debts, for my 
 estate is sufficient tr^ discharge what I owe on my 
 own account; and Orestilla would (such is her 
 generosity) clear all my engagements on ac- 
 count of others, out of her own fortune and 
 that of her daughters. But seeing men of no 
 merit raised to the highest honours of the 
 state, and myself set aside upon groundless 
 jealousies, I have, upon this account, taken 
 sucn measures for preserving the small remains 
 of my dignity, as my present situation will 
 sufficiently justify. I should have said more 
 to you ; but I am just now informed that vio- 
 lent measures are taken against me ; I there- 
 fore conclude with recommending Orestilla to 
 your protection ; beseeching you, by the re- 
 gard you have for your own children, to defend 
 her from injuries. Adieu. 
 
 Having staid a few days with C. Flaminius 
 in the territory of Reate till he had furnished 
 that neighbourhood, which had before been 
 gained over to his party, with arms, he pro- 
 ceeded with the fasces, and the other ensigns 
 of consular authority, to Manlius's camp. 
 When this was known at Rome, the senate 
 declared Catiline and Manlius enemies to the 
 state ; with pardon to such of their followers 
 as should quit their arms by a certain day, 
 those only excepted who were under sentence 
 for capital crimes. They likewise decreed, 
 that the consuls should levy forces ; that C. 
 
 Anionius should pursue Catiline with all ex- 
 pedition, and Cicero stay to defend the city. 
 The Roman state, at this; juncture, appears to 
 me to have been in a condition extremely de- 
 plorable ; since, though all nations, from the 
 rising to the setting sun, were reduced to its 
 obedience ; though peace and prosperity, the 
 greatest blessings of life, in the estimation of 
 men, reigned at home; there were yet some 
 of her citizens desperately bent on their own 
 ruin and that of the commonwealth. For, 
 notwithstanding the two decrees of the senate, 
 not a ijjan was found, amongst the numerous 
 followers of Catiline, to accept the reward, 
 and discover the conspiracy ; not a single per- 
 son to desert his camp. So strong a spirit of 
 disaffection had, like a pestilence, taken pos- 
 session of their minds. 
 
 Nor were the conspirators and their accom- 
 plices the only disaffected persons ; the whole 
 body of the populace, from their passion for a 
 revolution, approved Catiline's designs ; nor 
 in this did they act contrary to their usual 
 character. For in all states, those that are 
 poor envy the possessions of the great ; extol 
 the extravagant; hate what they have been 
 long accustomed to ; long for changes ; and 
 from a dislike to their own condition, endea- 
 vour to throw every thing into confusion: in 
 times of public disorder and discord, they find 
 their subsistence without any trouble ; since 
 poverty is always attended with this advantage, 
 that it has nothing to lose. But the Roman 
 populace were become extremely degenerate, 
 from several causes ; chiefly, because all who 
 were remarkable for wickedness and violence ; 
 such as had squandered their fjrtunes in riot 
 and extravagance ; in a word, all they who 
 were forced from their native country for their 
 crimes, flocked to Rome from all quarters, as 
 into a common sink. Many again were con- 
 tinually reflecting upon Sy lla's success ; whence 
 they had seen some common soldiers raised to 
 the dignity of senators, and others so enriched, 
 that in pomp and splendour they lived like 
 kings ; and every one hoped, in case of a civil 
 war, to gam the victory, and the same advan- 
 tages from it. Besides, the young men in the 
 country, who were accustomed to earn a scanty 
 subsistence by their laboui, being drawn to 
 R'jme by the allurements of public and private 
 largesses, preferred the ease of the city to their 
 hard labour in the fields: these, with all others 
 of the like character, found their support in 
 3 D 
 
]2 
 
 CONSPIRACY 
 
 the calamities of the state. So that it is not 
 to be wondered at, that such men as these, 
 oppressed with poverty, of dissolute lives, and 
 extravagant views, should consult the interests 
 of the state, just as far as they were subservient 
 to their own. They too, whose parents had 
 been proscribed, whose estates had been con- 
 fiscated, and who had been deprived of the 
 privileges of citizens, under the tyranny of 
 Sylla, had the same expectations from a war 
 as the others had. Moreover, all they who 
 were of any party different from that of the 
 senate, wished rather to see the state embroiled, 
 than themselves without power ; a mighty 
 evil! which, after having lain dormant for 
 many years, had again revived in the city. 
 
 For, after the tribunitian authority was re- 
 stored, under the consulship of Pouipey and 
 Crassus, certain young men, whose age and 
 spirits were full of fire, having acquired that 
 high dignity, began by inveighing against the 
 senate, to inflame the populace ; then by lar- 
 gesses and great promises to heighten their 
 rage ; and thus gained great credit and power 
 to themselves. 
 
 The greatest part of the nobility exerted 
 their utmost efibrts in opposition to them ; in 
 appearance, to support the grandeur of the 
 senate, but in reality, their own. For, to de- 
 clare the truth in few words, all who raised 
 commotions in the state in those days, made 
 use of specious pretences ; some to assert the 
 rights of the people ; others to advance the 
 authority of the senate ; all to promote the 
 public good ; whilst every one OKly endea- 
 voured to gain power to himself. Their con- 
 tests were .carried on without any bounds or 
 moderation ; and whatever party prevailed, 
 made a cruel use of the victory. 
 
 But when Pompey was sent against the 
 pirates and Mithridates, the power of the peo- 
 ple declined, and the whole sway was in the 
 hands of a few. These engrossed all public 
 ofiices, the government of the provinces, and 
 every thing else ; lived unaccountable them- 
 selves, in great ease and security ; overawed 
 the popular magistrates with impeachments, 
 and thus prevented them from spiriting up the 
 people. But as soon as there was any hope of 
 a change in the state, the old contest fired 
 the minds of the populace. And if Catiline 
 had conquered in the first engagement, or 
 come ofl'but with equal loss, great distress and 
 calamity must certainly have overwhelmed the 
 
 state : nor would the conquerors have long 
 enjoj-ed their victory ; but, when they were 
 weakened and exhausted, whoever had most 
 power would have seized the government, and 
 subverted liberty. 
 
 Some there were, however, who, though 
 not concerned in the conspiracy, yet imme- 
 diately joined Catiline. Amongst these was A. 
 Fulvius, the son of a senator; who was taken 
 upon the road, brought back to the city, and 
 put to death by his father's orders. At the 
 same time Lentulus, in obedience to Catiline's 
 orders, was endeavouring to gain over, by 
 himself or others, all such as from their cha- 
 racters or circumstances he thought proper to 
 be employed in bringing about a revolution ; 
 not only citizens of Rome, but all that could 
 bear arms. 
 
 Accordingly he employed one P. TJmbrenus 
 to apply to the deputies of the Allobroges, and 
 engage them, if possible, to join in the war: 
 for he imagined that, as they were oppressed 
 both with public and private debts, and the 
 whole nation of the Gauls was naturally war- 
 like, it would be no difficult matter to persuade 
 them to enter into such a design. Umbrenus, 
 having traded in Gaul, was known to most of 
 the principal men in it, and acquainted with 
 their characters. Accordingly, without any 
 delay, as soon as he saw the deputies in the 
 Forum, after putting a few questions to them 
 concerning the state of their nation, and aflect- 
 ing a deep concern for their grievances, he 
 proceeded to ask, what issue they hoped for to 
 their calamities 1 then, perceiving that they 
 complained of the covetousness of our magis- 
 trates ; that they inveighed against the senate 
 for yielding them no protection ; and that they 
 expected from death alone a remedy to their 
 miseries ; he replied, " If you will only act like 
 men, I will put you upon a method to get rid 
 of all your pressures." The Allobroges, upon 
 hearing this, conceived mighty hopes, and 
 besought TJmbrenus to take pity upon them ; 
 for that there was no enterprise so difficult or 
 dangerous, wherein they would not with the 
 utmost readiness engage, provided it would 
 free their state from so vast a load of debt. 
 He then carried them to the house of D. 
 Brutus, which joined to the Forum, and was a 
 very proper place for such a consultation, 
 Sempronia being an accomplice, and Brutus 
 then from Rome. To give the greater weight 
 to what he had to say, he sent for Gabiniua 
 
OF CATILINE. 
 
 13 
 
 too, before whom he laid open to them the 
 conspiracy, named ali who were engaged in 
 it, and also many innocent persons, of every 
 rank, to give them the greater courage, and 
 then dismissed them, after they had promised 
 their assistance. 
 
 The AUobroges, however, were long in sus- 
 pense what course to take. On one side were 
 pressing debt, a passion for war, and the pros- 
 pect of great advantages from victory : on the 
 other superior power, safe measures, and in- 
 stead of uncertain hopes, a certain recompense. 
 While they were thus balancing, the fortune 
 of Rome prevailed. Accordingly they dis- 
 covered all they knew of the conspiracy to 
 Q. Fabius Sangua, upon whose patronage 
 their nation chiefly depended. Cicero, ap- 
 prised of the matter by Sanga, ordered the 
 deputies to feign a mighty zeal for the con- 
 spiracy, to go to the rest of the accomplices, to 
 promise largely, and endeavour to bring them 
 under as clear conviction as possible. 
 
 Much about the same time, there were com- 
 motions in Hither and Further Gaul, in the 
 territory of Picenum, in Brutium and Apulia. 
 For those whom Catiline had sent thither, 
 acted like madmen, pushing inconsiderately all 
 their measures at once ; and by their consulta- 
 tions in the night-time, their carrying arms to 
 and fro, their eager haste, and precipitate pro- 
 ceedings, caused more alarm than danger. 
 Many of these, Q. Metellus Celer the praetor 
 committed to prison, agreeably to the decree 
 of the senate ; as did C. MurEena in Hither 
 Gaul, where he was deputy governor. 
 
 At Rome, in the mean time, Lenlulus, with 
 the other heads of the conspiracy, presuming 
 upon a sufficient force, resolved that, as soon as 
 Catiline arrived with his army in the territory 
 of Fsesulae, L. Bestia, the tribune, should as- 
 semble the people, inveigh against Cicero's con- 
 duct, and lay the blame of so distressful a war 
 upon the best of consuls ; that, upon this sig- 
 nal, the whole body of the conspirators should, 
 on the ensuing night, betake themselves to the 
 discharge of their respective parts, which were 
 said to be assigned them in the following man- 
 ner : Statilius and Gabinius, with a considera- 
 ble party, were to set fire at once to twelve of 
 the most convenient places in the city, that in 
 the general hurry they might the more easily 
 reach the consul, and all those whom they de- 
 signed to assassinate. Cethegus was to force 
 Cicero's house, and put him to death ; whilst 
 
 others were employed elsewhere in the like 
 manner: young men too there were, living as 
 yet with their parents, ^mostly indeed from 
 amongst the nobility,) who were to kill their 
 fathers ; and when they had spread their con- 
 sternation and horror every where by flames 
 and massacre, they were to march out and 
 meet Catiline. 
 
 While they were thus resolving and forming 
 their measures, Cethegus was constantly com- 
 plaining of want of spirit in his associates ; that 
 by their irresolution and delay, they abused the 
 fairest opportunities ; that in so dangerous an 
 enterprise, action was more necessary than de- 
 liberation ; that for himself, would a few only 
 but support him, he would, notwithstanding 
 the cowardice of others, attack the senate- 
 house. As he was naturally of a daring re- 
 solute spirit, and brave in his person, he thought 
 the success depended upon expedition. 
 
 Now the AUobroges, according to Cicero's 
 instructions, procured a meeting, by means of 
 Gabinius, with the rest of the conspirators ; and 
 demanded from Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, 
 and likewise from Cassius, an oath signed se- 
 verally by them, to carry to their countrymen, 
 who otherwise would not be easily prevailed 
 upon to engage in an affair of so great impor- 
 tance. The rest, suspecting nothing, readily 
 granted it ; but Cassius promised that he would 
 be in their country in a short time, and ac. 
 cordingly left Rome a little before the deputies. 
 In company with these, Lentulus sent one 
 VoltuTcius of Crotona, that, before they went 
 home, they might ratify the league with Cati- 
 line by mutual ties. He likewise gave Voltur- 
 cius a letter for Catiline in the following words : 
 
 " Who I am, you will learn from him whom 
 I have sent to you. Consider your great dan- 
 ger, and remember you are a man : recollect 
 what your situation requires: seek assistance 
 from all, even the lowest." 
 
 Besides, he gave him verbal instructions to 
 expostulate with Catiline, " how he could reject 
 the assistance of the slaves, when he was de- 
 clared a public enemy by the senate :" to ac- 
 quaint him likewise, that all preparations were 
 made in Rome, according to his directions ; and 
 that he himself must not delay to advance. 
 
 Upon this, Cicero, on the night fixed for the 
 departure of the deputies, from whom he had 
 learned all, ordered the prsetor V. Flaccus, and 
 C. Pomptinus, to lie in wait for the AUobroges 
 at the Milvian bridge, and to secure them. He 
 
14 
 
 CONSPIRACY 
 
 ttcquainted them at the same time with the 
 reason of thus employing them, and left them 
 to act as they should see occasion. According 
 to orders, they posted their guards quietly, and 
 silently heset the bridge. When the deputies 
 and Volturcius arrived, a shout was set up on 
 both sides, and the Gauls soon understanding 
 their design, immediately surrendered them- 
 selves to the prsetors, Volturcius at first, en- 
 couraging his companions, defended himself 
 with his sword against the numbers who sur- 
 rounded him ; but seeing himself forsaken by 
 the deputies, he began earnestly to beseech 
 Pomptinus as his acquaintance, to spare his 
 life ; at last, full of dread and despair, he sur- 
 rendered himself to the prretors, as if they had 
 been foreign enemies. 
 
 Immediately upon this, messengers were 
 despatched with an account of it to Cicero, 
 who was seized at once with great joy and 
 anxiety. He was glad to see the state res- 
 cued from ruin, by a full discovery of the con- 
 spiracy ; but what perplexed him, was the 
 difficulty of knowing how to proceed against 
 citizens of such eminence, convicted of such 
 horrid treason. To punish them, he thought, 
 would create him many enemies, and to let 
 them pass unpunished, would ruin the state ; 
 wherefore, arming his mind with resolution, 
 he ordered Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and 
 Gabinius to be summoned before him, as like- 
 wise Csparius of Terracina, who was upon the 
 point of marching to Apulia to raise the slaves. 
 The others came immediately ; but Ceeparius, 
 having gone from home a little before, and 
 learned that all was discovered, had fled from 
 the city. The consul took Lentulus, who was 
 then prtetor, by the hand, and conducted him 
 to the senate, which he had assembled in the 
 temple of Concord, whither he ordered the 
 rest to be brought under guard. Volturcius 
 and the deputies were introduced into a very 
 full house, and Flaccus was ordered to bring 
 the packet of letters which he had received 
 from them. 
 
 Volturcius being questioned about his jour- 
 ney, the packet of letters, and, lastly, what his 
 design was, and from what motives he acted ; 
 made, at first, ridiculous pretences, affecting to 
 know nothing of the conspiracy. But being 
 promised his pardon, upon the security of the 
 public faith, he discovered every thing; and 
 told them, that a few days before Gabinius and 
 Caeparius had drawn him in for an associate ; 
 
 that he knew no more than the deputies did , 
 only he used to hear Gabinius sa}', that P. Au- 
 tronius, Ser. Sulla, L.Vargunteius, with many 
 more, were engaged in the conspiracy. The 
 Gauls gave the same account; they likewise 
 convicted Lentulus (who pretended ignorance 
 of the whole matter) not only by his letters, but 
 by his common discourse, " that, according to 
 the Sibylline oracles, three of the Cornelian 
 family should be sovereigns of Rome ; that 
 Sylla and Cinna had been so already ; and he 
 himself was now the third, appointed by the 
 Fates to be master of the city ; besides, that 
 the present was the twentieth year from the 
 burning of the capitol, which the augurs, from 
 several prodigies, had often foretold would pro- 
 duce a civil war and much bloodshed." Upon 
 this, the letters were read, and the criminals 
 having acknowledged their signets, the senate 
 decreed; that Lentulus should lay down his 
 office, and, together with the rest, be kept in 
 custod}'. Accordingly, Lentulus was delivered 
 to P. Lentulus Spinther. who was then sdile ; 
 Cethegus to Q. Cornificius ; Statil-ius to C. 
 Caesar ; Gabinius to M. Crassus ; and Cseparius 
 (who was taken in flight, and brought back im- 
 mediately before) to Cn. Terentius, a senator. 
 
 Meanwhile the populace, which at first, 
 from their passion for a revolution, were too 
 fond of a civil war, upon discovery of the con- 
 spiracy, changed their sentiments ; cursed the 
 designs of Catiline ; extolled Cicero to the 
 skies ; and, like people rescued from bondage, 
 gave themselves up to mirth and jollity. For 
 though they expected more advantage than 
 loss, by the ordinary events of the war ; yet 
 they looked upon the firing of the city as an 
 inhuman, barbarous attempt, and extremely 
 distressful to themselves ; whose whole sub- 
 stance consisted in what supported them from 
 day to day, and what they daily wore. 
 
 The day after, was brought before the senate 
 one L. Tarquinius, who was going to join Cati- 
 line, as was reported, and apprehended by the 
 way. This man offering to give a particular 
 account of the conspiracy, upon the security of 
 the public faith for his pardon, was ordered by 
 the consul to declare what he knew. He then 
 gave the senate almost the same account Vol- 
 turcius had done, of the design to fire the city 
 of the intended massacre of the best citizens, 
 and of the march of the army to Rome ; adding, 
 that he was sent by Crassus to tel! Catiline not 
 to be discouraged by the apprehending of Len- 
 
OF CATILINE. 
 
 15 
 
 tuliis, Cethegus, ant! others of the conspira- 
 tors, but to make the greater haste to the city, 
 to rescue them from danger, and revive the 
 spirit of the rest. 
 
 When Tarquinius named Crassus, a man of 
 high quahty, great riches, and vast credit in 
 the state ; they all called out, that he was 
 a false witness, and desired that it might be 
 debated. Some thought it quite incredible ; 
 others, though they believed the charge to be 
 true, yet thought that a person of so great in- 
 fluence ought at such a juncture rather to be 
 courted than exasperated : besides, most of the 
 senators were under private obligations to 
 Crassus. Accordingly, it was agreed in a full 
 senate, at the motion of Cicero, that Tarqui- 
 nius's evidence appeared to be false ; that he 
 should be ordered to prison, and confined till 
 he discovered by whose advice he had framed 
 so impudent a falsehood. Some there were at 
 that time, who thought that this evidence was 
 a contrivance of P. Autronius, that Crassus, 
 by being involved in the same danger with the 
 rest of the conspirators, might protect them by 
 his power. Others said, that Tarquinius was 
 put upon it by Cicero, to prevent Crassus from 
 embroiling the state, by undertaking to protect 
 villains, as was his custom. I heard Crassus 
 indeed himself affirm, that this contumely was 
 fixed upon him by Cicero. 
 
 Yet, at the same time, Q. Catulus and C. 
 Piso were not able to prevail upon Cicero, 
 either by interest, importunity, or any offers 
 whatever, to have C. Csesar falsely accused by 
 the AUobroges, or any other evidence. For 
 both these gentlemen were inveterate enemies 
 to him ; Piso, because Caesar had obtained judg- 
 ment against him for bribery, in sentencingto 
 death a man beyond the Po, unjustly ; Catulus 
 was fired with resentment, because Caesar, 
 though but a young man, in their competition 
 for the office of high-priest, had carried it against 
 him in his old age, after having enjoyed the 
 highest honours of the state. Now this they 
 thought was a favourable opportunity to bring 
 him under suspicion : for by his great liberality 
 to private persons, and great largesses to the 
 people, he had contracted vast debts. But not 
 being able to persuade the consul to so black 
 a crime, they themselves, by going about from 
 man to man, and charging Caesar with many 
 instances of guilt, which they pretended to 
 have heard from Volturcius and the AUo- 
 broges, brought great odium upon him, inso- 
 34 
 
 much that certain Roman knights, who were 
 posted about the temple of Concord, as a guard 
 to the senate, whether struck with the great* 
 ness of the danger, or animated by a nobler 
 principle, to testify their zeal for the public, 
 threatened him as he came out of the house 
 with their drawn swords. 
 
 Whilst these things were transacting in the 
 senate, and rewards decreeing to the deputies 
 of the AUobroges and Volturcius, whose dis- 
 coveries were approved ; the freedmen, and a 
 few of the dependants of Lentulus, went into 
 different parts of the city, some endeavouring 
 to prevail upon the slaves and workmen in the 
 streets, to rescue him by force ; others search- 
 ing after the ringleaders of the mob, who used 
 for hire to raise commotions in the state. Cethe- 
 gus, too, sent messengers to his domestic slaves 
 and freedmen, fellows trained up to audacious 
 enterprises, begging of them to form them- 
 selves into an armed body, and come to his 
 deliverance. The consul, as soon as he re- 
 ceived information of these proceedings, placed 
 guards as the time and exigency required ; and 
 assembling the senate, desired to know, what 
 they would please to determine, concerning 
 those who were now in custody 1 A full senate 
 had indeed but lately declared them public 
 traitors. Then D. Junius Silanus, v.'ho was 
 first asked his opinion, as being consul elect, 
 voted for capital punishment to be inflicted, not 
 upon the prisoners only, but likewise upon L. 
 Cassius, P. Furius, P. (Jmbrenus, and Q. An- 
 nius, if they should be apprehended : but after- 
 wards yielding to the strength of Csssar's 
 arguments, he declared himself of the same 
 sentiments with Tiberius Nero, who had pro- 
 posed that the guards should be strengthened, 
 and the debate adjourned. Caesar, when asked 
 by the consul in his turn, spoke as follows: 
 
 " It is the duty of all men, conscript fathers, 
 in their deliberations upon subjects of difficult 
 determination, to divest themselves of hatred 
 and affection, of revenge and pity. The mind, 
 when clouded with such passions, cannot easily 
 discern the truth ; nor has any man ever 
 gratified his own headstrong inclination, and at 
 the same time answered any valuable purpose. 
 When we exercise our judgment only, it has 
 sufficient force ; but when passion possesses us, 
 it bears sovereign sway, and reason is of no 
 avail. I could produce a great many instances 
 of kings and states pursuing wrong measures, 
 when influenced by resentment or compassion. 
 
16 
 
 CONSPIRACY 
 
 But I had rather set before you the example 
 of our forefathers, and show how they acted,_ 
 in opposition to the impulses of passion, but 
 agreeably to wisdom and sound policy. In the 
 war which we carried on with Perses king of 
 Macedonia, Rhodes, a mighty and flourishing 
 city, v^hich owed all its grandeur too to the 
 Roman aid, proved faithless, and became our 
 siiemy. But when the war was ended, and the 
 conduct of the Rhodians came to be taken into 
 consideration, our ancestors pardoned them, 
 that none might say the war had been under- 
 taken more on account of their riches than of 
 injuries. In all the Punic wars too, though 
 the Carthaginians, both in time of peace and 
 even during a truce, had often insulted us in 
 the most outrageous manner, yet, our ances- 
 tors never improved any opportunity of reta- 
 liating; considering more what was worthy of 
 themselves, than what might in justice be 
 done against them. 
 
 " In like manner, conscript fathers, ought 
 you to take care, that the wickedness of 
 Lentulus, and the rest of the conspirators, 
 weigh not more with you, than a regard to 
 your own honour; and that, while you gratify 
 your resentment, you do not forfeit your repu- 
 tation. If a punishment, indeed, can be in- 
 vented adequate to their crimes, I approve the 
 extraordinary proposal made ; but if the enor- 
 mity of their guilt is such, that human invention 
 cannot find out a chastisement proportioned to 
 it, my opinion is, that we ought to be contented 
 with such as the law has provided. 
 
 " Most of those who have spoke before me, 
 have, in a pompous and affecting manner, la- 
 mented the situation of the state ; they have 
 enumerated all the calamities of war, and the 
 many distresses of the conquered ; virgins 
 ravished ; youths unnaturally abused ; children 
 torn from tiie embraces of their parents ; ma- 
 trons forced to bear the brutal insults of vic- 
 torious soldiers ; temples and private houses 
 plundered ; all places filled with flames and 
 slaughter: finally, nothing but arms, carcasses, 
 blood, and lamentations to be seen. 
 
 " But, for the sake of the immortal gods, to 
 what purpose were such aflfecting strains ? 
 Was it to raise in your minds an abhorrence 
 of the conspiracy 1 as if he, whom so daring 
 and threatening a danger cannot move, could 
 be inflamed by the breath of eloquence. No, 
 this is not the way ; nor do injuries appear 
 light to any one that suffers them ; many 
 
 stretch them beyond their due size. But, con- 
 script fathers, different allowances are made to 
 different persons, when such as live in obscu- 
 rity are transported by passion to the commis- 
 sion of any offences, there are few who know 
 it; their reputation and fortune being upon a 
 level: but those who are invested with great 
 power, are placed upon an eminence, and their 
 actions viewed by all ; and thus the least al- 
 lowance is made to the highest dignity. There 
 i must be no partiality, no hatred, far less any 
 resentment or animosity, in such a station. 
 What goes by the name of passion only in 
 others, when seen in men of power, is called 
 pride and cruelty. 
 
 " As for me, conscript fathers, I look upon all 
 tortures as far short of what these criminals 
 deserve. But most men remember best what 
 happened last ; and forgetting the guilt of 
 wicked men, talk only of their punishment, if 
 more severe than ordinary. I am convinced, 
 what D. Silanus, that brave and worthy man, 
 said, was from his zeal to the state, and that 
 he was neither biassed by partiality nor enmity ; 
 such is his integrity and moderation, as I well 
 know. But his proposal appears to me not 
 indeed cruel, (for against such men what can 
 be cruel ]) but contrary to the genius of our 
 government. Surely, Silanus, you were urged 
 by fear, or the enormity of the treason, to pro- 
 pose a punishment quite new. How ground- 
 less such fear is, it is needless to show ; 
 especially when, by the diligence of so able a 
 consul, such powerful forces are provided for 
 our security ; and as to the punishment, we 
 may say, what indeed is the truth, that to those 
 who live in sorrow and misery, death is but a 
 release from trouble ; that it is death which puts 
 an end to all the calamities of men, beyond 
 which there is no room for care and joy. But 
 why, in the name of the gods, did not you add 
 to your proposal, that they should be punished 
 with stripes ? Was it, because the Porcian 
 law forbids it? But there are other laws too 
 which forbid the putting to death a condemned 
 Roman, and allow him the privilege of banish- 
 ment. Or was it because whipping is a more 
 severe punishment than death 1 Can any thing 
 be reckoned too cruel or severe against men 
 convicted of such treason? But if stripes are 
 a lighter punishment, how is it consistent to 
 observe the law in a matter of small concern, 
 and disregard it in one that is of greater? 
 " But you will say, Who will find fault with 
 
OF CATILINE, 
 
 17 
 
 any punishment decreed against traitors to the 
 state 1 I answer, time may, so may sudden 
 conjunctures ; and fortune, too, that governs 
 the world at pleasure. Whatever punishment 
 is inflicted on these parricides, will be justly in- 
 flicted. But take care, conscript fathers, how 
 your present decrees may affect posterity. All 
 bad precedents spring from good beginnings; 
 but when the administration is in the hands of 
 wicked or ignorant men, these precedents, at 
 first just, are transferred from proper and de- 
 serving objects, to such as are not so. 
 
 " The Lacedemonians, when they had con- 
 quered the Athenians, placed thirty governors 
 over them ; who began their power by putting 
 to death, without any trial, such as were re- 
 markably wicked, and universally hated. The 
 people were highly pleased at this, and ap- 
 plauded the justice of such executions. But 
 when they had by degrees established their 
 lawless authority, they wantonly butchered both 
 good and bad without distinction ; and thus 
 kept the state in awe. Such was the severe 
 punishment which the people, oppressed with 
 slavery, suffered for their foolish joy. 
 
 " In our own times, when Syl'a, after his sac- 
 cess, ordered Damasippus and others of the like 
 character, who raised themselves upon the mis- 
 fortunes of the state, to be put to death, who 
 did not commend him for it? all agreed that 
 such wicked and factious instruments, who were 
 constantly embroiling the commonwealth, were 
 justly put to death. Yet this was an introduc- 
 tion to a bloody massacre. For whoever co- 
 veted his fellow-citizen's house, either in town 
 or country, nay even any curious piece of plate, 
 or fine raiment, took care to have the possessor 
 of it put upon the list of the proscribed. 
 
 " Thus they, who had rejoiced at the punish- 
 ment of Damasippus, were soon after dragged 
 to death themselves ; nor was an end put to 
 this butchery, till Syila had glutted all his fol- 
 lowers with riches. I do not indeed apprehend 
 any such proceedings from M. Cicero, nor 
 from these times. But in so great a city as 
 ours, there are various characters and disposi- 
 r tions. At another time, and under another 
 V consul, who may have an army too at his com- 
 mand, any falsehood may pass for facts ; and 
 when, upon this precedent, the consul shall, by 
 a decree of the senate, draw the sword, who 
 is to set bounds to it T who to moderate its 
 fury 1 
 
 " Ou: mcestors, conscrip fathers, never 
 
 wanted conduct nor courage ; nor did they think 
 it unworthy of them to imitate the customs of 
 other nations, if they were useful and praise- 
 worthy. From the Samnites they learned the 
 exercise of arms, and borrowed from them their 
 weapons of war ; and most of their ensigns of 
 magistracy from the Tuscans ; in a word, they 
 were very careful to practise whatever appeared 
 useful to them, whether amongst their allies or 
 their enemies ; choosing rather to imitate than 
 envy what was excellent. 
 
 " Now in those days, in imitation of the cus- 
 tom of Greece, they inflicted stripes on guilty 
 citizens, and capital punishment on such as were 
 condemned. But when the commonwealth be- 
 came great and powerful, and the vast number 
 of citizens gave rise to factions ; when the in- 
 nocent began to be circumvented, and other 
 such inconveniences to take place ; then the 
 Porcian and other laws were made, which pro- 
 vided no higher punishment than banishment 
 for the greatest crimes. These considerations, 
 conscript fathers, appear to me of the greatest 
 weight against our pursuing any new resolution 
 on this occasion. For surely, their virtue and 
 wisdom, who, from so small beginnings, raised 
 so mighty an empire, far exceed ours, who are 
 scarce able to preserve what they acquired so 
 gloriously. What, shall we discharge the con- 
 spirators, you'll say, to reinforce Catiline's 
 army 1 By no means : but my opinion is this ; 
 that their estates be confiscated ; their persons 
 closely confined in the most powerful cities of 
 Italy ; and that no one move the senate or the 
 people for any favour towards them, under the 
 penalty of being declared by the senate an 
 enemy to the state, and the welfare of its 
 members." 
 
 When Ccesar had made an end of speaking, 
 and the rest of the senators, either by words or 
 signs, approved or disapproved of the several 
 proposals made; Cato, being asked his opinion, 
 delivered it in the f illowing speech : 
 
 " I am very differently affected, conscript 
 fathers, when I view our present situation, and 
 the danger we are in ; and then consider with 
 myself the proposals made by some senators 
 who have spoken before me. They appear to 
 me to have reasoned only about the punishment 
 of those, who have entered into a combination 
 to make war upon their country, upon their pa- 
 rents, upon religion and private property; where- 
 as our present circumstances warn us rather to 
 guard against them, than to consider in what 
 
18 
 
 CONSPIRACY 
 
 manner we shall punish them. You may take 
 vengeance for other crimes after thej' are com- 
 mitted ; but if 3'ou do not prevent the commis- 
 sion of this, when it is once accomplished, in 
 vain will you have recourse to the tribunals. 
 When the city is once taken, no resource re- 
 mains to the conquered citizens. 
 
