s^'-. • O b ' o • •A (^ o % o o ^'^^, ,A^ J*' .0 c " * '' ^ O A."* b'". •^" :4. ^^^ :SMM^ "^c^^ -Jy^ V » 1 ■ "' ^.^ ^;#f^ bV 0^ .v^/. ^> v" iy vV<>*.*. ^ >^' ■ • ^° -^^ o '- ^0 ^ % '' "'J" \\ -\^ " s • ;, <^ o V . ; - - , ^- * ^^ -r,. .40^ .0^ -3 ^.• vV-^ -3 ^. ,0 ^, ..s^ A ■.c^ -^M \ ^ .0' • ';^€s [_l'»A .°^.^ o .V <* ,% >_ & /F'. EXAMINATION THOMAS L. M'^KENNEY'S REPLY TO THE REVIEW OF HIS NARRATIVE, &c BY KOSCIUSZKO ARMSTRONG NEW YORK: ^ R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 112 FULTON STREET. 1847. EXAMINATION OF T. L. MCKENNEY'S REPLY TO THE REVIEW OF HIS NARRATIVE, &c. AFTERa labor of two months, Thomas L. McKenney has been safely delivered of what he terms a "Reply" to my review of his narrative." A brief examination will determine, whether this bantling be one " of fair proportions" and even chances of life, or a rickety monster, born but to sprawl, and perish. Without metaphor, let me congratulate the Ex-Superintendant of Indian Affairs, on having at last discovered the propriety of supporting his statement of facts, by evidence, derived from other and more^respect- able sources. Under the influence of this new creed, he has sought and procured letters from Georgetown friends and associates, intended to show that, in his Narrative of the events which led to the capture of Washington, and the resignation of General Armstrong, he wrote nothing but truth ; and, if chargeable with any offence, it was the venial one of having looked on the Secretary's transgressions with too much lenity. Foremost among these witnesses is a Mr. Smith, who is ushered before the public with a flourish of trumpets suited to the dignity of a quondam Brigadier of Militia. I was sorry to see this gentleman's letter, — not from any ill effects to be feared from such evidence as he has given, or can give, but because I find it neither pleasant, nor profitable, to be compelled to unravel one tangled skein of misrepresentation after an- other. Of General Smith I have no personal knowledge, and, cer- tainly, bear him no ill-will : but, by connecting himself with Mr. Mc- Kenney, he has made it necessary for me to examine his testimony with a strictness, that will give him pain. The main question at issue between Mr. McKenney and myself is this: Was, or was not. General Armstrong negligent of his duty as Secretary of War, before and at the time of the ca'pture of Washington ? There are also minor points to be settled between us, — such as, the fictitious denunciation of Carrol, and Mr. McKenney's real agency in the Georgetown intrigue. Each shall bo noted in its turn : but the most important is entitled to precedence. In my examination of this question, I shall, whenever I state a fact derived from public documents, give my authority at the foot of the page, in order that the truth of whatever assertion or quotation I make, may be tested by the reader. Whatever neglect of duty the Secretary of War was guity of (for, in a position like his, negligence was guilt), must have been shown in one of three ways. 1st. In not recommending such addition to the fortified defences of Washington, as the exigency of the times required ; and, when the invasion took place, omitting the steps necessary to bring together a force, competent to resist it. 2d. In not furnishing the troops with arms and ammunition, and makinor no provision for their subsistence in the field. 3d. In refusing to give orders, having for their object a concentration of force, and withholding from General Winder such assistance as the Secretary of War may have been supposed able to give. In the discussion of these various subjects, I shall, unavoidably, be led into details more instructive than amusing. But the brevity of my story shall compensate for its dulness. Under the second and third heads, the evidence of StuU and Smith shall be fully analysed. 1st. With regard to the want of fortifications, I will recur to a docu- ment showino', that, as eai'ly as June, 1813, General Armstrong pointed out their necessity in his answer to the following questions asked by a committee of the Senate : — " What provision," said the committee, " has been made by the War Department for the protection of the sea- board ? Can the protection authorized by law be deemed sufficient ? And, if not, what further provision is nece&sary ?" The reader will see that the purport of these questions was suffi- ciently broad : it embraced past, present, and future, and the reply, like the demand, is an admirable specimen of multum in parvo. After statincr what had been done, the Secretary says : — " In my opinion, the present protection of the sea-board is not sufficient, and the measures to be taken for its better defence are of two kizids : addil/.oiud fortifica- tions and an increased number of regular troops." He tlien proceeds to recommend the erection of works for the purpose of giving more safety to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans. The only part of his report with which I have to do, is that relating to Washington. He says, "A work should be erected on Cedar Shoal Point on the Potomac. It cannot he douhted but that the seat of the General Government should be placed not merely beyond injury, but beyond disturbance from the enemy." It was not, however, on defences of earth and stone, that the Secretary relied ; he knew, that the best bulwark against attack, is that furnished by the breasts and bayonets of disciplined men, and expressed this opinion in the following words : — " Under the second general provision (an in- creased number of regular troops) I offer the following arrangement of permanent garrisons : To Districts No. 1 and 2, 2,000 men, do 3 and 4, 3,000 men, do 5, 3,000 (subsequently No. 10, including Washington), To District No. 6, 2,000 men, do 7, 3,000 men. 13,000."* Here is evidence enough to satisfy the most sceptical, that General Armstrong was not blind to the defenceless condition of the capital, and projected and recommended measures for its protection, at an early period of his administration of the War Department ; and if Congress from indifference, carelessness, an impoverished treasury, or that want of fixed purpose which characterizes deliberative assemblies, took no heed of his recommendations, the candid reader will allow, that he, at least, was not censurable for want of foresight. I now come to the steps taken by him, when the invasion occurred, to bring together a competent military force. In a Cabinet Council held on the 1st of July, 1814, President Madison offered for examination a plan of defence, matured by him for the special protection of Washington, Baltimore, and the country adjacent. This plan consisted in the forma- tion of a permanent camp of two or three thousand troops, at some point between the East Branch and the Patuxent, while corps of militia (amounting in all to ten or twelve thousand men) were required to be held in readiness by the neighboring states, for service in case of invasion. •{" The day after the Council, the War ]\finister created the 10th military district, and assigned General Winder to the command.:}: Three days afterwards, he made a requisition on the States for ninety-three thousand five hundred men ; of this number, six thousand from Maryland, five thousand from Pennsylvania, two thousand from Virginia, and the whole militia of the district of Columbia, were allotted to Winder's command, forming with the regular troops and marines, an aggregate of sixteen thousand five hundred men, three thousand of whom the commanding General was authorized to call into immediate service on the llth of July, and the remainder in case of actual or menaced invasion.