iiil bV •3' ^ * o „ ' -P,^ O^ * ^:p<^- o ^ V^^'* ^.^^ •##" \/ .•'^^"- ''^-'** ■*^^-^^"- -^ A '^ ■had made fun THE ARRIVISTES 163 of him to please his entourage. Ever after he was hostile to Muravieff. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Muravieff was faithful to but one person and that was himself. He had little real personality, was very careless and re- markably trivial. How recklessly he treated the very serious problem of Kiao-Tchao has already been mentioned. In many other matters, just as serious, he acted in the same way. His sole preoccupation was to cling to his office as long as possible. He had known how to win the sympathies of Empress Alex- andra by means small in themselves, but large in results. He used to play at being a horse on his hands and knees with the Imperial children, which with other similar tricks pleased the Imperial Couple. As he fully appreciated the weak character of Nicholas II, he became a flatterer of the boldest kind in order to gain his own ends and in his policies was usually most successful in guessing his Imperial master's mind. At this time the personal relations between the Eussian a-nd German Emperors were very strained. Instead of endeavouring to smooth over matters Muravieff added fuel to the flames and in conse- quence Russo-German relations became steadily worse and worse. Realizing his own ignorance of diplomacy, Mura- vieff selected as his Assistant Minister, Count Lams- dorff, who, having spent his whole life in the Foreign 164 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Office, was a regular mine of information. The Archives contained nothing he did not know. Mura- vieff constantly consulted him and he astonished the Emperor by his official reports, so great an under- standing and intimate knowledge did they display of existing conditions and circumstances. Of course, he took very good care not to tell the Emperor that all his information was supplied by Lamsdorff. The Eussian Emperor could hardly have chosen a less profitable Foreign Minister. His own irresolu- tion and weakness found no guiding and saving hand in the personality and powers of Count Muravieff, who, during his tenure of office had no steady policy, and no visible objective. His policy degenerated into a mere series of vacillations. His enemies worked hard to bring about his downfall and had all but succeeded when he died very suddenly. His valet found him in his study lying on the floor with a gash in his temple, which had been caused by his head coming into contact with the sharp edge of a low stool when he fell. In Petrograd, it was rumoured that he had committed suicide, being unable to bear the disgrace of dismissal which he knew was soon coming. Personally I do not believe this to be the case. As a young man Muravieif had been more than partial to women and wine and had sown a fine crop of wild oats. Despite his advancing years he appeared to enjoy the harvest when he returned to Petrograd. He had a mistress whom he visited HERR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG THE ARRIVISTES 165 every day, and he used to drink a quart bottle of champagne every night before he went to bed. Such habits were not conducive to a long life, and probably too great satisfaction, rather than dissatisfaction with himself carried him off. Count Lamsdorff, who succeeded him, was abso- lutely his opposite in temperament and character. Nicholas II, The Unreliable, could always be relied upon to appoint ministers whose characters and opin- ions had not the slightest resemblance to their prede- cessors. Thus Russian policies were continually chopping and changing. Although far better edu- cated than Muravieff and with an intensive knowl- edge of affairs of state, Lamsdorff was very narrow minded and small of soul and lacked the saving grace of Muravieff — common sense. He was a religious bigot. Women had never played any part in his life and consequently rumour gave him the reputa- tion of being a pervert. He lent colour to these rumours by showing great favouritism to some of the men about him who were for the most part, strikingly handsome young men. At that time there was attached to the Chancellery a very handsome young man, Savinsky by name, who held the minor position of Third Secretary. Lams- dorff noticed him and chose him as his travelling companion in the Crimea when the Emperor went to Livadia. Savinsky returned from this short voyage a Gentleman of the Chamber and Second Secretary. 166 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Only a few months later he was made First Secre- tary. Lamsdorff wished to make him Master of Ceremonies at Court but found himself strongly op- posed by Count Hendrikotf, then Grand Master of Ceremonies. Lamsdorff insisted! He went so far as to threaten to present his resignation to the Em- peror in case his protege was not appointed. As usual, Nicholas gave way and consented to Savin- sky's appointment. One day, at a gala performance in honour of the visit to Petrograd of the German Emperor, Savinsky fulfilled the duties of Master of Ceremonies. Dur- ing one of the entr 'actes Emperor Nicholas, turning to Admiral Lomen, his aide-de-camp, who told me the story, said to him: ''Point out Countess Lams- dorff to me." He meant Savinsky!!! The Em- peror showed that he felt something was wrong, but this did not prevent him appointing Savinsky his minister at Stockholm and, later, at Sofia, where he remained until the declaration of war. Prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister Lamsdorff had never been beyond the confines of Eussia, not even on a pleasure trip. H'e visited Central Europe for the first time when he accom- panied the Emperor to Compiegne, in France. Lamsdorff was popularly known as a rubber cushion such as invalids use in an inflated form. He had been Secretary and Vice-Director of the Im- perial Chancellery, under Prince Gortchakoff; later THE ARRIVISTES 167 Director- in-Chief of the Chancellery; then First Councillor under de Griers, and Prince Lobanoff, and finally Assistant Minister under Muravieff. The regime he instituted at the Ministry became paternal in its effects. He was surrounded by nonentities, but he was sure of them and had known them for many years. In his policy, Count Lamsdorff — having been a great admirer of Monsieur de Giers — ^used his meth- ods to avoid complications. While carefully keeping up the friendly feeling and intercourse which existed between Eussia and France, he also did his best to better our relations with Germany. The result of his policy was apparent during the Eusso-Japanese War. The Berlin Cabinet at that time surrounded us with favours, and Emperor William sealed this Nero-Platonic friendship with us by a commercial treaty which was disastrous to our industrial inter- ests. Later he inveigled the Emperor Nicholas into the extraordinary secret treaty concluded at Bjoerke which the Czar afterwards repudiated. This treaty when published by the Maximalists after the revolu- tion caused quite a sensation. Count Lamsdorff was frankly hostile to the war with Japan, and acted with great courage and hon- esty in this matter. He presented a long memoran- dum to the Emperor, later published by the famous Eussian revolutionary, Monsieur Bourtzeif. In this memorandum he called serious attention to the 168 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT grave dangers of any policy which would provoke or annoy Japan, as the well-known Yalu River Com- pany with Monsieur Bezobrazoff, a new favourite of Emperor Nicholas ''S at that time, at its head, was doing. Count Lamsdorff concluded this memoran- dum by stating his open opposition to an anti-Jap- anese policy, with almost brutal frankness and threatening to resign if it were continued any fur- ther. Nicholas II refused to accept his resignation and promised amendment, but the activities of the Yalu River Company in no way lessened, and the Russo-Japanese War was the result. At first sight it seems strange that Count Lams- dorff gave proofs of such real statesmanship. The key to the puzzle is to be found in the reports which passed between Count Lamsdorff and Count Witte. The latter, whose greatness was so little appreciated by Nicholas II, was the originator of the policy of Lamsdorff, by whom he was constantly consulted. Lamsdorff had sufficient acumen to make himself Witte 's mouthpiece and the latter 's fall was dis- astrous to Lamsdorff's calculations. The Emperor knew perfectly well of the two men's relations and the credit with which the Foreign Minister thought he had covered himself suffered severely in conse- quence. Lamsdorff fell into disgrace and died soon after. The Emperor's choice of his successor fell upon Monsieur Iswolsky. THE ARRIVISTES 169 Iswolsky had been Secretary of the Consulate at Philippopolis in Bulgaria; Secretary in Ronmania, Washington and Copenhagen; and as Official Agent in Rome renewed the intimate relations between Rus- sia and the Holy See — ^which had been severed for many years. He had also afterwards been our first representative at the Vatican, and then was Minister at Belgrade, Munich, Tokyo and Copenhagen. He had graduated from the Imperial Alexandre Lyceum, with honours, receiving a gold medal — and even at that time his comrades prophesied he would eventu- ally become Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had always dreamed of obtaining the post of Ambassador to Berlin and intrigued a great deal to secure it, but though he failed in this he achieved the higher office as had been prophesied. Incontestably very intelligent, with the very wide outlook and broad point of view of the real states- man, he had, however, two great faults : a limitless ambition and a snobbishness which amounted to a disease. In order to further his ambitions and his career he would hesitate at nothing. When he was First Secretary in Roumania he fought a duel with a Roumanian Officer, Lapteff by name. '*A diplomat who fights, is equal to a soldier who does not," Prince Gortchakoff had once said. This principle was always one of the rules of the Russian Foreign Office ; but Iswolsky cleverly knew how to make use of the duel to further his interests. 170 EECOLLBCTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT The cause of the duel had been a woman, but he let it be understood at Petrograd that, in reality, he had fought to defend the honour of his Imperial Master who — he claimed — had been insulted by his adversary. His version was believed and he was created a Gentleman of the Chamber, and, as he could no longer remain in Bucharest because of this contretemps, he was transferred to Washington. Iswolsky only had a very small fortune of his own and he spent the whole of it in the United States in order to make a good impression in Washington, Newport and Bar Harbor Society. All his friends made sure that he would marry an American heiress, but Iswolsky preferred to be transferred to Copen- hagen, w'here he married Countess Toll, daughter of our Minister to Denmark, whose parents were very high in favour with Alexander III. The Emperor himself was one of the bride's witnesses and on the day of his wedding Iswolsky was made Chamberlain. For the honeymoon he chose a visit to Eome. He well knew of the existing state of affairs between Eussia and the Pope, and hence decided to make a trip there to look into the matter — in a purely private and speculative way. From Rome he sent a long memorandum to the Foreign Office which was very much liked and he was appointed, at first, semi-offi- cial Representative of Russia at the Pope's Court, and soon after, Minister-Resident to the Holy See. This was really the beginning of his fine career. THE ARRIVISTES 171 His snobbishness at least equalled his ambitions. A great name was a divine endowment in his eyes. Of an unpleasing physical appearance he neverthe- less thought himself irresistible where women were concerned. He also believed that after Bismarck he was the greatest diplomat in the world ! After having been Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was made Ambassador to Paris and there had to receive the various members of a Eepublican govern- ment, which, to him, was torture. He preferred to associate with Dukes and Princes ; but, of course, his position as Ambassador necessitated his throwing open his drawing rooms to powerful Eepublicans. Monsieur Briand, who was then Minister of Jus- tice before being made President of the Council, knew Iswolsky's weakness in this matter very well. For that reason he avoided all invitations to the Rus- sian Embassy. When he became President of the Council, however, he could no longer refuse an invi- tation which was personally sent to him on one occa- sion by the Russian Ambassador. He went and was received by Madame Iswolsky, who said to him: "Monsieur Briand, it would seem that you have no pleasure in coming to us." Briand answered, '*0h, Madame, surely not as much in coming, as you have in asking me." On another occasion when he was giving a fete to which all classes were asked and, of course, all the members of the French Government, the Russian 172 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Ambassador was particular that the Duke of Ven- dome, a member of the Royal Family of France, should be present. This was not easy to accomplish as the members of the French Royalty studiously avoid coming into any contact with the Republican government representatives. Iswolsky therefore went to his British colleague, Sir F. Bertie, and the following conversation took place between the two Diplomats : ''I want very much to have the Duke of Vendome present at my reception," said Iswolsky. ''Well, why don't you ask him?" queried Sir Francis Bertie. "What would you do were you in my place?" Iswolsky insisted. ''I wouldn't ask him at all," said the British Am- bassador. ''But why then advise me to do so?" "Because that sort of thing amuses you, whereas it bores me," replied the British Ambassador. Many other anecdotes of a similar character floated about the Paris salons and were most annoy- ing to our Ambassador as they made him appear ridiculous. Iswolsky 's snobbishness was very ap- parent when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and, combined with his colossal self-assurance, made him follow a policy very dangerous for Russia. The an- nexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908-09) under- THE ARRIVISTES 173 mined his position and was a striking example of his self-assurance. In September, 1908, Iswolsky was taking a holiday abroad and was invited by Count Berchtold — Am- bassador of Austria-Hungary at Petrograd — to come for some shooting to his castle at Buchlau, in Bohemia. Iswolsky accepted the invitation and there met Count Aerenthal, Minister of Foreign Af- fairs of Austria-Hungary. Count Aerenthal had oc- cupied for many years the post of Ambassador to Russia, and, very naturally, knew intimately our Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berchtold did things in a big way. Iswolsky was royally received at Buchlau. Knowing the tastes of his guest, a whole galaxy of lovely women were present, and it was there that was discussed the question of the annexa- tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was to begin an era of complications in the Balkan Peninsula which had as their result the two Balkan Wars and — indirectly — began the present world war. Iswolsky stayed at Buchlau from the 19th to the 22nd of September. On the 23rd of September, the Minister was hunting in Austria with a friend, Prince Windichgraetz, and, on the 25th, he arrived at Ter- gensee, near Munich, where he owned a villa. I was at Tergensee at this time as I too owned a villa there, not far from his. On the 26th of September Iswol- sky, chancing to meet me while we were out walking, 174 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT begged me to come and see him, saying: ''I have a very serious matter to discuss with you." At that time I was correspondent of the Novoie Vremya, in Paris and naturally hastened to comply with his invitation. Iswolsky made me his confidant on several matters of high importance, of which I took copious notes. He told me that Count Aerenthal had approached him with regard to the annexation of Bosnia-Herze- govina by Austria-Hungary. The Austrian Minister had assured him that he personally was entirely against the annexation which might entail grave complications, of which he was well aware. But,; he added, the question would nevertheless, in all probability, be discussed by the parliamentary meet- ing of delegates at Budapest in about ten days or two weeks' time. The Austro-Hungarian Minister did not hide from Iswolsky that the delegates ''de- sirous of spreading sunshine about the last days of the old Emperor — so beloved all his life," might very well vote for the annexation under the cir- cumstances. Finally Aerenthal had bluntly asked Iswolsky this question: ''What would be said in Eussia should the annexation become a fait ac- compli?" Iswolsky told me he had answered: "It would most certainly be an ugly matter. Naturally we would not go to war about it, but would demand adequate compensations. ' ' THE ARRIVISTES 175 Our Minister then enumerated these compensa- tions. They would include the declaration of the independence of Bulgaria; territorial concessions to Montenegro; an outlet for Serbia on the Adri- atic, and, finally a settlement of the questions relative to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, in a way that would please Russia. Aerenthal promised his sup- port and once more emphasized the fact that he was personally against the annexation and that he would oppose it at the meeting of the delegates. Iswol- sky then carefully explained to me his reasons for his answers to Aerenthal and told me that we were not ready to open the Balkan question with all its ramifications, as great danger would arise were we to show ourselves unalterably opposed to the an- nexation. ''To protest it officially," he said, ''we should have to be strong enough to uphold our protest by force, if necessary. A mere protestation might easily become a severe diplomatic defeat and this I wish to avoid. ' ' The Minister concluded by asking me to send a telegram to my newspaper ''to prepare Russian opinion for the eventuality of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. ' ' I told him that it would be impossible for me to do this. "If," said I, "I should send my informa- tion in the form of a conversation that I had at Tergensee with a Russian statesman, it would nat- 176 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT urally be at once known that you must be the man and so this would not accomplish your ends. On the other hand, were I to publish news of so grave a character without giving my source of information, my editors might very possibly withhold its publi- cation. ' ' I then proposed that he should make use of our official telegraphic bureau, and send a telegram containing the news he had just given me. He agreed to this and the next day I submitted the tele- gram that I had drawn up over night. He made a few changes at first, but afterwards re-wrote it in his own hand. This message I personally sent to Berlin to my successor at the Russian Embassy, Monsieur Van der Vliet, asking him at the same time to hand it to Monsieur Markoff, the representative of our official telegraphs in Germany. In my letter which went at the same time to Van der Vliet, I con- fidentially told him the source of this very grave information. The telegram I sent was published in all Russian papers, and reproduced in all the well known European newspapers. It had the effect of a bomb, and unloosed a Russian press campaign of the most violent and bitter character. On the 27th of September I had another long in- terview with Iswolsky. I asked him if he could answer for the concurrence of the European Cab- inets in the matter of the projected compensations. Iswolsky seemed to be absolutely sure of the Cab- THE ARRIVISTES 177 inets of Rome, Paris and London. As for that of Berlin, lie thought it would follow the diplomatic action of Austria-Hungary; and this was all ar- ranged for between Aerenthal and himself. Naturally he had communicated with Aerenthal with regard to these negotiations, and had also given his own ideas to Emperor Nicholas. He proposed to the Emperor that he (Iswolsky) should go to Rome, Paris, London and Berlin to sound political sentiment in these capitals. The Czar accepted his proposal and on the 29th of September Iswolsky started on his journey. The King and Queen of Italy and their suite, being at the time at Raconidge, a castle of theirs near Tu- rin, Iswolsky went there first. He was accompanied by Madame Iswolsky. The King and Queen greeted him warmly. He was given the Grand Cordon of St. Maurice and Lazare, and Madame Iswolsky was paid marked attention by the Queen. Very much grati- fied with his pourparlers with the Italian statesmen Iswolsky left Italy and reached Paris the first of October, 1908. That same day Monsieur Pichon, then Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris, in a conversation with Iswolsky regarding the annexation said to him that according to reports he had received on the Balkan situation from the French representatives in Sofia, the annexation was already an accomplished fact in principle; that it would be preceded by the an- 178 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT nouncement of Bulgarian independence and that Prince Ferdinand would assume the title of Czar. Iswolsky would not believe it, although he too had similar reports to those of Monsieur Pichon, which had been sent to him by Monsieur Sementovsky, our Minister at Sofia. For Iswolsky to admit that these items of informa- tion were correct, was to admit his defeat at the hands of Aerenthal! Iswolsky 's colossal self-es- teem, always to the fore, would not permit any such thing, so he denied the truth of the reports, and tried to make himself believe that all was well. But he de- nied things that were self-evident to any one. On the evening of October 1st he received a tele- gram from Sementovsky in Sofia, telling him that the Proclamation of Bulgarian Independence would be issued the next day! This news was confirmed by our Ambassador at Vienna, to whom Iswolsky frantically telegraphed and the Ambassador added that the annexation would follow the proclamation, that is to say, within a very few days. And so it happened. On October 2nd Prince Ferdinand of Coburg proclaimed the Independence of Bulgaria, and assumed the title of Czar, and on the 4th Octo- ber the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a fait accompli! It is evident that Count Aerenthal completely and successfully duped Iswolsky at the Buchlau meet- ing. It is possible that the treaty between the Dual THE ARRIVISTES 179 Monarchy and Bulgaria was made after ^swolsky's visit to Count Berclatold. Naturally, this treaty was projected long before this, but Count Aerenthal feared a rupture with Eussia, knowing full well that Germany might possibly not uphold her ally, Austria- Hungary, as she was not at all ready at that date to begin the European War (October, 1908). But Iswolsky, having imprudently assured Berlin that Russia would not make war, and would be con- tent with adequate compensations, Aerenthal had absolutely a free hand. Furthermore, as Iswolsky had told him the compensations Russia would expect, Aerenthal, wishing t-o embroil his Russian colleague as deeply as possible in order that he might have the least possible success, won a signal victory by hurrying on the Bulgarian Proclamation with his Government's concurrence, and made it appear as if Austria-Hungary and not Russia had determined on Bulgarian independence of Turkey. Bulgaria played Austria-Hungary's game by not referring the question to Russia who up to that time had stood sponsor for Bulgaria in Europe. As to the other compensations demanded by Iswolsky, Aerenthal, once the annexation was accomplished, proposed to present them formally to the other For- eign Chancelleries, and this he did. Of course Iswolsky was undone, and in a terrible rage. He decided nevertheless to continue his pourparlers in Europe on the matter of compensa- 180 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT tions as he thought the only thing left for him to do was to fight matters out to the bitter end. The French Cabinet promised him its fullest sup- port, but the great problem was to win over the British Cabinet in the very delicate questions of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and the Berlin cabinet in the matter of Serbia and Montenegro, whose af- fairs were intimately connected with those of Ger- many's ally, the Dual Monarchy. Iswolsky therefore hastened to London to begin operations. He was received in the British capital with great cordiality, but when he touched upon the question of the Dardanelles, he was quickly told that this matter could not be decided hurriedly. He was assured, however, that in principle the British Cab- inet had nothing against passing a resolution on the Serbian question which would not antagonize Ber- lin, though it would first be necessary to find out the status of public opinion in England. It seemed evi- dent that the reply of the British Government was a refusal, disguised in polite terms. From London Iswolsky intended to go to Berlin. He sent a telegram to Count Osten-Sacken asking him to advise with the German Emperor as to the possibility of his (Iswolsky 's) seeing him. I have referred to the fact that William did not like Iswolsky, and he decided that now was the favourable time to humiliate the Russian statesman. He knew perfectly well that Iswolsky had not sue- THE ARRIVISTES 181 ceeded in London, so he sent word to Iswolsky that he was very busy with the festivities attendant upon the marriage of his son, August Wilhelm, and asked him if he would come to Berlin after the ceremonies were over. The intention of the German Emperor to wound Iswolsky was evident, for, under normal circumstances he would of course have invited our Foreign Minister to Berlin and the festivities. Iswolsky went to Baden-Baden, and conforming to the Emperor's wishes, returned to Berlin a week later. I was in the German capital at this time, and had been able to satisfy myself completely and accurately as to the sentiment in both official and public Ger- many. I knew perfectly well how greatly German political circles feared a war then. Aerenthal's startlingly brusque action had been severely con- demned by all parties, and relief was only felt when it was known that Russia, too, did not wish for war, and that she would not provoke one. It was only then that the German Foreign Office decided to press Austria-Hungary further into the matter, and at the same time, if possible, to force a diplomatic defeat on Russia. I knew Herr Stein, Editor-in-Chief of the Frankfurter Zeitung, inti- mately, who was persona gratissima with Prince von Buelow. He confided to me that the Emperor would avoid discussing politics with Iswolsky. I did not hesitate to transmit this information at once to our 182 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Foreign Minister, who was very doubtful if it were correct. But it was true, for on the very day of Iswolsky's arrival in Berlin, he was asked to a family luncheon at the palace. The Emperor broached all sorts of subjects, with the eo&ception of the political situation of the day. Prince von Buelow later gave a banquet in honour of his Russian colleague, but he too avoided delicate questions, and refused to allow the conversation to impinge on political questions in the slightest way. Among those present at this dinner were the high- est court functionaries, and a veritable host of beautiful women. It was only at the last moment on the day of Iswolsky's departure that the Ger- man Chancellor came to see him to discuss politics. It was seven o'clock at night, and Iswolsky's train left at eleven. To his great disappointment, this in- terview did not at all satisfy our Minister of Foreign Affairs. When he began to speak of *' compensa- tions," Prince von Buelow said that Germany had nothing to do with the question, and that she was not interested, advising him at the same time to take up the matter directly with the cabinet at Vienna. Our Minister's defeat was complete! On his return to Russia he fought the entire press, which had started a very vicious campaign against him. On the other hand he tried to continue the struggle against Aerenthal. Endless negotiations THE ARRIVISTES 183 between them followed, to such an extent that Berlin decided to put a stop to them. In the early part of March, 1909, Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador at Petrograd, came to see Iswolsky, and handed him a sort of ultimatum. Germany had had enough ! Fearing complications she demanded formally that the annexation of Bos- nia-Herzegovina he at once recognized hg Russia without ang reservations whatsoever. Iswolsky had to consent, and his discomfiture was complete. His snobbishness and his incredible ego- ism had ruined him. In the salons of Petrograd he was given the sou- briquet of ''The Prince of the Bosphorus." In his conceit Iswolsky could not see that he was being mocked, accepting the nickname with pleased smiles. The Russian press continued its vitriolic attacks on him, and his many enemies did their utmost to un- dermine his position. His final disgrace was first and foremost due to the matter of the Bosnia-Herze- govina annexation, though his resignation did not, however, take place until a year later. It would be unjust, however, to judge Iswolsky solely by the bad blunder he made in the Balkan question. Despite his faults he had without doubt the stuff in him of which statesmen are made. Per- suaded as he was that our relations with Germany had undergone a serious change, he tried to replace them by other diplomatic combinations. 