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T he Causes and Consequences 
 of the War 
 
The Causes and Con- 
 sequences of the War 
 
 By YveS Gliyot, Late French Minister of 
 State, Principal Editor of the "Journal des Economist es." 
 Translated by F. Appleby Holt, B.A., LL.B. 
 
 f 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 BRENTANO'S 
 
 1916 
 

 
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PREFACE 
 
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Preface 
 
 a permanent feature of international relations. Our business is not 
 to foster them but to prepare to consign them to oblivion. 
 
 Neither passion nor revenge, but foresight, must inspire the treaty 
 to come. 
 
 I have hoped to contribute something towards it by trying to 
 eliminate worn-out dynastic traditions, old diplomatic formulae for 
 so long accepted as international currency, the untruths and half- 
 truths of historical law, vague ideas about races and nationalities, 
 inexact and deceptive catchwords, and to replace them by the solid 
 conception, after the manner of Bentham, of a utilitarian policy. 
 
 Yves Guyot. 
 
 VI 
 
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION 
 
 I am very happy to present this book to the English public, which 
 has always shown me great kindness. Among the Press notices of 
 the first French edition none gave me greater pleasure than that of 
 Mr. A. J. Wilson, the well-known editor of the Investors' Reviezv, 
 who recommended my book to his readers, and added : 
 
 " This notice cannot be closed without a word of commendation in regard 
 to the lucid risumes of history embraced in the book. Where we have tested 
 these we have found them correct ; as, for example, in Chapter IV. of Part III., 
 devoted to the historical causes of the war — where we get a most lucid review 
 of the history of Prussia and Austria from 1847 to 1866."* 
 
 From another quarter, M. Paul Muller, an Alsatian of wide literary 
 knowledge and a specialist in the history of his country, wrote to me : 
 
 " The prospectus of your book ought to have given prominence to the section 
 devoted to the history of Franco-German diplomacy from 1871 to 1914. You 
 are the first to give a clear recital of the facts in forty pages." 
 
 I value very highly these words of appreciation and others of the 
 same tenor, for the object I put before me in undertaking this work 
 was to present the facts in a manner which all could understand, not 
 with a view to fostering prejudice and inflaming passion, but in the 
 hope, as far as possible, of extracting from the truth the materials 
 necessary to the formation of sound judgments. 
 
 The text has undergone no change, and there have been no mistakes 
 to correct. Subsequent events and additional documents that have 
 been published since the book was written have only confirmed 
 what I said. 
 
 I. — The Pact of KoNOPisHTf 
 
 Certain new and recent revelations as to the beginning of the war 
 have been published and are of importance. 
 
 * Investors' Review, September 4th, 1915. 
 
 t The authority on this topic is Mr. H. Wickham Steed, who has discussed it in 
 The Nineteenth Century and After. 
 
 vii 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 I have referred to the suspicions which gathered round the Sarajevo 
 crime at the outset. Confirmation is now forthcoming. The family 
 of the Hapsburgs comprises eighty Archdukes and Archduchesses, 
 all subject to their head, the Emperor Francis Joseph, guardian of the 
 " Family Law." They are all equally interested in the preservation 
 of their family rights and inheritance. In May, 1896, the Archduke 
 Francis Ferdinand became heir to the throne on the death of his father, 
 the Archduke Charles Louis, brother of Francis Joseph, and was 
 sent on a voyage round the world. On his return he became a regular 
 visitor to the Archduke Frederick at his palace in Vienna and his 
 castle at Pressburg. The Archduchess was under the impression that 
 he wished to marry her eldest daughter, but discovered one day that 
 he was wooing one of her maids of honour, the Countess Sophie Chotek, 
 of a noble but poor Bohemian family. She promptly showed him 
 the door, but the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was not to be turned 
 from his purpose of rescuing the girl from the convent to which she 
 fled, and marrying her. 
 
 The price of his triumph over the Emperor's resistance was his 
 submission, on June 1st, 1909, to a humiliating ceremony, at which 
 he was compelled, before the assembled members of his family, to 
 renounce on oath the right of his children to succeed to the throne. 
 The Emperor then laid this renunciation before the Austrian Parlia- 
 ment, which duly recorded it, and the Hungarian Parliament, which 
 incorporated it in the Constitution. The relations of the Archduke 
 and his wife with the other members of the Royal Family were a 
 mixture of cruel humiliation and jealous hatred. 
 
 The new wife was allowed the title of Duchess of Hohenberg, which 
 only gave her precedence in the Court ceremonies after all the Arch- 
 duchesses, even the youngest of them. The Archduke tried in vain 
 to procure for her the title of Archduchess. The Emperor's flat 
 refusal was dictated mainly by the consideration that, in virtue of the 
 Pragmatic Sanction of 1 722-1 723, that title would have given to the 
 children of the marriage the succession to the throne of Hungary, 
 and, as the husband would be Emperor of Austria, to the throne of 
 Austria also. 
 
 Three children were born of the marriage : the Princess Sophie 
 Hohenberg in 1901, Prince Charles Maximilian in 1902 and Prince 
 Ernest in 1904. Francis Ferdinand in no wise desisted from his 
 efforts to assure their future, though the other members of the family 
 persisted in regarding them as interlopers. It was plain that he 
 
 viii 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 could only alter the situation by some change in his personal position, 
 such as might be produced by a war. As a clerical of clericals he had 
 a bitter hatred of Italy. He was the head of the War Party, which 
 was exasperated when war was avoided in 1909 after the annexation 
 of Bosnia and Herzgovina. 
 
 Never very balanced in mind and the victim of some disease which 
 has only been hinted at, though its attacks were far from infrequent, 
 he pursued a restless and perilous policy which was inspired by his 
 almost insane hatred of Jews, Hungarians and Italians. 
 
 The Emperor William decided to make use of the jealousies and 
 humiliations of the Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenberg. True, 
 the fanatical clericalism of the Archduke stood in his way, but after 
 the annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina he established direct contact 
 with him, and lent a sympathetic ear to his schemes for solving the 
 Southern Slav question in favour of the Hapsburg dynasty and 
 Catholicism by opening the road to Salonica. In 1909 the Kaiser 
 invited the Archduke and his wife to Potsdam. 
 
 On June 12th, 19 14, they received him, accompanied by Admiral 
 von Tirpitz, at their castle of Konopisht in Bohemia. During this 
 visit the Emperor of Germany is said to have proposed to the Archduke 
 an arrangement, the terms of which have been sent to Mr. Henry 
 Wickham Steed, for ten years the foreign correspondent of The Times 
 at Vienna and now its foreign editor. 
 
 The Kaiser seems to have suggested to the Archduke and his wife 
 the formation of two kingdoms : one, comprising Poland, Lithuania 
 and the Ukraine, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would 
 be given to the Archduke and would form the inheritance of his elder 
 son, while the other, to be governed by his second son under his 
 direction, would be composed of Bohemia, Hungary and the larger 
 part of the Slav districts of Austria, with Serbia and the Slav coasts 
 of the Adriatic. The Kaiser promised to hand over a part of the 
 Duchy of Posen to the first kingdom, and, as compensation, German 
 Austria with Trieste, under the government of the Archduke Charles 
 Francis Joseph, would be annexed to the German Empire. 
 
 There would be a perpetual military and economic alliance between 
 the German Empire, the Kingdom or Empire of Poland and the new 
 Kingdom of Bohemia, Hungary and the Southern Slavs. That 
 alliance, master of the Balkans and the routes to the East, would 
 become the arbiter of Europe. No Power would be able to prevent 
 Germany from annexing Belgium and Holland. 
 
 ix 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 II. — The Sarajevo Crime 
 
 On June 28th, fifteen days later, the Archduke and his wife were 
 assassinated at Sarajevo. 
 
 The police of Sarajevo had received orders from the military 
 authorities to make no special preparations for the Archduke's visit, 
 which was exclusively their affair. There were only one hundred 
 and twenty police agents on a route of more than three and a half 
 miles. The first bomb was thrown by a young man named Cabrino- 
 vitch, the son of an Austrian police agent, who had spent part of 
 the previous winter at Belgrade on some suspicious task or other. 
 Nothing had been done for the Archduke's safety. No measures 
 were taken after his call at the Town Hall, when he started out for the 
 hospital. Another young man, Princep, a son of the Chief of the 
 Secret Service in Bosnia, stationed himself at the corner of a street 
 and killed the Archduke and his wife with three shots from his 
 revolver. General Potiorek, who was in command at Sarajevo, 
 remained Governor. He received the command of the first army 
 which invaded Serbia and after his defeat was pronounced insane and 
 shut up in an asylum. Says Mr. Wickham Steed : 
 
 " In the light of the ascertained facts concerning the production of the anti- 
 Serbian forgeries employed by Austria during the Annexation crisis of 1908-9, 
 and exposed during the Friedjung trial of December, 1909, it would certainly 
 not be beyond the power of Austro-Hungarian Secret Service agents to work 
 up a plot at Belgrade or at Sarajevo, were it considered desirable, for reasons of 
 Imperial policy, either to ' remove ' obnoxious personages or to provide a 
 pretext for war." 
 
 The funeral arrangements, carried out by Prince Montenuovo 
 in accordance with the Emperor's wishes, were such as to confirm all 
 suspicions. Mr. Steed's conclusion is this : 
 
 " If, however, the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Imperial Family obtained, 
 before or after the assassination, knowledge of an agreement such as that alleged 
 to have been made between the Archduke and the Emperor William at Kono- 
 pisht, much that has hitherto been obscure would become intelligible." 
 
 As this pact envisaged the abandonment, by the heir to the Austrian 
 Empire, of the hereditary provinces of the Hapsburgs to the German 
 Empire, it must have aroused intense uneasiness and disgust in the 
 Imperial Family. 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 Lorali, the Transylvanian priest who offered himself for election 
 to the Roumanian Chamber, but withdrew to avoid embarrassing the 
 Roumanian Government, declared in his election address that he 
 possessed documents which proved that Count Tisza and certain 
 Austro-Hungarian high officials were the authors of the Sarajevo 
 crime. 
 
 If Count Tisza actually procured the assassination of the Archduke 
 Francis Ferdinand in order to rid the Hungarians of a man they 
 detested and the Imperial Family of the ill-starred couple, and if 
 his ultimate motive was to have an excuse for a war against Serbia, 
 he may congratulate himself on his immediate success, but he must 
 be somewhat uneasy as to the final result. 
 
 The Emperor Francis Joseph, in his rescript of July 5th, 1914, did 
 not appear to intend making the assassination a pretext for war. 
 He denounced it as " the work of a small band of maniacs," and 
 declared that " he would continue to pursue the policy which seemed 
 to him most likely to further the welfare of his people." Nevertheless, 
 the Ballplatz, instructed by the Wilhelmstrasse, launched an ulti- 
 matum on the 14th of July. Francis Joseph hesitated to sign it, 
 but at length gave way under pressure from the War Party, and 
 especially Count Tisza, who became more and more the dominating 
 figure. Count Berchtold, in spite of appearances, was only a tool 
 during these events, and he eventually disappeared without leaving 
 traces behind him, and gave place to Baron Burian, who is only Tisza's 
 vassal just as Tisza is Wilhelm II. 's vassal. 
 
 What a fine pretext the Sarajevo crime afforded him ! 
 
 He pushed Austria-Hungary into the conflict. Instead of appear- 
 ing in the role of aggressor, he chose that of faithful ally, taking up 
 the task of inflicting just punishment on the authors and actors of 
 a hideous crime against a prince ! All sovereigns and princes should 
 owe him a debt of gratitude. 
 
 III. — The Assassination of Prince Yusuf Izzedin 
 
 On February 3rd, 1916, the Young Turk Government informed the 
 world of the death of Prince Yusuf Izzedin in the following communique : 
 
 " May God grant long life to His Imperial Majesty ! In consequence of the 
 
 malady from which he suffered so long, His Highness the Heir to the Throne 
 
 ommitted suicide at half-past seven this morning in the bedroom of the harem 
 
 xi 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 pavilion of the summer-house at Zindjirly, by opening the veins of his left 
 arm. 
 
 " The death of His Highness has caused His Imperial Majesty the Sultan 
 and the Imperial Government the most profound grief." 
 
 All those who read that communique came away convinced that the 
 Young Turks had had recourse to a time-honoured practice on the 
 shores of the Bosphorus. They had made the heir to the throne 
 " commit suicide." 
 
 Information from many quarters confirms that suspicion. The 
 Prince was neither a Young Turk nor an old Turk. He was a Turk, 
 and, as such, hated by Enver Pasha, the tool of Germany. After the 
 bombardment of Odessa by the Turkish fleet he indicated his dis- 
 approval in no uncertain manner. From that moment he was 
 doomed. 
 
 When the Sultan fell ill in the summer of 191 5, a conference was 
 called at the house of Hai'ri Bey, the Sheik-ul-Islam, at which Enver 
 Pasha, Talaat Pasha, Bedri Bey, the Prefect of Police, the Vice- 
 President of the Turkish Parliament, and the Prince's own doctor 
 took part. Hussein Djahid pointed out that the supply of munitions 
 was in danger of giving out, and that if the Allies won Yusuf Izzedin 
 might be useful in obtaining better terms of peace. These ideas 
 met with a hostile reception. If the Sultan died and Yusuf Izzedin 
 succeeded him, the Committee of Union and Progress were likely to 
 lose its mastery and find a master. Enver Pasha was strongly in 
 favour of " removing " the Prince at once. Certainly his substitute, 
 Prince Mahid-ed-Din, did not offer complete guarantees of com- 
 placency, but they recognized the difficulty of killing off the whole 
 Imperial Family and so resolved to run the risk of acquiescing in his 
 accession to the throne. 
 
 There were several other meetings, but nothing decisive was 
 settled, owing to external events, until after the evacuation of the 
 Dardanelles by the Allies, when the Committee considered that the 
 time was ripe for putting their scheme into execution. The friends 
 of the Prince are certain that the assassination was planned at the 
 German Embassy and carried out by his orderly officer, Hassan Bey. 
 
 No European doctor, not even a German doctor, would sign the 
 certificate of suicide and finally it was given by nineteen Turkish 
 doctors, including in their number the Director of the Army Medical 
 Services, one of Enver Pasha's creatures, the oculist Essad, a friend 
 of Talaat Bey, an accoucheur, Omer, who had made a fortune out of 
 
 xii 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 the Turkish Red Cross, Kassim Izz-ed-Din, a member of the secret 
 section of the Committee of Union and Progress, Halid, a spy and 
 friend of the head of the Secret Police, and, lastly, the Prince's own 
 doctor, who had voted in favour of his death at the meeting in the 
 house of the Sheik-ul-Islam. 
 
 Yusuf Izzedin was assassinated on the day before he was to start 
 for Europe. He had wired to the United States Minister at Sofia 
 to arrange an appointment. 
 
 This murder was committed on the shores of the Bosphorus ; yet 
 the Young Turks, who are entirely responsible for it, had claimed that 
 they overthrew the " red " Sultan, Abdul Hamid, to put an end to 
 the crimes which had distinguished his rule. They were cynically 
 repeating his policy. But they were not the sole criminals. They 
 were urged on and assisted by the representatives of the nation 
 which boasts of possessing the most advanced Kultur of the human 
 race. 
 
 This crime is an outstanding proof of the backwardness of German 
 civilization. It is in the same category as the crimes of her soldiers 
 in Belgium and other occupied countries, acts like the destruction of 
 Louvain and the murder of Miss Cavell, the exploits of her submarines, 
 and the hypocritical lies by which her Government has sought to 
 justify her conduct. 
 
 IV. — New Details of German Manoeuvres 
 
 When The Times unfolded the story of the letter it was intended 
 to publish and which was to be reproduced by the Wolff Bureau,* 
 it did not give the name of the writer. It has done so since and 
 revealed the name of Herr Ballin, President of the Hamburg-American 
 Line. 
 
 Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said in his speech on December 2nd, 
 1914 : " At the beginning of June, 1914, I informed the British 
 Government that I had knowledge of secret Anglo-Russian proposals 
 for a naval convention. I pointed out that such proposals involved 
 great dangers to the peace of Europe."! This story, told with the 
 object of presenting Germany as the object of a sinister persecution, 
 compelled to defend herself, was a mere invention. On October 28th, 
 
 * See Part I., ch. xvi., infra. t See Part I., ch. xvi., infra. 
 
 xiii 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 191 5, Sir Edward Grey stated that " there was no naval or military 
 agreement with Russia . . . prior to the agreement of September 5th, 
 
 1914." 
 
 V. — The Peace Conditions 
 
 I feel I have nothing to change as regards the conditions of peace 
 which I suggested. 
 I said : 
 
 " I say nothing of Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro, because the settlement 
 of the questions which interest them will only be of secondary importance 
 when the time for negotiations arrives."* 
 
 The events which took place in the Balkans in the month of Sep- 
 tember have done nothing to shake that opinion. 
 
 The diplomatists of the Triple Entente attempted to revise the 
 Treaty of Bucharest to the advantage of Bulgaria at the expense of 
 Serbia, Greece and Roumania. When they disastrously failed they 
 hastened to attribute that failure to the French and English publicists 
 and members of Parliament who had dared to express the opinion 
 that the occupation of Constantinople by Russia was the only possible 
 solution of the question of the Straits. I myself held that view, and 
 have seen no reason to change it. I ask those who were so anxious to 
 shift the responsibility for their mistakes on to others if they were 
 ignorant of Ferdinand's past, his close connection with the House of 
 Hapsburg and William II., his attack in 191 3 on the Serbs and Greeks, 
 and the loan, payable in munitions of war, which he contracted at 
 Berlin early in 1915.+ 
 
 The terrible events which were the logical consequence of the 
 unaccountable errors of English, French and Russian diplomacy 
 have added a horrible page to the history of martyred Serbia. 
 
 On November 2nd Mr. Asquith declared that the maintenance of 
 Serbian independence was one of the essential aims of the Allies. 
 This is not enough. Serbia must form a State or Federation with 
 the Southern Slavs. I distrust both the origin and the tendency of 
 the insidious question which is sometimes raised : " Will Serbia be 
 strong enough not to abuse her aggrandizement ? " 
 
 We hear little of what is taking place in Bohemia and Croatia. 
 Yet such news as comes through shows that the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government have intensified their repressive measures. Early in 
 
 * See p. 312. f See the Appendix: The Bulgarian Question. 
 
 xiv 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 March Dr. Liebknecht said in the Prussian Landtag that " in Austria 
 persecution has been worse than anything hitherto experienced. ,, 
 When the Emperor Francis Joseph ordered the execution of all the 
 surviving officers of the 28th Czech Regiment of Infantry, which 
 surrendered almost en bloc to the Russians, he proved that the war has 
 done nothing to reconcile the conflicting sentiments and interests 
 which keep the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire apart.* 
 In the Hungarian Parliament Urmauzy denounced the treachery of 
 the Czech troops in Serbia, while M. Kelemen put a question as to the 
 serious disorders in Szegedin caused by Czech officers and men who 
 were transferred there from Bohemia. It seems that they fraternized 
 with Roumanian officers and men, joined in singing Roumanian 
 national songs and the Slav national hymn, Onward, Slavs! and 
 overtly displayed their hatred of the Magyars. M. Kelemen dropped 
 his interpellation on a hint from Count Tisza and the President of the 
 Chamber that a discussion of the affair would be contrary to the 
 national interest.! 
 
 I have ridiculed the triumph of German diplomacy in replacing 
 Italy by Turkey in the Triple Alliance. To-day Italy has added her 
 armed strength to that of the Triple Entente. I paid a visit to Rome 
 and Milan in December and came away with a feeling of perfect con- 
 fidence in her fixity of purpose. The vote of the Italian Parliament on 
 the 1 8th of March, giving a majority of 394 to 64 to the Salandra 
 Ministry, proves that my confidence rested on a solid basis. Like 
 Japan, she has adhered to the Compact of London signed on Sep- 
 tember 6th, 1914, by Great Britain, France and Russia, providing 
 that none of these nations would conclude peace separately. This 
 in itself is sufficient to make her at war with Germany as well as 
 Austria-Hungary. 
 
 Great Britain has forced Germany to hide away her Dreadnoughts 
 and rely entirely on a submarine war, which has done nothing but 
 add to her execrable record. England has not only won and 
 maintained maritime supremacy for the Allies, but has succeeded in 
 raising an army of more than three millions, while more than five 
 million men voluntarily offered themselves for service. 
 
 One Saturday evening, towards the end of January, I was in 
 London in the company of one of the directors of munition making. 
 
 * See the Journal des ficonomistes, January, 1916 : La Situation Inter- 
 nationale, p. 19; 
 
 t The Journal des DSbats, March 6th : News from Bucharest* 
 
 XV 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 He suggested a visit to a munitions factory the next day. " But 
 to-morrow is Sunday," I said. " Sunday does not exist so far as 
 munitions are concerned," he replied. 
 
 The Allies are not sufficiently informed of each other's efforts. 
 The Russians have shown that their leadership is of the first order, 
 and that the rank and file are magnificent both in attack and defence. 
 Notwithstanding difficulties of supply, and at times even the lack 
 of arms and munitions, they have fought the Austro-German armies 
 to a standstill ; by taking Erzrum and Trebizond they have demon- 
 strated once more the unity of purpose which inspires the Allies. The 
 Turks have turned their backs on Egypt and abandoned their design 
 of cutting the Suez Canal for the benefit of Germany. They are less 
 anxious than ever to co-operate in the attack on Salonica and the 
 alarmists who anticipated the presence of a Turkish army in Cham- 
 pagne and Artois may recover their composure. Instead of setting out 
 to conquer Persia and the Persian Gulf, they are thinking more of the 
 defence of Constantinople. William II. 's great schemes for extending 
 German domination to the East have not materialized. 
 
 In 19 14 the Germans rushed upon Paris. In the epic battle of the 
 Marne they were driven back. In October they assaulted the Ypres- 
 Armentieres front with Calais as their objective. Their onslaught 
 was broken. In April, 19 15, they made a violent attack upon the 
 Yser front. It was the only great offensive they attempted on the 
 West front in the course of that year. In February of this year 
 they began a terrific battle before Verdun. Again they have failed 
 to break our lines. In this long-drawn conflict the French soldier has 
 made up for the grave technical defects in our military preparations 
 by his heroism and resource. His courage, determination and will 
 to conquer, combined with the exhaustion of the German reserves,* 
 enable us to look forward to overwhelming victory. 
 
 Having secured supremacy at sea, the Allies have the resources of 
 the world at their disposal, limited only by economic considerations. 
 Great Britain has shown that she is what she has always been, the 
 greatest financial Power in the world — an argument in favour of Free 
 Trade which is unanswerable. 
 
 True, the Allies had in their midst a number of Germanomaniacs, 
 who were hypnotized by the victors of Sedan, and agreed with the 
 Kulturkrieger (Intellectuals) in dating the economic greatness of 
 
 * See the articles of M. L. Gcawy, the Journal des Economistes, February, 
 191 5, January and March, 19 16, 
 
 xvi 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 Germany from that event. They forgot that the era of Sedan coin- 
 cided with certain discoveries and inventions which have been far 
 more beneficial to Germany than the war indemnity of 187 1. The 
 Bessemer process, the Martin-Siemens furnace, the Gruner process, 
 known as " Thomas and Gilchrist " — all date from that period. 
 These inventions, the product of English and French brains, have 
 made the metallurgical fortune of Germany.* The development of 
 her industry in dyes manufactured from coal-tar was due to the 
 discoveries of an Englishman, Perkins, and Verguin, a chemist of 
 Lyons. If the Germans have made a better use of those discoveries 
 than the English and French, they have to thank, not Bismarck, nor 
 Von Moltke, but the chemist Liebig, who introduced the practical 
 study of chemistry at Giessen in 1827. 
 
 The transformation of industry has done far more for the prosperity 
 of German industry than her victories in 1870. Those victories and 
 the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine imposed upon her a crushing 
 military burden and a disquieting policy, the evil effects of which 
 she has felt as much as those against whom it was directed and which 
 has finally led to the present cataclysm. 
 
 The fatal results of the triumph of militarist over economic policy, 
 patent though they are, have not deterred those Germanomaniacs, 
 who, in their patriotic zeal for England and France, desire to make 
 their countrymen adopt German imperialism, which is only the 
 exploitation of the weak by the strong.f Confusing war, which is an 
 affair between States, and commercial intercourse, which is an affair 
 between individuals, these enemies of Germany, saturated with 
 " Germanism," help to complicate the problem of the political and 
 economic future of Europe. They are a prey to doubt and hesitation 
 when it is shown that the only guarantee of future peace is the dissolu- 
 tion of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
 yet they are spoiling for an economic war after the conclusion of peace. 
 Their arguments, inspired by the old spirit of monopoly and com- 
 mercial jealousy, are the same as those used against England by 
 them and their fathers before them. 
 
 They talk of an economic war and dream of a treaty of peace 
 
 * See La MUallurgie Allemande, by Fritz Thyssen. Revue Economique Inter- 
 nationale, June 20th, 191 1. 
 
 I L'Imperialisme Economique, by Yves Guyot. Journal des Economistes, 
 March, 191 3. — La Jalousie Commerciale et les Relations Internationales, by 
 Yves Guyot (Pamphlet of the Ligue du libre-echange}. 
 
 xvii B 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 which will usher in an era of commercial boycotting. They would 
 like to obliterate from Central Europe its population of 115 to 120 
 million individuals, who will need food and commercial intercourse, 
 and whose foreign trade before the war was worth hundreds of 
 millions. They would forbid the Russians to sell wheat and barley 
 to the Germans, and the French to buy German coke and coal from 
 the Ruhr mines for the blast-furnaces of the Briey district. 
 
 The effect of such a policy would be not only to maintain a state 
 of war after the conclusion of peace, but to reveal conflicting interests 
 among the Allies. It is elementary that in these days no nation, not 
 even a group of nations, can be altogether self-sufficing.* If we 
 attempt to set up an economic system which can only have the effect 
 of fostering the passion for revenge of our beaten foes, we shall be 
 behaving as slavish imitators of the Germans and Turks. We make 
 war because we are determined to have peace. That peace can only 
 be permanent if the beaten nations cease to hanker after the im- 
 perialistic madness which has brought them to defeat and ruin, if 
 they are able to resume their national life and if they know that the 
 road to prosperity lies through well-directed energy and productive 
 activities. In that case, moral dissolution will follow political dissolu- 
 tion, but otherwise the hope of a permanent peace is vain. It is for 
 this reason that I emphasize the distinction between the political 
 and economic solutions. 
 
 From the first days of the war English, French and Russian states- 
 men have declared that the struggle can only end with the destruction 
 of Prussian militarism. Militarism is only an effect, and its 
 destruction involves the dissolution of the German Empire and the 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as the end of the Hapsburg and 
 Hohenzollern dynasties. 
 
 Mr. Shadwell, who has special information of the situation in 
 Germany, says : 
 
 " The war cannot be ended by negotiation or compromise, because no treaty 
 of peace concluded with Germany would be worth the paper it is written on. 
 None of the neutral countries trusts Germany now. Those nearest to her are 
 armed to the teeth and anxiously watching their frontiers day and night, because 
 
 * See the Journal des Economistes : Les Problemes Economiques apres la 
 Guerre. August and September, 191 5. — Journal de la Societe de Statistique, 
 March, 1916 : Le Commerce International en 191 5. Communication de M. Yves 
 Guyot. — " The Economic Policy of the Allies at the Conclusion of the War." 
 Lecture to the Political and Economic Circle of the National Liberal Club, 
 March 30th, 1916. 
 
 xviii 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 they know that their neutrality would be violated to-morrow if the Germans 
 thought they could violate it with advantage. A neutral observer, who has 
 recently studied the feeling in Switzerland, says that even the German-Swiss, 
 who are sympathetic to Germany, do not trust her (The Times, December 17th)."* 
 
 VI. — The Economic War 
 
 The solution of the economic problem implies the abolition of 
 protective duties in the countries of the Central Powers. Only in 
 this way can the German market be kept open to Alsace and Lorraine 
 after their re-incorporation with France. Great Britain, too, should 
 retain her Free-Trade policy. The British working man who has 
 joined the army will not expect to find on his return home that the 
 prices of his bread and bacon have been increased by protective duties. 
 France cannot continue to treat England, Belgium and Holland as 
 economic enemies. She cannot refuse most-favoured-nation treat- 
 ment to the United States of America. France can only rebuild her 
 ruins if she obtains the necessary implements and materials at the 
 lowest possible price. She can hope to recover her export trade only 
 by reducing to a minimum her cost price, which will in any case be 
 raised by the interest on the debt and the rapid repayment of 
 advances by the Bank to the State. 
 
 Immediate necessities and the vital importance of preventing fresh 
 wars compel us to return to long-term commercial treaties with a 
 marked bias in the direction of Free Trade. Here a Colbertist will 
 mockingly interrupt to remind me that " the votes of the Manchester 
 Chamber of Commerce and the Conference of five hundred delegates 
 of British Chambers of Commerce on the 29th of February show that 
 the British have broken the idol of Free Trade." The English Press 
 tell us that Mr. Bonar Law has expressed his approval of a scheme 
 of the French Government for a commercial war against Germany. 
 " That means an offensive and defensive alliance of the Allies against 
 the German Powers." 
 
 I cannot discuss here the weight that should be given to the votes of 
 those Chambers of Commerce. I admit that though thirty out of 
 thirty-three members of the Committee of the Manchester Chamber 
 of Commerce opposed the vote they have not been re-elected. But 
 I may mention that Mr. Bonar Law was President of the Tariff Reform 
 Committee before he became the Unionist leader. 
 
 * See the Nineteenth Century and After, January, 19 16 : The Only Way to 
 Lasting Peace. 
 
 xix B* 
 
Preface to the English Edition 
 
 The fact is that at the moment we are all militarists, and it 
 is hardly surprising that militarism is subduing and reforming 
 economics. Under its influence any reaction is possible. The anti- 
 quated prejudices of the mercantile system have come to the front 
 once more, thanks to the revival of that spirit of monopoly and 
 commercial jealousy which inspired the wars between Holland and 
 England, France, Holland and England, Spain and England, and 
 which led to the prohibition of trade in wheat and wool between 
 France and England. The object of such a system is to maintain 
 a continental blockade in time of peace.* 
 
 It is said that the British Government desire to supplement the 
 London Compact with another by which each of the Allies undertakes 
 not to make a separate commercial agreement with their enemies 
 without the approval of all the others. If this suggestion is accepted, 
 the protectionists of France will lose that free hand in tariff questions 
 of which they were so proud. We shall see what success will attend 
 the efforts of the protectionists of the different Allied nations to 
 find a basis of agreement for an alliance in an economic war.f I 
 suspect that the attempt will lead to differences which can only 
 weaken the strength of the political alliance. The present war, 
 like its predecessors, has not vitiated the economic argument which 
 Tooke enunciated in the Petition of the City Merchants in 1820 : 
 " The principle of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the 
 dearest, which inspires the dealings of any individual merchant, is 
 equally valid and commendable when applied to the commercial 
 dealings of whole nations." 
 
 The war has not undermined any of the economic truths set out in 
 the Manifest? de la Ligue du libre-e change. In particular, it has not 
 vitiated the proposition, vehemently combated by the German, 
 Friedrich List, that it is not States, but individuals, which have com- 
 mercial dealings. " Free Trade " means commercial dealings between 
 individuals without the intervention of an over-ruling third party. 
 It has for long been adopted as the best system for the internal trade 
 of nations with an advanced civilization, and it must become the 
 basis of international trade. 
 
 Yves Guyot. 
 April, 19 16. 
 
 * See Yves Guyot : Rapport General de V Exposition Franco-Britanuique de 
 1908. 
 
 f See Journal des ficonomistes, Vol. XLVI., p. 36. 
 
 XX 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PART I 
 THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE STARTING POINT 
 
 The Sarajevo trial — No connection between the assassination of the Arch- 
 duke and the war .......... 3 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA AND THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian claims and demands — Reply of the Serbian 
 Government — Intentional coincidences — M. Poincare's visit to Russia 
 — The attitude of the German Government — D-marches of the am- 
 bassadors — Austria, Germany and Russia — Declaration of war on 
 Russia on the 1st of August — Declaration of war on France on the 
 2nd of August — A tissue of falsehoods ...... 5 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY AND THE SLAVS 
 
 Austria expelled by Prussia — Bismarck, the " Man of Blood and Iron " — 
 Andrassy — Discord within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — Russia 
 not the author of Pan-Slavism — The Austrian Government and the 
 Slavs — The Emperor Nicholas and John Sobieski — The hegemony of 
 the Balkans — The Treaty of Berlin — The independence of Serbia — 
 The Germans and Magyars numerically inferior to the Slavs — Bulgaria 
 and Eastern Roumelia — Annexation — The Germans and Magyars 
 versus the Slavs — " The Pig War " — The declaration forced on Serbia 
 by Count Aehrenthal — The trial of Dr. Fried jung . . . 13 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE GERMAN AUTOCRACY 
 
 The Hohenzollerns — Voltaire's description of Frederick William — 
 Frederick II. — Bismarck — The wars of 1866 and 1870 — Political 
 motives for war — The Constitution of the German Empire — Germany 
 
 xxi 
 
Contents 
 
 is not a nation — The Bundesrat — The King of Prussia as Emperor — 
 Peace and war are outside the province of the Reichstag — Divine 
 Right of the Emperor — His absolutist declarations . . . .21 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE KAISER'S GOVERNMENT 
 
 The Constitution of 1871 and the Chancellor — William II. his own Chan- 
 cellor—William II.—" The will of God "— *' The instrument of the 
 Most High " — Government by force and fraud — Diplomatic illusions — 
 " I mean to be loved " — Bismarck on his hereditary pathology . . 26 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 POLICE GOVERNMENT AND ESPIONAGE 
 
 Niebuhr on Police Government — The Precetto — The police system in 
 Austria — Two Archdukes killed in less than twenty-five years — The 
 assassination of Rudolph — Criticism in connection with the assassina- 
 tion of Francis Ferdinand and his wife — The administration of justice 
 in Austria — Espionage as the foundation of diplomacy and strategy — 
 The Ultimatum, the Czar and M. Poincare — German miscalculations 
 in Russia, France and Belgium — Great Britain — The Turks — Italy — 
 An accumulation of errors . . . . . . . • 3 1 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND RUSSIA 
 
 Prussia and Russia after 1772 — Bismarck and Russia in 1877 — The Treaty 
 of Berlin — Fears of a Franco-Russian Alliance — The Austro-German 
 Alliance — Russian hatred of Germany — Bismarck — Bismarck and 
 Constantinople — The Re-Insurance Treaty of 1884 — Bismarck's 
 speech of February 6th, 1888 — Schemes against Russian credit — The 
 Russian loan in Paris of December 10th, 1888 — The accession of 
 William II. — Prince Hohenlohe's account of the rupture with Bis- 
 marck — The Triple Alliance in 1891 — William II. 's scheme — The 
 Franco-Russian Alliance — German diplomacy and its results . . 38 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 The policy of Great Britain — The Balance of Power and naval supremacy — 
 Bismarck and Great Britain — The Franco-Egyptian crisis — The 
 colonial policy of France — The French Protectionists — " Grasping 
 the Trident " — " Our future is on the sea " — Naval policy and world- 
 power — Opposition in the Reichstag — The Navy League — Anglophobia 
 — Treitschke — Kiao-Chau — Turkey — The Mohammedans — Polynesia 
 — Africa — The telegram to Kruger — Von Billow's confessions — Central 
 and South America — Holland and Belgium — The blockade of Russia — 
 
 xxji 
 
Contents 
 
 Megalomania — Picrochole — " Great Britain will not move " — Popular 
 illusions about English German ophiles — Mr. Lloyd George's speech at 
 the Guildhall on the ist of July, 191 1 — Rage against England . . 44 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 
 
 Bismarck's policy after Sadowa — Not extended to France — The peril of 
 1875 — Its true character — Colonial policy and Anglophobia in France 
 — Alsace-Lorraine — Boulangerism — Bismarck and preventive wars — 
 Opposition in the Reichstag — The Schnaebele affair — The Raon-1'Etape 
 affair — The isolation of Alsace — The Emperor William II. — A policy 
 of threats and favours — The visit of the Empress Frederick — Retalia- 
 tion on Alsace — The ambitions of William II. — The Franco-Russian 
 Alliance of 1894 . . . . . . . . . -53 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 
 ALGECIRAS 
 
 Bismarck a reluctant advocate of colonial policy — Opposition in the Reichs- 
 tag — New Guinea — Angra Pequefia and Great Britain — Togoland 
 and the Cameroons — The Berlin Conference of 1885 — Subsidies for 
 German shipping — Caprivi's opposition to colonial expansion — The 
 Anglo-French Agreement of April 12th, 1904 — The Franco-Spanish 
 Agreement — The resignation of Von Biilow — The Emperor William's 
 rage — Herr von Kiihlmann and M. Saint-Rene Taillandier — William 
 II. 's visit to Tangier — Germany's insolent demands — " We stand 
 behind Morocco with our full strength " — The Algeciras Conference — 
 German manoeuvres are checked — Von Biilow and the " isolation " of 
 Germany — German diplomacy as seen by the Frankfort Gazette . 62 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 
 AGADIR 
 
 The affair of the deserters — The interview with the Kaiser recorded by the 
 Daily Telegraph — Germany's threatening attitude — The agreement of 
 February 9th, 1909 — The annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina — 
 Germany " in shining armour " — The Agadir coup — Herr von Kiderlen 
 Wachter's declarations to Herr Class, President of the Pan-Germanic 
 League — Germany's object — Uncertainty — Morocco and the Congo — 
 " Our place in the sun " — German indifference to the Algeciras Con- 
 vention — The arrangement of November 4th, 191 1 — "Diplomatic 
 ethics " — The five threats to France — Biilow's confession — The motives 
 for Germany's ill-will — The routes through Alsace and Lorraine . . 69 
 
 xxiii 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND ITALY 
 Italy left in the lurch by Prussia in 1866 — Germany, Tunis and Italy — 
 The Prussian legation at the Vatican — Affronts to Italy — The Triple 
 Alliance of May 20th, 1882 — Its renewal in 1902 — Austria and the 
 Italians — Albania — Italy and Tripoli — The Kaiser provides the 
 Turks with submarine mines — Italy replaced by Turkey in the Triple 
 Alliance — Signor Giolitti's Note to Austria on the Serbian question — 
 Prince Bulow and Italy ........ 76 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
 Beust, Francis Joseph and Andrassy — Reasons for the Treaty of 1879 — 
 The self-abasement of the Austrian Emperor — The subordination 
 of Austria-Hungary to Germany — Dismemberment the inevitable 
 consequence .......... 82 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE NEW TRIPLE ALLIANCE 
 Bismarck and the Eastern Question — William II. and Turkey — Accusation 
 of wholesale bribery made by the Foreign Office — The lenience of the 
 British and French Ambassadors towards the Turks — Enver Pasha — 
 How the alliance was made — The Jehad — Allah and the " Old God of 
 Konigsberg " — " The Sick Man " — Von Billow's mistake . . .85 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SMALL STATES 
 Luxemburg — Gladstone and Belgium — William II. 's hopes — Herr von 
 Jagow and the British Ambassador — Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's 
 tirade — Germany covets Antwerp and the Netherlands — The Emden 
 failure — The Annexation programme — Professor Lasson — Intimida- 
 tion of small states ......... 89 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY. ITS METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
 The letter to The Times and the Wolff telegram — Herr von Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg's contradictory arguments — The aggressive and defensive aspects 
 of the Triple Alliance — Threats to England — Fatuity — Germany con- 
 fesses she created the Triple Entente — Great Britain guilty of not 
 accepting German hegemony of Europe — German attempts to break 
 up the Entente — Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg unable to save appear- 
 ances — The responsibility for the war — Against Belgium — Against 
 Japan — Violation of the Hague Convention of 1907 — Germany's argu- 
 ments, false both in law and fact — " Touching a hair of a German " — 
 A confession of German psychology — German political incapacity — 
 Biilow's admission- — Hypocritical and overbearing diplomacy . . 96 
 
 xxiv 
 
Contents 
 
 PART II 
 THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE WAR 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PRODUCTIVE versus MILITARIST CIVILIZATION 
 
 Their different characters — Germany's methods of expansion — Werre — 
 Treitschke's theories of the holiness and divinity of war — War versus 
 Law — War is an instrument of constraint ; commerce, of freedom — 
 Some apologists of war — A test for the professors — War always ends 
 with peace ........... 107 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE POPULATION OF GERMANY 
 
 " The rights of over-populated countries " — Emigration has almost ceased 
 in Germany — The populations of Belgium and Germany compared — 
 The area at their disposal — The Torrid Zone — An argument for the 
 Neo-Malthusians — The Slavs — The absurdity of the extermination 
 theory . . . . . . . . . . 109 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE THEORY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
 Economic science a cameral Science — The Historical School — National 
 Economy — The Congress of Eisenach — Adolph Wagner and Schmoller 
 — Reaction against the disciples of Adam Smith — A summary of the 
 economic doctrine — Frederick List — His conclusions . . .112 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE ZOLLVEREIN AND THE TARIFF OF 1879 
 
 The Zollverein — Bismarck's inconsistent policy — How his protectionist 
 policy encouraged Socialism — The rural and industrial populations — 
 Germany's nerve-centre lies west of Berlin — The importance of the 
 Rhine Province and Westphalia . . . . . . .117 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 ACTIVE PROTECTION AND THE AGRARIAN INTEREST 
 
 The demands oi the Agrarians — The tariffs of 1885 and 1887 — Bismarck's 
 mistake — Action against Russia — Caprivi's concessions — Anger of the 
 agrarians — Their appeal to the Kaiser — Agrarian v. Industrial policy 
 
 XXV 
 
Contents 
 
 — Prince Hohenlohe and the great estates — Coalition between the 
 great landowners and the great manufacturers — The low standard of 
 living of the working-class — The import of grain — The " Import 
 Certificates " — Agricultural " Dumping " — The export of rye to 
 Russia — The advantages of import certificates — Bounties on spirits — 
 Agricultural syndicates and the great landowners . . . .120 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE GERMAN SYNDICATES AND DUMPING 
 
 The Syndicates are monopolies of sales, not of production — They date from 
 the Tariff Law of 1879 — The syndicates and the chemical industry — 
 Herr Liefmann on the disappearance of economic individualism— Cost 
 price and market price — The fight against the customer — The con- 
 sumer exists for the producer — The Potash Syndicate — Waste — The 
 limitation of production — The Rhenish- Westphalian Syndicate 
 imports coal — Over-production — The consumer's revenge — The dis- 
 appearance of the small-scale producer — The combines — A fictitious 
 method of keeping up prices only prolongs crises — The impossibility 
 of controlling prices — The Prussian Industrial State and the syndi- 
 cates — " Dumping " — How it favours the foreigner — Rotterdam — 
 Export bounties for finished products — An unexpected result — Ger- 
 man and English sheet-iron — List's theory of national economy means 
 a present to the foreigner — Attacks on foreign industries — The Nobel 
 Dynamite Trust Company, Limited — The European Petroleum Combine 
 and the Deutsche Bank — Industry and the Banks — Financiers and the 
 syndicates — Some conclusions . . . . . . .127 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 COAL-MINING. THE METALLURGICAL AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES IN 
 
 GERMANY 
 
 Comparative figures of coal production — The reserves of coal — The produc- 
 tion and consumption of iron — Some comparative figures — Exports — 
 Realization of stocks — Pig iron and steel as raw material — The 
 chemical industry — The distribution of coal among the various 
 industries . . . . . . . • • • -136 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 ANGLO-GERMAN TRADE 
 
 The syndicates are the great export-machines — British and German trade 
 from 1904 to 191 3 — Anglo-German trade — The German figures — The 
 difference between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices — The British figures — The dis- 
 crepancies — German exports always higher — Special lines of trading — 
 Class I., foodstuffs — Class II., raw materials— Class III., manufactured 
 articles — Class IV., miscellaneous —Totals — British re-exports — British 
 exports into Germany and the German tariff . . . . • 143 
 
 xxvi 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 MARITIME RIVALRY 
 
 Palmerston and the German navy — Ships without ports — " Kolossal " — 
 The great German steamship lines — The British and German fleets — 
 Naval construction — The share of the German mercantile marine in 
 maritime traffic — " Tramps " disregarded by the Germans — Prestige 
 as a motive for maritime enterprise — Export bounties and subsidies — 
 Charges against Great Britain — The German Empire and the " Free- 
 dom of the Seas " . . . . . . . . . .150 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 FRANCO-GERMAN TRADE 
 
 Article 1 1 of the Treaty of Frankfort — The trade of France with her chief 
 customers and sources of supply — French and German statistics — The 
 chief imports of France — Coal, machinery, grain — French exports of 
 raw materials — Foodstuffs and chemical products — The skin and fur 
 trade — Seed for sowing — The textile industries — Jewellery — Toys — 
 Motor-cars — Interruption of the normal expansion of Franco-German 
 trade . . . . . . . . . . . .154 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 HOSTILE ECONOMIC PRACTICES 
 
 What is a commercially " closed " State — Fichte, Oldenburg and Wagner 
 — The Chancellor's protectionist views — Their effect on the elections — 
 The 1909 tariff — Additions to the number of articles — Article 103 — 
 Discrimination — No exchange of cattle between France and Germany — 
 Threats and recriminations — Article 15 of the Law of 1892 — Germany's 
 reply — Sparkling wines and brandies — Analyses — The Comite da 
 Commerce Francais avec V Allemagne — German railway rates — Export 
 fever in Germany — The Press agitation of 1913 — Commercial jealousy, 
 economic ignorance, hypocritical and unfair practices . . .161 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE OPEN DOOR 
 
 The Open Door — The Journal de Geneve and Algeria — German trade in 
 
 Algeria 167 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 COLONIAL AMBITIONS AND ILLUSIONS 
 German Colonial Policy — " Land hunger " — -Settlement colonies in Africa 
 — Massacre of the natives — No outlets for the German population — 
 Theories and facts — Kiao-Chau — German interests in Morocco — 
 Navigation for prestige — Economic pretexts to cover political aims — 
 " Extending the frontiers "........ 169 
 
 xxvii 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 
 
 Frederick Barbarossa and William II. — German friendship for Abdul 
 Hamid — The Konia-Bagdad railway — Financial arrangements — The 
 French Government's part — A check in England — The Franco- 
 German Agreement of February 15th, 1914 — Horns-Bagdad — Diplo- 
 matic mysteries — German trade in Turkey . . . . .174 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND IMPERIALISM 
 
 A contradiction — Pacific declarations of industrials and financiers — Their 
 arguments — They were self-evident — " The economic organization of 
 Germany was fashioned for peace " — Exchange is the affair of indi- 
 viduals, policy of Governments — The Kaiser as commercial busybody 
 — The Sultan as his customer — The Professors of Economics stray 
 from their subject — Economic Imperialism — Military interests — Herr 
 Thyssen's Anglophobia — French iron mines owned by Germans — Raw 
 material — Germany's large imports from Russia and Great Britain — 
 Great Britain her best customer — Economic considerations abandoned 
 — " Prestige " — The War Party — Harden's exhortations — A sum- 
 mary — The real end and its attainment by appeal to the passions . 180 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE PROFITS OF WAR. THE WAR INDEMNITY OF 1871 
 
 Maximilian Harden — The bandit view of war — The indemnity of 
 ^200,000,000 — The cost to Germany of the war of 1870 — How much 
 recovered through the indemnity ? — How the indemnity was paid — 
 Gold movements in Germany — Loss on the sale of silver — How the 
 indemnity was used — The Vienna crisis — Bismarck's view of the effects 
 of the indemnity — Mr. Norman Angell's hypothesis — The effect of the 
 indemnity on prices and wages — The indemnity cost Germany dearly . 187 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS 
 
 The Seven- Year and Five- Year Bills — The Reichstag's opposition — The 
 Laws of March 27th, 191 1 ; June 14th, 1912 and July 3rd, 1913 — The 
 Slav Peril and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech on April 7th, 191 3 
 — An ever-expanding budget — The accumulation of debt between 
 1900 and 1909 — The subscriptions to the loans of March, 1913 — The 
 levy on property — Its character — Miscalculations — Incitements to 
 waste — The naval and military expenditure of the German Empire 
 imposed a similar burden on other countries . . . . .193 
 
 xxviii 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 THE FACTOR OF SOCIALISM 
 
 The spread of Socialism — Its influence at the polls — Agrarians and Socialists 
 — The protection of foodstuffs — The failure of the Insurance Scheme 
 — The fall in wages in 19 14 — " Red Internationalism " and " Red 
 Nationalism ".......... 199 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE CONFLICT OF THE TWO CIVILIZATIONS 
 
 The immediate causes of the war — A " preventive " war — The conflict 
 
 between a militarist civilization and a productive one ., . . 202 
 
 PART III 
 THE HISTORICAL CAUSES 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 
 
 The coronation of Charlemagne — The Treaty of Verdun (843) — Historic 
 law — Lothair's portion — Germany — The Holy Roman Empire — 
 Anarchy in Germany — The Electors — The Hapsburg — France and the 
 Thirty Years War — The relation of France with Alsace — France the 
 Peace-maker — The services rendered by France — The Elector of 
 Brandenburg — Character of the Peace of Westphalia — Prussia under- 
 mines French influence ......... 207 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 FRANCE AND PRUSSIA FROM I735 TO 1814 
 
 France as the ally of Prussia — The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) — 
 France allied to Austria during the Seven Years War — The Brunswick 
 manifesto in 1792 — The Treaty of Bale in 1795 — The Franco-Prussian 
 Agreement — The Treaty of Luneville — The gains of Prussia and 
 Austria — The Holy Roman Empire becomes Protestant — The Diet of 
 Ratisbon — Napoleon's mistake — The Convention of Potsdam and the 
 results of Austerlitz — The Peace of Pressburg — The Confederation of 
 the Rhine (July 12th, 1806) — The end of the Holy Roman Empire — 
 Napoleon the heir of Charlemagne — The war with Prussia — The Treaty 
 of Tilsit — Napoleon's acts — Stein — General Scharnhorst — Prussia's 
 offers to France — Yorck and the Prussian forces after the Russian 
 campaign — Hardenberg : bribes to France — Prussia's indifference to 
 the fate of Germany — The Treaty of Kalisch — The King of Prussia's 
 summons to his people — The Treaty of Paris — The Germanic Con- 
 federation . . . . . . . . . . .212 
 
 xxix 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 
 
 The programme of the Treaty of Kalisch and the achievements of the 
 Congress of Vienna — Talleyrand — The rule of law — Public law — The 
 contempt of the Prussians and the Czar of Russia for public law — 
 Austria, Talleyrand and Lord Castlereagh — The Treaty of January 3rd, 
 18 1 5 — The disastrous mistake of Talleyrand and Lord Castlereagh — 
 Acquisitions of Prussia, Austria and Russia — Switzerland — The pro- 
 visions of the Congress of Vienna relating to the Germanic Confedera- 
 tion — Prussia's discontent — " Only accept the Rhine Province for the 
 defence of Germany " — The Holy Alliance — The final decree of the 
 Congress of Vienna ......... 222 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. 1847-1866 
 
 Frederick William's opposition to a written constitution — The Revolution 
 of 1848 and German unity — " Prussia transformed into Germany " — 
 The Parliament of Frankfort — The elimination of Austria — Offer of 
 the Imperial crown to the King of Prussia — The Treaty of the Three 
 Kings — The Parliament of Erfurt — The Diet of Frankfort — The Con- 
 vention of Olmiitz — Prussia's desire for revenge — Bismarck and the 
 prussification of Germany — Ferro et igne — Governing without Parlia- 
 ment — " Might is right " — Bismarck and the Polish insurrection — 
 The question of the Duchies — Napoleon III., Austria and Prussia — 
 Bismarck and Napoleon III. — The war of 1866 — The preliminaries of 
 peace at Nikolsburg — The Treaty of Prague — Prussia's gains — The 
 question of compensation — M. Benedetti's ignorance — His fears in 1868 227 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 
 
 The Federal Constitution — Procedure — The King of Prussia Bundes 
 Presidium and Bundes-Feldherr — The same attributions as those of the 
 Deutsche Kaiser — The Chancellor — The Bundesrat — The Reichstag — 
 Electoral conditions unchanged after 1867 — Treaties of defensive 
 alliance with the Southern States — The Zollverein . . . .235 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE 
 
 Astuteness of King William and Bismarck — Beginnings of the Hohen- 
 zollern Candidature question in March, 1869 — Prince Leopold's refusal 
 — He is compelled to accept — Proceedings at Ems — the Prince of 
 Hohenzollern withdraws — M. de Gramont's inconsistent demands — 
 The Ems incident — Bismarck's telegram — The opposition of the 
 southern States . . . . . . . . . .238 
 
 XXX 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE CERCAY PAPERS AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The Due de Gramont against Austria and Italy — The Bavarian minister 
 Bray — His policy and conversion — Count Beust follows suit — The 
 Cercay papers — M. de Ruville's explanation — Bavarian opposition — 
 The ceremony at Versailles — The Emperor disagrees with Bismarck — 
 The Emperor prefers the title of " Emperor of Germany " to that of 
 " German Emperor " — The necessity of dissolving the German Empire 242 
 
 PART IV 
 
 THE HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR 
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 RACES AND NATIONALITIES 
 Definition of a race — Lack of agreement — The different elements of ethnic 
 groups — The secondary role of somatic characteristics — The race 
 question in Austria-Hungary — Historical and linguistic characteristics 249 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 The Austrian Marches — The Duchy — The Hapsburgs — The monogram 
 A.E.I.O.U. — Austria was never among the Electors of the Empire — A 
 Duchy — Austria has no history — The title of " Emperor of Austria " 
 dates from 1804 . . . . . . . . . .251 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CZECHS 
 
 I. Slavs and Teutons — The Czech civilization — The bishopric of Prague — 
 
 German " peaceful penetration " — Relations with France — The King 
 of Bohemia as an imperial Elector — The struggle against German 
 influence — John Huss — The Czech language — Prague University — The 
 Council of Constance — The resistance of the Hussites — Ferdinand 
 of Hapsburg — The Confessio Bohemica — The Lettre de Majeste — 
 The defenestration of Prague — The Battle of the White Mountain — 
 Reaction in Bohemia. 
 
 II. The awakening of national feeling — The Judgment of Libasa — 
 
 Palacky's letter to the Committee of Fifty — The Congress of Prague — 
 The three issues in Austria : Centralism, Dualism and Federalism— 
 The Constitution of 1849 — Tne reaction — German policy — The elec- 
 toral system — Dualism — The progress of the Czechs — The decay of 
 German influence — The Germans and the Czechs — The Wacht am Rhein 
 and the Marseillaise . . . . . . . . .254 
 
 xxxi 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE HUNGARIANS 
 
 Their origin uncertain — They belonged to the Finno-Ugrian family — Their 
 choice of Western civilization — St. Stephen— A State independent of 
 the Roman and Eastern Empires — Struggles with the Turks — Ferdi- 
 nand of Austria elected King of Hungary — The Ottoman invasions 
 — Religious persecution — Resistance to German influence — The 
 Hungarian aristocracy — Szechenyi — The Magyar language — Fiscal 
 privileges — Historic rights and formalities — Revolts by and against 
 the Hungarians — Retrogression — Hungarian policy is anti-German 
 towards Hungarians, but Prussian towards others — Hungarian ambi- 
 tions and their realization to-day ....... 262 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 
 
 The Croats — Latin influences — The Serbs and Byzantine influences — 
 Historic claims : Koloman II. — Croats v. Magyars — The defeat of 
 Kossovo — Serbia — A Turkish pashalik from 1459 to 1804 — The Croats 
 escaped Turkish rule — Illyria — Subject provinces or allied kingdoms — 
 Croat nationality — The Nagoda of 1868 — Subjection to the Hun- 
 garians — The oppression of Croatia — The liberation of Serbia — Bosnia 
 and Herzgovina — Antagonisms and aspirations — The Congress of 
 Abbazia ........... 267 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE DISSOLUTION OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY 
 
 Joseph II. 's germanizing zeal — The policy of Metternich and Francis II. — 
 Divide ut imperes — Constitutional and centralist policy — The Diet of 
 Kromeriz — Bach — The Germans of Austria are one with the Germans 
 of Germany — The three bonds of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — 
 The Emperor — His titles — The army — The bureaucracy — The selection 
 of officers — The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — Both 
 Germans and Hungarians have striven for its dismemberment — Magyar 
 centralism ........... 273 
 
 PART V 
 THE CONSEQUENCES 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE END IN VIEW 
 International law — An aspiration rather than a reality — Treaties resulting 
 from wars are instruments of extortion — Neither victors nor vanquished 
 regard them as final — The sovereignty of the State — The absence of 
 
 xxxii 
 
Contents 
 
 morality in international dealings — " Might is Right " — The law of 
 the strongest — Historical law — The great treaties — The coming treaty- 
 will be the resultant of force — Use and misuse of force — The coming 
 treaty and acceptance of the inevitable . . . . .281 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 WHAT IS MEANT BY NATIONALITY IN POLITICS 
 
 Political anthropology — The Teutonic race — Its rights are the invention of 
 the Historical School — The principle of nationality is not a principle of 
 law — Is it a traditionalist principle ? — The Turks, Germans and Hun- 
 garians are incapable of assimilating the groups they govern — Their 
 power of resistance constitutes their nationality — The incompetence 
 of their rulers i3 their right to separation — The end of the Hapsburgs, 
 Hohenzollerns and the Ottoman Empire . . . . . .286 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY 
 
 The Compact of September 6th, 1914 — Neutrals will have no locus standi — 
 Only the belligerents can be parties to the treaty — The precedents of 
 1 8 14 and 18 15 — The Hohenzollerns and the Imperial Chancellor are 
 disqualified — The plenipotentiaries to the Bundesrat — The Reichstag 
 possessed the treaty-making power in the Germanic Confederation . 288 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS 
 
 The effect, not the cause — Results in 1806, 1856 and 1870 — Foreign inter- 
 ference in contrast to political independence ..... 290 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE GOAL IS THE REMOVAL OF THE CAUSES OF WAR 
 
 A political task — How to remove the causes of war — We must be satisfied 
 with that aim — The maintenance of peace — It is impossible with the 
 present constitution of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy — Prussia to be dismembered at the start of negotiations . 292 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The two autocracies : the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy — The remodelling of Germany — Commercial unity : the 
 Zollverein is permanent — Political unity : the Empire must be dis- 
 solved — The annexations of 1866 — Not by agreement — Those annexed 
 accepted the inevitable — King George V. of Hanover — The Emperor's 
 
 xxxiii c 
 
Contents 
 
 an — 7 he powers of the individual States — We must resr.;-. 
 ;: the mdmdu&l States while destroying I he diploma 
 ..'.::;.:• Autocracy of the King .... 294 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE FACTOR OF PARTICULARISM 
 
 kkms — Dissf :an Empire — 
 
 Ihe Gaeftb— The ' Party of 1 " — The::: :he 
 . pte siU gii — The Prossificatian of Germany — The | 
 
 . . — . :he 
 Soath and th ^deration of the Rhine — The chances of per- 
 se — A Saxon's opinion of Prussian influence — of 
 
 5 it . . . . 1 g . ; 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE DISMEMBERMENT OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
 
 The ooflapsf :-Hungar: - . e mutual h 
 
 :omponent peoples — Annnnal ;;d by natural 
 
 I mpmgs — Vitality - *— teater Serbia — Italy 
 
 and the Adriatic — The Trentino — The German provinces — Girault's 
 
 qc for the reconstruction of a German Ausl -.-nan Empire 
 
 — No counterpoise pass —Doc - and 
 
 1871 . . . . . . . . 500 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 ROUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA 
 
 I. Roumania — The Kingdom of Dacia — Tradition — Turkey and Russia — 
 
 : union of Moldavia and Wallachia settled by the Treaty of Paris 
 in 1S56 — Union in 1S59 — A constitutional monarchy in 1S60" — Sym- 
 pathy for France in 187] — I - s 1 in 1881. 
 
 II. Transylvania and I m BmmmL 
 
 III. Daco- Roumanian ambitions — The advantage oi having a strong 
 buffer State between Russia and the Balkans— The importance of a 
 final settlement . . . . . . . . . 5:5 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 TURKEY 
 
 Lord Beaconsheld introduces Germany to Eastern politics — Constantinople 
 a hot-bed of intrigue — The Anatolian Railway in 1SS9 — The " Sick 
 Man " — The Treaty of Paris — The dogma of Turkish integrity — Lord 
 Derby and the suicide of the " Sick Man '' — EI .Img theories 
 
 both conventional and false — The Khalifate — The break-up of the 
 Turkish Empire — Russia and Constantinople — The Balkans . . 310 
 
 xxxiv 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 RUSSIA 
 
 The development of the Slav States as an antidote to Pan-Slavism— 
 Russia's power of " assimilation " — The tolerance of Mohammedans — ■ 
 The Slav peril — Mazzini's opinion — An Italian alliance with the Slav 
 family 313 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 POLAND 
 
 Austria's right to Galicia — The partitions of Poland — The arrangement of 
 18 1 5 — The incorporation of Cracow in Austria — Germany's failure to 
 assimilate the Poles — The Kaiser's appeal to the Teutonic Knights — 
 The proclamation of August 14th, 1914 ...... 315 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 The German Colonies 317 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE RESTORATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE 
 
 I. The declaration of the Deputies in 1871 — Germany's failure to assimilate 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine — French culture survives — Area and population of the 
 annexed provinces — The proportion of German immigrants — The re- 
 constitution of the four departments. 
 
 II. Restoration a matter of right — The question of a plebiscite does not 
 
 arise — The plebiscite is a mechanical and simple system, but unsatis- 
 factory — Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague — Impossibility of securing 
 a genuine referendum . . . . . . . . . 31& 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE WAR INDEMNITY 
 
 War is an affair between States, not between individuals — " Strangling " 
 the Germans — The policy of pressure and the policy of reconciliation — 
 The war indemnity — Herr von Zedlitz's claims — Pecuniary responsi- 
 bility — Some crimes against the law of nations ought to entail personal 
 responsibility — Securities — The Prussian State railways — The State 
 mines — No State will secure material profit from the war . . .321 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 German Trade and Free Trade . 325 
 
 Conclusion 326 
 
 XXXV 
 
Contents 
 APPENDIX 
 
 THE BULGARIAN QUESTION 
 
 I. Balkan interests and peace — II. The Bulgarians before and after 1878 — 
 III. Bulgaria and the Wars of 1912-1913 — IV. The Bulgarians and 
 Macedonia — V. Diplomatic illusions — VI. The difficulties of the 
 problem ........... 329 
 
 Index 351 
 
 XXXVJ 
 
PART I 
 
 THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR 
 
The Causes and Consequences of 
 the War 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE STARTING POINT 
 
 The Sarajevo trial — No connection between the assassination of the Archduke 
 and the war. 
 
 O 
 
 N the 28th of October, 19 14, appeared an announcement that 
 judgment had been given in the Sarajevo trial. 
 
 The prisoners Danilo Ilio, Veljko Cubrilovic, Nedo Kerovic, Misco Jovanonic 
 and Jakov Milovic are sentenced to death by strangulation. 
 
 Mikar Karovic is condemned to imprisonment for life. 
 
 Danilo Princep, Nedjelko Cabrinovitch and Trifko Grabez are sentenced to 
 imprisonment for twenty years. 
 
 The announcement was barely noticed. So momentous had been 
 the consequences of the assassination of the Archduke Francis 
 Ferdinand on the 28th of June, that the event itself had almost 
 passed into oblivion. Nothing of the trial itself was known. Nine 
 persons had been sentenced. 
 
 As the same penalty had not been pronounced in each case, the 
 judges must have distinguished between the various degrees of guilt. 
 Yet men who knew nothing of that crime have lost their lives by 
 thousands and suffered every form of agony and mutilation, women 
 and children have known every form of torture and death, thousands 
 of houses have been destroyed, and sorrow and mourning have stalked 
 through Serbia, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany 
 and Austria-Hungary. 
 
 Why have these hordes of victims been sacrificed to the shade of 
 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand ? How comes it that an act which 
 alone concerned the lives and conscience of its perpetrators, whether 
 principals or accessories, has led to a holocaust, the horror of which 
 finds no parallel in human history or imagination ? 
 
 3 ** 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 In the June* issue of the Journal des Economistes, when examining 
 the risks of war and the burden of armaments, I concluded my 
 article thus : 
 
 The statesmen of every country should make it their business to compare the 
 importance of the objective causes of the risks of war with the crushing burdens 
 of an armed peace. The disparity is patent. There remain the subjective 
 causes which are not susceptible of calculation, being the outcome of certain 
 psychological conditions to which no standard can be applied. Yet in the 
 ordinary affairs of life it is assumed that men will behave as rational beings. 
 Is it too much to hope that those who direct the destinies of nations will behave 
 likewise ? 
 
 The present war shows that it was indeed too much to hope. The 
 Emperors Francis Joseph and William II., and their advisers, Count 
 Tisza, Premier of Hungary, Count Berchtold, President of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Council of Ministers, Doctor von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
 the German Imperial Chancellor, and Herr von Jagow, Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, have made the assassination of the Archduke an 
 excuse for plunging Europe into the horrors of universal war. 
 
 There is no relation between the cause and the effect. The conse- 
 quences are out of all proportion to the motive assigned. The mere 
 fact of that disproportion amply justifies us in believing that these 
 rulers and statesmen have committed themselves to a course of 
 conduct which Teuton psychology can alone explain. 
 
 * 1914. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA AND THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian claims and demands — Reply of the Serbian Government 
 — Intentional coincidences — M. Poincare's visit to Russia — The attitude of 
 the German Government — Demarches of the ambassadors — Austria, Ger- 
 many and Russia — Declaration of war on Russia on the ist of August — 
 Declaration of war on France on the 2nd of August — A tissue of 
 falsehoods. 
 
 THE authors of this war, realizing the necessity of justifying 
 themselves, in face of the responsibility they have assumed, 
 to their contemporaries, compatriots and posterity, have tried with 
 perverted and childish ingenuity to throw the onus on Russia, Great 
 Britain and France. 
 
 Yet it was neither Russia, Great Britain, nor France which deli- 
 vered to Serbia the ultimatum of the 23rd of July. 
 
 According to that ultimatum Serbia was held comprehensively 
 responsible for the murder of the Archduke. It demanded that the 
 Serbian Government should insert a three-paragraph notice on the 
 front page of the " Official Journal " to the effect that " the Royal 
 Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda directed against 
 Austria-Hungary," and pledged itself " to proceed with the utmost 
 rigour against all persons guilty of participation in such propaganda." 
 
 The Serbian Government was to pledge itself also : 
 
 (1) To suppress every publication which incites to hatred or contempt of 
 
 the monarchy. 
 
 (2) To suppress immediately the Society known as " Narodna Odbrana." 
 
 (3) To purge public instruction of anything which serves, or might serve, 
 
 to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. 
 
 (4) To dismiss from the Army and administration all officers and functionaries 
 
 guilty of participating in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian 
 monarchy. 
 
 (5) To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Imperial 
 
 and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement 
 directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy. 
 
 5 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 (6) To institute proceedings against all participants in Serbia in the plot of 
 
 the 28th of June. Delegates appointed by the Imperial and Royal 
 Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto. 
 
 (7) To arrest without delay Voislav Tankossitch and one Milan Zigano- 
 
 vitch, an employee in the Serbian state service, whose complicity in the 
 Sarajevo crime has been established. 
 
 (8) To prevent the Serbian authorities from co-operating in the illicit traffic 
 
 in arms and explosives across the frontier ; to dismiss and punish 
 severely the officials of the frontier service at Shabatz and Loznica 
 who were guilty of aiding and abetting the authors of the Sarajevo 
 crime by assisting them to cross the frontier. 
 
 (9) To give to the Imperial and Royal Government an explanation of the 
 
 unjustifiable utterances indulged in by high Serbian officials both in 
 Serbia and abroad. 
 
 (10) To notify the Imperial and Royal Government immediately on the 
 
 execution of the measures herein set forth. 
 The Imperial and Royal Government expects the reply of the Royal Govern- 
 ment not later than six o'clock in the evening of Saturday, the 25th of this 
 month.* 
 
 There followed a commentary in which the Austro-Hungarian 
 Minister affected to set forth the circumstances under which the note 
 was delivered. It held up to contrast the hostile attitude of Serbia 
 and the long-suffering benevolence of which Austria-Hungary was 
 giving yet further proof. It contained the following paragraph : 
 
 "The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this 
 step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all 
 civilized nations, who could not allow regicide to become a weapon that can 
 be used with impunity for the realization of political aims, nor the peace of 
 Europe to be in perpetual jeopardy from the machinations emanating from 
 Belgrade." 
 
 The five paragraphs which followed recited the various parts played 
 by the individuals mentioned in the ultimatum. 
 
 That this ultimatum inspired terror in Serbia is proved by the 
 character of the reply, which granted all the demands with the 
 following reservations : 
 
 (5) The Royal Government must confess that they do not quite grasp the 
 meaning and extent of the Imperial and Royal Government's demand 
 that Serbia shall agree to accept the collaboration on her own territory 
 of officials of the Royal and Imperial Government ; but they declare 
 that they will admit such collaboration as is consistent with the 
 principles of international law and criminal procedure, as well as good 
 neighbourly relations. 
 
 * See the British White Paper. 
 
 6 
 
The Ultimatum to Serbia and the Declarations of War 
 
 (6) The Royal Government have no need to assert that they consider it a 
 matter of duty to open an inquiry against all persons on Serbian soil 
 who, now or hereafter, may be shown to be guilty of complicity in 
 the plot of the 15th of June.* As for the participation in this inquiry 
 of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for that purpose 
 by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot 
 accept it, for it would be a violation of the Constitution and the law 
 of criminal procedure. However, in specific instances, information 
 as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to 
 the Austro-Hungarian agents. 
 
 {7} Voi'slav Tankossitch has been arrested, but Milan Ziganovitch had 
 escaped and he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 
 The Serbian Government asked that the presumptive evidence and 
 eventual proof of their guilt might be communicated to them in the 
 ordinary way. 
 
 All the accused were Austro-Hungarian subjects. The Austro- 
 Hungarian Government when drawing up this unprecedented 
 diplomatic document knew that Serbia could not accept, without 
 fatally compromising her independence, the two paragraphs in respect 
 of which she made her reservations. 
 
 This ultimatum to Serbia, requiring an answer within forty-eight 
 hours, had been delivered on the 23rd of July, a day on which 
 M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, was far from Belgrade. 
 At Vienna only Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, knew 
 of it.t All the other embassies had found the silence of the Ball- 
 platz so profound and reassuring that on the 20th of July the Russian 
 Ambassador had left Vienna for a fortnight's holiday. On the 22nd 
 and 23rd of July the French Ambassador had two interviews with 
 Baron Macchio, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. After 
 the first he came away with the impression that the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government would take no step to which any Government could 
 legitimately object. At the second he was not even told that the 
 Note had been presented the same day nor advised of its intended 
 publication on the following day. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who saw 
 the other Under-Secretary, Count Forgach, on the same day, had 
 been more fortunate and learned both the fact of its presentation and 
 the character of its contents. The Italian Ambassador, the Duke of 
 Avarna, was left entirely in the dark. Not one of the ambassadors 
 except the German was told anything by Count Berchtold of the 
 
 * Old Style. 
 
 f See the report of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, No. 161, " Great Britain and the 
 European Crisis," the British White Paper. 
 
 7 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 momentous event then preparing. During the forty-eight hours 
 which preceded the presentation of the Note he had left for Ischl, 
 where he was inaccessible to ambassadors. It is true that as early 
 as the 15th of July Sir Maurice had been aware of its existence, but 
 his information was derived solely from a private source. It is also 
 true that the Neue Freie Presse and other journals were using 
 threatening language to Serbia ; but the government organ, the 
 Fremdenblatt, was more moderate in tone ; so much so that, as 
 Sir Maurice de Bunsen said, " the prevailing opinion among my 
 colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to 
 involve her in grave European complications."* 
 
 The Note was published on the 24th of July and no one hesitated 
 to describe it as an ultimatum. At one moment a rumour gained 
 currency that Serbia had accepted it in its entirety. Disappoint- 
 ment was general in Vienna, but the same evening it became known 
 that the Serbian reply contained reservations and that the Austrian 
 Minister, Baron Giesl, had broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia. 
 There was a wild outburst of enthusiasm — kept under control, how- 
 ever — in Vienna and other Austrian towns. Both the Press and the 
 Street demanded immediate war with Serbia as a fitting punishment 
 for the Sarajevo crime. 
 
 While the Ballplatz thus kept the French Ambassador in ignorance, 
 they knew that the President of the Republic and the President of 
 the Council, returning from Russia, could not reach France for four 
 or five days. It is hardly a bold conjecture that this coincidence 
 was no mere accident. 
 
 At St. Petersburg, on the 24th of July, M. Sazonof, the Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, said to Sir George Buchanan, the British 
 Ambassador, that Austria would never have embarked on so provo- 
 cative and immoral a course without first being assured of the support 
 of Germany. 
 
 The German Government denied, and continues to deny, that they 
 knew anything about the ultimatum. Yet after the 24th of July 
 they declared that " the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment seemed just and reasonable." How did they arrive at that 
 conclusion if they had not been acquainted with those demands ? 
 They added that " the dispute is one which concerns Austria-Hungary 
 and Serbia only. The Imperial Government desire that the conflict 
 
 * See the British White Paper. 
 
The Ultimatum to Serbia and the Declarations of War 
 
 may be localized. Any intervention by another power may entail 
 incalculable consequences." Already, on the day on which the 
 ultimatum was launched, they had issued a decree of partial 
 mobilization. 
 
 " On the morning of the 25th of July the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine had 
 been confined to barracks. On the same day the frontier works had been put 
 into a state of war. On the 26th they had issued orders to the railways to 
 take preliminary measures for the concentration of troops. On the 27th the 
 necessary requisitions had been completed and the covering troops were in 
 position."* 
 
 Sir Edward Grey told Count Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian 
 Ambassador in London, that the Serbian reply was the greatest 
 humiliation that he had known any state to suffer, and that he was 
 bitterly disappointed to learn that it was regarded as unsatisfactory 
 by the Austrian Government. 
 
 If the Austrian Government's sole concern was to guard themselves 
 against Serbian aggression, they might have secured, by the way of 
 diplomacy, the goodwill of Russia and the other Powers. 
 
 As soon as the Serbian reply was received, the Austrian mobilization 
 was completed. 
 
 On the 27th of July, Sir Edward Grey announced in the House of 
 Commons that he had suggested a joint demarche at Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg of the English, French, German and Italian ministers. 
 The suggestion was accepted by France and Russia, but declined 
 by Germany. When communicating this suggestion to Count 
 Berchtold on the 28th, Sir Maurice de Bunsen was careful to avoid 
 the word " mediation," lest Austrian susceptibilities should be hurt. 
 The Austrian Minister replied that war would be declared on Serbia 
 the same day. In reply to certain observations of Sir Maurice de 
 Bunsen, Count Berchtold expressed an opinion that Russia had lost 
 any right to intervene from the moment that Austria assured her 
 that she aimed at no increase of territory. It seemed to be his view 
 that to reduce an independent state to a condition of vassalage was 
 less serious than to appropriate a part of it. Evidently the Ballplatz 
 considers the whole less than the part. 
 
 All the ambassadors, except the German, did what they could 
 to preserve peace. 
 
 The question was whether Count Berchtold, with all his arrogance, 
 
 * See the Memorandum of the 4th of August issued by the French Government. 
 
 9 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 was really prepared to defy Russia or was hoping that Austria- 
 Hungary could renew her challenge without greater risk than 
 in 1908. 
 
 On the next day, July 29th, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin 
 told Sir Edward Goschen that a European war was a remote con- 
 tingency, " Russia being unwilling and in no condition to make war." 
 On the 28th, in answer to the request of M. Schebeko, the Russian 
 Ambassador, Count Berchtold had refused to authorize Count 
 Szapary, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to begin 
 conversations with M. Sazonof. But two days later, after Russia 
 had ordered a partial mobilization against Austria, he gave his consent 
 without reserve and in the most friendly terms. Agreement seemed 
 well within sight. On the 1st of August Sir Maurice de Bunsen was 
 informed that Count Szapary had told M. Sazonof that Austria had 
 consented to submit to the arbitration of the powers those points 
 in her Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the independ- 
 ence of that State. M. Sazonof had asked that Austria should not 
 invade Serbia. On the 1st of August, Count Mensdorff, the Austro- 
 Hungarian Ambassador in London, assured the Foreign Office that 
 Austria had never shut the door on a peaceful solution nor broken 
 off conversations. The Austrian Ambassador in Paris gave a similar 
 assurance. On the other side, M. Schebeko had employed the most 
 conciliatory language at Vienna and had told Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
 that the tone of Count Berchtold had been no less friendly. The 
 general opinion was that Austria was merely seeking some means 
 to cover her retreat. 
 
 Unhappily the supreme direction of affairs had already passed 
 from the Ballplatz to the Wilhelmstrasse. On the evening of July 29th, 
 Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, had been 
 asked to meet the Chancellor, who had just returned from Potsdam. 
 The Chancellor's object in this interview was to secure Great Britain's 
 neutrality, in return for which he was prepared to guarantee that 
 Germany would make no territorial acquisition on the Continent at 
 the expense of France. Sir Edward Goschen having questioned him 
 as to whether that covered the French colonies, he replied that the 
 guarantee could not be extended. He was quite willing to pledge 
 Germany to respect the neutrality of Holland but Germany would 
 be compelled to pass through Belgium. If Belgium made no resist- 
 ance, Germany would, at the conclusion of the war, leave her territory 
 intact. 
 
 10 
 
The Ultimatum to Serbia and the Declarations of War 
 
 While conversations were still in progress at Vienna, Berlin had 
 proclaimed a state of war on the 31st of July and instructed Count 
 Pourtales, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to hand to the 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs an ultimatum comprising a 
 declaration that if Russia did not start demobilizing both as regards 
 Germany and Austria before midday of Saturday (the next day), 
 the German Government would be compelled to issue a decree of 
 general mobilization. 
 
 The same day that witnessed this hostile step towards Russia 
 witnessed even more hostile acts towards France, acts such as the 
 rupture of telephonic, road and railway communications, the seizure 
 of French locomotives at the frontier, the placing of machine-guns on 
 the railway track, which had been torn up, and the concentration 
 of troops along the frontier.* 
 
 On the 1st of August Germany declared war on Russia. On the 
 2nd, she violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, delivered an 
 ultimatum to Belgium, and crossed the French frontier at three 
 points. On the 3rd she declared war on France in the following 
 terms : 
 
 " Paris, August 3rd. 
 " Monsieur le President, 
 
 " The civil and military authorities have reported 
 certain hostile acts committed on German territory by French 
 military aviators. 
 
 " Several of these aviators have openly violated the neutrality 
 of Belgium by flying over that country. One attempted to 
 destroy buildings near Wessel, others have been seen in the 
 Eiffel district while another has thrown bombs on the railway 
 near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. 
 
 " I have instructions to inform Your Excellency that in view 
 of these aggressions, the German Empire considers itself in a 
 state of war with France. 
 
 " I have also the honour of informing Your Excellency that 
 the German authorities will detain French merchant vessels 
 found in German ports but that they shall be released if within 
 forty-eight hours a guarantee of reciprocal treatment is forth- 
 coming. 
 
 " My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, it only 
 remains for me to ask Your Excellence to furnish me with my 
 * See the Memorandum of the French Government. 
 II 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 passports and to take the steps necessary to assure my return 
 to Germany with the embassy staff, as well as the staffs of the 
 Bavarian Legation and the German Consulate at Paris. 
 
 " I beg you to accept, Monsieur le President, the assurance of 
 my highest regard. 
 
 " Signed : Schoen." 
 
 The French Government were in a position to state that no French 
 aviator had even been in or over Belgium and that similarly no 
 French aviator had committed hostile acts either in Bavaria or else- 
 where in Germany. The excuses put forward were a fitting climax 
 to the series of threats, intrigues and lies. 
 
 Yet the German Government could not put forward similar excuses 
 to the Belgians on whom war was declared on the 5th of August, 
 two days after their territory had been violated. 
 
 In a dispatch of the 4th of August, the German Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs told Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassador in London, to assure 
 Sir Edward Grey that Germany would annex no portion of Belgium 
 even if the Belgians resisted in arms. " It is obvious that we could 
 not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same 
 time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. German 
 army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium. . . . 
 Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being 
 for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance." 
 
 On the 3rd of August Italy declared her intention of remaining 
 neutral. On the 4th, Great Britain summoned Germany to respect 
 the neutrality of Belgium, and receiving no answer, declared war. 
 It was not until the 6th of August, the date itself demonstrating 
 Austria's eleventh-hour hesitation, that Count Berchtold announced 
 that " Russia had begun hostilities against Germany " (that Power 
 having declared war on Russia on the 1st of the month), and that, 
 therefore, Austria-Hungary was under the necessity of considering 
 that a state of war existed between herself and Russia. Yet she did 
 not recall her ambassadors from London and Paris. Both Great 
 Britain and France were compelled on the 13th of August to intimate 
 that they considered that a state of war existed between themselves 
 and Austria-Hungary. 
 
 On the 9th of August Montenegro declared war on Austria. On 
 the 1 6th Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany, and on the 
 24th declared war. The same day Austria declared war on Belgium. 
 
 12 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY AND THE SLAVS 
 
 Austria expelled by Prussia — Bismarck, the " Man of Blood and Iron " — 
 Andrassy — Discord within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — Russia not 
 the author of Pan-Slavism — The Austrian Government and the Slavs — 
 The Emperor Nicholas and John Sobieski — The hegemony of the Balkans — 
 The Treaty of Berlin — The independence of Serbia — The Germans and 
 Magyars numerically inferior to the Slavs — Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia 
 — Annexation — The Germans and Magyars versus the Slavs — " The Pig 
 War " — The declaration forced on Serbia by Count Aehrenthal — The 
 trial of Dr. Fried jung. 
 
 FROM the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) onwards the keynote of 
 Prussian policy was the destruction of the Austrian hegemony 
 in Germany. In 1834 sne gained for herself economic hegemony by 
 the foundation of a customs union — the " Zollverein." From 1859 to 
 1863 Austria bent all her efforts to build up a national union with the 
 German princes. Prussia resolutely stood out. Bismarck, who came 
 into power in 1862, put the matter with brutal frankness : " Austria 
 must give up thoughts of Germany and shift her centre of gravity 
 to Ofen " (the German name for Buda-Pest). He and King William 
 devoted their unflagging energies to building up an army strong 
 enough to defeat Austria. When speaking on an Army Bill, 
 Bismarck once said in the Prussian Diet : " The unity of Germany 
 will never be realized by speeches and votes, but by blood and iron." 
 It was, in fact, realized by three wars — one against Denmark in 1864, 
 another against Austria in 1866, and a third against France (1870-71). 
 After Sadowa Bismarck was anxious not to humiliate Austria. No 
 territorial acquisitions were made and the military clique was denied 
 its projected triumphal entry into Vienna. The Prussian statesman 
 counted on a future alliance with the beaten foe. After the foundation 
 of the German Empire in 1871 the alliance was duly effected. Francis 
 Joseph cherished no ill-feeling and became virtually the vassal of 
 his mighty friend, the Emperor of Germany. The terms of the 
 
 13 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 alliance were drawn up in 1874 by a Hungarian, Count Andrassy, 
 who had succeeded Count Beust in September, 1871. 
 
 The two Governments in Vienna and Buda-Pest are habitually in 
 conflict with the Slav majority of their subjects. Slav aspirations 
 are the nightmare of statesmen in those two capitals ; but instead of 
 conciliating the Slavs, they have never ceased to provoke their 
 antagonism, both at home and abroad. The result is what might 
 have been expected. All Slav peoples, notably those who are subject 
 to the domination of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, look for help 
 outside. Where else can that be but Russia ? Not Russia, but the 
 ruling powers in Austria-Hungary have been the creators of Pan-Slav 
 aspirations. 
 
 Another ironical result of this Austrian policy is that His Imperial 
 and Royal Apostolic Majesty has for some time found himself in league 
 with the infidel Turk, the sworn foe of the Christian peoples in the 
 Balkan Peninsula. 
 
 In 18 1 5 Austria opposed the grant of independence to Serbia on 
 the ground that such an example could not fail to encourage Slav 
 aspirations within her own borders. She likewise opposed the libera- 
 tion of Greece because the weakening of Turkey was to Russia's 
 interest. Austria's answer to the Russo-Turkish War of 1829 was 
 an attempt to form a coalition against the Slav power. In 1849 
 Francis Joseph appealed to Russia to subdue Hungary; but in 1854 
 he turned against his deliverer, whom the threat of 200,000 men 
 compelled to make peace. It is said that shortly after that event 
 the Emperor Nicholas II. was looking at a portrait of John Sobieski, 
 who forced the Turks to raise the siege of Vienna in 1683. " He and 
 I," he remarked, " have been equally stupid, for we both rescued 
 Austria and both of us have received her ingratitude as our reward." 
 
 Cast out from Germany, Austro-Hungarian statesmen have had one 
 ruling passion — to establish an Austrian hegemony in the Balkans. 
 In this passion they have been encouraged by German statesmen, 
 fearful lest Austrian glances should again turn northwards. By 
 preventing Austria from intervening in the Russo-Turkish War of 
 1877, Bismarck thought he had paid off his debt to Russia for her 
 neutrality in 1870. Yet the Treaty of San Stefano gave the hegemony 
 of the Balkans to Russia. Austria, exiled from the German Confeder- 
 ation, saw herself driven forth from the South and South-East also 
 
 At this period the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the closing 
 of the Straits to Russia were the cardinal dogmas of British foreign 
 
 14 
 
The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Slavs 
 
 policy. Bismarck and Lord Beaconsfield were of one mind in robbing 
 Russia, at the Congress of Berlin, of much that she had gained by 
 the Treaty of San Stefano. 
 
 Article 34 recognized the independence of the Principality of Serbia. 
 Article 25 dealt with the subject of compensation in these terms : 
 
 " The provinces of Bosnia and Herzgovina will be occupied and 
 administered by Austria-Hungary. As the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government have no wish to undertake the administration of the 
 Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, which separates Serbia from Montenegro, the 
 existing Ottoman administration shall not be disturbed. Nevertheless, 
 in order to assure the stability of the new arrangements and to 
 guarantee the security of the means of communication, Austria- 
 Hungary reserves to herself the right to maintain a garrison and to 
 have military and commercial routes throughout that part of the 
 ancient vilayet of Bosnia." 
 
 Bismarck seemed to be making Austria a handsome present, but 
 in reality he was only adding to her difficulties. For centuries the 
 Viennese Government had been trying to germanize its subject Slav, 
 Magyar, Roumanian and Latin populations. Since Sadowa and as 
 the result of the compromise of 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 had consisted of the Austrian Empire and the crown lands of Hun- 
 gary. Yet the Germans and Magyars, the two dominant races, were 
 in a numerical minority in 1878, and have always remained so, as 
 the lingual census of 1880, not to mention that of 1910, clearly 
 establishes.* 
 
 Cis.=Cisleithania. Tr.=Transleithania. B. and H.=Bosnia and Herz- 
 govina. (These two provinces were not mentioned in the census of 1880.) 
 
 (In thousands.) (In thousands.) 
 
 1880. Total. 1 9 10. Total. 
 
 Germans (Cis.) 8,008 1 g 9>95o 1 
 
 — (Tr.) 1,882 i 9 ' 9 2.037 12,010 
 
 B. and H 23 J 
 
 Hungarians (Tr.) ^' 2 ° 7 \6 2i7 10,050. 
 
 — (Cis.) 10/ 11 ^10,067 
 
 B. and H 6 ' 
 
 Bohemians > "| 
 
 Moravians I (Cis.) 5,180 | 6,436 
 
 Slovaks J [6,979 ')■ 8 >474 
 
 — (Tr.) 1,799 J 2,031 j 
 
 B. and H 7 J 
 
 Poles 3,238 5,019 
 
 * V. B. Auerbach, Les Races et les Nationalites en A utriche-Hongrie. 
 (Paris, F. Mean.) 
 
 15 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 (In thousands.) (In thousands.) 
 
 1880. Total. 1910. Total. 
 
 Ruthenians (Cis.) 2,793 1 
 
 - (Tr.J 345i 3 ' 138 4 '°°° 
 
 Slovenes 1,140 i,349 
 
 Croats and Serbs (Cis.) 563 1 2 88g 783 1 , 722 
 
 — (Tr.) 2,326) ' y 2,939/ 
 
 B. andH 1,882 
 
 Roumanians 2,326 
 
 Latins and Ladins 669 801 
 
 Putting aside the Roumanians, Latins and Ladins, Gypsies, and 
 other small groups, we reach the following figures : 
 
 (In thousands.) Percentage of 
 1880. 1910. increase. 
 
 Total population 37, 400 51,400 37.8 
 
 Germans 9,900 12,000 20 
 
 Magyars 6,000 10,000 66 
 
 Slavs 17,400 20,877 26 
 
 The increase in the Magyar population is so striking as to excite a 
 query whether it is due to the excess of births or perhaps to some 
 mode of census-taking which reckons as a Magyar any man speaking 
 their language in Transleithania. Notwithstanding this enormous 
 increase, the Magyars still form less than 20 per cent, of the total 
 population of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Germans 
 formed 23.5 per cent, and now form 27 per cent. 
 
 Both Germans and Magyars are numerically inferior to the Slavs, 
 who formed 45 per cent, in 1880 and 44 per cent, in 1910. The census 
 of this latter year took count of 1,822,000 Croats and Serbs inhabiting 
 Bosnia and Herzgovina. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Governments complained of having too 
 many Slavs, yet in 1879 ^ey added to the number. Such was the 
 diplomatic success they owed to Bismarck and they demonstrated 
 their gratitude in the next year by forming that alliance with Germany 
 which has reduced the Hapsburg Monarchy to the level of a satellite 
 of the Hohenzollern Empire. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had received the gift of the 
 administration of Bosnia and Herzgovina, but effective possession 
 had not been made over by the plenipotentiaries of Berlin. The 
 inhabitants of the two provinces, who had been the authors in 1875 
 of the struggle which drew in Serbia and Montenegro in 1876 and 
 finally Russia in April 1877, revolted at the prospect of being handed 
 over to the Germans of Vienna. Austria had to send more than two 
 
 16 
 
The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Slavs 
 
 hundred thousand men to subdue them. This army shot as rebels 
 those chiefs and soldiers on whom it could lay hands and left behind 
 it the memory of wrongs which time has done little to efface. The 
 administration of Baron Joseph von Szlavy led to the insurrection of 
 1881-1882. 
 
 The affairs of Bosnia and Herzgovina are managed by the joint 
 Minister of Finance. Von Kallay held that position from 1882 
 to his death in 1903. It may be admitted at once that his adminis- 
 tration and reforms did much for the prosperity of the provinces. 
 He established a civil service, harmonized Mohammedan law with 
 existing legislation, inaugurated many great public works, and 
 reorganized the system of finance and education. But even he failed 
 to reconcile the inhabitants of the two provinces to Austrian rule. 
 
 In 1885 Bulgaria violated the Treaty of Berlin by annexing 
 Eastern Roumelia with the approval of Germany, Austria and Russia.* 
 The other Powers raised no protest. Serbia, hoping to make capital 
 out of Bulgaria's difficulties, declared war on her, but was beaten 
 and would have been overwhelmed had not Austria intervened. 
 By the Convention of Top-Khane, Bulgaria compelled the Sultan to 
 recognize Prince Alexander as Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia. 
 In reality, the convention set the seal on the union of the two 
 countries. 
 
 In 1908 Austria rendered valuable service to Germany at the 
 Algeciras Conference and Russia was in the midst of an exhaustive 
 process of reorganization after her war with Japan. Consequently 
 Austria could count on solid support on one side and feeble opposition 
 on the other if she violated the Treaty of Berlin. The Young Turks 
 had just taken the reins at Constantinople. Count Aehrenthal and, 
 it is said, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand decided on the annexation 
 of Bosnia and Herzgovina to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
 communicated their decision to the world by a Note dated October 5th, 
 1908. Austria-Hungary gave up her claims in the Sanjak of Novi- 
 Bazar, and gave the following explanation of her conduct : 
 
 " Bosnia and Herzgovina have to-day — thanks to the unflagging labours of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Administration — attained a high degree of prosperity 
 and culture. The moment seems to have come to crown the work so auspiciously 
 begun by granting to these provinces the benefits of constitutional autonomy 
 which is fervently desired by the entire population." 
 
 Bosnia and Herzgovina, thus absorbed in the Hapsburg Empire, 
 
 * Infra, Ch. VII. 
 
 17 2 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 have waited in vain for their constitutional autonomy. Austria's 
 calculations proved accurate. Russia could not intervene. France 
 and Great Britain had too little direct interest in the question to 
 take steps which might lead to war without Russian co-operation. 
 The ultimatum of July 23rd, 1 914, was only launched by Vienna on 
 the assumption — nay, rather the conviction — that Russia would 
 stand aside as in 1908. 
 
 On February 29th, 1909, Turkey recognized the annexation. On 
 the 6th of April the independence of Bulgaria was recognized. Serbia 
 and Montenegro, whose protests had been vigorous and sustained, 
 had no option but to submit to destiny. 
 
 The Germans of Cisleithania and the Magyars of Transleithania 
 have never been able to assimilate the Slavs. There has never been 
 any sentiment other than hatred between the dominant and subject 
 races of the Hapsburg Empire. The sole business of the Government 
 of a country in which the Slavs predominate numerically is to foment 
 antagonism with the Slavs of Russia and the Balkans, as formerly 
 they lived on strife with the Turks. To achieve that end they have 
 bound up their destinies with those of Germany. But to combat 
 Slavdom they have increased the number of their Slav subjects by 
 annexing Bosnia and Herzgovina, in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin 
 of 1878. This bold stroke of Count Aehrenthal and the acquiescence 
 of Europe filled Austria with pride. In reality it was the policy of 
 the simpleton. " We don't know what to do with our Slavs. Let 
 us have more of them." 
 
 From Potsdam and the Hofburg a vision of oriental splendour 
 drew the eyes of the two Emperors and their advisers. The pro- 
 fessors never ceased to speak of the Drang nach SudosUn, the " March 
 to the South-East," and there were even French writers and statesmen 
 who lent reality to these chimeras by puffing the wonderful genius of 
 the Kaiser and the perspicacity of the Ballplatz. " Salonica will 
 be one day the halfway-house on the highway from Port Said to 
 Vienna or Hamburg, the meeting-place of Germany and India. "* 
 Politicians, going to economics rather than to probability for their 
 arguments, were already connecting up Salonica with Constantinople 
 and the Bagdad Railway. To India by rail, forsooth ! 
 