^ Thus far there is no evidence of " apathy" or " neglect," on the part of the Secretary of War, but, on the contrary, the most decisive proof, that his duty had been promptly fulfilled. Two weeks after the Cabinet Council, and Jive weeks before the landing of the enemy, he had given to General Winder whatever authority the War Department could give, * See Report to Committee of the Senate made June 10th, 1S13. I have a certified copy. t See Report of the Committee of Investigation, p. 6. i Gen. Winder was selected by President Madison. The Secretary had pro- posed the appointment of General Porter of the Artillery, an able and energetic man, but one whom high temper and rough manners made no favorite at the White House. § See Report of the Committee of Investigation, p. 38. to bring together the force allotted by the President to the defence of Washington. It would be foreign from my purpose to show, why this force was not collected ; — why Maryland offered but a " beggarly account of empty" battalions ; — why Pennsylvania was without a re- presentative on the field of Bladensburg ; — why Virginia sent forth a single regiment of unarmed men* the day before the battle, instead of her quota of two thousand ; the causes which led to these results were various, but as they had no connexion with the management of the War Department, I shall leave them unexplained. f Let the reader, however, bear in mind, that notwithstanding the partial failure of the requisitions, General Winder found himself, on the 24th of August, at the head of an army of nearly seven thousand men (one fifth of whom were regulars, seamen and marines), possessing over their enemy tiie decided advan- tages of numerical strength, a corps of cavalry, and a well appointed train of artillery.:]: 2d. The next subject of inquiry is, whether the Secretary of War neglected to furnish arms and ammunition ; or stinted the provender of the patriotic band, assembled for the defence of their domestic hearths. The Committee of Investigation, appointed by Congress to inquire strictly into all matters having any bearing on the loss of the Capital ; — a Committee, composed of men of both parties, and doubly respectable from the character and ability of members, say, in the Report, not a word of any deficiency in these great requisites. From this silence, I am justified in concluding, that the stomachs and cartridge-boxes of the Bladensburg heroes were abundantly filled ; and that weapons were put in their hands, which, to have been used with effect, needed but the possession of a quality which nature alone can give. It is true, how- ever, that there is a letter on record of General Walter Smith, in which that officer complained, that one company of self-styled riflemen belong, ing to his brigade, were armed with muskets, instead of the weapons they wished; but such was the evident absurdity of this complaint, that the committee did not even deign to notice it.^ I said in my " Review," that " the difficulties alleged to have exist- ed, with regard to arms and equipments, would, on inquiry, be found * See Report of the Committee, p. KJ.3. Letter of Adjutant General Gooch to the Secretary of War, from which I make the following extract : — " Your requisi- tion on the militia of this State, hearing date the 4th instant, has heen received. Jlrms, ammunition, &fc., will be placed in the hands of the w/iole." Yet Colonel Minor's regiment arrived ivifhout arms. Whose fault was this ? t Whoever may wish to obtain a clear understanding of the causes which led to the failure of the militia requisitions, made by the Government on the States of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, will fmd them fully set forth in tlie report of the Committee of Investigation. t The Maryland force at Bladensburg consisted of 3,U00 men; the Georgetown and Washington militia 2,000; the regulars, marines and seamen 1,40(3; and Minor's Virginia Regiment at the Capital, 700. Young's brigade is not included in this estimate because acting on detached service; there were twenty-four pieces of artillery. The British force consisted of 3,500 men, 1500 of whom were engaged. See Dr. Cattlet's testimony. § Report of Committee", p. 201. I recommend the perusal of this letter to whoever enjoys a hearty laugh. Smith's Report is such as Capt. Bobadil would have written, had Bobadil commanded the Georgetown Brigade. either not justly chargeable to the Secretary of War, or of a nature so frivolous, as to take from them all importance." As if to prove the truth of this remark, Mr. McKenney has produced a letter from the commander of the self-called Rifle company. This sagacious gentle- man — his name is Stall — evidently believes, that the substitution of one weapon for another in the arming of his hundred men, was the most efficient cause of the capture of Washington ! According to him, his riflemen would have scampered with much less alacrity, had it not been for those confounded smooth bores ; and to excuse their misconduct on the field, he adds " that they wanted confidence in muskets.^' A little reflection will convince Mr. Stull, that they wanted something of more importance, — confidence in their leader, and in themselves. Men seldom act without motives. Since General Armstrong refused to give the rifles, he had a reason for the refusal. As far &s personally concerned, it must have been a matter of indifference to him what kind of weapon was drawn by Stull's corps from the public arsenal ; and in fact, had the Secretary been a mere popularity seeker, he would gladly have seized this occasion of gratifying the whims of a portion of the " sovereign people," though at the expense of his better judgment. Fortunately for the truth, it is in my power to show, ivhy the rifles were withheld ; and the following letters from General Armstrong to Mr. George Graham, of Virginia, and to Major-General Brown, will bring every candid reader to the conclusion, that in substituting muskets, the Secretary acted with strict regard to the public interest. " Sir,— We have not, either in store at this place, or at any other depot of arms, rifle-guns for distribution to militia. A few guns of this description were borrowed on a late occasion from the Indian Department. The number possessed by that Department did not exceed eighty. There may be eighty more at Harper's ferry, but they are destined for the rifle regiments of the United States. I am, &c., &c., G. Graham, Esq. J. Armstrong." Extract from a letter to General Brown : — " Throughout Smith's report, we see some stress attempted to be laid on the fact, that Stull's rifle company was armed with muskets. On