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WASHINGTON: () V K R N M E N T PRINTING OFFICE 1864. \ Al6 i^\u^ Vi ( LETTER THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRAxssnmxG The report of Major General George B. McClcIIan upon the organization of the Army of the Potomac, and its campaigns in Tlrginia and Maryland, from July 26, 1S61, to Xovember 7, 1S62. Ik the Senate op the Uxtted Slates, February 17, IStU. Resolved, That five thousand additional copies of the McClellan report, without accompa- nying maps aud documents, be printed for the use of the Senate. "War Department, Washington City, D. C, December 22, 1S63. Sir: In compliance with the re?olui.iou dated December 1.5, 1S63, I have the honor to communicate herewith " the report made by INfajor General Georgre. B. ^IcClellau, concerning the organization aud operations of the army of the Potomac while under hi? command, and of all ar:ny operations while he was commander-in-chief." I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, EDWIX M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Hon. Schuyler Colfax, Speaker of the House (f Representatives EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. REPORT. FIRST PERIOD. CHAPTER I. New York, Avgust 4, 1863. Sir : I have the honor to submit herein the official report of the operations of the army of the Potomac while under mj charge. Accompanying it are the reports of the corps, division, and subordinate commanders, pertaining to the various engagements, battles, and occurrences of the campaigns, and important documents connected with its organization, supply, and movements. These, with lists of maps and memoranda submitted, will be found appended, duly arranged, and marked for convenient reference. Charged, in the spring of 1861, with the operations in the department of the Ohio, which included the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and latterly Western Virginia, it had become my duty to counteract the hostile designs of the enemy in Western Virginia, which were immediately directed to the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the possession of the Kanawha valley, with the ultimate object of gaining Wheeling and the control of the Ohio river. The successful affairs of Phillippi, Rich Mountain, Carrick's Ford, &c., had been fought, and I had acquired possession of all Western Virginia north of the Kanawha valley, as well as of the lower portion of that valley. I had determined to proceed to the relief of the upper Kanawha valley, as soon as provision was made for the permanent defence of the mountain passes leading from the east into the region under control, when I received at Beverly, in Randolph county, on the 21st of July, 1861, intelligence of the unfortunate result of the battle of Manassas, fought on that day. On the 22d I received an order by telegraph, directing me to turn over my command to Brigadier General Rosecrans, and repair at once to Washington. I had already caused reconnoissances to be made for intrenchments at the Cheat Mountain pass ; also on the Hunterville road, near Elkwater, and at Red House, near the main road from Romney to Grafton. During the afternoon and night of the 22d I gave the liual instructions for tlie construction of these woHcs, turnefl over the command to P.rigadier General Rosecrans, and started, on the morning of the 23d, ft)r Washington, arriving there on the afternoon of the 26th! On the 27th I assumed command of the division of the Potomac, comprising tlie troops in and around Washington, on both banks of the river. VVitli this brief statement of the events wbicli immediately preceded my being called to the command of the troops at Washington,! proceed to an account, from sudi authentic data as are at hand, of my military operations while com- mander of the army of the I'otoniae. The sul.jccts to be considered naturally arrange themselves as follows: 'I'he organization of the army of the Potomac. The military events con- nectcd with the defences of Washington, from July, 1861, to March, 1862. The campaign on the Peninsula, and that in Maryland. The great n-sources and capacity for powerful resistance of the south at the breaking out of the relxllion, and the full proportions of the great conflict about to take place, were sought to be carefully measured ; and I Iwid also endeavored, by every means in my power, to impress upon the authorities the necessity for REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 6 such immediate and full preparation as alone would enable tlie government to prosecute the war on a scale commensurate with the resistance to be offered. On the fourth of August, 1861, I addressed to the President the following memorandum, prepared at his request : MEMORANDUM. The object of the present war differs from those in which nations are engaged, maiuly in this : that the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace, and make a treaty on advantageous terms ; in this contest it has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent and warlike to constitute •A nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our an- tagonists, especially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter im- possibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent battle, (Manassas,) it is possible that we might liave been spared the labor and expenses of a great effort. Now we have no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders of the rebels to convince the mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all their resources. The contest began with a class, now it is with a people — our military success can alone restore the former issue. By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as to private property and unarmed persons, and a lenient course as to private soldiers, we may well hope for a permanent restora- tion of a peaceful Union. But in the first instance the authority of the gov- ernment must be supported by overwhelming physical force. Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively demand that the military action of the government should be prompt and irresistible. The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field, and it seems proper for us to make the first great struggle there. But while thus directing our main efibrts, it is necessary to diminish the resistance there ofiered us, by movements on other points both by land and water. Without entering at present into details, I would advise that a strong move- ment be made on the Mississippi, and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri. As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially united witli us, I would advise a movement through tha^t State into Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that region and of seizing the rail- I'oads leading from Memphis to the east. The possession of those roads by us, in connexion with the movement on the Mississippi, would go far towards determining the evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. In the mean time all the passes into Western Virginia from the east should be securely guarded, but I would advise no movement from that quarter towards Richmond, unless the political condition of Kentucky renders it impossible or inexpedient for us to make the movement upon Eastern Ten- nessee through that State. Every effort should, however, be made to organize, equip and arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other operations. At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to protect and re-open the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be occupied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in our possession. The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg will be very materially diminished so soon as our forci; in this vicinity becomes organized, strong and efficient, because no capable general will cross the river north of this city, when we have a. strung army here ready to cut ofi' his retreat. 4 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. To revert to the west. It is probable that no very large additions to the troops now in Missouri will be necessary to secure that State. I presume that the force required for the movement down the Mississippi will be determined by its commander and the President. If Kentucky assumes the right position, not more than 20,000 will be needed, together with those that can be raised in that State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville. The Western Virginia troops, with not more than five to tcn'thousand from Ohio and Indiana, should, under proper management, suffice for its protection. When Ave have re-organized our main army here, 10,000 men ought to be enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Potomac, 5,000 will garrison Baltimore, ,3,000 Fort Monroe, and not more than 20,000 will be necessary at the utmost for the defence of Washington. For the main aimy of operations I urge the following composition : 250 regiments of infantry, say 225, 000 men. 100 field batteries, 600 guns 15, 000 " 28 regiments of cavalry 25, 500 " 5 regiments engineer troops 7, 500 " Total 273,000 " Tlie force must be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains, and with transportation for everything save tents. Its general line of opera- tions should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of from point to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong naval force to protect the movement of a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either creating diversions and rendering it necessary tor them to detach laro-ely from their main body in order to protect such of their cities as may bo threateiu'd, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast at any favorable places that opportunity might ofier. This naval force should also co-operate with the main army in its efforts to seize the important seaboard towns of the rebels. It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads hits introduced a new and very imjiortant element into war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular positions large masses of troops from remote sectiona, and by creating new strategic points and lines of operations. It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations suggested, and such others as the particular case may recjuire. We must endeavor to seize places on the railways in the rear of the enemy's points of concentration, and we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that each State may be forced, by the .necessity of its own delence, to diminish its contingent to the confederate army. The proposed movement down the Mississippi Avill produce important results in this connexion. Tliat advance and the progress of the main army at tlie east will materially assist each other by diminishing the resistance to bo encountered by each. Tlie tcndc ncy of the Mississij)pi movement U])on all questions connected with cotton is too well understood by the l^rcsident and cabinet to need any illustration from me. There is another indej)endent movement that lias often been suggested and which lias always recommended itself to my judgment. 1 rei'er to a movement I'rum Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian territory upon Red river EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 5 and western Texas for the purpose of protecting and developing the latent Union and free- State sentiment well known to predominate in western Texas, and which, like a similar sentiment in Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize that section into a free State. How far it will be possible to support this movement by an advance through New Mexico from California, is a matter which I have not sufficiently examined to be able to express a decided opinion. If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as Avell as identifying them with our cause and connecting the bond of Union between them and the general government. If it is not departing too far from my province, I will venture to suggest the policy of an ultimate alliance and cordial understanding with Mexico ; their eympathics and interests are with us — their antipathies exclusively against our enemies and their institutions. I think it would not be difficult to obtain from the Mexican government the right to use, at least during the present contest, the road from Guaymas to New Mexico; this concession Avould very materially reduce the obstacles of the column moving from the Pacific; a similar permis- sion to use their territory for the passage of troops between the Panuco and the Rio Grande would enable us to throw a column of troops by a good road from Tampico, or some of the small harbors north of it, upon and across the Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot. To what extent, if any, it would be desirable to take into service and employ Mexican soldiers, is a question entirely political, on which I do not venture to offer an opinion. The force I have recommended is large ; the expense is great. It is possible that a smaller force might accomplish the object in view, but I understand it to be the purpose of this great nation to re-establish the poAver of its government, and restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest possible time. The question to be decided is simply this : shall we crush the rehellion at one blow, terminate the war in one compaign, or shall we leave it as a legacy for our descendants'? When the extent of the possible line of operations is considered, the force asked for for the main army under my command cannot be regarded as unduly large ; every mile we advance carries us further from our base of operations and renders detachments necessary to cover our communications, while the enemy will be constantly concentrating as he falls back. I propose, with the force which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans; in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's coun- try and crush the rebellion in its very heart. By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, the difficulties of trans- portation will be materially diminished. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that, in addition to the forces named in this memorandum, strong reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur. In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of the treasury may bo lessened by making only partial payments to our troops, when in the enemy's country, and by giving the obligations of the United States for such supplier as may there be obtained. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major General. I do not think the events of the war have proved these views upon tho method and plans of its conduct altogether incorrect. They certainly have not proved my estimate of the number of troops and scope of operations too large. It is probable that I did underestimate the time necessary for the completion of ai-ms and equipments. It was not strange, however, that by many civilians 6 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. intrusted with authority there should have beeu an exactly opposite opinion held on both these particulars. The result of the first battle of Manassas had been almost to destroy the morale and organization of our army, and to alarm government and people. The national capital was in danger; it was necessary, besides holding the enemy in check, to build works for its defence, strong and capable of being held by a small force. It was necessary also to create a new army for active operations and to expedite its organization, equipment, and the accumulation of the material of war, and to this not inconsiderable labor all my energies for the next three months were constantly devoted. Time is a necessary element in the creation of armies, and I do not, therefore, think it necessary to more than mention the impatience with which many re- garded the delay in the arrival of new levies, though recruited and pressed forward with unexampled rapidity, the manufacture and supply of arms and equipments, or the vehemence with which an immediate advance upon the enemy's works directly in our front was urged by a patriotic but sanguine jjeople. The President, too, was anxious for the speedy employment of our army, and, although possessed of my plans through frequent conferences, desired a paper from me upon the condition of the forces under my command and the immediate measures to be taken to increase their efficiency. Accoi-dingly, in the latter part of October I addressed the fullowing letter to the Secretary of War: Sir : In conformity with a personal imderstanding with the President yes- terday, I have the honor to submit the following statement of the condition of the army under my command, and the measures required for the preservation of the government and the suppression of the rebellion. It will be remembered that in a memorial I had the honor to address to the President soon after my arrival in Washington, and in my communication addressed to Lieutenant General Scott, under date of 8th of August; in my letter to the President authorizing him, at his request, to withdraw the letter ■written by me to General Scott; and in my letter of the 8th of September, an- Bwering your note of inquiry of that date, my views on the same subject are frankly aiul fully expressed. In tliese several communications I have stated the force I regarded as neces- sary to enable this army to advance with a reasonable certainty of success, at the same time leaving the capital and the line of the Potomac sufficiently guarded, not only to secure the retreat of the main army, in the event of disaster, but to render it out of the enemy's power to attempt a diversion in Maryland. So much time has passed, and the winter is a])proaching so rapidly, that but two courses are left to the government, viz., eitlier to go into winter quarters, or to assume the offensive with forces greatly inferior in numbers to the army I regarded as desirable and necessary. If political considerations render the first course iniadvisable, the second alone remains. AVhile I regret that it has not been deemed expedient, or perhaps possible, to concentrate the forces of the nation in this vicinity, (remaining on tlie defensive elsewhere,) keeping tho attention and efforts of the government fixed n[)()n this as the vital point, where the issu(; of the great contest is to be decided, it may still \w that, by introducing unity of action and dc^sign among the various armies of the land, by deter- mining the c<»urses to be pursued by the various connnanders under one general plan, transferring from tlie other armies the, superfiuous strength not required for the purpose in vi(!W, and thus re-enforcing tliis main army, whose destiny it is to decide the controversy, we may yet be able to move with a reasonable prospect of success before the winter is ftvirly upon us. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 7 The nation feels, and I share that feeling, that the army of the Potomac holds the fate of the country in its hands. The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, and the effect of the next battle will be so important throughout the future, as well as the present, that I con- tinue to urge, as I have ever done since I entered upon the .command of this army, upon the government to devote its energies and its available resources to- wards increasing the numbers and efficiency of the army on which its salvation depends. A statement, carefully prepared by the chiefs of engineers and artillery of this army, gives us the necessary garrison of this city and its fortifications, 33,795 men— say 35,000. The present garrison of Baltimore and its dependencies is about 10,000. I have sent the chief of my staff to make a careful examination into the condition of these troops, and to obtain the information requisite to enable me to decide whether this number can be diminished, or the reverse. At least 5,000 men will be required to watch the river hence to Harper's Ferry and its vicinity ; probably 8,000 to guard the lower Potomac. As you are aware, all the information we have from spies, prisoners, &c., agrees in showing that the enem}'' have a force on the Potomac not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly in- trenched. It is plain, therefore, that to insure success, or to render it reasona- bly certain, the active army should not number less than 150,000 efficient troops, with 400 guns, unless some material change occurs in the force in front of us. The requisite force for an advance movement by the army of the Potomac may be thus estimated : Column of active operations 150,000 men, 400 guns. Garrison of the city of Washington 35,000 " 40 " To guard the Potomac to Harper's Ferry 5,000 " 12 " To guard the lower Potomac 8,000 " 24 " Gai'rison for Baltimore and Annapolis 10,000 " 12 " Total effective force required 208,000 men, 488 guns, or an aggregate, -present and absent, of about 240,000 men, should the losses by sickness, &c., not rise to a higher per-centage than at present. Having stated what I regard as the requisite force to enable this army to advance, I now proceed to give the actual strength of the army of the Potomac. The aggregate strength of the army of the Potomac, by the official report on the morning of the 27th instant, was 168,318 officers and men, of all grades and arms. This includes the troops at Baltimore and Annapolis, on the upper and lower Potomac, the sick, absent, &c. The force present for duty was 147,695. Of this number, 4,268 cavalry were completely unarmed, 3,163 cavalry only partially armed, 5,979 infantry unequipped, making 13,410 imfit for the field, (irrespective of those not yet sufficiently drilled,) and reducing the effective force to 134,285, and the number disposable for an advance to 76,285. The infantry regiments are, to a consid- erable extent, armed with unserviceable weapons. Quite a large number of good arms, which had been intended for this army, were ordered elsewhere, leaving the army of the Potomac insufficiently, and, in some cases, badly armed. On the 30th of September there were with this army 228 field guns ready for the field; so far as arms and equipments are concerned, some of the batte- ries are still quite raw, and unfit to go into action. I have intelligence that eight New York batteries are en route hither; two others are ready for the field. I will still (if the New York batteries have six guns each) be 112 guns short of the number required for the active column, saying nothing, for the present, of 8 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. those necessary for the garrisons and corps on the Potomac, which would make a total deficiency of 200 guns. I have tlius briefly stated our present condition and wants ; it remains to sug- gest the means of supplying the deficiencies. First, that all the cavalry and infantry arms, as fast as procured, whether manufactured in this country or purchased abroad, be sent to this army until is fully prepared for the field. Second, that the two companies of the fourth artillery, now understood to be en route from Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, be ordered to this army, to be mounted at once; also, that the companies of the third artillery, en route from California, be sent here. Had not the order for Smead's battery to come here from Harrisburg, to replace the battery I gave General Sherman, been so often countermanded, I would again ask for it. Third, that a more effective regulation may be made authorizing the transfer of men from the volunteers to the regular batteries, infantry and cavalry; that we may make the best possible use of the invaluable regular " skeletons." Fourth, I have no official information as to the United States forces elsewhere, but, from the best information I can obtain from the War Department and other sources, I am led to believe that the United States troops are : In Western Virginia, about 30,000 In Kentucky 40,000 In Missouri 80,000 In Fortress Monroe 1 1,000 Total 161,000 Besides these, I am informed that more than 100,000 are in progress of or- ganization in other northern and western States. I would therefore recommend that, not interfering with Kentucky, there should be retained in Western Virginia and Missouri a sufficient force for de- fensive purposes, and that the surplus troops be sent to the army of the Poto- mac, to enable it to assume the oftensive ; that the same course be pursued in respect to Fortress Monroe, and that no further outside expeditions be attempted until we have fought the great battle in front of us. Fifth, that every nerve be strained to hasten the enrolment, organization and aiTOament of new batteries and regiments of infantry. Sixth, that all the battalions now raised for new regiments of regular infantry be at once ordercid to this army, and that the old infantry and cavalry en route from California be ordered to this army immediately on their arrival in New York. 1 have thus indicated, in a general manner, the objects to be accomplished, and the means by which we may gain our ends. A vigorous employment of these means will, in my opinion, enable the army of the Potomac to assume successfully this season the offensive operations which, ever since entering upon tlie command, it has been my anxious desire and diligent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance should nut be post- poned beyond the 2r>th of November, if possible to avoid it. Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action are indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped as a whole, and not in detached parts. One plan should be agreed upon and pursued ; a single will should direct and carry out these plans. The great object to be accomplished, the crushing defeat of the rebel army (now) at Manassas, should never i'or one instant be lost sight of, but all the in- tellect and means and men of the government poured upon that point. The loyal States possess ample force to effect all this and more. The rebels have REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 9 displayed energy, unanimity, and wisdom "worthy of the most desperate days of the French revolution. Should we do less ? The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. When the task is accomplished, I shall be glad to return to the obscurity from which events have drawn me. Whatever the determination of the government may be, I will do the best I can with the army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. Permit me to add that, on this occasion as heretofore, it has been my aim neither to exaggerate nor underrate the power of the enemy, nor fail to express clearly the means by which, in my judgment, that power may be broken. Urging the energy of preparation and action, which has ever been my choice, but with the fixed purpose by no act of mine to expose the government to hazard by premature movement, and requesting that this communication may be laid before the President, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General. Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. When I assumed command in Washington, on the 27th of July, 1861, the number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of thirty pieces. On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organization of General McDowell still existed, and the troops were stationed at and in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyon, Roach's Mills, Cole's Mills, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment at the Theologi- cal Seminary. There were no troops south of Hunting creek, and many of the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac, seldom in the best positions for defence, and entirely inadequate in numbers and condition to de- fend the long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. On the Maryland side of the river, upon the heights overlooking the Chain bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose commanders were independent of each other. There were no troops on the important Tenallytown road, or on the roads entering the city from the south. The camps were located without regard to purposes of defence or instruction, the roads were not picketed, and there was no attempt at an organization into brigades. In no quarter were the dispositions for 'defence such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, either in the position and num- bers of the troops, or the number and character of the defensive works. Earth- works, in the nature oi tctes de jjont, looked upon the approaches to the George- town aqueduct and ferry, the Long bridge and Alexandria, by the Little river turnpike, and some simple defensive arrangements were made at the Chain bridge. With the latter exception not a single defensive work had been com- 'menced on the Maryland side. There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resist- ance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded with straggling ofiicers and men, absent from their stations without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organization. 10 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. I at once designated an efficient stiff, afterwards adding to it as opportunity was afforded and necessity required, who zealously co-operated Avith me in the labor of bringing order out of confusion, re-assigning troops and commands, pro- jecting and throwing up defensive works, receiving and organizing, equipping and providing for the new levies arriving in the city. The valuable services of these officers in their various departments, during this and throughout the sixbsequent periods of the history of the army of the Potomac, can hardly be sufficiently appreciated. Their names and duties will be given in another part of this report, and they are commended to the favorable notice of the War Department. The restoration of order in the city of Washington was effected through the appointment of a pi'ovost marshal, whose authority was supported by the fcAv regular troops within my command. These troops were thus in position to act as a reserve, to be sent to any point of attack where their services might be most wanted. The energy and ability displayed by Colonel A. Porter, the provost marshal, and his assistants, and the strict discharge of their duty by the troops, produced the best results, and Washington soon became one of the most quiet cities in the Union. The new levies of infantry, upon arriving in Washington, were fonned into provisional brigades and placed in camp in the suburbs of the city for equip- ment, instruction, and discipline. As soon as regiments were in a fit condition for transfer to the forces across the Potomac, they were assigned to the brigades serving there. Brigadier General F. J. Porter was at first assigned to the charge of the provisional brigades. Brigadier General A. E. Burnside was the next officer assigned this duty, from which, however, he was soon relieved by Brigadier General S. Casey, who continued in charge of the newly arriving regi- ments until the army of the Potomac departed for the Peninsula, in March, 1862. The newly arriving artillery troops reported to Brigadier General William F. Barry, the chief of artillery, and the cavalry to Brigadier General George Stone- man, the chief of cavalry. By the 15th of October, the number of troops in and about Washington, in- clusive of the garrison of the city and Alexandria, the city guard and the forces on the Maryland shore of the Potomac below Washington, and as far as Cum- berland above, the troops under the command of General Dix at Baltimore and its dependencies, were as follows : Total present for duty 133, 201 " sick 9,290 " in confinement 1, 156 Aggregate present 143, 647 absent 8, 404 Grand aggregate .- 152, 051 The following table exhibits similar data for the periods stated, including tho troops in ^'\Iaryland and Delaware : Date. DoccmIxT 1. irei Jiiiiuury 1, IHfia F)1,480 190, 80G 193, 142 Sick. 15, 103 14, 790 14, :»;:} 13, l(i7 In confine- meut. 2,189 2, 'J(iO 2,917 2,108 Absent. 11 470 11 7;)7 14 110 13, 570 Total prpcvut and abiieut. 198,213 219, 7it7 222, 196 221, 9B7 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 11 For convenience of reference the strength of the army of the Potomac at subsequent periods is given. Present. Absent. Data. For duty. Sick. In arrest or con- finement. bo < o .a S . •cl Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. n AprU 30 June 20 July 10 4,725 4, 665 3,834 104, 610 101, 160 85, 715 233 496 685 5,385 10, 541 15, 959 41 44 60 3.56 320 213 115, 3.50 117, 226 106, 466 11, 0.37 27, 700 34, 638 """887' 3, 782 *126, 387 tl45, 8L3 1 144, 886 * Including Franklin. t Including McCall and Dix. J Including two brigades of Shiel's division absent, 5,354 men. In organizing the army of the Potomac, and preparing it for the field, the first step taken was to organize the infantry into brigades of four regiments each ; retaining the newly arrived regiments on the Maryland side until their armament and equipment were issued and they had obtained some little ele- mentary instruction, before assigning them permanently to brigades. When the organization of the brigades was well established, and the troops somewhat disciplined and instructed, divisions of three brigades each were gradually formed, as is elsewhere stated in this report, although I was always in favor of the organization into army corps as an abstract principle. I did not desire t<^> form them until the army had been for some little time in the field, in order to enable the general offices first to acquire the requisite experience as division commanders on active service, and that I might be able to decide from actual trial who were best fitted to exercise these important commands. For a similar reason I carefully abstained from making any recommendationa for the promotion of officers to the grade of major general. When ncAv batteries of artillery arrived they also were retained in Washing- ton until their armament and equipment were completed, and their instruction sufficiently advanced to justify their being assigned to divisions. The same course was pursued in regard to cavalry. I regret that circumstances have de- layed the chief of cavalry, General George Stoneman, in furnishing his report upon the organization of that ami of service. It will, however, be forwarded as soon as completed, and will, doubtless, show that the difficult and important duties intrusted to him were efficiently performed. He encountered and over- came, as far as it was possible, continual and vexatious obstacles arising from the great deficiency of cavalry arms and equipments, and the entire inefficiency of many of the regimental officers first appointed ; this last difficulty was, to a considerable extent, overcome in the cavalry, as well as in the infantry and ar- tillery, by the continual and prompt action of courts-martial and boards of ex- amination. As rapidly as circumstances permitted, every cavalry soldier Avas armed with a sabre and revolver, and at least two squadrons in every regiment with car- bines. It was intended to assign at least one regiment of cavalry to each division of the active army, besides forming a cavalry reserve of the regular regiments and some picked regiments of volunter cavalry. Circumstances beyond my control rendered it impossible to carry out this intention fully, and the cavalry force serving with the army in the field was never as large as it ought to have been. It was determined to collect the regular infantry to form the nucleus of a re- serve. The advantage of such a body of troops at a critical moment, especially in an army constituted mainly of new levies, imperfectly disciplined, has been 12 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. frequently illustrated in military history, and was brought to the attention of the country at the first battle of Manassas. I have not been disappointed in the estimate formed of the value of these troops. I have always found them to be relied on. Whenever they have been brought under fire they have shown the utmost gallantry and tenacity. The regular infantry, which had been col- lected from distant posts and which had been recruited as rapidly as the slow progress of recruiting for the regular service would allow, added to the small battalion with McDowell's army, which I found at Washington on my arrival, amounted, on the 30th of August, to 1,040 men; on the 28th of February, 1862, to 2,682, and on the 30th of April, to 4,603. On the 17th of May, 1862, they were assigned to General Porter's corps for organization as a division, with the fifth regiment New York volunteers, which joined May 4, and the tenth New York volunteers, which joined subsequently. They remained from the com- mencement under the command of Brigadier General George Sykes, major third infantry United States army. ARTILLERY. The creation of an adequate artillery establishment for an army of so large proportions was a formidable undertaking; and had it not been that the country possessed in the regular service a body of accomplished and energetic artillery officers, the task would have been almost hopeless. The charge of organizing this most important arm was confided to Major (afterwards Brigadier General) William F. Barry, chief of artill3ry, whose in- dustry and zeal achieved the best results. The report of General Barry is ap- pended among the accompanying documents. By referring to it, it will be ob- served that the following principles were adopted as the basis of organization : " 1. That the proportion of artillery should be in the proportion of at least two and one-half pieces to 1,000 men, to be expanded, if possible, to three pieces to 1,000 men. *' 2. That the proportion of rifled guns should be restricted to the system of the United States ordnance department ; and of Parrott and the 'smooth bores ' (with the exception of a few howitzers for special service) to be exclusively the twelve-pounder gun, of the model of 1857, variously called the ' gun-howitzer,' the ' light twelve-pounder,' or the ' Napoleon.' " 3. That each field battery should, if practicable, be composed of six guns, and none to be less than four guns, and in all cases the guns of each battery should be of uniform calibre. " 4. That the field batteries were to be assigned to divisions, and not to brigades, and in the proportion of four to each division, of which one was to be a battery of regulars, the rcraai!ul(>r of volunteers, the captain of the regular battery to be the commandant of artillery of the division, [n the event of sev- eral divisions constituting an army corps, at least one-half of the divisional ar- tilh'iy was to constitute the resiu've artillery of the corps. " 5. That the artillery reserve of the whole army should consist of one hun- dred guns, and should comprise, besides a sufficient number of light 'mounted batteries,' all the guns of position, and until the cavalry were massed, all the horse artillery. "6. That the amount of ammunition to accompany field batteries was not to be less than four hundred rounds per gun. " 7. A siege train of fifiy pieces. This was subsequently expanded, for special service at the siege of Yorktowii, to very nearly one hundred pieces, and com- prised the luuisual calibres and enormously heavy weight of metal of two 200-pounders, five 100-pounders, and ten 13-inch sea-coast mortars." vVs has been before stated, the chief of artillery reports the whole of the field artillery oi' the army of the Potomac, July 28, 1861, was comprised of nine im- EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 13 perfectly equipped batteries, of thirty guns, 650 men, and 400 horses, lu March, 18C2, when the wliole army took the fiehl, it consisted of ninety-two batteries, of 520 guns, 12,500 men, and 11,000 horses, fully equipped and in readiness for active field service; of the whole force thirty batteries were regulars, and sixty-two batteries volunteers. During the short period of seven months, all of this immense amount of material was issued by the ordnance department and placed in the hands of the artillery troops after their arrival in Washington. About one-fourth of all the volunteer batteries brought with them from their respective States a few guns and carriages, but they were nearly all of such pe- culiar calibre as to lack uniformity with the more modern and more serviceable ordnance with which the other batteries were armed, and they therefore had to be withdrawn and replaced by more suitable material. While about one-sixth came supplied with horses and harness, less than one-tenth were apparently fully equipped for service when they reported; and every one of these required the supply of many deficiencies of material, and very extensive instruction in the theory and practice of their special arm. The operations on the Peninsula by the army of the Potomac commenced with a full field artillery force of fifty-two batteries of two hundred and ninety- nine guns. To this must be added the field artillery of Franklin's division of McDowell's corps, which joined a few days before the capture of Yorktowu, but was not disembarked from its transports for service until after the battle of Williamsburg, and the field artillery of McCall's division of McDowell's corps, (four batteries, twenty-two guns,) which joined in Jtue, a few days before the battle of Mechanicsville, (June 26, 1862,) making a grand total of field artillery, at any time with the army of the Peninsula, of sixty batteries of three hundred and forty-three guns. With this large force, saving in six corps d'arm(;e of eleven divisions, and the artillery reserve, the only general and field officers were one brigadier general, four colonels, three lieutenant colonels, and three majors, a number obviously insufiicient, and which impaired to a great degree, in conse- quence of the want of rank and official influence of the commanders of corps and division artillery, the efficiency of the arm. As this faulty organization can be suitably corrected only by legislative action, it is earnestly hoped that the at- tention of the proper authorities may be at an early day invited to it. When there were so many newly organized volunteer field batteries, many of whom received their first and only instruction in the intrenched camps covering Washington during the three or four inclement months of the winter of 1861— '62, there was, of course, much to be improved. Many of the volunteer batteries, however, evinced such zeal and intelligence, and availed themselves so indus- triously of the instructions of the regular officers, their commanders, and the ex- ample of the regular batteries, their associates, that they made rapid progress, and attained a degree of proficiency highly creditable. Tlie designations of the different batteries of artillery, both regular and vol- unteer, follow within a few pages. The following distribution of regiments and batteries was made, as a prelim- inary organization of the forces at hand, shortly after my arrival in Washington. The infantry, artillery, and cavalry, as fiist as collected and brought into primary organization, were assigned to brigades and divisions, as indicated in the sub- joined statements. Organization of the division of the Potomac, Avgu>t 4, 1861. 'Brigadier General Hunter's brigade. — 23d, 25th, 35th, and 37th regiments New York volunteers. Brigadier General Heintzelman's brigade. — 5th regiment Maine volunteers, 16th, 26th, and 27th regiments New York volunteers, and Tidball's battery, (A,) 2d United States artillery. 14 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. Brigadier Geiieral W. T. Sherman's hrigade. — 9tli and 14th regiments Massachusetts volunteers, DeKalb regiment New York vohmteers, 4th regiment Michigan vohinteors, Hamilton's battery, (E,) 3d United States artillery, and company T, 2d United States cavalry. Brigadier General Kearney's brigade. — 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments New Jersey volunteers, Green's battery, (G,) 2d United States artillery, and com- pany G, 2d United States cavalry. Brigadier General Hooker's brigade. — 1st and 11th regiments Massachusetts volunteers, 2d regiment New Hampshire volunteers, and 26th regiment Pennsyl- vania volunteers. Colonel Kei/s's brigade. — 22d, 24th, and 30th regiments New York volun- teers, and 14th regiment New York State militia. Brigadier General Franklin's brigade. — 15th, 18th, 31st, and 32d regiments New York volunteers, Piatt's battery, (M,) 2d United States artillery, and company C, Nenv York (Lincoln) cavahy. Colonel Blender's hrigade. — Sth and 27th regiments New York volunteers, 27th regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, and Garibaldi guard. New York vol- unteers. Colonel RicJiardson' s brigade. — 12th regiment New York volunteers, and 2d and 3d regiments Michigan volunteers. Brigadier General Stone's brigade. — 34th and Tammany regiments New York volunteers, 1st regiment Minnesota volunteers, and 2d regiment New York State militia. Colonel iVilliam F. Smith's brigade. — 2d and 3d regiments Vermont volun- teers, 6th regiment Maine volunteers, 33d regiment New York A'olunteers, com- pany H, 2d United States cavalry, and Captain Mott's New York battery. Colonel CoMcii's brigade. — 2d regiment Rhode Island volunteers, 7th and 10th regiments Massachusetts volunteers, and 36th regiment New York volunteers. The 2d regiment Maine, the 2d regiment Wisconsin, and the 13th regiment New York volunteers, stationed at Fort Corcoran. The 21st regiment New York volunteers, stationed at Fort Eunyon. The 17th regiment New York volunteers, stationed at Fort Ellsworth. By October the new levies had arrived in sufficient numbers, and the process of organization so far carried on that the construction of divisions had been ef- fected. The following statement exhibits the composition of the army, October 15, 1861. Organization of the army of the Folomac, October 15, 1861. 1. Brigadier General George Stoneman's cavalry command. — Sth United States cavalry, 4th I'ennsylvania cavalry, Oneida cavalry, (one company,) 11th Pennsylvania cavalry, (Harlan's,) and Barker's Illinois cavalry, (one company.) 2. Colonel II. J. Hunt's artillery reserve. — Batteries L, A, and B, 2d United States artillery, batteries K and F, 3d ITnited States artillery, battery K, 4th United States artillery, battery H, 1st United States artillery, and battery A, 6th United States artilleiy. 3. CITY GUARD, niUGADIKU (^K.N'ERAL ANDREW PORTER. Cavalry. — Comj)anies A and E, 4th United States cavalry. Artillery. — Battery K, 5lh United States artillery. I/fanfry. — 2d and 3d battalions United States infantry, Sth and lat compa- nies United States infantry, and Sturgid'a rifles, (Illiuoia volunteers.) EEPORT OF GEMERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 15 4. BANKS'S DIVISION. Cavalry. — Four companies 3d regiment New York cavalry, (Van Allen's.) Artillery. — Best's battery E, 4th United States artillery, detachment 9th New- York artillery, Matthews's battery E, 1st Pennsylvania artillery, Tompkins's battery A, 1st Rhode Island artillery. Infantry. — Abercrombie's brigade : 12th Massachusetts, 12th and 16th In- diana, and 30th Pennsylvania volunteers. Stiles's brigade : 3d Wisconsin, 29th Pennsylvania, and 13th Massachusetts volunteers, and 9th New York State militia. Gordon's brigade : 2d Massachusetts, 2Sth and 19th New York, 5th Connecticut, 46th and 28th Pennsylvania, and 1st Maryland volunteers. m'dowell's division. Cavalry. — 2d New York cavalry, (Harris's Light,) Colonel Davis. Artillery. — Battery M, 2d, and battery G, 1st United States artillery. Infantry. — Keys's brigade : 14th New York State militia, and 22d, 24th, and 30th New York volunteers. Wadsworth's brigade : 12th, 21st, 23d, and 35th New York volunteers. King's brigade : 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th Indiana volunteers. hkintzelman's division. Cavalry. — 1st New Jersey cavalry. Colonel Halsted. Artillery. — Thompson's battery, C, United States artillery. Infantry. — Richardson's brigade : 2d, 3d, and 5th Michigan, and 37th New York volunteers. Sedgwick's brigade : 3d and 4th Maine, and 3Sth and 40th New York volunteers. Jameson's brigade : 32d, 63d, 61st, and 45th Penn- sylvania volunteers, and Wild Cat reserves, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) F. J. porter's division. Cavalry. — 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, Colonel Averill, and 8th Pennsylvania cavalry. Colonel Gregg. Artillery. — Battery E, 2d, and battery *E, 3d United States artillery. Infantry. — Morell's brigade : 33d Pennsylvania, 4th Michigan, 9th Massa- chusetts, and 4th New York volunteers. Martindale's brigade : 13th New York, 2d Maine, and 18th Massachusetts volunteers, and DcKalb regiment New York volunteers. Butterfield's brigade : 50th New York, 83d Pennsylvania, (Colonel McLean,) 17th and 25th New York volunteers, and Stockton's inde- pendent Michigan regiment. franklin's division. Cavalry. — 1st New York cavalry. Colonel McReynolds. Artillery. — Batteries D and G, 2d United States artillery, and Hexamer's battery, (New Jersey volunteers.) Infantry. — Kearney's brigade: 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th New Jersey volunteers. Slocum's brigade : 16th, 26th, and 27th New York, and 6tli Maine volunteeris. Newton's brigade : 15th, 18th, 31st, and 32d New York volunteers. stone's division. Cavalry. — Six companies 3d New York (Van Allen) cavalry. Artillery. — Kirby's battery I, Ist United States, Vaughn's battery B, 1st Rhode Island artillery, and Bunting's 6th New York iudepcnident battery. Infantry. — Gorman's brigade : 2d New York State militia, 1st Minnesota, * This battery was transferred to Sherman's expedition. 16 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 15th Massachusetts, and 34th New York volunteers, and Tammany regiment, (New York volunteers.) Lander's brigade : 19th and 20th Massachusetts, and 7th JMichigan volunteers, and a company of Massachusetts sharpshooters. Baier's brigade: Pennsylvania volunteers, (1st, 2d, and 3d California.) buell's divisioiv. Artillery. — Batteries D and H, 1st Pennsylvania artillery. Infantry. — Couch's brigade: 2d Rhode Island, 7th and 10th Massachusetts, and 36th New York volunteers. Graham's brigade : 23d and 31st Pennsyl- vania, and 67th (1st Long Island) and 65th (1st United States chasseurs) New- York volunteers. Peck's brigade : 13th and 21st Pennsylvania, and 62d (Anderson Zouaves) and 55th New York volunteers. m'call's division. Cavalry. — 1st Pennsylvania reserve cavalry, Colonel Bayard. Arlillcry. — Easton's battery A, Cooper's battery B, and Kein's battery G, Ist Pennsylvania artillery. Infantry. — Meade's brigade : 1st rifles Pennsylvania reserves, 4th, 3d, 7th, 11th, and 2d Pennsylvania reserve infantry. brigade : 5th, 1st, and 8th Pennsylvania reserve infantry. brigade : 10th, 6th, 9th, and 12th Pennsylvania reserve infantry. hooker's division. Cavalry. — Eight companies 3d Indiana cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Carter. Artillery. — Elder's battery E, 1st United States artillery. Infantry. brigade: 1st and 11th Massachusetts, 2d New Hamp- ehire, 26th Pennsylvania, and 1st Michigan volunteers. Sickles's brigade : 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5lh regiments Excelsior brigade. New York volunteers. blenker's brigade. Cavalry.— 'Ath. New York cavalry, (mounted rifles,) Colonel Dickel. Artillery. — One battery. Infantry. — 8th and 29th New York, 27th and 35th Pennsylvania volunteers. Garibaldi guard and Cameron rifles, (New York volunteers.) smith's division. Cavalry. — 5th Pennsylvania cavalry, (Cameron dragoons,) Colonel Friedman. Artillery. — Ayres's battery F, 5th United States artillery, Mott's 2d New York iiulfpeiideut battery, and Barr's battery E, 1st Pennsylvania artillery. Infantry. brigade : 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Vermont volunteers. Stevens's brigade : 35th and 49Lh New York and 6th IMaine volunteers, and *79th Now York State militia. Hancock's brigade: *47th and 49th Pennsyl- vania, 43d New York, and 5th Wisconsin volunteers. Companies B and E, Berden's sharpshooters. Casey's prorisional brigades. — 5th, 6th, and 7lli New Jersey volunteers, •Round-IIcad regiment, (Pennsylvania volunteers,) battalion District of Colum- bia volunteers, 4Uth I'ennsylvania, 8lli New Jersey, and 4th New Hampshire volunteers. * The 79th Now York State militia, the 47tli Pennsylvania volunteers, and the Koimd-Head regiment, were transferred to General yherman'a ex^ieditiou. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN, 17 5. Garrison of Alexandria. — Brigadier General Montgomery, military gov- ernor. Cameron gnard, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) Garrison of Fort Albany. — 14th Massacliusctts volunteers. Garrison of Fort Richardson. — 4t]i Connecticut volunteers. Garrison of Fort Washington. — Company D, L^t United States artillery, companies H and I, 37tli New York voluoteers, and United States recruits unassigned. 6. DIX'S DIVISION, BALTIMOnU. Cavalry. — Company of Pennsylvania cavalry. Artillery. — Battery I, 2d United States artillery, 2d Massacluisetts light battery, and a battery of New York artillery. Infantry. — 3d, 4tli, B appear to be advancing there under Baker. The left, under Gorman, has advanced its skirmishers nearly one mile, and, if the movement continues successful, will turn the enemy's right. " C. P. STONE, '^ Brigadier General. " Major General McClellan." " Edwards's Ferry, October 21, 1861 — i p. ??i. "Nearly all my force is across the river. Baker on the right; Goiman on the left. Right, sharply engaged. " C. P. STONE, "Brigadier General. " General McClellan. " "Edwards's Ferry, Ortober 21, 1861 — 9.30 />. m. " I am occupied in preventing further disaster, and try to get into a position to redeem. We have lost some of our best commanders — Baker dead, Cogs- well a prisoner or secreted. The wounded are being carefully and rapidly re- moved ; and Gorman's wing is being cautiously withdrawn. Any advance from Drainsville mvist be made cautiously. H. Ex. Doc. 15 3 <34 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. " All was reported going well up to Baker's death, but, iu tlie confusion fol- lowing that, the right wing was outflanked. In a few hours I shall, unless a night attack is made, be in the same position as last niglit, save the loss of many good men. "C. P. STONE, " Brigadier General. "Major General McClellan." Although no more fully informed of the state of affairs, I had, during the afternoon, as a precautionary measure, ordered General Banks to send one brigade to the support of the troops at Harrison's island, and to move with the other two to Seneca mills, ready to support General Stone if necessary. The 9.30 p. m. despatch of General Stone did not give me an entire understanding of the state of the case. Aware of the difficulties and perhaps fatal consequences of recrossing such a river as the Potomac after a repulse, and from these telegrams supposing his whole force to be on the Virginia side, I directed General Stone to intrench himself, and hold the Virginia side at all hazards until re-enforcements could arrive, when he could safely withdraw to the Maryland side, or hold his po- sition on the Virginia side, slaould that prove advisable. General Banks was instructed to move the rest of his division to Edwards's ferry, and to send over as many men as possible before daylight to re-enforce Stone. He did not arrive in time to effect this, and was instructed to collect all the canal-boats he could find, and use them for crossing at Edwards's ferry in sufficient force to enable the troops already there to hold the opposite side. On the 22d I went to the ground in person, and reaching Poolsville, learned for the first time the full details of the affair. The following extract from the evidence of General Stone before the "Com- mittee on the Conduct of the War" on the 5th of January, 1862, will throw further light on this occurrence. General Stone says he received the order from my headquarters to make a slight demonstration at about 11 o'clock a. m. on the 20th, and that, in obedience to that order, he made the demonstration on the evening of the same day. In regard to the reconnoissance on the 21st, which resulted in the battle of Ball's Bluff, he was asked the following questions : Question. "Did this reconnoissance originate with yourself, or had you orders from the general-in-chief to make it V To which he replied, "It originated with myself — the reconnoissance." Question. " The order did not proceed from General McClellan ?" Answer. " I Avas directed the day before to make a demonstration ; that demonstration was made the day previous." Questif)n. " Did you receive an order from the gencral-in-chief to make the reconnoissance V Answer. " No, sir," Making a personal examination on the 23d, I found that the position on the Vii'ginia side at Edwards's feriy was not a tenable one, but did not think it wise to withdraw the troops by daylight. I therefore caused more artillery to be placed in position on th(; Maryland side to cover the approaches to the ground held by us, and crossed the few additional troops that the high wind permitted us to get over, so as to be as secure as possible against any attack (luring the day. Before nightfall all the precautious were taken to secure an orderly and quiet passage of the troops and guns. 