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 ^lETHOD OF EDUCATION: 
 
 A.N A^DDKESS 
 
 INTRODUCTORY TO THE SESSION 1859-6U 
 
 OF THE 
 
 ST. LOUIS MEDICAL COLLEGE, 
 
 J. H. WATTE RS, M.D., 
 
 Professor of Physiology and Medical Jurisprudenca. 
 
 -^ST, LOUIS: 
 GEORGE KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS. 
 1859. 
 
 ^■UK£^ 
 
/ 
 
METHOD OF EDUCATION 
 
 A.:^ AI3X)I^ESS 
 
 INTRODUCTORY TO THE SESSION 1859-60 
 
 ST. LOUIS MEDICAL COLLEGE, 
 
 J. H. WAITERS, M.D., 
 
 Professor of Pliysiology and Medical Jurisprudence. 
 
 -r^v'^soAv;^ , 
 
 S ST. LOUIS: 
 GEORGE KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS. 
 18 5 9. 
 
St. Louis Medical College, 
 
 November 1st, 1859. 
 
 Prof. J. H. Watters. 
 
 \ 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 At a meeting held by tlie Class, J. T. Marsh in the 
 chair, it was unanimously resolved, tliat a committee be appointed for the pur- 
 pose of requesting from you permission to publish your Introductory Address, 
 delivered before the Class, in College Hall, on the evening of October 31st. 
 Hoping that the above resolve may receive your approbation, a favorable reply 
 will meet with the thanks of the Class, and of yours, 
 
 KespectfuUy, 
 
 J. L. WILCOX. 
 GBATZ A. ]V10.-E>-, 
 CHA?\ KXOWER. 
 JO[IN THOMPSON 
 J. C. IIICKERSON 
 
 St. Louis, Nov. 2, 1859. 
 
 Dear Sirs, 
 
 The manuscript of my lecture is at your service ; please jiresent 
 to the Class my acknowledgment of the compliment, 
 
 And believe me, as ever, 
 Your attaclied friend, 
 
 J. H. WATTEKS, 
 To Messrs Wilcox, Moses, Knower, Thompson, nicker.»-()n. 
 
METHOD OF EDUCATION: 
 
 An Address Introductory to the Session 1859-60 of the St. Louis Medical 
 College. By J. H. WATTERS, M.D„ Professor of Physiology and Med- 
 ical Jurisprudence. 
 
 Gentlemen, — Under favorable auspices we meet to-night to 
 celebrate the 02:)ening of our eighteenth session, and in behalf of 
 the faculty I welaome you as stiidents to these halls dedicated to 
 medical education. 
 
 The ardent aspirations of the young of a country to fit them- 
 selves for useful and honorable activities, brings hapjiiness not 
 only to the individual, but secures life, intelligence and refine- 
 ment to society — stability, power and influence to the state. It is 
 this Avhich engenders and fosters the very vitality, spirit and soul 
 of a community. General society — yes, our whole country — is 
 interested in this assemblage of young men gathered hither from 
 the various parts of our extensive and prosperous valley, all in- 
 spired with a common desire to be enabled to render a reasonable 
 answer to the problem of life. Some answer, whether it be rea- 
 sonable or not, must be given by every man. It is not optional, 
 but the necessity is implied in the very existence of a rational be- 
 ing : it is not a request, but an imperative demand. Should one 
 think to avoid it by silence or refusal to act, he deceives himself; 
 for his very silence and supineness become contempt, and contain 
 already his answer. 
 
 Man is by nature most munificently gifted; but his character and 
 activities are the answer he renders to the question, " what will he 
 do with it" — with his life, his mind, his reason, his image of God ? 
 The various grades of characters, from the lowest besotted di-egs 
 of society to the highest and noblest men, present merely the dif- 
 ferent uses made of nature's high gifts. Consider now 
 
 "The wisest of the sages of the earth 
 That ever from the stores of reason drew 
 Science, and truth, and virtue's dreadless tone ;" 
 
and now reflect upon tliis solemn fact, tliat 
 
 " Ilini, every slave now (Iratjging through tlie filth 
 Of some corrupted city his sad life, 
 Pining with famine, swoln with luxury, 
 Blunting the keenness of his spiritual sense 
 With narrow schemings and unworthy cares, 
 Or, madly rushing through all violent crime. 
 To move the deep stagnation of liis soul, — 
 Might imitate and equal." 
 
 We liear in our youth too niucli cant about "poor weak liuniau 
 nature, the flesh, and the devil ;" and those Avho Avould throw 
 upon the shoulders of these imaginary personalities the necessary 
 and legitimate results of individtial slothfulness, inactivity, and re- 
 fusal to use Avhat has been given, would obliterate what little of 
 the image of God is yet A'isible in humanity, and would juit a stop 
 to progress — not by bold and open opposition, which would be ac- 
 companied Math corresponding reaction, but by smothering and 
 destroying the already enfeebled energy and s})irit. 
 
