,liitiiil(H(iii:i!:ii«!i Class-- . )j \ ^. ' Rnnk ,A s(. c^^ Studies in Applied Tactics BY Lieutenant-General Georg von Alten. Anthorized Translation (with Bnbstitution of American Army Organization) BY Major C. H. Barth, I2th U. S. Infantry. PART I. Reconnaissance. PART II. Cavalry Outposts. March and Combined Outposts. 1908. Fbanklin Hudson FiiBLisBnio Comfant, KAK8A.S City, Mo. nX^^"^ Two Cooies R'-n.eived OCT 2ii,^oH Ceoyrifflit tntrv 'SJ Transferred from the L.ibrai3r ef Congress under Sec. 59, OopyriKbt A.ct of Mch. 4, 1»0». TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. Since the applicatory system of instruction in the art of war has come into such favor, and justly so, a great many books have appeared based on this system. All those producing these books are disciples of General von Verdy, and have imitated him more or less successfully. The more nearly they have suc- ceeded, the better their results have been. It is believed that the following pages devoted to research in this field will be foimd both valuable and interesting. The first part will appeal particularly to cavalry officers, as it deals with cavalry recon- naissance, especially that of smaller bodies. The second part will appeal to all ofi&cers studying troop-leading of the divis- ion and army corps. The author kindly consented to his work being translated and changed in so far as found desirable in adapting it to our own Army organization. Therefore it must be remembered, for example, that a troop of cavalry is assumed to contain loo men, divided into 4 platoons. These changes were made to facilitate a study of the problems. Whenever practicable, our own Field Service Regulations are quoted and referred to by foot-note. This happens quite frequently, the similarity between the German and our own doubtless being due to the former having been freely con- sulted in formulating the latter. PREFACE. To "know how" is the principal thing in every art, and in the art of war nothing fosters this so much as individual effort and determination to succeed. The following pages were writ- ten with this in view; it being intended to offer material in as varied a form as my imagination could produce. The discus- sion of the problems and the narrative of events are intended to smooth the reader's way in arriving at his own decisions. But I protest against my work being considered as model solu- tions. Good will come only from testing its correctness, not from accepting it on faith. I would also caution, against any attempt to deduce general rules from any single solution as they might fail in the first attempt to apply them. It is very seldom that a situation in war is repeated, and it would be impossible to rely on memory to assist in arriving at a decision. The leader must not allow any vain endeavor to recall something he has learned interfere with his exercising his common sense and cre- ative energy. He even must be cautious about making use of his own past experience. Still less can the form of my studies serve as a model. The form is of so little value compared with the substance that it is not worth while to imitate. The German Service Regulations form the basis for the work, although considerable discretion was exercised in their application. Exceptions prove the rule, and an individual case all the more justifies a deviation from a rule because the Regu- lations are the work of man. Before the tribunal of history, reference to a regulation will not be accepted as an excuse for a neglect ; and in all ages new and startling thoughts and meas- ures have triumphed over routine. 6 PRllIfACE. To carry out the idea of the following studies, the problems in the text are separated from my solutions which follow, so that the reader is able to write down his own unbiased solution before taking cognizance of mine. At first considerable time should be taken to think about each problem. Mature reflection, covering every detail, is the best preparation for quick decision. Work should continue on a problem until the reader is personally satisfied with the solution. By using a continuation of the same "situation," higher and lower commanders in turn have a chance to be heard. It can only be an advantage for a junior officer occasionally to solve problems carrying him beyond his actual rank and com- mand ; and a senior may improve his capacity as instructor by occupying himself with problems that on service would devolve on juniors. The first part of this book deals with cavalry reconnais- sance, and especially {hat of smaller bodies. This branch of the military service is discussed first because it usually initiates operations of war, and because the principles involved should be familiar to the commanders of all branches of the service if they wish to correctly employ and energetically support the advance cavalry. Even the junior officers of infantry and artillery employed in the service of security and information require a knowledge of the powers and limitations of the sister arm in advance of the army if the cogs of the machine are to work smoothly. The second part of the book deals with cavalry outposts, and the service of security of the dififerent arms combined. In this way an insight will be obtained into the command of larger bodies of troops, which will be discussed later if I may hope for a favorable hearing. Georg von AIvTEN. Berlin, October, 1902. i^l/ TABLE OF CONTENTS. Part I. Page Introduction — "General Situation" and "Special Situation" of the Blue Army 9 Estimate of the situation formed by Colonel A ,ist Cavalry- Arrangements made by him on the evening of May 4th 12 Arrangements of Captain E , Troop A, ist Cavaky, and in- structions given by him after receiving Colonel A 's orders the evening of May 4th 21 Lieutenant F ^"s patrol 32 Lieutenant C 's patrol early on May 5th 57 Decision and arrangements of Captain E the morning of May 5th, after arriving at Reichenthal 72 Instructions issued by Colonel A at 5 a. m., May 5th 92 Arrangements made by Major W , commanding ist Squad- ron ist Cavalry 99 Colonel A 's further intentions 105 Progress of Lieutenant C 's patrol from 9 a. m. to 3.50 p. m. . . 115 Conduct of Lieutenant D 's "strategical" patrol from p. m., May 3d, to a. m., May 5th 132 The hostile officer's patrol at Wormditt 155 Retrospect 162 Part II. I. Cavalry Outposts. Page Selection of the Night Position. Events occuring in the ist Cavalry until 5 p. m. ; reflections and arrangements of its commander at this hour 177 Arrangements of the Lieutenant-Colonel and squadron commander 213 Protection. Troop B on outpost. Surprise of a cavalry picket 220 Outpost of Troop C 248 Detached Posts. Post at Altkirch 256 Lieutenant L , at Regerteln 273 Modern Methods of Forwarding Information and Orders 278 7 Tablb; of Contents. The Army Corps on the March. Page Dispositions for the March. Orders of the Commanding General, ist Division, issued 4th May, p. m 293 Arrangements of the advance-guard commander 307 Arrangements of the captain of Troop C, 3d Cavalry, to estab- lish communication with the advance cavalry 314 Mounted orderlies 318 Changes in arrangement of units during the march 319 A Temporary Halt 329 Halt for the Night. — Combined Outposts. Quarters and Supplies 341 Security and Information. Arrangements of the Commanding Officer, Advance Guard, ist Division, 5th May, i p. m 347 Arrangements of outpost commanders and their subordinates. . 351 Conclusion 361 Message Blank 363 Vocabulary of German Names and English Equivalents 364 Studies in Applied Tactics. PART I. RECONNAISSANCE. A blue army in friendly territory is moving from the Vis- tula (Weichsel)* on the front Gilgenburg-Saalfeld, against a hostile red army coming from the east.f The two cavalry divisions (ist and 2d) of the blue army are united on the right flank of the army. The left wing of this army consists of the First Army Corps, t to which the First Cavalry from the First Cavalry Division has been attached. The fortress of Konigs- berg has its full armament and is garrisoned by (blue) organized militia. May 4, 1904, the ist Division,§ ist Army Corps, is in and near Saalfeld, with its advance troops at Barten, The 2d Divi- *Much time will be saved the reader, subsequently, if he will under- score in red the names of places the first time he locates them on the map. — Translator. It is recommended that the following "situation" be carefully read, and re-read if necessary, with maps before you, so that a clear idea can be obtained of all details of the situation. — Translator. fSee accompanying maps. In consulting these — particularly the one drawn to a scale of i : 300,000 — it is urgently recommended that a read- ing-glass be used. — Translator. JFor organization of an army corps, a division, and cavalry division, see par. 4, F. S. R. (" F. S. R. " refers to our own Field Service Regulations.) — Translator. §The term "division" means division of infantry; whenever a cavalry division is meant, it is so stated in the text. —2— lo Studies in Applied Tactics. sion, I St Army Corps, is in rear of the ist and extends as far as Gerswalde. The ist Cavalry (1,200 strong), which detrained at Marienburg on May 3d, is in and near Maldeuten. The orders issued the evening of May 4th from head- quarters ist Army Corps direct, that on the following day the corps continue its march via Maldeuten towards Mohrungen, while the ist Cavalry reconnoiters to the front and the left flank. The van guard of the ist Division leaves Barten at 6 a. m. The neighboring 2d Army Corps marches via Liebemiihl with the in- tention of having its advance troops reach Locken on May 5th. By II p. m.. May 4th, Colonel A , commanding the ist Cavalry, has the following information: Traffic has been suspended on the railways east of the line Liebemiihl-Saal- feld-Elbing, the rolling-stock having been withdrawn. The railway between Maldeuten, Pr.* Holland, and Miihlhausen is guarded by (blue) organized militia. The railway telegraph line as far as Horn railway station,! south of Narien-see (lake), is still in working order. Nothing has been seen or heard of the enemy at this station. But the operator at Ziegenberg reported at 9 p. m. that he would discontinue, after having failed for some time to get any reply from Briickendorf railway station. J A telegram was received from Liebstadt that no communi- cation had been had with Guttstadt since 5 p. m., nor with Wormditt since 8 p. m. Colonel A had sent out two patrols of i officer, i non- commissioned officer, and 12 troopers each. Lieutenant B , commanding one of these patrols, had wired from Liebstadt that the enemy had not been seen at Wormditt as late as 6 p. m. ; that until the same hour the enemy had not been seen on the *Abbreviation for "Preussische" (Prussian). — Translator. tMarked " H. St., " due north of Horn, on map. Consult the i : ) to find small towns. — Translator. {Marked "H. St.," near Briickendorf, on map. — Translator. Reconnaissance. ii Liebstadt-Guttstadt highway as far east as Wolfsdorf; and that the patrol would remain at Liebstadt over night. Lieu- tenant C , commanding the other patrol, had wired from Horn railway station, where he expected to spend the night, that at 7 p. m. the enemy had not yet appeared at Kallisten or Briickendorf. As early as the afternoon of May 3d, Lieutenant D , with 10 troopers on selected horses, had been sent from Marien- burg with orders from the commanding general of the ist Corps to reconnoiter in the general direction of Heilsberg and Bartenstein. Lieutenant D spent the night of May 3d-4th with the organized militia at Pr. Holland, and reported at 8 a. m. May 4th, from Wormditt, that so far he had seen nothing of the enemy; that he had learned on telegraphic inquiry that noth- ing had been seen of the enemy at Landsberg, Mehlsack, or Guttstadt, but that since 7 a. m. telegraphic communication had been interrupted with Landsberg and Heilsberg. Just before 11 p. m. a telegram was received from Zinten, indicating that Lieutenant D had encountered hostile patrols at Rau- nau, Neuendorf, and Groszendorf, and that apparently Heils- berg, Landsburg, and Bartenstein were occupied by the enemy. The weather is cool, and some rain has fallen the last few days. The ground is favorable for cavalry, and horsemen can go almost anywhere on the roads. Required :* 1. What is Colonel A — — 's estimate of the situation ? 2. What arrangements does he make after IIP. m., May 4TH? *Before reading the author's solution to these and all succeeding problems, it is recommended that the reader work out his own solution in full. — Translator. . , , , -vJ 12 Studies in Applied Tactics. The following is offered in answer to " i " : From the messages announcing interruption of telegraphic communication and from Lieutenant D 's last message, it is apparent that the enemy is approaching. Lieutenant D 's message from Wormditt, stating that the enemy had not been seen at Landsberg, Mehlsack, or Guttstadt, cannot mislead anyone if it is remembered that this was sent at 8 a. m. A collision of the main opposing forces is not to be ex- pected on May 5th; the intervening distance is too great. This day, therefore, is still at the disposal of the cavalry to se- cure further information of the enemy. However, such infor- mation must not arrive too late, if to be of service to the army during its march on May 6th. Narien-see blocks the direct advance towards the east and against the enemy. It would be precarious to divide the I St Cavalry so as to have it advance both north and south of the lake (Narien-see), and it is unnecessary to do so, because the divisional cavalry* of the ist Division, reinforced if neces- sary by that of the 2d Division, probably will advance to the south of the lake. Besides, the protection of the left flank and the appearance of the enemy at Wormditt and Heilsberg de- mand increased vigilance towards the north. Therefore it is advisable to have the entire regiment march via Mohrungen and the north end of the lake. It does not yet appear what course to follow later. The following is offered in answer to "2": The arrangements called for by the development of the situation will be^noted in the following paragraphs (from "a" to "g")' (a) Orders from Headquarters ist Cavalry: ♦Cavalry attached to a division of infantry, and therefore different from that of cavalry^divisions. — Translator Reconnaissance. 13 Headquarters ist Cavalry, Maldeuten, Prussia, 4 May 04, 11.20 p. m. Field Orders Nr>. I . The enemy apparently has continued his march in a west- erly direction. The telegraph line to Landsberg and Heils- BERG has been cut since this morning, and to Wormditt, Gutt- STADT, and BruckendorF since this evening. HeilsbERG and Landsberg apparently were occupied by the enemy to-day. The I St Army Corps will march via MaldEUTEN towards Mohr- ungen the 5th inst., and the 2d Army Corps via LiEbemuhl towards Locken. 2. This regiment will be formed by 5 a. m. the 5th inst. in column of route on the Mai^deuten-Gr.* Wii^msdorf highway, with head of column at the latter place. The ist Squadron,t which is to protect the formation, will be in the lead. 3. Troop A will be sent in advance of the regiment and will be under my immediate orders. 4. The baggage train, J with the advance guard pontoon train, will be formed by 6 a. m. the 5th inst. on the SeegerTS- walde-Gr. Wilmsdorp highway, with head of column at the Overland Canal. § 5. Squadron commanders will report to the right command- er for further instructions at 5 a. m. the 5th inst. at Gr. Wilmsdorp. By order of Colonel A : C B , Capt. and Adjt. ist Cav., Adjutant. Dictated to the officers|| detailed to receive orders. (6) Before the above order is sent out, the commander of Troop A is ordered to report to the colonel, who acquaints him with this order, together with the necessary details concerning the situation, and adds the following instructions: "You will reconnoiter in advance of the regiment towards Wormditt-Guttstadt-Munsterberg, leaving Maldeuten at 4 a. m. to-morrow. Lieutenant B , of your squadron, is at Liebstadt to-night, with 12 troopers, and Lieutenant C , ♦Abbreviation for "Grosz" (Great). — Translator. fOn the supposition that it furnished the outposts during the preced- ing night. JThe "regimental train" is styled "baggage train" in the proposed revision of F. S. R. — Translator. §"Oberlandische Kanal" on the 1:300,000 map. — Translator. ||The squadron adjutants in this case. — Translator. 14 Studies in Applied Tactics. of the 2d Squadron, is at Horn railway station; both can be reached by wire, so you would best at once communicate with them. Lieutenant B will be under your orders. Lieu- tenant C will be ordered to promptly reconnoiter to-mor- row morning via Briickendorf towards Gr. Buchwalde-Jonk- endorf and later try to join the regiment via Kallisten. At first I shall take the regiment in column of route as far as Gr. Hermenau; further dispositions will largely depend on your messages from the front. I shall hold the railway station at Mohrungen until relieved by the ist Division. ' ' I shall request the corps commander to use his divisional cavalry for reconnaissance south of the Narien-see towards the Alle River." (c) After the order had been dictated to the squadron adjutants, the following telegram was sent to corps head- quarters : The ist Cavalry will leave Gr. Wilmsdorf at 5 a. m. the 5th inst. I intend provisionally to take it in column of route as far as Gr. Hermenau, and would request that the di»visional cavalry of the ist Division, and, if possible, also that of the 2d Division, be sent forward early to reconnoiter via the south end of Narien-see towards Munsterberg-Jonkendorf. I shall occupy the telegraph stations of Mohrungen and Gr. Hermenau. I would request that any information for me yet to arrive be sent to Maldeuten till 4-30 a. m., to Mohrungen till 7 a. m., and after that to Gr. Hermenau. (d) The following telegram is sent to headquarters ist Division : Lieutenant C , ist Cavalry, who is at Horn to-night, is ordered to advance early to-morrow morning via Briickendorf towards Gr. Buch- walde-Jonkendorf, and to send any important information to the cavalry of the ist Division, whose advance via the south end of Narien-see towards Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf I have recommended to corps headquarters. (e) Lieutenant C , at Horn, receives the following tel- egraphic orders : ist Army Corps will march towards Mohrungen the 5th inst., and the 2d Army Corps via Liebemiihl towards Locken. At 5 a. m. the 5th instant this regiment will advance from Gr. Wilmsdorf via Mohrungen- Gr. Hermenau towards Wormditt-Guttstadt-Miinsterberg. Troop A will leave Maldeuten at 4 a. m. to reconnoiter in advance of the regiment. You will start early in the morning on reconnaissance via Briickendorf Reconnaissance. i5 towards Gr Buchwalde-Jonkendorf ; later joining your regiment via Kallisten. Send me information, if possible by wire, until 7 a. m. to Mohrungen, after that to Gr. Hermenau. Also send any important in- formation to the cavalry of the ist Division, which will advance via Mohrungen and the south end of Narien-see towards the Alle. (/) Lieutenant B , at Liebstadt, is wired as follows: You are placed under the orders of Captain E , commanding Troop A, ist Cavalry, from whom you will receive further orders. (g) A regimental staff officer of the ist Cavalry, who has been busy gathering telegraphic information since arriving at Maldeuten, continues his work during the night. An estimate of the situation often is required in problems on apphed tactics because it helps to a clear conception of the situation. Only the important and determining factors should be noted, omitting all well-known facts. It is not advisable to give reasons for details in the conclusion adopted, because judi- cious arrangements as a rule justify themselves. "Arrangements" include more than the formal orders issued by a commander. They include everything undertaken to insure unity of action among the co-ordinate parts and the attainment of the commander's aim. It is recommended that officers desiring to advance in professional knowledge repeat- edly write out messages, instructions, etc., so their form may present no difficulties when circumstances demand quick deci- sion and action. The situation of the ist Cavalry and the arrangements to be made by its colonel in some respects are of great importance, and therefore a more detailed discussion of them will follow what has gone before. Colonel A (as always should be done by subordinates) doubtless has consulted the General Staff map (scale i : 100,000) as well as the General map (scale i -.300,000), to get a compre- hensive idea of the situation as regards the whole army. He could easily see that there was still a considerable distance be- tween the opposing armies. If on the evening of May 4th the leading hostile patrols have but reached the line Wormditt- 1 6 Studies in Applied Tactics. Briickendorf, it may be assumed that the heads of the main columns are at least a day's march east of the AUe. Ivieutenant D 's message, stating that Landsberg and Heilsberg ap- parently are occupied by the enemy on the 4th, strengthens this assumption. As it is a question of large bodies on both sides, whose rate of march is lessened by depth of column and scarcity of good roads, it is reasonable to conclude that there will be no serious engagement on the 5th. The probability of encountering hostile cavalry necessitates holding our own well in hand, and it is all the more important to go past the north end of Narien-see as the ist Cavalry is called upon to protect the left flank of the ist Army Corps as well as to screen its ad- vance. The latter duty is self-evident and needed no special mention in orders from corps headquarters. If army head- quarters had not sent the railway rolling-stock back so com- pletely and so far (a measure that now proves very detrimen- tal), detachments of infantry could be sent forward on May 4th to Liebstadt, Gr. Hermeng^, Mohrungen, and Horn, and thus materially simplify the duties of the cavalry. The question arises as to whether 5 a. m., the selected hour of departure, answers the purpose, or seems too late. The sun rises at about 4 a. m.* It will take over half an hour for the troops to assemble from their cantonments, and we must allow at least an hour for feeding and saddling, if this is not to be done hurriedly ; therefore the men must be astir by 3 a. m., and perform some of their duties in the dark, notwith- standing the favorable season of the year and the not very early time set for departure. Further news of the enemy, the head of whose columns did not arrive on the Passarge River until evening, is not to be expected before Colonel A 's arrival at Gr. Hermenau — i. e., between 7 and 8 a. m. ; and not until then can it be decided on what road to continue the advance. Therefore it would be of little use to arrive at this cross-roads ^Central European time. Reconnaissance. i7 any earlier. Although so far the exertions required of the troops may not have been excessive, still, a consideration of the com- ing day demands every permissible economy of strength; and a materially earlier departure, instead of permitting a quiet issue of orders, would have necessitated hurry and marching by night, which unduly consume strength,' Unnecessary curtailment of rest indicates nervousness on the part of the leader and shakes the confidence of the troops in his capabilities. Colonel A simply orders the assembly of his regiment and defers issuing the order to march until later. Although on the evening of the 4th he had already decided in what direction to march, his delay in announcing this is natural, for experience shows that even well-founded decisions often need alteration at the last moment, and that therefore it is wise to never order more than what is absolutely necessary. Assembling on the road instead of in the adjoining fields saves time and strength and can be ordered unhesitatingly, as there is no danger of sur- prise by the enemy. Paragraph 3 of the regimental order, and the instructions to the commanding officer of Troop A based up- on it, require special notice. While the plan here adopted of having a troop perform all the reconnoitering in the main direction of advance is not con- trary to the German Field Service Regulations, still, it is not generally followed in the Army. More frequently the diflferent reconnoitering-patrols are sent out directly by the higher com- manders, and receive their instructions from the latter, while troops sent after them form their support and are charged with keeping up communication. Obviously it is very difficult for a higher commander to arrange for the movement and relief of distant patrols day by day, aside from the fact that this method does not take full advantage of the discretion and experience of troop commanders. Further events in our problem may help to clear up this subject. i8 Studies in Applied Tactics. Concerning the remainder of the regimental order there need only be said that it contains the necessary information of the enemy and of our supporting troops in concise terms, so that all concerned may take notice. The baggage train is assembled somewhat later than the troops, thus enabling the latter to use their heavy baggage until the last moment. Be- sides, it is very detrimental for the train to load and depart in the dark. But 6 a. m. probably is the latest time permissible for its assembly if it is to march ahead of the train of the ist Division. In case of danger the train would have to join that of the I St Division, in which event it would be unable to rejoin its regiment on the 5th. Such separation can be endured for a short time, but if prolonged, it not only is inconvenient, but also dangerous. Were the baggage train not urgently need- ed, it surely would soon have disappeared as an unnecessary impediment. Just remember that the baggage train includes rations and forage-wagons, and that the troop wagons, besides officers' baggage and re^rve clothing for men, carry armorers' outfits, horse medicines, and field forges.* In staff rides and maneuvers, where heavy baggage ap- pears only on paper, we often see in orders the words, "The baggage train will go into park here or there." As soon as the train actually appears, it becomes a different question to dispose of it judiciously. As a rule, the light bridge train, the same as medicine-carts, goes with the light train, which is never separated from the troops and therefore needs no special mention in orders. But it has heavy, cumbrous wagons that cannot keep up with troops, especially on country roads. Therefore it is preferably left with the baggage train as soon as it appears probable that the bridge train will not be needed in the first line. *Company and troop wagons may carry 950 lbs. tentage, 250 lbs. officers' baggage, 350 lbs. cooking utensils, and two days' rations and grain. (Par. 396, F. S. R.) Reconnaissaxce:. 19 Colonel A is fortunate to have the telegraph available for communication with the different headquarters as well as with his own patrols. This is an advantage due to being in friendly territory, and is utilized by Colonel A in making his arrangements. It may seem strange that his orders and messages, intended for transmission by wire, should not be ab- breviated to a so-called telegraphic style. But experience has taught me that this style greatly favors mistakes. The omis- sion of a single word, even if it seems superfluous, may lead to no end of confusion. Short, clear sentences are preferable. It is mentioned, under "^, " that a regimental staff officer has been busy obtaining telegraphic information since arriv- ing at Maldeuten. Naturally he would have several C3^clists as orderlies. Every means must be utilized that will afford additional information of the enemy. In spite of this, war often is very disappointing on account of the scarcity, unreli- ability, and slowness of information. From Maldeuten an effort can be made to learn from a larger telegraphic station — such as Elbing — how far on the Allenstein-Korschen* line telegraphic communication still exists; and inquiry of the last station on the line may throw a flood of light on the situation. Of course such information must be cautiously received, because the enemy in this way may try to spread false reports ; and our telegrams must never prove traitorous. Therefore you must studiously avoid any expressions from which the enemy might draw con- clusions as to our situation or intentions, such, for instance, as "Answer by wire to headquarters ist Cavalry at Maldeuten." One way of accomplishing the object is to collect the answers at a remote station with which we are in assured telegraphic communication. It must be separately decided in each case whether the subordinate (in our case, Colonel A ) may *See General map. Korschen is northeast of Allenstein, beyond the limits of the map. — Translator. 20 Studies in Applied Tactics. conduct such telegraphic inquiry without reference to higher authority. The date of the regimental order is "4 May 04, 11-20 p. m." Very likely May 5th has arrived before the squadron adjutants, receiving the order, are dismissed. Therefore the words "to- day" and "to-morrow" in the body of the order might lead to misunderstanding — this is avoided by inserting the date. Not until late at night are the orders received by those for whom they are intended. These officers, awakened from a heavy sleep of exhaustion, by poor light must consult maps that have become more or less unintelligible through use in wind and rain, and must hastily make their dispositions. This forms a fruitful source for the most unlikely misunderstandings. It is long past midnight at regimental headquarters before all arrangements are completed for the following day, which surely will tax officers and men in the extreme. Only a few hours remain in which to rest and gain new strength — a re- minder that some of theiime before arrival of orders from corps headquarters should have been thus utilized. A soldier should be able to store up sleep, as it were, considering that he never knows what may be required of him at any time. As soon as information or orders arrive, the guard at regimental head- quarters must awaken the officer on duty. The latter must decide whether or not the regimental commander should be awakened. Leaving regimental headquarters, let us consider the im- portant task that devolves on Captain K , commanding Troop A. This troop is quartered at Maldeuten, where it ar- rives on the afternoon of May 4th, after a march of 26 miles. It is well quartered and had plenty to eat for horses and men. Its baggage train arrived at 8 p. m. Captain E makes a memorandum of the verbal instruc- tions received from Colonel A , and reads them aloud before Reconnaissance. 21 leaving the latter's headquarters, finding it unnecessary to ask any questions about them. What arrangements does Captain E make after RECEIVING HIS instructions AND AFTER HAVING LEARNED BY WIRE FROM THE TWO OFFICERS IN LlEBSTADT AND HORN THAT THEY HAD NOTHING NEW TO REPORT? After leaving his regimental commander, Captain E presumably verbally told his squadron commander what orders he had received, directed his first sergeant and squad-leaders to report to him for orders, and went to the railway station to communicate with the officers at Liebstadt and Horn. He would send the following telegrams from the office at the rail- way station. (a) To Lieutenant C , at Horn: Troop A, ist Cavalry, en route to Gr. Hermenau, will arrive at Mohrungen shortly after 5 a. m., and looks for reports at both places. (6) To Lieutenant B , at Liebstadt: You will continue your reconnaissance via Wormditt and Guttstadt. By 6 a. m., at Gr. Hermenau, I shall expect a report of your reconnaissance to Wormditt and Scharnick. Any approach of the enemy must be at once wired here and after 4 a. m. also to Mohrungen. If Captain E has not a list of telegraph stations, and cannot obtain one at the station, he should enter a list of tele- graph lines and stations on his General map, as obtained upon inquiry from the station agent, and arrange with the latter to forward telegrams. The captain then returns to Maldeuten, and it will be fully an hour after midnight before he will have issued his orders. These will be as follows: 1. Lieutenant F will report at my quarters at 2 a. m., with 1 sergeant and 14 men of his platoon, ready for patrol duty. [This order is sent to the lieutenant at once.] 2. Troop A will be assembled at 4 a. m. at the southern exit of Maldeuten, ready to march. 3. The troop escort wagons will be ready at the same place at 5-45 a. m., and will join the baggage train of the squadron. The first sergeant copies these orders. At 2 a. m., when Lieutenant F reports, the captain explains the situation 22 Studies in Applied Tactics. to him, including the instructions sent Lieutenants B and C , and directs him as follows: "You will ride via Mohrungen-Gr. Hermenau, at first to reconnoiter towards Kallisten and then along the Kallisten- Guttstadt road. I shall expect a report of your reconnais- sance as far as the Passarge by 6 a. m., at Herzogswalde, to which place I shall send a connecting-patrol." The captain had previously written these instructions in his note-book. Chance has favored Captain E with an important and enviable task. His efficiency is increased not only by the ela- tion of a cavalryman who feels that he now may show of what he himself is capable and what his troopers can do, but also by an appreciation of the difficulties and responsibilities devolving upon him. An experienced troop commander is ready to meet all manner of obstacles and appreciates the bearing his work has on the decisions of higher authority. Therefore, with care- ful deliberation he tries to provide for every contingency. It is important that he, as* well as his regimental commander, should obtain information at Gr. Hermenau from all points under consideration. He is justified in ordering the patrol at I/iebstadt to reconnoiter via Wormditt as well as Guttstadt, because telegraphic communication still seems possible for some distance along the railway towards Wormditt. The cap- tain does not think it advisable to send Lieutenant B more detailed instructions, for example, about dividing his patrol, holding the telegraph station at Liebstadt, etc. How easily may the conditions there change before morning, so that such instructions could not be carried out and the oflftcer would be placed in an embarrassing position. Therefore the lieutenant is told what is expected of him and is allowed to do it in his own way. The captain sends Lieutenant F into the gap between Lieutenants B and C , the region south of the Lieb- Rfxonnaissance. 23 stadt-Guttstadt road. It is to be hoped that information will be available from Lieutenant C^ — 's district before the troop reaches Gr. Hermenau. It is true that the net broadly and promptly spread by Captain E to obtain information has wide meshes, but it affords some assurance that the enemy will not be able to slip through unobserved. In Troop A the issue of orders has taken until towards early dawn. The first sergeant and squad-leaders hardly will be able to obtain another half-hour's rest in the straw if everything among horses and men is to be in ship-shape order for the long day's work by 4 a. m., the time for departure. This is an earn- est reminder for higher authorities to issue their orders early, as these form the basis for others. By 4 a. m. May 5th word is received from Elbing that tele- graphic communication has been interrupted with Konigsberg and Pr. Eylau since a. m. of May 4th, and with Landsberg since noon that day. The latter office was dismantled on the ap- proach of hostile troopers. The telegraph line was destroyed between Mehlsack and Wormditt on the evening of May 4th, but at Mehlsack itself the enemy had not appeared up to 2 a. m. May 5th. At 2 a. m. Lieutenant B reported that he was about to leave for Guttstadt with 7 troopers, sending Sergeant H — — and 5 troopers to Wormditt. These reports do not cause Captain E to change any of his arrangements. At 4 a. m. he marched from Maldeuten and sent Corporal M with 3 troopers ahead to Herzogs- walde as a connecting- patrol for Lieutenant F . At 5-20 a. m. the troop arrived at the Mohrungen station, where the following telegrams were found: I. By wire from Horn railway station at 5 a. m. May 5th. Hillside just west of Bruckendorf, 5 May 04, 4-10 a. m. Found railway station near Bruckendorf occupied by enemy, who fired on us. C Lieutenani. 24 Studies in Applied Tactics. 2. Maldeuten, 5 May 04, 4 a. m. Major D , with 3 troops 3d Cavalry, leaves Drenken at 5 a. m., reconnoitering via Pfeiling towards Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf. By order of Colonel A : B , Adjutant. Captain A leaves a corporal and i private at the railway station with orders to see that all messages received for the troop are repeated to Gr. Hermenati, and to take charge of any for regimental headquarters. None of these must be allowed to fall into the enemy's hands. Upon arrival of reg- imental headquarters the detail is to rejoin its troop. The telegraph office in the town of Mohrungen had received no dis- patches of any importance. It and the postoffice were notified to hide all matter that could be of any value to the enemy, and to remain in constant communication with the railway station. The troop commander sent a short dispatch back to reg- imental headquarters at Gr. Bestendorf and then continued the march. At 6 a. m. the troop arrived at Gr. Hermenau, where the following dispatche's were found. 1. Message from Sergeant H , who was sent to Worm- ditt by Lieutenant B : WORMDITT, 5 May 04, 4 a. m. Yesterday evening 20 hostile troopers cut the telegraph line, de- stroyed the instruments, and blew up rails and switches at the station. They remained here over night and left at i a. m., going towards Aiken. (This message was wired from Sportehnen to Gr. Hermenau.) 2. Lieutenant B reports at 5.30 a. m., from Pittehnen (forwarded by wire from Liebstadt) : Shortly after 4 a. m. I encountered a platoon of hostile cavalry at Scharnick and retired to this point. Am still holding the crossing. The Passarge here can be crossed only on the bridge. 3. Lieutenant F reports from the edge of the woods. north of Sanglau at 5 a. m. : Reconnaissance;. 25 Twelve hostile troopers are riding from Lettau towards Herzogs- walde. I shall continue my reconnaissance via Sanglau towards Kallisten. I have sent a lance corporal and 2 men to Sackstein to report direct to the troop. The trooper carrying this message passed between Ponarien and Royer Forst (Forest), but did not see an3rthing more of the enemy. Upon inquiry, he stated that the highway at Walters- dorf was entirely deserted at about 5 a. m. No word had been received from the patrol sent to Herzogswalde. To WHAT DECISION DOES CaPTAIN E COME, AND WHAT ARRANGEMENTS DOES HE MAKE, AFTER 6 A. M. ? Hostile troopers are reconnoitering on all roads leading from the east. But no insight has yet been obtained behind these advanced parties. The captain may have hoped for more definite informa- tion from his patrols. He probably hoped for information at Gr. Hermenau that would have simplified his task. But on again comparing time and distance he realizes that by 6 a. m. he hardly could have expected more definite informa- tion unless large bodies of hostile troops crossed the Passarge early in the morning. So far there is no word about Kallisten from Lieutenant F , nor about Sackstein, although Lieu- tenant F had sent a patrol to the latter point. Therefore the question arises whether Captain E should await the arrival of further information that might serve as a basis for further arrangements. It takes time to wait, and, as the patrols everywhere have encountered hostile ones, which hamper their freedom of action, the same uncertainty might still obtain upon arrival of the regiment, if the troop did not take an active part in the reconnaissance. There are good reasons for not sending further strong pa- trols in the three main directions: Kallisten, Guttstadt, and Wormditt. At neither point would a decisive superiority be — 3 — 26 Studies in Applied Tactics. obtained, the captain's personal supervision and power to assist would become nil, and the scattered troop hardly could be as- sembled again during the day. In case the regiment encoun- tered the enemy, the troop would have lost its fighting power. Therefore it seems best that the troop continue on its way as a closed body, so that at one point, at least, it may be able to pierce the hostile screen and obtain some light. What direc- tion shall the captain choose? Captain E need not bother about the hostile patrol that advanced early in the morning from Wormditt towards Aiken. A part of Lieutenant B 's patrol is at Wormditt, and it is to be hoped that this will be able to make the necessary dispositions to watch the roads converging on that point. But, as this party might be driven off by other advancing hos- tile troops, it is advisable to send out an intermediate patrol to Iviebstadt, where this in addition should take charge of the im- portant telegraph ofi&ce. Lieutenant F is advancing via Kallisten. The 12 hogJ:ile troopers that passed him are an annoyance, but at the latest they will be driven back by the head of the regiment, and must not influence Captain E 's deci- sion. It is to be hoped that, if Lieutenant F 's report on Kallisten does not reach the troop in time, it at least will thus reach the regiment. And, besides. Major D , 3d Cavalry,* will reconnoiter via Kallisten. Therefore the Liebstadt-Outtstadt road seems to offer the best opportunity for profitable reconnaissance, although no definite conclusion can be drawn from the sole fact that in that direction Lieutenant B met a rather strong hostile detach- ment. It is the central one of the three possible directions and admits of a change to either of the other two without too great a detour. Probably many a one whom the "maneuver-habit" would have led to choose the Gr. Hermenau-Liebstadt highway as *0f the divisional cavalry. — Translator. Reconnaissance. 27 the route for the troop's advance would never have given a thought to the country road via Herzogswalde-Reichenthal as a desirable route. How often we hear the advice, ' ' Remain on the good roads," and "Even do not hesitate to make a detour if thereby the troops can remain on a good road." The princi- ple is correct, but, in my opinion, as a rule, is not applicable on reconnaissance duty. Large bodies of troops will and must select the best roads ; therefore on these we shall find the enemy's columns. But if your advanced patrols also keep to these roads, the enemy's will prevent all insight. Patrols and reconnoitering troops can accomplish their object much more readily on side roads. Of course there is a limit to the use of side roads and fields when thereby the ad- vance is too much retarded. In this case there are other reasons favoring the Herzogswalde-Reichenthal road: the troop will be able to keep the bridge at Sackstein under observation, whence no report has been received, so far; the troop can quickly turn south if necessary on account of reports received from Kallisten; it may be possible to drive off the hostile patrol coming from Lettau; and, as the route leads over high ground, an extended view is obtained of a large territory. Therefore Captain E orders his advance party to ride via Narien mill,* sends a small patrol of 3 troopers around the south side of Royer Forest to the Teufelsberg 185, and sends Sergeant L with 6 troopers to Liebstadt. The latter is ordered to occupy the railway station near the town, see that messages for the troop are sent the latter on the Herzogswalde-Reichenthal- Pittehnen road, and repeat all important messages for the troop to Gr. Hermenau. In addition he is directed to observe the roads leading to Gottchendorf, Wormditt, Klogehnen, and Pittehnen. Anything important to be wired direct to regi- mental headquarters at Gr. Hermenau. A connecting-post of 3 men is left at Gr. Hermenau. *"Narien M." on 1:100,000 map. — Translator. 28 Studies in Applied Tactics. Captain E then dictates the following message to regimental headquarters : Gr. Hermenau, 5 May 04, 6-20 a. m. Twenty hostile troopers were at Wormditt last night, destroyed the railway and telegraph at that point, and left on the way towards Aiken at I a. m. I am not pursuing them from this point. Sergeant H and 5 troopers are now located at Wormditt. Lieutenant B encountered a platoon of hostile cavalry at Schar- nick early this morning, and at 5.30 a. m. had retreated to Pittehnen. At 5 a. m. to-day 12 hostile troopers, coming from Lettau, rode towards Herzogswalde. Their whereabouts is not known. Lieutenant F is reconnoitering via Kallisten towards Guttstadt. Troop A will advance via Herzogswalde-Pittehnen to reconnoiter the Liebstadt-Gutt- stadt road. Lieutenant F sent a lance corporal and 2 troopers to Sackstein. No report yet received from them. I am leaving connecting-posts at telegraph stations in Liebstadt and Gr. Hermenau and at Herzogswalde. E . Captain. The message is wired to Mohrungen and in addition is sent to Colonel A by a trooper riding along the highway. The man is instructed to note when and where he meets Colonel A , and is then to ride to Corporal M , at Herzogswalde. In practice rides and at ICriegs-spiel many of you may have been surprised to notice, as I have, that, when under similar cir- cumstances a leader was asked for his decision and arrangements, his first answer would be: "I shall at once forward the mes- sage." At maneuvers, on the contrary, the message is entirely forgotten, or at least is not thought of for some time. Both practices are contrary to what is required in war. The sending of a message is seldom of more importance than a consideration of further necessary arrangements, which as a rule also must form the subject of a report. A combined report of what has been seen and what has been resolved upon furnishes the supe- rior with a better picture than would two separate reports for- warded by two horses instead of one. It is evident that in maneuvers as in war, where the enemy actually is in evidence, and miles are not measured only by the dividers, a message is easily overlooked. Time presses and Reconnaissance. 29 more thought is devoted to riding than to writing. A watchful assistant — an adjutant or a first sergeant — may remind you of it. It is self-evident that the regimental commander should be kept constantly informed of the reconnaissance work and where- abouts of the troop. Captain E possibly might content himself with forwarding the messages received ; simply append- ing his intended action. It seems expedient to me that he should report to his colo- nel in an abbreviated form what has happened so far, possibly showing the source of his information. He thus would spare his superior the labor of reading unnecessary details, or mistakes that would have to be sifted, and force himself to carefully test all information received. Only in exceptional cases should the original messages be forwarded, as when time presses or when the exact words received are of importance for the recipient. To habitually forward all messages would be incompatible with the troop commander's obligation, whose duty it is to see that the situation is cleared up, and who therefore should separate the important from the unimportant — the true from the false. It would be different if the troop acted simply as a support for a number of independent patrols. In this event the original messages would have to be promptly forwarded. This would increase the demand for horses and increase the difficulties of supervision at regimental headquarters. The time that the captain has devoted to quietly composing and writing his report (of which report he will retain a copy) he will regain in overtaking his advance party in company of a subaltern and several troopers (trumpeter, etc.), his troop fol- lowing at a trot. If in the meantime Lieutenant B has been driven away from Pittehnen, the time may be at hand when Captain E first meets the enemy. He might also encounter the hostile patrol that advanced via Lettau. Notwithstanding the rapid- ^o Studies in Applied Tactics. ity of movement, it is important to carefully look about in every direction, to avoid being surprised. An officer and 2 troopers are sent to the Teufelsberg, which limits the view to the south, while the captain himself rides to Knoll 136 west of the north end of Herzogswalde, carefully concealing himself and his com- panions from hostile observation. The view to the northeast is quite limited, the heights at Pragsden and Wuchsing limit it. The highway from Pragsden to lyiebstadt is visible almost along its entire length, and nothing of importance is visible on it, neither is there on the short stretch of highway visible near Blumen. In the vicinity of Warrhof there is a small group of horsemen moving on the Alt-Bolitten-Liebstadt highway. The captain turns his field-glasses in that direction, but his horse's movements prevent his obtaining an accurate view. But he does not wish to dismount until he finds out what the situation is in Herzogswalde, whither he sends a trumpeter. Neither his advance party nor Corporal M 's connecting patrol is visible, and, by the time he learns that the latter is at the southern edge of the village and the advance party at the exit towards Reich- enthal, his troop is already approaching. While thus waiting, the captain may have indulged in some strong language, for both detachments committed an error. Fortunately, no disastrous results have followed, but it serves as a lesson and will not be repeated. Both parties have thought only of the front and forgot that the large village behind them obstructed all view of the troop. The advance party should have left a man on Knoll 136. For his own safety, Corporal M at least should have guarded the cross-street in the village if perchance Knoll 136 had not ser\^ed his purpose better by affording a better lookout and cover. The captain did not at once dismount, even though he could not advantageously use his field-glasses while mounted. Pos- sibly he had the French General Staff officer in mind who, leav- ing his escort at the foot of a hill near Beaumont, August 29, Reconnaissance. 3^ 1870, dismounted and was captured by some Prussian Garde- Uhlans, who ascended the hill from the opposite side, unob- served. In the present case the large village of Herzogswalde might have harbored enemies; hence the captain's befitting caution. It is ascertained that the group of horsemen south of Liebstadt is Sergeant L 's patrol (connecting- post). After the captain had scanned the whole surrounding country with his glasses without discovering the enemy, the officer, who had returned from Knoll 185, reported that from the latter point (whence a view could be had to beyond Waltersdorf, as far as Seubersdorf, the Seubersdorf Forest, and Willnau) neither our own troops nor those of the enemy were visible. The officer there overtook the patrol sent around Royer Forest; it had not seen anything suspicious. The three troopers were left on the knoll until further orders and were continuing in observation. Nothing is known of the enemy in Herzogswalde. The inhabitants are assembled partly in the village street and partly in the church, where, notwithstanding its being a week day and very early in the morning, religious services are in progress. The fields and trails are deserted. News of the approach of the hostile army, as well as of the interruption of telegraphic com- munication, has spread among the villages. Fear and terror have taken possession of the people. This is increased by false and exaggerated rumors and by the absence from home of the able-bodied men who have been called to the colors. Although these people do not talk much, still, the captain has the trouble of investigating several rumors brought to him by them. He recognizes these rumors as untenable and fantastic, still he takes the necessary time to investigate. Then he has his advance party resume its march, first di- recting it to Knoll 153, and orders the patrol at Teufelsberg to ride towards Naglack, thus covering the advance of the troop on the south. On account of the supposed presence of a hostile 32 Studies in Applied Tactics. patrol in the neighborhood, Corporal M 's patrol at Herzogs- walde is increased to 6 men, with the following instructions: "You will ride to the Teufelsberg, observdng in all direc- tions as far as you can, and watching the course of the troop as far as you can, which will advance on Guttstadt via Pit- tehnen. You will keep up communication between the troop and the regiment, and therefore will read all messages arriv- ing and see that everything of importance is forwarded to the regimental commander, who should arrive at Gr. Hermenau shortly after 7 a. m. I must leave it to your judgment to send me any messages that are of importance for me and that still can reach me. You know that at 5 a. m. a hostile pa- trol of 12 men was seen riding from Lettau towards Herzogs- walde, and that it has since disappeared. Do not allow your- self to be surprised by it." The captain sends a short written report to the regiment, stating that the enemy could not be seen from Herzogswalde ; that no further information had been received; that the troop had resumed its march towards Pittehnen, and that Corporal M , with 6 men as connecting-post, had been sent to the Teufelsberg. Then (it is now 6.50 a. m.) he starts his troop at a trot and himself rides to the height near Wuchsing. Let us devote our attention for awhile to Lieutenant F- Awakened at 1.30 a. m, in Maldeuten, he had received his orders in the captain's quarters at about 2 a. m., at once record- ing them. It would have been fatal if later his memory should have failed him concerning a name or number. Beidses, as a means of protection, the patrol-leader, as well as the one order- ing him to duty, should have the orders in black and white. The orders were as follows: You will ride via Mohrungen-Gr. Hermenau, first to reconnoiter towards Kallisten and then along the Kallisten-Guttstadt road. I shall expect a report of your reconnaissance as far as the Passarge by 6 a. ra. at Herzogswalde, whither I shall send a connecting-patrol. Reconnaissance. 