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THE 
 
 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 PRECEDING THE REBELLION 
 
 THE TRUE STORIES OF SUMTER 
 AND PICKENS 
 
 THOMAS M. ANDERSON 
 
 \ 
 
 LIEUT. COL. U. S. A. 
 
 G 
 
 NEW YORK 
 P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 
 27 * 29 WEST 23D STREET 
 1882 
 

 COPYRIGHT BY 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 1882 
 
 BT 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 TO THE OLD FRIENDS OF 
 
 GENERAL ROBERT ANDERSON 
 
 THIS MONOGRAPH IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED BY 
 THE AUTHOR 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 ' ' O Conspiracy ! 
 Sham'st thou to show thy dangerous brow by night, 
 When evils are most free ? Oh ! then, by day 
 Where wilt thou find a cavern dark enough 
 To mask thy monstrous visage ? Seek none, Conspiracy ; 
 Hide it in smiles and affability : 
 For if thou put thy native semblance on. 
 Not Erebus itself were dim enough 
 To hide thee from prevention." 
 
 Julius CiESAR. 
 
 I PURPOSE in this monograph to give an 
 account of the political conspiracies immedi- 
 ately preceding the Rebellion of 1861 against 
 the authority of the National Government of the 
 United States of America. 
 
 It would be absurd to assume that one of 
 the greatest civil wars of modern times was the 
 result of conspiracies. 
 
 The causes which led to it were far too deep 
 and strong to be controlled by the machinations 
 of politicians. 
 
 Nevertheless the outbreak of the Rebellion 
 was preceded by a number of conspiracies the 
 object of which, so far as the Southern leaders 
 were concerned, was to gain certain advantages 
 
2 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 by cunning 2S\A finesse before they resorted to 
 the arbitrament of war. 
 
 These plots are naturally connected with the 
 sieges of Forts Sumter and Pickens, with which 
 the struggle began. 
 
 In regard to the mere physical facts of the 
 siege of Sumter there is no mystery or dispute. 
 But as to the political history which gives it im- 
 portance, as to the complications which cul- 
 minated in the first passage at arms in the war, 
 there has been almost as much discussion as 
 there has been as to the guilt or innocence of 
 Mary of Scotland. 
 
 What pledges, if any, did Mr. Buchanan give 
 to the South Carolina Commissioners ? 
 
 What understanding, if any, did he have with 
 Messrs. Barnwell, Adams, and Orr as to the re- 
 enforcement or evacuation of the forts in Charles- 
 ton Harbor? 
 
 What pledges, if any, did Mr. Seward subse- 
 quently give in relation to Sumter ? 
 
 Was Major Robert Anderson, its commander, 
 deterred by orders or by his sympathy with the 
 South from opening fire on the Confederates 
 when they began placing batteries around him ? 
 
 All these questions have been mooted and 
 discussed heretofore with much less intellieence 
 than zeal. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION, 3 
 
 Now at last the publication of the official 
 records gives us a fair, critical, and historical 
 standpoint. 
 
 After the October elections in the fall of 1 860 
 had been carried by the Republicans, the elec- 
 tion of Mr. Lincoln in November became a 
 foregone conclusion. Knowing this, the people 
 of South Carolina took no pains to conceal their 
 intention of seceding from the Federal Union as 
 soon as the result of the Presidential election 
 was known. As the day of the election ap- 
 proached, the people of Charleston manifested 
 such a turbulent and rebellious spirit, that the 
 engineer officer in charge of the construction 
 parties working on the forts in the harbor asked 
 for permission to arm a number of his workmen 
 to protect the ordnance and ammunition stored 
 in Fort Sumter. 
 
 On the I St of October (i860) the Chief of 
 Ordnance wrote to Mr. Floyd, the Secretary 
 of War, recommending that the request of the 
 engineer officer be complied with, provided it 
 met the approval of the commanding officer of 
 Fort Moultrie. Singularly enough Mr. Floyd 
 approved this application. 
 
 The commanding officer of Fort Moultrie, 
 when the matter was referred to him, gave a 
 very hesitating approval of the application, ex- 
 
4 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 pressing grave doubts of the loyalty and relia- 
 bility of the workmen engaged on the forts, 
 and closed his letter (written November 8th) 
 by a recommendation that the garrison of Moul- 
 trie should be re-enforced, and that both Forts 
 Sumter and Castle Pinckney should be garri- 
 soned at once by companies sent from Old Point 
 Comfort (Fort Monroe). Subsequently he or- 
 dered the ordnance officer at the Charleston 
 Arsenal to turn over to him, for removal to Moul- 
 trie, all the small arms and fixed ammunition he 
 had in store. The attempt to make this trans- 
 fer was successfully resisted by the Charleston 
 mob, and the attempt abandoned. 
 
 This action of the commander of the troops 
 in the harbor, and his application for re-enforce- 
 ments, led to his prompt removal. The officer 
 thus summarily dealt with was Lieut. Colonel 
 J. L. Gardner, ist Artillery, a native of Massa- 
 chusetts, and an old veteran who had entered 
 the service in 1813. The South Carolina Com- 
 missioners, in their correspondence with Presi- 
 dent Buchanan, reminded him, with scant cour- 
 tesy, that Colonel Gardner had been removed 
 at the dictation of the South Carolina delegates, 
 because he had called for re-enforcements and 
 recommended the occupation of Fort Sumter 
 and Castle Pinckney. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 5 
 
 Major Robert Anderson was ordered to re- 
 lieve this officer and take command of Fort 
 Moultrie on November i5, i860. 
 
 If the Southern cabal that controlled the 
 War Department supposed that he would prove 
 more pliant and less loyal than his predecessor 
 they soon discovered their mistake. 
 
 Robert Anderson was born in Kentucky in 
 i8o5. Both his father's and mother's family 
 came from England to Virginia in 1635, and 
 removed from Virginia to Kentucky at the close 
 of the War of Independence.' 
 
 Eight of his blood relations were officers in 
 the Continental Army. His father, the Lieut- 
 Colonel of the I St Virginia Continental Infantry, 
 had been wounded at the battles of Trenton and 
 Savannah, and, singularly enough, had fought at 
 Charleston and had been taken prisoner there 
 by the British. 
 
 He subsequently acted as A. D. C. to General 
 Lafayette in his campaign against Corn wallis that 
 ended in the siege and capture of Yorktowno 
 
 At the close of the Revolutionary War he 
 
 ' Major Anderson's relatives in the Continental Army were : R. C. 
 Anderson, Lieut. -Col. 1st Va. ; Capt. John Anderson, 3d Va. Inft.; 
 Capt. Wm. Croghan, 4th Va. Inft.; Capt. John Marshall, 7th Va. 
 Inft. (afterward Chief-Justice U. S.) ; Brig.-Genl. George Rodger 
 Clark; Lieut. -Col. Jonathan Clark, 8th Va. Inft.; Capt. Geo. An- 
 derson, provisional navy. 
 
 The members of his family who were officers of the Regular and 
 Volunteer forces, during the war of the Rebellion were as follows : 
 
O POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 was selected by the officers of the Continental 
 Army to survey and locate the generous gift of 
 public land given to them by the State of Vir- 
 ginia. This selection was, I believe, made at 
 the first meeting of the Society of the Cincin- 
 nati. That he might carry out this work, he 
 was made first Surveyor-General of the Virginia 
 military land district. 
 
 This present of land was all that the Conti- 
 nental officers received for their seven years' 
 service in the war for independence. In pro- 
 posing one of their number to apportion to each 
 his distributive share, they naturally selected a 
 man in whose integrity and justice they had 
 perfect confidence. 
 
 This high sense of honor Major Anderson 
 inherited from his father. A more honest, 
 honorable, and chivalrous man never lived. 
 He was a Southerner,' and in a proper sense 
 
 Brig.-Genl. Robert Anderson ; Col. Chas. Anderson, 63d Ohio 
 Vol. (subsequently Governor of .Ohio) ; Col. N. L. Anderson, 6th 
 Ohio Vol.; Col. A. L. Anderson, ist Cal. Vol.; Capt. Wm. P. 
 Anderson, 6th Ohio Vol. (A. A. G. Dept. of Ohio) ; Capt, E. L. An- 
 derson, A. D. C; Maj.-Genl. Stanley ; Capt. F. P. Anderson, A. D. 
 C. ; Maj.-Genl. Schofield ; Capt. H. R. Anderson, 3d U. S. Vol.; 
 Major John Simpson, 154th Ind. Vol.; Lieut. -Col. Thomas M. An- 
 derson of the Regular Army ; Surg. Richard Logan, Ky. Vol., U. 
 S. A. 
 
 ' The following are the more prominent officers of our army and navy 
 who, although Southerners by birth, remained faithful to the National 
 Government. 
 
 In the Army: Winfield Scott, Geo. H. Thomas, Ord, Pope, 
 Rosseau, Meigs, Harney, Frank Blair, Buchanan, Buford, Bayard, 
 R. H, Williams, McKeever, Jos. Taylor, J as. Marten, Easton, 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 7 
 
 was a Southern sympathizer. He loved his 
 State and he loved his friends, and, from acci- 
 dental associations, most of his friends were 
 Southerners. But few men ever lived who came 
 so near having no political opinions and sympa- 
 thies whatever. He probably never voted in his 
 life. He used to say that his father's religion 
 and General Washington's politics were good 
 enough for him. The Ten Commandments, 
 the Constitution of the United States, and the 
 Army Regulations were his guides in life. For 
 the subject of this essay, for the political prob- 
 lem which his conduct subsequently brought to 
 the test of practical solution, he cared as little 
 as any man of his day. 
 
 He was sincerely religious and a soldier of 
 antique character and courage. Above all, he 
 was a follower of his flag. To him it was like 
 a sacrament, an outward sign of an inward grace. 
 It was his symbol of duty. He always saw upon 
 its folds " In hoc signo vinces." 
 
 In the war that followed, eleven of his immedi- 
 
 Tompkins, Murray, Cuyler, Simons, Wm. Hammond, J. F. Ham- 
 mond, Newton, Benit,, Laidley, Baylor, Davidson, Royall, E. B. 
 Alexander, A. J, Alexander, Dent, Getty, T. L. Crittenden, Marrow, 
 Elwell Otis, Lugenbeel, Dodge, Sprig, Carroll, Cooke, Ramsey, Holt, 
 Brice, T. J. Wood, Emery, Paul, Mcintosh, R. W. Johnson Lang, 
 Seawell, Hunter, French, Graham (old Pike), Burke (old Martin). 
 
 In the Navy : Farragut, John Rodgers, Patterson, Fairfax, Hop- 
 kins, Carter, Burrett, Young, Jouett, Russell, Stribling, Powell, 
 Craven, Radford, Turner, Lee, Jenkins, Sands, Steedman, Taylor, 
 Scott, Stembel, Middleton, Bache, Horner, Ward, Palmer, and 
 Harlan, all of high rank. 
 
8 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 ate family, including himself, held commissions 
 in the Union Army. 
 
 With these antecedents and influences, it 
 would have been strange indeed if Robert An- 
 derson had not been loyal to his country. 
 
 Nevertheless it is true, beyond reasonable 
 doubt, that the Secretary of War, when he sent 
 him to take command of the forces in Charles- 
 ton Harbor, fully believed that he would obey 
 all his orders and finally throw his fortunes 
 with the South. 
 
 The first letter he received from Major An- 
 derson after he assumed command of Moultrie, 
 dated November 23, i860, must have shaken 
 his faith. 
 
 In it he explains the gravity of the situation 
 and the inadequacy of his means of defence ; 
 expresses the conviction that the people of 
 South Carolina intended to seize all the forts in 
 the harbor by force of arms as soon as their 
 ordinance of secession was published ; he en- 
 larges on the importance of Sumter and Castle 
 Pinckney, demands reinforcements, notifies the 
 War Department that he will send in a requisi- 
 tion for a supply of ordnance for all the forts, 
 and says, finally : " Fort Sumter and Castle 
 Pinckney must be garrisoned immediately if 
 the government determines to keep command 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. g 
 
 of the harbor." The italics are his (page 76, 
 vol. i, " Rebellion Records"). 
 
 In passing through Washington City on his 
 way to Charleston, Major Anderson had seen 
 President Buchanan and the Secretary of War. 
 By the latter at least he had been cautioned to 
 avoid all collision with the people of Charleston, 
 to avoid disturbance, not to excite them, and so 
 on, in this strain of conciliatory weakness. His 
 subsequent letters and instructions were all 
 pitched in the same key. 
 
 There is no telling what disapproval and re- 
 proof Major Anderson's first letter might not 
 have brought down on his head, for a much less 
 decided letter had caused the removal of Col- 
 onel Gardner, had not a new and unexpected 
 element been introduced into the controversy. 
 
 The venerable patriot, Lewis Cass, the Secre- 
 tary of State, suddenly denounced submission 
 as treasonable, and supported Major Anderson's 
 demand for reinforcements. Two other mem- 
 bers of the Cabinet seem to have supported Mr. 
 Cass. This was a political bomb-shell, and with 
 this begins the political history of the Sumter 
 episode. 
 
 To appreciate fully the situation we must re- 
 call the names of the men then in power at 
 Washington. 
 
lO POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 James Buchanan and John C. Breckenridge 
 were President and Vice-President. Buchanan's 
 first Cabinet were Cass, Cobb, Floyd, Toucey, 
 Thompson, Holt, and Black. Jefferson Davis 
 was Chairman of the Military Committee in the 
 Senate. The men in control of the War De- 
 partment were Floyd, Cooper, Joe Johnson, 
 Taylor, Craig, De Russy, Don Carlos Buell, 
 Fitz-John Porter, and Withers. 
 
 In the Cabinet, Cobb, Floyd, Toucey, and 
 Thompson were rebels or submissionists. They 
 had the ear of the President. In the War De- 
 partment, Floyd, Cooper, Johnson, Taylor, and 
 Withers were Southerners. Taylor, Craig, and 
 De Russy were loyal, but had no influence. 
 Buell and Porter afterward proved loyal, but at 
 that time were in Floyd's confidence, or at least 
 Floyd had confidence in them. Porter, then 
 Assist. Adjutant-General, made an inspection of 
 the forts in Charleston Harbor a few days be- 
 fore Anderson reached there. His attention 
 had evidently been called to the importance of 
 Castle Pinckney by Colonel Gardner, for in his 
 report he says of it : 
 
 " Castle Pinckney commands Charleston, and 
 its armament is complete. Here the powder 
 belonging to the arsenal in the city is stored. 
 A company can be accommodated here, while a 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. II 
 
 small force under an officer would secure it 
 against surprise or even a bold attack of such 
 enemies likely to undertake it." 
 
 But he had not the moral courage to recom- 
 mend its occupation. The report closes with 
 this sentence and signature of evil omen : 
 " Under present circumstances I would not rec- 
 ommend its occupation. Very respectfully, etc., 
 F.-J. Porter, Assistant Adjt.-General " (page 72, 
 Ibid). 
 
 Why not recommend it ? Oh, bitter shame 
 to us ! 
 
 Within two months we have a set of so- 
 called Commissioners writing to the President 
 of this nation these insulting words : 
 
 " For the last sixty days you have had in 
 Charleston Harbor not force enough to hold the 
 forts against an equal enemy. Two of them 
 were empty, one of those two the most impor- 
 tant in the harbor ; it could have been taken at 
 any time. You ought to know better than any 
 man that it would have been taken but for the 
 efforts of those who put their trust in your 
 honor." Signed. " Barnwell, Adams, Orr." 
 
 Thanks to this peace-at-any-price policy, this 
 was an insult we had to endure. The circum- 
 stance that prevented an officer of the United 
 States Army from recommending the occupation 
 
12 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 of a United States fort, was the threat of a rebel 
 mob. 
 
 General Porter's report was written on the 
 nth of November. On the 12th Mr. Humph- 
 ries, the ordnance store-keeper at Charleston 
 Arsenal, writes to the Chief of Ordnance : 
 
 " Sir. — In view of the excitement now exist- 
 ing in this city and State, and the possibility of 
 an insurrectionary movement on the part of the 
 servile population, the governor has tendered, 
 through General Schnierle, of South Carolina 
 Militia, a guard of a detachment of a lieutenant 
 and twenty men for this post, which has been 
 accepted." 
 
 What delightful protection ! How disinter- 
 ested ! The wolves offer to protect this pet 
 lamb against the geese ! On the 20th, Brevet 
 Colonel Benjamin Huger,' U. S. A., soon of the 
 C. S. A., assumes command of the arsenal by 
 order ; he writes back at once "that Mr. Humph- 
 ries' prudence and discretion meet his com- 
 mendation." So a wolf in sheep's clothing was 
 sent down to defend the fold. 
 
 Next in order we have a letter from S. 
 Cooper, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., soon to be 
 
 ' Huger, pronounced Hugee. Benj. Huger was a graduate of the 
 Military Academy in the class of 1825. He was twice brevetted for 
 gallantry in battle in the Mexican war. He resigned from the Federal 
 army in i36i, was made a Major-General in the Confederate army, 
 and led the advance of Lee's army at the battle of Malvern Hill. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 1 3 
 
 Adjutant-General, C S. A., asking Anderson as 
 to the condition " of the work under his com- 
 mand" (Fort Moultrie). 
 
 In reply (November 28th), Major Anderson 
 politely intimates that he considers himself in 
 command of all the works in the harbor, and will 
 put in estimates for ordnance to arm them all. 
 