 Unfortunately Serbia lies between Austria and the Aegean Sea, 
 
 * See the Journal des Economistes of November, 191 2 : La Question d' Orient 
 et les conflits economiques, p. 190, June, 1914. Les risqucs de guerre et les charges 
 mil ita ires, p. 361. 
 
 18 
 
The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Slavs 
 
 and as if oppression could remove geographical barriers as well as 
 destroy the mutual sympathies of Serbs, Croats and the Slavs of 
 Bosnia and Herzgovina, Austrian and Hungarian statesmen have 
 long carried on a campaign of intimidation. 
 
 The Emperor Francis Joseph accompanied the declaration of war 
 on Serbia with a proclamation to his people, in which the enemy was 
 roundly abused ; but it is far easier to draw a formidable indictment 
 against his Government. 
 
 Doubtless he was right in recalling Austria's services to Serbia in 
 1885, when on the point of annihilation by Bulgaria ; but then Serbia 
 had rewarded her with docile gratitude up to the death of King Milan 
 in 1901. 
 
 King Alexander Obrenovitch tried to liberate his country, but 
 was assassinated along with his wife in 1903. The Austrian 
 Government based high hopes on the restoration of the House of 
 Karageorgevitch but disillusionment was in store. When Serbia 
 concluded a customs union with Bulgaria in 1905, Austria-Hungary 
 did her best to ruin its prospects by closing her frontiers to Serbian 
 cattle and swine. I have told elsewhere how a Frenchman from 
 Bordeaux, M. Bigeon, by guaranteeing the purchase of 150,000 pigs 
 a year, enabled Serbia to negotiate a loan and thus procure arms. 
 The independence of Serbia dates from this " Pig War."* 
 
 The next stage was reached in October, 1905, in a conference at 
 Fiume which saw the last of the old dissensions between the Orthodox 
 Serbs and the Catholic Croats. 
 
 In 1907 the Austro-Hungarian Government arrested fifty-three 
 Southern Slavs on a charge of high treason ; but the Agram trial 
 showed that the alleged plot was an elaborate fiction of an agent 
 provocateur. In 1909, after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina, 
 Count Aehrenthal compelled the Serbian Government to sign a Note, 
 of which the following were the principal passages : 
 
 " Serbia recognizes that her rights are not affected by the changes in the 
 status of Bosnia ; accordingly she will accept the decisions arrived at by the 
 Powers in respect of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. 
 
 " Serbia, in conformity with the advice of the Great Powers, pledges herself 
 to abandon her attitude, maintained since October last, of protest and opposition 
 to the annexation. She promises, further, to change her policy towards Austria- 
 Hungary and henceforth to cultivate good neighbourly relations with that 
 Power." 
 
 The humiliation of a people is no more likely to earn their goodwill 
 * Journal des Economistes, November, 19 12, p. 184. 
 
 19 2* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 than an affront to an individual. A note of that character could do 
 nothing to improve the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary 
 and, indeed, the Ballplatz set itself to aggravate them. In December, 
 1909, the members of the Serbo-Croat coalition in the Diet of Agram 
 prosecuted Dr. Friedjung, who had accused them of high treason, 
 and it then appeared that his accusation had been based on a docu- 
 ment supplied by the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
 which was no more than a forgery of a member of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.* 
 
 This policy, so far from provoking dissension between Serbia and 
 the Southern Slavs of Austria, drew them together. 
 
 The Emperor Francis Joseph has told us that he has no desire to 
 annex Serbia. We can well believe it, for annexation would only 
 mean the addition of three millions (five millions if New Serbia were 
 included) to the Slavs who already outnumber the Germans and 
 Magyars in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government only wished to " punish " Serbia. For what ? 
 The Archduke's murderers were subjects of His Majesty the Emperor 
 of Austria and King of Hungary. 
 
 This monarch tells us that Austria only wishes to gain by her arms 
 guarantees which will ensure her permanent peace and the cessation 
 of internal disorder. How has she set about her task ? By reducing 
 Belgrade to ruins and wantonly killing innocent men, women and 
 children. This was the necessary if unconvincing justification of the 
 ultimatum of July 23rd ; but at bottom it was as irrelevant as the 
 pretext put forth by Francis Joseph. Count Berchtold was certain 
 that, as in 1908, Russia would not move. He only intended to bluff 
 and by taking up a bullying attitude show the world that none dare 
 challenge Austria, that Russia was merely an impotent mass, 
 imposing only in inaction, and that France and Great Britain were 
 too impressed by the menace of the German fleet and army to make 
 effective protest. 
 
 But from the moment that Russia took action and France sup- 
 ported her Count Berchtold's one thought was of retreat. So well 
 was this known to the German Chancellor that at midnight of 
 July 31st he instructed Count Pourtales to break down the bridges 
 behind him. On the next day Count Berchtold must have learned 
 that he had only been a tool in the hands of the Wilhelmstrasse. 
 
 * See Le Manifeste des KuUurkrieger. The story, told by Mr. H. Wickham 
 Steed in his Hapsburg Monarchy, is published there. 
 
 20 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE GERMAN AUTOCRACY 
 
 The Hohenzollerns — Voltaire's description of Frederick William — Frederick II. 
 — Bismarck — The wars of 1866 and 1870 — Political motives for war — The 
 Constitution of the German Empire — Germany is not a nation — The 
 Bundesrat — The King of Prussia as Emperor — Peace and war are outside 
 the province of the Reichstag — Divine Right of the Emperor — His absolutist 
 declarations. 
 
 IN 141 7 Frederick of Hohenzollern, Burgrave of Nuremburg, 
 bought the Marquisate of Brandenburg from the Emperor 
 Sigismund. In 161 8 one of his successors, John Sigismund, bought 
 from the Teutonic Knights a small plot of territory beyond the Vistula, 
 of which the most remote corner lay on the other side of the Niemen. 
 It was called Prussia. Although it formed no part of the Empire, 
 Frederick II. obtained the sanction of Sigismund to erect his 
 dominions into a kingdom (1701), and betook himself to Konigsberg, 
 there to be crowned as Frederick I. 
 
 Voltaire has left us in his Memoirs the following description of his 
 successor, Frederick William : 
 
 " He was a true Vandal, who throughout his reign had no thought save to 
 amass money and gather about him, with a minimum of expense, the finest 
 troops in Europe. No King was ever richer than he, no subjects were ever 
 poorer. At a scandalously low price he bought the nobility out of most of their 
 estates, and while they squandered half the purchase-money the other half 
 returned to the royal coffers as taxation. . . . 
 
 " Turkey is a republic in comparison with the despotism of Frederick William. 
 When Frederick William had attended a review he would sometimes take his 
 walk in the town. The townsfolk fled at his approach. If he met a woman he 
 would ask her why she was wasting her time in the street. ' Go home, hussy,' 
 he would say, and as often as not accompany his admonition with a box on the 
 ear, a kick in the stomach, or a shower of blows with his cane." 
 
 His son, the future Frederick II., was brought up in the same hard 
 school, and at length, tired of his father's treatment, resolved to run 
 
 21 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 away. Frederick William promptly executed his friend and accom- 
 plice, Kat, and then condemned his son to the same fate. The young 
 Frederick only escaped thanks to the direct intervention of the 
 Emperor Charles VI. On succeeding to the throne, Frederick lost 
 no time in making war on the daughter of his benefactor, Maria 
 Teresa, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, in order to rob her of Silesia. 
 He has himself given us a frank exposition of his motives in his 
 Memoirs ; " My reasons for making war were my troops, always 
 ready for instant action, my well-filled treasury and my mercurial 
 temperament. Ambition, interest, and the desire to get myself 
 talked about prevailed with me and war was declared." But his 
 troops were already in Silesia when Baron von Gotter, his minister 
 at Vienna, counselled Maria Teresa to submit with good grace and 
 surrender three-quarters of that province to his master the King- 
 Elector, in return for which the King of Prussia would lend her three 
 million crowns and make her husband Emperor. 
 
 " I take first," Frederick used to say, " and afterwards there is 
 no difficulty about finding some pedant to prove my claims." 
 
 Such traditions are by no means extinct. 
 
 The First Minister was a clerk. " The Secretaries of State sent all 
 their dispatches to the King's clerk who made an abstract of them. 
 The King wrote the answers in a couple of words on the margin. 
 Thus was all the government business transacted in an hour. His 
 royal father had left such perfect order in the finances and there 
 was such an atmosphere of military precision and blind obedience 
 that four hundred leagues of country were governed like an abbey." 
 
 Mirabeau, speaking of Prussia at the end of Frederick the Great's 
 reign, said : " War is the national industry of Prussia." Bismarck, 
 bent on the foundation of a German Empire under Prussian domina- 
 tion, used war as an instrument of policy. The war of 1866 eliminated 
 Austria from Germany, subdued Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Saxony, 
 Hanover, the two Hesses, Nassau, Baden, Frankfort, increased 
 Prussian territory, and led to the Confederation of the North. 
 Bismarck has related, in his Reflections and Reminiscences, his motives 
 in tampering with the Ems telegram in 1870 so as to provoke war : 
 
 " The German feeling, which in the southern states, lived along with the 
 individual and dynastic state feeling, had, up to 1866, silenced its political con- 
 science to a certain degree with the fiction of a collective Germany under the 
 leadership of Austria, partly from South German preference for the old imperial 
 state, partly in the belief of her military superiority to Prussia. After events 
 
 22 
 
The German Autocracy- 
 had shown the incorrectness of that calculation, the very helplessness in which 
 the South German states had been left by Austria at the conclusion of peace 
 was a motive for . . . the willing conclusion of the offensive and defensive 
 alliance with Prussia. ... I felt convinced that the gulf which diverse dynastic 
 and family influences and different habits of life had in the course of history 
 created between the south and north of the Fatherland could not be more 
 effectually bridged over than by a joint national war against the neighbour 
 who had been aggressive for many centuries." [France.] (Vol. II., p. 97.) 
 
 Bismarck realized his hopes. It was not as the leader of princes, 
 nor yet by the choice of the nation that King William of Prussia 
 gained the imperial crown. He assumed it in the Palace of Ver- 
 sailles, in the midst of his army, as a corollary to the ruin of France. 
 The German Empire is itself a thing of blood and iron, created for 
 the advantage of the King of Prussia. Therein lay the measure of 
 Bismarck's success. He made him the autocrat of Germany. 
 
 The German Empire is a legal entity of twenty-five members 
 and more than sixty-five million subjects. " The individual States, 
 not the individual citizens, are the members of the German Empire," 
 said Paul Labaud. # The sixty-one plenipotentiaries of these States 
 (which include Alsace-Lorraine) form the Federal Council of the 
 Empire (Bundesrat). Prussia sends seventeen, Bavaria six, Saxony 
 four, Wiirtemberg four, the Grand Duchy of Baden three, Alsace- 
 Lorraine three, Mecklenburg-Schwerin two, the Duchy of Brunswick 
 two, the other states and the three free cities of Liibeck, Bremen 
 and Hamburg one each. Frankfort has no representative, having 
 been annexed in 1866. 
 
 The members of the Bundesrat do not vote in accordance with 
 their private opinions, but solely on instructions from their con- 
 stituents. They are merely the diplomatic charges d'affaires of the 
 other States of the Confederation accredited to the King of Prussia. 
 Prussia has never had any difficulty in securing a majority. Bribery 
 and menace have succeeded when other means have failed. The 
 Sovereign participates in the work of the Bundesrat, not as Emperor, 
 but as King of Prussia, a constituent State, but he has a casting vote 
 because he is the president. 
 
 The legislative authority resides in the Bundesrat and the Reichstag, 
 but the Bundesrat takes no part in administration and only sits from 
 time to time. 
 
 By Article 1 1 of the Constitution, the King of Prussia is President 
 
 * Le Droit public allemand. 
 23 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 of the Federation with the title of German Emperor. He represents 
 the Empire in its international dealings, concludes alliances with 
 foreign States, and declares war or makes peace in the name of the 
 Empire. War can only be declared with the consent of the Federal 
 Council unless an attack is made on the land or sea frontiers of the 
 Confederation. In any case, the Reichstag has no voice on this 
 issue — a feature of the German Constitution which is specially 
 significant. The Reichstag represents the whole mass of subjects 
 and thus the nation is shut out from any expression of opinion on 
 the question of peace or war. This is the affair of the Emperor, 
 and, in the second degree, the Bundesrat. It does not concern the 
 Reichstag. 
 
 In spite of the restrictive final clause, however, the Emperor enjoys 
 absolute authority in all questions of international policy. William II. 
 summoned the Bundesrat on the ist of August, the same day that 
 war was declared, but he had already prepared the attack on Serbia 
 in conjunction with Austria ; he had launched his ultimatum 
 against Russia and, if we are to accept a statement in his declaration 
 of war on France, he considered that aviators had made an attack 
 on German territory. He did not await the approval of the Bundesrat 
 to begin hostilities and that approval was not necessary for the 
 violation of Belgian neutrality. As he alone directs German foreign 
 policy, with him must rest the entire responsibility. With him also, 
 as supreme head of the army, must rest the responsibility for its 
 methods and conduct of war. Prussian military law is in force 
 throughout the whole Empire. 
 
 The King of Prussia is King by right divine. He is Emperor 
 because he is King of Prussia ; therefore, he is Emperor by right 
 divine. That is the fundamental notion on which the structure of 
 William II. 's absolute authority has been reared. " Suprema lex 
 Regis voluntas" he wrote in the Golden Book of Munich. " I am 
 the sole master in this Empire : there shall be no other," he once 
 told the Chamber of the Rhine Province. " There is only one 
 law and that my law," he said to the recruits of 1893, and he wrote 
 under his portrait, when it was presented to him at the Ministry of 
 Public Worship in Berlin, " Sic volo, sic jubeo." He suppressed — 
 but the world supplied — the rest of Juvenal's line, " Sit pro ratione 
 voluntas P " My wishes are commands, my will a sufficient reason." 
 
 The Emperor has been at great pains to show that the conduct of 
 the war has been the affair of himself and his General Staff. In his 
 
 24 
 
The German Autocracy- 
 speech to the First Infantry Regiment of the Guard on the 14th of 
 August (published by the Cologne Gazette) he brandished his sword 
 and exclaimed : " You are the guarantee that I shall dictate terms 
 to my enemies. Up and smite the foe. Let the enemies of Branden- 
 burg bite the dust." Now, though Brandenburg includes Berlin, it 
 is not Germany. According to the last survey it has an area of 
 15,376 square miles, whereas Prussia has an area of 134,622 square 
 miles and Germany 208,780. Yet the Emperor spoke of it as the 
 pivot of the present war, and he is right, for his actions are those of 
 a true heir of the ancient Electors of Brandenburg and the kings 
 of the German States who follow him blindly are only his subjects. 
 
 25 
 
CHAPTER V 
 THE KAISER'S GOVERNMENT 
 
 The Constitution of 1871 and the Chancellor — William II. his own Chancellor — 
 William II.—" The will of God " — " The instrument of the Most High "— 
 Government by force and fraud — Diplomatic illusions — " I mean to be 
 loved " — Bismarck on his hereditary pathology. 
 
 THE Constitution of 1871 was the work of Bismarck, who 
 fashioned it for his own ends. Under the new regime the 
 Imperial Chancellor is the most important person. He presides 
 over the Bundesrat and represents it in the Reichstag. He is 
 responsible to the Emperor alone. The Secretaries of State are 
 merely officials. It is the Chancellor's business to cover the Emperor, 
 yet even in the hour of his accession William II. had decided to 
 dismiss Bismarck. Caprivi, appointed in his stead, made a frank 
 confession of incompetence. " Do not let that trouble you," said 
 William II. ; " I intend to be my own Chancellor." And, indeed, 
 the great dignitaries who have enjoyed that title have never been 
 more than docile subordinates. 
 
 William II. has had four Chancellors, General Caprivi, Prince 
 Hohenlohe, Prince von Biilow and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg. 
 The latter, " Refer endarius, Assessor, President of the Government, 
 First President-Minister, has never seen the world save through 
 state papers. He is a perfect type of the royal factotum." # 
 
 There is no cabinet. Each minister has exclusive defined functions 
 and is usually a specialist in the affairs of his Department. The 
 Chancellor is the only link between the various departments, but 
 lest he should be overwhelmed with a mass of details, he has had 
 subordinates to sign for him since 1878. The most obvious result is 
 that each Department pursues its own affairs without reference to 
 any other. There is no unity of direction and anarchy reigns. This 
 is amply proved by contradictory decisions which, as every Minister 
 
 * W. Martin : La Crise politique de VAllemagne. (Paris, F. Alcan.) 
 
 26 
 
The Kaiser's Government 
 
 has his own press bureau, never fail to gain publicity, however great 
 the efforts made to conceal them. 
 
 The Ministers are not responsible to the Reichstag, yet this does 
 not prevent ministerial crises. M. W. Martin says that since the 
 accession of William II. there has been an average of one a year. 
 It is true that they only affect individual Departments, but, never- 
 theless, German Ministers, exposed as they are to the intrigues of 
 the Court, the jealousy of the Chancellor, the opposition of their 
 colleagues, faction in the Federal Council, party bitterness and the 
 whims of the Emperor, Jiold their office by a tenure even more pre- 
 carious than Ministers under a parliamentary constitution. 
 
 It is vain for William II., improving on Louis XIV., to declare 
 himself an unfettered autocrat. The days of government by his 
 ancestor, old Corporal Schlague, have gone by. He is drawn all ways 
 at once by conflicting interests : the industrials of Westphalia and 
 the Rhine Province ; the " Junkers," great landed proprietors 
 in the eastern provinces, who have always been the mainstay of the 
 Prussian monarchy ; the Prussian Diet, the Bundesrat and the 
 Reichstag. He is the supreme chief of the army, yet remains the 
 sport of the rival intriguers in the Great General Staff. So far from 
 making a harmonious policy out of the action of his ministers, he 
 is perpetually obliged to accept or decline the conflicting proposals 
 they are ever bringing forward. 
 
 Seen in mass, the German Empire presents an appearance truly 
 kolossal, to use an expression popular in Berlin. Nevertheless, there 
 are many cracks, and the Emperor only keeps it together by holding 
 up the double menace of attack by France and Russia. No com- 
 petent critic doubts that the Serbian crisis is the outcome of his 
 desire to distract public attention from internal difficulties. Here 
 one question naturally arises. Was his intention merely to demon- 
 strate anew the armed might of Germany or was he draw r n into 
 war by the Crown Prince and the war party ? As yet it is 
 impossible to say ; but even if it were so, it would not diminish his 
 responsibility. 
 
 Most Frenchmen who have visited Berlin have heard Prussians 
 talk somewhat after this manner : " Our Emperor is a man after 
 the heart of the French who like theatrical coups, pomp, show, 
 speeches and parade. But to us Berliners, solid and serious-minded 
 as we are, he is too full of surprises to be congenial." 
 
 He is an extraordinary Jack-of-all-trades who decides military and 
 
 27 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 naval questions, designs the statue-groups of the Siegerallee in Berlin, 
 paints pictures, composes music and changes his clothes twenty times 
 a day. He is always an actor, and never happier than when being 
 talked about. Mr. Cloudesley Brereton a few years ago called him 
 " a Nero in vanity, but not in cruelty." " Perhaps the latter caveat," 
 he adds, " should now be modified."* 
 
 At the opening of the Kiel Canal the Kaiser gave the order that 
 the whole fleet should pass through. The senior i\dmiral, who was 
 in personal attendance on him that day, had the utmost difficulty 
 in convincing him that were his orders carried out not a ship would 
 survive the operation. 
 
 The theory of divine right has descended to the Emperor William II. 
 from Frederick William. " Our wish is to serve God, and if I reign, 
 it is because God has willed it so," was the declaration of his grand- 
 father at his coronation in 1861. He took the crown from the altar 
 with the words : " The crown comes from God alone. I bear witness 
 that I have received it at his hands." 
 
 These ideas have expanded somewhat since the war, witness 
 William II. 's proclamation to the army of the East : 
 
 " Remember that you are the chosen race ! The spirit of God has descended 
 upon me because I am Emperor of the Germans. 
 
 " I am the instrument of the Most High. 
 
 " I am his sword, his representative on earth. 
 
 " Woe and death to those who oppose my will ! Death to the infidel who 
 denies my mission ! Death to the coward ! 
 
 " Let all the enemies of the German nation perish ! 
 
 " God demands their destruction — God, who by my mouth summons you 
 to carry out his decrees. "f 
 
 What could be more convenient than to be styled " The instrument 
 of the Most High ! " The fortunate nominee may do what he likes 
 and throw the responsibility on God ! William II. lusts for the 
 applause of the mob, yet no man has a greater scorn of the mob 
 than he, for he regards the mob as but the instrument by which his 
 inspired desires are accomplished. Occasionally he emerges from 
 the clouds of mysticism and expresses himself in true Machiavellian 
 fashion, as when he said : " There are many situations in which 
 dupes are more necessary than friends." 
 
 * Who is responsible ? Armageddon and After. 
 t See the Gazetta Poranny of Warsaw, September 13th, 1914. 
 
 28 
 
The Kaiser's Government 
 
 His policy is the product of emotional impulse and knavery. It 
 is said that if some of his schemes had been realized chaos would 
 have reigned in the world. At one moment he contemplated sending 
 twenty thousand men to the Transvaal. His telegram to Kruger 
 will not soon be forgotten. Yet in a celebrated interview granted to 
 the Daily Telegraph correspondent in 1908, he boasted of having given 
 Queen Victoria a plan of campaign against the Boers. In 1904 he 
 took the initiative in offering a sword of honour to General Stoessel 
 as a mark of esteem for his defence of Port Arthur, though that officer 
 was about to appear before a court-martial. During the Spanish- 
 American War he tried to range Europe in a coalition against the 
 United States, the only effect of which was to bring about a recon- 
 ciliation between the British and the Americans who had never 
 forgotten 18 12. He was the foremost prophet of the Yellow Peril 
 and ordered his troops to leave the Chinese with memories of them 
 such as the Huns had bequeathed to Europe. He seized the territory 
 of Kiao-Chau. He compelled the Japanese to evacuate Port Arthur, 
 and then forced Russia into war with Japan on the (for Germany) 
 sound principle that this would remove Russian armies to a safe dis- 
 tance and weaken France. He cast longing eyes on Turkey, made a 
 friend of Abdul-Hamid, and tried to play the double role of protector 
 of the Mohammedans and the Holy Places. He schemed for the 
 Bagdad railway, and sent an autograph letter to the Sultan begging 
 for orders for Krupp's, in which he is personally interested. 
 
 In the Turco-Italian War, not only did German officers train and 
 lead Turkish troops against his ally but he sent arms and munitions 
 to the Tripolitans and like Austria, supplied the Turks with sub- 
 marine mines for the purpose of destroying Italian shipping. His 
 visit to Tangier, after the Bremen speech, and the dispatch of the 
 Panther to Agadir threw the world into consternation and spread 
 universal apprehension of his designs. A caricature in Punch repre- 
 sented him with a sword in his hand, his eyes gazing wildly around : 
 " I mean to be loved." 
 
 Frederick William IV., who became King of Prussia in 1840, was 
 a man of a very singular but ill-balanced temperament. In the 
 summer of 1857 he was afflicted with a mental disorder which neces- 
 sitated the appointment of his brother as Regent in 1858. Bismarck 
 thought that William II. had too strong a resemblance to his great- 
 uncle, and once said to the poet Felix Dahn : " If such a thing " 
 (the development of similar signs of mental disturbance) " should 
 
 29 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 happen, my successor will have a more difficult task before him 
 than I should have had, for the German people would have trusted me"* 
 The present war is the work of the Emperor William II., a 
 megalomaniac, and a monarch of eighty-four years of age, Francis 
 Joseph, who has chosen to mark the conclusion of a life which evokes 
 memories of the Atrides by bringing about the most terrible war that 
 the world has ever known. I had to learn that it was too much to 
 hope that His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary 
 and His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia would 
 conduct the affairs of their respective nations with as much intelligence 
 and judgment as rational human beings display in the ordinary affairs 
 of life. 
 
 * It Had to Be, by Sidney Whitman. The Fortnightly Review, September, 
 1914, p. 390. 
 
 30 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 POLICE GOVERNMENT AND ESPIONAGE 
 
 Niebuhr on Police Government — The Precetto — The police system in Austria — 
 Two Archdukes killed in less than twenty-five years — The assassination 
 of Rudolph — Criticism in connection with the assassination of Francis 
 Ferdinand and his wife — The administration of justice in Austria — 
 Espionage as the foundation of diplomacy and strategy — The Ultimatum, 
 the Czar and M. Poincare — German miscalculations in Russia, France and 
 Belgium — Great Britain — The Turks — Italy — An accumulation of errors. 
 
 THE German historian Niebuhr says that modern government 
 has become a despotism less tolerable than that of the Middle 
 Ages because it has assumed two new forms. It is founded, he says, 
 on a police system which is now no more than a gigantic network 
 of spies, and on a bureaucracy which ruthlessly destroys independence 
 of will and action. But which are the Governments thus denounced 
 by the all-unconscious Niebuhr ? The answer is Austria and Prussia. 
 Austria presents a typical example of police government. Italians 
 will never forget the pitch of perfection to which the Austrian 
 police system was brought in those parts of Italy subject to Hapsburg 
 domination. Its agents were the sbirro and the sgherro, words which 
 have no precise equivalent in English, but contain the idea of a spy 
 or agent provocateur. Its weapon was the precetto, written or verbal 
 orders to some individual commanding him to do, or refrain from 
 doing, certain acts. The prohibitions largely predominated. No 
 reasons were ever given. If the wretch who received a precetto 
 transgressed any of the injunctions therein, he was arrested and 
 condemned to a term of imprisonment, secret confinement, or perhaps 
 exile. This wonderful system contributed nothing to the maintenance 
 of Austrian domination in Italy and its memory is execrated through- 
 out the land. In his Hapsburg Monarchy, Mr. Wickham Steed 
 states that Austria has always made the police her principal instru- 
 ment of government. 
 
 ..." The Austrian police remains, at least potentially, much what it was 
 a hundred years ago." ..." The stranger is unaware that the porter of his 
 
 31 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 house is a confidant of the police, and that his goings and comings, his manner 
 of life, the number and names of his friends and all personal details are care- 
 fully communicated by the porter to the police . . . his correspondence is 
 being watched, his telephone ' tapped.' . . . 
 
 " Political disturbances and rioting are dealt with as official interests are 
 supposed to require. In the autumn of 1905 a Socialist manifestation in favour 
 of universal suffrage was suppressed ; blood was shed and arrests were made. 
 But within a week the wind in the higher regions had changed, and the Govern- 
 ment had veered round in favour of universal suffrage. A huge Socialist demon- 
 stration was organized in agreement with the police. . . . 
 
 " But on occasion the police is intractable — whenever its professional vanity 
 or the personal ambition of its chiefs is involved."* 
 
 The most striking results of this police system are the deaths by 
 assassination within twenty-five years of two Archdukes, heirs to the 
 Imperial and Royal crowns of Austria-Hungary. The Archduke 
 Rudolph was assassinated in 1889, and to this day his murderers 
 have remained undiscovered by the splendid Austrian police. With 
 such a glaring exhibition of incompetence before the Austrian Govern- 
 ment they had the hardihood to suggest that the Serbian police 
 ought to have prevented the Sarajevo crime which was committed on 
 Austrian soil ! The charge against that Government gathers weight 
 when we consider the motives that have been alleged for the dilatori- 
 ness of the Austrian police. In The Secret of an Empress, Countess 
 Zainardi Landi tears the veil from the mystery of the Archduke 
 Rudolph's death. It appears that he was violently in love with 
 Baroness Marie Vetsera and wished to procure a separation from his 
 wife, the Archduchess Stephanie, a Belgian princess. He requested 
 Pope Leo XIII. to annul his marriage but the letter was sent to the 
 Emperor by the papal nuncio Mgr. Galimberti, now a cardinal. After 
 a violent scene, in which the Emperor insisted that the Archduke 
 should never see Marie Vetsera again, Rudolph withdrew to Mayer- 
 ling, and wrote to her not to be uneasy at his absence ; but at the 
 same time she had received an order to marry a certain Austrian 
 nobleman within twenty-four hours. She went to Mayerling in the 
 same carriage which had brought the Archduke's letter. The 
 Emperor heard of her departure, and sent Baron Bolfras, a member 
 of the military cabinet, with a detachment of soldiers to bring back 
 the Baroness, and, in case of intervention, arrest the Archduke himself. 
 After some negotiation the Archduke consented to receive Baron 
 Bolfras but the soldiers rushed into the house. The Archduke 
 
 * The Hapsburg Monarchy, by Henry Wickham Steed. Austria-Hungary, 
 by Geoffrey Drage. 
 
 32 
 
Police Government and Espionage 
 
 fired his pistol and hit a gamekeeper. The invaders replied in kind, 
 and both the Archduke and Marie Vetsera were killed. 
 
 It is not difficult to imagine why the Austrian police have never 
 discovered the assassins. How comes it, then, that the all-perfect 
 Austrian police were unable to prevent the assassination of another 
 heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, 
 the Duchess of Hohenberg ? On this question of the impotence of 
 the Austrian police Mr. Archibald R. Colquhoun goes so far as to say : 
 
 " Those who, like the writer, have been in Sarajevo and know the efficiency 
 of the Austrian police, find it almost impossible to credit that the murder, which 
 was the result of a second attempt, could have taken place but for deliberate 
 negligence on the part of the Austrian authorities to take the usual precau- 
 tions. . . . 
 
 " Little pretence was made in Vienna of regretting the Archduke's death, 
 still less that of his morganatic wife, whose position was resented by those born 
 in the purple. . . ."* 
 
 This opinion is shared by Mr. Cloudesley Brereton in his study, 
 Who is Responsible ? Thus the most striking achievement of 
 police rule in Austria has been the destruction of the Hapsburgs 
 themselves. 
 
 A judiciary which has never attempted to reach the assassins of 
 the Archduke Rudolph proves its complicity. The Agram conspiracy 
 trial in 1907 further proves to what depths it will descend. I have 
 already referred to Mr. Wickham Steed's account of the prosecution of 
 Doctor Friedjung in 1909. In the Sarajevo trial, the assassin Princep, 
 who killed the Archduke and his wife, and Cabrinovitch, who threw 
 the bombs, were condemned to solitary confinement for twenty 
 years, but their accomplices were condemned to death. What is the 
 meaning of this mystery ? 
 
 A State which enjoys such a police and judicial system has no 
 grounds for claiming to oust the jurisdiction of the police and judiciary 
 of any other, as was done in the ultimatum of the 23rd of July to 
 Serbia. 
 
 In Germany, too, wholesale espionage has been made the founda- 
 tion of diplomacy and strategy. The Kaiser has had his network of 
 spies embracing the entire surface of the globe. Some clerk or mer- 
 chant, whose honest aspect lulls suspicion, makes himself popular 
 in a certain neighbourhood and spends his spare time in noting the 
 strategic features of the district, selecting sites for gun emplacements, 
 
 * Why the British Empire is at War : North American Review, November, 1914, 
 p. 683. 
 
 33 3 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 and collecting information as to the local resources which might be 
 available for an invading army. This patriotic spying has been made 
 a line art by disciples of German " Kultur," and forms part of the 
 official code of ethics according to which all means are justified 
 which further the aggrandizement of the Empire. All the information 
 so gathered is sorted, classified and pigeon-holed in the offices of the 
 General Staff by officials who have had long training in this type of 
 work and who boast, without fear of contradiction, that their 
 researches are on an unrivalled and unprecedented scale. 
 
 There is, however, one grave defect in this employment of the spy, 
 whether of lowly or exalted station. He is less anxious to discover 
 truth than information palatable to his superiors and employers, and, 
 of course, there is always the personal coefficient of error. Events 
 have demonstrated, in falsifying the accumulated results of this 
 magnificent Intelligence Department, how great that coefficient is. 
 No doubt the General Staff knew that guns could be emplaced at 
 such and such a spot, that trenches could be dug somewhere else, 
 that Mr. X had a car and so many horses, that Mr. Y would make a 
 valuable hostage. But when Mr. X's car and horses have been 
 requisitioned, and Mr. Y has been arrested, what then ? Operations 
 such as these, like the transactions of a village moneylender, bring 
 in little in the way of resources and have to be paid for a hundredfold 
 in the hour of defeat. Again, while the Great General Staff dissipated 
 their energies in these fruitless and miserable tasks, both they and 
 their Government were grossly deceived as to the material and 
 moral conditions of their allies and their prospective enemies. 
 
 The arch-spy in every country was the German Ambassador. Thus 
 the Wilhelmstrasse, on the strength of Count Pourtales' reports from 
 St. Petersburg, came to believe that Austria could do what she 
 pleased with Serbia, that Russia, in the throes of strikes, would give 
 way again as she had done in 1909, and, in so doing, would lose her 
 prestige, not only in the Balkans, but also in France and Great Britain, 
 and that accordingly Germany's position would be unchallenged. 
 Simultaneously the spies of the General Staff reported that the 
 reorganization of the Russian army would not be complete for three 
 years, and estimated its offensive powers so low that Berlin regarded 
 it as a negligible quantity which could be easily held up by the Austro- 
 Hungarian army and a few German reserve corps until the termination 
 of a victorious campaign against France released a triumphant horde 
 to hurl itself on Russia and annihilate her. 
 
 34 
 
Police Government and Espionage 
 
 France ! What a game they would play with France ! The 
 interview of M. Poincare with the Czar was fixed for July 24th. 
 The ultimatum should be dispatched on the 23rd, so that the mystery 
 of it might cast a sinister gloom over their meeting. The decision of 
 the Austrian Government would be known at the moment M. Poincare 
 left Russia. The two allies would be exchanging vows of eternal 
 friendship. Germany would bring them to a sense of reality. If 
 Russia acted, would France support her ? What ! In a wretched 
 squabble over Serbia ! What was Serbia to France ? Jacques 
 Bonhomme would soon say it was no affair of his. Panurge would 
 add : " I hate fighting, and if I am to fight I must know why." The 
 Socialist Congress had just adopted a motion of Jaures advocating 
 a general strike in case of war. Socialist opposition might safely be 
 counted on. The Ministry was composed of pacifists who had 
 opposed the Three Years Law. French finances were in a deplorable 
 condition. Her 805 million franc loan was not yet locked up. France 
 would abandon Russia and that would be the end of both the Double 
 and Triple Entente. She would cease to count among the Powers 
 of Europe. They could treat her as they pleased and not a finger 
 would be raised in her defence. They could beat her to the dust at 
 leisure as Austria would beat Serbia. 
 
 If, on the other hand, she accepted the challenge, they would make 
 but a mouthful of her. As she had not dared to add a year to the 
 service of the class which was under the colours in October, 19 1 3, 
 her army would consist of two classes of young soldiers, many of 
 them not more than twenty years of age. They would melt away 
 before the onslaught of the German invincibles. What of their 
 officers ? The German attaches had seen something of them at the 
 South-Western manoeuvres. They were a prey to political dissen- 
 sion. There were generals who were happy enough to possess decora- 
 tions, badges of rank, and the moral and material advantages they 
 conferred, but no desire to take hard knocks for the sake of the 
 Republic. Most of them did not believe in war. The Germans, 
 with their customary forethought, had spent forty millions more 
 than the French and therefore their preparations were infinitely 
 more extensive and complete. The French General Staff was wedded 
 to the idea that invasion would come by way of Lorraine, between 
 Toul and Belfort. The French troops would be massed on that 
 frontier while the Germans were passing through Belgium. Except 
 Maubeuge, no fortress would bar their path and within a fortnight 
 
 35 3* 
 
I :\: C:..>:> ?.:*d C: '<:-..: r ::> c : - : War 
 
 . . . 
 
 S 
 
 ; " . . ;; — :'.;' : ; ; : 
 
 sir* c carried on: 
 
 ... . 
 
 ? ::> ; ■ :v.:> 
 
 ? :"\\-> luences J 
 
 ; her their 
 
 ;mgh the question of con- 
 
 did 
 r.r: .v.:-: 
 
 not t 
 P 
 
 :^ :: - 
 
 oltra-pac 
 
 j 
 
 g 
 
 politics, and 
 
 Laments, 
 
 :hem 
 a 
 sses 5 remiss 
 
 or indirect, on foe. 
 
 on them for its ms wild not mc 
 
 - - . . 
 :o allow their a: 
 
 :uld be an 
 
 ■ ; s ^thing mc ms to a 
 
 War, and breakout . . . 1 :.ient 
 
 :"-_e :-.:■•.:■: are .: Britain's energies ;-. : .i:\-^rre.i ::: .-. tv.:^ri\i:i w.ir. 
 
 ; v ■ - « Italy. In : ripoli he 
 
 Neither die Wilhdmstrasse nor 
 the B th their in 
 
Police Government and Espionage 
 
 tions towards Serbia. The Kaiser thought that the Italian army 
 disorganized and her finance-, in confusion. He had already counted 
 her as lost to the Triple Alliance and while he thu .-fully 
 
 renounced tin of a Power with an army estimated at 
 
 1,250,000 men, he provoked the intei Belgian army 
 
 which, with all its defects of training and equipment, hag proved itself 
 by its heroi im a foe by no means to be despised. 
 
 By ranging Great Britain among Germany's foes the Kaiser was 
 certain to lose the help of Italy. 
 
 The final result of Germ- | the reports they 
 
 so Laboriously accumulated is that the Kaiser was led to plunge 
 Germany into war at the worst possible moment for her, by brie 
 about a coalition which includes all ' vv-rs of Europe 
 
 with the single- exception of Austria-Hungary. 
 
 37 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND RUSSIA 
 
 Prussia and Russia after 1772 — Bismarck and Russia in 1877 — The Treaty of 
 Berlin — Fears of a Franco-Russian Alliance — The Austro-German Alliance 
 — Russian hatred of Germany — Bismarck — Bismarck and Constantinople 
 — The Re-Insurance Treaty of 1884 — Bismarck's speech of February 6th, 
 1888 — Schemes against Russian credit — The Russian loan in Paris of 
 December 10th, 1888 — The accession of William II. — Prince Hohenlohe's 
 account of the rupture with Bismarck — The Triple Alliance in 1891 — 
 William II. 's scheme — The Franco-Russian Alliance — German diplomacy 
 and its results. 
 
 WE must believe that German diplomatists are wonderful men, 
 for, in addition to the assiduous self-advertisement of the 
 Germans themselves, we have the evidence of innumerable simpletons 
 who express a blind belief in Teutonic assertions of their all-round 
 superiority. We must also believe that German diplomacy has had 
 the benefit of the superior methods which characterize German 
 actions. We will now compare these beliefs with the facts. 
 
 In 1 870-1 87 1 Bismarck had created the German Empire, his work 
 of " blood and iron," and henceforth devoted his energies to maintain- 
 ing it. To preserve it, he followed a contradictory policy. He con- 
 cluded an alliance with Austria-Hungary and at the same time 
 entered into friendly relations with Russia. In this way he hoped 
 Germany would have nothing to fear. 
 
 Since the Seven Years War Prussia and Russia had always been 
 on good terms. The schemes for the partition of Poland had been 
 a source of discord but their accomplishment had drawn the two 
 great brigands together. If Prussia had abandoned Austria and 
 Russia after Austerlitz, resistance to Napoleon had reunited them. 
 During the Crimean War Prussia had favoured Russia, and in 1870- 
 187 1 Russia had adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality against 
 France. 
 
 In 1872 Bismarck was successful in persuading the Emperor Francis 
 
 38 
 
German Diplomacy and Russia 
 
 Joseph to visit Berlin to pay his respects to the Emperor William, 
 the victor of Sadowa, and meet the Emperor Alexander II. The 
 result was the Alliance of the Three Emperors against France. 
 
 When Russia made war on Turkey in 1877 Bismarck considered 
 he had paid off his debt to her by preventing Austria-Hungary from 
 intervening. The Russian army reached San Stefano, and the Treaty 
 of that name was concluded ; but it appears that its terms were 
 inconsistent with an Austro-Russian secret treaty which had been 
 signed at St. Petersburg before the war and also with an arrangement 
 come to with England at the end of the armistice. In 1878 the 
 Congress of Berlin gave to Austria the administration of Bosnia and 
 Herzgovina, the two provinces which had initiated the struggle. 
 Russia came out of it gravely weakened and Prince Gortschakoff 
 left Berlin with a feeling of resentment against Bismarck. During 
 his stay he had spoken to a French journalist of the possibility of 
 a Franco-Russian alliance. 
 
 Bismarck relates* that at his meeting with Count Andrassy, the 
 Austro-Hungarian Minister, at Gastein, on the 27th of August, 1879, 
 the latter said : "To a Russo-French alliance the natural counter- 
 poise is an Austro-German alliance." Bismarck, however, would 
 have nothing more than a purely defensive alliance against a Russian 
 attack on either of the contracting parties. The Emperor William 
 regarded the agreement as a kind of treason towards the Czar of 
 Russia for whom he entertained a warm personal regard. Bismarck 
 only overcame his scruples by being " compelled to bring the cabinet 
 into play, a method of procedure extremely against my grain. The 
 Emperor was not convinced by the arguments of policy, but gave the 
 promise to ratify the treaty only because he was averse to ministerial 
 changes."! Even so, William I. thought it only loyal to give the 
 Czar of Russia private notice of the alliance which had just been 
 concluded. 
 
 " The treaty which we concluded with Austria for common defence 
 against a Russian attack is ■publici juris. An analogous treaty 
 between the two Powers for defence against France has not been 
 published."! 
 
 Bismarck was quite aware of the hatred in Russia against all things 
 
 * Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 257. 
 
 t Bismarck : His Reflections and Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 268. 
 
 X Ibid, Vol. II., p. 272. 
 
 39 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 German and that the Czar could not ignore it, however ardent his 
 desire to be on good terms with Germany. 
 
 " Scarcely, however, could anti-German rancour acquire in Russia a keener 
 edge than it has among the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovenes of 
 the countries comprised within the earlier German Confederation, and the 
 Poles in Galicia. In short, if in deciding between the Russian and the Austrian 
 Alliance I gave the preference to the latter, it was not that I was in any degree 
 blind to the perplexities which made the choice difficult. "* 
 
 Bismarck tried to maintain friendly relations with Russia. He was 
 particularly anxious that the German Empire should not be drawn 
 into the vortex of Balkan politics, and spared no pains to convince 
 Russia of the v " defensive character of German policy." He foresaw 
 that Russian ambitions would one day be directed towards Con- 
 stantinople, and said that it would be all to Germany's advantage 
 if Russia were solidly established at Constantinople and preoccupied 
 with the burden of its defence. . . . And againf : " Were I an Austrian 
 Minister, I would not prevent the Russians going to Constantinople, 
 but I would not begin an understanding with them until they made 
 the move forward." Bismarck considered Germany's lack of direct 
 interest in the Eastern question a great asset in her policy. 
 
 After absorbing Italy in the Austro-German alliance in 1882 
 he tried to bring about another Triple Alliance between Germany, 
 Austria and Russia. On the 24th of March, 1884, a treaty was signed 
 at Berlin, which was ratified at a meeting of the three Emperors at 
 Skiernewice. Bismarck called it the " Re-Insurance Treaty." If 
 one of the three contracting Powers made war on a Power not a 
 party to the Treaty, the two others would preserve an attitude of 
 benevolent neutrality. Bismarck wished to add a clause providing 
 that if two of them made war on a fourth, the third would in that 
 case also remain neutral ; but Russia had her suspicions that this 
 stipulation was aimed at France, and refused to accept it. In case 
 of conflict in the Balkans, each Power would pursue its own interests 
 and if they clashed the third would decide. A protocol was added 
 allowing Austria to annex Bosnia and Herzgovina without regard 
 to the other signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. For the rest the 
 three Powers declared themselves responsible for its fulfilment or 
 non-fulfilment, a stipulation which explains their declaration that 
 they would not oppose the absorption of Eastern Roumelia by Bul- 
 
 * Bismarck's Reflections. f Ibid, p. 285. 
 
 40 
 
German Diplomacy and Russia 
 
 garia and would not permit Turkey to fortify the Balkan countries. 
 If Turkey allowed a fourth Power (Great Britain) to enter the 
 Dardanelles, the contracting Powers would intervene. 
 
 This Treaty brought no advantage to Russia. Bismarck makes 
 no reference to it in his Reflections and Reminiscences, and if it owed 
 its existence to him, he failed to maintain it. Bulgaria annexed 
 Eastern Roumelia, and to show her independence of Russia Stam- 
 bulofT condemned and executed nine Russophile officers. The 
 Schnaebele affair showed Russia that Bismarck had not abandoned 
 the idea of a second war against France. Alexander III. sent an 
 autograph letter to the Emperor William and the Skiernewice Treaty, 
 concluded provisionally for three years, was not renewed. 
 
 In practice Bismarck's policy went counter to the principles he 
 had enunciated. He was preparing the very Franco-Russian Alliance 
 he so much dreaded. In November, 1887, he offered the St. Peters- 
 burg cabinet Germany's armed support in case of an Austrian attack 
 on Russia, but on the 6th of February, 1888, he destroyed the effect 
 of that offer by an inflammatory speech in which he demanded a loan 
 of twenty-eight million marks for the purchase of munitions of war. 
 " We must carry out the decrees of Providence. . . ." The existing 
 misunderstanding with Russia would doubtless vanish ; but 
 as the Russian Press " has closed the door on the ancient and 
 powerful friend we have always been, we shall not knock there 
 again." 
 
 It was Bismarck himself who indicated to France and Russia the 
 necessity for combination against Germany. " We can be attacked 
 on three sides, while France can only be attacked on the east and 
 Russia on the west. We are more exposed to coalitions than any 
 other nation. Franco-Russian pressure makes internal unity im- 
 perative for us. If we found ourselves at war with Russia, war with 
 France would be inevitable." 
 
 In the spring he ordered the Reichsbank to cease taking Russian 
 bonds as security. On December 10th, 1888, a Russian loan of 
 five hundred million francs was floated in Paris. The ground was 
 thus prepared for the Franco-Russian Alliance. 
 
 Bismarck's Russian policy thus ended in a check. 
 
 On the 15th of June, 1888, William II. mounted the throne. His 
 first two speeches were made to the Army and Navy and not until 
 three days later did he address his people. He dismissed Bismarck 
 in March, 1890. According to Prince Hohenlohe's diary, the real 
 
 41 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 cause of the rupture was the conflict between the views of Bismarck 
 and the Emperor on the question of making a choice between Austria 
 and Russia at the moment when war was threatening between those 
 two Powers. It would seem that Bismarck then recognized that the 
 subordination of German policy to that of Austria was a mistake. 
 These are the entries in the diary : 
 
 " Berlin, March 26th, 1890. 
 11 The Emperor thought that Bismarck was contemplating abandoning 
 Austria and the Triple Alliance in favour of an understanding with Russia." 
 
 " It becomes increasingly clear that the divergence of opinion between the 
 Emperor and Bismarck with regard to Russian aims has been the cause of the 
 rupture. Bismarck wanted to let Austria go, but the Emperor insists on the 
 maintenance of the Austrian Alliance even at the risk of a war with Russia and 
 France. It is a black outlook for the future." 
 
 The Triple Alliance was renewed in 189 1. There were rumours of 
 an agreement between William II. and King Leopold that France 
 should be attacked through Belgium. It was also said that William II. 
 had suggested to England and Turkey an alliance against France. 
 Result — the visit of Admiral Gervais and his French squadron to 
 Cronstadt at the end of July, 1891. Alexander III. listened bare- 
 headed to the strains of the " Marseillaise " and the Russian National 
 Anthem. A military and naval convention followed, and the final 
 outcome was the alliance of 1895. I was a member of the Ministry 
 which sent the fleet to Cronstadt. All thinking men experienced a 
 profound sense of relief that the dangerous isolation of France had 
 become a thing of the past. 
 
 The Franco-Russian Alliance was responsible for a number of 
 illusions cherished by the more simple-minded Frenchmen who 
 believed that henceforth the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine was 
 assured. Russia had no intention of assisting France in a war of 
 revenge. The Franco-Russian Alliance was merely a guarantee of 
 security from German aggression. Von Biilow has twitted French- 
 men on their disillusionment, but to attribute to all the vain 
 imaginings of Deroulede was to assume too much. His jests only 
 concealed the chagrin of German statesmen at the maintenance of 
 the Alliance. Yet it has owed its continued existence largely to the 
 action of Von Biilow and the other Chancellors. Professors, journalists, 
 official and otherwise, have never ceased denouncing the Russians as 
 
 42 
 
German Diplomacy and Russia 
 
 barbarians animated with all a barbarian's hate of lofty German 
 civilization and the desire to destroy it.* 
 
 The Germans are never tired of posing as the bulwark of civilization 
 against the onslaught of these barbarian hordes. The Russian spectre 
 was invoked to support the arguments in favour of increased arma- 
 ments in 1912 and 191 3. The forces of the emancipated Balkan 
 nations would immobilize a part of the Austro-Hungarian army 
 destined for action against Russia. The German contingents must 
 therefore be increased. The Chancellor enunciated this policy in his 
 speech of the 7th of May, 191 3, and the policy itself may be expressed 
 in terms such as these : " Russia will never make war to satisfy 
 French passion for revenge. We must therefore force her into war. 
 In so doing we shall bring about the very contingency we ought to 
 prevent. The one aim of our policy should have been to avoid 
 finding ourselves beset both by France and Russia, yet for more than 
 thirty years we have pursued a policy which could only bring those 
 two Powers together." 
 
 In recent years the aims of this German policy have become 
 increasingly evident and German diplomacy touched its high-watei 
 mark when, on August 1st, 1914, it found itself compelled to take 
 the initiative by declaring war on Russia. 
 
 * If I were Emperor, a pamphlet published in 191 2, which had an immense 
 sale throughout Germany. 
 
 43 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 The policy of Great Britain — The Balance of Power and naval supremacy — 
 Bismarck and Great Britain — The Franco-Egyptian crisis — The colonial 
 policy of France — The French Protectionists — " Grasping the Trident " — 
 " Our future is on the sea " — Naval policy and world-power — Opposition 
 in the Reichstag — The Navy League — Anglophobia — Treitschke — Kiao- 
 Chau — Turkey — The Mohammedans — Polynesia — Africa — The telegram 
 to Kriiger — Von Billow's confessions — Central and South America — 
 Holland and Belgium — The blockade of Russia — Megalomania — Picrochole 
 — " Great Britain will not move " — Popular illusions about English 
 Germanophiles — Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Guildhall on the ist of 
 July, 191 1 — Rage against England. 
 
 IN his speech of December 2nd, 19 14, the Chancellor, Herr von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, reminded his audience that British 
 foreign policy had two aims : naval supremacy and the European 
 balance of power. 
 
 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries command of the sea 
 meant the monopoly of ocean commerce ; but the repeal of the 
 Navigation Act in 1849 proved that Great Britain no longer intended 
 to put forward that claim. She was content to possess, as a conse- 
 quence of her Free Trade policy, between fifty and sixty per cent, 
 of the world's carrying trade. 
 
 Since the Armada at least, the English have feared nothing more 
 than the hegemony of one state in Europe lest they themselves 
 should be subjected to it. At the end of the seventeenth century they 
 waged war on Louis XIV., who wished to restore the exiled Stuarts 
 and dominate the Continent. At the beginning of the eighteenth 
 century they again took up arms against him because he was 
 attempting to secure the Spanish throne for his grandson, Philip V., 
 while preserving all his rights as heir to the French throne. They 
 fought against Napoleon, who tried to master Europe and break 
 down their power. 
 
 The Prussians had the benefit of this policy in the Seven Years 
 
 44 
 
German Diplomacy and Great Britain 
 
 War. It is true that when Napoleon gave them Hanover their 
 acceptance was followed by a declaration of war from England in 
 March, 1806. England supported Prussia in 1813 and 1814; but 
 at the Congress of Vienna Prussia displayed such greed that she came 
 into collision with the Czar Alexander of Russia and Lord Castle- 
 reagh, the representative of Great Britain. She was obliged to give 
 up Saxony, which she intended to annex, and an alliance against her 
 was formed between France, Austria and England.* 
 
 In 1864 Great Britain was weak enough to allow Prussia and 
 Austria to annex the Danish Duchies. She also allowed Bismarck 
 to create the Confederation of the North, and subdue South Germany 
 in 1866. She raised no objection to the creation of the German 
 Empire in 1871. Bismarck took some pains to soothe British 
 susceptibilities as to the policy of the German Empire. He repre- 
 sented Germany as the model of prudence, thoroughly content with 
 her lot, entirely preoccupied with her own internal development 
 and consequently in no position to menace Great Britain either at 
 sea or on the Continent. At the same time, he was encouraging 
 France in her colonial enterprises and inciting her to pursue an 
 Egyptian policy which would lead to friction with Great Britain. 
 He was eminently successful, and the French protectionists lent him 
 their aid by exasperating public feeling in England. 
 
 It was not very difficult for a grandson of Queen Victoria to be 
 friendly to Great Britain, but only on the terms that he did not indulge 
 in a policy " exceeding the limits of Bismarck's." William II. 
 " meant to give Germany a preponderating voice in the world." 
 At another time he said that " Germany must wield the 
 trident." 
 
 Prince von Bulowf boasted of having carried out that policy, and 
 in justification tells a story of Bismarck to the effect that although 
 Friedrichsruh was not far from Hamburg the old statesman had not 
 visited that city for a long time. Some years after his retirement, 
 at the age of eighty, he accepted an invitation from Herr Ballin, 
 Managing Director of the Hamburg-American Line, to visit Hamburg, 
 and was amazed at the size and magnificence of the liners. " Yes, 
 this is a new age — a new world ! " he exclaimed. It was singularly 
 bold of Prince Bulow to read into these words Bismarck's conversion 
 to the naval and world policy of the Kaiser and his renunciation of 
 
 * V. Debidour : Histoive Diplomatique de I'Europe, Vol. I., p. 36. 
 f Imperial Germany, p. 102. 
 
 45 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 the course he had recommended and followed since 187 1. The words 
 were uttered on a liner, not on a Dreadnought. 
 
 The Kaiser, with his forceful personality, his well-known views 
 and his naval programme, presented for Great Britain a twofold 
 danger, of which one aspect was a continental policy which menaced 
 British security and rested on a claim to intervene in the affairs of 
 everyone else, and the other, Germany's lust for conquest which 
 affected the whole world. The Pan-German movement dates from 
 just before 1893 and owed its inception to the Kaiser, Admiral von 
 Tirpitz and Von Bieberstein. It was based on an interpretation of 
 Article 4 of the Constitution of the German Empire : 
 
 " Imperial supervision and legislation shall be extended to the following 
 objects . . . and also to colonization and emigration into foreign countries." 
 
 The Reichstag had no ambition for a great navy. On the 28th of 
 March a budget cutting down the number of new ships demanded 
 by the Government was passed on the third reading. On the 28th of 
 June Biilow became Chancellor of the Empire. On the 27th of 
 November Admiral von Tirpitz, as head of the Admiralty, brought 
 forward a building programme of seven battleships, two armoured 
 and seven light cruisers, to be completed by 1904. Speaking in the 
 name of the Bundesrat, he said : " Without prejudice to the rights 
 of the Reichstag or making any demand for the imposition of new 
 taxation, the Allied Governments have made it the basis of their 
 naval policy to create within a limited period a national fleet strong 
 enough to give effective protection to the maritime interests of the 
 Empire." Prince Biilow has said, not without a certain naive frank- 
 ness : " We thought this increase of our naval power might arouse 
 a certain uneasiness and resentment in Great Britain." If such 
 was his anticipation, it was not likely to be falsified by the appearance 
 of the " Deutsche Flotte Verein," the German Navy League, which 
 Admiral von Tirpitz founded in May 1898. He popularized it by 
 methods borrowed from the Salvation Army. German naval officers 
 took part in processions in which a great blare of trumpets, trombones 
 and drums strove to rouse the landlubbers to a proper conception of 
 the ideal enshrined in the Kaiser's famous phrase : " Our future lies 
 on the sea." 
 
 The preamble of the Navy Bill of 1900 said that " Germany must 
 possess a fleet so strong that the greatest naval Power in the world 
 would run the risk, even in c^se of victory, of losing command of the 
 
German Diplomacy and Great Britain 
 
 was represented as in the throes of starvation and even short of steel 
 with which to rebuild her fleet. German professors and journalists 
 made no secret of their hostility to Great Britain. The most famous 
 of them, Treitschke, said : 
 
 " We have squared our account with Austria-Hungary, France and 
 Russia. The last account with Great Britain will be the longest and 
 most difficult of all." 
 
 But he did not hesitate to describe it as a necessity. In January, 
 1900, Professor Hans Delbriick wrote in the North American Review : 
 
 " As her (Great Britain's) great naval power cannot be overwhelmed by a 
 single State, the best remedy would be an alliance against her of all her rivals 
 together, especially of Russia, France and Germany." 
 
 Twelve years later Eisenhart wrote in his book, Germany in the 
 Twentieth Century : 
 
 " We consider a great war with England inevitable." 
 
 University professors, schoolmasters and journalists have assiduously 
 taught that the English are too selfish and cowardly, except in the 
 field of sport, to defend their country. The mention of the British 
 army invariably suggested the analogy of the mercenaries of Carthage 
 and Cato's dictum, " Delenda Carthago.'''' " Carthage must be 
 destroyed." 
 
 They went on to demonstrate how easy this would be. They said : 
 " The British Empire is not a reality but a sham."* The population 
 of the colonies is not large enough to give Great Britain adequate 
 support. The ties between them and the mother-country are so 
 loose that they have no interests in common. Great Britain cannot 
 guarantee their protection. Why, then, should they prejudice their 
 security by fighting for her ? General Bernhardi counted on the 
 breaking away of Canada and on the probable loss of India. 
 
 The Germans are always explaining that the British Government 
 has not the stability of the German autocracy since it is in the hands 
 of Ministries, often disunited, and also subject to parliamentary 
 control. In such circumstances how could the diplomacy of Downing 
 
 * Professor Cramb : Germany and England. Dr. Charles Sarolea : The 
 Anglo-German Problem. 
 
 47 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Street compare with that of the Wilhelmstrasse ? Nevertheless, the 
 British Empire extends over the surface of the entire globe, while 
 Germany's sole asset is her European territory of a paltry 540,000 
 square kilometres.* Britain, then, is the foe which must be, and 
 can so easily be, destroyed. These fine imaginings were duly 
 translated into acts. 
 
 It is the habit of German politicians to regard every German emigrant 
 to a foreign country as a loss to Germany. However, it is not prac- 
 ticable to forbid emigrants to go to the United States and compel 
 them to settle in German East Africa. So other outlets had to be 
 found. 
 
 They first suggested the partition of China, and, by way of a start, 
 took possession in the autumn of 1897 of a large slice of territory 
 round Kiao-Chau Bay and forced the Treaty of Shantung on China. 
 But as China was over-populated already it was hardly suitable as 
 an outlet for the German surplus population. 
 
 In 1889 the Kaiser obtained from Turkey the concession of the 
 Anatolian Railway. In 1898, shortly after the first Navy Bill, he 
 landed in Palestine, assigned to himself the protection of the Holy 
 Places which the Pope had refused him, proceeded to Constantinople 
 to offer his friendship to Abdul-Hamid and on his way thither made 
 a famous speech at Damascus, in which he said : 
 
 " The three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over 
 the surface of the globe may rest assured that the German Emperor 
 will at all times be their friend." 
 
 This direct appeal to the Mohammedans of India, Egypt, Tunis 
 and Algeria could not be lost on Great Britain. Then, to put his 
 profession of friendship into practice, the Kaiser inaugurated the 
 Bagdad Railway scheme. 
 
 He has tried to lay hands on the territory of nearly every foreign 
 State, small and great. At the end of the Spanish-American War, 
 in 1899, he acquired the Caroline and Marianne Islands, and openly 
 boasted of having " secured a point cfappui in Polynesia." But what 
 was his purpose if not to agitate Australia ? In Africa the Germans 
 have steadily aimed at joining up their south-western and eastern 
 colonies by the acquisition of Rhodesia. They hoped the Boers 
 would undertake the groundwork of this task. Negotiations took 
 * Approximately 208780 square miles. 
 
 48 
 
German Diplomacy and Great Britain 
 
 place and the Germans agreed to supply them with arms. These 
 negotiations led directly to the eventful telegram to Kriiger in 1896, 
 which encouraged the Boers to declare war on Great Britain on the 
 10th of October, 1899. The Germans were intensely disappointed 
 when the British demonstrated their ability to transport an army 
 from Europe to the Cape and from the Cape to the Transvaal and 
 to bear with comparative ease the cost of the war. The violence and 
 vulgarity (which did not even spare Queen Victoria) of the German 
 Press exceeded that of any other country, nor was the impression on 
 English public opinion modified by the Kaiser's refusal to receive 
 Kriiger. The British were not deceived. They knew that Von 
 Billow's only reason for maintaining neutrality was the weakness of 
 the German fleet and the difficulty of obtaining French support for 
 a war of aggression against them. The British Government was 
 quite aware of Germany's share in the responsibility for the Trans- 
 vaal War. 
 
 The formation of the South African Union out of the various 
 peoples of South Africa, and the fact that the Boers played the 
 dominating role in it, carried Germany a stage further in the path 
 of disillusionment. Von der Goltz said : " We must resist the 
 English supremacy." 
 
 About 1880 the Germans entertained ideas of colonization in 
 Central and South America. Venezuela was the first object of their 
 attentions. They made her loans, bought mines and embarked on 
 commercial enterprises. The next step was to dispatch a warship 
 to the principal port and claim a share in the government of the 
 country.* These proceedings immediately alarmed the United 
 States which invoked the Monroe Doctrine and prohibited all inter- 
 ference in the internal affairs of Venezuela. This was the deathblow 
 to German hopes of colonial expansion in the Gulf of Mexico and 
 Germany had perforce to accept British and American supremacy 
 at sea. 
 
 To-day, thanks to their rate of emigration into Brazil, they are 
 thinking of establishing a German state in the State of San-Paolo. 
 
 Rotterdam and Antwerp are the ports of the Rhine and the Nether- 
 lands are the obvious base for an invasion of Great Britain. Holland 
 and Belgium are only independent because Great Britain and France 
 have prevented Germany from seizing them. Then, says Germany, 
 
 * Pan-Germanism, by Roland G. Usher, Professor of History at Washington 
 University, St. Louis, p. 119. 
 
 49 4 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 they must be taken, the Belgian Congo with Belgium and the Dutch 
 Indies with Holland. Denmark is the key to the Baltic, destined to 
 become a German lake. Denmark, too, must be taken, and then when 
 the outlets of Russia are blocked at the Bosphorus on the south 
 and the Sound and Great Belt on the north, she will have no other 
 open port in Europe save Archangel. 
 
 Germany has pushed Austria into adventures in the east and 
 south-east, but in reality Austria has only followed in her wake, 
 and it is Germany which has directed Austrian policy for her own 
 ends. German and Austrian statesmen, their imagination fired by 
 memories of classic times, have ever dreamed of controlling the great 
 highways by which the Romans, the Barbarians and the Crusaders 
 passed from the Danube valley to Constantinople, and the Turks from 
 Constantinople to the Danube valley. Imagination plays a far 
 greater part in these flights of fancy than an exact appreciation of 
 the benefits to be derived from their realization. Salonica, as a 
 commercial port, is almost valueless to Austria and Germany.* Its 
 sole use would be for military purposes. Then follows the dream of 
 the Bagdad railway, of the germanization of Turkey and Persia, and 
 afterwards India. As Italy is established in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, 
 Germany would take Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco. Victorious 
 Germany would found a world-embracing confederation, embracing 
 Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, Turkey, Egypt, Persia and 
 India, with the Kaiser as indubitably its head as he is head of the 
 German Empire. The simple gospel of the Pan-Germans is this : 
 " If the English can govern India we can do so too." Yet they 
 have never succeeded even in governing the Duchy of Posen and 
 Alsace-Lorraine ! 
 
 When, in the sixteenth century, an illustrious Frenchman named 
 Rabelais described the wonderful feats of Picrochole, he was uncon- 
 sciously making himself the historian of German policy. 
 
 The Germans are for ever telling us that Great Britain has acquired 
 nearly all her possessions by force and that this gives them the right 
 to expel her from them by force. Yet they have not the slightest 
 intention of restoring Australia to the aborigines, New Zealand to 
 the Maoris, Canada to the Iroquois, and India to her Rajahs or the 
 Great Mogul. Their idea is simply to take Great Britain's place. 
 Nor must it be forgotten that this ambition a la Picrochole is not 
 entertained solely by irresponsible journalists, but has received official 
 * See the Journal des Economistes, November, 191 2. 
 50 
 
German Diplomacy and Great Britain 
 
 sanction, as repeated attempts to realize it sufficiently prove. Bis- 
 marck's successors have laboured under the delusion that Great 
 Britain need never be considered. As Prince von Billow frankly 
 says in his book : 
 
 " Germany is now too strong to be attacked by sea, so Great Britain 
 will not move." 
 
 That phrase ignores at least one result of Von Billow's policy, the 
 Anglo-French entente of 1904. Maximilian Harden, the journalist 
 who claims to represent the Bismarckian tradition, has more than 
 once reproached the German Government for " diminishing by their 
 attitude of menace the causes of friction between Great Britain and 
 France in North Africa." The German Government have done more. 
 They have bound the two countries in a close-knit alliance. The 
 German Ambassador, Count Wolff Metternich zur Gracht, told the 
 Kaiser : " You and the Crown Prince hold England spellbound. 
 You may do what you like and England will not move. Her War 
 Minister is Mr. Haldane, who said ' Germany is my spiritual home.' 
 Mr. Lloyd George is enchanted with his visit to Germany and full 
 of admiration for our social policy." 
 
 Fortified by these assurances, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr 
 von Kiderlen Wachter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the 
 Panther to Agadir on the 1st of July, 191 1. On the 21st of July, 
 speaking at the Lord Mayor's annual dinner to the bankers and 
 merchants, Mr. Lloyd George reminded his audience that 
 
 " Great Britain would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. . . . But if 
 a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by 
 the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries 
 of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests 
 were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then 
 I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable 
 for a great country like ours to endure. National honour is no party question. 
 The security of our great international trade is no party question ; the peace 
 of the world is much more likely to be secured if all nations realize fairly what 
 the conditions must be." 
 
 Coming from a friend these words were all the more significant. 
 They were followed by a declaration of Mr. Asquith in the House of 
 Commons which met with universal assent, expressed by Mr. Balfour 
 in the name of the Unionists, and by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald on 
 
 51 4* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 behalf of the Labour Party. The effect was such that the German 
 Press immediately dropped its provocative tone and expressed itself 
 a3 thoroughly satisfied and ready for an understanding. 
 
 Germany doubled her armaments and to lull British suspicions 
 gave out false reports of the acceleration of her naval construction. 
 Her military experts devised plans for the invasion of Great Britain 
 and openly congratulated themselves that the days of Nelson's 
 strategy had gone by when the defence of the Channel was left to 
 the winds of Heaven. 
 
 German diplomacy, with all its method, with all its skill and with 
 all its unrivalled armoury, of which espionage is the principal weapon, 
 has produced a situation in which Great Britain, France and Russia 
 find themselves united in a common cause, a situation the reverse 
 of that of 1900 when Hans Delbruck dreamed of a coalition of Ger- 
 many, Russia and France against Great Britain. When the decisive 
 moment came Germany put forward a ridiculous casus belli against 
 Russia after refusing Sir Edward Grey's suggestion of a conference. 
 She carefully cleared away the last doubts as to her intention to 
 provoke war, then violated the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, 
 and gave Great Britain the magnificent role of defending the sanctity 
 of treaties which she herself described as so many " scraps of paper." 
 Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and his compatriots have ceased to 
 speak of Germany defending Europe against Slav barbarism. Their 
 rage is now directed against the English whom they are pleased to 
 call their near relations. They have taken endless pains to prove 
 that the violation of Belgian neutrality was only a pretext for the 
 English, yet they themselves presented Sir Edward Grey with a 
 motive for war which appealed irresistibly to all. Could Great 
 Britain have remained neutral without that motive ? For myself 
 I think not. She could not have kept out in face of so evident and 
 persistent a menace to her security as the patent designs of the 
 German Empire. But how can a sample of German diplomacy 
 which made British intervention inevitable be regarded as a proof 
 of its method, wisdom and superiority ? Diplomacy which has 
 arrayed Great Britain, Russia and France in war against its country 
 has brought it into dire peril, and the more the Chancellor 
 emphasizes the effect of British intervention, the greater is the 
 indictment against himself and Prince von Billow, unless, indeed, 
 they were merely the mouthpiece of William II. 
 
 52 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 
 
 Bismarck's policy after Sadowa — Not extended to France — The peril of 1875 — 
 Its true character — Colonial policy and Anglophobia in France — Alsace- 
 Lorraine — Boulangerism — Bismarck and preventive wars — Opposition in 
 the Reichstag — The Schnaebele affair — The Raon-1'Etape affair — The 
 isolation of Alsace — The Emperor William II. — A policy of threats and 
 favours — The visit of the Empress Frederick — Retaliation on Alsace — 
 The ambitions of William II. — The Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. 
 
 WE have seen by what methods of bluff and bluster the directors 
 of German policy have succeeded since 1871 in drawing 
 together Russia and Great Britain into alliance with France in 
 opposition to the Triple Alliance. The same methods were equally 
 characteristic of Germany's attitude towards France. In his Reflec- 
 tions and Reminiscences, Bismarck reveals that he always allo'wed 
 for the contingency of which Germany stood in so much dread and 
 we have seen the means by which he attempted to reconcile contra- 
 dictory policies. There was always, however, one fatal bar to his 
 success. Germany would make no promise not to attack France. 
 Bismarck tells us* how he opposed the King and the military clique 
 after Sadowa when they demanded territorial acquisitions and a 
 triumphal entry into Vienna. He made it his business " to avoid 
 leaving behind in her (Austria) any unnecessary bitterness of feeling 
 or desire for revenge." He says : 
 
 " In positions such as ours was then, it is a political maxim after a victory 
 not to inquire how much you can squeeze out of an opponent, but only to 
 consider what is politically necessary." 
 
 Nevertheless, he betrayed this principle after the victory over 
 France. He declared for " the frontier of language." Von Moltke 
 demanded Metz and Belfort. Thiers replied : " If you want both, 
 there is no chance of signing peace to-day." Bismarck says : " I 
 was distinctly apprehensive of foreign intervention at that moment." 
 * Reflections and Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 41. 
 
 53 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Von Moltke abandoned Belfort and kept Metz. No sooner had the 
 indemnity been paid and the last German troops left French soil 
 than France was again threatened in 1875. The French had just 
 established their fourth battalions. Von Moltke and the war party 
 demanded a preventive war on the ground that it would be both 
 agreeable and useful, would reduce France to impotence and give 
 them a new sheaf of laurels with little effort. Bismarck has accused 
 Prince Gortschakoff of having invented this story in order to rouse 
 the Czar of Russia to intervene. " Story " or not, Queen Victoria 
 was not slow in intervening also. On the 13th of August, 1875, 
 Bismarck wrote to the German Emperor : " I do not know whether 
 your Majesty would consider it feasible to take Queen Victoria at her 
 word when she assures your Majesty that she would find it easy to prove 
 that her fears were not exaggerated."* Bismarck goes on to speculate 
 as to her sources of information. As a matter of fact, he knew them 
 then and that they were quite otherwise than he hypocritically con- 
 jectured. In April, Herr von Radowitz, a very popular figure in the 
 Court of Berlin, had seen Count de Gontaut-Biron, the French Am- 
 bassador, at a ball, and warned him that French military reorganiza- 
 tion might lead to war. Blowitz, in the confidence of the Due de 
 Decazes — then Minister for Foreign Affairs — wrote to The Times, 
 saying that Germany intended to " bleed France white," to exact an 
 indemnity of ten milliards (£400,000,000), payable within twenty 
 years, and to keep an army of occupation in the eastern departments 
 until that sum was paid. Mr. Delane, the well-known editor of 
 The Times, only published this piece of news after having verified 
 it. Now the German Ambassador in London, Herr von Munster, 
 and the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, had both 
 announced it. The German Press denied it, but Radowitz, who had 
 made the original remark to de Gontaut-Biron, continued to remain 
 high in Bismarck's favour. One day, when Bismarck attributed 
 this story to Stock Exchange speculators, Lord Odo Russell replied : 
 " Will you censure your four ambassadors who have misled us and 
 the other Powers ? " Bismarck gave no answer. He says in his 
 Reflections and Reminiscences (Vol. II., p. 189) : 
 
 " So far was I from entertaining any such idea at the time, or afterwards, 
 that I would rather have resigned than lent a hand in picking a quarrel which 
 could have had no other motive than preventing France from recovering her 
 breath and her strength." 
 
 * Bismarck's Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 191. 
 
 54 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 Nevertheless, his letter of the 13th of August to the Emperor con- 
 tained the following observation : 
 
 " But, on the other hand, it is not advantageous to give our enemy (France) 
 the assurance that we shall in any case await his attack " (Vol. II., p. 192). 
 
 It is highly probable that Von Moltke and the war party, who were 
 so often the object of Bismarck's complaints, really had the intentions 
 divulged by Radowitz to Count de Gontaut-Biron. However that 
 may be, Radowitz's indiscretion proved doubly useful to Bismarck. 
 He confounded the war party and at the same time intimidated 
 France by revealing his hope that peaceful means would dissuade her 
 from pursuing her military reorganization. The result was the reverse 
 of what he wished. Great Britain and Russia both intervened and 
 their rulers intimated to the Emperor William their distrust of the 
 aggressive tone of German policy. 
 
 I have recounted,* briefly and without exaggeration, the deplorable 
 consequences of the policy into which Bismarck led France at the 
 Congress of Berlin in 1878. He successfully directed French passions 
 against Great Britain and induced his dupes to squander their strength 
 in Africa and the Far East, and generally to subordinate French foreign 
 policy to the necessities of Germany. The question of colonial policy 
 was the determining issue of the French elections of 1885. According 
 to the ministerial declaration of November 16th, " The extension of 
 our colonial enterprises imposes an unjustifiable burden upon us ; " 
 and when M. de Freycinet became President of the Council, he 
 declared on the 7th of January, 1886, that " Universal Suffrage 
 means that France shall pursue a policy of peace and honour, and 
 shall make her weight felt on the Continent. There must be no 
 more of these oversea adventures." 
 
 Unfortunately M. de Freycinet showed lack of statesmanship by 
 allowing General Boulanger to be thrust upon him as Minister for 
 War. The new Ambassador in Berlin, M. Herbette, hastened to 
 assure the Emperor William I. at his first audience on the 23rd of 
 October, 1885, " that the political aims of the French Government 
 were peace, industry and stability." William I. could hardly reply 
 that he hoped they would fail and had perforce to rest content with 
 this assurance ; but a month later, on the 25th of November, a Bill 
 was brought forward to increase the German army by ten per cent, 
 on its peace footing, and even more on its war footing. To overcome 
 
 * Journal des Economistes, May 15th, 1914, pp. 195-201. 
 55 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 the opposition of the Reichstag Von Moltke was imported, in the 
 hope that his immense prestige would influence the assembly, and 
 he declared that 
 
 " An understanding with France has been spoken of. But as long as public 
 opinion in France demands the restoration of two essentially German provinces, 
 such an understanding is impossible." 
 
 In France the " League of Patriots " did its best to furnish argu- 
 ments to Von Moltke and the big-army party. Its noisy and 
 irresponsible agitation found a fitting mouthpiece in General Boulanger 
 and the attitude of the German Press gave it a handle. 
 
 Speaking on the nth of January, 1887, Bismarck said : " We are 
 at the moment in possession of the subject of dispute — Alsace. We 
 are not therefore fighting to obtain it." He declared himself hostile 
 to the idea of a preventive war. " I never believe in making war 
 merely because sooner or later war is inevitable." He recited 
 the appalling consequences to Germany of a French victory, if war 
 broke out ; but if Germany should triumph, " we should try to reduce 
 France to such a condition that she would be unable to attack us for 
 thirty years." With all this persuasion, however, the Reichstag 
 voted the law for three years only and was immediately dissolved. 
 Francophobia was made the issue in the ensuing electoral campaign 
 and the Chancellor roused public feeling to fever-heat by the broad- 
 cast distribution of pamphlets and posters showing French soldiers 
 invading Germany and carrying away the women and cattle. The 
 Press announced that seventy-two thousand reservists would be 
 called up for the 7th of February. On the nth of March the new 
 Reichstag passed the Seven Years Law by 227 votes to 31. There 
 were 34 abstentions. 
 
 The agitation died down, but five weeks later, on the 10th of April, 
 a French police commissioner named Schnaebele was arrested on 
 the frontier and taken to Metz. This man was arrested on a 
 warrant emanating from the tribunal of Metz, ordering him to be 
 seized as soon as he set foot on German soil. The charge preferred 
 was that of high treason committed in France. He had been 
 denounced by a man named Klein, himself accused of the same 
 crime. Schnaebele had been lured on to the German side of the 
 frontier by his German colleague who pretended that a frontier-post 
 had fallen down. While on the German side and waiting for his 
 colleague he was set upon by some other men and though in the 
 
 56 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 course of the struggle that followed he got back on to French soil, 
 he was none the less arrested. 
 
 Explanations lasted until the 27th of April. The German Govern- 
 ment would not admit any violation of the frontier, but could not 
 help recognizing that a trap had been set, and on the 29th gave orders 
 for Schnaebele's release.* The French Government thus vindicated 
 their rights in the particular instance, but the German Government 
 preferred a claim to charge Frenchmen with high treason for acts 
 committed on French soil. The Times pointed out that according to 
 this theory all Frenchmen might be charged with treason by Germany 
 and likewise all Germans by France. A charge of treason brought by 
 one country against another is ridiculous. While the incident was 
 under discussion Bismarck uttered these words in the Prussian 
 Chamber : 
 
 "It is impossible to establish permanent friendly relations with so quarrel- 
 some a race as the French, who have attacked us times without number in the 
 past." 
 
 Under the circumstances, this declaration was an additional proof 
 that Bismarck shared the common German defect of want of tact. 
 His acts and speeches were far more dangerous than the freaks of 
 Paul Deroulede and the antics of the circus general named Boulanger 
 who left the Ministry on the 30th of May. The incident closed 
 officially on the note of " Peace with Honour." 
 
 On the 24th of September, 1887, there was a new frontier incident 
 at Raon-1'Etape. A soldier named Kauffmann, lent to the Forestry 
 Department, shot a Frenchman, M. Brignon, and wounded another, 
 M. de Wangen, who were shooting with three friends near the frontier. 
 The German Government granted an indemnity of fifty thousand 
 marks to M. Brignon's widow but no proceedings whatsoever were 
 taken against Kauffmann. On the contrary, he was rewarded by 
 his officers for " the noble achievement of having killed a Frenchman." 
 
 As Bismarck said, the German Empire was " in possession of the 
 subject of dispute." Yet no progress was made towards assimilating 
 the new provinces. The people of Alsace-Lorraine were stung to 
 fury by the measures taken by their first Statthalter, Herr von 
 Manteuffel, and his successor, Prince Hohenlohe. The machinery of 
 law was set in motion to repress expressions of opinion. French 
 
 * See L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885-1894), by Pierre Albin 
 (Paris, Felix Alcan), p. 82. 
 
 57 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 newspapers were not allowed in the two provinces. A close watch 
 was kept on girls' schools to discourage the teaching of French, and 
 no Frenchman was allowed to visit Alsace without a special permit 
 from the authorities. 
 
 The North German Gazette explained these measures of repression 
 by saying that " the chief obstacle to the assimilation of Alsace was 
 the continuation of social and economic relations with France." 
 Accordingly, those relations had to be restricted if they could not be 
 altogether suppressed. The French Government even had to make 
 an arrangement with Switzerland by which trains which had formerly 
 passed through Mulhausen were allowed to travel on Swiss territory. 
 
 Thus it came about that after nineteen years Bismarck was 
 declaring that France must definitely resign herself to the loss of 
 Alsace and Lorraine, and at the same time admitting that the 
 " germanization " of those two provinces had made no progress. 
 German tyranny there was itself, in fact, the heaviest indictment of 
 the territorial arrangements of 1871. Bismarck was also unwittingly 
 admitting that the German Empire was a thing so delicate and fragile 
 that its existence could only be maintained by an armed force which 
 he was pleased to call defensive. Yet he could not have created that 
 armed force without the aggressive arguments he advanced at one 
 time against France, at another against Russia. When he retired he 
 left the inevitable Franco-Russian Alliance as a legacy to William II. 
 
 However, Bismarck stood for a certain guarantee of peace which 
 vanished when William II. became his own Chancellor. At the 
 Labour Conference which was to have been held at Berne, but which 
 he managed to get transferred to Berlin in 1890, he showed himself 
 very friendly to Jules Simon and the other French delegates. But 
 no one was deceived by that manoeuvre. On the 6th of May, at the 
 opening of the Reichstag, he brought forward a Bill to increase the 
 field artillery by seventy batteries and the establishment by eighteen 
 thousand men. The two new army corps were brought up to strength 
 by the addition of their special arms. Caprivi, the new Chancellor, 
 justified the measure by Bismarck's old argument — the rapproche- 
 ment between Russia and France. 
 
 Bismarck's ambition was that Germany should always be so 
 powerful as to inspire terror in all other nations. In 1871 the Army 
 establishment was fixed for three years at 401,059 men ; that is to 
 say, one per cent, of the total population, in conformity with 
 Article 60 of the Constitution. In 1874, however, the General Staff 
 
 58 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 had the three years extended to seven, and in 1881 the establishment 
 was fixed for another seven years, to the 31st of March, 1888, at 
 427,274 men. 
 
 These Seven Years Laws fixed the Army establishment for a 
 definite period, avoided the necessity of frequent reference to the 
 Reichstag, and gave the Chancellor a free hand with his foreign 
 policy. Further, these laws were only binding on the Reichstag. 
 The Chancellor could ask the Reichstag to modify them if he thought 
 fit, and on the 25th of November, 1886, though the seven years' period 
 did not expire until 1888, he demanded an additional 41,135 men. 
 
 A year later the Chancellor again violated the Seven Years Law. 
 The service of the six classes of trained men whose time in the 
 landwehr would normally have expired in their thirty-third year was 
 extended to their thirty-ninth. Every fit man between seventeen 
 and forty-five who had not done service either in the Army or Navy 
 was to be incorporated in the landsturm. 
 
 On the 6th of May, 1890, as we have seen, the Seven Years Law 
 of 1887 was revised. The establishment was increased by eighteen 
 thousand men ; seventy batteries were added to the artillery, and 
 so on. It will be noticed that the Seven Years Laws were never 
 revised in favour of the diminution of armaments, but always in the 
 direction of increase. 
 
 The Freycinet Ministry (1 890-1 892), in which M. Ribot was Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, put an end, at least for the moment, to the anti- 
 English policy of France by concluding the Agreement of the 5th of 
 August, 1890.* At the same time Russia and France were drawing 
 ever closer together. 
 
 An incident in 1891 showed the uncertainty of the relations between 
 France and Germany. William II. projected an exhibition of paint- 
 ings at Berlin and commissioned Detaille, the most national of French 
 painters, to secure the support of French artists, as the Government 
 did not wish to take any part. Detaille was successful. The Empress 
 Frederick suddenly resolved to pay a visit to Paris. She went to 
 Versailles and crossed the Park of Saint-Cloud. Her movements 
 became the subject of great clamour among the Boulangists. 
 Detaille received the Empress on her first visit, but two days later, 
 Under pressure from Deroulede, he withdrew his co-operation. His 
 defection was followed by that of the other artists he had secured. 
 The Empress had to leave France without any public reception. 
 * I was a member of that Ministry. 
 
 59 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the W 
 
 . : ■ ■ P ass i 
 
 hress 
 
 Latter 
 
 j 
 M. R fid the 
 
 ;:u. The Ge m in Govei ome 
 
 i 
 
 but the ill-will b 
 
 with the atmc 
 i 
 It is 
 
 die 1st 
 
 [n July a French 
 August 
 : . on tbu- 
 interest in the 
 
 on d with the 
 
 other to j thai common 
 
 .•"v Eu ro- 
 On die 14th of Se William II 
 
 E rfurt in which he the Corsica] . p s art who 
 
 j humiliation on the P rinces 
 but on the 1 6th oi S ished t: 
 
 in Alsace-Lou line ' May, 1892, the R< 
 
 BID emp 
 
 denee 
 jot communes 
 .forth to be in ere / 
 
 Mulhauser sters must 
 
 wary. 
 A: the end of : Army Bill increased 
 
 :.i;> officers, 11.000 non-conr.v -;.ooo men » 
 
 and the 800,000 marks (app oxima ; 0.000). 
 
 Bisrr the mouth of Cap 
 
 Of course, the on of immedi . but '* the French 
 
 can.] 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 love war for the glory it brings," and the Chancel:- ! of them 
 
 eady to hurl themscV He wound up with a 
 
 to the I rapprochement^ the result 
 
 by German diplomacy, to th^ir utter amazement and confusion. 
 
 Id 1893 the Emperor William went to celebr; 
 Seda: battlefields oi Lorraine. He made a triumphal entry 
 
 into MetZ at the head of 25,000 men and in te banquet 
 
 told the Lorrainers, " Germans you are, and Germans you shall 
 remain." 
 
 After variou 3 negotiations, not free from difficulty, the I: 
 :«n Alliance was signed in March, 1894. Thus was lost to 
 Germany that European hegemony to which Bismarck had never 
 ceased to aspire, and which William II., vith greater emphasis, if 
 authority, has ever demanded as her due. 
 
 *« 
 
CHAPTER X 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 
 
 ALGECIRAS 
 
 Bismarck a reluctant advocate of colonial policy — Opposition in the Reichstag 
 — New Guinea— Angra Pequena and Great Britain — Togoland and the 
 Cameroons — The Berlin Conference of 1885 — Subsidies for German ship- 
 ping — Caprivi's opposition to colonial expansion — The Anglo-French 
 Agreement of April 12 th, 1904 — The Franco-Spanish Agreement — The 
 resignation of Von Biilow — The Emperor William's rage — Herr von 
 Kiihlmann and M. Saint-Rene Taillandier — William II. 's visit to Tangier — 
 Germany's insolent demands — " We stand behind Morocco with our full 
 strength " — The Algeciras Conference — German manoeuvres are checked — 
 Von Biilow and the " isolation " of Germany — German diplomacy as seen 
 by the Frankfort Gazette. 
 
 WE have already noticed certain deviations in Bismarck's policy 
 even during his long dictatorship. There remains another, 
 his excursions into the realm of colonial expansion. 
 
 Bismarck found it profitable to offer colonies to France but many 
 Germans found it intolerable that France should be allowed to add 
 to her territory while Germany remained confined within her old 
 frontiers. Bismarck feared friction with Great Britain and the 
 Liberals, on whose support he depended, opposed colonial adventures. 
 However, in 1879, after the collapse of the important house of Godefroy, 
 which had a large connection in the South Seas, he asked the Reichstag 
 for a State guarantee for a company which was to take over its 
 plantations in Samoa. The Reichstag refused. 
 
 A company was formed and began operations in the north of New 
 Guinea. The Deutscher Kolonial Verein began to work up public 
 opinion in favour of colonial policy. Bismarck yielded. In 1883, 
 when a Bremen merchant named Liideritz suggested to him the estab- 
 lishment of a trading-station at Angra Pequena, he informed Great 
 Britain. As that Power raised no kind of objection and even ignored 
 the intimation, Bismarck declared the whole coast and hinterland 
 
 62 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 between the Portuguese possessions and the Orange River (with the 
 exception of Walfisch Bay) a German Protectorate. Further north, 
 Dr. Nachtigal, stealing a march on both the French and English, 
 occupied Togoland and the Cameroons. In 1884 and 1885 a German 
 Protectorate was established on the east coast of Africa. Simul- 
 taneously German colonies were established in New Guinea and in 
 the archipelago of New Britain. The Caroline Islands would have 
 shared the same fate had it not been for the award of Pope Leo XIII., 
 who was called in to arbitrate between Germany and Spain. Bismarck 
 announced that he meant to delegate responsibility for the colonies 
 to the traders. The new territories were considered merely as pro- 
 tectorates, not incorporated in the Empire ; but in 1888 an Arab 
 rising compelled the German Government to undertake the defence 
 and administration of East Africa and all the German colonies were 
 put under the direction of a department of the Foreign Office. At 
 the Berlin Conference of 1885 Bismarck obtained recognition for the 
 German possessions in East and West Africa, and a year later for 
 the South African possession also. 
 
 In 1 881, as part of the programme, Bismarck demanded a subsidy 
 for German shipping ; but the project was opposed by Bamberger 
 and the Liberals and it was not until 1885 that he obtained subsidies 
 for Pacific steamship lines. Then others followed. 
 
 On the other hand, in 1892 Caprivi opposed the colonial movement, 
 and to those who said " Why not take the French colonies ? " he 
 replied, " We have quite enough of our own " (November 23rd, 1892). 
 This retort, however, far from soothing the German " colonials," 
 only served to irritate them. France occupied Tunis, Indo-China, 
 Madagascar, the Sudan, the Congo, and had by no means forgotten 
 Alsace-Lorraine. It was not fair. 
 
 The Fashoda incident did not lead to war between France and 
 Great Britain. At the time of the South African War Von Biilow was 
 given to understand that he could not drag France into a war against 
 England. At the end of March, 1904, he was informed that an agree- 
 ment was about to be concluded between Great Britain and France. 
 
 This entente bore the date of April 8th, 1904. On the 12th of April 
 Biilow, who had known of it a fortnight before, told the Reichstag 
 that " from the point of view of German interests it contains nothing 
 objectionable ; from the point of view of Morocco, German commercial 
 interests have everything to gain from the establishment of peace 
 and order in that country." 
 
 63 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 On the 6th o! October, 19043 ■ Franco-Spanish treaty was con- 
 cluded by which Spain adhered to the Tench Agreement. 
 The WOhefanstrasst s informed the same day and the German 
 Chancellor's attitude remained unchanged. His complacence, 
 ever, was uTusory. On the :4th oi April, 19^4, the Emperor William 
 had rancorously complained oi the warm reception which Italy 
 M. Loubet in the previous year. 
 
 '• Think mew the unity o! the G 
 
 nation; think of Worth fg I trust that the results 
 
 6 our eyes will be . . . to hnd us united, if 
 ever we are called on to take our part in w c 
 
 On the 50th of May the German Colonial Assembly . 
 
 D in the following terms : 
 
 '• La .\ny modification 01 the ... the German Empire must 
 
 receive compensation sufficient to counterbalance the i . French p 
 
 and cones] inoe ol her economic intei - - the country, 
 
 her need of naval bases and the requirements of her expanding population."' 
 
 At that time Russia was war with Japan and 
 
 cc could look for no material ass 1 in that quarter. Further, 
 
 as deputies and journalists were urging incessantly that dis- 
 
 prevailed in the French army and navy. 
 
 On February nth, 1905, the German Minister at I Herr von 
 
 Kuhlr to the French Minister. If. Saint-Rene Taillandier : 
 
 " We have noticed that you systematically treat . ftt. I 
 
 am formally instructed to tell you that the Imperial Government will ignore 
 ents that may have been concluded wit CO and will 
 
 maintain complete '. ::on.*' 
 
 1 Biilow told the French Ambassador that he knew nothing of 
 the words "attributed'' to his charge ..' A month later 
 
 William II. announced his pending visit to Tangier. In the Reichstag 
 Biilow declared : 
 
 •• I consider that the duty of the German Government is to see that in future 
 our economic interests in Matt not injured. - ' 
 
 The Frankfort Gazette considered that that formula implied die 
 M maintenance of the territorial integrity oi Morocco." Immediately 
 afterwards the voice of menace made itself heard in the Mum 
 
 • The reply of the threatened German interests 
 
 64 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 will be made through the gateway of Metz." Another journal tried 
 a flight of wit by adding that " English warships could hardly be 
 fitted with wheels so as to take part in a continental war." 
 
 After delivering a speech at Bremen, William II., on March 23rd, 
 embarked on the liner Hamburg which was escorted by the cruiser 
 Friedrich Karl. He stopped at Lisbon from where he is said to have 
 telegraphed to Bulow that he would not go to Tangier. Biilow seems 
 to have replied that as his voyage had been deliberately planned and 
 begun it could not be broken off. The Emperor accordingly pro- 
 ceeded. When he reached Tangier harbour, he sent his aides-de-camp 
 on shore at once but delayed his own landing for nearly four hours. 
 He was received by Mouley-Abd-El-Malek, and said to him : " I 
 consider the Sultan an absolutely free Sovereign, and it is with 
 him that I wish to confer as to the best means of safeguarding 
 German interests in Morocco with all our strength." 
 
 The German Government published a " White Book," setting forth 
 reasons for the voyage and the Emperor's declaration. It began with 
 certain quotations from the Press in justification of the step. Now, 
 with the exception of an extract from the Temps, all of them were 
 subsequent to Biilow's speech announcing the Kaiser's voyage. The 
 " White Book " put them forward as " provocation," yet in fact 
 they were that unusual species of provocation which follows, not 
 precedes, the decision and the act ! The whole German case was 
 based on the assertion that M. Saint-Rene Taillandier had addressed 
 the Sultan as the mouthpiece of Europe, but his subsequent dispatches 
 revealed what he actually had said : 
 
 " I reminded the Sultan that he was under an obligation to safeguard by any 
 and every means the French and European interests which were in such 
 serious jeopardy." 
 
 The German consul at Fez, in face of this simple and positive 
 declaration, made at the moment by a man who appreciated the signi- 
 ficance of his words, could only bring forward a version which he had 
 more or less wrung from the Sultan. 
 
 There followed an impertinent German attack on the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, M. Delcasse, who was compelled to hand in his 
 resignation on the 8th of June, 1905.* 
 
 M. Rouvier, President of the Council, took over his portfolio — 
 and also his difficulties. The Wilhelmstrasse called for a conference, 
 which they induced the Sultan to demand. Prince Radolin, the 
 
 * See Victor Berard : L' Affaire Marocaine. (Paris.) 
 
 65 5 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 German Ambassador in Paris, said at the Quai d'Orsay : u We stand 
 by a conference, and if there is no conference, then by the status quo. 
 You must realize that we are behind Morocco with our whole strength." 
 
 Germany hoped to secure through the conference the establishment 
 of international police, army, and financial administration in Morocco, 
 in which she would have a controlling voice. Yon Biilow took to 
 threats. He said to the French Ambassador, M. Bihourd : u This 
 difficult, this very difficult question, must not be allowed to drag on. 
 It is not wise to linger on the edge of a precipice." At last, on the 
 8th of July, M. Rouvier accepted the idea of a conference with the 
 reserve that " the Imperial Government should pursue no objective 
 contrary to the interests of France or the rights conferred by existing 
 treaties and arrangements." 
 