'I'he movement was commenced soon afrer dark, under the personal super- vih^ion of General Stone, who received the order for the Avithdrawal at 7.15 p. m. By 4 a. m. of the 24th (iverything had reached the Maryland shore in safety. A few duv8 afterwards 1 received information which seemed to be authentic, to REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE 15. M CLELLAN. dO the effect that large bodies of the enemy had been ordered from Manassas to Leesburg, to cut off our troops on the Virginia side. Their timely withdrawal had probably prevented a still more serious disaster. I refer to General Stone's report of this battle, furnished the War Depart- ment, and his published testimony before the " Committee on the Conduct of the War," for further details. The records of the War Department show my anxiety and efforts to assume active offensive operations in the fjill and early winter. It is only just to say, however, that the unprecedented condition of the roads and Virginia soil would have delayed an advance till February, had the discipline, organization, and equipment of the army been as complete at the close of the fall as was necessary, and as I desired and labored against every impediment to make them. While still in command only of the army of the Potomac, namely, in early September, I proposed the formation of a corps of New Englanders for coast service in the bays and inlets of the Chesapeake and Potomac, to co-operate with my own command, from which most of its material was drawn. On the first of November, however, I was called to relieve Lieutenant General Scott in the chief and general command of the armies of the Union. The di- rection and nature of this coast expedition, therefoi-e, were somewhat changed, as will soon appear in the original plan submitted to the Secretary of War, and tlie letter of instructions later issued to General Buruside, its commander. The whole country indeed had now become the theatre of military operations from the Potomac to beyond the Mississippi, and to assist the navy in perfect- ing and sustaining the blockade, it became necessary to extend these operations to points on the sea-coast, Roanoke island, Savannah, and New Orleans. It remained also to equip and organize the armies of the west, whose condition was little better than that of the army of the Potomac had been. The direction of the campaigns in the west, and of the operations upon the seaboard, enabled me to enter upon larger combinations and to accomplish results, the necessity and advantage of which had not been unforeseen, but which had been beyond the ability of the single army formerly under my command to effect. The following letters, and a subsequent paper addressed to the Secretary of War, sufficiently indicate the nature of those combinations to minds accus- tomed to reason upon military operations : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Washington, September 6, 1861. " Sir : I have the honor to suggest the following proposition, with tlie request that the necessary authority be at once given me to carry it out : to organize a force of two brigades of five regiments each, of New England men, for the general service, but particularly adapted to coast service — the officers and men to be sufficiently conversant with boat service, to manage steamers, sailing ves- sels, launches, barges, surf-boats, floating batteries, &c. To charter or buy for the command a sufficient number of propellers, or tug-boats, for transportation of men and supplies, the machinery of which should be amply protected by timber; the vessels to have permanent experienced officers from the merchant service, but to be manned by details from the command. A naval officer to be attached to the staff of the commanding officer. The flank companies of each regiment to be armed with Dahlgreu boat guns, and carbines with water-proof cartridges ; the other companies to have such arms as I may hereafter designate; to be uniformed and equipped as the Rhode Island regiments are. Launches and floating batteries with timber parapets of sufficient capacity to land or bring into action the entire force. "The entire management and organization of the force to be under my control, and to form an integral part of the army of the Potomac. " The immediate object of this force is for operations in the inlets of Chesa- 36 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. peake bay and the Potomac; by enabling me thus to land lri^o|j> at points where they are needed, this force can also be used in conjunction witli a naval force operating against points on the sea-coast. This coast division to be com- manded by a general officer of my selection; the regiments to be organized as other land forces; the disbursements for vessels, &c., to be made by the proper department of the army upon the requisitions of the general commanding the division, with my approval. "I think the entire force can be organized in thirty days, and by no means the least pf the advantages of this proposition is the fact that it will call into the service a class of men who would not otherwise enter the army. "You will immediately perceive that the object of this force is to follow along the coast, and up the inlets and rivers, the movements of the main army when it advances. " I am, very respectfuUv, your obedient servant, "G. B. McGLELLAN, "■Major General, Covunanding. " Hon. SiMo\ Cameron, " Secretary of War.'' Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring the requisite vessels, and adapting them to the special purposes contemplated, this expedition was not ready for service until January, 1862. Then in the chief command, I deemed it best to send it to North Carolina, witli the design indicated in the following letter. "Headuuarters of the Army, " WasJiiiigtoyi, January 7, 1862. "GrENERAL: In accordance with verbal instructions heretofore given yo you will, after uniting with Flag-officer Goldsborough at Fort Monroe, proceed un- der his convoy to Hatteras inlet, where you will, in coruiexion with him, take the most prompt measures for crossing the fleet over the Bulkhead into the waters of the sound. Under the accompanying general order constituting the department of North Carolina, you will assume command of the garrison at Hatteras inlet, and make such dispositions in regard to that place as your ulterior operations may render necessary, always being careful to provide for the safetv of that very important station in any contingency. "Your first point of attack will be Roanoke island and its dependencies. It is presumed that the navy can reduce the batteries on the marshes, and cover the landing of your troops on the main island, by which, in connexion with a rtijjid movement of the gunboats to the northern extremity, as soon as the marsh battery is reduced, it may be hoped to capture the entire garrison of the place. Having occupied the island and its dependencies, you will at once pro- ceed to the erection of the batteries and defences necessary to hold the position with a small force. Should the fiag-oflicer require any assistance in seizing or holding-the debouches of the; canal from Norfolk, you will please afford it to him. " The commodore and yourself having completed your arrangements in regard to Roanoke island, and the waters north of it, you will please at once make a descent on NcAvbern, having gained possession of which and the railroad passing through it, you will at once throw a sufficient force upon Beaufort, and take the steps necessary to reduce Fort Macon and open that port. AVhen you seize Newberu, you will endeavor to seize the railroad as fftr west as Golds- borough, should circumstances favor such a movement. The temper of the people, the rebel force at hand, &c., will go far tOAvards detennining the ques- tion as to how far west the railroad can be safely occupied and held. Should circumstances render it advisable to S(?ize and hold Rakigh, the main north and south line of railroad passing through (itddsborough should be so elVectnally destroyed for considerable distances iiortli and south o< that point, us REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAX. o7 - to render it impossible for the rebels to use it to your disadvantage. A great point would be gained, in any event, by the effectual destruction of the Wil- mington and Weldon railroad. "1 would advise great caution in moving so far into the interior as upon R;T.leigh. Having accomplished the objects mentioned, the next point of interest would probably be Wilmington, the reduction of which may require that ad- ditional means shall be afforded you. I would urge great caution in regard to proclamations. In no case would I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation with the naval commander, which should say as little as possible about politics or the negro ; merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union, and upholding ihe laws of the general government, and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, as far as possible, be protected in their persons and property. " You will please report your operations as often as an opportunity offers itself. " With my best wishes for your success, I am, &c., &c., "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, "Major General, Commanding in Chief "Brigadier General A. E. Burnside, " Comma7iding Expeditioii.'' The following letters of instruction were sent to Generals Halleck, Buell Sherman, and Butler; and I also communicated verbally to these officers my Anews in full I'egarding the field of operations assigned to each, and gave them theif instructions as much in detail as was necessary at that time: " HEADCiUARTERS OF THE ArMV, " Washingtofi, D C, November 11, 18G1. " General : In assigning you to the command of the department of Missouri, it is probably unnecessary for me to state that I have intrusted to you a duty which requires the utmost tact and decision. " You have not merely the ordinary duties of a military commander to pei-- form ; but the far more difficult task of reducing chaos to order, of changing probably the majority of the personnel of the staff of the department, and of re- ducing to a point of economy, consistent with the interests and necessities of tlio State, a system of reckless expenditure and fraud, perhaps unheard of before in the history of the world. " You will find in your department many general and staff officers holding illegal commissions and appointments, not recognized or ajjproved by the Pres- ident or Secretary of War. You will please at once inform these gentlemen of the nullity of their appointment, and see that no pay or allowances are issued to them until such time as commissions may be authorized by the President or Secretary of War. " If any of them give the slightest trouble, you will at once arrest them and send them, under guard, out of the hhnits of your department, informing them that if they return they will be placed in close confinement. You will please examine ii\to the legaHty ofthe organization of the troops serving in the depart- ment. When you find any illegal, unusual or improper organizations, you will give to the officers and men an opportunity to enter the legal military establishment under general laws and orders from the War Department; report- ing in full to these headquarters any officer or organization that may decline. " You will please cause competent and reliable staff officers to examine all existing contracts immediately, and suspend all payments upon them until you receive the report in each case. Where thex-e is the slightest doubt as to the propriety of tlie contract, yoti will be good enough to refer the matter, with full 38 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. explanation, to these lieadquarters, stating in eacli case what wonld be a fan* compensation for the services, or materials rendered under the contract. Dis- continue at once the reception of material or services under any doubtful con- tract. Arrest and bring to prompt trial all officers who have in any way vio- lated their duty to the government. In regard to the political conduct of aflfairs, you will please labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adja- cent States that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. " With respect to military operations it is ])robable, from the best information in my possession, that the interests of the government will be best sex'ved by fortifying and holding in considerable strength Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points, keeping strong patrols constantly moving from the terminal stations, and concentrating the mass of the troops on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations as the public interests may demand. " 1 would be glad to have you make as soon as possible a personal inspection of all the important points in your department, and report the result to me. I cannot too strongly impress upon you the absolute necessity of keeping me con- stantly advised of the strength, condition, and location of your troops, together with all facts that will enable me to maintain that general direction of the armies of the United States which it is my purpose to exercise. I trust to you to maintain thorough organization, discipline and economy throughout your de- partment. Please inform me as soon as possible of everything relating to the gunboats now in process of construction, as well as those completed. " The militia force authorized to be raised by the State of Missouri for its defence will be under your orders. " I am, general, &c., &c., " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, "Major General, Cormnanding U. S. A. " Major General H. W. Hallbck, U. S. A., " Com?nandins Department of Missouri^ "Headquarters of the Army, " Waskmgtan, November 7, 18G1. "General : In giving you instructions for your guidance in command of the department of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I merely wish to ex- press plainly the general ideas which occur to me in relation to the conduct of operations there. That portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland river is by its position so closely related to the States of Illinois and Missouri, that it has seemed best to attach it to the department of ]\Iissouri. Your operations there, in Iventucky, will be confined to that portion of the State cast of the Cumberland river. I trust I need not repeat to you that I regard tlie import- ance of the territory committed to your care as second only to tliat occuiiicd by the army under my immediati; command. It is absolutely necessary that we shall hold all thi; State of Kentucky; not only that, but that the majority of its inhabitants shall be warmly in favor of our cause, it being that which best 8ul)serves their interests. It is possible that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more important than that of our military operations. I certainly cannot overestimate the importance of the former. You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting ; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full antluu-ity of th insur- gent forces. That e.-^pccially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Pijtomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Munl'ordsville, Kentucky, tlu; army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of ^Mexico, be ready to move on that da}'. " That all other forces, both land and naval, with their res])ectivc connnanders, oljey existing orders for tln^ time, and be ready to obey additional orders Avhen duly given. "That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 43 and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval force?, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." The order of January 31, 1862, was as follow? : [Presiik:nt's Special War Order No. 1.] "Executive Mansion, " Washington, January 31, 1862. " Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after pro- viding safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south- westward of what is knoAvn as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the dis- cretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." I asked his excellency whether this order was to be regarded as fir.al, or whether I could be permitted to submit in writing my objections to his plan, and my reasons for preferring my own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore prepared the letter to the Secretary of War which is given below. Before this had been submitted to the President, he addressed me the follow- ing note : " Executive Mansion, " Washington, February 3, 1862. "My Dear Sir: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the army of the Potomac : yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rap- pahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York river ; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. "If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, 1 shall gladly yield my plan to yours : " 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine? "2d. Wherein is a victory jnore certain by your plan than mine? " 3d. Wherein is a victory 7nore valuable by your plan than mine ? "4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this : that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would ? 5th. In ease of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine ? "Yours, truly, "ABRAHAM LINCOLN. "Major Greneral McClbllan." These questions were substantially answered by the following letter of the same date to the Secretary of War : "Headquarters of the Army, " Washington, February 3, 1862. " Sir: I ask your indulgence for the following paper, rendered necessary by circumstances. " I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Satur- day, July 27, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull run. 44 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. " I found no army to command ; a mere collection of regiments cowering- on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. " Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works ; nothing whatever had been under- taken to defend the avenues to the city on the norrhern side of the ]^otomac. " The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled, and dispirited ; they were not even placed in military positions. The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. " Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to me; that task the honorable Secretary knows was given to me without solicitation or fore- knowledge. How far I have accomplished it will best be shown by the past and the present. "The capital is secure against attack, the extensive fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it against a numerous army, the enemy have been held in check, the State of Maryland is securely in our possession, the detached counties of Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, and all apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at an end ; the enemy are confined to the positions they occupied before the disaster of the 21st July. More than all this, I have now under my command a well-drilled and reliable army, to which the destinies of the country may be confidently committed. This army is young and untried in battle; but it is animated by the highest spirit, and is caj)able of great deeds. " That so much has been accomplished and such an army created in so short a time, from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest gloriet> of the administration and the nation. "Many weeks, I may say many months ago, this army of the Potomac wa«5 fully ill condition to repel any attack ; but there is a vast difference between that and the efficiency required to enable troops to attack successfully an army elated by victory and intrenched in a position long since selected, studied, and fortified. "In the earliest papers I submitted to the President, I asked for an effective and movable force far exceeding the aggregate now on the baidcs of the Potomac. I have not the force I asked for. "Even when in a subordinate position, I always looked beyond the opera- tions of the army of the Potomac ; I was never satisfied in my own mind with a barren victory, but looked to combined and decisive operations. " When I was placed in command of the armies of ths United States, I im- mediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the army of the Potomac as ordy one, while the most im])orrant, of the masses under my command. "I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a general plan Avhich had before existed, nor did 1 know that utter disorganizalion and want of preparation pervaded the western armies, "I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, in condition to move towards the fulfilment of my plans. I acknowledge that I made a great mistake. " 1 sent at once — with the approval of the Executive — officers I considered competent to command in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instructions looked to prompt movements. I soon found that the labor of creation and organization had to be performed there; transportation — arms — clothing — artillery — disci- pline, all were wanting. These things required time to procure' them. "The generals in conunand have done their work most creditably, but Ave are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made during the good weather of December ; I M-as mistaken. "My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee railroad, as a pre- EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 45 liminaiy movement, then to follow it up immediately by an attack on Nasliville and Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possible. " I have ever regarded our true policy as being- that of fully preparing our- selves, and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart. "Two hases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the army of the Potomac : "I. That of Washington — its present position — involving a direct attack upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, &c., or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a combination of the two plans. "The relative force of the two armies Avill not justify an attack on both flanks; an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication, and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detach- ments now on his extreme right and left. " Should we attack his right flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river, and near his hatteries, we could perhaps pre- vent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre, (we might destroy the former;) we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway com- munication, "The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth of the Bull run are watched by the rebels ; batteries are said to be placed on the heights in the rear, (con- cealed by the woods,) and the arrangement of his troops is such that he can op- pose some considei'able resistance to a passage of that stream. Information has just been received, to the effect that the enemy are intrenchhig a line of heights extending from the vicinity of Sangster's (Union mills) towards Evans- port. Early in January, Spriggs's ford was occupied by General Rhodes, with 3,600 men and eight (8) guns; there are strong reasons for believing that Davis's ford is occupied. These circumstances indicate or prove that the enemy anticipates the movement in question, and is prepared to resist it. Assuming for the present that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to ex- amine briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affairs, our column { for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least live or six) can reach the Accatinck without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax sta- tion, Sangster's, and Union mills. This danger must be met by occupying in some force either the two first named places, or better, the point of junction of the roads leading thence to the village of Occoquan; this occupation must be continued so long as we continue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, or until a battle is won. "The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords from Wolf's run to the mouth; the points of crossing not being necessarily confined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy occupy this lino in force, we must, \\ ith what assistance the flotilla can afford, endeavor to force the passage near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line, or be taken in flank himself. "Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be necessary to throw a column by the shortest route to Dumfries; partly to force the enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac; partly to cover our left flank against an attack from the direction of Aquia; and lastly, to establisli our commiuiications with the river by the best roads, and thus give us new depots. The enemy wotrld hy this time have occupied the line of the Occoquan above Bull run, holding Brentsville in force, and perhaps extending his lines somewhat further to the southwest. "Our next step would then be to prevent the enemy from crossing llie Occo- 46 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN, quan between Bull run and Broad run, to fall upon our right flank while mov- ing on Brentsville. This might be effected by occupying Bacon Race church and the cross-roads near the mouth of Bull run, or still more effectually by moving to the fords themselves, and preventing him from debouching on our side. "These operations would possibly be resisted, and it would require some time to effect them, as, nearly at the same time as possible, we should gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad run. Having secured our right flank, it would become necessary to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we could not leave it between the right flank and the main body. The final movement on the railroad must be determined by circumstances existing at the time. "This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defence enabling him to remain on the de- fensive, with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action. " Should we place a portion of our force in front of Oentreville, while the rest crosses the Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a distance too great to enable the two parts to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check. " I should perhaps have dwelt more decidedly on the fact that the force left near Sangster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of the Occo- quan until the decisive battle is over, so as to cover our retreat in the event of disaster, unless it should be decided to select and intrench a new base some- where near Dumfries — a proceeding involving much time. "After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this covering force could be drawn into a more central and less exposed position — say Brimstone hill or nearer the Occoquan, In this latitude the weather will for a consider- able period be very uncertain, and a movement commenced in force on roads in tolerably firm condition will be liable, almost certain, to be much delayed by rains and snow. It will, therefore, be next to impossible to surprise the enemy, or take him at a disadvantage by rapid manoeuvres. Our slow progress will en- able him to divine our purposes, and take his measures accordingly. The probability is, from the best infornration we possess, that the enemy has improved the roads leading to his lines of defence, while we have to work as we advance. "Bearing in mind what has been said, and the present unprecedented and im- passable condition of the roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line. Nor can its duration be closely cal- culated ; it seems certain that many weeks may elapse before it is possible to commence the march. Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line; of the up})er Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory; important results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, fur he could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of his troops permit. W he is in no condition to fight us again out ot the range of the intrencinuents at llichmond, we would find it a very difficult and tedious matter to follow him up there, for he would destroy his railroad bridges and otherwise impede our progress through a region Avhere the roads are as bad as they well can be, and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change Uie whole theatre of war, or to seek a shorter laud route to llichmond, with a smaller availalde force, and at an expenditure of much more time, than were we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the eni'niy to concentrate his forces and perfect his defensive measures at the very points where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared. EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 47 " II. The second base of operations available for the army of the Potomac is that of the lower Chesapeake bay, which affords the shortest possible land route to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the east. " The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year. "The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington, (which is ve)-y unfavorable,) much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall ; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours ; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Caro- lina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a posi- tion selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beueath the Candine forks. " Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. "During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time ; he can only oppose us in front; we bring our fleet into full play. "After a successful battle our position would be — Burnside forming our left — Norfolk held securely — our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburg — Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North Alabama — Halleck at Nashville and Memphis. "The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left, by re- ducing Wilmington and Charleston ; to advance our centre into South Carolina and Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval expedi- tion from New Orleans. " We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the southern seaports ; to occupy all the avenues of communication ; to use the great outlet of the Mississippi ; to re-establish our government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas ; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence, instead of that of the rebels ; to bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I have ever had in view — this is the general plan which I hope to accomplish. " For many long months I have labored to prepare the army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme ; from the day when I was placed in ^ com- mand of all our armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other armies in such a condition that they, too, could perform their allotted duties. "Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which promises the most brilliant result is Urbana, on the lower Rap- pahannock. This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught ; it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy — it is but one march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two mcxrches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off" Magruder in the Penin- sula, and enable us to occupy Richmond, before it could be strongly re-enforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of the navy, cross the James and throw ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us, for his position would be untenable, with us on the southern bank of the river. " Should circumstances render it not advisable to laud at Urbana, we can use Mobjack bay ; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe 48 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. as a base, aud operate with complete security, althougli with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula. "To reach whatever point may be selected as a base, a large amount of cheap water transportation must be collected, consisting mainly ofr canal-boats, barges, wood-boats, schooners, &c., towed by small steamers, all of a very different character from those required for all previous expeditions.. This can certainly be accomplished within thirty days from the time the order is given. I propose, as the best possible plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as a landing place for the first detachments ; to transport by water four divis- ions of infantry with their batteries, the regular infantry, a few wagons, one bridge train and a few squadrons of cavalry, making the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of embarkation for as many as possible ; to move the regu- lar cavalry and reserve artillery, the remaining bridge trains and wagons, to a point somewhere near Cape Lookout, then ferry them over the river by means of North River ferry-boats, march them over to the Rappahannock, (covering the movement by an infantry force near Heathsville,) and to cross the Rappa- hannock in a similar way. The expense and difficulty of the movement will then be very much diminished, (a saving of transportation of about 10,000 horses,) and the result none the less certain. " The concentration of the cavalry, &:c., on the lower counties of Maryland can be effected without exciting suspicion, aud the movement made without delay from that cause. " This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city of Washington to danger. " The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be, according to circirmstances, from 110,000 to 140,000. I hope to use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it quite safe. I fully realize that in all projects offered, time will probably be the most valuabh^ consideration. It is my decided opinion that, in that point of view, the second plan sliould be adopted. It is possible, nay, highly probable, that the weather and state of the roads may be such as to delay the direct movement from Wash- ington, with its unsatisfactory results and great risks, far beyond the time required to complete the second plan. In the first case we can fix no definite time for an advance. The roads have gone from bad to worse. Nothing like their present condition was ever known here before ; they are impassable at present. We are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line I regard success as certain by all the chances of war. We demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and where success must produce immense results. "My judgment, as a general, is clearly in favor of this project. Nothing is certain in war, but all the chances are in favor of this movement. So much am I in favor of the southern line of opertitions, that 1 would prefer the move from Fortress ^Monroe as a base — as a certain though h-ss brilliant movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas. "I know that his excellency the President, you, and I, all agree in our wishes ; and t liat tliese wishes are, to bring this war to a close as promptly as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire confidence in us — I am sure of it. Let us, then, look (mly to the great result to Ite accomplished, and disregard everything else. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. 'Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of [Var." REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 49 This letter must have produced some effect upon tlie mind of the President, since the execution of his order was not required, although it was not revoked as formally as it had been issiied. Many verbal conferences ensued, in which, among other things, it was determined to collect as many canal-boats as possible, with a view to employ them largely in the transportation of the army to the lower Chesapeake. The idea was at one time entertained by the President to use them in forming a bridge across the Potomac near Liverpool point, in order to throw the army over that point ; but this was subsequently abandoned. It was also found by experience that it would require much time to prepare the canal boats for use in transportation, to the extent that had been anticipated. Finally, on the 27th of February, 1862, the Secretary of War, by the au- thority of the President, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, to procure at once the necessary steamers and sailing craft to transport the army of the Potomac to its new field of operations. The following extract from the report of Mr. Tucker, dated April 5, will show the nature and progress of this well-executed service : ********** " I Avas called to Washington by telegraph, on 17th January last, by Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott. I was informed that Major General McOIellan wished to see me. From him I learned that he desired to know if transportation on smooth water could be obtained to move at one time, for a short distance, about 50,000 troops, 10,000 horses, 1,000 wagons, 13 batteries, and the usual equipment of such an army. He frankly stated to me that he had always supposed such a movement entirely feasible, until two experienced quartermasters had recently reported it impracticable, in their judgment. A few days afterwards, I reported to General McClellan that I was entirely confident the transports could be commanded, and stated the mode by which his object could be accomplished. A week or two afterwards I had the honor of an inter- view with the President and General McClellan, when the subject was further discussed, and especially as to the time required. "I expressed the opinion that, as the movement of the horses and wagons would have to be made chiefly by schooners and barges, that as each schooner would require to be properly fitted for the proDection of the horses, and furnished with a supply of water and forage, and each transport for the troops provided with water, I did not deem it prudent to assume that such an expedition could .start within thirty days from the time the order was given. " The President and General McClellan both urgently stated the vast import- ance of an earlier movement. I replied that if favorable winds prevailed, and there was great despatch in loading, the time might be materially diminished. " On the 14th February you (Secretary of War) advertised for transports of various descriptions, inviting bids on the 27th February. I was informed that the proposed movement by water Avas decided upon. That evening the Quarter- master General was informed of the decision. Directions were given to secure the transportation — any assistance was tendered. He promptly detailed to this duty two most efficient assistants in his department. Colonel Rufus lugalls was stationed at Annapolis, where it was then proposed to embark the troops, and Cciptain Henry C. Hodges was directed to meet me in Philadelphia, to attend to chartering the vessels. With these arrangements 1 left Washington on the 2Sth February. *»#*♦**# " I beg to hand herewith a statement, prepared by Captain Hodges, of the vessels chartered, which exhibits the prices paid, and parties from whom they were taken : 113 steamers, at an average price per day $215 10 188 schooners, " " " 24 45 88 barges, " " " 14 27 H. Ex. Doc. 15 4 50 EEPOET OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. "In tliirty-seven days from the time I received tlie order in Washington, (and most of it was accomphshed in thirty days,) these vessels transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Washington to Fort Monroe (the place of departure bavhig been changed, which caused delay,) 121,500 men, 14, 59;;^ animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph mate- rials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, &c., required for an army of such magnitude. The only loss of which I have heard is eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe — the cargoes being saved. With this trifling exception, not the slightest accident has occurred, to my knowledge. " I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, for economy and celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel on record. ** * * * * ** "JOHN TUCKER, " Assistant Secretary of War." In the mean time the destruction of the batteries on the lower Potomac, by crossing our troops opposite them, was considered, and preparations were even made for throwing Hooker's division across the river, to carry them by assault. Finally, however, after an adverse report from Brigadier General J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer, given below, Avho made a recomioissance of the positions, and in view of the fact that it was still out of the power of the Navy Department to furnish suitable vessels to co-operate with land troops, this plan was abandoned as impracticable. A close examination of the enemy's works and their approaches, made after they were evacuated, showed that the decision was a wise one. The only means, therefore, of accomplishing the capture of these works, so much desired by the President, was by a movement by land, from the left of our lines, on the right bank of the Potomac — a movement obviously unwise. The attention of the Navy Department, as early as August 12, 1S61, had been called to the necessity of maintaining a strong force of etificieut war vessels on the Potomac. "Headquarters Division of the Potomac, ^^ Washington, August 12, 1861. " Sir : I have to-day received additional information which convinces me that it is more than probable that the enemy will, within a very short time, attempt to ihrow a respectable force from the mouth of Aquia creek into Maryland. This attempt will probably be preceded by the erection of batteries at Matthias and White House points. Such a movement on the part of the enemy, in con- nexion with others probably designed, woidd place Washington in great jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that the strongest possible naval force be at once concen- trated near the mouth of Aquia creek, and that the most vigilant watch be maintained day and night, so as to render such passage of the river absolutely impossible. " I recommend tliat tlie Minnesota and any other vessels available from Hampton lloads be at once ordered up there, and that a great quantity of coal be sent to that vicinity, sufficient for several weeks' supply. At least one strong war vessel should be kept at Alexandria, and I again urge the concentration of a strong naval force on the ]\)tomac without delay. " If tiie Naval Department will render it absolutely impossible for the enemy to cross the river below Washington, the security of the capital will be greatly increased. " I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate compliance Avith these requests. " 1 am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "GEORGE B. iVLcCLELLAN, "Major General Commanding. " Hon. Gideon Welles, "Secretary of the United States Navy." KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 51 It was on the 27tli of September, 1S61, that General Barnard, Chief Engineer, iu company with Captain Wymau of the Potomac flotilla, had been instructed to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's batteries as far as Matthias point. In his report of his observations he says : " Batteries at High point and Cockpit point, and thence down to Chopa- wampsic, cannot be prevented. We may, indeed, prevent their construction on cer- tain points, but along here somewhere the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as many batteries as he chooses. What is the remedy % Favorable circumstances, not to be anticipated nor made the basis of any calculations, might justify and render successful the attack of a particular battery. To suppose that we can capture all, and by mere attacks of this kind prevent the naA'igation being molested, is very much the same as to suppose that the hostile army in our own front can prevent lis building and maintaining field-works to protect Arlington and Alexandria by capturing them, one and all, as fast as they are built." In another communication upon the subject of crossing troops for the purpose of destroying the batteries on the Virginia side of the Potomac, General Bar- nard says : " The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defence of the enemy, and all that we would have to do if we were really opening a campaign against them there. " It is true we hope to force this line by turning it, by landing on Freestone point. With reason to believe that this may be successful, it cannot be denied that it involves a risk of failure. Shoiild we, then, considering all the conse- quences which may be involved, enter into the o])eration, merely to capture the Potomac batteries ? I think not. Will not the Ericsson, assisted by one other gunboat capable of keeping alongside these batteries, so far control their fire as to keep the navigation sufficiently free as long as Ave require it % Captain AVy- man says yes." It was the opinion of competent naval officers, and I concur Avith them, that had an adequate force of strong and Avell-armed vessels been acting on the Po- tomac from the beginning of August, it Avould liaA^e been next to impossible for the rebels to have constructed or maintained batteries upon the banks of the riA-er. The enemy never occupied Matthias point, nor any other p)oint on the river, Avhich was out of supporting distance from the main army. When the enemy commenced the construction of these batteries, the army of the Potomac Avas not in a condition to prevent it. Their destruction by our army would have afforded but a temjjorary relief unless Ave had been strong enough to hold the entire line of the Potomac. This could be done either by driving the enemy from Manassas and Aquia creek, by main force, or by ma- noeuvring to compel them to vacate their positions. The latter course Avas finally pursued, and Avith success. About the 20th of February, 1862, additional measures Avere taken to secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. The preliminary operations of General Lander for this object are elscAvhere described. I had often obserA^ed to the President and to members of the cabinet that the reconstruction of this railway could not be undertaken until Ave were in a con- dition to fight a battle to secure it. I regarded the possession of Winchester and Strasburg as necessary to coA'er the raihvay in the rear, and it Avas not till the month of February that I felt prepared to accomplish this very desirable but not vital pi;rpose. The Avhole of Banks's division and two brigades of Sedgwick's division were thrown across the river at Harper's Ferry, leaving one brigade of Sedgwick's- division to observe and guard, the Potomac from Great Falls to the mouth of the Monocacy. A sufficient number of troops of all arms were held in readiness in the vicinity of Washington, either to march via Leesburg or to move by rail 52 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. to Harper's Ferry, should this become necessary in carrying out the objects in view. The subjoined notes from a communication subsequently addressed to the War Department will sufficiently explain the conduct of these operations. NOTES. "When I started for Harper's Ferry, I plainly stated to the President and Secretary of War that the chief object of the operation would be to open the Baltimore and Ohio railroad by crossing the river in force at Harper's Ferry ; that I had collected the material for making a permanent bridge by means of canal-boats ; that from the nature of the river, it was doubtful whether such a bridge could be constructed ; that if it could not, I would at least occupy the ground in front of Harper's Ferry, in order to cover the rebuilding of the rail- road bridge ; and finally, when the communications were perfectly secure, move on Winchester. " When I arrived at the place I found the bateau bridge nearly completed ; the holding-ground proved better than had been anticipated ; the weather was favorable, there being no wind. I at once crossed over the two brigades which had arrived, and took steps to hurry up the other two, belonging respectively to Banks's and Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty of crossing supplies had not then become apparent. That night I telegraphed for a regiment of regular cavalry and four batteries of heavy artillery to come up the next day, (Thurs- day,) besides directing Keyes's division of infantry to be moved np on Friday. "Next morning the attempt was made to pass the canal-boats through the lift-lock, in order to commence at once the construction of a permanent bridge. It was then found for the first time that the lock was too small to permit the passage of the boats, it having been built for a class of boats running on the Shenandoah canal, and too narrow by some four or six inches for the canal- boats. The lift-locks, above and below, are all large enough for the ordinary boats. I liad seen them at Edwards's ferry thus used. It had always been represented to the engineers by the military railroad employes, and others, that the lock was large enough, and, the difference being too small to be detected by the eye, no one had thought of measuring it, or suspecting any difficulty. I thus suddenly found myself unable to build the permanent bridge. A violent gale had arisen, which threatened the safety of our only means of communication; the narrow approach to the bridge was so crowded and clogged with wagons that it was very clear that, und(-'r existing circumstances, nothing more could be done than to cross over the baggage and supplies of the two brigades. Of the others, instead of being able to cross both during the morning, the last arrived only in time to go over just before dark. It was evident that the troops mider orders would only be in the way, should tliey arrive, and that it would not be possible to subsist them for a rapid march on Winchester. It was therefore deemed necessary to countermand the ordcn-, content ourselves with covering the reopen- iag of the railroad for the present, and in the mean time use every exertion to establish, as promptly as possible, dejiots of forage and subsistence on the Vir- ginia side, to supjjly the troops, and enable them to move on Winchester inde- pendently of the bridge. The next day (Friday) I sent a strong reconnoissance to Cliarlestown, and, under its protection, went there myself. I then determined to hold that place, and to move the troops composing Lander's and Williams's commands at once on Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus effectually covering the reconstruction of the railroad. "Having done this, and taken all ihe steps in my power to insure the rapid transmission of sujiplies over the river, 1 returned to this city, well satisfied witli what had been accom])lished. While up the river I learned that the President ■was dissatisfit;d with the state of afi'airs; but, on my return here. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 53 understood from tlie Secretary of War tliat upon learning the wliole state of the case the President was fuUj satisfied. I contented myself, therefore, with giving to the Secretary a brief statement, as I have written here." The design aimed at was entirely compassed, and before the first of April, the date of my departure for the Peninsula, the railroad was in miming order. As a demonstration upon the left flank of tlie enemy, this movement no doubt assisted in determining the evacuation of his lines on the Sth and 9th of March. On my return from Harper's Ferry, on the 2Sth of February, the prepara- tions necessary to carry out the wishes of the President and Secretary of War in regard to destroying the batteries on the lower Potomac were at once imder- taken. Mature reflection convinced me that this operation would require the movement of the entire army, for I felt sure that the enemy would resist it with his whole strength. I undertook it with great reluctance, both on account of the extremely unftivorable condition of the roads and my firm conviction that the proposed movement to the lower Chesapeake would necessarily, as it subse- quently did, force the enemy to abandon all his positions in front of Washing- ton. Besides, it did not forward my plan of campaign to precipitate this evacua- tion by any direct attack, nor to subject the army to any needless loss of life and material by a battle near Washington, which could produce no decisive results. The preparations for a movement towards the Occoquan, to carry the batteries, were, however, advanced as rapidly as the season permitted, and I Lad invited the commanders of divisions to meet at headquarters on the 8th of March, for the purpose of giving them their instructions, and receiving their advice and opinion in regard to their commands, when an interview with the President indicated to me the possibility of a change in my orders. His excellency sent for me at a A'ery early hour on the morning of the 8th, and renewed his expressions of dissatisftiction with the afli^fxir of Harper's Ferry, and with my plans for the new movement down the Chesapeake. Another recital of the same facts which had before given satisfaction to his excellency again produced, -is I supposed, the same result. The views which I expressed to the President were re-enforced by the result of a meeting of my general oflicers at headquarters. At that meeting my plans were laid before the division commanders, and were approved by a majority of those present. Nevertheless, on the same day two important ordei's were issued by the President, without consultation with me. The first of these was the gene- ral war order No. 2, directing the formation of army corps, and assigning their commanders. I had always been in favor of the principle of an organization into army corps, but preferred deferring its practical execution until some little experience in campaign and on the field of battle should show what general oflicers were most competent to exercise these high commands, for it must be remembered that we then had no oflicers whose experience in war on a large scale was suf- ficient to prove that they possessed the necessary qualifications. An incompe- tent commander of an army corps might cause irreparable damage, while it is not probable that an incompetent division commander could cause any very se- rious mischief. These views had frequently been expressed by me to the Pres- ident and members of the cabinet; it was therefore with as much regret as sur- prise that I learned the existence of this order. The first order has been given above ; the second order was as follows : [President's General War Order No. 3 ] "EXECl'TIVF ]\rA\SIO\, " Washington, March 8, 1SG2. " Ordered, That no change of the base of operatiojis of the army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force 54 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. as, in the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. " That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake bay, shall be freed from enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, or until the Presi- dent shall hereafter give express permission. " That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the general-in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake bay, shall begin to move Tipon the bay as early as the 18th ^larcli instant, and the general-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day. " Ordered, That the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to cap- ture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake bay. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN. " L. Thomas, Adjutant General. " After what has been said already in regard to the effect of a movement to the lower Chesapeake it is unnecessary for me to comment upon this document, fur- ther than to say that the time of beginning the movement depended upon the state of readiness of the transports, the entii'e control of which had been placed by the Secretary of War in the hands of one of the Assistant Secretaries, and not under the Quartermaster General ; so that even if the movement were not impeded by the condition imposed, in regard to the batteries on the Potomac, it could not have been in my power to begin it before the 18th of March, unless the Assistant Secretary of War had completed his arrangements by that time. Meanwhile important events were occurring which materially modified the designs for the subsequent campaign. The appearance of the Merrimack off Old Point Comfort, and the encounter Avith the United States squadron on the 8th of March, threatened serious derangement of the plan for the Peninsula movement. But the engagement between the Monitor and Merrimack on the 9th of ]\[arch demonstrated so satisfactorily the power of the former, and the other naval preparations were so extensive and formidable, that the security of Fort Monroe, as a base of operations, was placed beyond a doubt ; and although the James river was closed to us, the York river, Avith its tributaries, was still open as a line of Avater communication with the fortress. The general plan, there- fore, remained undisturbed, although less promising in its details than when the James riA'er Avas in our control. On Simday, the 9th of 3Larch, information from various sotn-ces made it ap- parent that the enemy Avas CA'acuating his positions at Centreville and Manassas, as well as on the upper and loAver Potomac. The President and Secretary of War Avere present when the most positive information reached me, and I ex- pressed to them my intention to cross the river immediately, and there gain the most authentic information, prior to determining Avhat course to pursue. The retirement of the enemy toAvards Richmond had been expected as the natural conse(j[uence of the movement to the Peninsula, but the adoption of this course innnediately on ascertaining that such a moA'ement Avas intended, Avhile it relieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors, and attested the character of the design, Avas unfortunate; in that the then almost impassable roads between our positions and theirs deprived \is of the oppor- tunity for inilicting damage usually afforded by the AvithdraAval of a large army in the face of a powerful adversary. The retirement of the enemy and the occupation of the abandoned positions which necessarily folloAvcd presented an opi)ortunity for the troops to gain some experience on the march and bivouac preparatory to the campaign, and to REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 55 get rid of tlie superfluous baggage and other " impediments" which accumulate so easily around an army encamped for a long time in one locality. A march to Manassas and back would produce no delay in embarking for the lower Chesapeake, as the transports could not be ready for some time, and it afforded a good intermediate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of the camps around Washington, and the rigors of active operations, besides accomplishing the important object of determining the positions and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, with the possibility of being able to harass their rear. I therefore issued orders during the night of the 9th of March for a general movement of the army the next morning towards Centreville and IManassas, sending in advance two regiments of cavalry under Colonel Averill with orders to reach Manassas if possible, ascertain the exact condition of affairs, and do whatever he could to retard and annoy the enemy if really in retreat ; at the same time I telegraphed to the Secretary of War that it would be necessary to defer the organization of the army corps until the completion of the projected advance itpou Manassas, as the divisions could not be brought together in time. The Secretary replied, requiring immediate compliance with the President's order; but on my again representing that this would compel the abandonment or postponement of the movement to Manassas, he finally consented to its post- ponement. At noon on the 10th of March the cavalry advance reached the enemy's lines at Centreville, passing through his recently occupied camps and works, and find- ing still burning heaps of military stores and much valuable property. Immediately after being assigned to the command of the troops around Wash- ington, I organized a secret service force, under Mr. E. J. Allen, a very ex- perienced and efficient person. This force, up to the time I was relieved from command, was continually occupied in procuring from all possible sources in- formation regarding the strength, 2>ositions, and movements of the enemy. All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees, and many prisoners of war, coming into our lines from the front, were carefully examined, first by the out- post and division commanders, and then by my chief of staff and the Provost 3Iar- shal General. Their statements, taken in writing, and in many cases imder oath, from day to day, for a long period previous to the evacuation of Manassas, com- prised a mass of evidence which, by careful digests and collations, enabled me to estimate with considerable accuracy the strength of the enemy before us. Summaries showing the character and results of the labors of the secret service force accompany this report, and T refer to them for the facts they contain, and as a measure of the ignorance which led some journals at that time, and persons in high office, unwittingly to trifle with the reputation of an army, and to delude the country with quaker gun stories of the defences and gross understatements of the numbers of the enemy. The following orders were issued for the examination of persons coming from the direction of the enemy: ["Circular.] "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Washington, December 16, 1861. " The major general commanding directs that hereafter all deserters, prisoners . spies, 'contrabands,' and all other persons whatever coming or brought within our lines from Virginia, shall be taken immediately to the quarters of the com- mander of the division within whose lines they may come or be brought, witliout previous examination by any one, except so far as may be necessary for the officer commanding the advance guard to elicit information regarding liis particu- lar post; that the division commander examine all such persons himself, or dele- 56 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. gate gucli duty to a proper officer of liis staff, and allow no other persons to hold any coiumunication with them; that he then immediately send them, with a suf- ficient guard, to the provost marshal in this city for further examination and safe-keeping, and that stringent orders be given to all guards having such per- sons in charge not to hold any communication with them whatever; and further, that the information elicited from such persons shall be immediately communi- cated to the major general commanding, or to the chief of staff, and to no other person whatever. " The major general commanding further directs that a sufficient guard be placed around every telegraph station pertaining to this army, and that such guards be instructed not to allow any person, except the regular telegraph corps, general officers, and such staff officers as may be authorized by their chief, to enter or loiter around said stations within hearing of the sound of the telegraph instruments. "By command of Major General McClellan. " S. WILLIAMS, "Assistant Adjutant General.^* "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Washington, February 26, 1862. "General Order > No. 27. S ********** "All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and other persons coming within our lines, will be taken" at once to the provost marshal of the nearest division, who will examine them in presence of the division commander or an officer of his staff designated for the purpose. This examination will only refer to such information as may affect the division and those near it, especially those remote from general headquarters. "As soon as this examination is completed — and it must be made as rapidly as possible — the person will be sent, under proper guard, to the Provost Marshal General, with a statement of his replies to the questions asked. L^pon receiving him, the Provost Marshal General will at once send him, with his statement, to the chief of staff of the army of the Potomac, who will cause the necessary examination to be made. The Provost Marshal General will have the custody of all such persons. Division commanders Avill at once communicate to other division commanders all information thus obtained which affects them. ********** "By command of Major General McClellam. "S. WILLIAMS, '■^Assistant Adjutant General." d In addition to the foregoing orders, the division commanders Avere instructed, whenever they desired to send out scouts towards the enemy, to make known the object at headquarters, in order that I might determine whether we had the information it was proposed to obtain, and that I might give the necessary or- ders to other commanders, so that the scouts should not be molested by the guards. It will be seen from the report of the chief of the secret service corps, dated March 8, that tlie forces of the rebel army of the l*otomac, at that date, were as follows : At IManassas, Centreville, Bull nin. Upper Occoquan, and vicinity. 80,000 men. At Brooks's station, Ihimfrics, Lower Occoqium, and vicinity 18,000 men. EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 67 At Leesburg and vicinity 4,500 men. In the Shenandoali valley 13,000 men. 115,500 men. About three hundred field guns and from twenty-six to thirty siege guns ■were with the rebel army in front of Washington. The report made on the 17th of March, after the evacuation of Manassas and Centreville, corroborates the statements contained in the report of the 8th, and is fortified by the affida- vits of several railroad engineers, constructors, baggage-masters, &c., whose opportunities for forming correct estimates were unusually good. These affida- vits will be found in the accompanying reports of the chief of the secret service corps. A reconnoissance of the works at Centreville made by Lieutenant McAlester, United States engineers, on March 14, 1S62, and a survey of those at Manassas, made by a party of the United States coast survey, in April, 1862, confirmed also my conclusions as to the strength of the enemy's defences. Those at Centreville consisted of two lines, one facing east and the other north. The former consisted of seven works, viz : one bastion fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries; all containing embrasures for forty guns, and con- nected by infantry parapets and double caponieres. It extended along the crest of the ridge a mile and three-quarters from its junction with the northern front to ground thickly wooded and impassable to an attacking column. The northern front extended about one and one-fourth mile to Great Rocky run, and thence three-fourths of a mile further to thickly wooded, impassable ground in the valley of Cub run. It consisted of six lunettes and batteries with embrasures for thirty -one guns, connected by an infantry parapet in the form of a cremaillere line with redans. At the town of Centreville, on a high hill com- manding the rear of all the works within range, was a large hexagonal redoubt with ten embrasures. Manassas station was defended in all directions by a system of detached works, with platforms for heavy guns arranged for marine carriages, and often connected by infantry parapets. This system was rendered complete by a very lai'ge work, with sixteen embrasures, which commanded the highest of the other works by about fifty feet. Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred to will be found among the maps appended to this report. From this it will be seen that the positions selected by the enemy at Centre- ville and Manassas were naturally veiy strong, with impassable streams and broken ground, affording ample protection for their flanks, and that strong lines of intrenchments swept all the available approaches. Although the history of every former war has conclusively shown the great advantages which are possessed by an army acting on the defensive and occu- pying strong positions, defended by heavy earthworks ; yet, at the commence- ment of this war, but few civilians in our country, and, indeed, not all military men of rank, had a just appreciation of the fact. New levies that have never been in battle cannot be expected to advance without cover under the murderous fire from such defences, and carry them by assault. This is work in which veteran troops frequently falter and^ are re- ptdsed with loss. That an assault of the enemy's positions in front of Washing- ton, with the new troops composing the army of the Potomac, during the winter of 1861-'62, would have resulted in defeat and demoralization, was too probable. The same army, though inured to war in many battles, hard fought and bravely won, has twice, under other generals, suffered such disasters as it was no excess of prudence then to avoid. My letter to the Secretary of War, dated 58 EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE R. m'cLELLAN. February 3, 1862, and given above, expressed the opinion that the movement to the Peninsula would compel the enemy to retire from his position at Manas- sas and free Washington from danger. When the enemy first learned of that plan, they did thus evacuate Manassas. During the Peninsula campaign, as at no former period, northern Virginia was completely in our possession, and the vicinity of Washington free from the presence of the enemy. The ground so gained was not lost, nor Washington again put in danger, until the enemy learned of the orders for the evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me at Harri- son's bar, and Avere again left free to advance northward and menace the na- tional capital. Perhaps no one now doubts that the best defence of Washington is a Peninsula attack on Richmond. My order for the organization of the army corps was issued on the 13th of March ; it has been given above. While at Fairfax Court House, on March 12, I was informed through the telegraph, l)y a member of my staff, that the following document had appeared in the National Intelligencer of that morning : [President's War Order, No. 3.] "Executive Mansion, " Washington, March 11, 1862. " Major General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the com- mand of the other military departments, he retaining command of the depart- ment of the Potomac. " Ordered, further, That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Kuox- ville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the department of the Missis- sippi ; and that, until otherwise ordered. Major General Halleck have command of said department. " Ordered, also. That the country west of the department of the Potomac and east of the department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the mountain department, and that the same be commanded by Major General Fremont. " That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by them, respectively report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frec^uent reports will be expected of all and each of them. "ABPvAHAM LINCOLN." Though unaware of the President's intention to remove me from the position of geucral-in-chief, I cheerfully acceded to the disposition he saw fit to make of my services, and so informed him in a note on the 12th of March, in which occur these words : " I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connexion with some western matters, that no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, and you will find that, under present circumstances, I shall Avork just as cheer- fully as before, and that no consideration of self will in any manner interfere with the discharge of my public duties. Again thanking you for the official and personal kindness you have so often evinced toAvards me, I am," &c., &c. On the 14th of March a reconnoissance of a large body of cavalry with some infantry, under connnand of CJeneral Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria railroad to determine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the llapj)ahannock, but the roads were in such condition that, finding it impossible to subsist hid men, General iStoneman was forced to return after reae-hiii"- Cedar run. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 59 Tlie following despatch from him recites the result of this expedition : "Headquarters, Union Mills, ''March 16, 1862. "We arrived here last evening about dark. We got corn for horses; no provisions for men. Bull run too high to cross. Had we stayed an hour longer we should not have got here to-day, owing to the high water in the streams. Felt the enemy cautiously, and found him in force at Warrentou Junction. Saw two regiments of cavalry and three bodies of infontry on the other side of Cedar run. Had we crossed, should not have been able to get back for high water. Had three men of 5th cavalry hit driving in enemy's pickets ; one slightly wounded in the head. Enemy acted confidently, and followed us some way back on the road, but did not molest us in any way. Enemy's force consisted of Stuart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of artillery, and some infantry. Railroad bridges all burned down up to Warrenton Junc- tion ; still entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn at a moment's warning, having dry wood piled upon them. Heard cars running during night before last ; probably bringing up troops from Rappahannock. Heard of two regiments of infantry at Warrenton engaged in impressing the militia and securing forage. Heard of a large force of infantry this side of Rappahannock river, having come up to Warrenton Junction from Aquia creek day before yesterday. Bridges all destroyed this side of Broad run. The aids who take this will give you further particulars. " Very respectfully, &c., "GEORGE STONEMAN, " Brigadie?- General, Commanding. " Col. COLBURN." The main body of the anny was, on the 15th of March, moved back to the vicinity of Alexandria to be embarked, leaving a part of General Sumner's corps at Manassas until other troops could be sent to relieve it. Before it was withdrawn a strong reconnoissance, under General Howard, was sent towards the Rappahannock, the result of which appears in the following despatch : "Warrenton Junction, " March 29, 1862. "Express just received from General Howard. He drove the enemy across the Rappahannock bridge, and is now in camp on this bank of and near the Rappahannock river. " The enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. There was skirmishing dur- mg the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artillery, without any loss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not known. General Howard will return to this camp to-morrow morning. " E. V. SUMNER, Brigadier Gc?icral. " General S. Williams." The line of the Rappahannock and the Manassas Gap railroad was thus left reasonably secure from menace by any considerable body of the enemy. On the 13th of March a council of war was assembled at Fairfax Court House to discuss the military status. The President's order No. 3, of March 8th, was considered. The following is a memorandum of the proceedings of the council : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Fairfax Court House, March 13, 1862. " A council of the generals commanding army corps, at the headquarters of the anny of the Potomac, were of the opinion — " I. That the ei;emy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind "v 60 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. the Rappaliannock and Rapidan, it is tlie opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers : Provided, " 1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimack, can be neutralized. " 2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac ; and, " 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York river. " 4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) " II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected, for both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Richmond railroads. (Unanimous.) " N. B. — That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned^ and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keys, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumner.") This was assented to by myself, and immediately communicated to the War Department. The following reply was received the same day : "War Department, MarcJi 13, 1862. " The President having considered the plan of operations agi-eed upon by yourself and tlie commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution : "1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of commu- nication. "2. Leave Washington entirely secure. " 3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all eventa, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. "EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secretary of War. "Major General George B. McClellan." My preparations were at once begun in accordance with these directions, and on the 16th of March the following instructions were sent to Generals Banks and Wadsworth : "Headquarters Armv' of the Potomac, "March 16, 1862. "Sir: You will post your command in the vicinity of Manassas, intrench ■«'ourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the front. 'Your lirst care Avill be the rebuilding of the railway from AVashington to l\Ianassas and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications with the valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four regiments, with two batteries, at or near the point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah valley, ;is well as through Chester gap, Avhich might perhaps be advantageously . occupi<'d by a detachment of infantry, well intrenched. Block-houses should be built at all the railway bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton June- REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAiq-. 61 tion and Warrenton itself, and also some little more advanced point on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as soon as tlie railway bridge is repaired. " Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Besides the two regi- ments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your disposal, to scout towards the Occoquan, and probably a fourth towards Leesburg. "To recapitulate, the most important points which should engage your atten- tion ai'e as follows : " 1. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas, perhaps even Centreville, and another force, (a brigade,) also Avell intrenched, near Strasburg. " 2. Block-houses at the railway bridges. "3. Constant employment of the cavalry well to the front. " 4. Grand guards at Warrenton Junction and in advance, as far as the Rap- pahannock, if possible. "5. Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early information as to the enemy. "6. The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac and Washington. " The above is communicated by command of Major General McClellan. "S. WILLIAMS, "Assistant Adjutant General. "Major General N. P. Banks, " Commanding Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac.^' "Headq,uarters Army of the Potomac, "March 16, 1862. " Sjr : The command to which yon have been assigned, by instructions of the President, as military governor of the District of Columbia, embraces the geographical limits of the District, and will also include the city of Alexandria, the defensive works south of the Potomac, from the Occoquan to Difficult ci-eek, and the post of Fort Washington. " I enclose a list of the troops and of the defences embraced in these limits. " General Banks will command at Manassas Junction, with the divisions of Williams and Shields, composing the fifth corps, but you should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in your front, carefully guard the approaches in that quarter, and maintain the duties of advanced guards. You vv^ill use the same precau- tious on either flank. "All troops not actually needed for the police of Washington and George- town, for the garrisons north of the Potomac, and for other indicated special duties, should be moved to the south side of the river. "In the centre of your front you should post the main body of your troops, and proper proportions at suitable distances towards your right and loft flanks. Careful patrols will be made, in order thoroughly to scour the country in front, from right to left. " It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain the forts and their armaments in the best possible order, to look carefully to the instruction and discij)linc of their garrisons, as well as all other troops inidcr your command, and, by fre- quent and rigid inspections, to insure the attainment of these ends. " The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges and ferries, within tlie above-named limits, Avill devolve upon you, and you are to insure their security and provide for their protection by every means in your power. You will also protect the depots of the public stores and the transit of stores to troops in active service. " By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour the neighboring country 62 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. soiitli of tlie Eastern Branch, and also on yonr right, and yon will nsc every possible prccantion to intercept mails, goods and persons passing unauthorized to the enemy's lines. " The necessity of maintaining good order within your limits, and especially in the capital of the nation, cannot be too strongly enforced. *' You will forward and fjicilitate the movement of all troops destined for the active part of the army of the Potomac, and especially the transit of detach- ments to their proper regiments and corps. " The charge of the new troops arriving in Washington, and of all troops temporarily there, will devolve upon you. You will form them into provisional brigades, promote their instruction and discipline, and facilitate their equipment. Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, composition and equipment, by every opportunity. "Besides the regular reports and returns, which you will be required to render to the Adjutant General of the army, you will make to these headquarters a consolidated report of your command, every Sunday morning, and monthly returns on the first day of each month. " The foregoing instructions are communicated by command of Major General McClellan. "S. WILLIAMS, ^^ Assistant Adjutant General. "Brigadier General J. S. Wadsworth, "Military Governor of the District of CoJuvihiaP The Secretary of War had expressed a desire that I should communicate to the War Department my designs with regard to the employment of the army of the Potomac in an official form. I submitted, on the 19th of March, the following : " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Theological. Seminary, Va., March 19, 1862. "Sir : I have the honor to submit the following notes on the proposed opera- tions of the active portion of the army of the Potomac. " The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, taking the line of Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond being the objective point. It is assumed that the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia ; also, that we shall hght a decisive battle between West Point and Richmond, to give which battle the rebels Avill concentrate all their available forces, understanding, as they will, that it involves the fate of their cause. It therefore follows — " 1st. That we should collect all our available forces and operate upon adja- cent lines, maintaining perfect communication between our columns. " 2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the licld of battle. "The advantages of the peninsula between York and James rivers are too ob- vious to need explanation ; it is also clear that West Point should as soon as possible be reached, and used as our main de[)ot, that we may have the shortest line of land transportation for our su])plies, and the use of the York river. "Then^ are two methods of reaching this point — " 1st. By moving directly from Fort i\Ioin-oe as a base, and trusting to the roads for our su])plies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near York- town as possible,', in order to turn the njbel lines of defence south of Yorktown; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps. " 2d. To make a combined naval and land attack upon Y^'orktown, the first object of the campaign. This h^ads to the most ra])id and decisive results. To accomplish this, the navy should at once concentrate upon the York river all REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 63 their available and most powerful batteries : its reduction should not in tliat case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of York- town, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond, with every facility for developing- and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. " It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full co-op- eration of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front sev- eral strong positions which by their aid could be turned without serious loss of either time or men. " It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact already alluded to, that the capture of Eichmond necessarily involves the prompt fall of Norfolk, while an operation against Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of the cam- paign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of the rebel troops involved, and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same means Avhich would have accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile afforded the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements, for they would well know, from the moment the army of the Potomac changed its base to Fort Monroe, that Richmond must be its ultimate object. " It may be summed up in a few words, that, for the prompt success of this campaign, it is absolutely necessaiy that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most important point — there the knot to be cut. An immediate decision upon the sub- ject-matter of this communication is highly desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occasion. " I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major General. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary/ of War." In the mean time the troops destined to form the active army were collected in camps convenient to the points of embarcation, and every preparation made to embark them as rapidly as possible when the transports were ready. A few da^^s before sailing for Fort Monroe, while still encamped near Alexan- dria, I met the President, by appointment, on a steamer. He there informed me that he had been strongly pressed to take General Blenker's division from my command and give it to General Fremont. His excellency was good enough to suggest several reasons for not taking Blenker's division from me. I assented to the force of his suggestions, and was extremely gratified by his decision to allow the division to remain with the army of the Potomac. It was therefore with surprise that I received, on the 31st, the following note : "Executive Mansion, WasM?igton, March 31, 1862. " My Dear Sir : This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's divi.-'ion to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that 1 did so with great pain, under- standing that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full jires- sure of the case, I am confident that you Avould justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the commander-in-chief may order what he pleases. " Yours, very truly, "A. LINCOLN. "Major General McClellan." ,. 64 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. To this I replied, in substance, that I regretted the order, and couhl ill aflPord to lose ten thousand troops which had been coiintcd upon in forming my plan of campaign, but as there was no remedy, I would yield, and do the best 1 could without them. In a conversation with the President a few hours afterwards I repeated verbally the same thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker's di- vision had been given to General Fremont from any pressure other than the re- quirements of the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the President's positi%'*e and emphatic assurance that I might be confident that no more troops beyond these ten thousand should in any event be taken from me, or in any way detached from my command. At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by the enemy, Jackson was at Winchester, our forces occupying Charlestown, and Shields's reaching Bunker Hill on the 11th. On the morning of the 12th, a brigade of General Banks's troops, under General Hamilton, entered Winchester, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock the evening before, his rear guard of cavalry leaving an hour before our advance entered the place. The enemy having made his preparations for evacuation some days before, it was not possible to intercept his retreat. On the 13th the mass of Banks's corps was concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Winches- ter, the enemy being in the rear of Strasburg. On the 19th General Shields occupied Strasbixrg, driving the enemy twenty miles south to Mount Jackson. On the 20th the first division of Banks's corps commenced its movement to- wards Manassas, in compliance with my letter of instructions of the l(3tli. Jackson probably received information of this movement, and supposed that no force of any consequence was left in the vicinity of Winchester, and upon the falling back of Shields to that place, for the purpose of enticing Jackson in pursuit, the latter promptly followed, whereixpon ensued a skirmish on the 22d, in which General Shields was wounded, and an aftair at Winchester on the 23d, resulting in the defeat of Jackson, who was pursued as rapidly as the ex- haustion of our troops and the difficulty of obtaining supplies permitted. It is presumed that the full reports of the battle of Winchester were forwarded direct to the War Department by General Banks. It being now clear that the enemy had no intention of returning by the Manassas route, the following letter of April 1 was written to General Banks : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " On hoard the Commodore, April 1, 1862. "General : The change in affairs in the valley of the Shenandoah has ren- dered necessary a corresponding departure, temporarily at least, from the plan we some days since agreed upon. "In my arrangements I assume that you have with you a force amply sufficient to drive Jackson before you, provided he is not re-enforced largely. I also assume that you may find it impossible to detach anything towards Manas- sas for some days, probably not until the operations of the main army have drawn all the rebel force towards Richmond. "You are aAvarc that General Sumner has for some days been at Manassas Junction with two divisions of infantry, six batteries, and two regiments of cav- alry, and that a n.'connoissance to the llappahannock forced the cncm}' to destroy the railway bridge at Rappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad. Since that time our cavalry have found nothing on this side the Rap- pahannock in that direction, and it seems clear that we have no reason to fear any return of the rebels in that quarter. Their movements near Fredericksburg also indicate a final abandonment of that neighborliood. I doubt whether John- son will now re-enforce Jackson with a view of offensive operations. The time is probably passed when he could have gained anything by doing so. I have ordered in one of Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson, late Sumner's) to EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 65 Alexandria for embarcation. Bleuker's has been dctacbed from the army of the Potomac and ordered to report to Greneral Fremont. " Abercrombie is probably at Warrentou Junction to-day. Geary is at White Plains. " Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered out, and are now on the way to relieve the two regiments of Sumner. " Four thousand infontry and one battery leave "Washington at once for Ma- nassas. Some three thousand more will move in one or two days, and soon after some three thousand additional. "I will order Blenker to march on Strasburg and to report to you for tem- porary duty, so that should you find a large force in your front you can avail yourself of his aid as soon as possible. Please direct him to Winchester, thence to report to the Adjutant General of the army for orders; but keep him until you are sure what you have in front. " In regard to your own movements, the most important thing at present is to throw Jackson well back, and then to assume ■such a position as to enable you to prevent his return. As soon as the railway communications are re-established it will be probably important and advisable to move on Staunton, but this would require secure comraunicafions, and a force of from twenty -five thousand to thirty thousand for active operations. It should also be nearly coincident with my own move on Richmond, at all events not so long before it as to enable the rebels to concentrate on you, and then return on me. I fear that you cannot be ready in time, although it may come in very well with a force less than that I have mentioned, after the main battle near Hichmond. When General Sumner leaves AVarrenton Junction, General Abercrombie will be placed in immediate command of Manassas and Warrenton Junction, under your general orders Please inform me frequently by telegraph and otherwise as to the state of things in your front. " I am very truly yours, Major General N. P. Banks, Commanding Fifth Corps. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General Commanding " P. S. — From what I have just learned, it would seem that the regiments of cavalry intended for Warrenton Junction have gone to Harper's Ferry. Of the four additional regiments placed under your orders, two should as promptly as possible move by the shortest route on Warrenton Junction. "I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Co>nmanding." This letter needs no further explanation than to say that it was my intention, had the operations in that quarter remained under my charge, either to have resumed the defensive position marked out in the letter of jMarch 16, or to have advanced General Banks upon Staunton as might in the progress of events seem advisable. It is to be remembered that when I wrote the preceding and following letters of April 1 I had no expectation of being relieved from the charge of the opera- tions in the Shenandoah valley, the Prasident's war order No. 3 giving no inti- mation of such an intention, and that so far as reference was made to final op- erations after driving Jackson back and taking such a position as to prevent his return, no positive orders were given in the letter, the matter being left for future consideration, when the proper time arrived for a decision. From the following letter to the Adjutant General, dated April 1, 1SG2, it will be seen that I left for the defence of the national capital and its approaches, when I sailed for the Peninsula, 73,456 men, with 109 pieces of light artillery, H. Ex. Doc. 15 5 66 EEPORT OF GENEEAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. including the 32 pieces in Washington alluded to, but not enumerated in my letter to the Adjutant General. It will also be seen that I recommended other available troops in New York (more than 4,000) to be at once ordered forward to re-enforce them. "Headquarters Army OF the Potomac, " Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. "General: I have to request that you will lay the following commimication before the Hon. Secretary of War. " The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are as follows : " General Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient to give him 5,000 for the defence of Baltimore, and 1,988 available for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men. " The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 10,600 men ; other disposable troops now with General Wadsworth about 11,400 men. " The troops employed in guarding the various railways in Mai-yland amount to some 3,359 men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismovuited cavalry, and to send forward to Manassas. " General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force, which, including Colonel Geary, at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces of artillery. " I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from Governor Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force 1 should be glad to have sent to Manas- sas. Four thousand men from General Wadswortli I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, Avill make up a force under the command of General Abercrombie of something like 18,639 men. " It is my design to push General Blenker's division from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to assume a definite foiin in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination. " The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus — including Blenker's division, 10,028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery; Banks's 5th corps, which embraces the command of General Shields, 19,687 strong, with 41 guns, some 3,652 disposable cavalry, and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men — amount to about 35,467 men. "It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, say 850 men, being, with some 500 cavalry, 1,350 men on the lower Potomac. " To recapitulate : At Warrenton there is to be 7,780 men " At Manassas, say 10,859 " " In the valley of the Shenandoah 35,467 " " On the lower Potomac 1,350 " " In all 55,456 " " There would thus be left for the garrisons aiul the front of Washington, i;nder General Wadsworth, some 18,000, inclusive of the batteries under instruc- tion. '^I'he troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn, will probably number mon; than four tliousand. These should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition wliere their services may be most required. " 1 am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "GEOIIGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. "Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, " Adjutant General United States Armi/." EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 67 The following letter from General Barry shows that thirty-two (32) field guns, with men, horses, and equipments, were also left in Washington city when the army sailed. These were the hatteries under instruction referred to above : "Headquarters Inspector of Artillery, " Washington, Drcemhcr 16, 1SG2. "General : It having been stated in various public prints, and in a speech of Senator Chandler, of Michigan, in his place in the United States Senate, quoting what he stated to be a portion of the testimony of Brigadier General "Wadsworth, military governor of Washington, before the joint Senate and House committee on the conduct of the war, that Major General McClellan had left an insufficient force for the defence of Washington, and not a gun on icheels — " I have to contradict this charge as follows : " From official reports made at the time to me, (the chief of artillery of the army of the Potomac,) and now in my possession, by the commanding officer of the light artillery troops left in camp in the city of Washington by yom- orders, it appears that the following named field batteries were left : " Battery 0, 1st New York artillery, Captain Barnes, 2 guns; battery K, 1st New York artillery. Captain Crounse, 6 guns ; battery L, 2d New York artillery, Captain Robinson, 6 guns ; 9th New York independent battery. Captain Mon- zordi, 6 guns; 16th New York independent battery, Captain Locke; battery A, 2d battalion New York artillery. Captain Hogan, 6 guns ; battery B, 2d bat- talion New York artillery, Captain McMahou, 6 guns ; total of batteries, 32 guns. " With the exception of a few horses which could have been procured from the quartermaster's department in a few hours, the batteries were all fit for im- mediate service, excepting the 16th New York battery, which having been pre- viously ordered, on General Wadsworth's application, to report to him for special service, was unequipped with either guns or horses. " I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "W. F. BARRY, " Brig. Gen., Inspector of Artillery United States Army. "Maj. Gen. McClellan, " United States Army." It is true that Blenker's division, which is included in the force enumerated by me, was under orders to re-enforce General Fremont, but the following de- spatch from the Secretary of War, dated March 31, 1862, will show that I was authorized to detain him at Strasburg until matters assumed a definite form in that region, before proceeding to his ultimate destination ; in other words, until Jackson was disposed of. And had he been detained there, instead of moving on to Harper's Ferry and Franklin, under other orders, it is probable that Gen- eral Banks would have defeated Jackson, instead of being himself obliged sub- sequently to retreat to Williamsport. "War Department, "Washington, D. C, March 31, 1862. " The order in respect to Blenker is not designed to liinder or delay the movement of Richardson, or any other force. He can remain wherever you desire him as long as required for your movements, and in any position you desire. The order is simply to place him in position for re-enforcing Fnhnont, as soon as your dispositions will permit, and he may go to Harper's Ferry by such route and at such time as you shall direct. State your own wishes as to the movement, when and how it shall be made. "EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secretary of War. "Maj. Gen. McClellan." 68 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. Without including General Blenker's division, there were left 67,428 men and 85 pieces of light artillery, which, under existing circumstances, I deemed, more than adequate to insure the perfect security of Washington against any force the enemy could bring against it, for the following reasons : The light troops I had thrown forward under General Stoneman in pursuit of the rebel army, after the evacuation of Manassas and Centi-eville, had driven their rear guard across Cedar run, and subsequent expeditions from Sumner'3 corps had forced them beyond the Rappahannock. I^hey had, destroyed all the railroad bridges behind them, thereby indicating that they did not intend to return over that route. Indeed, if they had attempted such a movement, their progress must have been slow and difficult, as it would have involved the re- construction of the bridges ; and if my orders for keeping numerous cavalry patrols well out to the front, to give timely notice of any approach of the enemy, had been strictly enforced, (and I left seven regiments of cavalry for this ex- press purpose,) they could not by any possibility have reached Washington before there would have been ample time to concentrate the entire forces left for its defence, as well as those at Baltimore, at any necessary point. It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to the authorities, that the movement of the army of the Potomac Avould have the effect to draw off the hostile army from Manassas to the defence of their capital, and thus free Washington from menace. This opinion was confirmed the moment the movement commenced, or rather as soon as the enemy became aware of our intentions; for with the ex- ception of Jackson's force of some 15,000, which his instructions show to have been intended to operate in such a way as to prevent McDowell's corps from being sent to re-enforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude made its appearance in front of Washington during the progress of our operations on the Peninsula ; nor until the order was given for my return from Harrison's landing was Wash- ington again threatened. Surrounded, as Washington was, with numerous and strong fortifications, well garrisoned, it was manifest that the enemy could not afford to detach from his main army a force sufficient to assail them. It is proper to remark, that just previous to my departure for Fort Monroe, I sent my chief of staff to General Hitchcock, who at that time held staff re- lations with his excellency the President and the Secretary of War, to sub- mit to him a list of the troops I proposed to leave for the defence of Washing- ton, and the positions in Avhicli I designed posting them. General Hitchcock, after glancing his eye over the list, observed that he was not the judge of what was required for defending the capital ; that General j\[cClellan's position was such as to enable him to understand the subject much better than he did, and he presumed that if the force designated was, in his judgment, sufficient, nothing more would be required. He was then told by the chief of staff" that I would be glad to have his opinion, as an old and experienced ofiicer; to this he replied, that as I had had the entire control of the defences for a long time, I was the best judge of what was needed, and he declined to give any other expression of opinion at that time. On the 2d of April, the day following my departure for Fort Monroe, Gen- erals Hitchcock and Thomas Avere directed by the Secretary of War to ex- amine and report whether the I*resident's instructions to me, of March 8 and 13, had been complied with; on the same day their report was submitted, and their decision Avas — " That the requirement of the President, that this city (Washington) shall be left entirely secure, has not been fully complied with." The President, in his letter to me on the 9th of April, says: "And no-w- allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to bo entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops." REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 69 In the report of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, alluded to, it is acknowl- edged that there was no danger of an attack from the direction of Manassas, in these words : " In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and therefore no large force would he necessary to hold that position." That, as remarked before, was precisely the view I took of it, and this was enforced by the subsequrnt movements of the enemy. In another paragraph of the report it is stated that fifty-five thousand men was the number considered adequate for the defence of the capital. That Gen- eral McClellan, in his enumeration of the forces left, had included Banks's army corps, operating in the Shenandoah valley, biit whether this corps should be regarded as available for the protection of Washington they decline to express an opinion. At the time this report was made, the only enemy on any approach to Wash- ington was Jackson's force, in front of Banks in the Shenandoah valley, with the Manassas Gap railroad leading from this valley to Washington ; and it will be admitted, I presume, that Banks, occupying the Shenandoah valley, was iu the best position to defend not only that approach to Washington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and above. The number of troops left by me for the defence of Washington, as given in my letter to the Adjutant General, were taken from the latest official returns of that date, and these, of course, constituted the most trustworthy and authentic source from which such information could be obtained. Another statement made by General Hitchcock before the " Committee on the Conduct of the War," in reference to this same order, should be noticed. He was asked the following question : " Do you understand now that the movement made by General McClellan to Fort Monroe, and up the York river, •was in compliance with the recommendation of the council of generals com- manding corps, and held at Fairfax Court House on the 13th of March last, or in violation of it ? " To which he replied as follows : " I have considered, and do now consider, that it was in violation of the recommendation of that council in two important particulars ; one particular being that portion of this report Avliich represents the council as agreeing to the expedition by way of the Peninsula, provided the rebel steamer Merrimack could first be neutralized. That important provis- on General McClellan disregarded." ** # # * * * * ** The second particular alluded to by General Hitchcock was in reference to the troops left for the defence of Washington, which has been disposed of above. In regard to the steamer Merrimack, I have also stated that, so far as our opera- tions on York river were concerned, the power of this vessel was neutralized. I now proceed to give some of the evidence which influenced me in coming to that conclusion. Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, was sent by the President to Fort Monroe to consult with Flag-officer Goldsborough upon this subject. The result of that consultatioii is contained in the following extract from the evidence of Admiral CJoldsborough before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," viz: "I told Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, that the President might make his mind perfectly easy about the Merrimack going up York river; that she could never get there, for I had ample means to prevent that." Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testifies before the committee as follows : "General McClellan expected the navy to neutralize the Merrimack, and I promised that it should be done." 70 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. General Keyes, commanding 4tli army corps, testifies as follows before the committee : "During the time that the subject of the change of base was discussed, I had refused to consent to the Peninsula line of operations until I had sent word to the Navy Department and asked two questions : First, whether the Merrimack was certainly neutralized, or not? Second, whether the navy was in a condition to co-operate efficiently with the army to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester point? To both of these, answers were returned in the affirmative; that is, the Merrimack was neutralized, and the navy was in a condition to co- operate efficiently to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester point." Before starting for the Peninsxila, I instructed Lieutenant Colonel B. S. Alexander, of the United States corps of engineers, to visit Manassas Junction and its vicinity for the purpose of determining upon the defensive woi-ks neces- sary to enable us to hold that place with a small force. The accompanying letters from Colonel Alexander will show what steps were taken by him to carry into effect this important order. I regret to say that tliose who succeeded me in command of the region in front of Washington, whatever were the fears for its safety did not deem it neces- sary to carry out my plans and instructions to them. Had Manassas been placed in condition for a strong defence, and its communications secured as recom- mended by Colonel Alexander, the result of General Pope's campaign Avould probably have been different. "Washington, D. C, April 2, 1862. "Sir: Yoii will proceed to Manassas at as early a moment as practicable and mark on the ground the works for the defence of that place, on the positions which I indicated to you yesterday. You will find two carpenters, experienced in this kind of work, ready to accompany you, by calling on Mr. Dougherty, the master carpenter of the Treasury extension. " The general idea of the defence of this position is, to occupy the fringe of elevation which lies about half way between Manassas depot and the junction of the railroad, with a series of works open to the rear, so that they may be commanded by the work hereafter to be described. " There will be at least four of these works, three of them being on the left of the railroad leading from Alexandria, at the positions occupied by the enemy's works. The other on the right of this road, on the position we examined yesterday. The works of the enemy to the north of this latter position, numbered 1 and 2 on Lieutenant Comstock's sketch, may also form a part of the front line of our defence; but the sides of these works looking towards Manassas station should be levelled, so that the interior of the works may be seen from the latter position. " Embrasures should be arranged in all these works for field artilltny. The approaches should be such that a battery can drive into the; works. The number of embrasures in each battery will de])end upon its size and the ground to be commanded. It is supposed there will be from four to eight embra- sures in each battery. "The other works of the enemy looking towards the east and south may be stengthencd so as to afford sufficient deiencc in these directions. 