184 EECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT He undertook pourparlers with the London Cab- inet on the Persian Question, which had always been the danger point in our relations with Great Britain. In 1907 he concluded an understanding with the London Cabinet which had as its object the delimita- tion of the zones of Russo-Anglo influence in Persia, and by so doing, paved the way for an eventual com- plete rapprochement with England. He followed this treaty by an entente with Japan, an entente the value of which proved itself thoroughly at the out- break of the present world war. Viscount Motono completed this understanding by his Treaty of 1916^ — which was published in January, 1918, by the Maximalists, and which made such a stir. The foreign policy of the Russian Empire changed completely. Our relations with Germany were still correct, but the secular traditions which had existed between Petrograd and Berlin disappeared into the vistas of the past. We now swam openly in British waters. The Anglo-Franco-Russo Entente took the place of the old Tri-Emperor Alliance. Iswolsky was the real founder of Russia's new policy, which was continued by his successor^ Monsieur Sazonoff. CHAPTER VIII THE WHIRLPOOL SazonofPs Policy: Russian Action in the Balkans. Bulgaria, Serbia and Roumania. Foreign Influence on Russian International Policy Finding himself attacked on all sides by the press, and by his enemies, and seeing the foundation of his power crumbling away under his feet, Iswolsky ap- pointed Sazonoff Vice-Foreign-Minister in the hope that he would secure the support and influence of Stolypin. But his hope proved vain. A few months later Iswolsky was made Ambassador to Paris, and Sazonoff became Foreign Minister. Monsieur Sazonoff thus owed his career partly to Iswolsky, whose secretary he had been at the Holy See in Rome, and partly to the fact that he had married the sister of Mme. Stolypin, when Stolypin was Preside it of the Ministerial Council and om- nipotent in the Empire. I knew Sazonoff intimately. He had been my col- league in the Foreign Office where our desks were opposite each other. We had both been appointed Imperial Chamberlains in the same year, and made 185 186 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT our debut at the Court at the same time in March, 1898, at Moscow during the Imperial Visit to the old capital. The new minister of Foreign Affairs — although not nearly so intelligent as his predecessor — was by no means stupid. He was chiefly handicapped by lack of experience. His whole experience had been gained in London and at the Holy See, and included only one appointment as a Minister of Russia — that of Resident Minister to the Papal Court. As Chief of the Foreign Office at first he was mod- est, and showed himself eager to learn, allowing him- self to be guided by his brother-in-law Stolypin. But he gradually became stubborn and insisted on dis- playing his own abilities, especially after the assas- sination of Stolypin. His successes in the Dmna completely spoiled him. The Liberal party gave him credit for being progressive and when the war broke out the deputies, who, with but few exceptions, were not at all partial to our existing foreign policies, credited him also with our understanding with Great Britain, and with Italy. Each time that Sazonoff appeared in the Duma he was received with vocifer- ous applause. This was the climax which completely turned his head. He believed himself to be another Talleyrand. In making decisions he refused to listen to any advice tendered by others, seeming to consider he was above criticism. Zinovieff the elder, THE WHIRLPOOL 187 our ex-Ambassador to Constantinople and a diplo- mat well-known in all European Capitals for his in- telligence, said to me : ''I never see Sazonoff any more. He does not talk over affairs these days! He decrees/' But notwithstanding his self-assurance, Sazon- off was quite amenable to the influence of the For- eign Ambassadors accredited to Petrograd. Before the Great War, Sazonoff naturally endeav- oured to carry on Iswolsky's policies, especially where England was concerned. But at the same time he was carefully watching Berlin, and shortly before the war he concluded with the Berlin Cabinet an entente regarding Persia, which, as I have already explained, was in my opinion very humiliating for Eussia. He promised to link Teheran and Bagdad by rail at our expense ! In this way we completely lost our influence in Persia. In the south our under- standing with England gave the British a definite sphere of influence in the empire of the Shah, and in the north, where England had given us a similar sphere, Sazonoff by this railway allowed the Ger- mans to penetrate. But his lack of experience and his unfortunate self-confidence were still more apparent in his Balkan policy. In the month of April, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria concluded an offensive and defensive alliance. This 188 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT treaty had been first submitted, and received Rus- sia's sanction. It was obvious that this alliance had Turkey in view, and that war would ensue. I was then in the Balkans as special correspondent of my paper (The Birjevia Wiedemosti — the larg- est daily in Petrograd) and had stayed for several weeks in Belgrade. From my conversations with Prince Alexander, heir to the Serbian throne. Mon- sieur Paschitch, President of the Siberian Council, and also with Monsieur de Hartwig, our Minister in Serbia, probably the best informed men on the Bal- kan situation, I had gained the firm conviction that Serbia was at that moment ready for war, that this was quite understood and agreed to by Montenegro, and that Sofia was to give the signal which would precipitate war. Later when I was in Bulgaria my conviction was confirmed. I was perfectly certain war would break out very shortly. More than that, on the 24th of July, 1912, I sent a telegram to my paper in which I predicted that hostilities would be- gin about the end of September. This telegram was quoted everywhere at the time and subsequent events proved I was right. On the 2nd of October, 1912 (modern style) the first shot was fired by Monte- negro. I had exceptional means of information because my brother-in-law, (Sementovsky), had been Minis- ter of Sofia for many years. He and his wife were very popular there, enjoying an exceptional position THE WHIRLPOOL 189 in political circles, and being very friendly with Czar Ferdinand. I also had met the Czar of Bulgaria be- fore, and when I arrived in Sofia immediately called formally at the palace. Two hours later I was vis- ited by Monsieur Dobrovitch, chief of the Czar's private information bureau, and his right hand man. Dobrovitch welcomed me in his master's name, and added that Ferdinand wanted to see me, and would like to know how long I intended remaining in Sofia. Knowing my answer would be reported verbally to the Czar, and having had experience of his little idiosyncrasies, I answered: *'To have the great honour of being received by your Sovereign I have decided to stay in Sofia weeks, months, years, and to die here, if necessary." Shortly afterwards, Dobrovitch visited me a sec- ond time. He told me that Ferdinand would receive me on the following day, but asked that our conver- sation should not be published in my paper. I in- sisted, however, and Dobrovitch sent me word in the evening that the Czar consented to the publica- tion of an interview on the condition that it was first submitted to him as censor. Ferdinand received me privately and the Queen was the only one present at our interview, which lasted two and a half hours. The Czar was most agreeable, and recalled many circumstances of our previous meetings, spoke with seeming affection of Prince Lobanoff, of Nicholas II, of Count Osten- 190 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Sacken, and with Ms usual enthusiasm for science, art and music — in short, he touched upon all possible subjects of conversation — with the exception of that which interested me the most, the political situation of the moment. It was only when I rose to make my adieu, that he said to me : * ' You have just come from Serbia, — what are your impressions?" I answered that the eyes of the Serbians were fas- tened on the royal palace of Sofia, whence the word of command was expected. I added that it was sufficient to have conversed with Prince Alexander, with Paschitch, and with Hartwig to realize opinion in Belgrade. At Sofia, I continued, it was not so easy. I had there interviewed a dozen statesmen all of whom were no doubt intelligent, but who all seemed to hold different points of view. The Czar smiled, and turning to the Queen, said to her: * ' You hear what the Baron has said to us, Madame ! You and I, too, know something of these matters!" and he gesticulated as if he carried a heavy weight on his shoulders. My interview with Czar Ferdinand and with his ministers confirmed the information I had gathered in Belgrade, and I reported accordingly to my paper. When the report was published M. Sazonoff was vis- iting European capitals. He was absolutely certain that war would not ensue and so expressed himself THE WHIRLPOOL 191 strongly in Paris and London. In speaking of the new Balkan Allies he said : **They will never dare!" When he reached Berlin he learned that war had been declared and said to his intimates : * ' The hounds have slipped my leash. ' ' On his return to Petrograd I met him at the rail- way station of Tsarkoe-Seloe, the residence of the Emperor, where we were both staying. Sazonoff asked me into his carriage to ride with him to Petro- grad. ''Where the devil did you get your information?" he asked abruptly. My answer greatly astonished him. ' ' From exactly the same source as you could have had it just as easily. More especially of course, thanks to Hartwig. You, however, did not agree with Hartwig, and did not follow his line of reason- ing, preferring to listen to the reports of Nikludoff, (who had succeeded the late Sementovsky as the Rus- sian Minister at Sofia). Naturally as you did not want war, you only listened to those who were of the same opinion and desires." It must be admitted that on the outbreak of hos- tilities, Sazonoff knew how to get out and keep out of trouble. Relying on our understanding with France, he suc- ceeded in forcing Austria-Hungary to recognize two principles : 192 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT The disinterestedness of the great European Powers in the war, and (2) The non-limitation of the theatre of war in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary evacuated the Sanjak of Novi- bazar, a Turkish Province she had militarily occupied since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus permitted the Serbs to join with the Monte- negrins. It is certain that Germany, and especially Austria- Hungary, were convinced the Slavic Balkan alliance would be crushed by Turkey, but when the victori- ous Serbs reached the shores of the Adriatic Vienna received a severe shock. Count Berchtold, at that time Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, promptly proposed a conference of the Powers to discuss Balkan problems, and Sazonoff was weak enough to accept this pro- posal. The conference took place, and resulted in the evacuation by the Montenegrins of the city of Scutari which they had occupied by force of arms ; the creation of Albania as an independent state but naturally dependent on the Central Powers with a German Prince, (Prince Wied), as Sovereign; and in the retirement from Durazzo on the Adriatic of the unfortunate Serbs. The Serbians retired — nay, were forced into Macedonia. Bulgaria shrieked ''Treachery," and a second Balkan war — this time THE WHIRLPOOL 193 between the Allies of the previous day — broke out in 1913. On one of my previous visits to the ex-Prime Min- ister of Russia, Monsieur Groremikine, the old states- man strongly criticized Sazonoff's policy. He said to me: ^'Why did he go to London at all? Had I been Minister of Foreign Affairs and had in my pocket the treaty with Austria-Hungary which did not limit the theatre of war, and had been asked to a confer- ence, I should have simply replied : ' Gentlemen, let the Slavs and the Turks cut each other's throats to their hearts' content! and when they have had enough of this and they make a treaty of peace, there will be plenty of time to hand their treaty round the chancelleries of Europe. ' ' ' Count Witte too on his part did not hesitate to criticize Sazonoff's work severely. Unfortunately Goremikine, through indolence, and Witte, through impotence, did not bring their respective points of view to the Czar's attention. Thus Sazonoff re- mained master of the situation. Afraid of a second Balkan War and very desirous of preventing it, he persuaded the Emperor to intervene personally. This was a great mistake. The telegram of the Eussian Emperor to the Kings of Serbia and Bul- garia gave no practical result, and Russian prestige in the Balkans was seriously damaged. 194 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT The second Balkan war was concluded by the treaty of Bucharest in 1914. This treaty pleased no one although I know that this is directly contrary to the opinion of my friend, M. Andre Cheradame, in his remarkable book ''The Pan-German Plot Un- masked.'^ Serbia victorious was very dissatisfied at not having obtained an outlet on the Adriatic Greece did not receive all she hoped for in Mace- donia. Eoumania was not content with what she received in Dobrudja and felt she had been pre- vented by Russia from marching on Sofia. Bulgaria lost all round. The Bulgarians were furious with Russia because they believed Russia had forced Eou- mania to intervene. The Treaty of Bucharest was chiefly the work of Sazonoff. It was obviously an expedient which sowed a harvest sure to be ripe for reaping one day. Yet when the harvest came in the present world war, as far as the Balkan States were concerned Sazonoff pursued his old policies, blind to their consequences. I am personally convinced that Sazonoff did not believe in the possibility of a European war which would develop into a world-wide war, and he im- pressed this belief both on France and England. They considered their interests in the Balkans small beside those of Russia and naturally preferred to follow the lead of Sazonoff. On the first of June, 1914, Emperor Nicholas had an interview with King Charles I of Roumania, at THE WHIRLPOOL 195 Constanza. I was there at the time, and learned through Eoumanian statesmen, and intimate friends of mine, that King Charles had made certain prom- ises to Russia. For example a military convention which had been in force between Austria-Hungary and Roumania for more than twenty years would not be renewed. Austria-Hungary, in consequence, lost a very strong support in the Balkans. Further- more, when Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Habsburgs, was assassinated at Serajevo, on the 28th of June, 1914, Sazonoff, doubt- less, knew of the war-like arrangements the Arch- duke had concluded in his Castle at Krobatin with the German Emperor, — yet as far as I could judge from my conversation with members of his entour- age, he was convinced that if the Archduke were out of the way, the peace of Europe would not be en- dangered. For my part after I left Constanza I spent ten days in Bucharest, and then went to Buda- pest and Vienna. At both places I had interviews with Austro-Hungarian statesmen; as for instance, Count Tisza, President of the Hungarian Council, and Count Forgach, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in Austria-Hungary. Some of these interviews I sent to my paper in Petrograd and in them, contrary to the opinion held by Sazonoff, I held strongly to the opinion that owing to the death of the Archduke the situation had become infinitely more serious. Count Forgach, — who had been a colleague of mine 196 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT at Munich — was most explicit. He did not attempt to hide the rage he was in against the Serbians. He said that Serbia fully deserved the most drastic kind of lesson, and added that Austria-Hungary would know how to inflict it ! Coming from such a source this was enough. Forgach was notorious as the forger of the Friedjung trial and one who would take any steps to harm Serbia. He and the German Emperor's representative, Tchirsky, were hand in glove. When I returned to Petrograd on the 2nd of July, 1914, I reported my impressions to Monsieur Nera- toff, vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. I found him very sceptical regarding my forebodings, and as I knew that Neratoff was Sazonoff 's alter ego, I real- ized that his views were those of the Foreign Min- ister himself, and that nothing would change them. After the declaration of war the Duma met in solemn conclave. All the ministers of State, and the foreign representatives of friendly allied Powers were received with wild enthusiasm. Sazonoff was unable to begin his speech for several minutes be- cause of the cheering of the deputies, and he thought the cheering was intended as a personal tribute and as confirming the excellence of his policies. It is apparent by simply examining a map which shows clearly the southern and eastern zones of the Great War, that the role Serbia would play in any such war was most important. Serbia lay as a bar- THE WHIRLPOOL 197 rier between Constantinople and the Central Powers, and her army of about 400,000 men, already victori- ous in the two Balkan wars, was a constant menace to Austria-Hungary. It should have been evident that the efforts of our diplomats in the Balkan Peninsula must concentrate themselves on endeavouring to help and use the Serbian forces as much as possible. It was therefore, necessary to, (1) Force Greece to action. (2) Bring Roumania into the Alliance. (3) Either assure ourselves that Bulgaria would join us, or that, at least, she would remain neutral, and (4) To unite Italian military strategy with that of Serbia. Unfortunately Russian diplomacy lacked initia- tive, and drew the Allies into the same mischiev- ous situation. Dynastic considerations were allowed to affect diplomatic and military action, and this unhealthy state of affairs was ultimately the cause of the Serbian disaster. Greece in 1913 had concluded an offensive and de- fensive alliance with Serbia, which was primarily aimed at Bulgaria, but also had as an objective the possibility of an European war. It was stipulated in this treaty that if Serbia were attacked Greece would come to her assistance with all her military and naval forces. King Constantine of Greece, who married a sister 198 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT of the German Emperor, and who received his mili- tary education in Berlin, regarded his rank of Gen- eral in the Prussian Army nearly, if not quite, as reverently as he did his position as King of Greece. He was pro-German to his very marrow. He was whole heartedly against an alliance of Greece with any powers inimical to Germany and German inter- ests. Venizelos, the only great statesman and dip- lomat in Greece, to whom Greece owed the re-acquisi- tion of her former territory, and who was the author of the treaty with Serbia, had to resign. He was re- placed by creatures nominated by the King, who falsely interpreted the treaty with Serbia, and con- fined Greece to a condition of neutrality entirely pro- German in its sentiments. All diplomatic action of the Allies should have concentrated in an attempt to force an anti-Con- stantine movement — or uprising — in Athens. In Paris the true situation was realized. But as much cannot be said for the authorities either in London or in Petrograd. The King of Greece sent one of his brothers to England and another to Eussia to plead his cause. Prince Christopher worked in Lon- don, and Prince Nicholas — married to a Grand Duch- ess of Russia, — did his best in Petrograd. They both used every possible argument regarding their dynastic interests, and both Sir Edward Grey and Sazonoff seem to have been blind to the real situa- tion. THE WHIRLPOOL 199 The islands of the Grecian Archipelago served regularly as bases for the revictualling and remu- nitioning of German submarines. A certain Baron Schenk, the German representa- tive in Athens, became the centre of a web of spies spread over the whole Balkan Peninsula. Venizelos, whose life was in danger, had to leave Athens, and it was only after the massacre of French officers and sailors at Athens which was inspired and abetted by the Royal Court itself, that Allied diplomacy began to show some signs of energy . King Constantine eventually was forced to leave the country, and his son Alexander was proclaimed King. Venizelos became Prime Minister again, and Greece — at last — made common cause with the Al- lies. But it was too late ! Serbia no longer existed ! The treaty which linked Serbia with Roumania, made in 1913, had expired automatically after the peace of Bucharest. But it was evident that Rou- manian interests lay more with the Allies than with the Central Powers. Among the Provinces of Hun- gary was Transylvania, inhabited by five or six mil- lion Roumanians, and naturally Roumania — follow- ing a thoroughly nationalistic policy — would keep the annexation of Transylvania ever in view. But at the beginning of the war the throne of Roumania was still occupied by King Charles I, by birth and in his whole soul a HohenzoUern, who had linked the 200 EE COLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT destinies of Ms country with those of the Central Powers. Despite this fact, through the pressure brought to bear on him by the majority of his peo- ple, — he had to denounce the military convention which he had concluded with Austria-Hungary in 1884. When the war broke out he held a Crown Council (August 2nd, 1914) and began by declaring that according to his convictions, Eoumania should become an ally of the Central Powers. But, as he said, in case the majority of the Council should not be in accord with such a policy, he was ready to follow a policy of the strictest neutrality. He added that this was his final concession, and that he would rather abdicate than act in any way against the Central Powers. The meeting was a very turbulent one. The King found some support in Monsieur Carp, the ex-Presi- dent of the Council, and a strong partisan of Ger- many, and also in the person of Monsieur Marghilo- man — also an ex-President of the Council who voted for neutrality. The true patriots, such men as the late N. Philip- pesco and M. Take lonescu, demanded immediate action on the part of Eoumania with the Allied Powers. Monsieur Bratiano, the leader of the Lib- eral Party, and the most powerful man in the coun- try, who was President of the Council, played a dou- ble game. He declared for neutrality as he did not wish to break with the King, but in a devious man- THE WHIRLPOOL 201 ner he let it be known to the partisans of the Allies that he was completely at one with their aspirations, and only awaited a favourable opportunity to force the King's hand and to follow a national policy. Thus at the beginning of the war, Eoumania pre- served her neutrality. But this neutrality was of a rather curious char- acter ! The Roumanian Government did not oppose the re- victualling and munitioning of Serbia by Rus- sia. We had installed at Reni, on the Danube and on the Roumanian frontier a special Military Commis- sion, presided over by Admiral Vesselkine. The ships belonging to this Commission brought the mu- nitions, equipment, and supplies down the Danube to the Serbians under the very eyes of the Roumanian authorities, but the latter deliberately turned their eyes another way! At the same time the Central Powers were unostentatiously passing whole batter- ies of guns of heavy calibre, shells and cartridges by the million, aeroplanes in sections, rifles by the thou- sand, through Roumania, all destined for Bulgaria and Turkey! German and Austrian officers were at complete lib- erty to come and go at will from Berlin and Vienna to Sofia and Constantinople. Furthermore, Rou- mania re-fitted and re-victualled the Central Powers with wheat and other cereals, and to cap all, finally concluded a commercial treaty with them. By this treaty Roumania promised to supply Austria-Hun- 202 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT gary and Germany with a certain quantity of wheat, other cereals, and petrol, in exchange for war mate- rials wherewith to make war. This was '^strict neu- trality ' ' with a vengeance ! Eussia several times tried to protest against the actions of Roumania in this matter, but each time Bratiano excused himself and assured the cabinet at Petrograd that he could not do otherwise. He sol- emnly stated he only awaited the opportunity to join the Allies openly, adding that Roumania was not yet ready from a military point of view. The greater number of Roumania 's heavy guns were made by Krupp, and the rifles by Mauser, and the Mannlicher Company — both being German and Austrian firms. It was therefore necessary, he said, to go to Germany and Austria for munitions for these weapons; and it stood to reason that the Central Powers would not provide him with such munitions unless he turned over food stuffs to them ! As to the question of per- mitting the carriage through Roumania of war ma- terials for Bulgaria and Turkey, and allowing Aus- trian and German officers to go and come as they pleased, Bratiano denied the facts absolutely. He explained such reports by saying that they were circulated by his enemies ! When hard pressed for the truth by the diplomatic insistence of the Allies, and afraid to declare himself one way or the other as to the date when Roumania might be expected by them to join their forces, Bratiano let it be under- THE WHIRLPOOL 203 stood that he would join the Allies as soon as Italy joined them. In order to lend colour to this assertion he sent a personal friend of his, the brother of the Roumanian Minister at Petrograd, M. Dia- mandi, to Rome. When Italy finally did join in the campaign, Roumania, instead of doing as she had said, still maintained her neutrality ! Bra- tiano explained this to the Allies by calling attention to the Italian refusal to link their forces and align their strategy with Roumania. It must be admitted that this explanation was well founded. Italy con- centrated all her efforts on the Trentino, and Trieste as her main objective, and would not extend her operations any further. I was again in Bucharest in July, 1916, and stayed a week then at Reni with Admiral Vesselkine, the head of our Military Commission, from whom I wished to obtain information as to Roumanian af- fairs for the reason that he knew them intimately. This time I stayed in Roumania fully four months and I was present when she at last took the field. At that time the Serbian disaster was un fait ac- compli! The heroic Serbian people had succumbed at last — thanks to the neutrality of Roumania and Greece and the bad judgment of the Allies. The Allied Forces — under command of the French Gen- eral, Sarrail, concentrated at Salonika, were grow- ing day by day, and — with the Serbians — attained 204 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT the not inconsiderable number of slightly more than 300,000 men. Venizelos had instituted at Salonika a separate government from that at Athens, and did his best from that place to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Allies. The Roumanian Court was now divided into two camps. King Charles had died of a broken heart at not being able to join the Central Powers. King Ferdinand was a constitutional king, and proved him- self such, saying that if the majority of his people demanded an alliance against the Central Powers he would not hesitate to sign it immediately. As the Government was in the hands of Bratiano, controlling an absolute majority in the House, the King trusted himself absolutely to him, and conse- quently Bratiano was complete master of the situa- tion. The Allied cause, however, found strong support at Court in the person of Queen Marie. Through her father, the Duke of Edinburgh, and later of Co- burg, she is British, and a grand-daughter of Queen Victoria. Her mother was the Grand Duchess Marie of Russia, the only daughter of Alexander II.