 That each individual may use his talents and powers in the best 
 and most reasonable way possible, is the object of all education, 
 Avhether literary, professional, scientiflc, or religious. In other 
 words, the object of education is to enable man, in his activities, 
 to harmonize with the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute. It is 
 only as his activities do harmonize and thtis cooperate with the 
 Infinite, that man is emancipated and exalted ; while in so far as 
 they are discordant, man militates against God, and in the con- 
 flict is always vanquished, degraded and enslaved. Tliis proposi- 
 tion is universal, and extends in its application through the whole 
 range of human activities. And, gentlemen, as you propose to as- 
 sume the responsible vocation of physicians, the object of your 
 professional studies is that you may be enabled so to act upon 
 physical nature as to cure disease and relieve sxtffering. This, 
 too, can be done only by cooperating with the imivcrsal and abso- 
 lute in perfect obedience to the physical laws; which laws are to 
 us the outward expression or representation, in space and time, of 
 universal reason. If our acts are not in obedience to these laws, 
 our medications, like the prayers of the wicked, are an abomina- 
 tion. It is a common saying that nature cures disease, and that 
 the physician's province is to assist nature. While this expression 
 admits of very liberal interpretations, yet literally it is most false. 
 Man under no circumstances assists nature ; this is neither his 
 province nor prerogative : it is his highest privilege to use nature. 
 But how are we to use nature ? By what method are we enabled 
 
to take advantage of her laws ? In other words, what relation has 
 education to success, science to art? This is the question I pro- 
 pose discussing to-night; and while I address you, gentlemen, 
 especially, as medical students, the method by which you will be 
 enabled to attain the objects of your calling, is the method of 
 every human activity whatever — of your social and political rela- 
 tions no less than professional. 
 
 As the object of all education is to enable man to harmonize his 
 activities with the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute, this object 
 can be attained only so far as we know the Infinite, the Universal, 
 the Absolute. I am aware that there are those high in authority 
 who contend that the capacity for this knowledge is not vouch- 
 safed to man. If this be so, then indeed are we most miserably 
 circumstanced. What! here — possessing hopes, desires, aspira- 
 tions, longings for something better — condemned to disappoint- 
 ment and ignoble defeat upon every side, except in so far as our 
 activities are in harmony with the Infinite, and yet having no ca- 
 pacity to know that Infinite by whom we are judged and to Avhom 
 we are subject! This cannot be so: else man could not adapt 
 means to ends ; the result of his spontaneity would be altogether 
 accidental ; his fortune would not be in his own hands. It is not so : 
 the development of science condemns it; our railroads, telegraphs, 
 and manufactures, and all the arts, condemn it; our social, politi- 
 cal and religious relations condemn it ; all culture and progress 
 condemn it. As the result of every human activity is determined 
 by its relation to the Infinite, the relation which any people bear 
 to the Infinite is expressed not only in their moral, social, political 
 and religious condition, but also as well in their machinery, their 
 manufiictures, their agriculture, their navigation, their architecture, 
 their painting, their sculpture, their poetry, their ornaments, their 
 dress, in all their activities and in every expression of their sponta- 
 neity. All advancement and progress of the individual, of society, 
 of humanity, is proof that we have the faculty to know the Absx)- 
 lute to which we are subject, as all success is but an expression of 
 this knowledge, and a resulting harmony between our activities 
 and the Infinite. 
 
 But man is guided in his activities by his intelligence, and mind 
 is in its very nature active, spontaneous, self-determinate. Know- 
 ledge, therefore, must be the determination of the mind itself, else 
 the spontaneity and self-determination of mind would be super- 
 seded and abrogated by knowledge, which is absurd. Consequent- 
 ly, the mind must possess the faculty of determining itself harmo- 
 niously with the Universal and Absolute ; — ^whether you agree to 
 
designate this power of tlie mind thus to determine itself, as know- 
 ledge of the Universal and Absolute, or not, matters nothing, so far 
 as the question under discussion is concerned — By what method 
 is man enabled to harmonize his activities with the Infinite, the 
 Universal, the Absolute f This faculty is reason, lieason being 
 one and absolute to man, to nature, and to God, it is most appa- 
 rent, that, so far as our activities harmonize with I'eason, they must 
 in that very fact harmonize with the Universe and with God. 
 Therefore, the method by Avhich the object of all education is to 
 be attained, is the method by Avhich we are enabled to harmonize 
 our activities with JReason. This proposition, gentlemen, embod- 
 ies the central idea which I hope to present to you to-night in an 
 intelligible manner. You will observe the important pjoint, that 
 in this proposition we have substituted lleasoii for the Infi- 
 nite, the Universal, the Absolute. I know full well, that, in 
 making this substitution here in a public lecture, I am in no little 
 danger of being understood as making man equal with God. But 
 if there were no danger here, there would be little or no occasion 
 for this lecture ; and if, on account of this danger, I had chosen 
 another theme, or had treated this in a manner to conform to the 
 more general and popular notions, I would in that have been hug- 
 ging my t)wn shackles ; whereas my theme this night is, IIow are 
 we freed, emancipated, exalted? A just man has not his freedom 
 curtailed by just laws in so far as he cognizes justice, because the 
 law unto himself frees him from the external laws ; that is, the ex- 
 ternal laws cease to bind and restrain him just in so far as from his 
 own self-determination he would fulfil them. Just so, and for the 
 same reason, a reasonable man has not his freedom annulled by 
 the laws of reason in so far as he knows reason. As one in his own 
 spontaneity determines himself according to reason, he ceases to 
 be restrained by the external laws of reason. If all moral and 
 physical laws be laws of reason, then indeed can man be delivered 
 from the dominion of necessity only so fiir as reason in him be- 
 comes self-conscious. We believe in Divine Omnipotence ; that 
 in the Infinite "we live, and move, and have our being;" that with- 
 0l^t Ilim we can not think a good thought or do a good act ; and 
 yet we believe that man is free and justly accountable. The truth 
 and consistency of these two positions is all I contend for in the 
 substitution I have made of Reason for the Infinite, the Absolute, 
 the Universal. He who believes in human freedom can not but 
 believe that man possesses the faculty of determining himself in 
 harmony with the Universal ; for in so far as man is determined 
 by anywhat not himself, he is necessitated and not free. He who 
 