'Phe AvorkNo. 3 in Lieutenant Com.stock's sketch may be also strengthened and arranged for field artillery, Mdien time will permit. This work is in a good position to cover a retreat, which would be made down the valley in which the railroad runs towards Bull run. " At Manassas station there should be; a fort constructed. The railroad will pass through this fort, and the depot, if there should be one built, should be placed in its rear. This latter work should be regarded as the key to the posi- tion. It should be as largo as the nature of the ground will permit. EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLKLLAN. 71 "By going: clown the slopes, wliicli are not steep, it may bo made large enough to accommodate 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the position need not be cut away ; it will be better to throw up the earth into a large traverse, which may also be a bomb-proof. Its profile should be strong, and its ditches should be flanked. It should receive a heavy armament of 24 or 32 pounders, with some rifled (Parrott) 20 or 30 pounders. Its guns should command all the exterior works, so that these works could be of no use to the enemy, should he take them. In accommodating the fort to the ground this consideration should not be lost sight of. "After tracing these works on the ground, youAvill make a sketch embracing the whole of them, showing their relative positions and size. This sketch should embrace the junction of the railroads and the ground for some distance around the main work. It need not be made with extreme accuracy. The distances may be paced, or measured, with a tape line. The bearings may be taken by compass. " Having located the works and prepared your sketch, you will report to Captain Frederick E. Prime, of the corps of engineers, who will furnish yuu the means of construction. " It is important that these works should be built with the least possible delay. You will, therefore, expedite matters as fast as possible. "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "B. S. ALEXANDER, '' Lieute.nant Colonel, Aide-de-Cainp. "Captain Fred. R. Munther, Present.''^ "Washington, April 6, 1862. "Sir: I enclose you herewith a copy of the instructions which I gave to Captain Munther, in reference to the defences of Manassas. " As there has been a new department created, (that of the Rappahannock,) it is possible that you and I, as well as General McClellan, arc relieved from the further consideration of this subject at the present time. " I will, however, state for your information, should the subject ever come before you again, that in my opinion the communication Avith Manassas by land should be secured. " To effect this in the best manner, so far as my observations extended, I think the bridge over Bull run, near Union mills and just above the railroad bridge, should be rebuilt or thoroughly repaired, and that a small work, or two or three open batteries, should be erected on the adjacent heights to protect it as well as the railroad bridge. " The communication by land would then be through or near Ceutrcville, over the road used by the enemy. " I wi'ite this for fear something should detain me here ; but I hope to leave here to join you to-morrow. My health is much improved. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "B. S, ALEXANDER, "Lieutenant Colonel, Aide-de-Camp. "Brigadier General J. G. Barnard, " Chief Engineer, Army of the FotomacJ'' I may be permitted also to mention that the plans (also unexecuted by my successor) indicated in my letter of instructions to General Banks, dated March 16, 1862, for intrenching Chester gap and the point where the JManassas rail- road crosses the Shenandoah, were for the purpose of preventing even the at- tempt of such a raid as that of Jackson in the month of May following. 72 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. MILITARY INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST PERIOD. Before taking up the liistoiy of the embarcation and Peninsula campaign, I shoukl remark that during the foil and winter of lS61-'62, while the army of the Potomac was in position in front of Washington, reconnoissances were made from time to time, and skirmishes frequently occurred, which were of great im- portance in the education of the troops, accustoming them to the presence of the enemy, and giving them confidence under fire. There were many instances of individual gallantry displayed in these affairs; the reports of them will be found among the documents which accompany this report. One of the most brilliant of these affairs was that which took place at Drains- ville on December 20, 1861, when the 3d brigade of McCall's division, under Brigadier General E. 0. C. Ord, with Easton's battery, routed and pursued four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of six pieces. The operations of Brigadier General F. W. Lander on the upper Potomac, during the months of January and February, 1862, frustrated the attempts of General Jackson against the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, Cumberland, &c., and obliged him to fall back to Winchester. His constitution was impaired by the hardships he had experienced, and on the 2d March the fearless General Lander expired, a victim to the excessive fatigue of the campaign. SECOND PERIOD. CHAPTER I. The council composed of the four corps commanders, organized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the army of the Potomac upon Richmond. For the prompt and successful execution of the projected operation, it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole of the four corps should be employed, with at least the addition often thousand men drawn from the forces in the vicinitj' of Fortress Moin-oe, that position and its dependencies being regarded as amply protected by the naval force in its neigliburhood, and the advance of the main army up the Peninsula, so that it could be safely left with a small garrisoii. In addition to the land forces, the co-operation of the navy was desired in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in contr jlling the York and James rivers for the protection of our flanks, and the use of the transports bringing supplies to the army. With these expectations, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my ori- ginal plan of moving by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base; adopted. In the arrangements for the transportation of the army to the Peninsula by water, the vessels were ori- ginally ordered to rendezvous mainly at Annapolis; but upon the evacuation of Manassas and the batteries of the lower Potomac by the eneni}', it became more convenient to embark the troops and material at Alexandria, and orders to that eflect were at once given. In making the preliminary arrangements for the movement it was de- termined that the first corps, General McDowell's, should move as a unit first, and eflect a landing either at the Sand-box, some four miles south of Yorktowu, in order to turn all the eiiem3''s defences at Ship point, Howard's bridge, Big Ijethel, &c., or else, should existing circumstances render it pre- ferable, land on the Gloucester side of York river and move on West Point. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 73 The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, therefore, to expedite matters, I decided to embark the army l\v divisions, as transports arrived, keeping army corps together as mucli as possible, and to collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In determining- the order of embarca- tion, convenience and expedition were especially consulted, except tiiat the first corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to move it in mass to its point of disembarcation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might then be determined. On the nth of March Hamilton's division, of the 3d corps, embarked at Alexandria and proceeded to Fort Monroe, with the following orders : "Washington, I). C, March 11, 1862. " You will, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, report to General Wool and request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from General McClellan. Should General Wool require the services of your division in repelling an attack, you wnll obey his orders and use every effort to carry out his views. "R. B. MAKCY, "Chief of Staff. " General C. S. Hamilton, " Commanding Division." On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, General Fitz- John Porter's division, of the same corps, embarked. General Heintzelinan was ordered to accompany it, under the following instructions : " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Seminary, March 22, 1862. " General r Upon the disembarcation of Porter's division at Fort Monroe, I have to request that you will move your two divisions, Porter's and Ham- ilton's, some three or four miles out from the fort to find good camping places, where wood and water can be readily obtained, and where your positions will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it advisable to place one division on or near the road leading to Yorktown from Newport News — the other upon that leading to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe. If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy communication and mutual support between the two divisions, it will be best to place one on each road. It will be best to remain pretty near the fort for the present, in order to give the impression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will do well, however, to push strong reconnoissances well to the front to ascertain the position of the enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possible, re-enforce you by the 3d division of your corps, and it is probable that a part or the whole of the 4th corps will also move from Fort Monroe. This will probabl_y be deteruiined before your disembarcation is completed, and 3'ou will be informed accordingly. " My desire would be to make no important move in advance until we are fully prepared to follow it up and give the enemy no time to recover. "The quartermaster of your corps will receive detailed instructions in regard to land transportation from General Van Vliet. " It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay, and have it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, ammunition, &c., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied without delay. "Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of things on the new field of operations, and whatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy. 74 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. " Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, and endeavor to send out spies, " I am very truly yours, " GEO. B. McCLELLAX, " Major General, Commanding. "Brigadier General S. P. Heintzelman, " Commanding ScZ Coi'ps." The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports could be sup- plied. On the 1st of April I embarked with the headquarters on the steamer Commodore, and reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d. In consequence of the dela}'' in the arrival of the horse transports at Alexandria, but a small portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artillery reserve had not yet completed its disembarcation. I found there the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry and the 5th regular cavalry; the 2d regular cavalry and a portion of the 1st had arrived, but not dis- embarked. So few wagons had arrived that it was not possible to move Casey's division at all for several days, while the other divisions were obliged to move with scant supplies. As to the force and position of the enemy the information then in our possession was vague and untrustworth3^ xMuch of it was obtained from the staff officers of General Wool, and was simply to the effi^ct that York- town was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong water batteries on the York river, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, under command of General J. B. Magruder. Maps, which had been pre- pared by the topographical engineers under General Wool's command, were furnished me, in which the Warwick river was represented as flowing par- allel to, but not crossing, the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry island a real island ; and we had no infor- mation as to the true course of the Warwick across the Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of works which it covered. Information which I had collected during the winter placed General Magrudcr's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of Gen- eral Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15,000. It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near Williamsburg. Knowing tliat General Huger could easily spare some troops to re-enforce Yorktown, that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army of Ma- nassas could be brouglit rapidly by the James and York rivers to the same point, I proposed to invest that town without delay. The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U. S. topographical engineers, attached to General Wool's staff, given to me as tiie result of several months' labor, indicated the feasibility of the design. It was also an object of primary importance to reach the vicinity of Y^orktown before the enemy was re-enforced sufficiently to enable him to hold in force his works at Big- Bethel, Howard's bridge, Ship ])oint, &c., on the direct road to Yorktown and Young's mills, on the road from Newport News. This was the more urgent, as it was now evident that some days must elapse before the first corps could arrive. Everything possible was done to hasten the disoinbavcatiou of the cavalry, artillery and wagons in the harbor; and on tlie 3d the orders of march were given for the Ibllowing day. There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the 3d c:)ri)s, two divisions of the 4th corps, and one division of the 2d corps, and Sykes's brigade of regular infantry, together REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 75 with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before named, in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division of artillery. Eichardsou's and Hooker's divisions of the 2d and 3d corps had not ar- rived, and Casey's division of the 4th corps was unable to move for want of wag'ons. Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the "War Depart- ment placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and au- thorizing me to draw from the troops under General AVool a division of about 10,000 men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. During the night of the 3d I received a telegram from the Adjutant General of the army, stating that, by the President's order, I was deprived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command, and for- bidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction. This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it. On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James river was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined in- fluence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the confederate steamers Merrimack, Yorktown, Jamestown, andTeazer. Flag-OfBcer Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimack ; and as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me, and materially affected my plans. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy pre- pared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our laud batteries had partially silenced the works. I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements, to drive before me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James river, and press on to Eichmond before he should be materially re-enforced from other portions of the territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be developed which frustrated these apparently' well-grounded expectations. I determined then to move the two divisions of the 4th corps by the New- port News and Williamsburg road, to take up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburg, while the two divisions of the 3d corps moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown ; the reserves moving so as to support either corps as might prove necessaiy. I designed, should the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the 1st corps, re-enforced if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse what- ever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel him to abandon his positions. In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious diflS- culties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general feature, we found to be inaccu- rately described in essential particulars in the oidy maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. Tliis difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia, through which Piy military operations have extended. Reconnoissances, frequently under fire proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however 76 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. truthful tlieir reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information. On the od the following orders were given for the movement of the 4th : " Porter's and Hamilton's divisions and Averill's cavalry of the 3d corps, and Sedgwick's division of the 2d corps, under Brigadier General Heintzel- man, commanding 3d corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: Porter's division with Averill's cavalry at 6 a. m., over the Newmarket and New bridges to Big Bethel and Howard's bridge. This division will send forward to the batteries where the Sliip Point road intersects the main York- town road a sufficient force to huld that point, and cut off" the garrison of the Ship Point batteries. The whole division may be used for this purpose if necessary, and if possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will encamp at Howard's bridge. "Hamilton's division will march at T a. m. by the New bridge road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howard's creek. " Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a. m. by the Newmarket bridge, taking the direct I'oad to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Hovv^ard's bridge. "Brigadier General Keyes, commanding 4th corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's divisions at 6 a. m., (Smith's division in advance,) by the James river road. The 5th regular cavalry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smith's division, which will encamp at Young's mills, throw- ing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's creek. "The reserve cavalry, artillerj^ and infantry will move at 8.30 a. m., by the Newmarket bridge, to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On the march it will keep in rear of Sedgwick's division." The following is an extract from the order issued on the 4tli for the march of the 5th: " The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (5th:) " General Keyes will move forward Smith's division at 6 a. m., via War- wick Court House and the road leading near the old ship yard, to the 'Half- way House' on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. " General Couch's division will march at 6 a. m., to close up on General Smith's division at the ' Halfway House.' "General Keyes's command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing ridge near the ' Halfway House,' so as to prevent the escape of the garri- son at Yorktown by land, and prevent re-enibrcements being thrown in. " General Heintzelinan will move forward General Porter's two rear brigades at 6 a. m., upon the advan(;ed guard, when the entire division will advance to a point about two and three-quarters miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly to the north, and where a road comes in from Warwick Court House. "General Hamilton's division will move at 6 a. m., and follow General Porter's division, camping as near it as possible. " General Sedgwick's division will march at 5 a. m., as far as the Warwick road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Doctor Powers's house, and will await further orders. "The reserve will mtircli at fi a. m., up!)n the main Yorktowii road, halting for furth(M' orders at Doctor Powers's house; the infantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear. " Ceneral Sedgwick's division will, for the present, act with the reserve, and he will receive orders from headc^uarters." EEPORT OF GENERAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 77 In giving- these orders of march for the 4th and 5th, it was expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance of the 3d corps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young's mills, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary for him to abandon those at Howard's bridge, and the advance thence on Yorktown would place Ship point in our possession, together with its garrison, unless they abandoned it promptly. The result answered the expectation. During the afternoon of the 4th, General Keyes obtained information of the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy in a strong position at Lee's mills. The nature of that position in relation to the Warwick not being at that time understood, I instructed General Keyes to attack and carry this pi)sition upon coming in front of it. Earl}^ in the afternoon of the 5th the advance of each column was brought to a halt, that of Heintzelmau (Porter's division) in front of Yorktown, after overcoming some resistance at Big Bethel and Howard's bridge; that of Kej-es (Smith's division) unexpectedly before the enemy's works at Lee's mills, where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses War- wick river. The progress of each column had been retarded by heavy rains on that day, which had made the roads almost impassable to the infantry of Ke^'es's column, and impassable to all but a small portion of the artillery, while the ammunition, provisions and forage could not be brought up at all. When General Keyes approached Lee's mills his left flank was exposed to a sharp artillery fire from the further bank of the Warwick, and upon reach- ing the vicinity of the mill he found it altogether stronger than was ex- pected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick river, and incapable of being carried by assault. The troops composing the advance of each column were, during the afternoon, under a warm artillery fire, the sharpshooters even of the right column being engaged when covering reconnoissances. It was at this stage and moment of the campaign that the following tele- gram was sent tome: " Adjutant General's Office, " April 4, 18G2. " By direction of the President, General McDowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail. "L. THOMAS, "AdJutatU General. " General McClellan." The President having promised, in an interview following his order of March 31, withdrawing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should be repeated — that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no further deductions from the force upon which its operations had been planned — I may confess to having been shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, removed nearly 60,000 men from my conmiand, and reduced my force by more than one-third, after its task had been assigned; its operations planned; its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply com- mitted to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations winch had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a difierent and a •less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations im- possible. It was a fatal error. 78 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. It was now, of course, out of my power to turn Yorktown by West Point. I had, therefore, no choice left but to attack it directly in front, as 1 best could witii the force at my command. Reconnoissauces made under fire on that and the following- day deter- mined that the sources of the Warwick river were near Yorktown, com- manded by its guns, while that stream, for some distance from its mouth on the James river, was controlled by the confederate gunboats; that tlie fords had been destroyed by dams, the approaches to which were generally through dense forests and deep swamps, and defended by extensive and foruiidable works; that timber felled for defensive purposes and the Hooding of the roads, caused by the dams, liad made these works apparently inaccessible and im- possible to turn; that Yorktown was strongly fortified, armed and garri- soned, and connected with the defences of the Warwick by forts and in- trenchmeuts, the ground in front of which was swept by the guns of York- town. It was also ascertained that the garrisons had been, and were daily being re-enforced by troops from Norfolk and the army under General J. E. Johnston. Heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe impassable, and delayed the arrival of troops, ammunition and supplies, while storms pre- vented for several days the sailing of transports from Hampton roads, and the establishment of depots on the creeks of York river, near the army. The ground bordering the Warwick river is covered by very dense and extensive forests, the clearings being small and few. This, with the com- parative flatness of the country, and the alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, rendered thorough reconnoissauces slow, dangerous and difficult, yet it was impossible otiierwise to determine whether an assault was any- where practicable, or whetiier the more tedious but sure operations of a siege must be resorted to. I made, on the 6th and 7th, close personal reconnoissauces of the right and left of the enemy's positions, which, with information acquired already, convinced me that it was best to prepare for an assault by the preliminary employment of heavy guns, and some siege operations. Instant assault would have been simple folly. On the 7th I telegraphed to the President as follows: " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "April 7, 1862. " Your telegram of yesterday is received. In reply, I have the honor to state that my entire force for duty amounts to only about (85,000) eighty- five thousand men. General Wool's command, as you will observe from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, altiiough he has most cheerfully co-operated with me. The onl;y use that can be made of his com- mand is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time only lirty-three thousand men have joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. " Please refer to my despatch to the tSecretary of War to-night, for the details of our present situation. " GEO. B. McOLELLAN, " Major General, " To the President, Wanhinglon, D. CP On the same day 1 sent the following: " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " In front of Yorktown, " April 7, 1862—7 p. m. "Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while I was absent, examining the enemy's right, which 1 did pretty closely. EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 79 '"Tlie whole Hue of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strong-ly defended by detaclied redoubts and other fortifica- tions, armed with heav}' and light guns. The approaches, except at York- town, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at most, two passag-es, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be necessar}' to resort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege operations, before we assault. All the prisoners state that General J. E. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong re-enforcements. It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands — probably not less than (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and probably more. In con- sequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corp>!, my force is pos- sibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position. " I am under great obligations to you for the oifer that the whole force and material of the government will be as fully and as speedily under my command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had not been created. "Since my arrangements were made for this campaign, at least (50,000) fifty thousand men have been taken from my command. Since m}' despatch of the 5th inst., five divisions have been in close observation of the enemy, and frequently exchanging shots. When my present command all joins, I i:'jall have about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from which a large force must be taken for guards, scouts, &c. With this army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them; but were I in pos- session of their intrenchments, and assailed by double my numbers, I should have no fears as to the result. "Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course, com- mence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's works, but to do this with a reasonable de- gree of certainty requires, in my judgment, that I should, if possible, have at least the whole of the 1st corps to land upon the Severn river and attack Gloucester in the rear. "My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for this purpose, without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag- Officer Goldsborough thinks the works too strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter and one of the commander of the gunboats here. " GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." I had provided a small siege train and moderate supplies of intrenching tools for such a contingency as the present. Immediate steps were taken to secure the necessary additions. While the engineer officers were engagcni in ascertaining the character and strengtli of all the defences, and the con- figuration of the ground in front of Yorktown, in order to determine the p(,)int of attack and to develop the approaches, the troops were occupied in opening roads to the depots established at the nearest available points, on branches of York river. Troops were brought to the front as rapidly as possible, and on the 10th of April the army was posted as follows : Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, Hooker's, and Hamilton's divi- sions, in front of Yorktown, extending in the order named, from the mouth of Wormley's creek to the Warwick road, opposite Winn's mills. Sumner's corps — Sedgwick's division only having arrived — on the left of Hamilton, 80 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLA.N. extending' down to Warwick and opposite to Winn's mills works. Keyes's corps (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) on the left of Sedgwick, facing the works at the one-gun battery, Lee's mills, &c., on the west bank of the Warwick. Sumner, after the 6th of April, commanded the left wing, composed of his own and Kej'es's corps. Throughout the preparations for, and during the siege of Yorktown, I kept the corps under General Keyes, and afterwards th(? left wing, under General Snmner, engaged in ascertaining the character of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, and the enemy intrenched upon the right bank, with the intention, if possible, of overcoming them and breaking that line of defence, so as to gain possession of the road to Williamsburg, and cut off Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces under General Heint- zelman were engaged in similar efforts upon the works between Winn's mills and Yorktown. General Keyes's report of the lOth of April, enclosing reports of brigade commanders engaged in reconnoissances up to that day, said, " that no part of his (the enemy's line opposite his own) line, so far as discovered, can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life." Eeconnoissances on the right flank demonstrated the fact that the War- wick was not passable in that direction, except over a narrow dam, the approaches to which were swept by several batteries, and intrenchments which could be filled quickly with supports sheltered by the timber immedi- ately in rear. General Barnard, chief engineer of the army of the Potomac, whose posi- tion entitled his opinions to the highest consideration, expressed the judg- ment that those formidable works could not, with any reasonable degree of certainty, be carried by assault. General Keyes, commanding 4th army corps, after the examination of the enemy's defences on tlie left, before alluded to, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, United States Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not strictly official, it de- scribes the situation at that time in some respects so well, that I have taken the liberty of introducing it here: " Headquarters 4th Corps, " Warwick Court House, Va., April *I, 1862. "My Dear Senator : The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that /our army corps should be employed, and that the navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I under- stood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James river. " To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, which by the President's or- der was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of the 2d corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of operations, and from the army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up James river, for fear of the Merrimack. " Tlie above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Major General McT)ow(^ll and Brigadier Generals Sumner, Heiiilzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by Major General McClcllan, who first proposed Urbana as our base. "This army being reduced by forty-five thousand troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for. " I command the James river column, and I left my camp near Newport News the morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting my ;:rtillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, and one of my divisions had ) ot all arrived in camp the day I left, and for the want of transportation EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 81 has not yet joined me. So you will observe that not a day was lost in the advance, and in fact we marched so quickly, and so rapidly, that many of our animals were twenty-four and forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. But notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, we were stopped by a line of defence nine or ten miles long, strongly fortified by breast- works, erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream, or succession of ponds, nowhere fordable, one terminus being Yorktown, and the other ending in the James river, which is commanded by the enemy's gunboats. York- town is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side it and Gloucester are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack either. " The approaches on one side are generally through low, swampy, or thickly wooded ground, over roads which we are obliged to repair or to make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving re-enforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an in- vading force in any country. " You will, then, ask why I advocated such a line for our operations ? My reasons are few, but I think good. " With proper assistance from the navy we could take Yorktown, and then with gunboats on both rivers we could beat any furce opposed to us on Warwick river, because the shot and shell from the gunboats would nearly overlap across the Peninsula ; so that if the enemy should retreat — and retreat he must — he would have along way to go without rail or steam transportation, and every soul of his army must fall into our hands or be destroyed. " Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was, that this line, it was expected, would furnish water transportation nearly to Rich- mond. " Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next ? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains command of James river, and we do not first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible for us to subsist this army 'three marches beyond where it is now. As the roads are at present, it is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist it in the position it now occupies. " You will see, therefore, by what I have said, that the force originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I thought the four army corps necessaiy when I supposed the navy would co-operate, and when I judged of the obstacles to be encountered by what I learned from maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all other sources, how much more should I think the full complement of troops requisite now that the navy cannot co-operate, and now that the strength of the enemy's lines and the number of his guns and men prove to be almost immeasurably greater than I had been led to expect. The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here, who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of being increased beyond the numbers we now have to oppose to him. Independently of the strength of the lines in front of us, and of the force of the enemy behind them, we cannot advance until we get command of either York river or James river. The efficient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, absolutely essential, and so I considered it when I voted to change our base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe. " An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown; and if several strong gunboats could be scut up James river also, our success will be certain and complete, and the rebellion will soon be put down. " On the other hand, we must butt against the enemy's works with heavy artillery, and a great waste of time, life, and material. H. Ex. Doc. 15 6 82 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. "If we break through and advance, both our flanks will be assailed from two great water-courses in the hands of the enemy ; our supplies would give out, and the enemy, equal if not superior in numbers, would, with the other advantages, beat and destroy this army. "The greatest master of the art of war has said, 'that if you would in- vade a country successfully you must have one line of operations, and one army, under one general.' But what is our condition ? The State of Vir- ginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six gen- erals, viz : Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the scrap over the Chesapeake, in the care of Dix. " The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it, the rebel- lion will be crushed — if we lose it, the consequences will be more horrible than I care to tell. The plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the means pro- posed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say that our success will be uncertain. "It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the 1st corps to have a separate department, and as this letter advocates his return to General McClellan's command, it is proper to state that I am not at all influenced by personal regard or dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured into xxvy ears, I must believe that, in regard to my present fine command, I owe much to General McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. But I have disregarded all such oflficiousness, and I have from last July to the present day supported General McClellan, and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good will as though he had been my brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so to the last, and so long as he is my commander. And I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the un- derstanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means suflicient, and with- out modification the enterprise was certain of success. But with the reduc- tion of force and means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain success. " Do not look Upon this communication as the offspring of despondency. I never despond ; and when you see me working the hardest, you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working now to my utmost.' " Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect, " Your most obedient servant, " E. D. KEYES, " Brigadier General, Commanding ilh Army Corps. " ITon. Ir.a. Harris, U. S. Senate." On the 1th of April, and before the arrival of the divisions of Generals Hooker, Richardson and Casey, I received the following despatches from the President and Secretary of War : "Washington, April 6, 1862 — S p. m. " Yours of II a. m. to-day received. Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbur3''s brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not be, interfered with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can. " A. LINCOLN, President. " General G. B. McClellan." REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 83 "Washington, April 6, 1862— 2 jtj. m. " The President directs me to say that your despatch to him has been received. General Sumner's corps is on the road to join you, and will g-o forward as fast as possible. 'Franklin's division is now on the advance towards Manassas. There is no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to bo of service in your present operations. Tele- graph frequently, and all in the power of the government shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require. "E.M.STANTON, " Secretary of War. " General G. B. McClellan." By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty good knowledge of the posi- tion and strength of the enemy's works, and the obstacles to be overcome. On that day I received the following letter from the President : "Washington, Ajyril 9, 1862. " My Dear Sir : Your despatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. " Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it — certainly not without reluctance. " After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the de- fence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to goto General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Poto- mac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. This presented, or would pre- sent, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the com- manders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. " I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction ; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substi- tute something for it myself And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to "be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented b^^ less than 20,000 unorganized troops ? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade. "There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thou- sand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 thou with j^ou and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for ? "As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away. " I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time. And if so, I think it is the precise time for 3'ou to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you — that is, he will 84 EEPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcc- ments alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the jus- tice to remember I always insisted that going' down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difQculty ; that we would find the same enemj^ and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. "I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act. "Yours, very truly, "A. LINCOLN. " Major General McClellan." With great deference to the opinions and wishes of his excellency the President, I most respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which I have presented and those contained in the accompanying letter of General Keyes, with the reports of General Barnard and other officers, as furnishing a reply to the above letter. His excellency could not judge of the formidable character of the works before us as well as if he had been on the ground ; and whatever might have been his desire for prompt action, (certainly no greater than mine,) I feel confident if he could have made a personal inspec- tion of the enemy's defences, he would have forbidden me risking the safety of the army and the possible successes of the campaign on a sanguinary assault of an advantageous and formidable position, which, even if success- ful, could not have been followed up to any other or better result than would have been reached by the regular operations of a siege. Still less could I forego the conclusions of my most instructed judgment for the mere sake of avoiding the personal consequences intimated in the Presi- dent's despatch. The following extracts from the report of the chief engineer (Brigadier General J. G. Barnard) embody the result of our rcconnoissances, and give, with some degree of detail, the character and strength of the defences of Yorktown and the Warwick, and some of the obstacles which the army contended against and overcame. Extracts from General Barnard's report. " The accompanying drawing (map No. 2) gives with accuracy the out- line and armament of the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with the de- tached works immediately connected with it. " The three bastioned fronts, looking towards our approaches, appear to have been earliest built, and have about fifteen feet thickness of parapet and eight feet to ten feet depth of ditch, the width varying much, but never being less at top of scarp than fifteen feet — I think generally nuich more. "The works extending around the town, from the western salient of fronts just mentioned, appear to have been finished during the past winter and spring. They liave formidable profiles, eighteen feet thickness of parapet, and generally ten feet depth of ditch. " The water batteries had generally eighteen feet parapet, the guns in barbette. " They were (as well as all the works mentioned) carefully constructed with well-made sod revetments. EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 85 " There were numerous traverses between the guns, and ample magazines ; how sufficient in bomb-proof qualities I am unable to say. " The two first guns of the work on the heights bear upon the water as well as the land, and were of heavy calibre. " The list herewith gives all the guns in position, or for which there were emplacements. The vacant emplacements were all occupied before the evacuation by siege guns, rifled 4^-inch 24-pounders, and 18-pounders. "In Fort Magruder (the first exterior work) there were found one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pounder, and one 8-inch siege howitzer; the two former in barbette. The sketch will show the emplacements for guns on field and siege carriages; making, I think, with the foregoing, twenty-two. Two of these were placed behind traverses, with embrasures covered by blindages- " The two external redoubts, with the connecting parapets, formed a re-entrant with the fronts of attack, and all the guns bore on our ap- proaches. " It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept by the fire of at least forty-nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them the most formidable guns known. Besides that, two-thirds of the guns of the water batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right batteries, though under disadvantageous circumstances. " The ravine behind wliich the left of the Yorktown fronts of attack was placed was not very difficult, as the heads formed depressions in front of their left, imperfectly seen by their fire, and from which access could be had to the ditches; but we could not be sure of the fact before tlie evacua- tion. The enemy held, by means of a slight breastwork and rifle trenches, a position in advance of the heads of these ravines as far forward as the burnt house. "The ravines which head between the Yorktown fortifications and the exterior works are deep and intricate. Tiiey were tolerably well seen, how- ever, by the works which run westwardly from the Yorktown works, and which were too numerous and complicated to be traced on paper. " Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to have been built at an early period. " The external connexion between this work was first a rifle trench, pro- bably afterwards enlarged into a parapet, with external ditch and an em- placement for four guns in or near the small redan in the centre. "Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulments, with connecting boyaus not fully arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended probably to protect their camps and reserves against the destructive eflects of our artillery. " From the ' red redoubt' these trenches and epaulments ran to the woods and rivulet which forms one head of the Warwick, and continue almost without break to connect with the works at Wynn's mill. This stream, just mentioned, whatever be its name, (the term ' V/arwick,' according to some, applying only to the tidal channel from the James river up as high as Lee's mill,) was inundated by a number of dams from near where its head is crossed by the epaulments mentioned down to Lee's mill. " Below Lee's mill the Warwick follows a tortuous course through salt marshes of two hundred yards or three hundred yards in width, from which the land rises up boldjy to a height of thirty or forty feet. " The first group of works is at Wyim's mill, where there is a dam and bridge. The next is to guard another dam between Wynn's and Lee's mills; (this is the point attacked by General Smith on the IGtli ultimo, and where Lieutenant Merrill was wounded; the object of the attack was merely to prevent the further construction of works and feel the strength of the position.) A work, of what strength is not known, was at the sharp angle of 86 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. the stream just above Lee's mill, and a formidable group of works was at Lee's mill, where there was also a dam and bridge. " From Lee's mill a line of works extends across Mulberry island, or is supposed to do so. " At Southal's landing is another formidable group of works, and from here, too, they extend apparently across to the James river. "These groups of field-works were connected by rifle trenches w parapets for nearly the whole distance. " They are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of of them I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country affords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, &c., was skilfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times. " The country on both sides of the Warwick, from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impas- sable during the heavy rains we have constantly had, except where our own labors had corduroyed them. " If we could have broken the enemy's line across the isthmus we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practica))le, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handling our forces, (owing to the imprac- ticable character of the country,) to do so. "If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of that place, the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault." The plan of the approaches and their defences as determined upon and finally executed is exhibited on the accompanying map, (No. — .) It was, in words, to open the first parallel as near as possible to the works of the enemy, and under its protection to establish almost simultaneously batteries along the whole front, extending from York river on the right to the War- wick on the left, a cord of about one mile in length. The principal ap- proaches were directed against the east end of the main work, which was most heavily armed and bore both on the water and land, and lay between Wormley's creek and York river. There also were placed the most of the batteries designed to act against the land front to enfilade the water bat- teries, and to act upon Gloucester. 