 " Your letter," he says, " confines my answer to 
 what refers to the work under my charge. I can- 
 not but remark that I think its security from at- 
 tack would be more greatly increased by throw- 
 ing garrisons into Casde Pinckney and Fort 
 Sumter than by any thing that can be done in 
 strengthening the defences of tliis work." Fur- 
 ther on he says, in reply to the suggestion of 
 the honorable Secretary of War about th ex- 
 pediency of employing reliable persons not con- 
 nected with the military service for purposes of 
 fatigue and police, " I must say that I doubt 
 whether such could be obtained here." This 
 was a patriotic suggestion of the Hon. J. B. 
 Floyd, who subsequently resigned his place in 
 the Cabinet because President Buchanan had re- 
 fused to adhere to his promise as Secretary of 
 War, that the forts in Charleston Harbor should 
 not be reinforced or their status changed. 
 
 Mr. Floyd fully intended in this way to se- 
 cure the forts in the harbor to the Charleston 
 
14 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 people. For the same reason he allowed the 
 work of construction and repair to be carried on 
 by the Engineers. He knew that the people of 
 South Carolina had declared their intention of 
 seizinsf the forts as soon as their State Conven- 
 tion had passed their ordinance of secession. 
 Yet with charming consistency we find him 
 sending this telegram to Captain Foster of the 
 Engineers : 
 
 I have just received a telegraphic dispatch informing 
 me that you have removed forty muskets from Charles- 
 ton Arsenal to Fort Moultrie. If you have removed any 
 arms return them insiatitly. Answer by telegraph 
 
 John B. Floyd, 
 
 Secretary of War, 
 
 Colonel Huger had pledged himself to the 
 Governor of South .Carolina that no arms should 
 be removed from the arsenal. 
 
 The Secretary's telegram was dated December 
 19, i860, the day before the South Carolina 
 ordinance of secession was passed. 
 
 All of the occurrences above narrated were 
 prior to this portentous date. 
 
 Did President Buchanan know of these 
 pledges and orders ? Did they have his con- 
 currence and approval? Or did he, as Judge 
 Black now asserts, wish to send reinforcements 
 to Major Anderson } 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 1 5 
 
 On December 8th, four of the members of 
 the South Carolina Congressional delegation 
 went to see the President about the forts in 
 Charleston Harbor. On the 9th, five of them 
 signed the following joint note : 
 
 His Excellency, James Buchanan, 
 
 President of the United States : 
 
 In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we 
 now express to you our strong convictions that neither 
 the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of 
 the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest 
 the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston pre- 
 viously to the action of the Convention, and, we hope and 
 believe, not until an offer has been made, through an ac- 
 credited representative, to negotiate for an amicable ar- 
 rangement of all matters between the State and Federal 
 Government, provided that no reinforcement shall be sent 
 into those forts, and their relative military status shall 
 remain as at present. 
 
 John McQueen, 
 Wm. Porcher Miles, 
 M. L. Bonham, 
 
 W. W. BOYCE, 
 
 Lawrence M. Keitt. 
 Washington, December 9, i860. 
 
 In Mr. Buchanan's letter to Barnwell, Adams, 
 and Orr, the South Carolina Commissioners, 
 written December 31, i860, after quoting the 
 above letter and referring to the interview that 
 followed, he says : " It is well known that it 
 
1 6 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 was my determination, and this I freely ex-, 
 pressed, not to reinforce the forts in the harbor, 
 and thus produce a coUision, until they had been 
 actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence 
 that they were about to to be attacked." (Page 
 117, Ibid^ 
 
 Further on, in reply to their demand for the 
 withdrawal of all the troops from the harbor, he 
 said : " This I cannot do ; this I will not do. 
 Such an idea was never thought of by me in 
 any possible contingency." 
 
 As to this statement, the South Carolina 
 Commissioners and two of the South Carolina 
 Congressmen, Miles and Keitt, gave the Presi- 
 dent the lie circumstantial, if not the lie direct. 
 (" Rebellion Records," pp. 120 to 128, vol. i.) 
 
 In this connection the Commissioners wrote 
 to him : " You did not reinforce the garrisons 
 in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a 
 distinguished and veteran officer from the com- 
 mand of Fort Moultrie because he attempted to 
 increase his supply of ammunition. You re- 
 fused to send additional troops to the same gar- 
 rison when applied for by the officer appointed 
 to succeed him. You accepted the resignation 
 of the oldest and most efficient member of your 
 Cabinet rather than allow these garrisons to be 
 strengthened. You compelled an officer sta- 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 1/ 
 
 tioned at Fort Sumter to return immediately to 
 the arsenal forty muskets which he had taken 
 to arm his men." General Cass had resigned 
 his office of Secretary of State on the 17th of 
 December, i860, for the avowed reason that 
 the President had refused to reinforce Ander- 
 son, and was negotiating with open and avowed 
 traitors. 
 
 In 181 2 General Cass had, in conjunction 
 with General McArthur, preferred charges 
 against General Hull for surrendering a United 
 States fort to a foreign enemy. He could not, 
 with any consistency, consent, as a Cabinet 
 Minister, to the adoption of a line of policy 
 that would legitimately lead to a surrender of 
 important defensive works to a domestic foe. 
 But so far Mr. Buchanan's course had been con- 
 sistent with his declaration in his annual mes- 
 sage, " that he had no right, and would not at- 
 tempt, to coerce a seceding State." 
 
 How did it happen that he so soon laid 
 himself open to charges of tergiversation, in- 
 consistency, and duplicity ? 
 
 We must turn back a little and refer to some 
 earlier events, now necessary to consider. Ma- 
 jor Anderson had been sent to Charleston by 
 order of Lieutenant-General Scott. Before this 
 order had been issued, Anderson had been sum- 
 
1 8 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 moned to Washington by telegraph (November 
 12th). His order to relieve Colonel Gardner 
 was dated : Headquarters of the Army, New 
 York City, November i5, i860. 
 
 Anderson's first official letter was sent through 
 the regular channels. But he was ordered by 
 the Secretary of War, November 28th, to ad- 
 dress his communications in future only to the 
 Adjutant-General or direct to the Secretary 
 (page ^^\ From this time forth Major Ander- 
 son could only communicate with the enemies 
 of his government, and could only receive his 
 orders from those who were plotting its destruc- 
 tion. It is only fair to remember this, in con- 
 sidering Judge Black's assertion that General 
 Scott was responsible for the failure to reinforce 
 Sumter. 
 
 There is reason to believe that the President 
 himself was not made acquainted with all that 
 was transpiring. 
 
 On December 27th the following message 
 was delivered to the President from General 
 Scott. 
 
 Since the formal order, unaccompanied by special in- 
 structions, assigning Major Anderson to the command of 
 Fort Moultrie, no order, intimation, suggestion, or com- 
 munication for his government and guidance has gone 
 to that officer, or any of his subordinates, from the Head- 
 quarters of the Army , nor have any reports or communi- 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. I9 
 
 cations been addressed to the General-in-Chief from Fort 
 Moultrie later than a letter written by Major Anderson 
 almost immediately after his arrival in Charleston Har- 
 bor, reporting the then state of the work. 
 
 G. W. Lay, 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel, A. D. C. 
 The President of the United States. 
 
 If General Scott and the country at large 
 were kept in ignorance of Major Anderson's 
 wish to occupy Sumter, the leading rebels were 
 not. At the interview of the South Carolina 
 delegation with Mr. Buchanan, on December 
 9th, one of them explained to him what they 
 meant in their letter by the expression, " Rela- 
 tive military status " ; they mentioned the dif- 
 ference between Anderson occupying Forts 
 Moultrie and Sumter. They stated that the 
 latter would be equivalent to reinforcing the 
 garrison, and would, just as certainly as the 
 sending of fresh troops, " lead to the result 
 which we both desired to avoid." ( Vide Miles 
 and Keitt's statement, page 127.) They add- 
 ed : " When we rose to go, the President said, 
 in substance, ' After all, this is a matter of 
 honor among gentlemen. I do not know that 
 any paper or writing is necessary. We under- 
 stand each other. 
 
 In the President's letter of December 31st, 
 before referred to he does not deny the un- 
 
20 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 derstanding, but he justifies his change of 
 policy by the statement, that, in transferring 
 his command from Moultrie to Sumter, An- 
 derson " had acted on his own responsibility 
 and without authority, unless indeed he had 
 tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a 
 hostile act on the part of the authorities of 
 South Carolina, which has not yet been al- 
 lecred. He adds in substance that he would 
 have ordered Anderson back if the South 
 Carolina people had not taken the law in their 
 own hands and occupied the other forts. This 
 was mere excuse and evasion, and it must have 
 been deeply humiliating to the President to 
 have to resort to it. 
 
 Major Anderson occupied Sumter on the 
 night of December 26th, six days after the 
 South Carolina act of secession, and the day 
 before the Commissioners reached Washington. 
 
 The Carolina people feared the move, al- 
 though they thought, that as Major Anderson 
 was a Southerner, the Secretary of War could 
 control him. Nevertheless they had steam- 
 vessels patrolling the harbor to prevent che 
 crossing. 
 
 The North was surprised and delighted at 
 this bold move, because it was not generally 
 known that the occupation of Sumter had been 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION, 21 
 
 contemplated and advised by Major Anderson. 
 
 The rebel sympathizers were proportion- 
 ately disgusted because they feared it, but 
 thought they had influence enough to prevent it. 
 
 Secretary Floyd's disappointment may be 
 seen from this historic telesram. 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 Adjutant-General's Office, December 27, i860. 
 Major Anderson, Fort Moultrie : 
 
 Intelligence has reached here this morning that you 
 have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned 
 the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not be- 
 lieved, because there is no order for any such movement. 
 Explain the meaning of this report. 
 
 J. B. Floyd, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Charleston, December 27, i860. 
 Hon. J. B. Floyd, Secretary of War : 
 
 The telegram is correct. I abandoned Fort Moultrie, 
 because I was certain that if attacked my men must have 
 been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I 
 spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages, to keep the 
 guns from being used against us. 
 
 If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered 
 without a fight. 
 
 Robert Anderson, 
 
 Major, First Artillery. 
 
 It was this event that compelled Mr. Bu- 
 
22 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 chanan to change his policy within ten days 
 after Mr. Cass left his Cabinet. He was placed 
 under the coercion of events. Before, he had 
 been dealing with theories ; from that time forth 
 he found that he had to grapple with facts. 
 
 The first that confronted him was the unex- 
 pected and general outburst of patriotic senti- 
 ment in the North. As this sentiment ex- 
 tended also to the Northern Democracy, the 
 President had to give his approval to Major 
 Anderson's act. 
 
 So Mr. Floyd resigned the portfolio of war 
 on December 31st, the day Mr. Buchanan 
 wrote his reply to the South Carolina Com- 
 mission. Mr. Cobb had previously resigned. 
 These changes forced a reconstruction of the 
 Cabinet. Judge Black became Secretary of 
 State, Governor Dix took the Treasury, Holt 
 the War Office, and Stanton became Attorney- 
 General. Toucey and Thompson should have 
 been dismissed. In this Book of Revelations 
 we have an interesting despatch from Mr. 
 Thompson. 
 
 Washington, January, 4, 1861. 
 
 A. N. Kimball, Jackson, Miss. : 
 
 No troops have been sent to Charleston, nor will be 
 while I am a member of the Cabinet. 
 
 J. Thompson. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 23 
 
 Mr. Toucey's Southern sympathies were just 
 as pronounced as Mr. Thompson's, and if the 
 President wished to have an efficient Cabinet he 
 should have gotten rid of this hostile element. 
 Black, Stanton, Dix, and Holt, were able, 
 earnest, and patriotic men, anxious, as we now 
 know, to uphold the honor of the government ; 
 but the truth is well known that Mr. Buchanan's 
 feeling was expressed in his famous phrase : 
 " After me the deluge." 
 
 To understand the policy of the administration 
 and the acts of Anderson, we should know the 
 orders given and received in relation to the forts 
 in Charleston Harbor. We therefore give a 
 resuTn^ of them in order of date, omitting those 
 that are unimportant or relate merely to mat- 
 ters of routine. 
 
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 Washington, November 24, i860. 
 
 Major Robert Anderson, 
 
 First Regiment Artillery, U. S. A., Commanding Fort Moul- 
 trie, Charleston, S. C. : 
 
 Major. — The Secretary of War desires that you will 
 communicate, with the least delay practicable, the present 
 state of your command, and every thing which may re- 
 late to the condition of the work under your charge and 
 its capabilities of defence, together with such views as 
 you may have to suggest in respect to the same. He de- 
 sires to be informed whether, in view of maintaining the 
 troops ready for efficient action and defence, it might not 
 
24 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 be advisable to employ reliable persons, not connected 
 with the military service, for purposes of fatigue and 
 police. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. Cooper, 
 
 Adjutant-General, 
 
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 November 28, i860. 
 Major Robert Anderson, 
 
 U. S. A., etc.. Fort Moultrie. 
 
 Major. — Your letter of the 24th instant has been re- 
 ceived and submitted to the Secretary of War. It is now 
 under consideration, the result of which will be duly com- 
 municated to you. In the meantime, authority has been 
 given by the Engineer Bureau to Captain Foster to send 
 to Castle Pinckney the engineer workmen, as suggested 
 by you, for purposes of repairs, etc. 
 
 The Secretary desires that any communications you 
 may have to make for the information of the Department 
 be addressed to this office, or to the Secretary himself. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. Cooper, 
 
 Adjutant- General. 
 
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 December i, i860. 
 Major R. Anderson : 
 
 Sir. — Your letter of November aStli has been received. 
 The Secretary of War has directed Brevet Colonel Huger 
 to repair to this city as soon as he can safely leave his 
 post, to return there in a short time. He desires you to 
 see Colonel Huger and confer with him, prior to his de- 
 parture, on the matters which have been confided to each 
 of you. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 2$ 
 
 It is believed, from information thought to be reliable, 
 that an attack will not be made on your command, and 
 the Secretary has only to refer to his conversation with 
 you, and to caution you that, should his convictions un- 
 happily prove untrue, your action must be such as to be 
 free from the charge of initiating a collision. If attacked, 
 you are, of course, expected to defend the trust commit- 
 ted to you to the best of your ability. 
 
 The increase of the force under your command, how- 
 ever much to be desired, would, the Secretary thinks, 
 judging from the recent excitement produced on account 
 of an anticipated increase, as mentioned in your letter, 
 but add to that excitement, and might lead to serious re- 
 sults. 
 
 S. Cooper. 
 
 Fort Moultrie, S. C, December, ii, i860. 
 
 Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, First 
 Artillery, commanding at Fort Moultrie, S. C. 
 
 You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of 
 War that a collision of the troops with the people of 
 this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determina- 
 tion to pursue a course with reference to the military 
 force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against 
 such a collision. He has therefore carefully abstained 
 from increasing the force at this point, or taking :any 
 measures which might add to the present excited state of 
 the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the 
 confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt 
 by violence, to obtain possession of the public works or 
 interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and 
 acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disap- 
 point those expectations of the government, he deems it 
 proper that you should be prepared with instructions to 
 
26 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 meet so unhappy a contingency. He has therefore di- 
 rected me verbally to give you such instructions. 
 
 You are carefully to avoid every act which would need- 
 lessly tend to provoke aggression ; and for that reason you 
 are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up 
 any position which could be construed into the assump- 
 tion of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession 
 of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to de- 
 fend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of 
 your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more 
 one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take 
 possession of any one of them will be regarded as an act 
 of hostility, and you may then put your command into 
 either of them which you may deem most proper to in- 
 crease its power of resistance. You are also authorized 
 to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evi- 
 dence of a design to proceed to a hostile act. 
 
 D. C. BUELL, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 This is in comformity to my instructions to Major Buell. 
 
 John B. Floyd, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 Washington, December 14, i860. 
 Major Anderson, 
 
 First Artillery, Comtnanding Fort Moultrie, Charleston, S. C. 
 
 Sir : — The Secretary of War directs me to give the 
 following answers to certain questions contained in your 
 late letters. 
 
 If the State authorities demand any of Captain Foster's 
 workmen on the ground of their being enrolled into the 
 service of the State, and the subject is referred to you, 
 you will, after fully satisfying yourself that the men are sub- 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 27 
 
 ject to enrolment, and have been properly enrolled under the 
 laws of the United States, and of the State of South Carolina, 
 cause them to be delivered up or suffer them to depart. 
 
 If deemed essential to the more perfect defence of the 
 work, the levelling of the sand hills which command the 
 fort would not, under ordinary circumstances, be con- 
 sidered as initiating a collision. But the delicate ques- 
 tion of its bearing on the popular mind, in its present 
 excited state, demands the coolest and wisest judgment. 
 
 The fact of the sand hills being private property, and, 
 as is understood, having private residences built upon 
 them, decides the question in the negative. The houses 
 which might afford dangerous shelter to an enemy, being 
 chiefly frame, could be destroyed by the heavy guns of 
 the fort at any moment, while the fact of their being 
 levelled in anticipation of an attack might betray distrust, 
 and prematurely bring on a collision. Their destruction 
 at the moment of being used as a cover for an enemy 
 would be more fatal to the attacking force than if swept, 
 away before their approach. 
 
