J* .-Ji;' "^ .o* .0... •>•_ iV ... v^ •••• .,6'^ • ^-*...' • ♦- o ^'-n.. 3^ o- .♦^-V. ^' f o\ v^ -ot.-^^ lV^ ^,* .^^ -^^ V^^ ;t» .^ ;* ^^' '•: '^ov* .* ^K "i- ^ \ o > -^v.^^ .^.^^^r "OV^ •- -^^0^ o' V.^^'A:co.VA-r^^. ^^^^^*i^'. -^ - *N 5°<. 0^ c » " " . - o. .^^ .. ' • - ■*. ^'^^9^' ■. % •> ^*s ♦ 4q, o \f* V°"" .*' .■^.^'■v :r -f -^^0^ o' ^^' '"oV^ ■O"^ o» ^' %.^^'- o °4. • A«>' V-'.t; o * \ .° ^^' 7 I vP^ ?" .••^% '> <.1°» • ' ■C' 3^ .* ^^ THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE THE CENTURY HISTORICAL SERIES George Lincoln Burr, of Cornell University, General Editor THE VOLUMES I Introduction to the Study of History. George L. Burr of Cornell University. II The Ancient World. (To about 49 B. C.) William L. Westermann of the University of Wisconsin. III Rome. (To about 568 A. D.) IV The Middle Ages. (To about 1273.) Dana C. Munro of the University of Wisconsin. V The Ren.mssance and the Reformation. (To about 1598.) Earle W. Dow of the University of Michigan. VI The Period of the Absolute Monarchies. (1603 to 1763.) Wilbur C. Abbott of Yale University. VII The Revolutionary Period. (From 1763 to 1815.) Henry E. Bourne of Western Reserve University. VIII The Nineteenth Century. (1815 ir 1900.) William E. Lingelbach of the Uni- ' y of Pennsylvania. THE CENTURY CO. NEW YORK THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE (1763-1815) ()T^ffT BY HENRY ELDRIDGE BOURNE Professor of History in Western Reserve University T^^ NEW YORK THE CENTURY CO. 1914 Copyright, 191 4, by The Century Co. JAN -6 1915 ©CI.A:i91267 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PACT I -^HE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 3 II GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 19 III CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 33 IV THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS 48 • V THE FRENCH MONARCHY AS A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM . 62 VI THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 76 VII THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 88 VIII REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION I07 IX THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH I25 X THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR 137 XI THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 150 y^- XII THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY l6g XIII THE REIGN OF FORCE I94 XIV THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC 2l8 XV IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY 232 XVI THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER ..... 248 XVII A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 267 XVIII BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 286 XIX FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE XX THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE XXI THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 301 317 340 XXII THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 367 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE XXIII THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 383 XXIV THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 400 XXV THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 414 XXVI THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 429 O XXVII THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE .... 446 NOTES ON BOOKS 467 INDEX aRc LIST OF MAPS FACING PAGE 1 INEQUALITIES OF THE SALT TAX 8 2 EUROPE IN 1763 24 3 PARTITIONS OF POLAND 56 4 PARIS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION 104 5 NORTHERN ITALY AT THE PERIOD OF NAPOLEON'S FIRST CAMPAIGN 240 6 GERMANY BEFORE THE REVOLUTION 296 7 CENTR.A.L EUROPE IN 1803 312 8 CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 18 15 456 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE f THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAPTER I THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME THE close of the Seven Years' War brought only a lull in chap. i the great conflicts of the eighteenth century, and yet for jy^^^irsg a time men seemed less influenced by dynastic quarrels, and their attention was centered upon questions of social and politi- Reform cal reconstruction. The policies of rulers were afifected by these iu4?in " newer interests. They tried to make an end of crying abuses, Europe or at least to simplify their administrative systems and to re- move troublesome obstacles to the exercise of their authority. In the last years of the century the timid plans of monarchical reform in France were thrust aside by a popular revolution which aimed to reorganize society according to the principle of equality. The same principle of reorganization was carried be- yond the ancient frontiers of France when war broke out and victorious French armies sought to enlarge the borders of the nation or to impose the national institutions upon dependent peoples. Before the period closed with the downfall of Na- poleon and the settlement of 1815, these two forces of mon- archical reform and revolutionary action had worked many changes in the structure of European society. No brief description of the characteristic features of the old regime can be made altogether satisfactory, because within the limits of a single country, or even of a province, there existed such baffling diversity. Although the proportions of truth are difficult to fix, the impression grows irresistible that the classi- fications of men in the eighteenth century were outworn, rigid, and unfair, and that those who labored on the farm or in the shop were seriously hampered by restrictions laid upon them by law and custom. When Rousseau declared in 1762 that " Man is born free and is everywhere in chains," the second part of his statement was sufficiently exact in the economic and the larger social sense. 3 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE The population of Europe was still mainly rural and its prin- cipal occupation was agriculture. Nine-tenths of the French people lived in the country or in small towns. Lyons was the only city besides Paris which had over one hundred thousand inhabit- ants. In Germany Berlin had just passed the one hundred thou- sand mark. Birmingham and Manchester, the great manufactur- ing centers of England, which now have a population of over five hundred thousand, had about thirty thousand. The inventions which created the modern factory system and have filled the towns with throngs of artisans had not been made. Industry was carried on much as it had been for generations. In the country there were only two classes, lords and peas- ants. A middle class hardly existed except in England. In some parts of Europe the relations of lord and peasant were as primitive as on an English or French manor of the twelfth cen- tury. In Hungary the peasant could not even own land. He was in a sense the property of the noble and his rights were not recognized by law. Within the kingdom of Naples it is said that a thousand kinds of feudal dues might still be levied. Even where, as in France, a new social order had for centuries been displacing the feudal system, feudal survivals were apparent on every side in the structure of rural society. Nor was it a question merely of quitrents and other dues. The possession of a noble estate usually carried with it some governmental au- thority. The lord might be to all intents and purposes a petty sovereign or he might retain merely shreds of his former pow- ers. Absolute rulers did not always interfere with the local sovereignty of their nobles. The kings of Prussia, for example, did not venture to curtail the powers which the lords exercised ever their peasants. Many of the nobles in France could hardly be said to belong to the rural population, because they usually resided in Paris or Versailles. They found life far from the sunshine of royal favor unendurable, and many of them could not pay their ex- penses without the aid of gifts and pensions. The religious wars of the sixteenth century had uprooted them from the soil, and Louis XIV had sought to increase the splendor of his Court by insisting upon their presence. He also hoped in this way to cure them of the rebellious mood into which they had fallen during the regency of Marie de' Medici and during the Fronde. By the middle of the eighteenth century the court nobles formed a class of absentee landlords. Their estates were left in the hands of stewards, whose success was measured by the amount of dues they extracted from the peasantry. The ideal THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME of efficiency appealed to these stewards as to the other adminis- chap, i trative officials of the time. They examined the seigniorial 1750-89 records containing statements of rights of lord or peasant in forests and common lands and of the dues which the peasant owed, in order that no part of their master's heritage might be lost by neglect or through patriarchal tenderness in enforcing collection. It seemed as if a feudal reaction were taking place. Still later in the century a fashion was adopted which prom- ised to correct the evil of absentee landlordism. The nobles imitated the English custom of spending several months every year in the country. Arthur Young, the English traveler, noted in his journal in September, 1787, that '*at this time of the year and for many weeks past, Paris is, comparatively speaking, empty. Everybody that have country-seats are at them; and those who have none visit others who have. This remarkable revolution in French manners is certainly one of the best cus- toms they have taken from England." The change, however, came too late to give the greater nobles any firm hold on the affections of the people or any large influence in local affairs. Among the lesser or provincial nobles there were many who lived habitually on their estates, absorbed by the cares of country gentlemen. The Marquis de Mirabeau, the father of the more famous Count de Mirabeau, was one. These nobles were not rich, but neither were they poor. They were on good terms with the peasants, and if their position in the community was not altogether satisfactory, it was through no fault of their own. There were also many nobles whose income raised them scarcely above the situation of the neighboring peasants. Arthur Young heard of nobles in southern France who were obliged to live on twenty-five louis a year. In 1789 several Poitevin nobles came to their electoral assembly dressed as peasants and without money enough to pay their bills at the inn. The noble's position was weak because his powers as seignior. The No- mere remnants of what he once possessed, made him the principal ^q^^^^^ creditor of his community, rather than its ruler, and, thereby, its natural leader and protector. The seigniorial court, where once the noble dispensed justice as a sovereign without appeal, pos- sessed only a shadow of its former authority. The cases brought before it were chiefly fiscal, disputes between the seignior and the peasants about rights and dues, the obligations of lord and tenant. Other services which the medieval noble had rendered to the community had suffered a similar transformation. He had caused a mill to be built, and had provided a wine-press and a bakery or public oven. He also maintained a market and was 5 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP. I often responsible for the local roads and ferries. Now these 1750-89 services had become privileges, giving him the sole right to let the contracts for grinding grain, pressing grapes, and baking bread. In his name tolls were charged on the roads and at the ferries and dues in the market-place. It was as seignior again, not as landlord in the narrow sense, that the noble could levy a cens or quitrent and other dues upon the peasant owners or rent- ers of land within his jurisdiction. All these rights he prized as the basis of his social superiority. He would not have con- sented to abandon them for a sum equal to the capitalized value of their annual revenue. As the royal government did not usually entrust him with local administrative duties, he had little or no opportunity to gain political leadership. His social position and his financial privileges, therefore, lacked the ordinary means of defense. ^^^ If the position of the French noble was weak, that of the peas- ant was wretched. He has been called by Taine the " beast of burden " of the old regime. His miseries sprang from no single cause. They were due to the system of landholding, the weight of taxation, and to the backward state of agriculture. Only a million and a half peasants, and perhaps fewer, chiefly in the eastern and northeastern provinces, were serfs; the other nine- teen or twenty million were owners of their farms, or renters, or agricultural laborers. In France more than in any other coun- try of Europe the peasant was an owner of the soil. His owner- ship, however, was still burdened with charges, which were a heritage from the feudal system, for the country was covered by a network of noble or ecclesiastical seigniories. Nevertheless, the peasant who could sell, bequeath, or mortgage his prop- erty must be described as its owner. In this sense there were multitudes of peasant proprietors. They held nearly one-half of all the farm land. In some parts of the south they owned still more. In the north their share was smaller, falling as low as thirty-three per cent, in a few places.^ The nobles owned from fifteen to twenty per cent., the middle class of the towns about as much, and the clergy considerably less. Besides the peasant proprietors there were many other peasants who cultivated the land for a part, usually half, of the produce, and who were fur- nished with house, half of the stock, and seeds. There were ' Exact knowledge of the extent of peasant property in France is due - mainly to the researches of M. Loutchisky. See his L'^tat des classes agricoles en France a la veille de la Revolution, or the review of his con- clusions in an article by M. S6e in the Revue d' Histoire Modeme et Con- temporaine, XVIII. 257-267. THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME also prosperous peasants who rented large farms, especially in chap.i the north and northwest. 1750-89 The feudal or seigniorial charges were vexatious rather than Feudal heavy. In addition to the cens or ground rent, the peasant had to ^^^^ pay dues called the champart or terrage, which amounted to a small percentage of the produce of the farm. These dues varied greatly throughout the country in name and character. Other dues commonly called lods et ventes, which must be paid if the land was sold, sometimes took as much as a third of the selling price and decreased the market value of the land. The seignior could oflfer the price and take the land, a possibihty which also lessened its value. In one respect the situation of the peasants had distinctly improved. The right of the nobles to require per- sonal labor had either been exchanged for a small money payment or had fallen into disuse. Even the money payments were grow- ing less, because the value of money was steadily decreas- ing. The greatest curse of the countryside was the hunting privi- leges, which except in a few regions belonged exclusively to the nobles. Restrictions were placed by law and custom upon the methods of agriculture, in order that the game might not lack for food. The nobles could ride across the growing crops. In many places the lord's pigeons were a pest. These evils were greatest in about four hundred leagues of territory treated as royal hunting preserves and called capitaineries. D'Argenson, one of Louis XV's ministers, wrote in his diary in 1753 that the inhabitants of " Fontainebleau no longer sow their land, the fruits and grain being eaten by deer, stags, and other game." Arthur Young, after a ride through the forest of Chantilly, which belonged to the Prince of Conde, remarked : " They say the capitainerie, or paramountship, is above 100 miles in circumfer- ence. That is to say, all the inhabitants for that extent are pes- tered with game without permission to destroy it, in order to give one man diversion." Seeing another princely estate he said: " Great lords love too much an environ of forest, boars, and huntsmen, instead of marking their residence by the accompani- ment of neat and well-cultivated farms, clean cottages, and happy peasants." The tithe which the Church demanded of the peasants was The Tithe collected less rigorously than in England. It amounted to about a thirteenth of the produce. But as the things in which it should be paid were often specified, it restricted the freedom of the peasantry and was one of the causes of the backward state of agriculture. Moreover, the income often went to non-resident ? THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP. I clergy or to nobles, while the parish priest was left to starve on 1750-89 a few hundred livres a year. It was neither the feudal noble nor the Church, but the State raxation which was principally responsible for the peasant's heavy burden. His load of taxation was constantly increased, although privileges and exemptions were distributed with lavish hand to other classes. The evil was partly historical in its origin. The principal direct tax was the taille, which nominally fell upon non-noble persons in proportion to their ability to pay, whether their income was I from agriculture or industry. The nobles were exempt because I the tax originated in feudal times when they rendered military i service to the King. The clergy as ministers of the altar were also exempt. In a few regions the tax rested on the land, rather than on the occupiers, and there a lord who occupied land classi- fied as " peasant " was obliged to pay the tax. Peasants who rented land from the nobles were not exempt from the taille, al- though they were not taxed as high as peasant owners. The tax should have been paid by the townsmen as well as the peas- ants, but many of the towns were exempt, while others com- pounded for the tax by the payment of lump sums which they collected under the form of tolls or octrois. Thousands of in- dividuals who held office were also exempt as a matter of privi- lege. The exemption of most of those whose voices counted in the formation of public opinion made the task of reformers diffi- cult. When the government needed more money, the ministers instead of attempting to equalize the burdens of the tax, increased the amount the long-suffering peasants were forced to pay- Two other direct taxes, the capitation or poll tax and an in- come tax called the twentieths, or vingtiemes, also were collected chiefly from the peasants. The great majority of the peasants paid the capitation not as a separate tax, but as an addition to the taille, increasing it by about fifty per cent. In the case of nobles, magistrates, and townsmen the assessment was light. When the first vingtieme was established, the government in- tended that it should amount to five per cent, of the taxpayer's income, and that it should be paid by the privileged classes as well as by the common people. To render the levy more exact the sources of income were classified in separate schedules, and officials were appointed whose business it was to verify personal declarations of revenue. But the clergy, the nobles, and the judges sought on all occasions to defeat such attempts to equalize the burdens of taxation. The clergy purchased exemption both from this and the capitation by offering at the time of the first levy an unusually large " free gift." They made the " free gift " THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME every five years, which was equivalent to about four millions chap, i annually, while a single twentieth of their income would have 1750-89 been over five millions. The question has often been asked, What part of the peasant's net income was absorbed by the three direct taxes? In Taine's opinion they took fifty-three per cent. This appears to be much exaggerated. The taille was supposedly levied on the net in- come of the peasant after the expenses of cultivation were paid, but as there were no statistics according to which such an estimate could be made the principle remained almost purely theoretical. The evils which sprang from the management of the levy were even more oppressive than the size of the burden. This was Taxes un- especially true of the taille. The total amount was arbitrarily f^iriy fixed each year by the King's council, and it was repeatedly in- creased until 1780, when Necker, director general of the finances, persuaded the King to declare that it should never be more than one hundred and six million livres.^ Until that time, great as the individual peasant's burden might be, he had no assurance that it would not be increased in a year or two. The method of as- sessment and collection vexed the peasant with dangers still closer at hand. ^ This task rested with the peasants themselves. All, the ignorant as well as the capable, were forced to take their turn at the ruinous duty, and obliged to obtain the amount assigned to the parish. In case of delay they were compelled to advance the money out of their own pockets. They were tempted to be lenient with their friends, harsh with their enemies, and timid toward the rich and influential. The only way in which a peas- ant could lighten the burden of taxation was by assuming the appearance of poverty or by making difficulties about paying. The system of the indirect taxes was equally vicious. In the collection of these the country was not treated as a single whole, but was broken up into regions, some of which had valuable privi- leges and exemptions. The method of collecting the salt tax, which was a government monopoly, illustrates the evils of the system. One-third of the country, the north central provinces, the region of the grandes gahelles, paid two-thirds of the tax. There was a region of the petites gahelles where the rate was smaller, and still other " redeemed " or " free " districts. As Brittany was '' free " and yet bordered on the region of the grandes gahelles, salt on the one side of the line cost from two to three livres a hundred pounds and on the other side from fifty- six to fifty-eight livres. The inevitable consequence was smug- 2 This sum includes the capitation and accessories. It could be increased only by a law duly registered by the parlements. THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. I 1750-89 gling, for the venturesome trader could carry salt across the frontier, sell it for a third of the government price, and still make an enormous profit. The expense of guarding the borders increased the cost of collecting the tax. In certain regions the amount which each family must use was fixed at seven pounds for each person seven years of age, and this at a time when salt cost in the region of the grandes gabelles about twelve cents a pound, without allowing for the diflference in the value of money. ^ ■ The peasants were required to work from eight to forty days upon the highways. This was called the royal corvee, and it was in effect a direct tax collected at a time and in a way which often interfered with the care of the crops. Arthur Young said the French roads would have filled him with admiration had he not known of the abominable corvees, which made him commiserate the " oppressed farmers, from whose extorted labour this mag- nificence has been wrung." ( French agriculture, like all European agriculture before the latter part of the eighteenth century, clung to methods centuries old. The tools were almost as primitive as in the days of the Romans and the Egyptians. There was no attempt to improve the species of grains or vegetables or to fertilize the soil. The culture of the vine alone had reached a high degree of develop- ment. Most of the domestic animals were inferior in size and quality. Draught horses and driving horses were an exception. Horse-racing was introduced in 1756 in imitation of the English. As yet there was Httle demand for beef, the poor not being able to buy it and the rich preferring venison or fish. To save the soil from becoming exhausted the peasant left a third or even a half of it fallow every year. ' The sale of grain, which was the principal crop, was hampered by the restrictions which the gov- ernment threw about the grain trade. There were, nevertheless, reasons for hopefulness. Enlightened noblemen, like the Duke de Liancourt, a friend of Arthur Young, were intensely interested in making improvements. Many agricultural societies were formed, and a school of writers calfed the Physiocrats arose, which contended that real increase in wealth comes only from land. The peasant had one resource beyond his agriculture. Me- chanical industries were not rigidly restricted to the towns, but were carried on in the country, so that the peasant whose plot of ground would not support his family might become a spinner, a weaver, or a cutler, or pursue some trade connected with rural life. As he competed with other men working in their homes or THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME their shops in the cities, and not with a highly organized group c hap. i of employees as in modern factories, his trade might furnish his i750-89 principal support while his farm or garden was secondary in importance. The burdens of the French peasant appear lighter when com- The German Peasantry pared with the load carried by many of the German peasants, especially by those living east of the Elbe. Here the rights of the nobles did not have the sanction of antiquity, as in France, for until money replaced barter and personal services were trans- formed into perpetual rent charges the German peasant had been usually a free man, cultivating his share of the village lands or occupying a farm, the rent of which he paid in produce or in labor. When the noble ceased to be a knight obliged to furnish military aid to his territorial prince, he found it to his advantage to transform his ancient prerogatives into the rights of a seign- iorial landed proprietor. Then, because he had the power, and because the territorial prince was more concerned with establish- ing his own position as a sovereign than with the condition of the peasants, he frequently added new rights to the old, until, by the eighteenth century, the peasant nearly everywhere in Germany had sunk into the condition of a dependent or subject of the noble, possessing few of the ordinary privileges of the free farmer. The situation of the German peasant varied in the different provinces or states. In the valleys of the Rhine and the Main, in central Germany, on the slopes of the Alps, and in the Austrian duchies, not much actual serfdom existed, although the peasants were subject to dues and services. In the Prussian provinces of Cleves and Mark most of the peasants were free, while in other Prussian provinces west of the Elbe they had lost their freedom, and were subject to burdensome dues such as the heriot, which, at the peasant's death, gave half his personal property to the lord. But it was east of the Elbe — in Prussia proper, in Pomerania, and in the duchies of Mecklenburg — that serfdom was most widely extended. When Stein traveled through Mecklenburg, as late as 1802, he found " the whole laboring class under the pressure of serfdom," and the abode of the nobleman seemed to him " as the lair of a wild beast, who desolates everything round him and surrounds himself with the silence of the grave." ^ Within the states of the King of Prussia the peasants on the peasant royal domains were better off than the others, for the King's pjy"'^^'^ right over his property would support him in an attempt to im- 3 Quoted by J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, I. 132. THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. I prove their condition, even against the protest of lease-holders. 1750-89 But the lords would invoke the same principle of property, if the King attempted to introduce changes in the condition of the peasants on their domains. The peasant could not be sure of being permitted to retain his farm nor did he possess the right to transmit his land to his heirs. The lord could select the son who should succeed to the farm. If the tenant was old or feeble, or incapable of cultivating his land, the lord might compel him to cede it to another more likely to fulfil the duties of a depend- ent. Without the lord's consent the peasant could not sell the land, nor put it in pledge, nor even borrow. There was danger also that the lords would use the power of eviction as a means of enlarging their own domains at the expense of the peasant. The result would be a reduction of the peasant population. At this point the Prussian monarchs asserted their right of protection, in order to be sure of having recruits for the army. Frederick William I issued a decree guaranteeing the peasants of Prussia and Pomerania a better tenant right, but he required from them the promise not to leave their farms nor send away their children, and he made no change in their customary obliga- tions. The decree was not carried out, even on the royal do- mains, for the local officials, many of whom belonged to the nobiUty, felt that it endangered their rights. Nevertheless, the monarchs were successful in preventing the nobles from adding much peasant land to their estates, insisting that if a peasant family was evicted, another should be found to take the vacant place. The peasant who was a soldier enjoyed in a special way the royal protection. Although he spent a large part of the year in time of peace on the lord's domain, he could not be treated tyrannically because he was in a sense the King's man. privUeges The German peasant was worse off than the French peasant in man'i.Md ^^^ amount of personal work he must perform for the lord or for renters of estates belonging to the royal domain. The situa- tion in the Prussian territories was not uniform, but it was fre- quently the case that the peasant was not protected even by cus- tom against an increase in the demands upon him. In addition, his children were liable to domestic service in the lord's manor house or castle at merely nominal wages. Except on the royal domain, the local lords were the real rulers, and controlled the courts, in which they could not be sued with- out their own consent. They also controlled the administration of the villages lying within their domains. Only in the collection of taxes and the recruiting of the army was this species of seigniorial sovereignty abridged. The royal government in its THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 13 work of centralization had not gone as far as had the royal gov- ohap^i ernment of France, and chiefly for the reason that it had begun 1750-89 much later. The Prussian peasant did not suffer as much from the burden of taxation as the French peasant, although the Prussian noble succeeded in obtaining exemption from most of the taxes. The Taxation peculiarity of the Prussian system was the sharp distinction made ^ Prussia between the open country and the towns. The two principal taxes were the land tax levied mainly upon peasant farms and the excise or indirect taxes upon commodities brought into the cities or produced within them. In order to make the excise productive, the government permitted in the open country none but the most necessary industries such as brewing, carpentry, and building. In the western provinces the line between city and country was not so sharply drawn. The nobles in most of the provinces were exempt from the land tax. In many cases also they were free from the excise, their city residences being exempt as well as the industries practised on their estates. They paid a small tax in lieu of the feudal military service which they formerly rendered. The economic position of the Prussian peasant was also bad, for the line which the administration drew between town and country compelled him to purchase all except the simplest neces- saries in the town at a price enhanced by the excise. His cloths, tools, sugar, and tobacco paid high duties on entering the Prussian dominions in order to favor home manufactures or prevent coin from being exported. His own products had a limited market, for the exportation of wheat was generally forbidden ; and in some quarters the exportation of raw material like wool was also checked, in order to keep supplies from being sold to rival countries. In England the peasant farmer was apparently better off than in France. There serfdom had left no traces in the form of xhe feudal dues and compulsory labor. The nobles bore their share English of the burden of taxation. Many of the villagers earned a large ^^^^^ ^^ part of their income by spinning, weaving, and other trades, for the guild system had broken down more completely in England than on the Continent, and industries were carried on throughout the countryside. In agriculture, also, medieval methods had been abandoned in many districts, although in others the division of the arable land into three fields, which were then sub-divided among the villagers, still persisted. There were, however, forces at work which were to put the English farmer in a more dis- advantageous position than his French neighbor. Already in [4 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP. I the change from medieval modes of holding land the nobles had 1750-89 greatly increased their share. The petty nobles or landed gentry used their influence in parliament to carry through laws which destroyed customary rights of tenure, such as the copyholder had possessed. The nobles also fenced off parts of the common lands of the villages, and the small farmers or yeomen did not have money enough to defend the village rights in the courts. Before the century was over the class of yeomen almost dis- appeared. French society was more complex in the towns than in the rhe country because of the existence of an important middle class. The richer part of the middle class, or bourgeoisie, included the ofifiicials engaged in the management of the finances, the magis- trates, and the wealthy merchants. Many of the magistrates, whose offices were their property and could pass from father to son, belonged to the " nobility of the robe," which was quite as proud of its position, and as jealous of its privileges, as the nobiUty of the sword. Wealthy bourgeois famihes lived in a style akin to that of the richer nobles. Below them was the petite bourgeoisie, made up of masters in the guilds and of or- dinary tradesmen. The artisans and the laborers were simply " people." The richer bourgeois occasionally purchased the estates of ruined noblemen and acquired patents of nobility. In Germany the divisions of society had been growing more rigid, and were even more complex than in France. The con- trol of the imperial cities was in the grasp of a set of families, which regarded themselves as fractional parts of the princely au- thority. This was especially true of Nuremberg, Augsburg, and Ulm. Hamburg and Frankfort seemed to possess a more liberal atmosphere, and yet in Frankfort, which was Goethe's birthplace, there existed at the " bottom of the scale a great mass almost without legal protection." Above were the guilds, next, doctors and merchants, and, at the top, the nobility. " Each class was subdivided into manifold grades," so that the social and political structure of the city resembled a " tower broad at the base and growing narrower as it rose, each separate story divided into numerous cages, through the gratings of which it was almost impossible to pass." * In the territories of Frederick the Great the duties of each class seemed appropriately arranged. The nobles commanded the army, the peasants furnished the recruits, the burghers enriched the State by trade, while the scholars and poets pursued their studies or dreamed their dreams undisturbed by the plainer cares of life. 4 Bielschowsky, Albert, Life of Goethe, I. 8. THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 15 The restrictions which the old regime in France threw about chap^i the industries of the townspeople were fewer than those which 1750-89 hindered the progress of agriculture. In most of the towns in- dustries were still under the control of guilds or corporations of Guilds masters, which aimed to regulate the methods of manufacture and to preserve to the members the advantages of a local mo- nopoly. The honor as well as the interest of the guild was involved in maintaining the reputation of the prod- uct. The masters naturally desired to lessen the numbers admitted to the guild, so that in some cases it was impos- sible for any except relatives of masters to become mem- bers, although they might have served their apprenticeship and their usual time as journeymen. This policy increased the value of the monopoly, but was likely to excite the indignation of the rest of the community. The government sometimes attempted to reduce the evil by offering royal letters of mastership, a prac- tice which also brought in a little revenue. In 1755 a decree threw open all towns except Paris, Lyons, Rouen, and Lille to men who had completed their apprenticeship and the usual term as journeymen, waiving the rule that they should first be received as masters. The guilds were still powerful enough to prevent their monopoly from being destroyed in this way, and the decree served chiefly to mark the increasing liberality of the government. The spread of industry into the country undermined the monop- oly of the guilds and was favored by the government, which after 1762 assured to the rural inhabitants the right to purchase tools, machines, and raw materials. The selfish conservatism of the guilds was not the only ob- stacle to the progress of industry. Under the influence of Col- bert's ideas, a mass of regulative decrees determined the exact Regulation amount of raw material which each piece of stuff should con- l^^ tain, as well as the manner in which it should be put together. The aim of these regulations was the protection of the consumer against bad workmanship or fraud, but they threw difficulties in the way of inventors, for it was not always easy to persuade a government council of the usefulness or practicability of a new production. The regulations were enforced by the guilds and by royal inspectors, whose seals were affiixed to the goods. Offenders were prosecuted, their goods pilloded or destroyed, and their business ruined. Roland, the ill-fated minister of the interior in the Revolution, declared that when he was an inspector in Rouen he had seen as many as one hundred pieces of goods destroyed in one morning, solely because they were of an irregu- lar weave. From the middle of the century masters and officers of Indus- i6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIQD IN EUROPE C HAP. I became less severe in the enforcement of the regulations. This 1750-89 movement was specially due to the influence of the economist Gournay, who became intendant of commerce in 175 1. The word manufacture has a literal application to the methods of work under the old regime, for most of the machinery was run by hand and was of a type which had been used for cen- turies. A few large shops employed several hundred persons, but there was little division of labor. Most of the shops were small, with only the master, an apprentice or two, and a few journeymen. The goods were often sold by the master, who was a petty tradesman as well as a " manufacturer." The ordinary workmen, who had little prospect of ever becom- Empioyees ing masters, sought to improve their condition by uniting in secret organizations or brotherhoods. Towards the middle of the cen- tury so many strikes and boycotts occurred that the government issued a decree forbidding such organizations or any combinations of employees to bring pressure on the masters. The employees could not abandon the service of a master without a permit ; and if another master received them without this permit, he, as well as they, was liable to a heavy fine. In Germany and Austria the guilds had long been losing ground when the territorial princes vigorously undertook their reor- ganization. Labor troubles such as were the object of French legislation furnished the occasion. In the German states the situation was peculiar in that journeymen who got into conflict with their employers or with the administration had only to cross a near-by frontier in order to be welcomed with open arms. Each state was glad to swell its population of artisans at the expense of its rivals. In Germany, also, the journeymen had an organization of their own akin to the guilds. The state govern- ments found no way to meet the difficulty except by resort to the outworn method of imperial legislation. With unusual energy the diet undertook the task and in 1731 seriously modified and weakened the powers of the organizations of journeymen, leaving them hardly more than their functions as charitable and religious bodies. No journeyman could be employed without a pass from the head of the guild, endorsed by his previous em- ployer, even though this employer belonged to another state. The guilds were put under the control of the states, with the re- sult that in Germany industry, like religion, became an affair of the state. The main purpose of the legislation which followed was to deprive the guilds of their petty monopolies and make the conditions of admission easier. Trade as well as industry suffered from the restrictions thrown THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD REGIME 17 about it in Europe. In France the process of destroying local chap^i barriers had been carried further than in Prussia or any part of 1750-89 Germany, but the system of customs and other indirect taxes was so complicated that Necker said scarcely two men in a gen- Trade eration succeeded in mastering it. The consequence was loss of trade. A load of wine from Roussillon paid twenty-two differ- ent charges on its way to Paris. These included customs duties collected by the government, octrois of the towns, and dues of seigniors. Sometimes these charges favored the importer* of foreign products. For example, the cloths of Carcassonne be- fore they reached the northern markets paid fifteen per cent, of their value, whereas similar Enghsh cloths in the same markets paid only eight per cent. The situation in Prussia and in the German provinces of Austria was worse, because the process of unification was far less complete. On the Rhine tolls were col- lected thirty times from Strasbourg to Holland. Moreover, the separate states had no incentive to break down barriers, but on the contrary many to make them higher. No trade restrictions were fraught with greater future dan- gers than those which had grown up in France about the com- merce of grains. These restrictions were suggested by the fear of famine, which in the days of poor roads and of little general commerce was not a mere figment of the imagination. The pre- cariousness of the crop seemed to offer peculiar opportunities to the farmer or trader who wished to profit by the calamity of the community, and government officials and local magistrates were convinced that only through careful regulation could an adequate supply of grain be maintained in each province. The laws provided that all grain must be sold in the open market and that the farmers could retain only enough for their personal use. Merchants deaHng in grain were registered, and the place and amount of their purchases were recorded. The provincial par- lements or courts frequently forbade the transportation of grain beyond the borders of their own provinces. Its exportation from the country was also forbidden. Occasionally in time of famine the government or the courts fixed a maximum price. The restrictions placed upon the colonial trade are also sig- nificant. They have been summed up by the descriptive term colonial " colonial pact," which does not imply that the colonies ever "^^^^^ agreed to them. According to the colonial pact the mother coun- try gave protection and offered a market for the staple produc- tions of the colony, and in return enjoyed the monopoly of the colonial market and commerce. In its more rigorous form the system was applied to the Spanish colonies, which were treated i8 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP. I as a p^j.^ Qf tj^g King's domain. Trade with these colonies was 1750-89 at first limited to a single port, emigration was hedged about with difficulties, and the foreigner was warned off on pain of death. At the opening of the eighteenth century England interfered with this monopoly, obtaining from Spain by treaty the right to import slaves into the Spanish colonies and to send two ships to the annual fair at Porto Bello. The English captains were not delicate in their observation of treaty limitations and they found smuggling too profitable to resist. Nor were the Spanish colonies the only ones to suffer from smugglers. The French could not keep the trade of their colonies altogether in their own hands. The English colonists in America were the most formid- able interlopers. They exported fish, lumber, and cereals, arti- cles which the French West Indians needed and for which they were anxious to give in exchange sugar, rum, and molasses. The English sugar islands complained that in this way French sugar was competing dangerously with English sugar, and parliament passed the Molasses Act, levying a prohibitive duty on these commodities ; but the act remained a dead letter. When the French lost Canada and Louisiana the preservation of the monopoly of their colonial trade became impossible, for they had no food-producing colonies from which the sugar islands might draw supplies. It is evident that many things characteristic of European social and industrial life in the eighteenth century needed the serious attention of reformers and statesmen. The only question is, Why were they unable to correct the evils in time to forestall revolution ? CHAPTER II GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN the eighteenth century something more than the consent of c hap. ii a well-meaning ruler was needed to insure the success of 1750-89 plans of reform. Even in France, the land of absolute mon- archy, the formula " As wishes the King, so wishes the law " was only a legal principle. The task of the reformer was merely begun when the King accepted his plans. Privileged classes and obstacles favored communities could often defend their advantages sue- to Reform cessfully by making a skilful use of the compHcated structure of the old governments. They could confuse public opinion, even when they did not delude themselves, by raising the cry of " lib- erty " and ''property." The institutions of the old regime were not the product of systematic minds, devising the articles of a paper constitution, but were the result of a long process of his- toric growth. They bore the marks of conflicts and compromises without number. Most of the European States had been pieced together at different times. When a prince annexed a province he was often obliged to promise to respect its ancient liberties, although they might injure, at least indirectly, other provinces under his rule. This is more surprising in the case of France than of Prussia or Austria. The Prussian monarch had but recently assumed the crown, and, strictly speaking, was King only in eastern Prussia. Make-up His other lands he held by other titles — elector, count, or duke. As these lands lay within the Holy Roman Empire, separated from one another often by the States of other princes, it was difficult, if not impossible, to treat them all as parts of an ab- solute monarchical system. It was certainly impossible in the case of Austria. The Hapsburg monarchy received its royal standing from the two kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, which Ferdinand, brother of Charles V, had gained by election in the sixteenth century. Upper and Lower Austria were only arch- duchies. The Hapsburgs possessed other lands in what is now the Austrian empire and in southern Germany. When the territories of Spain were divided in 171 3 and 17 14, they received Lombardy and the southern Netherlands. It would be difficult 19 of states 20 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. II to imagine a group more diverse in race, in language, and in his- 1750-89 torical traditions. Two of the group, Lombardy and the Nether- lands, were distant from the rest. The common subjection to the Hapsburgs was incidental, if not accidental. To adopt a policy of assimilation would be to invite trouble, as the Emperor Joseph was to discover. The situation in France was apparently different. In certain Local respects, however, the differences were only apparent. Many prwiieges Qf ^j^g French provinces had been united under the crown for centuries, but others, especially Franche Comte, Alsace, and Lor- raine,! had been held only a short time. The older as well as the newer provinces clung jealously to the privileges which the King had originally guaranteed to them. The promise of Louis XIV to Franche Comte was typical. He agreed to respect its " privi- leges, franchises, and immunities and to conduct himself in all things as a prince and count palatine of Burgundy is held to do." The rights of Brittany were secured both by the marriage con- tract between Anne of Brittany and Louis XII in 1491 and by the act of union of 1532. So it was with other provinces. The local rights and liberties were not altogether harmful. They could be used to check the tendency to unreasonable centraliza- tion which already characterized the French government. In the oldest provinces most of the earlier local liberties had disappeared. The monarchs in their struggle with the feudal nobles did not distinguish clearly between powers which the cen- tral government should exercise and those which should be left to each community. These provinces formed the great central region of the country and were called Lands of Elections because the districts into which they were subdivided were called elec- ProTinciai tions. The border provinces. Burgundy, Artois, Brittany, Lan- AsaembUea gygdoc, and Others, formed the Lands of Estates, because they retained their provincial estates or assemblies. Even in the eighteenth century, when a reasonable development of local self- government would have been an advantage rather than a danger, the royal administration kept such assemblies under strict con- trol. No resolution of any importance, especially none touching the expenditure of money, could be carried into effect without the consent of the King's council. Nevertheless, the existence of the estates, the presence of the leading men of the province, representing the clergy, the nobles, and the official class of the towns, acted as a check upon administrative tyranny. Further- 1 Lorraine was annexed in 1766, although it had been virtually a part of France since 1738, when Stanislas, ex-king of Poland, and father-in- law of Louis XV, became duke. GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 21 more, in some cases the assemblies undertook enterprises which c hap, n the central government had no thought of attempting. 1750-89 The provincial assembly of Languedoc was the most efficient of these bodies. It met every autumn at the call of the King and remained in session forty or fifty days. The deputies voted in- dividually in a single hall, although they were chosen separately by the clergy, the nobility, and by the third estate. The deputies of the third estate were not popularly elected, and represented their town because they held its offices, but they understood the local needs. Through the power which the assembly was per- mitted to exercise the taille was distributed more fairly and was collected without so many acts of petty oppression. The expendi- tures for local purposes, which were mainly under its control, often ran as high as two million livres. Arthur Young com- mented on the excellent roads of Languedoc, which the provincial assembly provided for without the use of the corvee. The provincial estates of Brittany were kept by their organiza- tion from accomplishing so useful a task. They were more suited to obstruction than progress. Every nobleman over twenty-five years of age had a right to a seat. Sometimes twelve hundred attended, while the third estate had only forty-two depu- ties. The inclination to resist measures of reform when they seemed to encroach upon ancient local privileges was, however, present Resistance in Languedoc as well as in Brittany. The provincial assemblies *°ciiange attempted to drive hard bargains with the King, when they did not refuse altogether to agree to changes. In 1749 the govern- ment introduced the vingtieme, or income tax, in order to equalize the burdens of taxation, and it was unwilling to permit provinces to offer a lump sum in lieu of the tax. Languedoc insisted upon its right to pay the tax only after formally giving its consent, ap- pealing to the terms of the will of the last Count of Toulouse by virtue of which Languedoc had passed to the Crown, and to early royal edicts which had confirmed its privileges. When the King would not listen, the assembly refused the customary " free gift,'' which was Languedoc's share of the taille. The government in a spasm of vigor dissolved the assembly and collected the tax, but four years later the minister who was responsible for the reform lost his influence and the government yielded to the protests of the privileged classes. In Brittany resistance was equally suc- cessful. The ministry considered the advisability of decreasing the number of nobles in the provincial assembly, but sought the same end by calling together a small " extraordinary " assembly. Although it consented to the royal demands, the regular estates 22 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP, n which assembled soon afterwards clamored for the suppression 1750-89 of the tax. The spirit of resistance was so widespread that the government officials could not make the appraisements upon which the tax should be based, and finally agreed to permit the province to offer a stated sum instead. A more curious instance of the manner in which ancient liberties served as a defense for existing abuses occurred in the last days of the old monarchy at the Assembly of the Notables, When the King's brother recom- mended the ministerial proposal to substitute a land tax resting upon all proprietors for the unfair system in force, a Provengal nobleman declared that one of the rights of Provence, guaranteed by the will of King Rene, at the time when his kingdom was an- nexed to France, was exemption from any land tax. In the levy of the indirect taxes many provinces possessed ad- vantages which obstructed the progress of reform. These privi- leges were historical in origin. For example, the provinces in which no salt tax was collected before they were annexed re- mained free from the tax. Other annexed provinces continued to pay for salt at the rate which they had been accustomed to pay before annexation. Still others had in the sixteenth century ad- vanced money to a needy King in return for a perpetual reduc- tion of the rate. The same evil affected the customs duties, which were not col- TariJBE Iccted at the frontiers of the kingdom, but at the boundaries of provinces or groups of provinces. Certain provinces, like Alsace and Lorraine, were treated as if they were foreign countries and were given a tariff system of their own. Other provinces, though simply " reputed foreign," also had a separate system, while seventeen provinces in the north central region were under a single tariff system. This was called the region of the " Five Great Farms," because the collection of the indirect taxes had once been let or farmed to five separate companies. In order to gain an idea of the obstacles to commercial progress during the old regime, it is necessary to add to these various tariffs the transit dues which the lords collected, Necker called the complicated tariff system " monstrous in the eyes of reason." Nobody under the old regime defended local or class privileges more stubbornly than the courts. They included the parlement of Paris, which had jurisdiction over most of the older France, The Courts and twclvc provincial parlements. Before a law became ef- Reform* fective it was customary to send it to the courts to be entered upon their records. This act made it valid within their juris- dictions. They had a right to withhold registration of the law as a protest against its provisions. The King could meet their Barriers GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 23 protest by modifying the terms of the project or by holding what chap. 11 was called a " bed of justice " and with great ceremony expressly 1750-89 commanding them to register. It took Henry IV several years to procure the registration of the Edict of Nantes by all the provincial parlements. The courts, also, had a limited legislative — - capacity of their own, issuing regulations which they enforced within their jurisdiction unless these were annulled by the King. The judges in parlement, regarding themselves as the last barrier against the triumph of despotism, were in danger of over-emphasizing their political opportunity and forgetting that they were primarily courts of justice. As they represented the interests of a class, they were likely to obstruct the action of the royal government if it undertook measures seriously attacking the system of privilege. The judges based their right to oppose specific acts of royal legislation upon their duty as interpreters of the constitution and the laws of the kingdom. They held that even the supreme legislator, the King, could not add laws which were in manifest contradiction to the long-estabHshed principles of royal legisla- Theory of tion. If his ministers, acting in his name, attempted this, the tiie Judges courts must declare the edicts subversive of the constitution. Nor could their opposition be overcome by a bed of justice, which in such a case would be a vulgar act of violence. That France had no written constitution in which definite Hmitations were placed upon executive and legislative power, did not affect their attitude. The trouble with the theory lay in their idea of what the constitution was and what rights it protected. If its principal use was to safeguard the privileges and exemptions of the clergy, the nobility, and the office-holders on the ground that they could never be deprived of the advantages which they had inherited from their ancestors, the conclusion was inevitable that the way to adequate reform was closed. One or two illustrations will make clear the practice of the courts on questions touching the rights of the privileged classes. When the first vingtieme was created and the administration made a sincere effort to collect the information needed for a fair dis- tribution of the burden, the parlement of Paris refused to register the edict. As the War of the Austrian Succession, which had offered an excuse for extraordinary taxes, was over, the judges concluded that the government was intent upon the establishment of a permanent " tribute," to be levied upon all property, and not merely upon the property of peasants or townspeople. They saw in the edict an insidious attempt to destroy exemption from taxation, but at this time they did not carry their resistance very 24 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP. II fa^j.. The administration held a bed of justice and the tax was 1750-89 registered. At the close of the Seven Years' War the finances were in a still more desperate state and the ministry grimly resolved to put through an appraisement of all real estate in the kingdom, in or- der to make the two vingtiemes which then existed more pro- ductive. The parlement of Paris registered the edict only under compulsion. In the provinces resistance was more violent. The parlements of Toulouse and Grenoble attempted to arrest the governors who demanded the registration of the edict, and the governors were obliged to maintain a permanent guard to pro- tect themselves from the court bailiffs. At Rouen all the judges left the court-room when the governor demanded registration; only the attorney-general and the clerk remained. The parlement declared the registration which these officials made null and void. After months of wrangling the government yielded, and arranged with the courts that the vingtiemes should be collected on the basis of the existing appraisements, which were notoriously un- fair, and that individual assessments should not be raised. Such was the idea the judges held of defending the constitution and laws of France. The possibility of obstruction was not the only or even the Local principal evil from which the French government suffered. It Govern- contained positive defects. The organization of the towns is a notable example. Instead of using them as healthy organs of the spirit of local self-government, the administration kept them strictly under its tutelage. The municipal corporations were re- cruited from a few privileged families. Like the provincial as- semblies, they could not raise money or expend it without the approval of the royal council. The same thing was true of the parish administrations. The records of the council show re- quests from parishes for the right to spend twenty-five livres. Several times within a century the government had treated town offices as a means of raising money. Louis XIV at one time made them venal, permitting the provincial assemblies to maintain freedom of elections by purchasing the offices as a whole. The same plan was tried in the reign of Louis XV. The right of elec- tion was restored in 1764, but it was again taken away in 1771, except for those cities which offered a lump sum for their liber- ties. In structure the town governments were as a rule made up of a municipal body or corps de ville, the officers of which singly ad- ministered departments and together formed a council. There was also a general assembly, composed of the members of the Long East 5 of Greemvich GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 25 notable families. Some of them had a right to seats, others were c hap, u chosen by the professional men, the trade guilds, the parishes, or 1750-89 wards of the towns. The government of Paris was a curious intermingling of medieval guild institutions and later royal agencies. At the Hotel de Ville sat the provost of the merchants, four aldermen, and the other officers of the municipal bureau. There were also Paris twenty-four councilors, although no council in the proper sense of the word. The peculiar province of the Hotel de Ville was the river trade and everything that concerned it, including a part of the responsibility for the supply of food. The most important official of the city was the lieutenant-general of the poUce, who took his orders directly from the royal minister of the house- hold. He not only controlled the police, who were supported by the regiment of the French guards, but directed all parts of the administration not reserved to the Hotel de Ville. He also issued ordinances similar to those commonly within the power of an American city council. In fining the positions of provost and aldermen there was an elaborate semblance of election. The provost was actually nominated by the King, but each year two aldermen were chosen by a body partly composed of officials and partly of notable citi- zens. Almost the only valuable opportunity of gaining experi- ence was offered by the parish organizations or fabriques. Two general assemblies were held each year for the election of a responsible churchwarden, and to pass upon the accounts of the retiring churchwarden. In order to vote in these assemblies it was necessary to be rated on the tax list for at least six livres. The local agent of royal authority, whether in the Lands of intendants Estates or in the Lands of Elections, was the intendant. His jurisdiction extended over a district called a generalite, an ad- ministrative subdivision of the kingdom which was of more uni- form size than the province. Sometimes a province contained two or three generalities, while in one or two instances more than a single province was included in a generality. The in- tendant had charge of the levy and collection of the direct taxes and of the expenditure of money for improvements. Doubtful matters he referred to the King's council. He was also responsi- ble in a measure for the public order and watched important cases in the courts, occasionally carrying them up to the council. He was an effective instrument of centralization, fashioned by Richelieu and Colbert, the prototype of the modern prefect. Like the prefect he was often an able and conscientious adminis- trator. As he was brought into immediate contact with the suf- 26 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. II 1750-89 The Eoyal Adminis- tratioQ The GOT- ernment of Prussia fering peasantry, he became anxious to remedy the evils of the tax system and promote the prosperity of his generality. Some of the most hopeful efforts for reform proceeded from these men, who, nevertheless, were complained of as the agents of royal or bureaucratic despotism. The administration of France centered in the King's council and its subsidiary councils or committees. Besides the high coun- cil to which only officials qualified with the title of " Ministers of State " were admitted, and which, like a royal cabinet, was en- trusted with questions of general policy, the important boards were the council of finances, in which the controller-general was the most influential member, the council of despatches, a ministry of the interior, and the council of parties, or privy council, which determined many questions of administrative jurisdiction. Through its councilors of State and masters of requests the council of parties investigated and prepared for discussion nearly all administrative questions brought before any one of the coun- cils. There was generally a principal minister, but he might not be the most influential officer of the administration. As the financial problem became more urgent it was inevitable that the controller-general's word would become decisive. In addition to the finances he had charge of public works, agriculture, and commerce, and might have been called minister of the interior. Affairs of local administration were, however, distributed among the four secretaries of State, — war, marine, foreign affairs, and royal household, — each secretary receiving several provinces. According to the plan, provinces on the coast should have been assigned to the minister of the marine and frontier provinces to the minister of war, but this was not always done. In the case of Prussia, where the process of territorial growth was of later date, and where no Alps or Pyrenees impelled to- wards unity, it is less surprising to discover how little the ad- ministrative system approached any ideal of formal organization. The King was bound to respect the privileges of his many terri- tories, although since the days of the Great Elector the Hohen- zollerns had been ready to attack privileges of estates or towns which stood in the way of the development of military power. The reformer of the royal administration had been Frederick William I, who, in 1723, organized the General Directory with the special aim of giving some unity to the management of the revenue. As in France, the work of the ministers was divided geographically rather then according to the character of the work itself. Frederick II had modified this plan by creating a minis- try of industry and commerce and what was equivalent to a de- GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 27 partment of military affairs or a quartermaster general's office, c hap, ii When, however, Silesia was annexed, instead of subjecting its ad- 1750-89 ministration to the General Directory, he entrusted it to a special minister. Neither he nor his father had a prime minister, but con- ducted affairs personally with the different ministers. Frederick attended to the most minute details and frequently rendered de- cisions which concerned a particular minister without even in- forming him of the matter. His ministers sometimes seemed to be degraded to the level of mere clerks, without initiative or responsibility. He used as his agents the councilors, who served as intermediaries and reporters, so that not infrequently a cabinet councilor had the King's confidence and was in a position to in- fluence the royal mind in a way impossible for the ordinary minis- ter. Under a weaker master than Frederick the Great such a practice might become fruitful of cabals and lead to backstairs intrigue. In local administration, as has been explained already, the nobility retained a large part of their feudal sovereignty, but the Landrath, head of the county or Kreis, had become a royal officer, chosen from a list of candidates named by the nobles. The towns were controlled by the tax commissioner known as the Steuerrath, for in almost all matters a financial question was involved, and the King desired to increase the revenues available for mihtary purposes. Through this officer he watched every possible channel of outflow. In the eastern portion of the Prussian territories the provincial estates had ceased to have more than a formal func- tion, but in the west they had important opportunities for advising the royal officers who formed the provincial chambers of war and domains. The towns had lost their old liberties, and were no longer centers of active political or administrative life. In this they resembled the French towns. The government of Great Britain differed from the European governments in one significant feature; that is, in the develop- TheEng- ment of rule through an elected assembly. In France the states ^^^j^°^^ general had not met since 1614. It had never succeeded in seri- ously limiting the powers of the King. Similar assemblies in other continental countries had played an even slighter role. But in England in the seventeenth century parliament had seized the reins of government, and a century later its supremacy was made effective by the development of the cabinet, or body of ministers, politically responsible to the majority of the members of the House of Commons. The leader of the cabinet was the prime minister. The King was supposed to accept as his official opin- ion the advice tendered him by his ministers. In this way the 28 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP. II government of the country, its legislative as well as its adminis- 1750-89 trative work, was controlled by public opinion which found ex- pression in parliament, and particularly in the House of Com- mons. The plan of responsible ministries was not completely worked out until the early part of the nineteenth century, but it was characteristic of England from the days of Sir Robert Wal- pole. The EngHsh system was, however, not free from defects. The Eng- Representation in the House of Commons was based on a medie- of Rep?e- val distribution of seats and took no account of the changes in sentation population. Too many seats were controlled by the great land- owners. It has been estimated that out of the total membership of six hundred and fifty-eight, the landowners, most of whom were nobles, had the power to nominate four hundred and eighty- seven. One family influential in the Lake district controlled the elections to eleven seats. According to another way of reckoning the proportions of the evil, one hundred and fifty-four persons, including the King and many peers, nominated three hundred and seven members, or nearly one-half, of the House of Commons. " It is certain that the King by the use of national funds and the gift of places and pensions was able to keep a sufficient band of followers in the House of Commons from 1767 to 1781 to enforce his personal rule." ^ Fortunately the nobles did not use their power to shift the weight of taxation to weaker shoulders or to create a system of special privileges, although they did multiply sinecures in order to provide for their younger sons. This method of choosing members for the House of Commons soon became a principal cause of quarrel between England and her colonies in America. In the course of a debate in 1793 upon a plan of reform, Mr. Grey, the Earl Grey of the Reform Bill of 1832, declared that had the defects of the EngHsh system been removed in time the American colonies would have been saved. Whether this assertion was anything more than a strong argu- ment in favor of his scheme or not, it is true that the colonists were not hkely to be treated fairly by such a parliament, nor could they feel inclined to accept its decisions. The English sys- tem of colonial government was in other respects far more liberal than either that of France or that of Spain. The French and Spanish colonies were governed by officials sent from the mother country and were without power to tax themselves or adopt laws of local application, while the English colonies enjoyed a large measure of self-government. In most of the North American 2 Edward Channing, History of the United States, III. 72. See also J. Holland Rose, William Pitt, I. 10. GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 29 colonies, the governor was appointed by the Crown, but he was c hap, ii controlled by an assembly elected by the citizens or " freemen." 