believes in human freedom and also in Divine Omnipotence and 
 Omniscience, must believe these two positions consistent ; unless, 
 indeed, he be himself a slave, clinging in blind fanaticism to the 
 very chains which bind him. And what does he mean by consist- 
 ency except their mutual harmony with reason? And when he 
 acknowledges that two truths viust be consistent, in this necessity 
 he recognizes reason as the universal umpire, authoritative to man, 
 to nature, and to God. 
 
 If, therefore, the object of all education is to enable us to har- 
 monize our activities with reason, then the method we seek is the 
 method of reason becoming self-conscious, oi', in other words, it is 
 the method of reason coming to a knowledge of itself. This is 
 perfectly clear, that in order that we may harmonize our activities 
 with reason we must know reason. But the reason alone can 
 know reason; consequently we can know reason only as the reason 
 becomes self-conscious. Did you ever see a little child held before 
 a looking-glass ? Through its senses it cognizes the phenomenon 
 and through its understanding it is convinced of duality, — it peeps 
 behind the glass fully expecting to find another child. But as it 
 comes to know itself^ with apparent rapture it recognizes itself 
 in the image. Not the senses^ nor yet the iinderstanding, but only 
 reason can know and comprehend reason. The spontaneity of man 
 may be under the dominion of the senses, or of the understanding, 
 or of the passions; but as these are all finite and related to the in- 
 finite only in and through reason, when tliey guide, the blind lead 
 the blind and both fall into tlie ditch together. But when our 
 spontaneity is guided by reason, the outward expressions of this 
 spontaneity — our activities, our works — must harmonize with rea- 
 son, with nature, and with God. The great problem of humanity, 
 therefore, is to identify our spontaneity in each, every and all of 
 its vai-ious possibilities with self-conscious reason. Our question, 
 therefore, as to the method by which the object of education is to 
 be attained is now reduced to this form : What is the method of 
 the reason in becoming self-conscious ? 
 
 As we are students of nature, and as in this department especial- 
 ly Ave hope to assist in the great struggle of humanity, and to leave 
 the world the better of our having lived, (if this be not our ambi- 
 tion we are unworthy of humanity,) I shall seek this method only 
 as expressed in the more developed sciences. And we may hope 
 to get some insight thus, because Science is the formal recognition 
 of reason. Do not allow yourselves to anticipate me here, and to 
 object in your thoughts to this position, that the physical sciences 
 treat of nature and her laws, and, consequently, that a knowledge 
 
10 
 
 of these laws can bo obtained only through observation and ex- 
 periment. Be patient one moment and we will consider this matter 
 together. It is admitted that observation and experiment are ne- 
 cessary conditions to a knowledge of nature and her huvs, but you 
 must admit also that you neither see, feel, taste, nor smell the j^hysi- 
 cal sciences. It is true you put ores and compounds into the 
 crucible, but you neither put therein nor take hence the science of 
 clieniistry ; it is true certain angles and distances must be obtained 
 by observation, but the transit instrument and the telescope are not 
 wonderfully devised machines for the manufacture of the science 
 of astronomy; you may examine and pee]), but the science is not 
 there — you can not get it thus. What, then, is the relation between 
 observation and science? This question is si(l> Judice, and until 
 decided it might be Avell to suspend our anticipated objection. 
 Physical science is rendered possible only in and througli the 
 identity of the laws of nature and the laws of thought. This is 
 a self-evident proposition ; for if nature could in her mode of 
 action be whimsical or unreasonable, where, I ask, would be the 
 criterion whereby we could know natui-e or determine her mode 
 of action ? There would be none, and we Avould necessarily be ut- 
 terly in the dark. If there be physical science at all, therefore, the 
 laws of nature must be identical with the laws of thought, and 
 Science must be the recognized identity. The senses do not and 
 can not give us science ; observation and experiment can only give 
 phenomena. Physical science exists only so far as reason has come 
 to a recognition of itself in the phenomenal. That is, so far as we 
 have science reason must have become the criterion "whereby na- 
 ture is recoo-nized as laws of thous-ht. But reason can become 
 the criterion only in so far as it becomes self-conscious, or as it 
 knows itself. Consequently, we may hope by an examination and 
 careful analysis of the sciences, to learn something of the method 
 whereby the object of all education is to be attained ; in other 
 words, of the method of reason in becoming self-conscious or in 
 recognizing itself Though Ave may thus only obtain a partial in- 
 sight, yet even this is not to be altogether despised. 
 