* Queen Marie did not attempt to hide her sympathy for the Allies, and as she was extremely popular in Roumania her influence was invaluable to their cause. The Allies also had several strong sup- porters among the Conservatives. Carp had aban- * See Appendix I. THE WHIRLPOOL 205 doned politics after the death of Charles I, and the Conservative Party of which he had been leader, had split. Marghiloman, preaching neutrality, was at one end of the rope, and Take lonescu and Philip- pesco, partisans of the Allies, were at the other end. There was a regular tug-of-war going on between the two factions. I succeeded, while in Bucharest, in keeping on the best of terms with all the parties, and for a time my wife and I were the guests of Philippesco at his charming villa. I was also very intimate with Take lonescu, and lunched several times a week with Marg- hiloman. One day the last named stated his convictions to me plainly. He said : ''The impossible must never be attempted. My political adversaries want to swallow Transylvania, and even the Banat! Our stomachs cannot digest all this. In annexing Transylvania, which is cul- turally far more advanced than we are, we should in time become Transylvanians, and no longer be Eou- manians. Besides we are not ready for military action, and our defeat — from my point of view — would be a foregone conclusion. We cannot give any serious military support to the Allies, and I am con- vinced that our neutrality will be more profitable to them in the long run^ than if we took the field ac- tively. ' ' It is necessary to state that since I had first known 206 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT him some years before, Marghiloman had lost a great deal of his prestige, even in the inner-circles of his own party, the leadership of which had passed into the hand of his adversaries. But the Conservative Party, as a whole, only exercised a small influence in the House, which was dominated by the Liberals. The latter consisted of bankers, rich men of the Bourgeoisie, and of various other individuals who hoped for a public career by strictly carrying out the orders of Bratiano. The latter was cunning, and had cleverly known how to make game — and profitable game of the Al- lies' Representatives at Bucharest, and to use them for his own ends! Unfortunately he did not have a very difficult game to play! The Russian Minister, — Monsieur Poklewsky- Kosiell, — was by no means unintelligent, but having fallen out with the first Secretary of our Legation, Monsieur Arsenieff, who had strong friends at court in Petrograd, he narrowly missed being recalled, and kept his position solely by the powerful and friendly support of Sazonoff. He very naturally wished to reinstate himself in the good graces of our Foreign Office, and saw but one way in which he could do so, namely by forcing Roumania into the war. How he was to achieve this mattered not one whit to him! Knowing that everything depended on Bratiano, he became a very docile instrument in the Roumanian Minister 's hands. Moreover he had THE WHIRLPOOL 207 embroiled himself with Admiral Vesselkine, and when the latter called the attention of the Russian Government to the serious infractions of the neu- trality of Roumania for the benefit and profit of the Central Powers, Poklewsky, under Bratiano's influ- ence, sent home reports which were entirely con- tradictory to those of the Admiral. The French Minister, Monsieur Blondel, was somewhat in the same position as his Russian col- league. He had been in Roumania for eleven years, and his daughter had married the Governor of Silis- tria. In Paris Blondel was thought to be too Rou- manian in his tendencies and his recall was decided upon, but he was eager to keep his post and, as his only method of doing so, stuck tightly to Bra- tiano ! The British Minister, Sir H. Barclay, naturally followed the lead of his French colleague. Under the circumstances this was of no great moment as he had not very much influence in Roumania owing to the pre-war policy of England, which did not like to mix too deeply in Balkan aifairs,. Barclay was also a very good friend of Poklewsky, who had been his colleague in Persia. Thus the principal representatives of the Allies were very much under the sway of Bratiano. So much so that when one day after a luncheon at Mon- sieur Poklewsky 's, I criticized Bratiano's policy, Poklewsky and the other two attacked me as though I 208 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT were a personal enemy of theirs, while Barclay marched up and down the room, his hands above his head, wildly protesting against the noise we made. Thus Bratiano was really dictator of Roumania. Vain, and very ambitious, he was eager to eclipse his father, who had been the liberator of Roumania, and whose colossal statue stands in the public square at Bucharest. All the Roumanian ministers were his most intimate friends. He had made his brother Minister of War, and at the head of the General Staff he had put his cousin. General Iliesco, a mili- tary nonentity. Bratiano did not really know the exact fighting strength of Roumania, He knew that, in case of war, Roumania should be able to put 500,000 men in the field, but he forgot that the Army only had muni- tions for two months, — that it entirely lacked any heavy artillery and had no aeroplanes at all Bratiano had but one aim : which was to force the Allies to pay as high a price as possible for Rou- manian assistance. He had assured himself of ter- ritorial aggrandizement by making an agreement which gave Roumania Transylvania, the Banat and a portion of the Bulgarian Dobrudja, but he had not sufficiently assured himself of armed assistance on the part of the Allies. When, a few months be- fore Roumania declared war, Philippesco, who, as Minister of War, knew the very bad condition his country was in, came to Petrograd, he insisted that THE WHIRLPOOL 209 Eussia should support Roumania with an army of at least 250,000 men. In his overweening self-assur- ance Bratiano consented to accept the help of three Russian divisions only, in the Dobrudja region I Furthermore he would listen to no suggestions from the Allies as to the military strategy of Roumania. He proposed to leave a small force in Dobrudja and on the Danube, which he thought would be quite suf- ficient to hold Bulgaria in check, and to throw the weight of the Roumanian army over and beyond the Carpathians, to invade Transylvania. He also hoped to ensure the neutrality of Bulgaria by means of small concessions. In an under-handed way he worked hard for this project, and he was — most un- fortunately — well seconded by the diplomatic actions of the Allies! Of course the Bulgars encouraged him in this belief, setting a trap by which they could force him to pay very dearly for his grave and ego- tistical errors. To me, who had studied the situation very carefully at first hand, the danger of a plan of campaign like this was vividly clear! I had sent my newspaper secret reports as to the real position of affairs, not for publication, but in order that it might be in a position to understand matters in view of eventuali- ties which to my mind were certain to follow. One copy of my report I also sent, through Admiral Ves- selkine, to General Brusiloff, who was at that time in command of the Russian Armies in the South, and 210 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT another copy went to the Emperor's headquarters.* In this report I asserted that within two months, or less, Roumania would be short of food supplies, and more important still would have no ammunition whatsoever! Thus I pointed out she would be a heavy burden on our shoulders as the other Allies could get nothing in the way of supplies of any kind to her. I also stated it would be very diffi- cult for Russia to do much, as we only had one available port, Archangel, which was far to the north, for receiving our own war munitions, and also that our railway facilities were so poor that they barely sufficed for our own purposes — to say nothing of outfitting and sustaining another . coun- try. It was primarily necessary, therefore, that Roumania should open a way for herself through to Saloniki in order to get into direct communica- tion with the Allies and their supplies, and that the weight of the Roumanian forces, reinforced by a Russian army of considerable strength, should act in conjunction with General Sarrail's forces, and be thrown at once across the Danube and hurled against Bulgaria and Turkey. In the north all that Roumania had to do to safe- guard herself against an Austro-Hungarian attack, was to use the Carpathian range, that could easily be defended and by a comparatively small army. I did not hesitate to assert the same things in * See Appendix II. THE WHIRLPOOL 211 Bucharest, but when Poklewsky learned what I was doing he made a tremendous uproar about it! In the presence of Take lonescu's brother he accused me of "mixing the cards." The Russian Military Attache, Colonel Tatarinoff, took sides and agreed with Poklewsky against me. The Colonel's reports were the antithesis of mine, and naturally their effect was to neutralize my opinion, while they did not in the least advance his theories. Events which soon followed proved me to be in the right. While the Roumanian army was descending the Carpa- thians and invading Transylvania without meeting with any serious resistance, the Bulgars, with Ger- man and Turkish assistance, attacked the Rou- manians on the Danube, and the weak Russo-Rou- manian forces in Dobrudja. Two of the finest and best equipped Roumanian Divisions were practically annihilated at Tourtoukai (on the Danube), and the little Russo-Roumanian Army had to hastily re- cross the Danube in full retreat. Two days before the disaster of Tourtoukai, the General commanding the Roumanian Southern Army was quietly playing cards in the club at Bucharest. He was sure the Bulgars would not attack, and in this idiotic supposition he was sustained by Bratiano ! In the north the Prussian General, von Falken- hayn, having been made Commander-in-Chief, gathered an Austro-German army together and com- pletely routed the Roumanian forces. The latter 212 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT fled in disorder and abandoned in their panic all the strongest passes of the Carpathian Range. The Ans- tro-Germans penetrated Roumania from the north, and at the same time the Turks and Bulgars attacked from the south. And the Roumanian tragedy had begun ! Obviously, poor Roumania owed her evil fortunes and tremendous sufferings principally to Bratiano, but proper diplomacy on the part of the Allies and their military advisers, could have done much to al- leviate the situation had they forced Bratiano either to declare war before Serbia had been completely crushed or to adopt a plan of campaign which con- formed to the military situation of the moment. Of the Allies, Russia must bear the chief blame for the terrible Roumanian disaster. The General Staff should have sent Roumania an army of at least 250,000 men, which Philippesco had asked for. The General Staff had no possible excuse for not doing so, as soon after, at a far less favourable time, it was able to concentrate on the Roumanian frontiers a force of 500,000 men. But the General Staff like all the rest listened to Bratiano and sent only the three divisions he asked for. Sazonoff, surely, should have made it his policy to bring pressure to bear on Bratiano, and persuade him to follow a plan which would not only conform with ours, but with that of the Serbians. He was always afraid Bratiano might go over to the enemy, THE WHIRLPOOL 213 which as a matter of fact was absolutely impossible ! Bratiano had gone too far with the Allies to re- treat. Moreover the immense majority of people in the country were for war against the Central Powers, and Bratiano was neither big enough nor strong enough to finally thwart the desires of the Rou- manian people. Sazonoff, in his policy towards Bulgaria, showed a still greater lack of foresight, and allowed himself to be completely duped by Ferdinand and his min- isters. It was so evident from the beginning of the war that Bulgaria was gradually but surely going over to the enemy's camp! German officers in civ- ilian clothes inundated Sofia. Guns of heavy calibre, aeroplanes, etc., were being constantly sent from Germany into Bulgarian territory. As she was not yet militarily prepared, it was only natural that her diplomats assured Russia that Bulgaria would maintain a rigid neutrality. But the numerous Slav societies, to which I still belong, and which are prin- cipally composed of men who know and understand our brothers in the Orient very well indeed, were not in the least deceived by the Czar of Bulgaria ! More than once, in resolutions constantly submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, they warned him of the grave danger which threatened. But M. Sazonoff continued to follow his own policies! He had al- ways relied on P. N. Milioukoff, who became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs after the Revolution. 214 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT M. Milioukoff liad at one time been Professor of History in the University of Petrograd. But being a participant in a revolutionary movement he was forced to escape into exile. He was warmly re- ceived in Bulgaria, and was given the Chair of His- tory in the University of Sofia. Naturally ever after he was always very sympathetic towards Bul- garia. Furthermore his professional temperament made it very difficult for him to deviate from a course which he had once determined to follow. He was sure of Bulgaria, and shut his eyes to all evi- dences of treachery, even when they were most ap- parent. He might be classed with the famous band of German professors at the Frankfort Diet, of whom the German people exclaimed: ''Hundert Professoren! Vaterland, du bist ver- loren!" (''A hundred professors! My country, thou art lost!") Two weeks before Bulgaria declared war on Serbia, M. T. Spolaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd, called on Sazonoff with instructions from Nikola Paschitch, President of the Serbian Council. He told our Minister of Foreign Affairs that there was not the least doubt in Serbia that Bulgaria would very shortlj:' enter the war as an ally of the Central Powers! The Serbian Minister asked the Eussian Government's authorization for the Serbian forces to attack Bulgaria at once ! He stated that he was sure the Serbian Army, already hardened by fighting THE WHIRLPOOL 215 and in good condition whereas Bulgaria as yet had not had time to mobilize her forces, could easily take Sofia. Serbia therefore proposed to dethrone Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, to arrest all German officers, whether in mufti or in uniform, whom they could catch, and then conclude an alliance with Bulgaria, by opening the eyes of the Bulgars to the nefarious policies, entirely anti-Slav, which their sovereign had been hatching. Sazonoff was terribly upset. He threatened to de- mand the resignation of Spolaikovitch if he persisted in maintaining such an attitude. A stormy scene between the two diplomats followed, but there was nothing else for the Serbian Minister to do but tele- graph to Paschitch all that Sazonoff had said. The next day, Spolaikovitch had lunch with me. The un- happy man, tears streaming down his face, told me the details of his interview with Sazonoff. I sug- gested that he should talk the matter over mth Gore- mikine, who was at that time President of the Coun- cil of Ministers. As the Serbian Minister accepted this suggestion with alacrity, I at once telephoned to Goremikine — asking him to receive Spolaikovitch. Goremikine asked the Serbian Minister to come and see him at once. When the latter told him of bis fears the old statesman said to him: "What the devil did you go to Sazonoff for? You Serbians should have acted! You know Sazonoff of old, and very well. Of a surety it is not he who 216 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT would sanction any snch precipitate action however logical it might be. " The incident shows how even in such dangerous times, the Russian Cabinet was all at sixes and sevens on the most vital policies. A few days after Bulgaria attacked Serbia, and the poor little nation, caught between the heavy cross fire of the Bulgarians and the Germans, experienced complete and tragic disaster ! The untold miseries of the Serbian people have continued even after their political existence has vanished — let us hope not for ever. The Allies had tried ever since the war began to obtain Italy's assistance, and here again it was the Slavs, and especially the Serbians, who had to bear the brunt and pay the price for Italian participation. The Italian Chauvinists insisted on compensation in the Balkans and Sazonoff signed a treaty with Italy whereby Italy — after a vigorous campaign — should obtain not only Istria, with Trieste, but also a portion of the Dalmatian Coast, which is almost entirely populated by Serbs. Sazonoff further rec- ognized the rights of Italy in Vallona, the Albanian port, and in Adana, in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. When the pitiful remnants of that brave little Serbian army, starving, crushed to the very dust by their horrible sufferings, clothesless, shoeless, and wholly destitute after a truly epic march across the THE WHIRLPOOL 217 wilderness of Albanian mountains, headed by their heroic King, 74 years of age, who insisted upon shar- ing the miseries of his soldiers, finally reached the shores of the Adriatic, they received prompt aid from France and Greece. France, chivalrous as ever, sent provisions and arms, and Greece offered Corfu as a refuge for the Government of Serbia and as a centre in which the Serbian army could be re- organized. Sazonoff 's fall, however, was not on account of his foreign policy. It was the result of a memoir he presented to Emperor Nicholas on the Polish question ! CHAPTER IX THE FOX OF THE BALKANS Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria The Czar of Bulgaria has played such a sinister part in the European tragedy that he deserves a special pillory. Prince Ferdinand of Coburg had a sister in Munich, Princess Amelie, who was married to Duke Max of Bavaria, and Ferdinand was often a guest there. In 1892 Europe ignored him completely. In point of fact he was then Prince of Bulgaria, but the European Courts still regarded him as Prince of Coburg. He was probably informed by his sister of my intimate friendship with my chief, Count Osten- Sacken, and when I met him for the first time at Bayreuth at a Wagnerian Festival in 1893 he went out of his way to be specially courteous to me. He hoped, through me, to influence Count Osten-Sacken, and through him to be able to approach Emperor Alexander III, who so far had obstinately refused to recognize him. A brilliant conversationalist, a connoisseur of music, speaking the flowery French of the Eighteenth Century, and knowing full well 218 THE FOX OF THE BALKANS 219 how best to use his excellent knowledge of both social and diplomatic history, he was a man, once known, never to be forgotten. A few years later I met him in Berlin on the occasion of his first official visit to the German capital (1896), after his official recognition by Nicholas II. But the German Emperor, who had kno\vn the Prince in his youth and disliked him, paid him no special attentions and gave him what was con- sidered a very bad reception. The Emperor did not come to the station to meet him but sent a minor Prince. There was no guard of honour and even the Chancellor of the Empire, Prince Hohenlohe, was conspicuous by his absence. The next day the Emperor opened the pan-German Exhibition and there was a royal procession in which the Prince of Bulgaria was preceded by all the Princes of Prussia and was obliged to give his arm to the Countess Keller, who was only a lady in wait- ing to the Empress. After the opening of the Exhibition, Prince Ferdinand came to the Russian Embassy and said, somewhat bitterly,- to Count Osten-Sacken : "You see, Monsieur I'Ambassadeur, how they treat the Prince of Bulgaria in Berlin." The Ambassador replied: "Patience, Monseig- neur, you are clever enough and diplomatic enough to be able to arrange such things to your liking." The Ambassador proved right. At one of the big regimental luncheons, the Prince of Bulgaria hap- 220 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT pened to be seated beside the Emperor. At the end of the luncheon, Prince Ferdinand began to enter- tain the Emperor with some of his scandalous anec- dotes. He gradually slipped from scandal to politi- cal matters with such dexterity that the German Emperor did not recognize where he was being led, but remained over two hours talking to the Prince whom he hitherto had affected to despise. As a result the Emperor asked the Prince to pro- long his stay in Berlin for one or two days more, and when Ferdinand finally left Berlin, William went to the station to see him off. After his departure, Wil- liam came to the Russian Embassy, and said to Count Osten-Sacken : ''My dear Count, your protege from Bulgaria is a very adroit fellow!" (Votre protege de Bulgarie est un coco!) In this way Ferdinand gained his point. The tragi-comedy of the situation lay in the fact that it was through Russian diplomacy that Ferdinand first became a friend of the German Emperor and this eventually led to his alliance with Germany in the Great War. In 1908, at the time of the annexation of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Russo-Bulgarian relations became very strained again. At Petrograd every one was cer- tain Ferdinand had allied himself by secret treaty with Austria-Hungary. The Russian Emperor did not recognize his title of Czar, and there was even THE FOX OF THE BALKANS 221 some question of breaking off our diplomatic rela- tions with Sofia. Under these difficult circumstances Ferdinand gave proof of an extremely quick mind. Grand Duke Vladimir of Russia, who was an inti- mate, personal friend of his, died suddenly at Petro- grad as the result of an attack of influenza. Ferdi- nand at once started from Sofia to take part in the Grand Duke's obsequies. He decided to do this very abruptly, and was already on his way to the Russian frontier while the Russian Court was still undecided as to what sort of a reception he should have. He could not be totally ignored, and the Emperor Nicholas finding his hand forced accorded him royal honours. Thus his recognition by the Russian court as the Czar of Bulgaria was automatically accom- plished. It was a master stroke on Ferdinand's part. It would be puerile to deny that he is an extraor- dinarily able and clever man. He has an especial gift of knowing how to make use of the slightest cir- cumstance favourable to him. To flatter those who could further his plans he was apparently ever ready to change his opinions. He once told the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, Achmet Tev/fik Pasha, that were he not a Catholic, he would prefer above anything else to be a Mussul- man. The very next day he confessed to the High Priest of our Church, Father A. Maltzoff, his un- . bounded admiration for the Orthodox belief! He '222 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT kissed the hand of the Sultan of Turkey, and of Em- peror Francis Joseph of Austria, and bowed double before the Emperors of Germany and Russia. "When necessary, he would emphasize his French anteced- ents, and claim descent from Louis XIV, the King of the Sun. (Ferdinand is the son of Princess Clementine of France, daughter of Louis Philippe, last King of the French.) But this did not at all prevent him, on other occasions, from fervently de- claring he was a German Prince. An international chameleon, he became Russian for the Russians, French for the French, and German for the Ger- mans! He avoided only declaring himself a Bul- garian ! He despises the people he adopted to rule over them. Worse still he suspects them always. When he shakes hands with one of his subjects he is carefully gloved, as he dreads catching some disease or other. The Bulgars reciprocate his feelings to- ward them, and he is far from being popular, but such is his ability that he is absolute master of them, and in difficult moments all eyes are turned toward the Royal Palace watching for his decision. Political intrigue was ever his favourite pastime. He supported Stambouloff, a very popular states- man in Bulgaria, in order to consolidate his own posi- tion with the people, and connived in Stambouloff's death, who was assassinated in the streets of Sofia, because he believed that statesman stood in the way of his recognition by Russia. To achieve his own THE FOX OF THE BALKANS 223 ends he used the diplomats accredited to his court by other nations, with consummate skill, intuitively picking out their weak points the first time he met them. Not wishing France and Russia to unite on any policy inimical to him, with incredible cunning he contrived to alienate Monsieur Paleologue, the French Minister, and M. Sementovsky, the Russian Minister at Sofia. The Russian Minister told me that things had gone so far that he preferred to work with his German colleague, Baron Romberg, rather than with Monsieur Paleologue, and this at a time when the Franco-Russian Alliance was very strong. Very soon after his recognition as Czar of Bul- garia by Russia, the question of a political treaty and military convention between Russia and Bul- garia was raised. Ferdinand hastened to declare himself an ardent partisan of such a convention, but promptly set to work against it secretly. This was quite natural seeing that since 1908 he had linked the interests of his country with those of the Habsburg Monarchy. Each clause of the projected treaty was objected to by the Bulgarian Government. Ferdi- nand suddenly became an ultra-constitutional mon- arch, and complained to the Russian Minister at Sofia that he could do nothing. In consequence al- though they were exceedingly flattering to Bulgaria the Political Treaty and the Military Convention failed utterly. 