1 designed at the earliest moment to open simultaneously with several batteries, and as soon as the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of land between Wormley's creek and the Warwick, were crippled and their fii*e kept down, to push the trenches as far forward as necessary and to assault Yorktown and the adjacent works. The approaches to the batteries, the necessary bridges, and the roads to the depots, had been vigorously pushed to completion by the troops under Generals Heintzelman and Sunnier, and were available for infantry, and in some instances for artillery, on the ITth of April, when the batteries and their connexions were commenced, and labor upon them kept up night and day until finished. Some of the batteries on easy ground and concealed from the view of the enemy were early completed and armed, and held ready for any emergency, but not permitted to open, as the return fire of the enemy would interfere too much with the labor on other and more import- ant works. The completion of the more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed by storms, preventing the landing of guns and ammunition. It having been discovered that the enemy were receiving artillery stores at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 1 battery No. 1 was opened with effect upon the wharf and town. On the 22d of April General Franklin, with his division from General EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 87 McDowell's corps, had arrived and reported to me. The garrison of Glou- cester point had been re-enforced and the works strengthened; but as this division was too small to detach to the Severn, and no more troops could be spared, I determined to act on Gloucester by disembarking it on the noi-th bank of the York river, under the protection of the gunboats. The troops were mainly kept on board ship while the necessary preparations were made for landing them, and supporting them in case of necessity. For a full account of this labor I refer to the report of Lieutenant Colonel B. S. Alexander, of the engineer corps, detailed for this expedition. While the siege works were being rapidly completed, the roads on the left wing necessary for communication and advance were opened and cordu- royed over the marshes, batteries were erected to silence the enemy's guns, and drive him from his works at Wynn's and Lee's mills, preparatory to the general attack. Active reconnoissances were continually going on, and attempts in force made to drive the enemy from the banks. The result of various reconnoissances made under the immediate direction of General W. F. Smith, commanding second division fourth corps, led to the belief that the weakest point of that part of the enemy's lines was oppo- site a field where it was ascertained that there was a dam covered by a bat- tery known to contain at least one gun. It was determined to push a strong reconnoissance on this point to silence the enemy's fire, and ascertain the actual strength of the position. Being prepared to sustain the reconnoitring party by a real attack, if found expe- dient. General W. F. Smith was directed to undertake the operation on the 16th of April. He silenced the fire of the enemy's guns, discovered the existence of other works previously concealed and unknown, and sent a strong party across the stream, which was finally forced to retire with some loss. Smith intrenched himself in a position immediately overlooking the dam and the enemy's works, so as to keep them under control, and prevent the enemy from using the dam as a means of crossing the Warwick to an- noy us. Many times towards the end of the month the enemy attempted to drive in our pickets, and take our rifle-pits near Yorktown, but always without success. As the siege progressed, it was with great difficulty that the rifle-pits on the right could be excavated and held, so little covering could be made against the hot fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry. Tlieir guns con- tinued firing up to a late hour of the night of the 3d of May. Our batteries would have been ready to open on the morning of the 6th May at latest; but on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that the enemy had ali-eady been compelled to evacuate his position during the night, leaving behind him all his heavy guns, uninjured, and a large amount of ammunition and supplies. For the details of the labor of the siege I re- fer to the accompanying reports and journals of Brigadier General J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, charged with the selections, laying out, and com- pletion of the approaches and batteries; of Brigadier General ^V'm. F. Barry, chief of artillery, charged with arming and supplying with ammuni- tion all the siege and field batteries; and of Brigadier General Fitz-John Porter, director of the siege, to whom were assigned the guarding of the trenches, the assembling and distribution of the working parties, &c., &c. Early in the morning of the 4th, on the enemy's abandoning his lines at Yorktown, I ordered all the available cavalry force, with four batteries of horse artillery, under Brigadier General Stoneman, chief of cavalry, iu im- mediate pursuit by the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, witli orders to harass the enemy's rear, and try to cut off such of his forces as had taken the Lee's mill and Williamsburg road. 88 REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. General Heintzelman was directed to send Hooker's division forward on the Yorktown and Williamsburg i-oad to support General Stoneman ; and Smith was ordered to proceed with his division upon the Lee's mill and Williamsburg road for the same purpose. Afterwards, the divisions of Generals Kearney, Couch, and Casey, were put en route — the first on the Yorktown road, and the others on the Lee's mill road. These roads unite about a quarter of a mile south of Fort Magruder, and are connected by cross-roads at several points between Yorktown and Williamsburg. After these directions had been given, General Sumner (the officer second in rank in the army of the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front and take immediate charge of operations until my arrival. General Stoneman moved forward promptly with his command, consist- ing of four batteries of horse artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Hays, the 1st and 6th United States cavalry, the Sd Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois, and Barker's squadron, meeting with but little opposition until he arrived in front of the enemy's works about two miles east of Williamsburg. At a point about eight miles from Yorktown, in accordance with my instructions, he detached General Emory with Benson's batteiy, the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, (Colonel Averill,) and Barker's squadron, to gain the Lee's mill road, and endeavor, with the assistance of General Smith, to cut off the portion of the enemy's rear guard which had taken that route. General Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry and a battery under General Stuart, and drove them in the direction of Lee's mill. General Smith having met with obstructions in his front, had transferred his column, by a cross-road, to the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, so that General Emory, finding no force to co-operate with him, was unable to cut off the rear guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a circuitous route along the bank of the James river. The position in which General Stoneman encountered the enemy is about four miles in extent, the right resting on College creek, and the left on Queen's creek ; nearly three-fourths of its front being covered by tributaries of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds. The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, consist- ing of Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulments for field guns. The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six feet high and nine feet thick; the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, filled with water. The length of the interior crest is about 600 yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of small dimensions, having faces of about forty yards. The woods is front of the position were felled, and the open ground in front of the works was dotted with numerous rifle-pits. The roads leading from the lower part of the Peninsula to Williamsburg, one along the York river, (the Yorktown road,) and the other along the James, (the Lee's mill road,) unite between the heads of the tributary streams a short distance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they are com- manded, and debouch from the woods just before uniting. A branch from the James river road leaves it about one and three-fourths of a mile below Fort iMagruder and unites with the road from Allen's landing to Williams- burg, wliich crosses the tributary of C(,)llege creek over a dam at the outlet of the pond, and passes just in rear of tlie line of works, being commanded by the three redoubts on the right of the line, at about the same distance from Fort Magruder. A branch leaves the York river road and crosses the tribu- tary of Queen's creek on a dam, and passing over the position and through REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 89 the works in its rear, finally enters Williamsburg ; this road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the line of the works. General Stoneman debouched from the woods with his advance guard, (consisting of a part of the 1st United States cavalry, and one section of Gibson's battery, under the command of General Cooke,) and the enemy im- mediately opened on him with several field-pieces from Fort Magruder, hav- ing the correct range, and doing some execution. Gibson's battery was brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would permit, and returned the fire ; while the 6th United States cavalry was sent to feel the enemy's left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, with infantry and artillery, came down upon it, whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. The rear squadron, under command of Captain Saunders, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry in the most gallant manner. In the mean time the enemy was being re-enforced by infantry ; and the artillery fire becoming very hot. General Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, ordered the withdrawal of the battery. This was accomplished, with the exception of one piece, which could not be extricated from the mud. The enemy attempted to prevent the movement, but their charges were met by the 1st United States cavalry, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Grier, and they were driven back, losing several officers and one stand of colors. General Stoneman then took a defensive position a short distance in the rear of the first, to await the arrival of the infantry. The advance of General Smith's column reached Skiff's creek about 11 1 o'clock, and found the bridge over that stream in flames, and the road im- passable. A practicable route to the Yorktown road having been discov- ered, the division, by order of General Sumner, moved on by that road, and reached General Stoneman's position about 5^ o'clock. General Sumner, arriving with it, assumed command. Generals Heintzelman and Keyes also arrived. During the afternoon of the 4th, near the Halfway House, the head of General Hooker's column encountered Smith's division filing into the road, and was obliged to halt between three and four hours until it had passed. General Hooker then followed on, and at Cheesecake church turned off, by General Heintzelman's direction, taking a cross-road, and moved out on the Lee's mill road, thus changing places with General Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early in the morning of the 5th. General Smith's division having been deployed. General Sumner ordered an attack on the works in his front ; but the lines having been thrown into confusion while moving through the dense forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt for that night was abandoned. Tlie troops bivouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain began, which continued until the morning of tho 6th, making the roads, already in very bad condition, almost impassable. During the morning of the 5th General Sumner reconnoitred the position in his front, and at 1 1 o'clock ordered Hancock's brigade, of Smith's division, to take possession of a work on the enemy's left, which had been found to be unoccupied. The remainder of Smith's division occupied the woods in front without being actually engaged. The divisions of Couch and Casey had received orders during the night to march at daylight ; but on account of the terrible condition of the roads, and other impediments, were not able to reach the field until after 1 o'clock p. m., at which time the first brigade of Couch's division arrived, and was posted in the centre, on Hooker's right. The other two brigades came up during the afternoon, followed by Casey's division. In the mean time General Hooker, having reconnoitred the enemy's po- sition, began the attack at 7^ a. m., and for a while silenced the guns of 90 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. Fort MagTuder, and cleared the ground in bis front ; but the enemy being continually re-enforced, until their strength greatly exceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn his left. For several hours his division struggled gallantly against the superior numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webber's battery were lost, and be- tween three and four o'clock his ammunition began to give out. The loss had been heavy, and the exhaustion of the troops was very great. . At this time the division of General Kearney came up, who, at 9 a. m., had received orders to re-enforce Hooker, and who had succeeded, by the greatest exer- tions, in passing Casey's troops, and pushing on to the front through the deep mud. General Kearney at once gallantly attacked, and thereby pre- vented the loss of another battery, and drove the enemy back at every point, enabling General Hooker to extricate himself from his position, and with- draw his wearied troops. Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, as has been mentioned before, was, immediately on its arrival, ordered by General Sum- ner to deploy on Hooker's right. This was promptly done, and the attacks of the enemy at that point were repulsed. General Peck held his position until late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by the other two brigades of Couch's division, and they were in quiet possession of the ground when night closed the contest. The vigorous action of these troops relieved Gen- eral Hooker considerably. General Emory had been left with his command, on the night of the 4th, to guard the branch of the Lee's mill road which leads to Allen's farm ; and on the morning of the 5th it was ascertained that by this route the enemy's right could be turned. A request for infantry for this purpose was made to General Heintzelman, who, late in the after- noon, sent four regiments and two batteries of Kearney's division — the first disposable troops he had — and directed General Emory to make the attack. With these re-enforcements his force amounted to about 3,000 men and three batteries. General Emory, on account of want of knowledge of tlic ground, and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in this movement. It involved some risks, but, if successful, might have produced important results. At 11 a. m., as before mentioned. General Smith received orders from General Sumner to send one brigade across a dam on our right, to occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy's line. Hancock's brigade was selected for this purpose. He crossed the dam, took possession of the first redoubt, and afterwards, finding the second one vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for re-enforcements to enable him to advance further and take the next redoubt, which commanded the [)lain between his position and Fort Magru- der, and would have enabled him to take in reverse and cut the communi- cation of the troops engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearney. The enemy soon began to show himself in strength before him, and as his rear and right flank Avere somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for ■ re-enforcements. General Smith was twice ordered to join him, witli the rest of his division, but each time the order was countermanded at the mo- ment of execution, General Sumner not being willing to weaken the centre. At length, in reply to General Hancock's repeated messages for more troops, General Sumner sent iiim an order to fall back to his first position, the execution of which General Hancock deferred as long as possible, being unwilling to give u[) the advantage already gained, and fearing to expose his command by such a movement. During the progress of these events, I had remained at Yorktown to com- plete the preparations for the departure of General Franklin's and other troops to AVcst Point by water, and to make the necessary arrangements with the naval commander for his co-operation. By ])ushing General Franklin, well supported by water, to the right bank of the Pamunkey, opposite West Point, it was hoped to force the enemy to EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 91 abandon whatever works he micyht have on the Peninsula below that point, or be cut off. It was of paramount importance that the arrangements to this end should be promptly made at an early hour of the morning. I had sent two of my aids (Lieutenant Colonel Sweitzer and Major Ilammerstein) to observe the operations in front, with instructions to report to me every- thing of importance that might occur. I received no information from them leading me to suppose that there was anything occurring of more importance than a simple affair of a rear-guard, until about one o'clock p. m., when a despatch arrived from one of them that everything was not progressing favorably. This was confirmed a few minutes later by the reports of Governor Sprague and Major Hammerstein, who came directly from the scene of action. Completing the necessary arrangements, I returned to my camp without delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance of some fourteen miles, through roads much obstructed by troops and wagons, and reached the field between four and five p. m., in time to take a rapid survey of the ground. I soon learned that there was no direct communication between our centre and the left under General Heintzelman; the centre was chiefly in the nearer edge of the woods, situated between us and the enemy. As heavy firing was heard in the direction of General Hancock's command, I immediately ordered General Smith to proceed with his two remaining brigades to sup- port that part of the line. General Naglee, with his brigade, received similar orders. I then directed our centre to advance to the further edge of the woods mentioned above, which was done, and I attempted to open direct communication with General Heintzelman, but was prevented by the marshy state of the ground in the direction in which the attempt was made. Before Generals Smith and Naglee could reach the field of General Han- cock's operations, although they moved with great rapidity, he had been confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited their onset, and then turned upon them, and after some terrific volleys of musketry, he charged them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their wliole force, killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men, he himself losing only 31 men. This was one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, and General Hancock merits the highest praise for the soldierly qualities displayed, and his perfect appreciation of the vital importance of his position. Night put an end to the operations here, and all the troops who had been engaged in this contest slept on the muddy field, without shelter, and many without food. Notwithstanding the report T received from General Heintzelman, during the night, that General Hooker's division had suffered so much that it could not be relied on next day, and that Kearney's could not do more than hold its own without re-enforcements — being satisfied thattheresult of Hancock's engagement was to give ns possession of the decisive point of the battle- field during the night, I countermanded the order for the advance of the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, and directed them to return to York- town, to proceed to West Point by water. Our loss during the day, the greater part of which was sustained by Hooker's division, was as follows: Killed, 456; wounded, 1,400; missing, 372; total, 2,228. On the next morning we found the enemy's position abandoned, and occu- pied Fort Magruder and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled with the enemy's wounded, to whose assistance eighteen of their surgeons were sent by General J. E. Johnston, the officer in command. Several guns and caissons, which the enemy could not carry off on account of the mud, were secured. Colonel AverUl was sent forward at once with a strong cavalry / 92 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. force to endeavor to overtake the enemy's rear-guard. He found several guns abandoned, and picked up a large number of stragglers, but the con- dition of the roads and the state of the supplies forced him to return, after advancing a few miles. It is my opinion that the enemy opposed us here with only a portion of his army. When our cavalry first appeared there was nothing but the enemy's rear-guard in Williamsburg. Other troops were brought back during the night and the next day to hold the works as long as possible, in order to gain time for the trains, &c., already well on the way to Richmond, to make their escape. Our troops were greatly exhausted by the laborious march through the mud from their positions in front of Yorktown, and by the protracted battle through which they had just passed. Many of them were out of rations and ammunition, and one division, in its anxiety to make a prompt movement, had marched with empty haversacks. The supply trains had been forced out of the roads on the fourth and fifth to allow the troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were now in such a state, after thirty-six hours' continuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them. General Hooker's division had suffered so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy, even if the roads had been good. Under these circumstances, an immediate pursuit was impossible. Steps were at once taken to care for and remove the wounded, and to bring up provisions, ammunition, and forage. Tlie condition of the roads, as has been said, rendered it next to impos- sible to accomplish this by land from Yorktown. A temporary depot was therefore promptly established on Queen's creek, and supplies drawn, and the wounded shipped from that place. The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey, in the vicinity of West Point. The remaining divisions, the trains, and the reserve ar- tillery moved subsequently by land. Early on the morning of the 1th General Franklin had completed the disembarcation of his division, and had placed it in a good position to cover the landing place, both bis flanks and a large portion of his front being pro- tected by water. Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division arrived during the morning. At about 9 a. m. a large force of the enemy appeared, consisting of Whiting's division and other troops, and between 10 and 11 they attacked the part of the line held by Newton's brigade. Tiie action continued until 3 p. m., when the enemy retired, all his at- tacks having been repulsed. This aflair, the most important in wliich the division had yet been engaged, was highly creditable to General Franklin and his command. For the details I refer to his report, which is hercnvith submitted. Our loss was 49 killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing. Total, 194, which includes a large proportion of officers Cavalry reconnoissances were sent out from Williamsburg on the Cth and 1th, and on the 8th General Sloneman moved with an advance guard of cav- alry, artillery, and infantry to open conununication with General Franklin. As soon as our supplies had been received and the condition of the roads had become a little better, though still very bad, the advance of the remain- ing troops was begun. Smith's division moving on the 8th. On the lOlh iieadquarters were at Roper's church, 19 miles from Williamsburg, all the divisicjns which had moved by land, except Hooker's, being in the vicinity of tliat place. We were now in direct communication with the portion of the army which had gone by water, and we began to draw supplies from them. REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 93 On account of the small number and narrowness of tlio roads in tliis neighborhood, movements were difficult and slow. On the 15th, headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykcs, and Smith reached Cumberland, which was made a temporaiy depot. Couch and Casey were then near New Kent Court House, Hooker and Kearney near Roper's church and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. On the 14th and 15th much rain fell. On the 15th and 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter were with great difSculty moved to White House, five miles in advance. So bad was the road that the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over this short distance. General Stoneman had occupied this place some days before, after several successful skirmishes, in which our cavalry proved superior to that of the enemy. The reports of these affairs are appended. About this time, with the consent of the President, two additional corps were organized, viz: the 5th provisional corps, consisting of the divisions of Porter and Sykes, and the reserve artillery, under the command of General F. J. Porter, and the 6th provisional corps, consisting of the divisions of Franklin and Smith, under the command of General W. B. Franklin. Headquarters reached White House on the 16th, and a permanent depot was at once organized there. On the 19th, headquarters and the corps of Porter and Franklin moved to Tunstall's station, five miles from White House. On the 20th more rain fell. On the 21st the position of the troops was as follows: Stoneman's ad- vance guard, one mile from New bridge; Franklin's corps three miles from New bridge, with Porter's corps at supporting distance in its rear; Sumner's corps, on the railroad about three miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the right with the left ; Keyes's corps, on New Kent road, near Bottom's bridge, with Ileintzelman's corps at supporting distance in the rear. The ford at Bottom's bridge was in our possession, and the rebuilding of the bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy, was commenced. On the 22d, headquarters moved to Coal Harbor. On the 26th the railroad was in operation as far as the Chickahominy, and the railroad bridge across that stream nearly completed. CHAPTER 11. When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light troops reached the banks of the Chickahominy river, at Bottom's bridge, they found that this as well as the railroad bridge, about a mile above, had been destroyed by the enemy. The Chickahominy in this vicinity is about forty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bordered by low marshy bottom lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. Our operations embraced that part of the river between Bottom's and Meadow bridges, Avhich covered the principal approaches to Richmond from the oast. Within these limits the fii-m ground lying above high-water mark seldom ap- proaches near the river on either bank, and no locality was found within this section where the high ground came near the stream on both sides. It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great variations in the volume of water, and a rise of a few feet overflowed the bottom lands on both sides. At low water it could be forded at almost any point ; but during high water it was above a fording stage, and could then be crossed only at the few points where bridges had been constructed. These bridges had all been destroy(>(l by the enemy on our approach, and it was necessary not only to reconstruct these, but to build several others. 94 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. Tlie west bank of the river opposite the New and Mechanicsville bridges wag bordered by elevated bluffs, wbicli afforded the enemy commanding positions to fortify, establish his batteries, enfilading the approaches upon the two principal roads to Richmond on our right, and resist the reconstruction of the important bridges. This obliged us to select other less exposed points for our crossings. As the enemy was not in great force opposite Bottom's bridge on the arrival of our left at that point, and as it was important to secure a lodgment upon the right bank before he should have time to concentrate his forces and contest the passage, I forthwith ordered Casey's division to ford the river and occupy the opposite heights. This was promptly done on the 20th, and reconnoissances were at once pushed out in advance. These troops were directed to throw up defences in an advantageous position to secure our left flank. General Heintzelman's corps was thrown forward in support, and Bottom's bridge immediately rebuilt. In the mean time our centre and right were advanced to the river above, and on the 24th we carried the village of Mechanicsville, driving the enemy out with oui- artillery, and forcing them across the bridge, which they destroyed. General Naglee on .the same day dislodged a force of the enemy from the vicinity of the " Seven Pines," on the Bottom's bridge road, and our advance on the left secured a strong position near that place. All the information obtained from deserters, negroes, and spies, indicated that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches to Richmond from the east, and that he intended to dispute every step of our advance beyond the Chickahominy, and the passage of the stream opposite our right. That their army was superior to ours in numbers, did not admit of a doubt. Strong defences had been con- structed around Richmond. Impressed by these facts with the necessity of strengthening the army for the struggle, I did not fail to urge repeatedly upon my superiors the importance of re-enforcing the army of the Potomac Avith every disposable man, in order to insure the success of our attack upon the rebel capital. On the 1 0th of May I telegraphed as follows : "Camp at Ewell's Farm, three miles beyond Williamsburg, " Maxj 10, 1862—5 a. m. " From the information reaching me from every source, I regard it as certain that the enemy will meet us with all his force on or near the Chickahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have, and are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well disciplined troops from the south. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much i-educed our numbers, and will con- tinue to do so. I shall light the rebel army with whatever force I may have, but duty requires me to urge that every effort be made to re-enforce me without delay Avith all the disposable troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we concentrate all our forces, as far as possible, to fight the great battle now impending, and to make it decisive. " It is possible that the enemy may abandon Richmond without a serious struggle; but I do not believe he will, and it would be unwise to count upon anything but a stubborn and desperate defence — a life and death contest. I see no other hope for him than to fight this battle, and we must win it. I shall fight them whatever their force may be, but I ask for every man that the de- partment can send me. No troops should now be left uncmjtloyed. Those who entertain tlie opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond without a struggle, are, in my judgment, badly advised, and do not comprehend their situation, which is one requiring desperate measures. "I beg that the I'rcsnidcnt and Secretary will maturely weigh what I say, and leave nothing undone to conn)ly with my re([U('st. If I am not re-enforced, it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers strongly REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 95 intrenched. I do not tliink it will be at all possible for me to briug more than (70,000) seventy thousand men upon the field of battle. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN^, " Major General, Commanding. " Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." On the 14th of May I sent the following telegram to the President: '.'Camp at Cumberland, Mai/ 14, 1S62. " I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that, in my opinion, the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. I beg leave to repeat their substance to your excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which you have ever accorded to my representations and views. All my iufoi-mation from every source accessible to me establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels to defend Richmond against this army by offering us battle with all the troops they can collect from east, west, and south, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my commanders whom I have been able to consult. '• Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, probably intrenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. It is possible that Richmond may be abandoned without a serious struggle ; but the enemy are actually in great strength between here and there, and it would be unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate upon anything but a stubborn and desperate resistance. If they should abandon Richmond, it may well be that it is done with the purpose of making the stand at some place in Virginia south or west of there, and we should be in condition to press them without delay. The confederate leaders must employ their utmost efforts against this army in Virginia, and they will be supported by the whole body of their military officers, among whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as there is also very little among the higher class of citizens in the seceding States. " I have found no fighting men left in this Peninsula. All are in the ranks of the opposing foe. " Even if more troops than I now have should prove unnecessary for purposes of military occupation, our greatest display of imposing force in the capital of the rebel government will have the best moral effect. I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your excellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal bloAv at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be re-enforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the gov- ei-nment. I ask for every man that the War Department can send me. Any commander of the re-enforcements whom your excellency may designate will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject. " I will fight the enemy whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have ; and I firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our triumph should be made decisive and complete. The soldiers of this army love their govern- ernment, and will fight well in its support. You may rely upon them. Thry have confidence in me as their general, and in you as their President. Strong re-enforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force the more perfect will be our combinations, and the less our loss. "For obvious reasons I beg you to give immediate consideration to this com- 96 REPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. munication, and to infonn me fully at the earliest moment of your final determi- nation. " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, "Major General. " His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, " President of the United States." To which, on the 18th of May, I received this reply: "Washington, May IS— 2p.m. " General : Your despatch to the President, asking re-enforcements, has been received and carefully considered. "The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is be- lieved that even if this were prudent, it woiald require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York river, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all pos- sible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communi- cation as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the north of Rich- mond. " It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey river. "In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond, and falling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty -five (35) and forty thousand (40,000) men. "A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation. " At your earnest call for re-enforcements, he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington, and you will give no order, either before or after your jimction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be necessary for sufficient co-operation. When General McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will in- struct your staff ofiicers to be prepared to supply him by that route. " The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves for- ward. "By order of the President. "EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secretary of War, "Major General George B. McClellan, " Commanding Army of the Potomac, hefore Richmond." It will be observed that this order rendered it impossible for me to use the James river as a line; of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the I'anmukey, and to approach Richmond from the north. I had advised, and preferred, that re-enforcements should be sent by water, for the reasons that their arrival would be more safe and certain, and that I would be left free to rest the army on the James river whenever the navigation of that fctream should be opened. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 97 The land movement obliged me to expose my riglit in order to secure the junction; and as the order for General McDowell's march was soon counter- manded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream. The following is a copy of the instructions to General McDowell : ""War Department, " Washington, May 17, 1862. " General : Upon being joined by General Shields's division, you will move upon Richasond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, co-operating with the forces under General McClellau, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York rivers. " While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold your- self ahvays in such position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sud- den dash of any large body of the rebel forces. " General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond, and throwing itself upon your coliunn, before a junction of the two armies is effected. "A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your force is annexed. " By order of the President. "EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secretary of War. " General McDowell, " Commanding Department of RappaJiannocJc.^^ Having some doiibts, from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to the ex- tent of my authority over the troops of General McDowell, and as to the time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this despatch: "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camp near TunstaWs Station, Virginia, May 21, 1862 — 11^. m. " Your despatch of yesterday, respecting our situation and the batteries of Fort Darling, was received while I was absent with the advance, where I have been all this day. I have communicated personally with Captain Goldsborough, and by letter with Captain Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co-oper- ation on land, which 1 will not be in condition to afford for several days. Cir- cumstances must detei-mine the propriety of a land attack. " It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the roads in- credibly bad for army transportation. I personally crossed the Chickahominy to-day at Bottom's bridge ford, and went a mile beyond, the enemy being about half a mile in front. I have three regiments on the other bank guarding the re-building of the bridge. Keyes's corps is on the New Kent road, near Bot- tom's bridge. Heintzelman is on the same road, within supporting distance. Sumner is on the railroad, connecting right with left. Stoneman, with advanced guard, is Avithin one mile of New bridge. Franklin, with two divisions, is about two miles this side of Stoneman. Porter's division, with the reserves of infantry and artillery, is within supporting distance. Headquarters will probably be at Coal Harbor to-morrow, one mile this side of Franklin. All the bridges over the Chickahominy are destroyed. The enemy arc in force on every road lead H. Ex. Doc. 15 7 98 KEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. ing to Richmond, within a mile or two west of the stream. Their main body is on the road from New bridge, encamped along it for four or five miles, spreading over the open ground on both sides. Johnston's headquarters are about two miles beyond the bridge. " All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own. The position of the rebel forces, the declaration of the confederate authorities, the resolutions of the Virginia legislature, the action of the city government, the conduct of the citizens, and all other sources of information accessible to me, give positive assurance that our approach to Richmond involves a desperate battle between the opposing armies. " All our divisions are moving towards the foe. I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack them according to my best judgment, and in such manner as to employ my greatest force. " I regret the state of things as to General McDowell's command. We must beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to this army for that eftbrt would do more to protect Washington than his whole force can possibly do anywhere else in the field. The rebels are concentrating from all points for the two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I would still, most respectfully, sug- gest the policy of our concentrating here by movements on water. I have heard nothing as to the probabilities of the contemplated junction of McDowell's force with mine. I have no idea when he can start, what are his means of transpor- tation, or when he may be expected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is little hope that he can join me over land in time for the coming battle. Delays on my part will be dangerous. I f ar sickness and demoralization. This region is unhealthy for northern men, and unless kept moving, I fear that our soldiers may become discouraged. At present our numbers are weakening from disease, but our men remain in good heart. " I regret also the configuration of the department of the Rappahannock. It includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I think that my own depart- ment should embrace the entire field of military operations designed for the cap- ture and occupation of that city. " Again, I agree with your excellency that one bad general is better than two good ones. " I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant ad- dressed to myself and General McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be cast of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my department. This fact, my superior rank, and the express lan- guage of the 62d article of war, will place his conmiand under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by your excellency ; and I consider tliat he will be under my command, except tliat I am not to detach any portion of his forces, or give any orders which can j)ut him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. 'J'he enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. " Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire that the extent of my authority over McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious rcssults which a di- vided connnand has so often caused. I would res})ectfully suggest that this danger can only be surely guarded against by <'X])licitly [)Iacing General ]\Ic- Dowell under my orders in the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsi- ble for the closest obs<'rvance of your instructions. 1 hope, Mr. President, that it ia not necessary for mc to assure you that your instructions would be observed REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 99 in the utmost good foitli, and that I have no personal feelings which could in- fluence me to disregard them in any particular. " I believe that thfire is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can, but in any event I shall figlit it with all the skill, caution, and determination that I possess, and I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my government, or that it may close my career. " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. " His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, " President of the United States." On the 24th I received the following reply : " May 24, 1S62.— (From Washington, 2ith.) " I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty- sixth, (26th.) We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril. " The enemy's forces, under General Anderson, now opposing General Mc- Dowell's advance, have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond. " If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey and in- tercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men; aiid if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for sup- plies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges 1 McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely. " You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the twenty-first, (2 1st.) " A. LINCOLN, President. "Major General G. B. McClellan.". This information that McDowell's corps would march for Fredericksburg on the following Monday, (the 26th,) and that he would be under my connnand, as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, Avas cheering news, and I now felt confident that we would on his arrival be sufliciently strong to overpower the large army confronting us. At a later hour on the same day I received the following : "May 24, 1862. — {From Washington, i p. m.) "In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are mak- ing a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force, and part of General McDowell's, in their rear. "A. LINCOLN, President. " Major General Geo. B. McClellan." From which it will be seen that I could not expect General McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate opei-ations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening I replied to the Preaident that I would make my calculations accordingly. 100 EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. It then only remained for me to make the best iTse of the forces at my dip- posal, and to avail myself of all artificial aiixiliaries to compensate as much as possible for the inadequacy of men. I concurred fully with the President in the injunction contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was necessary with my limited force to move "cautiously and safely." In view of tiie peculiar char- acter of the Chickahomiuy, and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundation, it became necessary to construct between Bottom's bridge and Mechanicsville eleven (11) new bridges, all long and diflicult, with extensive log-way approaches. The entire army could probably have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear.' If the com- munication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of wats ordered (xcneral Couch to move General Peck's brigade to occupy the ground on the left of the Williamsburg road, which had not before been occupied by our forces, and thus to support General Casey's left, wh(;re the iirst attack was the most severe. The enemy now came on iu heavy force, attacking General Casey simultaneously in front and on both flanks. General Keyes sent to General Heintzelman for re-enforcements, but the messen- ger was dcdayed, so that orders were not sent to Generals Kearney and Hooker until nearly 3 o'clock, and it was nearly 5 p. m. when Generals Jameson and P(!rry'8 brigades of General Kearney's division arrived on the field. General Birn<'y was orderi-d up tlie railroad, l)iit by General Kearney's order halted his brigade before arriving at the scene of action. Orders were also despatched for EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 109 General Hooker to move up from White Oak swamp, and lie arrived after dark at Savage's station. As soon as the firing was heard at headquarters, orders were sent to General Sumner to get his command under arms and be ready to move at a moment's warning. His corps, consisting of Generals Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, was encamped on the north side of the Chickahominy, some six miles above Bottom's bridge; each division had thrown a bridge over the stream op- posite to its own position. At one o'clock General Sumner moved the two divisions to their respective bridges, with instructions to halt and await further orders. At two o'clock orders were sent from headquarters to cross these divisions without delay, and push them rapidly to General Heintzelman's support. This order was rec-eived and communicated at half past two, and the passage was immediately com- menced. In the mean time General Naglee's brigade, with the batteries of Gen- eral Casey's division, which General Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to maintain the redoubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelming masses of the enemy. They were re-enforced by a regiment from General Peck's brigade. The artillery under command of Colonel G. D. Bailey, 1st New York artillery, and afterwards of General Naglee, did good execution on the advancing column. The left of this position was, howevei-, soon turned, and a sharp cross-fire opened upon the gunners and men in the rifle-pits. Colonel Bailey, Major Van Val- kenberg, and Adjutant Ramsey, of the same regiment, were killed ; some of the guns in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven back upon the position occupied by General Couch. The brigades of Generals Wessel and Palmer, with the re-enforcements which had been sent them from General Couch, had also been driven from the field with heavy loss, and the whole position oc- cupied by General Casey's division was taken by the enemy. Previous to this time General Keycs ordered General Couch to advance two regiments to relieve the pressure upon General Casey's right flank. In making this movement. General Couch discovered large masses of the enemy pushing towards our right, and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy column which had been held in reserve, and which was now making its way towards Pair Oaks station. General Couch at once engaged this column with two regiments; but, though re-enforced by two additional regiments, he was overjjowei'cd, and the enemy pushed between him and the main, body of his division. With these four regiments and one battery General Couch' fell back about half a mile towards the Grapevine bridge, where, hearing that General Sumner had crossed, he formed line of battle facing Pair Oaks station, and prepared to hold the position. Generals Berry and Jameson's brigades had by this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. General Berry was ordered to take possession of the woods on the left, and push forward so as to have a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This movement was executed brilliantly. General Berry pushing his regiments forward through the woods until their rifles commanded the left of the camp and works occupied by General Casey's division in the morning. Their fire on the pursuing columns of the enemy was very destructive, and assisted materially in checking the pursuit in that part of the field. He held his position in these woods against several attacks of superior numbers, ami after dark, being cut off by the enemy from the main body, he fell back towards White Oak swamp, and by a circuit brought his men into our lines in good order. General Jameson, with two regiments, (the other two of liis brigade having been detached — one to General l-'eck and one to General Birney,) moved rapidly to the front on the left of the Williamsburg road, and succijeded for a time in keeping the abatis clear of the enemy. But large numbers of the enemy press- ing past the right of his line, he, too, was foi-ced to retreat through the woods towards White Oak swamp, and in that way gained camp under cover of night. Brigadier General Devens, who had held the centre of General Couch's 110 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. division, had made repeated and gallant eflforts to regain portions of the ground lost in front, but each time was driven back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle-pits near Seven Pines. Meantime General Sumner had arrived with the advance of his corps, Gen- eral Sedgwick's division, at the point held by General Couch with four regi- ments and one battery. The roads leading from the bridge were so miry that it was only by the greatest exertion General Sedgwick had been able to get one of his batteries to the front. The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Colonel Sully) was immediately de- ployed to the right of Couch, to protect the flank, and the rest of the division formed in line of battle, Kirby's battery near the centre, in an angle of the woods. One of General Couch's regiments was sent to open communication with Genei-al Heintzelman. No sooner Avere these dispositions made than the enemy came in strong force and opened a heavy fire along the line. He made several charges, but was each time repulsed with great loss by the steady fire of the infantry and the splendid practice of the battery. After sustaining the enemy's fire for a considerable time. General Sumner ordered five regiments (the SjLth New York, Colonel Sinter; 82d New York, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson; "ISth Massachusetts, Lieutenant Colonel Kimball; 20th Massachusetts, Colonel Lee; 7th Michigan, Major Richardson — the three former of General Gorman's brigade, the two latter of General Dana's brigade) to advance and charge with the bayonet. This charge was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our troops springing over two fences which Avere between them and the enemy, rushed upon his lines, and drove him in confusion from that part of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for that day. During the night dispositions were made for its early renewal. General Couch's division, and so much of General Casey's as could be collected together, with General Kearney's, occupied the rifle-pits near Seven Pines. General Peck, in falling back on the left, had succeeded late in the afternoon in rallying a considerable number of stragglers, and Avas taking them once more into the action, when he was ordered back to the intrenched camp by General Kearney. Gen- eral Hooker brought up his division about dark, having been delayed by the heaviness of the roads and the throng of fugitives from the field, through whom the colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) reports he "was obliged to force his way with the bayonet." This division bivouacked for the night in rear of the right of the rifle-pits, on the other side of the railroad. General Richardson's division also came upon the field about sunset. He had attempted the jjassage of the Chickahominy by the bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far destioy(!d that he was forced to move Generals Howard and ^Meagher's brigades, with all his artillery, around by General Sedgwick's bridge, Avhile General French's brigade, with the utmost difiiculty, crossed by the other. General Sedgwick's division, with the regiments under General Couch, held about the same position as when the fight ceased, and General Richardson on his arrival was ordered to place his division on the left to connect with General Kearney; General French's brigade was posted along the railroad, and Generals Howard and Meagher's brigades in second and third lines. All his artillery had been left behind, it being impossible to move it forward through the deep mud as rapidly as the infantry pushed towards the field, but during the night the three batteries of the division were brought to the front. About five o'clock on the morning of the first of June skirmishers and some cavalry of the en(!my were discov(;red in front of General Richardson's division. Caj)tain ]\'ttit's batti^ry, (R, 1st New York.) having come upon the ground, threw a few shells among them, wlien they dis})ersed. There was a wide inteiwal be- tween (general Richardson and Gein-ral Kearney. To close this, General Rich- ardson's line was extended to the left and his first line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had they gained the position, when the enemy appearing in large force REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. Ill from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of musketry at short range ahjng the whole line. He approached very rapidly with columns of attack formed ou two roads which crossed the railroad. These columns were supported by infantry in line of battle on each side, cutting General French's line. He threw out no skirmishers, but appeared determined to carry all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly an hour the first line of General llichardson's division stood and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy being re-enforced and relieved time after time, till finally General Howard was ordered with his brigade to go to General French's assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased and his whole line fell back on that })iirt of the field. On the opening of the firing in the morning General Hooker })ushed forward on the railroad with two regiments (5th and 6th New Jersey,) followed by General Sickles's brigade. It was found impossible to move the artillery of this division from its position on account of the mud. On coming near the woods, which were held by the enemy in force. General Hooker found General Birnffy's brigade, Colonel J. Hobart Ward in command, in line of battle. He sent back to hasten General Sickles's brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned off to the left by General Heintzelman to meet a column advancing in that direction. He at once made the attack Avith the two New Jersey regiments, calling upon Colonel Ward to support him with General Birney's brigade. This was well done, our troops advancing into the woods under a heavy fire, and pushing the enemy before them for more than an hour of hard fighting. A charge Avith the bayonet was then ordered by General Hooker with the 5th and 6th New Jersey, 3d Maine, and 38tli and 40th New York, and the enemy fled in confusion, throwing down arras and even clothing in his flight. General Sickles, having been ordered to the left, formed line of battle on both sides of the Williamsburg road and ad- vanced under a sharp fire from the enemy, deployed in the woods in front of him ; after a brisk interchange of musketry fire while crossing the open ground, the Excelsior brigade dashed into the timber with the bayonet and put the enemy to flight. On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hour's cessation, which was promptly responded to by General Richardson's division. Again the most vig- orous efl'orts were made to break our line, and again they were frustrated by the steady courage of our troops. In about an hour General Richardson's whole line advanced, pouring in their fire at close range, which threw the line of the enemy back in some confusion. This was followed up by a bayonet charge led by General French in person, with the 57th and 66th New York, supported by two regiments sent by General Heintzelman, the 71st and 73d New York, which turned the confilsion of the enemy into precipitated flight. One gun captured the previous day was retaken. Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines held by them on the 31st before the attack. On the battle-field there were found many of our OAvn and the con- federate wounded, arms, caissons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage;, aban- doned by the enemy in his rout. The state of the roads and impossibility of manoeuvring artillery prevented further pursuit. On the next morning a reconuoissauce was sent forward, which pressed back the ])ickets of the enemy to within five miles of Richmond ; but again the impossibility of forcing even a few batteries forward precluded our holding permanently this position. The lines held previous to the battle Avere therefore resumed. General J. E. John- ston reports loss of the enemy in Longstreet's and J. W. Smith's divisions at 4,283 ; General D. H. Hill, Avho had taken the advance in the attack, estimates his loss at 2,500 ; which would give the enemy's loss 6,783. Our loss was, in General Sumner's corps, 1,223; Genei-al Heiutzelman's corps, 1,394; General Keyes's corps, 3,120 — total, 5,737. Previous to the arrival of General Sumner upon the field of battle, on the 31st of May, General Heintzelman, the senior corps commander present, was in 112 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. the immediate command of the forces engaged. The first information I received that the battle was in progress was a despatch from him stating that Casey's division had given way. During the night of the 31st I received a despatch from him, dated 8.45 p. m., in which he says: " I am just in. When I got to the front the most of G-eneral Casey's division had dispersed. * * * The rout of General Casey's men had a most dispiriting effect on the troops as they came up. I saw no reason why we should have been driven back." This official statement, together with other accounts received previous to my arrival upon the battle-field, to the effect that Casey's division had given way without making a proper resistance, caused me to state, in a telegram to the Secretary of War on the first, that this division "gave way unaccountably and discreditably." Subsequent investigations, however, greatly modified the im- pressions first received, and I accordingly advised the Secretary of War of this in a despatch on the 5th of June. The official reports of Generals Keyes, Casey, and Naglee show that a very considerable portion of this division fought well, and that the brigade of Gen- eral Naglee is entitled to credit for its gallantry. This division, among the reg- iments of which were eight of comparatively new troops, was attacked by superior numbers ; yet, according to the reports alluded to, it stood the attack "for three hours before it was re-enforced." A portion of the division was thrown into great confusion upon the first onslaught of the enemy; but the personal efforts of General Naglee, Colonel Bailey, and other officers, who boldly went to the front and encouraged the men by their presence and example, at this critical juncture, rallied a great part of the division, and thereby enabled it to act a prominent part in this severely contested battle. It therefore affords me great satisfaction to withdraw the expression contained in my first despatch, and 1 cordially give my indorsement to the conclusion of the division commander, " that those parts of his command which behaved discreditably were exceptional cases." On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two of our bridg<^s nearly completed ; but the rising waters Hooded the log- way approaches and made them almost impassable, so that it was only by the greatest efforts that General Sumner crossed his corps and participated in that hard-fought en- gagement. 1'he bridges became totally useless after this corps had passed, and others on a more permanent plan were commenced. On my way to headquarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge where General Sumner had taken over his corps on the day previous. At the time General Sumner crossed this was the only available bridge above Bottom's bridge. I found the approach from thfe right bank for Bome 400 yards submerged to the depth of several feet, and on reaching the place where the bridge had been, I found a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's bridge, six miles below, as the only practicable crossing. The approaches to New and JMechanicsvillc bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries established upon com- manding heights on the opi)Osite side. Tliese batteries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having ruimerous rifie-pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches Ixn'u in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage could have been secured. Tlie only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle, was to march the troops from Mechunicsville, and other points, on the left banks of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three (23) miles. In the condition of the roads at that time this march could not have been made with artillery in kp:port op general george b. m'clellan. 113 less than two days, by which time the enemy would have been sccm-e within his intrenchments around Richmond, In short, the idea of uniting the two Avings of the army in time to make a vigorou.s pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five mik^s distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and Avas, I presume, never for a mo- ment seriously entertained by any one connected with the army of the Potomac. An advance, involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Cliicka- hominy, would have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the position already gained, and completed our crossings as rapidly as possible. In the mean time the troops at Fair Oaks Avere directed to strengthen their positions by a strong line of intrenchments, which j)rotected them while the bridges were being built, gave security to tlie trains, liberated a larger fighting force, and offered a safer retreat in the event of disaster. On the 2d of June I sent the following despatch : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Neiv Bridge, June 2, 1862 — 10.30 a. m. " Our left is everywhere advanced considerably beyond the positions it oc- cupied before the battle. I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall sufficiently to enable me to cross the right. AVe have had a terrible time with our communicaticTns — bridges and causeways, built with great care, having been washed a^vay by the sudden freshets, leaving us almost cut off from communi- cation. All that human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose. " Please regard the portion of this relating to condition of Chickahominy as confidential, as it would be serious if the enemy Avere aAvare of it. I do not yet knoAv our loss; it has been very heavy on both sides, as the fighting Avas des- perate. Our victory complete. I expect still more fighting before avc reach Richmond. " G. B. McCLELLAN, "Major General. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." On the same day I received the following from the Secretary of War : " WashiiVGTon, June 2, 1862. " Your telegram has been received, and Ave are greatly rejoiced at your suc- cess — not only in itself, but because of the dauntless spirit and courage it dis- plays in your troops. You have received, of course, tlie order made yesterday in respect to Fortress Monroe. The object was to place at your command the disposable force of that department. The indications are that Fremont or Mc- Dowell will fight Jackson to-day, and as soon as he is disposed of another largo body of troops Avill be at your service. " The intelligence from Halleck shows that the rebels are fieeing, and pur- sued in force, from Corinth. All interest now centres in your operations, and full confidence is entert^iined of your brilliant and glorious success. "EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secrctarij of War. "Major General JMcClellan." On the 3d I received the following from the President : "Washington, June 3, 1862. " With these continuous rains, I am very anxious about the Chickahominy — 80 close in your rear, and crossing your line of coiiunimication. I'lease look to it, " ABRAUAaC LINCOLN, Fn^ident. " Major General McClellan." H. Ex. Doc. 15 S 114 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE P.. m'clELLAN. To which I replied as follows : "Headquarters Armv op the Potomac, " New Bridge, June 3, 1862. " Your despatch of 5 p. m. jr.^t received. As the Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in ruy way for several days, your excellency may rest assured that it has not been overlooked. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be, to perfect the communications across it. Nothing of importance, except that it is again raining. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. "A. Lincoln, President, WasMngtmi." My views of the condition of our army on the 4th are explained in the follow- ing despatch to the President : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, '' Nc^v Bridge, June 4, 1862. " Terrible rain, storm during the night and morning — not yet cleared off. Chickahominy flooded, bridges in bad condition. Are still hard at work at them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the corps on the right bank, but I cannot re-enforce them here until my bridges are all safe, as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, as they may probably attempt, I have to be very cautious now. Our loss in the late battle will probably exceed (5,000) five thousand. I have not yet full returns. On account of the effect it might have on our own men and the enemy, I request that you will regard this informatijn as confidential for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of the enemy was very considerably greater ; they were terribly punished. I mention these facts now merely to show you that the army of the Potomac has had serious work, and that no child's play is before it. " You must make your calculations on the supposition that I have been correct from the beginning in asserting that the serious o]>position was to be made here. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. " A. Lincoln, President." And in the following to the Secretary of War, on the same day : " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " New Bridge, June 4, 1862. " Please inform me at once what re-enforcements, if any, I can count upon having at Fortress Monroe or White House within the next three days, and when eacli regiment may be expected to arrive. It is of the utmost importance that I should know this inmiediately. The losses in the battle of the 31st and let will amount to (7, 000) seven thousand. Regard this as confidential for the present. > " If I can have (5) five new regiments for Port Monroe and its dependencies, I can draw (3) three more old regiments from there safely. I can well dispose of four more raw regiments on my communications. I can well dispose of from (15) fifteen to (20) twenty well drilled regiments among the old brigades in bringing them up to their original etfective strenglli. Pecruits are especially necessary for the regular and volunteer battei'ies of artillery, as well as for tlie regular and volunteer regiments of infantry. After the losses in our last battle. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 115 I trast that I will no longer be regarded as an alarmist. I believe wo have at least one more desperate battle to fight. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." Also in my despatch to the Secretary of "War, on the 5th : "Headuuarters Army of the Potomac, " Neic Bridge, June 5, 18G2. '• Rained most of the night ; has now ceased, but is not clear. The river still very high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our bridges near here this morning; our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced them, though some firing still kept up. The rain forces us to remain in statu quo. With great difficulty a division of infantry has been crossed this morning to support the troops on the other side, should the enemy renew attack. I felt obliged to do this, although it leaves us rather weak here. "G.B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Conwiandlng . " Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as follows : " Washington, Ju7ie 5, 1862 — 8.30 p. m. " I will send you five (5) new regiments as fast as transportation can take them ; the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. I intend sending you apart of AIcDowell's force as soon as it can return from its trip to Front Ko>al, j)robu- bly as many as you waiit. The order to ship the new regiments to Fort Mon- roe has already been given. I suppose that they may be sent directly to the fort. Please advise me if this be as you desire. "EDWIN M.STANTON, " Secretary of War. "Major General McClellan." On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows : " Headciuarters Army of the Potomac, ''June 7, 1862—4.40^. m. " In reply to your despatch of 2 p. m. to day, I have the honor to state that the Chickahominy river has risen so as to Hood the entire bottoms to the depth of three and four feet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, and the men are working night and day, up to th(;ir waists in water, to complete them. " The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely iiu{)assable i'or ar- tillery, or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, which renders any general movement, either of this or the rebel army, entirely out of the question until we have more favorable weather. " I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward re-enforcements so vigor- ously. " I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and t;ike llichmond tlie mo- ment McOall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving oil" the rebel pickets and securing a very advantageous position. 116 REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. " The rebels have several batteries established, couiraanding the debouches from two of our bridges, and fire upon our working parties contiuuallj, but as yet they have killed but very few of our men. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." As I did not think it probable that any re-enforcements would be sent me in time for the advance on Richmond, I stated in tlie foregoing despatch that I should be ready to move when General McCall's division joined me; but I did not intend to be understood by this that no more re-enforcements were wanted, as will be seen from the following dispatch. "Junk 10, 1^02—3.30 p. m. " I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and that some of his troops are to follow him. No great reliance — perhaps none whatever — can be attached to this; but it is possible, and ought to be their policy. " I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are liter- ally impassable for artillery, ahnost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state ; we have another rain-storm on our hands. " I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit ; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnoimal. "In view of these circumstances, I present for your consideration the pro- priety of detaching largely from Kalleck's array to strengthen this ; for it would seem that Ilalleek has now no large organized force in front of him, while we have. If this cannot be done, or even in connexion with it, allow me to sug- gest the movement of a heavy column from Daltou upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better conform to military princi})les to strengthen this army. And even although the re-enforcements might not arrive in season to take part in the attack upon llichmond, the moral effect would be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements. " I wish to be distinctly understood that, whenever the weather permits, I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger force would enable me to gain much more decisive results. " I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry. "If General Prim returns iiia Washington, please converse with him as to the condition of affairs here. "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Cojumanding. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." Our work upon the bridges continued to be pushed forward vigorously unlii the 20th, during which time it rained almost every day, and the exposure of the men caused uuu-h sickness. On the 1 Ith the following was received from the Secretary of War: "Washington, June 11, 1862. " Your despatch of three thirty, (3.30,) yesterday, has been received. I am fully inipres.-^ed with the difficnlties mentioned, and which no ait or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am stii\'iug to the uttermost to render you every aid in the power of the government. Yoin- suggestions will be innntidiately REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 117 communicated to General Halleck, with a request that he shall conform to them. At last advice he contemplated sending a column to operate with Mitchell against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee. 13uel reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a critical condition, demanding immediate attention. Halleck says the main body of Beauregard's force is with him at Okolona. McCall's force was reported yesterday as having embarked, and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as possible. "Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was pretty badly handled. It is clear that a strong force is operating with Jackson for the purpose of detaining the forces here -from you. I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies. " B3 assured, general, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid yon with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met ; and whatever others may say for their own pur- poses, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms. "EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secretary of War. "Major General G. B. McClellan." On the 12th and 13th General McCall's division arrived. On the 13th of June two squadrons of the 5th United States cavalry, under the command of Captain Royall, stationed near Hanover old church, were at- tacked and overpowered by a force of the enemy's cavalry, numbering about fifteen hundred men, with four guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but at some distance from our main body, and, though pursued very cleverly, made the circuit of the army, repassing the Chickahominy at Long bridge. The burning of two schooners laden with forage, and fourteen government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's station, and a little eclat, were the precise results of this expedition. On the 14th I sent the following to the Secretary of War : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camj) Lincoln, June 14, 1862 — midnigJit. "All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope two days more will make the ground practi- cable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time 1 would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage. " It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are com- pletely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that Mc- Call's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. " That request does not breathe the propsr spirit Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. 1 do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed. General McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his com- mand. "If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would pre- fer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for iho results. " The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me; but Gon- 118 KEPORT OF GENEBAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. eral McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of as- sistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal considerations to be entertained; you know that I have none. " The indications are, from our balloon reconnoissauces and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in numbers, and deter- mined to tight desperately. "G. B. McCLELLAX, " Major General, Commanding. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." On the 20th the following was communicated to the President: "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ''Camp Lincoln, June 20, 1862 — 2 p. m. "Tour excellency's despatch of (11) eleven a. m. received, also that of General Sigel. " I have no doubt that Jackson has been re-enforced from here, There is reason to believe that General R. S. Kipley has recently joined Lee's army, with a brigade or division from Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from Goldsboro'. There is not tlie slightest reason to suppose that the enemy intends evacuating Richmond; he is daily increasing his defences. I find him every- where in force, and every reconuoissance costs many lives, yet I am obliged to feel my way, foot by foot, at whatever cost, so great are the difficulties of the country; by tomorrow night the defensive works, covering our position on this side of the Chickahominy, should be completed. I am forced to this by my in- feriority in numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into action, and secure the army against the consequences of unforeseen disaster. I would be glad to have permission to lay before your excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. In the mean time I would be pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers and position, of the troops not under my command, in Virginia and elsewhere. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, "Major Gcfieral, Commanding. " His Excellency A. Lincoln, President.'" To which I received this reply : "Washington, Juyte 21, 18(32 — G/». m.. "Your despatch of yesterday, two (2) p. m., was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I v>ould rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troo])S not under your command, in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it, with accuracy, which I cannot, 1 would r.ither not transmit either by tel- egra])h or letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I cannot well leave here. "A. \A^VA)IM, President. "Major General Georok B. McClkllan." KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 119 To which I sent tlie following reply : "Camp Lincoln, June 22 — 1 p. m. '■I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of 8 p. m. yesterday. Under the circumstances, as stated in your despatch, [ perceive that it will be better at least to defer, for the present, the communication I de- sired to make. "G. B. McCLELLAN, "Major General, Commanding. "His Excellency the President." All the information I could obtain, previous to the 24th of June, regarding the movements of General Jackson, led to the belief that he was at Gordons- ville, where he was receiving re-enforcements from Richmond via Lynchburg and Staunton; but what his purposes were did not appear until the date specified, when a young man, very intelligent, but of suspicious appearance, was brought in by our scouts from the direction of Hanover Court House He at first stated that he was an escaped prisoner, from Colonel Kenley's Maryland regi- ment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself to be a deserter from Jackson's command, which he left near Gordons ville on the 21st. Jack- son's troops were then, as he said, moving to Frederickshall, along the Virginia Central railroad, for the purpose of attacking my rear on the 2Sth. I imme- diately despatched two trusty negroes to proceed along the railroad and ascer- tain the truth of the statement. They Avere unable, however, to get beyond Hanover Court House, where they encountered the enemy's pickets, and were forced to turn back without obtaining the desired information. On that day I sent the following despatch : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "June 24, 1862—12^9. m. "A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting and Ewe',1, (fifteen brigades.) at Gor- donsville on the 21st; that they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it was intended to attack ray rear on the 2Sth. I would be glad lo learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General.'' The following is his reply : "Washington, June 25, 18G2. "We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand men. Some reports place ten thousand rebels under Jackson, at Gordonsville; others, that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont yestciday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened; and General Kelly, that Ewell was advancing to New creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fniinont con- tradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray; the people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two (2) days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal tht- real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fi'emont, who arc at Middletowu, appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the do- 120 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. p.artnient yesterday, purported to be dated Gordonsville on the fourteenth (14th) instant, stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington and Balti- more as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report was to be circu- lated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is towards Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here. "EDWIN M. STANTON, "■Secretary of War. "Major General McClellan." On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket line of the left was ordered, preparatory to a general for- ward movement. Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on the Williamsburg road was a large open field; b'yond that, a swampy belt of timber, some five hun- dred yards Avide, which had been disputed ground for many days. Further in advance was an open field, crossed by the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and commanded by a redoubt and rifle-pits of the enemy. It was decided to push our lines to the other side of these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain the nature of the ground, and to place Generals Heintzel- man and Sumner in position to support the attack intended to be made on the Old Tavern, on the 2Gth or 27th, by General Franklin, by assailing that posi- tion in the rear. Between 8 and 9 o'clock, on the morning of the 25th, the advance was begun by General Heintzclmau's corps. The enemy were found to be in strong force all along the line, and contested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object was accomplished. The troops engaged in this affair were the whole of lleintz(;]man's corps, Palmer's brigade of Couch's division of Iveyes's corps, and a part of Richardson's division of Sumner's corps. For the details I refer to the report of General Heintzelman. The casualties (not including those in Palmer's brigade, which have not been reported) were as follows: officers killed, 1; wounded, 14; missing, 1; enlisted men killed, 50; wounded, 387; missing, 63; total, 516. The following telegrams were sent to the SecretJiry of War, dunng the day, from the field of operations: '•Rrdoubt No. 3, Jmie 25, 1862—1.30 p. m. "We have advanced our pickets on the left considerably, under sharp resist- ance. ()ur men behaved very haudsomel3'. Some liring still continues. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. *'Hon. E. M. Stanton." "Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862— 3.15 ^a m. "Tlie enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance of our picket's lines. Kearney's and one-half of Hooker's are where I w.int them. "I have this moment re-enforced Hooker's right wilh a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope in a f(!W mitmtes to finish the work intended for to-day. Our men are behaving splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also. This is not a battle; merely an aflair of Heintzehnan's corps, supported i'y Keyes, and thuB far all goes well. Wc hold every foot we have gained. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 121 " If we .succeed in wliat we have undertaken, it will be a very important advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. The fighting up to this time has been done by General Hooker's division, which has behaved as usmil — that is, most splendidly. "Ou our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front. "G. B. McCLELLAN, "Major General, Commanding. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of JVar." "Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862 — 5 p. m. "The affair is ov(r, and we have gained our point fully, and Avi h but little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition. Our men have done all that could be desired. The affair was partially decided by two guns that Captain De Russey brought gallantly into action under very difficult circumstances. Tho enemy was driven from the camps in front of this place, and is now quiet. "G. B. McCLELLAN, "Major General, Commanding. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretunj of War." Also, .on the same day, the following: "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862 — 6.15^;. m. "I have just returned from the field, and find your despatch in regard to Jackson. " Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauro- gard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond, yesterday. " 1 incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand (200,000,) including Jackson and Beau- regard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position, and repulse any attack. " I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the Ticcessity of re-enforcements, that this Avas the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command and. if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. "Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of tho Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for ro-cnforcemeuts. "Hon. E. M. Stvnton, " Secretary of War." G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. The report of tho chief of the "secret service corps," herewith forwarded, and dated tho 26th of June, shows the estimated strength of the enemy, /it tlie timo of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The 122 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'CLELLAN. game report puts his numbers, on the 26th of June, at about 180,000, and the specific information obtained ntgarding their organization warrants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength. It will be observed that the evidence contained in the report shows the following organizations, viz : two hundred regiments of infantiy and cavahy, including the forces of Jackson and Ewell, just arrived ; eight battalions of independent troops; five battalions of artillery; twelve companies of infantrj and independent cavalry, besides forty-six companies of artillery ; amounting, in all, to from forty to fifty brigades. There were undoubtedly many others whose designations we did not learn. The report also shows that numerous and heavy earthworks had been com- pleted fur the defence of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of these were mounted some two hundred guns. On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final ad- vance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of supply. The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my superiors from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsula campaign. I notified the Secretary of War in the following despatch : "Headhuarters Army of the Potomac, " Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862 — 12 m. " I have just heard that our advanced cavalry pickets on the left bank of Chicka hominy are being driven in. It is probably Jackson's advanced guard. If this be true, you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and will do my best to out-manoeuvre, out-wit, and out-fight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I Avill not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me. "G. B. McCLELLAN, •' Major General. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War.'' "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camjy Liincoln, June 26, 1862 — 2. 30 7;. m. " Your despatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c,, on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where re-enforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of ap- proaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Mon- roe, and thence according to state of affairs when they arrive. " It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communication more than Au hour or two longer. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, "Secretary of War." On the same day I received the following despatches from the Secretary of War : "Washington, June 25, 1862 — 11. 20 7?. m. "Your telegram of 6.15 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it imj)0S6ible for the government to send you any moro REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 123 re-euforcements than ha? been done, have been so disUnctly stated to you bj tie President that it is needless for me to repeat them. "Every effurt has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has readied Falmouth, Shields's division and Ricketts's division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done. "E. M. STANTON, " Secretary of War. " Major General G. B, T>[cClellan." "Washington, June 26, 1862 — 6j9. m. "Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to send you five thousand (5,000) men as fast as they can be brought from Manassas to Alexandria and embarked, which can be' done sooner than to wait for transportation at Fred- ericksburg. They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by land. Nothing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me advised fully of your con- dition. "EDWIN Vl. STANTON, " Secretary of War. "Major General G. B. McClellan." But .5,000 of the re-enforcements spoken of in these communications came to the army of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's bar, after the seven days. In anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to provide for the contin- tingency of our communications with the depot at the White House being sev- ered by the enemy, and at the same time to i>e prepared for a change of the base of our operations to James river, if circumstances should render it advisable, I had made arrangements more than a week previous (on the ISth) to have transports with supplies of provisions and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, Bent up James river. They reached Harrison's landing in time to be available for the army on its arrival at that point. Events soon proved this change of base to be, though most hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course. In order to relieve the troops of the 6th corps, on the 19lh of June General Reynolds's and General Seymour's brigades, of General McCall's division, (Pennsylvania reserves,) Avere moved from Gaines's farm to a position on Beaver Dam creek. General Meade's brigade being held in reserve in frontof Gaines'sfarra. One regiment and a battery were thrown forward to the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, and a line of i)ickets extended along the Cliickahominy river between the Mechanicsville and ileadow bridges. As has been already stated, I received, while engaged on the 25i.h in directing the operations of Heintzdraan's corps, information which strengthened my suspicions that Jackson was advanc- ing v>^ith a large force upon our right and rear. On this day General Casey, at the White House, was instructed to prepare for a vigorous resistance, and de- fensive works were ordered at Tunstall's station. Early on the 25th General Porter was instructed to send out reconnoitring parties towards Hanover Court House to discover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Tolopotamoy as far as possible. Up to the 2Gth of June the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and northeast. I'lie reasons (tlio President's anxiety about covering Washington from Fredcricksbm-g, McDowell's promised co-operation, partial advance, and immediate withdrawal) wliicli com- pelled the choice of this line of approach, and our continuance u})on it, have been attended to above. 124 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. The superiority of the James river route, as a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early given, and need not be repeated here. The dissipation of all hope of the co- operation by land of General McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the defence of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an imme diate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from the evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was bent. Such a change of base, in tlie presence of a powerful enemy, is one of the most difficult undertakings iu war. I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew th:it it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance and to fight the series of battles now inevitable, whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way throngli to the James river, and get a position whence a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith. (.)n the same day General Van Vliet, chief quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by my orders, telegraphed to Colonel Ingulls, quartermaster at the Wlnte House, as follows: "Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage's station, by way of Bottom's bridge. If you ai-e obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James river as soon as possible, and accom- pany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to estab- lish our depots on James river without delay if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work; after that you must exercise your own judgment." All these commands were obeyed. So excellent were the dispositions of th« different officers in command of the troops, depots, and gunboats, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. General Stoneman's communications with the main army being cut off, he fell back upon the White, House, and thence to Yorktown, when the White House was evacuated. On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chirkahominy to be prepared to sen! as many troops as they couKl spare on the f.dlowing day to the left bank of the river, as will be seen by the ap- pended telegrams. General Franklin received instructions to hold General Slocum's divi.*ion in readiness by daybreak of the 27tli, and if heavy fiiring fchould at that time be heard in the direction of General Ptu-ter, to move at once to his assistance without further '.irders. At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who had crossed abovo Meadow bridge, was disc vercd by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12.30 p. m. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets Averc; now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn. Jleade's brigade was ordered upas a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly afts. The rcguUirs, of Sykes's division, on the right, also repulsed several strong attacks. But our own loss under the trememlous fire of such greatly superior nuiiibere was very severe, and the tronps, most of whom had been under arms mon; than two days, were rapidly becoming' exhausted by the masses of fresh men con- stantly brought against them. When General Slocum's division arrived on the ground it increased General Porter's force to some 35,000, who were probably contending against about 70,000 of the enemy. The line was severely pressed in several points, and as its being pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable for Gen- eral Porter, who was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slo- cum's division, and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threatened. About 5 p. m., General Porter having reported his position as critical, French's and Meagher's brigades, of Richardson's division, (3d corps,) were oi-dered to cross to his support. The enemy attacked again in great force at 6 p. m., but failed to break our lines, though our loss was very heavy. About 7 p. m. they threw fresh troops against General Porter with still greater fury, and finally gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided by the confusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the 5th cavalry, and followed as it was by more determined assaults on the remainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused a general retreat from our position to the hill in rear overlooking the bridge. French's and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving before them the stragglers who were thronging towards the bridge. These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example, as well as by the steadiness of their bearings, reanimated our own troops and warned tbe enemy that re- enforcements had arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy, already repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops, failed to follow up their advantage. This gave an oppor- tunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Generals French and Meagher, and they again advanced up the hill ready to repulse another attack. During tbe night our thin and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed the rear guard, and about 6 o'clock on the morning of tlie 2Sth crossed the river, destroying the bridge behind them. Our loss in this battle in killed, wounded, and missing, was very heavy, espe- cially in officers, many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners while gallantly leading on their men or rallying them to renewed exertions. It is impossible to arrive at the exact numbers lost in this desperate engage- ment, owing to the series of battles which followed each other in quick succes- sion, and in which the whole army was engaged. No general returns were made until after we had arrived at Harrison's landing, when the losses during the whole seven days Avere estimated together. Although we were finally forced from our first line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects sought for had been obtained. The enemy was held at bay. Our siege guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army. The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was 22, three of which were lost by being run off the bridgi; during the final withdrawal. Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) Mas fought, and it was not until the last suc- cessful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces or struck down, and the guns captured. Doidrich's, Knierim's, and Grimm's batteries took position during the engMgement in the front of General .Smitli's line on the right bank of the stream, and with a battery of siege guns, served 128 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. by the 1st Connecticut artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of General Porter. So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chick- ahoniiny, that it was impossible to decide until the afternoon where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the old tavern, on Franklin's right, and threatening demonstrations were fre- quently made along the entire line on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a considerable force in position to meet them. On the 2Gr,h a circular was sent to the corps commanders, on the right bank of the river, asking them how many of their troops could be spared to re-enforce General Porter, after retaining sufficient to hold their positions for twenty-four hours. To this the following replies were received : "IIeadquarters Third Corps, ''June 2G — 4 j). m. "1 think! can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty -four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river, but the meu are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. * * » "8. P. KEINTZELMAN, " Brigadier General. " General R. B. Marcy." Telegrams from General Heintzelman, on the 25th and 26th, had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Generals Hooker and Kearney, and on the Charles City road, (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger,) and General Heintzelraaii expressed the opinion, on the night of the 2/)th, that lie could not hold his advanced position without re-enforcements. General Keyes telegraphed : "As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, all 1 have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small enougli." On the morning of the 27th, the following despatch was sent to General Sumner : "Headquarters Army ok the Potomac, " June 27 — 8.45 a. m. " General Smith just reports that six or eight regiments have moved down to the woods in front of General Sumner. "11. B. MARCY, " C/iid Pennsylvania kept u]) a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed. BATTLE OF SAVAGE's STATION. General Slocum arrived at Savage's station at an early hour on the 29th, and was ordered to cross White Oak swamp and relieve General Keyes's corps. As soon as General Keyes was thus relieved, he moved towards James river, which he reached in safety, with all his artillery and baggage, early on the mornmg of the 30th, and took uj) a position below Turkey creek bridge. During the morning General Franklin heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickahominy in large force, and advanc- ing towards Savage's station. He communicated this information to General Sumner, at Allen's farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's station. "A little after noon General Sumner united his forces with those of General Franklin', and assumed command. I had ordered General Heintzelman, with his corps, to hold the "Williamsburg road until dark, at a point where were several field-works, and a skirt of tinib(T between these Avorks and the railroad ; but he fell back before night, and crossed White Oak swamp at Brackett's ford. General Sumner in his report of the battle of Savage's station says : "When the enemy appeared on the Williamsburg road I could not imagine why General Heintzelman did not attack him, ami not till some time afterwards did I learn, to my utter amazement, that General Heintzelman had h.'ft the field, and retreated with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. This defection might have been attended with the most disastrous consefjuences; and although we beat the enemy signally and drove him from the fiidd, we should certainly have given him a more crushing blow if General Heinizelman had been there with his corps." General Heintzelman in his report of the operations of his corps says: **0n the night of the 28th of June I received orders to Avithdraw the troops of my corps from the advanced position they had taken on the 25th of June, and to occupy the intrenched lines about a mile in rear. A map was sent me, showing the positions General Sumner's and General Franklin's corps would occupy. "About sunrise the next day our troops slowly fell back to the new ]iositi(m. cautiously followed by the enemy, taking possession of our camps as soon as wsible to re-enforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to f ice the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. AVe still ha%'e strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. "A. LINCOLN. "Major General G. B. McClellan." In a despatch from the President to me, on the 2d of July, he says : " If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army, material and p(;rsonnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept." OntheSdof July the following kind despatch was received from the Pres- ident : 142 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. [Extract.] "Washington, July 3, 1862 — 3 7?. m. " Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers and men, have done the best you coukl. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it. "Major General G. B. McCkellan." On the 4th I sent the followinjr to the President A. LINCOLN. "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 18G2. " I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2d instant. " I shall make a stand at this j)lace, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much require. " After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night ; they were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded, the consequences would have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting which had con- tinued from the afternoon of the 26th ultimo, in a daily series of engagements wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both sides. " The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enormous. That of the enemy certainly greatest. On Tuesday morning, the 1st, our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point, our line of defence there being too extended tc be maintained by bur weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 p. m. on the 2d a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day and until the forenoon of yesterday. " The roads became horrible. Troops, artillery, and wagons moved on steadily, and oiu- whole army, men and material, was finally brought safe into this canip. " The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its morale, and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to make. " We now occupy a line of heights, about two miles from the James, a plain extending from there to the river; our front is about three miles long; tlicse heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The gunboat.s can render valuable support upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front we must hold our ground as we best may, and at whatever cost. " Our positions can be carried only by overwhelming numbers. The spirit of the army is oxc(illent ; stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiers exhibit the best results of discipline. Our posit it)n is by no means impreg- nable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground from our centre to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and if so, our front will be the scene of a dcisjjcrate battle, which, if lost, will be decisive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded and prisoners. " I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but wc were not beaten in any conflict. "The enemy were unable, by their ufmost eflbrts, to drive us from any field. Never did sucli a change of basi', involving a retrograde movement, and under incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more numerous fiK', par- take so little of disord(!r. ^Ve iiave lost no guns (!xcept 25 on the field of battle, 21 of which were lost -by the giving way of McCall's division, under the onset of superior numbers. EEPORT OF GENERAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 143 " Our communications by the James river are not secure. Tlicre are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and com- mand the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every effort to preserve, at least, the personnel of the army, aud the events of the last few days leave no question that the troops will do all that their crmntry can ask. Send such re-euforcemeuts as you can ; I will do what I can. We are shipping our wounded and sick and landing- supplies. The Navy Department should co-operate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Rodg-ers is doing all in his power in the kindest and most efficient manner. " When all the circumstances of the case are known, it will be acknowledged by all comiietent judges that the movement just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Under the most dithcult circumstances we have preserved our trains, our guns, our material, and, above all, our honor. "G. 13. McGLELLAN, " Major General. "The President. " -^ To which I received the following reply : " Washington, July 5, 1862 — 9 a. m. " A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches, of twelve and one p.m. yesterday, gave me. Be assured the heroism aud skill of yourself and officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated. " If you can hold your present position we shall hive the enemv vet. "A.LINCOLN. "Maj. Gen. Ct. B. McClellan, ^'Comma7iding Army of the Votomac.^'' The following letters were received from his excellency the President : "War Department, ''Wasldvgton City, D. CJuly 4, 1S62. "I understand your position as stated in your letter, and by General Marcy. To re-enforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a mouth, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I suppose,) and about ten thousand, I hope, you will have from Burnside very soon, and about five thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man Avithin a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army, first, Avhere you are, if you can, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which vou will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that with the aid of the gunboats and the re-enforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position ; provided, aud so long as you can keep the James river open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James river open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remem- ber that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention. " Yours, verv trulv, "A. LINCOLN. " Major General McClellan." " P. S. — If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not re- strained from doing so. "A. L." 144 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. The following telegram was sent on the 7th : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berl:c/ci/. Jt/hj 7, 1862—8.30 a. m. " As boat is starting, I have only time to acknowledge receipt of despatch bj General Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming* more so. If not attacked to-day, I shall langh at them. I have been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-othcer Goldsborough last night ; he is confident he can keep river open. He should have all gunboats possible. Will see him again this morning. My men in splendid spirits and anxious to try it again. " Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " A. Lincoln, President.'