£M I 31 i El jswnr DISCOURSE ON THE SOUL AND INSTINCT, PHYSIOLOGICALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM MATERIALISM, INTRODUCTORY TO THE COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE INST1TU 1 B3 OF MEDICINE AND MATERIA MEDICA, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. Delivered on the Evening of Nov. 2, 1848, BY MARTYN PAINE, A.M., M. D., Professor of the Institutes of Medicine and Materia Medica in the University of New York Member ot the Royal Verein fur Heilkunde in Preussen ; of the Medical Society of Leipsic; of the Montreal Natural History Society, and other Learned Associations. " The dust shall return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."— Eccl. xii. 7. " A chemist will reduce Divinity to the maxims of his laboratory, explain morality by sal, sulphur, and mercury, and allegorise the Scripture itself, and the Sacred mysteries thereof, into the philosopher's stone." — Locke, On the Human Understanding. " Man that is in honor, and understandeth not, is like the beasts that perish. 1 '— Psalms, xl. 20. [PUBLISHED ORIGINALLY BY THE MEDICAL CLASS. J ENLARGED EDITION. NEW YORK: REPUBLISHED BY EDWARD H. FLETCHER, 141 NASSAU STREET. 1849. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1848, by MARTY N PAINE, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York. J. H. Jennings & Co., Printers, 122 Nassau street. THE FOLLOWING ESSAY IS DEDICATED To the Author's Brother, CHARLES PAINE, A.M., LATE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, &s a Exfyutz * TO HIS VIRTUES, INTELLIGENCE AND ENTERPRISE. PREFACE. The following Essay was originally designed as a;i introductory D'scourse to the Author's Lectures on the Institutes of Medicine and Materia Medica, in the Uni- versity of the city of New York. Although the Discourse was addressed to medical gen- tlemen, the Author has been advised that it is equally suited to other classes of society, and has been urged to supply an opportunity for iis general circulation. Hav- ing yielded to this request, he can only hope that neither his friends nor himself may be disappointed. But he will not suffer this edition to go forth without expressing his objection to popularizing works upon medical topics, and even upon physiology in its ordinary acceptation. In this Essay the Author has had in view not only the characteristics of the soul and of the principle of in- stinct, in their moral and physiological aspects, but the importance of a right appreciation of their attributes in the practical pursuits of Hygiene, Pathology, and The- rapeutics. He has also been actuated by the belief, that no subject can offer greater interest to the whole human family; and, from its intricacies and entire want of de- monstration at the hands of physiologists, and more es- VI PREFACE. pecially on account of the prevalence of materialism, he has supposed that a service might be rendered to every contemplative mind, to the materialist himself, by affording reliable evidence of the existence of the soul as an independent, self-acting, immortal, and spiritual essence. " That the intelligence of any being," says D'Alem- bert, " should be able to reason, till he loses himself, on the existence and nature of objects, though condemned to be eternally ignorant of them ; that he should have too little sagacity to resolve an infinity of questions, which he has yet sagacity enough to make ; that the principle within us, which thinks, should ask itself in vain what it is that constitutes the thought, and that this thought, which sees so many things, so distant, should yet not be able to see itself, which is so near ; that self, which it is, notwithstanding, always striving to see and to know ; these are contradictions, which, even in the very pride of our reasoning, cannot fail to surprise and confound us." But, more than all, the Author has supposed that, if the doctrine of materialism can be shown to be errone- ous, and a perfect conviction of the existence of the soul as an independent, self-acting agent, could be established, it would hardly fail to enlarge and strengthen our con- ceptions of Creative Power, of our dependence upon that Power, and of our moral and religious responsi- bilities. Such a conviction, arising from demonstrative PREFACE. Vll proof, which appeals to the senses as well as the under- standing, it appears to the writer, has been wanted by the human family, however they may be disposed, in the main, to accede to Revelation, or to listen to the natural suggestions of reason. If the writer have failed, he will enjoy the consciousness of knowing that he will have done no harm to morals or Religion, and that the worst of the issue will be the trouble that may devolve upon others in restoring the subject to its former obscurities and consequent tendencies. The quotations which the Author has made from Scripture are not designed in the light of proof, except- ing as they may concur with the demonstration. They are, therefore, introduced rather for the purpose of show- ing how far our own facts corroborate the Divine Au- thority. The Author has added a Discourse on the general Philosophy of Life, as being, in his opinion, an appro- priate companion to the Essay which relates to the Soul and Principle of Instinct ; since each of these existences " is the compendium of various faculties, most wonder- fully compounded and harmonized." It will be found, moreover, that the chemical philosophy of organic life necessarily involves an equal exclusion of any other in- terpretation of the acts of intellection. If a principle of life be denied in accounting for the endless and unique phenomena which appertain to the functions of the body, it is sufficiently apparent, independently of the avow- VI11 PREFACE. ed doctrines of materialism, that the far more circum- scribed phenomena of mind, from their connection with the same organization through which the functions of life are conducted, must be placed on the same physi- cal ground. It would be an useless effort to controvert the chemical hypothesis of mind, while life is admitted to depend upon chemical processes. The former must irresistibly flow from the latter, so far as facts are con- cerned in inductive philosophy ; since the phenomena of life are more multifarious than those of mind, and are equally unique and opposed to the chemical rationale. But, in all fairness, it must be said that the doctrine of mental secretion is not liable to the same exclusive ma- terialism as the chemical hypothesis, where the former is founded upon a principle of life acting through the medium of organization ; though there are but few of this school who allow any other principle of life than such as naturally belongs to the elements of matter, but which are not manifested while matter exists in an ele- mentary state. It is to the few, therefore, to whom the present remarks are applicable. So far there is some- thing to contradistinguish the organic from the inorganic world. The moving power, in this case, is peculiar to animated beings ; though the manifestations of mind would be on common ground with all the physical pro- ducts. So far, therefore, this doctrine is less offensive to science than the chemical ; although, as I have en- deavored to show, it is abundantly contradicted by facts, PREFACE. IX while it is equally, as the chemical, armed with the sting of annihilation. But the chemical is far in the ascend- ant, and will probably soon leave the vital doctrine of mental secretion " among the things that were," on ac- count of the general acquiescence in the chemical doc- trines of life. Whoever, therefore, would arrest the progress of men- tal materialism, and promote a belief in a future state of being, with its attendant .moral influences on mankind in their individual and social relations, will not fail to consider well the vast corruptions of the chemical phi- losophy of life, and how easy as well as a necessary consequence it will be to carry the same philosophy to all the intellectual and instinctive acts. There are many Philosophers who are fully sensible that all the phenomena of life are entirely opposed to the ph} 7 sieal and chemical interpretations, but are not inclined to admit the existence of any principle beyond those which appertain to the inorganic kingdom. They have, therefore, singularly enough, ascribed all the ac- tions and results of life to the direct agency of the Cre- ator. This is the most dangerous of all the spurious doctrines of life, for it confounds the Author of Nature with his own Works, and is equivalent to a denial of Creative Power.* * See Author's Institutes of Medicine, Index, Art. God and Nature. Also, Medical and Physiological Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 46-54. Also, Mote at the end of this Essay. 1* X PREFACE. In my Essay on Spontaneous Generation, embraced in the Medical and Physiological Commentaries, I had occasion to refer to the charge of infidelity which has been often laid against the Medical Profession. I have there, too, as one of that Profession, defended it against so great an injustice, and have held responsible the pro- per Sources that have given rise to this imputation, and have shown, also, that it is greatly due to the chemical and physical hypotheses of life. These corruptions, it is true, have been creeping fast from the laboratory, not only into the walks of medicine, but throughout all the highways and byways of society, and mental material- ism has been making corresponding strides. They are, however, of a common origin, and have been received upon trust, — without examination, — without even a ref- erence to the graver consequences which respect the lofty attributes of the soul and its future destinies. I have also said, in connection with this subject, that the steps are gradual from the incipient errors in philo- sophy to a disbelief in the Mosaic record of Creation, (now so greatly turned from its natural import to build up systems of spontaneous generation, or to meet cer- tain supposed exigencies in Geology,) and that when w T e have ultimately reached the brink of the precipice, there is but one dreadful plunge, and we are then in the vor- tex of atheism. We may begin, as I have said, by a simple denial of the living powers of organized beings, when it will become, at last, an easy argument upon this and analogous premises, that the Almighty had but very little, if any agency, in the most sublime part of existences. I would desire, however, no greater re- straint upon free inquiry than such as is enjoined by the intrinsic value of facts ; and I say again, let Philo- sophy interrogate Nature to its fullest satiety, under the direction of its Heaven-born principles ; but let it be consistent, and maintain its dignity. And should it sometimes, as it must in its wide range of Nature, come in contact with Miracle, that is its limit, contented that it begins at the confines of Creation ; yet still may it stretch into the regions of Eternity, past and to come ; but now it is employed in its nobler work of sacrificing its relations to second causes, and in establishing rela- tions with the First Cause of All. DISCOURSE, &C. I speak of Man : — a subject not yet exhausted, although the perpetual study of himself since the day of his creation. Something remains to be known of his organization. Bat that part of his condition is nearly ascertained ; so far, at least, as its knowledge is of any practical interest. The absolute functions of his various constituent parts are, also, about as well known. But when we consider the multifarious and contradictory opin- ions as to the principles and laws upon which those functions and their results depend, one might be almost inclined to imagine that this vast and important field is a terra incognita. It is not so, however. It is only a collision between truth and error. The intellectuality which the subject in- volves is the occasion of all the discrepancies of opinion ; and he alone will be right who brings to the inquiry a sound judgment and a clear dis- cernment of the ways of Nature. To such an 6 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. inquirer the depths of physiology will appear to be laid open, and of no very difficult access. But the qualifications which I have mentioned are indispensable. Those who want them will either see in the conflicting doctrines an impracticable subject, or will mistake for the truth what is a libel upon Nature. Perhaps I might occupy your time with some useful remarks upon this branch of our science ; but I have been tempted to a yet more difficult enterprise, and to look at that physiological condi- tion of man upon which his locomotion depends, and which enables him to think, and to speak, of his own being and nature. Shall I, then, venture upon his spiritual essence, of which nothing has been yet said but what Rev- elation and metaphysics teach ; while materialism has occupied the whole physiological ground, with the advantage of dedicating its labors to the senses, and to the indolence of mankind? May I venture to speak of so intangible, invisible an existence as the soul of man ? I know that the demand now is for food for the senses. But shall materialism have the whole of the game? Shall the mind have no part in the chase, — seeing, especially, that it is itself the intended victim ? Shall I be told that I am infringing upon settled THE SOUL AND INSTINCT, 6 principles ? that I am applying an extinguisher to great and shining lights? Shall I be silenced by the thunders against metaphysics? Shall it be said that physiology has no relation to incorpo- real existences ? Have not physiologists employed their pens in describing the emanations of mind as the mere product of matter, — mere eliminations from the blood by the intellectual organ ? Have not others told us. that all the manifestations of thought are owing to a combustive process among the elements of the brain? And have we not patiently, credulously heard them? But some may still say, what connection has physiology with spiritual existences ? Certainly the same in relation to man as the merest physics, so only the thinking part be of an incorporeal nature. It may not be as clear a subject for demonstration ; since, especially, it is concerned about itself. Herein, indeed, has laid concealed the difficulties of the inquiry. The mind has wanted a medium through which it may be seen independently of its own direct manifestations ; and this neglect of the secondary aid has left the subject to the grasp of materialism, or exposed it to metaphysical specu- lations. This want it is my purpose to supply. If the thinking part be rightly turned upon the facts which it affords, and these be rightly applied, 4 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. I see not why a satisfactory amount of knowledge may not be obtained as to the main attributes of the rational, and also of the instinctive principle. It is peculiarly the duty of the physiologist to point out, as well as he may, the characteristics of the nobler part of man, and its relations to the body. The inquiry concerns, immediately, many momentous problems in physiology and the heal- ing art ; and may be turned, indirectly, to the morals, the dignity and the happiness of society ; to the general cause of Religion ; and to the special glory of the Almighty. Perhaps, too, the amount of attention which I have hitherto given to physiology entitles me to a candid hearing upon this subject. But the physiologist should steadily consider mind in its relations to the body. Heaven, alone : can look upon mind in its abstract condition. As presented to the physiologist, the compound na- ture of man is the most lofty as it is the most noble inquiry. " Of all organized beings," says Lavater, in his Essays on Physiognomy , " with which we are acquainted, there are none in which are so won- derfully united the three different kinds of life ; the animal, the intellectual, and the moral. Each of these lives is the compendium of various facul- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 5 ties, most wonderfully compounded and harmo- nized." " To know, to desire, to act, or accurately to observe and meditate, to perceive and wish, to possess the powers of locomotion and resistance, — these, combined, constitute man an animal, intel- lectual, and moral being. " Man, endowed with these faculties, with this triple life, is in himself the most worthy subject of observation, as he likewise is himself the most worthy observer. In him each species of life is conspicuous ; yet never can his properties be wholly known except by the aid of his external form, his body, his superficies. How spiritual, how incorporeal soever, his internal essence may be, still he is only visible and conceivable from the harmony of his constituent parts. From these he is inseparable. He exists and moves in the body he inhabits, as in his element. This material man must become the subject of observa- tion before we can study the immaterial." So far Lavater, who confined himself to the surface alone ; proceeding upon the simple propo- sition that, " The organization of man peculiarly distinguishes him from all other earthly beings ; and his physiognomy, that is to say, the super- ficies and outlines of his organization, show him to O THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. be infinitely superior to all those visible beings by which he is surrounded." If such, then, be the external characteristics of man, the mere outlines of an organization which he enjoys in common with the brute, though with modifications corresponding to the outlines, what shall be said of that internal essence which is endowed with attributes that have no analogies in the brute creation ? It is this great prerogative, and the relation of the immaterial to the material part, which it is my present object to consider. I shall distinguish, therefore, what has been commonly designated the spiritual, from the material man, though it be obvious, that, however spiritual, how incorporeal soever, the internal essence may be, it is yet inseparable from the mechanism of the body. I shall carry the distinction farther than is recog- nized by any physiologist of our own times, and shall endeavor to sustain my conclusions by facts alone. I shall not, therefore, entangle you in any metaphysical obscurities, nor shall I, like the materialists, assume imaginary data, or like them, reason from factitious analogies. It must be allowed a misfortune that the subject of mind has been, till a recent day, in the keep- ing of Metaphysicians. Learned, and able, and THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. / devoted as they may have been to the prerogatives of reason, and with all the lustre they have shed upon mind, their ignorance of anatomy, and of the laws of organization, has led them to consider the spiritual part of man too abstractedly from his structure, and not unfrequently to wander from the path of Nature. Their abstract philosophy, and the well-meaning subtleties of the less gifted, have engendered a reaction which now assumes the form of undisguised materialism. Nor is that all; for with the correlative aid of innovations upon organic life from those philosophers who reduce the whole to the maxims of physics, the more revolting doc- trine of spontaneous origin not only takes rank in the science of life, but is even practically illus- trated in the Acarus Crossii, — side by side with the Homo Dei ! And what part, think you, that these corruptions in Science and Religion have taken in the general insensibility which now pre- vails in relation to Divine subjects, and which led the distinguished President of Harvard University, in his late eulogy on President Adams, to speak of "a reverence for sacred things as almost obsolete"? I have said that the bold materialism of our age is, in no small degree, the parent of the greater evils. And, that you may know the extent of the doctrine both as to the soul, and organic life, I 8 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. shall quote several of our most applauded authors. To many of you, I have no doubt, the opinions will be new and startling, because you may be yet uninitiated in the dogmas, which may have had no part in your former education. You may have only witnessed the remote consequences. But you are now entering upon inquiries where you will see the springs which have contributed most largely to the turbulent movements of the world ; and they will be urged upon you as the fruits of a high advance in science, or of civilization. I say, of the world in its most comprehensive sense ; for the revolutionary spirit is not confined to our own science, nor to general literature and philoso- phy, but strikes at the more absolute foundations of society. It has reached the purlieus of popular factions, and hails an Mas malorum as its proud- est trophy. In its wildest desolation it was sha- dowed forth by the prophetic ken of genius rely- ing upon Retributive Justice. " Vengeance, vengeance will not stay ! It shall burst on Gallia's head Sudden as the Judgment-day To the unsuspecting dead. From the Revolution's flood Shall a fiery Dragon start ; He shall drink his mother's blood, He shall eat his father's heart. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. \f Nurst by anarchy and crime, He — but distance mocks my sight ! O — thou great Avenger, Time I Bring thy strangest birth to light !" " Prophet ! thou hast spoken well, And I deem thy words divine." * Let the enlightened stand by each other in the terrific crisis. A single one of them may sur- pass in power all the Potentates of the earth. The "New World" looks on with almost unruffled com- posure, but with a moral bearing that will ulti- mately restore the equilibrium of society ; while, for the present, a mighty people in Europe, through the same benign, though more active influences, is the immediate arbiter of the approaching desti- nies of the human race. For many of the movements to which 1 have re- ferred we can readily assign the proximate causes, and some of the instances, it is not improbable, may take the rank of reformations. But it is not so easy to comprehend the obliquity which sees nothing but matter in the constitution of mind, and nothing but accident in living beings. Far be it from me to impugn the motives which have flooded society with these unhappy opinions, or to detract from the learning and intellect which * Montgomery's Wanderer of Switzerland. 