1750-89 The controversies between the governors and the assemblies stimulated the feeling of independence. As the governor's salary depended upon the grant of the assembly, there was an effective way of bringing pressure to bear upon him. In matters of in- dustry and trade the colonies were subject to the decisions of parliament. The customs officials were officers of the Crown and paid by it, so that the colonial assemblies had no control over them. But the trade laws could not be enforced if colonial juries failed to convict offenders. From the point of view of the de- fense of the empire this local independence was a grave disad- vantage, for it was difficult to persuade a dozen colonial assem- blies to unite in any general scheme of defense or of taxation for imperial purposes, and an attempt of parliament to tax the people of the colonies directly might arouse resistance and even re- bellion. This problem was forced upon the attention of the British government by the cost of the struggle with France in America and by the permanent needs of colonial defense. The weakest spot in the French government was the financial system. The unjust distribution of the taxes by which the bur- French den was placed mainly upon the peasantry prevented the govern- Finances ment from raising money enough to meet its expenses unless it practised a severe economy and refrainei established interests would lead to sound political life more surely than any ingenious mechanism for expressing the " general will." His criticisms of the acts of the French and of their assembly were unjust because they were based upon a prejudiced and defective knowledge of social conditions in France both before the Revolution and during its first year. Burke's book brought many replies, the most not- able of which were Sir James Mackintosh's Vindiciae Gallicae and Thomas Paine's Rights of Man. A more effective reply appeared in Arthur Young's Travels in France and particularly in the section describing the burdensome feudal privileges which had rested on the peasantry. The controversy over the Revolution was carried into parlia- ment, especially in the debates on the constitution of Quebec in 1791, and led to a split in the Whig party and the alienation of Burke and Fox. The Revolution was beginning to alarm the classes which inherited a privileged position. They gained such a horror of reform that every scheme seemed equally reprehen- sible. The consequence was that the social and political de- velopment of England was retarded during a generation. There never was a real danger that admiration of French principles or of the achievements of the Revolution would lead to upheaval in England. The governing classes were not yet divided in attitude towards the principles of English social order or po- litical organization. Moreover, Englishmen had long enjoyed many of the liberties Frenchmen were struggling for. In Ire- land the situation was different. One of the societies organized was the United Irishmen, and a group of revolutionists was formed which was later to cause England anxiety. The full consequences of the Revolution for Germany were Germany momentous, but several years elapsed before they were even THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE partially apparent. Liberal-minded Germans were enthusiastic over the first conquests of the Revolution. They hailed the fall of the Bastille as a great symbolic event. Schlozer, of Gottingen, whose journal was a weight in political discussion and was al- ways upon the table of the Emperor Joseph, declared that the angels in heaven must have sung a Te Deum at the news. The poet Klopstock was fervid in his admiration. The philosopher Kant, who had been deeply influenced by Rousseau's writings, saw in the Revolution evidence of a truer appreciation of the essential worth of man. After the October insurrection, the Germans, like the English, began to be discriminating in their praises. They felt that the French were carrying too much passion into their work and that injustice would be the result. Gentz, who was to become one of Germany's foremost political thinkers, and who at first regarded Burke's criticisms as un- just, in 1792 translated the Rejections, adding valuable observa- tions, which were the first example in Germany of political dis- cussion in accord with the methods of the newer historical science. In Germany political conditions offered insuperable obstacles to the revolutionary propaganda. Its weakness as a loose con- federation of States practically independent was a source of strength in this respect, for there were many centers of local activity, each with its special traditions and attachments. The great States, Austria and Prussia, were not decadent, like the old Bourbon monarchy. Frederick the Great had been dead only three years. The Prussian landed aristocracy still pos- sessed feudal rights over the peasants, but they lived on their estates, and were a present force for good or for ill. Never- theless, in some of the petty States along the Rhine oppression was so odious and the contagion of revolution so near that dis- content produced local insurrections. Indeed, the news of the Revolution swept like a strong breeze across Germany, changing the moral atmosphere. The rulers of Europe watched the progress of the Revolution with feelings suggested by its bearing upon their cherished schemes. The financial crisis, out of which France had been attempting since 1787 to escape, had already exercised a paralyz- ing influence upon her foreign policy, but no one looked for so utter an overthrow of royal power as came suddenly in June and July, 1789. The impressions which it made were every- where distinct and fresh. For Austria it meant the collapse of an alliance which had been full of deceptions. If the cam- paign against the Turks had continued to be as disastrous as THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 153 it was in 1788, the loss of the moral support of France would c hap, x i have been serious. But the Emperor Joseph and his minister 1789-92 Kaunitz affected an attitude of indifference or disdain. Their disappointment must have been real, judging from the relief and joy with which the news from Paris was received in Ber- lin. The Prussians had not forgotten the perils from which the genius of the great Frederick delivered them in 1757, and it seemed possible that if the struggle in the East developed into a general European war France might again throw the weight of her army into the scale. With the fall of the Bastille this danger was averted. Late in July the Prussian minister Hertzberg wrote his master that the French monarchy was ruined, and that the opportunity had come to establish the in- fluence of Prussia upon firm foundations, since Austria could no longer reckon upon French support. The Prussian ambassa- dor in Paris was instructed to enter into relations with the radicals and increase the embarrassments of the French gov- ernment. The English government was suspected of pursuing a policy similar to that of Frederick William IL Shrewd observers felt that William Pitt, the prime minister, could not be indifferent to the fact that the revolutionary movement was ruining the power of France more certainly than a long succession of de- feats, and without drawing a single pound sterling from the British treasury for military expenditures. Since riots dis- astrous to French influence abroad were now cheap in Paris, few believed that so excellent a financier would resist the temp- tation to invest. In his first utterance in parliament on the Revolution, early in 1790, Pitt expressed the hope that France would emerge from her state of struggle and trial freer and therefore stronger, capable of taking a still more brilliant part in the affairs of Europe. His attitude was correct, but a quar- rel with Spain soon made evident the disappearance of France as an international factor. The Spaniards, attempting to render effective their occupa- tion of the northwestern coast of America, seized two English Nootka vessels in Nootka Sound, on the western coast of Vancouver ^^^ Island, a place to which English traders had occasionally re- sorted since Captain Cook visited it in 1778. As soon as Pitt was informed of this act, he demanded reparation from the Spanish government. By virtue of the offensive and defensive alliance known as the Family Compact, between Spain and France, Spain had a right to call upon France for support in case the quarrel resulted in war. When the formidable prepa- ^54 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAr. X I rations which England was making to enforce her demands were 1789-92 known, Montmorin, French minister of foreign affairs, thought that the time had come to silence the strife of factions by an appeal to patriotic union against the ancient enemy. He sent word to the National Assembly that in view of the armaments in England the King had ordered the arming of fourteen ships that he might fulfil his obligations to his ally. This precipitated a debate upon the right of peace and war, during which the radical orators ascribed war in general to cabinet intrigue and dynastic ambition. At the close the Assembly decreed that any declaration of war or treaty of peace must be made by the national legislature, although to the King was still left the right to propose the declaration. The Assembly also seized the occa- sion to assure the world of the peaceful character of the Revo- lution, formally renouncing wars of conquest or attacks upon the liberties of other peoples. This was a noble attitude, if it was a fixed principle of policy, but it might degenerate into mere delusive pose. Neither the debate nor its conclusion ofifered much prospect of support to Spain, When in June, 1790, Spain made a formal demand for help, Montmorin waited two months before he ventured to bring the matter again be- fore the Assembly. Under Mirabeau's influence the Assembly replied by ordering negotiations opened with Spain to give the alliance a purely defensive character. At the same time the Assembly voted the arming of forty-five ships. The Spaniards despaired of obtaining any real assistance and concluded to come to terms with the English, a conclusion hastened by the reception of an ultimatum from Pitt. A treaty was signed in October without even consulting France. The little that Mont- morin learned of the negotiations came through London. Noth- ing could have marked more significantly the destruction of the Family Compact and the ruin of French influence in foreign aflfairs. The conduct of the Assembly towards the rights of foreign Border States could be squared with its attitude of renunciation only Problems |-,y ^^ ingcnious method of definition and distinction. Its de- crees of August 4 attempted to destroy the rights which Ger- man princes possessed in Alsace and which were secured to them not only by the treaties of Miinster and Ryswick, but also in several instances by separate agreements with the French Crown. The abolition of the tithe, the confiscation of church property, and the destruction of foreign ecclesiastical jurisdic- tion within France, severing relations with German dioceses and provinces which had existed a thousand years, was a still THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 155 more serious blow to several great princes of the Church in c hap, x i Germany. Among those who suffered by one feature or another 1789-92 of this legislation were the Duke of Wiirttemberg, the Margrave of Baden, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Archbishop- Electors of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne, and the Bishops of Speyer and Basel. To them it seemed as if the spirit of Louis XIV had taken possession of the National Assembly and as if its acts were the sequel of the decisions of the Chambers of Reunion which had lighted the flames of war a century before. It was difficult for them to see how a nation which had solemnly renounced wars of conquest could settle by simple decree ques- tions of right which Louis XIV had been unable to determine by half a dozen campaigns. Even if an attempt had been made to settle the question of Alsace upon grounds of historical right, the French and the Alsace Germans would not have found agreement easy. When the French had obtained Alsace in 1648, they had received simply what the House of Hapsburg possessed. The treaty expressly stipulated that the princes, lay or ecclesiastical, who held fiefs directly, or " immediately," of the empire should not lose the rights and prerogatives attached to such a legal status. The same stipulation protected the autonomy of the imperial cities. These reserved rights were successfully ignored by Louis XIV, so far as they interfered with the exercise of sovereignty. The inability of the empire to protect its less powerful vassals led them to make separate arrangements with France, acknowledg- ing French sovereignty over their Alsatian territories, and re- ceiving in return a royal guarantee of their remaining rights. But when the Revolution began to exercise sovereignty, before which no barriers of local privilege were strong enough to stand, it was unlikely that princely rights in Alsace would be treated in a manner acceptable to the German legists. In no region did the burdens of the old regime rest with more crushing weight than in Alsace, where serfdom still lingered, and the people were taxed not only by the King of France but also by their German lords. The decrees of the National Assembly greatly reduced the burden and for the first time made the Alsatians feel like Frenchmen. In an obscure way the lawyers of the National Assembly perceived this, and declared that the union of Alsace to France rested on the will of the people and not on the treaties of Westphalia. They were ready to treat the rights of the German princes as relics of ancient and in- iquitous usurpations. These princes had, they said, no just ground of complaint, and if France should offer an indemnity, 156 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP. X I ^\^Q offer would be prompted solely by a desire to live on good 1789-92 terms with her neighbors. This attitude was embodied in a report which the Assembly adopted in October, 1790. To the German princes it was not wholly a question of right, or of income, but partly also of existence. What must be the effect upon the peasants of the States immediately across the Rhine or below Alsace, if they saw the Alsatian peasants sud- denly relieved of the burdens which had been oppressing them all for centuries, especially as relief came in the name of prin- ciples utterly destructive of the civil, ecclesiastical, and social order of Germany? The princes of the Church felt the dan- ger more keenly than other princes, and not without good rea- son. When the French sent a diplomat to take up the question of compensation, he suggested to the Margrave of Baden the plan of finding territorial indemnities in the domains of the Church on the right bank of the Rhine and offered him those that belonged to the bishopric of Strasbourg. It was natural that the ecclesiastical princes, especially the archbishops of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne should clamor for extreme meas- ures against the French. They urged upon the imperial diet the theory that France by ignoring the reservations made in the treaties had forfeited all right to Alsace, and demanded that the empire resume full jurisdiction. They were anxious, too, that a military cordon should be drawn along the French fron- tier to prevent the spread of the revolutionary plague. The lay princes were inclined to less aggressive views. The more impecunious would have taken money for their claims, had this not been forbidden by the diet. Others, under the leader- ship of Prussia, suggested that if the matter were properly brought before the French government it would recall the obnoxious decrees. Finally the long process of reaching a formal decision from the imperial authorities was begun after the Em- peror Leopold, who succeeded his brother Joseph in February, 1790, had been unable to obtain a satisfactory answer from the French government. The decision came in 179 1, and its affirmation of the German claims was one element of a diplo- matic situation of which war was the consequence. The spirit in which a prince-bishop of the empire was likely to meet the demands of moderate revolution was illustrated in Liege the case of Liege. The news from across the border in the summer of 1789 created such an atmosphere of political en- thusiasm that a controversy about the prerogatives of the bishop led to risings in one or two towns, and finally in Liege itself. There was a general cry for the restoration of the liberties THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 157 taken away a century before. The bishop appeared ready to c hap, x i yield every demand. New magistrates were chosen and the 1789-92 estates were summoned. But no sooner was this done than the bishop fled to Treves. He had already appealed to the imperial court at Wetzlar for protection. With unseemly haste, this court, by which the most important affairs were delayed for years and sometimes for generations, annulled the proceed- ings at Liege as an infringement of the peace of the empire, and ordered an " execution " by the troops of the circle of Westphalia. Prussia, because the duchy of Cleves, a possession of Frederick William of Prussia, belonged to this circle, took the leading part in the execution, but the King was anxious to negotiate a compromise between the absent bishop and his subjects and promised them redress of grievances and an amnesty. Neither the bishop nor the imperial court, however, would listen to suggestions of compromise and the King withdrew his troops. The duty of levying execution was then assigned to the cir- cles of Franconia, Swabia, and the Rhine, but their troops were defeated and it was not until 1791 that Austria, acting for the circle of Burgundy, restored the bishop. He avenged himself upon his subjects with such unreasoning cruelty that a year or two later they welcomed the French invaders as deliverers. The conduct of France towards the princes who held lands in Alsace and the contagion of French revolutionary princi- ples might vex the minds of petty German princes, lay or ecclesi- astical, but neither Austria nor Prussia was at first turned from the plans they were seeking to carry out when the Revolution began. Austria wished to bring the Turkish war to a success- Relations ful conclusion, while Prussia hoped with the support of the of Prussia maritime powers to intervene between the contending States in Austria such a way as to win substantial benefits without the costs of war. Frederick William's minister, Hertzberg, believed that Turkey would welcome Prussian intervention, and, glad to be saved from ruin, would concede to Austria the frontiers of the Peace of Passarowitz, which included northern Servia, with Belgrade, and a part of Wallachia. In order that the balance of power might be preserved Prussia could then demand com- pensation through a system of exchanges, according to which Austria should return Galicia to Poland and Poland should grant to Prussia the cities of Danzig and Thorn with the palatinate of Posen and Kalisch, territory which Prussia needed to round out what she had gained by the first Partition. Other advisers of the King urged a grand alliance against Russia and 58 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE The Austrian Nether- lauds C HAP. X I Austria, made up of Sweden, Poland, Turkey, and Prussia, 1789-92 supported by the maritime States. Sweden was already at war with Russia, and Prussian influence in a measure had supplanted the influence of Russia in Poland. Meanwhile Prussia was able to embarrass Austria by encouraging sedition in Hungary and open revolution in the Austrian Netherlands. The revolution in the Netherlands had apparently been sup- pressed in 1788, The following year it gained new life from a quarrel over subsidies. The Emperor Joseph considered the time opportune for changes in the constitution of the provinces. This violation of ancient liberties aroused a spirit of resist- ance, and a small army of exiles, which entered the country in October, found so much popular support that by December the Austrian troops were obliged to retire to Luxemburg. Early the following year the States General declared the Netherlands independent and attempted to organize a federal republic. Fred- erick William despatched one of his ablest diplomatic agents to Brussels to assist the new congress. At his suggestion also a Hessian general undertook to reorganize the provincial forces. Frederick William carried matters further than Hertzberg's scheme required, seeing a good opportunity of crippling Austria, while Hertzberg wished to use Austria's embarrassments to bring her to the acceptance of his favorite scheme. This revolution in the Netherlands had nothing in it which ofTended Frederick William's devotion to the ancient order. It had only the name revolution in common with the events which were destroying the foundations of that order in France. At first, indeed, the French were deceived by the coincidence in name. The ardent revolutionist Desmoulins named his journal Les Rev- olutions de France et de Brabant, and Lafayette was suspected of desiring to transform both the Austrian Netherlands and the United Provinces into liberal republics under the patronage of France. But as soon as the Austrians were driven out of the Netherlands the revolutionists fell to fighting among themselves and it was at once apparent that the stronger party was made up of stanch defenders of the Church and of local privileges. This party could no more restrain the fanatical masses of its followers than the Parisian leaders could control the populace of the faubourgs. In March, 1790, there was a rising in Brus- sels, and the Belgian democrats had to fly for their lives in the veritable reign of terror which followed. Such a republic the French National Assembly refused to recognize, although equally disinclined to respect the claims of the Austrians to sympathetic support. THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 159 The political situation in Europe was profoundly modified by c hap, x i the death of Joseph II and the accession of his brother Leo- 1789-92 pold, who was celebrated for his mild and enlightened admin- istration as Grand Duke of Tuscany. Leopold did not approve The of his brother's summary methods of revolution from above. Emperor He succeeded in quieting the Hungarians and in persuading them to recognize him as King, although he did not give up all the reforms which Joseph had introduced. With the Bel- gians his negotiations were not successful. His greatest danger lay on the side of Prussia, which seemed determined to insist upon her fantastic scheme of exchanges, even at the peril of war. Leopold undermined the Prussian position, however, by convincing the English that he was ready to abandon Joseph's plan for the partition of Turkey and by urging upon their atten- tion the danger that he might give the Netherlands to France in return for aid against the Prussians. In the spring Prussia mobilized an army in Silesia and sent him an ultimatum, but he contented himself with suggesting modifications in the scheme of exchanges. Finally, in July, a conference was held at the Prussian headquarters at Reichenbach. There the dis^ agreeable news was brought to Frederick William that neither Turks nor Poles would listen to Hertzberg's propositions, and that England demanded that peace be made upon the basis of the situation at the opening of hostilities. All that was left to the Prussians was the dubious satisfaction of dictating to Leopold terms of agreement which he had arranged beforehand. One of the consequences of the conference at Reichenbach was that Gustavus III concluded to abandon his useless strug- gle with the Russians. Another was that Leopold was free to restore by force his authority in the Netherlands. He made liberal promises to the Belgians and gave them until Novem- ber 21 to submit. Representatives of England, Prussia, and the United Provinces, meeting at The Hague, made a futile attempt to mediate. Leopold's troops crossed the border and easily overthrew the new republic. These troops also restored the bishop of Liege. The negotiations for peace with the Turks dragged on into the year 1791. Finally, in August, Austria made peace with Turkey by the Treaty of Sistova and a few days later Russia signed preliminaries which the following Jan- uary became the Peace of Jassy. The ambitious schemes of Catherine and Joseph for the partition of Turkey had dwindled to mere rectifications of frontier. Prussia's intervention, which was to illustrate a new application of the great Frederick's pol- icy in 1772, had led to humiliating rebuffs and a signal loss i6o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE Revolution in Poland of prestige. Meanwhile the Revolution in France forced itself upon the attention of the jealous rivals and Poland offered to Russia a better field of gain than the provinces of the Turkish empire. The Poles had shown an unexpected amount of political sense in bringing together a reform diet while Russia was involved in war with the Turks. This " Four Years' Diet " met in October, 1788. The anti-Russian party, supported by the as- surances of Prussian support, was successful in the elections. One of the first acts of the diet was a demand that Russian troops be withdrawn from the territories of the republic. This exhibition of energy, however, had no sequel, and the two years, the diet's term of service, expired before anything had been accomplished except the signature of a defensive treaty with Prussia. New elections were held in 1790, with the under- standing that the existing members of the diet should also sit in the new body. By the spring of 1791 the reform party, realizing that haste was necessary because the war clouds in the East were lifting and Russia's hands would soon be free, secretly agreed upon a draft of a constitution, which was pro- claimed by the King on May 3 and accepted by the diet. Only twelve members refused their approval. The new constitution made the monarchy hereditary and en- dowed it with effective powers of government. In place of a diet, paralyzed by the operation of the liberum veto, was a legislature, with two chambers. In the lower chamber repre- sentation was granted to the towns, depriving the nobles of the political monopoly which they had hitherto enjoyed. Personal liberty was also safeguarded. Although the Catholic religion remained the religion of the State, other creeds were tolerated. Serfdom was condemned in principle, but the constitution went no further than to sanction in advance any settlements which might be made by proprietors with individuals or with com- munities. As the opposition at first made no effort to organize resistance, it looked as if Poland had been regenerated and was about to enter upon a new career of greatness. The permanence of this revolution depended upon the atti- tude of the neighboring States, for if they should agree upon a policy of hostility and spoliation enough malcontents could be found in Poland to create a situation inviting foreign interven- tion. Prussian enthusiasm had been cooled by the refusal of the Poles to consider Hertzberg's project of exchange. The treaty of March, 1790, did not pledge Prussia to sustain the new constitution, although it did pledge her to defend the in- Attitude of the Powers THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE i6i tegrity of Poland's territory. When Hertzberg learned of the c hap, x i Polish revolution, he pointed out to the King the danger it con- 1789-92 tained for Prussia. The succession to the throne was offered by the constitution to the elector of Saxony and his heirs. If Saxony and Poland were united in a well-organized government Prussia's position would be imperilled. The total population of the new kingdom would be double the population of Prussia. Such a Poland would be the natural enemy of Prussia's progress, even if it did not deprive Prussia of the advantages won by Frederick the Great. But Frederick William still feared the possibility of war with Russia, and, if this took place, the friend- ship of Poland was necessary. Moreover, negotiations were already begun looking to an understanding between Prussia and Austria, and Frederick William learned that the Emperor Leo- pold was anxious to embody in any agreement a guarantee of the new order of things in Poland. Leopold's secret hopes were that Poland would become strong enough to curb the ambitions of both Russia and Prussia. Frederick William did not hesi- tate, therefore, to send word to Warsaw and to Dresden that he approved what had been done, and he indicated his readiness to join Austria in sanctioning the new constitution. Unfor- tunately for Poland the matter did not end there. Russia had to be reckoned with. Catherine II had twice guaranteed the old constitution of Poland, which was favorable to her schemes, and she regarded the coup d'etat of May 3 as fatal to her in- fluence. This strengthened her inclination to sign a peace with the Turks, in order to prevent the consolidation of the new Polish regime. Before the drama of Varennes none of the greater powers concerned itself with the troubles of France. The repeated de- Leopold mands of the emigrant princes only irritated Leopold. He *°*^'^^'i°« would give Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette no assurances of military support until they left Paris and drew about them a considerable party. The news of the flight and of the forced return of the King to Paris changed the situation. To the Emperor such violence seemed inexcusable and odious. He at once despatched to the principal powers a note suggesting com- mon action in order to restore the King to liberty and to restrain the excesses of a revolution which compromised the honor of monarchs and imperilled the existence of all governments. It was fatal to the success of this overture that England refused to take part in any intervention. The only consequence was that Prussia and Austria drew nearer together. Leopold seemed on the point of winning Prussia over to his Polish policy, and the Prussian THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE agent signed a preliminary treaty guaranteeing to Poland her territory and constitution. When the negotiations touched French affairs, the Prussians raised the question of indemnities, in view of the possibility that military intervention should lead to Austrian acquisitions on the French frontier. They Mrould not have been averse to the promise of Austrian Silesia. Eng- land's attitude, however, made intervention only a remote possi- bility. Frederick William and Leopold met at the chateau of Pillnitz in Saxony to discuss the situation. When the emigrant princes appeared demanding intervention, with the recognition of the Count of Provence as regent of France, Leopold and Frederick William refused to entertain such a scheme. The most they would do was to give the princes a " declaration " which was in the nature of a polite refusal. This is the famous " Declaration of Pillnitz," of August 27, 1791, which pronounced the restoration of the monarchy in France a matter of common interest and expressed the hope that other States would not refuse to employ their forces for this purpose. The declara- tion explained that " Then and in this case Austria and Prussia would be ready to act with sufficient troops." On the evening of the issue of the declaration Leopold wrote to Kaunitz that he had not bound himself to any definite action. " Alors et dans ce cas is with me," he said, " the law and the prophets — if England fails us, the case I have put is non-existent." He seems to have thought that the menace contained in the " decla- ration " might have a wholesome influence on public opinion in Paris and frighten the radicals into the adoption of a more moderate policy. Unfortunately for King Louis, his brothers published this declaration first a week after the King had ac- cepted the constitution and at the end of their open letter to him repudiating his acceptance as insincere and contrary to his sacred duty. They added, falsely, that not only Prussia and Austria, but England and the other powers, were making active preparations for intervention. Not all Parisians were deceived as to the character of the declaration, for many regarded it as a rebufif to the princes. Two weeks after the Declaration of Pillnitz the National As- sembly complicated the situation by annexing Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, the papal territories in the South. Since the preceding summer the question had been raised repeatedly, be- cause the papal authorities were unable to restore order. The desire of the inhabitants of Avignon for annexation was un- doubted, the wishes of the Comtat were not so clear. As long as Mirabeau was alive the Assembly adhered to its first position THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 163 that annexation would be contrary to the pledge inserted in the chapjxi constitution. The break with the Pope in the spring of 179 1 1789-92 over the enforcement of the laws reorganizing the French Church removed one reason for caution. Old claims to the ter- ritory were drawn from the archives. The method of aggran- dizement through popular movements in neighboring States ap- peared to have nothing in common with the brutal seizures operated by Louis XIV. The Assembly finally decided upon annexation, basing the act upon the ancient rights of France as well as upon the wishes of the inhabitants. The consent of the Pope was not sought, but the Assembly offered to negotiate with him for the payment of any indemnities which might be due. The proceeding was well characterized in a letter which Mirabeau's friend, the Count de la Marck, wrote to the Aus- trian ambassador : " It is evident that after such conduct France will be in a state of war with all governments ; she will threaten them with domestic insurrection, and insurrection will lead to conquest." Neither the Declaration of Pillnitz nor the annexation of Avignon was enough to bring on war between France and her neighbors. Moreover, as soon as Leopold heard that Louis XVI had accepted the constitution, he withdrew the declaration and other received the minister of France. Frederick William took the controv/ray same attitude. But serious questions still remained, furnishing grounds of complaint to both sides. On the one hand the af- fair of the dispossessed German princes was at a critical stage. The imperial diet in August reached a " conclusion " maintain- ing the rights of the princes, and this action merely awaited the ratification of the Emperor. Austria and Prussia were more inclined to defend these claims, now that the rights of the Pope in Avignon had been flagrantly violated. If the rights of princes were to be settled in Paris without consulting them, whose turn would come next? On the other hand, it seemed intolerable to patriotic Frenchmen that the border German States should serve as a base of operations for emigrant conspirators. The Count of Provence continued to hold court at Coblentz as re- gent of France, and the Prince of Conde made Worms his military headquarters. Only the most conciliatory diplomacy on both sides could find a peaceful solution for these problems, but no attempt was made to conduct negotiations in this spirit. In France four policies were pursued at the same time: one by the King through Breteuil, his representative abroad; an- other by Narbonne, the minister of war ; a third by the Feuillant or constitutionalist group in the ministry ; and a fourth by the 164 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XI 1789-92 Legislative Assembly. The King, deeming intervention by the powers his only hope, sent pressing appeals to them. Narbonne, supported by Lafayette's influence, thought that a short cam- paign against the princes who were harboring the emigrants would popularize the monarchy. If Austria gave them military support, the result would probably be the same, for Prussia could be detached and England would preserve her neutrality. Delessart, Montmorin's successor in the ministry of foreign alTairs, had no firm* policy, but was inclined to listen to the con- stitutionalists, who assured him that a sufficient display of force on the part of Leopold would thoroughly intimidate the French radicals and lead of necessity to a compromise and a restoration of royal authority. The Assembly, believing that open war was preferable to the continuance of an equivocal situation, speedily assumed direction of affairs and conducted negotiations by means of decrees which menaced the King and the ministry as much as they alarmed the German princes and exasperated the Em- peror. The question of the armed emigrants could be approached in two ways. The Assembly could Tby decree threaten their lives and sequestrate their property, or it could order the invasion of the States which harbored them. The first method was tried in a decree of November 9, which declared that those who after the first of the following January remained on the fron- tier in arms should be charged with revolt and upon their ap- pearance in France should be tried, and, if found guilty, should be put to death. The princes also were to be indicted for trea- son, if they did not return before January. This method was rendered futile by the refusal of the King to sanction the decree, although two months later he did approve of a measure seques- trating the property of the emigrants. The Assembly, on November 29^ tried the second method. A deputation was sent to the King requesting him to use in dealing with foreign powers " language suitable to a King of the French. ... To the German princes he should declare that if they continued to favor preparations made against France, the French would bear amongst them not fire and sword but liberty." On November 29 also a young deputy named Isnard expressed the same thought in more striking language. " Say to Europe," he cried out, " that if cabinets engage kings in a war against peoples we will engage peoples in a war against tyrants." The King decided to yield to the Assembly's de- mands, believing that the consequence would be a European in- tervention or a war. If war resulted, he thought the resistance THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 165 of France would be broken down in a single campaign and that c hap, x i his people would turn to him as mediator, to save them from 1789-92 the vengeance of the Powers. Accordingly on December 14 he announced to the Assembly the despatch of an ultimatum to the Elector of Treves, declaring that if he did not disperse the emigrants within a month he would be treated as an enemy. On the same day the King informed his confidential agent abroad that he hoped the Powers would intervene, disperse the emigrants, and defend the Elector. This they in effect did. When the Elector appealed to them, Austria and Prussia prom- ised aid, biit insisted upon the dispersion of the emigrants. The Elector [complied and the hapless exiles were obliged to seek a refuge elsewhere, traveling, many of them on foot, through the mud and snow of a German winter. The Landgrave of Hesse, the Duke of Wiirttemberg, and even the King of Prus- sia refused them asylum. On December 21 the French gov- ernment was informed that these measures had been taken, and the incident was closed. Unfortunately for France the war had got into politics. The Girondin leaders, especially Brissot, Vergniaud, and Isnard, be- lieved that war would unite all patriotic Frenchmen in support TheNon- of the Revolution. The King and his ministers would be obliged '^'^'^°" to support the national cause or be convicted of treason. Louis had irritated the radicals by his veto of a decree aimed at the non-jurors who were accused of fomenting civil war. Early in its career the Assembly had been informed by a special com- mission of the hostility of many parishes toward the new clergy. In some cases the non-jurors still retained their pulpits, or, if they had been expelled by force, they held services in the woods or the fields. The acts of the new clergy were often denounced as invalid, a serious accusation because the registry of births and marriages remained in the hands of the clergy. Sentiment in the Assembly first took the sensible direction of undoing in part the work of the Constituent Assembly by depriving the oath of its semi-religious connection, by renaming the Civil Consti- tution of the clergy a " law " concerning the civil relations of worship, and by taking from the clergy their character as offi- cials. Public opinion seemed to be moving toward a separation of Church and State, in order that in a free State the Church might also be free and might not continue to be a source of civil troubles. This moderate attitude was changed when news reached Paris from western France that the non-juring priests were organizing the peasants for resistance. In one or two places a repetition of the riots of Nimes and Montauban was THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE feared. The Assembly now decided to impose on the non- jurors a civic oath, depriving those who refused of their pen- sions and placing them under surveillance as suspicious persons. The King vetoed this decree the same month in which he vetoed the decree against the emigrants. He seemed to the radicals, therefore, the ally of traitors at home as well as of conspirators abroad. If the Assembly wanted war, excuses could easily be found. To the Emperor's announcement that he would support the " conclusion " of the German diet, it replied by a decree declar- ing " infamous " and a traitor any one who should take part in a congress looking toward the restoration of the rights sup- pressed by the Constituent Assembly. The Austro-Prussian treaty of July 25, 1791, based on the idea of intervention, which Leopold had not renounced altogether when he withdrew the Declaration of Pillnitz, was also treated as a pretext for war. The Girondins urged that France imitate the example of Fred- erick II in 1756 and not wait to be attacked. Their views tri- umphed and on January 25 the Assembly " invited " the King to declare to the Emperor Leopold that his acts were an in- fringement of the treaty of 1756 and to give him until March i to renounce all hostile combinations and to explain satisfactorily his conduct hitherto. The course of the negotiations had already convinced both Leopold and Frederick William that war was unavoidable and they resumed the task of arranging a definite treaty of alliance. This was signed on February 7, although the details were left for subsequent settlement. Leopold's reply to the summons of January 25 was full of strictures upon the French political sit- uation, and in it Kaunitz made the Emperor appeal to " healthy " public opinion to restrain the factious. When this was read in the Assembly, on March i, it aroused general indignation. A few days later the overthrow of the ministry followed. Nar- bonne sought the support of Lafayette in imposing his policy upon the King and was summarily dismissed. The war party, led by Brissot, then turned upon Delessart, who was working in sympathy with the Feuillant policy, accused him of treason in permitting Austrian insolence to go unrebuked, and imme- diately ordered his arrest. In the debate Vergniaud, the great- est of the Girondin orators, menaced the life of the Queen, declaring that perfidious counsels were misleading the King, that " he alone was inviolable," and that " no other head con- victed of being criminal could escape the sword of the law." The consequence of this struggle was the appointment of a THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE 167 ministry composed of men committed to the Girondin policy, chap, xi Foreign affairs were given to Dumouriez, a bold, clear-sighted 1789-92 man, but an adventurer rather than a statesman; the finances a Girondin to Claviere, a Swiss banker, and the interior to Roland, who, Ministry with Madame Roland, belonged to the inner circle of the Giron- din group. Dumouriez sought the support of the Jacobin Club and conducted his negotiations with the Austrian Court in the tone and with the accent of Jacobin eloquence. War became simply a question of days or, at most, of weeks. Meanwhile, on March i, the Emperor Leopold had died, and had been succeeded by his son Francis, who was more inclined to war than his father and who immediately drew nearer Prus- war with sia. The natural reluctance of Louis XVI to consent to war Austria was lessened by his conviction that the resistance of the French would break down speedily and that his people would turn to him as the only means of obtaining favorable terms of peace. Accordingly on April 20 he proposed to the Assembly a decla- ration of war against Austria. The sentiment in favor of war was so overwhelming that only seven deputies voted against the decree. The Assembly repeated the renunciation of conquest which the Constituent Assembly had placed in the constitution, asserting that France took up the sword simply in defense of liberty and independence and that the war was not of " nation against nation, but the just defense of a free people against the unjust aggression of a king." The war was directed against Francis not as emperor, but as head of the House of Hapsburg, whose royal title was " King of Hungary and Bohemia." The ministry attempted to separate the cause of Prussia from that of Austria, but Frederick Wil- liam took the attitude that a declaration of war against his ally was directed against him also. With the minor princes of Germany, France had better success, because they were exposed to the first shocks of the conflict. Bavaria adopted a policy of neutrality, and only Hesse-Cassel promised the allies assistance. Prussia and Austria threatened, if the minor States pursued a particularist policy, to limit their efforts to the defense of their own frontiers. Soon the kingdom of Sardinia, whose duchy of Savoy was on the French side of the Alps, was added to the list of the enemies of France. This war, undertaken " with a light heart," meant the ruin of the party which advocated it and the dethronement and death of the King who sanctioned it. The Girondins, who dreamed of a glorious struggle of liberty against tyranny and of peo- ples against kings, discovered that in the tempestuous sea of i68 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE C HAP. X I popular passion heaved up by war they were not strong enough 1789-92 to guide the ship of State. The King, instead of being mediator between subjects humbled by defeat and an angry Europe, be- came an object of distrust and hatred. In the turmoil and anarchy of the struggle supreme power was seized by the rad- ical Jacobins, who were not men of half measures and subtle combinations, and who were embarrassed by no alliances with the beneficiaries of the old regime or the ministers of the King. CHAPTER XII THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY ALTHOUGH war was declared on April 20, 1792, no serious ^^rf* operations were undertaken by either side until July. The French army was still seriously disorganized. The feeling of 1792-93 distrust between soldiers and officers had been increased by the emigration of thousands of officers. In August, 1791, when the flight of the royal family occasioned rumors of war, the Constituent Assembly ordered the enlistment of 100,000 volun- TheFrenc teers. It tried to make the service attractive by offering priv- ^^^^ ileges which the regular soldiers did not enjoy, including bet- ter pay, the right to choose their officers, and the permission to return home at the close of each year's campaign. Never- theless, volunteers came in slowly. After the war had been in progress for two months only half of the battalions were ready, and only half of these had any share in the actual fight- ing two months later. The spirit of disorder infected the vol- unteers as well as the regular soldiers. Their officers were often chosen for ability to manage political gatherings rather than for military qualities, although there were striking exceptions. Sev- eral were destined to become famous in the Napoleonic wars — among them Jourdan, Davout, Moreau, Desaix, Brune, Soult, and Lannes. The army suffered from other difficulties. Equipment and supplies were lacking. Frequent changes in the ministry of war added to the confusion. No fewer than seven ministers occu- pied the office within six months. Each worked zealously to bring order out of chaos, but the task was discouraging. The difficulties were increased by the depreciation of the assignats, which were quoted at 56 ^ in June. This caused suffering, especially among the officers. Neither Frederick William nor Francis was able to take ad- vantage of the situation. Francis would not be ready to open the campaign until his election as emperor had been secured. Delays of and both monarchs wished to settle the question of the in- Austria ^At Paris. The rate of depreciation differed in different localities. For example, assignats were, at the same time, 67.6 -f- in the Cotes-du- Nord. 169 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XII demnities which they might claim in the event of victory, each fearing to be overreached by his rival. The alliance between the two seemed a political monstrosity, in view of the half cen- tury of bitter conflicts just ended. Arthur Young wrote that the two would agree as well as " oil and vinegar — fire and water." Frederick William's chief anxiety was on the side of Poland, for the Empress Catherine of Russia during the fall and winter had been nursing the opposition of the Polish nobles to the settlement of May 3. They were ready to organ- ize a " confederation," counting on the support of Russian troops, which the Peace of Jassy made available. All that was needed to assure the complete success of Catherine's Polish policy was the absorption of the energies of Austria and Prus- sia in a struggle with France. Accordingly Catherine urged upon Frederick William and Francis the need of combating the Revolution; but they were not her dupes. Russian intervention in Poland came the month that war broke out between France and Austria. The Poles were ill prepared to resist. The mass of the population was indifferent, having no share in the promised reforms and no relief from serfdom. King Stanislas was too timorous a leader to utilize the forces which the patriotic members of the diet offered. When Prus- sia was appealed to for support on the strength of the defensive treaty of 1790, Frederick William replied that the May con- stitution had invalidated the guarantee. By July the struggle was practically over and the King obliged to give his adhesion to the Confederation of Targovitz, as the association of mal- contents was called. The fires of resistance were everywhere stamped out by merciless bands of soldiery. Catherine held the prey in her grasp, but she realized that she could not refuse to satisfy Prussian and perhaps Austrian greed of territorial gain. Before Frederick William moved an army towards the French frontier he had reason to believe that he would receive indemni- ties in Poland, but neither to him nor to Austria were Catherine's assurances clear. The Prussian and Austrian diplomats con- sidered an exchange of the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria as offering Austria the necessary indemnification, but it proved impossible to reach a definite agreement. In France the unreasoning enthusiasm for war was succeeded by anger at the discovery that the country was unprepared and that the efforts of the French foreign office to detach Prussia from Austria were futile. The Girondins skilfully turned sus- picion towards the King and the ministers in power before the March crisis. Delessart had already been accused of treason; THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 171 they now demanded the same accusation against Montmorin, his predecessor, still one of the secret counselors of the King. They declared that the King's friends, far from abhorring the projects of the enemy, desired an invasion and were seeking to assure its success. This assertion was only too true. Since the beginning of the war the Queen had been informing the Austrians of French mihtary plans, of which she learned through the King. Towards the end of May a royalist journalist, Mallet du Pan, left for Germany, provided with letters and instructions from the King, with the mission of convincing the Allies that, on the one hand, they should separate their cause from that of the emigrant princes and renounce publicly any design to restore the old regime, and, on the other hand, they should frighten the radicals by threats of condign punishment, and so afiford moderate men an opportunity of recovering control. The situation was rendered still more perilous because religious strife in western France threatened to grow into a peasant in- surrection encouraged by non-juring priests. The Legislative Assembly struck at the priests by a bill which empowered the local authorities to expel them from the country. Its suspi- cions of the King prompted it to accept the proposal of the minister of war for a camp of 20,000 federated national guards near Paris. Louis XVI was no more inclined than in the previous November to harass the dissident priests, and he was not willing to strengthen the radicals by furnishing them with an army of national guards. He was already weary of the ministers whom the March crisis had forced upon him, and when early in June Roland insisted upon the acceptance of the decrees the King dismissed him, with his colleagues Claviere and Servan. The Assembly declared that the fallen ministers car- ried with them the regrets of the nation. For two or three days Dumouriez remained, hoping to play a great role now that he was rid of his embarrassing colleagues ; but, when he saw that the King was not disposed to listen to his advice and that he might be held responsible for the dismissal of the " patriot " ministers, he withdrew. The ministerial revolution roused political passions in Paris as the dismissal of Necker had three years before. A new element was introduced by a letter from Lafayette, in com- mand of the army of the Center, criticizing the late ministers and denouncing the intrigues of the Jacobin Club. The intervention of a popular general, which was of sinister presage for the orderly course of constitutional life, emboldened the King to veto the project of a camp of federes as well as the plan of CHAP. XII 172 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XII A Mob in the Tuil- eries deporting priests accused of sedition. He also appointed a new ministry composed of dependents of Lafayette. After this intervention of the army came an intervention of the street. It took the form of an armed procession of peti- tioners, which finally was