 As mathematics is more developed and moi'e generally under- 
 stood than any other science, we will direct our attention to it 
 especially. And let it be understood that our object here is not 
 to reduce all science to what has been termed the mathematical 
 method, but rather to seek in the mathematics the method of the 
 reason in becoming self-conscious, as all science (mathematics, of 
 course, included) has been shown to be the reason coming to know 
 and recognize itself As my object, as a teacher, is always more to 
 
11 
 
 excite thought than to amuse, — to draw out the mind rather than 
 to instil dogmas, I hope you Avill excuse me for selecting for your 
 consideration a subject requiring so much study. My excuse is 
 that the jirinciples involved in this subject, though they may seem 
 abstract, are most practical, forming as they do the very foundation 
 of all knowledge and all success. 
 
 Mathematics as a science starts with certain 2:)rimary proposi- 
 tions, which are divided usually into two classes — Definitions and 
 Axioms. But what moan these propositions? whence came they, 
 and where is the authority for the use made of them in mathemat- 
 ics? If we can obtain correct answers to these questions, we will 
 have approached very near what we seek : but do not be uneasy, I do 
 not intend to load you over the paths already avcII worn by the Sen- 
 sationalists and Idealists. First let me call your attention to this most 
 important consideration — Tliat there can he no existence, law, mode 
 of action, or phenoinenon, xmtlioiit limitations.; for all these im- 
 ply determinations, and there can be no determinations without lim- 
 itations. This is self-evident and absolute ; think of it one moment. 
 There can be no this and that without a difference, and there can be 
 no difference without limitations. To vision, pure light would bo 
 equivalent to pure darkness ; there can be no seeing without a 
 mingling of the two — without shades or colors. Power is equiva- 
 lent to no power without resistance ; you can not lift yourself by 
 the hair; as Archimedes could not find a poii stb, or place to fix 
 his machine, he could not move the earth. The equation sign 
 stands forever between absolute motion and no motion ; the an- 
 cients did not recognize the parallel lines, and they attached the 
 predicate no motion to the earth. And our physical sciences (so 
 called) now are mostly legerdemain to induce the student, by com- 
 jjlicating the pi-ocess, to believe he has succeeded in lifting him- 
 self; in lieu of the earth, physical science is placed on the back of 
 a tortoise. As there could be nothing to know, therefore, without 
 limitations, so there could be no knowing. As all things and phe- 
 nomena depend upon the union of oppositos, as of motion and rest, 
 of power and resistance, of light and darkness; so science is based 
 upon the union of opposites necessarily. As what is to be known 
 has its existence in this union, evidently the knowing must be bas- 
 ed upon it. Now pure space, like pure light, is without limits, and 
 consequently is without determination. There is no this, as deter- 
 mined from that ; there is no here and no there ; no outside and 
 no inside ; no circumference, and no centre. As, for vision pure 
 light must be united with its opposite — darkness, so the science 
 of geometry must be based upon the union of the pure idea space 
 
12 
 
 and its opposite. Now, wliat stands opposed to space as darkness 
 is o])])osed to light? You at once recognize it as the point. The 
 point is not space, but it is related to space as its ojiposite, as its 
 negation, as its limitation. We are now prepared to understand 
 the meaning of the Definitions upon which geometry is based. 
 These definitions are the limitations of space by its opposite — the 
 point ; — the motion of a point may be said to generate a line ; the 
 motion of a line, to generate a surface; the motion of a surface, to 
 generate a solid. So, while pure space is without limitations or 
 determinations, yet united Avith its opposite we have definitions as 
 the bases of science. We now have a here and a there, a this and 
 a that. By this union we have a straight line, a curved line, a tri- 
 angle, a square, a polygon, a circle, an ellipse, a parabola, an hy- 
 perbola, a polyedron, a prism, a parallelopipedon, a sjihere, an ellip- 
 soid, &c. &c. 
 
 But before investigating further the meaning of the definitions 
 of mathematics, we must investigate whence they came ; a know- 
 ledge of their origin will contribute to the understanding of their 
 nature. You are aware that many contend that all our knowledge, 
 including of course mathematical definitions and axioms, is deri- 
 ved from sensation ; and that others contend, no less confidently, 
 for the existence of innate ideas, and for this origin of all know- 
 ledge. It is not pertinent to our present object to meddle with 
 either of these systems. We have seen that all determination is 
 through limitation ; that is, if all limitation were removed from 
 any thing, all determination would be removed ; and what would 
 be left would be equivalent to nought — is nothing — the thing 
 would no longer have existence. But do you say something would 
 still be left ? Think one moment ; your something left being with- 
 out determinations, wherein, I ask, is its difference from nothing ':* 
 You call it something, I call it nothing, and you can not apply a 
 predicate to your something which I can not also apply to my 
 nothing; if you can, then your "something left" has limitations^ 
 which is contrary to the hypothesis. It is j^erfectly apparent, 
 therefore, if we know not the limitations, we know not the thing ; 
 and that, in so far as we know the limitations, we know the thing 
 in itself — the thing having an existence only in these limitations. 
 Therefore, if things in themselves were not related to us, we could 
 never know them ; if there were no bond of union between nature 
 and ourselves, all things in nature by which we are surrounded 
 would be to us as though they were not, — we would be uncon- 
 scious of their existence. Consequently, if we know nature at all, 
 (and no one will be likely to deny this,) there must be some means 
 