this I would remark that Stull's company procured rifles in the summer of 1813— that in 1814, getting tired of these (like spoiled children) they wanted new ones, complaining 'that the bores of those they had were too small and needed too much wiping, and that the hammers of the locks were too soft, and did not always give fire. To these com- plaints I answered— that men really understanding the use of a rifle, and disposed to take care of it, would not make any objection to the smallness of the bores- and that if they would send such of the hammers as were too soft, to the Ordnance Department, they should be hardened. None were sent, and muskets were drawn By the way, this was the point I wished to bring them to. I well knew, that a hunting shirt and trousers did not make a rifleman, and that of the tinkers tailors, and cobblers, of Georgetown and Washington, there were not ten who knew anything of rifle shooting. But the reader, misled by Mr. McKenney's narrative, may say that after all, the guns might as well have been issued, as have been burned with other public stores. True j hut they were not burned ; and we have here another proof of the Ex-Superintendant's talent for mis- representation, even in trifles. Captain Stull, with proper caution, observes : " I will only further remark, that it was 7mder stood and be- lieved, that those very arms referred to, were destroyed by the British." McKenney, with characteristic boldness, says, " The rifles that would have been so eflicient in the hands of this admirahle company, never found their way to the Northern Army, hut icere consumed witli the Capi- "^tol and public buildings, on the •25th of August." Let me apply to this unqualified assertion, that formidable test, a public record. To estimate the extent of the national loss, in arms and ammunition, the Committee of Investigation called on the Commissary of Ordnance for a report of what was in store at the time of the British attack. From this report, I make the following extract. " In the military stores there was on hand previous to, and at tlie time of, the invasion, after considerable distributions had been made to the regular troops and militia, 2,993 stands of arms, 1,595 cartridge boxes, &c., 2,584 bayonet scabbards, &c., &c. " Of Rifles, it was impossible, though every exertion was made by this depart- ment, to procure a seasonable sitpply.''* Having disposed of this charge, let me now turn to another of more seeming importance, brought against Gen. Armstrong by McKenney, Smith, and Stull. I mean that of neglecting to arm and equip Colonel Minor's regiment in time to enable it to share in the battle of the 24th of August. Colonel Minor tells us, " that when he called on the Secretary of War, and requested an order for arms and ammunition, this functionary replied : ' it will be time enough to-morrow morning.'" Now, to what does this amount, unless it be shown, that there was not time enough to get the arms and marcli to the field between break of day and 1 o'clock p.m., when the action began ? Not even Mr. McKenney will venture on such an assertion, since both time and space would dis- prove it. But the reader will ask. Why did not Minor procure arms at an earlier hour ? Let the Col. himself give the answer : '^ Next morning,'" says that oflrtcer, "7 diligently sought Col. Carherry, witlwut being able to fold him ; and then went in search of Gen. Winder, who gave an order for the munitions wanting. On my arrival at the armory, I found that department in the care of a young man who dealt out the stores cau- tiously, which went greatly to consume time. At this place I found Col. Carherry, who introduced himself to me, and apologized for not being found, stating that he had left toivn the evening before, and had gone to Jiis seat in the country. ^^'\ Now, what must the reader think of Mr. McKenney's candor and of that of his abettors. Smith and Stull, who, with evidence like this before them, can yet charge the delay in the arming of Minor's regiment to the Secretary of War ? It would seem, that the miserable creatures by whom the War-minister was surrounded and beset, at that time, had * Report of Committee of Investigation, p. 322. t Report of Investigating Committee, p. 232. 9 determined to attribute to him the faults, or mistakes of every other public agent. If Colonel Carberry was absent from his post, General Armstrong was to be blamed. If Colonel Carberry's deputy was slow in his movements, the Socretary of War was to be made answerable. 3d. I have now arrived at the third and last branch of inquiry. It remains for me to examine whether General Armstrong ever refused to give the necessary orders for the concentration of troops, or withheld from General Winder any assistance which it was in his power to offer. With respect to the first point, Mr. McKenney asserts that he did, and triumphantly refers to the evidence of General Walter Smith, " an up- right and honorable man, whose word needs no backer." I will give this upright witness fair play, and copy his evidence in extenso : " During the period, I had but one occasion of personal communication with Gen. Armstronij, but well remember that there was a general and indignant com- plaint among the officers of the District having ofikial communications with him, for his great apathy and inertness in regard to the defences of the District, and his frequent discourtesy towards those who pressed him on the subject. The instance of my personal communication with him was at the Battalion Old Fields, on the day precedii}3; the engagement at Bladensburg. At the time. Gen. Winder was absent reconnoitring, and in his absence I commanded the troops encamped at that place, numbering somewhat more than two thousand, and embracing in that number, be- sides my immediate Brigade, Commodore Barney's men and some other auxiliaries. The enemy were then but a short distance from us, with more than double our force, and we were expecting an attack during the day, which we had prepared to resist. At this sta-je a messenger arrived incamp frnm Col. JJ/mor, commanding a regiment from Fairfax county, Va., with a note to Gen. Winder, stating that he was approaching with his force, about a thousand strong, under orders for Alexan- dria; but the information received led him to believe it more important that he should move, instead, to Washington, so as to unite with the force then under Gen. Winder's immediate command, and an immediate reply would reach him at the point where the roads to the two cities diverged. " In the absence of Gen. Winder, this note was brought to, and read by, me ; and feeling the importance of such an accession to our force, I at once communicated it to Gen. Armstrong, then in camp, with a suggestion that, in the circumstances, he should issue the requisite order to Col. Minor. He treated the matter with great indifference, and in a very unsatisfactory way declined to give any order. I then carried the note to Mr. Madison, also in camp, who entertained a different view ; and on being told of Gen. Armstrong's course, gave the order direct to Col. Minor to move on to Washington, so as to unite with its. Under this order. Col. Minor reached Washington the same evening, but failed to unite with us at Bla- densburg in time to participate in the engagement, because of the delay at the War Department in furnishing his force with arms and ammunition." It is certain that the Ex-Superintendant believes, that with the help of this evidence, he has got me in a tight place. He presents the follow, ing dilemma, on the sharp point of one of the horns of which, I must, in his opinion, necessarily be empaled. "Either General Armstrong did not believe, on the 23d of August, that Washington would be at- tacked, and if so, Mr. McKenney's first narrative stands confirmed ; or else he did believe in the danger of the capital, and for a treache- rous purpose, refused to give an order for the march of a thousand gallant Virginians.'