 During the negotiations Count Tattenbach made the most strenuous 
 efforts to secure a concession for the harbour works at Tangier and 
 other Moroccan ports, an order for ships, a loan, and a contract for 
 the material and installation of a cable between Tangier and the 
 Atlantic coast. All this was denied at first in Berlin but in Sep- 
 tember Von Biilow came to the end of his evasions and quietly said 
 to the French Ambassador : " In your place I should secure a similar 
 concession." 
 
 In a word, " I am guilty ; be guilty too, and we shall be quits." 
 
 The Conference met at Algeciras on the 1 6th of January, 1906. 
 The Russo-Japanese War had ended in the previous August so Russia 
 was free. Great Britain and Spain were in agreement with France. 
 The German Emperor offered the policing of all the Moroccan ports,* 
 both to Italy and Spain, and took to threats when, on March 3rd, 
 M. Revoil having demanded a discussion of the police question and 
 Herr Radowitz opposing, ten votes were given in favour of it and 
 only three votes against, the latter being those of Germany, Austria- 
 Hungary and Morocco. Germany, in no wise abashed, telegraphed 
 to St. Petersburg and Washington that all the Powers had deserted 
 France. In the night of March I3th-I4th the English Government 
 replied by a circular telegram, asserting their complete agreement 
 with France. On the 19th a similar assurance was given by the 
 Russian Government. 
 
 On the 20th of March Herr von Tschirschky, Secretary of State, 
 said to M. Bihourd : 
 
 (i The difficulties are at an end, since we conform to your wishes." 
 * Tardieu : La Conference d' Algisiras, (Paris, F. Alcan.) 
 
 66 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 In his book, Imperial Germany, Prince Bulow professes himself 
 satisfied with the result, which he records in these words : 
 
 " Nevertheless, we succeeded in preserving the sovereignty of the Sultan, 
 and in securing international control of the police organization and the Moroccan 
 National Bank, thus ensuring the open door for German economic interests 
 as well as for those of all other countries." (P. 82.) 
 
 M. Delcasse had left the Quai d'Orsay. The Tangier voyage was 
 over. The Algeciras Conference had finished its labours. Never- 
 theless, Bulow, speaking on the 15th of November, 1906, sounded 
 a note of petulance and menace : 
 
 " A policy which aimed at encircling Germany, at forming a ring of Powers 
 to isolate and paralyse us, would be very dangerous for the peace of Europe. 
 Such a ring is impossible without the exertion of a certain pressure. Pressure 
 creates counter-pressure. Pressure and counter-pressure can easily produce 
 explosions." 
 
 Yet when Germany formed the Triple Alliance, when in 1884 she 
 added to that another Triple Alliance embracing Austria and Russia, 
 and when she urged France into conflict with Great Britain — what 
 was all that but an attempt to isolate France ? Germany's idea of 
 what was legitimate was everything that increased her strength 
 against France, but everything that increased French resistance to 
 her aggression she denounced as provocation on the part of France. 
 
 When she held M. Delcasse responsible for the policy of so-called 
 " isolation " of Germany, she paid him the greatest possible com- 
 pliment, for she thereby admitted the superiority of French diplo- 
 macy to her own. The German charge was that M. Delcasse wanted 
 to isolate Germany by the Anglo-French Agreement, the Franco- 
 Italian Agreement, and the Franco-Spanish Agreement, super- 
 imposed on the Franco-Russian Alliance. The mighty Power which 
 aspired to the hegemony of Europe thus behaved like a lost child, 
 crying, " I won't be left alone ! I'm frightened ! " 
 
 To complete the picture, Germany threatened to hurl her army 
 at the Powers which " ringed her round." 
 
 About the end of 1906 the Frankfort Gazette gave the following 
 resume of the achievements of German diplomacy : 
 
 " German diplomacy has become unpopular throughout the world. First, 
 the telegram to Kriiger ; then declamations against the Yellow Peril and 
 America ; then pan-Islam agitation in Africa. One blunder after another . . . 
 what has it all led to ? We left the Boers to shift for themselves. The Japanese 
 have beaten the Russians. The Sultan of Morocco has had to accept the 
 Franco-Spanish police. . . ." 
 
 67 5* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 That is a German's considered judgment of German diplomacy- 
 diplomacy which has always been inspired by the Kaiser himself or 
 the Chancellor, and never been hampered by Parliamentary institu- 
 tions. Yet French writers and politicians are still to be found who 
 wax enthusiastic over the autocratic regime of Germany, the con- 
 sistency of her policy and the mechanical precision of her methods, 
 and not even a patent success such as that of Algeciras can shake 
 their assertion that France was beaten. 
 
 68 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 
 
 AGADIR 
 
 The affair of the deserters — The interview with the Kaiser recorded by the 
 Daily Telegraph — Germany's threatening attitude — The agreement of 
 February 9th, 1909 — The annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina — Germany 
 " in shining armour " — The Agadir coup — Herr von Kiderlen Wachter's 
 declarations to Herr Class, President of the Pan-Germanic League — Ger- 
 many's object — Uncertainty — Morocco and the Congo — " Our place in 
 the sun " — German indifference to the Algeciras Convention — The arrange- 
 ment of November 4th, 191 1 — " Diplomatic ethics " — The five threats to 
 France — Billow's confession — The motives for Germany's ill-will — The 
 routes through Alsace and Lorraine. 
 
 THE Algeciras Conference made little improvement in the internal 
 condition of Morocco. In March, 1907, Dr. Mauchamp was 
 murdered at Marakeck. In July some European workmen employed 
 at the port of Casablanca were killed. Moulai Hand, brother of the 
 Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, organized a rebellion which was supported by 
 the Germans who had abandoned their former protege. 
 
 Six deserters from the Foreign Legion, three of them Germans 
 and the others Swiss and Austrians, had been granted safe-conducts 
 by the German Consulate. On the 25th of September, 1908, the 
 French prevented them from embarking and there was something 
 in the nature of a " scene," in which the Chancellor of the German 
 Consulate took part. Baron von Schoen, then Secretary of State, 
 suggested arbitration. France agreed. Baron von Schoen imme- 
 diately demanded that France should first apologize for the encroach- 
 ment of her agents on the prerogatives of the German Consulate, 
 Germany expressing her regret for the grant of safe-conducts to Swiss 
 and Austrians who had obviously no right to them. 
 
 On October 28th the Daily Telegraph published a famous account 
 of an interview with the Kaiser, in which he avowed his friendship for 
 Great Britain but declared that it was not shared by the German 
 
 69 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 nation. The publication of this interview caused the greatest excite- 
 ment in Germany, and both the Emperor and the Chancellor were 
 severely criticized. 
 
 Was Biilow trying to distract public attention from the affair of 
 the deserters ? However that may be, he began to adopt a threatening 
 attitude towards France. Prince Radolin said as much to M. Clemen- 
 ceau and talked of leaving Paris. 
 
 The situation became so grave that the Army Corps of the East 
 were confined to barracks and the decision was taken to recall the 
 class dismissed in September. At last the German Emperor con- 
 sented not to go to war for such a trivial affair in which he was hope- 
 lessly in the wrong, and on November ioth he agreed to arbitration 
 without a preamble. On the 15th of November, Prince Biilow, in 
 the Reichstag, professed his friendship for France. This display of 
 good feeling was followed by the agreement of February 9th, 1909, 
 whereby Germany, recognizing the special political interests of France 
 in Morocco, undertook not to stand in her way. France guaranteed 
 Germany .-economic equality as she had already done in the case of 
 England, Spain and Italy. In May, 1909, a Moroccan Public 
 Works Association was formed, comprising all the great commercial 
 houses which had tendered for public works in Morocco in the 
 previous six years. 
 
 In March, 19 10, following on friendly negotiations, France and 
 Germany decided on a Moroccan loan to pay off the European 
 creditors whose claims had been examined in 1909 by an international 
 commission sitting at Casablanca. x4t the moment Franco-German 
 relations seemed to be on the most excellent footing.* 
 
 In Imperial Germany Prince Biilow speaks of the annexation 
 of Bosnia and Herzgovina as Germany's revenge for the Moroccan 
 affair and the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg told M. Isvolsky, 
 the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Germany, " in shining 
 armour," stood beside Austria. 
 
 The real attempt at revenge on the part of the German Empire 
 was the Agadir coup. 
 
 On July 1st, 191 1, Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, 
 handed to M. de Selves, who had only been three days at the Quai 
 d'Orsay, the following note : 
 
 " Various German commercial houses which carry on business in southern 
 Morocco, and particularly in Agadir and its neighbourhood, are alarmed at 
 
 * Tardieu : La France et les Alliances (1910J. (Paris, F. Alcan.) 
 
 70 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 the unrest among certain tribes. These houses have asked the Imperial Govern- 
 ment to undertake the protection of the persons and property of their repre- 
 sentatives. In answer to this request the Government have decided to send 
 a warship to the port of Agadir, so that in case of necessity assistance and 
 protection may be given to German subjects and proteges and the important 
 German interests in that region. As soon as tranquillity and order are restored 
 in Morocco, the vessel charged with this mission of protection will leave the 
 port of Agadir." 
 
 In the version which appeared in the North German Gazette a more 
 ominous note was heard. The protection of German subjects was 
 only a pretext. The Panther was sent to Agadir, not to intimidate 
 Moroccan tribes, but to intimidate France and deprive her of the 
 benefits of the Algeciras Convention. 
 
 The moment was well chosen. Saturday being the first day of 
 the English week-end, Sir Edward Grey was not at Downing Street. 
 Also, it was the eve of the departure of the President of the Republic 
 and the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Netherlands. Lastly, 
 the Emperor William II. was just about to start on his annual cruise 
 to the Norwegian fjords in order to create the alibi which was to 
 do such good service at the end of July, 1914. 
 
 With the clumsy bad faith which is characteristic of the German 
 Government they attempted to deny their intentions in this theatrical 
 proceeding, but the Fortnightly Review* has published the evidence 
 given on January 9th, 191 2, in court by the editor of the Rheinisch 
 Westfalische Zeitung in an action brought by him against the Grenz- 
 boten. It has only appeared in the former journal and the Tagliche 
 Rundschau, but has never been contradicted by the persons mentioned : 
 
 " Herr Class, the President of the Pan-Germanic League, is prepared to state 
 upon oath before this Court that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 Herr von Kiderlen Wachter, writing to him from Kissingen, requested Herr 
 Class to meet him at the Hotel Pfalzer Hof in Mannheim. During the interview, 
 which occupied several hours, Herr von Kiderlen- Wachter stated : ' The Pan- 
 Germanic demand for the possession of Morocco is absolutely justified. You 
 can absolutely rely upon it that the Government will stick to Morocco. M. 
 Cambon is wriggling before me like a worm. The German Government is in a 
 splendid position. You can rely on me, and you will be very pleased with our 
 Morocco policy. I am as good a Pan-German as you are.' On the 1st of July 
 Herr Class called at the German Foreign Office, and failing to find Herr von 
 Kiderlen Wachter, was received by Herr Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary. 
 Herr Zimmermann told him : ' You come at an historic hour. To-day the 
 Panther appears before Agadir, and at this moment (twelve o'clock mid-day) 
 
 * No. XCL, New Series, 462. 
 71 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 the Foreign Cabinets are being informed of its mission. The German Govern- 
 ment has sent two agents provocateurs to Agadir, and these have done their duty 
 very well. German firms have been induced to make complaints and to call 
 upon the Government in Berlin for protection. It is the Government's intention 
 to seize the district, and it will not give it up again. The German people require 
 absolutely a settlement colony. Please prevent, wherever in the Press you 
 have influence, the raising of claims for compensation elsewhere. Possibly 
 France will offer us the Congo. However, the German Government does not 
 want compensation elsewhere but a part of Morocco.' "* 
 
 There is the objective, stated unequivocally. The French Ministers 
 were thoroughly perturbed by this act of aggression. Should they 
 send a warship in reply to the dispatch of the Panther ? M. Delcasse, 
 then at the Admiralty, was opposed to that course, and finally it w r as 
 decided that France should follow the lead of Great Britain. While 
 M. de Selves was in the Netherlands, M. Caillaux, President of the 
 Council, had temporarily taken his place at the Ministry for Foreign 
 Affairs. He had a conversation with Herr von Gwynner, President 
 of the Deutsche Bank, and member of the Prussian Upper House. 
 But the Panther, a small gunboat about 210 feet in length, was 
 replaced by the cruiser Berlin, about 340 feet long and carrying a 
 crew of 273 men and 13 officers. France was retreating, Germany 
 advancing. 
 
 What did she really want ? 
 
 " A final solution of the Moroccan question," said the official Press. 
 But by what means r To this question various answers were returned. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, supported by Mr. Balfour, 
 Leader of the Opposition, and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, Chairman of 
 the Independent Labour Party, made an emphatic declaration that 
 the British Government would take all necessary steps to protect 
 British interests and fulfil the engagements contained in the treaty 
 with France. Count Osten Sacken, the Russian Ambassador, made 
 a friendly inquiry as to the views of the German Government. 
 
 M. de Selves, having returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
 asked Baron von Schoen what Germany wanted. Baron von Schoen 
 replied that " he had no information on the matter." M. Paul 
 Cambon was accordingly instructed to press the Wilhelmstrasse for 
 the answer which their Ambassador in Paris professed to be unable 
 to give. On July 8th, Baron von Schoen, speaking purely in a 
 private capacity, said that " he thought the Congo might become 
 
 * Quoted by J. Ellis Barker in his article, " Anglo-German Differences and 
 Sir Edward Grey," Fortnightly Review, March 1st, 191 2. 
 
 72 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 the subject of some understanding." Next day Herr von Kiderlen 
 Wachter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, said as much officially. 
 
 It has been rightly said that Germany was pursuing a policy of 
 extortion. She was demanding the Congo from France in exchange 
 for Morocco, as if Morocco belonged to Germany. 
 
 The negotiations followed a strangely erratic course. On July 15th 
 Herr von Kiderlen Wachter demanded the whole of Gaboon and all 
 the French Congo situated between the Atlantic and the river Sanga. 
 The French Government replied that " they could not entertain any 
 proposals on that basis." On the 23rd, Herr von Kiderlen Wachter 
 offered to compensate France with the Bee de Canard and Togoland ; 
 but at the same time he reserved the right to open the question of 
 special guarantees in favour of German trade and industry in Morocco. 
 
 The firmness of Great Britain made the Wilhelmstrasse draw back. 
 Germany gave up all claims to territorial compensation in Morocco, 
 but she demanded a favoured nation treatment in that country 
 and the maintenance of the system of " proteges," which the French 
 Government particularly wished to abolish. On the 1st of August 
 Herr von Kiderlen Wachter demanded compensation in the Congo : 
 (i.) Access to the sea between Libreville and Spanish Guinea in such 
 a way that the German possession should surround that colony ; 
 (ii.) access to the river Congo. In return France was to have a free 
 hand in Morocco. 
 
 Access to the river Congo meant cutting French Equatorial Africa 
 in two. 
 
 On the 4th of August Herr von Kiderlen Wachter demanded more 
 than half of Gaboon and the middle Congo. France was to surrender 
 to Germany her right of pre-emption on Spanish Guinea, and to come 
 to some arrangement with Germany in anticipation of the disap- 
 pearance of the Belgian Congo. On the 9th he maintained all these 
 demands, and withdrew the offer of Togoland. On the 14th and 17th 
 there were further demands. The conversations were interrupted by 
 the absence of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
 Chancellor ; but the German Press put their requirements still higher. 
 At a banquet given by the Hamburg Senate the Kaiser repeated once 
 again : " You may rest assured that no one will deny us our place 
 in the sun." Both he and his audience took his words to mean that 
 if Germany coveted territory already in the possession of France, the 
 French would have to give place. 
 
 On September 7th, when conversations were resumed, the whole 
 
 73 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 question was at large. In Morocco Germany reserved to herself 
 the right to treat directly with the Sultan and refused even France 
 the right to suggest reforms to him. Two zones were created, one 
 south and the other north of the Oued Tensift. The Germans were 
 to be guaranteed thirty per cent, of the public works in the first and 
 seventy per cent, in the second. 
 
 A similar guarantee was to be given in respect of the iron ores. 
 
 Germany was calmly proposing to tear up the Algeciras Treaty, but 
 she was forced to give way. On September 23rd an agreement 
 seemed to have been reached, but on the 27th Herr von Kiderlen 
 Wachter substituted new claims in Morocco for those he had had 
 to abandon. Again on October nth the matter seemed to have 
 been concluded but discussion revived over the question of the bi- 
 section of French Equatorial Africa. Herr von Kiderlen Wachter 
 consented to accept in substitution two strips of territory which 
 would connect the Cameroons with the river Congo. On October 25th 
 the parties were at one ; but on the 26th Herr von Kiderlen Wachter 
 raised the question of the French right of pre-emption on the Belgian 
 Congo, a right which was impliedly recognized in the Berlin conven- 
 tion of 1885, and formally acknowledged by the Franco-Belgian 
 arrangement of December 23rd, 1908. At length a formula was 
 found, and on the 4th of November the convention was signed. 
 
 The first Article gave France full liberty of action in Morocco. 
 This was the result for which Germany had threatened Europe with 
 a general conflagration ! It was true that she had obtained com- 
 pensation, but only by means which had inspired fresh distrust of 
 the " diplomatic ethics " of the Wilhelmstrasse. Herr von Kiderlen 
 Wachter's manoeuvres during the four months, now giving, now 
 withdrawing, and introducing fresh unexpected demands, were those 
 of an unskilful horse-dealer. The Germans admitted the check, but 
 consoled themselves with the thought that the Moroccan question 
 was not settled, but merely postponed.* 
 
 Since 1871 Germany's relations with France have been marked by 
 five distinct threats on the part of the former Power : the crisis of 1875, 
 the Schnaebele affair, the voyage to Tangier, the affair of the Casa- 
 blanca deserters, and the Agadir coup. But these were only the 
 patent threats. To them we must add latent threats, provocative 
 conduct, the alternately contemptuous, patronizing and aggressive 
 
 * Georges Blondel : Deutsche Kultur, in Le Monde Economique, December 19th, 
 1914, p. 1355. 
 
 74 
 
German Diplomacy and France 
 
 attitude of Germany, the speeches of the Kaiser, the Chancellors, the 
 Foreign and War Ministers, and last but not least, the incessant 
 growth of German armaments, in justification of which they put 
 forward, in terms more or less explicit and provocative, the irre- 
 concilability of " the hereditary foe." This description is known to 
 be totally false. 
 
 Prince Biilow, in his book Imperial Germany, has revealed the 
 motives of Germany's attitude towards France : 
 
 " No nation has ever recovered so quickly as the French from the effects of 
 national disasters. None have ever so easily regained their elasticity, their 
 self-confidence and their energy after grievous disappointments and apparently 
 crushing defeats." (P. 72.) 
 
 Thus we see that the resurrection of France after the downfall is 
 the cause of Germany's ill-will, disappointment and alarm. The 
 enemy she thought dead is alive and has upset all her calculations. 
 
 Bismarck's idea was to get rid of France by urging her into a 
 policy of colonial expansion. France took the hint and succeeded 
 better than Germany, thereby creating a new cause of hatred and 
 jealousy. 
 
 Above all Prince Biilow reproaches France with a failure to realize 
 the imperious political necessities of Germany. Through Alsace and 
 Lorraine lie the routes from Paris to Frankfort, Leipzig, Dresden, 
 Bale, Munich, the Danube valley and Vienna. 
 
 " In France there is no comprehension of the fact that what seems to them the 
 brutal severity of the conqueror was really a matter of necessity to us Germans." 
 
 Why ? Because the possession of Alsace and Lorraine is a military 
 asset in a German attack on France. But then the possession of those 
 provinces must also be a national necessity for France. This has 
 never occurred to Prince Biilow who never sees beyond the interests 
 of Germany. He is at a loss to understand how other nations are 
 also concerned for their own interests and security. 
 
 German diplomatists have never been able to enter into the feelings 
 and aspirations of other nations. Hence their failures. 
 
 75 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND ITALY 
 
 Italy left in the lurch by Prussia in 1866 — Germany, Tunis and Italy — The 
 Prussian legation at the Vatican — Affronts to Italy — The Triple Alliance 
 of May 20th, 1882 — Its renewal in 1902 — Austria and the Italians — Albania 
 — Italy and Tripoli — The Kaiser provides the Turks with submarine mines — 
 Italy replaced by Turkey in the Triple Alliance — Signor Giolitti's Note 
 to Austria on the Serbian question — Prince Biilow and Italy. 
 
 GERMANY'S diplomatic treatment of her Allies is on a par with 
 her treatment of France, Russia and Great Britain. 
 
 In 1866 Italy had an opportunity of testing the value of her rela- 
 tions with Prussia. On July 22nd Prussia concluded an armistice 
 with Austria without consulting the Italians who were accordingly 
 compelled to evacuate the Trentino, which had been almost completely 
 occupied by Garibaldi and his volunteers. They were faced with the 
 concentrated might of Austria which Prussia's action thus set free 
 to turn against them, and had no option but to withdraw and be 
 content with Venetia which Napoleon III. gave them. 
 
 After 1 87 1 Italy became alarmed at the movement in France to 
 restore the temporal power of the Papacy. Besides, Germany's 
 superiority had been proved. Italy and Germany began to draw 
 together. 
 
 Bismarck forged the weapon of the Austro-German Treaty of 1879 
 for use as much against Italy as against France, for Italy had never 
 forgotten Austrian oppression and the Irredentists would not be 
 silenced. 
 
 France embarked on her expedition to Tunis in 1 88 1, and its imme- 
 diate result was a loud chorus of protest in Italy, the Italian Govern- 
 ment even going so far as to appeal to Berlin. Bismarck's answer 
 was that France's action had been contemplated and approved since 
 the Treaty of Berlin, and made no secret of the fact that far from 
 dissuading her he had given her every encouragement. 
 
 The Italians bore him no grudge. The Cairoli Ministry fell and his 
 
 76 
 
German Diplomacy and Italy 
 
 successor, Depretis, accepted the Austrian Emperor's invitation to 
 King Humbert to pay him a visit in Vienna. The visit took place 
 on October 27th, 1881, but was never returned by the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Sovereign. Bismarck wanted more than that, and according 
 to his wont, set out to win the friendship of Italy by bullying her. 
 Without condescending to inform the Italian Government, he restored 
 the Prussian Legation to the Vatican, which had been withdrawn in 
 1874. The King of Italy's visit to Vienna was not even referred to 
 in the imperial message to the Reichstag on November 17th, 1881, 
 and on November 29th Bismarck spoke of Italy as a country of revolu- 
 tions and the semi-official Press opened a campaign in favour of an 
 international guarantee for the Holy See. 
 
 The consequences were very different from what Bismarck expected. 
 At the reception of the deputies on New Year's Day, King Humbert 
 declared that " Italy meant to be mistress in her own household," 
 and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin was instructed accordingly. 
 While Italy refused to recognize the Treaty of Bardo, which gave 
 France a protectorate in Tunis, Bismarck ordered the German 
 Consul at Tunis to acknowledge the decrees of the French Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Austria wanted Italy to renounce all claims to the Trentino and 
 Trieste. No Italian Ministry dare pledge itself to do so, but at length 
 the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed on May 20th, 1882. 
 Its existence was only divulged a year later. 
 
 Bismarck has told us that as a matter of fact he had given nothing 
 to Italy, and he affected to minimize the value of the Treaty for 
 Germany. " All I wanted," he used to say, " was that a corporal 
 with an Italian flag should threaten the West rather than the 
 East." 
 
 The Italian politicians who brought Italy into the Triple Alliance 
 obtained the paradoxical result that Catholic Austria became a 
 guarantor of the Italian occupation of Rome. The Emperor Francis 
 Joseph, who makes an annual gift of a million crowns to the Pope, 
 became the head gaoler of the prisoner of the Vatican on whose 
 behalf no French statesman since 1877 has ever thought of expelling 
 the King of Italy from the Quirinal. 
 
 Bismarck, who hated the radicalism of Depretis and Mancini, 
 treated them both with lofty disdain. When he had concluded the 
 Treaty of Skiernewice between the three Emperors, he began to 
 attach less importance to the Triple Alliance. In 1885 Mancini 
 
 77 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 announced in the Chamber of Deputies that the Treaty of 1882 ".left 
 Italy freedom of action, especially in respect of interests it could in 
 no case protect." These words meant that Italy's Mediterranean 
 interests were not within its scope. When it was renewed, however, 
 it seems that certain improvements were introduced. 
 
 Crispi, a blind admirer of Bismarck, was devoted to the Triple 
 Alliance. In 1887 he effected a rupture of commercial relations 
 with France, a step attended by disastrous consequences to both 
 countries. In 1888 and 1889 there was an exchange of royal visits 
 in Rome and Berlin. 
 
 In June, 1902, the Triple Alliance was renewed for a period of 
 twelve years but it had not succeeded in creating good relations between 
 Austria and Italy. Austria carried on a policy of petty persecution 
 of Italians in the Trentino, Istria and Dalmatia. The establishment 
 of an Italian University for her Italian subjects was vetoed. When 
 the suggestion was made that an Italian Faculty of Law should be 
 created at the University of Innsbruck there was a riot of the towns- 
 folk and students against the Italians in October, 1902. In 1903 
 and 1904 there were fresh acts of violence which extended into Croatia. 
 Besides, Austrian policy in the Balkans, and especially with regard 
 to Albania, clashed directly with Italian interests. In 1903, follow- 
 ing on the Miirsteg programme, Italy obtained the nomination of 
 General Giorgis as commander of the international gendarmerie in 
 Macedonia, and for Italian officers the supervision of the Albanian 
 district of Monastir. But these concessions she owed solely to Great 
 Britain, France and Russia. 
 
 When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzgovina in 1908 
 the Italians denounced the step as an act of brigandage. At first 
 they cherished the illusion that they would receive something 
 by way of compensation, but Austria-Hungary had made no pro- 
 mises, had no intention of giving compensation, and, in fact, gave 
 none. 
 
 In 191 2, Italy, after having assured herself of French and 
 British neutrality, set out to conquer Tripoli, and informed Berlin 
 and Vienna of her intentions. To all outward appearance her scheme 
 met with no opposition. However, she had to renounce any idea 
 of military operations against Turkey in the Adriatic, Asia Minor, 
 and at Constantinople itself. The Kaiser immediately tried to carry 
 out his repeated professions of friendship for Turkey in a manner 
 which could only injure Italy. The means which he employed are 
 
 78 
 
German Diplomacy and Italy 
 
 described thus by M. Pichon, ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the 
 Petit Journal of October 17th, 19 14 : 
 
 " I publish to-day the circumstances in which Germany supplied Turkey 
 with submarine mines for the purpose of destroying Italian shipping. Austria 
 delivered the first consignment, but the mines were discovered to be defective, 
 and Germany offered to replace them. A German naval officer was sent to 
 Constantinople to place them in the Bosphorus and this was done. 
 
 " I have shown how another Army officer was sent to Benghazi to take part 
 in the operations against the Italian forces. He was a Bavarian, and is still 
 on service in the East. The German embassy in Constantinople, then directed 
 by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, employed as its chief agents in these 
 affairs the correspondent in Turkey of a great German newspaper, M. W . . ., 
 and the deputy of Benghazi, C . . . These facts were more or less suspected 
 in Rome, and it was not entirely of his own free will that Baron Marschall left 
 Constantinople. ' If you could only hold on four months longer ! ' he said 
 to the Turks when representing to them Italy's inability to continue the cam- 
 paign after that period. 
 
 " His successor, Von Wangenheim, continued to render the Turkish Govern- 
 ment similar services, to the prejudice of the ally of his own country." 
 
 This curious (German and Austrian) conception of the duties of an 
 ally would hardly have met with Machiavelli's approval, for States 
 which behave in that way only earn the suspicion and hatred of 
 those on whom they ought to be able to count. Germany and 
 Austria replaced Italy in the Triple Alliance by Turkey, but they 
 did not even condescend to forewarn the Italians. 
 
 The Balkan Wars only embittered the relations between Italy and 
 Austria-Hungary. On December 6th, 1914, Signor Giolitti made 
 the following revelation : 
 
 " On the 9th of August, 191 3, the Marquis di San Giuliano, then 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, received a telegram, in which Austria 
 communicated to Italy and Germany her intention to take action 
 against Serbia. Austria claimed that her action was defensive only, 
 and that therefore the casus fcederis arose." 
 
 To this Signor Giolitti replied : 
 
 " If Austria takes action against Serbia, it is evident that the casus foederis 
 will not arise. She will be acting purely in her own interests. She will not be 
 defending herself because no one is thinking of attacking her. Vienna must 
 be informed of this in the most positive and formal manner." 
 
 These revelations prove that Austria-Hungary's action against 
 Serbia was premeditated. The assassinations at Sarajevo could 
 
 79 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 hardly furnish a pretext in 191 3, so Austria dispensed with one. 
 All these facts were known to Germany in 19 14, so Germany 
 was quite able to estimate what value could be attached to the 
 motives put forward by Austria for her ultimatum of the 23rd of 
 July. It is but an additional piece of evidence that, finding 
 the moment propitious for war, she would do nothing to prevent it. 
 
 I say nothing of the disputes between Austria and Italy over 
 Albania. The salient fact is that the Wilhelmstrasse, having seen 
 Italy's attitude in 191 3, knew that she would not be drawn into war 
 by any Austro-Hungarian aggression against Serbia. Accordingly, 
 the policy of the German Government achieved the remarkable 
 result that they lost the benefit of their alliance with Italy at the 
 very moment when they were faced with a coalition of Russia, France, 
 Great Britain, Belgium and Serbia, and when they could only count 
 on the assistance of Austria-Hungary. 
 
 Both Vienna and Berlin kept Italy entirely in the dark as to the 
 ultimatum of the 23rd of July, and she declared her neutrality on 
 the first day. In his pride the Kaiser seems to have been more or 
 less indifferent to this declaration. Italy ! a negligible factor. 
 Italian help was not needed to crush France. When the German plan 
 failed, however, they set themselves to win over Italy. Fervent 
 appeals were made to the Clericals of the Kolnischer Volkszeitung, 
 and then to the Socialists who sent Herr Siidekum to plead their 
 cause with the Italian Socialists. Some newspapers have even 
 asserted that certain of the Italian Socialist groups received bribes 
 from the German Socialists. In that case Herr Siidekum could 
 speak with authority. Nevertheless, his mission was an utter failure. 
 
 The Germans published an edition of the Berliner Tageblatt in Italian. 
 They flooded Italy with letters, pamphlets, extracts from the papers 
 and the concoctions of the Wolff Bureau. Still the Italian Govern- 
 ment refused to emerge from its " sacred egoism." Finally the 
 Germans sent Prince Biilow to Rome. Bismarck relates, with his 
 usual affectation of indifference in speaking of his colleagues, ho^ 
 Prince Billow's father came to visit Italy. On October 6th, 1879, 
 he spoke of him in these words to Busch : 
 
 " The Emperor gradually wears us all out. My nature is such that I have 
 been able to hold out for seventeen years ; but Biilow, for example, who onb 
 took my place for a few months, has thereby contracted a disease of the spins 
 cord and will die of it. The blame must lie at our Gracious Majesty's door. 
 Biilow is to be sent to Italy.* 
 
 * See Bismarck's Memoirs, by Maurice Busch. 
 80 
 
German Diplomacy and Italy 
 
 His son, Prince Biilow, was sent to Rome to make a supreme effort. 
 The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Baron Macchio, left Italy at 
 the moment of his arrival to avoid having to express any opinion on 
 the proposals he was bringing, for Prince Biilow was offering Italy 
 the Trentino. 
 
 Germany has always been ready to give away other people's 
 property. 
 
 81 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND AUSTRIA- HUNGARY 
 
 Beust, Francis Joseph and Andrassy — Reasons for the Treaty of 1879 — The 
 self-abasement of the Austrian Emperor — The subordination of Austria- 
 Hungary to Germany — Dismemberment the inevitable consequence. 
 
 BISMARCK has told us how he devoted himself to the struggle 
 against Austria after 1852. He used to complain that " she 
 treated Prussia so abominably that one fine day we were compelled 
 to give her solid proof that we could get along without her. In 1866 
 we took advantage of the first opportunity, and showed Austria 
 the door."* 
 
 Showing no ill-will, Bismarck next set himself to bring about a 
 reconciliation with Austria, but Beust enjoyed the reputation of 
 never having forgotten Sadowa. Francis Joseph did not take his 
 defeat too much to heart. He congratulated the Emperor of Ger- 
 many on his victory over France. In 1872 he went to Berlin to pay 
 his personal homage. He informed Beust that he intended to sacrifice 
 him in favour of Andrassy who, representing the interests of Hun- 
 gary, owed Prussia the deepest gratitude for having by her victory 
 forced Austria to the compromise of 1867 which inaugurated the 
 Dual System. 
 
 The following is Bismarck's estimate of his Treaty of Alliance 
 with Austria in 1879 '• 
 
 " We had to prevent an understanding between the Dual Monarchy and 
 France, and that object we thereby achieved without imposing on ourselves any 
 obligation to defend the Trentino, Trieste or Bosnia against the Italians, 
 Turks or Southern Slavs. 
 
 Bismarck reckoned that he was securing the support of the Germans 
 of Austria as well as the Hungarians. According to his ideas, the 
 Emperor of Austria preserved only the trappings of authority. In 
 
 * Busch's Bismarck. 
 82 
 
The German Empire and Austria-Hungary 
 
 favour of that view it could be said that Francis Joseph had recognized 
 the autonomy of Hungary and, as regards foreign policy, submissively 
 followed Bismarck's lead. The Chancellor peacefully consummated 
 the work of 1866. To crown it he even urged an " indissoluble con- 
 stitutional alliance ; " but Andrassy replied that he could not go 
 so far for fear of difficulties with the Reichsrath. 
 
 The Gazette de Lausanne of December 17th, 19 14, published the 
 wailings of an Austrian diplomatist over Austro-German relations. 
 So far from denying that Germany wanted the war, he asserts that 
 she only sought a casus belli. But this had to be of such a character 
 that Austria-Hungary could not draw back. 
 
 " From that point of view the Serbian affair could not be bettered. Berlin 
 incited our diplomacy to extreme measures, and the moment it appeared that, 
 after all, a compromise might be reached, launched her ultimatum to Russia. 
 We were thus forced into war, 
 
 " Our country is the only one which has not, up to the present, published the 
 diplomatic documents relating to the period immediately before the war. We 
 could not do so without exposing Germany." 
 
 Germany borrowed Austrian heavy artillery for the reduction of 
 the Belgian fortresses and on August 28th Austria found herself 
 obliged to declare war on the Belgians, to punish them for the crime 
 of being fired on by the guns Austria had lent to her ally. 
 
 The German General Staff has also assumed control of the Austrian 
 army and employed it to defend German soil against the Russians : 
 
 " Austria-Hungary has been sacrificed : she has endured the horrors of 
 invasion in order that the people of Germany may not suffer too much alarm 
 and inconvenience." 
 
 The Kaiser has not merely had a free hand in conducting the 
 foreign policy of the German Empire. He has been equally free to 
 direct Austro-Hungarian policy, and, of course, the interests of his 
 ally have ever been subordinate to his own necessities. 
 
 The Austrian diplomatist sums up the present situation very 
 lucidly : 
 
 " Ever since October 7th, 1879, the Ballplatz has followed the tracks which 
 Berlin marked out. The tragedy of Sadowa and the memory of the Holy 
 Roman Empire have been forgotten in order that we might fix our eyes on the 
 East which Germany dangled before us as fair prey. Yet she has always 
 prevented us from seizing it. All we did was to rouse Russia, threaten the 
 
 83 6* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 interests of the Mediterranean Powers and enable the German Chancellors to 
 create that atmosphere of European unrest which alone induced the Reichstag 
 to vote the enormous credits required for the maintenance and augmentation 
 of the army and fleet on which the greatness of the German Empire depends. 
 " To preserve the advantages of the Treaty of Frankfort and extend her 
 power in the world, Germany has made tools of her Allies and has brought 
 down the hatred of all Europe on our heads." 
 
 The war broke out. If Germany were successful, she would reap 
 all the fruits of victory. The Austrian diplomatist omits to mention 
 that the German Empire acts as a magnet to the Germans of Austria ; 
 that a German victory would transfer the centre of gravity in Austria 
 from Vienna to Budapest and might even lead to the absorption of 
 the German provinces of Austria in the German Empire. But he 
 foresees defeat and foretells that Germany will use all her endeavours 
 to saddle Austria with " the larger share of the cost of the policy of 
 adventure into which Germany has plunged." He predicts dismem- 
 berment which may well be even more thorough than he anticipates. 
 He is living on illusions, however, when he suggests that Austria, by 
 concluding a separate peace, " may recover her hegemony over the 
 Germanic peoples of Central Europe and restore the Germanic Empire 
 at the expense of militarist and aggressive Prussia, to the manifest 
 advantage of Europe and Humanity." 
 
 It is too late. Austria " has weakly and blindly followed in the 
 path of her hereditary enemy." She is bound hand and foot to 
 Berlin. 
 
 8 4 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 THE NEW TRIPLE ALLIANCE 
 
 Bismarck and the Eastern Question — William II. and Turkey — Accusation of 
 wholesale bribery made by the Foreign Office — The lenience of the British 
 and French Ambassadors towards the Turks — Enver Pasha — How the 
 alliance was made — The Jehad — Allah and the " Old God of Konigsberg " 
 — " The Sick Man " — Von Billow's mistake. 
 
 BISMARCK once said : " Germany has the advantage that her 
 policy is free from direct interests in the East."* However, 
 William II. has done his best to lose it. He was quite willing to 
 allow the Turkish Government to manage their own domestic affairs, 
 but he meant to direct Turkish foreign policy against their old friends 
 and protectors, Great Britain and France, while pretending to further 
 the interests of Bulgaria and Roumania, interests palpably at variance 
 with those of Turkey. He succeeded in gaining the friendship of 
 Turkey, but only aroused the suspicions of Russia, Great Britain and 
 France. So where was the advantage ? 
 
 The Turkish army was reorganized by the celebrated Baron von 
 der Goltz and in 191 2 all the General Staffs of Europe, on the 
 authority of its organizer, promised it victory. Nevertheless, in the 
 Balkan War it fell to pieces at the first shock. However, Germany's 
 military prestige survived. The Turkish Government put General 
 Liman von Sanders at the head of their military forces and Von der 
 Goltz went back to take up his old post. 
 
 On August 10th, 1914, the Turkish Government sheltered the 
 warships Goben and Breslau, then purchased them fictitiously, and 
 in spite of their promises to the Allies, kept the officers and the crews. 
 German officers went to Constantinople in large numbers. In its 
 communique the Foreign Office stated emphatically that German 
 influence was being exercised by means of wholesale bribery. 
 
 Yet the Ambassadors of Great Britain and France made every 
 possible allowance for the Turkish Government. They told the 
 * Reflections and Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 288. 
 
 85 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Turks that they were committing acts which, for any other Power, 
 would be regarded as a violation of neutrality, but that France and 
 England would pass them over in their desire that Turkey should 
 remain neutral, and not complicate the situation by adding to future 
 problems that of the dismemberment of Turkey. 
 
 Meanwhile, Enver Pasha, the Minister for War who was fanatically 
 pro-German, and his German advisers were preparing an attack on 
 Egypt via Akaba, Gaza and the Suez Canal. Sheikh Aiz Shawisl 
 was distributing in Syria, and probably in India, a pamphlet exhorting 
 all Mohammedans to rise against Great Britain. 
 
 On the other hand, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, the Finance 
 Minister, and a majority of the other ministers were in favour of 
 maintaining neutrality. 
 
 The Bourse Gazette, on the authority of one who is described as an 
 official high in the diplomatic world, gives the following account of 
 the circumstances in which Turkey was finally drawn into the 
 war. 
 
 In October the Turkish Government were faced with the necessity 
 of paying the salaries of their numerous officials, which were already 
 several months in arrear. Being short of funds, they turned to their 
 only available source — Germany. They decided to send to Berlin 
 Fethi Bey, who was particularly popular in German Government 
 circles. Fethi Bey went, was warmly received by Herr von Beth- 
 mann-Hollweg, and had an audience of William II. The Emperor 
 agreed to advance Turkey the sum of 150,000 Turkish pounds 
 (^136,000), but on the sole condition that Turkey should immediately 
 attack England and Russia (" Sie miissen aber sofort gegen England 
 unci Russland marschiren J ' "). Fethi Bey then declared that Turkey 
 would give military support to Germany when a particularly favour- 
 able moment presented itself, but that the actual occasion was 
 unsuitable. Now the very day — October 27th — that Fethi Bey 
 left Berlin, the German Admiral, Souchon Pasha, ordered the German 
 ships which had passed into the Black Sea to bombard the Russian 
 coast. Informed solely by the Press messages, the Turkish Ministers, 
 in their stupefaction, went to the German Ambassador, Baron von 
 Wangenheim, and demanded an explanation. The Ambassador 
 replied : " Fethi Bey has made a formal promise to Berlin that 
 Turkey shall enter the war, and when a promise is made to our 
 Emperor it has to be kept." Enver Bey, Germany's tool, was 
 followed by Talaat Bey, and carried the day. 
 
 86 
 
The New Triple Alliance 
 
 If the Kaiser really gained the assistance of Turkey with his £i 36,000, 
 it was the most usurious loan on record and he has all the glory of 
 having greatly improved on Shylock. ♦ 
 
 Heiri Bey, the Sheik-ul-Islam at Constantinople, announced the 
 Jehad, the Holy War on all infidels, who must certainly include 
 His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, Apostolic King 
 of Hungary. Yet the Catholics of Austria-Hungary, Bavaria and 
 the Rhine Provinces, and the Lutherans of Prussia waxed delirious 
 over these words of Heiri Bey : 
 
 " Nothing, not even the wars of Islam in the days of the Crusades, can 
 compare with the scale of the present Holy movement. Centuries have passed , 
 but faith has not weakened in Musulman hearts, and, when sounds the 
 clarion-call to the Holy War, all good Mohammedans, the women no less than 
 the men, will do their duty. Hundreds of thousands of pilgrims, knowing the 
 fetva, go from Mecca to Medina, to the sacred hills. Like microbes {sic) they 
 will enter the bodies of the enemy Empires." 
 
 The Kaiser has unquestionably bought the protection of Allah 
 remarkably cheaply, but how can he reconcile the stirring up of a 
 Mohammedan " Holy War " with his famous declaration of his 
 divine mission ? 
 
 " Remember that you (Germans) are the chosen race ! The spirit of God has 
 descended upon me because I am Emperor of the Germans. I am his instru- 
 ment, his sword, his shield. Woe to the unbelievers ! " 
 
 Does he think that the Mohammedans have been converted to the 
 " Old God " he incarnates ? Does he think that the seventy million 
 Mohammedans of India and the other millions of Russian Turkestan, 
 Arabia, Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco are likely to enter into a 
 Holy War at the bidding of the giaour who at Damascus in 1898 
 promised them his protection and in 1914 petitioned for theirs ? 
 The Shiites of Persia are not more obedient to the Sheik-ul-Islam 
 than are Protestants to the Pope. The Jehad summoned the Moham- 
 medans of Lybia to throw the Italians into the sea. If the Italians 
 refused to be thrown, they would be drawn into the war ; so German 
 Imperial diplomacy led to the result that Italy was driven into the 
 arms of the Triple Entente and her place in the Triple Alliance taken 
 by Turkey. 
 
 In 1853 the Czar Nicholas I., in a conversation with Sir George 
 Hamilton Seymour, said : " We have a sick man on our hands." 
 
 87 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 In 1914 the Sick Man's health was no better but the Kaiser had 
 to go to him for help. 
 
 On April 14th, 1904, Von Biilow, who was then Imperial Chan- 
 cellor, said : " If we keep our sword sharp we shall never have to 
 fear isolation. Germany is too strong for her alliance to be despised." 
 Yet she has been reduced to bringing in Turkey in order to re- 
 constitute the Triple Alliance ! 
 
 88 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SMALL STATES 
 
 Luxemburg — Gladstone and Belgium — William II. 's hopes — Herr von Jagow 
 and the British Ambassador — Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's tirade — 
 Germany covets Antwerp and the Netherlands — The Emden failure — 
 The Annexation programme — Professor Lasson — Intimidation of small 
 states. 
 
 I DO not remember the Luxemburg affair of 1867. It was but 
 the preliminary to the war with France which Bismarck had 
 resolved to bring about at his own moment while making France 
 seem the aggressor. 
 
 The neutral status of Luxemburg is not questioned by Germany. 
 General Tulff von Tschepe und Weidenbach, in a proclamation to 
 Luxemburg, dated August 2nd, but prepared long before, declared, 
 with that effrontery in lying which is characteristic of German 
 methods, that 
 
 " France, having violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, has begun hostilities 
 — as has been demonstrated beyond doubt — on the territory of Luxemburg 
 against the German forces. Faced with this emergency, His Majesty has 
 ordered the German troops — in first line to the 8th Corps — to enter Luxemburg." 
 
 The pretext was false, but Germany, for whom the route through 
 Luxemburg was a military necessity, calmly violated its neutrality 
 in spite of vehement protest on the part of the Grand Duchess. 
 
 Gladstone was open to criticism on the score of grave weaknesses 
 in his foreign policy but he never wavered in his attitude towards the 
 independence of Belgium. In August, 1870, he made separate agree- 
 ments with Prussia and France, whereby, if either of the two Powers 
 violated the neutrality of Belgium, England guaranteed to join the 
 other. In 1875, when Queen Victoria intervened to prevent a second 
 German attack on France, Gladstone sent a commission to devise 
 joint measures of defence. 
 
 The Kaiser laid himself out to reassure the Belgians. In October, 
 
 89 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 191 1, he had a conversation with the Belgian General Heimburger 
 and M. Delvapx de FenfTe, Governor of the Province of Liege, who 
 had come to greet him in the name of the King of the Belgians. He 
 said to M. de Fenffe : 
 
 " You are Governor of a province with which we have always 
 lived as good neighbours. You have recently passed, I think " (it 
 was just after the Agadir incident) " through a time of great anxiety. 
 Believe me, that anxiety was needless." 
 
 At the luncheon which followed, replying to the toast of General 
 Heimburger, he said : 
 
 " You are right to have confidence in us." 
 
 On August 3rd, 1 9 14, Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. 
 Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, stated quite frankly to the 
 British Ambassador their reasons for doing so. 
 
 " They had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as 
 to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some 
 decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, 
 as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in 
 view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got 
 through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss 
 of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their 
 troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German 
 asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops." * 
 
 During the afternoon the British Ambassador informed Herr von 
 Jagow that, unless the German Government stopped their advance 
 and gave an assurance by midnight that they would proceed no further 
 with their violation of the Belgian frontier, Great Britain would take 
 all steps to enforce the observance of the treaty which Germany had 
 signed. 
 
 Herr von Jagow replied that the safety of the Empire made it 
 absolutely necessary that the German troops should pass through 
 Belgium. The British Ambassador replied that he would have to 
 demand his passports and went to see the Chancellor, Dr. von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, who treated him to a harangue which lasted 
 not less than twenty minutes : 
 
 " Just for a word — ' neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often 
 been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make 
 
 * See the British White Paper. 
 90 
 
German Diplomacy and the Small States 
 
 war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. 
 All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible 
 step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his 
 accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had 
 done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while he was 
 fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for 
 all the terrible events that might happen." 
 
 Sir Edward Goschen replied that 
 
 " In the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that 
 for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance 
 through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to 
 understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of ' life and death ' for the 
 honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do 
 her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked." 
 
 " But at what price will that compact have been kept ? Has the British 
 Government thought of that ? " 
 
 Sir Edward Goschen replied that " fear of consequences could 
 hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements." 
 During this interview the Chancellor was so excited that Sir Edward 
 Goschen thought it wiser to refrain from increasing further his 
 agitation. 
 
 This harangue of the Chancellor will for ever remain a scene of 
 epic comedy. It demonstrated his utter contempt for the engage- 
 ments taken by his own Government, and from his own mouth we 
 learn that no reliance can be placed on their present and future 
 plighted word. The pathetic phrases in which he spoke of his dis- 
 illusionment revealed his mental simplicity. He complained that 
 Great Britain was stabbing Germany in the back. But was not 
 Germany stabbing Belgium in the back ? There were volumes of 
 irony in the perversion by which he tried to represent Great Britain 
 as a cunning apache because she faced the Chancellor with a " scrap 
 of paper " to which the seal of Prussia was attached. 
 
 The violation of Belgium was put forward as a strategical necessity, 
 but it was none the less a realization of political ambitions. Ger- 
 many's frontage on the North Sea consists of a strip of coast-line 
 seventy-five miles long as the crow flies, from Emden to Cuxhaven, 
 the outpost of Hamburg. Germany is a land Power, but on her 
 north-western frontier lies a maritime Power far excellence — Holland. 
 Now Holland's maritime prosperity is largely based on the industrial 
 prosperity of Westphalia and the Rhine Province, and these regions 
 
 9* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 have as their outlet only two ports, Rotterdam and Antwerp, both in 
 foreign countries. 
 
 In 1883, to avoid this dependence on foreign ports, Herr Wind- 
 horst, the leader of the Catholic Centre, agitated for the construction 
 of a canal from Dortmund to Ems in the hope of diverting a part 
 of the traffic in coal and other Westphalian products to Emden. 
 William II. was struck by the idea and the canal was opened in 
 August, 1899. A volume of trade to the figure of 1,500,000 tons* 
 had been anticipated but in 1905 it had not yet reached 700,000 tons, 
 though the tolls had been reduced. The canal was carried to the 
 port of Emden at a cost of twenty million marks.t The basin has 
 a depth of about thirty-six feet. The Emperor ordered certain 
 steamship lines to make useless calls there. The dredging apparatus 
 has for long taken up more space than the ships. When I visited it 
 I only saw two vessels which had brought iron ore from Sweden. 
 
 However, to ensure that the canal route should be used and not the 
 Rhine, the Dortmund-Ems canal was not connected with the Rhine, 
 a precaution which availed nothing, and finally the canal from Dort- 
 mund to the Rhine was included in the last programme. In spite 
 of all these efforts, traffic continued to avoid the canal, with its 
 twenty-seven locks, and use the Rhine. Between Carlsruhe and 
 its mouth, a distance of 621 kilometres (388 miles), there is only a 
 difference of 100 metres (328 feet) in level — that is, 16 centimetres 
 a kilometre. The river is nowhere less than 200 metres (218 yards) 
 wide. Its depth at Cologne is about eleven feet. The freight 
 between Ruhrort and Rotterdam is not more than one centime per 
 metric ton. 
 
 French public opinion has often been entertained by schemes 
 for partitioning Austria in favour of Germany, which was thus to 
 secure Trieste. In sober truth, the German Emperor's dream has 
 been to incorporate the Netherlands in the German Empire and seize 
 Antwerp. It must never be forgotten that if Antwerp is in Belgium, 
 both banks of the Scheldt not more than twelve miles below that 
 city are in Dutch territory. 
 
 There was no mystery about Germany's ambition to swallow up 
 Holland. Great Britain is the natural guardian of the Netherlands. 
 The South African Boers were of Dutch origin and during the 
 Transvaal War Dutch opinion for the most part was hostile to Great 
 
 * One metric ton = 2,204 lbs. f ^983,000 approximately. 
 
 92 
 
German Diplomacy and the Small States 
 
 Britain. I say " for the most part " advisedly, because it was not 
 unanimous as the following incident proves. 
 
 After a banquet given during the Exhibition in 1900, one of my 
 friends said to me : 
 
 " The Dutch delegates wish to be presented to you to thank you 
 for the reception you gave them in 1899, and also to congratulate you 
 on your attitude on the South African question." 
 
 My friend was extremely surprised and I not less so. The Dutch 
 gentlemen said to me : 
 
 " The permanent menace to us comes from one quarter — Germany. 
 Anything that weakens our relations with Great Britain is a danger 
 for us. We have blamed our Government for dispatching a Govern- 
 ment ship to bring back Kriiger." 
 
 The opinions of these distinguished men, some of them in official 
 positions, were soon reinforced from Germany itself. In 1901 and 1902 
 Herren Stubmann, von Hale and Huton published several pamphlets 
 inviting Holland to become incorporated in the German Empire. 
 They did not go beyond persuasion, and suggested a Zollverein for 
 a start. If Holland entered it she would have all Central Europe 
 for her market. Two Dutch newspapers, the Haagsche C our ant and 
 the Avond Post, took up the idea, as well as that of a postal 
 union. At length the Dutch and Belgians accepted a form of 
 union which appears in the Almanack de Gotha under the name of 
 the Union d? Administration de Chemins de Fer Allemands. This 
 joint system is composed of the railways of Germany and Holland and 
 part of those of Belgium. 
 
 The Dutch were not enthusiastic over their wooing by Germany. 
 Holland is a Free-Trade country and could only lose by entering the 
 German tariff system. They find dumping very profitable. The 
 German syndicates sell sheet-iron cheaper abroad than to their own 
 people. The Dutch use it for the manufacture of boilers, which they 
 re-sell in Germany, and barges for navigation on the Rhine. 
 
 Persuasive methods having failed, the German Press took to 
 threats and all the Pan-Germans exclaimed that the Dutch had no 
 right to deny themselves the honour done them in being counted as 
 Germans. They went further. On September 30th, Professor Lasson 
 wrote : 
 
 " Holland is incapable of protecting herself. This little Kingdom pursues her 
 tranquil existence at our expense, living on the memories of past glories and 
 accumulated wealth. Holland is only an appendage to Germany. Her life 
 
 93 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 is smoothly-flowing, a life in dressing-gown and slippers, which demands little 
 reflection or exertion. 
 
 " We Germans have little respect and sympathy for the Holland of to-day. 
 We can thank God that, except for their dependence upon us, the Dutch are 
 not our friends." 
 
 In September, 1906, dwelling on this danger in the Nineteenth 
 Century and After, I terminated my article thus {translated) : 
 
 " The basis of the entente cordiale between France and Great 
 Britain is the necessity of preserving the independence of Holland 
 and Belgium. The maintenance of the status of those two countries 
 is a common interest of France and Great Britain — indeed, of all 
 civilized nations — except one." 
 
 The German occupation of Antwerp brings the whole question to 
 the fore. The Kaiser hopes that by holding Antwerp he will be in 
 a position, when peace terms come to be discussed, to invoke the 
 formula, " Beati possidentes." But he is deceiving himself. Great 
 Britain and France will never allow Germany to remain there. Imme- 
 diately after the fall of Antwerp The 'Times voiced British public 
 opinion in an article which gave Holland great credit for her correct 
 attitude but pointed out that she would find her situation extremely 
 difficult, if not intolerable, if Germany permanently controlled the 
 Scheldt and thus turned the Dutch defences. If Antwerp became 
 a second Wilhelmshafen and the focus of German militarism in the 
 North Sea, the Dutch possession of the mouth of the Scheldt would 
 be absolutely useless. The Times added that a few days previously 
 a German paper had asked whether they (the English) would fight 
 on for twenty years ? They would fight for twenty years and more 
 if necessary because they could never lay down their arms until the 
 last of the Prussian bandits had been driven from Belgium. 
 
 Herr Zimmermann, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 has not, however, concealed from the Dutch that their fate aftei 
 the war is to be absorbed into the German Empire. But it is not 
 only Belgium and Holland that are threatened. Switzerland, Den- 
 mark, Norway and Sweden are no better off. 
 
 Herr Spahn, a professor at Strasburg University, contemplating the 
 results of the war, says : 
 
 " The conditions of Swiss national life will unite even more closely than in the 
 past the destinies of Switzerland and Germany." 
 
 94 
 
German Diplomacy and the Small States 
 
 Herr Oncken, professor of Universal History at Heidelberg, has 
 put forward the following definition in a recent pamphlet : 
 
 " A neutral State, a little parasitic organism which waxes fat by living on the 
 divisions of the great." 
 
 Another writer says :* 
 
 " The small States have lost their right to exist, for no State can make good 
 its right to independence unless it can assert it by force of arms. In word no 
 less than in deed the German Empire has shown itself to be the common enemy 
 of all nations." 
 
 * If I were Emperov. 
 
 95 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY. ITS METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
 The letter to The Times and the Wolff telegram — Herr von Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg's contradictory arguments — The aggressive and defensive aspects of 
 the Triple Alliance — Threats to England — Fatuity — Germany confesses she 
 created the Triple Entente — Great Britain guilty of not accepting German 
 hegemony of Europe — German attempts to break up the Entente — Herr 
 von Bethmann-Hollweg unable to save appearances — The responsibility 
 for the war — Against Belgium — Against Japan — Violation of the Hague 
 Convention of 1907 — Germany's arguments, false both in law and fact — 
 " Touching a hair of a German " — A confession of German psychology — 
 German political incapacity — Billow's admission — Hypocritical and over- 
 bearing diplomacy. 
 
 THE foregoing recital of facts has adumbrated the results which 
 German diplomacy was destined to achieve. The following 
 incident, which occurred after the declaration of war, affords an 
 example of its artless methods. 
 
 The Tunes received a letter from a highly-placed person saying 
 that the Kaiser's religious convictions made him averse to war, but 
 that Russia had driven him to it. The Times did not publish it. In 
 consequence of an error in transmission The Times received, the 
 same evening, a telegram meant for the representative of the Wolff 
 Bureau in London. It said : " The Times will publish to-morrow 
 an article on the situation. Telegraph it word for word. — Wolff, 
 Berlin." 
 
 Speaking on December 2nd, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg revealed 
 the disconcerting sang-froid with which Germany puts forward con- 
 tradictory explanations. He began by contrasting " the aggressive 
 character of the Triple Entente with the purely defensive character 
 of the Triple Alliance." To give that assertion even the colour of 
 truth, it is necessary to forget Germany's five well-marked acts of 
 aggression against France, the behaviour of Austria in the Balkans, 
 the Kaiser's speeches, the Crown Prince's indiscretions and declara- 
 
 96 
 
German Diplomacy. Its Methods and Achievements 
 
 tions, the provocative utterances of various Chancellors and War 
 Ministers, the clamours of the Pan-German, Naval and Colonial 
 Leagues, the official writings of Von der Goltz and Bernhardi, not 
 to mention the frantic outbursts of megalomaniac fury which have 
 proceeded from German professors of history, from Treitschke to 
 Lamprecht. 
 
 Then he went on to blame Great Britain for wishing to maintain 
 the balance of power, and asserting " as elementary dogma that the 
 role of arbiter mundi was her inalienable right." Forgetting that 
 he had just announced the " purely defensive " character of the 
 Triple Alliance, he added : 
 
 " I have never believed that England could be brought to abandon that 
 attitude by methods of persuasion, but I thought it possible that the growing 
 power of Germany and the increasing risk of war would lead England to realize 
 that that principle could not be maintained, and that it was better to abandon 
 it in favour of a peaceful compromise with Germany. However, that dogma 
 has always paralysed our attempts at an understanding." 
 
 So Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, like his predecessor, Prince Billow, 
 could only think of one way of treating England — the way of threats. 
 The more violent the threats, the sooner would England come to 
 heel ! This German statesman was quite incapable of the following 
 simple reasoning : 
 
 " By yielding to threats England will admit that she is afraid of us. 
 If she once admits that, she will see herself compelled to give way 
 under further pressure from us. Now though we have a very poor 
 opinion of British statesmen, we must not think them incapable of 
 foreseeing that situation and consequently our pressure, so far from 
 bringing them to submission, will drive them to increase their fleet 
 and look for allies among other nations." 
 
 A statesman of average intelligence would have considered all 
 possibilities in the case of any nation ; but in the case of Great 
 Britain the German Chancellor scorned reflection, though anyone 
 with even a nodding acquaintance with British psychology knows 
 that the Anglo-Saxon is trained from his youth up to resent pressure 
 and never to yield to threats. 
 
 Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg boasted of having made Great Britain 
 retreat at Agadir and notwithstanding Mr. Lloyd George's speech at 
 the Guildhall we may admit that he was right. But he added that 
 England was always trying to establish closer relations with France 
 
 97 7 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 tass Herr von Bethmarm-K. 
 
 the results . - & He » - ■ • - i 
 
 t, let hi 
 
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 3 . 
 
 ! te 
 5 concessions 
 
 ! 
 
 I 
 
 reals Mrs * 
 
 In a 
 
 tecaus* 
 
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 W 
 
 ss >s v < . t is the < 
 
 
 
 : 
 
 * S - - ■ ■ ? . i E 
 
 I with 
 
 3 
 
 - 
 
 9» 
 
German Diplomacy. Its Methods and Achievements 
 But who was it that broke the peace I Hei lethraann-Hol 
 
 .v.i . OOt even clev le. 
 
 The diplomatic documents published by the different be! 
 
 leave no room for doubt that the G r the 
 
 nature of the ultimatum to en if they did not collaborate 
 
 in it. When M. Sazonof knew its contents on July 24th he a 
 that the tirne-lirnit of forty-eight hours should be ert 
 
 ot exactly a provocative requt 
 the Austro-Hungarian Am . . carne to inform 
 
 that the ultimatum had been delivered. H. 
 followed by that of Baroi] I who said at or.se : 
 
 in entire agreement with Austria. If her demand. 
 will take military measures. Germany hopes that 00 one will inter- 
 vene in this question. It is to the intei 
 localize the conflict by leaving it to the parties concerns 
 
 What the German Government called " localizing the conflict :: 
 the delivery of this highly provocative declaration, which was likely 
 to lead to war. 
 
 The next day Baron von Schoen returned to the Quai d :f 
 explain that " these words conveyed no threat ; " but he made 
 them worse by adding that " Germany appr- andpoint, 
 
 and can only allow herself to be guided by her duties as an ally." 
 
 On July 3 1 st. M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for F01 
 Affairs, and Count Szapary, furnished with plenary by Count 
 
 Berchtold, had arrived at an agreement which Serbia accepted. I 
 have already shown* how the Kaiser, to prevent that solution, had 
 instructed Count Pourtales to hand in an ultimatum to Russia at 
 midnight on July 31st. In fact, Germany declared 
 o'clock in the evening of August 1st. 
 
 Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, has 
 revealed that Count Berchtold, alarmed at the consec .:' his 
 
 ultimatum, was still negotiating on the 1st of August. If. Schebeko, 
 the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, has told us that the Austrian 
 Cabinet were so horrified and angry that they nearly left the K 
 to face Russia alone. We have heard of violent scenes bev 
 Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, and Count Berchtold, 
 in which the former broke out in unmeasured abuse. 
 
 These facts were perfectly well known to Herr von Bethmann- 
 Hollweg who none the less had the audacity to say that " England 
 
 * Chapter II. 
 
 99 7* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 and Russia bear before God and Humanity the responsibility for 
 the catastrophe which has fallen on Europe and the world." 
 
 In 1867 Bismarck raised the Luxemburg question with a view to 
 isolating France in Europe, but he meant to declare war on her at 
 the moment of his own choosing and make her seem the aggressor. 
 
 The Kaiser and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg made war on Russia 
 and France at their own selected moment, but lest the opportunity 
 should slip, they assumed the part of the aggressor. They were 
 under the impression that when they had produced a situation, 
 they could change its character. 
 
 Those whose sole intellectual and moral criterion is success are 
 accustomed to distort facts, and were prepared to accept Herr von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg's reasoning if it had been justified by victory. 
 
 The Chancellor is always forgetting his own statements. When 
 he was explaining the violation of Belgian neutrality for the first 
 time, he said : " Necessity knows no law. ..." A treaty which 
 guarantees the neutrality of a country is only a " scrap of paper." 
 But when he came to address the Reichstag on December 2nd, he 
 indulged in a tirade against Belgium, as if blissfully unconscious of 
 his previous admission. " As for Belgium's guilt ... it has been 
 proved by a document we found in Brussels." What was in that 
 document ? Even on German showing, it was a scheme for the 
 defence of Belgium, devised in concert with Great Britain. But 
 defence in what circumstances ? In case of the violation of Belgian 
 neutrality. Said the Chancellor : " From the moment that Belgium 
 rendered assistance to France and England by resisting the German 
 invasion, she was no longer neutral." He did not venture to speak 
 of Luxemburg. Luxemburg did not count. But to accuse the 
 Belgian Government of being guilty because they wished their 
 neutrality to be respected is to introduce a new notion into Inter- 
 national Law which sheds much light on German political ethics. 
 
 The Chancellor likewise accused Japan of violating the neutrality 
 of China by seizing Kiao-Chau, and, turning severely to Great 
 Britain, he said : " Did this violation of neutral territory provoke 
 their intervention ? " It would have been very easy for Great 
 Britain to reply : " When Germany first established herself at 
 Kiao-Chau, was she respecting Chinese neutrality ? " As Kiao- 
 Chau had become a German possession, Japan was acting against 
 Germany, not against China. 
 
 During the war itself Germany's conduct has been one long violation 
 
 100 
 
German Diplomacy* Its Methods and Achievements 
 
 of the Hague Convention of 1907. Germany's argument in her 
 defence has been twofold. 
 
 (1) In law. — The 9th Convention of the Hague of 1907 is only binding on a 
 belligerent if all the belligerents are signatories to it. 
 
 (2) In fact. — Three of the belligerents in the present war have not signed 
 the 9th Convention, namely, Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. 
 
 The German argument is false under both heads. 
 
 First, the final Article stipulates that denunciation — or abstention 
 — by one of the Powers only affects that Power. The Convention 
 remains binding on the other contracting parties (Convention IX. 
 of 1907, Article 12). 
 
 Secondly, the 9th Convention of the Hague was signed on 
 October 18th, 1909, by Serbia, represented by MM. S. Grouitch, M. G. 
 Milovanovitch, M. G. Militchevitch — by Montenegro, represented 
 by MM. Nelidow and Martens N. Tcharykow — by Turkey, represented 
 by H. H. Turkan Pasha — without reserve.* 
 
 When Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg tries to put forward legal 
 arguments, he only shows his contempt for all law. In his speech 
 of December 2nd, after bewailing the conflict " thrust " upon them, 
 he uttered a paraphrase of the famous civis Romanus sum, but 
 applying it as only a German could : 
 
 " The world must learn that no one can touch a hair of a German with 
 impunity." (Vociferous applause.) 
 
 The Pan-German League, All Deutscher Verein, the official organ 
 of German aspirations, has announced that by virtue of a higher 
 law emanating from the " Old God of Konigsberg," every Prussian, 
 and in the second degree, every German, can freely break the heads 
 of all who refuse to give up to them any particular object they happen 
 to covet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has announced " Germany's 
 intention to make her force and capacity prevail in the world." 
 
 Prince Biilow affords a striking illustration of German ignorance 
 of psychology. In his book, Imperial Germany, he states that after 
 the annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina Russia dared not intervene 
 and that France and Great Britain would not. He immediately 
 jumped to the conclusion that they yielded before German prestige. 
 
 * Edouard Clunet in Le Temps, December 28th, 1914. 
 101 
 
The Causes and Consequences d the War 
 
 truth was much more simple. Ru>si.-. qo condition 
 
 :";:•:.;■.•:, ..ua Furace and Great Britain were 
 
 The Germans concluded I bat Russia having yielded in 1909. 
 would yield ag [ 9Hi : -- i: ^ **■ •- pl ace 
 
 ■ in 1014; that England, not having 
 
 td in 1900, wc [914 — even dated 
 
 the neutrality 0: Belgium, the Germans jined that because 
 
 bout §e bia, raid refuse to 
 
 .ith Austria-Hungary. It 
 
 direct interests in Sei 
 
 but : . Austria-Hungary 
 
 ar.d v : , RttSSI a not 
 
 ge to Its help the er .-.gum be able to count on Russia if 
 
 same situation . thai il they did not 
 e theii s ty with Russia no one ■ auk! trust them 
 
 td they would rind th< ess and despised 
 
 to : . - old take the 
 
 first :hem pret 
 
 . i d to himself: " 1: is bound to come 
 
 soone: m later/ 3 fid timsc I in bis country's 
 
 . s s 
 
 ^ : ; ms 6 same ig 
 
 the methods " Holy War.* 1 
 
 nedans oJ the Sudan replied that Turkey's wax 
 ;: .-;.-...-. sible purpose was to support 
 
 .-.uu Austria-Hungary which no more profess faith 
 
 1 did Grt ce.* 
 
 Ev* 
 
 ig • 
 s book t passage 
 
 Doctoi Akhc 
 
 ' YV 
 
 j 
 
 S 
 
 isses 3 .'•.-.-. • -. .-. 1 ....'. point so 
 •Seel -9th, 191^ . nani- 
 
 -OUT.'' 
 
 EOi 
 
German Diplomacy* Its Methods and Achievements 
 
 Prince Bulow repeats approvingly : " We are not a political 
 people." 
 
 He has himself furnished the best proof of the truth of his 
 statement, for during his period of office the character of German 
 diplomacy underwent no change. It was simultaneously hypocritical 
 and provocative, but the provocation unmasked the hypocrisy and 
 no one was deceived. 
 
 The results of its methods were to unite against the German Empire 
 the three greatest Powers of Europe and two small ones, Serbia and 
 Belgium, the heroism of which has been of vital importance to the 
 Allied plan of campaign. Germany lost one of her allies, Italy, and 
 at the critical moment her other ally, whom she had made her 
 cat's-paw, nearly drew back on seeing the abyss that yawned before 
 her feet. If she had set out to league against her all the enlightened 
 peoples of the earth she could not have been more successful. 
 
 German diplomacy shares the responsibility for the violations of 
 the Hague Convention with the German Army, whose behaviour 
 has been such that merely by attempting to justify it Germany has 
 put herself outside the pale of civilized races. 
 
 I offer these achievements of German diplomacy for consideration 
 to those of my compatriots who, with craven perversion, have 
 grovelled before Germany since 1870, displaying their patriotism 
 by declarations of the perfection of everything German and the 
 futility of everything French. 
 
 103 
 
PART II 
 
 THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE WAR 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 PRODUCTIVE versus MILITARIST CIVILIZATION* 
 
 Their different characters — Germany's methods of expansion — Werre — 
 Treitschke's theories of the holiness and divinity of war — War versus Law 
 — War is an instrument of constraint ; commerce, of freedom — Some 
 apologists of war — A test for the professors — War always ends with peace. 
 
 AUGUSTE COMTE, Herbert Spencer and G. de Molinari have 
 drawn comparisons between a militarist civilization and 
 a productive civilization, and their conclusions can be summarized 
 thus : 
 
 " Capture is the sole mode of acquisition known in the animal world, and to 
 Man in his pre-commercial phase. The idea of exchange, which presupposes 
 goodwill on the part of the contracting parties, is peculiar to Man, and to him 
 only when his evolution is far advanced." 
 
 The Germans presented the most extreme form of a militarist 
 civilization. Tacitus tells us that they held it shameful to win by 
 the sweat of their brow what they might have obtained by force. 
 Pigrum et iners videtur suadore acquirere quod possis sanguine parare 
 {Germ., 14). Such ideas are by no means extinct among their 
 descendants. 
 
 I find in the Encyclopedia Britannica, under the heading War : 
 (Old English) Werre, (French) Guerre, of Teutonic origin. 
 
 German professors have attempted to endow war with all sorts of 
 virtues. Treitschke speaks of its " holiness " and its " divinity " 
 because " it is the most powerful force that goes to the making of 
 nations." Herbert Spencer says that war is the origin of govern- 
 ment. A human aggregation which finds itself under the necessity 
 of defending itself or attacking another selects a chief distinguished 
 for his warlike qualities. This chief inspires confidence and exacts 
 
 * The Journal des Economistes, January 15th, 1904 — my communication to 
 the SocUU d'Economie Politique : " The Influence of the Economic Ideas of 
 Herbert Spencer ; " The Theory of Evolution, Ultima Verba, by Molinari ; Le 
 Commerce et les Commerfants, Book II., Chapter II., by Yves Guyot. 
 
 107 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 obedience. From this process springs the military type with its 
 reliance on the governing power. Along such lines of evolution we 
 reach the regime of statute, regulating the actions of men. 
 
 War is an instrument of constraint ; exchange, being the resultant 
 of discussion, individual initiative and agreement between the parties, 
 is an instrument of freedom. 
 
 Treitschke, contrasting the two civilizations, says : 
 
 " The majesty of War appears in the effacement of paltry individualism 
 before the conception of the all-embracing State." 
 
 General Bernhardi and others have developed that idea : 
 
 " The Ethos of Prussian policy, preserved inviolable through the ages, is 
 War — war not merely as a means to territorial expansion and the realization of 
 political ambitions, but as a moral discipline, or rather as a kind of spiritual 
 inspiration." 
 
 Baron von Strengel, returning from the Hague Conference, wrote a 
 book in which he denounced peace as a national peril and prayed 
 that " the love of peace might be torn from the soul of the nation." 
 Mirabeau said that " war was the national industry of Prussia," and 
 Hans Delbnick has added : " It is our national religion and life." 
 An Austrian professor, Herr Ludwig Gumplowitz, has revived the 
 old Latin doctrine : " A foreigner is an enemy." Heinrich Rettich 
 considers that " war between States is a human necessity," a necessity 
 which is " none other than the tendency to increase one's possessions at 
 the expense of strangers." If this principle applies to groups it 
 must equally apply to individuals, and when the professor who 
 expresses these views wants some coffee he should seize it instead of 
 buying it from the grocer who has himself bought it from the importer. 
 
 This plan has not infrequently been tried by various individuals, 
 but the professors, by a singular lapse of logic, call them thieves, 
 and remind them that there is a Penal Code which makes that method 
 of " increasing their possessions " both dangerous and unpleasant. 
 
 It is idle for the descendants of the Germans, so well described by 
 Tacitus, to speak of making war for war's sake, because war always 
 ends in peace and the periods of peace have been much longer than 
 the periods of war. Besides, the Germans are not merely a race of 
 warriors. They claim to take the first place in agriculture, industry 
 and commerce. The real origin of the present war is the absence 
 in Germany of equilibrium between productive civilization and 
 militarist civilization. 
 
 108 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE POPULATION OF GERMANY 
 
 "The rights of over-populated countries" — Emigration has almost ceased in 
 Germany — The populations of Belgium and Germany compared — The area 
 at their disposal — The Torrid Zone — An argument for the Neo-Malthusians 
 — The Slavs — The absurdity of the extermination theory. 
 
 IT must be remembered that the area of Germany (540,800 square 
 kilometres = 208,780 square miles) is only 4,400 square kilometres 
 more than that of France (536,400 square kilometres = 207,100 square 
 miles). In 1871 the population of Germany was 41,059,000; in 
 1900, 56,367,000 ; in 1910, 65,000,000 ; and according to the 
 calculation for 191 3, 66,835,000. 
 
 Germany is over-populated. Then she has a right to additional 
 territory ! Such is the basis of her claims — claims endorsed by many 
 non-Germans, who, parrot-like, take up the cry. 
 
 Yet the Germans themselves are not finding existence so onerous 
 that they must seek better conditions elsewhere. Quite otherwise. 
 The volume of emigration has steadily diminished. In 1885 the 
 emigrants numbered 171,000. In 1892 the number fell to 116,000, 
 in 1898 to 23,000, and from 1908 to 1912 the annual average has not 
 exceeded this last figure. If the Germans themselves do not find 
 that there are too many of them in Germany, why talk of Germany's 
 surplus population entitling her to additional space ? 
 
 The Pan-Germans reply : " It is true that Germany is capable 
 of supporting a population of 68 millions, but she will be unable to 
 support one of 80 or 90 millions." Now a German population of 
 90 millions would mean 166 to the square kilometre. But Belgium, 
 with an area of 29,455 square kilometres, had a population of 
 7,658,000 in 191 3 ; that is, 260 to the square kilometre, or 56 per cent, 
 more than Germany. If the German argument is sound and they 
 have the right to take territory from other nations, how much 
 weightier is it in the case of Belgium ! It gives the Belgians a claim 
 to a slice of Germany. On the same scale the population of Germany 
 would be, not 6y millions, but 140 millions ; so there is still a margin. 
 
 109 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Belgium has no need of conquests to support her population. The 
 Belgians do not even emigrate to the Congo, where there are only 
 5,500 whites. 
 
 The earth is not yet over-populated. The United States, Canada, 
 Argentina and Brazil still have huge areas which are only sparsely 
 populated. 
 
 The German colonies are for the most part situated in the Torrid 
 Zone, to which the European, especially the North European, seldom 
 becomes acclimatized. The white population of the German colonies, 
 including Kiao-Chau, was only 27,800 in 1912. These colonies have 
 no more furnished an outlet for the German population than has 
 the Congo for Belgium. 
 
 The Germans had better hopes of Morocco, but there, too, their 
 calculations went wrong. 
 
 The German argument that their over-population justifies the 
 invasion and conquest of other countries would be a formidable weapon 
 in the hands of every German householder whose family approaches 
 unwieldy proportions. He could say with justice that a man with a 
 large number of children has a right to help himself to the property of 
 a man with a smaller number. But before putting his theory into 
 practice he would have to secure the reform of the Penal Code, which 
 punishes thieves without regard to their family burdens. 
 
 The adherents of this peculiarly German theory also supply the 
 Malthusians with an overwhelming retort : " Instead of exercising 
 self-restraint you multiply with no regard for consequences and then 
 seize territory from other peoples under the pretext that your short- 
 sightedness gives you the right. To shift your responsibilities on 
 to their shoulders, you use your surplus population to overwhelm 
 them with your outflanking strategy and mass tactics. They resist ; 
 and your surplusage of men vanishes in the gaps created by your own 
 theories of war. It would have been better to deny yourselves the births 
 and education of the poor beings you sacrifice on your battlefields. " 
 
 If mere numbers betoken rights, the Slavs, with their population 
 increasing faster than that of Germany, have an even greater claim 
 to accessions of territory. Between 1846 and 1855 Russia in Europe 
 had a population of 65 millions. On January 1st, 1910, the population 
 of European Russia, including Poland and Finland, was estimated at 
 137 millions. If Asiatic Russia is added, the total amounts to about 
 170 millions. Thus the increase in population of Russia in Europe 
 is nearly double that of Germany. 
 
 no 
 
The Population of Germany 
 
 In 191 2 and 191 3 the Chancellor put forward the Slav peril as the 
 principal justification for the increase of the German army, and the 
 Slav peril is unquestionably the Kaiser's motive for selecting 19 14 
 as the best date for the war. 
 
 Does he think that the 170 million inhabitants of the Russian 
 Empire can be exterminated ? Suppose he thinks he can kill two 
 millions of them, though Russian military history does not encourage 
 the belief that Russians allow themselves to be slaughtered like sheep. 
 If he loses only half as many in the process, the relative situation 
 remains unchanged, in view of Russia's numerical superiority. But 
 if he loses the same number, the loss is double. He knows quite well 
 Russia cannot be conquered and that an army which pentrates into 
 the heart of Russia is an army lost. Then what is his real aim ? 
 Does he want to colonize Russia with Germans ? In spite of his 
 appeal to the Teutonic Knights, his coercion laws and the expenditure 
 of millions, he has failed to clear the Poles from the Duchy of Posen. 
 
 It is as impossible for the Germans to exterminate the Slavs as 
 for the Slavs to exterminate the Germans. All this talk of extermi- 
 nation is a relic of atavism, a return to the primitive ideas of men who 
 lived at least two thousand years ago. The Teutons could not even en- 
 tirely exterminate the thinly-scattered alien populations of that period. 
 
 The modern Germans make themselves ridiculous when they com- 
 pare themselves to the races of classical antiquity which were over- 
 whelmed by the barbarian invasions. There is nothing more absurd 
 than the efforts of Goethe and Nietzsche to transform the Teutons 
 into Greeks. Mephistopheles and Zarathustra came from our 
 Northern mists. Aristophanes never met them on the Agora. We 
 have still to wait for the sculptor who is to adorn the Tiergarten 
 with a modern German's idea of the Apollo Belvedere, a spiked 
 helmet on his head, a pipe between his teeth, drinking his beer and 
 staring manfully at a heavy-footed Callypigian Venus. 
 
 This self-comparison with Greece, absurd enough to excite our pity, 
 proves that a nation's civilizing influence does not depend upon its 
 numbers. Men will be reading Aristotle and Plato long after they 
 have forgotten the names of the ninety-three signatories to the 
 Manifeste des Kulturkrieger* (" Manifesto of the Intellectuals "). 
 
 * See the Journal des kconomistes, August and September, 19 14, and April, 
 191 5. Letters from Luigi Brentano, Yves Guyot, D. Bellet and G. Blondel. 
 This correspondence has appeared in a brochure, under the title : Le Manifeste 
 des Kulturkrieger. (Published by Felix Alcan, Paris.) 
 
 Ill 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE THEORY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
 Economic science a cam eral Science — The Historical School — National Economy 
 — The Congress of Eisenach — Adolph Wagner and Schmoller — Reaction 
 against the disciples of Adam Smith — A summary of the economic doctrine 
 — Frederick List — His conclusions. 
 
 IN Germany economic science has always been regarded as a cameral 
 science. (The word " cameral " comes from " Kammer" the 
 Chamber, which in the Middle Ages in most German States adminis- 
 tered the Crown lands and looked after the revenue.) In 1727 
 Frederick William I. founded at Halle and Frankfort chairs of 
 economics and cameral science. Economics was only a department 
 of government and the exchequer. It has not lost that character. 
 
 The German historical school of jurisprudence, with Savigny at 
 its head, proposed to set up traditionalism in opposition to the 
 French Revolution and the critical school of Kant. 
 
 The economists who founded the historical school have more or less 
 followed Savigny. The German historico-ethical school might just 
 as well call itself the school of economic atavism. Its ideal is a 
 return to the ancestral type. Von Thiinen, List and Roscher are 
 nationals. Roscher says that there are several political economies, 
 as if there could be several national arithmetics. They became 
 " Academic Socialists " when Roscher, a professor at Leipzig Univer- 
 sity, who in 1843 had enunciated the programme of the Historico- 
 Ethical School, Grundriss zu Vorlesungen ilber die Staatswirthschaft, 
 founded the " Society of Social Policy," which held its first congress at 
 Eisenach on October 6th, 1872. There were present Professors Schon- 
 berg of Tubingen University, Adolph Wa"grler of Berlin University, 
 Luigi Brentano, then at Breslau University and now at Munich, 
 Hildebrand of Jena, Knies of Heidelberg, and others. Schmoller, 
 who has since become rector of Berlin University, gave the inaugural 
 address, in which he declared that " the physiological conditions of 
 
 112 
 
The Theory of National Economy 
 
 the various social classes ought to be the basis of our reforming 
 activities. He was not asking for the suppression of industrial 
 liberty, nor the capitalist class ; but he could not, merely out of 
 respect for abstract principles, allow so-called freedom of contract to 
 lead to the economic exploitation of the working classes." 
 
 For the rest, there were divisions in the camp. Herr Wagner poked 
 fun at the " Ethico-historico-psychologico-statistico-inductive School, 
 the members of which fortify themselves in their narrow ideas and 
 form a clique." The nerveless fatalism of the " paleographical 
 economists " he dubbed " historical quietism," and spoke jocularly 
 of " this science of archives." Herr Schmoller, on the other hand, 
 called him a metaphysician. 
 
 The Germans are right in speaking of their historical method as 
 being peculiarly their own. Herr Schmoller described it thus at the 
 close of his inaugural address as Rector of Berlin University in 1897 : 
 " All the great idealistic conceptions, humanity, Christianity, the 
 development of law during thousands of years, the moral duties of 
 the State, especially as they have been understood in Germany and 
 Prussia, lead us along that pathway of reform to which the imperial 
 messages of 1880 and 1890 beckoned us. German science has done 
 nothing more than to attempt to lay a solid foundation for those old 
 ethico-religious and juridico-political precepts." 
 
 Thus Herr Schmoller assigns to German economic science the task of 
 justifying the past and present of the German Empire and the political 
 ideals of the German Government, truly the task of a maid-of-all-work. 
 
 " Modern economic theory," he says, " has reached a historical 
 and ethical conception of the State and Society utterly unlike that 
 which was formulated by rationalism and materialism. It is no 
 longer a simple theory of commerce and exchange. It has once more 
 become a great political and moral science which has restored man 
 to his rightful place as its true subject-matter, not goods and capital." 
 
 Herr Schmoller, with all the authority given him by his rectorate, 
 carefully notes that " a pure disciple of Adam Smith cannot be a 
 useful teacher," and that, consequently, he would have to adapt 
 his science to the necessities of the Government's social policy or 
 " relinquish his chair."* 
 
 Economic Science must be " national." The Catheder Socialisten, 
 
 * This passage, disputed by Herr Luigi Brentano, is to be found at p. 323 
 of Schmoller 's Politique Sociale et Economie Politique. French translation 
 reviewed by the author. 
 
 113 8 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 the " Academic " Socialists, are always clamouring for greater inter- 
 ference by the State in economic affairs, " to invigorate public spirit," 
 says Herr Held, forgetful that the stronger the State, the weaker is 
 public spirit. Herr Wagner goes so far as to say that the individual 
 citizen has no right to his own comings and goings, to change his 
 residence from one place to another, or to marry without permission. 
 Following Mario and Schoffle, he would allow the State to fix the 
 number of families and the number of children to each. He forgets 
 to tell us how the State would ensure obedience to the last regulation. 
 The tenets of this school may be summarized thus : 
 
 (i) Man is not a mere egoist. He is gregarious by nature (Gemeinsinn), and 
 has the instinct of obedience to duty, his country and God. 
 
 (2) There are no universal and unchanging factors in. human nature. Men 
 
 differ from each other according to their stages of civilization. 
 
 (3) Every question must be examined in its relation to a given country, and 
 
 with the help of statistics and history. This is the " historical and 
 realistic method." 
 
 (4) The State takes precedence of the family, and the family of the individual. 
 
 (5) A private person has only such rights as the laws give him. 
 
 (6) The function of Political Economy is to examine the condition of the 
 
 various social classes and maintain equilibrium between them. 
 
 (7) The Government has the right and duty to regulate competition within 
 
 the State ; a fortiori, competition with other countries. 
 
 (8) It is untrue that all interests, even legitimate interests, can be made to har- 
 
 monize. Egoism spurs men to robbery and evil conduct, and to set up 
 their own private interests in opposition to the general good. The 
 State, the highest instrument of Law, and in the name of national 
 interests, must suppress or restrain them. 
 
 (9) The State must protect and foster every form of economic activity which 
 
 furthers its purposes, and discourage all others. 
 
 (10) The State should replace private foresight by public foresight. 
 
 (11) Rights of property have assumed very various forms. They are not 
 
 absolute nor always identical. 
 
 (12) Economic problems are not self-contained. They are intimately 
 
 bound up with psychology, religion, morals, law, national habits and 
 , history. 
 
 (13) Political Economy is a " cameral " science. The State is its subject, 
 
 and the social question is a moral question.* 
 
 Frederick William and Frederick II. organized the economic system 
 of Prussia on the military model. The " National Economists," 
 " Historico-Ethicals " and " Catheder Socialisten " bear the stamp 
 of their origin. They are committed to the inconsistency of wishing 
 
 * See Yves Guyot : La Science fcconomique, 4th edition, 191 1, p. 351. 
 
 114 
 
The Theory of National Economy 
 
 to maintain in an industrial civilization that all-pervading domination 
 of the Government which characterizes a militarist civilization. 
 
 The man who was cited as the authority in favour of the protec- 
 tionist changes of 1879 was Frederick List. List was born in 1789 
 at Reutlingen in Wiirtemberg. He spent his youth attacking the 
 nobility and bureaucracy and threw himself into the movement 
 which, after 1 8 15, aimed at removing the customs barriers which 
 separated the small States of Germany. After ten months of hard 
 labour in prison, his reward for a too enthusiastic advocacy of this 
 cause, he was compelled to leave Europe for the United States. There 
 he attacked Adam Smith's system of " cosmopolitan economy " 
 and enunciated his theory of national economy. Although he con- 
 tinued to devote himself to questions immediately concerning Ger- 
 many, he was unable to return to his native land until 1834. In 
 1 841 he published his National System of Political Economy and com- 
 mitted suicide in 1846. I give here the principal points of his work : 
 
 (1) There should be no duties on imported foodstuffs. 
 
 (2) In international trade the exchange is between nations, not between 
 
 individuals. 
 
 (3) Nations should maintain a protective system until they are in a position 
 
 to compete with England. 
 
 (4) It should be the Government's business to foster the increase of pro- 
 
 ducing capacity for all commodities the production of which is 
 favoured by natural resources. 
 
 (5) A nation should be self-supporting, except in respect of certain raw 
 
 materials like cotton. 
 
 (6) All the States of Germany should enter a single customs union. 
 
 (7) Holland is as much a part of Germany as Normandy is of France. 
 
 (8) What is called " the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe" has 
 
 been nothing but the effort of the weaker to prevent the stronger 
 from realizing his purposes. 
 
 (9) Germany, with the countries " which belong to her," Holland, Belgium 
 
 and Switzerland, can make herself a commercial and political Power. 
 
 (10) The nations, Germany, Holland and Belgium, whose naval power is 
 
 inferior to that of England should amalgamate to form a united naval 
 Power instead of remaining at the mercy of English supremacy. 
 
 (11) It is to the interest of all that England's industrial predominance should 
 
 lose those avenues of access (Holland, Belgium and the Hanseatic 
 towns) by which England has hitherto maintained her ascendancy in 
 the Continental markets. 
 
 (12) It is of ten times greater importance to secure and maintain the home 
 
 market than to seek wealth abroad. 
 
 (13) No commercial privilege should be granted in Asia exclusively to one 
 
 European nation. Neither of the two routes to the Red Sea and the 
 Persian Gulf must be in the sole possession of England. 
 
 115 8* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 (14) If any nation is qualified for the establishment of a national industrial 
 
 power, that nation is Germany. 
 
 (15) We maintain that the existence, independence and future of the German 
 
 nation depend on a German system of national protection. 
 
 We will now see in what manner and with what modifications those 
 who appealed to List put his theories into practice. 
 
 116 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE ZOLLVEREIN AND THE TARIFF OF 1879 
 
 The Zollverein — Bismarck's inconsistent policy — How his protectionist policy 
 encouraged Socialism — The rural and industrial populations — Germany's 
 nerve-centre lies west of Berlin — The importance of the Rhine Province 
 and Westphalia. 
 
 UNDER the Continental System Napoleon prohibited maritime 
 trade, but insisted on free trade between all nations under 
 the total or partial domination of France. Their population was 
 estimated to be seventy-two millions. 
 
 After the Congress of Vienna in 18 15 Germany found herself cut up 
 into a number of small States, each of which insisted on its own 
 customs and currency as the sign manual of its independence. No 
 doubt it was very glorious, but it was extremely inconvenient for the 
 populations distributed among them. In Prussia, which was a medley 
 of States having little or no connection with each other, there were 
 no less than sixty different tariffs covering 2,800 articles. At one 
 point of her long frontier a particular article was duty-free ; at 
 another, duty was payable on it. 
 
 Baron Heinrich von Biilow, Minister of Commerce, and Karl George 
 Mxasen, the Finance Minister, decided to impose no import duties 
 on raw materials but to impose a ten per cent, duty on manufactured 
 articles and a twenty per cent, duty on colonial products. These 
 duties were specific and not ad valorem. Prussia's neighbours, the 
 small States, jealous though they were of their economic freedom, 
 gradually entered the customs union. The first recruit was Schwarz- 
 burg-Sondershausen in 18 19, and others followed. In 1828 Wiirtem- 
 berg and Bavaria formed a customs union. Towards the end of that 
 year a commercial union of central Germany was formed between 
 Hanover, the Saxon duchies, Brunswick, Nassau and the free cities 
 of Frankfort and Bremen, in opposition to the development of the 
 Prussian system. On May 29th, 1829, however, Prussia signed a 
 
 117 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 commercial treaty with the southern commercial union, and on 
 March 22nd, 1833, tne central and northern unions were amalgamated. 
 On January 1st, 1834, the larger part of Germany had a single 
 customs frontier, and by January 1st, 1854, tne Prussian system 
 had, in spite of Austrian opposition, absorbed the whole of Germany 
 except Hamburg, which only accepted it in 1888. The development 
 of railways had convinced the most resolute opponents that a Zoll- 
 verein was inevitable. 
 
 The German tariff, after the commercial treaty of 1862, was com- 
 paratively liberal. Bismarck established the protectionist tariff of 
 1879 in the interests of the industrials of the Rhine Province and 
 Westphalia. At the same time that he was introducing repressive 
 legislation against the Socialists, these import duties were fostering 
 industry and thus swelling their ranks. To this masterpiece of logic 
 he added the inauguration of an Imperial insurance scheme, a sooth- 
 ing poultice of bureaucratic Socialism which he thought would 
 dissolve the Socialist party, but which only strengthened it. It 
 contributed largely towards the exodus of the rural population into 
 the industrial centres. 
 
 In 1 87 1 the rural population living in communities of less than 
 2,000 inhabitants was 64 per cent, and the urban population 36 per 
 cent. In 1895 the two populations were numerically equal. In 1907 
 the entire agricultural population numbered 17,243,000, out of a total 
 of 61,720,000, or 279.5 per 1,000, instead of 349 per 1,000. The 
 industrial population, excluding those employed in mines, numbered 
 23,404,000, or 375 per 1,000, instead of 355. The mining population 
 numbered 2,982,000, or 48.3 per 1,000, instead of 35.7. Commerce 
 and the transport industries accounted for 8,278,000, or 134 per 
 1,000, instead of 115.2. 
 
 Berlin is nearly midway between the eastern and western frontiers 
 of Prussia. Her nerve-centres lie to the west. Except for the great 
 industrial province of Silesia, all the industrial forces of Germany 
 have a tendency to congregate in the west. The movement of the 
 population of Prussia demonstrates the truth of this observation. 
 Except for Breslau, which has 515,000 inhabitants, all the towns with 
 more than 250,000 inhabitants lie to the west of Berlin, which, accord- 
 ing to the census of 1910, had a population of 2,071,000. Cologne has 
 517,000 inhabitants; Frankfurt-am-Main, 415,000; Diisseldorf, 
 359,000 ; Charlottenburg, 306,000 ; Hanover, 302,000 ; Essen, 
 295,000 ; Magdeburg, 280,000. For the rest of Germany, Dresden, 
 
 118 
 
 \ 
 
The Zollverein and the Tariff of 1879 
 
 with 552,000 inhabitants, is on the same degree of longitude as Berlin ; 
 but Leipzig, with 626,000 inhabitants, Munich with 608,000, and 
 Hamburg with 987,000 lie to the west. 
 
 At the Diisseldorf Exhibition of 1909, a great chart near the 
 entrance demonstrated the importance of the Rhine Province and 
 Westphalia to the Prussian Monarchy. 
 
 Percentage. 
 
 Area 52,820 kilometres (approx. 20,374 1 5 
 
 square miles) 
 
 Population 9,955,000 29 
 
 Volume of trade 97,545,000 tons (metric)* 45 
 
 Coal products 72,187,000 ,, 71 
 
 Mining products 2,977,000 ,, 66 
 
 Iron products 4,706,000 ,, 81 
 
 Steel products 3,647,090 ,„ 86 
 
 The proportion has steadily risen. 
 