224 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Fate should have made Ferdinand an actor, as h« would most certainly have eclipsed the talent of either a Coquelin or a Eossi. On a throne he was neither more nor less than a traitor. When he kissed the Sultan's hand he was planning his ruin. When he held out his hand in friendship to Serbia his mind was scheming the betrayal of that nation. He asked for reinforcements from his Serbian ally for the taking of Adrianople, and at the same time was dis- cussing the best way to seize Macedonia, despite Serbia. He deceived every one at every opportunity, not omitting his own country, which he forced to fol- low an anti-Slav and anti-national policy. If any opportunity arises in the present war he will not hesitate to embarrass his ally, the German Emperor, should favourable conditions arise for so doing. In his private life Ferdinand is a tyrant and a deceiver. His first wife, a Princess of Parma, killed herself, as she could not bear his treatment any longer. The Princess of Reuss, his second wife, who has died since the beginning of the present war, was reduced solely to playing the part of a nurse to her children. Her sons hardly dared speak in his presence. Ferdinand is very much afraid of contagious dis- eases, and of attacks against his person. During the present war, in order to give himself courage, he has taken to alcohol. His sleep is short and very dis- turbed. He changes his sleeping quarters every THE FOX OF THE BALKANS 225 night. At meals he insists that members of his fam- ily or even one of his guests taste the dishes before he will touch them. Perhaps he may escape the vio- lent death he fears, but he will not escape the im- partial judgment of history, having made a German province of the Slav nation which by evil fortune had him as its sovereign. Immensely vain of the re- sult of the war with Turkey, he had himself photo- graphed in the costume of a Byzantine Emperor! The livery of a footman to the German Emperor would suit him ever so much better! CHAPTER X THE EVE OF REVOLUTIOIT The Last Foreign Ministers of Nieliolas II — Sturmer, Pokrowsky, Vice-Minister Neratoff — The Ambassadors Sazonofp was replaced by Monsieur Sturmer, who was at the time President of the Ministerial Council. He was nothing but a courtier. For many years he had occupied the position of Master of Ceremonies at court. After that he was governor of two differ- ent provinces where he proved himself to be an out and out reactionary, and, finally he became a member of the Council of Empire. He never made a speech in Council, contenting himself by voting with the Party of the Extreme Right, and he knew absolutely nothing of our foreign policy. He was entirely pre- occupied by his efforts to hold his position. He was as false as an imitation coin. On the day before his nomination as President of the Council, I met him at M. Goremikine's residence, against whom he was constantly plotting and intriguing, and whom he was to succeed on the morrow, though Goremikine did not know that at the time. I heard him assure the 226 THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 227 old statesman of his absolute devotion and admira- tion. When he was appointed Foreign Minister he placed himself entirely in the hands of M. Neratoff, the Vice- Minister and disciple of Sazonoff. Our policy there- fore remained the same, though if anything it became more generally muddled, as the new minister thought far more of himself and of his own position than he did of affairs of state. Sturmer is generally accused of having led Russia towards a separate peace. I know for instance that Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador to Petrograd, was of this opin- ion, but personally I do not agree with this point of view. Sturmer only obeyed his Imperial master's orders, and Emperor Nicholas II, with all his faults, would never have been a traitor, nor would he ever have signed a separate peace. I am convinced of this because I discussed the point with Goremikine, and also with persons of the immediate entourage of the Emperor. The last Minister of Foreign Affairs, under Nicho- las II was M. Pokrowsky, who held office for only two months. His appointment by the Emperor was wholly unexpected ; but for once Nicholas was fortu- nate in his choice. The new minister had passed his ofiBcial life in the department of finance. Count Witte had been the first to recognize his great ca- pacity and possibilities, and Count Kokowtzoff ap- pointed him Assistant Minister of Finance. He then 228 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT became a Member of the Council of the Empire and, prior to becoming Foreign Minister, occupied the post of State Controller, with rank equivalent to a minister of state. He had never meddled with Eus- sia's foreign policy in any way, but as he was very intelligent and gifted with a large degree of natural finesse he soon became familiar with the duties and responsibilities of his new position. The personnel of the ministry received him at first with a great deal of scepticism, and the various chiefs of the bureaux were sure that he would prove a docile instrument in their hands. But they soon recognized to their pained surprise, that in Pokrowsky they had a stern chief, who knew how to enforce his orders. Pokrowsky was thoroughly aware of the perilous situation in which Russia was placed. He reiterated time and time again that the abnormal conditions then existing in the Empire must not last, indeed could not last, and that he clearly saw a terrible revolution approaching. One evening in his private study, he went to a window which overlooked the square before the Imperial Palace, where stands the column of Alexander I, surrounded by four great bronze candelabra. I asked him what he was gazing at so intently. "My dear friend,*' said he, **I am admiring those beautiful candelabra, and asking myself from which of the four I may soon be hung." But his fears were groundless. When the Eevo- THE EVE OP REVOLUTION 229 lution broke out he was not even arrested or molested. More than this, the Provisional Govern- ment authorized him to keep his oflSces in the ministry- building until he found suitable ones elsewhere. He had known how to win the esteem of the most extreme parties by his frankness, his honesty and his pro- gressive ideas. Among the officials of the Foreign Office during the reign of Nicholas II, it is necessary to mention M. Neratoff, who, though only Assistant Minister, nevertheless played an ill-fated part in our diplo- macy. He was nothing but a windbag. He began his diplomatic career some thirty-five years before the Revolution, and starting in the modest position of a minor attache at the ministry, finished by reach- ing the post of Assistant Minister without ever hav- ing been attached to any of our embassies or lega- tions abroad. His mental capacity was hardly mediocre. His entire success he owed to his zeal and to his very thorough knowledge of the contents of our diplomatic archives. He had been at college with Sazonoff, who later appointed him Assistant Minister, and since then always had the sense to make himself indispensable to all the foreign minis- ters, despite their widely divergent mentalities and ideas. Sturmer, Pokrowsky, Milioukoff, and even Terestchenko could not do without his collaboration. These ministers succeeded one another as in a moving picture play, but Neratoff stayed on securely 230 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT at his post. Petrograd hummed, ' ' The world may come, the world may go, but Neratoff stays on for ever." The representatives of foreign powers dealt especially with him, and visited him daily in their official capacities. He was no longer the little Nera- toff of olden days. He had become the right hand man of all the ministers. But his mentality did not change either ; he was ever the same as on the first day he entered the service, always very eager to execute the orders of his superiors, a hard worker, but painfully narrow minded, and wholly devoid of any of the attributes of the great statesman he fondly imagined he resembled. His influence was especially pernicious in Balkan affairs. He was completely hypnotized by the personal charm of Milioukoff, and like Sazonoff, was blindly led by Ferdinand of Bul- garia. In short, ''little" Neratoff was a tragic per- sonality in the annals of our diplomacy. His period at the foreign office will be marked with a black cross by any impartial critic of Russian history. In order that Russian diplomacy and policies dur- ing the reign of Nicholas II up to the outbreak of the Revolution may be understood by the world at large, it is necessary to give some particulars concerning our more important ambassadors and ministers, and the representatives of the Allied Powers, accredited to Petrograd. Nicholas II had three ambassadors at Berlin during his reign : Count Chouvaloff, Count Osten-Sacken and M. Sverbeef. Count Chouvaloff THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 231 had been appointed by Alexander III. Prior to be- ing made an ambassador, he had had nothing to do with our foreign policies. He was a general who had distinguished himself in the Russo-Turkish War 1877-78, and had won the military cross of St. George for meritorious services. He commanded the Im- perial Guard Corps at the time that Alexander III chose him as his ambassador at Berlin. He soon accustomed himself to his new position, and his mili- tary manners gave much satisfaction at the German capital. It did not take him long to become a diplo- mat of much finesse and adroitness. He learned how to steer a safe course between Scylla and Charybdis. Prince Bismarck was his intimate friend, and at the same time he managed to enjoy the German Emper- or's highest favour and esteem. His popularity at Berlin was tremendous, especially in military circles, and he was very fond of surrounding himself with officers, and — as all good Russians are very fond of wine — did not disdain to become hilariously drunk with them. But he had one priceless trait : after hav- ing consumed an incredibly large amount of liquor he always remembered everything he had said and far more important, he also remembered everything said to him. M. de Bacheracht, Secretary of the Embassy, with whom the Ambassador especially liked to work, told me the following story: One evening Count Herbert Bismarck, son of the 232 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Chancellor and secretary in the German foreign of- fice, came to see Chouvaloff. Count Herbert was not a man to deny the pleasures of wine either. The two drank heavily until both diplomats were hors-de- combat. Count Herbert, his tongue loosened by wine, began to make a confidant of our ambassador, and told him many very indiscreet but highly inter- esting things. Chouvaloff only replied with foolish jests and laughter, but no sooner was the German out of the Embassy than the ambassador, after plunging his head in a basin of iced water, sent for Bacheracht and dictated word for word a report of all the Ger- man diplomat had foolishly confided to him. When Chouvaloff left Berlin, being recalled by Nicholas, and made Governor-General of Poland — the Emperor came in person to the station to salute and say au revoir to his friend, whom he honoured by calling him **mein teure freund." Chouvaloff left nothing but universal regret in Berlin, and wrote a brilliant page in the annals of our diplomacy. I have already on several occasions referred to my chief. Count Osten-Sacken, who was Chouvaloff 's successor at Berlin, and who stayed there fifteen years, all through the most dangerous and trying times of our relations with the German Empire. Count Osten-Sacken was the son of the famous hero of Sebastopol. His family originated in the Baltic provinces and his ancestors were all of the Ortho- dox religion, and Eussians heart and soul. His THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 233 grandfather had been killed on the battlefield during the Napoleonic Wars, and his great uncle Prince Osten-Sacken had been Military Governor of Paris in 1815. He had married a Princess Dolgorouki, whose ancestors had reigned in Moscow. He was her second husband. Her first was Prince Golitzin, our ex-Ambassador to Madrid. Countess Osten-Sacken was a woman of an exceedingly rare type. Married when she was only sixteen to Prince Golitzin, she had begun her wedded life in Paris, and had received in her salon the flower of the French diplomatic and political world of the day. Messieurs Guizot and Thiers were her intimates, and Chopin himself gave her piano lessons. Count Osten-Sacken had been Secretary of our Embassy at Madrid when Prince Golitzin was Ambassador. It was there that he first met his future wife, whom he married shortly after the death of the Prince. Countess Osten-Sacken was of inestimable value and a powerful support to her husband. She had been a childhood friend and play- mate of many of the Russian Grand Duchesses, and her position at court was a most distinguished one. She knew all the secrets. Emperor Nicholas was es- pecially fond of her, and always did her the honour of kissing her hand wherever and whenever they met. The German Emperor did the same thing. In her private life the Countess was simplicity personified, kind and affable to all, without excepting the most humble of her servants. Towards the members of 234 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT her official family, she was like a tender mother, and we all cherish reverently affectionate memories of this noble woman. Count Osten-Sacken began his diplomatic career at eighteen years of age, as Attache at the Chancellery of Prince Paskevitch, Commander of the Russian armies on the Danube in the Russo-Turkish Wars (1854). After a short subsequent stay as Secretary to the Chancellery at Petrograd, and also as Secre- tary of the Embassy at Madrid, he left diplomatic life and did not re-enter it until 1864, being appointed at that time first Secretary and afterwards Charge d 'Affaires at Turin and at Florence. From there he went as Minister Resident to Darmstadt, and then as Minister to Munich, from which place he was ap- pointed Ambassador to Berlin in 1895. He had spent more than forty years of his diplomatic life in Germany, and naturally knew it most thoroughly in consequence, but strangely enough, both he and his wife massacred the German language horribly. A diplomat of the old school, he always spoke French by preference, and although extremely Russian by nature and sentiment, he wrote Russian with the greatest of difficulty. When Alexander III replaced French by Russian in the diplomatic reports and communications Count Osten-Sacken was at first much embarrassed, but despite his great age, he set to work like any schoolboy to learn it, and in two THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 235 years his official reports written in the Russian lan- guage were used as models at Petrograd. From the previous chapters, it must be evident what a great part Count Osten-Sacken played in Berlin during most trying times. Destined always to suffer for the incredible and stupid caprices of Nicholas II and to support the intemperances, idiotic rages, and sullennesses of the German Emperor, it was only his absolute poise and dignity which made him so respected, both in Berlin and Petrograd, and enabled him to prevent any very serious complica- tions. In brief he was a great ambassador, and when he disappeared, though he was then practically at the end of his span of life, old and very frail, Eussian diplomacy soon learned what a brain and character it had lost. M. Sverbeef was his successor. He had previ- ously been Minister to Greece for about two years. He owed his sudden appointment exclusively to his friendship with Sazonoff. He was a good man, noth- ing more. He had very little personality. He could not hold the German Emperor in check, and the latter never took him seriously. One day for instance, at the time of the last visit of Nicholas II to Berlin, at luncheon in one of the barracks of the Imperial Guard, Sverbeef, contrary to usual etiquette, ap- peared in full uniform, wearing the Grand Cordon of Prussia, which had been bestowed on him the 236 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT day before. Emperor William made fun of his cos tume, and said to him,, *'It is easy to see that you are a civilian.'* To which Sverbeef answered, *'I am so happy, Sire, at having received your Grand Cordon that I sleep in it. " The Emperor shot back, **And you are right, you received it very quickly — now endeavour to deserve it." I would very much like to have been present on any occasion when the Emperor would have dared say any such thing to Count Osten-Sacken ! Sver- beef was absent from Berlin during the summer of 1914 at the time our relations with Germany were becoming more and more strained. When he re- turned, he said to M. Bronewsky, Councillor of the Embassy, ''I believe, mon cher, that things are not going so well here." Five days later his passports were handed to him. I think that this one detail suffices to show how much our ambassador realized the seriousness of the situation. Nicholas II was represented in Paris by three am- bassadors during his reign, Baron de Mohrenheim, M. Nelidoff, and M. Iswolsky. I have already dealt fully with the last named. As for Baron Mohren- heim and M. Nelidoff, they were both incontest- ably statesmen, with horizons and understandings. THE EVE OF EEVOLUTION 237 Baron de Mohrenheim had contributed much to our alliance with France and M. Nelidoff had been one of our most brilliant ambassadors in Turkey. Both men enjoyed in Paris positions of enormous influence. The recall of Nelidoff was solely due to an intrigue on the part of Iswolsky, which eventually forced Iswolsky's fall from the Foreign Office. He had, however, prepared for himself a comfortable nest in Paris. During the same period we had in London two am- bassadors, Baron de Staal, and Count Benckendorff. The first was a diplomat of the old school, prudent, and avoiding all serious action. He made a very good position for himself in the British capital, and was very clever in smoothing over any difficulties he discovered in his diplomatic path. The services he rendered Russia are not to be denied, especially if one takes into consideration that in his day, we were at the climax of Russo-British antagonism. His successor. Count Benckendorff, was one of our greatest ambassadors. Although he was of German origin, and had a sister married to Prince Hatzfeldt, Duke of Trachenberg, and also a Catholic, Bencken- dorff was Slav to his backbone. He was even more Russian than the Russians. An eye witness told me that he had tears in his eyes when he received a dis- patch from Sazonoff consenting to the abandonment of Scutari by the victorious Montenegrin army. The Serbian people had in him a powerful and convincing 238 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT champion. I do not think that I exaggerate in the least when I assert that to Count Benckendorff the Slavic world owes the recognition of its interests by Great Britain. At Vienna, after Prince Lobanoff, we had no am- bassadors worth mentioning. Count Kapnist, who succeeded him, was perhaps the only one who made a position for himself in the Austro-Hungarian politi- cal world. As for M. de Giers, eldest son of our ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Schebeko, the former was an absolute nonentity, and the latter was only in Vienna for a short time. Among our ambassadors at Eome, it is only neces- sary to mention M. N. de Giers, second son of our ex- Foreign Minister. He had a long diplomatic career behind him, and was the last ambassador to Turkey, before our rupture with that country. Physically and morally he is his father's understudy; he is pru- dent and not entirely lacking in finesse, but he is not equal to any great sustained action. His appoint- ment as Minister of Foreign Affairs was often mooted, and of a surety, had he received the office he would not have been guilty of the blunders made by Sazonoff. At Constantinople, there were three ambassadors during the reign of Nicholas II; M. Zinovieff, M. Tcharikow, and M. de Giers, (junior). I have al- ready described the last and pass on to M. Zino- vieff. He was a deep student and connoisseur of THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 239 Oriental matters and had spent part of his career in the Balkans and part in Turkey. He had been Min- ister to Persia, and Director of the First Department of Foreign Affairs, under which came all matters relating to Turkey. On one occasion in negotiating a treaty with Persia, the foreign ofiQce was ready to accede to certain amendments desired by the Persian government. Zinovieff ignored his official instruc- tions and insisted upon the original conditions. He always had a revolver on his writing table, as he had fully decided to kill himself if his plans failed. When he was ambassador at Constantinople he con- stantly asserted that the Young Turk party would of a certainty fall into the hands of Germany, and he strongly advised us not to support that party. But in Great Britain, the Young Turks were in high favour so the Petrograd Cabinet, which was then di- rected by Iswolsky, being most anxious for a com- plete understanding with Great Britain was not in- clined to follow Zinovieff 's advice, or heed his warn- ings. The old diplomat was therefore recalled, and his place filled by N. V. Tcharikow, who was a pro- Young Turk, and thus quite unconsciously, the way was opened for a Turko-German Alliance. The idealistic policy and attitude towards the Young Turks adopted by the London Cabinet, and the natu- ral desire of our Minister of Foreign Affairs to sup- port British statesmanship, played directly into the 240 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT German Emperor's hands. Indeed, the British Liberal Party treated the Young Turk party almost as co-religionists, taking into no consideration the fact that their leader, Enver Pasha, was an out-and- out German mercenary. As for our ministers accredited to the smaller na- tions, it is only necessary to mention those who were really able men, or those who by their misplaced activities did the greatest harm. Among the first are, N. H. de JHartwig and D. K. Sementovsky- Kuzilo; among the second, A. W. Nikludoff and A. N. Savinsky. M. de Hartwig after having been Vice-Director and later Director of the first department in the bureau of Foreign Affairs (the Asiatic department) repre- sented our government in Persia, and afterwards in Serbia. He was very far-sighted, and perfectly un- derstood the troubles which were agitating Persia even in his day. He felt we should uphold the Shah. He also knew very well that Persia was not yet ready for a constitution, and that the Shah and only the Shah, was the foundation stone of order in his coun- try. Furthermore SLah Mahomet Ali was devoted to Russia body and soul, and this was still another rea- son why we should have given him our whole-hearted support. The British Liberal Cabinet, however, was anxious to support a constitutional government in Persia. When in 1907, Iswolsky concluded his Treaty with England which divided Persia into two M. SAZUiXOFF THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 241 zones of influence, Shah Mahomet Ali abdicated in favour of his young son. As a result of our policy we lost our influence in southern Persia, and German influence replaced that of England at Teheran, just as it had done in Constantinople. In brief, Britain's idealism opened the road for German intrigue and Eealpolitik, whereas if Russia and Britain had fol- lowed the road of their own interests they would have weakened the German position. M. de Hartwig fought his hardest, and in consequence was the bete noire of the Germans. Iswolsky sacrificed him and sent him to Serbia, possibly with the hope that in the very slippery and dangerous Balkan region, he might break his neck. But shortly after his arrival at Belgrade, Hartwig created a most exceptional position for himself. The King, Prince Alexander Paschitch, none of these made any decision without first consulting him. He had cleverly instilled in the minds of all. the Serbian parties a love for Russia. I have seen him at his work, having been his guest for some time at Belgrade in 1912. Every morning his study was be- sieged by Serbian statesmen who came to get advice from him, but as usual the saying that a prophet is not without honour save in his own country held true, and Iswolsky and Sazonoff, possibly fearing a suc- cessor in Hartwig, took it upon themselves to para- lyze his actions and nullify his work. When Hart- wig warned our ministry that the first Balkan War 242 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT was inevitable, Sazonoff sent him a note with orders to advise a moderate course to the Serbian govern- ment. Hartwig told me personally of the reception that such notes received at the hands of the Serbian government. One day when our minister had read one of these innumerable notes sent by Sazonoff to M. Paschitch, the old Serbian statesman said to him, *'Have you finished, mon cher ami? All right! C'est bien. Nous pouvons maintenant causer seri- eusement!" (We can now discuss matters seri- ously.) While M. Hartwig was at Belgrade, D. K. Semen- tovsky, also a very able man, and one who knew the Balkan situation thoroughly, was our minister at Sofia. Both these men were friends of long stand- ing and understood each other perfectly, but their combined efforts were of no avail against the preju- dices of our foreign ministers. Hartwig died very suddenly after drinking a cup of black coffee at the residence of the Austro-Hun- garian minister. As it was well known in Belgrade that our minister was hated and feared by the Aus- trians, of whom he was the sworn enemy, public opinion in Serbia still attributes his death to a politi- cal assassination by poisoning. The body was given a magnificent burial at the expense of the Serbian government ; the entire court, led by the King, all the political parties without exception and immense crowds followed the hearse. His death was the cause THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 243 of national mourning in Serbia and the Serbian peo- ple erected a superb monument to him by subscrip- tion ; and an avenue in Belgrade was given his name. Before being appointed Minister to Sofia, D. K. Sementovsky-Kusilo had replaced M. Hartwig as Director of the First Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iswolsky did not get on well with him and sent him to Bulgaria in order to get rid of him. His debut at Sofia was not at all promising. Ferdinand, knowing Iswolsky 's antipathy towards Sementovsky, hoped to find in the latter a docile in- strument. When he discovered that he had to do with a strong personality, he did everything possible to force his recall — not even hesitating to enmesh Sementovsky 's wife in an intrigue towards that end. But to give Nicholas II his due, on this occasion he did not consent to Sementovsky being recalled but supported him strongly. Subtle and evasive as ever, Ferdinand promptly changed his policy toward the Russian Legation. He offered the minister and his wife every courtesy al- ways in the hope of getting the Russian minister on his side of the fence ; but the latter continued on his own lines, thinking only of the good of his country. Unfortunately, Iswolsky rarely listened to his advice. Sazonoff, it is true, esteemed him greatly, but such esteem was not under the circumstances of much practical value unless it were backed with diplomatic support. 244 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT M. Sementovsky died at Sofia of appendicitis. Relatively speaking he was a young man as diplo- mats go, being only forty-nine. The necessary operation performed by a very famous Viennese surgeon was a complete success, but he was after- wards attended by the Czar of Bulgaria's own phy- sician and it was common property in Belgrade that his death — like that of Hartwig — was due to assas- sination. Nicholas II had bad luck. Almost at the same mo- ment he lost two of his best diplomats and the men whom Sazonoff chose to replace them were not of the same calibre. A. W. Nikludoff, Councillor of the Paris Embassy, was appointed to Sofia. He was of mediocre intelli- gence and, in consequence, not in the least fitted to measure wits with Ferdinand — past master in all political intrigue. The Czar of Bulgaria did not concern himself about him one way or the other; in fact whole months passed by without his being received. Nikludoff, therefore, had not the faintest concep- tion of the real situation and did not believe there would be a Balkan War, even when it had become inevitable. He amused himself by studying Bul- garian history and sent the results of his studies to our Foreign Office. He one day read me a report of his on King Krum of Bulgaria, who lived before THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 245 Bulgaria was conquered by Turkey!! (The Turks made their entry into Europe in 1453.) When Sazonoff himself recognized the utter im- possibility of keeping Nikludoff any longer at Sofia he made a delightful shuffle to replace him. As A. N. Savinsky was also compromised in Sweden, where he was our Minister at that time, Sazonoff simply made them exchange posts. I have already mentioned Savinsky in connection with Count Lamsdorif. The ''means" which he em- ployed to advance his career will therefore be re- membered. At Sofia his behaviour caused consider- able scandal. The Russian Legation became the cen- tre of nightly revels and was known as a veritable gambling hell by night while by day the Eussian Minister either promenaded the streets of Sofia dressed as a dandy, or made motor trips outside the city limits. It is said, however, that he foresaw the alliance of Bulgaria with the Central Powers. The truth of this I cannot vouch for, but in any case, a man with a past such as Savinsky 's, a man whom the Emperor himself had dubbed "The Countess Lams- dorff , ' ' ought not to have been included on the list of our diplomats in foreign countries. Of the diplomats accredited to the Russian Court during the last years preceding the Revolution, I knew Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, when I was stationed at our Embassy 246 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT in Berlin and he was Councillor of the British Em- bassy there. Buchanan is an Englishman in every sense of the word, an accomplished gentleman but cold and rather reserved. He had always dreamed of a Russo-British *' rapprochement. " He became very popular in Russia and was elected an Honor- ary Citizen of Moscow and a Member of the Univer- sity of the ancient capital. The Russian Liberals saw in him a support to their aspirations. France was represented at Petrograd by M. Paleo- logue, who had not had much experience as a diplo- mat, having had only one post, that of Minister at Sofia. At Petrograd M. Paleologue was hardly a success. He was looked upon as a light weight and was not very popular. The real influence of our western allies was concentrated in the person of Sir George Buchanan and consequently England was paramount in our policies. Marquis Carlotti, the Italian Ambassador, was an accomplished diplomat of the Machiavellian school. Astute, clever, he managed to know everything, and was ready at all times to make use of his knowledge. He did well for Italian nationalistic claims, forget- ting that the war was not a matter of one nation but of nations. None of our ministers or the foreign representatives appeared to grasp the fundamentals of German policy towards the Balkans. Italy, through her representatives in Petrograd, made the same error as Austria-Hungary. Her politicians THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 247 and consequently her foreign representatives ignored and antagonized the Serbians and Jugo-Slavs. As will be obvious before the war is ended this policy must be changed. Carlotti did not appreciate criti- cism along such lines and did his best to prevent it, thinking he best served his country in that manner. Since the Revolution the Marquis Carlotti has been replaced by Marquis de la Toretta, a very clever man and a great friend of Russia and the whole Slavic world. The Japanese Ambassador, Viscount Motono, later Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, came to