10 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. have been engaged in the work. I am bound to believe in the sincerity of the one, and I cannot doubt the prowess of the other. Nor would I wish to restrain the outpourings of error by any other means than a display of truth. I proceed, therefore, to state, in the first place, a prevailing doctrine of the spontaneity of living beings, as forming a part of the ground which has prompted this Introductory Discourse ; and the following may be taken as a summary sketch by the British and Foreign Medical Review. It will also show you, in some degree, the extent to which this doctrine is sustained and promulgated by eminent physiologists. " The doctrine," says the Review, " which Dr. Carpenter has propounded respecting vital proper- ties, and which is essentially the same as that upheld by Dr. Prichard, Dr. Fletcher, Mr. Rober- ton, and other able writers on the same side, may be concisely stated as follows : — Certain forms of matter (especially oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen) are endowed with properties which do not manifest themselves either in those elements when uncombined, or in those combinations of them which the Chemist effects by ordinary means. But they do manifest themselves when they are united into those peculiar compounds THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 11 which are known as organic, and when those compounds have been submitted to the process which is termed organization. It is possible that the first of these conditions, (that is, organic com- pounds, and therefore, certainly organic life.) may- be imitated by the chemist. No one can say that the properties do not exist in the elements of mat- ter in a dormant state because they do not manifest themselves to him." "We argue that they (the properties of life) were as much present in the Elements as any of their other properties, which only exhibit themselves in certain condi- tions." So far the Review ; and thus Dr. Carpen- ter for himself, in his " Principles of General and Comparative Physiology" when speaking of organic beings : — " There is no reasonable ground for doubt," he says, " that if the elements could be brought to- gether in their respective states and proportions by the hand of man, the result would be the same as the natural compound." The difficulty, he says, consists in our ignorance of the requisite means ; but " we may believe," he says, " that there exists in all matter a tendency to become organized" ! * * And thus the eminent organic Chemist, Professor Mulder, in his Chemistry of Vegetable and Animal Physiology, — " The 12 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. It is also an unavoidable doctrine of this exten- sive and powerful school, that when man dies, and is resolved into the elements of matter, his vital properties, or his vitality, continue to exist in those elements ; and that when the same ele- ments become a part of the organization of inferior animals, or of plants, his. vital properties will then animate, or constitute the vitality of the toad or mushroom. It follows, also, upon the great plan of materialism, that the soul must observe the elements of the organic kingdom, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, are susceptible of endless modifications. For that reason they can form, with minute changes, a great diver- sity of products ; and by the operation of the same primary forces, they stand towards each other in entirely different rela- tions from those assumed by all the other elements; so that they can produce a peculiar series of bodies which are called organic substances." "Adhering to what we observe and know with certainty, we calculate that every elementary body is endowed with a great many specific properties, which, to a laige extent, are dependent on the same principle that causes their combina- tion, and thus on the proportion and character of the chemical tendency. If we adopt this idea, we have the advantage of see- ing somewhat of Vitality in Dead Matter. This is an idea derived from the endless series of phenomena which are observed in the Laboratory, in daily occurrences, and in nature at large." "Any one who imagines that there is any thing else in action (in living beings) than a molecular force, than a Chemical Force, sees more than exists." " Upon the principles which have been stated, no reason is left fur the dispute as to equivocal generation." — Mulder. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 13 same rule of construction, appearing under the manifestations of instinct in animals, and in plants according to the nature of their organization.* This is the old doctrine of Transmigration, figu- ring under the auspices of modern science. You readily perceive the conclusion of the whole matter. In plain language, the properties of life being" assumed to exist in the elements of matter, those elements are supposed to be capable of organizing themselves into living beings, with an equally spontaneous development of the soul and instinct. Indeed, it is but a short time since we were presented with pictural views, in English and American Scientific Journals, of an animal said to have been created by Mr. Cross out of a solution of silex in water ; and the savans actu- ally bestowed upon it the name of its creator, f * The oldest satire exiant, by the poet Simonides, is upon this subject. It may be seen in the 209th paper of the Spectator. t The distinguished Author of the " Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation" says that, — "The Acarus Crossii was a type of being ordained from the beginning, and destined to be realised under certain physical conditions. When a human hand brought these conditions into the proper arrangement, it did an act akin to hundreds of familiar ones which we execute every day. and which are followed by natural results, but it did nothing more"! The defence of La Place's system of the evolution of the sun and planets out of a fiery vapor, known in Astronomy by the name of nebula, proceeds upon the same specious assumption And 2 14 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. I just now said, that a proper consistency in this plan of spontaneity should equally provide for a development of the thinking and instinctive now to justify, in ample extent, the propriety of this Dis- course, I shall quote a passage of general import from the two leading Medical Journals in Europe, as embraced in elaborate reviews of "The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation." And first, the Medico- Chirurgical Review, London, January, 1846. The beginning thus, — " This is a remarkable volume, small in compass, but embracing a wide range of inquiry beyond the visible starry firmament, to the minutest structures of man and animals. No name is pre- fixed, — perhaps in order to avoid the snarls of the narrow-minded and bigoted Saints of the present day," &c. The middle thus, — " For how many millions and millions of years this production and reproduction of animals went on before man made his appearance on the scene, no human being will ever know. Our Author's speculations on the how, the why, the when, and the wherefore, this great event occurred, will not give satisfaction to the present race of mankind. His hypothesis is three or four centuries in advance of the times, and will be stigmatised by the modern Saints as downright atheism," &c. And the end thus, — . "We have dedicated a space to this remarkable work that may induce many of our readers to peruse the original. The Author is decidedly a man of great information and reflection. He will have a host of Saints in array against him, and many will join in the cry, from hypocrisy and self-interest. As we said before, his doctrines have come out a century before their time." — Med. Chirurg. Rev., pp, 147, 153, 157, Next, Dr. Forbes, in the British and Foreign Medical Re' view, London; also, January, 1846, — - " This is a very beautiful and a very interesting book. Its THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 15 powers, corresponding with that of the general organization, and according to the unique phe- nomena of mind and instinct. But, as we shall soon see, it is not even imagined that the soul, or theme is one of the grandest that can occupy human thought, — no less than the Creation of the Universe." " We are also influenced by the abstract desire to place before our readers matter for their contemplation, which cannot fail at once to elevate, to gratify, and to enrich the mind." Of La Place's nebular hypothesis, the Reviewer says, — " So far from admitting the atheistical tendency which the timid religionists have attributed to the nebular hypothesis, we consider it the grandest contribution which Science has yet made to Religion," &c. The reader, therefore, will have no difficulty in understanding the " conventional"' nature of certain phrases in the following remarks by the Reviewer. " That the Creator formed man out of the dust of the earth, we have scriptural authority for believing, and we must confess our own predilection for the idea, that, at a period however remotely antecedent, the Creator endowed certain forms of inorganic matter with the Properties requisite to enable them to com- "BINE, AT THE FITTING SEASON, INTO THE HUMAN ORGANISM, Over that which would lead us to regard the great-grandfather of our common progenitor as a chimpanzee or an orang-outang." The " Vestiges of Creation" is thus quoted by the Reviewer, — " We have seen powerful evidence that the construction of this globe and its associates, and, inferentially, that of all the other globes of space, was the result, not of any immediate or personal exertion of the Deity, but of Natural Laws which are expressions of his will. What is to hinder our supposing that the Organic Creation is also a result of Natural Laws which are, in like manner, an expression of h's will 1 ?" (Vestiges, &c.) — Upon 16 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. instinct, have any true existence, like the proper- ties of life, in the elements of matter ; but that their manifestations are mere physical results of certain changes which take place among the ele- the foregoing extract, which is a part, of a more extended one of the same nature, the Reviewer remarks, that, — " The complete, accordance of these views with those some time ago propounded by ourselves (vol. 5, p. 342), must be evident, we think, to our readers. To the objection which some timid reli- gionists may urge against them, that they are inconsistent with the Mosaic Record, we simply reply with our Auhor, that we do not think it right to adduce that. Record either in support of, or in objection to, any scientific hypothesis, based upon the pheno- mena of nature," &c. — Brit, and For. Med. Rev., pp. 155, 158, 167, 180. The Reviewer assumes, of course, that all the misapprehensions and perversions of " the phenomena of nature" are paramount to any thing declared in the Mosaic Record. There can be no better proof of the design to substitute physical agencies for a Creative Being, in the philosophy involved in the foregoing quotations, than the introduction of causes which are wholly superfluous ; since no reason can be assigned for supposing that the Almighty did not create the original beings by a direct act, while, also, there is no part of organic nature that does not irresistibly enforce this conclusion. A single fact, predicated of physical laws, proves it ; for all that is known of the affinities between inorganic substances is to result in inorganic compounds, and farther, also, that their chemical influences are destructive of life and of organization. It will be readily seen that the first of the foregoing arguments is equally applicable to the formation of the systems of the Uni- verse.— -(See Note at end of this Essay.) THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 17 ments after their organization. It is universally conceded, in respect to all things else which manifest a series of enduring phenomena, that the sequences are the results, at least, of properties impressed upon the various material objects, which are the immediate causes of the phenomena. But even this attribute is not allowed to the brain in its co-ordinate function of intellection, but all the unique manifestations of mind and of instinct are placed by the materialists upon the same physical ground as they interpret the common organic functions and their results. In other words, the phenomena of mind and of instinct are ascribed to exactly the same physical changes in which the organic functions of the brain and of all other parts are supposed to consist. Perhaps I should leave this part of my subject incomplete, did I not state that there is a section of this large school who start, in their philosophy of the spontaneous origin of living beings, with matter in an organic state. The eminent, and I may say able physiologist, Tiedemann, belongs to this section. He lays down their modification of the doctrine in the following manner, in his " Physiology of Man? " The most probable hypothesis is," says Tiede- mann, " that the substance of organic bodies ex- 18 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. is ted primitively in water, as matter of a partic- ular kind, and that it was there endowed loith the plastic f amity ; that is to say, with the power of acquiring, by degrees, different simple forms of living bodies, with the concurrence of the general influence of light, heat, and perhaps of electricity, and of then passing from the simple forms to others more complicated ; varying in proportion to the modification occurring in the external influences, until the point when each species acquired duration by the power of repro- duction." * * The metamorphoses of insects, frogs, &c, and the slight variation of influences to which they are progressively liable in the varying exigencies of life, are assumed as a foundation for the hypothesis to which this note refers. But it proceeds upon a neglect of the established and immutable laws of organization, and a partial view of the manifestations of those laws as witnessed in different species of animals. The metamorphoses, &c, are as much the exact result of determinate laws, engrafted upon an original constitution of life, as the development of the human ovum, or of the seed of a plant, nor are they in any respect more fluctu- ating or less circumscribed. In all the cases the metamorphoses and other developments of structure, and modifications of life, take place in one uniform way, according to the species of animal or plant. All the special conditions, or potential whole, necessary to the progressive changes from the ovum through the larva and pupa to the fly, and in all analogous instances, are as perfect in the germ of the mutable tribes as in the ova of the highest order of animals, or in the seed of plants ; nor can there be a departure from a precise and uniform succession of developments in any of THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 19 But whence came the organic matter ? This question was anticipated by Tiedemann ; for he says, — " Although we cannot here answer the question, whence came the water and the organic matter which it contained, yet this hypothesis is the one which accords best with the facts with which Geology has lately been enriched." This difficulty evidently crowded itself upon the mind of our distinguished Philosopher, as he recurs to it again, and in nearly the same lan- guage. But as the statement is so varied as to show you how things are now-a-days rejected which man cannot imitate, or demonstrate by the species, respectively, and, therefore, no transmutation of species, or even an introduction of varieties. In respect to the variable physical agencies required by animals subject to metamor- phoses, according to their several stages, the principle is implanted in the ovum itself, and equally so as in that of man, by which his development is started by one kind of vital stimulus, and is farther conducted through fcetal life by another kind, while other kinds obtain after independent life begins. It is a metamorphosis in all. The same law of limitation applies equally to the speculations which are now going on among some amateur physiologists, and by which a spontaneity of being is inculcated upon the popular mind through the analogies in the organization of animals accord- ing to their respective ranks in the scale of animated existence ; particularly the young of some species and the adults of other species next below, and through which it may be inferred that they have successively run into each other, according to the doc- trine set forth in the text above. 20 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. experiment, 1 shall repeat it. — " If it be asked," he says, " whence organic matters proceed, how they are produced, together with the power of - formation inherent in them, we are necessitated candidly to confess our ignorance on the subject, inasmuch as the first origin of organic matters and living bodies is altogether beyond the range of experiment." And now, gentlemen, that great Reformer of the day in our department of Science, Professor Liebig, shall tell you how those special manifes- tations are generated which we have been accus- tomed to ascribe to a spiritual existence, known as the soul of man. " In the animal body," says Liebig, " we recognize as the ultimate cause of all force only one cause, the chemical action which the elements of the food and the oxygen of the air mutually exercise on each other. The only known ultimate cause of vital force, either in animals or plants, is a chemical process." "All vital activity arises from the mutual action of the oxygen of the atmosphere and the elements of the food." tl Physiology has sufficiently deci- sive grounds for the opinion that every motion, every manifestation of force, is the result of a transformation of the structure or of its sub- stance ; that every conception, every mental affec- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 21 tion, is followed by changes in the chemical na- ture of the secreted fluids ; that every thought, every sensation is accompanied by a change in the composition of the substance of the brain." " Every manifestation of force is the result of a transformation of the structure or of its sub- stance."* This is the broad chemical doctrine of all the manifestations of reason, instinct, moral and reli- gious sentiment, the passions, &c. It is the theory of combustion, as propounded by' Liebig, which supposes the union of oxygen with the combusti- ble elements of the brain. But in my judgment, the only combustion about the matter will be found in " thoughts that burn." The doctrine appears in the celebrated work on Animal Chem- istry, written at the invitation of the " British Association for the Advancement of Learning," and by them endorsed and published. The whole * " The higher phenomena of mental existence cannot," says the Professor, " in the present state of science, be referred to their proximate, and still less to their ultimate causes. [Of course, therefore, not to a soul.] We only know of them that they exist." Again : — " The efforts of philosophers, constantly made, to penetrate the relations of the soul to animal life, have all along retarded the progress of physiology. In this attempt, men have left the province of philosophical research for that of fancy." — Liebig's Animal Chemistry. 2* 22 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. work is remarkably distinguished by the same chaotic speculations, as I have abundantly shown on former occasions. Still it is hailed as the " march of mind" — " a new era in physiology," — " a new plan of instruction for medical colleges." But I have the satisfaction of knowing that my examination of this matter has met with the most distinguished approval, and that it has been clothed in the German language at the very door of the Reformer. In respect to the subject of mind, there is a class of philosophers who defend the main ground of the Reformer, but admit the existence of a spiritual part.* While, however, they contend for the chemical theory of intellection, or the com- bustive process, they do not even hint at the allotted part of the soul in the functions of reason, * In connection with this subject, it may be interesting to many to see the philosophy of intellection and that of sleep, as taught in chemical materialism, placed in their immediate relation. It will be found to be a consistent philosophy throughout, as ex- pressed by Prof. Liebig ; while it shows the depth of the abyss into which physiology as well as mind has been plunged by organic chemistry. Thus, the Baron, — " Now, since in different individuals, according to the amount of force consumed in producing voluntary mechanical effects, unequal quantities of living tissue are wasted, there must occur in every individual, unless the phenomena of motion are to cease entirely, a condition in which all voluntary motions are com- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 23 nor of instinct in its wonderful precision and in- definite transmission. This chemico-spiritual hypothesis I have con- troverted in another article, to which 1 will now add that the supposition of the dependence of thought upon any chemical process in the brain necessarily excludes the agency of an immaterial principle, even if we allow so incongruous an association as the co-operation of a spiritual es- sence with chemical forces. The results would still be chemical, and nothing more. If oxygen unite with another element, and result in combus- tion, it takes. place under a special law, and an exact chemical product ensues, which neither the soul can alter, nor imagination affect. The only part which the soul could take, according to any analogies borrowed from chemistry, and which pletely checked ; in which, therefore, these occasion no waste. This condition is called sleep. " Now, since the consumption of force for the involuntary mo- tions continues in sleep, it is plain that a waste of matter also continues in that state ; and if the original equilibrium is to be restored, we must suppose that, during sleep, an amount of force is accumulated in the form of living tissue, exactly equal to that which was consumed in voluntary and. involuntary motion during the preceding waking period." — Liebig, ibid. Is it not a sufficient objection to this philosophy that many who labor hardest, and sleep least, like the seafaring man, are apt to be the most robust 1 24 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. must have been the part supposed, would be that of exerting merely a predisposing affinity among the elements. This predisposing influence of the soul, is meant to embrace whatever may be sup- posed to result from its action upon the doctrine of catalysis. In this view of the subject, which is the only one that can be propounded, the chem- ical tendency of the soul would no more react upon itself than that of platinum, and the only result would be a combustion of the elements of the brain, just as when hydrogen and oxygen gases are submitted to the catalytic action of the metal. And so of any other given chemical change. It always terminates in one way. If it be conflagration by the contact of potassium with water, it will not produce ice. But I should be less astonished at such an effect than to witness evidences of intellectual results. When, therefore, oxygen unites with the phos- phorus of the brain, according to the material doc- trine of intellection, whether chemical or chem- ico-spiritual, it can form no other compound than phosphorous acid, whatever the supposed activ- ity of combustion ; or, if with those other com- bustible elements of the organ, carbon and hydro- gen, the resulting compounds must be carbonic acid in one case, and water in the other. An THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 25 exciting, or predisposing, or any other agency of the soul, even were the soul a material substance, could in no respect affect those results; and, to imagine that the soul enters into either combina- tion as a third element, and is yet in perpetual operation, per se, would be a chemical absurdity. You would readily appreciate the difficulty, both here and in regard to organic results, which are equally ascribed to a chemical process, should you attempt to call in the aid of spirit, or the principle of life, in any of the manipulations of the labora- tory. They are so far on common ground ; and if the soul can promote combustion in the brain, or in any way modify its results, it should be equally competent out of the body, so only it could be brought into external operation. But no imagination can surmise the possibility of applying it in a chemical manner, and, least of all, eliciting by its aid the phenomena of mind from the most ingenious devices in organic chem- istry. On the other hand, however, we have no difficulty in regarding the soul as a cause, acting through the vital constitution of an organ ;* while, in so doing, we get rid of an unnecessary, as well as an unmeaning multiplication of causes. * See this united action examined in the Author's Medical and Physiological Commentaries. Vol. 1, p. 82 — 106. 