 An armed body, approaching for hostile purposes, 
 would, in all probability, either attempt a surprise or send 
 a summons to surrender. In the former case, there can 
 be no doubt as to the course to be pursued. 
 
 In the latter case, after refusal to surrender, and a 
 warning to keep off, a further advance by the armed 
 body would be initiating a collision on their part. 
 
 If no summons be made by them, their purpose should 
 be demanded at the same time that they are warned to 
 keep off, and their failure to answer, and further advance, 
 would throw the responsibility upon them. 
 
 I am, etc., 
 
 S. Cooper, 
 
 Adjutant- General. 
 
28 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 The peculiarly infamous character ot this let- 
 ter will be readily perceived. 
 
 The army officers in the Charleston harbor 
 are ordered to submit to the insolent demand 
 oi the South Carolina officials, to allow them to 
 enroll their workmen in their militia, and also 
 prohibiting Major Anderson from removing ob- 
 structions from before his guns. 
 
 His letter of December 21st was a protest 
 against this ruling. On the same day that the 
 above letter was written by the direction of the 
 Secretary of War, the following circular was 
 sent from Washington. 
 
 TO OUR CONSTITUENTS. 
 
 Washington, Dec. 14, i860. 
 
 The argument is exhausted. All hope of relief in the 
 Union, through the agencies of committees, Congres- 
 sional legislation, or constitutional amendments, is ex- 
 tinguished, and we trust that the South will not be 
 deceived by appearances or the pretence of new guaran- 
 ties. In our judgment the Republicans are resolute in 
 the purpose to grant nothing that will or ought to satisfy 
 the South. We are satisfied the honor, safety, and inde- 
 pendence of the Southern people require the organization 
 of a Southern Confederacy — a result to be obtained only 
 by separate State secession ; that the primary object of 
 each slave State ought to be its speedy ana absolute 
 separation from a union of hostile States. 
 Signed by : 
 
 Pugh, Clopton, Moore, Curry, Stallworth, Iverson, Un- 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 29 
 
 derwood, Gartrell, Jackson, Jones, Crawford, Hawkins, 
 Hindman, Jefferson Davis, A, G. Brown, Barksdale, 
 Singleton, R. Davis, Cragie, Ruflfin, Slidell, Benjamin, 
 Loandrum, Wigfall, Hemphill, Reagan, Benham, Miles, 
 McQueen, and Ashmore. 
 
 There can be no doubt of Floyd's knowledge 
 of the sending of this secret circular. He was 
 in daily consultation with many of the signers. 
 
 One of the signers (Slidell) was his brother- 
 in-law. He was busy at the time in transferring 
 arms and munitions of war from Northern to 
 Southern arsenals, and, finally, he knew that he 
 was charged with being particeps criminis with 
 Secretary Thompson in an embezzlement of 
 $870,000 government funds. 
 
 December i^, i860. 
 Major Robert Anderson, etc., 
 
 Charleston, S. C. 
 
 I have just telegraphed Captain Foster to return any 
 arms that he may have removed from Cnarleston arsenal. 
 
 J. B. Floyd. 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 
 Washington, December 21, i86o. 
 Major Anderson, 
 
 First Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S. C. 
 
 Sir : — In the verbal instructions communicated to you 
 by Major Buell, you are directed to hold possession of the 
 forts in the harbor of Charleston, and, if attacked, to defend 
 
30 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 yourself to the last extremity. Under these instructions, 
 you might infer that you are required to make a vain and 
 useless sacrifice of your own life and the lives of the men 
 under your command, upon a mere point of hotior. This is 
 far from the President's intentions. You are to exercise a 
 sound military discretion on this subject. 
 
 It is 7ieither expected nor desired that you should expose 
 your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in 
 defence of these forts. If they are invested or attacked by 
 a force so superior that resistance would, in your judg- 
 ment, be a useless waste of life, // will be your duty to yield 
 to necessity, and make the best terms in your power. 
 
 This will be the conduct of an honorable, brave, and 
 humane officer, and you will be fully justified in such 
 action. These orders are strictly confidential, and not 
 to be communicated even to the officers under your com- 
 mand without close necessity. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 John B. Floyd, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 This was the letter delivered by Captain John 
 Withers, subsequently of the C. $. A. It was 
 written the day after the secession of South 
 Carolina, and delivered December 23, i860. 
 Read between the lines, it meant treason pure 
 and simple. On receiving it, Major Anderson 
 determined to move over to Sumter without 
 delay. 
 
 The next was Floyd's telegram of December 
 27th, already given. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 3 1 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY. 
 
 New York, January 5, 1861. 
 
 Major Robert Anderson, 
 
 First Artillery, Commanding Fort Sumter. 
 
 Sir : — In accordance with tne instructions of the 
 General-in-Chief, I yesterday chartered the steamship 
 Star of the West to reinforce your small garrison with 
 two hundred well-instructed recruits from Fort Columbus, 
 under First Lieut. C. R. Woods, Ninth Infantry, assisted 
 by Lieuts. W. A. Webb, Fifth Infantry, and C. W. Thomas, 
 "First Infantry, and Asst. Surg. P. G. I, Ten Broeck, Medi- 
 cal Department, all of whom you will retain until further 
 orders. Besides arms for the men, one hundred spare 
 arms and all the cartridges in the arsenal on Governor's 
 Island will be sent ; likewise three months' subsistence 
 for the detachment, and six months' desiccated and fresh 
 vegetables, with three or four days' fresh beef for your 
 entire force. Further reinforcements will be sent if neces- 
 sary. 
 
 Should a fire, likely to prove injurious, be opened upon 
 any vessel bringing reinforcements or supplies, or upon 
 tow-boats within the reach of your guns, they may be 
 employed to silence such fire ; and you may act in like 
 manner in case a fire is opened upon Fort Sumter itself. 
 
 The General-in-Chief desires me to communicate the 
 fact that your conduct meets with the emphatic approba- 
 tion of the highest in authority. 
 
 You are warned to be upon your guard against all 
 telegrams, as false ones may be attempted to be passed 
 upon you. Measures will soon be taken to enable you to 
 correspond with the government by sea and Wilming- 
 ton, N. C. 
 
 You will send to Fort Columbus by the return of the 
 
32 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 steamer all your sick, otherwise inefficient officers and en- 
 listed men. Fill up the two companies with the recruits 
 now sent, and muster the residue as a detachment. 
 I am, sir, very respecfuUy, 
 
 Your obedient servant, L. Thomas. 
 
 Assistant Adiutant-General. 
 
 Not received until after the Star of the West 
 had been fired on. 
 
 War Department, January lo, 1861. 
 Major Robert Anderson, 
 
 First Artillery, Cofntnanding at Fort Sumter, S. C. 
 
 Sir : — Your dispatches to No. 16 inclusive have been 
 received. Before the receipt of that of 31st December, 
 announcing that the government might reinforce you at 
 its leisure, and that you regarded yourself safe in your 
 present position, some two hundred and fifty instructed 
 recruits had been ordered to proceed from Governor's 
 Island to Fort Sumter on the Star of the West, for the 
 purpose of strengthening the force under your command. 
 The probability is, from the current rumors of to-day, 
 that this vessel has been fired into by the South Caro- 
 linians, and has not been able to reach you. To meet 
 all contingencies, the Brooklyn has been dispatched, with 
 instructions not to cross the bar at the harbor of Charles- 
 ton, but to afford to the Star of the West and those op 
 board all the assistance they may need, and in the evett 
 the recruits have not effected a landing at Fort Sumtej 
 they will return to Fort Monroe. 
 
 I avail myself of the occasion to express the great satis- 
 faction of the government at the forbearance, discretion, 
 and firmness with which you have acted, amid the per- 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 33 
 
 plexing and difficult circumstances in which you have 
 been placed. You will continue, as heretofore, to act 
 strictly on the defensive ; to avoid, by all means com- 
 patible with the safety of your command, a collision with 
 the hostile forces by which you are surrounded. But for 
 the movement, so promptly and brilliantly executed, by 
 which you transferred your forces to Fort Sumter, the 
 probability is that ere this the defencelessness of your 
 position would have invited an attack, which, there is 
 reason to believe, was contemplated, if not in active prep- 
 aration, which must have led to the effusion of blood, 
 that has been so happily prevented. The movement, 
 therefore, was in every way admirable, alike for its hu- 
 manity (and) patriotism, as for its soldiership. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. Holt, 
 
 Secretary of War ad interim. 
 
 War Department, February 23, i86r. 
 
 Maj. Robert Anderson, 
 
 First Artillery, Commanding Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C. 
 
 Sir : — It is proper I should state distinctly that you 
 hold Fort Sumter as you held Fort Moultrie, under the 
 verbal orders communicated by Major Buell, subsequently 
 modified by instructions addressed to you from this De- 
 partment, under date of the 21st of December, i860. 
 
 In your letter to Adjutant-General Cooper, of the 16th 
 instant, you say : " I should like to be instructed on a 
 question which may present itself in reference to the 
 floating-battery, viz.: What course would it be proper 
 for me to take if, without a declaration of war or a noti- 
 fication of hostilities, I should see them approaching my 
 fort with that battery ? They m;iy attempt placing it 
 
34 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 within good distance before a declaration of hostile in- 
 tention." 
 
 It is not easy to answer satisfactorily this important 
 question at this distance from the scene of action. In 
 my letter to you of the loth of January, I said : 
 
 " You will continue, as heretofore, to act strictly on the 
 defensive, and to avoid, by all means compatible with the 
 safety of your command, a collision with the hostile forces 
 by which you are surrounded." 
 
 The policy thus indicated must still govern your conduct. 
 
 The President is not disposed at the present moment 
 to change the instructions under which you have been 
 heretofore acting, or to occupy any other than a defensive 
 position. If, however, you are convinced by sufficient 
 evidence that the raft of which you speak is advancing 
 for the purpose of making an assault upon the fort, then 
 you would be justified on the principle of self-defence in 
 not awaiting its actual arrival there, but in repelling force 
 by force on its approach. If, on the other hand, you 
 have reason to believe that it is approaching merely to 
 take up a position at a good distance, should the pending 
 question be not amicably settled, then, unless your safety 
 is so clearly endangered as to render resistance an act of 
 necessary self-defence and protection, you will act with 
 that forbearance which has distinguished you heretofore 
 in permitting the South Carolinians to strengthen Fort 
 Moultrie and erect new batteries for the defence of the 
 harbor. This will be but a redemption of the implied 
 pledge contained in my letter on behalf of the President 
 to Colonel Hayne, in which, when speaking of Fort Sum- 
 ter, it is said : 
 
 " The attitude of that garrison, as has been often de- 
 clared, is neither menacing, nor defiant, nor unfriendly. 
 It is acting under orders to stand strictly on the defensive, 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 35 
 
 and the government and people of South Carolina must 
 know that they can never receive aught but shelter from 
 its guns, unless, in the absence of all provocation, they 
 should assault it and seek its destruction." 
 
 A dispatch received in this city a few days since from 
 Governor Pickens, connected with the declaration on the 
 part of those convened at Montgomery, claiming to act 
 on behalf of South Carolina as well as the other seceded 
 States, that the question of the possession of the forts and 
 other public property therein had been taken from the 
 decision of the individual States, and would probably be 
 preceded in its settlement by negotiation with the govern- 
 ment of the United States, has impressed the President 
 with a belief that there will be no immediate attack on 
 Fort Sumter, and the hope is indulged that wise and 
 patriotic counsels may prevail and prevent it altogether. 
 
 The labors of the Peace Congress have not yet closed, 
 and the presence of that body here adds another to the 
 powerful motives already existing for the adoption of 
 every measure, except in necessary self-defence, for avoid- 
 ing a collision with the forces that surround you. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. Holt. 
 
 This brings the orders and correspondence 
 down to the close of the Buchanan administra- 
 tion. In itself it would be incomprehensible 
 either to the military or political student. The 
 clue to the mystery is to be found in the cor- 
 respondence between the Executive and the 
 Hon. J. W. Hayne, the Attorney-General of 
 South Carolina. 
 
36 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 While Mr. Crittenden was devising com- 
 promises and Mr. Taylor and his confreres 
 were getting up peace conventions, Mr. Hayne 
 came to Washington to serve, as it were, a 
 legal process on the government. He ten- 
 dered payment on the part of his State for all 
 government property in the borders of South 
 Carolina, and in case the United States gov- 
 ernment did not see fit to accept his offer, he 
 gave notice, on the part of his free and sover- 
 eign State, of its intention to act by forcible 
 entry and detainer. Singularly enough, the 
 President answered this piece of political im- 
 pertinence by a long chop-logic letter through 
 Mr. Holt, his Secretary of War. 
 
 Driven from his non-intervention standpoint 
 by the outburst of patriotic feeling that followed 
 the occupation of Sumter, Mr. Buchanan had 
 to assume the position, in a message he sent to 
 Congress on the 8th of January, 1861, that he 
 was bound to hold the forts as public prop- 
 erty. 
 
 Seeing that he claimed for his government 
 no right of sovereignty, but only a property 
 right, founded on purchase and relinquish- 
 ment. South Carolina adroitly came forward 
 with her claim of eminent domain and national 
 sovereignty. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 37 
 
 No one cares for this controversy now, but 
 it throws a strong light on the character of the 
 Old Public Functionary, and explains many ap- 
 parent inconsistencies. 
 
 Up to the time of his election to the Presi- 
 dency, Mr. Buchanan had been very generally 
 considered a man of ability his speeches and 
 State papers were creditable, if not brilliant; 
 yet as an executive officer in a great crisis he 
 was an evident failure. It seems to me that his 
 failure resulted from a misunderstanding of the 
 philosophy of history, which caused him to 
 misapprehend the first principles of national 
 growth. He seemed to think that the Contract 
 Sociale was something more than an illustrative 
 theory ; that nations could be formed by agree- 
 ment, held together by paper constitutions or 
 dissolved by mutual consent. He seemed to 
 think that the constitution made the Ameri- 
 can Nation and was not rather the expression 
 of the lex non scripta of our national life. He 
 did not seem to understand the principle of the 
 unification of races, and that, with us at least 
 the cohesive principle was as strong as reason 
 habit, pride, self-interest, and love of liberty 
 could make it. The deluge overtook him and 
 in its waves his political reputation perished. 
 
 If the publication of the Rebellion records 
 
38 POLITICAL CONSPJMACJES 
 
 give us no positively new information in rela- 
 tion to the two expeditions sent to the relief 
 of Sumter, it will at least settle some disputed 
 points. 
 
 Judge Black has recently asserted that Lieu- 
 tenant-General Scott was responsible for the 
 failure of these expeditions. Yet it appears 
 from the record that the first attempt, at least, 
 was suggested by the Lieutenant-General. On 
 December 28, i860, Scott wrote to the Sec- 
 retary of War, requesting : first, that Sumter 
 should not be given up ; second, that it be re- 
 inforced and provisioned ; and, third, that two 
 armed vessels should be sent to support the 
 fort. 
 
 As Mr. Floyd resigned the next day, Gen- 
 eral Scott wrote to the President direct to the 
 same effect. On the 31st of December he sent 
 an order to Colonel Dimick, at Fort Monroe, to 
 send four companies to Sumter by the sloop-of- 
 war Brooklyn. 
 
 The President was subsequently persuaded to 
 substitute a merchant steamer, the Star of the 
 West, for the Brooklyn. 
 
 Unfortunately the garrison of Sumter was 
 not notified of its coming, and was taken com- 
 pletely by surprise when the Morris Island bat- 
 teries opened fire. Before they got ready to 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 39 
 
 fight the vessel had turned back. This was on 
 January 9th. When the fort was occupied 
 fourteen days before, it must be remembered 
 that it was in the hands of Captain Foster's 
 workmen, and in a very unfinished state. It 
 was literally filled with construction material 
 and debris. The parade was covered with their 
 frame workshops. The gorge was open ; the 
 embrasures boarded up loosely with inch plank ; 
 only the lighter guns were mounted ; the heavy 
 guns were not mounted before the fifteenth, as 
 stated by General Doubleday in his personal 
 reminiscences of Moultrie and Sumter. The 
 distance from Sumter to the Star of the West 
 battery was 2,800 yards. At that distance any 
 of the guns then mounted at Sumter would have 
 been ineffective. The South Carolina authori- 
 ties were notified of the departure and mission 
 of the Star of the West by Mr. Thompson, the 
 Secretary of the Interior, who learned the pur- 
 pose of the President at a Cabinet meeting, the 
 proceedings of which were declared confidential. 
 Captain Ward, of the navy, who commanded 
 the receiving ship North Carolina in New York 
 harbor, in the winter of 1861, proposed during 
 the month of February to relieve fort Sumter 
 by using four or more small coast survey steam- 
 ers. Mr. Cameron, in the synopsis of the vari- 
 
40 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 ous plans for the relief of Sumter, which he 
 laid before President Lincoln, on March i5, 
 1 86 1, says that this plan met with General 
 Scott's concurrence, but that the late President 
 would not allow the attempt to be made (" Re- 
 bellion Records," vol. i, p. 197). Subsequently 
 it is stated that Captain Ward afterward aban- 
 doned his plan, after consultation with General 
 Scott. Yet on the 20th of February, the Lieu- 
 tenant-General wrote to Colonel H. L. Scott, 
 his A. D. C, in New York City, directing him 
 to prepare the expedition as soon as Captain 
 Ward could get his squadron ready. Judge 
 Black, then Secretary of State, is authority for 
 the statement that President Buchanan with- 
 drew his assent to Captain Ward's expedition 
 upon General Scott's advice. 
 