 Bismarck always designed his protectionist policy to keep on good 
 terms with the manufacturers of the Rhine Province and Westphalia, 
 and so that at the time he was attempting to proscribe Socialism 
 he could say : " I give work to the working classes." 
 
 * A metric ton=2,204'6 lbs. 
 
 119 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 ACTIVE PROTECTION AND THE AGRARIAN INTEREST 
 
 The demands of the Agrarians— The tariffs of 1SS5 and 1S87— Bismarck's 
 mistake — Action against Russia — Caprivi's concessions — Anger of the 
 agrarians — Their appeal to the Kaiser — Agrarian v. Industrial policy — 
 Prince Hohenlohe and the great estates — Coalition between the great 
 landowners and the great manufacturers — The low standard of living of 
 the working-class — The import of grain — The " Import Certificates " — 
 Agricultural " Dumping " — The export of rye to Russia — The advantages 
 of import certificates — Bounties on spirits — Agricultural syndicates and 
 the great landowners. 
 
 IN his 1879 tariff Bismarck had imposed a duty of one mark* per 
 100 kilogrammest on imported wheat, rye and oats, and 50 pfennigs 
 on barley. These were small duties which List would none the less 
 have opposed. 
 
 But this duty, so far from satisfying the great landowners 
 of the East, only roused their anger and fired their ambitions. 
 Thev considered their interests had been sacrificed to those of the 
 industrials of the West. Had they not a far stronger claim to pro- 
 tection ? Were they not the pillars and props of the Crown ? Were 
 not East Prussia, West Prussia, Brandenburg and Pomerania the 
 ancient possessions of the Prussian Monarchy, while the Western 
 provinces had only been acquired by war or diplomatic pressure ? 
 Was not Bismarck himself by birth a great landed proprietor ? 
 Bismarck lent a sympathetic ear and immediately after the Treaty of 
 Skiernewice, forgetting that he had just been striving to establish an 
 entente between Germany and Russia, he secured the acceptance of 
 the law of May 24th, 1885, which raised the duties on wheat and rye 
 to 3 marks per 100 kilogrammes, on barley and oats to I mark 50 pf. 
 By the law of December 21st, 1887, these duties were again raised 
 to 5 marks for wheat, 4 marks for oats and 2 marks 25 pf. for barley. 
 
 This policy pleased the agrarians, and also annoyed Russia, 
 
 * One mark=n|d. ; 50 pfennigs=6d. 
 f One kilogramme=» 2-204 1ds - avoirdupois. 
 
 120 
 
Active Protection and the Agrarian Interest 
 
 Bismarck being apparently under the singular impression that he could 
 ingratiate himself with that country by his hostile economic practices. 
 This tariff war was not without effect on the relations between Russia 
 and France. Yet Bismarck recognized the importance of keeping on 
 good terms with Russia ! 
 
 When Caprivi was Chancellor he cared less for the friendship of 
 Russia than for the goodwill of the United States and Great Britain. 
 All this time, while the import duties checked the imports of Russian 
 wheat into Germany, Russia was answering them with duties on 
 manufactured articles. Both countries suffered heavily. Caprivi 
 had to consent to a reduction of the duty on wheat and rye from 5 
 marks to 3 marks 50 pf., on oats from 4 marks to 2 marks 80 pf. 
 This scale, lower than that of 1887, was still higher than that of 1885. 
 The agrarians were all the more exasperated with the " con- 
 temptible " Chancellor, because he " owned not a foot of ground nor 
 a blade of grass." They appealed to a man of their own class, a great 
 landed proprietor like themselves, the Kaiser ! He heard their cause, 
 expressed his sympathies and one fine day, after a violent scene, 
 brusquely dismissed the Chancellor as a reward for his great services 
 to the Empire in concluding commercial treaties with Russia, 
 Roumania, Austria-Hungary, and other countries. Caprivi was 
 replaced by Count Biilow, a great landowner whose agrarian sym- 
 pathies were well known. Thus did the Agrarian Bund (League) 
 triumph. 
 
 In his speeches at Essen and Breslau in 1902 William II. revealed his 
 violent aversion to the Socialists. He wanted to pursue an agrarian 
 policy in preference to the industrial policy which fostered Socialism. 
 In the session of January 23rd, 1905, Count Posadowsky, Minister of 
 the Interior, expounded this policy. He contrasted the restless 
 " neurasthenia " of German public and political life with German 
 agriculture, which he called " the sheet-anchor of the ship of State." 
 He wanted to maintain the agricultural element as a permanent 
 counterpoise to the floating population of the towns, " which gave 
 the Reichstag the largest Radical majority in the world." 
 
 However, Prince Hohenlohe confessed in the Reichstag that an 
 owner of twelve hectares,* so far from being in a position to sell corn, 
 had to buy it. Small holders represent j6 per cent, of all the agricul- 
 tural proprietors of Germany, so he was admitting that fifteen million 
 peasants had no interest in the tariff duties. 
 
 * One hectarea«nearly z\ acres. 
 121 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The corn duties were only imposed in the interests of the great 
 landowners. A small holder produces ten tons of rye and sells one. 
 If he profits by the duty of 5 marks per 100 kilogrammes, it is only 
 to the extent of 50 marks, which, spread over 100 metric quintals*, 
 gives him 50 pfennigs a quintal. The large scale grower who produces 
 1,000 quintals can sell at least 900. His profit from the protective 
 tariff amounts to 4,500 marks (£221), which gives him 4 marks 50 pf. 
 per quintal. 
 
 But this argument had no bearing because the great landowners 
 had been clever enough to negotiate with the great industrials and 
 arrive at an understanding profitable to both. The working classes 
 would pay a little more for their bread and pork, but a rise in wages 
 does not necessarily follow an increase in the cost of living. The 
 only thing that mattered was to maintain the protective system, and 
 in 1905 the Reichstag, by 228 votes to 81, raised the duty on wheat 
 to 5 marks $o pf., the duty on rye and oats to 5 marks, and the duty 
 on barley to 4 marks. The duty on flour was raised from 7 marks 
 30 pf. to 10 marks 20 pf. ; that on pigs, from 3 marks 30 pf. to 9 
 marks ; that on sheep from 1 mark 70 pf. to S marks, and on fresh 
 and frozen meat from 15 marks to 35 marks. 
 
 The census of 1907 shows that the imposition of duties on foodstuffs 
 has not won back the nation to agriculture. At the same time they 
 have been a heavy burden on the working classes. Mr. Andrew D. 
 White, formerly United States Ambassador in Germany, said in 
 1905 :t 
 
 • ' There is much distress among the poorer classes. The food consumed by 
 many is not only unappetizing but abominable. In a number of industrial 
 centres human beings herd like animals. The condition of the peasants in 
 Prussia, Silesia and Thuringia is terrible. Horrible misery is hidden behind the 
 flimsy fabric of politico-humanitarian institutions which deceive the superficial 
 inquiries from other lands. These institutions are but the pitiless travesty of 
 State providence, and are already crumbling to their doom." 
 
 Yet notwithstanding all these privations, Germany is not a self- 
 supporting country, and is compelled to import a certain quantity of 
 corn. 
 
 In 1894 tne agrarians invented an exceedingly ingenious method 
 of using the import duties on cereals as an export bounty, a method 
 
 * One metric quintals* 100 kiIogrammes=«220 lbs. avoirdupois. 
 
 I Germany's Aim in Foreign Politics, "North American Review," April, 
 
 1905. P- 56i. 
 
 122 
 
Active Protection and the Agrarian Interest 
 
 known as the system of " Import Certificates " (Einfuhrscheine). 
 Any exporter of grain or flour has the right to a certificate which 
 authorizes him to import, free of duty, a quantity not only of cereals, 
 but of things such as coffee and oil, equivalent in value to the amount 
 specified in the certificate.* If the world's market price of rye is no 
 marks and the German market price 150 marks, an exporter will 
 export his rye at no marks and receive an import certificate of 50 
 marks, which he sells on the Bourse. He thus receives 160 marks, 
 showing a bonus of 10 marks on the German market price. 
 
 This is a kind of agricultural dumping, with the aggravating circum- 
 stance that it originated in a law. Thanks to the system, Germany, 
 formerly an importer of rye, has become an exporter : 
 
 Five year average. Imports. 
 
 1891-1895 646,800 
 
 1906-1910 453,600 
 
 1910 389,500 
 
 1911 614,100 
 
 The average annual value of Russian rye imported into Germany 
 from 1891 to 1895 was £2,400,000; from 1896 to 1900, £3,270,000. 
 In 1909 it fell to £1,755,000 and in 1910 to £1,945,000. 
 
 The rye growers of Germany are to be found mainly in the Eastern 
 provinces. Instead of selling their harvests in the west of Germany, 
 they find it more profitable, thanks to the import certificates, to export 
 them to Northern Europe, especially Poland, Russia and Finland. 
 The Germans have established mills in Russia just within the frontier. 
 They send their rye there, availing themselves of the import certifi- 
 cates. The flour is sold in Russia and the bran re-exported into Ger- 
 many. If the market piice of rye were not higher in Germany, the 
 export bounty would amount to 31.35 per cent, of the value of the 
 the rye. 
 
 The following table shows the increase of the German export of rye 
 into Russia : 
 
 Tons. Value in £. 
 
 1891-1895 7,700 £48,000 
 
 Exports. 
 
 Difference 
 
 (In metric tons.) 
 
 
 17,400 
 
 - 629,400 
 
 506,500 
 
 + 52,800 
 
 820,000 
 
 + 430,500 
 
 768,500 
 
 + 158,400 
 
 1901-1905 
 1906-1910 
 1911 . .. . 
 
 * The Journal des ticonomistes 
 
 16,100 £81,000 
 
 111,000 £750,000 
 
 146,700 £1,050,000 
 
 April 15th, 19 14, p. 68. Le Traite de Com- 
 merce Russo-Allemand et I'Allemagne exportatrice de cirSales, by Max Hoch- 
 schiller. 
 
 123 
 
r cent age 
 
 . Germany. 
 
 Percentage. 
 
 98 
 
 300 
 
 i-7 
 
 25-7 
 
 38,000 
 
 46.2 
 
 The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The increase in the export of German rye into Finland has advanced 
 from 1,832 tons in the period 1 885-1889 to 26,437 tons in the period 
 1905-1909, while the import from Russia advanced from 14,400 tons 
 to 34,000, and instead of constituting 88 per cent., as in the first period, 
 only formed 56 per cent, in the second. 
 
 The diminution, as regards imports of flour, is even more striking : 
 
 Russia. 
 
 1885-1889 17,300 
 
 1905-1909 21,200 
 
 The flour which the Germans export to Finland comes from the 
 wheat they import from Russia. 
 
 Germany has also driven Russian grain and flour out of Sweden 
 and Norway. 
 
 The German agrarians claim that this system is perfect and are 
 for ever clamouring for higher duties on wheat. We can easily see 
 why. In 19 10 Germany exported 820,000 metric tons of rye, in 
 respect of which there were import certificates for £2,010,000. The 
 same year she only imported 389,500 tons, on which the import 
 duties amounted to £963,700. The figure for the value of import 
 certificates not paired with import duties was thus £2,010,000 — 
 £963,750 — £1,046,250. Such was the clear profit, not to mention 
 the profit resulting from the difference between the world's market 
 price and the German market price. 
 
 The Russo-German Treaty was due to expire in 1917. The 
 Russians disliked intensely the aggressive protectionist system so 
 beloved of the Germans. One would not be far wrong in saying 
 that one of the motives for the declaration of war on Russia could be 
 expressed in the words : " As soon as we have beaten Russia we can 
 compel her to accept the terms of any commercial treaty we choose 
 to dictate." 
 
 With a view to favouring agriculture and especially the great 
 potato-distillers, a scheme was started in 1887, in the Bismarckian 
 era, to graduate the duty of 70 marks a hectolitre* in such a way 
 as to return 20 marks a hectolitre to certain classes of producers 
 of spirits for specified quantities. The quantity of spirits which paid 
 duty at 50 marks was less than the consumption, which was thus 
 obliged to pay as if the duty of 70 marks had been imposed on the 
 total production. In this way the distillers made an extra- profit 
 
 * A hectolitressioo litres=22 imperial gallons. 
 124 
 
Active Protection and the Agrarian Interest 
 
 of 20 marks per hectolitre on all the spirits they distilled and sold. 
 In other words, it was a present of £2,000,000 per annum as com- 
 pensation for the drop in the consumption. In 1909 the duty was 
 raised from 70 to 125 marks a hectolitre — the rate being only 105 
 marks up to the amount of 226.4 million litres. This preserved the 
 Liebesgabe of £2,250,000 to £2,350,000 ; but the consumption having 
 fallen off, the profit realized was not more than £2,000,000 in the last 
 years. Between 1887 and 1910 some of the big distilleries made six 
 or seven million marks out of the difference of 20 marks. 
 
 The production and sale of spirits in Germany are controlled by 
 the Central fiir Spiritus V erwertung, which includes almost every 
 producer. Legislation has been passed which embodies the syndi- 
 cate's wishes. There are fines for overproduction and bounties on 
 denaturation. German spirits pay 125 marks a hectolitre, while im- 
 ported spirits would pay a duty of 225 marks if they could get into 
 the country. 
 
 Import duties and export bounties are both favourable to the policy 
 of the syndicates. M. A. Souchon has studied that policy in his 
 book, Les Cartels de V Agriculture en Allemagne* He comes to 
 the conclusion that " les cartels sont £ autant plus facile s a etablir que 
 le sol est moins morcele." (The fewer the subdivisions of land — i.e., 
 a few large estates instead of many small ones — the easier it is to 
 form syndicates.) Thus they work in favour of the great landowner. 
 Their success has been most striking in Pomerania. The Central 
 fiir Spiritus V erwertung has its supporters among the great land- 
 owners of the east. 
 
 The Sugar Syndicate was killed by the Brussels Conference in 1902. 
 M. Souchon says that " the Central fiir Spiritus V erwertung would 
 have been equally unable to survive such an ordeal. " 
 
 The Agricultural Syndicates have roused the suspicions and anger 
 of the consumers. Not without reason in the case of the Sugar 
 Syndicate, adds M. Souchon. t 
 
 The syndicates, however, are not always successful in maintaining 
 prices at a high level because the hope of even further rises stimulates 
 supply. 
 
 The entire economic organization of Germany is concerned with 
 
 * 1903. A Colin. 
 
 | See Yves Guyot : " La Question des Sucres en 1901; " " L'Industrie du Sucre 
 sur le Continent." Journal de la SociiU de Statistique, Nov. 1902. 
 
 125 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 production only. Demand and the purchasing power of the con- 
 sumer are not considered. If the consumer cannot keep up it is his 
 own fault. 
 
 Thus Germany's idea is to throw her surplus production to the 
 foreigner, and if the foreigner is rude enough to receive it without 
 enthusiasm he must be prepared to meet the Kaiser's anger. 
 
 126 
 
 -ji 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 THE GERMAN SYNDICATES AND DUMPING 
 
 The Syndicates are monopolies of sales, not of production — They date from, the 
 Tariff Law of 1879 — The syndicates and the chemical industry — Herr 
 Liefmann on the disappearance of economic individualism — Cost price 
 and market price — The fight against the customer — The consumer exists 
 for the producer — The Potash Syndicate — Waste — The limitation of pro- 
 duction — The Rhenish- Westphalian Syndicate imports coal — Over-produc- 
 tion — The consumer's revenge — The disappearance of the small-scale 
 producer — The combines — A fictitious method of keeping up prices only 
 prolongs crises — The impossibility of controlling prices — The Prussian 
 Industrial State and the syndicates — " Dumping " — How it favours the 
 foreigner — Rotterdam — Export bounties for finished products — An unex- 
 pected result — German and English sheet-iron — List's theory of national 
 economy means a present to the foreigner — Attacks on foreign industries — 
 The Nobel Dynamite Trust Company, Limited — The European Petroleum 
 Combine and the Deutsche Bank — Industry and the Banks — Financiers 
 and the syndicates — Some conclusions. 
 
 HERR ROBERT LIEFMANN* has defined a syndicate as a 
 voluntary association of producers in the same line of industry 
 who, while preserving their own independence, agree to act together 
 with a view to acquiring a monopoly in the market. The words 
 " preserving their own independence " are not strictly accurate, for 
 the members of a syndicate are bound by a limit of production which 
 they may not exceed, and cannot dispose of their own products 
 entirely as they please. But this description has the merit of being 
 frank, and admits that the object of a syndicate is to acquire a selling 
 monopoly and to impose its own price on the consumer. Every 
 member can consult his own convenience as to his method of pro- 
 duction, and therein lies the difference between a syndicate and a 
 
 * Cartels et Trusts, by Robert Liefmann, Professor at the University of 
 Freiburg in Breisgau, 1909. French translation, 1914. Trusts, Cartels et 
 Syndicats, by Arthur Raffalovich, 2nd edition, 1909. See also the Marche" 
 Financier, which M. Raffalovich publishes annually and which contains a record 
 of all the events in connection with syndicates in the last twenty-five years. 
 
 127 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 trust. In almost every case a syndicate is only an instrument for 
 the monopoly of sales. 
 
 Some German syndicates were founded prior to 1870, but the great 
 crash in the middle of that year led to their development. They still 
 remained, however, isolated phenomena, and the real era of syndicates 
 begins with the protective tariff of 1879. 
 
 Herr Liefmann says that the protectionist reaction was not a 
 reason so much as an opportunity for the growth of syndicates. 
 This may be true in general, but Liefmann admits that in 1879, 
 the tariff having increased the cost of raw materials in the soap and 
 dynamite industries, the producers were compelled to restore the 
 balance between the sale price and the increased cost price by means 
 of general agreements. The greatest development of syndicates 
 occurred in the periods of marked industrial expansion, such as 1888 
 to 1890, 1895 to 1900, and from 1904 to 1907. They were, therefore, 
 not intended to maintain prices but to raise them. 
 
 According to the investigations made by the Imperial Department 
 of the Interior in 1903, the syndicates numbered 335. There were 
 132 in the brick industry, 62 in the iron industry, 19 in the coal 
 industry, 46 in the chemical industry, 27 in the industries connected 
 with stone and earthenware, 17 in the industries engaged in supply- 
 ing food. They represented 15 groups of industries, including the 
 textile industries, in which there were 27. 
 
 But syndication is not always feasible. It is only really suitable 
 for those industries the products of which present a character 
 of simplicity and uniformity. Hence the appearance of sub- 
 syndicates, especially in the chemical industry, which are only con- 
 cerned with the production of one substance. An example is the 
 Bismuth Syndicate. Of the 500 existing syndicates, a certain number 
 represent " syndicated " concerns which have disappeared and been 
 replaced by others. 
 
 The Germans have gone on from national syndicates to inter- 
 national syndicates, of which more than half belong to the chemical 
 industry ; the others concern rails, steel tubing, and other metallur- 
 gical products. The field of action of these syndicates is mainly 
 confined to Austria and Belgium. 
 
 Herr Liefmann greets the advent of syndicates with the most 
 unfeigned enthusiasm. They have destroyed economic individualism. 
 Adam Smith had stated that in a free market competition tended to 
 keep the selling price very near to the cost price. The producers being 
 
 128 
 
The German Syndicates and Dumping 
 
 rivals, the consumers were the tertius gaudens. The syndicate has 
 changed the fight for the consumer into a fight against him. It is 
 the old militarist notion that the individual does not count. It 
 is no longer the producer's object to satisfy the consumer's (that is, 
 the whole world's) needs as expeditiously as possible. He is to be 
 the consumer's master, and the consumer's raison d'etre is to be the 
 source of his profits. Under tht r egime of competition the profits 
 are the measure of the consumer's satisfaction, and he is more neces- 
 sary to the producer than the producer to him. But under the 
 regime of syndication the profits are the result of successful exploita- 
 tion of the consumer. The syndicate regime attempts to make the 
 consumer put himself entirely at its service, and one of its methods 
 is to make him buy exclusively from the syndicates. 
 
 This ambition is by no means always realized. The syndicates 
 force up prices with the inevitable result of raising up against them- 
 selves rival concerns, some of which are formed with the sole object 
 of compelling the syndicates to buy them out. These things have 
 happened in every industry, notably the potash industry (Kaliin- 
 dustrie). The new firms care naught for demand, and seem to labour 
 under the delusion that the mere production of potash implies profits. 
 This error is the revenge on the syndicates of the theory of economic 
 liberty. The syndicates have encouraged the industrials to give no 
 thought for the consumer but to produce for production's sake. In 
 1879 a syndicate was formed which comprised the two largest pro- 
 ducers of potash — the Prussian State, the State of Anhalt — and two 
 private firms. In 1905 there were no less than three hundred boring 
 undertakings. The Kalisyndikat spent millions of marks on making 
 borings in the vicinity of rival borings merely to compel competitors 
 to sell their ground. In 1909 there were fifty-two members of the 
 syndicate. Thirty new workings were in course of construction. 
 The figure of participation of the three oldest concerns fell to 2.8. 
 
 In the summer of 1909 some of the large firms resumed their freedom 
 of action and concluded several large contracts with the United 
 States. The syndicate found itself broken up. This was an unex- 
 pected occurrence, and the Imperial Government reconstituted the 
 syndicate by enacting that all the workings should be included in it. 
 The State works and those in which it was interested were to have 
 no limit of production, but all others were to be restricted in their 
 output for six years. This arrangement was calculated to keep new 
 concerns out of the field, but the calculation proved vain. In 1910 
 
 129 9 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 there were sixty-nine concerns. The estimate for 191 5 was two hundred 
 and seventy-five. It has been said that between 1901 and 1914 the 
 potash industry has been responsible for a waste of £60,000,000.* 
 The root principle of the syndicate is the limitation of production by 
 ;:iing a certain output to each member. They are all liable 
 to the fate which overtook the Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate when, 
 owing to its difficulties in increasing output and opening new mines 
 in 1906, it was obliged to purchase immense supplies of coal in 
 England, as it could not meet the demand. Six months later it had 
 a heavy surplus on its hands. To prevent the mines being closed 
 down and the employees turned off, it was obliged to accumulate 
 stocks and to sell abroad at dumping prices. 
 
 The syndicates claim to be able to regulate the conditions of 
 industry, but they have patently failed, in spite of all their efforts 
 to make demand suit their own convenience. From time to time 
 the consumer takes his revenge and demonstrates that he does not 
 exist for the producer but the producer for him. 
 
 But the syndicates have certainly resulted in the extinction of 
 the small-scale producer to the advantage of the large-scale producer. 
 
 At the same time they have raised up against themselves what are 
 known as " Combines." For example, the great foundries begin to 
 work mines and themselves undertake the production of everything 
 thev need, so as not to be dependent upon the syndicates for their 
 materials. The Cassel firm of Hendschel and Solm, which makes 
 locomotives, has acquired blast furnaces and a coal mine. Many 
 blast furnaces and steel works are now known as Hiittenzechen (mine- 
 foundries). On the other hand, the great mining concern of Gelsen- 
 kirchen has taken over two large metallurgical works, the Hachencr 
 Huttenverein Rote Erie and the Scbalker Gruben- und Hii;: 
 which were already a combine. 
 
 During a crisis the task of the syndicates is to prevent prices 
 from falling in sympathy with the demand, or at least to the same 
 extent. They keep up prices on paper without regard to the diminu- 
 tion of demand. At first the producer is delighted. The prices 
 remain at the old figure, but the demand leaves them severely alone. 
 They are pure window-dressing, and, being fictitious, only prolong the 
 crisis. If they were lowered they would stimulate demand, and 
 therefore the creation of new concerns by those who have available 
 capital and want to take advantage of the prevailing cheapness 
 * Raffalovich : Le Marchi I . 1912-1913, p. St. 
 
 130 
 
The German Syndicates and Dumping 
 
 to benefit as soon as the crisis was over. These fictitious prices 
 delay such a solution. Herr Liefmann says that the loudest com- 
 plaint of syndicates and their high prices are heard in times of 
 industrial depression. 
 
 But even a syndicate cannot resist the competition of rivals, which, 
 under no necessity to prop up feebler members and producing cheaply, 
 demonstrate to the consumer the advantage of an open market. 
 
 On June 4th, 1908, the Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate was com- 
 pelled to begin limiting the output of coke. The diminution finally 
 reached forty per cent, of the original output. In March the output 
 of coal had similarly to be restricted. 
 
 Syndicates cannot maintain stability of prices and sometimes they 
 are the cause of their fluctuations. 
 
 The dissolution of several syndicates on January 1st, 1909, was 
 followed by a very sharp struggle. In August, 1909, the great mixed 
 works reduced to 46-48 marks the price of Thomas steel, which 
 stood at 75-76 marks at the beginning of 1908. In 1909, after 
 the dissolution of the Silesian cement groups, there was a violent 
 conflict in Central Germany between them and the outsiders. 
 The Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate lowered the selling price from 
 400 marks to 265.* On January 22nd, 191 3, they raised the price 
 of coal from 27 pfennigs to one mark for coke, and that of briquettes 
 to one mark. They explained the rise by saying that owing to new 
 conditions in the metallurgical industry, wages and working expenses 
 in the coal industry had increased. On October 14th they announced 
 a further rise in prices for 1913-1914. There was a general outcry 
 that the syndicate was acting in defiance of public interest and 
 was solely prompted by considerations of profits and dividends for 
 shareholders. 
 
 The Prussian Treasury grew nervous and repudiated their arrange- 
 ment with the syndicate. 
 
 The Prussian State was in a quandary. Their cost of production 
 was higher than that of private firms. They wanted high prices, 
 but feared the revolt of the consumers. Of course they wanted their 
 works to earn profits. The Treasury was not a member of the 
 syndicate, but they had empowered the syndicate to sell all the 
 output which Prussia and the Empire could not take. 
 
 The Frankfort Gazette denounced this arrangement as a surrender 
 on the part of the Prussian State. 
 
 * Raffalovich, 19 12. 
 
 131 9* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The renewal of the Steel Syndicate (Stahlzverksverband) for a period 
 of five years took place in 191 2, and the agreement was only signed at 
 three o'clock in the morning of the 1st of May. Three new works 
 producing Thomas steel claimed their share in the " A " products 
 (half-wrought, railway material and wrought iron). The Deutsch- 
 Luxemburg claimed a monopoly in the girders of the Grey 
 system, of which it had the patent. An allotment was made to 
 twenty-five members. " B " products (bar iron, wire rods, sheet 
 iron, tubes, cast and forged iron) had to be left out of the syndicate's 
 programme. The concerns employed in the manufacture of Martin 
 steel pay for their raw material at the rates fixed for " A " products 
 and try to obtain it from concerns outside the syndicate. The mixed 
 works, on the other hand, have been supported by the syndicate. 
 
 The coal which the mines took for their foundries contributed 
 nothing towards the common expenses and formed no part of their 
 quota. These concerns have had to pay a larger share of the joint 
 expenses, but they limit the market for the ordinary mines as they 
 provide their own consumers. 
 
 There was also some difficulty over the renewal of the Coal Syndi- 
 cate. A notice of the nth of January announced that it would be 
 dissolved that year. 
 
 One of the greatest weapons of the syndicates is the practice of 
 " dumping," that is, selling to the foreigner at a lower price than to 
 their own nationals. Rotterdam owes much of its industrial pro- 
 sperity to this practice of dumping. The Rotterdam works import 
 their sheet-iron cheaply, and work it up into boilers and lighters, 
 which they export to Germany. 
 
 The German Wire Nail Makers' Association (Drahstiftverband) lost 
 £43,750 on its foreign sales in the second half-year of 1900, but made 
 a total profit of £57,000, thanks to its home trade. 
 
 The Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate has been charged with selling 
 fifteen per cent, cheaper abroad than in Germany, and reference has 
 been made to its sales to the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee Railway, f.o.b. 
 Rotterdam at eight shillings a metric ton, equivalent to six shillings 
 at the pit-head. It thus appears that the syndicates favour foreign 
 industries at the expense of German industries which need iron, steel 
 and other finished and half-finished products. 
 
 To soothe the agitation of the manufacturers who use their 
 products the syndicates give them export bounties {Ausfuhrver- 
 giitungen). They pay them an indemnity for the quantity of syndicate 
 
 132 
 
The German Syndicates and Dumping 
 
 products they employ for their exported goods. Since 1902 the 
 Coke and Coal Syndicate and the Steel Syndicate have maintained a 
 central office at Diisseldorf which has laid down uniform regulations 
 for the granting of these export bounties. When the bounties were 
 granted to all manufacturers, the syndicates merely raised up rivals 
 to themselves in foreign markets. To-day the bounties are given to 
 the syndicates only ; but it is the foreigner who profits by them as 
 against the sellers of unfinished products. Yet they themselves 
 supply them ! 
 
 From the 15th of December, 1909, to the end of March, 1910, the 
 Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate gave a bonus of one and a half 
 marks per ton of the Syndicate's coal employed in the manufacture 
 of finished products for export. After that date the premium was 
 reduced to one mark, and the concession could be withdrawn at any 
 time on eight days' notice. The arrangement was terminated at the 
 end of 191 1. 
 
 Shipbuilding material is exempt from duty in Germany. Herr 
 Reumer, a National Liberal, whom Herr Singer has called the Cartel 
 King, addressing a commission of inquiry in 1903, said : 
 
 " Our sheet-iron industry must enter into competition with England for the 
 delivery of materials for German construction. But we cannot, get orders 
 without quoting lower prices for our products than those of the English pro- 
 ducts, that is, unless sacrifices are made. It is the syndicate which makes 
 these sacrifices."* 
 
 The great system of national economy has produced the ironical result 
 that instead of " protecting the national industries" the syndicate gives 
 work to the foreign workman. List's economic policy makes German 
 industry serve the interests of the foreigner and gives him presents. 
 
 But at the same time the German system of export bounties is 
 intended to annihilate the industries of other nations. 
 
 Herr Liefmann also mentions concerns which are not engaged in 
 economic activities, but whose sole function is to control other con- 
 cerns by virtue of a governing interest in their shares. 
 
 " Some of these concerns aim at establishing a monopoly : they desire to 
 concentrate the entire organization and management of some particular 
 industry in their own hands by acquiring a controlling interest. The oldest of 
 this species of concern is the Nobel Dynamite Trust Company, Limited, which 
 was, it is true, originally an English company, formed in London in 1886 as an 
 English ' trust,' but which is none the less substantially a German concern,! 
 
 * Quoted in Trusts et Cartels, by Raffalovich, p. 314. 
 
 f See also the Journal des Economistes, August, 1914, p. 253. 
 
 133 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 there being only one branch, a dynamite factory . in England. This company 
 owns the shares of all its branches, though to the outside world these offshoots 
 look like independent concerns with their own dividends. In reality, however, 
 the dividends are held for the trust and all the branches are under common 
 management." 
 
 The first controlling company, formed in 1901, was the Rice Trade 
 Association, which comprises all the German rice mills. The most 
 important is the European Petroleum Combine, which has finally 
 acquired an imperial monopoly, exercised by a private company 
 under State control and accountable for its profits to the State. 
 
 " It has been said/' M. Raffalovich remarks,* " that the Deutsche 
 Bank, which has great interests in oil and which had made an un- 
 profitable agreement with the Standard Oil Company and wanted 
 to get rid of it, urged on the formation of the combine. Others have 
 spoken of its keen competition with another financial group (the 
 D is co n to Gesellsch aft) . ? ' 
 
 The great electrical concerns of the Allgemeine Elektrizit'dts-Gesell- 
 schaft and Siemens und Halske are connected up by amalgamation or 
 participation with a host of concerns occupied in any and every 
 branch of the electrical industry. The large companies have their 
 offshoots whose exclusive function is to acquire a controlling interest 
 by purchasing the shares of local electricity works. 
 
 In Germany, most of the industries, so far from leading the banks, 
 are led by them. German professors call this situation the reign of 
 capital. The expansion of industry does not correspond to any 
 increase of demand but to the amount of capital which the banks 
 have at their disposal seeking investment in any branch of industry 
 which offers a prospect of profit. In the inquiry on syndicates under- 
 taken by the Society of Social Policy {Verein fitr Sozial-politik), 
 Professor Wagner called attention to this change in the character of 
 German industry. Control and management tend to pass from the 
 hands of the technical expert to those of the financier pure and simple, 
 and the financier is always favourable to the formation of syndicates, 
 because he sees in the syndicates some guarantee of industrial stability 
 and security for his capital. Herr Liefmann frankly confesses : 
 
 " The prevention of competition between those engaged in the same profes- 
 sion or industry has been in no way conducive to economic peace ; but a struggle, 
 far keener than the ordinary right for customers, has now broken out in many 
 industries, a fight against customers, especially those engaged in working up 
 raw material, and the retailers." 
 
 * Le Mcuche Financier, 1912-13, p. Si. 
 
 134 
 
The German Syndicates and Dumping 
 
 In short, the syndicates are a monopolistic organization of the 
 large-scale producers directed against the manufacturers, who are 
 dependent upon them for their material, and all the consumers. The 
 manufacturers, who must have an unending supply of raw material, 
 are sacrificed to the small group of industrial magnates who purposely 
 withhold that supply. Their employees are sacrificed with them. 
 Thus the industrial organization of Germany is oligarchical. The 
 great magnates of the Rhine districts are favoured like the Junkers 
 of the East. 
 
 The syndicates cannot keep prices steady and not infrequently 
 contribute to their fluctuation. 
 
 By their policy of " dumping " they raise up foreign competition 
 abroad against their own nationals, while their policy of aggressive 
 protection against foreigners helps to injure foreign industries. 
 
 They set out to replace economic competition between producers, 
 a benefit to the consumer, by the establishment of monopolies to the 
 detriment of the consumer. 
 
 Thus, whilst in a free market sale price always tends to approximate 
 to cost price, they try to maintain sale price at any figure they please 
 by treating the consumer as of no account. 
 
 135 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 COAL-MINING. THE METALLURGICAL AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES IN 
 
 GERMANY 
 
 Comparative figures of coal production — The reserves of coal — The production 
 and consumption of iron — Some comparative figures — Exports — Realiza- 
 tion of stocks — Pig iron and steel as raw material — The chemical industry 
 — The distribution of coal among the various industries. 
 
 SYNDICATES have not brought economic peace, as Herr Robert 
 Liefmann frankly confesses. 
 Nevertheless, the Germans are never tired of chanting the industrial 
 expansion of Germany, forgetful, doubtless of set purpose, that the 
 development of the United States has been even more remarkable, 
 and that other nations have also made progress, the United Kingdom* 
 among them. 
 
 These are the figures for coal-mining (not including lignite) in the 
 three countries : 
 
 1901-1905. 1906-1910. 1911. 1912. 
 (In millions of tons [English].) 
 
 Germany 113. 1 142 .5 156 172 
 
 United Kingdom 229 261.7 271.8 260.4 
 
 United States 302.9 405.8 443-2 477-2 
 
 Germany's increase of production is thus 52 per cent., but that of 
 the United States is 58 per cent. The actual increase is 59 million 
 tons for Germany and 175 million tons for the United States. 
 
 In 191 2 there was a falling-off in the coal production of the United 
 Kingdom owing to the coal strike ; but in spite of that the British 
 output exceeded that of Germany by 88 million tons. In 191 3 the 
 British output went up to 287,400,000 tons, and that of Germany 
 191,500,000 tons, so that the difference was 96 million tons. 
 
 * Le Marchi Financier (Annual), by A. Raffalovich. Statistisches Jahrbuch 
 fiir das Deutsche Reich (Berlin). The Diplomatic and Consular Reports and 
 the British Blue Books. 
 
 136 
 
Coal-Mining. Metallurgical and Chemical Industries 
 
 The figures of imports and exports of coal for the three countries 
 in 191 1 and 191 2 are as follows : 
 
 191 1 1912 Excess of 
 
 ( A ^ 1 * ^ Exports in 
 
 Imports. Exports. Imports. Exports. 191 2. 
 (Million tons.) 
 
 Germany 11. 9 36.6 11. 3 42.6 31.3 
 
 United Kingdom — 87 — 85.8 85.8 
 
 United States 1.3 25.6 1.8 26.8 25 
 
 The consumption of coal has been : 
 
 1901-1906. 1906-1910. 1911. 1912. 
 
 (In million tons.) 
 
 Germany 99.7 126.5 131. 3 140.7 
 
 United Kingdom 166 178.2 184.8 174-8 
 
 United States 295.5 394- 2 4 2 5-6 459-5 
 
 Per head of population (in tons). 
 
 Germany 1.69 2 2 2.12 
 
 United Kingdom 3.93 4.04 4.08 3.83 
 
 United States 3.67 4.43 4-54 4-82 
 
 Thus the consumption per head of population in Germany falls 
 considerably short of that in Great Britain and the United 
 States. 
 
 The value per ton at the pit-head for Germany and Great Britain 
 has been : 
 
 United Kingdom 
 Germany 
 
 1901-1905. 
 
 1906-1910. 
 
 1911. 
 
 1912. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 7 10* 
 
 8 3f 
 
 8 1! 
 
 9 of 
 
 , 8 9+ 
 
 10 o|- 
 
 9 11 
 
 10 6\ 
 
 Nasse, having said that the coal reserves of Great Britain would 
 not be exhausted for six hundred and sixty-eight years, has not been 
 deemed worthy of attention by the Germans. Thomson, however, 
 gives them a limit of one hundred and fifty years, and Forster Brown's 
 estimate is only sixty years. This last figure is all the more satis- 
 factory to the Germans, because their own reserves will not be ex- 
 hausted before a thousand years in the Ruhr district, eight hundred 
 and seventy years in Saxony and five hundred and seventy-five years 
 
 137 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 in Upper Silesia. These are the calculations of the same Nasse who 
 is regarded this time as an authority on the question. 
 
 Thus Great Britain will run short of coal long before Germany, 
 and fall into a position of inferiority. All Germany must do is to 
 trust to time. Unfortunately Germany is impatient. 
 
 In another estimate I find the following figures, which are not in 
 entire agreement with those given above for 191 1 and 191 2. They 
 illustrate the progress made in the production of coal and iron ore in 
 Germany. These are the relevant figures* : 
 
 Mixing Output. 
 Coal. Value. 
 
 (Millions of tons [metric].) 
 
 1892 71.4 £25,800,000 
 
 1900 109 . 3 £4.7,400,000 
 
 1905 121. 3 £51,500,000 
 
 1910 152.8 £74,800,000 
 
 1911 160.7 £77,100,000 
 
 1912 174-9 — 
 
 1913 191. 5 — 
 
 Iron ore. 
 
 Value. 
 
 (Millions 
 
 of tons [metric].) 
 
 11. 5 
 
 £2,020,000 
 
 18.9 
 
 £3,810,000 
 
 23-4 
 
 £4,020,000 
 
 28.7 
 
 £5,250,000 
 
 20.9 
 
 £5,675,000 
 
 26.2 
 
 £5,679.000 
 
 The production, imports and exports (including, since 1907, those 
 of coal and briquettes, expressed as coal), and the consumption of 
 coal, show the following figures : 
 
 
 
 Percentage 
 
 
 Percentage 
 
 
 Percentage 
 
 Home 
 
 Percentage 
 
 
 Pro- 
 
 -f or - on 
 
 Imports 
 
 + or - on 
 
 Exports. 
 
 + or — on 
 
 con- 
 
 + or - on 
 
 
 duction. 
 
 previous 
 
 
 previous 
 
 
 previous 
 
 sump- 
 
 previous 
 
 
 
 year. 
 
 
 year. 
 
 
 year. 
 
 tion. 
 
 year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 In millions of tons [metric].) 
 
 
 
 1904.. 
 
 .120.8 
 
 + 3-5 
 
 7-3 
 
 + 7-3 
 
 18 
 
 + 3-5 
 
 110. I 
 
 + 3-7 
 
 1905.. 
 
 .121.3 
 
 + -4 
 
 9-4 
 
 4-28.8 
 
 18. I 
 
 + I 
 
 112. 5 
 
 + 2.2 
 
 1906.. 
 
 .137.1 
 
 + 13 
 
 9.2 
 
 + 1.7 
 
 19.5 
 
 + 7.69 
 
 126.8 
 
 4-12.6 
 
 1907.. 
 
 .143.2 
 
 + 4-4 
 
 14.5 
 
 
 25-7 
 
 
 132 
 
 
 1908 .. 
 
 .147.7 
 
 + 3.1 
 
 12.5 
 
 -14. 1 
 
 26.7 
 
 + 4 
 
 133-4 
 
 4- 1 
 
 1909.. 
 
 .148.8 
 
 + -7 
 
 I3-I 
 
 + 5-3 
 
 28.8 
 
 + 7-7 
 
 133. I 
 
 — .2 
 
 1910.. 
 
 .152.8 
 
 + 2.7 
 
 12. 1 
 
 - 8 
 
 30-9 
 
 + 7-3 
 
 134 
 
 + .6 
 
 1911 . . 
 
 .160.7 
 
 + 5-2 
 
 11. 8 
 
 — 2 
 
 35 
 
 + 13-2 
 
 137.4 
 
 + 2.5 
 
 1912 . . 
 
 .177 
 
 + 10. 1 
 
 11. 2 
 
 - 4.9 
 
 40.6 
 
 + 15-8 
 
 147.7 
 
 + 7.4 
 
 1913-. 
 
 .191.5 
 
 + 8.1 
 
 11. 3 
 
 + 1.2 
 
 44.9 
 
 + 10.6 
 
 157.9 
 
 + 6.9 
 
 Between 1904 and 191 3 the output of coal increased by 57 per cent, 
 and the consumption by 46 per cent. 
 
 * For the purpose of this table 1 mark=n|d. 
 
 138 
 
Coal-Mining. Metallurgical and Chemical Industries 
 
 The output and consumption of iron in the Zollverein have increased 
 as follows : 
 
 Output of 
 
 pig iron. 
 
 (Millions of 
 
 metric tons.)* 
 
 1866-1869 1.2 
 
 1879 2.2 
 
 1890 4.6 
 
 1900 8.5 
 
 1901 7.8 
 
 1902 8.5 
 
 1903 10 
 
 1904 10. 1 
 
 1907 13 
 
 1908 11 .8 
 
 1912 17.9 
 
 
 Consumption 
 
 of 
 
 
 
 iron expressed 
 
 
 Per head. 
 
 as pig iron. 
 
 
 Per head. 
 
 (Kilo- 
 
 (Millions of 
 
 
 (Kilo- 
 
 grammes.) 
 
 metric tons. 
 
 )8 
 
 rammes.) 
 
 32.7 
 
 1 .2 
 
 
 33 
 
 50.5 
 
 1-5 
 
 
 35-1 
 
 97.1 
 
 3-9 
 
 
 81.7 
 
 I5I-4 
 
 7-4 
 
 
 131. 1 
 
 138 
 
 5-1 
 
 
 89.4 
 
 147 
 
 4.4 
 
 
 76 
 
 171. 4 
 
 5-7 
 
 
 97-9 
 
 169.2 
 
 6. 7 
 
 
 112. 2 
 
 209.8 
 
 9 
 
 
 145-12 
 
 187.6 
 
 7.3 
 
 
 115.97 
 
 268.52 
 
 10.3 
 
 
 155-54 
 
 Thus the increase of output is far more marked than that of con 
 sumption. 
 
 I now give the figures for the output of pig-iron in Germany, the 
 United Kingdom and the United States during the period 1908- 
 I9l2t : 
 
 Germany. 
 
 1908 11 .8 
 
 1909 12.6 
 
 1910 14.8 
 
 1911 15 .6 
 
 1912 17 .9 
 
 1913 19-3 
 
 United United The world 
 
 Kingdom. States. output. 
 (In millions of tons [metric].) 
 
 9.2 16.2 48.8 
 
 9.7 26.2 60.6 
 
 10.5 27.7 66.4 
 
 — 24 65 
 
 9-7 30.2 75 
 
 Since 1903 Germany has taken the second place among the 
 countries producing pig-iron. In 191 2 her proportion of the world's 
 output rose to 23 per cent. 
 
 * 1 metric ton=a2,204 lbs. ; 1 kilogramme=»2i lbs. 
 t Circulaire du Comite des HouilUres, No. 4,856, December 22nd, 191 3. 
 
 139 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Below are the figures for the iron exports from the Zollverein : 
 
 Pig-iron Wrought Addition of 33 £ per Totals 
 
 of iron and cent, to the figures in 
 
 all kinds. steel. the preceding column to 
 
 arrive at the quantities 
 expressed as pig-iron. 
 (In thousand tons [metric].) 
 
 1866-1869 62.6 94.4 3i-4 188.6 
 
 1879 433-1 625.4 208.5 1,267 
 
 1890 181. 8 864.1 288 1,334 
 
 1900 190-5 T .589 5 2 9-7 2,309 
 
 1901 303-8 2,250.1 750 3,304 
 
 1902 516.9 3, on. 6 1,003.8 4.53 2 -9 
 
 1903 5 2 7-8 3.202 1,067.3 4,797 
 
 1904 316.2 2,721 907 3.944-3 
 
 1907 385-7 3.529 1. 176 5.092 
 
 190S 421.5 3>7 11 1,237-2 5.370 
 
 1910 934 4.369 1,456.4 6,759 
 
 1911 1,003.6 4,890 1,630 7,523 
 
 1912 1,217.9 5,391 1,797 8,406 
 
 According to a work of Doctor Gluckauf, the following table shows 
 the changes in the relation between the exports of iron from the 
 Zollverein and the total output of pig-iron : 
 
 Percentage. Percentage. 
 
 1868-1869 15-59 1904 39- 12 
 
 1879 56.9 1907 40.72 
 
 1890 34-59 1908 39-03 
 
 1900 27.1 1910 45.7 
 
 1901 4J-93 l 9 11 48.29 
 
 1902 53 ; i4 x 9i2 47-°4 
 
 1903 39.04 
 
 The 1902 figures show that the exports are sometimes the realization 
 of stocks. In the period 1910-1912 the amount exported was nearly 
 half the total output. 
 
 Now, as Sir Hugh Bell has shown in a remarkable study, pig-iron 
 and steel are raw materials. Mere output is less important than to 
 make full use of them for machinery, tubes, shipbuilding and other 
 
 * The Iron and Steel Industry in Great Britain, by Sir Hugh Bell, Journal des 
 Economistes, January, 191 1. 
 
 140 
 
Coal-Mining* Metallurgical and Chemical Industries 
 
 After coal-mining and the metallurgical industry comes the German 
 chemical industry. There are two enormous chemical works. Bayer 
 at Leverkusen and the Badische Anilin unci Soda Fabrik, which was 
 founded in 1865 to exploit the properties of fuscine, discovered in 
 i860 by Verguin, a chemist of Lyons, but which the French did not 
 know how to turn to commercial uses. 
 
 Germany cannot complain that foreigners refuse her exports. 
 About 1820 the French Government adopted red trousers for the 
 infantry in order to encourage the madder industry. Then that 
 colour was replaced by alizarine, which is made by the Badische 
 Anilin Fabrik, and the War Department has permitted no change 
 since. 
 
 Out of a total production of sixteen million pounds' worth 
 of dye-stuffs by the great works, export accounts for three- 
 quarters. 
 
 One of the five leading dye companies, the Aktien Ge 's ells ch aft filr 
 Anilin Fabrikation of Berlin, has taken up on an immense scale the 
 manufacture of cinematograph films. This firm bought from two 
 chemists of Paris, MM. Clement and Riviere, a process for replacing 
 nitro-cellulose or celluloid by acetate of cellulose, which is less 
 inflammable. The invention had not been taken up in France, but 
 now the municipal regulations make the substitution compulsory 
 for cinematograph work. 
 
 The spinning and weaving industries are in a backward 
 condition. 
 
 Germany claims to have a monopoly in the manufacture of 
 musical instruments, her exports being of the annual value of 
 £4,000,000. 
 
 She also has an export trade in toys and trinkets. 
 
 M. V. Cambon says* : 
 
 " German industry owes its triumphs to causes other than perfection of 
 workmanship. The dominant factors in its favour are cheapness, the close 
 attention paid to the customer's craving for variety and novelty, and especially 
 unparalleled and ubiquitous advertisement." 
 
 The distribution in 1910 and 191 1 of the coal output of the 
 Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate among the various classes of 
 
 * Les Dernters Progres de I'Allemagne, by V. Cambon (1914) (published by P. 
 Roger), p. 196. 
 
 141 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 consumers will throw light on the relative importance of the 
 different industries.* 
 
 Coke and briquettes expressed as coal. 
 
 1910. 19c t. 
 
 Tons Per- Tons. Per- 
 
 (Metric), centage. centage. 
 
 1. Coal-mining and production of coke 
 
 and briquettes 4,722,249 7.48 4,860,173 7.09 
 
 2. Metal mines and the preparation of 
 
 ores 305,692 .46 282,285 .41 
 
 3. Salt mines and works 277,472 .42 333.474 «49 
 
 4. Metallurgical works of every kind "] 
 
 except siderurgical j 
 
 5. Siderurgical works (production of 
 
 iron and steel, rolling-mills, 
 
 foundries) } 27,931,992 42.45 28,249,869 41.22 
 
 6. Metal working (except iron and j 
 
 steel) 
 
 7. Iron and steel working 
 
 8. Machinery J 
 
 9. Electrical industries 958,995 1.46 1,070,744 1.56 
 
 10. Stone and earthenware industries 
 
 (bricks, earthenware and pottery) 2,835,517 4.31 3.233,271 4.72 
 
 11. Glass industry 482,589 .7^ 521,098 .76 
 
 12. Chemical industry 1,979-358 3.01 2,022,015 2.95 
 
 13. Gas-works 2,141,370 3.26 2,274,514 3.32 
 
 14. Textile clothing and cleaning indus- 
 
 tries 2,012,116 3.06 2,000,325 2.92 
 
 15. The paper industry and polygraphic 
 
 business 684,130 1.04 901,499 1.32 
 
 16. Leather, rubber, etc., industries.... 242,814 .37 249,456 .36 
 
 17. The wood industry and carved work 97.395 .15 91,548 .13 
 
 18. Beet-sugar industry, sugar refineries 
 
 and the making of syrup 405,091 .61 375, 911 .55 
 
 19. Brewing and distilling 701,697 1.07 734,690 1.07 
 
 20. Industries producing other foodstuffs 654,629 1,00 646,512 .94 
 
 2 1 . Works pruducing materials for water- 
 
 supplies, baths and wash-houses . . 307,166 .47 319,748 .47 
 
 22. Commercial and domestic heating.. 8,693,514 13.22 8,789,934 12.83 
 2^. Railway and tramway construction 
 
 and working 6,996,767 10.64 7,926,096 11.57 
 
 24. Inland navigation, coasting traffic, 
 
 deep-sea fisheries, harbour and 
 
 pilotage services 2,772,867 4.21 2,924,345 4.27 
 
 25. Navy 579,863 .88 718,609 1.05 
 
 Totals 65,783,280 100 68,526,115 100 
 
 * Circulaive du Comite des Houilleres, No. 4,644, January 21st, 191 3. 
 
 142 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 ANGLO-GERMAN TRADE 
 
 The syndicates are the great export-machines — British and German trade from 
 1904 to 191 3 — Anglo-German trade — The German figures — The difference 
 between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices — The British figures — The discrepancies — 
 German exports always higher — Special lines of trading — Class I., food- 
 stuffs — Class II., raw materials — Class III., manufactured articles — 
 Class IV., miscellaneous — Totals — British re-exports — British exports 
 into Germany and the German tariff. 
 
 HERR FRITZ DIEPENHORS remarked in a recent article,* 
 in which he lauded Germany's economic superiority over 
 Great Britain : 
 
 " Germany's conquest of foreign markets must certainly be ascribed mainly 
 to the syndicates. It is due to open or secret export bounties that the members 
 of the syndicates were able, especially in periods of depression, to maintain 
 themselves as serious competitors in foreign markets. With that assistance 
 prices are kept at a level which barely covers the lowest cost of production." 
 
 He correctly states the conditions precedent to the establishment 
 of syndicates, " a rigidly protectionist system as regards customs and 
 tariffs, low freights and the existence of products of the soil in which 
 a monopoly may be established." 
 
 " The Englishman, who regards Free Trade as a sine qua non, is compelled 
 to resist to the best of his ability all such attempts at combination as are per- 
 mitted in Germany. The syndicate imposes on its members a certain renun- 
 ciation of independence, a thing contrary to English tradition. He (the English- 
 man) refuses to submit to the subordination of individuality which follows 
 monopolistic organization, forgetting that such an organization is only an 
 abstraction for capitalistic organizations." 
 
 So the English, with their Free-Trade system, are shut out from 
 the blessings of a regime of syndicates, a grave cause of weakness to 
 them, in Herr Diepenhors' view. He goes on to make an enthusiastic 
 comparison between the economic development of Germany and that 
 
 * La Concurrence Anglo- Allemande {Revue Economique Internationale, May 
 15th, 1914). 
 
 143 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 of Great Britain, in which the superiority of the former is clearly 
 demonstrated. 
 
 The following tables show the movements of British and German 
 trade from 1904 : 
 
 British Trade. 
 Imports* retained in the Exports. Total. 
 
 United Kingdom. 
 
 (Million £.) 
 
 1904 480.7 300.7 781.4 
 
 1912 632.9 487.2 1,120.1 
 
 1913 659.1 525.2 1,184.3 
 
 Between 1904 and 1913 the increase was actually £403,000,000, 
 or 51.8 per cent. 
 
 German Trade. 
 Imports. Exports. Total. 
 
 (Million marks.) 
 
 1904 6,821 5,315 12,136 
 
 I9 J 2 10,691 8,956 19,647 
 
 1913 10,770 10,098 20,868 
 
 Between 1904 and 191 3 the increase of German trade was 
 £428,000,000 (8,700,000,000 marks), or 69 per cent. Thus British 
 trade still stands at a higher figure, but the difference is not great, 
 particularly in 191 3. 
 
 We will now examine the figures for trade between the United 
 Kingdom and Germany. 
 
 Below are the figures from the German customs returns : 
 
 Imports from the Exports to the 
 
 United Kingdom. United Kingdom. 
 
 In million marks. 
 
 1901 552.7 906.7 
 
 1902 557-3 958.2 
 
 1903 594 982.2 
 
 1910 766.6 1,102 
 
 1911 808.8 1,139-7 
 
 1912 842.6 1,161.1 
 
 1913 876.1 1,438.2 
 
 British exports into Germany have thus increased by 54 per cent, 
 between 1901 and 1912, and in 191 3 the advance was 58 per cent. 
 In the first period German exports to the United Kingdom 
 increased by 28 per cent., but in 191 3 the advance was 58 per cent. 
 Up to 191 2, therefore, as these German figures show, the increase of 
 
 * Less re-exports. 
 144 
 
Anglo-German Trade 
 
 German exports to the United Kingdom was much less than that 
 of British exports to Germany. 
 
 The export figures are calculated at f.o.b. prices — that is to say, 
 " free on board," while the import figures are calculated at c.i.f. 
 prices — i.e., " cost, insurance, freight." 
 
 Consequently, the German customs authorities arrive at a figure 
 for exports to Great Britain lower than that estimated by the British 
 customs themselves and, conversely, a higher figure for imports 
 from Great Britain. I now give a table from the British customs 
 returns. It covers imports retained for consumption in the United 
 
 Kingdom : 
 
 German exports to the British exports 
 
 United Kingdom. to Germany. 
 
 1901 £32,207,000 £23,573,000 
 
 1902 £33.633,000 £22,850,000 
 
 1903 • • • ^34-533.000 £23,550,000 
 
 1910 £58,105,000 £37,020,000 
 
 1911 £61,277,000 £39,283,000 
 
 1912 £65,841,000 £40,362,000 
 
 1913 £76,183,000 £40,677,000 
 
 According to these figures German exports to England have 
 advanced, as compared with 1901, by 105 per cent, in 1912 and 137 
 per cent, in 191 3. British exports to Germany have advanced, in 
 1912 by 70 per cent, and in 1913 by 72 per cent. The discrepancies, 
 which are obvious, are due to (1) the difference between f.o.b. prices 
 and c.i.f. prices ; (2) the carelessness displayed by the customs 
 officials in calculating the value of goods leaving the country. One 
 fact, however, is clear. In 1901 and 1902, as in 191 2 and 191 3, 
 Germany sold more to England than she bought from England. 
 
 On an analysis of German exports to the United Kingdom and 
 British exports to Germany, based on the British figures, we find 
 the following results for the years 1909-19 13 : 
 
 Class I. — Articles of food and drink, and tobacco. 
 
 Imports from Retained for home Exports to 
 
 Germany. consumption. Germany. 
 
 (Million £.) (Million £.) 
 
 Total. 
 
 1909 l 3 l2 -9 2 -9 
 
 1910 11 .7 11 .6 3 
 
 1911 13-2 13 3-9 
 
 1912 11 10.9 4 
 
 1913 l6 -4 J 6.3 4 
 
 145 10 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Of these figures, in 1913 £102,000 represented tobacco. Refined 
 sugar accounted for £6,161,000 and unrefined sugar for £4,733,000, 
 or a total of £10,894,000, equivalent to 66 per cent, of the total. 
 
 In the figure of British exports herrings accounted for £2,818,000, 
 or 70 per cent, of the total. 
 
 Class II. — Rcnv materials. 
 
 (Million £.) 
 
 1909 4.8 4.6 6.6 
 
 1910 5.9 5-8 7 
 
 1911 5.1 4.9 6.8 
 
 1912 6 .6 6.3 7.2 
 
 1913 7.1 6.8 8.4 
 
 Of the £8,400,000 exports into Germany, £5,346,000, or 63 per cent., 
 represented coal. English coal has even made its way to Frankfort, 
 to fight the Syndicate on its own ground. 
 
 Class III. — Manufactured articles. 
 
 (Million £.) 
 
 1909 39-4 36.5 21.9 
 
 1910 43.6 40.1 26 
 
 191 1 46.4 42.6 27.6 
 
 1912 51 .7 56.1 28 
 
 1913 56.1 52.3 27 
 
 The imports from Germany are very miscellaneous. Chemical 
 products of all kinds account for a smaller proportion than might 
 be expected. In 191 3 they were valued at £1,135,000, of which 
 £1,098,000 worth were retained for consumption in the British Isles. 
 To this must be added £156,700 for saltpetre, £441,400 for potash, and 
 £102,000 for soda. 
 
 The dyes extracted from coal which Germany sent to England in 
 191 3 were valued at £1,730, 00, of which £1,717,000 worth was for 
 British consumption. Electrical machinery and parts accounted 
 for £721^000, £699,000 being the value of that retained for home 
 consumption. £1,546,000 represented machinery of all kinds, of 
 which machinery to the value of £1,468,000 remained in the country. 
 
 The outstanding German export was steel : ingots, billets, tinplates. 
 For this heading the figure is £3,055,000, all consumed at home. 
 Iron and steel of other kinds, £4,177,000 ; retained for home consump- 
 tion, £4, 1 36,000. Of musical instruments, pianos account for £700,000, 
 
 146 
 
Anglo-German Trade 
 
 £671,000 retained. Other instruments £45,600, £40,000 retained. 
 Parts £156,000, £144,000 retained. Total, £901,600. 
 
 Silk and silk-wares account for £1,758,000, of which £1,665,000 
 represents the amount retained. Ribbons £493,000, £455,000 
 retained. 
 
 In spite of the tariff, the British exported to Germany in 1913 
 cotton thread to the value of £5,141,000, cotton stuffs to the value 
 of £1,800,000, and other kinds of cotton goods to the value of 
 £633,000. 
 
 British exports to Germany of combed wool, woollens, cloth, etc., 
 amounted to £8,147,000. 
 
 Class IV. — Miscellaneous. 
 
 Postal packages and other articles. 
 
 1909 £521,000 £518,000 £794.500 
 
 1910 £560,000 £556,000 £945.300 
 
 1911 £567.500 £565,000 £958,300 
 
 1912 £694,100 £692,000 £1,059,700 
 
 1913 £700,500 £699,000 £1,255,900 
 
 General Total. 
 (In million £.) 
 
 1909 57.8 54.6 32.2 
 
 1910 61 .8 58.1 37 
 
 1911 65.3 61.2 39.3 
 
 1912 70 65.8 40.4 
 
 1913 80.4 76.2 40.7 
 
 England continues to send Germany goods she gets from abroad 
 or her colonies 
 
 Foodstuffs. Raw materials. Manufactured Total General 
 
 articles. including total, 
 miscellaneous 
 articles. 
 (In million £.) 
 
 1909 1.8 10.7 2.3 14.9 47.2 
 
 1910 1.8 13 3 17-9 54-9 
 
 19" : -9 13 3-i J 8.i 57-4 
 
 1912 2.2 14 2.9 19.2 59.6 
 
 1913 2 -5 H. 1 3-2 19-8 60.5 
 
 Among the exports of raw materials for 191 3 appears the figure 
 of £4,100,000 for wool, some of which came from Australia and New 
 Zealand. This is a great source of annoyance to Germany. 
 
 147 10* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The Germans show typical ingratitude when they complain of 
 their commercial relations with the United Kingdom, which is amongst 
 their best customers and sources of supply. 
 
 A Diplomatic and Consular Report gives an analysis of British 
 exports to Germany. The German customs tariff is divided into 946 
 groups, subdivided into 2,009 headings. In 191 2 British exports 
 into Germany to the value of £41,300,000 fell under 1,400 headings. 
 The British Report* classifies the German tariff in four categories : 
 
 " (1) Under customs rates which have not been altered by any 
 bargaining by third parties (autonomous rates) ; (2) or under customs 
 rates reduced as the result of commercial treaties with third parties 
 (treaty rates). If they are imported free of duty, the immunity may 
 (3) be due to the fact that the autonomous tariff provides no customs 
 duties ; (4) or due to the fact that whatever duty rates had existed 
 were abolished as the result of negotiations with third parties. 
 
 " Both (1) and (3) represent autonomous rates ; both (2) and (4) 
 represent treaty rates." 
 
 If the value of British exports into Germany in 191 2 be distributed 
 among these four categories, we find : 
 
 Groups. Articles. Value. Per cent. 
 
 of total value. 
 (Millions of marks.) 
 
 1 680 324 38.43 
 
 II 370 155 18.39 
 
 III. 290 344 40.81 
 
 IV 60 20 2.37 
 
 Total 1,400 843 100 
 
 It therefore appears that British exports in groups (1) and (3) 
 represent £32,700,000, or 79.24 per cent. ; those in groups (2) and (4) 
 represent £8,600,000, or 20.76 per cent. Therefore four-fifths of 
 British exports to Germany come under the autonomous rates ; 
 40.8 per cent, enter free in the third group, which declares certain 
 articles enumerated therein duty-free, namely, cotton, wool, coal, 
 oil-cake, bran, old paper, crude metals and ships. 
 
 The 680 articles in the first group, representing a value of £16,000,000, 
 or 38.43 per cent, of the total, pay duty. But what duty ? The 
 duty which Germany has thought sufficient to protect herself : 
 
 * Annual Series : Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 5,404, 1914, 
 Germany. 
 
 148 
 
Anglo-German Trade 
 
 autonomous duties. How can Germany, then, complain that Great 
 Britain compelled her to lower her tariffs, when she imposed these 
 tariffs to suit her own convenience and not as the result of a bargain ? 
 
 It is plain that Anglo-German trade rivalry has not been due to 
 any reduction of tariffs extorted from Germany since she has made 
 no such reductions even to third parties. She has fixed them at the 
 figure that suited her. 
 
 It is true that while Hamburg received from the Rhenish-West- 
 phalian Syndicate 3,718,000 tons of coal, no less than 21,949,000 
 tons were received from the United Kingdom. It is certainly a 
 humiliation for the mines of the Ruhr, but in itself that is hardly a 
 sufficient ground for national hatred against Great Britain. 
 
 149 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 MARITIME RIVALRY 
 
 Palmerston and the German navy — Ships without ports — " Kolossal " — The 
 great German steamship lines — The British and German fleets — Naval 
 construction — The share of the German mercantile marine in maritime 
 traffic — " Tramps " disregarded by the Germans — Prestige as a motive 
 for maritime enterprise — Export bounties and subsidies — Charges against 
 Great Britain — The German Empire and the " Freedom of the Seas." 
 
 ALTHOUGH Germany cannot compete with Lancashire for her 
 cotton-thread, or her spinning and weaving machinery, those 
 industries are not responsible for the morbid jealousy which animates 
 her statesmen and many of her industrials. The true cause is the 
 British mercantile marine. 
 
 They have never forgiven Palmerston for his remark in 1861 that 
 the Germans could plough the soil, fly in the clouds and build 
 castles in the air, but would never learn to venture on the seas. 
 
 They repeat that sally so often and in such a way that we might 
 almost think that they launched the hnperator and V aterlancl merely 
 in reply to it. 
 
 The hnperator is 689 feet long, has a beam of 98 feet and draws 
 36 feet of water. Her tonnage is 55,000 and her horse-power 65,000. 
 The Vaterland's dimensions are : Tonnage, 60,000 ; length over all, 
 905 feet ; draught, 63 feet ; horse-power, 70,000. 
 
 In their hurry to produce something really " Kolossal " to over- 
 shadow the Olympic, the Germans built these ships before there 
 were ports to receive them. The Elbe is not deep enough and the 
 existing depth is sometimes affected to the extent of three feet by 
 the wind. The Imperator was put into service before Cuxhaven'was 
 ready for her, so that she had to moor outside. But the English had 
 no ship as big and that was the main thing ! 
 
 Germany has two steamship companies which have larger fleets 
 than any other in the world. At the beginning of 19 13 the Hamburg- 
 Amerika Line possessed tonnage to the figure of 1,307,000. The 
 
 150 
 
Maritime Rivalry 
 
 North German Lloyd had a fleet of 821,000 tons. Of the great English 
 companies, the Ellerman Line had only 563,000 tons, the British India 
 Steam Company 553,000, the Peninsular and Oriental 539,000. No 
 other had as much as 500,000. True, there are more of them.* But 
 how has Great Britain injured the German companies ? 
 
 The rift in the lute was that in 191 3 Great Britain had a fleet of 
 12,602 steamers representing 11,273,000 tons, and 8,336 sailing ships, 
 with a tonnage of 846,000, a total of 20,938 vessels and 12,119,000 
 tons. On January 1st, 1914, Germany had only 2,170 steamers, 
 with a tonnage of 2,832,000, and, sailing ships included, 4,935 vessels, 
 with a total tonnage of 3,320,000. 
 
 According to Lloyd's the world's shipbuilding for 19 14 amounted 
 to 2,852,000 tons, or only 48,000 tons less than in 1913. Of that 
 figure the share of the United Kingdom was 59 per cent., of which 
 a tonnage of 1,288,600 was kept. If only ships of more than 3,000 
 tons are reckoned the share of the United Kingdom was 64 per cent. 
 Before the commencement of hostilities Germany had launched 
 387,200 tons, or 78,000 tons less than in 1913. 
 
 The Germans, however, have encouraged shipbuilding by remitting 
 all duties on the materials employed in that industry. 
 
 As regards the movements of traffic in German ports, foreign 
 shipping represents 62,265,000 tons and German shipping 29,000,000. 
 In view of the fact that many German lines are subsidized, that foreign 
 preponderance of 45 per cent, proves that German shipping does not 
 meet the transport necessities of the country. This it is which 
 Germans cannot forgive Great Britain. 
 
 The Germans care little about " tramps." These wayward vessels 
 which pass from one port to another, calling wherever there is a cargo 
 to be picked up, are a shock to their maritime notions. In Great 
 Britain, on the other hand, they form 60 per cent, of the mercantile 
 marine. In 1909, it appeared from inquiries made by The Economist, 
 that out of the 160 shipping companies interrogated, 73 possessed 
 tramps only, of a tonnage of 2,500,000, and small private shipowners 
 had tramps to the tonnage of 2,700,000. 
 
 The Germans prefer to concentrate on their great lines. 
 There is much that is purely artificial about their maritime activity. 
 Their direct service between Hamburg and the Persian Gulf corresponds 
 to no commercial necessity. Its aim is a political one. 
 
 * Georges Michon : Les Grandes Compagnies Auglaises de Navigation, 191 3 
 (published by A. Rousseau). 
 
 151 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Many of the lines to Chile, Colombia, the Republic of San Domingo, 
 Siam, Morocco, the Philippines, Venezuela, Bolivia and Uruguay 
 have been established mainly to display the German flag. The 
 German object is prestige. Unfortunately prestige is expensive and 
 cannot be turned to profit. 
 
 All consignments of less than 5,000 kilos and most consignments 
 above are sent to the ports at special export rates. In 1900, for the 
 Levant and East Africa the rates were fixed from every German town 
 to the place of destination. These rates were at once export bounties 
 and subsidies to the lines employed in the carriage of the goods. 
 Every bill of lading contains a clause nullifying any special 
 contract. 
 
 In spite of such efforts Great Britain retains her superiority. But 
 in what way does she injure German shipping ? When German ships 
 enter British ports they receive the same treatment as British ships. 
 What have they to complain of ? 
 
 A jealous person never needs real reasons for inflaming his passion. 
 He resorts to the fanciful. Such persons are the Germans. They 
 allege that Great Britain can close the Channel to them and so they 
 have been anxious to seize Calais. Then they say that Great Britain 
 has made the seas her preserve, but they cannot produce a scrap of 
 evidence to show that she has hindered the development of their own 
 shipping in any way whatever. That development is itself an 
 unanswerable refutation of the charge. Besides, one of their proudest 
 boasts is that they have torn down Great Britain from her pre- 
 eminent position because the expansion of their own shipping has been 
 more rapid than hers. Looking at percentages, they are doubtless 
 right. But, if so, why the Navy League and its inflammatory propa- 
 ganda against Great Britain ? " In the name of the Freedom of the 
 Seas ! " reply the professors, performing, as in the days of Frederick II., 
 their function of justifying the actions of their rulers. 
 
 Has British naval supremacy impeded the growth of Norwegian 
 shipping ? Do the Dutch fear that it will cut them off from their 
 colonies in the East Indies ? 
 
 The day on which maritime supremacy passes to Germany will 
 see the end of Holland as an independent country, and Norwegian 
 shipping will feel itself no longer safe. 
 
 The German Empire cares no more for the " freedom of the seas " 
 than for the freedom of the land. Her policy aims at world power, 
 and as it is unrealizable so long as Great Britain bestows on her fleet 
 
 152 
 
Maritime Rivalry 
 
 the attention it deserves, the Germans have concentrated against 
 her all their ruinous and futile efforts. 
 
 The war broke out and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz has not dared 
 to bring out his Dreadnoughts from their shelters behind Heligoland 
 or in the Kiel Canal. His famous raid, to avenge the failure of 
 Zeppelin attacks on open towns was not a success, and he is now 
 driven to submarine attacks on merchant vessels. 
 
 On February 4th, 191 5, Von Pohl, the Naval Chief of Staff, issued 
 a notice to neutrals announcing that from February 18th the German 
 Navy would destroy all hostile merchant ships. Why that date ? 
 The new procedure had already been employed when German sub- 
 marines were sent to torpedo ships off Havre and in St. George's 
 Channel. The Germans had not hesitated to torpedo the Amiral 
 Ganteaume, a vessel belonging to the Chargeurs Reunis, which was 
 transporting Belgian refugees from Calais to Havre. They had also 
 attempted to torpedo in the Channel a hospital ship, the Asturias. 
 The new departure was the threat to sink neutral ships which might 
 be found in the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, the 
 Channel included. It was a logical extension of German methods of 
 warfare, which already included bomb-dropping from aircraft, incen- 
 diarism, and the wholesale shooting of old men, women and children. 
 It can only be described as an exhibition of impotent rage. 
 
 The Kaiser does not " grasp the trident " and Germany's future 
 does not " lie on the water." 
 
 *53 
 
CHAPTER X 
 FRANCO-GERMAN TRADE 
 
 Article ii of the Treaty of Frankfort — The trade of France with her chief 
 customers and sources of supply — French and German statistics — The 
 chief imports of France — Coal, machinery, grain — French exports of raw 
 materials — Foodstuffs and chemical products — The skin and fur trade — 
 Seed for sowing — The textile industries — Jewellery — Toys — Motor-cars — 
 Interruption of the normal expansion of Franco-German trade. 
 
 ARTICLE 1 1 of the Treaty of Frankfort bound " France and 
 Germany to the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing 
 of the most-favoured nation." The article limited this condition 
 to six nations, England, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria and 
 Russia. Germany has extended the most-favoured-nation clause to 
 more than forty nations, including the Republic of San Marino and 
 the Hawaiian Islands. 
 
 French protectionists were extremely indignant over these exten- 
 sions, but I confess I have never been able to understand their 
 attitude. 
 
 I will now take the figures of French trade for four years with the 
 principal nations which supply and take her products, and endeavour 
 to show Germany's share of the total. I am selecting the year 1903, , 
 because it is ten years before 191 2, 1913 because the statistics for 
 that year have just been published, and 1907 because there were 
 some exceptional features in that year. 
 
 First I give a table showing French imports from her principal 
 sources of supply : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1912. 1913. 
 
 The United Kingdom ... .£22,000,000 £35,000,000 £41,500,000 £43,900,000 
 
 Germany £17,600,000 £25,200,000 £39,560,000 £42,400,000 
 
 The United States £21,400,000 £26,600,000 £35,200,000 £35,400,000 
 
 Belgium £12,900,000 £16,900,000 £21,400,000 £22,000,000 
 
 Russia £11,900,000 £10,700,000 £17,100,000 £18,140,000 
 
 The British Indies £9,700,000 £14,250,000 £14,100,000 £15,370,000 
 
 154 
 
v Franco-German Trade 
 
 At the same periods French exports to her principal customers 
 were : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1912. 1913. 
 
 The United Kingdom ....£47,210,000 £54,260,000 £54,040,000 £56,740,000 
 
 Belgium £25,000,000 £34,100,000 £45,220,000 £43,920,000 
 
 Germany £20,320,000 £25,700,000 £32,580,000 £34,340,000 
 
 The United States £10,060,000 £15,700,000 £17,140,000 £16,760,000 
 
 Switzerland £9,540,000 £13,980,000 £16,140,000 £16,080,000 
 
 Italy £6,900,000 £13,980,000 £11,980,000 £12,120,000 
 
 Thus French imports from Germany have increased by 140 per cent., 
 while French exports to Germany have increased by 68 per cent. 
 But British exports to France have advanced 99 per cent., while 
 French exports to the United Kingdom have only advanced 14 
 per cent. 
 
 If we compare the figures of the French Customs with the figures 
 of the German Customs, we arrive at the following figures for Franco- 
 German trade at the four dates selected : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1912. 1913 
 
 (Million marks.) 
 
 Imports from France . . 306.2 453-6 55^.2 584 
 
 Exports into France . . 253.2 449-1 689.4 790 
 
 According to these German figures, French exports to Germany 
 between 1903 and 191 3 advanced 90 per cent, instead of 60 per cent., 
 and French imports from Germany 212 per cent. If we convert the 
 marks into francs (1 mark=i franc 23 centimes) we find that the 
 figure for German exports to France reached 847 million francs in 
 1912 and 972 million francs in 191 3. 
 
 I have already given the two reasons why the figures of the 
 importing country are always higher than the figures of the exporting 
 country : (1) Exports do not interest the customs authorities, who 
 are mainly concerned as revenue officials and do not search the 
 luggage of the traveller on his departure ; (2) The customs authorities 
 accept the value declared without verifying it, and this declared 
 value is the price /.<?.£., while the value of imports is the 
 price c.i.f. 
 
 What classes of imports have contributed most to the increase 
 
 155 
 
1907. lgn. 
 
 1912. 
 
 I9I3- 
 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 
 
 67.2 61.7 
 
 60.5 
 
 57-7 
 
 32.7 57 
 
 59-7 
 
 51.6 
 
 10.2 13 . 1 
 
 13.5 
 
 15 
 
 The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 shown in these figures ? According to the French customs 
 
 returns : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 Coal 40.2 83.9 1 1 8. 3 1 50 .3 165 
 
 Machinery and parts 32.9 76.7 ^3 l -9 J 3 2 -9 132 
 
 Cereals (grain and flour) ..2 — 52.1 25.7 87 
 
 Between 1903 and 191 3 the increase in the imports of coal, 
 machinery and cereals amounted to 311 million francs (£12,320,000), 
 out of a total increase of 625 millions (£24,750,000), or 49 per cent. 
 
 Of these three headings of imports two were destined for industrial 
 uses and the third for food. 
 
 France has sent the following raw materials to Germany : 
 
 1903. 
 
 Wool and woollen waste . . . .65 .6 
 Cotton and cotton waste . . ..23.5 
 Copper 4.4 
 
 As regards raw material, if Germany in 191 3 sent France six million 
 tons of coal to the value of £6,540,000, France sent Germany in the 
 same period four million tons of ores, the value of which, however, 
 was only £1,350,000. 
 
 Except in the case of ores, most of the raw material exported from 
 France comes originally from other countries. These exports are due 
 to arbitrage between different prices. They may represent the 
 realization of stocks, or perhaps sales at a profit ; but, whatever they 
 are, the steady rise of the figures under this head shows that the 
 French exporters find the trade profitable. 
 
 French imports of foodstuffs are concerned mainly with corn and 
 potatoes, destined for animal as well as human consumption. French 
 exports of foodstuffs are quite different, being articles of diet which 
 are not indispensable, but the taste for which has grown with the 
 increasing wealth of Germany. 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 Table fruits 3.5 10.4 20.9 15 21 
 
 Wines 24.9 29.5 20,5 33.2 19. 1 
 
 Detailed analysis of Franco-German trade returns reveal many 
 
 156 
 
Franco- German Trade 
 
 cases in which articles belonging to the same industrial categories 
 appear both as exports and imports. 
 
 The chemical industry is the most prosperous in Germany which 
 sends France her chemical products but at the same time receives 
 chemical products from France. 
 
 Chemical Products. 
 French imports from French exports into 
 Germany. Germany. 
 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 1903 24.3 10 
 
 1907 34-7 11. 7 
 
 1911 53.5 3i-7 
 
 1912 61 .2 35 
 
 1913 86.7 39.9 
 
 Thus from 1903 to 191 3 the increase for Germany has been 260 per 
 cent, and for France 300 per cent. In spite of their potash mines and 
 their wonderful chemical works, Germany has no monopoly of chemical 
 products, since she imports some from France. It will be seen that 
 of the total quantity of chemical products passing between France 
 and Germany in 191 3, France sold Germany 31 per cent, and Germany 
 sold France 69 per cent. 
 
 Germany sends France prepared dyes to the value of 6,300,000 
 francs. The value of the French export of dyes to Germany is 
 1,600,000 francs. 
 
 The next table shows the movements of the skin and fur trade : 
 
 Undressed skins 
 and furs. 
 
 Imports. Exports. 
 
 1903 14.2 46.8 
 
 1907 12.4 43-4 
 
 1912 21.5 60.4 
 
 1913 2 3.6 75-5 
 
 Dressed skins. 
 
 Imports. Exports. 
 (Million francs.) 
 13.2 11. 3 
 
 13.4 11. 3 
 
 21.4 22.5 
 
 20 22 
 
 Skins and furs pre- 
 pared and worked up 
 into finished goods. 
 
 10.4 
 
 15-5 
 
 46.5 
 45-6 
 
 Imports. Exports. 
 
 5-5 
 12.5 
 
 32.5 
 32.4 
 
 Seeds for sowing are a national product. Of course the French are 
 always being told of Germany's superior methods of agriculture. 
 The beet growers have said that they could not do without German 
 beet seeds even in war time. Nevertheless, the German demand for 
 
 T-57 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 French seeds is even greater, as they pay more for them than the 
 French do for German seeds. 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 French imports from Germany 2.4 4.9 j .7 7 7.6 
 
 French exports into Germany .. 1 1 .5 9.4 22.9 13.3 17 
 
 The imports of certain classes of manufactured goods show no 
 advance, or a very slight one. Textile wares for example : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 191 3. 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 Thread 4.2 3.6 5 4.8 4.2 
 
 Linen, hempen goods 9 1.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 
 
 Cotton goods 20.5 31. 1 28.1 28.2 26.2 
 
 Woollens 12.5 11. 6 8.6 8.8 8.8 
 
 Silk and floss silk 13.8 16.9 12.6 13.4 12.8 
 
 Thus the imports of German textile products have remained 
 stationary. 
 
 The next table shows French exports to Germany : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
 
 Thread 10. 1 
 
 Cotton goods 5.2 
 
 Woollens 8.2 
 
 Silk and floss silk 19.2 
 
 During the three years 1911-1913 the average annual value of the 
 French import of thread was £178,000, and that of the export, £752,000. 
 The Germans send France more cottons and woollens than they 
 receive from her. 
 
 At first sight the figures relating to silk seem to show that the 
 average annual value of the French import of German silk in the 
 years 1911-1913 was £534,000, while that of the French export was 
 only £396,000. But to this last figure must be added the value of 
 silk goods sent by post : 
 
 
 (Million francs. 
 
 ) 
 
 
 22.9 
 
 17 
 
 18.5 
 
 23.6 
 
 12 .7 
 
 9.8 
 
 12.3 
 
 10.5 
 
 6.1 
 
 5-3 
 
 5.6 
 
 7.2 
 
 9.7 
 
 10.6 
 
 10 
 
 9.8 
 
 1903. 
 
 1907. 
 
 1911. 1912. 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 1913. 
 
 18.4 
 
 19. 1 
 
 21. 1 22.8 
 
 23.8 
 
 (£729,000) 
 
 (£757,000) 
 
 (^835,500) (£903,000) 
 158 
 
 (£942,500) 
 
Franco-German Traoe 
 
 If we take the average of the three last years, while Germany sold 
 France annually silks to the value of £515,000, France sold Germany 
 £1,310,000 worth ; that is, 154 per cent. more. 
 
 In certain categories the movements of exports and imports can 
 be appreciated at a glance : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
 (Million francs.) 
 Imitation jewellery imported from 
 
 Germany 3.2 6.2 36.5 39.5 7,7-7 
 
 Gold and silver wares and jewellery 
 
 exported by France 5.6 7.4 8.8 9.3 -j ,.\ 
 
 Toys, fans and trinkets are exchanged, but^itjis plain that the 
 articles which these terms connote are not the same in all cases : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 Imported from Germany .. 11. 7 12.2 15.7 18.3 19.7 
 
 Exported into Germany 9.5 16.4 19.3 16 18.9 
 
 To within the last two years French exports in these lines were 
 larger than the German. 
 
 The figures for carriage-work and motor-cars are as follows : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 191 7 . 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 Imported from Germany 3 10.2 5.8 4 7 
 
 Exported into Germany 6.5 14.5 14.4 16.9 22 
 
 The French supremacy is unquestionable. 
 
 Only in the categories of earthenware, glass and glassware is there 
 an increase of imports without reciprocity : 
 
 1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
 (Million francs.) 
 
 Imported from Germany 17.4 29.4 42.1 44.5 37-4 
 
 Exported into Germany 3.4 4.2 4.6 5 4.8 
 
 A detailed analysis of Franco-German exports and imports reveals 
 one striking fact. 
 
 In 191 3 Germany exported to France : 
 
 Among foodstuffs, cereals 87 million francs. 
 
 Among raw materials, coal 165 ,, 
 
 Among manufactured articles, machinery and parts 132 ,, ,, 
 
 159 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 If the 165 million francs for coal be deducted from the total value 
 of the German exports to France, the figure remaining is 904 million 
 francs (£35,800,000). The difference in value between the German 
 imports to France and the French exports to Germany is thus 
 reduced to 37 million francs (£1,4.65,000). 
 
 The French imports from Germany of corn and flour can only be 
 explained on the assumption that France needed them, and the 
 French corn-growers cannot complain that this import has ruined 
 prices because prices have been very high. 
 
 The other great import has been that of machinery and parts. 
 Who bought these ? Plainly the French manufacturers who needed 
 them for their business. This machinery has therefore contributed 
 to the economic development of France. 
 
 France has no corn to send to Germany. Nor has she any coal. 
 After all, even if France imports machinery of German manufacture 
 there is a demand for French machinery in Germany, as is proved 
 by the eight or nine million francs' worth which the Germans buy 
 annually. 
 
 The richer Germany became, the better customer she was for 
 France, in spite of the tariff. Similarly France's custom was growing 
 ever more valuable to Germany. In plain fact the two countries 
 were excellent customers for each other, and had there been no such 
 phenomenon as " economic imperialism " to interrupt the course 
 of their commercial relations, their trade must have expanded 
 normally, to their mutual great advantage. 
 
 160 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 HOSTILE ECONOMIC PRACTICES 
 
 What is a commercially " closed " State — Fichte, Oldenburg and Wagner — 
 The Chancellor's protectionist views — Their effect on the elections — The 
 1909 tariff — Additions to the number of articles — Article 103 — Discrimina- 
 tion — No exchange of cattle between France and Germany — Threats and 
 recriminations — Article 15 of the Law of 1892 — Germany's reply — 
 Sparkling wines and brandies — Analyses — The Comity du Commerce 
 Fran^ais avec V Allemagne — German railway rates — Export fever in Ger- 
 many — The Press agitation of 19 13 — Commercial jealousy, economic 
 ignorance, hypocritical and unfair practices. 
 
 TRADE between France and Germany has increased steadily, 
 in spite of the Protectionists in the two countries who have 
 done their best to drive them into economic war. 
 
 The idea of a commercially " closed " State, a Geschlossener 
 Handelsstaat, must be ascribed to Fichte. In 1897 it was revived 
 by Oldenburg and received the support of the celebrated Professor 
 Adolph Wagner, who desired Germany to be self-supporting. Dietzel 
 answered him with Free Trade arguments. Oldenburg cried out in 
 terror : " If the corn-producing countries, such as the United States 
 and Russia, become industrialized, they will no longer take our 
 manufactures and we shall then die of hunger." 
 
 Adolph Wagner, in a book called Germany, an Industrial and 
 Agricultural State, says : 
 
 " We must seek to retard the large increase of our population."* 
 
 The duties on corn were raised. It might have been hoped that 
 dearer food would produce the result desired by Adolph Wagner. 
 It produced no such result. The population continued to increase, 
 and if the rate of increase has slackened considerably of late years, 
 the change has been most noticeable in the wealthiest parts of 
 Germany. 
 
 * Discussion du Huitieme Congres £vangelique, 1897.- 
 
 l6l II 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The theoretical question has been abandoned by the two great 
 Protectionist groups in Germany,* the landowners and farmers on 
 one side and the big manufacturers on the other. Although the manu- 
 facturers are National Liberals and politically hostile to the Agrarians, 
 they are all in agreement as to the necessity of maintaining the pro- 
 tectionist system. However, their interests are not identical. The 
 Catholic Centre looks for support both to the working classes and 
 the landed proprietors of the Rhine Province. In Silesia the great 
 landed proprietors have also large mining interests and wield immense 
 influence. 
 
 In September, 191 1, the Prussian railways reduced by one-half 
 their rates for the carriage of feeding stuffs for cattle. The potato 
 harvest was so poor that the Prussian Government permitted the 
 substitution of maize in the distillation of spirits. 
 
 Various Chambers of Commerce and other bodies demanded the 
 temporary abolition of the duties on maize (which stood at three 
 marks a quintal) and also on the poorer qualities of barley, as well 
 as the suspension of all restrictions on the import of meat and 
 cattle. 
 
 To this demand the Chancellor replied in the Reichstag that any 
 abolition or reduction of duties would injure the agricultural interest. 
 Temporary abolition would be all the more dangerous, as it might 
 end by becoming final. 
 
 However, the orators of the Centre and the National Liberals, 
 while professing their adherence to a protectionist policy, demanded 
 the reduction or temporary suspension of the duties on maize and 
 barley, the admission of frozen meat from the Argentine Republic, 
 and revision of the system of import certificates for corn. The 
 Chancellor showed himself more protectionist than the Protectionists. 
 The Deutsche Export Revue, the organ of the Bund des Industriellen, 
 declared that his attitude would cause deep dissatisfaction in com- 
 mercial and industrial circles. 
 
 It is certainly probable that the Chancellor's attitude had some- 
 thing to do with the success of a hundred and ten Socialists in the 
 elections of 1912. 
 
 The German tariff of 1909 covered no less than 941 articles. The 
 
 Prussian bureaucracy which drew it up wanted to evade some of 
 
 the effects of the most-favoured-nation clause. They went to work by 
 
 increasing the number of the headings of the tariff in such a way 
 
 * Luigi Brentano : The Free Trade Congress at Antwerp (1910). 
 
 162 
 
Hostile Economic Practices 
 
 that certain French specialities exported into Germany were not 
 included in the commercial treaties which had been concluded. 
 
 French Protectionists waxed extremely wrath over Article 103, 
 dealing with cattle with heavy bay or brown markings, pasturing 
 normally 300 metres (984 feet) above sea-level, but spending one 
 month of the year in pastures at an altitude of 800 metres (2,600 feet). 
 Whatever the origin, cattle for fattening paid the same duty of 9 
 marks per 100 kilos (220 lbs.), while other cattle paid the full duty 
 of 20 marks. 
 
 It is plain that this distinction had been made to favour a certain 
 Swiss breed, perhaps with the object of introducing the species into 
 Germany. In any case, French, Austrian, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, 
 Danish and other cattle, not answering to these descriptions, could 
 not take advantage of the reduced duty. 
 
 It was a case of discrimination. From the French point of view, 
 what was the result ? Was France so rich in flocks and herds that 
 she might have invaded Germany with them ? 
 
 Was it possible to reply to this discrimination by putting duties 
 on cattle of German origin ? Germany does not export cattle. 
 Could France retaliate on German coal, raw material ? The metallur- 
 gists, strongly protectionist, would have objected. In the French 
 tariff of 1910 the duties on machinery and parts were raised, but this 
 affected the imports of that class from England and Belgium as well 
 as from Germany. The increase might profit some of the manu- 
 facturers, but it hit all who needed machinery. 
 
 These cases of discrimination made an excellent springboard for 
 M. Klotz, about to start on his campaign which led to the revision 
 of 19 10. Both he and his friends kept repeating that twelve per cent, 
 of French exports had been harmfully affected by German discrimina- 
 tion and that only six per cent, had benefited. 
 
 In any case, the expansion of Franco-German trade was not 
 arrested, and, in fact, the exports of France exceeded her imports. 
 
 M. Klotz made inflammatory speeches which seemed directed 
 towards Germany ; but at the same time he said : 
 
 " The object of the revision is not a systematic raising of our minimum tariff, 
 but a systematic raising of our general tariff." 
 
 In his speeches M. Klotz indicated Germany and her discrimination. 
 But in virtue of Article 1 1 of the Treaty of Frankfort, France could 
 not apply her general tariff to Germany. 
 
 163 11* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The Germans knew quite well what they were about, but mutual 
 recriminations do not pave the way for good relations. However, 
 Franco-German trade continued to increase. 
 
 But the matter did not stop at words. Article 15 of the French 
 Tariff Law of Jan. nth, 1892, ran as follows : 
 
 " All foreign goods, whether in a natural state or manufactured, bearing 
 either on themselves or on their packings, cases, wrappings or labels any manu- 
 facturer's or trade mark, name, sign or legend of any kind, suggesting that 
 they have been made in France or are of French origin, may not be imported, 
 bonded, or carried by rail, and all trade in them is strictly prohibited. 
 
 "This regulation also applies to manufactured or unmanufactured foreign 
 goods coming from a district or locality with the same name as any French 
 district or locality which do not bear, in addition to the name of the district 
 or locality, the name of the country of origin and the word ' Imported ' in 
 legible and distinct characters." 
 
 The apparent object of this innovation was to prevent confusion 
 between the foreign and French origin of any particular article. 
 But of late the law has been applied in such a way that all imports 
 from abroad into France must show a mark of origin. 
 
 The new law compelled a German firm which had been selling 
 optical instruments in France for more than sixty years to add to 
 its trade-mark (" X. Jena ") the words " Imported from Germany." 
 The customs authorities were kind enough to dispense with the 
 redundant words.* 
 
 However, we must not pass over in silence the rare example of 
 moderation they displayed in not insisting that every piece of coal 
 exported from England, Belgium and Germany into France should 
 be stamped. 
 
 As a reply to these hostile practices, it was suggested in Germany 
 that Article 15 should be met by a regulation that not only all goods 
 imported into Germany, but even goods in transit, should be 
 stamped with the name of country of the origin, if necessary in 
 indelible characters. 
 
 When the Germans revised their tariff in 1910 the duties on spark- 
 ling wines were raised from 130 marks to 180 marks, and on 
 brandies from 300 to 350 marks. 
 
 The German Customs regulations laid down that every consign- 
 ment of wine should be analysed on entering the country at the 
 
 * Maurice Ajam : Le Conftit Economique Franco- Allemand : Journal des 
 Economistes, November, 191 3. 
 
 164 
 
Hostile Economic Practices 
 
 expense of the consignor. The French exporters made little objection 
 so long as the German Customs officials contented themselves with 
 one analysis per consignment. But on September 1st, 1910, the 
 German authorities decided that only those wines could be con- 
 sidered " homogeneous " which were of the same district, vintage and 
 price. Therefore a separate analysis was necessary for each variety 
 in a consignment 
 
 The German law permits blending up to forty-nine per cent., but 
 this admissible blending was hardly likely to improve the quality of 
 French clarets. 
 
 At the suggestion of M. Lucien Coquet a few years ago, a number 
 of Frenchmen founded the " Comite du Commerce Francais avec 
 FAllemagne." Its presidents have been M. Pierre Baudin, M. Rene 
 Millet, and since June, 191 3, M. Maurice Ajam. It is known simply 
 as the Comite Franco-AUemand. Its aim has been " to promote 
 good trade relations between France and Germany." In the summer 
 of 191 3 M. Maurice Ajam went to Germany to study the trade question, 
 and on his return kindly published his conclusions in the Journal des 
 Economistes for November, 1913, under the title, " Le Conflit 
 Economique Franco-Allemand." He also published further details 
 of his investigation in a book called Le Probleme Economique Franco- 
 AllemandT* 
 
 The majority of the members of this society were French and 
 German exporters. I can speak freely on this topic, because, although 
 I was invited, I never joined this body. The Protectionists who 
 always want to sell without buying can hardly find fault with those 
 Frenchmen who try to win a larger market for French goods in Ger- 
 many. But were not the Germans enjoying the French market ? 
 The Protectionists have the same complaint to make as regards 
 England and Belgium ; yet in spite of their efforts they have not yet 
 found a means of preventing goods from being exchanged for other 
 goods. 
 
 Tariffs, however, are not the only weapon in their armoury. In 
 Germany the Protectionists make use of the railway rates, scaled low 
 for exports and high for imports. Thus the consumer is hit twice. 
 The export of home products is facilitated and the price of foreign 
 products is kept high. 
 
 " Always sell and never buy " is the first commandment of Pro- 
 tectionists in every country. The policy of the syndicates is only 
 * Published by Perrin. 
 