33 The captain also imparted the information concerning the enemy, the regimental commander's intention, the troop's orders and those of Lieutenants B and C , and that the cav- ahy of the ist Division would advance from south of Narien-see towards the AUe. Captain E has been busy the past three hours making arrangements for his scout, and he certainly is entitled to unin- terrupted rest until the time of departure of his troop. Still, Lieutenant F , before leaving his superior, must carefully think over his orders with his map before him, so he can ask for information on any points about which he may be in doubt. The bodily exhaustion and mental tension that are the rule in war must be fought at every point by will-power. Concerning maps, it is to be assumed that all cavalry offi- cers are provided with a General map and a General Staff map of the section under consideration. This may be so in your own country. The patrol-leaders' tasks would become most difficult without maps. In such cases they would have to pre- pare maps for themselves, showing at least the principal roads, villages, railways, and water-courses. Lieutenant T had no questions to ask of his captain. But before having his patrol mount he satisfied himself, as far as darkness would permit, that his men were properly equipped for the trip. A lame horse or a sick man could still be exchanged. The hurried departure necessitated deferring an examination of the saddling and shoeing until the first halt. The horses could not be fed before starting, but it may be assumed that they had a good feed in the evening. It is of no consequence that the men start without breakfast. A patrol has an advan- tage over a troop in securing food. A piece of bread and cheese with a cup of milk can be had at almost any farm-house. Although the ride as far as Mohrungen can be considered perfectly safe, still Lieutenant F forms a point or advance party of three men and has it precede the patrol about 300 34 Studies in AppIvIEd Tactics. yards on the highway. And until daylight 2 men ride as con- necting-file between the point and the patrol. When first com- ing to a walk from a trot, the officer informs his men of the task before them and informs the sergeant, who is to take his place in case of accident, more in detail concerning the situation. The sergeant, too, will write down the import of the order at the^first opportunity. Arriving at the railway station of Gr. Bestendorf the lieutenant inquires for news, but receives none, any more than at Mohrungen. From the latter place be makes telegraphic inquiry of Liebstadt, Gr. Hermenau, and Horn, but learns nothing new. He simply receives word that the patrol left Liebstadt at 2 a. m., and the one at Horn left at 3 a. m. The short halt at the railway station of Mohrungen was utilized to readjust the saddles, then the patrol continued along the highway via Georgenthal. About 4 a. m., at dawn, the patrol reaches Gr. Hermenau. A hasty survey of the terrain reveals nothing suspicious ; the inhabitants know nothing about the enemy; a farmer who was in Alt-Bolitten yesterday after- noon states that the enemy had not been seen there either. Renewed inquiry by wire of Liebstadt and Mohrungen results in no change in the situation. Upon inquiry of Maldeuten, word is received that telegraphic communication with Landsberg and Pr. Eylau, as well as between Wormditt and Mehlsack, was cut off the 4th inst. The village president (of Gr. Hermen- au), upon inquiry, states that at Kloben, Kallisten, Sackstein, and farther down the Passarge averages 15 yards in width and 2 yards in depth; that the meadows along the stream are marshy; that, as far as he knows, the stream can be crossed only on the bridges; and that there are no fords between Briickendorf and Pittehnen. What will Lieutenant F do after this, and what arrangements does he make at about 4 a. m. ? Although the captain's orders specifically direct the patrol towards Kallisten, the leader realizes that Lieutenant B ,. Reconnaissance. 35 who is to reconnoiter from Liebstadt towards Wormditt and r ll f '.^^''''°^ '^^ ^^^ ^°"^^^y ^°"th of the I^iebstadt- Guttstadt highway, and that therefore this task devolves on Lieutenant F . It is simplified by the fact that the Passarge between Kallisten and Pittehnen apparently can be crossed only on the bridge at Sackstein. The next point of crossing above Kalhsten the bridge at Kloben, also lies within Lieutenant t- s domain; while the Passarge south of this point prop- erly can be left to the charge of Lieutenant C reconnoiter- mg toward Jonkendorf and to the cavalry of the ist Division. iherefore Lieutenant F 's reconnaissance from Gr Her menau should at first be directed towards the Passarge between Kloben and Sackstein, and, being well-versed in map-readin- he concludes that the village president's statement concernin<: the passableness of the stream is correct, as there are no trails or roads mdicated on the map across the broad meadows along the river. The work can be accomplished by sending small pa- trols towards the three bridges, while the leader with the remain- der of his patrol follows on the central road to the vicinity of Lettau-Waltersdorf. The small patrols cover quite a large territory and it will be difficult for any hostile detachment to es- cape their notice. What one does not see, another will The captam at Herzogswalde expects a report of the reconnaissance as far as the Passarge by 6 a. m. It is over 9 miles from Gr. Hermenau to the Passarge, and about 6 miles back to Her- zogswalde. Therefore there is no time to be lost, and simul- taneous reconnaissance towards all three bridges promises the quickest results. ^ f V ^""^1^^'^ T °^J^^ti°^« to this method of procedure. Each of the small patrols must contain at least 3 men, so that after sending back the first message, it may not be reduced to a single pair of eyes. Therefore the lieutenant would retain but the sergeant and 5 men. But he may encounter the enemy on this side of the Passarge. In this event the scattered smaH 36 Studies in Applied Tactics. patrols probably would be completely dispersed. Their mes- sages largely would fail to reach the officer, and where are they then to go ? Neither the messengers nor the leaders of the small patrols are sufficiently well acquainted with the general situa- tion. They have no maps, and the absence of field-glasses limits their power of vision. They therefore can do little more than report the presence of hostile advance parties. The offi- cer, with his few remaining men, cannot carry out his instruc- tions even if he should succeed in slipping by the hostile detach- ments unobserved. After sending back a single message, he would be almost without escort. Being unable to protect his march with point and flankers, his activity would soon come to an end. In time of peace, when fighting capacity does not count, where most persons have maps, where no one is captured, and where individual messengers safely ride past hostile detach- ments, the subdivision of an officer's patrol into a number of small groups may sometimes achieve the desired end. In time of war it exposes the leader to the loss of his escort, which is necessary for his safety, for reliefs to messengers, and for fight- ing. Ferreting out, recognizing, and observing the enemy es- sentially is the function of the leader. He alone has a general view of the situation, and with his map and field-glasses posses- ses superior facilities for the work. His men can perform only secondary duties for him; and small parties of them will be detached only for short distances and to accomplish some minor object — otherwise the reins will slip from the leader's hands and the thinnest hostile screen will become impenetrable. Should Lieutenant F conclude to send a patrol each to Sackstein and Kloben and with the remainder of the patrol himself to ride to Kallisten, he would reduce his detached parties to 6 men; but, should he encounter the enemy, he could not count on sending messages. He would not improve his case much. He would prefer to keep his men together as long Reconnaissance. 37 as possible and divide them only when it becomes absolutely necessary, and when a reassembling seems reasonably assured. He can at least advance to the vicinity of Herzogswalde with his patrol united. Lieutenant F 's decision as to the extent of territory to be covered by him, and his action concerning the Passarge, lead to the question : ' 'Why is he required at first to reconnoi- ter only towards KalHsten? Why did not the captain say, 'Reconnoiter the Passarge from Kloben to Sackstein' ? " In the Field Service Regulations we see "that orders must state clearly what information is desired, what points are of special importance" ;* and it undoubtedly was of importance to the captain that on his arrival at Gr. Hermenau he should have news not only of Kallisten, but of the entire Passarge within reach of this patrol. It must be admitted that more detailed orders in this par- ticular would have been desirable. But the captain had a right to count on the officer's interpreting the orders in the manner intended. As a rule, it must be sufficient to give the general direction— the main line of advance— in which a reconnaissance shall take place. If, in addition, the patrol commander is in- formed of the orders of the neighboring patrols, his discretion and energy may be trusted to look out for the intervening country. The second part of the order simply calls for a reconnais- sance of the Kallisten-Guttstadt road. But no officer on this account would claim that hostile detachments off the road did not concern him. At Maldeuten no special importance could be assigned the bridges over the Passarge because the captain so far had no information as to the passableness of the stream. We also must bear in mind the many arrangements we had to make hastily and late at night before condemning any failure of his to go into minute details in any particular case. Too *See par. 75, F. S. R. 38 Studies in Applied Tactics. great anxiety easily leads to pedantry and certainly would have delayed Lieutenant F 's departure. A fault-finder even might take exception to the word "reconnoiter," and ask that the officer be told to what extent the reconnaissance should be carried — whether hostile patrols, cavalry in close formation, or even the infantry in rear of these should be sought out. Lieu- tenant F very properly asked no questions of this sort when he recorded his orders. The captain simply could have replied that he was not a clairvoyant, and could not know in advance what important things might happen at the front. The value of an officer's patrol materially depends on the military judg- ment of the leader, who should be able to grasp the situation and work into his superior's hand without previously receiving an enumeration of all details — a feat of which the latter would not be capable. Lieutenant F will be able to learn from the inhabitants of Gr. Hermenau whether the Teufelsberg affords as good a point of view as is to be ^inferred from the map; if it does, then this becomes the next objective. It seems less advisable to go there around the south side of Royer Forest than to gain the eastern edge of the forest by the Gr. Hermenau-Herzogswalde road and then to continue across the hilly country between the village and the forest. In this way we shall obtain a quicker and better view of the road-forks at Herzogswalde. Although, in the darkness and while covered by the lake to the eastward, the patrol could safely advance (to Gr. Her- menau) with only a point in advance, from now on greater pre- cautions will be necessary to prevent an unexpected clash with hostile detachments. A mounted patrol cannot crawl, but must advance rapidly. Its safety depends on a skillful utilization of cover and continuous and vigilant watch for the enemy in every direction, so as to discover the enemy before being itself dis- covered. As spying and feeling for the enemy is very difficult while going at a rapid gait on horseback, the movements of a Reconnaissance. 39 patrol will usually be by rushes, as is the case with the cavalry point of an advance guard. A detachment on patrol duty will be organized in such a way that certain designated men are permanently held respon- sible for the observation of the country to the flanks and rear, with authority to leave the road as necessary to reach good view-points or to accompany the patrol with a lateral interval, but without becoming conspicuous at a distance. There has been endless discussion as to whether it is better for a patrol to advance as a compact body or on a broad front. There is no formation that will apply to all cases. On a road through a dense forest, a compact formation may be best, while in a nar- row valley flankers might be very necessary. Only in excep- tional cases should the patrol-leader ride with the point, as when he alone is able to find the way or where there is no special dan- ger. He should not unnecessarily expose himself to the danger of capture. The arrangements Lieutenant F has to make at 4 a. m. consist in dividing and instructing his men in accordance with the foregoing principles, at the same time showing them the map, explaining the situation and informing them of his im- mediate intentions. He will have the nose-bags filled with oats at Gr. Hermen- au. Who knows if there will soon be another opportunity to do this? The supply of grain carried along enables the patrol to feed at any secluded spot without again visiting a village. The men can take advantage of the short halt at Gr. Her- menau to get their breakfast and lay in a supply of food for the future. Of course the ofiicer protects himself against surprise by posting sentries, and does not allow his men to remain within inclosures. In France this resulted in the capture of many a German cavalry patrol, and even in your own country it is a dangerous practice. 40 Studies in Applied Tactics. In leaving Gr. Hermenau the of&cer has the point precede the patrol at a considerable distance. The point must ride to the eastern edge of Royer Forest, the patrol not following into the forest until it is informed, by pre-arranged signal from con- necting files, that the field is clear. Using the necessary cautionary measures and after vainly questioning the inhabitants of Narien mill,* Lieutenant F , sharply looking to all sides and into the depths of the forest, arrives at its eastern border. Then, after sending two troopers to Herzogswalde to make inquiry, and, riding outside the village, to rejoin the patrol, Lieutenant F — — takes the patrol through low-lying ground to the Teufelsberg. This prominent hill also might have attracted hostile troopers ; therefore the point of the patrol advances towards it considerably in advance of the re- mainder of the party. At 4.40 a. m. the top of the hill is reached. The sun has risen, but the hazy spring morning does not ad- mit of a distant view. But the highway north and south of Waltersdorf can be plainly seen as well as the country about Bergling and Reichau, Gr. Trukainen, Naglack, Banners, and Pragsden. The 2 troopers who had been sent to Herzogs- walde reported that nothing was known of the enemy at that point. The people on the farms near the Teufelsberg say the same thing. Nowhere in road or field is man or beast visible. The of&cer decides to continue the advance and, to avoid the highway, will go along the Sanglau-Bergling road, whence he hopes to be able to watch the highway and country just west of it and get a glimpse of the Kallisten-Seubersdorf road. But it now becomes necessary to send a detachment to Sackstein. The sergeant, who in case of necessity must command the patrol, is not selected for this duty, but an adroit lance corporal and 2 men, who are given the following instructions: *"Narien M," east of Gr. Hermenau, on 1:100,000 map. R£;connaissance;. 41 'You will ride to Sackstein and see if anything can be learned about the enemy, also carefully questioning the inhab- itants. Send report of your investigation to the troop at Herz- ogswalde. It is about 5 miles to Sackstein, and, as the troop commander expects a report by 6 a. m. a rapid gait must be taken — abo ut 7 or 8 miles an hour. Should the connecting-patrol sent by the troop to Herzogswalde not yet have arrived, the report must go back to Gr. Hermenau. From Sackstein you will try to rejoin your patrol as soon as possible via Mathildenberg." The officer shows the men on the map the route they should follow (also pointing it out in the country before them), shows them the route he will follow, and gives them the names of the villages in sight. He sees the 3 men depart and then continues on his way. Shortly after 5 a. m., as he reaches the fir thicket north of Sanglau on the Herzogswalde-Sanglau road, he sees the point taking cover behind the nearest buildings of Sanglau and sig- nalling, "Enemy in sight." The connecting-file drops behind a little knoll and repeats the signal. Lieutenant F , looking across some underbrush (where the letter L of " Lettau " is on the map), discovers 12 troopers trotting along the road from Lettau towards Herzogswalde; 2 men about 100 yards in advance of the point. Nothing is seen on the road norti; of Lettau, nor at Waltersdorf or on the road between this poiuu and .Mathil- denberg. Looking through his field-glasses, the lieutenant becomes satisfied that the men are hostile troopers. What does Lieutenant F decide to do? Instead of discussing the subject now, I should prefer that instruction be derived from the events following, as far as these may serve the purpose. Therefore I shall proceed with the narrative and return to particular points later. Lieutenant F remembers several cases in his peace service where superiors called attention to the directions in the — 4 — 42 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. Field Service Regulations that the prime duty of a reconnoiter- ing patrol was to see — combat being simply a means to an end. He cannot remember a single case where the so-called "bat- tling" of patrols met with the approval of superiors. In every instance the opposing patrols got out of each other's way and both continued their reconnaissance. To be sure, the young officer realizes that war may on occasion demand a different method of procedure. But on careful examination of the case he remembers that the Regulations state that "patrols should avoid combat unless it is absolutely necessary in the execution of their orders."* As the hostile patrol apparently is about to ride past him into the woods, presumably it will not prevent his continuing his reconnaissance. Therefore, as soon as the enemy has reached the woods, he trots ahead across a meadow, keeping a sharp lookout to the rear. But before doing this, he sends the message of which we already know: Twelve hostile troopers are riding from Lettau towards Herzogs- walde. I shall continue my reconnaissance via Sanglau towards Kallisten. I have sent a lance corporS.1 and 2 men to Sackstein to report direct to the troop. The messenger is ordered to rapidly ride between Ponarien and Royer Forest, and then via Narien mill to Gr. Hermenau. He is to take advantage of the woods to cover himself from the hostile patrol. Sending the message is in accord with the para- graph of the Regulations which says that ' 'as soon as it is certain that the enemy has been discovered, a message should be sent."t Lieutenant F considers that one trooper is sufficient to carry the message. He must economize in horses and men and has reasons to hope that the man will succeed in reaching the goal which is near. The man cannot be sent via Herzogswalde as he might easily fall into the hands of the hostile patrol. Ex- ception might be taken in various ways to the wording of the *See par. 80, F. S. R. tSee par. 79, F. S. R. Reconnaissance. 43 message. The captain woefully misses any definite mention of the extent to which the reconnaissance has progressed; for he can only indirectly learn by questioning the messenger that Lieutenant F has seen nothing of the enemy, aside from the 12 troopers, not even on the Naglack-Waltersdorf-Kallisten road ; but to what extent this road was visible the captain does not learn. It is fortunate that the messenger remembered the name "Waltersdorf." But the exacting captain may forgive the young patrol-leader, should he meet the latter again and learn how hurriedly the message was written and how his atten- tion was almost constantly directed to the hostile patrol. Carefully taking advantage of the conformation of the ground, Lieutenant F reaches Seubersdorf (R. G.)* at 5.45 a. m. From the heights near Bergling the highway is visible from Waltersdorf to Kallisten, but nothing is noticed on it, any more than on the heights near Deppen which limit the view to the east. In Seubersdorf the inhabitants say that about an hour ago 12 to 15 hostile troopers passed through the village on the way towards Willnau. What arrangements must Lieutenant F make NOW? Lieutenant F started with i sergeant and 14 men, of whom he sent 3 to Sackstein and i to Gr. Hermenau, leaving him I sergeant and 10 men. His captain certainly would like to learn very soon what the lieutenant knows up to now, espe- cially as the message concerning the reconnaissance to the Pas- sarge cannot be delivered by 6 a. m., as originally ordered. By 6 a. m. the troop was to be at Gr. Hermenau, but would hardly remain there. Should it go towards Liebstadt or Pittehnen, the message even if forwarded by the connecting-post at Her- zogswalde, would reach the captain rather late and would lose its importance. Should the troop advance via Sackstein or *"R. G.," abbreviation for Rifier-gut, a knight's manor. 44 Studies in Applied Tactics. Waltersdorf, it would be approaching the patrol, and a message from the latter would be less urgently needed. Already at Bergling the lieutenant debated about sending a report stating that no enemy was visible en the highway as far as Kallisten, be- cause this would have taken at least two messengers without his having cleared up the situation as far as the Passarge, Not the spirit but only the form of the captain's orders would have been complied with in this case by sending a report to Herzogswalde by 6 a. m. ; and, besides, the road thither presumably was blocked by the hostile patrol that had recently gone in that direction. Even now the message must be forwarded by at least two men, as the hostile troopers in rear render the region unsafe. Should the three troopers sent to Sackstein fail to rejoin the patrol, it would be reduced to eight men, and yet the day's work which may still call for a number of messages, has hardly begun. It is proper to consider whether Lieutenant F should UDt defer writing his next message until he can report something more definite concerning the state of affairs on the Passarge, more particularly because in Kallisten or the neighboring villages he probably will learn something more about the hostile detachments that crossed the stream early in the morning. Then, should the message not reach the troop, presumably it will reach the regimental commander, who, as the lieutenant knows, expects to arrive at Gr. Hermenau by 7 a. m. Nothing would be gained by following the hostile detach- ment that went towards ^Willnau. It ought to run into the cavalry of the ist Division, and hardly could be overtaken. Lieutenant F at once turns towards Kallisten. The ride to this point requires caution, as the enemy may be holding the Passarge bridge, but it would^^take too long to go via Kloben. The officer carefully examines Kallisten through his field-glasses and questions the occupants of the mill (at K of "Kallisten" on the map), but learns nothing. Then the point rides ahead towards the village, while 2 men at a rapid gait follow the Weng- Reconnaissance. 45 litten-Kloben road along the left bank of the Passarge to find out the nature of the stream and examine the construction of the bridge at Kloben. The point finds that there is no enemy in Kallisten and rapidly rides to the nearest height east of Deppen. Lieutenant F , constantly keeping a sharp lookout to the rear, follows into the village as far as the bridge. The lance corporal with one private from Sackstein trotted up to this point and reported as follows : ' ' Nothing was seen of the enemy in or near Sack- stein; and the villagers knew nothing about him." He had sent one man with a written message to Herzogswalde and then rode along the edge of the woods on the left bank of the Pas- sarge without seeing anything suspicious in the river valley or on the eastern ridge of hills. Upon being questioned, the lance corporal is unable to give definite information concerning the construction of the bridge at Sackstein, and very properly is censured for it by the lieutenant. It is true that the patrol received no specific instructions to examine the terrain, but this is so much a matter of course as not to require special mention and would always be attended to by a skillful patrol-leader. It is inexcusable that the importance of a bridge across an un- fordable stream should not have appealed to the patrol-leader. The inhabitants of Kallisten state that early in the morn- ing a hostile body of horsemen crossed the bridge and rode off on the road to Waltersdorf. Statements differ as to the strength of the body. There were 6 men in the lead, followed, according to some, by 30 or 40 more ; according to others, by an entire troop. The lieutenant is inclined to believe that the latter estimate is an exaggeration, as he probably would have noticed sd large a body in the vicinity of Bergling-Waltersdorf, and as only 12 to 15 men are reported to have passed through Seubersdorf. He argues that west of Kallisten a part of the 30 or 40 hostile troopers took the Waltersdorf-Lettau road, and the remainder 46 Studies in Applied Tactics. the road to Willnau. A hostile officer who spoke German pretty well inquired at Kallisten about the roads and about our troops. The villagers answered truly that they had seen no soldiers, but that a large army was advancing from western Prussia. A trooper, sent back by the hostile officer, took the road to Heiligenthal. lyieutenant F ■ further inquires about the depth of water in the Passarge and about the existence of fords, orders the sergeant to have a sentry-post at the western exit of Kallisten to guard the bridge and keep open the line of retreat, and then gallops to the point. The latter has halted about 650 yards east of Deppen on the road to Heiligenthal, which road can be seen for about 1,100 yards. Aside from this the view extends only as far as the nearest woods north and south of the road and to Knoll 123 on the road to Schlitt. As Lieutenant F notices nothing of importance, he is about to write his message when he concludes that it would be advisable to survey the country from Knoll 157, which is near by and promises an extended view. Leaving a connecting-file behind, he gallops after the point which he had sent ahead, and finds his expectations realized. The view extends beyond Heiligenthal and Ankendorf to Queetz. To the north he can follow the highway almost as far as Scharnick and can over- look the more elevated parts of the ground between this high- way and the Passarge. South of the Heiligenthal-Queetz high- way the view is limited by Knoll 170 (southeast of Heiligen- thal), but between this and Height 157 near Alt-Garschen the view extends to Rosengarth, and south to the vicinity of Schlitt. To the rear (west) he can see the heights between Kloben and Seubersdorf, but the Willnau-Seubersdorf-Kallisten road can- not be seen. Examining this region, first with the naked eye and then with his field-glasses, and at the same time orienting himself by his map, he concludes in a few minutes that nothing hostile is in sight. The fact that none of the population is work- Reconnaissance. 47 ing in the fields makes it less difficult to reconnoiter than in time of peace. Writ© the message to be sent at 6-30 a. m. ; and how wiIvIy it be forwarded? With the renewed reminder that my solution shall serve only as an example and not as a model, I shall give the word- ing of the message, because it presents my ideas in the briefest form and because the continuation of the study requires this as a basis. SENDING DETACHMENT. LOCATION. DAY. MONTH. TIME. Officer's Patrol, Lieut. F , ist Cav. Knoll 157, S. W. of Heili- genthal. 5 5 6-30 a. m. No. 2. Received To Captain C , xst Cavalry: After having avoided the hostile patrol of 12 troopers near Lettau (whose presence I have already reported), I came here via Bergling-Seu- bersdorf (R. G.)-Kallisten without seeing anything of the enemy en route or on the continuously observed Waltersdorf-Kallisten highway. Inhabit- ants of Seubersdorf say that before 5 a. m. to-day 12 to 15 hostile cavalry- men passed through their town, going towards Willnau. Inhabitants of Kallisten state that early this morning a hostile cavalry detachment rode through their town. Estimates of the strength vary from 30 men to a troop; the latter seems to me excessive. A hostile officer who spoke Ger- man inquired in Kallisten concerning the roads and our troops. He was told that none of our troops had been seen, but that a large army was ap- proaching from west Prussia. The officer sent back a trooper, who took the road to Heiligenthal. The hostile detachment went westward along the highway. I presume that part of it went towards Willnau, and the remainder towards Waltersdorf-Lettau. A lance corporal of my patrol found no enemy at Sackstein and sent a message to Herzogswalde. From here nothing is visible of the enemy towards Schamick, Queetz, Rosen- garth, or Schlitt. I shall continue reconnoitering towards Guttstadt, and intend keeping north of the highway. The bridge at Kallisten consists of a broad stone arch; the one at Kloben is narrow and of wood, but suitable for wheel traffic. The Pas- sarge is quite high ; inhabitants claim that it averages at least 2 yards in depth. The meadows are marshy, and no fords exist in the neighborhood. Apparently passage of the stream is everywhere limited to the bridges. 48 Studirs in Applied Tactics. Inhabitants of this vicinity claim that the bridge at Sackstein is of wood, but suited for wheel traffic. Although the road thence to Waltersmiihl is used by teams, it in part is an unreveted causeway.* F , Lieutenant. A trooper of the point is designated to take back the mes- sage and received the following verbal instructions: "In the first place, you will ride back to the bridge at Kallisten, tell the sergeant to give you Private P as a companicn, and then to take the entire patrol to the edge cf that grove of trees (grove northeast of Deppen), where I shall join him. "Your further instructions are to take this message to Herzogswalde. The captain intended posting a patrol there to forward my messages. You will deliver the message to the patrol with the following orders : The message should be sent to the captain if he can be readily and easily reached. Should there be any doubt about this, the message must go to the reg- imental commander, who expected to be at Gr. Hermenau at 7 a. m., and presumably will continue his march from that point. It is more important that the colonel, than the cap- tain, should receive the message. If you should not find the patrcl at Herzogswalde, you must look up the colonel. The envelope should remain unsealed. Carefully read the message and impress its contents on your mind. The important points in it are: Kallisten and the Heiligenthal region are free from the enemy; Sackstein was so as late as 5.25 a. m. A hostile cavalry detachment early this morning rode through Kallisten ; a part of it rode towards Willnau, the remainder towards Wal- tersdorf-Lettau. A hostile messenger rode from here towards Heiligenthal. I am going towards Guttstadt. "You will ride along the highway through Mathildenberg, then through Bergling-Sanglau back over our route, and must *The latter statements naturally would be omitted from the reader's solution. Recoxnaissance. 49 carefully avoid meeting the hostile patrol in cur rear. Ycu will take the message to the captain, if you should see our troop. You will not return to me, but will join the troop or the regiment. Try to reach Herzogswalde by about 7.30 a. ra. The distance is about 7 miles, so you must go alternately at a trot and walk." Lieutenant F — ■ — 's message, as well as the instructions he gave, deserve closer inspection. To begin with, it may seem strange that the message is designated as "No. 2." The one sent at 5 a. m. was "No. i." The lance corporal sent to Sackstein knew nothing of the latter fact, and therefore numbered his "i," with 'sending station' as "Lieutenant F 's officer's patrol." His signature and the contents of Lieutenant F 's first message will help ex- plain the apparent inconsistencies to the receiving officer. But it is a question whether the message sent at 6.30 a. m. should not be numbered "3," The numbering of messages is intended to help the receiving officer determine whether any have gone astray. In this event, it is hoped he will investigate and be able to supply the deficiency. The case under consideration shows that the directions don't always fit; and my readers probably have had the same experience themselves. For ex- ample, if a patrol must send messages to different parties, as is the case with Lieutenant C , who not only reports to the regimental commander, but, under certain conditions, also to the cavalry of the ist Division (see page 14), messages can hardly be numbered without causing confusion ; and even the instructions that a series of numbers shall hold for one day only will cause misunderstandings. The moment such specific instructions cannot be generally carried out they are of doubt- ful value. They draw on a painstaking patrol-leader's time and energy and produce false impressions at the receiving station. Had Lieutenant F designated his message as "No. 3," his captain probably would have concluded that 50 Studies in Appi^iud Tactics. one liad been lost. Furthermore, experience teaches that where numerous messages are received there is seldom op- portunity to check up the numbers, as should be done to ob- tain the object in view. The one attempting to do this will have endless trouble and confusion. In time of peace it usually takes place at the end of a maneuver, and then serves as a point for the discussion following. This should prove the small prac- tical value of a requirement whose discontinuance would help to simplify the message system. It would be more valuable in any message briefly to refer to a preceding one, as was done at the beginning of the foregoing example. The address also demands our attention. Lieutenant F can expect his message to reach Captain E only in case the troop has followed towards Kallisten. He himself specifically tells the messenger that it is more important the message should reach the colonel than the captain. The recon- noitering of Troop A is to serve as a basis for Colonel A 's decisions, and although Captain E must retain control of the reconnaissance service as much as possible, still, in this case, it is highly probable that the message will not reach the captain, but the colonel. Therefore the instructions given the messen- ger were right and proper. Why, then, was the message not addressed to Colonel A ? Lieutenant F fears that the message might fall into the hands of the hostile patrol in his rear, and that in this case the colonel's address might be a valua- ble pointer for the enemy. We must admit that he is right, and that his caution is reasonable. Our Field Service Regulations wisely omit instructions on similar points. The practical sol- dier always will be able to help himself; for the impractical one there could not be minute enough instructions given to cover every case and its exceptions. The captain's not having told or even intimated to Lieu- tenant F what route he would follow from Gr. Hermenau makes it more difficult for the lieutenant now and later to cor- reconnaissance;. 51 rectlv address his messages. But even if the lieutenant before leaving Maldeuten had asked the captain about this, he would have received no definite answer. On the contrary, an erro- neous designation of the route might easily divert the messen- ger service into wrong directions. In the body of the message the information concerning the direction taken by the hostile messenger upon leaving Kallisten is not without importance; and Lieutenant F should liave inquired about the direc- tion had the information not been volunteered. The description of the terrain in the message is all too often omitted in time of peace. Its value for the higher cavalry commander is patent. It must simplify matters for Colonel A to learn, already at Herzogswalde or Gr. Hermenau, whether the Passarge can be forded or can be crossed only on the bridges; and he would have cause to praise an officer who in sending such a message distinguished between what he him- self had seen and what was hearsay. Unfortunately, as later transpires, the colonel is quite angry on accoimt of the illegible writing, which lessens the value of the message. The length of the message is justified by its importance. The Field Service Regulations very properly state: "It is not the profusion of messages that counts, but the quality, such as will clear up the situation and are exhaustive and suitable as a basis for further action." Lieutenant F was able only to report on small hostile scouting parties, and has seen nothing of the enemy near Heiligenthal ; but this very fact will be of importance for the regimental commander. And the lieuten- ant's accurate statements afford a safer basis for future action than if the message read: "There is no enemy in the region as far as the Passarge or near Heiligenthal, with the excep- tion of a few hostile patrols on the west bank of the Passarge." The wording would be "short and sweet," but might arouse the regimental commander's doubt as to its accuracy and reliabilitv. 52 Studies in Applied Tactics. The trooper who is to carry the message will have to prick up his ears and tax his wits if he is to understand and remember his lieutenant's instructions, which, by the way, hardly could have been shortened. The route to be followed by the trooper is easily described if the man carefully observed the country during this morning. An experienced patrol-leader will embrace every opportunity to instruct his men concerning roads and names of localities, so they could find their way back. He thus leaves behind a string of landmarks— Daumling's* white pebbles. Without these the enlisted man will lose himself, even in friendly ter- ritory where the inhabitants can help him. How much more difficult is it for him in hostile territory where the names of localities sound strange to his ears and the inhabitants either give no information at all or such as is false, and on occasion even endanger the life of a solitary horseman. Lieutenant F did not mark the rate of speed on the envelope in the usual way. Even if the cavalryman is taught not to mechanically foltow the rate of speed indicated, but that the horse's condition and the nature of the country may call for deviations, still, he does not as a rule find mile-stones along his route to regulate his speed. The explanation in the Field Service Regulations is of little assistance. "Ordinary" speed calls mainly for a walk ; "rapid," mainly for a trot. How little shall he trot in the first instance, and how little shall he walk in the second? In time of peace it may be possible to drill messen- gers in these gaits, but in time of war there will be little left of the skill acquired, due to weariness of the horses from the extra weight they have to carry and the roughness of the country to *Daumling," in German folk-lore, was the youngest of seven children whose indigent parents in a time of famine decided to abandon them in a dense forest. Daumling, overhearing the plot, gathered a lot of pebbles, and, when taken to the forest with the other children for the purpose stated secretly dropped these pebbles from time to time and afterwards by their means led the other children out of the forest again. — Translator. Reconnaissance. 53 be traversed that often is lacking in roads. In many cases 5 miles per hour (as prescribed for "ordinary") will not suffice, while 7 to 8 miles per hour ("rapid") would be imnecessary, or should not be required after a long ride, while a slightly slower gait is still possible. It is therefore praiseworthy if the send- ing officer also considers this point, and, deviating from the routine form, adds explanatory remarks. If the messenger is relieved from the necessity of estimating the number of miles per hour he is traveling, he can devote additional time to look- ing out for the enemy and examining the terrain, and is relieved from the necessity of estimating distances and of frequently consulting his watch, shovld he have cne. As the patrol, after but a short night's rest, has already traveled about 25 miles. Lieutenant F thinks best that his messenger take a medium gait which should bring him to Her- zogswalde in 60 to 65 minutes. Another point requires consideration. Lieutenant F gives the messenger a companion, notwithstanding the fact that he must husband his strength to the utmost. The inse- curity of the district in which the enemy is already prowling about exposes a solitary trooper to great danger. Four eyes see better than two, and mutual assistance helps to overcome difficulties of the road. Two horsemen can help each other across swampy meadows and marshy ditches where one would be mired. If one horse becomes disabled, the other can carry the message farther. One man stands guard while the other inquires the way and questions countrymen. In a hand-to- hand fight the two support each other, and one of them, in case of necessity, can make use of his firearms. For these reasons we must approve Lieutenant F 's sending the men together instead of writing a duplicate message and sending a copy by each man ever a different route. The chances for safe delivery would hardly be improved in the latter case. Having each of the duplicate copies carried by 2 men would be an unwarranted 54 Studies in Applied Tactics, drain. With good instruction had in time of peace, it is un- necessary to caution that the message must not fall into the enemy's hands. Lieutenant F continues in observation while writing the message and instructing the messenger. When he sees that the patrol, led by the sergeant, has reached the edge of the grove north of the Deppen-Heiligenthal road, he indicated to the point a knoll northwest of Heiligenthal, to which it is next to ride. He himself gallops to the grove and says to the ser- geant: "I shall ride with the point. You will follow with the patrol to the left and rear under cover and will watch for signals from me." As the country is open and affords a good view in all directions, thus precluding a surprise, the oJB&cer considers it permissible to ride near the point, where he can use his own eyes and indicate to the point the route to be followed. Keeping west of the Heiligenthal-Scharnick highway, whose shade-trees, though without leaves, afford some cover, and only peering over the crest of the ridge of hills, he passes Komalmen, whose inhabitants know nothing of the enemy, and arrives at Height 135 east of this village. The sergeant had been on Knoll 140 southeast of Waltersmiihl, and had re- ported that nothing suspicious was visible from that point. The lieutenant had sent 2 men to Waltersmiihl, who have just returned and report that nothing had been seen of the enemy in that village. The lieutenant scans the horizon, naturally looking mostly to the east. At this instant (7.25 a. m.) he sees 6 troopers on the Queetz-Guttstadt highway, northwest of Glottau, trotting towards Oueetz. They are followed at a distance of several hundred yards by a body in close order. The shade-trees along the highway prevent an accurate esti- mate of the number. Besides, there is a group of horsemen visible on Height 150 northeast of Queetz (R. G.). The latter village itself is hidden by Height 138. East of Glottau the Glottau-Guttstadt highway is not visible. Finally, a single Reconnaissance;. 55 trooper is seen trotting along the highway from HeiHgenthal towards Ankendorf. Towards Lingnau-Neuendorf the coun- try is visible as far as the highway connecting these points and is free from the enemy. Farther west, Knoll 141 at the north end of Zaun-see limits the view, then we see the roofs of Schar- nick and Warlack, but not the Lingnau-Wolfsdorf highway Nor is there anything suspicious visible in this direction. What arrangements wilIv Lieutenant F • make at about 7.25 a. m., and how wii.i. he conduct himself? Apparently hostile cavalry from Guttstadt is following its patrols sent across the Passarge early in the morning, and in a very short time will bar the way via Kallisten. Possibly communication via Sackstein will yet remain open for a little while. But after that the patrol's retreat will be seriously menaced and presumably it will be able to regain safety only by going in a northerly direction. But the enter- prising officer thinks of safety only in so far as through its being threatened his undertaking might suffer. An officer is placed in charge of a patrol not only because his military judgment is considered superior to that of a non-commissioned oflEicer, but because the utmost is expected of his determination and capac- ity for self-sacrifice. Should he now ride back via Sackstein, he would be able to report only about detached hostile groups which would afford no basis for weighty decisions. Lieutenant F positively must send a message concern- ing what he has just seen. He further decides to continue his reconnaissance and observe what is coming from Guttstadt, fully realizing the difficulties and dangers of his venture. He can depend on his horses and on his own nerves. He hopes to benefit by his past careful conduct, for the enemy apparently has not discovered him; and it is of prime importance that he remain undiscovered. Unfortunately, this requirement pre- cludes his attempting to capture the hostile trooper now trotting 56 Studies in Applied Tactics. by before his eyes. The patrol under cover quickly rides into the grove on the southwest shore of Zaun-see and hides itself there. The lieutenant sends the sergeant and 3 men to Knoll 125 at the north end of the grove to observe without showing themselves, and himself remains in the south end of the grove, where he writes the following message: Near KomalmEn, 5 May 04, 7-35 a. m. To Captain E ; Six hostile troopers are trotting along the highway from Glottau to- wards Queetz; in rear of them follows a body of cavalry in close order, whose strength cannot be determined. A second group of horsemen is visible on Knoll 150 northeast of Queetz (R. G.). I shall remain east of the Passarge. F , Lieutenant. As the officer cannot see the highway near Queetz as well from the grove near Komalmen as he could from his former point of view, and as time presses, he must forego naming the strength of the hostile body in his message. In view of the reduced numbers of hi^ patrol, he decides to send but one man with the message, for this purpose choosing the man who had been to Sackstein with the lance corporal. He directs the man to go via "Waltersmiihl-Sackstein to Herzogswalde, which route he still thinks available. The message again is addressed to the captain, though the messenger is cautioned that it is more important the colonel should receive the message. Again in this case the rate of speed is not marked in the orthodox way. Five miles per hour ("ordinary") seems too slow to him, and, considering that the horse already has traveled over 30 miles to-day, it will not be able to go these 8 or 9 miles at the rate of 7 to 8 miles per hour ("rapid"). Therefore he says to the mes- senger: "You will go at a slow trot, alternating with short distances at a walk." The messenger is directed to ride along the slopes in such a way that, without losing the opportunity to look around, he still will be fairly well concealed. He is to avoid habitaticns as much as possible, except that in Komal- Reconnaissance, 57 men he is to tell the people that the patrol, passing along in rear of the height, has gone via Warlack towards Kleinefeld. In this way the officer wishes to mislead hostile inquirers. Leaving Lieutenant F to his own devices, the divers- ity of the situation will warrant our following the experiences and conduct of Lieutenant C . The latter passed the night of May 4th-5th in the little farm-houses close to Horn rail- way station, and about midnight received the following tele- graphic orders from headquarters of the ist Cavalry: I St Army Corps will mardi towards Mohrungen the 5th inst. and the 2d Army Corps via lyiebemiihl towards Locken. At 5 a. m. the 5th inst. this regiment will advance from Gr. Wilmsdorf via Mohrungen-Gr. Her- menau towards Wormditt-Guttstadt-Mixnsterberg. Troop A will leave Maldeuten at 4 a. m. to reconnoiter in advance of the regiment. You will start early in the morning on reconnaissance via Briickendorf towards Gr. Buchwalde-Jonkendorf ; later joining your regiment via Kallisten. Send me information, if possible by wire, until 7 a. m. to Mohrungen, after that to Gr. Hermenau. Also send any important information to the cavalry of the I St Division, which will advance via Mohrungen and the south end of Narien-see towards the AUe. Soon after this Captain E 's telegram from Maldeuten was received: Troop A, ist Cavalry, en route to Gr. Hermenau, will arrive at Mohrun- gen shortly after 5 a. m., and looks for reports at both places. As Lieutenant C already knew in the evening that the telegraph station at Ziegenberg had been closed and that the one at Brtickendorf no longer answered to its call, he decided to advance on the latter place with his whole patrol at 3 a. m. the 5th inst. He hoped to obtain better results on this day with fresh horses, and rightly feared that an expedition by night, when no sur\'ey of the situation could be had, would yield no adequate return. It was suspected as far back as Maldeuten that a hostile advance party had reached Briicken- dorf. More than this could hardly be determined during the night. Besides, Lieutenant C considered the condition of his patrol consisting of i sergeant and 12 troopers (quartered in the two farm buildings) of whom not more than one-half — 5— 58 Studies in Appued Tactics. dared sleep at the same time. Sending out 3 or 4 men would have made it impossible for the remainder to gain strength for the coming day. There was no telegraph chart at Horn railway station, but the operator stated that in the vicinity there was nothing but the railway telegraph line, excepting a single wire between Ivocken and Osterode. After providing for the destruction of the message tapes* at the office and after the members of the patrol were informed of the situation and the task of the patrol, he departed with it early on the 5th, via Gubitten, for Ziegenberg, and here en- coimtered 3 hostile troopers whose retreat to Briickendorf he vainly attempted to cut off. Several shots were fired on the pursuers from the bridge, but without taking effect ; and so the patrol assembled at the farm (north of the letter c in " Briicken- dorf ") about 1,400 yards west of Briickendorf. Through the mist in the valley Lieutenant C could only make out that several persons, some on foot and some mounted, were moving about at the bridge. Lieutenant C — — • learns from the farmer that hostile troopers, whose language he could not understand, had arrived in the village and at his farm the preceding even- ing; that they had taken a good horse from him and then re- turned to the station; that early this morning he had seen 3 troopers ride by towards Ziegenberg; and that he did not know how large a detachment of the enemy was at Briickendorf. Lieutenant C further learns that the Passarge is flooded, the water being at least 2 yards deep everywhere, and that there are no fords in the vicinity. The Passarge meadows recently were flooded, and can be crossed only by foot-men. There is said to be an old wooden bridgef over the Passarge *These contain signals recorded in ink, giving a permanent record; thus differing from our system, where the signals are received by sound alone. fSee map i : 100,000. Reconnaissance. 