^ This looks formidable enough ; yet, let me see whether tliat "special pleading" which is shown in a close research of documentary evidence, or that "sophistry " which consists in draw- ing just conclusions from established premises, may not help me in my distress. 2 10 The evidence furnished by Brigadier Smith, after the lappe of more than thirty years, contains two important assertions : 1st. That on the 23d of August, during the absence of General Winder, a message was received at Battalion Old Fields, from Colonel Minor, requesting orders to proceed with his regiment to Wasliington ; and that Smith communicated this message to General Armstrong, who refused in give the order. 2d. That in consequence of this refusal, the order, at Smith's soJicilation, was sent directly to Minor by President Madison, who was then in the camp. Now, I pronounce, without liesitation, these pretended facts to be, what in the spirit of charity I will call, mental delusions of Mr. Smith. That they are false is proved, not by the vague recollections of a superannuated witness, but by testimony furnished to the investigating committee, two months after the capture of Washington, when events were still fresh in the memory of all, — by Lieut. Colonel Tayloe, and Colonel Minor. Hear Colonel Tayloe : — " I arrived at Washington on Sunday night, late (the 21st), and reported myself early the next morning to General Armstrong, who directed me to meet him at the War Otiice at 12 o'clock, and from whom I received the following order: " War Department, Av^vst 22d, 1S14. " General Order. — General Douglas will assemble his brigade at Alexandria, and hold it there subject to orders. " J. Armstrong." •' I immediately proceeded with all speed and executed the above order. Hav- ing received General Douglas's communication, I hastened to Washington and handed it to General Armstrong on Tuesday night, the 23d; wh'en he instantly sent me back to Virginia with the following orders, and with verbal directions to forward 07i the Virginia drafts with all possible speed." " War Department, Jlngust 23rf, ISI4. " General Onr}Kn.—Lieute7iant Colonel Minor will repair to Washington with the regiment under his command with the utmost despatch. He will report 071 his arrival at Washington to Colonel Carberry, of the 36lh regiment of if. S. Infa7itry, a7id 7nake a requisition for ar/ns and ammunition. " J. Armstrong." " War Department, August '23d, 1S14. " General Order. — All militia now m and marchijig to Alexandria (be- sides that of Colonel Minor), will march immediately to Washington. " J. Armstrong." " For the purpose of executing those orders without loss of time, and after communicating by a dragoo7i loitli Colonel Minor, I proceeded down the north- ern neck to General Hungerford's brigade, then encamped at Seldon, near Potomac creek. " General Armstrong manifested much zeal and earnest solicitude for the de- fence of Washington, :im] instructed me to use my best exertions in hastening the troops for the attainment of that desirable object.* " John Tayloe, " Lieut. Col. of Cavalry, M.D.C. "Hon. R. M. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee of Investigation." Thanks to " special pleading," I already perceive an enlargement of * Report of Committee of Investigation, p. 234. 11 space and breathe more freely. Let us see whether Colonel Minor's testimony will not set me completely at my ease : — «' On Sunday, the 2Ist [I] received orders throup;h Brigadier General Douglas to repair with a detachment of ninety nnen, that had been previously placed in detail, to march at a moment's warning to the aid of General Hungerford, whose head-quarters were either in the counties of Westmoreland, King George, or Northumberland ; and to make one other requisition of a htmdred and forty men exclusive of officers, ^nd order them to the aid of General Winder, city of Wash- ington. On Monday evening, the 22d, received a verbal message from the Pre- sident, by Mr. John Graham, to hasten on the troops which had been ordered from my regiment [the li;^0 men] which w'ill more fully appear by said Graham's letter to General Winder, to which I beg leave to refer the committee. After informing Mr. Graham of the purport of the orders 1 had received, we both con- cluded it would be proper for him to return to Washington, and have the orders first alluded to countermanded, so as to justify me in marching with 7?iy M'^o/e force to the city ; which co7isisted as well as I can recollect of six himdred in- fantry and about 07ie himdrcd cavalry ; and the said Graham returned to Wren's tavern on Tuesday evening, the 23d, with General Winder's orders, written ON THE SAME LETTER TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED THE COMMITTEE. On receipt of which I took up my line of march, &c., &c.* " George Minor, Col. Com. 60th Regiment." The reader will probably agree with me, that I have effected my escape from the awkward position in which General Smith's imaginhtgs had placed me. The evidence of Minor, given under solemn circum- stances, and before a high national tribunal, shows, — that the orders under which he marched, emanatedyrom General Winder, who could not, as Smith says, have been absent from the camp, since he wrote the order re- quired ; consequently, the whole story about the communication by Smith of Minor's message to General Armstrong, and to the President, is a fabrica- tion or a delusion ; more, it is shown, that the intercourse between Mr. Madison and Colonel Minor was limited to a verbal message, having for its object the march of one hundred and ninety men, and sent on the '2'2d of August. That Minor's request for orders arrived in camp, on the 23d, after the President and Secretary had left it, and that neither of them knew anything about it, is placed beyond the reach of all cavilling by the preceding and following facts: on the 13th of August, Gen. Armstrong had been served with a special rule forbidding him to " issue any order having for its object the movement of troops,^' unless previously submitted to and approved by the President. f Now, the Secretary, as Tayloe shows, did issue an order for the march to Washington of Minor's and other militia corps, on the 23d — this order must, therefore, have received the President's sanction. Now, if Mr. Madison had known anything of Winder's communication to the Virginia Colonel, he would certainly have told the Secretary that any order from him relative to that move- meat was unnecessary. The fact is, that the commanding General in • Report of Committee, &-c., p. 231. t This order ia the President's hand-writing is in my possession. 