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HANDBOOK 
 
 OF 
 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 jNTotes of Lectures Delivered at Michigan 
 University During 
 
 1876-7 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PROF. B. F. COCKER, LL. D. 
 
 ANN ARBOR: 
 
 COURIER STEAM PRINTING HOUSE. 
 
 1877. 
 
 
at 
 
 \ 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the Year 1877, by 
 
 B. F. COCKER, 
 In tire Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
TO THE 
 
 CLASS OF '77. 
 
 AT WHOSE REQUEST THESE "NOTES" WERE PRE- 
 PARED, AND AT WHOSE EXPENSE THEY WERE 
 PUBLISHED, THIS SMALL VOLUME IS 
 DEDICATED WITH SENTIMENTS OF 
 RESPECT AND AFFECTION. 
 
 " I wish to give you the materials on which an independent judgment, 
 may be formed; to enable you to reason as I reason, if you deem me right; 
 to correct me if I go astray ; and to censure me if you find me dealing un- 
 fairly with my subject."— Tyndall. 
 
 B. F. C. 
 
BOOK J. 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 CHAP. I. Philosophy Defined. 
 
 I. Philosophy has been defined, in general, as " the Search 
 after Truth, 7 ' not particular, relative, contingent truth, but uni- 
 versal, necessary, and absolute Truth. 
 
 Moeell: "Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of 
 Europe in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 19,2."). Carlyle: "Critical and 
 Miscellaneous Essays," vol. i, p. 94. Coleridge: "Works," vol. iii, 
 p. 249. 
 
 Truth, is the correspondence or agreement of the content of 
 knowledge with actual existence or Reality. Truths are of three 
 kinds: (1) Truths of Fact, or Experiential Truths ; (2) Truths of 
 Reason, or Rational Truths; (8) Truths of Inference, or Scien- 
 tific Truths. 
 
 1. Experiential Truth has for its object the phenomena of 
 external and internal experience. It is that agreement of the 
 content of knowledge " with the immediate outer or inner per- 
 ceptions which exist when the soundness of the mind and of 
 the bodily organs is undisturbed." It is relative and contingent 
 knowledge, and its opposite is both thinkable and possible. 
 
 2. Rationed Truth has for its object the eternal ideas or prin- 
 ciples " which the Divine creative thinking has built into 
 things." It is the agreement of the content of knowledge with 
 absolute Reality. It is, therefore, universal and necessary, and 
 its contradictory is unthinkable and impossible. 
 
 3. Scientific Truth has for its object the relations of co-exist- 
 ence, resemblance and succession among phenomena, which are 
 the basis of all classification and inductive inference; and the 
 correlations between phenomena and ultimate reality (substances, 
 causes, ideals, and reasons or ends,) which are the foundation of 
 all deductive inference (syllogistic reasoning). 
 
 II. The immediate object of Philosophy is to attain the 
 insight of First Principles of knowledge and existence — the ulti- 
 mate grounds, causes, ideals (archetypes), and reasons or ends of 
 all phenomena. 
 
 Hamilton: "Metaphysics," p. 41. Uebebweg: "History of Philosophy," 
 vol. i, p. 1 ; "Logic," p. 11. Stockl : " Lehrbuch der Philos.," vol. i, p. 4. 
 Fleming: "Vocab. of Philos.," in loco. 
 I 
 
—0— 
 
 A principle {principium. (i-pyj,, beginning,) is "an abso- 
 lutely or relatively Original Element, on which a series of exist- 
 ences and cognitions depends." — Ueberweg. "The primary 
 source from which everything is, becomes, or is known. 11 — Aris- 
 totle. 
 
 1. A Principle of Knowledge (principium cognoscendi) is 
 (1) the common starting-point of a series of cognitions, the phe- 
 nomenal, real, and relational (formal) intuitions — the original 
 Percepts, Ideas, and Relations; (2) a universal and necessary 
 Law of Thought, which has been attained by immediate abstrac- 
 tion. 
 
 2. A Principle of Existence {principium essendi aut fiendi) 
 is the common basis of a series of real essences or processes, that 
 is, the material, efficient, formal, or final cause. 
 
 3. An Absolute First Principle [principium principiorum) 
 is. the "ultimate of all ultimates," in which all essences, causes, 
 ideals and reasons are reduced to Unity— that which is unorigin- 
 ated, self-existent, unconditioned, absolute. 
 
 III. The final aim of Philosophy is to reduce all knowledge 
 to Unity— the Unity of one absolutely First Principle or " Ulti- 
 mate of all Ultimates," which contains, p redetermines and pro- 
 duces all things in relation to a Final Cause, Purpose, or End. 
 
 Green: "Spiritual Philosophy," vol. i, p. 1. Coleridge: "Works," vol. ii, 
 p. 42( . Hamilton : " Metaphysics," p. 42. Plato : " Philebus," (Jowett's 
 Trans., vol. iii, p. 161.) Hutton : "Theo. and Lit. Essays," vol. i, p. 50. 
 Murphy: "Scient. Basis of Faith," 195, 196. 
 
 Unity is either Formal, Substantial, or Causal. 
 
 1. Formal Unity is the unity of thought, the highest pro- 
 duct of abstraction and generalization — the summum genus, or 
 highest concept. (Idealism.) 
 
 2. Substantial Unity is the unity of substance, and all differ- 
 ences of kind are but modes of one eternal and infinite substance. 
 (Absolute Identity.) 
 
 3. Causal Unity is unity of origination, a unity of Power 
 and Reason (will), which produces and determines all diversity. 
 (Theism.) 
 
 CHAP. II. Distinction between Philosophy and Science. 
 
 Science is the reduction of individual facts or phenomena to 
 general concepts (classification according to resemblance), and 
 the investigation of these conceptions in their relations of co- 
 existence and succession, in order to discover uniformities of 
 relations — that is, Laws (induction). Philosophy is the bringing 
 of these generalizations of Science into harmony with a priori 
 rational ideas or First Principles — " the mutual determination of 
 a priori and empirical elements." It is the adequate explana- 
 
tion, or interpretation, of all phenomena through the rational 
 
 insight of First Principles (substances, causes, ideals, and ends), 
 
 and the reduction of all principles to an ultimate Unity. 
 
 Philosophy must, therefore, include Science, but Science does 
 
 not necessarily include Philosophy. "Science determines what 
 
 is (ore); Philosophy, why it is (dion)." — Trendelenberg : 
 
 "Elena, of Logic," p. 76. 
 
 Murphy: "Scientific Basis of Faith," pp. 27, 23, 29. Spencer: "First Prin- 
 ciples," pp. 17,18,81. Mansel : Art. "Metaphysics," Encyc. Brit., vol. 
 xiv, p. 555. 
 
 Science is the foundation, Philosophy is the summit and 
 completion, of real knowledge. All Science approaches perfec- 
 tion as it approaches to a unity of First Principles. "It is the 
 very business and work of Science to rise from the visible to the 
 invisible — from what we observe by sense to what we know by 
 reason.' 1 — Argyll : "Reign of Law," p. 108. " The deeper nat- 
 ural science penetrates from outward phenomena to universal 
 laws, the more she lays aside her former fear to test the latest 
 fundamental questions of being and becoming, of space and 
 time, of matter and force, of life and spirit, by the scale of the 
 
 inductive method So much the more will the gap be narrowed 
 
 which since the time of Kant has separated science and philoso- 
 phy."— Prof. Cohn: "Nature," vol. vii, p. 159. 
 
 " A true and enduring system of Philosophy must embrace 
 both Physics and Metaphysics. However material our postulates 
 may be, they must insensibly lead the argument into the imma- 
 terial, inasmuch as force is immaterial. A true system must 
 embrace geometry and the algebras — not their merely physical 
 and symbolical terms, but their high, deep, and purely intel- 
 lectual principles, which appertain to Psychology, and which, 
 expressing an absolute universality of Mind and Purpose, lift us 
 freely and positively into studies of the Infinite." — Winslow : 
 " Force and Nature" p. 5. 
 
 : 
 
 CHAP. III. A Science of Mind the foicniation of a Philosophy 
 
 of Nature. 
 
 The highest generalizations of physical research bring us 
 ce to face with certain conceptions, or more properly ideas, 
 hich are metaphysical and purely rational. Such are the ideas 
 of Substance, Cause, Force, Life, Mind, Purpose, Law, Unity, 
 
-4- 
 
 Identity, the Infinite and the Perfect. These ideas are not trans- 
 formed sensations, neither are they generalizations or abstractions 
 from sensible experience. They are the logical antecedents of 
 all experience, and the light of all our intellectual constructions. 
 They are the principles which inform sensations, and coordinate 
 and interpret all phenomena, and they enter, as constitutive 
 elements, into all our notions of things. It is only by the syn- 
 thesis of sensation and idea that man intellectually perceives the 
 reality of things. 
 
 " Man is the interpreter of nature," and Philosophy is the 
 right interpretation. Nature, or the aggregate of sensible phe- 
 nomena, is "one vast Mythus" or symbolical representation, 
 "an unspoken alphabet," an exponental image of the great 
 archetypal ideas of the all-pervading Reason of the universe. 
 The senses place before us the characters or symbols of the book 
 of nature, but these convey no knowledge apart from the ideas 
 of reason, which are the key to the interpretation of nature. We 
 can only interpret nature in " terms of thought." The solution 
 of phenomena cannot be derived from phenomena, " The laws 
 of motion cannot account for the origin of Force." Co-existence 
 and succession afford no explanation of Order. The idea of 
 Unity is not evolved from multiplicity and diversity, and no 
 addition of the finite can give the idea of the Infinite. 
 
 Therefore two things are necessary to a Philosophy of nature, 
 viz., Facts and Ideas — the observation and classification of phe- 
 nomena, and the illumination of phenomena by the a priori 
 ideas of the intuitive reason, or the interpreting Mind. If we 
 know nothing of mind and its modes of functioning, we know 
 nothing about what we know, or even that we know. The 
 knowledge of mind, of its ideas and laws, must therefore be the 
 foundation of a Philosophy of Nature. 
 
 WHEWEiii: "Novum Organon," pp. 5, 6. Coleridge: "Works," vol. ii, pp. 
 421,444,441). Uebeeweg: "Logic," p. 2. Mivart: " Genesis of Species," 
 p. 273. Tyndail: "Frag, of Science," pp. 66, 130. Powell: "Unity of' 
 Worlds," Essay I, \ ii. 
 
 CHAP. IV. A Science of Mind possible. 
 
 A Science of Mind is possible, for the same reasons and on 
 the same conditions that a Science of Nature is possible. Facts 
 equally distinct, and equally undeniable, are given as the founda- 
 tion of both sciences. The facts of external perception, or sense 
 
perception, are the foundation of natural science. The facts of 
 internal perception (thought, feeling, and volition), are the 
 foundation of mental science. The objection that we know- 
 nothing of the ultimate constitution of Mind or Spirit, has no 
 force. We are equally ignorant of the ultimate constitution of 
 Matter. The phenomena of mind may be observed and classi- 
 fied, laws of mental phenomena may be inductively ascertained, 
 and some light may be thrown upon the nature of the ultimate 
 substance or substratum which is the ground and source of the 
 phenomena. As the naturalist knows and applies electro-mag- 
 netism in its relations, without comprehending its essence, so 
 we can duly appreciate spirit and matter, in their relations to 
 each other as body and mind, without being able to explain their 
 nature. All the phenomena and laws of physical Optics have 
 been carefully studied, and are well understood, but the existence 
 and constitution of the " luminiferous ether" is still hypotheti- 
 cal. No theory yet proposed is adequate to the explanation of all 
 the phenomena. But ignorance of the nature of the medium in 
 which the phenomena take place, is no bar to a science of 
 Optics. The facts have been coordinated, and the laws of the 
 phenomena have been discovered. So our ignorance of the essen- 
 tial nature of Spirit as the subject of mental phenomena, is no 
 bar to an exact science of Mind. Our instincts, propensities, 
 sensations, perceptions, mental reproductions, generalizations, 
 inferences, sentiments, form a real body of actual' phenomena 
 which are as capable of being classified and reduced to laws as 
 the observed facts of nature. 
 
 " The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are 
 thus, not smaller, but greater than those of any other science." 
 — Spencer: "Psychol.," vol. i, p. 141. 
 
 Fetjchteeslebex : "Med. Psychol.,'' p. 79. 
 
 CHAP. V. Utility of Philosophical Studies. 
 
 1. As a mental discipline. 
 
 2. As a means of culture. 
 
 3. As related to Theology. 
 
 4. As related to History. 
 
 5. As related to Ethics. 
 
CHAP. VI. Classification of the Object- Matter of Metaphysics, 
 {Philosophy proper?) 
 
 I. Psychology (Inductive Science of Mind). 
 
 1. Phenomenal Psychology, (subjective inquiry): What are 
 the Facts or Phenomena to be studied in their relations of resem- 
 blance, co-existence, and succession? 
 
 (i) Cognition, "I know," \ 
 
 (2) Feeling, " I feel," \ Phenomenology. 
 
 (3) Volition, " I resolve," J 
 
 2. Dynamical Psychology, (subjective inquiry): What are 
 the Powers and capacities indicated by this classification ? 
 
 (1) Intellect. Intellectual Philosophy. 
 
 (2) Sensibility. Philosophy of the Sensibility. 
 {3) Will. Philosophy of the Will. 
 
 II. Homology. 3. Nomological Psychology. What are the 
 Laws by which the mind is governed in its cognitions, thoughts, 
 feelings, and determinations? 
 
 (i) Laws of Cognition (Intuition) : Primordial Logic (Noetic). 
 
 (2) Laws of Thought (Classification, Judgment, Reasoning) : 
 
 Formal Logic (Dianoetic). 
 
 (3) Laws of Association (Memory) : Mnemonics. 
 
 (4) Laws of Feeling (Sentiment, Emotion) : Pathematics. 
 
 (5) Laws of Imagination : ^Esthetics. 
 
 (6) Laws of Self-determination and Moral Action: Ethics. 
 
 Ill Ontology (Deductive Philosophy). 
 
 "What are the Necessary Inferences from the Facts and 
 Laws given by the Inductive Science of Mind as to the Ulti- 
 mate Grounds, Causes and Reasons of all Phenomena?" 
 
 (i) The Ultimate Substratum of all statical, sensible phe- 
 nomena — Matter : Hylekology. 
 
 (2) The Ultimate Ground of all dynamical and intelligible 
 phenomena — Spirit : Pneumatology. 
 
 (3) The Ultimate of all Ultimates— God : Theology. 
 
 Psychology. — The science of psychical phenomena — "the 
 science conversant about the phenomena, or modifications, or 
 states of the Mind, or conscious subject, or Soul, or Spirit, or 
 Self, or Ego." — Hamilton: "Metaphysics," p. 91. 
 
 Nomology (Nomological Psychology).— That branch of Phi- 
 losophy which treats of the Laws which govern the operations 
 of the Mind, (Hamilton: "Metaphysics," p. 86); especially, 
 
"the regulative Laws, on whose observance rests the realization 
 of Truth in the theoretical activity of man," and the realization 
 of Right in the practical activities of man. — Uebekweg : " Log- 
 ic," p. 6. 
 
 Ontology. — The Philosophy of Being, or Ultimate Reality, 
 as distinguished from phenomena. It " endeavors to evolve true 
 propositions respecting God, the soul, and nature, as a priori 
 objects of knowledge, and whether by deduction, intuition, or 
 dialectic, to reach the essence of their necessary being." — Mar- 
 tineau : "Essays," p. 238, 2d Series. 
 
 Uebekweg: "Logic,'' pp. 11, 12. 
 
 CHAP. VII. Problems of Philosophy. 
 
 I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 (Has respect to the Source of our knowledge.) Are there in 
 the human mind any elements or principles of knowledge not 
 derived from sensation and sensible experience ? 
 
 Classification of Schools of Philosophy in view of this 
 Problem. 
 
 (1) They who affirm that all the elements, or principles, of 
 human knowledge are derived from sensation and sensible 
 experience, constitute the Sensational or Experiential 
 School. 
 
 (2) They who affirm that there are elements, or principles, 
 of human knowledge which are not derived from sensation, and 
 that there are constitutive elements of knowledge which are 
 given by the reason, constitute the Rational or Transcend- 
 ental School. 
 
 II. THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 (Has respect to the Validity of our knowledge of the phe- 
 nomenal World, or Cosmos.) What conception are we to form 
 of "the orderly series of sensible phenomena" we call the Cos- 
 mos? Is it subjective or objective? — real (i. e., a subsistence in 
 nature) or ideal (i. e., a representation in thought) ?— or, is it 
 partly ideal and partly real ? Are we to regard the totality of 
 the phenomena called Nature as purely phenomena of the Ego, 
 or of the Non-Ego, or the joint product of the Ego and the 
 Non-Ego ? 
 
Here we are dealing solely with Phenomena, without any 
 reference to the question whether we have any cognition of Real 
 Being underlying phenomena. The Ontological question is post- 
 poned. Cosmology, simply, is a science of the relative and phe- 
 nomenal ; Rational Cosmology is the philosophy of the Real in 
 cosmology. 
 
 Classification of Schools of Philosophy in view of this 
 Problem. 
 
 To deal with the above problem aright, we must subdivide it 
 into the following questions : 
 
 1st Ques. As to the fundamental difference between exter- 
 nal and interned phenomena. Is the object of sense-perception 
 (material phenomena, so called,) a quality, mode, or phenome- 
 non of an external Non-Ego (either directly known or inferred) ; 
 or is it a quality, mode, or phenomenon of the Ego or Mind 
 itself, or of something in the Mind, which internal or subjective 
 object we may, on either alternative, call an Idea? Briefly, has 
 the Cosmos an actual existence external to the conscious Mind, 
 or only an ideal existence within the mind ? 
 
 If we take the first ground, we are Cosmothetic Realists ; 
 if the second, we are Cosmothetic Idealists. These are the 
 most fundamental divisions. 
 
 (I.) COSMOTHP]TIC realism. 
 
 2d Ques. As to whether our knowledge of the externed object 
 is mediate or immediate. The phenomenal reality of the exter- 
 nal object being admitted, is our knowledge of that external 
 object direct, immediate, presentative, intuitive, or is it indirect, 
 mediate, representative, and inferential ? Have we, or have we 
 not, an intuitive knowledge of any qualities or phenomena ex- 
 ternal to the Mind? 
 
 If we say that our knowledge of the external actuality is 
 immediate, presentative, intuitive, we are Natural Realists ; 
 if we say that it is mediate, representative, or inferential, we are 
 Hypothetical or Constructive Realists. 
 
 (1) NATURAL realism. 
 
 3d Ques. As to whether our knowledge is toted and absolute, 
 or partial and relative. Assuming that we have a knowledge (some 
 knowledge) of the external object which is intuitive, direct, or 
 presentative, is all our knowledge of the external object of this 
 character — that is, absolute and total — or is some of it partial and 
 relative ? 
 
If we hold that all our knowledge is absolute and total, and 
 that the objects we see, touch, and taste do veritably exist, and 
 exist precisely as they are seen, touched, and tasted, we are 
 Crude, Vulgar Realists. If we hold that some of our knowl- 
 edge is absolute and complete, and some relative and partial, that 
 is, if we regard the " secundo-primary qualities" (statico-dyn- 
 amical qualities) of body as constituting the objective object of 
 direct and immediate perception, and the so called "secondary 
 qualities" (dynamical qualities) are in reality not qualities of 
 body at all, but only subjective affections or sensations, which 
 are concomitants of certain "modes of motion," supposed but 
 not perceived, we are Philosophical Realists. 
 Hamilton: "Philosophy," p. 266. 
 
 (2) CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM. 
 
 4th Ques. As to whether the content of our knowledge docs 
 or does not correspond or agree with the actually existing external 
 object. Assuming that our knowledge of the external object is 
 mediate, representative, and inferential, how can we be certain 
 that the content of our knowledge (the notion) agrees with the 
 objective reality, or thing in itself? 
 
 If we answer that "our knowledge of the outer world de- 
 pends upon a combination of external and internal perception 
 which takes the form of reasoning from analogy," our doctrine 
 is one of Critical Realism.— Ueberweg : " Logic," pp. 91, 92. 
 
 If we answer that our knowledge of the outer world extends 
 simply to the affirmation of the existence of a real object, separ- 
 ate from and independent of the subjective self, but that our 
 perceptions are only symbols of the external reals, which have 
 no resemblance to the reals, our doctrine is one of Transfig- 
 ured or Symbolical Realism. 
 
 Spencer: " Principles of Psychology," vol. ii, ch. xix. 
 (II.) COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM. 
 
 5th Ques. As to whether the ideal object is or is not a mere 
 mode of the knowing mind. The real existence of an external 
 world being denied, and its purely ideal or notional character 
 affirmed, the question arises, whether the idea or notion is a 
 mode or phenomenon of the Ego or Subject, or whether it is 
 infused into or presented to the mind by supernatural agency. 
 
 If we regard the idea as a modification of the mind itself* 
 we are Egoistic Idealists. 
 
■10- 
 
 If we regard the idea as infused into or presented to the 
 mind by supernatural agency, we are Non-Egoistic Idealists. 
 
 If we say that subject and object, thought and existence, 
 internal and external phenomena, are identical, we are Abso- 
 lute Idealists. 
 
 III. THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 (Has respect to the extent of our knowledge.) Is our knowl- 
 edge limited solely to phenomena, or can the human mind 
 transcend phenomena, and apprehend permanent, changeless, 
 essential or absolute Reality ? Is there any substratum of real, 
 continuous Being underlying phenomena, or is the universe of 
 material and mental phenomena a mere fleeting appearance — 
 " a play of phantasms in a void"? What is "the ultimate of 
 all ultimates," the last and highest ground of all existence? 
 
 Classification of Schools of Philosophy in view of this 
 Problem. 
 
 (I.) ONTOLOGICAL NIHILISTS. 
 
 If we assert that our knowledge is limited solely to phenom- 
 ena, and that we have no cognition, direct or indirect, of ultimate 
 Reality, we are Absolute Nihilists. 
 
 If we assert that all real knowledge is confined to phenome- 
 nal existence, but that we have "a nascent consciousness of 
 unconditioned being," which is unknowable, we are Qualified 
 Nihilists. 
 
 Spexcer: "First Principles," pp. 93, 97. 
 (II.) ONTOLOGICAL IDEALISTS. 
 
 If we admit that we have ultimate Ideas (of God, the soul, 
 freedom, etc.,) but assert that these are purely subjective ideas — 
 "regulative principles" which have no objective validity, we 
 are Ontological (or Transcendental) Idealists. 
 
 Kaxt: "Critique of Pure Reason,"' pp. 391-429. 
 (III.) ONTOLOGICAL REALISTS. 
 
 If we assert that we have some knowledge, direct or indirect, 
 of ultimate Reality, and that this knowledge has objective valid- 
 ity, we are Ontological Realists. 
 
 Ontological Realism is subdivided, in view of the following 
 questions : 
 
 (1) Is our knowledge of the ultimate Reality direct or indi- 
 rect, intuitive or inferential ? 
 
— 11 
 
 They who regard our knowledge as direct and intuitive, are 
 Absolute Realists. 
 
 They who regard our knowledge as indirect and inferential, 
 are Qualified Realists. They who assert that our knowledge 
 rests solely on faith, are Mystical Realists— (Hamilton : 
 "Metaphysics," p. 531; "Philosophy," p. 61,)— whilst they 
 who affirm that our knowledge is based upon "indefinite feel- 
 ing," are Reasoned Realists— (Lewes : "Problems of Life 
 and Mind," pp. 162-180, vol. i. ; pp. 409-451, vol. ii.) 
 
 (2) Is the ultimate Reality material or spiritual? 
 
 They who affirm that Matter is the ultimate Reality, and 
 that mind is a phenomenon of organized neural matter, are 
 Materialistic Monists. 
 
 They who affirm that Spirit is the ultimate Reality, and that 
 matter is a phenomenon of force, or a product of spiritual activ- 
 ity, are Spiritualistic Monists. 
 
 They who affirm that mind and matter, thought and exten- 
 sion, idea and force, are at bottom one and the same — that is, are 
 attributes or modes of one common ultimate substratum or 
 Reality, are Absolute Monists (absolute identity). 
 
 The first conception is Atheistic, the second Theistic, the 
 third Pantheistic. 
 
BOOK IT. 
 
 METHODOLOGY. 
 
 Method is literally a way, or path of transit. It is an 
 orderly and logical transition. But there can be no continuous 
 logical transition without a preconception. "All method sup- 
 poses a principle of unity and progression." (Coleridge : 
 '•Works," vol. ii, p. 416.) '"All method is a rational progress — 
 a progress towards an end; and the method of philosophy is the 
 procedure contlucive to the end which philosophy proposes, 7 ' 
 viz., the discovery of causes, efficient, formal, and final; and the 
 reduction of all our knowledge to unity. 
 
 Hamilton: '•Metaphysics," ch. vi, On Method. 
 
 VARIOUS METHODS PROPOSED. 
 
 I. The Method of the Cerebral Psychologists. (Or.tective 
 Psychology.) 
 
 Assuming that every mode of consciousness is a concomitant, 
 if not a consequence, of certain molecular changes or actions of 
 the nervous system, and that separate portions of the brain fulfill 
 separate mental functions, the Cerebral Psychologists assert that 
 " Psychology cannot be a true science unless it be studied object- 
 ively," that is, physiologically, in the action of the brain and 
 nervous system. 
 
 Laycock: " Mind and Brain," vol. i, pp. 4-12 ; Cakpenteb: "Mental Physi- 
 ology," eh. i; Maudsley: "Physiology and Pathology of the Mind," 
 chap. i. 
 
 Objections. 
 
 (i.) The essential conceptions on which Psychology, in gen- 
 eral, proceeds are furnished solely by Subjective Psychology, that 
 is, by the study of consciousness alone. 
 
 See Spencer's "Psychology," vol. i, p. 141; Leifchild: "Higher Ministry 
 of Nature," pp. 40, 46; " Meth. Quarterly Review," October, 1867, p. 
 626. 
 
13— 
 
 in.) Mental Physiologists have no direct evidence that nerv- 
 ous excitations and molecular changes are the causes of feeling 
 and thought. 
 
 see Spencer's "Physiology," vol. i, p. 99; "Nature," vol. vii, p. 298; De 
 Boismont "On Hallucination," etc., Pref. vi, vii.. .. :; 
 
 (in.) Molecular motions and groupings, supposing them to 
 
 be known, are not adequate to the explanation of mental phe- 
 
 nomesa. "In reality, they explain nothing." — Tyndall : 
 
 "Frag, of Science," p. 119. 
 
 see Wallace "On Natural Selection," pp. 360-385; Feuchtersleben : 
 "Medical Psychology," pp. 14-10. 
 
 (iv.) Mental Physiologists have not made the least approach 
 toward the localization of the mental functions of the brain. 
 See " Nature," vol. viii, p. 447; vol. x, pp. 45, 245. 
 (v.) The examination of the surface of the cranium furnishes 
 no information as to the configuration of the brain. 
 
 Dalton : "Hum. Phys.," pp. 427-9 ; Hamilton: "Metaph.," App. ii. 
 
 II. The method of the Associational Psychologists. 
 
 Regarding the human mind as " nothing but a series of feel- 
 ings," (sensations which we suppose to be caused by external 
 objects, and internal feelings,) the Associational Psychologists 
 affirm that our notions, conceptions, ideas, judgments, and even 
 the so-called faculties of the mind, are groups of sensations or 
 feelings which, by frequent repetition, have become more or less 
 " inseparably associated." The "Law of Inseparable Associa- 
 tion " is the principal instrument employed by this method for 
 unlocking the deepest mysteries of mental science. This law is 
 made to take the place of every other law and condition of men- 
 tal activity, and to exclude every other power or capacity. It is 
 even regarded as adequate to explain the origin of all necessary 
 and universal beliefs. 
 
 See J. S. Mill : "Exam, of Hamilton's Phil." vol. i, ch. xii and xiv. 
 
 Objections. 
 
 (i.) The theory that the human mind is only "a series of 
 feelings" or " present sensations" is incompetent to explain 
 memory and expectation. (See Masson: " Recent Brit. Phil.," 
 p. 274.) Mr. Mill admits the force of this objection ; he is there- 
 fore under the necessity of supplementing his definition of mind 
 by adding that it is a series of feelings " which is aware of itself 
 
-U- 
 
 as past and future." This statement, however, is admitted by 
 Mr. Mill to be "paradoxical." 
 
 See "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,*' vol. i, pp. 260-2. 
 (ii.) If the human mind is only "a series of feelings" 
 (which are purely subjective), then we have no direct evidence 
 of the independent existence of other sensient beings besides 
 self. 
 
 See Massox: "Recent British Philosophy," pp. 285-290; JACK30N: "Philos- 
 ophy of Natural Theology," ch. iii, note b. 
 
 (hi.) On the hypothesis that mind is only a bundle of asso- 
 ciated sensations, which are necessarily subjective, we can have 
 no perception of an external world. 
 
 See Martineau's "Essays," vol. i, p. 86. 
 
 III. The Metaphysical {a priori) Constructive Method. 
 The Metaphysical or Constructive Method commences with 
 
 abstract principles — rational conceptions of being in se — and en- 
 deavors to deduce a priori the essential characteristics of all 
 existence, and to explain all phenomena without the aid of 
 experience and observation. "The perfect method," says Spi- 
 noza, " is that which teaches us to direct the mind under the law 
 of the idea of the absolute, or of perfect Being."—" De Emend. 
 Intel!., " ii, p. 287. 
 
 For criticism of this method, see Porter: "Human Intellect," pp. 59, 60; 
 Saisset: "Modern Pantheism," vol. i, pp. 144-147; Moeell: "Modern 
 Philosophy," pp. 645-9. 
 
 IV. Inductive or Analytico- Synthetic Method. (Introspect- 
 ive-Psychology.) 
 
 Induction is the process or method (1) of observing, scru- 
 tinizing, and classifying individual facts, as preparatory to illa- 
 tion ; (2) of Synthetic Illation, or inference by which we attain 
 to General Principles or Laws ; and Analytic Illation, by which 
 we attain to Ultimate Principles or Essential Elements. 
 
 Note. — The former (General Laws) are called express or 
 formal principles ; the latter (Ultimate Principles) are operative, 
 real, and constitutive principles. 
 
 " The method of Induction admits, mutatis mutandis^ of appli- 
 cation to the study of the Human Mind, as well as to the material 
 universe." (McCosh.) " The method of Psychology must agree 
 with the method of the science of external nature." (Beneke.) 
 "We must borrow the experimental method of Bacon." (Cou- 
 sin.) 
 
 See Murphy: "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 24. 
 
— 15— 
 
 INDUCTIVE OR ANALYTICO-SYNTHETIC METHOD IN 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Philosophy is the effort of human thought to attain to the 
 clear and distinct knowledge of First Principles — the ultimate 
 foundations of all knowledge and all existence. It is the search 
 after Absolute Truth and Ultimate Reality. 
 
 The facts of Consciousness are the material and starting-point 
 of Philosophy, and Philosophy is the scientific evolution of the 
 facts of which Consciousness is the revelation and the guarantee. 
 (Hamilton: "Metaph.," p. 194.) It is here (in consciousness) 
 that observation seizes them, and reflection analyzes and classi- 
 fies them, before committing them to illation, which forces them 
 to reveal the logical consequence and necessary principles which 
 
 they contain. 
 
 Hamilton: "Metaphysics," p. 185-188. 
 
 The grand task of Philosophy, therefore, is to enumerate all 
 the complex phenomena of consciousness, and ascertain their 
 actual characteristics ; analyze these complex phenomena, and 
 determine their primitive characteristic; trace their origin-, des- 
 ignate the capacities and powers of the mind concerned in the 
 phenomena; study the relations of the phenomena, in order to 
 learn the laivs of the mind ; with the design of finally discovering 
 what are the ultimate Realities — necessary principles and abso- 
 lute constitutive essentia which underlie and determine phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 fundamental principles of the inductive method. 
 
 I. Substances {Subsistentia) are, and can only be known, 
 
 through their essential attributes. 
 
 Note. — Attribute is modified essence. " Take away necessary 
 attributes, and you take away the essence of substance; you take 
 away substance itself." — Saisset. 
 
 (a.) All substances are as their essential attributes. (a=a. 
 Law of Identity.) 
 
 (b.) All substances whose essential attributes are fundament- 
 ally unlike, are to be regarded as totally distinct (in essence). 
 
 (c.) Attributes which are absolutely contrary, incompatible, 
 and incommensurable, cannot be supposed to cohere in the same 
 common substance, (a — a=o. Law of Non-contradiction.) 
 
 (d.) A plurality of substances is not to be assumed if the 
 phenomena can be explained by one. 
 
 II. Causes are known, and can only be known, through 
 their action or effectuation. 
 
 Note. — Act is related or conditioned essence. 
 
 
-16- 
 
 (A.) Effects are analogous to causes. (Analogia= " similar- 
 ity of ratios or relations." Analogy does not mean similarity of 
 two things, but similarity of two relations.) If the effect is 
 mechanical, the cause must be mechanical; if vital, the cause 
 must be vital ; if mental, the cause must be mental. 
 
 (b.) The effect cannot contain anything which does not exist 
 potentially in the cause. Xo effect can transcend its cause. 
 
 (c.) The continuance of any true effect is dependent on the 
 continued action of its cause or causes. 
 
 III. Ideals (archetypes) are revealed, and can only be re- 
 vealed, by the consecutive evolution of a predetermined Type or 
 Plan. 
 
 Xotc. — Ideas are metaphysical unities which inhere in the 
 reason. Ideas become ideals when they present themselves to 
 the free-will as models according to which action is shaped. 
 
 IV. Reason (intentions, purposes) are manifested, and can 
 only be manifested, by and through Adaptations and Means. 
 
 order (gradation; of the inductive method. 
 
 1st Step. Make a complete enumeration of the complex 
 phenomena of the mind, and ascertain their actual characteris- 
 tics. 
 
 2d. Analyze the complex phenomena and reduce them to 
 their simple, original principles, or elements, and ascertain their 
 prim dive characteristics. 
 
 3d. Determine the Origin of the primary principles of cog- 
 nition {principia cognoscendi). 
 
 4th. Designate the powers or faculties of the mind indicated 
 by the preceding classification. 
 
 oth. Ascertain the B" J cdio^s (1) of the complex phenomena 
 of the mind, (2) of the elements, or principles of cognition among 
 themselves. 
 
 6th. Formulate the Laws which govern the mind in simple 
 apprehension, conception, and inference; also in feeling, memory, 
 and voluntary determination. 
 
 7th. Deduce the necessary inferences from the facts and 
 laws of mind — the necessary inference in regard to Ultimate First 
 .Principles, {principia essendi) or Absolute Becdity. 
 
 LAWS OF THE INDUCTIVE METHOD. 
 
 I. Laws of Enumeration. 
 
 (1) Law of Integrity. " Omit nothing." (Cousin: "Hist. 
 of Philos./' vol. ii, p. 139.) " The whole facts of consciousness 
 
■17 
 
 must be taken without reserve or hesitation, whether given as 
 constitutive or regulative data." (Hamilton: "Metaphysics," 
 p. 186.) 
 
 (2) Law of Parclmony. "Suppose nothing." (Cousin: 
 " Elem. of Psychol.," p. 398.) Assume nothing as a fact of con- 
 sciousness which is not directly and immediately given. 
 
 (3) Law of Simjilictty. "Pervert nothing." (Cousin: 
 "Elem. of Psychol.," p. 402.) "Exhibit each fact in its sim- 
 plicity or purity, neither distorted nor mutilated." (Hamil- 
 ton: " Philosophy," p. 30.) 
 
 II. Law of Analysis. 
 
 No phenomena or fact of consciousness is to be assumed as 
 elementary which can be resolved into simpler elements, or prin- 
 ciples. A principle, or element of cognition must be incapable 
 of further reduction ; it must be indecomposable and ultimate. 
 
 III. Law of Designation. 
 
 Phenomena in their fundamental characteristics alike are to 
 be attributed to the same faculty ; phenomena fundamentally 
 different must be attributed to distinct faculties. 
 
 IV. Law of Co-ordination. 
 
 Percepts, notions, and concepts that uniformly resemble or 
 succeed each other are to be regarded as psychologically related ; 
 those which necessarily imply each other, as logically correlated. 
 
 V. Law of Ontological Inference. (Deductive or Analytic 
 Inference.) 
 
 Logical inferences as to ultimate Being, or Absolute Reality 
 are to be recognized as legitimate only as necessary deductions 
 from the immediate data of consciousness, and every position re- 
 jected as illegitimate which is contradictory of these. (Hamilton : 
 " Metaph.," pp. 192-8 ; also p. 88 and 108.) 
 
 TERMINOLOGY. 
 
 1. Terminology as related to Method. 
 
 Every step in the progress of philosophic method is marked 
 by the formation or appropriation of Technical Terms. And as 
 our knowledge becomes more exact we require a language which 
 shall be exact — which shall exclude alike vagueness and fancy, 
 imperfection and superfluity — in which each term shall convey 
 a meaning that is steadily fixed and rigorously definite. Philo- 
 
— 18— 
 
 sophic language becomes thus precise and definite through the 
 use of Technical Terms. 
 
 2. Importance of exact Terminology. 
 
 Since Terminology, almost itself a science, acquires import- 
 ance with the growth of all liberal and severe inquiry, and since 
 a slight difference in the use of language will invariably produce 
 confusion and misapprehension, we must aim at a precise and 
 unequivocal terminology. ^ "Nine-tenths of the confusion and 
 controversy that have existed in this department are owing.... 
 to the employment of the same term in various shades of mean- 
 ing, and with reference to various phenomena of consciousness." 
 (MANSEii.) " There can be no sound philosophy without clearly 
 defined terms." (Spencer.) 
 
 3. Explication of the principal terms employed in Philoso- 
 phy. 
 
 Subject and Object. Subject, denotes the knowing mind or 
 Ego. Object, denotes that about which the knowing mind is 
 conversant, the Xon-Ego. 
 
 Subject ioe and Objective. Subjective, denotes that which in- 
 heres in, belongs to, or proceeds from the thinking subject ; 
 Objective, denotes that which belongs to, or proceeds from the 
 object known, and not from the subject knowing. 
 
 Subjective-object and Objective-object. The object of cogni- 
 tion may be a mode or phenomena of the Ego — a Subjective- 
 object; or a phenomenon of the extra-organic Xon-Ego — an 
 Obj ective-obj ect . 
 
 Heal and Ideal. The Real is that which exists external to, 
 or beyond the phenomena of the mind, either as a phenomenon, 
 a relation, or a substance, in opposition to a representation in 
 thought, or a pure rational apperception ; the Ideal, in general, is 
 that which exists within the mind— a notion, a concept, or an 
 idea. 
 
 Phenomenon and Relation. Phenomenon is the Greek word 
 for that which appears — that which presents itself to the Sense, 
 external or internal. "Phenomenon" and "appearance" are 
 not, however, strictly synonymous ; a Phenomenon is a change — 
 "a successive existence and non-existence of the determinations 
 of a substance which is permanent." (Kant.) Relation is a 
 connection (contingent or necessary), in nature or in thought, 
 between two objects; (relations of co-existence, resemblance and 
 
-19— 
 
 succession are contingent; relations of causality, inherence, recip- 
 rocality, etc., are necessary.) 
 
 The Phenomena! (existence) and the Heal (being). The Phe- 
 nomenal is the changeful, the fleeting; the Real is the perma- 
 nent, constant, abiding. " The Real (ontological) is that which 
 exists absolutely under all changes o; mode, form, or appear- 
 ance." (Spencer.) 
 
 Existence and Being. Existence (ex-sisto— to set, to place, to 
 cause to stand) that which has relative permanence, derived and 
 dependent being. Being, that which is absolutely permanent, 
 changeless, eternal. Thus we say "the Being of God," "the 
 existence of man." " Being creates existence." (Gioberti.) 
 
 Essence and Substance. The Essence {Essentia) is the sum- 
 total of those fundamental and changeless attributes on which 
 the subsistence, worth, and meaning of the object depends (Es- 
 scrdialia const itutiva). The Substance or Substratum is the ab- 
 stract ultimate reality in which the fundamental attributes 
 inhere. {Ens per se subsisted.) 
 
 Attribute and Quality. An attribute is an essential and in- 
 herent mode of existence which a substance cannot lose without 
 ceasing to be what it is ; a Quality is an accidental and variable 
 mode of existence which substances have at one time and not at 
 another, or which they have at all times, but may loose without 
 ceasing to be. 
 
 Sensibility and Sensation. Sensibility is the simple, primi- 
 tive, original capacity of feeling in general— an essential attribute 
 of spirit as contradistinguished from matter. Sensation is purely 
 an affection or modification of the sensitive soul, occasioned by 
 some " mode of motion " in the physical organism. "The un- 
 conscious translation by the soul of vibratory motion into feeling." 
 Sensation is purely subjective, it has no object. 
 
 Perceptivity (power), Perception (act), Percept (product). Per- 
 ceptivity is the simple original power of the soul by which it 
 becomes aware of the existence of something external or object- 
 ive to self, in general. Perception (intuitive) is the specific act of 
 the percipient soul by which it refers sensation to an object. It is 
 the re-action of the soul upon sensation, which gives " a glare," a 
 "mere appearance " (schein), but not a perfect cognition. (Ue- 
 berweg.) A Percept is a single element of knowledge obtained 
 through a single organ of sense, as red, hard, smooth, etc. 
 
— 20- 
 
 Simple Apprehension and Notion. Apprehension {appre- 
 hendo— to lay hold on) is the spontaneous synthesis of several 
 percepts, ideas, and relations in a notion which corresponds to 
 an individual object or existence. A Notion (notio — nosco—no- 
 tus, to know) is the immediate and irrespective knowledge we 
 have of a particular or individual object. (First Notion.) The 
 clear and distinct knowledge of the object (attained by specifica- 
 tion and individualization) constitutes consciousness. 
 