permitted to defile before the Assem- bly, and which soon afterwards broke into the Tuileries and crowded for hours past the King and Queen. The mob was moved by brutal curiosity or the desire to frighten the King into recalling his ministers and accepting the vetoed decrees. The incident occurred on June 20, the third anniversary of the Tennis Court oath. The news aroused indignation in different parts of the country, which was in the main still loyal to the King and the constitution. Even the radicals in Paris and the Assembly felt that the affair was a blunder. Lafayette hurried to Paris and demanded the punishment of the conspirators re- sponsible for the outbreak. There was a chance that he would rally the Paris National Guard and close the Jacobin Club, but the King and Queen treated him coldly and he returned to his troops without accomplishing anything. Before Dumouriez withdrew from office he occupied the min- istry of war for three days and signalized his presence by re- porting the deplorable condition of the army and the defense- lessness of the frontier fortresses. France now began to realize her peril. The Girondins, their friends no longer in the min- istry, redoubled their attacks upon the Court. Vergniaud in a powerful speech, on July 3, declared that the Allies, the emi- grant princes, and the deserting officers all acted in " the name of the King," to " restore his authority " and " the splendor of his throne," and intimated that, while in the conduct of the war the King complied formally with the terms of the consti- tution, he had not felt it his constitutional duty to provide for the needs of the army or to win victories. The Assembly, realizing that invasion was imminent, sol- emnly announced that the country was " in danger." This proc- lamation carried with it special obligations for the people. Every one must wear the national cockade; all citizens who had been members of the National Guard or who were capable of bearing arms were called to active service; and all administra- tive bodies must exercise unremitting vigilance. Attempts were made to strengthen the army by adding new battalions of vol- unteers. When it was known that several departments, in spite of the royal veto, had despatched their contingents for the pro- posed camp, the Assembly renewed the project in a different form, providing that after taking part in the anniversary cele- THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY 173 CHAP. XII bration of July 14 the guards should march to Soissons to form a camp of reserves. July 14 came and the King proceeded to the Champ de Mars and renewed his oath to the constitution. ^'^''^•'^' arrested a sufficient number of their opponents to obtain control. They then drew up a constitution which transformed the United Netherlands into the Batavian Republic " one and in- divisible," abolishing the old provinces and dividing the country like France into departments. They also proclaimed separation of Church and State. A new treaty was made with France, promising in addition to the support of 25,000 French soldiers a subsidy of 1,200,000 guilders. The high-handed way in which the victorious faction proceeded led to a split in its own ranks, and as the government at Paris now inclined toward the moder- ates a new coup d'etat in June drove the victors of January out of the administration. Meanwhile the country was beginning to feel the effects of the French alliance. In one year the num- ber of vessels entering Dutch ports declined from 4,300 to 1,600. The trade with Russia, which had required 430 ships, was car- ried on in sixteen. The East India Company, with a glorious history of two centuries, fell into ruin and was abolished. The financial position of the Bank of Amsterdam was compromised. The poverty in that city increased so rapidly that more than a third of the population had to be given relief in the winter of 1798-1799. Dutch agriculture, however, was in a prosperous condition during this period. Meanwhile the Directory was engaged in creating other repub- The lies of the same kind, plundering them in the first instance, and EepnbUo afterwards subjecting them to the usual burdens of French pro- tection. The first of these was the Roman Republic. The di- rectors never relished the terms which Bonaparte had granted at Tolentino, and, when a French officer was shot in a riot be- tween radical agitators and papal soldiers, they seized the occa- sion to despatch an army against Rome. General Bonaparte was asked to draw up the instructions to General Berthier, its commander, who had been his chief-of-stafT in the Italian cam- paign, Berthier was charged to turn everything into money, a task which he accepted with enthusiasm, assuring Bonaparte in a letter that " in sending me to Rome you have named me treas- urer of the expedition," meaning an expedition which was being organized at Toulon ; and he added, " I will try to fill the fund." The Pope, Pius VI, was given the choice of abdication or impris- onment, and as he refused to abdicate was arrested and taken eventually to Valence, where he died. A French commission THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 251 drew up a constitution providing for consuls, senators, and ^^^J tribunes, a variation from the ordinary model only in the choice of ancient Roman official names, but the important matter was I'^^^-isoa the agreement of the new finance minister to pay France 15.300,000 francs in coin, in addition to the indemnities already exacted, and, besides, other millions in supplies. The French estimated that they had now drawn from papal territory seventy- seven millions, without including sums taken by generals or commissioners, or by contractors and hangers-on. Certainly they could not be charged with holding too cheap the liberty they brought. Their treatment of the Pope embittered the Catholic populations of Europe, and indicated that they were not seek- ing peace, but the triumph of Jacobin dogma and French domi- nation. To the Roman Republic was soon added the Helvetic Republic, " one and indivisible." The motive in this case was mainly switzer- plunder, and the chief consequence was that the eastern frontier ^ was opened to attack, because the neutrality of Switzerland was destroyed. An excuse for intervention was found in the quarrels between the Swiss democrats and an oligarchic party particularly strong at Berne. Intervention was begun in January, 1798, but the revolution was not over until September, when the stubborn resistance of the last mountain cantons had been crushed. The treasury of Berne, which contained five million francs in coin, was seized, while a commissioner with the suggestive name of Rapinat was sent to levy contributions. The new republic was forced to sign an offensive and defensive treaty with France. The money from Berne was sent to Toulon to pay for the equipment of an expedition about which a veil of mystery still hung. At the same time the republic of Geneva, long allied to the Swiss Confedera- tion, was annexed to France. General Bonaparte as commander of the Army of England was ordered to make preparations for the great venture, but an inspection of the northern coast and of the resources for trans- port convinced him that such an attempt would be futile, at least The ex- for a year. His thoughts were already absorbed by a project of to^*^pt a descent upon Egypt, which twice before his day had been sug- gested to the government. In September, 1797, he wrote to Talleyrand, recently appointed minister of foreign affairs, urging the retention of the Ionian Islands, and suggesting the seizure of Malta; for with these as a naval base the control of the Mediterranean would be assured. He added that if England should retain the Cape of Good Hope (which she had lately seized from the Dutch), France must take possession of Egypt, and 252 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVI Battle of the Pyra- renew by way of the Red Sea the struggle with the English for supremacy in India. In the following February Talleyrand pre- sented a memoir to the French Institute, arguing the advisability of seizing Egypt. The project had the good fortune to please the directors as well as Bonaparte; the first because it would rid them of the burdensome presence of a popular general, the second because such a mission promised freedom from petty govern- mental interference and an easy triumph in the glorious East. Preparations for the expedition were completed secretly at Toulon. In addition to the army Bonaparte planned to take with him a group of scientific men who might study the resources of Egypt and the remains of its ancient civilization. None seemed to anticipate the risks of the enterprise, probably because for eighteen months no English fleet had been in the Mediterranean. At this very time, however, the English were organizing a squadron strong enough to destroy the Toulon armament. Nelson, who had distinguished himself at the battle of Cape St. Vincent, was made its commander, but the ships did not reach their rendezvous until three weeks after the French had sailed. Nelson steered for Naples and then to the coast of Sicily, where he learned that the French had eflfected the capture of Malta and had sailed eastward. Twice within the next few days he nearly overhauled them. This would have been their ruin, for their decks were encumbered with soldiers and army stores and they would have fought under difficulties. Nel- son reached Alexandria before the French, but uncertain that this was their destination, missed them by leaving before they arrived, the English topsails disappearing over the eastern horizon just as the French appeared from the west. Egypt was nominally a vassal state of the Sultan of Turkey, but the Turkish pasha at Cairo was controlled by the Mamelukes, praetorian bands of feudal warriors, recruited from Circassian youths and led by chiefs or beys, of whom the most powerful were Ibrahim and Murad. Besides these bands of horsemen, there was no army to oppose the French. Alexandria was cap- tured without difficulty. The decisive battle was fought near Cairo on July 21. The French army, formed in squares, easily repulsed the few thousand horsemen whom Murad led against it, while Ibrahim's followers for the most part watched the con- flict from across the Nile. This affair, eloquently described by Bonaparte, who greatly exaggerated the number of the enemy, has been named the " Battle of the Pyramids." Murad retired into southern Egypt and Ibrahim to the borders of Palestine. Bonaparte entered Cairo, organized provincial administrations or THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 253 divans, seeking to allay the fears of the Moslem population by ^xvi** posing as a believer in the message of the Prophet and an instru- ment in the hands of God which it would be perilous to resist. ^797-1802 He was anxious to make it appear that he had come simply to de- liver the land from the domination of the Mamelukes and that his acts were not contrary to the Sultan's authority. Hardly had his work of reorganization begun when he received the terrible news that his fleet was destroyed and that the army was now cut off from France. Nelson had at last found the French fleet. When he had left Alexandria he sailed for Syria, then for Crete, returning almost in despair to Sicily. Proceeding eastward again, off the coast of Greece he heard of the destination of the French. On his way Battle of to Alexandria he decided, in conference with his captains, that *^® ^^^® if the French were found at anchor he would concentrate his ships against their van and center, crushing them before the ships in the rear could come to the rescue. The French commander, obliged to remain on the coast, and yet unable on account of the shallow water to gain the protection of the harbor of Alexandria, had moored his ships in Aboukir Bay, a few miles east. It was his intention to anchor so close to shoal water that the English could not attack him on the land side, but his captains carelessly left several hundred yards of deep water within his lines. The English fleet arrived in sight of the French position early in the afternoon of August i ; and, although it would not be possible to bring the struggle to a decisive issue before nightfall. Nelson ordered his ships forward. A favoring breeze blew down the French line, and five of his ships ran inside, while the rest sailed along the seaward side. The French fought with stubborn cour- age, but one after another of their ships was disabled and sur- rendered. About ten o'clock the admiral's ship blew up. After a lull, the fight went on until morning. Only two French battle- ships and a frigate were able to escape, the remainder of the fleet being captured or destroyed. No victory more decisive was gained on the seas during this long series of wars. One of the first consequences was to embolden the Sultan of Turkey to de- clare war on the French. This enabled the Czar of Russia, who had been chosen Protector of the Order of St. John, nominally sovereign in Malta, to send a fleet through the Dardanelles to avenge the French attack on the island. The news of the disaster at Aboukir Bay, often called the Battle of the Nile, seemed only to stimulate Bonaparte's courage. He declared to one of his generals, " Well ! we must remain in these lands, and come forth great, as did the ancients." Nor was 254 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVI Scienti- fic Ee- sults of the Ex- pedition Failure in Syria he daunted by a fierce revolt which threatened the destruction of the army at Cairo. Punishing this with a ferocity truly oriental, he devoted himself to the organization of the resources of the conquered land. Monge, Berthollet, Denon, Jomard, and other scientists or savants who accompanied the expedition were formed into an institute, in four sections, two of which were assigned to public economy and to literature and the arts. Practical problems were necessarily emphasized, but the ruins of buildings and monu- ments were measured by Denon and his companions. Jomard began to decipher the hieroglyphics. Somewhat later the famous Rosetta Stone with its trilingual inscription was unearthed. This work laid the foundation for the scientific investigation of Egyptian history and revealed a long- forgotten world. It is the only permanent result of the ill-fated expedition. Early in 1799 Bonaparte attempted to open communications with Tippoo, the Sultan of Mysore, a formidable enemy of the growing influence of the British East India Company. He or- dered two corvettes to be constructed on the Red Sea ; and, had he not been diverted from such efforts by the danger of a Turkish attack, his presence in Egypt might have been more than an empty menace to the English in India. As it was, it only hast- ened the fall of Tippoo, whom Lord Wellesley threatened with war if he did not renounce his dealings with the French. A dila- tory answer did not satisfy Wellesley, who assembled an army and stormed Seringapatam, capital of Mysore, in May, 1799. The Sultan perished and his kingdom was divided. The hostile attitude of the Pasha of Acre, with whom Ibrahim Bey had united his forces, determined Bonaparte to carry the war into the enemy's country. Leaving an adequate force in Egypt, he started for Syria with a small army. No serious ob- stacle troubled the expedition until it reached Acre, the fortifica- tions of which had been strengthened by a French engineer, a former fellow student of Bonaparte at Brienne, but now an emi- grant. Bonaparte's attack was compromised by the loss of a flotilla containing his siege guns; nevertheless, his troops after almost superhuman struggles gained a foothold within the walls of the town. The defenders, encouraged by the English naval commander, clung stubbornly to their inner lines, until Bona- parte, having lost about 5,000 men and not daring to risk further sacrifices, withdrew and retreated towards Egypt. With sub- lime assurance he reentered Cairo on June 14 as if he had been triumphant. A month later he did have the good fortune to win a spectacular victory, for, when a Turkish army landed in Egypt THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 255 to complete his ruin, he defeated it near Aboukir, inflicting a loss ^^^f' of more than 10,000 men. During negotiations for an exchange of prisoners the English 1797-1802 put into his hands a bundle of European journals, which con- tained news of another coalition against France, the defeat of the Bonaparte French army in Italy, and the perilous situation of the Republic, g*^^ He at once resolved to return to France, leaving the army in command of General Kleber. He had originally planned to re- turn before the close of 1798, but the destruction of his fleet made this impossible. In May, 1799, the directors sent a message re- calling him, and issued orders for the concentration of a fleet to bring back the army, but neither message nor fleet appeared, nor did Bonaparte know of the project. He kept his own plans secret, telling only those offlcers and scientists who were to return with him, because the army was so weary of its enforced stay in Egypt that it was not safe to make known his intended departure. This was not a flight nor a desertion, but it was the abandonment of an enterprise which even his genius could not save from ulti- mate failure, while it left the responsibility for the final collapse to rest upon others. He was to return to France to utilize the greater opportunity which the blunders of the directors and the disasters of the French armies now furnished him. He and his companions embarked during the night of August 22. The situation had become critical even before General Bona- parte sailed for Egypt. When the Austrians found they were likely to obtain no further :concessions of Italian territory, they resolved to check the increasing demands of the French on the Rhine, and appealed to the Czar to mediate between France, Aus- tria, and Prussia in the settlement of the German question. In a new July, 1798, the Czar promised the aid of an auxiliary force, which Jj^^^®**^ in a few weeks was in Galicia, slowly marching southward. Aus- tria also entered upon negotiations with Naples for an offensive and defensive alliance. The Neapolitans had been in an agony of fear lest Bonaparte's expedition was directed against them, the spectacle of the conquest of papal Rome warning other States of their approaching fate. To guard against this danger was part of the reason why the English sent Nelson into the Mediterranean. The news of Nelson's victory filled the Neapolitan court with exultation. The victorious admiral was received at Naples with eflfusion, and added the prestige of his influence to the project of war against the French. England and Austria officially warned the Neapolitans against precipitate action, but their counsels were unheeded. Retribution was swift ; not long after the Neapolitan 256 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVI Dissen- sions of the AlUes army crossed the frontiers of the Roman Republic it was de- feated in detail by General Championnet and driven disorganized back upon Naples. The Court fled on English ships to Sicily, and the French proclaimed the fall of the Bourbon monarchy, estab- lishing in its place, on January 23, 1799, the Parthenopean Repub- lic. In Naples the story of systematic plunder was repeated. Besides exacting an indemnity of sixty million francs, officers and soldiers were rewarded according to a scale, like pirates at the capture of a rich prize. Championnet, disgusted with the con- duct of the French commissioners, expelled them from Neapolitan territory ; but they complained to the directors, who removed him and placed in command a general more ready to share in the spoil. The occupation of Naples weakened the French position in Europe, because the French armies were scattered from the North Sea to southern Italy. Little compensation was to be found in the numbers of the recruits which could be demanded of these ill-affected vassal peoples. Meanwhile England signed a treaty with Russia, promising subsidies for a large army. The presence of the Russian auxiliary force within the Aus- trian dominions provoked an ultimatum from France, and the War of the Second Coalition began on March i, 1799. The war did not proceed far before the fabric reared by vic- tory, but undermined by greed, seemed on the verge of utter ruin. In Germany the French were defeated at Stockach by the Archduke Charles. An allied army, under command of the Russian Suvorof, overran northern Italy in a shorter time than Bonaparte had required to conquer it, entering Milan, the capital of the Cisalpine Republic, before the end of April. The French hastily abandoned Naples and Rome. The Bourbon king re- turned to Naples and from the deck of Nelson's ship organized a reign of vengeance and terror. In the north the French were driven to Genoa as a final refuge. A supreme effort at Novi, on August 15, led to the death of the commander. General Joubert, and the disastrous defeat of his army. At this juncture France was saved, as in the previous war, by the jealousies of the Allies. The Austrians, once in pos- session of Piedmont, refused to recall the King of Sardinia, and the Russians and the English were in no mood to sacrifice men and money for the aggrandizement of Austria in Italy. The English also feared that Russia had designs on certain islands in the Mediterranean as a permanent naval base, while the Russians suspected England of purposing to capture and hold Malta. Prussia, although neutral, was suspected of scheming THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 257 CHAP. XVI to use the difficulties of the other powers as an opportunity to increase her territory in northwestern Germany. These fears and jealousies, some well-grounded, others baseless, brought about a lack of cooperation among the Allies and fatally com- promised the successes of the spring and summer. The Rus- sians withdrew from Italy into Switzerland, towards which a second Russian army under Korsakoff was marching. Had the Austrians under the Archduke Charles cooperated with them, the French would have been driven from Switzerland, but the Archduke was directed to move towards the Rhine in order to prevent the Prussians from securing new advantages in case an English-Russian army operating in the Dutch Netherlands should be successful. Massena seized the opportunity of a di- vided enemy and defeated Korsakoff at Ziirich, on September 25-26, before Suvorof could reach him. After this disaster Suvorof, to avoid capture, plunged into the untrodden paths of the higher Alps and made his way with terrible losses into the Grisons. Three weeks later Brune defeated the English-Rus- sian army in the Netherlands and compelled it to reembark. Unless the French were ready to abandon their territorial pre- tensions, the victories of Massena and Brune would bring only respite from the fear of invasion. To recover the position which politics France occupied at the Peace of Campo Formio was far more difficult, and it seemed hardly likely that the Directory would be equal to the task. In 1797 the directors supposed they had saved the Republic by the proscriptions of the i8th Fructidor, but the elections of the following spring were also hostile, al- though the menace came from the left, rather than from the right. The directorial party in the councils, accordingly, an- nulled sixty-four elections, enough to preserve a governmental majority. This was called the coup d'etat of the 22nd Floreal. Again in 1799 the elections were unfavorable, but the directors were so discredited that they dared not repeat the manceuvers of Fructidor or Floreal. For several months they had been sub- jected to a campaign of hostile criticism. To their opponents in the councils they seemed the protectors of speculators, army contractors, and commissioners in vassal republics ; indeed, of every one who was fattening upon the public calamities. When the time came to fill the annual vacancy in the Directory, Sieyes was chosen. He held aloof from the other directors and allied himself with the opposition in the councils, some of whose mem- bers were more conservative than the directorial group, while others were more radical. This coalition proceeded to annul the election of one of the directors on the ground that it had been at Paris THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVI unconstitutional, and forced the resignation of two more. From the day on which the events culminated the incident is commonly called the coup d'etat of the 30th Prairial. With success achieved, the allied groups separated in mutual distrust. Sieyes and his friends now formed the design of revising the constitution. They required the aid of a victorious general, whose prestige would give popularity to the enterprise, and who would, if necessary, use soldiers to overawe the radicals. Gen- eral Joubert was chosen for the part, but instead met defeat and death. The opponents of Sieyes took advantage of the situa- tion to propose in the Council of Five Hundred a resolution de- claring " the country in danger." They approached General Bernadotte, minister of war, with the scheme of seizing the gov- ernment and organizing an administration of radicals. The tide of discontent among those who had anything to lose was already high. On the excuse of military necessity the councils early in the summer had adopted a decree levying a forced loan of one hundred millions on the rich. It was exacted, first, of those pay- ing taxes on real estate, and increased in amount with the amount of the tax, taking as much as three-quarters of the income of the richer tax-payers. In the second place, those whose wealth consisted of personal property should contribute according to their presumed ability, the basis to be fixed in each case by a jury of inquiry. This feature would enable the government to compel speculators and contractors to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. The mere proposal of the law created a panic in Paris. Men saw that their only escape was in proving that they were not rich; shops were closed, dealers declared themselves bank- rupt, and creditors tried to collect their debts in coin and hide the money. Such legislation arrayed against the Republic, or, at least, against the politicians in the councils, the great body of those whom the Revolution had enriched and who desired to enjoy their riches in security. The councils also alienated mod- erate men by passing a law of hostages, which aimed to restore peace in the regions infested by brigands or by royalist conspira- tors, by ordering the arrest of former nobles and relatives of emigrants, threatening them with deportation if the disorders continued. Paris was alarmed by the reappearance of the Ja- cobin Club under another name, omen of an approaching Reign of Terror. With the return of victory political passions had begun to subside. The directors had met the crisis firmly, using the ex-Terrorist Fouche, now minister of police, to close the new club. Late in September Sieyes resumed his plans. He and his Bonapaxte THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 2- friends believed that they could count upon a majority of the ^^vi* Council of Elders. They expected serious opposition from many members of the Council of Five Hundred and from several 1797-18( generals, like Augereau, Jourdan, and Bernadotte, who were sieySs identified with the radicals. Among the directors Ducos was closely associated with Sieyes, Barras was thoroughly discredited, and Gohier and Moulins anything but formidable. To overawe the opposition Sieyes needed the cooperation of a distinguished and popular general. He thought of Moreau, but Moreau had little taste for political intrigue. As the two were discussing the question one day in October, it was announced that Bonaparte had landed at Frejus on the southern coast. " There 's your man ! " exclaimed Moreau. But Sieyes was full of misgivings, for, as Lucien Bonaparte afterward remarked, he feared that Napoleon's " sword was too long." The news that Bonaparte had landed at Frejus on October 9 caused great rejoicing. His reputation for invincibility had been enhanced only a few days before by the arrival of a bulle- tin from Egypt describing in glowing terms his victory over the Turks at Aboukir. All other reputations were dwarfed by com- parison. Upon his arrival in Paris his brother told him the details of the Sieyes plan and he agreed to support it, although he re- fused to see Sieyes at first. He shrewdly contrived to keep all factions in a state of expectation. When finally the interview with Sieyes took place, it was decided to obtain the appointment of three provisional consuls and two legislative commissions, one from each council, to carry on the administration until the neces- sary constitutional measures could be drawn up and submitted to popular vote. For this purpose the Council of Elders, utilizing the powers conferred upon it by the constitution, was to decree the transfer of both councils to St. Cloud beyond the reach of a hostile Jacobin mob. The excuse was to be found in rumors of a new Jacobin plot. Bonaparte was to be put in command of the troops, in order to block any action by those directors who were not in the scheme. Sieyes and Ducos were to resign, and it was believed that Barras could be bribed or forced to resign, leaving only a minority, which would be powerless. Even in the Council of Five Hundred the conspirators were not helpless, for Lucien Bonaparte had just been elected president out of compliment to his brother. ■ H the Council of Elders should take the initiative, it might be possible by a mixture of parliamentary manoeuvering and military force to rush the appointment of a provisional ad- ministration through the Council of Five Hundred. Early on the morning of November 9 (18 Brumaire), the 26o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVI 18th Biumaire day selected for the coup d'etat, the decrees transferring the councils and appointing Bonaparte commander of the troops were adopted by the Elders and announced to the Five Hundred, after which the latter body was immediately adjourned, to give the opposition no time to ask inconvenient questions. Mean- while the directors Sieyes and Ducos resigned, and Barras, rumor said, was handed a resignation, accompanied by a substantial sum of money ; he signed one and put the other in his pocket. Gohier and Moulins, the two remaining directors, refusing to resign, were guarded at the directorial palace by soldiers under com- mand of General Moreau. During the day placards and inspired editorials served to allay public fears. Everybody was aware that the Directory was doomed. But when the councils met the next afternoon at St. Cloud, the Elders, after a night's reflection, had lost their confidence in a scheme the details of which had not been confided to them. Some inquired about the alleged Jacobin conspiracy, but Sieyes and his friends had overlooked the necessity of providing answers to unseasonable curiosity. Disturbed by the vexatious delays, General Bonaparte entered the council, where, unaccustomed to the manners of deliberative as- semblies, he became confused and incoherent, and his friends were obliged to lead him out. In the Council of Five Hundred the radicals, who had recently plotted to save the Republic by seizing the government themselves, were swept by a furor of patriotic emotion, denounced the conspiracy, and compelled every member to swear fidelity to the constitution, a proceeding which served the purpose of Lucien Bonaparte and Sieyes, now anxious to gain time until their proposition was voted by the Elders. News of the resignation of a majority of the directors added to the uproar. Suddenly General Bonaparte appeared in the hall, hoping perhaps to provoke an outbreak and justify intervention with troops. His entrance was greeted by cries of " Down with the dictator ! " many radicals rushing upon him, shrieking in his ears, and hustling him. Officers and soldiers in the doorway hastened to his rescue and bore him half-fainting from the hall. The radicals first demanded a decree of outlawry, but after- wards hit upon the more practical plan of placing the troops under the immediate orders of the councils, and nothing but the fact of Lucien Bonaparte's presence in the chair prevented its adoption. Finally, Lucien, powerless to resist, made his way out of the hall, and declaring to the troops that the assembly was dominated by a group of conspirators with drawn daggers, called upon the legislative guards to drive them out. The guards en- THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 261 tered the hall, with bayonets fixed, and the members fled out of ^^^f " the windows into the gathering darkness. During the night of November 10 (19 Brumaire), a few of the 1797-1802 dispersed councilors reassembled and with the Elders adopted a provis- a decree appointing a provisional :consular commission, composed guiate of Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Ducos, and two legislative commis- sions, representing the Council of Elders and the Council of Five Hundred. The legislative commissions received the task of preparing changes in the organic law of the Republic and of adopting, at the suggestion of the consuls, legislative meas- ures immediately necessary. Most of the men who had a share in the events of the i8th and 19th Brumaire believed that they had saved the Republic, and the soldiers marched back to Paris singing revolutionary songs. The " Consolidated Third " rose from 11.38 on the 17th Brumaire to 20 on the 24th Brumaire. The men who overthrew the Directory were confronted by a double task: they must settle many perplexing constitutional, financial, and social questions, and must also bring to a successful issue the War of the Second Coalition. The first could scarcely be begun before the second must be undertaken, and prestige enough to carry through schemes of reform or reorganization must come primarily from triumphs on the battle-field. Of the political situation it is enough to say here ^ that the provisional government gave way before the close of the year to the Con- sulate. General Bonaparte was made First Consul, and to him were granted the chief executive powers. He also had a con- trolling influence over foreign relations and directed the military campaigns, although it was not expected that he would command in the field. General Bonaparte required no penetrating genius to discover a foreign policy. His program was marked out for him in the terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio, which he had himself cam- negotiated. His administration would soon be discredited unless ^f^^ °^ he could recover the ground in northern Italy lost during the year 1799. When, accordingly, he wrote to George III and to Francis II, offering to negotiate for peace, the obstacle lay not in his personal insincerity, but in the incompatibility of the aims of the Allies with those of France. Peace would come, as in 1795 and 1797, only through new French victories or through the fail- ure of the enemies of France to cooperate heartily. Bonaparte did not have to fear the active hostility of the Czar Paul, who 1 For details of the new political system, see the following chapter. i62 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^xvi"' looked upon him as a restorer of order in France. The incidents . of 1799 had also embittered the Czar against the Austrians. 797-1802 ^g jj^ j^0^ ^Yie most decisive battle was fought in Italy. The strongest forces of the Republic were in Germany under com- mand of Moreau, while the Army of Italy under Massena was disorganized by the defeats of the previous year. Bonaparte assembled a reserve army in eastern France, intending to rein- force Moreau and himself take personal charge of a campaign in southern Germany. But Moreau was unwilling to play such a subordinate part, and, therefore, the First Consul changed the scene of the principal military effort. He utilized his central position in the upper valley of the Rhone to open the campaign in spectacular fashion and accomplish at a stroke what had required half a dozen battles in 1796. He planned to descend into Italy from the Great St. Bernard pass and cut the Austrian line of [communications in the valley of the Po, compelling the Austrians to abandon all northwestern Italy, which they had been occupying since the preceding summer. This would also relieve General Massena who was shut up with half of his army in Genoa. The reserve army was nominally under command of Berthier, but the real commander was the First Consul. In May everything was ready and the great operation was begun. The passage of the Alps occupied five days, from May 15 to May 20, and took the Austrians completely by surprise, for they did not dream that the French would attempt the higher Alpine passes. On June 2, Bonaparte entered Milan, the capital of that Cisal- pine Republic which he had created in 1797 and which the Austrians had destroyed during his absence in Egypt. He thought that the Austrians would immediately concentrate all larengo their forces and attack him in order to keep open the roads lead- ing into Venetia, and he selected the defile of the Stradella on the southern bank of the Po as the best position at which to check such a movement. A part of the Austrian army attempted to fight its way through, but failed. Bonaparte then advanced into the plain in front of Alessandria. On June 13, afraid that the Austrians would attempt to escape either to the north or the south, he detached divisions to head them off, one under Desaix towards Novi. The following morning at nine he sent orders to Desaix to persist in his movement, but within a little over an hour the Austrian general, Melas, marched out of Alessandria in full force and fell upon the weakened French army. In spite of the most stubborn fighting about the village of Marengo, the French were driven back. By noon Bonaparte sent a frantic THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 263 appeal to Desaix, which fortunately reached him in time, because ^^y?' he had halted upon the sound of cannonading. When Desaix arrived on the field at five o'clock the French were in full re- 1797-I802 treat, the battle apparently lost. A vigorous onslaught by the, fresh troops, a charge of cavalry, and the victorious Austrians, surprised in turn, were thrown into disorder and driven routed towards Alessandria. By seven o'clock a second battle had been fought and won. In his bulletin of victory Bonaparte so described the strug- gle that success seemed due to his forethought in placing Desaix's division. Desaix did not live to claim his share in the glories of the day, for he was killed in the conflict. His contribution to the final triumph need not detract from the honor due to his chief, for Marengo was only an incident, although a culmi- nating incident, of a campaign which ranks amongst Bonaparte's most brilliant successes. The consequences of the victory were immense. The Austrians signed an armistice which gave to the French control as far as the Mincio. It was also a personal triumph for Bonaparte and consolidated his hold upon France. As Pasquier remarked : " What strength did this victory not give him who only had to show himself to conquer Italy in a day ! " The French under Moreau were also successful against the Austrians and compelled them a month after Marengo to agree to another armistice. The negotiations for peace were at first unsuccessful, partly because the Austrians would lose an Eng- lish subsidy if they should sign a treaty with France before February i, 1801. Moreau's decisive victory at Hohenlinden in December, opening the road to Vienna, and further French suc- cesses in Italy brought the struggle to a close. The treaty of peace, which was signed at Luneville, on Feb- ruary 9, 1801, repeated the main features of the Treaty of Campo Formio, but obliged the Emperor to agree, without fur- Peace of ther consultation of the German diet, that the territories west Luneviiie of the Rhine should go to France. Another blow at Hapsburg influence in Italy was struck by the transfer of the Grand Duke of Tuscany to Germany, leaving the grand duchy, changed into a " Kingdom of Etruria " for the benefit of the Duke of Parma and his wife, the Spanish Infanta. Austria also consented to recognize the Helvetic and Batavian republics, uniting with France in guaranteeing their independence, and the " freedom of the inhabitants to adopt such a form of government as they should see fit." ^ 2 A contemporary caricature represents the French Republic as a large THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVI Bonaparte did not attempt to restore the Parthenopean Re- public, but made a treaty with the King of Naples which per- mitted the establishment at Taranto of a French expeditionary force destined for Egypt and maintained in the meantime at the expense of Naples. The King also promised to exclude the English from his harbors. The newly elected pope, Pius VII, was assured by Bonaparte that he would not be disturbed in the possession of the States left him at the Peace of Tolentino. The position of France was strengthened at this time by a union of the northern powers against England, a revival of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, finding its motive in an intolerable extension by the English of the rights of belligerents over neu- tral commerce. The English wished to include under the term contraband wheat, hemp, pitch, and timber, indeed anything which could facilitate the military or naval enterprises of the French. They also interpreted loosely the conditions of a block- ade, seizing on the high seas ships whose papers showed that they were bound for a port nominally in a state of blockade, but not continuously blockaded. The English, however, could not without grave danger permit the neutral to take advantage of his lower insurance risks and underbid the English ship- owner and merchant, for upon their prosperity depended in large part the payment of taxes and the maintenance of a war fleet. They contemptuously refused to accept the neutral doctrine that " free ships make free goods," with its corollary that neutral property must be respected even on ships of the enemy. French diplomacy did all it could to sharpen the antagonism of the north- ern powers to the English as the most effective way to bring the English to terms. Bonaparte conciliated the Czar by offer- ing to restore Malta to the Knights of St. John, of whom the Czar was now the " protector," calculating that this would alienate the Czar still more from the English, because they were on the point of forcing the French garrison to surrender. The Armed Neutrality, constituted in December, and including — besides Russia — Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, was short- lived. England sent a strong fleet into the Baltic, a part of which under Nelson gained a victory over the Danes at Copen- hagen on April 2, 1801. Meantime the eccentric and tyrannical mushroom surrounded by several smaller mushrooms, — the Batavian, Helvetic, Ligurian, and Cisalpine republics. The three continental mon- archs are gazing at it in alarm. The King of Prussia exclaims, " Good- ness, how it grows ! " The Czar of Russia remarks, " That would be pleasant to eat " ; whereat the Emperor protests, " Don't touch it, my friend; it is poisonous." THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER 265 Czar Paul had been assassinated by his own officers, and his ^J^f" successor, Alexander I, was inclined to come to terms with the English. The members of the league compromised with Eng- 1797-I802 land on the question of blockades, deciding that they should be efifective if maintained by cruising ships. Contraband was in- terpreted more favorably to the interests of the northern neutral, whose principal exports were wheat and timber. While par- tially successful in the north, the English received a blow in the south when Portugal was compelled by Spain, at the dicta- tion of France, to close her ports to their trade. The best argument for peace between England and France was the futility of continuing the war. Both nations had suf- rrance fered severely, although the English found compensation in the ^^d'^"^' seizure of French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies — the Cape, Ceylon, Malacca, and Amboyna in the East, and, in the West, Trinidad and several of the French West Indies., But their shipping suffered heavily from French privateers, to which more than 3,000 vessels fell a prey from 1793 to 1800. To check these losses, which pushed up insurance rates towards prohib- itive figures, the Convoy Act was passed in 1798 and vessels were not permitted to sail without escort. The financial burdens of the country were staggering, with a national debt of i537,- 000,000, and an interest charge of £20,000,000. Within a decade the expenditures had risen from nineteen to sixty-one millions, and the new income tax took ten per cent, of all incomes over i200. Such a situation called for at least an experiment in the direction of peace. France equally felt the need of peace. As the year 1801 wore on her position became more isolated. The Armed Neu- trality had broken down and Russia drew nearer to England. The army which Bonaparte had left in Egypt on his return to France was obliged to surrender to the English in June, as Malta had been forced to surrender in the previous September. Bona- parte had another motive — his plan to restore the French Peace of colonial empire. He already had the secret promise of the Spaniards to return Louisiana. He wished to recover the col- onies in the West Indies which the English held, and to reassert French authority in Santo Domingo. One obstacle to peace was removed by the retirement of Pitt, the great war minister. His successor Addington was inclined to try a peace, even if it proved to be only a truce. Actual fighting was ended by the signature of the Preliminaries of London in October, 1801, while the definitive treaty was signed at Amiens on March 27, 1802. The English did not insist upon any agreement in regard to the con- Amiens 266 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, tinental situation, not even in regard to the Dutch, so long their alUes. They acted as if the agreements of Luneville would mark 1797-1802 the limits of French advance. They restored the French col- onies, retaining only the Dutch Ceylon and the Spanish Trini- dad. They also promised to restore Egypt to the Turks and to give Malta back to the Knights of St. John under a guarantee of the powers. The question of a commercial treaty was post- poned. Nearly ten years had passed since the diplomats of the Legis- lative Assembly had forced Louis XVI to declare war upon Austria. France had been covered with ruins as a result of the civil war into which the foreign war had plunged her. She now stood forth apparently more powerful than even under Louis XIV. The question was, Would she be able to consolidate her conquests by years of peaceful development? The answer was not far to seek, since the wars had also subjected her to the control of an ambitious military chieftain, surrounded by a body of restless soldiery. CHAPTER XVII A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP THE revolution of Brumaire was followed by forty-four days chap. of provisional government, giving place on December 25 to the Consulate. In no sense had the Republic been overthrown, 1799-180 although the constitutional system which was adopted offered an opportunity to one man to gather the reins of power into his hands. His success both in the reorganization of the country and in the solution of French financial, industrial, and social problems, as well as in the defense of national interests abroad, was so great that within two years similar and increased powers were conferred upon him for life, with the right to name his successor. His " beneficent dictatorship " became a monarchy thinly veiled. Two years more and the soldier who had " saved the Republic from anarchy " in 1799 was in name as in fact both princeps and imperator. To commissions of the councils had been assigned the task of proposing the modifications which should be made in the consti- The tution of 1795. As Sieyes was the originator of the scheme of ^j'°^®*=*^ revision, the commissioners turned to him for definite sugges- sieyis tions. They discovered that he had not committed his views to writing; indeed, he seems to have expounded two projects, vary- ing in detail, but resting on the same fundamental principle,^ which he regarded as the necessary corrective of the democratic ideal. The voters, he argued, should designate those eligible to office, but should not appoint them. The principle was expressed in the apothegm, " confidence should come from below, authority from above." Both projects provided for a communal Hst of eligibles, a tenth of the voting population and chosen by it. From this list a tenth, or departmental list, should be selected either by the communal eligibles or by electoral assemblies chosen by the voters. A national list should be formed in similar fashion, and would contain about 6,000 names, from which appointments to offices national in scope might be made. The head of the gov- ernment according to one plan was an " Elector-Proclaimer," 1 For further information in regard to these projects and their origin, see Aulard, IV. 158-159; Vandal, L'Avenement de Bonaparte, I. 495 f.; A. Neton, L'Abbe Sieyes, 393-407; J. H. Clapham, L'Abbe Sieyes, 240-248. 267 268 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE *^^^- whose principal business was the appointment of officials, gov- ernmental policy and actual administration being entrusted to a 1799-1801 council of state and to the ministers. According to the other plan the head of the government was a " Grand Elector," a mere ceremonial chief magistrate, while affairs were managed by two consuls, one for war and one for peace (that is, foreign affairs and domestic administration), and appointments were made by a " College of Conservators," or " Conservative Senate." Leg- islation should be proposed by a council of state and discussed by a tribunate, councilors and tribunes arguing the matter before a " constitutional jury," or legislative body, which should accept or reject without debate or amendment. It was suggested that Bonaparte should be content with the position of grand elec- tor, a palace at Versailles, and an income of six millions ; but Bonaparte had no intention of being, as he expressed it, put out to fatten like a pig. The suggestion of placing the government in the hands of two consuls was equally unsatisfactory to him, although the committees named to report on a constitution ap- peared to favor it. After one or two further attempts Bona- parte practically dictated a project, using fragments from various schemes which had been proposed. It was not discussed for- mally in the commissions, although individual members agreed to it, but was submitted to a popular vote, or plebiscite, and was declared in force as soon as the results in the nearer departments showed that it would be accepted. The vote in its favor was overwhelming — 3,011,007 against 1,562. ^ In the new constitution the substance of power belonged to General Bonaparte as First Consul, for he could appoint all constitu- officials except justices of the peace and judges of the supreme 1799°^ court of appeals. Through the Council of State, the members of which he selected, he had the initiative in legislation, includ- ing appropriation bills. In many matters of governmental policy he was assisted by the second and third consuls, but in all cases the decision rested with him. He was not expected to command the armies in the field, but their direction belonged to him as head of the board of consuls. Projects of law originated with the Council of State, and were transmitted to the Legislative Corps, which referred them immedi- ately to the Tribunate for discussion, naming a time for report. After the Tribunate had reached its conclusion, it deputed three of its members, who, with three members of the Council of State, discussed the measure before the Legislative Corps. This body could not amend, but only accept or reject. Opposition might, however, lead the government to withdraw the measure A BENEFICE:NT dictatorship 269 and submit it again in amended form.^' The Senate had the power ^^f' to pronounce decrees inconsistent with the constitution, but this was utiHzed by Bonaparte to modify rather than safeguard that 1799-1804 instrument. The most important function of the Senate was the choice of tribunes, legislators, supreme judges, and consuls, al- though it never actually chose consuls, for the original consuls were named in the constitution and the Republic ceased to exist before their ten-year term was over. The constitution pro- claimed the suffrage universal, but, except for the choice of minor local officials, only gave the voters the privilege of choosing, as Sieyes had suggested, a tenth of their number as a communal list of the notabilities. This tenth in turn was to reduce itself to a tenth, or a departmental list, and this to a tenth, which should be the national list. From these lists appointments were made by the consuls and elections by the Senate for local, departmental, and national offices. To set the new machinery of government in motion, the con- stitution not only named the consuls, but also provided that the second and third consuls, with Sieyes and Ducos, who were ap- The New pointed senators, should select a majority of the sixty original Officials senators, this majority to name the rest. As the list of notabili- ties was yet to be created, the first choices of tribunes and legis- lators were made from lists drawn up by Sieyes and his friends. So many ex-members of the Council of Elders and of the Coun- cil of Five Hundred were chosen — 65 out of 100 tribunes, and 230 out of 300 legislators — that the Parisians were reminded of the efforts of the Convention to perpetuate itself, and the journals protested ; one of them praying, after the manner of the litany, " From the eternal Conventional, Good Lord deliver us ! " The consequence was that when the Tribunate took an attitude of opposition to the consular policy its criticisms counted for little, recalling disagreeably the strife of factions during the whole course of the Revolution. The Senate was composed more wisely of men who had rendered noteworthy services at different periods since 1789. Bonaparte's choice of councilors of state illustrated a still broader principle, because he named men of tried experi- ence in their various fields, whether they had served the old monarchy or the new repubhc. He also selected his ministers well, maintaining Talleyrand at the foreign office and Gaudin at the ministry of finance, appointments made during the Pro- visional Consulate, and a little later choosing Chaptal minister of the interior and Decres minister of the navy. The Council of State, which was the working body in the new constitutional system, was composed of from forty to forty- 270 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVII Policy of the Con- sulate five members, divided into five sections — civil and criminal legislation, domestic aflfairs, finance, war, and admiralty. Mat- ters matured in the sections were discussed in general sessions^ often under the presidency of the First Consul, who favored great freedom of opinion, as the proceedings were not publicly reported. Besides the preparation of consular decrees and proj- ects of law, the Council of State drew up ordinances touching public administration, decisions in administrative disputes, and official interpretations of statutes. Until 1802 the ministers had no seats in the Council, although they could give advice. Even- tually it was the only council of ministers, for outside its cham- ber Bonaparte dealt with the ministers individually and not as a cabinet. It was, therefore, the center of government, as Sieyes had intended, but it served the will of the master who appointed its members. The policy of the Consulate was foreshadowed during the Provisional Consulate. Three days after the coup d'etat the law of hostages was abrogated, and a little later a war tax of twenty-five centimes in the franc was substituted for the obnox- ious forced loan, while provision was made for restitution in cases where the loan had been paid. It is not surprising that the bankers came to the rescue of such a government, which sorely needed temporary assistance, for there were only 167,000 francs in the treasury. That the government might not be com- pelled to live continually from hand to mouth, like the Directory, the minister of finance, supported by a law which centralized responsibility for the preparation of local tax rolls, attacked at once the gigantic evil of arrears in the payment of direct taxes. Towards the emigrants the government took a conciliatory attitude, authorizing the return of all exiles who had been pro- scribed by legislative act without trial, and ordering the release of priests imprisoned in consequence of the ordinances issued after the i8th Fructidor. As soon as the adoption of the con- stitution was announced, the Council of State, organized imme- diately, declared that the laws which deprived relatives of emi- grants and ex-nobles of all share in the political and administrative life of the country were inconsistent with the terms of the con- stitution and hence null and void. This decision opened the offices under the Consulate to men whom the radical revolution- aries had treated as political suspects. In the new constitution certain omissions were significant; especially the absence of all reference to the liberty of the press, of conscience, and of meeting. There were evidences of haste. A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 271 The judicial system was only sketched and the machinery of ^^j* local government barely mentioned. One of the first and most important tasks of the consular legislators was, therefore, a 1799-1804 local government law. They broke with the theories of de- Local centralization cherished by the Constituent Assembly and en- ^^^^' trusted the administration of the department exclusively to a prefect appointed by the First Consul. This was a feature of the plan of Sieyes, and grew out of the need everywhere felt for order. In a sense the prefect was the successor of the intendant, but his task was much simpler, for the Revolution had swept away a mass of privileges which prevented the in- tendants from achieving the highest success. With the prefect sat a council of prefecture, as a tribunal to consider questions arising between the administration and the icitizen, and this gave the individual a measure of assurance that he would be dealt with fairly. The law, disregarding what was implied in article 59 of the constitution, abandoned the idea of cantonal municipalities and restored the communes, large and small, the ex-Constituents in the Council preferring to return in this re- spect to the system of 1789. The appointment of mayors by the First Consul or by the prefects meant the destruction of local independence in administrative matters and at the same time deprived the citizens of any vital share in the management of their affairs. Paris was divided into twelve districts, each with a mayor, but the city was ruled by the prefect of police, successor of the lieutenant-general of the police under the old regime. This local government law was a triumph of the idea of extreme centralization, according to which the will of the master should be communicated to the prefects, through them to the sub-prefects, and through these to the mayors. It had the advantage of curbing arbitrariness in petty officials, while the tyranny of the State was distant and felt by comparatively few. Pasquier says that the people were glad to see the last of the multitude of mediocrities whom the Revolution had in- troduced into local administration and who were delighted to display their authority. The reorganization of colonial government was inspired by The similar impulses towards centralization of authority, but with co^o^iies less happy results. Several of the most important colonies were in possession of the English in 1800, and it was necessary to wait until the Peace of Amiens before creating a colonial sys- tem. The situation in Santo Domingo, formerly the richest of the West India colonies, was not much better. Out of the con- fusion of the slave insurrections in the Revolution had emerged 272 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^' a unique figure, Toussaint Louverture, a negro, who had en- tered the service of France in 1794 as a brigadier-general, and 1799-1804 ^j-j^ saved the island from falling completely under control of the Spaniards and English. In the year following Spain ceded the eastern part of the island to the French, but they could do nothing to secure possession until Toussaint overran it and entered the capital in January, 1801. Meantime he had begun a course of independent action, expelling commissioners sent to assert French authority, and making a commercial agreement with the United States, in order to preserve a trade necessary to Santo Domingo at a time when France and the United States were temporarily involved in hostilities, A statesman, as well as a soldier, he saw that the prosperity of Santo Domingo could only be restored if the planters were persuaded to return and if they were assured of a supply of black laborers. This could not be accomplished, if the negroes were permitted to acquire land and were not obliged to find employment with the planters. His supporters, white as well as black, drew up a constitution, making him governor for life with the right to name his suc- cessor. As he did not intend Santo Domingo to be independent, he sent an officer with this constitution to Paris in July, 1801, to obtain governmental approval. Such a plan of local autonomy, going beyond anything conceded even by the Constituent As- sembly, with a negro ruler whose powers exceeded those of the First Consul, was utterly abhorrent to Bonaparte, and in 1802 the organization of a colonial regime was by law left solely to the government. The system created by the Council of State did not provide for a local legislature, but placed administration in the hands of officials who under other names reproduced the machinery of colonial government before the Revolution — ■ a captain-general, a colonial prefect, and a commissioner of jus- tice. As if these reactionary measures were not enough, a decree in May, 1802, reestablished slaver)^ and the slave trade. Such a policy had to reckon with obstacles more serious than the existence of Toussaint Louverture and foredoomed to failure the great schemes of colonial restoration which French statesmen had not ceased to ponder. The successors of Genet had called renewed attention to the strategic value of New Orleans in controlling the fate of the Louisiana Mississippi Valley. At the peace of 1795 the French negotia- tors tried to recover Louisiana, and French statesmen condemned the privileges of deposit granted by Spain to the Americans that same year. When Talleyrand became minister of foreign affairs he schemed to bar the progress of the Americans beyond A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 273 the Alleghanies. The triumph of Bonaparte at Marengo intim- ^3^" idated the Spaniards, and they agreed to restore Louisiana on the understanding that France should transform Tuscany into 1799-1804 a Kingdom of Etruria for the Duke of Parma and his wife, the Infanta of Spain. Of this secret agreement the American gov- ernment had no authentic information until May, 1802, although rumors had reached President Jefferson the year previous, and had provoked from him these memorable v^ords sent to the American minister at Paris : " It completely reverses all the political relations of the United States. . . . There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and political enemy. It is New Orleans. . . . The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her within her low-water mark. . . . From that time we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." The stepping-stone to Louisiana was Santo Domingo and Bonaparte's reply to Toussaint's appeal for recognition was an Bona- expedition of 35,000 men, under General Leclerc, Bonaparte's pi^^laiis brother-in-law. The expedition started as soon as the Prelimi- naries of London made the sailing of a French fleet possible, and early in 1802 crushed opposition in Santo Domingo with apparent ease. Trusting to promises of Leclerc, Toussaint surrendered in May, and was sent to France to die a prisoner in the fortress of Joux on the chilly heights of the Jura. But another enemy awaited the French : yellow fever, which by September left only 4,000 men fit for duty. Leclerc died two months later. This prevented an expedition which had been planned for New Or- leans, because the troops were needed in Santo Domingo. The decree restoring slavery led to a negro revolt, although the government intended to preserve slavery only in the Spanish part of the island. The consequence of all these disastrous events was that before the King of Spain issued orders for the effective transfer of Louisiana, Bonaparte was weary of his futile enter- prise and sold Louisiana to the United States for $15,000,000. Its transfer to France in November, 1803, was therefore merely a formality. The most serious difficulty which confronted the consular administration at the outset was the lack of money. The new consular central agency created to supervise the collection of taxes found that not only the current lists, but those for the years V, VI, and VII, were still to be prepared. Bonaparte sought to teach the people that payment of taxes was a public duty in the per- formance of which different parts of the country should vie with each other, oifering to name a Paris square for the depart- Finances 274 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^3f^- ment which should pay most promptly. The lists or rolls in XVII arrears were made out, those of the current year completed, i 1799-1804 ^j^(j those of the next year prepared, so that the work of collec tion for the year IX might commence at its beginning in Sep- tember, 1800. The budget had been estimated at 800 millions, but was cut down to 600, while only 563 were actually expended. As the navy could be of no present service, Bonaparte did not hesitate to strike 90 millions from its credit. In place of ex- travagance and corruption, characteristic of the Directory, there were severe economy and rigid inspection. Although the gov- ernment was at first compelled to resort to financial expedients not unlike the practices of its predecessors, it succeeded better, because of the air of order and honesty which pervaded the administration. Gaudin believed that the indirect taxes which the Revolution had abolished should be restored in part, but Bonaparte refused to commence by introducing new taxes, and he also refused to countenance a loan, contenting himself with what temporary assistance he could get from favored bankers. The treasury was embarrassed by a mass of State obligations of all sorts, issued in previous years, which might appear in tax collections, and some of which enjoyed a privileged claim on the coin which was collected. Among the latter were sixty- five million francs in " delegations," which authorized the hold- ers to levy on the coin obtained by the receivers of taxes. After some hesitation, and upon Gaudin's advice, the government sus- pended this privilege, with the excuse that the " delegations " had often been given in payment for supplies never delivered, but finally agreed to recognize such debts after the contractors consented to furnish in coin a loan of equivalent amount. Other state paper of the directorial period was exchanged for an- nuities, but on the basis of a revaluation, while the bons given in 1797 for two-thirds of the national debt were converted into annuities with a capital value of five per cent, of their nominal value, or about twice their current valuation. The news of Marengo enhanced the credit of a government Restora- Still trembling on the verge of financial ruin, and by the middle Credit^ of the summer it was able to announce that holders of annuities or pensions should be paid in coin. The announcement was at first received with skepticism, and creditors who had so often been defrauded wondered if this was the prelude to another bankruptcy. All the greater were their surprise and gratitude when the promise of the government was kept strictly. So successful was the financial policy of the Consulate that the budget of the year X (1801-2) showed a slight surplus. The A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 275 only unfavorable symptom was that annuities rose no higher ^^^' than 53, and this was due to the precariousness of a situation which seemed dependent upon a single life and upon a will ^'^^a-iso* uncontrolled by representatives of the nation. The payments of annuities were made over the counter of the Bank of France, founded by consular decree in January, 1800, replacing a prosperous institution known as the Bank of Cur- rent Accounts. The new bank was intended to do for France what the Bank of England had long accomplished for England. The First Consul, members of his family, and other high offi- cials subscribed to shares of its stock. Its success was imme- diate, and in a short time its shares doubled in value. In 1803 it received the exclusive privilege of issuing bank notes. As the government did not repeat the mistake of subordinating its management to the financial necessities of the administration, it had a happier fate than the former Bank of Discount. The chief obstacle to the pacification of France was the open or secret antagonism of the ancient Church. The affections of the rural population turned generally towards the priests who had repudiated the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and they The looked for guidance to their old bishops, eighty-one of whom Q'^ss'i''^ were still living, most of them abroad, particularly in London Religion and Germany, under influences hostile to the Republic. Bishops and people acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope, who recog- nized Louis XVIII as King of France. The majority of the dissident priests who had returned did not care to mingle in politics, but they could not avoid being affected by such influ- ences. To Bonaparte, therefore, it seemed wise, if not abso- lutely necessary, to break the connection between the priest- hood and an emigrant and hostile episcopate, and to separate the interests of the Church from the claims of the Bourbons. No sooner was the new government organized than a consular decree ordered that only a declaration of submission should be demanded of the clergy, and soon afterward another order per- mitted the opening of churches on other than the official decadis. Fouche attempted to distort Bonaparte's intentions by inter- preting the decree to mean that the promise of submission should be made by those who had already taken the prescribed oaths. Bonaparte corrected this interpretation in his conversations, but he did not feel strong enough until after Marengo to ignore the anti-Catholic ministers and councilors by whom he was sur- rounded. He took immediate advantage of the prestige of vic- tory, issuing a decree which made the ceremonies of decadi obligatory only for office-holders, and which deprived these cere- 276 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVII The Non- Jurors The Con- cordat monies of their special attraction by allowing civil marriages to take place elsewhere.