12 the camp, and the Secretary in the Cabinet, both saw the necessity of a concentration of force, and gave almost simultaneous orders to effect it. — Is this "sophistry," Mr. McKenney ? The reader can now estimate with some exactness, the degree of credit which is due to the historical evidence of that " upright man whose word needs no backer." Had this gentleman, instead of trusting to a treacherous memory, or giving the reins to a more treacherous imagination, consulted existing documents, he would have spared me trouble, and himself 5/ta/;;e.* Let us now see how far the written and verbal communications between the Secretary and the Government, and commanding General, are of a nature to support the charge against the former, of" apathy" and " neglect." One note to Mr. lAIadison is in existence which proves, that when the War-minister found him on the point of sacrificing the fleet without fighting, he cautioned him against this misstep, and in a spirit almost prophetic, pointed out the evil results of this measure. "Should you destroy tile fleet without fighting, will it not lead to further aggression? A soldier's objects increase and multiply with his good fortune." In his letter to General Winder he was equally desirous to set and keep him right. On the 19th of August, he advised him to push forward his light troops and harass and impede the enemy ; on the 22d he counselled him to throw a corps on the flank of the British army, menace its communications, and paralyse its march wiiether directed to Baltimore or Washington ; on the 23d, according to Colonel McClane, he counselled Winder against risking a pitched battle in the field with raw, inefficient troops, and recommended the occupation of the Capital and grounds adjacent, as affording the best position of defence against an attack of rapid and Cossack-like nature. Verily, had there been found among the defenders of Wasliington, a little more of the same "apathy" which marked the conduct and advice of tlic Secretary, a day of disgrace would have been turned into a day of glory. I believe, I have thus answered, fairly and fully, the charges of apathy and neglect, so industriously circulated against the Secretary of War. Let me now see, if I cannot find in the conduct of the Smiths and McKenneys, an efficient cause of the national disaster ; something more criminal than " neglect," more disgraceful than " apathy." The * In a brief notice of Mi\ McKenney's card, I advised him to "look before he leaped." H;td he given the same caution to his friend Smith — this rash gentle- man would not now lie stretched in the gutter. Let me ask Mr. Smith, in his recumbent position, a few questions: How came it, that in liis long and minute report to the Committee of Investigation, in ISl'l, — a report in ichich he soxif^ht every possible occasion of attributing blame to the Secretari/ of War, — he should not have alluded to the latter's refusal to give Minor an order to march to Washington 1 A circumstance so decisively pointing out to the Investigating Committee, the author of the national calamity, was kept hidden by the " upright man whose word needs no baclcer," when its production was necessary to the ends of justice. Wliat caused tiiis suppression of important testimony, when the country demanded the truth and the irhule trnth ? Why was it kept '• bottled up" to this hour, and ordy uncorked to serve the special ])itrpose of his friend McKenney? These arc questions which Master Walter will lind it difficult to answer. 13 evidence I shall adduce will not be evidence of to-dmj, but statements made by disinterested witnesses, before the Investigating Committee. It will be remembered, that General Smith and liis brigade were encamped at Battalion Old Fields, about eight miles from Washington, on the evening of the 23d. Winder, the commanding General, having some experience in surprises, and distrusting the temper of his troops, determined to fall back that night upon the city. The resolution was not improper, although evincing perhaps too much caution, as the enemy were many miles distant. There are two ways, however, of making a retreat: the one, slow and orderly, — the other, rapid and disorderly. Let us see what was tlie character of the liackward movement, performed by Smith, and his brigade. Hear the evidence of Mr. John Law : " About 5 o'clock, p.m , after having remained some time in line of battle, we were ordered to retreat to \Vashington, and although cur march '.vas exfreme/y rapid, yet orders were occasionally given to hiirri/ o?i the men. The march literally became a 7-un of eight miles, and the propriety of this rapid movement which unnecessinly fatigued and dispirited the men, may be tested by the fact, that the main body of the enemy bivouacked that night on the Melwood estate, more than three miles distant from the ground we had left.* Hear Captain Burch of the Artillery : '-'Just as I had despatched the second division of my guns, the Aide-de-Camp of Brigadier Smith [Thomas L. McKenney] gave me orders to move with the whole as fast as possiile. As the main body had by this time got a considerable distance a head, I was unable to get up with the rear till they arrived at the Eastern Branch Bridge, when my men were so greatly fatigued, that they could scarcely stand by their guns." "j" What a picture ! the troops staggering under the weight of their arms, and breathless from the rapidity of their march, whilst foremost rode Smith, King Arthur of the Georgetown Round Table ; and press- ing his panting courser, came McKenney (" sharp rowel" among tlie Knights of the Spur), urging the exhausted artillery-men to efforts beyond nature, though there was not an enemy within four leagues ! Let us now examine the state of feeling that existed in the brigade, after the run of eight miles : hear Dr. Cattlet. He had slept within a mile of Battalion Old Fields, and ascertained at daybreak, that the enemy were not yet there. He rode to tlie city, which he reached at 8 o'clock, and thus relates what he saw and heard : " The first news I heard on entering the city, was, that the enemy was within tico and a half miles coming to the bridge, and there appeared to be a continual succession oi false reports, and false alarms. The enemy were perti- naciously represented to be at least nine thousand. There appeared to be an impression with our troops, generally, that the enemy were much more formidable than appearances would justify.:]: And oy whom were created these unhappy impressions, which con- trih'.ied so much to dispirit the troops ? By the reconnoitrcrs, among w'.om figured, according to hisown account, Mr. Thomas L. McKenney, * Report of the Committee of Investigation, p. 315. t Report r. p. 257. X Report of the Committee, p. 3Q7. 14 who, seeing with the eyes of terror, magnified platoons into regiments, and regiments into brigades.