 Note. — Notion is a generic term of which First Notion, Rep- 
 resentative Notion, and Second Notion are species. ( Vorstellung is 
 used by the Germans in the same general sense.) 
 
 Conception (act), and Concept (result). Conception means to 
 grasp or take up in bundles— to reduce our knowledge to the 
 unity of thought; the act by which we form general notions 
 (Second Notions). Concept is the general notion formed hy ab- 
 straction, comparison and generalization. Concept (Begriff) is 
 the notion of an object, not as it exists in itself, but as it is 
 thought by the mind. 
 
 Apperception (Rational Intuition) and Idea. Apperception 
 is the act of the reason by which it spontaneously and imme- 
 diately apprehends ultimate realities which lie back of, produce, 
 and condition all phenomena — the act of intuitively apperceiv- 
 ing the Supersensible, Metaphenomenal, and Supernatural. Ideas 
 are rational, a priori, universal, and necessary principles or ele- 
 ments of cognition, which are not derived from sense, and cannot 
 be pictured or imaged in the sensuous imagination ; as the idea 
 of Substance, Power, Cause, Purpose, the Infinite, the Absolute, 
 and the Perfect. "Ideas are the immaterial essential forms of 
 the intelligible world, in contrast with the sensible forms of the 
 visible world." 
 
 Incorrect use of Idea. — " The French have an excellent idea 
 of cooking in general, but their most accomplished maitres de 
 cuisine have no more idea of dressing a turtle, than the Parisian 
 gourmands have any real idea of the true taste and color of the 
 tat." 
 
BOOK III. 
 
 APPLICATION OF METHOD. 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 (GENERAL CLASSIFICATION.) 
 
 I. PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 (1) Cognition. (Intuition, Representation, Thought.) 
 
 (2) Feeling. (Sensation, Emotion.) 
 
 (3) Volition. (Spontaneity, and Choice.) 
 
 II. DYNAMICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 (1) Intellect. 
 
 (2) Sensibility. 
 
 (3) Will. 
 
 I. Phenomenal Psychology. General Classification of the 
 Phenomena of the Mind. 
 
 A scientific method will commence by seeking to form a 
 general notion of the character and properties of the subject for 
 investigation, and striving to obtain a comprehensive view of the 
 general divisions or classes of phenomena to be studied. 
 
 In the present instance the subject for investigation and study 
 is the human Mind. 
 
 The most fundamental conception of Mind (or Spirit) is that 
 it is an Individualized Center of Poiver which has persistence or 
 permanence, and which is essentially sensient, percipient, and 
 spontaneous. It is a self -manifesting Poiver (to itself, as well as 
 to other minds), a self-moving, self-determining Power, and a 
 self-directive Power, ' ' bearing its own light and seeing its own 
 
—22— 
 
 way.' 1 The essence of the soul consists in its natural activity, 
 and this activity consists in the production of ideas."— Sulzer, 
 (quoted by Hamilton : " Metaphysics," p. 595. See also p. 415.) 
 
 The general division or classification of the phenomena of 
 the mind, now universally recognized, is Cognition, Feeling, and 
 Volition. 
 
 (1.) Cognition (Knowledge) is the general name which we 
 apply to all those mental states in which we become aware (or 
 conscious) of some affection or activity of the mind itself, or 
 some quality or relation of a real existence external to the mind. 
 ' The act of knowing is that activity of the mind by means of 
 which it consciously reproduces in itself what actually exists." 
 — Ueberweg : "Logic," p. 1. 
 
 " To know is more than to feel, more than to perceive, more 
 than to remember. No doubt words are much abused. We speak 
 of a dog knowing his master, of an infant knowing its mother. 
 In such expressions, to know means to recognize, [" means no 
 more than that a present sensuous impression is associated with 
 a past sensuous impression." — " Science of Lang.," 2d Series, p. 
 592.] But to know is more than to recognize. We know a thing 
 when we are able to bring it, or a part of it, under more 
 general ideas. We then say, not that we have a perception, but 
 a conception." — Muller : "Science of Language," 1st Series, 
 p. 378. 
 
 More^e: "Elements of Psychology," p. 141. Helmholtz: "Popular Lec- 
 tures on Science," pp. 308, 309. 
 
 (2.) Feeling is the general name for those modes or states of 
 the psychical or spiritual nature of man, always more or less 
 pleasurable or painful, which are the concomitants of all the 
 energies of life — physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual life. 
 If these " energies of life " are unimpeded, we experience pleas- 
 urable feelings ; if they are repressed or overstrained, we experi- 
 ence painful feelings. 
 
 Hamilton: "Metaphysics," pp. 561-563. 
 
 Feelings are not cognitions. Some feelings precede, and are 
 the conditions of cognition (e. g., the appetencies and the sensa- 
 tions), and some are the consequences of cognition (e. g\, the 
 emotions and sentiments). But sensations may exist without 
 involving any cognition. 
 
 Spencer: "Psychology," vol. ii, pp. 372-373. Maktineau: "Essays," 2d Ser- 
 ies, pp. 264-265. Laycock: "Mind and Brain," vol. i, p. 142. 
 
 Again, instances are found of men who, with distinct cogni- 
 tion, seem to be destitute of all emotion, as well as cases where 
 sensation was absent, and yet consciousness existed. 
 
 Hamilton: "Metaphysics," pp. 224-227. Abercrombie: "Intcll. Powers," 
 pp. 124-126. Brodie: " Psycho. Inquiries," vol. i, p. 181. 
 
(3.) Volition is a spontaneous act of the soul, by which it 
 
 chooses from among several objects or motives, determines itself 
 
 to a fixed purpose in view of the objects or motives, and resolves 
 
 to use and does use means to realize or actualize that purpose. 
 
 The internal act of choosing, resolving, willing, is a volitional 
 
 act ; the consequent external movement of the bodily organs is 
 
 a voluntary act. 
 
 Volition is not feeling — is not desire. Desire, be it ever so 
 intense, never becomes volition but by a distinct movement 
 known to consciousness, and no action can follow until volition 
 arises. Desire is a feeling; volition is an act. The object of de- 
 sire is something which already exists. The object of volition 
 is the voluntary act which does not yet exist, but which it creates 
 or causes. A man cannot create or cause his desires, but he can 
 create or cause his acts. A man is not responsible for his desires, 
 but he is responsible for his acts. 
 
 "Whedon "On the Will," pp. 1G, 17. Locke: "Essay on the Human Under- 
 standing," b. ii, ch. 21. Reid: "Active Powers," Essay ii, ch. 1. Stew- 
 art: "Act. and Moral Powers," Append., p. 471. 
 
 II. Dynamical Psychology. Classification of mental 
 Powers involved in the p>receding phenomena. 
 
 " All the faculties of the soul can be reduced to the following- 
 three, which cannot be any farther deduced from a common 
 cause: (1) The faculty of Cognition; (2) The faculty of Pleas- 
 ure and Pain; and (3) The Conative faculty." — Kant: "Crit- 
 ique of the Understanding," Introd. 
 
 "There are in all men three general Faculties which are 
 always mingled together, and are rarely exercised except simul- 
 taneously, but which analysis divides in order to study tnem 
 better, without misconceiving their reciprocal play, their inti- 
 mate connection, and indivisible unity — viz., Intellect, Sensibility, 
 and Will.' 1 — Cousin. 
 
 "The division of the phenomena of the mind into three 
 great classes of the Cognitive Faculties, the Feelings, or capacities 
 pf pleasure and pain, and the Exertive, or Conative Powers, I do 
 not propose as original. It was first promulgated by Kant, and 
 the felicity of the distribution is so apparent, that it has now 
 become universally adopted in Germany by the philosophers of 
 every school."— Hamilton : " Metaph.," p. 129. 
 
 (1) The Intellect is the general name for the totality of 
 powers or faculties by which the soul is able to knoiu 
 its own affections, states and activities, and also to know objects 
 external to the mind, whether material or spiritual, together with 
 their nature and relations. 
 
(2) The Sensibility is the general capacity of feeling— the 
 susceptibility of being affected or excited by impressions upon," 
 or changes in the organism ; of being urged by connate or in- 
 stinctive desires ; and of being inspired and stirred by concep- 
 tions, thoughts and ideas. 
 
 (3) The Will is the grand power of spontaneously determin- 
 ing one's self to the performance of specific acts either of mind 
 or of body. " The Will is the power of the soul by which it is 
 the conscious author of an intentional act."— Whedon : "On the 
 Will," p. 15. 
 
 Psychology is thus divided into three parts, viz.: 
 Part I. Intellectual Philosophy. 
 Part II. Philosophy of the Sensibility. 
 Part III. Philosophy of the Will. 
 
DIVISION I. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (general.) 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 Metaphysics, being u the philosophy of the facts of conscious- 
 ness," should commence with a clear conception of the nature, 
 development, and authority of consciousness. 
 
 " Philosophy itself is but the articulate development of con- 
 sciousness." — Mansel : "Ency. Brit.," vol. xiv, p. 553. 
 Cousin: "Elem. of Psycho.," p. 413. 
 
 " Philosophy is the scientific evolution of the facts of which 
 consciousness is the revelation."— Hamilton : "Philos.,"p. 222. 
 
 Consciousness. — Etymology of the term. Conscientia (con 
 
 — with, scientia — knowlege) a joint knowledge, a knowing along 
 
 with others. ' ' The members of a conspiracy were said to be con- 
 
 scire, and conscius is even used for conspirator." — Hamilton: 
 
 | Metaph.," p. 135. Consciousness is joint knowledge — associated 
 
 knowledge — synthetic knowledge— the knowledge of one thing 
 
 or object in connection or relation with another. Consciousness 
 
 is the knowledge of the relation between two objects or two 
 
 terms. 
 
 (Hamilton: "Metaph.," p. 133.) 
 
 Consciousness is defined by Hamilton as " the recognition by 
 the mind or Ego of its own acts and affections." (" Metaph.," p. 
 133.) In this, he says, "all philosophers are agreed." 
 
 Viewed in connection with Sir Wm. Hamilton's entire doc- 
 trine in regard to Consciousness, this definition is open to criti- 
 cism, and must be pronounced inadequate. All philosophers 
 have not, by any means, meant the same thing by the term 
 consciousness. Most men (including even Reid and Stewart) 
 
—86— 
 
 have meant Self-consciousness. They have held that we can be 
 conscious only of some state of our own mind. The mind's " own 
 acts and affections" are within the mind itself and not external 
 to it ; accordingly we have, in their opinion, no direct evidence 
 of consciousness for the existence of the external world. And 
 in this doctrine most philosophers " are agreed." 
 
 This is not, however, the doctrine to which Hamilton assents. 
 
 Nothing can be further from his mind. Though he has defined 
 
 consciousness as the recognition of the mind's own acts and 
 
 affections, he nevertheless teaches that we are conscious of things 
 
 outside of, external to, the mind. For example, he says : " I am 
 
 conscious of the inkstand." c'Metaph.," p. 158.) "We are 
 
 conscious of the external world immediately and in itself. This 
 
 is the doctrine of natural Realism." — "Philosophy," p. 394; 
 
 see also p. 178. 
 
 On World-Consciousness see Manser: "Encyc. Brit.,'* vol. xiv, p. 513. 
 Spencer: "Psychol.,'' vol. ii, p. 437. McCosh: "Defence of Fundamen- 
 tal Truth," p. 157. Dr. Carpenter: '*Ment. Physiol.," p. 177. Hamil- 
 ton: "Philosophy," p. 177. 
 
 Hamilton must either enlarge his definition of consciousness 
 or abandon the doctrine of Natural Realism, which teaches that 
 " we are conscious of the external world." The definition which 
 is given by Mansel (the editor of Hamilton's "Metaphysics") 
 is more comprehensive and satisfactory. " Consciousness (Pre- 
 sentative or Intuitive) is the knowledge of an individual object, 
 be it a thing, or state, or act of mind, immediately presented be- 
 fore me here and now — that is, with a definite position in time or 
 space, or both." — Art. "Metaphysics," Encyc. Brit., vol. xiv, 
 p. 556. 
 
 I. 
 
 Consciousness is Knowledge. To be conscious is to per- 
 ceive, {percipio : to take up wholly — to seize wholly) ; it is to 
 apprehend, {cipprehendo : to grasp — to take hold of); it is to 
 know— the word explains itself (scientia-cum). Xot only have I 
 a sensation, but I knoiv that I have it. I can differentiate it, de- 
 fine it, and refer it to its source ; not only do I will or determine, 
 but I know that I will, I know why I thus decide, and I can fore- 
 see some of the consequences of my determination. In general, 
 then, Consciousness is Knowledge. 
 
 " Consciousness and Knowledge are not opposed as really 
 different they severally infer each other, and are really iden- 
 tical."— Hamilton: "Metaph.," p. 134. " We know; and we 
 
know that we know:— these propositions, logically distinct, are 
 really identical; each implies the other." — Hamilton: " Philos- 
 ophy," p. 171. 
 
 Xote A. — Sensation (feeling) is not consciousness, is not in 
 an;/ sense know/edge. J. S. Mill asserts that " in the language of 
 philosophy, feelings and states of consciousness are synonymous, 
 everything is a feeling of which the mind is conscious."—" Log- 
 ic," eh. iii, | 3. 
 
 To the doctrine of Mr. Mills, we object — 
 
 (1) A Sensation is simply a sensalion and nothing more. It 
 is not perception, not memory, not imagination, not judgment, 
 not reasoning. 
 
 McCosh: "'Defence of Fund. Truth," pp. SI. 85. 
 
 (2) Sensation is purely subjective; "sensation as such has 
 no object."— Maktineau : " Essays," 2d series, pp. 236, 268. 
 
 Ueberweg: " Logic," pp. 77, 78. 
 
 (3) Sensation may exist without any cognition. 
 
 spex geb: "Psycho.," vol. ii, pp. 872-8. 393. Carpenter: "Human Physio.," 
 p. -Vol; " Mental Physio.," p.*183 ; "Comp. Physio.," pp. 637-310. Laycock: 
 "Mind and Brain," vol. i, p. 118. Feuchtersleben : "Med. Psycho.," 
 pp. 84, 208. Murphy: " Habit and Intell.," vol. ii, p. 13. Marthseau : 
 " Essays." 2d series, pp. 26i, 265. 
 
 (4) There may be consciousness even when there is complete 
 insensibility to outward impressions. 
 
 Sir B. Brodie: "Psychological Inquiries," vol. i, p. 131. Abercroxbie: 
 " Intellectual Powers," pp. 121, 125. 
 
 II. 
 
 Consciousness is a Special Kind of Knowledge. 
 Knowledge is a concept of much wider extent than conscious- 
 ness. Knowledge is either potential or actual. "I know a 
 science, or language, not mereh T while I make a temporary use 
 of it, but inasmuch as I can apply it when, and how I will. Thus 
 the infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures lies always 
 beyond the sphere of consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses 
 of the mind." (Hamilton: " Meta.," p. 233.) This is potential 
 knowledge. When that knowledge of a science, or a language, 
 is really before the eye of the mind, and used by the mind, it is 
 actual knowledge. Furthermore, actual knowledge is either me- 
 diate or immediate. When we cognize a thing "in or through 
 something numerically different from itself," that is through a 
 vicarious image or sjnnbol, that knowledge is mediate (symbol- 
 ical). When we cognize a thing "in itself," that is, when the 
 thing is, as it were, viewed by the mind face to face, we have 
 immediate knowledge. Consciousness is actual and immediate 
 knowledge of what is here and now present to the mind. 
 
11 Consciousness and immediate knowledge are terms univer- 
 sally convertible."— Hamilton : "Philosophy," p. 177. 
 
 "Consciousness is a knowledge solely of what is now and 
 here present to the mind." — Hamilton:'" Philos.," p. 250. 
 Mansei, : Art. " Metaphysics," Ency. Brit., vol. xiv, p. 556. 
 
 "An immediate knowledge of the past is impossible." — 
 Hamilton: "Philos.," p. 251; "Metaphysics," p. 152. 
 
 " We are not conscious of the distant." — Hamilton : " Meta- 
 physics," p. 374. 
 
 Note. — Hamilton commits a grave mistake in regarding mind 
 as strictly co-extensive with consciousness, and asserting "that 
 we have no knowledge of which we are not conscious." This 
 is in direct opposition to all that is said in ch. xviii : " Is the 
 mind ever unconsciously modified?" and especially at p. 236 and 
 p. 253. 
 
 III. 
 
 Confused or Obsbure Perception is not Consciousness. 
 Every moment the light is reflected from innumerable objects; 
 sounds and odors of innumerable kinds affect our senses ; and 
 different bodies are in contact with our bodily organism ; but we 
 pay no immediate attention to them ; and yet they are perceived 
 by the mind. These are what Leibnitz calls " obscure percep- 
 tions;" they do not come clearly and distinctly into the field of 
 consciousness. In order to a clear and distinct knowledge there 
 must be some unfolding of the Will, that is, a certain "concen- 
 tration of analytic attention." Therefore, Consciousness is clear 
 and distinct knowledge {attained through specification and indi- 
 vidualization) of what is here and now present to the mind. 
 
 " Our knowledge proceeds from the confused to the distinct — 
 from the vague to the determinate — so, in the mouths of chil- 
 dren, language at first expresses neither the precisely general, 
 nor the determinately individual, but the vague and the confused ; 
 and out of this the universal is elaborated by generijication, the 
 particular and the singular by specification and individualiza- 
 tion."— Hamilton : " Metaph.," pp. 497-501. 
 
 " Consciousness is distinct cognition evolved out of obscure 
 intuition." — Mi\NSEL: "Prolegomena," p. 42. 
 
 " A notion is clear when it has sufficient strength of con- 
 sciousness to enable us to distinguish its object from other 
 objects. It is distinct when its individual elements are also clear, 
 and consequently when it suffices to distinguish the elements of 
 the object from each other." — Ueberwig : " Logic," p. 125. 
 
 " Individual conceptions [First Notions] gradually arise out 
 of the original blur of perception (ungeschiedenen Gesammtbilde 
 der Wahrnehmung) when man begins to recognize himself as an 
 individual essence, in opposition to the outside world." — Ueber- 
 weg, "Logic," p. 111. 
 
— 29— 
 
 " Wundt draws a sharp line between clear and obscure per- 
 ception, recognizing various degree of each, both in one and the 
 same mind, and in the scale of animal existence. The circle of 
 distinct consciousness is determined by the process called atten- 
 tion. He draws an analogy between the region of attention and 
 the field of distinct perception in vision, and makes use of the 
 terms 'field of view 1 and "point of view ' to illustrate the distinc- 
 tion between all the presentations at a given moment, and that 
 part of them to which attention is directed. The entrance of a 
 presentation into the internal 'field of view' is termed percep- 
 tion ; its entrance into the internal ' point of view,' an appercep- 
 tion " [apprehension]. — Art. "On Physiological Psychology in 
 Germany." — Mind, p. 36. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Consciousness is only a small sphere of mental modification 
 in the center of a far wider sphere of action and passion of which 
 we can only be cognizant through its effects. It is, so to speak, 
 the illuminated field where everything that takes place in the 
 obscure recesses of the mind is seen in its concrete results. 
 
 " I do not hesitate to maintain that what we are conscious of 
 
 is constructed out of what we are not conscious of The 
 
 sphere of our conscious modifications is only a small circle in 
 the center of a far wider field of action and passion of which we 
 are only conscious through its effects." — Hamilton : " Metaph.," 
 pp. 241, 242. 
 
 " The sphere of our immediate consciousness is very small, 
 it is but the center of our sphere of knowledge which extends in 
 every direction." — Murphy : " Scient. Basis of Faith," p. 93. 
 
 "Psychology contains and reflects all, that which is known 
 of God and that which is known of the world, under the precise 
 and determinate angle of consciousness." — Cousin: "Hist, of 
 Philosophy," vol. i, p. 97. 
 
 "The human soul leads a two-fold existence, one clear as day 
 and self-conscious, the other obscure and unconscious, and in its 
 dim abyss it holds some contents which never fully emerge into 
 the light."— Martensen: "Ethics," p. 110. 
 
 See Morell : " Eleni. of Psycho.," part 1, p. 74. Unser and Prochaska : " On 
 the Nervous System," Intro, p. vii. Laycock: "Mind and Brain," vol. 
 i, p. 174. Ueberweg: "Logic," p. 102. 
 
 The human mind exerts energies, and is the subject of modi- 
 fications of which it is not conscious. 
 
 Hamilton: "Metaphysics," Lect. xvii and xviii. Laycock: "Mind and 
 Brain," vol. i, p. 174. Winslow : "On the Brain and Mind," pp. 353-4. 
 Mansel: Art. "Metaphysics," Ency. Brit., vol. xiv, p. 575. 
 
 (a.) Pre-conscious mental activities, which exist and operate 
 prior to consciousness, and manifest their presence and activity 
 in the total concrete result — the Individual Notion. 
 
 (1) Those activities of the soul by which it translates the 
 external organic affections (neural tremors) into internal quali- 
 
— 30- 
 
 ties — Sensations. "Sensation is the unconscious translation, by 
 the soul, of vibratory motion into feeling." — Heidenham. "Sen- 
 sitivity is the action of the soul by which it con verts mere bodily 
 affections into sensations." — Lotze. 
 
 Note.— Even in sensation the mind is not passive. 
 See Hamilton : " Metaph.," pp. 415, 573. 
 
 (2) Those activities of the soul by which it re-acts upon the 
 external occasion, or excitant of sensation, and forms percepts, 
 and groups of percepts. '' Perception is the semi-conscious trans- 
 lation, by the soul, of sensation into objective cognition." — 
 Heidenham, "Perception is the power of the soul to localize 
 its sensations." — Lotze. It is the power by which the mind re- 
 fers sensations to their occasion or source. 
 
 Carpenter: "Mental Physio.," p. 176-177. 
 
 (3) Those activities of the soul by which it combines pre- 
 cepts of sense with ideas of reason so as to form Individual No- 
 tions. 
 
 Ueberweg: "Logic," p. 77, # 36. McCosh: "Defence," etc., p. 23S. Kant: 
 "Critique of Pure Reason," pp. 62, 63. 
 
 (b.) Sub-conscious menial activities. Those actions of the 
 soul by which modes of thought (notions, concepts, inferences), 
 modes of feeling, and modes of voluntary activity of which we 
 have once been conscious, become so associated that when one 
 re-appears, or is re-presented, the other will involuntary re- 
 appear, either simultaneously or successively — Mental Habits. 
 Murphy: "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii, pp. 48, 55. 
 
 (1) Hal tits of Thought. When notions, conceptions and in- 
 ferences have co-existed or succeeded each other in the mind, the 
 recurrence of one of the cognitions tends to recall the conscious- 
 ness of the other. 
 
 (2) Habits of Feeling. When a mode of thought and a mode 
 of feeling have occurred together, or in immediate succession, 
 the reproduction of one will recall the other. 
 
 (3) Volitional Habits. Actions which at first are performed 
 by a conscious effort, tend by repetition to become habitual and 
 serai-conscious or unconscious. 
 
 (c.) Conservative Power of the Mind. That power of the 
 mind by which whole systems of knowledge (sciences and \a\\- 
 guages)are retained in the mind and reproduced in consciousness 
 and applied at will. 
 
 Hamilton: "Metaph.," p. 236. 
 
 (d. ) Latent Mental Modifications. Certain systems of knowl- 
 edge, or parts of systems of knowledge, which the subject is 
 wholly unconscious' of possessing, and cannot reproduce at will, 
 but which are revealed to consciousness in certain states of extra- 
 ordinary exaltation of mental power. 
 Hamilton : "Metaph.," pp. 236-240. Abercro:u:bie : " Itel. Powers," pp. 119, 133. 
 
 Consciousness is a complex phenomenon, the result of the 
 spontaneous and simultaneous action of the primary powers of 
 the mind — sense, reason, and primitive judgment (spontaneous 
 apprehension). 
 
— 31— 
 
 11 All our [primary] faculties enter, at first, into spontaneous 
 exercise, on account of the power which is inherent in them, and 
 not on account of our will, and they enter into exercise all to- 
 gether . . , and this simultaneous action of all our faculties results 
 in a complex fact — consciousness." — Cousin : " Hist, of Philos.," 
 vol. i, p. 323 ; also pp. 237, 238, 287, 238 and 337. 
 
 "Human consciousness ... is a compound of several ele- 
 ments. Our personal consciousness, like tne air we breath, comes 
 tous as a compound." — Mansel: Art. " Metaph.," Ency. Brit., 
 vol. xiv, p. 560. 
 
 "Every definite state of consciousness is the many in the 
 one — the synthetic unity which is termed apperception." — JL ay- 
 cock : " Mind and Brain," vol. i, p. 15r>. 
 
 " The immediateness of knowledge (in perception) is rela- 
 tive, since many psychical operations are blended in with the 
 sense-activity, although only their collective product appears in 
 consciousness." — Ueberweg : " Logic," p. 77. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Consciousness is sense illuminated by reason— the rational a 
 priori idea informing the sense, and thus empowering the mind 
 to form notions of individual objects. 
 
 " All light comes from the reason, and it is reason which 
 perceives both itself and the sensibility which envelopes it.... 
 The element of knowledge is rational in its essence; and con- 
 sciousness, although composed of three integrant and inseparable 
 elements, borrows its most immediate foundation from reason, 
 without which no knowledge would be possible, and conse- 
 quently no consciousness. Sensibility is the'external condition 
 of consciousness, the Will is its center, and Reason its light.' 1 '' — 
 Cousin: " Elem. of Psychol.," p. 417. 
 
 " In every judgment and in every thought, the grosser as 
 well as the more refined, an exact analysis discovers two elements 
 — one empirical , the other rational] a datum a posteriori and a 
 concept a priori. — Saisset : " Modern Pantheism," vol. i, p. 144. 
 " The content of perception reached by means of organic affec- 
 tion must be recognized to be a ccdperating factor in the process 
 of the formation of notions . . .By it [organic affection] the exter- 
 nal orderly arrangement in space and time is brought to con- 
 sciousness. The thinking, led from the signs contained in it to 
 the internal orderly arrangement, makes it signify the moments 
 
 constituting the essence of things The system of notions is 
 
 not given in a lasting way, in the general subjective reason. It 
 exists in the absolute reason, which comprehends all mere subjec- 
 tivity, and adjusts it to objectivity. 11 — Ueuerweg : "Logic," p. 107. 
 
 VII. 
 
 The unity of consciousness is a Synthetic Judgment — the 
 spontaneous synthesis, by the indivisible Ego or Will, of the per- 
 cepts of sense and the ideas of reason in a primitive psychological 
 Judgment. 
 
" Extending the terms Apprehension [Simple Apprehension] 
 and Judgment beyond the region of thought proper, it may be 
 laid down as a general canon of Psychology that the unity of 
 consciousness is a Judgment. 1,1 — Mansee : " Prolegomena," p. 62. 
 
 " The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception "...."I call 
 the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indi- 
 cate the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it." — 
 Kant: " Critique of Pure Reaaon," p. 82. 
 
 "Consciousness necessarily involves a judgment. .. .A con- 
 sciousness is necessarily the consciousness of a determinate 
 something; and we cannot be conscious of anything without 
 virtually affirming its existence, that is, judging it to be. Con- 
 sciousness is thus primarily a Judgment." — Hamilton: u Meta- 
 physics," p. 463. 
 
 " The first act of knowing is a judgment free from all reflec- 
 tion, an affirmation, without any mixture of negation,— an im- 
 mediate intuition, the legitimate child of the natural energy of 
 the mind."— Cousin: " True, Beautiful, and Good," p. 70. 
 
 See "Hist, of Philos.," vol. ii, pp. 337. 343, 363. 
 
 Judgment is essentially a personal act, the act of the Indi- 
 visible Ego, or Self, or Will. " Sensible facts are necessary. We 
 do not impute them to ourselves. Rational facts are also necessary ; 
 and reason is no less independent of the will than sensibility. 
 Voluntary facts alone are marked in the view of consciousness 
 with the character of personality. The will alone is the person, 
 or the me. The me is the center of the intellectual sphere. So 
 long as the me does not exist, the conditions of the existence of 
 all the other phenomena might be in force, but, without relation 
 to the me, they would not be reflected in the consciousness." — 
 Cousin : " Elem. of Psycho.," p. 416. 
 
 Spontaneity is essentially the action of Will, as much as re- 
 flection and deliberation. "Spontaneity is essentially free, al- 
 though it is accompanied by no deliberation, and often in the 
 quick springing forth of its inspired act, eludes its own observa- 
 tion and leaves scarce a trace in the depths of consciousness." — 
 Cousin: "Elem. of Psycho.," p. 564. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 The Psychological or Experiential Unity of Consciousness is 
 
 a tri-unity — a triplicity in a psychological unity, — Sensivity or 
 
 Sensible Intuition (Sense), a priori, Rational Intuition (Reason) 
 
 and spontaneous activity (Will). 
 
 " The triplicity of consciousness, the elements of which are 
 distinct and irreducible, one to the other, is then resolved into a 
 single fact, as the unity of consciousness exists only on condi- 
 tion of that triplicity."— Cousin : " Elem. of Psycho.," p. 433. 
 
 IX. 
 
 The Psychological Unity of Consciousness corresponds with 
 the Ontological Unity of the contents of Consciousness — God, 
 the Soul, and Nature. 
 
Psychological Elements. Ontological Elements. 
 
 Reason = God. 
 
 Will = The Soul. 
 
 Sense = Nature. 
 
 " Thus, the psychological unity of consciousness in its tri- 
 plicity is found, so to speak, face to face with the ontological 
 unity in its parallel triplicity. Every fact of consciousness is 
 psychological and ontological at once, and contains already the 
 three great ideas which science afterwards divides or brings to- 
 gether, but which it cannot go beyond, viz., self, nature, and 
 God."— Cousin: u Elena, of Psychology," p. 434; also pp. 435-7. 
 
 1. SELF-coNSCiousNESS=Immediate, direct cognition of Self 
 
 — the indivisible and identical Ego. 
 
 " The essence of self-consciousness is consciousness of the 
 Ego," (p. 85.) " In mental acts, consciousness and existence are 
 one and the same," (p. 84.) — Ueberweq : "Logic," 
 
 " The personal Self is neither a mode of consciousness, nor 
 the aggregate of many modes, but a substance, distinct from 
 all its affections, though discerned in consciousness in conjunc- 
 tion with them. This one Presented Substance (Myself) is 
 the basis of the other notions of substance which are thought 
 representatively in relation to other phenomena." — Mansel : 
 Art, " Metaph.," Ency. Brit., vol. xvi, p. 600 ; "Prolegomena 
 Logica," pp. 122, 124. 
 
 See Green: "Spiritual Philos.," vol. i, p. 189. Porter: "Intell. Philos.," p. 
 95. Hamilton: "Metaph.," p. 259. Beneke: "Neue Grundlegung zur 
 Metaphysik," p. 10. Galuppi : in Ueberweg's "Hist, of Philos.," vol. ii, 
 p. 486. Jouffroy: "Nouveaux Melanges Philos.," p. 275. 
 
 2. WoRLD-coNSCiousNESS=Immediate, direct cognition of 
 the external world. 
 
 " Consciousness and immediate knowledge are terms univer- 
 sally convertible; and if there be an immediate knowledge of 
 things external, there is, consequently the consciousness of an 
 outer ivorld," (p. 177.) "I have frequently said that, in percep- 
 tion, we are conscious of the external object Immediately and in 
 itself," (p. 394.)— Hamilton: "Philos." 
 See also Spencer: " Psychology," vol. ii, p. 437. McCosh: "Defence," p. 157. 
 
 Mansel: "Ency. Brit," vol. xiv, p. 613. Dr. Carpenter: "Mental 
 
 Physio.," p. 177. 
 
 3. God-consciousness = The immediate cognition of God. 
 
 (Gottesbewusstsein — Intuition of God.) 
 
 " As the existence of the conditioned Ego can only be ex- 
 plained from the being of the unconditioned Ego, there Is innate 
 in each self-consciousness, not merely a relation to itself and the 
 world, but a God-consciousness, and a bias to God potential — 
 Muller: " Christ. Doct. of Sin," vol. ii, p. 316. 
 
 Mansel : " Limits of Religious Thought," pp. 32, 115. Saisset : " Mod. Panth.," 
 vol. ii, 243. Coleridge: "Works," vol. v, p. 16. Martensen: " Dog- 
 matics," p. 75. Christlieb: "Modern Doubt," p. 141. M' Vicar: "Sketch 
 of Philos.," pp. 84, 85. Prof. Sylvester: "Nature," vol. i, p. 238. Car- 
 lyle: "Essays," vol. i, p. 85. Mtjller: "Science of Language," 2d 
 series, p. 455. 
 
 3 
 
— 34— 
 x. 
 
 Consciousness, though natural and necessary to every human 
 mind whose powers are naturally developed, is not exercised at 
 the beginning of its existence, but only after certain conditions 
 of growth, and stages of progress have been attained. 
 
 We have defined Consciousness as the direct and immediate 
 knowledge of an individual Object, be it an external thing, or an 
 act or state of the mind, as present here and now to the percipi- 
 ent Ego, together with a direct and immediate knowledge of the 
 Subject or Ego which perceives and knows. This Consciousness 
 has a gradual development. 
 
 " The mind, like the body, acquires its functions by insensi- 
 ble degrees, 'unseen, yet crescive in its faculty'; and we rind 
 ourselves in possession and exercise of nature's gifts, without 
 being able to say how we accpuired them." — Mansel : " Eucy. 
 Brit., 1 ' vol. xiv., p. 559. 
 
 " Man is subject to a development in time, and not only his 
 physical being, but also his mental, developes itself from ail ob- 
 scure nature-basis. . .His self-consciousness unfolds itself from 
 the unconscious, obscure, embryonic abyss." — Martensen : 
 " Ethics," p. 110. 
 
 See Porter : " Human Intell.," p. 100. 
 
 1. The first activities of the soul are those of simple 
 life. We do not here refer to cosmical, bioplasmic Life (the 
 characteristics of which are assimilation, nutrition, growth, and 
 organization) but individual JLife=an Individualized Center of 
 Power having certain instinctive appetencies which are essential 
 to its preservation and development. This Power is first mani- 
 fested in spontaneous motions which are unconscious and may 
 exist even before the experience of sensations. 
 
 2. Original Innate Sensation (General Feeling— Ob- 
 scure Self-Feeling). The earliest sign by which the Ego becomes 
 perceptible is in the primitive, original Sensibility ( Ursinn) 
 which is an essential attribute of Spirit, and may exist indepen- 
 dent of a nervous system, It is "the dim sense of an indi- 
 vidual Subject" (Kant). "A feeling of existence" (Ulrici). 
 " Self-hood ( being-for-or-to-self ) without reference to what is 
 not self."— (Lotze). 
 
 3. Ccen.esthesis or Common Feeling. The next step in 
 the development of the Ego is sensation through the mediation 
 of the Ganglionic Sj^stem of Nerves; e. g. hunger, thirst, etc. 
 
 4. Muscular Sensations. Those sensations wmich arise 
 from the varying condition of the muscles when in action or at 
 rest, impeded or unimpeded, fatigued or cramped. 
 
 5. Special Sensations (touch, taste, smell, hearing, 
 and sight) throngh the medium of the organs of sense, and the 
 Cerebro-spinal Nerves; and developed (probably) in the older 
 given above. 
 
6. Sense of Effort and Feeling of Resistance to 
 Locomotive Energy. The muscles obeying (though imper- 
 fectly) the spontaneous effort of the Will are resisted by an im- 
 pediment external to the organism, thus giving a dim and 
 obscure perception of outness, or externality. 
 
 7. Perception (Distinguishing Activity of the Soul). The 
 mind re-acts upon the occasion, or excitant of sensation and 
 localizes the object — "refers sensation to its occasion or source." 
 The translation of subjective sensation into objectivity. 
 
 8. Rational Intuition. The apperception of permanent 
 Realities (Substance, Cause, Purpose, Identity, etc.) which are 
 necessary to the interpretation of sensible phenomena — the Rea- 
 son illuminating and informing Sense. 
 
 9. Apprehension. The synthesis of percepts of sense and 
 ideas of reason under the relations of Time, Space, Inherence, 
 Causality, Intentionality, and Reciprocality, giving Notions of 
 individual existences, and affirming their objective reality. 
 
 10. Ethical Feelings. The sense of duty and the feeling 
 of responsibility giving the apprehension of personal rights. 
 The human Ego becomes perfectly conscious of itself only in re- 
 lation to another Ego. When we realize that we have certain 
 obligations, that we are set to perform certain duties, and that 
 we have certain rights, then we are fully assured of our Person- 
 ality. " The real knowledge of our own essence depends on our 
 apprehension of the Ethical Idea" (Ueberweg). " A conscious- 
 ness properly human, means Conscience." — (Coleridge). 
 
 Through these various stages consciousness is fully devel- 
 oped. 
 
 XI. 
 
 Consciousness considered in its relation to the Objects of 
 knowledge is of three kinds: 1st, Spontaneous and Realistic; 
 2d, Representational ; 3d, Reflective and Symbolical. 
 
 1. Spontaneous and Realistic Consciousness is the direct and 
 immediate knowledge of an individual Object (an external exist- 
 ence or an internal act or state of the mind) which is here and 
 now present to the mind with a difinite position in tim.e or space 
 or both. 
 
 2. Representational Consciousness is a direct and immediate 
 knowledge of a vicarious image or a sign which now represents 
 an individual object that was once present to the mind with a 
 definite position in time or space or both. 
 
 3. Reflective and Symbolical Consciousness is the present 
 direct and immediate knowledge of a General Notion, or Con- 
 cept, that symbolizes, or typifies a class or group of possible 
 individuals which agree with or resemble each other in essen- 
 tial attributes — a consciousness that "looks before and after," 
 which has prevision as well as revision. 
 
 Note. — In Spontaneous Consciousness there are two elements : 
 (1) The Conscious Subject or Self; (2) The Object of which the 
 subject is directly cognizant. In Representational Consciousness 
 there are three elements: (1) The Knowing Subject or Self; (2) 
 The subject-object (image, feeling, sign) immediately known ; (3) 
 
-36- 
 
 The external object mediately known through the image, feeling, 
 or sign. In Reflective Consciousness there are two elements: (!) 
 The knowing Subject or Ego; (2) The thought-object or symbol 
 immediately known, which may or may not represent a possible 
 object of intuition. 
 
 These three kinds of Consciousness considered subjectively 
 are characterized as follows : 
 
 Spontaneous is Representational is Reflective is 
 
 Intuitive, Intermediate, Discursive, 
 
 Involuntary, _ Voluntary, 
 
 Synthetic, _ Analytic, 
 
 Begins with affirmation, _ Begins with doubt, 
 
 The point of departure, _ The point of return, 
 
 The genius of human nature, _ The genius of the few, 
 
 Constitutes Natural Logic, _ Constitutes Formal Logic, 
 
 (Jives Truth. Creates Art. Produces Science. 
 
 XII. 
 
 Inasmuch as all our knowledge rests ultimately on certain 
 facts of consciousness which are primitixe, indecomposable, self- 
 evident, necessary, and universal, the deliverances of spontane- 
 ous consciousness must be acceped as of Absolute Authority. 
 
 " Consciousness is to the philosopher what the Bible is to the 
 theologian. Both are professedly revelations of Divine Truth. 
 Both exclusively supply the constituent principles of knowledge, 
 and the relative principles of its construction. To both we must 
 look for elements and laws." — Hamilton: " Philosophy,' 7 p. 222. 
 
 " The verdict of consciousness is admitted on all hands to be 
 a decision without appeal" (p. 161). " All the world admits that 
 it is impossible to doubt a fact of internal consciousness" (166). 
 " A real fact of consciousness cannot be doubted or denied" (166). 
 — J. S. Mill : " Exam, of Hamilton's Philos.," vol. i. 
 
DIVISION I. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PART I. 
 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (SPECIAL CLASSIFICATION.) 
 
 (A.) PHENOMENOLOGY. 
 
 {Perception (Internal and External), 
 Apperception, 
 Apprehension. 
 
 f Representation I 
 
 II. REPRESENTATION, j REP ^c?io N) BE »' MN ™- 
 
 L Recollection. | 
 
 f Conception, 
 | Predication, 
 
 III. THOUGHT, \ Ideation, 
 
 | Illation (Synthetic and Analytic), 
 [ Rational Integration. 
 
 Application of Method. 1st Step. Make a complete enumer- 
 ation of the complex phenomena of cognition and ascertain their 
 actual characteristics. This naturally divides into (1) The 
 enumeration of the complex phenomena of cognition, (2) The 
 ascertainment of the actual characteristics of the complex phe- 
 nomena of cognition. 
 
 COMPLEX PHENOMENA OF COGNITION. 
 
 (I. INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE.) 
 
 1. The knowledge of what is here and noiv presented to con- 
 sciousness, that is, the individual object of immediate, spontane- 
 ous, intuitive apprehension ; whether external, internal, or super- 
 nal (transcendental)— The FIRST NOTION. 
 
-38 
 
 A First Notion (notio; nosco, notus, — to know) is the 
 immediate, irrespective knowledge we have of a particular 
 individual or personal object in immediate relation with the 
 organs of sense or the pure reason, as the complement of cer- 
 tain cpualities or attributes considered simply as belonging -to 
 itself. " A First Notion is the cognition of a thing [or object] 
 as it exists in itself, and independent of any operation of 
 thought."— Hamilton: "Discussion," p. 139, note. 
 