- This resulted in a revival of the observance of Sunday and a desertion of the decadi ceremonies. A still more important step was the ruling that the laws against the emigrants did not apply to the dissident priests — a ruling which made their return legal. Such measures of pacification did not put an end to the prin- cipal difficulties, because the majority of the returned priests would not make a declaration of submission, feeling that they would thereby condone the confiscation of church property and other acts of the Revolution. In dealing with the religious ques- tion the policy of the government varied with the region. In the West complete liberty was granted in order to prevent fresh Vendean outbreaks, but even there the priests preferred not to enter the churches and frequently celebrated the offices of re- ligion in fields or barns or private houses, being encouraged in this attitude by the emigrant bishops. In so doing they mani- fested publicly the desire not to be compromised by the favors of the Republic. The victory of Marengo enabled General Bonaparte to open negotiations for a settlement which transformed the French Church from a hostile political force into a well-disciplined army, willing to support the consular government, and especially the First Consul. He broke immediately with Revolutionary tradi- tion by attending a Te Deum in the cathedral of Milan and by publishing in one of his bulletins the fact of his splendid recep- tion by the clergy. He sent word to Pius VII that the situa- tion required a new episcopate, appointed by the First Consul and receiving its bulls of institution from the Pope. He was willing that the Church should be dominant, if it was loyal to his government. . But the Pope and the Roman clergy hoped that a turn in the tide of victory might enable them to negotiate to better advantage, and so the aflfair dragged on through the winter, until peace with Austria and Naples left papal territory at the discretion of the French. A few months later, on July 15, 1801, the papal consent was given by Cardinal Consalvi to a Convention, or Concordat. The Pope and his advisers were unwilling to concede the resignation of the bishops who had remained faithful to the 2 By a law of the 13th Fructidor, year VI, local officials, as well as representatives of the central government, must attend these ceremonies in costume. Laws and public acts of the preceding ten days should be read, along with a bulletin giving information of events or heroic deeds. Civil (that is, legal) marriages must take place on such occasions. A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 277 Church unless the Roman Catholic religion was declared the ct-av. religion of France, dominant therefore in a sense which Bona- parte did not intend, and unless the Church should receive 1799-1804 again its property, at least that which remained unsold. Such concessions were politically impossible, even if Bonaparte had wished to make them, and the papal negotiators were obliged to yield. They also permitted the insertion in one of the articles of an agreement that the Catholic worship should " conform to the police regulations which the government should deem neces- sary for public tranquillity," enabling Bonaparte under cover of this vague phraseology to mature the details of a scheme for the further subjection of the clergy. The Pope undertook, in case any of the non-juring bishops refused to resign, to de- prive them of jurisdiction, and consented, in return for a salary list for the clergy, and for the sake of peace, to abandon the claim to the confiscated lands, accepting the use of cathedrals and other church buildings needed for worship. A new dis- tribution of bishoprics should be made, and the incumbents were to be named by the First Consul and instituted by the Pope. The parish priests were appointed by the bishops with the approval of the government in every case. Cathedral chapters were restored, and seminaries organized, but nothing was said about monastic orders. It was agreed that public prayers should be recited for the Republic and the consuls, and that the clergy should take the oaths customary under the old regime. Although the Concordat was signed in July, it was not pro- claimed until April, 1802. This was due to difficulties on both Reorgani- sides. After repeated efforts the Pope obtained the resignation ^^*^^°^ of only forty-five of the dissident bishops. A group residing in church London, foUov/ed by others in Germany, refused, encouraged in this attitude by the pretender, Louis XVIII, but they were forbidden by the Pope to exercise any jurisdiction within their ancient dioceses. All the constitutional bishops, with one or two exceptions, handed their resignations to the government. Bona- parte, to make the treaty palatable to French public opinion, drew up in the Council of State the " police regulations " under the name " Organic Articles," embodying an interpretation of the treaty repugnant to its terms and more in harmony with militant Gallicanism. He also planned to proclaim on the day the Concordat was promulgated Organic Articles of the Prot- estant Religions, in order to show that the Concordat would not interfere with liberty of worship. When he first read the text of the Concordat to his Council, it was received in silence. He anticipated opposition in the Tribunate and in the Legislative 278 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVII Chateau- briand Lycees Corps, but it was disorganized by the Senate's shrewd assumption of the right to designate the individuals whose two years' term of service was just expiring, using the right to include in the list every prominent person who had appeared lukewarm towards the consular policy. After a summary discussion the Concordat was accepted and the two sets of Organic Articles adopted. A new difficulty arose in the refusal of the papal representa- tive to institute any of the ex-constitutional clergy who should not confess penitence for the sin of schism, but the obstacle was overcome through a well-conceived series of misunderstandings.^ Of the sixty bishops and archbishops nearly five-sixths came from the dissident clergy. The most of the constitutional clergy were received again into the Church and became parish priests. At the Te Deum celebrating the return of peace in 1802 the re- constituted Church appeared with all its ancient ceremonial. The official world expressed its dissatisfaction in bitter sarcasms, but the mass of the French people rejoiced that the decade of strife was over. The Church officially hailed the First Consul as a new Constantine, a restorer of religion. The religious history of France since 1795 illustrated the futility of the efforts of the Jacobin rulers during the Reign of Terror to destroy what they were pleased to call fanaticism. The most that they had accomplished was to cure the middle class and the nobility of Voltairianism. The new attitude of thoughtful France was eloquently set forth in the year of the Concordat by Chateaubriand, a returned emigrant, in his Genius of Christianity. Chateaubriand sought to prove that Christian- ity, far from being the enemy of literature, art, and liberty, was the most " poetic, the most human, the most favorable to lib- erty, to the arts, and to letters, of all the religions that have ever existed." The book was the sensation of th>2 day. Not only was its religious influence profound, but its appearance marked a new tendency in literature, which culminated a few years later in the Romantic movement. In 1802 also a beginning was made of the reorganization of the system of public instruction. The Central Schools decreed by the Convention gave way to Lycees, which were government boarding schools, with rigid discipline, and with a course of study which embodied more of the older classical training and gave less attention to natural science. Several thousand scholar- ships were provided, part of which were reserved for the sons 3 The Abbe Bernier, made bishop and afterwards cardinal, declared that the ex-constitutionals had retracted in his presence. His statement was accepted, although the individuals in question denied having done so. A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 279 of civil or military officers. The creation of primary schools ^^j" was left to the care of the communes. Nothing was done until after the Consulate to reorganize the universities. The surviv- 1799-I804 ing members of the ancient French Academy hoped that it would now be reestablished in its former position and privileges, but the most that Bonaparte and his advisers would concede was the reorganization of the Institute, in which the second of the four classes was devoted to the " French Language and Literature " and contained forty members, the number fixed for the membership of the old academy. The survivors of the three academies were then given seats in the Institute. In the year of the Concordat still another wound of the Revo- lution received healing treatment. This was the affair of the Return of emigrants. Bonaparte first attempted to deal with cases in- g^^t™^" dividually by a commission in the ministry of justice, but when he returned from Marengo he found that the commission had become a center of intrigue and corruption, so great were the temptations offered by the intense desire of emigrants or their friends to obtain favorable decisions. Fouche believed that the best method was to reduce the list arbitrarily by removing from it whole classes of names belonging to persons who had been driven from the country by fear, and who were not emigrants in any true sense, much less enemies. It was obviously impos- sible to consider each case separately for they numbered more than 100,000. The first concession to Fouche's system was a consular decree of September, 1800, which struck about 50,000 from the list, including names of relatives of emigrants, of their servants, and of others, which had been inserted in order to facilitate seizure of property. A final settlement of the ques- tion was made by senatus consulted in April, 1802, in accord- ance with which all emigrants, except about 1,000 militant roy- alists, received the legal right to return, provided they availed themselves of the privilege within five months. If their estates had not been sold, they were restored. Beside the old nobility of birth Bonaparte sought to place a new aristocracy of achievement. In May, 1802, he created a Legion Legion of Honor, and became like the ancient kings a dispenser °* ^°^°^ of rewards and distinctions. According to the original plan the Legion was to number about 6,000 members, chosen by a coun- cil over which the First Consul should preside. The grounds of choice were distinguished services, civil as well as military. Bonaparte had been accustomed to reward his soldiers with *A decision of the Senate in interpretation of the constitution.. 28o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. " arms of honor," and the plan of the Legion embodied the same idea in a more developed form. At first the scheme was 1799-1804 regarded as un-republican and was opposed more vigorously than most of Bonaparte's projects. Perhaps the size of the hostile vote in the legislative bodies measures the real opposi- tion to the ambitious plans to secure greater personal power which he was pushing forward at the same time. The project passed the Council of State by a vote of 14 to 10; the Tribunate by 56 to 38, and the Legislative Corps by 166 to no. The Consulate not only reestablished the national credit, it opened an era of industrial progress and prosperity. In 1800 Industry French industries had not recovered the position they occupied before the Revolution. Another decade was to elapse before the statistics were decidedly favorable to the new rather than to the old regime. Chaptal, the minister of the interior, was a distinguished chemist, and what was more, an administrator with a broad interest in every branch of industrial development. With Berthollet, Monge, and some others, he founded in 1801 a So- ciety for the Encouragement of National Industry. He recog- nized the enormous advantage which mechanical inventions had given to the English and concluded that success in competition with them could be obtained only by introducing similar ma- chinery.^ He invited to Paris Douglas, an expert English con- structer, assigned to him a large building on an island in the Seine, lent him money, and promised an annual subsidy. The experiment was a success, for within a year fifty complete equip- ments were introduced. It was at this time also that the flying shuttle was first used by French weavers. The printing of mus- lins by means of engraved copper cylinders was begun. A dis- tinctly French contribution was the improvement by Jacquart of the machinery for the production of silks. The progress in ^the application of the new machinery to manufacturing was, however, slow. Natural conservatism is the partial explanation of this. Another reason was the failure to introduce the steam engine, although it had been in successful use in English mills for more than ten years. Not until 1810 was a French spinning mill equipped with a steam engine. It is an interesting fact that Robert Fulton's first success in propelling a boat by means of steam was gained at Paris in April, 1803. His boat moved up the river at the rate of six kilometers an hour. Bonaparte and his advisers were appar- ently not impressed by the importance of the invention, although 5 Mes Souvenirs sur Napoleon, 99. A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 281 at a later time when he was planning a descent upon the Eng- *^^t" lish coast he asked for a report from the Institute upon it. In his letter he declared that such an invention might " change the 1799-1804 face of the world." But nothing came of this spasmodic inter- est. The progress of manufacture by machinery was also depend- ent, as it had been in England, upon the development of the iron industry. In this the French were nearly half a century behind the English. Only tentative beginnings were made of the use of mined coal in smelting iron, and it was not until'iSio that the process of puddling was used at the Creusot works. In order to stimulate public interest in the efforts made by French manufacturers, Chaptal organized an exposition late in the summer of 1801. It was so successful that another was organized in 1802, and the number of exhibiters was increased from 220 to 540. The First Consul took a keen interest in the display and examined with minute attention the goods which were on exhibition. What he saw increased his determination '^ to apply a rigorously protectionist policy and enforce the Revo- lutionary laws against the importation of British products. One of the greatest benefits conferred by the new regime upon manu- facturing and trade was internal peace and the improvement of the roads, which in many places had become almost impassable. Some of the French manufacturers and tradesmen would have been glad to see the ancient guild system reestablished, but the First Consul permitted this only in the meat and bread trades, where regulation by the State seemed necessary to the public health. The legislation against strikes or even unions of em- ployees or employers was strengthened. The law also sought to secure on the part of workmen the fulfilment of their agree- ments by requiring them to present to a new employer a livret signed by the former employer showing that the previous con- tract had been completed. In spite of this legislation Bonaparte was popular among the Paris workmen. Employment was steady and wages were good, and the workmen were weary of being used as pawns in the political game. They were intensely French in their sympathies and were proud of the national pol- icy that the First Consul seemed to pursue. Their desire for peace was far less earnest than that of the middle class. Every legislature of the Revolution had planned to embody in a code the new principles of law which had been established, civii adjusting them to whatever of the old still remained. Imme- ^°*® diately after the overthrow of the Directory a committee had undertaken to prepare such a code, but its work was inferior 282 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, and was not considered. The first serious step, in August, 1800, was the appointment of a committee of four eminent lawyers, 1799-1804 ^i^Q ^gj-g expected to have a project ready in three months. This draft was printed in January, 1801, sent to the law courts for criticism, revised in the legislative section of the Council of State, and finally discussed in full council under the presi- dency of Bonaparte. Of eighty-seven general sessions he pre- sided at thirty-five, and although his knowledge of law was lim- ited to what he had picked up in desultory reading and in conversations with Portalis, Tronchet, and other councilors, he contributed not a little to the success of the discussions by rea- son of his capacity to go straight to the heart of a question. Thibaudeau, one of the ablest of his councilors, says that " he spoke without any preparation, embarrassment, or aflfectation; using the freedom of an ordinary conversation. ... He was never inferior in tone or knowledge of the subject to any mem- ber of the Council ; he usually equalled the most experienced of them in the facility with which he got at the root of a question, in the justice of his ideas, and in the force of his arguments. He often surpassed them all by the turn of his sentences and the originality of his expressions." ® The civil code was not completed during the first period of the Consulate, because its first " titles " were rejected by the Tribunate and the Legislative Corps. In April, 1802, Bonaparte put an end to the general discussion of successive titles in the Tribunate, ordering them submitted to the legislative section, which should send its criticisms to the Council. They were then presented to the Legislative Corps without further action of the Tribunate, being explained by councilors chosen for this pur- pose. It was, however, two years before the project was car- ried to completion. The civil code, like most other achievements of the Consulate, Changes was a work of reconciliation and compromise, although it em- m French bodied somc ideas decidedly reactionary. The legislation of the Revolution had seriously menaced the stability of the family, which the code sought to strengthen by depriving natural chil- dren of the favors conferred by the Convention, surrounding even adoption with restrictions, and by enhancing paternal au- thority. The father could now dispose freely by will of from one-fourth to one-half of his property. He was given the right of disciplinary arrest, a revival of the practice of issuing lettres de cachet to protect family honor or to compel obedience. In 6 Bonaparte and the Consulate, 168, A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 283 such cases he had only to apply to the district judge for the *^i" order, which must be made without inquiry. The position of woman was weakened. She had no share in the family prop- 1799-1804 erty and must obey as a child. Divorce was preserved, but mutual consent was necessary unless grave specific reasons of- fered ground for an action in court. For the sake of Catholic consciences, judicial separation was reestablished. The code was not free from defects, due in some instances to haste and to lack of exact knowledge, but Bonaparte justly regarded it as one of the great achievements of his government. At a later period of his career, when French influence was dominant in Western Europe, it was an effective instrument for the spread of the principles of the Revolution applied to civil order. Neither the program nor the ambitions of the First Consul were subjected to control by the press. As the Parisian jour- The nals during the Provisional Consulate had shown tendencies towards frank independent criticism, no sooner was the Con- sulate organized than the Moniteur, the principal newspaper, was bridled by making it the official journal, and all others except thirteen designated by name were suppressed on the ground that they served the interests of the enemy rather than those of France. Bonaparte regarded a journal and its subscribers as forming a species of club, and, as clubs were not tolerated, he saw no reason for preserving journals. Among those permitted to exist were, however, one or two belonging to the opposition. All were warned in vague terms, recalling the worst legislation of the Jacobins, against printing articles contrary to the sov- ereignty of the people or the glory of the armies, or which might disturb public opinion and trouble commerce, and were ordered more specifically to publish no military news or references to religion. Outside of Paris it became the policy to have a single newspaper in each department, carefully supervised by the pre- fect. Bonaparte wished the newspapers to preserve an air of liberty, but he rigorously repressed any tendencies towards in- dependence. By 1803 only eight newspapers, besides the Moni- teur, were published in Paris, and their subscription list con- tained 18,680 names. The general feeling of gratitude, created by the achievements of the Consulate, and especially by the successful negotiation ^j'^JJ^^'® of the Treaty of Amiens, was skilfully utilized by Bonaparte and his supporters to make his power virtually monarchical. Many professed to see in the permanence of his control the only effective barrier agai:ist the return of the anarchy of the Directory. His admirers were so ardent that their schemes often outran his most 284 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVII Changes in the Constitu- tion venturesome resolutions and gave to these an air of moderation. On May 6, the day the Peace of Amiens was formally an- nounced, the Tribunate, prompted by the second consul, Cam- baceres, spoke in favor of according to General Bonaparte a " signal pledge of national gratitude." Individual members of the Senate were asked to give this the form of an election as Consul for Life. The proposal was brought up at a session of the Senate, but the majority tried to head off the demand by voting to reelect Bonaparte for a second term, prolonging his tenure of office until 1819. In a letter to the Senate he pre- tended that he could not consider the burdens of a second term (whose beginnings were still seven years distant) unless the people should impose such a sacrifice. When the terms of a referendum or plebiscite were discussed by the Council of State, his partisans argued that it would not be right to restrict the question to the confirmation or rejection of the Senate's vote, and that the people should have an oppor- tunity to decide the larger question. Under guise of offering such an opportunity the Council decided that the voters should be asked to vote " Yes " or " No " on the question, " Shall Na- poleon Bonaparte become Consul for Life ? " The question was embodied in a consular decree and the votes were recorded on open registers. There was some talk that the Senate would intervene, but timidity soon got the better of the impulse to safeguard the republican constitution. The plebiscite was an immense success for the Bonapartists — if the group which en- gineered the enterprise may be so named — for, out of 3,577,259 persons voting, only 8,374 voted " No." Among these was Lafayette, who owed his return from prison and exile to Bona- parte, but who wrote the First Consul that he would vote for the Consulship for Life when the First Consul should add to the benefits of his " reparatory " dictatorship the greater benefit of the reestablishment of political liberty. Bonaparte took advantage of the overwhelming vote in his favor to revise the constitution in such a way as to leave no effective obstacle to the realization of his will. He inserted a right to designate his successor, although he had stricken this out of the question submitted to the voters. He secured con- trol of the Senate through the privilege of naming for each of the fourteen vacancies still remaining two candidates, of whom the Senate should choose one, and the further privilege of ap- pointing forty other senators. The possibility of o])position in the Council was lessened by the creation of a Pri/y Council, whose personnel should be chosen for each session by Bonaparte A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP 285 from the ministers and councilors. Treaties were to be referred ^^J' to this body for confirmation, instead of being subject to the chances of ordinary legislative measures as before. The new 1799-1804 council also received the right to lay before the Senate projects for the interpretation of the constitution and the regulation of matters not provided for in its text. Such projects, if accepted by the Senate, were promulgated as senatus consultes and en- joyed the same authority as other parts of the constitution. In the new constitutional arrangements an attempt was made .to conciliate or hoodwink public opinion by adding to the duties of the voter. A hierarchy of electoral assemblies was organ- ized, beginning with primary assemblies made up of all voters in each canton. But the electoral assemblies received only rights of nomination, the appointing power resting as before with the First Consul. Indeed, his power of appointment was in- creased, for he named even the justices of the peace, who had been elected up to this time. Moreover, the original electoral assemblies were chosen by the notables on the communal list and held their positions for life, with the consequence that the primary assemblies organized two years later could only fill vacancies, and not even these until two-thirds of the places were vacant. The change in the constitution was accompanied by a return to monarchical manners, requiring an expenditure correspond- ingly royal. The civil list of the First Consul was increased from 500,000 francs to 6,000,000. Henceforward the Republia existed only in name. The Empire was not far off. CHAPTER XVIII BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY CHAP. xvm Attitude toward the Eevolu- A New Periclean Age AFTER the signature of the Treaty of Luneville a revolution in German affairs was inevitable. The only question was, How far would it go? Would it mean simply the shifting of a few boundary lines, a slight modification of the constitution of the empire, or would it lead to changes which in the end would bring into being a new Germany, capable of assuming a greater role? The answer to these questions is to be found in the tendencies of German life and thought in the decade which fol- lowed the Peace of Basel quite as much as in any conclusions reached by the diplomats to whom the problems presented by the Treaty of Luneville were referred. In outward appearance the Germany of 1801 was altogether similar to the Germany of 1763. The old regime had been mod- ified in no essential particular. Some changes had been made, but they were not profound enough to affect the general situa- tion. Were it not for the reforms which were to follow, these changes might be regarded as belated efforts of " Enlightened Despotism " rather than as precursors of a reorganization far more radical. The moral influence of the French Revolution in Germany had not been great or lasting. Public opinion was confused by the spectacle of Jacobin violence, and early enthusi- asms were chilled by the miseries of a war which involved nearly all Western Europe. The philosopher Kant, it is true, still re- tained his conviction that the Revolution was essentially sound and declared that the acts of the Jacobins were no worse than the misdeeds of many tyrannical rulers. The direct influence of the movement did not, however, penetrate far beyond the Rhine, and even in that region the conduct of French generals and civil commissioners did not serve the cause of the propa- ganda. The principal reason why Revolutionary ideas found so lit- tle lodgment in German minds was that Germany had won her intellectual and moral independence. She had ceased to look to France for leadership in literature or in philosophy. By 1795 it was Kant's teaching that controlled the reflections of the most thoughtful minds. The achievements of Goethe and Schiller 286 BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 287 were fast giving Germany the right to claim for her literature xvm a place beside the literatures of France and England. The period from 1794 to 1805 was a new Periclean Age, with Weimar I'^^^-isoa as the modern Athens. Of the older poets Wieland was still there. Goethe had been there for twenty years and Schiller for nearly ten. Herder was also there until his death in 1803. The intimate association of Goethe and Schiller began in 1794, three years after Goethe had been made director of the court theater. In rapid succession came Schiller's greatest plays — Wallenstein, Maria Stuart, Die Jungfrau von Orleans, and Wilhelm Tell, the last the year before Schiller died. In 1796 Goethe had published Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre and the next year Hermann und Dorothea. He did not complete the second version of Faust until three years after Schiller's death. It is not without significance that at a time when Germany was about to sink to the depths of humiliation politically the German language reached its full maturity as an instrument for the expression of lofty ideals and the interpretation of experi- ence. This meant that the disunion of the German people was only apparent and temporary. The power for a moral renaissance and a political reconstruction was simply waiting to be roused. Schiller and Goethe, and Lessing and Herder, who preceded them, were " the true representatives of public life," " the true upholders of national honor," and the creators of the soul which in the nineteenth century " at last wrought for itself a body." ^ The German poets and philosophers of this period have been accused of being too much concerned with the problems of the Tenden- individual and indifferent to dangers which threatened their German land with political enslavement. It is true that for a long time Literature they had seemed to be content with a social order which left them at leisure to cultivate poetry and the arts or to study sci- entific problems, dwelling serene on the far slopes of thought or feeling, while below plodded peasant and townsman, the one with the task of furnishing recruits to the army and servants to the nobles, the other with the duty of enriching the State by industry and trade. This is not a surprising attitude con- sidering the rigid political framework of German society under the old regime. The most thoughtful minds, hedged in on every side by barriers upon which neither caustic satire nor vigorous criticism made much impression, were naturally thrown back upon questions of individual experience. Some great impact from without was apparently needed to wreck and discredit the 1 Francke, History of German Literature, 397, 398. THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVIII Romantic Movement old system before a broader and more healthful public spirit could find room to live and breathe. To furnish that impact was Napoleon's function. Meanwhile, however, there were Ger- man thinkers who were disgusted with their isolation from pub- lic life and the concerns of the common people. In the Mono- logues which Schleiermacher published in 1800 he asked, " Where is the devotion which would rather sacrifice the narrow conscious- ness of personality . , , which would rather risk the individual life than that the fatherland should perish ? " And he added, " So far removed is this age from even the dimmest conception of what the highest form of human life means, that they think that State the best which is felt the least. . . ." ^ That tendency in German literature which has been described as the Romantic Movement was also beginning to make itself felt in the first years of the new century. One of its conse- quences was to interest Germans in their early folk songs and tales and in their earlier history. In 1805 two writers of this Romantic School published a collection of folk songs called Des Knaben Wunderhorn, the predecessor of the more famous Kin- der- und Hausmdrchen published by the brothers Grimm seven years later. As has been remarked : " Naturally the common folk who had created all this began to appear in a new light. The plain man had suddenly become as the hero of a long- neglected romance." ^ A new German patriotism was nourished by such poems and tales, since the people gained a stronger feel- ing for their land and its associations. As the leaders of the Romantic School turned to the Middle Ages for their inspiration, their writings quickened the interest in the history of medieval Germany. Herder's teaching that the literature of a people at any epoch is an expression of the national development exercised an influence in the same direc- tion. The idea which the Romanticists had formed of medieval life was often sentimental and fanciful, but it was corrected with the progress of historical studies. The main thing at the time was the creation of a genuine interest. Already in F. A. Wolf's discussion of the Homeric question an excellent example had been presented of the application of the historical method to a literary problem. Young German scholars were being trained in the Greek seminaries of Beck and Hermann at Leip- zig to use the same exact method. It was only a question of a few years before some of these students would apply it in inves- tigations of the earlier history of Germany. 2 Francke, 431. 3 Thomas, German Literature, 341. BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 289 The old regime was undermined in another direction by the xvm spread of sound ideas upon economic conditions. A new trans- lation of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in 1794, 1795-I803 exercised a wide influence. Its doctrines were championed es- Reformers pecially by Professor Kraus, a colleague of Kant at Konigsberg, who had turned from philosophy to economics. In 1796 he declared that " since the time of the New Testament no work has had more beneficial effects than this will have if it should be more . , . deeply impressed upon the minds of all who have to do with public affairs." * Kraus made it his business to " possess some excellent heads with it," a very important achieve- ment indeed because these very men were to have a share in the reorganization of Prussia a few years later. The men who were soon to lead in the revival of German public spirit and to undertake definite tasks of reform were already in the service of various German States, particularly of Prussia. The most notable example was Baron vom Stein, an imperial knight, who had been a Prussian official since the closing years of Frederick's reign. From 1796 to 1804 he was provincial governor of Westphalia. Hardenberg, who had ne- stein gotiated the Treaty of Basel, and who was also to have an important share in the regeneration of Prussia, was originally from Hanover. Scharnhorst, to whom the army of the Wars of Liberation was to owe its organization, was another Han- overian, and he did not become a Prussian officer until 1801. Schon, one of the authors of the Emancipation Edict of 1807, had begun his administrative career in 1793. His father had been a friend of Kant and he had been influenced by Kraus at the University of Konigsberg. This official class, recruited often from young men of ideas and capacity, was an important center of public opinion, partly making up for the lack of an organ- ized " third estate." Moreover, serious attempts to remove the obstacles to a healthier social and industrial life were made. If they did not save Germany from disaster, it was that they were belated, were not radical enough, were not wide enough in scope, and did not always receive the hearty support of the administration. Dur- neform in ing the reign of Frederick William II, Prussia suffered from a ^^^^^^^ natural reaction against the severe system of Frederick the Great as well as from the blighting influence of royal favorites and mistresses. Frederick William III, who became King in 1797, was a prince of attractive private virtues, but timid and * Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, L 409. 290 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVIU hesitant, to whom men of greater energy of character and orig- inality of mind were uncongenial. From the beginning, how- ever, he showed an anxious desire to improve the condition of the peasantry, regarding the French Revolution as a warning to unjust princes. His apparent zeal aroused enthusiasm in Berlin, and men looked for a revolution from above which in beneficent results should put to shame the Jacobin upheaval. One of the most serious obstacles to reform was the burden of Polish ter- ritory, the spoil of the second and third partitions of Poland, since the German element in the Hohenzollern States was not strong enough to render easy the assimilation of so large a Slavic population. The seizure of these lands had also opened opportunities for the enrichment of officials, bringing scandal and disorganization into the Prussian service. Fortunately a Napoleonic amputation soon relieved the Prussian State of the incubus. The peasant reforms attempted by Frederick William III were the logical continuation of efforts begun in the reigns of Fred- erick William I and Frederick the Great. The condition of the peasants was, on the whole, pitiful, although the burdens differed in different provinces. Even in some western provinces, where more rapid progress might have been looked for, the peas- ants were still serfs, subject to dues like the heriot, which per- mitted the lord at the peasant's death to take half his personal property. The law was more severe than the practice, but the nobles were loath to abandon any of their rights without a com- pensation which government officials thought excessive. In the last year of the reign of Frederick William II a reform had been begun in Westphalia, transforming labor dues into money payments on the lands of the royal domain and encouraging the peasants to become proprietors of their farms. Frederick Wil- liam III pursued this policy in other parts of the domain, not everywhere with the same success. In Silesia the redemption of obligatory services went on slowly, while in Prussia proper little progress was made in the creation of peasant properties. The peasants were more eager to be rid of the burdens of com- pulsory labor than to acquire proprietorship, since with pro- prietorship would cease the assistance which the State as ulti- mate owner was wont to grant in times of war, famine, and pestilence. The King's advisers were anxious to avoid the dan- ger that the freedom of the peasants would result in their aban- doning the soil. In Pomerania and the central Marks the crea- tion of peasant properties was more successful. The conviction BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 291 that a thoroughgoing reform was needed was not strong enough ^^j{ to enable the King to impose similar plans upon the nobles. This period saw also the beginnings of administrative reform 1795-1803 in Prussia. Stein was one of the leaders in the movement. The early sphere of his activity was in Westphalia, where the excise system of the eastern provinces, with its rigid distinction between town and open country, had never been fully introduced. His most useful work was the readjustment of the tax system in order to harmonize the interests of peasants and townsmen. Among other things, the tariff was rearranged, freeing raw ma- terial, and taxing merchants who dealt in foreign manufactured articles. In the county of Mark he abolished internal customs barriers, collecting the tariff at the frontiers, a first step toward the complete reorganization of the Prussian customs system which was made long afterwards in 1818. Such changes were excellent, but slight in amount compared with the need. The forces of conservatism and privilege were still too strong. It was the rude hand of the spoiler, rather than the projects of enlightened reformers, which pushed Germany on toward funda- mental changes. The reform movement was not limited to Prussia, In south- ern Germany its most significant incidents occurred in Bavaria. Bavaria The Elector's principal minister, the Count de Montgelas, an illuminist of Savoyard extraction, was inclined to reforms of the type attempted by Joseph II, and was especially eager to attack the supremacy of the Church, which had held undisputed sway in Bavaria since the days of the Catholic Reformation. The clerical order numbered, one for every 166 inhabitants, and half of the number were monks or nuns. In a series of edicts from 1800 to 1803, the Bavarian Protestants were granted tolera- tion and the right to acquire landed property. The protests of the aristocracy were met with the reminder that the example of Prussia and Hanover proved that prosperity was not dependent upon unity of faith. Two years later followed an attack on the monastic orders; some were dissolved, others consolidated in fewer cloisters, none were permitted to receive novices. The aim was mainly fiscal, but much of the property was dissipated because the work was entrusted to unskilful or dishonest hands. Germany had long been the principal battle-ground of Europe and had been frequently sacrificed at treaties of peace. This hard fate was the consequence of political disintegration. There Holy was a " Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation," and yet ^^"^ Germany had ceased to be much more than a geographical ex- 292 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. xvm 1795-1803 Peace of Luneville pression. The Empire was composed of more than three hun- dred and fifty States, ranging in size from the electorate of Brandenburg, ruled by the Prussian king, and the Austrian duchies, possessed by the Hapsburgs, to lordships or counties a few miles square. A day's journey " might take a traveler through the territories of a free city, a sovereign abbot, a vil- lage belonging to an imperial knight, and the dominions of a landgrave, a duke, a prince, and a king, so small, so numerous, and so diverse were the principalities." ^ If the imperial baronies, situated in Swabia, Franconia, and the Rhine country, be counted the number of German sovereign States was over twelve hun- dred. These States recognized no master except the distant Em- peror, who had succeeded in preserving only a shadow of his former prerogatives. Their only means of common action was the imperial diet, at which many of them no longer took the trouble to be represented. It was nominally made up of a college of electors, a college of princes, and a college of free cities. If these colleges reached a common conclusion, this must receive the approval of the Emperor. The rivalries of Prussia and Austria, which had been especially keen since the accession of Frederick II in 1740, had still further weakened the crumbling structure of imperial government. They exposed Germany to exactly that kind of meddling on the part of outside powers which followed the Treaty of Luneville. The Emperor Francis had agreed in the treaty that the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine should be indemnified according to the plan adopted tentatively at the Congress of Rastadt. The situation offered France an opportu- nity to intervene in regulating the indemnities and to work for the organization of a group of minor States dependent upon her. This danger could be lessened only by hastening a settlement of the question before the French should have their hands freed by peace with England. The imperial diet ratified the Treaty of Luneville promptly, but there unanimity ceased and conflict- ing interests made themselves felt. The German ecclesiastical princes — archbishops, bishops, and abbots — menaced by the plan of seizing their territories in order to furnish compensation for the dispossessed, argued that the losses should be distributed among all classes of States. They hoped for the support of the Emperor, because they had been the bulwark of Hapsburg power. His inclination was to insist that only enoug-h ecclesiastical territory should be secularized 5 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, 2n(i ed., 405, n. BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 293 to meet actual losses. He was also in favor of preserving the ^^^J.- electorates of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne, endowing them with territory belonging to minor ecclesiastical rulers. 1795-1803 The policy of the Austrians, however, went beyond the project of indemnities for losses incurred by the cession to France of a part of the Empire. In the first place they sought compensa- tion for the Hapsburg grand duke who had been deprived of Tuscany. They also were intent upon reviving earlier schemes of aggrandizement. They wished particularly to push their Kivai frontiers westward at the expense of Bavaria, and suggested schemes that the Elector take in exchange enough baronies, cities, and other petty States along the upper Danube and the Neckar. Such schemes, emanating from their historic enemy, were un- palatable to the Bavarians, and hinted, moreover, that other classes of weak States besides ecclesiastical principalities were threatened with ruin. A chief element in the Austrian policy was the desire to prevent the enlargement of Prussia. The Hohenzollerns abandoned their attitude as guardians of Germany more completely than the Hapsburgs, and they were so intent upon gaining the utmost which the occasion afforded that they appeared mainly as beneficiaries of French partiality. Bonaparte, like his predecessors in the Committee of Public Safety and the Directory, pursued the policy of a Prussian alli- ance, which he was ready to purchase by large concessions of territory. This did not prevent his attempting to bring to an end Prussian interests in South Germany by arranging an ex- change by which they should give up Ansbach and Baireuth and receive Mecklenburg, together with some Westphalian bishoprics or abbeys. This would facilitate his plan of constructing a " Third Germany," composed of the minor southern States jeal- ous of both Prussia and Austria. But the Prussians had a plan of their own altogether contrary to this, proposing to receive part of their indemnities in Bamberg and Wiirzburg, which with Ansbach and Baireuth would form a large block of territory in the heart of southern Germany. Since the German powers were hopelessly divided and given over to selfish aims, the solution of the problem of conflicting covetousness belonged to Bonaparte and to France. The rivalry of Austria and Prussia was illustrated during the summer of 1801 in the affair of the archbishopric of Cologne, to which was also attached the bishopric of Miinster. The arch- bishop died on July 27, and Austria immediately took steps to promote the election of a successor, hoping to throw an obstacle in the way of secularization. As a part of the Miinster lands 294 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVIII Imperial Deputa- tion had been promised to Prussia as indemnity, the Prussians pro- tested that no election should take place until the question of 1795-1803 indemnities was settled. The members of both cathedral chap- ters naturally took the Austrian view of the matter and elected to the vacant see the Archduke Anton, the brother of the Em- peror. The Prussians declared that they would not recognize the election, whereupon the Austrians, not wishing the matter to assume too serious an aspect, conceded that the election should have no bearing upon the question of indemnities. After the diet had confirmed the treaty it was necessary to find a basis for the detailed settlement of indemnities. The secular princes, particularly Prussia and Bavaria, were ready to abandon to the Emperor the odious responsibility of proposing a definite plan of despoiling the victims. This he declined to do, although he was willing to arrange the indemnities if his decisions should be accepted as final, for he would thus become the dispenser of enormous patronage. The matter dragged on through the summer, and in September the Emperor proposed that a deputation of eight members should undertake the task. The Reichsdeputation, or Imperial Deputation, as finally consti- tuted, was made up of four electoral States — Mainz, Saxony, Brandenburg (representing Prussia), and Bohemia (represent- ing Austria) — and four members of the college of princes — Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wiirttemberg, and the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. Only two of these, Bohemia and the Grand Master, were likely to accept the Hapsburg view of the situa- tion, although Mainz and Saxony were not ready to go so far as the remaining four. But the deputation accomplished noth- ing, serving merely as the instrument which French diplomacy used to work its will. As it became apparent that the question of indemnities was to be settled in Paris the German princes who had something to gain or lose hastened to the capital of France or sent their rep- resentatives. Rumor declared that French officials had their price and were ready to utilize a unique opportunity to establish their fortunes. The salon of Talleyrand, Bonaparte's minister of foreign affairs, was the center of these manceuvers. " Princes and dukes, princesses and duchesses, paid huge sums to be com- prehended in the indemnities. Some of the money was inter- cepted by swindling agents : much found its way into the long purse of Talleyrand, whose enormous fortune was largely built out of the complimentary gifts which he received for his services upon this occasion."^ In August, 1801, Bonaparte signed a « Fisher, Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany, 41. The French Plan BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 295 treaty with Bavaria, promising compensation for losses on the Tvin left bank of the Rhine as well as for all other losses, and thus guaranteeing the Elector against Austrian schemes. The terms 1795-1803 of the treaty showed also that the question of indemnity was becoming merged in the larger question of the territorial re- organization of Germany. Before the year was over France was freer to take the initiative in German matters, because the signa- ture of the Preliminaries of London had ended the war with England, and especially because a treaty of peace with Russia pledged the Czar to act in agreement with the French on the German question. In May, 1802, the French plan was embodied in separate treaties with Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Wiirttemberg, and Hesse-Cassel, and was accepted by Russia as a basis for joint mediation. Although half of the States in the Imperial Deputation were now bound by treaty to support the French plan, months passed before the business was completed. As soon as the Emperor Francis heard of the proceedings he issued a rescript declaring The that the integrity of the empire must be preserved and that the gj^^,'^*'^'^' usual mode of procedure must be followed. The Prussians, however, regarded the matter as so far settled that they de- spatched troops to occupy the lands allotted to them, including Miinster, The Bavarians attempted to occupy Passau, but the bishop appealed to the Austrians, and they reached the city first. When the deputation reassembled, the Emperor insisted that each claim for indemnity be examined separately, denying that the preservation of a balance of interests between the various States was the principal question. At this juncture the repre- sentatives of France and Russia at Regensburg (Ratisbon), the seat of the diet, notified the deputation that a final decision must be reached within two months. The princes were satisfied with their own prospects and anxious to accept the Franco-Russian plan as a basis, but the Emperor still resisted, evidently hold- ing out for better terms. These the French conceded, increas- ing the compensation of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena, and giving Austria the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen. The Emperor now consented to bring the " Con- clusion " of the " Imperial Deputation " before the diet. New delays would have ensued had the victims been permitted a voice in the question of their own destruction, but it was de- cided to call the names of the spiritual princes and declare them absent. In this way the " Conclusion " was adopted in March, 1803, and, a month later, was ratified by the Emperor — with 296 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVIII Gains and Losses reservations, touching particularly the distribution of votes in the reorganized college of princes. From the details of the settlement it is clear that the necessity of indemnifying the dispossessed princes had served as an occa- sion for a new distribution of power amounting to a veritable revolution. Prussia had lost only 127,000 inhabitants by her cession of territory on the left bank, and she received in com- pensation 500,000. Bavaria's gain was not relatively as large, but Baden and Wiirttemberg were given ten times as much as they lost, partly because of Bonaparte's scheme of a " Third Germany," and partly because their ruling princes were rela- tives of the Czar. So much territory was assigned to the larger States that not enough could be found to indemnify dispossessed counts and barons, and many lost both their property and their status in the empire. They and the ecclesiastical princes were not the only victims. Of over fifty free cities only six remained : Hamburg, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Liibeck, Bremen, and Frank- fort — two or three of these receiving slight territorial gains. The settlement influenced the fortunes of individual States, the constitution of the empire, and the position of the Church. The most obvious result was the simplification of the map of Germany, Two classes of States, one with a single exception, the other with only six, disappeared. The ecclesiastical States had been especially extensive in the south and west, where the tide of the Lutheran Reformation had been stayed. They now vanished from the map. The Archbishop-Elector of Mainz was indemnified with the principality and bishopric of Regensburg, besides other ecclesiastical and secular lands, and was made Elector of Regensburg, Archbishop of Regensburg and Prince- Primate of Germany. The largest of the destroyed ecclesiastical States were Salzburg, Wiirzburg, and Miinster. The suppres- sion of most of the free cities affected the map less obviously because their rule did not extend far beyond their walls. The States which received ecclesiastical lands and free cities acquired continuity of territory and ceased to be a puzzhng patchwork of color. In the case of Miinster the complexity was increased, for it was divided between six or seven States besides Prussia. The annexations to Prussia still left the map of western Ger- many intricate, and many Berliners declared that Prussia had received merely a few more " islands " in Westphalia. The future of Bavaria was affected by annexation of the better part of Wiirzburg, part of Bamberg, of Passau, and of Freising, besides many towns and abbeys. Her territory was extended northward toward the center of Germany, and she GERMANY drentJj/^;? Kioppen. BEFORE Koevo ./ THE REVOLUTION Scale of Mil es ' ^^', 10 20 30 Ztnjdet 9° 10° AVATE Ol-; LiLNEBEltGr— EBEKG 4>\OL-,-\ y ,'?;^i«<'^---,lrH^rr»n fold ^;zs5^->^BEKG,' I. ymg^ _^ M .Iy^II"'" v/-iut« J^a ^_^,.rc§^^";f SBourmont >^ *> fiapporteweiier rs!-|.,w,-=«y> ,,^ ,-^S^' !-■>-! -' / J^-tJi^mLrpmontA *'New Breii 7 ^^ L--n \^E„sis!;^i"f *( |5J^^f'''^j?«4:::;M^'^"^i^^!;^fi^ A.Archbiehopric, B.BiBhopric.C.Coumy, \^ I).Duchj,L.Landgraviate,M.Margra/ate C.^ «,»££'''\ f'if I 1 Imperial Cities l^<> Vf^^dJS^ Ecclesiastical States OLAJJuXw, ^v' To 6'^ Longitude 7° East ^^ "i>-o^. " F^ki>ch ^ Greenwich 10° BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 297 gained a population more progressive and cultured. The Prus- ^vm' sian gains were not to be despised, for they were large rela- tively to the losses, but the chief advantage was a population 1795-1803 purely German, which in its influence upon the development of this group of States would offset the addition of a large Slavic population from the partitions of Poland. The acquisition of Miinster was especially valuable, because under the rule of the later bishops it had become a center of civilization in the best sense. With other annexed territory — the bishopric of Pader- born and the abbeys of Essen and Werden — it was so situated as to facilitate communication between provinces already pos- sessed. The settlement of 1803 meant the ruin of the Holy Roman Empire. The disappearance of 112 States affected the organiza- tion of the diet, of the imperial court, and of the circles. The Effect college of free cities, one of the constituent elements of the diet, Empir?