Petrograd at a very difficult time as the Eusso- Japanese War had hardly ended. But gradually Viscount Motono by his affability and extreme ability created an enviable position, not only for himself, but for his nation, at Petrograd. He belonged to the highest society and was as welcome in financial cir- cles as among the lower classes. He was not content with living only in Petrograd, but travelled all over our vast country so as to be able to study it thor- oughly at first hand. Belonging to Prince Ito's school, he was a fervent advocate of a binding alli- ance between Japan and Russia. Both our treaties with Japan (1907 and 1916) owe their existence chiefly to him as their author. He left Petrograd with nothing but the best of wishes and kindest thoughts on the part of us all. I have endeavoured to describe the personalities 248 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT of our own ambassadors and ministers as well as those accredited to us, in order to give an exact pic- ture of the circumstances and characters which de- cided our foreign policy during the reign of Nicholas II. The vacillations and indeterminations of our policy were entirely due to the weak character of our Sovereign, which made our foreign ministry a ship without sails or rudder. This fact in conjunction with a domestic policy which was wholly reactionary and absolutely contrary to the sentiments of the ma- jority of the Russian people, was to lead us irrevoca- bly toward a revolution which was to engulf the Rus- sian monarchy under the ruins of the throne of Nicholas II. CHAPTER XI GENESIS The Origin of the Russian Revolution — The Ministers, the Clergy, Absence of Justice, Deprivations of Russian Society. General Dissatisfaction A REVOLUTIONAEY movement was first visible in Rus- sia in 1825, when Alexander I died. The mal-con- tents took advantage of the abdication of Alexander 's successor, the Grand Duke Constantin, in favour of his brother Nicholas, to create a rising among the troops. They spread the report that the abdication had been forced by undue influence, and they hoped to create a constitutional government, which would replace the autocracy. The conspiracy fell through and Nicholas I ascended the throne. There followed a reactionary reign of terror in Russia, and the flower of the military youth, all bearers of the high- est names in Russia, paid for their daring in the awful cold and snows of Siberia ! This first revolutionary outbreak had not an anti- Czarist character. It was a constitutional move- ment. A few regiments, especially of the Imperial Guard, officered by men who belonged to the aristoc- 249 250 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT racy of the country, supported the plot. But the people ignored it. Even the soldiers who took part in it understood next to nothing of what they were fighting for. They shouted "Vive Constantin and the Constitution" believing that "Constitution" was the wife of Constantin ! ! During the reign of Nicholas I the spirit of the revolution and many of the men who inspired it, spread over Europe. The famous Hertzen, the recognized leader of the movement, established him- self in London, founded a newspaper office there, and beat his war drums against the Russian autocracy, from the British capital After the death of Nicholas I, his successor, Alexander II, inaugurated an era of reform. In 1861 he freed the serfs (peas- ants) who had been slaves until then. He abolished the use of the knout in the army and established a provincial system of self-government, the Zemst- vos, and the jury system. In consequence the young Emperor became the idol of his people. Hertzen wrote to him from London, ' * You have conquered me, Galilean!" Unfortunately this almost ideal con- dition of affairs did not last long ! It was plain that the reforms instituted by the Emperor were the first steps towards abolishing autocracy. Russia awaited a constitution which would crown their monarch's ef- forts, but the Emperor stopped half way. Discon- tent followed, and the Emperor — instead of continu- ing his reforms — began to destroy those he had al- GENESIS 251 ready instituted. In a very short time the whole nation was seething with revolutionary propaganda. The fanatics instituted a system of terrorism, minis- ters and provincial governors were assassinated in broad daylight, and finally Alexander II, one of the best rulers Eussia has ever had, and to whom the people had given the name of ^'Liberator Czar," was blown to pieces by a bomb in one of the avenues of Petrograd on March 1st, 1881. The horror, in- spired in the majority of the Russian people by the murder of their sovereign, greatly helped his suc- cessor, Alexander III, to institute a most reactionary policy. There were, however, some further outbreaks, but these were suppressed quite easily and once more the centre of the revolution moved elsewhere. When Nicholas II ascended the throne in 1894, Russia was still waiting for a serious attempt to bring about liberal refonns. It was greatly hoped that Nicholas II would continue the work of the first years of the reign of his grandfather, which was stopped throughout the reign of Alexander III. But Nicholas II did nothing. He apparently decided to continue the reactionary regime of his father. He declared, "I wish to leave the country to my son, even as I received it from my father." He sur- rounded himself with ultra-reactionary ministers. Count Witte was probably the only exception, but even he, absorbed by financial reforms, held aloof 252 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT from anything' concerning the internal administra- tion. The Zemstvos were badly handicapped. Jus- tice was prostituted to the Government's general policy. Discontent was general and it was stimu- lated by revolutionary propaganda, which was stirred up as much in foreign capitals as in Eussia itself. Kevolution was, even then, in the air, and only a favourable moment for a general outbreak was wanting. That moment came after the unfortunate war with Japan. The war had exposed all our weak- nesses, and the rottenness of the government both civil and military. The national pride of the people had been deeply wounded and the army was dis- gusted and sore. The revolution broke out in Petrograd. A gen- eral strike was proclaimed, tne capital was plunged in darkness, deprived of water, food and fuel. Rail- way transportation was paralyzed. Petrograd was entirely isolated from the world. The Emperor Nicholas, nearly out of his mind with fear, issued the famous manifesto of October 17th, 1905, which gave to his people a kind of constitution. National repre- sentation through the Duma, freedom of speech, liberty — of the individual, of conscience, meetings, and the press was proclaimed, and Count Witte be- came President of the reformed Council of Ministers, which took the place of the old Cabinet of Ministers of the days of autocracy. But the revolutionary movement sweeping in full flood from Petrograd, GENESIS 253 reached Moscow. Count Witte, to dam the flood, wanted to try persuasion. But the Minister of the Interior, A. N. Dournovo, advised the Emperor to act more firmly. He promised to throttle the revolution in its infancy, and the Emperor approving, the revo- lution in Moscow was choked in blood ! Count Witte promptly resigned, and reaction held high carnival all over Russia. The Duma tried to stem the ebb tide, but was dissolved twice and twice reconstituted by fraudulent elections. Finally it was forced to capitulate. From that moment the government went from bad to worse. Minister succeeded minister as water flows over a fall. The Empress came actively on the scene with all her scabby entourage, and the Emperor was only the shadow of a sovereign. At the begin- ning of the Great War, Nicholas seemed to win a cer- tain degree of popularity. At that critical moment the Russian people supported their Monarch, and in- ternal discussion was forgotten. But very soon seri- ous disasters to the Russian armies threw a pitiless light on the instability of the Emperor and the fatu- ity, weakness and corruption of the bureaucracy. Violent speeches were made and still more violent scenes took place in the Duma. The Duma de- manded direct participation in public affairs, but the Czar continued his fatal course. Then, for the first time, the trend of the revolution changed from the constitutional road it had followed up till this time 254 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT and became openly anti-Czarist. Famine in Petro- grad, deliberately staged by an imbecile minister, finally rung the curtain down on the drama of the Eomanotfs on the 25th of February, 1917. In order to understand the last act of this drama it is necessary to know the personalities and char- acteristics of the principal actors who played their part in it, from 1905, the date of the real revolution, to 1917, the year of the Emperor's abdication. The first to come on the stage was Count Witte, President of the first Council of Ministers under the so-called Constitutional Government. Although bearing a German name he was a thorough Russian by birth and sentiment. He was a self-made man. "When he was thirty-one he was still a station master on the Western Eailroad of Eussia. He offered a sug- gestion to the directors which doubled the receipts of the company and was made a member of the com- pany's executive. T. T. Wichnegradsky, then Min- ister of Finance, noticed Witte 's work, and appointed him Superintendent-in-Chief of the Eight of Way of Eussian Eailways. About a year later he was ap- pointed Minister of Communications, and eleven months later succeeded Wichnegradsky as Minister of Finance. At that time he was barely forty. He was a man of quite unusual mentality, endowed with the practical imagination of a statesman who turns dreams into facts, ambitious, emotional, and deter- mined. No obstacles were great enough to deter him GENESIS 255 when once he visualized his goal. In administering his department he piled reform on reform. To him Kussia owed the introduction of gold coinage and the monopoly of alcohol. While he held office France lent Eussia huge sums for development and the for- eign capitals began to rain money into our com- mercial enterprises. The aristocracy regarded Witte as a parvenu. The bureaucracy envied his phenomenally rapid rise. They combined to plot his fall. But Witte was not easily caught. He scattered his enemies from his path, beating down some and buying others. He bought for the State, for double its value, a do- main of Count Worontzoff-Dachkoff, Minister of the Court during the reign of Alexander III, and he appointed Kokowtzoff his Assistant Minister, thus assuring himself of the vital support of these two statesmen. Having studied the evil side of human nature, Witte profoundly suspected and feared it. He said to me one day, ''I am reproached with hav- ing corrupted society and with buying my people. I, the purchaser, am not to blame. The blame rests with a society so rotten that it permits itself to be bought! For the good of my country I hesitate at nothing. ' ' When Nicholas II ascended the throne Witte was at the pinnacle of his power. As Minister of Finance, his influence was felt in every other depart- ment of the government. He made the same mistake 256 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT with the Emperor, that Bismarck made with the Emperor William. He treated the young monarch as a school boy. It is said that at times he was vulgar and rude in his presence. Whenever the Emperor attempted to contradict him, he immedi- ately presented his resignation, which he knew very well Nicholas did not dare accept. But when he fell he gave another illustration of how much he re- sembled Bismarck. He, like the famous German, lacked personal dignity in his disgrace. He criti- cized the Emperor, the Government and especially his successors, and began to cultivate the press, as- siduously, behaving like a caged lion. He had but one fixed idea, to regain power! His opportunity came at the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan. In the weak and po- litically impoverished ranks of our diplomatic serv- ice there was no striking personality, who by his name alone, could influence our adversary. Public opinion unanimously pointed to Witte as being the only man to whom the nation could confide its in- terests at so serious a time. Despite his personal antipathy to him, Nicholas appointed Witte, First Minister-Plenipotentiary to the Portsmouth Confer- ence. There in the realm of foreign affairs which was an entirely new departure for him, he gave evidence of his remarkable abilities. Public opin- ion in the United States was far from being favour- able to Russia owing to her treatment of the Jews. GENESIS 257 Japan had won American sympathy and financial support. It was therefore a problem of extreme importance to change the American viewpoint, and Witte gave it his first attention. The Japanese Plenipotentiaries wished first of all to discuss those clauses of the treaty on which they were determined to insist, and with which Russia could only comply if absolutely forced to do so. Witte, however, first took up the less important clauses which were more or less acceptable to Russia. In this way the American public began to think that Russia was ready to make any sacrifices in order to ensure the peace which the Americans ardently desired to see signed. Russia was thus fast regain- ing American sympathy when the time came to dis- cuss those clauses to which Russia refused to con- sent, such for instance as a heavy indemnity. Witte 's ground was already prepared. Public opinion began to accuse Japan of obstinacy and a desire to thwart peace. It was believed that if Rus- sia was willing to give way on the first points, Japan might do as much for the remainder. In view of this, and not wishing to antagonize American opin- ion, the Japanese plenipotentiaries gave way. The Treaty of Portsmouth was not a very bad one for Russia ! Witte returned in great triumph to Russia. Em- peror William made a point of meeting him as he passed through Berlin on his way to Petrograd. 258 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT The German Emperor felt that Witte's star would again be in the ascendant, and he wished to win such a proven statesman and diplomat over to his own interests. • Witte has often been accuse^Jbf being German- ophile. Witte was not Germanophile, Francophile or Anglophile, he was Russophile! The German Emperor, for all his attentions, was very far from having any personal sympathy with Witte. As a matter of fact, during the last years of Alexander III and the first years of Nicholas II, when Witte was omnipotent, the Emperor William had been very afraid of him. He had learnt that here was a Rus- sian statesman who could not be bullied by Germany. For example, the German Government, wanting to bring economic pressure to bear on Russia, prohib- ited the importation of Russian geese into Germany. Witte countered at once by an economic war and be- gan by prohibiting the importation of a series of articles of German manufacture which made a hole in the German budget of more than 18,000,000 roubles. When Witte fell from power the first time the German Emperor was greatly pleased. After the treaty of Portsmouth William believed he had won Witte to his point of view, but when he realized that this was not the case, he detested him more than ever and the news of Witte 's secand downfall was greeted at Berlin with much joy. GENESIS 259 Witte's whole policy, as lie detailed it more than once to me after his fall, was: ''Russia must pur- sue a peaceful policy in order to increase her econo- mic well being. We can get on perfectly well with Germany by recognizing her rightful interests, and forcing her to respect ours. If William should be- come arrogant, we can make him lower his flag by means of our understanding with France. We must follow the same policy where England is concerned. As against her we can always count on having Ger- many at our disposal. The antagonism which ex- ists between Germany and England is our trump card. Iswolsky made a grave mistake by bringing about the British understanding and Sazonoff was still more wrong in permitting himself to be guided by that alliance. No good can come of it for Rus- sia. We are not in a fit state for a war with Ger- many. Such a war, to succeed, must have a wholly national character. In order for a war to be na- tional, we must have a popular sovereign. Nicholas II is not popular and therein lies the very gravest danger. A second unfortunate war for us might easily be the prelude to a revolution." Such a political ''credo" can hardly be called Germanophile in sentiment. It is that of a states- man with big ideas and a very wide outlook. I was very intimate with Witte, and saw him at least twice a week and there was rarely a day when we did not speak by telephone. I think, therefore, that 260 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT probably I knew him better than most people and could appreciate his fine qualities and realize his great faults. It was nothing but his desire to re- gain power at any price which alienated public opinion. He flattered the Imperial Court and as- siduously cultivated the Grand Dukes and states- men who found favour in the eyes of the Sovereign. He was an habitue of the aristocratic salons, and it is said did not even disdain Easputin. It was in this way he alienated the Liberals. On the other hand he carefully cultivated the press and sought the friendship and esteem of the Duma, and so alien- ated the Court and high bureaucracy. When he died (1915) he had been for a long time without any political support whatsoever, and with only a very few intimate friends. And yet, during the last years of his life, when he mounted the tribune of the Council of State, every one present listened to him with serious attention. Only a few years before his death Witte miracu- ously escaped an attempt against his life. An in- fernal machine had been placed in the chimney of his study which was fortunately noticed by his serv- ant who was about to light a fire. A judicial in- vestigation followed. It was established that the conspiracy had been hatched by the party of Ex- treme Eeaction, (Black Bands). Despite the in- sistence of Witte, the matter was hushed up. More than that, when the Count at his wife's insistence, GENESIS 261 asked for a detective to protect him in future, the police chose a man for the position who belonged to the Black Bands, and who shortly afterwards was found assassinated by order of the revolution- ary committee as an admitted spy. Witte told me that the so-called guardian of his person was neither more nor less than another assassin sent by his enemies! Such were the means used by the Black Band when it tried to get rid of its opponents, "Witte 's many enemies whispered to Nicholas II that the retired statesman was aiming at becoming president of a Russian Republic. It was an infam- ous lie. Witte was a thorough Czarist, but he desired that Czarism should be supported by a more or less Liberal Constitution. He was very proud of the Imperial Manifesto of the 17th October. He said to me, *' Nicholas may detest me as much as he likes, but he will never be able to destroy the letter he wrote to me when the Manifesto was issued! I in- sisted that his letter should be published at the same time as the Manifesto, and I have ordered it to be en- graved on my tombstone ! The Russian people will at last know the part I played at that time!" Such was the man, Nicholas II dismissed on two occasions as he would a valet! I do not believe that during the last half century Russia has had a states- man his equal. Ivan Loguinovitch Goremikine, who succeeded Witte as President of the Council of Ministers, was 262 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT the complete antithesis of his predecessor. He was an aristocrat whose family had always played some part in the history of Russia since the days of Ivan the Terrible. He had had a long bureau- cratic career and had held among other offices that of the Ministry of the Interior. It would be unjust to call him a reactionary. He approached more nearly to the type of the English Tory. He instinctively regarded administration as government by law. If the law was bad then it could be changed but as long as the law was on the statute books it must be obeyed absolutely. One day he said to me: ''When I was Minister of the Interior the general opinion was that I was a Liberal. I was given the name of the Red Flag Minister. Yet in 1906 when I was President of the Council for the first time, everybody thought me a reactionary. I am neither a reactionary nor a radical. I am a man who stands by the law." Such sentiments were a serious fault in any min- ister who desired to succeed during sach times. A law which served in the Russia of 1900 could not serve the needs of 1906. Russia was suffering the birth-pangs of a new era. Her doctors diagnosed her case as the bad temper of a child. Goremikine was very badly received by the Duma, which desired above all to emphasize its independ- ence. Directly he attempted to speak, cat calls and shrill whistles resounded everj^where. The Em- GENESIS 263 peror had two courses open to him. He could dis- solve the Duma or he could form a constitutional ministry with its assistance. The Democratic Con- stitutional Party, (Cadets) was so sure of obtain- ing power that a list of ministers was made out, in which appeared the name of Milioukoff as Premier and Foreign Minister. The Emperor, hearing of this, summoned the Council of State to discuss the situation. The majority of the Council pronounced in favour of a constitutional government. Gore- mikine and Stolypin, the Minister of the Interior in his cabinet, urged dissolution. When the Council was dismissed the Emperor requested Goremikine to wait and then expressed to him his chagrin with the sentiments expressed by the majority. He asked Goremikine what could be done. The latter replied : "I do not change my opinion. The present con- stitution gives you the right to decide whether you will dissolve the Duma or accede to the sentiment of the majority. You are the master and must make your choice. The Duma has entirely over- stepped its rights and must be put in its place." The Emperor bowed his head in his hands and stood thus for some minutes in deep reflection. He then went slowly up to Goremikine. Making the sign of the cross he exclaimed: *'In God's name dissolve the Duma, I entirely agree with your point of view." 264 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT After his interview with the Emperor, Goremi- kine drafted the proclamation dissolving the Duma and went direct to the state printer and ordered it to be printed and immediately issued. He found there a proclamation of the Cadet Party to the peo- ple anticipating the formation of a really constitu- tional cabinet by the Emperor. He personally con- fiscated the proofs and took them to his house in his carriage. One of his most striking qualities was his calmness at critical times. He was not in the least disturbed though of course he realized the gravity of the situation. He dined with his family quietly and afterwards smoked and played solitaire as usual, without showing any signs of perturbation. He then retired. At half past eleven a special courier came from the Emperor with a message to the effect that Nicholas had changed his mind. He desired the minister to cancel the proclamation of dissolution and requested him to come to Tsarskoe Seloe the next day at eleven in the morning. Goremikine sent his valet to the courier with a message that the Minister was not well and was asleep but that the message would be delivered when he awoke. But Goremikine carefully did noth- ing and next day to the Emperor's stupefaction there appeared the decree of dissolution. The Min- ister went to Tsarskoe Seloe as requested and told the Emperor he regretted the mistake and blamed his valet who had not desired to awaken him. He GENESIS 265 then presented his resignation which the Emperor refused to accept. Demonstrations against the Government were pre- pared for. But the public in general was tired of revolutionary disorders and almost welcomed the dissolution of the Duma. The members of the Cadet Party fled to Viborg in Finland and from there is- sued their proclamation to the people. It fell ab- solutely flat. Goremikine however was obdurate. He again pre- sented his resignation telling the Emperor that any opprobrium for the dissolution which might come later ought to fall on him, who was really to blame, and insisted that his resignation be accepted. The Emperor finally gave way and at Goremikine 's re- quest appointed Stolypin to succeed him. Knowing Stolypin's character it always seemed to me in think- ing this matter over that Goremikine had a grim sense of humour. The new President of the Council before serving as Minister of the Interior had been governor of Saratoff on the Volga. He was relatively a young man about forty-five, very ambitious, astute, de- termined, but inclined to be narrow minded and provincial. His critics nicknamed him ^^The Gov- ernor of All the Russias." He ruled Russia as if it were Saratoff. As President of the Council he pur- sued an ultra nationalistic policy and this naturally led to the further estrangement of the Poles and 266 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Finns. He was supported in this policy by the No- voie Vremya of which his brother was a director. When he discovered that there was no outburst of sympathy and apparently no regret for the de- parted Duma, he was anxious to appropriate all the credit for the dissolution and openly boasted of his success in preventing ''stupid constitutional re- forms." He was to receive a lesson on the folly of vanity. Meanwhile Goremikine, the real author of the Duma's downfall, was staying with me at my villa at Tergensee and together we visited Paris, Goremi- kine enjoying his freedom from office and state affairs with all the abandonment of youth. He was intensely amused when he heard that Stolypin was appropriating a responsibility which he himself had felt to be most serious and from which he was only too anxious to escape. His amusement, however, was changed to regret when we heard that Stolypin 's residence in Petrograd had been destroyed by a bomb and that Stolypin himself only escaped death by a miracle, as he fell from the second floor to the ground floor yet only received some bruises and scratches. Twenty people were killed and wounded and the Minister's children were badly hurt. Stolypin 's first act was to arrange for elections to the Duma. He was determined that the new Duma should not be impregnated with the radical- ism of the Cadets and relied on the Peasants, Cler- GENESIS 267 icals and Conservatives to give that support to the Government, which was so plainly lacking in the first Duma. He succeeded in attaining his object as far as the arrangement of the parties was concerned, but he soon discovered that he had over-reached himself. The Peasants and Clericals turned out to be infinitely more revolutionary than the Cadets and a socialist plot against the Czar in the Duma itself, was nipped in the bud. Stolypin thereupon dissolved the Second Duma and the Socialistic mem- bers concerned in the plot were brought before a judge and banished to Siberia. Among them was Tseretelli, who after the Revolution became a cab- inet minister in Kerensky's government. By the use of even more unscrupulous methods in the elections the Third Duma proved a docile instru- ment in the hands of the Minister. The majority was in the hands of a new party, the Octobrist, which was constitutional but not so advanced as the Cadets. But Stolypin was even now not content. He wanted more and more power and even the mild criticism of the Octobrists spurred him to reaction. He formed a party, which was called Nationalist, and through this party instituted a new reactionary campaign against the Jews, Finns, and Poles. In this policy he was violently supported by the Novoie Vremya, which during this entire period earned for itself a bad reputation. It always supported the power "in being" whether good or bad and had no 268 RECOLLECTIONS OP A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT principles outside this policy. One of the greatest Eussian satirists, Soltikoff, (Tchedrine), gave the paper the name of "What-you-Will." In consequence extreme discontent arose through- out Eussia. The Jews, Finns and Poles combined with the intellectuals against Stolypin. Opposition only seemed to make him more determined. He be- came more and more reactionary and unscrupulous in his use of authority to suppress any opposition, although in the Duma he still kept his ascendancy owing to his magnificent oratory and appearance. But the more he stamped on the embers of revolu- tion in one place, the more he used the weapons of reaction and encouraged the Black Bands, the stronger grew the sentiment against him and his government. Finally he was assassinated by a Jew named Bagroff, in the presence of the Emperor and Empress at a gala performance in the theatre of Kiev. Had he escaped the assassin's shot, his political assassination was certain. He had already been con- demned by the Emperor who had been persuaded by Stolypin 's enemies that the Minister was lead- ing Eussia on the road to ruin. His resignation was only a matter of days. His assassin after- wards declared that his real intent had been to kill the Emperor, and that it was only at the last moment he had decided to murder the Premier instead! Thus Stolypin died, as a matter of fact, for his sov- GENESIS 269 ereign! But despite this the Emperor did not at- tend the funeral of his Minister, giving as his ex- cuse that on that day he had promised to review the main body of troops just outside the city. This pretence again shows the character of the Emperor ! The ingratitude of Nicholas equalled his vacillation. A monument was erected to Stolypin at Kiev but it was destroyed in the final revolution. While he had been in power, Stolypin was forced to accept as Minister of Finance, Count Kokowtzoff, a strong political adversary. The Emperor insisted upon this appointment, faithful to his principle, divide et impera. Kokowtzoff now succeeded to the presidency of the Council. This statesman had had a long bureaucratic ca- reer. Born of an impoverished family of the lesser nobility, he owed his success to his own zeal and in- telligence, though perhaps more especially to his intimate knowledge of finance. As has been already stated, for a time he had been an antagonist of Count "Witte, but the latter bought his assistance by ap- pointing him Vice-Minister of Finance, and Kokowtz- off became one of his principal collaborators and as- sistants in all his projects. Later Kokowtzoff became Minister of Finance, and held the position for ten years. Although he was most intelligent, he was very narrow minded. The wide horizons which mark the great statesman were 270 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT absolutely lacking in him. A remarkable '^Budget- ist," all Ms efforts were bent on increasing the wealth of the state. He wrangled over every penny of credits which other ministers requested, and naturally the State suffered. A wit once com- pared him to a certain beggar in Montmartre, one of the poorest quarters in Paris, who starved to death in his attic and in whose mattress 15,000 francs were found after his death. Kokowtzoff was a great orator. He could speak for hours together on any subject, and was always an enthusiastic admirer of his own verbosity. Witte, with whom he had quarrelled a second time, called him ' * a lark. ' ' *'He is a bird that sings very well, but otherwise is not worth much, ' ' he said. Kokowtzoff did not lack character. For instance when Witte sent him to Paris, after the Kusso- Japanese War, to arrange for a loan, he succeeded despite the opposition of Clemenceau, the then pow- erful Minister of Interior of the French Government. Meeting with such opposition Kokowtzoff did not hesitate to threaten Clemenceau with the fact that if the projected loan were refused by France he would declare Eussia bankrupt ! Clemenceau said to me: "Your Kokowtzoff is not a minister I He is a blackmailer of the first water!'