 The Object of intuitive, or immediate apprehension may be 
 either external, internal, or supernal transcendental) — the imper- 
 sonal Non-Ego, the personal Ego, or the self-existent, uncon- 
 ditioned Cause of the Ego and the Non-Ego. 
 
 (1) The Notion of the impersonal Non-Ego is the conscious- 
 ness of a complexus of real qualities (extension, incompressibil- 
 ity, inertia i inherent in; of physical properties (resistance, 
 weight, mobility! manifested by : and of vital, or organic affec- 
 tions, occasioned by some mode of motion in; a material sub- 
 stance, e. g.. This Book. 
 
 (2) The Notion of the personal Ego is the consciousness of a 
 complexus of ideal phenomena manifested by, and mental 
 powers inherent in, a spiritual substance, e. g., Myself. 
 
 (3) The Notion of the self-existent, unconditioned Cause 
 of the Non-E'-ro and the individual Ego is a complexus of real 
 attributes inherent in and manifested by a spiritual substance — 
 God. 
 
 (II. REPRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE.) 
 
 2. The knowledge of what was once present to intuition but 
 
 is now represented in consciousness by a.i a vicarious image, (b) 
 
 a similar feeling or mental state or (c) an artificial sign or symbol 
 
 —The REPRESENTATIVE NOTION. 
 
 The immediate object of consciousness in representative cog- 
 nition is an individual or particular object created by the mind's 
 own energy (a subject-object) in which or by which the past or 
 absent object is mediately presented to the mind. 
 
 3. The knowledge which was once presented to intuition 
 but afterwards modified or decomposed and recombined by the 
 imagination or em plastic power— The PLASTIC NOTION. 
 
 fill. THOUGHT KNOWEEGE.) 
 
 4. The knowledge which has been conceived in the mind 
 through a process of Comparative Abstraction — the apprehension 
 and generalization of certain relations of resemblance between a 
 class of objects and their denotation by a common symbol which 
 may represent a possible object of intuition or may be predicated 
 of a possible object of intuition. The SECOND NOTION or 
 CONCEPT. 
 
 The object of immediate consciousness in mediate, symboli- 
 cal cognition is a product of thought (a thought-object) which 
 
39— 
 
 may (a) represent, or (b) be predicated of a possible object of in- 
 tuition. 
 
 (A.) A collection of attributes united by a common symbol 
 and representing a possible object of intuition in some of its re- 
 lations— The Complex Concept, e. g., Vertebrate. 
 
 (b.) A single quality act or relation prescinded, generalized, 
 and named, which may be predicated of a possible object of in- 
 tuition— The Simple Concept, e. g., Color, Motion, Ruler. 
 
 Conception (con, together, eapio, to seize). — the act of 
 grasping a number of single objects under certain relations of 
 resemblance (quantity, quality, form, and function) and binding 
 them together in a unity of thought — comprehending the many 
 in one. 
 
 Comparative Abstraction. The points of resemblance 
 in a number of objects are discerned by abstraction (selective 
 attention), and constituted a concept, or thought-object by com- 
 prehension, or conception. 
 
 5. The knowledge which is developed in the mind by the 
 apprehension of certain relations of totality (whole and parts), 
 either in extent or content, between two concepts. The PRED- 
 ICATIVE JUDGMENT or JUDGMENT PROPER. 
 
 " A Judgment is a combination of two concepts, related to one 
 or more common objects of possible intuition." — Mansel : l< Pro- 
 legomena," p. 68. A Proposition is a contingent judgment ex- 
 pressed in words ; an Axiom is a necessary judgment expressed 
 in words. 
 
 " The Judgment is the consciousness of the objective validity 
 of a subjective union of concepts The Judgment, in its va- 
 rious forms, corresponds with and is the* subjective copy of the 
 various objective relations."— Ueberweg : " Logic," p. 187. 
 
 Note. — If. by observation and experiment, the relation be- 
 tween concepts is found to be uniform, we have attained to what, 
 in science, is called a general law. 
 
 6. The knowledge which has been developed in the mind 
 
 by a process of Immediate Abstraction — the apprehension of the 
 
 absolute and necessary correlation between a concept and an idea 
 
 of the reason, and its positive affirmation as a universal law of 
 
 cognition and thought. The ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLE or 
 
 LAW. 
 
 " The knowledge based upon the direct consciousness of the 
 absolute and necessary correlation between a concept and an idea." 
 (See Rosmini in Ueberweg's " Hist, of Philos.," vol. ii, p. 491.) 
 
 " Man's intellectual supremacv consists in the idealization of 
 facts."— Whewell: "Moral Philos.," p. 129. 
 
 7. The knowledge which is derived from the extension of our 
 generalized experiences (Predicative Judgments) to other facts or 
 
10- 
 
 objects beyond our experience (the past, the distant, and the 
 future)— that is " proceeding from the known to the unknown " 
 by a mediate Judgment, warranted by and based upon an apriori^ 
 necessary and universal Principle. The SYNTHETIC IN- 
 FERENCE. 
 
 Hamilton calls this "inductive inference." Ueberweg calls 
 it " inference of superordination." " Inference is the combina- 
 tion of the necessary truth with contingent knowledge." — Apelt. 
 The extension {extent, breadth, domain, sphere, denotation, or 
 application) of a concept consist of the individual things embraced 
 under it and represented by it. 
 
 §. The knowledge which is deduced from the intension 
 of our generalized experiences (Predicative Judgments)— that is, 
 the analysis of the subject and predicate concepts into their 
 constitutive and consecutive elements (fundamental and deriv- 
 ative Essentials), and the affirmation that the same essential 
 characteristics which are conceived as the content of the concept 
 must be predicated of all the individuals symbolized or repre- 
 sented by the concept. The ANALYTIC INFERENCE. 
 
 Hamilton calls this "deductive inference" (See "Discus- 
 sions," pp. 160, 161); also " analytic illation " (ibid.). "Aris- 
 totle regards the deductive syllogism as the analysis of a whole 
 into its parts." (Ibid.) Ueberweg calls it "inference by the 
 analysis of concepts." ("Logic," p. 334.) He rests the validity 
 of the deductive inference (inference based on the analysis of 
 concepts) on the axioms of Identity and Non-contradiction. 
 " The attributes conceived in the content of the concept inhere in 
 all the objects conceived through the concept, and the relation of 
 inherence is represented by the predicate." (Logic: p. 231. ) 
 
 The intension {intent^ content, depth, connotation, or impli- 
 cation) of concepts consists of the fundamentally essential, and 
 derivatively essential attributes which are necessarily implied in 
 the existence of the objects represented thereby, and without 
 which they could not be what they are. 
 
 9. The knowledge which is attained by a process of ra- 
 tioned integration, in which all the universal and necessary 
 principles of reason are united in one " ultimate of all ultimates " 
 ( principium principorium) — an absolute First Principle, contain- 
 ing, predetermining, and producing all things in their relation 
 to a final purpose. The SYSTEM. 
 
 Science, and more especially Philosophy (" The Science of 
 Sciences") is a whole of knowledge in the form of a system. 
 " System is meant to represent in its articulation the articulation 
 of the totality of its objects, natural and mental." Ueberweg: 
 "Logic," p. 540. 
 
 All systems of knowledge, however special, limited, incom- 
 plete or even erroneous, are the result of the inherent desire and 
 
-U- 
 
 striving to contemplate all our intuitions in a unity of thought; 
 and they approach to perfection just in proportion as they attain 
 to the unity of one absolute First Principle. 
 
 ACTUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPLEX 
 PHENOMENA OF COGNITION. 
 
 First Notions 
 are 
 
 f Immediate, { Mediate, 
 
 Presentative, J Representative, 
 
 Intuitive, Second Notions, I Symbolical, 
 
 Singular, or Concepts, j General, 
 
 Concrete, are | -Abstract, 
 
 Real. I Relational. 
 
 ( Singular, 
 | Subjective, 
 Representative Notions <| Imageal, 
 
 are Patbematical, 
 
 [Symbolical. 
 
 Propositions ( s y ntnetic > « posteriori, a XTOMS f Analytic, a priori, 
 i ™ 0p Obi T iON& l Necessary, a£ i Necessary, 
 
 ^ re (General. are (Universal. 
 
 f Sythetic a priori, 
 
 First Principles, | Self-evident, 
 
 or Laws of Thought, \ Conditionally Unconditionally 
 
 are necessary necessary, 
 
 [Universal Absolute. 
 
 Inferences f 'J^%J^Wetl^II=^^l Analytic, 
 
 ( Contingent Necessary. 
 
 IMMEDIATE. MEDIATE. 
 
 Immediate knowledge is the knowledge of a thing or object 
 in itself. Mediate knowledge is the cognition of a thing or object 
 through something numerically different from itself. In imme- 
 diate knowledge there is one sole object; the thing immediately 
 known and the thing existing being one and the same. In 
 mediate knowledge there are two objects ; the subject-object im- 
 mediately known (a representative image or a symbolical notion,) 
 and the thing actually existing and represented being different. 
 
 A Judgment is immediate when the relation between the 
 two terms is intuitively apprehended. 
 
 A Judgment is mediate when the relation between the two 
 terms is cognized through the mediation of a third term (the 
 Middle term), with which each of the other (the Major and 
 Minor) may be compared. 
 
 PRESENTATIVE. REPRESENTATIVE. 
 
 Inasmuch as the object immediately known is itself present, 
 or directly presented to the mind, ihe knowledge is called pre- 
 sentative. And inasmuch as the object remotely known in medi- 
 ate knowledge is held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious 
 representation, the cognition is called a representative cognition. 
 
 There are three degrees of representative cognition, (a.) To 
 recall the cognition of an individual object of sensible intuition, 
 
-1,2- 
 
 we must be able to image, or body forth that object in a similar 
 form to that in which it was first presented to intuition. This is 
 representation proper — Imageai Representation, (b.) To recall 
 the cognition of a past mental state (an affection of the sensibil- 
 ity), we must be able to reproduce a similar feeling to that which 
 was previously present to internal perception. This is repre- 
 sentation in the second degree— Mathematical Representation. 
 (G.) When an object, or a relation which has been presented and 
 denoted by a sensible sign, and the sign has, in our mind, taken 
 the place of the actual object, so that we may employ it without 
 mental reference to the actual object, this is representation in 
 the third degree— Ideograph ic or Phonetic Representation. 
 
 INTUITIVE. SYMBOLICAL. 
 
 In immediate and presentative cognition the thing or object 
 is viewed, as it were, "face to face," without any intermedia- 
 tion; this knowledge is called intuitive. It may be an exercise 
 of either bodily or purely mental vision, an intuition of sense or 
 of reason, but in either case it is the direct vision of an object or a 
 truth. In mediate cognition the thing or object is known by 
 means of second notions, or concepts. For example, I may not 
 have seen the Ostrich. I am told it is an animal, a vertebrate, a 
 bird (class, Avis), a stilt-bird (order, Grallse). that it has a long 
 neck, beak longitudinally depressed, etc., etc. I think or know 
 the Ostrich under second notions, or concepts. This is symbolical 
 knowledge. 
 
 SINGULAR. GENERAL. 
 
 A singular notion is the cognition of a single object. All 
 first notions are therefore singular. 
 
 A general notion is the conception of a class of objects which 
 agree in certain attributes or characteristics common to all the 
 members of the class. 
 
 Singular notions are either particular, individual ox personal. 
 A particular thing is a single object which may be divided 
 into parts without losing its distinctive attributes. Thus, a piece 
 of ice is a particular thing. Its distinctive qualities are coldness, 
 brittleness, transparency, and crystalline structure. The piece of 
 ice may be broken into smaller parts, and each part will continue to 
 have the same qualities as the whole. Coldness, brittleness, trans-? 
 parency, crystalline structure, are common to all the parts ; they 
 are therefore general notions or concepts. An individual thing 
 is a single object which cannot be divided or separated into parts 
 
—&- 
 
 without having its individuality destroyed. A plant or an ani- 
 mal is a unity of interdependent parts or organs, which are 
 mutually means and ends. If these parts or organs are divided 
 or separated, the individuality or unity of the plant or animal is 
 destroyed. The common characteristic of plants and animals 
 is, that they are living organic existences. Life and organiza- 
 tion are therefore general notions, or concepts. 
 
 A personal being is an individual, endowed with sen- 
 sation, reason, and self-determination. The personal being is 
 characterized by a conscious unity or identity, and by power to 
 determine his own moral character. Socrates, Tecumseh, 
 Washington, are single notions. Each had individual traits, 
 and a moral character the result of his own personal voli- 
 tions. But they were all partakers of the common attributes 
 of humanity, and are all included in one class called human 
 beings, or men. Humanity, human beings, man, are therefore 
 general notions, or concepts. 
 
 CONCRETE. ABSTRACT. 
 
 Concrete notions are cognitions of single objects (particular, 
 individual, or personal), which have been formed in spontaneous 
 consciousness, {con, together, eresco, to grow ) The separate 
 elements (percepts, ideas, and relations) of which the notion is 
 formed have "grown together," that is, have been spontaneously 
 and naturally formed in the mind. Abstract notions (i. e., con- 
 cepts) are those cognitions which have been artificially formed 
 in reflective consciousness by abstraction, comparison, and gen- 
 eralization. Thus, this individual horse, bird, fish, or reptile 
 is a single object, and the cognition of each is a concrete 
 notion. But there are some characteristics in which, they all 
 agree. They are all vitalized, sentient organisms — animated be- 
 ings, and we call them animals. Animal is therefore an abstract 
 notion, or concept. 
 
 ESSENTIAL. NON-ESSEXTIAE. 
 
 Abstract notions are essential or non-essential. An essential 
 notion is the conception of those fundamental attributes which 
 are the common and persistent basis of a class of objects, and 
 which they cannot lose without ceasing to be what they are, as 
 the attributes of sensivity, perceptivity, and spontaneous power 
 in man. 
 
 The non-essential notion is the cognition of certain modes or 
 accidents of things or objects which may be present or absent 
 
-u- 
 
 without the identity of the species being changed, as, for exam- 
 ple, for a man " to walk," or " to be sick," or " to be a native of 
 Paris." Of these examples, the first two are separable accidents, 
 because they may be separated from the individual (the man may 
 sit down, and he may recover from sickness) ; the last is an in- 
 separable accident, not being separable from the individual (i. e. 
 he who is a native of Paris can never be otherwise.) 
 
 The possibility of correct inductive reasoning depends on 
 the good formation of concepts according to their essential attri- 
 butes. " In proportion as the really essential characteristics are 
 known, the concepts acquire scientific certainty and objective 
 validity." — Ueberweg : " Logic," p. 140. 
 
 SUBJECTIVE. OBJECTIVE. 
 
 In general, the Subjective is that which inheres in, or per- 
 tains to, or proceeds from the knowing Subject; the Objective is 
 that which belongs to, or proceeds from the object known. But, 
 inasmuch as a state or act of the mind may constitute an object 
 of cognition, therefore, to be more precise, we must employ the 
 term Subjective-object to denote a mode or act of the mind as 
 object of cognition, and the term Objective-object to denote a 
 phenomenon or a substantial existence, external to the mind, as 
 object of cognition. The Subjective-object may be (1) a state or act 
 of the mind, immediately and presentatively known (subject- 
 object); (2) a creation of the mind's own energy, which is repre- 
 sentative of an individual object existing external to the mind, 
 (representative-object) (3) a product of anatysis and generaliza- 
 tion which is symbolical of a class of objects (thought-object). 
 
 REAL (ACTUAL). RELATIONAL (RELATIVE). 
 
 A real notion is the cognition of the actual or substantial 
 existing object, as this man, this desk. A relative notion is the 
 cognition of some relation which existed between a number of 
 actual, or real objects, as subject, ruler, father, son, husband, 
 wife. 
 
 SYNTHETICAL. ANALYTICAL. 
 
 Judgments are of two kinds, synthetical and analytical. 
 Analytic Judgments are those which analyze or distinctly evolve 
 in the predicate what is obscurely contained in the subject, as e. 
 g. " All bodies are extended," a proposition in which the predi- 
 cate " extended " is involved in the very conception of the subject, 
 " bodies." An analytic judgment contains nothing in the predi- 
 cate but what is involved in the right conception of the subject. 
 It does not communicate any new element of knowledge, but 
 
—4-5- 
 
 gives a clearer apprehension and larger application to what 
 we already possess. Hence it is called an Explicative Judgment. 
 
 Synthetic Judgments are those by means of which the predi- 
 cate adds to the conception of the subject a new and additional 
 element, e. g. " all matter has weight," a proposition in which 
 the conception " weight" is added to that of " matter," and yet 
 is not necessarily involved in the conception of" matter." Inas- 
 much as the synthetic judgment is a positive extension of our 
 knowledge, it is called an Ampliative Judgment. 
 
 Synthetic Judgments are either a posteriori or a priori. Syn- 
 thetic Judgments a posteriori are all based upon experience, and 
 are therefore contingent judgments, as e. g. " All swans are 
 white." Synthetic Judgments a priori are based upon rational 
 intuitions, and the necessary co-relation between these and the 
 concepts generalized from experience. They are therefore nec- 
 essary judgments, as e. g. " Every event must have a cause." 
 
 Analytic Judgments are all a priori, that is, they are formed 
 in the mind a priori whether the concept analyzed be empirical 
 or not. For the mind, having once gained this concept as a sub- 
 ject, has no occasion for an additional experience to determine 
 the predicate which is already involved therein. These judg- 
 ments are based upon the intuitive apprehension of the relation 
 of identity or equality between concepts. They are therefore 
 necessary. 
 
 CONTINGENT. NECESSARY. 
 
 A Notion is contingent when its object is conceived as exist- 
 ing, with the possibility of conceiving of its non-existence, as, 
 e. g., this or that particular thing phenomenal change or succes- 
 sion of events. A notion is necessary when its object is con- 
 ceived as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its 
 non-existence, as, e. g., being, cause, duration, the Infinite. 
 
 A Judgment is contingent when the relation between two 
 notions is conceived as existing, with the possibility of conceiv- 
 ing of its non-existence, as, e. g., the relation of resemblance. 
 A Judgment is necessary when the relation between two notions, 
 or between a concept and an idea of reason, is conceived as exist- 
 ing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence, 
 and its negation would be self-contradictory, as, e.g., the relation 
 of inherence, of causality, of reciprocality. 
 
 "To conceive 11 does not mean to image or represent in the 
 sensuous imagination. It means "to construe in thought" 
 under the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, Excluded Mid- 
 dle, and of Sufficient Reason. 
 
— #7— 
 
 Necessity (ne, negation, cesso, to cease) — the impossibility 
 and self-contradiction of the opposite. " Necessity is not simply 
 the impossibility of the contrary. It implies fixed principles, 
 of judgment from which the impossibility is perceived. It in- 
 volves logical and ontological principles. It is being penetrated 
 by thought." — Trendelenberg. The necessary laws ofUhought 
 are necessary laws of things, because the laws of things are the 
 expression of thought. 
 
 CONDITIONAL NECESSITY. UNCONDITIONAL NECESSITY. 
 
 Aii idea is conditionally necessary when its object is neces- 
 sarily supposed as the condition of the existence of other objects, 
 as. e.g., substance, personal identity, power, purpose. Qualities be- 
 ing given, substance must be. Event being given, cause must be af- 
 firmed. Adaptation being given, purpose must be assumed. An 
 idea is unconditionally necessary when the reality of its object 
 does not necessarily suppose the existence of any other object as 
 its cause and explanation, and when the reason affirms that the 
 former object of intuition does and must exist whether any other 
 thing does or does not exist, as, e. g., Absolute Being, Infinite 
 Efficiency, Perfect Personality. 
 
 UNIVERSAL. ABSOLTUE. 
 
 Universal — That which admits of no exception at any time 
 and in any place — that which is true in all worlds and in all ages 
 — unchangable, permanent, eternal. Absolute — That which is 
 free from, independent of, not subject to, not conditioned or 
 limited by another — self-existent, self-moved, self-sufficient. 
 
 UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 — Not limited or conditioned by Quantity= Infinite: "There 
 are no bounds." 
 
 — Not limited or condition by Kind— Absolute : "There are 
 no superiors, and no equals." 
 
 — Not limited or conditioned by Degree— Perfect : " There are 
 no defects." 
 
 PRIMITIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF COGNITIONS. 
 
 2d step of Method. Reduce the complex phenomena of 
 cognition to simple and indecomposable elements and ascertain 
 their primitive characteristics. 
 
 The analysis of the complex phenomena of cognition and its 
 resolution into primary elements so that we may find the Origin 
 of our knowledge is one of the most important problems of phi- 
 
/ rv 
 
 losophy, and must be conducted according to the rules laid down 
 in Methodology (Bookii). 
 
 It is one of the most valuable and indisputable principles of 
 the critical philosophy that " the Understanding has no power of 
 intuition," that is, "the act of thought cannot create it own ob- 
 jects." Being mediate and reflective it must be based on the im- 
 mediate and directly presented facts of spontaneous conscious- 
 ness. (Maxsel: " Prolegomena, " p. 47). Our consciousness of 
 single (particular, individual, personal) objects, that is, our First 
 Notions must supply the whole content (material) of our gener- 
 alized or abstract notions, and our universal principles. (Hamil- 
 ton: "Logic," p. 385). It is, therefore, unnecessary to analyze 
 concepts, propositions, and inferences since all the elements of 
 these are contained in our First Motions. Here by analysis we 
 must find the elements of all cognition, the material of all 
 thought, and the primitive source of all knowledge. 
 
 See Cousin: "Hist, of Philos.,'* vol. i., p. 97; ii., p. 267. Porter: "Human 
 Intellect," pp. 80—81, 497—199. McCosh : " Intuitions," pp. 21, 25, 20, 31. 
 
 ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST NOTION. 
 
 (The cognition of the Impersonal Object, or Non-Ego,) 
 
 The analysis of a concrete cognition, or First Notion (say, 
 this apple) into its elements, will give : 
 
 I. Certain Qualities. It is extended ; it is hard — it offers re- 
 sistance to pressue ; it is smooth ; it has color, flavor, odor ; it is 
 somewhat resonant; and it has form, it is round. These are all 
 seperate elements of the notion which have been obtained 
 through seperate organs of sense. They are sensible Phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 II. These qualities, which may be seperated, in thought, 
 from the object, are held together by an underlying nexus or 
 bond — a substratum, or subject, in which they inhere. Hence 
 the idea of Substance. 
 
 III. The apple has also (1) temporal and spcdial rela- 
 tion. It occupies a definite place in relation to other objects. It 
 began to be, has passed through successive changes, and it will 
 cease to be. The cognition of the apple, therefore, involves the 
 relations of space and time. (2) It has numerical relations. It is 
 one, and along with others may be gathered into numerical 
 groups. (3) It has relations of resemblance to other existing ob- 
 jects, and may be classified accordingly. The apple cannot be 
 
■-J+8— 
 
 properly cognized — not even known at all, except under these 
 relations, for cognition is possible only under relations of plural- 
 ity, succession, and difference or resemblance. 
 
 IV. The apple is a product or effect. Its production was 
 conditioned on certain relations of light, heat, moisture, capillary 
 attraction, and organic chemism, and it was effected through the 
 action of a directive vital force. All the conditions need to be 
 collocated and adjusted the one to the other. Reason sees in all 
 these collocations and adjustments a causative and efficient 
 agent. This is the general relation of cause and effect. 
 
 V. The apple fulfils a purpose. It is useful. It sustains life 
 and it has certain medicinal properties. It is pleasant for food 
 and gratifies the taste. Here we have the relations of means and 
 ends — adaptation, design. 
 
 Here then we have, (i.) Qualitative and Quantitative Phe- 
 nomena apprehended by the several senses, (ii.) Ideas of Sub- 
 stance, Cause, Force, Purpose, Design apprehended by the rea- 
 son, and (iii.) Relations cognized by the judgment and spontane- 
 ously affirmed. The synthesis of all these elements constitutes 
 our Notion of the apple. 
 
 (The cognition of the Personal Ego or Self.) 
 
 I. I am conscious of certain subjective Phenomena: (1) Feel- 
 ings, pleasurable or painful, (2) Thought-processes, as reflection, 
 comparison, judgment, and inference, (3) Voluntary acts, as at- 
 tending, deliberating, choosing, refusing, and putting forth 
 energy to realize, or actualize my purposes. These are all Phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 II. I am conscious of self as the subject of these various 
 affections and states, and the doer of these various acts. This is 
 not the consciousness of the phenomena, but the consciousness of 
 self as subject and cause, and the consciousness of these acts and 
 states as mine. This one presented substance, Myself, is the most 
 fundamental, certain, and direct cognition of Being or Reality. 
 "The Reason knows itself.' 7 I am also conscious of power or 
 causative efficiency. "The soul is a power conscious of itself." 
 I am finally conscious of personal indentiiy ; I am the same 
 being under all phenomenal change. These ideas belong to the 
 category of Reality. 
 
 III. I am conscious of relations ; (1) of Time — the experi- 
 ence of successive states of consciousness in the one, enduring 
 
-49- 
 
 subject; (2) of resemblance or difference to other persons or 
 things; (3) of dependence upon, and obligation to, other moral 
 personalities. (4) Finally, I am conscious of standing in relation 
 to a moral order, and to a purpose or end to be fulfilled by my 
 existence, namely, the attainment of moral perfection. 
 
 Here again we have (i.) Phenomena apprehended by inter- 
 nal sense (ii) Realities apprehended by the reason, and (iii.) Re- 
 lations cognized by the judgment, and spontaneously affirmed. 
 
 (Cognition of the Self-existent Personal Cause.) 
 
 All men have a natural, instinctive, and necessary belief in 
 the existence of a Personal First Cause, the Creator, Sustainer, 
 and Ruler of the World. 
 
 Here is (1) the idea of Power or real efficiency adequate to 
 the production of all existence ; (2) the idea of Intelligence con- 
 ditioning power in order to the fulfilment of a foreseen and pre- 
 determined purpose; the idea of Self-existence that is, of exist- 
 ence which is underivecl, original, imbeginning; (4) the idea of 
 Supreme Being, that is, being which is not conditioned by an- 
 other — the one, sole, only God. 
 
 RESULTS OF PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 
 
 I. Elements, or principles of cognition, obtained (a) through 
 single organs of sense — the organs of vision, hearing, touch, 
 smell, taste ; the muscular sense : and the vegetative, or gangli- 
 onic system of nerves ; (b) through the original, general, innate 
 sensitivity which belongs essentially to the spirit as spirit — 
 Percepts. 
 
 II. Elements, or principles of cognition, that are added to 
 perception, by the immediate, spontaneous apperception of rea- 
 son, as the necessary antecedents of the phenomena of sense 
 without which all phenomena would be inexplicable — Ideas. 
 
 III. Elements, or principles of cognition, that are spon- 
 taneously and immediately apprehended and affirmed, and 
 which, (A) as a real bond, hold phenomena to reality in the 
 objective sphere, or (b) as an ideal bond coordinate the 
 actual and the real in the subjective sphere— Relations. 
 
■50- 
 
 PRIMITIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ELEMENTS 
 OF COGNITION. 
 
 f ("Contingent f (Necessary 
 
 i Empirical^ Individual | Rational^ Cniveksal 
 
 PFRUFPTS <! I Personal tdfasJ (Impersonal 
 
 i ^ihFib -j p SYCH olo6icali,y ideas -j logically 
 
 Antecedence Antecedent 
 
 [ Occasion [ Cause 
 
 RELATIONS. Necessary. 
 
 empirical (a posteriori), rational [a priori). 
 
 The Empirical, or a posteriori element of cognition is de- 
 rived from sensible experience. The Rational, or a priori, ele- 
 ment of knowledge (called also trancendental) is derived from 
 the pure reason, and is potential in the mind antecedent to all 
 experience, as the condition sine qua non of all consciousness 
 and thought. 
 
 CONTINGENT. NECESSARY. 
 
 The Empirical, or a posteriori element of cognition is con- 
 tingent upon the existence and healthy action of the nervous 
 organization, but when these conditions exist, sensation and 
 perception are irresistible. The Rational, or a priori element of 
 cognition is absolutely necessary (objectively and subjectively) 
 because no conditions or circumstances are conceivable or possi- 
 ble in which they would be unreal and invalid. 
 
 INDIVIDUAL. UNIVERSAL. 
 
 The Empirical element of cognition is individual, because it 
 is the percept of a single quality or act or state. The Rational 
 element is universal because it is the idea of a reality underlying 
 and determining a multiplicity of i)henomena— the substratum, 
 cause, and reason of all phenomena. 
 
 PERSONAL. IMPERSONAL. 
 
 We are conscious that the Will, in all its various activities, 
 is stamped with the impress of our personality ; our volitions are 
 our own. So our sensations are our own, our desires are our 
 own, our emotions are our own. That which we experience of 
 all such phenomena, is not experienced in the same manner by 
 any one else. But not so with the ideas of the reason. These do 
 not belong to one human being more than another; they have 
 no element of personality about them ; they are common to all 
 men, and identical in all men— they are impersonal. "Man 
 
—51— 
 
 may say ' my feelings,' 'my determination,' but trust him, he 
 will never say 'my truth.' "—Cousin. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICALLY ANTECEDENT. LOGICALLY ANTECEDENT. 
 
 Principles of cognition are of two kinds according as the 
 particular or the universal is regarded as the starting point of 
 knowledge ( — the psychological or the logical primitive). A 
 principle, or element is anterior to another in the logical, or 
 rational order in so far as it is necessarily presupposed as the 
 foundation and explanation of the other, thus, for example, 
 motion, or change cannot be cognized except as the effect of force. 
 Force or power is, therefore, the logical antecedent. 
 
 A principle, or element is anterior to another in the psycho- 
 logical or natural order in so far as it is presented to the human 
 mind first in the order of time; for example, the percept of 
 motion, or change must precede the idea of power. Motion, or 
 change is, therefore, the psychological (or chronological) antece- 
 dent. 
 
 Percepts are the psychological primitive; ideas are the logi- 
 cal primitive. 
 
 See Cousin: "Hist, of Philos.,*' vol. ii, pp. 210-218; " Elem. of Psycho.," pp. 
 472, 523^25. 
 
 OCCASION. CAUSE. 
 
 It is admitted that apart from sensation and sense-percep- 
 tion there can be no true cognition. Still it is not sensible expe- 
 rience alone which produces consciousness. Sensible experience 
 is the occasion (the condition), but the reason is the true cause 
 of that knowledge we call consciousness. 
 
 First notions are not transformed but informed sensations — 
 that is sensations illuminated and informed by rational ideas, for 
 without ideas, sensation has no form. The ideas of the Supreme 
 Reason are symbolized or embodied in nature, and it is the 
 apperception of these ideas by the reason of man (made in the 
 image of God) which enables him to translate the affections of 
 the sensibility into consciousness and thought. All light, all 
 comprehension, all coordination comes from the reason. There- 
 fore, reason is the true cause of knowledge. 
 
 Note. — Between the real cause and the occasion of any phe- 
 nomenon there is a clear distinction. The former implies a real, 
 efficient, productive power; the latter, some condition or con- 
 ditions under which the power is manifested. I cast a grain of 
 wheat into the earth. The occasio?i of its germination and 
 development into leaf, stem, ear, and grain is light, warmth, 
 moisture, etc. ; but these are by no means the cause. The cause 
 
■5%- 
 
 is the mysterious, organizing force which is immanent in the 
 seed. The rest are but conditions under which or upon which 
 the cause produces the effect. 
 
 ULTIMATE CATEGORIES 
 
 OF ALL POSSIBLE OBJECTS OF COGNITION. 
 
 I. BEING or REALITY (absolute or dependent). 
 
 (1.) Absolute Being. Being in se is underived, self-exist- 
 ent, unconditioned, changeless, eternal. 
 
 (2.) Dependent Being of Finite Existence— that which 
 has a permanent, but still derived, dependent, and conditioned 
 being. 
 
 II. PHENOMENA (Statical, Dynamical, Quantita- 
 tive, and Qualitative). 
 
 (1.) Statical phenomena are the derivatively essential at- 
 tributes of matter, which are conditions essential to the action of 
 force; as, e. g., Mass, Limit, Position, Distance, Mobility, etc. 
 
 (2.) Dynamical phenomena are mental states, vital changes, 
 and forms of mechanical ^energy consequent upon the action of 
 force or power. 
 
 (3.) Quantitative phenomena are species of Magnitudes, 
 numerical, extensive, or intensive— Magnitude of numbers, 
 Magnitude of extension, Magnitude of degree. 
 
 (4.) Qualitative phenomena are subjective affections 
 of the mind as connected with the nervous organization, and 
 belong to bodies only so far as they are supposed capable of 
 specially determining certain sensations in us ; such as warmth, 
 cold, sweet, bitter, red, violet, etc. 
 
 III. RELATIONS (Contingent and Necessary). 
 
 (1.) Contingent relations are (a) relations of resemblance 
 in form, function, quality, and degree; (b) numerical relations- 
 unity, plurality, totality ; (c) spatial relation — priority, coexist- 
 ence", succession ; (e) thought relations— relative unity in inten- 
 sion or extension. 
 
DIVISION I. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY PROPER, 
 
 PART I. 
 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (B.) DYNAMICS. 
 
 Special application of Method to the Intellect. 4th Step. 
 Designate the i^oivers of the mind indicated by the preceding 
 analysis of the phenomena of cognition. 
 
 The analysis and classification of the phenomena of cogni- 
 tion already made, reveals the following faculties or powers : 
 
 I. A general power of sensitive perception— a 
 power of seizing upon, distinguishing, and recogniz- 
 ing the phenomena presented in the sensibility (ex- 
 ternal or internal), and of referring the various sen- 
 sations and emotions to their source, that is, their 
 various objects, and thus forming percepts. 
 
 This power is designated SENSE (Internal 
 and External,.) 
 
 II. A general power of rational apperception by 
 which the mind seizes upon what lies back of or be- 
 yond the phenomena of sense — the statical condi- 
 tion ; the dynamical source, pushing phenomena 
 into the objective field; and the teleological idea 
 conditioning force for the fulfillment of a specific 
 end. 
 
 This power is called REASON, (Supernal, 
 
 Sense. 
 
 III. A general power of spontaneous apprehen- 
 sion by which the mind seizes the necessary correla- 
 tions between subject and object, phenomena and 
 reality, and combines the correlates into the unity 
 of a First Notion. 
 
 This power is called Natural or Primitive 
 JUDGMENT. 
 
 These are called Pri- 
 mary Faculties of the 
 mind, through the 
 joint or simultaneous 
 action of which the 
 First Notion is form- 
 ed. The collective or 
 total result of the ac- 
 tion of these Powers 
 is SPONTANEOUS 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
Sir- 
 
 IV. A general power of retaining, recalling and ") 
 representing to the mind what has previously been 
 presented to consciousness; that is, representing 
 First Notions. 
 
 This power is called MEMORY. 
 
 V. A general power of recombining First No- 
 tions, or parts of First Notions, under new forms, 
 either fantastic or artistic. 
 
 This power is called IMAGINATION. 
 
 VI. A general power of thought proper- — that is, ") 
 
 a power to grasp the relations of objects, and, by ab- 
 straction, comparison, generalization, ideation, in- 
 ference, and rational integration, to combine the 
 manifold of presentation and representation in the 
 higher unity of pure Reason. 
 
 This power is called the UNDERSTANDING. 
 
 These are called the 
 Secundo - Primary 
 Faculties, because 
 partly spontaneous, 
 and partly reflective. 
 The collective or total 
 result of the action of 
 these powers is REP- 
 RESENTATIVE 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 This is the second- 
 ary faculty of the 
 mind, as distinguish- 
 ed from the primary 
 faculties. The result 
 of its exercise is RE- 
 FLECTIVE CONSCI- 
 OUSNESS. 
 
 I. SPONTANEOUS CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 (i.) SENSE (External and Internal.) 
 (it.) REASON. 
 (in.) PRIMITIVE JUDGMENT. 
 
 I. SENSE. 
 
 1. Sense defined. The term Sense is used strictly to de- 
 note the power of perceiving (that is grasping, distinguishing, 
 and recognizing) the phenomena of the Sensibility, and of refer- 
 ring sensations, feelings and emotions to their occasion or source, 
 thus differentiating or localizing their objects and forming per- 
 cepts. Or again, Sense (the power), perception (the act) is that 
 general power of the mind by which we distinguish and rcog- 
 nize the affections of the subjective self, and refer these affec- 
 tions to their occasion or source — (a) extra-organic and intra- 
 organic objects (objective objects) ; (b) purely internal objects, as 
 the primitive original feeling of self, the sense of effort or 
 energy, and the emotions excited by notions, concepts and ideas 
 (subjective objects). 
 
 Sense is employed ambiguously to denote sensibility, the 
 faculty of sensitive "perception, and even the material organ of 
 sensitive perception. But in philosophy it is employed strictly 
 and exclusively to denote the faculty of sensitive perception, that 
 is, of perceiving phenomena, external and internal. 
 
—55 
 
 " The phrase, ' we know by the senses,' is ambiguous. If by 
 the senses be meant the bodily organs. . .1 affirm we know noth- 
 ing by these bodily parts. But if by the senses be meant the 
 mind exercised in sense-perception, summoned to activity by the 
 organism and cognizing the external world, then in that "sense 
 we know by the senses " — McCosh : " Intuitions," p. 132. 
 
 "Perception is the act by which the mind refers sensations 
 to their source." — Murphy : "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii, 
 p. 59. 
 
 " The mental recognition of the object to which the change 
 [in the sensibility] is due, is dependent on a higher process to 
 which the name perception is now accorded." — Carpenter: 
 "Mental Physiology," p. 177. 
 
 " The mind, in perception, goes out upon something which 
 has been [the occasion of sensation or feeling] and which, there- 
 fore, whether it belong to the outer world or the subjective self, 
 opposes itself to the act of perception as something objective. 11 — 
 Ueberweg : " Logic," p. 78. 
 
 "Perception is the power of the soul to localize its sensa- 
 tion."— Lotze. 
 
 2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSE AND SENSIBILITY. 
 
 Sensibility is that general capacity of the soul by which it is 
 susceptible of feeling — that is, of being affected by impressions 
 upon or changes in the physical organism, of being excited by 
 innate or instinctive desires or appetencies, and of being inspired 
 and stirred by conceptions, thoughts, and ideas. 
 
 Sense is that general power or activity of the intellect by 
 which it is able to perceive, distinguish and recognize the phe- 
 nomena of the sensibility, and refer sensations, feelings and 
 emotions to their occasion or source. 
 
 3. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 Sensation is the unconscious translation (by the soul) of 
 vibratory motion into feeling ; perception is the more or less 
 conscious translation of subjective feeling into objective cogni- 
 tion. 
 
 Sensation proper is a special kind of feeling ; perception 
 proper is a special kind of knowledge. 
 
 Sensation proper is subjective ; perception proper is objective. 
 
 Sensation proper is a state; perception proper is an act. 
 
 Sensation proper and perception proper are in the inverse 
 ratio of each other. 
 
 See Hamii/ton: -'Metaphysics," pp. 335-340; "Philosophy," pp. 430, 43C. 
 Martixeau : " Essays," 1st series, pp. 87-89 ; 2d series, pp. 264-268, Ueber- 
 weg: "Logic," p. 77. Porter: "Human Intellect," ch. viii; "On the 
 ativity of the Soul in sense-perception," p. 210, et seq. Feuchtersi-e- 
 bes: " Medical Psychology," p. 107. 
 
— 56— 
 
 4. DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUTER SENSE AND INNER SENSE. 
 
 Outer or external sense is the faculty preservative or intuitive 
 of the phenomena of the non-ego or matter ; the faculty by 
 which we perceive certain affections of the animated or " be- 
 souled" sensorium, and certain extra-organic objects which are 
 in immediate correlation with the organism. 
 
 Inner or internal sense is the faculty presentative or intuitive 
 of the phenomena of the metaphysical ego or Spirit; the faculty 
 by which we perceive certain affections, passions, or emotions 
 whereof the soul as a sentient or feeling subject is capable, and 
 which have no prototype in organic impressions. 
 
 "External perception, [Outer Sense] or perception simply, is 
 the faculty presentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the 
 non-ego, or matter. .. .Internal perception. .. [Inner Sense] is 
 the faculty j>resentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the 
 ego or mind." — Hamilton : " Philosophy, p. 247. 
 
 " Outer perception has to do with the outer world ; inner or 
 psychological perception, with mental or psychic life." — Ueber- 
 aveg: " Logic," p. 77. 
 
 "We admit at once that, were the question whether we 
 
 should distinguish under consciousness two special faculties 
 
 and bestow T distinctive appelatives on consciousness considered 
 as a special faculty cognizant of the external world, and on con- 
 sciousness as more particularly cognizant of the internal, this 
 would be highly proper and expedient." — Hamilton: "Meta- 
 physics," pp. 15P, 400 
 
 " External intuition by which we become cognizant of the 
 phenomena connected with our material organism ; internal in- 
 tuition by which w r e become cognizant of the several successive 
 states and acts of our own minds." — Mansel : " Ency. Brit.," 
 xiv, p. 562. 
 
 See Greex: "Spiritual Philosophy," vol. i, p. 19. Feuchteesleben 
 " Med. Psycho.," p. 84. Stoke: " Lehrbuch der Philos.," vol. i, pp. 46, 50. 
 
 (A) OUTER SENSE of EXTERNAL SENSE. 
 
 (i) Essential Nature or External Perception. In 
 the first place it must be distinctly noted that Sensation and Per- 
 ception are both psychical and not physical phenomena. Sensation 
 is a change in the state of the sensibility, and sensivity or feel- 
 ing is an affection of the mind and not of the bodily organs — " a 
 subjective experience of the soul, more or less pleasurable or 
 painful." — Porter: "Human Intellect," p. 128. 
 