 " Now I conjure you by the immortal gods, 
 you who have always valued your fine houses 
 in town and country, your pictures, your statues, 
 more than the welfare of the state ; if you are 
 desirous to preserve these things, which, what- 
 ever their real value be, you are so fond of; if 
 you would have leisure for pursuing your 
 pleasures ; rouse for once out of your lethargy, 
 and take upon you the defence of the state. 
 The debate is not about the public revenues, 
 nor the oppression of our allies : no ; our li- 
 berties, our lives are in danger. 
 
 <• Often, conscript fathers, have I spoken in 
 this house ; often have I complained of the 
 luxury and avarice of our fellow-citizens ; upon 
 which account I bear the enmity of many : I, 
 W'ho never indulged myself in any vice, nor even 
 clrerished the thoughts of any, could not easily 
 pardon the crimes of others. And though you 
 little regarded my remonstrances, j-et the com- 
 monwealth remained firm ; her native strength 
 supported her, even under the negligence of her 
 governors. B ut the present debate is not about 
 the goodness or depravity of our morals ; nor 
 about the greatness or prosperity of the Roman 
 empire: no, it is whether this empire, such as 
 it is, shall continue our own, or, together with 
 ourselves, fall a prey to the enernj'. 
 
 " And, in such a case, will any one talk of 
 gentleness or mercy ? We have long since lost 
 the true names of things. To give away what 
 belongs to others, is called generosity ; to at- 
 tempt what is criminal, fortitude ; and thence 
 the state is reduced to the brink of ruin. Let 
 them, since such is the fashion of the times, be 
 generous from the spoils of our allies ; merciful 
 to the plunderers of the treasury ; but let them 
 not be prodigal of our blood, and by sparing a 
 few bad citizens, destroy all the good. ■ 
 
 " C. Csesar has just now spoke, with great 
 strength and accuracy, concerning life and 
 death, taking for fictions, I doubt not, the vul- 
 gar notions of an infernal world ; where thb 
 bad, separated from the good, are confined to 
 dark, frightful, and melancholy abodes. Ac- 
 cordingly, his proposal is, that their estates be 
 confiscated, and their persons confined in the 
 
 corporate towns ; from an apprehension, I 
 imagine, that, if they were kept at Rome, they 
 might be rescued hy force, either by their fellow- 
 con.spirators, or a mercejiary mob : as if wicked 
 and profligate persons were only to be found in 
 this city, and not all over Italy ; or, as if there 
 were not more encouragement to the attempts 
 of the desperate, where there is least strength 
 to resist them. 
 
 " This then is an empty proposal, if he fears 
 any danger from them ; but if, amidst this so 
 great and universal consternation, he alone is 
 void of fear ; so much the more does it concern 
 me, to be afraid, both for myself and you. 
 
 *■ Wherefore, in determining the fate of Len- 
 tulus and the other prisoners, be assured, that 
 you likewise determine that of Catiline's army, 
 and all the conspirators. The more vigour and 
 resolution you exert, so much the less spirit 
 and courage will they have ; but if they ob- 
 serve the least remissness in your proceedings, 
 they will presently fall upon you with fury. 
 
 " Do not think it was by arms our ancestors 
 raised the state, from so small beginnings, to 
 such grandeur: if so, we should have it in its 
 highest lustre ; as having a greater number of 
 allies and citizens, of arms and horses, than 
 they had. But there were other things from 
 which they derived their greatness, such as we 
 are entirely without. They were industrious at 
 home, and exercised an equitable government 
 abroad ; their minds were free in council, nei- 
 ther swayed by crimes nor passion. Instead of 
 these virtues, we have luxury and avarice ; 
 poverty in the state, and great wealth in the 
 members of it ; we admire riches, and abandon 
 ourselves to idleness ; we make no distinction 
 between the virtuous and the wicked ; and all 
 the rewards of virtue are possessed by ambition. 
 Nor is it at all strange, whilst each of you pur- 
 sues his separate interest ; whilst you abandon 
 yourselves to pleasure at home, and here in 
 the senate are slaves to money or favour ; that 
 attacks are made upon the state when thus for- 
 saken. But no more of this, 
 
 " Romans of the highest quality have con- 
 spired to destroy their country, and are endea- 
 vouring to engage the Gauls, the sworn ene- 
 mies of the Roman name, to join them. The 
 commander of the enemy is hovering over us 
 with an army, and yet at this very juncture you 
 delay and hesitate how to proceed against such 
 of the conspirators as are seized within youi 
 walls. Would you extend your compassion to 
 
OF CATILINE. 
 
 19 
 
 wards them 1 be it so ; they are young men 
 only, and have offended through ambition ; send 
 them away armed too: what would be the 
 consequence of this gentleness and mercy 1 
 why this, when they got arms in their hands, 
 it would prove your utter ruin. 
 
 " Our situation is indeed dangerous ; but you 
 are not afraid : yes, you are very much ; only 
 from effeminacv and want of spirit you are in 
 suspense, waiting everj' one the motions of 
 another ; trusting perhaps to the immortal 
 gods, who have often saved this common- 
 wealth in the greatest dangers. But assis- 
 tance is not obtained from the gods by idle 
 vows, and supplications like those of women ; it 
 is by vigilatice, activity, and wise counsels, 
 that all undertakings succeed ; if you resign 
 yourselves to sloth and idleness, it will be in 
 vain to implore the assistance of the gods ; you 
 will only provoke them to anger, and they 
 will make you feel it. 
 
 '< In the days of our ancestors, A. Manlius 
 Torquatus, in a war with the Gauls, ordered 
 his son to be put to death, for having engaged 
 the enemy without orders ; and thus a young 
 man of great hofies was punished for too much 
 bravery. And do you demur about the doom 
 of the most barbarous parricides 1 
 
 " Their present olTence, perhaps, is unsuit- 
 able to their former character : show a tender 
 regard then for the dignity of Lentulus, if you 
 find that he himself ever showed any for his 
 own chastity, for his honour, for gods or men ; 
 pardon Cethegus, in consideration of his youth, 
 if this is not the second time of his making war 
 upon his country. For what need I mention 
 Gabinius, Statllius, Cjeparius 1 who, if they 
 had possessed the least degree of reflection, 
 would never have embarked in such wicked 
 designs against the state. 
 
 " Finally, conscript fathers, were there any 
 room for a wrong step on this occasion, I should 
 suffer you to be corrected by the consequences, 
 since you disregard my reasonings. But we 
 are surrounded on all sides : Catiline is hover- 
 ing over our heads with an army ; we have 
 enemies within the walls, and in the very 
 heart of the city. No preparations can 
 be made, no measures taken, without their 
 knowledge: hence the greater reason for 
 despatch. 
 
 " My opinion then is this, that since by a 
 detestable combination of profligate citizens 
 the state is brought into the greatest danger ; 
 34* 
 
 since they are convicted by the evidence of 
 Volturcius, and the deputies of the Allobroges, 
 and their own confession, to have entered into 
 a conspiracy for destroying their fellow-cilizens 
 and native country, by slaughter, conflagration, 
 and other unheard-of cruelties ; they be put to 
 death, according to the ancient usage, as being 
 condemned by their own mouths." 
 
 When Cato had done speaking, all of con- 
 sular dignity, and the greatest part of the se- 
 nate, indeed, apjilauded his opinion ; extolled 
 his resolution to the skies ; and reproached 
 one another with pusillanimity. Cato was 
 looked upon as a great and illustrious patriot ; 
 and a decree passed conformable to his pro- 
 posal. 
 
 Now, as I have read and heard much of the 
 glorious achievements of the Roman people, in 
 war and peace, both by sea and land ; I was 
 very desirous to discover the cause to which 
 they were principally owing. I knew that 
 they had often, with a handful of men, engaged 
 mighty armies : I v^'as not ignorant, that with 
 small forces they had carried on war against 
 powerful princes ; that they had often supported 
 themselves undei the severe buffetings of ad- 
 verse fortune ; that the Greeks surpassed them 
 in eloquence, and the' Gauls in military glory. 
 And having duly weighed every cause, I waa 
 convinced, that all was owing to the great 
 virtue of some particular persons ; hence it waa 
 that poverty triumphed over riches, and a hand- 
 ful of men prevailed over great numbers. Nay, 
 after Kome became depraved by luxury and' 
 sloth, the commonwealth still supported herself 
 by her native strength, under the miscarriages 
 of her magistrates and generals; even when^ 
 like a mother past bearing, she did not pro- 
 duce, for a long time, any citizen of distin- 
 guished merit. 
 
 Two, however, I myself remember, Cato- 
 and Cfesar, both men of great abilities, but 
 different characters ; whom, as so fair an oppor- 
 tunity presents itself, I would not omit taking 
 notice of; but shall endeavour, in the best 
 manner I am able, to display the temper anJ 
 man'ers of each. 
 
 As to their extraction, years, and eloquencci 
 they were pretty nigh equal. Both of them 
 had the same greatness of mind, both the same 
 degree of glory, but in different ways : Cajsar 
 was celebrated for his great bounty and gene- 
 rosity ; Cato, for his unsullied integrity ; the 
 former became renowned by his humanity and 
 3E 
 
20 
 
 CONSPIRACY 
 
 compassion ; an austere severity heightened 
 the dignity of the latter. CiBsar acquired 
 glory hy a liberal, compassionate, and for- 
 giving temper ; as did Cato, by never bestowing 
 any thing. In the one, the miserable found a 
 sanctuary ; in the other, the guilty met with cer- 
 tain destruction. Csesarwas admired for an easy 
 yielding temper; Cato, for his immoveable 
 firmness. Csesar, in a word, had formed him- 
 self for a laborious, active life ; was intent upon 
 promoting the interest of his friends, to the ne- 
 glect of his own ; and refused to grant nothing 
 that was worth accepting ; what he desired for 
 himself, was to have sovereign command, to be 
 at the head of armies, and engaged in new 
 wars, in order to display his military talents. 
 As for Cato, his only study was moderation, 
 regular conduct, and above all, rigorous seve- 
 rity. He did not vie with the rich in riches, 
 nor in faction with the factious ; but, taking a 
 nobler aim, he contended in bravery with the 
 brave ; in modesty with the modest ; in inte- 
 grity with the upright ; and was more desirous 
 to be virtuous, than appear so : so that the less 
 he courted fame, the more it followed him. 
 
 When the senate had agreed to Cato's pro- 
 posal, as I have already related, the consul 
 thought it most expedient to put the sentence 
 in execution immediately, lest any new attempt 
 should be made in the night, which was just at 
 hand ; and accordingly ordered the triumvirs to 
 get every thing in readiness for it. He him- 
 self, after posting the guards, conducted Len- 
 tulus to prison, as the praetors did the rest. 
 
 There is a place in the prison, after a small 
 descent to the left, called Tullus's dungeon, 
 sunk about twelve feet under ground, secured 
 on all sides with strong walls, and above with 
 an arch of stone ; a dark, noisome solitude, 
 frightful to behold. Lentulus, being thrust 
 down into this place, was presently strangled 
 by the executioners, appointed for that purpose. 
 Such was the death of this noble patrician, 
 who had borne the office of consul, and was 
 descended from the most illustrious family of 
 the Cornelii : a death due to his life and crimes. 
 Cethegus, Statilius, Gabinius, and Cfeparius, 
 were executed in the same manner. 
 
 During these transactions at Rome, Catiline, 
 out of all the forces which he had carried with 
 him, and those under the command of Manlius, 
 formed two legions ; filled up the several co- 
 horts, according to the number of his men ; 
 then distributing equally amongst them all the 
 
 volunteers, with those who were sent him by 
 his associates, he soon saw his legions com* 
 plete ; though he had at first but two thousand 
 men. But of these a fourth part only were 
 completely armed ; the rest were furnished 
 with whatever chance threw in their way, — 
 some had darts, some spears, and others sharp 
 stakes. 
 
 As soon as Antony approached with his 
 army, Catiline betook himself to the moun- 
 tains ; one while advancing towards Rome, 
 another towards Gaul ; and by this means de- 
 prived the enemy of an opportunity of fighting 
 him. He was indeed in daily hopes of re- 
 ceiving great reinforcements, if his accomplices 
 executed their designs at Rome. In the mean- 
 time he refused to take the slaves into his ser- 
 vice, who flocked to him in great numbere 
 from the very beginning ; trusting to the 
 strength of the conspiracy, and likewise con- 
 ceiving that it would be bad policy, to appear 
 to blend the cause of freemen with that of fu- 
 gitive slaves. 
 
 But when news reached the camp that the 
 conspiracy was discovered at Rome ; that Len- 
 tulus, Cethegus, and the rest above mentioned 
 were put to death ; most of those, who were 
 tempted to take arms by the hopes of spoil, or 
 a passion for changes, presently left him 
 The rest he led by long marches over steep 
 mountains into the territory of Pistorium, with 
 a design to escape into Cisalpine Gaul by ob- 
 scure roads. 
 
 Q. MetelJus Ccler, who at that time com 
 manded three legions in the territory of Pice- 
 num, judged that Catiline, in his present dif- 
 ficulties, would take this very course. Ac- 
 cordingly, having learned from his deserters 
 what route he had taken, he immediately de- 
 camped, and posted himself at the foot of the 
 mountains, just where Catiline was obliged to 
 pass in his way to Gaul. Nor was Antony far 
 behind, who pursued the flying rebels through 
 ways more level, at the head of a great army. 
 When Catiline saw himself enclosed by the 
 mountains and the enemies* troops ; that his 
 designs had miscarried in the city ; that there 
 was neither hope of escaping nor receiving any 
 succour ; he thought his best way, in such a 
 situation, was to try the fortune of a battle, 
 and determined to engage Antony as soon as 
 possible. Accordingly, assembling his troops, 
 he spoke to them in the following manner: 
 
 " I have learned by experience, fellow-sol* 
 
OF CATILINE. 
 
 21 
 
 diers, that words cannot inspire courage, nor a 
 general's speech render a spiritless and timor- 
 ous army, brave and intrepid. Every man 
 displays in battle, just so much courage as 
 nature or habit has given him, and no more. 
 It IS to no purpose to exhort him, whom neither 
 glory nor danger can animate ; his fear de- 
 prives him of his hearing. I have assembled 
 you, fellovr-so'.diers, to instruct you in a few 
 particulars, and to lay before you the grounds 
 of my final resolution. 
 
 " You all know what a dreadful calamity 
 Lentulus by his slow and spiritless conduct has 
 brought upon himself and us ; and how I have 
 been prevented from marching into Gaul, by 
 waiting for reinforcements from Rome. In 
 what posture our affairs now are, you all see 
 as well as I. Two armies, one from Rome, 
 another from Gaul, obstruct our motions. 
 Want of provisions and other necessaries will 
 not allow us to make any longer stay here, 
 were we ever so desirous of doing it. To what 
 place soever you think of marching, you must 
 open yourselves a passage with your swords. 
 I conjure you, then, to summon up all your 
 courage ; to act like men resolute and un- 
 daunted ; to remember when you engage, 
 that you carry in your hands riches, honour, 
 and glory ; nay, even your liberty and your 
 country. If we overcome, all will be safe ; we 
 shall have plenty of provisions; the corporate 
 towns and colonies will be all ready to receive 
 us. But if we flinch through fear, the very re- 
 verse will be our fate; nor will any place or 
 friend protect those, whom arms could not. Let 
 me add to this, my fellow-soldiers, that we have 
 different motives to animate us, from what the 
 opposite army has. We fight for our country, 
 for our liberty, for our lives; they, for no in- 
 terest of their own, but only to support the 
 power of a few. Let this consideration, then, 
 engage you to fall upon them the more cou- 
 rageously, remembering your former bravery. 
 
 " We might, indeed, have passed our days, 
 with the utmost infamy, in banishment: some 
 of you too might have lived at Rome, depend- 
 ing for your subsistence upon others, after 
 having lost your own estates. But such a con- 
 dition appearing infamous and intolerable to 
 men of spirit, you resolved upon the present 
 course ; vvhich if you desire to leave, you must 
 exert your courage : none but a conqueror 
 hath ever exchanged war for peace. For to 
 hope for security from flight, when you have 
 
 turned from the enemy the arms which servo 
 to defend you, is the height of madness. In 
 battle, the most timorous are always in the 
 most danger : courage is a wall of defence. 
 When I consider your characters, fellow- 
 soldiers, and reflect upon your past achieve- 
 ments, I have great hopes of victory : your 
 spirit, your age, your virtue, encourage me; 
 and our necessity too, which even inspires 
 cowards with bravery. For the straitness of 
 our situation will prevent the enemies' num- 
 bers from surrounding us. But should fortune 
 envy your bravery, be sure you fall not, without 
 taking due vengeance upon the enemy ; suffer 
 not yourselves to be taken and butchered like 
 cattle; but fight rather like men, and leave the 
 enemy a bloody and mournful victory." 
 
 Pausing a little after this speech, he ordered 
 to sound to battle ; and led down his forces in 
 their ranks to the plain. Then, sending away 
 all the horses, in order to encourage his men 
 the more, by making the danger of all equal ; 
 he himself, on foot, drew up his army in order 
 of battle, according to its number and the na- 
 ture of the place. For as there lay a plain on 
 his left, bounded by the mountains, and a steep 
 rock on his right, he placed eight cohorts in 
 liis front, and the rest he posted in closer order 
 to support them. 
 
 From amongst these, he drew out the 
 choicest centurions, the honorary veterans, and 
 the bravest and best armed of the common 
 soldiers, and placed them in the front. He 
 appointed C, Manlius to command the right, 
 and a native of Fsesulse the left; he himself 
 with his freedmen, and such troops as he had 
 raised in the colonies, stood by the eagle ; the 
 same which C. Marius was said to have had 
 in his army in the Cimbrian war. 
 
 On" the other side, C. Antony, being hin- 
 dered by the gout from being present at the 
 engagement, gave the command to M. Petreius 
 his lieutenant-general. 
 
 He posted the veteran cohorts, which he had 
 raised on this occasion, in the front; and the 
 rest of his army behind them, as a body of re- 
 serve. He himself rode from rank to rank, 
 and addressing himself to his men by their 
 names, entreated and conjured them " to re- 
 member that they were now to engage against 
 unarmed robbers, in defence of their gods, their 
 country, their children, and their property." 
 As he was an old soldier, having served in the 
 army upwards of thirty years, as tribune, prse- 
 
22 
 
 CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE 
 
 feet, lieutenant-general, or prsetor, and that 
 with distinguished renown ; he knew most of 
 the soldiers and their gallant actions; and by 
 calling these to remembrance, he roused their 
 courage. 
 
 Petreius having taken all his measures with 
 the utmost precaution, sounded to battle, and 
 ordered his cohorts to advance slowly : the en- 
 emy did the same. But when they were come 
 near enough for the light-armed soldiers to be- 
 gin the fight, they set up a mighty shout, rushed 
 with great fury into a close engagement, and, 
 laying aside their darts, made use of their swords 
 only. The veterans, mindful of their former 
 bravery, pressed vigorously upon the rebels, 
 who made a bold resistance ; so that the fight 
 was maintained with great obstinacy. Catiline 
 was all the while in the first line, at the head 
 of a light-armed body ; sustaining such as were 
 severely pressed ; putting fresh men in the 
 room of those that were wounded ; providing 
 for every exigence, often charging the enemy 
 in person, and performing at once the duty of 
 a brave soldier and a great commander. 
 
 Petreius, when he found that Catiline, con- 
 trary to his expectations, exerted himself with 
 great vigour, brought up the Prsetorian cohort 
 against his main body, broke their ranks, and 
 made great slaughter of them, as he did like- 
 wise of the others who maintained their ground 
 elsewhere. Then he fell upon both the wings 
 at once. Manlius and the other officer from 
 Faesula? were both killed, fighting in the fore- 
 
 most rank. Catiline, when he saw his forces 
 routed, and himself left with a few only ; mind- 
 ful of his birth and former dignity, rushed head- 
 long into the thickest of the foe, Avhere he fell, 
 covered with wounds, and fighting to the last. 
 When the engagement was ended, it evi- 
 dently appeared with what undaunted spirit and 
 resolution Catiline's army was fired. For the 
 body of every one was found upon that very 
 spot, which, during the battle, he had fought 
 from ; those only excepted who were forced 
 from their posts by the Praetorian cohort ; and 
 even they, though they fell a little out of their 
 ranks, vi-ere all wounded before. Catiline him- 
 self was found, far from his own men, amidst 
 the dead bodies of the enemy, breathing a little, 
 with an air of that fierceness still in his face 
 which he had when alive. Finally, in all his 
 army there was not so much as one free citizen 
 taken prisoner, either in the engagement or in 
 the flight; for they spared their ovi-n lives as 
 little as those of the enemy. The army of the 
 republic obtained the victory, indeed, but it was 
 neither a cheap nor a joyful one ; for their 
 bravest men were either slain in battle or dan- 
 gerously wounded. As there were many, too, 
 who went to view the field, either out of curi- 
 osity or a desire of plunder, in turning over the 
 dead bodies, some found a friend, some a re- 
 lation, and some a guest; others there were 
 likewise who discovered their enemies ; so that 
 through the whole army there appeared a mix- 
 ture of gladness and sorrow, joy and mourning 
 
THE 
 
 WAR AGAINST JUGURTHA 
 
 It is an unjust complaint that mankind have 
 made of their nature, as being frail and of 
 short duration, and governed more by chance 
 than by virtue. For, on the contrary, you 
 will find nothing, upon reflection, greater or 
 more excellent ; and that men want industry 
 more than time or abilities. 
 
 The director and governor of human life is 
 the soul; which, when it pursues glory in the 
 paths of virtue, is abundantly prevalent, nay, 
 even crowned with renown, and stands in no 
 need of the aids of fortune, which can neither 
 bestow nor take away probity, industry, or any 
 worthy quality. But when the soul becomes 
 enslaved to ignoble passions, and abandoning 
 itself to indolence and sensual pleasure, has, 
 by a course of debauchery, lost in sloth its vi- 
 gour, time, and abilities, the frailty of nature 
 is blamed. For it is usual with men to blame 
 the course of things for the evils they bring 
 upon themselves. Whereas, would they but 
 engage in virtuous pursuits with the same ar- 
 dour and spirit as they do in such as are unin- 
 teresting, nay, and dangerous too, they would 
 no more be governed by fortune, than fortune 
 by them ; they would even arrive at such 
 sublime heights of grandeur, as, from being 
 mortals to become immortal through glory. 
 
 For as man is compounded of snul and body, 
 so all our actions and all our pursuits partake 
 of the one or the other. Accordingly, beauty, 
 great wealth, strength of body, and other 
 things of the like nature, are of short duration ; 
 but the noble productions of the soul are, like 
 itself, immortal. Moreover, the good things 
 of the body, and of fortune, as they have a 
 beginning, so they have a period ; and all 
 
 things indeed that rise and increase (all and 
 decay. But the soul is incorruptible and im- 
 mortal ; the governor of human kino i which 
 animates and comprehends all thinft^i, but is 
 comprehended by nothing itself. So that the 
 depravity of those is the more surprising, who, 
 sunk in sensuality, spend their lives in luxury 
 and idleness ; and suffer their minds, the no- 
 blest and most refined part of their frame, to lie 
 uncultivated, and languish in indolence; espe- 
 cially, since there are so many and such vari- 
 ous accomplishments by which the mind may 
 acquire the highest renown. 
 
 Magistracy and high command, though 
 among the number of such pursuits, yet do not 
 appear to me to be at all desirable at this con- 
 juncture, nor indeed any share in the adminis- 
 tration ; since honours are neither bestowed on 
 the virtuous, nor are they who obtain authority 
 by infamous means, the more secure, or the 
 more honourable, for enjoying it. For to go- 
 vern your country and kindred by force, though 
 you may have it in your power, and may even 
 rectify abuses, is, however, a dangerous situa- 
 tion ; especially since all innovations in a state 
 threaten slaughter, banishment, and all the 
 miseries of war. To strive for power to no 
 purpose, and to reap nothing by continual 
 fatigue but public odium, is extreme madness; 
 unless we imagine any one to be possessed of 
 so base and pernicious a spirit, as to sacrifice 
 his honour and liberty to the power of a few. 
 
 Among the different ways of employing 
 men's abilities, that of writing history is of 
 eminent use ; but I shall say nothing of its ex 
 cellence, because many have already shown 
 it; and lest I should be charged with vanity, 
 
24 
 
 THE War 
 
 for extolling what I am myself engaged in. 
 There are some, however, I doubt not, who, 
 because I have resolved to pass my days at a 
 distance from any share in the management of 
 public affairs, will be ready to call this my 
 undertaking, however great and useful in itself, 
 an indolent amusement : this, at least, will be 
 the language of such, who think the task of 
 saluting the people by their names, and court- 
 ing their favour by feasts, the greatest of all. 
 
 But if these men will only consider at what 
 times I was promoted in the state ; the dignity 
 of those who were then unsuccessful in their 
 pursuit of employment ; and what sort of men 
 have since got into the senate, they will cer- 
 tainly allow that I altered my sentiments upon 
 iust grounds, and not from indolence ; and that 
 the state will reap more benefit by my retiring 
 from business, than by the caballings of others. 
 For I have often heard that Q. Maximus and 
 P. Scipio, with other great men of our state, 
 were wont to say, that, upon beholding the 
 images of their ancestors, their minds were 
 powerfully animated to virtue. Not that the 
 wax, or the figure, made so strong an impres- 
 sion upon their minds ; it was only the recol- 
 lection of the glorious achievements of their 
 forefathers, that excited that generous flame in 
 the breasts of those brave men, which they 
 could never extinguish, till they had attained 
 the like degree of glory and reputation. 
 
 How different are the manners of the present 
 age ; in which there is not a man to be found 
 who vies with his ancestors in probity and in- 
 dustry, but in riches only and extravagance. 
 Nay, even persons of obscure birth, who were 
 formerly wont to anticipate nobility bj' their 
 virtuous deeds, aspire now after places of ho- 
 nour and power by secret contrivances; and 
 money got by injustice and violence, rather 
 than by worthy accomplishments. As if the 
 prsetorship, consulship, and all the other dig- 
 nities, conferred glory and renown of them- 
 selves, and did not owe their estimation to the 
 good behaviour of such as are vested with 
 them. But I have been carried too far, and 
 taken too much freedom, from my concern for 
 the depravity of the state. Now I come to 
 my purpose. 
 
 lam going to write the history of a war which 
 the Roman people carried on with Jugurtha, 
 king of the Numidians; a subject which I have 
 made choice of, because, in the first place, the 
 war was a terrible and obstinate one, and the 
 
 success long uncertain ; and likewise because 
 a check was then given, for the first time, to 
 the exorbitant pride of the nobility : a con- 
 tention which confounded all things, divine 
 and human ; and was carried to such a height 
 of madness and fury, that it ended in a civil 
 war, and the desolation of Italy, But, before I 
 enter upon this task, I shall trace a few things 
 backwards, that what follows may appear in a 
 clearer and stronger light. 
 
 During the second Punic war, wherein 
 Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, reduced 
 the power of Italy more than had ever been 
 done since the Roman name became formida- 
 ble, Masinissa, king of the Numidians, being 
 received into the Roman friendship, by P. 
 Scipio, afterwards surnamed Africanus, on ac- 
 count of his gallant achievements, performed 
 many and glorious exploits : in consideration 
 of which, when the Carthaginians were over- 
 come, and Syphax taken, who had an extensive 
 and powerful kingdom in Africa, all the cities 
 and lands that had been taken from him were 
 given to Masinissa by the Roman people. 
 This prince continued a faithful and useful 
 ally to us, till death put an end to his reign : 
 upon which, his son Micipsa succeeded alone 
 to the kingdom, his brothers Manastabal and 
 Gulussa dying some time before. Micipsa had 
 two sons, Atherbal and Hiempsal; but kept ' 
 at his court, and educated with the same care 
 as his own children, the son of his brother 
 Manastabal, called Jugurtha, whom Masinissa 
 had left in a private condition, because he was 
 born of a concubine. 
 
 This youth, when he grew up, with all the 
 advantages of strength of body, a graceful 
 person, and, above all, a fine genius did not 
 suffer himself to be carried away with luxury 
 and idleness ; hut agreeably to the manners of 
 the nation, accustomed himself to ride, to throw 
 the dart, to contend with his companions in 
 running ; and though he surpassed all in glory, 
 he was still beloved by all. Besides, he spent 
 a good deal of time in the chase ; and was al- 
 ways the first, or amongst the first, in wounding 
 the lion, and other wild beasts ; and though 
 he performed a great many brave deeds, he 
 never boasted of himself. Micipsa was at first 
 highly pleased with this, thinking that the 
 bravery of Jugurtha would reflect glory upon 
 his reign : but when he considered that he 
 himself was now grown old, that his chi'idren 
 were very young, and that Jugurtha was in the 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 25 
 
 {7iime of life, and growing daily m reputation, 
 he was deeply affected, and his mind distracted 
 with perplexing thoughts. The consideration 
 of the ambitious nature of man, and his im- 
 petuosity in gratifying his desires, alarmed 
 him ; and likewise the favourable opportunity 
 arising from his own age and that of his chil- 
 dren, which was a temptation strong enough to 
 transport even men of moderate views ; add to 
 all this, the great affection of the Numidians 
 for Jugurtha, which made him apprehensive, 
 lest, should he destroy him by artifice, it might 
 occasion a sedition, or a civil war. 
 
 Being thus beset with difRculties, and find- 
 ing that it was not possible for him to destroy 
 so popular a man, either by force or fraud, he 
 resolved to expose him to the dangers of war, 
 as he was of a daring disposition, and fond of 
 military glory, and thus try what fortune would 
 do. Accordingly, Micipsa, being to despatch 
 auxiliaries of horse and foot to the Romans, 
 who were then laying siege to Numantia, sent 
 him to Spain, as their commander ; in hopes 
 that he would be cut off, either from an osten- 
 tation of his courage or the efforts of the ene- 
 my. But that matter fell out quite contrary 
 to his expectation. For as soon as Jugurtha, 
 who had great vivacity and penetration, be- 
 came acquainted with the temper of P. Scipio 
 the Roman general, and the character of the 
 enemy, he in a short time acquired so high re- 
 nown, by his great labour and application, his 
 submissive obedience to orders, and exposing 
 himself often to dangers, that he was extremely 
 beloved by our men, and dreaded by the Numan- 
 tians. He was, indeed, both brave in action, 
 and wise in council ; qualities very seldom 
 united in tlie same person : precaution being 
 generally accompanied with fear, and courage 
 ■with rashness. 
 
 Accordingly, Scipio employed Jugurtha to 
 put all his most difficult enterprises in execu- 
 tion, took him into the number of his intimate 
 friends, and grew fonder of him daily, as one 
 who succeeded in all his schemes and under- 
 takings. To these advantages were added 
 great generosity and address ; by which means 
 he had contracted an intimate friendship with 
 many of the Romans. 
 
 There were many at that time in our army, 
 some of high rank, others newly raised, who 
 preferred riches to virtue and honour ; men of 
 factious dispositions, of great power at Rome, 
 and more distinguished among our allies bv 
 
 their figure than their honesty. These in- 
 flamed the mind of Jugurtha,(of itself ambitious 
 enough,) by assuring him, " that when Micipsa 
 died, he alone would have the kingdom of Nu- 
 midia ; as he was a person of such distinguished 
 merit, and all things venal at Rome," 
 
 Upon the destruction of Numantia, when 
 Scipio had determined to dismiss the auxilia- 
 ries, and return home himself, having be- 
 stowed great presents and high encomiums upon 
 Jugurtha, in presence of the whole army, he 
 brought him into his tent ; and there advised 
 him in private, " to court the friendship of the 
 Roman people in a public rather than private 
 way, and not to bestow bribes on any : that it 
 was dangerous to purchase from a few, what 
 belonged to all. If he would but continue in 
 his virtuous practices, that glory and sove- 
 reignty would fall to him of course ; but if he 
 hurried on precipitately, his money would 
 prove his ruin." 
 