^ was practically annihilated. The most serious consequence was the destruction of the alliance with the Church, upon which in theory the empire rested. Two ecclesiastical electors, Treves and Cologne, were suppressed, and four lay electorates added — Baden, Wiirttemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg. Moreover, a Catholic majority was changed into a Protestant majority of six to four, making the succession of another Hapsburg on the throne of the empire doubtful. The majority in the college of princes was also changed; the total number being reduced from 100 to 82, of which the Protestants controlled 52 or 53 and the Catholics 29 or 30. The Emperor, insisting that it was neces- sary to preserve the parity between the religions, desired to increase the number of Catholic votes; but the empire disap- peared before the question was settled. The Pope now referred to it as Imperium Germanicum, rather than as Imperium Ro- manum, and turned to the First Consul for a protector of Cath- olic interests in Germany. The results to the Catholic Church in Germany were hardly less revolutionary. The property of the monasteries, not only me of those deprived of sovereignty by the " Conclusion," but also chu^S*' of those lying within the States of indemnified princes, was placed at the disposition of rulers for educational, religious, or even ordinary governmental expenditures. The property of con- vents for women could, however, be touched only with the con- sent of the local bishop. Universities were sometimes affected, a part of their revenues coming from religious foundations. Several had already lost similar property situated west of the Rhine. The foundations for the support of the clergy of the 298 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVIII cathedral chapters, over 700 in number, were confiscated, de- priving Catholic noblemen of an opportunity of obtaining lucra- tive prebends for younger sons. Henceforward the priesthood was recruited more largely from the middle class and the peas- antry; during the remainder of this period no nobleman of ancient family entered the German priesthood. The position of bishop was less attractive, now that it was divorced from sovereignty, and the change affected the attitude as well as the interests of the clergy. The higher church dignitaries, no longer rulers, responsible for interests purely German, became in policy ultramontane, papal, like the French clergy whom the Revolu- tion had despoiled. The old imperial constitution had been the bulwark of weak States as well as the safeguard of the Catholic Church. The glamour which had hitherto protected privileges possessed for centuries had received as rude a blow as that inflicted by the Lutheran movement in the sixteenth century, and the dynastic ambitions of a few houses had become the dominant element in the situation. More than ever before Germany was open to those who desired to add to their territories or to create new States. In southern Germany a group of secondary States had been formed, which were to serve as a make-weight against both Hapsburg and Hohenzollern ambitions. At the same time the trend of the Hapsburg power eastward was emphasized by the loss of its westernmost territories, pointing to a time when Germany would be organized without Austria. After the work of division ended the task of assimilation be- gan. For Prussia the treatment of Miinster, its most import- ant acquisition, may be considered as typical. The adminis- tration was entrusted to Stein, whose attitude was conciliatory. He wished to preserve the old organization as far as possible in order to give opportunity for the growth of a spirit of co- operation. Already distrustful of the work of uncontrolled bureaucracies, he believed that the administration would need the counsel and the criticism of the local estates. His Prussian superiors, however, only promised that the Miinster estates should be treated like those of the older provinces, which meant that they would have little to do. The monastic and other foundations devoted to educational work, to the care of hos- pitals, or to the training of nurses and teachers were maintained, although much of the property was used for ordinary govern- mental expenditure. The problem of taxation was perplexing, for, evidently, the usual excise system could not be introduced in complete form. In most of the territories west of the Weser BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY 299 a moderate tariff system was established, on the understanding xvm that the merchants would purchase part of their stock in regions 1 ^, • • r 1795-1803 where the excise was in lorce. In South Germany the changes were more radical and were shaped consciously upon French models. The general aim was to substitute the machinery of a centralized State for the con- south fusion of numberless jurisdictions and antiquated privileges, ^""^"y The instrument was an efficient bureaucracy. One consequence was higher taxation to meet the expenses of the new system and to put an army on foot. In Bavaria an interesting attempt was made to improve the tenant right of the peasantry, but neither there nor in Baden did such efforts lead to much more than changes in terminology descriptive of peasant obligations and burdens.'^ The Elector of Wurttemberg regarded the time as opportune for the consolidation of his personal power; but his methods displayed the vices as well as the benefits of cen- tralized administration, and gained him the bad repute of a tyrant. Among the questions which were not settled in 1803 was the status of the Imperial Knights. Bavaria had already begun to encroach upon the rights of the Franconian Knights, on the theory that the knights had once been simply nobles, and that imperial they should now be reduced to that position. In October, 1803, ^'"siits a patent was issued embodying this view, and it was followed by a forcible occupation of many knightly lands. Other States were more than ready to imitate so profitable an example. Even petty princes, with territories only a little larger than those of the knights, seized the opportunity to round out their posses- sions. One seizure proved more historic than the rest. On the last day of 1803 the Duke of Nassau-Usingen sent officials and soldiers to occupy two villages belonging to the Baron vom Stein. Stein immediately summoned him to the bar of German opinion, declaring in an open letter, apropos of the duke's published reasons, " Germany's independence will be little helped through the absorption of the knightly possessions by the small lands which surround them. If a great and advantageous end is to be accomplished, these small States must be united to the two great monarchies upon whose existence depends the fate of the German name." And he added a prayer that he might live to see this done. The action of Bavaria and her imitators was premature. The Emperor for the last time vigorously asserted his powers and through the imperial court annulled the annexa- 7 For a more favorable view of changes in Bavaria, see Doeberl, Entwickelungsgeschichte Bayerns, II, 396. 300 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XVIII tioiis. This was decisive because France was unwilling to inter- vene actively in the affair, and Prussia, although jealous of Austria's attitude, did not support Bavaria. Meanwhile the German question had been reopened in another form by the French occupation of Hanover, situated in north- ern Germany beyond the demarcation line drawn in 1795. This was an incident in a larger struggle eommenced in 1803. B CHAPTER XIX FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE EFORE the Treaty of Amiens was signed the First Consul chap. entered upon a course of conduct which made the long con- tinuance of peace improbable. To what extent he was carrying I803-04 out with greater intelligence policies which had been adopted by the Directory, and to what extent he gave them a more aggres- sive turn and a new character, is not easy to determine. In his attempt to recover the earlier French colonial empire it was not his fault if the projected transfer of Louisiana aroused the fears of the United States and threatened to turn the peace-loving Jefferson into a resolute and irreconcilable enemy, for the scheme was well under way before he became master of the destinies of France. This is less true of the ideas which guided him in dealing with the European situation, although his acts may be considered as only a successful application of the prin- ciples which had directed French foreign policy since 1795. He flattered the conviction of the French that they were the " grande nation" and convinced them that their version of their own rights or of the rights of their neighbors was not subject to protest or revision ; but, at the same time, he prepared a cruel disappointment of their genuine desire for peace. Moreover, while he strengthened the control of France beyond her borders, he associated it with his personal supremacy. He became an imperial figure long before the Republic was transformed into the Empire. Bonaparte's policy, its benefits as well as its dangers, is well illustrated in the history of Italy from 1800 to 1805. The Treatmen French were welcomed in 1800, although the year before they °^ i*^'y had been so unpopular that some Italian republicans fought on the side of the Allies. The Austrians had proved to be masters as harsh as the French in their exactions and more detestable in their policy, imprisoning all identified with French rule. New victories did not change the character of the French, whose army of occupation was commanded by Murat, now Bonaparte's brother-in-law. The country was levied on without compunc- tion by generals and by civil agents, and, while spoliation was 301 302 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, less irregular, the result was a more complete exhaustion. The Cisalpine Republic was at once restored, with a provisional ad- 1803-04 ministration, assisted by an assembly of notables. It was not proposed to put in force the former constitution, but to draw up another, on the lines of the new French constitution, and to place at the head of the government a president and a vice- president. Bonaparte's original intention was to make his brother Joseph president, but Joseph had no relish for the role of puppet, and demanded as conditions of his acceptance that the army of occupation be withdrawn and that the territory of the repubUc be enlarged by the addition of Piedmont. Bonaparte concluded to take the presidency himself. A " Consulta," com- posed of 454 Italian delegates, was brought together at Lyons in December and January, 1801-1802, and Talleyrand was sent from Paris to win over a majority for Bonaparte's plan before the assembly was formally convened. A committee was ap- pointed to consider the draft of the new constitution and to prepare a list of officials. When the question of the presi- dency arose, the members voted first for Count Melzi, a dis- tinguished Lombard noble, but, upon a hint from Talleyrand, elected Bonaparte, choosing Melzi as vice-president. Bonaparte then proceeded to Lyons for the formal session. He addressed the delegates in Italian, and before reading the text of the con- stitution inquired whether they wished to inscribe at the head " Cisalpine " or " Italian." When some cried out " Italian," he decided that this should be the name of the new republic. The national hopes of the delegates were flattered, and they looked forward to the Italy dreamed of by Alfieri, an " Italia virtuosa, magnanima, libera ed una." Bonaparte was determined to secure French supremacy in The Italy, and kept an army of occupation in the new republic at its Republic expense, but he meant to make an end of the injustice and rob- bery from which the Itahans had suffered. The two men whom he chose to inaugurate his policies were Melzi, the vice-president, and Prina, a former councilor of the King of Sardinia. Melzi was a serious student of public affairs, as well as a man of an- cient family and great wealth. The only class which he found it difficult to conciliate were politicians of the Jacobin type, who had pushed their way up to prominence during the anarchy of the series of revolutions. He also had to contend against the particularist tendencies of the region south of the Po, which did not wish to remain under the domination of Milan. The con- stant presence of a French army, under an officer like Murat, with the airs of a conqueror and a leader of faction, was a source FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 303 of irritation to the sensitive Italian population, which was hos- °xk' tile to dependence upon France. Count Melzi, with the aid of Prina, commenced an important ^^os-oi work of reorganization. Universal military service was intro- duced, and the army increased from about 8,000 irregulars to 20,000 citizen soldiers. Military schools were established. A gendarmerie was created to put down brigandage. In spite of the heavy cost of such changes, order was restored in the finances and the budget of 1804 saw an end of the deficit. The question of the Church was treated much as it was in France. The old calendar was restored and liberty of worship was con- ceded. Count Melzi was present at public worship. The difficulties of his position as mediator between French demands and Italian sentiment wearied him of his position and before his term ended he urged Bonaparte to accept his resignation. Bonaparte's treatment of the question of Piedmont influenced the course of European politics more immediately than did his Piedmont control of the Italian Republic. As long as the Czar Paul lived he had not ventured to decide the fate of this land, because Paul took a deep interest in the fair treatment of the King of Sar- dinia. With Paul's death Piedmont apparently lost its diplo- matic importance and Bonaparte determined to annex it to France. To minimize the alarm which the step would certainly arouse, he contented himself in April, 1801, with dividing it into military districts of the size of departments, introducing French machinery for the collection of taxes and the administration of justice. The general commanding the army of occupation was made administrator-general. Final annexation was delayed un- til September, 1802, several months after the Peace of Amiens. Bonaparte also changed the government of the Ligurian Repub- lic, imposing a new constitution, with a doge chosen by him, controlling in this way the port of Genoa, the natural outlet of Piedmont, and doubly valuable in case of new difficulties with the English. At the same time his hold upon northern Italy was facilitated through a firmer control of the Simplon road, se- cured by forcing the separation of the canton Valais from Switz- erland and placing it under the protection of the French and Italian repubUcs. Further south the French exercised a con- trolling influence in the new kingdom of Etruria, using it to keep the English out of Leghorn. Bonaparte determined, as the Directory had done, that Switz- erland should form one of the barrier States which should safe- switzer- guard the frontiers of France. The Treaty of Luneville had ^^^* guaranteed the independence of the Swiss, but it had not fore- 304 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CH^. stalled intervention to restore political peace. The constitution imposed by the Directors on the Helvetic Republic " one and in- 1803-04 divisible " had never been acceptable to a majority of the peo- ple. The partisans of the older aristocratic constitution, with its variety of traditional local privileges, had not abandoned hope of a restoration. But there was an increasing number ready for compromise, desiring to preserve the advantageous reforms which the revolution had brought in, and yet anxious to restore those elements of the ancient order closely associated with local habits. This group was borne into power in January, 1800, partly through the influence of the Brumaire revolution in France. Bonaparte favored their aims, but he was unwilling that the Swiss should settle their controversies independently of France; and, when the new party attempted to prepare a con- stitution, he imposed the " constitution of Malmaison," in some respects an excellent solution of the problem, but unacceptable to the Swiss without revision. The consequence was a period of turmoil, ending in civil war, skilfully fomented in order to justify a thorough-going French intervention. In October, 1802, a " mediation " was announced, delegates were summoned to Paris, and a commission, drawn equally from the two principal factions, prepared the draft of another constitution, which was Act of embodied in an Act of Mediation, February 19, 1803, and signed Mediation ]^y ^^^ commission in the " name of the Swiss nation." The compromise was adjusted so shrewdly to the habits and aspira- tions of the Swiss that turmoil ceased and the cantons had an opportunity to develop in peace the sources of their prosperity. Bonaparte regarded this as one of the most successful strokes of his career; his popularity was assured and the dependence of Switzerland was put beyond all question. The Helvetic Republic now became the Swiss Confederation, with nineteen equal, sovereign cantons and three types of local organization: one for rural cantons, which recovered their dem- ocratic organization, with popular assemblies voting on projects submitted by a grand council ; another, more aristocratic, for urban cantons; and still another, politically between the two, for cantons which were formerly dependent districts. The com- mon afifairs of the federation were administered by a landam- mann and a diet, but there was no army and only a small common fund, and no means of guarding the national independence. Later in the year the Swiss were compelled to sign a treaty of alliance with France, promising to furnish 16,000 men. On the left flank of advancing French dominion lay the Dutch Republic, the control of which was as important to the schemes FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 305 of the First Consul as that of Switzerland or Italy, if England's ''^ix influence on the Continent was to be held in check. Some change in the government was required, because, patterned after 1803-04 the fallen Directory, it had been discredited by the levy of a The forced loan necessitated by the heavy financial demands of the Dutch French. Bonaparte, aided by the Dutch delegate in Paris, drew ®^^ up a new constitution, in which the functions of the legislature were restricted as carefully as under the consular system, and a Council of State, instead of a single individual, was placed at the head of the government. When the Dutch chambers re- jected the scheme, they were dissolved by French troops under General Augereau, whose first lessons in managing legislatures had been taken in Paris on the i8th Fructidor. After the French manner also a plebiscite was ordered, at which 68,988 out of 416,419 voters took part, only 16,771 voting for the con- stitution; but this did not confuse the purposes of the First Consul, who announced that the constitution was accepted, as the great majority had not opposed it. One of the tasks of the new government was to collect sixty-five million florins, the bal- ance of the indemnity due France, and to furnish supplies to the French army of occupation, which was not withdrawn after the Peace of Amiens, as had been agreed with the Dutch. The continental powers watched with increasing alarm the Bonapartist interpretations of the eleventh article of the Treaty of Luneville, which guaranteed the independence of the Dutch, Attitude Swiss, and Italian republics. The situation was especially vexa- 3^^^^^* tious to the English, for every extension of French influence meant the withdrawal of another region from English trade. They had expected that the Treaty of Amiens would be followed by a commercial agreement, but Bonaparte took no serious steps in that direction, while he enforced the decrees on the statute books which excluded from France goods of British origin. A similar policy was pursued in lands under French control, includ- ing Spanish and Dutch colonies, which the English gave up when peace was made. This made itself felt by a marked falling off in the volume of British exports, and the merchants concluded that peace was more disastrous than war. Every diplomatic ques- tion between the two countries was discussed in a spirit of increas- ing bitterness. In the fall of 1802 the growth of French influence on the Continent seemed so dangerous that the English began to make difficulties about the evacuation of Malta. One after another came Bonaparte's agreement with the Czar Alexander upon the Malta German question, the annexation of Piedmont, and the media- 3o6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^xix ^^°" '^^ Switzerland. Although in each case the affair went back to the period before the Preliminaries of London, so that 1803-04 ^^^ English had ample warning, the cumulative effect of these assertions of influence appeared to violate the tacit understand- ing upon which the terms of the peace were based. General Bonaparte insisted upon the letter of the document, asking the English to point out where mention was made of Switzerland, or Germany, or Holland. Lord Whitworth, the English am- bassador at Paris, was ordered to declare that George III would " never forego his right of interfering in the affairs of the Con- tinent on any occasion in which the interests of his own domin- ions or those of Europe in general may appear to him to require it." ^ The English took the attitude that the annexation of Piedmont had so strengthened French influence in the Mediter- ranean that they would be justified in retaining Malta as an offset. The return of the Cape to the Dutch was equivalent, they saw, to its control by France, since the French army was not with- drawn from the Batavian Republic, and this rendered the Cape route to the Indies precarious, and thereby made necessary some provision for the safety of the overland routes from the Medi- terranean, which could hardly be done if they abandoned both Malta and Egypt. The English availed themselves of the ex- cuse that the terms of the guarantee of the independence of Malta agreed upon in the treaty had not yet been carried out. The Czar Alexander was so indignant at the annexation of Pied- mont without any compensation to the King of Sardinia, that he intimated to the English the wisdom of keeping hold of Malta. An act of the First Consul made the situation still graver. In September, 1802, he sent Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt to study the condition of the country, the state of the Turkish and British garrisons, and the attitude of the inhabitants towards the French. Sebastiani returned in January, 1803, and in his report, pubUshed in the official Moniteur, he accused the com- mander of the British garrison of provoking the natives to mur- der him. He also gave the numbers of the British force, de- scribing the Turkish army as beneath contempt, and following this by the statement that " 6,000 Frenchmen would suffice to- day to conquer Egypt." ^ The English now refused to discuss 1 Quoted by Rose, J. H., Life of Napoleon, I, 373. - The reason ordinarily ascribed to Bonaparte for raising the Egyptian question so abruptly was the desire to cover his retreat from the disas- trous venture in Santo Domingo, for in January came also the news of General Leclerc's death and the decimation of his troops by disease. FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 307 the question of Malta until Bonaparte should offer a satisfactory ''xix' explanation of the report, although they withdrew their troops from Alexandria two months later. The menacing tone of the ^sos-oi First Consul's communications with Whitworth led the English to arm. News of this angered Bonaparte, who declared before a group of assembled diplomats that no compromise could be Outbreak made on the question of Malta, crying out as he left the room, °' ^^' " Malta or war, woe to those who break treaties ! " He too began preparations for war, but the final rupture did not come until May. He signalized his rage at British truculence by or- dering the arrest of all British subjects traveling in France, al- leging in justification that the English had seized two French ships before the outbreak of war, although the capture had been made four days after war was declared.^ Such an act only popularized the war in England. If the sudden outbreak of war with Great Britain in a measure forestalled Bonaparte's expectations and disconcerted him, it was a serious disappointment to the French people, to whom the Treaty of Amiens had brought the peace which the leaders of the Republic had always declared they were fighting for. Their hopes were now exchanged for the anxieties of a war, the scope of which might be extended until the perilous situation of 1799 or even 1793 reappeared. The hatreds sprung from many long conflicts were all that awakened enthusiasm for the struggle, but these could not be felt by the more discerning per- sons who saw that the First Consul's aggressive policy was partly responsible for the failure of the peace. In England all those interested in foreign trade and high prices were eager for a re- newal of war as the only means of obtaining profitable markets. Political leaders who did not think the terms arranged at Amiens had sufficiently protected British interests were glad when that peace broke down. With the exception of Fox and a few others, the small group of liberals, who had sympathized with the earlier Revolution, English never learned to admire Bonaparte, and regarded him as a despot ^^^^^^e rather than as a reformer and restorer. During the Peace of Amiens when many Englishmen hastened to Paris full of curi- osity about the new ruler of French destinies, Wordsworth also crossed the Channel, but lingered on the coast. The eagerness of his fellow-countrymen to see Bonaparte provoked in him the scornful question: 3 These ships, however, had received no notice of the declaration of war. 3o8 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XIX 1803-01 Is it a reed that 's shaken by the wind, Or what is it that ye go forth to see? Lords, lawyers, statesmen, squires of low degree, Men known, and men unknown, sick, lame, and blind, Post forward all, like creatures of one kind, With first-fruit offerings crowd to bend the knee In France before the new-born Majesty." And he added: Seizure of Han- over " When truth, when sense, when liberty were flown, What hardship had it been to wait an hour ? " Romilly was one of the Englishmen to visit Paris in 1802, but he was so " disgusted at the eagerness with which the English crowded to do homage at the new court of a usurper and a tyrant," as he explains in his diary, that when Talleyrand offered to present him to the First Consul, he " made an excuse." If men who sympathized with France felt this way, it is not sur- prising that the outbreak of war was greeted by most English- men with a fierce joy, and that Bonaparte's order for the arrest of travelers roused public sentiment to fury. The contest at first appeared like a struggle between an ele- phant and a whale. Although Bonaparte assembled a large army on the coast, particularly at Boulogne, the marked inferiority of the French navy made immediate invasion impossible. If the war was to come to an issue, it would be through English at- tacks on the French and Dutch colonies and by the organization of a new coalition, or by French attempts to ruin the English market on the Continent. One of the consequences was the re- turn of Pitt, the great war minister, to the helm of state in Eng- land.* He alone was regarded as able to marshal the energies of the English against the desperate assaults of Bonaparte. As soon as war began Napoleon strengthened the laws against English trade by ordering that colonial products or merchandise coming from British ports, of whatever origin, or covered by whatever flag, should be excluded from the ports of France and of her allies. He sought further to embarrass England by oc- cupying Hanover, of which George III was Elector, but the Brit- ish government did not consider the protection of this principality one of its duties. The Prussians made an ineffective protest, Hanover lying north of the line fixed by the Treaty of Basel. The resistance of the Hanoverians could be only formal, and they were soon forced to place the resources of the electorate at the disposition of the French. The free cities of Hamburg and * In 1804. FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 309 Bremen were also subjected to French control. The exclusion ^'J^- of British commerce from the Elbe and the Weser, and the blockade which the English established in retaliation, affected ^^o^.o^ the Hanoverian income disastrously and within three years the debt was increased by 22,000,000 francs. Meanwhile 67,000,000 were paid into the French military chest and 25,000 or 30,000 troops were quartered on the country. The Hanoverians were docile, but even the commanders of the army of occupation re- aUzed that the burden was too great. Soon after the invasion of Hanover, Bonaparte ordered the Neapolitan ports of Brindisi, Otranto, and Taranto to be occu- rrench pied, alleging as an excuse the unjustifiable retention of Malta of°Neu-°^ by the English. It was at this time that the Swiss were forced trauty to sign a treaty promising auxiliary troops, and that the Dutch signed a new agreement, promising to support 18,000 French troops besides 16,000 of their own. By a proceeding akin to blackmail, Godoy, the powerful Spanish minister, was compelled to persuade his master, Charles IV, to pay into the French treas- ury six milUon francs a month, instead of furnishing the less valuable forms of aid promised in the Treaty of San Ildefonso. Portugal purchased neutrality at an expense of sixteen millions more. The Spanish subsidies offered the English an excuse a few months later for the seizure of a Spanish treasure fleet, and this brought on open war between Spain and England. Bona- parte had begun the conquest of Europe in order to coerce the British. It is not surprising that States just beyond the line of danger should consider new alliances, anxious to guard themselves from attack, if not to reduce the overgrown power of the French. The principal difficulties in organizing a coalition against France were Austria's financial weakness and Prussia's conviction that neutrality was more profitable. The Czar Alexander, who at first desired to signalize his reign by domestic reforms and economy, had concluded that an assertion of Russian influence abroad would find in Russia fewer enemies. The failure of a half-hearted offer to mediate between the English and the French had left him among the opponents of France, although not yet openly hostile. By the occupation of Hanover and of the Neapolitan ports, as well as by the coercion of Holland, Spain, and Portugal, Na- Project poleon had closed the European coast line from the Elbe to invasion Taranto, but he could not hope by such means alone to compel of Eng- England to make terms, and he was anxious to push forward preparations for a descent upon the Enghsh coast. The Chan- 3IO THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XIX Conspira- cies against Bonaparte nel was the most serious barrier to success, because of the in- feriority of the French fleet, even if combined with the fleets of Holland and Spain. Bonaparte's first plan set the passage of the Channel for the late fall or winter of 1803, and proposed to embark 100,000 men on fishing vessels, escorted by light gun- boats which could be rowed. A few days of fog or calm would eliminate the fighting value of the English fleet and " the ditch might be leaped." Bonaparte thought that the English could not check him if he made a landing, and that a rapid march on Lon- don must lead to immediate peace on his terms. He was influ- enced by the notion, held a decade earlier by the Revolutionists, that an English rebellion would support an invader, failing to comprehend the lesson of the Prussian invasion of 1792. More- over, it was not sure that he could overcome the English forces. Everything was done to render certain a stubborn defense. Martello towers were built, and a semaphore system of tele- graphing installed, along the threatened coast. Preparations were made to remove food and other supplies, and to transfer the state treasure and the contents of Woolwich arsenal to Wor- cester. But, although the English were really alarmed, and were put to great expense, the danger was slight. Their power- ful fleets would have destroyed the expedition, if it had started. Moreover, no such expedition could start ; actual experiment re- vealed the fact that six days were required to take the whole flotilla outside the harbor of Boulogne, while no period of six days of favorable weather occurred during the years 1803 and 1804. When Bonaparte understood these practical difficulties he considered the plan of assembling a fleet sufficiently powerful to control the Channel for a few days, only to discover a new set of difficulties ; so that the scheme of a descent on the English coast fell into the background and the Boulogne camp was util- ized to train a large army for instant service in case a new coali- tion were formed against France. If anything were required to strengthen Bonaparte's power, it would be either the perils of a war which should emphasize the value of his military leadership, or a dangerous conspiracy which should threaten to destroy him and his policies together. His dictatorship since the i8th Brumaire had been beneficial in so many ways that he was regarded as indispensable. Promi- nent office holders, and a multitude of persons whose property was of Revolutionary origin, feared that the destruction of the system would be their own ruin. The conspiracies during the Consulate are difficult to disen- tangle, because mixed with genuine plots were operations of a FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 311 secret police seeking to obtain credit with the government by ^^ix*' serving up plots spiced to the taste of their patrons. The most serious attempt on the First Consul's life had, however, surprised I803-04 the police as well as the government. The means selected was the explosion of an infernal machine on Christmas Eve, 1800, in a narrow street through which the carriage of the First Con- sul was to pass on the way to the opera. The explosion was mistimed and did not injure Bonaparte, although it killed several others. The police pretended that it was the work of the Ja- cobins, and, by order of the Senate, 130 were proscribed, and 50 of these deported to the colonies. The real conspirators were obscure royalists, two of whom were afterwards caught and ex- ecuted. A second affair, the " libel plot," or conspiracy of Rennes, which grew out of the discontent of many army officers at Bonaparte's policy, especially after the Peace of Amiens, aimed to replace the Consulate by a government of republican generals, or, perhaps, to bring back some of the conditions ex- isting prior to Brumaire. The denouement was a fiasco, and came at the time when Bonaparte was made Consul for Life. He wisely concluded that, if the affair gained too much noto- riety, it would blur his glory, and it was permitted to sink into deeper obscurity. A year later another plot, in its form due partly to operations of police, became politically profitable. Georges Cadoudal, one of the Chouan leaders, had fled to England in 1800. He and the members of the emigrant group in London believed that the elimination of Bonaparte would bring The the revolutionary system to destruction and open the way to a p^^^""**^ restoration. This was a new version of an old theory, held dur- ing the Revolution by the emigrants, and shared by foreign offi- cials, and the only change was the substitution of Bonaparte for the Jacobins. Before the outbreak of war in 1803 made the English eager to foment insurrection in France, a police agent named Mehee appeared in London, giving out that he was one of the irreconcilable repubUcans, anxious to bring about co- operation with the exiles in London for the overthrow of the " tyrant." In France he was still classified as a Jacobin and a " septemhriseur," and had been expelled after the conspiracy of the infernal machine, but was apparently employed by Fouche, not now titular minister of police, though provided with secret funds by Bonaparte. Mehee convinced the emigrants and the English officials that the Jacobins were eager to join forces with them. Encouraged by this prospect, Cadoudal and other royal- ist plotters built large designs of insurrection in Normandy and Brittany, and planned also the abduction of Bonaparte, intend- 312 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XIX Pichegru The Duke d'Enghien ing to surprise him some day on the road from Paris to Maknai- son. If Bonaparte or his escort resisted, a fight would ensue, and if Bonaparte were killed, the ends of the enterprise would be secured. Nothing was said to English government officials about assassination, but the assassins were on their pay roll. After Mehee had done what was possible in London, he went to Munich, where he furnished Drake, the English diplomatic agent, with manufactured secrets and in return obtained his confi- dences. The English agent at Stuttgart also dabbled in con- spiracy. In August, 1803, Cadoudal crossed over to France in an Eng- lish government cutter. He was supplied with a million francs in drafts. Accompanying him was a man named Querel, probably also an agent of Fouche. The royalist General Pichegru fol- lowed Cadoudal in January, 1804, hoping to influence General Moreau, the hero of Hohenlinden, to join in attempting Bona- parte's overthrow, Moreau was ready to assist in making an end of Bonaparte's personal power, but he would have nothing to do with the royalist plotters. Meanwhile the regular police discovered some of the threads of the plot, and Bonaparte, who through Fouche knew more about it than they, jeered at their lack of skill. But neither he nor Fouche knew all that was planned, for a conspirator like Cadoudal did not reveal the de- tails of his designs to men like Mehee and Querel. As the at- mosphere of conspiracy thickened, Bonaparte's irritation, if not his alarm, became intense. The police arrested Querel, who told what he knew — among other things, that Cadoudal was in Paris and that a prince of the House of Bourbon was soon to appear in France. Evidence of Moreau's complicity was found and he was arrested. A little later followed the arrest of Piche- gru and the capture of Cadoudal. It was first expected that the " prince " would land in Nor- mandy, but when this did not happen news came that at Etten- heim, just across the frontier of France in Baden, resided the Duke d'Enghien, grandson of the Prince of Conde, and that he was plotting with Dumouriez and other emigrants. The news was incorrect, for Dumouriez was in England, and the duke was not a conspirator, but, before the government discovered the ac- tual situation, it had decided upon the serious step of abducting the duke. This was done on the night of March 14. His papers showed the falsity of the police reports, but Bonaparte and his advisers concluded to transfer the duke to Vincennes and try him before a military court on the charge of being an emigrant who had fought against France. His grave was dug before he FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 313 arrived, his trial was hurried through, and early on the morning ^^ix* of March 21 he was shot. This deed warned the Bourbons and their followers that the game of abduction and assassination was I803-04 not one of the divine rights of kings, but the resource of any disciple of Machiavelli who might be armed with power. And the radical Revolutionists were reassured, for what difference was discernible between men who had voted the execution of Louis XVI and him who ordered the judicial murder of the Duke d'Enghien, of the same sacred Bourbon blood? Soon after the sinister tragedy at Vincennes, Pichegru was found strangled in prison, and Moreau was brought to trial for treason. A record of English intrigues was also laid before the Senate. Public indignation was aroused against the government which made itself officially responsible for attacks on the life of the chosen head of the Republic. From all sides came ad- dresses of citizens and declarations of civic bodies, congratu- lating the First Consul upon his escape and condemning the dia- bolical manoeuvers of the English and of the exiled princes. A group of men, among them Fouche, promoters of Bona- parte's fortunes, resolved to seize the occasion and consolidate the Bonapartist regime. Schemes which the First Consul had been revolving in his mind since 1802 now became politically creation practical. A week after the execution of the Duke d'Enghien Empire the Senate was persuaded to petition him in vague terms to " com- plete his work by making it, like his glory, immortal." But there was opposition ; even men like Talleyrand, minister of for- eign affairs, and Cambaceres, the second consul, expressed fears and reservations, and several weeks were required to give the movement the appearance of a general demand, irrespective of the factions which had divided France since 1792. When all was arranged, an ex-member of the Convention was selected to introduce in the Tribunate a motion that " Napoleon Bonaparte be declared Emperor of the French, and that this dignity be de- clared hereditary in his family." This motion was seconded by an ex-councilor proscribed as a royalist on the i8th Fructidor. After a conference in the Privy Council, Bonaparte asked the Senate for a full expression of the thought suggested in the pe- tition of March 27. The senators, consulted individually, con- sented, for the most part, to what the Tribunate should recom- mend. The Tribunate then passed the motion, Carnot alone vot- ing against it. On May 18 the Senate adopted a decree trans- forming the consular constitution into the constitution of a Napoleonic empire. The Republic did not cease to exist in name, for the first 314 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^xix*' clause of the new constitution declared that the " government of the Republic is entrusted to an Emperor," and the last vestige 1803-04 q£ ^j^g name survived until 1809, when the word " empire " re- The placed it on the coinage. The principal changes in the machinery E6gfmo oi government concerned the work of legislation. The Tribu- nate, divided into three sections, deliberating behind closed doors, could no longer subject the proposals of the government to public criticism. The Legislative Body was authorized to discuss meas- ures, but the discussions were not public unless the government so ordered. In practice the legislative process took the course of decrees rendered in the Council of State and embodied in senatus consultes. The Senate was completely in the Emperor's hands, for he could appoint new members at pleasure. Although the constitution included clauses wearing the guise of liberal checks upon arbitrary power, they were either illusory or ineffec- tive. The imperial republic speedily took on the aspects of monarchy. General Bonaparte, known henceforth as Napoleon I, was sur- rounded by " Grand Dignitaries " and " Grand Officers," " Grand Marshals," and a host of minor title bearers. His brother Joseph was " Grand Elector " ; his brother Louis, " Constable " ; his brother-in-law Murat, " Grand Admiral." His uncle Fesch, now cardinal, was not forgotten, and became " Grand Almoner." The second consul, Cambaceres, was " Mon cousin " the " Arch- Chancellor " of the Empire, and the third consul, Lebrun, was " Arch-Treasurer." Among the " officers " were names distin- guished in the old court — Talleyrand, " Grand Chamberlain," and Segur, " Grand Master of Ceremonies." The principal gen- erals became " Marshals of the Empire." And this was merely a beginning. The Empire needed two consecrations — one by plebiscite, the The Cor- other by unction of the Church. The constitution as a whole was not submitted to popular approval, but only the question whether the people wished " the imperial dignity to be hereditary in the line of descent, direct, natural, legitimate, or adoptive, of Napoleon Bonaparte, and in the direct, natural, and legitimate descent of Joseph Bonaparte and of Louis Bonaparte." The " yeas " numbered a few thousand more than in 1802, while the " noes " were reduced to the ridiculous proportions of 2,569, The Empire seemed popular even among the workmen of Paris, who had furnished recruits for all the uprisings of the Revolu- tion, wages being good and work abundant. Long negotiations were necessary to persuade Pope Pius VII to grace with his presence the ceremony of coronation, which took place in De- onatiou FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE 315 cember. He desired that his compliance should mean substan- ^J^' tial concessions to the Church, the withdrawal of the obnoxious Organic Articles, the restoration of the Church to a " dominant " 1803-04 position, or the return of the Legations. The only concession which Napoleon made was the restoration of the Gregorian cal- endar. The Pope was not even permitted to place the crown upon the Emperor's head : it was arranged expressly that Na- poleon should crown himself and then crown Josephine as Em- press. But the holy oil was poured on his head : he ceased to be a parvenu of genius, raised to power by the will of the sover- eign people, and became the " anointed of the Lord." Napoleon did not find entry into the brotherhood of European monarchs a mere formality. Diplomatic relations with the Czar Alexander had become strained before the close of 1803 and in Napo- the fall of 1804 they ceased. No recognition was expected from R°^ogui. Great Britain, although Bonaparte made a personal appeal to tion George III for peace, as he had done after Brumaire. Of the German powers, Prussia was obsequious, pursuing the policy of profitable neutraUty, with the hope that some way might be found of obtaining Hanover. The Hapsburg Francis II took the pre- caution of proclaiming himself " Hereditary Emperor of Aus- tria," and made the recognition of this title the condition of recognizing Napoleon as Emperor, with the further understand- ing that the title " Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire," should retain its honorary precedence. Napoleon consented, but re- quired the recognition of the French Empire to be made while he was at Aachen, the ancient capital of Charlemagne. There also he received the homage of the south German princes, whose dominions were so close to the French frontier that they could hardly choose their line of conduct. To them in return he hinted of promotions and crowns. In the background of European politics were ominous signs that this empire would not mean peace. Not a week after it was proclaimed, even Prussia agreed by a " declaration," which was Origin of a defensive treaty in everything but in name, that further en- jhird croachments of France in northern Germany would be resisted coalition by the two powers Prussia and Austria. This agreement barely missed becoming effective in October, when by Napoleon's orders French soldiers seized Sir George Rumbold, the British diplo- matic agent at Hamburg, accredited also to the Lower Saxon Circle, of which Frederick WiUiam was " director." At Fred- erick William's request, couched in terms of embarrassed friend- ship, Rumbold was released. Meanwhile Austria was alarmed at the negotiations in Italy to transform the Italian Republic into a 3i6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. Napoleonic monarchy. A month before the coronation at Notre Dame, Russia signed a defensive alHance with Austria, pledging 1803-04 ^jjg |-^Q States to resist encroachments either in Italy or in Ger- many. It was difficult for the ancient rivals of France to accept a system of interpreting treaties which set no barriers to French expansion, no limits to the ambitions of Napoleon. CHAPTER XX THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE AS Emperor, Napoleon gave new proofs of his military genius chap. and his capacity for organization, but he did not increase ^^ his reputation for statesmanship. In his conduct of foreign af- 1804-07 fairs he exaggerated the worst policies of the Convention or the Directory, besides identifying the interests of France with his personal or family ambitions. His administrative successes and the glories he brought to French arms formed a sort of " Treas- ury of Merit," drawn upon to cover sins of reckless pride, ambi- tion, and tyranny, of which he was repeatedly guilty. His career from 1805 to 1815 showed what could be accomplished by transcendent ability directing tremendous forces, but unrestrained by a sense of measure or by an adequate conception of the perma- nent welfare of European peoples. He asserted constantly that ' he was struggling for peace, and that it was either British gold, Austrian perfidy, or Prussian folly which deferred the day of its attainment; but his conception of a reasonable peace could be accepted by other nations only at the point of the sword. Many years of moderate and conciliatory conduct were required to render acceptable to them the settlements of Luneville and Amiens, which were contrary to the historic position of two such States as Great Britain and Austria ; but Napoleon's policy never allowed the experiment to be tried on its merits. The conse- quence was that even while his French Empire was being organ- ized, a new coalition against France was coming into existence. A new coalition was desired anxiously by the English, to draw pressure away from the threatened southern coast and end the The Em- nightmare of invasion, Russia was inclined to it partly on ac- ^^^^^^ count of Napoleon's attitude towards the affairs of the Turkish Empire, his occupation of Neapolitan ports on the Adriatic indi- cating a definite eastern policy. Austria, though crippled by the losses of the preceding war, might be driven to fight by peril on the side of Italy. Austrian leaders had not finally abandoned the intention to recover the predominance in Italian afifairs which the campaigns of 1796 and 1797 had destroyed and which had been restored for a few months by the victories of 1799. Since November, 1804, Alexander and Pitt had been endeavoring to 317 31^ THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. Alarm in Aastria England and Bussia reach an agreement, but it was delayed by England's refusal to withdraw from Malta and to abate her extravagant claims in re- gard to the treatment of neutral property at sea. Such differ- ences were Napoleon's opportunity, but he made no serious at- tempt to utilize them. The first public intimation that a new coalition was imminent was made at the opening of parliament, on January 15, 1805, when the King's speech declared that the French offers of peace could not be considered except after com- munication with the continental powers, and especially with the Emperor of Russia, to whom King George was united in a con- fidential manner. Napoleon's treatment of the Italian question meanwhile alarmed Austria. The positions of President of the Italian Re- public and Emperor of the French seemed incongruous, and, ac- cordingly, he planned to transform the republic into a kingdom, and place his brother Joseph on the throne, allaying the fears of Austria by exacting a renunciation of Joseph's rights of succes- sion in France. Joseph consented, but afterwards withdrew his consent, insisting on his rights in the French empire. Louis Bonaparte refused the crown for his son, and Napoleon, after considering Eugene de Beauhamais, Josephine's son, whom he adopted, decided to take the crown himself as a temporary meas- ure of settlement. Austria, informed of these plans, did not stir at once, because the Archduke Charles argued the impossibility of reopening the struggle with fair prospects of success, but ber fore Napoleon proceeded to Italy for his coronation the archduke lost his influence, and Austria watched the progress of events with increasing hostility. England and Russia came to terms by the treaty of April 11, 1805. This treaty possesses a double interest, showing the per- manent hostility of the leading European States to the settlement of 1801 and 1802, and bringing forward at least two character- istic features of the settlement of 1814-1815 — a Holland en- larged by most of the former Austrian Netherlands, to serve as a barrier against France on the north, and an enlarged kingdom of Sardinia, to furnish a barrier on the side of Italy. According to the plan Prussia might expect to gain much of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine, in addition to what she lost by the Treaty of Basel. If Prussia and Austria acceded to the treaty of April II, they were to receive, like Russia, an annual subsidy of £1,250,000 from the English for every 100,000 men they put in the field. In the meantime Napoleon seemed intent upon his project of a direct attack upon England. This project now involved the sudden concentration of a su- THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 319 perior force of fighting ships, which should give command of ^%^' the Channel for a few days. Such a superiority could be gained only if the British naval authorities were deluded into dispersing 1804-07 their forces in order to guard against expected attacks in the Napo- Mediterranean, and in the East and West Indies. The scheme ^^l^'J^ assumed that squadrons blockaded at Toulon, Ferrol, Rochefort, scheme and Brest, could escape, could unite with the Spanish fleet, out- manoeuver the tried seamen of England, and appear in the Chan- nel at the time appointed. Napoleon issued orders and wrote letters as if he believed that such a series of fortunate strokes was possible. At the close of 1804 there were in European waters about the same number of ships belonging to Napoleon and his allies as to the English, but his naval officials reckoned that French ships were only two-thirds as efficient as English ships. The expedition to the West Indies, in which he hoped to concentrate the Toulon, Rochefort, and Brest squadrons, had as a first object injury to the British colonies and trade, but it would naturally compel the English to dispatch a fleet to the rescue, and if this weakened seriously their home stations the combined French and Spanish fleet would seize the opportunity to occupy the Channel. But had Napoleon considered this more than a re- mote possibility, he would have pursued a less aggressive policy in Europe. It seems more likely that he meant to do all the damage he could to the English incidentally, and to find in a suc- cessful campaign on the Continent a brilliant alternative to al- most certain failure with the Boulogne project. Whatever may have been Napoleon's conception of his " im- mense project," the manner in which it failed gave a dramatic Manoeu setting to the opening of the war against the Third Coalition. Admiral Villeneuve, in command at Toulon, escaped on March 30, 1805, while Nelson was temporarily off the station. He passed the straits of Gibraltar on April 9, united with the Spanish squadron at Cadiz, and sailed for the West Indies. Not until he was on his way did Nelson know that he had passed the straits, and he had been gone a month before Nelson learned his destina- tion. But Nelson made a quick voyage to the islands and arrived before Villeneuve had done much damage. British shipping had suffered from the operations of the Rochefort squadron, which had escaped the English blockaders in January, but which, through a misunderstanding, returned to Rochefort without wait- ing for Villeneuve. When Villeneuve heard that Nelson was in the West Indies, he sailed for Europe, regarding his fleet as inferior in equipment and quality, although superior in numbers. Not many days vers of Villeneuve 320 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. 1804-07 Fate of the "Im- mense Project" Austria Joins the Coalition elapsed before Nelson was in his wake, sending ahead a swift brig to advise the admiralty of the movements of the allied fleet. The brig overhauled Villeneuve's fleet, noted its direction, and went on to Plymouth, arriving on July 7. The admiralty imme- diately concentrated a fleet off Cape Finistere to check Villeneuve. Nelson was on the coast of Spain on July 18, but found it neces- sary to sail to Gibraltar for water and provisions. Four days later an inconclusive battle was fought off Cape Finistere by the alHed fleet and the English. Villeneuve now formed a junction with the Ferrol squadron at the neighboring port of Corunna, while the English fleet, not feeling strong enough to blockade him, retired to Brest. Nelson joined them on August 15, but soon returned to England for a brief rest. At this juncture the commander of the English fleet off Brest made the tactical error of dividing his forces, sending twenty ships southward to meet Villeneuve and thus giving Villeneuve a chance to elude him and to crush between two fires the rest of the ships blockading Brest. However, this was only a chance; it presumed too much English blundering, and too many succes- sive gifts of good fortune to the French. Villeneuve had re- ceived orders to proceed to the Channel, but they permitted him to go first to Cadiz for reinforcements. He made an attempt to sail northward, until strong head winds and rumors of an ap- proaching English fleet led him to use his discretionary powers and turn (August 15) toward Cadiz. Seven days later Na- poleon, perhaps on the supposition that Villenueve was approach- ing Brest, sent a message by semaphore, commanding him not to " lose a moment . . . [but] enter the Channel. England is ours! We are ready, everything is embarked. Appear for twenty-four hours, and all is finished ! " This telegram was an effective manner of bringing on the dramatic climax, but proba- bly nothing more. Had Villeneuve reached the Channel without a fight, and Napoleon embarked his army for the shores of Great Britain, the consequences would have been a disaster in com- parison with which the Battle of the Nile and the enforced stay in Egypt would have sunk into insignificance.^ While Nelson and Villeneuve were playing a game of hide and seek in the Mediterranean and on the ocean, events in Italy had reached a crisis. On May 26 Napoleon placed the iron crown 1 For the controversy upon Napoleon's intentions, see A. Fournier, Napoleon I (German ed.), II. 74 f., especially note p. 86. Cf. A. Sorel, L'Europe et la Revolution Frangaise, VI. 448-459. The principal au- thority is E. Desbriere, Pro jets et Tentatives de Debarquement aux lies Britanniques, 1 793-1805, vol. IV. THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE of Lombardy on his head, and followed this a few days later by ^^^' the annexation of Genoa to the French empire, alleging as a rea- son the need of redressing the balance of power disturbed by the i804-07 two partitions of Poland, Russian advance at the expense of Turkey, and English seizures in the colonies. Such explanations were unlikely to reassure Austria, especially as the coat of arms and the scepter of the new Italian kingdom included the Venetian lion. On July 7 the Emperor Francis gave orders to mobilize his army and a month later formally entered the coalition. As soon as Napoleon's agents told him of the movements of Aus- trian troops in Tyrol he hastened back to Paris. On August 2 he was informed that Nelson had returned and that the British possessed a naval superiority in European waters. Napoleon's next move is significant. In three successive notes, with intervals carefully timed, and with increasing sharpness, he demanded that Austria disarm, although he was aware that the consequence must be war, since the peace party had lost its influence at Vienna. At the same time he attempted to win an alliance from Prussia by the offer of Hanover, and his agents exerted pressure on the South German courts to obtain offensive and defensive alliances. He declared privately that his army was on the march against Austria before he was informed that Villeneuve had turned southward toward Cadiz. Even if Villeneuve had pro- ceeded to Boulogne, he would have found on his arrival only the rear guard of the Army of England, now transformed into the Grand Army. In the War of the Third Coalition, Napoleon had the advantage of an army highly trained and ready to march at a moment's notice. It was organized into corps, each corps composed of capture several divisions and commanded by a marshal. As an instru- °^ ^^ ment of warfare adaptable to the requirements of a strategy which was bold in conception and wide in its field of operation, the French army had reached the highest development. Na- poleon resolved to concentrate this magnificent force for a stroke at the heart of Austria, forestalling the Allies, who entertained a cumbrous scheme of separate attacks upon his corps, scattered, as they supposed, from southern Italy to Hanover. The Aus- trian plan of campaign assigned to an army commanded by Gen- eral Mack the task of saving the resources of southern Germany for the Allies, while the principal operation was directed by the Archduke Charles against the new kingdom of Italy. It was not expected that Mack would do any lighting before the Russians reached the River Inn about the middle of October. The folly of Mack and the astounding quickness of the French concentra- THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, tion along the Danube, a large part of the army marching 200 miles in 14 days, resulted in a great Austrian disaster. As Mack 1804-07 did not penetrate into Bavaria soon enough to prevent an alli- ance with Napoleon, he should have retired to the Inn and waited for the Russians ; but, instead, he advanced to Ulm, near the con- fluence of the Iller and the Danube, planning to defend the passes of the Black Forest. Napoleon's army turned these, seized the line of the Lech below Ulm, and was on the point of cutting Mack's communications with Austria. When the French sol- diers were already marching southeastward to complete the op- eration. Mack supposed they were flying in disorder toward the Rhine, and made no attempt to break through to the north while a chance still remained. The result was the surrender of his army on October 20, and the destruction of the only force which covered the approach to Vienna. On the day after the capture of the Austrian army the French effort to recover control of the sea came to a disastrous close off Trafalgar Cape Trafalgar. As soon as Villeneuve had entered Cadiz, the English estabhshed a blockade, at first with a few ships, after- ward with a large force. Late in September Nelson arrived in the Victory and assumed command. To lure Villeneuve from Cadiz, he withdrew to the open sea, leaving only a few ships off the port. Villeneuve, goaded by the contemptuous reproaches of Napoleon, who publicly blamed him for the failure of the " im- mense project," resolved to make the Mediterranean, as fresh orders directed, and to fight if the British fleet was not pre- ponderant. Nelson, warned by his guard ships on October 19, prepared for battle, which he expected on the 21st. When Ville- neuve on that day saw the British bearing down upon him, he turned northward, in order to have the port of Cadiz on his lea. His line, composed of thirty-three ships, was bent into an obtuse angle, with the Spanish ships interspersed, because he was afraid of their conduct. According to Nelson's plan the British fleet of twenty-seven ships came on in two columns ; the right under ColUnwood steering toward the allied rear division, while Nel- son, with the left, undertook to hold off their van and pierce the center. Nelson's plan was skilfully covered until the final on- slaught, each column, as it approached, sailing almost parallel to the enemy's line. By sharp turns to right and left both columns pierced the line, Collinwood behind the thirteenth ship from the rear, and Nelson behind the tenth ship from the van. A ship to ship action followed. The French and Spaniards fought until they were decimated, but surrenders began at one o'clock, an hour after the battle opened. Early in the fight Nelson was mortally THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 323 wounded by a French sharpshooter, although he lived long ^^^' enough to know that a great victory had been won. More than half the allied fleet were captured, but the important result was ^^oi-o? the ruin of French sea power and the undisputed supremacy of the British on the ocean for more than two generations. The surrender of Mack compelled the Austrians to withdraw from Italy and Tyrol, but these armies were too remote to Danger save Vienna. In one respect the Austrian situation seemed for gfanTnter- a time to improve. In the advance upon the Danube one of the vention French corps had marched across the Hohenzollern territory of Ansbach. This did not occur without warning, for Napoleon had sent Duroc to Berlin with an offer of Hanover as the price of an alliance, at the same time requesting permission for the passage of troops. But Frederick William did not wish to abandon the much vaunted neutrality, and he had already declined a request of the Russians for similar privileges. Napoleon had not waited for a reply, and had ordered his troops to cross Ans- bach. The news of this outrage threw the Berliners into a pas- sion, and Frederick William seemed ready for war. He opened his frontiers to the Russian troops, and on November 3, at a personal interview with Alexander at Potsdam, signed an agree- ment to impose armed mediation upon Napoleon, with the treaty of Luneville as a basis, promising to join the Allies if Napoleon did not accept his proposals within a month. He also discussed with the British the terms of a subsidy treaty. Their refusal to listen to any plan of territorial exchange by which Prussia could obtain Hanover, together with continued French successes, cooled Frederick William's warlike ardor, and when Haugwitz, his minister of foreign affairs, set out with the ultimatum for Na- poleon's headquarters, the King told him privately to preserve peace between Prussia and France. Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army, which had ad- vanced to form a junction with Mack, and, entering Vienna in Napo- triumph, to dictate a peace in the Austrian capital. The Rus- Vienna sians, however, retired skilfully before him, resolved to unite with a second Russian army in Moravia, and await the coming of the Archduke Charles from Italy. Napoleon entered Vienna unop- posed, and the same day Murat by a dubious ruse gained posses- sion of the Tabor bridge leading to the northern bank of the Danube, although he was unable to prevent the union of the two Russian armies. Napoleon's position was fast becoming precarious. By follow- ing the Russians into Moravia his line of communications was dangerously long, especially if Frederick William persisted in 324 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, the policy to which he was pledged at Potsdam. But Haugwitz proceeded slowly toward the French headquarters, and, when 1804-07 admitted to Napoleon's presence, spoke only of friendly media- tion, a guarantee that neither side would be overreached during the negotiations. He agreed that if the Prussian project was ac- cepted the Allies should not attack Holland. Such conduct may have suited the King's secret purposes, but Prussian statesmen like Stein and Hardenberg did not so understand the responsibili- ties of the occasion. Whether the menace of Prussian interven- tion was serious or not, Napoleon was soon rescued from a deli- cate situation by the blunders of the Czar Alexander's military advisers. Alexander, instead of listening to the veteran Kutusoff, who counseled delay until all the allied forces were concentrated, The Cam- yielded to the persuasions of younger officers, who thought that Moravia ^^^ French numbered only 50,000 and could easily be cut off from Vienna. Accordingly he ordered an advance upon Briinn, Napoleon's headquarters. As soon as Napoleon heard of this, he divined the blunder his enemies were making and prepared a trap for them, meanwhile summoning two of his lieutenants, in order to bring the numbers of his army to the size of the allied forces. One division of these reinforcements marched seventy miles in forty-four hours in order to reach the field in time. To draw the enemy on. Napoleon withdrew his lines from Auster- litz, and abandoned even the heights of Pratzen. For the same reason he left his right wing in an isolated and exposed position, which encouraged the Allies in their design of outflanking him and induced them to weaken their center. Their movements on December i showed that the ruse was successful, and Napoleon prepared to crush their weakened center the following day when the mancEuver was fully developed. So confident was he of suc- cess that in the evening he went from camp-fire to camp-fire and explained to his soldiers what the course of the battle would be. The battle of Austerlitz was fought on the first anniversary of Napoleon's coronation. It has always been regarded as pe- Auster- culiarly his battle, for although success was due to the excellent utz fighting qualities of his soldiers and the skilful leadership of corps commanders, it was fought as he planned and the decisive character of the victory is accounted for by the nature of the plan. The battle also illustrated more than Napoleon's previous battles a method of handling armies which became an essential feature of the art of war as practiced in the nineteenth century. The line which the French occupied was about seven miles long. It was Napoleon's plan to hazard his right wing — if necessary THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 325 permitting it to be driven back — in order to lead the enemy to chap. weaken the position against which he proposed to launch his heaviest masses. If he succeeded in breaking their line at that I804-07 point, which was their center on the plateau of Pratzen, the fact that they had extended their line in pursuing his right wing, would be an advantage because he could now fall upon the pur- suers, isolated from the rest of their troops, and destroy them. Such is the story of the battle on that December day when the sun of Austerlitz finally broke through the wintry mists of the morning. The Russians fought well, but eventually their center was pierced, their army thrown into confusion, and their left wing, over 30,000 strong, utterly crushed, dispersed, or captured amidst the frozen marshes where it was fighting.^ Napoleon's situation ceased to be dangerous and became glorious. And he meant to sign a glorious peace. But his use of the power brought by victory was no more likely to satisfy the permanent interests of rival States than did his policy after Luneville and Amiens, and so this victory was merely one of a series of brilliant rescues from perils which were of his own creation. Austerlitz opened the way for the formation of what is called the " Grand Empire," which was a fresh Bonapartist interpreta- The tion of the Jacobin scheme of surrounding the Republic with a ^^p^g barrier of dependent States. As the Jacobins collected indem- nities in return for the blessings of liberty. Napoleon exacted tribute for the benefits of improved administration. They can- toned French soldiers in these States, and so did he, but he also sought to bind them closely to his personal fortunes by erecting thrones for the members of his family and constituting fiefs for his chief civil and military officers. Incidentally, changes were made in Italy and Germany which were to become perma- nent, and significant turns were given to the fortunes of power$ like Austria and Prussia. The immediate consequences of Austerlitz were the withdrawal of the Russian army from Austrian territory, the transformation of the armed mediation of Prussia into alliance with France, and terms of peace more disastrous to Austria than had ever been ac- cepted by her Hapsburg rulers. When the Emperor Francis learned that the Czar Alexander was unwilling to try the further chances of war near the scene of his recent overthrow, he was obliged to sign an armistice with Napoleon, in accordance with conduct which all foreign troops should be excluded from his lands, a °fa,^'"^" provision aimed primarily at Prussia. Haugwitz, cowed by Na- 2 For the legend of the drowning of thousands of Russians in the Lake of Tellnitz, see Fournier (Ger. ed.), II. no. 326 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE Treaty of Press- burg poleon, now denied the agreements of Potsdam, and signed, on December 15, a treaty which pledged Prussia to an alHance with France, and brought her the coveted Hanover, but which re- quired the cession of Neuchatel to France, Ansbach to Bavaria, and Cleves to a prince to be named by Napoleon. The terms also pledged Prussia to guarantee the changes which he proposed to make in Italy and Germany, The Austrians could not wait to learn whether Frederick William would ratify this treaty, the terms of which they did not know, because Napoleon's appetite, as Talleyrand told them, " increased with eating," and his condi- tions grew harder every day. The result was the Treaty of Pressburg which cost Austria all the Venetian territory gained at Campo Formio and Luneville, leaving her on the Adriatic only the port of Trieste. The Hapsburg lands in South Germany were abandoned to the rulers of Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, and Baden, who were freed from imperial suzerainty, and two of whom were recognized by Napoleon as kings. Talleyrand had proposed a plan to end the ancient rivalries of France and Austria. He had advised that Austria receive com- pensation in the Balkan peninsula for her losses in Italy and Germany, and that her cessions to France be formed into buffer States, so that the frontiers of the two powers should be sepa- rated. Napoleon, however, refused to listen to counsels of mod- eration. The most important consequence of the settlement at Pressburg was the expulsion of the Hapsburg power from south- ern Germany, emphasizing once more its trend eastward. For the first time Venice formed part of a great Italian kingdom, a prophecy of her eventual destiny. The acquisition of the Dalma- tian coast, temporarily annexed to the kingdom of Italy, pointed once more to Napoleon's desire to obtain an influence in the affairs of the Turkish empire. He also intended to seize Mon- tenegro and was enraged when the Austrians surrendered Cattaro to a Russian force. Haugwitz was received with indignation when he returned to Berlin with his treaty, but the King, instead of rejecting it, at- tempted to change it into an agreement for a defensive alliance, and to make the occupation of Hanover provisional until a gen- eral peace. Before he knew whether Napoleon would accept such modifications, he made the fatal blunder of reducing his army to a peace basis, in spite of the fact that over 200,000 French troops were still quartered in South Germany, ready to move on Berhn. Napoleon had explained their presence, alleg- ing Austria's surrender of Cattaro to the Russians. It had the additional advantage of throwing the principal burden of sup- I The Prus- sian AUi- ance THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 327 porting the French army on the Germans. Frederick William ^%^' sent Haugwitz to Paris with the revised draft of the treaty, and meanwhile marched his troops into Hanover. It is not surpris- I804-07 ing that Haugwitz brought back a new edition of the Vienna agreement, with the terms rendered harsher, pledging Prussia to annex Hanover and close the rivers of northern Germany, to- gether with the Hanseatic port of Liibeck, against English trade. Under menace of immediate attack Frederick William signed the treaty. This led to British reprisals, seizure of Prussian ships, blockade of German rivers, and (April 20) a declaration of war, bringing to a grim and costly conclusion Prussia's decade of profitable neutrality. The collapse of the Third Coalition and the defection of Prus- sia had already given the death blow to England's great minister, Death William Pitt. There is a story that when he heard of the battle °' ^"* of Austerlitz he asked for a map of Europe to see where the place was, and then said sadly : " Roll up that map : it will not be wanted these ten years." But it was the situation to which Austerlitz led, and which imperiled the British empire, that has- tened the ravages of a fatal disease. The end came on January 23, 1806. As soon as the Treaty of Pressburg was signed, Napoleon, by a simple order addressed to his soldiers, deposed Ferdinand IV and Marie Caroline of Naples, and soon despatched his brother Napoleon Joseph to take the kingdom. This was the punishment inflicted ^^^ upon the sister of Marie Antoinette, aunt of the Austrian em- peror, for breaking a promise of neutrality and admitting Brit- ish and Russian troops to Neapolitan harbors when Napoleon was deeply involved in the Austrian campaign. On March 30, 1806, he sent a decree to the French Senate, declaring that Joseph was made King of Naples and Sicily, and providing that while the crowns of France and Naples were to be separate Joseph was to remain a grand dignitary of the French empire and a member of his family, subject, therefore, to his control as its head. In his proclamation he had said with the pictorial eloquence upon which he fed the imaginations of his soldiers and his subjects, " Go ! Hurl into the waves, if, indeed, they await you, the feeble battalions of the tyrants of the sea." Joseph occupied Naples, but he could become king of Sicily only " in partibus," for the tyrants of the sea held the island. Moreover, they crossed into Calabria, and the first French force which came into conflict with them " was defeated and broken up in a few minutes." Joseph was not the first Bonaparte whom Napoleon raised to the throne, for he had made his sister Elise Princess of Piom- 328 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XX 1804-07 Principal- ities for the Bona- partes The New Charle- magne bino in 1805. He now hurried forward the task of throne mak- ing. Elise became Princess of Lucca, Massa, and Carrara. His brother Louis, who had married his step-daughter Hortense, he appointed to a throne in Holland, persuading the reluctant Dutch that otherwise they could not hope at the coming peace with England to receive again their lost colonies. His step-son Eugene was already his viceroy in the kingdom of Italy.*f His brother- in-law Murat became Grand Duke of Berg, a Rhenish territory, part of the heritage of Cleves which in the seventeenth century had been divided between the Hohenzollerns and the Wittels- bachs, and his sister Pauline, Princess Borghese, was made Duchess of Guastalla. Bernadotte, who had married the sister of Joseph's wife, received the principality of Ponte Corvo. Nor were officials and generals forgotten. Berthier, chief of staff, became Prince of Neuchatel, and Talleyrand, minister of foreign affairs. Prince of Benevento. One-fifteenth of the income of a multitude of domain lands in the kingdom of Italy, of Naples, Lucca, Parma, and Piacenza, went to endow twenty dukedoms, held as fiefs of the empire by favored officers. To enrich his extraordinary fund from which future benefits might be drawn, he reserved i,200,(X)0 francs on the revenue of the kingdom of Italy and a million on that of Naples. His brothers Lucien and Jerome remained unprovided for. Lucien was shut out from imperial favor by a marriage which for a time seemed to compromise the succession. He was eventu- ally made Prince of Canino, but by favor of the Pope, his brother's enemy. Jerome must wait for the next turn in the European kaleidoscope. As a stay to the new dynasties, dynastic marriages were ordered: the marriage of Eugene to a Bavarian princess, the marriage of Josephine's niece to the heir of Baden, while a princess of Wiirttemberg was destined for Jerome as soon as he could be separated from his American wife.^ Napoleon now frequently referred to himself as, a second Charlemagne, a pose which had no element of humor for those within marching distance of his French battalions. The Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire were both the designated victims of this curious historical analogy. Napoleon was already on bad terms with Pius VII because the Pope had protested vigorously against the occupation of Ancona in November, 1805. Napoleon took this step, he said, to protect the city against a landing of the English or the Russians. He upbraided the Pope for listening to evil counselors and declared that " God has revealed by the suc- 3 Elizabeth Patterson of Baltimore. THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 329 cess with which he has favored my arms the protection he has ^^^' accorded to my cause. ... I consider myself, hke my predeces- sors of the second and third races, the eldest son of the Church." I804-07 Writing to his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, his ambassador at Rome, he threatened to appoint a senator to command there in his name, and added, " For the Pope I am Charlemagne, since as Charle- magne I unite the crown of France and the crown of Italy." The medieval phraseology of royal controversy with the Papacy now offered him no greater difficulty than did the stylistic pe- culiarities of Moslem piety in 1798. But theories and menaces alike were lost on Pius VH, who changed merely his secretary of state. Napoleon began to reduce theory to practice by sending troops to occupy Civita Vecchia. Charlemagne had been master in southern and western Ger- many, and this mastery was Napoleon's next aim, influenced not so much by the Charlemagne illusion as by a policy which had attracted French statesmen since the days of Richelieu. A " Third Germany " had been one of the projects of 1802 and 1803, and Napoleon spoke of his " Confederation " in 1805. Remaking When Austerlitz destroyed the effective power of Austria and ^^^(^^^ Prussia over German affairs, the only obstacle to the creation many of such a confederation was Napoleon's uncertainty as to the form it should take. His German clients were not likely to object, for he could hold out to them a prospect of annexations as profitable as those of 1803. One of the most subservient, Dalberg, arch- chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire, whose archiepiscopal see was now formally transferred from Mainz to Regensburg, dis- covered that in Napoleon the Germans had the possibility of the revival of the Western Empire of Charlemagne. He agreed that Cardinal Fesch should be made his coadjutor, although remaining archbishop of Lyons and primate of the Gauls. As in 1802, Paris was the center of bargaining for States which hoped to gain territory and for those which were afraid of being handed over to others. Napoleon did not wish the scheme to raise new difficulties on the side of Prus- sia and Austria, and threw an air of mystery about the negotia- tions, but the series of treaties was finally ready and on July 17 the sixteen States admitted to the Confederation of the Rhine were given the alternative of signing or running the risk of being absorbed, or at least of losing all chance of territorial gain. Sev- eral of the fortunate States were large, like Bavaria and Wiirt- temberg, while others were so small that they must have pos- sessed a magical formula for conjuring away a fate reserved for thei' neighbors. The annexations absorbed sixty-seven States, 330 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. Confeder- ation of the Bhine the Holy Roman Empire Quarrel with Prussia including three cities, all the countships, and many petty prin- cipalities. In addition, all the imperial knights were deprived of sovereign rights. The process was called mediatization, because the annexed States lost their immediate relation to the suzerain authority, which had been the Emperor, and became subjects. The loss of sovereignty did not, however, entail the loss of prop- erty or of aristocratic and social privileges. To their 1,200,000 subjects the change was a benefit, ridding them of many petty, expensive, and pretentious courts. It was also another step in the simplification of the German state system, with unification as the goal. But the immediate result was to subject the States of the Confederation to the will of Napoleon, who was declared its protector, and whom they promised to follow in his wars, furnishing a contingent of 63,000. The creation of the Rhenish Confederation gave the coup de grace to the agonizing Holy Roman Empire. The States that belonged to it formally withdrew from the empire, and neither they nor Napoleon any longer recognized its existence. This compelled the Emperor Francis to renounce his titles and preroga- tives as its head and to be henceforward simply Francis I of Austria. So perished an empire a thousand years old, but one which had ceased to do more than give occupation to lawyers and themes to political philosophers. Its place was taken by a real empire resting on military success rather than upon tradi- tions or ideals. Before the negotiations for the establishment of the Confed- eration were completed, futile attempts were made to patch up a peace with Great Britain and with Russia. The only interest that attaches to the negotiations with Russia arises from the Czar's evident desire to persuade the French to withdraw from Dalmatia, a position which threatened his sphere of action in the Balkan peninsula. Napoleon frightened the Czar's diplomatic agent into signing a draft treaty which left the French in Dalma- tia. The negotiations with the English were important because they helped to precipitate war between France and Prussia. In order to reach a basis of settlement he showed no hesitation in promising to return Hanover, although it was already occupied by Prussia, planning to oflfer Prussia an equivalent at the expense of the minor German States. Nevertheless, while the negotiations were proceeding, he assured the Prussians that his insistence upon their retention of Hanover was the only obstacle standing in the way of peace. They heard of his duplicity through an after- dinner confidence of an English diplomatist to the Prussian min- ister at Paris. Frederick William had already been alarmec by THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 331 the organization of the Rhenish Confederation, and he was only ^^x^' partially reassured by Napoleon's suggestion that he organize a North German Confederation and take the title of Emperor, for, I804-07 when he made overtures to Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, the Mecklen- burgs, and the Hanseatic towns, he discovered that French diplomacy was stirring up a feeling of jealous opposition. The news of the contemptuous treatment of Prussia in the affair of Hanover brought on a climax, and Frederick William put his army on a war footing, alleging in explanation the movements of French troops in southern and western Germany. The fear that restrained him for a time was the chance that the Czar might ratify the treaty which his agent had signed. Late in August he was informed that Alexander had rejected the treaty, and war became inevitable. Not all the voices of Germany echoed the sentiments of Arch- chancellor Dalberg. The feeling of nationality was fast becom- ing a moving force, stimulated by the preaching of Schleier- National macher at Berlin, and influenced also by Arndt's The Spirit of ^^many the Age, which argued for the freedom and brotherhood of Ger- mans. From Vienna came a book of Gentz on the recent revolu- tion in Germany, which condemned in unmeasured terms the subservient friends of France. In South Germany, upon which rested the burden of supporting the French soldiery, were circu- lated many pamphlets full of criticism and complaint. When information of this rising tide of sentiment reached Napoleon, who thought peoples had no sacred right except that of being well administered, he determined to terrify it into silence, de- claring that the publications imperiled his army. A bookseller named Palm, who lived in Nuremberg, recently annexed to the dominions of the newly crowned King of Bavaria, was responsi- ble for the circulation of a pamphlet which was milder than its title might suggest — Deiitschland in seiner tiefen. Erniedrigung. He was selected as an example, was arrested, taken to Braunau, an Austrian fortress still occupied by the French, and executed on August 25. This act was a pendant to the deed of 1804, when Napoleon showed that he could execute a prince with less com- punction than the members of the Convention in their first mood. It proved that he was like them in their second mood and could judicially murder ordinary men also. The act produced a profound impression throughout Germany, and became one of the principal causes of the intense hatred later felt against the French. Even at the time Gentz remarked that a single defeat of the French armies would bring on another Sicilian Vespers. Prussia was not a match for France. It is true Prussia might of Prus- sia 332 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^x' "°^ ^^ obliged to meet the French single-handed, for the Czar was her ally, and as the conflict with England could be brought 1804-07 ^Q ^j^ ^^^^ England might also become an ally. The principal dis- strength advantages under which Prussia suffered were due to her own faulty organization. To all outward appearance the State which Frederick II had raised to the position of a great power was still unchanged in its characteristic features. The chief solicitude of her rulers was that there should be peasants enough to meet the requirements of the recruiting system and enough nobles to command them. This concern prevented Frederick William and his advisers from radically modifying the condition of the peas- ants or from reducing the privileges of the nobles. Men of the citizen class were not expected to serve in the army, and they viewed its fate with comparative indifference. Nor could the peasant soldier, often ill-treated in his native village by his noble master, be expected to follow another noble enthusiastically into battle. The consequences of defeat were certain to be disastrous, because there was little unity of feeling between the provinces, and no national uprising, like that of France in 1792, would fol- low the news that the enemy's army had crossed the frontiers. There were reasons more specific why Prussia's chances were few. Frederick William's army was nominally 250,000 strong; equal, therefore, to that of Napoleon, but he could put only half the number into the field. Most of his generals were old, without sufficient energy or initiative. The chief command was entrusted to the Duke of Brunswick, who had led the Prussians in the ill- fated Valmy campaign. He was an advocate of peace, was afraid of losing his duchy, and was overawed by Napoleon's mili- tary prestige. The management of Prussian policy since Haugwitz signed the Treaty of Vienna * had convinced a group of Prussian offi- cials, among them the Baron vom Stein, that the way of safety and honor was through a radical change of men and system, stein Stein had been a minister since 1804, without being in any sense mnistry responsible for the policy of the government, for the ministers, with the exception of the minister of foreign affairs, were ad- ministrators, entrusted with specific tasks and brought rarely into direct contact with the King. It was the " cabinet-ministry," composed of cabinet councilors and often including the minister of foreign affairs, which determined with the King questions of general policy. To this ministry belonged especially Haugwitz, Lombard, and Beyme, all partisans of Frederick William's policy 4 Also called the Treaty of Schonbrunn, from the palace where it was signed. THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 333 of peace with profit. In April, 1806, Stein prepared a memorial, ^ ^^ ' urging the substitution of a ministerial council, between which and the King should stand no cabinet councilors. His memorial i804-07 was couched in such passionate language that his friends thought it would do more harm than good. In this opinion Queen Louise, to whom it was shown, concurred. Nevertheless, in August, when it appeared necessary to give a firmer direction to affairs, before disaster should overwhelm, the group united in a petition for the removal of Haugwitz, Lombard, and Beyme, only to be severely rebuked by the King. Nothing remained but to await the lessons of defeat. Late in September Frederick William sent an ultimatum to Napoleon, demanding that as a condition of peace he should withdraw French troops across the Rhine and acknowledge in principle the formation of a North German Confederation. But Advance Napoleon's army was already in motion, with the heads of col- ^1^^^^°' umns ready to advance towards Berlin. Believing that he was in the presence of a combination similar to the one which he had broken up a year before, and learning that the Prussians, without waiting for the Russian army, were marching into Thuringia, ap- parently to cut him off from the Rhine, he decided to repeat the strategy of the Ulm campaign. He concentrated his army about Bamberg, in the upper valley of the Main, about eighty miles east of Frankfort. He could afford to ignore the advance of the Prussians toward the Rhine Valley, for if he threatened their line of communications with Berlin, they would be obliged to turn back and fight. In the inevitable battle he proposed to out- number them two to one. Before he knew where that battle- field was to be, he wrote Marshal Soult : " You may well be- lieve what a fine thing it would be to reach the neighborhood of Dresden in a battalion square of 200,000 men. Nevertheless, all that requires a little art." Between his position and the Prus- sian line of communications, however, was the watershed sepa- rating the upper Main and the upper Saale. This mountainous region is called the Franconian Wood, and is a prolongation east- wards of the Thuringian Forest. To cross it would require three marches. The danger was that a vigilant enemy might attack and destroy isolated corps, strung out along the mountain roads. To decrease the risks Napoleon formed his army into three great columns, each column composed of two or three corps, separated from one another by a distance of half a day's or a day's march. The columns were to take parallel roads and at the end of three days were to stream out into the plains of Saxony with a front of thirty-eight miles. The army could then be concentrated in 334 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XX 1804-07 Jena and Auerstadt Collapse of Prus- sia forty-eight or at most seventy-two hours. The manoeuver was successfully completed, and as soon as the three columns were again in the open country the whole army swung around toward the left, as on a pivot, and marched directly toward the Prussian lines. The movements of the Prussian army offered a pitiable con- trast. Frederick William felt that honor required his presence with the troops, but as soon as he arrived the Duke of Brunswick no longer acted as full commander-in-chief. Prince Hohenlohe did not wish to serve under Brunswick, and a separate army was constituted for him. The plans of campaign were repeatedly changed, and the soldiers were wearied by frequent counter- marches or by long delays while councils of war debated. The rapid advance of the French took the Prussian leaders completely by surprise, but instead of concentrating for battle or ordering a retreat they debated once more. They finally adopted the plan of retreating upon Magdeburg, and Hohenlohe was given the task of protecting the movement by taking up a defensive posi- tion on the plateau west of Jena. On October 14 Napoleon at- tacked Hohenlohe and crushed his army by the weight of num- bers. Twelve miles away to the north, as the main army was pursuing its retreat, its columns stumbled upon a heavy French corps at Auerstadt commanded by Marshal Davout. There the odds were reversed, the Prussians outnumbering the French two to one, and yet they were unable to drive back the French, who fought skilfully and stubbornly. Early in the action Brunswick was fatally wounded, after which neither the King nor any one else seemed capable of giving unity to the struggle. Davout finally took the offensive and the Prussians fell back. They had not gone far before they came upon a stream of fugitives from the field of Jena, and the whole army, panic-stricken, was hope- lessly disorganized. Many soldiers threw away their guns and went home, and no large body of them came together again. The defeat of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt would not have been so memorable, had it not been followed by the total collapse of the national defense. The remnants of the army at- tempted to retreat upon Magdeburg, closely pursued by the re- lentless French marshals. Berlin was left defenseless and was occupied by Napoleon's troops on October 25. Frederick Wil- liam retired first to Kiistrin, then to Graudenz. Fortress after fortress, badly prepared to stand siege, and commanded by old men without energy, surrendered — Stettin to a brigade of hus- sars which was simply reconnoitering, and Magdeburg, with a garrison of 24,000, to Marshal Ney, whose corps numbered only THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 335 16,000. Soon the seat of war was transferred to the region be- ^^^' tween the Oder and the Vistula, and even east of the Vistula, while the Court took refuge in Memel, on the extreme eastern i804-07 limits of the Prussian kingdom. Napoleon believed that he had overthrown the monarchy of Frederick the Great, and prepared the draft of a decree of depo- sition, awaiting merely the psychological moment to proclaim this new decision of fate. The sword and insignia of Frederick were removed from the tomb at Potsdam and sent to the Hotel des Invalides at Paris. Napoleon also signalized his presence in Ber- lin by declaring the British Isles in a state of blockade, and mak- ing all communication with the British unlawful within his do- minions and the dominions of his allies.^ Even before the seizure of the capital, he treated the Prussian territories west of the Elbe as stuff from which to carve new principaUties, or, per- haps, a kingdom for Jerome ; and he had laid a war contribution of 160,000,000 francs on Prussia and her German allies. Saxony, one of these, was soon detached, the Elector raised to royal dig- nity, and admitted to the Confederation of the Rhine. Mean- while Napoleon had deposed the Elector of Hesse-Cassel and the Duke of Brunswick. Although Napoleon dallied with the idea of dethroning Fred- erick William, he was ready to treat with him, if the Prussians would submit to his terms, which included the cession of the western provinces, the dismissal of the Russian allies, ^nd the pledge to join in war upon Alexander if he attempted to seize any Turkish territory. With each new display of Prussian weak- ness the French terms grew harsher, until Frederick William abandoned hope of peace and threw himself fully upon Russian support. In the midst of the crisis the controversy over the organization Crisis in of the royal government came to a climax. Haugwitz and Lom- bard had retired, driven out by public opinion, and the King, al- though unwilling to adopt the plan of a cabinet council, tried to induce Stein to enter a council of three ministers in which Beyme should control the distribution of business and the final reports. Stein refused to have anything to do with a scheme which em- bodied the most vicious feature of the old system, the interposi- tion of such a councilor between the King and his ministerial ad- visers. His manner of giving his refusal offended the King, who angrily accepted his resignation from the Prussian service. Governmental affairs drifted for a time, but gradually passed under the control of Hardenberg. ^ See next chapter, The Continental System. Prussian Affairs 336 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XX The Winter Campaign Napo- leon's Triumph As soon as the French armies approached the Pohsh provinces of Prussia, the spoil of the partitions of 1793 and 1795, the hopes of the Poles for the recovery of independence were stirred. Murat entered Warsaw on November 28 amid the plaudits of the inhabitants. But the only answer Napoleon would give to the appeals of the Poles was that they must first show themselves worthy of independence by forming an army capable of defend- ing it. He needed troops for the inevitable struggle with the Russians, and yet it was by no means clear that he could satisfy the aspirations of the Poles without gaining the enmity of Aus- tria, which had Polish provinces to lose, and this would menace a line of communications as long as his line a year before on the eve of Austerlitz. The danger increased as he attempted to march late in December along the fathomless roads and over the deso- late plains of Poland. The soldiers, suffering from hunger and "disease, began to grumble because they were used to support schemes which had no real relation to the interests of France. In February, Napoleon received a serious check at Eylau, not far from Konigsberg, and, had the Russians followed up their ad- vantage, he would have been obliged to withdraw west of the Vistula. He now renewed his efforts to persuade the Turks to attack the Russians, and negotiated a treaty with the Persians, both to secure aid for the Turks, and to prepare for an eventual attack upon India. Napoleon's enemies gave him time to conjure the peril as they had done in 1805. Austria did not stir, resolved to husband her resources for a better day ; and England was exasperatingly slow, given to small expeditions, chiefly in regions which would strengthen her maritime power. In 1806 she seized the Cape, but failed at Buenos Ayres. A temporary success in southern Italy had been followed by futile expeditions to Constantinople and Egypt. A change of ministry in March, 1807, with George Canning at the ministry of foreign affairs, raised the hopes of the Russians and Prussians ; but three more months were allowed to pass, and then it was too late. In April Alexander and Frederick William signed the Treaty of Bartenstein, to which Austria, England, and the minor powers were asked to give adhesion. The treaty stated the aims of the alliance to be the deliverance of both Germany and Italy from French control, without meaning, necessarily, that Napoleonic dynasties should cease to rule in Naples, in the kingdom of Italy, and in Holland. Napoleon used the late winter and spring to organize an army which should outnumber the Russian troops and the small Prussian contingent nearly two to one, with a re- THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 337 serve army in central Germany to keep the Austrians from inter- *'5x*' fering. To accomplish this he was obliged to demand of the French 80,000 conscripts of the year 1808. By such sacrifices I804.07 victory was assured, and at Friedland, June 14, it was made crushing through the bad strategy of the Russians, a reminiscence of the blunders at Austerlitz. The consequences of Friedland were a diplomatic revolution which transformed the Czar Alexander from the defender of Europe against the enterprises of a military upstart into his close Napoleon ally, proposing to divide with him the spoils of the East and the Alexander West. Alexander had been serious with his schemes of libera- tion, but he had gained no support from either Austria or Eng- land, and Prussia was too feeble to assist effectively in her own deliverance. Many Russians were bitterly opposed to what they regarded as a Quixotic policy, believing that Russian arms should be directed toward the conquest of the Danubian provinces or Swedish Finland. Moreover, Alexander was astonished to find that after his defeat Napoleon said nothing of territorial sacri- fices, but only of accessions, offering all the land east of the Vis- tula for an alliance against the English. Before Alexander's mind hovered visions of an Empire of the East and an Empire of the West which should share the control of Europe. Nego- tiations began formally with a conference on a raft anchored in the Nieman near Tilsit. It is said that Alexander's first words were, " I hate the English as much as you do, and I will second you in all your actions against them," and that Napoleon's reply was, " In that case all can be arranged and peace is made." Nevertheless obstacles were soon discovered, especially in the Polish and Turkish problems. Although the Czar declined to accept Napoleon's offer of the crown of a restored Poland, he Treaty was unwilling that this crown should be placed on the head of '^ Napoleon's brother Jerome, as Napoleon suggested. While they were discussing the Turkish question, Alexander placed his finger significantly upon Constantinople, and Napoleon instantly ex- claimed, " Never ! That would be the empire of the world ! " The Polish problem was solved provisionally by constituting out of New East Prussia and South Prussia — mainly the provinces Prussia gained in 1793 and 1795 — the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which under the King of Saxony as grand duke should enter the Confederation of the Rhine. The solution of the Eastern ques- tion provided that France should mediate between Russia and Turkey, and that in case the mediation was unsuccessful the Turks should be deprived of their European lands except Rumelia and Constantinople ; but it did not state definitely what the Rus- 338 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^' sians should get. Alexander's friendly intervention saved the King of Prussia from total ruin, and Napoleon promised to re- 1804-07 store all lands east of the Elbe upon payment of an indemnity, the amount of which was, unfortunately, not specified. The dis- trict of Bialystock was, however, to be given to the Czar. Such were the important features of the treaty which the two emperors signed at Tilsit on July 7, 1807. In it Alexander also recognized Napoleonic creations in Germany and Italy, including a new kingdom of Westphalia, composed mainly of Hesse-Cassel, Bruns- wick, the west-Elbe provinces of Prussia and Hanover. With Napoleon the principal advantage was Alexander's promise to exclude English trade and declare war upon England in case the English refused to make peace. The minor courts of Stockholm, Lisbon, and Copenhagen were to be invited to join in the conti- nental crusade, and, if they refused, were to be treated as enemies. The chief provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit were repeated in a treaty which Napoleon signed with Frederick William immedi- ately afterward. Queen Louise sought by personal entreaties to save at least Magdeburg, but her efforts were unavailing. Prus- sia also agreed to declare war upon England in case Alexander's intervention did not bring about peace. Two or three startling incidents served as pendants to the Tilsit agreement. The British ministry, receiving inexact reports Fate of of the arrangement in regard to the minor neutrals, particularly Denmark, resolved to be beforehand with Napoleon. An agent was sent to Denmark with an offer of alliance, asking that Eng- land hold the Danish fleet as a pledge, and, when the Danes de- clined, an expedition of overwhelming force was sent to Copen- hagen, on the supposition that they would see that resistance was useless. But the Danes felt in honor bound to resist, and the fleet bombarded the city for three days, finally compelling the sur- render of the Danish ships. This high-handed proceeding di- verted attention from Napoleon's manner of persuading neutrals to accept his offers of protection. At that very time he was en- gaged upon plans to coerce the Portuguese, whom he had begun to threaten as soon as he returned from Tilsit, and in October he negotiated a treaty with Spain looking to the partition of Portugal. A French force reached Lisbon on November 30, only to find that the Court, with the treasure and the archives, had sailed for Brazil under the protection of a British fleet. The at- tack on Copenhagen added the Danes to the allies of Napoleon, but Sweden refused to abandon its alliance with the English and Alexander invaded Finland and drove out the Swedish troops. To check a rising of Finns he formally recognized the rights of Neutrals THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE 339 the Grand Duchy and assumed the title of Grand Duke of Fin- chap. land. In the bitter controversies which preceded the outbreak of war 1804-07 in 1803 Napoleon had declared to the English that if through their machinations a new coalition was formed against France he would be forced to conquer Europe and bring into being that " Empire of the Gauls " which they affected to dread. He had now apparently made good his threat. The question was, Would his triumph lead to the humiliation of the English ? CHAPTER XXI THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM CHAP. XXI 4 4^nr^ HE time approaches when England shall be declared in Origin of the System serted in the army bulletin issued nine days after Jena, Napoleon indicated the final step which must render inevitable the ruin of the English. Before he published the decree which should make known the destiny of another presumptuous nation, he waited until he had entered in triumph the capital of the humili- ated Prussians. In a setting so dramatic appeared, on Novem- ber 21, 1806, the Berlin Decree, which is commonly taken as the formal estabhshment of the Continental System. But this decree, comprehensive in scope, and sententious in form, pro- vided for a continuation, rather than a beginning, and in its more violent features was a resumption of threats first used by the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety. Napoleon and his advisers were engaged in applying on a grander scale policies which their predecessors had tried to carry into effect with insufficient means. After the Treaty of Tilsit the means at his disposal were such that success seemed not far from his grasp, but he soon spoiled the plan and compassed his own ruin by the blunder of attempting to treat the Spaniards as clay of the same texture as the Neapolitans, the Dutch, and the Germans of the Rhenish Confederation. The origin of the Continental System must be sought at least as far back as 1793. A month after war broke out in February of that year the Convention proscribed English merchandise, and a little later ordered the arrest of all British subjects. Not only were importers of British goods threatened with the severest punishment, but those who used such goods were declared sus- picious persons. Under the Directory this policy was rendered more systematic by the law of October 31, 1796, which pro- hibited the entry of several classes of manufactured goods, par- ticularly cotton and woolen fabrics, iron and steel products, and refined sugar, on the ground that they were English, whatever certificates of origin accompanied them. England's control of the sea made necessary the modification of the rule regarding refined sugar, and in 1799 a high duty was substituted for abso- 340 THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 341 lute prohibition, but importers were obliged to pretend that the sugar was not English. Meanwhile, other articles, either neces- sary in the processes of French manufacture or demanded by- fashion, were obtained through the medium of the contraband trade, which had grown to enormous proportions. In the sum- mer of 1800 the prefect of police reported that Paris was full of English goods and that although they were openly displayed it was impossible to effect seizures. He estimated that within five months English cottons to the value of three millions of francs had been sold. The First Consul reproached the women because they wore muslins, undoubtedly made in England, in- stead of French silks or linens. This was the situation when the Peace of Amiens was signed and the proscription of English merchandise lost the character of a war measure. The theory of such war measures was that the English were a nation of traders, that out of the profits of trade they main- tained their navy, subsidized the enemies of France, and paid for the plots which kept her in a state of ferment, and that as they could not be reached directly, because the French navy was disorganized, the surest method of forcing them to beg for peace was to close their continental market. Wherever French armies went, therefore, one of their objects was to put an end to trade with England. Just before the Committee of Public Safety ceased to direct the policies of the Republic, it expressed the hope of excluding the English " from the Continent, and closing it to them from Gibraltar to the Texel." General Bona- parte's successes made it possible for the Directory to extend the limits of this exclusion. The development of the contra- band trade, however, left the plan still mainly in a state of theory. These measures had another motive, equally powerful, al- though it remained in the background during the war. Many French manufacturers beheved that the treaty of commerce of 1786 between France and England had exposed them to a ruin- ous competition and they welcomed the opportunity to return to the policy of prohibitions, characteristic of the older commercial regime. They aspired to control the French market and to gain every new market from which the English, their most serious competitors, were excluded. In the Continental System, there- fore, it is necessary to distinguish the elements which were parts of the permanent commercial pohcy of France from those which had the more temporary aim of ruining a dangerous enemy. The tariff of 1791 had contained few prohibitions and these were of little consequence; and with good reason, for England CHAP. XXI 342 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXI French TariflEs Tariff of 1806 was protected against such prohibitions until 1798, the term of the treaty of commerce. French manufacturers were forced to wait until war furnished an excuse for the abandonment of the treaty stipulations, and when, eight years later, peace was made, they did not mean to return to the regime of English competition. At an early stage in the negotiations the First Consul had offered to agree to the preparation of a treaty of commerce, the special prohibitions of English merchandise being suspended, but nothing was stipulated with regard to the matter in the Preliminaries of London, or in the Treaty of Amiens. By that time pressure had been brought to bear upon him by the manufacturers, increasing his own preference for strongly protective measures. It was intimated in the official Moniteur in October, 1801, that treaties of commerce were suitable to nations which were not rivals in the manufacture of similar articles. Although the merchants of Paris, whose interest was dilYerent from that of the manufacturers, clamored for the re- opening of trade, the influence of the manufacturers was greater, and none of the prohibitions were removed or abated. In May, 1802, the government received authority provisionally to raise or lower rates, to introduce or revoke prohibitions, but the only use the First Consul made of the power was to place a high duty on certain cotton fabrics, of non-British origin, which the French manufacturers wanted to exclude altogether. The policy of the government was displayed again in the tariff law of April 28, 1803, which made no concessions to English commerce, and which is regarded as one of the causes of the renewal of war a month later. With the war it was natural to enforce more rigidly the plan of prohibitions as well as to place further re- strictions upon neutral ships which offered facilities to the con- traband trade, but side by side with these extraordinary devices went the development of the policy of assuring to the French manufacturer the monopoly of the home market. The makers of textile goods, especially of cottons, urged the government to adopt the plan of absolute exclusion. The tariff of April 30, 1806, marks the adoption of a definite policy. Indeed, it remained the basis of all subsequent French tariffs until 1881. This excluded all manufactures of cotton with the exception of certain grades of thread, some of which could not be produced in France. These were subjected to a high duty. For the first time raw cotton became dutiable, but a draw- back was allowed in case the goods were manufactured for ex- port. Heavy duties were placed on all colonial products. While the law was under discussion Napoleon intimated to his Council THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 343 of State that he wanted to go further. He said : " Forty-eight *^S4f ' hours after peace with England, I shall proscribe foreign prod- ucts and shall promulgate an act of navigation, which will per- I8O6-12 mit entry to our ports only to French ships. . . . There will be clamor, because commerce in France has a bad spirit, but six years afterward we shall be in the greatest prosperity." He was evidently determined to establish the industrial and com- mercial supremacy of France on the Continent. He meant not only to close the home market to foreigners, but through his political power to secure a favored position for French products in the markets of alHed or friendly States. Although he ap- peared to single out the English for attack, his measures, sooner or later, would afifect every industrial rival of France whether friend or foe. The warfare of commerce between Great Britain and France inevitably affected the trade of neutrals. Even during an ordi- position nary war between States it is a delicate matter to adjust the °^ ?^®"' rights of neutral and belligerent. As France remained weaker on the sea, the highway of trade, the French were at first in- clined to facilitate neutral commerce so far as it offered to do what it had become impossible for their ships to do, that is, provide them with their own colonial products. It was equally natural that England should attack such trading by neutrals. In the first war, to placate the United States, England finally permitted the " broken " voyage by which French, Spanish, or Dutch colonial goods could be carried by American ships to some port of the United States, entered for import, landed, reloaded, receiving as a drawback the money paid for duty, and dispatched on the same vessel to a port of France, Holland, or Spain. But England interpreted in her own interest the right of search, extended the list of contraband of war, and resorted to the im- pressment of foreign seamen. It was to abate such practices that the Armed Neutrality of 1801 had been formed. While much might be said in excuse of the practices of the EngHsh, their policy was not wholly defensive. The shipping and mercantile interests were very strong with the government, and as the French manufacturers seized the occasion of the war to estabhsh a monopoly of the home market, the English mer- chants used the war to strengthen the supremacy of English trade. In any case the neutral was narrowly watched, his rights American trampled on if possible, and his unique opportunity of becoming ^^ade enriched while most of the nations were engaged in destroying their neighbors and ruining themselves was seriously interfered with. In spite of the restriction imposed by both British and 344 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^xxf' French, the profits of the neutral, and especially of the Amer- ican, who was near the French and Dutch colonies, were very 1806-12 great. This is shown by the fact that the Americans during the year 1800 exported 82,000,000 pounds of sugar and 47,- 000,000 pounds of coffee, undoubtedly the product of foreign colonies. When peace came and French and Dutch were able to take charge of their own colonial trade, American exports of sugar and cofTee fell to twenty and ten millions each. With the outbreak of war in 1803 a new golden opportunity opened before the neutral, and it seemed as if the bulk of the colonial trade with the Continent would pass into the hands of the Americans. In one respect the northern neutrals were in a still more favorable position, for they could clear from some port in the West Indies for a home port, and their voyage would carry them close to the ports of Spain, France, and Holland, so Seizure that they could seize a favorable opportunity to slip in. The American Americans, however, could use the same commercial strategy. Ships To protect her own mercantile and shipping interest, and to assist the sale of her colonial products, England reversed in 1805 her decision about the broken voyage, and did it by the mouth of the same judge who had delivered the previous opin- ion. This was done in the case of the ship Essex, which sailed from Barcelona, landed her cargo at Salem, refitted, reloaded the cargo, which meanwhile had been regularly imported, re- ceived the drawback on the duties paid, and sailed for Havana. The judge held that in deciding whether the rule of 1756 had been infringed the intention of the shippers must be examined. Under the new ruhng many ships were seized, the owners of which were acting on the understanding that the previous de- cisions were still authoritative. Even before this decision struck a severe blow at the American trade with the West Indies, it had suffered from the rapacity of the British prize courts, which had a pecuniary interest in condemning all prizes brought in. The situation was modified again in the spring of 1806, when the trouble with Prussia led the English to proclaim a blockade of the Continent from the river Elbe to the port of Brest The treatment of the American neutral was peculiarly ob- noxious, the American coast was closely watched, and some har- bors practically blockaded by British ships of war or privateers. In 1806 the British ship Leander oK Sandy Hook fired a shot across the bows of a vessel which her commander wished to search, and the shot ricochetting across the waters killed the steersman of a coasting schooner. When British ships were THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 345 not about, French ships were likely to appear. It was unfortu- ^^^f' nately true that the United States was not strong enough to enforce respect for her rights as a neutral, and that in a struggle 1806-12 so fierce the officials of neither France nor England were likely to be over punctilious in dealing with the weak who got in the way. Jefferson's administration attempted to procure better treatment by the threat of a non-importation act in accordance with which certain classes of goods of British origin might be prohibited.^ One of the most serious grievances of the American neutral arose from the Enghsh practice of impressing seamen. Condi- The im- tions in the navy had not been markedly improved since the Q^gs^tTon'* great mutinies of 1797. The discipline was harsh, the wages low, and no reliance was placed upon voluntary enlistment, be- cause the service was unpopular. In the ports the press gang swept up sailors loitering in their usual resorts, while on the sea ships of war stopped merchant vessels and took off the men they wanted, without being over curious about the question of nationality. As the English conception of the indefeasibihty of allegiance did not recognize the right of naturalization, English- men who had become American citizens were still regarded as liable to impressment. In this the English were not ideally con- sistent, for parliamentary legislation during the colonial period was the basis of the American system of naturalization, but they were not ready to see these principles applied to their dis- advantage. They found excuse in the fact that deserters from the English marine could often obtain naturalization papers without the requirement of the ordinary term of residence. As the profits of neutral commerce grew the demand for sailors in- creased, and wages on American ships rose from nine to forty- two dollars a month. The English believed that 30,000 or 40,- 000 seamen of British birth were on American ships, engaged in building up a trade which was bound to cripple their own. It seemed intolerable to them that deserters even from their navy should be received on board American vessels. Their exaspera- tion was increased by a feehng of contempt for the Americans. For this reason a question which could have been adjusted by calm negotiation became hopelessly involved, and not merely acted as a cause of war, but also remained an irritating recollec- tion in the American national tradition. The English also were angry because the Americans appeared to be the alUes of Na- poleon in his attempts to force them to submission. Such was the general situation when by the Berlin Decree, 1 Made effective in November, 1806, and again in December, 1807. 