13 
 
 of our knowing or becoming conscious of the limitations of things 
 in themselves. But how can the mind know or become conscious 
 of that which is outside of itself? This is the difficult but most 
 important question. If we admit the duality of nature and mind, 
 must Ave admit that the mind can get outside of itself to know na- 
 ture ? This would be a manifest absurdity, for nothing can get 
 outside of itself Then, to admit a knowledge of nature, are we 
 compelled to do away with the duality, and to become out and out 
 materialists on the one hand, or idealists on the other ? I think 
 not. Then, if the mind can not get out of itself, how can the mind 
 know nature if duality be admitted ? I think I see one, and only 
 one possible solution of this problem ; for, in admitting that the 
 mind can not get out of itself, we admit that our knowledge of na- 
 ture comes from the mind knowing itself. This is the problem : 
 Admitting the duality of nature and mind, and that the mind can 
 not get out of itself, how can the mind know nature? 
 
 It is admitted that Ave have some knoAvledge of nature, and, con- 
 sequently, that there must be some relation betAveen mind and 
 the external Avorld. Noav if we admit duality, the only possible 
 relation is that of mutual limitation ; that is, in so far as nature and 
 mind are distinct and dual, they must reciprocally exclude and ne- 
 gate each other. And in so far as they are distinct, the only pos- 
 sible relation they can have on the side of their duality must be 
 the mutual limitation through this reciprocal exclusion and nega- 
 tion. This is the only possible relation uj^on the admission of dual- 
 ity, because neither could get outside of itself, Avhich Avould of 
 course be necessary for any other relation. Consequently, this re- 
 lation, so far from requiring the denial, is iti virtue of the duality ; 
 and, as this is the only possible relation consistent with duality, this 
 must be the avenue to a knoAvledge of nature ; or else, we must de- 
 ny either the duality, or, the possibility of such knoAAdedge. These 
 three are the only jiossible alternatives : — You must either do aAvay 
 with the duality and become materialists on the one side, or ideal- 
 ists on the other ; or else, admitting the duality, you must deny 
 the possibility of a knoAvledge of nature ; or else, admitting both 
 the duality and a joossibility of a knowledge of nature, you must 
 find in the mutual exclusion and limitation the condition of this 
 knowledge. Endorsing this last alternative, Ave must endeavor to see 
 hoAV nature and mind mutually excluding and limiting each other, is 
 the avenue to a knoAvledge of nature. "We are not now concerned 
 with the inquiry koto nature and mind limit each other, but our 
 present inquiry starts Avith the foct that they must limit each other, 
 upon the admission of duality. This is the solution : Nature and 
 
14 
 
 ntind mutually excluding; nnd limiting each other, in so far as the 
 mind cognizes its ovxn limitation, in that act, being limited by na- 
 tio'e, it recognizes the limitation of nature. To illustrate : suppose 
 A and B own adjacent farms; A, in knowing the limitations of his, 
 knows, in that very foot, the limitations of B's so far as they mutu- 
 ally limit each other ; just so, the mind, in knowing its own limita- 
 tions, knows the limitations of nature so for as they exclude and 
 limit each other. Thus the mind knows nature in knowing itself. 
 This is the only possible solution ; but we need no other as this is in 
 every respect most satisfactory, containing within itself evidence 
 of its truth, and is therefore worthy of all acceptation, even though 
 we were not forced to adopt it, or else either materialism or ideal- 
 ism, or the doctrine that all knowledge of nature is impossible. 
 But, at first glance, all this may seem to have little to do with the 
 Definitions of mathematics. Upon reflection, however, I suspect it 
 will be found to have somewhat to do not only with mathematics 
 but with our political, social and even religious condition, with the 
 steam engine and weaver's shuttle and doctor's jjill, and even with 
 our bread and butter. 
 
 But to continue ; — all knowledge, therefore, including mathema- 
 tics and the natural sciences, is the mind knowing itself. If this 
 be so, you may ask, how do we know that nature is actual and 
 real? You may say, "upon the admission of the duality of nature 
 and mind, and, that they mutually limit each other, it is clear 
 enough that the mind, in knowing itself, knows nature in so far as 
 they thus limit each other; but, if the mind oidy knows itself, how 
 do you get the duality ? IIow does the mind know that an actual 
 nature stands over against it limiting it; and that these limitations 
 of itself, which only it knows, have an external condition at all ?" 
 This knowledge comes through sensation, which gives us a con- 
 sciousness of objectivity. This Avill be clear, I think, if you will 
 call to mind a point already discussed at some length. As Ave have 
 seen that all existence and phenomena depend upon the union of 
 opposites, as of motion and rest, of power and resistance, of light 
 and darkness, so all consciousness implies duality. Consequently, 
 consciousness in the line of our spontaneity — that is, a limitation 
 Avhere we know there is no internal limitation — gives us objectiv- 
 ity authoritatively. The primary condition of our knowledge of 
 the existence of nature, as opposed to and as limiting mind, is mo- 
 tion. But I must not dwell upon this part of my subject. 
 