 On the 1 6th of January, 1 861, Judge Black 
 addressed a letter to the Lieut.-General, urging 
 a renewed attempt to reinforce Major Ander- 
 son. General Scott never answered that letter, 
 and the probabilities are that he had even then 
 formed the opinion that any further attempt to 
 relieve Sumter would be unadvisable. It is 
 very improbable that the Star of the West was 
 substituted for the Brooklyn upon his advice, in 
 view of his earnest recommendation, already 
 quoted, made upon December 28, i860, that 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 4 1 
 
 two armed vessels be sent to the support of 
 Fort Sumter. 
 
 But there is, I think, no doubt that he was 
 opposed to all attempts to relieve the garrison 
 of Sumter by sea. 
 
 General Scott, in answer to a question ad- 
 dressed to him by Mr. Lincoln, on the 1 2th of 
 April, replied. 
 
 " I should need a fleet of war vessels and trans- 
 ports which, in the scattered disposition of the 
 navy (as understood), could not be collected in 
 less than four months : 5,ooo additional regular 
 troops, and 20,000 volunteers ; that is, a force 
 sufficient to take all the batteries, both in the 
 harbor (including Fort Moultrie) as well as in 
 the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize, 
 and discipline such an army (not to speak of 
 necessary legislation by Congress, not now in 
 session) would require from six to eight months. 
 As a practical military question the time for suc- 
 coring Fort Sumter with any means at hand 
 had passed away nearly a month ago. Since 
 then a surrender under assault or from starva- 
 tion has been merely a question of time." 
 
 What is still more conclusive is the evidence 
 contained in the " Rebellion Records," of the truth 
 of the assertions of Mr. Welles and Mr. Mont- 
 gomery Blair: that Mr. William H. Seward 
 
42 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 and Lieut.-General Scott obtained the order 
 from President Lincoln which detached the 
 Powhatan from Mr. Fox's rehef expedition to 
 Sumter. First we have the letter of Mr. Lin- 
 coln (p. 406, " Rebellion Records") assuming the 
 responsibility for relieving Captain Mercer and 
 of placing Lieutenant D. D. Porter in command 
 of the Powhatan. Next we have this letter of Mr. 
 Secretary Welles' " youngcaptain named Meigs." 
 
 QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE. 
 
 Washington, D. C, February 27, 1865. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. E. D. Townsend, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General, War Department. 
 
 My Dear General: — The Navy Department has no 
 copy of the instructions to D. D. Porter and other naval 
 ofificers under which they co-operated with the expedition 
 of April 1 86 1, to reinforce Fort Pickens. 
 
 The President has none, and they have applied to me. 
 My copies, I think, I placed in Hartsuff's hands. He 
 was adjutant of the expedition. 
 
 Please forward the enclosed note to him, and if you 
 have copies, let me have, for the Navy Department, a 
 copy of the President's order to Porter, and to other 
 naval ofificers. Also of the order to Colonel Brown, which 
 required all naval officers to aid him. 
 
 General Scott knew of the expedition and its orders ; 
 and you were acting confidentially with him and may 
 have had custody of those orders, which were kept secret 
 even from the Secretaries of War and Navy, I believe. 
 Yours truly, 
 
 M. C. Meigs, 
 
 QuartennasUr-General, Brevet Major-General. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 43 
 
 It is hard to understand why Gen. Scott 
 sanctioned the transfer of the Powhatan from 
 the Sumter to the Pickens expedition without 
 the knowledge of either the Secretary of War 
 or the Secretary of the Navy. He was a 
 great soldier, a cultivated gentleman, the soul 
 of honor, and a true patriot. Yet the fact 
 seems indisputable. It may be that he knew 
 he could not save Fort Sumter, and hoped to 
 save Fort Pickens at the sacrifice of the other. 
 A general may give up an outpost, like a 
 chess-player offering a gambit pawn, but, as 
 before remarked, the mystery in this case is 
 that he acted without the knowledge of the 
 heads of departments. The following letter 
 from Gen. Meigs fully explains his connection 
 with the Pickens expedition. 
 
 Washington, Oct. 31, 1881. 
 
 Lt. Col. Thomas M. Anderson, 
 
 9/A Infantry, Fort McKinney, Wyo. Ter. 
 
 My Dear Sir : — I have not time to reply fully to your 
 questions about Pickens. Something on the subject 
 from me you will find in Scott's two volumes of the 
 "Records of the Rebellion " thus far published. 
 
 I may say that Mr. Seward took me to see President 
 Lincoln, saying that he understood that some officers of 
 higher rank than myself were indisposed to advise active 
 measures to relieve posts in danger. That he had noth- 
 ing to say as to how I should speak to Mr. Lincoln ; he 
 
44 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 wished me to answer any questions put to me according 
 to my best belief and knowledge. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln asked whether Sumter could be relieved. 
 I said that was a matter for the navy. It must be done 
 by ships. That there might be difference of opinion on 
 such a subject, but that I was sure I could find him 
 young naval officers then in Washington, who would 
 gladly, if authorized, undertake to attempt it. 
 
 He then dropped the subject, and I heard no more of 
 Sumter till at Santa Rosa Island I saw extracts from 
 newspapers, mutilated slips sent to Fort Pickens by 
 General Bragg, announcing its surrender as a military 
 necessity. 
 
 The subject of Pickens was taken up. I had passed it 
 going out of Pensacola Harbor in November, i860, and 
 was familiar with the maps and plans of the position in 
 the engineer office. 
 
 Could Fort Pickens be reinforced ? Yes, if done in 
 time. The embrasures are a few feet only above the 
 bottom of the ditch, and a coup-de-main with loss of a 
 few men, could, I believed, carry it against the very in- 
 sufficient garrison under Slemmer. 
 
 How can it be done ? Send a ship of war immediately 
 under sealed orders to enter the harbor and prevent boat 
 expeditions crossing from Pensacola to Santa Rosa 
 Island. For this purpose I recommended, for reasons 
 which I stated fully, and which were derived from his 
 history, Lieut. David Porter, now Admiral Porter. I 
 also said Providence supplies the man and the means. 
 Porter I had seen within a day or so in Washington, and 
 I learned by the newspapers that the Powhatan had just 
 returned from a foreign cruise. If she could cross the 
 Atlantic she could at once go to Pickens. 
 
 Send as soon as possible troops and supplies in a 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 45 
 
 transport steamer to land and reinforce the garrison of 
 Pickens. 
 
 The Powhatan will prevent the boat expedition, which, 
 I said, might be at that moment (it was after dark) under 
 weigh ; if she got in, the others would relieve the for- 
 tress. The island is fitted with longitudinal sand ridges, 
 which would protect troops and stores landed on the 
 beach east of the fort and out of the range of the rebel 
 batteries in their approach to Pickens. 
 
 The President said he would perhaps send for me 
 again, I urged that the strictest secrecy was indispen- 
 sable, as it was known that telegrams had communicated 
 information to the Southern leaders. 
 
 I had no suspicion of anybody in high station, but the 
 ordinary business of the executive departments brings 
 every paper under the eye of more than one person. A 
 secretary cannot take care of the papers he signs or acts 
 upon. They are too many, and clerks and others are 
 necessary to perform the mere physical labor of caring 
 for records and dispatching and filing official papers. I 
 believe that it was suggested afterward by Porter that 
 the telegraph wires around Washington ought all to be 
 cut. 
 
 The President sent for me again on a Saturday even- 
 ing . or a Sunday morning, and directed that Colonel 
 Keyes, Military Secretary to General Scott, and myself 
 should draw up a project for the relief of Pickens, sub- 
 mit it to General Scott, and do this by, I think, 2 p. M. 
 of Sunday. 
 
 We went to the engineer office, to which, though closed, 
 I had access, got out the plans of Santa Rosa and of 
 Pensacola Harbor, prepared our project, took it to Gen- 
 eral Scott, who, after discussion, approved it as it stood, 
 except the provision authorizing the commander of the 
 
46 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 expedition to declare martial law on the Gulf Coast, 
 especially at Key West. This he thought illegal. Mr. 
 Seward came in ; we discussed it ; I urged its legality 
 and necessity. The Constitution was examined again, 
 and Mr. Seward said that was authority enough for him, 
 and we should have power to declare martial law. 
 
 He said he wished me to go with the expedition, and 
 he suggested that I should be given rank to command it. 
 General Scott told him that all the power of the Presi- 
 dent then could not make a captain a major even, which 
 I knew well enough. I told Mr. Seward that I was in 
 this contest and ready to go with my present rank or 
 with none at all. 
 
 General Scott was earnest and fully approved. He 
 objected to our proposition to take a mounted battery of 
 artillery then in Washmgton, as taking away all his 
 strength in this city. I said : " General, if this comes to 
 war you will want not a battery of artillery here, but a 
 large force, and the regular array will be nothing ; it will 
 be the yeomanry of the country that will come to defend 
 Washington." He then consented. 
 
 The force taken has been published. Porter had 
 orders, drawn up by myself and Keyes, signed by the 
 President's own hand, to take the Powhatan. Telegram 
 to New York Navy Yard, and letter to her then com- 
 mander from the President, ordered her to be dispatched 
 under Porter's command at the earliest possible moment 
 and under sealed orders, her destination unknown to her 
 then commander or crew, or to the officers at the navy 
 yard. 
 
 Major Harvey Brown was ordered to command the 
 troops which were gathered at New York and dispatched 
 in the steamer Atlajitic, which I accompanied. 
 
 The rest is history. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION, 47 
 
 She was followed by the Illinois, with other troops. 
 
 I heard no one hint any doubt of the good faith of any 
 executive officer or of General Scott. He entered 
 heartily into the project, and was kind and cordial to 
 the authors. I think he recognized the importance of 
 absolute secrecy for protection against information which 
 might leak out if the project was known to any but those 
 who were engaged in it. 
 
 I think that Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward, General Scott, 
 Harvey Brown, after he received his orders, Keyes, Lieut. 
 David Porter, and myself were the only persons who 
 knew the destination of the troops, of the Poivhatan, or 
 of the Atlantic, until the steamers Pow/iatan and Atlantic 
 reached Santa Rosa. 
 
 The Powhatan was delayed in New York, and sailed 
 only an hour or two before the Altantic, and the latter, 
 being the faster vessel, arrived at least a day before the 
 Powhatan, and the troops were in Pickens before the 
 Powhatan hove in sight. Then, at request of Harvey 
 Brown, I met the Poivhatan with difficulty, and only by 
 ld\ ing the ship I was on athwart her bows, stopped her 
 and explained to Porter that the fort being reinforced it 
 would be a crime to expose his ship and crew to injury 
 by attemptirg to enter the haibor. 
 
 The secrecy was to prevent leaks from whatever source, 
 and not from doubt of the loyalty and fidelity of any 
 officer of high position. 
 
 If you wish to keep any project secret, tell it to 
 nobody, and to those to be engaged in it tell only so 
 much as will direct their movements till it is necessary to 
 tell more. 
 
 All the orders for the expedition were drawn up by 
 Keyes and myself, and they were signed in effect exactly 
 as we advised. 
 
48 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 I knew of no attempt to relieve Sumter. It appeared 
 afterward that Naval Secretary Welles destined the 
 Powhatan for Sumter. He had not, I believe, perfected 
 his plan at the time I suggested her use for Pickens, for 
 when we got to New York, instead of finding her ready 
 to sail, we found her crew detached and the ship partially, 
 at least, dismantled, so that it took some days of active, 
 earnest work to get a crew on board and make her ready 
 to sail. 
 
 When I first spoke with the President on her use, I 
 had just seen in the day's papers her arrival in New York 
 reported, and I supposed she could start as soon as 
 ordered. 
 
 I do not believe that the Powhatan was changed from 
 the Sumter to the Pickens expedition. I believe that 
 the first order was Mr. Lincoln's, giving her to Porter 
 and Pickens, and that in ignorance of this order, she was 
 destined by the Navy Department to Sumter. But Mr. 
 Lincoln's sign-manual to Porter's orders to take com- 
 mand, and to Captain Mercer's orders to resign com- 
 mand, overruled the orders of the Secretary of the 
 Navy, which, I believe,, were received while Porter and 
 Foote, who was then in command of the Brooklyn Navy 
 Yard, were straining every nerve to refit her for a desti- 
 nation unknown to all navy officers and the Navy De- 
 partment, except Porter. 
 
 He called me to Brooklyn, finding the case blocked, 
 and I showed Captains Mercer and Foote the sign- 
 manual of the President ; told them that the Secretary of 
 the Navy and the Secretary of War knew nothing of this, 
 and asked which they would obey, the President or his 
 Secretary. They concluded to obey the President's 
 order exhibited to them. 
 
 The President, therefore, if he changed at all the des- 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 49 
 
 tination of the Powhatan, did it after he had signed 
 orders sending her to Pickens. 
 
 I had no occasion to discuss the question of saving or 
 sacrificing Sumter as against Pickens. After advising 
 the President that I could find him naval ofificers who 
 would be glad to attempt the relief of Sumter, that for- 
 tress was not again mentioned in my presence. 
 
 I had no apprehension from, and I heard none ex- 
 pressed of, spies in high places. My object was to avoid 
 leakage, which is sure to occur in a vessel of too many 
 joints or parts, and I urged that nobody know what we 
 intended to do, except those who directed and controlled, 
 and the orders to the Atlantic were to sail in a certain 
 direction from New York, and at a certain distance open 
 an order which directed only the next stage of the 
 voyage, etc., etc. 
 
 General Scott's feelings and inclinations have been 
 much discussed. All I saw of him during his life was 
 hearty, true loyalty, and fidelity to his oath as an officer 
 of the army of the United States. 
 
 I believe I have answered, as fully as I can without 
 searching documents for dates, all vour questions. 
 
 I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 M. C. Meigs, 
 
 Quartermaster-General, Bvt. Major-Generil, U. S. A. 
 
 There is also a letter from General Meigs to 
 Mr. Seward, too long to quote, which contains 
 this felicitation, of the success of their conspir- 
 acy by which the naval expedition to Sumter 
 was deliberately ruined : 
 
50 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 " Your dispatch arrived as I was on my way 
 to the Atlantic, just before the hour at which 
 she was to sail, and two or three hours after 
 that appointed for the Powhatan. When the 
 arrow has sped from the bow it may glance aside, 
 but who shall reclaim it before its flight is fin- 
 ished? " (P. 369.) 
 
 This letter was written at sea, yet Captain 
 Meigs evidently feared that either the Sec- 
 retary of War or the Secretary of the Navy 
 might get intelligence of the orders sent to the 
 Powhatan without their knowledge, and still 
 reclaim her even in her flight. 
 
 In the long letter of instructions from Gen- 
 eral Scott to Colonel Harvey Brown, com- 
 manding the Pickens expedition, approved 
 by the President, and which was supple- 
 mented by an endorsement by Mr. Lincoln, 
 directing all officers of the army and navy 
 -^^ to aid the expedition, there is no word to 
 warn the President that the Powhatan was to 
 be used for the purpose of the Pickens expe- 
 dition. 
 
 As the Poivhatan had on board all the troops 
 intended to reinforce Sumter, and all the 
 barges provided for the landing of both soldiers 
 and supplies, when she was detached, of course 
 the expedition failed. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 5 1 
 
 It is only fair to say that Pickens was saved 
 if Sumter was sacrificed/ 
 
 The most singular fact in this connection is 
 that both General Scott and General Totten 
 (chief of engineers) had been asserting that 
 neither Sumter nor Pickens could be saved. 
 
 An account of the siege and fall of Fort 
 Sumter may be very briefly given. It is a 
 matter of very little military importance, its 
 significance being altogether political- Only 
 such important points in the oft-repeated story 
 will be referred to, as may be necessary for a 
 better understanding of the great drama of 
 Rebellion, of which it was the prelude. 
 
 Major Anderson had warned his government 
 that the people of South Carolina intended to 
 take forcible possession of the forts in Charles- 
 ton Harbor as soon as the State convention 
 adopted the ordinance of secession. He had 
 
 ' The opinions of the army and navy officers laid before President 
 Lincoln, as given in the " Rebellion Record," vol. i, p. ig6, et se- 
 quentia, may be summarized as follovi's : 
 
 Gen. Scott and Gen. Totten did not think that Fort Sumter could 
 be relieved w^ith the means they had or vv'ere likely to get. 
 
 Gen. Anderson thought such an enterprise would require 20,000 
 men. Gen. Seymour, his second in command, thought the attempt 
 would result in a siege as formidable and protracted as that of Se- 
 bastopol. 
 
 Lieut. Synder , Eng. Corp. : four thousand men and four vessels of war. 
 
 Lieut. R. K. Mead, Eng. Corp.: 5,000 men, supported by gun-boats. 
 
 Dr. S. W. Crawford (afterward General) : 4,000 men, supported by 
 the navy. 
 
 Lieut, (afterward General) J. C. Davis : 3,000 men and six war 
 vessels. 
 