* But he agreed to the loan! In his relations with the Duma, Kokowtzoff tried GENESIS 271 to be as conciliatory as possible, but Ms efforts were not often crowned with success. He bad no party on which he could effectively rely. Towards the end of his tenure of office he staged an excellent burlesque. He had entirely stopped ap- pearing in the Duma, and ordered all the other Min- isters to do the same! It was a sort of strike of the Ministers against the Duma. Kokowtzoff 's greatest quality was his unimpeach- able honesty, which he maintained in his private affairs as well as in matters of state. In this re- spect he distinguished himself as being far above the Eussian statesmen of the last years of the Monarchy. He had flatly refused to meet the Court favourite, Rasputin, and the latter avenged himself by becoming one of the prime movers in his down- fall. From his father he had inherited a small property not far from Petrograd. When he re- signed, this little property was all that he possessed in the world. In dismissing him, the Emperor offered him a gift of 300,000 roubles, but Kokowtzoff refused it, saying to the Emperor that his appointment as a member of the Council of the Empire amply sufficed for his modest tastes and needs. Instead of appreciating this rare quality in a Rus- sian statesman, Nicholas was seemingly much an- noyed by it. After his retirement, the Sovereign always avoided seeing Kokowtzoff and the only time 272 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT that lie did receive him was because it could not be avoided. While he was in power, Kokowtzoff had not fore- seen the revolution. He continued to hope that by concessions to the Duma the existing state of things could be made to last, at least until the end of the Great War. He changed his mind after his resig- nation, however. Having re-entered private life he naturally came in contact with all kinds and condi- tions of people. He was frankly spoken to by all sides and thus obtained a far better idea of Rus- sian sentiment in general. I knew Kokowtzoff when I was a young man and had always been very intimate with him. For a certain time while he was in power our relations were troubled, for my newspaper opposed him. After his resignation, however, we returned to the old friendly basis, and I saw him very often. He was always very sad and quiet and did not hide from me that he felt the Court had, on his advice, followed a fatal policy. He then foresaw the revolu- tion clearly, and said, too, that it was not far dis- tant — even that it would take place before the war was over. Of Nicholas he remarked : **The Emperor obstinately refuses to see any- thing, or permit himself to be shown anything. He seems as if he were still drunk with the ovations he received at the time of the fetes of the 300th Anni- versary of the Romanoff dynasty. He does not hear GENESIS 273 the grumbling of the coming revolution because of the cheers of the multitude. If he insists upon sur- rounding himself with such indolent ministers as Goremikine and with such scamps as Stunner and Rasputin, the end is near at hand." Unfortunately Kokowtzoff did not impart his opin- ions to any but his most intimate friends. He did not act, neither did he try to influence the Court. When the Emperor learned by accident of his point of view and appeared interested in it, he was slily informed that Kokowtzoif still rankled over his dis- missal from office and that therein might be found the real key to his ideas and actions. His well known honesty saved Count Kokowtzoff at the time of the Revolution. He was not even ar- rested as were most of the ministers of the old re- gime. To the stupefaction of all political circles Goremi- kine was appointed successor to Kokowtzoff. Gore- mikine was seventy-seven years old, and had the gen- eral reputation of a reactionary. By his nomina- tion it seemed plain that the Emperor intended, if possible, to pursue a still more autocratic policy. The Emperor gave immediate proof of this when he summoned a council of the ministers over which he himself presided. At this conference he told the Council that it must look to Goremikine for every- thing as he had the utmost confidence in him and was determined to support him in every way possible. 274 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Goremikine, immediately after the council, requested the members of the press to wait upon him and told them that he was determined to follow a policy which would have the approval of the Duma, if the Duma in its turn gave him the necessary support. To do this, however, he must have time as circum- stances were such as to make it most difficult to bring about such reforms as the Duma demanded without running the risk of destroying the fabric of the Russian government. The Duma received this declaration without enthusiasm but in a not un- friendly spirit. Goremikine was somewhat encour- aged thereby as it was a very different reception from that which he had experienced the first ti"^'^ he had been President of the Cabinet. Goremikine intimated that he would dismiss Soukhomlinoff, the Minister of War, Maklakoff, the Minister of the Interior and Tcheglowitoff, the Min- ister of Justice, all of whom were very much dis- liked by the Duma and Liberal circles in Eussia. Unfortunately Goremikine was an extreme procras- tinator. He always put off till tomorrow the things he should have done today. His characteristic in- dolence had increased with his years, and all three ministers remained in office despite his seeming promise to purge Russia of their disastrous influ- ence. One evening I was dining en famille with Goremikine and strongly criticized the policy of the three ministers, especially that of Soukhomlinoff. GENESIS 275 Goremikine said nothing at the moment, but after- wards, just as I was going home, he said : *'You are quite right, my dear friend, but have patience. You must not forget it is necessary to manage the Emperor." I replied: ''Take care, Ivan Loganovitch, that when you think the time is ripe to manage the Em- peror you do not find that he is no longer the Em- peror. ' ' Goremikine answered sadly: "I know, — I know what you mean, but you know my sentiments regard- ing him. I have too much affection for him. I have known him too long. ' ' In these words Goremikine summed up a situation I knew only too well. Witte had said to me on one occasion that Goremikine was nothing but '*a maitre d 'hotel" to the Emperor. But this was not true. The old statesman regarded his master with the af- fection a man may feel towards a youth who has been his pupil. He knew and deplored the weak- nesses of the Emperor but he could not find it in his heart to deal drastically with him. He spoilt him, always hoping that in time the good qualities he saw in his pupil would overcome the weakness of his character. One day he severely criticized the Emperor to my sister, especially with regard to his folly regarding Rasputin ; he said : "The Emperor knows my affection for him and yet he treats me as if I were his valet de chambre. ' ' 276 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT My sister replied: ''Yes, but if the Emperor recalls you, you will go to him just as a dog to the whistle of his master." Goremikine answered: ''You are right, but what can I do? I love him and I can refuse him noth- ing." It was clear that this sentiment of Goremikine, combined with his indolence and age, would create an impossible situation. It became no longer a ques- tion of reform, but of expediency — ^that fatal weak- ness in all politics and diplomacy. The ministers did as they pleased in their departments and the cabinet was not united on any definite policy, and when in due course, Goremikine was told that min- isters were blundering he took refuge in ignorance. "I do not know what they do," he would cry. He forgot he was intrusted with full powers. He was like a stage manager who refuses to be responsible for the interpretation of their parts by the actors. It was as though he staged a drama and then sat in a box and criticized it. Goremikine sat comfortably in his chair and exclaimed : "Eh! but this is a horrible play. It bores me. Why did I ever come to see it ? " Usually at cabinet councils he slept. In the eve- nings when he should have been hard at work he played solitaire. The most powerful minister in Russia played solitaire while Russia slid into the abyss ! GENESIS 277 Once, however, Goremikine showed a flash of his old self. After Austria sent the ultimatum to Ser- bia and mobilized, Goremikine called a meeting of the Cabinet. He told the ministers that they must make up their minds to the course Eussia must pur- sue if Germany and Austria were determined on war. A hot discussion followed and Goremikine seemingly went to sleep. One minister after the other spoke and the majority were in favour of com- ing to some understanding with Austria and Ger- many if possible. Suddenly Goremikine opened his eyes and said: **Well, gentlemen, I have heard all you have to say and will tell the Emperor that you have unanimously decided we must stand by Serbia to the end." And he added fiercely yet with great dignity, as if to re- mind the Council that it had forgotten something: **Our honour is at stake." He then went to the Emperor and suggested that everything possible must be done to preserve peace, and as a result Sazonoff, the Foreign Minister, sent a circular telegram to our ambassadors in Paris, London and Berlin, asking for the friendly inter- vention of those powers between Eussia and Aus- tria. The Emperor Nicholas sent a personal tele- gram to the Emperor William suggesting the same thing. But what happened is well known. Sir Ed- ward Grey proposed a conference which was ac- cepted by France and Eussia but refused by Ger- 278 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT many. Emperor William, after having prepared for war for forty-four years, encouraged Austria to stand fast. When Austria finally realized that Rus- sia would not abandon Serbia, Count Szapary, her ambassador in Petrograd, was instructed to see Sazonoff and endeavour to gain time. Meanwhile, however, Eussia had ordered the mobilization of ner Southern and Western armies at Kiev, Warsaw and Odessa against Austria, in reply to the mobilization of the latter. Despite the peaceful efforts of the French, Russian and English cabinets, the Emperor William, being afraid some arrangement might be come to, ordered the secret mobilization of Germany. By mistake this was disclosed by the Lokal Anseiger of Berlin. The paper was promptly suppressed but in Russia the secret was already known and orders were given for general mobilization. Immediately there came from Berlin the German ultimatum de- manding the demobilization of all Russian forces in twelve hours, which was followed by the declaration of war against Russia and France. At the beginning of the war the Emperor Nicholas desired to nominate himself Commander-in-Chief of Russia's troops, but Goremikine insisted that the Grand Duke Nicholas should be appointed to the su- preme command. In consequence when he came to the Duma and told the deputies what had been done, he was received enthusiastically for the first time in his official career. GENESIS 279 Henceforward Goremikine 's whole policy was di- rected to making every sacrifice necessary to win the war. He had determined that on no account must there be any patched up peace. He said to me: *'If we lose Warsaw, Petrograd, and even Moscow, and retire to the Volga, we must never make peace until militarism has been destroyed." But unfortunately Goremikine forgot that in or- der to win the war it must be popular and to be pop- ular the government must be in agreement with the people especially in its domestic policies. This was impossible as long as the Emperor was surrounded by such men as Rasputin, Maklakoff and Tcheglowitoff, and under the entire influence of the Empress, all of which the people knew perfectly well. The liberal and progressive influences, which were perfectly ready to assist the Government in every way possible, were regarded by this clique as revo- lutionary. The discontent of the people became ever greater and greater and yet when I told Goremikine we were heading straight for a revolution, he only replied: ''That is all nonsense. Reform is necessary but it must come after the war. As for revolution it is nothing but the dust on the healthy body of Russia. When I breathe on it, it will disappear." What must have been the thoughts of the old statesman, when, after the Revolution, seated in a 280 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT motor car accompanied by soldiers and workmen, and spat upon by the people, he was escorted hatless through the streets of Petrograd, with the ther- mometer thirty below zero, to the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. Goremikine's fall was entirely unexpected by him. "When the former Assistant Minister of the Interior, Beletzky, who was in close relationship with the Court and with Easputin, informed him that the Emperor had determined to replace him with Sturmer, Goremikine replied: "That is impossible. He might ask for my resig- nation but he never could replace me with such a nonentity as Sturmer." On the day before his dismissal the Empress ac- tually wrote to Madame Goremikine, who showed me the letter, which said "as long as your dear hus- band is at the head of affairs we sleep soundly. He takes good care of Eussia and of us." Such was the despicable treachery of the Emperor and his court to those who served and loved him. Goremikine's end was tragic. Eighty years old, he was assassinated by the Bolsheviki at Sotche in the Caucasus, with his wife who was over seventy and his son-in-law. General Ovtchinnikoff. Of all the ministers during the reign of Nicholas, he and Witte had the greatest individuality and independence. He should havs held the office of Foreign Minister. GENESIS 281 He had the great quality of resistance which none of the other ministers had. Count Witte, who was personally antagonistic to him, said to me one day, when the question of the nomination of Goremikine as minister of Foreign Affairs was mooted. "Goremikine would make an ideal foreign min- ister and if he comes into power, I will try and obtain from him an ambassadorship to Constantinople. I would like to work with him." One of Russia's greatest tragedies was the fact that Goremikine and Witte never united to form a party. They each criticized the other instead of uniting to criticize the government. When he was dismissed Goremikine might well have cried with Louis Quatorze "Apres moi le de- luge." CHAPTER XII THE DELUGE When Sturmer was appointed as his successor, the Court and its intimates made no ceremony or fuss about the new President of the Council. For the most part the Emperor absented himself from Pet- rograd, and spent most of his time at Army Head- quarters at the front. To all intents and purposes it was the Empress who reigned and in consequence Easputin became the dispenser of Russia's destiny. Sturmer was a man of his making. Rasputin treated him as dirt beneath his feet, and sent him his orders written on filthy scraps of paper. The ad- ministrator of the Russo-French Bank asked me one day, knowing of my friendly relations with Prince Obolensky, Commander of Petrograd, to intercede with him in favour of a Jewess, a relative of one of the employes of the Bank, whom Obolensky was going to expel from the city; but he refused my request categorically. **Hair will grow on my head before I will permit her to stay in Petrograd!" he exclaimed. (The Prince was entirely bald.) I told the unhappy Jewess of the non-success of 282 THE DELUGE 283 my mission and advised her to try and see Rasputin. This she did. Rasputin interested himself in her case and gave her one of the famous slips of soiled paper to give Sturmer. I was shown the slip and took a copy of it. And this is the message that Ras- putin sent to the President of the Council ! ''Dear Boris Vladimirovitch, " ( Sturmer 's Chris- tian name), ''I send you this woman. Do as she wishes. *'Your well-wisher, *' Gregory Rasputin." Sturmer hastened to send the necessary orders to Prince Obolensky and the Jewess was permitted to continue her residence in the capital. On the night of the gala dinner given for Messieurs Viviani and Thomas, who had come to Petrograd on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the Franco-Russian Alli- ance, I chanced to sit beside Prince Obolensky. I said to him : ''Well, mon Prince — I do not see that your hair has grown!" The Prince did not seem to relish my little joke ! Sturmer thought of nothing except of keeping his own position. He had as his private secretary a person called Manuiloff — a man of very shady repu- tation, who shortly after, was condemned to a year in prison for blackmail. The secretarj^'s duties lay 284 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT chiefly in keeping the minister informed of the sen- timents and opinions current in political circles. For this work Manuiloff drew 12,000 roubles per year, to say nothing of supplementary credits and the sums of money given to him. At the same time, — an excellent illustration of our regime in those days — he drew 6,000 roubles a year from the Assist- ant-Minister of the Interior to spy on Sturmer! Conditions were so bad that one might well im- agine oneself transported to Constantinople before the war, where the same sort of agents served at one and the same time the interests of the Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, and of Enver Pasha, who was his most deadly enemy ! Sturmer was still Minister of the Interior and in that department every one did exactly as they pleased. The provincial governors had become mere satraps, justice existed on paper only. Solely oc- cupied with his own affairs, Sturmer did not even take the time or trouble to read the official reports ! When he finally vacated the ministry to become Min- ister of Foreign Affairs, still keeping the presidency of the Council, he was replaced by A. D. Protopopoff, whose activities surpassed those of Sturmer in arbi- trariness and glaring abuse of his office. Sturmer tried to get on good terms with the Duma, and as it had been dissolved by Goremikine, he at once reconvened it. Then he influenced the Em- peror to visit the Duma. Nicholas went and made THE DELUGE 285 a speech. He assured the deputies of his well- wishes, and asked them to work for the country's good in accord with their sovereign in the difficult times through which they were then passing. This speech was enthusiastically received, but the deputies were disappointed in their hopes. The Emperor had spoken to them, it is true, in a very fatherly and kind way, but he had promised them nothing! The country wanted a responsible ministry that would be answerable to the Duma for its actions, or for at least a practical execution of the promises made in the Imperial Manifesto of 17th October, 1905 — but since, entirely forgotten. Nicholas would not even sacrifice the iniquitous Protopopoff, Minister of the Interior, for them, al- though he was universally hated in Russia. It was then only natural that after the Emperor left the Duma violent speeches against the Govern- ment and criticisms of the ministry were heard on every side. Two or three days later Milioukoff thun- dered from the tribune the truth of the evils under which unhappy Russia was groaning and suffering. Sturmer's cabinet was so wretchedly constituted that among all its members there was not one man who could answer Milioukoff's terrible denunciation and charges. Sturmer had recourse to the old method and proceeded forthwith to the dissolution of the Duma, but the deputies, when they returned to their constituencies, exposed the rottenness of the 286 EECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT Government in great detail and discontent spread fast and far. In his relations with the Court, Sturmer was fawning and servile. As he had been Master of Ceremonies for many years, he knew it in all its devious ways. German by birth, his father a Prot- estant by religion, Sturmer posed as a convinced Orthodox. He visited all the churches regularly, and assiduously sought friends among the highest church dignitaries, as he knew that in so doing he would win the favours of the Empress, whom he in- fluenced by the most insidious flattery. It would be ridiculous to speak of Sturmer 's "pol- itics" or "policy," as he had neither one nor the other. He lived from day to day, executing the ever-vacillating wishes of the Czar. He signed any treaty put before him, one was as good as another to him and the same slipshod way of doing things as had distinguished his administration at the Min- istry of the Interior, was the rule in the Foreign Office. He was always ready either to bargain with the deputies, or attack them virulently. He had been accused by Milioukoff before the whole Duma of having been a thief while in power. Miliou- koff stated that even if he had not himself stolen, which could not be proved, it was certain his wife and sons were most seriously compromised. Milioukoff 's attack, however, was not the real rea- son of Sturmer 's fall, which was solely due to the ca- THE DELUGE 287 price of the Czar, or rather, of the Empress. As he came to power, so he fell from it. Matters were so rotten at Court that an open attack on a Minister by the Duma only strengthened his position with the sovereigns! Usually Imperial favours were a sure reward for the hatred of the deputies! It was merely a coincidence that made Sturmer the excep- tion. The last President of the Ministerial Council un- der Nicholas II was Prince Golitzin. His nomina- tion was unexpected, not only by the public at large, but even by himself. He had been the Governor of two provinces and a Senator, and his last position had been that of a Member of the Imperial Council. He always voted with the party of the Extreme Eight. He was seventy-two years old when he at- tained the highest office. He was a gentleman in every sense of the term, loyal and honest, but totally ignorant of affairs of state. He was the President of two societies for the furtherance of the public wel- fare, one of which had as its patron the Empress Alexandra, and the other the Dowager Empress Ma- rie. Although the two Empresses did not get on at all well together, and were entirely unlike in charac- ter, Prince Golitzin managed to retain the favour of both. He came to the palace to make his report to the Empress one day, when he found himself unex- pectedly face to face with the Emperor, who promptly offered him Sturmer 's position as head of the Coun- 288 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT cil ! The Prince confided to my sister Sementovska, that he had done all he could to keep this bitter cup from his lips! He did not feel strong enough to assume such a heavy responsibility and did not hide this from the Emperor, giving him a long list of candidates for the position, whom he thought to be far better fitted. But it was all in vain. The Em- peror insisted, and the Prince became President of the Council. In political circles every one was highly amused by his appointment and the Prince was not taken at all seriously. The Duma expected an uproar the first time Prince Golitzin appeared, especially as he relied on the infamous Protopopoff's assistance. But the Prince dared not attempt the experience! He kept away from the Duma, and in this way the deputies had no idea of the policy he intended to follow. The Golitzin Ministry lasted just one month. By order of the Emperor, who was then at the front, the Prime Minister signed a decree of dissolution. The Duma refused to be dissolved and the Revolu- tion broke out ! The unfortunate Prince left his official quarters and took refuge in my sister's house where he lived before he became Prime Minister. But as the other tenants very much feared the mobs, they begged my sister to make him leave. Prince Golitzin, a gentle- man always, inunediately telephoned to the President THE DELUGE 289 of the Duma to come and arrest him. He was at once incarcerated in the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, but was soon freed. Of all the Czar's minis- ters, he was perhaps one who suffered most from his master's capricious whims. Meanwhile Protopopoff, the Minister of the In- terior, who played such a disastrous part during the last days of the monarchy in Eussia, flitted on and off the stage. Just before the curtain de- scended he became one of the principal actors in the drama. In all countries the Minister of the Interior oc- cupies a very important position. In Russia the holder of this portfolio has always been almost om- nipotent ! The whole administration of the internal affairs of the vast Empire was absolutely in his hands. He appointed the governors of provinces, and controlled the activities of the Zemstvos. He regulated all questions except those of religion. By custom, the Minister of the Interior was a high dig- nitary, having the full confidence of the Sovereign, and being ''his man," in every way. During the reign of Nicholas II, the Ministry of the Interior especially reflected the vacillating character of the ruler. And it was in this important branch of the government that ministers were most frequently changed, so much so that during the last months of the monarchy, the Ministry of the Interior was nothing but a continuous moving picture I The Em- 290 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT peror called for some one, it did not matter whom, and offered him the post of Minister of the Interior. The gentleman so '' honoured" accepted, and went home, highly delighted, to dilate on his good for- tune to his family ! This would happen in the morn- ing; and the evening of the same day the Czar changed his mind, another man was appointed, and the appointee of the morning had not even had time to make the acquaintance of his colleagues. The innumerable Ministers of the Interior kept their positions not by their policies or accomplish- ments, but solely by Imperial favour! They all