346 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXI The Ber- lin Decree Orders in Council Napoleon sought to make as wide as the Continent his attack upon the EngHsh manufacturer, planter, merchant, and shipper. In the " considerations " which prefaced the decree he enum- erated England's offenses against international law in order to justify his pose as champion of the liberty of the seas. There were, indeed, enough of these offenses, but by adding several articles to the international code of practice he increased their number. For example, he pretended to regard it as extraordi- nary that England should blockade any but strong places and claimed for private property at sea an immunity which he had not granted to private property on land. If the neutrals had been inclined to accept seriously his championship of their rights, they were soon disillusioned, for the decree practically ordered them to cease trading with the British Isles, and made British goods wherever found liable to seizure. This was a more seri- ous menace to the few neutrals still within reach of Napoleon's armies than to those, like the Americans, who were guarded from his attacks by a vast expanse of ocean. The declaration that the British Isles were in a state of blockade, however, was not even mere stage thunder, for it exposed neutral ships to capture by French privateers or wandering cruisers. The Amer- ican minister at Paris was assured that the decree did not apply to his fellow-countrymen. Its principal immediate consequence was to bring a rejoinder from the British, cutting off neutrals from the coasting trade between ports from which British ships were excluded. Napoleon was for several months deeply ab- sorbed in the winter and spring campaign in Poland and Prussia, and he could give little attention to the enforcement of his Conti- nental System. He merely illustrated the method by confiscat- ing vast quantities of British goods in the Hanseatic cities. The Treaty of Tilsit set Napoleon's hands free and added to the number of England's enemies. Soon Russia, Prussia, and, through her own violent conduct, Denmark, were allied with the French against her. In order to defend her market against so formidable a combination, her ministers resolved that if Napoleon meant to prevent English wares from entering the markets of the Continent, they would see to it that the much-desired colonial goods — especially sugar, coffee, and cotton — should reach the Continent only through the medium of the English shipper or after paying duty at an English port. The method was embodied in the famous Orders in Council of November ii, 1807. These left to the neutral the direct trade between his own ports and the enemy's colonies, but no ship was to be permitted to sail to a European port without first entering a British port and paying THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 347 charges on its cargo amounting practically to an import duty, ^^^f' The news of these orders found Napoleon in Italy, and his reply was the Milan Decree, which declared denationalized and fair 18O6-12 prize any ship which should comply with the British require- ments. It is obvious that a situation had now been created which theoretically isolated Napoleon and his alHes from all contact with neutrals by way of the sea, and isolated the British from all except their own colonies. In practice the French decrees added only sHghtly to the risks of trade with the English, but the Brit- ish regulations threatened honest neutral trade with ruin. Both orders and decrees were, however, subject to exceptions. The resentment in the United States against the English policy toward neutrals had meanwhile been much heightened by the at- The Em- tack of the British frigate Leopard on the American frigate *"^° Chesapeake in July, 1807, in order to force the surrender of de- serters who were said to have been accepted as part of the crew of the Chesapeake. After a brief and unequal conflict four men were taken from the Chesapeake, three of whom were native Americans previously impressed into the British service. One, who was an Englishman, was carried to Halifax and hanged. The ineffectiveness of Jefferson's retaliatory measures did not improve the situation. In the fall came news that Napoleon was begin- ning to enforce the Berlin Decree against American vessels, and a little while later arrived newspapers forecasting the contents of the new orders in council of November 11. Jefferson was con- vinced that America's only defense was an embargo which should keep her ships in port. Congress responded promptly to the President's request and in December the embargo went into effect. This prevented American ships from leaving port and permitted European ships to carry with them only the amount of cargo on board at the time of the passage of the act. It did not prevent foreign ships from entering American ports, and the consequences were therefore more serious to the American than to the British shipper. The Americans attempted to avoid the effects of the law by keeping their ships away from the ports of the United States or by transforming them into coasters, which once clear of port sailed for the West Indies or Europe. Supplementary acts and finally a Force Bill made such evasions increasingly difficult and threatened to involve the coast and river trade in the ruin of the foreign trade. Grass began to grow in the streets of the seaports, sailors were in distress, and even the farmer in remote valleys felt the effects of the falling off of the exports, because his market for grain and lumber was destroyed. The fate of the ships that kept the seas or evaded the law and 348 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE Conse- quences of the Sys- CHAP. sailed for Europe was hardly better. Napoleon replied to the embargo by ordering the seizure of all American ships, on the 1806-12 ground that they were either English ships under American col- ors or American ships which had complied with the British orders. As the seas were covered with British cruisers it was perilous not to comply with these orders, and yet they put a heavy charge upon the profits of the voyage. The supporters of the embargo estimated that a ship with 400,000 pounds of tobacco, bound for Holland, and returning with six hundred pipes of gin, would pay $31,000 to the English in duties, charges, and license fees.^ The Continental System meant that the French manufacturer enjoyed the monopoly of the home market and that in nearly all European markets he was protected from English competition. Had it been possible to suppress smuggling, this protection would have been absolute. Although the Napoleonic decrees made the introduction of English goods expensive, their relative cheapness rendered such transactions profitable. The rapid development of the factory system in England since the beginning of the Revo- lutionary period accounts for this ; machinery, for example, hav- ing reduced the cost of weaving a piece of cloth from 39s. gd. in 1795 to fifteen shillings in 1810. As the French were still where the English were prior to 1795, the expenses and risks of the smuggling were covered by the large margin of profit. Moreover, the French could not obtain raw cotton and certain kinds of cot- ton fabrics except from England or through neutral commerce which had paid for English toleration. The prices of sugar and coffee in Paris at this time were so high that many could not buy them at all, but the desire of the Parisians for these articles was no less keen than before the development of Napoleon's grandiose schemes. The smuggler's profits were generally from forty to fifty per cent. It was through Holland and western Germany that the most active trade went on. Napoleon constantly found fault with his smuggung brother Louis for winking at such transactions, but Louis sym- pathized with the sufiferings of a maritime people Hke the Dutch. Jersey, Sardinia, Sicily, and Malta served also as points from which smugglers could start for the European coast; but the history of Heligoland, a small island thirty miles from the mouth of the Weser, offers the most starthng illustration of the extent of smuggling operations. When the English occupied it in Sep- tember, 1807, so many merchants made it their headquarters that a chamber of commerce was formed. Within the space of three ~ Summarized by MacMaster, History of the People of the United States, III, 308. THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 349 months in 1808, 120 vessels were said to have discharged cargoes ^^xf there, and the annual volume of business amounted to eight mil- Hon pounds sterling. " When the French government prohibited I8O6-12 refined sugar, the traders of Heligoland deluged the Continent with eau sucre. Coffee passed as horse beans, sugar as starch, the aliases of pepper were legion." ^ It is said that citizens of Hamburg crossed the Danish border to Altona, and walked back with all the sugar, coffee, and indigo they could carry concealed. " Mock funerals were organized in which consignments of colon- ial goods played the role of corpse." More roundabout routes were also attempted. Goods were landed at Salonica and car- ried overland into Hungary, from whence they found their way up the Danube to the markets of central Europe. The French, in order to obtain raw cotton from the Levant, tried to establish a route from Marseilles and Genoa through Bosnia into the Bal- kan Peninsula, where they hoped also to sell the cloths of Langue- doc. The Continent was nominally closed to English commerce, but this situation was modified not merely by the operations of smug- glers, but by the fact that several of England's enemies were so Licenses only in the sense that they were bound to Napoleon's chariot wheels. Many Prussian, Russian, and, later, Swedish ships were saved from capture by English war vessels because they pos- sessed English licenses to trade. These licenses could, it is said, be purchased in blank in Europe. The States of southern Eu- rope were also weak spots in the System. This was true of the kingdom of Etruria and the States of the Church, whose annexa- tion was approaching. The situation in the Spanish Peninsula was peculiarly unsatisfactory. Portugal in 1807 was dependent upon England, and must. Napoleon decided, be driven into hos- tility to her, but this was a business of little moment compared with the problem of Spain. Napoleon had reasons for attacking the Spanish Bourbons, be- sides the inefficiency of their administration, which compromised the success of the System. He had deposed the Bourbons in Naples ; his Revolutionary predecessors had driven the Bourbons Spain from France; the work was incomplete as long as Bourbons reigned in Spain. He had a special grievance. Before the battle of Jena, when the Prussian army still enjoyed its prestige, and men believed that Napoleon might be defeated, Godoy, the Span- ish minister, had persuaded King Charles IV to issue a call to arms. Although the particular enemy was not designated, it was 3 Fisher, Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany, 339. 350 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXI Portugal Napoleon and Spain evident that Spain desired to free herself from a burdensome al- liance. After the Prussian defeat at Jena, Godoy gave out that the mobilization had been directed against Portugal, but Napo- leon was not deceived, for the despatches of the Prussian ministry at Madrid had been seized, and he knew^ their contents. Had Jena been another Austerlitz, he might have given a repetition of the last act in the Neapolitan drama. Eylau v^as still to be fought and Tilsit was months away, and he contented himself by demanding the services of a Spanish corps of 15,000 at the mouth of the Elbe, the union of the Spanish with the French fleet at Toulon, and the rigorous application of the Berlin Decree. Not until he was in the midst of his operation to coerce Portugal did he see an opportunity to hasten the fate of the Bourbons. The Portuguese were unable to satisfy Napoleon by breaking off relations with the English ; they must in some form come under his control. On October 27, 1807, he signed a treaty at Fontainebleau with Spain providing for a partition of Portugal. The suspicious part of it was the concession of a province to Godoy, who was to be made prince, a strange requital for the bellicose proclamation of the yeai* before. Another part of Portugal was assigned to the King of Etruria in exchange for the cession of his kingdom, the former grand duchy of Tuscany. While these plans were being matured a bitter family quarrel be- tween Charles IV and his son Ferdinand, growing out of the scandalous influence of Godoy, and the appeal of each to Na- poleon for support, offered him the opportunity to pose as judge of this decadent house. The terms agreed upon at Fontainebleau could be utilized to disarm Spain quite as much as to procure a partition of Portugal. An army under Junot had already set out for Lisbon, and it was stipulated that a Spanish corps should take part in the expedition, while a reserve French army should be gathered at Bayonne, to cross into Spain if the English landed a force in Portugal. The Portuguese phase of the affair was ap- parently terminated late the next month when Junot arrived at Lisbon only to find that the Portuguese Court, with the state treasure, had taken refuge on board ships of war protected by an English fleet and had sailed for Brazil. The Spanish phase of the affair opened before Junot reached Lisbon, the reserve army having crossed the Bidassoa without excuse or notice. In December the Spaniards were alarmed by rumors of invasion, and with reason, for, although Napoleon had not fixed the details of his solution of the Spanish problem to his own satisfaction, he had been persuaded by the analogy of Louis XIV to place a Bonaparte upon the Spanish throne. The THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 351 marriage of Ferdinand with a princess of the imperial house of- ^J^f' fered one method, although not as satisfactory as the substitution of either Louis or Joseph Bonaparte for the Bourbon monarch. 18O6-12 Early in January another corps entered nothern Spain and in February a mixed army of French and Italians invaded Catalonia, while Murat was appointed " Lieutenant for the Emperor in Spain." To explain the entry of these troops Napoleon's ambas- sador spoke of an expedition against Gibraltar. When Murat was within striking distance of Madrid, Godoy persuaded Charles IV to emulate the example of the Portuguese house, but at the news of this, Spanish rage burst out against the man who had made Spain so long subservient to French in- terests. On the night of March 17, terrified by a riot, Charles abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand. Murat now saw a chance to bring the royal family into Napoleon's power, and, when he reached Madrid, he refused to recognize Ferdinand, persuading Charles to declare that his abdication had been pro- cured by force. Murat had not been informed of all Napoleon's plans and hoped he was erecting a throne for himself. At this juncture it was announced that Napoleon was coming to Madrid, although he did not intend to leave Bayonne, and, by a sinister coincidence. General Savary, the executioner of the Bourbon Duke d'Enghien, was chosen to persuade Ferdinand to meet Napoleon first at Burgos and afterwards at Vittoria. At Vittoria he was intimidated into crossing the frontier to Bayonne, where a few days later his parents and Godoy appeared. At first Napoleon could not frighten Ferdinand into an act of renunciation, but early in May the news of an uprising against the French army in Madrid, like another " Veronese Passover " extricated Napoleon from the impasse, enabling him to threaten Ferdinand with a trial for treason if he did not abdicate. Ferdinand had no desire to have his name added to the fist of Bourbon martyrs and yielded. His father had already abandoned all his rights to Napoleon as " the only one," so he declared, " who could reestablish order." Charles IV, the Queen, and Godoy became Napoleon's pensioners, and Ferdinand was strictly guarded at the chateau of Valengay, with Talleyrand as his jailer. Another act had to be presented before the comedy turned to tragedy. Murat appointed a Junta of Regency from Madrid office holders with the function of requesting that Joseph Bona- Joseph parte be granted to them as king. When they had done this, 150 ^oJ^aparte notables were summoned to Bayonne in order to beg the same boon, and ninety-one appeared and acted the part assigned to them. This body also gave the semblance of national authority 352 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^xxi *° ^ constitution proclaimed early in July. The incident ap- patently terminated when Joseph accepted a formal cession of 1806-12 ^j^g rights held by Napoleon and when Murat was chosen for the vacated throne of Naples. Towards the close of his life Napo- leon characterized the whole transaction in the words, " I em- barked very badly on the Spanish affair, I confess : the immoral- ity of it was too patent, the injustice too cynical." ^ At the time when Napoleon was treating with brutal contempt Napoleon the national honor of the Spaniards, he roused their religious Pope* ° passions by despoiling the Pope of several of his provinces and by holding him practically a prisoner in his own capital. General Miollis had occupied Rome in February, 1808, and in April, An- cona, the duchies of Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino were an- nexed to the kingdom of Italy. Pope Pius VII forbade the in- habitants to take the oath to their new sovereign under penalty of jeopardizing their eternal salvation, and for this the papal sec- retary of state was expelled. In May, Tuscany was transformed into French departments. All Italy was now under Bonapartes, although the formal annexation of Rome to the French empire did not come until a year later. Long before Joseph could set out for his capital, insurrection had broken out in all parts of Spain. The people and the priests refused to believe that they had been voluntarily abandoned by their princes, and they looked upon Napoleon with horror as insurrec- the jailer of king and pope. The movements in the different provinces were isolated, and under control of local juntas or com- mittees, which displayed no zeal for union, so that it was not until the latter part of September that a central junta was or- ganized. Even then no single commander was appointed, and the junta attempted to direct the operations of troops in regions widely separated. At first few competent leaders came forward. Many of the notables had concluded that submission was inevit- able and had taken the oath to the new regime. The absence of responsible leadership gave to resistance too often the character of sanguinary insurrection. Mobs attacked not merely small bodies of French soldiers, but defenseless merchants, and even Spanish officials who thought resistance to Napoleon futile. The patriotic party contained many impelled by a self-sacrificing and enlightened spirit of national independence, and many oth- ers who detested the French mainly because for two decades they had represented liberty and progress. Smugglers and bandits joined in the fray as soon as the fighting began. When the reach 4 Quoted by Rose, II. 153. tion in Spain THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 353 and strength of the movement was perceived, those who had ^^f' tamely submitted to the decisions of Bayonne began to rally to the popular cause. I8O6.12 From the beginning Napoleon made the mistake of underesti- mating the strength and persistence of the forces with which he had to contend. He was so anxious to keep the Grand Army cantoned in Germany, at the expense of the Prussians and his German allies, and for the sake of the influence its presence might have upon the politics of central and northern Europe, that he capituia- sent into Spain an army made up chiefly of the raw conscripts Bayie°n of 1807. The result was disastrous. A column of 20,000 under General Dupont pushed southward from Madrid towards Seville, but was checked by a larger number of Spanish troops and was soon afterwards compelled to surrender. This incident at Bay- len, on July 23, stirred not only Spain, but Europe. A still greater feat was the repulse after weeks of fighting of a French army from the streets of Saragossa, practically by the exertions of the inhabitants, for few regular Spanish troops were present. Na- poleon was beside himself with rage, and, although he was quite as responsible as Dupont, exacted vengeance upon the hapless officer by keeping him in prison as long as the empire lasted. The uprising in Spain gave England for the first time a sat- isfactory opportunity to place a large army on European soil. Early in June deputies from the Asturias were enthusiastically welcomed in London, and Spain was at once stricken from the list of England's enemies. Help was promised, the more gladly conveu- because the resistance of the Spaniards was not an affair of pro- ^j^^i °^ r . . ,. , , , . . , . Cintra fessional diplomacy, but was due to a genume national aversion, like the aversion which the English had felt since 1793, and par- ticularly since 1803. The enterprise bade fair also to be profit- able, for it might rob the French and the Continental System of the Iberian Peninsula. Indeed, the exports from France to Spain sank in one year from sixty-five to thirty-three million francs. This loss brought corresponding gains to the Enghsh. The friendship of the Spaniards might also open to them the ports of the Spanish colonies far better than naval expeditions had suc- ceeded in doing. The English instinctively perceived the magni- tude of Napoleon's error, and resolved to profit by it. The first consequence was the landing in Portugal in August of an expe- ditionary force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general already distinguished for his services in India, and brother of a gover- nor-general. This force repulsed Junot decisively, and but for the appearance on the scene of superior officers, dispatched thither by factional jealousy, Wellesley would probably have compelled 354 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. Junot to surrender unconditionally. Wellesley's successor signed a convention at Cintra, granting Junot the privilege of a return 1806-12 ^ith his army to France on British ships. Public opinion in England condemned the convention, but this did not render it more palatable to Napoleon, especially as the English about the same time rescued most of the Spanish soldiers whom he was re- taining in Northern Germany. Joseph Bonaparte entered his capital on July 20, but the news of Baylen caused him to withdraw ten days later. By the end of August the French held nothing of importance south of the Ebro and had lost control of Portugal. Joseph feelingly wrote to his brother, " Your Majesty can form no idea of the hatred felt here for your name. Two hundred thousand Frenchmen would be necessary to conquer Spain, and one hundred thousand scaffolds would also be needed to maintain here the prince con- demned to reign over it." Napoleon was ready to sacrifice more than two hundred thousand in the effort to complete the task undertaken, but he was to discover that even this was not enough. Before he undertook the conquest he must see that the System did not totter and collapse at the other end of Europe. The agreements at Tilsit had left certain questions for the Napoleon future to answer. One of these concerned Turkey. The Czar still had his eyes upon Constantinople, and was anxious to annex at least the Danubian principalities. Before Napoleon went to Bayonne he desired a personal interview with the Czar, in order to bind him more closely to the Continental System, and to divert his mind from immediate gains along the Danube by the prospect of a joint expedition against the Indies. Meantime Alexander would serve as policeman for central Europe while Napoleon attacked the Spanish problem. But Alexander refused an inter- view without a previous understanding about the partition of Turkey. Napoleon started for Bayonne with the expectation that the seizure of Spain and the annexation of Tuscany and of the Papal States would give him control of the Mediterranean, bringing the Eastern question within the sphere of influence of the Grand Empire, and reducing Alexander to the position of a suppliant for favors. The sinister termination of the Spanish affair upset these calculations and in a measure reversed the roles. An interview became necessary to Napoleon to overawe the restive Austrians and put an end to agitation in Germany prompted by the news from Spain. Alexander consented to meet Napoleon at Erfurt, although many of his advisers warned him against a closer alliance with the French Emperor. He thought that the time had not yet come to overthrow the colossus, and and Alexander THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 355 that Russia, Prussia, and Austria must wait until it had begun to crumble of its own weight. The two Emperors met on September 27 and remained together two weeks. Napoleon tried to dazzle Europe by the spectacle of kings and princes forming a magnificent court of which he was the center. Before a theater filled with princes and monarchs the members of the Comedie Frangaise played the classical pieces. Goethe and Wieland paid their homage to the conqueror and ad- ministrator of half the world. In the midst of these festivities there were many interviews between Napoleon and Alex- ander. Napoleon wished Russia to unite with him in compelling Austria to cease her military preparations, or in forcing her to join in the war against England. When arguments did not succeed, he tried exhibitions of rage. He threw his hat on the floor and stamped on it, but the Czar quietly declared, " Let us talk, let us reason, or I go." The result was a secret convention upon terms of a possible peace with Great Britain, with the basis uti possidetis, meaning that the Russians were to gain Finland and the Danubian principalities and that the new situation in Spain was to be recognized. France was to withdraw her mediation between Russia and Turkey and intervene only in case the Austrians took sides with the Sultan. In the event that Austria should attack France, Russia should come to her assistance. A few weeks before, on September 8, the Prussians had signed a treaty which seemed to bind them to the Napoleonic system still more effectively, although most of the Grand Army was withdrawn from Prussia to fight in Spain. Several fortresses on the Oder were still to be garrisoned by French troops and the Prussian army was limited for ten years to 42,000 men, a number which was not to be increased by " any extraordinary levy of militia or of citizen guards, nor any mustering that tends to augment the forces specified." In case of war with Austria in 1809 Prussia was to furnish 12,000 men. One of the reasons why the Prussians consented to these hard terms was the seizure of a letter from the King's principal minister Stein, in which he rejoiced in the success of the Spanish party of resistance and urged that the same spirit be everywhere stimulated in Germany. Napoleon after his return from Erfurt hurried south into Spain, where already an army, composed mainly of veterans of the Grand Army, had been concentrated. The Spaniards did not have more than half that number and were unskilfully handled. The result was a foregone conclusion; defeats disor- ganized each of their principal armies and by December Napoleon CHAP. XXI Spanish Campaign 356 THE REVOLUTIONARY TERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXI WeUIng- ton's De- fense of Portugal was in Madrid. He took the attitude of a conqueror, as if the determinations of Bayonne had been destroyed by the war that had followed ; hoping, perhaps, to make the acceptance of Joseph appear to the Spaniards their only means of escaping annexation. During his stay in Madrid he issued a series of decrees abolish- ing the Inquisition, sweeping away the remains of feudalism, re- moving provincial customs boundaries, and reducing the num- ber of monasteries by two-thirds. To most Spaniards this was another instance of the " Greeks bearing gifts," aggravated by the fact that the gifts were detestable, reminding them of revolu- tionary and atheistic France. Napoleon intended to send columns to attack Seville and Lisbon, but, hearing that Sir John Moore with a British army was within striking distance, set off in De- cember to capture him. The British made good their retreat on Corunna, and Napoleon gave over the pursuit to Marshal Soult, while he returned to Paris. Soult attempted to attack Corunna while the British were embarking, but was repulsed. It was in this fight that Sir John Moore was killed. For the next two years the struggle in Spain went on with varying fortunes. In 1809 Napoleon was too much absorbed in a new conflict with Austria to give it much attention, relying on his marshals to effect the capture of Lisbon and to occupy south- ern Spain. In Portugal, Soult got no further than Oporto, when he was attacked by Wellesley, who in April had returned with supreme command of the British forces. Soult was glad to escape across the mountains into Galicia with the sacrifice of his baggage and artillery. Through the faulty cooperation of his Spanish colleagues Wellesley was less successful against Victor, who had Seville as his objective point. He won the bloody battle of Tala- vera in July, but was soon obliged to retreat into Portugal to escape a large army sent under Soult to cut his line of communi- cations. When the Austrian campaign was over heavy reinforce- ments were despatched to Spain by Napoleon, and early in 1810 the French successfully occupied Andalusia and drove the Span- iards back upon Cadiz, In August a French army under Massena began a march upon Lisbon, to defend which Wellesley, now Viscount Wellington, devised a remarkable plan. He constructed three lines from the Tagus to the sea, the first of which was 29 miles long, and which, altogether, included 126 closed redoubts, mounting 427 guns. The inhabitants of the region through which the French army would advance were required to remove or destroy their food supplies, and withdraw to Lisbon or Oporto, possibly to the mountains. While the Anglo-Portuguese army should man the " Lines of Torres Vedras," as the fortifications THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 357 were called, bodies of militia should hang on the flanks and rear ^^^f ' of the French force, cut off their communications, seize foragers or stragglers, and prevent their control of any except the ground I8O6-12 on which they stood. Massena reached Wellington's lines on October 12, after suffering a smart repulse at Busaco on Septem- ber 27. He speedily realized that assault was futile, and, after lingering about Santarem until his army was in a starving con- dition, in March, 181 1, he began his retreat into Spain. In Austria, as well as in Germany, every phase of the tragedy of 1808 had been watched with intense interest. The loyal sub- jects of the House of Hapsburg could not regard as final a sit- rears of nation which had excluded Austria from her traditional position ^^^^^^^^ in Europe. Events had followed one another in a series which also awakened forebodings. Pressburg had been supplemented by the agreements with the States of the Rhenish Confederation, and these by Tilsit. In the negotiations for the settlement of the question of the Turkish empire Austria had not been consulted, although early in 1808 she was forced to adhere to the Conti- nental System. Still more ominous seemed the overthrow of the Bourbons in Spain, especially because this had been accomplished without protest from Russia, the only great independent power besides Austria left on the Continent. Austrian statesmen looked upon their empire as peculiarly open to a new Napoleonic ven- ture, because the French federative system might be extended by breaking up their own federation. It is not surprising, there- fore, that rumors that Austria was arming reached Paris early in the summer. In June the Emperor Francis had initiated the reorganization of the army by creating a Ictndwehr in which all men from eighteen to twenty-five should be enrolled, and the Archduke Charles addressed himself to the task of improving the different branches of the service. What Francis would at- tempt depended upon the attitude of other States, but it was cer- tain that he would not be ready for a struggle until 1809, and consequently Metternich, his ambassador at Paris, denied em- phatically the reports of hostility. During the winter the war party at Vienna gained the as- cendant, arguing that the stubborn resistance of the Spaniards and the presence of the English in Portugal would cripple Na- poleon so that he could not place more than 200,000 men on the Austrian frontier. They hoped that if war broke out the Prus- sians would rise and they did not despair even of the Russians, being confidentially informed of the misunderstandings at Erfurt between Napoleon and Alexander. They also counted on finan- cial aid from the English and a possible diversion made by the 358 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, landing of English troops in northwestern Germany. These hopes were quickened by the fear that Napoleon would attack them 1806-12 anyway, for financial reasons if for no other. Spain was prov- ing a heavy drain upon his resources, and some means had to be found to fill his treasury. He would not abandon the profit- able principle which he had learned from the Revolutionists, that war must pay for war. The Austrians found that they could expect no assistance from either Prussia or Russia, and yet in February, 1809, they decided to fight. Unfortunately for them they had also miscalculated the ability of Napoleon to raise troops for the campaign. He summoned the conscripts of 1810 in Sep- tember, 1808, and in 1809 he called to the colors all who had not served in the classes from 1806 to 1809. By such means the number of soldiers was forced up to 800,000, including 200,000 German auxiliaries. Of these 300,000 were kept in Spain. The quality of the troops was, however, beginning to deteriorate, be- cause of the youth fulness of the conscripts, called a year or a year and a half before the regular age. The campaign opened with the Austrian invasion of Bavaria in April. In a proclamation to his soldiers the Archduke Charles The Aus- declared, " The freedom of Europe has taken refuge under your Campaign banners, your victories will loose her chains, and your German brethren, now in the enemy's ranks, await their deliverance." At the outset the Austrians had the advantage of earlier concentra- tion, for Napoleon had misjudged the time at which the war would begin, but the disorganization of their commissariat, resulting in movements unusually slow, cost them this advantage, and a few days after Napoleon's arrival they were driven in full retreat into the Bohemian mountains. Napoleon pressed on to Vienna, believ- ing that the possession of the capital would enable him to dic- tate terms of peace, but the Austrians were not ready to yield. He used his presence in the enemy's capital, however, to announce the annexation of Rome to the French empire, revoking the gift made by his " august predecessor," " Charlemagne, Emperor of the French." A few days later when he attempted to cross the northern bank of the Danube and attack the Archduke Charles, he was awakened rudely to actualities. Before the movement was completed, he was attacked by the Austrians at Aspern-Ess- ling and his bridge of boats, over which reinforcements must be brought, was broken by masses of material which they floated down upon it. After a day of the most stubborn fighting he was forced back to the island of Lobau. This defeat deprived him of the glamour of invincibility, but six weeks later he was more successful in establishing a position on the northern bank, and vrtth Aus- tria THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 359 defeated the Austrians at Wagram, almost on the same field, ^xxf Francis I was ready to abandon the struggle, and on October 14, after waiting several weeks in the hope of English or Prussian 18O6-12 intervention, signed the Treaty of Schonbrunn.^ His loyal sub- jects in Tyrol carried on a desperate struggle against the French and Bavarians until December. Their leader, Andreas Hofer, was finally betrayed, taken to Mantua and shot. The hope of assistance from the Germans had seemed at one time not alto- gether illusory. Colonel Schill led his cavalry regiment out of Berlin in April to give the signal, but the people did not stir and he was killed a few weeks later at Stralsund. In the summer the young Duke of Brunswick startled Germany by a raid from Bohemia across Saxony to Brunswick, eventually taking refuge on board the English fleet. The terms of peace embodied in the Treaty of Schonbrunn were Peace hard. They did not constitute a settlement, but, rather, reasons for another war a few years later. The Austrians were obliged to cede Austrian Galicia to the grand duchy of Warsaw, a portion of East Galicia to Alexander, and certain western districts to Bavaria. The greatest blow was the creation of the Illyrian Provinces out of Carniola, a part of Carinthia and Croatia, with the coast about Trieste. Nor was money forgotten. In addition to the contribution levied during the war, 85,000,000 in coin were now required. Austria also agreed to reduce her active army to 150,000. The question of the succession had perplexed Napoleon ever since the possibility of imperial power first appealed to his im- Marriage agination. It troubled his adherents also, for upon its proper solution depended the stability of the regime to which they owed titles, incomes, and worldly influence. Even Napoleon's settle- ment of the controversies inherited from the Revolution, and his work of reorganization, appeared to depend too much on the chances of his life. The solution of the problem seemed to lie in a dynastic marriage, which might also serve as a pledge of peace after the long struggle of France against the world. This accounts for the rumors that Napoleon intended to divorce Jose- phine, who had borne him no children. At Erfurt he spoke vaguely to Alexander about a marriage alliance. After he re- turned from Vienna in 1809 he intimated to Josephine the neces- sity of divorce. Negotiations were opened once more with Russia for a sister of the Czar, and with Austria for an archduch- ess. Alexander's answer was bound to be unfavorable, because •5 Also called the Treaty of Vienna. Alliance 36o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^x^" ^^ referred the matter to his mother, who hated Napoleon bitterly. Napoleon's advisers, therefore, favored an Austrian marriage, and 1806-12 Francis was ready to sacrifice his daughter Maria Louisa to pre- serve the remnants of his empire. The ever convenient instru- ment of a senatus consulte freed Napoleon from the civil bond and the metropolitan of Paris declared that the religious ceremony, performed in 1804, had been irregular and was, therefore, invahd. Josephine retired to Malmaison, followed by public sympathy, while Maria Louisa reigned in her stead. Already a place and title were prepared for an heir who was to be called " The Prince Imperial " and to " bear the title and receive the honors of King of Rome." In 1810, when the Continental System had broken down in Annexa- Spain and Portugal, Napoleon attempted to strengthen it along HoUand ^he coast of the North Sea by annexing Holland and northwestern Germany. King Louis Bonaparte had not enforced the system to the satisfaction of his brother, and he was plainly told that he could retain his crown only if he kept English goods out of Hol- land. American ships had begun to visit Dutch ports again, since the Non-Intercourse Act had replaced the embargo. As these ships had complied with the requirements of the British Orders in, Council he demanded that Louis order their confisca- tion. Louis regarded the situation as intolerable, and, abdicat- ing the throne on July i, fled to the dominions of the Emperor Francis. Annexation followed in a few days. The first punish- ment visited upon the Dutch was the exaction of a tax of fifty per cent, on the colonial products discovered in their warehouses. Northwestern Germany, another sphere for the operations of smugglers, was annexed in December, and this carried the French frontier up to the shores of the Baltic just beyond Liibeck. With the exception of the Iberian Peninsula, the coast of Europe from the borders of Denmark to the kingdom of Naples was now in the hands of Napoleon's officials. The consequences for Great Britain must have been serious except for the outcome of the Spanish adventure and the results of the French license system. As soon as Great Britain undertook to aid the Spanish party The of resistance English ships were welcome wherever the French coronies were not actually in possession. Portugal was also under British control almost continuously from the summer of 1808. England regained the trade with Brazil after the reestablishment of friendly relations with the exiled royal house. In the Spanish colonies she had long profited by a large contraband trade. When she was involved in war with Spain the only way to control these colonial markets was through conquest. In i8c6 Buenos Ayres THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 361 had been captured, but it was recaptured by the inhabitants within ^^^' six weeks. Montevideo was seized and held for several months, while English ships flocked to the harbors and English merchants I8O6-12 enjoyed a thriving trade in goods of which the inhabitants had long been deprived. It is said that people came from the slopes of the Andes attracted by the new market. This was merely a temporary advantage, but when Napoleon deposed the Bourbon monarchs the Spanish colonies revolted. The Spanish Central Junta and the Regency that succeeded could not expect to main- tain the old commercial monopoly in its rigor and one after an- other the Spanish colonial ports were opened to British and neutral commerce. This gave the British the opportunity to sell part of their accumulated stocks of merchandise, and British ex- ports rose from £37,275,000 in 1808 to £48,438,000 in 1810. The principal element in this increase appeared to have been the pro- scribed cottons, the exports of which were £18,616,000 in 1810, and only £9,846,000 in 1808. In the United States the policy of the embargo had proved so Repeal ineffective and unpopular that just before Jefferson's second term Embargo closed the act was repealed. It was replaced by a Non-Inter- course Act, forbidding trade with the offending States until their obnoxious decrees and orders should be withdrawn. This pro- voked reprisals from Napoleon, and by the Rambouillet decree in March, 1810, he ordered the seizure of American ships, al- though he did not publish the decree for two months after its adoption. He utilized the opportunity to seize many American ships which meanwhile entered Dutch, Neapolitan, and Spanish ports in good faith. The Non-Intercourse Act gave way in turn to a bill authorizing the President by proclamation to impose non- intercourse with one of the two powers, should the other agree to withdraw its decrees. As soon as Napoleon heard this he con- fronted the Americans with a dilemma, for he promised to revoke the Berlin and Milan decrees, so far as they were concerned, if England withdrew her orders or the Americans caused her to respect their rights as neutrals. When the English took no steps towards this, Madison imposed non-intercourse with them, after reopening trade with France. While Napoleon was urging his allies to enforce the Continental System against the English, he prepared to share with the English the profits of the monopoly they continued to enjoy in colonial Napo- goods. His practice of issuing licenses, regularized in 1806 and j^cense developed in 181 o, permitted the entry of most English goods with the exception of cottons. The question had early been raised, What should be done with prize cargoes? and in Jan- 362 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^xxf' "^^y' 1810, the government authorized the sale of such cargoes, even if the goods belonged to the prohibited classes, provided that 1806-12 ^ gg^j ^^g appended indicating that they were " prize-goods " and that a duty amounting to forty per cent, was paid. From this source the government hoped to increase its income substantially, and as not enough prizes were taken to assure the estimated in- come, the officials winked at the introduction of prohibited arti- cles, labeling them " prize-goods." Cottons, however, were de- stroyed, the government indemnifying the captors. The extra- legal trade was increased by the issue of licenses, effective for limited periods, permitting the importation of prohibited goods in case the merchant should export an equivalent amount of French products. As these products were excluded from Eng- land the merchants sometimes turned their exports over to smug- glers, or loaded boxes of sand marked with deceptive labels, and threw them overboard when the ships were out of sight of land. The license system incidentally opened the way to the corruption of officials, and provoked vehement protests from manufacturers and traders who could not enjoy its expensive privileges. When Napoleon was convinced that the colonial trade was com- pletely under the control of the English, and that smugglers were System obtaining the profits of the demand which still existed, he sought and^^e- by the Trianon tariff of August 5, 1810, to add these profits to crees the government revenue. This tariff charged about fifty per cent, on coffee, cocoa, sugar, and raw cotton. In the case of cotton the duty varied with the place of origin, that is, Levant cotton was charged two francs a pound and American cotton twice as much. This was a heavy blow for the cotton manufacturers and threatened their business with ruin. It also increased the diffi- culties of the dealers in colonial products, and on both accounts is to be regarded as one of the causes of the terrible panic from which France suffered from the fall of 1810 to the summer of 181 1. The situation was rendered still worse by the Fontaine- bleau decree of October 18, 1810, in which he ordered the de- struction of all products of British manufacture, except such as had been admitted under his licenses. Seizures were especially frequent in Germany, upon the pretext that goods accumulated within four days' march of the imperial frontier were des- tined to the contraband trade. Some of these goods were taken to Antwerp and sold, but the cottons were publicly burnt. Na- poleon urged the Czar to imitate this action and to seize the neutral vessels, chiefly American, in the Baltic ports, on the ground that they were carrying British goods. He wrote to Alexander that such a blow would be decisive and would bring THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 363 the English to terms at once. Alexander, however, would not ^^^xf" listen to these proposals which were contrary not only to the stand Russia had taken ten years before on the rights of neutrals I8O6-12 but also to the interests of Russian merchants. About the time when Napoleon's license system assumed large proportions the English began to restrict the issue of licenses, especially as they discovered that he thought it necessary to re- open trade to this extent. They had also resorted to other de- vices to keep open trade with the Continent. One was to send out American vessels which had never seen America, and " whose papers were manufactured in London." ^ Napoleon's willing- ness to permit French exports to England relieved the English in a notable crisis. The grain crop of 1809 was a partial failure, and that of 1810 an almost total failure, with the result that the average price of wheat in August, 1810, was 116 shilHngs a quar- ter. There would have been actual famine had not quantities of grain been obtained from France and her dependencies. The consequences of such a vast system of government in- French terference with the ordinary currents of trade were serious. Exports There was much suffering, principally beyond the borders of France, but also in those French towns which depended on mari- time commerce. For example, the number of ships fitted out in Bordeaux in 1802 had been 224, and in 181 o it was only 29. A German traveler wrote in his journal in September, 1809, that La Rochelle was as still as death. " You may go up and down the streets," he added, " without seeing a living soul. The grass in the streets is as undisturbed as in the fields. The population has fallen to a half." ^ This did not mean a decrease in exports, because the continental market was steadily widening. Trade found new land routes or reopened old ones. In 1806 the ex- ports were 143 millions more than they had been in 1802, the year of maritime peace. On this trade Strasbourg in France, and Frankfort and Leipzig in Germany, where great fairs were held, were rapidly growing rich. But when the rigors of the Continental System were fully developed, there followed a sharp decline in trade, and exports and imports fell from 933 millions in 1806 to 621 in 1809. A slight recovery took place in 1810, but was not lasting. Napoleon's policy of wars, military contri- butions, heavy taxes, commercial discrimination, was bound to cripple the continental market. The consequence would be the « Quoted by W. E. Lingelbach, from a report of an American Consul, American Historical Review, XIX, 269-270. 7 Quoted by Paul Darmstadter, Studien zur napoleonischen Wirtschafts- politik, in Vierteljahrschaft fur Social-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, II. 577. 364 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^xxf' **^^" °^ ^^^^ industrial supremacy which it had been his purpose to give to France. 1806-12 PoHtical association with the French empire did not carry with it the reduction of French tariffs. Only by annexation to France The sys- was the area of freedom of trade on the Continent extended, and Dependent ^^en in this case the change was not immediate. The industrial states fortunes of the grand duchy of Berg may illustrate the situation of allied States. It was there that the famous Remscheid steel was manufactured. The exports of the region before the war had amounted to 60,000,000 francs, but by 181 1 they had fallen to 18,000,000. Cotton goods were affected by the tariff of 1806, made to protect French cottons, although, after Murat was moved to Naples, Berg was ruled by Napoleon. When Holland was annexed the coal miners on the Ruhr expected to find a market for their coal, but it was practically prohibited by a rate established in January, 181 1. The final blow was the confisca- tion of all colonial goods found in the grand duchy, which was, on Napoleon's part, an act of mad self-consistency, if the date — 1813 — be noted, for this was when his empire beyond the Rhine was collapsing. A more striking illustration of the treatment of an aUied State is to be found in the case of the kingdom of Italy, over which Napoleon himself ruled. Shortly after his coronation he issued a decree prohibiting the importation of British goods. This was followed a year later by a decree declaring certain kinds of cot- tons and woolens, together with buttons and pottery, to be Eng- lish. As Italy manufactured few such goods, the decree con- ferred a monopoly upon France, and deprived several friendly States, notably Switzerland and Saxony, of a good market. In 1807 Napoleon learned that Swiss calicoes were sold in large quantities in Italy, and in December he issued a decree which barred all cottons not of French origin. The next year as King of Italy he negotiated a commercial treaty with himself as Em- peror of the French, according to which the Italians conceded to France substantial advantages in return for benefits which looked better in the treaty than anywhere else. Two years later he subjected Italian silk to a high export duty if it was sent to any other country than France. This injured the Itahan manu- facturer, while it secured to the manufacturer of Lyons an ade- quate supply of raw silk. Napoleon's motto was " France first," as he said to the Viceroy Eugene. His measures immensely in- creased the French exports to the kingdom of Italy, forcing them up from 12,900,000 francs in 1802 to 40,000,000 in 1806 and 51,600,000 in 1 8 10. THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 365 1806-12 Growth of French Manufac- tures For a few years French manufacturers had the benefit of an extraordinary expansion of their market, while they were pro- tected from Enghsh competition. Certain industries, especially the manufacture of hardware and of cotton goods, received such a stimulus that the Continental System marks an epoch in their development. The woolen manufactures also profited. In the case of silk, an article of luxury, the expansion of the business was so rapid until the fall of 1810 that the manufacturers could not keep pace with the demand. The number of looms was nearly double that under the old regime, although the silk in- dustry had been reduced to ruin by the Revolution. In 1808 it was reported that were there looms enough 10,000 more persons could be profitably employed. The panic of 1810, however, put an end to this prosperity. It should not be forgotten that some districts beyond the fron- tiers of France profited, as did many French cities, by the tem- porary cessation of British competition. England was equipped, as they were not, with the new machinery. In their case, there- fore, the Continental System acted like a highly protective tariflf. Behind such a wall ventures in manufacturing might be safely attempted. The cotton industry made rapid progress, especially in Saxony, where so many spinning machines were set up that the number of spindles rose from 13,200 in 1806 to 210,150 in 1812. It was a part of the irony of the situation that the British orders, which were designed to safeguard British trade, should in America have resulted in bringing into being strong rival in- dustries. The capital which had been invested in the shipping business was diverted by the operation of the embargo and the Non-Intercourse Acts into the new manufactures of cotton, wool, and steel. From 1807 to 181 1 the number of cotton mills in- creased from fifteen to eighty-seven, while during the next four years the rate of increase was still greater. The progress with woolens was slower, but the foundations of this important in- dustry were laid. One of the most curious incidents of the struggle between Napoleon and England was the French effort to find substitutes for cane sugar and colonial dyewoods. By 1810 sugar was four francs a pound in Paris. It happened that a decade earlier a Berlin chemist had succeeded in producing a few lumps of sugar from the treatment of the beet root, and that a report on the subject had been read before the French Institute. The high price of sugar tempted manufacturers to carry the processes to perfection so that the product might become commercially profit- American Manufac- tures SHgar 366 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. able. By 1811 a French chemist produced certain lumps which Napoleon could not distinguish from lumps made of cane sugar. 1806-12 ^ yg^j. ja^gj. |.j^g success of Benjamin Delessert, a manufacturer of Passy, seemed so undoubted that Napoleon visited his fac- tory and decorated him with the cross of the Legion of Honor. A decree had already been issued declaring that after January I, 1813, the importation of cane sugar should be prohibited. As sugar of this kind could then not be made at a cost less than four francs a pound, it was evident that the industry would collapse if the stringency of the Continental System was re- laxed. Similar efforts were made to substitute woad, madder, and saffron for colonial dyewoods. Even the experiment of raising cotton in Corsica and Italy was attempted. The fires fed by confiscated British merchandise in 1810 ap- peared to signalize the triumph of the Napoleonic policy. The French manufacturers hastened to congratulate the Emperor be- cause he had delivered a " fatal blow at English commerce." They were mistaken. Most of the goods destroyed had al- ready been paid for by French or continental merchants. A financial and industrial panic, the consequence of the Napoleonic policy, had begun to sweep over France. Events were at the door which were to add to the defection of Spain the far more serious defection of Russia. The annexation of the northwest- em coast of Germany, which was intended to strengthen the Continental System, prepared its final ruin. Among the States annexed was the duchy of Oldenburg, the ruler of which was a relative of the Czar Alexander. CHAPTER XXII THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA ''"VTEVER were sowing and reaping, spinning and weaving, X^ buying and selling, so much a patriotic duty." Such is the comment of a German historian upon the desperate situa- 1807-12 tion of Prussia after the Peace of Tilsit. For the Hohenzollern monarchy it was a hard fate to lose half its territories. The sacrifice of the lands west of the Elbe was the serious part of the loss, since the Polish provinces, out of which the grand duchy of Warsaw was formed, had proved difficult to assimilate. But the menace of the situation lay not in the size or the meaning of these losses; it lay in the fact that the royal administration did not for months recover control of the larger portion of what was left. Nor was this all. With inconceivable carelessness Field Marshal Kalckreuth had signed a convention (July 12, 1807), according to which the withdrawal of the French was contingent upon the payment of a war contribution, but which did not specify its size or the basis for reckoning it. Nor could the King collect his revenue within the region occupied by French troops until the contribution was paid. The Prussian monarchy was apparently caught on the horns of a cruel dilemma. One of the King's officials declared that a man who could sign such an agreement should be sent to the madhouse or the gallows. The ambiguities of the Convention of Konigsberg were not conse- due to the indifference of a generous victor in matters of de- of^ifigit tail. Napoleon meant to complete the ruin of Prussia as a great power in Europe. In his later life he regretted that he had not destroyed the kingdom altogether. That Frederick William was spared was due to the importance of the Russian alliance in the development of the Continental System. At the same time the distrust that Napoleon felt in regard to Alexander's real attitude and policy made it convenient for him to have an army in a posi- tion which menaced both Russia and Austria, especially if that army were supported at the expense of the defeated Prussians. In case Alexander showed an intention to act in good faith, he might be repaid in favors to his friend Frederick William, by reducing the war contribution or by withdrawing the army a little further westward. Similar concessions might also be of- 367 368 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE *':^a' ^6^^d i" reply to embarrassing Russian requests. As the months passed Alexander showed no disposition to withdraw his troops 1807-12 from the Danubian principalities. Napoleon offered to accept the situation if he received Silesia as compensation; but this Alexander refused. Whether the Prussian monarchy should survive depended upon the character of the intelligence and courage which was to pre- Recau of side Over its counsels. Hardenberg, as the negotiator at Barten- stein of that intimate union with Russia before the battle of Friedland, had become impossible, and he advised the King to recall Stein, to whom the reform party among the officials had begun to look as the person fitted by his clearness of vision, by his energy and independence, and by his long administrative ex- perience, to carry the State through the present crisis. The selec- tion was disagreeable to the King, but he yielded and dispatched the summons to Stein, who was living in retirement on his es- tates in Nassau. It was the close of September before he reached Memel, where the Court was then living. Up to that time, except for foreign affairs, the administration had been en- trusted to an Intermediate Commission, composed of Harden- berg's associates. Their jurisdiction was not extensive, for not until the following December did the French army withdraw even to the Vistula. Within the occupied provinces the journals were not permitted to publish royal ordinances, officials were obliged to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor, and the reve- nues were collected for the current requirements of administra- tion and the support of the French army. The kingdom of Frederick William was reduced to the province of East Prussia and a small part of West Prussia. When negotiations were opened to fix the amount of the war contribution, it was discovered how far apart Napoleon and the Prussians were in their reckoning, although, to deceive the Czar, Financial Napolcon asserted that he asked simply for the amounts levied before the close of the war. The Prussians claimed that the contributions already made in the provinces should be sub- tracted and that only 19,800,000 francs remained due, while the French estimated the balance at 154,500,000. The French claim was one and one-half times the annual income, assuming that Frederick William could dispose of the revenue of the territories left to him at Tilsit. But how could it be paid from the reve- nues of a single province; one, moreover, which had felt the full weight of war? For the months of November and December, 1807, only ten per cent, of the Prussian income came from revenue receipts, the THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 369 remainder being drawn from existing funds, among them what ^^^' was left of an English subsidy. Every element of expenditure, from that of the Court to that of the most obscure branch of I807.12 the service, was severely scrutinized, to discover possible econo- mies. Strong percentages were taken off the higher official sal- aries and appropriations for the army were cut again and again ; but ruin seemed inevitable unless the French could be persuaded to evacuate other provinces, so that all sources of revenue would become available. The desperate situation accounts for the strange willingness of Stein to sign a treaty of alliance with France which should place a large Prussian corps at Napoleon's service, and to agree that Prussia should enter the Confederation of the Rhine. The King's brother was despatched to Paris with the hope that Napoleon might be moved to leniency by such pro- posals, but Napoleon had given the Prussians so many reasons to detest him that these hollow overtures were made in vain. Among the resources considered by Stein the most important was the royal domain, the value of which was estimated at 68,- The 000,000 thalers. If a portion could be sold, it might be possible ^l^^^ to pay the contribution and be rid of the French. Napoleon was willing to take domains to the amount of 45,000,000 francs, but Stein had no desire to find among the troublesome vassals of the King a group of French paladins. He was ready to sell a part of the domain to ordinary purchasers, but the difficulty was to obtain a satisfactory price under the circumstances. There was another possibility. To save noblemen whose fortunes had been compromised in the wars of the eighteenth century, Fred- erick the Great had founded credit societies, of which the noble landowners of a province were members, and which lent money to individual nobles to enable them to restore their estates. The notes of these societies, secured by vast masses of property, easily found purchasers, so that there was no trouble in obtaining money.^ It was now proposed that the royal domains in the several provinces should enter these associations, and that a part of the debt should be paid with the new notes which might then be marketed. The opposition of the nobles, who feared for the effect upon their associations and their own property, was finally overcome by the insistence of the administration, and the do- mains entered the credit societies. By this means Stein was able to obtain 71,000,000 francs towards the payment of the debt. Stein's efforts to reach a settlement in regard to the amount of the war contribution were unavailing until the treaty of Sep- 1 See page 51. 