52 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES. 
 
 reason to believe this from the open declara- 
 tion of their highest State officials, and their 
 military preparations all over those States. He 
 regarded the proclamation of the ordinance of 
 secession on December 20th, as an open act of 
 rebellion, and, six days after, moved to the safer 
 position on the island of Sumter. To give the 
 fullest possible confirmation to his belief, the 
 South Carolina militia took possession of Fort 
 Moultrie and Castle Pinckney the next day. 
 On the 30th they seized the United States 
 arsenal in Charleston, entering it by escalade. 
 In point of fact they had had a guard over it for 
 two weeks, under the poor pretext, before re- 
 ferred to, that their slaves might take it. They 
 claimed that Major Anderson's change of base 
 was an act of war. Yet they had been pre- 
 paring for war and levying war for months. 
 
 They began erecting batteries about Sumter 
 within twenty-four hours of its occupation. 
 
 Lieut. Theodore Talbot, ist Art.: 3,000 men and navy. 
 
 Capt. (afterward Gen.) A. Doubleday : 10,000 men and navy. 
 
 Captain (afterward Gen.) Foster : 6,000 regulars, or 20,000 volun- 
 teers to take them ; 10,000 regulars or 30,000 volunteers to hold 
 them. 
 
 Commodore Stringham agreed with Foster. As Foster had once 
 belonged to the Coast Survey, he probably knew more about the 
 question than all the rest put together. 
 
 Gen Geo. B. McClellan, then in Cincinnati, told the writer, the 
 day the rebel guns opened on Sumter, that that fort was ut- 
 terly indefensible, and would not hold out forty-eight hours. This 
 was somewhat surprising, as an officer of engineers, now a general in 
 the army, had, on the evening before, explained to a set of gratified 
 listeners, that Fort Sumter was impregnable. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 53 
 
 They fired into the Star of the West on January 
 9, 1 86 1. On the nth the governor of South 
 Carolina demanded the surrender of the fort. 
 On the first of March the Confederate govern- 
 ment assumed control of the forces in Charles- 
 ton Harbor. General Beauregard assumed 
 command on the 3d, and on the same day the 
 schooner Rhoda H. Shannon was fired on by 
 the Confederate batteries, this being their first 
 overt act of war. 
 
 Major Anderson never feared the South 
 Carolina militia ; as long as they were his only 
 opponents he assured his government that he 
 was perfectly secure in his position. 
 
 But when the Confederate authorities took 
 charge of the siege operations against him, 
 they soon made such a show of strength and 
 energy that he discovered his mistake, and 
 frankly avowed it. As soon as he could do so, 
 he informed the War Department, not only of 
 the difficulty of holding the fort, but of the 
 serious obstacles that would have to be over- 
 come in effecting its relief. 
 
 It was on the 12th of March, 1861, that the 
 so-called Confederate Commissioners arrived in 
 Washington, and asked permission to call on 
 the President, and present their credentials as 
 the embassadors of a foreign power. This was 
 
54 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 ot course declined, but they were nevertheless 
 allowed to remain in Washington until they 
 voluntarily left, after the sailing of the second 
 Sumter expedition on the loth of April. 
 
 The Rebellion records give us the de- 
 spatches and letters these gentlemen and other 
 confederates in political crime were allowed to 
 send from Washington in the last days of Mr. 
 Buchanan's, and in the early days of Mr. Lin- 
 coln's administration. We will give a few 
 samples. 
 
 lolt succeeds Floyd. It means war. Cut off sup- 
 plies from Anderson and take Sumter soon as possible. 
 
 Louis T. Wigfall. 
 
 {A United States Senator drawing pay ft om the United States Gov- 
 ernment. ") 
 
 President's reply : " Brooklyn not for South Carolina. 
 On errand of mercy and relief. 
 
 "John Tyler." 
 
 This shows that Mr. Buchanan was himself 
 responsible for the substitution of the Siar of 
 the West lor the Brookly7t. 
 
 Washington. January 8, 1861. 
 The Star of the West sailed from New York on Sun- 
 day with government troops and provisions. It is said her 
 destination is Charleston. If so, she may be hourly ex- 
 pected off the harbor. 
 
 Louis T, Wigfall. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 55 
 
 The fact that troops were on board was sup- 
 posed to be a profound state secret. 
 
 But there seemed to be no secrets. Even 
 after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, despatch after 
 despatch was sent from Washington to the 
 Confederate authorities, in relation to the move- 
 ment of troops and of vessels of war, giving in- 
 formation also as to all that went on in Cabinet 
 meetings : that the vote in Mr. Lincoln's Cabi- 
 net stood six to one in favor of withdrawing 
 Major Anderson's command from Sumter ; that 
 no faith could be put in Seward's promise, no 
 faith in the administration ; and finally, on the 
 9th of April, we have Mr. Commissioner Craw- 
 ford's final despatch : " That diplomacy had 
 failed. The sword must now preserve our in- 
 dependence. " 
 
 But the most interesting despatch is this : J 
 
 Washington, April d, 1861. 
 Hon. A. G. Magrath, Charleston^ S. C. 
 
 Positively determined not to withdraw Anderson. Sup- 
 plies go immediately ; supported by naval force under 
 Stringham, if their landing be resisted. 
 
 (Signed), A Friend. 
 
 This " Friend " turned out to be James E. 
 Harvey, who subsequently found means to have 
 himself appointed Minister to Portugal. 
 
 Certainly there is no other government that 
 
$6 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 would have allowed such traitors to have re- 
 mained at large in its capital for a single day. 
 
 But the strangest thing in this strange, eventful 
 history, was the course taken by the Secretary of 
 State. For years Mr. William H. Seward had 
 been the political leader of Abolitionism ; he 
 spoke of the antagonism between freedom and 
 slavery as the irrepressible conflict, and reiterated 
 Mr. Garrison's famous saying, that there is a 
 " higher law than the Constitution," in a debate 
 on the floor of the Senate. Yet no sooner had 
 he in his official capacity declined to receive and 
 recognize Messrs. Crawford, Roman, and For- 
 syth, in their diplomatic capacity, than he en- 
 tered into a private correspondence and nego- 
 tiation with them. The Secretary seemed to 
 be struck with judicial blindness, and to be 
 filled with hopes as vain as those of the Bour- 
 bons that their white flag will once again wave 
 over fair France. He yielded to the delusion 
 that the rebel States could be induced to revoke 
 their ordinances of secession ; give up a contest 
 he himself had declared to be irrepressible, and 
 return peacefully to the Union. To effect this 
 purpose, he promised that the garrison of Sum- 
 ter should be withdrawn. 
 
 At the very time the Secretary of State was 
 entering upon these ways that were dark and 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 57 
 
 tricks that were vain, Mr. Cameron, the Secre- 
 tary of War, laid before Mr. Lincoln and his 
 Cabinet a paper, already referred to, giving the 
 opinions of many prominent naval and army 
 officers, as to the expediency and possibility 
 of relieving Sumter, and their suggestions as to 
 how this purpose could be best effected in case 
 that course should be determined on. By far 
 the greatest number consulted gave their opin- 
 ion that the attempt should not be made with 
 the means then at the government's dispos- 
 al. With the sole exception of the Hon. Mont- 
 gomery Blair, the members of the President's 
 Cabinet advised him to give up any pur- 
 pose of relieving Fort Sumter, and to with- 
 draw the garrison before the i5th of April, 
 when its supply of subsistence would be ex- 
 hausted. 
 
 From a merely military point of view, this 
 advice would have been sound, but Mr. Lincoln 
 and Mr. Blair judged more wisely that it would 
 be better to sacrifice the garrison of Sumter for 
 political effect. As nearly all his military ad- 
 visers had given their reasons for believing 
 that Fort Sumter could not be relieved by less 
 than an army of twenty thousand men and a 
 powerful fleet, the President must have known 
 that his expedition of two hundred men, mostly 
 
58 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 recruits, and the absurd naval force, under Mr. 
 Fox, would fail as it did fail. But the expedi- 
 tion was sent in accordance with a generous 
 public sentiment, and with the knowledge that 
 it would compel the rebels to strike the first 
 blow. If the last man in the garrison of Sum- 
 ter had perished, it would have been a cheap 
 price to pay for the magnificent outburst of 
 patriotism that followed. Indeed it might have 
 been better if they had. 
 
 If the example of no surrender had been set 
 there, we would have had fewer capitulations to 
 armed rebels afterward. 
 
 When Mr. Seward found that Mr. Lincoln 
 had determined to reinforce both Sumter and 
 Pickens, he notified the rebel Commissioners of 
 the fact, and induced the President to send for- 
 mal notice to the authorities at Charleston. 
 This note was delivered on the night of April 
 8, 1 86 1, to General Beauregard and Governor 
 Pickens. Then, too, the extraordinary plot was 
 carried out, by which the Powhatan was de- 
 tached from the Sumter expedition and sent to 
 Florida. The order was sent on board of her 
 after she was steaming down the harbor and 
 just passing Staten Island. 
 
 Mr. Gideon Welles, in his reminiscences, is 
 very severe in his condemnation of the decep- 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 59 
 
 tion Mr. Seward practised in this matter both on 
 the Secretaries of War and the Navy. He as- 
 serts that it was prompted by his determination 
 to make good his promise to the rebel Commis- 
 sioners, that Sumter should be evacuated. Mr. 
 Blair (the Secretary of the Interior), in a letter 
 published in Mr. Welles' reminiscences (p. 66), 
 says : 
 
 " Mr. Seward had two objects in detaching 
 this vessel (the Powhatan). 
 
 " I St. — It defeated the relief of Fort Sumter 
 which he was pledged to surrender. 
 
 " 2d. — Fort Pickens could be claimed as hav- 
 ing been saved by an expedition conceived and 
 carried into execution under his orders, and so, 
 though he would by this movement abandon 
 his method of meeting exactions with conces- 
 sions, and violence with peace, he would signal- 
 ize his abandonment of his peace policy by a 
 success in administering the force policy, as 
 would put himself /^r saltum at the head of his 
 opponents." 
 
 It has been asserted that General Scott was 
 opposed to the relief of Sumter from his south- 
 ern sympathies, and that General Anderson was 
 lukewarm in its defence for the same reason. 
 
 These charges against those distinguished 
 officers can be examined together. 
 
6o POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 One of the lieut.-general's avowed reasons 
 for not approving attempts for the relief of 
 Sumter was, that Major Anderson had never 
 asked for reinforcements after he occupied that 
 post. This was not only true, but that officer 
 had written to the adjutant-general on the 6th 
 of January, that he would not ask for reinforce- 
 ments, because he did not know what the ulteri- 
 or designs of the government were, and for 
 the further reason that from that time on he 
 could only be relieved by a powerful fleet. 
 
 His first report read to Mr. Lincoln was this : 
 " I confess that I would not be willing to risk 
 my reputation on an attempt to throw reinforce- 
 ments into this harbor within the time for our 
 relief rendered necessary by the limited supply 
 of our provisions, and with a view of holding 
 possession of the same, with a force of less than 
 twenty thousand good and well-disciplined 
 men." 
 
 At this time General Scott and Major Ander- 
 son had probably a perfect understanding and 
 agreement about the Sumter problem. They 
 had long been intimate personal friends. Major 
 Anderson's eldest brother, who died as our first 
 minister to Columbia, had been a classmate 
 with Scott at William and Mary's College in 
 Virginia. Anderson himself had been several 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 6 1 
 
 times on the staff of the old chief. At the battle 
 of Moleno del Rey in Mexico, Scott had to send 
 his friend on a most desperate attack, in which 
 he received five wounds and nearly lost his life. 
 After that General Scott always showed the 
 greatest sympathy and regard for him. More- 
 over Major Anderson had married a daughter 
 of General Clinch, an old compatriot of Scott's. 
 They were both border State men, and had, in 
 fine, a remarkable concordance in sympathies 
 and opinions. 
 
 It is important to state these facts in this con- 
 nection, because if General Scott afterward ap- 
 parently abandoned one of his most cherished 
 friends to his fate, he must evidently have been 
 influenced by some powerful consideration. 
 
 It will be remembered that in his first letter 
 from Moultrie, Major Anderson had urged the 
 occupation in force of Castle Pinckney and Forts 
 Sumter and Moultrie. The military reason for 
 this is obvious. Castle Pinckney could com- 
 mand and overawe Charleston so long as 
 Sumter and Moultrie kept open its communi- 
 cation with the sea. 
 
 In Major Anderson s opinion all three forts or 
 none should have beeji held. 
 
 With the rest of the harbor held by an enemy. 
 Fort Sumter was useless and untenable. At 
 
62 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 a time of great political excitement, he wrote 
 of making the fort impregnable, but General 
 Scott knew better, and every officer consulted 
 by the Secretary of War put himself on record 
 to the contrary. General Anderson was a good 
 artillery officer, the author or compiler of the 
 artillery text-books we were using at that time, 
 and he really knew better. He told the writer 
 that he knew his garrison was being sacrificed 
 to a political necessity, and that tlierefore he did 
 not wish another man to be sent to him. Dur- 
 ing the months of January and February all the 
 cotton States seceded, and Anderson knew per- 
 fectly well that they could surround him with 
 an army of twenty thousand men. He has also 
 been censured by so-called soldiers and plaintive 
 patriots for not opening fire when the rebels be- 
 gan placing batteries around him. 
 
 The writer once asked him why he did not 
 open fire when he saw the first shovelful of 
 earth turned at Cummings' Point. He replied, 
 in effect, that he had three reasons : First, he 
 was not perfectly secure against escalade until 
 the middle of January ; secondly, he had orders 
 to await attack ; and, thirdly, that he had not 
 been educated to consider the Secretary of War 
 a traitor (referring to Floyd). 
 
 I have before said that the majority of Mr. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 63 
 
 Buchanan's reconstructed Cabinet were able 
 and patriotic men. Why was it that Major 
 Anderson's orders were not changed under 
 their administration ? They were temporizing 
 to save the border States. We know now that 
 they were attempting a vain thing. It was not 
 thought so then. The hopeful put faith in 
 peace conventions and Crittenden compromises. 
 
 If Major Anderson had opened fire on the 
 Carolina militia on the 27th of December, let us 
 speculate for a moment on the probable re- 
 sults. 
 
 Would Mr. Buchanan have called out the 
 military strength of the nation to have sustained 
 him? 
 
 It is certain he would not. Then, no mat- 
 ter what the fate of Sumter, which, indeed, 
 would have been as dust in the balance, the 
 obvious result would have been that Mr. Lin- 
 coln could only have gone to Washington like 
 Cromwell, at the head of his Covenanters. 
 What a sad precedent would this have been ? 
 What a loss of prestige ? What a sacrifice of 
 moral power ? 
 
 The State of Kentucky, instead of remaining 
 loyal, would have been actively hostile, and the 
 war would have opened at once on the Ohio and 
 the Potomac. 
 
64 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 In that event thousands of hardy troops that 
 hastened to the defence of the national capital 
 would, in the first instance, have had to guard 
 their own borders. McClellan and Rosecrantz 
 could not have invaded Western Virginia if 
 rebel camp-fires had been lighted on the hills 
 back of Covington. The ultimate result might 
 have been the same, but the final triumph 
 would have been more difficult and long de- 
 ferred. 
 
 General Anderson's course at Sumter, and 
 his popularity as a Kentuckian, turned the 
 wavering sentiment in that State in favor of the 
 the Union. It was in recognition of this fact 
 that Mr. Lincoln, himself a Kentuckian, sent 
 General Anderson there as the first department 
 commander. 
 
 These considerations had also great influence 
 with General Scott. But when Judge Black 
 was urging him, much too late, to send re- 
 inforcements to Sumter, he was also possessed 
 with the idea that the rebels had formed a plot 
 to seize Washington City just before Mr. Lin- 
 coln's inauguration. Our navy was scattered 
 over the four quarters of the globe, and our 
 little army was, for the most part, stationed in 
 insignificant fragments on our most distant 
 frontiers. To collect a few reliable regulars 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 65 
 
 in Washington was his first and greatest 
 care. 
 
 Yet why did he not reinforce Sumter after 
 the capital was secured ? 
 
 I can also answer this question. 
 
 I once heard General Scott and General 
 Anderson discuss the Sumter problem in New 
 York City, during the siege of Fort Wagner 
 by General Gilmore. Some one asked General 
 Anderson as to the best way of taking Sumter. 
 He replied : " Take Charleston." General Scott 
 then said : " Yes, Robert, that is the way to take 
 the Charleston forts. To attack Sumter from 
 the sea, is taking hold of the wrong end of the 
 poker." 
 
 There are only two other points in connec- 
 tion with this famous siege that require notice. 
 
 Mr. Blair, in his published letter, already re- 
 ferred to, makes this statement : 
 
 " General Anderson had made preparations 
 to defend it (Sumter), but left his barracks stand- 
 ing, to be fired at the first shot, instead of pull- 
 ing them down and taking to his casemates as 
 he certainly would have done if he had not been 
 authoritatively told that the fort was to be evacu- 
 ated as soon as the small supply of provisions 
 on hand had been consumed." 
 