 165 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 a logical application of it. But those who are for ever seeking a 
 " remedy for crises " want to go one better. 
 
 In the second half of 19 13 there was marked industrial depression. 
 
 The Press immediately found the remedy — exporting. In the 
 name of Germany's economic mission in the world and in the name 
 of Weltzvirtschaft, a chorus of obloquy was raised against Great Britain 
 which had her colonies, and America which had a whole continent ; 
 while Germany, the new-comer, had no commercial " preserves." 
 Then followed exhortation to Germany to take her share of Africa 
 and secure a monopoly in Asiatic Turkey, South America and China. 
 
 " Within forty-eight hours of each other two scientific institutions 
 were inaugurated early in 1 9 14, both specially devised to teach 
 the science " (? or art) " of international trading, viz., the Institut 
 fiir Seeverkehr unci Weltzvirtschaft, inaugurated at the University of 
 Kiel, February 20th, 19 14, as a branch of the Kaiser Wilhelm Stiftung, 
 serving scientific purposes, and the Weltzvirtschaftliche Ge sells ch aft, 
 constituted at Berlin, February 22nd, composed of scientists and 
 pursuing only theoretical ends (lectures and papers on the world's 
 economic development)."* 
 
 Commercial jealousy, economic ignorance, unfair and hypocritical 
 practices — these have been in all countries the offspring of Protection. 
 
 * Annual Series of Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 5,404, 1914, 
 Germany. 
 
 I6G 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 THE OPEN DOOR 
 The Open Door — The Journal de Geneve and Algeria — German trade in Algeria. 
 
 IT is easy to understand the ill-feeling in France and Germany 
 caused by the tariff war between the two countries, but Germany 
 had certainly no ground for complaint with regard to Great Britain's 
 treatment of her. 
 
 At the end of 1903 Mr. Balfour had certainly talked of Retaliation, 
 but he had seemed half-hearted. Mr. Chamberlain took up the 
 question of " Tariff Reform," but could not convince the English of 
 the desirability of a change. 
 
 Germans are very envious of Great Britain's predominance in the 
 carrying trade. 
 
 In a series of articles on " Germany and England " in The Statist 
 for 191 2 Sir George Paish put the following question : 
 
 " When does the commerce of a nation become its commerce ? The world's 
 wheat shipments are made in the vessel of any country available for the purpose 
 at the moment. The vessel is the property of one person or of a group of persons 
 of one nationality, and the cargo belongs to another or to several others of a 
 different nationality. Not until the wheat is in the English Channel is it known 
 whether or not the vessel will discharge its cargo in Liverpool, or in Hamburg, or 
 in Rotterdam, or in Antwerp, or at a French port. And even when its destination is 
 decided upon the wheat is still the property of those who caused the wheat to be 
 shipped, who may be citizens of any country. A portion of the commodities 
 needed by England is brought in foreign vessels ; a large portion of the commo- 
 dities needed by Germany arrives in the vessels of other countries. Thus a vessel 
 may be owned by one country, its cargo by another, and its underwriting be 
 performed by a third. It is possible for a country to enjoy a great overseas 
 commerce and to own neither ships nor goods at sea." 
 
 But Germany wanted to be self-supporting, and could not forgive 
 British ships for bringing her cheaper goods than she could produce 
 herself. 
 
 Lastly, Germany could not deny that Great Britain pursued the 
 
 167 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 policy of the " Open Door." At the time of the Agadir crisis the 
 Cologne Gazette said : 
 
 " Experience shows that in Algeria, Tunis, Indo-China, Madagascar, and 
 everywhere else, France has bolted and barred the door against the trade of 
 all other nations." 
 
 France certainly does not favour the " open door " system, and yet 
 the logic of events has triumphed over the force of Protection. Here 
 is a reply from the Journal de Geneve to this charge against France : 
 
 " The numerous Swiss who have taken up their residence in Algeria and 
 Tunis and gained — certainly many of them — positions of influence and import- 
 ance, are unanimous in their opinion that French rule there means a warm 
 welcome, tolerance and security for foreigners. Foreigners are treated exactly 
 like Frenchmen. No obstacle is thrown in the way of their purchasing land. 
 They may establish their businesses and engage in trade without let or hindrance. 
 They are subject to no taxation from which Frenchmen are exempt. ' I have 
 lived ten years in Tunis,' said a Swiss friend of ours the other day. ' I have 
 worked and developed my property there without paying a sou towards the 
 revenue.' 
 
 " France has so effectively ' bolted and barred the door,' to use the language 
 of the Kolnische, that while 105,000 Italians now reside in Tunis, there are only 
 38,000 Frenchmen there. The Italians fare as well as if they were in Italy. 
 They have their own schools, doctors, lawyers and clubs. Consequently they 
 are now thoroughly reconciled to the French protectorate, and have forgotten 
 their original suspicions and resentment. They are able to say that they could 
 not have been given more scope if it had been their own country which had 
 borne the burden, faced the dangers, and surmounted the difficulties of occupying 
 Tunis and restoring order in that country. 
 
 " In Algeria there are more than 400,000 Europeans, mainly Spanish and 
 Italians, not to mention many Swiss. 
 " What about trade ? 
 
 " Let us take the Statistical Year Book of the German Empire for 1910. It 
 shows that German exports to Algeria advanced from 500,000 marks in 1902 
 to 3,600,000 marks in 19 10. Between 1901 and 19 10 they increased from 
 600,000 marks to 1,300,000 in Tunis and from 2,400,000 marks to 4,500,000 
 marks in West Africa. 
 
 " The same Year Book, marking the expansion of the national trade in 
 triumphant percentages, places the increase of German exports for eight years 
 at 575 per cent, for Algeria, 127 per cent, for Tunis, 86 per cent, for West Africa, 
 360 per cent, for French Indo-China, 183 per cent, for Guiana and Martinique 
 and 253 per cent, for French possessions in Oceania." 
 
 These figures demonstrate the absurdity and futility of the " closed 
 door " policy. 
 
 Germany's plan was to force open the doors of others with her 
 cannon while she kept her own closed. 
 
 168 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 COLONIAL AMBITIONS AND ILLUSIONS 
 
 German Colonial Policy — " Land hunger " — Settlement colonies in Africa — 
 Massacre of the natives — No outlets for the German population — Theories 
 and facts — Kiao-Chau — German interests in Morocco — Navigation for 
 prestige — Economic pretexts to cover political aims — " Extending the 
 frontiers." 
 
 GERMAN protectionists, like those of every other country, have 
 two objects before them in addition to the restriction of trade 
 between their own and other nations : 
 
 (i) That Germany should be self-supporting. 
 
 (2) That Germany should increase the outlets for her trade by 
 acquiring consumers who would be her own property. 
 
 The second object is the basis of her colonial policy which Bismarck 
 could not resist, though his support was half-hearted. In 1884 he 
 took over Angra Pequena from a Bremen merchant, Liideritz, who 
 had obtained it from a Namaquois chief. 
 
 Herr F. Koike, the editor of the Koloniale Zeitschrift, gives a table 
 for 191 1 showing the following figures for German trade with English, 
 French, Dutch and Belgian colonies. 
 
 Imports into Germany. Exports from Germany. 
 (Million francs.) 
 i,342.5 352.5 
 
 The idea of Germany's buying three times as much from the colonies 
 of foreign Powers as she sold them enraged the pundits of National 
 Economy. A greater spur to their indignation was the knowledge 
 that out of 55,500,000 square miles, the area of the habitable globe, 
 the English possessed 13,123,712, Russia 8,400,000, France 
 4,330,000, while Germany had to rest content with only 
 1,343,020. Hence the new passion which they denominate Landgier, 
 " Land Hunger." Their cardinal dogma is that a great Power should 
 possess, in every quarter of the globe, territories corresponding to 
 its population and its capacity to expand. 
 
 169 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 They meant their African colonies to be settlement colonies. Ger- 
 man savants would not condescend to remember that white men hardly 
 ever become acclimatized to countries in the Torrid Zone with 
 25 isothermal degrees.* 
 
 The Germans massacred the Herreros and other native peoples, 
 and were then surprised to discover that black labour was indis- 
 pensable to the development of their colonies. But if Doctor Dern- 
 burg, the first Secretary for the Colonies, despised the blacks, he had 
 not a much better opinion of whites. His ideal was a colony without 
 inhabitants to be exploited by banks. Unfortunately even the banks 
 had their doubts. His successor, Solf, reverted to the idea of settle- 
 ment colonies, but Pomeranians and Mecklenburgers are afraid of fever 
 and dysentery and display a marked preference for North America. 
 
 In 191 3 there were 28,800 whites in the German colonies. As the 
 excess of births over deaths in Germany is 800,000, it could not be 
 said that the colonies provided an outlet for that over-population of 
 the Mother Country which Herr Adolph Wagner and other professors 
 feared so much. Indeed, of that 28,800, officials and missionaries 
 accounted for 12,000. 
 
 Herr Bonn, Professor of Munich University and Director of the 
 Academy of Commerce, delivered in 191 1, on a special occasion, a 
 lecture on German colonial policy with special reference to Africa. 
 He drew a vivid contrast between theories and the facts. It had 
 been said that the German colonies in Africa could supply all the 
 cotton required for home consumption. Now in 1909-1910 that 
 consumption was 1,664,000 bales ; that is, 377 million kilogrammes. 
 To supply the home market it would have been necessary to cultivate 
 two million hectares and dispose of the labour of two or three million 
 people. Doctor Bonn estimated the number of blacks available 
 at fourteen millions, counting men, women and children. 
 
 In 19 1 2 the total trade of the German colonies was : 
 
 Imports. Exports. Total. 
 
 (Million francs.) 
 322 251 573 
 
 If Kiao-Chau be excluded 
 
 143 101 244 
 
 the figures are 
 
 179 150 329 
 
 Thus Kiao-Chau accounts for two-fifths of the total. 
 
 * See Yves Guyot : Lettres sur la Politique Coloniale, pp« 47, 55. 
 
 170 
 
Colonial Ambitions and Illusions 
 
 For several years the Kaiser's ambitions were turned from Turkey 
 to China. Germans believed that in view of the future partition of 
 China Kiao-Chau was one of the tit-bits. Belgium, the United States 
 and Great Britain had all obtained railways but no territorial con- 
 cessions. In November, 1897, two German missionaries were 
 murdered. As it happened there was a small German squadron, 
 under the command of Admiral Diedrichs, present at the time. On 
 November 14th detachments were landed from these ships which 
 took possession of the territory around Kiao-Chau Bay and hoisted 
 the German flag on the neighbouring hills. Almost at once a pro- 
 clamation was issued assuring the Chinese that the Germans enter- 
 tained nothing but friendly feelings for them, but would retain 
 possession of the territory in question with a view to obtaining satis- 
 faction for the murders. Pekin summoned the Germans to depart, 
 but, so far from complying, they demanded the concession of a railway 
 line and some mines in the province of Shantung. China was in no 
 condition to resist and the German Government duly obtained a 
 lease for ninety-nine years of 193 square miles of the province of 
 Shantung, the bay of Kiao-Chau and a sphere of influence of 2,750 
 square miles. The compact was signed on March 6th, 1898. The 
 second paragraph of the first article ran thus : " His Majesty the 
 Emperor of China, desiring that the German troops should take 
 possession of the territory hereinafter delimited . . ." But that was 
 not the end of this study in irony. The province of Shantung was 
 abandoned to the Germans. In return the Germans gave an under- 
 taking that they had no ulterior designs with regard to China, and, in 
 particular, " would make no attempt to seize illegally any part of 
 that province." In return for the mining concession, the German 
 Government added that " they were not inspired by any ill-feeling 
 towards China, but only wished to increase the trade and improve the 
 relations between the two countries." 
 
 When demanding a credit of five millions for the development of 
 the new acquisition Prince Biilow said : 
 
 "The Chinese authorities will have the proofs of German power ever before 
 them and will understand that any injury to the German people will not be 
 disregarded. We have secured a strategic and political position at Kiao-Chau 
 which will give us a decisive influence on the development of events in the 
 Far East." 
 
 The Germans immediately set to work to fortify their new posses- 
 sion. It has been said that they emplaced five hundred Krupp guns 
 
 171 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 of the^latest model. The development of the trade of the port was 
 duly boomed, but obviously much of its increased activity was due 
 to the shipping employed for the fortification and railway construction. 
 In 1904 the railway from Tsing Tao to Tsinan-Fu, 256 miles in length, 
 was opened. It feeds the most fertile and thickly-populated dis- 
 tricts, hitherto destitute of means of communication, and connects 
 with the main line in China from Nankin to Pekin. 
 
 To this railway is due the commercial activity of the port of Kiao- 
 Chau, the trade of which advanced, as the customs returns show, 
 from 59,482 Huakim taels in 1900 to 1,670,000 in 191 2. 
 
 The expansion of the navy, which has proved a costly luxury to the 
 German Empire, dates from this occupation of Kiao-Chau. 
 
 To-day the Japanese have deprived the Germans for ever of their 
 possession. Kiao-Chau was the only colony which was a striking 
 commercial success, and that because it provided the Chinese with 
 railway facilities ; but it was the Chinese, not the Germans, who 
 made its prosperity. In German eyes its value was mainly 
 strategic* 
 
 When the Germans spoke of their interests in Morocco, it might 
 have been thought that they did a flourishing trade in that part of 
 Africa. As a matter of fact, the entire trade of Germany with 
 Morocco in 1909 was 11,300,000 marks, her total trade in that year 
 being 17,000,000,000 marks. In other words, the Moroccan portion 
 was not even one per cent., being six-tenths per cent, of the whole. 
 British trade with Morocco was worth £2,204,000, French £2,195,000, 
 German £564,147. To threaten the peace of the world for " interests " 
 of such dimensions proves that the Kaiser and his advisers have no 
 sense of proportion. 
 
 The Germans had another plan, a highly artificial one, for swelling 
 the importance of their Moroccan " interests." The figures for the 
 tonnage of ships entering the port of Tangier illustrate its operation. 
 
 German. English. 
 
 Laden. In ballast. Laden. In ballast. 
 
 1907 40.540 104,517 195.245 81,835 
 
 1908 25,375 147.176 191,606 25,387 
 
 1909 42,896 135,670 193.230 34.636 
 
 * " Tsingtau and its Significance : with Some Impressions from a Recent 
 Visit," by William Blane, The Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1914. 
 " Tsing-tao et la Ruine de la Culture Allemande en Extreme-Orient," par 
 D. Bellet. Revue des Deux Mondes, March 1st, 191 5. 
 
 172 
 
Colonial Ambitions and Illusions 
 
 While the proportion of English ships in ballast is about one-eighth 
 of their total, German ships in ballast represent four-fifths of their 
 total. These German ships call for the purpose of displaying the 
 German flag. The British Consul has pointed out that the German 
 services to the coast of Morocco would be discontinued were it not for 
 the Government subsidies they receive. 
 
 In 1901 there were 16,500 Europeans in Morocco, of which total 
 Germans, Austrians and Swiss combined amounted to 153, or 1 per 
 cent. ! 
 
 The official communique said that the Panther was sent to protect 
 the lives of Germans and German proteges ; but the village of Agadir, 
 with its three or four hundred inhabitants, did not contain a single 
 German. 
 
 It is plain that the Kaiser's chief interest in Morocco was its 
 strategic importance. The Panther was sent to Agadir, where there 
 was not a German to protect, and not to Mogador, because Agadir 
 could easily become an important port and the Germans wanted it 
 for a naval base. " This country," they said, " stands at the corner 
 of Africa, and such a position in the continent is a factor of the highest 
 strategic importance." 
 
 The geographer Ratzel enunciated the principle of accumulating 
 territory in these words : " The development of a world-empire means 
 that in one region after another the conquering power extends its 
 political frontiers." The Kaiser, once established in Morocco, would 
 have attempted to put that principle into practice as he had done 
 when scheming to join up German South-West Africa with German 
 East Africa. « 
 
 The motives of German colonial policy must always be sought in 
 considerations of strategy and politics rather than in economic 
 ambitions. 
 
 173 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 
 
 Frederick Barbarossa and William II. — German friendship for Abdul Hamid — 
 The Konia-Bagdad railway — Financial arrangements — The French 
 Government's part — A check in England — The Franco-German Agreement 
 of February 15th, 1914 — Horns-Bagdad — Diplomatic mysteries — German 
 trade in Turkey. 
 
 IN 1 1 89 Frederick Barbarossa entered Constantinople. In 1889 
 William II. celebrated the seven-hundredth /anniversary of that 
 event by paying a state visit to the same city. Although the Crusades 
 were a resounding failure, William II. felt the spirit of the Crusader 
 within him, even at the moment of offering his friendship to the Sultan 
 Abdul Hamid and his protection to the Moslem world. His visit was 
 rewarded by the concession of a railway in Anatolia as far as 
 Konia. 
 
 The year 1898 was marked by the Armenian massacres. Sultan 
 Abdul Hamid became an object of execration the world over. This 
 was the moment for the Kaiser to distinguish himself. He sent the 
 Sultan his portrait and in a high-sounding state speech assured him 
 of his eternal friendship. " Eternal " was a strong word. True, 
 the friendship had had a beginning. But there was also to be an 
 ending. 
 
 In October, 1898, he visited Constantinople again. In 1899 an 
 irad of the Sultan decreed the extension of the railway from Konia 
 to Bagdad. 
 
 At this time, however, the Kaiser was haunted by his Chinese 
 dreams, although the study of the railway problem, always disguised 
 as archaeological or other research, had never ceased. In 1900, an 
 engineer of the Deutsche Bank published a book in which he projected 
 a scheme for connecting European and Asiatic Turkey by a bridge over 
 the Bosphorus. 
 
 However, Russia had obtained from the Sultan a promise that 
 
 174 
 
The Bagdad Railway 
 
 railways in Armenia should only be constructed by the Turks them- 
 selves, or by Russians. Great Britain was busy with the Transvaal 
 War. The memory of Fashoda still embittered her relations with 
 France. German scholars consoled their countrymen for their dis- 
 appointments in Africa and China with visions of the agricultural 
 resurrection of Mesopotamia and the fine field it offered for German 
 colonization. 
 
 The Kaiser obtained a second irad, dated February 18th, 1902. 
 The estimate amounted to 800 millions ; but in spite of the guarantees 
 given by the Turkish Government, German financiers knew that the 
 money could not be raised in their own market. 
 
 It may be admitted at once that both the French Government and 
 financiers made mistakes. An agreement was concluded between the 
 German Anatolian Railway Company and the French Smyrna- 
 Cassaba Company that Germany should raise 40 per cent, of the 
 capital required and France another 40 per cent., the remaining 20 per 
 cent, being found by the Powers having financial interests in Turkey. 
 Germany, however, was not equal to raising her 40 per cent, and 
 magnanimously invited Russian co-operation. Count Witte replied 
 by an official communique in the Russian Financial Messenger, advising 
 Russians to keep their capital for national enterprises of more imme- 
 diate interest. 
 
 Germany, so far from encountering opposition on the part of the 
 French Government, received their support. M. Victor Berard says* 
 that M. Delcasse had used his visit with President Loubet to St. 
 Petersburg (May, 1902) to speak favourably of the Bagdad railway 
 scheme ; that he prosecuted the idea during the whole of 1902 and 
 at the beginning of 1903, and ended by convincing Count Lamsdorf 
 that as the Germans were determined to build the railway in any 
 event, it would serve Russian interests better to be with them rather 
 than against them, or at least to allow France to enter a combination 
 which could thus not be used as a weapon against Russia. There 
 was an interview between the Emperor William and the Czar Nicholas 
 at Revel (August, 1902), and at length Russia consented. 
 
 William II. tried to interest England in the scheme during his visit 
 to that country in 1902. In 1903 the suggested proportions were 
 revised. Germany was to find 30 per cent., France 30 per cent., 
 England 30 per cent., and the remainder was to be raised at large. 
 In return the English were to consent to an increase in the Ottoman 
 * La France et Guillaume II., 1907. 
 175 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 tariffs, the adoption of the Bagdad route for the carriage of the 
 Indian mails and the creation of a terminus on the Persian Gulf. 
 Mr. Balfour declared that he did not wish the route to be under the 
 sole control of a Franco-German company. Lord Lansdowne had 
 expressed approval of the scheme. However, Mr. Balfour soon came 
 to see that the control of the system would be exclusively German, 
 and on April 23rd, 1903, Great Britain finally refused to take any part. 
 The old arrangement was restored. France was to find 40 per cent., 
 Germany 40 per cent., and the remainder was to be placed in Switzer- 
 land and Belgium. 
 
 The greater Germany's difficulties, the greedier she became. The 
 original agreement had provided that the Director should be a German, 
 and the President a Frenchman. Berlin now claimed that both 
 offices should be filled by Germans. The reply was simple. Bagdad 
 Railway shares were not allowed to be quoted on the French market 
 (October, 1903). In revenge the Kaiser made his famous voyage 
 to Tangier in 1905. 
 
 The Germans constructed the 125-mile stretch between Konia and 
 Boulgourdou over a level plain ; but when they reached the Taurus 
 sector, artificial works, such as tunnels and bridges, involved an 
 enormous outlay. They obtained a further guarantee of four per 
 cent, per kilometre for a special loan of 98 million francs. The 
 Deutsche Bank returned to France and offered this four per cent, 
 guarantee as a bait in the fond hope that it would secure French 
 assistance. 
 
 Russia, in return for her complacence towards the Bagdad railway 
 scheme, obtained recognition for her special interests in Armenia 
 and Northern Persia. Simultaneously she came to an arrangement 
 with Great Britain defining her zone of influence in Persia, and an 
 Anglo-Russian agreement of August 31st, 1907, fixed the relations 
 of the two Powers with Afghanistan, which is now connected by 
 railway with the Trans-Caspian at Merv. 
 
 In 1908 there was a fresh Turco-German arrangement by which 
 the surplus of the customs revenue was guaranteed to the grantee 
 company. At the end of 191 3 negotiations between MM. Porsot and 
 Scrgent, representing France, and Herren Gwynner and Helferich, 
 representing Germany, assisted by M. Cambon and Herr Zimmermann, 
 resulted in the conclusion of an agreement on February 15th, 1914, 
 whereby France abandoned her interest in the Bagdad Railway, 
 and Germany recognized her exclusive right to undertake the public 
 
 176 
 
The Bagdad Railway 
 
 works, construct and manage the railways and control the ports of 
 Syria and North and North-east Anatolia. 
 
 The Germans — Turkey's good friends — thus arranged for her dis- 
 memberment without so much as consulting her. On the other hand, 
 the three French lines, including the Smyrna-Afiunkara-hissar line 
 and the Soma-Panderma line, were isolated, and could not give 
 France influence in any way comparable to that enjoyed by Germany 
 through the management and control of the great Bagdad route. 
 
 But Bagdad is five hundred miles from the Persian Gulf. Ger- 
 many had still to deal with the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, 
 and her ambitious scheme had not opened a new route to India. 
 On the 15th of June, 1914, six weeks before the declaration of war, 
 Great Britain had come to an arrangement delimiting her sphere of 
 influence beyond Bagdad, and when Turkey declared war on the 
 Allies, her first act was to land an Anglo-Indian force and secure 
 Basrah. 
 
 The Anglo-French project of a railway from Horns to Bagdad 
 connected with a terminus at the Syrian port of Tripoli was mooted 
 as a counterblast to the German Bagdad line. It would be shorter 
 than its German rival and require none of the great artificial works 
 which distinguish the Taurus sector. It would touch the Euphrates 
 at Deir, serve Mesopotamia, and be the most direct route by the 
 Mediterranean for the mail services. The idea was more than eighty 
 years old. Without doubt the Germans would rage against a rival. 
 But although the rival lines would meet at Bagdad, throughout the 
 greater part of their length they would be at too great a distance 
 from each other to allow of serious competition. Sir William Willcox, 
 who was deputed by the Ministry of Public Works in Constantinople 
 to study the question of Mesopotamian development, reported in 1909 
 that this railway would provide the necessary stimulus to local trade. 
 He estimated the cost of construction of a narrow gauge railway at 
 69,000 francs a kilometre. In 1910, M. Bernard Marimone, backed by 
 a powerful group of English and French financiers, brought forward 
 another scheme for a railway passing through Palmyra, Deir and 
 Anah. At the time certain diplomatic intrigues were taking place 
 which have been revealed by Mr. Francis Aldridge in an article called 
 " A Bungle in Entente Diplomacy."* The reasons for the hostility 
 displayed by certain French diplomatists is not easy to understand. 
 However, the scheme fell through, to the great joy of the Germans. 
 * Fortnightly Review, August, 19 14. 
 
 177 12 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 We must take care that future Anglo-French negotiations with regard 
 to Eastern affairs are not marred by similar misunderstandings. 
 
 If we were to accept the statements of some journalists and politi- 
 cians, German trade has acquired in the Ottoman Empire the same 
 predominance which her diplomacy already enjoys. A glance at the 
 statistics dispels that legend which many Frenchmen have indus- 
 triously spread abroad with the purpose of rousing French manufac- 
 turers, financiers, and even the Government. 
 
 The figures for the fiscal year ending March 13th, for 1906, 1909, 
 1910 and 191 1 are as follows (1 piastres. 23 franc = approximately 
 2jd.) : 
 
 Imports (million piastres). 
 Exporting Country. 1906. 1909. 1910. 191 1. 
 
 Great Britain 1.099 94 1 882 8 4 8 
 
 Austria-Hungary 651 407 628 765 
 
 France 267 397 318 393 
 
 Germany 132 194 221 387 
 
 Exports. 
 
 1906. 1909. 1910. 1911. 
 
 Great Britain 633 314 55 8 537 
 
 Austria-Hungary 213 248 174 219 
 
 France 381 363 365 440 
 
 Germany 123 115 112 131 
 
 Total Trade of the Turkish Empire. 
 
 Imports 3,137 3,143 3.338 4.256 
 
 Exports 1,967 1,844 1,820 2,208 
 
 Thus German trade with Turkey is much less than that of Great 
 Britain, although German exports to Turkey have advanced and 
 approach those of France. No doubt part of that advance is repre- 
 sented by material for the Bagdad railway and also war material 
 of all kinds. 
 
 In this case, as in most others, there is something fictitious about 
 the figures of German trade. 
 
 Germany has also sent colonists to Turkey but only in small 
 numbers. They have been entirely without influence, and in all 
 probability strongly dislike Oriental government. German ambitions 
 in that quarter have also resulted in failure. On the other hand, 
 the Kaiser's influence at Constantinople has been supreme. His bold 
 ambassadors have robbed the English and French ambassadors of 
 their old prestige. The latter, indeed, put no obstacles in their way. 
 Obsessed by the idea that the Turks would be triumphant in 191 2, 
 
 178 
 
The Bagdad Railway 
 
 they were so hypnotized by German ambition that they accepted 
 with calm resignation all its consequences. If Turkey had been 
 victorious in the war of 19 12 Austria-Hungary would have crushed 
 Serbia and extended her influence to Salonica. The Emperor of 
 Germany would have stretched out a friendly hand to the Sultan, 
 and tacitly informed Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece that they must 
 regard him as their natural protector. 
 
 Berlin, Vienna, Constantinople, Bagdad ! From the terrace at 
 Potsdam the Kaiser saw himself at last in a position to strike at 
 England in India and Egypt and his dreams a la Picrochole bore 
 him into the Infinite. 
 
 In 1916 the Allies are at Salonica, Russia holds Erzrum and 
 continues to destroy the German armies. The English threaten 
 Bagdad. What a fall ! 
 
 179 12 s 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND IMPERIALISM 
 
 A contradiction — Pacific declarations of industrials and financiers — Their argu- 
 ments — They were self-evident — " The economic organization of Germany- 
 was fashioned for peace " — Exchange is the affair of individuals, policy 
 of Governments — The Kaiser as commercial busybody — The Sultan as his 
 customer — The Professors of Economics stray from their subject — Economic 
 Imperialism — Military interests — Herr Thyssen's Anglophobia — French iron 
 mines owned by Germans — Raw material — Germany's large imports from 
 Russia and Great Britain — Great Britain her best customer — Economic 
 considerations abandoned — " Prestige " — The War Party — Harden's ex- 
 hortations — A summary — The real end and its attainment by appeal to 
 the passions. 
 
 I HAVE already shown the aggressive character of Germany's 
 " Economic Imperialism. " Yet it must be granted that the 
 extension of her economic interests implied in itself a certain force 
 working for peace. 
 
 Several French writers have reported conversations with German 
 financiers and industrials who displayed natural pride in the immense 
 progress made by Germany and, in particular, cited the growth of 
 German capital. A banker said : "In a country like ours, where 
 industry is in the hands of finance, finance is necessarily peace-loving."* 
 " We want peace above everything else, because we are business 
 men," said the manager of the Dresdner Bank. A Prussian official, 
 high in the imperial service, gave M. Bourdon an extremely eloquent 
 and lucid description of the historical development of Germany and 
 added : " We are still in process of expansion. It is vital for us that 
 this process should not be arrested or even impeded. Peace is a 
 necessity for us. It is always a prime necessity for a nation which 
 is accumulating wealth, just as war and pillage are necessities for 
 the needy conqueror. Victory would give us nothing we do not 
 possess already. Defeat would spell utter ruin."f 
 
 * Georges Bourdon : L'Enigme Allemande, p. 386* 
 f Georges Bourdon, ibid., p. 176. 
 
 180 
 
Economic Interests and Imperialism 
 
 Doctor Rathenau, director of the great electricity combine, declared 
 openly, that, " In Germany the people want peace." 
 
 In 1913, M. Maurice Ajam, representing the Comite du Commerce 
 Frangais avec VAllemagne, of which he was president, visited Germany 
 to sound the opinions of the great German industrials. Some of them 
 spoke to him of the Slav peril : 
 
 " The only chance of war between France and Germany lies in a sudden 
 onslaught on Austria by Russia. In that case we should stand by Austria 
 even if the whole world were to totter under the shock. But in no case would 
 the first attack come from us."* 
 
 As regards the economic aspect of the question, they added : 
 
 " We regard other countries, particularly France, only as so many markets. 
 A nation so essentially industrial and commercial as ours cannot pursue an 
 aggressive policy." 
 
 Returning to the Slav peril, they remarked that " a war would not 
 remove it." 
 
 M. Maurice Ajam was so impressed by the general tone of these 
 conversations that he said : 
 
 " Peace ! I can say that all Germans, those in the business world without 
 exception, are devoted to the cause of European peace." 
 
 If M. Ajam was wrong, his mistake has cost him dearly for he has 
 lost a son in the war. It must be remembered also that the German 
 manufacturers and merchants gave reasons for their pacifist inclina- 
 tions. Germany's industry, commerce and wealth were in process of 
 expansion. Even the policy of the syndicates and the practice of 
 " dumping," both hostile to competing industries, were profitable to 
 the foreign consumer for whose benefit they were intended. It is 
 easy to say now that the Germans who used those words were hypo- 
 crites. Their arguments are as true and applicable to-day as they 
 were in 191 3, and M. Maurice Ajam's conclusion is as appropriate 
 now as then. 
 
 Arthur Raffalovich, whose knowledge of Germany is profound, 
 wrote : " The economic organization of Germany is fashioned for 
 peace." 
 
 While exchange is the province of the individual members of the 
 various national communities, politics concern their governments and 
 
 * Le ProbUme ficonomique Franco- Allemand, 1914, by Maurice Ajam. 
 
 181 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 rulers. Now all state action implies limitation of individual liberty, 
 and between nations that limitation is called war. 
 
 The Kaiser has always played the part of showman of the 
 German industrial and commercial world. It is quite likely that 
 some Germans gave him credit for having speeded up the triumphal 
 car of German industry and believed that he could open up new 
 markets with the point of his sword. It is probably true with regard 
 to Krupp's, for whom he acted as commercial traveller. He wrote to 
 the Sultan with his own hand to recommend their guns and thanked 
 him personally for the orders he placed. At the end of 1905, when 
 all the European Powers sent their squadrons to Crete to make a demon- 
 stration against Turkey, Germany alone was unrepresented. In return 
 William II. obtained an order worth two and a half million Turkish 
 pounds (approximately £2,400,000).* 
 
 William II. could hardly hope for a similar success with his uncle, 
 Edward VII. Yet when he went to Sandringham in 1909 he took 
 with him a stock of little appliances for lighting, cooking, heating 
 and hairdressing, Lampen, Koch appar ate, Frisierapparate, and gave 
 demonstrations in person in the hope of introducing those products 
 of German industry on the English market. 
 
 To this low level had the exponent of National Economy descended 
 in his attempt to put it into practice. He could not enunciate broad 
 principles such as strike the imagination and evoke sympathy. Men 
 do not go to universities to learn the intricacies of buying and selling. 
 Conscious of their shortcomings, German Professors, instead of con- 
 centrating on their economic researches turn to political speculation. 
 They take refuge in history and hold up to the admiration of their 
 pupils those manifestations of force which masquerade as victories 
 or defeats. They give lessons in Economic Imperialism. 
 
 It was to the interest of all the generals and officers and their 
 aristocratic families, the non-commissioned officers and their rela- 
 tions, to feed the flame of their countrymen's warlike passions, for 
 war was their raison d'etre. The Emperor and the Chancellor provided 
 them with the appropriate war-cries, which they were not slow to 
 take up : " The Slav Peril " on one side, the " Hereditary Foe " on 
 the other, and last but not least, " Perfidious Albion," denounced 
 by the naval officers who figured in the processions of the Navy 
 League as if she had closed the Straits of Dover to the vessels of the 
 Hamburg-American Line or the North German Lloyd. 
 
 * Victor Berard : La France ei Guillaume II., p. 179* 
 182 
 
Economic Interests and Imperialism 
 
 I give the justification of the war put forward by Herr Thyssen, the 
 mining magnate, who was the first to work the iron mines of Perrieres, 
 Soumont and Dielette in Normandy : 
 
 " Every far-seeing Englishman must have known that Germany would not 
 for ever submit to England's pressure. 
 
 " The policy England pursued made the war inevitable, and it must continue 
 till the egoism and arrogance of England are broken down and Germany's 
 position in the world is recognized." 
 
 But how had England injured Herr Thyssen ? She had not pre- 
 vented him from exploiting the mineral wealth of Normandy. He 
 could not even complain of English competition. 
 
 Germany threatened the world's peace on the pretext of her 
 interests in the iron mines of Morocco. No one has ever refused to 
 sell ores to her. German metallurgists have found scope for their 
 energies even in the Meurthe-et-Moselle basin. They have a share 
 in seven mining concessions, with a total area of 5,165 hectares 
 (approximately 12,757^ acres) : Valleroy, Jarny et Sancy, Murville, 
 Moutiers, Conflans and Serrouville. The grant of a share of Serrou- 
 ville was made in exchange for the grant of a share in a German coal- 
 field. In exchange for the grant of a share in the Valleroy conces- 
 sion, the Longwy Steel Company obtained from the Rochling a share 
 in the Carl Alexander mines at Baesweiler. The Senelle-Maubeuge 
 Mining Company formed the Jarny Mining Company, in which three 
 German metallurgical works participate — the Phcenia Aktien Gesell- 
 schaftfur Bergbau und Hiittenbetrieb of Horde, the Hasper Eisen und 
 Stahlwerk of Hasper, and the Hosch Eisen und Stahlwerk of Dort- 
 mund. The Senelle-Maubeuge Company also formed a company 
 with the Lorraine blast furnace company, Aumetz-Friede, to work the 
 Murville mines. The Moutiers mine is worked by an association 
 formed in 1900, consisting of two French groups, two Belgian groups 
 and a German group. Out of two hundred shares in the Conflans 
 concession, one hundred belong to MM. Vieillon and Migeon, seventy 
 to the Dislinger Werke of Detlingen (Germany), ten to a Belgian 
 company. The Gehenkirken own nearly 2,000 hectares (approximately 
 4,940 acres) in the Lorraine mining area, including the concessions of 
 Saint-Pierremont, Sexey, Haute-Lay, Saint-Jean, Sainte-Barbe, 
 Crusnes and Villerupt. 
 
 Herr Thyssen has himself acquired in the Meurthe-et-Moselle 
 basin the concessions of Batilly, Bouligny and Jouaville, which 
 feed his Hagendingen works near the Moselle. 
 
 183 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The Germans control eighteen concessions, covering more than 
 10,000 hectares (24,700 acres), a seventh of the whole, in the Eastern 
 mining area, and ten concessions, covering 7,300 hectares in 
 Normandy.* 
 
 If the Germans intend Germany to be self-supporting, even with 
 regard to all raw materials, they will have to annex Louisiana and 
 other southern states of the United States in order to get their cotton, 
 and the Argentine Republic and Australia to get their wool. 
 
 Out of 717.000 kilos of refined gold, 410,500 kilos come from the 
 British Empire ! That is to say, £57,500,000 out of £98,000,000. 
 Yet no one has prevented the Germans from buying shares in the 
 Transvaal mines, and before the war they had no difficulty in buying 
 gold in London. 
 
 Great Britain does not refuse to sell gold to Germany. In 191 3, 
 though Russia sold to the Germans to the value of £70,000,000, Great 
 Britain came next, having sold to them to the value of £43,000,000, 
 and bought from them to the value of £70,500,000. The British are 
 their best customers. Austria-Hungary, in spite of her central 
 position, bought less — £54.100,000. Turkey, notwithstanding the 
 Kaiser's utmost efforts and the increasing activities of German com- 
 mercial agents, only bought from Germany to the value of less than 
 £4,900,000, and even that figure included building and other material 
 for the Bagdad railway, and probably some consignments from 
 Krupp's for the army. 
 
 Did Germany's economic interests require her to make war on the 
 two countries from which she drew the bulk of her imports, one of 
 which was also her best customer ? 
 
 In the article on Anglo-German commerce, to which I have already 
 referred, Herr Diepenhors, after reciting all the arguments that his 
 economic Anglophobia could suggest, doubtless recognized that they 
 vitiated his own case, so he came to the conclusion that in the 
 opinion of many people the Anglo-German problem could only be 
 solved by an appeal to force and took on himself to declare that : 
 
 ' It is the province of the politician, not the economist, to determine in what 
 manner the two nations will best arrive at an understanding." 
 
 Economic competition was not enough for this German. He 
 
 declared openly that it had been superseded by political competition. 
 
 To hasten the day of Germany's economic supremacy. 
 
 * L'Allemagne en France : EnquHes Economiques, par Louis Bruneau. 
 
 184 
 
Economic Interests and Imperialism 
 
 Apparently, notwithstanding the statistics of German industry and 
 trade, he had no confidence in their future. He did not regard the 
 unfettered operation of the law of supply and demand as enough. 
 He favoured an appeal to force which would crush competition alto- 
 gether and leave Germany without a rival. 
 
 It was not the objective interest of gain which prompted the 
 Germans to supersede the economist by the warrior. It was the 
 insidious passion for prestige ! 
 
 This passion was exploited by the War Party, known as the 
 Bernhardi-Keim-Reventlow Trinity, with Maximilian Harden's 
 journal, Die Zukunft, as their organ and the Crown Prince for their 
 mouthpiece. Harden wailed that " the German bourgeois was too 
 engrossed in business, work and money-making. Few of them ever 
 think of war, or rather they have let peace become a necessity."* 
 He hoped to rouse them from that unmanly torpor by exhortations 
 such as these : 
 
 " Industrialism is stifling Germany. Was she not promised that she should 
 be the mistress of the seas and that not an inch of the earth's surface should be 
 divided up without her securing the best portion ? Has there been any dividing 
 up since ? No, not even in Africa or the Gulf of Bothnia. Instead of the 
 triumphs promised, Germany has witnessed the commission of one error after 
 another. The Pax Britannica, not the Pax Germanica, rules the world. What 
 has the Agadir coup brought us ? We have gained some useless marshes in the 
 Congo, while Chauvinism and the old military spirit have revived in France. 
 
 " Gold is forged with iron, but not iron with gold. To believe otherwise is 
 mortal sin against the holy spirit of the nation. Hear, good people, what the 
 foreigner will say : Forty-three years after Sedan the wealthy Empire of Ger- 
 many is compelled to make a levy on property to defend its sixty-eight million 
 subjects against forty million Frenchmen, because it can no longer pick a single 
 blade of grass from the paths it has tracked out. Is the spirit of the true 
 Prussian, who always knew to what goal his work bore him, then dead ?f 
 
 Herr Freymann, the author of a book If I were Emperor, which 
 had an enormous sale in Germany, wrote : 
 
 " No war I Such is the cry of our capitalists. It would ruin us I " 
 
 On this question he comes to a decision without hesitation : 
 
 " Trade will suffer heavily but will find new outlets. Far more serious will 
 be the damage to industry. To have any conception of what that damage 
 
 * Bourdon : L'fcnigme Allemande, p. 330. 
 
 I See "Maximilian Harden, Guillaume II. et le Kronprinz," Le Carres pan dant, 
 February 10, 19 15, by M. Andre. 
 
 135 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 may be, it is only necessary to think of the ravages caused by a crisis of a few 
 months. But even this has its good side. We have before us an accumulation 
 of evidence to show that our export policy is making us dependent on the 
 foreigner. Thanks to that, our leaders of industry will overcome their hesitation 
 to limit their activities to supplying the requirements of the home market." 
 
 This advocate of war did not favour the commercial expansion of 
 Germany. According to him Germany must go to war to gain the 
 right not to sell abroad and to compel her manufacturers to limit their 
 output. 
 
 We may summarize our conclusions thus : 
 
 Germany's aggressive policy clashes with her economic interests. 
 
 Many German industrials and financiers are aware of this. 
 
 Economic Imperialism cannot be justified on economic grounds. 
 
 It has brought Germany into antagonism with her two chief sources 
 of supply — Russia and Great Britain, the latter being also her best 
 customer. 
 
 The objective basis of Jingoistic appeals and exhortations was the 
 interest of the military and its allied aristocratic caste. These 
 appeals could only be addressed to subjective passions. 
 
 186 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE PROFITS OF WAR. THE WAR INDEMNITY OF 1871 
 
 Maximilian Harden — •The bandit view of war — The indemnity of ^200,000,000 — 
 The cost to Germany of the war of 1870 — How much recovered through 
 the indemnity ? — How the indemnity was paid — Gold movements in 
 Germany — Loss on the sale of silver — How the indemnity was used — The 
 Vienna crisis — Bismarck's view of the effects of the indemnity — Mr. Norman 
 Angell's hypothesis — The effect of the indemnity on prices and wages — 
 The indemnity cost Germany dearly. 
 
 HARDEN added an objective argument to the rhetorical outburst 
 previously quoted. He said that " the most profitable 
 achievement of the Germans in the nineteenth century was the war 
 of 1870." He thus depicted his countrymen as a band of highway- 
 men counting their five milliards* of war indemnity. 
 
 He remembered that the last instalment was paid on September 5th, 
 1873, though it was not due until March 2nd, 1874. This fact con- 
 vinced the Germans that they had been too modest in their demands. 
 Their mistake prompted them to threaten France in 1875. If they 
 renewed the contest they meant to " bleed France white." Before 
 the present war German writers spoke freely of exacting an indemnity 
 of thirty milliards from France. It would give them the double 
 satisfaction of enriching Germany and ruining the nation which had 
 survived all its defeats at their hands. These brigand instincts are 
 largely responsible for the present conflict. The actual cost of that 
 conflict as well as the outlay on military preparation in 191 2 and 
 1903 would be recovered by robbing the vanquished. Thus the 
 German taxpayers would be reimbursed. True, several tens of 
 thousands of them would lose their lives in that profitable affair, but 
 that was nothing. 
 
 jjfDid the effects of the war indemnity of 1 87 1 justify the Germans 
 in entertaining such extravagant hopes ? 
 
 * A milliard = a thousand million francs. 
 187 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The German Government received £200,000,000, but they did not 
 distribute the money among the population. 
 
 Sir Robert Giffen* estimates the cost of the war of 1 870-1 871 to 
 Germany thus : 
 
 Direct losses £66,000,000 
 
 Indirect losses £50,000,000 
 
 Total £1 16,000,000 
 
 The capital represented by the human lives lost is not included. 
 Sir Robert Giffen estimated it at £30,000,000 — a very low figure. Even 
 excluding this item, the war indemnity only exceeded the actual loss 
 to Germany by about £80,000,000. 
 
 It has been said that the indemnity conferred a tangible advantage 
 on Germany by enabling her to adopt a gold standard. Doubtless 
 that is partly true, but it is ridiculous to pretend that the money 
 flowed over Germany in one great golden wave. I give the final 
 
 figures of the indemnity : 
 
 Francs. 
 
 Principal 5,000,000,000 
 
 Interest 302,123,000 
 
 Cost of discount and conversion of foreign bills 
 
 at the expense of the French Government.. 13,635,000 
 
 Total 5,315,758,000 
 
 The German Government made an allowance of £13,000,000 as the 
 value of that part of the Chemin de fer de l'Est, which they took over 
 in the annexed provinces. 
 
 The amount of French gold and silver sent in payment to Germany 
 was only 512,294,933 francs. The remaining 4,353,365,519 francs 
 was paid in German coin and notes and commercial bills. Of that 
 total, bills represented 4,248,326,374 francs and fell into two classes : 
 
 Francs. 
 
 German " liberative " bills 2,799,514,184 
 
 Bills other than German bills, including Marks- 
 banco, Hamburg money of account 1,448,812,190 
 
 These are the figures given by M. L6on Say in his report of 1874. 
 
 While the instalments were being paid off the exchanges were in 
 favour of Germany ; but as soon as the whole had been liquidated 
 * Essays in Finance. "The Cost of the Franco-German War." 
 
 188 
 
The Profits of War. The War Indemnity of 1871 
 
 gold began to leave Germany. Between July, 1874, anc * tne begin- 
 ning of 1875 gold to the value of £25,000,000 went out of Germany. 
 The Bank of Prussia was compelled to raise its discount rate to six 
 per cent., and began to pay in silver thalers, which had " provision- 
 ally " kept their liberative power, instead of in gold. 
 
 The single gold standard was adopted on the 9th of July, 1873. 
 A large part of the indemnity had been paid in silver. The German 
 Government lost 15 per cent., or £4,800,000, on its sales of silver, 
 which amounted to £32,000,000. 
 
 Of the 5,315 million francs of the indemnity, the German Empire 
 kept 2,050 millions and divided the rest between the different States. 
 The Confederation of the North received about 2,800 millions and 
 the other States the remainder. Details are lacking as to how these 
 amounts were spent, but it is supposed that they were devoted to 
 making good the damage resulting from the war or military purposes. 
 
 The Empire only spent about 56 million francs for civil purposes, 
 25,500,000 francs towards buildings for the Reichstag, and the 
 remainder on the Alsace-Lorraine railways and the Luxemburg line. 
 A thousand millions was put at the uncontrolled disposal of the 
 Chancellor. While the funds were waiting to be appropriated, part 
 to the construction and repair of fortresses, they were lent at interest 
 to the banks and the pension fund for soldiers. 
 
 The Confederation of the North paid off £13,000,000 borrowed for 
 the war. The sum of £6,000,000 was deposited in the fortress of 
 Spandau as a war chest. In March, 1915, England received several 
 quite new one-pound pieces, the dates of which showed that they 
 must have been part of it. 
 
 The Government used the indemnity to pay their debts for war 
 material, as well as to renew and increase their stocks. Much of it 
 was devoted to fortress construction. It therefore promoted activity 
 in certain industries, but only for the benefit of enterprises which, 
 so far from being productive, involved an ever-increasing outlay. 
 
 Professor Adolph Wagner, examining the uses to which the war 
 indemnity was put, has expressed regret that it was not devoted to 
 great works of public utility. 
 
 In the " Black May " of 1873 there was a severe financial crisis in 
 Austria, which extended to Germany and the whole world. It was 
 due to the wholesale absorption of capital for war purposes, in rail- 
 way construction in the United States, which had doubled its mileage 
 in seven years, Russia, whose mileage of 11,875 miles had been the 
 
 189 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 work of the years since 1868, and in Austria, where the mileage had 
 increased by 4,000. The loans of Brazil, La Plata, Chile and Peru, 
 not to mention those of Honduras, Paraguay, San Domingo and 
 Costa Rica, had also contributed. 
 
 The crisis resulted, as crises always result, from the destruction of 
 capital or the conversion of circulating into fixed capital.* The war 
 indemnity did not save Germany from its effects. It has even been 
 said that it was one of the causes of the financial depression in that 
 country. This is an exaggeration^ All that can be said is that it 
 did not prevent it. 
 
 When Bismarck introduced his protective legislation on March 2nd, 
 1879, ne compared the relative positions of France and Germany, 
 and declared that the war indemnity of 187 1 had not enriched 
 Germany. 
 
 On November 29th, two years later, he said : 
 
 " About 1877, for the first time, I was struck with the general and increasing 
 distress in Germany, as compared with France. I have witnessed a diminution 
 of the general well-being." 
 
 He was not merely speechifying. Busch, his biographer, expressed 
 a similar opinion in private conversation : t 
 
 " In the long run the [French] milliards were no blessing, at least not for 
 our manufacturers, as they led to over-production. It was merely the bankers 
 who benefited, and of these only the big ones." 
 
 In " The Great Illusion " Norman Angell takes a hypothetical case, 
 and postulates that Germany extracts an indemnity of £1,000,000,000 
 from Great Britain. If these millions are paid in real wealth — 
 that is, products and goods directly or indirectly useful for exist- 
 ence — they mean a wholesale invasion of imports which would be 
 anathema to Protectionists. But Mr. Angell also postulates that 
 this indemnity would entail a rise in prices. Now if it meant an 
 increase of imports, that in itself ought to lower prices. It could 
 only raise prices if it stimulated demand and commercial activity. 
 
 Mr. Horace Handley O'Farrell, in his study, " The Franco-German 
 War Indemnity and its Economic Results," has taken two tables 
 
 * Yves Guyot : La Science fcconomique. Journal des ficonomistes, August, 
 I9I3- 
 
 f Sir Robert. Giffen : Essays in Finance. " The Liquidations of 1 873-1 876." 
 I Bismarck; Vol. III., p. i6i« 
 
 190 
 
The Profits of Wai\ The War Indemnity of 1871 
 
 from the " First Fiscal Blue-book " (Cd. 1,761). To arrive at the 
 figures for real wages, he has divided the figures for nominal wages by 
 the index number for prices. 
 
 The figures for German wages are those of Krupp's. 
 
 Prices and Wages in Germany. 
 
 Prices and Wages in France. 
 
 
 Prices 
 
 (1900= 
 
 1 00}. 
 
 Nominal 
 
 Real 
 
 Wages 
 
 0. 
 
 Prices 
 
 Nominal 
 
 Real 
 
 Year. 
 
 (Money) 
 Wages 
 
 (1900= 
 100). 
 
 (Money) Wages 
 (1900=100). 
 
 Wages 
 0. 
 
 
 (1900=100]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Not 
 
 1870 
 
 in 
 
 64 
 
 .581 
 
 available. 
 
 Not available. 
 
 available. 
 
 1871 
 
 117 
 
 63 
 
 .540 
 
 104 
 
 74 
 
 .712 
 
 1872 
 
 130 
 
 7i 
 
 •545 
 
 in 
 
 74-5 
 
 .672 
 
 1873 
 
 135 
 
 78 
 
 .576 
 
 no 
 
 75 
 
 .682 
 
 1874 
 
 124 
 
 81 
 
 •653 
 
 IOI 
 
 75 
 
 •743 
 
 1875 
 
 116 
 
 81 
 
 .695 
 
 102 
 
 75 
 
 •735 
 
 1876 
 
 "3 
 
 7^ 
 
 .672 
 
 100 
 
 76.5 
 
 .765 
 
 1877 
 
 113. 5 
 
 70 
 
 .616 
 
 102 
 
 78.5 
 
 .785 
 
 1878 
 
 104 
 
 67 
 
 .654 
 
 89 
 
 79 
 
 .870 
 
 1879 
 
 94-5 
 
 63 
 
 .666 
 
 86 
 
 79 
 
 .920 
 
 1880 
 
 105. 5 
 
 67 
 
 .635 
 
 80 
 
 84 
 
 1.050 
 
 These figures show that there was a marked rise in prices in Germany 
 in 1872 and 1873, followed by a fall which brought them below the 
 figure of 1870. Wages only rose afterwards, in accordance with an 
 almost universal rule, and then fell likewise ; but as prices were below 
 the level of 1 870, there was an actual rise in real wages. 
 
 In France a rise was also observable in 1872 and 1873, but it was 
 not so marked as in Germany. The rise in nominal wages was not 
 great, but in view of the fall in prices the rise in real wages in France 
 was actually 47 per cent, as compared with 187 1, while in Germany it 
 was only 17 per cent. 
 
 There is no doubt that Krupp's benefited greatly from the war 
 indemnity. They had been paid in full for the war material they 
 had supplied and received large orders for the new material to 
 replace that consumed in the war. Their workpeople were therefore 
 in a position to derive advantage from the indemnity, yet the fact 
 remains that, in respect of wage advances, they were a long way 
 behind the French workpeople. 
 
 In all cases of robbery the loss to the victim exceeds the gain to 
 the robber. Robbery is an occupation that has its risks. The 
 damages of war are not merely to be reckoned in terms of human life. 
 
 19T 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 It involves costly preparation and ruinous expense. Sir Robert 
 Giffen calculated that the real figure of the indemnity received by 
 Germany was not more than £80,000,000. 
 
 The indemnity is not a tenth part of the sum Germany has spent 
 on armaments since she pocketed it and up to the outbreak of the 
 present war. And Germany has forced France, Russia and England 
 to arm. She has driven them to a coalition against her. To-day the 
 £80,000,000 net that she received has vanished under the mountain 
 of millions she has spent since August, 19 14, to which will be added 
 the indemnity that she in her turn will have to pay. 
 
 Germans who are still capable of reflection will leave to Harden the 
 inspiration that " the most profitable achievement of the Germans 
 in the nineteenth century was the war of 1870." 
 
 192 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 THE BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS 
 
 The Seven- Year and Five-Year Bills — The Reichstag's opposition — The Laws 
 of March 27th, 191 1 ; June 14th, 191 2 and July 3rd, 191 3 — The Slav Peril 
 and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech on April 7th, 191 3 — An ever- 
 expanding budget — The accumulation of debt between 1900 and 1909 — 
 The subscriptions to the loans of March, 191 3 — The levy on property — Its 
 character — Miscalculations — Incitements to waste — The naval and military 
 expenditure of the German Empire imposed a similar burden on other 
 countries. 
 
 WE have seen the Seven- Years Law in operation under the Bis- 
 marck regime, and that the ever-increasing expenditure on 
 the army met with opposition in the Reichstag. 
 
 The Army Bill of November 25 th, 1886, was opposed by the Centre, 
 led by Windhorst ; the Liberals, led by Richter ; and the Socialists, 
 led by Grillenberger. On the 14th of January, 1887, the Reichstag 
 adopted an amendment of Stauffenberg, reducing the period of its 
 operation to three years. Bismarck immediately read a message 
 from the Emperor dissolving the chamber. In the ensuing elections 
 the Bill was approved by 227 votes to 31, with 84 abstentions. When 
 the Chancellor, Caprivi, introduced a Bill for the period 1893-1899, 
 increasing the army effectives to 492,068, the commission engaged on 
 its examination threw it out on January 12th, 1893. On the 6th of 
 May Caprivi had to dissolve the Reichstag, but on July 15th the Bill 
 was duly passed by 201 votes to 185. 
 
 In each case the opposition of the Reichstag was not ratified by 
 the country. 
 
 We have also seen that while the Seven-Years Law pledged the 
 Reichstag to a certain minimum of military expenditure, it did not 
 bind the Chancellor. This was equally true of the Five-Years Law 
 of March 27th, 191 1. It was followed by the Law of the 14th of June, 
 191 2, which added 29,000 men on a peace footing to the 10,000 men 
 added in the preceding year, and increased the first estimates by the 
 sum of £43,000,000, spread over the financial years 1912-1917. 
 
 193 x 3 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Next came the Law of July 3rd, 191 3, which was the con- 
 sequence of the Balkan Wars. We have seen that the Germans of 
 Central Europe are outnumbered by the Slavs. From the 65 millions 
 which form the population of Germany itself, three million Poles in 
 the Duchy of Posen must be deducted, not to mention a million 
 foreigners. If the twelve million Germans in the Austro-Hungarian 
 Empire be added, we have a maximum of 74 million Germans. Now 
 Russia in Europe alone has a population of 132 millions, and its rate 
 of increase is higher than that of Germany. If we deduct from the 
 Austro-Hungarian population (less the German element) ten million 
 Magyars and three million Roumanians, there remain more than 
 twenty-five million Slavs in the Dual Monarchy. 
 
 When Germany compares herself with France she boasts of her 
 numbers, but when she compares herself with Russia the thought 
 of numbers is a nightmare. 
 
 Addressing the Reichstag on April 7th, 191 3, Herr von Bethmann- 
 Hollweg declared that though Germany wanted to be prepared for 
 war, all her desires centred on peace. Peace would be assured were 
 it not for evilly-disposed neighbours. But what of Germany's neigh- 
 bours ? The Chancellor announced that Germany's relations with 
 Russia were cordial and expressed his belief that a race-war was 
 improbable. He stated that Germany was on good terms with Great 
 Britain. What of France ? He indulged in a tirade against French 
 Chauvinists. But if the French Chauvinists had not ceased their 
 idle clamour they were neither as ambitious nor as vociferous as the 
 Pan-Germans. Every year Germany trained 280,000 recruits, and 
 put 60,000 men on one side. In his speech, the Chancellor, Herr von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, put the following question : " Ought we to pay 
 for the luxury of denying ourselves thousands of trained men when 
 we might have all these thousands of soldiers ? " 
 
 The Army Bill* of 1913 proposed to add 4,000 officers, 15,000 non- 
 commissioned officers, 117,000 men and 27,000 horses to the peace 
 establishment. It fixed the number of units in the different armies 
 at 669 battalions, instead of 651 ; 550 squadrons of cavalry, instead 
 of 516 ; 633 batteries of field artillery (no increase) ; 55 battalions of 
 foot artillery, instead of 48 ; 44 battalions of pioneers, instead of 33 ; 
 31 battalions of communication troops, instead of 18 ; 28 train 
 battalions, instead of 25. The new establishment set up by this Bill 
 
 * La Vie Militaire en France et a VEtr anger, 2 e Annee, 1912-1913, p. 222 etc. 
 (F. Mean). 
 
 194 
 
The Burden of Armaments 
 
 was 36,000 officers, 110,000 non-commissioned officers, instead of 
 95,000 ; 661,000 men, instead of 544,000. To these we must add 
 6,000 superior and 4,000 inferior clerks, whose services are performed 
 by soldiers in France, and 18,000 one-year volunteers, instead of 
 14,000. These figures give a total of 835,000, and with the additional 
 incorporations the establishment was expected to reach 870,000 by 
 the beginning of spring. All the provisions of the Bill were to have 
 been put into operation by the 1st of October, 1915 ; but as regards 
 the three principal armies, the changes had been effected by the 1st of 
 October, 1913. 
 
 All these ever-elastic bills, Seven-Year and Five-Year, illustrated 
 the common defect of financial estimates. At the time they were 
 passed each of them contemplated a certain definite figure for the 
 expenditure they involved ; but when they expired, it was discovered 
 that most of that expenditure was continuing. 
 
 In 1872 the estimated Imperial expenditure was £22,100,000*, of 
 which £13,200,000 was for the army and £1,200,000 for the navy. 
 In 1912-1913 the expenditure on the army and navy amounted to 
 £65,450,000. If the Soldiers' Pension Fund and the loan raised for 
 national defence are added, the total was about £76,400,000. 
 
 The expenditure of the Empire and the federated States for 191 2- 
 191 3, according to Herr Wermuth, the Finance Minister, was 
 £422,000,000, or £255,000,000, if self-balancing items are deducted. 
 At the end of 1870 the imperial debt amounted to £24,000,000. 
 In 1880 it was £61,000,000. 
 
 In 1912 Herr Wermuth stated that between 1900 and 1909 the 
 Empire had had to borrow no less than £132,000,000. 
 
 "Fourteen per cent, of the total," he said, " had been allocated to productive 
 expenditure, such as the post office and the railways ; the remaining 86 per cent, 
 represents the balance, more or less disguised, of the ordinary and extraordinary 
 expenditure ; 60 per cent, went to the army and navy, more than 14 per cent, to 
 the expeditions in Eastern Asia and South-West Africa. A small part was devoted 
 to the construction and widening of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal, and the adminis- 
 tration of the Protectorates. It cannot be doubted that the rest represented 
 loans to cover the annual deficits." 
 
 He added : 
 
 " To be meeting the cost of armaments during a long period of peace by means 
 of loans that are never reduced, is merely to shift the responsibility for assuring 
 the safety of the nation on to the shoulders of the next generation, and in that 
 way imposes a double burden on that generation." 
 
 * Calculated on the basis of 20 marks=^i9 7. 
 
 195 13* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 In the first week of March, 191 3, the Germans were called upon to 
 subscribe to two loans, one of £7,350,000 of Government stock of 
 the Empire and Prussia, the second of £20,000,000 of Prussian four 
 per cent, exchequer bills, issued at ninety-nine and repayable in five 
 years. 
 
 The Government stock was over-subscribed to the amount of 
 40 per cent., the total reaching £10,000,000 ; but the subscription of 
 Treasury bills only produced half the sum required, though all the 
 great banks had prophesied a success. As a matter of fact, the 
 number of individual subscribers to both loans was very small. 
 
 The expenditure involved in the two Army and Navy Bills of 191 1 
 and 191 2, and still to be covered, was in addition to the £27,500,000, 
 which were to be spread over four years. In addition, there were 
 deficits. The yield of the duty on spirits had been estimated at 
 £1,800,000. The figure had been only £900,000. The surplus of the 
 customs revenue had been estimated at £2,250,000, but the surplus 
 realized had been only £1,400,000. 
 
 Such was the financial situation in 191 3 when the military measures 
 of that year demanded an additional expenditure of £50,000,000. 
 This demand was met by the imposition of a levy on capital, the 
 proceeds of which were to be devoted exclusively to the one object. 
 The Socialists were delighted. " It is a bold step in the direction of 
 Socialism," they cried. Militarist megalomania was itself forging the 
 key which would open the strong boxes of capitalism to the Social 
 Revolution ! But their delight was tempered with scepticism. The 
 new military system involved an additional annual expenditure of 
 twelve to fourteen million pounds. What measure of taxation would 
 be needed to produce that sum ? For while the levy on capital would 
 be a temporary expedient, other impositions would be permanent. 
 
 The announcement of the levy was followed by immediate financial 
 depression, and the discount rate went up to five per cent. The 
 Frankfort Gazette said : " Behind an affectation of approval we see 
 hesitation and head-shakings." It confessed that there was a 
 suspicion that the mere threat of the levy had led to the export of 
 capital, with its two attendant dangers — diminution of the available 
 capital and depletion of the stock of gold. 
 
 German taxpayers are like the taxpayers of all other countries 
 in resenting additions to their financial burdens. 
 
 The levy on capital was not an imperial imposition. The Con- 
 federate States contributed a fixed proportion of one mark per head 
 
 196 
 
The Burden of Armaments 
 
 of population. It was raised to two marks, but was then not levied 
 per head of population, but on assessed capital. These States had 
 to raise the additional sum by means of a tax on capital, death duties, 
 and other expedients of the same kind. The choice was left to their 
 respective Diets. 
 
 When Herr Lucke, a National Liberal deputy, advocated death 
 duties, the Chancellor opposed the suggestion vigorously on the 
 ground that it would be likely to produce serious friction with the 
 States. 
 
 The new law embodied a fiscal amnesty for all who voluntarily 
 rectified previous false declarations of capital and property. This 
 clause, however, brought in no great windfall, for false declarations 
 continued. The yield of the levy had been estimated at £74,000,000, 
 which it was hoped would render the third year's contribution 
 unnecessary. The yield was only £49,000,000. Berlin and its 
 suburbs had been expected to produce £10,000,000. It only pro- 
 duced £7,100,000. The capital of Frankfort had been assessed at 
 £162,000,000, which would have produced £2,250,000. Frankfort 
 only furnished £1,750,000. 
 
 For the fiscal year 1914-1915 the Budget of the German Empire 
 was made out as follows : 
 
 Total receipts, £430,895,000, in which Post Office and Telegraphs 
 figured for £41,050,000, railways for £8,100,000, miscellaneous receipts 
 for £41,000,000, and extraordinary receipts, the proceeds of the loan, 
 for £264,400,000. 
 
 The ordinary recurring expenditure was £130,850,000, the non- 
 recurring was £36,125,000. The extraordinary expenditure was 
 £264,350,000. The total was thus £431,200,000. 
 
 Recurring Non-recurring Extraordinary- 
 Expenditure. Expenditure. Expenditure. 
 (Million pounds.) 
 
 Ordinary Army Estimates 42.68 16.6 — 
 
 Ordinary Navy Estimates 1 1 .05 1 1 . 5 1 .45 
 
 Extraordinary War Estimate — — 26 1 
 
 (Million pounds.) 
 
 Imperial Interest-bearing Debt 235 
 
 Non Interest-bearing : 
 
 Exchequer Bonds 8 
 
 Paper Money 6 
 
 — H 
 
 Total 249 
 
 197 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 A Berlin note of the nth of July, 1914, announced that there would 
 be additional taxation in the autumn for naval purposes. 
 
 Professors Delbnick and Ballod justified the ever-increasing 
 expenditure with these words of List : 
 
 " Nations whose destinies call to the sea mock at the parsimony of those who 
 cling to the land." 
 
 Unfortunately every increase in the naval and military expenditure 
 of Germany was followed by a corresponding increase in that of 
 France, Great Britain and Russia. Germany, breathless but unwilling 
 to fall out, was doomed to exhaustion in such a contest. She could 
 only end it by bringing about a catastrophe. 
 
 198 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 THE FACTOR OF SOCIALISM 
 
 The spread of Socialism — Its influence at the polls — Agrarians and Socialists — 
 The protection of foodstuffs — The failure of the Insurance Scheme — The 
 fall in wages in 1914 — " Red Internationalism " and " Red Nationalism." 
 
 THE attitude of the Socialist Party must always be reckoned 
 among the factors which urged the Kaiser to make his 
 " preventive " war in 1914. 
 
 Of the 397 members of the Reichstag, the number of Socialist 
 deputies returned at each election since 1898 was : 
 
 1898. 1903. 1907. 1912. 
 
 56 82 43 no 
 
 The Socialist party has replaced the Centre, which was formerly 
 the most influential bloc in the Reichstag. Further, the number of 
 deputies does not reflect the voting power of Socialism in the country. 
 The elections are based on the census returns of 1867, so that many 
 an industrial district only elects one Socialist member, although its 
 increased population would entitle it to several. The number of 
 votes cast for Socialists was 4,239,000, 991,000 more than in 1907. 
 Added to the other opposition votes, the total reached 7,524,000, 
 whereas the Government only polled 4,664,000 votes. 
 
 There are also 221 Socialists in the Diets of the different States. 
 Bavaria has thirty. They form the majority in Schwartzburg 
 Rudolstadt, though the Diet has been twice dissolved. The Socialist 
 party had eighty-five daily papers, including the Vorw'drts. 
 
 In 1914 they had a " Red Week," in which the membership of the 
 party was increased by 132,200 and brought up to 1,115,000. 
 
 The Emperor has more than once hurled maledictions against the 
 Socialists. Such were the results. Socialist propaganda made head- 
 way even in the army. Rosa Luxemburg opened a campaign to 
 denounce the ill-treatment of the men and was duly prosecuted. She 
 asked leave to call 925 witnesses. The Government was alarmed 
 and dropped the charge. 
 
 199 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The Government's agrarian policy furnished the Socialists with a 
 whole armoury of arguments. In 191 1 they pointed to the ruling 
 prices of wheat (per metric ton) : 
 
 Shillings. 
 
 Berlin 207 
 
 New York 150 
 
 Liverpool 163 
 
 Paris 202 
 
 In the debates which took place at the end of November the 
 Ministers declared that the public must decrease their consumption 
 of meat, but that the new regulations touched the middle as well as 
 the working class. Herr von Schorlemer-Lieser, the Prussian Minister 
 of Agriculture, said : " Those affected are not merely the workmen, 
 but the small clerks, artisans and traders ; " and he added, by way of 
 consolation : " Horse-meat is becoming more and more popular." 
 Herr Delbriick, the Minister of the Interior, admitted that " the 
 Tariff policy aimed at raising prices." Of course it was awkward 
 for meat-eaters, but they must reconcile themselves to the change. 
 This protectionist legislation was passed by a majority of 174, but 
 there was a minority of 140 in favour of the abolition of all duties 
 on food. 
 
 We must remember with what enthusiasm William II., in 1890, 
 summoned to Berlin the Conference for the International Protection of 
 Labour, which was originally to have been held at Berne. The failure 
 of State Socialism, as inaugurated by Germany, has been exposed by 
 a Professor of Berlin University,* Herr Ludwig Bernhard, who bases 
 his conclusions on the evidence of several other professors, and one 
 of the highest officials in the Imperial Insurance Bureau, Herr 
 Friedensburg. He says that the wonderful system of State insur- 
 ance has been responsible for the chronic condition of Rentenhysterie 
 and malingering. Compulsory assistance has demoralized those it 
 was meant to benefit. He also shows that the regulation of labour 
 had introduced an element of oppressive control which threatened 
 to destroy the spirit of enterprise. 
 
 The first half of 191 3 had been a period of good times for the working 
 classes. In the second half there was a fall in wages which continued 
 
 * See the Journal des kconomistes, July, 1902. La Faillite de la Politique 
 Sociale Allemande, par A. Raffalovich. L' Industrie et les Industriels, by Yves 
 Guyot, Book IV., Ch. IX. (1914). 
 
 200 
 
The Factor of Socialism 
 
 during the first three months of 1914, as the following figures 
 show :* 
 
 Average Earnings of a Workman of the Ruhr Basin. 
 
 st Quarter of 1st Quarter of 
 
 Quarterly earnings, 
 
 Quarterly earnings, 
 
 1913. 1914. 
 
 I9I3- 
 
 1914. 
 
 M. Pf. (per day.) M. Pf. 
 
 M. 
 
 M. 
 
 5 44 5 3i 
 
 429 
 
 405 
 
 The Kaiser and several of his Ministers have regarded the war as a 
 means of shelving these difficult problems and transforming the 
 Socialist party from the Opposition into the national party, bound 
 to the Kaiser, the supreme chief of the army and the personification 
 of the German Empire. He adopted the idea of Herr Fendrich, 
 formerly deputy of the Diet of Baden, who proposed to substitute 
 " red nationalism " for " red internationalism." 
 
 * Comiti des Houillires, N. 4,983, June 25, 1914. 
 
 201 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 THE CONFLICT OF THE TWO CIVILIZATIONS 
 
 The im the wai — A '" preventiv; mi — The conflict between 
 
 a militarist civiiir.. one. 
 
 FROM the for I facta v, e can draw the following 
 
 conclusions. 
 
 The Kaiser and the forward party wanted to settle internal diffi- 
 culties h :.z a great crisis. The idea reminds one of the g 
 
 hich always Eorms a 
 of re\ S --.-.lists, and which Karl Marx and Engels pro- 
 
 .: hand. A great i ;/. to oblivion 
 
 the revelations of the exti y morals of the Emperor's 
 
 favo.. cince von Eulenburg, Count von Sanders and others. 
 
 It would conceal t rchy in which the German Govern- 
 
 ment was flc. It would reconstitute the army, the weak- 
 
 which had been exposed in Franz Adam Be;. i's book. 
 
 " Jena or Sedan. 91 It would restore its . which had been 
 
 such as the _ '. b era i ic lent.* 
 An article in the C 1014. announced 
 
 that by ioi~ Russ Id have completed the reorganization of her 
 
 army, coi Me Balti I the Gulf of 
 
 FinLv zstituted her corps :. .-. and built a system of 
 
 strategic railways in Poland. Further, the Russo-German com- 
 • would fall to be renewed in 191 ~. By crushing Russ: a 
 beforehand Germany would be able to impose what conditions she 
 pleased. 
 
 It woula be accessary to overthrow France so completely that she 
 
 would never again stand in the way of Germany's international ambi- 
 
 France had pinned her faith to her Three Years Law. She 
 
 had called up two classes and dismissed the third class. Her army 
 
 would be much stronger in 1915, 1916 and 191 7. The French Socialists 
 
 * Suftj. Fart I.. Ch. V., "The Kaiser's Government." 
 
 203 
 
The Conflict of the Two Civilizations 
 
 had voted in favour of a general strike in case of war. French 
 finances were in disorder. Several Ministers had voted against the 
 Three Years Law. A senator, M. Humbert, had exposed many cases 
 of flagrant maladministration in the army. It would be a case of 
 the 1870 army over again, and this time without a commander of 
 renown. 
 
 Great Britain was still spending millions on her fleet. Germany 
 would be exhausted before British determination and resources 
 were vitally impaired. It was essential to make the best use of 
 what they had, and therefore the occasion was favourable for a 
 preventive war. 
 
 By declaring war in 1914 the Kaiser only antedated the event to 
 secure more favourable conditions of success, for this war was the 
 inevitable consequence of his policy, which was the expression of the 
 doctrine which places militarism above all the needs of civilization, 
 war being a necessity to the State. 
 
 M. Leon Hennebicq, a Belgian, waxes enthusiastic over Germanic 
 Imperialism in his book, " LTmperialisme Economique Anglais " : 
 
 " Germany, aggressive and methodical, has increased her trade and industry 
 by applying the principles of her General Staff in the field of economic warfare. 
 It is a military Imperialism" (p. 276). 
 
 Imperialism, economic or otherwise, is only a consecration of force, 
 the ultima ratio. The economic policy of the German Empire is a 
 relic of the system in which the State made trade for the citizens. 
 But the expression " Economic Imperialism " is a contradiction in 
 terms, for Imperialism implies acquisition by force, without exchange, 
 whereas economic action implies acquisition by production or exchange. 
 
 A productive civilization is based on freedom of contract, a militarist 
 civilization on the limitation of liberty. 
 
 The motive force of a productive civilization is economic competition ; 
 that of a militarist civilization is political rivalry. 
 
 The most characteristic types of the two civilizations are those 
 of Great Britain and Germany. 
 
 Hence the insane jealousy of Great Britain displayed by Germany. 
 
 The present war is a conflict between these two civilizations. 
 It can only end in the final triumph of the productive over the 
 militarist civilization. 
 
 203 
 
PART III 
 
 THE HISTORICAL CAUSES 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
CHAPTER I 
 THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 
 
 The coronation of Charlemagne — The Treaty of Verdun (843) — Historic la v 
 — Lothair's portion — Germany — The Holy Roman Empire — Anarchy in 
 Germany — The Electors — The Hapsburg — France and the Thirty Years 
 War — The relation of France with Alsace — France the Peace-maker — The 
 services rendered by France — The Elector of Brandenburg — Character 
 of the Peace of Westphalia — Prussia undermines French influence. 
 
 WHAT are the characters and antecedents of the foes with 
 whom the Allies are fighting to-day ? 
 
 The German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Turkey are not unitary 
 States like Great Britain, France or Russia. We must analyse 
 the different elements which have gone to make up the enemy empires 
 before we can estimate their solidarity and the chances of dissolution 
 or reorganization. 
 
 A survey of their history is indispensable but we will start with the 
 day on which Charlemagne, kneeling in the basilica of St. Peter at 
 Rome, received the imperial crown at the hands of Pope Leo III. 
 during the Christmas festival in the year 800 a.d. This coronation 
 gave him unlimited powers to " defend the Faith against the heretic 
 and to carry it abroad into heathen lands." 
 
 Charlemagne's Empire was divided up by the Treaty of Verdun 
 (a.d. 843). 
 
 It has always been said that this treaty was the origin of the 
 historic law of Europe. The law of what ? And for whom ? It 
 gave to Lothair, with the title of Emperor, Italy and a large stretch 
 of territory which had not even the Rhone for its western boundary, 
 but included Vivier and Uzes. On the north-west it took in 
 Cambrai, but not Ghent. It is said that it was bounded on the 
 east by the Rhine, but it actually extended to the mouth of the Weser. 
 Louis the German had Speyer and a large enclave on the left bank of 
 the Rhine. The frontiers were not conterminous with the boundaries 
 
 207 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 of the archbishoprics of Cologne, Reims and Lyons, nor with those of 
 the dioceses of Mainz and Besancon. 
 
 The Frankish Kings on one side and the German Emperors on the 
 other fought to conquer or keep the territories which the Treaty 
 of Verdun had assigned to neither party. All it had done was to 
 create a territorial bone of contention. 
 
 The Germans assert that the national existence of Germany dates 
 from the Treaty of Verdun ; yet the history of Germany is the story 
 of a feudal anarchy in which the seigneurs bear a close resemblance 
 to bandits, a resemblance which has not disappeared with the lapse 
 of centuries. 
 
 There were four original German duchies, Bavaria, Swabia, Fran- 
 conia and Saxony. Their dukes were absolute sovereigns with their 
 own courts, armies and diets. Each duchy was divided into counties. 
 The counties on the frontiers were called " Marks," the rulers of which 
 were the " Margraves " (Markgraf). 
 
 The peoples of these duchies spoke different languages and had 
 different customs and laws. There was, indeed, a nominal king, 
 but it was not before the reign (a.d. 919) of Henry the Fowler, of the 
 House of Saxony, that he began to exercise any real authority. In 
 962, Otto, summoned to Italy by the Romans, the Lombards and 
 probably Pope John XII., re-established the Empire. He spent his 
 reign in conflicts with the anarchical tendencies of Germany, foreign 
 invaders and especially the Popes and Italian factions. Rome was 
 the capital of the Empire, but when the Emperor desired to visit it 
 he generally had to lay siege to it. 
 
 The struggle of Pope and Emperor is a familiar story. The legends 
 that have gathered round the name of Frederick Barbarossa are the 
 highest expression of the power of the Hohenstaufens. When the 
 conflict came to an end in the middle of the thirteenth century, both 
 the antagonists were exhausted. 
 
 The Pragmatic Sanction, drawn up by the States at Frankfort in 
 1338, asserted that the majesty of the imperial authority came from 
 God alone ; that it was confirmed solely by the election of the prince 
 electors, and that the Holy See had no right to approve or veto the 
 choice of the electors. The Golden Bull of 1356 prescribed the regula- 
 tions for the election of the Emperor. The number of electors was 
 fixed at seven, three of them to be ecclesiastics, the Archbishops of 
 Mainz, Treves and Cologne, and four secular, the King of Bohemia, 
 the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Duke of Saxony and the Mar- 
 
 208 
 
The Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia 
 
 grave of Brandenburg. The Emperor maintained the electoral rights 
 of the great ecclesiastics of the Rhine valley because he needed their 
 support against the feudal nobility, virtually independent and always 
 hostile. 
 
 The title of Holy Roman Emperor gave its possessor neither lands, 
 men, nor money. The electors were concerned to see that the 
 Emperor was not too powerful. Hence their preference for princelings, 
 such as Rudolph of Hapsburg. They were anxious that the dignity 
 should not become hereditary, but it none the less became hereditary 
 in the House of Hapsburg after 1438. Maximilian (1493-15 19) 
 added large stretches of territory to the ancient Austrian possessions. 
 
 Every Emperor felt himself under an obligation to undertake an 
 expedition into Italy. There they came in contact with the Franks. 
 The hostility of both Pope and Emperor to the Kings of France, 
 subject to the jurisdiction of neither, was a bond of sympathy between 
 them. 
 
 In 15 19 Francis I. of France was a rival candidate to Charles, 
 grandson of Maximilian, for the imperial dignity. Thus began that 
 series of wars between Austria and France, broken only by the Seven 
 Years War, which lasted to 1859. 
 
 Richelieu intervened in the Thirty Years War when he appealed 
 to the King of Sweden to save Germany from the ravages of Tilly 
 and Wallenstein's hordes. By the Treaty of Paris of November 1st, 
 1634, the Swedes asked the King of France to take possession of 
 Alsace, as protector, on condition that the Protestant princes and 
 States concluded no peace or truce with the Emperor without the 
 consent of France and Sweden. 
 
 The war continued for a further fourteen years with armies which 
 consisted largely of personal followers of their generals, who could 
 only offer them pillage for pay. When all the booty was exhausted 
 the armies perished of hunger, without any vital military operations 
 having taken place. The French, so far from prolonging these 
 misfortunes, put an end to them by their intervention in concert with 
 Sweden. 
 
 The Treaty of Westphalia was inspired by the book of the jurist 
 Chemnitz, " De Ratione Status in Imperio Nostro Romanico-Ger- 
 manico." The diplomats merely applied it.* Chemnitz laid down 
 that the German constitution ought to be regarded as a product of 
 the national soil, and that it was impossible, and indeed ridiculous, 
 
 * Bryce : The Holy Roman Empire. Ch. xix. 
 
 209 14 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 to apply to Germany the so-called Ux rsgia and the whole absolutist 
 system of Justinian which the Emperors had established. He went on 
 to denounce the House of Hapsburg and its incessant quarrels with 
 the nobility and to anticipate the downfall of the House of Austria. 
 
 The Emperor was to recognize the sovereignty of all the princes, 
 Catholic and Protestant without distinction, over their respective 
 territories. The Princes and States of Germany were to enjoy in 
 all the national assemblies a free and deciding voice on all questions 
 of imperial policy, new legislation, the declaration of war, the raising 
 of troops, and the imposition of taxation in the interests of the 
 Federation. The free towns were to have a deciding voice in the 
 local diets. The electors and princes might make alliances together, 
 and even with foreign powers, provided that these were not aimed at 
 the Emperor or the Empire. 
 
 Among those who profited most by the Treaty of Westphalia was 
 the Elector of Brandenburg to whom d'Avaux, the French Minister, 
 wrote : " Monsieur, I have done all that I could to serve you." He 
 lost Upper Pomerania, but gained the fertile country of -Magdeburg, 
 the bishoprics of Cammin and Halberstadt and the principality of 
 Minden. 
 
 France had paid the Swedes and given various subsidies during 
 the Thirty Years War. She demanded no indemnity from the 
 stricken lands but contented herself with the recognition of her 
 claims to the three bishoprics of Verdun, Toul and Metz, and Alsace 
 without Strasburg. She gave the Archdukes of the Tyrol three million 
 livres for Alsace and Sundgau. She retained old Breisach and its 
 dependencies and the right of garrisoning Philipsburg. Strasburg 
 attached itself to France in 1682, and later she acquired Pignerol 
 and Casal in full sovereignty, independent of the Empire. 
 
 Holland and Switzerland were declared autonomous States. An 
 eighth electorate was created in favour of the Palatinate. 
 
 The Protestant and Catholic States were put on the same footing. 
 Lutherans and Calvinists were to be outside the jurisdiction of the 
 Papacy and all other Catholic States. 
 
 This treaty marked the abrogation of the temporal authority of 
 Rome. The Emperor Ferdinand had deprived the Protestants of 
 the privileges won by the Peace of Passau, and France and Sweden 
 were of one mind to restore them. They reverted to the religious 
 situation of 1624, the sixth year of the war, except in the Palatinate 
 and the Palatine territories, where the situation of 1619 was restored. 
 
 210 
 
The Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia 
 
 The possession of the ecclesiastical property which had passed into 
 the hands of the Protestants was duly confirmed to them. Austria 
 was excluded from the scope of the treaty except for Silesia, where 
 the Lutherans gained the right to build new churches. 
 
 The Treaty of Westphalia was signed at Miinster and Osnabruck 
 on October 14th, 1648, as a " fundamental and perpetual law." The 
 Pope launched a Bull against it, but the Bull was without effect. 
 However, it was manifest that the Emperor had been shorn of the 
 absolute powers conferred on Charlemagne by the Pope " to defend 
 the Faith against the heretic and to carry it abroad into heathen 
 lands." 
 
 This treaty gave peace to Germany, harried and distracted, but 
 she owed it to the efforts of France and Sweden. Germany continued 
 to be spoken of as the Empire, as the seat of the Roman Empire ; 
 but the Emperor had no longer any possessions in Italy, and even in 
 Germany he was only the titular head of a republic of principalities 
 and towns. 
 
 It was by virtue of his imperial authority that the Emperor 
 Leopold I. conferred the title of King of Prussia on the Elector of 
 Brandenburg. Prussia, however, was a little patch of territory on 
 the banks of the Niemen, and was not incorporated in the Empire. 
 The King of Prussia remained Elector of Brandenburg. 
 
 The Treaties of Utrecht (171 3) and Rastadt ( 1 7 1 4) gave the 
 Emperor the Low Countries, Naples, Sardinia, the Milanese and 
 Tuscany, and once more turned imperial policy towards Italy. 
 
 Prussians are in the habit of speaking of the French as " the 
 hereditary enemy," yet the importance of Prussia dates from the 
 Treaty of Westphalia in which France played a part they cannot 
 ignore. 
 
 Frederick William, the father of Frederick the Great who was the 
 ally of Austria, was anxious to destroy French influence in Germany. 
 In 1733 he concluded an agreement with Austria and Russia to prevent 
 the election of Stanislaus Leszczinski, the French candidate, to the 
 throne of Poland. 
 
 211 14* 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 FRANCE AND PRUSSIA FROM 1735 TO 1814 
 
 France as the ally of Prussia — The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) — France 
 allied to Austria during the Seven Years War — The Brunswick manifesto 
 in 1792 — The Treaty of Bale in 1795 — The Franco-Prussian Agreement — 
 The Treaty of Luneville — The gains of Prussia and Austria — The Holy 
 Roman Empire becomes Protestant — The Diet of Ratisbon — Napoleon's 
 mistake — The Convention of Potsdam and the results of Austerlitz — The 
 Peace of Pressburg — The Confederation of the Rhine (July 12th, 1806) — 
 The end of the Holy Roman Empire — Napoleon the heir of Charlemagne — 
 The war with Prussia — The Treaty of Tilsit — Napoleon's acts — Stein — 
 General Scharnhorst — Prussia's offers to France — Yorck and the Prussian 
 forces after the Russian campaign — Hardenberg : bribes to France — 
 Prussia's indifference to the fate of Germany — The Treaty of Kalisch — 
 The King of Prussia's summons to his people — The Treaty of Paris — The 
 Germanic Confederation. 
 
 WHEN Frederick the Great set out to conquer Silesia he asked 
 for an alliance with France. France sent 40,000 men into 
 Bavaria instead of invading the Low Countries. Maria Theresa 
 abandoned Silesia to Prussia. The French army was besieged in 
 Prague, and France found herself in arms against all Europe after 
 having fought for the sole advantage of Prussia. After continuing the 
 war for five years France surrendered, by the Treaty of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, all the Low Countries, the larger part of which was in her 
 occupation. Madame de Pompadour had said to the French envoys : 
 " Do not return without peace. It is the King's wish." 
 
 It is true that during the Seven Years War France was the ally 
 of Maria Theresa against Frederick the Great. The situation marked 
 a revolution in her diplomacy. Frederick beat the Saxons so 
 thoroughly that he incorporated their forces in his own ; but if he 
 triumphed over the coalition against him, it was largely due to the 
 incompetence of the French generals. He was able to pit Prussia, 
 a powerful Protestant and unified State, against Austria, Catholic 
 and a medley of different races. 
 
 Maria Theresa bought the succession to the Electorate of Bavaria 
 
 212 
 
France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 
 
 from its direct heir, the Elector Palatine. Frederick opposed this 
 step and was supported by France and Russia (1779). 
 
 During the eighteenth century France was at one time the enemy, 
 at another the ally, of Prussia. On the 27th of August, 1791, the 
 King of Prussia, Frederick William, and the Emperor Leopold II. 
 met at Pilnitz, near Dresden, and announced their intention of inter- 
 vening in favour of Louis XVI. On the 25th of July, 1792, the Duke 
 of Brunswick, commanding the Prussian army, issued a manifesto 
 threatening to deliver over the capital of France to a military execu- 
 tion unless Louis XVI. were restored to all his rights. This mani- 
 festo produced the events of the loth of August. The Prussians 
 were beaten at Valmy on the 20th of September, 1792, and in 1795 
 the King of Prussia abandoned the enemies of the Revolution by the 
 Treaty of Bale. The instructions given to Count Golz, the Prussian 
 Minister, included the intimation that " Prussia had always had a 
 friendly feeling for France, as his Majesty had proved more than once 
 in the course of the war."* 
 
 This treaty and its supplementary articles gave France the Rhine 
 Provinces, while the circles of Westphalia, Lower and Upper Saxony, 
 and the part of the two circles of the Rhine situated on the right 
 bank of the Main formed a line of demarcation, the neutrality of 
 which Prussia undertook to respect. 
 
 France was virtually granting Prussia a protectorate over Northern 
 Germany. Prussia, by making a separate peace, betrayed the Holy 
 Roman Empire. 
 
 By the Treaty of Luneville (February 9th, 1801) Prussia offered to 
 adapt her foreign policy to that of the First Consul, to conclude a 
 formal alliance with him and to guarantee all his territorial arrange- 
 ments in Italy. The treaty provided that all the lay princes with 
 possessions on the left bank of the Rhine which passed to France 
 should be indemnified. The indemnities were raised by a method 
 which had already been employed during the Reformation, and at 
 the time of the Peace of Westphalia — the secularization of the eccle- 
 siastical states. Catholic Austria, as well as Lutheran Prussia, 
 regarded those territories, with their inhabitants, as so much 
 property, the fair subject of bargain. Austria took for the Emperor's 
 relations, two Italian archdukes, and Prussia for the Stadtholder of 
 
 * Histoirc de la Prusse depuis la mort de Fridiric II. jusqu'a la hataille de 
 Sadowa, by Eugene Veron (Paris, F. Alcan). Thiers : Histoire du Consulat et de 
 I' Empire. 
 
 213 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Holland, none of whom had any interest in Germany, a quarter of 
 the secularizations. 
 
 The First Consul, faced with the difficulty of satisfying so many 
 demands, asked the Emperor of Russia to intervene at the same time 
 as himself. 
 
 Prussia had lost on the left bank of the Rhine the duchies of Geldern 
 and Jiilich, the principality of Mceurs, and a part of the duchy of 
 Cleves, territories with a population of 137,000 and a revenue of 
 £120,000. By a compact of the 13th of May, 1802, with France, 
 Prussia received in exchange the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildes- 
 heim, Eichsfeldt, Erfurt, Untergleichen, the town and bishopric of 
 Miinster, with several other towns and abbeys. She gained a popula- 
 tion of more than 400,000 by the exchange. The Prince of Nassau 
 received the bishopric and abbey of Fulda and the abbeys of Corwen 
 and Weingarten which were to revert to Prussia if the direct line failed. 
 
 The First Consul next came to an understanding with Baden, 
 Wiirtemberg and the two Hesses, which were handsomely treated. 
 
 Austria, too, could not complain, for she received for the Archduke 
 of Tuscany the bishoprics of Brixen, Trent, Salzburg, Passau (without 
 the fortress of Passau) and Berchtesgaden, representing a revenue 
 of 3,500,000 florins as compensation for the loss of a revenue of 
 2,500,000. 
 
 This remodelling involved a profound change in the constitution 
 of the Holy Roman Empire. The electoral college was previously 
 composed of eight members, but of the three ecclesiastical electors 
 two had disappeared, the Archbishops of Cologne and Treves. There 
 remained Bohemia, the Elector Palatine for Bavaria and the Pala- 
 tinate, the King of Prussia for Brandenburg and the King of England 
 for Hanover. Finally, the number of Electors was raised to ten, 
 but the Protestants commanded six votes against four Catholic votes. 
 If the Protestants had elected a new Emperor of their own faith, the 
 Holy Roman Empire would have had for its head a heretic from 
 whom the Pope could not have demanded a renewal of Charlemagne's 
 oath against heretics. 
 
 The Catholic majority in the College of Princes, fifty-four votes to 
 forty-three, likewise disappeared. Almost all the princes who succeeded 
 to the ecclesiastical votes were Protestants, and therefore on the side 
 of Prussia. Yet there were cross-divisions. Catholic Bavaria voted 
 with Prussia against Austria and Protestant Saxony was always in 
 opposition to Prussia, of whom she stood in fear. 
 
 214 
 
France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 
 
 On February 25th, 1803, the Diet of Ratisbon adopted the pro- 
 visions of the Treaty of Luneville. Sweden alone opposed them. 
 The members of the Diet, far from concealing their satisfaction at the 
 results achieved, were anxious that the execution of the treaty should 
 be entrusted to France. Austria ratified it on the 24th of March, 
 and, in breach of faith, seized the thirty million florins which had 
 been deposited in the Bank of Vienna by the States recently secularized. 
 
 Bonaparte's policy had been clever, but after the rupture of the 
 Treaty of Amiens in 1803 he sent forces to occupy Hanover, and 
 the Czar was a guarantor of the execution of the arrangements come 
 to at the Diet of Ratisbon. He had also extended his protection to 
 the kingdom of Naples which Napoleon proceeded to occupy likewise. 
 The seizure of the Duke d'Enghien on territory belonging to Baden 
 was the immediate cause of the break with Russia. Napoleon was 
 anxious to secure the help of Prussia, but that Power was alarmed 
 at the occupation of Hanover and the closing of the Elbe and Weser. 
 The Prussian aristocracy hated France. Queen Louisa had been 
 won over by the Czar of Russia, Alexander. King Frederick William 
 remained neutral. Before Austerlitz he dared not accept Hanover 
 which Napoleon offered him, but while he made the Russians respect 
 the neutrality of his territory the French armies violated it. 
 
 Then came the Convention of Potsdam between Alexander and the 
 King of Prussia ; but immediately after Austerlitz, the Prussian 
 envoy at Vienna, Count Haugwitz, congratulated Napoleon on his 
 victory. " That is a compliment the direction of which has been 
 changed by fate," came the answer. But he made good use of it. 
 On December 15 th he signed with Haugwitz an offensive and defensive 
 alliance giving Hanover to Prussia. He robbed her of 400,000 sub- 
 jects and gave her a million. This treaty, however, was not ratified 
 in Berlin. While the King of Prussia was wasting time in hesitation 
 and vacillation, Napoleon decided to create the Confederation of the 
 Rhine. 
 
 The Peace of Pressburg had expelled Austria from Italy and 
 conferred important benefits on Bavaria. Napoleon gave the title 
 of King to the Princes of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg. He first dis- 
 closed his scheme of confederation to those two sovereigns and the 
 Grand Duke of Baden without troubling himself about the views of 
 the other princes and the free cities, much less those of the popula- 
 tions concerned. He even made no attempt to preserve appearances, 
 as he had in 1803. He handed the treaty for signature to the other 
 
 215 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 princes who were included in the Confederation without asking their 
 opinion. 
 