 On the other hand again, one disposed to sensationalism Avill ob- 
 ject, — "this is all nonsense to talk about the mind knowing nature 
 by knowing itself, — I see and feel objects themselves, but I do not 
 
15 
 
 know the mind,— I can not see it !" I grant you your position fully— 
 that you see and feel objects, and that you know mind very little; 
 probably if you could only get it under a microscope, or into a cruci- 
 ble, you w-ould know it better. But I thank you for your objection 
 just here in close juxtaposition with the one of the idealist already 
 considered; as we have to steer here between Scylla and Char}'bdis, 
 we must keep in mind their localities. In reply to idealism just now, 
 it was maintained that objectivity is given authoritatively in sensa- 
 tion, in that all consciousness implies duality, — the union of op- 
 posites. This seems to the senses to approach dangerously close 
 to you, O voracious Charybdis ! who would draw all knowledge 
 into the abyss of sensationalism. You say you do not know mind, 
 but that you know nature, objects, matter, which are given in 
 sensation. Hence you peep at nature; you make observations and 
 experiments ; you turn her round to make her present herself to 
 your senses on as many sides as possible ; probably you may use 
 a microscope to assist the senses ; you note down very carefully 
 the results — what you see!; you classify this and call it Physical 
 Science! And to be so lucky as to see something first, say a new 
 fossil, and to describe it and classify it, entitles one to endless fome 
 in the history of Science! Can it be that now, in the latter half of 
 the nineteenth century, such a gross and bungling counterfeit is 
 palmed upon humanity so currently ! You say you know little or 
 nothing of mind because you can not see it, — this I have granted 
 without the slightest mental reservation ; but you say you know 
 nature and objects around you because you see them and feel 
 them ! Hold ! you feel the fire and say it is hot ; you see the rose 
 and say it is red ; you taste sugar and say it is sweet. But the 
 sugar is not sweet, the rose is not red, the fire is not hot ; these are 
 but sensations which you objectify and put into things which you 
 say you know in sensation. Now you must acknowledge that you 
 know not the things you imagine you see, and you say that you 
 know not mind as yoii can not see it ; — what, then, do you know ? 
 Your physical science is no science, containing as it does the two 
 factors — the things seen and the individual seeing — most hetero- 
 geneously mixed uj?, neither known, both undetermined, and one 
 of them (the individual seeing) extremely variable. Call this 
 Science! It is mockery, it is trifling with common sense to palm 
 such stuff" oft' as science. 
 
 We have seen that the mind can knoAV nature only in knowing 
 itself, and, consequently, that the mind can know nature only in so 
 far as they mutually limit each other. Now the grossest sensa- 
 tionalist acts upon this position ; for when he says the rose is red, 
 
16 
 
 that sugar is sweet, that fire is hot, lie actually makes his own 
 limitations in sensation tlie limitations of things; and the more re- 
 fined of the class who say, "we can know nothing of nature except 
 the phenomena," in this fully endorse tlie same position. The real 
 difterence between these and me is not here therefore, but ratlier 
 in this, that they would restrict mind to sensation, or at most to 
 the understanding. They, no less than I, acknowledge their own 
 limitations as all they know of nature or indeed can knoAV. But 
 it may be asked, — "if the limitations of mind are the means of our 
 knowing things, or all of nature that we can know, are we not right 
 in objectifying our sensations?" Certainly we are right; if we 
 washed to, Ave could not help seeing tlie rose as red, feeling the fire 
 as hot, and tasting sugar as sweet. But I do most solemnly pro- 
 test against the currency of this, or of any classification or gen- 
 eralization of AAdiat is given in sensation, as scie?ice either of na- 
 ture or mind. Jt is not science, because the mind does not /cnoio 
 and recognize itself in wJiat is given in sensation. It cognizes 
 only the sensation, the feeling, the redness, the heat, the sweet- 
 ness, &c., Avhich are cognized as Avell by beasts ; for no doubt 
 they see the grass as green and feel the fire as hot as Avell as Ave. 
 In the language of Scripture, — "The ox knoAveth his OAvner, and 
 the ass his master's crib ; but Israel doth not knoAv, my people doth 
 not consider." The mere cognition of phenomena is not knoAA"-- 
 ledge either of the thing or of mind; and although plienomena are 
 an essential condition of physical science, it is a gross blunder to 
 suppose Ave can get knowledge or science by an accumulation, 
 classification, and generalization of no-knoAvledge, wo-science. You 
 can not hang your coat on the shadoAV of a nail ; it will not sustain 
 it, try it as often as you please. From all Ave have said, it folloAvs 
 most manifestly that, as the thing exists only in its limitations as 
 we have seen, and as the limitations of nature are the limitations of 
 reason, physical science can only exist in this, — the reason becoming 
 self-conscious and recognizing itself in tohat is given in soisation. 
 This is a most difficult process, but it alone is Avorthy of humanity 
 and of our highest ambition ; the reason in becoming self-conscious 
 pulls down the "Avall of partition," and admits us into the Aery 
 presence of the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute. It alone can 
 make us free indeed, not by doing aAvay Avith the external laAv, but 
 by enabling us in our own spontaneity to fulfil the law; Avhich is the 
 object of all education, and should be of all human aspiration. 
 