59 opposite the north end of Briickendorf which can be approached only from the left bank — there bemg no road through the swampy meadow on the right bank. At Alt-Kochendorf there is said to be a single stringer of a former bridge across the Pas- sarge, a narrow foot-path leading to this from both sides of the stream. The next crossing further down is said to be at Kloben, where there is a good wooden bridge. What are Lieutenant C 's intentions and ar- rangements AT 4 A. M. ? (As a matter of course, the message on page 23 might be altered as thought best; its contents were intended simply as a basis for Captain E 's decisions.) It is with Lieutenant C • as with his comrade, Lieuten- ant F ; his main idea is to make an extended reconnaissance to the Alle. Lieutenant F was unopposed at the Passarge crossing of Kallisten, but Lieutenant C at Bruckendorf is opposed by hostile fire-arms. Even if the opponents should be few in number, it would be very venturesome to attempt forcing a crossing afoot or on horseback. Swampy meadows preclude his using the nearest bridge, which in addition lies within effective fire of the enemy. It would require at least an hour and a half to go around by Kloben, with the possibility of finding the bridge occupied by the enemy. It would be less of a detour to go via Magergut-Kammersdorf, but this is con- siderably to one side of the route to be followed by the regiment. It would not be surprising if the officer desisted from any fur- ther attempt at penetrating farther to the east, thinking it impracticable to do so at this time, and hoping that the enemy himself might soon advance and open the road. He might be confirmed in this view by the thought that he would be able to keep the enemy in sight, who also could find no crossing near by, and thus render good service to the cavalry of the ist Division which is following. But on further reflection he must see that 6o Studtks in Appi^iud Tactics. it is highly improbable the enemy himself will open the trouble- S3me door for him. If the enemy leaves but a few men behind, the door will remain closed. Upon further reflection he realizes that his solicitude for the divisional cavalry is simply an excuse with just enough color to quiet his military conscience, which con- demns inactivity and a waiting policy in a patrol. It is not un- reasonable to assume that the three hostile troopers who barely escaped across the Passarge will exaggerate the number of their pursuers and induce the leader to remain at the bridge and net venture to an encounter with us on the left bank of the Pas- sarge. In the meantime we have a more free field. If Lieu- tenant C looks beyond his regiment and the divisional cavalry, it may occur to him that a message by wire from Locken to Osterode may reach Army headquarters sooner than through regular channels of the ist Army Corps. If only the message should amount to something — -if it only really cleared up the situation! He can hardly hope to discover anything of im- portance in the comer between the Passarge and Mahrung-see. He can report that he encountered the enemy at Briickendorf , and then cheerfully intrust the divisional cavalry with the task of settling with the hostile parties in front of the Army Corps. He is anxious to take advantage of the hours' start he has over his troop and of the carefully treasured strength of his horses, and dismisses the last remaining objection — viz., that his patrol, in advancing via Kammersdorf , puts itself on the line of march of the neighboring corps. If the latter's cavalry is far enough in the lead, it will be all the easier for the patrol to advance. He decides to send a message to the telegraph station at Horn, citing his further instructions (which, therefore, should have been included in the message on page 23) and then to tide forward under cover towards Magergut, keeping the Passarge bridge under observation so as to take advantage of any oppor- tunity that might offer there. Then he intends advancing via Kammersdorf towards Schaustern. East of Kammersdorf the Reconnaissance. 6i Passarge does not flow through open meadows, but between closely wooded banks. Should the bridge on the road to Schau- stem prove unserviceable or be blocked by the enemy, the two yards' depth of water has no terrors for him or his horses. At Kammersdorf he will be able to learn of places suitable for swimming the stream. It is very important to be cautious during the advance. The point must keep well to the front, for it is highly probable that hostile troopers also will be en- countered in the vicinity of Kammersdorf. To this point Lieutenant C wishes to ride rapidly and then, before going any farther, will watch the highway at Briickendorf for a little while. In the meantime inquiry is to be made as to the condi- tion of affairs at Locken and whether telegraphic communica- tion still exists with Ostercde. To be sure, a doubt arises as to whether Colonel A , who expressly prescribed the route via Briickendorf, will ap- prove of the deviation to the south. But on various occasions during peace maneuvers Lieutenant C had noticed that his colonel approved of the decision of a subordinate not be- cause it was the best, but because it was a decision. He pins his faith to this and unhesitatingly proceeds to carry out his plan. The patrol reaches the vicinity of Jagd-see* unmolested; the highway towards Locken is deserted, two troopers are sent to the latter place. The sun shines brightly and has scattered the mist. A glance through the field-glasses shows no change at Briickendorf. No one is visible on the left bank of the Pas- sarge. The patrol crosses the highway bridge across the low ground between Jagd-see and Miihlen T.f and turns to the left into the country road towards Kammersdorf. As the point reaches the grove northeast of Mergel-see, the leader overtakes *See map i :ioo,ooo — a small lake marked "Jagd-S." south of Mahrung-see and west of Kammersdorf. fA long narrow mill-pond just west of Jagd-see. 62 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. it at a gallop and at the first glance to the east from the grove he discovers several horsemen on the Kammersdorf-Schaustem road.* They are several hundred yards east of the cemetery, f and, trotting towards it along the road that is visible almost to the edge of the woods, Lieutenant C comits 12 men and recognizes them as enemies. A second glance shows that there is no enemy in sight as far as Point 128 on the Locken-Sten- kienen road or towards Eissing-see. The main body of his patrol is just trotting across the bridge between Jagd- and Mergel-see. The two troopers sent to Locken have not yet returned. What does Lieutenant C decide to do? A signal to the patrol and a short gallop would carry it back to the highway and Ramten mill, to a safe point of obser- vation, though under penalty of separation from the 2 men sent to Locken, who would have to try to rejoin the patrol along the left bank of the Locke. To insure a union with these 2 men, the patrol might ride back to Locken. The hostile patrol might be avoided in yet another way: By rapidly riding along the eastern shore of the Mergel-see and hiding in the vicinity of Gr. Schwa rze-see until the enemy has passed, unless one of his scouts, riding up the high ground east of the latter lake, should discover the ruse, and unless other enemies should approach from Pulfnick. It is hardly practica- ble to secure a hiding-place at Kammersdorf in the few minutes available. And with the most patriotic motives of the inhab- itants the matter could not be kept secret, aside from the rattle of accouterments and neighing of horses. Neither does the the grove near the road, in which Lieutenant C now is, offer any place of concealment. *The place where Lieutenant C halts is but a trifle lower than KnoU 108, so that, being mounted, he can look over and beyond it. fOn the Kammersdorf-Schaustem road, about 700 yards east of the former place. Reiconnaissance;. 63 The young officer does not long consider. It never occurs to him to hurry back to Ramten or Locken. Without taking his eyes off the enemy he quietly says to a member of the point : "This way with the patrol at a gallop!" Then he loosens his sword in its scabbard, forms his approaching troopers within the grove so they cannot be seen without, and awaits his oppor- tunity. The enemy halts at the cemetery; 2 men ride into the village, the remainder go to Knoll 109. After anxious minutes, the two hostile troopers reappear at the south edge of the vil- lage and signal to the others, and, while the former ride along the edge of the village towards the bridge between Jagd-see and Mergel-see, the larger body trots towards the edge of the grove — straight at the corner where our patrol is halted. Lieu- tenant C allows it to come quite near and then charges it, disregarding the detached troopers. The melee is soon ended. Eleven troopers against ten ; powerful well-ridden horses against hardy but underbred ones. In addition to this, there is the advantage of surprise. The hostile point of 2 troopers will not change the result, even though it arrived on the scene. The disparity in numbers under the latter contingency might even be more unfavorable without affecting the victory. For the present we shall not discuss whether Lieutenant C acted correctly and judiciously. We shall let later events decide, as in the case of Lieutenant F , who at Lettau al- lowed the hostile patrol to ride past unmolested. Identically the same conditions are never repeated either in life in general or in war, and the reader surely will have noticed the difference between the two cases. In accordance with his orders, Lieu- tenant F could continue his reconnaissance, via Kallisten towards Guttstadt, without being detected. Lieutenant C would have been able to continue his advance only in case he succeeded in hiding himself with his patrol en the eastern shore of Mergel-see, which was highly improbable. His soldier's pride resented the idea of a retreat to Ramten or Locken before 64 Studies in Applied Tactics. an enemy but slightly superior in numbers; for our cavalryman felt himself more than equal to the enemy under existing con- ditions — a feeling to be encouraged and not repressed. Even if the patrol were defeated in the enccimter, for example, if at the decisive moment hostile reinforcements appeared, no stain would attach to the officer's escutcheon of honor, a gain so great that no theory may thrust it aside unheeded. An officer would forever lose the confidence of his men, who ought willingly to follow him to certain death, should he but once give them cause to suspect him of cowardice. At the most, lyieutenant C 's military judgment might 'be criticised. But we cannot refuse to praise his quick decision and skillfully led attack, which brought success. It might be objected that, instead of charging in knightly fashion, he should have used his rifles. Roosevelt's Rough Riders or a mounted "body of war-experienced Boers would have done the latter, and it is recommended that every one of our cavalry officers carefully consider in individual cases, whether the saber or bulkt promises the best results. Here at Kammersdorf dis- mounting to fight on foot would have had to be executed in considerable haste, and had the enemy changed the direction of his march and not ridden into the ambuscade, valuable time would have been lost. He would have been obliged hastily to return rifles and mount again. And, if dismounted, an excited man very easily might have pressed the trigger prematurely and spoiled the surprise. Against single troopers the rifle promises good results only at close range. How difficult it is to drop fleeing game at even loo yards' distance! How much greater is the nerve-tension of the soldier than that of the hunter, and, besides, the former must aim more than lo yards ahead of a trooper galloping by at 600 yards' distance. The rattle of 20 to 30 shots would alarm the whole neighborhood and would attract all hostile detachments within hearing. I^ieutenant C did right to remain in the saddle, whereby RECONNAISSANCli;. O5 it became easier to cut off the enemy's retreat and capture prisoners. As a basis for the continuation of our problem the follow- ing will be assumed: Two severely and two slightly woimded enemies and one unwounded one fell into our hands; likewise two sound horses. Four hostile troopers, including an officer, escaped towards Pulfnick, and three towards Schaustern. At 5.10 a. m. Lieutenant C has assembled his patrol at Knoll 108, excepting two men whom he has sent to Height 128. Of his men, one was seriously woimded by a saber-cut across the face, another was lightly wounded, also in the head. With the exception of a few scratches — the lieutenant himself received a severe blow across his arm with the fiat of a saber — no damage was done. The two troopers sent to Locken have returned, and report that nothing has been seen there of the enemy or of our own troops; and that the telegraph line to Ost erode is in work- ing order — one operator being on hand. The hostile patrol belonged to the 6th Dragoons. It was impossible to talk with the prisoners. Several troopers are now visible en the heights southwest of Briickendorf, who, through field-glasses, are beHeved to belong to the enemy. What wihh Lieutenant C do — bearing in mind THAT conditions ARE DIFFERENT FROM TIME OF PEACE, WHERE THERE ARE NO WOUNDED AND NO PRISONERS? The officer again has his men take cover in the grove near Jagd-see, whence he continues his cbserv^ations, for the same purpose designating individual men to watch certain districts to the rear. He takes care that no one shows himself unneces- sarily and that there is as little moving about as possible. The soldier, as well as the hunter, appreciates the value of immo- bility, which materially lessens the danger of discovery. The wounded also are brought into the grove. Even the two se- verely woimded prisoners must submit to this. War is a rough 66 Studies in Applied Tactics. trade. Human sympathies must give way before the exigencies of the service. The lieutenant sends the sergeant and a trooper to the village to bring back the village president and four re- liable men with two well-horsed wagons filled with straw. The village president is intrusted with the care of the three severely wounded men imder the protection of the red cross, and the slightly wounded are bound up as well as possible. Then the two slightly wounded and the unwounded prisoner, shackled if necessary, are put in the wagons under guard of the slightly woimded trooper and the four villagers, and are sent to Locken in charge of a reliable unwounded trooper. The officer retains one of the captured horses as an extra mount; the remaining led horses are fastened alongside the draft -horses of the wagons. The man selected as escort for the wagons receives the follow- ing instructions: "You will take the wagons back through Locken to Liebe- miihl and will take care that the prisoners and this message are delivered to a high-ranking officer of troops marching on this road (the Locken- Liebemiihl highway), taking receipt for the men and message. Then you will ride with our wounded trooper, or at least with his horse, to Mohrungen, and will see that the original of the telegram I shall give you reaches head- quarters of the ist Army Corps. Should the wounded be un- able to stand the journey, they will be left in some house along the road, taking receipt for them. " The telegram is as follows: Locken, 5 May 04, a. m. To the Telegraph Operator, Osterode: At 4-40 a. m. to-day I encountered 1 2 men of the hostile 6th Dragoons near Kammersdorf ; and I sent 3 prisoners back over the road to Liebemiihl. I was unable to converse with them. Briickendorf is occupied by hostile troopers. I shall continue towards Jonkendorf. This message should be promptly wired to Army headquar- ters, whose whereabouts is unknown to me, and to Mohrungen. C Lieutenant xst Cavalry, Commanding Patrol. Reconnaissance. 67 The message was worded in the same way, except that the last sentance was omitted. The message and telegram are given to the trooper in an unsealed envelope with instructions to familiarize himself with the contents. The telegram is to be wired from Lccken, the trooper again taking possession of the original, after sending, as already stated. The trooper is cau- tioned that he will be held responsible for the prisoners, and warned to guard the unwounded one with special care. Upon arriving at Mohrungen, he is to make a verbal report of what has happened at Briickendorf and Kammersdorf. As soon as the wagons have left, and Lieutenant C is satisfied that no danger threatens from Magergut or Pulfnick, he continues on his way with the patrol. Presumably this can- not be until about 6 a. m. The incident described requires considerable time. We should very much like to have matters proceed more rapidly and have Lieutenant C resume his march earlier. But we must avoid illusions, although some- times in reality many things can be hurried. In hostile territory I have known a hay- wagon to be hitched up at night and made ready to transport wounded men in a few minutes. Possibly the officer might limit himself to writing the message and tele- gram, leaving everything else to the sergeant. But in thinking the matter over we must realize that the sergeant hardly would be in a position to appreciate all the attending circumstances, that it seems most important the telegram should safely reach headquarters at Mohrungen, and that the prisoners should be delivered to someone able to question them. The statements of the prisoners alone might be more valuable than the gain of half an hour in resuming the reconnaissance. The prisoners' departure must be guarded against detection by other hostile patrols that might appear at any moment. And, finally. Lieu- tenant C hesitates, as did Lieutenant F , to separate himself from the sergeant who must lead the patrol, should any accident happen to the officer. 68 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. The telegram simply gives Mohrungen as the second ad- dress, not "Headquarters ist Army Corps," because this would disclose too much should the dispatch fall into the enemy's hands. Should our wounded trooper be unable to act as guard on the wagon, another trooper probably would have to be sent along. In fact, an escort of two is sufficient only on the sup- position that the four villagers will do their duty. The laws of war make it expedient to make believe these civilians are simply to minister to the needs of the wounded. But it may be assumed that these friendly villagers wdll not allow any prisoner to escape. The officer need have no conscientious scruples about this arrangement. Other nations do not observe the laws of war as strictly as we do. It is too important that the patrol, already reduced to a sergeant and 8 men, be net further weakened. The detailed account of Lieutenant C 's conduct after encoimtering the enemy must only be looked upon as an attempt to call the attention of anyone not familiar with war to the dif- ference between it and peace conditions. In time of peace, opposing patrols on meeting possibly exchange friendly greet- ings and then proceed with their respective roles irrespective of each other. Our example shows how serious is the duty of a patrol under such circumstances in time of war. But general rules of conduct cannot be devised. Bach case must be de- cided on its own merits. Everyone must depend on expedients that ingenuity and experience will suggest. Many may be able to devise more suitable measures than these given by me. But in two particulars I wish to defend mine against possible objec- tions — viz. : Why does not Lieutenant C turn over all his wounded to the care of the village president of Kammersdorf ? In this case he would have to arrange for the transportation of but one unwounded prisoner, which would have simplified the proceedings and saved time. But undoubtedly more can be Reconnaissance. 69 gleaned from the statement cf three pris:ners cress-questioned separately than from only one, and war experience (all too easily lost in time cf peace) shows the great value of such state- ments for higher commanders. An oft-repeated reminder of Napolecn's to his generals was, "Send me prisoners." The Field Service Regulations also call attention to the importance of prisoners. Our slightly wounded trooper is sent along not only as a guard, but also to preclude the possibility of his fall- ing into the hands of hostile patrols at Kammersdorf and being questioned by them. Were it possible to move our seriously wounded trooper, he, too, would be sent back. The transportation must first go to Locken because the telegram is to be sent from there. But it dees net go thence over the shortest route (via Eckersdorf) to Mohrungen and our own army corps on account of the length and insecurity of the road. The prisoners ate of more importance even than the telegram (in which the number of the hostile regiment is the only important news) and should be promptly brought to a place of safety and where they can be questioned. This sug- gests the idea of turning them over to the 2d Army Corps ad- vancing via Liebemiihl. Lieutenant C will have found out from the inhabitants of Kammersdorf where the Passarge can be most easily forded. Should such a place be near a road, it will be used not only to avoid a possible ambuscade at the bridge, but also to make his messengers feel independent of the bridge on their way back. Horses trained to swim streams can cress narrow places 2 yards deep without difficulty, and with the rider in the saddle. Of course the rider also must be experienced and must assist the horse; if necessary, dismounting and holding on by the mane. The patrol succeeds in crossing the Passarge east of Grim- mak-see (at the point on the map where the letter Fof "Fcrst" is located). The enemy is not found at the bridge. The 2 troopers are called in from Knoll 128, and report that the flee- 70 Studies in Applied Tactics. ing troopers disappeared in the woods northeast of Pulfnick. At 6.30 a. m. the patrol reaches Knoll 119 south of Labens. From this point the villages of Stenkienen, Windtken, and Schaustern can be seen, as well as the railway nearly to the woods south of Kl. Gemmern. The view is limited by Heights 127, 135, 131, and 128. Nothing is seen in motion an5^where. The inhabitants of Labens report that early in the morning a body of hostile troopers had passed there going towards Kam- mersdorf; that nearly an hour ago 3 troopers had returned in haste and had continued towards Windtken; and that no hostile troops were in Schaustern or Windtken during the night. Which way will IvIe;utenant C go now, and what ARE HIS plans concerning THE RAILWAY AHEAD OF HIM? As the day advances it becomes more likely that larger bodies of hostile cavalry will be met. The three troopers re- treating towards Windtken presumably came from there; and, even without this pointer, the roads from Jonkendorf to Bal- lingen and to Pupkeim and the Jonkendorf-Blankenberg road would be likely lines of approach for the enemy. He probably also will approach along the Alt-Schoneberg-Stenkienen road, but this region is beyond the sphere of Lieutenant C 's patrol. It is best to observe the Jonkendorf-Ballingen and Jonkendorf-Pupkeim roads from between the two, where several patches of woods offer concealment. The patrol must move in that direction, but without going through Windtken, for this would take us directly towards the enemy and keep us too long in the open. It would be best to ride across country, between Schaustern and Windtken, towards the nearest woods. If the meadows covild not be crossed, a road could be followed from Knoll 131 to the woods. Anyone who has actually at- tempted to take up rails realizes that the patrol on reaching the railway must not be delayed by such effort. And as the patrol has no high explosives, it would be useless to attempt de- stroying track or switches at Windtken without the assistance Reconnaissance. 71 of the railway employees. The officer received no specific instructions to undertake any such work and hesitates to do so on his own responsibility, because it seems to him very unlikely that the enemy will use this part of the track. For the present this district may be included in the enemy's field of operations, but it may soon belong to that of our own army. But the destruction of the telegraph line is a different ques- tion. According to the German Field Service Regulations, Lieutenant C 's right to do so is somewhat problematical, as only by a forced construction can he be looked upon as an independent commander. But he knows that the station at Briickendorf must have been surprised by the enemy, for the operator did not report the latter's approach nor his (the operator's) intention to discontinue his office. It is therefore possible that the enemy is using the line to send back his own messages. This might be ascertained at Windtken. But the officer does not want to visit this place. A strict and conserv- ative interpretation of the Regulations would result in Lieu- tenant C 's deciding not to molest the telegraph line. Thus he would assume no responsibilities and possibly avoid the un- pleasantness of an explanation, considering that his instruc- tions do not indicate that he is to attempt any demolitions. But Lieutenant C , as he already has demonstrated, is a man who does not fear to assume responsibility and who re- members the splendid words of the introduction to the Field Service Regulations, which are that "every officer must unhes- itatingly act to the best of his ability in every contingency, even without waiting for orders concerning details." He also remembers the concluding remarks, which are: "Even the lowest soldier must bear in mind that he will be more severely dealt with for an omission or neglect than for any error in choice of means." While superior authority sometimes might be able to indicate the points in advance where demolitions should be attempted, still it is impossible to give instructions 72 Studiks in Appukd Tactics. to every patrol concerning railways and telegraph lines that may be encountered. If nothing but the wire is cut, there will be but little work to subsequently repair the line. But if the wire is strung on high poles, it will be difficult to cut without iron climbers and wire-nippers. The best place to select would be near a section- house. The patrol must not be long dela3^ed by the work as it might be discovered if it remained long in such an exposed position. At about 7 a. m. the patrol may reach the woods east cf Schaustern after having cut the telegraph wire just S3Uth cf said village with the assistance of some countrymen. The patrol is only about 8 miles from Horn in an air- line, but has actually come about I2| miles in 4 hours. This apparently is a short distance. The regimental commander at Gr. Her- menau, not understanding the situation, may be very angry at the infrequency of messages from this patrol, particularly because they could be forwarded by wire from Horn. It re- mains to be seen whether the loss of time that resulted from Lieutenant C 's detour via Kammersdorf and skirmish will be made good in other ways. Bearing the following in mind, let us glance back at Troop A, which at 6.50 a. m. left Herzogswalde for Reichenthal. Captain E left Corporal M and 6 troopers at the Teu- felsberg (it might be added that the corporal made arrange- ments at the southern exit of Herzogswalde to have messengers directed to his new station) ; 3 were sent to Naglack to observe towards the south; i sergeant and 6 troopers were sent to Iviebstadt; and Lieutenant F , with 14 men, was sent via Kallisten towards Guttstadt. Of the latter patrol, i trooper has returned with a message and has rejoined the troop. Then, 2 men were left at Mohrungen, 3 at Gr. Hermenau, and i man was sent back from each of these two places with a message Reiconnaissance;. 73 for the regimental commander. Therefore the captain has r officer and 63 men left. Nothing is known of Lieutenant F — — , except that about 5 a. m. he rode past 1 2 hostile troopers near Lettau (of these nothing has since been heard), and that he sent a lance corporal to Sackstein, but the latter's message has not yet been received. At 7.05 a. m. the captain reaches Knoll 153 near Wuchsnig with his point, and looks about. The houses of Pittehnen are visible, but no details. No enemy is visible on the Liebstadt- Pittehnen highway, nor in the intervening country. Two horse- men are visible on Knoll no near Elditten, but it cannot be determined whether they are friend or foe. The flanking-patrol is galloping in from Gr. Trukainen. A small detachment, ap- parently hostile, is seen galloping alongside the highway from the south towards Naglack. The captain sends a non-com- missioned officer and 3 troopers on reconnaissance to Pittehnen , and has the troop halt under cover in rear of the hill, with the idea of surprising the hostile troopers as soon as they should approach near enough. At the same time he sends several troopers via Gr. Pragsden (where they are concealed from the south) to the Passarge to examine the river and look for fords. It is true that he was told in Herzogswalde that there are no fords in the vicinity, but he wants to be sure about it. The hostile detachment, consisting of 10 men, halts between Nag- lack and Banners. The captain then orders his leading platoon to drive the enemy away and to advance far enough to obtain a view of the country about Lettau-Waltersdorf and towards Sackstein. The hostile troopers retreat towards Alt-Menzels and disappear in the woods. The platoon follows as far as a hill south of Alt-Menzels and sends a patrol to Sackstein and another to Height 148 near the highway. At 7.45 the platoon returns via Naglack. The platoon commander reports that the hostile detachment crossed the Passarge at Sackstein. The pursuing patrol was ordered by —6— 74 Studies in Applied Tactics. the platoon commander to remain at Sackstein for the present and continue watching the enemy. Nothing suspicious was seen at Waltersdorf or Lettau nor on the part of the highway visible south of Waltersdorf. The inhabitants of Naglack stated that at 5 a. m. to-day 3 friendly (blue) troopers passed through the village and inquired the way to Sackstein. Im- patient at the time lost through the hostile patrol, the captain, looking backwards to see if the regiment has yet come in sight, trots towards Reichenthal without further delay, going north of the road through the low ground, to be covered from view as much as possible. He depends on Corporal M , at Teu- felsberg, discovering his march and notifying the colonel about it, as well as about the encounter with the hostile patrol. The orders of the patrol at Sackstein are not changed ; and 2 troopers are again sent towards Naglack to keep on the lookout to the south. Even before reaching Reichenthal, the captain recognizes the situation at Pittehnen. Shots are fired from the heights on the right bank of the Passarge which are answered from the houses of the hamlet. A hostile troop of cavalry is visible on the Pittehnen-Elditten highway, having just halted about half- way between these two points. A part of the troop dismounts and advances towards Pittehnen. East of Elditten the high- way is visible as far as the woods between this point and Wclfs- dorf, but nothing is visible on it. The scouts sent to the Pas- sarge have reported that the stream is not fordable and that the meadows will not support the weight of a horse. The inhabit- ants of Gr. Pragsden have informed the captain that between Sackstein and Pittehnen there is neither ford nor bridge, but that there are two fords at Kalkstein. What does the Captain decide to do at 8 a. m. at Reichenthal? (It must be remembered that lyieutenant F 's mes- sages of 6.30 from Heiligenthal and 7.35 from Komalmen have not yet been received.) Reconnaissance. 75 If the captain at Herzogswalde or Wuchsnig had received word of Lieutenant P from Heiligenthal and of the lance corporal from Sackstein, he might have decided to advance via Sackstein, and, driving back the hostile patrol, would now be on the right bank of the Passarge; whereas this bothersome stream, like an impenetrable wall, still precludes an extended view, while the regiment is already on the captain's heels. Without knowing what Lieutenant F in the meantime had discovered, it would have been justifiable for the captain to deviate from the chosen route of Pittehnen-Guttstadt only in case the hostile patrol from Naglack had been backed up by larger bodies. At the same time the captain, notwithstanding his impatience, could not continue his march until he had shaken off this patrol and obtained a view behind it. Now the hostile troop at Elditten forms a new obstacle. The captain may correctly guess the colonel's displeasure, who will have expected better results from the former's discretion and spirit of enter- prise. How often such mishaps mar the plans of the most active and experienced leader ! Had it not been for the delay caused by the hostile patrol, the captain long ago would have been at Elditten — possibly victor over the hostile troop — and would have had an extended view of the road to Guttstadt. When the captain learns what considerations induced Lieuten- ant F to desist from accepting battle at Lettau, he may exclaim: "Would that my dear lieutenant had remembered less of the Regulations!" But how shall the captain adjust himself to the new situation? It will not do to turn back from Reichenthal and go to Sackstein. This would open the way for the hostile troop via Pittehnen and enable it promptly to ferret out our regiment and send back welcome news. And, besides, it might not be possible to ride to Sackstein unobserved. It seems equally inadvisable and impracticable to attempt fording the Passarge 76 Studies in Applied Tactics. at Kalkstein. If we are not to lose more time by waiting, there is nothing to be done but to forcibly break through at Pittehnen. If the hostile troop waits dismounted on the right bank of the Passarge, Captain E also must dismount and drive the enemy away by dismounted fire action and capture the bridge. Of course fire-superiority cannot be obtained by numbers, but by superior markmanship. Would a company of blue infantry hesitate in the face of a hostile company? Why should it be different with troop against troop than with company against company? It would be advantageous if the troop could reach the vicinity of Pittehnen under cover, where Height io8 apparently offers a commanding position. We might succeed in this by circling to the west and crossing the highway at the point P of "Pittehnen." It will be necessary to use combat patrols, particularly towards Kalkstein ; unfortunately, this reduces the fighting strength. But doubtless the hostile troop also has weak- ened itself by using similar patrols. We must consider whether the led horses should be kept west of Height io8, and what amount of mobility is desired of them. If the horses are im- mobile,* the men after capturing the bridge on foot would have to return for their horses ; while, if mobile, they can be brought up to the riders. But in the latter case from one-fourth to one-half of the men must remain with the horses, which greatly reduces the number of men on the firing-line. Quick results are to be expected only when not a man is missing. If the troop is victorious, there will be time and opportunity to mount — this may take place by platoon. If the troop does not suc- ceed, the men can quickly fall back on their horses. Neither must there be a mounted reserve, though one is ordinarily pre- scribed — the stream, which protects from any sudden hostile mounted attack, justifies the omission. *A11 the horses of a platoon linked together in a circle and watched by a single horse-holder. (Wagner's "Organization and Tactics.") Reconnaissance. 77 Presumably the hostile troop dismounted simply to clear the way to Pittehnen. The enemy probably will remount and cross the Passarge as soon as he has driven the blue patrol out of Pittehnen. But the captain does not want to wait for this. It is quite possible that his troop has already been discovered by the enemy; for example, from Knoll no south of Blditten. If the enemy simply wishes to block the way at Pittehnen, he can all the better make preparations for this the longer he is left undisturbed. The captain also rejects the idea of asking for assistance from the colonel, by the time this could arrive the enemy also may have been reinforced; and it is doubtful if the colonel would grant the request. Asking for reinforce- forcements is very properly frowned upon in the (German) Army. If a detachment positively is not strong enough to do what is required of it, the situation and present intentions of its commander are reported to higher authority, and it is left for him to decide whether reinforcements shall be sent or not. Deciding to act at once, the captain sends a non-com- missioned officer and 4 troopers via Blumen towards Kalkstein, as a protection against the north and northwest, and conducts the troop along depressions of ground to the west of Reichen- thal, constantly keeping an eye on the enemy. When he, with his troop close behind him, and so far apparently not seen by the enemy, reaches the Reichenthal-Blumen road, he sees Lieutenant B 's patrol hastily riding baek from Pittehnen on the road towards Liebstadt, and sees the hostile troop mount ; whereupon the following happens: He (the captain) lets the hostile main body, which is following Lieutenant B in some disorder, get out of Pittehnen about 1,000 yards, and then charges it in flank. He has nearly 1,000 yards to go, but it is down hill and for a short time the terrain still conceals him. But fortune only half-way favors the captain. The enemy discovers the attack too soon, and gives way to the north. The 78 Studies in Applied Tactics. troop, advancing at a gallop, forces the enemy to separate and retreat hastily. A few hostile troopers escape into the woods and a group rides around the southern border of the same, while the greater part turns north towards Klogehnen. The captain follows the latter with his troop, only detaching half of the left platoon to the left around the woods. He sends an officer and 6 troopers towards Pittehnen to protect the right flank. The horses are tired out by the time they reach Height 94 southeast of Klogehnen. The captain is convinced that he cannot overtake the enemy, who is continuing his flight in dis- order towards Gillwalde and Stollen. He orders Sergeant K and 6 troopers to follow and keep touch with the enemy. As he assembles the troop the group detached from the left flank rejoins on the Polkehnen-Klogehnen road. The leader re- ports that he sent 3 troopers to follow the hostile troopers flee- ing towards Stollen. The combat-patrols join the troop, as well as Lieutenant B and 6 men of Troop B, who were driven from Pittehnen (i man fell in the engagement at the Passarge bridge). Three of the hostile troopers, who retreated into the woods, have been captured. One of our troopers is able to talk with them, and the captain thus learns that he had encountered Troop No. 2, 5th Dragoons, which left Heilsberg early this morning, having spent the night there with the entire regiment. The prisoners can neither describe the road over which they came to-day nor tell where they were night before last, or where their regiment is, which they have not seen to- day. Nor can anything else of importance be found out from them. The troop is assembled by 8.35 a. m. Of the detached troopers, 5 have reported who were left at Mohrungen and Gr. Hermenau and were relieved by others from the regiment, and the 2 messengers sent to the regimental commander. They report that the regiment arrived at Mohrungen at about 6.20 Reconnaissance. 79 a. m., and at Gr. Hermenau shortly after 7 a. m. They bring no orders or information. Four horses were captured by the troop, which, aside from two horses seriously hurt by falling, has had no losses. About this time a regimental staff officer, accompanied by a trooper, arrives and states that the advance guard of the regiment arrived at Herzogswalde at 8 a. m., where the reg- imental commander expects to halt for a while. The troop commander is to report how matters are progressing with him. The staff officer is unable to definitely answer the captain's inquiries concerning messages received by the regimental com- mander or the latter's intentions. He simply remembers to have heard that a message had been received from Lieutenant F . The enemy was not visible from Herzogswalde, and while the staff officer en route through Reichenthal saw what had happened in the troop, he saw nothing else concerning the enemy. The officer who with 6 troopers was sent to protect the right flank of the troop during the pursuit is visible on the right bank of the Passarge at the bend of the highway northeast of Pittehnen. What are Captain E 's decisions and arrange- ments SOUTH OF KlOGEHNEN ABOUT 8.35 A. M.? Should the captain follow the retreating troop, he would drive it farther away and prevent its obtaining any insight into the movements of the regiment. But in this event he would abandon his reconnaissance towards Guttstadt. Both of these enterprises cannot be carried out together. If the pursuit is continued to the north, only small patrols can be sent towards Guttstadt, which would not assure an energetic and profitable reconnaissance. But, taking all things into consideration, the latter direction is of greater importance than the one towards Wormditt. Hostile infantry surely will not be encountered 8o Studies in Applied Tactics. towards Wormditt. If the 5th Dragoons turned that way from Heilsberg, the road through Guttstadt may be all the more accessible for operations against the main columns of the enemy, and the troop may yet be able to obtain timely information about them. If larger bodies of hostile cavalry are approach- ing from Guttstadt, a further pursuit of the defeated troop would be useless. There is an objection to a continued advance to the east. Soon after crossing the Passarge, communication with the reg- iment will become precarious, unless the latter should follow on the same road. The captain does not know whether this will happen or not. Should the regiment take a different direc- tion, the colonel might want to have the bridge at Pittehnen held. Therefore the captain might conclude to halt until he had asked for further orders, as he is but 4^ to 5 miles from the regiment. He can get word in an hour if the regiment has re- mained at Herzogswalde. During this time he can cover the regiment from the hostile troop that retreated to the north as well as from Guttstadt ; and he can begin further reconnaissance in the latter direction by sending out new patrols. Uncon- sciously the mental lassitude, observed by those experienced in war to follow even successful engagements, works in favor of the latter plan. The over-taxed nerves clamor for their rights, and it takes a strong will-power to overcome this condition. To ask for orders of a superior and await his reply is a doubtful expedient for an enterprising and self-reliant man. Often enough he had urged his subordinates to independent action and self-help, and in many instances had shown them what a mistake it was to ask for orders. Is it possible that here we have the exception that authorizes or calls for a departure from the rule? The captain tries to imagine himself in the colonel's position when the latter received the request. At the most he will communicate the plans he has formed in the mean- Reconnaissance. 8i time, but he hardly will be able to give minute instructions as to the future conduct of the troop. He knows less about the situation at Pittehnen than the captain, and does not know what information has been received there since the request was made, or that may be received during the next half-hour. Very likely, therefore, he will refer the captain to his general instructions, and emphatically call his attention to the fact that all details are left exclusively to him. Possibly the request will shake the colonel's confidence in the captain, and induce the former against his will to give detailed instructions that later seem impracticable and only place the captain in a worse predicament than before. To be sure, we here have to deal with a sin of omission on the part cf the colonel or his adjutant; namely, that the staff officer sent to Pittehnen was not carefully informed about the information that had been received at regimental headquarters, or the colonel's further plans — an error with which also the staff officer himself is to be blamed. Had the latter been able to inform the captain concerning the situation, the latter would have been able to decide more readily. But no matter how much such mistakes are to be regretted, and how much damage they may do, they always will happen. Every leader must be prepared for them and know how to deal with them. If the captain has been at all in doubt, he will be brought to a decision by the fact that, in case the regiment in the mean- time should have left Herzogswalde, he might have to wait hours for an answer, and that in any event valuable time again would have been lost. Should the regiment follow via Pit- tehnen, communication is not threatened; should it advance via Sackstein or Kallisten, the troop in going towards Gutt- stadt would more quickly regain communication than if it remained at Pittehnen. If, contrary to all expectation, the regiment should turn towards Wormditt, as might happen if positive and conclusive information should demand it, the troop 82 Studies in Appued Tactics. is all the more obliged to reconnoiter towards Guttstadt. Fi- nally, the message to be sent by the staff officer to the colonel will enable the latter to make any arrangements necessary to further the troop's action. But the troop commander will not let the staff officer go until the latter fully understands the former's plans and arrangements. The most important thing is the route to be taken by the troop. The smooth highway favors speed and apparently af- fords a good view. But it has already been ' mentioned that reconncitering parties as far as possible should avoid the high- ways. It is fair to assume that the hostile troop encountered near Pittehnen will be followed by a larger body of cavalry, and this can be more readily discovered and its strength esti- mated from the country to one side of the road than by a direct encounter with it on the road. The vigilance of point and flankers may guard against surprise, but they are not suited for careful and thorough reconnaissance work, because they are forced to defend themselves against hostile patrols that are striving to prevent observation. The enemy's eyes, the same as our own, most carefully scan the highway and would dis- cover our troop all too soon. But the best way to observe the enemy is from a place of concealment. The highway can be farther and better overlooked from the heights to the south than to the north of it and the southern route will more promptly establish communication through Sackstein, whence no further information has been received. Therefore the captain decides at first to ride to Kleinefeld, which he hopes to reach unobserved. But before beginning his march he must attend to several things. What shall be done with the prisoners? As the troop had an interpreter, it is unlikely that more will be found out from them at regimental headquarters than has already been learned. The regimental staff will hardly have time to bother with them. Reconnaissance. 83 and, besides, it is uncertain where the regiment will be found. Therefore it seems best to send them back to the army corps. Sergeant L 's patrol is still at Liebstadt. He can send back the prisoners through Gr. Hermenau to Mohrungen by- means of the police or citizens assisted by a trooper. They will be taken to Liebstadt in a wagon from Pittehnen, escort- ed by 3 troopers, who are promptly to return to Pittehnen and report to Corporal P . These troopers will inform the non- commissioned officer at lyiebstadt of the situation and the cap- tain's further intentions. Corporal P is informed of this, and is ordered to remain at Pittehnen with 3 troopers as a con- necting-post and to secure the way across the Passarge. This detail includes the two men whose horses were injured in the pursuit. The captured horses are turned over to Corporal P as remounts for the two men. The 3 troopers detailed to escort the prisoners, upon returning, will form part of the connecting-post. Corporal P is cautioned that all mes- sages of importance for corps headquarters must be sent to Mohrungen, particularly if communication with the regiment becomes uncertain. For this purpose it is advisable to use the telegraph from Liebstadt. It is not the great distance, but the unsafe road, that leads to the establishment of a post at the Passarge bridge. Later in the day it may prove useful as a means of communication with the army corps. Finally, instructions must be sent Sergeant K , who was ordered to follow the hostile troop, and the message to be taken back by the staff officer must be written. It is recommended that both these messages be writ- ten IN FUIvIv, and, to show HOW LONG IT TAKES, THAT THE WRITING BE TIMED. PiTTEHEN, 5 May, 8-40 a. m. To Sergeant K .• Troop A will continue its advance towards Guttstadt via Kleinefeld. You will keep touch with the defeated troop and protect the regiment to- 84 Studies in Applied Tactics. wards the north. Messages should be sent to the regiment through Ser- geant L , at Liebstadt, or Corporal P , at Pittehnen. At 8 a. m. the regiment was at Herzogswalde. The 3 troopers that the chief of the 3d platoon sent to follow the enemy towards Stollen are placed under your orders. The bearer of this message should return to the connecting- post at Pittehnen. E , Captain. Pittehnen, 5 May, 8-55 a. m. To Adjutant, ist Cavalry: After being delayed by a group of hostile troopers at Naglack, this troop arrived at Reichenthal at about 8 a. m. and attacked a hostile troop that was advancing from Pittehnen on the highway towards Blumen. The enemy escaped to the north and was pursued as far as Klogehnen. He has disappeared towards Stollen. Sergeant K and 9 troopers are follow- ing to keep touch with the enemy and protect the regiment towards the north. Three prisoners state that the enemy consisted of Troop No. 2, 5th Dragoons, which left Heilsberg early this morning, where it had passed the night with the entire regiment. The prisoners neither can describe the route they followed to-day, nor tell where they were night before last, or where their regiment, which they have not seen to-day, now is. They apparently know nothing else of importance. I am sending the prisoners to Mohrungen via Liebstadt, and shall advance via Kleinefeld towards Guttstadt. A connecting- post, under Corporal P , is left at Pittehnen, to which point^please send information concerning future move- ment of the regiment and of any important messages received. I shall attempt to establish communication with the regiment through Sackstein. I have not yet received any word from the right bank of the Passarge. Below Sackstein the stream can be crossed only on bridges, excepting at Kalkstein, where there are said to be two fords. Captain. It took me about 5 minutes to write the instructions to Sergeant K , and the message to the adjutant took nearly 15 minutes. Some may be able to do it in less time. It is not so much the actual writing, as a careful consideration of the subject-matter, that takes time. In the field, additional time will be consumed by all sorts of interruptions and the observa- tion of terrain and enemy. All this must be borne in mind by both the sender and receiver. It is desirable to diminish the time required as much as possible. But can this best be done by shortening the wording? Searching for the shortest form of expression might take longer than rapidly writing several RSCONNAISSANC]?;. 