26 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. But suppose for a moment that the soul does exert some mysterious agency in promoting the union of oxygen with the combustible elements of the brain, what answer will the chemist make as to all the varieties, moral and physical, in the operations of reason, instinct, and the passions? We have seen that he must abandon any other supposed contribution to the chemical combina- tions upon the laics of chemistry. Nor can those combinations and those laws take any possible part in the acts of the soul or of instinct ; and the chemical speculatist, therefore, is coerced to the alternative of ascribing all intellectual and instinc- tive functions to the immaterial principles in their co-operation with the vital constitution of the brain, or to deny the existence of those principles, and throw himself exclusively upon the chemical ra- tionale. I will not imagine that he would attempt to propagate the latter doctrine under any disguise ; for that would be the uncharitable fling of the an- cient fabulist. If it stand, it must be upon its own merits, and not through any sophistry that may seem like a leaning towards the imagined truth, no gilding the material device, no conces- sion of what may be considered the innocent but obstinate belief of the spiritual theorist, in the trust that he may finally discern the reality of his delu- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 27 sion. Moreover, the organic chemist maintains that all the processes of life are owing to exactly the same combinations of oxygen with phospho- rus, carbon, and hydrogen, and the same acid products, and water, as give rise to intellection. The brain is thus placed on common ground with all other parts. It is a chemical process, the same everywhere, and nothing more throughout ; and it will be seen that precisely the same objections are applicable here as I shall soon present against the doctrine of mental secretion. And here I may also ask, if the soul or instinct make all the differ- ence, as regards intellectual and instinctive mani- festations, what makes the difference in respect to the corporeal phenomena? Let these questions be intelligibly answered, and the materialist will command an attention which is due to the high- est effort of genius. The chemico-spiritualist is here on terms of equality with the exclusive ma- terialist ; for although he allow the existence of the soul, but without any conceivable employ- ment for it, and even an encumbrance, these same philosophers deride the principle of life, or or- ganic force, as " a phantom of the imagination," and give full scope to the chemical hypothesis where the moral sense of mankind will bear the exclusion. But it should be recollected that the 28 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. existence of the soul and the principle of instinct has been far less substantiated by demonstrative proof than the principle of life ; and philosophers should be at least as ready to yield to the latter series of facts as to the former, especially as a multitude which are relative to the principle of life are of a demonstrable nature. It would appear, therefore, that there is a total absence of proof for the combustive or chemical hypothesis of intellection, as entertained by the school of Liebig, or as modified by others in in- troducing the soul as taking a subordinate part in the combustive process. Nay, more ; the whole of our proof, at this primary step, is fatal to either speculation. If any other than the spiritual theo- ry of mind, as with all the physical hypothesis of life, be brought to a comparison with the pheno- mena, there is not a single manifestation but may be turned against it. But although an assump- tion, without a fact or analogy, the spirit of the age demands an elaborate contradiction. There is a contingent fact attending both the chemical hypothesis of intellection, and of organic life, which is worth our attention. I mean the rapid ascendancy of those doctrines over the slow progress of the spiritual theory of mind, and the vital theory of organic processes. Such have THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 29 ever been the pace of truth, and the flight of er- ror. The latter springs into being in a day, and its wings must be clipped again and again before it will come to the ground ; but the slightest obstacle, a word of satire, may arrest the other in its gradual march through centuries of time. Ver- itas latet in pnteo ; or, as another has it, " Truth, like a single point, escapes the sight, And claims attention to perceive it right ; But what resembles truth is soon descried, Spreads like a surface, and expanded wide." Or, as Dry den has it, " Errors, like straws, upon the surface flow ; He, who would search for pearls, must dive below." Against the ground which I have now gone over I have been an inflexible opponent. I have seen nothing in it but thorns and " deadly night- shades." I have striven to mow them down, and had intended to retire from the contest. But I have thought that something more might be said on the nature of mind and its physiological rela- tions to the body ; and in again resuming that subject, T may say that it is with the design of presenting a series of facts which afford a demon- stration that the soul of man is distinct in its 30 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. nature from his corporeal frame, and that its pe- culiar operations are more independent of organ- ized structure than allowed by those physiologists who admit its existence as a special essence. I distinguish, also, between the soul of man and the instinct of animals ; and although they have certain attributes in common, each is to be re- garded as a distinct essence. To one, or the soul, is allotted a greater independence, in its opera- tions, of the material part, than to the other, or the principle of instinct. The evidence turns wholly upon physiological facts. My essential premises are relative to the nervous system, have been deduced from the most accurate and multiplied experiments, and are admitted by all. These must be briefly stated to render the argument intelligible to the student. First, then, the brain is especially subservient to the soul and the principle of instinct.* Secondly. The spinal cord, and the nerves which depart from it, are, among other uses, the organs through which the will transmits its influ- ences to the voluntary muscles. Thirdly. The ganglionic or sympathetic nerve is designed, particularly, to connect together, in * See Institutes of Medicine, §.455. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 31 harmonious action, the involuntary organs, or those upon which life essentially depends. Fourthly. The cerebro-spinal, and sympathetic systems of nerves, are intimately blended with each other, so that the brain is the great centre of both systems, and the spinal cord a less general centre ; while the ganglia of the sympathetic are supposed, also, by many to be local centres to that nerve,* but, like the spinal cord, subordinate to the brain. The cerebro-spinal system has, in conse- quence, certain organic influences upon the essen- tial organs of life. Physical irritations of cerebro- spinal nerves may be thus transmitted through the nervous centres and the sympathetic nerve to the involuntary organs, and the passions, by their direct action upon the brain, though not the will, may readily affect those essential or involuntary organs through the sympathetic nerve. j" These organs, and the voluntary muscles, are also readi- ly affected by mechanical or other irritants applied to the brain or spinal cord. So, too, on the other hand, from the same intercommunication of the cerebro-spinal and sympathetic systems, irrita- * This last is of no importance to my argument. See Insti- tutes of Medicine, § 520—524. t Ibid. § 476, c. 32 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. tions or other affections of the involuntary organs may be felt by the voluntary organs, through influences transmitted by the sympathetic nerve to the cerebro-spinal system.* Fifthly. The nerves are composed of two kinds, one of which transmits the influence of the will and of the passions, and the effects of other causes, from* the nervous centres towards the circumference ; while the other kind trans- mits impressions from the circumference to the nervous centres. The first of these two orders of nerves is concerned in the development of voluntary and many involuntary motions, and are hence called excito-motory nerves. The se- cond kind are nerves of sensation, or sensitive nerves; though the influences transmitted by them to the nervous centres are only felt, in the natural state, when propagated through the nerves which supply the organs of sense. f It should be also remarked, that while some of the two orders of nerves are wholly or mostly of one kind or the other, — either excito-motory or sen- sitive, — a very large proportion of the nerves are composed of fibres of both orders, though per- * See Institutes of Medicine, § 454— 462J. i Ibid. §450. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 33 fectly distinct from each other in arrangement and function. Such is the case with the nerves which go off from the spinal cord, the great sym- pathetic, and pneumogastric. All these, there- fore, are known as compound nerves. Exam- ples of entire and almost purely excito-motory nerves are rare. They are seen in the facial and third pair of cerebral nerves. The purely sensi- tive are nerves of special sense, and consist of the olfactory, the optic, and auditory nerves. This double order is perfectly established throughout the body, and has brought the physiology of the nervous system completely within the range of the most exact experiment, and has become the foundation of many laws which are as clearly ascertained as any in astronomy. The two or- ders of nerves or of fibres never interchange their functions; one of them being always em- ployed in transmitting impressions to the brain and spinal cord, the other as purely centrifugal in its office. Tt is also important to understand, that my dem- onstration is particularly concerned with the sys- tem of excito-motory nerves, or those nerves, or fibres of compound nerves, which transmit influ- ences from the brain towards the circumference.* * See Institutes of Medicine, § 462—475. 34 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. Sixthly. Influences, as I have said, may be transmitted from the brain and spinal cord to- wards the circumference by impressions made di- rectly upon those centres ; as when they are irri- tated by mechanical or other agents, or when the will or passions operate.* But impressions may be also made upon those centres through irrita- tions produced in distant organs, and then re- flected from the nervous centres upon other dis- tant parts, and even upon the parts from which the irritations originally proceeded.f In this case, the original impressions are transmitted from the distant parts to the nervous centres through the sensitive nerves or sensitive fibres of compound nerves, and are reflected from those centres through excito-motory nerves, or the mo- tor fibres of compound nerves, which are also called nerves of reflexion. This is clearly ex- emplified in respiration, in vomiting, in contrac- tion of the iris, in spasms from teething or from irritations of the bowels, &c. In breathing, for instance, two principal nerves are concerned, and the diaphragm is the principal muscle which * See Institutes of Medicine, § 476—494. t This is called reflex action by some, and remote sympa- thy by others. There are good reasons for preferring the latter term. See Institutes of Medicine, § 512 — 524. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 35 is moved. The pneumogastric is the sensitive nerve through which an impression, arising from want of air, is transmitted to the nervous cen- tres, and which calls the diaphragm into ac- tion ; and the phrenic is the excito-motory nerve through which the impression is reflected from the nervous centres, and through which the will operates upon the diaphragm in voluntary res- piration. The other respiratory muscles have similar relations to the pneumogastric and to oth- er excito-motory nerves, and the will operates as readily upon the intercostal muscles as upon the diaphragm. But the diaphragm is very conspic- uously marked in this respect, and is only infe- rior in importance to the heart. In seeing; we have the beautiful example of the motions of the iris, which are entirely of an involuntary nature; although the iris stands in the same relation to perfectly distinct nerves, in all its movements, as does the diaphragm. In seeing, the optic nerve, or second pair from the brain, not only conveys the impression which is recognized by the mind, but it is also the sen- sitive nerve for the iris, by which the pupil is exactly adjusted to the degree of light, while the excito-motory nerve of the iris is from the cili- ary branches of the lenticular ganglion, through 36 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. its communication with the third pair of cere- bral nerves. The brain is the bond of union be- tween the two orders of nerves, in both the cases ; but for an obvious final cause, the iris, unlike the diaphragm, is withdrawn from the will, possi- bly through its connection with the ganglion of the sympathetic nerve.* As the stimulus of light, however, is indispensable to the natural contraction of the iris, and is so far unobserv- ed, you will readily understand how a simi- lar impression upon the pneumogastric nerve in the lungs is necessary to the involuntary mo- tions of the diaphragm. Indeed, there is no mode of destroying life so instantaneous, as by cutting off the influence which is transmit- ted to and from the nervous centres by the respi- ratory nerves. The whole brain, for example, maybe sliced down to the medulla oblongata, or beginning of the spinal cord, without affect- ing, at the time, the organic functions ; but as soon as the knife reaches the origin of the pneu- mogastric or sensitive nerve of the lungs, where * It is probable, however, from experiments, that the ganglia of the sympathetic nerve are not relative to the will or sensation. Their main office U, beyond doubt, to co-operate with the cerebro- spinal system so far as the latter is concerned in influencing or- ganic functions. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT, 61 the influences for the respiratory movements are combined, the animal will instantly die. This, therefore, is the most fatal point in the body, Death is then mostly produced by arresting res- piration, the immediate cause being the failure of the lungs to excrete carbonaceous matter from the blood.* The principle, therefore, is exactly the same^ whether impressions made directly upon the ner- vous centres give rise to motion in parts that are voluntary or involuntary, or, whether the im- pressions upon those centres be occasioned by in- fluences transmitted to them from remote parts, and which, by reflection, equally give rise to mo- tions. But, in ail the latter cases the resulting * We hear much, and very truly, of the indispensable import- ance of the oxygen of the atmosphere to the whole animal king- dom ; and I would go as far as any man in allowing the force of the expression, " He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," But oxygen is indispensable in a very different respect from what the chemical physiologist supposes, and how it is indispensable is seen, at once, in the effects of the foregoing experiment. The carbon of the venous blood, not the want of oxygen in that blood, is the destructive cause ; and this is farther shown by the imme- diately fatal effects of transfusing a little of venous blood into the artery leading to the brain. It is equally true, also, and of all animals, that it is the poisonous action of carbon upon the brain, to which death is mostly owing in all the modes by which the access of oxygen gas to the respiratory organs is arrested. The great final cause, therefore, of the respiratory function is the re~ 3 38 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT, motions are involuntary ; as are all in the other cases excepting such as arise from the operation of the will. But in the case of the direct im- pressions, it is important to remark that the mo- tions which are produced by the passions are en- tirely involuntary, and therefore exactly analo- gous to such as arise from irritating the brain mechanically, or when convulsions follow teeth- ing or intestinal troubles, as the effect of irrita- tions propagated to the nervous centres. It may be finally added, that the two nervous centres, and both orders of nerves, co-operate to- gether in giving rise to motion in the organs of organic life, so far as organic motions depend upon the nervous system ; while only the brain moval of redundant carbon from the blood, not the absorption of oxygen. I will also add, that, in an article which I have prepared for the press, I have endeavored to show that the chemical doctrine of the absorption of oxygen into the blood, in the process of respiration, is unfounded, and that its office is what was only lately supposed by chemists : namely, that of uniting with the redundant carbon of venous blood after its excretion by the mucous tissue of the lungs. The more recent hypothesis of the absorption of oxygen from the atmosphere is the sole foundation of the present interpre- tation of all organic and animal functions, including those of the senses, and all the rational and instinctive acts. The subversion of this single assumption will leave the whole stupendous system of chemical physiology as " the baseless fabric of a dream." (See this subject considered in Institutes, § 447^, a — -/.) THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 39 and spinal cord, and the excito-motory nerves, are concerned in developing the motions which are brought about by the mind, or the instinctive principle, or by mechanical or other direct physi- cal irritations of the brain. In ordinary respira- tion, for example, the sensitive fibres of the pneu- mogastric nerve are indispensable for the trans- mission of an exciting influence from the lungs to the nervous centres ; but, in voluntary respira- tion the pneumogastric nerve is not concerned, but only the nervous centres and the excito-mo- tory nerves of the respiratory muscles. In the former case the irritation of the nervous centres proceeds from the lungs ; in the latter those cen- tres are irritated by the will. The former is true of all involuntary motions when the nervous cen- tres are not immediately irritated, and their irrita- tion then proceeds from other parts ; and the lat- ter is true of all voluntary motions, and of all the involuntary when the irritating cause is applied immediately to the centres. Seventhly. It is allowed that some invisible, intangible principle exists in the nervous system, commonly known as the nervous power, through the agency of which motions are produced when they are connected with the nerves. 1 have en- deavored to show that the nervous power is a 40 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. vital agent, which is very variously brought into action, either by physical or moral causes ; and whether, therefore, motion be produced by irri- tants applied to the brain, or by the operation of the will or the passions, it is in consequence of the development of this nervous power, and the direction of its influence upon the parts that are brought into motion. But it is not important to my present argument that any special mode of ac- tion should be conceded.* From what I have now said of the ground of my reasoning, you begin to perceive the conse- quences which must logically follow. You be- gin to discern the force of the analogy between the effects of those elements of the mind, the will and the passions, and of mechanical and other physical agents when applied to the brain. You see, already, that if the brain be influenced by something, when physical agents acting upon it give rise, in consequence, to motion in the vo- luntary muscles, and in the heart, so must it be equally influenced by something, and that some- thing must be as much an exciting and analo- gous cause, when the will gives rise to voluntary motion, or when the passions affect the action of the heart. From the close analogy in effects in * See Institutes of Medicine, pp. 106—111, 323—332. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 41 the two cases, there must be equally an analogy among the causes and their modus operandi ; and therefore the soul, and the principle of instinct, of which the will and the passions are elements or properties, are as much distinct entities as are the mechanical irritants or other physical agents which determine the corresponding movements. I say, gentlemen, that such is your mental con stitution you cannot help this conclusion, how- ever prone you may be to materialism. Here is an animal whose brain is irritated mechanically, and spasms follow in the voluntary muscles as a consequence. You see the close analogy with the effects of the will. The movements are often so alike that you fail of distinguishing one from the other. Here is another, whose brain is irri- tated by the application of alcohol, and you see the heart beating more actively, as a result ; and here is a third whose heart is enfeebled in action by the application of an infusion of tobacco to the brain, — just as it is excited by joy and anger in one case, or depressed by grief and fear in the other. You also witness the same spasms in the voluntary muscles from the operation of the pas- sions as arise from irritating the brain by me- chanical agents.* Consider, for example, a par- * See Institutes of Medicine, § 476—494, 42 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. oxysm of hysteria^ where convulsions of the vol- untary muscles are brought on by some mental irritation, and where they are exactly the same as when produced by irritating the brain mecha- nically. Consider, also, how precisely analogous are the voluntary and the involuntary acts of respiration ; one of them being determined by the direct action of the will upon the brain, and the involuntary act by an impression transmit- ted from the lungs to the brain. How precisely analogous, also, the involuntary contraction of the sphincter muscles, and their contraction as brought about by the will, and where the same philosophy in respect to causation is concerned as in the involuntary and voluntary acts of res- piration.* An universal analogy proves that motion, in all the cases, is brought about by a common proxi- mate cause ; that is, by a determination of the ner- vous power upon the muscles which are thrown into action, and to which it proves a vital agent. The will has no farther connection than this with voluntary motion, nor the passions with the vari- ous modified motions which they induce in the sanguiferous organs ; no more so than the alco- * See Institutes of Medicine, § 500 ; 514, /-514, g. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 43 ho], or tobacco, when applied to the brain, or when mechanical irritations of that organ give rise to similar motions. You also see plainly from my premises, that if the movements which are excited by the action of physical agents upon the brain itself be remotely due to those causes, and not to any 'primary change in the brain, it must equally follow that the effects of the will in developing voluntary motion, or of the passions in modifying the action of the heart, cannot be due to any primary changes in the condition of the brain, but of necessity, to some cause as dis- tinct from the brain as are the physical agents. So far, then, the analogy is complete. But in the case of the physical agents, the causes are of a passive nature, and require other agencies to bring them into operation. How different, on the other hand, with the will and the passions ! Here the causes are entirely self-acting ; originating their own actions upon the great nervous centre. This, in itself, establishes a radical distinction between the nature of the soul and instinctive principle, and of all physical causes, and is utter- ly fatal to materialism. The self-acting nature of the soul and instinct, and especially of the ra- tional faculty,* transcends even the principle of * See pages 50 — 52. 