 But, as we have seen, the mind can not get out of itself, and yet, 
 what has been giA'en in sensation you have throAvn from you and 
 already put in the thing, or rather, haA^e made it the thing. How 
 
17 
 
 are you to get it back into mind again, to enable tbe reason to re- 
 cognize itself in it? It is absolutely necessary, as you see, to get in 
 terms of the reasoning the limitations given first in sensation. The 
 only possibility left now for science, is for the reason to go out and 
 limit itself by the limitations of sense made olject. To illustrate : 
 suppose you wish to get a cast containing the limitations or form 
 of a given object; you first take an impression in plaster; you now 
 make it the object of which you take an impression in a given 
 metal ; you now have in metal the limitations of the original ob- 
 ject. So you first take an impression of nature in the terms of ex- 
 ternal sense, you now make this the object and take an impression 
 of it in terms of the reason. You now have, not science, but the 
 first condition of science; you have the object in terms of the rea- 
 son, — but the science is the reason coming to know and recognize 
 itself in this its own object. As the thing in itself exists in those 
 same limitations which you now have in terms of the reason, the 
 reason in knowing itself in its own object, knows the thing in itself. 
 The object of reason thus obtained is always an idea limited by its 
 opposite, — as we have already seen the "definitions" upon which 
 geometry is based consist of the idea Space limited by its opposite. 
 Now we see whence the definitions come, and understand clearly 
 what they are. We now have some insight, I think, back to where 
 science must begin, if it begin at all. The definitions upon which 
 geometry is based, are, in distinction from the objects of sense, ob- 
 jects of reason : they are ideal, not sensual. The words, point, line, 
 triangle, &c., are but signs to represent to the miderstanding the lim- 
 itations of the idea; consequently, when I say a triangle is a figure 
 bounded by three straight lines, I give only a verbal definition of the 
 Avord triangle; but the word defined is only a sign of the Conception. 
 So when I draw a triangle on the blackboard, the diagram is only a 
 sensual representation. The real, Avhich the verbal definition and 
 diagram represent, is the ideal object — the object of reason. There 
 are many who think they study mathematics, who never grasp the 
 real definitions, but only the shadow as given in sensations. All these 
 ever reach are forms and rules. When they get a little older and 
 dabble in philosophy, they tell us mathematics is based upon hy- 
 potheses and even absurdities ; for, say they, '•'■nothing can have 
 position which has neither length, breadth, nor thickness, as the 
 the mathematician predicates oi ^ point.'''' This only shows that 
 the objector himself does not see the point, and it is to be feared 
 he never will see it, because not given in sensation. 
 
 The science of mathematics, in all its various branches, from the 
 determining the product of two and two, to the highest achieve- 
 
18 
 
 ments of Newton or LaPlace, is constituted of the expressions of 
 the reason in the act of coming to know itself in the various limit- 
 ations of the idea Qi(cmtity. This definition follows from wliat has 
 already been sufficiently insisted upon, but I will try to make it 
 even more clear. The data of every mathematical problem must 
 limit the problem, or it can not be solved. This involves, if clearly 
 understood, the most that I have said to-night. Every standard 
 measure of real things must be given both in sensation and in rea- 
 son; that is, it must be both cognized in sensation and recognized 
 by the reason. For instance, Avhen I say a foot is one straight line 
 twelve inches long, here the straight line and numbers one and 
 twelve are recognized limitations of reason, whereas /bo^ and inch 
 are cognized limitations of objects. All the standard measures are 
 such as as are both cognized and recognized together, and hence 
 used Avith the least iiossible effort. But all which is necessary is 
 that the data should limit both the thing and the idea. Hence, on 
 the side of sensation I may use inch, foot, yard, pole, or any stand- 
 ard, provided I cognize it ; so on the side of reason I am not 
 restricted to straight line, but may use triangle, square, circle, &c., 
 &c., provided they can be both cognized and recognized. Hence 
 you see the application of the whole of mathematics to jjhysical 
 science in regard to its qiiantitativie determinations, Thoi;gh I 
 can not measure the height of a steeple with a straight line, a foot 
 stick, I can measure it with a triangle. Here the cognition and 
 recognition are not together, and apparently in the same act of 
 mind, as wdien a foot rule is used, since we can not recognize the 
 triangle in all its properties by a simple act of the reason. Hence, 
 when Ave get the base line, or one side of the triangle, in units of 
 feet, and the angles in units of degrees — all of AAiiich are both cog- 
 nized and recognized — Ave neglect for a time the side of sensation, 
 that the reason may recognize itself in the triangle; and Avhen Ave 
 thus recognize the other leg of the triangle in units — terms of the 
 reason — Ave then put back these units into feet from which Ave took 
 them, and noAV both cognize and recognize the height of the stee- 
 ple at once ; that is, Ave knoAV it. This is an illustration of every 
 application of mathematics to physical science. 
 