 In this connection I beg leave to quote from 
 
66 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 a letter written to me by General Truman Sey- 
 mour on this subject. Seymour commanded one 
 of the companies of artillery in Sumter, and was 
 General Anderson's room-mate during the siege. 
 " General Anderson did not take down ' the 
 wooden barracks ' at Sumter — the necessity for 
 which was so sagely suggested by Mr. Blair, — 
 because there were none to take down ! The 
 three barracks were permanent structures of 
 brick, three stories high, and built solidly against 
 the faces of the casemates ; they were con- 
 structed by the engineers to be fire-proof, and 
 were supposed so to be : not a member of the 
 garrison ever suspected they would or could be 
 consumed as they were. The floors were of 
 brick arches upon iron beams, overlaid by a 
 board floor ; the sash and casings of windows 
 were of wood, and the slate roofing was fastened 
 to board sheathing. The burning of these 
 buildings was only a temporary inconvenience ; 
 after the dense smoke had been blown off 
 there was no longer any point worthy of notice in 
 connection with them. The burning of the gates 
 to the fort could easily have been made good 
 by the rubbish near it. When Sumter was oc- 
 cupied, the parade was crowded with wooden 
 sheds, shops, etc., all of which were soon cleared 
 away. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 6y 
 
 " The point made by Mr. Blair is too absurd 
 to be worthy even of refutation ; he should 
 have known better (as a graduate of West 
 Point) than to have raised it. 
 
 " General Anderson never had the slightest 
 suggestion from the government, or from any 
 member of it, that the command would be with- 
 drawn. He would doubtless have felt profoundly 
 humiliated at any such acknowledgment of 
 weakness — so would any of the officers there." 
 
 Strange as it may seem, General Seymour 
 was mistaken in supposing that his commanding 
 officer had never received an intimation that 
 the garrison of Sumter would be withdrawn. 
 On the 2 5th of March Mr. Lamon, Mr. Lin- 
 coln's private secretary, went to Sumter and 
 told Major Anderson that in a few days his 
 command would probably be transferred to 
 another fort. He also made the same communi- 
 cation to Governor Pickens. It shows how 
 closely Anderson kept his counsel, when he 
 never communicated this intelligence to his 
 second in command. This gave rise to a very 
 strange episode.' 
 
 'The Chew Memorandum, presented to Gov. Pickens and Gen. 
 Beauregard by Lieut. Talbot and Robert S. Chew, Esq., was as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 " I am directed by the President of the United States to notify 
 you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with 
 provisions only, and that if such an attempt be not resisted, no effort 
 
68 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 The next day General Beauregard wrote 
 Major Anderson a very friendly personal note, 
 congratulating him on his prospective removal, 
 offering to give him every assistance possible, 
 but saying finally that he would only require of 
 him his statement on honor, that he had not 
 mined the fort. (" Rebellion Records," vol. i, p. 
 222.) Anderson replied : * * * "I must state 
 most distinctly, that if I can only be per- 
 mitted to leave on the pledge you mention, I 
 shall never, so help me, God, leave this fort 
 alive." [Ibid.) 
 
 There was a rumor that Fort Sumter was to 
 be blown up by the Yankees when they left it. 
 
 Curiously enough. Captain Foster had writ- 
 ten to the Chief of Engineers, December 19, 
 i860, "that he proposed to connect a power- 
 ful Daniel's battery with the magazine at Sum- 
 ter, by means of wires stretched across under 
 water to Fort Moultrie, and to blow up Sumter 
 if taken by an armed force." 
 
 This, of course, was before that fort was oc- 
 cupied by our people. But how did the rebels 
 get the rumor ? Evidently there was a leaky 
 vessel in the Engineer Department. 
 
 to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without further 
 notice, or in case of an attack on the fort. 
 
 "April 8, i86i." 
 
 This memorandum was not communicated to Major Anderson, and 
 the Powhatan, with the troops, was secretly detached. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION, 69 
 
 It may be inferred from General Seymour's 
 letter that he believed that the fort could have 
 been held longer ; Captain Foster, in his report 
 of the siege, also says as much. 
 
 This is undoubtedly true. By putting the 
 garrison on starvation rations of pork, the fort 
 could probably have been held for a week or 
 ten days longer. But what would have been 
 gained by this delay ? There were eighty men 
 (only thirty-five of whom were skilled artiller- 
 ists) holding a sea-coast fort against eight thou- 
 sand. Apart from the moral effect, the only 
 purpose in delay would have been to have 
 kept this many men a little longer from the 
 Northern frontier. This would have been a 
 sufficient reason, and the sacrifice would have 
 been made, had the government ever intimated 
 its desire that it should be made. 
 
 The Administration of Mr. Lincoln showed 
 nothing but doubt and vacillation in regard to 
 the Sumter question, up to the time of the fall 
 of the fort. 
 
 Evidently all it cared for was a show of force 
 on the part of the garrison, and a proof of 
 aggression on the part of the rebels. 
 
 This is unquestionably so, or they would not 
 have greeted the defenders of Sumter with 
 thanks and approval. 
 
70 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 The truth is, I believe, that they intended to 
 sacrifice them for moral effect, and both the 
 Administration and the nation were happy to 
 see them get off with their lives. 
 
 From February 23d to April 4th, no orders 
 were sent from the War Department to Fort 
 Sumter. Its commanding officer was thrown 
 on his own resources, left to his own devices, 
 yet hampered by the old order not to fire unless 
 attacked. At last, however, Secretary Cameron 
 sent the following autograph letter : 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT. 
 Washington, D. C, April 4, 1861. 
 
 Major Robert Anderson, U. S. Army. 
 
 Sir : Your letter of the ist instant occasioned some 
 anxiety to the President. 
 
 On the information of Captain Fox, he had supposed 
 you could hold out till the 15th instant without any great 
 inconvenience, and had prepared an expedition to relieve 
 you before that period. 
 
 Hoping still that you will be able to sustain yourself 
 till the nth or 12th instant, the expedition will go for^ 
 ward ; and, finding your flag flying will attempt to provis- 
 ion you ; and, in case the effort is resisted, will endeavor 
 also to reinforce you. 
 
 You will therefore hold out, if possible, till the arrival 
 of the expedition. 
 
 It is not, however, the intention of the President to sub- 
 ject your command to any danger or hardship beyond what, 
 in your judgment, would be usual in military life ; and he 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 7 1 
 
 has entire confidence that you will act as becomes a 
 patriot and soldier under all circumstances. 
 
 Whenever, if at all, in your judgment, to save yourself 
 and command, a capitulation becomes a necessity, you are 
 authorized to tnake it. 
 
 Simon Cameron, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 The answer to the above letter was inter- 
 cepted by the Confederates and sent to Mont- 
 gomery. It never reached Washington until it 
 went there with the Confederate archives. It 
 was accompanied by a private note to Colonel 
 Thomas asking him to destroy it. 
 
 [No. 96.] Fort Sumter, S. C, April Z, 1861. 
 
 Col. L. Thomas, 
 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. Army. 
 
 Colonel : I have the honor to report that the re- 
 sumption of work yesterday (Sunday) at various points on 
 Morris Island, and the vigorous prosecution of it this 
 morning, apparently strengthening nearly all the batteries 
 which are under the fire of our guns, show that they 
 either have received some news from Washington which 
 has put them on the qui vive, or that they have received 
 orders from Montgomery to commence operations here. 
 I am preparing by the side of my barbette guns protection 
 for our men from the shells, which will be almost con- 
 tinuously bursting over or in our work. 
 
 I had the honor to receive by yesterday's mail the let- 
 ter of the honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4, and 
 confess that what he there states surprises me very 
 greatly, following as it does, and contradicting so posi- 
 
72 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 tively, the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was 
 authorized to make. I trust that this matter will be at 
 once put in a correct light, as a movement made now, 
 when the South has been erroneously informed that none 
 such will be attempted, would produce most disastrous 
 results throughout our country. 
 
 It is, of course, now too late for me to give any advice 
 in reference to the proposed scheme of Captain Fox. I 
 fear that its result cannot fail to be disastrous to all con- 
 cerned. Even with his boat at our walls, the loss of life 
 (as I think I mentioned to Mr. Fox) in unloading her 
 will more than pay for the good to be accomplished by 
 the expedition, which keeps us, if I can maintain posses- 
 sion of this work, out of position, surrounded by strong 
 works, which must be carried to make this fort of the least 
 value to the United States Government. 
 
 We have not oil enough to keep a light in the lantern 
 for one night. The boats will have, therefore, to rely at 
 night entirely upon other marks. I ought to have been 
 informed that this expedition was to come. Colonel 
 Lamon's remark convinced me that the idea, merely 
 hinted at to me by Captain Fox, would not be car- 
 ried out. We shall strive to do our duty, though I 
 frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is 
 to be thus commenced. That God will still avert it, and 
 cause us to resort to pacific measures to maintain our 
 rights, is my ardent prayer. 
 
 I am, Colonel, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 Robert Anderson, 
 Major, First Artillery, Commanding. 
 
 In a previous letter Major Anderson had re- 
 proached the War Department for leaving him, 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 73 
 
 after nearly forty years' service, without orders, 
 intelligence, or advice. 
 
 It is on the the strength of the expression, 
 " I frankly say that my heart is not in the war," 
 that General Doubleday accuses General Ander- 
 son of want of loyalty and of being pro-slavery in 
 sympathy. 
 
 It so happens that after nearly forty years of 
 faithful service, the fame of that officer has 
 come to rest on one episode of his life— his de- 
 fence of Moultrie and Sumter. He foueht 
 bravely in the Black Hawk, the Seminole, and 
 the Mexican wars. He served with distinction 
 on the staff of Lieut.-General Scott. He wrote 
 several useful works for his branch of the ser- 
 vice, and did as much hard work as any officer 
 of his day ; yet if it can be made to appear that 
 he was weak, unwise, or wicked in the per- 
 formance of his last great trust, then his long 
 years of honorable toil will have been in vain, 
 for it is always the last important act that gives 
 tone and color to the picture of our lives. 
 
 No wonder he used the expression attributed 
 to him. For months he had been isolated. He 
 felt deserted and sacrificed. He had seen the 
 ebb-tide of patriotism, and the shoals and quick- 
 sands it left around him ; he did not know of 
 the mighty tidal wave of national feeling that 
 
74 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 had commenced its flow. What wonder was it 
 that he was sick at heart ? Brutus at Philippi 
 shrank for a moment before the premonition of 
 his doom. Peter denied his Master, and the 
 Master himself upon the cross cried out : " Eli, 
 Eli, lama sabachthani .'^ " 
 
 Who did not recoil from that prospect that 
 appalled Webster, — "• of States dissevered, dis- 
 cordant, belligerent ; of a land rent with civil 
 feuds, and drenched, it may be, in fraternal 
 blood?" 
 
 There was not an honest and patriotic man 
 in the country who did not dread to see the 
 war begun. And of all sorts and conditions of 
 men the soldier best knows the horrors of war, 
 and is most unwilling to see his own country 
 subjected to its miseries. Of course their finer 
 feelings are blunted in the heat of ac^^ion. 
 
 " The blood more stirs to rouse a lion 
 Than to start a hare." 
 
 No one has ever claimed that the siege of 
 Sumter was at all remarkable in a military 
 sense. It was a moral and not a military crisis. 
 
 The Count of Paris says of General Ander- 
 son, that " he showed a great moral courage — a 
 very rare thing in revolutions." 
 
 The government hesitated to strike, and let 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 7$ 
 
 I dare not wait upon I would. It hesitated and 
 temporized, apparently weighing small physical 
 advantages against the prestige of moral 
 right. It seemed at first more inclined to fol- 
 low the Macchiavellian policy of Louis XI, 
 rather than the braver example of Themis- 
 tocles. 
 
 But Anderson's action changed all this. The 
 struggle inaugurated at Sumter ended in a 
 great revolution. 
 
 In this contest, while the South was in re- 
 bellion, it was the North that forced the revo- 
 lution. 
 
 Formerly we had only a Union of States, 
 now we have a United People. Formerly we 
 claimed to be a nation only by the consent of 
 Sovereign members bound by artificial ties ; 
 now we claim to be a Sovereign People devel- 
 oped through psychological laws. 
 
 Like other nations we are beginning to have 
 an autonomy of action and a political equation. 
 
 The next and not less important feature in 
 our Revolution was the abolition of slavery. 
 We cast out that unclean thing, because it had 
 become heterogeneous and hateful. We placed 
 the higher law of Equality m our Constitu- 
 tion, because it was of endogenous growth. 
 This necessity for a change in our government 
 
76 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES. 
 
 had grown out of a change in our character as 
 a people. Such a time in a nation's Hfe is hke 
 a crisis in a disease. A nation that cannot 
 stand it, disintegrates. We have had our trial 
 and tragedy, and bitter and bloody it was. 
 But now that the issue is settled, we should 
 criticise the events of the time and the men of 
 that hour with all possible fairness. 
 
 There is glory enough for all. And although 
 those who came at the eleventh hour should 
 receive their reward, even as those who came 
 at the first, yet the nation will not forget those 
 who were the first to stand firm, and who were 
 faithful among the faithless and faithful to the 
 end. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 RETROSPECTIVE 
 
 IF the familiar statement were renewed that 
 Republican governments have produced 
 more than their share of the great men of his- 
 tory, it would be accepted as a truism by nearly 
 all readers of the English-speaking race. If a 
 second thought were given to the proposition, 
 the heroes of Plutarch, and the Hampdens and 
 Cromwells, the Washingtons and Lincolns of 
 modern times would be passed in almost un- 
 conscious mental review as a satisfactory illus- 
 tration of the assumption. Yet all thoughtful 
 men of our time know that there is a reverse to 
 our Democratic medallion. 
 
 If very heroic qualities are developed in our 
 times of trial, very undesirable qualities are 
 manifested in our seasons of prosperity. That 
 majorities can be as despotic as crowned kings, 
 is pretty generally conceded. That popular 
 opinion is as impatient of contradiction as the 
 most pedantic pedagogue, seems to be as unde- 
 
 77 
 
78 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 niably true. Hence it too often happens that 
 in repubHcs there is a certain duplicity or ti- 
 midity in criticism, if the question to be examined 
 is one about which a popular opinion has been 
 formed. 
 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill was asked on the hust- 
 ings, on the only occasion on which he stood 
 for Parliament, if he had not said that the Brit- 
 ish workingmen were given to lying. Mr. Mill 
 said, unhesitatingly, that he had. The British' 
 mob were generous enough to cheer him. No 
 doubt they consoled themselves with the thought 
 that, on Falstaff's authority, the whole world 
 was given to the same practice. 
 
 The American public have not been accused 
 of this fault, yet, in discussing the causes and 
 purposes of our late civil war, there is a very 
 politic, yet positive, suppressio veri. 
 
 We all talk and write as if our fore-thoughts 
 had been the same as our after-thoughts. In 
 the hurley-burley of the present we forget the 
 passions and prejudices of the past. There 
 seems to be a quiet assumption on the part 
 of most middle-aged men that their political 
 opinions have not changed since the rebel guns 
 opened on Sumter. We are all political proph- 
 ets, but, unfortunately, prophets after the facts. 
 
 Nearly all men condemn slavery now. This 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 79 
 
 is right and proper. The image of Dagon is 
 overthrown. Who ever worshipped Dagon ? 
 No man. It is a safe and pleasant thing to re- 
 vile a blind and helpless Samson. 
 
 If our elections are any index to popular opin- 
 ion, the great majority of voters in this country 
 up to i860 either did not believe that slavery 
 was wrong or were indifferent to it as a political 
 issue. If Mr. Lincoln had proclaimed on the 
 4th of March, 1861, that he was about to wage 
 a war for the suppression of slavery, in all 
 human probability his administration would 
 have proved an utter failure.' 
 
 There is one thing in connection with our 
 civil war that we have almost forgotten, and 
 which future historians are likely to overlook. 
 It is, that the cause of the gravest apprehension 
 to all thoughtful men and women in all parts of 
 our country was at that time the fear of a ser- 
 vile insurrection in the South. Undoubtedly 
 one of the gravest sins the rebel leaders have 
 to answer for is, that in bringing on the war, 
 
 ' The Abolition party so late as the Presidental election of 1852 only 
 numbered 156,149 (Hale's vote), out of a total of 3,144,201 votes cast. 
 
 It w^as often mentioned as a matter of ridicule or reproach during 
 the war, that the original abolitionists were rarely found at the front. 
 It cannot be fairly assumed that this fact proves their insincerity. A 
 large proportion of these fanatics were preachers, scholars, quakers, 
 or aged men, whose age, infirmities, or callings prevented them from 
 becoming military crusaders in the cause. I do not doubt that Gid- 
 dings. Garrison, or Wendell Phillips would have died at the stake 
 rather than denied their abolition sentiments. 
 
8o POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 they risked this fate for their misguided fol- 
 lowers. 
 
 I can state on the best possible authority that 
 General Anderson dreaded this possibility with 
 the most painful intensity. And why was this 
 apprehension not realized ? Simply and solely 
 because slavery degraded and emasculated the 
 black race more than we thought.^ 
 
 If, for instance, the slaves had retained the 
 courage and wild spirit of freedom of the Zulu 
 Kaffirs, who does not know that there would 
 have been a holocaust of houses, barns, and 
 bridofes all through the South, as soon as the 
 Federal soldiers crossed the Potomac ? What 
 murders, torturings, and ravishings would there 
 not have been had a black Spartacus arisen in 
 every Southern State ! Is this mere theorizing ? 
 Ask the people of Northern Minnesota what 
 atrocities the Sioux committed when they took 
 the war-path in 1863. And the provocation of 
 
 ' I am indebted for this statement and the deduction made from it, 
 to Gov. Chas. Anderson, the sole surviving brother of Gen. Robert 
 Anderson. 
 
 About the time of the bombardment of Sumter, Gov. Anderson 
 made a Union speech in San Antonio, Texas, during the delivery of 
 which his life was repeatedly threatened by armed desperadoes, who 
 were enraged by his vehement denunciation of the rebel leaders. 
 