44 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. organic life ; for that principle requires the opera- tion of stimuli to rouse it and to maintain it in action. But so far as action is immediately con- cerned, an analogy obtains, and we may reason, upon that analogy, from the self-acting mind to the existence of an active principle of life upon which organic motions depend. But we shall seek in vain, throughout the wide range of Na- ture, for any direct similitude with the manifesta- tions of reason or of instinct ; though if we pass the limits of Nature, we may discover in Creative Energy that analogy with the soul which shad- ows forth the " Image of God." What has now been said is equally applicable to materialism, whether it regard the manifesta- tions of mind as a chemical phenomenon, or as elaborated from the blood. In the Institutes of Medicine, where I have transiently called up this subject, there is an argument directed specifically against the doctrine of mental secretion ; and as it is alike applicable to the chemical hypothesis, and as these two make up the whole sum of materi- alism, in its proper acceptation, to render the pre- sent examination more complete, I shall quote the argument there stated. I have there said that, — In former works I have presented certain facts which go to the conclusion that the mind or THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 45 soul is a distinct immaterial substance, and that the instinctive principle of animals is equally a distinct substance from the brain ; and I will now add a few words, physiologically, in res- pect to the main argument of the materialists drawn from analogy, that the mind, like the gas- tric juice, bile, &c, is only a product of the or- ganic functions of the brain. The analogy is fictitious. Both the mind and instinct are entirely wanting in every known at- tribute of the product of other organs, and are siii generis in all their characteristics. This is suffi- ciently obvious. But there are other, considera- tions which establish the distinction more fully, though they appear not to have engaged the at- tention of physiologists. What, for example, is the efficient cause of the production of bile, sali- va, &c.? Certainly the blood, in connection with organic structure and organic actions ; and while these actions go on, bile, saliva, &c. are uninter- ruptedly secreted ; or, if arrested, it is from the failure of the organic processes. But it is just otherwise in respect to the mind and the instinc- tive principle. These are completely suspended, in all their manifestations, during sleep, and often so with great instantaneousness. And yet there is every reason to believe that the organic func- 3* 46 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. tions of the brain continue to move on as perfect- ly as those of the liver, the lungs, &c. ; especially when it is considered that sleeping- and waking may happen in almost the twinkling of an eye. Indeed, were any change to befall the brain, it should be more or less manifested by some con- sequent modification of all the organic actions ; particularly as those of animal life undergo com- plete suspension. The continuance of all the or- ganic results proves that organic life is in perfect operation ; while, by equality of reason, the sus- pension of all results in animal life proves that an agent, upon which these results depend, has ceased to operate. In one case, organic functions must go on without interruption, and therefore the moving causes upon which they depend must be in perpetual action. In the other, and for an equally obvious reason, the organs peculiar to the division of animal life must have repose, and therefore, by parity of reason, their spring of ac- tion, in man and brute, is constitutionally fitted for quiescence as well as action, and this, as re- spects sleeping and waking, corresponds with the alternations of thinking and not thinking during the waking time. There are various gradations in the suspension of mental and instinctive func- tions from their quiescence in the waking state to profound slumber. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 47 Do you ask for the modus operandi of this constitutional peculiarity? Would it not be as reasonable to demand an explanation of the abso- lute nature of mind, or of the Deity Himself? Must not that be understood before the modus op- erandi can be known 1 Is not this problem rais- ed like the difficulty of comprehending the works of Creative Energy, because li the first origin of organic matters and living bodies is altogether beyond the range of experiment" ? (P. 20.) Again, other peculiarities, which contradistin- guish the mind and instinct from every organic product, are the quick transitions from sleeping to waking, and the occurrence of the change without any change in the organic functions of the brain. Take in connection the act of sleep- ing and the act of waking, the instant suspension and the instant reproduction of the intellectual operations, and in all their isolated aspects, and there must be conceded not only an entire want of analogy with any other phenomenon of nature, but that there must be a unique cause for such perfectly unique effects. But, again, suppose some change in the organic condition of the brain as the cause of sleep ; what is it, I say, that so instantly reinstates its organic functions when we pass from the sleeping to the 48 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. waking state ? What arouses the organ to its wonted secretion of mind ? Certainly not the blood. Are there any analogies supplied by the liver, or by any other organ 1 What is it, I re- peat, that brings the great nervous centre into op- eration in all the acts of volition, in all the acts of intellection % This question must be answer-. ed consistently, or in some conformity with the argument drawn from analogy. If that can be done, (this simple physiological requisite alone.) then it must be conceded that the analogy is irre- sistible, and the argument in favor of materialism incontrovertible. So, on the other hand, should the argument fail in this indispensable requisite, materialism must stand convicted of sophistry, insincerity, and a leaning to infidelity. The premises are perfectly simple. They are also sound so far as it respects all organic actions and results. The blood, as -it is with all other organs, is the natural stimulus of the brain in its organic condition, and here as there all organ- ic phenomena are distinctly pronounced. They proceed in all parts with uniformity, and with- out interruption. Nothing can suspend or mod- ify them in the brain, or elsewhere, during their natural condition. So far the analogy is com- plete. Now, as it cannot be the blood, according THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 49 to our premises, which rouses the brain to action in willing^ reflecting, &c, or which awakes us from sleep, I ask the materialist the nature of the stimulus which operates upon the brain in eliciting the phenomena of mind ? * Thus far the Institutes on that branch of our . inquiry, and it will be readily seen that all which is here said applies equally to the chemical doc- trine of intellection ; since, as I have shown, the acts of intellection and all organic processes and results are placed by the chemist on com- mon ground. If, therefore, it be the circulation of the blood in the brain, as in other parts, which gives rise to the union of oxygen with the com- bustible elements of the brain in the organic pro- cesses of that organ, what is it that starts the union of the same elements in the acts of intellec- tion, or which rouses the chemical display so as to awake us from sleep? The chemico-spiritu- alist may answer, the soul ! But has he a sha- dow of fact, or of analogy, for this hypothesis, and can he assign any possible agency for the chemical process ? (See page 21.) It will be readily seen that objections of this nature may be carried to an indefinite extent. Thus, what, for example, makes the difference * Institutes of Medicine, § 175, c. 50 THE SOTUL AND INSTINCT. between the early riser and the sluggard ; be- tween him who awakes on the instant, and him who as habitually requires the sound of a bell, but a self-acting cause which is more energetic, or better disposed to act in one case than in the other? Or, why is one man capable of greater acts of ratiocination than another ? Let us grant that it may be due, in part, to some difference in the development of the brain, or to some greater energy of the supposed combustive process in one than in the other ; why then does an untutored mind come, by instruction, to the mastery of sci- ence? Or why do we witness in the unletter- ed boy a facility in instituting great truths, or of seizing upon vast principles, in science, of which even the erudite are incapable ? I might refer, as examples, to Paschal in mathematics, Mozart in music, and other familiar names ; but there is one so transcendently greater, and who has cast a shade upon the highest order of intelligence, that this single instance is abundantly illustra- tive of my subject. The recent statement, how- ever, by the Rev. Mr. Stevens, of the apparently superhuman efforts of Truman Henry Safford, supersedes the necessity of a more extended refer- ence to a display of mind altogether beyond any of the usual corresponding developments of or- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 51 ganization, or rudimentary instruction. But it may be well to say, that, after a very superficial attendance at a country school in Vermont, with an attenuated frame and feeble health, this boy, at the age of nine years and six months, produced the " Youth's Almanac for 1846," having made all the calculations of eclipses, the rising and set- ting of the sun, &c., &c, without any assistance whatever; and that recently, in the 13th year of his age, and in the same unassisted manner, he calculated the orbit of the telescopic comet of November, 1848, and with an accuracy, as I am informed, which is corroborated by the best as- tronomers. At the age of ten years he was tho- roughly examined by the Rev. Mr. Adams in al- gebra, plane trigonometry, mensuration of surfa- ces and of solids, pyramidal and spherical, cube roots, &c. The interrogatories were of a very dif- ficult nature, resolved mentally and according to the rules of science, and generally with great in- stantaneousness. For the purpose of testing the reach of his mind in computation, he was finally asked to " multiply in his head 365,365,365,365,- 365,365, by 365,365,365,365,365,365. He flew round the room like a top, pulled his pantaloons over the top of his boots, bit his hand, rolled his eyes in their sockets, until, in not more than one :i 52 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. minute, said he, 133,491,850,208,566,925.016,658, 299,941,583,225. What was still more wonder- ful, he began to multiply at the left hand, and to bring out the answer from left to right, giving first, 133,491, &c. Here, confounded above measure, I gave up the examination. This last performance is not so interesting an illustration of the logical power of the child, as others above given, but as a stupendous effort of computation it is absolutely inconceivable, and throws into comparative petti- ness the largest calculations of Colburn, or any other similar genius with whom we are acquaint- ed. We are impressed, indeed, with a sentiment of awe when we think what must be the power and fleetness of thought in the purely spiritual state, when such a child, by the mere accident of a pe- culiar organization, astounds us by such immea- surable compass and velocity of mind. "—Nor was this early display of mind limited to mathematics, but took, in almost equal compass, every depart- ment of science with which it came in contact ; and whatever the object of inquiry where books were the medium of suggestions, especially the high branches of mathematics, he commonly open- ed the works in their middle, and seized at once upon the antecedent premises upon which the in- ductions had been founded. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 53 But again I say, if the admitted analogy be- tween the soul and its Maker have any founda- tion, then, independently of specific facts, the soul of man is a self-acting agent; and since this conclusion must flow from each series of my pre- mises, and from the analogies between the mani- festations of the soul and the instinctive princi- ple, as well as from the direct facts relative to the latter, the principle of instinct is also a self-acting substance. Independently, however, of the induc- tion from analogy as to the soul, and looking alone at the plain matters of fact, I again ask the materialist what he can extort from the whole range of physics and chemistry that will afford the slightest pretence for grasping at the manifes- tations of mind which I have thus far indicated? Seeing none myself, I shall return to a farther consideration of our subject, as relative to the comparative effects of the mind and its passions, and of physical agents, in producing movements in the voluntary and involuntary organs. The ignorant in physiology, or the caviller in argu- ment, may assume that muscles are artificially brought into action without an immediate im- pression upon the nervous centres. There is al- ways, however, an impression made upon those centres. If it be not from direct action upon 54 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. them, it is then indirect ; that is to say, the im- pression is then propagated from remote organs to the brain and spinal cord through the sen- sitive nerves. This is equivalent to what re- sults from the direct action of agents. It is even true of the involuntary acts of respiration during sleep, permanently so of the sphincter muscles, and of all the involuntary movements of muscles subject to volition. An irritation, or other im- pression, is somewhere set up in parts remote from the nervous centres, and transmitted to them through sensitive nerves. In all the cases there is a positive impression made upon the nervous centres by some remote cause, as a consequence of which the nervous influence is reflected from those centres, through excito-motory nerves, up- on the muscles which are brought into action. That power, thus reflected, proves a stimulus, or depressant, to properties inherent in muscles, and which are the immediate causes in the produc- tion or modifications of motion. Take, as a clear illustration, an inflamed superficial nerve, or an inflamed tendon, or the condition of the gums in teething, where each affection propagates an irri- tation to the nervous centres, by which the nervous influence is rendered an exciting agent, and is re • fleeted as such upon various muscles, and throws THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 55 them into convulsive action. Nux vomica, ad- ministered by the stomach, will produce the same chain of causation, ending in convulsions. Ad- minister, now, an anti-spasmodic, as conia or opi- um, in any of those conditions, and a sedative effect will be exerted upon the excited nervous centres, through which the nervous influence is modified in a corresponding manner, and may ar- rest the spasms. (See Author's Materia Medica, pp. 170—181.) The impressions upon the nervous centres, by which the nervous influence is developed, and determined with various effects upon distant parts, are all upon a par, in principle ; whether they re- sult from agents applied directly to the centres themselves, or are transmitted to them through the medium of parts remotely situated, or wheth- er the will and the passions make their demon- strations. Take some of the common examples among the muscles which are both voluntary and involuntary. Let these, again, be the mus- cles which are concerned in respiration, inclu- ding those of the face. Now, their several move- ments are liable to numerous modifications; some of which are natural, as in coughing, sneezing, yawning, laughing, and others more or less mor- bid, as in asthma, hiccough, &c. In all but two 56 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. of these cases, the movements depend upon the excitement of the nervous power through some sensitive nerve, which is generally the pneumo- gastric nerve, and the reflection of that power from the brain and spinal cord upon a part of or upon all the respiratory muscles. In each process, there is a special irritation of the nervous centres, and in each, the nervous influence is brought in- to operation in a peculiar manner, and according to that manner will be the nature of the move- ment. In asthma, a stronger irritation is pro- pagated from the lungs to the nervous centres, and a more intense motor excitement is reflected from those centres upon all the muscles of respi- ration, (often including those of the face,) than in ordinary breathing, and in severe cases the ivill comes to the aid of the irritation propagated from the lungs to the nervous centres. Here, then, we see the mind and the physical cause brought into immediate co-operation in rousing the brain and spinal cord. The physical cause is insufficient to excite the movements of respiration, and there- fore the mind lends its assistance. Both act in per- fect harmony together ; nor can the slightest differ- ence be observed in the results of either, excepting as the mind acts with greater energy, and brings the respiratory muscles of the face into motion. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 57 Take next the acts of voluntary and involun- tary laughing. When the feet or armpits are tickled, laughing follows as the effect of an irri- tation propagated to the nervous centres by sensi- tive nerves supplying the skin of those parts ;* for you should now understand, that in all the modi- fied motions of the respiratory muscles, the nervous centres may be irritated through many other sensi- tive nerves than the pneumogastric, while in all the cases the same excito-motory nerves bring the muscles into action. A beautiful exemplification of this is seen in the new-born infant and other animals breathing with lungs, as I have expound- ed on a former occasion ; since here the first im- pression is transmitted to the nervous centres through the sensitive nerves of the skin, in con- sequence of the contact of cold air with the sur- face. f That is the rationale of the first breath we draw, — standing alone in organic life. Ever afterwards the transmitted irritation goes from the * See Author's Institutes of Medicine, § 514, d. t" The cause of the first inspiration," says the eminent physiol- ogist, Miiller, " appears to me to be solely the stimulus afforded to the brain and medulla oblongata by the blood, which immediately becomes oxydized in the lungs. The former had been in a com- paratively sluggish, torpid condition; but the arterialized blood, in a few minutes, reaches the brain, when the respiratory movements immediately commence." (Muller's Physiology, p. 355.) The 58 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. lungs. The same thing happens, as I also ex- plained, when cold air, or cold water, applied to the surface, reproduces breathing in syncope ; or, if it be ammonia, &c, applied to the nose, then the sensitive nerves are branches of the fifth pair of the cerebral. I will also now say that the func- tion of the pneumogastric nerve is developed for the first time by the first act of inspiration, and fully developed, both as respects the lungs and the stomach.* Now, as to involuntary laughing from tickling the feet, it is absolutely independent of the mind, and in opposition to it. And yet it is apparently the same as voluntary laughing. In this instance, the impression upon the nervous centres is obvious enough from the sensation ; and the nervous in- fluence is so far unceasingly determined upon the muscles of the face while the irritation goes on, that laughing may continue irresistibly till the irritability of the muscles becomes obtuse to the stimulus of the nervous influence, or their mo- bility exhausted. In a recorded case, a husband English Translator remarks upon this, that, " before the arteri- alized blood can reach the brain, respiration must have com- menced ;" and inquires, " hoto is the air first drawn into the lungs ?" * See Author's Medical and Physiological Commentaries ^ol. i. pp. 175—178 ; vol. ii. pp. 48—50. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 59 bound the limbs of his wife, and tickled her feet until she died of laughing ;* just as some die sud- denly from a strong mental emotion. In what 1 have hitherto said we find a ready explanation of the foregoing case. The act was mainly in opposition to the will. But at the be- ginning of the paroxysm of involuntary laughter, the impression which is propagated from the feet to the brain simultaneously rouses the nervous influence of the organ and the action of the mind. At this stage, therefore, the will concurs with the physical cause in a farther development of the nervous influence, and establishes a harmony of operation, which is at first mainly expended upon the muscles of the face. The propagated impres- sion, however, soon becomes painful, and the will then endeavors to resist the cause which had called it into action. Now it is that the nervous power is wholly developed by the physical irrita- tion, and if that be indefinitely continued, as in the foregoing example, the influence of the brain is ultimately extended from the muscles of the face, and with a destructive effect, over the whole system of organic life. The case now becomes exactly parallel with that in which sudden death * Shakspeare speaks of the same thing, thus, — " Which is as bad as die with tickling." 60 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. is produced by a paroxysm of anger or of joy, where the mind is the agent which acts upon the brain and develops the nervous influence. The rationale is the same as when respiration goes on in defiance of the will, the same as when a burn, or other injury of the skin produces general con- vulsions, or when tetanus arises from the wound of a tendon or nerve. And here I would ask the materialist what other construction he can apply to the cases of sudden death from joy and anger, than the powerful operation of some unseen cause upon the brain, and through that organ, upon or- ganic life ? What other condition, I say, than a violent shock of the brain from a cause as distinct in its nature from the organ, as the hammer whose blow upon the head is fatal through pre- cisely the same physiological effects?* A case * The following explanatory remarks are introduced from the Author's Institutes of Medicine. The nervous power may extin- guish life with great instantaneousness. When rapidly fatal, the causes by which it is brought into operation must be violent and sudden in their action. Examples occur in the fatal effects of joy, anger, apoplexy, blows over the region of the stomach, drinking cold water when the system is prostrated by fatigue in hot wea- ther, prussic acid, strychnine, aconitine, &c. In the case of joy, anger, apoplexy, and blows on the head, the nervous power is de- veloped in a direct manner, and destroys mainly by its sudden de- termination upon the organic properties of the brain and heart ; though it is also directed with violence upon the stomach and in- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 81 precisely parallel in its physiological rationale occurs in syncope when produced by an emotion of the mind, as in hearing or seeing something offensive. Here the immediate cause, as in the case of death from joy or anger, is the instant and powerful determination of the nervous in- fluence upon the heart, stomach, &c. But there must be something to develop that nervous in- fluence in the brain, and the common sense of every one must assure him that it is a con- scious agent which does the work. But for the fullest illustration of this subject, let us con- sider the physiological rationale of syncope as* produced by offensive odors. Here the mind may have but little participation in the prostration of the heart, &c., but the effect be mainly due to the phy- sical impression propagated to the brain through the olfactory nerve, and the nasal branches of the testines, and upon the whole capillary system of blood-vessels. In the cases of blows and sanguineous apoplexy, the general effect is also increased by any disorganization which the brain itself may sustain. But in what is called nervous apoplexy, and which is the most immediately fatal form, there is no apparent disorganiza- tion of the brain, and this form is commonly owing to a perni- cious impression propagated to the brain through the pneumogas- tric and sympathetic nerves by an overloaded stomach. This va- riety of apoplexy, therefore, results immediately from an indirect development of the nervous influence, and is parallel with the cases of sudden death from drinking cold water, prussic acid, &c. 4 62 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. fifth pair, which impression , in itself, greatly de- velops the nervous influence. But the mind may also contribute to that development j for if the odor were not perceived by the mind, no syn- cope might follow. Thus again we have associ- ated the physical and moral causes in producing a common effect. Nevertheless, in cases of this nature, the mind generally endeavors to resist the effects of the odor, (when it is perceived,) and as syncope will happen in spite of the effort, it is evident that the depressing influence is mostly due to the direct action of the physical cause* up- on the brain. Now let us connect with the fore- going facts the syncope which follows blows up- on the head, and we shall see, as plainly as we see that the physical blow upon the brain is the cause in one case, and the odors in others, that the mind inflicts the blow in the first of our series. The physiological effects prove conclusively, both in their nature and coincidence, that one cause is just as much an agent, acting upon the brain, as the other, and that both are equally distinct from the organ. These clear examples will readily suggest many others of a corresponding nature.