 After having given him this advice, he dis- 
 missed him with the following letter to Micip- 
 sa. « Your nephew Jugurtha has highly 
 distinguished himself, during the siege of Nu- 
 mantia ; which, I am sure, will give you great 
 joy. His great merit has made him dear to 
 me ; and I shall use my endeavours that he be 
 so to the senate and people of Rome. I con- 
 gratulate you, indeed, on this occasion, as my 
 friend : for in him you have a man worthy of 
 you, and his grandfather Masinissa." 
 
 The king, finding that what he had learned 
 from common fame was confirmed by Scipio's 
 letter, was so touched with the merit and interest 
 of the man, that he altered his purposes, and 
 endeavoured to gain him by favours. Accord- 
 ingly he immediately adopted him, and, by his 
 will, made him joint-heir with his sons to the 
 kingdom. A few years after, being worn out 
 with age and infirmities, and, finding that the 
 period of his hfe was approaching, he is said 
 to have addressed himself to Jugurtha, in the 
 presence of his friends and relations, as also of 
 Atherbal and Hiempsal, to this purpose: 
 
 " I took thee, Jugurtha, when a fatherless 
 infant, and without hopes or fortune, undei 
 my own care ; as I promised myself, that 
 my favours would render me as dear to 
 thee as if I had been thy father. Nor have I 
 indeed been disappointed : for, not to mention 
 thy other great and noble achievements, thy 
 late behaviour at Numantia reflects honour 
 ufX)n me and my kingdom. By thy gallant 
 
26 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 behaviour thou hast united us to the Romans 
 in closer ties of friendship than before, and 
 revived the honour of our family in Spain. In 
 a word, (what is the most difficult thing among 
 men,) that hast even overcome envy itself by 
 thy glory. Now, as nature is putting a period 
 to my days, I beseech and adjure thee, by this 
 right hand and the honour of a prince, to em- 
 brace with a tender and affectionate regard 
 these my sons, thy near relations by birth, thy 
 brethren by my generosity ; and not to prefer 
 the friendship of strangers, to that of persons 
 united to thee by blood. 
 
 " It is not troops, or treasures, that are the 
 support of a kingdom, hut friends ; whom you 
 can neither acquire by force, nor purchase with 
 money : they are only to be procured by good 
 offices and fidelity. Now, who should be more 
 closely united in friendship than brothers 1 or 
 what stranger viill be found faithful to him who 
 is an enemy to his own relations 1 I leave you 
 a kingdom, strong indeed, if you are virtuous 
 and agree; but weak, if you are wicked and at 
 variance with one another. For by union 
 small states flourish, whilst the greatest are 
 destroyed by divisions. 
 
 " Now, it is more incumbent upon thee, Ju- 
 gurtha, as surpassing thy brethren in age and 
 wisdom, to take care that no dissensions arise ; 
 for in all contests, the most powerful, even 
 ?hough he receive an injury, is still thought to 
 have done it, because he is most able. As for 
 you, Atherbal and Hiempsal, observe and re- 
 verence this worthy man : imitate his bravery ; 
 and let it never be said, that Micipsa was 
 happier in his adopted children than in his 
 own." 
 
 Jugurtha, though he was very sensible of the 
 king's insincerity, and had himself quite dif- 
 ferent views from what he pretended, yet made 
 a very dutiful reply, suitable to the occasion. 
 Micipsa died a few days after ; and after his 
 funeral was celebrated with royal magnificence 
 by the young princes, they met together to 
 regulate their aflfairs. 
 
 Hiempsal, the youngest of them, who was 
 naturally violent, and had been accustomed to 
 treat Jugurtha with contempt, on account of 
 his mean birth by his mother, seated himself at 
 Atherbal's right hand, to prevent Jugurtha's 
 sitting in the middle, the most honourable 
 place among the Numidians ; and though he 
 was prevailed upon by the importunity of his 
 brother to yield to superior age, and go to the 
 
 flirthcr side, yet it was with reluctance. At 
 this interview, after much reasoning about the 
 administration of aflfairs, Jugurtha proposed, 
 among other things, to repeal all the ordi- 
 ijances and regulations of Micipsa for the 
 last five years of his life ; as he was worn out 
 with age, and the vigour of his faculties lost. 
 Hiempsal replied, " that he was entirely of the 
 same opinion ; since Jugurtha had been made 
 partner of the kingdom by adoption, only within 
 three years," 
 
 This expression sunk deeper in Jugurtha's 
 mind, than any one imagined ; insomuch that, 
 from that very time, being distracted with rage 
 and fear, he was eagerly bent upon . the de- 
 struction of Hiempsal, and continually medi- 
 tating by what secret means to eflTect it. But 
 these operating too slowly for the violence of 
 his resentment, which was not in the least 
 abated, he determined to execute his design at 
 any rate. At the first meeting of the princes, 
 ahead)' mentioned, it was agreed, that, to pre- 
 vent mutual disputes, the public treasure should 
 be divided, and the kingdom too, with the 
 portion of each marked out by distinct bounda- 
 ries ; and certain times were appointed for 
 both these purposes, but first for the distribu- 
 tion of the money. 
 
 In the meantime, the young princes retired 
 to diflferent places adjacent to where the trea- 
 sure lay : Hiempsal, particularly, to Thermida, 
 vi'here he happened to lodge in the house of 
 one who was Jugurtha's principal lictor, and 
 had always been his favourite and confidant. 
 Fortune presenting Jugurtha with so fit an in- 
 strument, he loaded him with promises, and 
 prevailed upon him to go, under pretence of 
 seeing his house, and provide himself with false 
 keys to the gates ; for the true ones were al- 
 ways carried to Hiempsal ; assuring him,"lhat 
 when matters were ready he himself would 
 come with a considerable body of men. 
 
 The Numidian soon executed his orders, and 
 introduced Jugurtha's soldiers by night, agree- 
 ably to his instructions ; who, as soon as they 
 entered the house, went diflJerent ways in quest 
 of the prince ; put to death all they found 
 1 asleep, and all such as they met ; searched 
 every private apartment; broke open such as 
 were shut ; and filled the whole house with 
 confusion and horror. Meanwhile Hiempsal 
 vpas discovered, concealing himself in a mean 
 apartment beloneins to a servant maid, whither 
 he had fled, full of dread, upon the first alarm, 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 27 
 
 being unacquainted with the house. The Nu- 
 midians, accordi^ig to their instructions, carried 
 his head to Jugurtha. 
 
 The news of so horrible a murder soon flew 
 over all Africa. Atherbal, and all of those 
 who had been subject to Micipsa, were seized 
 with terror : the Numidians divided into two 
 parties ; the greater number declared fiir Ather- 
 bal, but the best soldiers for Jugurtha ; who 
 immediately raised as great an army as possible, 
 reduced several cities by force under his obe- 
 dience, got others to submit to him, and pushed 
 for nothing less than to be master of all Numi- 
 dia. Atherbal, though he had despatched am- 
 bassadors to Rome, to inform the senate of the 
 murder of his brother, and his own distressful 
 situation, yet depending upon the number of 
 his men, he resolved to hazard a battle ; but 
 being defeated upon the first onset, he fled to 
 our province, and from thence went to Rome. 
 
 Jugurtha having thus executed his designs, 
 and made himself master of all Numidia ; when 
 he came to reflect at his leisure upon his enor- 
 mous crimes, began to dread the Roman peo- 
 ple, and had no hopes of security against their 
 resentment, but in the avarice of the nobility, 
 and in his money. He therefore sent ambas- 
 sadors to Rome, in a few days, with great store 
 of gold and silver; and ordered them first of 
 all to load his old friends with presents, then 
 to make new ones : in a word, to spare no 
 money for bringing aver to his interest as many 
 as possible. 
 
 When the ambassadors were arrived at Rome, 
 and, according to the king's instructions, had 
 sent large presents to his friends and others of 
 great interest in the senate ; so great a change 
 happened, that Jugurtha, who was before held 
 in detestation, grew all on a sudden into mighty 
 favpur with the nobility ; many of whom being 
 gained over by bribes, and others hoping to be 
 bribed, used all their interest with every sena- 
 tor, to prevent any rigorous resolution against 
 him. When the ambassadors thought their 
 cause was safe, a day was -fixed for the senate 
 to give audience to both parties. Upon which 
 occasion, it is said that Atherbal spoke in the 
 following manner: 
 
 " My father's orders to me, conscript father?, 
 in his dying moments, were, that I should look 
 upon myself as having the administration of the 
 kingdom of Numidia only, the right and sove- 
 reignty being yours ; and likewise to endeavour 
 to be as serviceable to the Roman people as pos- j 
 35 
 
 sible, both in war and peace ; to esteem you as 
 my kindred and relations; adding, if I did so, I 
 should find in your friendship, forces, riches, 
 with every necessary support to my kingdom. 
 When I was going to pursue these orders of my 
 dying father, Jugurtha, the most wicked wretch 
 on earth, in open contempt of your authority, 
 stripped nie, the grandson of Masinissa, the 
 hereditary friend and ally of the Roman people, 
 of my kingdom and my all. 
 
 " Since I was to be reduced to so wretched 
 a condition, conscript fathers, I wish I could 
 have implored your aid, rather on account of 
 my own services, than those of my ancestors ; 
 above all, that I could have had a title to such 
 aid, without standing in need of it, or, if I did, 
 have received it as my due. But as innocence 
 of itself is but a weak defence ; and as it was 
 not in my power to form the heart of Jugurtha, 
 I have fled to you for protection, conscript fa- 
 thers, to whom I am forced to be a burden be- 
 fore I have done any service, which is my great- 
 est misfortune. Other kings have been cither 
 conquered by you, and then received into your 
 alliance, or in their distress have implored your 
 friendship ; our family commenced allies to the 
 Roman people during their war with Carthage, 
 at a time when the Roman honour was more 
 to be regarded than their fortune. 
 
 " Do not suflTer me, conscript fathers, who am 
 descended from that family, and the grandson 
 of Masinissa, to implore your aid in vain. If I 
 had nothing to plead in order to obtain it but 
 my wretched condition, that I, who was but 
 lately a prince, of high descent, of signal re- 
 nown, and great power, am now reduced by 
 complicated misery, destitute and forlorn, and 
 dependent upon others for succour ; it would 
 still become the dignity of the Roman people 
 to protect me from oppression, and not to suffer 
 any man to enlarge his territories by iniquity. 
 But I have been forced from those very posses- 
 sions which the Roman people gave my ances- 
 tors, and from whence my father and grand- 
 father, in conjunction with you, drove Syphax 
 and the Carthaginians. It is your bounty, con- 
 script fathers, that is torn from me ; and in the 
 injuries done me you are insulted. 
 
 " Alas ! miserable man that I am ! Are these 
 the fruits of thy generosity, O my father! that 
 he whom thou didst adopt, he whom thou hast 
 left joint-heir to thy kingdom with thy own sons, 
 should, of all others, be the instrument to ex 
 tirpate thy race ? shall our family never fiqd 
 3F 
 
28 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 quiet 1 must ours be ever a blootly lot I must 
 tlie ilevouring sworil and banishment be always 
 our portion ! 
 
 " Whilst the Carthaginians continued in 
 power, no wonder we were exposed to all man- 
 ner of calamities. Our enemies were at our 
 doors, you our friends were afar off; and all 
 our hopes in our arms. When Africa was freed 
 from that plague, we enjoyed the sweets of 
 peace, as having no enemies, unless you com- 
 manded us to treat any as such ; when, on a 
 sudden, Jugurtha.with insupportable audacious- 
 ness, glorying in his pride and cruelty, murders 
 my brother, his near relation, and seizes his 
 kingdom as the reward of his crime : then, find- 
 ing that he could not destroy me by the same 
 wicked snares, he fell upon me with open force, 
 at a time when, trusting to your power, I ex- 
 pected neither war nor violence, drove me from 
 my country and my home, and reduced me to 
 that wretched condition wherein I now appear 
 before you, destitute of every thing, and so op- 
 pressed with misery, that I am safer any where 
 than in my own kingdom. 
 
 " I have often, conscript fathers, heard my 
 father saj', and I was myself of the same opi- 
 nion, that whoever set themselves carefully to 
 cultivate friendship with you, were engaged in- 
 deed in an arduous undertaking, but were of 
 all others the most secure. Our family has 
 done all that was in their power for you ; thej' 
 have assisted you in all your wars ; it is in your 
 power, conscript fathers, now that you enjoy 
 peace, to place us in a state of security. My 
 father let"i behind him us two brothers, and by 
 adopting Jugurtha for a third, thought to en- 
 gage him in the closest union with us. One 
 of the three is already murdered ; and it was 
 with diiTiculty I escaped from the bloody hands 
 of the other. 
 
 " What shall I do 1 or whither had T best 
 go, miserable man that I am ! all the supports 
 of my family are cut off. My father through 
 age yielded to the lot of human nature ; Ju- 
 gurtha, trampling upon every tie of nature and 
 gratitude, imbued his wicked hands in the blood 
 of my brother. My other friends and relations, 
 wherever he took them, he has destroyed by a 
 variety of cruel deaths : some he has crucified ; 
 others he has thrown to wild beasts ; those few, 
 whose lives he has spared, are imprisoned in 
 gloomy dungeons, there to lead a life more in- 
 supportable than death, in sorrow and anguish. 
 
 " Were I still in possession of all that I have 
 
 lost ; were my circumstances, which are row 
 so wretched, as flourishing as formerly, and those 
 persons who are now my enemies, my friends 
 as before; I should yet apply to you, conscrip 
 fathers, for succour in case of any sudden cala- 
 mity befalling me ; to you, whom it becomes, 
 on account of your great power and dominion, 
 to maintain equity and prevent injustice every 
 where. But now that I am banished from my 
 country, from my home, forsaken by all, desti- 
 tute of every thing suitable to my rank, to whom 
 shall I go, to whom shall I apply for aid ] 
 Shall I apply to such nations and princes as are 
 all the avowed enemies of our family, on ac- 
 count of our friendship with you ? have I any 
 place to go to, where there are not monuments 
 of hostilities committed by my ancestors upon 
 your account 1 or can any one who has ever 
 been your enemy have compassion upon me 1 
 
 " We were, moreover, taught by Masinissa, 
 never to cultivate friendship with any but the 
 Koman people ; to enter into no other engage- 
 ments; to make no other alliances; that 
 in your friendship we should find abundant 
 security ; and if your empire should fall by a 
 change of fortune, we too must be involved in 
 the same ruin. By your own bravery and 
 the favour of the gods, you are still great and 
 mighty ; all your undertakings are crowned 
 with success, and every thing yields to your 
 power ; so that you can the more easily redress 
 the grievances of your allies. One thing only 
 I am afraid of ; lest the favour of some persons 
 here for Jugurtha, whom they little know, should 
 give a wrong bias to their minds; such, I hear, 
 are making their utmost efforts in his behalf; 
 and importuning particular senators not to come 
 to any resolution against him, in his absence, 
 without hearing his defence ; alleging that my 
 grievances are all pretended, and that I was 
 under no necessity of flying, but might have 
 continued with safety in my own kingdom. 
 
 " that I could but see him, by whose enor 
 mous cruelty I am reduced to this degree of 
 wretchedness, practising such simulation ! and 
 that either you or the immortal gods would, for 
 once, take human aflairs under your care; that 
 he who now boasts and triumphs in his crimes, 
 may atone by extreme tortures for his mon- 
 strous ingratitude to my father, the murder of 
 my brother, and the evils he has made me suf- 
 fer. 
 
 " And now. my dearest brother! though 
 thou wert cut off in the flower of thy days, by 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 29 
 
 tne hands of one who of all men should have 
 been the last to have done it ; yet I think thy 
 fate rather matter of joy than of grief; for by 
 thy fall thou didst not so much lose thy king- 
 dom, as escape the hardships of flight, banish 
 rnent, poverty, and all the calamities which op- 
 press me. But I, wrelclied and forlorn, driven 
 from the throne of my ancestors into an abyss 
 of misery, afford a rueful spectacle of the un- 
 certainty of human affairs ; knov? not what 
 course to take, whether I shall revenge thy 
 wrongs, whilst I myself stand in need of assis- 
 tance ; or whether I shall attempt the recovery 
 of my kingdom, when my death or life depends 
 on the power of others. I could wish it were 
 honourable to put an end to my misery by a 
 voluntary death ; to prevent that infamy which 
 must necessarily fall upon me, if, sinking under 
 the weight of my afflictions, I should tamely 
 submit to injustice. Now, as I have no incli- 
 nation to live, and yet cannot die but with dis- 
 honour, I adjure you, conscript fathers, by your- 
 selves, by your children and parents, by the 
 majesty of tbe Roman people, succour rne in 
 my distress, curb haughty oppression, and suf- 
 fer not the kingdom of Numidia, which is your 
 own, to fall a prey to a usurper, and to be 
 stained with the blood of our family." 
 
 When the king had made an end of speaking, 
 the deputies from Jugurtha, trusting more to 
 their money than the justice of their cause, 
 made a short reply, that Hiempsal had been 
 put to death by the Numidians for his cruelty ; 
 that Atherbal, after he bad made war without 
 any provocation, and was defeated, complained 
 that he could not execute his schemes of op- 
 pression ; that Jugurtha begged of the senate, 
 not to believe him changed from what they had 
 known him at Numantia, nor to regard the 
 words of an enemy more than his own actions. 
 Then both parties withdrew, and the affair 
 was immediately debated. 
 
 The patrons of the deputies, and a great 
 many more, corrupted by their influence, disre- 
 garded what Atherbal had said ; highly extol- 
 led Jugurtha's bravery; and by their interest, 
 their pleadings, and indeed every other possible 
 method, endeavoured as strenuously to defend 
 the crimes and infamy of another, as if it had 
 been in support of their own reputation. On 
 the other hand, there were a few who, prefer- 
 ring justice and equity to money, gave it as their 
 opinion, that Atherbal should be assisted, and 
 ample vengeance taken for Hiernpsal's death. 
 
 He who distinguished himself most in support 
 of this opinion, was -^5milius fcjcaurus, a man 
 of high rank, active, factious, passionate for 
 power, honour, and riches, but one who con- 
 cealed his vices v'ery artfully. This nian per- 
 ceiving that Jugurtha's money was distributed 
 in a shameless and notorious manner, and fear- 
 ing lest such barefaced bribery should, as ia 
 usual on the like occasions, raise public odium, 
 restrained his passion for money. 
 
 That party, however, prevailed in the senate, 
 which preferred money and favour to truth and 
 equity ; and it was decreed that ten commis- 
 sioners should divide tiie kingdom, which Mi- 
 cipsa had possessed, between Jugurtha and Ath- 
 erbal. 'I'he principal person in the commission 
 was L. Opimius, a man of eminence and great 
 authority in the senate, because, when consul, 
 he had put to death C. Gracchus and M. Ful- 
 vius, and avenged the nobility upon the com- 
 mons with great fury. Jugurtha, though he 
 knew this senator was his friend at Rome, yet 
 received him with the most solicitous respect ; 
 and, by great presents and ample promises, 
 brought him to sacrifice honour, rt-putalion, and 
 in a word, every thing else, to his interest. He 
 applied to the other commissioners in the same 
 manner, and succeeded with most of them ; 
 some few indeed there were who set a higher 
 value upon their honour than money. In the 
 division of the kingdom, that part of Numidia 
 which borders upon Mauritania, and is the 
 most fertile and populous, was assigned to Ju- 
 gurtha. Atherbal had the other ; which was in- 
 deed better furnished with ports and fine build- 
 ings, but of greater beauty than importance. 
 
 My subject here seems to require of me a 
 short account of the situation of Africa, and 
 of those nations with whom we have had war 
 or alliance. As for those other countries, 
 which excessive heats, the difficulty of travel- 
 ling, and vast deserts, have made less frequent- 
 ed, I shall say nothing at, all ; it being very 
 difficult to meet with any certain information 
 concerning them. My account of the rest I 
 shall despatch with all possible brevity. 
 
 In the division of the globe, most authors 
 reckon Africa a third part of the whole: there 
 being but few who divide it into Asia and Eu- 
 rope, and include Africa in Europe. It it 
 bounded on the west, by the straits which, 
 join our sea to the ocean ; on the cast, by 
 spacious sloping plains, by the natives called 
 Catabathmos. The sea of Africa is tempestu 
 
30 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 ous, and without harbours ; the soil is fruitful 
 in grain and good for pasture, but produces 
 few trees; here it seldom rains, and there are 
 but few springs of water. The natives have 
 hale bodies, are remarkable for their agility, 
 and can endure much fatigue: most of them 
 die of old age, except such as are destroyed by 
 the sword or wild beasts; for few of them are 
 cut otf by diseases : noxious animals they have 
 in great numbers. 
 
 Concerning the original inhabitants of Afri- 
 ca, and such as settled in it afterwards, with 
 the manner of their uniting together, I shall 
 here give a short account, different indeed from 
 the common one, but such as was interpreted 
 to me out of the Carthaginian books, said to 
 be those of king Hiempsal, and agreeable to 
 the opinion of the natives themselves; but for 
 the truth of the relation, let the authors be 
 accountable. 
 
 Africa was at first possessed by the Geluli- 
 ans and Libyans, a savage and unpolished 
 people, who lived upon the flesh of wild beasts, 
 or fed upon the herbs of the field, like cattle ; 
 subject to no laws, discipline, or government; 
 without any fixed habitation ; wandering from 
 place to place, and taking up their abode 
 wherever night overtook them. But when 
 Hercules died in Spain, as the Africans think 
 he did, his army, made up of diverse nations, 
 having lost their general, and many competi- 
 tors arising for the command, dispersed in a 
 short time. Those that were Medes, Persians, 
 and Armenians, sailed over into Africa, and 
 took possession of those places that lie upon 
 our sea. But the Persians settled nearer the 
 ocean ; and they made houses to themselves of 
 their ships turned upside down, because there 
 was no timber in the country, nor had they an 
 opportunity of importing it from Spain, having 
 no commerce with that nation, on account of 
 its great distance from them by sea, and their 
 language, which was not understood there. 
 These by degrees mixed with the Getulians by 
 intermarriages ; and because they were con- 
 stantly shifting from place to place, trying the 
 goodness of the soil, they called themselves 
 Numidians. The houses of the Numidian pea- 
 sants, which they call mapalia, are still like 
 the hulls of ships, of an oblong form, with 
 coverings rising in the middle, and bending at 
 each end. 
 
 The Libyans, who lived near the African 
 eea, mingled with the Medes and Armenians : 
 
 for the Getulians lay more to the sun, almost 
 under the equinoctial line. The Libyans 
 built cities very soon ; for being separated from 
 Spain only by the straits, they exchanged 
 commodities with that country. By degrees 
 they corrupted the name of the Medes, calling 
 them, in their barbarous language, Moors. 
 Now the Persians soon became a powerful 
 people, and multiplied so greatly, that the 
 youth, leaving their parents, on account of 
 their vast numbers, and retaining their new 
 name of Numidians, took possession of the 
 country bordering upon Carthage, which is 
 still called Numidia. Afterwards assisting each 
 other, they reduced their neighbours, either by 
 the terror or force of their arms, under their 
 dominion, and thus acquired great glory and 
 reputation, especially those who advanced 
 farthest along our sea coast ; because the Li- 
 byans were less warlike than the Getulians. 
 At last almost all lower Africa was possessed 
 by the Numidians ; and the conquered nations, 
 forming but one people with the conquerors, 
 went by the same name. 
 
 Afterwards the Phoenicians came ; some of 
 whom left their homes to ease their country, 
 which was overstocked with inhabitants ; others 
 were prompted by ambition and engaged the 
 populace, and such as were fond of novelty, 
 to follow them. They built Hippo, Adrume- 
 tum, Leptis, and other cities on the sea coast; 
 which growing powerful in a short time, proved, 
 some of them a defence, others an honour to 
 their mother cities. For, as to Carthage, I 
 think it is better to be altogether silent than to 
 say but little ; besides, it is time to return to 
 my subject. 
 
 From the plains of Catabathmos, then, which 
 separate Egypt from Africa, as we go along 
 the sea coast, the first city is Cyrene, a colony 
 from Thera. Next to this are the two Syrtes, 
 with Leptis between them ; then the altars of 
 the Phileni, which bound the Carthaginian 
 empire on the side of Egypt ; and afterwards 
 other Punic cities. The rest of Africa, as far 
 as Mauritania, is possessed by the Numidians : 
 the Moors are nearer to Spain. Above Nu- 
 midia, as I have been informed, are the Getuli, 
 who live, some of them in huts, while others 
 wander about without any fixed abode. Be- 
 yond them are the Ethiopians ; and then coun- 
 tries scorched by the heat of the sun. In the 
 war with Jugurtha, the Romans had governors 
 of their own in most of the Punic cities, and 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 31 
 
 those places which had been lately subject to 
 Carthage. Great part of the Getulians were 
 under Jugurtha ; and the Numldians too, as far 
 as the river Mulucha. The Moors were all 
 subject to Bocchus, who knew nothing of the 
 Romans but the name; nor was he known to 
 them before, cither in war or peace. I have 
 now said enough of Africa and its inhabitants 
 for my purpose. 
 
 After Numidia was divided by the Roman 
 commissioners, and they returned home ; when 
 Jugurtha; contrary to his fears, saw himself 
 rewarded for his crimes, he was fully persuaded 
 of the truth of what he had heard from his 
 friends at Numantia, that all things were to be 
 bought at Rome; and being encouraged too 
 by the promises of those whom he had loaded 
 with presents, he resolved to seize Atherbal's 
 kingdom, H e was himself, indeed, of a daring 
 disposition, and an excellent soldier; but he 
 whose destruction he aimed at was quiet, spirit- 
 less, of a meek temper, obnoxious to insults, and 
 more apt to be terrified than to inspire terror. 
 Accordingly, on a sudden he invades his terri- 
 tories with a powerful body, takes many pri- 
 soners, cattle, and other booty, sets fire to his 
 cities ; and, flying about with his cavalry from 
 place to place, ravaged his country. He then 
 returned into his own kingdom with all his 
 forces, thinking that Atherbal would have 
 recourse to. arms for redress, and thus furnish 
 him with a pretext for war. But he, not look- 
 ing upon himself as a match for Jugurtha at 
 arms, and relying more upon the Roman 
 friendship than his own subjects, sent ambas- 
 saJ'ors to complain to Jugurtha of such out- 
 rages; and though they returned with an in- 
 sulting answer, yet he determined to suffer any 
 thing, rather than enter into a war in which he 
 had succeeded so badly before. This did not, 
 however, allay the insatiable ambition of Ju- 
 gurtha, who had already, in his mind, taken 
 possession of Atherbal's kingdom. Therefore 
 he began now to make war, not as before, at 
 the head of a band of plunderers, but with a 
 great army, and openly aimed at the sovereign- 
 ty of all Numidia: wherever he marched, he 
 took cities, laid waste the country, committed 
 universal depredation, and did every thing to 
 inspire his men with courage, and strike terror 
 into the enemy. 
 
 Atherbal^ finding that he must either quit 
 his kingdom or dcfttnd it by arms, submitted to 
 necessity, and raising forces, marched against 
 35* 
 
 Jugurtha : so that both armies encamped near 
 the city Cirta, not far from the sea ; but as the 
 evening approached, they did not engage. 
 When night was almost past, and day began to 
 dawn, Jugurtha's men, upon a signal given, 
 broke into the enemy's camp, and falling upon 
 them, whilst some were scarce awake and 
 others just taking their arms, put them to 
 flight. Atherbal, with a few horse, made his 
 escape to Cirta ; and was so closely pursued, 
 that if the Italians in great numbers had not 
 repulsed the Numidians from the walls, the war 
 between the two kings had been begun and 
 ended in the same day. Jugurtha upon this laid 
 close siege to the town, and by towers, moving 
 galleries, and engines of all sorts, strove to take 
 it ; being desirous to be master of it, before the 
 ambassadors, who he heard were sent to Rome 
 before the battle, should arrive there. But as 
 soon as the senate had notice of the war, they 
 despatched three ambassadors, all young men, 
 with orders to go to each of the kings, and ac- 
 quaint them, that it was the pleasure and ap- 
 pointment of the senate and people of Rome 
 they should quit their arms, and decide their 
 differences by law rather than the sword ; that 
 thus they would act as the dignity of Rome and 
 their own interests required. 
 
 The ambassadors arrived quickly in Africa, 
 making the greater despatch, because, whilst 
 they were preparing to depart, a report both of 
 the engagement and siege of Cirta reached 
 Rome ; but this report was but little credited. 
 Jugurtha, upon hearing their commission, re- 
 plied, <' that nothing was more sacred, nothing 
 dearer to him, than the authority of the 
 senate ; that from his youth he had endeavoured 
 to merit the approbation of every person of 
 eminent worth ; that he had gained the friend- 
 ship of Scipio, that excellent man, by his virtu- 
 ous conduct, not by infamous arts : that Micipsa 
 had in consideration of his good qualities, and 
 not for want of children, adopted him joint-heir 
 with his own sons to the kingdom. But the 
 braver and more deserving his conduct had 
 been, the less could his spirit bear with insults. 
 That Atherbal had laid snares for his life, which, 
 when he discovered, he endeavoured to defeat: 
 that the Roman people would neither act a 
 just nor a wise part, if they denied him the 
 common right of nations: finally, that he 
 would quickly send deputies to Rome, to satisfy 
 them concerning all his proceedings." 
 
 With this answer the ambassadors departed 
 
33 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 without being allowed access to Atherbal. 
 Jugurtha, when he thought they had left Afri- 
 ca, perceiving it impossible to take Cirta by 
 assault, on account of its natural strength, be- 
 girt it with a trench and rampart, raised towers, 
 and filled them with armed men. He likewise 
 tried day and night all possible methods both 
 of force and stratagem ; one while tempting 
 the besieged with promises, another endeavour- 
 ing to terrify them by threats ; constantly ani- 
 mating his men and pushing every necessary 
 measure with the utmost diligence. Ather- 
 bal, finding his affairs in extreme danger, his 
 enemy determined on his ruin, no hopes of 
 succour, and that the war could not be con- 
 tinued long for want of provisions, chose two 
 of the most active and resolute of those who 
 fled with him to Cirta, and prevailed upon 
 them, by great promises and an affecting re- 
 presentation of his distress, to venture in the 
 night time through the enemy's lines, to the 
 next shore, and from thence to Rome. The 
 Kumidians in a few days executed their orders. 
 Atherbal's letter was read in the senate ; and 
 was to this effect : 
 
 « It is not my fault, conscript fathers, that I 
 make such frequent application to you ; it is 
 the violence of Jugurtha that forces me to it, 
 who is so resolutely determined upon my de- 
 struction, that he pursues it without regarding 
 your resentment or that of the immortal gods 
 themselves. He prefers my blood to every 
 other consideration ; insomuch that I, though 
 a friend and ally of the Roman people, have 
 been besieged by him almost five months; nor 
 does the generosity of my father Micipsa to 
 him, nor the authority of your decrees, avail 
 any thing towards my relief. Whether famine 
 or the sword presses hardest upon me, I am 
 unable to say. My wretched situation discou- 
 rages me from writing at greater length con- 
 cerning Jugurtha ; having learned by experi- 
 ence how little credit is given to the miserable : 
 this, however, I will venture to add, that I am 
 sensible he aims at something beyond my ruin, 
 and that he can never expect to enjoy my 
 kingdom and your friendship ; which of these 
 he prefers to the other, can be a secret to none. 
 For first he murdered my brother Hiempsal, 
 then he drove me from my father's kingdom. 
 Let these, however, be considered as injuries 
 done to our family, and no ways affecting you ; 
 yet now he keeps by force a kingdom that is 
 yours, and besieges me, who was appointed by 
 
 you king of the Nuraidians. How much he 
 regarded the orders you sent him by your depu- 
 ties, my dangers abundantly show. What re- 
 mains, then, but that you have recourse to 
 force, which alone can move him 1 As for mc 
 I could wish, that what I write at present, and 
 what I formerly complained of before the se- 
 nate, was altogether groundless, rather than it 
 should be verified by my sufferings. But since 
 I was born to be a spectacle of Jugurtha's 
 cruelty, I do not beg to be rescued from death 
 or distress, but only from falling into his hands, 
 and from the tortures that are prepared for me. 
 Dispose of the kingdom of Numidia, which is 
 your own, as you may judge most proper ; but 
 I conjure you by the majesty of the Roman 
 empire, and by the faith of friendship and alli- 
 ance, deliver me from the impious hands of 
 Jugurtha, if you have any regard for the 
 memory of my grandfather Masinissa." 
 