 He was subsequently imprisoned by Gen. Ben. McCoUough, C. S. 
 A., but made a remarkable escape into Mexico. He made his way 
 back to Ohio, and was commissioned Colonel of the 63d Ohio Inft. 
 He was wounded at Stone River, ran on the Republican ticket for 
 Lieut. Governor of Ohio, was elected by a 100,000 majority, and suc- 
 ceeded Brough as governor on his death in 1865. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 8 1 
 
 the worst-used Indian tribe we ever cheated 
 out of home and lands was mild as moonlight 
 compared to the curse and wrong of slavery. 
 
 Fortunately, these apprehensions were not 
 realized. But we can not fairly judge of the men 
 who were prominent actors in the first act of 
 our Rebellion, without analyzing all the consid- 
 erations that influenced them at that time. 
 
 The abolition of slavery was not one of the 
 objects, but one of the accidents, of the war. 
 We may say now that it would have been a 
 justifiable and praiseworthy object ; yet this is 
 an after- thought. 
 
 It must be stated, in all fairness, that although 
 a great many people thought slavery was wrong, 
 even before our war, yet so strong was the rev- 
 erence for the written law, that but few would 
 have risked a war to abolish it. 
 
 The object of the war is generally and more 
 properly stated to have been the preservation 
 of the Union. Admitting thai this was its ob- 
 ject, it must now be admitted that there was an 
 accidental consequence more important even 
 than the perpetuation of the Union. 
 
 As before stated, it is our union as a people. 
 
 The war established the paramount claim of 
 the general government on the personal al- 
 legiance of every man in the country. 
 
82 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 It established the right of the government to 
 punish everv man in the country for a violation 
 of its laws. Mr. Calhoun claimed that a State 
 could throw the aegis of its protection over any 
 citizen, and thus nullify the power of the gen- 
 eral government. This will never be seriously 
 claimed again. 
 
 It has established for us as a fact that which 
 was once held by a few as' a metaphysical the- 
 ory, that the true principle of nationality is the 
 cohesive power of race. 
 
 This may seem to be a merely plausible plati- 
 tude. Yet it is a self-evident deduction. Peo- 
 ple of the same race, when living contiguously, 
 will, of course, speak the same language. Un- 
 der this great bond of union, they are likely to 
 be subject to the influence of the same laws and 
 literature. Consequently, their tastes and am- 
 bitions will be given the same bent. Living 
 and laboring under the same conditions, they 
 will have the same temptations to vice, the same 
 incentives to virtue. They will find it to their 
 advantage to combine in business enterprises, 
 and this can only be successfully done by people 
 who speak the same language and have been 
 raised in the same way. In fine, masses of 
 men moving in the same direction and under 
 similar conditions have to combine. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 83 
 
 There were many of the last generation who 
 thought they could escape the effect of this law 
 of race. We know now that any community 
 which would claim independent action in the 
 midst of any of the great nationalities of our day 
 would suffer annihilation. The time when dy- 
 nasties and factions can stand in the way of 
 national progress, or interfere with the autono- 
 mous action of a race, is past. 
 
 Without considering these facts and weighing 
 these considerations, we cannot fairly estimate 
 the political problem of Sumter. 
 
 It was not a question of blood and bones, 
 and bricks and mortar. 
 
 " It was not all of life to live, 
 Nor all of death to die." 
 
 A question of national existence, and, more 
 than that, of national character, hung upon the 
 issue. 
 
 From the time Major Anderson went to Fort 
 Moultrie to the time he left Sumter, it is hard 
 to characterize the course of both the Buchanan 
 and the Lincoln administrations in dignified yet 
 appropriate terms. Now that their despatches 
 have been published, it is evident that both ad- 
 ministrations wished that officer to relieve them 
 of responsibility by taking his own course. 
 
84 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
 
 Probably neither could have relieved Sumter 
 without risking the safety of Washington. Nor 
 could they abandon without sacrificing a prin- 
 ciple, so both temporized and left the garrison 
 of Sumter to its fate. ' 
 
 If Major Anderson had disobeyed his orders 
 and fought, he would have been whipped. 
 Then he could have been made a scape-goat, 
 and cashiered. Had he capitulated before a 
 fight, he would have been equally open to cen- 
 sure. 
 
 He felt that he was badly treated and said 
 so, yet in spite of this, and in disregard of per- 
 sonal sympathies and friendships, he was true 
 to his duty. 
 
 When Marshal Bazaine was tried for treason, 
 he said, in the course of his trial, that after the 
 Emperor Napoleon was dethroned he did not 
 know what to do. " What! " asked the Due 
 D'Aumale, the president of his court-martial, 
 " did France then cease to exist ? " 
 
 Major Anderson had no such doubts. He 
 knew he had a country to cherish, love, and de- 
 fend, in spite of mistakes and vacillations of 
 Cabinets and leaders. After the first overt act 
 of war, after he had to deal with facts, the great 
 mind of Abraham Lincoln asserted itself. From 
 
 ' See Addenda. 
 
PRECEDING THE REBELLION. 8$ 
 
 that time on we had nothing to be ashamed of. 
 From that time on we had grand, not petty, 
 war ; statesmanship, not statecraft. 
 
 As stated in the beginning, the poHtical con- 
 spiracies which preceded our civil war of 1861 
 were the consequences and not the causes of 
 the conflicting interests which made the contest 
 inevitable. However spontaneous the out- 
 burst of revolutions and rebellions may appear, 
 their force must at first be directed by con- 
 spirators. For, to overthrow an established 
 government, force is required, combination is 
 essential, and secrecy is a necessity. Other- 
 wise all such attempts would be suppressed in 
 their inception. 
 
 It was on the 5th of January, 1861, the day 
 that the Star of the West started for the relief 
 of Sumter, that the Southern leaders in Wash- 
 ington held their secret caucus in which they 
 organized their rebellion. This course had been 
 determined long before, but it was on this oc- 
 casion that these four resolutions were adopted. 
 To wit : 
 
 I St. The cotton States should secede imme- 
 diately. 
 
 2d. Delegates should be chosen to meet in 
 Montgomery, Ala., on Feb. i5th, to organize 
 a provisional government. 
 
86 POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES. 
 
 3d. That the conspirators should remain in 
 the Federal Congress during the Buchanan Ad- 
 ministration, to obstruct coercive legislation ; 
 and 
 
 4th. Davis, Mallory, and Slidell were ap- 
 pointed a committee to carry out the objects of 
 the meeting. 
 
 That their conspiracies utterly failed was 
 owing to the fact, which was so impressively 
 stated by Mr. Webster in the Senate in i85o, 
 " that the machinations of men are powerless 
 against the laws of nature." 
 
 Under the directive force 01 moral laws the 
 balance between the centrifugal and centripetal 
 forces of our political system seems to be re- 
 established, and let us hope that in the future, 
 as in the past, " Treason can but peep to what 
 it would." 
 
 THE END. 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 Reports of Generals Anderson and Beauregard of the 
 bombardment and evacuation of Fort Sumter. 
 
 TELEGRAM, 
 
 Steamship Baltic, off Sandy Hook, 
 
 April i8 (1861), 10:30 A.M. via New York. 
 
 Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, 
 until the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates 
 destroyed by fire, the gorge walls seriously injured, the 
 magazine surrounded by flames, and its door closed from 
 the effect of heat, four barrels and three cartridges of 
 powder only being available, and no provisions remain- 
 ing but pork, I accepted terms of evacuation offered by 
 General Beauregard, being the same offered by him on 
 the nth inst., prior to the commencement of hostilities, 
 and marched out of the fort Sunday afternoon, the 14th 
 inst., with colors flying and drums beating, bringing away 
 company and private property, and saluting my flag with 
 
 fifty guns. 
 
 Robert Anderson, 
 
 Major First Artillery, Commanding. 
 
 Hon. S. Cameron, 
 
 Secretary of War, Washington. 
 87 
 
88 ADDENDA. 
 
 REPLY. 
 
 War Department, "'Vashington, 
 
 Atril 20, 1 86 1. 
 Major Robert Anderson, 
 
 Late Commanding at Fort Sumter : 
 
 My Dear Sir. — I am directed by the President of the 
 United States to communicate to you, and through you 
 to the officers and men of your command at Forts Moul- 
 trie and Sumter, the approbation of the government of 
 your and their judicious and gallant conduct there, and 
 to tender you and them the thanks of the government 
 
 for the same. 
 
 Simon Cameron, 
 
 Secretary of War, 
 
 GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S REPORT. 
 
 Hdqrs. Provisional Army, Charleston, S. C. 
 
 April 2T, 1S61. 
 
 Sir. — I have the honor to submit the following detailed 
 report of the bombardment and surrender of Fort Sum- 
 ter and the incidents connected therewith. Having com- 
 pleted my channel defences and batteries in the harbor 
 necessary for the reduction of Fort Sumter, I dispatched 
 two of my aids at 2:20 p.m., on Thursday, the nth of 
 April, with a communication to Major Anderson, in com- 
 mand of the fortification, demanding its evacuation. I 
 offered to transport himself and command to any port in 
 the United States he might elect, to allow him to move 
 out of the fort with company arms and property and all 
 private property, and to salute his flag in lowering it. He 
 refused to accede to the demand. As my aids were 
 about leaving. Major Anderson remarked that if we did 
 
ADDENDA. 89 
 
 not batter him to pieces he would be starved out in a 
 few days, or words to that effect. This being reported 
 to me by my aids on their return with his refusal at 
 5:10 P.M., I deemed it proper to telegraph the purport of 
 his remark to the Secretary of War. Ir» reply I received 
 by telegraph the following instructions at 9:10 p.m. 
 
 " Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter. If 
 Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated 
 by him, he will evacuate, and agree that in the meantime 
 he will not use his guns against us unless ours should be 
 employed against Fort Sumter, you are authorized thus 
 to avoid effusion of blood. If this, or its equivalent, be 
 refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides most 
 practicable." 
 
 At I P.M. I sent my aids with a communication to 
 Major Anderson, based on the foregoing instructions. It 
 was placed in his hands at 12:45 a.m., 12th inst. He 
 expressed his willingness to evacuate the fort on Monday 
 at noon, if provided with the necessary means of trans- 
 portation, and if he should not receive contradictory in- 
 structions from his government or additional supplies, 
 but he declined to agree not to open his guns on us in 
 the event of any hostile demonstrations on our part 
 against his flag. This reply, which was opened and shown 
 to my aids, plainly indicated that if instructions should 
 be received contrary to his purpose to evacuate, or if he 
 should receive his supplies, or if the Confederate troops 
 should fire on hostile troops of the United States, or upon 
 transports bearing the United States flag, containing men, 
 munitions, and supplies designed for hostile operations 
 against us, he would still feel himself bound to fire upon us, 
 and to hold possession of the fort. As in consequence of 
 a communication from the President of the United States 
 to the governor of South Carolina, we were in momentary 
 
90 ADDENDA. 
 
 expectation of an attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter, or 
 of a descent upon our coast to that end from the United 
 States fleet then lying at the entrance of the harbor, it 
 was manifest by an imperative necessity to reduce the 
 port as speedily as possible, and not to wait until the 
 ships and the fort should unite in a combined attack 
 upon us. Accordingly my aids, carrying out my instruc- 
 tions, promptly refused to accede to the terms proposed 
 by Major Anderson, and notified him in writing that 
 our batteries would open on Fort Sumter in one hour. 
 This notification was given at 3:20 a.m. of Friday the 
 12th instant. The signal shell was fired at Fort Johnson 
 at 4:30 A.M. At about 5 o clock the fire of our batter- 
 ies became general. Fort Sumter did not open fire until 
 7 o'clock, when it commenced with a vigorous fire upon 
 the Cummings' Point iron battery. The enemy next di- 
 rected his fire upon the enfilade battery on Sullivan's 
 Island, constructed to sweep the parapet of Fort Sumter, to 
 prevent the working of the barbette guns, and to dismount 
 them. This was also the aim of the floating battery, the 
 Dalhgren battery, and the gun batteries at Cummings' 
 Point. The enemy next opened on Fort Moultrie, be- 
 tween which and Fort Sumter a steady and almost con- 
 stant fire was kept up throughout the day. These three 
 points — Fort Moultrie, Cummings' Point, and the end of 
 Sullivan's Island, where the floating battery, Dahlgren 
 battery, and the enfilade battery were placed — were the 
 points to which the enemy seemed almost to confine his 
 attention, although he fired a number of shots at Captain 
 Butler's mortar battery, situated to the east of Fort Moul- 
 trie, and a few at Captain James' mortar batteries at 
 Fort Johnson. During the day (12th instant) the fire of 
 my batteries was kept up most spiritedly, the guns and 
 mortars being worked in the coolest manner, preserving 
 
ADDENDA. 9I 
 
 the prescribed intervals of firing. Toward evening it be- 
 came evident that our fire was very effective, as the enemy 
 was driven from his barbette gun which he attempted to 
 work in the morning, and his fire was confined to his 
 casemated guns, but in a less active manner than in the 
 morning, and it was observed that several of his guns en 
 barbette were disabled. During the whole of Friday night 
 our mortar batteries continued to throw shells, but, in 
 obedience to orders, at longer intervals. The night was 
 rainy and dark ; and as it was almost confidently expected 
 that the United States fleet would attempt to land troops 
 upon the islands or to throw men into Fort Sumter by 
 means of boats, the greatest vigilance was observed at all 
 our channel batteries, and by our troops on both Morris 
 and Sullivan's islands. 
 
 Early on Saturday morning all our batteries reopened 
 upon Fort Sumter, which responded vigorously for a time, 
 directing its fire specially against Fort Moultrie. About 
 8 o'clock A.M., smoke was seen issuing from the quarters 
 of Fort Sumter. Upon this the fire of our batteries was 
 increased, as a matter of course, for the purpose of 
 bringing the enemy to terms as speedily as possible, inas- 
 much as his flag was still floating defiantly above him. 
 Fort Sumter continued to fire from time to time, but at 
 long and irregular intervals, amid the dense smoke, flying 
 shot, and bursting shell. Our brave troops, carried away 
 by their natural, generous impulses, mounted the differ- 
 ent batteries, and at every discharge from the fort cheered 
 the garrison for its pluck and gallantry, and hooted the 
 fleet lying inactive just outside the bar. 
 
 About 1.30 P.M., it being reported to me that the flag 
 was down (it afterward appeared that the flag-staff had 
 been shot away), and the conflagration, from the large 
 volume of smoke being apparently on the increase, I sent 
 three of my aids with a message to Maior Anderson to 
 
92 ADDENDA. 
 
 the effect that, seeing his flag no longer flying, his quar- 
 ters in flames, and supposing him to be in distress, I de- 
 sired to offer him any assistance he might stand in need 
 of. Before my aids reached the fort the United States 
 flag was displayed on the parapet, but remained there 
 only a short time when it was hauled down and a white 
 flag substituted in its place. When the United States 
 flag first disappeared, the firing from our batteries almost 
 entirely ceased, but reopened with increased vigor when 
 it reappeared on the parapet, and was continued until the 
 white flag was raised, when it entirely ceased. Upon the 
 arrival of my aids at Fort Sumter they delivered their 
 message to Major Anderson, who replied that he thanked 
 me for my offer, but desired no assistance. Just previous 
 to their arrival Col. Wigfall, one of my aids, who had been 
 detached for special duty on Morris Island, had, by order 
 of Brigadier-Gen. Simons, crossed over to Fort Sumter 
 from Cummings' Point, in an open boat, with private Gour- 
 din Young, amidst a heavy fire of shot and shell, for the 
 purpose of ascertaining from Major Anderson whether his 
 intention was to surrender, his flag being down and his 
 quarters in flames. On reaching the fort the colonel had 
 an interview with Major Anderson, the result of which 
 was that Major Anderson understood him as offering the 
 same conditions on the part of General Beauregard as 
 had been tendered him on the nth instant, while Colonel 
 Wigfall's impression was that Major Anderson uncon- 
 ditionally surrendered, trusting to the generosity of Gen- 
 eral Beauregard to offer such terms as would be honor- 
 able and acceptable to both parties. Meanwhile, before 
 these circumstances were reported to me, and in fact as 
 soon as the aids I had dispatched with offers of assist- 
 ance had set out on their mission, hearing that a white 
 flag was flying over the fort, I sent Major Jones, my 
 chief-of-staff, and some other aids, with substantially the 
 
ADDENDA. 93 
 
 same propositions I had submitted to Major Anderson on 
 the nth inst., with the exception of the privilege of sa- 
 luting his flag. The Major (Anderson) replied : " it would 
 be exceedingly gratifying to him, as well as his command, 
 to be permitted to salute their flag, having so gallantly 
 defended the fort under such trying circumstances, and 
 hoped that General Beauregard would not refuse it, as 
 such privilege was not unusual." He further said he 
 "would not urge the point, but would prefer to refer the 
 matter to me." The point was, therefore, left open until 
 the matter was submitted to me. Previous to the return 
 of Major Jones, I sent a fire-engine, under Mr. M. H. 
 Nathan, chief of the fire department, and Surgeon-Gen- 
 eral Gibbes of South Carolina, with several of my aids, 
 to offer further assistance to the garrison of Fort Sumter, 
 which was declined. I very cheerfully agreed to allow 
 the salute, as an honorable testimony to the gallantry and 
 fortitude with which Major Anderson and his command 
 had defended their fort, and I informed Major Anderson 
 of my decision about 7^ o'clock, through Major Jones, my 
 chief-of-staff. 
 