* * See preceding note. — To multiply the variety of illustration, I will avail myself of a pathological fact,, which appears, in an opposite aspect from the preceding, to exhibit the mind as a dis- the souiTand instinct. 63 So, also, if in convulsive or involuntary laugh- ing from tickling the feet, as in involuntary res- piration, some impression upon the brain by a cause perfectly distinct from that organ be indis- pensable, how obvious is it that an equally dis- tinct cause must act upon the brain when the mind gives rise to exactly the same movements, whether it be voluntary laughing or voluntary respiration ? And what other cause than the mind itself? An antecedent cause must operate upon the brain. To suppose the absence of such a cause is a physiological absurdity ; and to sup- pose any other cause than the mind is a greater absurdity. Nay, more, the mind, the brain, and the nerves, are absolutely indispensable to all vol- tinct agent, as well as the relations which it bears to the brain, and indirectly through the nervous system, to other parts of the body. It is well known that in the delirium of drunkenness very large quantities of opium are often appropriate and necessary to procure sleep, though no suffering attend the wakefulness. Now, in these cases, such is the moibid irritability of the brain it can be subdued only by powerful narcotic influences. And should these fail of their intended effect, the mind continues in an uproar, shakes the whole animal and organic fabric, till death closes the tragedy. On the contrary, however, should the opiate overcome the action of the mind by its influence upon the brain, the patient is apt to awake in a state of convalescence. This action of the mind upon the nervous centres may be farther illustrated by the parallel which is seen in the effects of strychnine, and in traumatic tetanus, as set forth at page 55. 64 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. untary movements ; while the motions of organs in organic life may go on without mind, brain or nerves. The heart will often continue to pulsate long after its removal from the body. The stimu- lus of the air is then sufficient. But should any cause, like sleep, suspend the operations of the mind, no voluntary motion can take place ; thus proving that the mind, or instinct, is a more in- dispensable cause of motion than any other attri- bute of living beings. I have said, that in the several modified move- ments of the respiratory muscles which I men- tioned, all but two depend upon irritations of the nervous centres propagated through sensitive nerves of the lungs, or of other parts, and that in all the cases the same excito-motory nerves bring the muscles into action. The two exceptions are voluntary laughing and yawning. In the former case the mind rouses the brain without the inter- vention of any sensitive nerves, and determines the nervous influence directly upon the muscles of the face through their excito-motory nerves ; which is also true of the blood-vessels of the face in blush- ing, and of the production of tears in weeping. In ordinary yawning, which is exactly a modified act of respiration, the mind, and a physical im- pression transmitted from the lungs to the nervous THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 65 centres, act in co-operation, just as happens in severe cases of asthma. But now observe how the mental and the physical causes appear, as it were, to identify themselves with each other in sympathetic yawning, or where one yawns on seeing or hearing another yawn, or in talking about it ; for in one case an irritation is propaga- ted both to the brain and mind through the optic nerve, and in the other cases through the audi- tory, and simultaneously the mind conspires with the physical irritations in exciting the nervous influence, and directing it upon the muscles of respiration. Just so, too, in respect to offensive odors, when they produce vomiting- instead of syncope. In all these cases, the mind is far more interested in the physiological effects than in the cases of syncope from analogous odors ; since the odors are so far different in the two series that disgust is in ac- tive operation in one, but not in the other. The mind, therefore, in the cases of vomiting, and the nervous influence, are brought into simultaneous operation by the transmitted impression, and the mind now co-operates with the physical impres- sion, and occasions a farther development of the nervous power, and thus increases the intensity of that degree which is created by the effect of 66 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. the physical impression upon the brain. But the mind is adequate to the entire effect, for it will produce vomiting by reflecting upon the former action of the odor, and which may have happen- ed years antecedently. Sympathetic vomiting, on seeing or hearing another vomit, is mostly of this nature ; though here the transmitted impres- sion through the optic or auditory nerve not only brings the mind into operation, but contributes to the development of the nervous influence by its direct action. But here, too, as in the case of the odors, the mind alone may determine an act of vomiting by simply reflecting upon a disgust- ing spectacle which had, at a former time, upset the stomach. Now the mind, in all these examples, is neces- sarily a substantive agent, acting of itself upon the brain, and the nervous influence which it de- velops is exactly equivalent to the action of an emetic upon the stomach. In the latter case the impression is transmitted to the nervous centres through the sensitive fibres of the pneumogastric and sympathetic nerves, and the consequent ner- vous influence is reflected through motor nerves upon the respiratory muscles, by which they are thrown into convulsive action. So, also, when the mind occasions vomiting, there must be equal- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 67 ly something to develop the nervous influence and excite the nausea at the stomach, and the subse- quent convulsive action of the respiratory mus- cles, as where an emetic produces exactly the same effects. That something, it is readily seen, can be nothing else than a self-acting agent, or some- thing which brings itself into operation upon the brain. The physiology is the same as when vo- miting is produced by an emetic, though the in- fluences are a little varied. This variation should be understood, since it serves to explain a thou- sand analogous problems ; though other parallel examples have been already stated. In the case, therefore, where the mind is the remote cause of vomiting, it develops the nervous influence, and occasions its transmission to the mucous coat of the stomach through the centrifugal or excito- motory fibres of the pneumogastric and sympa- thetic nerves, when an irritation similar to that occasioned by the direct action of an emetic is set up in that coat of the organ. This irri- tation is then returned to the nervous centres through the centripetal or sensitive fibres of these nerves, just as it is when occasioned by the direct operation of emetics. The remaining part of the process is precisely alike in all the cases. When vomiting arises from tickling the i bD THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. throat, the mind has no connection with the ef- fects, but the physiology is so exactly coincident with that which is relative to the mind, that it goes with the rest in showing how the mind is necessarily a substantive, self-acting cause. In the case of tickling the throat, the irritation is propagated through nerves, supplying that part, to the nervous centres, the nervous power de- veloped, and reflected upon the mucous coat of the stomach, just as when developed by the mind, and when, also, as in the example of the mind, it irritates the stomach after the -manner of emetics ; and the remaining part of the process is the same as when the mind is the remote cause. Whenever vomiting springs from disturbances, or disease, or any novel conditions, of organs re- mote from the stomach and brain, the same chain of causation always obtains as in irritating the throat ; the point of departure being the affected part, and the nerves supplying it are the organs of transmission to the nervous centres. In all such cases, too, as in the example of the mind, the stomach must be first nauseated by a reflec- tion of the nervous influence upon its lining membrane. Then follow the same associated physiological influences as when the mind is THE SOUL AND INSTINCT, 69 the remote cause of vomiting. The experience of every one will almost enable him to trace out, in all the examples, the series of influences which I have indicated, and all of which are demon- strable by experiments upon the nerves. The sickness and vomiting which spring from sail- ing, whirling, riding, &c, depend upon the same chain of causation. In these examples, the re- mote influences are partly propagated to the brain by the mechanical effects upon different parts, and partly exerted directly upon the brain itself. In this manner they develop the ner- vous influence, which is next transmitted with a nauseating effect to the lining coat of the stom- ach ; and so on. In these instances, however, the mind often participates, more or less, in develop- ing the nervous influence, through some emo- tion which grows out of the physical influences ; for it frequently happens that a strong determina- tion to resist sea-sickness, for example, will pre- vent its occurrence, especially the act of vomit- ing. The nervous influence which is the direct effect of the motion of the vessel then falls short of the intensity necessary to vomiting. And so of other analogous causes, and so, too, when of- fensive odors, disgusting sights, &c, operate, or, when memory turns them again upon the stom- 4* 70 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. ach. In all such cases, the mind r by resolving not to co-operate with the physical* causes, or keeping down fear and disgust, may often yield no little protection to the stomach. (Note, p. 63.) Finally, once more as to the mind alone in ca- ses of vomiting ; as when it arises from coming, unexpectedly upon a precipice. In this case it is fear which starts the physiological work, and, at the same instant, and through the same ner- vous influence which it inflicts upon the stom- ach, it will bathe the skin with a cold perspira- tion, throw the voluntary muscles into a convul- sive tremor, start the eyes from the sockets, agi- tate tumultuously the action of the heart, hasten the excretion of urine, and not unfrequently set up a diarrhosa. Consider, next, and in connection with the ex- ample of seeing, as stated at page 35, the complex but perfectly demonstrable physiology of sneez- ing, when occasioned by a strong light impinging upon the retina of the eye, and where the primary exciting cause, or light, is felt through the eye, and the reflected nervous influence is felt through the nose, and in both organs as sensations of un- easiness. In this case the optic nerve transmits a different impression to the brain from that which occurs in seeing, and of such a nature that it de- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 71 termines the nervous influence upon the lining membrane of the nose, though not through the olfactory or nerve of smelling, but through the motor fibres of the nasal branches of the fifth pair of cerebral nerves. This reflected impression sets up an irritation in the mucous membrane of the nose, which is propagated back to the brain through the sensitive fibres of the nasal branches, and again the nervous influence is developed, and reflected through the respiratory nerves upon the muscles of respiration, by which they are thrown into convulsive action. The irritation of the lin- ing membrane of the nose, and the sensation, are similar to those occasioned by the action of snuff, or other errhines, upon the extremities of the nasal branches of the fifth pair. But, although the irritation is perceived in both the cases, the mind is not interested, in either case, in the invol- untary action of the respiratory muscles. The nervous influence which occasions the sensation in the nose, is developed entirely by the physical impression transmitted to the brain by the action of light upon the retina of the eye, and its re-ex- citement in the brain and final determination upon the respiratory muscles are equally occa- sioned by the reverberation upon the brain of the physical impression set up in the lining mem- brane of the nose. 72 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. And now observe how perfectly the mind will do the same thing ; since, by thinking intently upon a former paroxysm of sneezing, the mind will develop the nervous influence by its own direct action upon the brain, will determine that influence upon the nose, through the motor fibres of the nasal branches of the fifth pair of nerves, from whence it is returned to the brain through the sensitive fibres of the same nerves, as when tobacco is snuffed, and from thence reflected through the motor respiratory nerves upon the muscles of respiration. And so of vomiting. Now, in these several examples of sneezing, it is, perhaps, superfluous to add, that the primary causes must be equally substantive agents ; that is, the light which excites the brain through the optic nerve, the nervous power which irritates the membrane of the nose, and> also, throws the res- piratory muscles into action, the tobacco which occasions the same irritation of the nasal mem- brane, and the mind which does the same thing when dwelling intently upon a former paroxysm of sneezing, just as in the case of yawning when simply thinking about it. The only apparent difference, so far as effects are concerned, be- tween the physical and mental causes consists in the self-acting nature of the latter. In all the examples hitherto stated in which the THE SOUL AN® INSTINCT. 73 mind is interested in the production of motion, it should be observed how clearly it appears from the analogy supplied by all other causes that de- velop motion through the instrumentality of the nervous system, whether in voluntary or invol- untary muscles, that the mind, like the physical causes, is only an agent acting upon the nervous centres, while the immediate exciting cause of the muscular movements must be some influence generated in those centres by the several primary causes, and propagated from them upon the mus- cles which are brought into action. If the me- chanical or other physical irritant which is applied to the nose, or feet, or lungs, or directly to the brain, be not transmitted to the muscles which they are remotely instrumental in bring- ing into action, so, also, is not the mind ; but from the coincidence in effects, all the primary causes alike develop a certain special agent in the nervous centres, (known as the nervous power, and nervous influence, and nervous fluid,) which, by its transmission to the muscles in all the cases, is the immediate exciting cause of the motions produced ; the power which actually produces the motions being implanted in all the parts, and brought into action by the nervous influence. If this species of evidence be not received, then must 74 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. all the attendant facts be denied, and every testi- mony of sense brought under the Berkleyan hy- pothesis. Nor can I imagine any other method by which the materialist can escape from the demonstration which I have made. Let us, however, vary the illustration, by show- ing the complete analogy between the nervous influence, and causes acting directly upon any part of the body without the intervention of nerves ; while, at the same time the proofs will multiply as to the substantive and self-acting na- ture of the mind. Take the simple examples of excitement of the heart by emotions of the mind, and weeding from the same cause, and the flow of saliva at the expectation of food. Here the mind develops the nervous influence by its di- rect action upon the brain, and determines it in one case upon the heart, in another upon the lachrymal glands, and in the other upon the sali- vary glands ; and this influence starts the action of the heart, and the secretion of tears and of sali- va. Now, that the mind is truly a self-acting agent in these cases, and the nervous influence a stimulus to the heart and glands, is unequivocal- ly shown by pricking the heart, and thus renew- ing its actions, when extirpated from the body, and by the tears which are produced on irritating THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 75 the lachrymal duct in the nose by some physical agent, or the salivary ducts in the mouth, when the physical irritations are propagated immediate- ly along the ducts to the glands, and increase the flow of tears and of saliva. The effects are equal- ly the same in all the cases ; while, in the former series, the mind produces the effects by determin- ing the nervous influence upon the several parts, to which the influence proves an excitant, and in the latter series the physical causes are the im- mediate excitants, since they bring the moving powers into operation by their direct action upon the parts, and without the intervention of the nervous influence, or, at most, but slightly so. Here the physical causes are equivalent both to the mind which excites the brain and the nervous influence which excites the heart and glandular organs. They are plain examples, also, of what is everywhere in progress, of various parts being brought into the same states of action by physical agents acting directly upon them, and by the ner- vous influence as brought into operation by its antecedent development by the mind. In one case the hand, for example, provides and applies the pin to the extirpated heart, in the other the mind provides and applies the nervous influence to the organ. Or. according to former explana- 76 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. tions, the nervous influence may be equally ex- cited and determined upon the heart, and with the same exciting effect, by physical impressions propagated to the brain from remote parts, as by pungent vapors applied to the nose, cold water to the surface, pricking the skin, tickling the feet, &c. The mind, the nervous influence, and phy- sical agents, are all on a par, in principle, as it respects their character of substantive causes in relation to effects. In farther regard to the heart, in the foregoing examples, the coincidence be- tween the mind and physical causes, as substan- tive agents, is not less unequivocally shown by the application of alcohol to the surface of the brain, when the heart is instantly thrown into increased action, just as it is when emotions of the mind operate, and just as when it is pricked after its extirpation from the body. You cannot fail of observing a common principle in all the cases, — something irritating all the organs. Such are plain examples, among a multitude of analogous ones. But we must consider others less obvious, that materialism may not oppose us with specious problems in organic philosophy, for it may be divested of even a shadow of foun- dation. It may, for instance, be asked, how will you explain the movement of the limbs during THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 77 sleep, upon your doctrine ? The ready answer is, exactly upon that doctrine ; since the facts are of the same nature with those already stated. In these cases, the act may be either voluntary or involuntary ; but throughout, it arises from some impression exerted upon the nervous centres. Sleep may not be so profound as to suspend en- tirely the action of the will : or, in other cases, the motion is remotely owing to unusual impres- sions propagated from the limbs to the nervous cen- tres. These remote impressions arise from some constrained position, or analogous cause, and may not awaken perception, or call the will into exercise. The phenomenon is then precisely co- incident, both as to cause and effect, with the motions of decapitated animals ; as when, for ex- ample, a decapitated tortoise draws up its leg on being pricked, or as a bird flutters or runs on striking off its head. It is well settled that these motions are involuntary, and that the nervous in- fluence, in such cases, proceeds from the spinal cord. In respect to the movements of the limbs during sleep, it seems highly probable that they generally involve a sense of consciousness, and an act of the will, when it is considered how remarkably the operation of the will is under the influence of 78 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. habit; and how impressions upon the brain are constantly perceived without special attention. Such may be the case, in certain degrees, with the ordinary acts of respiration during the wak- ing hours ; but in perfect sleep, from the univer- sality and regularity of respiration, the will can have no connection with that process. (See In- stitutes of Medicine, § 451, c. d.) The impression upon the nervous centres, in these cases, is similar to that which proceeds from the organic viscera, and by which their actions are influenced. But in all there is a distinct foreign cause in operation upon the great central parts of the nervous system ; and so perfect is the coincidence throughout, that it follows, irresisti- bly, that the mind and the instinctive principle, are as distinct from the brain as are the other causes. Let us next suppose that the materialist will demand of us an explanation, upon our general facts, of the influences which are concerned in sleeping in the erect posture ; which is common to many animals. The physiology of voluntary and involuntary respiration, and of the action of the constrictor muscles, and the exact coincidence between the voluntary and the involuntary acts, in either case, respectively supply an answer to THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 79 the interrogatory. You will bear in mind that an unceasing nervous influence, developed in the nervous centres by special remote causes, and thence determined upon those muscles, is the im- mediate exciting cause of their involuntary ac- tion. It is plain, therefore, without farther dem- onstration, that in sleeping in the erect posture, the muscles are placed by the will in a state of tension which determines upon them an unceas- ing nervous influence after the action of the will is suspended, and in a manner analogous to that which holds the sphincter muscles in a state of permanent contraction. Indeed, the two cases are so much alike, as there is always a certain degree of involuntary nervous influence operat- ing upon the voluntary muscles, and of course, independently of the will, by which their an- tagonism is balanced. This is shown by the division of nerves, as when those on one side of the face are divided, or paralyzed, the opposite side is drawn away. Another example occurs in the wry neck. The same explanation is applicable to the con- tracted leg of the bird, in roosting. The whole principle, in all it's manifestations, according to the nature of the animal, and the uses of parts, has its foundation in consummate design ; and if 80 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. we may not trace out the exact mechanism, or the remote causes, in all the cases, there are a multitude of analogous facts which have been clearly ascertained, and which as clearly interpret the less demonstrable problems to every right- thinking mind. The route of the nervous influ- ence among the organic viscera, and even among the voluntary muscles, is often eluding the knife of the anatomist ; and well may he often despair of success, yet rest in the conviction that Nature operates by general laws, when he considers the fact that the will determines its influence upon whatever voluntary part it chooses, may com- pound its actions upon a great variety of parts, isolating many intermediate nerves, or elect one only, and far removed from its own seat of opera- tion. And so he shall equally find it in organic life, where the passions play their part, at one moment upon the heart, at another upon the skin, or kidneys, or raise the blush of modesty in the capillaries of the face, or strike us dead in an in- stant ; and he may witness far greater demonstra- tions of the same principle in the action of reme- dial agents. But the operations of the will alone, in its connection with physiological analogies, are enough to substantiate my conclusions with eve- ry understanding. You almost see the self-act- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 81 ing principle enthroned upon the great centre of the nervous system, wielding at its inexpressible pleasure, and through the instrumentality of its organ, that amazing power which as far surpasses electricity in its compass and variety of phenome- na, as the effulgence of the human mind tran- scends the glimmerings of instinct. The will but commands, and all its associate faculties obey, or tumultuous passion settles down in tranquil sub- mission. With inconceivable rapidity of action it directs all the muscular movements, which form the various feats of dexterity, the flight of animals, and the melody of song. Observe, also, an instance which exemplifies the manner in which the will may restrain the deleterious action of physical agents, and where it displays its most profound and far-reaching pow- er. It may be often summoned to the prevention of colds, sea-sickness, various epidemic diseases, &c. In all these cases it operates, however variously, by holding fear in subjection, which, by increas- ing the susceptibility of organs, predisposes them to be acted upon injuriously by physical causes. Who, then, shall go on to imagine that all this wonderful display of a single element of the mind, operating through a variety of organized struc- ture, can depend upon chemical mutations of the 82 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. brain, or any organic function of that organ, and where we should be left with more than a para- doxical problem as to the cause of the cerebral movements ? In what I have said on former occasions of the distinct nature of the soul and instinctive princi- ple, and of their connection with the brain, my remarks have had special reference to the mind and instinct in their immediate relations to the body, as established through the medium of the cerebro-spinal system.