 Upon reading this letter, there were some 
 senators who proposed that an army should be 
 sent into Africa, and succours despatched to 
 Atherbal with all expedition ; and that Jugur- 
 tha's disobedience to their orders should be 
 forthwith taken into consideration. But the 
 king's advocates strenuously opposed such 
 measures ; and thus the public good, as is 
 g£nerally the case, was sacrificed to private 
 interest. Ambassadors were chosen, however, 
 to be sent into Africa ; men of age and dignity, 
 vrho had borne the highest offices of the state; 
 amongst whom was M. Scaurus, whom we have 
 already mentioned, a man of consular dignity, 
 and at that time prince of the senate. These, 
 observing that the public odium was great 
 against Jugurtha, and being pressed by the 
 Numidians to make all possible haste, embark- 
 ed in three days ; and arriving soon at Utica, 
 wrote to Jugurtha, to come directly into the 
 Roman province ; for that they had orders to 
 him from the senate. 
 
 When he found that men of such eminence , 
 and authority at Rome were come to oppose his 
 designs, he was distracted between fear and. 
 ambition. On the one hand, he dreaded the 
 resentment of the senate if he did not obey their 
 deputies ; on the other, his eager passion for 
 power hurried him on to the execution of his 
 wicked undertaking. At last ambition prevail- 
 ed ; and surrounding Cirta with all his army, 
 he made a general assault, labouring with al 
 his might to break into it ; as he hoped, by di 
 viding the enemy's forces, to have a chance f?. 
 
AGAINST JUGURTIIA, 
 
 33 
 
 victory, either by force or artifice. But this 
 attempt miscarrying, and fimlinglhat his great 
 aim, of getting Atherbal into his possession, 
 before he met the deputies, could not be effected, 
 he came with a few horse into the Roman pro- 
 vince, that he might not, by longer delay, in- 
 cense Scaurus, of whom he stood in great awe. 
 Upon his arrival, though the deputies, in the 
 name of the senate, denounced grievous threat- 
 enings against him for continuing the siege, 
 yet after a long debate they departed without 
 success. 
 
 When an account of this was brought to 
 Cirta, the Italians, by whose bravery the town 
 was defended, persuading themselves that their 
 persons would not be violated after a surrender, 
 in consideration of the Roman power, advised 
 Atherbal to deliver himself and the town to 
 Jugurtha, without insisting on any conditions, 
 but that of having his own life, as the senate 
 would take care of every thing else. Atherbal, 
 , though he was very sensible that nothing was 
 less to be depended upon than Jugurtha's word, 
 yet considering that it was in the power of those 
 who advised him to -force him to a compliance 
 in case of refusal, yielded to the proposal of the 
 Italians, and surrendered. Upon which Ju- 
 gurtha put Atherbal to death immediately upon 
 the rack, and then slaughtered all the Numi- 
 dian youth and foreign merchants without dis- 
 tinction. 
 
 When this was known at Rome, and began 
 to be debated in the senate, the king's former 
 advocates, by their intrigues, by their interest 
 ■with particular senators, and often by protract- 
 ing the time in long speeches, endeavoured to 
 qualify the horror of his crimes ; and had not 
 C. Memmius, tribune of the people elect, a man 
 . of spirit, and a declared enemy to the power of 
 the nobility, informed the Roman people, that 
 the design of all this was to procure impunity 
 to Jugurtha for his crimes by means of a faction, 
 '\ the public indignation against him would un- 
 doubtedly have vanished by their studied de- 
 lays; so powerfully did favour and the king's 
 - money operate. But the senate, through a con- 
 sciousness of the injustice of their proceedings, 
 began to dread the resentment of the people, 
 ■ and complying with the Sempronian law, de- 
 ** creed Numidia and Italy the provinces of the 
 , next consuls, who were declared to be P. Scipio 
 j^asica, and L. Bestia Calpurnius. To the 
 former of these Italy fell, and to the latter Nu- 
 midia. Then an aimy was raised to be sent 
 
 into Africa; and a decree was made for the 
 payment of it, and for every thing necessary 
 to carry on the war. 
 
 When Jugurtha heard this news, so contrary 
 to his hopes, as he had a strong persuasion that 
 every thing was to be had at Rome for money, 
 he sent his son and two of his intimate friends 
 on an embassy to the senate, and ordered them, 
 as he had formerly done those he sent after 
 having murdered Hiempsal, to bribe all sorts 
 of men. Upon their approach to Rome, Bestia 
 consulted the senate, " whether the deputies of 
 Jugurtha should be admitted within the walls ;" 
 and it was decreed, " that unless they came to 
 surrender Jugurtha and his kingdom, they 
 must depart out of Italy within ten days." 
 This the consul, by the senate's orders, signified 
 to the Numidians; and thus they returned 
 without doing any thing. 
 
 Calpurnius, in the meantime, having raised 
 an army, chose for his lieutenant-generals per- 
 sons of quality and intrigue, whose authority 
 he hoped would support him in whatever he 
 might do amiss ; amongst whom was Scaurus, 
 of whose temper and character we have already 
 given an account. The consul himself had in- 
 deed many excellent endowments both of body 
 and mind, but avarice rendered them all use- 
 less : he was hardy, of great penetration and 
 foresight, well skilled in war, and not to be 
 moved by dangers or surprise. The legions 
 marched through Italy to Rhegium, where thej 
 embarked for Sicily, and from thence were 
 transported to Africa ; so that Calpurnius, who 
 had early provided himself with all necessaries, 
 entered Numidia with great vigour, took a 
 great number of prisoners, and several cities 
 by storm. But when Jugurtha began by his 
 deputies to tempt him with money, and to lay 
 before him the difficulties of the war in which 
 he was engaged, his soul, sick with avarice, 
 was easily softened. He took Scaurus, how- 
 ever, as his partner and adviser in all his 
 schemes ; who, though he had at first vigorously 
 opposed the king, even when most of his party 
 were already corrupted, was nevertheless pre- 
 vailed upon by a vast sum of money, to desert 
 the cause of honour and equity, for that op- 
 pression and injustice, 
 
 Jugurtha at first only purchased a sus- 
 pension of the war, flattering himself that in 
 the meantime he should succeed at Rome, 
 either by favour or money ; but hearing that 
 Scaurus was engaged in his interest, he con- 
 
34 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 ceivec' liigh liopcs of obtaining peace, and de- 
 ternuned to ti'cat with hiui in person concern- 
 ing the tern\s of it. In the meantime, to 
 remove any apprehensions of danger from his 
 coming, the consul sent Sextius the quiBstor to 
 Vacca, where Jugurtha was; but under pre- 
 tence of receiving corn, which Calpuruius had 
 pubUcly ordered the deputies to provide, since 
 a truce was granted, till a surrender should be 
 made. Jiiguvlha, at last, came into the camp, 
 as he had determined ; and after a short speech 
 to the council of ollicers, to lessen the odium 
 of his crimes, he proposed to deliver himself 
 up. The terms he afterwards settled privately 
 with Bestia and Scaurus ; and was, the day 
 after, admitted to a surrender, as if the matter 
 had been concluded in due form by majority 
 of voices. Accordingly thirty elephants, some 
 cattle, with a great number of horses, and a 
 small sum of money, were, agreeably to the 
 order of the council, delivered to the qusestor. 
 Calpurnius goes to Rome, to assist at the elec- 
 tion of magistrates ; all being quiet in Numidia 
 and in our army there. 
 
 When the transactions in Africa, and the 
 manner of proceeding there, came to be known 
 at Komo. the behaviour of the consul was the 
 subject ol' conversation in all companies ; the 
 people were tilled with indignation, and the 
 senate with perjilexity ; not knowing whether 
 they should ratify so dishonourable a treaty, or 
 make void the ordinance of the consul. The 
 authority of Scaurus, who was said to be the 
 adviser and associate of Bestia, was what prin- 
 cipally diverted them from acting a just and 
 honourable part. While the senate was thus in 
 suspense, C. Memmius, whose freedom of 
 spirit and sworn enmity to the power of the 
 nobility we have already mentioned, stirred up 
 the people in their assemblies to revenge their 
 own wrongs : warned them not to desert the 
 interests of the public and their own libertj' ; 
 laid before them many instances of the haughty 
 and tyrannical behaviour of the nobility, and 
 used every possible method to inflame the 
 minds of the populace against them. 
 
 Now, as the eloquence of Memmius was at 
 that time in great reputation and of great influ- 
 ence at Rome, I have thought proper to trans- 
 cribe one of his speeches, out of many ; and 
 above all otiiers, that which he made to an as- 
 sembly of the people, after the return of Bestia, 
 in the following strain : 
 
 «' If my zeal tor the public good did not bear 
 
 down every other consideration, Romans, there 
 arc many inolives to dissuade nio from ad- 
 hering to your interests; n\otives great and 
 powcrl'ul — the strength of the opposite party; 
 your taincncss of spirit; the universal preva- 
 lence of injusiice ; and above ail, innocence 
 rather exposed to danger, than crowned with 
 honour. For it really gives me pain to relate 
 witli what insolent scorn you have beentreated 
 by a few great men, for these fifteen years ; how 
 basely your great champions have been suf- 
 fered to perish unrevenged ; how your former 
 spirit is sunk through indolence and eifeminacy, 
 who, even now, when your enemies are at your 
 mercy, do not stir against them ; and are, even 
 now, afraid of those to whom you should be a 
 terror ! But notwithstanding all this, my 
 spirit obliges me to oppose the power of the 
 faction ; nor will I fail to use that liberty which 
 is transmitted to me by my father ; but whether 
 with or without success depends entirely upon 
 you, Romans. Not thai I advise you to re- 
 dress your wrongs by arms, as your ancestors 
 have often done ; there is no need of violence, 
 none of leaving the city ; since they must cer- 
 tainly ruin themselves by their own proceed- 
 ings. After the murder of Tiberius Gracchus 
 who was charged by them with having aimed at 
 the sovereignty, the severest cruelties were eX' 
 ercised towards the Roman people. After C. 
 Gracchus and i\I. Fulvius were put to death, 
 man}' of your body perished in prison ; nor was 
 it law, but their own good pleasure, that put an 
 end to both these massacres. But let restoring 
 the people their rights pass for aiming at the 
 sovereignty ; let it be deemed lawful to remedy 
 what could not otherwise be remedied than by 
 shedding the blood of Roman citizens ! You 
 have, for several j'ears, with secret indignation 
 beheld the treasury robbed ; beheld kings and 
 free nations pay tribute to a few of the nobles ; 
 and those few adorned with public honours, 
 and possessed of immense wealtli. Nay, looking 
 upon the commission of such enormities with 
 impunity as but a small matter, they have at last 
 betrayed your laws, your majesty, every thing 
 divine and human, into the hands of your ene- 
 mies. Nor for all this are they touched with 
 remorse or shame ; no, they appear in public 
 with great pomp, displaying their sacerdotal 
 dignities, their consulships their triumphs; as 
 if these dignities possessed by them were really 
 honourable, and not marks of their usurpation. 
 Slaves bought with money do not submit to the 
 
AGAINST JUGURTIIA. 
 
 35 
 
 unjust commands of their masters; and can 
 you, Romans, who are born to command, 
 tameJy submit to slavery? 
 
 " But who are they who have seized upon 
 the commonwealth 1 The most profligate of 
 all men; their hands dyed with the blood of 
 their fellow-citizens ; men of boundless ava- 
 rice, of enormous guilt, and matchless pride ; 
 men who turn honour, faith, public spirit, and, 
 in short, whatever is just or unjust, into gain. 
 Some of them owe their security to their having 
 murdered your tribunes, others to lawless pro- 
 secutions, and most of them to their having 
 shAl your blood : so that they who have done 
 you the greatest wrong are in the greatest 
 safety ; and instead of being afraid of punish- 
 ment at your hands for their numerous crimes, 
 from your cowardice they make you afraid of 
 them. As their desires, their aversions, their 
 fears are the same, they are closely united to- 
 gether: now such a conformity of inclinations 
 among good men is friendship, but faction when 
 found among the wicked. 
 
 " But were you as much concerned for the 
 preservation of your liberty as they are for es- 
 tablishing their tyranny, the commonwealth 
 would not be torn in pieces as it now is; and 
 your favours, instead of being conferred on the 
 most audacious, would be bestowed on the most 
 deserving. Your ancestors twice withdrew 
 from the city, to mount Aventine, in arms, in 
 order to assert their rights and establish their 
 dignity : and will not you labour with all 
 your might to maintain the liberty they have 
 transmitt{--d to you ? nay, will not you labour 
 with the greater zeal, as it is more dishonour- 
 able to lose what has been acquired, than not 
 to have acquired it at all 1 
 
 " Here some will ask me. What then would 
 you have done ? I answer, I would have those 
 punished who have betrayed the commonwealth 
 to an enemy ; not by force or violence, a 
 method of punishment which though they de- 
 serve, yet does not become your dignity to in- 
 flict; but by a legal prosecution, and the evi- 
 dence of Jugurtha himself; who, if he has 
 really surrendered himself, will obey your com- 
 mands ; hut if he despises them, you may then 
 judge what kind of peace or surrender it is, 
 from whence .lugurtha derives impunity for his 
 crimes, — a few great men immense wealth, and 
 the state nothing but loss and infamy. But 
 perhaps you are not as yet satiated with the 
 tyranny of these men, and are best pleased with 
 
 those times, when kingdoms, provinces, law, 
 the administration of justice, war and peace, in 
 a word, every thing divine and human, were 
 at the dispobal of a few, while you, the Roman 
 people, always invincible, and lords of the world, 
 were humbly content to be allowed to live. For 
 was there a man of you, who had spirit to re- 
 fu e the yoke ? As for me, though I look upon 
 it as very dishonourable to a man tamely to beai 
 ill usage : yet I should patiently see you par- 
 don the most guilty criminals, because; they are 
 your fellow-citizens, were it not thatyour com- 
 passion would prove your own certain ruin. 
 
 " Such, indeed, is the mischievous spirit of 
 these men, that to pardon their past crimes will 
 signify little to you, if you do not deprive them 
 of power to repeat them ; and nothing will re- 
 main to you but continual anxiety, when you 
 find that you must either be slaves, or preserve 
 your liberty by force. For what hope is there 
 of mutual faith and concord between them and 
 you ■? They desire to be lords, you to be free : 
 they to oppress you, you to defend yourselves: 
 in a word, they use your allies like enemies, 
 your enemies like allies. Can peace or friend- 
 ship possibly subsist between persons of such 
 opposite dispositions? 
 
 " Wherefore I advise and exhort you, not to 
 suffer such enormous villany to go unpunished. 
 It is not the robbing of the treasury, nor ex- 
 torting money from your allies, that now come 
 under your consideration, — crimes which, how- 
 ever heinous, yet are become so common that 
 they pass for nothing. It is the authority of 
 the senate, it is your own mighty power, that 
 is betrayed to a very terrible enemy, and the 
 commonwealth exposed to sale both at home 
 and abroad. Which crimes, unless you prose- 
 cute, and take vengeance upon the guilty, 
 what remains but to live the slaves of those 
 who committed them? — for to do with impu 
 nity what one pleases, is being a king. 
 
 " I do not hereby mean, O Romans, to en 
 courage you to wish that these your fellow 
 citizens may be found to have acted basely ra- 
 ther than honourably ; but only warn you, not 
 to ruin the good and deserving by pardoning 
 the wicked. Besides, it Is much wiser in any 
 government to forget services rather than 
 wrongs : for a good man b}' being neglected 
 becomes only more indolent ; whereas a bad 
 man grows still worse. Let me add, if injuries- 
 are prevented, you will seldom stand in need 
 of assistance." 
 
 3G 
 
36 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 By this and the like speeches, C. Memmius 
 persuaded the Roman people to send L. Cas- 
 sius, who was then prfetor, to Jugurtha, and 
 bring him to Rome upon the public faith ; 
 that, by his evidence, Scaurus and the rest, 
 who were charged with betraying their trust 
 for money, might be clearly convicted. Whilst 
 these measures were pursuing at Rome, the 
 officers whom Bestia had left with the command 
 of the army at Numidia, in imitation of their 
 general's conduct, committed many and infa- 
 mous crimes. Some, for a sum of money, re- 
 stored Jugurtha his elephants ; others sold him 
 his deserters ; and some plundered the pro- 
 vinces at peace with the Romans ; such was 
 the violence of avarice, which, like a plague, 
 had taken possession of their minds. 
 
 The praetor Cassius, in consequence of this 
 ordinance of the people, procured by Mem- 
 mius, to the great surprise of the nobility, went 
 to Jugurtha, and persuaded him, though sore 
 afraid, and from a consciousness of his guilt 
 diffident of his cause, " that since he had al- 
 ready delivered himself up to the Roman peo- 
 ple, he should try their mercy rather than their 
 power." He likewise engaged to him his own 
 faith, which Jugurtha reckoned as strong a 
 security as that of the public. Such at that 
 time was the reputation of Cassius. 
 
 Jugurtha accordingly came to Rome with 
 Cassius ; yet without any regal pomp, and 
 dressed in such a manner as to excite pity. But 
 though he was himself of an intrepid spirit, and 
 was moreover encouraged by assurances from 
 those, in reliance upon whose power and villany 
 he had committed the above-mentioned crimes; 
 yet, by a vast sum of mone)' he secured the 
 assistance of C. Baebius, tribune of the people, 
 one who had impudence enough to protect him 
 against all law and all manner of injuries. 
 
 When an assembly of the people was called 
 by Memmius, though they were so highly 
 exasperated against Jugurtha, that some of 
 them were for putting him in irons, others for 
 putting him to death like a public enemy, ac- 
 cording to the ancient usage, unless he dis- 
 covered his associates ; yet Memmius, more 
 concerned for their dignify than the gratifica- 
 tion of their fury, endeavoured to calm the 
 tumult and soften their minds, and declared 
 that he would take care that the public faith 
 should not be violated. At last, having ob- 
 tained silence, and ordered Jugurtha to be 
 brought before the assembly, he proceeded in 
 
 his speech, recounted all his wicked actions 
 both in Rome and Numidia ; laid open his 
 unnatural behaviour to his fathers and brothers 
 adding, that the Roman people, though they 
 were not ignorant by whom he had been aided 
 and supported, still desired full information of 
 the whole from himself. If he declared the 
 truth, he hod much to hope from the faith and 
 clemency of the Roman people; but if he 
 concealed it, he would not save his friends by 
 so doing, but ruin himstlf and his hopes for 
 ever. 
 
 When Memmius had made an end of speak- 
 ing, and Jugurtha was ordered to replf , the 
 tribune Bsebius, who had been secured by a 
 sum of money, as we have already mentioned, 
 desired him to be silent : and though the peo- 
 ple there assembled were highly incensed, and 
 endeavoured to frighten him with their cries, 
 with angry looks, nay and often with violence, 
 and every other method which indignation in- 
 spires, yet his impudence triumphed overitalL 
 The people departed, after being thus mocked: 
 Jugurtha, Bestia, and the rest, who were at 
 first terribly afraid of this prosecution, assumed 
 greater courage. 
 
 There was at this juncture a certain Numi- 
 dian at Rome, called Massiva, the son of Gu 
 lussa, and grandson of Masinissa ; who, having 
 .taken part against Jugurtha in the war between 
 the three kings, had fled out of Africa upon 
 the surrender of Cirta and the murder of 
 Atherbal. Sp. Albinus, who with Q. Minu- 
 cius Rufus succeeded Bestia in the consulship, 
 persuaded this man to apply to the senate for 
 the kingdom of Numidia; as he was descended 
 from Masinissa, and Jugurtha the object of 
 public abhorrence on account of his crimes, 
 and alarmed with daily fears of the punishment 
 he deserved. The consul, who was very fond 
 of having the management of the war, was 
 more desirous that the public disturbances 
 should be continued than composed. The 
 province of Numidia had fallen to him, and 
 Macedonia to his colleague. When Massiva 
 began to prosecute his claim, Jugurtha, finding 
 that he could not rely upon the assistance of 
 his friends, some of whom were seized with 
 remorse, others restrained by the bad opinion 
 the public had of them, and by their fears, 
 ordered Bomilcar, who was his faithful friend 
 and confidant, " to engage persons to murder 
 Massiva for money, by which he had accom- 
 plished many things ; and to do it by private 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 37 
 
 means, if possible ; but if these were ineffec- 
 tual, by any means whatever." 
 
 Boinilcar quickly executed the king's orders, 
 and by employing proper instruments, discover- 
 ed his places of resort, his set times, and all 
 his motions ; and when matters were ripe, laid 
 a scheme for the assassination. One of those 
 wlio were to put the murder in execution, at- 
 tacked Massiva and slew him, but so impru- 
 dently, that he was himselF apprehended ; and 
 being urged by many, especially by the consul 
 Albinus, confessed all. Bomilcar was ar- 
 raigned, more agreeably to reason and justice 
 than to the law of nations ; for he accompanied 
 fugurtha, who came to Rome upon the pub- 
 lic faith. Juguriha, though clearly guilty of 
 so foul a crime, did not however give over 
 endeavouring to bear down the force of truth, 
 till he perceived that the horror of his guilt 
 was such as to baf9e all the power of favour 
 or money. Upon which, though he had upon 
 the prosecution of Bomilcar given fifty of his 
 friends as sureties for his standing his trial, he 
 sent him privately to Numidia ; being more con- 
 cerned for his kingdom than his friends : for 
 he was afraid, were this favourite to be punish- 
 ed, lest the rest of his subjects should be dis- 
 couraged from obeying him. In a few days 
 he himself followed, being ordered by the se- 
 nate to depart out of Italy. When he left 
 Kome, it is reported that, having frequently 
 looked back to it without saying any thing, 
 he at last broke out into these words : " A 
 venal city, and ripe for destruction, when a 
 purchaser can be found." 
 
 The war being now revived, Albinus made 
 haste to transport into Africa, money, provi- 
 sions, and every thing necessary for the use of 
 the army ; and soon after followed himself, 
 that he might put an end to the war, either by 
 defeating the enemj', by obliging Jugurtha to 
 surrender, or by any other means, before the time 
 for election of magistrates, which was near at 
 hand. Jugurtha, on the contrary, endeavoured 
 to protract time, and was continually finding 
 fresh pretences for delay : one while he pro- 
 mised to surrender ; another he feigned dis- 
 trust ; when the enemy pressed him, he gave 
 way ; and soon after, lest his men should be 
 discouraged, he attacked them in his turn. 
 Thus did he baffle the consul by an alternate 
 course of hostilities and proposals of peace. 
 Some there were at that time who imagined that 
 Albinus was not ignorant of the king's designs. 
 
 and who could not believe that the protracting 
 of the war, after such vigorous preparations, 
 was so much owing to inactivity as to fraud. 
 
 The time being elapsed, and the elections 
 at hand, Albinus went to Rome, leaving his 
 brother Aulus to command in the camp as 
 prastor. The commonwealth was at this time 
 terribly agitated by the contentions of the tri- 
 bunes of the people. Two of these, P. Lu- 
 cullus and L. Annius, endeavoured to continue 
 in their office, notwithstanding the opposition 
 of all their colleagues ; which contest kept ofi 
 the election for a whole year. Upon this de- 
 lay, Aulus, who was left proprfftor in the 
 camp, as we have already related, conceiving 
 hopes of either terminating the war, or, by the 
 terror of his army, obliging the king to give 
 him a sum of money, drew his men out of their 
 winter-quarters in the month of January, and 
 by long marches, under the rigours of the sea- 
 son, reached Suthul, where the king's treasure 
 lay. The sharpness of the weather, and the 
 situation of this place, rendered it impossible 
 to take or even to besiege it ; for besides its 
 being built upon a steep rock and strongly 
 walled, the plains that surrounded it were 
 turned into a perfect marsh by the winter rains. 
 Notwithstanding all this, Aulus, either as a 
 feint to frighten the king, or blinded by ava- 
 rice, to make himself master of the town on 
 account of the treasure, framed moving gal- 
 leries, threw up trenches, and made all neces- 
 sary preparations for a siege, 
 
 Jugurtha, perceiving the propraetor's igno- 
 rance and vanity, made use of several arts to 
 increase his madness and presumption ; fre- 
 quently sent deputies to him with humble 
 messages, whilst he himself, affecting fear, led 
 his army through forests and narrow passes. 
 At last Aulus, in hopes that the king would 
 surrender upon conditions, was tempted to quit 
 Suthul and pursue him. Jugurtha, appearing 
 to fly before him, by this means drew him into 
 countries utterly unknown to him, the better to 
 execute his own designs. In the meantime hs 
 employed cunning instruments day and night 
 to debauch our army ; bribing the centurions 
 and officers of horse, some to desert to him, 
 and others upon a signal given to quit their 
 posts. Having thus far pursued his schemes 
 successfullj', on a sudden, in the dead of night, 
 he surrounded Aulus's camp with a great body 
 of IVumidians. The Roman soldiers being 
 struck with this alarm, some iook their arms 
 
38 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 Bome liiJ themselves, and others encoiiragecl 
 those that were afraid. There Vas every 
 where the greatest consternation : the number 
 of the enemy was great, the night was dark 
 and cloudy, and danger on every side : in a 
 word, it was impossible to determine whether 
 it was safest to maintain their ground or fly. 
 Meanwhile, a cohort of Ligurians, two troops 
 of Thracian horse, with a few common men, de- 
 serted to Jugurtha, by whom they had been 
 corrupted, as we have already related ; and a 
 centurion of the first rank, belonging to the 
 third legion, opened a passage to the enemy 
 into the camp, at which all the Numidians 
 poured in, by delivering up a strong post, the 
 defence of which was assigned him. Our men 
 shamefully fled, and the most of them throwing 
 away their arms, took possession of a neighbour- 
 ing hill. 
 
 Night and the plunder of the camp hindered 
 the enemy from improving the victory. Next 
 day, Jugurtha, at a conference with Aulus, 
 told him, that though both he and his troops 
 ■were at his mercy, being hemmed in on all 
 sides with sword and famine, yet, mindful of 
 the inconstancy of human affairs, if he would 
 conclude a treaty with him, he would dismiss 
 them all unhurt ; only making them pass under 
 the yoke, and obliging them to quit Numidia 
 in ten days. The conditions, though very 
 rigorous and extremely dishonourable, were 
 yet submitted to, as they were thereby all deli- 
 vered from the fear of death ; and a peace 
 was concluded upon the king's terms. 
 
 When this was known at Rome, fear and 
 sorrow seized all the city. Some were deeply 
 concerned for the glory of the empire ; others, 
 unacquainted with war, trembled for their li- 
 berty ; all were filled with indignation against 
 Aulus, those especially who had distinguished 
 themselves often by their bravery in war, that 
 with arms in his hands he should consult his 
 safety rather by submitting shamefully than 
 defending himself gallantly. The consul Al- 
 binus, dreading the pubhc odium, and thereby 
 great danger, on account of his brother's in- 
 famous conduct, consulted the senate upon the 
 treaty ; yet in the mean time raised recruits for 
 the army, sent for auxiliaries from the Latins 
 and allies, and made all necessary preparations 
 with the utmost diligence. The senate, as was 
 fit they should, decreed, that without their au- 
 thority and that of the people, no treaty could 
 be concluded. The consul not being allowed 
 
 by the tribunes of the people to transport into 
 Africa what forces he had raised, went thither 
 himself in a few days without them : for the 
 whole, army, according to agreement, had quit- 
 ted Numidia, and wintered in our province. 
 Upon his arrival, though he had an eager de- 
 sire to march against Jugurtha, and thereby 
 lessen the public cdium under which his brother 
 had fallen, yet v\4len he found that the courage 
 of the soldiers was sunk by their late flight, 
 and hot only so, but that they were witl^out 
 discipline, extremely licentious and debauched, 
 be resolved, after mature deliberation, 'to at- 
 tempt nothing. 
 
 At Rome, in the meantime, C. ^amilius 
 Limetanus, one of the tribunes, proposed to the 
 people to pass an ordinance, for arraigning those 
 by whose encouragement Jugurtha had dis- 
 obeyed the decrees of the senate ; those who 
 had received money from him, when sent aS 
 deputies to him, or trusted with the manage- 
 ment of the war against him ; those who had 
 restored him his elephants and deserters ; and 
 likewise those who had taken upon them to 
 enter into any engagements with the enemy 
 relating to peace or war. Such as were aimed 
 at by this ordinance, not daring openly to op- 
 pose it, some through their consciousness of 
 deserving it, others through fear of falling a 
 sacrifice to the heat of party, professed to be 
 pleased with it and the like proceedings ; yet 
 secretly endeavoured to prevent its passing by 
 means of their friends, especially the Latins 
 and the other Italian allies. But it is almost 
 incredible how zealous the people were upon 
 this occasion, and with what eagerness they 
 voted, authorized, and passed the ordinance ; 
 more indeed out of hatred to the nobility, 
 against whom it was levelled, than out of any 
 regard to the welfare of the state ; so violent 
 was the fury of party. 
 
 Whilst the rest were seized by fear, M. 
 Scaurus, who had been lieutenant-general to 
 Bestia, as above related, during the rejoicings 
 of the people, the flight of those of his party, 
 and the distraction of the city, got himself 
 named one of the three commissioners, who 
 were appointed by the ordinance of Mamilius 
 to put it in execution. The prosecution fol- 
 lovi'ed, and was managed with great severity 
 and violence, to gratify the mad humour and 
 clamour of the people, who upon this occasion 
 used their svperiority with great insolence, as 
 the nobility had often done. 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 The distinction of the people and senate into 
 opj)Osite parties, with all the mischievous 
 practices consequent upon it, took its rise at 
 Rome a few years before, and sprung from 
 profound quiet, and the abundance of those 
 things which mm set the highest value upon. 
 For before the destruction of Carthage, the 
 people and senate jointly governed the state 
 with great moderation and harmony ; the citi- 
 zens had no contests with one another on ac- 
 co6nt of power and influence ; fear of their 
 ^nemies kept the state in good order : but when 
 this fear was removed, pride and debauchery, 
 the usual attendants of prosperity, poured in 
 upon th'em. So that peace, which they so ar- 
 dently wished for in the time of war and dan- 
 ger, when they obtained it, proved more fatal 
 to them than either ; for the nobility began to 
 convert their dignity into tyranny ; the people, 
 their Uberty into licentiousness, and all, in- 
 deed, centering their views in themselves only, 
 laboured to get as much power and property as 
 they possibly could. Thus, whilst each party 
 strove to have all power in its hands, the com- 
 monwealth, which lay between both, was mis- 
 erably rent. The faction of the nulnlity, how- 
 ever, prevailed ; for the authority of the peo- 
 ple, being loose, and divided among a multi- 
 tude, had less force ; so that all affairs, both at 
 home and abroad, were managed by a few. 
 They disposed of the treasury, provinces, ma- 
 gistracies, public dignities, and triumphs. The 
 populace were oppressed by poverty and mili- 
 tary service, while the generals, with a few 
 great ones, engrossed all the spoils of victory : 
 and even the parents and children of the 
 soldiers were driven from their estates, if they 
 happened to border upon any of the grandees. 
 Thus did avarice, in conjunction with power, 
 without moderation or restraint, invade, pollute, 
 and lay waste every thing, disregarding what 
 was just or sacred, till it rushed headlong to 
 its own ruin. For as soon as there arose any 
 from among the nobility who preferred real 
 glory to unjust power, the state was in an up- 
 roar ; and such civil broils ensued, as if the 
 universe had been dissolving. 
 