85 longer sentences, and might result in ambiguities similar to those often arising from the so-called telegraphic style. It is most appropriate to say, "Please excuse this long letter; I haven't time to write a shorter one." It is hardly possible to omit anything contained in the foregoing messages. But the question arises whether the captain might not have saved the 15 valuable minutes taken in writing the second message, by letting the staff officer carry back a verbal report. As we here have an officer, and above all, the colonel's selected staff officer, to take back word, the captain certainly would be authorized in sending a verbal message to his superior. No one would blame the captain if he considered such verbal mes- sage sufficient. But his confidence in the staff officer may have been somewhat shaken by the latter's imperfect knowledge of the situation, for a reliable and energetic officer would not have left Herzogswalde in such blissful ignorance. The captain is the responsible party, and he would be blamed for any mis- understanding caused by inaccurate transmission of the mes- sage. He knows what a valuable document a written message is. Possibly he already has learned by experience that such a document may ser\^e as a protection against unmerited censure ; and, even if this consideration would not be the motive for a high-minded man's course of action, still, the thought of his reputation as a careful commander justified his course. The troop cannot start at once; it must first let the point and flank- ers gain the necessary lead. This allows some time in which to restore order after the pursuit, and enables horses and men to somewhat recover from its effects. It also affords some time for writing the message which is dictated to two men so that a copy can be retained by the first sergeant. While the latter forms the troop under cover near Pit- tehnen, the captain has an opportunity to commend his men for their meritorious conduct, and to order the horses to be watered, before joining the officer whom he has intrusted with 86 Studies in Applied Tactics. keeping watch towards Guttstadt. He finds the latter and the 6 troopers at the bend of the road northeast of Pittehnen. The captain took along Lieutenant B and his 6 men of Troop B, as well as 2 non-commissioned officers and 10 men of his own troop, to promptly make the necessary arrangements on the right bank of the Passarge. The ofiicer, Lieutenant S , reports that two hostile troopers were visible for a few minutes on Height no south of Elditten; but that he had seen nothing else of the enemy. The captain scans the country, excepting a number of depres- sions, as far north as Klogehnen, and to Height in north of Schwenkitten, then from the grove on the road to Dittrichsdorf beyond Height 1 11 to the border of the woods on the slope of Hasenberg,* as far as half-way between Elditten and Kleinefeld and as far as Height no south of Elditten. There is nothing suspicious to be seen anywhere, and the occupants of the neigh- boring farm do not know anything more than what the captain already has learned. To the rear the view extends as far as the highway at Gr. Prags3en and Wuchsnig. There is nothing to be seen of the regiment. The captain requests the staff officer to listen to his next arrangements and then to rapidly ride back to the colonel. What arrangements does Captain E make at the bend of the highway northeast of pittehnen? So far the patrols in front of the troop, whose arc had been partly penetrated by the hostile troop, have been detained by the Passarge. The assembled blue troop, after driving the enemy away, has entered the outer zone of the reconnoitering screen and its own safety as well as a continuation of the recon- naissance calls for a rearrangement of the service in its front. We can resort to the regulation plan of sending cut patrols in fan-shape order: one patrol via Arnsdorf-Ereymarkt towards *"Hasen B." on map. Rejconnaissanci;. 87 Schmolainen, one along the Wolfsdorf-Guttstadt highway, one via Kleinefeld-Warlack towards Glcttau, and possibly a fifth via Hohenfeld-Waltersmiihl towards Heiligenthal-Rosengarth. These would form the orthodox screen and would sufficiently protect the body of the troop, following at some distance, from surprise. But on closer examination of existing conditions we see that such a typical formation is not suited to this case. Even in figuring on a minimum strength for these patrols, we hardly would have each one consist of less than a leader and 5 men; taking 30 men in all. This would reduce the strength of the main body of the troop to an unwarranted extent. But even patrols of 6 men, if the distance from their support in- creases, cannot perform their duty properly and will become helpless as soon as they have sent back two or three messages. And, as for sending these messages by 2 men each, as should be done in clcse proximity to the enemy, this is entirely out of the question. But at least the patrol sent via Arnsdorf-Freymarkt to- wards Heilsberg would have to be considerably stronger, as it probably could not return to-day. If the captain does not wish to see his command melt away in small detachments, he must adopt a different system. Of what use is the typical net-work of small patrols whose threads cross all avenues leading towards the enemy? Practi- cally only as a means of protection. These small groups ac- complish relatively little in the way of obtaining information — the hostile screen will see to this. Even if the latter is raised a little here and there, thus affording the patrols an extended glimpse, it will seldom happen that the messenger sent back will bring the information obtained on time. On page 35 mention has already been made of the small value of reconnaissance by junior non-commissioned officers without map or field-glasses, and without comprehensive mili- tary judgment. 88 Studies in Appukd Tactics. The united troop is able to tear the hostile screen, and the captain, who, with his practiced eye is able to judge the com- plete situation, exposes the enemy's cards if he personally ar- rives on the spot where there is something to be seen. It is a very different matter if he can report, "I have seen," than if he must repeat the incomplete and frequently contradictory re- ports of his non-commissioned officers. It therefore seems best that the captain personally undertake the reconnaissance at the head of his troop south of the Pittehnen-Guttstadt highway, and for the same purpose intrusting an officer with a large patrol north of this highway. The men detailed to protect the march of the troop will confine themselves to narrow limits and, like the latter, will try as far as possible to remain unseen. It is unnecessary to send a patrol along the highway, as this is visible from the road through Kleinefeld, and would unnecessarily attract the enemy's attention. In many other cases a similar method to the foregoing might be applicable, but it would be folly to think of deducing a general rule from it. More valuable than the recognition of the suitability cf the foregoing scheme is this: that it is more easy to ride on the road of careful thought and conformity than in the ruts of conventionality. The captain orders Lieutenant S to take i non-com- missioned officer and 8 men and ride ahead to Elditten, to ob- serve from that point — using the church-tower for this purpose. He intends to follow with the troop and go to Kleinefeld under cover alongside the road, with a point i,ooo to 1,500 yards in advance. A flanking patrol will be sent via Hohenfeld to keep the Passarge valley and its left bank under observation and permit of visual communication with the regiment, should it advance via Pittehnen of Sackstein. To Lieutenant B , who, with his 6 troopers, has gone a comparatively short distance to-day, the captain assigns i Reconnaissanci:. 89 non-commissioned officer and 8 men of his own troop, and sends him to reconncdter north of the Guttstadt highway. What instructions does the Captain give to Lieu- tenant B ? "We have learned from prisoners that during the past night the 5th Dragoons was at Heilsberg. We have not found out whence the regiment came, where it is to-day, or to what larger unit it belongs. The hostile cavalry might advance from Heilsberg towards Wormditt or Liebstadt, or via Gutt- stadt. It is important that this point be cleared up for our colonel, but it is more important that corps headquarters find out something about the infantry columns following, over what roads they are advancing, and where the heads of columns are. I am going towards Guttstadt with the troop, and for the pres- ent shall remain south of the highway. You will reconnoiter the country north to include the Wormditt-Freymarkt-Heils- berg highway and east to the Alle. If you have time, you will also cbserv^e the Guttstadt-Heilsberg road, which you may be able to do by going via Sperlings to Liewenberg. Friendly in- habitants were unable to give any information west of the Pas- sarge. Now that hostile advance patrols have passed by, more may be learned by questioning the inhabitants. If you find the road at Freymarkt and the Alle crossings free of the en- emy, you must report the fact — you yourself must decide when your patrol shall return. The prospect of discovering some- thing of importance and the condition of your horses may de- cide you to pass the night in an advanced village. I wish to remind you that it is not important to investigate details, but that you should find out the general situation as conclusively as possible. "Send your messages to the relay station at Pittehnen. Should this have been discontinued, or the road be barred, you must not search for the troop or regiment, but the mes- 90 Studies in z\ppi,ied Tactics. sengers should endeavor to forward messages to corps head- quarters at Mohrungen; for this purpose reach Liebstadt and thence wire to Mohrungen. Sergeant Iv and 6 men are at Liebstadt. It is reported that there are two fords across the Passarge at Kalkstein." These might be the verbal instructions for Lieutenant B , and presumably they are longer than those composed by the majority of my readers. Therefore, referring to what I have said on page 19 concerning the "telegraphic style," and to my draught of previous messages, I wish further to justify the above instructions. Very properly stress is laid on military brevity. But who- ever has learned by experience, as I have, will admit that brevity may be overdone and become a useless formula. How often mistakes have arisen from short commands even on the drill- ground, where a few clear sentences would have explained matters. Whoever reads the orders and instructions of great commanders, hande4 down to us in history, sometimes is sur- prised at their minuteness, deviating very much from the scant style of our maneuver^ and map problems. When the Prusso- German Army began its last great war, a lack of skill and un- certainty in composing orders became manifest in many cases, which, as soon as recognized, was earnestly combated and remedied by careful instruction. Our Army Regulations de- voted much attention to this important point; and in the General Staff and the military schools, as well as with tioops, strenuous efforts were made to lemedy the defects. Therefoie gteat progress has been made in the art cf issuing orders in the German Army. Even the candidate for a commission is re- quired to understand it on his entrance examination, and on maneuvers the wording of orders takes up much of the critique. The progress attained by years of study is unmistakable. But on many occasions I have found out that this art is merely a matter of form, that many points contained in some orders Reconnaissance. 91 based upon the prescribed models were superfluous and that other points were missing that happen not to be mentioned in these models. I wish to call attention to the provisions of the Field Service Regulations relating to Letters of Instructions,* in place cf orders, a form that is but little used any more, but which I believe should be used not only with larger commands, but also with smaller ones — particularly in reconnaissance duty and verbal communications in general. An ordinary conversational form often is clearer and more easily understood than the brief order-form, which, besides, deters a subordinate from asking for elucidation or further ex- planation, and which seldom affords insight into the situation or the commander's plans. Whoever has seen General von Goeben, one of our most prominent commanders, in trying times, will never forget the friendly and instructive manner in which he gave his instructions and orders, thus helping his subordinates to a successful cooperation. The general had the reputation of being taciturn, but his orders in time of war — particularly his verbal ones — often assumed the form of in- structions without losing definiteness of character. Particularly Goeben's example called my attention to this point, and I must caution you not to sacrifice necessary details to brevity and terseness. It is possible that my draft of instructions to Lieutenant B , if included in a report on a maneuver, or delivered before an inspector, would be unfavorably criticised. Instructions something like the following would be mere favorably received: "The troop will advance south of the Pittehnen-Gutt- stadt highway; you will reconnoiter north of the same towards Freymarkt-Heilsberg. ' ' I admit that this form would do if Lieutenant B were a specially capable officer, who looked out for everything else himself; who realized how important it is to get a glimpse be- *See par. 29, F. S. R. 92 Studies in Applied Tactics. hind the hostile cavalry, to find the infantry columns and the crossings of the Alle, to get a view of the Heilsberg-Guttstadt highway, to report to corps headquarters, to remain out all night if necessary, to question inhabitants, and to make use of the telegraph line from Iviebstadt. But if the captain is not absolutely certain of such exceptional intelligence in his subordi- nates, it would be better for him to impart some of his own intelligence and knowledge. Besides, co6pera,tion would be more likely to result. The captain by all means must tell the officer what he found out from the prisoners, and he ought to say mere about the situation in general than is contained in my draft, were it not fair to assume that L-ieu tenant B already had this information from the colonel, who had sent him ahead. Neither would it do to omit instructions concern- ing the messengers' route. I am not in favor of instructions covering all sorts of pos- sible contingencies; but the omission of a useful hint is more questionable than thp addition of a sentence that on close in- spection proves to be superfluous. Excessive brevity as easily causes doubt as verbosity. But the abbreviated form of instructions, with addition of messengers' route, may do for the lieutenant's note-book and the first sergeant's letter-book. After discussing a number of important events at the ex- treme front of the cavalry reconnoitering parties, we must return to regimental headquarters; but in doing so, you must try to forget in your deliberations and discussions what has been said as having happened at the front, very much as you would a vivid and impressive dream. To help produce this effect, let us assume for the time being that entirely different reports concerning the enemy and our own patrols have been received. Reconnaissance. 93 Then it is recommended that pages 9 to 15 be re-read to refresh the memory. During the night (May 4th-5th) the messages received by Captain E from Elbing also came to regimental headquar- ters; viz., that telegraphic communication had been interrupted with Konigsberg and Pr. Eylau since early on May 4th and with Landsberg since noon the same day; that hostile troopers had seen seen at the latter place; that the telegraph line was de- stroyed between Mehlsack and Wormditt on the evening of May 4th; and that the enemy had not appeared at Mehlsack itself as late as 2 a. m. May 5th. The following telegram is received from corps headquarters: The cavalry of the ist Division and at least one troop from the 2d Division will reconnoiter via Pfeilings towards Jonkendorf-Miinsterberg on the 5th inst. Colonel A— — • was not awakened on account of these mes- sages. They were not shown him until after 4 a. m., when the following was received: Drenken, 5 May, 3-30 a. m. bhall leave at 5 a. m. with 3 troops to reconnoiter via Pfeilings to- wards Jonkendorf-Miinsterberg. D , Major T,d Cavalry. The regimental commander considers it desirable to have a personal interview with the major, whose message should be acknowledged. He therefore sends back word by the return- ing messenger asking the major to overtake him on the road to Mohrungen. There are no further arrangements necessary at this time (about 4 a. m.) ; still, corps headquarters is informed by wire that there is no change in the situation and that the regiment will start on time. A messenger would not have been sent for this purpose, but, the telegraph line being convenient, this report of minor importance is sent by wire. It is not without 94 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. value for corps headquarters to learn that nothing has hap- pened to interfere with the execution of existing orders. Before starting, the regimental adjutant reports that Lieu- tenant F had wired from Gr. Hermenau at 4 a. m., asking to be informed by wire of any further information received since his departure and stating that he had neither seen nor heard anything of the enemy. So far telegraphic communica- tion with Mohrungen and lyiebstadt as well as with Horn has not been interrupted. Upon inquiry it has been learned that Lieutenant C left the latter station at 3 a. m. Troop A, ist Cavalry, left Maldeuten at 4 a. m., as ordered. On his way to Gr. Wilmsdcrf the colonel and his staff ride past the different troops which already have largely joined the column and dismounted upon arriving at their respective places, as is always done without orders upon halting, unless it be neces- sary to be in immediate readiness for action. Promptly at 5 a. m. Colonel A arrives at Gr. Wilmsdorf. Unless unavoid- able, he purposely tries never to arrive before the time named by himself, so as to avoid even the suspicion of being nervous or perturbed, and not to interfere with the routine duties of his staff. The squadron commanders report at Gr. Wilmsdorf, stating that nothing of importance has happened among the troops. Troop C, Captain W commanding, has been sent forward half way to Gr. Bestendorf to protect the regiment while assembling. A platoon of Troop D is at the railway sta- tion of Maldeuten for the same purpose. This station is occu- pied by a platoon of the organized militia. What arrangements does Colonel A make at 5 A. M.? The German Field Service Regulations say practically nothing about the manner in which cavalry divisions, or sub- divisions of the same, shall protect their march ; one is tempted to add, "fortunately." Here, where everything depends on Reconnaissance. 95 circumstances, every regulation, no matter how carefully- worded, would be a detriment. But, in spite of the notable absence of instructions, there is hardly a cavalry officer who would be helpless in the face of the problem. Most of them certainly would devise suitable arrangements, even though differing from each other. And yet the protection of the march of cavalry is by no means easier or simpler than that of a force of all arms, whose work in this particular to a great extent is performed by the cavalry sent in advance. We might almost believe that the detailed and comprehensive instructions of our Field Service Regulations, for the protection of the march of the main columns of an army, unconsciously are based on a long-since-forgotten system of peace training and on a conviction of its being innocuous. My contemporaries may remember the careful method of examining localities along the line of march, and which no body of troops was allowed to pass until point and flankers had sent back word that everything was all right. This method was conscientiously followed for a whole day by the division to which I belonged in the campaign of 1866. We had started at 3 a. m. and at 6 p. m. we reached our destination, 12 miles away. But, beginning with the following morning, no one ever thought of the carefully practiced rule which never- theless has been partly resurrected in long paragraphs of the Field Servdce Regulations, to be sure in a purified and better form, so that following it cannot result in similar disadvantages. But it would be a decided advantage if the present regulations were condensed and all figures and measurements were omitted ; for no one can depend on these, but everyone is forced to make arrangements on his own judgment and responsibility in ac- cordance with the requirements of each case. As the (German) Field Service Regulations require that cavalry must adopt such formation of column and means of protection as may be demanded by circumstances, commanders of infantry would also be able to do this if only the fundamental principles 96 Studies in Applied Tactics. of the service of security are established and peace training as- sures an intelUgent and certain execution of the same. Later I shall return to this subject, but think it appropriate to refer to the subject here so as to call the cavalry leader's attention to the value of the independence authorized by the Regulations. The measures adopted to obtain information also help in the matter of security or protection, but are not sufficient. The troops must not be surprised by the enemy and must ex- tend a second and closer series of tentacles, finer meshed and more reliable, to serve as a second network of reccnnoitering bodies. The subdivisions of this system will differ according to the country and circumstances, and require a more permanent organization and supervision. As the commander of a larger bcdy of troops cannot per- sonally attend to the details of this service, he intrusts it to the care of one or more subordinates, and, as it is not a question of independent action, and to avoid unnecessary expenditure of energy, the detachments for this purpose are made as small as circumstances will permit. Colonel A wishes to intrust Troop C, which already is in front, with the duty of protecting the march of the regiment. But the troop will be unable to satisfactorily perform this duty towards the north, the exposed flank, of the regiment. The platoon of Troop D at the Maldeuten railway station is con- veniently situated to assist in this matter. But the latter easily might need reinforcement, and if it remained under the imme- diate command of the colonel, the latter, contrary to his wishes, would have to continually arrange the various details.. There- fore the colonel orders as follows: "The regiment provisionally will march via Gr. Bestendorf and Mohrungen to Gr. Hermenau. Troop C is detailed as ad- vance guard. I shall personally give the captain his orders. Major W , commanding ist Squadron, is charged with the protection of the left flank. For this purpose he may use the Reconnaissance. 97 platoon of Troop D now at the Maldeuten railway station. Our march will begin at 5.10 a. m., at a walk. Afterwards the gait will be regulated by that of the advance guard, where I shall be." The regimental and squadron adjutants write down this order. Then the colonel joins Troop C and gives the captain the following orders: "Hostile patrols arrived last night at Wormditt, Guttstadt and Briickendorf. The regiment provisionally will march via Gr. Bestendorf and Mohrungen to Gr. Hermenau. You will form the advance guard with your troop. Besides protecting our march in front, it is important that you reconnoiter the defile between Narien-see and Mahrung-see and the Willnau- Kallisten road. Lieutenant C left the railway station near- est Horn at 3 a. m. to-day to reconnoiter via Briickendorf to- wards Jonkendorf-Gr. Buchwalde. There is still telegraphic communication with the station nearest Horn via Mohrungen; also with Liebstadt. Troop A at 4 a. m. advanced from Mal- deuten to Gr. Hermenau and will reconnoiter towards Worm- ditt-Guttstadt-Miinsterberg. Major W is charged with the protection of our left flank. You will keep connection with the main body of the regiment. I shall remain with your troop and indicate the gait." After having satisfied himself that Captain W has obtained no information concerning the enemy, so that pre- sumably the march will not be interfered with for the present, the colonel sends the following written order to the officer in charge of the baggage train: The baggage train will start at 6 a. m., at first following the regi- ment on the Mohrungen-Georgenthal highway to a point east of the Moh- rungen railway station. It may seem strange that no arrangements are made for the protection of the bagage train, which might be attacked by hostile patrols from the north. It also may have been 98 Studies in Applied Tactics. noticed that the regimental order of May 4th neither designated an escort nor a commander for the train.* With the baggage train of a cavalry regiment (sup- posedly about 400 yards long, but probably 500 or 600 yards long) there always is a considerable number of armed men, such as men in charge of led horses, convalescents,^ men whose horses have become disabled, and other detailed men — probably amounting to 7 or 8 men per troop and aggregating 80 or 90 all told. If these men are properly utilized, and not unneces- sarily scattered, they will be sufficient to drive off hostile patrols. The detail of 8 or 10 troopers would not help matters much, especially as there always are some mounted men with the train. The men with the train would best be commanded by an officer and this is the rule in our field maneuvers. But in time of war an officer seldom can be spared for this purpose, as his presence would be badly missed in his command,! whereas he probably never would become actively engaged with the enemy while with the train. Why would not one of the paymasters answer the purpose ? All of them are reliable non-.commissicned officers accustomed to command. Even for an entire division, pay- masters in time of war have often conducted trains with perfect satisfaction. In the regimental order no mention is made of a paymaster to command the train because it is assumed that he has been permanently detailed for this purpose. Some explanation is necessary for the colonel's order re- quiring the troop to preserve connection with the main body. J This is contrary to the requirement of the (German) Field Service Regulations, which provide that subdivisions of col- umns shall preserve connection with those farther to the front. *But see pars. 399, 401, and 402, F. S. R. fPar. 401, V. S. R., provides that the regimental quartermaster shall control the train. The Germans keep all their regimental staff with the troops for service with them. — Translator. JBut see par. 105, F. S. R., where this is prescribed. Reconnaissance. 99 In woods, close country, at night, or in a fog it often happens in larger commands that connection is lost. Who has not experienced this? I ascribe the fault mainly to the above named requirement. The commander of the entire force usu- ally is in front with the advance guard and directs its move- ments. If the commander of the main body or of its leading unit, who but casually understands the situation and knows nothing of the information received, is charged with preserv- ing connection, he can simply make the customary arrange- ments: he sends a few privates forward where even an officer at times might be led astray. In close country, in towns of straggling villages, for example, the advance guard sends a reconnoitering detachment to one side, the connecting-file may easily mistake this for the advance guard itself and, following it, may lead the entire main body en a wrong road, for there is no one with the latter who at once would recognize the mis- take. But the advance-guard commander knows the road and all he has to do is to notify the main body the moment there is a change of direction, or if it becomes difficult to follow. If he is held responsible for preserving connection, he will be careful to see that the main body does not lose its way, for he alone, aside from the commanding officer, is able to do this. This provision of the Field Service Regulations doubtless is a relic of the time when the commanding officer, who had to know the road, habitually marched with the main body and not with the advance guard. Now let us see what the subordinate commanders decide to do in consequence of the colonel's orders. First: What arrangements does Major W — ■ — , com- manding First Squadron, maice? The major is charged with the protection of the left flank of the regiment. Here, naturally, as elsewhere, "protection" includes keeping the enemy at a distance and preventing recon- loo Studies in AppuFvD Tactics. naissance en his part. This need not be impressed on an ex- perienced cavalry officer, although good protection does not always insure perfect screening. For example, holding a bridge may prevent all attacks by the enemy, while neighboring heights might aflFord him ample opportunity for reconnaissance. At first the Eestendcrf Forest will form a complete screen for the regiment; if it is to remain so, the enemy must be pre- vented from entering it unobserv^ed. A protecting body there- fore must be sent to the north border ; in part also because that affords an extended view. As the regiment will start at once and seen will go at an increased gait, there is no certainty that the platoon at the Maldeuten railway station will gain sufficient distance via Freywalde to insure its being able to protect the flank in time and by itself. Therefore Major W selects a platoon of the leading troop and instructs its commander as follows in the presence of the troop commander: "The regiment will start at once and at first go as far as Gr. Hermenau via Gr. Bestendorf-Mohrungen. Troop C, which is in advance,* will form the advance guard. You will cover the left flank and at first will ride via Alt-Kelken to the north border cf the forest and then in the general direction of Steindorf-Rollnau to Wiese. You will remain at Wiese until further orders, reconnoitering thence towards Kahlau, Gold- bach, and Silberbach. The ist platoon of Troop D, which now is at the Maldeuten railwa}^ station, will at first follow you via Freywalde to Rollnau and protect the flank in rear of you." The ist platoon of Troop D receives orders conforming to the foregoing. It is self-evident that both platoons must look out for their own protection towards the north and must observe the region about Hagenau and Konigsdorf. Their orders contain nothing about the enemy, because it may be assumed that the squadron commanders already have told all their officers what is known of the enemy, and that the Rejconnaissance. ioi officer at the Maldeuten railway station secured this informa- tion for himself from the telegraph office at that place. It is true that half a troop is used as flank guard, but the two platoons will not have to make much of a detour, and presumably they could be en hand in case of an engagement. The distance accidentally existing between the two platoons is not objectionable; it broadens the front of protection on the north. The platoons will arrive respectively at Wiese and RoUnau before the regiment passes Mohrungen, and the anticipated halt at the latter place will enable the major to issue further instructions. What are the advance-guard commander's arrange- ments? It may be assumed that the captain has vedettes at Wolla and Alt-Kelken and a patrol on the highway at the eastern exit of Gr. Bestendorf. Protection must promptly be arranged for to the front, so that the regiment's march may not be delayed. Therefore the captain orders as follows in a loud tone cf voice, so that every man may understand: "The troop is the advance guard for the regiment. The line of march at first is through Mohrungen to Gr. Hermenau. Troop A went ahead an hour ago over this road. "Patrol ahead of the advance party: Lieutenant G and 8 troopers, including the patrol at the eastern exit of Bestendorf. You will ride ahead, at first to the vicinity of Alt-Bolitten and Herzogswalde. "Advance party: Sergeant B with i corporal and lo troopers. You will go past Mohrungen railway station and Georgenthal — trot out! "Right flank patrol: Lieutenant N and 12 troopers, including the vedette at Wolla. You will ride through Kuh- diebs-Paradies-Himmelforth-Willnau towards Kallisten, and will protect the right flank of the regiment. Messages at I02 Studies in Appi.iEd Tactics. first will be sent to Mohrungen, with which point there is still telegraphic communication from Horn railway station; later, messages will be sent direct to Gr. Hermenau. Lieutenant C , I St Cavalry, who left Horn railway station at 3 a. m., is going past Briickendorf towards Jonkendorf. You must hasten your ride as far as the vicinity of Horn. "Left jiank patrol: Sergeant K with the vedette at Alt-Kelken, and 5 troopers. You at first will ride past Alt- Kelken-Neu-Bestendorf-Neuhof to the north exit of Georgen- thal and will protect the left flank of the troop. "Sergeant V and 5 troopers: You will ride between the troop and the main body of the regiment, and are respon- sible for preserving connection between the two bodies." If, in the meantime, the troop must start, he can give part of the instructions en route. The captain rides at the head of the main body of his troop and keeps the advance party or connecting-files in sight. The colonel, who has listened to the captain's orders, adds the following to Lieutenant N 's orders: "Be sure and report by wire from the station nearest Horn. Major D , with 3 troops of the 3d Cavalry, leaves Drenken at 5 a. m., following the regiment at first and then reconnoitering through Pfeilings toward Jonkendorf." The colonel's additional order shows how judicious it was for him to have listened to the captain's orders. It was not done from distrust of the latter's judgment, but from a desire to keep track of events and to be able to add to his own orders if necessary, which would still be possible at this time. In his orders to the captain he omitted the information concerning the detachment of the 3d Cavalry, which is of importance for the troop as well as for Lieutenant N . Such an error may be made by even the most method- ical commander. In listening to the orders given by a subordi- nate, a superior must be very careful to interfere only in case Reconnaissance. io3 of extreme necessity. He should give the subordinate a free hand, even if thereby his orders are carried out a Httle differ- ently from what he had anticipated. Neither of the commanders has given any instructions about the distance of the advance party from the troop or of the latter from the main body of the regiment. The colonel himself will order the advance guard to start, and then will regulate its distance from the main body of the regiment with- out expressing this in figures. The captain purposely omitted stating in yards the distance the advance party should be ahead of the troop. It is self-evident that the advance party must try to reach the edge of the woods west of Mohrungen as soon as possible, to get a good view; an order to keep i,ooo yards ahead might only serve to confuse it in this intelligent purpose. Sergeant V 's orders to preserv^e connection with the main body does not relieve the captain of the responsibility for the proper execution of this duty. But the sergeant is a well-instructed intermediary, able to transmit information from the captain to the main body concerning any change of route. As soon as the advance party and patrols had made some headway, the colonel had the main body of the troop start and at about 6 a. m. he arrived with it at the eastern edge of Best- endorf Forest. Here Major D , of the 3d Cavahy, comes up. The colonel informs him of his intentions and arrange- ments. The major reports that he intends going via Briicken- dorf. The advance guard inquired for telegrams at the Gr. Bestendorf station, and brought the colonel the message sent by Captain E at 5.20 a. m. from Mohrungen, in which the latter stated that the situation remained unchanged and that he would continue his advance towards Gr. Hermenau. At 6.25 a. m. Colonel A , the advance guard, and Major D arrived at the Mohrungen station, where the follow- ing message from Lieutenant C was received by the colonel : I04 Studies in Applied Tactics. Hillside just west of Bruckendorf, 5 May, 4-10 a. m. Found railway station near Bruckendorf occupied by enemy, who fired on us. C , Lieutenant. The message was wired at 5 a. m. from Horn railway sta- tion. It was also learned that this station no longer answered to its call. Nothing was seen of the enemy at Neuhof, Wiese, Georgenthal, or Dohringshof. The colonel did not see fit to stop the march. He surmised that only some advance patrols of the enemy had reached Horn and believed that Major D could cope with them. The regimental commander's decision is of interest because there is a possibility that larger hostile bodies of cavalry already may have reached the defile between Narien- and Mahrung-see. But it will not do to halt on account of this possible contin- gency so as to assist Major D in case of necessity. It might take a long time to find out something definite, and we might keenly regret the delay if in the meantime the enemy appeared from the north, where the regiment's main duty lies. Major D remained to await the arrival of his troops; Colonel A , with the advance guard took the road past the railway station towards Georgenthal, but sent an ofiicer into the town of Mohrungen to inquire for messages of the Postal Telegraph office, destroy all tape records of the past few days, and question the mayor concerning news of the enemy. Upon arriving at Georgenthal at 6.50 a. m., Colonel A received the message from Captain E , which was as follows: Gr. Hermenau, 5 May, 6-20 a. m. Twenty hostile troopers were at Wormditt last night, destroyed the railway and telegraph at that point, and left on the way towards Aiken at I a. m. I am not pursuing them. Sergeant H and 5 troopers are now at Wormditt. Lieutenant B encountered a platoon of hostile cavalry at Schar- nick early this morning, and at 5-30 a. m. had retreated to Pittehnen. At 5 a. m. to-day 12 hostile troopers, coming from Lettau, rode towards Her- Reconnaissance. 105 zogswalde. Their whereabouts is not known. Lieutenant F is recon- noitering via Kallisten towards Guttstadt. Troop A will advance via Herzogswalde-Pittehnen to reconnoiter the Liebstadt-Guttstadt road. Lieutenant F sent a lance corporal and 2 troopers to Sackstein, No report yet received from him. I am leaving connecting-posts at tele- graph stations in Liebstadt and Gr. Hermenau and at Herzogswalde. Captain. Continuing at a walk, Colonel A , while lie held his map before him, had the message read to him. It is less troublesome to find the names of localities than is usually the case on peace maneuvers. The seriousness of war forces com- manders and their staffs to carefully consider all contingencies in advance and familiarize themselves with the map. The message contains nothing necessitating a change of plans, particularly as in the meantime nothing has been seen of the enemy at Goldbach or Silberbach. At 7.15 a. m. the advance guard reached Gr. Hermenau. The colonel discovered that telegraphic communication still existed with Liebstadt and that the patrol of Troop A located there knew nothing of the enemy. Beyond lyiebstadt tele- graphic communication exists only as far as Sportehnen. A short message was received from Captain E at Herzogs- walde, stating that he had seen nothing of the enemy there and had received no further information. The troop had resumed its march towards Pittehnen at 6.50 a. m., and had sent the connecting-post under Captain M ■ to the Teufelsberg. The colonel thought it inadvisable to pursue the hostile patrol that went from Wormditt towards Aiken, but he informed the advance guard commander and Major W about it. He sent a short telegram to the corps commander, stating what had been accomplished, and then quietly continued the march towards Herzogswalde, leaving i non-commissioned officer and 4 troopers at the telegraph station in Gr. Hermenau. Arriving at Herzogswalde shortly after 8 a. m., the reg- imental commander receives the following messages: io6 Studies in Applied Tactics. 1. Frcm Ccrpcral M , Troop A, Teufelsberg, 7-55 a. m. Ten hostile troopers were seen riding along the road from Naglack towards Banners. They were pursued in an easterly direction by a platoon of Troop A, ist Cavalry. The troop is now in the vicinity of Reichenthal. Nothing else seen of the enemy. 2. The same ncn-commissioned officer transmits the mes- sage sent by Lieutenant F at 6-30 a. m. from Knoll 157 southwest of Heiligenthal. (See page 47.) 3. A message from Major D , sent from Dohringshof at 7-20 a. m. Fifteen hostile troopers reported as retreating from Pfeilings along railway. Nothing heard from Lieutenant C . This message was wired from Mohrungen to Gr. Hermenau. No word has been received from the patrols sent out by the advance guard towards Reichau, Sanglau, Waltersdorf, and Sackstein. The situation is still obscure. The regiment has marched nearly 16 miles and is considerably ahead of the army •corps. It is still early and there may be considerable more to do to-day. Colonel 4 thinks it best to order a halt, which will give the reccnnoitering bodies time to obtain further infor- mation. He sends an officer to Troop A to find out something more definite about this (his most important) recoimoitering body. The squadrons are billeted on Herzogswalde for rations and forage; the advance guard is charged with the protection of the regiment towards the south and east, while Major W continues to see to the protection towards the north. (In the the meantime the platoon of Troop C has rejoined the troop; and the ist platoon, Troop D, is at Alt-Bolitten.) The colonel takes advantage of the halt to orient himself and obtain a personal view of the sm-rounding country. First he goes to the Teufelsberg, where he learns that the message from Sackstein, referred to by Lieutenant F , has not been received, and carefully scans with his field-glasses the broad Reconnaissance. 107 expanse of country visible. His view extends beyond the line Willnau-Seubersdorf-Kallisten and to the heights east of Dep- pen and to Waltersmiihl. Our own patrols are visible at Reichau and Waltersdorf, but nothing is seen of the enemy. No conclusions can be drawn from the movements of individual figures seen in the distance. Following the horizon around farther to the north, Hohenfeld is seen. A view to Elditten and Pittehnen is prevented by the tree-covered heights east of Gr. Pragsden and west of Reichenthal. To the north, Lieb- stadt and the country west of the railway can be seen, but nothing suspicious is noted. Then the colonel rides across country between Herzogswalde and the Wuchsnig-see, to the north end of this lake, hoping there to get a glimpse of the country about Pittehnen. But even Height 153 does not ad- mit of this. At Elditten he sees several horsemen, but cannot tell whether they are friend or foe. At 9.30 the regimental staff officer of the ist Cavalry sent to Troop A returns with Captain E 's message of 8.50 a. m. (See page 84.) While the staff officer is giving a more de- tailed account, a message is received from Sackstein, stating that our patrols are being fired on from the right bank of the Passarge at that point; but that the enemy's strength could not be determined; and that individual hostile troopers are visible on the heights near Waltersmiihl. The squadrons found forage in Herzogswalde, and it may be assumed that they have watered and fed by this time, 9-35 a. m. What are Colonel A 's further intentions? (Lieutenant F 's message dated 7.35 a. m., from Komal- men, has not been received by the colonel, and therefore canno- be considered.) Considerable valuable information is at hand, and a suc- cessful encounter has been had with the enemy; nevertheless io8 Studies in AppIvIi^d Tactics. there is uncertainty about many things, and it [is by no means self-evident what shall be done. We again see that uncertainty is the normal condition in war, and that the more commanders are obliged in time of peace to grope about in this semi-darkness, the more will their sense of touch and power of combination be developed. Troop A's engagement with the enemy has demonstrated that we have to deal with quite a force of the enemy's cavalry. One of his troops has been temporarily defeated, but where the remainder of his cavalry force is can only be surmised. Whether it is acting alone or in combination with other troops is entirely unknown. The hostile regiment of dragoons was at Heilsberg during the night and sent one of its troops towards Pittehnen. But so far nothing but hostile patrols have been noticed at Kallisten and Sackstein; and a larger body hardly could have concealed itself in the river valley near Sackstein. Thus it is possible that the hostile cavalry, or at least a part of it, will follow towards Pittehnen. This assumption is the more likely to be correct because it may seem more advantageous to the hostile commander to advance past the north end of Narien- see than through the defile between it and Mohrung-see. Of course, if this assumption is correct, the enemy can just as well advance via Wormditt or Kalkstein as via Pittehnen. It does not signify that so far nothing has been heard from the patrol at Wormditt. It is a long way off, the patrol may have been pushed aside, oi its message may have been intercepted. Nevertheless, should the hostile cavalry as a whole or in part come via Guttstadt-Kallisten-Willnau, it at first would meet Major D— — , and later the advance guard of the army corps, which would be less objectionable than if it succeeded, by a detour to the north, in reaching the flank of the ist Army Corps and locating one flank of the army. Herzogswalde is favorably located, in that from here the regiment can promptly advance against the enemy should he Reiconnaissance. 109 approach on any of the above-named routes. But, after all, is it Colonel A 's duty to advance against the hostile cav- alry? According to the wording of the order, he is simply to "reconnoiter," and the Field Service Regulations emphasize that, "the main object being to observe the enemy, combat should be avoided, except as a means to this end."* Before further discussing Colonel A 's plans, it is de- sirable to get a clear idea of this fundamental question. A great number of patrols close to each other, on an ex- tended front, followed by contact troops, apparently would insure our cavalry seeing everything to a great distance. How- ever, if the reconnoitering is to be performed in this way not for only two or three days, but for a long time, provision must be made for the relief, reinforcement, and support of this ad- vance cavalry, for even the contact troops will be able to con- tinue this destructive activity for a few days only. This neces- sitates a further division of the force, so that possibly each regi- ment of the cavalry brigade would have to advance on a separate road. Although this theory has been advocated by some, still it is generally objected to, because thereby the force would be too much scattered. Experience proves that sometimes it is neces- sary to fight to clear up the situation, and that to succeed in this event it is necessary to keep the force together ; for it is seldom that we know in advance whether there will be a fight or how strong the enemy is. But there is another reason for keeping your force together and being careful in sending out detach- ments. The enemy is quite as anxious as we are to get infor- mation, and to insure our success it is almost as important to prevent the enemy from reconnoitering and to keep his com- mander in the dark as it is for us to have ample information of him. Preventing hostile reconnaissance, which under the term of "screening our own movements" is not as clearly and *See par. 65, F. S. R. no Studies in Applied Tactics. sharply defined as it should be, must be considered by our cavalry as of almost equal importance with reconnaissance. The word "almost" in this sentence is justified only on the supposition that our own commander-in-chief is superior to the enemy's and is better able to utilize the information he receives than is the case with the enemy. By combat alone can this end be attained, and rational principles of warfare teach that it is not necessary to defeat every small detachment, but simply the main hostile force; which result will immediately be followed by the retreat of the smaller detachments, and end the enemy's extended activity in reconnaissance, while furthering our own. No one would censvire the cavalry leader who, trusting in his own good troops, looks upon a combat with the hostile cavalry not as a last resort, but as the first and best one. If he seeks a decisive encounter instead of avoiding it, his confident demeanor will be a powerful factor for success as opposed to any less certain and determined enemy. A recognition of the correctness of this principle will not induce a prudent man to omit carefully weighing each separate case or utilizing every advantage. He would not wish to offer an easy victory to a superior hostile force. Cool calculation must check eagerness for combat; first consider, then venture. Sometimes, contrary to our wishes, safety lies in accepting the inevitable by patiently and craftily waiting for a favorable opportunity. It therefore will be well for Colonel A from the begin- ning to bear in mind the possibility of an encounter with the enemy and try in advance to secure all possible advantages in case the combat should take place as early as to-day. Even the halt for feeding at Herzogswalde will pay for itself by in- creasing the power of endurance of his troops. The foregoing general remarks were called forth by the fact that the regiment from Herzogswalde could oppose the Reconnaissance. m enemy on any of his possible lines of advance. It may be as- sumed that our patrols at the latest would discover the enemy when he crosses the Passarge at one of the few bridges. And the elevated ground near Wuchsnig-see makes it possible to discover the enemy's arrangements and strength while still at a distance. Presumably the enemy is still in ignorance of the presence of our regiment, and, by remaining motionless and under cover at Herzogswalde, it probably would not be discovered, so that it would be able to make an unexpected attack, or, in case of the enemy's great superiority, it would be able to retreat in time. It is not very tempting to lie in wait for an enemy who may be making a long detour or possibly has no idea whatever of crossing the Passarge. But had we reliable information of the advance of greatly superior hostile forces, such action would be earnestly recommended, as a continuation of our advance would be admissible only under very exceptional circum- stances. Only too easily the advantages of a dash to the Alle under such conditions might be lost by sacrificing the regiment. But the incentive for such an enterprise is wanting — ^viz., the certainty of the advance of a superior hostile force. It is pos- sible and even probable that we will encounter such a force; but the contrary is also possible, or the possibility of meeting a detached force that, however, would still offer a chance for a victory. Our own consciousness, and historical criticism, would never forgive us if, through excessive caution, we lost the chance before the decisive battle to penetrate the darkness that so far has surrounded the enemy's movements. If after thoughtful consideration it seems to be a choice between boldness and caution, there can be no doubt as to the proper course to follow. Therefore Colonel A decides to continue his march. The direction is fixed by the fact that hostile reconnaissance from the north must be especially opposed and that a safe 112 Studies in Applied Tactics. crossing of the Passarge has been secured by Captain E . This direction of advance also will make it more difficult for the hostile troop, which has retreated towards Stollen, to re- sume its advance. On the right bank of the Passarge, Colonel A depends on receiving further news from Captain E , as a basis for further arrangements. Already in going to Pitt- ehnen he will have the regiment advance as much as possible under cover, even if to do so he would have to leave the regular road. Only in case of absolute necessity would he be willing to sacrifice the advantage of remaining unseen and of being able to surprise the enemy. Captain E is informed of the colonel's decision. The colonel does not think it neces- sary to make further report to corps headquarters at this time. At lo a. m. the advance guard arrives at Pittehnen and the main body at Reichenthal. The commander of the con- necting-post at Pittehnen turns over the following messages: 1. From Sergeant K , sent from Stollen, 5th May, 9-15 a. m. The hostile troop crossed the Passarge north of Sportehnen and disap- peared in the woods. There is no enemy at Kalkstein, where there are two fords. Nothing is to be seen of the enemy as far as Albrechtsdorf . 