 But the different sciences may involve different ideas ; quantity 
 is not the only idea involved in the physical sciences. The ancient 
 Greeks did not, for obvious reasons, succeed in developing a science 
 of other ideas as they did of the idea quantity, and Avith us other 
 ideas have but little to do Avith assumed knowledge, Avith sci- 
 ence. We do not recognize the Platonic "Idea" as the A'ery 
 life of all science, of all knoAvledge and all success; and it is 
 
19 
 
 fashionable in these days to declare, both implicitly and expli- 
 citly, that the Organon of Bacon has superseded the Organon of 
 Aristotle. As both sensation and reason are essential to physical 
 science — the one to give the condition, the other the essence and 
 life — it is difficult to comprehend how the one can supersede the 
 other, except upon the assumption that reason is nonessential to 
 science. But if, as we have seen, science consists in the reason 
 knowing and recognizing itself, then this judgment can be but a 
 sign of ourselves, that sense has superseded reason in us ; — 
 
 " Doth the harmony 
 In the sweet lute-strings belong 
 To the purchaser, who, dull of ear, doth keep 
 The instrument? True, she hath bought the right 
 To strike it into fragments, — ^yet no art 
 To wake its silvery tones, and melt with bliss 
 Of thrilling song ! Truth to the wise exists, 
 And beauty for the feeling heart." 
 
 I now find that many points are left untouched Avhicli I intend- 
 ed to discuss, and which would be necessary to give unity to the 
 subject; but I find time will not i^ermit, and I must hasten to a 
 conclusion. Let me remark, however, that Axioms are but expres- 
 sions in terms of the understanding of the living-force of the rea- 
 son of each individual. How erroneous, therefore, is the definition 
 that an axiom is that which all men receive as absolutely true. An 
 axiom is an absolute and universal truth, but it may not be recog- 
 nized by all men. If I had sufficient energy of thought or living 
 force of self-conscious reason, the proposition that the square of the 
 hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two 
 sides of a right-angled triangle, would become an axiom ; but as I 
 have not this, and as the mind can not transcend itself, I have to 
 use the lever of method. But as all this is but the carrying out of 
 what has already been said, I need not dwell upon it. This living 
 energy of reason was so great in Plato, Shakspeare, and Goethe, 
 that they could lift greater weights directly than most men could 
 with all the appliances of levers and pullies. 
 
 We have seen that, as the mind can not get out of itself, (and 
 this j^osition is /»?plicitly admitted by all, though it may be ea'pli- 
 citly denied,) it can know only through a knowledge of itself. We 
 have seen that we can know physical nature even, only because 
 nature exists in its limitations, and these limitations are identical 
 with the limitations of mind or the laws of thought. And God being 
 Infinite Mind, in whose image we are created, the mind knows God 
 only in so far as it becomes self-conscious or knows itself " God 
 
20 
 
 is a Spirit, and tliey wlio worship Ilim must Avorship Ilini in spi- 
 rit and in truth." But we have seen, also, that the mind can know 
 itself only in self-conscious reason, and that reason hence is the 
 only criterion of truth. It is sad to reflect how little self-conscious 
 reason there is in the Avorld, in humanity. Tliough reason is the 
 only criterion of truth, and it alone can exalt us and free us, by en- 
 ablin<^ us to unite and cooperate with the Universal and Absolute, 
 yet, do Ave not see this our only hope condemned and ujibraided 
 even in the pulpit, driven from the state, and trampled doAvn and 
 spit upon by politics, and treated little better by science, so-called? 
 When this is gone, what have we left? Nothing but individual 
 tape-strings ! Oh, yes ! they all talk loudly about the " Higher 
 Law," and say "do right! do right!" And you ask them, what is 
 the Higher Law? what is right? — and they immediately and Avith 
 the most impudent assurance present their individual tape-strings, 
 and commence straightway measuring ! measuring! But by Avhat 
 authority are these stamped ? By the senses, the feelings, the j^as- 
 sions. But each individual has a diiferent standard stamped by 
 the same authority, except where what is called education induces 
 many to use the same string. And Avhat power is umpire in these 
 irrei>ressible conflicts tlius inevitably induced ? God is out of the 
 question, as reason has been dethroned, and nothing is left but 
 physical force. Hence fomily, political and religious discord and 
 strife — one tape-string in conflict Avith another ; no self-conscious 
 reason, no knowledge of the Absolute. If you direct your mind 
 through the Avhole range of human activities, you find labels ac- 
 cording to these tape-strings stuck on every thing — the most sa- 
 cred no less than secular. And this is called KnoAvledge ! Truth ! 
 Higher Law ! And Education, in all its various departments, is, 
 in the main, the drilling into the young these lifeless forms, these 
 shams, these midnight apparitions, these labels arranged in order 
 to suit the easy method of the sensational understanding. Oh! it 
 is sad to behold hoAV grossly humanity is engulfed into the senses. 
 "We boast that Ave are the lords of creation ; Avhich means, that Ave 
 can bridle the horse, and that Ave Avill ultimately exterminate the 
 lion : for, the spirit of liumanity is indicated, not in the question, 
 hoAV shall Ave use those gifts to us Avhich have not been A'ouchsafed 
 to beasts ? but rather, hoAV shall avc make up our deficit'in beastly 
 gifts? — "What shall we eat? Avhat shall avc drink? and Avhere- 
 Avithal shall we be clothed?" 
 
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