 For after Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, 
 whose ancestors had done signal service to the 
 state ; both in the Carthaginian and other wars, 
 began to attempt the recovery of the people's 
 rights, and to lay open the wickedness of a few 
 great men ; the nobility, being conscious of 
 their guilt, and under terrible apprehensions, 
 :J6 
 
 endeavoured to defeat their designs, sometime! 
 by means of our Italian allies and the liatin 
 state, and sometimes by means of the Roman 
 knights, whom the hopes of being admitted to 
 a partnership in power with the nobility had 
 drawn off from the interests of' the people. 
 First they murdered Tiberius, whilst tribune 
 of the people, and, in a few years after, Caius, 
 who was pursumg his brother's measures, to- 
 gether with M. Fulvius P'laccus, both invested 
 with the triuDiviral authority of planting colo- 
 nies. And. indeed the Gracchi, through an 
 eager desire of carrying their point, did not 
 act with moderation ; for it is better to yield, 
 than to conquer opposition by unlawful means. 
 
 The nobility, using the advantage they had 
 gained according to their own wanton humour, 
 put many citizens to death, banished others, 
 and rendered themselves more terrible for the 
 future, rather than more powerful ; a method 
 of proceeding which has ruined many flourish- 
 mg states ; whilst parties have endeavoured to 
 conquer each other, and to treat the con- 
 quered with the utmost cruelty. But were I 
 to enter into a minute detail of the views and 
 animosities of our parties, with the conduct ot- 
 our citizens, and to treat so copious a subject 
 in its full extent, time would fail rne sooner 
 than matter. I return then to my design. 
 
 After the treaty of Aulus and the shameful 
 flight of our army, Metellus and Silanus, con- 
 suls elect, shared the provinces between them; 
 and Numidia fell to Metellus, a man of spirit 
 untainted reputation, and equally esteemed by 
 both parties, though he opposed that of the 
 people. As soon as he entered upon his office, 
 considering that his colleague had an equal 
 share of all the other duties of the consulship, 
 he employed his thoughts wholly upon the war 
 which he was to conduct. Accordingly, having 
 little dependence upon the old army, he made 
 new levies; sent for auxiliaries from all parts ; 
 provided arms, horses, and all other warlike im- 
 plements, with great plenty of provisions ; 
 and, in a word, every thing necessary in a war, 
 which required various management and many 
 things to conduct it properly. In making these 
 preparations, he was vigorously assisted by the 
 senate, our allies, and those of the Latin state; 
 foreign princes of their own accord sent him 
 auxiliaries; and, in short, the whole city sup- 
 ported him with the greatest zeal. When all 
 things were furnished and regulated accord- 
 ing to his wishes, he passed over into Numidij^ 
 
40 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 leaving his fellow-citizens full of great hopes ; 
 not only on account of his many excellent 
 qualities, but chiefly because he had a soul 
 never to be subdued by money. For it was 
 the avarice of our commanders that, till this 
 time, had ruined our affairs in Numidia, and 
 rendered the enemy successful. 
 
 Upon his arrival in Africa, the army of the 
 proconsul, Spurius Albinus, was delivered to 
 him : but an army spiritless and unwarlike ; in- 
 capable of sustaining danger or fatigue ; rea- 
 dier to talk than to act ; without any order or 
 discipline ; and accustomed to plunder our al- 
 lies, whilst itself was the spoil of the enemy : 
 so that the depravity of the soldiers occasioned 
 the general more anxietj', than their numbers 
 gave him either support or confidence. But 
 though Metellus saw the summer far advanced, 
 from the elections being put off, and considered 
 that his fellow-citizens were impatient for the 
 issue ; yet he determined not to enter upon 
 action, till, by restoring the ancient discipline, 
 he had enabled the soldiers to endure fatigue. 
 For Albinus, struck with the disgrace of his 
 brother Aulus and the overthrow of his troops, 
 having resolved not to stir out of the province 
 during so much of the summer as he command- 
 ed, kept the soldiers for the most part in the 
 same camp, till stench or want of forage obliged 
 them to remove. Besides, contrary to all the 
 rules of war, no watch was kept in the camp ; 
 the men left their ensigns at pleasure ■, and the 
 leaders, together with the soldiers, wandered 
 abroad day and night, robbing the farms, pil- 
 laging the fields, and striving to exceed one 
 another in carrying oflTcaltle and captives, which 
 they exchanged with the rnerchants for wine 
 and other such things ; nay, they sold the corn 
 that was allowed them by the state, and bought 
 their bread from day to day. In a word, all the 
 excesses of idleness and luxury that can either 
 be expressed or imagined,prevailed in that army. 
 
 Metellus appears to me to have approved 
 himself as able and wise a man, by the manner 
 In which he cured these great disorders, as by 
 his conduct against the enemy ; so just a me- 
 dium did he observe between a servile desire to 
 gain the affections of the soldiers, and a seve- 
 rity in punishing them. For by his first edict 
 he removed every thing that could administer 
 to idleness, ordering, " that none should sell 
 bread or any dressed victuals in the camp ; that 
 no sutlers should follow the army : and that no 
 common soldier should have a servant, or any 
 
 beast of burden, e'ther in the camp or on a 
 march." He made other regulations too with 
 great judgment. Besides, he decamped daily, 
 marching his army through cross and difKcult 
 places ; fortified his camp with a ditch and pali- 
 sade, as if an enemy had been at hand ; set 
 guards, and changed them often ; and went 
 frequently round them all himself, attended by 
 his lieutenant-generals. On a march too he 
 was equally vigilant, appearing one while in 
 the front, another in the rear, and often in the 
 main body ; to see that none quitted their 
 ranks, that all kept close by their standards, 
 and carried their own arms and provisions. 
 Thus, in a short time, he restored discipline 
 and vigour to his troops, rather by preventing 
 abuses than punishing them. 
 
 Jugurtha, in the meantime, having learned 
 from his emissaries what measures were taken 
 by Metellus, whose integrity he had been con- 
 vinced of when at Rome, began to despair of 
 success, and thought of surrendering himself 
 in good earnest. Accordingly he sent ambas- 
 sadors to the consul, with power to deliver up 
 all to the Romans, only stipulating for his own 
 life and that of his children. But' Metellus, 
 who had learned by experience that the Nu- 
 midians were a faithless people, fickle and fond 
 of change, applied tc each of the ambassadors 
 apart ; and when, by sifting them, he found they 
 'were proper instruments for his purpose, he 
 engaged them by great promises to deliver up 
 Jugurtha to him alive, if possible ; if not, to bring 
 him his head : and his answer to their embassy 
 he gave them in public. In a few days after, 
 he went into Numidia at the head of a resolute 
 army, where he found none of the symptoms of 
 war, but the country-houses full of inhabitants, 
 flocks and herds feeding in the fields, and the 
 husbandmen all at work. The king's officers 
 came from the towns and cottages to meet him, 
 offering to furnish him with carriages and 
 provisions, and, in a word, to do whatever he 
 should order them. Metellus, notwithstanding 
 all this, was still upon his guard ; marched with 
 his ranks, as if the enemy had been at hand ; 
 and sent scouts to view the country a great way 
 round, looking upon these marks of submission 
 as contrived for show only, and to draw him 
 into an ambush. Wherefore he himself marched 
 always in the front, with some light-armed co- 
 horts, and a select body of slingers and arch- 
 ers : leaving his lieutenant-general, C. Marius, 
 at the head of the cavalry to bring up the rean 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 41 
 
 The auxiliary horse he placed on each wing, 
 and gave the command of them to the tribunes 
 of the legions and the prasfects of the cohorts, 
 mixing with them the light-armed foot, that the 
 enemy's cavalry might be repulsed, on what 
 side soever they made their attack. For Ju- 
 gurtha had so much subtlety, so perfect a know- 
 ledge of the country, and such abilities in war, 
 that it was uncertain whether he was more mis- 
 chievous when at a distance or near, when 
 making proposals for peace or openly engaged 
 in war. 
 
 Not far from Metellus's route there was a 
 city called Vacca, the most famous for com- 
 merce in all Numidia, very much frequented 
 by Italians, who came to it for traffic, and many 
 of whom had settled in it. The consul put a 
 garrison into this place, either to try whether 
 Jugurtha would bear with it, or because he was 
 pleased with its situation ; and likewise ordered 
 corn and other necessaries to be brought him ; 
 supposing, as was very natural for him to do, 
 that his army would be abundantly supplied, 
 from such a concourse of traders and such 
 plenty of provisions ; and that the place itself 
 would be very convenient for executing the 
 designs he had already formed. In the mean- 
 time Jugurtha renewed his applications to the 
 consul with greater earnestness, still sending 
 ambassadors to implore peace, and offering to 
 deliver up all he had, without stipulating for 
 any thing but his own life and that of his chil- 
 dren. The consul having engaged these am- 
 bassadors, as he had the first, to betray their 
 master, sent them back without either pro- 
 mising or denying the peace ; waiting, in the 
 meantime, the execution of what they had un- 
 dertaken. 
 
 When Jugurtha compared the words of Me- 
 tellus with his actions, and found that his own 
 arts were practised upon him, that whilst he 
 was amused ivith the hopes of peace, he was 
 warmly pursued with war ; when he saw that 
 he had lost one of his strongest cities, that the 
 enemy was well acquainted with his territories, 
 and his subjects solicited to revolt ; being forced 
 by his desperate situation, he determined to 
 hazard a battle. Accordingly, having got in- 
 telligence of the enemy's route, and conceiving 
 hopes of victory from the advantages which the 
 country gave him, he raised a force as great as 
 he could, and by private ways got before the 
 army of Metellus. 
 
 In that part of Numidia which, upon the 
 
 division of it, fell to the share of Atherbal, was 
 a river called Muthul, flowing from the south: 
 parallel to which, at the distance of about 
 twenty miles, there was a mountain of equal 
 length, desert and uncultivated. Between this 
 mountain and the river, almost at an equal 
 distance from each, rose a hill of prodigious 
 height, covered with olives, myrtles, and other 
 trees, such as grow in a dry and sandy soil ; the 
 intermediate plain was all desert for want of 
 water, those parts only excepted which border- 
 ed upon the river, in which were many groves, 
 and abundance of cattle and inhabitants. Ju- 
 gurtha took possession of this hill, which 
 flanked the Romans in their march to the 
 river, extending his front as far as possible ; 
 and giving the command of the elephants and 
 part of the foot to Bomilcar, with orders how 
 to act, he posted himself with all the horse and 
 the choicest of the foot nearer the mountain. 
 Then he rode round the several squadrons and 
 battalions, conjuring them " to summon up 
 their former bravery, and, mindful of their late 
 victory, to defend themselves and their country 
 from the Roman avarice. They were to en- 
 gage with those whom they had already van- 
 quished, and forced to pass under the yoke ; 
 and who had only changed their general, but 
 not their spirit. As for himself, he had done all 
 that was incumbent upon a general to do ; had 
 secured to them the advantages of the ground, 
 which they were well acquainted with, and the 
 enemy a stranger to ; and had taken care not 
 to expose them to an unequal engagement with 
 "an enemy superior in number or skill: they 
 should, therefore, when the signal was given, 
 fall vigorously upon the Romans ; this day 
 would either crown their former toils and vic- 
 tories, or be a prelude to the most grievous 
 calamities." Besides, addressing himself singly 
 to such as he rewarded with honours or money 
 for their gallant behaviour, he put them in 
 mind of his favours, and proposed them to 
 others as patterns for their imitation. In a 
 word, he applied to all, in a manner suited to 
 the disposition of each, and by promises, threat- 
 enings, and entreaties, roused their courage. 
 
 In the meantime, Metellus descending from 
 the mountain with his army, without knowing 
 any thing of the enemy's motions, discovered 
 them upon the hill. At first he did not know 
 what to think of so strange an appearance ; for 
 the Numidian horse and foot were posted 
 among the bushes, by reason of the lowness of 
 
43 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 which they were neither altogether covered 
 nor yet entirely discerned ; the obscurity of the 
 place, afid their own artificial posture, prevent- 
 ing them from being clearly seen : but soon 
 finding that it was an ambush, he made his 
 army halt a little ; and altering the disposition 
 of it, he made the flank next the enemy thrice 
 as strong as before, distributed the slingers and 
 archers among the infantry, placed all the 
 cavalry in the wings ; and animating them by 
 a short speech suitable to the occasion, ad- 
 vanced, in this order, towards the plain. 
 
 But observing the Numidians to keep their 
 ground, without offering to stir from the hill, 
 and fearing lest, from the heat of the season 
 and the scarcity of water, his army would be 
 distressed by thirst, he ordered his lieutenant- 
 general Rutilius, with the light-armed cohorts 
 and a detachment of horse, to march before 
 him to the river, and secure a place to encamp 
 on ; judging that the enemy would, by frequent 
 skirmishes, and attacks upon his flank, endea- 
 vour to retard his march, and to harass his men 
 by thirst and continual fatigue, as they had no 
 hopes of success in battle. He then advanced 
 gently, as his circumstances and situation al- 
 lowed him, in the same order as he had de- 
 scended from the mountain ; posted Marius in 
 the centre, and marching himself in the left 
 wing, at the head of the cavalry, which was 
 now become the front. 
 
 Jugurtha, when he saw that the Roman rear 
 had got beyond his first rank, detached two 
 thousand foot to take possession of that part of 
 the mountain from whence Metellus had de- 
 scended, that it might not serve the enemy for 
 a place of security if they were routed ; and 
 ■then, giving the signal, fell upon them. Some 
 ■of his men made great slaughter in our rear, 
 ■whilst others charged us on the right and left; 
 they advanced furiously, fought vigorously, and 
 -every where broke our ranks. Even those of 
 our men who opposed them with the greatest 
 firmness and resolution, were baffled by their 
 disorderly manner of fighting ; being wounded 
 at a distance, and unable to return blow for 
 blow, or come to a close engagement: for the 
 Numidian cavalry, according to the instructions 
 they had received from Jugurtha, when any of 
 the Roman troops advanced against them, im- 
 mediately fled, not in close order, or in a body, 
 but dispersed as wide as possible. As they 
 could not, however, by this means discourage 
 as from pursuing them, yet, being superior in 
 
 number, they charged us either in flank ol 
 rear; and when the hill seemed more conve- 
 nient to fly to than the plain, their horses, being 
 accustomed to it, made their way more easily 
 through the thickets ; whilst ours, not beiiig 
 used to such rough and difficult places, could 
 not follow them. 
 
 The whole transaction, indeed, aflorded a 
 spectacle various and perplexed, dismal and 
 shocking ; some flying, others pursuing : all 
 separated from their fellows ; no standard kept 
 to ; no ranks observed ; every one standing 
 upon his defence, and repulsing his adversary, 
 wherever he was attacked ; arms and darts, 
 horses and men, enemies and fellow-citizens, 
 blended together in wild confusion ; nothing 
 acted by counsel, nothing by authority, but 
 chance over-ruling every thing : so that though 
 the day was far spent, the event was still un- 
 certain. At last, both sides being fatigued 
 with fighting and the heat of the day, Metellus, 
 perceiving the Numidian vigour abated, rallied 
 his men by degrees, restored their ranks, and 
 posted four legionary cohorts against the ene- 
 my's foot, a great part of which had, through 
 weariness, retired to the rising grounds for 
 repose. At the same time he entreated and 
 exhorted his men not to lose their courage, nor 
 suffer a flying enemy to be victorious ; adding, 
 that they had no camp nor castles to fly to, but 
 that all their hopes were in their arms. Nor 
 was Jugurtha, indeed, in the meantime inac- 
 tive, but rode about, animated his men, renewed 
 the fight, and at the head of a select body, made 
 all possible eflforts ; supported his men, where 
 they were pressed ; charged the enemy vi- 
 gorously, where they wavered ; and where 
 they stood firm, annoyed them with darts at a 
 distance. 
 
 Thus did these two generals contend ; both 
 excellent officers and equally matched, but un- 
 equally supported. Metellus had brave men, 
 but a bad situation ; Jugurtha had every other 
 advantage but that of soldiers. At last the 
 Romans, considering that no place of refuge 
 was left them ; that the enemy avoided every 
 opportunity of engaging, and that night ap- 
 proached ; advanced up the hill, according to 
 orders, and made themselves masters of it. 
 The Numidians, having lost this post, were 
 routed and put to flight, but few of them slain : 
 their own swiftness, and our being unacquainted 
 with the country, saved most of them. 
 
 In the meantime, Bomilcar, to whom Ju 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 43 
 
 gurtha, as we have already related, had given 
 the command of the elephants and part of the 
 foot, when he saw that Rutilius had passed him, 
 drew down his men gently into the plain ; 
 where,without being interrupted, he drew them 
 up in order of battle, as the exigency required, 
 whilst the lieutenant-general was marching 
 with great haste to the river, whither the con- 
 sul had sent him; nor did he neglect to inform 
 himself of what the Romans were doing on 
 every side. As soon as he had learned that 
 Rutilius was encamped, and free from all ap- 
 prehensions of danger; and perceiving that the 
 noise of the battle, wherein Jugurtha was en- 
 gaged, grew greater ; fearing lest the lieute- 
 nant-general, upon discovering the matter, 
 should return to the relief of our men in dis- 
 tress, in order to obstruct his passage, he ex- 
 tended his front, which before, distrusting the 
 bravery of his troops, he had formed close and 
 compact ; and in this order advanced to the 
 camp of Rutilius. 
 
 The Romans on a sudden perched a great 
 cloud of dust, which at first thej' supposed was 
 raised by the wind driving the dry soil ; for the 
 country being covered with bushes hindered 
 their view of the Numidians : but observing it 
 to continue constant, and approach nearer and 
 nearer as the army moved, they perceived what 
 the cause of it was ; and flying to their arms, 
 drew up before the camp, according to orders. 
 When the enemy was come up, they encoun- 
 tered on both sides with terrible shouts. The 
 Numidians maintained the fight as long as they 
 thought their elephants could be of any service 
 to them ; but when they saw them entangled 
 among the branches of the trees, and sur- 
 rounded by our men, they betook themselves to 
 flight, and throwing away their arms, escaped 
 most of them unhurt, partly by the advantage 
 of the hill and partly by that of the night. 
 
 Four elephants were taken ; the rest, forty 
 in number were all slain. The Romans, how- 
 ever, though fatigued with their march, with 
 fortifying their camp, and fighting ; and though 
 all highly pleased with their success, yet, as 
 Metellus tarried beyond their expectation, they 
 advanced resolutely in order of battle to meet 
 him : for such was the Numid^an subtilty, as 
 to leave no room for inactivity or remissness. 
 When they were at a small distance from one 
 another, as the night was dark, the noise on 
 both sides greatly alarmed each with the ap- 
 prehensions of an approaching enemy ; and 
 36* 
 
 this mistake had like to have produced the 
 most fatal consequences, if some horsemen, 
 despatched by both parties, had not discovered 
 the true cause of it. Whereupon their fear 
 was quickly changed into gladness ; the sol- 
 diers joyfully called to one another by name: 
 mutually recounted their late exploits : and 
 every one extolling his own gallant behaviour 
 to the skies. For such is the nature of hu- 
 man aflTairs ; upon a victory, even cowards 
 may boast ; whilst a defeat casts reproach even 
 on the brave. 
 
 Metellus continued four days in the same 
 camp ; took proper care of the wounded ; con- 
 ferred the usual military rewards on such 
 as had distinguished themselves in the late 
 engagements ; commended the whole army, 
 which he assembled with that view ; returned 
 them his public thanks ; then exhorted them 
 " to act with equal courage in what farther 
 remained, which was but little. They had 
 already fought sufficiently for -yictory ; their 
 future labours would be only to enrich them- 
 selves with plunder." In the meantime, how- 
 ever, he despatched away deserters, and other 
 proper persons, to discover where Jugurtha 
 was; what he was doing; whether he was at 
 the head of an army, or attended only with a 
 few ; and how he brooked his defeat. The 
 king, he found, had retired into woods and 
 places fortified by nature, and raised an army 
 more numerous than the former, but weak and 
 spiritless ; better acquainted with tilling and 
 pasture, than with war : the reason of which 
 was, that, upon a defeat, none of the Numidi- 
 ans follow their king, excepting his horse- 
 guards ; the rest go wherever they please. 
 Nor is this reckoned any reproach, it being the 
 custom of the nation. 
 
 Metellus, when he saw that the king's spirit 
 was still undaunted, that the war was to be 
 renewed, which could not be carried on but 
 just as Jugurtha pleased ; and moreover con- 
 sidered, upon what unequal terms he engaged 
 the enemy, who suffered less by a defeat, than 
 he did in defeating them ; he resolved to pur- 
 sue the war, not regularly by pitched battles, 
 but in a different manner. Accordingly, he 
 marches into the richest parts of Numidia ; 
 ravages the country ; takes many towns and 
 castles, that were either slightly fortified or 
 without garrisons, and burns them ; orders the 
 youth to be put to the sword, and gives every 
 thing else to the soldiers for spoil. This man- 
 3H 
 
44 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 ner of proceeding struck such terror, that many 
 hostages were given him; corn, and other ne- 
 cessaries plentifully supplied; and garrisons 
 suliered to be placed wherever he judged con- 
 venient. These measures alarmed the king 
 more than the loss of the late battle ; for he, 
 who had no hopes but in flying before us, was 
 now forced to follow us ; and though he could 
 not defend his own territories, he was obliged 
 to wage war in those possessed by the Romans. 
 Under this difficulty, however, he pursued such 
 measures as seemed most advisa de. He or- 
 dered the greatest part of his army to con- 
 tinue together, whilst he himself, with a select 
 body of cavalry, pursued Metellus ; and by 
 marching in the night-time through by-roads, 
 he surprised such of our men as were rambling 
 over the country ; most of whom being unarmed 
 were slain, many were taken prisoners, and none 
 escaped without being wounded. For before 
 any assistance could be sent them from the 
 camp, the Numidianshad, according to orders, 
 retired to the neighbouring hills. 
 
 In the meantime, there was great joy at 
 Rome when they heard of the management of 
 Metellus ;" how he had conducted himself 
 and his army according to the ancient disci- 
 pline ; had, by his bravery, come off victorious, 
 though under the disadvantage of situation ; 
 had made himself master of the enemy's coun- 
 try ; and toreed Jugurtha, whom the infamous 
 conduct of Aulus had lately rendered so inso- 
 lent, to place all his hopes of safety in flight and 
 deserts." The senate, therefore, appointed 
 public thanksgivings and oblations to the im- 
 mortal gods for the success of their arms. The 
 city, before full of anxiety for the event of the 
 war, was now full of joy, and nothing was to 
 be heard but the praises of Metellus ; which 
 made him exert more vigorous efforts to obtain 
 a complete victory : with which view he pushed 
 all his measures with the utmost diligence, 
 still guarding, however, against any surprise 
 from the enemy ; and remembering, that aft^r 
 glory comes envy. Thus the more renowned 
 be was, the more vigilant he became ; nor since 
 the late unexpected attack from Jugurtha, 
 would he suffer his men to spread themselves 
 over the country in quest of plunder. When 
 he stood in need of corn or forage, he detached 
 all the cavalry, with some bands of foot, to 
 guard it. One part of the army he commanded 
 himself, and Marius the other ; the country was 
 laid waste more by fire than depredations. 
 
 The two bodies of the army encamped sepa- 
 rately, but at a small distance from each other ; 
 and when there was occasion for it, they 
 united ; but in order to spread terror and 
 desolation the Airther, they acted apart. Ju- 
 gurtha all this time followed them upon the 
 mountains, watching some favourable oppor- 
 tuniiy or situation to attack them ; and when- 
 ever he heard which way they intended to 
 march, he destroyed the forage and the springs, 
 of which there was great scarcity. One 
 while he presented himself to Metellus, another 
 to Marius ; sometimes he fell upon their rear, 
 and then presently drew off to the hills ; by 
 and by he attacked them" again, now in one 
 quarter, now in another ; neither venturing a 
 battle, nor suffering them to be quiet ; but only 
 endeavouring to hinder the execution of their 
 designs. 
 
 When the Roman general perceived that he 
 was harassed by the artful management of the 
 enemy, who avoided all occasions of giving 
 him battle, he determined to lay siege to Za- 
 ma, a very considerable city, and the bulwark 
 of the kingdom on that side ; supposing that 
 Jugurtha would not fail to advance to the relief 
 of his subjects in that distress, and that an en 
 gagement would thereupon ensue. But Ju- 
 gurtha, having got intelligence of this design 
 from the deserters, reached Zama by great 
 marches before Metellus ; encouraged the in- 
 habitants to defend their walls, and reinforced 
 them with a body of deserters, who were the 
 most desperate of all his forces, as they durst 
 not betray him. He promised besides, that he 
 would return in due time to their assistance at 
 t'le head of an army. Having thus regulated 
 his affairs, he withdrew into the most solitary 
 parts of the country ; and soon after being in- 
 formed that Marius, with a few cohorts, was 
 sent from the army as it marched, to bring 
 provisions from Sicca, which was the first town 
 that revolted from him after his defeat, he 
 Vk'ent thither by night, with a select body of 
 horse, and attacked the Romans just as they 
 were returning through the gate. At the 
 same time he called aloud to the inhabitants, 
 " to fall upon the cohorts in the rear ; that 
 fortune presented them with an opportunity of 
 performing, a noble achievement ; which if 
 they did, that he should for the future enjoy 
 his kingdom, and they their liberties in safety." 
 And had not Marius advanced the standards, 
 and got speedily out of the town, the greatest 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 45 
 
 part of the inhabitants, if not all, would cer- 
 tainly have changed sides ; such is the in- 
 constancy of the Numidians. But Jugurtha's 
 troops, »who, being animated by hirn, had 
 for a short time maintained the fight, finding 
 themselves pressed by the Romans with supe- 
 rior vigour, fled with the loss of a few of their 
 men, and Marius arrived before Zama. 
 
 This town was built on a plain ; better for- 
 tified by art than nature ; well furnished with 
 every thing necessary ; and abounding with 
 men and arms. Metellus, having regulated 
 every thing as the occasion and undertaking 
 required, surrounded it with his army ; as- 
 signed his lieutenants their several posts of 
 command ; and then, upon a signal given, a 
 great shout was raised at once from all quar- 
 ters. This, however, did not terrify the Nu- 
 
 ■ midians, who waited the attack without any 
 disorder, full of ardour and resolution. Ac- 
 cordingly the encounter began ; our men 
 fought each according to his inclination ; some 
 
 . at a distance, with stones and slings ; some 
 withdrew after they had attacked, and others 
 came in their place; one while they under- 
 mined the walls, another they endeavoured to 
 scale them ; all eager to engage the enemy in 
 close fight. The townsmen, on the other 
 hand, rolled down stones on those who came 
 nearest the walls ; and discharged darts, 
 stakes, and burning torches of pitch and sul- 
 phur upon them. Nor were such of our men 
 as kept at a distance through fear, the more 
 secure for it ; most of them being wounded by 
 weapons thrown by engines, or by force of 
 arm. So that the cowards were exposed to 
 equal danger with the brave, without sharing 
 their glory. 
 
 During this contest at Zama, Jugurtha, at 
 tho head of a great body of troops, surprised 
 the Koman camp, and by reason of the negli- 
 gence of the guard, who apprehended nothing 
 less than an attack, broke in at one of the 
 gates. Our men, struck with sudden conster- 
 nation, consulted their safety, each according 
 to his character: some fled, others had recourse 
 to their arms, and many of them were wounded 
 or slain. Of all the number, there were only 
 forty who acted like Romans : they, forming 
 themselves into a body, took possession of a 
 rising ground, which they maintained against 
 the most vigorous efforts of the enemy to dis- 
 possess them ; and even returned the darts that 
 were thrown at them, which did the more exe- 
 
 cution, as they were few against many. If 
 the Nurnidians ventured nearer them, then they 
 exerted their utmost bravery ; slaying, routing, 
 and putting them to flight. 
 
 In the meantime, whilst Metellus was carry- 
 ing on the siegje of Zama with great vigour, he 
 heard a noise and shouting behind hirn, like 
 that of an enemy ; and turning his horse, ob- 
 served men flying towards him, a certain proof 
 that they were his own. Wherefore he' im- 
 mediately sent the whole cavalry to the camp ; 
 and soon after C. Marius with the auxiliary co- 
 horts, conjuring hirn wilh tears, " by their mu- 
 tual friendsliip, by his regard to the pubhc wel- 
 fare, not to suffer such a stain to rest upon a 
 victorious army, nor the enenfy to escape with- 
 out taking ample vengeance upon them." 
 Marius quickly executed his orders. 
 
 Jugurtha now found himself and his men 
 embarrassed in our intrenchments : some 
 threw themselves over the rampart; the rest, 
 striving to get through the gates, which were 
 too narrow, obstructed one another; so that 
 after the loss of a great many men, he betook 
 himself to his strong holds. Metellus, not 
 succeeding in his attempt upon the town, re- 
 turned in the evening with his army to the 
 camp. 
 
 The next day, before he returned to renew 
 the assault, he posted all his horse without the 
 camp, with orders to guard that side on which 
 he expected Jugurtha would appear ; and 
 having distributed the guard of the gates and 
 the adjoining posts amongst the tribunes, he ad- 
 vanced to the town, and made an assault upon 
 the walls as he had done the day brfore. Ju- 
 gurtha in the meantime, leaving his covert, fell 
 suddenly upon our men. Those of the advanced 
 guard being somewhat terrified, were put into 
 disorder, but quickly relieved by the rest ; so 
 that the Numidians could not have maintained 
 their ground any longer, if their foot, mixing 
 with their horse, had not done great execution 
 among us ; for the horse, trusting to the assis- 
 tance of the foot, did not charge as formerly, 
 advancing and retiring by turns, but pressed 
 forward with great vigour, grappled with our 
 men and broke them ; then delivered them up, 
 when nigh conquered, to be despatched by their 
 light-armed foot. 
 
 During this very time there was a sharp con- 
 flict at Zama : the lieutenants and tribunes made 
 prodigious efforts in their several posts ; all 
 placing their hopes of victory in their owa 
 
46 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 bravery, rather than in the assistance of others. 
 The townsmen, too, made a vigorous resistance, 
 boldly repulsing our men, and defending them- 
 selves resolutely in every quarter. They were 
 more eager, indeed, on both sides, to wound the 
 enemy than to protect themselves. A confused 
 noise of exhortations, shouts of joy, and groans, 
 arose continually; the din of arms reached 
 the skies, and darts flew thick on every side. 
 Those who defended the walls, when they foHfid 
 the fury of the besiegers ever so little abated, 
 viewed the engagement of the cavalry with 
 great earnestness : and according as Jugurtha 
 prevailed or not, you might have observed their 
 joy or concern : nay, as if they could have been 
 heard or seen by their friends, some advised 
 them, others encouraged them, making signs 
 with their hands, and moving their bodies this 
 way and that, as if they had been avoiding darts 
 or throwing them. When Marius, who com- 
 manded in that quarter, observed this, he pur- 
 posely slackened his attack, as if he had lost 
 all hopes of success, and suffered them to view 
 the engagement at the camp without interrup- 
 tion. Then, whilst their attention was closely 
 engaged, he made a sudden and vigorous assault 
 upon the walls ; and the soldiers had almost 
 gained the top of them with their scaling lad- 
 ders,when the townsmen flying to their defence, 
 poured down upon the besiegers stones, fire, and 
 all sorts of weapons. Our men sustained all 
 this for a while ; but some of the ladders break- 
 ing down, and those who stood upon them 
 tumbling headlong, the rest retreated each as 
 he could, the greatest part of them covered with 
 wounds, few escaping unhurt. At last, night 
 put an end to the combat. 
 