* But I will now say, that the brain is subservient to the soul, independently of its relations to the body, and in all its highest * See Institutes of Medicine, § 234,/. 241, 500, &c. The following remarks occur ar. § 500, p. In respect to the subserviency of the brain to the operations of the mind, I will add in farther explanation of what I said in § 241, that we have the best reason for believing that the brain is especially designed for the subserviency of the will and perception, and has compara- tively little connection with judgment, reflection, &c. ; and less with perception than with the will. The great final cause in respect to the soul and instinct, particularly with the latter, is to serve as a medium of communication with the voluntary muscles, through the nervous power. The will is, therefore, a stimulus to the brain, while the organ supplies, in consequence, the nervous power by which the voluntary muscles are brought into action. In respect to perception, we discover the relation of the mind to the brain in another aspect, and, also, another analogy between the will and physical agents as vital stimuli. Through sensibility the brain is acted upon, and this impression rouses the mind, or its property, perception, and sensation is the resulting effect. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 83 functions ; while it manifests no such subservien- cy to the instinctive principle of animals. The instrumentality of the brain, in the former case, comes through that property of the soul which is known as perception, and to which the senses are subordinate. The same property belongs, also, to the instinctive principle ; and so far as mere sensation is concerned, or as it may give rise to volition in its simple relation to animal life, the results are apparently the same in man and ani- mals. But it goes no farther in animals, though in man, perception, as resulting from sensation, is the great fulcrum of reason, and trie fountain of intellectual knowledge. But that knowledge, gar- nered up, stands in relation to reason as the fruits of the harvest to the husbandman. Every ave- nue to the mind may be shut, but the harvest of facts remains, and may now be multiplied, culti- vated, embellished, by the light of reason alone. We have seen, indeed, indisputable proof, and in very forcible examples, that the mind is capable of profound inventions in its uncultivated state, and where no contributions are made through the medium of the senses. (P. 51.) And here I will add another proof as to the individuality of the soul in correspondence with what I have said, on another occasion, of the distinct nature of the principle of 84 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. life ; and it will be also seen that they corroborate each other. The facts which are treasured up are ever present from childhood to decrepit age. But as the brain is constantly subject to renewals, the facts should go with the parts upon which they are impressed, if the brain alone be their receptacle. Or, in the language of organic chemistry, all for- mer ideas should burn out as the parts of the brain upon which they are impressed may undergo com- bustion. It should be the same in this respect as with the transcript of ideas upon paper after the paper is burnt. Nor can any loss of knowledge be assumed as a proof that such an obliteration of ideas is owing to the supposed combustive pro- cess, or to any other mutations of the brain ; since that is contradicted by the indelible nature of a greater amount of knowledge through the lapse of years. Why are the events of childhood fresh to the octogenarian, when those of the day are speedily forgotten ? Why may memory be train- ed with especial reference to particular subjects, and to a forgetfulness of others, or disciplined to the general compass of knowledge ; or why is it the tendency of mnemonics to impair the whole mind? Materialism must here be consistent, and stand on its own philosophy. But the soul, as also the instinctive principle, being of anunchang- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 85 ing nature, (as proved by these very facts,) holds fast the treasury of knowledge, or the improve- ments it may gain. And so of the principle of life and those permanent impressions which come to it through the medium of the body.* In respect to knowledge, and its independ- ent improvement, the will alone may summon, through other elements of the mind, a host of in- tellectual images, and render them tributary to those abstruse processes by which the laws of the Universe are scanned, and mind itself analyzed and understood. Here, too, we discover a more elevated office of the will in the control which it exercises over the highest attributes of the soul. There is nothing like all this in animals. It is all instinct with them, while it is only feebly shadowed forth in man.f And this leads me to indicate the most fundamental distinction, in a physiological sense, between the soul of man and the instinct of ani- mals ; nor am I aware of any well-founded ex- ception to the distinction which I make. Their principle of guidance is limited exclusively to the * See Institutes of Medicine, pp. 84, 87, 383—397, 423— 426, 520. t See Institutes of Medicine, p. 122 — 125, where the terms understanding and mind are examined, and a fact set forth to prove the identity of species in the human race. 5 86 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. uses of the body. It is in complete operation at the moment of their birth ; when its dawning has hardly begun in the human species. It is as per- fect in the ant as in the elephant. "The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib " ; and that is the compass of their knowl- edge. It has no higher aim in the brute than the mere xoants of organic life, and it never oper- ates without manifesting effects, either active or passive, in the mechanism of animal life. That is its grand characteristic, and its broadest contra- distinction from the mind. It terminates there ; and reason, therefore, must prompt the conclusion that the instinctive principle perishes with the bo- dy. But how different with the soul, which spans the sciences, rolls up its vast acquisitions from the depths of analogy, the majestic stream, which, as Horace has it, labitur et labetur in omne vol- ubilis aivum, and sees in itself " the Image of God " ! All its noblest functions have no rela- tion whatever to the uses of the body. The un- tutored savage has all the perfection of life that is enjoyed by a Newton. He may become a New- ton without a gain to his corporeal being. Here, in the exercise of reason, all physiological analo- gies fail. There is no participation of the nerves, no influences seen upon any part of the organism. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 87 We look upon its manifestations as apparently emanating' from itself alone.* By parity of rea- son, therefore, as it respects instinct, we must con- clude that the soul will continue to exist without the body. Nay, more, the conclusion derives no little support from the argument drawn as to the perishable nature of instinct. The facts, in both the cases, concur together in advancing the de- monstration. If I might, also, be permitted to deviate, for a moment, from my physiological ground, to final causes of a moral nature, I would * This is manifestly allied to Creative Energy, and is probably what is meant by the " Image of God/' since, also, it is the grand distinction between the soul and the principle of instinct. " The soul," says Addison, " considered with its Creator, is like one of those mathematical lines (the asymptotes of the hy- perbola) that may draw nearer to another for all eternity without the possibility of touching it ; and there can be no thought so transporting as to consider ourselves in these perpetual approach- es to Him, who is not only the standard of perfection, but of happiness I" Here, also, see Addison's beautiful metaphysical argument up- on dreams, as to the nature of the soul, in Spectator, No. 487. To facilitate a farther analysis, through physiological princi- ples, of the subject, as embraced in the note at page 82, I may say, that while the rational properties, as judgment, reflection, &c, act, as it were, in behalf of reason, and in apparent inde- pendence of the brain, the will manifests a like independence in directing the processes of reason. The operation is then real- ized only through the medium of consciousness. But, in all its manifestations upon the voluntary muscles it rouses the brain OO THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. point., your attention to the manifest uses of ani- mals for the human race, as a farther proof of their absolute extinction when those ends are ful- filled ; and on the other hand, to the noble and sublime objects of man in his no less obvious companionship with God, as equally conclusive of the perpetuity of his being. Still, the analogies between the soul and the principle of instinct are such, that if one be a distinct essence from the brain, so must be the other. But the great practical final causes of into action, develops the nervous influence, and directs it upon the organs which are set in motion. This variety in the func- tions of the will, and which is demonstrable in respect to the muscles, is very expressive of the relations which the soul and the principle of instinct bear to the brain, though operating in ani- mals only in the lower aspect of volition. But its combined pre- rogatives in man show us forcibly the self-acting nature of mind, and that the brain, in its relations to the body, is especially de- signed as a medium through which the soul and instinctive prin- ciple may govern the animal fabric ; while the organs of animal life do the mutual office, through the same medium, of conveying impressions to the immaterial part. It may be also farther said, that, since there is nothing in the manifestations of the will, when it operates in the processes of reason, which denotes any develop- ment of nervous influence, while that influence is strongly dis- played when the action of the will refers to the organs of volition, this distinction in its moral and physical functions corresponds exactly with my inductions as it respects the general consti- tution of mind, and the relation which the mind bears in other respects to the body. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 89 the soul and the principle of instinct, independ- ently of our other facts, are broad fundamental distinctions between them ; nor have they, with- in my knowledge, been hitherto indicated. It is, however, only a display of the common law of analogies which prevails throughout organic nature. The coincidence and the distinction be- tween reason and instinct are far less remarkable than the corresponding analogies and distinctions which are supplied by organic life in its greatest extremes ; for there is not a single organic func- tion performed by man that is not equally so by the lowest plant. With greater reason, therefore, should we argue the identity of man and plants, than of the soul and the principle of instinct. I am finally conducted to some more circum- stantial, but brief remarks upon my special pro- position, that certain properties of the soul, as judgment and reflection, or those elements which constitute the reasoning part, act in greater inde- pendence of the brain than has been supposed by any physiologist. This conclusion I endeavored to sustain, on a former occasion, by certain direct facts,* and I will now add a physiological consid- * See Medical and Physiological Commentaries, vol. 2, p. 139, note As examples of the facts which are there collected, I may re- 90 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. eration which appears to me demonstrative. In any event, I should be glad to see another inter- pretation. In the mean time, let me not be misunder- stood. Far be it from me to imply that there is not a certain co-operation of the brain in all acts of intellection, and that the full exercise of the intellectual faculties, as well as of instinct, re- peat the following. The celebrated Saussure was affected with extensive disorganization of the brain for the space of five years without any sensible alteration of the intellectual powers. — Mr. Howship relates a case where, in consequence of a slight blow on the head, the whole middle lobe of the brain was found in a state of scirrus forty years afterwards. But with the exception of oc- casional pain, the subject had no other symptoms till towards the decline of life, when she became gradually sleepy and stupid. — Here is a case which interests also certain physiological and phre- nological doctrines. A lad aged 11 years received a kick from a horse, which fractured the frontal bone. " In two hours after, he recovered every faculty of his mind, and they continued vigorous for six weeks, and to within an hour of his death, which took place on the 43d day." " He sat up every day, often walked to the window, frequently laughing at the gambols of the boys in the streets," &c On dissection, in presence of other physicians, " the space of the skull previously occupied by the right anterior and middle lobes of the cerebrum presented a perfect cavity, filled with sero-purulent matter ; the lobe having been destroyed by sup- puration. The third lobe was much disorganized. The left, he- misphere was in a state of ramollissement down to the corpus callosum." This case should be compared with the celebrated one by O'Halloran, where there was great destruction of the brain without any derangement of intellect. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 91 quires, in a general sense, a natural condition of the organ ; and their greatest exercise, at least of the former, developments of the organ beyond the natural standard. This is inferrible, not from the direct manifestations of mind, but from what we observe of their relations to anatomical char- acteristics, natural or morbid. Equally true is it, also, from the co-operation of the soul and the brain in the processes of reason, that exces- sive exercise of the mind is felt in the organs of organic life, and too often permanently felt. The proper development of the brain is also ar- rested, and thus, in its turn, the mind suffers a corresponding injury. My general premises would lead to this conclusion, and our primary schools confirm the principle in the lamentable amount of broken constitutions, and smothered intellect. Nothing like this has ever been wit- nessed from the most severe discipline of the in- stinctive principle. On the contrary, by untiring zeal, and the lash of instruction, it is often sus- ceptible of artificial impressions in the infancy of animals, and only then. It is just the reverse with reason. It should be observed, however, that what has been thus supposed to be a " cul- tivation of instinct," is, in reality, no such thing, since it subserves no useful purpose, and only 92 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. manifests itself under the special influences, re- spectively, by which the several impressions were originally produced. The "tricks," &c., of the an- imal, wherever there is a deviation from the natu- ral operation of instinct, require suggestions from the associate causes. Unlike improvements of the rational faculty, the artificial conditions of instinct do not operate without the presence of these pri- mary causes, or their equivalents, and then always in exact conformity with the nature of the exter- nal cause. In other words, (for the distinction is important,) reason operates independently of remote causes ; the artificial conditions of instinct require the agency of such causes to bring them into renewed manifestations. In the former case, the senses are not interested ; in the latter, im- pressions must always be made upon sense (as in seeing and hearing) and transmitted to the brain, when instinct will operate in an automatic manner. It is only a display of those low anal- ogies with the soul to which I have referred.* * Imitation, as seen in parrot- talking, belongs to the same principle. But in these cases it is more constitutional, and will therefore display itself as an offspring of nature, and as a matter of habit, and without any extraneous prompting. What is thus acquired from man by the parrot, and magpie, and which has been supposed, even by Mr. Locke, to evince a rational faculty, THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 93 Even the promptings of instinct, which impel animals to search after food, whether for pres- ent or future use, have their origin in sensations transmitted from the stomach to the brain. The same physiological influence of hunger, in re- spect to immediate wants, operates in the infancy of man, though without discrimination, for the infant will as readily suck at all things else as at the breast. Its apparent instinctive impulses go no farther than the movement of the mouth ; and that is all the display of instinct it evinces, unless farther shown by its cries when hunger remains unappeased. Yet even is this urged as a parallel example with the promptings of instinct in ani- mals, that an identity may be established between instinct and reason. But as soon as reason ob- tains its development, it displays an endless vari- ety of inventions for the sustenance of life, which is derived by other birds from other songsters, particularly by the American mockingbird, and catbird, who appropriate the notes of all other warblers. Now, there is nothing more in parrot-talk- ing than ia these last examples. They go towards the illustra- tion of our subject in showing how instinct is adapted to the pe- culiarities of organization in different animals, while in man the will is enabled through the rational faculties to imitate every va- riety of voice and vocal music, and to perform almost endless combinations of muscular movements which are never executed by animals. 5* 94 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. are wholly irrespective of associations with the original physiological incitements. "It casteth bread upon the waters, that it may find it after many days." Whatever similitude may seem to exist between these acts of intelligence and the acts of the animal in procuring food, or providing for the future, organic influences are interested in the latter as often as hunger returns ; and so far as the processes are dependent, in animals, upon the inscrutable constitution of instinct, they are contradistinguished from all the analogous manifestations in man, by their uudeviating uni- formity in animals, and according, also, to the species of animal. Man, it is true, is, like the animal, protected in his organic condition by a sense of hunger ; but it operates in him, in sup- plying the wants of nature, in an endless variety of ways, and at times only when most compati- ble with other occupations, or most conducive to a " feast of reason and a flow of soul " ; or, the impulse maybe resisted till starvation takes place. In animals, on the contrary, the sense of hunger is the time for eating. That is its aim and end, and the whole of its compass.