tried to secure such favour by all sorts of means, any means sufficed, as long as they were successful. Some, Sturmer, for instance, by making a round of all the churches ; others, like Maklakoff, in imitating the *4eap of the amorous pantheress" which made the Empress and the Imperial children laugh, and a third class like Protopopoff, by flattering the Em- press, and doing things they claimed were spiritual- istic. And all by first assuring themselves of being In the very good graces of Easputin. Of all the Ministers of the Interior that Nicholas II had, Protopopoff contributed the most to the fall of the Monarchy. He was a gentleman from the Province of Simbirsk, on the Volga. Previously he had been an officer, but left the army when he was still young. He was very rich, an extensive land- owner, and was at the head of several industrial THE DELUGE 291 enterprises. He had worked in several of the Zems- two bureaux and had been elected chief of the nobil- ity in his home province. He thus represented his province in the third and fourth Dumas, belonging to the Octobrist Party. Finally he was Vice-Presi- dent of the Duma. His speeches were usually of a pronouncedly liberal character. An excellent ora- tor, and most insinuating in his manner, he made himself very popular with the deputies, especially by his violent attacks on the Government. When a delegation from the Duma visited the capitals of our Allies, Protopopoff was of the party. As he spoke English, French and Italian fluently, he spoke for the whole delegation. He produced an exceedingly good impression in Europe, and was very popular everywhere. On his return to Russia he passed through Stockholm with Count Olsouiev, Member of the Imperial Council, who had also been a member of the deputation. In the Swedish cap- ital the latter discovered a Russian journalist, Ko- lischko by name, who lived there as he would not leave his mistress, who was a German whom the Rus- sian Government had expelled. Naturally enough Germany and its affairs were among the topics of conversation, and Count Olsouiev expressed a desire to see a real German in order to learn something of German sentiments. Kolischko offered his assist- ance, and at a luncheon at his house introduced a man by the name of Warburg to the Count. War- 292 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT burg was a German financier, a friend of Herr Ballin, and in consequence in touch with the ideas of Em- peror William. At the last moment Protopopoff expressed a wish to be present at this luncheon, and so was asked. Although the conversation did not have any great political significance, Protopopoff was fatuous enough to mention it to a reporter, adding that it was he, and not Olsouiev, who had arranged for the meeting with Warburg. The matter got abroad, and when Protopopoff reached Petrograd, he found that his position in the Duma was seriously compromised, even in the ranks of his own Party. The President of the Duma, M. W. Rodzianko, wrote him a letter in which he asked, in the name of the Duma, to present formal explanations regarding the Stockholm incident. In order to excuse himself, Protopopoff threw all the blame on Olsouiev ; but the latter succeeded in clear- ing himself and proved conclusively that Protopopoff was a liar. He had formerly been the Liberal candidate for the post of Minister of Commerce, but after this incident there was no doubt that not only would he lose his position as Vice-President of the Duma, but even that of being a deputy ! Protopopoff was more fortunate at Court. Wanting to know the details of the visit of the dele- gation to the Allied capitals, the Emperor received THE DELUGE 293 him in the Empress' presence. Protopopoff made a very good impression. The Empress asked him if King George resembled the Emperor as much as it was commonly reported. Protopopoff answered: "Only as a bad copy resembles a superb original." This reply pleased the Emperor and Empress im- mensely. Seeing that he was done for as far as the Duma was concerned, Protopopoff decided to make himself popular at Court. He listened to Easputin and made himself most agreeable, and employed the same tactics with the Archbishop of Petrograd. As he had prepared the ground carefully at the Palace, he was appointed Minister of the Interior. At first he played up to the Liberals. He argued to himself that the title of ''Minister of the In- terior, and Deputy of the Duma," would make him popular with the masses, and that it might win him once again the support of the Duma. But his cal- culations were wrong! His own Party voted for his exclusion! While Protopopoff was still Vice-President of the Duma, he had founded a newspaper. When he was appointed Minister of the Interior he declared he would have nothing more to do with this publica- tion, but he nevertheless relied on it for support, and as a matter of fact, the editor came to his study every morning in secret to receive his orders. But the 294 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT truth leaked out and in consequence the paper en- tirely lost its influence and was unable to popularize the Minister. The whole of Russia was hostile towards him and the press clamoured unanimously for his resigna- tion. He did not dare go to the Duma, being sure of provoking a scandal were he to do so. He sought refuge at Court, and found it. The Empress, in- fluenced by Rasputin, was sure of his loyalty and devotion, and he became one of her most intimate friends, spending whole evenings with her, the fa- mous Madame Wiroubova and Rasputin. During these evenings religion was often a subject of con- versation and the necessity of saving the masses from the pernicious influence of the Liberals ! Pro- topopoff was enthusiastic on the latter point, even if he was bored by the former. When Rasputin was assassinated, public opinion generally took it for granted that Protopopoff's popularity at Tsarskoe Seloe would come to an end, but nothing happened. Protopopoff was stronger than ever. He persuaded the Empress, who was then turning to spiritualism, that the spirit of Ras- putin had entered himself, and he spoke to her in the language of the moujiks (peasants), clipping his words and sentences in imitation of Rasputin's pe- culiar way of speaking. When the Emperor expressed himself as much an- noyed with the attitude of the Duma, Protopopoff THE DELUGE 295 calmed him, saying that the Duma was not to be feared. Finally he advised the Emperor to decree its dissolution and the Duma was thus eliminated. Protopopoff wanted to crush the revolutionary movement, of which he was fully aware, and advised the Emperor to use Dournovo's method. Dournovo had crushed the previous revolution in Moscow by the simple method of massacring the people ! Pro- topopoff therefore increased the number of police in Petrograd by adding large forces made up of non- commissioned officers of the army, on whom he could rely. By this means the force of police in the capital reached the total of 18,000 men. He also ordered all the cross streets to be guarded with machine guns and the roofs of all the higher buildings to be simi- larly equipped and he explained his orders by calling attention to the possibility of a German air-raid on the capital. His idea was to force the revolution into the open, provoke the working classes and then mow them down. To achieve this object, he ordered, on the 23rd of February, 1917, that no bread should be sold in those parts of the city inhabited by the workmen and the poor. On the 24th of February there were mass meetings of the starving crowds who howled for bread. These meetings were easily dispersed by the police ; but, on the 25th, the move- ment suddenly became revolutionary. The garri- sons of Petrograd were in collusion with the people and there followed a massacre of the police. About 296 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT 5,000 people were killed and Protopopoff's *'army" fled, or was arrested by the revolting troops. The revolution had won the day in Petrograd ! Protopopoff fled and took refuge in a village near the capital, but fearing to be recognized and killed, four days later he presented himself to the Duma. Meeting Kerensky there he said to him : * * Excellency, have pity on me ! " To which Kerensky replied : **In the first place, I am not 'Excellency'! As to your crimes against the nation, the people will judge them. ' ' He was arrested and incarcerated in the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. He narrowly escaped be- ing torn to pieces by the mobs while he was being taken there. Goremikine and Sturmer, the one by his inaction, the other by his actions, played their parts in the last scene of the drama, but it was Protopopoff who rung the curtain down. Justice in the country was administered in exactly the same way as the government. There was noth- ing left at all of the liberal institutions and reforms of Alexander II. The tribunals had lost their inde- pendence and were docile tools in the hands of the Government. All cases in which members of the Government, or of the Court were concerned, were promptly quashed. Justice became a by-word. Pol- THE DELUGE 297 itics pure and simple controlled all the law courts and their decisions. Monsieur Tcheglowitoff, the Minister of Justice, was without faith or creed. He had been my com- rade in school days, and at school he was called **John Cain." After his graduation he posed as a Liberal, and Milioukoff, in 1905, wished to appoint him Minister of Justice in a Constitutional Cabinet. At that time seeing that the Liberal cause was lost, Tcheglowitoff became a pillar of the reactionary movement. A few months prior to the final out- break, when he found himself attacked on all sides, he resigned as Minister of Justice, but the Emperor appointed him President of the Council of State — the highest official position in Eussia. As President he concentrated all his attention on preventing any and all of the Liberal members of the Council from speaking. His name was as much execrated by the masses as was that of Protopopoff and when he was arrested after the Revolution by the Provisional Government, the crowds, even to the children, spat on him as he was taken through the streets. He was taken to the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul and accused of high treason against the people of Eussia. The Eussian clergy have ever played a most im- portant part in the history of the nation. The masses are extremely religious and in consequence 298 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT the priests have very great influence over them. The church was always regarded with reverence and was a power every sovereign relied upon for sup- port. The assistance of the clergy was therefore cultivated. In the last years of the monarchy princes of the church were appointed from among those on whom the Court could rely, but as all these appointments were made through the influence of Rasputin, the appointees were naturally men of evil reputation, without any morality. Morality was re- placed by a fawning servility. A monk who had been a friend of Rasputin 's at Tobolsk, wholly ignor- ant and scarcely able to write his own name — was made an Archbishop, and Pitirim, well known for his depraved habits, was placed at the head of the Pet- rograd clergy as ''The Metropolitan." The assist- ance of such characters was really of no earthly use to the Court, as the people, knowing their reputations and habits would have nothing to do with them. As a result the church lost its influence. In the end Pitirim lost his position, became again a monk, and was imprisoned in a monastery situated in the far north of Russia. In the army discontent with the regime of Nicholas II had become general. At the beginning of the war the enthusiasm of the troops was undoubted. The first military reverses in East Prussia in no way dispirited the army. They were fully offset by Gen- eral Brusiloff's victories in Galicia, which were THE DELUGE 299 crowned by the taking of Lemberg, and Przemysl, the great Austrian fortress. Even when the Army suffered badly for want of munitions its morale kept up to a fine standard. Having no more cartridges, the men fought with stones and the butts of their rifles. But as time went by, and no munitions were supplied the Army was forced to a permanent re- treat. Even while Russian fortresses were falling one by one, and the Germans were overrunning more and more territory, the Army still had confidence in the future. It was only when it learned of the treachery of the Minister of War — General Soukhomlinoff, and of his imprisonment, that discontent grew apace in all ranks. The ofiQcers especially did not attempt to hide their disgust. In the casinos and restaurants there was severe criticism on all sides against the Government. The Emperor himself was not spared, and no blame was too great for the Empress because the military saw in her the chief cause of its dis- asters. The Imperial Guard was no exception to this bitter sentiment. I talked very often with offi- cers of the First Regiments of the Guard, and they frankly told me that if the Emperor did not change his policy soon, if he did not replace the inefficient and traitorous ministers by a cabinet which would be responsible to the Duma, he would have to be de- throned and a regency instituted. These sugges- tions and many similar ones, were known to the 300 RECOIiLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT men of the rank and file, and the Emperor gradually lost not only their respect, but such little popularity as he had had. But in the ranks the non-success of our armies was credited not only to the Emperor, but to the higher Eussian command. Generals were accused of indo- lence and inefficiency, or servility to the Emperor, and the officers were accused of being the generals' accomplices. This sentiment explains the soldiers' fury against the generals and officers during the Eevolution, and why so many of them were mas- sacred. In the last months before the revolution, the lack of food supplies and of warm clothing fanned the flames. This was attributed and not without rea- son, to the corruption of the departments which were supposed to supply the army with its requirements. Desertion became rife, despite the iron discipline which still existed in the ranks. Thus from the political, judicial, clerical and mili- tary point of view things were going from bad to worse. Meanwhile society was divided into two camps. In the one camp no one cared anything about either the army or the war. They thought only of enriching themselves and to them the slack- ness of the administration was of great assistance. The army contractors filled their pockets. Dealings on the stock market attained enormous and un- precedented figures, yet the nation was starving to THE DELUGE 301 death and the army lacked everything. A third of European Russia was held by the enemy, and still all values on the stock exchange rose steadily, thanks to the speculation that went on in high financial cir- cles. Men who were penniless one day were mil- lionaires the next! Bakery shops were repeatedly attacked by the hungry masses, whose long bread lines stretched for hundreds of yards in many parts of the city. And while this state of things existed the jewellers' establishments were worked harder than they ever had been before. One of these, the famous Faberge, told me that his profits had trebled. He added that the buyers were all unknown to him, and they cared nothing for the quality of the things they bought, insisting only on high prices. The theatres and cafe concerts were always crowded. Four and five hundred roubles were paid for a box at Red Cross entertainments. Wine was officially forbidden, but this did not prevent champagne from flowing in streams in private houses and in private dining-rooms, despite the fact that its price was ninety roubles per bottle. In this world of people, gone absolutely pleasure mad, and literally drunk with money, Rasputin was everywhere, in the character of Principal Devil, for it was he who made it possible for these floods of money to get into the pockets of the vulturous crowds of pleasure-seeking leeches. The dangers of the sit- uation were well known. The majority well knew 302 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT they were dancing on the crumbling edges of a vol- cano; but so much the more haste was made to bleed suffering, starving, agonizing Russia to a still greater degree, and with the results enjoy life the more! And it was on this class of people the ministers relied, and it was auaojig them that the Government looked for salvation! In the other camp of society, which was the more numerous, the certainty of the great catastrophe's approach was well known, and also that the crisis could not be long delayed. The Emperor was now openly criticized on street corners, and the Empress loudly cursed. I was with the Assistant Minister of Justice in his study one day, who up to that time had been looked upon as a reactionary. There were present two senators, one of whom had been Chief of the Police. Their con- versation was such that had I closed my eyes I should have believed myself to be in the presence of three convinced, out-and-out Revolutionaries! Among the legal profession sentiment was even more bitter. Kerensky, who was a lawyer, hurried to the President of the Lawyers ' Club one day very pale, and with tears in his eyes, asked him if some violent action had not better be taken in order to save the people and the army! The members of the Duma met every day in party caucus. They were absolutely convinced that the THE DELUGE 303 state of things could not last any longer. But while the better thinking element of society limited it- self to criticism, and tried to deliberate as to what was best to be done, the workmen were organizing. The intellectuals lost ground in their endless delib- erations and the workmen became complete masters of the situation. The press played only a very small part in the crisis. The Liberals had been muzzled. Those sup- porting the party of the Eight, subsidized by the Government, had no readers, and in consequence no sales. Furthermore Russia had no great journal- ists at the time. The Katkoffs, Aksakoffs, and the Souvorines had vanished and no one to fill their illustrious places could be found. The Novoie Vremya was run by the sons of the great Souvorine. One of them, of no use whatso- ever, spent his time with women. The other, a man of talent, took to drink. Lacking in funds, the Souvorines sold a large part of their shares which passed into the hands of a Jewish banker, Rubin- stein by name. He had made a very large fortune, was an intimate of Rasputin's and thus became quasi-editor-in-chief of the Novoie Vremya! The other papers were colourless and weak, mth the exception of the Retch, the organ of Milioukoff. But the military censorship, which had become a purely political affair, dependent on the desires of the Minister of the Interior, heavily blue-pencilled all 304 RECOLLECTIONS OF A EUSSIAN DIPLOMAT articles intended for publication by the papers. Usually a blank space met the readers' eyes when they looked for an editorial. In revenge the papers made much of the complaints of the various parties, despite the efforts of the police, and this method of internal warfare spread to the people, and thence to the trenches, increasing the general distrust and dis- content. The President of the Duma, Rodzianko, on two occasions had tried to show the Emperor the dan- gers which menaced the Nation, but his efforts were all in vain. Nicholas II, guided by Protopopoff, plunged on to the doom which grimly awaited him. The peasants who make up eighty-five per cent, of the population of Eussia thought differently from the workmen in the cities. Their living had never been so good as during the war ! Three factors com- bined to enrich the country people : (1) Each family having a soldier in the ranks received a certain sum of money each month. (2) Produce was sold at very high prices, and (3) As alcohol was forbidden, the earnings of the men of the family stayed in the family. From these things it is true that among the peas- ants peace and content resulted. But also immor- ality rapidly increased. Many women thought of nothing but money, and almost always the husband being away, his place was taken by a prisoner of war. This was often the case even in Society ! THE DELUGE 305 The peasant, however, finally made common cause with the revolution, because always the aspirations of the country people were for an increase in their holdings of land. The revolutionaries had incul- cated in the peasant mind that these aspirations could only be satisfied hy a Revolution, and grad- ually the creed of the peasants became: Land and Liberty. When the Revolution broke out the peasants thought that their time had come. They seized the landlords' properties without waiting for any legal arrangement to be made by the Revolutionary Gov- ernment! Uneducated and savage, the peasants burned and destroyed secular property, tearing down libraries and ruining treasures which had been gathered little by little by their owners. This movement, and these actions, however, had nothing to do with socialistic theories. The peas- ant, who had become a landed proprietor since the days of Stolypin, does not rally to a doctrine which denies the rights of property! Having received what they demanded, an increase of their territorial holdings, the Russian peasants will necessarily again become a conservative element. Already in the first months of the revolution the peasant was very far from sharing the advanced ideas of the workmen in the cities. The conditions and factors prevailing in Russia in the third year of the Great War, which were the 306 RECOLLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT direct cause of the downfall of the Monarchy, can be thus summarized : An unpopular Emperor, lacking in willpower. An Empress who was cordially detested. The Grand Dukes and the Court suspected. A discontented and deceived Army and Navy, which had lost all faith in their Generals, Admirals and Officers. Venal and incapable Ministers. Satraps in the position of Provincial Governors. Administrative abuses which increased daily. Justice all over the land reduced to a farce. An unconsidered and despised Clergy. A Society corrupt and rotten to the core. The Duma and its Leaders lacking in courage and initiative. The workmen won over by the Socialists. The peasants having lost all idea of morality, pil- laging and destroying property. Add to these the constant military disasters and the large part of Eussia in the hands of the enemy and you have an exact picture of unhappy Russia prior to the Revolution of February 25th, 1917. Such was the drama and such were the principal actors in it. The curtain is down ! the house silent and deserted ! APPENDIX I QUEEN MAEIE OF EOUMANIA "I WILL sooner abdicate than recognize a peace shameful to my country," cried the Queen of Eou- mania, on learning the terrible peace conditions dic- tated by the Emperor William and his partner Aus- tria, and imposed on the poor little Danubian King- dom, crushed by superior force after an heroic re- sistance. The Sovereign reveals herself in her cry of in- dignation, straight from the heart. In these mo- ments of anguish she shows herself as she is — noble and proud, worthy of her people, and worthy niece of two great sovereigns, Edward VII of England and Alexander III of Russia. It will be remembered that Queen Marie is the daughter of the Duke of Edinburgh, brother of Ed- ward VII, and of the Grand Duchess Marie of Rus- sia, only sister of the Emperor Alexander III. "I belong to a truly international family," said the Queen to me one day, referring to the fact that her father was English, her mother Russian, and of her sisters, one was married to a Russian, the Grand Duke Cyril, the second to a German, the Prince of 307 308 APPENDICES Hohenlohe Lauenburg, and the third to a prince of Spain. My first opportunity of getting to know the Qneen of Eoumania was when she was a princess of Eng- land, towards the end of the year 1892 in Munich. I was Second Secretary of the Russian Legation in that city. The Countess Osten-Sacken, the wife of my chief, was an intimate friend of the Grand Duchess Marie, mother of the future Queen of Eou- mania. This lady confided to her all the difficulties she had with regard to the approaching marriage of her daughter. '* Imagine," she said, ''Marie has got two suitors at the same time, both desperately in love with her, the Grand Duke George of Eussia and Prince Ferdi- nand of Eoumania, the former is here, and Ferdi- nand is expected in a few days. I don't know what to do. It seems to me that my daughter prefers the Roumanian, but it hurts her very much to disappoint the Grand Duke. She is so kind-hearted ! " However, the Princess made light of her mother's difficulties and decided matters for herself. In Jan- uary, 1893, she married the heir to the throne of Eoumania. Endowed with exceptional beauty, only equalled by the goodness of her heart, she became at once the idol of her people. Her personality captivated every one. The highest and lowest were equally amenable to her great charm. Her uncle, King APPENDICES 309 Charles of Koumania, compared her to a ray of sun- light, notwithstanding his pronounced sympathies for Germany which were so opposed to those of his niece. In June, 1914, I again met the Princess Marie. She was still the Princess and was present at the meeting between King Charles of Roumania and the Czar, at Constanza. Wherever she appeared, driv- ing, riding or walking, beautiful as the day, gay, smiling and waving her handkerchief in response to the cheers of the people, the enthusiasm of the crowd for their princess was immense. The Princess little dreamt of the terrible trials which awaited her in the ensuing three years. I was once more in Roumania, in Bucharest, in the summer of 1916, about two months before the decla- ration of war by Roumania, The country was then divided into three political parties. The first, led by Carp, former minister of King Charles, favoured an alliance with the Central Powers. This party was supported chiefly by conservatives. Although some of these supported Mr. Marghiloman, who was in favour of neutrality. The second party had for its leaders Philippesco, Take lonescu and Michel Cantacuzene, who insisted on an inmiediate entry into the war on the side of the Allies. The third party and the most powerful had for its chief, M. Bratiano, who was then President of the Council. He led a double game, emphasizing his sympathy for the Al- 310 APPENDICES lies and at the same time concluding a commercial treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary. As to the King, he hesitated. His original, all his youthful sympathies, drew him towards Germany, but he decided to remain a really constitutional mon- arch to the end. He made up his mind only to follow the wishes of the majority of his people. Looking back on all that I saw, it seemed to me that Ferdi- nand saw clearly how he would have to drink the cup with its dregs one day, but all that he wished was to postpone the evil hour as long as possible. This will explain the entire and unwavering support he gave to Bratiano's policy. But from the beginning of the crisis, Queen Marie did not hide her sympathies. At one moment dur- ing this my last stay in Bucharest, when the con- clusion of the commercial treaty with the Central Powers seemed almost certain, old Philippesco said to me, ''Luckily we have our dear Queen with us and with such a faithful ally I have no fear for the future. ' ' One day the Princess Cantacuzene, wife of one of the warmest partisans of the Allies, and intimate friend of Queen Marie, invited my wife and myself to pass the evening with her and the Queen. Un- fortunately I was absent, called away to Eeni on the Danube by Admiral Vesselkine, commander of our flotilla, and my wife alone was able to take advan- tage of the Princess's amiable invitation. APPENDICES 311 The Queen was accompanied by her daughter, the Princess Elizabeth. A large part of the evening was devoted by the Sovereign to herself reading aloud a small book of hers entitled, ' ' The Heart of the Rou- manian Peasant." This little work was written in English, this and the Roumanian language being pre- ferred by the Queen. Her very soul is revealed by this little essay. It illustrates her passionate love for her people and her pride in being their Queen. Happy in her great and rightly deserved popularity, she boasts how on frequent occasions she has had to accept the responsibility of figuring as godmother to so many children of humble peasants. She describes their cottages and waxes enthusiastic over the sterl- ing qualities of the parents of the newly born. In the short preface, the Queen says, ^ ' The object of this little work is to make Roumania as much ad- mired by my readers as she is loved by me." Al- ways and everywhere her strongest feeling is a real devotion to the country of her adoption. Naturally immediately on my return to Bucharest, I deemed it my privilege to ask for an audience, which a few days later was accorded me. Rou- mania had then