 Metellus, finding that his attempt upon the 
 town was unsuccessful ; that Jugurtha was .de- 
 termined not to engage, unless by surprise, or 
 where he had the advantage of the ground, and 
 that the summer was already over, left Zama, 
 and placed garrisons in those cities which had 
 revolted to him, and were strong by nature or 
 well fortified ; then put his army into winter 
 quarters in those parts of our province where it 
 borders upon Numidia. Nor did he spend his 
 time there, as others had done, in luxury and 
 inaction ; but finding what small progress he 
 made in the war by fighting, he formed a de- 
 ■ sign to defeat the king by employing the treach- 
 ery of his friends against him instead of arms. 
 Accordingly he applies to Bomilcar, who had 
 been at Rome with Jugurtha, and being ar- 
 
 raigned for the murder of Massiva, had fled 
 from thence to evade his trial, abandoning his 
 sureties. This man, who had the best oppor- 
 tunity of betraying the king upon account of 
 his great intimacy with him, Metellus prevailed 
 upon, by the force of promises, to come, first to 
 a private conference with him ; then, pledging 
 his honour, " that if he would deliver to him 
 Jugurtha dead or alive, he would procure him 
 his pardon from the senate, with the enjoyment 
 of his whole fortune ;" he easily persuaded the 
 Numidian, who was naturally faithless, and 
 likewise afraid lest, if a peace was concluded 
 with the Romans, he should, by the articles of 
 it, be delivered up to punishment. 
 
 Bomilcar, as soon as he found an opportunity, 
 accosted Jugurtha, when full of anxiety, and 
 lamenting his lot ; and with tears in his eyes 
 pressed and conjured him, " to consult at last 
 his own safety, that of his children, and the Nu- 
 midians, who had been so zealously devoted to 
 his service. He begged of him to consider, 
 that he had been defeated in every engage- 
 ment ; that his country was laid waste ; many 
 of his subjects taken ; many of them slain ; the 
 strength of his kingdom exhausted ; that he 
 had already suffici.ently tried the bravery of his 
 troops and the inclination of fortune, and ought 
 now to take care lest the Numidians, whilst he 
 thus delayed, should provide for their own 
 safety." By these and the like arguments he 
 prevailed upon the king to surrender. Accord- 
 ingly ambassadors were sent to Metellus, to let 
 him know that Jugurtha was ready to submit 
 to whatever he should desire, and to deliver 
 himself and his kingdom absolutely to his dis- 
 posal. Metellus forthwith ordered all those of 
 senatorial rank to be summoned from their win- 
 ter quarters, and advised with them, and others 
 whom, he thought proper to consult upon the 
 occasion ; acting herein according to ancient 
 usage. Then, agreeably to an order of the 
 council, he sent deputies to Jugurtha, com- 
 manding him, " to deliver up to the Romans 
 two hundred thousand pounds of silver, all his 
 elephants, with some horses and arms." This 
 being immediately complied with, he ordered 
 " all our deserters to be brought him in chains." 
 A great part of them were brought accordingly ; 
 the rest, who were but few in number, had fled 
 for refuge to Bocchus king of Mauritania, 
 upon the first appearance of a surrender. When 
 Jugurtha, thus stripped of his arms, men, and 
 money, was himself summoned to Tisidium t 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 47 
 
 surrender to the consul, he began again to 
 change his mind, and to dread the punishment 
 which he was conscious to himself was due to 
 his crimes. Many days were spent by him in 
 irresolution : one while he preferred any terms 
 whatever to war, being tired with calamities ; 
 another, he considered what ^ terrible fall it 
 was from a throne to servitude : but at last he 
 determined to renew the war, after he had 
 needlessly diveSted himself of so considerable a 
 part of his strength. The senate at Rome, too, 
 having met to consult about the distribution of 
 provinces, had, during this juncture, decreed 
 Numidia to Metellus. 
 
 About the same time, as C. Marius, who 
 happened to be at Utica, was sacrificing to the 
 gods, he was told by a diviner, " that great and 
 wonderful things were presaged to him ; he 
 should therefore pursue whatever designs he 
 had formed, and trust the gods for their success ; 
 he might try fortune as much as he pleased, all 
 his undertakings would succeed." Now Marius 
 had been long seized with an ardent desire of 
 the consulship, and had indeed every qualifi- 
 • cation for obtaining it, except that of a noble 
 descent: he had industry, probity, vast know- 
 ledge in war, great spirit in battle, uncommon 
 sobriety, a soul that disdained to be enslaved to 
 liches or pleasure, and which only thirsted 
 after glory. He was born at Arpinum, where 
 he passed his childhood ; and as soon as he was 
 of age to bear arms, he did not give himself up 
 to the study of Grecian eloquence, nor to the 
 delicacies of Rome, but to the life of a soldier ; 
 and thus, in a short time, did this excellent 
 genius, by a proper course of discipline, acquire 
 a masterly knowledge in war : so that when he 
 made his first suit to the people for the military 
 tribuneship, though the greatest part of them 
 did not know his face, his character was so well 
 known, that he obtained it by the voices of all 
 the tribes. After that, he mounted still higher ; 
 and in every office which he bore behaved so 
 well, that he was always thought to deserve a 
 greater. Yet Marius, with all his merit, till 
 this time (for ambition afterwards hurried him 
 into strange excesses) had not dared to stand 
 for the consulship. For though the people at 
 that time conferred all the other offices, that of 
 consul the nobility engrossed to themselves: 
 every new man, however renowned or distin- 
 guished by his merit, was reckoned by them 
 unworthy of that supreme magistracy, and, as 
 it were, a profane person. 
 
 When Marius perceived that the answer 
 from the diviner was agreeable to his own in- 
 clinations, he petitioned Metellus for leave to 
 go to Rome to stand for the consulship. Me- 
 tellus, though he had a great deal of virtue and 
 honour, and other desirable qualities, yet pos- 
 sessed a haughty and disdainful spirit, the com- 
 mon failing of the nobility ; he was, therefore, 
 at first struck with so extraordinary a request, 
 expressed his great surprise at his designs, and 
 advised him, as in friendship, « not to entertain 
 such unreasonable views, nor suffer his mind 
 to be exalted above his station : it did not be- 
 come every man to aspire after every thing ; he 
 ought to be contented with his present condi- 
 tion ; in a word, he ought to take care not to 
 demand that of the Roman people which they 
 might justly refuse him." When, after these 
 and the like remonstrances, he still found 
 Marius steady to his purpose, he promised to 
 grant his request, as soon as the condition of 
 public affairs would allow him. After this, as 
 he still continued to urge his petition, Metellus 
 is reported to have told him ; " that he had no 
 need to be in such a hurry, for that it would be 
 time enough for him to stand for the consulship, 
 when his son was of age to join with him. 
 This youth was then about twenty years of age, 
 and serving under his father, but had no com- 
 mand. 
 
 This fired Marius with a more ardent desire 
 of obtaining the consulship, and highly in- 
 censed him against Metellus ; so that he blindly 
 followed the dictates of ambition and resent- 
 ment, the worst of counsellors. He did and 
 said every thing that could promote his views : 
 he gave greater liberty to the soldiers undei 
 his command in their winter quarters than 
 formerly ; he inveighed severely to our traders, 
 then in great numbers at Utica, against Metel- 
 lus's manner of conducting the war, and boast- 
 ed greatly of himself; " that were but half the 
 army under his command, he would in a few 
 days have Jugurtha in chains: that the consul 
 prolonged the war on purpose, being a vain 
 man, possessed of kingly pride, and fond of 
 command." All which was the' more readily 
 believed by those traders, as they had suffered 
 in their fortunes by the long continuance of the 
 war ; and to an impatient spirit, no measures 
 appear expeditious enough. 
 
 There was, besides, in our army a Numidian 
 named Cauda, the son of Manastabal, and 
 grandson of Masinissa, whom Micipsa had ap- 
 
48 
 
 THE wa: 
 
 pointed next heir to his immediate successors ; 
 one whose bodily disorders had impaired the 
 faculties of his mind. This man had applied 
 to Metellus for a seat next him, and afterwards 
 for a troop of Roman horse for his guard, and 
 was denied both: the seat, because it was con- 
 ferred on none but those whom the Roman 
 people distinguished with the title of kings ; 
 the troop, because it would be an affront to the 
 Roman horse to be body guards to a Numi- 
 dian. This double refusal filled his mind with 
 discontent, in the height of which Marius ac- 
 costed him, and prompted him to seek revenge 
 for the affronts put upon him by the general, 
 promising him his assistance. By soothing 
 speeches h« filled the imagination of the man, 
 whose faculties were weakened by diseases, 
 with a high conceit of his own dignity, extol- 
 ling him " as a prince, a person of great im- 
 portance, the grandson of Masiriissa ; one who 
 would forthwith get the kingdom of Numi- 
 dia, were Jugurtha once taken or slain, which 
 would presently happen, if he himself was 
 made consul, and had the management of the 
 war." 
 
 By these means, not only Gauda, but the 
 Roman knights, soldiers, and traders, were all 
 engaged, some by Marius, most of them by 
 their hopes of a speedy peace, to write to their 
 friends at Rome concerning the war, with se- 
 vere invectives against Metellus, and to desire 
 Marius might be made general. Thus the con- 
 sulship was solicited for him by great numbers 
 of men, in a manner highly honourable to 
 him. The people, too, at this juncture having 
 given a deep wound to the power of the no- 
 bility by the Mamilian law, were proceed- 
 ing to raise plebeians to the chief magis- 
 tracies ; so that every thing favoured the views 
 of Marius. 
 
 Jugurtha, in the meantime, having dropped 
 his purpose of surrendering, and begun the war 
 afresh, made preparations for it with the utmost 
 diligence and despatch. He raised an army ; 
 endeavoured by threats or promises, to recover 
 the cities which had revolted from him ; forti- 
 fied what places he still held ; made or bought 
 arms and warlike stores, in the room of those 
 which he had parted with in hopes of peace ; 
 solicited the Roman slaves to join him ; tempted 
 those who were in the garrisons with his money ; 
 in a word, he left nothing unattempted ; raised 
 commotions every where, and pushed every 
 possible measure. In consequence of these ef- 
 
 forts, the principal inhabitimts of Vacca, whero 
 Metellus had placed a garrison upon the first 
 proposals made by Jugurtha for a peace, being 
 wearied out with the king's importunities, and 
 indeed not alienated from him in their affec- 
 tions, entered into a conspiracy for betraying 
 the city. For the populace were, v\'hat they 
 generally are qfery where, more especially in 
 Numidia, inconstant, seditious, fond of distur- 
 bances and innovations, and enemies to tran- 
 quillity and repose. Having concerted their 
 scheme, they pitched upon the third day fol- 
 lowing for the execution of it; because that 
 being a festival, to be celebrated throughout 
 all Africa, was thought a more proper season' 
 to inspire mirth and jollity, than fear and dis-" 
 trust. When the day came, the conspirators 
 invited the centurions, the military tribunes, 
 and T. Turpilius Silanus, governor of the city, 
 to their several houses, and butchered them all 
 amidst the feast, except Turpilius; after which 
 they fell upon the soldiers, who, as it was a day 
 of rejoicing, were dispersed over the town, 
 without their arms, and under no command. 
 The populace joined them, part of them being 
 instructed beforehand by the nobility, and 
 others pushed on by their passion for such pro- 
 ceedings, being highly pleased with the com- 
 motion and the novelty of the thing, though 
 they neither knew what was transacting, nor 
 the reason of it. 
 
 The Roman soldiers, struck with this sud- 
 den alarm, and not knowing whence it arose, 
 nor what course to take, fled in great confusion 
 to the castle, where their standards and shields 
 lay ; but found it shut and guarded by the ene- 
 my. 'J^he city gates too were shut, to prevent 
 their escape ; and to heighten their calamity, 
 the women and children with great fury poured 
 down upon them, from the tops of the houses, 
 stones and whatever else came to their hands. 
 Being thus beset with danger in various shapes, ' 
 without being able to guard against it, and the 
 bravest men incapable of resisting the weakest 
 hands; the worthless and the worthy, the daring 
 and the cowardly, perished all alike unrevenged. 
 During so direfiul a massacre, whilst the Nu- 
 midians exercised the utmost rage and cruelty, 
 and the city was shut on all sides, Turpilius 
 the governor escaped unhurt, the only Italian 
 who did so : but whether this was owing to 
 the kindness of his host, to private compact; 
 or chance, does not clearly appear ; whicf. 
 way so ever it was, he must be considered £0 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 49 
 
 worthless and infamous wretch, since in so 
 great a calamity to the state, he preferred an 
 inglorious life to unsullied honour. 
 
 Metellus, when he heard of what had passed 
 at Vacca, was so deeply afflicted, that he did 
 not appear in public for some time ; but indig- 
 nation mixing with his grief, he made all pos- 
 sible haste to revenge the injur}'. Accordingly 
 he drew out the legion which wintered with 
 him, with as many light Numidian horse as he 
 could get together, and marching about sun- 
 set at the head of this detachment, he arrived 
 next morning, about the third hour, in a cer- 
 tain place enclosed on all sides with small emi- 
 nences. There, the soldiers being fatigued 
 with the length of their march, and refusing to 
 
 / obey any further orders, he informed them that 
 the town of \'"acca was not above a mile off; 
 and that it became them patiently to endure 
 the small remaining fatigue, since it was to 
 
 , take vengeance for the death of their fellow- 
 citizens, the bravest of men, and miserably mas- 
 sacred. He likewise generously offered them 
 the whole plunder ; and having thus roused 
 their courage, he placed the cavalry in the 
 front, ordering them to extend themselves as 
 wide as possible, and the foot to march in close 
 array, concealing their standards. 
 
 The inhabitants of Vacca observing an army 
 march towards them, judged rightly at first, 
 that it was Metellus, and accordingly shut 
 their gates ; but when they saw that the lands 
 were not ravaged, and that those in the front 
 were Numidian horse, they next imagined it 
 was Jugurtha, and went out with great joy to 
 meet him. Our horse and foot, upon a sudden 
 signal given, immediately fell upon them ; some 
 cut off the rabble that poured out of the city in 
 great numbers ; others hastened to secure the 
 gates ; and part seized upon the towers : their 
 thirst of vengeance, and hopes of plunder, 
 making them forget their weariness. Thus 
 the people of Vacca triumphed only for two 
 days in their treachery ; and their city, which 
 was great and opulent, was delivered up wholly 
 to the fury of our soldiers, eager for vengeance 
 and rapine. Turpilius, the governor of the city, 
 who, as we have already related, was the only 
 one that made his escape, was summoned be- 
 fore Metellus, to answer for his conduct; but. 
 not clearing himself, he was condemned, sen- 
 tenced to be scourged, and ; hen put to death ; 
 a punishment inflicted upoi: him as a native of 
 Latium. 
 
 About this time, Bomilcar, at whose insti- 
 gation Jugurtha had offered to surrender, 
 though he was prevented by fear from doing it, 
 was very desirous of bringing about a revolu- 
 tion, for the king and he were filled with distrust 
 of each other. Accordingly he was contriving 
 plots for Jugurtha's destruction both day and 
 night ; and, after revolving a variety of schemes 
 in his mind, he took Nabdalsa for his associate, 
 a nobleman of great riches and highly beloved 
 by his countrymen, who used to command an 
 army apart from the king, and manage all such 
 affairs as Jugurtha, when fatigued with others, 
 or engaged in those of greater moment, could 
 not despatch himself; by which means he ac- 
 quired great glory and wealth. 
 
 A day was agreed upon by those two for the 
 execution of the plot, and all other measures 
 were left to be regulated as occasion should rc- 
 qiTire : upon which Nabdalsa went to the army, 
 which, agreeably to the king's orders, he kept 
 in the neighbourhood of our winter quarters, in 
 order to prevent the ravaging the country with 
 impunity. But being afterwards struck with 
 the enormity of the enterprise, and prevented 
 by fear from coming at the time appointed, 
 Bomilcar, who was impatient to accomplish his 
 design, and greatly concerned lest his associate 
 should depart from his late engagements, and 
 consult his own safety by a discovery, sent a 
 letter to him by such as he could confide in, 
 wherein he upbraided him with effeminacy and 
 want of spirit ; called the gods, by whom he 
 had sworn, to witness ; and warned him, " not 
 to turn the rewards offered by Metellus to his 
 own destruction ; Jugurtha's ruin was at hand ; 
 the only thing to be considered was whether it 
 was to be effected by their bravery or that of 
 Metellus; he ought therefore to think with 
 himself which he would make choice of, a great 
 recompense, or a cruel death." 
 
 It happened, that Nabdalsa received this let- 
 ter at a time when, being much fatigued after 
 a great deal of exercise, he was reposing him- 
 self on his bed : upon reading it, he was at first 
 filled with great. anxiety ; then, as is usual to 
 minds burdened with cares, sleep seized him. 
 He had in his service a certain Numidian of 
 approved fidelity, who was highly in favour, and 
 acquainted with all his designs except this last : 
 this man, when he heard that a letter was 
 brought, supposing that there would be occa- 
 sion, as usual, for his service or counsel, went 
 into his master's tent, and finding him asleep, 
 
50 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 took the letter, which lay neghgently behind his 
 head on the pillow, and read it ; and having 
 discovered the plot, went with all possible haste 
 to the king. Nabdalsa, who waked soon after, 
 missing his letter, and being informed by de- 
 serters of all that had passefd, endeavoured at 
 first to have his accuser intercepted ; but fail- 
 ing in that, he went directly to the king, to 
 try to appease him. He affirmed that he was 
 prevented from making the discovery himself, 
 by the treachery of his servant ; and with tears 
 in his eyes conjured him, " by their mutual 
 friendship, by his faithful past services, not to 
 suspect him of so foul a crime." To this the 
 king returned a gracious answer, very different 
 from what he thought ; and putting Bomilcar 
 to death, with others whom he knew to be ac- 
 complices in the plot, he suppressed his resent- 
 ment, lest, by making any more sacrifices to his 
 vengeance, he should occasion an insurrection. 
 
 From this time Jugurtha enjoyed no tran- 
 quillity of mind day or night ; judged himself 
 insecure in every place, with every person, and 
 upon every occasion ; equally distrusted his sub- 
 jects and his enemies ; was constantly upon his 
 guard ; affrighted at every noise ; passed his 
 nights one while here, another there, often in 
 places very unsuitable to royal dignity ; some- 
 times started out of his sleep in the dead of 
 night, and snatching his arms, raised an alarm. 
 Thus did his fears, like a phrenzy, continually 
 tear and transport him. 
 
 Metellus, v?hen he received intelligence by 
 deserters of the fate of Bomilcar and the dis- 
 covery of the plot, made preparations afresh 
 with the utmost vigour, as if the war had been 
 but just beginning. And as Marius was con- 
 stantly importuning him for leave to be gone, 
 he now dismissed him, thinking it improper to 
 trust him, as he served with reluctance, and 
 bore him personal enmity. At Rome too, the 
 populace, when they learned the contents of 
 the letters which were sent from Africa con- 
 cerning Metellus and Marius, were well 
 pleased with the accounts of both. The high 
 quality of the general, which had hitherto been 
 a motive for honnuring him, exposed him now 
 to the odium of the people ; whilst the obscu- 
 rity of his lieutenant's birth recommended him 
 to their favour: but still the diffeient parties 
 were more influenced by their partiality, than 
 the good or bad qualities of either. Besides, 
 the factious magistrates inflamed the multitude, 
 by charging Metellus with capital crimes, in all 
 
 their harangues.and highjy . /elebrating the merit 
 of Marius. At length the people were so fired, 
 that the mechanics and boors, whose whole sub- 
 stance and credit were derived from their daily 
 labour, quilting their several employments, 
 crowded from all quarters to attend upon Ma- 
 rius ; and were more concerned for his advance- 
 ment, than for procuring the necessaries of life 
 to themselves. The nobility being thus depress- 
 ed, the consulship was bestowed upon a new 
 man, which had not happened for many years 
 before. After this, when the people were asked 
 by Manlius Mantinus, tribune of the people, to 
 whom they would commit the management of 
 the war against Jugurtha, they in a full assembly 
 assigned it to Marius, which rendered abortive 
 the decree of the senate, that a little before had 
 decreed Numidia to Metellus. 
 
 In the meantime Jugurtha, finding himself 
 bereft of his confidants, most of whom indeed 
 had been put to death by him, and the rest ap- 
 prehending the like fate had fled, some to the 
 Romans, others to king Bocchus, was agitated 
 with great perplexity of mind, and knew not 
 what to do. He saw it was impossible to carry 
 on the war without ministers, and thought it 
 dangerous to risk the fidelity of new ones, after 
 having met with so much treachery in the old : 
 no scheme, no advice, no person could please 
 him ; he shifted his marches, and changed his 
 officers every da>' ; one while he moved towards 
 the enemy, another towards the deserts ; often- 
 times he placed all his security in flight, present- 
 ly after in arms ; nor could he determine whether 
 the fidelity or courage of his subjects was least 
 to be confided in : thus, which way soever he 
 turned his thoughts, he found nothing but 
 vexation and discouragement. 
 
 During this irresolution, Metellus on a sud- 
 den appeared with his army. Jugurtha im- 
 proved what little time he had to draw up his 
 men in order of battle ; after which the combat 
 began, and which was maintained for some 
 time where the king fought in person, but the 
 rest of the army was routed and put to flight 
 upon the first encounter. The Romans took 
 all their standards and arms, with a small num- 
 ber of prisoners. The swiftness of the Numi- 
 dians, indeed, in all their engagements with the 
 Romans, was more serviceable to them than 
 their arms. 
 
 After this defeat, Jugurtha, having less 
 hopes of success than ever, retired with some 
 deserters and part of his cavahy to the desert* 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 51 
 
 and from thence to Thala, a great and wealthy 
 town, where his treasure was chiefly kept, and 
 his children educated in a very princely man- 
 ner. When Rletellus was informed of this, 
 though he knew that between the adjoining 
 river and the city he had to march through 
 a wilderness of fifty miles' extent, yet, hoping 
 to put an end to the war by the reduction 
 of that city, he determined to bid defiance to 
 all difficulties, and attempted even to triumph 
 over nature herself He therefore gave orders 
 that the usual burdens should be taken from the 
 beasts of carriage, and that they should be laden 
 " only with corn for ten days, together with 
 leathern bottles, and other utensils proper for 
 , carrying of water. Besides, he got together 
 all the beasts of burden he could find in the 
 neighbouring country, and loaded them with 
 vessels of every kind, but mostly of wood, pro- 
 cured from the cottages of the Numidians. He 
 moreover commanded the natives of the neigh- 
 bourhood, who had surrendered themselves to 
 him after the defeat of the king, to furnish 
 themselves with as much water as they could 
 carry, and bring it to a certain place, which he 
 appointed, fixing the time for doing it. For a 
 supply to himself, he loaded his beasts from the 
 river, which, as we have already related, was 
 the nighest water to the town : and thus pro- 
 vided he advanced towards Thala. 
 
 When he was arrived at the place where he 
 had ordered the Numidians to meet hira, and 
 had pitched and fortified his camp, such a flood 
 of rain is said to have fallen as would alone 
 have been more than sufficient for the whole 
 armyT* Provisions, too, were brought him in 
 greater plenty than he expected; for the Nu- 
 nndians, as is usual with those who have sub- 
 mitted to new masters, had even brought more 
 than was demanded of them. The soldiers, 
 from a principle of superstition, chose chiefly 
 the water which fell from the heavens ; for 
 they imagined they were the objects of the par- 
 ticular care of the immortal gods, and this 
 greatly heightened their courage. The next 
 day, contrary to Jugurtha's expectation, they 
 arrived before Thala. The inhabitants, who 
 imagined themselves sufficiently secured by 
 their situation, were struck with astonishment 
 at so strange an event; but nevertheless made 
 vigorous preparations for defending themselves, 
 as did our men for attacking them. 
 
 The king, thinking now that nothing was 
 too hard for Metellus, who had by his vigour 
 37 
 
 triumphed over arms, places, seasons, nay, 
 even over nature herself, which forces every 
 thing else to submit to her, fled out of the town 
 in the night-time, with his children and great 
 part of his treasure. Nor did he ever after 
 tarry above a day or night in one place ; pre- 
 tending that it was business which thus hurried 
 him, though in reality he was apprehensive of 
 treasonable practices, which he hoped to pre- 
 vent by his expedition ; being persuaded that 
 such designs were only formed by leisure and 
 opportunity. 
 
 Metellus, finding that the inhabitants were 
 determined to fight in their own defence, and 
 that the city was strong both by art and nature, 
 surrounded it with a trench and rampart ; then 
 ordered his men to roll the moving machines 
 to all convenient places, to raise mounds upon 
 them, and towers upon the mounds, in order 
 to defend the work and those who conducted 
 it. The besieged did not fail to make other 
 preparations against these, and acted with great 
 spirit and vigour ; nothing indeed was left un- 
 attempted on either side. The Romans at 
 length, spent with much toil and many sharps 
 conflicts, made themselves masters of the bare- 
 city, after a forty days' siege; the whole spoil 
 being destroyed by the deserters. For they, as 
 soon as they found the walls .='' ..«.en by the 
 battering rams, and their ow.. case desperate,- 
 carried away the gold and silver, with whatever 
 else was esteemed valuable, to the royal pa- 
 lace ; and there, after glutting themselves with 
 wine and feasting, they committed ail to the 
 flames, the wealth, the palace, and their own 
 lives ; inflicting voluntarily upon themselves- 
 the severest punishment they could have ap- 
 prehended from the enemy, had they fallen into 
 their hands. 
 
 Just when Thala was taken, deputies came 
 to Metellus from Leptis, to beg of him that he 
 would send them a garrison and a governor ; 
 for that one Hamilcar, a factious nobleman, 
 whom neither the power of the magistrates nor 
 the authority of the laws was able to restrain, 
 was labouring to bring about a revolution ; and 
 that unless he sent them present assistance, 
 they, the allies of Rome, would be in the ut- 
 most danger. The people of Leptis had in- 
 deed, at the beginning of the war with Jugurtha, 
 sent first to the consul Bestia, and afterwards 
 to Rome, desiring to be admitted to friendship 
 and alliance with us. From that time, their 
 request being granted, they continued our good 
 31 
 
52 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 and Aiithful allies, and readily complied with 
 all the orders they received from Beslia, Al- 
 binus, and Metellus. Wherefore they easily 
 obtained from the general what they requested 
 of him. Four cohorts of Ligurians were sent 
 thither, and C. Annius as governor. 
 
 The city of Leptis was founded by the Si- 
 donians, who, we are told, quitted their country 
 on account of their civil broils, and came by sea 
 into those parts : it is situated between the two 
 S3rrtes, places so called from their quality. 
 'J'hey are two bays almost in the extremity of 
 Africa, of unequal bigness, but naturally alike ; 
 near the shores of which the sea is very deep ; 
 elsewhere it is sometimes deep, sometimes shal- 
 low, just as the wind happens to blow. For 
 when the sea begins to swell, and to be agitated 
 by the winds, the waves roll along with them 
 slime, sand, and stones of a prodigious size ; so 
 that as the wind shifts, the bed of the waters 
 changes ; and from this quality of dragging 
 their channel they derive their name of Syrtes. 
 
 The inhabitants of this city have by their in- 
 termarriages with the Numidians changed their 
 native language, but still retained the greatest 
 part of the laws and customs of the Sidonians, 
 which they have done the more easily, because 
 of their being at so great a distance from the 
 Numidian court : for between them and such 
 parts of Numidia as are well peopled are vast 
 deserts. 
 
 Now that the affairs of Leptis have led me to 
 discourse of this country, it seems not improper 
 to give an account of a famed and surprising 
 adventure of two Carthaginians : — the place 
 puts me in mind of it. 
 
 "Whilst the Carthaginians were masters of 
 the greatest part of Africa, the Cyrenians too 
 were a powerful and wealthy people. Between 
 them there lay a vast sandy plain, altogether 
 uniform, without river or mountain to ascertain 
 the boundaries of their several territories ; 
 which proved the occasion of long and bloody 
 wars. After their fleets and armies had been 
 often routed and put to flight on both 
 sides, and they had considerably weakened one 
 another, apprehending lest some common ene- 
 my should fall upon the conquerors or conquer- 
 «d, both equally exhausted, they came first to a 
 cessation of arms, then to an agreement, that 
 each city should send out deputies at a stated 
 time, and that the place where they met should 
 be the common boundary of their dominions. 
 Two brothers having the same name, that of 
 
 Philcenus, were sent from Carthage, and tra- 
 velled with great expedition. The Cyrenians 
 advanced more slowly, whether from laziness 
 or chance I have not been able to learn. This 
 much is certain, that those parts are sometimes 
 impassable, being equally liable to be agitated 
 with tempests as the sea itself. For when the 
 wind blows hard in these vast and naked plains, 
 the sand being hurled from the earth, and 
 driven with a mighty force, fills the mouths and 
 eyes of travellers ; and thus depriving them of 
 their sight, hinders them from proceeding. The 
 Cyrenians, finding themselves surpassed in ex- 
 pedition, and apprehending a severe punish- 
 ment at home, fur having occasioned so great 
 a loss to their country, charged the Carthagi- 
 nians with setting out before the limited time, 
 made a mighty bustle, and declared they would 
 do any thing rather than yield. JXow when 
 the Carthaginians desired any other method of 
 deciding the matter that was but fair, the Cy- 
 renians gave them their choice, " either of being 
 buried alive in that place, where they were for 
 fixing the boundary of their dominions, or of 
 suflering them to proceed as far as they thought 
 proper upon the same terms." The Philaeni, 
 accepting the condition, sacrified their persons 
 and lives to the good of their country, and were 
 buried alive in that very spot. There the Car- 
 thaginians erected altars sacred to them, and 
 instituted other solemnities in Carthage itself, 
 to immortalize their fame. 1 now return to my 
 subject. 
 
 Jugurtha, after the loss of Thala, thinking 
 nothing a sufficient security against Metellus, 
 fled with a few attendants through vast deserts, 
 into the country of the Getulians, a brutal un- 
 polished race, and then unacquainted Viith the 
 Roman name. Of these he got together a 
 great number, and accustomed them by degrees 
 to move in ranks, to follow their standards, to 
 obey orders, and to perform all military exer- 
 cises. Moreover, by great presents and greater 
 promises, he gained over to his interest the 
 greatest favourites of king Bocchus; and, ap- 
 plying to the king by their means, prevailed 
 upon him to undertake a war against the Ro- 
 m.ans. This was the more easily effected, be- 
 cause Bocchus was filled with resentment 
 against the Romans, for having refused to ad- 
 mit him into their friendship and alliance, which 
 he had sent ambassadors to Rome to desire in 
 the beginning of our war with Jugurtha ; an 
 alliance, extremely advantageous on such an 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 53 
 
 occasion, but obstructed by a few noblemen, 
 who, blinded with avarice, made it their cus- 
 tom to turn every thing into sale, whether 
 honourable or infamous. Besides, Bocchus 
 had, some time before, married a daughter of 
 Jugurtha ; though such an alliance is little re- 
 garded among the Numidians and Moors; for 
 all have a plurality of wives, some ten, others 
 more, according to their abilities to maintain 
 them ; and their kings consequently more than 
 any. Amidst such a variety of women, the 
 heart of man is distracted ; so that none of 
 them are looked upon as his companion, but 
 all equally treated with contempt. 
 