 The Confederation was composed of two colleges. The College of 
 Kings comprised the Prince Primate, ex-Elector of Mainz, the King 
 of Bavaria who was given the free cities of Nuremburg and Ratisbon, 
 the King of Wtirtemberg, the Grand Duke of Baden, the Grand Duke 
 of Berg, the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt. The College of Princes 
 was composed of the Dukes of Nassau, Usingen and Weilburg, the 
 Princes of Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 
 the Princes of Salm-Salm, Salm-Kirburg, Isamburg, Aremberg, Lich- 
 tenstein and Leyen. The old nobility of the territories comprised 
 in these States were incorporated. They lost their rights of legislation, 
 jurisdiction, police, taxation and recruiting. 
 
 On the ist of August the French ambassador announced to the Diet 
 of Ratisbon that the French Emperor, who consented to become the 
 protector of the Confederation, no longer recognized the existence of 
 the Empire. The Emperor Francis II., in a circular of August 6th, 
 announced that he considered dissolved the old ties that bound him to 
 the Germanic body, released from their allegiance the States which 
 formed it, and confined his authority to the government of his 
 hereditary dominions under the title of " Emperor of Austria," 
 which he had adopted in 1804. The Holy Roman Empire, founded 
 in 800 by the coronation of Charlemagne, had lasted one thousand 
 and six years. Its disappearance was final. 
 
 The Holy Roman Empire existed no longer, but Napoleon was 
 obsessed by the memory of Charlemagne. Bourrienne tells us that 
 he remarked one day : " I have succeeded Charlemagne, not 
 Louis XIV." He intended to have a medal struck with the inscrip- 
 tion, " Renovatio Imperii." He meant to become Emperor of the 
 East, with a cortege of kings, grand-dukes, dukes and counts as his 
 vassals. 
 
 He sent a note to the King of Prussia to congratulate him on his 
 release from the Imperial bonds. " It would give him great pleasure 
 if Prussia would gather to his side, by means of a confederation 
 like the Confederation of the Rhine, all the States of Northern Ger- 
 many." He specified Hesse-Cassel, Saxony with its various branches, 
 the two branches of Mecklemburg, and several Northern princelets. 
 The King of Prussia, delighted with the proposal, wished to profit 
 by it, but Napoleon, intoxicated by his victories, calmly invited the 
 Prince of Hesse-Cassel to join the Confederation of the Rhine, holding 
 
 216 
 
France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 
 
 out as bait the promise of Fulda which belonged to the Prince of 
 Orange, the King of Prussia's brother-in-law. He forbade the Han- 
 seatic towns, Bremen, Hamburg and Liibeck, to enter the Confedera- 
 tion of the North. Simultaneously he treated with England 
 for the restoration of Hanover which he had already given to 
 Prussia. 
 
 The King of Prussia resigned himself to the war which he had 
 refused to make in concert with Austria and Russia. The famous 
 army which he had inherited was disastrously beaten at Auerstadt 
 and Jena (October 14th, 1806), and in seven weeks Prussia was no 
 more. Russian help prolonged the campaign for seven months, 
 and the Treaty of Tilsit was only concluded on the 9th of July, 
 1807. The King of Prussia gave up all his possessions between the 
 Rhine and the Elbe and these went to form the Kingdom of West- 
 phalia. He had to recognize Jerome Bonaparte as its legitimate 
 sovereign. He also gave up all Prussian Poland which was handed 
 over to the Elector of Saxony. He kept East and West Prussia, 
 Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia, about five million inhabitants 
 out of ten. The King's commissioners calculated the deferred 
 indemnity payable to the conqueror at 19 million francs. Daru 
 claimed 154 millions, but agreed to take 35 millions. While this 
 sum was being paid off, two hundred thousand men occupied Prussia 
 and lived on the inhabitants. Prussia had two silver currencies 
 at the time, of different standards. Naturally it was only the debased 
 currency which remained in the country and it was three years before 
 it could be withdrawn from circulation. Prussia was also affected 
 by the Continental blockade. She could no longer export wood and 
 was unable to import national necessities. 
 
 After her defeat, the Confederation of the Rhine comprised four 
 kingdoms, five grand duchies, twenty-three duchies and principalities, 
 and had a population of twenty millions. Napoleon wished to create 
 principalities and kingdoms for the members of his family. He 
 created the Grand Duchy of Berg and gave it first to Murat, his 
 brother-in-law, and afterwards to one of the sons of the King of 
 Holland, an infant in the cradle. He had created the Kingdom of 
 Westphalia for his brother Jerome, whom he married to the daughter 
 of the King of Wiirtemberg. He married Eugene de Beauharnais to 
 the daughter of the King of Bavaria. He made the Elector of Saxony 
 a king as a rival to the King of Prussia and endowed him with the 
 Grand Duchy of Warsaw and New Galicia. He alarmed and disgusted 
 
 217 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 the whole world b ny in this id his sole 
 
 faithful friend and ally was the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmsl 
 
 Napoleon tain number of reforms which, 
 
 while unquestionably of general utility, irritated the priv 
 
 5CS. I the land of their birth by his 
 
 and his Continental system made his rule 
 
 universally loath;". (irected Europe's sympathies *. 
 
 Britain. He had made k. iukes and dukes, but he made 
 
 . secret oi s contempt for the puppets which he thus dignified. 
 
 m of hatred. 
 A P - minister, Stein, nee in Pi. 
 
 . '.eon had him expelled from the minis: .red his arrest 
 
 ion of hi- y. Hies him seem 
 
 itriotk martyr in the eyes U Prussia] - 
 To beal ... d the Napoleonic Stein introduced the prin- 
 
 ciples of i - ".' into Prussia. He transformed th< serfs . country 
 
 cts into gricultural and commercial 
 
 .: to hold land just as the nobility were all< 
 gage ind industry. He gave the towns the French 
 
 municipal constitution of i~ s 
 
 The army had bee :duced te ad men. Ge. 
 
 .a unive: ice with die Landwehr 
 
 .sturm, so that the whole m ived military 
 
 ;. and he opened die higher ranks to the middle cl isses, 
 uiwhile Austria had been reorganizing under the direction of 
 Count Stadion ... [8c believed that the moment was rir 
 revenge. She issued an appeal to the German ss. Except 
 
 for the Tyrol, her . aatWagram, 
 
 and had to cede Salzburg Berchtesj .d the Inn region to 
 
 - 1 ern Galicia to the Duchy of W; 
 Galicia to Russia. France took ( Cars Friuli and Trieste, 
 
 which woe [stria and i to form the Illyrian Provii 
 
 Tlie Tyrol opposed a most determined resistance to Bavarian domi- 
 nation and when it v come B.. - compelled to hand 
 part of it to the m oi Italy, She had also to cede Ulm 
 to Wiirtemberg, but received in exchange the princip. 
 Radsbcn and Bayreuth. 
 
 X.-.roleon had made his brother Louis King of He". 
 
 ::ot sufficiently zealous in enforcing the Continent.:" System and 
 was made to abdicate. Holland and the Hanseatic towns of Hamburg, 
 
 2l8 
 
France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 
 
 Bremen and Liibeck, the Duchy of Oldenburg, a part of Hanover 
 and several petty States were incorporated in the French Empire 
 (December, 1810). This Empire then comprised one hundred and 
 thirty departments, extended from the Elbe to Carigliono in Italy, 
 and had as its feudatories the kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Spain, 
 Westphalia, Saxony and Bavaria. 
 
 In April, 181 1, the King of Prussia, prompted by his minister 
 Hardenberg, offered France his alliance, and on February 28th, 181 2, 
 Napoleon condescended to accept it. On the 9th of March he left 
 Paris and took up his residence in Dresden, where he held a court of 
 kings until the 22nd of June, the date of his declaration of war on 
 Russia. He incorporated in his army twenty thousand Prussians, 
 thirty thousand Austrians, and other troops raised by conscription 
 in all the States of the Confederation of the Rhine. 
 
 After the retreat from Moscow, General Yorck, commanding the 
 Prussian contingent, was induced by Clausewitz, then in the service 
 of Russia, to go over to them. The King of Prussia was terrified when 
 he heard of this betrayal. At the suggestion of Hardenberg, he 
 wrote to Hatzfeld, his minister in Paris : " I am the natural ally of 
 France. If I change sides, I only give the Emperor the right to regard 
 me as an enemy. If he will give me a subsidy I will raise and equip 
 fifty to sixty thousand men for his service."* At the same time he 
 offered the Czar Alexander to make an alliance if the Russians would 
 make an immediate advance towards the Vistula and the Oder. 
 
 A few days after Yorck's defection, Hardenberg suggested to Saint- 
 Marsan, the French Ambassador, that the King of Prussia should be 
 made King of Poland. " The sea and land frontiers of Prussia and 
 Poland would enclose a compact mass which would be a formidable 
 barrier against encroachments of Russian power." The King of 
 Prussia and Hardenberg were only thinking of Prussia. They cared 
 little for the liberation and unity of Germany which the Hohen- 
 zollerns have since wished to incarnate in their own persons. Saint- 
 Marsan wrote to Maret : " If the Emperor would do something 
 for Prussia, it would be very easy, notwithstanding the exasperation 
 of the nation, to keep Frederick William in the path he has followed 
 hitherto." The King proceeded against Yorck as Napoleon ordered, 
 but Yorck, established at Konigsberg in the old kingdom of Prussia, 
 and disregarding the King's commands, was organizing the country 
 
 * See Eugene Veron : Histoire de la Prttsse depuis la mort de Fridiric II., 
 p. 180 (Paris, F. Alcan). 
 
 219 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 with Stein who had been furnished with plenary powers by the 
 Czar, and putting the finishing touches to his army. The Cossacks 
 advanced to Berlin. Scharnhorst raised the levies in Silesia at the 
 very moment when Napoleon completed the ruin of the country by 
 his requisitions for the garrisons of the Oder. 
 
 At the same time Napoleon informed the Corps Legislatif that he 
 intended to maintain the integrity of the territories of all his allies. 
 The King of Prussia could thus no longer count on the compensa- 
 tion he expected. Stein met him secretly at Breslau on the 27th of 
 February. 
 
 After the crossing of the Niemen the Russian army had been 
 reduced to about fifty thousand men. The Emperor Alexander was 
 ready for peace, but Kutusoff, representing Russia, and Scharnhorst, 
 representing Prussia, signed a treaty between the two countries at 
 Kalisch on the 28th of February. The King of Prussia followed, and 
 on March 17th he issued an appeal to his people and by two edicts 
 called out the Landwehr and Landsturm. The preamble of the 
 summons to the Landsturm ran thus : " At the approach of the 
 enemy all the inhabitants of the villages must fly after filling up the 
 wells and destroying or carrying away the corn stocks. The struggle 
 to which you are called justifies all means. The most terrible are 
 the best." In two and a half months Prussia, a State with a population 
 of hardly 4,500,000, produced an army of 148,000 men, to which 
 another 100,000 men were added two months later. Napoleon, who 
 had failed by incredible negligence to see through the Landwehr 
 and Landsturm scheme, said : " Prussia can bring 40,000 men 
 against me in two months and never more than 75,000." 
 
 On April 10th Napoleon suggested to Austria the partition of 
 Prussia. On June 15th, Austria, Russia and Prussia signed a treaty 
 of alliance at Reichenbach. On August 20th Austria declared war 
 on France. On October 19th the Saxons deserted the French army 
 on the battlefield of Leipzig. 
 
 The suppression of the Kingdom, of Westphalia had been proclaimed 
 on September 28th. Bavaria had united her forces with those of 
 Austria on October 8th. The Confederation of the Rhine was already 
 dissolved. The King of Wiirtemberg, the Grand Duke of Baden 
 and the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt had made treaties with the 
 Allies. The dispossessed rulers, Frederick William of Brunswick, 
 the Prince of Oldenburg, the Elector of Hesse, returned to their States. 
 Napoleon's work on the right bank of the Rhine had been undone by 
 
 220 
 
France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 
 
 the end of 1813. On January 1st, 1814, the allied armies crossed 
 that river. On the 1st of March Russia, England, Austria and Prussia 
 concluded the Treaty of Chaumont, by which each engaged not to 
 make a separate peace and not to treat with Napoleon. 
 
 On the 30th of May the Treaty of Paris was signed, confining 
 France within her frontiers of January, 1792. It contained this 
 expression : " The States of Germany will be independent and united 
 by a federal bond." The Congress entrusted with the work of 
 reorganization met at Vienna in September. 
 
 2a 1 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 
 
 The programme of the Treaty of Kalisch and the achievements of the Congress 
 of Vienna — Talleyrand — The rule of law — Public law — The contempt of 
 the Prussians and the Czar of Russia for public law — Austria, Talleyrand 
 and Lord Castlereagh — The Treaty of January 3rd, 18 15 — The disastrous 
 mistake of Talleyrand and Lord Castlereagh — Acquisitions of Prussia, 
 Austria and Russia — Switzerland — The provisions of the Congress of 
 Vienna relating to the Germanic Confederation — Prussia's discontent — 
 " Only accept the Rhine Province for the defence of Germany " — The Holy 
 Alliance — The final decree of the Congress of Vienna. 
 
 ACCORDING to the proclamation of Kalisch (March 25th, 1813), 
 the Czar of Russia and the King of Prussia " intended to 
 re-establish an ancient Empire." However, the treaties of Teplitz, 
 Chaumont and Paris said nothing about any resurrection and the 
 matter was not mentioned at Vienna. 
 
 Catholic Austria made no attempt to undo the secularizations of 
 1803, to re-establish the mediatized nobility in their ancient status 
 or to return to the election of the Emperors and restore to them 
 the title of " Roman " Emperor. 
 
 Friedrich von Gentz, the secretary of the Congress, admitted in a 
 report of February 12th, 1815, that 
 
 " The high-sounding phrases about the reconstruction of the social order, 
 the regeneration of the political system of Europe, a lasting peace founded on 
 a true distribution of power, and so on, were uttered with a view to the calming 
 of national unrest and to give that solemn assembly an air of dignity and 
 grandeur. But the real function of the Congress was to distribute the spoils 
 of the vanquished among the victors."* 
 
 By the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1st, 18 14), the four great 
 Powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia had resolved that 
 France, reduced to the frontiers of 1792, should have no voice in the 
 
 * Debidour : Histoire de la Diplomatie — MSmoires de Metternich, Vol. II., 
 p. 474- 
 
 222 
 
 -: 
 
The Congress of Vienna 
 
 disposal of the territories to be partitioned. At Vienna they had 
 decided that important questions should be determined by themselves 
 alone. 
 
 Talleyrand, the representative of France, cleverly grouped round 
 him all the smaller powers by his declaration that the assembled States 
 might be unequal in size, but had equal rights, and owing to him, 
 France, Spain, Portugal and Sweden were associated with the 
 committee instructed to draw up the programme. 
 
 Talleyrand enunciated the principle of " Legitimacy " in these 
 terms : " The first task of Europe is to banish the view that rights 
 can be acquired by conquest alone." He demanded that the words 
 " all arrangements shall be in conformity with public law " should be 
 inserted in the declaration of the 8th of October. The plenipoten- 
 tiaries of Prussia, Hardenberg and Humboldt, made a violent protest. 
 On October 23rd the Czar of Russia said to Talleyrand : " Public law 
 is nothing to me. What value do you think I set on your parchments 
 and treaties ? " Thus those who had assembled to draw up a treaty 
 announced beforehand their contempt for the undertaking on which 
 they were engaged. 
 
 When Talleyrand contrasted " Legitimacy " with force, he was 
 adopting the point of view that rulers and sovereigns are pro- 
 prietors. He never mentioned the feelings of their subjects because 
 that aspect of the question was never considered by anyone. 
 
 Prussia wanted to incorporate the Kingdom of Saxony and Russia 
 supported her. Austria did not want Prussia as her next-door 
 neighbour. Talleyrand made with England and Austria the Treaty 
 of January 3rd, 1815. The King of Saxony kept his title and rather 
 more than half of his territories. The rest was given to Prussia with 
 other portions which added 855,000 to her population. It is ex- 
 tremely regrettable that Talleyrand did not abandon Saxony to 
 Prussia instead of giving her on the west the Rhine Province and 
 Westphalia which have been the source of her wealth. He thereby 
 brought Prussia into immediate contact with France. The French 
 representative made Prussia the bulwark of Germany against 
 France.* 
 
 The new Prussia was twice as large and populous as the Prussia 
 of Frederick II. It fell into two groups. One consisted of East 
 Prussia and Brandenburg, connected by Pomerania, the valley of the 
 
 * For Talleyrand's mistake see the " Memoires du Chancelier Pasquier," 
 Vol. III., Ch. 4 and 5. 
 
 223 
 
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 Russia her 
 
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 &4 
 
The Congress of Vienna 
 
 become general and Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and Hanover shall 
 have four vot':. each, 'ih<: total number of votes shall be sixty-nine, 
 
 "The Diet shall be permanent buf may adjourn for periods not exceeding 
 four months. 
 
 "Article 63 provides thai the confederate Princes engage to undertake the 
 defence, riot merely of ail Germany, but of all the individual the Union, 
 
 and mutually guarantee ail their ;•■ bich are included in the 
 
 f< derate territories, J he confederate Princes may at any time conclude alliances 
 with foreign Princes wrho arc not members of the Confederation, provided that 
 such alliances are not aimed at the Confederation or any of the individual 
 States. They shall undertake also not to make war upon each other foi 
 
 ) and to submit their differences to th<: arbitration of the Diet. If this 
 method fails and a decision shall become necessary, it shall be furnished by a 
 court (Aw.traf'al Tnstanz) to which the contending parties shall appeal. 
 
 " The seal of the Di< I shall be .-it Frankfort, and the presidency in perpetuity 
 shall pertain to Austria." 
 
 From 1795 to 1X06, and again from 18 10 to the middle of 181 2, 
 Prussia had worked for her own hand, caring nothing for the inf- 
 of Germany. If Napoleon had shown rather less contempt for her 
 King, Frederick William, the Prussian monarch had been his humble 
 servant. As a reward for his particularist policy he induced the 
 Congress of Vienna to double the area of Prussia. Yet both he and 
 his ministers, Hardenberg and Stein, were dissatisfied. Prussia had 
 had to surrender Franconia to Bavaria which had remained attached 
 to Austria. Further, her long stretch of territory from Memel to 
 Sarrebriick was cut in twain by Hanover, which also separated her 
 from the North Sea. She had also been compelled to cede East Frisia 
 to Hanover. The inhabitants of the Rhine valley were Catholic, 
 strongly imbued with French traditions and influences, and formed 
 a heterogeneous element which weakened Prussia. The Prussian 
 statesmen consented to receive the Rhine Province " solely for the 
 defence of Germany," and gave Prussia the role of champion of 
 Germany. 
 
 This pretence of devotion was wasted on the princelets of Germany, 
 who knew Prussia's covetous nature and feared absorption. They 
 grouped themselves round Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden, and 
 maintained their timorous and suspicious particularism. 
 
 The promises of reform made by Stein and other Prussian and 
 German patriots (to the German people), and more or less endorsed 
 by their rulers, were not so much as mentioned at the Congress of 
 Vienna. 
 
 On September 26th, 1815, the Czar of Russia, the Emperor of 
 
 225 15 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Austria and the King of Prussia signed the compact of the " Holy 
 Alliance." England stood aloof. 
 
 On August 19th, 1 8 19, eleven members of the Confederation met 
 at Carlsbad and passed resolutions which became the final provisions 
 of the Congress of Vienna. They proclaimed that " the fundamental 
 principle of the Germanic Confederation requires that the sovereign 
 power should reside in the supreme head of the Government." They 
 admitted the right of intervention in cases where an internal rebellion 
 menaced the security of the other States of the Federation. The Diet 
 assumed the right to take action against the Press for any publication 
 or newspaper in any of the federal States and power to carry out 
 these laws, if necessary by force, was entrusted to a commission of 
 five members. Measures were taken against the universities and 
 a commission was appointed to search out those suspected of Liberal 
 sympathies. 
 
 Every princelet, not to mention the King of Prussia, exploited and 
 tyrannized over his subjects to his heart's content. 
 
 226 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. 1847— 1866 
 
 Frederick William's opposition to a written constitution — The Revolution of 
 1848 and German unity — "Prussia transformed into Germany" — The 
 Parliament of Frankfort — The elimination of Austria — Offer of the Imperial 
 crown to the King of Prussia — The Treaty of the Three Kings — The Parlia- 
 ment of Erfurt — The Diet of Frankfort — The Convention of Olmutz — 
 Prussia's desire for revenge — Bismarck and the prussification of Germany 
 — Ferro et igne — Governing without Parliament — " Might is right " — 
 Bismarck and the Polish insurrection — The question of the Duchies — 
 Napoleon III., Austria and Prussia — Bismarck and Napoleon III. — The 
 war of 1866 — The preliminaries of peace at Nikolsburg — The Treaty of 
 Prague — Prussia's gains — The question of compensation — M. Benedetti's 
 ignorance — His fears in 1868. 
 
 IN 1847 Frederick William IV. consented to give Prussia a Parlia- 
 ment, but on the nth of April, at the convocation of the Diet, 
 he said : 
 
 " I could never allow a piece of parchment to interpose as a second Providence 
 between God, Our Lord in Heaven, and this country, to govern us by its clauses 
 and substitute them for holy and time-honoured fidelity." 
 
 Then came the revolution of 1848. The King worked on the 
 popular fear that France would try to recover the Rhine Provinces. 
 Yet he was obliged to promise domestic reforms, though he tried to 
 alter the character of these concessions. 
 
 " We demand before everything that Germany shall be transformed from 
 a federation of States into a federal State. We demand a uniform military 
 system for the whole of Germany, a replica of the Prussian system with a federal 
 Commander-in-Chief. We demand a German flag and a German fleet, a German 
 federal court to deal with differences between the peoples and States." 
 
 He tried to rouse the passion for German unity in the hope of 
 distracting his subjects from questions of constitutional reform and 
 liberty. Immediately after the rising of the 20th of March he pro- 
 
 227 15* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 claimed that " he felt himself called to save German liberty and 
 unity." On the 21st he ordered his troops to wear the German 
 cockade with the Prussian cockade and announced in a proclamation 
 that " from that moment Prussia was transformed into Germany." 
 
 Austria and the other Powers found Frederick William IV.'s inter- 
 pretation of the " federal decree " of the Congress of Vienna somewhat 
 singular. If it was thus torn up as regards the Germanic Confederation, 
 what value could it have in relation to the other States ? 
 
 Meanwhile a congress of fifty delegates, self-appointed delegates, 
 sitting at Heidelberg, had decided to convene a German national 
 parliament. This parliament was only an assembly more or less 
 regularly elected. It evolved, after much effort, a constitution for 
 the German Empire. It declared that a German state could not 
 form a single state with non-German states. This was to leave the 
 Emperor of Austria only a personal tie with Hungary, Bohemia 
 and Italy. At that time there was a sharp dissension between the 
 " Little Germany " party, which would only admit Germans into the 
 German Empire, and the " Greater Germany " party, which wished 
 to include all the dependent peoples of the Austrian Empire. The 
 Assembly pronounced in favour of the former (November 27th), 
 and thus made Prussia thenceforth the mistress of Germany. 
 
 On January 14th, 1849, it turned Austria out of the Germanic 
 Empire. On March 27th it voted that the Imperial crown should be 
 hereditary in the house of the sovereign it might select, and on the 
 28th it offered the Imperial crown to the King of Prussia by 290 votes 
 against 248 abstentions. Austria recalled her deputies. On April 26th 
 the Prussian Chamber ordered the Ministry to recognize the Constitu- 
 tion of Frankfort. The Chamber was dissolved next day. The King 
 refused the Imperial crown, protested against the Constitution and 
 invited the sovereigns to a congress. It was just after the Russians 
 had invaded Hungary, and fear of Austria, freed from anxiety as 
 regards the revolt of Hungary, must be regarded as a factor in the 
 decision of the King of Prussia. 
 
 The Parliament of Frankfort vanished, but Frederick William was 
 seeking an occasion to seize the Imperial crown, which he had refused. 
 With the Kings of Saxony and Hanover he concluded the Treaty of 
 the Three Kings, of which the declared object was to " maintain the 
 internal and external security of Germany." Austria did not admit 
 the validity of a commission of five members which met at Berlin for 
 that object. The King persuaded this commission to convoke a 
 
 228 
 
Prussia and Austria, 1847-1866 
 
 new federal parliament to meet at Erfurt, a town in Prussia. 
 Twenty-seven German Governments approved of this project, but 
 it turned out to be a phantom. On April 26th, 1850, Austria sum- 
 moned the members of the ancient Diet to Frankfort. The Diet 
 resumed its functions in spite of a protest from Prussia. On Septem- 
 ber 7th, 1850, the Elector of Hesse proclaimed a state of siege because 
 the Assembly of States refused to authorize him to raise a loan 
 without specifying its object. He demanded the help of the German 
 Diet when Prussian troops invaded his country. War seemed inevit- 
 able. Prussia gave way and submitted to the Convention of Olmiitz, 
 whereby she abandoned the Erfurt scheme and accepted Austria's 
 policy with regard to Schleswig-Holstein. She also withdrew her 
 troops from Hesse and Baden and pledged herself to conform to the 
 decisions of the Congress which was to meet at Dresden. 
 
 Thenceforth the Prussian Government devoted itself to schemes 
 of revenge for this rebuff. During the Crimean War Prussia main- 
 tained neutrality while Austria threatened to intervene against Russia. 
 
 In 1857 Frederick William's mental affliction had reached such a 
 stage that the Prince Royal, William, had to take over the govern- 
 ment. He represented the Liberal party but that party's idea of 
 Liberalism was the prussification of Germany. Bismarck published 
 a manifesto which contained a frank declaration : 
 
 " Prussia can no longer remain with Austria in the Germanic Confederation 
 as constituted by the federal decree of 181 5 and the final decree of 1820. She 
 could never have permitted its reconstruction in 1851, and it is to her interest 
 to bring about its dissolution." 
 
 The regent William showed his approval of this view by appointing 
 Bismarck as his minister to Russia and Bismarck set himself to secure 
 the support of that Power by efforts which were not without result. 
 He was next sent to Paris. Bismarck, in his correspondence, 
 denounced " the federal constitution from which Prussia suffered," 
 which he desired to destroy ferro et igne. In 1862 the King of 
 Prussia selected him as President of the Council and Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs with a view to compelling the Chamber of Deputies 
 to vote the military credits they had refused. 
 
 During the four years 1862 to 1866 the King of Prussia and Bis- 
 marck governed without the Chamber voting any supplies. Each 
 dissolution was followed by the return of the same members. From 
 the start Bismarck had declared that since the deputies refused to 
 
 229 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 vote supplies and the King and himself were of one mind in their 
 determination to carry on the government, the affair had become 
 a question of force, and that since force was on the side of the King 
 and himself they would not give way. It was during this dispute 
 that the famous expression " Might is Right " occurred. Bismarck 
 denied having ever used it, but his opponents, when quoting it, were 
 only condensing his thoughts. Bismarck carried on the government 
 on the basis of the financial provisions of the year prior to his entry 
 into the ministry and devoted the surplus to the military credits 
 demanded by the King. 
 
 The year 1863 was marked by the insurrection in Poland when 
 Prussia earned the goodwill of Russia by handing over to the Russian 
 authorities the insurgents who took refuge on her territory. 
 
 Towards the close of that year Christian IX. mounted the throne 
 of Denmark. The Constitution of November 15th, 1863, provided 
 for the incorporation of Schleswig into the Danish States and the 
 separation of Holstein. Prince Frederick Augustenburg replied by 
 taking possession of the two Duchies in a proclamation of November 
 1 6th, 1863. Prussia and Austria demanded that the constitution 
 should be repealed. On January 20th, 1864, Prussian troops invaded 
 the Duchies. Austria followed suit. The Danes resisted heroically 
 until October 30th. The King of Denmark then had to cede Holstein, 
 Schleswig and Lauenburg to Austria and Prussia. The two Powers 
 immediately began to quarrel over the spoils. Bismarck successfully 
 opposed all the claims of Austria and the Germanic Confederation. 
 The Convention of Gastein on August 14th, 1865, decided that the 
 Duchies should remain in possession of the conquerors and that 
 Schleswig should revert to Prussia and Holstein to Austria. Prussia 
 bought the Duchy of Lauenburg and Bismarck received the title of 
 Count, but the undivided sovereignty was maintained. 
 
 The Emperor Nicholas, related by marriage to the family of 
 Holstein-Gottorp, might have claimed a reversion in some part of the 
 Danish possessions, but he was grateful for Prussian support in 
 crushing the Polish insurrection and acquiesced in the new situation. 
 England proposed an international agreement, and Napoleon III. 
 a congress ; but England was lacking in determination to have the 
 Treaty of London of 1852 respected, and Napoleon III. was too busy 
 in Mexican affairs to intervene effectively. 
 
 I am not writing a history of French diplomacy but at times it is 
 necessary for me to refer to French relations with Germany. 
 
 230 
 
Prussia and Austria. 1847-1866 
 
 The Germanic Confederation, an inert mass incapable of collective 
 effort, was a guarantee of peace for France. Napoleon III. could only 
 live down the memory of his coup d'etat by drawing public attention 
 to questions of foreign policy, and this remorseless necessity imposed 
 upon him so alarmed all the nations of Europe that, in spite of his 
 declaration at Bordeaux in 185 1 that " the Empire means Peace," 
 England, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed a secret agreement 
 together on December 3rd, 1852. It must be admitted that the 
 Emperor's foreign policy, involving the demise of the treaties of 
 1815 and the principle of nationality, was capricious and alarming. 
 
 The Crimean War united France and England in the prosecution 
 of an ill-chosen task which ended in the guaranteeing of Turkish 
 integrity by the Congress of Paris (1856). This war could only have 
 drawn Russia and Prussia together. 
 
 In the Italian War of 1859 Napoleon III. weakened Austria to the 
 advantage of Prussia and helped to associate the interests of Prussia 
 with those of Germany. Summoned by the Diet of Frankfort to 
 intervene on Austria's behalf, Prussia did so, and it was owing to 
 this action that Napoleon III. consented to the Peace of Villafranca 
 which disappointed all the aspirations he had roused in Italy. Bis- 
 marck went to Biarritz and fascinated Napoleon III. so thoroughly 
 that the Emperor kept his photograph on his work-table. Bismarck 
 came away with the conviction that Napoleon III. was an impractical 
 dreamer who would always accept, with or without ill-grace, a 
 fait accompli. 
 
 Bismarck proposed a new federal constitution by making the 
 Schleswig-Holstein question a federal affair. On June 10th he pre- 
 sented to the Governments of the Southern States a scheme of constitu- 
 tional reform which would make Germany a federal State from which 
 Austria would be excluded. The supreme command of the armies 
 of the North would pertain to the King of Prussia, that of the Southern 
 armies to the King of Bavaria. Austria, while referring the Schleswig- 
 Holstein question for decision to the Confederation, convened the 
 State Assembly of Holstein for June nth, 1866. 
 
 Prussia immediately invaded Holstein to compel the two Duchies 
 to accept a single government. On June 9th Austria asked the Diet 
 to decree the mobilization of the whole federal army with the excep- 
 tion of the Prussian contingent. The Diet acquiesced in this demand 
 by nine votes to six. On June 15th Prussia summoned Electoral 
 Hesse, Saxony and Hanover to accept the new federal constitution 
 
 231 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 and declare their neutrality. On their refusal they were invaded. 
 Bavaria threw in her lot with them. 
 
 Six weeks after the opening of hostilities, on the 26th of July, 1866, 
 the preliminaries of peace between Prussia and Austria were signed at 
 Nikolsburg. Immediately after the victory of Sadowa Bismarck had 
 opposed the Prussian military clique which demanded the annexation 
 of the territory taken from Austria and a triumphal entry into 
 Vienna. He had three reasons for wishing to make peace as quickly 
 as possible. He feared French intervention. He wanted to make 
 Austria abandon the States which had fought with her, so that her 
 weakness and the strength of Prussia would be manifest. Lastly, 
 he hoped for a future alliance with Austria. 
 
 The Emperor of Austria agreed to the dissolution of the Germanic 
 Confederation and the exclusion of Austria from a reconstructed 
 Germany. By the Treaty of Prague on August 23rd the independence 
 of four German States south of the Main was recognized. Prussia 
 waived the annexation of Saxony on condition that she entered the 
 North German Confederation and put her army under the command 
 of the King of Prussia. The Kingdom of Hanover, the Electorate of 
 Hesse, the Duchy of Nassau, and the free city of Frankfort-on-the 
 Main were incorporated in Prussia, the area of which was increased 
 from 108,494 square miles to 134,622 square miles, while her popu- 
 lation advanced from 19,600,000 to 23,900,000. Her territories also 
 became compact. 
 
 The commission of the Prussian Diet declared that they had 
 searched in vain for a legal basis for these annexations to Prussia. 
 " Prussia has made war," declared Herr Kirchmann, " and shall 
 gather the fruits of war." Her wishes were her justification. 
 
 M. Benedetti, in his plea for French diplomacy which he repre- 
 sented at Berlin, has displayed the same unaccountable ignorance 
 which characterized Napoleon III. Before the declaration of war 
 Bismarck suggested a triple alliance of Prussia, France and Italy. 
 He was prepared to accept rectification of frontiers, but Benedetti, 
 in a letter of the 8th of June, said that " the King would be unwilling 
 at the moment to consider the possibilities of such sacrifices." 
 Bismarck generously offered compensation in Belgium. General 
 Govone, who represented Italy, remarked to him that the present 
 " of a country which had such strong national life and sentiment " 
 was not a very tempting offer. Napoleon III. was warned that 
 Prussia promised nothing but as soon as war broke out he said in his 
 
 232 
 
Prussia and Austria. 1847-1866. 
 
 speech at Auxerre : " If Prussia takes an inch of ground France 
 will require compensation." 
 
 If he spoke those words in good faith, he could not have known the 
 dispatches of his ambassador. If he did know them, he was wittingly 
 deceiving France. 
 
 Immediately after the war, while Drouyn de Lluys refused to recog- 
 nize Prussia's conquests, the Emperor recognized them without 
 informing his minister. He replaced him by La Valette, who issued 
 a note declaring that " France could only rejoice in the aggrandize- 
 ment of Prussia," but discreetly expressing regret that Prussia did 
 not have recourse to a plebiscite before annexing territory. This 
 attitude was so extraordinary that no one believed in its sincerity. 
 Bismarck refused all compensation in Germany but directed France 
 to seek compensation in Belgium. At the same time, assigning to 
 France the ambitions he had himself suggested, he used them to unite 
 yet more closely the German States so recently hostile and excite 
 alarm in Russia and England. 
 
 Immediately after the triumph of Nikolsburg M. Benedetti wrote 
 to Paris (July 26th, 1866) : 
 
 " I shall tell Your Excellency nothing new when I say that Herr von Bis- 
 marck's opinion is that we ought to seek compensation in Belgium and that he 
 has offered to come to some arrangement with you." 
 
 When Bismarck returned to Berlin he refused finally to give any 
 sort of compensation on the Rhine. Benedetti confesses : 
 
 " We have thus reached the point of drawing up a scheme of arrangement* 
 which would settle the future of Belgium. I admit that we should get Luxem- 
 burg at once, thanks to an understanding with the King of Holland, and that 
 we should be authorized to take steps towards the ultimate union of Belgium 
 with France, with the help of Prussia." 
 
 Benedetti forwarded the scheme to Paris as Bismarck's own. The 
 Emperor, in a letter to M. Rouher, makes no mention of the annexa- 
 tion of Belgium, which he evidently regarded as unattainable at the 
 moment. He only speaks of Luxemburg and the restoration of the 
 federal fortresses to the different States, Luxemburg to France, 
 Mainz and Saarlouis to Prussia, Landau to Bavaria, Rastadt to Baden, 
 Ulm to Wiirtemberg. He mentions the annexation of Saxony, a 
 Protestant state, to Prussia, and the transfer of the King of Saxony 
 
 * Benedetti : Souvenirs Diplomatiques. L'Empereur Guillaume I. et le Prince 
 de Bismarck, p. 58 et seq. 
 
 233 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 to the left bank of the Rhine — Catholic territory. Napoleon III., 
 in fact, returned to the scheme which Talleyrand and Lord Castle- 
 reagh, in concert with Austria, had prevented the King of Prussia 
 from realising in 1815. But now it was too late. 
 
 Bismarck said nothing further about Belgium. As for the Em- 
 peror's infantile schemes, it is unlikely that they ever saw the light. 
 Napoleon III. dealt with Luxemburg by buying it from the King of 
 Holland, William III. Prussia, changing her attitude, immediately 
 forbade the execution of the bargain. France demanded that Prussia 
 should give up her right to maintain a garrison in the fortress of 
 Luxemburg. The representatives of the Powers which had signed 
 the Belgian treaty of 1839 met in conference and decided to assure 
 the independence of Luxemburg by guaranteeing its neutrality. 
 
 The only definite result of these negotiations was that after bringing 
 France and Prussia to the verge of war a conflict was made sooner 
 or later inevitable. 
 
 Napoleon III., who had been attracted to Mexico by the dream 
 of founding there a Latin Empire which would be a makeweight to 
 the United States, abandoned Maximilian, withdrew his army before 
 the expiration of the agreed period and shared the responsibility for 
 his execution at Queretaro on the 19th of June, 1867. The other 
 States of Europe accepted the Treaty of Prague. But it was only the 
 first stage. M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, foresaw 
 that Prussia would want to incorporate the Southern States in the 
 Confederation of the North and restore the imperial dignity for the 
 benefit of the Hohenzollerns. On January 5th, 1868, he wrote : 
 
 " The more I see of the conduct of the Prussian Government the stronger is 
 my conviction that it intends to impose its authority on the whole of Germany, 
 and every day I have fresh evidence that it pursues that object, knowing that 
 it will be unattainable unless France is reduced to a condition in which she will 
 be unable to place any obstacle in its way. 
 
 " We shall therefore have to reckon on a terrible war in which a whole nation 
 will take part against us."* 
 
 Thus forewarned, Napoleon invited Berlin, through London, in 
 January, 1870, to summon a conference to consider the question of 
 general disarmament. Bismarck replied that as Prussia could 
 acquiesce in no such suggestion, it was idle to discuss its principles 
 and consequences. 
 
 * Benedetti : Souvenirs Diplomatique*. L'Empereur Guillaume I, et le Prince 
 de Bismarck. Ma mission a Ems. 
 
 334 
 
 am 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 
 
 The Federal Constitution — Procedure — The King of Prussia Bundes Presidium 
 and Bundes-Feldherr — The same attributions as those of the Deutsche 
 Kaiser — The Chancellor — The Bundesrat — The Reichstag — Electoral con- 
 ditions unchanged after 1867 — Treaties of defensive alliance with the 
 Southern States — The Zollverein. 
 
 AFTER the 10th of June, 1866, Bismarck had sent to the German 
 Governments a circular, in which he proposed to them " a 
 scheme for the establishment of a new Confederation." On June 14th, 
 the Prussian representative in the Federal Assembly declared that 
 the Prussian Government withdrew from the Confederation, but was 
 disposed " to form a new Confederation with such of the German 
 States as felt attracted by the proposal." By the compact of the 
 1 8th of August, sixteen States agreed to send delegates to Berlin to 
 draw up a scheme for a federal constitution on the basis of an offen- 
 sive and defensive alliance with Prussia and the disposal of their 
 forces under the supreme command of the King of Prussia. A 
 parliament was to be summoned as provided by the Imperial electoral 
 law of April 12th, 1849, and it was to ratify the scheme of the federal 
 constitution drawn up by the representatives of the States.* 
 
 The operation met with some opposition. The Prussian Chamber 
 of Deputies was unwilling that the Reichstag should have the right 
 of voting the Constitution. They wanted to confine its powers to 
 discussion only. Next, the Constitution had to be submitted to the 
 Prussian Landtag and the other twenty-one State Assemblies. The 
 Government had to accept the amendments to the electoral law 
 carried in the Chamber of Deputies. Only a majority of the States 
 granted the future Reichstag the right of " discussing " the 
 Constitution. 
 
 The form of the Constitution was settled in the conferences of the 
 representatives of the States, which came to an end on the 7th of 
 
 * Labaud : Le Droit Public et l' Empire Allemand, Vol. I., p. 38 et seq. 
 
 235 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 February, 1867. On April 16th the Reichstag voted the constitutional 
 scheme by 230 votes to 53. The representatives of the allied States 
 accepted it at once. 
 
 The King of Prussia obtained more than Bismarck had dared to 
 hope, the supreme command of the army. The Constitution gave 
 him the title of Bundes Presidium (Federal President) and Bundes- 
 Feldherr (Federal Commander-in-Chief). As President, the King of 
 Prussia had the right of summoning, opening, adjourning or dissolving 
 the federal parliament, appointing and dismissing the federal Chan- 
 cellor and officials, declaring war and making peace. As Commander- 
 in-Chief of the army he had the supreme direction of the military and 
 naval forces ; he could fix their establishment, order the construction 
 of new fortresses, declare a state of siege in any part of the federal 
 States and mobilize the federal army against a recalcitrant member 
 of the federation. Lest he should be thwarted by the Reichstag, he 
 was empowered to have army bills voted for several years. 
 
 These were the powers which the King of Prussia retained when he 
 became Deutscher Kaiser (German Emperor) in 1871. The new title 
 added nothing to the powers he already enjoyed in the North German 
 Confederation. 
 
 The Chancellor was the sole source of executive power. He was 
 responsible solely to the President of the Bundesrat, the German 
 Emperor. He concentrated in his person the executive and legis- 
 lative power. The plenipotentiaries who met together in the 
 Bundesrat were only officials. 
 
 The Reichstag had only one right — that of refusing supplies. Its 
 members enjoyed no parliamentary initiative. They only dealt with 
 bills which had already been examined by the Bundesrat and their 
 amendments were subject to the veto of that body. No responsible 
 minister ever appeared before them. 
 
 Their powers were not increased in 187 1. 
 
 The deputies of the Reichstag were elected on the principle of one 
 member to every 100,000 inhabitants in addition to a member for 
 every fraction of more than 50,000 inhabitants of a State. Although 
 Lauenburg had a population of less than 100,000, it sent a represen- 
 tative. The elections took place on the basis of the census of 1867. 
 This electoral division underwent no change in 1871, otherwise the 
 Reichstag would now have 600 deputies instead of 397. Berlin, with 
 two million inhabitants, still sends only six deputies. Many industrial 
 districts, the population of which has trebled and even quadrupled, 
 
 236 
 
The North German Confederation 
 
 thus entitling them to three or four deputies, have only one member 
 to-day. 
 
 The North German Confederation comprised twenty-two States : 
 Prussia, Saxe-Weimar, Adenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe- 
 Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg- 
 Rudolstadt, Waldeck, Reuss (the younger branch), Schaumburg- 
 Lippe, Lippe, Liibeck, Bremen, Hamburg, the two Mecklemburgs, 
 Reuss (the older branch), Saxe-Meiningen and the Kingdom of Saxony. 
 
 The King of Prussia and Bismarck regarded the war of 1866 as 
 only the first stage. Peace had hardly been signed when the King 
 set about the reorganization of the army, which was to be swelled 
 by the forces of the annexed States and those which entered the 
 Confederation with Prussia. The number of army corps was increased 
 from nine to twelve. 
 
 *37 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE 
 
 Astuteness of King William and Bismarck — Beginnings of the Hohenzollern 
 Candidature question in March, 1869 — Prince Leopold's refusal — He is 
 compelled to accept — Proceedings at Ems — the Prince of Hohenzollern 
 withdraws — M. de Gramont's inconsistent demands — The Ems incident — 
 Bismarck's telegram — The opposition of the southern States. 
 
 BISMARCK and King William were at one in their conviction 
 that they must proceed step by step. They were both 
 anxious that they should have appearances on their side. In 1866 
 they managed affairs so that the declaration of war came from 
 Austria. In 1867 they were not sufficiently certain of the support 
 of their German allies to risk a new war. They were also afraid of 
 alarming Europe. 
 
 But while Von Moltke and Roon were preparing the army, Bismarck 
 was seeking the occasion. Early in 1869 he put forward the Prince of 
 Hohenzollern as candidate for the Spanish throne. King William, 
 however, thought his forces were not ready. 
 
 M. Benedetti has told us that it was on the 27th of March, 1869, 
 that he first drew the attention of the Quai d'Orsay to the Hohen- 
 zollern affair. On the nth of May he questioned Bismarck on the 
 subject, and received the answer that " if the Prince became King 
 of Spain his rule could only be a short one, and would expose him 
 to personal danger as well as disappointments." 
 
 However, in November, 1869, with Bismarck's approval, Herr von 
 Werther, Prussian Minister to Bavaria, presented to the Hohenzollern 
 princes, in one of their castles, a Spanish envoy, Sefior Salazar, who 
 had been commissioned to offer the Spanish crown to one of them. 
 He offered it to each in turn, and even to King Charles of Roumania, 
 but all declined the honour. Sefior Salazar paid a second visit to 
 Germany in January, 1870, but on this occasion went straight to 
 Berlin. Prince Leopold was hesitating. On March 20th, 1870, Prince 
 Anthony wrote : " Bismarck wishes the offer to be accepted for 
 
 238 
 
 an 
 
The Hohenzollern Candidature 
 
 dynastic and political reasons. On the 15th we held a very exciting 
 and important conference. The King presided, and the Crown Prince, 
 Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Schleinitz, Thile and Delbriick were present. 
 They all agreed in recommending us to accept, saying we could not 
 refuse as good Prussians. Leopold has declined." Prince Frederick 
 was suggested instead, but Prince Leopold, " pressed by all," ended 
 by accepting. 
 
 At bottom no one cared a fig for the Spanish crown. What was 
 wanted was a pretext for a war with France. But the King of Prussia 
 hesitated to make war over an affair which was the peculiar concern 
 of the Hohenzollern dynasty. 
 
 When the issue became clear in the month of July, the Prussian 
 Government told the Powers that if the King had furthered the 
 candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern it was as head of his 
 family and not as King of Prussia. The affair was no concern of the 
 Government. Besides, the Cortes had not yet ratified the selection 
 of Prince Leopold. 
 
 At the moment of crisis the system of absence and alibi was con- 
 spicuous, as again in 1914. Bismarck was at Varzin, the King at Ems, 
 the Ambassadors were on leave and only the Under-Secretary of 
 State, Herr Thile, was in Berlin. Herr Thile disclaimed all interest 
 in the matter. 
 
 M. Benedetti went to Ems, armed with a letter from M. de 
 Gramont telling him to obtain the following declaration from the 
 King: 
 
 " The King's Government does not approve of the Prince of Hohen- 
 zollern's acceptance, and orders him to wiihdraw it." The minister 
 added : " I must be informed if the Prince, in obedience to that 
 command. . . ." M. Benedetti did not adopt the hectoring terms 
 which had been dictated to him. " It shall be my special care 
 not to precipitate the Government with myself into the trap laid 
 for us." 
 
 M. de Gramont did his best to lead France into the trap. The 
 Prince of Hohenzollern withdrew his candidature. It is true that 
 France only learned this from a source outside the negotiations at 
 Ems, but M. Thiers rightly declared that the withdrawal was enough. 
 The affair was closed. Unhappily the Ollivier ministry hankered 
 after some patent proof of success. M. de Gramont, without 
 telling M. Benedetti, asked the Prussian Ambassador to invite the 
 King to address a letter to the Emperor stating that he had never 
 
 239 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 intended to encroach on the interests and honour of the French 
 nation in authorizing the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern. 
 Leaving M. Benedetti in ignorance of this step, he instructed him to 
 ask the King of Prussia " to give an assurance that he would never 
 again authorize the candidature of a Hohenzollern prince." This 
 meant that the Ambassador was to ask more of the King than the 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs was himself asking 
 
 On the morning of July 13th the King met M. Benedetti out walking 
 and went up to him. M. Benedetti asked him " to authorize him 
 to convey to his Government the assurance that His Majesty would 
 use all his authority to forestall any attempt to renew the can- 
 didature withdrawn." 
 
 " You ask me," the King replied, " for an undertaking unlimited 
 in point of time and for all circumstances. I cannot give it." He 
 expressed regret that he could not make so " novel and unexpected 
 a concession." In the afternoon the King had the Ambassador 
 informed that Prince Leopold had withdrawn and that he approved 
 of the withdrawal ; further, that he regarded that intimation as 
 the end of the negotiations. The King did not refuse to receive 
 M. Benedetti. He merely informed him that he refused to continue 
 the discussion as to guarantees for the future. 
 
 Was the goal of the Ollivier ministry a patent diplomatic score to 
 exhibit to the Corps Legislatif or was it war ? In either case, its 
 position was such as to serve the ends of the King of Prussia. Bis- 
 marck was immediately authorized to do all he could to bring about 
 war. He recalled the German Ambassador from Paris. He gave 
 his own version of the Ems incident to all the Governments. The 
 King telegraphed to him : 
 
 " Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand from 
 me, finally, in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to tele- 
 graph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my 
 consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last 
 somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements 
 of this kind & tout jamais. Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no 
 news, and as he was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid than myself, he 
 could clearly see that my government once more had no hand in the matter."* 
 
 Bismarck, who had Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, and Roon, 
 the War Minister, dining with him, asked them if the army were ready. 
 
 * Bismarck : Reflections and Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 96. 
 240 
 
The Hohenzollern Candidature 
 
 On their reply in the affirmative, Bismarck boasts that he " edited " 
 the telegram in such a way that it ended thus : 
 
 " His Majesty the King thereupon decided not to receive the French am- 
 bassador again, and sent to tell him through the aide-de-camp on duty that 
 his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador."* 
 
 Bismarck adds that he said to his guests : 
 
 "It is important that we should be the party attacked, and this Gallic over- 
 weening and touchiness will make us, if we announce in the face of Europe, so 
 far as we can without the speaking trumpet of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly 
 meet the public threats of France." 
 
 The two generals, hitherto silent and dejected, " suddenly recovered 
 their pleasure in eating and drinking," and Roon said piously : 
 " Our God of old lives still and will not let us perish in disgrace."f 
 
 The treaties with the South German States were defensive. Count 
 Bray, the Bavarian minister, prompted by his friend Beust, and 
 Varnbiiler, the minister of Wiirtemberg, hoped to be released from 
 their obligation to follow Prussia over a question which, as it con- 
 cerned the Spanish throne, could excite neither interest nor passion 
 in Germany. Between July 13th and 16th the Second Chamber 
 and a body of the Press in Bavaria were opposed to war. The 
 Government of Napoleon III. played wholesale into the hands of 
 the King of Prussia and Bismarck by declaring war on the 15th of July. 
 Yet even on the 19th the Commission of the Bavarian Chamber 
 decided that there was no ground for raising the casus foederis, and 
 its resolutions were only defeated by 89 votes to 58. The Treaty of 
 1866 had been received without enthusiasm in Wiirtemberg and 
 the Duchy of Baden. As Bismarck had foreseen, the unity of Germany 
 was created, willy-nilly, by war.t 
 
 * Bismarck : Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 99. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 100. 
 
 t Supra, Part I., Chap. IV., " The German Autocracy." 
 
 241 16 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 THE CERCAY PAPERS AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The Due de Gramont against Austria and Italy — The Bavarian minister Bray — 
 His policy and conversion — Count Beust follows suit — The Cercay papers — 
 M. de Ruville's explanation — Bavarian opposition — The ceremony at 
 Versailles — The Emperor disagrees with Bismarck — The Emperor prefers 
 the title of " Emperor of Germany " to that of " German Emperor " — 
 The necessity of dissolving the German Empire. 
 
 NAPOLEON III.'s foreign policy seemed conceived entirely in 
 the interests of the King of Prussia. He declared war on him 
 at the moment most favourable to Prussia. France might have had 
 powerful allies, for both Count Beust, for Austria, and Italy offered 
 him their alliance. In the case of Italy, however, there was a con- 
 dition — the abandonment of Rome. On the 25th of July the Due de 
 Gramont heard that a compact had been concluded and imme- 
 diately tore it up with the words, " France cannot defend her honour 
 on the Rhine by sacrificing it on the Tiber." On the 27th he wrote : 
 " Count Beust's conduct fills us with disgust and aversion." All 
 Gramont's desires were fulfilled. He had the war he longed for. 
 He lost the alliances he did not want,* and he added the finishing 
 touches to the edifice of the German Empire. 
 
 In Bavaria Prince Hohenlohe who pursued a policy favourable 
 to Prussia, had been replaced by Count Bray, who had certainly had 
 some share in Count Beust's project of an alliance between France 
 and Austria. 
 
 In spite of Gramont's refusal to accept Beust's proposals, the 
 Austrian minister suggested that Austria should take advantage of 
 the absence of the German armies to recover Silesia and march on 
 Berlin. According to his opponent, Hohenlohe, Bray even went so 
 far as to say to Count Sradion : " Austria made a grievous mistake 
 when the Bavarian Chambers admitted the casus foederis. She ought 
 
 * Bolton King : The History of Italian Unity. Emile Bourgeois : Manuel 
 Historique de Politique Etrangire, Vol. III. p. 722. 
 
 242 
 
The Cer^ay Papers and the German Empire 
 
 to have threatened them with an immediate declaration of war if 
 they did not reverse their resolution and declare their neutrality. 
 The King is losing himself in his castles." 
 
 During the siege of Paris Bismarck elaborated his scheme for the 
 foundation of the German Empire. He wanted the initiative to come 
 from Bavaria. In October he invited Baden and Wurtemberg to 
 send delegates to Versailles, but he dared not put pressure on Bavaria, 
 and " left her free to act in accordance with her interests." Bray 
 declared that he would himself go to Versailles and Beust reminded 
 him that " Article 4 of the Treaty of Prague provided that His 
 Majesty the Emperor of Austria consented to the German States 
 south of the line (the river Main) forming a union the national ties 
 of which with the North German Confederation should be the subject 
 of a subsequent treaty between the two parties and which should 
 have an independent national existence." 
 
 Bray arrived at Versailles on October 23rd. After a few days, dread- 
 ing the addition of Baden, Hesse and Wurtemberg to the Northern 
 Confederation, he conceived the idea of a new Bavarian Confederation. 
 " The King of Bavaria should appear side by side with the German 
 Emperor as the representative of the German Empire. These two 
 sovereigns would each represent a part of Germany and together the 
 whole." It is perfectly clear that neither William nor Bismarck 
 would have accepted this combination. Bray told Bismarck that he 
 intended to leave Versailles and return to Munich ; but on the 5th of 
 November he had a long interview with him and came away from 
 it a changed man. From being an opponent of the German Empire 
 he became an ardent enthusiast for it. 
 
 At the same time Count Beust, who pretended that he was taking 
 his wife to Switzerland, visited Munich. Pie saw the Bavarian 
 ministers and induced them to accept the German Empire. Wurtem- 
 berg drew back. King Charles wrote to his representatives at Ver- 
 sailles to sign nothing which Bavaria would not accept. Bray 
 advised the ministers at Stuttgart to sign and on the 23rd he was 
 authorized to sign by King Louis. 
 
 What had happened at the interview of November 5th between 
 Bismarck and Bray ? 
 
 This is the explanation given by a Professor of Halle University, 
 Herr A. de Ruville, a German, though his name sounds French, in 
 his book, " The Role of Bavaria in the Restoration of the German 
 Empire." Some Mecklemberger chasseurs discovered a bundle of 
 
 243 16* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 i the chftteau o . near Brunoy, belonging: to M. 
 
 Rouhei them to Bismarck. These documents 
 
 C< s R : their falling into German 
 
 5, That 
 
 to remained i able. Herr de Ruville 
 
 tei see them, but has managed to reconstruct son 
 
 them from the : the men referred to and the books pub- 
 
 ibout them. He - - that thev must have 
 
 tine of Benedetti's letters, the Emperor's instructions, 
 
 the lettc: s ad the Marquis de la Valette, the 
 
 the French s ind ministers in Germany 
 
 ae letter at Beust. Bismarck 
 
 s imiliar with some part of their contents. In iS"*i he 
 pub!'- r of theEmp s me letters of Benedetti. 
 
 written in .\ a IIl.'s annexat 
 
 Rouhei . arms inserted in the r. . 
 
 L;' PempU Frm :ti's ktters are not the only documents 
 
 •. have fallen into the hands of the Prussian Government. All 
 
 ; and 1866 between the 
 French Governing oents Bavaria and Wiirtem- 
 
 X) left at D e now in the possession of Prince 
 
 Bismarck." - a threat against the ministers who had become 
 
 Bism ~ 'ies. It was Bismarck's a m not to com- 
 
 promise them and he ce publish extracts from the Cercay papers. 
 
 Wachenhuse . the corres i of the Cole: s that 
 
 at Cercay he B letter from Dalwigk, the Hessian Minister, to 
 
 Rouher apropos of the Lux. in which occurred the phrase : 
 
 u I: there is war, the French will be received with open arms in Ger- 
 ." In 1867 Ducrot had furnished numerous reports of his 
 vith the Grand Duke of Hesse, who said to him : M How 
 could the Emperor have left us to the vengeance of these unspeakable 
 Pn^ ms i Ducrot also recalled the autograph letters of this 
 d Duke, the King of Wurtemberg and the King of Bavaria to 
 the Emperor, both before and after Sadov . begging him for help. 
 
 These letters were taken to the Chancellor about the 1 2th of 
 October. More than a year later Bismarck told Hohenlohe that there 
 were still M whole boxes oi letters he had not yet examined,'' and 
 that the seizure of the papers had put him in possession of w the 
 entire diplomatic correspondence of Napoleon III." He told Count 
 Beust himself that all his correspondence had been taken at Cercay. 
 
 3« 
 
The Ce^ay Papers and the German Empire 
 
 Hen* de Ruville's conclusion is that Bismarck received at the end of 
 October the most important of the documents, such as the correspond- 
 ence of Count Beust with Bray and Gramont, the letters of Varn- 
 biiler and Dalwigk, and the letters of the Grand Dukes and Kings of 
 the Southern States. Bismarck possessed a powerful blackmailing 
 weapon against them and used it immediately. Hence the change of 
 front of Bray, Beust and Dalwigk. 
 
 " This is the key," says Herr de Ruville, " to the foundation of the 
 German Empire, a phenomenon of which no satisfactory explanation 
 has hitherto been given." 
 
 Bavaria only accepted the Empire on January 21st, though the 
 Imperial Constitution had been in operation since January 1st and 
 the ceremony in which the King of Prussia was proclaimed German 
 Emperor took place on the 1 8th. That great scene was enacted in 
 the Galerie des Glace s at Versailles. It was Prussia's revenge, in the 
 palace of Louis XIV., for the humiliations she had suffered at the 
 hands of Napoleon. 
 
 However, William's ambitions were not completely realized by his 
 enthronement as successor to Louis XIV. He desired the title of 
 Emperor of Germany which would have implied sovereignty over 
 the non-Prussian States, the rulers of which were unwilling to acknow- 
 ledge it. Bismarck had persuaded the Reichstag to vote the Constitu- 
 tion and give the King the title of German Emperor only. On the 
 morning of the Versailles ceremony Bismarck had called on the 
 Grand Duke of Baden who had been selected to speak immediately 
 after the reading of the proclamation, and asked him what title he 
 proposed to give the new Emperor. " Emperor of Germany, as his 
 Majesty has decreed," was the answer. Bismarck showed him that 
 the King's desire could not be fulfilled, and the Grand Duke got out 
 of the difficulty by acclaiming " the Emperor William." Bismarck 
 says :* 
 
 " His Majesty was so offended at the course I had adopted, that on descending 
 from the raised dais of the princes he ignored me as I stood alone upon the free 
 space before it, and passed by me in order to shake hands with the generals 
 standing behind me. He maintained that attitude for several days until 
 gradually our mutual relations returned to their old form." 
 
 The Imperial Constitution was the execution of the November 
 treaties which provided for a Confederation formed by the amal- 
 
 * Reminiscences and Reflections, Vol. II., p. 132. 
 245 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 gamation of the North German Confederation with Hesse, the 
 Grand Duchy of Baden, Wiirtemberg and Bavaria. 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine was incorporated in the German Empire by the 
 Law of the 9th of June 1871, which transferred the exercise of 
 sovereignty in the two provinces to the Emperor, though certain 
 executive acts required the approval of the Bundesrat and Reichstag. 
 
 Such is the German Empire, a work of " iron and fire," of lies 
 and threats, consummated thanks to the weakness, indifference and 
 diplomatic errors of the other nations of Europe, and notably France. 
 Bismarck and the Emperor William only brought it into being for 
 the benefit of Prussia. Their aim was the prussification, not the 
 unification, of Germany. 
 
 In the first two parts of this book we have seen the system they 
 inaugurated at work. It has given countless proofs that it is the 
 greatest moral and material danger the world has ever faced. That 
 danger can only be removed by the dissolution of this political power. 
 How can that be done once and for all ? The treaty which will mark 
 the end of the present war must provide the solution of the problem. 
 
 246 
 
PART IV 
 
 THE HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHT 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 RACES AND NATIONALITIES 
 
 Definition of a race — Lack of agreement — The different elements of ethnic 
 groups — The secondary role of somatic characteristics — The race question 
 in Austria-Hungary — Historical and linguistic characteristics. 
 
 EVERY anthropologist knows the difficulty of comparing the 
 somatic characteristics of one human group with those of 
 another. The word " race," which is used so glibly in current speech, 
 is indefinite from the point of view of scientific language. 
 
 Topinard's classification, based on the grouping of five charac- 
 teristics, the nasal index, hair, cephalic index, colour and height, 
 distinguishes nineteen races. 
 
 M. A. Hovelacque, in his article " Races Actuelles " in the Die- 
 tionnaire des Sciences Anthropologiques* says : " Unquestionably 
 different characteristics distinguish the different human races. 
 But there is no exact relationship between these characteristics. 
 Classifications are out of touch with reality and do not correspond 
 to scientific distinctions. It is mere fantasy to claim to have 
 reduced a complex of characteristics to a system." 
 
 M. Deniker, in his learned work, " Races et Peuples de la Terre," 
 explains that he only uses the word " race " because it is in general 
 use, but that the groups designated by that word are " ethnical 
 groups," constituted in virtue of community of language, religion and 
 social institutions, but never of zoological species. They may 
 include human beings of one or several species, races and varieties.! 
 Somatic characteristics only play a secondary part. 
 
 * Dictionnaire des Sciences Anthropologiques: Magyars, by Emile Picot ; 
 Races, by A. Hovelacque ; Roumains, by A. Hovelacque. Les Races et les 
 Nationalitis de V Autriche-Hongrie, by B. Auerbach (1898 ; Paris, F. Alcan). 
 J. Deniker : Races et Peuples de la Terre, 1900. W. Z. Ripley : The Races 
 of Europe, 1900 (Kegan Paul & Co.). 
 
 f Deniker : Op. cit., p. 3. 
 
 249 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 In the three provinces of German Austria the population is pre- 
 dominantly brackycephalic with brown eyes and hair * With the 
 
 exception of the Slovenes, the Dalmatians and the Croats, who are 
 hycephalic and tall, all the groups present certain broad 
 eristics. 
 
 M. Louis Leger relates that in 1S06 Thiers maintained that 
 Austria was populated by Germans. Yet the race question is the 
 predomii -sue in Austro-Hungarian polities. 
 
 In 1849 Palacky, the famous historian of Bohemia, counted seven 
 rmans, Bohemians, Poles, Italians, Jugo-Slavs. 
 Mag-. Wallachians. 
 
 These g an be divided into two classes. On the one hand 
 
 the German and Hungarian groups which desire to dominate 
 
 the others ; on the other the rest, which all possess their history and 
 
 E to testify to their powers of resistance, often carried to the 
 
 point ism. 
 
 Austria has been called a u polyglot polyarchy." 
 The his: ad linguistic groups, the origin of which is extremely 
 
 1 bscure, invoke in their favour historic rights based on documents 
 and facts more or less disputed and disputable. To realize their 
 and the political complexity of the Austro-Hungarian 
 question, it is necessary to review the history of the more important 
 among them. 
 
 * Auerbach : Op. cii. 
 
 250 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 The Austrian Marches — The Duchy — The Hapsburgs — The monogram 
 A.h.I.O.U. — Austria was never among the Electors of the Empire — A 
 Duchy — Austria has no history — The title of " Emperor of Austria " dates 
 from 1804. 
 
 THE word " Austria " is a translation of the German Osterreich 
 (Eastern Kingdom), which appears for the first time in a 
 document of 996 : " In regione vulgari nomine Ostirrichi." But it 
 was not a kingdom. It was composed of two Marches governed by 
 Margraves {Mark Graf, Count of the March, or border) ; that of 
 Friuli, comprising Lower Pannonia south of the Drave, Carinthia, 
 Istria and Dalmatia, less the littoral which had been ceded to the 
 Emperor of Constantinople ; that of the East, comprising Lower 
 Pannonia north of the Drave, Upper Pannonia and the Ostmark 
 (East Mark) proper. The population was German and Slav. The 
 frontiers of this mark underwent frequent changes. At one moment 
 it included Bavaria, at another it lost Pannonia. The Hungarians 
 invaded a part of it, but were driven out after the battle of Augsburg. 
 Leopold of Babenberg, whose name is commemorated in that of the 
 town of Bamburg, received the East Mark in 973, and founded a 
 dynasty which died out in 1246. His early successors carried the 
 boundary of the mark to the Leitha after struggles with the Hun- 
 garians for the advantage of the Holy Roman Empire, which gave 
 them assistance. Their policy conformed to that of the Emperors, 
 whom they usually supported in their conflict with the Papacy. 
 Leopold III. married the sister of Henry V., by whom he had eighteen 
 children. By the marriage of his daughters the House of Babenberg 
 became connected with the families of Saxe-Thuringen, Montferrat, 
 the Piasts of Poland and the Premyslides of Bohemia. 
 
 This policy of matrimonial alliances, begun by the Babenbergs 
 was continued with great skill by the Hapsburgs. 
 
 251 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Henry II., after being compelled to surrender Bavaria, which he 
 had acquired through his marriage with the widow of Henry the 
 Proud, but which was claimed by the son of the latter, Henry the 
 Lion, after his mother's death, made Austria into a duchy free of all 
 suzerainty of Bavaria, and even hereditary in the female line (1141- 
 1177). He was one of the founders of Vienna. 
 
 Leopold V. acquired Styria, populated by Slovenes and Germans. 
 
 After King Ottokar II. of Bohemia had twice refused to recognize 
 him, Rudolph of Hapsburg was elected Emperor in 1273. He com- 
 pelled Ottokar to give up Carinthia, Carniola, Austria and Styria and 
 regarded Bohemia as an integral portion of the Empire. 
 
 But the imperial dignity was not hereditary. As became a man 
 of prudence Rudolph presented Austria, Styria and Carniola to his 
 sons Albert and Rudolph at Augsburg in 1282. Skilful though the 
 Hapsburgs were in adding to their possessions, they were not success- 
 ful in their efforts to get the Dukes of Austria included among the 
 Electors of the Holy Roman Empire. By way of compensation, 
 Rudolph IV. invented the Privilegium Majus, consisting of a series of 
 forged documents, which gave all kinds of privileges to Austria. These 
 franchises nearly brought on war and led to the treaty of 1364, by 
 which the Houses of Hapsburg-Austria and Luxemburg-Bohemia 
 guaranteed each other's hereditary possessions. Rudolph IV. added 
 the Tyrol to his inheritance. Albert V. acquired Moravia through his 
 marriage with Elisabeth, the daughter of the Emperor Sigismund, 
 in 1422. At Sigismund's suggestion the States of Bohemia and Hun- 
 gary chose him as King (1438). From that time forward the imperial 
 dignity became hereditary in the Hapsburg dynasty. Frederick V., 
 grandfather of the Emperor Charles V., and Ferdinand of Austria, 
 made Austria an archduchy. He was the author of the famous 
 monogram A.E.I.O.U. : Austria Est Imperare Orbi Universo ; Aquila 
 Electa iuste omnia vincit ; Alles Erdreicb 1st Oesterreich Unterthan 
 (" The whole earth is Austria's vassal "). 
 
 The real greatness of the House of Austria dates from the reign 
 of Maximilian. He annexed Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and the 
 Tyrol, possessed Trieste and Friuli, and inherited Gorica, Gradisca, 
 Nuttesburg and the Pusthertal. He fought France to secure his 
 succession to the Duchy of Burgundy. He used his influence as 
 Emperor to make another attempt to include Austria in the number 
 of the Electors. The seven Electors all refused to allow any addition 
 to their number. Thus Austria, which had the dignity of Holy Roman 
 
 252 
 
Austria 
 
 Emperor hereditary in her ducal line, was not one of the electoral 
 powers. 
 
 Maximilian's son, Philip the Fair, was the father of Ferdinand [. 
 and Charles V., who was elected Emperor in 15 19. But though 
 Charles kept the title of Duke of Austria, he handed over his German 
 possessions to his brother Ferdinand, to whom the Hungarians and 
 Czechs offered the crown in 1526 after the defeat of Mohacs. Nothing 
 survived of Charles V.'s Empire, comprising the Low Countries, Spain, 
 part of Italy and America, but Ferdinand consolidated the position 
 of Austria. 
 
 Austria has no history of her own. Her dukes had all manner of 
 relations with Hungary, Bohemia and the other nationalities over 
 which she extended or sought to extend her sway. They were elected 
 Emperors, though the imperial dignity was hereditary in the House of 
 Hapsburg, and as such they played an active part in the general 
 history of the world. But Austria has never been a nation, nor 
 even a kingdom. Before 1804 Austria was an archduchy. When 
 Napoleon had himself proclaimed Emperor of the French, Francis II. 
 had himself proclaimed Emperor of Austria, and the Holy Roman 
 Empire came to an end in 1806. 
 
 253 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE CZECHS 
 
 I. Slavs and Teutons — The Czech civilization — The bishopric of Prague — 
 
 German " peaceful penetration " — Relations with France — The King of 
 Bohemia as an imperial Elector — The struggle against German influence — 
 John Huss — The Czech language — Prague University — The Council of 
 Constance — The resistance of the Hussites — Ferdinand of Hapsburg — The 
 Confessio Bohemica — The Lettre de Majeste — The defenestration of Prague 
 — The Battle of the White Mountain — Reaction in Bohemia. 
 
 II. The awakening of national feeling — The Judgment of Libusa — Palacky's 
 
 letter to the Committee of Fifty — The Congress of Prague — The three issues 
 in Austria : Centralism, Dualism and Federalism — The Constitution of 
 1849 — The reaction — German policy — The electoral system — Dualism — 
 The progress of the Czechs — The decay of German influence — The Germans 
 and the Czechs — The Wacht am Rhein and the Marseillaise. 
 
 THE Germans assert that the country of Bohemia, originally 
 conquered by the Teutons, was invaded by the Slavs between 
 the fifth and seventh centuries.* But according to Posidonius, the 
 Cimbri, in their march on Rome, came into collision with the Boh, 
 who gave their name to Bojohcemum — Bohemia. The frontiers of 
 Bohemia and Moravia have been, according to the German historians 
 Ranke, Treitschke and Lamprecht, the scene of the struggle between 
 Slav and Teuton. This fact gives its importance to the history of 
 Bohemia, the people of which form the most clearly defined of the 
 national groups which make up the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
 In 874 Bohemia was governed by a Christian prince, Borivoj. His 
 son sought the protection of Germany and substituted the Latin 
 Liturgy for the Slav Liturgy, which was in the vernacular. Henry 
 
 * The German Colonisation of the East, by Professor Richard Mayer, in the 
 "History of the World;' of Dr. H. F. Helmolt, Vol. VI. (London, W. 
 Heinemann). Les Races et les Nationalites en Autriche-Hongrie, by Bernard 
 Auerbach (Paris, F. Alcan). Histoire de V Autriche-Hongrie depuis Marie- 
 Thirise, by M. Asseline (Paris, F. Alcan). Louis Leger : Histoire de l' Autriche- 
 Hongrie, le Monde Slave, etc. Austria-Hungary , by Geoffrey Drage. 
 
 254 
 
The Czechs 
 
 the Fowler, with the assistance of Arnulf of Bavaria, invaded 
 Bohemia and compelled King Vacslav, canonized by the Church and 
 better known under his Latin name of St. Wenceslaus, to pay tribute. 
 The bishopric of Prague was founded towards the close of the tenth 
 century but was attached to the archbishopric of Mainz. Its first 
 bishop was St. Adalbert who baptized the Priest-King Stephen of 
 Hungary, went to Poland, and was murdered by the Prussians in 997 
 during his missionary labours amongst them. 
 
 Vratislav II. rendered assistance to the Emperor Henry IV. in his 
 Italian expeditions and was rewarded with the title of King in 1086. 
 Bohemia, torn by the quarrels of the princes, the nobility and the 
 Bishops of Prague, was in a state of feudal anarchy. The small land- 
 owners, exploited by the nobility, grouped themselves round the 
 great barons from whom they received protection while increasing 
 their influence. 
 
 When Premysl Ottokar II. ascended the throne in 1250 Bohemia 
 had become a powerful State. This sovereign, at the invitation of 
 Pope Innocent IV., sent an expedition to East Prussia which founded 
 Konigsberg, the future capital of the Kingdom of Prussia. 
 
 Surviving every species of political turmoil, Bohemia soon became 
 the centre of mid-European civilization and Prague one of its 
 commercial emporia. The silver mines of Kutua Hova and Nemeky 
 Brod were worked there. On the occasion of the marriage of 
 Wenceslaus II. in 1297, there assembled twenty-eight princes and 
 their suites, with thousands of horses, it is said, and the ceremony was 
 reckoned as one of the greatest pageants of the Middle Ages. 
 
 During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Germans, on the 
 invitation of the Kings of Bohemia, had been busy clearing the forests. 
 Germans engaged in trade and occupied the episcopal see of Prague 
 and other important state offices. 
 
 The dynasty of the Premyslides came to an end in 1306 with 
 Wenceslaus III., who was compelled by the Emperor Albert to 
 renounce all interest in the relations between Bohemia, Poland and 
 Hungary, and was assassinated shortly after. 
 
 John, son of the Emperor Henry of Luxemburg, was so devoted to 
 France that, although blind, he fought and was slain at the battle 
 of Crecy ; but he had had his son Charles brought up in France and 
 this prince brought away a passion for economy and order, a striking 
 tribute to the superiority of French government at that period. He 
 restored the administration of finance and justice in Bohemia and 
 
 355 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 suppressed brigandage. In 1348 he founded the University of Prague 
 which brought together nearly twenty thousand students and was 
 second only to that of Paris. He invited a Frenchman, Mathias of 
 Arras, to rebuild the cathedral of Saint Vit, built the great stone 
 bridge and the royal castle of Prague, and founded the first school 
 of painting of the Middle Ages. Czech literature developed greatly 
 during his reign. In 1355 he added to his Bohemian kingdom the 
 Duchy of Silesia, the Marquisate of Lusatia and two districts of 
 Poland. He became Emperor as Charles IV., and in 1356 settled the 
 German imperial constitution by his " Golden Bull." This document 
 provided that the King of Bohemia was to be one of the seven electors 
 of the Holy Roman Empire, but that Bohemia itself was not to be a fief 
 of the Empire. If the royal family died out, the King of Bohemia 
 could only be elected by the States and the Emperor could not 
 interfere. All appeals abroad were forbidden to Bohemian subjects. 
 
 The German influences which threatened to strangle the country 
 were strongly resisted by a powerful national movement which, under 
 a religious form, centred in the figure of John Huss. Dean and 
 preacher of the Bethlehem chapel, he delivered sermons in the Czech 
 tongue in 1402. He reformed it, fixed its orthography, adapted the 
 Latin alphabet to it and weeded out the germanisms. Having 
 attacked clerical abuses, he was accused of sympathy with the doc- 
 trines of WyclifTe. Supported by the King, the Bohemian nobility, 
 who were attracted by the prospect of sharing in the secularization 
 of ecclesiastical property, and the people, he proclaimed that " the 
 Czechs ought to be the first in the Kingdom of Bohemia, as the French 
 are in the Kingdom of France and the Germans in Germany. The 
 laws, the divine will and natural instincts decree that they should 
 fill the high places." King Wenceslaus ordained that thenceforth the 
 Czech nation should have three votes in the universities and foreigners 
 only one. The Germans, angry at losing their control, went away 
 to found the University of Leipzig and bided the day of revenge. 
 John Huss was appointed Rector of Prague University, but Pope 
 John XXII. laid every town which he visited under an interdict. 
 Huss continued his propaganda in the castles of the nobility and the 
 countryside. 
 
 A council assembled at Constance. The Emperor Sigismund 
 invited Huss to appear before it and provided him with a safe 
 conduct. Huss went to Constance, but the Council, alleging that 
 the imperial safe-conduct was an encroachment of the temporal on 
 
 256 
 
The Czechs 
 
 the spiritual power, threw him into prison on a charge of heresy. 
 After being refused a hearing, he was handed over as a heretic to the 
 secular arm and burnt alive on July 6th, 141 5. 
 
 His death only inspired his followers. Under the name of 
 " Utraquists " they set up the communion in both kinds in opposition 
 to the Roman communion. The University of Prague made its 
 stand before the Council. The peasantry gathered round leaders 
 like the old knight, John Ziska, and took the name of " Taborites." 
 The Emperor Sigismund proclaimed a crusade against them but 
 met with defeat, and in a few months they held all the towns of 
 Bohemia except Pilsen and Budejovice. The Germans were driven 
 out in every quarter and lost all the advantages gained in five cen- 
 turies of effort to establish their supremacy in Bohemia. 
 
 The Hussites offered the crown to Wladislaw of Poland who, 
 prompted by Pope Martin V., perpetrated the blunder of not accepting 
 it. The German princes, led by Sigismund, prepared a new crusade. 
 The Hussites were distracted by dissensions. Some of the nobility 
 seceded. Nevertheless, the imperial army was again routed by the 
 blind Ziska on the banks of the river Sazava (1422). Ziska's 
 troops were possessed by a fanatical religious mania which is not easy 
 to understand to-day, but at the same time they were defending Czech 
 and Slav nationality against the Germans. Unfortunately the 
 Taborites came to blows with the party of the " Compactata," who 
 had made great concessions to the Utraquists. The Taborites were 
 disastrously defeated on May 30th, 1434, at Lipau, where Procop and 
 sixteen thousand of his men were slain. " The Czechs were never 
 beaten save by themselves," says M. Louis Leger, who has familiarized 
 France with the history of the Slav nationalities, a subject hitherto 
 and elsewhere ignored.* 
 
 In the end the Emperor Sigismund agreed to exclude all foreigners 
 from public appointments, to allow Hussite preachers at his court, 
 and to guarantee the prosperity of the University of Prague. 
 
 The nation was exhausted, but the nobility had grown rich at 
 the expense of the Church and the Crown. The national movement 
 of John Huss had died away in theological quibbles. Sigismund's 
 death in 1437 brought the male line of the House of Luxemburg to 
 an end and the union of Bohemia with Hungary was still unachieved. 
 
 The struggle of Bohemia against the Germans and Hungarians 
 continued with varying fortunes. In 1526, after the defeat of the 
 
 * Histoire de V Autriche-Hongrie. 
 
 257 *7 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Hungarians by the Turks in the famous Battle of Mohacs, a com- 
 mission of the Diet elected Ferdinand of Hapsburg as King, and from 
 that time forward the Bohemian crown has been hereditary in his 
 dynasty. Being a brother of Charles V., he was anxious to help on 
 the work of stamping out Protestant heresy, but the Utraquists of 
 Bohemia and the Bohemian brethren sympathized with the Lutherans. 
 After the defeat of the German Protestants at Miihlberg (1547) 
 Ferdinand established the Jesuits in Bohemia and revised the 
 franchises of the towns. The " Compactata " were abolished under 
 Maximilian who, King of Hungary as well as Emperor, and an astute 
 politician if a sceptic, hoped to hold his widely varying dominions 
 together by the bonds of religious unity. The majority of the Diet 
 adopted a profession of faith known as the " Confessio Bohemica," 
 which was inspired by Calvinism. Maximilian expressed his personal 
 approval, but refused to allow it to be published or kept in the State 
 charters (1575). In 1609, however, Rudolph recognized the Confessio 
 Bohemica in a Lettre de Majeste, and gave the Protestants control of 
 Prague University. In 161 7, during the reign of Mathias, the Arch- 
 bishop of Prague ordered the suppression of Protestant services. The 
 Bohemian Protestants, acting under the direction of Count Thurn, 
 protested, and resolved to punish the King's confidential advisers. 
 They hurled two out of five of them and their secretary from a 
 window of the Castle of Prague. Their cloaks acted as parachutes 
 and they fell nearly a hundred feet on to a rubbish heap and were 
 not killed. The " defenestration of Prague " was the signal for the 
 outbreak of the Thirty Years War. 
 
 No country suffered more than Bohemia during that upheaval. 
 The Battle of the White Mountain on June 21st, 1621, left her helpless 
 before Ferdinand. The leaders of the national movement were 
 executed and their heads exposed on the bridge at Prague. Others 
 were banished. All their property was confiscated and given to 
 adventurers, mainly Germans, who had joined the imperial ranks. 
 Even at the present day the Bohemian nobility are for the most part 
 descended from these upstarts. The Catholic religion was the only 
 one allowed. The Jesuits controlled the University and Archbishopric 
 of Prague. In 1627 the Bohemian Constitution was abrogated, and 
 the crown declared hereditary in the Hapsburg dynasty. German 
 became the official language side by side with the Czech, and later, 
 in the reign of Joseph II., was proclaimed the sole official language. 
 The history of Bohemia, as a nation, stops here. Overrun and 
 
 258 
 
The Czechs 
 
 ravaged in turn by the armies of Wallenstein and the Swedes, by the 
 end of the war she had lost a large proportion of her population. 
 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the resurrec- 
 tion of Czech nationality was heralded in literature. Old Czech books 
 were brought to light. M. Louis Leger, in his " Histoire de l'Autriche- 
 Hongrie," says : " The discovery of poems of the Middle Ages, like 
 the Judgment of Libusa and the manuscript of Kralove-Dzvor, was 
 received with enthusiasm." The authenticity of these poems has 
 been questioned, but they none the less had an irresistible influence. 
 " Shame were it on us to take our law from the Germans," said the 
 Judgment of Libusa. " The stranger has entered by force into our 
 heritage and commands us in an unknown tongue," said the Kralove- 
 Dwor manuscript. In 1824 the poet Kollar published the SlavyDeera 
 (" The Daughter of Slava "), and cried : " Shame on Bohemia that 
 she has let herself be colonized by the Germans." And in a passionate 
 appeal he proclaimed the unity of the Slav race : 
 
 " Russians, Serbs, Czechs, Poles, unite ! From Athos to Pomerania, from 
 the fields of Silesia to the plain of Kossovo, from Constantinople to the Volga, 
 everywhere where the Slav tongue is spoken, let us all rejoice and embrace ! " 
 
 In 1848 the National Party demanded union with Moravia, the 
 restoration of Silesia to Bohemia, the reconstitution of the kingdom 
 of Bohemia, and the establishment of equal rights for the two 
 nationalities of Austria and Bohemia. It was not an extravagant 
 programme. 
 
 The German Committee of Fifty at Frankfort assembled to arrange 
 the convocation of the German Parliament, invited Palacky, the 
 historian of Bohemia, to join them. He replied : 
 
 " The avowed object of your meeting is to replace a federation of princes 
 by a federation of peoples and revive the national sentiment of Germany. . . . 
 I am no German, but a Czech, of Slav origin, and such as I am, I am at the 
 service of my nation. It is perhaps a small nation, but it constitutes a historic 
 individuality." 
 
 The Government of Vienna had given Bohemia certain undertakings 
 which it proceeded to disregard in the Constitution of April 25th. 
 A Congress composed of Czech, Moravian, Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, 
 Croat and Serb delegates, was then summoned at Prague. Hardly had 
 it met before it was broken up after a riot, the causes of which have 
 never been known. 
 
 259 17* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 There were three parties, the party of " Centralism," supported by 
 the Germans, which wished to unite all the nationalities under a 
 single government at Vienna ; the party of " Dualism," represented 
 by the Hungarians who stood for Hungarian autonomy and domina- 
 tion ; the party of " Federalism," which desired to maintain the 
 Austrian Empire while satisfying all the various nationalities which 
 composed it. Palacky had drawn up a federal constitution providing 
 for four joint ministries and a central Diet composed of seven nations 
 — Germans, Bohemians, Poles, Italians, Jugo-Slavs, Magyars and 
 Wallachians. 
 
 At this moment the Frankfort Parliament was declaring that no 
 part of the German Empire should be united in a single State with 
 any non-German countries, and that if a German and a non-German 
 State had the same sovereign, the tie between them was to be regarded 
 as purely personal. The Austrian Emperor, so far from acquiescing 
 in his exclusion from Germany, maintained his claim to the hegemony 
 of Central Europe. The Diet which met at Vienna was dissolved, 
 and the Government conceded the constitution of March 4th, 1849, 
 which never materialized and was suppressed on January 1st, 1852. 
 This constitution guaranteed equal rights, both to the historic nations 
 (Volker) and the individual races {V oik erst amme). These " races," 
 not defined, had the right of maintaining their language and nationality. 
 The Government's mental reservation was not obscure ; all these 
 races were equal, but the German was their superior.* 
 
 Alexander Bach, the new head of the Ministry, resumed the tradi- 
 tional policy of Metternich until after the war with Italy. On the 
 outbreak of that war the Bohemian peasants said : " If we are beaten 
 we shall get a constitution, but if we win we shall have the Inquisition." 
 The Emperor was beaten and dismissed Bach, but the Schmerling 
 ministry persisted in his endeavours to maintain the German domina- 
 tion. They organized the provincial diets on the system of the 
 representation of interests by establishing three classes of electors — 
 the great landowners, the burgesses of the towns, and the country 
 peasants. The distribution of the constituencies also favoured the 
 Germans at the expense of the Slavs. In Bohemia the German 
 hamlet of Panhen, with five hundred inhabitants, had a deputy, 
 while the Slav town of Kladno had none. In 1863 the accession to 
 power of Belcredi, a Moravian, brought a glimmer of hope to the 
 Slavs. 
 
 * Auerbach, p. 29. 
 260 
 
The Czechs 
 
 Unhappily, after Sadowa, the Emperor Francis Joseph summoned 
 Count Beust, formerly Saxon Foreign Minister, whose one idea was 
 to establish the Dual System and ruthlessly sacrifice the Slav peoples 
 to the Magyars and the Germans of Austria. The Czechs of Bohemia 
 and Moravia resisted, and in 187 1 the Austrian minister, Karl Hohen- 
 wart, revived their hopes for the restoration of the kingdom of 
 Bohemia. But the Germans destroyed these hopes at the meetings 
 between Francis Joseph and William at Ischl, Salzburg and Gastein. 
 The only concessions Bohemia secured were the recognition of the 
 equality of the two languages in 1878 and the foundation of a Czech 
 university at Prague in 1879. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Czechs go from strength to strength. Prague, 
 which was a German city in 1850, is wholly Czech to-day. The same 
 may be said of Pilsen and the smaller towns, which are recruited 
 from the Czechs of the country districts. Germans predominate only 
 in certain mining districts in the mountains. 
 
 The Germans of Bohemia, wearing the old colours of Germany and 
 singing the " Wacht am Rhein," never attempted to conceal their 
 hatred of the Czechs. They not only celebrated the anniversary of 
 Sedan, but wished to raise a statue of Bismarck in memory of Sadowa. 
 The Czechs replied with the " Marseillaise " and open professions of 
 their sympathy with France. 
 
 In 1910 the Czechs of Bohemia, the Slavs of Moravia and the 
 Slovaks of Transleithania numbered 8,500,000. If the Austro- 
 Hungarian monarchy is dismembered they must form an independent 
 State. 
 
 261 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 THE HUNGARIANS 
 
 Their origin uncertain — They belonged to the Finno-Ugrian family — Their 
 choice of Western civilization — St. Stephen — A State independent of the 
 Roman and Eastern Empires — Struggles with the Turks — Ferdinand of 
 Austria elected King of Hungary — The Ottoman invasions — Religious 
 persecution — Resistance to German influence — The Hungarian aristocracy 
 — Szechenyi — The Magyar language — Fiscal privileges — Historic rights and 
 formalities — Revolts by and against the Hungarians — Retrogression — 
 Hungarian policy is anti-German towards Hungarians, but Prussian towards 
 others — Hungarian ambitions and their realization to-day. 
 
 THE origin of the Hungarians is very obscure. Their language 
 is supposed to belong to the Finno-Ugrian family mingled with 
 Turkish elements. It is surmised that among the subjects of the 
 Khazars, a combination of Huns and Turks, whose Kha-Khan dwelt 
 in the Crimea, was a race to whom the Greeks and Romans gave the 
 name of Hungares or Hungarians. Vambery pronounces them to be 
 Turco-Tatars. 
 
 In the course of the ninth century they crossed the Carpathians 
 under the leadership of their semi-mythical chief, Arpad, and spread 
 over that great plain between the Danube and the Theiss, which they 
 have called the " Alfold." There they found a remnant of the Khazar 
 nation which went under the name of " Mogers," or " Magyars," a 
 word meaning " men of the soil," according to the derivation generally 
 accepted. Vambery, however, alleges that it is synonymous with the 
 Turkish word " bajar," meaning " powerful " or " ruler." 
 
 The Emperor Arnulf summoned them to war against the Moravians, 
 and they destroyed the Moravian kingdom. In 899 they ravaged 
 Carinthia and Friuli, and penetrated into Lombardy. In 900 they 
 invaded Bavaria and imposed tribute. Their horsemen overran 
 Alsace, Lorraine and Burgundy, leaving behind them the word " ogre " 
 as a souvenir of the terror they inspired ; but in 955 they were routed 
 at the Battle of Augsburg and driven out of Germany. 
 
 262 
 
The Hungarians 
 
 The Hungarians had to choose between Eastern and Western 
 civilization. They adopted the Latin alphabet and the Roman 
 faith. In iooo a.d. Stephen received the crown at the hands of the 
 Pope. The state he thus founded was subject neither to the Eastern 
 nor the Western Empire. The Magyars have preserved the crown 
 of St. Stephen as the symbol of their nationality. 
 
 They shared in the defeat of the Serbs on the fatal field of Kossovo 
 in 1389. Occasionally allied to the Ottomans, they more usually 
 suffered defeats by them. After the battle of Mohacs in 1526, in the 
 hope of increasing their military power they offered the crown of 
 St. Stephen to Ferdinand of Austria, subject to a declaration on his 
 part that " we bind ourselves to preserve your nation and language 
 and never to betray them " (" Nationem et linguam vestram servare, 
 non perdere, intendimus "). 
 
 Few nations have suffered greater misfortunes than the Hungarians. 
 Before 1689 Hungary was invaded and partially occupied by the 
 Turks. She adopted the Reformation and suffered abominations, 
 like the Pressburg trial of 1673, when ninety Protestant ministers 
 were condemned to death. In 1687 Leopold proclaimed that he had 
 the right to treat Hungary as a conquered country and transformed 
 the elective monarchy, an institution that had lasted seven hundred 
 years, into a monarchy hereditary in the Hapsburg family. The 
 " germanization " of Hungary proceeded apace. 
 
 Maria Theresa helped on the process by the arts of diplomacy, but 
 Joseph II., saturated with the theories of the French philosophers, a 
 man before his time and contemptuous of historical tradition and the 
 claims of race and nationality, attempted to make the use of the 
 German language compulsory. On his death in 1790, the Hungarians 
 broke into revolt and tried to sever their connection with the Haps- 
 burg dynasty. But the champions of Hungarian nationality were 
 only the nobles and country magnates who oppressed the peasantry 
 by shifting the burden of taxation on to their shoulders. They were 
 in mortal terror that some echo of the French Revolution might be 
 heard in the countryside and were very relieved when Leopold II. 
 assumed the crown of St. Stephen. 
 
 When Francis II. proclaimed himself Emperor of Austria in 1804, 
 their national pride was stung to the quick. 
 
 The wars of Austria with revolutionary France and Napoleon led 
 to no secession by Hungary. After Wagram, Napoleon issued to the 
 Hungarians a proclamation skilfully inspired by the poet Bacsanyi, 
 
 263 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 who had spent nine years in prison for having translated the 
 Marseillaise. But to the Hungarian magnates Napoleon stood for 
 the revolutionary ideas which they detested. 
 
 After 1815, Francis II., thinking that he had no further need of 
 their services on the battlefield, neglected to convene the Diet and 
 he and Metternich devoted their attention to germanizing them. In 
 1825, however, he wanted men for his campaign against Italy. He 
 was compelled to summon the Diet. In previous diets a kind of 
 dog-Latin had been spoken, but now Szechenyi spoke in the Magyar 
 tongue in the House. Between 1833 and 1835 there were lively 
 debates on the question of reforming the condition of the peasantry, 
 but the magnates were extremely jealous of their privileges. When 
 a toll was imposed on all, without distinction of rank, who crossed 
 the bridge of Budapest, the great judge, Cziraki, vowed he would never 
 set foot on that debasing highway. 
 
 Basing their claims on historic tradition, the Hungarians attach 
 great importance to the formalities associated with it. Ferdinand IV. 
 offended them deeply by neglecting to be crowned at Budapest. 
 
 The revolution of 1848 entailed the collapse of Metternich's policy. 
 All the German princelets granted constitutions. All the nationalities 
 of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were in a ferment. On March 3rd 
 the Chamber of Magyar Deputies, assembled at Pressburg, acting 
 on the suggestion of Kossuth, passed a resolution demanding a 
 constitution. 
 
 The Hungarians, however, were only a minority in the countries 
 of the crown of St. Stephen. The Serbs, Croats and Roumanians 
 over whom they tyrannized rose in revolt against them. The Hun- 
 garians likewise broke into rebellion against the Emperor who had 
 commissioned Jellachich, ban of Croatia, to restore order. The 
 populace of Vienna, loathing the Slavs, took the part of the Hungarians. 
 On the 2nd of December, 1849, Ferdinand abdicated in favour of 
 Francis Joseph, the present Emperor. 
 
 The new Sovereign called on Russia for aid. The Russians inter- 
 vened actively and Hungary was reduced to silence. 
 
 Next came Austria's two disastrous wars, the struggle with Italy 
 in 1859 and her defeat at Sadowa in 1866. That moment marked 
 the triumph of Dualism. The Hungarian " sage," Deak, produced 
 a programme of ten points, and in 1867 he secured the " Compromise " 
 which " fixed the relations of Hungary towards the other lands under 
 His Majesty's rule." Hungary recognized no central Parliament, 
 
 264 
 
The Hungarians 
 
 and constituted an independent constitutional monarchy with the 
 Emperor of Austria as King. Hungary nominated delegates to the 
 two chambers to deliberate on common affairs. The defence of the 
 integrity of the monarchy was the common concern of Hungary and 
 the other states of the Empire. Foreign affairs were a common 
 concern, likewise finance so far as it related to the army and 
 foreign policy. Common affairs were in the hands of a special 
 Ministry. 
 