* While general-in-chief, and directing the operations of all our armies in the field, I had become deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and car- rying out certain views regarding the conduct of the war, which, in my jiulgment, were essential to its objects and its success. During an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country, these were so fully confirmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we then occupied, not to withhold a candid expression of the more important of these views from the commander-in-chief, whom the Constitution places at the head of the armies and navies, as Avell as of the government of the nation. The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ^^Ca77ij) near Harrison's Landing, la., July 7, 1862. "Mr. President: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in the front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly re- late to the situation of this army, or strictly come M'ithin the scope of my oflicial duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply im])ressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned ; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If seces- sion is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon tlie people of every State. " The time has come when the goverinnent must determine upon a civil and military policy, covei-ing the whole ground of our national troulilc. " The responsibility of determining, declaring, and su])portiiig such civil and military ])olicy, and of directing the whoh; course of national atfairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency. " This rebellion has assumed the character of a war ; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted iipon the highest principles know'n to christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war ui)on popula- tion, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither coniiscatiun REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 145 of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. " In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations ; all pri- vate property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for ; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes ; all unnecessary trespass sternly pro- hibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towai-ds citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments, constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. " Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compen- sation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State ; and in ]Missouri, peidiaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. " Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the efibrt to obtain requisite foi'ces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the government must be sup- ported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist. " In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army, one who possesses your confidence, under- stands your views, and who is competent to exc.'cule your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and 1 will do so as faithfully as ever sub- ordinate served superior. " I may be on the brink of eternity ; and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my country. "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, "Major General, Cominandins^. "His Excellency A. Lincoln, President.'" H. Ex. Doc. 15 10 146 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. I telegraplied the President on the 11th a? follows: "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, July 11, 1862—3 p. m. ****** "We are very strong here now, so far as defensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again. All in fine spirits. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. "A. Lincoln, President y These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th, and 18th, to his excellency the President: "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, July 12, 1862—7.15 a. m. " Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent county, via Long bridge. I am still ignorant what road they afterwards took, but will know shortly. "Nothing else of interest since last despatch. Rain ceased, and everything quiet. Men resting well, but beginning to be impatient for another fight. " I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here, but promptly re-enforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we have a little more than half a chance we can take it. "I dread the effects of any retreat upon the morale of the men. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. "A. Lincoln, President." "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, July 17, 1862— S a. m. " I have consulted fully with General Bui-nside, and w^ould commend to your favorable consideration the general's plan for bringing (7) seven additional regi- ments from North Carolina by leaving Newbern to the care of the gunboats. It appears manifestly to be our policy to concentrate here everything we can possibly spare from less important points, to make sui'e of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems cleai-ly to be the most important point in rebeldora. Nothing should be left to chance here. I would recommend that General Burn- side, with all his troops, be ordered to this army, to enable it to assume the offensive as soon as possible. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. "A. Lincoln, President." "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Berkeley, July 18, 1862—8 a. m. "No change worth reporting in the state of affairs. Some (20,000) twenty thousand to (25,000) twenty-five thousand of the enemy at Petersburg, and others thence to Richmond. "Those at Petersburg say they are part of Beauregard's army. New troops arriving via Petersburg. Am anxious to have determination of government tliat no time may b- m. " The movement undertaken up the river last night failed on account of the incompetency of guides. "The proper steps have been taken to-day to remedy this evil, and I hope to be ready to-morroAv night to carry out your suggestions as to pressing, at least to accomplish the first indispensable step. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. " Maj. Gen. Halleck, " Commandmg United States Army." On the 4th General Hooker was re-enforced by General Sedgwick's division, and having obtained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Malvern hill, and driving the enemy back towards Richmond. The following is my report of this affair at the time : "Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862 — 1 p. m. " General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a very considerable force of infantry and artillery stationed at this place, and carried it handsomely, driving the enemy towards New Market, which is four miles dist;int, and where it is said they have a large force. We have captured 100 prisoners, killed and wounded several, with a loss on our part of only three killed and eleven wounded; among the latter, two officers. " I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to act as circumstances may require, after the return of my cavalry rccoimoissances. "The mass of the enemy escaped under the cover of a dense fog; but our cavalry arc still iu pursuit, and I trust may succeed in capturing many more. " This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, and only 14f miles distant; and I feel confident that with re-enforcements I would march this army there in five days. " I this instant learn that several brigades of the enemy are four miles from here on the Quaker road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet them. 150 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. " General Hooker's dispositions were admirable, and bis officers and men dis- played tbeir iisual gallantry. " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commanding. "Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States ArmyP "Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862 — S p. m. "Since my last despatch Colonel Averill bas returned from a reconnoissance, in tbe direction of Savage's station, towards Ricbmond. He encountered the 18tb Virginia cavalry near White Oak swamp bridge, charged and drove them ^ome distance towards Richmond, capturing 28 men and horses, killing and wounding several. " Our troops have advanced (12) twelve miles in one direction, and (17) seven- teen in another, towards Richmond to-day. "We have secured a strong position at Coggin's point, opposite oiu- quarter- master's depot, which will effectually prevent the rebels from using artillery liereafter against our camps. " I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men about six miles back from this point, on the south bank of the river. What their object is I do not know, but will keep a sharp lookout on their movements. " I am sending off" sick as rapidly as our transports will take them. I am also doing everything in my power to carry out your orders, to push recounois- sances towards the rebel capital, and hope soon to find out whether the reports regarding the abandonment of that place are true. " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United tStates Army." To the despatch of 1 p. m., August 5, the following answer was received : " Washington, August 6, 1862 — 3 a. m. " T have no re-enforcements to send you. "Major General G. B. McClellan." And soon after the following: : "H. w. halleck, " Major General. "Washington, August 6, 1862. " You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Buniside's command at Aquia creek. It is reported that Jackson is moving north with a veiy large force. "H. W. HALLECK, " ]\Iajor General. "Major General G. B. McClellan." On th(^ 4tli I liad received General Halleck's order of the 3d, (which appears below,) directing \\\v, to withdraw the army to Aquia, and on the same day sent an earnest protest against it. A few hours before this. General Hooker had in- formed me tliat liis cavalry pickets reported large bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them in, and tliat h(! would probably be attacked at daybreak. Under these circninstaiices I liad determined to support liim; but as I could not get the whole army in position until the next afternoon, I concluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram from the general-in-chief, to withdraw General ^ EEPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 151 Hooker, that there might be the least possible delay in conforming to General Halleck's orders. I therefore sent to General Hooker the following letter : "Headquarters Army of the Pot»>mac, " Berkeley, August G, 1SG2 — 10 ^7. m. "My Dear General : I find it will not be possible to get the whole army into position before some time to-morrow afternoon, which Avill be too late to sup- port you, and hold the entire position, should the enemy attack in large force at daybreak, which there is strong reasons to suppose he intends doing. " Should we fight a general battle at Malvern, it will be necessary to abandon the whole of our works here, and run the risk of getting back here. " Under advices I have received from Washington, I think it necessary for you to abandon the position to-night, getting everything away before daylight. " Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with orders to destroy the Tur- key creek bridge when they are forced back. " The roads leading into Haxall's from the right should be strongly watched, and Haxall's at least held by strong cavalry force and some light batteries as long as possible. " I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely to your discretion. "Please signal to the fleet when the withdrawal is about completed. " Report frequently to these headquarters. " General Sumner was ordered up to support you, but will halt where this passes him, and will inform you where he is. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "General J. Hooker, " Commanding at Malvern Hill." And the following reply was sent to General Halleck : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 6, 1862 — 11.30 p. m. "Despatch of to-day received. I have not quite (4,000) four thousand cavalry for duty in cavalry division, so that I cannot possibly spare any more. " I really need many more than I now have to carry out your instructions. " The enemy are moving a large force on Malvern hill. In view of your despatches, and the fact that I cannot place the whole army in position before daybreak, I have ordered Hooker to withdraw during the night if it is possible; if he cannot do so, I must support him. " Until this matter is developed I cannot send any batteries ; I hope I can do so to-morrow if transportation is on hand. " I will obey the order as soon as circumstances permit. My artillery is none too numerous now. I have only been able to send off some (1,200) twelve hundred sick. No transportation. There shall be no diday that I can avoid. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, Commandi?ig. "Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding U. S. Army." Five batteries, with their horses and equipments complete, were embarked on the 7th and 8th, simultaneously with General Hooker's operations u[iiin Mal- vern. I despatched a cavalry force under Colonel Averill towards Savage's sta- tion, to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements towards our right flank. 152 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. He found a rebel cavalry regiment near tlie AYliite Oak swamp bridge, and completely routed it, pur.^- "Your telegram of (2d) second is received. The answer (to despatch of July 30) was sent this morning. "We have about (12,500) twelve thousand five hundred sick, of whom per- haps (4,000) four thousand might make easy marches. We have here the means to transport ( 1,200) twelve hundred, and will embark to-morrow that number of the worst cases, with all the means at the disposal of the medical director; the remainder could be shipped in from (7) seven to (10) ten days. " It is impossible for me to decide what cases to send off, unless I know what is to be done with this army. " Were the disastrous measures of a retreat adopted, all the sick who cannot march and fight should be despatched by water. " Should the army advance, many of the sick could be of service at the depots. If it is to remain here any length of time, the question assumes still a different phase. " Until I am informed what is to be done, I cannot act understandingly or for the good of the service. If I am kept longer in ignorance of Avhat is to be effected, I cannot be expected to accomplish the object in view. " In the mean time I will do all in my power to carry out what I conceive to be your wishes. "GEO. R. McCLELLAN, "Major General, Commancling. "Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army, Washington, D. C" The moment I received the instructions for removing the sick, I at once gave the necessary directions for carrying them out. With the small amount of transportation at hand, the removal of the severe cases alone would necessarily take several days, and, in the mean time, I de- sired infonnation to determine what I should do with the others. The order required rac; to send them away as (piickly as possible, and to no- tify the genei'al-iii-chief when tliey were removed. Previous to the receipt of the despatch of the 2d of August, not having been REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 153 advised of -vvliat the army under my command was expected to do, or wLicli way it was to move, if it moved at all, I sent the following despatch : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, Avgust 3, 1862. " I hear of sea steamers at Fort INEonroe ; are they for removing- my sick ? If so, to what extent am I required to go in sending them off? There are not many who need go. "As I am not in any way informed of the intentions of the government in regard to this army, I am unable to judge what proportion of the sick should leave here, and must ask for specific orders. "G. B. j\IcCLELLAN', "Major General, Commanding. " Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army, Washington." If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it was important that it should be unencumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all interfere with its mobility ; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond, from the position we then occupied, there Avere many cases of slight sickness which would speedily be cured, and the patients returned to duty. As the service of every man would bo important in the event of a forward offensive movement, I considered it to be of the utmost consequence that I should know what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the despatch of 11 p. m. on the 3d, before receiving the following telegram : "Washington, August 3, 1862 — 7.45^. m. " I have waited most anxiously to learn the result of your forced reconnoissance towards Richmond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my telegram. "It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia creek. You will take immediate measui-es to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. " Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from your own officers. " Your material and transportation should be removed first. You will assume control of all the means of transportation within your reach, and ap})ly to the naval forces for all the assistance they can render you. You will consult freely with the commander of these forces. The entire execution of the movement is left to your discretion and judgment. " You will leave such forces as you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places, which we must occupy. "H. W. HALLECK, " Major General, Commanding United States Army. " Major General Geo. B. McClellan." I proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the army of the Poti>mac from Harrison's landing, where its communications had by the co-operation of the gunboats been rendered perfectly secure, would, at that time, have the most disastrous effect upon our cause. I did not, as the commander of that army, allow the occasion to pass without distinctly setting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities in the fol- lowing telegram : 154 REPORT OF GENERA.L GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 4, 1862—12 m. " Yoiii' telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements. " This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a de- bouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction ; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as now secure " We are twenty-five (25) miles from E-ichmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) miles, which brings us practically within ten (10) miles of llich- mond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty- five (25) miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within twelve (12) miles of Richmond. " At Aquia creek we would be seventy-five (75) miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way. "From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy (70) miles, for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material, except by land. " The result of the movement would thus be a march of one hundred and forty-five (145) miles to reach a point now only twenty-five (25) miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water transportation. "Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the north, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, it may be promptly re-enforced to enable it to resume the offensive. " It may be said that there are no re-enforcements available. I point to Burnside's force ; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry ; to those portions of the army of the west not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion ; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow Avhich will determine the fate of the nation. " All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here ; a decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not Avhat partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere; here is the true defence of Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided. "Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from tlie commencement of this war, I do now, Avhat I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded. "If my counsel docs not prevail, I Avill with a sad heart obey your orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the movements, Avhich I clearly foresee will be one of tlic utmost delicacy and (lifru-ulty, whatever skill I may possees. Whatever the result may be — and may (lod grant tliat I am mistriken in my forebodings — 1 shall at least have the internal satislaction that 1 have written REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 155 and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert dis- aster from my country. " G. B. McCLELLAN, "Alajor General, Cumuianding. " ajor General H. W. Halleck, " Com7nanding United States Army." Soon after sending this telegram, I received the following, in reply to mine of 11 p. m. of the 3d : "Washington, Avgust 4, 1S62 — \2A5 p. m. " My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future opera- tions; it was expected that you would have sent oft your sick, as directed, with- out waiting to know what were or would be the intentions of the govei-nment respecting future movements. "The President expects that the instructions Avhich were sent you yesterday, with his approval, will be carried out with all possible despatch and caution. The Quartermaster General is sending to Fort Monroe all the transportation he can collect. "H. W. HALLECK, " Major General. "Major General G. B. McClellan." To which the following is my reply : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 5, 1862 — 7 a. m. "Your telegram of yesterday received, and is being carried out as promptly as possible. With the means at my command, no human power could have moved the sick in the time you say you expected them to be moved. "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United Stales Army." My efforts for bringing about a change of policy Avere unsuccessful, as will be seen from the following telegram and letter received by me in reply to mine of 12 m. of the 4th : "Washington, August 5, 1862 — 12 m. "You cannot regret the order of the withdrawal more than I did the neces- sity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness. It is believed that it can be done now without serious danger. This may not be so, if there should be any delay. I will write you my views more fully by mail. "H. W. HALLECK, " Major General, Commanding United States Army. "Major General G. B. McClellan." The letter was as follows : "Headquarters of the Ar.mv, " Washington, August 6, 1862. "General: Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. 156 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. "You, general, certaiuly could not liave been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview. And even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. "I assure you, general, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thoughts than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued — there was to my mind no alternative. "Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. "You and your ofiicers at one interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. Since then, you and others report that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from the south. General Pope's army, covering Washington, is only about forty thousand. Your effective force is only about ninety thousand. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you read.y to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other as he may elect; neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack. "If General Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsnla to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united. "Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged: you say that the withdrawal from the present position will cause the certain de- moralization of the army ' which is now in excellent discipline and condition.' "I cannot understand why a simple change ol position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist iu that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. " Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to your present condition was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it de- moralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it. " A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a re-enforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. " The change with such advantages will, I think, if properly represented to your array, encourage rather than demoralize your troops. INIoreover, you your- self suggested that a junction might be eft'ected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the isthmus would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. "You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further than Fred- ericksburg is. Besides, the latter is between Richmond and AYashington, and covers AN'asliington from any attack of the enemy. " Th(! political efi'cct of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable ; but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separated fragments. EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 157 " But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Rich- mond from my present position 1 To do this, you said, at our interview, that you required thirty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impos- sible to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have ' some chance ' of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards telegraphed me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely re-enforced. " If your estimate of the enemy's strength was coiTCct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable ; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troo could be enlisted and organized, which would require several Avceks. " To keep your army in its present position until it could it be so re-enforced would almost destroy it in that climate. " The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river ; and even after you received the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries be- fore you could advance on Richmond. " It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time — perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. " This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from yuu. " In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are de- cidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally ad- vocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment. " I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by whose advice or for what reasons the army of the Potomac was separated into two parts with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them. " I find the forces divided, and 1 wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you, or any one else, had presented a better plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require re-enforcements which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. " I have written very plainly as I imderstand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having fully considered the matter, although 1 may have ar- rived at very diff'erent conclusions from your own. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, «H. W. HALLECK, " Gencral-in-Chicf. "Major General G. B. McClellan, " Commanding, t^r., Berkclct/, llrginia." On the 7th I received the following telegram : "Washington, August 7, 1S62 — 10 a. m. " You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since you received my order, the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at your disposal — that is, the number of persons that can be carried on all the vessels which by my order you were authorized to control. "H. W. HALLECK, Major General G. B. McClellan." 'Major General. 158 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B, m'cLELLAN. To wliicli I made tins reply : " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " August 7, 1862—10.40 p. m "In reply to your despatch of 10 a. m. to-day, I report the number of sick sent off since I received your order as follows : Three thousand seven hundred and forty, including some that are embarked to-night and will leave in the morning. The number -still to be shipped is, as nearly as can be ascertained, five thousand seven hundred. " The embarcation of live batteries of artillery, with their horses, wagons, &c., required most of our available boats except the ferry-boats. All the trans- ports that can ascend to this place have been ordered up ; they will be here to- morrow evening. Colonel Ingalls reports to me that there are no transports now available for cavalry, and will not be for two or three days. As soon as they can be obtained I shall send off the first New York cavalry. " After the transports Avith sick and wounded have returned, including some heavy-draught steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, we can tiTinsport twenty-five thousand men at a time. We have some propellers here, but they are laden with commissary supplies and are not available. " The transports now employed in transporting sick and wounded will carry 12,000 well infimtry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy draft to come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. Several of the largest steamers have been used for transporting prisoners of war, and have only be- come available for the sick to-day. " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. " Major General. " Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States ArmT/." The report of my chief quartermaster upon the subject is as follows : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Office of Chief Quartermaster, Harrisort s Landing, August 7, 1862. "General: I have the honor to return the papers herewith which you sent me, with the following remarks : " We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, &c., which requires the detailing of most of our available boats, except the ferry- boats. The medical department has ten or twelve of our largest transport ves- sels, which, if disposable, could cany 12,000 men. Besides, thei'e are some heavy' draft steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. "I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. They will be here to-morrow evening. As it now is, after the details already made, we can- not transport from this place more than 5,000 infantry. " There are no transports now available for cavalry. From and after to-mor- row, if the vessels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. In two or three days a regiment of cavaliy can be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport 25,000 at a time. The number that can be trans- ported is contingent on circumstances referred to. "Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary or other supplies, and most of the tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft also laden with supplies. "I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, "liUFUS INGALLS, *' Chief Quartermaster. "General R. B. Marcy, -Chufof StaJV REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 159 On tlie 9 til I received this despatch : "Washington, August 9, 1S62 — 12.45/?, m. " I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing liis forces in front of Gen- erals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. "Y(ni must send re-enforcements instantly to Aquia creek. "Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity. "H. W. HALLECK, " Major General. "Major General G. B. McClellan." To which I sent the following reply : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 10, 18(32 — 8 a. m. " Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries sent to Burnside took the last available transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day. The sick are being embarked as itipidly as possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert — not an hour's — but everything has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General Commanding. "Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." The following report, made on the same day by the officer then in charge of tlie transports, exposes the injustice of the remark in the despatch of the gen, eral-in-chief, that, "considering the amount of transportation at your disposal your delay is not satisfactory." "Assistant Quartermaster's Office, Army of the Potomac, ^'Harrison's Landing, Virginia, August 10, 1862. "Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has requested me to telegraph to you con- cerning the state and capacity of the transports now here. On the night of the 8th I despatched eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six schooners, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of which have yet rc^turned. " Requisition is made this morning for transportation of one thousand cavalry to Aquia creek. All the schooners tliat had been chartered for carrying horses have been long since discharged, or changed into freight vessels. "A large proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded with stores, or are in the floating hospital service engaged in removing the sick. To transport the one thousand cavalry to-day will take all the available steamers now liere not engaged in the service of the harbor. These steamers could take a large number of infantry, but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and much space is thus lost. Several steamers are expect. m. " Leave such garrisons in Fortress ]\Ionroe, Yorktown, &c., as you may deem proper. They will be replaced by new troops as rapidly as possible. " The forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. " By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. Moreover, they may have to fight as soon as they land. " H. W. HALLECK, " Major General, Commanding United States Army. " General McClellan." 168 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAJVT. To wliicli the following are replies : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Fortress Monroe, Avgust 21, 1862 — 7.30 p. m. " Your despatch of (6) six p. m. received. I have not lost an hoiir in sending troops, nor will I. Franklin is here, and I will try to get some of his troops ou board to-night. I had already ordered all the ammunition forward. " I will put headquarters ou board ship early to-morrow morning, so that I can leave at a moment's notice. I hope tliat I can get off to-morrow. Shall I go in person to Aquia, or do you wish to see me first at Washington ? If you wish it I can probably ship quite au amouiit of ammunition for other troops than this army. ^ " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " Major General Halleck, " Washmgion, D. C." "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Fort Motiroe, August 21, 1862 — 10.25^. m. "I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. 1 can supply any deficiency that may exist in General Pope's army. Quite a number of rifled field guns are on hand here. "The forage is the only question for you to attend to; please have that ready for me at Aquia. I want many more schooners for cavalry horses; they should have water on hand when they come here. " If you have leisure, and there is no objection, please communicate to me fully the state of afi:airs, and your plans. I will then be enabled to arrange details understandingly. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General Halleck, Washington." Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe, I gave directions for strengthening the defences of Yorktown, to resist any attack from the direction of Richmond, and left General Keyes, with his corps, to j)erform the work, and temporarily garrison the place. I telegraphed as follows on the 22d : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ''Fort Monroe, Avgust 22, 1862 — 2.15^. /». "Despatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps is embarking as rapidly aa possible. Sumner's corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as fast as transportation arrives. Keyes is still at Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of defence. I think that all of Franklin's corps will get off to-day, and hope to commence with Sumner to-morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and Avagous. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General H. W. Halleck, " Washington, D. C." "IlEADQUAirrERS Army of the Potomac, ''Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862 — 3.40;;. 7n. "Two (2) good ordnnnco sergeants are needc^d immediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new defences are arranged and commenced. " I reconnnend that (5,00Q|) ^ivc thousand new troops be sent immediately to EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. ilCLELLAN. 169 garrison York and Gloucester. They should be commanded by an experienced general officer, who can discipline and instruct them. About (900) nine hundred should be artillery. I recommend that a new regiment, whose colonel is an artillery officer, or graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and sent there. A similar regiment is absolutely necessary here. "G. B. McCLELLAN, Majo?- General. "Major General H. W. Hallrck, " Cominandivg United States Army." On the 23d Franklin's corps sailed. I reported this in the following de- spatch : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ''Fort Monroe, August 23, 1SG2 — 1.30 y>. m. "Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for Aquia in about half an hour. jS^o transports yet for Sumner's corps. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General, " Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." On that evening I sailed with my staff" for Aquia creek, where I arrived at daylight on the following morning, reporting as follows: " Headquarters Army ok the Potomac, "■Aquia Creek, August 24, 1S62, "I have reached here, and respectfully report for orders. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. Major General Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." I also telegraphed as follows : "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Aquia Creek, August 24, 1862 — 2 p. m. "Your telegram received. Morell's scouts report Rappahannock station burned and abandoned by Pope, without any notice to ]\Iorell or Sykes. This was telegraphed you some hours ago. Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens are sup- posed to be with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to-day. Morell and Sykes are near Morrisville Post Office, watching the lower fords of Rappahan- nock, with no troops between there and Rappahannock station, which is reported abandoned by Pope. "Please inform me immediately exactly where Pope is, and what doing; until I know that I cannot regulate Porter's movements ; he is much exposed now, and decided measures should be taken at once. Until I know what my com- mand and position are to be, and whether you still intend to place me in the command indicated in your first letter to me, and orally through General Burn- side, at the Chickahominy, I cannot decide where I can be of most use. If your determination is unchanged, I ought to go to Alexandria at once. Please define my position and duties. "G.B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " Major General H. TV. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." 170 PtEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. To wliicli I received the following reply : "Washington, August 24, 1862. " You ask me for information wliicli I cannot give. I do not know either where General Pope is, or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have all day been most anxious to ascertain. " H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major General McClkllan." On the 26th I received the following : "Washington, August 26, 1862 — 11 a. m. " There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenandoah valley. Reconnoissances will soon determine. General Heintzel- man's corps was ordered to report to General Pope, and Kearney's will probably be sent to-day against the enemy's flank. Don't draw any troops down the Rappahannock at present ; we shall probably want them all in the direction of' the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had better leave General Buruside in charge at Aquia creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities are reported there. General Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives transportation. "H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major General G. B. McClellan." On receipt of this I immediately sailed for Alexandria, and reported as fol- lows : "Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 8 a. m. " I arrived here last night, and have taken measures to ascei'tain the state of affairs here, and that proper remedies may be applied. Just received a rumor that railway bridge over Bull run was burned last night. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " Major General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." "Alexandria, August 27, 1862—9.40 a. m. " The town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers, who are said to be chiefly convalescents. " The affairs of the quartermaster's department are reported as going on well. " It is said that the Bull run bridge will be repaired by to-morrow. The disembarcation of Sumner's corps commenced at Aquia yesterday afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappahannock station earlier that way than from here. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General II. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." On the same day I received the following : "Washington, August 27, 1862. "Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnsido, just received, say that Banks is at Faycttoville; McUowell, Sigcl. and Ricketts near AVarrenton; Reno on his ri2;lit. Porter is marching on Warrentou Junction, to rc-cnforcc REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 171 Pope. Nothing said of Heintzclman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, caiTying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied, as far as possible, by raih-oad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just telegraphed about sending out troops. Please see him, and give him your directions. There has been some serious neglect to guard the railroad, which should be immediately remedied. "H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. "Major General McClellan." I replied as follows : "Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 10 a. m. " Telegram this moment received. I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform me as to his means of transportation. "Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock station; Porter at Bealton, Kellip, Barnells, &c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to-day. Williams's Massachusetts cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day. "I loaned Burnside my personal escort (one sq[uadron 4th regulars) to scout down Rappahannock. " I have sent for Couch's division to come at once. As fast as I gain any in- formation I will forward it, although you may already have it. "G. B. McCLELLAX, "Major General. "Major General H. W. Halleck, " Washington, D. C." I also received the following telegrams : "Washington, August 27, 1862. "Direct General Casey to furnish you about five thousand of the new troops under his command. " Take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria. " Determine questions of priority in transportation, and the places they shall occupy. Pope's headquarters are near Warrenton Junction, but I cannot ascertain the present position of his troops. "H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-CJiieJ'. " Major General McClellan." "Washington, August 27, 1862. " I can get no satisfactory information from the front, either of the enemy or of our troops. There seems to have been great neglect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's corps should march in that direction as soon as possible. A competent officer should be sent out to take direction of aflfairs in that vicinity. , " H. W. HALLECK, " Gcneral-in- Chief, " Major General McClellan." Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent the following telegram to Generals Heintzelman and Porter : 172 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. "Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 10.30 a. m. "Where are you, and what is state of affairs — what troops in your front, right, and left? Sumner is now landing at Aquia. Where is Pope's left, and what of enemy ? Enemy burned Bull run bridge last night with cavalry force. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General Heintzelman, Warrenton. "Major General Porte u, Bealton. "P. S. — If these general officers are not at the places named, nearest operator will please have message forwarded." I also telegraphed to the general-in-chief as follows : "Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 10.50 a. m. " I have sent all the information I possess to Burnside, instructing him to look out well for his right flank, between the Rappahannock and Potomac, and to send no trains to Porter without an escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed at Bull run last night may trouble Burnside a little. I have sent to communicate with Porter and Heintzelman, via Falmouth, and hope to give you some defixiite information in a few hours. I shall land the next cavalry I get hold of here, and send it out to keep open the communication between Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Manassas. Please send me a number of copies of the best maps of present field of operations. I can use fifty (50) to advantage. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major Generals "Major General IIalleck, " Commanding United States Army." "Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 11.20 a. vu "In view of Burnside's despatch, just received, would it not be advisable to throw the mass of Sumner's corps here, to move out with Franklin to Centreville or vicinity ? If a decisive battle is fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any troops on lower Rappahannock in a dangerous position. "They would do better service in front of Washington. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General Halleck, " Washington, I). C." " Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 12.5 p. vu " My aid has just returned from General Franklin's camj) ; reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that heavy firing has been heard this morning at Centreville, and have sent to ascer- tain the truth. I can find no cavalry to send out on the roads. Are the works garrisoned and ready for defence'? " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. Major General IIalleck, Washington." "Alexandria, August 27, 1802 — 12.20 7?. m. "What bridges exist over Bull run? Have steps been t^ken to construct bridgcH for the advance of troops to rc-enforce Pope, or to enable him to retreat if in trouble 1 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 173 "There should be two gunboats at Aquia creek at once. Shall I pu^;h the rest of Sumner's corps here, or is Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain of success 1 I have sent to inspect the works near here and their garrisons. "As soon as I can find General Casey, or some other commanding officer, I will see to the railway, &c. It would be well to have them report to me, as I do not know where they are. I am trying to find them, and will lose no time in carrying out your orders. Would like to see Burnside. "G. B. M(CLP:LLAX, " Major General. "Major General H. W. Halleck, Washington." "Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 1.15^. m. " Franklin's artillery have no horses, except for (1) four guns Avithout caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrange- ments for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defence ? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. " Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front 1 " Should not Burnside take steps at once to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia. at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction ? " I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connexion with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley 1 "G. B. McCLELLAN. " Major General. "Major General Halleck, Washington." "Alexandria, August 27, 1S62 — 1.35 p. m. " I learn that Taylor's brigade, sent this morning to Bull run bridge, is either cut to pieces or captured. " That the force against them had many guns, and about (5,000) five thousand infantry, receiving re-enforcements every minute ; also, that Gainesville is in possession of the enemy. Please send some cavalry out towards Drainsville, via Chain bridge, to watch Lewinsville and Drainsville, and go as far as they can. If you will give me even one squadron of good cavalry here I will ascer- tain the state of the case. I think our policy now is to make these works per- fectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but not to advance them until they can have their artillery and cavalry. I have sent for Colonel Tyler to place his artillerymen in the works. " Is Fort Marcy securely held ? " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " General Halleck." "Alexandria, August 27, 18C2 — 2.20 p.m. " Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his corps that are within reach. Orders have been sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown with the least possible delay. But one squadron of my cavalry has arrived; that Mill be dis- embarked at once and sent to the front. " If there is any cavalry in Washington it should be ordered to nqjort to me at once. '• I still think that wc should first provide for the immediate dcfiuco of Wash- ington on both sides of the Potomac. 174 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. " I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, unless I re- ceive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " Major General H. W. Halleck, " Coi7wiandlrig United States ArmyT "Alexandria, August 27, 1863 — Q j^.m. " I have just received the copy of a despatch from General Pope to you, dated 10 a.m. this morning, in which he says: 'All forces now sent forward should be sent to my right at Gainesville.' " I now have at my disposal here about (10,000) ten thousand men of Frank- lin's corps, about (2,800) twenty -eight hundred of General Tyler's brigade and Colonel Tyler's first Connecticut artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for the defence of Washington. " If you wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point jou may indicate. " In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order General Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to move, but not to send them off till further orders. " G. B. McCLELLAN, *' Major General. "Major General H. "W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Armyy On the 28th I telegraphed as follows : "Headquarters Camp near Alexandria, " August 28, 1 862-— 4.10 f. m. " General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the con- dition of artillery and cavalry. " We are not yet in condition to move ; may be by to-morrow morning. " Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's hill. They must be held at any cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them, I will send a corps of good troops there. It is the key to Washington, which cannot be seriously menaced as long as it is held. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " Major General Hallrck, " Washiyigton, D. C." I received the following from the gcneral-in-chief : "Washington, August 28, 1862. " I think you had better place Sumner's corps as it arrives near the guns, and particularly at the Chain bridge. " The principal thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, especially in the night time. " Use Cox's and '^I'yler's brigade, and the new troops for the same object, if you need them. " Porter writes to Burnside from Bristow, 9. .'JO a. m. yesterday, that Pope's forces were then moving on Manassas, and that Burnside would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. " General Cullum has gone to Harper's FeiTy, and I have only a single regular officer for duty in the ofHce. EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 175 " Please send some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is taken at the forts against a raid ; also at the bridge. Please answer. "H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major General McClellan." On the 29th the following despatch was telegraphed ; "Camp near Alexandria, " August 29. 1862—10.30 a. m. "Franklin's corps is in motion; started about (6) six a.m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton's hill, to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via Freedom hill and Hunter's lane. Cox has (2) two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the engineer brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached, last night, two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Murcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Aquia. If he moves in support of Franklin it leaves u$ without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done ? No more cavalry arrived ; have but (3) three squadrons. Franklin has but (40) forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets with serious resistance. I should not have moved him bnt for your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainsville ? "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " Major General Halleck, " Washington, D. C." To which the following is a reply : " Washington, August 29, 1862 — 12 m. " Upton's hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. " Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing from Drainsville. "H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major General McClellan." On the same day the following was received from his excellency the Presi- dent : "Washington, August 29, 1862 — 2.30/>. m. "What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally? "A. LINCOLN. " Major General McClellan." To which I replied as follows : "Camp near Alexandria, "^w^?/*^, 29, 1862—2.45;?. m. " The last news I received from the direction of jManassas was from strag- glers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring towards Thoroughfare gap. This by no means reliable. " I am clear tliat one of two courses should be adopted : 1st, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications Avith Pope; 2d, to leave Pope to get 176 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. out of his scrape, aud at once lase all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. " No middle ground will now ans>ver. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " A. Lincoln, Fresident." And copy to General Halleck. To which the following is a reply : " Washington, August 29, 1862 — 4.10 jo. m. "Yours of to-day just received. I thick yoiu' first alternative, to wit, *to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels. "A. LINCOLN. "Major General McClellan." It had been officially reported to me from Washington that the enemy, in strong force, was moving through Vienna in the direction of the Chain bridge, and had a large force in Vienna. This report, in connexion with the despatch of the general-in-chief on the 28th, before noted, induced me to direct Franklin to halt his command near Auandale until it could be determined, by recon- noissances to Vienna and towards Manassas, whether these reports were true. General Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry force from Upton's hill towards Vienna and Drainsville in one direction, and towards Fairfax Court House in the other, and Franklin to push his two squadrons as far towards Manassas as possible, in order to ascertain the true position of the enemy. With the enemy in force at Vienna, and towards Lewinsville, it would have been very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small force beyond Anandale. It must be remembered that at that time we were cut off from direct communi- cation with General Pope; that the enemy was, by the last accounts, at Manas- sas in strong force, and that Franklin had only from 10,000 to 11,000 men, with an entirely insufficient force of cavalry and artillery. In order to represent this condition of affiairs in its proper light to the general-in-chief, aud to obtain definite instructions from him, I telegraphed as to Hows : "Camp near Alexandria, " Augtist 29, 1862—12 m. " Have ordered most of the (12th) twelfth Pennsylvania cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting duty towards Rockville, I'oolsville, &c. " If you apprehended a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better send a brigack- or two of Sumner's to near Tenallytown, where, with two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch both Chain bridge and Tenallytown. " Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, whence they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain bridge, and even Teuallytowu '{ REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 177 "Franklin lias only between (10,000) ten thousand and (11,000) eleven thoiTsand for duty. " How far do you wish this force to advance 1 "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General Halleck, WasJiington." " Camp near Alexandrfa, " August 29, ] 862—1 p. m. " I anxiously await rej)ly to my last despatch in regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order at once. " riease authorize me to attach new regiments permanently to my old brigades. I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. 