 Accordingly the kings met with their armies 
 at a place agreed on by both, where, after 
 pledging their faith to one another, Jugurtha 
 set himself to inflame the spirit of Bocchus, by 
 representing to him " that the Romans were 
 oppressive, insatiably covetous, and the com- 
 mon enemies of mankind ; that they had the 
 same cause for making war upon Bocchus as 
 upon himself, and so many other nations, name- 
 ly, their lust of dominion, which made them look 
 upon all independent states as their enemies; 
 that at present they pursued him as an enemy, 
 as they had, a little before, king Perses and the 
 Carthaginians; and that, for the future, what- 
 ever prince appeared considerable for his power, 
 would be treated by them as an enemy." 
 
 After having said this and much more to 
 the same purpose, they resolved upon marching 
 to Cirta, because Metellus had there lodged 
 his booty, prisoners, and baggage ; whence Ju- 
 gurtha thought that he should find his account 
 abundantly, either in taking the city, or en- 
 gaging the Romans if they came to its relief. 
 Such was the subtlety of the Numidian, who, 
 by this impatience for action, wanted only 
 to prevent Bocchus from entertaining any 
 thoughts of peace ; lest, by delays, hs might 
 choose something very different from war. 
 
 Metellus, when he received intelligence of 
 the confederacy of the kings, was more circum- 
 spect than when he had only to do with Ju- 
 gurtha, whom he had so often defeated. He 
 was not forward, as formerly, to engage the 
 enemy upon all occasions, but, fortifying his 
 camp, waited for the kings not far from Cirta ; 
 thinking it better, as the Moors were a new 
 enemy, not to fight till he was acquainted with 
 their cliaracter, that so he might do it with the 
 more advantage. In the meantime he was in- 
 formed from Rome that the province of Nu- 
 
 midia was assigned to Marius, for of his being 
 advanced to the consulship he had heard be- 
 fore. This news mortified him extremely, 
 and transported him beyond all the rules of 
 decency or dignity ; insomuch that he could 
 neither refrain from tears, nor moderate his 
 tongue. For, though he was a man otherwise 
 eminently distinguished for every noble quality, 
 he wanted strength of mind to hear up under 
 vexation and grief. Some imputed this weak- 
 ness to pride; others, to a worthy spirit pro- 
 voked by bad usage : many to a deep concern, 
 that the victory, already gained, should be 
 snatched out of his hands. As forme, I have 
 the greatest reason to believe that the advance- 
 ment of Marius gave him more uneasiness than 
 his ovs'n wrongs, and that he would have quit- 
 ted his province with less regret, if it had been 
 bestowed upon any other than Marius. 
 
 Not concerning himself therefore any further 
 in the war through indignation, and thinking 
 it folly to take care of the interest of another at 
 his own hazard, he despatched deputies to king 
 Bocchus, to admonish him, " not to become an ' 
 enemy to the Roman people without any pro- 
 vocation : that he had now a fine opportunity 
 of entering into friendship and alliance with 
 them, which ought greatly to be preferred by 
 him to war. What confidence soever he placed 
 in his own strength, that still he ought not to 
 exchange certainties for uncertainties; that it 
 was an easy matter to begin a war, but extremely 
 difficult to conclude it: that it was not in the 
 l^ower of the same person to undertake and to 
 terminate it : that the conqueror could only drop 
 it, though even a coward might stir it up : that 
 he should therefore consult his own interest 
 and that of his kingdom, and not blend his 
 own flourishing circumstances with the des- 
 perate fortune of Jugurtha." To this tbe king 
 replied courteously, "that he too desired peace, 
 but pitied Jugurtha ; if he were to be included 
 in it, they should soon agree." Again the Ro- 
 man general sent deputies with an ansvi'er to 
 the demands of Bocchus, who was satisfied v^'itli 
 some particulars, and rejected others. Thus, 
 by sending and returning deputies, the time was 
 spun out, and the war protracted, agreeably to 
 Metellus's desire, without any hostilities, 
 
 Marius, who had been created consul by 
 the people with all the proofs of the warmest 
 zeal for his interest, as we have above related, 
 when he was likewise made governor of Nu 
 midia by them, behaved towards the nobility 
 
64 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 against whom he was before h' ghly exaspe- 
 rated, with more fur_y and insolence than ever; 
 sometimes heinsuhed particular persons, some- 
 times the whole body. He was continually 
 boasting that he had wrested the consulship 
 from them like spoils from a vanquished ene- 
 my, with many things of the like nature, all 
 to extol himself, and mortify them. In the 
 meanume, his principal care was to provide 
 every thing necessary for the war ; he demand- 
 ed recruits for the legions ; and sent for auxil- 
 iaries from foreign states, kings, and allies. 
 He, moreover, summoned from Latium all the 
 bravest men, most of whom he himself knew 
 by their having served with him, so that there 
 were but few whose characters he had learned 
 from common fame ; and even, by the force of 
 persuasion, prevailed upon the discharged ve- 
 terans to go along with him. Nor durst the 
 senate, though his avowed enemies, deny him 
 any thing, nay they even cheerfully decreed 
 him recruits ; because they imagined the popu- 
 lace would be averse to enlist, and so Marius 
 would either not be able to pursue the war, or 
 lose the affections of the people. But herein 
 they were disappointed ; so eager a desire of 
 going with Marius had seized most of them. 
 Every man flattered himself to return crowned 
 with victory, and enriched with spoil, with the 
 like pleasing thoughts. Marius indeed had, 
 oy a speech of his, not a little contributed to 
 raise their expectations ; for, after all he desired 
 had been granted him, resolving to raise 
 recruits, he called an assembly of the people, 
 both to encourage them to follow him, and to 
 inveigh against the nobility, as he was wont : 
 he then harangued them in the following man- 
 ner : — 
 
 «' 1 know, Romans, that most of those who 
 apply to you for preferment in the state, assume 
 a different conduct from what they observe af- 
 ter they have obtained it. When they are 
 candidates, they are active, condescending, and 
 modest ; when magistrates, haughty and indo- 
 lent ; but to me the contrary conduct appears 
 reasonable. For in proportion as the good of 
 the state is of more importance than the con- 
 sulship or ])r8etorship, the greater care and 
 attention is -equisite to govern the common- 
 wealth, than to court its dignities. I am very 
 sensible wha an arduous task is imposed upon 
 me by your generous choice of me ; to make 
 preparations for the war, and yet to be sparing 
 of the treasury , to oblige those to serve, whom 
 
 you would not willingly ofTend ; to attefid to 
 every thing both at home and abroad ; and to 
 perform all this amidst a confederacy of envi- 
 ous men, eternally obstructing your measures, 
 and caballing against you, is, Romans, a 
 more difficult undertaking than can easily be 
 imagined. Moreover, if others fail in the dis- 
 charge of their duty, the ancient lustre of 
 their family, the heroic actions of their ances- 
 tors, the credit of their kindred and friends, 
 and their numerous dependants, afford them 
 protection. As for me, I have no hopes but in 
 myself; my firmness and integrity alone must 
 protect me, every other support would be of 
 little avail. I am well aware too, Romans, 
 that the eyes of all are upon me ; that all hon- 
 est, all candid men, pleased with my successful 
 endeavours to serve the state, wish well to 
 me ; but that the nobility watch for an oppor- 
 tunity to ruin me. Whence I must labour the 
 more strenuously that you be not ensnared by 
 them ; and that they be disappointed. From 
 my childhood to the present time, my manner 
 of life has been such, that toils and dangers 
 are now habitual to me. The course I pur- 
 sued, Romans, merely from a disinterested prin- 
 ciple, before you conferred any favours upon 
 me, I shall be far from discontinuing now you 
 have bestowed so noble a recompense. Those 
 who put on the deceitful guise and semblance 
 of virtue, to obtain power, must, when pos- 
 sessed of it, find it difficult to act with modera- 
 tion ; but to me, whose whole life has been an 
 uninterrupted series of laudable pursuits, vir- 
 tue, through the force of habit, is become na- 
 tural. 
 
 " You have ordained that I should have the 
 management of the war against Jugurtha ; an 
 ordinance highly displeasing to the nobility. 
 Now, pray consider with yourselves, whether 
 you had not better alter your choice, and em- 
 ploy upon this, or any other like occasion, one 
 of the tribe of the nobility, a man of an ancient 
 family, surrounded with the images of his an- 
 cestors, and who has never been in the ser- 
 vice : see how, upon such an important occa- 
 sion, he will hurry and be confounded, and, 
 ignorant of the whole of his duty, apply to 
 some plebeian to instruct him in it. And thus 
 it commonly happens, that he, whom you 
 have appointed your general, is obliged to find 
 another from whom to receive his orders. I 
 myself, Romans, know some who, after they 
 were made consuls, began to read the history 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 55 
 
 of our ancestors, and the military precepts of 
 the Greeks. Preposterous method ! For though, 
 in the order of time, the election to offices pre- 
 cedes the exercise of men, yet. in the order of 
 things, qualifications and experience should 
 precede election, 
 
 " Compare me now, Romans, who am but a 
 new man, with these haughty nobles. What 
 they only read or heard of, I have seen performed, 
 or performed myself: what they have gathered 
 from books, I have learned in the service. Now 
 do you yourselves judge, whether practice or 
 speculation are of greatest value. They de. 
 spise me for the meanness of my descent ; I 
 them, for their indolence: I am upbraided with 
 my fortune, they with their crimes. I am of 
 opinion that nature is always the same, and 
 common to all ; and that those who have most 
 virtue, have most nobility. Suppose it were 
 possible to put the question to the fathers of Al- 
 binus or Bestia, whether they would rather 
 have chosen me for their descendent, or them 1 
 What answer do you think they would make, 
 but that they should have desired to have had 
 the most deserving men for their sons 1 but if 
 they have reason to despise me, they have the 
 same to despise their ancestors, whose nobility, 
 like mine, took its rise from their military vir- 
 tue. They envy my advancement, let them 
 likewise envy my toils, my integrity, my dan- 
 gers ; for by these I gained it. These men, in 
 truth, blinded with pride, live in such manner as 
 if they slighted the honours you have to bestow, 
 and yet sue for them as if they had deserved 
 them. Deluded men ! to aspire at once after 
 two things so opposite in their natures ; the 
 enjoyment of the pleasures of eflfeminacy, and 
 the fruits of a laborious virtue. When they 
 harangue too before you, or in the senate, they 
 employ the greatest part of their eloquence in 
 celebrating their ancestors, and vainly imagine 
 that their exploits reflect a lustre on themselves : 
 whereas it is quite the reverse ; for the more 
 illustrious their lives were, the more scandalous 
 is the spiritless and unmanly behaviour of these 
 their descendents. The truth of the matter is 
 plainly this ; the glory acquired by ancestors, is 
 like a light diffused over the actions of their 
 posterity, which neither suffers their good nor 
 bad qualities to be concealed. This light, Ro 
 mans, is what I want ; but, what is much more 
 noble, I can relate my own achievements, 
 
 " See only how unreasonable they are ! What 
 
 they arrogantly claim to themselves for the ex- 
 
 37* 
 
 ploits of others, that they deny me for my own : 
 and what reason do they give for it 1 why truly 
 this, because I have no images of my ancestors 
 to show, and my nobility is no older than my- 
 self, which certainly it is more honourable for 
 one to acquire himself, than to debase that 
 which he derives from his ancestors. 
 
 " I am very sensible, that if they had a mind 
 to reply to what I now advance, they would do 
 it with great eloquence and accuracy. Yet, as 
 they have given a loose to their calumniating 
 tongues upon every occasion, not only against 
 me, but likewise against you, ever since you 
 have conferred this dignity upon me, I was re- 
 solved to speak, lest some should impute my 
 silence to a consciousness of my own guilt. 
 
 " Though I am abundantly satisfied, that no 
 speech whatever can hurt me; since, if what 
 is said be true it must be to my honour ; if false, 
 my life and conduct will confute it : but because 
 your determination is blamed, in bestowing 
 upon me the highest dignity of the state, and 
 trusting me with the conduct of affairs of such 
 importance ; consider again and again, whether 
 you had not better alter your choice. I cannot, 
 indeed, boast of the images, triumphs, or con- 
 sulships of my ancestors, to raise your confi- 
 dence in me ; but, if it is necessary, I can show 
 you spears, standards, collars, and other military 
 presents in great plenty, besides scars of wounds 
 all received before, 'ihese are my statues ; 
 these the proofs of my nobility, not derived from 
 ancestors, as theirs are, but such as I have my- 
 self acquired by many toils and dangers. 
 
 " My language too is unpolished ; but that 
 gives me small concern : virtue shows itself 
 with sufficient clearness. They stand in need 
 of the artful colourings of eloquence, to hide 
 the infamy of their actions. Nor have I been 
 instructed in the Grecian literature : why truly 
 I had little inclination to that kind of instruc- 
 tion, which did not improve the authors of it in 
 the least degree of virtue. But I have learned 
 other things far more useful to the state : to 
 wound the enemy ; to watch ; to dread nothing 
 but infamy , equally to undergo cold and heat; 
 to lie upon the bare ground ; and endure at the 
 same time hunger and fatigue. These lessons 
 shall animate my troops ; nor shall I ever be 
 rigorous to them, and indulgent to myself; or 
 borrow my glory from their toils. This is the 
 manner of commanding that is useful to the 
 state ; this is what suits the equality of citizens. 
 For to treat the army with severity, whilst 
 
58 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 ybu indulge yourself in ease aid pleasure, is to 
 act the tyrant, not the general. By a conduct 
 hke this, your ancestors gained immortal 
 honour both to themselves and the republic ; 
 which cur nobility, though so unlike them in 
 their character, relying upon, despise us who 
 imitate them ; and demand of you all public 
 honours, not on account of their personal merit, 
 but as due to their high rank : arrogant men ! 
 but widely mistaken. Their ancestors left 
 them everything in their power to leave them ; 
 their wealth, their images, their high renown ; 
 but their virtue they did not leave them, nor 
 indeed could they ; for it can neither be given, 
 nor received as a gift. 
 
 " They call me an unpolished ill-bred fellow, 
 because I cannot entertain elegantly, have no 
 buffoon, and pay no higher wages to my cook 
 than to my steward ; every part of which 
 charge, Romans, I readily own. For I have 
 learned from my father and other venerable 
 persons, that delicacy belongs to women, la- 
 bour to men ; that a virtuous man ought to have 
 a larger share of glory than riches ; and that 
 arms are more ornamental than splendid fur- 
 niture. 
 
 " But let them still pursue what is so dear 
 and dehghtful to them; let them indulge in 
 wine and women ; let them spend their old age, 
 as they did their youth, in banqueting and the 
 lowest sensual gratifications ; let them leave 
 sweat and dust, and other such things, to us, 
 to whom they are more agreeable than the 
 most elegant entertainments. But even this 
 they will not do ; for after having debased 
 themselves by the practice of the foulest and 
 most infamous vices, these most detestable of 
 all men endeavour to deprive the brave of the 
 rewards that are due to them. Thus, by the 
 greatest injustice, luxury and idleness, the most 
 mischievous vices, are no ways prejudicial to 
 those who are guilty of them ; at the same time 
 that they threaten the innocent commonwealth 
 with ruin. 
 
 " Now since I have answered these men, 
 as far as my own character was concerned, 
 though not so fully as their infamous behaviour 
 deserved, I shall add a few words concerning 
 the state of public affairs. And first of all, 
 Romans, be of good courage as to Numidia ; 
 since you have now removed all that hitherto 
 secured Jugurtha, namely, the covetousness, 
 incapacity, and haughtiness of our command- 
 ers. There is an army there likewise, well 
 
 acquainted with the country, but indeed more 
 brave Aan fortunate ; for a great part of it has 
 been destroyed by the rapaciousness and rash- 
 ness of its commanders. Do you, therefore, 
 who are of age to bear arms, join your efforts 
 to mine, and assume the defence of the com- 
 monwealth ; nor let the fate of others, or the 
 haughtiness of the late commanders, discou- 
 rage any of you : when you march, when you 
 engage, I will always be with you, to direct 
 you how to act, and to share every danger with 
 you. In a word, I shall desire you to act no 
 otherwise in any instance, than as you see me 
 do. Moreover, all things are now ripe for 
 us, — victory, spoil, and glory ; and though they 
 were uncertain, or at a distance, it would still 
 be the duty of every good citizen to assist the 
 state. For no man ever became immortal by 
 inactivity ; nor did e-ver any father wish his 
 children might never die, but rather that they 
 might live like useful and worthy men. I 
 should add more to what I have already said, 
 if words could inspire cowards with bravery ; 
 for to the valiant I think I have said enough." 
 
 Marius, upon delivering the speech, finding 
 the minds of the people animated, ordered pro- 
 visions, money, and other necessaries for the 
 war, to be embarked with all expedition ; and 
 sent his lieutenant A. Manlius along with 
 them. In the meantime he himself was em- 
 ployed in levying troops, accepting all who 
 were inclined to go, without observing the an- 
 cientmethod of enrolling those of certain classes 
 only. The greatest part of them consisted of 
 such as were, upon account of their poverty, 
 exempted from bearing arms : which conduct 
 of his some imputed to the scarcity of better 
 men, others to a design of making his court to 
 the rabble, to whom he first owed his reputa- 
 tion, and then his advancement. Add to this, 
 that to one who aims at power, the most needy 
 are the properest assistants ; since they have 
 no property to be solicitous about, and think 
 every thing honourable that is gainful. Ma- 
 rius, setting sail for Africa, with a number of 
 troops somewhat greater than had been de- 
 creed him, in a few days arrived at Utica. 
 There the army was delivered up to him by P. 
 Rutilius, lieutenant-general to Metellus ; for 
 Metellus avoided the sight of Marius, that he 
 might not behold what he never could bear to 
 hear. 
 
 The consul, having completed his legions 
 and auxiliary cohorts, marched into a fertile 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 57 
 
 country, abounding in plunder: where, what- 
 ever he took, he bestowed upon the soldiers. 
 Then he assailed such fortresses and towns as 
 were not very strong by nature, nor well gar- 
 risoned ; and had frequent skirmishes in differ- 
 ent places. In the meantime the new-raised 
 soldiers learned to join in an encounter without 
 fear; they saw that such as fled were either 
 taken or slain ; that the bravest were the most 
 secure ; that by arms, our liberty, our country, 
 our parents, and every thing else were pro- 
 tected, and glory and riches acquired. Thus 
 in a short time the new men matched the ve- 
 terans, and the bravery of both became equal. 
 
 The two kings, as soon as they had notice of 
 the arrival of Marius, retired each into places 
 of difficult access. This was the contrivance of 
 Jugurtha, who by this means hoped that the 
 enemy would disperse, and so afford him an op- 
 portunity of falling upon them ; supposing that 
 the Romans would, like most others, becom-e 
 more remiss and licentious when their fears 
 were removed. 
 
 Metellus in the meantime, upon his re! urn to 
 Rome, was received, contrary to his expecta- 
 tions, with the greatest demonstrations of joy 
 and affection ; being equally dear to the com- 
 mons and senate, now that the popular odium 
 had subsided. As for Marius, he showed great 
 activity and prudence in observing the enemy's 
 measures and pursuing his own ; in consider- 
 ing what might tend to promote or obstruct 
 either.; informing himself of the separate 
 inarches of the two kings ; and preventing all 
 their machinations. He suffered no remissness 
 in his own army, nor rest nor security in those 
 of the kings ; insomuch that, having frequently 
 attacked both the Getulians and Jugurtha, as 
 they were carrying off the plunder of our al- 
 lies, he always routed them; and even forced 
 the king himself, not far from Cirta, to cast 
 away his arms and fly. But when he considered 
 that all this was only matter of empty show and 
 applause, without producing any thing decisive ; 
 he resolved to invest all the cities that by the 
 strength of their garrisons, or situation, gave the 
 enemy the greatest advantage against us; as 
 Jugurtha would thus be stripped of all his strong 
 holds, if he suffered them to be taken, or to be 
 brought to an engagement. For Bocchus had 
 frequently sent deputies to him, to signify his 
 desire of the Roman friendship, and that no 
 hostilities were to be apprehended from him. 
 But whether this was only pretence, that he 
 
 might fall upon us unawares with the greater 
 success ; or whether it proceeded from the in- 
 constancy of his temper, one while prompting 
 him to war, another to peace ; I have not been 
 able to discover. 
 
 The consul, in pursuance of his design, ad- 
 vanced against the strong towns and forts, some 
 of which he took by assault, and others he 
 gained over to him by threats or promises. At 
 first, indeed, he attempted only small towns, 
 thinking that Jugurtha, in order to protect his 
 subjects, v^ould come to a battle : but finding 
 that he kept at a distance, and was em.ployed 
 in other affairs, he thought it was time to enter 
 upon greater and more difficult enterprises. 
 
 There stood, in the midst of vast deserts, a 
 large and strong city called Capsa, said to have 
 been founded by the Libyan Hercules. The 
 citizens, by reason of the many immunities they 
 enjoyed under Jugurtha, v/ho exercised a gentle 
 government over them, were thought to be 
 faithfully devoted to him. They were secured 
 against their enemies not only by good fortifi- 
 cations, numbers of men and magazines of arms, 
 but much more by the difficulty of approaching 
 them: for the whole country round, except the 
 fields adjoining to the town, was barren and un- 
 cultivated, without water, and infested with ser- 
 pents, whose rage, like that of other wild beasts, 
 is heightened by famine, and who, though na- 
 turally mischievous, are still more so when they 
 are inflamed by thirst. Marius had an ardent 
 desirelo master this place, not only on account 
 of its importance for the purposes of war, but 
 because of the difficulty of the undertaking : as 
 an additional motive, too, Metellus had acquired 
 great glory by taking Thala, a town that much 
 resembled it in strength and situation, except 
 that at Thala there were several springs not 
 far from the town ; whereas the inhabitants of 
 Capsa had only one, and that within the city, 
 without any other supply of water but from the 
 heavens. This people, as well as the other in- 
 habitants of Africa who lived at a distance from 
 the sea, and in a rustic manner, the more easily 
 supported this scarcity of water, because the 
 Numidians live mostly upon milk and venison, 
 without the use of salt, or, indeed, any other 
 incentive to appetite : the sole purpose of eat- 
 ing and drinking among them is to satisfy the 
 necessary demands of nature, and not to gratify 
 luxury and intemperance. 
 
 The consul took all possible precautions in 
 this undertaking ; but relied, I am apt to think. 
 
58 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 upon the gods for success ; as human prudence 
 could not sufficiently provide against so great 
 difficulties. To his other discouragements was 
 added scarcity of corn, theNumidians applying 
 themselves more to grazing than tillage : be- 
 sides, what grain there was, had been carried 
 off, by the king's orders, into fortified places ; 
 and as it was the end of summer, the ground' 
 was parched and produced nothing. He acted, 
 however, considering his condition, with great 
 prudence and foresight. The cattle he had 
 taken some days before, he committed to the 
 auxiliary cavalry to conduct ; and ordered his 
 lieutenant A. Manlius to march with the light, 
 cohorts to the city Laris, where he had placed 
 his provisions and military chest ; telling him, 
 that he was going in pursuit of plunder, and 
 would join him in a few days. Thus conceal- 
 ing his design, he marched directly to the river 
 Tana. 
 
 In his march, he every day distributed cattle 
 among the companies of foot and troops of 
 horse in equal proportion, and took care to 
 have bottles made of their hides : thus he at 
 once made the want of corn less sensibly felt, 
 and provided such utensils as were soon to be- 
 come necessary, whilst all were ignorarft of his 
 intentions. After six days' march they arrived 
 at the river, and had already made a great 
 number of bottles. Having pitched his camp 
 there, and fortified it slightly, he ordered his 
 men to refresh themselves, that they might be 
 ready to march at sun-set ; and likewise to lay' 
 aside all their baggage, and load themselves 
 and their beasts of burden only with water. 
 At the time appointed he decamped, and march- 
 ing the whole night, encamped again in the 
 morning. The same he did the next night ; 
 and the third, long before dawn, he came to a 
 place full of small hills, about two miles from 
 Capsa, where he passed the remaining part of 
 the night, concealing his forces with the great- 
 est possible care. But as soon as day appear- 
 ed, and the Numidians, being under no appre- 
 hensions of an enemy, had many of them left 
 •the town, he instantly ordered all his horse, 
 with the nimblest of his foot, to fly to Capsa 
 and secure the gates. He himself followed 
 with great despatch, not sufl!ering any of his 
 men to stray for plunder. When the inhabi- 
 tants found this, the great consternation where- 
 with they were seized, the unexpected calamity 
 that befell them, and the consideration that 
 many of their fellow-citizens were without the 
 
 walls in the hands of the enemy, forced them 
 to surrender. Their city, however, was burnt ; ' 
 the youth put to the sword ; all the rest sold ;' 
 and the plunder given to the soldiers. This 
 severe course, contrary to the laws of war, was 
 not occasioned by the avarice or cruelty of the 
 consul ; but was taken, because the place was 
 very advantageous to Jugurtha, and of difficult 
 access to us ; the citizens, an inconstant per- 
 fidious race, not to be curbed by favours or ter- 
 rors. 
 
 After Marias had executed so bold an enter- 
 prise without any detriment to his men, his 
 name, which was indeed great and renowned 
 before, became now much more so. All his 
 actions, even those that were too forward, were 
 looked upon as the effects of superior abilities ; 
 the soldiers, being under a gentle command, 
 and withal enriched by him, extolled him to 
 the skies ; the Numidians dreaded him as more 
 than mortal : in short, both allies and enemies 
 believed he had either the spirit of a deity, or 
 that the gods assisted him in all things. 
 
 After this success, the consul advanced 
 against other towns ; in taking some of which 
 he met with opposition from the Numidians ; 
 but most of them were deserted by their inhabi- 
 tants, who dreaded the tragical fate of Capsa ; 
 and these he burned to the ground. Thus all 
 parts were filled with lamentations and slaugh- 
 ter. At last, having made himself master of 
 many places, and most of them without loss of 
 blood, he engaged in another enterprise, not 
 so hazardous as that of Capsa, but equally dif- 
 ficult. 
 
 Not far from the river of Mulucha, which 
 separated the kingdoms of Jugurtha and Boc- 
 chus, there stood, in the midst of a plain, a 
 small fort, upon a rock of considerable breadth 
 at top, and prodigiously high ; naturally as 
 steep on every side as art or labour could have 
 made it, except one part very strait. As the 
 king's treasure was kept in this place, Marius 
 exerted his utmost efforts to take it ; and suc- 
 ceeded more by chance than prudent manage- 
 ment : for the castle was abundantly provided 
 with men, arms, provisions, and a spring of wa- 
 ter; its situation rendered it impossible to make 
 use of mounds and turrets, and all the machi- 
 nery of a siege ; the way to it was very narrow, 
 with a precipice on each side ; the moving gal- 
 leries were pushed against it with great danger, 
 and to no purpose ; for when they advanced but 
 ever so little, they were destroyed by fire or 
 
A.GAINST JUG JRTHA. 
 
 59 
 
 great stones. The soldiers could neither stand 
 firmly to advance their works, for the steepness 
 of the rock ; nor make use of their batteries, 
 without exposing themselves to great danger. 
 The bravest of them were either slain or 
 wounded, and the rest greatly discouraged. 
 
 Now Marius having thus spent many toil- 
 some days, debated with himself, whether he 
 should abandon his enterprise, as it proved 
 unsuccessful, or wait the interposition of fortune, 
 which had been so often favourable to him. 
 Whilst he was under this sore perplexity for 
 several days and nights together, a Ligurian, 
 a common soldier of the auxiliary cohorts, 
 going out of the camp in search of water, hap- 
 pened to observe, not far from the side of the 
 castle opposite to that where the attack was 
 made, some snails crawling among the rocks ; 
 of which gathering one, then another, and still 
 climbing to procure more, he was got insensi- 
 bly almost to the top of the mountain : where, 
 perceiving every thing quiet, the natural de- 
 sire of seeing unknown objects prompted him 
 to proceed. It happened that there grew, in 
 that very place, a great oak out of the side of 
 the rock, which bending downward a little near 
 the root, then taking a turn, mounted upward, 
 as all trees naturally do. 
 
 The Ligurian, one while laying hold of the 
 branches of this tree, another of the prominen- 
 ces of the rock, got so high at last as to be able 
 to survey the whole plan of the castle, without 
 being disturbed by the Nuraidians, who were 
 all engaged on that side where the attack was 
 made. After he had carefully examined what- 
 ever he thought would be of use to him in the 
 execution of his design, he returned the same 
 way, not hastily, as he went up, but pausing 
 at every step, and observing every thing with 
 the utmost care. He then hastened to Marius, 
 informed him of what he had done, pressed him 
 to make an attempt upon the castle on that 
 side where he himself had mounted, and pro- 
 mised that he would lead the way, and be the 
 first to face the danger. Marius sent some of 
 those who attended him along with the Ligu- 
 rian to examine into the proposal ; who accord- 
 ing to their different judgments reported that 
 the undertaking was easy or difficult. The con- 
 sul, however, took courage upon it, and deter- 
 mined to make the attempt the next day ; ap- 
 pointing for that purpose a guard. of four centu- 
 rions with their companies, and five trumpeters, 
 the nimblest he could find, ordering them all 
 
 to follow the directions of the Ligurian, who, 
 when the time was come, and every thing pro- 
 vided and put in order, advanced to the place. 
 
 The centurions, according to the instructions 
 which they had received from their guide, had 
 changed their arms and dress, and marched with 
 their head and feet bare, that they might have 
 the freer prospect, and climb more easily. They 
 had their swords over their shoulders, and their 
 bucklers too, which were of the Numidian kind, 
 and made of leather, both for Hghtness, and 
 that they might not sound if they happened to 
 dash against the rock. The Ligurian, leading 
 the way, tied cords about the stones, and such 
 old roots of trees as appeared here and there, 
 to assist the soldiers in climbing ; lending his 
 hand, from time to time, to such as were dis- 
 couraged at so rugged a march. When the 
 ascent was steeper than ordinary, he sent them 
 up before him unarmed, and then followed 
 him.self with their arms. What appeared ex- 
 tremely difficult and threatening even to their 
 best endeavours, he tried ; and by ascending 
 and descending several times, encouraged the 
 rest to follow him, and then retired to make 
 way for them. At length after much tedious 
 labour, they gained the castle, which was quite 
 naked on that side, the enemy being all engaged, 
 as at other times, in the opposite quarter. When 
 Marius was informed of the success of the Li- 
 gurian, though he had kept the Numidians em- 
 ployed all day long by a continued attack, yet 
 now encouraging the soldiers, he sallied out of 
 his galleries, and drawing up his men into the 
 form of a shell, advanced against the castle. 
 At the same time too, in order to terrify the 
 enemy, he phed them hard with engines, 
 archers, and slingers, at a distance. The Nu- 
 midians, who had often before broke to pieces 
 and even burnt the Roman galleries, did not 
 now defend themselves within their battlements, 
 but spent whole days and nights without their 
 walls, railing at the Romans, and charging 
 Marius with madness. They threatened our 
 men with being made slaves to Jugurtha, and 
 were, indeed, extremely insolent on account 
 of their success. 
 
 While both sides were warmly engaged in a 
 vigorous struggle for glory and empire on the 
 one hand, and life and liberty on the other, the 
 trumpets on a sudden sounded in the enemy's 
 rear. Upon which the women and children, 
 who had come out to see the engagement, fied ; 
 after them such as were next the walls ; and 
 -3K 
 
60 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 at last all, armed and unarmed. The Romans 
 upon this pressed onward with greater vigour, 
 overthrowing the enemy, and only wounding 
 most of them ; then going over the heaps of 
 slain, they flew to the walls, all thirsting for 
 glory, and striving each to get before the other, 
 not one person stopping for plunder. Thus ac- 
 cidental success justified the rashness of Marius, 
 and even his imprudence contributed to height- 
 en his glory. 
 
 During this transaction, L. Sylla the qujestor 
 arrived in the camp with a great body of horse, 
 having been left at Rome by Marius, to raise 
 them in Latium and among our allies. And 
 here, as this circumstance has led me to make 
 mention of so extraordinary a man, I thought 
 it would not be improper to give some account 
 of his genius and character ; especially as I do 
 not design to speak of him elsewhere, and as L. 
 Sisena, the best and most accurate of all those 
 who have given us his history, appears to me 
 not to have spoken of him with so much free- 
 dom as he should have done. 
 