* Is this " sophistry ?" Let me now direct the reader's attention to the following facts, each one of which has been fully established : 1st. Mr. Madison made the plan of defence ; he consulted the Secre- tary of War only in common with other cabinet ministers. 2d. Mr. Madison selected the military commander, against the advice and recommendation of the Secretary. 3d. Mr. Madison served General Armstrong on the 13th of August, a few days before the opening of the campaign, with a rule forbidding him " to issue any orders having for their object the movement of troops, without the President's sanction and approval.^' And what was the motive for these extraordinary proceedings? To secure the monopoly oHaurels for the children of the "Old Dominion." Is it not clear as the sun at noon day, that if the enemy had been re- pulsed. General Armstrong would not have been allowed any credit for that result? He would have been met with the indubitable facts — that he had not /orwed the plan of defence, selected the victorious commander, or issued any military order except at the President's suggestion. But when " Hannibal reached the gates," and it became suspected that the coveted wreath might prove of nettles, Mr. Madison turned to the Secre- tary for support, and conferred a momentary command, withdrawn when the President reached the battle-field, and had time to consult with somebody. f Let me close by presenting Mr. McKenney with a dilemma more difficult than his own. If the charges of apathy and neglect brought by him and his Georgetown friends against General Armstrong were founded in error and prejudice, then is my cause gained ; if, on the other hand, they were true, what are we to tiiink of the conduct of the patriotic Madison, who, knowing these facts, yet almost at the last hour stood ready to confer upon the " apathetic " and " negligent " Secre- tary, the highest proof of confidence — the direction of the army ?:{: I have said, that another question of minor importance to be settled between Mr. McKenney and myself was his story of Carrol's public • Cannot the reader now touch with his finger one of the causes which led these Georgetown heroes, Smith, McKenney and others, to got up an excitement against General Armstrong and charge to his apathy, the effect of their misconduct 1 The same motive that prompted them then is operative now, and pervades and perverts their vvholetestiinony. t Without the aid of spectacles, one may see the first traces of a "plot" in these preliminary arrangements. X See letter of" George'W. Campbell to the Committee ; also General Armstrong's letter to the same. — Pp. 10, 8-2, Report, &c. What was Gen. Armstrong's conduct when this proposition was made .' Did he refuse the command .' Did he say, as he might justly have said, " after trusting to others so long, you have no right to burden me with the resjionsibility of a game almost lost ?" No, even then he was willing to tempt his furtuno ; but, happily, *' there is a divinity above that shapes our ends," and the authority given him was withdrawn at the last moment. Had he beea actually in command, all my eSbrla against bis enemies, would have been vain. 15 affront offered to General Armstrong at Windmill Hill. The Ex-Super- intendant is solicitous to prove what, if true, would only show, (hat his accomplice, Carrol, was a bully and a braggart, who, when backed by a military mob, dared to face a better man than himself. But the evidence brought forward is of the most suspicious cliaracter. The principal witness. Smith, says that, "he first became aware of the Secretary's presence in the camp, by hearing from his quarters the voice of Carrol rejecting the proffered hand of General Armstrong." Now, without doubting the power, or the length of wise Walter Smith's ears, I may be permitted to remind him that to give evidence with regard to a fact which is only a subject of vision, it is necessary to see. Besides, it has been shown, that the Brigadier's memory is so much impaired, or his imagination so active, that his testimony with respect to historical events cannot be received with too much caution. Mr. Stewart says, that he heard the story ; but he admits, at the same time, that he heard 7nany stories. " One attributing to the Secretary a criminal correspondence with a relative, — an officer of the British army, wounded at Bladensburg ; — another, laying to his charge a bitter sarcasm on the sheepish qualities of the Georgetown Brigade," &c., &c. Each and all, save the last, of a character so manifestly absurd, as to excite now nothing but contempt, although at the time of their concoction and circulation, they no doubt perniciously influenced the minds of many citizens, more worthy than wise. There remains the letter of a Mr. Mallory, who says that he heard Carrol say, that he had refused the Secretary's hand. What then? If Carrol said so, it would be a reason the more for doubting it. With Mr. Carrol, General Armstrong was then, and had long been, on no hand-shaking terms. The former had very decidedly taken part in the quarrel between his bosom friend Wilkinson, and the Secretary of War ; and notwithstanding Mr. McKenney's distaste for moral evidence (probably because it is moral) I must be allowed to assert, that the silence of Wilkinson, who, at that time, was hunting through every purlieu of Washington, in search of slanders against the Secretary, in order to engraft and preserve them in his Memoirs, is of more force to show the story false, than all Mr. McKenney's hearsay evidence, to prove it true. Mr. McKenney indulges in a smile at my ignorance of military usages, because I had asserted in my Review that as the " aide of Gene- ral Smith," his services in the equipment of troops must have been limited to the brigade. By cunningly altering my text, and substituting Major General Van Ness for " General Smith," he seeks to fix upon me a blunder. Now, 1 never knew him as Van Ness's aid, nor has he offered any evidence but his own doubtful assertion, that in that capa- city he had any intercourse with the Secretary of M'^ar. The only proof he adduces to show that he knew General Armstrong at all, is a letter of Colonel Thompson, of Piscataway, who says, that when Adju- tant of his Legion in 1813, he despatched McKenney with a letter to the War Department, requiring a supply — not of arms — hu[ of diuretics and cathartics ; useful things no doubt, and cleansing to the bowels, but hardly to be considered as munitions of war, by any but an imaginative 16 man, like the Ex-Superintendant, who doubtless regarded them as such, because 1 lively to produce offensive operations. I have now reached that point when in turn I must be the assailant, and furnish evidence to justify the charge made by me against Mr. McKenney, of having been one of the principal agents in the George- town Plot. In my Review I said, — " Though these military mummeries fur- nished employment for the mass, there were a select few who turned the three days of the Secretary's absence to a more personal account. A committee purporting to represent the citizens of the district, w^as chosen to wait on tlie