 This pact, however, only bound the Hungarians and the Emperor. 
 Count Beust, who had been summoned from Dresden to take up 
 the post of First Minister, is reported to have said to Deak : " Look 
 after your own hordes and we will look after ours." By " hordes " 
 he meant the Croats, Serbs and Roumanians. 
 
 From that time forth, while the Government at Vienna has pro- 
 ceeded with the germanization of Cisleithania, the Hungarians have 
 patiently persevered with the task of magyarizing the Roumanians, 
 Slovaks and Serbo-Croats who inhabit Transleithania. Nevertheless, 
 their recriminations against Austria have not diminished. They have 
 been anxious to transform the Compromise of 1867 into a simple 
 personal union and there was a violent conflict over the question of 
 giving orders in German in the army. For several years Hungary 
 was in a state of anarchy. 
 
 As a race the Magyars are charming and friendly, but they never 
 forget that they owed the Compromise of 1867 to the victories of 
 Prussia and if their domestic policy has been anti-German, Andrassy 
 showed that their foreign policy is Prussian. 
 
 To judge by the charges levelled by some Hungarians against the 
 Government of Vienna it might be thought that they desired the 
 separation of Hungary and Austria. Yet that is not the goal even 
 of the extremists, for they have no wish to be ten million Hungarians 
 isolated among the twenty-one million inhabitants of Transleithania. 
 They do not look forward to the return of the three million Rouman- 
 ians of Transylvania to Roumania, the constitution of a Czech state 
 by the addition of two million Slovaks to the Czechs and Moravians, 
 and the foundation of greater Serbia by the amalgamation of the 
 Croats and the Serbs. Such an eventuality would find them a small 
 State surrounded by peoples whom they had habitually harassed and 
 oppressed. What influence would they have ? What would be 
 their part in the world ? Hungary, confined within her true limits, 
 would be cut off from the sea. 
 
 265 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The Hungarians, so far from pining for separation, are the most 
 active opponents of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian 
 monarchy. Their ambition is to dominate in that monarchy, and 
 the present moment sees them under Count Tisza and Baron Burian 
 in the act of realizing their desires. 
 
 266 
 
CHAPTER V 
 THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 
 
 The Croats — Latin influences — The Serbs and Byzantine influences — Historic 
 claims : Koloman II. — Croats v. Magyars — The defeat of Kossovo — Serbia 
 — A Turkish pashalik from 1459 to 1804 — The Croats escaped Turkish rule 
 — Illyria — Subject provinces or allied kingdoms — Croat nationality — The 
 Nagoda of 1868 — Subjection to the Hungarians — The oppression of Croatia 
 — The liberation of Serbia — Bosnia and Herzgovina — Antagonisms and 
 aspirations — The Congress of Abbazia. 
 
 THE Romans were in occupation of Pannonia in the year 35 b.c. 
 When the Eastern Empire was founded in 315 it remained 
 an appanage of the Western Empire. 
 
 We first hear of the Croats, or Chrobati, Chrovati, and Khzvraty, 
 as the contemporary chroniclers call them, in the first half of the 
 seventh century after the invasions of the Goths and Avars in the 
 fifth and sixth. They formed the left wing of the Great Slav invasion 
 which extended from Bulgaria to the Adriatic. They occupied the 
 regions between the Drave and the Save, now known as Croatia- 
 Slavonia, Dalmatia and North-West Bosnia. They came under 
 Latin influence, and when they entered the Frankish Empire in 806 
 they accepted the Church of Rome and the Latin alphabet. 
 
 The Serbs crossed the Danube perhaps just before the occupation 
 of Pannonia by the Croats. They were only a collection of clans, 
 more or less related, but without political unity. Each of these clans, 
 called " zhupaniyas," attempted to subdue the others. Drawn this 
 way and that by the Eastern Empire and Church and the Church of 
 Rome, and living in fear of the Bulgarians, who had formed a powerful 
 kingdom on their eastern and south-eastern frontiers since the close 
 of the seventeenth century, their political life had been strenuous 
 and eventful. 
 
 Towards the end of the ninth century they recognized the suzerainty 
 of the Eastern Empire, and adopted the Greek Church and the 
 Cyrillic alphabet. At the close of the twelfth century Serbia 
 
 267 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 renounced all allegiance to the Eastern Empire and established a 
 national church with a Slavonian liturgy and sacred books in the 
 Slavonian tongue. 
 
 The differences which have separated the Croats and Serbs in the 
 past, and even keep them apart to-day, must be traced to the rivalry 
 of these two competing influences. The somatic characteristics of 
 the two groups are identical ; both Croats and Serbs are tall, dark 
 and brachycephalic. 
 
 The Croats, like the Serbs, had to defend their independence both 
 against the Bulgarians and the Hungarians. In 1102 they offered 
 their kingdom to Koloman II. 
 
 The character of Koloman's sovereignty has always been a theme 
 of lively debate between the Magyar and Croat historical schools. 
 Magyar writers like Pesty allege that Croatia surrendered her in- 
 dependence to the Magyars out of fear, and thenceforth submitted 
 to Hungarian domination. The Croats assert that Koloman was 
 King only by personal right, and that they kept their capital Agram, 
 their army, coinage and fiscal system and the right of controlling 
 the administration and nominating the bishops. Even at the present 
 day they appeal to the maxim, Regnum regno non 'prcescribit leges, 
 and cite in proof the undeniable fact that they have never ceased to 
 resist the encroachments of the Magyars. 
 
 Stephen Dushan, King of Serbia, was proclaimed Emperor of the 
 Serbs and Greeks at Uskub in 1346, and in 1349 published the " Laws 
 of the Tsar Dushan," which show the high degree of development 
 to which Serbian civilization had attained. He died in 1355 at tne 
 moment when, marching on Constantinople, he was hoping to establish 
 a powerful State to stay the advance of the Turks. The Turks, after 
 a victory on the Tenarus in 1371, won a crushing victory at Kossovo 
 in 1389 which delivered Serbia and Bulgaria into their hands. Yet 
 though Serbia became a vassal state of Turkey, she retained her own 
 government until 1459, when she became a mere pashalik, governed 
 directly by the Porte. This state of affairs continued for three 
 hundred and forty-five years to 1804. 
 
 It is difficult for a Western nation to imagine the lamentable 
 condition of peoples suffering from the effects of centuries of Turkish 
 misrule. All the more remarkable is the pertinacity with which 
 they have preserved their personality and inherited characteristics 
 and their refusal to regard their servitude as perpetual. 
 
 The Hungarians, even when fighting the Turks, never relaxed 
 
 268 
 
The Southern Slavs 
 
 their hold on Croatia. In 1490 Matthias Corvinus had to abandon 
 Slavonia to them, but his successor, Ladislaus of Poland, styled 
 himself King of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. 
 
 After the battle of Mohacs in 1526 the Turks extended their sway, 
 not only over Hungary, but over Croatia, and by 1606 only Western 
 Croatia with the towns of Agram, Karlstadt, Warasdin and Zengy 
 retained their independence. The Turks, however, made no attempt 
 to colonize Slavonia and Croatia and left no permanent mark on 
 these provinces as they did on Bosnia. The variation in treatment 
 explains the differences between the Bosniacs and the Serbo-Croats 
 of to-day. 
 
 By the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699 and the Treaty of Passarowitz 
 in 1718 the Turks ceded Slavonia and all Hungary in their occupation 
 to Austria. 
 
 The name " Croatia " was applied officially to the Slavonic pro- 
 vinces of Visovitza, Pozega and Syrmia. From 1767 to 1777 these 
 provinces, to which Dalmatia was added, received the name of Illyria, 
 and were governed from Vienna, but afterwards they were divided. 
 The port of Fiume was taken from Croatia and given to Hungary. 
 In 1809, after Wagram, Napoleon formed a new amalgamation of 
 Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorz and Gradisca, 
 which he called the Illyrian Provinces. They remained until 18 1 3 
 under French administration, from which they derived substantial 
 benefit, but they never reconciled themselves to the quid pro quo in 
 the shape of conscription. In 18 14 Dalmatia was incorporated in 
 Austria, while Istria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorz and Gradisca became 
 the Kingdom of Illyria, which lasted until 1849 ; but Croatia 
 and Slavonia were declared appanages of the crown of 
 Hungary. 
 
 The Hungarians assert that they were considered as partes adnexce, 
 or subject provinces, but the Croats and Slavonians maintain that 
 their true position was that of regna soda, or allied states. The Croats 
 were allowed to retain their language as an official language, and an 
 elective Diet. A Ban or Viceroy governed them in the name of 
 Hungary. 
 
 Throughout this period there were efforts among the Croats, as 
 among the Czechs, to revive national feeling. The leaders of this 
 movement were a writer, Ljudevit Gaj, and, later, Bishop Strossmayer 
 and Baron Joseph Jellachich, who became Ban in 1848, when the 
 Illyrists assumed power. They made war on the Hungarians and 
 
 269 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 were defeated but Jellachich immediately took action against them 
 in the name of the Government of Vienna. The Constitution of 1849 
 separated Croatia-Slavonia from Hungary and it became a province 
 of the Austrian crown. Fiume was added to it. The period of 
 reaction, during which there was neither ban nor diet, lasted from 1850 
 to i860. Immediately after the war with Italy the Government of 
 Vienna conceded the " October Diploma," which was followed by 
 the constitution of February, 1861 ; but the elected diet was dissolved 
 as soon as it demanded the formation of a great Southern-Slav 
 confederation under the Imperial Government. 
 
 After Sadowa, in the heyday of Dualism, Croatia-Slavonia became 
 part of the Hungarian crown lands. By the " Nagoda " of 1868 
 it was placed under the Government at Budapest. The Viceroy, or 
 Ban, is appointed nominally by His Imperial and Royal Majesty, 
 but in reality by the Prime Minister of Hungary. The provincial 
 government is in the hands of three ministers who are responsible 
 to the Ban, who is himself responsible only to the Hungarian Ministry 
 and the National Assembly (Narodna Skupshtina), which has no 
 control. This assembly consists of members elected by electors 
 who vote orally before officials in the pay of the Ban, and privileged 
 members drawn from the nobility, the upper clergy and the civil 
 service. All legislative acts must be signed by a minister without 
 portfolio who is a member of the Hungarian cabinet. The Assembly 
 sends forty members to the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, but 
 they can only take part in questions immediately concerning Croatia- 
 Slavonia. The situation of Fiume makes it the port of Croatia and 
 it performed that function from 1848 to 1870, when it was handed 
 over to Austria along with its enclave of some eight square miles. It 
 is now administered by the Government at Budapest. 
 
 Croatia has always objected to this dispensation. In 1875 and 
 1876, when the train fired by Bosnia led to the Turkish war which 
 ended in the Berlin Treaty of 1878, a party calling itself the " Party 
 of the Right " began an agitation for a " Greater Croatia." It was 
 rewarded with repressive measures and the imprisonment of its 
 leader. Since that time Croatia has suffered all the evils of despotism. 
 In 1888 Bishop Strossmayer was compelled to resign for having sent 
 a telegram to the Russian Church. 
 
 The Croats have accordingly agitated for union with Bosnia and 
 Herzgovina. In 1908 Baron Rauch, Ban of Croatia, refused to 
 summon the Diet. 
 
 270 
 
The Southern Slavs 
 
 The abominable treatment of the Croats has been related 
 elsewhere.* 
 
 It has been shown that Serbia was a Turkish province from 1459 
 to 1804. From 1804 to the autumn of 181 3 it enjoyed self-govern- 
 ment as an independent State. By the Treaty of 1 81 2 with Turkey 
 Russia did not secure sufficient protection for the Serbs, and in 18 17 
 the Serbs broke into revolt and, after a conflict, regained their 
 autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. In 1829 Russia 
 guaranteed that autonomy in the Treaty of Adrianople, but Belgrade 
 and other Serbian towns retained their Turkish garrisons until 1867. 
 
 In 1875, when Bosnia tried to shake off the Turkish yoke, the Serbs 
 declared war on Turkey ; but though they were defeated, their action 
 brought Russia into the war which ended in the Treaties of San 
 Stefano and Berlin. The Treaty of Berlin recognized the complete 
 independence of Serbia, but placed Bosnia and Herzgovina under 
 Austrian administration. 
 
 The Austrian minister Andrassy, a Hungarian by birth, who had 
 concluded the alliance between Austria-Hungary and the German 
 Empire, resigned rather than accept the gift. 
 
 Thus there are Serbo-Croats on one side of the frontier, Serbians 
 on the other, and Bosniacs and Herzgovinians in immediate contact 
 with both, the bond of sympathy between them being hatred of 
 Austria. On May 13th, 1848, when the Serbians formed them- 
 selves into an independent nation, they demanded union with Croatia. 
 
 It is often said that the two aspirations — a Greater Serbia and a 
 Greater Croatia, with Bosnia, Herzgovina and Dalmatia as buffers 
 between them — are incompatible. The question is whether these 
 two Slav groups are capable of subduing their national pride and 
 reconciling their religious and linguistic differences ? Can they 
 profess and practise equality between all the groups, which include 
 the Slavs of the south as well as those of Northern Istria and the 
 districts of Udine and Carniola, Slovenes, Serbo-Croats, Serbs and 
 Dalmatians ? 
 
 If prolonged national misfortunes can teach men anything, the 
 answer is in the affirmative, and, indeed, in this case that answer 
 seems to have been already given. 
 
 Yet the Serbian clergy showed hostility to the IHyrian movement 
 because they wished to preserve Slavonic as the language of the 
 liturgy. They affected to detect papal encroachments in the adoption 
 
 * Supra, Part I., Chapters IV. and V, 
 271 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 oi .-. igue. The difference of creed unquestionably keeps 
 
 the two &ati< >art, though the Concordat of 1014 
 
 . : the Holy See is a iliation. 
 
 It will be remem 1 led to disasti 
 
 at Agram. However, to rds th< March, 1913, the 
 
 Southern Slavs held a congress at Abb which a memorandum 
 
 was read which had been placed before the Irchduke Francis 
 
 id, the imperial heir, I oi members of the Croat 
 
 asked that the Dual System of 1867 should be 
 
 .• a cod - Se bo Croatia should form part. 
 
 "All our youth," ran the memorandum, " Eoi a union with 
 
 ... and Eeels itself drawn to the south by the recent successes 
 
 of the Balkan League. The Governments Austria and Hungary, 
 
 preparing the 
 
 great separatist movement, and perhaps for a rcvolur. 
 the Southern Slavs." 
 
 2 ~ J 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE DISSOLUTION OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY 
 
 Joseph II. 's germanizing zeal— The policy of Metiernich and Francis if. - 
 
 Divide ut imperes — Constitutional and centralist policy— The Diet of 
 Kromcriz — Bach The G rmans oi Austria are one with the Germans oi 
 Germany — The three bonds oi the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — The 
 
 Emperor — His titles — The army — 'J he bureaucracy 'I he selection oi ol 
 
 — The dissolution oi the Austro-I Jungarian Monarchy — Both Germans and 
 
 Hungarians have striven for its dismemberment — Magyar centralism. 
 
 IT 1ST0RY records the failure of all attempts by the Dukes and 
 JL Emperors of Austria, the Kings of Bohemia and Hungary 
 and others, to germanize the different ethnical groups over whom 
 they held sway. Joseph II. 's systematic efforts towards the unifica- 
 tion of language and institutions met with passionate resentment 
 and open hostility. Yet his motive was unquestionably to advance 
 the welfare of the various peoples of his dominions. In 1790 he 
 relieved his successors of the burden of carrying out his reforms by 
 revoking them on his deathbed. 
 
 Francis II. issued a penal code in 1803 and a civil code in 181 1. 
 Hungary and Transylvania refused to accept the civil code. 
 Although obsessed by the ideas of the eighteenth century, he main- 
 tained a special code of laws for the Church, the Jews, and the land- 
 owning interest. Without reviving serfdom he vexed the peasantry 
 with all manner of feudal exactions. 
 
 After 1 815 Metternich abandoned the work of unification and 
 took for his motto the maxim " Divide ut imperes" Francis II. 
 defined his policy in the following terms to the French Ambassador : 
 
 " My peoples are foreigners to each other. All the better. They will not all 
 have the same diseases at the same time. I put Hungarians in Italy and Italians 
 in Hungary. They do not understand each other and hate each other. From 
 their antipathies comes order, and peace from their mutual dislike." 
 
 We have, however, seen proofs of the resentment of the Magyars, 
 
 273 18 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 and when the Revolution of 1848 broke out the whole fabric seemed 
 on the point of collapse. 
 
 ^ Intelligent statesmen would have met the wishes of the various 
 nationalities by adopting a federal system, but the Germans had no 
 intention of abandoning their control of the Empire. Schwarzenburg 
 was the apostle of absolutism but Ferdinand was compelled to 
 abdicate in favour of Francis Joseph, the present Emperor, then 
 eighteen years old and declared of age for the occasion. His minister 
 Stadion followed a constitutional and centralist policy : " To unite 
 all the lands and peoples of the Monarchy in one great State with a 
 single Government at Vienna." He was none the less so conscious 
 of the insuperable difficulties of his programme that he did not summon 
 the representatives of Hungary to the Diet of Kromeriz. He then 
 used their absence, for which he was responsible, to declare the Diet 
 invalid and dissolve it. The Emperor looked also to Frankfort and 
 the Germans of Austria hoped to dominate the Germanic Confederation 
 at the same time as the nations of the Austrian Empire. 
 
 Austria was declared an independent, indivisible and indissoluble 
 state. From 1850 to i860 Bach continued the despotic tradition of 
 Metternich. He maintained a state of siege until 1854 an< ^ n ^ s name 
 is associated with police government and Clericalism, the two elements 
 most hostile to individual national sentiment. In 1856 a Concordat 
 put public education in the hands of the clergy and the Jesuits. 
 All religions other than Catholicism could only be practised in private. 
 Juries and public trial were suppressed. The publication of news- 
 papers in the Czech tongue was forbidden. 
 
 This centralizing German Government was shattered by the 
 disasters of 1859 and 1866. The emancipation of Vienna's subject 
 peoples was brought about by the victories of Austria's enemies and 
 defeat has been the instrument of progress in that Empire. But the 
 Compromise of 1867 satisfied only the Germans of Cisleithania and 
 the Magyars of Transleithania, both of whom threatened the Hungarian 
 monarchy with disruption. 
 
 The Germans of Austria have compared Bohemia to Schleswig, 
 and, associating themselves with the Germans of Germany, pro- 
 claimed in the Reichsrath that " they had not won at Sedan to become 
 the helots of the Czechs." After the establishment of the Dual System 
 the first Austrian ministry was composed of eight Germans and a Pole. 
 
 The peoples of Austria-Hungary are the people of the King- 
 Emperor in an almost feudal sense. 
 
 274 
 
The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 
 He triumphed over the Hungarians in the affair of the military words 
 of command, when he threatened to abdicate. Not even the most 
 uncompromising of the extremists was ready to assume responsi- 
 bility for such a catastrophe. The Hapsburgs have always had one 
 fundamental policy : Foluntas imperatoris suprema lex esto (" The 
 Emperor's will is the highest law "). The Kaiser parades it before 
 the eyes of the world, but the Emperors of Austria have preferred 
 to put it into practice. 
 
 Ministers and other public servants must devote all their patriotic 
 sentiment to the service of 
 
 Francis Joseph (Franz-Joseph) I. Charles, Emperor of Austria, Apostolic 
 King of Hungary, King of Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodo- 
 meria and Illyria, King of Jerusalem, etc., Archduke of Austria, Grand-Duke of 
 Tuscany and Cracow, Duke of Lorraine, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and 
 Bukovina, Prince of Transylvania, Margrave of Moravia, Duke of Upper and 
 Lower Silesia, Modena, Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, Auschwitz and Zator, 
 Teschen, Friuli, Ragusa and Zara, Prince Count of Hapsburg and Tyrol, Kyburg, 
 Goritz and Gradisca, Prince of Trent and Brixen, Margrave of Upper and Lower 
 Lusatia and in Istria ; Count of Hohenembs, Feldkirch, Brigantia, Sonnenberg, 
 etc., Lord of Trieste, Cattaro and the Wendian March, Grand Voyvode of Serbia, 
 etc., etc., Maj. Imp. and Roy. Apostolic* 
 
 The Emperor has two instruments of government — the army and 
 the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is the State. The universities 
 train the officials and professors themselves become ministers in the 
 Austrian cabinets, which are not composed of ministers responsible 
 to Parliament. They are heirs to the traditions of Joseph II. As 
 men they are generally very charming and highly expert in depart- 
 mental business, but they are utterly unscrupulous in their methods 
 of government and have the most profound contempt for individual 
 rights. t 
 
 The other instrument of government is the army. A Viennese 
 poet said to General Radetzky in 1848 : "Austria is there, in your 
 camp." The army cannot be national because, collectively, it does 
 not represent a nation, but is a hotch-potch of nationalities thrown 
 together and more or less at enmity with each other. The element of 
 unity is supplied by the person of the Emperor, the General Staff 
 and the corps of officers. Many officers, poor but of high birth, look 
 
 * Almanack de Gotha. 
 
 I See the Journal des frconomistes , 1914, Aug. 14th, p. 177-187 and Sept. 15th, 
 P- 2 73- 
 
 275 18* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 to the military profession as a career for their sons. Between the 
 ages of ten and twelve the sons are admitted without payment 
 to the primary cadet Realscbulen, and from there go on to the 
 superior cadet Realschulen. Between seventeen and twenty they 
 choose their arm and enter one of the two academies, from which 
 they emerge second lieutenants, not after a competitive examination, 
 but after their studies have been completed. Those who distinguish 
 themselves most become officers, while the others become cadets, with 
 rank varying from acting-officer to that of sergeant (corpoul). For 
 wealthy families which do not wish to part with their sons at once, 
 there are cadet schools which they enter between the ages of fourteen 
 and seventeen. The cadets are never allowed to mix with the men. 
 The higher ranks have been increased to facilitate promotion and 
 encourage the officers. There are few Magyar officers in the active 
 army but many Slav officers. 
 
 The Sovereign's bodyguard is of five different kinds. The rank and 
 file of Arcierengarden and the Hungarian Guard is composed of 
 senior and junior regimental officers, while the duties of non-com- 
 missioned officers are performed by generals and colonels.* 
 
 The Archdukes have special titles and honours. 
 
 Each soldier takes an oath of personal allegiance to the Emperor. 
 Each man must have a religion, and a religious service is held at mid- 
 day every day, when the posts turn out of the guardhouse and line 
 up for devotions. 
 
 Great efforts have been made to foster the esprit de corps of the 
 different regiments by the grant of distinguishing marks and special 
 uniforms, but there are few regiments composed solely of men of 
 the same nationality. Some consist of a medley of Germans, 
 Roumanians, Croats and Magyars. German is the only army lan- 
 guage, but the officer must explain the ordinary German military 
 terms to the men in their own tongue. The explosion in 
 Hungary over the question of commands in German is of recent 
 memory. 
 
 The regiments are broken up to form the various garrisons, a step 
 dictated by political considerations but detrimental to military 
 efficiency. The men are sent out oif their own country and changed 
 frequently from one depot to another. At the time of the fall of the 
 Badeni ministry a Bosniac regiment was employed to repress the 
 German agitation at Gratz. Every German in the Monarchy imme- 
 
 * Armie, Race et Dynastie en Autriche-Hongrie, by E. Terquem (Cerf, 1903). 
 
 276 
 
The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 
 diately denounced the intervention of the " barbarian Slavs." It was 
 intended to renew the military band concerts, but the populace 
 threw dirt at the bandsmen. 
 
 In Bohemia the Germans caused such a disturbance at a Czech fete 
 that the military had to be called out. When the German dragoons 
 appeared on the scene they were greeted by the " Wacht am Rhein " 
 from the German ringleaders and a shower of stones from the Czechs. 
 
 It is not merely in war time that the regulation is enforced which 
 provides that if " a soldier, at a critical moment, suggests disobedience 
 to orders, he may be killed by any superior who happens to be near." 
 
 Every general is accompanied by a socius, an officer, usually of 
 equal rank, with the title of Assistant Corps Commander, whose duty 
 is to keep him under observation. The same procedure is observed 
 in the case of the divisional commanders of the " Honved," the Trans- 
 leithanian landwehr. In 1866 the regiments recruited from the 
 Venetian district refused to march against the Italians. From various 
 sources information has been received that the Slav and Czech troops 
 have displayed their hostility to the present war, though it is im- 
 possible to establish the truth of this until confirmation is forth- 
 coming. It is inherently probable, because they are keenly alive to 
 the interests of their own nations. The dissolution of the Austro- 
 Hungarian army would mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy. 
 
 The object of Francis Joseph's policy, like that of his predecessors, 
 has been to maintain the dynasty. Yet what does that dynasty 
 stand for ? It was as the Kaiser's tool that Francis Joseph brought 
 about the catastrophe of 1914. 
 
 What guarantee can his successors give to the other nations of 
 Europe ? To preserve the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would be 
 to resume a task as futile and dangerous as that of maintaining the 
 integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, the dismemberment of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy will not be the work of the Allies. 
 The process began with the triumph of Dualism in 1867. Since 1870 
 the Germans of Austria have been feeling the irresistible attraction of 
 the German Empire and the Magyars have thrown them into the 
 arms of Germany. Count Beust resigned himself to the " compulsory 
 visit " which Francis Joseph paid to Berlin, but Bismarck distrusted 
 him with good reason. His successor, Andrassy, on the other hand, 
 suggested to the German Emperor on November 14th, 1871, the alliance 
 which was not concluded until 1879, because of Russia. The Dual 
 
 277 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 System was transformed into Magyar domination over the whole 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In 1914 this policy was continued. 
 Count Berchtold was a Hungarian, but it was Count Tisza who con- 
 ducted the campaign of the Ballplatz from Budapest. After the 
 departure of Count Berchtold, over whom his control was not complete, 
 he remained at Budapest but sent Baron Burian, a man after his 
 own heart, to Vienna to occupy the post of Joint Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. He himself went to confer with the Kaiser, thus exposing 
 the utter subordination of Vienna to Budapest. 
 
 The Dual System of 1867 has become Magyar centralism and 
 Magyar foreign policy dates from the victory of Prussia over Austria. 
 
 
 278 
 
PART V 
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE END IN VIEW* 
 
 International law — An aspiration rather than a reality — Treaties resulting from 
 wars are instruments of extortion — Neither victors nor vanquished regard 
 them as final — The sovereignty of the State — The absence of morality in 
 international dealings — " Might is Right " — The law of the strongest — 
 Historical law — The great treaties — The coming treaty will be the 
 resultant of force — Use and misuse of force — The coming treaty and accept- 
 ance of the inevitable. 
 
 THE object of the preceding chapters has been to isolate the 
 issues raised by the present war from its remote or immediate 
 causes. To realize them it is essential to regard them from the 
 objective point of view alone and resolutely to avoid the nebulous 
 phrases which have covered those political aberrations of the past 
 which are responsible for the crisis of the present. 
 
 We have heard much of international law since the war began, but 
 Mr. A. V. Dicey pokes fun at his " friend the Chichele Professor of 
 
 * Les Grands TraiUs Politiques, by P. Albin. A collection of the principal 
 diplomatic text from 1815 to the present day, with a commentary and notes. 
 Preface by M. Herbette ; 2nd edition, revised and brought up to date ; 1912. — 
 Le " Coup " d'Agadir. La Querelle Franco- A llemande, by the same ; 1912. — 
 L'Allemagne et la France en Europe ; 188 5-1 894. La Paix Armee, by the same ; 
 1913. — Bismarck et son Temps, by P. Matter. — Bismarck (1815-1898), by H. 
 Welschinger, of the Institut ; 2nd edition. — L' Esprit Public en Allemagne vingt 
 ans apres Bismarck, by H. Moyssel (Crowned by the Academie Francaise). — 
 La Crise Politique de V Allemagne Contemporaine, by William Martin. — Cent 
 Projets de Partage de la Turquie, from the thirteenth century to the Treaty of 
 Bucarest (1911), by J. J. Djuvara, Roumanian minister in Belgium. With a 
 preface by M. Louis Renault and eighteen maps. — La Vie Politique dans les Deux 
 Mondes, published under the direction of MM. A. Viallate and Caudel, professors 
 at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, with the collaboration of MM. D. Belief, 
 J. Blosciszewski, P. Chasles, M. Courant, M. Escoffier, G. Gidel, Paul Henry, 
 Rene Henry, G. Isambert, J. Ladreit de Lacharriere, G. Lagny, A. de Lavergne, 
 A. Marvaud, P. Matter, Ch. Mourey, R. Pinon, P. Quentin-Bauchart, H. Sage, 
 A. R. Savary, A. Tardieu, R. Waultrin, professors and former pupils of the 
 Ecole des Sciences Politiques ; seven volumes (1906- 1907) — all these works 
 published by F. Alcan. 
 
 28l 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 International Law, ... he being a teacher of law which is not law, 
 and being accustomed to expound those rules of public ethics which 
 are miscalled international law. . . ."* "International law" is an 
 aspiration rather than a reality. 
 
 The Hague Conventions'' are an attempt to establish rules of inter- 
 national law, but one of the signatories to those conventions has 
 violated them with impunity. Once again events have shown that 
 international law, as at present constituted, lacks the assistance of an 
 independent and disinterested judicial power to ensure its enforce- 
 ment. It has no sanction. 
 
 The relations of States with each other are always anarchical. 
 True, some States make treaties with others ; but, as a rule, these 
 treaties are the result of armed conflict, and therefore only the accept- 
 ance by the vanquished of the terms imposed upon them by the 
 victors. Such treaties correspond to the agreements obtained by 
 duress which are void in law. 
 
 As soon as the treaty is concluded the victor uses it as the basis of 
 his claims, the vanquished to preserve what has been left to him — 
 for example, his frontiers ; but the victor none the less lives in fear 
 that the vanquished is only awaiting a favourable opportunity to 
 tear it up, while the vanquished only accepts it with the ulterior 
 intention of seizing the first opportunity of destroying the document 
 which testifies to his defeat. The victor's distrust often leads him 
 to tear up the treaty himself, with a view to crushing his foe more 
 completely. Such has ever been the attitude of Berlin towards the 
 Treaty of Frankfort ; and if Germany waited until 1914 for the new 
 war, which would enable her to wipe it out, it is only because she did 
 not consider herself ready or because she feared intervention by 
 other States. 
 
 The Kaiser appeals to Right Divine, by virtue of which he is King 
 of Prussia, and therefore Emperor of Germany. Since he incarnates 
 the God from Whose hands the crown was received at Konigsberg, 
 everything is permitted to him. For one with a divine mission, the 
 end justifies the means. 
 
 Many politicians, who care no more for the divine mission of the 
 Kaiser than for the " divine right " of Louis XIV., are nevertheless ob- 
 sessed by the theory of the sovereignty of the State as an axiomatic 
 dogma. They count up the votes on a parliamentary division, 
 and even though those votes only reflect the opinions of a minority 
 * The Law of the Constitution. 
 
 
 282 
 
 :u 
 
The End in View 
 
 in the country, if they are a majority in the parliamentary sense they 
 attribute to the decision resulting from the processes of addition and 
 subtraction an unlimited authority to override all private and moral 
 objections, an authority incapable of alienation. Those in favour of 
 income-tax have been heard to state that it would be a derogation 
 from the State's sovereignty to forego taxation of its loans. Yet 
 when one State makes a treaty with another it sacrifices a part of 
 its sovereignty. When it makes a contract with its officials, it parts 
 with some of its sovereignty in their favour. When it makes a 
 contract for the purchase of material, or invites tenders for public 
 works, it becomes an ordinary contracting party in the eye of the 
 law. When it borrows money it acknowledges the principle that one 
 cannot both give and keep ; it could only violate that principle 
 by force. 
 
 I shall not enlarge here on the definition of sovereignty, a word the 
 subject of keen controversy, but I hold emphatically that if a State 
 makes an agreement, whether with other States or with individuals, 
 it must act honourably. 
 
 Nevertheless, the majority of politicians in all countries think 
 lightly of that moral precept as applied to inter-State dealings, no 
 less than to the dealings of States with individuals. When they sign 
 a treaty, they do so with the ulterior design of tearing it up at the 
 moment dictated by their passions, convenience or supposed interests. 
 
 The German Mommsen said : 
 
 " Every nation rightly makes it a matter of amour fropre to undo disastrous 
 treaties it has been compelled to sign."* 
 
 On January 27th, 1853, Bismarck is reported as having said in the 
 Prussian Landtag, " Force overrides the law." The remark was made, 
 not apropos of any question of foreign policy, but as a comment on his 
 manoeuvre of governing without any financial provision being made. 
 At the end of the sitting he denied having used the words attributed 
 to him by the deputy for Schwerin who gave the following explanation 
 in his reply : " I did not say that the President Minister used the 
 words ' Force overrides the law,' but his speech led up to that con- 
 clusion. He seems to have meant : * Force must decide when the 
 law is helpless.' "t 
 
 * History of Rome. 
 
 I See Le Figaro of April 10th, 191 5 : The discussion of l'Abb6 Forme and Polybe 
 (Joseph Reinach). 
 
 283 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 What does it matter whether Bismarck used these exact words or 
 not. The man who made no secret of his programme of imposing 
 Prussian domination on Germany ferro el jgfli, need make no secret 
 of his conviction that Force was the source of Law. This view 
 was by no means peculiar to him, but is that held bv all who 
 appeal to conspiracy or insurrections for the settlement of domestic 
 problems, and war as a solution of external difficulties. But it 
 may be admitted that the use of force to destroy an existing law 
 and replace it by another has often been a factor of progress 
 and a means of bringing liberty to individuals and States.* 
 
 All so-called international historical law is based on treaties 
 associated with marriages, grants, inheritance and family arrange- 
 ments, some approved by both parties, others forced by one on the 
 other. In many cases their terms are enshrined only in forged docu- 
 ments. The validity of such historical claims cannot be admitted 
 by those who refuse to confuse sovereignty with ownership, and to 
 believe that nations are like flocks — the private property of certain 
 families. When Talleyrand, at the Congress of Vienna, opposed the 
 principle of " legitimacy " to the ambitions of Prussia, he was 
 advocating the theory of royal ownership. 
 
 But although sovereigns invoke traditional claims in favour of 
 their own rights, they do not hesitate to tear them up if they clash 
 with the claims of others. 
 
 Traditional claims are the sole basis of the Austrian Empire, but 
 the Government of Vienna have never relinquished their efforts to 
 undermine the traditional claims of the nations which form the 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The King of Prussia invokes tradi- 
 tional claims based on M divine right," a divine right bought in 1 701 
 from the Emperor Leopold who made East Prussia a kingdom. But 
 the Kings of Prussia have extended and consolidated their power 
 solely by overriding the traditional claims of other potentates. 
 
 In addition to dynastic sources historical international law appeals 
 to treaties for its sanction. Yet how many treaties are there which 
 have not been the outcome of wars ? The great treaties on which the 
 so-called " public law " of Europe is based — the Treaty of West- 
 phalia (164S), the Treaty of L T trecht (1713), the treaties in 1815, 
 the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Treaty of Prague in 1866, the Treaty 
 of Frankfort in 1S71, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, and, finally, die 
 Treaty of Bucharest in 191 3 — none of these was the outcome of 
 
 * See Manuel de Diplomatique, by Giryj 
 284 
 
The End in View- 
 peaceful agreement. They were the consequences of wars and 
 instruments of peace which were themselves the cause of fresh wars. 
 
 The treaty to come will be the result of a war. If the Allies were 
 defeated, their downfall would mean an unlimited licence to the 
 Governments of the Kaiser and the Emperor-King of Austria-Hungary 
 to oppress the peoples which wish to escape or which have hitherto 
 escaped their domination. 
 
 The Allies will triumph. Our peace will be the result of victory. 
 It will therefore be the result of force. This is the problem that 
 faces us : 
 
 This work of force must not be an abuse of force. Imposed on 
 Governments which are based on traditional authority or force, its 
 object must be the liberation of the national groups which have been 
 their victims and a final restoration of the world's peace. We must 
 have clear ideas of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to carry 
 out this apparently inconsistent programme. The inconsistencies 
 should be reduced to a minimum and their existence must not make 
 us recoil from our task. 
 
 We have to impose a peace on States which believe that their 
 power entitles them to oppress other States, a peace which they will 
 not be able to violate, and yet one which would not subject them to 
 the tyranny they meant for others. The peace must leave these 
 States so situated that their future policy shall be dominated by no 
 desire for revenge, and their statesmen will be led to resign themselves 
 to the fait accompli. 
 
 285 
 
CHAPTER II 
 WHAT IS MEANT BY NATIONALITY IN POLITICS 
 
 Political anthropology — The Teutonic race — Its rights are the invention of the 
 Historical School — The principle of nationality is not a principle of law — 
 Is it a traditionalist principle ? — The Turks, Germans and Hungarians are 
 incapable of assimilating the groups they govern — Their power of resistance 
 constitutes their nationality — The incompetence of their rulers is their 
 right to separation — The end of the Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns and the 
 Ottoman Empire. 
 
 THE question of nationality has already been discussed. The 
 Germans have attempted to justify their conquests of 1870 
 by arguments drawn from political anthropology. They tell us that 
 they annexed Alsace because its population was German. They could 
 not say the same of Lorraine, but that consideration hampered them 
 no more than it had done in the partitions of Poland. 
 
 The Prussians are an offshoot of the Wends, who are Slavs, and 
 Wends are still to be found, with their own speech, customs and 
 manners, within forty miles of Berlin.* 
 
 Mr. William Z. Ripley, of Harvard University^ in his book, " The 
 Races of Europe : a Sociological Study," has something to say of 
 the Teutonic type. In reality, its somatic characteristics vary widely 
 among the peoples who claim membership of the same race. The area 
 of Germany inhabited by tall dolichocephalic with blue eyes and 
 fair hair is very small, comprising only Hanover, Mecklemburg and 
 a part of Brandenburg and Pomerania.J 
 
 The rights of the Teutonic race have been invented by the German 
 Historical School, which has sought their origin in a past so dim and 
 distant that any theory can be successfully maintained.^ 
 
 In Europe, races are differentiated by language, tradition and 
 historical associations. All three must be considered, for language 
 
 * William Martin : La Crise Politique de VAllemagne, p. 153. 
 | Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., Limited, 1900. 
 J W. Ripley : Plan, p. 222. 
 
 § V. E. Bourgeois : Manuel Historiquc de Politique Ltrangere, Vol. II., 
 Chap. VI., " Les Doctrines de Races en Europe." 
 
 2S6 
 
What is Meant by Nationality in Politics 
 
 and traditions have formed groups. The principle of nationality, 
 dear to Napoleon III., who played so disastrous a part in European 
 history during the second half of the nineteenth century, is not a 
 principle of law at all, but a traditionalist principle in antagonism 
 with the general theory of law enunciated by the French eighteenth- 
 century philosophers. 
 
 When the moment arrives for settling the future of Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary the Allies must start from the following basis. 
 
 From the battle of Kossovo (1389) to 1878 the Serbs were under 
 Turkish rule, but all that Turkish misrule could do was insufficient 
 to destroy their nationality and the hope of regaining their independ- 
 ence. The Germans and Hungarians have shown the same inability 
 as the Turks to assimilate the groups they govern. The common 
 features of all these groups have been their speech, legends, history, 
 aspirations and hatred of the States whose domination they endured. 
 Those features made them nations, and give each of them a right 
 to independence to-day. Some writers suggest that economic interests 
 have been the predominant factors among these groups, but they are 
 wrong. The common interests which unite their members and 
 differentiate them are religious, traditional, intellectual, philological— 
 in a word, psychological. Their rulers, instead of assimilating them, 
 have never ceased to abuse and oppress them. Prussia is detested 
 by the Poles of the Duchy of Posen, and after more than forty years 
 Germany finds Alsace-Lorraine as obdurate as on the first day. 
 
 The inability of the Germans of Germany and Austria and the 
 Hungarians to assimilate the groups over which they tyrannize gives 
 those groups the right to independence. Those two great Empires, 
 each of them a standing despotism and menace, must be broken 
 up for the same reasons which apply to Turkey. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy must be divided between a 
 number of small nations of eight to twelve millions, such as Bohemia 
 with Moravia and the Slovaks, Greater Serbia with Croatia and 
 Slavonia, and Greater Roumania. The part of the Cisleithan provinces 
 in which Germans predominate can form a nation of ten millions. 
 Vienna will be no longer an imperial city, but it may keep its geo- 
 graphical situation and its monuments. Its only loss will be His 
 Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. 
 
 The dynasties of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, for so long bitter 
 enemies and become friends for evil purposes alone, must disappear 
 together. 
 
 287 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY 
 
 The Compact of September 6th, 19 14 — Neutrals will have no locus standi — 
 Only the belligerents can be parties to the treaty — The precedents of 18 14 
 and 181 5 — The Hohenzollerns and the Imperial Chancellor are disqualified 
 — The plenipotentiaries to the Bundesrat — The Reichstag possessed the 
 treaty-making power in the Germanic Confederation. 
 
 THE compact signed at London on September 6th, 1914, is fresh 
 in the public memory : 
 
 " The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to 
 conclude peace separately during the present war." 
 
 I have no need to enlarge on the significance of that engagement, 
 nor to insist that it will be kept. 
 
 Several well-intentioned people, like my friend Mark H. Judge, have 
 offered the suggestion that neutrals should be invited to co-operate 
 in drawing up the treaty. Now of the forty neutrals which signed 
 the Hague Convention, some have shown that they had not the will, 
 others that they had neither the will nor the ability, to make that 
 Convention respected. They have thus no claim to intervene. 
 
 I know the maxim : " One cannot be both judge and suitor," and 
 its corollary is that the belligerents must not settle the questions at 
 issue by and for themselves. Yet the constant appeal to force as 
 the final solution of disputes has proved the difficulty hitherto 
 experienced of composing international differences by peaceful means. 
 
 The belligerents know what the war has cost them. The vital 
 necessity for the Allies is to ensure that its repetition may be made 
 impossible. Besides, if one of the belligerents refused to accept the 
 decision of the neutrals, what sanction would it have ? How far 
 could it be effective ? 
 
 The issues will be settled by the Allies on one side, Great Britain, 
 Russia, France, Italy, Belgium, Serbia and Japan ; on the other, 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary . 
 
 288 
 
The Parties to the Treaty 
 
 Turkey, having become a mere vassal State, has lost the right she 
 gained in 1856 of being represented at a congress. 
 
 In 1 8 14, when the Allies entered Paris, Napoleon abdicated at 
 Fontainebleau. They did not treat with him. After his return 
 from Elba they announced that they would entertain no thought of 
 peace until he was delivered up to them. That course of action 
 is a precedent entitling the Allies to refuse to treat with any member 
 of the House of Hohenzollern. 
 
 When the Kaiser and his Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
 in the name of the Empire, spoke of the treaty guaranteeing the 
 independence of Belgium as a " scrap of paper," and when they pro- 
 ceeded to disregard the Hague Conventions relating to the conduct 
 of war, they disqualified themselves. What faith could anyone put 
 in any declarations made in a treaty by those who had proclaimed 
 that, although an undertaking was binding on neutrals, they did not 
 regard it as binding on themselves ? 
 
 The German Empire is a confederation of States, but the Emperor 
 makes treaties without consulting the Bundesrat. As M. Labaud 
 says : " As the sittings of the Bundesrat are not public, a foreign 
 Power cannot tell if that body has given its assent to a treaty." In 
 the old Germanic Empire, on the other hand, the treaty-making 
 power resided in the Reichstag, not in the Empire. 
 
 The Allies must restore the earlier system. By refusing to treat 
 with the Emperor of Germany they will refuse to treat with the King 
 of Prussia. They will treat with the representatives of the States as 
 accredited to the Bundesrat, with the exception of Prussia and 
 Alsace-Lorraine, 
 
 28) 19 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS 
 
 The effect, not the cause — Results in 1806, 1856 and 1870 — Foreign interference 
 in contrast to political independence. 
 
 THERE are some who talk of the limitation of armaments and 
 the demolition of fortresses, but they are only suffering from the 
 illusion which confounds cause with effect. History is full of examples 
 of the futility of such measures. 
 
 After Jena Napoleon limited the size of the Prussian army to forty 
 thousand men. Scharnhorst met that situation by his system of the 
 " Landwehr." The army was kept nominally at that figure, but 
 all able-bodied men were passed through it, received military training, 
 and were ready in 181 3 to take part in the King of Prussia's revenge. 
 Again, Article 13 of the Treaty of Paris in 1856 prohibited any Power 
 from constructing or maintaining arsenals on the Black Sea. To 
 this was added a clause forbidding the high contracting parties — 
 in reality, Russia — from keeping in the same waters more than six 
 steamships of eight hundred tons at the most, and four smaller 
 ships of two hundred tons each. In 1870 Prussia's consent to the 
 abrogation of those clauses was one of the reasons for Russia's bene- 
 volent neutrality during the Franco-German War. Russia took 
 advantage of that war to have them repealed by the treaty of March 
 31st, 1 87 1. It will thus be seen what disastrous consequences a 
 measure of that kind may entail. 
 
 When peace comes the conquerors must set up no claim to police 
 the territories of the conquered. Police and gaoler work of that 
 kind is exhausting for those who perform it and leaves behind it 
 feelings of hatred and vengeance which can only lead to future 
 disasters. 
 
 The most stringent rules for the limitation of armaments can be 
 rendered useless by an invention. At one time it is smokeless 
 powder revolutionizing explosives, at another the 75mm. field-gun. It 
 
 290 
 
The Limitation of Armaments 
 
 is usual to reckon naval strength in " Dreadnoughts," yet submarines 
 and mines have altered the character of naval warfare. Aviation has 
 made cavalry reconnaissance a thing of the past. 
 
 Those who look to disarmament to give war its death-blow are 
 confounding cause with effect. Our first duty is to remove the causes 
 of war. 
 
 29T 19* 
 
CHAPTER V 
 THE GOAL IS THE REMOVAL OF THE CAUSES OF WAR 
 
 A political task — How to remove the causes of war — We must be satisfied with 
 that aim — The maintenance of peace — It is impossible with the present 
 constitution of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — 
 Prussia to be dismembered at the start of negotiations. 
 
 PEACE in the future will be impossible unless the causes of war 
 are removed. The task before the Allies is thus a political 
 one and it must be rigidly confined to the one end in view. 
 
 On January 25th, 18 14, at Langres, the Czar of Russia, the Emperor 
 of Austria, the King of Prussia and the representatives of England 
 drew up " a resolution concerning the form of government to be 
 given to France."* 
 
 The Allies of to-day ought not to interfere with the form of govern- 
 ment in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Yet the future peace of 
 Europe is plainly incompatible with the existence of the German 
 Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as at present con- 
 stituted. We must be careful that the changes in the structure 
 of these two Powers shall not be inspired by any desire of the Allied 
 Governments to meddle in their domestic affairs. The sole ambition 
 of the Allies must be to prevent their enemies from threatening the 
 world with another war in a few years' time. 
 
 Before 1866 many Germans like Bluntschli dreamed of a Germany 
 united by some great Liberal movement. Count Beust, when Minister 
 of Saxony, and Bray, the Minister of Bavaria, had schemes of other 
 kinds ; but it was Bismarck who made good the hegemony of the 
 Hohenzollerns. The system he inaugurated has not been proof against 
 adversity. The Crown Prince is certainly not the man to undo the 
 disastrous work of his father, whom he is popularly supposed to have 
 egged on. 
 
 The State which began in 1866 and ends in 1916 must give place 
 
 * Metternich : Mimoires, Vol. I., p. 182. 
 292 
 
The Goal is the Removal of the Causes of War 
 
 to another. As soon as negotiations begin, Prussia must be reduced 
 to the old frontiers she had before the partitions of Poland in 1772, 
 1793 and 1795. The Duchy of Posen, at least a part of Silesia, all 
 Prussia between (and including) Danzig and the mouths of the 
 Vistula and East Prussia must be restored to Poland. The Rhine 
 Province and Westphalia must be declared autonomous. Saxony 
 must recover what she lost in 181 5. Frankfort must return to the 
 status of a free city. The annexation of Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse 
 and Nassau must be declared null and void, for from the point of 
 view of positive law, the Prussian Diet was not competent to 
 sanction it.* 
 
 * See William Martin : La Crise Politique de V Allemagne Contemporaine. 
 
 2Q3 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The two autocracies : the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 — -The remodelling of Germany — Commercial unity : the Zollverein is 
 permanent — Political unity : the Empire must be dissolved — The annexa- 
 tions of 1866 — Not by agreement — Those annexed accepted the inevitable — 
 King George V. of Hanover — The Emperor's powers — The powers of the 
 individual States — We must respect the independence of the individual 
 States while destroying the diplomatic and military autocracy of the King 
 of Prussia. 
 
 THE autocracy of the Emperor of Germany and the autocracy 
 of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary 
 are responsible for Europe's condition of nerves since 1S71 and the 
 present war. The security of Europe can only be gained through the 
 disappearance of those two autocracies. 
 
 Germany has been remodelled six times since the opening of the 
 nineteenth century : first by the Treaty of Luneville in 1802 ; then 
 by the Peace of Pressburg in 1S05 ; next by the constitution of the 
 Confederation of the Rhine; then in 1815 by the constitution of 
 the German Confederation ; then in 1866 by the constitution of the 
 Confederation of the North ; finally in 1S71 by the foundation of 
 the German Empire. 
 
 The policy of both Austria and Prussia, pursued in devious ways 
 but clear enough in its main outlines, was to exclude each other from 
 the Confederation of German)', an unwieldy organization which was 
 incapable of action. The petty States of Germany, each with its 
 tariff, coinage and separate diplomacy, formed an unexampled 
 political medley. 
 
 Prussia first gained commercial unity through the Zollverein, and 
 that commercial unity may be regarded as indestructible. She went 
 on to secure political unity by a policy of " blood and iron." That 
 political unity must be destroyed. 
 
 In 1866 the Prussian Diet decreed the annexation of Hanover, 
 
 294 
 
The Dissolution of the German Empire 
 
 Nassau and Frankfort. It was not by agreement, and those annexed 
 had no voice in the decision which settled their fate.* 
 
 In 1866 the dispossessed princes bowed to the logic of facts, and 
 the King of Hanover, George V., alone remained at war with Prussia. 
 His grandson, however, now the Kaiser's son-in-law, has been invested 
 with the Duchy of Brunswick, and as an officer in the German 
 army has taken the oath of allegiance which impliedly records his 
 renunciation of Hanover. 
 
 The ancient free city of Frankfort, so ill-used in 1866, is now quite 
 resigned to the Prussian yoke. 
 
 In 1871 the Confederation of the North of 1866 was extended to 
 form the German Empire. The Emperor is the President of the 
 Bund and the supreme head of the army. Bismarck thought the 
 King's desire to obtain that supreme command so ambitious that 
 he dared not hope to get it accepted ; but in spite of his misgivings he 
 was successful. 
 
 The Bundesrat represents the princes. These princes are officers 
 of the army, and, as such, owe military obedience to the Kaiser. All 
 important questions are decided by the Emperor and Chancellor alone. 
 When the Emperor William made speeches, like the celebrated 
 outburst at Bremen before his departure for Tangier, when he sent 
 the Panther to Agadir, when he declared Germany's solidarity with 
 Austria in her action against Russia, the kings and grand-dukes of 
 Germany stood by as idle spectators. Neither the Emperor nor the 
 Chancellor has ever condescended to take their advice. They have 
 not even thought it necessary to inform them of their intentions. 
 These princes learned the Kaiser's decisions through the Wolff 
 Bureau or their newspapers. 
 
 The Allies find themselves faced with the problem of a Confedera- 
 tion of States, all of which have, speaking broadly, all the sovereign 
 powers of independent States, but which have parted with control 
 over their military forces and their relations with foreign nations to 
 Prussia. That problem is the task of respecting the autonomy of 
 these individual States, while putting an end to the diplomatic and 
 military autocracy of the King of Prussia. 
 
 * William Martin : La Crise Politique de V AlUmagne Contemporaine, p. 229 
 et seq. 
 
 295 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE FACTOR OF PARTICULARISM 
 
 Opposition to military ambitions — Dissension in the German Empire — The 
 Guelfs — The " Party of the Right " — The illusion of safety and the fetish 
 of prestige — The Prussification of Germany — The psychological effects of 
 defeat — The powers of the States — The Confederation of the South and the 
 Confederation of the Rhine — The chances of permanence — A Saxon's opinion 
 of Prussian influence — The fear of France — The necessity of dispelling it. 
 
 WILL the dissolution of the German Empire encounter any 
 violent or permanent opposition ? It would be presumptu- 
 ous to answer in the negative, but we can consider the possibilities. 
 We imagine that all Germany rose up as one man to destroy 
 France, because we have seen her at war. Nevertheless, it is im- 
 portant to remember that her martial passions have been subject to 
 restraining influences in times past. Between 1862 and 1 866 Bismarck 
 governed without Parliament, but the victory of Sadowa came to 
 operate as an Act of Indemnity. The war of 1870 gave Prussia the 
 hegemony of Germany. The military expenditure, far from diminish- 
 ing, increased, and the Reichstag began to oppose the successive 
 Army Bills. In 1893 an Army Bill was opposed by the Democrats, 
 the Centre, the Liberals, the South German party, the Alsatians, the 
 Danes and the Guelfs, but was supported by the Conservatives, the 
 National Liberals, the Imperialists, the Poles, the Anti-Semites, and 
 the members of the Free Association. The opposition represented 
 4,233,000 votes in the country, while the Government's supporters 
 only represented 3,225,000, and were therefore in a minority of 
 1,008,000. 
 
 The Reichstag, haunted by the spectres conjured up by the Kaiser 
 and the Chancellor, voted the credits involved in the Army Bill of 
 191 3 ; but there were many Germans who reflected anxiously over 
 the policy which had brought the German Empire into jeopardy 
 forty years after Sedan. 
 
 296 
 
The Factor of Particularism 
 
 The imposing German Empire has hypnotized us into a belief in 
 its solidity, but there are cracks.* More than once the attitude of 
 the Bundesrat has compelled the Chancellor to draw back. Bismarck 
 had to withdraw his scheme for an imperial railway system. In 1877 
 he wanted to make Berlin the seat of the Supreme Court, but the 
 Bundesrat preferred Leipzig, and at Leipzig it remained. 
 
 The Guelfs have always refused to recognize the constitution of the 
 Empire. As supporters of the King of Hanover, they have lost their 
 raison d'etre. They long ago abandoned hope of a restoration of the 
 Monarchy, but in 1889 they founded the " Party of the Right," 
 which has gained few adherents, although there are many active 
 sympathizers in the other States. In reality, this party is the only 
 " Conservative " party in Germany.f 
 
 What will be its policy and influence in the immediate future ? 
 
 The autocracy of the Kaiser has given the Germans the illusion of 
 omnipotence and the fetish of prestige. Yet the destroyer of the 
 peace of other nations has not been able to give peace to his own. 
 Neither the omnipotence nor the prestige will survive defeat. 
 
 Will defeat be followed by the disintegration of the German Empire, 
 or will it cement the union of States which Bismarck established, 
 in blood, indeed, but by victory. 
 
 In Germany, King, princes and people alike have been prussianized. 
 All have rejoiced in terrorizing other nations and preaching the gospel 
 of Germany's divine mission. In their new-won satisfaction the 
 vanquished of 1866 have come to regard their defeat as a victory. 
 The King of Bavaria has forgotten that he owes his lameness to a 
 Prussian bullet. 
 
 Nevertheless, this great Germany has not brought Germans the 
 security they expected. The Kaiser has thrown all Germany into war 
 without consulting the States which speak through the Bundesrat. His 
 aggressive policy, of which they were accustomed to brag over their 
 beer, has passed from the stage of words to that of acts. The irre- 
 sistible army, under its masters of strategy, rushed at the pigmy 
 Belgium which resisted, and proved that its deeds were in every 
 respect worthy of its spirit. 
 
 The French, so careless and light-headed, so thoroughly beaten 
 in 1870, have refused to be stamped in the dust by the German masses. 
 The Crown Prince, instead of entering Paris, was forced to retreat 
 
 * See Part L, Chap. V., " The Kaiser's Government." 
 j W. Martin : Op. cit., p. 243. 
 
 297 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 twenty miles in one night and the German hosts, so far from repeating 
 the triumph of Sedan, find themselves helpless in both east and west. 
 
 The glory and the peace have departed, while the constitution of 
 Germany crumbles away in the most overwhelming catastrophe that 
 has ever overtaken her. Will the spirit of German particularism 
 raise its head in the hour of defeat ? Will the various nations of 
 Germany say : " We are no longer Prussians. We are once more 
 Saxons, Bavarians, Wiirtembergers, Badeners, Hanoverians and free 
 Frankforters ? " 
 
 It must be remembered that considerable powers are reserved to 
 the individual States. They all make their own financial provision 
 and administer their own revenue, including their share of imperial 
 revenue from the customs and certain specific taxes. They all have 
 sole authority in questions of public education, the relations of Church 
 and State, mines and forests, hunting and fishing, and police 
 administration. 
 
 Bavaria, Wurtemberg, the Grand Duchy of Baden, would form 
 a thriving confederation with the Rhine Province and Westphalia. 
 Saxony could be the nucleus of a Central German Confederation 
 formed by restoring the independence of the States annexed by 
 Prussia in 1866. 
 
 What chance of permanence would there be for the new order ? 
 The answer is furnished by the history of Germany after the Peace 
 of Luneville, the Peace of Pressburg and the Treaty of Tilsit. The 
 Germans would have readily resigned themselves to their situation if 
 Napoleon had not displayed open scorn of the kings and princes he 
 set up, introduced conscription into the Confederation of the Rhine 
 and carried off the recruits thus raised to die in Russia, and deprived 
 the Germans of sugar and tobacco by his continental blockade. The 
 Rhine Province had already become thoroughly French. 
 
 Has Prussia really won the affection of the other peoples of Ger- 
 many ? A foreigner is not able to say, but a Saxon, Herr Paul 
 Rohrbach, in his book of Pan-German propaganda, " Der Deutsche 
 Gedanke," published before the war, has deplored the narrow- 
 mindedness of North Germany, and especially Prussia. Though an 
 unstinted admirer of all that Prussia has done for the unification of 
 Germany, he shows that she has never been able to make " moral 
 conquests," and sees in that failure a vista of peril for Germany. 
 
 During the famous ceremony in honour of Germany celebrated on 
 the Wartburg a hundred years ago, the young Saxons brought as 
 
 298 
 
The Factor of Particularism 
 
 their offering for the altar of the " German Ideal " a corporal's cane, 
 the breastplate of an Uhlan, and a copy of the new Prussian Police 
 Code of Kamptz. 
 
 " Prussia," said a German statesman just after the war of 1 87 1, 
 " has always enjoyed the privilege of inspiring the most violent anti- 
 pathy in all the nations of the Germanic Confederation. She does 
 not seem to have lost it." 
 
 Bismarck and the Kaiser's great instrument for holding the German 
 Empire together was the national fear of France. It will be for France 
 to dispel that fear, after the war, by limiting her territorial ambitions 
 to the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. 
 
 299 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE DISMEMBERMENT OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
 
 The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — The mutual hatreds of its 
 component peoples — An unnatural combination replaced by natural 
 groupings — Vitality of the Czechs — Illyria and Greater Serbia — Italy and 
 the Adriatic — The Trentino — The German provinces — Girault's scheme 
 for the reconstruction of a German Austro-Hungarian Empire — No 
 counterpoise possible — Docility of the Germans of Austria and Germany 
 since 1871. 
 
 ACCORDING to the Almanack de Gotba, the Austro-Hungarian 
 Empire consists, in accordance with the Fundamental Law 
 of December 21st, 1867, of the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom 
 of Hungary, two inseparable constitutional Monarchies, hereditary 
 in the male line of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine and descending 
 in the female line on the extinction of the male. 
 
 The professors of Constitutional Law have wasted much ingenuity 
 over the question whether the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is a 
 federal State, a federation of States, a State of States, a Kingdom of 
 States, an unitary State, a dual State, and so forth. Without ven- 
 turing into such deep waters, we can say that at the present moment 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is breaking up. The Slavs and 
 Roumanians in the Austrian Empire have never ceased to agitate for 
 their independence. They are all filled with loathing of the Germans 
 and Magyars. The Roumanians of Transylvania and the Bukovina 
 look forward to union with Roumania, the three and a half million 
 Ruthenes are longing for union with Russia, while Croatia and 
 Slavonia, Catholic though they are, seem anxious to throw in their 
 lot with Serbia in the new " Greater Serbia." 
 
 Austria-Hungary is only a medley of races at loggerheads. There 
 is no bond of sympathy between them. The Monarchy is merely a 
 government and an army. Its so-called parliamentary system is but 
 a travesty, with race-antagonism as its distinguishing feature. The 
 
 300 
 
The Dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 
 
 statesmen of Austria seem to concentrate their energies on playing 
 off the various nationalities against each other. 
 
 Those peoples which have not been absorbed by the Magyars and 
 Germans of Austria must recover their independence ; some, like the 
 Bohemians, Moravians and Slavs, to form new States, others to be 
 united with their compatriots over the frontier in Poland, Russia, 
 Roumania, Serbia and Italy. The treaties of 1916 must substitute 
 voluntary groupings for the compulsory associations of the past. The 
 dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is the inevitable 
 corollary to the grasping and aggressive policy of the Hapsburgs. 
 
 The Czechs have never ceased to demand the fulfilment of the 
 promise of Bohemian autonomy which Austria gave them in i860. 
 Their national development has proceeded uninterruptedly. German 
 influences have been rooted out. Thirty years ago the Germans 
 were masters of Prague. To-day they hardly show themselves there. 
 In the Middle Ages the Czechs boasted of the most advanced civiliza- 
 tion in Central Europe. Their John Huss had been one of the 
 heralds of the Reformation. Bohemia's perpetual struggles for self- 
 realization constitute her right to independence. 
 
 The Czechs, the Moravians and Slovaks form a group of some 
 8,500,000 persons, ready and anxious to form a new independent State 
 in the future, in which they have maintained an unshaken belief. 
 
 Since 1867 the Slovenes have agitated for a Kingdom of Slovenia or 
 Illyria, to include Trieste, Istria, Gorica, Gradisca, Carniola, Southern^ 
 Carinthia and Southern Styria. These ambitions are more likely ( 
 to be realized in the formation of a Greater Serbia, which may be a J 
 confederation of all these districts. 
 
 The ultimate disposition of Trieste and the ports of Dalmatia is 
 a thorny problem. The Adriatic is Italian as far as Trieste, of which 
 the Italians represent the active, intelligent and wealthy element ; 
 but the rest of the coast is Croat. Fiume is the port of Hungary and 
 must be the port of Croatia and Slavonia. The small ports of Dal- 
 matia have Italian sympathies, but Dalmatia itself is Slav. The 
 question is open to more than one solution. 
 
 In 1848 the Italians and Ladins who inhabited the Tyrol south of 
 the Brenner Pass protested vigorously against the action of the 
 Frankfort Parliament in treating them as members of the German 
 Empire. In 1866 the Germans accused them of wishing for union 
 with Italy, like Venice. There, as elsewhere, Germans have proved 
 their inability to assimilate subject races. The Italians and Ladins 
 
 301 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 form a group of 804,000 out of a total Tyrolese population of 940,000. 
 In the figure of 804,000 Latins and Ladins are included the Italians 
 of Istria and Dalmatia ; but the Latins and Ladins constitute an 
 enormous majority in all that part of the Tyrol which lies south of 
 the Brenner. It must be restored to Italy. 
 
 "The Vorarlberg, a small district, with an area of 1,004 square miles 
 and 145,000 inhabitants, whose only channel of communication with 
 Austria is by the Arlberg tunnel, should be reunited with Switzerland, 
 but probably the Swiss would not welcome the gift, for Vorarlberg is 
 both Catholic and German. The German Swiss are disinclined to add 
 to the number of Catholics in the Confederation, and the French 
 Swiss are not anxious to reinforce the German element which is 
 already in the ascendency. 
 
 The German provinces of Austria, Lower and Upper Austria, 
 Salzburg, Northern Styria and Carinthia and the German Tyrol, may 
 form a State of some twelve million people, with Vienna as its capital, 
 or else they may be united with Bavaria, the lot which befell some 
 of them after Napoleon wrung the Treaty of Pressburg from Austria. 
 Thus these German provinces of Austria will have access to the sea 
 only by the Danube or through Trieste, destined to be Italian or 
 independent. 
 
 The Hungarians will shrink to a small nation of some ten million 
 souls in an advanced stage of decadence. " Pride will be the ruin of 
 my people," said Szechenyi in 1849. Hungary will still have the 
 fertile plain of the Alfold, but her dream of ruling the earth by subor- 
 dinating Vienna to Budapest will be at an end. She will not be 
 allowed to keep Fiume. The embittered and disillusionized Hun- 
 garians will never forgive others the errors they have committed. 
 They will never cease to be a factor of unrest ; but, as they have also 
 never inspired any emotion but ill-will, they will not be dangerous. 
 
 The inability of the Germans of Austria and the Hungarians to 
 assimilate their subject races is the weightiest indictment of their 
 rule. Why, then, should we trouble to maintain the authority of a 
 State which has shown conspicuous incompetence in its domestic 
 affairs and proved a standing menace to the world's peace by its pas- 
 sions and ambitions ? 
 
 The dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is the 
 course urged by the majority of its political thinkers, a truth acknow- 
 ledged even by the school of politicians which maintains that the 
 continued existence of Austria-Hungary as a great Power is necessary 
 
 302 
 
The Dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 
 
 to the equilibrium of Europe. Of this doctrine a distinguished 
 exponent is M. Arthur Girault, Professor of Political Economy in the 
 Faculty of Law of Poitiers. He admits that Austria must lose 
 Galicia (30,307 square miles, population 8,025,700), the Bukovina 
 (4,030 square miles, population 800,000), Bosnia and Herzgovina 
 (16,206 square miles, population 1,898,000), Dalmatia (4,940 square 
 miles, population 645,900), Croatia-Slavonia (16,417 square miles, 
 population 2,627,000), Fiume (8 square miles, population 40,000), 
 Istria (2,000 square miles), Trieste (38 square miles), Gorz and 
 Gradisca (1,126 square miles), the population of these last districts 
 amounting to 894,000, and, lastly, the Trentino (population of 
 Italians and Ladins 800,000) and Transylvania (22,000 square miles, 
 population three millions). He leaves to Austria Bohemia, Moravia 
 and the Slovaks, although the policy of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government towards them has been conspicuously oppressive.* 
 
 After these changes Austria-Hungary would be a State of some 
 160,000 square miles, instead of 240,000, with a population of 
 30,000,000 instead of 51,500,000. It would thus be smaller, but 
 have a larger population than Spain. 
 
 M. Girault concludes : 
 
 " That situation would be very dangerous, not only for the independence of 
 Austria-Hungary, but also for the European balance of power. First in the 
 economic sphere, then in the political, Austria would speedily sink into bondage 
 to Germany. The Germans of Austria would be inevitably drawn into the 
 German Empire. Austria would become a second Bavaria. Vienna would 
 descend to the rank of Munich. The Hohenzollern Empire would find the 
 acquisition of Austria a solid compensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and 
 the Polish provinces. Lastly, Germany would emerge greater than before 
 from a war in which she would have been beaten." 
 
 How can this danger be avoided ? M. Girault indicates a way of 
 salvation : 
 
 " To avert this disaster it is absolutely essential that Austria-Hungary should 
 remain a great Power, and Vienna the capital of an Empire capable of acting as 
 a counterpoise to that of the Hohenzollerns. Curtailed on the east and south, 
 she will only be able to maintain her position among the Powers by expanding 
 on the north and west ; in other words, at the expense of the German Empire. 
 Silesia, the loss of which Austria has never forgotten, and South Germany, with 
 its natural leanings towards Vienna rather than Berlin, would attach them- 
 selves readily enough to the Hapsburg Monarchy. They are preponderatingly 
 
 * The figures given are those of the census of 19 10. The estimates for 191 3 
 would show larger totals. 
 
 303 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Catholic. Their incorporation in an Empire which stands as the hereditary- 
 champion of Catholicism among the Powers of Europe could not violate their 
 local sentiment. Silesia has a population of five millions, Bavaria six millions 
 (nearly seven with the Palatinate), Wurtemberg nearly two and a half, the 
 Grand Duchy of Baden more than two. 
 
 " That part of the Grand Duchy of Hesse which lies south of the Main and the 
 ancient free city of Frankfort should also be incorporated in Austria. These 
 sixteen or seventeen million Germans, passing from the Hohenzollern to the 
 Hapsburg Empire, would restore the balance of power, and enable Austria- 
 Hungary to remain what she is to-day, a great Power of fifty million souls, while 
 her new population would equal that of Germany thus reduced, and would no 
 longer be distracted by domestic differences due to the clash of tongues and 
 nationalities." 
 
 This solution is based on the assumption that Bavaria and Baden 
 would welcome incorporation in Austria. Their history, however, 
 especially since the Treaty of Luneville, does not support that view. 
 It also assumes that Vienna will be entirely emancipated from the 
 influence of Berlin, though since 1870 the Germans of Austria have 
 submissively followed the lead of the German Empire. When Hun- 
 garians, such as Andrassy and Tisza, drove them into alliance with 
 Germany they made no demur. There was no thought of resistance. 
 To group all the Southern Germans round Vienna and allow Prussia 
 to revive the Confederation of the North would be to create for her 
 a new German Empire, held together by universal hatred of France 
 and Russia. The Hapsburgs would remain what they have been 
 since 1871, the tool of the Hohenzollerns. 
 
 The only permanent solution is the dissolution of the two Empires. 
 
 304 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 ROUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA 
 
 I. Roumania — The Kingdom of Dacia — Tradition — Turkey and Russia— The 
 
 union of Moldavia and Wallachia settled by the Treaty of Paris in 1856— 
 Union in 1859 — A constitutional monarchy in 1866 — Sympathy for France 
 in 1 87 1 — Becomes a kingdom in 1881. 
 
 II. Transylvania and the Banat. 
 
 III. Daco-Roumanian ambitions — The advantage of having a strong buffer 
 State between Russia and the Balkans — The importance of a final settlement. 
 
 I. Roumania 
 
 MODERN Roumania is composed of two separate States : one 
 is called Wallachia by Europeans, though its inhabitants call it 
 " Muntenia," or " Tsara Romaneasca " (Land of the Roumanians), 
 and the other Moldavia. Their amalgamation into a single State was 
 recognized only in 1862, and in diplomatic documents they were 
 known as the " United Principalities " or the " Danubian Princi- 
 palities." The name of " Roumania " only began to be used officially 
 in 1874, but was established by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878. 
 
 According to M. Xenopol,* the Roumanians are the descendants of 
 the colonists sent by Trajan in a.d. 107 to occupy and populate Dacia. 
 They did not come from Italy, but ex tote orbe romano, from every 
 corner of the Roman world. Their official language was Latin. 
 
 The Hungarians claim as their historic patrimony the ancient 
 Kingdom of Dacia, the capital of which was Sarmizegethus in Tran- 
 sylvania. It stood in a valley now known as the Hatszeg which is 
 the bed of a tributary of the Maros, which joins the Theiss. 
 
 All national claims are based on traditional rights, and it is there- 
 fore necessary to glance at the history of the Roumanians. 
 
 Before the thirteenth century the history of the Moldo-Wallachian 
 provinces is wrapped in obscurity. They were often at war with the 
 
 * Histoire des Roumains de la Dacie Trafane (in French, 1895). 
 
 305 20 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 Hungarians, and in 1389, having allied themselves with the Serbians 
 against the Turks, they shared the disastrous defeat of the former 
 at Kossovo. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the King of 
 Hungary, Matthias Corvinus, wrote to the King of Poland : " The 
 voi'vodes of Wallachia and Moldavia fawn upon the Turks, Tartars, 
 Poles and Hungarians in turn, and, with this multiplicity of masters, 
 their perfidy goes unpunished. Knowing their weakness, they play 
 all manner of tricks upon their more powerful neighbours." 
 
 The septennial elections of a hospodar by the boyars led to a con- 
 dition of anarchy from which the provinces did not even escape when 
 they became a Turkish protectorate. The Turks governed them 
 through phanariotes, who systematically robbed them. Then a new 
 factor appeared — Russia. On July loth, 1774, she restored the two 
 provinces and Bessarabia to the Porte, but reserved to herself a share 
 in the government and an interest in their foreign relations. 
 
 These rights were recognized in the treaties of 1779, l 7%3 anc ^ 1 79 2 - 
 The Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 restored Bessarabia to Russia. On 
 March 17th, 1826, the Emperor Nicholas required the Porte to 
 evacuate the Principalities and settle the Serbian question. The 
 Treaty of Akerman completed the Treaty of Bucharest, and a separate 
 agreement gave Russia a protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia. 
 The Porte tried to disregard its obligations and brought down on its 
 head a Russian expedition, which compelled it, on the 14th of Sep- 
 tember, to grant Russia free trade on the Black Sea and throughout 
 the Ottoman Empire, to open the Straits, and to pay a war indemnity 
 of some .£5,500,000. The hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
 instead of being elected for seven years, were to be elected for life. 
 Russia appointed as Governor of these provinces Count Kisseleff, 
 who gave one of the rare examples of an enlightened despotism, 
 though he left the peasantry subject to burdensome corvees, while the 
 amount of land assigned to them by their landlords was reduced 
 from twenty-two hectares to six.* 
 
 In August, 1834, Alexander Ghica was appointed hospodar of 
 Wallachia, and Michael Stourdza hospodar of Moldavia. Ghica was 
 deposed in 1842 and replaced by George 0. Bibesco. The only con- 
 nection between the hospodars and the Porte was the homage they 
 rendered at their election. The internal disorders of Wallachia do 
 not concern us here. 
 
 The union of the two provinces was decided in principle at the 
 * One hectare = 2.47 acresi 
 306 
 
Roumania and Transylvania 
 
 Congress of Paris in 1856. Napoleon III. hoped by establishing a 
 comparatively powerful State to separate Russia from the Slav 
 provinces of the Balkans, Prussia wanted to weaken Austria, 
 Piedmont to set up a precedent in favour of the principle of nationality, 
 Russia to weaken the Ottoman Empire. Austria and Turkey alone 
 opposed the change. Great Britain accepted it with reserve. In 1859 
 the union was brought about by the double election of Prince Alex- 
 ander John Cuza by Moldavia and Wallachia. The Constitution of 
 1866 established a constitutional monarchy, and Prince Charles, 
 second son of Prince Charles Antony of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 
 and an officer in the Prussian army, was elected Prince Regent. He 
 was twenty-seven years old. 
 
 In 1 87 1 the Roumanians made no secret of their sympathies for 
 France. The ringleaders in a popular demonstration were brought 
 to trial, but were acquitted. Shortly afterwards a German named 
 Stransberg, who had obtained a railway concession through the 
 Prince's favour, went bankrupt. There was a loud outcry against 
 the German colony. The Prince summoned the Council of Regency 
 and offered to abdicate. The Roumanian Conservative party took 
 fright. The elections went in the Prince's favour and he remained 
 in power. 
 
 In 1878, Roumania not only allowed the Russian army to cross her 
 territory, but assisted actively with her own forces, which played an 
 important part in the campaign. The result of the war was to make 
 Roumania entirely independent of Turkey, but Russia rewarded her 
 for her assistance by seizing from her, in exchange for the Dobrudja, 
 the part of Bessarabia which had been ceded to Moldavia after the 
 Crimean War. It was in reference to this affair that Lord Beaconsfield 
 wrote : " Ingratitude in politics is often the reward of the greatest 
 services." 
 
 Roumania became a kingdom in 188 1. In 1884 tne constitution 
 was to some extent remodelled. 
 
 Roumania's part in the Balkan War is a matter of history. In 
 spite of the manoeuvres of Austria-Hungary, she intervened on the 
 outbreak of war between Bulgaria and Serbia. Without firing a shot 
 she compelled Bulgaria to sign the Treaty of Bucharest, surrendering 
 some 3,340 square miles of her territory and a population of 354,000. 
 
 The present area of Roumania is some 56,000 square miles, and her 
 population 7,600,000. 
 
 307 20* 
 
.-.<, ■< • '/ Jc •>;*: . ;.-.;< ' W.U 
 
 :h the M*gv*rs« T 
 
 io r.*.::* ./' . ...v./ ". /. • >.«;■. : i M ut . S. . ;/.:. tftS n*<k 
 
 the proportion of voting power of each nationality to the : 
 
 ton:.- though the 
 
 rr. r:v :^:\ :* : u- -:..". :vr ;:'.,;: .>:: is icvi, 
 
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 « ; - < .■ .; 
 
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 The new frontier R< i on the west must enclose the 
 
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Roumania and Ttansyhrania 
 
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 mil':l ( : ; '• ■•": , \* 
 
 rnom< ' :/ 7/ '" ^' 
 
 realize d 1 1 i 
 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 TURKEY 
 
 Lord Beaconsfield introduces Germany to Eastern politics — Constantinople a 
 hot-bed of intrigue — The Anatolian Railway in 1889 — The " Sick Man " — 
 The Treaty of Paris — The dogma of Turkish integrity — Lord Derby and 
 the suicide of the "Sick Man " — High-sounding theories both conventional 
 and false — The Khalifatc — The break-up of the Turkish Empire — Russia 
 and Constantinople — The Balkans. 
 
 IN 1878 Lord Beaconsfield brought Germany into Eastern politics 
 with a view to counteracting Russian influence. I know that 
 Bismarck once attempted to demonstrate his friendship for Russia by 
 saying that he " never opened the Constantinople despatches." He 
 even went so far, according to his Reflections and Reminiscences, as 
 to declare that he believed it necessary, from the point of view of 
 German interests, that the Russians should be firmly established at 
 Constantinople.* 
 
 For the last two centuries the Turkish Government has been nothing 
 more than a battle-ground for rival European intriguers, a breeding- 
 ground of controversies between the great Powers, skilfully nursed 
 by Turkish politicians like Abdul Hamid. 
 
 Bismarck was still in power when the Germans, under Gerad Pasha, 
 began to teutonize Turkish policy. The Convention which gave 
 them the Anatolian Railway dates from 1889. William II. paid two 
 visits to the Sultan, secured orders for the necessary material, became 
 his bosom friend, and finally obtained the concession of the Bagdad 
 Railway. 
 
 In 1853 the Czar Nicholas I. remarked in a conversation with the 
 British Ambassador, Sir George Hamilton Seymour : " We have a 
 sick man on our hands." He declared : " I do not desire the per- 
 manent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians, but I am 
 anxious that it shall never fall into the hands of the English, the 
 
 * Vol. II., p. 286. 
 310 
 
Turkey 
 
 French, or any other great Power." He went on to say that the 
 interests of Russia and Austria were one, and that he did not object 
 to the British occupation of Egypt and Candia. 
 
 Sir George Hamilton Seymour replied that by occupying Egypt 
 England only wished to secure free and rapid communication with 
 India. 
 
 Great Britain and France joined hands in the Crimean War. The 
 Treaty of Paris restored the Straits to the Porte and forbade Russia 
 to keep a navy in the Black Sea, a clause which she disregarded after 
 1 871. Since the opening of the Suez Canal Great Britain has occupied 
 Egypt. 
 
 At that period Great Britain was anxious that Russia should not 
 advance beyond the Caucasus and approach Persia. Russia built 
 the Trans-Caspian Railway, and has come to an agreement with Great 
 Britain as to their respective spheres of influence in Persia. 
 
 The integrity of Turkey was a dogma of French diplomacy from 
 the days of Francis I. It was solemnly affirmed by the Congress of 
 Paris in 1856. 
 
 In 1875 Lord Derby said : " Twenty years ago, by the Treaty of 
 Paris, we guaranteed the Sick Man against being killed — we did not 
 guarantee him against committing suicide." The Sick Man has 
 committed suicide after all. If so much effort had not been directed 
 towards keeping him alive for so long, in all probability there would 
 have been no present war. 
 
 The importance of Constantinople is a tradition that dates from the 
 time of the Crusades. In those days it was the second or third city 
 of the world, whereas to-day it is only the fourteenth or fifteenth. 
 Although most geographical, historical and diplomatic treatises are 
 fond of repeating that the route to India lies through Constantinople, 
 the facts are otherwise. It was one of the great world routes only 
 for the Crusaders on the way to Jerusalem. It has been frequently 
 said that the possession of Constantinople means world domination. 
 In that case, the Turks have been masters of the world for centuries. 
 Constantinople is, however, the gate of the Black Sea and it is ridiculous 
 that a Government which is no more than a glorified anarchy should 
 have the communications of Russia with the outside world at its 
 mercy. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's note of November 1st, 1914, recalls that on the 
 outbreak of the war Turkey received from Great Britain, France 
 and Russia an assurance that if she remained neutral her independence 
 
 311 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 and integrity would be respected during the war and when terms of 
 peace came to be considered. It seems that the Turkish Government 
 allowed German officers to usurp its authority. 
 
 Turkey is even less a nation than Austria-Hungary. The break-up 
 of the Turkish Empire is already an accomplished fact. Another 
 political system must take its place to ensure that the Bosphorus 
 and Dardanelles will always be kept open. The Sultan will in future 
 be merely the Khalif of Islam, as the Pope remained head of the 
 Catholic Church after the entry of the Italians into Rome. He 
 will retain his religious functions and dignities, but will lose all 
 temporal authority. 
 
 Constantinople is not a Turkish city. It is cosmopolitan, a town 
 of many tongues, in which Greeks, Armenians and men from many 
 lands live their lives of intrigue. 
 
 Would a joint administration by Great Britain, France and Russia 
 be able to secure order and the freedom of the Straits ? The experience 
 of joint administrations in times past is not encouraging. Their 
 lease of life has usually been short. The only practicable solution of 
 the problem is to hand over Constantinople and the Straits to Russia 
 in full confidence that she will not abuse her position. As the 
 Spectator pointed out, while Turkey's occupation of Constantinople 
 has been a historical scandal, it is to be expected that Russia will 
 thoroughly justify her possession of the city if only because she has 
 given incontestable proof of her ability to govern Mohammedans. 
 According to the religious census of 1897, there were no less than 
 fourteen million Mohammedans in the Russian Empire. The number 
 has certainly increased since then. The Spectator went on to ridicule 
 the fear that the possession of Constantinople would make Russia too 
 powerful. Those who are haunted by that fear may be easy in their 
 minds. The Czar of all the Russias will not abandon Petrograd to 
 make Constantinople his capital. Saint Sophia will never take the 
 place of the Kremlin. 
 
 The dissolution of the Turkish Empire might be carried out on the 
 following lines : Russia would have all that part of Turkey which 
 forms the coast of the Black Sea. Great Britain would acquire 
 Mesopotamia and the courses of the Euphrates and the Tigris, while 
 Syria and part of the coast would go to France. I say nothing of 
 Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Albania, because the settlement 
 of their affairs will be only a minor matter in the peace negotiations. 
 
 312 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 RUSSIA 
 
 The development of the Slav States as an antidote to Pan-Slavism — Russia's 
 power of " assimilation " — The tolerance of Mohammedans — The Slav 
 peril — Mazzini's opinion — An Italian alliance with the Slav family. 
 
 HERR GUMPLOWITZ, a professor at the University of Gratz, 
 gave an excellent piece of advice to the statesmen of Austria, 
 haunted by fears of Pan-Slavism, when he counselled them to foster 
 the development of national feeling among the Slav groups. He 
 urged Prussia and Austria to promote the sentiment of Polish 
 nationality. The only effective method of saving Bohemia from 
 Pan-Slavism is to allow Czech nationality to develop unhampered. 
 He recommended the same course for the Southern Slav groups of 
 Austria-Hungary. Liberty would mean the preservation of their 
 individuality, whereas oppression would drive them into the arms of 
 Russia. 
 
 In support of this view he cited the case of Bulgaria, which was 
 emancipated from Turkish rule by the efforts of Russia, and had yet 
 always put independence as regards Russia before gratitude for her 
 services. He recalled that Queen Nathalie was expelled from Serbia 
 on account of her marked leanings towards Russia. 
 
 This advice was exceedingly wise, because it was based on reality ; 
 but the Governments of Vienna and Budapest have continued to 
 pursue a policy which alienates the Slavs and makes them look to 
 Petrograd for deliverance. 
 
 Herr Gumplowitz* denounces Russian diplomacy as being equally 
 skilful and dangerous, and a marked improvement on the teachings 
 of Machiavelli. " Rome," he says, " conquered first and assimilated 
 afterwards." Prussia took a piece of Poland, then tried to assimilate 
 her Poles, but, so far from succeeding, her germanizing methods in 
 Prussian Poland have roused a strong Russophile sentiment in 
 Russian Poland. The weakness of the Turks is due to the fact that 
 
 * La Lutte des Races (Paris, F. Alcan). Sociologie et Politique, I vol. (Giard 
 et Briere). 
 
 313 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 when they have made conquests they have made no effort to assimilate 
 the conquered. 
 
 The Russians, he says, begin at the other end. They start with 
 spiritual assimilation. Peter the Great styled himself Pope of the 
 Greek Church. Every member of that Church owes allegiance to the 
 Czar. Russia adds to spiritual pressure temporal assistance to the 
 Greek clergv. The kinship of the various Slav tongues facilitates 
 penetration. Moral conquest precedes military conquest. 
 
 This generalization of Herr Gumplowitz as to Russian methods errs 
 in the direction of exaggeration, but he explains their comparative 
 failure in Poland on the ground that Poland represented a higher 
 civilization than that of Russia. The Russians went to Tashkend 
 and Samarcand before sending Greek priests there. They have made 
 no attempt to convert the Mohammedans of Asia to the Greek Church. 
 Yet it is incontestable that Russia has assimilated her Mohammedan 
 subjects with ease, whereas the Germans and Magyars have failed 
 conspicuously to assimilate their subject populations. 
 
 Will the Russians develop the war-madness of the Prussians ? 
 Those who know them best say that the Russian peasant is the most 
 gentle and least quarrelsome of men. 
 
 The German Socialists, taking their cue from the Wilhelmstrasse, 
 have attempted to justify their attitude towards the war by talking 
 of the Slav peril. No doubt they see it, but the French have seen 
 the German peril for the last fifty years and it became more formid- 
 able from day to day, though the German Socialists tried to convince 
 the Belgians, French and English that it was a phantom of their 
 imagination. To-day the acts of their countrymen with whom they 
 have sided prove that the German peril is the peril of barbarism let 
 loose, while their treacherous and lying diplomacy, their flagrant 
 disregard for their plighted word, prove that they are lost to all sense 
 of shame. If the behaviour of the Germans in Belgium, France and 
 Poland be compared with that of the Russians in Galicia, the latter 
 appear as models of virtue. 
 
 The Slav peril has often been held out as a terror for Italy in the 
 
 hope of fomenting discord over the future of the Adriatic coast. 
 
 Signor Rodolico, however, writing on the 8th of November in the 
 
 Mazocco of Florence, recalled a letter of Mazzini's, in which he said : 
 
 " The true objective of Italian international policy, the shortest route to her 
 future greatness, is an alliance with the Slav family. The Turkish and Austrian 
 Empires are irrevocably condemned to death, and the sword which will deal 
 them their deathblow is in the hand of the Slavs." 
 
 314 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 POLAND 
 
 Austria's right to Galicia — The partitions of Poland— The arrangement of 1815 — 
 The incorporation of Cracow in Austria — Germany's failure to assimilate 
 the Poles — The Kaiser's appeal to the Teutonic Knights — The proclamation 
 of August 14th, 1914. 
 
 IN the twelfth century Hungary warred with Venice and the 
 Russians of Galicia, the capital of which was Przemysl. They 
 were helped by the Poles. Bela III. compelled part of Galicia to 
 render homage. Andrew II. took the title of King of Galicia and 
 Lodomeni, but had no authority. His title formed the basis of 
 Austria's claim to Galicia in 1772, six centuries later, at the time of 
 the partition of Poland. 
 
 That partition formed a bond of union between Austria, Russia 
 and Prussia. Frederick II. wrote in his Memoirs : " The acquisition 
 of Poland was one of the most important events for us, because it 
 joined Pomerania to East Prussia, and gave us control of the Vistula." 
 Maria Theresa wept with grief over the partition, but accepted Galicia. 
 In 1793 there was a second partition. Prussia received the provinces 
 of Posen, Kalisz and Sieradz, and the towns of Danzig and Thorn, 
 Austria eighteen thousand square miles and more than a million 
 new subjects, and Russia the rest. 
 
 At the Congress of Vienna three rival schemes were put forward. 
 The Emperor of Russia wanted a Russian protectorate, while the 
 British and French desired the establishment of an independent Polish 
 nation. Russia, Prussia and Austria made a private agreement for 
 the disintegration of Poland. The Congress was not even consulted, 
 and they merely brought their private arrangement to the eight 
 Powers for signature. As if half ashamed of their action, the inde- 
 pendent Republic of Cracow was created under the protection of 
 Austria, Prussia and Russia ; but in 1846 the three protectors, 
 violating their assurances to England and France, joined in incor- 
 porating it with Austria. 
 
 315 
 
The Causes And Consequences oi the War 
 
 The Ge pi K) ed dmilate i 
 
 the I 
 . -. 1867 the Duchj 
 
 688,000 G< . ; . s ; ; - : ill 1 10, 8< ' 
 
 ■ . : -e.e. I Poles Out Oi i,e 
 > to 381 j. In Silt 
 
 1,774,00c Germans . in V. est Prussia ..-. 
 
 Poles, The parts the Poles are in a 
 
 .:•. must be res It is a work of ventilation 
 
 which can be out generously. 
 
 [n 1900 the K >eech in the ax 
 
 Teutonic King hts at Marienburg, in which he summoned : 
 
 1st the Poles. 1: is plain that >lain if he 
 
 gets rid of the 
 
 On August 14th, 1014, tame of the Czar, die ^ : rand Duke 
 
 Nicholas pre 
 
 " PoleG 5 yOUT fathers ,, K | o rA nd- 
 
 - 
 
 the sceptre oi the C 
 tm.free in iguage, and 
 
 ■ 
 
 re sm te c tioo oi 
 is 
 
 The the Kingdom of Poland is the Czar of Russia's 
 
 ■ \-.e\ . Gj ilicia to I >w will form pa 
 
 it, as e Polish districts of Si 
 
 and West Prussia. The mouths cd the Vistula and Danzig will be 
 
 lish frontier will be withii 
 hundred miles of Berlin. If the King of Prussia w visit 
 
 1 unless he goes through Polish 
 In [848 . sd erne - i the restorati c of Poland was pre- 
 
 :. "It would sever the most 
 
 I issia," said Bismarck. 
 
 Poland will form a buffer State between Russia and Prussia, a 
 
 suggestion put I at the Congress of Vienna, when Prussian 
 
 its real:. stOl ition of Poland is the 
 
 best guarantee that Russia can give against the ambitions that some 
 
 attribute to her. 
 
 316 
 
CHAPTER Xlll 
 
 THE GERMAN COLONIES 
 
 ^HE German colonies, which can never be oilier than a bone of 
 J~ contention, will be divided between Gre; t Britain, Belgium, 
 
 France and Japan. This arrangement must be regarded not less 
 as the sanction of territorial gains than as a guarantee of peace. 
 
 The Kaiser's declarations at the beginning of the war proved that 
 his colonial ambitions were one of his motives in taking the pli 
 This motive must not be left to him. 
 
 The disinterestedness of Great Britain, France and Russia as 
 regards the acquisition of territory in Europe is a guarantee of their 
 agreement over the settlement of the world-questions raised by Ger- 
 many and Austria-Hungary. The Allied Towers entered the war to 
 win peace and assure it to Europe. 
 
 V7 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE RESTORATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE 
 
 I. The declaration of the Deputies fan 1871 G< -.uilate 
 
 swn BS population of the 
 
 annexed provinces — The proportion of German immigrants — The n\v ..- 
 stitution of the four departments. 
 
 II. Restoration a matter of right — The question ..rise — 
 
 Ti. ~ s s ft, but unsatisfactory — 
 
 Article 5 of the Treaty of Pr.. . of securing a genuine 
 
 . rendum. 
 
 OX February 10th. 1871, in the National Assembly at Bordeaux, 
 die thirty-six Deputies of the Haut and Bas-Rhin, the Moselle, 
 Meurthe and the Vosges, declared that they did not recognize 
 
 the validity of the Treaty of Frankfort. 
 
 ght of the Alsace-Lorraincrs to remain members 
 of the .-.tion, and we swear, for our constituents, our children and their 
 
 ess :han for ourselves, that we will never cease to claim it by 
 all means and against all usurper? 
 
 Aft© -foul years tins claim ought to have lapsed. It has not 
 
 done so. The Germans have had no more success in assimilating the 
 Alsace-Lorrainers than in assimilating the Poles. 
 
 The re-incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine with France is a matter 
 as much above dispute as the complete evacuation of Belgium by 
 the Germ 
 
 M. Andrt* \\ eiss raises this quest:. 
 
 " Further - without saying that this restoration, of right, to French 
 
 •.-.sequence of the eviction of the Germans r.v 
 
 > thOG - which were established in the lost 
 
 -:. The immigrants of German origin will have no claim 
 to it. Will it not be possible, by means of privileged, though individual, nation- 
 alizations, to throw open French nationality to those who have given guarantees 
 of their attachment and fidelity by their conduct and culture ? " 
 
 318 
 
The Restoration of Alsace-Lorraine 
 
 M. Maxime Leroy says very truly : 
 
 " We must sternly oppose all measures which may seem aimed at the lawful 
 interests of the Germans well disposed toward us : I mean that France must 
 respect private property belonging to Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, not only 
 in ipirit, but to the letter. Anything resembling the abominable expropriations 
 in Poland must be avoided. In this way, and chiefly in this way, France will 
 show that she is as incapable of stealing a mill as of stealing a province. 
 
 The following figures show the area and population of the territories 
 torn from France in 1871 :* 
 
 Square Population 
 
 miles. in \Vf>. 
 
 Alsace 3, 1 iG 1,066,000 
 
 Lorraine 2,488 535,000 
 
 5,604 1,601,000 
 
 These provinces comprised the whole of the Department of the 
 Bas-Rhin — that is, some 1,756 square miles — and four-fifths of the 
 Department of the Haut-Rhin. 
 
 The new frontier was purely artificial. It was not determined by 
 natural features, nor did it correspond to distinctions of language. 
 
 In the census of 1910 the civil population of Alsace was assessed in 
 round figures at 1,800,000, distributed in the following manner : 
 
 Percentage. 
 
 Alsatians and Lorrainers 1,495,000 83.42 
 
 Germans 220,000 1 2 . 30 
 
 Foreigners 76,000 4 . 28 
 
 The inhabitants classified as Germans are those who are natives of 
 a State of the Empire other than Alsace-Lorraine. If only the place 
 of birth be considered, the figure for Germans drops to 164,000 ; 
 but among the children of immigrants a certain number may have 
 become naturalized Alsatians and this element increases the German 
 element to an unknown degree. 
 