2. From lyieutenant B , sent from Height 114 north- west of Dittrichsdorf, 5th May, 9-35 a. m. Nothing suspicious visible at Kalkstein or Voigtsdorf, on the highway west and east of Arnsdorf, or at Lauterwalde-Petersdorf. A hostile patrol rode through Dittrichsdorf two or three hours ago. I shall go via Arnsdorf towards Freymarkt. 3. From Captain E , sent from Kleinefeld, 5th May, 9-40 a. m. After my advance party drove back 5 or 6 hostile troopers from Kleinefeld towards Scharnick, 2 of Lieutenant F 's messengers, who till then had been stopped by the hostile troopers, delivered the inclosed message. I have not received Lieutenant F 's 7-35 a. m. message. Aside from the above 5 or 6 troopers, nothing is seen of the enemy in the country before me. And nothing is visible on the Elditten-Guttstadt highway, which I can see quite well to beyond Lingnau. A hostile troop rode through Wolfsdorf this morning, presumably the one I defeated at Pittehnen. At Sackstein there is a hostile patrol that I shall drive away. I shall next ride to Waltersmiihl and send an officer to Guttstadt. Reconnaissancb;. 113 Lieutenant F- 's message is as follows: Zaun-see, near Komai^men, 5 May, 8-35 a. m. Five hostile troops of cavalry are advancing along the Guttstadt- Heiligenthal highway. The leading one is the one I reported at 7-35 a. m. and must be at Heiligenthal by this time; the other four have passed ■Queetz. There is nothing visible on the highway back of them as far as near Glottau. Hostile patrols have prevented my sending a message until now. I shall remain here in observation. What does ColoneIv A decide to do? The situation has not materially changed since the regi- ment left Herzogswalde. Apparently there are no large bodies of hostile cavalry on the Liebstadt-Guttstadt highway or the country north of it (though this is by no means certain) ; but that these, contrary to all expectation, have taken the road from Guttstadt to Kallisten. Five hostile troops are reported, and they probably belong to the 5th Dragoons, of which one troop was defeated at Pitt- ehnen; but possibly they simply are the advance guard of a larger body following at some distance. From present indica- tions they are going past the south end of Narien-see. Of course they might change the direction of their march if they heard of the presence of our regiment or of the misfortune that befell their troop at Pittehnen. Should they continue the march beyond the left bank of the Passarge, they will reach Naglack, Reichau, or Willnau by 10.30 a. m. But for the present they might be content to hold the Passarge bridge at Kallisten and send out patrols from that point. This is highly probable if the 5 troops as yet have no substantial backing. Already, at Mohrungen and Herzogswalde, Colonel A had reflected on the possibility of hostile cavalry driving back Major D , advancing towards Mohrungen past the south end of Narien- see, and thus discovering the advance of the ist Division. Notwithstanding this, he chose the northeastern line of march, because it seemed to him more important to prevent hostile reconnaissance of our left flank and because he hoped for better 114 Studies in Applied Tactics. results from reconnaissance extending around by the north. It would be detrimental for us to have hostile cavalry discover the head of our infantry columns at one point or another, but it cannot always be prevented on a broad front. However, it would be of much greater advantage for the hostile com- mander-in-chief to locate the flank of our army; for example, to learn that strong columns are marching on the Saalfeld- Mohrungen highway, and that the district north of that road is unoccupied. This would form a safe basis for his decisions, while the discovery of the head of a column at Mohrungen would not be a guarantee that other blue columns are not marching on Liebstadt and Wormditt. Therefore if the hostile cavalry remains in the direction of Ka'llisten-Willnau, it can do but little damage, and the reg- iment unhesitatingly can devote itself to its reconnaissance towards the Alle. But it is not yet known in what direction the enemy will advance after crossing the Passarge. Should he advance via Herzogswalde-Gr. Hermenau, the hostile com- mander-in-chief might be furnished with the important infor- mation above referred to. At present (lo a. m.) the regiment is only about 3 miles from Herzogswalde, and within an hour we might have an opportunity to render the enemy harmless, and then be able to resume our reconnaissance to the east with our messenger-route secured. This possible chance must not be thrown away. But it would be a mistake for us to enter on a wild chase after the 5 hostile troops on the left of the Passarge. The distances are too great and the country is too extensive. And, anyway, who can tell whether we shall find the quarry? Possibly the enemy will remain at Kallisten, as already suggested. In this case the regiment would have the bothersome stream between itself and its objective. At Pittehnen the regiment, so to speak, has one foot on each bank of the stream, ready to draw either to the opposite side if neces- sary. Troop A by this time must be near Waltersmiihl and Reconnaissance. 115 have a view of the Queetz-Heiligenthal road as well as towards Kallisten. In a short time we ought to have word from the troop and the numerous patrols sent via Willnau, Reichau, Lettau, Walter sdorf, and Sackstein, as to whether the enemy has crossed the Passarge and what route he has taken from Kallisten. It seems all the more desirable to await this as our reconnaissance towards Guttstadt and Heilsberg does not seem to be interfered with at present, and the delay in the regiment's advance therefore does not check its regular work. The colonel's desire for action is again blocked by this renewed halt, but experience has taught him that it is the rule for closed bodies of cavalry to advance tentatively, cautiously, and deliberately until that moment when the occasion calls for quick and sure action. He knows that nothing so quickly destroys the confidence and efficiency of men as when hasty decisions have to be paid for by many miles of trotting. The colonel will take advantage of the proximity of the telegraph station at Liebstadt to send his report to corps head- quarters, in which he will invite attention to the advantage of having Gr. Hermenau promptly occupied by a detachment of cyclists so as to check hostile reconnaissance. The situation growing out of Lieutenant C 's recon- naissance is of more than ordinary interest, and therefore will next occupy our attention. His experience could not be con- tinuously followed without presenting a distorted picture. Lieutenant C had cut the telegraph wires at Schau- stern and at 7 a. m. had arrived at the grove east of Schaustern apparently without having been detected by, and without him- detecting, the enemy. (See pp. 57-72.) His patrol, besides himself, still consists of i non-commissioned officer and 8 troopers, one of whom is leading a captured horse. At Schau- stern it was learned that yesterday evening about 20 hostile ii6 Studies in Applied Tactics. troopers passed through there, going towards Briickendorf. Nothing has been learned from the neighboring villages, be- cause everybody is staying at home. Lieutenant C , care- fully working forward through the various groves, at 7.20 a. m. reaches Knoll 160 north of Gottken and from here sees several horsemen riding from Height 155 east of Wengaithen towards the latter village, and also sees several others riding along the highway from Jonkendorf towards Pupkeim. He withdraws to the north-most grove, from whose border he carefully con- tinues his observations. The groves consist of a mixture of pines and firs, with underbrush along the border, whose young foliage affords fair cover, so that the officer succeeds in remain- ing concealed and by 9 a. m. has discovered the following: Four hostile troops followed the advance party on the Jonken- dorf-Pupkeim highway, and at the latter place diverged to- wards Schlitt, They have just (at 9 a. m.) passed Schlitt. Since then no others have followed them on the road as far back as near Jonkendorf, where the lieutenant's view ends. Another hostile body of one or two troops rode over the ridge east of Wengaithen towards the latter village, but could not be followed any farther, as Knoll 160 was occupied for some time by a hostile patrol and the Wengaithen-Schaustern road could not be seen from the hiding-place. Since 8 a. m. nothing more has been seen of the enemy at Wengaithen. Lieutenant C did not care to report the hostile patrols, for which purpose the way probably would still have been open via Neu-Kockendorf-Kloben or via Kammersdorf. When he saw the closed bodies of the enemy the patrols already were far in advance — some troopers had gone via Pupkeim towards Neu-Kockendorf — so that his message no longer could get through. Reconnaissance:. 117 What are Lieutenant C 's arrangements and in- tentions AFTER 9 A. M. ? It is self-evident that it would be of considerable value for Colonel A to know what Lieutenant C has seen. How can the information be sent? The regiment might have reached Gr. Hermenau at about 7 a. m. It is hard to guess where it now is or where it will be two or three hours from now. It is true that later Lieutenant C is expected to rejoin the regiment via Kallisten, and naturally a message should be sent in that direction. But even should the messenger succeed in getting through the hostile cavalry, it may be confidently assumed that the events would overtake the message. Long before it could reach the regimental commander the latter would gain touch with the enemy. It is all the more hazardous because the Passarge can be crossed only on bridges, and these the enemy surely will hold. In view of the fact that the mes- sengers (of whom there must be at least two) must avoid meet- ing the enemy, how will they be able to find their way without a map over the circuitous route they must take? Lieutenant C does know that Troop A is to reconnoiter ahead of the regiment towards Wormditt-Guttstadt-Munsterberg. But it seems even more hopeless to try to find the troop in the broad expanse of territory between the Passarge and the Alle. It might be suggested that the message be sent to Locken, and thence either be wired via Osterode to Molirungen, or be de- livered to the advance parties of the 2d Army Corps, which by this time should have reached that vicinity. But even if promptly forwarded by wire, the message probably would not reach the regimental commander until afternoon. Its contents are of no value for the commander of either the ist or 2d Army Corps, for these know without being told that closed bodies of cavalry will follow the hostile patrols. The manner in which these troops are grouped is of no particular value to the corps commanders; and the message gives insufficient information ii8 Studies in Applied Tactics. concerning their strength, because those so far seen might be followed by entire regiments in the next half-hour. The result of the deliberation is : A message reporting the appearance of the hostile troops of cavalry would be of but lit- tle use, probably would not reach its destination, and would seriously weaken the already reduced patrol. It is evident that Lieutenant C cannot be of service to the colonel in the latter 's immediate deliberations. Any information that Lieutenant C might send him about the appearance of hostile cavalry near Pupkeim would not arrive in time. He will the more energetically devote himself to the general is- sue: the reconnaissance towards Jonkendorf-Gr. Buchwalde. Should he succeed in reaching Allenstein Beechwoods (AUen- steiner Buchwald) unobserved, he may hope not only to get a view of Jonkendorf, but also of the Jonkendorf-Gottkendorf highway. After the hostile troops have disappeared from view to- wards Schlitt, and it had been ascertained from the south-most grove, near Knoll 1 60,' that the enemy no longer was visible at Windtken, Ballingen, or Gottken, the patrol trotted towards Allenstein Beechwoods, utilizing the cover afforded by the ground. It is hard to get through the woods, on account of some marshy ground and several wet ditches. The patrol does not reach the edge of the woods near Knoll 173 until 10.30 a. m. From this point Jonkendorf, Mondtken, and the high- way can be seen almost as far as Wilhelmsthal. To the east the view extends as far as Knoll 143 northeast of Mondtken. No one is to be seen anywhere. What klse will Lieutenant C do? Although the colonel's orders simply call for a reconnais- sance to Jonkendorf, and do not indicate that it is to extend beyond this point, still it must seem very desirable to go a little farther. Rejconnaissance. 1 19 The preceding night at Maldeuten, when the colonel dic- tated the order, he must have looked upon the line Jonken- dorf-Gr. Buchwalde as a well-advanced goal, and in doing so it probably did not occur to him that the patrol might get behind the closed bodies of the hostile cavalry. This is a rare piece of good luck of which the patrol-leader must take ad- vantage on his own initiative. The commanding officer in advance cannot mention all possibilities, his orders thereby would become too minute and indefinite. He must depend on an officer's supplementing his orders where demanded by cir- cumstances. Subordinates should not aim to carry out their orders literally, but to efficiently support their superior's in- tentions and intelligently utilize all advantages that chance may ofifer. According to the wording of Lieutenant C 's orders, it would answer if he now rode to the vicinity of Gr. Buchwalde and then to Kallisten to look up his colonel and report: "At 10.30 a. m. there was no enemy at Jonkendorf or Mondtken, and at a. m. there was none at Gr. Buchwalde." But this can't be done now. Having come this far, is it not possible to investigate a little farther and provide head- quarters with better information? Under proper supervision few officers would be lacking in the enterprise and insight here necessary to independently exceed these orders. The farther the patrol now advances the more easily may its retreat be intercepted. The district towards Allenstein, bounded by river, lake, and marshy ground, calls for special caution. As the patrol should remain undiscovered, it is ad- visable not to advance from Knoll 173 straight across the open country between Jonkendorf and Mondtken, but to work along the edge of the woods to the vicinity of Knoll 143, and then, rapidly crossing the open country, to gain the shelter of the grove east of Mondtken. I20 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. The northwest corner of this grove was reached at ii.20' a. m., and the non-commissioned officer with 2 men was posted at the southern edge, while Lieutenant C — — , from a favor- able lookout at the northwest corner, carefully examined the vicinity. Here, as elsewhere, a pair of good field-glasses proves to be of great value for the cavalry officer. The very best kind is only just good enough. Lieutenant C over- looks the valley of the AUe to beyond Bergfriede, the Mossong- see and the hills on its eastern shore, the wooded lowlands to beyond Braunswalde, whose northern exit and its church are very distinctly visible. He also sees the elevated village of Hochwalde, but Diwitten is hidden by woods and hills. He sees nothing suspicious anywhere. A section-hand, who has remained in his section-house at the edge of the grove, says that early in the morning several hostile troopers went through Kainen towards Polleicken. The officer has the tele- graph wire cut, with the assistance of the section-hand, and then proceeds to the south edge of the grove. From here he can see as far as Redigkainen and Height 138 east of Redig- kainen-see ("Redigk. S." on map). Knoll 124, near Kalt- fliesz, obstructs part of the view, but, past its southern end, the western end of the Gottkendorf railway station can be seen, and, proceeding farther west, the terrain sloping up- wards to the heights on the northern shore of the Okull-see can be seen. The towers of Allenstein are plainly visible in the distance. Four horsemen are trotting from Gottkendorf towards Wilhelmsthal along the highway. Nothing else is to be seen of the enemy in this district, either. The officer is aware that the Alle forms an obstacle similar to the Passarge, and the section-hand states that a horseman could not ford it ; that the meadows of the Alle are reported soft and marshy ; and that there is a wooden bridge at Kainen suitable for light teams. reconnaissance;. 121 What will Lieutenant C do at 11.40 a. m? Still nothing is seen of the hostile main columns. A message stating that nothing more had been seen of the ene- my up to 11.40 a. m. at Kainen, Kaltfiiesz, and Gottkendorf would be more valuable than one stating that none had been seen at Jonkendorf and Mondtken up to 10.30 a. m. But the difference in value is not very great, and Lieutenant C hopes to do still better. He does not yet despair of getting touch with the hostile main forces, well knowing how im- portant this may be for his commander-in-chief. And though continuing his reconnaissance, he hopes to be able to report negative results in time, whose value is not to be under- estimated, if none other are obtainable. Being far in advance of the army, he feels the importance of his task, for in all probability there is not another patrol in front of the ist Army Corps that can see as far as he can. Less than four miles away lies Allenstein, whose steeples seem to beckon to him. If insight is to be had anywhere, it ought to be at this im- portant cross-roads. Should nothing be seen there of the hostile columns early in the afternoon, and should he succeed in returning to his regiment or to Locken by evening or even by dawn the following day with this information, the com- manders would have a very different basis for their further decisions than if they remained without it. It is true that difficulties are increasing. The space between the Alle and the Okull-see is becoming so narrow that the danger of getting cut off is growing to an alarming degree. Therefore, that his mission may not fail at the last moment, Lieutenant C decides to use extraordinary precautions, and to not cross the troublesome creek that flows past Wilhelmsthal and Kaltfiiesz into the Alle until he to some extent has made sure of his retreat. For this reason the sergeant is sent ahead with two troop- ers. He is to ride to Kaltfliesz, look about from Knoll 124, and, if the country seems safe, to leave one man at this knoll —9— 122 Studies in Applied Tactics. and with the other one ride to the heights at the south end of the Redigkainen-see to obtain a view of the Gottkendorf- Allenstein highway. He is authorized to carefully make in- quiries at the railway station, and in isolated farm-houses. The sergeant, in the presence of his 2 men, is carefully in- structed about the roads and localities. He doubtless already knows how to take advantage of the folds of the ground for cover. If, in spite of this, he should stumble on the enemy, his good horse may be expected to bring him back. At any rate, the officer will receive information from the lookout near Kaltfliesz, and can govern himself accordingly. A signal is agreed upon for use between the sergeant and the patrol through the lookout, in case the sergeant finds the region about Gottkendorf free of the enemy; in which event the patrol will continue its march. During the sergeant's absence the entire region — ^also to the rear — will be carefully watched, and the four hostile troop- ers, trotting towards Wilhelmsthal, will be kept in view as far as conditions wiirpermit. At 11.50 a. m. the sergeant left, and at 12.30 p. m. he returns at a rapid gait and reports: "From an elevation near the railway station a part of the highway on this side, and beyond, a village, situated on the lake, was visible. A column, which I believe to be in- fantry, was marching on this highway. At the same time several horsemen appeared at Gottkendorf." Lieutenant C himself sees 5 or 6 horsemen on an ele- vation west of the Gottkendorf railway station. The four troopers trotting ahead towards Wilhelmsthal continued along the road and disappeared from view in Jonkendorf. Nothing else has been seen of the enemy, not even from the north edge of the grove in looking towards Braunswalde and Bergfriede. Reconnaissance:. 123 What are Lieutenant C 's further intentions? At first it will be necessary to further observe the enemy and see if the sergeant's suspicions as to infantry are correct. This can be done from the hiding-place where the patrol has lain concealed for an hour. But shall we be able to determine the strength and composition of the enemy's force from this point? It is highly probable that Lieutenant C will soon be forced to vacate his point of observation. If he now boldly advances via Kaltfliesz, he may still be able to reach a point of observation on the enemy's flank and count his battalions and batteries — an achievement for which under similar con- ditions in maneuvers he probably already has been highly praised. Even the Field Service Regulations emphasize the importance of obtaining accurate figures of the enemy's strength.* Who knows if Lieutenant C will again have this opportunity? It is only necessary for the enemy to halt in the vicinity of Jonkendorf or Mondtken, and the opportunity is gone. We here have a case where it is possible to obtain clearness on one of the duties of reconnoitering bodies that is left in semi- obscurity by the uncertain light of maneuver experiences. If the patrol-leader an hour ago felt very dubious about advancing any farther with his entire patrol, without at first having some assurance as to the safety of his line of retreat, his farther advance now would be a bold venture, challenging fate. Even should he reach the Redigkainer-see, it cannot be hoped that later he would still find the crossing at Kaltfliesz unguarded by the enemy. He would have to retreat via Redig- kainen, and it would be too much to expect fortune to keep open the route via Braunswalde to Kainen or Bergfriede. Even if the adroit officer's well-known cunning should save him from capture, it may be assumed that he would have to *See par. 79, F. S. R. 124 Studies in Applied Tactics. make a detour of many miles beyond the Alle to get back. And, after that, would there be a single horse in condition to get a message on time through the enemy's cavalry on the Passarge ? But all these objections would be swept aside were it certain that the results would warrant the venture. The scout sent ahead almost established the fact that hostile infantry is approaching, and we doubtless shall soon be able to verify this point from where the patrol now is. Of what particular value would it be if we could count a number of battalions and batteries on the highway at Gottkendorf? Imagine yourself in the commander-in-chief's position, who receives this information late in the evening or during the night. Doubtless it is important for him to know that at noon hostile infantry appeared at Gottkendorf. But of what value for him is the information that there were 2 or 4 bat- talions followed by 3 or 6 batteries? In rear of these there might be a great many more battalions and batteries; in the prospective encounter of the two large armies this would be highly probable on such a fine road as the one through Gott- kendorf, even if Lieutenant C had seen but a single com- pany or battalion. Should patrols attempt to let the whole hostile column pass so they can count every man and gun? The highly praiseworthy and arduous efforts of the (Ger- man) Great General Staff to draw attention to the service of information of the cavalry during grand maneuvers of recent years expose certain illusions we largely had entertained, and point the way to a rational method and judicious action. The reports of the General Staff with painstaking accuracy follow the experiences of almost every patrol, and enable us to form an unprejudiced opinion. A majority of the patrol-leaders looked upon the problem as a forced ride, which promptly brought them in contact with the hostile columns, but with their horses used up, which forced them to rest there or even Reconnaissance, 125 in rear of these columns in very unwarlike fashion. No mat- ter how much they saw, their superiors remained ignorant of it. The strength of the horses had been exhausted and no longer was available for sending a message which, besides, in time of war, certainly would have been captured. Thus it has happened that the commander-in-chief never received a single message informing him of the approach of numerous hostile columns, although officer's patrols had been sent out against them in all directions, and the commanding general's decisions materially depended on a knowledge of the time at which the hostile advance parties would reach a certain district. It was not necessary to inform him that these advance parties would be followed on all good roads by long columns; and he never would have been able to cal- culate the strength of these columns from the most careful compilation of his patrols' reports. It is a vain and dan- gerous undertaking for them to try to deliver a strength re- port of the enemy to their commander-in-chief. They should rather remember the admonition that the best reconnaissance is worthless if information gained by it reaches the commander too late or not at all. In smaller maneuvers, such as those carried on by brigades and divisions, the efforts of patrols to learn the strength, composition, and direction of march of hostile columns, and, if possible, also the intention of the hos- tile commander, often are successful, and result in exhaustive reports (spoiling the commanding officers) that owe their ac- curacy almost entirely to the fact that in time of peace no prisoners are captured and blank cartridges are used. And, finally, to take cognizance of another point, Lieu- tenant C 's situation reminds us of the advice of the Field Service Regulations, which is that "occasionally it will be ad- visable for the leader to leave his patrol in a place of con- cealment, and continue his observation with one or two com- 126 Studies in Applied Tactics. panions; in the case of cavalry, the leader and the men thus detached should be well mounted."* Anyone well versed in the Regulations very properly might ask if this should not have been done when Lieutenant C sent the sergeant out past Kaltfleisz, and if even now more might not be accomplished in this way than by waiting in the edge of the woods near Mondtken. It may often happen that the officer's superior judgment and the greater speed and endurance of his horse may have to be utilized as suggested by the Field Service Regulations. But this will mostly be where the distance under considera- tion is short — a few thousand yards — to save the entire pa- trol's going over this distance, and but seldom on account of trying to remain concealed. In the open country even a single horseman would be visible, and where one can be concealed there is always cover for several. If the leader goes too far from his men, or places obstacles between them and him- self, such as a stream or marshy ground, there is danger of becoming permanently separated from them. If Lieutenant C , instead of the sergeant, had gone to Redigkainen-see, how easily might he have been pushed back from Kaltfleisz and forced to retreat via Redigkainen ! And how easily might hostile troopers have driven the remainder of his patrol out of the grove near Mondtken! In neither case is it likely that the officer would have found his patrol again. He would have been unable to carry out his orders, presumably the re- sults thus far attained would have been lost, and there would have been nothing left for him to do but to attempt retreat- ing alone over the long and dangerous road to Kallisten. A consideration of this possibility surely would have induced him not to go without an escort, and if he took one or two men, he might as well have taken the whole patrol. *See par. 79, F. S. R. Reconnaissance. 127 But there are other reasons why it is inadvisable for the officer to go entirely alone, even if he can fully depend on his horse and his horsemanship. The slightest mishap might render him helpless, or the neighing of his horse going by itself might disclose his presence. Should the sergeant not have returned, there was nothing to prevent a continuance of the reconnaissance. But the loss of the leader robs the patrol of its mainstay and endangers its further usefulness. Imagine the situation of the sergeant, without map or field-glasses in the grove near Mondtken, if his lieutenant did not return after half an hour or an hour, or if he himself were forced by hostile detachments to retreat into Allenstein Beechwoods. It would have been right and proper for him to consider it his duty to make every efifort to find his officer again. He would not have been justified to ignore the lieutenant's fate and to solely think of continuing the reconnaissance. These reasons will more strongly influ- ence the lieutenant and decide him not to separate himself from his patrol, but to continue in observation from his pres- ent hiding-place. About I p. m, troops appear at the Gottkendorf railway station, which are readily recognized as infantry, and detach- ments of about half a battalion each, with advanced parties, march from there towards Kaltfliesz and Wilhelmsthal. Lieu- tenant C withdraws into Allenstein Beechwoods, and thence watches the placing of outposts on Height 131 north of Wilhelmsthal and at the edge of the woods east of Mondtken. Lieutenant C continues to retreat before hostile infantry patrols, at first towards PoUeicken, and, while riding west of Buchwalder-see towards Gr. Buchwalde, he is fired on from the heights east of the lake, thereby having one horse wounded. At 3.30 p. m., from the grove east of Neu-Garschen, he is able to distinguish hostile infantry establishing outposts close to the village and sending out patrols. Individual horsemen 128 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. are visible between Rosengarth and Gr. Buchwalde and near Neu-Garschen. What does Lieutenant C think of the situation AT 3.30 p. M., and what orders DOES HE GIVE? It is true that Lieutenant C has not seen any long columns of troops, and he is not likely to do so. But he will conclude that the discovery of hostile infantry outposts will be just as important for his headquarters. In a ma- neuver further procedure would be quite simple: a message would be written and sent back by a man on a good horse with orders to follow the easily-found road via Neu-Garschen- Blankenberg-Schlitt to Kallisten, where, if he did not find the regiment, he at least would find ways and means to have the message taken farther. The patrol commander, whose horses have traveled only about 25 miles to-day, mindful of the regulations which specify that every patrol upon obtain- ing touch with the enemy must retain it, could devote him- self to the duty; could further observe the enemy with the object of discovering 'the bivouac of some large body; also could investigate the state of afifairs at Miinsterberg; and, after sending a last message late in the afternoon, could, with the consciousness of an energetic performance of duty with good results, take shelter in one of the numerous farm-houses in front of the enemy's position, and the following morning, still having i non-commissioned ofiicer and 6 men, could re- sume his duties with renewed energy. But he does not find things as smooth as this in time of war. A single trooper surely would not succeed in carry- ing the message. Even 2 men hardly would succeed. Even sending a duplicate message by two different routes may not be successful and would take 4 troopers. It would be out of the question for the messengers to follow the traveled roads, where they almost certainly would be captured. Presumably, reconnaissance;. 129 Kloben and Kallisten are occupied by the enemy, so that the messengers would have to go towards Sackstein or Pittehnen to cross the Passarge. How will they find their way across country through woods and marshes without a map? These thoughts assail the officer as he, to avoid the next danger — i. e., a hostile infantry patrol— works his way to the western edge of the grove, and, leaving Neu-Garschen to the left, finds safety in the southeast corner of the woods through which the Neu-Garschen-Ankendorf road runs. He is con- vinced that he alone, with the aid of map and field-glasses, may still be able to get the important message to its destina- tion, and that to accomplish this he will need all his caution and experience and possibly the fighting strength of his men. He debates for a moment whether it would not do to go with but 5 men, leaving the sergeant and 3 men behind to retain touch with the enemy. In this way he would carry out the letter of the instructions of the Field Service Regulations, but only the letter. It simply would be a subterfuge to avoid reproach. The sergeant would be able to accompHsh but little. In the midst of hostile cavalry, he would be con- stantly on the move, seeking for hiding-places, and the little that he might see he would be unable to report upon. As soon as night fell, observation and reports would cease, and the following morning would not improve matters for the small tired group, which, without a map, would have to depend on information received from occupants of isolated habitations to keep from getting lost. But possibly 9 men will enable Lieutenant C to over- come hostile opposition attempting to bar his way, when 5 men would not suffice. The stronger he remains, the more likely is he to succeed in capturing hostile messengers on their way back. If Lieutenant C is satisfied that he must himself take back the message, and with his whole patrol, he will finally I30 Studie;s in AppIvIEd Tactics. consider whether he cannot add to it. A knowledge of the extent of the enemy's front would be of great importance, and if he could determine whether or not Miinsterberg is oc- cupied by infantry, it undoubtedly would be of decided ad- vantage. The horses, having traveled only about 25 miles, and having been singly watered and fed during the numerous halts, surely are not yet tired out. But it must be remem- bered that the ride would require more than an hour and largely would be across open country. New and increased dangers would threaten the important message giving infor- mation of the hostile outposts at Mondtken and Gr. Buch- walde, and the later it arrives at Mohrungen the less valuable it would be. This doubt may turn the scale; and, besides, the officer has a right to hope that Troop A, reconnoitering towards Miinsterberg-Guttstadt, and the rest of the regiment, have accomplished results that make his work in that direction un- necessary. But it would not be wrong or censurable if his endurance and love of'action should induce him to round out his line day's work by a ride to Miinsterberg. If he should conclude to go back at once, it would be advisable (after ex- changing the wounded horse for the captured led horse and turning the former adrift as soon as it became bothersome) to go along the eastern edge of the woods which the patrol has just entered, then passing through the northern part to the northwest corner of the same and from here force his way to Kallisten or Sackstein. Notwithstanding the diversity of instructions given to the patrols we have followed, none of them was decidedly what is sometimes called a "strategical patrol." Even those that went farthest cooperated with the main body of the troop, which acted as their support and on which they would Reconnaissance. 131 fall back. It simply required a varying number of hours to execute their orders, and these did not keep them out until the following day. Possibly Lieutenant C 's instructions to reconnoiter via Briickendorf towards Jonkendorf-Gr. Buch- walde might be looked upon as passing beyond the sphere of minor into that of great operations of war, and we might look upon his patrol and upon that of Lieutenant B , sent by Captain E from Pittehnen via Freymarkt towards Heilsberg (see page 89), as "strategical patrols " — anyway, the name does not matter ; our Regulations do not contain it, and it is merely a handy, easily understood term for a not easily described idea. For there is no sharp line of demark- ation between "ordinary" or "small" and "strategical" pa- trols. But it will pay to examine the conditions under which a patrol-leader would operate in the sphere of the strategical activity of cavalry, considering that theory sets great store by such patrols, which are called "the eyes of the commander- in-chief." Although there are several successful long-distance pa- trol rides on record from our campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71, still, German Army headquarters were not informed in time of the movements of the French army on the left bank of the Mosel the i6th of August, 1870, or of the extent of the French line of battle west of Metz on the 17th of August; and the decision to turn to the right, on the left bank of the Meuse, towards Beaumont and Sedan, had to be made be- fore reliable and conclusive information had been received (of the movements of MacMahon's army). Moreover, the Aus- trian cavalry in Bohemia (in 1866) was not used in a way that would have completely blocked the way of our patrols, and the French cavalry (in 1870-71) practically offered no opposition to German reconnaissance. Therefore, at the time in the field and later in discussions many complaints were heard that our patrols in distant reconnaissances, as a rule, 132 STUDiiiS IN Appi^ied Tactics. did not accomplish what had been expected of them. Gen- eral Goeben, too, as he personally has told me, belonged to these dissatisfied ones. The above-named experiences in grand maneuvers in Germany indicate that, in spite of years of earnest endeavor in time of peace. Army headquarters to-day cannot depend on being furnished with good information by ' ' strategical ' ' patrols. One of the patrols (so far but casually mentioned in our study) received comprehensive instructions of a strategical nature. A discussion of the movements of this patrol might help to an understanding of the reasons that cause the above- named deficiency. As early as the afternoon of May 3d, Lieutenant D , ist Cavalry, with 10 troopers on selected horses, left Marien- berg. He had received orders from the commanding general to reconnoiter in the general direction of Heilsberg-Barten- stein. On the same day he reached Pr. Holland, 28 miles away, rested here a few hours, and started again at 4 a. m. May 4th. At 8 a. m. Tie arrived at Wormditt, 22 miles away, and reported thence by wire that so far he had seen nothing of the enemy. This information was of no special value to the commanding general, who could have obtained it from the telegraph operator without the patrol. It is true that in the enemy's country, where the telegraph would not be avail- able, this information would have been of some consequence. But it is doubtful if I/ieutenant D would have sent one of his men to Saalfeld on accoimt of this information. It is more than 31 miles from Wormditt to Saalfeld. Therefore, the messenger would have traveled 53 miles since leaving Pr. Holland and 81 miles since leaving Marienberg, and hardly would have arrived (at Saalfeld) before 3 or 4 p. m. on May 4th. To know that the enemy was not at Wormditt at 8 a. m. would be no criterion for the commanding general as to how matters stood there or at Mehlsack or Liebstadt sev- Reconnaissance. I33 eral hours later. Lieutenant D had a right to assume that it would not be his duty to reconnoiter this district, lying so near the field of operations of the army — at least, not in so far as it related to matters of minor importance. If he was in doubt on this point, the blame partly would lie in the wording of his instructions, which very properly might have included a statement to the effect that his reconnais- sance should be of a general nature only. Reference also should have been made to the intentions of the corps and army commanders, so that Lieutenant D could act in har- mony with the ideas of the higher commanders, and could send his messages in the right directions. He should have known that the army corps would reach the vicinity of Saal- feld. May 4th, and presumably would march towards Mohr- imgen on the 5th, if the corps commander could have given this information as early as the 3d. Let us assume that Lieu- tenant D received the additional information at the latest upon his telegraphic inquiry from Wormditt, where arrange- ments should at once be made to destroy the tape records of telegrams. In view of the already mentioned requirement of the Field Service Regulations (that a patrol's orders must state clearly what information is desired [see page 33] ), it would still seem that Lieutenant D 's instructions are too general. But if we imagine ourselves in the position of the command- ing general, who, at Marienburg, on May 3d, only knows that a hostile army is approaching from the east, we can appre- ciate the order, to which only might have been added how far telegraphic communication still existed on this day. Even had it been possible approximately to guess where the enemy was on May 2d, his movements for May 3d, 4th, and 5th could not have been foreseen. A more definite order to the patrol — for example, that it should locate the enemy's right flank — • would have been an error. It was uncertain whether the pa- 134 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. trol would find the enemy's right flank in the direction of Heilsberg-Bartenstein. The hostile army might have kept much farther to the south, so that the enemy would not have been found at Heilsberg or Bartenstein. Again, the enemy might have moved in a northwesterly direction, so that the patrol would have encountered the enemy's front. To this might be objected that it would have been better to let the officer choose his own route, and simply order him to locate the hostile flank. What a difficult task for the young officer and his little group of men! The commander-in-chief him- self would have to go to accomplish this. Is hostile cavalry to be regarded as the enemy's flank? Where is the flank in question if the enemy is not advancing on a closed front, but by detachments? Which way should the patrol go if it learns that hostile detachments have arrived at Pr. Eylau? Should these be looked upon as the hostile flank, or be ignored on the plea that presumably they are detached to invest or ob- serve the fortress of Konigsberg? We can readily see that the uncertainty of the situation made it impossible for the commanding general on the 3d of May to say any more to the patrol-leader than that he should reconnoiter. It is ex- pected that the latter 's messages will form a basis for more definite instructions to be given the cavalry of the army corps. It seems fitting that the commanding general should have sent Lieutenant D in the general direction where it was expected the hostile flank would be found, if surmises were correct. In this way he prevented an aimless wandering about of the patrol, and formed a sort of tentacle on an avenue near one flank of the army. Had not the field of reconnaissance of Konigsberg included Pr. Eylau, Domnau, and Friedland, doubtless a patrol would have been sent via Mehlsack-Lands- berg-Pr. Eylau, but this would not have influenced the move- ments of Lieutenant D , which we now shall follow. Reconnaissance. 135 It is noteworthy that apparently the commanding gen- eral does not expect Lieutenant D 's explorations to have any influence on the movements of the army until after May 5th. The movements for May 5th certainly will be ordered from Army headquarters, at the latest by the afternoon of May 4th — i. e., at a time when the patrol may have reached the vicinty of Heilsberg, but not yet have been able to send any report. Only in case the patrol should encounter the enemy on the morning of May 4th near Wormditt and be able to send a detailed report by wire, would it be practicable to make any changes in the proposed march of the army for the 5th. If telegraphic communication were not available, then such report probably would arrive too late to change the di- rection of march of the army on the 5th. The patrol rested at Wormditt, naturally exercising every precaution. Such duties are made easier in friendly territory, because courageous inhabitants always can be found who are willing to watch from church-towers or hilltops. During this halt Lieutenant D made telegraphic inquiry of Liebstadt, Mehlsack, Zinten, Landsberg, Pr. Eylau, Heilsberg, Barten- stein, and Guttstadt. In this way he found out that the en- emy had not appeared at Liebstadt, Guttstadt, Mehlsack, Zin- ten, or Landsberg. But Landsberg reported that communi- cation with Heilsberg had been interrupted since 7 a. m. All this information was wired to corps headquarters. Up to 9.30 p. m. no reply had been received to the message sent Pr. Ey- lau via Konigsberg. The telegraph operator at the latter place stated that he had informed the military governor of the message. Lieutenant D— — decides not to await information con- cerning Pr. Eylau. It is evident from the message from Lands- berg that he is approaching the enemy, and he might have to wait too long to get news from the governor of Konigsberg. He decides to go towards Heilsberg past Frauendorf, but, as 136 Studies in Applied Tactics. far as possible, to keep off the highway. Therefore, he rides via Thalbach-Kaschaunen. As he omits sending scouts to the edges of woods to save his horses, he does not get an ex- tended view again until he reaches Kaschaunen. He is more anxious not to be discovered or delayed than he is to dis- cover every hostile patrol. He hopes in a way to make good the deficiencies of his reconnaissance by questioning the farm- ers. Of course he might meet hostile patrols on the wood- roads, but he hopes to avoid being surprised by keeping a sharp lookout to the front and flanks and having the point well in advance of the main body of the patrol. The dense woods would quickly hide him again from the enemy, and his map would help him along. Nothing has been seen of the enemy at Kaschaunen. The patrol continues on its way south of the Drewenz River, and about I p. m. arrives near Bogen. From Height 114, north- east of the village, 5 or 6 hostile troopers are visible at the wind-mill northeast of Raunau. What Are Lieutenant D 's Reflections Concerning Further Action on His Part? The officer sent off on a reconnaissance of several days' duration has to consider the conduct of his patrol on meeting hostile patrols, the same as we have seen was the case with Lieutenants C and F . His messages are in greater danger than those of patrols sent out but a short distance, if hostile troopers penetrate between him and his army, for the longer road increases the dangers besetting messengers. "Stra- tegical" patrols, too, can help screen the movements of their army by destroying or capturing hostile patrols; can help to interfere with the enemy's messenger service; and for them, also, the answers of prisoners are of great importance — often clearing up the situation better than prolonged personal ob- servation. It is, of course, necessary that at least one member of such patrol be able to speak the enemy's language. Reconnaissance;. 137 And yet conditions are different from those of patrols working in a more restricted area. The farther away a pa- trol is from its army, the harder it is to bear losses incident to engagements, which cripple further activity of the patrol or stop it altogether. Unless it is a question of individual hostile troopers, the easiest and most successful feat of arms will be of no value, but simply will call up a swarm of ene- mies. As a rule, it seems inadvisable to forcibly penetrate the hostile screen. We know that the screen has wide gaps, and that in field warfare the cloud of patrols, as a rule, passes but once or twice over the ground. Waiting in a good hiding- place until the vicinity is again free from patrols offers better chances, because even a successful fight cannot keep the road to the rear open for messengers. This is more readily accom- plished nearer the army by the mutual support of the denser network of patrols. Messengers from "strategical" patrols are always instructed to make use of remote trails and skillful dodging, and always will be exposed to the dangers of the solitary ride within reach of the enemy. Nevertheless, even this class of patrols, on principle, must not invariably avoid an engagement, and certainly must not let slip any chance to capture hostile messengers. But they must very carefully consider the probable outcome of an en- gagement, and, in case of doubt, preferably turn aside and continue on their way unseen. As telegraphic communication between Heilsberg and Landsberg has been interrupted since early in the morning. Lieutenant D has not to deal with individual hostile sol- diers that might prove an easy and tempting capture, and so he decides, for the present, to wait and watch the Heilsberg- Frauendorf highway. He succeds in fording the Drewenz at a covered spot and in hiding himself in the vicinity of the Nickelsberg. Should he send back a message? — 10— 138 Studies in AppuiEd Tactics. It is true that the Field Service Regulations state that "as soon as it is certain that the enemy has been discovered a message should be sent";* still Lieutenant D has a right to doubt whether he would perform any noteworthy ser- vice for the commanding general were he to report the ap- pearance of a hostile patrol at Raunau. It was easy to infer at Saalfeld that the enemy had reached the vicinty of Heils- berg, from the telegram stating that telegraphic communica- tion between Landsberg and Heilsberg had been interrupted. Therefore, the message would not relate anything new, and would cost the officer at least one man. The officer has a right to hope that he soon will be able to report other and more important facts. After the hostile patrol near Raunau had ridden back to- wards this village and disappeared. Lieutenant D con- tinued his ride via Krug and Workeim to near Neuendorf, where he arrived at about 3 p. m. Nothing was known of the enemy in Workeim. A single hostile trooper is seen trotting along the road from^F.f Grossendorf towards Heilsberg; but the intervening marshy meadows interfere with an attempt to capture him. People at Neuendorf state that at various times during the day hostile troopers passed through the hamlet, some going towards Petershagen and others towards Heils- berg. This adds to the probability that detachments of hos- tile cavalry are at Heilsberg, and Lieutenant D , remem- bering the teachings of times of peace, decides to go farther around the enemy's flank if possible, to get a view of the Heilsberg-Bartenstein road, or to find out something more definite from the inhabitants about the enemy at Heilsberg. He reaches Grossendorf Woods (Grossendorfer Wald), but then, to avoid a hostile patrol which appeared at Grossendorf, he went via Jegothen to Gunten, where he arrived at 4.30 p. *See par. 79, F. S. R. t Abbreviation for Forsterei, "Ranger's house." Reconnaissance. 