 See also McCosh: "Defence of Fundamental Truth," p. 80. Carpenter: 
 " Mental Physiology," p. 148. Unser and Prochaska: "On the Nervous 
 System," p. 33. Mill: "Logic," b. iii, I 4. Mivart: " Lessons ^from 
 Nature," p. 67. Prof. Maxwell: "Nature," vol. iv, p. 13. 
 
Secondly, it must be borne in mind that though, in the adult 
 mind, sensation and perception are general co-existent, and co-ex- 
 istent in the inverse ratio of each other, yet they are not necessarily 
 co-existent. " We are inclined to think that what are called the 
 \ ignoble senses' are wholly impercipient, and would never, by 
 the mere succession of feelings, waken into consciousness the dis- 
 tinction between subject and objects or reveal their own organic 
 
 seat Without pretending to pronouce upon the psychology of 
 
 the mollusca, we may reasonably doubt whether an animal of 
 that class can affirm, ' I feel a good taste,' or ' this taste is from my 
 food ;' and, if so, sensations may exist without involving any 
 
 cognition, even of themselves To have a sensation is a state 
 
 far short of knowing that one has them." — Martineau: "Es- 
 says," 2nd series, pp.264, 265. (Spencer: "Psychology," vol. 
 ii, pp. 98, 99, 373, 374.) "It is very probable that a newly-born 
 infant feels pain without knowing that it feels as an individual, 
 and desires without knowing that it desires — probable as a matter 
 of fact, and probable because the cognition of the self or me im- 
 plies the cognition of the not-me, or the external world, — an 
 amount of knowledge which if conceeded to the newly-born in- 
 fant (a great assumption) cannot be conceded to the members of 
 the lowest classes of the animal kingdom, the hydras and oys- 
 ters, which may possibly feel pain and enjoyment, but have no 
 knowledge of self and not-self." -Dr. Laycock: "Mind and 
 Brain," vol. i, p. 142. "Nothing is more certain than that we 
 may have sensations which are not perceived at all. — Lewes : 
 "Physio, of Common Life." vol. ii, p. 59. (Murphy: "Habit 
 and Intell.," vol. ii, p. 13. Carpenter: "Hum. Physio.," 
 7th ed., p. 554.) 
 
 Thirdly, Sensation is purely subjective, and, therefore, as such 
 has no object. " Objectivity does not belong to sensation at all." 
 Sensation is an affection of the mind occasioned and conditionedbj' 
 impressions made upon, or molecular changes in the nervous 
 organism. In order that sensation may become perception there 
 needs the spontaneous energy of attention which distinguishes 
 and recognizes the state of the sensibility, and "streaming out 
 through the instruments of sense," refers that state to an 
 external excitant or source — that is, to some intra-organic affec- 
 tion or change, or to some extra-organic object in immediate cor- 
 relation with the organism, an object which is extended, solid, 
 etc., like the organism. It is only then that "the term object ac- 
 quires its first title to appear."— (Martineau: "Essays," 2d 
 
-E8— 
 
 Series, pp. 267-268.) External perception, or sensitive perception 
 is, therefore, an act of the intellect, an act of spontaneous ana- 
 lytic attention, and a translation, by the soul, of sensation into 
 objective cognition. External perception is complex in its 
 nature ; in this single act the soul discerns two factors — its own 
 affection or state, and an external material object. 
 
 Fourthly, the simplest form in which external, outer percep- 
 tion is experienced is in connection with a single organ of sense. 
 The state of clear and distinct cognition we call consciousness, by 
 which we attain to First Notions, is made up of too many ele- 
 ments, empirical, rational and relational, to allow us to deter- 
 mine the precise character of the phenomenal element in sense- 
 perception. It is only when we direct attention to a single act of 
 perception as seeing or hearing, and the simplest percepts, as a 
 single color or sound, that we are in a position to determine the 
 essential nature of external perception. 
 
 Finally, it must be distinctly noted that the mere percepts of 
 sense do not by themselves constitute the complete and distinct 
 consciousness of an object. "Knowledge [clear and distinct 
 knowledge] is the apprehension of being and its relations." — 
 Porter: "Hum. Intellect," p. 498. The higher orders of ani- 
 mals, and the infant, may have perception and yet not distinct 
 and complete consciousness. We know an object only when we 
 cognize it under the relations of time and space, of resemblance 
 and difference, of inherence, causality, reciprocality, and inten- 
 tionality. The First Notion is composed of sensational, rational 
 and relational elements, or principles, which analysis will re- 
 veal and which were originally united in the consciousness by a 
 primitive synergia. 
 
 (n) Conditions and Media or External Perception. 
 The most fundamental condition of external perception is the 
 mysterious co-existence and blending of Matter and Spirit in 
 one individual — "the Ego of the mental physiologist," which, 
 if it be not absolutely indispensible to the final purpose of crea- 
 tion, yet subserves the most important ends, and seems to indi- 
 cate that it is the general, if not the universal law of all finite 
 beings in all worlds — the condition and means by which the 
 energies of the soul are developed in time and space. 
 
 1. We must assume that body is the necessary means of 
 bringing mind, or spirit, into relation with extension, and so of 
 giving it place. 
 
tf— 
 
 Strictly speaking, an un embodied spirit, or pure mind has no 
 relation to place. Whereness— ubiety, is a pure relation, the re- 
 lation of body to body. Cancel body, annihilate matter and 
 there is no here or there. " Place is a relation of extension, and 
 extension is a property of matter, but that which is wholly ab- 
 stracted from matter, and in speaking of which we deny that it 
 has any properties in common therewith, can in itself be subject 
 to none of its conditions ; and we might as well say of a pure 
 spirit that is is hard, heavy or red, or that it is a cubic foot in 
 dimensions, as say that it is here or there. 11 But when spirit 
 comes into mysterious relation with matter "by means of a cor- 
 poreal lodgement, it brings itself into alliance with the various 
 properties of the external world, and takes a share in its con- 
 ditions. Thenceforth mind occupies one place at one time." — 
 Taylor : " Physical Theory of Another Life," pp. 23, 24. 
 
 Extension cannot be predicated of mind without also being 
 predicated of thought, and to ascribe it to either would lead to the 
 wildest absurdities, as has been noted and perhaps caricatured by 
 Dr. Thomas Brown. If mind is, like matter, extended and 
 divisible " then it will be no more absurd to talk of the twen- 
 tieth part of an affirmation, or the quarter of a hope, or the top 
 of a remembrance, or the north-east corner of a comparison, than 
 of the twentieth of a pound, or the different points of the com- 
 pass, in reference to any part of the globe . . .We are as incapa- 
 ble of forming any conception of what is meant by the quarter 
 of a doubt, or the half of a belief, as of forming an image of a circle 
 without a centre, or of a square without a single angle." 
 —(Brown : " Lectures on the Philos. of the Human Mind," vol. 
 ii, p. 470. Cudworth : " Intell. System of the Universe," vol. 
 hi, p. 392.) 
 
 "The statement that the soul is 'nowhere' will excite the 
 ridicule of the unreflecting. We cannot scruple to make that 
 affirmation, whatever the award of thoughtless derision. That 
 which exists in space needs not have its whereabouts in space." — 
 R. W. Hamilton : " Revealed Doct. of Future Rewards and 
 Punish's," p. 21. 
 
 "The maxim is 'an object may exist and yet be nowhere 1 
 and I assert that this not only possible, but that the greater part 
 of beings do and must exist after this manner. Thought and 
 extension are wholly incompatible, and can never incorporate in 
 the same subject.— David Hume. 
 
 " Our mental experiences, our feelings, and our thoughts 
 have no extension in space, no place, no form, no outline, no 
 mechanical division of parts, and we are incapable of attending 
 to anything mental until we shut out all this."— Bain : " Mind 
 and Body," p. 135. 
 
—60- 
 
 "Matter possesses extension, or occupies space, whilst mind 
 has no Such property."— Dr. Carpenter: " Human Physio.," p. 
 541. 
 
 " The soul as a spirit related to the body has no seat, for a 
 spirit has no relations to space." — Feuchtersleben: "Med. 
 Psycho.," p. 108. 
 
 " If we regard mind as a magnitude, it must be an intensive 
 magnitude which admits of no measurement." — Lewes : " Prob. 
 of Life and mind," vol. ii., p. 384. 
 
 "Power is not capable of situation and is not confined to 
 what we call place, and for this very reason, also, it cannot be 
 placed under geometrical dimensions, nor does it come under any 
 kind of figure whatever, as any one knows. — Bayma: "Mole- 
 cular Mechanics," p. 17. 
 
 " Material existences must exist in space, no doubt, but intel- 
 lectual existences may be neither in space nor out of space ; they 
 
 may have no relations to space at all For all that I can see, 
 
 then, there may be intellectual existences to which both space 
 and time are nullities."— Jevons: " Principles of Science," vol. 
 ii, p. 469. 
 
 ' ' Extension in space, in the proper sense of the expression, 
 belongs only to sensible phenomena, while in the sphere of abso- 
 lute reality juxtaposition of objects is impossible." — Beneke : 
 
 Ueberweg: " History of Philosophy," vol. ii, p. 287. 
 
 2. Corporeity is essential, to bring finite spirit into proten- 
 sive relations ; that is, into relations of time. 
 
 " It is motion or change that measures duration, and time is 
 duration measured into equal parts by the equable motion of 
 bodies in spaee. But as motion belongs to matter, of which it is 
 a condition, and is that in which duration and extension com- 
 bine to form a common product, so mind must become related to 
 extension in order to have a knowledge of matter, or to its being 
 able to avail itself of the measure of duration ; or, in other words, 
 it is only in connection with matter that it can know anything 
 of time.' 11 — Taylor : " Physical Theory," p. 28. " Pure spirit is 
 timeless as well as spaceless ; and we cannot be conscious of 
 'pure time,' that is, of time simply and in itself. In fact, we 
 have no knowledge of pure time as an entity, notwithstanding 
 the constant references to it. Time is a relation, the relation of 
 successive changes in the state.of our experience or in the forms 
 of existence, and changes in the states of our experience must be 
 ultimately dependent on changes in the forms of existence. 
 Knowledge of time, therefore, is nothing else than the conscious- 
 ness of these changes." — C alder wood : " Philos. of the Infin- 
 ite," pp. 300, 305. 
 
— 61 
 
 3. Corporeity is essential to the manifestation of force. 
 
 Mind, embodied, by the simple act of volition, originates 
 motion ; that is, the original, spontaneous power of the soul, 
 through the instrumentality of the motor nerves, and of muscu- 
 lar contractility, as applied to the body itself or to other bodies, 
 puts it or them in motion. This power of the mind to overcome 
 the inertia of matter and the force of gravitation, is the only 
 active influence, in relation to the material world, which we have 
 any certain knowledge of possessing. Indeed, we have no 
 knowledge of force except as the result of immediate volition. 
 
 4. Corporeity is essential to the differentiation of sensations. 
 The corporeal alliance of mind and organized matter is the 
 
 means of bringing the mind into relation with the various modes 
 of motion in the external world, in such a manner that the char- 
 acter of the sensation depends not so much on the properties of 
 the extra-organic object, as on those of the organs which receive 
 the external impression. The mind has, of course, an innate 
 capacity of sensation ( Ursinn — primitive, original sensibility) ; 
 if it were not so, material impressions upon the animal organ- 
 ism could not educe feeling. Nevertheless, it is probable that 
 sjDecial sensation is conditioned or determined by the corporeal 
 organism. The senses may be regarded as limiting the mind to 
 the kinds of sensation known to actual experience. 
 Taylor : " Physical Theory," pp. 32 and 65. 
 
 11 Bodily affections are necessary for the soul, in order that it- 
 may convert them into sensation."— Lotze. 
 
 Ueberweg: "Hist, of Philosophy,"' vol. ii, p. 317. 
 
 " Between the mind of man and the outer world are inter- 
 posed the nerves of the human body, which enable the mind to 
 translate the impressions of that world into facts of conscious- 
 ness." — Tyndall : "Frag, of Science," p. 167. 
 
 5. Corporeity is the essential condition of representative 
 imagery. 
 
 "The brain," says Feuchtersleben, "is the focus of repre- 
 sentative images, and as such, doubtless essential to the mani- 
 festation of physical life." ("Medical Psychol.," p. 105.) The 
 power of representation proper — that is, of imaging objects — is 
 confessedly dependent on organic conditions. When an organ 
 of sense, and the corresponding parts of the brain, disappear, the 
 definite power of representation disappears. There are instances 
 of persons who, having become deaf and blind, no longer remem- 
 ber objects of hearing and sight, and no longer dream of them." 
 
 Hamilton: "Metaphysics," p. 461. Feuchteesiebex : "Medical Psychol- 
 ogy," p. 120. 
 
-62- 
 
 Notc. — Beyond this we have no organic point of attack. The 
 mind advances in the processes of thought (through the discrim- 
 ination, analysis, and recombination of the characteristics and 
 relations of these images), to the formation of concepts, judg- 
 ments, and inferences, in which processes nothing material is 
 concerned. Consequently, the higher powers of the mind must 
 be excluded from k ' Mental Physiology." 
 
 The mind is related to the body in some such manner 
 as foree is related to matter. Force is not an inherent or essential 
 attribute of matter. On the contrary, matter is essentially passive 
 and inert, and does absolutely nothing but supply the statical 
 conditions for the manifestation of physical phenomena. All we 
 can say of it, is "that it is the recipient of impulse and of 
 energy." Force is that which acts upon matter, and produces 
 change or motion. The relation between force and matter is not 
 a relation of identity or analogy. Neither is it a relation of co- 
 extension, because force cannot be placed under geometrical 
 dimensions; nor does it come under any kind of figure. It is 
 simply conceived as a relation of causality. And so the relation 
 between physical phenomena (that is, matter acted upon and 
 moved by force,) and mind, is a relation of teleology — that is, 
 force directed to the fulfilment of a specific end. The nexus of 
 that relation is vitality, or the principle of life, a force which 
 works towards ends. 
 
 " The universe presents us with an assemblage of phenom- 
 ena, physical, vital, and intellectual. The connecting link be- 
 tween the worlds of intellect and matter being that of organizing 
 vitality." — Herschee: " Familiar Lect. on Science," p. 473. 
 
 " The principle of life is the power or element, the agency of 
 which brings mind into conscious connection with matter." — 
 Taylor: " Physical Theory," p. 163. 
 
 " It is in relation with the delicate living matter seated near 
 the surface of the gray matter of the convolutions of the brain, 
 that I conceive vital power attains its most exalted form. It is 
 here that the Ego comes into communion with the Non-Ego." — 
 Beale : "Protoplasm," p. 319, 3d Ed. 
 
 The first condition of sense-perception, therefore, is the exist- 
 ence of a material nervous organism, vitalized, and in a healthy, 
 normal condition. 
 
 The nervous organism may be described briefly as follows : 
 
 I. The Sympathetic System (Ganglionic or Vegetative 
 System) consists of a double chain of nervous ganglia running 
 from the anterior to the posterior extremity of the body, along 
 the front and sides of the spinal column, and connected with each 
 other by slender longitudinal filaments. 
 
— 63— 
 
 enforced by a motor and sensory filament derived from the cerebro- 
 spinal system, and thus the organs under its influence are brought 
 indirectly into communication with external objects and phe- 
 nomena. The nerves of the great sympathetic are distributed to 
 organs over which the will has no immediate control, as the 
 heart, stomach, liver, intestines, kidneys, etc. 
 
 See. Dalton: "Human Physiology," pp. 514-524. Carpenter: "Human 
 Physiology," pp. 73 5-737, 7th Ed. 
 
 II. Cerebro-Spinal System, consisting (i) of the Cranio- 
 spinal Axis which embraces the Spinal Cord and the Ssnsory 
 Ganglia, altogether constituting the centre of automatic action : 
 (n) the Cerebral Hemispheres or Hemispheric ganglia, em- 
 bracing the Cerebellum and Csrebrum. 
 
 (i) The peripheral filaments of the nerves collect into twigs, 
 the twigs into branches, the branches into boughs, and these into 
 one main stem — the Spinal Cord. This rises in the vertebral 
 column to the foramen magnum where, for some space, it is called 
 the medulla oblongata, which divides above into four columns 
 which from before backwards are named (1) the Anterior Pyra- 
 mids, (2) Lateral Tract and Olivary Body, (3) the Restiform 
 Bodies, and (-4) the Posterior Pyramids. The Restiform Bodies 
 terminate in the hemispheres of the Cerebellum ; the remainder 
 terminate in the Corpora Quadrigemina, Corpora Striata, and 
 Thalami Optici. 
 
 (ii) Under the Sensory Ganglia may be comprehended 
 that assemblage of ganglionic masses lying along the base of the 
 skull in man, and partly included in the Medulla Oblongata, in 
 which the nerves of the " special senses" — Taste, Hearing, Sight, 
 and Smell have their terminations. With these may be as- 
 sociated the two pairs of ganglionic bodies known as the Corpora 
 Striata and Thalimi Optici, into which may be traced the greater 
 portion of the fibers which constitute the various strands of the 
 Medulla Oblongata, and which seem to stand in the same kind 
 of relation to the nerves of Touch that the Optic, Olfactory, 
 Auditory and Gustatory ganglia bear to their several nerve 
 trunks. 
 
 (in) The Cerebellum, or little brain, is situated beneath 
 the posterior lobes of the Cerebrum. The surface is not convo- 
 luted like the cerebrum, but traversed by numerous curved fur- 
 rows, "sulci," which penetrate deep into its substance. It 
 contains, in proportion to its size, a much larger quantity of grey 
 
-0%- 
 
 matter than the cerebrum. It has no direct connection with the 
 cerebrum, and its relations are altogether with the cerebrospinal 
 axis. It is the special organ of the Muscular sense, and its special 
 function is that of coordinating the different voluntary move- 
 ments. 
 
 (iv) The Cerebrum. The two hemipheres of the cerebral 
 ganglia constitute, in the human subject, about nine-tenths of* 
 the whole mass of the brain. Thoughout their whole extent 
 they are entirely destitute of sensibility and excitability. Both 
 the white and grey matter ma}- be burned, wounded, lacerated, 
 crushed, without any convulsive movements or any apparent 
 sensation. Xo sensory nerves terminate directly in the cere- 
 brum, nor do any motor nerves issue from it. "We shall find 
 strong anatomical and physiological grounds for believing that it 
 [the cerebrum] has no direct communication with the external 
 world.' 11 — (Cabpenteb: "Hum. Physiology," p. 438.) "It is 
 the focus of representative images/' — (Feuchterslebex : " Med. 
 Psycho.," p. 105). 
 
 .Regarding the pure, indivisible, incorporeal spirit as the 
 proper Ego, and the body as really a part of the material 
 world, the Non-Ego, and, as such, an object of })erception to the 
 Ego or Mind, we may regard the organs of sense-perception as : 
 
 I. The Sympathetic or Ganglionic system of nerves by 
 which we become aware of the states of the body in the sphere of 
 vegetative life, as, e. g., corporeal heaviness or buoyancy, atony 
 or toneity, hunger, thirst, etc. 
 
 II. The Muscular system of nerves (or nerves connected 
 
 with the muscular system) by which we become aware of the 
 
 varying condition of the muscles in action and repose, contrac. 
 
 tion or relaxation, impeded or unimpeded. 
 
 Note. — Dr. Beale has shown that every delicate muscular 
 fiber is crossed by delicate nerve-fibers (both voluntary and in- 
 voluntary) ; these nerve-fibers " lie upon the external surface of 
 the sarcolenima," and "have no terminal ends." (" Croonian 
 Lect.," 1835). " The sensations appertaining to the muscular 
 sense are transmitted upwards to the Restiform Bodies ; these 
 connect with the cerebellum. It is, therefore, the seat of the 
 muscular sense, which has an important share in the guidance 
 of muscular movements." — (Carpenter: "Hum. Physio." p. 
 517.) 
 
 III. The organs of Special Sexse. 
 
 (1) Touch. Xerves diffused throughout the skin — spinal 
 cord— Optic Thalami. 
 
-65— 
 
 (2) Sight. The eyes— optic nerves— Tubercula Guadri- 
 
 GEMINA. 
 
 (3) Hearing. The ears — auditory nerves— Auditory Gan- 
 glia (lying in the substance of the medulla oblongata). 
 
 (4) Smell. Membraneous walls of nostrils — olfactory nerves 
 —Olfactory Ganglia. 
 
 (5) Taste. Surface of tongue and soft palate — gustatory 
 nerves— Gustatory Ganglia (lying in the substance of the 
 medulla oblongata). 
 
 The second condition of sense-perception is a plurality and 
 diversity of external phenomena, either as molecular changes in 
 the physical organism, or as objects external to, but in immediate 
 correlation with, the organism. 
 
 " Independent of the necessary contrast of subject and ob- 
 ject, a plurality, alteration, and contrast of phenomena is needed." 
 — Hamilton: "Philosophy," p. 414. 
 
 " All consciousness is primarily the consciousness of differ- 
 ence. That is to say, if the mind were to be always experiencing 
 the same sensation, it would never be conscious at all." — Mur- 
 phy: "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii, p. 137. 
 
 The third condition of sense-perception is a repetition of 
 similar affections, of definite intensity, and some rudimental 
 memory, or more properly "conservation of the past," which is 
 the condition of memory. 
 
 The fourth condition of sense-perception is a certain concen- 
 tration of the mind on the phenomenon — an act of attention. 
 
 " Sensations are not perceptions. That they may become so, 
 something must be added, namely, an action of the mind which 
 manifests itself as a spontaneous power, as attention. 11 — Porter: 
 " H u man I ntellect , " p . 2 1 . 
 
 Carpenter: " Mental Physiology," p. 182. 
 
 (in.) Classes of External Percepts. The external 
 sense-percepts may be divided into three classes — the Organic, 
 the Muscular, and the Special sense-percepts. This division is 
 determined, in part, by the character of the sensations them- 
 selves, and in part by their physiological conditions. 
 
 1. The Organic sense-percepts are those which have their 
 real objects in the sphere of vegetative life, that is, in the nutrita- 
 tive and reproductive organs and functions, which, inasmuch as 
 they are found in plants as well as animals, are called " vegeta- 
 tive." The states of the vital organs are revealed to us through 
 the Sympathetic or Vegetative System of nerves, sometimes 
 5 
 
— 66— 
 
 called " the Nervous System of Organic Life." The whole class 
 
 of feelings belonging to this system are included under the title of 
 
 CcENiESTJElKSlS or Common Feeling, and the percepts may be 
 
 designated Common Percepts. They are (a) General ; as oof? 
 
 poreal buoyancy, toniety and atony, melancholy, cheerfulness, 
 
 irritability, etc. ; (b) Special ; as hunger, thirst, nausea, anxiety 
 
 from impeded respiration and functional derangement of the 
 
 heart, etc. 
 
 See Lewis: "Physio, of Common Life," vol. ii, p. 2]7. Feuthtersleben: 
 " Med. Psychology," pp. 91-93. 
 
 2. The Muscular sense-percepts are those which have their 
 real objects in the sphere of the muscular system. The state of 
 the muscles is revealed to us through the system of nerves asso- 
 ciated therewith, which .have their termination in the Cere- 
 bellum, and, perhaps, also in the Corpora Striata. The whole 
 class of feelings which are associated with this system of nerves 
 is included under the title of Muscular Sensations, and these 
 sensations, as objects of perception, are called Muscular sense- 
 percepts. They are muscular motion and repose, tension and re- 
 laxation, fatigue, convulsion, and cramp. 
 
 Locomotive Energy {sense of Effort), in varying degrees of 
 intensity, associated with Muscular Sense, gives a variety of Per- 
 cepts. "When I exert an enorganic volition to move [any part 
 of the body] and am aware that the muscles are obedient to the 
 will, but at the same time aware that the limb is arrested in its 
 motion by some external impediment, and that the resistance is 
 of varying degrees of intensity, 11 I obtain percepts of the 
 Secundo-primary (Statico-dynamical) qualities of matter, or 
 those qualities which result from the action of force upon mat- 
 ter, and are contained under the category of resistance, or pres- 
 sure. They are Heavy and Light, Hard and Soft, Solid and 
 Fluid, Viscid and Friable, Tough and Brittle, Rigid and Flexible, 
 Ductile and Inductile, Rough and Smooth, Slippery and Tena- 
 cious, Elastic and Inelastic, Compressible and Incompressible, 
 Resilient and Irresilient, Movable and Immovable. 
 
 See Hamilton: "Philos.," pp. 358-360, 391-410 (note *1 running over these 
 pagesj 421-431. Dr. Carpenter : "Hum. Physio.," p. 655; "Nature," vol. 
 vi, p. 309. Mansel : " Metaph.," Ency. Brit., vol. xiv, p. 568. 
 
 3. Special-sense percepts are those which have their real 
 objects external to the organism, but in correlation with organs 
 specially constituted for the function of sense-perception. These 
 organs are commonly called " the five senses"- (sense-organs) — 
 
67— 
 
 Smell, Taste, Hearing, Touch, and Sight. The objects of the 
 special senses (except in the case of superficial extension) are 
 "certain occult powers" which external objects are supposed to 
 possess, by which they are capable of specifically determining 
 the various parts of the nervous apparatus, to the peculiar actions 
 or motions of which they are susceptible. They are, in reality, 
 "forms of Energy" — modes of invisible molecular motion, and 
 constitute the Secondary (Dynamical) properties of bodies. The 
 subjective sensations — Color, Sound, Flavor, Savor, and Tactile 
 sensations (as heat, electric and galvanic affections, etc.) — are 
 mental translations or interpretations of external phenomena, 
 which have no resemblance, whatever, to the external occasion or 
 cause, and in referring these sensations to external objects, the 
 mind infers that the objects possess certain specific powers capa- 
 ble of exciting a certain correlated manifestation in us. "The 
 Secondary qualities of bodies are inferred powers," and known 
 " only mediately in their effects on us." — Hamilton : " Philos.," 
 pp. 378-9. 
 
 (1) Percepts of Smell. Odors of almost endless variety, 
 which are indefinite in their position and limits, but the occa- 
 sions or causes of which are supposed to be external. We class- 
 ify them in view of the subjective sensations, as refreshing, sick- 
 ening, aromatic, etc. We name them usually from the objects 
 which are supposed to excite them, as the odor of the rose, 
 violet, peach, apple, etc. 
 
 (2) Percepts of Taste. Savors of various kinds, and count- 
 less in number. They are classified subjectively as bitter, sweet, 
 pungent, acrid, sharp, etc. ; objectively, by their inferred occa- 
 sions or causes, as the taste of salt, aloes, the onion, the apple, 
 etc. 
 
 (3) Percepts of Hearing. Of these there are a great variety, 
 but they are readily distinguished by quality, intensity, and 
 quantity. 
 
 (4) Percepts of Touch. Superficial extension, temperature, 
 electric and galvanic affections, titilation, horripilation, shud- 
 dering. 
 
 (5) Percepts of Vision. Illuminated superficial extension, 
 color, outline, direction, relative position. 
 
 Note. — It is generally conceded, alike by Physiologists and 
 Psychologists, that the special senses, alone, convey to us no 
 direct knowledge of the extra-organic world. "Even touch 
 
— 68— 
 
 [apart from the consciousness of our locomotive energy being re- 
 sisted] gives no other perception than that of the existence of 
 our own organism as extended." — Maxsel : "Metaphysics," 
 Ency. Brit., xiv, p. 565. " If we lay our hand upon a table 
 (gently), we become conscious, on a little reflection, that we do 
 not feel the table, but merely that part of our skin which the 
 table touches." — Muller: "Physiology," p. 1081. "It is pri- 
 marily in the consciousness of our locomotive energy being re- 
 sisted" and not being resisted by aught in our organism itself, 
 and secondarily, through the sensations of muscular feeling, that 
 the perception of Externalitv is realized."— Hamilton: "Phi- 
 losophy," pp. 431, 424, 894. 
 
 (Bj INNER, OR INTERNAL SENSE. 
 
 Inner, or internal sense is the faculty presentative, or intui- 
 tive of the phenomena which belong exclusively and preemi- 
 nently to the inner psychical life ; the faculty by which we per- 
 ceive, discriminate, and recognize certain original feelings and 
 primitive desires, which are native to the human soul, and cer- 
 tain purely psychical emotions which are awakened and deter- 
 mined within us by conceptions, ideas, and thoughts. 
 
 " The internal intuitions [perceptions] as a class, may be de- 
 scribed as comprehending all those affections of the mind, which 
 are neither directly caused by conditions of the organism, nor 
 representative of any objects distinct from themselves. The first 
 criterion will distinguish them from sensitive affections [exter- 
 nal sense-percepts], the second from intellectual powers, properly 
 so called."— Mansel: Art. "Metaphysics," Ency. Brit., vol. 
 xiv, p. 568. 
 
 " The emotions, to use the felicitous words of Herbert Spen- 
 cer, are ' generated independently in consciousness, and have no 
 prototvpe in bodily sensations."'" — Murphy: "Habit and In- 
 tell.," vol. ii, p. 43. 
 
 Essential Nature of Internal Perception. In order 
 clearly to understand the nature of Internal Perception, we must 
 distinguish three moments, (1) The percipient Subject, the per- 
 son, one and identical ; (2) The states of the sensibility which 
 have no occasions or prototypes in bodily affections (—primitive 
 feelings, original desires, and purely psychical emotions) ; (3) 
 The act of inner perception itself, which is an act of the intellect, 
 and not a state of the sensibility. If we call the totality of the 
 purely subjective states of the sensibility, which have no ante- 
 cedents in bodily affections, A ; and the act of inner perception 
 itself, B ; then B is not identical with A. But the essence to 
 which both belong, O, is one and the same essence which per- 
 ceives, and whose states of feeling are the object of j^erceptlon. 
 Internal perception, then, is the discrimination and recognition 
 by the soul of those of its own inner states or feelings which are 
 
■69- 
 
 not occasioned by, and have no prototypes in, bodily affections, as 
 e. g., the feeling of self-hood, the sense of effort, the impulse of 
 self-preservation, the desire to know, etc. These are " subjective 
 affections of the soul as pure spirit." 
 
 Original innate feeling must be distinguished from common 
 feeling (ecensesthesis). The latter is associated with the func- 
 tioning of a distinct system of nerves, the Sympathetic system. 
 But original innate feeling, which is essential to the other par- 
 ticular sensations, n\ny exist independently of a nervous system. 
 See Feuchterseeben : '-Med. Psycho.," p. 84. Carpenter: "Comparative 
 Physiology," p. 639. Coeeridge: " Works," vol. i. p. 166. 
 
 Original Impulses (innate desires and tendencies) are the 
 " nature bases" of psychical life, and belong essentially to spirit 
 as spirit. They are the living excitants of the progressive de- 
 velopment of man, in which progress, self-development from 
 within, and appropriation from without, mutually condition each 
 other. "The spirit, as created, becomes excited to self-develop- 
 ment by innate impulses." — Mullee. 
 
 Neither innate feeling, nor original impulse constitute cog- 
 nition. Mere self- feeling must be conceded to brutes ; but self- 
 feeling cannot rise above animal life until it is illuminated and 
 informed by reason. The same is true, of instinctive tendency, 
 which, apart from reason, is only blind appetency. Innate feel- 
 ings and instinctive desires become objects to the intellect (per- 
 cepts) only through attention and self-discrimination. 
 
 The Emotions or sentiments are a higher class of feelings, 
 which have no prototypes and no analogues in bodily affections. 
 They are purely psychical feelings (pleasurable or painful) which 
 accompany or are consequent upon cognition, but they do not 
 constitute cognition. Like all other feelings they become objects 
 of perception (percepts) only through attention, discrimination, 
 and specification. 
 
 Classes of Internal Percepts. The internal percepts 
 may be divided into two classes : (I.) Those which have for their 
 objects certain states of the sensibility which precede all cog- 
 nition ; and (n.) those which have for their objects certain states 
 of the sensibility consequent upon cognition, as the feeling of 
 beauty and sublimity, and the moral and religious emotions. 
 
 I. Percepts which have for their objects certain states of the 
 sensibility antecedent to cognition. 
 
 1. Self-hood. The percept of self in the empirical, not in 
 the metaphysical sense. The feeling of existence, "the sense of 
 
—70- 
 
 being alive." This is a manifestation of self to self without any 
 reference to what is not self—" the necessary prius of the contra- 
 position of other objects." — Lotze. 
 
 2. Effort or Exertion. The percept of self as activity, as 
 possessed of autokinetic energy — a pure spontaneity of move- 
 ment, a self-caused changefulness. 
 
 3. Limitation. The percepts of self as circumscribed and 
 limited in its activity. This sense of limitation is the first dim 
 perception of something other than self, and stands at the begin- 
 ning of finite consciousness. When this feeling of limitation 
 acquires specific content, it becomes sensation. 
 
 4. Self-assertion , or Self-conservation. The percept of self- 
 assertion in response to interference, or as resistance to limita- 
 tions which would otherwise reduce serf to the mere life of 
 nature. The effort of sentient being to preserve its existence 
 and its autokinetic energy, which is life and freedom— an innate 
 conservation of self, or, briefly, the the instinct of self-preserva- 
 tion. When this feeling acquires specific content, it becomes 
 alarm or watchfulness, aversion or desire, sympathy or antipathy, 
 pleasure or pain. 
 
 5. Self-love or Self-ness. The percept of self-ness, or the 
 desire to appropriate everything which heightens self-feeling — 
 the desire of self-gratification in the exercise of power, either by 
 production, or by domination. 
 
 6. Curiosity. The percept of curiosity, that is, of the desire to 
 know. The craving for knowledge is the impulse to seek mental 
 nourishment. " All men are by nature actuated by the desire to 
 know." — Aristotle : "Metaph.." B. i, eh. i. 
 
 II. Percepts which have for their objects certain states of 
 the sensibility consequent upon cognition — the Emotions. 
 
 1. Intellectual. (1) The pleasure of knowledge, (2) the joy 
 of discovery, (3) the love of truth. 
 
 2. JEsthetical. (1/ Sense of unity in diversity, (2) feeling of 
 sublimity. 
 
 3. Ethical. (1) Sense of obligation, (2) feeling of moral ap- 
 probation or disapprobation. 
 
 4. Social. Love of family, — of friends, — of country, — of hu- 
 manity. 
 
 •5. Religion*. (1) Sense of dependence, (2) reverence, (3) 
 sentiment of the Divine, (4) adoration, (5) gratitude, (6) love 
 to God. 
 
— 71 
 
 II. REASON. 
 
 Various Designations. Nouq — noetic faculty. — Aristo- 
 tle. Derreinen Vernunft— the Pure Reason. — Kant. Common 
 Sense. — Reid. Supernal Sense. — Jacobi. Intellectual Intuition. 
 — Schelling. Spontaneous Reason. — Cousin. Speculative Rea- 
 son. — Coleridge. Intuitive Reason. — Whewell. Pure intel- 
 lectual, impersonal, cosmical Perceptivity. — McVicar. 
 
 (i.) Reason Defined. Reason is the organ of universal 
 and necessary Ideas ; the power of spontaneously and immedi- 
 ately apprehending Ultimate Realities which lie back of or be- 
 yond, produce, and condition all phenomena; the power of 
 intuitively apperceiving the Metaphenome na I (or super-sensible), 
 the Metaphysical, the Supernatural, the Unconditioned Reality. 
 
 Phenomenal,— that which appears to Metaphexomexal- tlie "round of 
 sense. phenomena, the super- 
 
 sensible. 
 
 Physical— that which is produced or Metaphysical— that which is per- 
 changed. manent. 
 
 Natural— the becoming, that which Supernatural- the cause of all be- 
 begins and ends. coming-. 
 
 Conditioned— that which is limited Unconditioned— the unlimited and 
 by quantity, kind, underived which Con- 
 
 or degree. ditions all that is. 
 
 Supposing such a faculty of insight to be granted, it must be 
 different in kind, rather than in degree, from ail our logical pro- 
 cesses. It cannot proceed discursively (analyzing, abstracting, 
 generalizing, inferring) ; it must look upon, or behold its objects 
 face to face. If there be such a faculty, it must perceive (as 
 Aristotle says of the Supreme Intellect) by what seems to us like 
 an act of touch, a figure half-shadowed when we say we grasp or 
 apprehend a truth, and much as St. Paul speaks when he bids us 
 "feel God and find Him, who is not far from any one of us." 
 Reason must be an intuitive (intueor— to behold) power — an 
 organ of direct and immediate knowledge. 
 
 " We participate in the Becoming with the body and by sen- 
 sal ion, but we participate in Real Being with the' soul and by 
 reason."— Plato: "Sophist,." £ 247. 
 
 " We ought, in the first place, to define that which is ever- 
 existent and has no beginning, and that which is in a state of 
 becoming, but never really is. The former of these is apprehended 
 by reflection united to reason, and always subsists according to 
 identity, while the latter is perceived by opinion united with irra- 
 tional perception, since it subsists in a state of mutability and 
 change, and never really is." — Plato: " Timeeus," ch. ix. 
 
 Aristotle lays it down, in general, as the condition of the 
 possibility of knowledge, that it does not regress to infinity, but 
 departs from certain primary princip>les which are true, and 
 
— 7£— 
 
 whose truth commands assent through and by itself alone. 
 These, as the elements of demonstration, are themselves inde- 
 monstrable. The fountain of all certainty, they are themselves 
 absolutely certain, and if ever denied in words' they are always 
 mentally admitted. The faculty of such principles is not the 
 discursive or dianoetic faculty, but the noetic faculty. The intel- 
 lectproper (vo5£), the faculty of First Principles, as an immedi- 
 ate apprehension of what really is, is in certain respects a sense 
 ((>.". (jih^'.z) — a supernal sense. 
 
 See Hamilton: "Philosophy," p. 54. 
 
 11 As the reality [the phenomenal reality, or better, actuality] 
 revealed by external sense, requires no guarantee, itself affording 
 the best assurance of its truth, so the reality revealed by that- 
 deep internal sense we call reason, needs no guarantee, being 
 alone and of itself the most competent witness of its veracity. 
 Of necessity, man believes his senses ; of necessity, man also 
 believes his reason, and there is no certainty superior to the cer- 
 tainty which this belief contains." " The' reason, the internal 
 eye, which immediately receives the light of existence [reality] 
 and apprehends reality as the bodily eye apprehends the outline 
 and colors of the sensible world, is an immediate sense, which 
 contemplates the invisible." — Axcillox : " Ueber Glaube," 
 (quoted by Hamilton : "Philos.," tj. 151.) 
 
 " I have no objection to define reason, with Jacobi, as an 
 organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects — the univer- 
 sal, the eternal, the necessary— as the eye bears to material and 
 contingent phenomena." — Coleridge : " Works," vol. ii, p. 144. 
 
 " There is a higher faculty in man than the understanding, 
 viz., the reason (Vernunft), the pure ultimate light of our nature ; 
 wherein lies the foundation of all virtue and all religion." — Car- 
 lyle : Vol. ii, p. 105. 
 
 " There is a third faculty in man which I call the faculty of 
 apprehending the Infinite — not only in religion, but in all things, 
 — a power independent of sense, . . . . a real power, if we see how 
 it has held its own from the beginning of the world." — Max 
 Mullee : " Science of Religion," p. 14. 
 
 " As sensibility puts us in relation with the physical world, 
 so another faculty puts us in relation with truths that depend 
 upon neither the world nor me, and that faculty is reason." — 
 Cousin: ' l True, Beautiful, and Good," p. 47. 
 
 " Die Vernunft ist das unkorperliche Organ fur die Wahrneh- 
 mungen des Uebersinnlichen." — Jacobi: u Werke," ii, 35. 
 
 " Reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the princi- 
 ples of knowledge a priori.'' 1 — Kant: " Critique," p. 15. 
 
 " Man finds within him the capacity of apprehending, in a 
 world of flux and change, the immutable ; in a world of imper- 
 fection, the perfect ; in a world of relations, the supra-relative ; 
 in a world of de})endenee, the unconditioned '; this capacity is 
 reason."— Greex~ : " Spiritual Philos.," p. xxvi, Introd. 
 
 " We are gifted with what the Germans call Anschauungsgabe 
 acuity of intuition — 'ccoperant reason ')-, and Einbildungskraft 
 ower of intuition), and by these powers we can lighten the 
 
"3— 
 
 darkness which surrounds the world of sense." — Tyndall : 
 "Fragments," p. 130. 
 
 (ii.) Distinction between Sense and Reason. Sense is 
 that faculty of the mind by which we perceive the fleeting and 
 changeful phenomena of nature ; the faculty by which we appre- 
 hend the various modes in which the sensibility is affected by 
 external, sensible objects. Reason is the power by which we 
 apprehend that which lies beyond sensible phenomena, the super- 
 sensible substratum, cause, reason, and explanation of all phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 " Man is the high priest and interpreter of nature." Reason 
 is the organ of those principles by which we attain to a right 
 interpretation. The senses place before us the characters in 
 which the Book of Nature is written, but these convey no knowl- 
 edge without the key by which these characters are to be ex- 
 plained. This key to the interpretation of nature is found in the 
 Ideas of the intuitive reason, for these give to phenomena that 
 .significance and coherence which is not an object of sense. The 
 antithesis of percepts of sense and ideas of reason is thus the 
 foundation of all philosophy. 
 
 See Whewell: " Novum Organon Renovatum," pp. 5, 7. 
 
 " Nature is a drama, of which reason alone can teach the 
 plot. To the eye of sense the world of phenomena is merely an 
 ever-varying collection of isolated facts, a spectacle which has no 
 significance. Its mystery is unfolded to the reason alone." — M. 
 
 JOUFFROY. 
 