* * " Thou makest darkness, and it is night ; wherein all the beasts of the forest do creep forth. The young lions roar after THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 95 Hence, also, it will be seen that memory is dif- ferent in man from its nature in animals. In the former it is often relative alone to acquirements which the mind has made through its own pro- cesses of reflection, and they may be as vast and profound as the elaborate inductions which led to the discovery of the universal law of gravitation, and thence to the calculation of the existence of the planet Neptune. Nor does memory require any extraneous aid, like the apparently corres- ponding function in animals. It is a rational function in one, independent of sense ; an instinc- tive one in the other, and dependent upon sense. In one it may involve a vast complexity of ideas ; in the other it is relative to the single impression which had been transmitted to the brain by some external cause, and which can be recalled only by renewed applications of the same or analogous causes. By extending the analysis in this man- ner, it will be seen that it is all soul in man, and all instinct in animals. Nevertheless, it is due to their prey, and seek their meat from God. The sun ariseth, they gather themselves together, and lay them down in their dens. Man goeth forth to his work and to his .labor until the evening." " In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." " Behold the fowls of the air ; for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor ga- ther into barns ; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them" 96 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. truth that it should be conceded that some of the manifestations of instinct appear to be insuscepti- ble of explanation upon the physiological grounds which lie at the foundation of my demonstration ; such, for example, as the migration of animals, the unerring flight of the carrier-pigeon, and the return of the bee to its hive through miles of track- less air. Exceptions, however, of this nature are but few, and if they be admitted to surpass our present knowledge, the probability will be allow- ed, through the weight of analogies, that even these problems will be seen to be related to the common physiological laws which rule the in- stinctive principle in its ordinary operations, and more especially so as they refer, in common with the rest, to the wants of organic life. It should be also considered that each act is distinguished by its simplicity, is peculiar, in certain respects, to each species of the animals so endowed, while the endowments, and their several peculiarities, re- spectively, are forever attendant on every individ- ual of the species, always operating in one uniform way. But if such be some of the difficult problems in the physiology of instinct, they may be applied with abundant effect in establishing the distinc- tion between instinct and reason ; since the latter THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 97 is incapable of the same achievements, and there- fore a proof of their dependence upon a principle which is very different from reason. But the most curious problem in the history of instinct is its natural mutations in certain animals, and which carry with them an abundant proof of the radical distinction between that principle and the soul, and that the former is designed for the mere purposes of organic life. It has been seen in a note at page 18, that many animals are subject to what is called metamorphosis, but that there is no other principle concerned in the successive devel- opments of structure in those cases than what obtains in the evolution of the human ovum. A common law prevails in that respect throughout the animal and vegetable tribes. But in many of the instances the changes of organization, which have acquired the name of metamorphosis, are far greater than in the rest. This is especially true of insects, a large proportion of which have four stages of existence, — the egg, the larva, the pupa, and the imago, with corresponding instinctive habits in the last three. But, in many insects the metamorphosis is far from being complete, and these partial changes are seen to pass by grada- tions into the progressive developments of struc- ture among fishes and birds. A series of connect- 98 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. ing links, or universal principle, or great law of analogy, thus stretches itself from the insect which undergoes the most perfect metamorphosis to the highest order of animals. The same thing, indeed, is witnessed, under a great variety of aspects, in every thing which relates to the whole organic kingdom, whether of structure, functions, or laws. In respect to the metamorphoses, where they are most remarkable, some of the organs undergo such modifications as to require a change of con- ditions in the stimuli of life which could not be realised without corresponding modifications in the promptings of instinct. This is strikingly il- lustrated by the difference in the wants and habits of those animals which at one period breathe in the water with gills, and subsequently in the air with tracheae, and in the larva of bees, borers, saw flies, ichneumon flies, and the full grown insects. Now all the corresponding mutations of instinct have palpably an exclusive reference to the vary- ing conditions of organic life, and nothing, bearing any analogies, can be more unlike the characteris- tics of the human mind. Like the law of develop- ment which is engrafted upon the ovum of insects, a corresponding law obtains in respect to their in- stinctive essence, which shall harmonise in its mutations with those modifications of organic life THE SOUL AND INSTINCT, 99 that distinguish the several stages of metamor- phosis. The same contradistinction is broadly shown in all the phenomena which are most allied between man and animals. The peculiarity of instinct, for example, in each species of animals, and its trans- mission, universally, to the same species, by which many lay wait to entrap their food, but variously, although always exactly in a certain way, accord- ing to the nature of the species, while others wait until the food is delivered to them, and neither species takes forecast beyond the present sensation of hunger, but in yet other species the principle seemingly operates after the quiet manner of rea- son in providing for their future wants. In all these cases, as in the others, every individual of the species, and throughout all generations, seeks its food in the same exact manner, to the same extent, and with precisely the same apparent fore- cast as to the future. All this, too, is clearly al- lied to those suggestions of instinct which I have provisionally excepted from known physiological influences ; but this very alliance, and the obvi- ous relation which the devices for procuring the means of sustenance bear to the wants of organic life, are a substantial ground of induction that the apparent exceptions are founded in corresponding 100 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. physiological laws.* The pigeon returns to his distant home for his accustomed supply of food, and the bee to lay up for the future. That corres- pondence between the peculiarities of instinct and the mechanism in animal and organic life is so strikingly full and perfect in its design, and so un- like any of the manifestations of the human mind in their connection with the organs and functions of either division of life, that a glance at the for- mer will contribute farther aid in distinguish- ing the soul from the instinctive principle, and in proving the absolute existence of instinct as a distinct essence of the brute creation. Now, it will be found that in every species of ani- mal, excepting man, the promptings of instinct, in the pursuit of food, have a direct relation to the peculiarities that may exist in the organization of the stomach, and the modifications of the special endowments of the gastric juice, in each of the species, by which one species is enabled to con- vert flesh, another nuts, and another hay, &c, into one homogeneous substance, called chyme, and which, from man to the lowest tribes, is apparent- ly alike in all, whatever the nature and the variety of the food. But the agreement between man and * See Institutes of Medicine, § 353, THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 101 brutes is limited to that result ; and what is true of the precise adaptations of instinct to the organic conditions, and its invariable operation in one es- tablished way, according to the nature of the ani- mal, is in no way true of the human mind ; for the latter operates, in this respect, according to other acts which involve the exercise of judgment, &c., and very variously, also, according to indivi- dual suggestions of reason, passion, love of sensual gratifications, the exigencies of disease, &c. ; or, in the vast uncivilized regions, no provision is made for future wants. Since, therefore, instinct has its special consti- tution conforming to the organization of the sto- mach and the peculiarities of the gastric juice, we shall see how far it is related in its peculiari- ties to other varieties in the organs of organic life, and .to the varieties in the mechanism of animal life, by considering how all these pecu- liarities in every species, respectively, have an equally direct reference, as the peculiarities of instinct, to the special organization of the stom- ach and special constitution of the gastric juice. If, therefore, such be the reiation of the whole mechanism of animals, both organic and ani- mal, to the special condition of the stomach and gastric juice in their adaptation to the va- 102 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. rieties of food, in the several species, it is obvi- ous that instinct in all the species, respectively, must be constituted with a corresponding refer- ence to every part of the organization. Now an intestine, claw, tooth, hoof or any bone of an unknown animal being given, we may con- struct a skeleton, say from the bone, that shall be nearly true to nature in all its parts. We may then proceed to cover it with muscles, pro- vide it with claws, or hoofs, and special kinds of teeth, &c, and lastly, we can tell from that tusk, or claw, or hoof, or other bone, what was the structure of the digestive apparatus, and to what kind of food the gastric juice was specifi- cally adapted, and what were the peculiar instinct and habits of the animal ; so special is the adap- tation of all other parts of the organization, both in animal and organic life, and all the habits and instincts of animals, to the peculiarities of the di- gestive organs in every species. How different with man in ail that relates to his organic wants ! His means are endless, as various as the individuals, critically referring to his constitution, fluctuations of health, &c. They are intellectual means, in which judgment and reflection take the lead. However the inquiry may be pursued, it will THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 103 always result in a uniform way. To enable you to pursue it most readily, I may point your at- tention to the correspondence between the in- stinct of animals and their weapons of defence ; each species of animals, and all the individuals of the species, acting defensively or offensive- ly according to the special weapons with which they are provided. These means of protection embrace not only such as are actively employed, like horns, but others of a passive nature, vary- ing from the quills of the porcupine to the ar- mor of the rhinoceros and the scales of fishes. All the natural animal poisons fall, also, under the same denomination, as do, likewise, the gal- vanism of the electrical eel, and the ink of the cuttlefish. Many of the important members of animal life embrace, also, among their designs that of self protection ; such as the claws, teeth, beaks, &c, of beasts of prey. So, too, the poison of serpents, and the weapon of the swordfish, are designed as well for self-preservation, as for pro- curing the means of subsistence. Again, certain animals, and those, too, of inferior orders, such as cockroaches, some species of worms, often af- fect the appearance of death when closely pur- sued ; and where this is seen in one animal, it is common to all the individuals of the species. 104 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. Other animals, as many birds that keep near the ground, are protected by the color of their plu- mage ; and in these cases instinct displays itself in conformity with the special means of protec- tion, and the animal lies close. It starts only when discovered, and then the wings or legs be- come the means of. safety. The peculiarities in all the species are perpetuated with so little vari- ation, that they show themselves like the results of some well-contrived machinery. In all the cases there is a manifest unity of designs, which conspire together for the well-being of organic life. Or, where the means of safety which I have mentioned are wanting, substitutes exist for their flight or retreat, &c, and where instinct is equally and exclusively adapted to the physical provisions. In all the cases, too, the means of defence, of offence, of flight, or of whatever vari- ety or modification, are adapted to all the me- chanism in animal life, to special sensation, (fee; and, according to the whole, will be the special promptings of instinct for the protection of the individual. Fear, in its ordinary acceptation, therefore, is not the impulse which sets in mo- tion the means of safety, in animals, or only so, at most, in a limited number; and this is seen especially in the numerous species whose mode THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 105 of defence is aggressive. I need not add how entirely otherwise it is with man, who adopts all modes of defence, and how obviously dependent upon totally different promptings. It is farther worthy of observation, as showing, by analogy, how universally related, and how entirely restricted, is the instinctive principle to the exigencies of organic life, that we find nu- merous species of plants provided with various means of protection, but forever the same in the same species, and for exactly the same security as the corresponding endowments of animals. Such, therefore, are the provisions of nature for the protection of organic life where reason can- not wield its power. But observe another fact which equally sepa- rates instinct from the soul. The young animal will turn from danger about as impulsively as the old, while the human infant will thrust its hand into the blaze of a candle sooner than it will seize the nourishment which is simultane- ously offered. In animals, indeed, the most ex- quisite sensitiveness to danger prevails, trans- cending even the promptings of hunger. The predominance of the principle in animals is de- signed alone for the preservation of organic life, and such are their exposures, and so limited their 106 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. conceptions, it is made to operate with great uni- formity and instantaneousness. In man, on the contrary, its impulses are comparatively feeble and slow, and, so far as it obtains, it aims at a variety of objects. Examples are often adduced either of an apparent cultivation, or of a natural exaltation, of the instinctive perception of dan- ger, with a view to the identity of instinct and reason. One of the strongest is seen in the ele- phant on crossing a bridge, or when embarking on a steamboat, as he first presses the bridge or the boat with a single foot to learn their stability. Instinct is here constituted with reference to the weight of the animal, who would be otherwise exposed to frequent injuries, and the associations that are indispensable to safety are early formed, But they go no farther, and this particular de- monstration is seen only in animals that may break a bridge or sink a boat. It is, however 3 only an instance of the ordinary impulsive asso- ciations which are always in operation in cases of danger, and is exactly similar to the careful tread of the smooth-shod horse when about step- ping upon ice, (though not the rough-shod,) and to the doubling of the hare as pursued in the chase, or the wariness of the fox in eluding the trap, or the squirrel in his curious expedients to THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 107 escape from the sportsman, &c. The variety in these examples is almost as great as the species of animals, and they all belong to that exquisite prin- ciple which warns them of approaching danger. It is often seen, indeed, in the aspect of mutual protection among animals of the same species, when it always operates according to the nature of the species. The crow has his sentinel, and the affrighted ant throws the whole hive into the same alarm. And now, if this analysis be pur- sued through an obvious series of analogies, it will be found that the habits of bees in relation to their queen, and many other remarkable prob- lems in the history of instinct, are allied to the principle which I have just considered. Another shade of difference in the general prin- ciple occurs in an example which has been pre- sented by metaphysicians to illustrate the sup- posed identity of instinct and reason. It is that of the dog, when making for a boat, who has been seen once, at least, to lay out the plan of first ascending the bank of a stream above the boat, that the distance between may compensate for the motion of the water, which would other- . wise carry him below his destination. I present the example in its strongest light, and as implying all that can be surmised of a rational process. But, 108 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. with all instances of a similar nature, it falls with- in the common laws of the instinctive principle, which are just so far operative, according to the species of animal, as shall subserve the exigen- cies of life. In the case of the dog, this animal is more or less addicted to the water, and his in- stinct is therefore adapted to the emergencies that may attend that temporary mode of life. He ear- ly acquires, in consequence, an impulsive appre- hension of the effects of strong currents of water, and he is so far capable of forming associations as may be necessary to his safety, or to his natu- ral wants. The instance of the boat is one of safety and of want, and is exactly parallel with that where all dogs will elect a bridge of 500 feet in preference to swimming a width of a dozen feet. The knowledge of the effects of a current of water exceeds but little that of its quality of wetting ; and when, therefore, a dog is moved by the desire of bathing, he neglects the bridge and takes to the water. Various prejudices and misapprehensions rela- tive to supposed instinctive acts abound in the community, who are prone to the most favorable comparison of the brute with his lordly associate. The rarity of apparent evidences of reason in brutes, and the enjoyment of what is thus unex- 'THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 109 pected and wonderful, lead the multitude to seize upon what is accidental, and carry it to the ac- count of instinct. An example of this, which has often gone the round of the public, is that of the elephant and apple, where the latter, being just beyond the grasping range of the animal's trunks was made, by a forcible projectile blow, to re- bound within its reach from an opposite walk But this was an act of irritation ; the blow being designed in the same resentment as when pro- voked by any other cause, The speculatist points to the care with which ; anirnals provide for their young, and the appa- rent analogy between their attachments to off- spring and that of man, as evidences of the sup- posed identity of reason and instinct. But I an- swer that the analogy is more seeming than real} and that however the principle may have an ul- timate reference to the well-being of organic life in the infancy of man, it embraces in him far lof- tier objects, and prompts to an endless variety of useful purposes in the care of his progeny which have not the least relation to the exigen- cies of organic life, but which, on the contra- ry, are greatly relative to the culture, the enjoy- ments, the morality, the religion, the eternal wel- fare, of their spiritual part. It follows them 110 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. through all the stages and vicissitudes of life, re- joices in their happiness, and grieves for their ad- versities, with a never-ending joy, or a grief that is only equalled by the suffering of the offspring. When intercourse fails, every expedient is devis- ed, from the tardy messenger to the electric tele- graph, to impart renewed expressions of affection, and fresh hopes of prosperity. And how is it on the part of the offspring ? Does not every heart beat responsively to the Divine command to "hon- or thy father and thy mother " ? And can there be imagined a broader distinction between the at- tachments of animals and of mankind than what Scripture implies and what man approves? The very attachments which man contracts for favor- ite animals flow from the divine sentiment which is impressed upon his soul. And then all that kindred display of sympathy and friendship among companions of mutual thoughts, or of heartfelt kindness towards the faithful and trusty servant, or the relative partialities between the master and the slave, or the universal characteristic known as the sentiment of humanity, — where, I say, shall we look for the dawning of these mental attributes in the constitution of instinct? And what of the instinctive movements of animals towards their immediate offspring? Wherein is the impulse THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. Ill related to human affections? Does it not operate alone for the preservation of life, and thus inci- dentally for the mere perpetuation of the species, as conclusively shown by the total and abrupt disappearance of brute attachments as soon as the offspring can provide for and protect themselves ; and this, too, at ordained times according to the species of animal ? Nay, more, parents and off- spring mutually abandon each other at the allot- ted times, and turn upon each other. Finally, the same distinction exists between the loves of the sexes in the human race and what is observed of the brute creation, and is not less opposed than our other facts to the assumed identity of reason and instinct. The former is kindled by Divine love, solemnized by Divine authority, and takes in its scope the loftiest senti- ments of mind, and anticipates all the intellectual endearments of domestic society, and yields a grateful tribute to its munificent Author. Nor can there be a parallel between reason and in- stinct more degrading to man or more unjust to his Maker, or more characteristic of a perverted mind, than that which is so often drawn in re- spect to human and brute affections. Yet he who makes it has a better opinion of himself, and onlv thinks so of the rest of his race. 112 THE gOtlL AMD INSTINCT. And this leads me to speak of the very remark- able distinction between the soul and instinctive principle known as conscience. I employ the term in its popular acceptation, as meaning the ability and the impulse of man to decide on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of his own actions and affections, and to instantly approve or con- demn them according to their nature. Nothing like this has ever been manifested by animals. It has a clear reference to the moral, religious, and social well-being of the human race. It may be said, however, in objection, that the dog, for example, manifests a sense of wrong when he surprises the game in a manner opposed to his instruction, or does other analogous acts. But this manifestation happens only under the influ- ences of those physical causes which led him to act more habitually in a different manner. The sense of wrong does not originate from the act, or on account of the act, but is inspired by the presence of his master, whom he associates with the suffering which he endured when his instinct was undergoing discipline, and thus resolves it- self into dread of punishment. It is, therefore, exactly analogous to all the other functions of in- stinct which I have indicated, and forms the limit of associations of which animals are capable. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 113 May I not, therefore, avail myself of the meta- physical induction, that the process by which we arrive at the distinctions between reason and in- stinct is a conclusive proof of the correctness of my distinction between them? Is it even proba- ble that animals have any conception of their own existence beyond what may arise from pre- sent sensation ? So far, then, these facts go with the rest in estab- lishing the several conclusions already deduced. But it does not follow from what I have said, that the rational may not act in greater indepen- dence of the brain than the instinctive faculty. My argument to this effect is founded upon the distinctions which I have indicated between the soul and instinct, and upon the analogy which obtains between the brain of man and of the highest order of animals ; though just the oppo- site conclusion has been deduced from this analo- gy. But the inference as to the equal dependence of the operations of the soul and of instinct upon a concurrent action of the brain has also depended upon a neglect of the distinction in their attri- butes, or an assumption that there is no difference. The analogy in such a case would be sound and conclusive. But our premises are indisputable, that all the higher acts of intellection, every thing 114 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. which falls within the province of reason, have no existence in animals. It is the only thing, indeed, which essentially distinguishes man from the brute. And since, therefore, the organization of the brain of the higher animals is greatly like that of man, and since instinct is as perfect and as comprehensive in many of the lowest tribes where a ganglion takes the place of a brain, and is often as mature in the new-born as in the adult being, and far transcends, in all. the analogous manifes- tations in man, we must logically conclude that what is so absolutely peculiar to the soul, and, as generally granted, allied to God himself, acts in greater independence of the brain than does sim- ple instinct. Our demonstrations show, indeed, that even instinct is capable of originating actions in the brain. But so inscrutable are its connec- tions, like those of the soul, with the organ in which it resides, that I shall not trespass beyond the limits which are prescribed by observation. Our facts terminate abruptly at this point, and mystery begins. But we may pursue the facts, and reason upon them as upon the most tangible evidence. We will, therefore, interrogate other proof in support of my conclusion. We have seen, that every variety of cerebral structure, from its approximation to man's in the THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. H5 higher animals to its disappearance in a scarcely- appreciable ganglion in the lowest tribes, is at- tended throughout with equal manifestations of instinct, though according to the nature of the animal, while they are only feebly seen in the human species. This, in respect to instinct, is conformable with all analogy as it regards other organs where the results depend upon anatomi- cal structure acting through the principle of life. There is every variety, for example, in the organ- ization of the liver, from its great elaboration in man and the higher animals, until we meet with it in lower orders as a bundle of tubes or a simple sac. Yet in all it generates a fluid which is nearly the same, and which performs the same office throughout. And so of the kidneys, sali- vary glands, stomach, &c. So far the analogy is complete between instinct and its organ, and the principle of life and the body which that principle animates. But instinct must not, therefore, be confounded with organic products. The analogy goes with our other facts in showing that it is the cause of certain results through the brain and nervous system, as the principle of life is the cause of other results through every variety of structure. Coming to the brain of man, the foregoing anal- 116 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. ogy totally fails as it respects the manifestations of reason. There is something here which de- clares a relation between the soul and the brain differing from what obtains in respect to instinct ; something which shows an independence and individuality of mind as distinctly as we know the organ with which it is associated. Again, we have seen that in the infancy of man the mind is inoperative, while the instinc- tive principle of animals is nearly as active and comprehensive in their earliest as their latest stage of existence. We have also seen that in- stinct is susceptible of artificial impressions, re- sembling education, in the infancy of animals, and only then. This distinction can proceed on- ly from a radical difference between the soul and instinct ; and the attendant final causes of that difference consist in the special design of the soul for rational functions, and of instinct for the sim- ple uses of the body. The necessity of instinct, it may be farther said, is superseded in man by the endowments of reason, while no such protec- tive care can be extended by the instinctive prin- ciple to the new-born animal. Nor is this a small confirmation of the distinction which I make between the soul and instinct, since there is nothing in Nature that denotes superfluity. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 117 Hence, also, it is that instinct is in full operation at the birth of animals, when there is no display of it in the human race, and while the soul is on- ly slowly developed in its operations. And thus do the physiological and final causes concur to- gether. And now comes up the remarkable ana- tomical fact, which goes, also, to the same con- clusion, (although it might be perverted if left without its physiological solution,) that instinc- tive acts are irrespective of the progressive stages of cerebral development, while those of the hu- man mind wait for that development. This cor- responds, in respect to animals, exactly with what we know of the perfection of the functions of all other parts at all stages of life, and with what we have seen of the objects of reason and of instinct, since instinct must be in early operation for the exigencies of organic life, while reason, in the complexities of its functions, is only ready, in a general sense, to act when the brain shall have acquired sufficient maturity for those endless phy- sical impressions which come through the me- dium of the senses, and from which the soul gathers its earliest treasures of knowledge. This, then, is the relative aspect in which must be re- garded the correspondence between the progres- sive development or hardening of the brain and 6* 118 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. the operations of the mind in early life ; the de- velopment or maturity of the brain having as well a reference to the multifarious physical con- tributions from the senses, as to its co-operation with the soul in acts of intellection. The soul, therefore, may be, abstractedly considered, in as perfect a state in infancy as at any stage of life ; and thus does the physiological demonstration sustain the metaphysical induction, that, the soul of the infant is in a state similar to paper without inscriptions. And so may the metaphor be ex- tended to the brain, especially by supposing the paper, like the brain, to be in a soft condition, and that it must acquire condensation and maturity before the inscriptions can be made. The brain, in its soft and immature condition, cannot receive the physical impressions requisite for knowledge, and, of course, the soul can only gather and ap- propriate impressions in proportion to the maturi- ty of the organ which is destined to receive them from the external world, and which are the sources of its first acquirements. Besides, there- fore, the physical development which is requisite for the external impressions, that maturity of the brain is, also, generally, as a part of the design, a necessary medium through which the soul may appropriate the impressions. Having made these THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 119 advances, the soul comes to act in more or less complete independence of sensation, and to mul- tiply knowledge by its own efforts. Neverthe- less, it is peculiarly useful to my purposes that even this development of the brain is not indis- pensable to efforts of reason that are without pa- rallel in the history of the human mind, as we have seen illustrated in a most unequivocal man- ner in the puny and sickly boy, Truman H. Saf- ford. But the brain of animals is on a par with all other organs. And thus do the contrasts be- tween the soul and instinctive principle corres- pond with the anatomical contrasts both as they relate to the brain of man and of animals and to the human brain and other organs in the state of infancy, and with the coincidences in function between the brain of animals and other organs at all stages of life. And here, too, should be brought into review what has been said at page 91 of the injuries which are inflicted upon the mind and its associate organ, and, through those media, upon the whole organism, by crowding the mind in early life, while no such injuries are sustained, but the contrary realised, by a severe exercise of instinct in the infancy of animals.* * See Institutes of Med reive, § 563 — 568- 120 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. But I have something yet farther upon the topic immediately before us, and which not only forms a most imposing contrast between instinct as manifested at all stages of the life of animals and the displays of the soul in early childhood, but can leave no room for doubt as to the perfec- tion of the soul in its essential condition in the infancy of man, and of its self-acting nature. This, indeed, should be obvious enough from the complete exercise of instinct in the infancy of animals and from the analogies between the man- ifestations of instinct and of the human mind. The foregoing comparison of the early condition of mind with the blankness of paper is undoubt- edly true so far as it respects innate ideas ; and, for a certain period of infant life, it is also true as to the insusceptibility of the brain, in its con- nection with mind, of receiving impressions by way of the senses that shall form the basis of knowledge. Nor is it less probable that all the earliest ideas of man are prompted by impressions exerted upon the senses by external objects. But this will not affect the proposition that, after. a certain maturity of the brain, and before sensa- tion shall have provided the mind with any rela- tive elementary facts, the self-acting principle may originate a labyrinth of ideas. And this THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 121 brings me to the specific proof of the perfect con- stitution of the soul in the infant state, as well as of its capability of originating ideas as soon as the brain has acquired the maturity which it obtains in early childhood, and independently of any knowledge imparted by sensation. My proof will be found in examples already adduced, Mo- zart, Pascal, Safford, &c., examples which seem, as it were, to have been ordained to aid in the demonstration about which I am employed. In these instances there had been only the most slender antecedent, relative knowledge acquired through the medium of the senses, but the soul itself originated its own vast attainments, carried them into a variety of practical applications with- out the instrumentality of foreign aid, and to an extent where erudition, with all the appliances of sense, falls far short of equal achievements. % Now it cannot be doubted, that, in all onr rea- soning and conclusions, we must take the facts as we find them ; and, throughout the range of in- tellectual and instinctive manifestations, we meet with nothing that conflicts with the laws or with other phenomena of living beings. Peculiarities are necessarily attendant upon the operations of mind and instinct ; and we may be surprised on- ly that principles so endowed do not manifest a 122 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. greater independence of organic structure, espe cially the rational principle. Such would be the natural conclusions of the limited apprehension of man, when he regards the mind, in all its highest purposes, as acting for itself and without refe- rence to the uses of the body. But, when he duly considers all the surrounding facts, the anal- ogies of Nature, Unity of Design, &c, he is pre- pared to find the self-acting principle, though existing for itself , so connected with organized structure that it shall receive from that structure important contributions to its own great final causes, and simultaneously, and in mutual har- mony, subserve some of the uses of its physical abode. May it not also be well to inquire into what is meant by ideas, and whether there have been any definite conception of their nature, and by ascer- taining the facts, thus show that the earliest ac- quirements through the instrumentality of the senses completely demonstrate the self-acting, and originating nature of mind ; while it is dis- tinguished, at its very dawning, from the instinc- tive principle, by the characteristic of forming ideas of the nature of objects ? This inquiry, like much of the rest, belongs alone to the physi- ologist. How, then, does sensation give rise to THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 123 what are recognised as ideas by reason ? The impressions transmitted to the brain through the organs of sense do not -certainly constitute the ideas, as is generally supposed, and, according to my demonstration, the impressions made upon the brain cannot, by any physical or chemical in- fluences upon the organ, elicit the ideas from the organ itself. The impressions, therefore, must, of necessity, call into action a principle by which the ideas are alone formed ; from which it ap- pears that the process, by which the mind seizes and appropriates impressions transmitted through the organs of sense, is similar to that by which it multiplies or originates ideas. It is the soul, therefore, which essentially does all the work, while, in respect to ideas of sensation, external objects only supply the materials. This is enough for my purposes ; and it will be as vain to inquire into the modus operandi of the mind in its ab- stract operations, or in its perception of external objects, or how impressions are made upon the nerves of sense, or what their nature, or how they are transmitted by the nerves to the brain, or how they call the mind or instinct into action, as to interrogate the modus operandi of Creative Energy. Now, therefore, from all the demonstrations 124 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. hitherto made, and the coincidence among them, must I not irresistibly draw the conclusion that, inasmuch as the early maturity of instinct, and the whole compass of its final cause, are designed for the exigencies of organic life, however much it may be rendered subservient to sensual gratifi- cation, so, on the other hand, the absence of all corresponding indications of instinct in the early stages of man, their correspondence with the op- erations of reason in all their subsequent display, and, above all, the entire quiescence of the soul in all its higher acts of intellection till the brain, and the whole mechanism of animal life, are so developed and matured as to render the opera- tions of reason and the acquisition of knowledge of any practical use, evince the predestination of the soul for totally different purposes from the objects of instinct, and an independence of con- stitution and a final destination beyond the cor- poreal medium through the instrumentality of which its primary knowledge is obtained ? To such conclusions the evidence of anatomi- cal and physiological facts has successively led: nor have I any doubt, that others will see in this demonstration that man is only an animal in his physical being ; that in mind he is far less allied to the things of the earth than he is to their Au- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 125 thor ; and will realize a harmony with their own conceptions, that the soul and instinctive principle possess relations to the brain so far different as implied by the ultimate existence of one in an ab- stract condition, while the other shares the fate of organic life. They will see, I say, in the proof I have offered, a new ground of belief in the im- mortality of the soul, and of the perishable nature of instinct. And if this be so, they will see in my premises and conclusions, a contradistinction between God and Nature, and what is equivalent to a demonstration of the existence of a Creative Spirit in which the soul of man can have had its origin alone. And coming to other details in relation to man, they will see in the Mosaic decla- ration that " The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nos- trils the breath of life, and man became a living soul" the inspiration of Him who "created man in His own image," and repose with equal confi- dence in the assurance that although "The dust shall return to the earth as it was, the spirit shall return unto God who gave it? They will abide in the emphatic distinctions between the dust, the breath, and the soul, and regard the spirit as a special gift, a new creation, and the body and the breath as referring to materials already in be- 126 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. ing, and which were designed, in their organic state, to connect the spiritual part with the mate- rial world. They will also see in the exclusion of the analogous principle in animals and the limitation of the statements to the soul of man, what is the ultimate destiny of instinct. Or, if what is thus so clearly implied be not within the ready apprehension of all, they will find it en- forced in the unequivocal statement that — (l Man that is in honor, and under standeth not, is like the beasts that per ish ; " where, in the figurative parallel between the neglect to exercise reason and the operations of instinct, a broad distinction between them is drawn ;* and where, also, in the specific affirmation relative to brutes, the immor- tality of the soul and the perishable nature of in- stinct are clearly indicated.! Nor can they fail to observe, that the foregoing revelations must be taken as a whole, and that the admission of one of their parts necessarily involves that of the others ; nor can it be mistaken that the anatomi- * Again, — " The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his mas- ter's crib ; but Israel doth not know, my people do not consider." f Again, — " Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth up' ward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?" Eccl. iii., 21. THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 127 cal and physiological demonstration sustains, as far as it goes, what is thus revealed.* Hence it follows, if Revelation be received as to the immortality of the soul and the death of nstinct, it must be received, also, as revealing a fundamental distinction between them, and should operate as a perfect barrier with all, who uphold the Scriptures, against the common prejudice of identifying instinct with reason, as confounding the revealed distinction, and therefore promoting infidelity in its aim at materialism and annihila- * Although not immediately relative to my subject, I may also say that, if the foregoing citations be allowed to rest on Divine Authority, the same literal construction must be given to the equally specific statements which distinguish so remarkably the whole Mosaic Record of Creation, and which admonish us to look for the import of words in their connection with each other, and with the objects of their author, whose context is the true diction- ary of his thoughts, and to pause at the " medals of the rocks," and other geological discoveries, as being possibly susceptible of interpretations that shall not obliterate the seal which the Creator has impressed upon the Narrative of His works ; although in thus saying, it must be allowed that the facts which may be disclosed in geology can be reconciled to the most obvious import of Reve- lation only through the principles which science has established. Assumptions in opposition to the laws of Nature, or forcing Crea- tive Energy into conflict with those laws, for the purpose of meet- ing the exigencies of apparent contradictions of Revelation, have always contributed to the strength of the adversary, however much the same laws may have been violated in speculative geology. 128 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. tion. That fundamental distinction, indeed, is very forcibly declared in the account which is given of the Creation of man and animals, and the affinity of the soul to its Author as clear- ly announced. However familiar may be the Narrative which sets forth the Beginning of all things, the specific statements to which I refer must be presented in immediate connection with my subject, that the language may be duly con- sidered and its proper import attentively examin- ed. Thus— " And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing and beast of the earth after his kind ; and it was so. " And God made the beast of the earth after h s kind, and cattle after their kind, and everything that creep- eth upon the earth after his kind, and God saw that it was good. " And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. " So God created man in His own image, in the im- age of God created He him ; male and female created He them. " And God blessed them, and said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and sub- due it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 129 It would be mere tautology to attempt a plainer interpretation of what is revealed in respect to the Creation of man than is conveyed by the [Narra- tive itself. But as some commentators esteemed ingenious have assumed that the soul is not a dis- tinct creation, but only a part of Deity Himself, and, as it would follow upon our premises that instinct must observe the same rule, I shall in- troduce what I have said on a former occasion where I have availed myself, incidentally and as a correlative aid only, of a statement in Scripture to corroborate my proof of a distinct creation of the principle of life, in opposition to the numer- ous physiologists who deny the existence of any such principle. It will be seen that the language is very explicit, and, when taken in connection with the foregoing extracts, which distinguish organic life from the soul, the declaration as to the distinct creation of both becomes very em- phatic, In my former attempt, I was employed in showing that the revealed statement did not relate alone to the soul, and now it is my object to show that it does not relate alone to life, by which I hope to be able to meet both classes of the adversary. Thus, in the Medical and Phy- siological Commentaries I have said that — u Addressing ourselves to those who strictly 130 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. believe with us in the Mosaic history, we think we may find in Revelation some proof that even the forces of life are unique and have no types in any other department of nature. We premise, however, that we have no belief that any knowl- edge has been imparted by Scripture in relation to special matters of science ; but that much may be inferred from the account of Creation as to the nature of the forces by which living matter is governed. On looking, then, at the account given by Moses, we find a very extraordinary and specific description of the manner in which man was brought into existence, and which dis- tinguishes his Creation from that of inorganic matter. 'And the Lord God formed man out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.' " Here was no agency of the chemical or physi- cal powers. The whole plan, also, was perfectly distinct from that of inorganic matter. The fabric of the new being had no analogies with the for- mer, and his phenomena were all distinct and without a semblance to anything that existed be- fore the beginning of vegetable life. This, in itself, supplies an irresistible proof that new forces (or the same as designed for animals and vegeta- THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. 131 bles,) were created for the government of his organization, and to constitute the essence of his life. But, as if to convey a full and distinct im- pression that man is not the creature of the physi- cal forces, nor amenable to their operation, the in- spired writer, after informing us that all the varie- ties of organization were direct and specific acts of God, and thus contradistinguishing organic from inorganic matter, proceeds to state the manner in which life was imparted to the miraculous fabric of man : — ' He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.' Now, it cannot be philosophically contended that this act relates alone to the soul of man ; for, in the first place, the annunciation refers as well to life, in its ordinary acceptation, as to the soul. The ori- ginal language imports a distinction which clearly substantiates the foregoing construction, and leaves no room for cavil. '' In assuming Scripture, therefore, as a ground of argument, it is manifest that man was completed in his structure without life before he became en- dowed with a soul * and that the act which created * This, and its analogies, are the only instances in which it can be said that the Act of Creating did not involve the simultaneous production of the forces by which matter is governed. The whole work of Creation was the direct result of Creative Energy, and 132 THE SOUL AND INSTINCT. his soul, bestowed also, the vital force. One ap- pears to be as much a new creation, distinct from the forces of dead matter, as the other. When man was already perfected in his structure, he was without life. But by the act of breathing in- to his nostrils, his peculiar physical life and his soul were simultaneously created. And how per- fectly in harmony is all this with the exit of mam His soul and the vital force leave the corporeal frame simultaneously ; nor will either be restored but by another act of Creative Energy. 11 But again, it cannot be said that the soul itself constitutes the life of man, — leaving out all phy- therefore not connected by any analogies with the subsequent pro* cesses of Nature excepting as it instituted those processes. Throughout the Mosaic account, the plan of Creation is repre- sented as progressive in all things. The several Acts were suc- cessive steps, both as to the earth and living beings. Each must be regarded as complete in itself. The Creation of matter and its endowment with special properties was one step ; the formation of the body another ; and then followed the grand Creation of organic life, the soul and instinct, which were s therefore, super- added principles. In all these we see a forcible consistency with the statements as to the distinct Creation of light, of the firma- ment or atmosphere, &c. This harmonious order of events, to- gether with its correspondence with Unity of Design, are an internal proof of the Divine Origin of the Record. But it is only an example of a profusion of similar proof with which the first Chapter of Genesis is urged upon our faith. — See Note at the end c _ -., ' 1 sHer?^ — -r