1 shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and IMarcy, at least with strong advanced guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicuiity, including Franklin, who I really think ought not, under present circumstances, to advance beyond Anandale ? "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " General Halleck." On the same day I received a despatch from the general-in-chief, in which he asks me why I halted Franklin in Anandale, to which I replied as follows : " Camp near Alexandria, " Avgust 29, 1862—10.30 a. m. '' By referring to my telegrams of 10.30 a. m., 12 m., and 1 p. m., together with your reply of 2.48 p. m., you will see why Fraidvlin's corps halted at Anandale. His small cavalry force, all I had to give him, was ordered to push on as far as possible towards Manassas. " It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circum- stances, until we knew what was at Vienna. " General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. " Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. I have sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction and supply trains as soon as possible. " General Tyler to furnish the necessary guards. " I have directed General Banks's supply trains to start out to-night at least as ffir as Anandale, with an escort from General Tyler. " In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major Geiicral. " Major General Halleck, " Washington, D. C." H. Ex. Doc. 15 12 178 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. On the same eveuing I sent the following despatches : "Camp near Alexandria, " August 29, 1862—10 p. m. " Not heaving from you, I have sent orders to General Franklin to place him- self in communicatiou with General Pope as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope's supplies. " Orders have been given for railway and wagon trains to move to Pope with least possible delay. " 1 am having inspections made of all the forts around the city by members of my staff, with instructions to give all requisite orders. "I inspected Worth and Ward myself this evening; found them in good order. " Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable as to condition of works. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General Halleck, Was/iington." "Camp NEAR Alexandria, " August 29,1862—10 p. m. "Your despatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of two regiments, much fatigued, came in to-day. Tyler's brigade of three new regiments, but little drilled, is also here ; all these troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all except Franklin's to await further orders. "If you wish any of them to move towards Manassas, please inform me. " Colonel Wagner, 2d New York artillery, has just come in from the front. He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairflix Court House, Reports rumors from various sources that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are at Manassas. " That the enemy, with 120,000 men, intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain bridge, with a view of attacking Washington and Balti- more. "General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of the line of for- tifications on this side of the Potomac requires 2,000 additional artillerymen, and additional troops to defend intervals, according to circumstances; at all events, he says an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain bridge, and a few regiments distributed along the lines to give confidence to our new troops. I agree with him fully, and think onr fortifications along the upper part of our line on this side the river very unsafe with their present garrisons, and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon those works. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. " General H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief United States Army, Washington, D. C." " Camp near Alexandria, "August 30, 1862—11.30 a. m. " Your telegram of 9 a. m. received. Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been endeavoring to get transportation from the quartermaster at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been told that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 179 After the departure of liis corps he procured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition, by unloading Banks's supply train. "General Sumner endeavored, by application upon the quartermaster's depart- ment, to get wagons to carry his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march with what he could carry in his cartridge-boxes. " I have this morning directed that all my headquarters wagons that are landed be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin ; but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency. "Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermasters last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward at 1 a. m. with an escort via Anan- dale. Every effort has been made to carry out your orders promptly. The great difficulty seems to consist in the tVict that the greater part of the trans- portation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. Such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermasters, and it appears to be true. " I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you. "(i. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General Halleck, " General-in-Chief.'' On the morning of the 30th heavy artillery firing was heard in the direc- tion of Fairfax Court House, Avhich I reported to the general-in-chief. At 11 a, m. the following telegram was sent : "Camp near Alexandria, "August 30, 1S62 — 11 a. m. "Have ordered Sumner to leave (1) one brigade in vicinity of Chain bridge, and to move the rest i-ia Columbia pike on Anaudale and Fairfax Court House. " Is this the route you Avish them to take 1 He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. " Shall Couch move out also when he arrives? " G. B. McCLELLAN, " JSIajor General. "Major General Halleck, Washington." ^ On the same day I received the following: "Washington, August 30, 18G2 — 1.45^. ?«. "Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forwai'd to Centreville for General Pope. It must be done with all possible despatch. "H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. "General McClellan." To which this reply was made : "Camp near Alexandria, ''August 30, 1862— 2.10 jP. 7n. " I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artillery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance officer to load up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my headquarters wagons. You will have to see that wagons are sent from Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available wagon in Alexandria shall be loaded at once. "The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain near Chain bridge and Tenallytown should go from your headquartc^rs to save time. I un- derstand you to intend it also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and will now send them with the train as you direct. I will also send my only remaining 180 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. gqiiaclron of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the army of the Potomac who is within mv reach. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General H. W. Halleck." At 10.30 p. m. the following telegram was sent: "Camp near Alexandkia, ''Avgust 30, 1862—10.30^;. m. "I have sent to the front all my troops with the exception of Couch's division, and have given the orders necessary to insure its being disposed of as you directed. 1 hourly expect the retui-u of one of my aids, who will give au- thentic news from the field of battle. " I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further iise here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more ; they will fight none the n-orse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. " Please reply to this to-night. " I have been engaged for the last few hours in doing what I can to make ar- rangements for the wounded. I have started out all the ambulances now landed. As 1 have sent my escort to the front, I woidd be glad to take some of Gregg's cavalry with me, if allowed to go. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General IT. "W. Halleck, " Commanding United iStates Army, M^askingfon, D. C." To which, on the following day, I received this answer: "Washington, August 31, 1S62 — 9.18 c. m.- " I have just seen your telegram of 1 1.5 last night. The substance was stated to me when received, but I did not know that you asked for a reply immediately. I C4innot answer without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, by his orders, of the department. "I think Couch's di^^sion should go forward as rapidly as possible and find the battle-field. " H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major General McClellan." On the same day the following was received : "Washington, August 31, 1862 — 12.45^. m. "The subsistence department are making Fairfax station their principal depot. It slundd be well guarded. The olficer in charge should be directed to secure the depot by abatis against cavalry. As many as possible of the new regiments should be prepared to take the field. Perhaps some more should be sent to the vicinity of Chain bridge. " H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chitf. "Major General McClellan." EEPOET OF GEXEEAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 181 At 2.30 p. m. tiie foDo-wing despatcli was telegraphed : " Camp near Alexandria, " Avg^mt 31, 1S62 — 2.30^. m. " Major Haller is at Fairfax station with my prorost and headquarters guard and other troops. I have requested (4) four more companies to be sent at once, and the precautions von direct to be taken. " Under the War Department order of yesterday I have no control over any- thing except my staff, some one hundred men in my camp here, and the few re-' maining near Fort Monroe. I have no control over the new regiments — do not know where they are. or anything alxjut them, except those near here. Their commanding officers and those of the works are not under me. " Where I have seen evils existing under my eye I have ofirrected them. I think it is the business of General Casey to prepare the new regiments for the field, and a matter between him and Greneral Barnard to order others to the vicinity of Chain bridge. Neither of them is under my command, and by the War Department order I have no right to give them orders. '• G. B. McCLELLAX, " Major GeKeral. " General Halleck, Was?cin£ton." To which the following is an answer : " Washixgto.v, August 31, 1S62 — 10.7 j». im. '• S'nce receiving your despatch, relating to command, I have not been able to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have not seen the ordr-r as pub- Kshed, but will write to you in the morning. You will retain the command of evervthing in this vicinity not temporarily belonging to Pope's army in the field. " i beg of you to assist me in tMs crisis with your ability and experience. I am entirelv tired out. • H. W. HALLECK, " GcH-eral-iH-Chiff. " General McClellax." The order referred to in the preceding despatch was as follows : '•War Depart.mb.vt, August 30, 1S62. " The following are the commanders of the armies operating in Viiginia : " General Bumside commands his own corps, except those that have been temporarily detached and assigned to General Pope. " General McClellan commands that portion of the army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's command. " General Pope commands the army of Virginia and all the forces temporarily attached to it. All the forces are under the command of Major General Halleck, ceneral-in-chief. • E. D. TOWXSEXD, " Atsittamt Adjutant General.'' I was informed by Colonel Townsend that the above was published by order of the Secretary of War. At 11.30 p. m. I telegraphed the following: "Camp near Alexandria. • August 31, 1S62— 11.30 /». m. "The squadron of 2d regular cavalry thai I sent with General Sumner was captured to-day about 2 p. m., some three miles from Fairfax Court House, be- yond it on the' Little river pike, by Fin Hugh Lee, with three thousand cavalry and three light batteries. 182 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. "I have conversed with the 1st sergeant, who says that when he last saw them they were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope had no troops on that road ; this squadron getting there by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right of Centreville but Sumner's corps. There was much artillery firing during the day. A rebel major told the sergeant that the rebels had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the road is filled with wagons and stragglers coming to- wards Alexandria. " It is clear from the sergeant's account that we were badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's right is entirely exposed. " I recommend that no more of Couch's division be sent to the front, that Burnside be brought here as soon as practicable, and that everything available this side of Fail fax be drawn in at once, including the mass of the troops on the railroad. I apprehend that the enemy will, or have by this time occupied Fairfax Court House and cut off Pope entirely, unless he falls back to-night via Sangster's and Fairfax station, " I think these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in the dispositions made as I gather them. To speak frankly — and the occasion re- quires it — there appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total de- struction of the army. I have some cavalry here that can carry out any orders you may have to send. The occasion is grave, and demands grave measures. The question is, the salvation of the country. I learn that our loss yesterday amounted to fifteen thousand. We cannot afford such losses without an object. " It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that Pope should fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be lost. " I will use all the cavalry I have to watch our right. Please answer at once. I feel confident that you can rely upon the information I give you. " I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any orders you give me. " G. B. McCLELLAN, "Major General. "General Halleck, Waskington." To which this reply was received : " Washington, September 1, 1862 — 1.30 a. m. " Burnside was ordered up very early yesterday morning. Retain remainder of Couch's forces, and make arrangements to stop all retreating troops in line of works, or where you can best establish an entire line of defence. My news from Pope was up to 4 p. m. ; he was then all right. I must wait for more de- finite information before I can order a retreat, as the falling back on the line of works nnist necessarily be directed in case of a serious disaster. Give me all additional news that is reliable. " I shall be up all night, and ready to act as circumstances may require. I am fully aware of the gravity of the crisis, and have been for weeks. "H. W. HALLECK, * ' Gen cral- in- Ch ief. *♦ Major General McClellan." FOURTH PERIOD. On the 1st of Soptemljer I went into Washington, where I had an interview with the general-in-chicf, who instructed me, verbally, to take command of its defences, expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and {)rohibiting me from ex(;rcising any control over the troops actively engaged in front under General Pope. During this interview I suggested to the general- REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 183 in-cliief the necessity of his going in person, or sending one of his personal staff, to the army under General Pope, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of affairs; he sent Colonel Kelton, his assistant adjutant general. During the afternoon of the same day I received a message from the general- in-chief, to the effect that he desired me to go at once to his house to see the President. The President informed me that he had reason to believe that the army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and supporting General Pope; that he had "always been a friend of mine;" and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. I replied, sub- stantially, that I was confident that he was misinformed ; that I was sure, what- ever estimate the army of the Potomac might entertain of General Pope, that they would obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty. The President, who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to "Fitz-John Porter, or some other of my friends," and try to do away with any feeling that might exist; adding, that I could rectify the evil, and that no one else could. I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to General Porter, or do anything else in my power to gratify his wishes and relieve his anxiety; upon which he thanked me very warmly, assured me that he could never forget my action in the matter, &c., and left. I then wrote the following telegram to General Porter, which was sent to him b}«the general-in-chief: "Washington, September 1, 1862. " I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and the old army of the Poto- mac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-opera- tion to General Pope, in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that, for their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever haA^e to me. "I am in charge of the defences of Washington, and am doing all I can to ren- der your retreat safe, should that become necessary, "GEO. B. McCLELLAX. "Major General Porter." To which he sent the following reply : "Fairfax Court House, 10 a. m., ''Scptcmher 2, 1862. "You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial co- operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty. F. J. PORTER. " General George B. McClellan, " Major General Commanding, Washington." Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor at any other time, did I think for one moment that General Porter had been, or would be, in any manner de- relict in the performance of his duty to the nation and its cause. Such an im- pression never entered my mind. The despatch in question was written purely at the request of the President. On the morning of the 2d the President and General Ilallcck came to 184 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front; that our affairs were in a bad condition; that the army was in full retreat upon the defences of Washington ; the roads filled with strag- glers, &c. He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the strag- glers ; to place the works in a proper state of defence, and to go out to meet and take command of the army, when it approached the vicinity of the works, then to place the troops in the best position — committing everything to my hands. I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and sent an aid to Gen- eral Pope with the following letter : "Headquarters, Washington, " Septemher 2, 1862. " General : General Halleck instructed me to report to you the order he sent this morning to withdraw your army to Washington, without unnecessary delay. He feared that his messenger might miss you, and desired to take this double precaution. "In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are already familiar, it would be best to move Porter's corps upon Upton's hill, that it may occupy Hall's hill, &c.; McDowell's to Upton's hill; Franklin's to the works in front of Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the Chain bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alex- andria, as may be most convenient. " In haste, general, very truly yours, " GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major General United States Army. "Major General John Pope, " Commanding Army of Virginia" In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front, and at Upton's hill met the advance of McDowell's corps, and with it Generals Pope and McDowell. After getting what information I could from them, I sent the few aids at my disposal to the left to give instructions to the troops aj)proachiug in the direction of Alexandria ; and hearing artillery firing in the direction of the Vienna and Langley mad, by which the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel were returning, and learning from General Pope that Sumner was probably en- gaged, I went, with a single aid and three orderlies, by the shortest line to meet that column. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as far as LeAvinsville, where I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be able to reach its intended position without any serious molestation. I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were to occupy, sent instructions to General Sumner, and at a late hour of the night re- turned to Washington. Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rectifying the positions of the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary supplies, &c. I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any attack made by the enemy on the south sid(} of the Potomac. On the 3d the enemy had disapjieared from the front of Washington, and the information which 1 received induced me to believe that he intended to cross tli(^ npjx.-r Potomac into ]\Iaryland. This materially changed the aspect of affairs, and enlarged the sj)liere of opeiations; for, in case of a crossing in force, an' active cani]iaign would be necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of I'ennsylvania, and clear Maryland. J therefore, on the third, ordered the 2d and 12th corps to Tenallytown, and the 9th corps to a point on the Seventh street road near Washington, and EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 185 sent Piicli cavalry as was available to tlie fords near Poolsville, to watch and impede tbe enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. On September 5, tbe 2d and 12tb corps were moved to Rockville, and Coucb's division (tbe only one of tbe 4tb corps tbat bad been brongbt from tbe Peninsula) to Offut's cross-roads. On tbe 6ib tbe 1st and 9tb corps were ordered to Leesbnrg; tbe Gtb corps, and Sykes's division of tbe 5tb corps, to Tenallytown. On tbe 7tb tbe 6tb corps was advanced to Eockville, to wbicb place my bead- quarters were moved on tbe same day. All tbe necessary arrangements for tbe defence of tbe city, under tbe new condition of tilings, bad been made, and General Banks was left in command, having received bis instructions from me. It will be seen from Avhat has preceded tbat I lost no time tbat could be avoided in moving tbe army of tbe Potomac from the Peninsula to tbe support of tbe army of Virginia; tbat I spared no effort to hasten tbe embarcation of tbe troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News and Yorktown, remaining at Fort Monroe myself until tbe mass of the army had sailed ; and tbat, after my arri- val at Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone to forward supplies and re-enforcements to General Po])e. I sent, with tbe troops that moved, all tbe cavalry I could get bold of. Even my personal escort was sent out upon the line of tbe railway as a guard, with tbe provost and camp guards at headquar- ters, retaining less than one hundred men, many of whom were orderlies, inva- lids, members of bands, &c. All the headquarters teams tbat arrived were sent out with supplies and ammunition, none being retained even to move tbe head- quarters camp. The squadron tbat habitually served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth with General Burnside, as be was deficient in cavalry. I left Washington on tbe 7th of September. At this time it was known that tbe mass of tbe rebel army had passed up the south side of tbe Potomac in the direction of Leesbnrg, and tbat a portion of tbat army had crossed into ]\Iary- land ; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force Avith a view to turn Washington by a flank movement down tbe north bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which, at that time, we bad no means of determining. This unceitainty as to the intentions of the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to march cautiously and to advance the army in such order as continually to keep Washington and Balti- more covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if tbe enemy took tbe direction of lYmn- sylvania ; or to return to tbe defence of Washington, if, as was greatly feared by tbe authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood ready to seize tbe first favorable opportunity to attack the capital. In tbe mean time tbe process of re-organization, rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon tbe other side of tbe Poto- mac, was rapidly progressing ; the troops were regaining confidence, and their fomier soldierly appearance and discipline were fast returning. My cavalry was pushed out continually in all directions, and all possible steps were taken to learn the positions and movements of tbe enemy. Tbe following table shows the movements of the army, from day to day, up to the 14th of September: 186 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. September 4. September 6. September 9. September 10. BURNSIDE. 9th corps, Keno Ist corps, Hooker SUMNER. Seventh street road . Upton's hill 12th corps, Williams . . . 2d corps, Sumner FRANKLIN. Tenallytown Tenally town Middleburg Middleburg Clarksburg 6th corps, Franklin Couch's division Alex. Seminary ... Tenallytown Tenallytown Offut's Cross Roads. Damstown Mouth of Seneca. . . Poolsville Tenallytown September 11. September 12. September 13. September 14. BURNSIDE. 9th corps, Reno New Market Middleburg Ridgeville, New Market, camp on the Monocacy. SUMNER. 12th corps, Williams . . . 2d corps, Sumner FRANKLIN. Ijamsville Cross Roads. Clarksburg 6th corps, Franklin Couch's division Lickenwell Cross Road. Barnsville Buckeystown Sieksville Burkettsville PoolSville Burkcttsville Sykes's division Middleburg 1 The right wing, consisting of the 1st and 9th corps, under the command of Major General Burnside, moved on Frederick ; the 1st corps via Brooksville, Cooksville and Ridgeville, and the 9th corps vja Damascus and New Market. The 2d and 12th corps, forming the centre, under the command of General Sumner, moved on Frederick ; the former via Clarksburg and Urbana, the 12th corps on a lateral road between Urbana and New I\Iarket, thus maintaining the communication with the right wing, and covering the direct road from Frede- rick to Washington. The Gth corps, under the command of General Franklin, moved to Buckeystown via Darnstown, Dawsonville and Barnsville, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a position to connect with and support the centre, should it have been necessary (as was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's division moved by the " river road," covering that approach, watch- ing the fords of the Potomac, and ultiiftately following and supporting the 6th corps. The following extracts from telegrams, received by me after my departure from Washington, will show how little was known there about the enemy's movements, and the fears which were entertained for the safety of the capital. On the 9th of Se})tember, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows : " Until we can gc^t better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Drains- ville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping, too much, the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the I^otomac. Think of this." Again, on the litli of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows: EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 187 " Why uot order forward Kejes or Sigcl 1 I tliink the main force of the enemy is in your front ; more troops can be spared from here." This despatch, as published by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the gencral-in-chiei", reads as follows : " Why not order forward Porter's corps or Sigel's ? Jff^ic main force of the enemy is in your front, more troops can be spared from here." I remark that the original despatch, as received by me from the telegraph operator, is in the words quoted above, " I think the main force of the cneyny,^' Sec. In accordance Avith this suggestion I asked, on the same day, that all the troops that could be spared should at once be sent to re-enforce me, but none came. On the 12th I received the following telegram from his excellency the Presi- dent : " Governor Curtin telegraphs me, ' I have advices that Jackson is cross- ing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland.' " The President adds : " Receiving nothing from Har- per's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is re-crossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt." On the loth General Halleck telegraphed as follows : " Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncov- ei-ing the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy Avill send a small column towards Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over." Again, on the 14th, General Halleck telegraphed me that " scouts re- port a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear." Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the most positive evidence that Lee's entire army was in front of us, I received the following : "War Department, " September IG, 1862 — 12.3^7. m. "Yours of 7 a. m. is this moment received. As you give me no information in regard to the position of your forces, except that at Sharpsburg, of course I can- not advise. I think, however, you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river ; 1 fear now more than ever that they will re-cro8s at Harper's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject : a heavy rain might prevent it. ^ ^ J ' J -H.W. HALLECK, " General -in- Chief. "Major General McClellan." Tlie importance of moving with all due caution, so as not to uncover the na- tional capital until the enemy's position and plans were developed, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me ; and as my troops extended from the Baltimore and Ohio railroad to the Potomac, with the extreme left flank moving along that stream, and with strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard all the available fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it ap- pears from the foregoing telegrams that the general-in-chief was of a dift'erent opinion, and that my movements were, in liis judgment, too precipitate, not only for the safety of "Washington, but also for the security of my left and rear. The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a precipitate advance may now be perceived. The general-in-chief, in his testimony Ixfore the Com- mittee on the Conduct of the War, says : " In respect to General McClellan going 188 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. too fast or too slow from Washington, there can be found no such teh^gram from me to him. He liad mistaken the meaning of the telegi-ams I sent him. I tele- graphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Po- tomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity^ to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. 1 thought General McClellan should keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry." As I can find no telegram from the general-in-chief recommending me to keep my left flank nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe that when he gave this testimony he had forgotten the purport of the telegrams above quoted, and had also ceased to remember the fact, well known to him at the time, that my left, from the time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and my centre was continually in position to re-enforce the left or right, as occasion might require. Had I advanced my left flank along the Potomac more rapidly than the other columns marched upon the roads to the right, I should have thrown that flank out of supporting distance of the other troops, and greatly exposed it. And if [ had marched the entire army in one column along the bank of the river instead of upon five different parallel roads, the column, with its trains, would have extended about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated the advance before the rear could have reached the scene of action. JNIoreover, such a movement would have uncovered the commimications with Baltimore and Washington on our right, and exposed our right and rear. I presume it will be admitted by every military man that it was necessary to move the army in such order that it could at any time be concentrated for battle; and I am of opinion that this object could not have been accomplished in any other way than the one employed. Any other disposition of our forces would have subjected them to defeat in detached fragments. On the 10th of September I received from my scouts information which ren- dered it quite probable that General Lee's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, but whether his intention was to move towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania Avas not then known. On the 11th I ordered General Burnside to push a strong reconnoissance across the National road and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, to- wards New ]\Iarket, and, if he learned that the enemy had moved towards Hagerstown, to press on rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops constantly ready to meet the enemy in force. A corresponding movement of all the troops in the centre and on the left was ordered in the direction of Urbana and Pools- ville. On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after a brisk skir- mish at the outskirts of the city and in the streets. On the 13th the main bodies of the right wing and centre passed through Frederick. It was soon ascertained that the main body of the enemy's forces had marched out of the city on the two previous days, taking the roads to Boonsboro' and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering it necessary to force the passes through the; Catoctin and South Mountain ridges, and gain possession of Boonsboro' and Rohrersville before any relief could be extended to Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry. On th(^ l.'Jlh an order fell into my hands, issued by General Lee, which fully disclosed his jdans, and I immtidiately gave orders for a rapid and vigorous for- ward moveme'ut. The following is a copy of the order referred to : "SPECIAL ORDERS No. 191. "Heauquauters AaiMV of Northern Virginia, "Sept ember 9, 1862. " The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middle- KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 189 town, with such portion as he may select, take the route towards Sliarpshurg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday night, take possession of the Baltimore and Oliio raih-oad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martiusburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Har- per's Ferry. " General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boons- boro', where it will halt with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of the ai'my. " General McLaws, ^ith his own division and that of General U. II. Ander- son, will follow General Longstreet; on reaching Middletown, he Avill take the route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Mary- land heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. "General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's ford, ascend its right btink to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudon heights, if practicable, by Fri- day morning ; Keys's ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-op- erate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. "General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the array, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill. "General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the com- mands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and ]McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind. "The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after accom- plishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. "Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood, &c. "By command of General R. E. Lee. "Pv. H.CHILTON, "Assistant Adjutant General. " Major General D. H. HiLL, " Commanding Division." In the report of a military commission, of which ]\Iajor General D. Hunter was president, which convened at Washington tVu' the purpose of investigating the conduct of certain ofhcers in connexion with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, 1 find the following : "The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot, from any motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those in high command when it thinks such cen- sure deserved. "The general-in-chief has testified that General IMcClellan, after having received orders to repid the enemy invading the State of ^Maryland, marched only six miles per day, on an average, when pursuing this invading army. "The general-in-chief also testifies that, in his opinio'n, he could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the commission fully concur." I have been greatly surprised that this connnission, iu its investigations, never called upon me, nor upon any olficer of my staff, nor, so far as 1 know, upon any officer of the army of the Potomac able to give an intelligent state- 190 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. ment of the movements of that armj. But another paragrapli in the same report makes testimony from such som-ces quite superfluous. It is as follows : " By a reference to the evidence it will be seen that, at the very moment Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland heights, his little army was in reality relieved by Generals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's gap, within seven miles of his position." The corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner were a part of the army which I at that time had the honor to command, and they were__acting under my orders at Crampton's gap and elsewhere; and if, as the commission states, Colonel Ford's " little army was in reality relieved " by those officers, it was relieved by me. I had, on the morning of the lOtli, sent the following despatch in relation to the command at Harper's Ferry : "Camp near Rockvillr, "September 10, 1862—9.45 a. m, " Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand, with nine thou- sand troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me by the most prac- ticable route. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General. "Major General Halleck, " Washington, D. C." To this I received the following reply : " There is no Avay for Colonel Miles to join you at present ; his only cHance is to defend his works till you can open communication with him. " H. W. HALLECK." "George B. McClellan, Major General.'' It seems necessary, for a distinct understanding of this matter, to state that I was directed on the 12th to assume command of the garrison of Harper's Ferry as soon as I should open communications with that place, and that when I re- ceived this order all commiuiication from the direction in which I was approach- ing was cut off. Up to that time, however. Colonel Miles could, in my opinion, have marched his command into Pennsylvania, by crossing the Potomac at Wil- liamsport or above ; and this opinion was conlirmed by the fact that Colonel Davis marched the cavalry part of Colonel Miles's command from Harper's Ferry on the 14th, taking the main road to Hagerstown, and he encountered uo enemy except a small picket near the mouth of the Antietam. Before I left Washington, and when there certainly could liave been no enemy to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Colonel JMiles, I recommended to the proper authorities that the garrison of Harper's Ferry sliouhl be with- drawn via ilagcrstown, to aid in covering the Cunibiu-land valley ; or that, taking up th(! ])ontoou bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it shouM fall back to the Alaryland heights, and there hold out to the last. In this position it ought to have maintained itself for many days. It waa not deemed proper to adopt either of these suggestions, and when the matter was left to my discretion it was too late for me to do anything but endeavor to relieve the garrison. I accordingly directed artillery to be fireil by our advance at frequent intervals as a signal that relief was at hand. This was done, and, as I afterwards learned, the reports of the cannon were distinctly heard at Har- per's Ferry. It was confidently expected that Colonel Miles would hold out until we had carried the mountain passes, and were in condition to send a de- REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 191 tachment to his relief. The left was therefore ordered to move through Cramp- ton's pass ill front of Burkettsville, while the centre and right marched upon Turner's pass in front of Middletown. It may be asked by those who are not acquainted with the topography of the country in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, why Franklin, instead of march- ing his column over the circuitous road from Jefferson via Burkettsville and Brownsville, was not ordered to move along the direct turnpike to Knoxville, and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. It was for the reason that I had received information that the enemy were anticipating our approach in that direction, and had established batteries on the south side of the Potomac which commanded all the approaches to Knoxville; moreover the road from that point winds directly along the river bank at the foot of a precipitous mountain, where there was no opportunity of forming in line of battle, and where the enemy could have placed batteries on both sides of the river to enfilade our narrow approaching columns. The approach through Crampton's pass, which debouches into Pleasant val- ley in rear of Maryland heights, was the only one which afforded any reasona- ble prospect of carrying that formidable position ; at the same time, the troops upon that road were in better relation to the main body of our forces. On the morning of the 1 4th a verbal message reached me from Colonel Miles, which was the first authentic intelligence I had received as to the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The messenger informed me that on the preceding afternoon Maryland heights had been abandoned by our troops after repelling an attack of the rebels, and that Colonel Miles's entire force was concentrated at Harper's Ferry, the Maryland, Loudon, and Bolivar heights having been abandoned by him, and occupied by the enemy. The messenger also stated that there was no apparent reason for the abandonment of the jMaryland heights, and that Colonel Miles instructed him to say that he could hold out with certainty two days longer. I directed him to make his way back, if possible, with the information that I was approaching rapidly, and felt confident I could relieve the place. On the same afternoon I wrote the following letter to Colonel Miles, and despatched three copies by three different couriers on diftereut routes. I did not, however, learn that any of these men succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry : " Middletown, September 14, 1862. "Colonel : The army is being rapidly concentrated here. "We are now at- tacking the pass on the Hagerstown road over the Blue ridge. A column is about attacking the Burkettsville and Boonsboro' pass. You may count on our making every effort to relieve you. You may rely upon my speedily accomplish- ing that object. Hold out to the last extremity. U it is possible, reoccupy the Maryland heights with your whole force. If you can do that, I will certainly be able to relieve you. As the Catoctin valley is in our possession, you can safely cross the river at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as opposition on this side of the river is concerned. Hold out to the last. -GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " ISlujor General Commanding. « Colonel D. S. Miles." On the previous day I had sent General Franklin the following instructions: " HeADQI AUTRRS Ar.MV OF THE PoTOMAC, " Camp near Frederick, September 13, 1862 — 6.20 p. m. "General: I have now full information as to movements and intentions of the enemy. Jackson has crossed the upper Potomac to capture the gar- rison at Martinsburg and cut off Miles's retreat towards the west. A di- 192 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. vision on the south side of the Potomac was to cany London heights and cut off his retreat in that direction. McLaws with his own command and the division of R. H. Anderson was to move by Boonsboro' and Rohrersville to carry the Maryland heights. The signal officers inform me that he is now in Pleasant valley. l"he firing shows that Miles still holds out. Long- street was to move to Boonsboro', and there halt with the reserve corps ; D. H. Hill to form the rear guard ; Stuart's cavalry to bri»g np stragglers, &;c. We have cleared out all the cavalry this side of the mountains and north of us. The last I heard from Pleasonton he occupied IMiddletown, after several sharp skirmishes. A division of Buniside's command started several hours ago to support him. The whole of Burnside's command, including Hooker's corps, march this evening and early to-morrow morning, followed by the corps of Sum- ner and Banks, and Sykes's division, upon Boonsboro' to carry that position. Couch has been ordered to concentrate his division and join you as rapidly as possible. Without waiting for the whole of that division to join, you Avill move at daybreak in the morning by Jefferson and Burkettsville upon the road to Rohrers- ville. I have reliable information that the mountain pass by this road is practi- cable for artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occupied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as practicable, and debouch upon Rohrersville in order to cut off the retreat of or destroy McLaws's command. If you find this pass held by the enemy in large force, make all your dispositions for the attack and commence it about half an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws's command and relieve Colonel Miles. If you effect this you will order him to join you at once M'ith all his disposable troops, first destroying the bridges over the Potomac, if not already done, and, leaving a sufficient garrison to prevent the enemy from passing the ford, you will then return by Rohrersville on the direct road to Boonsboro', if the main column has not succeeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the road to Rohrersville, to Sharpsburg and Williamsport, in order either to cut off the retreat of Hill and Longstreet towards the Potomac, or prevent the rcpassage of Jackson. My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail. I believe I have sufficiently explained my intentions. I ask of you,, at this im- portant moment, all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exei'cise. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General Commanding. " Major General W. B. Franklin, " " Commanding 6(h Corps." Again, on the 14th, I sent him the following: "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Frederick, Scjitcmber 14, 1SG2 — 2 /j. m. " Your despatch of 13.30 just received. Send back to hurry up Conch. Mass your troops and carry Burkettsville at any cost. We shall have strong opposi- tion at both passes. As fast as the troops come up I will hold a reserve in readiness to support you. If you find the enemy in very great force at any of these passes let me know at once, and aniust; them as best you can so as to re- tain them there. In that event I will j)robably throw the mass of the army on the pass in front of here. If I carry that it will clear the way for you, and you must follow the enemy as rapidly as possible. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major General Commanding. "Major General Franklin." REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 193 General Franklin pushed his corps rapidly forward towards Crampton's pass, and at about 12 o'clock ou the 14th arrived at Bnrkettsville, immediately in rear of which he found the enemy's infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, with artillery in strong positions to defend the approaches to the pass. Slo- cum's division was formed upon the right of the road leading through the gap, and Smith's upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and Torbett's brigades, supported by Newton, whose activity was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemy were driven from their posi- tion at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, steadily forced back up the slope until they reached the position of their battery on tlie road, well up the mountain. There they made a stand. They were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery in echelon luitil, after an action of three hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy hastily fled down the mountain on the other side. On the left of the road, Brooks's and Irvin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the protection of Slocum's flank, charged up the mountain in the same steady manner, driving the enemy before them until the crest was carried. Four hundred prisoners from seventeen different organizations, seven hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three colors, were captured by our troops in this brilliant action. It was conducted b}- General Franklin in all its details. These details are given in a report of General Franklin, herewith sub- mitted, and due credit a\varded to the gallant officers and men engaged. The loss in General Franklin's corps was one hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and sixteen wounded, and two missing. The enemy's loss was about the same. The enemy's position was such that our artillery could not be used with any effect. The close of the action found General Franklin's advance in Pleasant valley on the night of the 14th, within three and a half miles of the point on Maryland heights where he might, on the same night or on the morn- ing of the 15th, have formed a junction with the garrison of Harper's Ferry had it not been previously withdrawn from Maryland heights, and within six miles of Harper's Ferry. On the night of the 14th the following despatch was sent to General Frank- Hn: " Bolivar, Sej^temhe?- 15 — 1 a. m. "Gkneral: »»•♦»*•* " The commanding general directs that you occupy, with your command, the road from Rohrersville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sulKcient force at Kohrers- ville to hold that position in case it should be attacked by the enemy from Boons- boro'. Endeavor to open communication with Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking and destroying such of the enemy as you may find in I'leusant valley. Should you succeed in opening communication with Colonel Miles, direct him to join you with his whole command, with all the guns and public property that he can carry with him. The remainder of the guns will be spiked or destroyed ; the rest of the public property will also be destroyed. You will then pro- ceed to Boonsboro', which place the commanding general intends to attack to- morrow, and join the main body of the army at that place; should you find, however, that the enemy have retreated from Boonsboro' towards Sharpsburg, you will endeavor to fill upon him and cut off his retreat. •' By command of Major General McClellan. "GEORGE D. RUGGLES, " Culond and Aide-de-Camp. '• General Franklin." H. Ex. Doc. 15 13 194 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. On the 15th the following were received from General Franklin : "At the foot of Mount Pleasant, " In Pleasant Valley, three miles from Rolirersville, *' September 15 — 8.50 a. m. " General : My command started at daylight this morning, and I am wait- ing to have it closed up here. General Couch arrived about 10 o'clock last night. I have ordered one of his brigades and one battery to Rohrersville or to the strongest point in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up in line of battle about two miles to our front, one brigade in sight. As soon as 1 am sure that Rohrersville is occupied I shall move forward to attack the enemy. This may be two hours from now. If Harper's Ferry has fallen — and the cessation of firing makes me fear that it has — it is my opinion that I should be strongly re-enforced. "W. B. FRANKLIN, " Major General Commanding Cor^s. "General G. B. McClellan." "September 15 — 11 a. m. " General : I have received your despatch by Captain O'Heefe. The enemy is in large force in my front, in two Hues of battle stretching across the valley, and a large column of artillery and infantry on the right of the valley looking towards Harper's Ferry. They outuvimber me two to one. It will of coui-se not answer to pursue the enemy under these circumstances. I shall commu- nicate with Burnside as soon as possible. In the mean time I shall wait here mitil I learn what is the profc^pect of re-enforcement. I have not the force to justify an attack on the force I see in front. I have had a very close vi i o it, and its position is very strong. "Respectfully, "W. B. FRANKLIN, ^^ Major General. "General G. B. McClellan, Coj7imanding" Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 8 a. m. on the 15th, as the ces- sation of the firing indicated, and General Franklin was ordered to remain where he was to watch the large force in front of him, and protect our left and rear until the night of the l(3th, when he was ordered to join the main body of the army at Keedysville, after sending Couch's division to Maryland heights. While the events which have just been described were taking place at Cramp- ton's gap the troops of the centre and right wing, which had united at Frederick on the i3th, were engaged in the contest for the possession of Turner's gap. On the morning of the 13th General Pleasonton was ordered to send Mc- Keynolds's brigade and a section of artillery in the direction of Gettysburg, and Rush's regiment towards Jeff"erson to c(nnmunicate with Franklin, to Avhom the Gth United States cavalry and a section of artillery had previously been sent, and to proceed with the remainder of his force in the direction of Middle- town in pursuit of th<> enemy. After skirmishing with the enemy all the morning, and driving them from sev- eral strong ])Ositions, he reached Turner's gap of the South mountain in the after- noon and found the enemy in force and apparently determined to defend the pass. He sent back for infantry to General Burnside, who had been directed to support him, and proceeded to make a reconnoissance of the position. The South mountain is at this point about one thousand feet in height, and its general direction is from northeast to southwest. The national road from Fred- REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAX 195 erick to Hagerstown crosses it nearly at right angles through Turner's gap, a depression which is some four hundred feet in depth. The mountain on the north side of the turnpike is divided into two crests, or ridges, by a narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the north. There are two country roads, one to the right of the turnpike and the other to the left, which give acc<'ss to the crests overlooking the main road. The one on the left, called the '-Old Sharpsburg road," is nearly parallel to and about half a mile distant from the turnpike, until it reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the left. The other road, called the "Old Hagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the mountains about a mile from the turnpike, and bending to the left over and along the first crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pa