 The material universe is a congeries of moving masses and 
 vibrating molecules, without light or heat or sound as these are 
 known to us, and is, in itself, without any significance and any 
 purpose. It is only when beings appear with the psychical 
 powers of feeling, reason, and thought, that the dark, cold, silent 
 atom-streams reveal themselves as a radiant, and colored, and 
 ardent, and vocal world, and its multitudinous and separate parts 
 are presented in consciousness as an orderly world, having a 
 rational meaning, and a definite purpose and end. Order, mean- 
 ing, purpose, can only be manifested to mind, and can only be 
 the product of mind. The entire significance and meaning of 
 sensible phenomena depends, therefore, upon the rational power 
 of interpretation by means of Ideas. The act of knowing the 
 universe is in fact •' an after-thinking of the thoughts which the 
 
-7k- 
 
 Divine Creative Thinking has built into things." — Ueberweg : 
 " Logic," p. 2. 
 
 A.GAS3IZ: "Essay on Classification," pp. 8-9. Jackson: "Philos. of Natural 
 Theology," p. 1~>2. Cousin: ,: Elements of Psychology," p. 417. 
 
 (in.) Distinction between Understanding and Rea- 
 son. The Understanding is the faculty of thought-proper, and 
 deals solely with the relation* of things. The products of thought 
 are concepts, judgments, laws, inferences. The Reason is the 
 faculty of intuition proper, in its highest form ; the power by 
 which we immediately apprehend invisible and super-sensible 
 realities. 
 
 1. The understanding is discursive— it 1. Thereason is fixed, and knows no 
 
 proceeds by steps from the par- processes— it apprehends its ob- 
 
 ticular to the general, and from jects by immediate and direct in- 
 
 premises to conclusions. tuition. 
 
 2. The judgments of the understand- 2. The intuitions of the reason pre- 
 
 ing admit of degrees of certi- elude all degrees ; they are abso- 
 
 tude. lute. 
 
 o. The laws which govern the under- 3. The laws of reason are the neeessary 
 standing are imposed by the rea- and universal ideas of the reason 
 
 son. itself. 
 
 4. The understanding in all its judg- 4. The reason in all its affirmations 
 
 ments refers to the reason as its appeals only to itself— that is, to 
 
 ultimate authority. its own apperception of realities. 
 
 5. The understanding has no power of 5. The reason furnishes to the under- 
 
 intuition ; the act of thought standing the necessary element 
 
 cannot create its own object. in all cognition. 
 
 H. The understanding gives mediate 6. The reason, in connection with the 
 cognition, that is, a knowledge sense, gives immediate cognition, 
 
 based upon the intuitions of 
 sense and reason. 
 
 (iv.) Reason is the read CAUSE, Sense and Expe- 
 rience are the CONDITIONS of Knowledge. It is admitted 
 that apart from sensation and experience there can be no knowl- 
 edge of the external world ; but it is not sensation, nor a repeti- 
 tion of various sensations which constitutes knowledge. Sensa- 
 tion is merely the occasion, the true cause of knowledge is the 
 intuitive reason with universal and necessary ideas. Thus, its 
 without the observation of contiguous and successive change 
 there could be no clear idea of cause ; but whenever change is 
 perceived, it presents itself at once to the reason as a manifesta- 
 tion of power, and refers us to a causal ground. Without the 
 perception, by sense, of the collocation and disj^osition of objects 
 or parts of objects, there could be no clear idea of design ; but on 
 such collocations and aiTangements being presented the mind in- 
 tuitively regards them as being intended, or designed. The 
 sensation or perception is not the cause of the judgment, it is 
 simply the occasion. The idea of power is not seen by the senses, 
 
L 'J- 
 
 it is seen by the reason. The purpose, or design is not perceived 
 by the material eye, it is not in the mechanism at all. The de- 
 sign, or purpose exists in the mind of the maker of the machine 
 and is perceived by the eye of reason in the arrangement of the 
 parts of the machine, that is, the same idea is excited or occasion- 
 ed in our mind which existed in the mind of the maker or the 
 contriver of the mechanism. " We always single out one dy- 
 ncunical antecedent— the power which does the work, or one ra- 
 tioned antecedent— the purpose for which work is done, from the 
 aggregate of material conditions under which these are mani- 
 fested."— Dr. Carpenter: " Nature,'*' vol. vi, p. 210. 
 
 " There is danger of confounding conditions and causes. The 
 dilute acid in the battery will attack the zinc only on condi- 
 tion that you connect the zinc and platinum externally by means 
 of a conductor ; but this does not make the conductor the agent 
 which dissolves the zinc. I build a wall behind my grape-trellis 
 and I find the ripening of the fruit accelerated ; but it is not the 
 wall which does the work, it is still, as before, the sun. The 
 amount of light emitted by my lamp is determined, within cer- 
 tain limits, by the height of the wick ; but this does not render 
 the wick the cause of the light. The varying wick is only a 
 varying condition of a varying result of a varying activity of a 
 constant physical force — chemical action between oil and oxygen. 
 Similarly, the amount of thought which I can evolve is condi- 
 tioned by all the affections and conditions of the brain. My 
 poetry and my philosophy are indeed correlated to brain and 
 blood and oxygen and beef-steak, but only in the same way as 
 my boots are correlated to calf-skin and tan-bark and black-wax. 
 These conditioned the exercise of the boot-maker's skill; beef- 
 steak conditioned the exercise of mine. It is quite true that the 
 activity in both cases has other conditions, but it is also true that 
 none of these conditions can be elevated to the dignity of causes. 
 The physical scientist is sometimes hoodwinked by the exact gra- 
 dation of mental activity to the condition of the brain, and com- 
 mits the mistake of clothing condition with the character of 
 cause.' 11 — Dr. Winchell : "Thoughts on Causality," pp. 21, 22. 
 
 "Conditions are not actively productive, but are passively 
 permissive ; they do not cause variation in any direction, but they 
 permit and favor a tendency which already exists." — Huxley : 
 " Critiques," etc., p. 273. 
 
 " To make the stimulating condition or occasion the cause of 
 cognition is as illogical as to make the setting of the pointer-dog 
 which aroused the attention of the sportsman the cause of the 
 killing of the game." — McCosh : "Defence," etc., p. 86. 
 
 (v.) Universal and Necessary Ideas of Reason are 
 not Generalizations from Sensuous Experience. It is ad- 
 mitted that the human mind is in possession of universal and 
 necessary ideas or principles — mathematical, ethical, logical, and 
 metaphysical. From whence are they derived, and how are they 
 accounted for ? 
 
1. They cannot be derived from experience. Experience 
 cannot conduct us to universal and necessary truths ; not to uni- 
 versal truths, because she has not tried, and in the nature of things, 
 she cannot try all cases ; not to necessary truths, because neces- 
 sity is not a matter to which experience can testify. 
 
 Vheweu: " Novum Organon," p. 7. 
 
 2. They cannot be obtained by induction ; for it is a funda- 
 mental canon of all inductive inference " that no conclusion must 
 contain more than was contained in the premises from which it 
 is drawn." A universal conclusion cannot be drawn from a 
 limited experience. 
 
 See Hamilton : " Metaph." p. 72. Mill : " Logic," B. iii, chap, xxi, \ 1. 
 
 3. They cannot be accounted for by " the law of inseparable 
 association." J. S. Mill asserts that all our knowledge is derived 
 from sensuous experience, and association of feelings or states of 
 consciousness. What we call " necessary truths" are simply the 
 conjunction of similar experiences rendered inseparable by fre- 
 quent repetition. He says that " associations produced by conti- 
 guity become more certain and rapid by repetition. When two 
 phenomena have been very often experienced in conjunction, and 
 have not in a single instance appeared separately, either in ex- 
 perience or in thought, there is produced between them what has 
 been called an ' inseparable association' .... and it is impossi- 
 ble for us to think the one disjoined from the other." — " Exami- 
 nation of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philos.," vol. i, p. 235. These 
 inseparable associations constitute our necessary beliefs. 
 
 But on Mr. Mill's own admissions experience and inseparable 
 association are inadequate to account for necessary and universal 
 ideas. 
 
 1. Experience and generalization give 1. But we have a knowledge which 
 
 us the knowledge of what is with- transcends experience and is 
 
 in the range of our observation, really universal and necessary.— 
 
 with a reasonable extension to "Logic'*: B. i, ch.vii, 2 7, p. 101. 
 
 adjacent cases.— " Logic*' : B. iii, Harper's Ed. "Exam, of Hamil- 
 
 chap. xxi, g 4, p. 40-5. Harper's Ed. ton," vol. i, pp. 127, 131. 
 
 2. Experience carries us only from par- 2. But from single instances Ave do 
 
 ticulars to particulars— from the get general and even universal 
 
 individual to the individual. — propositions. — " Logic" : B. iii, 
 
 "Logic": B. iii, ch. xxi, g 4, p. ch. iii, g 3, p. 228. (p. 345.; 
 405. 
 
 3. Experience can give us only the 3. But we have some knowledge of 
 
 knowledge of the contingent and the necessary and the absolute.— 
 
 the relative.—" Exam t of Hamil- " Exam, of Hamilton" : vol. i, pp. 
 
 ton" : vol. i, pp. 1:3-27. 62, 64. 
 
 4. Experience can give us only the 4. But we have the knowledge of real 
 
 phenomenal-phenomena in their Being. — "Logic": B. i, ch. v, £ 
 
 relations of resemblance, co-ex- 5, 6. 
 
 istence and succession. — " Exam, 
 of Hamilton" : vol. i, p. 27. 
 
How do we know that the future will be as the past, that is, 
 that the course of nature will be uniform? Do you answer that 
 we know by experience? What do you mean by " knowing by 
 experience ?" Experience is only of the past or the present ; you 
 cannot mean that the future of nature has fallen under your ex- 
 perience, for that would be to say that a future event ma, past 
 event, which is a contradiction. You can onty say that you ex- 
 pect (or believe) that the future will be as the past. But what is 
 the ground of your expectation f It is said by some, " we have al- 
 ways found the course of nature to be constant, therefore we ex- 
 pect it will be so in the future." This is no explanation at all, or 
 in other words, it takes for granted that which is to be proved. 
 The question is how are we able to reason from what we know to 
 what we do not know? — Whj^ do we believe that it is possible or 
 practicable to apply the data of experience to things of which 
 we have no experience? And the answer given is that " we be- 
 lieve that what holds true of what we do know, also holds true 
 of what we do not know," which is no explanation at all. The 
 question still recurs, what ground have you for that belief ? 
 
 Do you answer, we arrive at the conclusion by induction ? 
 Then we may reply, in the words of Mr. Mill himself: "If we 
 throw the inductive argument into a series of syllogisms, we 
 shall arrive, by more or fewer steps, at an ultimate syllogism 
 which will have for its major premise the principle or axiom of 
 ' the uniformity of the course of nature.' Having reached this 
 point, we have the whole field of induction laid out in syllo- 
 gisms, and every inference exhibited as the conclusion of a ratio- 
 cination except one ; but this one, unhappily, includes all the 
 rest. Whence came this uni versed major ? What proves that all 
 nature is governed by general laws ? Where are the premises of 
 which this is the conclusion?" -"Logic," B. iii, ch. iii, \ 1, p. 
 240. 
 
 If you answer that we have a native, instinctive belief " that 
 the course of nature is uniform," you concede the point, viz., 
 that we have a source of knowledge distinct from and higher 
 than experience — that is, in pure reason. 
 
 (vi.) Our Bationae Intuitions are not the Embodied 
 Experiences of Previous Generations transmitted by 
 Inheritance. An attempt has been made by Spencer, Carpen- 
 ter, and Lewes to reconcile the Experiential and Intuitional 
 schools by an hypothesis known as the " Psychogenetical Hypo- 
 
—78— 
 
 thesis," which may be thus stated : The constant experiences of 
 
 the race tend to the formation of certain uniform habits of 
 
 thought ; these habits of thought impress themselves upon the 
 
 nervous organization with such force as to become permanent, 
 
 and thus occasion an hereditary transmission to the offspring of 
 
 " a tendency to similar modes of thought." Such a priori forms 
 
 of thought as Force, Cause, Purpose, Belief in the uniformity of 
 
 Nature, etc., become thus necessarily connate in the structure of 
 
 the nervous organization, and the Laws of Thought are inherited 
 
 in the same way as the instincts of the retriever dog. 
 
 See Spencer: "Principles of Psychology," Eng. Ed., pp. 579-n581; Amer. Ed., 
 vol.i, cli. vii, pp. 151-471. Lewes: "Prob. of Life and Mind," vol. i, pp. 
 195-201. Carpenter: "Nature," vol. vi, p. 309; "Mental Physiology," 
 ch. ix, "On Common Sense." 
 
 1. Our first objection to this theory is that we cannot inherit 
 more than our fathers had. If our ancestors gained all their 
 knowledge from experience, it was still only a limited experi- 
 ence. All experience, be it that of the individual, or of the race, 
 is finite. Xo amount of experience, however general, could give 
 rise to strictly universal truths ; that is, could give us ideas which 
 compel us to deny the possibility that in any world, however dif- 
 ferent from this, 2+2—5 ; or that " two straight lines can enclose 
 space "; or that " a triangle can have the sum of its angles greater 
 or less than two right angles " ; or that " a change can take place 
 without a cause " ; or that " it is just to be unjust " ; or that " a 
 can be a and not — a." Dr. Carpenter says : " The very perception 
 of finite existence leads to the idea of the infinite ; the perception 
 of dependent existence leads to the idea of self-existence." How f 
 we ask. Again, he says : " We are led to conceive of Him [God] 
 as the absolute, unchangeable, self-existent, infinite in duration, 
 illimitable in space, the highest ideal of Truth, Right, and 
 Beauty." ("Mental Physiol.," p. 247.) The ideas of absolute, 
 unchangeable, self-existent, infinite, illimitable, are, however, a 
 class of conceptions altogether distinct from the notions of the 
 finite, the limited, the dependent, the relative, the changeful, as 
 given in experience, and cannot be developed out of these by any 
 logical or any physical process. Experience is finite, the number 
 of cells and fibres in the brain is finite, and out of these we can 
 not, by any conceivable process, educe the absolute, the infinite, 
 and the perfect. 
 
 2. Secondly, the advocates of the doctrine of " inheritance " 
 (physical inheritance) admit that "knowledge cannot descend 
 
79- 
 
 from one generation to another." They say we inherit only "an 
 aptitude for the acquirement of knowledge," — a "tendency to 
 similar modes of thought," consequent upon a certain configura- 
 tion of brain tissue, which is transmitted by inheritance. As 
 examples of these hereditary tendencies which have become con- 
 nate in the nervous system, Dr. Carpenter instances " the First 
 Law of motion," "the Law of the conservation of Energy," and 
 " the belief in the uniformity of nature." But these are all real 
 cognitions, generalizations from experience, which are transmit- 
 ted in books, and communicated by instruction, and in no sense 
 hereditary. No intuitionalist has ever regarded these Laws or 
 beliefs as cases of self-evident, necessarj^, and universal Truths — 
 that is, truths which carry their own evidence, which are at once 
 recognized as necessary, and which have been held by all men, 
 at all times, and in all places, — " semper, ubique, et ab omnibus.'' 1 
 That "every event must have a cause" is a real case of self- 
 evident, universal, and necessary truth, which has always been 
 recognized by all men, and is believed with as much confidence 
 by the child and the savage, as by the philosopher. 
 
 3. Thirdly, the advocates of this hypothesis do not present the 
 faintest glimmering of a rational explanation of the modus oper- 
 andi of the transmission of intellectual intuitions from one gen- 
 eration to another by a physical process. The transmission of 
 physical peculiarities, constitutional diathesis, and tendencies to 
 bodily diseases, mentioned by Dr. Carpenter, are in nowise anal- 
 ogous ; and the hypothesis of "pangenesis" suggested by Dar- 
 win, is a physiological romance. 
 
 See Darwin: "Animals and Plants under Domestication," vol. ii, pp. 400- 
 403. Mivart: "On the Origin of .Species," ch. x. Beale: "Protoplasm," 
 3d Ed., p. 279. 
 
 (vii.) Ideas of Reason are Constitutive Principles, 
 or Elements, and not Regulative, Subjective Laws of 
 Cognition. 
 
 Kant teaches that ideas of the reason are not constitutive 
 principles through which a real knowledge of things in them- 
 selves can be obtained, but they are simply regulative principles 
 or laws which have a subjective necessity only. Hamilton fol- 
 lows Kant, and designates reason "the Regulate Faculty." He 
 even questions the propriety of using the term " faculty " in this 
 connection. ("Metaphysics," p. 277.) He also teaches, with 
 Kant, that all necessity is subjective. " A thing is conceived as 
 
80- 
 
 impossible, only as we are unable to construe it in thought." 
 (P. 403.) 
 
 And yet, by a strange inconsistency, Hamilton admits that 
 the mind has certain "native notions, 11 — "it has the power of 
 being the native source of certain necessary a priori cognitions, 11 
 (p. 512.) Now the question is, Have these cognitions or notions any 
 real objects external to the mind, or are they illusions? Have 
 they any objective validity, any absolute truth? It is true in 
 itself that "every phenomenon has a cause," and "every qual- 
 ity has a subject." If it is not absolutely true that every quality 
 has a subject of inherence, then it is not certain that we have a 
 soul. If the principle of causality is only a subjective law of our 
 mind, the external world which this principle discloses to us 
 loses its reality, it is only a succession of phenomena. Matter 
 exists no more than soul. Everything is reduced to mobile 
 appearance, to a perpetual becoming, there is no permanent 
 being, or reality. Hume, the skej)tic, remains master of the 
 
 field. 
 
 Cousin : " True, Beautiful, and Good," pp. 65-67. 
 
 Now, we contend that these ideas of the reason, and the 
 necessary cognitions to which they give rise, have an absolute 
 value in themselves. For every true percept of sense there must 
 be a real object, external or internal. The intuition must be de- 
 termined by the object intuited. The existence outside of con- 
 sciousness is permeated by reason, conformable to reason,, and 
 therefore necessarily determines the idea in our reason. — (Ueber- 
 aver : " Logic," p. 2.) 
 
 It is the very nature of reason to have an immediate knowl- 
 edge or vision of spiritual truth and real being, even as sense-per- 
 ception gazes upon external phenomena. If, in perception, as 
 Hamilton contends, we have an immediate knowledge, " a con- 
 sciousness of external reality," may we not also be as directly 
 conscious of super-sensible and invisible realities through the 
 reason? On any consistent theory of knowledge, the ideas of 
 reason are no more subjective than the percepts of sense. All 
 knowledge implies a subject and an object. Now, if, as Hamil- 
 ton asserts, we have " necessary a priori cognitions," where and 
 what are the objects of these cognitions? They are certainly 
 beyond the sphere of sense. Take for example the idea of Cause. 
 It is now universally conceded that we have no perception by 
 the senses of any causal connection or nexus in the material 
 
-81— 
 
 world. (Mansee: "Prolegom.," pp. 258, 276. Grove: " Corr. 
 andConser. of Force," p. 20.) Where, then, is the object of this 
 " a priori cognition," and by what organ or faculty is it known? 
 We conclude that human reason is not so much the "seat" as 
 the " organ of principles," just as sense is not the seat of phan- 
 tasms, but the organ by which we perceive phenomena. By a 
 higher warrant than can be claimed that in the act of perception 
 we have a real knowledge of the external object, do we claim 
 that, in rational intuition, reason beholds its object face to face. 
 Even the validity and signiricancy of sense-perception is de- 
 rived from that element in the cognition of externality which 
 reason supplies. " The phantasms of the schools have been 
 swept away from the theory of natural vision, but these other 
 phantasms — the abstractions of sense mistaken for the realities 
 of reason — still remain to perplex our spiritual vision, and con- 
 fuse our philosophy." — Prof. Smith: " Theo. Review," 1861, 
 January No., p. 140. 
 
 "The manifestations of the infinite Reason are external to 
 my consciousness, they are processes in time which correspond 
 to the Divine Thought, which is 'a becoming ,' as distinguished 
 from the Divine Reason which is an 'eternal being.' 1 But the 
 being of God as the infinite and eternal Reason is always imma- 
 nent to the human soul The human mind must be, so" to speak, 
 
 constitutionally permeated with a nascent knowledge of the 
 Omnipotent, the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Perfect. In a 
 word, in virtue of the universal law of assimilation, and the abiding- 
 presence, to the soul of man, of the Infinite Reason, there must 
 exist in the mind of man those abiding modes of mental action 
 which go by the name of first principles, a priori cognitions, 
 laws of thought, or, in a word, ideas of pure reason. 11 — Mc- 
 Vicar: " Sketch of Philos.," p. 84. 
 
 " The correlation of mind with the physical and vital forces, 
 considered in relation to design in creation, or the doctrine of 
 Ends, brings the highest manifestations of mind — as a creative 
 and regulative power — into synthesis with creation, and, consecu- 
 tively, into synthesis with the human mind. The ideas of the 
 Divine Mind, as revealed in the phenomena of creation, are none 
 other than the fundamental ideas and a priori conceptions of 
 the human mind, as revealed in consciousness." — Dr. Laycock : 
 " Mind and Brain," vol. i, p. 114. 
 
 Agassiz: "Essay on Classification," pp. 8-12. 
 
 (viii.) Impersonality of Ideas of the Reason. The 
 Will is preeminently the Ego or person. In all its various acts 
 we are conscious of freedom. Our volitions are enstamped with 
 the impress of our personality. Our volitions are our own. Our 
 desires are our own. Our emotions are our own. Even our sen- 
 sations are our own. That which we experience of all such phe 
 6 
 
— ££— 
 
 nomena is not experienced in the same manner by any one else. 
 But not so in the ease of our rational ideas, and our intuitive, 
 spontaneous judgments determined by rational ideas. Reason 
 does not modify itself to our tastes, our circumstances, our organ- 
 ization ; we cannot in all cases think as we please; neither can 
 we be educated by others to think in opposition to the dictates of 
 pure reason. Try to conceive that 2+2=5; that two parallel 
 lines can enclose space ; that a triangle can have the sum of its 
 angles greater or less than two right angles ; that an event can 
 happen without a cause, or that the just is not obligatory. You 
 will try in vain. Reason will impose upon you and upon all 
 men the same necessary judgments, and we should regard the 
 man as insane who rejected the authority of reason. Further- 
 more, if the ideas of reason and the judgments they necessitate 
 were not impersonal, that is, if they were merely individual, we 
 should not dream of demanding that other individuals should 
 conform their actions thereto. To force our personal conceptions 
 and judgments, and our individual determinations, upon others 
 would be the most extravagant despoti&m. But we know that 
 necessary truths have no element of personality about them ; 
 they do not belong to one human being more than another ; they 
 are the common patrimony of our rational nature — a direct ema- 
 nation from God. 
 
 The question as to the impersonality of the ideas of the 
 reason lies at the foundation of another question, namely, 
 whether we have an organon of Philosophy ? The settlement of 
 the former determines the fate of the latter. If it be decided 
 that the ideas of the reason are impersonal, then that imperson- 
 ality logically accounts for, and guarantees the objective valid- 
 ity of the a priori, necessary and universal ideas which constitute 
 that organon. But if the ideas of reason are personal, are indi- 
 vidual, they have no authority beyond the limits of the individ- 
 ual subject. 
 
 SeeMoEELL: "Hist, of Philos.," p. 650. Cousix : "Hist, of Philos.," vol. i, 
 pp. 85, 86, 126-133; "True, Beautiful and Good.'' pp. 79-73. Maetineau; 
 "Essays," 1st series, p. 373. 
 
 (ix.) The Ideas of the Reason, a Revelation of 
 Immutable and Permanent REALITIES. The absolute 
 ideas of the reason are the reflection within our spirits of eternal 
 and immutable things, as they really are. They are an emana- 
 tion from that Eternal Reason which fashioned, and which 
 still governs the universe by laws of unerring truth, beauty and 
 
— 83- 
 
 righteousness, and which, so far as they are manifested at all, are 
 
 manifested to every rational mind alike. " Reason is literally 
 
 and truly a Revelation, a necessary and universal revelation 
 
 which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man 
 
 that comes into the world — illuinat omnem hominem venientem in 
 
 hunc mundum. Reason is the kayos of Pythagoras, Plato," and 
 
 Philo.— Cousin : " Elem. of Psycho.," pp. 436-437. 
 
 "There is a spirit in man, and the Inspiration of the 
 
 Almighty giveth him understanding." — Job, xxxii, 8. " He 
 
 teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and maketh 
 
 us wiser than the fowls of heaven." — Job, xxxv. 11. 
 
 il What and whence are those primary ideas of consciousness 
 which constitute or presuppose our deepest, though not our full- 
 est faith? Are they of our own making? — of our own finding? 
 Have we any thing to do with their genesis ? Do they not re- 
 port to us of* the necessary and the eternal? And are they not 
 the presence with us of the Eternal, whereof nothing temporal 
 and finite can report? The reason in us is not personal to us, but 
 a manifestation in our consciousness of the Infinite Reason, pre- 
 senting us with its supernatural realities. Reason is the Logos, 
 which is at once the objective truth and the subjective revelation 
 of God."— Martineau : " Essays," 1st series, p. 373. 
 
 " It is evident that as God is in the universe, and the uni- 
 verse in God — that the Divinity is in us also, in a certain sort, 
 as the universal mover of the soul. For the principle of Reason 
 is not reason itself but something better. Now, what can we say 
 is better than the universe except God."— Aristotle : " Etri. 
 Eud." L. vii, c. 14. 
 
 " The scientific inquirer is able to pass beyond the variable 
 and contingent phenomena of consciousness and life, to an 
 Energy in action — a quoddam Divinum — which is the source of all 
 universal and necessary truth." — Laycock : " Mind and Brain," 
 vol. i, p. 81. 
 
 See Cub worth : "Intell. System of the Universe," vol. iii, p. 71. Green: 
 "Spiritual Philos.," vol. i, Intro, xxvii. Butler: "Hist, of Ancient 
 Philos.," vol. i, p. 55. Jacobi : (in Ueberweg: "Hist, of Philos.," vol. ii, 
 p. 200.) Rosmini : (Ibid., vol. ii, p. 491). Coleribge : " Works," vol. i, pp 
 241-242, 460. 
 
 (x.) Criteria of Ideas of Reason. In order to a complete 
 enumeration of the fundamental Ideas of the Reason, we must 
 clearly understand by what Criteria they are to be identified. 
 
 (1) They are Self-evident. Ideas of the reason shine in their 
 own light and carry their own evidence. No explanation can 
 make them clearer, no demonstration can make them more cer- 
 tain than they are when first apprehended. 
 
 (2) They are Original. Ideas of reason are original and 
 ultimate, that is, they are not deduced from, nor comprehended 
 
— So- 
 under any higher notion or belief. "Deeper than science and 
 more certain than demonstration," they are the original premises 
 from which all other truths are inferred. 
 
 (3) They are Simple. Ideas of reason are incapable of an- 
 alysis, that is, they cannot be resolved into a plurality of ele- 
 ments, because they are the simplest of all elements of cognition. 
 
 (4) They are Necessary. We cannot construe in thought 
 their opposites, and their negation is self-contradictory and im- 
 possible. 
 
 (5) They are Catholic. They are held by all men, and have 
 been held by all men at all times, and in all places — semper, 
 ubique, et ab omnibus. 
 
 (6) They are strictly Universal. They admit of no possible 
 or conceivable exceptions. They are true in all ages and in all 
 worlds. 
 
 (xi.) EXPLICATION and ENUMERATION of the 
 IDEAS of the REASON. A clear explication, and complete 
 enumeration of the principles of Common Sense, i. e. the Ideas of 
 the Reason "is one of the chief desiderata of Logic," (Reid), 
 " the most important problem of Philosophy," (Hamilton) and 
 "the most delicate undertaking of Psychology," (Cousin). When 
 properl y achieved it will constitute "the organon of Pure Rea- 
 son." — (Kant). 
 
 In order to a true Philosophy of the human mind there is 
 needed, not singly a mere enumeration of the Ideas of the Rea- 
 son, and a vindication of their absolute authority, but an orderly 
 digest of them in their genesis and their mutual relationship. 
 
 ONTOLOGICAL IDEAS. 
 
 I. BEING or REALITY (Substance-Subsislens— that which 
 really is and abides) — that which is permanent, persistent, con- 
 stant, in contradiction to all phenomenal change ; {Substans — 
 that which lies under and sustains) — the continent and support 
 of motion, life, and thought. (1) Spirit as a permanent real- 
 ity, having self-manifesting and self-directing power. (2) Mat- 
 ter as a permanent substratum, the statical condition for the 
 manifestation of power. 
 
 Beino or Reality is either dependent or absolute. Finite 
 dependent Existence is real but derived existence, and necessa- 
 rily supposes another reality which is absolute and ultimate, as its 
 cause — the Being of Beings (rd dvrwq dy~). 
 
— 85— 
 
 Note. — It is admitted on all hands that inner and outer sense 
 give us only phenomena — changes, qualities, and states of matter 
 and mind. 
 
 II. ABSOLUTE UNITY or UNIOITY— (incomposite 
 
 unity). Absolute unity is the negation of all plurality and com- 
 plexity of parts, and is strictly synonymous with simplicity or 
 indivisibility. It does not necessarily involve iinitude or infini- 
 tude, limitation or illimitation, and is perfectly compatible with 
 either. It is preeminently the unity which is possessed by 
 Mind. 
 
 Unity is either absolute or relative. Absolute unity is unic- 
 
 ity — perfect indivisibility; relative unity (numerical, organic or 
 
 logical) is totality. The former is an idea of the reason, the 
 
 latter is a concept of the understanding. 
 
 Note.— The senses give us only plurality, multeity; and 
 from plurality added as many times as you please we cannot de- 
 duce unicity, but simply totality. Even our conception of total- 
 ity presupposes the absolute unity of the Ego, which combines 
 plurality unto unity, " all arithmetic supposes an arithmetician" 
 who is himself a unity. 
 
 III. ABSOLUTE IDENTITY or indivisible DURA- 
 TION. Absolute identity or sameness is the negation of all di- 
 versity and succession. It is persistent unity and continuity of 
 duration ; an absolute sameness cognized beneath or beyond all 
 diversity, change and succession. It does not necessarily involve 
 fmitude or infinitude (finite duration — time, or infinite duration 
 — eternity,) and is compatible with either. It is preeminently 
 the identity of the metaphysical Ego or person. 
 
 Identity is either absolute or relative. Absolute identity 
 is the persistence or continuity of being — indivisible duration ; 
 relative identity is the recognized sameness or equality of two 
 separate existences. The former is an idea of the reason, the lat- 
 ter an understanding concept. 
 
 Note. — The senses give us only diversity, change, succession, 
 and out of diversity we cannot generalize identity. Indivisible 
 duration, whether* of a finite essence or of the Infinite One, is 
 distinct from succession, which presupposes duration instead 
 of being presupposed by it. "Things cannot succeed except by 
 relation to a something which endures.' 1 '' Even related succes- 
 sion can only be conceived by a being who is identical. 
 
 IV. UNCONDITIONEDNESS— (Illimitation by Quan- 
 tity, Kind, or Degree). Unconditionedness is freedom from 
 all limitation by Quantity (intensive, extensive, protensive), by 
 Kind (coordinate or superordinate), or by Degree. Being, which 
 
— 86— 
 
 is Self-existent, Self-determined, Self-complete, the ground and 
 cause of all determined, conditioned, and relative existence — the 
 Infinite and Absolute Personality. 
 
 A Not conditioned Protensive Quantity Eternity 
 
 H by Quantity— Infinite Extensive Quantity Immensity 
 
 £ Intensive Quantity Omnipotence 
 
 ^ hvTv'infl-AwnTrTv Co-ordinate Kind Onliness 
 
 q DyKina absolite Superordinate Kind Supremacy 
 
 § Intelligence Omniscience 
 
 % by Degree— Perfect Freedom Righteousness 
 
 ;d Love Benevolence 
 
 PNEUMATOLOGICAL IDEAS (SPIRIT). 
 
 I. POWER— (Spontaneity, Vitality, Vis Voluntatis). 
 The ability to originate change and motion de novo. The effi- 
 cient and adequate principle of all action, whether immanent 
 (i. e. change of subjective state— volition), or transitive (i. e. 
 change in objective relations — motion). 
 
 Note. — Power is not an object of sense. All that we per- 
 ceive is change, succession, motion. It is universally agreed that 
 we have no perception by the senses of a causal connection or 
 nexus in the external world. The only experience we have of 
 causality is the consciousness of effort or exertion accompanied 
 with an intention thereby to accomplish an end. 
 
 II. SENSIBILITY. The original, innate, fundamental 
 capacity of feeling ( — desire, emotion, sympathy, compassion, 
 love) — the essential basis of all character. 
 
 Note. — Sensibility is not a property of matter nor a result of 
 organization, it is an essential attribute of spirit whether finite or 
 infinite. It is not by science that the nature of feeling can be 
 either known or explained. 
 
 III. IDEALITY. The ultimate source and fountain of all 
 ideals and ends. The absolute first principle of all order and all 
 adaptation; the foundation of all law, and the source of all intel- 
 lectual light. 
 
 Note. — Order, purpose, design, law, are not objects of sense; 
 all that we perceive by the senses is a certain collocation and dis- 
 position of matter in space ; it is the reason which gives law, uni- 
 ty of thought, purpose, intention. 
 
 The synthesis of Power, Reason, and Feeling constitutes 
 personality. The possession of truly individualized Power— a 
 potentiality or energy, which shall be a cause in its own right, 
 which shall see its own way, and have a reason for action within 
 itself, constitutes a Person. 
 
—87 
 
 HYLEKOLOGICAL IDEAS (MATTER). 
 
 " The essential attributes of matter may be deduced a priori, 
 the bare notion of matter being given." — Hamilton. 
 
 I. INERTIA or MASS. The statical condition necessary 
 to the manifestation of force ; or the negation or non-existence of 
 power to change its own state of motion or of rest. " The sole 
 unalterable property of matter is its mass. At the revival of 
 science this property was expressed by the phrase inertia of mat- 
 ter No part of this mass can be due to supposed centres of 
 
 force." Maxwell. " There is one wonderful condition of matter, 
 perhaps its only true indication, namely inertia." — Faraday. 
 
 II. ULTIMATE LIMIT. The necessary conception of 
 matter as consisting of ultimate discrete particles — individual 
 molecules, one and indivisible by any existing forces — the atomic 
 constitution of matter. The atomic theory demands from us a 
 belief in the existence of a limit to division ; and if we resolve 
 matter into " centres of force " we still trace it to a limit. Dis- 
 crete quantity is an empirical fact, and reason demands ultimate 
 units as its necessary condition. 
 
 III. ULTIMATE CONTINUITY. The necessary and es- 
 sential attribute of occupying space of three dimensions — 
 length, breadth, and depth. Assuming that matter consists or 
 ultimate units, actually indivisible by existing forces, " they 
 must be physical and real units occupying a finite portion of 
 space and forming measurable constituents of solid bodies." — 
 Thomson. If they are not extended, the aggregate sum cannot 
 constitute an extended body. " The absolute continuity of mat- 
 ter is therefore a simple idea irreducible to lower terms." — Ab- 
 bot. 
 
 IV. ULTIMATE INCOMPRESSIBILITY. That neces- 
 sary and essential attribute of matter by which it fills a definite 
 portion of space so that two particles or atoms cannot occupy the 
 same portion of space at the same instant of time — " the impossi- 
 bility of conceiving of its being reduced from what is to what is 
 not extended."— Ham ilton. 
 
 DYNAMICAL IDEAS (POWER). 
 
 Power is inherent ability to originate change or motion— the 
 principle of action, immanent or transeunt. "It is a hyper- 
 physical idea, a postulate of reason applied to nature." — Mar- 
 tineau. 
 
the 
 
 I. ACTION is the exertion or manifestation of Power 
 conditioning of power to accomplish an end. It is either imma- 
 nent or transeuht. An immanent act has no effect on anything 
 beyond the agent. A transeunt act produces a result outside of 
 or beyond the agent. The first is Volition ; the second is exer- 
 tion, effort, or Force. 
 
 "We have the consciousness of effort accompanied with in- 
 tention thereby to accomplish an end, when we exert power to put 
 matter in motion, which gives us the internal experience of 
 force, and all our knowledge of mechanical force in the material 
 world is derived from this conscious eftbit we make in producing 
 motion. All other attempts to render an account of that deep 
 mystery of the universe, mechanical force, are abortive. — Her- 
 schel. " Mind is the one and only source of Power." — Car- 
 penter. " The conception of force is a mental or spiritual con- 
 ception . ' '—Murphy. 
 
 II. FORCE is conditioned Power — the amount of effort or 
 
 impulse needed to impart a specific velocity to a given mass, and 
 
 is measured by the momentum generated by it in unit of time. 
 
 " The impulse of a force is equal to the momentum produced 
 by it."— Maxwell. "The magnitude of a force is represented 
 by the product of the mass into the velocity produced in it by 
 the action of the force in unit of time."— Stewart. 
 
 III. ENERGY is the continuous power of doing work, and 
 work is done when resistance is overcome. " All energy has its 
 origin in force, but energy is not the same as force. Energy is 
 due to the action of force. The quantity of energy is due to the 
 intensity of the force multiplied into the space through which 
 the force, acts, and is proportionate to the mass multiplied into 
 the square of its velocity." — Murphy. 
 
 JESTHETICAL IDEAS. 
 
 Beauty is ideal unity in diversity. " The highest beauty 
 is associated with the largest complexity and the most perfect 
 unity, as in man." 
 
 I. Unity of Form {Symmetry, Harmony). Having the 
 parts of a collocated or organic whole in due proportion and just 
 adaptation to each other. 
 
 II. Unity of Grouping {Order, Coordination). The regu- 
 lar and methodical disposition of lesser wholes in groups and 
 classes. 
 
 III. Unity of Series {Rhythm of Motion). The uniform 
 measure and proportionality of succession in action, sound, 
 or language. 
 
■89— 
 
 IV. Unity of Pukpose (Subordination, Fitness). Just 
 adaptation of means to ends, of action to law, and of structure to 
 function. 
 
 V. Unity of Moral Action {Moral Order, Righteous- 
 ness, Benevolence), The conformity of freedom to Law, and the 
 surrender of self-interest to Love. 
 
 MATHEMATICAL IDEAS. 
 
 " Mathematics is the science of Quantities {numerical, exten- 
 sive, and intensive), and of Quantitative Relations." — Abbot. 
 (Comte, Montferrier, " Encyclopddie Mathimatique"). 
 
 I. Unity, (and the relations of discrete quantity — totality, 
 equality, proportionality). The absolute unity or oneness of the 
 thinking subject is the condition of all numeration. There can 
 be no arithmetic without an arithmetician. Every number, al- 
 though inconceivably great, is impossible unless unity be given 
 as its basis. 
 
 II. Continuity of Matter (and the relations of co-exist- 
 ent positions). The existence of matter as the condition sine qui 
 -non for the manifestation of force is a rational idea, and the idea 
 of its ultimate continuity is necessarily a priori. Space, under- 
 stood in any other sense than as " the relation of coexistent posi- 
 tions" does not come under the category of quantity. The an- 
 tithesis of space is immensity, which is an attribute of God 
 alone. 
 
 III. Duration of Existence, (and the relations of suc- 
 cession). The idea of Duration rests solely upon our conscious 
 Identity. Succession necessarily implies identity or permanence. 
 Time is duration measured into equal parts by the rhythmical 
 motion of bodies or molecules. The antithesis of time is eternity, 
 which is an attribute of God alone. 
 
 IV. Limit and Determinate Form, (the perfect circle, 
 sphere, triangle, square). " Mathematics is the science of the 
 determination of Limits."— Abbot. 
 
 Note. — Inasmuch as quantity is defined as " that which is 
 susceptible of augmentation or diminution" (" Eneyclop&die 
 Mathem." — Tome I, p. xiii), an " infinite quantity" is a contra- 
 diction in terms. " It will be observed that o does not represent 
 absolute zero, and that oo does not express absolute infinity" — 
 (Price "Infinitesimal Calculus," Vol. I, p. xiii). The " infin- 
 ite" of mathematics is the "indefinite." — (Carnot " BS flexions 
 sur la Mitaph. du Calcul Infinite smal," 1813, pp. 19, 20). 
 See North American Review, 1864, Oct., pp. 430, 431. 
 
-90 
 
 
 LOGICAL IDEAS. 
 
 Identity, {absolute or relative) in Diversity of phenomena 
 is the foundation of Logic, as the science of the Laws of Thought. 
 Identity of Essence and Equality of Ratios (relations and rea- 
 sons) or, " Homogeneity of Terms and Identity of Ratios," is the 
 basis of all valid generalization and ratiocination. 
 
 I. Identity of Essence. The absolute sameness, or per- 
 manence of the knowing subject, or Ego, is the condition of all 
 analytic inference, because it justifies the assumption that there 
 must be an ultimate essence in individual things, distinct from 
 their individual characteristics, which authorizes their union in 
 thought. (Universalia in re). Hence % the Principle of Iden- 
 tity — "the same attributes constitute the same essence," or 
 " identical existences must have the same essential attributes." 
 
 Note. — The essence is the totality of those permanent at- 
 tributes which constitute the common basis of a multitude of 
 other specific and individual qualities. 
 
 II. Non-Contradiction. { Falsehood of Contradictory Op- 
 position). The negative expression of the law of Identity gives 
 another principle, viz: that "identical existences cannot have 
 contradictory attributes," or "the same attributes cannot be 
 affirmed and denied of the same subject." Hence, the Principle 
 of Non-contradiction — " Judgments opposed as contradictory to 
 each other cannot both be true." 
 
 III. Excluded Middle. {Exclusive of a third or middle 
 Judgment). The law of Identity in its positive and negative 
 expression, (i. e. the principle of Identity, and of Non-contradic- 
 tion) leaves us no middle course between contradictory attribu- 
 tions ; one or other must be true. Hence, the Principle of Ex- 
 cluded Middle. " Of contradictory attributes we can only affirm 
 one of the same subject, and if one be explicitly affirmed the 
 other is implicitly denied." 
 