President, and demand General Armstrong's removal from office." No one wlio has not read Mr. McKenney's pamphlet can understand, how the meaning of these two plain sen- tences could be so far distorted as to represent me as asserting that "all the citizens of the district iield a meeting, and deputed Mr. Mc- Kenney and his associates as their representatives." Is it not obvious that I limit the movement to a kw plotters, who met, not in the public square, but in a more fitting place for their deliberations, some obscure tavern of the suburbs ? Is it not clear as day, that I do not speak of a committee openly appointed to express the ivill of the citizens of Georgetown, but of a set of men pretending to that character ? But Mr. McKenney has offered negative testimony to show that a plot having for its object the political ruin of General Armstrong was never heard of — no, not even by Brigadier Smith, who " has so quick an ear for distant sounds." Let me refer to a witness who Jieard at least a " rumor " of it. It is a person who has written a book entitled " Memoirs Official and Personal, with Sketches of Travels AMONG THE NORTHERN AND SoUTHEKJM INDIANS, EMBRACING A War EX- CURSION, AND DESCRIPTION OF SCENES ALONG THE WESTERN BORDERS." In the second chapter of this work the author tells us, that after General Armstrong w^is superseded in the office of Secretary of War by Mr. Monroe, " It was 21'hispered that this change had been produced by the undermining agency of Mr. Monroe. Whence the rumor came, or by whom it was originated, no one knew; but it remained a source of deep disquiet to harass Mr. Monroe to the hour of his death.'' Having thus shown to the ex-Superintendant's satisfaction that there was, at least, a " rumor " of the plot, let me now attempt to show its reality. Mr. McKenney seems to be blessed with one of those convenient memories, which, like india-rubber, may be either compressed, or .stretched to an indefinite extent. At times, he finds no difficulty in fishing up what he terms /ac/^ from the clear depth of his recollection; and after the lapse of thirty-two years, remembers, not only the sub- stance of opinions, but the very words in which they were expressed; at other times, he is a true non mi ricordo witness — a striking counter- part of Theodore Mnjocehi ; he has forgotten the snug closet where he passed a happy hour in the honorable society of the President, and as for the subject of their mysterious discourse, it seems blotted from his mind for ever. Not knowing the secret springs by which this elastic memory is moved, the attempt would be vain, on my part, to make him n recollect, and still more so, to draw from him an ackvow''c(lgmeni of the recollection. But, as far as the public is concerned, the following extracts from letters of individuals — whose superiority to Mr. McKenney in everything estimable, was such, that I deem it almost an affront to their memory to place their names in juxta-position with his — will show, that I ventured on no statement of facts, without sufficient authority. Let Mr. McKenney wipe the dust from his spectacles, and look at this. Extract from a letter of William Elliott, Esq., to General Armstrong, dated Washington City, October 14tli, 1815. " I have mada some inquiry, and have obtained snme information respecting the circumstances, attendinij; the G!or^etown dele^iation to the President; but have not as yet been fully able to ascertain alt the (acts; however, the following maybe rcHecI on as true. Messrs. Hanson, F.ditor of the Feder.il Republican, Washington Bowie, and Thotiias McK^cnney, at the request of several militia ofticers and others (amon^^st whom, I b.dieve, were Gen. Mason and Ciiarles Car- rol), waited on the President with a re(iuest to i-imove yuu from office ; or at least to deprive you of your authority in the District of Columbia. The President on being informed who were in waiting, and prr.bably knowin<; their mission, gave for answer, that he was busy, and could not then see them, but would be glad to see one of them at a more convenient time — probably designating Mr. McKenney; for he (Mr. McK ) waited on him afterwards, and was closeted with him above an hour. 'I'he result you know. More base, nor fouler means, were never taken (to my own knowledge and observation) than were taken to overthrow your well earned character, and just reputation." The reader will perceive, that the foregoing letter is the source from which my narrative was principally drawn. The inference, that *' McKenney carried back to his coadjulors the news only of a doubtful success." was clearly deducible from the fact, that, in order to quicken the fears and deliberation of Mr. Madison, it became necessary for the cabal, to get up the succe.ssful farce on Windmill Hill. It is obvious, that if the President's mind had been fully made up, and his promise given to McKenney at the closet consultation, the necessity for any dis- play of martial indignation, on the part of the Knights of the Spur, would not have existed. As corroborative proof of the reality of the pht, and of the character of the plotters, 1 shall now offer the following extract from a letter of General Desha, of Kentucky, written at Washington, September 20th> 1814, or less than a month after the occurrence of the event to which it refers : — "I have a high opinion of the man who administers the p;ovcrnment : he pos- sesses a good heart : — but, if he had studied the book of nature a little more, — if he had a more thorough ktiowled;ie of man;, he would not be so often imposed on by designing sycophants, nor would he be driven from a correct course to conciliate a faction who will be satisfied with nothing short of getting into power." Had the old soldier of Kentucky searched his vocabulary for ex- pressions which should most deafly designate the Georgetown associa- tion, he could not have found any half so appropriate as the terms em- ployed: '^designing sycophants.'^ There is, positively, in these words, 3 18 a pictorial power : they portray the agents of the intrigue as distinctly as the subsequent words, '• driven from a correct course, to conciliate a faction," represent the reluctant yielding of President Madison, and the motive of liis wavering conduct. Let me now place before the reader the letter of a private gentleman of Baltimore, who — removed by taste and temper from the evil in- fluences of political strife— had, unlike Mr. McKenney, no interest in disguismg truth, to promote either his own ends, or tliose of others. To the following extract I especially invite the reader's attention, since it places the reality of the Georgetown intrigue beyond the shadow of a doubt. John Holmes, Esq., to Gen. Armstrong, October 15th, 1814 : "Washinsrton Bowie is in town from W. He says— and I believe him — that the day before you returned to Washington, Madison, Monroe, Mason, and others of that stamp had a meeting ; the result was, that some atonement must be made for the disgrace at W., and that you were fixed on as the scape-goat." The reader has now before him the " precious confession " of one who was present at the secret council, where the