 In view of the marked exodus of Alsatians and Lorrainers into 
 France and the immigration of officials, it is curious that the propor- 
 tion of Germans is not higher. Of the 220,000, 120,000 are Prussians. 
 There are 35,000 each from Bavaria and Baden and 15,000 from 
 Wiirtemberg. 
 
 * Journal de la Socttte de Statistiqae. Paul Merriot : " La Statistique comparee 
 des territoires cedes par la France en 187 1 ." 
 
 319 
 

 
 • • QQO 
 
 
 
 ffe 
 
 
 
 
 - 000 
 
 The Causes *\nd Consequences of the War 
 
 lv. Low c: Alsao BS as 
 
 . than 68,000 [he ma 
 
 M. 1 part- 
 
 I B ~ 1 : 
 
 ;8I 
 
 - ; 
 
 *; I 
 
 
 
 g the ultimate dis 
 of Alsa< - i biscitt . . s agg< 
 
 . for it would mean the recog Itioo oi v : . jht of 
 
 to its cc 
 
 StOJ J d '. 
 ining befori . ar of i S ~ i . 
 Hm bt stitu- 
 
 . . 5 Of ] 
 
 [he sys cal in g 
 
 was dear to Napoleon III., ho d< ted how useful if could be 
 
 i the Battle of Sadowa by 
 
 le 5 in die Treaty oi 
 
 "His His Majesty the K. 
 
 granted him 
 
 le northern 
 of Schleswig s (press are lor 
 
 Tliis article was carried out. Even if it had been, what 
 
 rantee would it h.:. ded 1 Who would have been in cfc 
 
 of the ballot-boxes on the pollii Who would ha\ inteed 
 
 the genuinenes gores : Would 
 
 the • - solutely unf< decision ? In 
 
 any c . gt the unknown future ; Far 
 
 this system is dw the traditi 
 
 ..ich unite certain human groups and disintegrate others. 
 
 «o 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 THE WAR INDEMNITY 
 
 War is an affair between States, not between individuals — " Strangling " the 
 Germans — The poliey of pressure and the policy of reconciliation — The war 
 indemnity — Herr von Zedlitz's claims — Pecuniary responsibility — Some 
 crimes against the law of nations ought to entail personal responsibility — 
 Securities — The Prussian State railways — The State mines — No State will 
 secure material profit from the war. 
 
 THOSE who are swayed by sentiment and passion and will not 
 listen to the dictates of reason have a very simple prescription 
 for the treatment of Germany. 
 
 " They have made war on us," they say, " after having kept U3 
 perpetually in an agony of suspense. They have lied impudently in 
 the hope of changing their role of aggressor into that of injured inno- 
 cent. They have violated the neutrality of Belgium, and committed 
 atrocities unnameable, which they repeated in France. Their intel- 
 lectuals have declared themselves at one with their Government 
 and proclaim their approval of the war methods of their commanders 
 and troops. They must be made to pay for it ! We must strangle 
 Germany ! " 
 
 Now what does " strangling " Germany mean ? Do they wish to 
 undertake the responsibility of governing the Germans ? It is all a 
 country can do to govern itself. Do they wish to repeat the experi- 
 ment of 1806 on a nation which will still number sixty-four to sixty-five 
 millions after the war ? Do they want to have a permanent army 
 of occupation in Germany ? Officers and men would deteriorate and 
 degrade themselves in the task. 
 
 A far different policy must be pursued if peace is not to be gained 
 at too high a price. Rousseau, Portalis and a multitude of writers 
 on international law have laid down as axiomatic that war is an affair 
 between States, not between individuals. In war, each belligerent 
 aims at the destruction of the military forces of his opponent, so 
 that that opponent, finding himself disarmed, will be compelled to 
 
 121 21 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 accept his terms. The terms may be political or territorial changes, 
 but whatever form they take, they ought to be imposed on the State 
 and not intended to touch individuals. They should not aim at the 
 ruin of the peasantry, the landowners, or the industrial proletariat, 
 and, above all, should not be devised to deprive the working classes 
 of work. 
 
 " But then," cry the extremists, " the Germans will revive. Our 
 victory will avail us nothing." Those who talk in this fashion should 
 calmly put one question to themselves. If a Power reduces its 
 enemies, not collectively, but individually, to despair, it inevitably 
 makes them rally round their Government, or its memory if the Govern- 
 ment has disappeared. These tactics pave the way for revenge. The 
 right course for the conqueror is to strive to dissolve the hostile forces. 
 When the conquered realize that they can resume their old existence 
 and take up their old business and pursuits, when they find themselves 
 as secure in their lives and property as before, bitter memories fade 
 away, the feeling of enmity and desire for revenge vanish, and hatred 
 dies a natural death. 
 
 During the peace negotiations we must advocate this policy with 
 unyielding resolution in opposition to the policy of the uttermost 
 farthing. 
 
 Yet, in spite of all our efforts, if victory entails suffering for the 
 victors, it will mean far more to the vanquished. The victors will 
 have a right to a war indemnity as compensation. 
 
 Herr von Zedlitz, an ex-director of the Prussian State Bank, firm 
 in his belief in an Austro-German victory, has expressed some interest- 
 ing views on the question of the war indemnity which a victorious 
 Power has the right of imposing on its adversary. He includes in 
 the account the cost of mobilization, the maintenance of the fleet 
 and army during active operations, the re-stocking of armament, the 
 repair of fortresses, compensation for losses to shipping, the restoration 
 of the railways, an indemnity for local and provincial war expenditure 
 (allowances, local relief), compensation for losses of all kinds suffered 
 by individuals, rural districts and towns, and, lastly, the capital 
 represented by pensions to the injured and the families of deceased 
 soldiers. He remarks that Count Henkel (afterwards Prince Donners- 
 mark) advised the Government in 1871 to take £200,000,000 in specie 
 and short-date bills, and another £200,000,000 in Government rentes, 
 in order to be able to lower French credit at any moment that German 
 policy required. The idea was based on a fallacy, as M. A. Raffalovich 
 
 322 
 
The War Indemnity 
 
 points out, because when a nation's vital interests are at stake, its 
 determination is not shaken by any depreciation of Government 
 stock. He adds ; 
 
 " When the time comes for the Allies to examine this question of a war in- 
 demnity, they must begin by giving priority as a matter of justice to the losses 
 suffered by individuals at the hands of the Germans, Austro-Hungarians and 
 Turks. State demands must take second place, and at the moment of the 
 distribution of the indemnity we suggest a formula based on the effective daily 
 strength of the officers and men at the front. That would present a common 
 divisor." 
 
 Article 3 of the Hague Convention dealing with the Laws and 
 Customs of War on Land, dated August 17th, 1907, lays down that 
 " the belligerent who violates the provisions of the said Regulations 
 will be liable to pay an indemnity. It will be responsible for all acts 
 committed by those who form part of its armed forces." 
 
 The Germans seem to have made a point of swelling the figure of 
 the indemnity they w T ill have to pay. But the question arises as to 
 whether personal responsibility attaches to those who have com- 
 mitted, or ordered the commission of, crimes like the massacre of 
 women, children and the aged, wholesale burning, rapine and indis- 
 criminate destruction. If not, who is responsible ? The answer must 
 be the army leaders who authorized and encouraged the commission 
 of these crimes and took no steps to prevent them, however horrible, 
 as well as those who supervised the execution of the orders. Such 
 crimes are violations of public law. They must be punished as such. 
 If we could only rid ourselves of certain ancient prejudices, the Kaiser 
 and the Crown Prince would be treated as common criminals. 
 
 The cost of the war already exceeds all anticipation. When the 
 German Empire and Austria-Hungary sue for peace, their resources 
 will be drained. The estimates that were made of the interest on 
 their debts at the beginning of the war have been falsified by their 
 successive loans during its course. 
 
 Some revenue may be obtained from the State railways. The 
 estimate of the revenue of the Prussian State railways for the year 
 1914-1915 was 374 million marks (approximately ^18,400,000). If 
 this was the genuine revenue, it would represent capital which could 
 be distributed in realizable bonds. But even taking the rate of 
 interest at five per cent., this capital would only be ^368,000,000. It 
 would only be a trifle on account. 
 
 323 21* 
 
The Causes and Consequences of the War 
 
 The same observation applies to the State mines and salt works 
 in Prussia. Their profits were estimated at 37 million marks 
 (£1,820,000). In these cases also conversion into bonds might be 
 effected, but the capital would probably not exceed £40,000,000. 
 
 This method of obtaining a war indemnity has the double advan- 
 tage of depriving the conquered State of its revenues and, consequently, 
 reducing its resources. At the same time, its weight would not be 
 felt by the taxpayers. 
 
 There are no Imperial railways. The Allies might extend the 
 operation to the other States of the German Empire, but with great 
 regard for their interests. The estimate of the profits of the Bavarian 
 State Railway was only 3,000,000 marks (£147,000). In view of the 
 prospective condition of the railways after the war, their capital will 
 be comparatively insignificant. 
 
 We must not deceive ourselves. The war will not bring material 
 profit, even to the victors. The most they can do is to reduce their 
 loss. 
 
 324 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 GERMAN TRADE AND FREE TRADE 
 
 EVER since the war began there has been a multitude of speeches 
 and articles on the destruction of German trade by French and 
 British trade. 
 
 French Protectionists demand the repeal of Article 1 1 of the Treaty 
 of Frankfort, which assured most-favoured-nation treatment to 
 France and the German Empire. Many who are most anxious to 
 annihilate German trade propose to keep out German goods by means 
 of more or less prohibitive customs duties. They forget, in their 
 simplicity, that customs duties are paid by the consumers, not the 
 producers. Suppose they treble the duty on coal coming from 
 Germany. It is the French metallurgical industry which surfers. 
 If they increase the duties on dyes they injure the French textile 
 industries. If they want to make at home the machinery which 
 France imported to the value of .£5,000,000 in 191 3, they adversely 
 affect all French industries dependent on it. 
 
 For France to fine herself for introducing the German products 
 of which she stands in need would be a singular method of injuring 
 the Germans. The only way for her to set a limit to the expansion 
 of German trade and industry is not to close her own frontiers, but 
 to open those of Germany. 
 
 Herr Diepenhors has said that " Germany's conquest of foreign 
 markets must certainly be ascribed mainly to the syndicates."* 
 These syndicates thrive on the practice of " dumping," made possible 
 by customs duties. To prevent future dumping Germany must be 
 made a Free-Trade country. To compel Germany to adopt Free 
 Trade would not be to work for her ruin, but to rebuild the founda- 
 tions of her prosperity. If France remains a Protectionist country, 
 the condition of her trade and industry relative to that of Germany 
 will be less favourable than it is now. 
 
 * Part II., Chap. VIII,, supra*. 
 325 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I HAVE tried by a dispassionate examination of facts to arrive at 
 the international consequences of the war. My method has 
 been as much as possible analytical, and I have studiously avoided 
 the atmosphere which pervades speeches and articles on the war. I 
 have said nothing of justice, immemorial right, still less of the eternal 
 verities. The mythical has formed no part of my study. 
 
 My one object has been to discover the means of arriving at a 
 lasting peace by satisfying once and for all the aspirations of the 
 numerous groups which have never ceased to protest against the 
 foreign domination under which they groan. 
 
 The political dissolution of the German Empire is the essential 
 outcome of this war, but it will only be effective if it is accompanied 
 and followed by its moral dissolution. We must work for that moral 
 dissolution by refusing to be carried away by hatred, a passion which 
 German statesmen, officers and soldiers have spared nothing to 
 arouse. We can demonstrate the superiority of our civilization by 
 showing that we are above a policy of reprisals. 
 
 We must not be turned aside from our task of replacing the civiliza- 
 tion of brigandage by the civilization of exchange. 
 
 326 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 THE BULGARIAN QUESTION 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 THE BULGARIAN QUESTION^ 
 
 L Balkan interests and peace -II. The Bulgarians before and after 1878 — III. 
 Bulgaria and the Wars of [912 [913 IV. The Bulgarians and Macedonia — 
 V. Diplomatic illusions — VI. The difficulties of the problem. 
 
 1 
 
 I. Balkan Interests and Peace 
 
 HAVE said : I 
 
 " I say nothing of Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Albania, because the 
 
 s< ttlement of theil affairs will be only a minor matter in th< oliations." 
 
 Present events do not lead me to adopt any other point - 
 Those States will not settle their own future by themselves and their 
 Governments will have no case for intervention in the peace negotia- 
 tions, because their destinies are in the hands of the Allies. Jt is 
 therefore advisable at this moment to appreciate the situation of 
 those peoples, in order that it may be duly considered when the day 
 for a final settlement of the Eastern Question arriv . 
 
 When the Balkan War broke out I pointed out in the Journal des 
 Economistes for October and November, 191 2, the insignificance of 
 the interests at issue, the negligible economic value of the region 
 
 * Bibliography : La Question d' Orient, by Ed. Driault. — La Vie l J 'jlitique 
 dans les Deux Moncles, by A. Viallate and M. Caudel. — L'Lurope el la Politique 
 Orientale, 1878-1912, by Count de Landemont, 1912.— Les Origines de la Guerre 
 Europeenne, by A. Gauvin, 191 5. — Macedonia and the Reforms, by Diagonof, 
 London, 1908. — Light on the Balkan Darkness, by Crawford Price CSimpkin, 
 Marshall & Co.), 1915. — Germany and Eastern Europe, by Lewis B. .'.armor 
 (Duckworth & Co.), 1915. — Nationalism and War in the Near East, by A Diplo- 
 matist ; edited by Lord Courtney of Penwith ; Vol. I. (Carnegie Endowment 
 for International Peace) ; Oxford, Clarendon Pr< 
 
 | Part V., Chapter X., p. 312. 
 
 329 
 
Appendix 
 
 known as the Balkan Peninsula and the false notions entertained 
 wilfully or ignorantly by statesmen and publicists as to the importance 
 of the routes through the Balkans. I demonstrated the absurdity 
 of phrases like these : " Salonica will be one day the half-way house 
 on the highway from Port Said to Vienna or Hamburg, the meeting- 
 place of Germany and India ; " " Constantinople lies on the highway 
 to India ; " and " is the gate of the East," although in sober fact its 
 sole importance is due to the fact that Turkey has been permitted 
 to remain in a position to close the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles 
 at will. I also exposed the popular illusions to which the Bagdad 
 Railway gave rise in the minds of those who had never stopped to 
 compare maritime freights for long distances with the cost of rail 
 transport or the cost of transport part by rail and part by sea, 
 involving the expense of transfer. 
 
 II. The Bulgarians before and after 1878 
 
 The Bulgarians, whose original home was in Asia, are much more 
 akin to the Turks than to the Slavs. In 679 a.d., led by their Khan 
 Asporukh (or Isperikh), they crossed the Danube and made them- 
 selves masters of the scattered Slav populations, while adopting 
 their language, customs and institutions. In the ninth century their 
 Tsar Boris was converted to Christianity. The independence of the 
 Bulgarian Church was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople, 
 and their primate himself received the title of Patriarch. From 893 
 to 927, under Simeon, the " Emperor and Autocrat of all the Bul- 
 garians and Greeks," their Empire extended from the Black Sea to 
 the Adriatic and from the frontiers of Thessaly to the Save and the 
 Carpathians. However, Basil II., BovXyapoKrovog, the " Slayer of 
 Bulgarians," brought their empire to an end, and for more than a 
 century and a half (1018-1186) Bulgaria was subject to the Emperors 
 of Byzantium. 
 
 From 1 218 to 1241 Ivan Asen II. established Bulgarian sway over 
 Albania, the Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace, and Bulgaria attained 
 a comparatively high stage of civilization ; but in 1330 the Tsar 
 Michael Shishman was beaten by the Serbs at the battle of 
 Kustendil, and Bulgaria became part of the Empire of Stephen 
 Dushan (1 331-1355). Then the Turks came on the scene. In 1340 
 they ravaged the valley of the Maritza, captured Philippopolis in 
 
 330 
 
Appendix 
 
 1342 and Sofia in 1382. By 1396 the last vestige of Bulgarian 
 independence had vanished. 
 
 The Turkish conquest was so complete that four centuries later 
 Bulgaria took no part in the movement for the liberation of Serbia 
 from the Turkish yoke, which began in 1804. In 1862, however, 
 when the Serbians drove out the remaining Turkish garrisons from 
 their towns, the Bulgarians also began to organize ; but it was the 
 Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, Ignatieff, who inspired the 
 revival of their national feeling. Citing the precedent of their 
 patriarch, who was recognized by the Greek patriarch in the ninth 
 century, he put such pressure on the Porte that it consented to issue 
 the firman of February 28th, 1870, providing that : 
 
 Article I. — A separate ecclesiastical district shall be established under the 
 official name of the Bulgarian Exarchate. The administration of spiritual 
 and religious affairs in these districts shall pertain exclusively to the said 
 Exarchate. 
 
 Article II. — The metropolitan of the said districts shall bear the title of 
 Exarch. 
 
 In Turkey religion and nationality are the same thing. Ignatieff 
 thus created Bulgarian nationality, notwithstanding the protests of 
 the Fanar. The Russians next taught the Bulgarians to realize that 
 they had twice possessed an empire, gave them schools, supplied them 
 with war material and inspired them with ambitions. 
 
 Yet Bulgaria was still an embryonic State when in 1870, Karaveloff, 
 one of the Bulgarian leaders, wrote in the Swoboda of November 18th : 
 " The hopes we have put in Russia are the cause of our sufferings in 
 the last century. Our safety depends upon a Danubian federation, 
 and not upon Russia." In 1872 he resumed his argument : " We 
 must win our independence ourselves without foreign aid." On 
 July 20th, 1874, he said to the Bulgarians in his paper Negazvissimost 
 (" Independence ") that " the Slavs of the South ought not to want 
 either help or sympathy from foreigners."* 
 
 Yet without Russia Bulgaria would still be under the Turkish yoke. 
 
 In 1875 the inhabitants of Herzgovina refused to pay taxes, or to 
 work in the corvees, and resisted the Turkish authorities. Foreign 
 consuls intervened in the affair and Turkey promised a wide scale of 
 reforms, but the rising spread. The Bulgarians massacred Turkish 
 
 * The Early History of the Balkan League, by L. Barber. — The International 
 Review, October 5 th, 19 14. 
 
 331 
 
Appendix 
 
 police agents. Abdul Hamid had become Sultan after the com- 
 pulsory suicide of Abd-ul-Aziz and the deposition of his brother 
 Murad. Chefket Pasha was commissioned to stamp out the revolt, 
 and carried out his work in a revolting manner which roused the 
 wrath of Gladstone, who made the mistake of supposing that the 
 Bulgarians were the only victims. The method of massacre was, 
 in fact, extended to the Greeks and Serbs of Macedonia. Russian 
 intervention saved Serbia, but roused the suspicions of Lord Beacons- 
 field. There followed the Conference of Constantinople, which forced 
 a constitution on Turkey, but only delayed the Russian declaration 
 of war. 
 
 On April 24th, 1877, the Czar commanded his armies to ignore the 
 protest of Great Britain and cross the Danube. Roumania joined 
 forces with them, but Bulgaria took no part in the struggle. 
 
 Colonel Verestchagin, brother of the painter, has left an account 
 of his experiences in the war of 1877-1878. He reveals the terror 
 which the Turks inspired in the Bulgarians who did not know how 
 to use a gun, having been brought up under a regime which allowed 
 any Turk to kill offhand every Bulgarian found armed with that 
 weapon. But covered by the Russian armies, they took their revenge. 
 The Turks found themselves manacled with the fetters they had 
 destined for the Bulgarians and subjected to wholesale pillage. On 
 one occasion, when the Bulgarians wanted to get some loot across a 
 Russian camp, they feigned a Turkish attack. 
 
 Bismarck prevented Austria from intervening. England was 
 mortally afraid that the Russians would enter Constantinople, but 
 they stopped short at San Stefano, and the treaty they imposed on 
 Turkey established an autonomous principality of Bulgaria, which 
 comprised the provinces of Bulgaria proper, Roumelia and Mace- 
 donia. Bismarck thought that by preventing the intervention of 
 Austria-Hungary in the war, he had paid off his debt to Russia for 
 her friendly neutrality in the Franco-German War.* He represented 
 himself as the " honest broker " acting as intermediary between 
 Russia, Austria and Great Britain. The Treaty of Berlin (1878) 
 radically revised the Treaty of San Stefano. Macedonia was restored 
 to Turkey. The new principality of Bulgaria was cut down to the 
 territory between the Danube and the Balkans. It was to remain 
 tributary to Turkey. Independently of Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia 
 
 * See supra, p. 39* 
 332 
 
Appendix 
 
 was created with a Christian governor, appointed for five years by 
 the Sultan. The Bulgarians considered themselves robbed, and 
 resolved never to respect those clauses of the Treaty of Berlin which 
 injured them. 
 
 They chose Prince Alexander of Battenberg as Prince of Bulgaria. 
 Although this selection was inspired by Russia, Prince Alexander 
 found himself obliged to side with the anti-Russian party. In 1885 
 a revolution broke out at Philippopolis. Prince Alexander of Batten- 
 berg went there, and in violation of the Treaty of Berlin assumed 
 the title of " Prince of the Two Bulgarias " and annexed Eastern 
 Roumelia. The Greeks demanded territorial compensation ; but 
 a naval demonstration soon compelled Greece to recognize Bulgaria's 
 right to flout the Treaty of Berlin, bearing the signatures of its 
 authors, the Germans, Austrians, British, Italians and Russians. 
 France, also a signatory of the treaty, indicated to Greece in friendly 
 fashion the necessity of accepting this unexpected interpretation 
 of it. 
 
 The Serbians, egged on by Austria, attacked the Bulgarians, but 
 were defeated at Slivnitza (November 19th, 1885). 
 
 The Russian Government never forgave Alexander of Battenberg. 
 He was kidnapped one night and carried off to Reni. Recalled by 
 the people, he was compelled under pressure from Russia to abdicate 
 a few days later. Stambuloff became Regent. He governed by the 
 most barbarous methods, and on the 7th of July, 1887, induced the 
 Sobranje to elect Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a lieutenant in 
 the Hungarian army, whose claims were supported by Austria and 
 Germany. The new ruler had been born in Vienna, was twenty-six 
 years of age, and a grandson of Louis-Philippe through his mother, 
 Princess Clementina. He was a great landowner in Hungary, very 
 rich, very ambitious, anti-Russian by birth. He boasted of having 
 French blood in his veins, but he was francophobe by training. In a 
 famous letter he once complained of being treated as the Nero of 
 Sofia, and represented himself as an innocent victim wholly devoted 
 to his people. Stambuloff put incredible energy into the work of 
 government which was characterized by affairs such as the execution 
 of Major Paniza in 1890. 
 
 It has been observed that Ferdinand was invariably absent whenever 
 one of these little political accidents occurred. By a singular coin- 
 cidence he was absent when Stambuloff was assassinated in 1895. 
 In an unguarded moment he once remarked to an Englishman : 
 
 333 
 
Appendix 
 
 " When I came to Bulgaria I made up my mind that if there were 
 to be assassinations, I would be on the side of the assassins." 
 
 To Mr. Dillon he said one day : " You were very devoted to my 
 predecessor, Prince Alexander of Battenberg." 
 
 " Yes," replied Mr. Dillon, " I admired him sincerely, though his 
 qualities were those of the heart rather than of the head." 
 
 " I shall never deserve that reproach," was Ferdinand's retort. 
 
 His election was not confirmed by the Porte until 1896. He 
 assumed the title of " Royal Highness." He then tried to curry 
 favour with Russia by having his son Boris baptized in the Orthodox 
 religion, with the Czar Nicholas for his godfather. 
 
 On October 5th, 1908, in further violation of the Treaty of Berlin, 
 he proclaimed himself Tsar of the Bulgarians at Tirnovo. The Great 
 Powers had already shown how little they cared for the maintenance 
 of the treaty and they acquiesced without protest. 
 
 It is true that Bulgaria has a national parliament, the Sobranje, 
 and responsible ministers ; but in reality Ferdinand wields despotic 
 powers. There are ten political parties in the country : (1) The 
 Nationalists, under M. GheshofT ; (2) the Liberal Progressives, under 
 Dr. Danef ; (3) the Democrats, led by M. Malinoff ; (4) the Stam- 
 buloffists, under Dr. Ghenadieff ; (5) the Liberals, under Dr. Rado- 
 slavofT, the present Prime Minister ; (6) the Young Liberals, led by 
 Dr. Tontcheff, the present Finance Minister ; (7) the Radicals, under 
 M. Isanow ; (8) the Agrarian Party, led by M. Stambouliski ; and 
 the two wings of the Socialist Party, led by M. Yanko Sakazoff and 
 M. Blagoyer. It has been child's play for Ferdinand to keep the 
 Press and all these parties, torn by jealousies, under control. 
 
 He has also worked through the comitadjis, marauding bands 
 whose function was to stir up trouble in Macedonia, and whom he 
 employed to make attacks on Serbia in the present war, even when 
 Bulgaria was still nominally neutral. He always disavowed these 
 agents while secretly supporting them,* and by creating an atmosphere 
 of universal terror, he continued the traditions of Stambuloff, which 
 are represented by Ghenadieff, an ardent pro-Austrian. 
 
 * The Aspirations of Bulgaria, by Balkanicus (translated from the Serbian). 
 London, Simp kin, Marshall & Co., 19 15. 
 
 334 
 
Appendix 
 
 III. Bulgaria and the Wars of 1912-1913 
 
 On October 8th, 191 2, the very day on which Montenegro declared 
 war on Turkey, there appeared a note beginning with these words : 
 
 " The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments will inform the Balkan 
 States that the Powers reprobate any step likely to lead to war, and that if, 
 notwithstanding, war breaks out between the Balkan States and the Ottoman 
 Empire, they will not permit any modification of the territorial status quo in 
 Turkey in Europe at the conclusion of the struggle." 
 
 The fact was that Austria-Hungary and Germany had pushed the 
 allies of the Balkan League into war with Turkey, not in the interests 
 of the Balkan nations, but to further their own designs. They were 
 certain that Turkey would beat the Balkan Christians. Hence 
 the provision as to the maintenance of the territorial status quo. 
 
 Yet, in spite of Von der Goltz's reorganization of the army, the 
 Turks abandoned Kirk Kilisse without resistance, and the Bulgarians 
 who occupied it became popular heroes. The Austrian and German 
 diplomatists and Press announced the pending triumphal entry of 
 Ferdinand into Constantinople and his coronation at St. Sophia. 
 It was true that before Ferdinand could hope to realize this ambition, 
 it was necessary to carry the fortified Tchataldja lines, but he did not 
 attribute his disillusionment to that military reason. He laid the 
 blame for his failure on the Russian Government, to whom he sent 
 General Radko DmitriefL The answer to this envoy was a direct 
 negative. It is said that by way of compensation he was promised a 
 lucrative financial deal. The upshot was that Ferdinand henceforth 
 regarded as enemies the Pan-Slavs of Petrograd, who had reminded 
 the Bulgarians at a banquet that " the Balkan question is bound up 
 with the age-long dream of Russia to plant the cross on St. Sophia.* 
 
 Towards the end of October the Powers abandoned the provision 
 of the 8th of October relating to the maintenance of the status quo. 
 
 M. Poincare, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, proposed to the 
 Powers a joint declaration of their territorial disinterestedness. 
 Austria-Hungary refused, and reinforced her troops in Bosnia, while 
 Russia retained with the colours the class which would normally have 
 been disbanded. 
 
 * L'Europe devant Constantinople, by Max Hoschiller, p. 73. 
 335 
 
Appendix 
 
 The Serbian Government claims to have proof that in the spring of 
 10,12, before the outbreak of the first Balkan War, the Bulgarian 
 Government, by agreement with the Ballplatz, had arranged the 
 following career for the Balkan League. Bulgaria was granted per- 
 mission to fight Turkey with the assistance of Serbia. If she won 
 Serbia was to be rewarded with some insignificant territorial con- 
 cessions ; but if she lost Austria would guarantee her integrity. 
 After this first war there was to be a second, in which Serbia would 
 be finally crushed. 
 
 The Turks began negotiations with the Bulgarians on November 
 15th. On the 28th Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference in 
 London of ambassadors (Germany, Austria, France, Great Britain, 
 Italy and Russia), who should keep in touch with the delegates in 
 London of the warring nations, and draw up the terms of a general 
 settlement of the questions raised by the war. 
 
 From the start Austria demanded that the autonomy of Albania 
 should be recognized. The Ottoman Government accepted the terms 
 of the Balkan League, but the Young Turk party overthrew it, and 
 the new Turkish Ministry of Mahmud Chefket issued a note on 
 January 3rd, 191 3, in which it referred the whole matter to the Powers. 
 However, on February 3rd hostilities were resumed. On March 6th 
 the Greeks took Janina ; on the 26th, the Bulgarians, with Serbian 
 assistance, captured Adrianople, and the Serbians proceeded to drive 
 the remnants of the Turkish forces out of Macedonia. 
 
 Bulgaria stood in fear of the Roumanians, who demanded com- 
 pensation. The Montenegrins went on fighting until April 23rd, 
 on which date they occupied Scutari, but the Powers, to appease 
 Austria, made a naval demonstration with a view to forcing them 
 to evacuate the town. The preliminary treaty of peace was signed 
 in London on May 30th. The Sultan referred to the Powers the 
 disposal of all Turkey in Europe to the west of a line from Enos on 
 the Aegean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea, with the exception of 
 Albania. The delimitation of the frontier and cognate questions 
 were left to them, as also the destiny of Crete, the Turkish islands in 
 the Aegean Sea and the peninsula of Mount Athos. 
 
 Disputes immediately ensued between the members of the Balkan 
 League and the Great Powers. The Greeks demanded Upper Epirus, 
 inhabited largely by men of their own race, while Italy desired its 
 union with Albania. The Greeks also claimed all the islands of the 
 Aegean Sea, the Greek population being 394,000 out of 423,000 souls. 
 
 336 
 
Appendix 
 
 The Italians wished to keep the Dodecanese, with a view to its ultimate 
 restoration to the Turks along with the islands off the coast of Asia 
 Minor and the Dardanelles. 
 
 The alliance between the Serbians and Bulgarians was established 
 by the treaty of February 29th, 191 2, and the military convention 
 of June, 19 1 2. The real compact was a secret treaty.* The treaty 
 gave Bulgaria an exclusive right to annex all territory east of the 
 river Struma and the Rhodope Mountains. Serbia was to annex the 
 territory to the west and north of the Char-Planina Mountains. As 
 regards the territory between the Char, the Rhodope Mountains, 
 the Aegean Sea and Lake Ochrida, Serbia undertook to restrict her 
 claims to the territory bounded by a line from Mount Golem on the 
 Turco-Bulgarian frontier (to the north of Krivoretchna-Palanka), 
 passing south-west through a mountainous tract to the monastery of 
 Gubavatz on Lake Ochrida. Bulgaria agreed to accept that frontier 
 if Russia, " as final arbitrator," approved it. By Article 4 the con- 
 struction of the treaty or any part was assigned to the Czar of Russia 
 as arbitrator. 
 
 This treaty ought to have been carried out in strict accordance with 
 its terms, but the Powers themselves were the first to flout it when 
 they handed over to Albania part of the territories it assigned to 
 Serbia. The Serbs demanded compensation in the Monastir district. 
 They added that the terms of the military convention had not been 
 kept, that they had put in the field 300,000 men instead of the 150,000 
 stipulated, and that the 100,000 Bulgarians who were to operate in 
 Macedonia had failed to make their appearance, while the Serbians 
 had rendered invaluable assistance in men and material during the 
 siege of Adrianople. 
 
 The terms of the treaty of May 16th, 191 2, between the Bulgarians 
 and Greeks were not definitely settled at the conclusion of the war, 
 for both parties claimed Salonica, and, in fact, the troops of the two 
 nations came into open conflict in that district. Both the Bulgarians 
 and Serbians ignored the fact that they had agreed, by the first treaty, 
 to submit disputes to an arbitrator. The Czar Nicholas sent a tele- 
 gram to both parties reminding them of their original intentions. 
 The four Governments — Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Turkey — 
 agreed to send delegates to St. Petersburg. 
 
 According to the report of an American, Mr. Jacob Gould Schuman, 
 
 * See The Aspirations of Bulgaria, by Balkanicus, p. 89, and Nationalism 
 and War in the Near East (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 
 
 337 22 
 
Appendix 
 
 who was in Sofia at the end of June, 191 3, M. Daneff, then Prime 
 Minister, spoke to him of the tension between Bulgaria, Serbia and 
 Greece, but said it would not end in war. On the 28th, however, 
 he issued the official declaration of war. That same evening, at eight 
 o'clock, General Savoff, the Bulgarian Commander-in-Chief, issued an 
 order in cipher to the General commanding the 4th Army to attack 
 the Serbs along the whole front on the evening of the 29th. The same 
 day he issued orders to the other army commanders to attack the 
 Serbs and Greeks and secure Salonica, stipulating that " these attacks 
 should not be preceded by an official declaration of war." The 
 orders were duly carried out. No one believes that General Savoff 
 inaugurated these operations on his own initiative, and universal 
 report assigns the responsibility for them to King Ferdinand, who 
 had had a long conference with the Austro-Hungarian Minister. 
 
 The Bulgarians were defeated. On July 30th M. Daneff implored 
 Russia to intervene as arbitrator, and begged her " assistance against 
 the attacks of Turkey and Roumania which had already begun." 
 
 Russia saved Bulgaria by insisting that the Roumanians should not 
 secure the Rustchuk- Varna line nor enter Sofia. M. Daneff resigned, 
 and the Bulgarians, the danger having passed, gave to Austria 
 Hungary the gratitude they owed Russia. 
 
 The delegates of the four Governments assembled at Bucharest 
 on July 30th, and M. Majorescu, the Roumanian Prime Minister, and 
 M. Take Jonescu presided. After a month of fighting Bulgaria 
 admitted defeat and ceded Adrianople and a large tract of territory 
 to Turkey. As regards Serbia and Greece, the treaty of 1912 was 
 definitely at an end. 
 
 The new treaty was signed on the 10th of August. Roumania 
 acquired a slice of Bulgaria bounded by a line from above Turtukai 
 to a point on the Black Sea to the south of Ekrene. Bulgaria was 
 to demolish the fortifications of Rustchuk and Schumla, and to give 
 guarantees with regard to the Roumanian schools and churches in 
 New Bulgaria. The Serbo-Bulgarian frontier started from the old 
 frontier at Paratrica and followed the original Turco-Bulgarian 
 frontier and the line of the watershed between the Vardar and the 
 Struma, with the exception of the valley of the Strumnitza, which 
 passed to Serbia. It terminated at Mount Besalica, where it met the 
 Bulgaro-Greek frontier. The Bulgarians left Greece in possession of 
 Salonica, the territory to the east of Drama, Seres, and the port of 
 Kavalla. The Turks resumed possession of Adrianople, in violation 
 
 338 
 
Appendix 
 
 of the treaty ot May 30th, and Bulgaria ceded to them Dimotika 
 
 and Kirk Kilisse, with a frontier from Enos to Midia. As regards 
 
 Albania, Austria insisted on preserving its integrity because it was 
 
 bound to be a bone of contention between Serbia, Montenegro, Russia, 
 
 Italy and Greece. The other Great Powers acquiesced, a fatal 
 
 concession. The following table shows the gains of the respective 
 
 parties. 
 
 Gain. 
 
 Square Square 
 
 miles. Population. miles. Population. 
 
 Roumania — — 3,220 353,000 
 
 Serbia 18,630 2,957,200 15.057 1,290,000 
 
 Greece 24,867 2,631,000 19,806 1,624,000 
 
 Bulgaria 37.IQ8 4,329,000 6,949 400,000 
 
 Thus Bulgaria's ambition to secure the hegemony of the Balkans 
 received a rude shock. On August nth, the day after the treaty 
 was signed, King Ferdinand denounced it in a proclamation to his 
 army : " No patriotic Bulgarian will abandon willingly and without 
 a struggle Monastir, Ochrida, Dibra, Prilep, Salonica, Seres and 
 other Bulgarian lands inhabited by our fellow-countrymen." 
 
 From M. Take Jonescu's revelations we know now that from May 
 onwards Austria was anxious to attack Serbia. The object of the 
 communication to M. Jonescu was the intimidation of Serbia. In 
 August Signor Giolitti received a telegram from the Marquis di San 
 Giuliano, Minister for Foreign Affairs, informing him that the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government had communicated to Italy and Germany 
 their intention to attack Serbia and invoking the casus foederis. 
 Italy refused to recognize any obligation. Austria had perforce to 
 abandon her designs ; but it was plain, after King Ferdinand's mani- 
 festo, that he had hopes of obtaining his revenge for the Treaty of 
 Bucharest with the assistance of the Triple Alliance. 
 
 IV. The Bulgarians and Macedonia 
 
 The Bulgarians put forward historical and ethnographical claims 
 to Macedonia. 
 
 But what is Macedonia ? 
 
 The ancients included Roumelia in Macedonia. The Romans 
 
 339 22 * 
 
Appendix 
 
 added to it Central Albania with Durazzo. French and English 
 geographers understand by that name the whole country between 
 the Rhodope Mountains on the north, Olympus and Thessaly on the 
 south, the Pindus range on the west, and watered by the rivers which 
 flow into the Aegean.* To the Bulgarians " Macedonia " means all 
 the territory they covet to the west of the Rhodope range, and old 
 Serbia, and forgetting that by the Treaty of Bucharest they obtained 
 the valleys of the Struma and Strumnitza, they assert that the Serbs 
 and Greeks have wrongfully appropriated the whole of Macedonia. 
 
 I confess I am not impressed by the claim based on historic rights. 
 About 950 a.d. Constantine Porphynogeretus wrote that the town of 
 Serblia, on the river Bistrita in the district of Salonica, received its 
 name from the Serbs who inhabited that region. In the sixteenth 
 century Western travellers found Salonica still inhabited by the 
 Serbs, and the Russian historian, N. P. Kondaloff, in his Voyages 
 Archeologiques en Macedoine (1907), says that the Serbs crossed the 
 Danube in the fifth century, and that the first Slav invaders of Mace- 
 donia were Serbs, and were followed by the Bulgarian hordes at a 
 subsequent date. 
 
 The French officers whom Napoleon commissioned to visit Dalmatia 
 and Macedonia mention the Serbs, but never the Bulgarians. 
 
 Little weight must be attached to the opinions of the English or 
 French travellers who have visited the Balkans purely as sightseers 
 or on political missions. They give predominance to the Bulgarians, 
 Greeks or Serbs, but their choice is determined by the views of their 
 dragoman. If they do not start out with an opinion already fixed, 
 they invariably reflect that of their interpreter. 
 
 The Serbs were brutally persecuted after the insurrection of Kara 
 George and the Peace of Bucharest in 181 2, and the insurrection of 
 Dobrenovitch in 18 15. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, were a 
 model of meekness. The Serbs would call themselves Bulgarians 
 when they wanted to assure their own safety. Yet the Serbs possessed 
 many schools in Macedonia, though after the Turkish defeats in the 
 wars of 1876 and 1877 the Turks closed those schools. The Serbs 
 then had to choose between education given by the Greek Patriarchate 
 and that given by the Bulgarian Exarchate. Many chose the latter 
 from fear of the Bulgarian comitadjis. 
 
 On the principle that religion constitutes nationality, the inhabitants 
 of Macedonia were classified either as Greeks or Bulgarians. Officially 
 
 * Dictionnaire de Geographie, by Vivien de Saint-Martin, Vol. III. (1887). 
 
 340 
 
Appendix 
 
 the Serbs disappeared, more or less absorbed in the Bulgarians, 
 though the latter have never enjoyed a numerical majority. 
 
 Macedonia has never been Bulgarian. According to the census of 
 1905, taken after the international commission of control was estab- 
 lished (police officers, etc.), there were in the vilayet of Salonica, 425,613 
 Mohammedans, 360,000 Greeks, 200,488 Bulgarians ; in the vilayet 
 of Monastir, 220,369 Mohammedans, 2j6>66j Greeks and 148,426 
 Bulgarians. 
 
 The official statistics of education issued by the Bulgarian Exarchate 
 and the Greek Patriarchate give the following figures. In 1904, in 
 the vilayet of Salonica, the Greeks had 521 schools, with 32,534 
 scholars; the Bulgarians, 319 schools, with 9,544 scholars. In the 
 vilayet of Monastir, there were 477 Greek schools, with 27,106 Greek 
 pupils, and 242 Bulgarian schools, with 8,767 Bulgarian pupils. 
 Before 191 3, in all the large towns the Greeks virtually had the field 
 to themselves in banking, industry and the higher branches of com- 
 merce. Before 1906 a Bulgarian doctor or barrister was not to be 
 found either at Salonica or Monastir. The fifteen great works of 
 Verroia-Edessa, the district of waterfalls, were established by Greeks 
 and are still in Greek hands. 
 
 The Treaty of Bucharest deprived the Bulgarians of the vilayet 
 of Monastir, but gave Greece not a single caza (district) in which the 
 Greeks had not since 1905 a numerical preponderance over the Bul- 
 garians. The vilayet of Salonica comprised twenty-four cazas. There 
 was a Bulgarian majority over the Greeks in ten of these — Doiran, 
 Avret-Hissar, Strumnitza, Tikvech, Petritsi, Demir-Hissar, Melenikon, 
 Nevrokop, Djuma-Bala and Razlog. Of these ten the Bulgarians 
 lost only Doiran (which went to Serbia), Avret-Hissar and Demir- 
 Hissar (which were given to Greece), and the loss was more than made 
 good by the territories acquired in western Thrace at the expense of 
 Hellenism. 
 
 A treaty which defined the respective spheres of influence was 
 accepted in March, 191 2, by the Greek and Bulgarian deputies with 
 the approval of the Patriarchate and the Exarchate, and established 
 the following distribution : 
 
 Vilayets. Greek Seats. Bulgarian Seats. 
 
 Salonica ...... 5 3 
 
 Monastir ...... 5 2 
 
 Adrianople .... 8 1 
 
 341 
 
Appendix 
 
 Thus the three vilayets gave the Greeks a superiority of three to one. 
 In western Thrace, which went to Bulgaria, Suffli, Dedeagatch and 
 Xanthi are Greek. The Bulgarians claim Kavalla, but of its 45,000 
 inhabitants not one is Bulgarian. In 1905, in the whole sandjak 
 (province) of Drama there were only 2,120 Bulgarians out of 148,807 
 inhabitants ; that is, barely i| per cent. 
 
 " This summer, when travelling in Macedonia," says M. Michel 
 Andre,* " I stayed at the town of Vodena, which was delighted to have 
 resumed its famous name of Edessa. In the gardens a ' Karagyeuz ' 
 (a kind of Punch and Judy show) presented popular plays. In one 
 of them a Bulgarian and a Greek set out to share three sheep which 
 they had jointly acquired. ' That one,' said the Bulgarian, pointing 
 to the first sheep, ' is mine by rights. The second you will give me 
 out of friendship, and I shall take the third.' " 
 
 To-day Bulgaria claims to apply the principle illustrated in that 
 " Karagyeuz " to the whole of Macedonia. 
 
 It is difficult for us to have any idea of the life of the Macedonian 
 inhabitants under Turkish rule, even after the Treaty of Berlin and 
 the Miirsteg Programme drawn up by the Czar of Russia and the 
 Emperor of Austria. According to a Bulgarian document, in the 
 first eleven months of 1905 there were 1,010 murders, of which 330 
 were perpetrated by Turks or Albanians, 195 by soldiers, 451 by 
 Greeks and 34 by Serbs. For 1906 Sir Edward Grey published the 
 reports of the consuls, which show that between January 1st and 
 September 30th, 577 Christians were killed in the vilayet of Salonica, 
 431 in the vilayet of Monastir, and 183 in the vilayet of Kossovo ; 
 a total of 1,191. The reports, however, do not ascribe the majority 
 of these crimes to the Turks. Their authors were mainly Bulgarian 
 comitadjis. 
 
 What must have been the mental and moral condition of the 
 inhabitants of those Macedonian villages, obsessed by mutual hatred, 
 suspicion, terror, malice and a passion for revenge ? 
 
 The population was composed of three classes : landowners, 
 " tchiftdis " (metayers) and farm labourers. The landowning class 
 was mainly Mohammedan. The Metayer system was in operation in 
 three-quarters of the estates. The metayer was compelled to take 
 his farm produce to market sometimes fifty to sixty miles away. The 
 cattle and agricultural implements belonged to him, but he had to 
 work ten days a year for the bey. If the bey erected a mill he had 
 * Le Temps, December 15th, 1914. 
 342 
 
Appendix 
 
 to take his corn there. He had also to pay the police agent, whose 
 principal function was to terrorize him. 
 
 The wage for a year of an agricultural labourer was ioo to 120 
 Turkish piastres. A piastre is worth 2jd., so he received 18s. yd. 
 to £1 2s. 6d. in money and the rest in corn. Thus he had absolutely 
 no certainty of payment, for the bey could deduct what he liked. 
 
 Such are the conditions of life of a population which has been the 
 direct cause of the horrible devastation of Europe during the last 
 three years. 
 
 V. Some Strange Diplomatic Illusions 
 
 In view of the facts already given, it was certain that the Bulgarian 
 Government could only welcome Austria's declaration of war on Serbia. 
 It meant that after the lapse of a year they would obtain that revenge 
 for the Treaty of Bucharest which they had expected at once, but 
 which had to be postponed on account of Italy's refusal to regard 
 Austria's unprovoked attack on Serbia as a casus foederis. 
 
 The diplomatists of the Allied Powers must have been perfectly 
 familiar with those events. 
 
 Anything the Allies could offer Bulgaria was necessarily at the 
 expense of Serbia and Greece, though it is true that they also talked of 
 compensation at the expense of Austria, forgetful of the intimate ties 
 between Ferdinand and Francis Joseph. Some publicists were 
 anxious to procure a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest in favour 
 of Bulgaria, " in conformity with the principle of nationality." This 
 meant that Bulgaria would be given Macedonia, which she was pleased 
 to regard as Bulgarian. The Socialists made the same mistake with 
 regard to Bulgaria as they had made with regard to the German 
 Socialists before the war. 
 
 The Bulgarian Sobranje was composed of 213 members. M. 
 Longuet* says that 116 of them — that is, a majority — were opposed 
 to a pan-German policy. It may be true, but a parliamentary majority 
 goes for nothing in a government like that of King Ferdinand. 
 
 In the Revue Bleue of September nth-i8th, M. Paul Louis wrote : 
 
 " The Balkan Federation can and must once more be a reality, and that 
 in no long time. Every statesman, at Nish, Bucharest, Sofia or Athens, who 
 opposes its resurrection, is committing more than an error — a real crime against 
 his country, the Balkan world, Europe herself."! 
 
 * L'HumaniU, October 20th, 191 5. 
 ■f Paul Louis : La Ligue Balkanique. 
 
 343 
 
Appendix 
 
 The idea of reviving the Balkan League, which had only survived 
 a few months, and had been always disregarded by the Bulgarians 
 and finally broken up by them on June 29th, was one of those 
 Utopian fantasies which are excusable when indulged in by journalists, 
 but unpardonable in experts in foreign politics, who are supposed 
 to act only on facts and probabilities. 
 
 Yet the diplomatists of England, France and Russia appear to have 
 lost all sense of reality in their dream, and in the name of Ferdinand 
 they exercised pressure on Greece and Serbia, quivering under the 
 blows of Austria-Hungary, in favour of Bulgaria. 
 
 On August 4th, 19 1 5, the Quadruple Entente informed Athens that 
 they wished to give Bulgaria part of Macedonia. The immediate 
 result was an indignant outburst in Greece and Macedonia. In 
 one town the skulls of the Greeks who had been massacred by the 
 Bulgarians in 191 3 were exhumed and carried round in procession. 
 The same method of pressure was applied to Serbia. On August 18th, 
 I was astounded when a French statesman, in answer to no question 
 of mine, remarked spontaneously : " I have some good new r s for you. 
 We have obtained from Serbia and Greece what Bulgaria wanted, so 
 now we are sure of her ! " 
 
 Can the prudent diplomatists of the Quadruple Entente have been 
 so ignorant of the behaviour of Bulgaria since the beginning of the 
 war ? 
 
 In the autumn of 19 14 bands of Bulgarian irregulars had delivered 
 two attacks on Strumnitza. The irregulars had been assisted by 
 regulars, acting on instructions from Sofia. Some of the comitadjis 
 who were killed had Austrian money on them, and prisoners said 
 that their leaders had been in communication with the Austro- 
 Hungarian Legation.* On three occasions the Bulgarians had 
 attacked the Nish-Salonica railway. They had allowed war material 
 and supplies to go through to the Turks, and had even furnished 
 munitions and men themselves. Their General Staff was instructed 
 openly or semi-secretly by German officers in plain clothes or Bul- 
 garian uniforms. Says M. R.-R. Reiss : " I myself saw a German 
 officer and his mechanic, whose aeroplane had come down on Serbian 
 territory through engine trouble, who were dressed in Bulgarian 
 uniforms and carried documents." 
 
 The Allies professed themselves satisfied with explanations which 
 
 * See the article of M. R.-R. Reiss in the Gazette de Lausanne, October 13th. 
 
 344 
 

 Appendix 
 
 were patent lies and went on blackmailing Serbia and Greece for the 
 benefit of Bulgaria ! 
 
 Yet the Russian, English and French diplomatists were by no 
 means ignorant of the successive phases of Ferdinand's policy. 
 How could they so thoroughly have deceived themselves, 
 considering their knowledge of his financial relations with 
 Germany ? 
 
 After the Balkan Wars various German banks, among them the 
 German National Bank, the Berlin Commercial Association, and the 
 Commercial and Discount Bank, were in possession of Bulgarian bills 
 given in payment for war material. Gold being at a premium of 
 forty per cent., certain banks, under the direction of the Disconto 
 Gesellschaft of Berlin, formed a syndicate which reduced the premium 
 on gold to nine per cent., and thus paved the way in May, 1914, for 
 the negotiation of a consolidated loan. 
 
 The Gazette de Lausanne of November 20th gives some information 
 of these events which it derived from German sources. In its report 
 for 1914 the Disconto Gesellschaft spoke of the " patriotic character " 
 of the dealings with Bulgaria. On July 15th, 1914, the Bulgarian 
 National Bank was able to repay 25 millions in gold to English banks 
 and 10 millions in gold to Austrian banks. Further, the Bulgarian 
 Government received 120 millions in gold against treasury bills at 
 7 per cent., and the contract for a 5 per cent, loan of 500 millions 
 issuable at 84 was signed. This loan was to be paid in two instal- 
 ments. In exchange Bulgaria granted a concession of Bulgarian 
 mines to the Disconto Gesellschaft. The contract contained a clause 
 suspending its operation in case of war. 
 
 However, in November, 1914, the Disconto subscribed 100 millions 
 and the Bulgarian National Bank and Agricultural Bank 50 millions. 
 The German banks relinquished their option on the first portion of 
 the Bulgarian loan. Further negotiations led to a special advance 
 of 150 millions in gold against 6 per cent, treasury bills. Seventy-five 
 millions were deposited and 10 millions were to be advanced every 
 fortnight. This advance of 50 millions and the advance of 100 
 millions in July, 1914, were not included in the loan which had been 
 negotiated. In March, 191 5, after the attack of the Allied fleet on 
 the Dardanelles, it became known that the option on the second 
 instalment of the loan had been relinquished, and that liabilities for 
 past and present supplies of war material were to be covered by the 
 loan of 500 millions. Bulgaria thus received 270 millions in gold, 
 
 345 
 
Appendix 
 
 500 millions in war material, a total of 770 millions, in addition to 
 100 millions for the mines. 
 
 How could anyone have been deceived as to the end she had in 
 view ? 
 
 In the provisional estimates for the first quarter of 1916 an increase 
 of seventeen million francs was earmarked for secret uses by the 
 Department of Foreign Affairs. We hope that they will be employed 
 to good purpose ; but if the object is a practical knowledge of the 
 behaviour and preferences of Ferdinand of Bulgaria, it will be neces- 
 sary to buy and read a number of books and reviews, and to keep 
 a file, which I hope already exists in the Foreign Office. The entire 
 Press had drawn attention to the financial relations of Bulgaria with 
 the Berlin banks. 
 
 Any man in the street who haunted the precincts of Downing Street 
 or the Quai d'Orsay could have told the diplomatists of England or 
 France that if Germany was making loans to Bulgaria it was in 
 pursuance of a common aim. 
 
 There are some statesmen who complain that in view of the known 
 facts the Allies ought to have kept Ferdinand under the impression 
 that they would make him Emperor of Constantinople. They must 
 have had a poor opinion of his wits. Ferdinand knows that Russia, 
 which has had such signal proofs of Bulgarian ingratitude, would 
 never agree to make the Bulgarians guardians of the Straits in place 
 of the Turks. How could any statesman be blind enough, even in 
 good faith, to think of establishing at Constantinople a king who had 
 been a mere tool of the Central Empires ? However low his opinion 
 of the Allied diplomatists, whom he has found such easy game, 
 Ferdinand could not possibly have believed that they would resume 
 with him the thorny problem of the Straits. The more obsessed 
 they became, the more they strove to excite his ambitions, the more 
 suspicious Ferdinand became. He could not fail to realize that if 
 Russia, France and England were victorious, they would never instal 
 a vassal of William II. at Constantinople. 
 
 Whilst Ferdinand was playing with the Allies, he had signed on 
 July 17th a compact with Prince Hohenlohe, representing Germany, 
 countersigned by the representatives of Austria and Turkey. It 
 gave Bulgaria all northern and southern Albania, all Serbian Mace- 
 donia and Greek Macedonia, with Kavalla, Drama, Seres, Fiorina 
 and Kastoria. 
 At the beginning of October the Athenian paper Hestia published 
 
 346 
 
Appendix 
 
 the information that Great Britain had secured the text of the treaty, 
 and had communicated it to the Greek Government. On September 
 2nd the Austro-Germans began their renewed campaign against 
 Serbia with the bombardment of Semendria. On September 22nd 
 Bulgaria mobilized. Serbia informed the Allies that the Bulgarian 
 mobilization would take seventeen days, and asked permission to 
 march at once on Sofia. 
 
 It was the second time she had suggested that course, and, indeed, 
 if the Allies had not been hypnotized by their obsession of winning 
 over Ferdinand, that attack would have had far-reaching results 
 to the advantage of unhappy Serbia and the Allies. 
 
 Yet the true state of affairs might long since have been gathered 
 from the visits to Sofia of the Duke of Mecklenburg, accompanied by 
 Herr von Rosenberg, chief of one of the departments of the Wilhelm- 
 strasse. A few days before the mobilization two German generals 
 were established at the War Office. Another German general was 
 installed at the Foreign Office. The mobilization was carried out 
 under the direction of the general staff, consisting of twenty-eight 
 German officers, who paraded the streets of Sofia in uniform, and 
 several Bulgarian generals selected from the court party. 
 
 The Sofia correspondent of the Messagero, writing in October, said 
 that immediately after the mobilization the War Office drew up a 
 list of officers with supposed pro-Russian sympathies and ordered 
 them to resign. Many were imprisoned, and some who had given 
 open proof of their preferences were shot. The Government em- 
 ployed atrocious methods in suppressing an attempted revolt in the 
 Fifth Corps, which resented the imprisonment of General Dankeff, 
 accused of having revealed his Russophile sympathies to his subal- 
 terns. A manifestation of feeling was followed by a massacre, and 
 the houses of political suspects were subjected to visitation and 
 search. 
 
 M. Radoslavoff summoned M. Ghenadieff and said to him : 
 
 " My dear Ghenadieff, we have now taken all precautions to prevent 
 any recurrence of rebellion. You are free to pursue whichever of 
 three courses you prefer. You may bow to the inevitable and agree 
 to remain confined in your own house, you may choose to be hung, 
 or you may prefer to become a minister in my cabinet." 
 
 Ghenadieff, to forestall further sacrifices, chose the first course. 
 Ferdinand, on his part, summoned M. Malinoff and put the same 
 alternatives to him. Malinoff also yielded. 
 
 347 
 
Appendix 
 
 M, Gueschofr", to whom so much information had been imparted 
 in imprudent conversations in Paris, said to the correspondent of 
 the Messagcro : " Monsieur, we shall go with the victor." 
 
 The Bulgarian Government were good enough to acquaint their 
 subjects with the motives for their conduct in a document which has 
 become known through a communication from Reuter's Agency, 
 dated from Amsterdam on October 8th. It was published by the 
 Fra?ikfurter Zeitung, where it occupied eight columns. Twenty 
 thousand copies had been distributed by the Bulgarian Government 
 some time previously in different German cities. The document 
 recited the motives of the contending parties in the war, went on 
 to show the superiority of the Central Powers, and ended as follows : 
 
 " At the outset no man could foretell how events would shape themselves, nor 
 which side would be victorious. If the Government had decided to intervene 
 at once in this great war it might have committed the error of throwing in its 
 lot with the party ultimately defeated and thus imperilling the Bulgarian 
 Empire. 
 
 " We do not know the contents of the famous note which the Quadruple 
 Entente presented to the Bulgarian Government, but from what has appeared 
 in the Press it would seem clear that Russia and her Allies oifered us nothing 
 in exchange for our neutrality, but, on the other hand, demanded (i) that we 
 should intervene as soon as possible in the war ; (ii) that Bulgaria should put 
 her army at the unfettered disposal of the Quadruple Entente, which should 
 control it entirely and send it where they pleased ; (iii) that the Bulgarian army 
 should first take Constantinople and immediately hand it over to Russia. 
 
 " In return for this, Bulgaria was to acquire Turkish territory to the Enos- 
 Midia line, and there were vague promises of insufficient compensation in 
 Macedonia, provided that Serbia gained sufficient compensation from Austria. 
 
 " Although the details of the Austro-German offers are not known, it may 
 be said without fear of contradiction that Austria and Germany promised Bul- 
 garia, in return for her neutrality, the whole of Macedonia, including Skoplie 
 (Uskub), Bitolia (Monastir), Ochrida, etc. In addition, they promised their 
 friendly mediation between Bulgaria and Turkey, with a view to the concession 
 by Turkey of the Dedeagatch railway line and territories to the west and on the 
 right bank of the river Maritza. 
 
 " Even larger promises of compensation at the expense of Serbia were made 
 by the Central Powers in the event of our military intervention on their side. 
 These promises recognized our desire to obtain a common frontier with Austria- 
 Hungary along the Danube. Other parts of old Serbia were also offered 
 to us. 
 
 " Besides, the promises of the Quadruple Entente could not be regarded with 
 confidence, and we are certainly right in putting our faith in the promises of 
 Germany, which has never failed to carry 7 out its treaty obligations. 
 
 " Finally, Bulgaria must range herself on the side of the Central Powers, 
 because victory inclines towards Germany and Austria-Hungary." 
 
 348 
 
Appendix 
 
 Articles have appeared in the French Press under the title, " La 
 Trahison de Bulgaria " (" Bulgaria's Betrayal "). The title was 
 inaccurate, for Ferdinand has ever been faithful to his Austro-German 
 policy. The diplomatists who thought otherwise have only them- 
 selves to thank for their disillusionment. 
 
 On October 19th the Emperor Nicholas issued the following 
 manifesto : 
 
 " We make known to all our faithful subjects Bulgaria's treason to the Slav 
 cause. Perfidiously prepared from the beginning of the war, the thing incredible 
 has now become an accomplished fact. 
 
 " Bulgarian forces have attacked Serbia, our faithful ally, bleeding from her 
 struggle with a stronger foe. 
 
 " Russia and the Great Powers, our Allies, have striven to dissuade the 
 Government of Ferdinand of Coburg from this fatal step. The realization of 
 the ancient aspirations of the Bulgarian nation by the acquisition of Macedonia 
 was secured to Bulgaria in a manner consistent with the interests of the Slav 
 world. But German intrigues and fratricidal hatred of the Serbs have 
 triumphed. 
 
 " The Bulgarians, men of our own faith and not long ago freed from Turkish 
 thrall by the affection and blood of the Russian people, have thrown in their 
 lot with the enemies of Christianity, the Slav cause and Russia. Russia grieves 
 at the treason of Bulgaria, so dear to her until these last days, and with bleeding 
 heart draws her sword and commits the fate of the traitors to the Slav cause 
 to the just punishment of God." 
 
 Yet the Russian Government ought to have been accustomed to 
 the ingratitude of Bulgaria. They must have known the relations 
 of Ferdinand with their enemies, and experience should have 
 familiarized them with the Bulgarian motto : " The only Slav interests 
 are the interests of Bulgaria." 
 
 VI. The Difficulties of the Problem 
 
 The events which are happening in the Balkans confirm my 
 observations in the body of this book. The affairs of that quarter of 
 the world will be settled by the Great Powers now at war with 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
 
 Ever since Bulgaria became a nation, resurrected by Russia, she 
 has been a constant source of unrest. She erected a statue to the 
 Czar Alexander II. in Sofia, but has steadily pursued a policy dic- 
 tated by Austria and Germany. She betrayed Serbia and Greece 
 
 349 
 
Appendix 
 
 even when she seemed to be acting in concert with them. The events 
 of her history since 1878 show that peace can never be established 
 in the Balkan Peninsula on the basis of the balance of power. Bul- 
 garia has ever aimed at a Bulgarian hegemony there, and if she 
 had attained it Germany would have exploited it. 
 
 How must the Balkan nations be treated when the day of peace 
 arrives ? 
 
 To begin with, the Allies will never forget that Serbia was the 
 victim from the first day of the war, and that in August, 19 14, she 
 drew upon herself 350,000 Austro-Hungarian troops and inflicted 
 upon them the defeat of the Jadar. Serbia must form with Croatia 
 and the other Southern Slavs of Austria a Confederation of Greater 
 Serbia. 
 
 The Bulgarians must give up Macedonia. No longer must we toy 
 with the idea of letting them cut across the Salonica-Belgrade railway. 
 They must be kept as far from it as from Salonica and Constantinople. 
 Will they be allowed to keep Eastern Roumelia ? It is a difficult 
 question. 
 
 But there will also be a domestic problem. King Ferdinand and 
 his dynasty must be exiled from Bulgaria. What political system 
 will be most suitable for this race ? Their history shows that they 
 are not ready for parliamentary government. Impoverished, their 
 man-power exhausted, burdened with debt, distrusted by all and 
 with their last illusions dispelled, they will cherish feelings of bitter- 
 ness and await the first opportunity for taking their revenge. Bul- 
 garia will be a centre of unrest, all the more dangerous from its 
 proximity to Hungary, which will be in the same plight. When the 
 day of settlement arrives they must be separated by a greater distance 
 than before the war. 
 
 Bulgaria must be rendered impotent, like the two great empires 
 with which she has thrown in her lot. Her intervention has been 
 disastrous for Serbia, but can have no serious effect on the operations 
 in the French and Russian theatres, where alone a decision will be 
 obtained. 
 
 350 
 
INDEX 
 
INDEX 
 
 -ZIA COfljgreM ok 2J2. 
 
 Abd-el-Aziz, Sultan oi >, 69 
 
 Abdul-Hamid, 29, 48, 174, 310, 332. 
 Adrianople, Treaty of, 271. 
 Adriatic Sea, The, 301. 
 
 thai, Count, i;-:> 
 Afghanistan, 1 - 
 Africa, French Equatorial, 72-74. 
 
 , German Sout:. 
 
 Agadir 2> $6, \: r -^-:\. 90, 173. 
 
 iTi conspiracy trial, 19, \ \ 
 — — . Diet df : , 
 
 •, in Germany, 12c- 
 '162. 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 212. 
 Ajam, Mauri:.- [64 I : . ; 
 
 Albania - - 3 • -; 
 
 Aldridge, Francis, 1 
 
 Alexander III., Czar of Rn ,2 
 
 Alexander : 2 
 
 Alexander, h: : - 
 
 33: 
 Alfold, The, 262, 302. 
 Algeciras Conference, The, 17, 62- 
 - 
 
 Convention, 71 -_ 
 
 ria, 168. 
 Alsace -Lorr air. - 58,60,61, 
 
 7;, 209, 210 : J 
 Althoff, Dr., 102. 
 Amiral Ganteaume, The 5 
 Anatolian Railway, The, 48, 174, 310. 
 Andraasy Count, 14, 35 -. _ _-: 
 
 Andr ;_: 
 
 Angell, Norman : 
 
 me! Entente, The, 51, 6 : 
 
 _' 
 . o-Russian agreement, The. 17 
 Antwerp, 36, 49, 92, 94. 
 
 iments, Competition in, 193-:;: 
 
 , Limitation of, 290 291 
 
 Armenian m aaaacxca I he 174. 
 Army Bills (Germi: 
 
 60, 193-196, 296. 
 Asquith, Mi -_ 
 
 Astmrias 1 
 
 Auerstadt, Battle of, 217. 
 Augsburg, Battle of, 2^2. 
 
 ria-Hungar \ ■ ■- 1 2 13 -2 . 
 
 22: 22^ 22 --2 ;. 242 Part IV. 
 
 I 
 ■ro-Germar 
 
 ro-Hungarlan E .rxei- 
 
 D : 15 : ' 
 
 C 
 
 2*7 100-304 
 
 ... ------- 
 
 - - - _ - _ -- 
 .. ■ if, 7 
 
 Bab^. famse of, 2- 1 
 
 .:...-..-.. _ - _ 
 
 fan 1 - . ' 
 
 2 23, 214, 2 : 24 
 Bagdad Railway, 1 
 
 I 
 
 . .: 213. 
 Balfour 
 Balkan Peninsula, ix, 14, 40 - • ; : ,.- 
 
 Ballplatz (Austrian Foreign Or 
 
 -- 
 
 - : - - 
 
 "-.---- - - 
 
 _:• _-_ 24] 243 
 Bea: . a .-. : Lard 15 - ; 
 
 : : : - 
 Belgian neutrality, 10, : 24 _ ■ : 
 : jo. 
 :um, io, 11, 12, ; \2 >_ 
 
 - 2C - ' : 
 S .r H_r 140. 
 Benedetti, M., 232-234, 2 I : -2 _ : 
 Berchtold, Count, xi, .t g :: 12,20, 
 
 99- 27 S- 
 Berg, Grand Duchy of , 2 : - 
 
 : 
 Treaty oi 17 il i<j _- - .' 2-: 
 
 353 
 
 23 
 
Index 
 
 ! 
 
 SS 
 
 3 
 
 ! I 
 - 
 - 
 I 
 I 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 174 
 
 
 
 3 1 
 
 - 
 
 • - ■ 
 vges 
 
 - 
 
 ; : : 
 
 5 - 
 
 ■ • - 
 " • ■ 
 
 Bulow. T 51, 
 
 - - 7$,$ HJ. ioi, 
 
 Bundesrat. Th; a 3 art :;■ 
 
 Busch, Maurice 5a ".90. 
 
 -.tch. Nedjklko. X 3 J3 
 
 Caillaux. M.. -: 
 
 Cairoli Ministry, Th. - 
 
 Cambon. M. Paul. -: 
 
 Cambon. M. V.. 141. 
 
 Canieroons, The 74 
 
 Capital. German. Growth of, 180, 
 
 in France 3 3 
 
 . Levy on [1913), 106. 107. 
 
 ....: ; 5 5 B 5o, 65, 121. 193. 
 Carlowitz. Peace of, 2 
 
 - 
 
 Ans . ; . 
 
 The, 
 3 
 
 ! 
 ( 
 
 s 
 
 1 41 . 
 
 I 
 
 SSSC 
 
 ■ - 
 
 Con - .-. : 
 
 [ 
 
 i 
 
 Sondes Mi 
 
 . : . 3 - 
 
 
 
 mcoi 
 
 - 43 
 
 - . : : : : : : \) 
 
 - ... 
 
 - 
 
 -'-74. 
 
 Cons: - . -., 310, 
 
 311 3 
 
 inns, Matthias. King of Hungary, 
 
 tcow, Republic of, 315. 
 I7« 
 lean War. 18 : p 311. 
 ris, The fir./ - f$ 189, 190. 
 
 Crispi, Signer. -- 
 
 and the " Nagoda " of 1868, 270. 
 
 Cronstadt. Visit of French fleet to, 42, 
 
 Crown Prince. The. ty 
 
 Cubrilovic. Veljko, 3. 
 
 Customs Union, Serbo-Bulgarian, 19. 
 
 German. 5tv Zollverein. 
 
 Czechs, The xv, 40, 253. 254-261, 301. 
 and the Germans. 2;6-26i. 
 
 354 
 
Index 
 
 Dacia, 305. 
 
 Dahn, Felix, 29. 
 
 Daily Telegraph, interview with the 
 
 Kaiser, 29, 69. 
 Dalmatia, 78, 269. 
 Damascus, 48. 
 Daneff, Dr., 338. 
 Danish Duchies, Annexation of, 45, 
 
 230, 231. 
 Danubian Principalities, The, 305. 
 Dardanelles, The, 41. 
 Deak, Ferencz, 264, 265. 
 De Bunsen, Sir Maurice, 7, 8, 9, 10, 99. 
 Decazes, The Due de, 54. 
 Delane, Mr., 54. 
 
 Delbriick, Hans, 47, 52, 108, 198, 200. 
 Delcasse, M., 65, 67, 72, 175. 
 Deniker, J., 249. 
 D'Enghien, The Due, 215. 
 Denmark, 13, 50, 230, 231. 
 Depretis, Signor, 77. 
 Derby, Lord, 311. 
 Dernburg, Doctor, 170. 
 Deroulede, Paul, 57, 60. 
 Detaille, Edouard, 59. 
 Dicey, Mr. A. V., 281. 
 Diedrichs, Admiral, 171. 
 Diepenhors, Herr Fritz, 143, 325. 
 Djavid Bey, 86. 
 Dmitrieff, General, 335. 
 Dobrudja, The, 307. 
 Dortmund-Ems Canal, The, 92. 
 Drang nach Sudostcn, 18. 
 " Dualism," 260. 
 Dual System, The, 82. 
 " Dumping," 127-135. 
 
 Eastern Roumelia, 17, 41, 332, 333. 
 Economics, German theories of, 112- 
 
 116. 
 Egypt, 45, 311. 
 Eisenhart, 47. 
 
 Elections, German, 193, 199. 
 Electors, The Imperial, 208. 
 Empress Frederick, The, 59. 
 Emden, 92. 
 Empire, The Holy Roman, 207-216, 
 
 252, 253, 256. 
 Ems Telegram, The, 22, 239, 240. 
 Enver Pasha, xii, 85. 
 Espionage, German, 34-37 . 
 
 Fashoda, Incident at, 63. 
 " Federalism," The party of, in Ger- 
 many, 260. 
 Fenffe, M. de, 90. 
 Ferdinand, The Emperor, 210, 258. 
 
 , King of Bulgaria, 333, 334, 335, 
 
 339. 346. 
 Fethi Bey, 86. 
 Fez,. 65. 
 
 Fichte, Johann, 161. 
 Finance, German, 195-198. 
 Fiume, 19, 269, 270, 301, 302. 
 
 , Conference at, 19. 
 
 Forgach, Count, 7. 
 
 Fortnightly Review, Revelations of, 71. 
 
 France, 5, 11, 12, 13, 35, 53-75. /6, 
 
 89, 109, 187-192, 209, 212-221. 
 Francis I., King of France, 209. 
 Francis II., Emperor, 216, 263, 264, 
 
 273- 
 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, viii, ix, 
 
 x, 3- 17. 33- 272. 
 Francis Joseph, Emperor, xi, 4, 13, 14, 
 
 19, 20, 30, 39, 77, 82, 261, 264, 265, 
 
 274, 275. 
 Franco-Russian Alliance, The, 39, 41, 
 
 42, 60, 61, 67. 
 Franco-Spanish Treaty, The (1904), 
 
 64, 67. 
 Frankfort, 22, 23, 232. 
 
 , Constitution of, 228. 
 
 , Parliament of, 228, 259, 260. 301. 
 
 , Treaty of, 154, 163, 320, 325. 
 
 Frederick I., King of Prussia, 21. 
 Frederick II., King of Prussia, 21, 22, 
 
 212, 315. 
 Frederick William I., 21, 22, 112, 211, 
 
 216-220. 
 Frederick William IV., 29, 227-229. 
 Free Trade, xix, xx, 44, 325. 
 Fremdenblatt, 8. 
 French Colonies, The, 10. 
 Freycinet, M. de, 55, 59. 
 Freymann, Herr, 185. 
 Friedjung, Dr., 20, 33. 
 
 Gaboon, 73. 
 
 Galicia, 315, 316. 
 
 Galimberti, Mgr., 12. 
 
 Gastein, The Convention of, 230. 
 
 Gentz, Friedrich von, 222. 
 
 German Colonies, The, 317. 
 
 German Constitution, The, 23, 24, 26, 
 
 27, 46, Part III. passim, 246, 294- 
 
 299. 
 German diplomacy, 38-103. 
 German Empire, Foundation of, 13, 
 
 45, 243-246, 295. 
 Germanic Confederation, The, 224-226, 
 
 230, 231, 232. 
 Germanv, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21-30, 33-37. 
 38-103, Parts II. and III. 
 passim, 294-299. 
 
 , Population of, 109-111. 
 
 and China, 171, 172. 
 
 and Turkey, 48, 78, 79, 85-38. 
 
 Gervais, Admiral, 42. 
 Ghica, Alexander, 306. 
 Giesl, Baron, 8. 
 Giffen, Sir Robert, 188, 192. 
 
 355 
 
Index 
 
 Giolitti, Signor, 79, 339. 
 
 Girault, M. Arthur, 303. 
 
 Gladstone, Mr., 89, 332. 
 
 " Golden Bull," The, 208, 256. 
 
 Gontaut-Biron, Count de, 54, 55. 
 
 Gortschakoff, Prince, 39, 54. 
 
 Goschen, Sir Edward, 10, 91. 
 
 Gotter, Baron von, 22. 
 
 Govone, General, 234. 
 
 Grabez, Trifko, 3. 
 
 Gramont, Due de, 238-242. 
 
 Great Britain, 5, 10, 12, 36, 37, 44-52, 
 
 55, 62, 63, 66, 72, 73, 89-91, 97, 98, 
 
 230, 311, 332. 
 Greece, 14, 333, 336-339. 340, 341. 
 Grey, Sir Edward, xiv, 9, 12, 52, 71, 
 
 72, 98, 311, 336. 
 Guelfs, The, 297. 
 Guinea, Spanish, 73. 
 Gumplowitz, Herr von, 108, 313. 
 Gwynner, Herr von, 72. 
 
 Hague Conventions, The, 101, 103, 
 
 3 2 3- 
 Hairi Bey, xii. 
 Hamburg, 23, 45, 73. 
 Hanover, 22, 45, 214, 215, 217, 224, 
 
 232. 
 Hapsburg, Rudolph of, 209, 252. 
 
 , House of, viii, 209, 251, 252, 275. 
 
 , Ferdinand of, 258. 
 
 Harden, Maximilian, 51, 185, 187, 192. 
 
 Hardenberg, Prince von, 219, 223, 225. 
 
 Heidelberg, Congress at, 228. 
 
 Heimburger, General, 90. 
 
 Held, Herr, 114. 
 
 Hennebicq, Leon, 203. 
 
 Henry the Fowler, 208, 255. 
 
 Herbette, M., 55, 60. 
 
 Herreros, The, 170. 
 
 Herzgovina, 15, 331 (and see Bosnia). 
 
 Hesse, 22, 214, 232. 
 
 Historical School, The, in Germany, 
 
 112, 286. 
 Hohenberg, Duchess of, viii, ix, 33. 
 Hohenlohe, Prince, 26, 41, 42, 57, 121, 
 
 242, 346. 
 Hohenwart, Karl, 261. 
 Hohenzollern, House of, 238, 239. 
 
 , Frederick of, 21. 
 
 , Prince Leopold of, 238, 239, 240. 
 
 Hohenzollern candidature, The, 238- 
 
 241. 
 Holland, 10, 12, 91-94, 210. 
 
 , Neutrality of, 10, 49. 
 
 Holy Alliance, The, 226. 
 
 Holy Places, Protection of, 48. 
 
 Humbert, King, 77. 
 
 Hungary, 14, 82, 83, 251, 252, 253, 
 
 262-266. 
 
 Hungary, Roumanians in, 15, 16, 265, 
 301-303, 308. 
 
 , Stephen of, 355, 263. 
 
 , History of, 262-266. 
 
 Huss, John, 256, 257. 
 
 Ignatieff, M., 333. 
 
 Ilio, Danilo, 3. 
 
 Illyrian movement, The, 271. 
 
 Import certificates, German, 123. 
 
 Indemnity, Question of, 321-324. 
 
 (1871), 187-192. 
 
 India, 311. 
 
 Innsbruck, University of, 78. 
 International law, Sanctions of, 282. 
 Iron, Production of, in Germany, 139, 
 
 140. 
 Irredentists, The, 76. 
 Ischl, 8. 
 Istria, 78. 
 Isvolsky, M., 70. 
 Italy, xv, 12, 29, 31, 36, 37, 40, 64, 
 
 76-81, 208, 209, 215, 231, 242, 301, 
 
 302, 336, 339. 
 Ivan Asen II., 330. 
 
 Jadar, Battle of the, 350. 
 
 Jagow, Herr von, 4, 90. 
 
 Japan, 12, 17, 29, 100, 172. 
 
 Jehad, The (Holy War), 87, 88. 
 
 Jellachich, Baron Joseph, 269, 270. 
 
 Jena, Battle of, 217. 
 
 John XXII., Pope, 256. 
 
 Joseph II., Emperor of Austria, 258, 
 
 263, 273. 
 Jovanonic, Misco, 3. 
 Journal de Gene've, The, 168. 
 Judgment of Libusa, The, 259. 
 " Junkers," The, 27. 
 
 Kalisch, The Treaty of, 220, 222. 
 
 Kallay, Von, 17. 
 
 Kant, Immanuel, 112. 
 
 Karageorgevitch, House of, 19. 
 
 Karaveloff, 331. 
 
 Karovic, Mikar, 3. 
 
 Kauifmann, 57. 
 
 Kerovic, Nedo, 3. 
 
 Khazars, The, 262. 
 
 Kiao-Chau, 29, 48. ioo, 170-172. 
 
 Kiderlen-Wachter, Herr von, 71, 7$, 
 
 74- 
 Kiel Canal, The, 28. 
 Kirchmann, Herr, 232. 
 Kisseleff, Count, 306. 
 Klotz, M., 163. 
 Koike, Herr F., 169. 
 Koloman II., King, 268. 
 Konia, 174. 
 Konigsberg, 21, 219. 
 Konopisht, Pact of, vii-ix. 
 
 356 
 
Index 
 
 Kossovo, Battle of (1389), 263, 268, 
 
 306. 
 Kossuth, Louis, 264. 
 Kromeriz, Diet of, 274. 
 Kriiger, President, 29, 49, 93. 
 Krupp's, Kaiser Wilhelm II. and, 182. 
 
 and the indemnity of 1871, 191. 
 
 Kuhlmann, Herr von, 64. 
 " Kultur," 34. 
 Kustendil, Battle of, 330. 
 Kutusoff, General, 220. 
 
 Labour Party, The British, 52, 72. 
 
 Ladislaus, King of Poland, 269. 
 
 Lamsdorf, Count, 175. 
 
 Lansdowne, Lord, 176. 
 
 Laur, Francis, 60. 
 
 League of Patriots (French), 56. 
 
 Leger, M. Louis, 257, 259. 
 
 " Legitimacy," The principle of, 223, 
 
 284. 
 Leipzig, Battle of, 220. 
 Leo XIII. , Pope, 63. 
 Leopold, King of Belgium, 42. 
 Leopold II., Emperor of Austria, 213. 
 Leroy, M. Maxime, 319. 
 Liberals, The German, 62, 63, 229. 
 Lichnowsky, Prince, 12. 
 Liebknecht, Dr., xv. 
 Liefmann, Robert, 127, 134. 
 Liman von Sanders, General, 85. 
 Lipau, Battle of, 257. 
 List, Friedrich, 112, 115, 116, 133. 
 Lloyd George, Mr., 51. 
 London, Compact of, xv, xx, 288. 
 Lothair, The Emperor, 207. 
 Loubet, M., 64, 175. 
 Louis the German, 207. 
 Louis XVI., King of France, 213. 
 Loznica, 6. 
 Lubeck, 23. 
 Lucke, Herr, 197. 
 Luderitz, Herr, 62. 
 Luneville, Treaty, of 213. 
 Luxemburg, 11, 52, 89, 100, 233, 234. 
 , Rosa, 199. 
 
 Macchio, Baron, 7, 81. 
 Macedonia, 78, 332, 339~343. 344- 
 Magyars, The, 15, 16, 18, 194, 262, 268, 
 
 273. 274. 
 Mancini, Signor, 77. 
 Manifeste des Kulturkrieger, 20. 
 Maria Theresa, 22, 212, 263. 
 Maritime rivalry, Anglo-German, 1 50- 
 
 153- 
 Mauchamp, Dr., 69. 
 Maximilian, The Emperor, 209, 252, 
 
 258. 
 Mayerling, 32. 
 Mazzini, 314. 
 
 Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 23. 
 Memorandum of French Government, 
 
 9. 11. 
 Mensdorff, Count, 9, 10. 
 Metternich, Prince, 264, 273. 
 Metz, 53, 56. 
 Meuriot, M. Paul, 320. 
 Mexico, 234. 
 Milan, King, 19. 
 Milovic, Jakov, 3. 
 Mirabeau, 22, 108. 
 Mohacs, Battle of, 253, 258, 263. 
 Mohammedans, Appeal to, 48, 86, 87, 
 
 102. 
 Moldavia, 305, 306. 
 Moltke, Count von, 53, 54, 55, 56, 240, 
 
 241. 
 Mommsen, Professor, 283. 
 Monastir, 78, 337. 
 Monroe Doctrine, The, 49. 
 Montenegro, 12, 15, 16, 18, 336. 
 Moravia, 259, 262. 
 Morocco, 63-75, 172, 173. 
 Moscow, French Exhibition at, 60. 
 Moula'i-Hafid, 69. 
 Mouley-Abd-El-Malek, 65. 
 Muhlberg, Battle of, 258. 
 Mulhausen, 58, 60. 
 Munster, Herr von, 54. 
 Mursteg Programme, The, 78. 
 
 Napoleon L, 213-221, 263, 264. 
 
 Napoleon III., 76, 230-234, 241, 307. 
 
 Narodna Odbrana, 5. 
 
 Nassau, 22. 
 
 National economy, Theory of, 1 12-1 16. 
 
 National Liberals in Germany, The, 
 
 162, 193. 
 Nationality, Definition of, 286, 287. 
 Naval Convention, Anglo-Russian, 98. 
 Navigation Act, Repeal of, 44. 
 Navy Bills (German), 46. 
 Navy League (German), 46, 152. 
 Neue Freie Presse, 8. 
 Nicholas I., Czar of Russia, 14, 87, 230, 
 
 306, 310. 
 Nicholas II., 175, 337, 349. 
 Nikolsburg, Treaty of, 232. 
 Normandy, German interests in, 183. 
 North German Confederation, The, 
 
 235-237. 
 North Sea, German frontage on, 91. 
 Novi-Bazar, Sanjak of, 15, 17. 
 
 Odessa, xii. 
 
 O'Farrell, Mr. H. H., 190, 191. 
 
 Ofen (Buda-Pest), 13. 
 
 Official Journal of Serbia, 5. 
 
 Ollivier, M., 239. 
 
 Oncken, Herr, 95. 
 
 " Open Door," Policy of the, 168. 
 
 357 
 
Indes 
 
 Ostei: S 
 
 1 5 2 : ; : . 
 
 S 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 Pane. 
 
 :v.s in Ans 
 
 Par: . -9. 
 
 J 
 
 - 
 
 -.an Gulf". The. 151. 17 
 Pichori. II 
 
 . .10. 
 
 I - 
 Pohl 
 
 : : : 
 
 / - 
 
 . Partitio: 
 
 ill, 194. 
 
 .ent in Austria. 31-37 
 Posada 3 [ aunt, tai. 
 
 -. [94 224 - 
 . s Count. 1 1 a c 
 pnatic Sanction, The (ij.: v 
 Pra a at a - 5 : ; a 5 ; 261. 
 
 . Treaty 01. 2 J a 
 
 Un iversity ol 256 157 . 
 
 Premyslides. P 
 Pressburg, Peace of. a : 
 Princep. Danilo x 
 
 rhc -5- 
 
 Procop. Andre w 257. 
 
 Protection in Germany, 120-12 1 a 
 165 
 
 Prussia. 13. 21-30, 38 45 - 
 
 117-119, 211 212—221, Part 
 III. - 286, 290, 25 a 
 
 and France 212-22 1 a 3 B 
 
 and Austria. 227-2 
 
 Race No precise definition of 
 Race question in Austria-Hur.^ 
 
 The, 250-278 
 Radolin, Prince, 65, 70. 
 Radoslavofi. M. 347 
 Radowitz. Herr von. 5 1 
 Raflalovich, ML Arthur, 127, 1 31-154. 
 
 1 8l , ; - 
 
 Rastadt, Treaty of, 211. 
 Raon-1'Etape, Incident at 57, 
 
 Rather.,. v. Doctor 181. 
 
 1 - 
 
 -.-.- I - ; 
 
 Reu . 1 ; 
 
 - 
 S g V' . 23 24 27 - 
 
 a jrc 
 
 : I 
 S 
 Rettich. Heinrich, t< - 
 Reumer. Herr 
 
 . a 227 
 Rhine. Tbf 
 
 Rhine Province. The. 91. 11 
 a a 5 
 
 Ripley. Mr. \V. Z.. 28 
 
 Rohrbach, Herr Paul. ;. 
 
 - - 
 
 ■ ■ ■ - ' -' , ; ! 
 Roscher. Wilhelm. 1 
 
 rdam. 40. 02. 152. 
 Rouher. II 
 Roir. 
 
 Rouvier. II 
 
 Rudolph, Archduke. 32 : 
 
 Russell. Lord do 54 
 
 Russia, xvi. 5, 8 [6-1 8 
 
 38-43.55 - 
 
 264. 29c. 
 
 
 
 
 
 : - : ; : : : | ; : ; 
 
 3^ 33« 
 
 . Population of. no 
 
 - German Treaty, 
 
 The, 124 a 
 
 tariff war. The. 123 124 
 
 Russo-Japanese War. The, 66. 
 Russo-Turkish Wars. 14, 3 
 Ruville. Herr A. de. 245 s 
 
 Sadowa. Battle of. 13 53 $2 
 Salazar. Seuor. : 
 Salonica. 18 5 33 - 338 
 Ifaxqnis d: 
 San-Paolo, 49. 
 San Stefano. Treaty of. (4 
 Sarajevo trial. 3, 33. 
 
 assassination, x. xi. ;. 52, 79. 
 
 Sarolea, Dr. Charles. 47 
 Savigny, Friedrich Karl von, 112. 
 
 General. 338. 
 Saxony - : :.-• 45 - B 217, 223 232, 
 Say. Leon 
 Sazonof. If., S, 10, 99. 
 
 9< n. Count, 99. 
 Scharnhorst, General, 21$, 290. 
 Schebeko, M., 10, 99. 
 
 358 
 
Index 
 
 Scheldt, The, 92, 94. 
 Schmoller, Professor, 112, 113. 
 Schnaebele affair, The, 41, 56, 57. 
 Schoen, Baron von, 12, 69, 70, 72, 99. 
 Schorlemer-Lieser, Herr von, 200. 
 Secularization of ecclesiastical States, 
 
 The, 213, 214. 
 Selves, M. de, 70, 72. 
 
 >ia, xiv, 3, 5-12, 14, 16-20, 33, 79, 
 80, 267-272, 331, 332, 333, 
 336-339. 340, 347- 
 
 , Ultimatum to, 5-12, 99. 
 
 Seven Years War, The, 38, 44, 212. 
 
 Seymour, Sir George Hamilton, 67, 310. 
 
 Shabatz, 6. 
 
 Shantung, Treaty of, 48. 
 
 Sheik-ul-Islam, The, 87. 
 
 Shipping, Relative figures of, 150, 151. 
 
 , German, subsidized, 63. 
 
 Sigismund, The Emperor, 21, 256, 257. 
 
 , John, 21. 
 
 Silesia, 22, 212, 316. 
 Simon, Jules, 58. 
 Skiernewice, Treaty of, 41, 77. 
 Slavs, The, 13-20, no, III, 259. 
 
 , Majority in Austria-Hungary, 
 
 14-16. 
 Slivnitza, Battle of, 333. 
 Slovaks, The, 15, 265. 
 Slovenes, The, 15, 301. 
 Smyrna-Cassaba railway, The, 175. 
 Sobieski, John, 14. 
 Socialists, The German, 32, 80, 118, 
 
 121, 162, 193, 196, 199-201, 314. 
 Solf, Doctor, 170. 
 Souchon Pasha, 86. 
 South African Union, The, 49. 
 South German States, The, 22, 2^, 231, 
 
 241-245. 
 Southern Slav question, The, ix, 19, 
 
 267-272. 
 Sovereignty, Theory of, 282, 283. 
 Spahn, Herr, 94. 
 Spain, 238, 239, 240. 
 Spandau, War-chest at, 189. 
 Spanish-American War, The, 48. 
 Spencer, Herbert, 107, 108. 
 Stadion, Count, 218, 242, 274. 
 Stambuloff, 41, 333, 334. 
 Steamship services, German, 152. 
 Stein, Baron von, 218, 225. 
 Stephanie, Archduchess, 32. 
 Stephen Dushan, King of Serbia, 268, 
 
 330. 
 Strengel, Baron von, 108. 
 Strossmayer, Bishop, 269, 270. 
 Sudekum, Herr, 80. 
 Sweden, 209. 
 Switzerland, 302. 
 
 Syndicates, The German, 125, 127-135. 
 Syria, 177. 
 
 Szapary. Count, 10, 99. 
 Szlavy, Baron Joseph von, 17. 
 
 Taborites, The, 257. 
 
 Tacitus, 107. 
 
 Taillandier, M. Saint-Rene, 64, 65. 
 
 Talaat Bey, xii, 86. 
 
 Talleyrand, Prince, 223, 224, 284. 
 
 Tangier, 64, 66, 172. 
 
 , The Kaiser's visit to, 29,64,65, 
 
 176. 
 Tankossitch, Wis lav, 6, 7. 
 " Tariff Reform " in England, 167. 
 Tariff Wars, Franco-German, 161-168. 
 
 , Russo-German, 123, 124. 
 
 Tattenbach, Count, 
 
 Teutonic Knights, The, 21. 
 
 Thiers, M., 53, 239. 
 
 Thile, Herr, 239. 
 
 Thirty Years War, The, 209, 258. 
 
 Three Emperors, Alliance of the, 39, 77. 
 
 Three Years Law (French), The, 202. 
 
 Thurn, Count, 258. 
 
 Thyssen, Herr, 183. 
 
 Tilsit, Treaty of, 217. 
 
 Times, The, 54, 57, 94, 96. 
 
 Tirpitz, Admiral von, 46, 153. 
 
 Tisza, Count, xi, 4, 278. 
 
 Title of Emperor William I., The, 245. 
 
 Togoland, 73. 
 
 Top-Khane, Convention of, 17. 
 
 Trade, Anglo-German, 143-149. 
 
 .Franco-German, 154-160, 161- 
 
 168. 
 
 , Turkish, 178. 
 
 Transvaal War, The, 29, 49, 63, 92. 
 
 Transylvania, 273, 305-309. 
 
 Treaty, Principles of the future, 293- 
 
 304. 
 Treitschke, 47, 107, 108. 
 Trentino, The, 76, 77, 7S, 81. 
 Trieste, 77, 301, 302. 
 Triple Alliance, The, 40, 42, 53, 67, 77, 
 
 85, 97- 
 
 Tripoli, 36, 78. 
 
 Tschirschky, Herr von, 7, 66, 99. 
 
 Tunis, French occupation of, 76, 77, 
 168. 
 
 Turco-Italian War, The, 29, 78. 
 
 Turkey, 14, 18, 29, 36, 41, 48, 78, 79, 
 85-88, 174-179, 224, 268, 269, 
 289, 306, 307, 310-312, 330- 
 338. 
 
 , Railway projects in, 177, 178. 
 
 , Trade statistics, 178. 
 
 Tyrol, The, 218, 252, 301,302. 
 
 United States, The, 49. 
 Utraquists, The, 2^7, 258. 
 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713), 211. 
 
 359 
 
Index 
 
 VautT, Battle 
 Varobuler, 241. 
 Vatican Dm -■ 
 
 Venetia, 76. 
 Venezuela, 49. 
 
 Vcnjrin, If., 141. 
 Hes : } I | \ 
 
 Vetsera, Baroness Marie :: 
 Victoria. Queen, 20. 49, ;_ 
 Vienna 1 3 - - 
 
 I 4 5 ;;:-;; 
 
 Voltaire 21 
 
 Von der Goltr j - 3 3 5 
 
 . :.-,rlberg. Tb* ;•:: 
 
 toe and Germany, 191. 
 
 Wagner, Adolph. 112, 134, 16: 
 
 ■am, Batt^ vi 11S 
 Walla cliia . 3 q 5 
 
 g . Dheim Paron von - : Mi 
 Dtigin oJ 107 
 
 GOOD [Ofl 
 
 .Profits of 1 ,- ; --i92. 
 
 Weiss, M. Andre. 51S. 
 
 Wenceslaus I.. King of Bohemia 155 
 
 Wends, I. 
 
 Wermuth. Herr. 195. 
 
 Werther. Herr von. a 3 v 
 
 : tS, HO ;: : 
 
 ol (164S). 13, 209-211. 
 
 Kingdom of, 2 17. 
 
 White. Mr. Andrew D., ::: 
 
 White Mountain. Battle of the, : j 
 
 Wickham Steed. Mr. H., \-ii. x 
 
 WillM m Foreign 
 
 Omce) 1 
 
 William I., King of Prussia and Ger- 
 man Emperor 1 3 | | 3 g ; ; | ; | - 
 241. 
 
 William II., German Emperor, i\ 4 
 14-3C *] 4a 45 ;o-oi. 64, 
 
 5 69. ;i, -.; -S 85-I tftt, 
 
 I - 5 1 B 1 1 
 
 Willcox, Sir William. I - - 
 
 Wilson Mr. A. J., vii. 
 
 Witte, Count, 
 
 Wolff Bureau. The, 80, 96. 
 
 Wjnrtemberg 1 1 1 3 a 4 1 1 5 . 24.5. 
 
 Xenofol. M.. 505. 
 
 CK, General, 210. 2:: 
 Young Turks, The, xi-xiii. IT, 
 Yv.sui" Izzedin, Prince, xi-xiii. 
 
 Zedlitz. Herr vom :::. 
 
 ch, Milan, r - 
 Zimmermann, Herr, 94. 
 Ziska, John, ^; - 
 Zollverein, The. 13, 93, 11 7- 119. 
 
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