 IV. Identity of Ratios, {relations and reasons). The 
 identity or absolute sameness of reason in all men, and the im- 
 personality of the ideas of reason, is the condition of all synthetic 
 inference, because it justifies the assumption that the reason of 
 man is identical with the Divine reason, and that the relations of 
 things in nature are the product of the Divine Will ( — the syn- 
 thesis of Reason and Power) , therefore, the laws of thought are 
 laws of things.— (Universalia Ante Rem). Hence, the Prin- 
 ciple of Sufficient Reason. " Whatever exists, or is true, must 
 
 
-91- 
 
 have a sufficient reason why the thing or proposition should be 
 as it is, and not otherwise." 
 
 From this principle it follows that, whatever essential rela- 
 tions (necessary correlations) are found to exist between attrib- 
 ute and subject, phenomena and cause, means and end, the de- 
 terminate and the determinant, the relative and the absolute 
 ( — the cause of all relations) must be predicated of all analogous 
 cases at all times, because all nature is conformed to law, 
 that is, to ideals and end. 
 
 ETHICAL IDEAS. 
 
 Personality, or the synthesis of Reason, Freedom and Love, 
 is the basis of all ethical relations, i. e. the relations of Person to 
 Person. 
 
 I. The Highest Good. {The idea of the Perfect Good.) 
 (1) The personality of God is, per se, the Absolute Good, that is, 
 the perfect intelligence, freedom, and benevolence of God, is 
 the highest good. (2) The actualized or perfectly realized per- 
 sonality of man, that is, the complete development of his intel- 
 ligence, freedom, and benevolence, is the highest good for man 
 — resemblance of human personality to the Divine. — (Plato). 
 
 " Human personality, conceived in its purity and perfection, 
 is the one and universal type which should assume form in a 
 realm of human entities or individuals, each man on his own 
 account, and all in unison must work out the realization of this 
 grand aim." — Martensen. " Ethics," p. 3. "The formation of 
 noble human character is the highest work that man or, so far 
 as we know, that God, can be engaged in."— Murphy. " Sclent. 
 Basis of Faith, 11 p. 39. 
 
 II. Moral Law. (The Good as a norm for the Will). Re- 
 spect all Personality, that is, esteem and treat the moral Per- 
 son according to its intrinsic dignity, and its relative ex- 
 cellence and desert. 
 
 To esteem and treat the moral person according to its inher- 
 ent and intrinsic dignity is benevolence ; to esteem and treat 
 the moral person according to its relative, that is, self-determined 
 excellence, is justice. 
 
 III. Obligation or Duty. (The Good as Obligatory). 
 It is because there is in me a moral Personality (reason, free- 
 dom, and love,) that I am obliged to respect it, and that I 
 have also the right to demand that it shall be respected 
 by others. And, conversely, I am under obligation to esteem 
 moral personality in all other beings, and do unto others as I ex- 
 
—92- 
 
 
 peet and demand they shall do unto me. My right* are the exact 
 measure of my duties. If I perform my duty I actualize the 
 good ; if I violate my duty I actualize the evil. 
 
 IV. Moral Desert. The ideas of merit and demerit are 
 essentially united with the ideas of good and evil. He who re- 
 spects his own personality and seeks its perfection ; he who re- 
 spects the personality of others and accords its rights, has merit 
 or praiseworthiness. He who fails to do this, has demerit or 
 blameworthiness. 
 
 V. Retribution. (Return or repayment corresponding to 
 desert). Merit is the natural right to be approved and rewarded ; 
 demerit is the natural liability to be condemned and punished. 
 Merit and demerit, as a lawful debt, imperatively demand a 
 proper satisfaction. 
 
 SCHEMA OF THE IDEAS OF THE REASON. 
 
 The ideas of the reason may be divided into those which are 
 primary and those which are secondary. The primary are the 
 logical antecedents or correlatives of the phenomena of sense; 
 the secondary are the logical antecedents or correlatives of the 
 concepts of the understanding. 
 
-93- 
 
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 in. 
 
 PRIMITIVE (Spontaneous, Psychological) JUDGMENT. 
 (1) Definition. Primitive Judgment is that power of the 
 indivisible Ego (an absolute unity) by which it spontaneously and 
 intuitively apprehends the necessary relations between the per- 
 cepts of sense and the ideas of the reason, and grasps them into 
 the unity of a first notion, or primitive cognition. It is the nat- 
 ural synthesis of percepts and ideas, under necessary relations, 
 constituting the unity of consciousness and the affirmation of the 
 reality of the object of that consciousness. 
 
 Judgments are of Two Classes. (1) They are judgments 
 in which we acquire direct and immediate knowledge concerning 
 objects of which we were before ignorant, or (2) they are judg- 
 ments in which we elaborate, classify, systematize, account for, 
 and apply the knowledge already acquired. The former are nat- 
 ural, SPONTANEOUS, INTUITIVE, PSYCHOLOGICAL JUDGMENTS, 
 
 and constitute the unity of spontaneous consciousness, the latter are 
 artificial, (as opposed to natural) reflective, discursive, logical 
 judgments, and constitute the unity of reflective consciousness. 
 We are now concerned only with the former. 
 
 The first act of knowing " is a judgment free from all reflec- 
 tion, an affirmation without any mixture of negation, an imme- 
 diate intuition, the legitimate child of the natural energy" of the 
 mind. The second act of knowing is the formation of concepts 
 and judging by means of concepts (thought proper) — an act of 
 the understanding or discursive faculty, "in which we en- 
 counter doubt, sophism, and error." — Cousin: "True, Beauti- 
 ful, and Good," pp. 69, 70. "Hist, of Philos.," Vol. ii, pp. 
 337, 343, 363. 
 
 " The psychological must not be confounded with the logical 
 judgment. The first is the judgment of a relation between the 
 conscious subject and the object of consciousness ; the latter is the 
 judgment of a relation which two objects of thought bear to each 
 other."— Mansel : " Prolegomena," pp. 63, 64. 
 
 "I apply the word judgment to every determination of the 
 mind concerning what is true or false. Many of these determin- 
 ations are simple primitive beliefs accompanying the exercise of 
 all our faculties— judgments of nature, the spontaneous product 
 of the intelligence." — Reid : " Intell. Powers," ch. i, 34. 
 McCosh : " Intuition," p. 33. 
 
 Primitive Judgment, a Synthesis of Simple Appre- 
 hensions. It may be laid down as a general canon of Psychol- 
 ogy that the unity of consciousness is a Judgment, or in other 
 words, every act of consciousness is an affirmation, and involves 
 the intuition or mental vision of some relation which is the basis 
 of the unity of the cognitive act. Thus, for example, the affirm- 
 
■95 
 
 ation " This is here," or " That is there," involves the intuition 
 of spatial relations, that is, of coexistent positions, or space. 
 Again, the affirmative, "This substance is hard," involves the 
 intuition of the relation of inherence, that is, that the quality of 
 hardness inheres in the substance. Or again, the affirmation 
 " This object has been moved or changed," involves the intuition 
 of the relation of causality, the motion or change must have a 
 cause. Consequently, with reference to primary and spontane- 
 ous consciousness, as distinguished from secondary and reflex 
 consciousness, it is most appropriate and correct to describe it as 
 u a synthesis of simple apprehensions 11 under necessary relations 
 — a natural, spontaneous, primitive Judgment, free from all re- 
 flection and all negation. 
 
 " The apprehension of the manifold elements given in pres- 
 entation, and the combination of them into one whole is the 
 synthesis of apprehensions." — Kant, "By the word synthesis, 
 in its most general signification, I understand the process of join- 
 ing different representations [presentations] to each other, and of 
 comprehending their diversity imder one cognition [notion] . . . 
 a blind, but indispensable function of the soul, without which 
 we should have no cognition whatever, but of the workings of 
 which we are seldom even conscious." — Kant: "Critique of 
 Pure Reason," p. 62. 
 
 Judgment, the Faculty of Relations. "If we really 
 know the objective relations of things we must have some facul- 
 ty of pure, immediate cognition of relations, because a relation is 
 not a sensation. "The discernment of relation is in no case a 
 work of sense."— M Ansel. 
 
 " A relation is not a passion, nor the cause of a passion . . . 
 it is an intellectual, not a sensitive cognition." — Hamilton: 
 "Philos.," p. 381. 
 
 " We have an intuition — a mental vision or perception of re- 
 lation."— Lewis : " Problems," etc., p. 346. 
 
 (n) Relations under which the Indivisible Ego 
 unites Percepts and Ideas into First Notions or Primi- 
 tive Cognitions. 1. The first and most fundamental relation 
 under which, or by which, the mind unites percepts and ideas is 
 that of Reciprocality (—mutual contrast and mutual implica- 
 tion). Every psychical phenomenon is the product of two factors, 
 subject and object, and these are known in correlation and con- 
 trast. 
 
 2. The next relation under which the mind unites percepts 
 and ideas is that of Number (numerical relations). " In the 
 knowledge of existences external to ourselves we first affirm a 
 plurality of animated existences."— Ueberweg : " Logic," p. 92. 
 
— 96— 
 
 3. The third relation under which the mind unites percepts 
 and ideas is Time (succession of changes). " Time is manifested 
 in the form of a relation of successive modes of consciousness" 
 in the one permanent subject. — Mansel : " Ency. Britt." xiv, p. 
 562. " Time is the succession of different states in the same en- 
 during existence." — Calderwood : " Philos. of the Infinite," p. 
 311. " Time is the order (relation) of the succession of phenom- 
 ena,"— Leibnitz. Time is the measure of duration, or duration 
 measured by rhythmic motion, or change, or succession. " Suc- 
 cession presupposes duration." — Royar-Collard. " Time is 
 the concept of a certain correlation of existence." — Hamilton : 
 "Philos.," p. 472. 
 
 4. The fourth relation under which the mind unites percepts 
 and ideas is that of Space (co- existent positions). " Space is the 
 being, the-one-outside-the-other, of existence. ' ' — Schleirmach- 
 er. " Space is the order (relation) of co-existent phenomena." 
 — Leibnitz. " The relation of things to each other — their jux- 
 taposition." — Lotze. " It is the concept of a certain correlation 
 of existence."— Hamilton : "Philos.," p. 473. "Space is the 
 abstract of co-existent positions, its concretes are bodies in the 
 various relations of position, but in our abstractions we drop the 
 bodies and retain only the relations of position ; although a mo- 
 ment's consideration suffices to show that were there no bodies 
 there would be no positions of bodies, consequently no relations 
 of co-existent positions — in a word, no space." — Lewis : " Prob. 
 of Life and Mind," vol. ii, p. 433. 
 
 5. The fifth relation is that of Causality (relation of change 
 to power or force). The causal connection between volition and 
 its actual accomplishment, and the necessary interpretation of 
 natural changes and effects by the same correlation. 
 
 6. The sixth relation is that of Inherence (inherence and 
 subsistence). Every quality inheres in or belongs to a subject. 
 All qualities and powers inhere in a substance or substratum. 
 " The relation of what inheres to what exists is recognized in the 
 relation of individual perception, feeling, or volition to the total- 
 ity (identity) of our existence, or to our Ego." — Ueberweg: 
 "Logic," p. 221. 
 
 7. The seventh relation is that of Intentionality (adapta- 
 tion of means to ends). We make effort or put forth ex- 
 ertion with the intention of fulfilling an end ; and we make a 
 collocation and arrangement of matter or material things in or- 
 
der to accomplish a purpose. Whenever we see such effort or ar- 
 rangement in art or nature, we necessarily infer design. 
 
 8. The eighth relation is that of Polar Opposition (neces- 
 sary reciprocality or logical opposites). Correlatives are known 
 together, and only together — " the same indivisible consciousness 
 is conversant about both terms of the relation of knowledge." — 
 Hamilton. Finite — Infinite ; Conditioned — Unconditioned; 
 Unity — Plurality ; Identity — Diversity ; these are necessary cor- 
 relates in polar opposition. 
 
 Necessary truths " are of a dual character, taking the form 
 of a magnet with two poles." — Tyxdall. " The two poles of a 
 magnet are opposed as implying each other ; neither pole can be 
 isolated, and if the magnet is broken in two, each part presents 
 the two poles."— Murphy. 
 
 8. The ninth relation is that of Obligation or Duty. The 
 relation of personality to personality is one of reciprocal obliga- 
 tions. The person has natural and inalienable rights, and rights 
 are the exact measure of duties. Dependence, and subjection to 
 the Absolute Personality involves obligation. 
 
 Note. — "The mathematical relations (number, time, space 
 and equality) are common to the outer and the inner world, and 
 here we may look for the complete correspondence between our 
 conceptions and the objects which excite them." — Helmholtz : 
 "Popular Lectures," pp. 315,310. The metaphysical relations 
 (inherence, causality, intentionality and reciprocality) belong- 
 immediately to the inner world of cognition and thought, and, 
 on the authority of reason, are applied, as necessary data, to the 
 interpretation of the outer world of sensible phenomena. 
 
 subject relation object 
 
 Self as an animated extend- 
 ed organism. 
 
 (The psychological Ego) 
 Self as a unit— as single. 
 
 Self as IDENTICAL 
 
 Self as having locomotive en- 
 ergy— as changing position. 
 Self as a power— as making 
 effort 
 
 Self as a permanent sub- 
 ject. 
 
 Self as a law — as having a 
 purpose. 
 
 Self as dependent and con- 
 ditioned. 
 
 Self as a person, as free and 
 yet under law. 
 
 RECIPROCALITY 
 
 NUMBER 
 
 TI3IE 
 
 SPACE 
 
 CAUSALITY 
 
 INHERENCE 
 
 INTENTIONALITY 
 
 POLAR OPPOSITION 
 
 Not-self as extended, visi- 
 ble, etc., affecting the or- 
 ganism. 
 
 Not-self as distinct and plu- 
 ral. 
 
 Not-self as diverse and suc- 
 cessive. 
 
 Not-self as having place, 
 position, etc. 
 
 Not-self as moved and 
 changed. 
 
 Not-self as the fleeting, 
 changeful phenomena. 
 Not-self as subordinated to 
 a purpose. 
 
 Not-self as an Infinite Be- 
 ing.self-existent and uncon- 
 ditioned,\vho conditions all. 
 Not-self as an Absolute 
 Personality, imposing Lav>~, 
 and holding to account. 
 
—98— 
 
 (in.) ORDER in which— PROCESS by which Percepts 
 and Ideas are Combined and Coordinated so as to Con- 
 stitute First Notions. 
 
 1. The primitive, original percept of Self, (in the empirical 
 not the metaphysical sense) that is, the feeling of Self as exist- 
 ent and as making effort (Self-hood and Self-activity), is the pri- 
 mary condition of all knowledge. Self-ness is a primordial and 
 fundamental feeling or percept—" the being-for-or- to-self " (fiirsi- 
 chsein) without reference to what is not self, and the necessary 
 prius to the contraposition of other objects. So also the feeling 
 or percept of Self-activity is primordial and fundamental. "It 
 is through this self-activity that we first attain to the notion or 
 relation of time." 
 
 2. The commencement, the succession, or the change of 
 spontaneous activities— innate impulses, feelings and acts, give 
 the relation of time. " Time is manifested in the form of a rela- 
 tion of successive states in the one enduring Self." — Mansee. 
 
 3. The coordination of the percepts of touch under the rela- 
 tions of time gives superficial extension, that is, the extension of 
 our organism, "a certain length and breadth." — Brown. 
 
 4. The combination of the percepts of touch and the muscu- 
 lar sense, under the relations of time, gives trinal extension, " a 
 certain length, breadth, and depth." — Mueller. 
 
 5. The combination of the percepts of touch, of muscular 
 sense, and the inner sense of effort, under the relation of recipro- 
 cality (action and reaction) gives externality or outness — a not-self 
 as opposed to self. " The restrain laid upon our impulses [our 
 activities] is the foundation of our intuition of body." — Fort- 
 lage. 
 
 " The knowledge of the external world depends not on the 
 relation which the world stands to our sensations, but on that in 
 which it stands to our volitions." — M Ansel. 
 
 6. In the intuition of existences external to ourselves we 
 first affirm a plurality of animated existences, and attain the re- 
 lation of number. — (TJeberweg.) 
 
 7. The combination of the percepts of touch, sight, muscu- 
 lar sense, and locomotive energy, under relations of number 
 gives co-existent positions, distance, and direction, that is space 
 — " the circumambient field." — Lotze. 
 
 8. .The combination of the percepts of touch, muscular 
 sense, and the inner sense of effort in varying degrees of inten- 
 
— 99— 
 
 sity, under relations of time and space, gives the statico-dynami- 
 cal, (secundo-primary) qualities of bodies, as e. g., hard, soft; 
 solid, fluid; rough, smooth; tough, brittle; elastic, inelastic; 
 etc. 
 
 9. The combination of the percepts of the " five senses" and 
 ^he inner sense of effort with the idea of force, under the relation 
 of causality, gives the dynamical (secondary) properties of mat- 
 ter. 
 
 10 The combination of the percepts of inner sense with the 
 idea of a subject or substance having conscious power, under the 
 relation of inherence, gives the idea of absolute reality (spirit). 
 
 11. The combination of the l^ercepts of outer sense with the 
 idea of substance, under the relation of inherence, gives external 
 reality (matter). 
 
 12. The combination of the percepts of external sense 
 (dispositions and collocations of matter) and the inner sense of 
 effort, with the idea of end or function, under relations of inten- 
 tionality, gives the notion of order, adaptation, design in the 
 universe. 
 
 13. The combination of the sense of limitation and depen- 
 dence with the idea of self-existent, absolute Being, under the 
 relation of polarity, gives the notion of primal origination or 
 creation de novo. 
 
 14. The combination of the sense of freedom, with the 
 idea of moral law, under the relation of duty, gives the notion of 
 responsibility, and of a moral personality to whom we are ac- 
 countable. 
 
 (iv.) PRIMITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL JUDGMENTS 
 
 (Egoistic, Non-egoistic, Theistic, and Ethical). 
 
 1. Egoistic Judgments. "I exist, I am;" "I think, feel, 
 and determine;" "I am dependent and finite;" "I am free" 
 (with moral liberty), " I am immortal." 
 
 2. Non-egoistic Judgments. " The outer world is a reality," 
 — "is an effect, and must have a cause," — "is a cosmos (har- 
 mony, orderly whole), and must be the product of Mind," — " is a 
 correlated whole of mutual adaptations, and must be designed" 
 (must be the product of thought). 
 
 3. Theistic Judgments. "God exists" — "is self-existent" — 
 "has always existed" — "is the Cause of all other existence" 
 — and " is the moral governor of the world." 
 
 4. Etliiccd Judgments. " Free volitions are morally right or 
 wrong ;" " I ought to will the right;" " I am responsible for my 
 voluntary acts ;" " The good will be rewarded ; vice will be pun- 
 ished." 
 
DIVISION I. 
 
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— 101- 
 
 REPRESENTATION IN GENERAL. 
 
 Re— back, again ; Pr^esens— present=to make again pres- 
 ent in consciousness what has before been immediately known. 
 Memory (jury pi) from fivdo/xat — to court, solicit) — the recalling 
 or bringing back into consciousness a previous intuition or cog- 
 nition (Remembrance, Reproduction, Recollection). 
 
 1. The fundamental condition of all reproduction or repre- 
 sentation is Retention, conservation, or persistence of mental 
 energy. 
 
 2.' Another fundamental principle is that all Representation 
 must be based upon presentation. 
 
 MEMORY. 
 
 (i.) Presentative— Representation.— " Inseparable As- 
 sociation," or Cohesion of Intuitions. The simple association of 
 percepts of sense. " When two phenomena [percepts of sense] 
 have been very often experienced in conjunction, and have not 
 in any instance occurred separately, there is produced an insep- 
 arable association, " so that when one is again presented the 
 other is necessarily represented. 
 
 Note.— This is called (by Mansel, Porter, and McCosh) " Ac- 
 quired Perception," but, inasmuch as all presentation is immedi- 
 ate, or intuitive, the term ''acquired" is misleading. If bj T 
 " acquired" is meant " inferred" then the knowledge is not pre- 
 sentative; if by " acquired" is meant "gained," "obtained" as 
 distinct^from innate, then all our perceptions are "acquired," 
 and the distinction is without a difference. "The examination 
 of our acquired perceptions [?] should in strict accuracy be under- 
 taken in connection with Representative, not with Presentative 
 Consciousness. They are not properly given in the sensitive act 
 to which they are supposed to belong, but inferred [?]... ac- 
 cording to a law of association, from the presence of something- 
 else." — Mansel: " Ency. Brit.," xiv, 572. We may properly 
 ask whether "association" is a case of inference at all. We 
 should say not. 
 
 1. Presentations to Smell (percepts of smell), with which is. 
 inseparably associated the representation of percepts of sight 
 and touch, and the complex percept of direction. 
 
 I go into a darkened room and perceive a peculiar fragrance. 
 I know and say there is a rose in the room, though I cannot see 
 or handle it. By means of the odor I am directed to the place 
 where the flower is placed, and I grasp it with the hand. (Por- 
 ter.) I have previously seen and handled the rose at the time 
 of inhaling its fragrance, and all these percepts have become in- 
 separably associated in my mind. 
 
—102— 
 
 2. Presentations to Hearing (percepts of sound) with which 
 is inseparably associated the representation of percepts of 
 sight and touch, and the complex percepts of distance and direc- 
 tion. 
 
 I hear a sound and I know it is a piano, a guitar, a human 
 voice, the voice of my intimate friend ; I know also the direction 
 from which it comes, and can judge from how great distance. A 
 man strikes with a hammer upon the head of a barrel, and 
 knows in an instant whether it is full or empty. We have previ- 
 ously heard, perhaps produced, some of the sounds, and the per- 
 cepts of sight and touch are now associated so as to be insepar- 
 able. 
 
 3. Presentations to Sight (percepts of vision) with which 
 is associated the representation of percepts of touch, taste, 
 the muscular sense, and the complex percepts of distance, mag- 
 nitude, etc. 
 
 When we look at a sphere we see [only a disc on which the 
 transitions of color, or light and shade pass so finely into each 
 other that we know, if we were to grasp it with the hand, we 
 would feel it to be spherical in form. I see an orange at a dis- 
 tance, this, as an object of visual perception, is simply a rounded 
 yellow disc within the eye, or in close proximity to the eye ; but 
 j)ast experience has lead me to know what are the tactual and 
 muscular sensations usually associated with the sight impress- 
 ions — how it is a spherical body with a somewhat rough surface, 
 and at a certain distance from the eye. Then I have learned also 
 by experience that these impressions are usually associated with 
 a certain odor and a certain taste, a certain degree of succulence, 
 and certain Internal optical characteristics. A combination of 
 any of these may go to form our notion of the orange, and may 
 flash into consciousness on the presentation of the object simply 
 to the visual sense. — (Bastian.) 
 
 (ii.) Spontaneous Representation. "Association of 
 Notions." Relative suggestion of incidentally associated modes 
 of consciousness. Individual notions, concepts, and feelings, 
 which have often been presented in consciousness together, or in 
 groups, become so conjoined that, when one is presented, it sug- 
 gests or readily calls up the whole group, without any effort of 
 will on our part. 
 
 See Abercrombie: "Intell. Powers," p. 103. Brown: "Philos.," vol. i, p. 
 387. Hobbes: " Leviathan," part i, ch. 3. Hamilton : " Metaphysics," pp . 
 431—441. 
 
—103— 
 
 (in.) Voluntary Representation or Memory -proper 
 (Reminiscence, Reproduction, Recollection),— the power by 
 which we bring back into consciousness, remember, reproduce, 
 recall a past mental state or act. 
 
 1. Representation-proper (Form), Imageal Knowledge. 
 The consciousness of an image in the mind which represents or 
 resembles a former object of intuition. It is thus, at the same 
 time, presentative and repiesentative. The cognition is presen- 
 tative of the image which has its own distinct existence in con- 
 sciousness. And the consciousness is representative of the object 
 once intuitively known, which the image resembles, and such 
 resemblance is possible only on the condition that the image be, 
 like the object, individual. 
 
 Note. — The power of representation proper is dependant on 
 organic conditions. When an organ of sense, and the corre- 
 sponding parts of the brain disappear, the definite power of re]> 
 resentation disappears. — Feuchtersleben : "Med. Psycho.," 
 p. 120. Hamilton : " Metaph.," p. 461. 
 
 2. Reproduction (Feeling) Pathematical knowledge. The 
 reproduction of a past mental state, that is, a similar state of feel- 
 ing to one previously experienced, is necessarily indirect and 
 mediate, and depends upon the power to represent the past objects 
 or events with which the feeling was associated. The feelings are 
 not under the direct control of the will, and consequently we can 
 awaken emotion only by the representation of the causes or occa- 
 sions of emotion ; and we can control or change the state of the 
 feelings only by directing the attention to new objects, and, as far 
 as possible, placing ourselves in different surroundings. 
 
 3. Recollection (Symbol) Symbolical knowledge. Recollec- 
 tion is distinguished from representation-proper by the fact that 
 the latter deals with images of individual objects, while the 
 former deals with the relations of objects, and employs these re- 
 lations as the means of recalling the past. These relations are 
 (1) Co-existence or immediate succession in time. (2) Contiguity 
 or proximity in place. (3) Cause and effect. (4) Similarity or 
 antithesis. (5) Sign (phonetic or ideographic) and thing signified. 
 (6) Affinity or logical connection in thought. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 
 ELABORATED RE-REPRESENTATION. Recombina- 
 tion, artistic or fantastic. I»i agination is the mind working 
 upon the materials supplied by memory. It dissolves in order to 
 recreate. Not satisfied with the order prescribed by nature or 
 
—m— 
 
 suggested by accident, it selects parts of the objects of memory to 
 form a new whole more pleasing, more awful, or more terrible 
 than has ever been presented in the ordinary course of things. 
 It struggles to idealize and unify, and gives birth to a system of 
 symbols. 
 
 Memory retains and recalls the past in the form it was previ- 
 ously presented to the mind. Fancy is a mode of memory eman- 
 cipated from the natural order of time and space; and Imagina- 
 tion dissolves, and recombines the past in new shapes, new 
 creations or compositions. Fancy arranges the images of mem- 
 ory in new groups and new relations without modifying the 
 images themselves. Imagination modifies images or concep- 
 tions by recombining the parts of different ones so as "to form 
 new wholes of our own creation."— Stewart. 
 
 11 To imagine is to symbolize — to idealize — to cloth intel- 
 ligible and abstract truths in forms of sensible nature, represent- 
 ing the invisible by the visible, the infinite by the finite." — 
 Fleming. " Imagination is the reconciling and mediating 
 power which incorporates the [ideas of the] reason in the images 
 of the sense, and organizes, as it were, the flux of the senses by 
 the permanence and self-circling energy of the reason." — Cole- 
 ridge. 
 
 Beneath this magic circle of the imagination lies the ma- 
 terial world, above it the ideas of the intelligible world, and 
 within it the world of ideals, which are ideas of reason symbol- 
 ized in the images of the world of sense. The great "analyst of 
 human nature" has well described imagination : 
 
 " Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, 
 Such shaping fantasies that apprehend 
 More than cool reason ever comprehends ; 
 The lunatic, the lover, and the poet 
 Are of imagination all compact : 
 One sees more devils than vast hell can hold : 
 That is the madman ; the lover, all as frantic 
 Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt ; 
 The poet's eye in a fine frenzy rolling 
 Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven ; 
 And, as imagination bodies forth 
 The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen 
 Turns them to shape, and gives to airy nothing 
 A local habitation and a name." 
 
 Midsummer- Wight's Dream, Act v, Scene 1. 
 
 Substitute for " airy nothing" " the abstractions of the under- 
 standing, or the ideas of the reason" and the above is a philo- 
 sophic description of the imagination' 
 
— 105- 
 
 The imagination may be controlled and consciously guided 
 by certain ideas and laws, or it may be uncontrolled, lawless and 
 abnormal. In the first case it is artistic, in the second it is fan- 
 tastic. 
 
 (I) VOLUNTARY, ARTISTIC IMAGINATION. 
 
 1. Fancy (artistic association without previous analysis.) 
 Fancy is the habit of rapid association, which supplies the orator 
 and the poet with a number of resembling or analogous images 
 for illustrating or embellishing his subject, and is the source of 
 metaphorical language. The fancy groups together images, which 
 have no natural or moral connection, by means of some acciden- 
 tal connection or resemblance, as in the well-known passage from 
 " Hudibras :" 
 
 " The sun had long since in the lap 
 Of Thetis taken out his nap 
 And like a lobster boil'd, the morn 
 From black to red began to turn." 
 
 The following passage from Wordsworth's " White Doe of 
 Rylstone" is a good example of Fancy as distinguished from po- 
 etic imagination : 
 
 " White she is as the lily of June 
 And beautious as the silver moon 
 When out of sight the clouds are driven 
 And she is left alone in heaven ; 
 Or like a ship, some gentle day, 
 In sunshine sailing far away— 
 A glittering ship that hath the plain 
 Of ocean for its wide domain," 
 
 2. Poetical. Imagination (analysis and recombination) is 
 a higher form of imagination than fancy. In addition to the 
 single images and analogies which are supplied by the fancy, the 
 Poetic Imagination decomposes and modifies single images and 
 combines the parts into a more complex scene, and so unifies and 
 identifies the whole as to represent abstract conceptions, spiritual 
 sentiments and rational ideas, and thus excite the noblest emo- 
 tions of our nature. " Fancy does not require that the materials 
 she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their consti- 
 tution, from her touch, and where they admit of modification, it 
 is enough for her purpose" if it be slight and evanescent. Directly 
 the reverse of this are the desires and demands of the poetic im- 
 agination. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pli- 
 ant, and the indefinite." — Wordsworth. 
 
—106— 
 
 The finest illustration of the power of imagination is given 
 by Wordsworth himself in the " Wanderer," (vol. vi, pp. 15, 19), 
 commencing with the lines : 
 
 " So the foundations of his mind were laid, 
 In such communion, not from terror free, 
 While yet a child, and long before his time, 
 Had he perceived the presence and the power 
 Of greatness ; and deep feelings had impressed 
 So vividly great objects, that they lay 
 Upon his mind like substances, whose presence 
 Perplexed the bodily sense," etc. 
 
 " In the after-day 
 Of boyhood, many an hour in cares forlorne 
 And 'mid the hollow depth of naked crags 
 He sat, and even in their fixed lineaments. 
 Or from the power of a peculiar eye, 
 Or by creative feeling overborne, 
 Or by predominance of thought oppressed, 
 Even in their fixed and steady lineaments 
 He traced an ebbing and afloiving mind, etc. 
 
 Note. — However critics may differ as to the definition of 
 Poetry all are agreed that in prose compositions we meet pas- 
 sages to which we feel that the term poetry could be properly 
 applied. When Byron said that few poems of his day were half 
 poetry he evidently meant by poetry something distinct from 
 rhythm and rhyme. The poetry is in the imagery, the scenic 
 representation, the idealization, not in the measure or the rhyme. 
 
 3. Empeasttc Imagination ("Esemplastic power."— Cole- 
 ridge). The power which moulds and fashions the materials 
 of sense so as to symbolize the ideals in the mind of the artist 
 and form a language of symbols. " In painting and sculpture 
 we have languages which do not employ analysis [so much as 
 synthesis]. A painting or a statue would be called by some a 
 synthesis, composition, sign or symbol, from the notion that in it 
 all the elements and qualities of the object which would have 
 been mentioned separately in a description, are thrown together 
 and represented at one view. The statue of the Dj 7 ing Gladiator 
 gives at one glance all the principal qualities so finely analyzed 
 by the following description, which, however, includes also the 
 poet's reflections upon, and inferences from the qualities he ob- 
 serves : the objective impression is described, but with a develop- 
 ment of the subjective condition into which it throws the specta- 
 tor," and which subjective feeling it is presumed the sculptor 
 designed to excite : 
 
 '■ I see before me the Gladiator lie : 
 He leans upon his hand — his manly brow 
 Consents to death but conquers agony, 
 And his- drooping head sinks gradually low— 
 
—107— 
 
 And through his sfde the last^drops, ebbing slow 
 From the red gash, fall heavy, one by one 
 Like the first of a thunder-sthower ; and now 
 The arena swims around him — he is gone, 
 Ere ceased the inhuman shout which hailed the wretch who won. 
 
 " He heard it, but he heeded not— his eyes 
 Were with his heart, and that was far away ; 
 He recked not at the life he lost, nor prize, 
 But where his rude hut by the Danube lay: 
 There were his young barbarians all at play, 
 There was their Dacian mother— he, their sire, 
 Butchered to make a Roman holiday ! 
 All this rushed with his blood— shall he expire 
 And unavenged? Arise ! ye Goths, and glut your ire ! " 
 
 Byron , 
 
 4. Scientific Imagination. That power of the imagina- 
 tion "bounded and conditioned by ccoperant reason" by which, 
 from our present verified knowledge of forms of energy, causal 
 relations and laws, we are able, reasoning from analogy, to con- 
 struct hypotheses which shall aid us in the interpretation of more 
 obscure phenomena, and thus "bind all the parts of Nature in 
 one organic whole." 
 
 " Physical science, more than anything else besides, teaches 
 us the actual value and right use, of the imagination . . . Prop- 
 erly controlled and directed by experience and reflection, it 
 becomes the instrument of discovery in science : without it, New- 
 ton would never have invented fluxions, nor Davy decomposed 
 the earths and alkalies, nor would Columbus have found another 
 continent."— Sir B. Brodie. 
 
 See Tyndall " On the Scientific Use of the Imagination." 
 
 5. Ethicae Imagination. That power of imagination by 
 which the mind is able to form for itself a mental picture or rep- 
 resentation of the relations of conscience, and to evoke ideals of 
 moral perfection and excellence which shall present themselves 
 to free-will as models for imitation, and the highest aims of per- 
 sonality."— Martensen : " Ethics," pp. 2-3. 
 
 6. Religious Imagination. That form of imagination by 
 which we are able to represent to ourselves the relations of God 
 to nature and man. " When we denominate not only the reason 
 but also the Imagination as the organ of religious perceptivity ; 
 when we say that without our fancy no one can get a lively con- 
 ception of God, the assertion may to many sound strange. But 
 experience shows that no religion has ever assumed an important 
 
—108— 
 
 historical character without developing a comprehensive ideal 
 view of the universe, an imaginative view by which the invisi- 
 ble blends with the visible ; whether the blending has the sig- 
 nificance of a mere myth, or symbol or connects itself with a divine 
 revelation. — Martensen : "Dogmatics," p. 9. 
 
 (II) INVOLUNTARY, FANTASTIC IMAGINATION. 
 
 1. Reverie. Here the succession of mental images is auto- 
 matic. The mind abandons itself without choice of subjects, 
 without control over the mental train, to the involuntary associa- 
 tions of the imagination. " Reverie and castle-building is a kind 
 of waking dream, and does not differ from dreaming, except by 
 the consciousness which accompanies it." "There is a pleasure 
 attached to its illusions which renders it seductive and dangerous. 
 The mind, by indulging in this disposition, becomes enervated; 
 it acquires the habit of a pleasing idleness, loses its activity, and 
 at length even the power and desire of action."— Wixslow : 
 " On the Brain and Mind," p. 277. 
 
 2. Dreaming. Dreaming is nothing more than the occupa- 
 tion of the mind in sleep with the pictorial world of the imagi- 
 nation. "As the closed senses afford it no materials, the mind, 
 ever active, must make use of the stores which memory supplies, 
 but as its motor influence is organically suspender], it cannot in- 
 dependently dispose of its store. Thence arises a condition in 
 which the mind looks, as it were, on the play of the images 
 within itself."— Feuchterslebex : " Med. Psycho.," p. 163. 
 
 In dreaming, phases of intellectual vigor and states of men- 
 tal acuteness are developed which were not normal manifesta- 
 tions during the waking hours. The most exquisite creations of 
 poetic fancy have been engendered under these circumstances. 
 " The dullest wight is at times a Shakspere in his dreams." 
 During the hours of sleep "the intellect has with rapidity solved 
 subtle questions, which had puzzled and perplexed the mind 
 when in full and unfettered exercise of its waking faculties. 
 Difficult mathematical problems ; knotty and disputed questions 
 in the science of morals ; abstruse points of philosophy, have 
 (according to accredited testimony) found the right solution dur- 
 ing the solemn darkness of night, and periods of profoundest 
 sleep."— WixsiiOw: " Obscure Diseases of the Brain," etc., p. 47. 
 
 Condorcet finished in sleep a difficult calculation which had 
 puzzled him all the previous day. Condillac says, that when en- 
 
— 109— 
 
 gaged in his " Cours d 1 Etude " he frequently developed and fin- 
 ished in his dreams a subject which he had broken off before 
 retiring to rest. Coleridge's poetical fragment " Kubla Khan" 
 was composed during sleep. Sir Isaac Newton is alleged to have 
 solved a subtle mathematical problem whilst sleeping. And it is 
 said that we owe the famous sonata, by Tartini, called the 
 " Devil's Sonata," to a dream in which Tartini heard the devil 
 execute it on the violin. 
 
 See DeBoismont " On Dreams, Hallucinations," etc., pp 202, 204. "Winslow: 
 " Brain and Mind," pp. 46, 53. Aberceombie : " Intellectual Powers," pp. 
 214, 236. Carpenter : •' Mental Physio.," pp. 584-591. 
 
 Note. — The mind is always active even when the senses are 
 torpid. That we, in fact, never sleep without dreaming is placed 
 beyond doubt, not so much from reasoning a priori on the un- 
 ceasing activity of the mind as from the observation that when 
 we are suddenly awakened we are conscious of an image just van- 
 ishing. If it were not so sleep would be death. — Feuchtersee- 
 ben: "Med. Psy.," pp. 164-165. Hamilton: "Metaphysics," 
 pp. 224-234. 
 
 3. Somnambulism. Dreaming carried to a pathological ex- 
 tent furnishes the phenomena of sleep-walking. The controlling 
 or directing power of the will seems entirely suspended. But 
 the Somnambulist differs from the ordinary dreamer in possess- 
 ing such a control over his nervo-muscular apparatus as to be able 
 to execute, or at any rate to attempt whatever it may be in his 
 mind to do ; while some of the inlets to sensation ordinarily re- 
 main open, so that the Somnambulist may hear, though he does 
 not see orfeel, or may feel while he does not see or hear. The 
 phenomena of Somnambulism present a curious diversity, 
 which in some respects correspond to the difference between ab- 
 straction and reverie. " A. mathematician will work out a diffi- 
 cult problem ; an Orator will make a most effective speech ; a 
 Preacher will address an imaginary congregation with such di- 
 rectness and pathos as deeply to move his real auditors ; a Musi- 
 cian will draw forth most enchanting harmonies from his accus- 
 tomed instrument ; a Poet will improvise a torrent of verses ; a 
 mimic will keep the spectators in a roar of laughter at the droll- 
 ness of his imitations. The reasoning processes may be carried 
 on with remarkable accuracy and clearness, so that the conclu- 
 sion may be quite sound, if the data have been correct and ade- 
 quate."— Carpenter: " Mental Physio," p. 591-592. 
 
 Feuchterseeben : " Med. Psycho.," p. 201-205. DeBoismont : " On Halluci- 
 nation," pp. 233-259. 
 
— 110— 
 
 Induced Somnambulism, Clairvoyance, Hypnotism. The 
 method of producing artificial somnambulism, consists in "the 
 maintenance of a fixed gaze, for several minutes consecutively, 
 on a bright object placed somewhat above and in front of the 
 eyes at so short a distance that the convergence of their axes upon 
 it is accompanied with a sense of effort, even amounting to 
 pain." This state of somnambulism arising without previous 
 sleep advances through several stages. In the second stage the 
 sleep becomes more profound, the patients become absorbed in 
 self, and in their world of imagination live a distinct, and, as it 
 were, a new life, with some perception of the external world 
 which is not obtained through the " five senses." In the third 
 stage the patients manifest remarkable sympathies and antipa- 
 thies, ask and answer questions, fortell the time of waking, 
 describe the interior of their own bodies, prescribe remedies for 
 their own ailments, enter " en rapport" with persons who are in 
 sympathy with them, and are then as sensible of their condition 
 as of their own, display exalted powers, compose poems, have 
 visions, see things at a distance through stone walls and with 
 closed eyes, and speak in refined language, frequently in a lan- 
 guage with which they are not familiar, and have forgotten all 
 when they awake. 
 
 See Feuchtersleben: "Med. Psycho.," pp. 205, 211. De Boismont: "On 
 Hallucination," etc.. pp. 233, 259. Carpenter: "Mental Physio.," pp. 
 601—610. Titke: "Influence of the Mind on the Body," pp. 9, 31, 43,402— 
 407. 
 
 Animal Magnetism. Somnambulism induced by a " sup- 
 posed magnetic influence passing from A to B." It is contended 
 by Dr. Carpenter, Braid, Tuke and others that no such influence 
 exists, and that all the cases narrated by Prs. Elliotson, Esdaile, 
 Mr. Towshend, and others are explained by the psycho-physical 
 power (imagination and expectancy) of the subject. There are 
 facts, however, which are not adequately explained on the 
 hypothesis of a purely subjective cause. " The magnetized per- 
 son can not only be acted upon, but he can without his knowl- 
 edge, be thrown into and aroused from a complete somnambulic 
 condition, when the operator is out of sight, at a certain distance 
 from him, and separated by doors." — "Report to the French 
 Academy of Medicine." 
 