declared war. When the Queen received my wife and myself in her palace at Bu- charest, it was already completely transformed into a hospital. Her Majesty, beautiful and charming as ever, wore the dress of the hospital nurse. After the usual exchange of greetings and courtesies, the 312 APPENDICES Sovereign passed on to the questions of the mo- ment, speaking directly of the war and the Council of Ministers which under the presidency of the King had decided on its declaration. **I know what anxious moments the King must have passed," she said to me. *' And I have a right to be proud of his decision." Her Majesty added, ''I assure you that I have no hatred for the Ger- mans, my mother and my sister are in Germany, but I felt that the fate of my country depended on an alliance with the enemies of Germany and Aus- tria. The Germans evidently know the part I have played for they do everything possible to eliminate me. Their aeroplanes pursue me night after night, and I am obliged continually to change my abode. But all this leaves me perfectly calm and every day I say to myself, 'What a blessing to be Queen at such a moment!' " She did not seem to have any doubts about final success, although she fully recognized the difficul- ties the Roumanians would have to overcome. *'They are very strong," she said again and again, in speaking of the Central Powers. In bidding her adieu, I asked for a copy of the little book which she had read at the soiree of Coun- tess Cantacuzene. The Queen graciously acceded to my request and the following day, I received the lit- tle volume accompanied by her portrait, and signed APPENDICES 313 by her. I remained another week in Bucharest, which by then had become a real hell. The Germans and the Bulgarians commenced a bombardment of the poor ''Balkan Paris" the day after the declaration of war. It was a Sunday. The streets were full of people enjoying the lovely weather, when the first hostile aeroplane appeared. The public thought it was manoeuvres of the Eou- manian aviators. Half an hour later the ambu- lances of the Red Cross destroyed these illusions. The Huns and their Allies chose for their mark the most frequented squares and places. Bucharest was more tried and more punished than almost any other town that suffered an aerial bombardment. In this first hour, there were three hundred and seventy- five dead and wounded, the great majority being women and children. Whole districts of the city, only a few weeks ago devoted to pleasure, were com- pletely destroyed. I saw with my own eyes one poor mother quite out of her mind. Her four chil- dren had been crushed to death ! But the Germans and the Bulgarians did not confine themselves to this mode of destruction. In addition they dropped bombs containing packages of poisoned candies. The chemist (Professor Cantacouzene) who made an analysis, told me that these bon-bons were filled with diphtheria microbes and typhus germs. Placards were immediately posted in the streets warning the 314 APPENDICES people of this unsuspected danger. Unfortunately, it was too late. Numbers of children were already victims of an enemy devoid of human sentiment. Imagine what terrible moments the poor Queen must have passed. How she must have suffered, she, so full of motherly tenderness. But she contin- ued bravely to do her duty as sovereign. Later at Jassy she shared all the privations endured by the remnants of the army and the crowds of fugitives. She refused the offer of the Czar, who put at her disposal a palace at Odessa or one at Kiev. "I will not abandon my people in distress," invariably was her answer. She struggled to the end, encouraging the King to resist and continuing her work of benevolence. When at last the King, giving way to the advice of his Ministers, declared himself ready to sign a treaty of peace, the Queen revolted against his decision. ''Rather abdicate," she cried with her British pride. This cry of indignation has immortalized her. The name of Queen Marie of E-oumania will figure in all history as that of a real Queen and Patriot. APPENDIX II THE RESULT OF EOUMANIa's PARTICIPATIONS IN THE GREAT WAR Bucharest, Sept. 15tli, 1916. Confidential report of E. de Schelking, Correspond- ent of Journal de La Bourse of Petrograd, and formerly Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Berlin. Transmitted to Gen. Alexiev and Bru- siloff and submitted to the Czar, Nicholas II. Upon my departure irom Roumania after a sojourn of three months, I consider it necessary to sum up my impressions. There are two main considerations which I would bring to your notice : (1) What was the practical value to Russia and the Allies of Roumania 's participation in the war? (2) Did that value come up to the expectations of Russia considering the price paid for the same? Unhappily on examining the situation in detail I am forced to the conclusion that Roumania 's help was not of real advantage to Russia, and that the price paid for the same was too high. Our political understanding with Roumania ar- ranged forsan adjustment of boundaries which would 315 316 APPENDICES have doubled her territory. Besides having prom- ised her the acquisition of Transylvania, which is in- habited by a very large number of Roumanians, we promised Roumania Bukowina, including the cap- ital, Czernowitz, which was twice drenched with Russian blood during the war, and also the Banat, including Torondal, the population of which was ex- clusively Serbian. Thus in our desire to secure Roumania 's co-operation, we sacrificed our blood brothers, the heroic Serbians. At the same time, we gave rise to new complica- tions between two Balkan states, Roumania and Serbia, because the Serbians could never be satis- fied with a situation which placed Serbia under the menace of Roumanian guns at Torondal, instead of those of Austria at Semlin. Such an understand- ing was contrary, in my opinion, to the interests of Roumania herself, because the vital interests of Rou- mania were, under any circumstances, linked with those of Serbia, if only it were to give her an outlet to the Adriatic by a complete understanding with Serbia. I know positively that the arrangements for the cession of Torondal created a most painful im- pression in the political circles of Serbia. In her intense desire to help the Allies, Serbia not only showed herself willing to sacrifice part of Dalmatia to Italy, but had also consented to give up a portion of Macedonia to Bulgaria. This last arrangement as we know, was part of a secret treaty made with APPENDICES 317 Britain, France, Eussia and Italy, to which N. Pas- chitch, the Serbian Premier, gave a broken-hearted consent under Kussian pressure. The Serbian gov- ernment realized to the full the immense value of Italy's participation in the war and the continued neutrality of Bulgaria, if these could be secured by such sacrifices. So far as Roumania is concerned Serbian states- men knew perfectly well the military position of Roumania and realized that the cession of the Banat and the entire Roumanian demands were not in ac- cordance with the practical interests of the Allies. In my opinion our great amiability towards Rou- mania was entirely due to the fact that all the diplo- matic representatives of the Allies in Roumania, except Italy, were not au courant with the true situa- tion. They had at heart nothing but the advance- ment of their personal careers and they blindly fol- lowed the lead of M. Bratiano, the premier of Rou- mania. Their sole object was the participation of Roumania in the war, regardless of consequences. The former French minister, M. Blondel, knew perfectly well that his diplomatic days were num- bered, but he hoped that he would retain his posi- tion if he were able to bring about the participation of Roumania in the war. The Russian representa- tive, Chamberlain Poklewsky-Kosiell, found himself in the same position. For over a year his recall had been decided upon and he had only retained his post 318 APPENDICES through the direct support of M. S. D. Sazonoff, the Eussian foreign minister. He realized that his feet were not on firm ground and that if he were to pre- serve his position he must accomplish something spectacular. The British minister. Sir F. Barclay, was not taken very seriously in Bucharest. He was very intimate with Poklewsky-Kosiell in Persia, and in Roumania he was inclined always to follow the Russian's lead. These three diplomats naturally were used by Bratiano. Whatever concerned the prime minister 's official position and also that of the Ministry of War which he occupied, was not deemed a matter of con- cern to others. Bratiano would not brook any criti- cism or contradiction or even suggestions from out- side sources. He had named as Vice-Minister of War his nephew, General Iliesco, whose incapacity in all that concerned military affairs was notorious. Iliesco, to flatter the vanity of Bratiano, assured the Prime Minister that the forces at the disposal of Roumania were very much bigger than they were in reality. In his desire to be master of the situation in Roumania, Bratiano worked to crush all opposi- tion and to this end inveigled the Allies' diplomats into supporting him. Our real friends, for example. Messieurs Philippesco, Take lonescu and Michel Cantacuzene, found themselves paralysed by the Russian understanding with Roumania in 1914. For APPENDICES 319 by that understanding we had made very serious concessions to Roumania, not for her participation in the war, but only for her neutrality. The amour propre of the Roumanian deputies had been flattered by this understanding and the opposition lost ground, and Bratiano was consequently completely master of the situation. But if the political understanding between Rou- mania and the Allies was bad, the military arrange- ments were even worse. It is surely clear that the principal front not only for Roumania but especially for Russia was the southern or Bulgarian front. During the two years of her neutrality the Rou- manian people were principally occupied with mak- ing money. They had been able to sell all their produce to Germany, Bulgaria, Austria and Turkey. The result was that there was no beef to be ob- tained in Roumania even before the war started. In July, 1916, there were already three beefless days a week and in September there were four, and it is certain that in a short time there will be no more beef in the country. There is also no coal. Hotels and other public places in all the larger cities could get no coal in September. It must be presumed that Bratiano allowed the export of all these products in exchange for war materials from Germany and Aus- tria. At least in making a new commercial treaty with Germany and Austria and being asked by the 320 APPENDICES Allies the reason for such a treaty he made this his excuse and explanation. Marghiloman and Philippesco were two Rou- manian statesmen strongly opposed to each other. The former was pro-neutral and the latter pro-ally. Marghiloman, who at this time was President of the Council of Ministers in Roumania, felt very strongly that Roumania should remain very strictly neutral; not the neutrality conceived by Bratiano but a neu- trality which could be respected by every one. He said that Roumania could not possibly digest Tran- sylvania and that there was danger of Roumania becoming part of Transylvania. Out of Transylva- nia would arise in his opinion two problems, the Agrarian and the Jewish, the solving of which would prove most difficult in the future. He added that Roumania was not prepared for a great war and he had no confidence in the assistance to be received from Russia. If Roumania were not to receive such help from Russia she would be bound to lose a war fought under circumstances which would prove dis- astrous. Philippesco disagreed with Bratiano 's policy for two reasons. The first reason was that he disliked the double dealing of Bratiano. Being a very frank man himself he wanted to deal openly with the Al- lies, not play on two sides ; a game he deemed dan- gerous. The second reason was that he feared Bra- tiano was far too much obsessed by the territorial APPENDICES 321 readjustments of a successful war and not suffi- ciently aware of the necessity of Russian help to gain such successes. In Philippesco 's eyes the help Roumania was to obtain from Russia was by far the most important question. He said to me : — *'I have been Minister of War and I know the real condition of the Roumanian army. We cannot win such a war without help from Russia of at least 250,000 men, as I insisted when I was in Petrograd. Iliesco is a foolish man and flatters Bratiano. I am astonished that he should be Chief of General Staff at such a time as this." In consequence my opinion was that the Rouman- ians must defend the northern front, — the defiles of the Carpathians offering excellent positions, — with as small forces as possible and the chief cam- paign must be made against Bulgaria across the Danube in co-operation with the Allied forces at Saloniki and the Russian forces in Dobrudja. If the Roumanians insisted on a campaign in Tran- sylvania they would meet at once with the full strength of the Central Empires, which would be di- rected against them just at a moment when I knew well that the armies of General Brusiloff in Buko- wina and Galicia could not assist with a major of- fensive. I heard from an unimpeachable source that Bratiano believed that Bulgaria would not attack Roumania but would remain on the defensive. Bra- tiano agreed that the Bulgarians would not fight 322 APPENDICES against the Eussians, but I know the mentality of the Bulgarians and I was certain they would take the offensive against the Roumanians and fight willingly against Russia. In consequence I was sure that the campaign as planned by General Iliesco would lead to disaster. Unfortunately this belief is already proving true. For the defence of the southern front only four divisions were allowed, and of these four, one line division, the ninth, was at Turtakai and the three others were only mobilized just before war was de- clared. Russia sent into the Dobrudja two and a half divisions, which were comprised chiefly of Ser- bian forces, which had taken refuge in Roumania after the advance of Mackensen on the north and Bulgaria on the east had cut them off from their own main armies. From Roumania they had been sent to Odessa and were there equipped by the Rus- sians. These forces were under the command of Lieutenant General Zaiontchkowsky and were not nearly strong enough. But Bratiano with extreme fatuity had declared that Roumania was sufficiently strong for all purposes. At the same time he asked Russia to supply him with half a million men. The Russian Government pointed out that if such large forces were supplied it was impossible for Roumania to acquire so much territory and that in consequence the treaty would have to be revised and the Banat at least restored to Serbia. Bratiano thereupon re- APPENDICES 323 joined that Roumania was sufficiently strong. His one idea was to secure the territories he had set his heart upon. Moreover Bratiano declared over and over again that he was absolutely certain Bulgaria would re- main on the defensive and be unable to attack. He was strongly supported by the Russian Military At- tache at Bucharest, a colonel of the general staff by name Tatarinoff, who before he was appointed to Bucharest had been Military Attache at Sofia and in consequence must have been fully informed as to the forces and military intentions of Bulgaria. The result of these blunders was very soon ap- parent. Two days after war was declared, Bulga- rian, Turkish and German forces under Mackensen attacked the ninth division at Turtukai and anni- hilated it. Thus in two days Roumania lost twenty thousand men of the best troops on the Dobrudja front. After this victory Mackensen rapidly marched against Zaiontchkowsky who was thus placed in a very difficult position. The Roumanian division which was attached to his army was not of the best material despite the assurances of Colonel Tatari- noff to the contrary. Not only regiments but whole brigades broke and ran directly the Turkish shrapnel ranged them, thus exposing Zaiontchkowsky 's right wing and forcing him to change his front and retire. For confirmation of this it is only necessary to re- 324 APPENDICES fer to Zaiontclikowsky 's report to the Eussian gen- eral staff. I cannot prophesy as to the future but at this mo- ment it is plain that the whole responsibility now rests on Eussia, and in Bucharest people are al- ready crying that they have been betrayed by Eus- sia, knowing of course nothing of our military con- vention concluded with Bratiano. Yesterday I had an interview with Colonel Ta- tarinoff and I cannot hide my astonishment of the manner in which he spoke. He stated that it was necessary for Eoumania to start the war and ** thank God it had been accomplished." Hitherto he had stated that two and a half divisions from Eussia would be enough and yet now he stated to me that Bulgaria had a first class army of 550,000 men and Eoumania could do nothing against such an army. He said that to ensure the defeat of Bulgaria it would be necessary to obtain from Eussia an army of 500,000 men at least and no such army under present conditions was available. Therefore it will be necessary to make a small local attack and at the first success propose terms of peace to Bulgaria. But he added that at the same time it would be pos- sible to dethrone Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria. When I replied to him that such things were quite impossible because of our arrangements with both Serbia and Eoumania he replied that he was very sorry but he saw no other way out of the muddle. APPENDICES 325 Meanwhile our minister Poklewsky appeared very well satisfied with the way things were going, al- though his whole conception of the situation was dictated by Bratiano. For example when I pointed out to Poklewsky that the Eoumanian government was not living up to our agreement (which included the provisioning of our troops, the proper supplies for the Red Cross and adequate transportation . . . we had been promised twelve trains a day and only two had materialized), and suggested that if the Roumanian government could not live up to its agreement the military and political agreements might be changed to our mutual advantage, he re- plied : ' ' I am very sorry. The convention was signed not only by Russia but by Britain, France and Italy and is obligatory upon the Allies and we cannot place Bratiano in a difficult position by suggesting such changes now as might affect his political position with the Roumanian people and thus destroy con- fidence." It is thus plain that the Allies had concluded it was absolutely necessary to support Bratiano at all costs. At this time Bratiano completely lost his head. The former French minister. Monsieur Blondel, whose daughter was married to the Roumanian gov- ernor of Silistria and who lived in Bucharest, told me that Bratiano had entirely lost his self-confidence. 326 APPENDICES In conversation with him Bratiano had declared that the Allies had persuaded him against his better judgment to enter the war and that therefore they were to blame for the situation. Monsieur Blondel replied that this was by no means the case. The Allies had never pushed matters but had allowed Roumania to choose her own time and had concluded with Bratiano himself all the arrangements he had desired and had been assured by him that the Rou- manian army was fully prepared to carry out the conventions and was in a very strong position. Fearing the criticism of the opposition Bratiano attempted to form a coalition government and of- fered to take into the cabinet M. Take lonescu, Mi- chel Cantacuzene and Stelian, but refused to give them any responsible portfolios, and in consequence these statesmen refused to enter the government. The question of the change of government was placed before the Chamber of Deputies during the next two weeks. To summarize : 1. Our political understanding with Roumania gave too much to the Danubian Kingdom and we re- ceived from Bratiano far too little support and this political understanding was not in the interests of the Roumanians themselves ... (as for instance the question of Torandel). 2. The military convention was based on a false APPENDICES 327 principle in not making the main front to the south but to the north on the Transylvania front. At this moment this assertion is proved by the fact that the convention is being automatically changed. The Roumanians are sending troops from the northern front to Dobrudja and we have to reinforce this front also. 3. The Allies had not taken into proper considera- tion the military strength of Bulgaria nor its stra- tegic plans. Bulgaria was more or less ignored and the blame for this state of affairs must be placed on the shoulders of the Eussian attache at Bucharest, Colonel Tatarinoff. The right thing to do was for the Allies to dis- patch large Russian forces through the Dobrudja towards Sofia and co-operate with General Sarrail at Saloniki. By this means the Allies would have been able to handle the Grecian situation, dethrone King Constantine and joining forces with the Russians and Greeks have crushed Bulgaria and eliminated her from the war. If this cannot be done it is possible to support Rou- mania for a considerable period but eventually dis- aster is assured and Roumania will be totally de- feated. Editor's Note: At the time this report was presented the Rou- manians appeared to be victorious in Transylvania and had not yet been defeated beyond the Rothen Thurm pass and driven back into Roumania by von Falkenhayn. PBINTED IN TEE UNITED STATES OV AMEBIOA 'T'HE following pages contain advertisements of a few of the Macmillan books on kindred subjects. ERNEST POOLE'S NEW BOOK The Village: Russian Impressions. By ERNEST POOLE Illustrated. Cloth, i2mo. This volume describes in personal and narrative form Mr. Poole's visit to the small estate of an old Russian friend, whose home was a rough log cabin in the North of Russia. From there he ranged the neighborhood in company with his friend, talking with peasants in their huts ; with the vagabonds camped at night on the riverside ; with the man who kept the village store ; with the priest, the doctor and the school teacher, as well as with the saw-mill owner. Their views of the war, the revolution and American friend- ship are all of great significance now, for the peasants form nearly ninety per cent, of the Russian people. "The Dark People": Russia's Crisis. By ERNEST POOLE. Author of " His Family," " The Harbor," etc. Cloth, i2mo., $1.50 " Too strange, too romantic, too imaginative, to be anything but sober truth. . . . We have read no book which got closer to the heart ... of the Russian people." — A'^. Y. Tribune. " A valuable book, . . . sane and informative, . . . shows close study by an impartial mind." — N. Y. Herald. " We have never read a book more deeply thrilling. It is not the book of a dreamer, but of one whose vision is far because his heart beats for his fellowmen. . . ." — Book Review. " A sincere, unpretentious, and strikingly successful attempt to get at the mind and heart of these people in the midst of revo- lution." — N. Y. Evening Post. Inside the Russian Revolution By RHETA CHILDE DORR Illustrated. Cloth, $1.50 " Mrs. Dorr's book is an excellent piece of reporting. It will be the exceptional reader who will not find here what he would most like to get from an American visitor who has had ex- ceptional opportunities to learn the truth. Her book will have to be consulted by the future historian of anarchy's reign in Russia." — Springfield Republican. " As a distinctively first-hand study of a world event of il- limitable influence and implications, this volume is a milestone along the pathway of history." — Philadelphia North American. THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York STEPHEN GRAHAM'S BOOKS ON RUSSIA Through Russian Central Asia ///.. 8vc, $2.25 "Full of information and charming as it is informing. It is rich in the lure of the open road ... in the romance of old cities, in the wildness of the vast waste spaces ... in the view it gives of a phase of Russian life entirely new to American read- ers." — A'. Y. Times. A Tramp's Sketches ///., 8vo, $1.75 The narrative of a walking trip through Russia. " A book throbbing with life which cannot help but prove of interest to many readers. ... A treasury of information ... a source of great inspiration." — ■ The Examiner. With the Russian Pilgrims to Jerusalem III., 8vo, $3.00 " Mr. Graham has written an intensely interesting book, one that is a delightful mixture of description, impression, and de- lineation of a pculiar but colorful character." — Book News Monthly. With Poor Immigrants to America III, Svo, $2.25 " Mr. Grahan has the sp'rit of the real adventurer. . . . He writes with a freshness and vividness that mark him a good mixer with men, a keen observer and a skillful adept with the nen." — North American. THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York STEPHEN GRAHAM'S BOOKS ON RUSSIA The Way of Martha and the Way of Mary Colored frontispiece, $2.25 A study of Russian national characteristics, particularly as typified by her religious spirit, which is contrasted with the spirit of Western Christianity. Priest of the Ideal $1.60 Mr. Graham here employs his vast knowledge of Russian life in the writing of a novel. It was inevitable that with his ap- preciation of Russian character, his sense of humor and of the dramatic, he should sooner or later turn to fiction. Russia and the World Illustrated, $2.25 A comprehensive survey of Russian problems, not by any means wholly a war book. ". . . By a man who knows Russia well and who has excep- tional ability for making his own observations and impressions known to others." — New York Tribune. The Quest of the Face Illustrated, $1.73 "A thoughtful and thought-provoking book With rare spiritual insight." — N. Y. Tribune. " Stephen Graham . . . draws again and freely upon the sim- plicity of faith which he has found in Russia." — N. Y. World. THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York RECENT TRANSLATIONS OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE THE TALES OF CHEKHOV Translated by Constance Garnett THE BISHOP AND OTHER STORIES. THE CHORUS GIRL AND OTHER STORIES. Chekhov volumes already published Each Volume, Cloth, i2mo., $1.50 The Lady with the Dog The Duel The Party The Wife The Darling The Witch "Chekhov is indispensable to our understanding of the psy- chology of the great people that has introduced into the present world situation an element so complex, so disturbing, so tragic and so beautiful. Chekhov is the faithful reporter, unerring, in- tuitive, direct. He never bears false witness. The essence of his art lies in a fine restraint, an avoidance of the spectacular and sensational. His reticence reveals the elusive and lights up the enigmatic. And what a keen, voracious observer he was! Endless is the procession of types that passes through his pages — the whole world of Russians of his day; country gentlemen, chinovniks, waitresses, ladies of fashion, shop girls, town phy- sicians, Zemstvo doctors, innkeepers, peasants, herdsmen, soldiers, tradesmen, every type of the intelligentsia, children, men and women of every class and occupation. Chekhov describes them all with a pen that knows no bias." — The Dial. THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Publishers 64r-66 Fifth Avenue New York RECENT TRANSLATIONS OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE THE NOVELS OF DOSTOEVSKY Translated by Constance Garnett Each Volume, Cloth, $1.50, Leather, $2.00 THE GAMBLER AND OTHER STORIES By FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY This, the ninth volume in Constance Garnett's new series of Dostoevsky stories, brings together three remarkable tales — The Gambler, Poor People, and The Landlady. Each is a mas- terpiece of its kind, offering fresh proof of Dostoevsky's genius. Particular interest is attached, perhaps, to Poor People, in that it was the writer's first book, appearing when he was only twenty- five years old. It has always remained one of his most popular. "The secrets of the human heart are laid bare here," says Wil- liam Lyon Phelps of it; maintaining further that "no one can read it without being better for it and without loving its author." Dostoevsky's novels already published IN THIS SERIES: The Brothers Karamazov Crime and Punishment The Eternal Husband The Gambler and Other Stories The Idiot: A Novel in Four Parts The Possessed: A Novel in Three Parts House of the Dead The Insulted and Injured A Raw Youth THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York BD- 95 I 4 o^ ' **'\ Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. ,-^*' '''^v^ ° ^ ^ Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide aV „ 'ts A , -^ Treatment Date MAY - 2002 ">t »0 PreservationTechnologies C A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION n 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive ► Cranberry Township, PA 1 6066 (724)779-2111 •• • » < > "V.^ ' • . » .VJ" .0 ,-j>- . 0^ • %^'^^?^ A 0* ^^-n^. v^. : «>""-^. ^.^M^^- ^^^^^^ ^. <'. ,-^ .' > , « o ,