victim was designated for the sacrifice. For the honor of human nature, and Mr, Madison's own, I cannot believe that he was one of that council : doubtless, all that Bowie meant to intimate was, that the President had identified himself with the conspiracy by receiving its deputation, and finally yielding to its requirements. But, with respect to " Mason, and others of that stamp," the evidence of a co-conspirator is conclusive, and I cannot sufficiently admire the modesty of Mr. McKenney, who, at this late date, would fain get rid of the credit belonging to the part which he took in this subtle, political manoeuvre. Certainly, when afterwards he became a candidate for ofiice, he was not quite so willing to renounce what formed in fact his only substantial claim to govern- ment patronage. But I may be met by the question — Who and what were the writers of these letters? Elliot was for many years chief clerk of the Patent Ofiice, under Dr. Thornton, and city Surveyor by appointment of the corporation of Wasiiington. " Until the day of his death," says a much esteemed correspondent,* " he was considered a man of probity, and one in whose statements every confidence could be placed.' He was a mathematician, too, of some repute, and I note this circumstance, because it has been remarked, that no men are more scrupulous in their admission of facts, than those whose minds have been disciplined by the study of the exact sciences. General Desha was, at the time he wrote, a distinguished member of Congress, and subsequently go- vernor of his native State ; and Holmes, as before said, was a worthy, high principled gentleman of Baltimore, who enjoyed during life the esteem, afiection, and credit of all wlio knew him. And now let me call the reader's attention to the fact, that these letters furnish no hegged evidence ; they were written by persons not having the remotest • Colonel C. K. Gardiner, Washington city. 19 connexion with each other; moving in different social circles, and deriving their information from sources as various as their tempers and pursuits : yet, mar]< how each directly points to the same conclusion — the existence of a plot at Georgetown to fix on General Armstrong the whole blame of the Bladensburg defeat. If Elliot's letter stood alone, it might be supposed to convey mistaken intelligence; but it receives additional strength from Desha, and "confirmation strong" in all essential particulars, from Bowie's confession, as detailed by Holmes. Springing from sources far apart, these streams of testimony flow together, and form, when united, a current of truth rapid enough to sweep before it every dike, that startled guilt can erect. But my budget of evidence is not yet exhausted. Among those whom the perils and exigencies of the British invasion brought to Washington, was a gallant soldier, who, though advanced in years, felt no diminution of the fire and spirit of other days. I allude to the late Colonel Allan McClane, a distinguished officer of the revolution, who, throughout this brief campaign, was usefully employed as Volunteer Aide of General Winder. Among his papers, now preserved in the Histo- rical Society of New York, is a sketch of the Bladensburg business, which, after severely touching upon the misconduct of the troops, ter- minates with the following words. "Such reflections are too mortifying; to dwell on. I must leave [the subject] to the impartial historian, but who will live to see the people of the United States prepared to receive the truth, and where is the man who will state facts ? You refused to breast the enemy, and when you have disgraced yourselves and your arms, you turn on the first men in office, denounce them as traitors, drive them into retirement, and cover your cowardice by your ingratitude. The manner in which General Armstrong ivas treated by the people of Columbia, after General Ross had retired to his ships, is sufficient to dampen the ardor of every honest patriot, and make us who have passed through the war of independence, retire from the ungrateful scene. That will astonish posterity, when the truth dare be told." High minded old man ! the fear which he felt lest the darkness of history should prove eternal, was not without foundation; he had marked the reign of obscurity for more than twenty years; had heard the denunciation of the innocent; seen the triumph of the iniquitous; and learned to distrust the maxim, " Magna est Veritas et prevalebit." Without indulging the ambitious hope of " astonishing posterity," I may be allowed to believe, that I have done something towards the elucida- tion of truth ; the dawn of a better day is visible, and my only I'egret is, that the gallant soldier of Lee's Legion is not living to see it and rejoice. I shall now take my leave of Mr. McKenney. His occupations in this world have been various — he has been a holiday soldier, a political hack, a Superintendant of Indian Affairs, an itinerant lecturer, and is now, an author by profession. Certainly, I should not have dis- turbed him in his literary speculations, had he not thought proper to insert in his book, a chapter of insidious calumny, directed against my father, in which he has impudently inserted the words, " General Armstrong vindicated," in order, doubtless, that the General's surviving Iriends and relatives, looking only at the title, should purchase his trashy volume, Ijcfore the error could be detected. Should any reader believe, that cither in my first or second notice of this gentleman's productions, I have ^vritten with too much severity, I beseech him to reflect on the nature of the provocation, and to' remember, that in a cause like mine, Charity itself would be merciless. As every reader of this Pamphlet cannot be expected to have within his reach, the means ot" ascertaining whether my references to, and quotations from, pub- lic and private documcnis, are correct ; and, as {'romlheunscnipulovs character of the persons with wliom I have to deal, 1 must, as fnr as possible, guard against misrepresentation ; I sought, and obtained, the following statement, from a gentleman of the highest character, generally known and as generally esteemed. " At Mr. Armstrong's request, 1 have examined the several references in his Pamphlet, to the printed documents, MS. letters, and the rule served on Gen. Armstrong, on the 13th August, 1814, prohibiting him from iiisui7ig any orders to officers ''relatiie to the moiemevt of troops, without the President's previous sanction, and find them correctly made ; and have no doubt of the genuineness of the papers and documents thus used by him. JOSEPH G. COGSWELL. New York, February 23, 1847." B C24 EXAMINATION OF THOMAS L. M^'KENNEY'S REPLY TO THE REVIEW OF HIS NARRATIVE, & BY KOSCIUSZKO ARMSTRONG NEW YORK: B. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 112 FULTON STREET. 1847. iF- m. t & i I ^ ,v . ^ ^^^ .,. ^-^ '^"' 4 o^ ' , Iff p>^ : ^ ■^ -^ .SS c, o " <= , <>. o ^. %^:^ / ^ v\ " c , ^ 3 V SAcT c .^ o > -^ .0^:,"*,^^ <:^ ^0' •^^ .^' o_ .^-^^:^\o-^ "v^^^f^^^^ >c > ,C,^ vP. ^* cT "^^ -.^^^^Z . '-V -^^ »^^^ -r^"^ ^^-v^. -^ ' V "' .V O -,,oO ^0 ^O'i-, .v I* .0^ K' ^■^^ — >>o