 4. Hallucination (Morbid action of the Imagination on 
 the Senses) co-existing with soundness of mind. Hallucination 
 is the mental state of a person who sees what no other person 
 
■111- 
 
 sees, and hears what no other person hears, but he is still 
 able to recognize his state as a creation of the imagination and 
 may or may not correct it by the understanding. The ideals of 
 the imagination are converted into material signs, or sensible 
 images and projected into space. De Boismont: "Hallucina- 
 tion," etc., ch. ii, pp. 40, 75. 
 
 Note.— Hallucination must be distinguished from Illusion. 
 Illusion is a false or incorrect apprehension of real sensations — 
 error of the judgment in the interpretation of sensations, 
 altered perception which may be corrected by a further inspec- 
 tion of the external object and the comparison of the percepts of 
 two or more senses. Hallucination is a pure creation of the im- 
 agination without any immediate external occasion or excitant, 
 and cannot be capable of verification by an appeal to the other 
 senses. Errors of judgment, however great, are not insanity. 
 
 5. Insanity (Psychopathy) is disease of the emperical per- 
 sonality, or derangement of the reciprocal relation between the 
 body and the soul. "A certain proportion in the relation be- 
 tween mind and body is called health, and a deviation from it (in 
 any marked degree) is called disease. This proportion is by no 
 means a complete equilibrium, but the perfect adaptation of the 
 body, without injury of its integrity, to the purposes of the 
 mind." — (Feuchterseeben, p. 83.) 
 
 " We are not ourselves 
 When nature, being oppressed, commands the mind. 
 To suffer with the body."— Lear. 
 
 The two series of physiological and psychical phenomena — 
 sensation and locomotion the one hand and reason and will on 
 the other hand come together on the neutral ground of the im- 
 agination. " It is here where the psycho-physical relation van- 
 ishes in the last sensible breath which diffuses itself, imparting 
 life to the regions above and below — to the intellectual and ma- 
 terial world."— Feuchtersleben. 
 
 The morbid action of the imagination on the senses is the 
 root of all the so-called mental disorders. " When we attempt to 
 follow the course and issue of a morbid action of the fancy (or 
 imagination) we immediately enter upon the confines of those 
 conditions which we usually call, in a more restricted sense, 
 mental derangement, psychoses, psychopathies, etc. The idea of 
 confounding the internal with the external world is in itself the 
 idea of a derangement of the relation of the mind to the body, 
 and experience sufficiently confirms that a disordered imagina- 
 tion precedes the commencement of insanity, or rather it is the 
 
— im— 
 
 resting place in psychical life for those anomolies in it which be- 
 long to the physician. The operations of body and mind meet 
 in the fancy (or imagination) as in a punctum saliens; it is only 
 through the imagination that they act and react together. 
 Thought without an image cannot become diseased; nor can sensa- 
 tion without imagination become psychically diseased. Below im- 
 agination we find affections of the sensor and motor nerves 
 which remain purely corporeal diseases so long as they do not 
 encroach upon her domain ; above imagination (fancy) we find 
 affections of thought, feeling and will, which, though they may 
 contradict the laws of the mind (as error and vice) are not dis- 
 ease in the strict sense of the word so long as they do not imply 
 a confounding of the internal and external world ; but this they 
 do only through the imagination (fancy)."— Feuchterseeben : 
 " Med. Psycho.," pp. 242, 243. When the sufferer cannot distin- 
 guish this disordered state, in which the internal and the exter- 
 nal are confounded, from his proper self, he has become insane. 
 Insanity may be said to exist in the following degrees : 
 
 1. Fixed Delusion — (Monomania). The assumption as real 
 of a non-existing objectivity in particular. 
 
 2. Fatuity — (Folly). The assumption as real of a non-exist- 
 ing objectivity in general. 
 
 3. Mania — (Madness). The senseless endeavor to give ob- 
 jectivity to the impossible. 
 
 4. Idiocy— The absence of all correct relation to objectivity. 
 
 Note. — Errors of judgment, however great, are not insanity. 
 " The higher power of the mind (reason— speculative and discur- 
 sive) must therefore be excluded from medical psychology." 
 " The maladies of the spirit alone in abstracto, that is, error and 
 sin, can be called diseases only per analogon. They cannot come 
 within the jurisdiction of the physician, but of the teacher and 
 the clergyman, who again are called physicians per. analogiam." 
 — Feuchterseeben. 
 
 The views presented above as to the nature of insanity, are 
 confirmed by the fact that the most effectual remedies in the 
 treatment of the insane are psychical remedies, especially those 
 which act upon the imagination, as that is the immediate atrium 
 to physical effects— the birth-place of the images which form the 
 mind. 
 
DIVISION I. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PART I. 
 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (B.) DYNAMICS. 
 
 III. 
 
 REFLECTIVE (Symbolical) CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 UNDERSTANDING. 
 
 First Form of the Understanding CONCEPTION— Comparative Abstraction. 
 Second Form PREDICATION— Logical Affirmation. 
 
 Third Form IDEATION— Immediate Abstraction. 
 
 Fourth Form ILLATION— Logical Inference. 
 
 Fifth Form INTEGRATION— Complete Unification. 
 
 UNDERSTANDING.— Coleridge. Verstand.— Kant. Dis- 
 cursive Reason.— Whewell. Elaborative Faculty.— Hamilton. 
 Dianoetic Faculty. — Aristotle. 
 
 1. Definition. The understanding is, in general, the Re- 
 flective Faculty, the faculty of thought-proper, which deals 
 solely with relations (ratiocination — setting in relation). It is the 
 whole of our intellectual nature in exercise in its discursive, re- 
 flective processes. Its function is to bring the multiplicity and 
 diversity of presentation and representation (of spontaneous and 
 representative consciousness) into the higher unity of rea- 
 son. The understanding deals with the relation of the particu- 
 lar to the general, and of the general to the universal; — the rela- 
 tion of the empirical to the rational, the fleeting to the perma- 
 
—m— 
 
 nent, the phenomenal to the real, the finite to the infinite, the 
 temporal to the eternal. Conditioned Existence to Uncon- 
 ditioned Being. 
 
 " I use the word understanding, not for the noetic faculty, 
 intellect proper, or place of principle, but for the dianoetic facul- 
 ty in the widest sense, for the faculty of relation .... and this 
 is the meaning in which Verstand is now employed by the Ger- 
 mans."— Hamilton : " Discussions," p. 12. 
 
 11 The function of the speculative intellect, or the understand- 
 ing is thought, or the mediate representation which consists in 
 this, that a given manifold of representations is bound up into a 
 higher unity."— Krug : "Fund. Philos.," p. 35. 
 
 " There is one faculty in man by which he comprehends and 
 embodies in his belief first principles which cannot be proved, 
 which must be received on authority ; there is another by which, 
 when a new fact is laid before the mind, he can show that it is 
 in conformity with some principle possessed before. One process 
 resembles the collection of materials for building, the other their 
 orderly arrangement. One is intuitive, the other is logical."— 
 Aristotle. 
 
 To understand anything is to apprehend it according to 
 certain general notions, ideas and laws. Under-stand-ing is the 
 cognition of a thing through the relations, essences, laws, and 
 ideals which stand under a multiplicity of things or events and 
 binds them together in a unity. Thus, " we understand a lan- 
 guage when we apprehend what is said according to the estab- 
 lished vocabulary and grammar (laws) of the language. We 
 understand a machine when we perceive how its parts are related, 
 and how they will work upon each other according to the laws of 
 mechanics," and for what purpose it exists. — Whewell : "Elem. 
 of Morality," vol. i, p. 31. 
 
 " We know (or understand) a thing if we are able to bring it, 
 or any part of it, under more general ideas. We then say, not 
 
 that we have a perception, but a conception The facts of 
 
 nature are perceived by our senses, the thoughts of nature by our 
 reason. When these are reflectively and consciously combined 
 we understand. — Muller: " Science of Lang.," p. 378. 
 
 Symbolical knowledge is a knowledge of the relations, es- 
 sential attributes, and ideals under which a number of individual 
 things are coincident ; the relation, or the essence, or the ideal 
 being taken as the prototype of all the individuals. A symbol, 
 properly defined, is a sign of that which is essential and funda- 
 mental in the thing or object which it represents ; it is an actual' 
 part chosen to represent the whole, either in content or extent. 
 It is, therefore, not an arbitrary sign, but a real type. We must 
 carefully distinguish between a metaphor (rhetorical) and a sym- 
 
—115— 
 
 bol (logical); also between an arbitrary sign (a name, or an alge- 
 braic sign) and a real type. 
 
 11 A symbol is characterized by a translucence of the species 
 in the individual : of the universal in the general ; above all, by 
 the translucence of the eternal in or through the temporal. It 
 always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible, and 
 while it enunciates the ivhole, abides itself as a living part in that 
 unity of which it is representative."— Coleridge : "Works," 
 vol. i, p. 437. 
 
 " Every interpenetration or unity of reason in nature which 
 implies a coming action of reason on nature is organic, while 
 every such unity which implies a past action is symbolical." — 
 
 SCHLEIRMACHER. 
 
 The special function of the understanding (which is in re- 
 ality the whole of our intellectual nature in action, in reflective 
 or discursive processes) is to bring the multeity and diversity of 
 spontaneous and representative consciousness into a higher unity. 
 It is therefore mainly synthetical; but it analyses the concrete 
 wholes of spontaneous consciousness in order that it may unite in 
 a new whole more distinct, lucid, determined, and scientific. " It 
 bestows on the cognitions which it elaborates the greatest possible 
 compass (comprehension and extension)— the greatest possible 
 clearness and distinctness — the greatest possible certainty , and the 
 greatest possible systematic order ;" and " from the necessity it 
 has of thinking of everything as the result of some higher rea- 
 son, it aims at the deduction of every object of cognition from a 
 simple [ultimate] principle."— Hamilton : " Metaph.," pp. 
 620, 622. 
 
 In consciousness there may be distinguished three classes of 
 
 cognitions : 
 
 INTUITIVE. 1 i. The immediate and irrespective knowledge we 
 
 | have of an individual object, here and now present 
 
 (The sphere of Spon- J- to the mind, as a complement of certain characterist- 
 
 taneous Conscious- | ies, inhering in a subject, produced by a cause, and 
 
 ness.) J existing for some end. 
 
 REPRESENTATIVE 1 n. The mediate knowledge we have of an indi- 
 
 , vidua! object of past cognition reproduced by remin- 
 
 (The sphere of Repre- )■ iscence, and now represented by a vicarious image or 
 
 sentative Con- a similar feeling, or a representative sign (phonetic 
 
 sciousness.) J or ideographic.) 
 
 "RTTT ATro^TAT 1 II1, The relational or symbolical knowledge we 
 
 ttEiLiAiiu^Aij. , nave Q f groups or classes of objects which partake of 
 
 ,'Ti 1DO nh OTO AfT?pfl P r. ! a common essence {essentia— essential attributes) and 
 
 ( tVvpS?^vmh«H?qT l stand in fundamental and mutual relation. The 
 
 • r^2«5«^!£« ! knowledge of objects as conformed to Law-that is to 
 
 consciousness.. j ideals and en ds. 
 
 Spontaneous and Representative Consciousness present a 
 multiplicity of individual objects and images. These are the 
 rude material submitted to elaboration by a higher faculty (the 
 understanding— reflective consciousness) which operates upon 
 
— 116— 
 
 them in obedience to certain Laws and in conformity to certain 
 Ends.— Hamilton : " Logic," p. 10. 
 
 The Understanding not an Intuitive Power. It is 
 one of the most important canons of Philosophy that u the 
 Understanding has no power of intuition?' 1 consequently nothing 
 can be coNceived that was not previously PERceived (by sense or 
 reason). "The act of thought cannot create its own object." 
 All thought being mediate and relational, it requires to be based 
 upon an immediate, and in a certain sort, absolute knowledge of 
 the real objects and related terms, given in spontaneous con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 11 Reflection creates nothing, can create nothing; everything 
 exists previous to reflection in the (spontaneous) consciousness, 
 but everything pre-exists there as a confused and obscure total- 
 ity ; it is the work of reflection to illuminate what is obscure, to 
 develop what is undeveloped." " Reflection is for consciousness 
 what the microscope and the telescope are for the natural sight." 
 These instruments do not create or change the objects, they con- 
 centrate attention upon them, they bring out their characteristics 
 more clearly, they penetrate their constitution more thoroughly, 
 and enable us to learn their inmost nature and laws more accu- 
 rately.— Cousin. 
 
 (ii.) The Unification of our Knowledge {the bring- 
 ing of the multeity of perception into the unity of reason) is the 
 Process of Induction. 
 
 Induction (inductio — k-ayioy/j — a bringing on, to, or in ; a 
 leading into) is the bringing into unity of individual notions 
 i— the Anadytico-Synthetic Method). 
 
 The term "induction" should be restricted to this use; it denotes 
 a method, which is both analytic and synthetic Synthetic infer- 
 ence is often called "inductive inference," and analytic infer- 
 ence is called "deductive inference." But the use of the term 
 " inductive" in connection with inference is confusing. Syn- 
 thetic inference is only a part of the inductive method. 
 
 All scientific research (whether directed to nature or mind) 
 presupposes an intellectual or mental initiative — a Prudens 
 Qu^estio ( — Bacon) — a forethoughtful query which is the motive 
 and guide of all inquiry — all observation and experiment. " All 
 method presupposes a pre-cognition — a principle of unity with 
 progression." If we ask, where is this pre-cognition, — this fore- 
 thoughtful query, which gives unity to, and is the motive and 
 guide of all research, to be found? The answer is, in the Pure 
 Reason, in Intellectual Intuition, in the " lumen siccum," 
 (Bacon), of the Mind. In regard to each phenomenon, and in 
 
— 117— 
 
 regard to the totality of phenomena we call nature, it suggests 
 the following questions : 
 
 1st. Quails— of what kind? 2d. Qua ratione {relatione) — in 
 what relation ? 3d. Quid est — what is its essence ? 4th. A quo — 
 by what means or cause — how is it produced? 5th. Propter 
 quod — why, for what reason or end is it produced ? 
 
 1. The answer to the first question (qualis?) is reached by 
 the method of comparative abstraction (analytic attention and 
 synthesis) — the observation, scrutiny, testing by experiment, 
 comparison, and classification (on the basis of resemblance) of in- 
 dividual facts or phenomena, in order to attain GENERAL 
 NOTIONS (—CLASSES). 
 
 2. The answer to the second question (qua ratione?) is 
 reached by the method of generalization (synthesis) — the inten- 
 sive and extensive observation of the co-existences (relations in 
 space) and successions (relations in time) of phenomena, in order 
 to attain the knowledge of uniformities in nature or mind, that is, 
 GENERAL LAWS. 
 
 3. The answer to the third question (quid est ?) is reached 
 by immediate abstraction, (analysis) — the decomposition or reso- 
 lution of a real object, or a concrete notion into its ultimate ele- 
 ments, eliminating all that is variable, contingent, and indi- 
 vidual, and disengaging the changeless, the necessary, the uni- 
 versal, and the essential, thus attaining to UNIVERSAL and 
 NECESSARY PRINCIPLES (—The REAL ESSENCE and 
 the NECESSARY CORRELATION.) 
 
 4. The answer to the fourth (a quo?) and the fifth question 
 (propter quod ?) is reached by the method of illation, that is, by 
 an inference warranted by a universal and necessary principle 
 (the principle of Sufficient Reason). From amid the varied 
 antecedents and coexistences, we select one unvarying dynami- 
 cal antecedent — the Power which does the work ; and one 
 rational antecedent — the Purpose for which the work is done, as 
 distinct from the physical or psychical conditions (statical con- 
 ditions) under which the power is distributed and applied, and 
 the end is realized— SYNTHETIC and ANALYTIC INFER- 
 ENCE. 
 
 5. The climax of inquiry is reached by the method of abso- 
 lute integration — the rational and necessary presupposition or pre- 
 cognition of an Absolute First Principle from which the law 
 according to which, the power by which, and the end for which 
 
—118- 
 
 all things exist, are derived, are adequately explained— THE 
 PRINCIPIUM PRINCTPIORUM (" Ultimate of all Ultimates"). 
 
 (in.) Forms of the Understanding, or Stages of Pro- 
 gression in the Unification of Cognition. We have seen 
 that the function of the Understanding or discursive Reason is 
 to bring the multeity and diversity of spontaneous consciousness 
 into the higher unity of thought and reason. Commencing with 
 the relations which are nearest to sense, and most obvious to in- 
 cipient reflection, it advances by successive and regular stages to 
 those relations which are more abstract and nearest to reason, 
 until it finally attains that Ultimate of all Ultimates in which 
 reason and being are absolutely coincident and identical. 
 
 The first stage in this understanding progression is 
 
 ! the union of a plurality of individual or singular no- 
 
 COMPARATIVE \ tions in one general notion or concept, on the basis of 
 
 r\ITY i cer t am relations of resemblance, (I) in quality, 12) in 
 
 quantity, (3) in form, (4) in function— Conception. 
 
 ,, The second step is the union of two concepts (as sub- 
 
 ject and predicate) in one proposition on the basis of 
 
 LOGICAL \ certain relations— (1) of totality in extent and content, (2) 
 
 UNITY I of e Q ua -^y m ratios, (3) of uniformity in co-existence 
 
 and succession— Predication. 
 
 f 
 in. 
 
 The third step is the union of a concept and a neces- 
 sary and universal idea of the reason in one absolute 
 
 METAPHYSICAL < first jyrinciple on the basis of certain correlations— (1) of 
 UNITY inherence, (2) of polar opposition, (3) of causality, (i) of 
 
 intentionality, (5) of obligation— 
 
 Ideation. 
 
 IV. 
 
 LOGICAL and 
 
 METAPHYSICAL 
 
 UNITY. 
 
 The fourth step is the union of two logical proposi- 
 tions, or, more properly, of a logical proposition and a 
 universal principle, which necessitates a third judg- 
 ment, or conclusion, as a necessary consequence of 
 the identity of their middle term, thus forming the 
 syllogism— Illation or Inference. 
 
 f The fifth step is the union of all absolute first prin- 
 
 V. j ciples in one Ultimate of all Ultimates i [principium 
 
 nvTATAmr'AT J pr incipiorura)— the unconditioned Being, self-existent, 
 
 u.muluwlal -j se if. C onditioned, and self-sufficient, the cause of all 
 
 UNITY. I conditioned existence and of all relations - Absolute 
 
 i Integration. 
 
 (iv.) Each Form of the Understanding is a Judg- 
 ment Founded on Relation. To judge {jipLvziv—judicare — 
 to discern) is, in general, to recognize the Relation in which 
 two or more objects of thought stand to each other. " A Judg- 
 ment is the consciousness of the objective validity of a subjective 
 union of conceptions, whose forms are different from, but belong to 
 each other. The judgment, in its various forms corresponds 
 to and is the subjective copy of the various relations." — (Ueber- 
 weg: "Logic," p. 187.) All understanding depends, therefore, 
 upon "the recognition of relations," and every act of thought- 
 proper is finally resolved into a judgment founded on relations. 
 
— 119- 
 
 A Judgment which enlarges or extends our knowledge is a uni- 
 fying act, an affirmation, and "all negation is only the repel- 
 lent force of an affirmation." — Trendelenberg. 
 
 I. PSYCHO- 
 
 (coe'val with the first act of ( 
 LOGICAL consciousness) | 
 
 First Notion. 
 
 5 « 
 
 »-5 
 
 II. 
 
 (i.) Comparative— based) 
 
 on relations of resem- y Concept. 
 blance J 
 
 (ii.) Predicative— based) 
 
 on relations of totality, ^Proposition. 
 equality, and uniformity ) 
 
 (hi.) Immediate — based 1 
 
 on direct relations »f! F p 
 
 LOGICAL < identity, and necessary \ * IRfeT ^ RI * CIPLE - 
 
 correlations 
 
 (iv.) Mediate— based on) 
 indirect relations of ! T 
 j identity and necessary r inference. 
 correlations j 
 
 ^•V^raH^^^l^oo^lTZO^P^Ko™. 
 
 The Judgments of the understanding are all logical. " The 
 absolute Judgment is developed from the sum of all completed 
 Judgments whose subject is the orderly whole of existence.' 1 '' — 
 Ueberweg : " Logic," p. 201. 
 
 Note. — There is an important difference between "all" and 
 "the whole." The first can never be ascertained as a standing 
 quantity ; the second, if comprehended by insight into its parts, 
 remains forever known. 
 
 (v.) Relations which are the Bases of all Logical 
 Judgments. The most vital question in logic, or more properly 
 in philosophy, is, What are the fundamental relations which 
 underlie and determine our judgments in conception, predica- 
 tion, ideation, inference, or illation? What constitutes the 
 
-120- 
 
 unitg of thought ? This is a deeply metaphysical question upon 
 which logicians have scarcely entered. 
 
 The fundamental canon of a sound philosophy is that "the 
 relations of thought correspond with and are but reflexes of the 
 actual relations of things," and consequently every logical pro- 
 cess presupposes some intuition or rational insight, by the reason, 
 of real existence and real truth. 
 
 See Porter: "Intell. Philos.," p. 451. 
 
 All relation \ratio, quod) supposes treason (ratio, cur) — that 
 is, a cause, a law, and an ideal ; and to know by means of rela- 
 tions is to know by means of reasons ; it is to reason (ratioci- 
 nari) ; it is ratiocination. 
 
 The fundamental relations of things can be cognized by 
 thought, for the sole and only reason that they are the express- 
 ion or manifestation of thought. The act of knowing, in so far 
 as it is a representation in consciousnes of the essential relations 
 of things is " an after thinking of the thoughts which the divine 
 creative thinking has built into things. In action the precedent 
 thought determines what actually exists, but in knowing the 
 actual existence, in itself conformable to reason, determines the 
 human thought." — Uebekweg: "Logic," p. 2. 
 
 There must be a Sufficient (Determinant) Reason why 
 a thing exists, and why it is as it is, and not otherwise — there 
 must be an efficient cause, an ideal or exemplar cause, and a final 
 cause of each thing, and of the totality of all existing things. A 
 Judgment, consequently, finds its sufficient reason only when 
 the logical connection corresponds to the real or causal connec- 
 tion. The perfection of knowledge lies in this, that the ground 
 of formal knowledge is coincident with the real ground. 
 
 The knowledge of the real interdependence of things con- 
 formable to law ( — to rule — to reason) is reached as the knowledge 
 of the inner constitution of things in general ; and more especi- 
 ally as the individual existence is reached (The Essence) and 
 the fundamental relations (The Ratios) are known. — Ueber- 
 weg: "Logic," p. 281. 
 
 Thus the actual existence in nature of a real conformability to 
 Law, that is, to the ideas of the Eternal Reason, is the ground of 
 all known relations— even the relations of resemblance, (which 
 
— mi— 
 
 might be regarded as the most superficial of relations) inasmuch 
 as all scientific classification finally reposes on homology (in 
 structure) and analogy (in function). It is preeminently the 
 ground of all relations of totality (identity and affinity, coordina- 
 tion and subordination) because these depend on conformity to 
 an " archetypal idea ;" and all relations of succession (progressive, 
 prophetic, and synthetic types) are ultimately grounded upon an 
 intellectual, ideal connection embracing all development in time. 
 
 The uniformities of nature, contemporaneous and successive 
 — uniformities in the order of co-existent phenomena (constitu- 
 tion of nature), and uniformities in the order of successive phe- 
 nomena (course of nature) are the result of Law, that is, of 
 ideas of reason enforced by power. It is law which unifies every- 
 where, in all worlds and all ages. 
 
 (a) Relations which are the Bases of all COM- 
 PARATIVE Judgments. 
 
 RESEMBLANCE 
 
 (partial or total) 
 
 in QUALITY 
 
 II. 
 in QUANTITY 
 
 (1) Statical (relation of body to itself)— 
 mass, inertia. 
 
 (2) Statico-dynamical (mechanical rela- 
 tion of body to body— resistance solid- 
 ity, mobility, position, size, weight, 
 etc. 
 
 (3) Dynamical (relation of body to the 
 living subject)— modes of affecting the 
 physiological Ego— sound, odor, light, 
 color, temperature, etc. 
 
 (1) Discrete quantity — magnitude of 
 Numbers, as two, ten, twenty. 
 
 (2) Continuous quantity— magnitude of 
 Extension, as length, breadth, depth. 
 
 (3) Intensive quantity — magnitude of 
 Degree, as heavy, light ; swift, slow. 
 
 in. (1) External outline or figure. 
 
 ttm Trrmivr J (2) Internal structure or organism. 
 ±jn r uivm i ^ ^allocation or arrangement of parts 
 or organs. 
 
 IV. 
 
 in FUNCTION 
 
 (1) Functions necessary to the exertion 
 of locomotive energy. 
 
 (2) Functions necessary to the preser- 
 vation of life. 
 
 (3) Functions necessary to the preser- 
 vation of society. 
 
 (4) Functions necessary to the perfec- 
 tion of humanity. 
 
2^2 — 
 
 TOTALITY 
 
 (reciprocal whole 
 and parts) 
 
 IN CONTEXT 
 (real wholes) 
 
 (b) Relations which are the Bases of all PREDI- 
 CATIVE Judgments (Analytical and Synthetical). 
 
 1. Colligation of similar or dissimilar 
 parts, constituting a physical or integrate 
 whole- the Particular. 
 
 2. Interdependence of parts or organs 
 which are mutually means and ends, 
 constituting a vital or organic whole— the 
 Individual. 
 
 8. Co-inherence (interpenetratioh) of es- 
 sential attributes, constituting a meta- 
 physical or essential whole — the Essence. 
 
 1. Similarity— total sameness in the con- 
 secutively (or derivatively) essential 
 qualities of a number of objects, consti- 
 tuting a whole of Similars. 
 
 2. Identity of' essence— absolute same- 
 ness in the constitutively essential attri- 
 butes of a number of individual exist- 
 ences (molecules, cells, organs, souls), 
 constituting a whole of Identicals. 
 
 3. Identity of ratios or relations— abso- 
 lute sameness or equality of ratios or re- 
 lations,as e.g., the combining proportions 
 of chemical elements; the convertibility 
 and quantitative equivalence of forms 
 of energy; sameness of function in or- 
 gans different in form; constituting a 
 whole of Analogons. (Analogous cases 
 are instances which follow the same gen- 
 eral law ) 
 
 4. Coordination of functions— coincidence 
 of natural arrangements founded on dif- 
 ferent functions -the relation of one set 
 of arrangements | or adaptations of struc- 
 ture to function) to another set of ar- 
 rangements, in different individuals, 
 constituting a whole of natural Affinities. 
 
 5. Subordination to archetypal ideas— 
 conformity to typical ideas, in varying 
 degrees of complexity and perfection, 
 (and under various modes of adaptation 
 to function and environment) in an as- 
 cending series, constituting a serial, 
 ideal, or typical ichole. 
 
 6. Super-ordination (preordination) to 
 an ultimate purpose— conformity of all 
 orders of existence to an ultimate or 
 final purpose, constituting a systematic 
 whole. 
 
 in EXTENT 
 (logical wholes) 
 
 ( Absolute Equality— The absolute equivalence of a whole 
 and all its parts. 
 
 | Numerical Equality— Two quantities, each of which is 
 equal to a third quantity, are equal to 
 each other. 
 
 J ^ ' Morphological Equality— In all determinate or absolute 
 
 forms the relations are equal ; as e. g., 
 the radii of a circle; all right angles are 
 equal to each other. 
 
 Dynamical Equality— Action and reaction are equal and 
 opposite. 
 'of Co-existence— uniformity of the constitution of nature, 
 "the same substances have always the 
 same attributes'— " the same properties 
 coexist with the same properties." 
 
 UNIFORMITY^ 
 
 of Succession— uniformity of the course of nature— " simi- 
 lar consequents follow similar anteced- 
 
 t ents." 
 
—123- 
 
 (c) Correlations which are the Bases of all 
 IMMEDIATE (necessary) Judgments. 
 
 [INHERENCE (Correlates— aUributes=substance). At- 
 tributes inhere in a substance or substra- 
 tum. "All qualities necessarily suppose 
 a subject or substance in which they in- 
 here, and through which the subject is 
 manifested." 
 
 CAUSALITY (Correlates— phenomena=/orce). All mo- 
 tion and change, all that appears, every- 
 thing that begins to be, supposes a power 
 in action, adequate to its production, that 
 is, an efficient cause. "All phenomena 
 present themselves to our reason as the 
 manifestation of power, and refer us to a 
 causal connection." 
 
 POLARITY or polar opposition (Correlates— multeity 
 =unity ; diversity=identity ; conditioned ex- 
 istence=unconditioned Being). All reality 
 manifests itself in opposite and correlated 
 forms of energy which perpetually tend to 
 a relative unity— thesis, antithesis, and 
 synthesis. "Opposite forces are modes of 
 one and the same power, which tend to 
 unity in a harmonious product."— (Cole- 
 ridge.) Opposite concepts are the pro- 
 duct of one and the same energy of rea- 
 son ; " Correlates are known only to- 
 gether; the science of opposites is one."— 
 (Hamilton.; 
 
 N. B.— Of opposites there are two kinds, 
 one denies, the other posits; one is logical, 
 the other real; one is contradictory, the 
 other is polar or correlative. 
 
 INTENTIONALITY (Correlates— means=ends). Every 
 adaptation of means to an end supposes 
 an intention or design. "Nature presents 
 itself to our reason as 'a realm of aims,' a 
 vast teleological scheme, a system of wise 
 adaptations in which all is united by a 
 predetermined purpose or relation of in- 
 tentionalityy 
 
 OBLIGATION (Correlates— r^Ws^oocfc). All moral- 
 ity is based upon the relation between 
 two persons, between I and Thou, Will 
 and Will, natural rights and the highest 
 good -the relation of obligation. Person- 
 ality imposes upon me a duty, and 
 confers upon me a right, therefore rights 
 and duties are reciprocal, and the com- 
 mon bond is moral obligation. 
 
 (d) Relations which are the bases of all MEDI- 
 ATE INFERENCES (analytic and synthetic.) 
 
 f The validity of all analytical 
 Homogeneity of Terms I inference (sometimes called 
 
 METAPHYSICAL 
 UNITY 
 
 LOGICAL 
 
 METAPHYSICAL 
 UNITY 
 
 J "deductive inference") rests 
 ! on the preservation of homo- 
 
 IDENTITY OF RATIOS 
 
 Efficient 
 
 Causality-, Formal 
 
 L Final 
 
 , geneity of terms, and the 
 L identity of their ratios. 
 
 The validity of all synthetic 
 inference ^sometimes called 
 "inductive inference")which 
 makes a real addition to our 
 knowledge, is the necessary 
 presupposition that a real 
 conformity to law (—Reason 
 enforced by Power) exists 
 and can be known, accord- 
 ing to the principles of Suffi- 
 cient Reason. " The logical 
 connection of thought cor- 
 responds to the causal con- 
 (nection of things." 
 

 (vi.) CONDITIONS of all Modes of the Understand- 
 ing. 
 
 1. Attention. The first condition of all thought, of any 
 mode of comprehension, is an act of selective attention, that is, 
 the concentration of the mind upon certain qualities or charac- 
 teristics of a given object and its withdrawal or abstraction from 
 all else in order to accurately observe those qualities and charac- 
 ters and compare them with the characteristics or qualities of 
 other objects. "In technical language, we are said to prescind 
 the phenomena which we exclusively consider. To prescind, to 
 attend, and to abstract, are merely different but correlative names 
 for the same process, and the first two are nearly convertible. 
 When we are said to prescind a quality we are merely supposed 
 to attend to that quality exclusively, and when we abstract, we 
 are properly said to abstract from, that is, to throw other attri- 
 butes out of account."— Hamilton : " Logic," p. 88. 
 
 " Abstraction is the concentration of our attention on a par- 
 ticular object, or a particular quality of an object, and diversion 
 of it from anything else." — J. S. Mill. " Abstraction is nothing 
 more than non-attention to certain parts of an object." — Mansel. 
 Selective attention is " a simple spontaneous power for the pro- 
 duction of which no organic medium can be assigned." — Feuch- 
 tersleben. It is " purely an act of will."— Dr. Laycock. 
 
 2. Recollection. The second condition of understanding 
 is recollection — the representation in consciousness of the notion 
 of a past object of intuition, in order to compare, classify, and 
 generalize our knowledge. This act of representation is all-irn- 
 portant, because it would not only be inconvenient, but impossi- 
 ble to collect all the actual objects we desire thus to compare, 
 classify, etc. The absence of the representative power would be 
 a disqualification for all thought and all scientific knowledge. 
 " Let us suppose, for example, a being in whose mind every suc- 
 cessive state of consciousness was forgotten as soon as it had taken 
 place. Every individual object might be presented to him pre- 
 cisely as it is to us. Animals, men, trees, and stones, might be 
 successively placed before his eyes ; pleasure and pain, and anger 
 and fear, might alternate within him : but as each departed, he 
 would retain no knowledge that it had ever existed, and conse- 
 quently no power of comparison with similar or dissimilar objects 
 of an earlier or later consciousness. He would have no knowl- 
 edge of such objects as referred to separate notions ; he could not 
 say this, which I see, is a man or a horse; this, which I feel, is 
 
— 125 
 
 fear or anger. He would be deficient in the distinctive feature of 
 thought, — the concept or general notion resulting from the com- 
 parison of objects."— Mansel: " Prolegom.," p. 21. 
 
 (vn.) FIRST FORM of Understanding— the Synthet- 
 ic Unity of CONCEPTION. Conception, the act of which the 
 general notion, or concept is the result, expresses the act of pre- 
 scinding, comparing, and comprehending or grasping into unify, 
 the various qualities, marks, or characteristics in which a plural- 
 ity of objects coincide or resemble each other, and denoting the 
 class or group b\ T a general term. " The rude materials furnished 
 by sense, retained in memory, and reproduced by reminiscence, 
 the Understanding elaborates into a higher knowledge," by 
 means of abstraction, comparison, and classification. — Hamil- 
 ton : "Logic," p. So, 87. 
 
 When, by an act of the mind, we have abstracted from the 
 relations in space under which all objects of sense are presented, 
 and by virtue of that abstraction, comparison, and classification, 
 have advanced from individual to specific unity, from the simi- 
 lar attributes of several objects to the mutual relation of all, the 
 result of the process becomes a mental product, the offspring of 
 thought— a concept. 
 
 A concept may, therefore, be defined as " the cognition of 
 the general character or characters, attribute or attributes, in 
 which a plurality of objects coincide;'' or again, a concept is a 
 collection of attributes united by a common sign, and capable (1) 
 of symbolizing a possible object of intuition, or (2) of being at- 
 tributed to a class of possible objects of intuition. Concepts are 
 therefore of two classes, those which are symbolical, and those 
 which are attributive. 
 
 • 1. A >S^/;?z 6o//c<r^ (substantially or essentially abstract) concept 
 is an actual part of the common or essential characteristics of a 
 class of objects chosen to represent the whole of the individuals 
 comprised in the class. It is a real type, not an arbitrary sign. 
 11 It is characterized by a translucence of the special in the indi- 
 vidual, of the general in the special, and of the universal in the 
 general. It always partakes of the reality, which it renders in- 
 telligible, and wmile it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a real 
 part of the unity which it represents;" as e. g. plant, animal, man, 
 vertebrate, mollusk. 
 
 2. An Attributive (verbal, adjectival, relational) concept is a 
 single act, quality, or relation, prescinded, generalized and named, 
 
■126— 
 
 
 which may be predicated of, or attributed to a class of possible ob- 
 jects, of intuition ; as e. g., thought swiftness ; wisdom, kindness, 
 purity ; ruler, servant, officer. It is to this class that the epithet 
 " connotative" is specially applied, because they denote an activ- 
 ity, quality or relation, and connote objects performing the acts, 
 possessing the qualities, or sustaining the relations. 
 
 Extent and Content of Concepts. All symbolical concepts 
 have a double meaning — a meaning in extension, and a meaning 
 in intension. The extension of a concept is made up of the num- 
 ber of objects which are thought mediately through a concept — 
 the number of objects embraced under the concept. The intension 
 of a concept is the number of different attributes of which the 
 concept is the conceived sum — the qualities which are necessarily 
 j)Ossessed by the objects bearing that name. Thus, for example, 
 "What is the meaning of the name 'metal?' The first and 
 most obvious answer is that metal means either gold, or silver, 
 or iron, or copper, or aluminium, or some other of the' 48 sub- 
 stances known to chemists, and considered to have a metallic na- 
 ture. These substances then form the plain and common meaning 
 of the name, which is the meaning in extension. But if it be 
 asked why the name is applied to all these substances and to 
 these only, the answer must be: Because they possess certain 
 qualities which belong to the nature of metal. We cannot, 
 therefore, know to what substances we may apply the name, or 
 to what we may not, unless we know T the qualities which are in- 
 dispensable to the character of a metal. Now chemists lay these 
 down to be somewhat as follows: (1) A metal must be an ele- 
 ment or simple substance, incapable of decomposition by any 
 means known. (2) It must be a good conductor of heat and elec- 
 tricity. (3) It must possess a great and peculiar reflective power, 
 known as metallic lustre. These properties are common to all 
 metals, and are what mark out and distinguish a metal from 
 other substances. Hence they form in a certain way the mean- 
 ing of the name metal, the meaning in intension.' 1 '' — Jevons : 
 "Elem. of Logic," p. 38. 
 
 Scientific Classification and Realism. The numer- 
 ous groups into which animals and plants have been divided are 
 ideal entities which have an objective basis. Classes, orders, 
 families, genera, and species exist as such only in the mind. Ob- 
 jectively, that is, in nature, there is nothing but individual ani- 
 mals and plants. Nevertheless, the different biological groups 
 
— im— 
 
 also exist objectively in those facts of structure which various 
 animals and plants present, and which serve for the definition of 
 such various groups. Natural classification, indeed, though 
 formed by the mind, does not depend on the mind. It is not 
 arbitrary, but is governed by the eternal reality of things. It is 
 not that we choose to separate bats and whales, from birds and 
 fishes respectively, and put them in the same class as that which 
 contains also the lion and the antelope. We are compelled by 
 the multitudinous facts of animal structure, so to separate and to 
 class them. Moreover, such zoological classification is only pos- 
 sible because different animals are found to have like parts (part 
 alike as to their relations of position to other parts) which can be 
 compared and contrasted, and can, by the agreements and dis- 
 agreements they present, furnish us with the determining and 
 limiting characters of the different natural groups. Every bird 
 and beast, every fish and insect, is formed of a complete aggre- 
 gation of parts which are grouped together into a harmonious 
 inter -dependency ', and have a multitude of relations among them- 
 selves, of different kinds. The mind detects a certain number of 
 these relations as it follows up different lines of thought. To de- 
 tect the most hidden laws of unity, the fixed ideal types underly- 
 ing the differences presented in animal structure, is the work of 
 philosophical anatomy. " The types shadowed forth to our intel- 
 lects by material existences, are copies of divine originals, and 
 respond to prototypal ideas in God." — St. George MivArt : 
 " Lessons from Nature," ch. viii. 
 
 See Agassiz: "Essay on Classification," chap, i, §g 1-4. Thomsox: "Out- 
 lines of the Laws of Thought," pp. 116, 124 " On Nominalism and Realism." 
 
 (viii.) SECOND FORM of Understanding— PREDI- 
 CATION. 
 
 A Predicative Judgment (Logical Affirmation), the act 
 of which a Proposition or Predication is the result, is a combina- 
 tion of two concepts, as related to common objects of possible in- 
 tuition. This form of logical judgment is " the consciousness of 
 the objective validity of a subjective union of concepts, whose 
 forms are different from, but belong to each other." — Ueber- 
 weg : " Logic," p. 187. 
 
 (1) All Predicative Judgments are either Analytical or Syn- 
 thetical. Analytical Judgments are those which analyze, or dis- 
 tinctly evolve in the predicate what is obscurely contained in the 
 subject; e. g., " All bodies are extended," a proposition in which 
 
— 128— 
 
 the predicate " extended" is involved in the very conception of 
 " bodies." Mathematical axioms are of this character — such as 
 " The whole is greater than its part;" " Things that are equal to 
 the same are equal to each other;" "If equals be added to 
 equals, the sums are equal." Of this character are all proposi- 
 tions in which the pedicate is said to be of the essence of the sub- 
 ject; whether a part of the essence, as in the predication of 
 genus or differentia or the sum of the parts, as in the case of 
 definition. These judgments do not, in reality, communicate 
 any new element of knowledge, but give a distincter apprehen- 
 sion and larger application to the knowledge we already possess. 
 Hence they are called, also, Explicative Judgments. Synthetical 
 Judgments are those which by means of the predicate add to the 
 conception of the subject a new and additional conception, as e. 
 g., " All bodies have weight," a proposition in which the con- 
 ception "weight" is added to that of "body," and yet is not 
 necessarily involved in the conception of " body." Or, again, 
 "All monocotyledons have parallel- veined leaves," a proposi- 
 tion in which the conception " parallel-veined leaves" is not con- 
 tained in the conception "monocotyledons," but is derived a 
 posteriori, that is, from observation or experience. Of this kind 
 are all propositions in which the predicate is said to be joined to 
 the essence as a property or accident. Inasmuch as the synthetic 
 judgment is a positive extension of our knowledge, it is called, 
 also, an Amplicative Judgment. Analytic judgments a priori 
 are based on the relation of Identity or Equality. Synthetic 
 Judgments a posteriori are based on the relations of coexistence 
 and succession, and of reciprocal whole and parts. 
 
 See Kant: " Critique of the Pure Reason," pp. 7-12. Mansel, : "Prolegom.,"' 
 pp. 93-98. 
 