139 m., and halted at Height 94. The inhabitants of neither of the two places know anything definite about the enemy; they simply know of a rumor that there is hostile cavalry at Bart- enstein and Heilsberg, From Pr. Holland to Gunten the patrol came 43 miles, and during the past 24 hours it has traveled over 70 miles. Most of the horses are tired out, and a continuation of the ride to-day would completely use them up; therefore, they absolutely need a good rest. What arrangements does Lieutenant D make at 4.30 p. M. May 4TH? The estate of Gunten is too extensive to use as quarters for the patrol, because the latter could not properly guard it, and, being at a cross-roads, it might receive sudden visits from hostile patrols. The patrol will be able to rest only at a remote point; the best place would be in the woods south of Gunten, far from the road. Being in friendly territory, where there is no danger of treachery, one of the farms south- west of Borchertsdorf might be used in case of bad weather. Although the nights during May still are quite cool in East Prussia, the officer doubtless will prefer the woods, where, under protection of a sentry-post, the horses can be fed and watered in a creek flowing into the Elm River. Feed would be taken along from Gunten, or would be carried from there after dark. He now considers it necessary to send off a message, and composes the following: To Telegraph Station, Saaljeld: ^ ^^'^' ^ ^' ""• At I p. m., while riding from Wormditt via Kaschaunen and Bogen 1 noticed 5 or 6 hostile troopers at Raunau. Later I saw a mounted mes- senger on the Neuendorf-Heilsberg highway; and I went via Te<^othen to avoid a hostile patrol that appeared near Grossendorf. Farmers say that during the day patrols have frequently come through Neuendorf some going towards Heilsberg and some the opposite way. Apparently Landsberg, Heilsberg, and Bartenstein are occupied by hostile cavalry. D , Lieutenant. I40 Studies in Applied Tactics. How shall the message be forwarded? The condition of the horses and the numerous hostile patrols that are abroad preclude its being sent towards Saalfeld. An effort must be made to reach a telegraph station that still is in communi- cation with the district occupied by our army. The best op- portunity to do this seems to be on the Landsberg-Zinten rail- way. Landsberg, which seems to be occupied by the enemy, must be avoided, and the message sent say from Sangnitten or Arnstein, or even farther north. In friendly territory, where information from the inhab- itants helps out, a single horseman may thus be able to avoid the enemy and get through; and, in view of the small number of his men. Lieutenant D may consider it permissible to send but one man, because the message apparently is not of great importance. The messenger will have to go i8 miles or more to the desired telegraph station. Even the best horse would not be able to stand this after the exertions of the last 24 hours. But in the horse-country of East Prussia it ought to be possible to find a suitable saddle-horse, even after the drain upon it for war purposes. Otherwise, the sending of the message must be deferred until the messenger's horse has rested sufficiently. The day's experience will induce Lieu- tenant D , if there is still an opportunity, to take a horse from the owner of the estate or from some farmer, as a pre- cautionary measure, giving a receipt therefor, and have it taken along as a remount together with the horse the mes- senger leaves behind. A reminder that the enemy surely will requisition all serviceable horses, and probably without giving receipts, may induce the owner to give up a horse more readily. If the spare horse becomes troublesome, it can be let loose at any time. The messenger will be told that after seeing that the message is sent by wire he must try to reach the army corps, going in the general direction of Mohrungen, and calling on Reconnaissance;. 141 village authorities to supply him with a new mount when- ever necessary. He is to keep the original copy of the mes- sage until he reaches his command again, unless he should be obliged to destroy it on account of imminent danger. Anything of importance that he might learn of the enemy during his ride he is to add to the telegram over his own signature. Un- der this heading would come any information as to whether or not Ivandsberg is occupied by the enemy. It might be added, concerning the wording of the mes- sage, that the address, 'Chief of Staff, ist Army Corps," is purposely omitted ; likewise the name of the place where Lieu- tenant D is and route he expects to follow after resting. It is intended that the message should disclose as little as possible, should it fall into the enemy's hands. The scanti- ness of information received from inhabitants of the country by patrol-leaders belies the experience of time of peace. While during maneuvers the appearance of a body of troops at Heils- berg would be known in a couple of hours in all the surround- ing habitations, lyieutenant D obtains nothing but un- reliable rumors, except in the villages where the enemy actu- ally has been seen. During maneuvers, travel on the country roads becomes more active than in ordinary times. Wagons, cyclists, horsemen travel from place to place. Not a single movement of troops escapes the curiosity and interest of the inhabitants, and a wide-awake patrol-leader often can better inform himself about the march of a hostile body of horse- men from the statements of country people than if he had seen it himself ; but it is otherwise in time of war. The towns- man and the countryman, the tradesman and the official, all are kept home by duty or apprehension, unless a panic should drive them into the woods. Women and children, who dur- ing maneuvers are attracted in multitudes by the noise of arms, hoof-beats, drum and trumpet, in war hide themselves in excessive fear of the approaching enemy of their coun- 142 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. try. Therefore, even in friendly territory, patrol- leaders must be prepared to find out much less about the enemy than they do during time of peace. Granted that the messenger can be furnished a good horse of fair gait — a badly-broken, obstinate brute cannot be used in this case, even by an excellent rider — he hardly could leave before 5.30 p. m. He would give Landsberg a wide berth, possibly going via Eichhorn, Worienen, Schonwiese. Prob- ably the telegraph stations at Sangnitten and Arnstein have been abandoned, even if the enemy has not yet arrived there. He probably will have to go as far as Zinten, a distance of 25 to 28 miles, before finding an office that is still open, and it will be late in the evening before the telegram is received at Saalfeld. Lieutenant D will not get much information in his hiding-place during the remainder of the afternoon and even- ing. If he wishes to remain concealed, he must remain quiet. Not until after dark will he try to obtain information from neighboring farms thfough countrymen. It is true that these people thereby would risk their necks, but doubtless some can be found who are willing to do this service, even if they did not go as far as the enemy's lines. In this way Lieutenant D learns that Heilsberg act- ually is occupied by the enemy, and that from Settau, where a hostile patrol was seen during the day, several troops of cavalry were seen, which early in the evening rode through Roggenhausen towards Heilsberg. Nothing had been seen of the enemy at Borchertsdorf. What are Lieutenant D 's further intentions? Lieutenant D 's orders direct him towards Barten- stein, and the rumor seems plausible that hostile cavalry had reached that point, presumably the main body of the ad- vanced detachments known to be at Landsberg and Heils- Reconnaissance;. i43 berg. Therefore, Lieutenant D takes Bartenstein as his next objective. The endeavor to remain on the outer flank of the enemy, as well as solicitude for his messenger-route (which must continue towards telegraph stations situated at the north or northwest), make it desirable to remain north of the Alle. And, not to run into the arms of hostile detach- ments on the straight and convenient Bartenstein-Reddenau road, the ofhcer intends to cross this road and for the present ride past Albrechtsdorf towards Pilwen. At Albrechtsdorf he may be able to get more definite information about hostile detachments supposed to be at Landsberg; and there, as well as at Pilwen, something definite may be learned about Bart- enstein. He wishes to cross the Bartenstein-Albrechtsdorf road before dayUght, and therefore orders the patrol to start at I a. m. May 5th. A countryman on horseback is taken along as guide. There is no necessity to send back any further message. By i a. m. the horses have rested 8 hours, and doubtless have had an abundance of feed. And presumably the men were passably well provided for, as food could be obtained from neighboring farms and from Gunten at night. Of course, the guard and the officer obtained very little rest, but a few hours' sleep in the grass are sufficient to provide new strength. At a farm near Albrechtsdorf the officer learns that about 15 horsemen passed the place the day before, going towards Landsberg. After reaching Pilwen at about 3 a. m., where nothing is known of hostile troops being in Bartenstein, the patrol cautiously continued its reconnaissance, and found out that the town actually was not occupied by the enemy. In the outer houses the officer learns that yesterday afternoon the hostile 5th Dragoons, coming from Schippenbeil, passed through the town, towards Heilsberg. Since then only oc- casionally had single hostile troopers passed through the town. The mayor, who had been sent for, verifies this report, and 144 Studies in Applied Tactics. adds that yesterday afternoon several baggage-wagons passed through the town and that on the order of the hostile com- mander, who spoke German, he had sent ten wagon-loads of oats to Schonbruch and Langheim (near Korschen), respect- ively, where they were to report to army officials. The mayor had heard nothing more about the grain. He did not know how matters stood in Schippenbeil, but yesterday evening there was no enemy in Legienen, Wehrwillen, Sandlack, or Plensen. Telegraphic communication with Pr. Eylau and Korschen has been interrupted. The telegraph instruments of the Postal Telegraph and of the railway station of Bart- enstein have been destroyed. What ark Lieutenant D 's reflections and de- cisions concerning further action? (It is now about 4.15 a. m.) The justified assumption that the enemy's main body would be found at Bartenstein has proven erroneous. In time of war things often t«m out differently from what was an- ticipated. Were there a large hostile force at Schippenbeil, there would be more traffic through Bartenstein. But it may be assumed that hostile troops are at Schonbruch and Lang- heim, for it is improbable that army officials whould be sent to these points in hostile territory without being accompanied by troops. The direction whence they came to Schonbruch will give a clue to the enemy's intentions, and this may be more easily found out on the Schippenbeil-Schonbruch road than at Schonbruch itself, where hostile outposts certainly would prevent near approach. As it is only about six miles to Langanken, Lieutenant D will not send a message until he has reached this point. Possibly he will find out something about Schippenbeil at Langanken. At 5.45 a. m. the patrol approaches the highway at Lang- anken, on which there is a convoy of army and civilian wag- Reconnaissance. i45 ons, guarded by dragoons moving towards Schonbruch. Ivieu- tenant D counts 30 wagons. He lets them pass and they disappear in the woods north of Woduhnkeim; then he sends a party to Langanken. Here he finds out that yesterday a hostile regiment of dragoons, coming from Schippenbeil, passed by and halted for the night north of Schonbruch. Its train, which has just passed by, halted for the night at Langanken and Woduhnkeim. A sick officer, unable to travel, remained at the Langanken estate. He understands some German, but refuses to give any information. He belongs to the 4th Dra- goons. His servant hid himself upon the approach of our patrol, and cannot be found. Nothing is known at Langanken about Schippenbeil. To find out something more definite about the where- abouts and line of march of the hostile cavalry. Lieutenant D sends 2 troopers towards Gahlkeim and 2 others to- wards Schippenbeil, while he, with the remainder of his pa- trol, conceals himself in a grove west of Langanken. By 8.30 a. m. it is learned that the hostile cavalry reg- iment left Schonbruch at 5 a. m. and marched towards Dom- nu along the highway, and that the train is following it on this road. The troopers sent towards Schippenbeil were fired upon from the northwest exit of the town, but they, as well as the two sent to Galkeim, returned unharmed. The inhab- itants of Thorms stated that, with the exception of a ford at Hoschenen, there is no place of crossing over the Alle be- tween Bartenstein and Schippenbeil. What are; Lieutenant D 's further arrangements AND INTENTIONS? The hostile regiment of cavalry either is marching to- wards Konigsberg or is making so wide a circuit around the flank of our army that it is useless to follow it. The im- portant thing is to find the hostile columns of infantry, and 146 Studies in Applied Tactics. it is questionable if the patrol will do so in the direction it has so far gone. The Schippenbeil-Bartenstein road, on which the hostile 5th Dragoons marched yesterday, apparently is deserted to-day. The road south of the Alle has not yet been seen, nevertheless the march of a column there would have become evident: Bartenstein would not have been found un- occupied by the enemy, and at Schippenbeil more would have been noted than the whistle of a few bullets fired by con- cealed men. And if hostile columns were approaching Schip- penbeil from the east, their advance detachments already would have been felt. These points are not conclusive evi- dence, but they are indications which, though not proving anything mathematically, when considered together have a certain weight. Positive information can be obtained by riding a few miles farther east. The Alle probably can be crossed at Stolzenfeld or Massaunen; and even information that the enemy was not encountered on the roads east of Schippenbeil will help clear up the situation for headquarters. But military instinct warns the patrol-leader against fol- lowing this plan. If, contrary to expectation, hostile infantry columns should be on the march to Schippenbeil, they hardly could get any farther than Bartenstein to-day, and to-morrow but little beyond the line Landsberg-Heilsberg. But only on this line they become of importance to our army, whose left wing to-day. May 5th, is expected to reach Mohrungen. There- fore, if they find out this evening at Mohrungen that up to this morning only the hostile 5th Dragoons have come along the Schippenbeil-Bartenstein-Heilsberg road, this in itself will form a basis for judging the situation. If the patrol clings any longer to the Heilsberg-Barten- stein-Schippenbeil road and its eastern prolongation, it may sacrifice important affirmative information in favor of nega- tive information. Should the 5th Dragoons simply be a flank guard, and should the enemy's main columns already be march- Reconnaissance. 147 ing on the roads through Bischofstein and Seeburg, there would be danger in the delay. Information of this could be sent promptly enough, as the heads of these columns might en- counter our own as early as the 6th. But if the enemy is not on these roads, timely information of this fact probably will be more welcome than any news from the district east of Schippenbeil. To be sure, many doubts still remain. If the heads of the enemy's main columns have not yet advanced as far as the line Schippenbeil-Bischofsburg, the patrol, in going south, might get in front of the hostile army and lay itself open to the charge of neglecting the important duty of locating the enemy's flank. And Lieutenant D can safely assume that his regimental commander will have the district east of Guttstadt reconnoitered, so that his own work in the vicinity of Bischofstein and Seeburg would be superfluous or of minor importance. And, finally, the officer cannot under- estimate the obstacles there would be to the forwarding of his messages should he go south, for in this case he would give up the use of the telegraph. The decision requires such a deep insight into the require- ments of greater operations of war that it can but seldom be found in officers of limited experience. Prudence, therefore, demands that commanders-in-chief should not set their ex- pectations too high, for many a patrol will fail simply because it is imable to hit upon the right thing to do in such com- plicated situations. And yet it is very seldom that these "stra- tegical" patrols, these "eyes of the commander-in-chief," can be explicitly told just what to do. They are permanently thrown on their own resources concerning the objective of their trip. No instructions, no matter how thoroughly thought out or carefully weighed, given Lieutenant D on the 3d of May, could have simplified the weighty decision for him that he must now make — a decision that finally results in fa- vor of turning south, because, reaching the flank of the hostile 148 Studies in Applied Tactics. columns, he would be able to see much more than would the patrols sent from Guttstadt against the heads of these columns. The patrol must ford the Alle at Hoschenen, and pre- sumably at Louisenhof will be able to find out something more definite about the garrison of Schippenbeil. Then the patrol will ride to Gr. Schwansfeld. But before crossing the Alle a message must be sent to the commanding general. What was discovered early this morning is of sufficient importance, and this may be the last opportunity to use the telegraph line. It is not advisable to wait until after crossing the stream before sending the mes- sage. It is not expedient to send single horsemen through a swollen stream, and at Bartenstein they might unexpectedly run into the enemy without being able to get away. What shall the message contain and how shall it be for- warded ? Near SchippEnbSil, 5 May, g a.m. To Telegraph Station, Saalfeld: Yesterday at noon the hostile 5th Dragoons coming from Schippen- beil passed through Bartenstein towards Heilsberg. At 4 a. m. to-day there was no enemy in Bartenstein and so far no other troops have followed the 5th Dragoons. Yesterday the mayor of Bartenstein was forced to send 10 wagon-loads of oats to Schonbruch and Langheim, respectively. The hostile 4th Dragoons camped last night at Schonbruch whither it marched from Schippenbeil. At 5 a. m. to-day it left for Domnau. Several shots were fired at my men from Schippenbeil. No troops were visible there and, therefore I think the place contains but few of the enemy. I shall not follow the hostile cavalry that apparently is marching towards Konigsberg, and, as apparently hostile columns will not use the Schippenbeil-Bartenstein-Heilsberg road, I shall turn south towards the roads passing through Bischofstein and Seeburg. D , Lieutenant. It is unlikely that a telegraph office will be found in op- eration in Pr. Eylau or on the Pr. Eylau-Konigsberg railway. This district is too near the 4th Dragoons. Besides, a mes- sage sent in that direction easily might fall into the enemy's hands. It is more promising to have the messenger follow the same route as did the one of yesterday — ^viz., towards the Ri;CONNAISSANCE. 149 Landsberg-Zinten railway. The wooded country between the two Hnes of railway will favor the messenger's slipping through. But the way is long and hard to find. Too many obstacles threaten a single horseman, and the importance of the message justifies sending 2 men, even though this will reduce the pa- trol to 7 men. Will the message escape the danger of the road? Even if the messengers are given remounts, or if such are obtained during the trip, these are not accustomed to great exertions, and easily may give out. It is 31 miles to Zinten by direct route; who knows what detours the messengers will have to make, or number of wrong roads they will take, as they must avoid the highways, keep to the woods, and solely depend on statements of inhabitants, who seldom can give accurate in- formation about roads to distant points. The troopers for nearly two days have been engaged in very fatiguing nervous work and constantly in the saddle, except during short pauses. Weariness and the opportunity to rest and refresh themselves en route will delay the ride, so that the messengers hardly will arrive at Zinten before 4 p. m. The hostile cavalry at Schonbruch surely sent a detach- ment as far as Pr. Eylau, and the latter naturally will cut off telegraphic communication to-day between Konigsberg and the western parts of the province. If, as we know, the rail- way and telegraph were destroyed at Wormditt on the evening of May 4th, we may certainly expect the same iliin.j to hap- pen to-day at Zinten, which is only 16 miles from Pr. Eylau. Therefore, it cannot be expected that the niessr.ge can be sent from Zinten, and it would be useless to make further search along the road either towards Mehlsack or Konigsberg. The happy thought to ride to Pleiligenbeil might accomplish the desired object. Will this saving thought occur to the two troopers, or will I^ieutenant D have sufficient forethought to direct them to this point before their departure, in case I50 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. they find the telegraph line no longer working at Zinten? It is only too likely that the message either never arrives at headquarters of the ist Army Corps or arrives so late that the chief of staff will place it with the retained papers marked "Obsolete." But granted that by luck or chance it reaches headquarters at Mohrungen on May 5th, whither it certainly would be forwarded from Saalfeld, it could hardly influence the arrangements made at Army headquarters for May 6th. It would be of but slight advantage even for the commanding general, ist Army Corps, no matter how important it may have seemed to the sending officer. The general has the right to assume that larger bodies of hostile cavalry will not appear on his left flank on May 6th, and, if in addition he can feel sure that there are no hostile columns approaching Heilsberg from Bartenstein, he still does not know whether such columns have reached Heilsberg from Bischofstein. Notwithstanding every exertion of horse and rider, and the leader's unusual caution, and unusual good luck which saved the, patrol from mistakes and errors, false information and the bullets and sabers of the enemy, and the advantage of operating in friendly territory, and the favor- able season, good weather, good roads, the faithfulness of tel- egraph operators in clinging to threatened stations, and the supply of suitable horses for the messengers — in short, not- withstanding a succession of favoring incidents, all of which could hardly be expected to happen, the message that finally reaches its destination contains nothing that could point out the way to Army headquarters. If we assume that the goddess of fortune further favors Lieutenant D , he may be able to ford the Alle without accident at Hoschenen, and learn at Louisenhof that Schip- penbeil is occupied by a small detachment of cavalry, a sort of connecting-post, and that the place was occupied the night of May 3d-4th by the 5th Dragoons, while the 4th Dragoons, Rejconnaissance;. 151 coming from Romsdorf, marched through the town May 4th, going towards Schonbruch. About noon the patrol may- reach the Bartenstein-Langheim highway at Gr. Schwansfeld, and find out that so far nothing but patrols have passed over it. The further information that the railway center, Kors- chen, has been occupied by the enemy since May 3d, will save the patrol-leader from the erroneous assumption that on the 5th, at Schwansfeld, he still is ahead of advance detach- ments of the hostile army, and therefore must return to the Bartenstein - Schippenbeil road. After obtaining some rest, which is much needed after the 30-miles ride of to-day, he may be able to find out by 4 or 5 p. m. whether or not, and from what direction, hostile columns have come to Bischofstein. In either case the news would be of great value to the commanding general of the ist Army Corps, although no change could be made in the orders issued for May 6th. But how difficult it becomes to forward the message! The tele- graph stations that still are in operation are so distant that it would not pay to look for one of them. The remaining strength of their horses must carry the messengers back to within reach of our troops. If the enemy has not marched through Bischofstein, the effort can be made to send the mes- sage directly back via Blumenau-Reichenberg-Sperlings-Gro- nau-Pittehnen. Otherwise, it must be sent in a wide circuit northwards, possibly crossing the Alle at Katzen, as hostile detachments surely would have possession of the bridges at Heilsberg. The patrol has covered more than 37 miles to-day, over 140 miles in the last 48 hours, and now from 35 to 50 miles more are required. Even if the messengers should be fortunate enough to find remounts, it is too much to expect that they would find their way, going the long distance through an unknown re- gion, and also escape from the midst of hostile cavalry. The 152 Studies in Applied Tactics. attempt would be absolutely hopeless on their own overworked horses. If our imagination carries us a step farther on the route that Lieutenant D has mapped out for himself, on the supposition that he will find Bischofstein unoccupied by the enemy, we possibly shall see him the evening of May 5th — after a 50-miles ride that day and 125 miles from Marienburg, mostly traveled across country with many a detour, frequently going at a rapid gait, and under constant nervous strain — op- posed by hostile infantry outposts; or at Lantern, watching hostile wagon-trains pass by. At the same time we shall see him in despair at not being able to send back a report in time of what he has seen. Thanks to good luck and his perseverance and prudence, he has succeeded in carrying out the ideal requirement of pass- ing around the enemy's flank and through the latter 's cavalry screen to the flank of his main columns before the main battle is fought. But of what use is this to the commander-in-chief, whose forces now have approached within a day's march of the heads of the hostile columns, which presumably have reached the Alle. The Army Corps must have received their orders some time ago for the coming day, which will lead them against the enemy and decide the role they must play in the coming bat- tle. And yet there lie between the patrol and its nearest out- posts 30 to 40 miles, two rivers, and the entire zone of the hostile reconnoitering and protecting force. What a slight chance there is to overcome these obstacles, even by the fore- noon of May 6th ! — and by that time the information will have been overtaken by the events it foreshadowed, and, in the din of battle, will be relegated to the scrap-heap. The officer was not confronted by adverse circumstances. We are satisfied that fortune rode at his side. And we can- not reply in extenuation that he took the wrong road and Reconnaissance;. 153 thus took too much time. But, on the contrary, we can con- fidently assert that he acted judiciously, and, guided a little by me, took the right direction a little more promptly than if he had been left entirely to his own inspirations. How many patrol-leaders would have followed the hostile cavalry that was discovered near Schonbruch ; how many would have gone east beyond Schippenbeil ; how many would have gone from Schippenbeil towards Kdrschen ! There is nothing unusual in finding hostile cavalry from 12 to 15 miles beyond the flank of an army. Moreover, it was fortunate for Lieutenant D that this flank guard con- sisted only of cavalry. And he did not proceed in a leisurely manner, but spared neither horse nor rider. Notwithstanding the progress made by our cavalry in long-distance and endur- ance rides, and however great may be the number of miles that officers and non-commissioned officers now and then have ridden on good horses, the number of voices is increasing that warns against overdoing and illusions. Quite a number of horses failed to come up to expectations or succumbed before reaching the goal. If we consider that a troop-horse already at the time of mobilization and concentration is subjected to unusual exer- tions, long journeys by rail, etc. ; often is poorly sheltered and fed at irregular times; that besides rider and accouterments it must carry a heavy pack ; and that even in a troop of selected horses we can count only on average results where the weakest sets the pace, we must look upon Lieutenant D 's ride as an unusual achievement that but seldom would be possible during a long campaign. The indifferent success of the patrol was not due to mis- takes of the leader or his men, but to the difficulties of the task, which are emphasized in the example we have minutely followed. Had patrols been sent from Marienburg towards Gvittstadt and Landsberg as well as via Heilsberg-Bartenstein, —11— 154 Studies in Appi.ie;d Tactics. the result would have been practically the same. The patrol sent through Guttstadt would have met the hostile advance detachments and would have been driven back, the one sent through Landsberg simply would have been able to locate the hostile cavalry marching towards Konigsberg. As things turned out, only Lieutenant D 's patrol was so situated as to get a glimpse of the movement of the hostile army, and therefore a discussion of its experiences was the most instructive. Although Lieutenant D had to overcome many dif- ficulties, they don't compare with the obstacles that are met while reconnoitering in the enemy's country. How many ex- pedients available in a friendly territory are denied the patrol - leader upon crossing the boundary! He must find his way with a poor map or possibly v/ithout any. It becomes more difficult to understand the inhabitants — is practically impos- sible for a single man — and the inhabitants' statements con- cerning roads and the enemy can be accepted only with mis- giving, even if the population is not wrought up and guerrilla warfare does not threaten the life of individual men. No habitation should be entered without extreme cau- tion ; only force will procure food for men and horses ; no place of concealment is safe, because treachery lurks everywhere. In friendly territory the people freely give information about the enemy to the reconnoitering cavalry; in the enemy's coun- try very little that is true and much that is false will be heard, and no telegraph office will be found outside the field of op- erations of your own forces to assist in forwarding messages. To properly appreciate the increased difficulties, I would, in conclusion, call the attention of my patient readers to the hostile patrol that spent the night of May 4th-5th at Wormditt (see page 28). Reconnaissance. 155 This patrol presumably was sent from Schippenbeil early on May 4th, with instructions to destroy the Seeburg-Lands- berg railway near Heilsberg and the railway between Worm- ditt and Mehlsack. After completing this work, it presuma- bly will be expected to reconnoiter via Pr. Holland towards Marienberg-Saalfeld, as the detaining of troops on the Vistula (Weichsel) probably has not remained a secret. Possibly it also has orders to cut the railway farther west. The patrol's orders are so important and carry it so far into hostile territory that it will consist of at least 2 officers, 2 non-commissioned officers, and 20 men; of these, i officer and I non-commissioned officer speak German a little. As the army intends assuming the offensive, and later expects to make use of the railways, it cannot be the intention to completely destroy the railways, but simply to block them for a few days, so that technical troops can repair damages in a short time. Therefore, it will be sufficient if the patrol has a number of dynamite cartridges, so it can destroy rails and switches. As i cartridge is sufficient to destroy a rail, 40 cartridges would enable the patrol to do considerable work. Therefore, each man must carry 2 cartridges, for which room can be made by leaving behind other articles of the pack; or 2 led horses might be loaded with the cartridges, thus furnishing valuable remounts in case of necessity, al- though they might somewhat delay progress across country. Naturally, the patrol must destroy all telegraph lines, and is equipped with instruments to tap the line. At Bartenstein and Heilsberg the patrol found the tele- graph offices abandoned, so that there was no chance to in- tercept any messages. At the Heilsberg railway station the patrol commander limited himself to destroying two railway switches, but consumed some time in destroying neighboring telegraph offices. Neither in Heilsberg nor in Bartenstein 156 Studies in Applied Tactics. could the telegraph instruments be found, as they had been removed. Late in the afternoon, after a ride of about 50 miles (in- cluding side trips), the patrol arrived at Wormditt, and sur- prised the telegraph ofhces in the town and at the railway sta- tion. The two German-speaking members of the patrol (an officer and a non-commissioned officer), who also know how to telegraph, will have tried to utilize the telegraph line, and force the operator to make inquiries in various directions. But it is hardly to be expected that this ruse will succeed under present conditions. The nature of the inquiries would arouse suspicion, and the results are more likely to mislead than enlighten. And even listening to messages coming over the wires would not lead to any important results, as care would be taken not to send valuable news to outl3dng sta- tions. At the most, Saalfeld or Maldeuten might ask Worm- ditt for news about the enemy. This would be dangerous only in case, as in time of.peace, the imposing title of the sending authority adorned the heading of the telegram. The situation of a small detachment of horsemen in a large hostile settlement is endangered by a prolonged stay and the keeping up of telegraphic communication, which can be but imperfectly controlled, and easily, by some pre-arranged signal, may reveal the presence of the detachment. There- fore, efforts to get information over the wire will soon be stopped and the instruments be destroyed. Searching the re- tained copies of recently-received telegrams, which the oper- ator may be forced to translate under threat of death, and seizing the letters and newspapers found at the post-office, might reveal valuable information ; but this would be very te- dious work for one only superficially versed in the language of the country. Nevertheless, during the night of May 4th-5th, the patrol in this way might discover something about the de- training of troops at Marienburg on May 3d. This informa- Reconnaissance. i57 tion might reach Heilsberg the morning of May 5th, and by- noon of the same day the higher commanders, supplementing similar information received from other sources. In destroying telegraph lines one thing must be remem- bered by an isolated patrol, the neglect of which might ab- ruptly end its career: Interference with a line will soon be noticed by the neighboring stations and will be reported by them to stations farther back, so that any opposing troops that may be near at hand can receive the news and come to the rescue. Therefore, prudence dictates that the line be de- stroyed in several places to increase the space in which the enemy must hunt for the ofifenders and make it more difficult for him to find them. The railway demolitions at the Worm- ditt station will be more extensive than at Heilsberg, and will require at least 8 or 10 cartridges. An undisturbed night's rest cannot be expected at Worm- ditt. It was a mistake that the patrol remained there. It should have left the place as soon as it had accomplished its object, and spent the night at some isolated spot. But pos- sibly it v/as delayed by its efforts at the telegraph office and the investigation of mail-matter. It also was a mistake for the patrol to ride along the Wormditt-Aiken highway early on the 5th; but possibly the patrol was forced to do this by the darkness and the absence of a good map, which in the ene- my's country cannot be replaced by information obtained from the inhabitants. The patrol, leaving at i a. m., with horses fairly rested, and cautiously working its way past habitations, at 7 a. m. reaches Pr. Holland, after successfully avoiding several hostile troopers, and finds the town and railway station occupied by hostile infantry. It is doubtful if the patrol will learn that the garrison consists of organized militia (see page 10). At any rate, considerable time will be consumed in reconnoitering the town; and in the attempt to pass to the north and south of 158 Studies in Applied Tactics. the town it is discovered that the entire line of railway is guarded. It will not be until 9 a. m. that the patrol-leader will be able to send back a message concerning the situation at Pr. Holland. The messenger has to go more than 30 miles to reach Guttstadt. His horse, after 5 or 6 hours' rest at Wormditt, has traveled over 50 miles and the day before trav- eled about 50 miles, or over 100 miles in a day and a half. It will be 5 or 6 p. m. before he can reach Guttstadt, going the shortest way — i. e., via Liebstadt, and we know what dan- gers threaten on the way, should he find it. As the higher commanders probably are not in telegraphic communication with the advanced cavalry, the message will not be received by them until late at night on May 5th, and it might confuse instead of enlighten them, should the patrol not have discov- ered that the garrison of Pr. Holland consists of organized militia. If this patrol, in its efforts to locate and turn the hostile left flank, makes a circuit to the north towards Elbing, its further efforts would be in va'in. Should it break through the line of railway guards south of Pr. Holland, to get a glimpse behind the screen of organized militia, it is doubtful if any messenger v/ould succeed in repassing the line. Only in case it turned south towards the road between Maldeuten and Mohrungen is there any prospect of a profitable reconnaissance, although the flank guard of the ist Army Corps would interfere with the patrol's activity. But it would be phenomenal if informa- tion, say of blue outposts being established at Steinsdorf, Roll- enau, and Wiese, should get through the district covered by the ist Cavalry, or, passing around this via Wormditt, should reach headquarters before the morning of May 6th. And, then, what would have been gained? Considering that the com- mander-in-chief had learned that blue cavalry had been en- countered between the Alle and the Passarge during May 5th, and blue patrols had appeared in front of his infantry at Jonk- Reconnaissance. I59 endorf and Gr. Buchwalde, he will not be surprised to learn that blue infantry was found at Mohrungen on this day, and only positive information that the enemy did not appear on the Pr. Holland-Iyiebstadt road during the afternoon would justify him in concluding that the flank of the blue army was at Mohrungen. Even if the message gave conclusive informa- tion on the subject, no changes could be made in the move- ments of the army, which would have to proceed in accord- ance with orders formulated the day before. Only detailed orders for the troops on the flank might be changed by it. Let us assume a more favorable case for the patrol — one on which regulations and theories greatly count — viz., that the patrol, making a wide circuit around the flank, is able to watch the march of hostile columns. Let us imagine that the or- ganized militia on the Maldeuten-Elbing railway does not ex- ist, and that the way is open for the patrol via Pr. Holland to the west. Let us even assume that the patrol received in- formation at Pr. Holland that obviates a groping about and saves long detours, so that, crossing the overland canal (Ober- landischen Kanal), it reaches the vicinity of Gr. Arnsdorf as early as lo a. m., and discovers the ist Army Corps march- ing on the Saalfeld-Maldeuten road — which, of course, pre- supposes criminal negligence on the part of the Army Corps. The distance traveled from Wormditt was from 35 to 40 miles, and the messenger would have to cover about 45 miles on un- known roads back to Guttstadt, if he wishes to avoid the dense zone of protection of the ist Army Corps. When will he ar- rive? when will headquarters, located possibly at Wartenburg or Bischofsburg, receive the message? The enemy would have succeeded no better than the blue force in sending out several "strategical" patrols to clear up the situation on the northern flank. A patrol coming via Lieb- stadt either would have been forced on to the route of the one whose fortunes we have followed, which came via Wormditt, i6d Studies in AppuEd Tactics. or it would have met the ist Cavalry; and a third patrol, coming via Mehlsack, would have obtained nothing but neg- ative results. Only by the rarest of good luck might it have happened to catch an important message on the Miihlhausen- Braunsberg telegraph line. But even such a message would have been belated in reaching Wartenburg or Bischofsburg. It might be objected to the "situation" assumed in the foregoing study, and the conclusions drawn as to the results of patrols working over an extended territory, that there was not enough room allowed for strategical reconnoitering ; that both parties should have sent out their patrols on May ist or 2d, and not as late as May 3d or 4th. Whoever takes the trouble to carefully examine the case will find that the pros- pects would not materially change for either party. The pa- trols simply would encounter the opposing cavalry one or two days earlier, behind which the main columns of the army would still be able to make considerable lateral movements; the messenger routes would become longer and more danger- ous; the powers of horse and man would be more greatly taxed; and all too soon the small band would melt away, whose connection with its army would constantly become more precarious, and whose conduct would become more dif- ficult the farther it advanced. Should Lieutenant D^ ^'s blue patrol reach the vicinity of Schippenbeil the morning of May 4th instead of May 5th, it would come within reach of the 5th Dragoons, who remained there the night of May 4th-5th. Should the patrol succeed in avoiding the 5th Dragoons, it might encounter the 4th Dra- goons, who later turned off towards Schonbruch, and, to defi- nitely ascertain the direction of march of the latter, the patrol might have to tarry in observation until the morning of May 5th, so that no time would have been gained for the recon- naissance of the roads to the south. However, if a lucky in- spiration sent Lieutenant D to the north more promptly, Reconnaissance. i6i he presumably would have met hostile patrols and flank guards on the afternoon of May 4th in the vicinity of Bischof stein that would have prevented further insight on this day, whose advance to the Alle on May 5th, however, would have enabled him to penetrate beyond Bischofstein to the Lautern-Seeburg road. A message received at the headquarters of the blue army on the morning of May 5th, concerning hostile advance troops at Bischofstein, in no wise would have cleared up the situation, as everything would have depended on whether the columns in rear of them would have marched to Seeburg or Heilsberg on the 5th. Of course. Lieutenant D could not have guessed this on May 4th, and could not have transmitted this important information any earlier than the morning of May 5th, which would have been too late to use as a basis for the commander- in-chief's decision for May 6th. In the same way the unchangeable laws of time and space would have prevented the hostile patrol sent via Wormditt (had it not reached this point on the 4th, but as early as the 3d or 2d of May) from sending its commander-in-chief infor- mation that would have removed all doubt and have informed him on the 4th or 5th what roads the hostile columns would follow on this day, so that he could have regulated his own movements accordingly. Even if the patrol on May 4th had discovered blue cavalry at Maldeuten or infantry outposts near Saalfeld, and even if this information miraculously had been sent back the 68 miles to Bischofsburg in time to reach head- quarters on the evening of May 5th, he never would be able to guess whether the enemy on the 5th would march to Mohr- ungen or Liebstadt, and whether on the 5th the flank column of the blue army would not appear on the Pr. Holland-Lieb- stadt road. 1 62 Studies in AppIvIEd Tactics. RETROSPECT. This clipping from the hfe of the cavalry service does not begin to exhaust the variety of situations constantly present- ing themselves in surprising shapes to those called upon to decide and act. The situations are very different for recon- noitering cavalry when the army to be screened is engaged in a flank march, or a retreat, or is awaiting an attack in a pre- pared position; or in minor warfare. And the customary method of having the mass of cavalry several days' march ahead will be greatly changed if, before the beginning of hos- tilities, both armies concentrate in the immediate vicinity of the frontier. It was not the object of my work to devise rules of con- duct for all these cases, to which might be added a great many others, such as operations in a mountainous country, in deso- late regions, in winter, besieging and defending large fortresses, etc. I simply aimed to assist in coming to a correct decision under various conditions; and the discussion of my simple "special situation" will show what great demands the recon- naissance service makes on the capacity of troops, the in- telligence, energy, and endurance of leaders as well as of in- dividual troopers. Judicious deliberation and boldness tem- pered by caution are the guiding stars of a cavalryman, who always must have a remedy at hand, scent danger from afar, whose sharp eye must see for miles, and whose nerves must never relax, if he wishes to retain his aim. The best precepts and theories fail if practice and experience do not hold sway. There is room for only a few noteworthy hints of a gen- eral character. The Field Service Regulations state that the strength of a patrol will depend on circumstances,* and that single men *See par. 74, F. S. R. Re;connaissanc]5;. 163 or a small group of men are best for purposes of observa- tion only. What has gone before shows that an officer's patrol sent to a great distance must not be too small, otherwise it would soon have to discontinue its messenger service, and its ex- plorations would be useless. As we have seen, it must have a certain fighting power and must be able to furnish reliefs for guards at night. On the other hand, there is a demand that details be economized to avoid scattering the strength of a force and insuring superiority of numbers at the decisive point. Our study will have demonstrated that important pa- trols cannot get along with 5 or 6 men, and that even 10 men seldom will suffice. Lieutenant F 's valuable message of 7.35 a. m., re- porting the presence of assembled hostile cavalry at Glottau (see page 56) was lost. Sent via Sackstein, it presumably fell into the hands of the hostile patrol which Lieutenant F discovered early in the morning near Lettau, and which he allowed to pass unmolested, although its defeat was prac- ticable. The same patrol probably also intercepted the mes- sage of Lieutenant F 's lance corporal who was sent to Sackstein; and we know that it delayed Captain K for some time near Wuchsnig. Who knows what it saw and re- ported from Teufelsberg, where it doubtless viewed the coun- try. It is true that Lieutenant F 's messr. re v^as carefully worded, but if it could not be destroyed, it si-Ill would reveal a number of noteworthy things — among others, the number of the blue cavalry regiment. On the other hand, we see considerable advantage re- sulting from Lieutenant C 's fight near Kammersdorf (see page 62). It assured him a clear road to the front and for some time a safe messenger-route to the rear. It for a while stopped hostile reconnaissance in this vicinity, and superior 164 Studij-s in Applied Tactics. authority probably derived some advantage from questioning the prisoners. Although these two examples may be objected to on the plea that they owe their existence to the imagination and bias, still they may serve to recall other cases from maneu- vers and kriegsspiel, and thus clear up matters. In my opin- ion, the seriousness of war does not justify a turning aside, advocated by theory, that endangers the messenger service and freely permits a hostile patrol to get a view of our columns. Our troopers not only should have recourse to arms when forced to do so, or when fortuitous circumstances suggest this course, but they should systematically make life a burden to hostile patrols and to shrewdly and cunningly devise ambus- cades for them. Reconnaissance service will be a very dif- ferent affair if danger threatens the hostile advance detach- ments from behind every bush, and if the superiority of our patrols in minor warfare forces the enemy to hold back from our front. Time thus consumed would be regained, and it would be imwarranted to assume that in such a method of proced- ure our men would be losers. Such an objection might be raised against any skirmish or battle. If we cannot hope for victory, we should not go to war. But even this principle must not be accepted as a model for invariable use; and it would be unreasonable were every patrol, regardless of every- thing, to charge the enemy with a loud hurrah whenever seen. The events of a few hours that in our study are culled from the course of a campaign do not permit an appreciation of the advantages of intrusting Captain B with the entire reconnaissance in front of the regiment in contradistinction to the system of a large number of patrols sent out by the higher commander (colonel). A consideration of an episode of sev- eral days would show the advantages in a clearer light. We would more readily see that great difhculties are encountered RECONNAISSANCt- 1 65 by a higher commander in directing patrols; that touch with them is easily lost; that their members and capacity are soon exhausted ; and that it hardly would be practicable to fill gaps in time. Every change in the situation that would necessitate a change of route or produce a new task for troops would cause patrols to wander about in wrong directions, ignorant of the condition of affairs in front of the army; and the threads to guide this tangled net would soon slip from the commander in spite of the invention of "message assembly stations," which is a fragile makeshift that would work hardly a single day. Even the reconnaissance of troops sent forward to supplement the activity of the patrols will help out the defects of this system very little. A troop commander hardly will know the number and duties of the patrols and will be unable to keep touch with them. Then, how can he support them and sup- plement their activity? Notwithstanding the bad luck that I purposely placed in Captain E 's way, to present a convincing case, we see how he passably well controlled his patrols on a broad front, and how his military judgment and the fighting power of his troop assured the continued progress of the reconnaissance. This would have been more clearly shown had Lieutenant F , at 5 a. m., attacked and dispersed the hostile patrol near Lettau. The obstacle formed by the Passarge and the encounter with the hostile troop at Pittehnen would have thwarted in- dividual patrols not under the captain's orders, or would have forced them to make wide detours, in which case their mes- sengers would have been unable to find their way back. The captain would have found out something from one or the other of these patrols by chance only ; and it hardly would have been possible to newly organize the system of reconnaissance after crossing the Passarge, unless he, on his own authority and in excess of his orders, had assumed the role that, to my notion, i66 STUDiiiS IN Applied Tactics. fundamentally belongs to a "reconnaissance troop." A "re- connaissance troop" should be intrusted with the full duties that the name implies, thus at the same time forming a living and permanent "message assembly station." There is noth- ing to prevent a superior commander, if he sees fit, from send- ing out other patrols with special missions — a means that can be successfully employed even by the commander-in-chief of an army without his feeling obliged to personally direct the general patrol-service in front of the army. The results accomplished by the patrols sent out for stra- tegical purposes during the course of this study seem to be in sharp contrast with what in many quarters is hoped from them. Nevertheless, our examples might have some effect on those who are less skeptical, and, imbued with enthusi- asm for their branch of the service, look upon the officer's patrol as destined to point out the way to victory to the commander-in-chief. Our two strategical patrols promised the best results, as their efforts were directed against and around the flank of the hostile army. They had no unusual obstacles to overcome. I rather exerted myself to smooth their way, to show how thorny and rocky it is even under favorable circumstances. Even at the grand maneuvers we have strategical patrols fail us; how vastly less can we expect of them in time of war. How often will their messages, if they escape capture, arrive too late and have no effect on the movements of the army! And should instruments be invented that would enable pa- trols to communicate by wireless telegraphy, reliable messages could be hoped for in this way only if the enemy should be unable to read them too, and if he by the same means should not be able to deceive our headquarters. I do not believe that I have exaggerated the difficulties and dangers or the exhausting effect of patrol-service, or un- derestimated the number of miles that horsemen can be ex- Reiconnaissance. 