 Sylla was descended from an eminent patri- 
 cian family ; but its lustre was almost quite ob- 
 scured by the degeneracy of his late ancestors. 
 He was perfect master of the learning both of 
 Greece and Rome ; of a great spirit ; fond of 
 pleasures, but fonder of glory ; when business 
 did not call him, he indulged to luxury, but 
 never suffered his business to be hindered by it, 
 unless in the case of his divorce, in which he 
 ought to have acted in a more honourable man- 
 ner. He was eloquent, artful, easy, and obliging 
 in his friendships ; of vast reach in disguising 
 his designs ; liberal of every thing, especially 
 of his money. He was, indeed, the happiest 
 of all men, before his success in the civil wars ; 
 yet his fortune never surpassed his merit ; so 
 that many have made it a question, whether 
 he were more brave or more fortunate. As to 
 his behaviour after the civil war, I know not 
 how it is to be recounted, whether with greater 
 shame or horror. 
 
 When Sylla, as we have already related, was 
 come into Africa, and had joined Marius in his 
 camp, though he was before raw and ignorant 
 in the art of war, yet in a short time he became 
 a very able warrior. He was, moreover, very 
 affable to the soldiers ; granted favours to many 
 upon their asking them, and to many without 
 asking; was backward to receive benefits him- 
 self, but more forward to repay them than if 
 thev had been a debt of money ; would never 
 
 have any returns for what favours he bestowed; 
 but rather aimed at bringing as many as pos- 
 sible under obligations to him. He often en- 
 tered into conversation with the common men, 
 talking sometimes jocosely, sometimes serious- 
 ly ; was with them upon every occasion, in their 
 marches, in their works, and in their watchings ; 
 nor did he, in the meantime, wound the cha- 
 lacter of the consul, or any other worthy person, 
 according to the base practice of those who are 
 actuated by ambition ; striving assiduously to 
 suffer none to surpass him in counsel or action, 
 in both which he almost excelled all others. 
 By this conduct and these qualifications, he 
 was in a short time greatly beloved by Marius 
 and the whole army. 
 
 Now Jugurtha, after he had lost Capsa and 
 other strong and impontant places, with a great 
 deal of money besides, sent messengers to 
 Bocchus, to press him to hasten his march into 
 Numidia ; for that this was a proper time to 
 give the enemy battle. But finding him ir- 
 resolute, and weighing the motives for peace 
 and those for war, he gained over his confidants 
 by money, as he had formerly done ; nay, and 
 promised the Moor himself the third part of 
 Numidia, upon condition that the Romans were 
 either driven out of Africa, or he recovered his 
 whole dominions by a treaty of peace. Bocchus, 
 tempted with such an offer, marched imme- 
 diately to Jugurtha. When both armies were 
 joined, they fell upon Marius, as he was going 
 into winter-quarters, towards the close of the 
 evening : persuading themselves, that, in case 
 of a defeat, the night would secure them, and 
 if they proved victorious, it would be no disad- 
 vantage to them, since they were so well ac- 
 quainted with the country ; whereas the dark- 
 ness must distress the Romans, whatever were 
 the event. 
 
 The enemy was already in full view, just as 
 the consul was receiving manifold information 
 of their approach ; and before the army could 
 be formed or the baggage drawn together, nay, 
 before the signal or any orders could be given, 
 the Moorish and Getulian horse poured upon 
 them ; not in due order, or any regular method 
 of engaging, but in scattered parties, just as 
 chance huddled them together. Our men, 
 though alarmed with so unexpected an -onset, 
 yet mindful of their former bravery, boldly 
 grasped their arms, all ready to encounter the 
 enemy, or defend those that were yet un- 
 armed. Some of them mounted their horses, 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 61 
 
 Siid advanced against the foe. The whole 
 action had more the resemblance of a fray of 
 robbers, than of a regular battle ; horse and 
 foot were jumbled together, without standards 
 or ranks ; some were cut to pieces, others were 
 mangled ; many, whilst they were engaging 
 the foe vigorously in front, were themselves 
 attacked in rear; neither courage nor arms were 
 a sufficient security ; for the enemy, being far 
 more numerous, surrounded us on all sides. 
 At last, our men, in whatever place they hap- 
 pened to meet in parties, both the veterans and 
 new-raised soldiers (for they too had learned 
 war by .practice and example) threw them- 
 selves into circular bodies ; and thus, having a 
 front every way, they sustained the shock of 
 the enemy. 
 
 In this distressful situation Marius was not in 
 the least daunted, nor his courage more sunk 
 than on former occasions ; .but with his own 
 troop, which he had filled up with men of the 
 greatest bravery, without any regard to personal 
 friendship in the choice of them, flew about to 
 every quarter, one while succouring his own 
 men in distress, another charging the thickest 
 of the enemy in person ; and by using his sword 
 did all the service he could to his troops, since 
 it was impossible for him to act the part of a 
 general amidst so great confusion. By this 
 time the day was quite spent, without the bar- 
 barians abating any thing of their fury ; nay, 
 agreeably to the orders of the kings, who 
 thought the darkness an advantage to them, 
 they chared with greater ardour than before. 
 Whereupon Marius, as the best measure his 
 circumstances would admit of, in order to se- 
 cure a place of refuge for his army, resolved 
 to take possession of two hills near each 
 other; in one of which, though not large 
 enough to encamp on, there was a plentiful 
 spring of water : the other was very proper 
 for a camp, because it was very high and steep, 
 and required but little fortification. He ordered 
 Sylla to pass the night by the spring, with his 
 cavalry : he himself having by degrees drawn 
 together his scattered troops, the enemy being 
 still in no less confusion,went straight with them 
 to the other hill. The kings, being thus dis- 
 couraged by the difficulty of the ascent from 
 making any further attack, did not, however, 
 suffer their forces to retire, but besetting both 
 hills, pitched all round them with their dis- 
 orderly multitudes. Then the barbarians, 
 kindling many fires, passed most of the night 
 in mirth and jollity, hounded to and fro, and 
 
 shouted terribly after their usual manner. 
 Their leaders, too, were highly elated, and be- 
 haved like conquerors, because they had not 
 been obliged to fly. All this was easily per- 
 ceived by the Romans in the dark, being si- 
 tuated upon the upper ground, and gave them 
 no small encouragement. Marius's confidence 
 being increased by the unskilful conduct of 
 the enemy, he ordered a profound silence to be 
 kept, not even suffering the trumpets to sound 
 as usual, when the guard was changed. As soon 
 as day appeared, when the enemy were now 
 weary and just fallen asleep, he directed all the 
 trumpets, both of horse and foot, throughout 
 the army, to sound at once, and the soldiers to 
 pour down upon the enemy with a terrible shorut. 
 
 The Moors and Getulians, being suddenly 
 roused by so horrid and unusual a noise, could 
 neither fly nor take arms, and were utterly in- 
 capable to act or contrive any thing for their 
 own security, to such a degree, that being 
 stunned with the noise and frightful shouts, 
 severely pressed by our men, without receiving 
 any assistance from their own leaders, they 
 sunk like men stupified under this tumult, 
 terror, and amazement. In short, they received 
 a total overthrow, most of their arms and 
 military standards were taken, and more were 
 killed in that battle than all the former : for 
 sleep and extraordinary surprise had prevented 
 their flight. 
 
 Marius now pursued his march into his 
 winter-quarters, which he determined to fix m 
 the maritime towns, for the sake of provisions. 
 In the meantime his late victory made him 
 neither remiss nor imperious ; but, as if the 
 enemy had been in view, he marched with his 
 army in form of a square. Sylla command- 
 ed the cavalry on the right ; A. Manlius, with 
 the slingers and archers, as also the Ligurian 
 cohorts, on the left: in the front and rear he 
 posted the tribunes with the light-armed foot. 
 The deserters, being of small account, were em- 
 ployed to observe the motions of the enemy, as 
 they were perfectly well acquainted with the 
 country. Besides, the consul, as if he had 
 committed no share of the command to any 
 other, carefully attended to every thing him- 
 self, went to every quarter, extolling some, 
 reprimanding others, just as they deserved it; 
 and as he was constantly armed and ready for 
 action himself, he obliged the soldiers to be so 
 too. Nor was he less cautious in fortifying 
 his camp, than he was in his march. He com- 
 mitted the guard of the gates to the cohorts of 
 
62 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 the legions, and that without the gates to the 
 auxiliary horse, placing others upon the lines 
 and ramparts, and visiting them all round in 
 person : not so much from any distrust that his 
 orders would not be performed, as to animate 
 his men to undergo their fatigues with the 
 greater cheerfulness, when they saw their 
 general take an equal share. And indeed 
 Marius, both now and all the time he was era- 
 ployed in the war against Jugurtha, maintained 
 good order in the army more by the shame of 
 offending, than the fear of punishment : which 
 some imputed to his passion for popularity ; 
 others alleged that, being inured to hardships 
 from childhood, he took pleasure in what others 
 reckon the greatest misery. This much, how- 
 ever, is certain ; the affairs of the state Tyere 
 managed with as much success and dignity as if 
 his command had been ever so rigorous. 
 
 At last, on the fourth day, when they were 
 not far from Cirta, the scouts appeared on all 
 sides, advancing with great haste; whence it 
 was concluded that the enemy were not far off: 
 but as they returned from different quarters, 
 yet all with the same account, the consul not 
 knowing how to draw up his army, resolved not 
 to alter its disposition, but waited the coming of 
 the enemy, in the same order and the same 
 place. This disconcerted Jugurtha, who had 
 divided his troops into four parts, flattering him- 
 self that some of them must certainly attack the 
 Rorbans in the rear with advantage. In the 
 meantime Sylla, upon whom the enemy first 
 fell, encouraging his men, charged the Moors 
 at the head of some troops in as close order as 
 possible ; the rest, without moving from their 
 ground, defended themselves from the darts 
 thrown at a distance, and cut to pieces all who 
 ventured to come up to them. 
 
 During this engagement of the horse, Boc- 
 chus attacked our rear with a body of foot 
 brought by his son Volux, but which had not 
 marched expeditiously enough to be present at 
 the former battle. Marius was then in the front, 
 making head against Jugurtha, who fought 
 there with a numerous force. But the Numi- 
 dian prince, when he heard of the arrival of 
 Bocchus, wheeled about with a few attendants 
 to our foot, and cried with a loud voice in 
 Latin, which he learned at the siege of Nu- 
 mantia, " that they fought to no purpose, for 
 that he had slain Marius a little before with his 
 own hand ;" and at the same time showed them 
 his sword dyed with the blood of one of our 
 foot, slain by him in the encounter with great 
 
 bravery. Our men hearing this were more struck 
 with so shocking a report thaK was consistent 
 with the opinion they had of the veracity of the 
 author of it : on the contrary, the barbarians 
 were inspired with fresh courage, and with 
 greater fury than ever, pushed the Romans, 
 who were disheartened, and upon the point of 
 betaking themselves to flight, when Sylla, 
 having routed those he was engaged with, fell 
 upon the Moors in their flank ; whereupon 
 Bocchus immediately fled. Jugurtha, whilst 
 he endeavoured to sustain his men, and main- 
 tain a victory which he had almost gained, was 
 enclosed both on the right and left by our horse ; 
 and, having slain all about him, broke singly 
 through the enemy, and got off amidst a shower 
 of darts. By this time, too, Marius, who had 
 routed the cavalry, came to the relief of his 
 men who he heard had given ground. And 
 now the enemy was entirely defeated in every 
 quarter. 
 
 Then it was that a tragical spectacle present- 
 ed itself all over the widely extended plain ; 
 some flying, others pursuing ; some killed, 
 others taken ; horses and men prostrate in the 
 agonies of death. Many wounded, and though 
 impatient to fly, unable to do it ; one while 
 striving to rise, and instantly dropping down 
 again. In a word, the ground was covered, as 
 far as the eye could reach, with arms and car- 
 cases, and the intermediate spaces stained with 
 blood and gore. 
 
 The consul, now undoubtedly conqueror, pur- 
 sued his march to Cirta, as at first he intended. 
 Here, five days after the defeat of the bar- 
 barians, deputies came to him from Bocchus, 
 requesting of him, in his name, to send two per- 
 sons, whom he could entirely confide in, to the 
 king, that he might treat with them upon mat- 
 ters that concerned his own interest, and like- 
 wise that of the Roman people. The consul 
 immediately sent L. Sylla and A. Manlius, 
 who, though they went at the king's request, 
 yet thought proper to accost him with a speech, 
 in order to dispose him to peace, if he still 
 seemed averse to it : or if he desired it, to 
 strengthen that disposition. Accordingly Sylla, 
 to whom Manlius gave precedence, in con- 
 sideration of his eloquence, and not of his 
 seniority, thus briefly addressed himself to 
 Bocchus : — 
 
 " It is a great pleasure to uS; king Bocchus, 
 that the gods have disposed a prince of your 
 merit to prefer peace to war, and no longer to 
 stain your own distinguished character by unit- 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 63 
 
 mg with Jugurtha, the most detestable of all 
 men ; since you have thus delivered us from 
 the disagreeable necessity of pursuing you both 
 with the like vengeance ; you, for your mistake 
 iri assisting him ; and him, for his enormous 
 crimes. The Roman people, even in the in- 
 fancy of their state, when their territory was 
 but small, always reckoned it better policy to 
 procure friends than subjects ; thinking it safer 
 to rule over such as yielded a willing obe- 
 dience, than those who openly obeyed through 
 compulsion. Nor can any alliance be more 
 advantageous to you than ours: one great rea- 
 son is, that we are at a great distance from you, 
 so that you cannot be apprehensive of re- 
 ceiving any injuries from us, and yet we are 
 ready to be as serviceable to you as if we were 
 your neighbours. As another inducement, we 
 have already as many subjects as we wish for, 
 and only want to increase the number of our 
 friends, of whom neither we, nor any other state, 
 can ever have enough. I wish, indeed, you had 
 at first taken the present course ; in that case, 
 you would certainly before now have received 
 more benefits from the Roman people, than you 
 have suffered calamities from their arms. But 
 since it is the determination of fortune, which 
 over-rules the greatest part of human aflTairs, that 
 you should make trial of the force of our en- 
 mity, as well as of our friendship, embrace 
 quickly the occasion she now ofifers, and ac- 
 complish speedily what you have now begun 
 You have many opportunities, and many things 
 in your power, for retrieving your past mistakes 
 by future services. To conclude, be firmly 
 persuaded of this, that the Romans are never 
 to be overcome in generosity. Their power in 
 war, you yourself have- already proved." 
 
 To all this Bocchus returned a very courte- 
 ous answer, making at the same time a brief 
 apology for his misconduct; alleging, " that he 
 had recourse to arms from no hostile intention, 
 but purely to defend his own territories ; that 
 he could not bear to see Marius lay waste that 
 part of Numidia which was his own by the 
 right of war, as having conquered it from 
 Jugurtha ; that he had formerly sent ambassa- 
 dors to Rome desiring to be admitted to an al- 
 liance, and was rejected ; but that he was wil- 
 ling to omit mentioning old things, and to send 
 deputies again to the senate, if Marius consent- 
 ed to it." This being granted him, the mind of 
 the barbarian was again changed by such of his 
 confidants as were corrupted by presents from 
 Jugurtha ; who, when he heard that S'^-t la and 
 8 
 
 Manlius had been sent to Bocchus, apprehend- 
 ed what was really contriving against him. 
 
 Marius in the meantime, having settled his 
 army in winter-quarters, marched into the de- 
 serts, with a detachment of light-armed cohorts 
 and part of his cavalry, to besiege a tower of 
 Jugurtha's, where he had placed all the Roman 
 deserters for a garrison. Now again Bocchus, 
 either reflecting upon his two late defeats, or 
 wrought upon by some others of his confidants, 
 whom Jugurtha had not corrupted, resumed his 
 former sentiments, and chose from amongst his 
 friends five ambassadors, of proved integrity 
 and eminent abilities : these he ordered to go to 
 Marius, and afterwards, if he should think pro- 
 per, to Rome ; giving them full powers to nego- 
 tiate affairs, and end the war upon any terms. 
 
 The ambassadors departed speedily for the 
 winter-quarters of the Romans ; but being be- 
 set on the road, and stripped of all they had, by 
 Getulian robbers, they pursued their march to 
 Sylla, whom the consul, when he began his 
 expedition, had left propraetor. Sylla received 
 them, not as such faithless enemies deserved, 
 but in a respectful and generous manner : the 
 barbarians were so pleased with this, that they 
 gave no credit to the report of the Roman ava- 
 rice, and concluded Sylla to be their friend, from 
 his munificence towards them. For there were 
 many ignorant, even in those days, that boun- 
 ties were ever given from interested views ; 
 every generous man being then thought be- 
 nevolent, and all presents to proceed from kind- 
 ness. Before him, therefore, they laid their or- 
 ders from Bocchus, beseeching him at the same 
 time to assist them with his advice and good of- 
 fices. They likewise spoke in high terms of the 
 wealth, honour, and power of their king, forget- 
 ing nothing which they thought would be sub- 
 servient to their design, or tend to gain the fa- 
 vour of the qusestor. When Sylla had promised 
 all they desired, and instructed them in what 
 manner to address Marius, and afterwards the 
 senate, they still waited there about forty days 
 
 Marius not succeeding in his enterprise, re- 
 turned to Cirta; and being informed of the 
 arrival of the ambassadors, ordered both Sylla 
 and them to come to him. He likewise sum- 
 moned L. Bellienus the prsetor from Utica, 
 and all those of senatorian rank who were to 
 be found in the country. He examined, to 
 gether with them, Bocchus's instructions to 
 his ambassadors, whereby they had powers 
 given them to go to Rome, and to apply to 
 the consul for a cessation of arms till they 
 
64 
 
 THE \^= ^R 
 
 should return. Sylla and the greatest part of 
 the council approved of this. But there were 
 a few, who, unacquainted with the nature of 
 human affairs, which are never fixed, but al- 
 ways changing, and constantly for the worse, 
 proposed more violent measures. 
 
 The Moors, having obtained all they desired, 
 throe of them proceeded to Rome, with C. 
 Octavius Rafo, who had come into Africa as 
 qua3stor, with money for the army ; two re- 
 turned to the king, who heard with pleasure 
 the account they gave him of all that had 
 passed, and especially the kindness of Sylla, 
 and the many demonstrations of friendship 
 they had received from him. His deputies at 
 Rome, having implored pardon of the senate 
 for the misconduct of the king, into which, they 
 said he had fallen through the artifices of Jugur- 
 tha, and desired to be admitted into friendship 
 and alliance, received the following answer: — 
 
 " The senate and people of Rome are always 
 mindful both of favours and injuries. They 
 pardon Bocchus, however, because he repents 
 of his transgression, and will admit him into 
 friendship and alliance when he deserves it." 
 
 As soon as Bocchus had notice of this, he 
 wrote to Marius to send Sylla to him, that by 
 his counsel matters might be adjusted between 
 them. -Sylla wras sent accordingly, with a 
 guard of horse and foot, Balearian slingers, a 
 certain number of archers, and a cohort from 
 Pelignum with light arms for the sake of ex- 
 pedition ; which however secured them, as well 
 as any other, against the enemy's darts, which 
 were but slight. On the fifth day of their 
 march, Volux, the son of Bocchus, appeared 
 on a sudden in the open plains at the head of 
 a thousand horse, who advancing hastily and 
 without any order, seemed more numerous 
 than they really were, and made Sylla and 
 those that were with him suspect they w-ere.. 
 enemies. Whereupon every one made ready, 
 adjusted their arms, and put themselves in a 
 posture of defence ; they were not, indeed, 
 without their fears ; but their hopes were 
 greater, as being victorious, and to engage with 
 those they had often conquered. In the mean- 
 time, the horsemen, who were sent to recon- 
 noitre them, returned with tidings that re- 
 moved all their apprehensions. 
 
 As soon as Volux arrived, he addressed 
 himself to the quaestor, acquainting him that 
 he was come by his father's orders to receive 
 and to guard him. Accordingly they con- 
 tinned their march together for that and the 
 
 following day without any alarm ; bu in' the 
 evening, when they had already pitched their 
 camp, the Moorish prince ran to Sylla with an 
 air of consternation, and told him, trembling, 
 that he was informed by his scouts, " that Ju- 
 gurtha was near at hand ;" at the same time 
 asking and entreating the quaestor " to fly away 
 with him privately in the night." To wbiph 
 Sylla resolutely replied, " that he wa' «ibt 
 afraid of the Numidian, whom he had so often 
 defeated ; that he did not distrust the courage 
 of his troops ; and that, were he sure of meet- 
 ing certain destruction, he would stand his 
 ground, rather than fly infamously, and betray 
 those whom he commanded, merely to save a 
 life, at best but of precarious tenure, and 
 which might perhaps in a short time be cut off 
 by some distemper." 
 
 A^'olux, however, proposing to him to march 
 in the night-time, he approved of his advice ; 
 and immediately ordered his men to make a 
 great number of fires in the camp, after they 
 had supped, and then to march silently, at the 
 first watch of the night. Next morning about 
 sun-rise, ■.vhen they were all thoroughly tired 
 with their march, as Sylla was encamping, the 
 Moorish horsemen acquainted him, that Ju- 
 gurtha had pitched his camp about two miles 
 further. Upon hearing this, our men were seized 
 with great consternation, as believing them- 
 selves betrayed and led into an ambushby Vo- 
 lux ; and some even proposed putting him to 
 death, for that so vile a traitor oughtnot to go 
 unpunished. 
 
 But Sylla, though he entertained the same 
 suspicion as the rest, would not suffer his men 
 to offer him any violence. He exhorted them 
 " to be of good courage ; that a few brave 
 troops had often prevailed against a numerous 
 army ; that the less they spared themselves in 
 battle, the ir ore secure they would be ; that 
 none, who had arms in their hands, should 
 seek assistance from their heels which vv^ere 
 unarmed, nor in the midst of danger turn their 
 backs, which were blind ahd defenceless, to- 
 wards the enemy," Then invoking almighty 
 Jove to bear testimony to the guilt and treach- 
 ery of Bocchus, he ordered Volux to depart 
 his camp, as one who had hostile intentions. 
 He, ivith tears in his eyes, entreated him " not 
 to entertain any such suspicion of him ; that 
 nothing of this had happened by any treachery 
 in him, but rather through the subtilty of Ju- 
 gurtha, who, being constantly in quest of in 
 telligence, had discovered his route. How 
 
AGAINST JUGURTHA. 
 
 65 
 
 ever, as -le had no great force with him, and 
 depended entirely upon Bocchus for strength 
 and support, he did not imagine that he would 
 dare to make any open attempt, where the son 
 of Bocchus must be witness to it ; so that he 
 thought his best course would be to march 
 boldly through the middle of his camp. That 
 as for himself, he would either send his Moors 
 be" , or leave them there, and accompany 
 Sylh. singly." In such an extremity this pro- 
 posal was approved of. Accordingly they im- 
 mediately advanced, and passed without mo- 
 lestation ; Jugurtha being surprised at their 
 unexpected coming, and not having time to 
 take any resolution. Tn a few days after, they 
 got to the end of their journey. 
 
 There was at that time a certain Numidian 
 called Aspar, in the court of Bocchus, with 
 whom he enjoyed great freedom and familiari- 
 ty, having been despatched thither by Jugur- 
 tha, as soon as he had notice that Sylla had 
 been sent for, in order to take care of his in- 
 terest, and to pry narrowly into all the designs 
 of Bocchus. There was likewise one Dabar 
 in his court, the son of Massugrada, and de- 
 scended from Masinissa, but not of equal qua- 
 lity, by his grandmother, for his father was born 
 of a concubine. Bocchus, whose favour and 
 confidence he had gained by his many excel- 
 lent accomplishments, having found him upon 
 many former occasions a true friend to the Ro- 
 mans, despatched him forthwith to Sylla, to 
 acquaint him, " that he was ready to do what- 
 ever the Romans required ; that Sylla himself 
 might appoint the day, the place, and even the 
 hour of conference; that he had reserved every 
 thing to be adjusted by himself and Sylla ; that 
 an ambassador there from Jugurtha ought not 
 to give him umbrage, since he was admitted to 
 the negociation with the sole view of facilitating 
 it, as it was impossible by any other means to 
 defeat the dark measures of that prince." 
 
 But T find that Bocchus acted more like a per- 
 fidious African, than agreeably to what he pro- 
 fessed, amusing both the Romans and Jugurtha 
 with hopes of peace ; and that he frequently 
 debated with himself, whether he should de- 
 liver up Jugurtha to the Romans, or Sylla 
 to Jugurtha ; his inclinations leading him to 
 be against us, and his fears for us. 
 
 Sylla replied, " that he should say but little 
 before Aspar, reserving what he had to add, to 
 bo communicated in secret to the king alone, or 
 at least in the presence of very few •" instruct- 
 
 ing Dabar at the same time as to the answer 
 which he expected to receive from Bocchus, 
 in the presence of others. When the time ap- 
 pointed for the conference arrived, Sylla de- 
 clared, " that he came by order of the consul to 
 know his final resolution as to peace or war." 
 
 The king, agreeably to his instructions, de- 
 sired Sylla to return about ten days after, at 
 which time he should have a full answer, for 
 that as yet he had come to no determination. 
 Upon this they both departed to their respec- 
 tive camps. But when the night was far ad- 
 vanced, Bocchus sent privately for Sylla; 
 none were admitted on either side but trusty 
 interpreters, except Dabar, a man of strict 
 honour, who mediated between them, and was 
 sworn by mutual consent, to make faithful re- 
 presentations to both. Upon which the king 
 began thus : — 
 
 " I never imagined, that I, the most power- 
 ful prince in this part of the "world, and the 
 richest of all the princes I know, should ever 
 be under obligations to a private person. And 
 indeed, Sylla, before I knew you, I have often 
 assisted great numbers at their own request, 
 and many of my own accord, but never stood 
 in need of the assistance of any myself. The 
 case is now altered ; an alteration for which 
 others usually mourn, but I rejoice. I shall 
 always glory once to have had occasion for 
 your friendship, which I value above every 
 thing. And as a proof of my sincerity, accept 
 of my forces, my arms, my money, and what- 
 ever else you desire ; use them as your own ; 
 and after all, never think, as long as you live, 
 that I have made you a sufficient requital for 
 your favours. My gratitude shall still con- 
 tinue the same ; nor shall you ever desire any 
 thing in vain that is in my power to do for you, 
 if I only know it. For in my opinion it is more 
 dishonourable for a prince to be outdone in 
 generosity, than vanquished in arms. 
 
 " As to the affairs of your commonwealth, 
 whose interests you are come hither to take 
 care of, hear what I have briefly to say. I 
 never made war upon the Roman people ; nor 
 so much as intended it : I only defended my 
 own dominions against an armed force that 
 came to invade them ; and now, since it is 
 your pleasure, I shall desist. Carry on the 
 war with Jugurtha just as you think proper. I 
 shall never pass the river Mulucha, the bound- 
 ary betwixt me and Micipsa, nor suffer Jugur- 
 tha to come over to my side. If you have any 
 
66 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 thing further to ask worthy of Bocchus and 
 your republic, it shall be granted you." 
 
 Sylla returned a brief and modest reply to all 
 that rejated to himself; but as to the peace and 
 negociation, he spoke at great length. He told 
 the king, " that what he proposed, would be 
 looked upon by the Romans as no kindness at 
 all, since their arms had been successful. He 
 must do something that should appear more 
 for their benefit than for his own ; an easy 
 task, as he had Jugurtha in his power, whom 
 if he delivered up to the Romans, they would 
 then be greatly indebted to him, and admit him 
 freely to their friendship and alliance, with a 
 grant of that part of Numidia which he claimed." 
 
 The king at first refused this condition, 
 urging « the ties of blood, those of affinity, and 
 solemn leagues ; alleging too, that he was 
 apprehensive lest, by acting so treacherously, 
 he should lose the affections of his subjects, 
 who loved Jugurtha, and abhorred the Ro- 
 mans." But yielding at last to the impor- 
 tunity of Sylla, he promised to do whatever 
 he desired of him. They then concerted 
 measures for conducting the mock treaty of 
 peace, which Jugurtha, now quite weary of 
 the war, passionately desired. And having 
 thus laid their plot, they departed. 
 
 Bocchus the next day sent for Aspar, Ju- 
 gurtha's minister, and acquainted him, that 
 Dabar had told him from Sylla, the war might 
 be concluded upon conditions : he should there- 
 fore go and discover the sentiments of his 
 master. Aspar went with great joy to Ju- 
 gurtha's camp ; and having received ample 
 instructions, returned with great- expedition 
 to Bocchus in eight days, and told him, " that 
 Jugurtha was disposed to comply with what- 
 ever was required of him, only he could not 
 trust Marius, having often made treaties of 
 peace before with the Roman generals, which 
 were never ratified at Rojae. If Bocchus 
 would consult not only Jugurtba's interest but 
 his own, and have a sure peace, he should 
 procure a meeting of all the parties, under 
 pretence of conferring about the terms of it, 
 and then deUver up Sylla to him. If he had 
 in possession a person of such importance, a 
 treaty of peace would then be concluded by 
 order of the senate and people of Rome, who 
 would neve.' suffer one of his quality to con- 
 tinue in thj :iands of the enemy, into which 
 
 he had fallen, not through any ill conduct, 
 but, for performing his duty to the slate." 
 
 The Moor, after having long reflected npon 
 this proposal, at last consented to it ; but whe- 
 ther with a fraudulent design or sincerity, is not 
 clear. The inclinations of princes indeed, as 
 they are generally violent, so they are unsteady, 
 and often inconsistent. Time and place being 
 now appointed for a treaty, Bocchus one while 
 talked with Sylla, another with Jugurtha's mi- 
 nister ; caressed each, and made the same promi- 
 t'Cs to both, who were thereupon equally pleas- 
 ed, and conceived equal hopes. But the night 
 before the day fixed for the treaty, the Moor, 
 calling his friends together, then suddenly 
 changing sentiments, and dismissing them, is 
 reported to have had many violent struggles 
 wiih himself; insomuch that his frequent 
 changes of countenance, and external agita- 
 tions, clearly discovered, notwithstanding his 
 silence, the various emotions of his mind. At 
 last, however, he sent for Sylla, and, in concert 
 with him, laid a plot for the Numidian. 
 
 When the day came, and Bocchus was in- 
 formed that Jugurtha was near at hand, he, 
 with a few of his courtiers, and our qusestor, 
 went out, under pretence of doing him honour, 
 to meet him, as far as a little eminence, in 
 full view of those who were placed in ambush. 
 Thither, according to agreement, the Numidian 
 prince came unarmed with many friends: and 
 immediately, upon a signal given, those who lay 
 in wait to seize him rushed upon him all at 
 once. They who accompanied him were pul 
 to tlie sword. He himself was delivered in 
 chains to Sylla, who conducted him to Marius. 
 
 About this time, our general Q. Caspio 
 and M. Manlius had an unfortunate battle 
 with the Gauls, which spread consternation 
 over all Italy. The Romans had always 
 been strongly of opinion, and now no less so, 
 that all other nations must yield to their brave- 
 ry ; but that, when they fought with the Gauls, 
 they were only to aim at the preservation of 
 their state, and not at glory. Kow as soon as 
 it was known at Rome that the war in Numi- 
 dia was at an end, and that Jugurtha was com- 
 ing in chains ; Marius, though absent, was cho- 
 sen consul, and Gaul decreed him for his pro- 
 vince. On the first of January he triumphed 
 with great glory. At this juncture, indeed, the 
 hopes and security of Rome rested upon him. 
 
 3Q 
 
 THE END. 
 
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