 Note.— All Analytical Judgments are a priori; Synthetic 
 Judgments are either a posteriori or a priori. Synthetic judg- 
 ments a posteriori belong to predicative judgments; synthetic 
 judgments a priori are ideational judgments, that is, First Prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 (2) Synthetic (amplicative) Judgments a posteriori are 
 either Extensive or Intensive propositions. This distinction of 
 Judgments is taken from the relation of Subject and Predicate as 
 reciprocally whole and part. If the Subject or determined con- 
 cept be viewed as the containing whole, we have an Intensive 
 proposition ; if the Predicate or determining concept be viewed 
 as the containing whole, we have an Extensive proposition. 
 
B. Conditional 
 
 —129— 
 
 This distinction of propositions is founded on the distinction 
 of the two qualities of concepts — their Extent and their Content. 
 
 (3) Synthetic Judgments are again classified in view of the 
 different mode in which the relation of determination subsists 
 between the subject and predicate of a proposition. This rela- 
 tion is either simple or conditional. 
 
 A. Simple. When the relation is simple, excluding all extrinsic 
 conditions, the judgment is categorical — A is B. 
 
 When the relation is conditional, and the 
 qualifying condition lies proximately in the 
 subject, the judgment is hypothetical — if B is, 
 then A is. 
 
 When the relation is conditional, and the 
 qualifying condition lies proximately in the 
 predicate, the judgment is disjunctive — A is 
 either B, or C, or D. 
 
 When there is a two-fold condition, one be- 
 longing to the subject, and the other to the 
 predicate, the judgment is dilemmatic — if X is 
 A, it is either B or C. 
 
 4. Synthetic Judgments are further classified as to their 
 Quality. " Either the Subject and Predicate may be recognized 
 as reciprocally containing and contained in the opposite qualities 
 of Extension and Comprehension [Intension] ; or they may be 
 recognized as not standing in this relation. In the former case 
 the Subject and Predicate are affirmed of each other, and the 
 proposition is an Affirmative ; in the latter case they are de- 
 nied of each other, and the proposition is called a Negative Judg- 
 ment." 
 
 5. Finally, Synthetic Judgments are classified in view of 
 their Quantity. The quantity of Judgments has reference to the 
 whole of Extension by the number of objects concerning which 
 we judge. If the judgment is concerning the whole of a concep- 
 tion, it is Universal; if concerning a part of the conception, it is 
 Particular. 
 
 (ix.) Third Form of Understanding = IDEALIZA- 
 TION (=IDEATION). 
 
 Idealization is that special form of the understanding 
 process, sometimes called "Immediate Abstraction," by which 
 the mind seizes the necessary and universal element [the rational 
 idea or law] in all concrete existences, presents it in its pure form, 
 and affirms it as a universal and necessary law of all cognition 
 and all thought. It is through "this faculty of universalizing 
 9 
 
— ISO— 
 
 (idealizing) — separating the intelligible form, or the essence of 
 the objects perceived — that the mind attains to universal princi- 
 ples."— Rosmini: (Ueberweg's "Hist, of Philos.," vol. ii, p. 49.) 
 It is because man is endowed with reason that there is in him 
 this tendency to "the idealization of facts" of experience; that 
 there is in him "the inherent tendency to contemplate all his 
 cognitions in their universality, integrity and perfection," — 
 Green : " Spiritual Philos.," vol. i, p. 213. 
 
 "Abstraction in conjunction with the idealizing activity 
 passes beyond what is given [in perception], fashions what is 
 higher in science, according to scientific laws, into the regulative 
 typical conceptions''' 1 [or universal principles or Laws]. — Ueber- 
 weg : " Logic," p. 549. 
 
 "In the Republic (B. vi., \. 510; B. vn, \. 532— Jowett's 
 Trans.), Plato contrasts deduction, — which, from certain general 
 propositions that are, however, not necessarily ultimate, or ex- 
 pressive of first principles, derives conclusions that depend on 
 them, — with the process of rising to the unconditioned, a process 
 which is accomplished by the suppression of all that is merely 
 hypothetical, that is, eliminating all that is particular and indi- 
 vidual, and disengaging the absolute." — Ueberweg: "Hist, of 
 Philos.," vol. i, p. 121. 
 
 Aristotle was just as much a realist as Plato, though he made 
 the realities accessible by a different path. His controversy with 
 Plato never touched the question as to ivhether we have any on- 
 tological knowledge, but only the question how we have it. 
 Plato explained how we have it, by identifying the objective ideals, 
 reasons and laws embodied in nature (which Aristotle called 
 " forms") with the subjective, universal ideas of the intellectual 
 constitution of the universe; its hierarchy of essential types 
 and universal and derivative laws come up into conscious forms 
 on the corresponding theater of our reason, by virtue of the kin- 
 ship of our reason with the eternal reason, and our sympathetic 
 share in the thoughts incarnated in nature, so that we read its 
 deepest meaning and essence straight off by a sort of rational in- 
 sight. For this doctrine of immediate fellowshipoj reason with 
 its objective realities, Aristotle substituted a method of gradual 
 approach to them : declaring that whilst nature developes itself 
 deductively — thinking itself out into actuality, from the universal 
 to the particular — we must trace the same line regressively or 
 inductively, beginning with the sensible, which is nearest to us, 
 
—131— 
 
 and gradually ascending to the universal, which is furthest.— 
 Marttneau: "Essays," 1st series, p. 79. St. Augustine, Des- 
 cartes, Malebranche, Cud worth, Clarke, Taylor, Schleirmacher, 
 Cousin, Martineau, Tappau, Mahan and Smith follow Plato. 
 
 i. The NATURE, or actual characteristics, of national, or 
 Absolute Principles. The Rational, or Absolute Principle, is a 
 synthetic judgment a priori, of which the two terms (termini), 
 or correlates, are a general concept and an idea of the pure 
 reason, as e. g. : 
 
 General Concept— Attribute Idea of Reason— Substance (real Being) 
 
 —Change —Power 
 
 -Succession —Duration 
 
 — Multiplicity — Unity 
 
 —Diversity —Identity 
 
 —Means —Ends 
 
 —Rights —Goods (chief-good) 
 
 —Conditioned —Unconditioned. 
 
 (1) The Absolute first appears in the concrete. The Absolute 
 first makes its appearance in the intelligence under a concrete 
 form, that is, in synthesis with individual and particular percep- 
 tions, constituting our first notions. " All our synthetic judg- 
 ments a priori are at first particular and determinate judgments, 
 and it is under the form of paiticular and determinate judgments 
 that all universal principles make their first appearance. " Thus, 
 a certain change appears under our eyes at the moment of speak- 
 ing, and in an instant, without any reflection, and any doubt, we 
 affirm it must have a cause. The child, the savage, and the 
 philosopher are equally certain at this point. No human being 
 can be found who would, at the very instant, assert that the 
 change was uncaused, or had no cause. This is an act of pure 
 spontaneous affirmation — the natural logic of the human mind. 
 
 "First principles of every kind have their existence, and, 
 indeed, operate powerfully and largely, long before they come to 
 the surface of human thought, and are articulately expounded." — 
 Ferrier. (Porter: "Human Intell.," pp. 81, 497, 499.) 
 
 (2) The Absolute, secondly, appears as a law of the mind. In 
 the more developed intelligence the Rational principle appears as 
 a law of thought (a belief, a category) which is authoritative, 
 without any inquiry as to its authority. We feel that it is im- 
 possible for us not to believe that it is true in itself, even when 
 we cannot explain to ourselves the ground of our incapacity to 
 believe otherwise. Pure apperception having become a necessary 
 belief, constitutes logic-proper. 
 
—m- 
 
 II. The ORIGIN, or primitive characteristics of Rational, 
 or Absolute Principles. The origin of Rational Principles is 
 found in the necessary and universal ideas of the Reason and the 
 necessary relation {correlation) between them and actual phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 Every principle is, in reality, actualized by an idea, and every 
 idea of the reason is real, productive, and contains an endless 
 power of semination. The intuitive reason is the source of ideas 
 and the foundation of the necessary and the universal in our 
 judgments and conclusions. All our primitive judgments are 
 personal and determinate ; nevertheless, in the depth of these 
 personal and determinate judgments are ideas and relations which 
 are not personal and determinate, although they determine and 
 individualize themselves in the determination and individuality 
 of the terms. Synthetic judgments a priori are not founded upon 
 external and internal perceptions, for relations are not the ob- 
 jects of sense, neither are they generalizations from sensible expe- 
 rience. They are founded upon reason, which, without the inter- 
 vention of any reasoning process attains its objects by direct 
 insight, and apprehends them with infallible certainty. The 
 reason does not appeal to any authority save its own ; the reason 
 believes in itself. If then intuitive reason is above induction and 
 demonstration, the faith of reason in its own intuitions is purer, 
 stronger, more elevated than our confidence in induction and de- 
 monstration. Ourinferencemaybe perfectly logical, our demon- 
 stration may be necessary, whilst our premises are false. But the 
 principles which reason supplies are necessary and absolute. The 
 authority of reason is, therefore, absolute. 
 
 In affirming that the Reason is the ultimate source of that 
 absolute authority which distinguishes synthetic judgments d 
 priori, we are led to recognize that its ideas are not our exclusive 
 and individual property, and that its authority is not our author- 
 ity. The light of reason makes its appearance in us, but is not of 
 us, and can in no way be confounded with our personality. When 
 the conditions of knowledge are present, the reason imposes its 
 truths upon us, independent of our wills. Whence comes this 
 wonderful quest which is the source of this uniform and univer- 
 sal illumination? It is the absolute and eternal Reason, the 
 Aoyoq, which " enlightens every man that comes into the world." 
 " Above reflection is a sphere of light and peace, where our rea- 
 son [a ray of the divine] perceives the truth without returning 
 upon itself, for the sole reason that truth is truth, and because 
 
—133— 
 
 God has made the reason to perceive the truth, as he has made the 
 eye to see, and the ear to hear." — Cousin : " True, Beautiful and 
 Good," p. 70. 
 
 On the Impersonality of the Ideas of the Reason, see Cousin : " Hist, of Philos- 
 ophy," vol. i,pp. 85-87; 127-132. "True, Beautiful and Good." pp. 70-71; and 
 whole of ch. iv. Martineau: "Essays," 1st series, pp. 372, 373. Rosmini 
 and GiOBERTi(in Ueberweg: "Hist, of Phil.," vol. ii, pp. 490-500.) 
 
 in. The process by which national or Absolute Principles 
 are disengaged from individual facts and presented in their pure 
 form— Immediate Abstraction. 
 
 Immediate abstraction — the abstraction of the universal and 
 necessary correlations between phenomena and realities, and their 
 positive affirmation as absolute principles or laws of cognition 
 and thought. " The necessary correlation constitutes the princi- 
 ple." 
 
 Immediate (not comparative) abstraction operating, not upon 
 a number of concrete instances, but upon a single case, elimin- 
 ates the individual and particular element, and disengaging the 
 absolute element, raises it at once to its pure and universal form. 
 The parts to be eliminated in a concrete cognition are, 1st, The 
 particularity of the object and of the circumstances under which 
 the absolute truth unfolds itself; 2d, The individuality of the 
 subject which apprehends but does not constitute the absolute 
 truth. Eliminating the finite me and the relative not-me ; the 
 absolute remains. — Cousin: "Elements," (Henry's edition) p. 
 503. 
 
 Two terms, or correlates, are presented in consciousness, one 
 the notion of change (phenomena, motion and event) the other, 
 the idea of power (conditioned power, force) ; the reflective faculty 
 or discursive reason seizes the correlation between them, and by 
 an act of immediate abstraction, which has no need to observe, 
 compare, and classify a number of instances, at once eliminates 
 the particularity and individuality of the terms, and disengages 
 the universal and necessary relation in its abstract form. 
 
 On the Distinction between Comparative and Immediate Abstraction : See Cous- 
 in: "True, B. and G.," pp. 56-58 
 
 (x.) Fourth Form of Understanding^ MEDIATE IN- 
 FERENCE. 
 
 Illation or inference (from infero — to bring, to bring forward) 
 is the carrying forward into the last proposition (the conse- 
 quence) what was virtually contained or involved in the ante- 
 cedent judgments (the premises). All inference is, therefore, 
 in reality deductive, not inductive. " Inference (ratio, ratiocina- 
 
—m— 
 
 tio, ratiocinium, discursus. aoXXoyifffioq) in the widest sense, is the 
 derivation of a judgment from any given elements. Deriva- 
 tion from a single concept, or from a single judgment, is immed- 
 iate inference. Derivation from at least two judgments is 
 mediate inference, oy inference in the strictest sense." — Ueber- 
 weg: "Logic," p. 225. 
 
 Note. — The "immediateness" of this so called " immediate 
 inference," is, however, relative, and derives its validity from 
 latent principles in the mind, or from another judgment,' which 
 though suppressed in statement is involved in thought; and if 
 the real ground of the inference were exhibited, the reasoning 
 would constitute a syllogism. 
 
 A syllogism is a combination of two judgments necessitating 
 a third judgment as the consequence of their mutual relation. 
 A syllogism, therefore, contains three judgments, and three 
 terms {termini or boundaries) ; the two whose agreement or dis- 
 agreement we are seeking to determine, and a third by which we 
 determine it. The two first are the Extremes, and the third is 
 the Middle term. The two judgments in which the middle 
 term occurs are called the Premises, and the remaining one is the 
 Conclusion. 
 
 The relation of the Extremes to the Middle term -is either a 
 relation of Identity (total or partial) or a relation of Causality 
 (efficient, formal, or final) — that is, the relation of force to 
 change, of archetype to ectype, of end or reason to means. This 
 involves a division of Inference into two classes — Analytic and 
 Synthetic. 
 
 1. Analytical Illation or Inference, is inference by 
 the analysis of concepts, inference from Identity (total or par- 
 tial). Total Identity is absolute sameness of Essence ; partial 
 Identity is relative sameness, unity perceived under plurality, 
 constituting a logical whole. 
 
 Hamilton calls this "deductive inference," also "intensive 
 (comprehensive) deductive syllogism." 
 
 " Aristotle regards the deductive syllogism as an analysis of 
 a logical whole into its parts, and he makes deduction [analytic 
 illation] necessarily dependent on induction" [on a priori ana- 
 lytico-synthetical process by which general notions and propo- 
 sitions are formed]. — Hamilton : " Discussions," p. 166. 
 
 " In so far as the true and proper ground of a thing [or con- 
 cept] lies in the essence, to this extent the syllogism rests upon 
 the essence, and since the definition gives the essence, syllogis- 
 
— 135 
 
 tie knowledge stands in the most reciprocal relation to knowl- 
 edge by definition, in spite of their undeniable difference. The 
 definition is the principle of the syllogism in so far as it supplies 
 the major premise," because it reveals the essence; and the rela- 
 tion of the extremes to the essence (middle term) is the ground 
 or reason of the conclusion. — Ueberweg : " Logic," p. 342. 
 
 Principle which gives Validity to the Analytic 
 Inference. All perfect and really valid analytic inference rests 
 upon absolute or relative Identity of Essence (Law of Identity, 
 A=A). 
 
 In every syllogism the force of the reasoning depends on 
 what is called the Middle term. This middle term must stand in 
 a fixed and changeless relation to the major and the minor, or no 
 conclusion can be valid. What is the principle which embraces 
 or expresses this relation? It is usually answered that, the prin- 
 ciple or maxim of Aristotle entitled the Dictum de omni et nullo 
 — "whatever is universally affirmed (or denied) of a class, may 
 be affirmed (or denied) of every thing contained in that class." 
 The relations of whole and parts, or of both extent and content 
 combined, do not, however, give to the premises of the syllogism 
 the power of demonstration. They suggest but do not express 
 the real relation which furnishes to the deductive process its con- 
 vincing power over the mind. No syllogism is valid to which 
 the Dictum cannot be applied, but it does not follow that the 
 maxim contains the real ground. The rule may test every syllo- 
 gism without stating the relations on which the argument rests 
 its force to compel assent. — (Porter: " Intell. Philos.," p. 447.) 
 
 The Logical Principle of Identity. The absolute 
 sameness or permanence of the knowing subject or Ego justifies 
 the assumption that there must be an ultimate essence in individ- 
 ual things, distinct from their individual characteristics, which 
 authorizes their union in thought under one general notion, or 
 concept. Hence the Principle or Law of Identity (A=A), " the 
 same attributes constitute the same essence," or " identical exist- 
 ences have always the same essential attributes, and the same 
 permanent relations to other substances ;" as, for example, eveiy 
 molecule of hydrogen must have the same properties, the same 
 definite mass, the same periodic vibrations, and the same chemi- 
 cal affinities. If these were to be altered in the least, it would 
 no longer be a molecule of hydrogen. — (Maxwell: " Theory of 
 Heat," p. 310. "Nature," vol. ii, p. 421.) Our confidence in 
 the uniformity of the constitution of nature (uniformity of co- 
 
— 136— 
 
 existence) is simply a manifestation of this same principle or law 
 of thought — " the same attributes which constitute the same 
 essence will always be found coexistent, so that if one be pre- 
 sented the rest are necessarily assumed." 
 
 The Principle of Identity, then, expresses the relation of 
 total sameness in which a concept stands to all, and the relation 
 of partial sameness in which it stands to each, of its constitu- 
 tively and derivatively essential attributes. In other words, it 
 declares the impossibility of thinking the concept and its attri- 
 butes as reciprocally exclusive. The attributes conceived as the 
 content of the concept must inhere in all the objects symbolized by 
 the concept (its extent). 
 
 Concrete illustration of the Principle of Identity. When we 
 pass from the contemplation of physical phenomena to the 
 consideration of the molecules themselves, we leave the world of 
 chance and change and enter a region where everything is cer- 
 tain and immutable. The molecules are all comformed to a con- 
 stant type with a precision that is not found in the sensible prop- 
 erties of the bodies which they constitute, 1st, The mass of 
 each individual molecule, and all its properties are absolute 1 !] un- 
 alterable. 2d, The properties of all molecules of the same kind 
 are absolutely identical. "Let us consider the properties of two 
 kinds of molecules, oxygen and hydrogen. We can procure 
 oxygen from very different sources — from the air, from water, 
 from rocks of every geological epoch. In like manner we can 
 procure hydrogen from water, from coal, or as Graham did from 
 meteoric iron ; and all the molecules of the same kind are found 
 to be absolutely identical. 
 
 Hydeogex (H;. Oxygen (O). 
 
 1. In ATOMIC WEIGHT (H=I) 1, 16. 
 
 2. In combining proportions (by weight) 1, 8, 
 
 3. In combining proportions (by volume i, one 
 
 quart, one pint, one cubic foot. etc. 2, 1, =H20 
 
 4. In specific heat (the atoms are associated 
 
 with equal amounts of specific heat 3. 4090 3. 48 
 
 5. In periodic vibrations Internal moveO 
 
 ments, when these are excited, the mole- 1 . , fmrtamrii co» 
 cule emits rays, the wave-length of which is f 4 ' 4 Seconds ' 
 
 a measure of the time of the vibration J 
 
 6. In velocity (of mean square; metres per sec- 
 
 ond at 0° Centigrade 18-59 465 
 
 7. In mean-path (tenth-metres) 965 560 
 
 8. In collisions in a second < millions) 17750 7646 
 
 9. In diameter 'tenth-metres, 5.8 /.6 
 10. In mass twenty-fifth grammes) 46 736 
 
 Note.— A fourteenth second is a second of time dvided by 10^; a tenth- 
 metre is a metre divided by ll)io. 
 
 See "Nature," vol. ii. p. 421: vol. vii. p. 441. (The students' attention is es- 
 pecially directed to the entire article " On Molecules'" by Prof. Maxwell. 
 
 Metaphysical Principle lying at the ultimate basis of the 
 logical Principle of Identity. "We hang everything at last, 
 upon the will of the Creator [a Will which is the synthesis of 
 Eternal Reason and Omnipotence]. And it is only so far as he 
 has created two things alike and maintains the foundations of 
 the universe unchanged from moment to moment, that our most 
 careful inferences can be fulfilled." — Jevoxs : "Principles of 
 Science, 1 ' vol. i, p. 168. 
 
— 137— 
 
 (n.) Synthetic Illation or "Inference of Subordination"— a 
 real extension of our knowledge is "the combination of neces- 
 sary truths of reason with contingent knowledge." — Apelt. 
 
 Synthetic inference is the extension of the results of our gen- 
 eralized experiences (predicative judgments) to other facts or 
 objects beyond our experience (the past, the distant, and the 
 future), that is, proceeding " from the known to the unknown" by 
 a mediate judgment warranted by an a priori, necessary and 
 universal principle or law. 
 
 Hamilton says that "the inductive inference [synthetic in- 
 ference] is warranted by the general analogy of nature," (" Dis- 
 cussions," p. 157) , or " the presumption that nature is uniform in 
 her operations." (" Metaphysics," p. 72.) S'» also Cousin affirms 
 that it rests upon " the supposition of the constancy of nature." 
 (" Hist, of Philos.," vol. ii, pp. 126, 127.) 
 
 But it is admitted that the principle which gives validity to 
 the inductive (synthetic) inference " cannot itself be the product 
 of induction," ( — Hamilton: "Metaphysics," p. 72), for then 
 we should be perpetually arguing in a vicious circle (petitio prin- 
 cipii). If the conviction of the universally valid truth of the 
 premises is first reached by comparison of all individual cases 
 (which is simply impossible in regard to the past, the distant 
 and the future) then it is evident that those cases wmich are as- 
 serted in the conclusion must also be included in the cases com- 
 pared, and the truth of the conclusion must already be estab- 
 lished ere the truth of the premises can be recognized ; thus we 
 really fall into the fallacy of the circle when we attempt again to 
 deduce the conclusion from the premises. (Ueberweg : " Logic," 
 p. 338.) All scientific predictions, all inferencs which reach be- 
 yond their data are purely hypothetical, and proceed on the 
 assumption that new events will conform to the conditions ob- 
 served of past events — and if we ask for the real ground of 
 validity we must fall back upon metaphysical principles. Ham- 
 ilton is therefore under the necessity of assuming that our belief 
 in the uniformity of the course of nature (uniformity of success- 
 ion) is a primitive, necessary and universal belief. 
 
 The constancy of the course of nature or the uniformity of 
 causation is not a self-evident and necessary truth. In so far as 
 it is a scientific truth it is purely an induction from experience, 
 an experience which is necessarily limited, and therefore does 
 not warrant a universal conclusion. There is no rational a priori 
 
— 138— 
 
 ground for the assumption that the same or similar causes (even 
 if we understand by physical causes all antecedent conditions) 
 shall necessarily produce the same effects. In other words, there 
 is no authority for the assertion that the course of nature or the 
 procession of phenomena must be absolutely uniform. Science 
 has succeeded in establishing a strong probability, but it is be- 
 yond her power to demonstrate an absolute certainty. This is 
 generally conceded, alike by physicists and metaphysicians. J. 
 8. Mill says, "The uniformity in the course of events . . . must 
 be received, not as a law of the universe, but of that portion of it 
 which is within the range of our means of observation, with a 
 reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases." — ("Logic," 
 bk. iii, ch. xvi.) "The uniformity of causation," says Murphy, 
 " is not a truth of the reason, it is known by experience only ; 
 and the truth of a conclusion from experience can never be free 
 from all possibility of limitation or exception." — (" Scient. Basis 
 of Faith," p. 79.) And Professor Jevons asserts, "The conclu- 
 sions of scientific inference appear to be always of a hypothetical 
 and purely pro visional nature. Given certain experience, the 
 theory of probability yields us the true interpretation of that ex- 
 perience, and is the surest guide open to us. But the best calcu- 
 lated results which it can give us are never absolute probabilities, 
 they are purely relative to the extent of our information. It 
 seems to be impossible for us to judge how far our experience 
 gives us adequate information of the universe as a whole, and of 
 all the forces and phenomena which can have place therein." — 
 ("Principles of Science," vol. ii, p. 465.) 
 
 Before we can extend our knowledge from the known 
 to the unknown (that which has not fallen under our ex- 
 perience) — before we can say that what holds true of the pres- 
 ent, holds true of the past, and will hold true for the future ; the 
 universal and the necessary must be recognized as true, in order 
 that the truth in regard to every individual case may be de- 
 rived from syllogistic deduction. 
 
 In order, then, that the synthetic inference (syllogism) may 
 become a real addition to the sum of our knowledge and a valid 
 extension of science, the major premise of the syllogism must be 
 the expression of the real cause — the efficient cause, the ideal or 
 exemplar cause, or the final cause or purpose. That which gives 
 real validity to the inference is consequently a metaphysical 
 principle, and not an empirical generalization. 
 
—139— 
 
 Ueberweg grounds the validity of the inductive inference on 
 the objective reign of law, that is, a real causal nexus, and a real 
 reason : for law is an idea of reason enforced or actualized l>3 r 
 power. " The possibility of the syllogism, as a form of knowl- 
 edge, rests on the assumption that a real conformability to law 
 exists, and can be known, according to the principle of sufficient 
 reason."—" Logic," p. 337. 
 
 " The laws of nature are those laws [or ideas] according to 
 which the beings in the universe are conditioned by the Governor 
 thereof, as regards time, place, and sensation." " Assuming the 
 existence of a Supreme Governor of the universe, the principle of 
 continuity may be said to be a definite expression, in words, of a 
 trust that He will not put us to a permanent intellectual con fusion." 
 — Stewart and Tait (?) : "Unseen-Universe," pp. 47,60. 
 " The universe is not the work of chance, and therefore will not 
 be found to contain any boundless irregularities, or mere freaks 
 and inconsistencies of plan and principle. The universe is the 
 work of mind, and, therefore, it will, amid all its diversity and 
 variety, keep close to order, law and prme?pte." — Taylor : 
 " Physical Theory," etc., p. 307. " We hang everything upon the 
 will of God the Creator, and it is only so far as He has created two 
 things alike or maintains the framework of the world unchanged 
 from moment to moment, that our most careful inferences can be 
 fulfilled."— Jevons : " Principles of Science," vol. i, p. 169. 
 
 " The truth is, that the ordinary course of nature is a contin- 
 ued miracle — one continued manifestation of the Divine mind. 
 If that course is uniform, it is only because it is what it should be 
 in order to be the expression of a Will which moves in harmony 
 with an Eye which is omniscient, and an Intelligence which is 
 perfect."— McVicar: u Sketch of Philos.," p. 117. 
 
 (xi.) Fifth Form of Understanding— RATIONAL IN- 
 TEGRATION. The grand problem, the solution of which forms, 
 according to Plato, the final object and distinctive character of 
 Philosophy, is this— for all that exists conditionally, (that is, the 
 the existence of which is inconceivable except under the condi- 
 tion of its dependence on some other as its antecedent,) to find a 
 ground that is unconditioned and absolute, and thereby to reduce 
 the aggregate of human knowledge to a system — " the intellectual 
 system of the universe." The possession by us of reason — of a 
 spiritual nature, which is itself an absolute unity, and which is 
 illuminated by the eternal reason, impels us to seek for a cen- 
 tral unity in all the diversified phenomena of nature, which is 
 the last and ultimate ground and explanation of all existence. 
 " The end of Philosophy is the intuition of unity."— Peato : 
 "Philebus," p. 16. 
 
 " The transcendental conceptions of the reason imply abso- 
 lute totality or completeness in the synthesis of conditions, and 
 
— UO— 
 
 seek to carry the synthetic unity which is conceived in the cate- 
 gory up to the absolutely unconditioned. 11 — Kant: (Ueberweg, 
 11 History of Philosophy," vol. ii, p. 173.) " Philosophy, then, as 
 the knowledge of effects in their causes necessarily tends, not to- 
 wards a plurality of ultimate causes, but towards one alone." — 
 Hamilton: " Metaphy.," p. 41. "The inevitable tendency of 
 our intelligence is towards a philosophy radically theological, so 
 often as we seek to penetrate, on whatever pretense, into the in- 
 timate nature of phenomena." — Comte: " Pos. Philos.," vol. iv, 
 p. 662. 
 
 " If the universe had a beginning, that beginning, by the 
 very conditions of the case, must have been supernatural; the 
 laws of nature cannot account for their own origin." — J. S. Mill : 
 In "Westminster Review," April, 1865, p. 135. 
 
 " We cannot think about the impressions which the external 
 world produces upon us without thinking of them as caused, and 
 we cannot carry out an inquiry concerning their causation with- 
 out inevitably committing ourselves to the hypothesis of a First 
 Cause,' 11 (p. 37) " — a First Cause in every sense perfect, complete, and 
 total : including within itself all power, and transcending all law. 
 Or to us the established word, 'absolute.' " — p. 38. Spexcer : 
 " First Principles." 
 
 " The principle that wherever there is plurality or diversity 
 there must be unity hidden in, or behind it, appears to be a truth 
 of reason, and not a generalization from experience. . . . Furth- 
 ermore, while the axiom of Unity proves that the universe has 
 a principle of unity transcending physical law, the axiom of 
 Causation proves that it has a Cause transcending physical causa- 
 tion. . . . The principle of unity is an absolutely originating 
 Cause."— Murphy: " Scient. Basis of Faith," pp. 195-201. 
 
 There exists in man, as the essential characteristic of his hu- 
 manity, a power styled the Reason, which awakens in him the 
 desire, and determines his understanding to the effort, to com- 
 prehend all his necessary a priori intuitions in their absolute in- 
 tegrity, universality and perfection. 
 
 This absolute integration is attained when all the necessary 
 and universal principles which have been reached by the idealiza- 
 tion of the facts of experience are united in one ultimate of all 
 ultimates (principium principiorum) or Unconditioned Cause, 
 which contains, predetermines, and produces all things in their 
 manifold and harmonious relations, in subordination to a final 
 purpose ; thus realizing a totalitj 7 (a Cosmos) of which this abso- 
 lute principle is still the conserving and governing Energy. 
 
 The requisite insight of such ultimate causative Principle is 
 derived from the idea of will as revealed in human conscious- 
 ness — will which is the very core and center of our personality, 
 the basis of all our conscious knowledge of reality, unity, identity 
 
—Ul— 
 
 and causality, and the only form under which it is possible 
 for us to conceive of a truly originative and determining Cause 
 — a Supreme and ever-living Will which is the inseparable unity 
 and perpetual differentiation of reason, power, and love ; the only 
 explanation, and the sufficient explanation of all identity, all 
 efficiency, and all perfection. 
 
 Unconditioned Treason— ground of all ideality 
 
 WILL 
 
 t Power— ground of all efficiency V Absolute Person 
 Love— ground of all perfection J 
 
 y 1 
 
 cy^ 
 
 .See Green : " Spiritual Philos.," vol. i, p. 2. Coleridge : " Works," vol. i, p. 
 196. Murphy: "Scient. Basis of Faith." p. 201. Martineau : "Essays," 
 1st vol., p. 139 ; 2d vol., p. 188. Saisset: " Mod. Panth.," voi. i, p, 32. Her- 
 SCHEl: "Outlines of Astro.," p. 233. Carpenter: "Hum. Physio.'" p. 
 542, 7th ed. Argyll: "Reign of Law," p. 123. Laycock : " Brain and 
 Mind," vol. i, p. 237. Mueller ; " Christ. Boot, of Sin," vol. i, p. 13-16 ; 27- 
 28. Herschel : " Fam. Lect. on Science," pp. 461, 475. 
 
DIVISION I. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PART II 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SENSIBILITY. 
 
 (GENERAL CLASSIFICATION.) 
 
 Physiological. 
 
 Psychical. 
 
 (1) General Primitive Sensation. 
 
 (2) CfEN.ESTIIESrS. 
 
 Sensations (3) Muscular Sense. 
 <4> Special Senses. 
 
 (1) Egoistic. 
 
 (2) Ethnological, (social "ego-altruistic") 
 
 (3) Intellectual. 
 Sentiments (4) JEsthetical. 
 
 (5) Ethological, (moral "altruistic") 
 
 (6) Religious. 
 
 The Phenomena of Feeling in General. (The phe- 
 nomena of Pleasure and Pain.) The term " feeling" is ambigu- 
 ous. " In English, this, like all other terms of a psychological 
 application, was primarily of a purely physical relation, being 
 originally employed to denote the sensations we experience 
 through the sense of touch, and in this meaning it still contin- 
 ues to be employed. From this, its original relation to matter 
 and the corporeal sensibility, it came, by a natural analogy, to 
 our express conscious states of mind in general, but particularly 
 in relation to the qualities of pleasure and pain, by which they 
 are characterized. Such is the fortune of the term in English ; 
 and precisely similar is that of the cognate term Gefiihl in 
 German. The same, at least a similar history, might be given 
 of the Greek term a-aOrjo-iq, and of the Latin sensus, sensatio." — 
 Hamilton: " Metaph.," p. 562. 
 
 Sensibility or Sensitivity is now used to denote the ca- 
 pacity of feeling as distinct from the power of cognition and of 
 conscious self-determination. It includes sensation, both exter- 
 
—143— 
 
 nal and internal, and all the emotions, or sentiments; in short, 
 every modification of feeling which is accompanied by pleasure 
 or pain. 
 
 Pleasure and Pain. Pleasure is the result of certain har- 
 monious relations, of certain agreements ; Pain is the result of 
 certain inharmonious relations, of certain disagreements. The 
 pleasurable is, therefore, not inappropriately called the agreeable, 
 the painful the disagreeable. In conformity with this doctrine 
 Pleasure is the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion 
 of a power (faculty, capacity, disposition, tendency) of whose en- 
 ergy we are conscious ; Pain is the reflex of a repressed or an over- 
 strained exertion of such power." — Hamilton : " Metaphysics," 
 p. 577. 
 
 Sensation is the universal condition of perception proper ; 
 and inasmuch as it is always associated with, or a concomitant of, 
 certain affections of a vitalized organism, it is called physiological. 
 At the same time it must never be forgotten, as even Mr. Mill ad- 
 mits, that " Sensations are states of the sentient mind, not states 
 of the body as distinguished from it." Furthermore, in sensa- 
 tion the mind is not absolutely passive;. Lotze defines sensations 
 as " acts of self-assertion on the part of the soul in response to in- 
 terference," and he speaks of "a power of the soul to produce 
 sensation in response to nervous irritations." " The Ego is not 
 passive, and cannot be, since it consists in free activity. Neither 
 is the unknown object in sensation purely passive" since all the 
 phenomena of matter are forms of energy. " Passivity, there- 
 fore, [in sensation] is nothing but the relation [the equipoise] be- 
 tween forces which act on each other," as equilibrium in mechan- 
 ics is only a balance of opposite and equal forces. — Cousin : 
 "Elements," p. 430. 
 
 Sentiment (Emotion) is the universal consequent of cogni- 
 tions. These (the emotions) belong exclusively to the spirit, and 
 are, therefore, psychical not physiological. Dr. Noble (in " The 
 Human Mind in its Relation to the Brain," etc.) has shown with 
 great clearness and force, that emotional sensibility is not of a 
 quasi -physical character — that it is not dependent upon any of 
 those causes which operate in connection with purely sensational 
 phenomena, (pp. 130-134.) Sentiment is the living and harmo- 
 nious relation between reason and sensibility. 
 
 Note.— The student will please read Hamilton's Lectures, xli-xlv. 
 
DIVISION I 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 PART III. 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 
 
 f(l) Power. 
 WILL J (2) Spontaneity. 
 
 (. (3) Alterety (Reflection and Choice). 
 
 Will is " the poiver of the soul by which it is the conscious 
 author of an intentional act." — Dr. Whedon : " The Freedom of 
 the Will," p. 15. Mueller: " Christ. Doct. of Sin," vol. i, p. 
 28. 
 
 " The most fundamental conception of Mind or Spirit is that 
 it is an individualized centre of power which has persistence or 
 permanence ; a self-manifesting Power, a spontaneous Power, an 
 alternative, or pluri-emcient Power, a self-determining Power." 
 
 (i.) Will constitutes Personality. The central point of 
 our consciousness — that which makes each man what he is in 
 distinction from every other man, that which expresses the real 
 essence of the spirit, is the Will. Will expresses power, sponta- 
 neity, self-determination, self-direction — the ability to act inde- 
 pendently and to form one's own character. Without will man 
 would fall back from the elevation which he now assumes, to the 
 level of impersonal nature; in a word, he would cease to be man, 
 and become a thing. Will, power, spontaneity, alternativity, 
 these, or similar words, express the essential nature of Personal- 
 ity — the essence of spirit. 
 
 See Cousin: " Elem. of Psycho." (Henry's Ed.), pp. 422-428. Muller: 
 " Christ. Doct. of Sin," voi. ii, p. 55; On "the distinction between Powers 
 and Things;" see Bushnell : " Nature and the Supernatural," p. 86. Cou- 
 sin : " True, Beaut, and Good," pp. 287-288. 
 
 (n.) Will as Power, Force, Causality. The will is a 
 real power of producing change or motion de novo. Every in- 
 telligent effort is an exercise of originative, creative power which 
 
— Ho— 
 
 makes the future different from what, but for the exercise of that 
 power, it would have been. "Every free agent is therefore an 
 original creator." — Whedon. "I do not see how it is possible 
 not to recognize an original causation, or at least one which it is 
 morally and intellectually and logically impossible for us to find 
 an antecedent." — Herschel. " Many considerations lead me 
 to conclude that Will, so far from being a result of certain chem- 
 ical changes in matter, should rather be regarded as the power 
 which influences the material particles and causes them to take 
 up new positions" in the neural chances connected with memory 
 and thought. — Dr. Beale. "Man exercises power when he 
 communicates motion, that is, applied force to bodies, but that 
 conscious exercise of power is eminently an act of will — a mental 
 act— it is the Will."— Dr. Laycock. "In the control and 
 direction which the will has the power of exerting upon the 
 course of thought, we have the evidence of a new and independ- 
 ent power, which is entirely opposed in its very nature to all 
 automatic tendencies." — Dr. Carpenter. 
 
 The will is a power or cause above nature and capable of pro- 
 ducing results which nature does not produce. 
 
 See Cousin: "Hist, of Philos.," vol. i, pp. 16, 17. Taylor: "Physical The- 
 ory," etc., pp. 243-245. Wallace: "On Natural Selection," pp. 324-326. 
 Bushnell: "Nature and the Supernatural," pp. 43-46. Dr. Beale: 
 "Protoplasm," p. 121. Colercdge: "Works," vol. i, pp. 152, 263. Mar- 
 
 tixeau : "Essays," p. 126. 
 
 Will as Spontaneity, that is, the will in its own intrinsic 
 nature as subjectively free from all inner necessity of action. 
 Spontaneity not only implies a real causative power, but a power 
 which is under the agent's own control — a cause which has the 
 point of departure wholly in itself. "It is the true and real de- 
 pendence of our actions upon ourselves." — Leibnitz. Spontane- 
 ity therefore exists previous to deliberation. It is an activity for 
 which no cause need be assigned, because the will itself is a full, 
 complete, and adequate cause. "A complete cause needs nothing 
 to cause it to produce its normal effect."— Whedon. " The me 
 already exists with the productive power which characterizes it, 
 in the flashing forth of spontaneity, and it is in this immediate 
 flashing forth that it immediately apprehends itself. We may 
 say that it discovers itself in spontaneity and establishes itself in 
 reflection. "— Cousin. 
 
 Will as Alternativity. (Pluripotent causation). In the 
 midst of any movement spontaneously originated by ourselves or 
 excited by external objects, we have the consciousness of being 
 
■IAS- 
 
 able to commence a different movement instead. We have the 
 power (1) of conceiving it, (2) of deliberating whether we shall 
 execute it, of weighing or considering reasons for and against the 
 conceived mode of action, (3) of finally resolving and proceeding 
 to its execution— of beginning, of pursuing, of suspending or re- 
 tarding, and at all times of controlling it. " The fact is certain ; 
 and it is no less certain that the movement accomplished on these 
 conditions assumes a new character; we impute it to ourselves, 
 we refer it, as an effect, to ourselves, we consider ourselves as the 
 cause;" we approve or disapprove our action, and we regard our- 
 selves as accountable for it. 
 
 " Power, in the only form in which we are conscious of it, is 
 the power to choose between two alternatives. . . . Eamthecause 
 of my own actions inasmuch as I do them voluntarily, with a 
 power at the same time to abstain from them." — Mansel : 
 "Proleg.," p. 277. 
 
 Freedom of the Wile, is " the power or immunity to put 
 forth in the same circumstances either of several volitions. Or 
 supposing a given volition to be in the agent's contemplation, it 
 is the unrestricted power of putting forth in the same unchanged 
 circumstances, a different volition instead. Hence, it is often at 
 the present day called, the power of contrary vhoise." — Whedon: 
 "On the Freedom of the Will," p. 25. 
 
 We have an Immediate Consciousness of Freedom. 
 The human consciousness tells this truth absolutely, however it 
 may be supposed to class with some other conceptions in the dim- 
 lighted chambers of the logical understanding. By that same 
 faculty by which I know that I exist, do I also know that I am 
 free. "I am free, this is the revelation of consciousness." — 
 Fichte. 
 
 " I am conscious, not merely of the phenomena of volition, but 
 of myself as producing it, and as producing it by choice, with a 
 power to choose the opposite alternative." — Mansee : " Proleg.," 
 p. 282. 
 
 " The mind has, and must have this power of free choice, so 
 says consciousness. Cause in the mind is not of the same charac- 
 ter as causation in nature." — McCosh : " Intuitions," p. 312. 
 
 "I am conscious of the sovereign power of the will. I feel 
 in myself, before its determinations, the force that can determine 
 itself in such a manner or in such another. At the same time 
 that I will this or that, I am equally conscious of the power to will 
 the opposite. I am conscious of being master of my resolution, 
 of the ability to arrest it, continue it, or repress it. When the 
 voluntary act ceases, the consciousness of the power ceases not, 
 it remains with the power itself, which is superior to all manifes- 
 tations." — Cousrx : •' True, Beautiful and Good," p. 288. 
 
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