 The arrangements being completed, Major Anderson 
 embarked with his command on the transport prepared to 
 convey him to the United States fleet lying outside the bar, 
 and the troops immediately garrisoned the fort, and be- 
 fore sunset the flag of the Confederate States floated over 
 the ramparts of Fort Sumter. 
 
 * * * * * * > 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, 
 
 Vour obedient servant, 
 
 G. T. Beauregard, 
 
 Brigadier-General Com'dg. 
 Hon. L. p. Walker, 
 
 Secretary of War, 
 ' The omitted part embraced only compliments to his command. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 The Confederate leaders profiled by the lesson given by Major An- 
 derson in his seizure of Sumter, by taking the forts within their 
 borders, either before they passed their ordinance of secession or a few 
 days after. In most instances Messrs. Floyd and Cooper had taken 
 care that good reliable rebels were in command at important posts. 
 
 A brief resume may be interesting as a reminiscence. 
 
 Georgia passed its ordinance of secession January 19, 1861. 
 
 Fort Pulaski was seized on January 3d ; Augusta Arsenal, January 
 24th ; Oglethorp Barracks and Fort Jackson, on January 26th. 
 
 Fort Pulaski was in charge of Captain Wm. H. C. Whiting, Capt. 
 of U. S. Engineers, born in the State of Maine ; subsequently 
 General Whiting, C. S. A., Chief Engineer in Charleston Harbor, 
 and later on at Fort Fisher. 
 
 Augusta Arsenal was garrisoned by Captain Elzey, 2d Artillery, 
 and his company. Captain Elzey surrendered without firing a shot, 
 and became General Elzey, C. S. A. 
 
 It was also the painful duty of Captain Whiting to report the sur- 
 render of Oglethorp Barracks and of Fort Jackson. 
 
 An ordinance of secession was adopted in Mississippi on January 
 9th, and in Alabama on January 11, 1861. 
 
 The arsenal at Mount Vernon was seized by State troops January 
 4th, and Forts Morgan and Gaines on the 5th. 
 
 Governor Moore, of Alabama, wrote to his Excellency James 
 Buchanan as follows : " Sir : In a spirit of frankness I hasten to in- 
 form you by letter that, by my order, the above-named forts and ar- 
 senal have been peacefully occupied and are now held by the troops 
 of the State of Alabama. 
 
 ******** 
 
 " I deem it my duty to take every precautionary step to make the 
 secession of the State peaceful, and prevent detriment to my people. 
 ******** 
 
 " The purpose with which my order was given, and has been exe- 
 cuted, was to avoid and not to provoke hostilities between the State 
 and Federal governments." (Page 327, "Confederate Correspond- 
 ence.") And so on for quantity. 
 
 Imagine the Fenians seizing Dublin Castle with these excuses. 
 
 94 
 
APPENDIX. 95 
 
 Florida voted on the ordinance of secession on January loth. 
 The result could not have been known for a week, yet the arsenal at 
 Apalachicola was seized on January 6th; Fort Marion, St. Augustine, 
 January 7th; Barrancas Barracks, Forts Barrancas and McKee, and 
 the Pensacola Navy Yard were seized, and the surrender of Fort 
 Pickens was demanded, on the 12th. 
 
 In the Confederate correspondence in relation to Florida, p. 348, 
 st seq., there is some interesting reading. 
 
 First we find a request of Senator Yulee to the Secretary of War, 
 asking a list of anny officers from Florida, with rank and pay. The 
 information was given by Secretary Floyd. Next we find a request 
 of Yulee and Mallory for the number of U. S. troops in Florida, and 
 the amount of arms and ammunition in all the forts and arsenals of the 
 State. A paper giving the desired information in full was made out 
 by the Ordnance Department. But on January 9th it suddenly oc- 
 curred to Secretary of War Holt, that "the interests of the ser- 
 vice forbid that the information which you ask should at this moment 
 be made public." 
 
 One fort and one arsenal had already been forcibly seized, a few 
 days before, by the constituents of the Honorable Senators. 
 
 The U. S. steamer Brooklyn arrived off Pensacola with reinforce- 
 ments for Fort Pickens on February 6, 1861. 
 
 These troops were kept on board the steamer by a secret under- 
 standing with the rebels, called an informal truce, from that date to 
 the I2th of April, when they were landed. 
 
 On the 23d of January, 1861, a special messenger of the govern- 
 ment. Lieutenant Saunders, was arrested as a prisoner of war at Pen- 
 sacola. 
 
 January 26th, Secretary Holt telegraphs General Scott : " The 
 President is much disturbed by a telegraphic despatch which an- 
 nounces that the Brooklyn has sailed with two companies instead of 
 one as ordered." (Vol. I, p. 454, " Rebellion Record.") 
 
 On the same page we have the explanation of the disturbance of 
 the Executive intellect. 
 
 " Pensacola, January 28, 1861. 
 ' ' To Hon. John Slidell, or, in his absence, Hon. R. W. Hunter, 
 or Governor Bigler : 
 
 " We hear the Brooklyn is coming with reinforcements for Fort 
 Pickens. No attack on its garrison is contemplated, but, on the con- 
 trary, we desire to keep the peace, and if the present status be pre- 
 served we will guarantee that no attack will be made upon it, but if 
 reinforcements be attempted, resistance and a bloody conflict seem 
 inevitable. Should the government thus attempt to augment its force 
 — when no possible call for it exists, when we are preserving a peace- 
 ful policy — an assault may be made upon the fort at a moment's 
 warning. All preparations are made. Our whole force — 1,700 
 strong — will regard it as a hostile act. Impress this upon the Presi- 
 dent, and urge that the inevitable consequence of reinforcement un- 
 
96 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 der present circumstances is instant war, as peace will be preserved if 
 no reinforcements be attempted. If the President wants an assur- 
 ance of all I say from Colonel Chase, commanding the forces, I will 
 transmit it at once. I am determined to stave off war if possible. 
 Answer promptly. 
 
 "S. R. Mallory." 
 
 It is evident that Slidell, Hunter, & Co. had anticipated Senator 
 
 Mallory's suggestions. 
 
 The despatch, which was sent by Lieut. Saunders to Commodore 
 
 Armstrong, and which was taken from him by force, was in words 
 
 and figures as follows : 
 
 "Washington, January 7.% 1861. 
 
 "To James Glynn, commanding the Macedonian; Capt. W. S. 
 Walker, commanding the Brooklyn, and other naval officers in 
 command ; and Lieut. Adam J. Slemmer, First Regiment Artil- 
 lery, U. S. Army, commanding Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla. : 
 
 " In consequence of the assurances received from Mr. Mallory in a 
 telegram of yesterday to Messrs. Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, with 
 a request it should be laid before the President, that Fort Pickens 
 would not be assaulted, and an offer of such an assurance to the same 
 effect from Colonel Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile col- 
 lision, upon receiving satisfactory assurances from Mr. Mallory and 
 Colonel Chase that Fort Pickens will not be attacked, you are in- 
 structed not to land the company on board the Brooklyn unless said 
 fort shall be attacked or preparations shall be made for its attack. 
 The provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you will land. 
 The Brooklyn and other vessels of war on the station will remain, 
 and you will exercise the utmost vigilance and be prepared at a 
 moment's warning to land the company at Fort Pickens, and you and 
 they will instantly repel an attack on the fort. 
 
 " The President yesterday sent a special message to Congress com- 
 mending the Virginia resolution of compromise. The Commissioners 
 of different States are to meet here on Monday, the 4th February, 
 and it is important that during their session a collision of arms should 
 be avoided, unless an attack should be made or there should be 
 preparation for such an attack. In either event the Brooklyn and 
 the other vessels will act promptly. 
 
 " Your right, and that of the other officers in command at Pensacola, 
 freely to communicate with the government by special messenger, 
 and its right in the same manner to communicate with yourself and 
 them, will remain intact as the basis on which the present instruction 
 is given. 
 
 "J. Holt, Secretary of War. 
 
 " Isaac Toucey, Secretary of the Navy." 
 
 This was the basis of the famous trace under which the Confeder- 
 ates erected batteries all around Pickens, as they did about Sumter. 
 It was on the 1st of April that General Scott signed the order 
 
APPENDIX, 97 
 
 placing Bvt. Lieut. -Colonel Harvey Brown in command of the secret 
 expedition for the relief of Fort Pickens, of which the Powhatan 
 formed a part. 
 
 The following extracts from General Meig's letter to General Tot- 
 ten, p. 394, partly explain the Powhatan mystery : 
 
 " The uncertainty of the government as to the condition of Fort 
 Pickens, and as to the very orders and instructions under which the 
 squadron off that fortress was acting, led to apprehensions lest the 
 place might be taken before relief could reach it. 
 
 " A landing in boats from the mainland on a stormy night was per- 
 fectly practicable, in spite of the utmost efforts of a fleet anchored 
 outside and off the bar to prevent it. Such a landing in force, taking 
 possession of the low flank embrasures by men armed with revolvers, 
 would be likely to sweep in a few minutes over the ramparts of Fort 
 Pickens, defended by only forty soldiers and forty ordinary men from 
 the navy yard, a force which did not allow one man to be kept at each 
 flanking gun. 
 
 " Believing that a ship-of-war could be got ready for sea and reach 
 Pensacola before any expedition in force, I advised the sending of 
 such a ship under a young and energetic commander, with orders to 
 enter the harbor without stopping, and, once in, to prevent any boat 
 expedition from the main to Santa Rosa. 
 
 " Capt. David D. Porter readily undertook this dangerous duty, and, 
 proceeding to New York, succeeded in fitting out the Powhatan, and 
 sailed on the 6th for his destination. 
 
 "On the morning of the 17th, while engaged in landing the horses, 
 the Powhatan, which we had passed without seeing her during the 
 voyage, hove in sight. A note from Colonel Brown advised me that 
 in his opinion her entrance into the harbor at that time would bring 
 on a collision, which it was very important to defer until our stores, 
 guns, and ammunition were disposed of. 
 
 "As the enemy did not seem inclined yet to molest us ; as with 600 
 troops in the fort and three war steamers anchored close inshore, 
 there was no danger of a successful attempt at a landing by the 
 enemy, it was evident that it was important to prevent a collision, 
 and her entrance would have uselessly exposed a gallant officer and a 
 devoted crew to extreme dangers. 
 
 " The circumstances had changed since Captain Porter's orders had 
 been issued by the President. Knowing the imperative nature of 
 these orders, and the character of him who bore them, I feared that 
 it would not be possible to arrest his course ; but requesting the com- 
 mander of the Wyandotte, on board of which I fortunately found my- 
 self at the time I received Colonel Brown's letter, to get under way 
 and place his vessel across the path of the Powhatan, making signal 
 that I wished to speak with him, I succeeded at length, in spite of his 
 changes of course and his disregard of our signals, in stopping this 
 vessel, which steered direct for the perilous channel on which 
 frowned the guns of McKee, Barrancas, and many newly constructed 
 batteries. 
 
98 APPENDIX. 
 
 " I handed to Captain Porter Colonel Brown's letter, indorsed upon 
 it my hearty concurrence in its advice, which, under his authority from 
 the Executive, had the force of an order from the President himself, 
 and brought the Powhatan to anchor near the Atlantic, in position to 
 sweep with her guns the landing-place and its communications. 
 
 "The Brooklyn shortly afterward anchored east of ths Atlantic, 
 and the Wyandotte took up position near her." 
 
 But why first assign the Powhatan, first assigned to the Sumter ex- 
 pedition, and then transferred without the knowledge of either the 
 Secretaries of War or the Navy ? 
 
 We extract a few interesting extracts from the " Confederate Cor- 
 respondence," p. 443, etseq. : 
 
 " I shall give the enemy a shot next week before retiring (from the 
 U. S. Senate). I say enemy ! Yes, I am theirs, and they are mine. 
 I am willing to be their masters, but not their brothers. 
 
 " Yours, in haste, 
 
 "D. L. YULEE." 
 
 (Oh, shade of Lindley Murray hover o'er us !) 
 
 "Washington, January'}, i86i. 
 "Joseph Finegan, Esq. (Tallahassee, Fla.): 
 
 " My Dear Sir : On the other side (following) is a copy of reso- 
 lutions adopted at a consultation of the Senators from the seceding 
 States, in which Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Mis- 
 sissippi, and Florida were present. 
 
 ' ' The idea of the meeting was that the States should go out at once, 
 and provide for an early organization of a Confederate government, 
 not later than 15th February. This time is allowed to enable Louisi- 
 ana and Texas to participate. It seemed to be the opinion that if we 
 left here, force, loan, and volunteer bills might be passed, which 
 would put Mr. Lincoln in immediate condition for hostilities ; where- 
 as, by remaining in our places until the 4th March, it is thought we 
 can keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied, and disable the Republicans 
 from effecting any legislation which will strengthen the hands of the 
 incoming Administration. 
 
 * * *.* * 4: « « 
 
 " In haste, yours truly, 
 
 " D. L. YULEE." 
 
 How secret the Pensacola expedition was may be seen from the 
 following despatches ; 
 
 "Augusta, March 20, 1861. 
 " President Davis: 
 
 "My always reliable Washington correspondent says: 'Evident 
 Lincoln intends to reinforce Pickens.' 
 
 "Wm. H. Pritchard." 
 
APPENDIX. 99 
 
 "War Department, A. and I. G. O. 
 
 " Montgomery, yi;)n7 6, 1861, 
 
 "Brig.-Gen. Braxton Bragg: 
 
 " The government at Washington have determined to reinforce Fort 
 Pickens, and troops are now leaving for that purpose. 
 
 *' S. Cooper, 
 "Adjutant and Inspector-General." 
 
 North Carolina seceded May 20th. Forts Caswell and Johnston 
 were seized April i6th. The arsenal at Fayetteville was surrendered 
 by Capt. S. S. Anderson, U. S. A., subsequently C. S. A., April 
 22d. He had forty-two men, but made no resistance. 
 
 Louisiana seceded on January 26th. The U. S. arsenal and bar- 
 racks at Baton Rouge were seized, January lOth ; Forts Jackson and 
 Saint Philip, January nth; Fort Pike, January 14 ; Fort Macon, Jan- 
 uary 28th. Paymaster's funds and ail government property were soon 
 after taken in New Orleans. 
 
 The form of the demand was the same in all cases. To wit : " In 
 the name of the Sovereign State of Louisiana, I now demand," etc., 
 etc. 
 
 The ordinance of secession was adopted by the Arkansas Conven- 
 tion, May 6th ; all the U. S. forts and property within the borders of 
 that State and the Indian Territory were seized before the secession 
 of Arkansas. 
 
 In Texas no hostile demonstrations were made against the U. S. 
 Government until after the passage of the ordinance of secession, 
 February i, 1861. 
 
 There is only one thing important to note in connection with our 
 subject, and that is, that although General Twiggs, commanding that 
 Department, commenced writing for instructions as early as Decem- 
 ber 13, i860, and wrote urgently over and over again, he only re- 
 ceived one non-committal letter from General Scott's Aid. 
 
 It was evident from the time of his first letter that he did not in- 
 tend to support the government in coercive measures. In subsequent 
 letters he said that he intended only to be a looker-on, and that he 
 never would fire on an American citizen. 
 
 Before the passage of the ordinance of secession Twiggs would 
 probably have collected the troops under his command and marched 
 them to any place the government might have designated. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the government wished to hold Texas by 
 force, the troops should of course have been placed under the com- 
 mand of some able and loyal officer, and concentrated at the State 
 capital. 
 
 As it was, Twiggs was relieved by Col. Waile, February 19, 1861. 
 
 The first letter of instructions to Col. Waite is a military curiosity: 
 
lOO APPENDIX. 
 
 * HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, 
 
 " Washington, Febrtmry 4, 1861. 
 
 " Col. C. A. Waite, U. S. Army, 
 
 " Commanding Departtnent of Texas, San Antonio : 
 
 ' ' Sir. — The General-in-Chief directs me to write you as follows : 
 To relieve Brevet Major-General Twiggs, you were put in orders the 
 28th ultimo to command, according to your brevet rank, the Depart- 
 ment of Texas. Instructions followed three days later for sending 
 the five companies of artillery on the Rio Grande to Brazos Santiago, 
 there to be embarked in a steamer (ordered hence to meet them), 
 with their batteries complete, leaving their horses, for sale or other 
 service, behind. If necessary, the artillery companies will be re- 
 placed by detachments of infantry, unless Texas should in the mean- 
 time have declared herself out of the Union. 
 
 " In the latter case you will wait for instructions respecting the dis- 
 position of the troops (other than the artillery) under your command 
 and the public property in their hands, which you will hold and pre- 
 serve. 
 
 " I am, etc., 
 
 "L. Thomas." 
 
 This letter was written not by the traitor Floyd but by the patriot 
 Holt ; not under the administration of poor Pierce, but under that 
 of the veteran statesman, James Buchanan. 
 
 A department commander is told that instructions will only be 
 sent him as to his arm of strength a/ier the State in which he is com- 
 manding may have seceded. 
 
 This letter was sent at a time when the government had learned to 
 its sorrow that secession meant open defiance, spoliation, or war. 
 
 " Angels and ministers of grace defend us!"