167 pected to go. To corroborate my statements, I shall refer to a few examples from actual war that happened on the classical ground of our study. When, early in 1807, Benningsen, the Russian commander- in-chief, surprised the French in their winter quarters, and Marshal Ney, who was first attacked, had provisionally brought his threatened troops into safety in the Guttstadt-Allenstein district, he (Ney) sent word from Allenstein of what had hap- pened on the evening of January 2 2d to Elbing, the head- quarters of Bernadotte's corps, which was next to him. The distance was 56 miles, and it took 24 hours to carry the mes- sage. The "operation order" which Napoleon sent January 31st from Willenberg to Bernadotte at Lobau was intercepted by the Russians, and, notwithstanding the Emperor's efforts, communication] between him and Bernadotte continued in- terrupted. Even on February 7th, the eve of the battle of Pr. Eylau, the Emperor was ignorant of the whereabouts of Bernadotte's corps, although the latter general sent messages January 30th from Lobau, February ist, 2d, and 3d from Strasburg, the 5th again from Lobau, and the 6th from Os- terode; all these arrived afterwards. The distances between Bernadotte and imperial headquarters were about 75 miles at Strasburg and from 50 to 60 miles at Lobau and Osterode. Marshal Ney received the "operation orders" on January 31st, at Gilgenburg, and the Emperor had to wait until Feb- ruary 2d for the anxiously-hoped-for information that Ney had begun his march, although the Emperor had sent him one messenger after another, and the distance was only between 35 and 45 miles. Several days later, on February 5th, Ney fought the Prus- sians between the Passarge and Narien-see, and occupied Lieb- stadt in the afternoon of that day. The Emperor, who had spent the preceding night with the Marshal at Schlitt, did not receive Ney's report of the action at his new headquarters at i68 Studies in Applied Tactics. Arnsdorf, about 8^ miles from Liebstadt, until the morning of February 6th. In the summer campaign of the same year, which also began unexpectedly for the French, it took over 24 hours for a report of the first encounter (which occurred on June 4th, at Spanden on the Passarge) to reach the Emperor's head- quarters, 37 miles away; though a message received at the same time from Ney at Guttstadt, 50 miles away, came through in 9 hours. A letter that the Emperor, on the evening of June 6th, sent from Finkenstein to Davoust, who was 40 miles away, reached its destination in 13 hours. Napoleon laid great stress on rapid and safe systems of communication, which were well organized in his armies. All the above-named dispatches were carried by officers and within the French field of operations passed over well- known roads. And although, especially in the winter cam- paign, the roads were far from what might have been desired, the couriers were not limited to riding horseback, but, accord- ing to circumstances, *made use of wagons and sleighs, for which purpose villages, furnished the necessary teams. The Emperor's aides knew his strict ideas concerning their duties in carrying messages, and extensive experience in war had familiarized them with all expedients for overcoming ob- stacles. It is true that maps were defective, but communi- cation with the inhabitants was simplified by interpreters, furnished by German auxiliaries serving with the French. And, besides. Napoleon's officers already had been through a number of campaigns on German soil. If, in spite of all this, the transmission of orders and the messenger service generally was greatly handicapped by all manner of friction, we must be all the more careful in esti- mating the capacity of patrols sent far ahead into the field of operations of the enemy. An appreciation of the obstacles and dangers surrounding them will not paralyze the energy Reconnaissance. 169 of their leaders, but urge them to greater exertions than if they had to be aroused from their illusion by stern realities of each case. Large armies do not always encounter each other along a serried front. If strategical patrols move against the flanks of hostile columns, or into intervals between hostile columns, there may be opportunities for more profitable employment than in the case assumed by our study. The two campaigns of 1807 in Prussia furnish proof of this. At the same time that Ney sent the above-named message of January 2 2d to Bernadotte, he sent a message to Berthier at Warsaw, which was intercepted by a Russian patrol south of Allenstein, and was delivered to Russian headquarters at Bischofstein the evening of January 23d. It contained a state- ment of the location of the Marshal's troops, his intentions and optimistic view of the situation. The copy of the opera- tion orders sent by Napoleon to Bernadotte on January 31st was intercepted by Cossacks, and the same day was sent from Dt. Eylau, by Prince Bagration, to Benningsen, at Mohrungen, where it arrived late in the evening of February ist. In both cases the Russian commander-in-chief, had he been equal to the occasion, Would have derived incalculable ad- vantage from the knowledge of the opponent's situation that the papers conveyed. And in our own times similar rewards beckon to the en- terprising patrol-leader, as is shown by the already mentioned case of the capture of the French General Staff officer near Beaumont, August 28, 1870, whose order-case contained Mac- Mahon's operation orders. In all three cases the enemy's flank and his line of com- munications lay in the direction of the patrols' march and of- fered a nearer and more convenient objective than if the hos- tile flank had to be reached by a wide detour. But I wish to call attention to this fact, as emphasizing what has been said —12— lyo Studies in Applied Tactics. above: not one of the important documents would have been captured from the enemy had the bearer been allowed to pass on unmolested. Of course, the most ardent advocate of the theory that patrols should simply see and not fight would not mean that such valuable prizes should be allowed to slip away. But who will be able to guess whether hostile troopers, dis- covered by the patrol-leader's sharp eyes, are carrying such treasures in their saddle-bags or not. The grand prize in the shape of the enemy's operation orders will not daily fall into the commander-in-chief's lap and relieve him from the burden of uncertainty. Notwith- standing the most self-sacrificing activity and brilliant endow- ment of his patrol-leaders, his own sagacity, groping in the dark, must know how to find the right way. The reconnoiter- ing bodies cannot relieve him of his office as guide, but they can assist him, and they can do this the more successfully the better they understand their business and the more their efforts surpass those of the enemy. Lieutenant C ''s patrol (of those sent due east from the ist Cavalry) was quite successful after overcoming the ob- stacle presented by the Passarge. It is quite likely that the result of his reconnaissance (the principal value of which consists in the discovery of the loca- tion of hostile infantry outposts) will be carried back by Lieu- tenant C before dark. It also may be assumed that Cap- tain E 's arrangements, by early in the afternoon, will clear up the situation in the vicinity of Guttstadt. It is quite possible that by evening Army headquarters can be wired from Gr. Hermenau concerning the state of affairs on the Alle, and that, although the orders for May 6th will have been issued, some changes may still be made, suitable to the changed sit- uation. Of course, in the enemy's country we cannot count on such prompt telegraphic communication. The headquar- ters of the ist Army Corps undoubtedly will derive benefit Reconnaissance. 171 from the messages, and the service done by the ist Cavalry during the forenoon of May 5th entitles it to due credit, even if the achievements have not been brilliant. The service was in accordance with the capabilities of the regiment and such as could be expected by headquarters. The comparatively favorable results no doubt in part were due to the fact that until noon no large bodies of hostile cavalry had been encoun- tered, and that there were gaps in the hostile cavalry screen, through which our patrols and troops could either slip or force their way. If my narrative, based on experience in campaigns, his- tory, and imagination, at all conforms to the manner in which, reconnaissance should be carried on, then there is a vast dif- ference between the way this service is performed in peace and in war. For a fact, it is very difficult to organize this service on a war basis in time of peace. Even in the school of the troop it is hardly possible for the captain to observe all his patrols, and it is quite likely that some of the regula- tions that prescribe a pacific demeanor for patrols are due to the difficulties in the way of reconnaissance in time of peace. And yet this duty is the foremost and most important devolving on cavalry. If it is not to prove a failure in war; if our troopers are not to become helpless and useless the mo- ment they encounter a real enemy instead of a maneuver- opponent who does not shoot, cut, or make prisoners; if our commanders are not to become bitterly disappointed at the non-receipt of messages that in time of peace arrive with sur- prising regularity, we must find the way to a proper training for war. In time of peace great care is taken to check anything done by infantry or artillery that is inconsistent with war conditions. No mounted man is allowed to show himself in the fire-swept zone; no order or message may be delivered that would not reach its destination in time of war; officers 172 Studies in AppuKd Tactics. and men alike must take advantage of cover and conform to difficulties of command incident thereto. Only the cavalry patrols ride as and where they wish, as if the grayish helmet- cover were a "hood of darkness" (tarnkappe), not only ren- dering the wearer invisible, but also invulnerable; and their messengers go unharmed through the midst of the enemy by the shortest and best roads. We sometimes hear this justified on the plea that the dash and hardihood of cavalry must not be interfered with, and that whistling bullets would soon enough produce the neces- sary sobering effect. We might on the same grounds forbid infantry and artillery to take advantage of shelter on the ground and construct artificial cover in time of peace. It might only too easily happen that this hardihood of peace would change into its opposite if the soldier in time of war unex- pectedly encountered dangers and obstacles he has not learned to overcome. My own experience justifies me in this misgiv- ing. If we remove the obstacles that the trooper encounters at every turn, and if, on account of the difficulty to observe and instruct him in extended territory, we do not give him any chance to acquire and practice caution, adroitness, and power of decision, which alone will carry a patrol through all vicissi- tudes to its objective and the message back, the smooth and successful course of peace maneuvers will be founded on self- delusion. These important attributes will not be produced by a twist of the wrist upon declaration of war. It is equally true of the cavalry as of the other arms, that only such troops are well trained as in war need change noth- ing they learned in time of peace. In addition to giving instruction on the map through problems and kriegsspiel, which also is suitable for non-com- missioned officers, I consider it essential to increase and im- prove the means of troop-leading in field exercises. If a large number of well-trained umpires (some of whom may be non- Re;connaissance. i73 commissioned officers) watch the conduct of reconnoitering bodies, the commander will be able to control and properly instruct patrols without adopting any measures contrary to practice in war. A knowledge that unskillful action, inatten- tion, and indecision will lead to failure as in war ; that patrols which are surprised or receive effective fire will be ruled out of action the same as infantry and artillery; that messengers falling into the enemy's hands will remain prisoners and must give up their messages as in war, will be the best school- mistress. To insure a decision when no umpire happens to be present, it might be ordered that the senior commander of the two opposing bodies render the decision. It does not matter if this decision should be slightly biased. In larger operations the officers detailed as umpires should each have several assistants to look after patrols, who, under the direc- tion and supervision of their superiors, surely would give to reconnaissance on a large scale the similitude of war. The entire service will benefit by the experience gained by officers and non-commissioned officers as umpires. I conclude these pages with the wish that the reader, who has entrusted himself to my guidance, may receive benefit from his work, and that I may have succeeded in impressing some of the realities of war upon him who has not yet expe- rienced it. Whoever may not be fully satisfied with my solutions should remember that no one is born a master, that many roads lead to Rome, and that, fortunately, the enemy also makes mistakes. Studies in Applied Tactics. PART II. CAVALRY OUTPOSTS, MARCHES AND COMBINED OUTPOSTS. PREFACE TO PART II. The Preface to Part I. of these studies gives information as to its object and plan and the method in which it should be studied. A conviction that the only sure way to become a troop-leader is by practice, and an effort to present realistic material for my readers to think about, are my guiding-stars. Service can only be properly performed in the predom- inant branches of the Army — the Infantry and Artillery — if everyone has a clear idea of the powers and limitations of cav- alry. Therefore, the first part of this work is devoted to cav- alry reconnaissance, anc^, the second part first deals with cav- alry outposts, which are intimately related to reconnaissance, and later with marches and outposts of the arms combined. It is intended later to make use of the understanding hereby established between the reader and myself by discuss- ing operations and battles. Georg von Alten. Berlin, August, 1904. CAVALRY OUTPOSTS. SeIvEction and Occupation of the Night Position. The "situation" is a continuation of that discussed in the first part of this work. A blue army is moving from the Vistula (Weichsel) on the front Gilgenburg-Saalfeld against a hostile (red) army coming from the east. The two cavalry divisions (ist and 2d) of the blue army are united on the right flank of the army. The left wing of this army consists of the ist Army Corps, to which the ist Cavalry has been attached from the ist Cavalry Division. The fortress of Konigsberg has its full armament and is garrisoned by (blue) organized militia. The orders issued on the evening of May 4th from headquarters of the ist Army Corps at Saalfeld provide that on the following day the corps will continue its march via Maldeuten towards Mohrungen, while the ist Cavalry will re- connoiter to the front and left flank. Subsequently the corps commander ordered that 3 troops of the 3d Cavalry, under Major D , of the divisional cav- alry of the two divisions of the corps, take charge of the re- connaissance south of Narien-see towards Jonkendorf-Miin- sterberg. The ist Cavalry had left Gr. Wilmsdorf at 5 a. m., May 5th. At 10 a. m. its advance guard reached Pittehnen and its main body Reichenthal. Part I. tells of the regiment's experience to this point and gives the arrangements of the regimental commander and subordinates, as well as the contents of messages received, in so far as they are of importance to the situation. Our im- agination will now further accompany the regiment. At 10 a. m. the colonel had received from Captain E , who had advanced with Troop E via Kleinefeld towards Wal- 177 178 Studies in Applied Tactics. tersmiihl, the message of Lieutenant F (who, for several hours, had been in the vicinity of Komalmen), stating that at 8.35 a. m. 5 hostile troops of cavalry were marching along the Glottau-Queetz highway towards Heiligenthal. Colonel A temporarily remained at Reichenthal awaiting further developments. Contradictory reports detained him longer than he wished. The information received, that several hostile troops had crossed the Passarge at Kallisten and had gone towards Waltersdorf, was soon modified by further informa- tion that only i troop had gone towards Waltersdorf, halting at Mathildenberg. Some of the blue patrols west of the Pas- sarge had to fall back before the enemy, and had lost sight of the Passarge valley at Kallisten. It was not until 11 a. m. that a message from Captain E cleared up the situation. At 10.20 a. m., from Height 140, south of Waltersmiihl, he had discovered several hostile troops dismounted near Deppen, while nothing had been seen of the enemy on the highway between Heiligenthal and Glottau since 9 a. m. Thereupon the regiment resumed its march via Elditten and Kleinefeld, and at 12.30 p. m. arrived north of Walters- miihl. Captain E reported that several hostile troops were advancing from Deppen. While the regiment was form- ing for action at Waltersmiihl the enemy halted south of the creek flowing from Komalmen past Waltersmiihl, which forms a serious obstacle. After vainly waiting for some time, the regimental commander decided to advance via Komalmen. Thereupon the enemy, from whom the movement could not be concealed, fell back; while doing so it was possible to estimate his strength, which was placed at 7 or 8 troops. The regiment advanced via Ankendorf, with the idea of cutting off the enemy's retreat; but the latter could not be overtaken, as he branched off via Alt-Garschen, where, at 2 p. m., it gained touch with Major D , who had taken 2 troops of the 3d Cavalry to Schlitt. The colonel learned from the major, who Cavalry Outposts. i79 rode up, that he had vainly tried to capture the bridge at Briickendorf by dismounted action, in which his men had ex- pended most of their ammunition. He then had ridden north and crossed at Kloben, after a hostile troop had retired from there via Schlitt towards Blankenberg. He estimated that at least 200 rifles had been opposed to him at Briickendorf station (marked "H.St." east of Briickendorf on map). His casualties were 3 dead and 14 wounded; the latter were left at Briickendorf. Troop E, 3d Cavalry, which belongs to the 2d Division, has not yet joined. Major D has sent it word to watch the enemy near Briickendorf and prevent his reconnoitering towards Mohrungen. He himself intends going towards Jonkendorf-Gr. Buchwalde with Troops A and B. The major stated that he already had sent patrols in this direction, but that his command needed some rest. The colonel explained the situation to the major and ar- ranged with him that the 1st Cavalry would return to the Heiligenthal-Guttstadt road, and reconnoiter towards the AUe north of Miinsterberg, while Major D would reconnoiter towards Gr. Buchwalde-Jonkendorf and farther south with his 2 troops. In the meantime the hostile troops had continued their retreat via Blankenberg towards Steinberg. At 2. 30 p. m. the regiment arrived at Heiligenthal, where, at 2.50 p. m., word was received from Troop A, ist Cavalry, that the enemy had not been seen at Gut+stadt up to 11.30 a. m., or at Knopen up to noon; that an officer's patrol was going beyond Guttstadt to reconnoiter towards Freudenberg- Tollack; that another patrol had been sent up the AUe via Knopen- Althof-Lower (Unter) Kapkeim; and that the troop for the present would remain at Queetz, sending small patrols towards Schwuben, Miinsterberg, and Rosengarth. The colonel sent Troop G to Rosengarth to reconnoiter towards Miinsterberg-Gr. Buchwalde, and as a means of pro- i8o Studies in Appued Tactics. tection. The regiment took post west of Heiligenthal and dismounted. To protect his own messenger route and to block it for the hostile patrols remaining on the left of the Passarge, Colonel A increased the post at Pittehnen to i officer and 1 5 men, then placed a non-commissioned officer and 10 men at Sack- stein, and later sent a platoon of Troop H to Deppen with orders also to occupy the bridge at Kloben. Several prisoners have been brought in whose statements, partly corroborated by inhabitants, reveal the following: The hostile 5th Dragoons,* which spent the preceding night at Heilsberg, this morning came via Guttstadt to Kallisten, where it joined the 6th Dragoons,* which was at Allenstein the pre- ceding night. The two regiments belong to different brigades, but both belong to the 2d Cavalry Division and are with the 2d Army Corps. During the night of May 3d-4th the 5th Dragoons was alone at Schippenbeil. It could not be deter- mined where the 6th Dragoons was during the same night. But the prisoner from the regiment says that his troop camped beside the railway, and that on the forenoon of May 4th he was sent back to this railway with a message, which he de- livered to an infantryman at the place where he had camped the night before ; that on the afternoon of May 4th, constantly riding along the railway, he had returned to his troop at Allenstein; that he estimated the distance from his former camping-place to Allenstein to be 25 versts (about 16 miles); that he had seen no troops during this ride; and that the rail- way was double-tracked. In addition, two messages had been captured. The first is as follows: *In this translation the enemy s (red) cavalry regiments are sup- posed to consist of 600 sabers each, which conforms to the strength of European regiments, and is only half that of our own. But the red troop is taken at 100 men, corresponding to our own. — Translator. Cavalry Outposts. i8i ToMLACK Woods,* South of Willnau, 5 May, 11-30 a. m. To Colonel M ; The two hostile troops reported by me at 8-30 a. m. as advancing from Mohrungen via Pfeilings forced me back into the woods, and are now followed by a third troop, which has reached Horn railway station and is trotting east along the track. The 2 troops first reported have ad- vanced via Gubitten. After 10 a. m. we heard small-arms fire from the direction of Briickendorf. There are hostile patrols at Gallinden and Willnau. N , Lieut. $th Dragoons. The messenger was captured at Seubersdorf by a patrol of Troop C, 3d Cavalry. His comrade escaped. Nothing has been learned concerning the whereabouts of the hostile oflEicer's patrol. The second captured message is as follows: Teufelsberg, South of Herzogswalde, 5 May, 1 1-30 a. m. To Colonel M ; Circling around Waltersdorf, and avoiding a hostile patrol, I arrived here, after 4 or 5 troopers, who had occupied this knoll, had retreated towards Alt-Bolitten. Nothing suspicious can be seen from the Teufels- berg. I shall continue towards Gr. Hermenau. M , Lieut. 5th Dragoons. The two bearers of this message carelessly approached Kallisten after it was occupied by a platoon of Troop H, ist Cavalry. The vedette at the western exit shot down one of the men; the second, whose horse was killed, was captured. At 4.30 p. m. Lieutenant C , ist Cavalry (see page 130), arrived at Heiligenthal and reported the resilt of his reconnaissance. Riding along the edge of the woods west of Rosengarth, he recognized Troop G of his regiment en route to Rosengarth and verbally reported the situation to its captain. The gist of his report is that during the forenoon a hostile cavalry regiment advanced from Jonkendorf, the greater part going via Pupkeim towards Schlitt and about one-fourth going *"Tomlacker Wald" on map. i82 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. via Gottken-Ballingen; that between i and 2 p. m. hostile infantry outposts were posted at Wilhelmsthal and east of Mondtken; and that about 3.30 p. m. infantry outposts also were posted at Gr. Buchwalde. Lieutenant C had seen nothing of the hostile cavalry that according to another report had retreated via Blankenberg towards Steinberg. About 5 p. m. a message is received from Major D , dated 4.30 p. m., in which he states that the enemy has with- drawn from Briickendorf, Troop E, 3d Cavalry, then crossing at this point and advancing towards Pupkeim ; that the enemy had taken along 3 wounded of the 3d Cavalry and the officials of Briickendorf station on wagons via Kl. Gemmern, leaving behind 13 seriously wounded and 6 dead of his own, most of whom belonged to the 6th and a few to the 3d Dragoons ; that the hostile troops at 3.30 p. m. had left Steinberg for Poll- eicken; and that the major would follow towards Pupkeim with Troops A and B. Troop G, ist Cavalry, reports from Height 166 north- west of Rosengarth that individual infantrymen have been seen at the edge of the woods east of Rosengarth, near the Rosengarth-Miinsterberg road, and on the Rosenberg-Gr. Buchwalde road, who fired at long range on our patrols; and that shots also were fired from New Garschen. Troop A, ist Cavalry, is at Queetz. It reports that as late as 3.30 p. m. the enemy had not appeared at Knopen, or at Guttstadt, where a picket under a non-commissioned officer is stationed. The inhabitants of Guttstadt state that no hos- tile troops have passed through that town excepting the 5 th Dragoons. May 4th a strong hostile patrol destroyed the telegraph line and railway switches at the station. A patrol of Troop A, ist Cavalry, which advanced through Schwuben fell back at 4 p. m. before at least a company of hostile infantry which came fromKlutken mill ("Klutken M." on map) and oc- cupied Height 113 near Schwuben. The patrol also -claims to Cavalry Outposts, 183 have seen hostile infantry on Podonnenberg near Miinsterberg. The enemy has not been seen at Knopen as late as 4 p. m. A patrol sent south via Battatron was fired upon from Klutken, mill and from the height northeast of Lower (Unt.) Kapkeim, and discovered an infantry post a few hundred yards north of this village on the highway leading through Battatron. The connecting-post at Pittelmen compiled a report from the messages there received, from which it appears that Lieu- tenant B (who was sent via Freymarkt towards Heilsberg in the forenoon by Captain E , Troop A, ist Cavalry) at 11.20 a. m. arrived at Freymarkt without seeing anything of the enemy, and continued his reconnaissance towards Launau; that Sergeant K , Troop A, ist Cavalry, following the troop defeated by Captain E , lost track of it north of Sportehnen and rode towards Wormditt; and that Sergeant L , Troop A, ist Cavalry, reports from Liebstadt that Gr. Hermenau has been occupied by a battalion of the ist Infantry. Hostile cavalry patrols are no longer visible anywhere except near Neu-Garschen and Blankenberg. Colonel A sent word to the commanding general of the ist Army Corps, via Kallisten and the telegraph station at Gr. Hermenau, of the events happening up to 3 p. m. : the appearance of the two hostile cavalry regiments, their with- drawal towards Blankenberg, his meeting Major D , and that the enemy had not appeared at Guttstadt up to 11.30 a. m. or at Knopen up to 12 noon. At 5 p. m. 3 troopers from the connecting-post at Gr. Hermenau arrived with the following telegram: Headquarters ist Army Corps, Mohrungen, 5 May, I p. m. To the Comdg. Officer, ist Cavalry: The ist Division will be quartered for the night at Himmelforth, Pfeilings, Horn, and Kranthau, the 2d Division at Mohrungen and Gr. Bestendorf, corps headquarters at Mohrungen. Your orders remain un- changed. So far no reports received here sufficiently clear up the situa- 184 Studie;s in Applied Tactics. tion east of the Passarge. Last message received from you is dated Pittehnen, 11 a. m. By command of Lieutenant-General G. : E. S , Chief of Staff. The commander of the connecting-post has added the following : Gr. HermEnau, 5 May, 1-30 p. m. The importance of the enclosed telegram and the insecurity of the road induced me to send it by 3 men. A strong hostile patrol was seen near Herzogswalde at 11 a. m. We still have telegraphic communica- tion with Liebstadt, where, so far, nothing has been seen of the enemy. A battalion of the ist Infantry has occupied Gr. Hermenau. H , Sergt. Troop C, ist Cav. The bearers of the message came via Alt-Bolitten, where Corporal M , Troop A, ist Cavalry, joined them and rode with them to Teufelsberg, whence he had been driven at 11 a. m. by a hostile patrol. At Sanglau they were obliged to hide themselves from hostile troopers until the latter rode back towards Seubersdorf, and thus they were considerably delayed. It was not iintil they reached Waltersdorf that they were able to continue on their way undisturbed to Kallisten, where they found the platoon of Troop H, ist Cavalry. The ist Cavalry, leaving Maldeuten at 5 a. m., has come about 33 miles. It fed at Herzogswalde from 8 to 9.35 a. m., rested at Reichenthal-Pittehnen from 10 to 11 a. m., and has been at Heiligenthal about 2 hours, during which time the troops were able to water in succession. Discussion of the Situation of the: Regiment; Intention AND Arrangements of Its Commander at 5 p. m. At last, word is being received about the enemy's infantry. The colonel has a right to hope that the report he is about to send, and which ought to arrive at Mohrungen by 8 p. m., will clear up the situation for the commanding general as far as this is possible up to date. Hostile infantry outposts are es- Cavalry Outposts. 185 tablished all along the line from Schwuben via Gr. Buchwalde and Mondtken to west of Wilhelmsthal. It may be confidently assumed that, in rear of these, columns have followed as far as the Alle. The fact that so far we have had to deal only with cavalry belonging to the 2d (red) Army Corps justifies the surmise that this corps has occupied the line of the Alle — but only the surmise. It would be of no advantage to lead the regiment against the hostile outposts to find out further particulars. We could not find out for certain even if we suc- ceeded in penetrating the line at great cost. The Alle would check further progress. And of what advantage would it be to know that at some point there are a few battalions of the 2d Army Corps? It is sufficient for the commanding general to know that the advance of the hostile infantry has crossed the Alle. But it would be of great importance if corps headquarters could be informed where the northern flank of the enemy is. The message concerning hostile outposts at Klutken mill and Lower Kapkeim is a pointer on this subject. But a definite conclusion cannot yet be drawn, for we still have no news about the roads leading east from Guttstadt on which hostile infantry also might be found. The reconnaissance of the ist Cavalry probably will no longer have any influence on the decision of the army com- mander, but it will serve the commanding general ist Army Corps, and possibly of the 2d Army Corps also, as a basis for orders on May 6th, and may even be of use for their orders to be issued on the evening of May 5th. In Part I. attention was called to the fact that too much must not be expected from cavalry reconnaissance; and it must be admitted that the ist Cavalry did not encounter any unusual difficulties. On the contrary, it was favored by the unexpected weakness and the withdrawal of the hostile cavalry; and if the hostile infantry had arrived later, its presence might not have been detected —13— i86 Studies in Appued Tactics. until evening, so that a report about this might not have been received at Mohrungen until early the following day. So Colonel A may look upon his day's work with con- siderable satisfaction. But how much still remains to be done, and how much is still enveloped in darkness! Minor uncertainties, such as the enigmatical appearance of two hostile regiments of two different brigades and the ab- sence of all information about the remainder of the 2d Cavalry Division, or the appearance of a part of the 3d Dragoons at Briickendorf, which, according to the well-known organiza- tion of the hostile army, belongs to the ist Army Corps,* are of small moment. It is possible that the cavalry of the neigh- boring army corps, coming from the south, assisted the 6th Dragoons at Briickendorf — but it would not pay to bother about such details. It is of far greater importance to find out definitely how far the front of the hostile army extends to the north; and nobody knows if late in the day a hostile column may not reach Guttstadt or vicinity, to prolong the front early in the morning and envelop our flank. It is true that Captain E as a precautionary measure has sent an officer's patrol to the east via Guttstadt, but how easily can a patrol be captured or forced aside; how little would be gained could it report that it was fired on by hostile outposts at Klingerswalde or Eschenau. For it is possible that there or even at Nosberg the troops encountered simply might be hostile covering detachments. Were it not 5 p. m., and had the regiment not already covered a distance of over 30 miles, it would be an easy matter to clear up the mystery. The way is open and a ride to Gutt- stadt would bring the regiment to the commanding point on the enemy's flank. It may very properly be asked : Why *The German General Staff has an accurate knowledge of the ordre de bataille of all foreign armies — including the names of the commanders of all larger organizations. — Translator. Cavalry Outposts. 187 did not the regiment continue its march towards Gr. Buch- walde or Guttstadt as early as 2 or 3 p. m. ? This was im- practicable both on account of the necessity for a prolonged rest and the uncertainty that prevailed at the time. It was possible that a march to Buchwalde would bring the regiment immediately in front of the enemy and prevent a reconnais- sance of his flank ; and a march to Guttstadt might be a wild- goose chase. It is not until 5 p. m. that the messages received justify a consideration of Guttstadt as the next objective. But can Colonel A expect this further effort from his command late in the afternoon of May 5th? To-day's march has not demanded unusual exertions. The main body of the regiment marched at an ordinary gait; there was no gallop- ing to strain lungs or sinews of the horses; prolonged halts afforded opportunities to rest; it was practicable to feed at Herzogswalde, and, during the past two hours, it was possible to water at Heiligenthal ; there were no scorching sun's rays. Critically examining his command. Colonel A surely would conclude that its strength is far from exhausted. The 8 miles to Guttstadt could be traveled without any harm if it only were possible to rest there. But there energetic reconnais- sance would have to begin, and at that exposed point, only 3 miles from the hostile outposts at Schwuben, it would be impossible to unsaddle, water, and feed. How would it be with the efficiency of the regiment on May 6th, the probable day of battle? Will it be able to give a good account of itself; will it be able to give efficient assistance after covering 40 miles on May 5th and passing a restless night under a frosty sky? Would it not be with a last gasp of horse and man that it would deliver its decisive attack on May 6th to cover a re- treat or to pursue the enemy, if throughout the preceding night there should be ceaseless activity, as if May 6th were to be the last day of maneuver, when the "general" would be sounded and peace and quiet spread over the land. French's i88 S'ruDiE;s IN Applied Tactics. cavalry division may serve as a warning, which in the late Boer war rode into Kimberley and as the result of a single day's overexertion was hors de combat for a long time afterwards. Months may pass before peace is restored and every day in the meantime may bring new work, new exertions. This must be taken into consideration by every commander. And yet there is none who would hesitate to do his utmost, to shed every drop of blood, if necessary. Has this moment arrived for Colonel A on the afternoon of May 5th? Is what he hopes to accomplish by riding to Guttstadt worth the risk of materially reducing the efficiency of his regiment for the fol- lowing day? It would be different if ht v^e^.e forenoon and we were at Heiligenthal after a 12- to 15-mile ride. Arriving at Guttstadt in good shape, reconnaissance might be successfully undertaken on the right of the Alle. Daylight would enable us to get an extended view from the heights east and southeast of the town, troops could be sent forward as far as Nosberg and Eschenau, and Guttstadt could be abandoned in time for a safer place in case of the advance of hostile columns. As matters now stand, the regiment would arrive at Gutt- stadt as the sun is setting, approaching darkness would make an extended view impossible, no conclusion could be drawn from the picket-firing of different posts, and no columns on the march would be discovered. If, on the evening of May 5th, the regiment wishes to get into safe quarters from Guttstadt, the 40 miles it has marched would be increased to 45 or 50, to which at least 5 to 10 miles more must be added for the reconnoitering troops. Should the regiment remain at Guttstadt, it would assume the role of a reconnoitering-patrol close to the hostile outposts without the advantages of mobilty and ease of concealment of such patrol. A hostile platoon of infantry stealthily ap- proaching along the railway could attack it with impunity and force it to fall back in the dark. Cavalry Outposts, 189 The colonel must see that the regiment at Guttstadt virtu- ally could accomplish no more than the patrols that have al- ready been sent out, and that the march thither would un- necessarily tire and expose it, and unnecessarily reduce its strength for May 6th. If the colonel decides not to advance to Guttstadt to-day, the next thing to consider is a place to spend the night. If it is impracticable to continue the reconnaissance against the enemy's flank, every other exertion seems useless. It would seem, then, that the only thing to do would be to gain new strength for to-morrow's duties and to otherwise carefully prepare for these. It would be most convenient for the regiment to remain at Heiligenthal and Ankendorf. The two towns surely could provide most of the food necessary for the 1,200 horses and men, and whatever may be lacking can be brought from Ko- malmen, Waltersmiihl, Kallisten, Deppen, and Alt-Garschen. Even if the baggage-train, which is still at Mohrungen, 15 miles away, has to be dispensed with, the troops very quickly could make themselves comfortable. It may even be pos- sible to obtain straw, something unusual when bivouacking in the face of the enemy. For it must be a bivouac, be it never so cold, or should the rain descend in torrents. It would be rash to place the horses under cover only 3 to 3J miles from the enemy's outposts at Neu-Garschen and near Rosengarth, and half a day's march from our own in- fantry. It is even possible that the hostile cavalry, probably assembled near Neu-Garschen, might make a sudden attack. Extensive preparations would have to be made for de- fense at the edge of the woods southeast of Ankendorf and Heiligenthal and to keep the roads thence under observation, and to resist the advance of the enemy from the line Alt- Garschen-Height 168 (southeast of Ankendorf), on the high- way towards Queetz and on the one towards Komalmen. 190 Studii;s in AppIvIEd Tactics. The protection of the bivouac, for which purpose it might be necessary to detail strong interior and exterior guards in ad- dition, might take half of the men, while at least one troop would have to form a detached post at Guttstadt, so that re- connaissance beyond the latter point might continue. As with a bivouac at Guttstadt, so also one at Heiligenthal would re- sult in using up strength instead of conserving it. Cavalry finds most complete rest with the least expendi- ture of strength in rear of a natural obstacle. There is a quiet night's rest in store on the left of the Passarge if the crossings at Kloben, Deppen, and Sackstein are held. Even the bag- gage train can be brought up to the quarters by lo or ii p. m., and the pickets at the bridges will have an easy time and mostly be able to place their horses under cover. A troop on outpost at Sackstein, another at Kallisten (left bank of the Passarge) with vedettes on the crest near Deppen, a troop at Kloben, the remainder of the regiment at Mathildenburg, Wenglitten, R. G.* Seubersdorf and Seubersdorf — such a dis- position would insure the regiment's appearing on the scene May 6th rested, refreshed, and spick and span. It would be an arrangement that would render communication safe with the Army Corps, and in conjunction with pickets at Pittehnen and Gr. Hermenau would prevent hostile patrols gaining any insight of the situation of the ist Army Corps during the re- mainder of the day and during the night. In this case, too, at least one troop would have to form a detached post towards the enemy to keep touch with him and watch the roads on the right of the Alle leading towards Gutt- stadt. "Were this task allotted exclusively to the patrols al- ready in front, we would jeopardize communication with them, which, for example, might be completely severed by a hostile *"R. G." is an abbreviation for Ritter-Gut, knight's manor. Cavalry Outposts. 191 troop or a platoon of infantry advancing to Queetz, Glottau, or Guttstadt. But 1 1 troops would be well taken care of on the left of the Passarge, and an early start on May 6th still might bring the refreshed and invigorated regiment on time into the vicin- ity of Guttstadt. Finally, it must be remembered that the colonel as yet does not know anything of the plans of headquarters for the 6th, and that the regiment in its quarters near Kallisten will remain well in the commanding general's control, so that thence he can send it whichever way he will. He may desire to have the march of his corps screened by the cavalry regiment whether the corps turns south past Narien-see towards Briickendorf- Kallisten, or past the north end of the lake (see) via Sack- stein-Pittehnen ; and this small cavalry force can in no way perform this task better than by blocking the crossings of the Passarge. But should the commanding general desire the cavalry to advance farther, it would not have interfered with his plans. It could just as well advance towards Guttstadt or Wormditt, towards Miinsterberg, Gr. Buchwalde, or Jonkendorf, depend- ing on the inportance that the commanding general places on one or the other direction. He may have received informa- tion or orders calling for an entirely different view of the situa- tion from that acquired by the colonel from his reconnaissance. There are good reasons for adopting the plan just de- scribed. No one could censure the colonel, should he decide in its favor. Nevertheless, there not only arises the inevitable "but" with which every decision has to contend — for there is none that answers all requirements — there also arises a doubt in the colonel's mind whether, in spite of all this, there is not a better solution. irst of all, it may be the experienced leader's natural aver- sion to a plan that so completely meets all requirements for 192 Studies in AppuEd Tactics. feed and rest as to remind him of field-maneuver methods. Then, too, his knightly sensitiveness rebels against the com- mand to retreat that he must issue if the good quarters behind the Passarge are to be occupied. It is true that quite often during a campaign the cavalry far in advance of an army, after a day's work is completed, finds it necessary to go back a step to be able to pass the night in a protected spot where outpost duty will be lessened and sufficient supplies can be found. But here conditions are dif- ferent. The regiment is almost toe to toe with the enemy on the ground vacated only a few hours since by the hostile cav- alry, which, avoiding an engagement, acknowledged our superi- ority and surrendered to the regiment and its patrols the con- trol of the territory between the two opponents. Ought the regiment now of its own accord relinquish this control and enable the hostile cavalry by a quick movement to gain its lost ground and thus make amends for the mistake of earlier in the day? It would "be very easy to do so. For example, if the hostile cavalry is on the Gr. Buchwalde-Rosengarth road, behind the forest screen held by the infantry outposts, and learns of the withdrawal of the ist Cavalry towards Kallisten (which hardly would remain concealed after Major D 's de- parture), it would only take about an hour for said cavalry again to be at Alt-Garschen or Heiligenthal. The Passarge also would protect it against a sudden attack if it should place adequate outposts opposite Kloben and Deppen; and the fol- lowing morning the ist Cavalry would have to force a defile before it could advance unmolested. The regiment might remain at Heiligenthal until dark, in the meantime having quarters prepared on the left of the Passarge. This would prevent the enemy's promptly discover- ing the withdrawal, but he nevertheless might accidentally reach Heiligenthal before the ist Cavalry again regained the right bank of the Passarge on the morning of May 6th. We Cavalry Outposts. 193 would be trusting to luck instead of taking no chances, and would be sacrificing valuable time that should be devoted to rest and for which reason the step backwards would have taken place. It would be quite a long step, for some of the troops now at Heiligenthal must march back more than 4 miles. The thirt)''-odd miles traveled by them and by those to be sent to Kloben and Sackstein would be increased to nearly 40 miles; and it is pertinent to ask whether, as it seems necessary to go a few miles farther for suitable quarters, it would not be pos- sible to find some more suitable place than the hiding-place behind the Passarge. Such place cannot be found on the Deppen-Guttstadt highv/ay. Oueetz and Glottau are even more exposed than Guttstadt and Heiligenthal. Komalmen is too small. Wal- tersmiihl lies in a narrow valley close to the Passarge meadows, which restrict freedom of action. But Scharnick seems to offer what the colonel wants. Situated on the Liebstadt-Guttstadt highway, in close com- munication with the telegraph system, near enough to Gutt- stadt to closely watch it, far ahead of our own and near the enemy's flank, the regiment here would be at an advantageous spot ready for service early in the morning. Only a few miles would separate the regiment from the bridges across the Alle at Schmolainen, Kossen, Guttstadt, or Knopen, should it wish to get a view beyond the river. A hostile advance towards the Passarge would not escape the notice of the regiment, which would constantly be in a position to report progress of the hostile wing. It is true that the com- manding general has not yet issued his orders for May 6th, but even if the directions of 1 1 a. m. were not at hand, which repeat the general instructions and allow the colonel freedom of action, he in this contingency would have to decide for himself as to what he thought best for the regiment and most useful for the 194 Studies in AppLiiiD Tactics. army corps and army. He practically would discontinue his reconnaissance against the hostile front, for, although several patrols would remain on the left bank of the Alle in front of the hostile outposts, it is to be expected that they will be forced back early on May 6th at the latest. They would be able to see little of what happens behind the hostile screen of outposts. The regiment even would open the way for the hostile cavalry to and across the Passarge, as the weak posts of observation at the bridges easily could be overpowered. If the colonel pictures to himself the corps commander's thoughts, in so far as this is possible without knowing what orders have been received from army headquarters or what information has come from the front through other channels than the ist Cavalry, he must feel satisfied that the disadvantages he would voluntarily incur would be of slight importance compared with the advantage of constantly remaining in touch with what is taking place on the enemy's outer flank. It is quite likely that nowhere else would it still be practicable to discover and report upon the depth of the hostile columns before they form up and come into action. Nowhere else could the regiment so effectively and successfully employ its fighting strength, either to relieve our own front, support the decisive attack, cover a retreat, or follow in pursuit. It still would be doubtful whether the regiment would reach the Guttstadt-Iviebstadt highway in time from quarters at Kallisten and Seubersdorf, even if there were no opposition to crossing at Deppen. We must count on the possibility of other hostile heads of columns arriving at Guttstadt on the after- noon of the 5th of May and by their advance on the morning of the 6th blocking the road to Pittehnen. The good line of com- munication gained at Scharnick via Liebstadt with corps head- quarters at Mohrungen would always make it possible to comply with an order of the commanding general sending the regiment in different directions from those so far considered correct. Cavalry Outposts. i95 Judging by the map, the ground at Scharnick to a certain ex- tent favors a night's rest. To be sure, we shall not find the same ideal security and comfort as behind the Passarge, still, Zaun-see andthe former Lingnau-Lake("Ehe-maliger Lingnauer od. Sawangen-see " on map) cover a part of the front, in rear of which the two Scharnick estates A and B, and the village of Lingnau can be utilized for shelter. It is true that the country is quite open towards the east and north, and although so far there is no indication of danger threatening from these directions, the service of security must not be neglected there and will require some strength. The last objection that excited nerves might offer — viz., that the missing regiments of the hostile 2d Cavalry Division may be expected at Guttstadt in the evening, and that the enemy's superior numbers in the end might force the ist Cav- alry from its commanding place on the hostile flank — is pushed aside by the fearlessness of the soldier who does not allow him- self to be frightened. In the face of such untoward circum- stances, which so far have in nowise been foreshadowed, the regiment still would be more advantageously placed at Schar- nick than at any other point. The only change that might take place is that the cantonment at Scharnick and Tingnau probably would be changed into a bivouac at Wolfsdorf or Elditten. The colonel will issue his orders happy to think that it is not necessary for him to have his regiment fall back, but that the miles that lie between him and his quarters lead forward. Considerable space was allotted these reflections because it seemed a favorable opportunity to elucidate certain princi- ples concerning the conduct of independent cavalry as well as to show the reasoning that may precede the taking of an im- portant step. Many of my readers may have encountered difficulties in attempting to put themselves in Colonel A 's 196 Studi£;s in Applie;d Tactics. place, and deduce for him a suitable and practicable plan out of the various possibilities presenting themselves. And yet the situation is not complicated or enigmatical, but compar- atively simple. It seems to me that the problem has developed itself naturally before the reader's eyes during the progress of events narrated, and is less obscure than is usually the case with scholastic problems in tactics that have to draw more extensively on the imagination to produce the "situation" desired. The problem does not call for an ingenious solution and is not intended to test the student's ability to discover and correctly apply a military principle presented in a vague and indefinite form. The regiment is not in an unusual stiuation which only a genius could fathom. On the contrary, the cir- cumstances are not at all unusual, but such as often occur in war. In my opinion, the difficulty mainly lies in the lack of opportunity to become familiar with the operations of larger bodies of cavalry in time of peace — particularly with the ques- tions of quarters and (3utposts for independent cavalry. There are few generals in the German Army who as staff officers have not drafted orders for detachments, advance guards, and out- posts of the combined arms in maneuvers, and who have not solved such problems in staff rides and kriegsspiel. But how seldom is it possible in time of peace to obtain practical ex- perience in the command of larger bodies of cavalry forming part of an army operating in the field on a war footing against an opponent similarly organized. The expenses of such exer- cises would be too great, and it would be out of the question to call out army corps for the sake of cavalry instruction who in the resulting maneuvers would do nothing for some days but march along in rear of the cavalry. Unfortunately, the few opportunities during grand maneuvers (Kaisermanover) often are circumscribed and spoiled by the necessity of com- plying with peace conditions, so that entire fieedom of action and decision but seldom obtains. The obstacles in the way of Cavalry Outposts. ^97 organizing and carrying on reconnaissance on a war footing, and of taking the effect of fire into consideration (as explained in Part I.) add to the difficulties of command in this branch of the service. Military history furnishes but few examples illustrative of these principles as taught in maneuvers. The Napoleonic era dates back so far and deah with such radically different conditions that its examples but indifferently serve our purpose. Neither will Stuart's celebrated cavalry operations during the Civil War in America help us out of the dilemma because they took place in a different kind of country and had different ob- jectives from what would be the case with cavalry in Europe. Nor will our own campaigns of 1866 and 1870, the Russo- Turkish War, or the campaign in South Africa afford us suf- ficient instruction, as in no case tJie cavalry on both sides per- formed the part that must be expected of it in the wars of the future. It is not surprising, therefore, if things do not run smoothly in theoretical instruction, if it does not receive adequate atten- tion on staff-rides and at kriegsspiel. On account of lack of personal experience in the field and in maneuvers, the instructor hesitates to touch a subject where he must draw too much on his imagination. I am inclined to believe that we would take a long step in the right direction if annually we could have cavalry maneuvers of several days' duration under war condi- tions where regiment would operate against regiment and bri- gade against brigade; and if, whenever possible, cavalry divi- sions not only operated alone, but against each other under war conditions. The armies covered need not actually exist; they could be imaginary. The chief umpires soon would gain sufficient skill and experience to substitute messages for the actual appearance and co-operation of these bodies.* The ^ have devised exercises for field artillery ^^^ere the infant^ and cavalry are imaginary. A similar arrangement could all the better 198 Studies in Applied Tactics. extensive employment of a large number of well-trained, active, strict umpires would be a prerequisite ; also the adoption of rules based on the realities of war with reference to capture of prisoners, placing out of action, interception of messages, etc., as well as the use of the telegraph between commanders and umpires. As long as we lack the necessary experience we must all the more carefully and thoroughly think the subject over. The detailed discussion that I introduced concerning the situa- tion of the regiment was prompted by this fact. It also was intended as an object-lesson for the inexperienced — showing that by picking to pieces and testing the p'ros and cons of various propositions ideas can be shifted and a useful decision can be arrived at. The method is not infallible, but it some- times answers the purpose when quick intuition fails and when no war experience fitting the case comes to mind. The method in itself does not insure a correct decision ; but the more often such cases are thoroughly thought out, the more readily and easily a practicable patii will be found. But even the most gifted should carefully verify a quick decision. It is a myth that the art of troop-leading is based on sudden inspirations, and that campaigns and battles are unconsciously won by heaven-inspired genius. The very greatest of our generals have borne witness that their decisions have been the result of strenuous thought. All the more will careful, conscientious thought be necessary from lesser lights. But it would be a mistake to imagine that it was the right and duty of a leader in a certain measure to ask for time so be made for cavalry, because it, as a rule, is not in close contact with other branches of the service. The difficulties of obtaining forage would not prove insurmountable if all the villages in the maneuver area kept such supply on hand as they were able to spare, of which troops could buy for cash what they needed. Whatever was not used would remain the property of the community. There would be no difficulty in pro- curing the necessary food for the relatively small number of troopers from the villages. This manner of supplying food and forage would not be out of the way, because in time of war the cavalry would have to live off the country. Cavalry Outposts. 199 that he alone or with the help of an assistant may think over the situation, when called upon to make a decision in the field. The mental superiority of a commander more particularly shows itself in an emergency by the cool methodical way in which he works. But it is seldom that at the last decisive moment there would be time for such a methodical analysis as is contained in the foregoing pages, and it would be dangerous to have the appearance of being in doubt. Before the moment calling for action is the time for clear- sighted thought, which prepares for possibilities so that you may not be surprised by the unexpected and taken at a dis- advantage. The more carefully and correctly every change in the situation and every report is tested and considered, the more you accustom yourself to look far ahead and weigh the arrangements that may be demanded in the future, the better will your mind be prepared for rapid decision. As a matter of fact. Colonel A was not suddenly called upon to come to a decision. The panorama of the situation was gradually unrolled before him, and long before the receipt of the last information (at 5 p. m.) he held council with him- self on the significance of details obtained from Major D , the messages from his own patrols and of those intercepted from the enemy, the prisoners, and inhabitants. Even before Lieutenant C personally brought information of the dis- covery of hostile infantry outposts. Colonel A concluded that hostile infantry would to-day reach the Alle, on account of the statement of the prisoner captured from the 6th Dragoons who yesterday delivered a message to an infantry major only 1 5 miles from Allenstein. There was no more danger of lyieu- tenant C 's message misleading Colonel A into believ- ing that the hostile flank was located at Gr. Buchwalde, than there was of Colonel C 's message about hostile infantry at Schwuben and Kapkeim inducing him to believe that there was no possibility of Guttstadt being occupied later by the 200 Studies in Applied Tactics. enemy. While the regiment was resting and watering, filHng nose-bags, and obtaining supplies generally at Heiligenthal, the colonel, presumably on Knoll 170, had two hours' time to think about the situation. It would have been during this period, in time of war, that most of the deliberation would have taken place which the student of the problems in this work can undertake only as the latter are presented in quick succession by the author. Colonel A could have come to a decision based on Lieutenant C 's message received at 4.30 p. m. But he did well to delay, for, if it proved true that the enemy's left flank actually was at Gr. Buchwalde, there would be no need to go farther north. In this case he would have been on the enemy's outer flank on the Kallisten-Guttstadt highway, and, being more than 6 miles from the enemy's infantry, could remain where he was. The message received at 5 p. m., concerning the hostile company at Schwuben, at once enabled the colonel to decide what to do, *as he already had thoroughly gone over everything that had been received before. It will be somewhat of a relief for junior officers to realize that as a rule the necessity to come to a decision does not pre- sent itself as suddenly as in practice problems. At the same time it must be remembered that in a campaign a commander must constantly tax his mental powers so as not to be surprised by occurrences, but to be prepared for the worst. As Hamlet says, "the readiness is all." The careful reader of military history often is surprised at the almost resigned air in Napoleon's letters written to confi- dential friends on the eve of battles, as if this great optimist and believer in his star and power wished to have a clear idea of the means of safety at hand in case the planned blow should fail. I also can refer you to Goeben, the general of unchal- lenged, dauntless determination, who told me that the night before the battle of St. Quentin he did not sleep, but for hours Cavai^ry Outposts. 201 thought over the situation while referring to a map so as not to overlook a single chance presenting itself to him or the enemy, either for victory or defeat. Not only the last drop of blood and the last breath of horse and man must be risked to gain the end in view, but also the last particle of brain-fiber. Exigencies of the service often not only demand that jun- iors implicitly follow the orders of their superiors, but also that they willingly accept the latters' plans and views even if con- trary to their own. It therefore would be no waste of energy if any reader, who came to radically different conclusions from my own regarding Colonel A 's situation, would accept my own, and, based upon them, write out the arrangements to be made by Colonel A at 5 p. m. , before consulting the following : Arrangements Made by the Regimental Commander at 5 P- M. After word had been sent to the lieutenant -colonel and squadron commanders to report to the colonel, the latter dic- tated the following report to three officers of his staff: I- Heiugenthal,, 5 May, 5 p. m. To the Chief of Staff, ist Army Corps, Mohrungen: From I to 4 p. m. to-day the enemy established infantry outposts on the line Wilhelmsthal-Mondtken-Gr. Buchwalde-Munsterberg-Schwu- ben; also at Klutken mill and Lower (Unt.) Kapkeim. So far nothing has been seen of the enemy at Knapen, Guttstadt, or Kossen. No word has yet been received from the reconnaissance to the east via Guttstadt. No enemy was found at Freymarkt at 11-20 a. m.; an officer is now riding thence towards Heilsberg. Only the 5th Dragoons came through Guttstadt, who, in conjunction with the 6th Dragoons, at 3-20 p. m., went from Steinberg towards Polleicken. Major D left Schlitt for Pupkeim at 4-30 p. m., with 2 troops of the 3d Cavalry, to join Troop E, 3d Cavalry, which crossed the Passarge at Briickendorf. At Briicken- dorf, in addition to wounded of the 6th Dragoons, there also were found some belonging to the 3d Dragoons. I am taking the regiment to Scharnick and Lingnau, where I intend to pass the night, and would request orders and information be sent me via Liebstadt to Lingnau. There are connecting-posts at Liebstadt and —14— 202 Studies in Applied Tactics. Pittehnen. Small detachments will be left at Sackstein, Kallisten, and Kloben. I would request that Lieutenant G be retained at corps head- quarters to-morrow as observer. The colonel then dictates orders (2 and 3) to Lieutenant G and the regimental adjutant: 2. To the Platoon Commander, Troop H, ist Cavalry, Kallisten: The regiment will go to Scharnick and Lingnau for the night. Your platoon will continue to hold the crossings at Kallisten and Kloben, and will be directly under my orders. Your messenger route will be via Heil- igenthal-Komalmen or via Sackstein- Kleinefeld-Wolfsdorf. The detach- ment at Sackstein will remain there for the night. 3- To the Commander, Baggage Train, 1st Cavalry, Mohrungen: The train will at once move to Liebstadt, where it will go into can- tonment for the night and attend to its own safety. Report your de- parture from Mohrungen to me by wire via Liebstadt to Lingnau, and your arrival at Liebstadt via connecting-post at Pittehnen. Lieutenant G has authority to change or add to these instructions. Lieutenant G », who was one of the officers copying the report for corps headquarters, receives the following verbal instructions : "You will take 5 troopers and ride to corps headquarters via Kallisten and Willnau to deliver the report (No. i). At Kallisten you will give the commander of the platoon Troop H, ist Cavalry, this order (No. 2). "West of Willnau you may find outposts of the ist Divi- sion. You will acquaint the outpost and advance-guard com- manders with the contents of the report (No. i) as far as this is possible without losing time. You will take along two copies of the report (No. i); carrying one copy yourself and having one of your escort carry the other. You will take ad- vantage of every opportunity offered to send the report ahead more rapidly (cyclists or telegraph). I expect you to reach Mohrungen by 8 o'clock this evening. CavaivRy Outposts. 203 "I will give you this order (No. 3) for the baggage train, which ought to be at the Mohrungen railway station. You may modify this order as may seem best to you." Lieutenant G departs after repeating his verbal in- structions, and after the colonel is satisfied that the officer is familiar with what has happened during the day. The colonel may possibly add some instructions as to what he expects the officer to do next day. The lieutenant-colonel and squadron commanders having arrived, the colonel gives them the following verbal instruc- tions in the presence of the squadron adjutants, who make the necessary notes: 4. "The ist Army Corps will remain at Mohrungen, Pfeilings, Horn, and Kranthau to-night. "The enemy has established infantry outposts on the left bank of the Alle from Schwuben via Gr. Buchwalde and Mondt- ken to near Wilhelmsthal ; and on the right bank of the Alle at Klutken mill, north and northeast of Lower Kapkeim, as far as has been determined. Until quite recently the enemy had not appeared at Knopen, Guttstadt, or Kossen. Troop A, ist Cavalry, now at Queetz, sent an officer's patrol via Guttstadt towards Freudenberg-Tollack, but no report has yet been received from the latter. Lieutenant B at 11.20 a. m. found Fre5^markt unoccupied by the enemy and then proceeded via Launau towards Heilsberg. At 3.30 p. m. hos- tile cavalry that was opposed to us left Steinberg, going to- wards Polleicken. Major D , with 2 troops of the 3d Cav- alry, is en route from Schlitt to Pupkeim to join a third troop of the 3d Cavalry, which crossed the Passarge at Briickendorf. "The troop of the hostile 5th Dragoons which this morn- ing retreated via Klogehnen from before Captain E gained the right bank of the Passarge at Sportehnen. At this point Sergeant K , who was following, lost trace of it and went to Wormditt. 204 Studiks in Applied Tactics. "I intend having the regiment spend the night at Schar- nick and Lingnau, starting thither shortly via Komalmen. The i^^ Squadron will lead and will be charged with the protec- tion of the column towards the north, northeast, and east. It will occupy Lingnau and will make arrangements for the protection of this place as well as of the cantonment of the entire regiment on a front extending from the former Lingnau- lake (inclusive), to the Beiswalde and Neuendorf railway, and thence to a point on the creek between Beiswalde and the Scharnick-Regerteln highway southwest of Beiswalde. "Troop A for the present will continue as reconnaissance troop under my immediate orders, and provisionally will go to Neuendorf; but probably will spend the night with the squadron at Lingnau. "The ist Squadron is charged with watching the crossings of the Alle below Kossen, especially the two bridges at Schmol- ainen, as well as the roads leading to Liewenberg, Sperlings, and Launau. Requisition may be made on Beiswalde and, if necessary, also on Regerteln and Neuendorf. "The remainder of the regiment, under the lieutenant- colonel, will occupy Schamick. It will follow the ist Squad- ron, and is charged with the protection of the column towards the northwest, west, and south. Later it will protect the front of the regiment from the former Lingnau-lake (exclusive) , past the north end of Zaun-see, across the Scharnick-Heiligenthal highway to the Lingnau-Wolfsdorf road, and thence across the Scharnick-Regerteln road, joining the outpost of the ist Squadron southwest of Beiswalde. In front of the outpost, the roads to Freymarkt and Wormditt and the Guttstadt- Kallisten highway must be carefully watched. This part of the regiment also will keep up the connecting-posts with Pit- tehnen. Requisition may be made on Komalmen, Warlack, and Wolfsdorf. Troop G will receive separate orders and will Cavalry Outposts. 205 continue in observation of the hostile outposts. Provision will be made for quarters for it at Scharnick. "The detachments at Liebstadt, Pittehnen, Sackstein, and Kallisten will remain in position and will receive orders from me. "The ist Squadron will reserve quarters in Lingnau for regimental headquarters. "The baggage train has been ordered to Liebstadt. It will not be at the disposal of the troops. The 1st Squadron may start in 15 minutes, provisionally going only as far as the north end of Zaun-see. The column must keep off the parts of the highways that are visible from the east. "All detachments necessary to provide for the service of security and information of the regiment and for preparation of quarters will be sent out at once. "In case of attack, the quarters occupied will be defended." The lieutenant-colonel and commander of the ist Squad- ron will require some time to think about the new situa- tion and their instructions, and to compose their orders, so that more than 15 minutes will pass before the column can start. The regimental commander has time to make further arrangements. He dictates the following orders : Heiligenthal, ^' 5 May, 5-25 P- m- To Commanding Officer, Troop G, 1st Cavalry, at Rosengarik; and Commanding Officer, Troop A, 1st Cavalry, at Queetz: At 4 p. m. a hostile company of infantry established an outpost The regiment is about to march to Scharnick and Lingnau to pass ^ "xroop G for the present will continue as reconnaissance troop under my immediate orders, and will watch the hostile outposts Unless cir- cumstances should forbid, it may take quarters for the night at Schar- nick, but will be responsible that touch is retained wrth the enemy from Wolken to the vicinity of Steinberg. A platoon of Troop H is at Kal- listen and Kloben. 2o6 Studies in Applied Tactics. The I St Squadron will provide for protection at Lingnau and Beis- walde. At 6 p. m. Troop A will proceed from Queetz to Neuendorf under cover, and will continue as reconnaissance troop under my immediate orders. It may take quarters for the night at Lingnau, but will be re- sponsible that touch is maintained with the enemy to the north of Wolken on both banks of the AUe. I shall expect a report from both troops at Lingnau not later than 8 o'clock this evening. I shall attend to the detachments at Herzogswalde, Liebstadt, and Pittehnen. The crossings of the Alle north of Kossen and the roads to Liewen- berg and Launau will be looked after by the ist Squadron. To the Connecting Post, Pittehnen: Read the inclosure and promptly forward it to Liebstadt. Inclosure : To the Connecting-Post, Liebstadt: The sub-joined telegram for corps headquarters to be wired at once- The connecting-post at Liebstadt will see that the detachments of the I St Cavalry at Gr. Hermenau and Herzogswalde will at once come to Lingnau via Pittehnen. The connecting-posts at Liebstadt and Pittehnen will continue their present duty. * By order of Colonel A : B , Adjutant. Telegram to corps headquarters, Mohrtmgen: Near HeiligenThal, 5 May, 5-30 p. m. There are hostile infantry outposts at Lower (Unt.) Kapkeim, Schwuben, Miinsterberg, Gr. Buchwalde, and Mondtken. Enemy not at Knopen, Guttstadt, or Kossen. To-night the regiment will remain at Lingnau. Request orders via Liebstadt. A , Colonel. 7. Near Heiugenthal, 5 May, 5-35 p. m To Detachment, at Sackstein: The regiment goes to Lingnau. The detachments at Pittehnen, Sackstein, and Kallisten will remain in place. Numbers 6 and 7 are prepared in duplicate and No. 5 in triplicate, so the regimental adjutant will have a retained copy. They will be forwarded by messengers, preferably such as know the way. To attain this end and to sax^e men, it is usually Cavalry Outposts. 207 advisable not at once to send back men who have come with messages, but to hold them until they can carry back a mes- sage or an order. Numbers 6 and 7 will be taken by one man, who will con- tinue on his way from Sackstein to Pittehnen. Finally, the colonel will send a non-commissioned officer and 3 men of Troop H to look for Major D , 3d Cavalry, in the vicinity of Pupkeim, and verbally tell the latter that the ist Army Corps will pass the night at Mohrungen, Pfeil- ings, and Horn, while the regiment will stay at Lingnau and Scharnick, leaving a platoon at Kallisten and Kloben. Should the major not be found at Pupkeim, then the non-commissioned officer is to ride via Neu-Kockendorf to Briickendorf, where presumably there is a connecting- post. The non-commis- sioned officer is to inquire where the major will stay for the night and what further information has been received. Then he is to ride to Kallisten and join the platoon of his troop at that point. A written report from the non-commissioned officer is to be sent to Lingnau. It can be confidently asserted that every single case deal- ing with the conclusion of a day's work of a body of cavalry, in the future coming to any reader's notice, will differ from the one above described. It therefore would be a loss of time to study Colonel A 's arrangements as prospective models. But it will pay to examine the wherefore of some of these ar- rangements, so as to derive mental benefit from such examina- tion of the reasons. The first thing to be done was to send a report to corps headquarters. The earlier they know about the situation at corps headquarters, the better can commands be issued to suit the case. A colonel reports in a dififerent way from a patrol-leader. He summarizes results while, as a rule, a young 2o8 Studies in AppIvIKd Tactics. officer or a non-commissioned officer is limited to reporting on individual cases. Colonel A included in his report several pieces of information concerning Major D , and possibly already reported by the latter. Major D 's further advance that afternoon notwithstanding the exhaustion of his troops, and the appearance of troops from the 3d Dragoons, whose pres- ence heretofore had not been suspected, make it highly prob- able that he will meet with difficulties and that there might be trouble about his messages getting through to headquarters. On this account Colonel A 's addition to his report will be welcome at Mohrungen. One of the regimental staff officers is to carry the report, not only because he will be able to give the commanding general further details about the events of the day, but also to insure orders later going back to Ling- nau and to furnish instructions to the baggage train. Certain details omitted by Colonel A because he thought them a side issue might be of iftiportance to the commanding general; and while Colonel A does ask that orders for him be sent over a certain route, still, he has a right to expect more de- tailed accounts of what is worth while for him to know, if sent by his special representative. During the evening of May 5th there is so much to be done at corps headquarters that in the bustling activity something of importance to the regiment easily might be overlooked and fail to reach it in time on the 6th, as an early start must be made. The officer is to remain at corps headquarters May 6th and see that the regiment is informed of everything of importance for it. It is not custom- ary to have observers with superiors ; they are more necessary with neighboring commands not under an immediate superior, for the personal interest of a superior is closely enough inter- woven with that of his subordinates. And Colonel A would not have taken this step had he not anyway been obliged to send an officer to headquarters with a strong escort who Cavalry Outposts. 209 would not be able to get back to the regiment in time and who at the same time has sufficient authority and discernment to judiciously direct the baggage train. The colonel abandons the idea of having the train join the regiment. The staff officer will be unable to deliver the report at corps headquarters before 8 p. m., and the train cannot be counted on leaving before 9 p. m., probably not reaching Lieb- stadt before midnight. It would be 3 a. m. before the train could arrive at Scharnick and Lingnau, an hour at which the regiment, owing to the strained situation, no longer would be able to make use of the facilities offered by it. Very likely any orders for the train to join the troops in their cantonment would have to be revoked and this might necessitate special arrangements for protection. But it seems right and proper that the train should be ordered away from Mohrungen, where it is in the midst of the troops of the army corps. This seems a favorable opportunity to examine what the train has accomplished during the day. To be sure, it did not assemble at Maldeuten until 6 a. m., but as the regiment left at 5 a. m. the train began its work long before this. The escort certainly did not get up any later than the members of troops, and in most instances the horses, too, were harnessed before 5 a. m. Since 9 or 10 a. m. the column has halted on the road at Mohrungen, to continue its march late in the evening. It was impossible to obtain any real rest during the long wait. Although men and animals were able to obtain the necessary food, it was not possible to unharness the animals. The commander and non-commis- sioned officers had the difficult task of maintaining order; and every officer of experience knows what that means with an army corps marching by and a neighboring town to encourage infraction of orders. It is not too much to assert that a halt of nearly 1 2 hours at Mohrungen under such conditions is more wearing than would have been an additional march of 12 miles 2IO Studies in Appliijd Tactics. on the smooth highway. Arriving at Liebstadt at midnight, the train will be nearly at the end of its tether, although in more than 1 8 hours it traveled only about 18.5 niiles on a good road. The baggage trains of all troops almost daily encounter similar discomfort, and unfavorable weather and bad roads increase the difficulties in a high degree. Although the regiment in this case has the prospect of obtaining food and forage in the neighboring localities, and thus is not dependent on the sup- plies carried in the baggage train, I wish to call attention to the difficulties that might arise under other conditions. Lack of supplies can destroy the best of plans and dampen the enter- prise of the most intrepid leader, particularly in the cavalry, where efficiency of the horses depends so much on forage. A cavalry commander especially must think of supplies, because this matter does not concern him in time of peace, and because the system of forwarding supplies and the training of the personnel in all European armies undoubtedly are not up to date. While all other appliances of war have been greatly improved by taking advantage of modern inventions, we are, as far as forwarding of supplies is concerned, almost on a mediaeval basis, once the support of railways fails us; for we depend almost entirely on the many thousand wagons, none of which can go much farther than 18 miles a day, and carry comparatively small loads. The colonel gives his instructions verbally to the lieuten- ant-colonel and squadron commanders; dictation would take too long and is not really necessary, as any misunderstanding readily could be rectified almost at any time. Everything about the situation might be omitted that is already known to these commanders. Different arrangements for the march and the night posi- tion might be ordered and still answer the purpose. The reader who took the trouble to work them out will have recog- nized the difficulties of the case notwithstanding its appearing Cavalry Outposts. 211 very simple at the first glance. I have attempted to so arrange the duties that the colonel would have nothing more to do with details, and to shorten the line of outposts as much as pos- sible, so that a minimum number of men would be needed. The colonel waits with issuing orders for the troops to occupy their quarters. He provisionally has the regiment go as far as the north end of Jaun-see, because he is not yet certain that he can carry out his intentions. Further infor- mation about the enemy at the last moment might necessitate a change. But the detachments to prepare for the occupation are to be sent out at once, so that the reconnoitering and pro- tecting screen may be formed in the new direction before dark and prevent any farther delay in the regiment's going to rest. The colonel already has decided what to do in case of alarm, because the orders for the squadrons in part depend on this. They would have to make very different arrangements if, in case of sudden attack, the troops were not to defend the villages, but had to assemble beyond them. It is easy to see why the colonel decided not to assemble his men in case of attack. The whole regiment in a way is on outpost-duty and so near the enemy that in case of a sudden attack there hardly would be time to get out the horses. As the effort presumably would have to be made under fire, it would result in confusion and interfere with the efficiency of the men in the dark. If there is timely warning of an attack— if plenty of time will be available— there is nothing to prevent the colonel's subse- quently ordering the men to mount, should he consider it advantageous. It would be inadvisable to designate a place of assembly for the entire regiment even if it seemed certain that under all circumstances the men would act mounted. The colonel would thereby unnecessarily tie his hands. Any- way he would have to send the order to assemble to part of the regiment not m the first line, and it is just as well to wait until then before informing the men where the place of assembly 212 Studies in Applied Tactics. is. Even with troops quartered in a single village, it is advis- able to have different places of assembly for smaller units. Scharnick, which is more protected and seemingly] more com- fortable, is not selected for regimental headquarters, but Ling- nau, so the headquarters may be nearer at hand to receive information from the outpost and guards. It anyway is out of the question for the colonel to expect a quiet and comfortable night. As the colonel by his orders to his subordinates has rid himself of the details of protection, he can the more completely give his attention to watching the enemy, and the terrain, and supervising the movements of the two reconnaissance troops. The services of the latter cannot yet be dispensed with and must not be disturbed. Relieving them just now would cause confusion in reconnaissance work, no matter how much it is to be desired that Troop A be relieved and allowed to rest; a better opportunity must be awaited. On the other hand, it is contemplated to have Both troops join their respective squad- rons for the night, so they may be relieved at least from the care of providing for their own protection. But it will depend on the enemy whether or not they can take advantage o this favor. A joint order was drawn up for the two troops, so they might mutually understand their orders and co-operate in carrying them out. The connecting-post had to have orders in any event, and this opportunity to send a copy of the report to corps head- quarters by wire could not be missed. Touch with Major D is somewhat relaxed by the regiment's departure; hence a non-commissioned officer is sent to Pupkeim, but without any written communication, because there is considerable danger of a written message fall- ing into the enemy's hands. As elsewhere in this study, so also here, the length and number of orders and arrangements Cavalry Outposts. ii3 may cause surprise. It certainly would be desirable to shorten and reduce the number, but I did not succeed in doing it. In my opinion, any attempt at this would open the door to con- fusion and misunderstandings. The time required might be somewhat shortened by the discovery of various expedients during the routine of a campaign. For example, the com- mander might permanently intrust a capable officer of his staff with looking out for communication to the rear and to the flanks and with preparing and suggesting all arrangements to this end. In the present case this officer might have drawn up the orders for the detachments at Kallisten, Sackstein, Pittehnen, and Liebstadt, and might have suggested the send- ing of a telegram to corps headquarters and of a patrol to Major D . In view of the number and length of the instructions that a cavalry commander must order and dictate at such a time, it is interesting to imagine to what extent his work would accumulate should he wish to retain the actual reconnaissance work in his own control. It would be almost hopeless to make all the arrangements now necessary for sending information of the new situation to the officers' patrols far ahead, for clos- ing the gaps in the screen, and for providing the additional patrols to be sent out with suitable instructions. Five or six additional orders would be necessary, and even then there would be no certainty that provision had been made for ob- serving the enemy at every point and that protection was assured the command. It is simpler and surer to let the recon- naissance troops attend to this matter. The arrangements of the lieutenant-colonel and the com- mander of the ist Squadron, now to be considered by us, would have to be made by the map even in time of war. Therefore, the reader who wishes to work out these arrangements is not placed in an unnatural position by not being able to see the 214 Studies in Appi^ied Tactics. actual ground. But it must be remembered that to-day, May 5th, the weather is fine, while it rained for several days before. The rivers and creeks are flooded. The meadows in places cannot be crossed by teams or moimted men. It was learned at Heiligenthal that the bed of what once was Lingnau Lake can only be crossed by single footmen with experienced guides. What arrangements are made by the Lieutenant- Colonel AND THE Major commanding the First Squadron AT 5.30 p. M. ? During the ride to Heiligenthal these two ofi&cers confer with each other and agree about the junction of their re- spective outposts on the creek about 1,100 yards northeast of Scharnick. Upon arriving at the halting-place of the troops, the troop commanders are informed of the situation. The commander of the ist Squadron, who has also called up Lieutenant H , Troop C, and Lieutenant J , Troop D, adds the following; "The squadron is ordered to occupy quarters at Lingnau. I shall give fiurther information on the subject on the spot. Lieutenant H will ride ahead, divide the village among the four troops, and select quarters for regimental and squad- ron headquarters. To Troop B will be assigned the buildings at the exit towards Guttstadt; and to Troop C, those at the exit towards Wolfsdorf . The safest part of the village will be reserved for Troop A. Lieutenant H will attend to forage for all the horses ; and will have the people commence cooking in all the dwellings. If sufficient oats cannot be found at Lingnau, a further supply will be requisitioned from Beis- walde. The different troops will let the lieutenant have the necessary men. "Troops B and C will be the outpost troops.* *See par. 190, F.S. R. Cavalry OuTPosts. 215 "Troop B's section of outpost will extend from the bed of Lingnau Lake across the Lingnau-Neuendorf highway to the railway, along this to the Lingnau-Altkirch road (exclusive). "Troop C's section begins at this road (inclusive) and ex- tends west across the Lingnau-Beiswalde road to the creek flowing from Scharnick towards Regerteln. At a point on this creek about 1,100 yards northeast of Scharnick the outpost will join that of the troops quartered in Scharnick. Each of the two troops will at once send forward a detachment of such strength as may seem necessary to provide for protection. "Lieutenant J with a platoon of Troop D will ride to Altkirch, beyond the line of the outpost, where he will watch the Guttstadt-Sommerfeld road, the crossings of the AUe be- low Kossen-particularly the two bridges at Schmolamen-and the roads leading to Liewenberg, Sperlings, and Launau. He will remain at Altkirch over night and will be under my im- mediate orders. "The squadron will start immediately and at first will go via Komalmen as far as the north end of Zaun-see. "Troop B will act as advance guard. It will be followed by Troop C and the latter by Troop D. ' ' Parts of the highway visible from the east will be avoided bv turning to the west of the road." ^ The captain of Troop B is instructed to send a patrol to Queetz to keep in touch with Troop A and to act as a protec- tion towards the south and southeast in the district between Zaun-see and the former Lingnau-see until the outpost from the remainder of the regiment arrives there. The lieutenant-colonel also has two lieutenants present when he issued his orders, which are as follows: ' 'The 2d and 3d Squadrons will follow the ist in the follow- ing order: Troops E, F, H, and 3d Squadron. Troop M will form the rear guard. Lieutenant K , Troop E, with one platoon of his troop, will at once proceed to Scharnick, where 2i6 Studies in Appued Tactics. he will provide quarters for my headquarters, Troops E, F, G, and the 3d Squadron. Troop E will be located at the north exit, and Troop F at the south exit of the village. He (Lieut. K ) will have at least 275 bushels of oats sent to Scharnick from Wolfsdorf, and prepare a supply of oats, hay, straw, and food for the men, in the various districts of the town. Lieutenant L , with a platoon of Troop E, will precede the regiment to Regerteln, where he will watch the Altkirch-Arnsdorf- Wormditt highway and the roads leading to Gronau, Frey- markt, Arnsdorf, and Dittrichsdorf. He will remain there during the night. Troops E, F, and H are designated as out- post troops. Troop E's section of the outpost begins at the creek flowing west of Beiswalde from Scharnick towards Regert- eln. The right flank will join the left flank of the outpost of of the ist Squadron about 1,100 yards northeast of Scharnick. The outpost will extend along this creek past the cross-roads north of Scharnick (which must be permanently held) and to opposite the north side of Scharnick B, which northern side it must locally protect. "Troop F will continue the line from west of Scharnick B for about 900 yards along the creek. It will locally protect the west, south, and east sides of Scharnick A and B. It will establish a detached post at the western exit of Wolfsdorf to watch the roads leading to Petersdorf , Dittrichsdorf, Kalkstein, and Kleinefeld, and keep up communication with the connect- ing-post at Pittehnen. "Troop H, of which one platoon will remain at Kallisten under the immediate orders ol the colonel, will form a section of the outpost extending from that of the ist Sqtiadron at the south end of the former Lingnau-see past the north end of Zaun-see, to the left of Troop F's section, and will permanently observe the Guttstadt-Kallisten road. The captain will ride ahead to his position at the north end of Zaun-see and will re- Cavai,ry Outposts. 217 port to me what he intends doing. The troop may draw on Komalmen and Warlack for supplies. "The necessary detachments will be sent out at once. "The detached post of Troop F for Wolfsdorf will ride via Walter smiihl-Kleinef eld as a flank guard for the regiment." Even less than in former cases can the commanders' deci- sions be looked upon as typical. There is entirely too much room for variations. My dispositions are intended simply to enable the reader more readily to test his own work. If, judg- ing by my dispositions, he concludes that his are practicable, and contain everything necessary, then they are all right. The lieutenant-colonel and the commander of the ist Squadron have deferred issuing orders concerning the ways and means of providing shelter and the arrangements for de- fense. They will proceed to the spot with the troop command- ers (ahead of the men) and issue orders in accordance with the nature of the villages and their surroundings. This cannot be settled by the map. In place of this, some remarks will be made that somewhat anticipate the regular course of events. If the quarters lay on the left of the Passarge, or a long ways from the enemy, the superior officers would need to concern them- selves only that men and horses obtained good shelter and ample food supplies. Everyone, with the exception of a few guards and sentries, could sleep. The proximity of the enemy to Scharnick and Lingnau calls for greater precaution. Comprehensive arrangements have been made to watch the enemy and his avenues of approach. A circle of outposts will surround the quarters of the regiment. Still, sudden at- tacks are not precluded. The patrols might be pushed aside at some point and the outposts be surprised. A sudden attack from hostile infantry, whose nearest bodies are at Schwuben 5 or 6 miles away, is to be feared only in case parts of the chain —15— 2i8 Studies in Appwkd Tactics. of outposts should fail. But it is always possible that under cover of darkness hostile infantry might approach within sev- eral thousand yards of the quarters of the regiment without being discovered, when, possibly, the firing of the pickets would give the alarm. During daylight hostile cavalry, dis- persing the advanced detachments, might appear in front of the pickets almost at the same time with the report of this advance. A sudden attack by cavalry at night is less likely, because even in open country it would largely have to advance along roads and therefore be discovered in time. But we must not become pessimistic; such enterprises seldom take place on a large scale in modern war. As a rule, the advantages of success do not compare with the attending dangers ; and success often depends on chance and on such an accurate knowledge of the enemy as is but rarely available. And in hostile territory we find the additional obstacles of un- known ground and difficulty of obtaining reliable guides. Not- withstanding all this, w^ must be vigilant ; a single case of care- lessness may be severely punished. The English repeatedly found this out in South Africa. Nevertheless, the troops should be allowed as much rest as is at all possible under the circum- stances. It is difficult to find the correct middle course. Very properly, therefore, outpost duty is very carefully performed in the German Army ; so far only larger bodies of cavalry have suffered from not having sufficient opportunity in this line. Apparently the village of Lingnau consists of a number of farm-houses separated from the adjoining fields by picket or board fences, and occasionally by a low stone wall. The village street is narrow. The northwest and southeast exits and the east side of the village are most exposed to a sudden attack. The provisional division of the village among the troops into four approximately equal parts forms a good basis for defense- The major will order as follows: Cavalry Outposts. 219 "Each troop will be responsible for the defense of its sec- tion of the village. The horses will be niainly placed in the farm yards west of the village street, each troop seeing that exits to the west exist from these yards. Sentries will con- stantly guard the perimeter of the village. Guards will be located at the eastern side and at the exits of the village. In case of alarm the horses will remain in place under suitable guards previously designated. The remaining men will as- semble at their respective troop assembly-places armed only with fire-arms, and will be handled by the troop commanders. A platoon from each of the two interior troops (A and D) will remain on the village street at my disposal. Troop A will keep a sentry-post at the farm-yard about 200 yards in front of the east side of the village. The entrances to the village will be blocked by wagons, but in such a way that single horsemen may readily pass. As far as practicable, a good lighting of the street and farm-yards will be provided for by means of lamps and lanterns. The horses will be unsaddled, unless there should be a change during the evening, bringing the enemy nearer. But several horses must be kept ready for immediate use in each troop. The men will not undress, and will keep their fire-arms beside them for immediate use." Similar arrangements will be made in Scharnick. There need be no hesitancy about placing the horses under cover in sheds, barns, and stables. For here it is not a question of hav- ing the men mounted and ready to move. On the contrary, the better the horses are provided for, the fewer men will be needed to guard them and the better they will be protected from bullets. If we wish to defend the quarters., we cannot at the same time be in the saddle. If we wish to do the latter, quarters cannot be occupied at all, but the command must bivouac with horses saddled and bridled, if necessary. This might be necessary if, for instance, we were opposed to superior numbers of enterprising cavalry with horse artillery. 220 Studies in Applied Tactics. In such a case the defense of an isolated village might prove the ruin of the bravest cavalry regiment. The commander may choose between the two alterna- tives ; a combination of the two would lead to half-way meas- ures and uncertainties. Everything that has been seen and heard of the enemy during the day, and the distance from his outposts, justify the taking of quarters in the two villages, so as not to waste any strength for the coming day. Protection. Having previously disposed of the subject of quartering troops because it would be difficult later to interweave this in the study, and because the principles concerned must be familiar to subordinates if they are to act in conformity with the views of their superiors, we now can turn to the duties of individual troops, which afford an opportunity to discuss important ques- tions concerning outpssts. What arrangements does the commander oe Troop b make after receiving the instructions of the squadron COMMANDER AT HEILIGENTHAL? Troop B, as outpost-troop, will take post in Lingnau at the exit towards Guttstadt. Its section of the outpost will extend from the bed of Lingnau Lake across the Lingnau- Neuendorf highway to the railway, and along this to the Ling- nau-Altkirch road (exclusive). There is no road across the bed of Lingnau Lake. According to the map, the meadow in this lake bed is marshy and presumably impassable for horse- men, and during the night also for footmen. It is unlikely that hostile troops will venture on this uncertain ground. The troop commander probably will find out the nature of this underfeature at Heiligenthal. On the supposition that the information agrees with what has been assumed, it will be necessary only to observe this meadow, unless an inspection should prove that other measures are necessary. Cavalry Outposts. 221 The troop commander, who has explained the situation to his officers and non-commissioned officers, therefore orders as follows: "The third platoon under Lieutenant R , will ride ahead to Lingnau, going along the highway as far as the north end of Zaim-see and thence past Height 141, will occupy the exit towards Guttstadt, and temporarily will see to the protec- tion of the regiment's quarters from the north end of Lingnau Lake bed to the Lingnau- Altkirch road (exclusive), which will be occupied by Troop C. A strong picket will be required on the Lingnau-Neuendorf highway. Sergeant N and 3 men of the 3d Platoon will ride to Queetz and obtain touch with Troop A, which at 6 p. m. will go thence to Neuendorf and which should be kept in view. He will protect the march of the squadron towards the south between Zaun-see and former Lingnau-see, and will return to the troop at Lingnau as soon as the outpost has been established in this region by the re- mainder of the regiment." The captain waits with giving orders about observing the bed of Lingnau-see until he shall arrive on the groiuid. Lieutenant R , covered by a point, trots ofif almost at the same moment as Lieutenant J , Troop D, who is ordered to Altkirch, and as the platoon of Troop C which is going to the north end of Jaun-see to act as a protecting force. In this way the three officers have an opportunity mutually to discuss their duties and plans and can agree on a plan for mutual support. It will be 5.50 p. m. before they reach Komalmen. Behind them they see their squadron following them on the road from Heiligenthal. Continuing their ride, they can see Troop A moving from Queetz towards Neuendorf. About 6.30 p. m. they reach Lingnau. Lieutenant R proceeds to the slight elevation east of the southern exit of the village. From this point he obtains quite an extended view. 222 Studies in Applied Tactics. It is true that Beiswalde is hidden by Knoll 143 and 133, but to the northeast Altkirch can be seen and beyond to Schtno- lainen woods (Schmolainer Wald). Almost all of the highway between Guttstadt and Altkirch can be seen, the Guttstadt railway station and church-tower can be seen as well as Neuen- dorf and the greater part of the railway from Guttstadt to the Ivingnau-Altkirch road. South of the bed of Lingnau-lake whose impassability for horsemen in the meantime has been determined, the view is limited by the hills along the former southern shore of the lake. Lieutenant R has half of his platoon dismount at the southeast exit of Lingnau and with the other half rides forward along the Lingnau-Neuendorf highway. The bend of the road, where a field-road leads north towards the railway, seems to him a suitable place for the intended picket, after learning that a ravine in his front, across the highway, is an awkward obstacle for horsemen. He gives Sergeant C 12 men and instructs the sergeant as follows (the sergeant already has been informed of the situation in general and instructed about the surround- ing country) : "You form picket No. i on the Lingnau-Neuendorf high- way to protect Lingnau along a front extending from here to the Lingnau- Altkirch road (exclusive). Your picket is not large enough to establish a vedette in the ground north of this highway. For the present it can be seen from here ; after dark you must send patrols along the railway as far as the road to Altkirch, which will be watched by Troop C. I shall send you supplies in two wagons, use the latter to block the bridge across the ravine ahead of you as soon as Troop A, now at Neuendorf, returns to Lingnau, but leave a passage-way for patrols. You will inform Troop A of your orders and location." After Lieutenant R inspected the ground along the railway, he returned to Lingnau. It is now 7 p. m. The ser- geant whom he left at Lingnau posted several dismounted men Cavalry Outposts. 223 in the farm-yards at the village entrance, and has one man as a lookout in a gable-window affording a good view. The horses are in rear of one of the houses. Sergeant O (picket No. i) reports that Troop A has learned nothing new about the enemy, and that it has orders to return to Lingnau. In the meantime the squadron commander, hastening ahead of his command, has arrived at Lingnau with his troop commanders, and has informed these of the already described arrangements for quarters and defense. The commander of Troop B, proceeding with his own duties, has Lieutenant R report. Although the space between the highway and the road to Altkirch is not watched by a vedette, the captain does not make any change, because it would take 9 men for a vedette-post and because he knows that another troop will establish a post at the farm-yard about 200 yards east of Lingnau. He personally verifies the correct- ness of Lieutenant R 's statement, and of the villagers, that the bed of the former Lake Lingnau will not bear the weight of a horse, but can be crossed only by single footmen, led by a guide. After taking but a few steps the ground gives way under his horse's feet. Therefore the meadow insures against an attack from that direction. But it seems unfortu- nate that the squadron's position can be seen from the hills along the Queetz-Neuendorf road. It must seem very desir- able to prevent hostile patrols from obtaining a view from that direction, and the little wooded knoll south of Number 116 seems to be a good place for a post to prevent the approach of hostile troopers. But the post would have to be quite strong ; it would not be advisable to have less than 12 men on account of its isolation. The captain is all the more averse to establish- ing such a post because its line of retreat, which would have to be either via Neuendorf or past the south end of Lingnau Lake bed, might easily be cut off. He decides to chance it and not send anyone to the exposed point. But the troop on the right 224 Studies in Appi