370 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, tember 8, 1808, fixed it at 140,000,000 francs. This was only a , small portion of the sums extracted from the hapless kingdom 1807-12 £qj. ^j^g support of the army of occupation, the replenishment of Napoleon's extraordinary fund, and the enrichment of French officials. Napoleon acknowledged that he obtained a thousand millions, and German historians estimate the amount at two hun- dred millions more. After Napoleon's army was needed for the war in Spain the evil was abated, for the French soldiers re- mained only in Berlin and a few fortress towns, so that the ex- pense of maintenance as well as opportunities of oppression were greatly decreased. Something more was necessary than the payment of the French war contribution. The old monarchy and the old social Projects order had been pitilessly condemned at Jena. Had it been pro- of Re- posed after Tilsit to continue in the beaten paths, few officials would have had the courage to order the sacrifices necessitated by the payment of the contribution. Even before the Peace of Tilsit was signed, Frederick William had asked of Hardenberg a memoir upon the reorganization of the Prussian State. As the weeks passed the need for action became imperative, for in the Polish provinces of Prussia incorporated in the grand duchy of Warsaw a new constitution abolished serfdom. The same step was soon to be taken in Westphalia, which also contained former Hohenzollern lands. Towards these States it was likely that a tide of discontented peasants would turn, if the Prussian states- men proved incapable of vigorous action. And there were other things besides serfdom to be swept away. All except drowsy or stubborn reactionaries realized that the rigid classification of the inhabitants as peasants, citizens, or nobles, must be abolished, implying, as it did, a similarly rigid classification of work and of land and a sharp distinction between town and open country. If independence was to be reconquered it would be by a new Prussia, freed from the trammels of antiquated law and custom, and with plenty of elbow room for hard work. When Stein reached Memel he found a reform decree ready for his approval or for any revision which he might see fit to introduce. The scheme had been drawn up by the Intermediate Commission, and its terms were mainly the work of Schon, a councilor who, as already remarked, was an ardent disciple of the English Adam Smith. The principal change which Stein made was to extend its application to all the lands that remained to the King, the commission having in view only the provinces of East and West Prussia. The ideas of the project were ac- ceptable to the King, who declared, in regard to serfdom, that THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 371 he had been working towards its abolition throughout his reign, ^xxu The fundamental aim of the plan was, in Hardenberg's words, to embody " democratic ideas in a monarchical state " ; that is, I807-12 revolution from above. The part Stein was to play is sug- gested in Hardenberg's remark that " the principal question of all is to what chief the execution [of the plan] is committed, and that unlimited scope . . . should be given to such a leading mind, if only it is equal to the great task." ^ The chance of success would be increased by the prestige of a leader who would not listen to counsels of timidity. A more hesitant statesmanship would invite obstruction from every single interest bound up in the defense of the existing order of things. The great edict was signed October 9, 1807. The first two articles removed the restrictions upon the holding of land and upon the choice of occupation. Although safeguards were The thrown about the acquisition of peasant land, the general prin- ^^°"^*' ciple was laid down that any man, peasant, citizen, or noble, may acquire, without special authorization, any land hitherto called noble, or citizen, or peasant. Work, too, ceased to be classified. The noble might engage in citizen occupations, and the peasant and the citizen might exchange places. It is obvious that in these provisions the newer spirit of economic enterprise burst through the bonds that long had obstructed its action. One of the aims of the commission was to attract capital towards agri- culture. Noble estates, whose owners had become impoverished, and which were unproductive, could now pass into the hands of enterprising burghers or peasants or of other nobles who had money to develop them. Similarly good results must be pro- duced by the freedom of all occupations from social stigma. The nobleman who had strong business instincts might utilize them to the enrichment not merely of himself but of his province. The citizen need not dawdle in some traditional city employment, if he was inclined to be a farmer, but he might acquire peasant land and live among the other peasant farmers. These provisions, however, have not attracted so much atten- tion to the edict as the articles abolishing serfdom, which de- clared that serfs with hereditary claims to their lands were free, and that all others would be in November, 1810. This applied especially to peasants on the estates of the nobles, for little was left of serfdom on the domains of the State. The edict did not specify the obligations from which the peasants were freed. They were not freed from what were called feudal dues; that 2 Seeley, Stein, I. 410. 372 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, is, payments in work, in products, or in money, which were con- nected with their tenure of land ; for it was stated expressly that 1807-12 ^j^gy -^ere still subject "to all the obligations which bind them Difficult as free persons by virtue of the possession of an estate or by Queationa virtue of a special contract." On the other hand, they retained some of the safeguards which the State had previously thrown about them, and as its wards they could not be coerced or even induced to sell their holdings to their landlords except under conditions defined in instructions sent to the provincial au- thorities. The obscurities of the situation were increased by the con- fusion in several provinces between dues paid to a lord as mas- ter and similar dues paid to him as magistrate. Stein, in a memoir which he had prepared before he became a minister, had urged the withdrawal from the nobility of their functions as magistrates; that is, their control of manorial justice, and the performance of such duties by state officials ; but the edict of October 9 did not raise the question. The terms upon which nobles might acquire land of former serfs afifected the ancient policy of preserving peasant holdings in order that the peasant population might not be decreased and that the army might not lack recruits. Several officials felt that it would be contrary to the spirit of the edict, which had introduced freedom in the purchase and sale of land, to place special restrictions upon the acquisition of peasant land, and argued that the peasant as a free man was a better judge as to whether he would gain or lose by selling his rights to his former landlord. When the question of population was raised, they replied that the population was Hkely to increase with better methods of cultivation, but they were willing to concede that, for every peasant-holding the landlord purchased, he be required to establish a cottager provided with three acres. On the mar- gin of this proposition Stein wrote " cessat in totum." His own impulse was to protect all peasant-holdings against pur- chase by former landlords, except in cases where the lords, on account of the devastations of the war, were unable to restore the buildings and restock the farms, or where the holdings were very small. He finally accepted a compromise, which protected long-established tenures, and provided that, in case the newer tenures were consolidated or added to the lord's domain, the lord was to create a peasant farm of equal size, free from all feudal services. Unfortunately this excluded from protection most of the holdings created by the peasant colonizing work of Frederick 11. THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 373 CHAP. XXII 1807-12 If the provisions of the October edict be compared with the work of the Constituent Assembly embodied in the laws of March and May, 1790, it is apparent that their consequences ended where the work of the French reformers began. The prin- Compara- cipal aim of the French legislation was to extinguish the feudal ^^ts of dues as well as to remove every trace of feudal superiority and Prussian substitute state for manorial courts. Even Louis the Sixteenth's ® °^™ declaration of June 23 had promised that the remnants of serf- dom should be destroyed. It should, however, be remembered that Stein did not intend to pause with the work of October, 1807, although he was more deeply interested in administrative or constitutional reform than in social reorganization and the re- hef of the peasants. An important outgrowth of the October reform was an edict doing for the peasants on the domain in East and West Prussia what had in the earlier part of the reign been attempted for the Peasant peasants of Pomerania and the Marks. In this case the State tors'"^ did not ask the peasant to decide whether he would become a proprietor, nor did it demand any payment in return for its aban- donment of its superior property right. Its profit was found in a release from the obligations previously resting upon the ad- ministration of the domain as a proprietor. The peasant would henceforth be obliged to stand on his own feet. As for the feudal dues, three-quarters were to be paid off by installments, leaving one-quarter as a land tax. Schon wanted those who could not go on without state aid to be evicted, but Stein, remem- bering how the peasants had been impoverished by the war, de- cided that the State should continue its help for two years. The final result of this legislation was the creation of over 45,000 peasant proprietors in East and West Prussia and Lithuania. If Stein contemplated similar reforms on the estates of the lords, he did not have time to propose definite plans. The decree of October 9 had improved the situation of the citizens of the towns, destroying their isolation from the other classes, conceding the right to purchase noble or peasant land, and permitting a wider range of choice of occupation. Before complete industrial freedom was established the distinction be- tween town and country, commercial monopolies, and the system of guilds must be removed. Stein made a beginning of these changes, but left their fuller accomplishment to his successors. His most important work for the towns was the restoration of the right of self-government, secured by the decree of November 19, 1808, a few days before his second removal from office. In this municipal corporations act Stein's share was greater 374 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXII Prussian Cities Govern- ment Con- trol than in the Emancipation Edict, but he owed the development of the project especially to the work of a Konigsberg official named Frey. Like other enlightened Konigsbergers, Frey had been led by Kant to admire the work of the Constituent Assem- bly and his project bears upon it marks of the study of the French municipal code of December 14, 1789. Stein's latest bi- ographer, Professor Lehmann, says that it was a " combination of the ideas of the Constituent Assembly with legal relationships which either still existed or had existed in Prussia." ^ The most remarkable thing about the law was that in a group of territories, with different historical origins and differing sys- tems of administration, it applied a uniform method of organiza- tion to all towns having more than 800 inhabitants. Elements of continuity were not lacking and yet the break with the past in many a locality was sharp. The project had at first been de- vised for East and West Prussia, but Stein decided that it was to apply to all the provinces of the King. The details of gov- ernmental machinery were determined by extent of population rather than by the character of special privileges. The towns were divided into great, middle, and small, with a population of 10,000, 3,500, and 800 as the lower limit of the different classes. The inhabitants were to be of two kinds, citizens and residents, although the distinction here was not exactly like that between " active " and " passive " citizens in France. Any one owning a house in town or quahfied to pursue a trade was necessarily a citizen, and even non-residents who paid taxes of a certain amount possessed the privilege of voting. Women could be ad- mitted to citizenship, but not qualified to vote. The citizen's con- trol of municipal affairs must be through a wise use of his vote, for he was not permitted to instruct his representatives in the council, the framers of the law also sharing the prejudice of the Constituent Assembly against instructions to deputies. But the citizen could take a direct part in administrative work, and it was intended that such matters as education, care of the poor, prisons, sanitation, and public buildings should be managed by deputations made up partly of councilors and partly of citizens. The only matter of local administration reserved for more im- mediate state supervision or control was the police. The royal government might appoint a special magistrate to exercise this function or it might delegate the power to the burgomaster. The amount of expenditures for police and justice were also fixed by the State, while other expenditures were to be determined by 3 II. 462. THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 375 the councilors as a representative assembly. The chief official, the " burgomaster," was in a measure a state appointee, for in the " middle " and " small " towns the choice of the representa- tives was to be confirmed by the provincial administration, while in the case of the *' great " towns the representatives were to name three candidates from which the King was to select. It was the management of the police power that opened the door to state interference on a large scale. If the burgomaster repre- sented the State in the matter, he acquired a double relation dif- ficult to manage. The men who framed this law were not of the opinion that the State should be deprived of effective control over local administration. The State retained the power to con- firm new statutes adopted by the council and to inspect the ac- counts of the municipality. The aim of Stein to train the citizens for public affairs and to quicken their sense of responsibihty is seen not merely in the provision that citizens may be appointed on commissions, but also in the fact that there were two kinds of councilors, paid and unpaid, only those being paid who devoted their whole time to the business of administration. It was expected that every pub- lic-spirited citizen would willingly undertake such honorable duties, with permission to retire at the close of three years. Paid councilors were chosen for periods of six, and, in some cases, twelve years. For over forty years this law provided the only semblance of popular government in an absolute State, and, modified by the laws of 1831 and 1853, it still lies at the basis of Prussian munici- pal rule. The reform of municipal administration should have been accompanied by reform for villages, but there Stein would have encountered formidable opposition, because the structure of the rural communities was affected by the jealously guarded police and governmental powers of the nobility. He intended to create provincial estates, and to place at the head of a hierarchy of self-governing bodies an assembly representing the varied in- terests of all communities and authorized to advise in matters of administration, in the levy of taxes, and upon projects of law. According to Stein's own view the most immediate need was a reorganization of the central administration and of the cham- bers or boards which were its agents in the circles or districts. He was particularly anxious to rid the administration of the ills characteristic of bureaucratic government, the interminable cor- respondence between departments, the accumulation of reports, and of official red tape of every sort. His remedy was discussion CHAP. XXII Permar nence of the Be- form 376 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXII A Royal Council among ministers and responsible chiefs of administrative services in an organized cabinet or council. Another crying need was the redistribution of work according to its character, rather than by provinces. The details of the scheme were ready by the close of 1807, but the negotiations about the war contribution absorbed so much of Stein's attention that the plan was not completed before his retirement in November, 1808. His successors, how- ever, put its main features into efifect. The most important change was the creation of a real re- sponsibility on the part of individual ministers, and, especially, of the head of the ministry. This was accomplished by estab- lishing the principle that business was to be laid before the min- isters by the First Minister and that councilors were not to be the agents through whom the King was to act. The importance of the ministers was also increased by abandoning the practice of appointing several men to a single ministry. Stein planned a royal council made up of princes, ministers, and other high officials, meeting under the presidency of the King, which should receive projects of policy or legislation, should discuss them and receive the decision of the King. But Frederick William had an unconquerable aversion to such a method of work, and Stein did not get beyond a " general con- ference," over which he presided and in which were convened heads of departments as well as ministers. The final outcome, after Stein had ceased to be minister, was a ministerial council, nominally under the presidency of the King, although during the ministry of Hardenberg this council played a secondary part. Among the specific reforms which Stein introduced was the separation of justice from administration, a change demanded by public opinion since the days of Montesquieu. The citizen was protected against abuse of power through an appeal to the ordi- nary courts. Another reform was the consolidation of the vari- ous treasuries, which numbered eleven towards the end of the old regime, into a single central treasury. It was no longer the rule, as in the days of Frederick the Great, that no one except the King and, perhaps, a confidential cabinet councilor, under- stood the financial situation of the government. The reform of the local government turned the circles into dis- tricts and the chambers into administrations, which again were divided into sections corresponding to the ministries or parts of ministries. Stein introduced into these administrations small groups of proprietors, chosen by the local estates. Between these administrations and the central government were the " Su- THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 377 perior-presidents," who would have general duties as inspectors ^^^' over one or two provinces. The reorganization of the army was one of the most impor- 1807-12 tant reforms begun during Stein's ministry. Two tasks were The undertaken: first, the punishment of the officers responsible for ^^^ the disgraceful collapse of Prussian resistance in 1806; and, sec- ond, the recasting of the army in a national mold. For the first the King showed more persistence of purpose than for the sec- ond. He appointed a commission of inquiry which pitilessly struck off the army Hst the old, the incompetent, and the dis- graced. Seven officers were condemned to death by military tribunals, although the King did not permit the penalties to be inflicted. Out of 143 generals in 1806 only eight remained on the list six years later and only two commanded in the Wars of Liberation. The significance of this work can be understood if it is remembered that the disgraced officers were nobles and had many relatives and friends among the nobility. Unfortunately the King showed little zeal or comprehension when it came to radical reform, and the first commission on the reorganization of the army contained three conservative members over against the reformers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had grasped the lesson taught by the success of the French Revolutionary armies. They saw that forces of unsuspected magnitude had lain dormant in the life of nations, and that the day was past for an army like that of Frederick, recruited in part from the vagabonds of Europe. With these reformers the King refused to go to the extent of in- troducing universal service, but he gave up the practice of hiring mercenaries and relied upon the cantonal system. The new at- titude toward the Prussian peasant had as its corollary the aboli- tion of cruel and humiliating punishments, and for the majority of the soldiers corporal punishment gave place to imprisonment. A still more important measure was the withdrawal of the ex- clusive privilege of the nobles to be officers in the army. Up till this time the appointment of citizens as officers had been ex- ceptional and irregular. The bulk of the officers were still nobles, but sons of the citizen class could hope for appointment by passing the examinations. Furthermore, the officers ceased to be purveyors for their troops. It was also decided that in time of war the army should live by requisitions and should not be delayed by heavy baggage trains and by the necessity of es- tablishing supply stations. Such was the penury of the government during 1807 and 1808 378 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXII 1807-12 Tbe Kilimper System Kesigna- tion of Stein that the reduction of the army could not be avoided, and only 1,638 out of 7,000 officers remained on the active list, some of these being obliged to accept half pay. In September, 1808, Bonaparte compelled Prussia to sign a treaty limiting the army for ten years to 42,000 and forbidding the organization of a militia. As the reformers cherished the idea of a national up- rising, it was obvious that an army of this size would be too weak to begin the conflict. Scharnhorst solved the problem by devising the Krumper system, in accordance with which the ef- fectives of the regiments were severely reduced and the canton- ists were called to the colors for a month's hard training and then sent home. During festival days officers found them again in their cantons and gave them additional training. In this way before the crisis came Prussia had 150,000 fairly trained soldiers. The remark has been made that, when it was necessary to hood- wink the French, Scharnhorst had as many wrinkles in his con- science as upon his simple face. Stein's ministry closed November 24, 1808. Three times be- fore he finally withdrew he had offered his resignation. He thor- oughly disapproved the policy of the King, illustrated in the ac- ceptance of the Convention of September 8, unless it was done to gain time, because he believed Prussia should make ready to strike when Austria and France should be at war. Indeed, he had felt that the first successes of the Spanish insurrection were the signal for all Prussians to be prepared to rise. Late in the summer his position in the ministry was fatally undermined by the publication of a letter, which the French had intercepted, and in which he said that Spanish affairs were making a Hvely impression in Germany and that it would be useful to spread the news prudently. He expressed the hope that connections could be made in Hesse and Westphalia and added that at Konigsberg war between Austria and France was considered inevitable, and that upon its issue rested the fate of Europe, and, particularly, of Prussia. Napoleon caused the letter to be published in the Moniteur of September 8, with the commentary that the King of Prussia was to be pitied for having such unskilful and per- verse ministers, but he did not demand Stein's dismissal, for his situation at the time was too precarious to run the risk of a re- fusal or of an uprising in northern Germany. He simply util- ized the incident to force the September convention upon the Prussians. The publication of the letter strengthened the ene- mies of Stein, those who looked upon him as a dangerous revo- lutionist, as well as those who disbelieved in the policy of re- sistance. Even Hardenberg advised his dismissal. As these THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 379 withdraw feeling that he retained the King's confidence.* Hardenberg did not follow Stein as principal minister until 1807-12 June, 1810. The crushing burden of the French war contribu- tion kept the intervening ministry from accomplishing anything uniyer- comparable to the work which Stein had undertaken before and ^^\°^ which Hardenberg was to resume afterwards. Scharnhorst was in this ministry, and he continued his work for the army. The most notable achievement was the foundation of the University of Berlin, the result of the effort of William von Humboldt, an- other of the group of ministers. One consequence of the de- feats of 1806 had been the loss of Halle, the seat of one of the three older universities of the King's dominions, and public opin- ion turned towards Berlin, already an intellectual center, as the place in which the work of Halle should be carried on. It was there that in the winter of 1807-8 the philosopher Fichte de- livered his " Addresses to the German Nation," which have been regarded as the prophetic call to the sacrifices of the Wars of Liberation. They were couched in academic language, and therefore escaped the rigors of French censorship, although many feared that Fichte would meet the fate of Palm. Fichte asked why the ancient Germans had resisted Rome, and replied that " To them freedom meant just remaining Germans, con- tinuing to settle their own affairs independently and spontane- ously, according to their own disposition . . . ; while slavery to them meant all the advantages the Romans offered, because they would force them to be something different from German, to be- come half Romans." ^ If the French censor had remembered the use Camille Desmoulins made of Tacitus, he might have con- ceived a suspicion of this philosopher turned historian. In a still plainer passage Fichte declared that " A nation that is cap- able of fixing its eyes firmly on the vision from the spiritual world. Independence, and of being possessed with the love of it, like our earliest ancestors, will assuredly prevail over a nation that is used only as the tool of foreign aggressiveness and for the subjugation of independent nations, like the Roman armies." Humboldt's plans were matured by 1809 and a royal order an- nounced the creation of the university. It is significant that, at a time when the State was too poor to pay in full the salaries of its officers, 150,000 thalers a year were appropriated for the new university. On the teaching staff were men already dis- * Napoleon now issued a decree of proscription against Stein, who took refuge in the Austrian dominions. Seeley, II. 33-34- 38o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE S^?" tinguished, Schleiermacher, Fichte, Savigny, Wolf, and Niebuhr. The University of Breslau was created at the same period out of 1807-12 |-j^g older University of Frankfort-on-the-Oder and a college at Breslau. In building up a newer Prussia the teacher and the investigator were to labor beside the statesman and the soldier. During this period the Court moved back to Berlin, because its continued stay at Konigsberg, on the eastern border of the Hohenzollern dominions, seemed to Napoleon a plain manifesta- tion of distrust and a disagreeable protest against his policy. A few months afterwards Queen Louise, whom Napoleon's insults had made a national heroine, died, broken by the misfortunes of her house and the sufferings of her people. Hardenberg's ministry opened in June, 1810, with large pros- pects of reform. Like Stein he believed that the Prussian State Harden- needed a complete regeneration, but he did not seek as much as Ministry Stein the cooperation of the citizens, desiring to reorganize the administration in such a way as to strengthen the action of the State. He ventured to attack the local governing powers of the nobles by his gendarmerie edict, which placed in the circles or dis- tricts a director with some of the powers of a French prefect, but in the face of the opposition of the nobles he was obliged to recede. His treatment of the question of a national parlia- ment illustrated his attitude towards one of the ultimate aims of Stein. The first body in any sense representative was a small assembly composed mainly of crown nominees, officials, nobles, townsmen, and peasants, which sat for several months in 181 1. A second body, meeting a year later, was equally small, but was chosen in the provinces. Each was regarded simply as an in- termediary between the government and the people, although the first assembly was permitted to modify Hardenberg's plans of peasant reform. The financial question was of immediate importance, and in dealing with this Hardenberg took a long step towards the de- struction of the privileges and exemptions characteristic of the old regime and which hindered an effective increase in the gov- ernmental income. He did not venture to touch the exemption of noble land from the old land tax or " contribution," but he abolished exemptions from the operation of the excise and the tariff laws. The excise was extended from the towns to the country, and, while it increased the already heavy burdens of the peasants, it rendered possible the development of manufactures outside the town limits and broke down the old barrier between town and open country. He also removed restrictions from in- ternal trade and established industrial freedom in place of the form THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA 381 old guild system. As in France, this was accomplished by sub- ^^jj' stituting the payment of a tax called a patent for the previous conditions of entry into trade or the mechanic arts. The need I807-12 of a larger revenue led him to institute an oppressive milHng tax, and forbid the use of handmills, with the consequence that in some places the peasants could not afiford to eat bread; but after a few months the tax was modified and he adopted the plan of income taxes, which he had once opposed. His most interesting effort undertook to solve the problem which Stein had indicated in the edict of October, 1807, although, as in the case of taxation, what he accomplished was far smaller a New than either his principles or his proposals called for. The peas- o/*peas- ants had been freed from serfdom by the October edict, but, ^^^^®- except on the royal domain, nothing had been done about the dues by which they were still burdened. It was now proposed, first, to concede to the peasants who held land by an hereditary or life tenure the proprietorship of their holdings, and, second, to determine whether the lord or the peasant was the loser through the complete abandonment of the old system. The lord lost services, but was relieved of duties, and in some cases might gain more than he would lose by the change. If so, he should pay the peasant the difference. In most cases the peasant would be the gainer and must pay the lord an indemnity. This project did not contemplate any change in the relations of the lord and of those peasants who did not possess at least hf e tenure, although the lord might give such a peasant half his holding free from dues and annex the rest. Where indemnity was due, the peas- ants could pay in money or in land ; that is, they might abandon a portion of the holding in order to retain the remainder in full property and free from burdensome dues. This project suffered material transformation through the in- fluence of the assembly of notables, before which it was laid in 181 1. In the first place, the most numerous class of peasants, who enjoyed simply a life tenure, was grouped with simple rent- ers. Secondly, the right of proprietorship was not conceded until the balance of gain and loss had been determined. The most important change was the assumption that the peasants in all cases owed the lords an indemnity amounting to one-third of the holding. If an arrangement was reached between the peas- ants of the second class and the lords, the peasants were to give up half of the holding. Even in this form, embodied in the edict of September 14, 181 1, the revolution might be hailed as the end of an outworn and oppressive system ; but the publication of the edict did not close the affair. Little was done in the months that 382 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXII Attitude of the People followed, on account of the outbreak of the French war with Russia. As the years went on the lords steadily recovered the influence of which the calamities of 1806 and 1807 had deprived them and pressed for a declaration which should restrict the number of holdings affected by the plan. They were suc- cessful in 1816, when a declaration restricted the application of the edict to the larger holdings, and, even in their case, to those only about which Stein had placed special safeguards. At the same time those safeguards were withdrawn and the peasant was left to deal as best he could with his former master, who retained the powers of a magistrate. The consequence was that the lords utilized the coveted opportunity to enlarge their estates and that many peasants were made landless. The effort for reform of which the Prussian peoples and lead- ers were capable in the hour of defeat and under the burden of foreign military occupation showed that the moral strength of these north Germans should not be estimated by the ease with which Napoleon's armies overran the country in 1806. Side by side with this effort developed a passionate desire to drive out the oppressor. Stein was the real interpreter of the nation's aspirations in 1808, and the luckless Colonel Schill was not re- garded as a traitor, but as a hero who had died gloriously. Brunswick's ride across Germany, and the joy with which he was hailed in his old domains, had revealed the sentiments of the people. The poems and letters of the day make them still clearer. Napoleon's influence had waned and his control would be gone as soon as a great disaster should render him less terrifying. CHAPTER XXIII THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE THE influence of France during the Napoleonic era cannot chap. be grasped fully without a study of its more permanent social and political consequences for the countries lying beyond I800-12 the borders of the old Bourbon kingdom. Peoples whose main concern was defense against the aggressions of the new Charle- magne were unable to undertake long series of important re- forms, even if to them the very name of reform was not dis- credited by its association with the deeds of the French revolutionists and their imperial continuator. The story of re- form during this period in Austria, Russia, and Great Britain may therefore soon be told. In countries more immediately under the influence of the French the reforms were well nigh as thorough-going as in France herself, although effected in a different manner. In none was the work equal in far reaching results to what was accomplished in Prussia by Stein, Harden- berg, and their friends. Upon the lands of the Hapsburgs during the whole period fell the weight of French attack. The English were more persistent Austria enemies, but, except indirectly through Hanover, they could not be reached by French armies. The territorial losses of Austria would have been disastrous for a less loosely organized group of lands, and the financial strain might have overwhelmed an industrial State in similar circumstances. For Austria the con- sequences were greater poverty and a closer dependence upon English subsidies. The principal political change was the as- sumption by Francis I of the title of Hereditary Emperor of Austria two years before he was obliged by Napoleon to give up his imperial title in Germany. The Emperor Francis was an industrious plodder. The ad- ministration was so badly organized that affairs which minor officials should have decided were referred to him, and it is said that at one time two thousand reports were piled on his table awaiting attention. His policy may be " summed up in the word immobility." It is not astonishing that the nephew of Marie Antoinette should fear popular movements. Count Stadion, his principal minister from 1805 to 1809, seemed likely to lend a 383 384 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^m revolutionary color to the acts of the government. He was friendly to Stein and the Prussian reformers, and did what he 1800-12 could to give the campaign of 1809 the attitude of a national uprising. The collapse of that movement caused his withdrawal and in his place was appointed Count Metternich, a man of great diplomatic talents, who could discover and formulate excellent reasons for the policy which Francis instinctively followed. The work for the serfs which Joseph II had begun, and which Leo- pold had been inchned to pursue, was not resumed, and the con- dition of the peasantry was not materially changed until the Revolution of 1848. The fear of peasant revolts led the Hun- garian nobles to be submissively loyal and to consent to increases in the army and in the revenues of the Crown. They fought with genuine national enthusiasm at Essling and Wagram. Alexander I, Czar of Russia, in his early years had admired Russia the French' Revolution, and even after he became emperor he called the four confidential advisers who counseled him to under- take fundamental reforms his '* Committee of Public Safety." One of these friends remarked afterwards, when illusions had vanished, that the Emperor " loved the forms of liberty as one loves the theater," and that " he would have consented willingly that everybody should be free on the condition that everybody should voluntarily do his will alone." The consequence was that the only serious reform during these years was a much-needed reorganization of the central administration, the substitution of a ministry divided into eight departments for boards and for officials with the powers of satraps. The new department of " public instruction," created at a time when not even France possessed one, accomplished important results in the establish- ment of three new universities, including the University of St. Petersburg. The Emperor entertained the project of transform- ing the senate, a body of officials clothed with mixed adminis- trative and judicial powers, into a council sharing with him the work of legislation, but when it ventured to protest against one of his measures it was promptly rebuked for meddling. He also seriously considered the question of freeing the serfs, without, however, planning to concede to them the proprietorship of the land they cultivated, but he only issued a decree forbidding peas- ants to be sold separately from the estates and limiting the num- ber of blows which might be inflicted upon them in punishment. Even these measures were not carried into effect. Alexander later came under the influence of an able administrator named Speranski, the son of a parish priest, who hoped not merely to free the serfs but also to give Russia a hierarchy of deliberative THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 385 CHAP. XXTTI assemblies or dumas, each composed of delegates from the body next below, but he was driven from office by an opposition of nobles. The blame for the lack of progress in a reign which *'*""'^' opened with such promise must fall mainly upon this opposition, which Alexander had to reckon with, if he would avoid the fate of his father. One of the strange consequences of the Peace of Tilsit was a change of dynasty in Sweden. The Swedes refused to accede Sweden to Napoleon's Continental System without a struggle and Alex- ander declared war upon them, compelling them to surrender Finland as well as to join the combination against Great Britain. They vented their rage upon King Gustavus IV, who had proved unequal to his task, and a military insurrection in March, 1809, led to his deposition. His successor had no direct heir and the Swedes took the novel course of proposing the adoption of Mar- shal Bernadotte, who had made a favorable impression upon them while he commanded in northern Germany. Napoleon gave a reluctant consent and in 1810 Bernadotte became Prince Royal of Sweden. Upon England the effect of the desperate struggle with Na- poleon was to strengthen the conservative reaction which had England been originally provoked by Jacobin violence. Even attempts to reform the cruel penal code with its long list of death penalties were regarded as showing a dangerous spirit of innovation. In 1810 when Sir Samuel Romilly's bill to " abolish capital pun- ishment for the crime of stealing privately to the amount of five shillings in a shop " was before the House of Lords, he was re- proached with having been the " author of the act, passed two years ago, to abolish the punishment of death for the crime of picking pockets. . . .'* ^ The political situation is illustrated by the fact that the Tories were in control of parliament not only during the war, with the exception of one year, but also for fif- teen years afterward. Beyond the walls of parliament liberal ideas seemed to be gaining new adherents. In 1802 Sidney Smith, Jeffrey, and Brougham founded the Edinburgh Review, which became the great champion of liberalism. William Cob- bett in his Political Register appealed to a more democratic con- stituency. Jeremy Bentham, the political philosopher, lent his prestige in the unequal contest against triumphant Toryism. The period did not pass without some important laws. One of the most significant was the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, for it prophesied the abolition of slavery also. Its pas- 1 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly, II, 332, 386 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XZIII sage indicated that the planters no longer wielded the influence they once possessed. The first of the long series of Factory Acts was equally significant. It aimed to prevent slavery of a new kind from becoming established in England as one of the incidental results of the introduction of the factory system. Mill owners, who often had difficulty in obtaining enough hands from the neighborhood, hit upon the plan of taking children from the poorhouses of the large cities. They agreed to feed, clothe, and educate the children, but they often shamefully neglected these wards. The hours of labor were long — in many cases four- teen — and the children were frequently forced to work on night shifts. It was such abuses that the Act sought to check. The high cost of living, which was one of the consequences of the war, caused great suffering among the common people. From 1809 to 18 13 the price of wheat averaged 107 shillings a quarter. This was in spite of the fact that five million acres were added to the cultivated land of England and Wales before the war was over. Indeed, the increase in the amount of land put under the plow was indirectly a cause of suffering, for it frequently meant the loss by the poorer villagers of rights of pasturage which they had hitherto possessed. If they received a small sum of money in compensation, this was soon exhausted. Their misfortunes did not come singly, since spinning and weav- ing and other village industries were being transferred to the towns or at least to villages which possessed good water-power. The burden of taxation which all classes had to bear became almost intolerable. The finance minister declared in 181 1: " There is not an article of dress — boots, shoes, leather, breeches, etc., — not an article in the house — locks, keys, bells, etc., — which has not been recommended to him as objects of taxation." The public debt rose to the stupendous figure of £800,000,000, with an annual interest charge of £30,000,000, Bank notes fell to a discount of nearly fourteen per cent. The leaders who real- ized the cost of the struggle with Napoleon may, perhaps, be pardoned because they declined to increase the number of un- certain factors by entering upon a series of reforms. Their mo- tives, however, were not always unselfish nor do they seem to have used much boldness of conception in determining what might, and what would not, add to the dangers and confusion of the situation. In striking contrast to the laggard steps of Austria and Rus- sia, and even of England, was the feverish activity of those sub- ject to Napoleon's authority, or within his sphere of influence, although measurably independent in the management of their THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 387 internal affairs. It is true that several members of the Rhenish ^j^' Confederation successfully guarded their borders from the in- roads of change, but they lay in central and northern Germany I800-12 and not directly under the master's eye. To obtain a clear un- derstanding of the situation it is necessary to recall the political geography of Europe at the close of 1810, when the Napoleonic process of state-building reached its climax. In Napoleonic Europe lay everything from the borders of Russia and Austria to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The limits of the French empire had recently been pushed Napo- both northward and southward. In the north the annexation of Europe Holland, after the abdication of Napoleon's brother Louis, had been followed by the seizure of the northwestern coast of Ger- many, made up of the Hanseatic towns, the duchy of Oldenburg, the northern part of the electorate of Hanover, and a portion of those Prussian provinces which had originally gone to the creation of the kingdom of Westphalia. Their historic past was hardly suggested by new departmental names like " Western Ems," " Upper Ems," and " Mouths of the Elbe." In the south, beyond Piedmont, annexed in the days of the Republic, Genoa had been added in 1805, Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany three years later, and the Patrimony of St. Peter in 1809. Parma be- came the department of the Taro, Tuscany the departments of the Arno, Ombrone, and Mediterranee, and the remnant of the papal state the departments of Trasimene and of Rome. At this time Napoleon also ruled directly over the kingdom of Italy, to which, since its establishment in 1805, had been added Venetia, Italian Tyrol, and the northern part of the Papal states. Be- yond the Adriatic he administered the Illyrian Provinces, includ- ing Dalmatia and parts of Carinthia, Carniola, and Croatia. When Murat was transferred to Naples Napoleon became ruler of Berg. The States he controlled through members of his im- perial family were Spain, Naples, and Westphalia. As the crea- tor of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and because its most power- ful official was his " Resident," his will there also was law, although the nominal ruler was the new King of Saxony. He was Mediator in Switzerland, and Protector in the Rhenish Con- federation. The Confederation contained all the princes of Ger- many except the King of Prussia, but the number was small as a result of the secularizations of 1803, of the mediatizations of 1806, and of the readjustments of 1807. Within the Confedera- tion there was some territory which like Erfurt was occupied by French troops for military purposes and never received a civil organization. THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXIII In the lands annexed to France it is natural to look for a more complete realization of the Napoleonic program. Even there a distinction should be made between regions like the left bank of the Rhine, which had been occupied since 1794, and of which the departmental organization had been complete since September, 1802, and Northwestern Germany, annexed in December, 1810, where the intermediate commission completed the work of re- organization only a few months before the collapse of the empire began. The process of assimilation was necessarily slow, and, in the case of the latest annexations, the changes were slight and temporary, and the period one of confusion rather than of prog- ress. It seemed a simple matter to declare that the feudal sys- tem was abolished, but to determine the legal consequences and to adjust conflicting claims was another affair. In the Rhine country ten years elapsed after the first occupation before the mode of dealing with these questions was determined clearly. In Italy connection with the empire had most chance of justi- fying itself in Piedmont, annexed in 1802. The benefits of annexation were mixed, even from the point of view of those who regarded the French system of civil equality as far superior to the debris of historic rights, privileges, and oppressions which it swept away. On the one hand there were the French codes and new judicial organization, the admirable system of public works, the stimulus which came from connec- tion with a great State, the center of European action; on the other hand were the conscription, or blood tax, a heavier burden of taxation, and the more rigid enforcement of the Continental System. Annexation did not always bring immediate access to the French market. Moreover, habits of trade are not readily established, so that no large amount of trade developed between the Rhenish departments and the interior of France, and the customs frontier along the Rhine served mainly as an obstacle in the trade with Germany which they still continued to carry on, while their commerce down the Rhine was ruined by the Continental System. No magic in the formulae of annexation could make over Ger- mans, Dutchmen, and Italians into Frenchmen, and the practical problem of adjusting the new system to the old always remained. ^ In dealing with the Piedmontese, the Tuscans, and the Romans, a special effort \!vas made to conciliate their pride as peoples with a separate history. This Napoleon could do and at the same time provide a splendid position for two of his sisters and as- sociate his son's name with that medieval empire of which he declared his to be the successor. Camillo Borghese, husband to THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 389 Pauline Bonaparte, was made governor-general of the depart- ^^fj ments beyond the Alps, with actual jurisdiction over Piedmont and Genoa and with a capital at Turin. A similar government I800-12 was set up in Florence for Elise Bonaparte, who had married Pascal Bacciocchi, and who now styled herself Grand Duchess of Tuscany. After his second marriage, Napoleon caused the promulgation of a senatus consulte declaring that the future prince imperial should be called King of Rome and providing that Rome should be the second city of the empire. Rome was also to have a senate of 60 members, nominally in charge of the business of the city. Neither this arrangement nor the provision for his sisters prevented the strict administration of the Italian departments like other departments of France. The question of language was also important. In the Hanse- atic departments the solution was a version of the codes in both languages and the simultaneous use of both in court proceedings and important administrative documents. In Piedmont French was official. The governmental newspaper, the Courier de Turin, was published in both languages. In Tuscany and Rome Italian continued to be authorized. Indeed, in Rome the government affected to encourage the cultivation of Italian by the offer of prizes for the best productions in prose or verse. The fate of Holland was harder than that of any other an- nexed territory. Although the Dutch tongue was not driven Holland from official usage, and Amsterdam was declared the third city of the empire, almost everything that might recall the ancient constitution and local peculiarities of the United Netherlands was changed. The two most important departments, with capitals at Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were administered by Belgians. The conscription was enforced rigorously. The rate of taxa- tion was pushed up until it equaled thirty florins per inhabi- tant, and the income of sixty millions was expended principally on dockyards, ships, and soldiers. Books were subjected to a rigid censorship. It was small compensation for such a regime that Dutchmen were to sit in the French Senate, Legislative Body, and Council of State; but it did not last long, for within three years French control was ended. In the countries outside the empire but governed by Napoleon or by members of his family the program of reform was not essentially different. Whether the history of Naples or of West- Dependent phalia, of the grand duchy of Berg or of the lUyrian Provinces or of the kingdom of Italy be considered, there are certain con- stant features, although the success with which they were intro- duced varied with the circumstances and the previous condition states 190 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, of the people. The dependent relation of these lands was also made evident, occasionally in ways that were painful. 1800-12 All such allied peoples were obliged to endure the presence and provide for the support of bodies of French troops. The French army in the kingdom of Italy cost the budget of that State 30,- 000,000 francs a year. In Westphalia, a smaller kingdom, 12,500 French troops were maintained at a cost of ten millions, and it was also stipulated that 6,000 other Frenchmen should serve in the Westphalian army. Even in Naples, under the rule of Napoleon's ablest cavalry leader, Joachim Murat, where the finances could ill support the burden, a large French contingent was stationed. Naples and the other Napoleonic states were also obliged to furnish expeditionary forces to take part at their own expense in Napoleon's campaigns. The presence of a French army might be defended on the ground that the local troops were not strong enough to give sta- bility to their governments, but another form of tribute had even less color of right or reason. Napoleon continued the practice of reserving in newly created states a part, sometimes a half, sometimes even a larger amount, of the princely domains from the revenues of which he replenished his extraordinary fund kept in the Tuileries, or endowed his generals. In the case of Hanover, he took practically all the domains, but in Westphalia one-half. Even the little grand duchy of Frankfort paid him annually 600,000 francs on domains in Fulda and Hanau and provided an endowment for the dukes of Eckmiihl and Wagram, made illustrious in the campaign of 1809. WestphaHa was un- fortunate enough also to have charged against it a heavy war contribution, because it had been once territory of the king of Prussia and the elector of Hesse-Cassel. Napoleon also levied contributions in works of art, according to the practice which he learned from Revolutionary France. From the galleries at Cas- sel, for example, he took no fewer than 299 pictures, one of which, by Leonardo da Vinci, did not have the good fortune to be safely guarded in the Louvre until a better day should re- store it to its place. Against these darker aspects of French domination must be placed the undoubted benefits of constructive reform. Wherever French control was undisputed the remnants of the feudal regime and its oppressions were swept away. No country needed reform more than the kingdom of Naples, in which lin- gered over a thousand kinds of feudal dues. The Neapolitan lords took little interest in the peasants, abandoning their estates to the management of stewards. Not only was feudalism abol- THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE ished when Joseph Bonaparte became King, but steps were taken to sell the royal domains, divide communal property, and break up large private estates by annulling the right of primogeniture and the right of entail. Although this work was hardly begun when Joseph was transferred to Spain, it was pushed forward under Murat by a commission, directed by Giuseppe Zurlo, the minister of the interior. The case of Westphalia illustrates a different application of the same principles. The German depu- ties who were summoned to Paris to behold King Jerome, their new monarch, and state their wishes, feared that noble rights would be treated as they had been in France by the Convention, and petitioned that the lords should receive compensation for the loss of agricultural services. Their wishes were respected, and, although the new constitution of Westphalia abolished serf- dom, later laws provided that only such dues were abolished without indemnity as were neither defined by contract nor re- corded on the rolls of the estate, besides marriage-dues and heriots, and the obligation of domestic service. Others were made redeemable, but the peasants were too poor to purchase reUef from services, and the legislation did little to decrease the power of the lords. A still greater benefit was the introduction of the French codes and of French judicial procedure. It is true that laws are an outgrowth of the needs of a people, the result of a large The body of local experience, and that it is not generally advisable to force the legal customs of one people upon another ; but, when custom loses its flexibility and becomes a heavy yoke, any event which weakens it even temporarily may be looked upon as progress. In some cases the French system, once introduced, lasted for many years and became the basis for a permanent settlement of law and procedure. It survived the Napoleonic regime in Naples and was extended to Sicily. In Holland, the later Belgium, in Baden, in part of Switzerland, and in Russian Poland its main features were also preserved. This meant not only civil equality, but also a just recognition of the rights of persons accused of crime, and an abolition of cruel punishments. The Westphalian deputies petitioned that the civil code should not be introduced for three years, but their prayer was not granted, and within three years the code was working as smoothly as if it had been made expressly for Westphalians, so skilful was the French administrator Simeon in establishing the new order of affairs. Although French control increased the burden of expenditure, it brought with it a reorganization of financial systems, so that CHAP, XXIII 1800-12 French Codes THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXIII the heavier burden was more evenly distributed and could be carried. In Westphalia the system " displayed for the first time in Germany the leading principles of enlightened finance." With the disappearance of the guild system came the tax called in France the " patent." The land tax v^as heavy, but it v^^as free from the ancient abuse of exemptions. The tariff was low, and, except in the case of iron and copper, was designed to raise a revenue and not to protect local industries. The attempt to introduce the French plan of personal property taxes did not succeed as well. In the kingdom of Italy, Prina displayed as- tonishing energy in raising unprecedented sums of money, the budget being nearly doubled in the seven years from 1805 to 1812. Some of his expedients, like the milling tax, were bur- densome, not to say oppressive, but his work had the merit of bringing order out of confusion and establishing an equilibrium between receipts and expenditures without resort to loans. In Naples Roederer had similar success in more than balancing a heavy budget. The public debt was reduced out of the proceeds of the sale of monastic property. For over a hundred kinds of direct taxes, resting almost wholly upon the poor, he substituted a single land tax, from the payment of which none was exempt. The work accomplished by such men as Simeon in Westphaha, Beugnot in Berg, Prina in Italy, and Roederer in Naples, should soften the memory of the exactions which were always incidents of French rule. The kingdom of Italy was the most successful of Napoleon's creations beyond the confines of France. Its name embodied an aspiration of the enlightened Italians, and they were filled with enthusiasm when its borders were enlarged by the addition in 1806 of the territory of Venetia. Even the burdens laid upon the country had incidental advantages. It is said that, although the Lombards were taxed more heavily than under the mild rule of Maria Theresa and her sons, they learned to practise economy and emerged from the experience richer than before. The young men were at first disinclined to bear arms, but became excellent soldiers after they had been subjected to discipline and proved their courage and skill on many a battlefield. They never for- got the days of triumph under the star of their emperor-king, and men are still living who have seen the aged veterans of those wars weep at the very mention of the great leader's name. The opposition of the middle class to the conscription was weakened by the concession that substitutes could be furnished. The sons of the richer men were expected to join the royal guard or some other select corps. By 1812 Italy had an army of 80,000, with THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 393 a highly trained body of officers. Through this comradeship in ^j^" arms men from Lombardy, Venetia, Modena, or the March of Ancona, learned a common sentiment of loyalty to Italy. Local I800-12 feeling with its narrow fidelities was fast disappearing. The completion of important roads also rendered easier com- munication between different parts of Italy and between Italy and France. After five years' labor the Simplon road was finished. In commemoration of the event a triumphal arch was erected in Milan, the termination of the route. The harbor of Venice was improved and more securely fortified. The attempt was made to develop agriculture through training in special schools. Furthermore, an example was given of a well ordered state, en- dowed with a highly developed administrative system, drawing upon all the resources of its scattered communities, and dealing with its citizens according to clearly defined principles of law, the same for the noble as for the peasant who had once been his serf, and holding out to all the promise of equal access to the offices of the State. All this was valuable preparation for the movement later in the century which was to bring about the unification of Italy. In this and other ways Napoleon's government showed the better qualities of enlightened despotism. But criticism was not tolerated. An editor who gave untimely announcement of the seizure of Tuscany was thrust into an insane asylum, and the new legislature which ventured to criticize the first budget was dismissed, never to be summoned again. In the government Napoleon was represented by his step-son, Eugene de Beauhar- nais, as viceroy. Prince Eugene was an able general, a man of attractive personality, full of excellent aims, but he labored in everything to serve his master, and the welfare of the Italians was a secondary consideration. The work of reform in Naples would have been more thor- ough had not Bonapartist rule remained from the first precarious. Naples When Joseph entered Naples in February, 1806, the principal solicitude of the inhabitants was lest his rule might be as brief as that of the Parthenopean Republic in 1799 and might offer the Bourbon monarchs another chance to exact a bloodthirsty vengeance. It was several months before the fortress of Gaeta surrendered, and in July the French army in Calabria was de- feated by an English force brought over from Sicily. The Eng- lish had also seized the island of Capri, just outside the Bay of Naples, and held this until October, 1808, when Murat captured it by a brilliant feat of arms. In 1809 again a large force of British, while the French were weakened by the campaign about 394 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXIII Spain The Illyrian Provinces Vienna, moved up the coast from Sicily, ostensibly to overthrow the kingdom, and captured the island of Ischia. The news of Austrian defeat at Wagram prompted the retreat of the expe- dition before any serious attack had been made upon Naples. Joseph's reign at Madrid was not as productive of good results, for its history is principally recorded in the series of victories and defeats beginning with the capitulation of Baylen and ending five years later with the disastrous overthrow at Vittoria. Na- poleon had not forgotten to promulgate a constitution at the out- set, the first that modern Spain received ; but, even if this con- stitution had been more liberal, it would not have suited the Spaniards, because it came from the hands of the man who had basely tricked them as well as their princes. Joseph's reign was of consequence only in the national movement which it provoked. One feature of this movement, much heard of in the later his- tory of Spain and Italy, was the Constitution of 1812. The loyal Spaniards had been obliged to take refuge in Cadiz, where their cause was nominally under the control of a central junta and later of a "committee of regency." In 1810 an extraordi- nary cortes was elected, delegates coming even from parts of Spain overrun by the French armies. After two years this cor- tes promulgated a constitution, which was liberal except in its refusal to tolerate any religion other than the Roman Catholic. A legislature, or ordinary cortes, was chosen in 1813, and at the beginning of the next year took up its work in Madrid which had been evacuated by the French. From these events date the struggle for liberal institutions in Spain. Another Mediterranean land, the Illyrian Provinces, felt the effects of Bonapartist rule, since after 1809 they were imperial territory, although not formally annexed to France. Most of them — Croatia, Carniola, Carinthia, and Istria — had long been parts of the Hapsburg dominions, Dalmatia had belonged to Venice, and Ragusa had been a republic. Marmont, one of Na- poleon's ablest marshals, became governor-general, and the French system was introduced with discrimination, the princi- ples of August 4th being hardly appHcable to Military Croatia. The chief benefits of French control were the suppression of brigandage, the construction of roads, like the coast road between Zara and Spalatro, and the organization of public education. Marmont's name is still remembered in the region and many a town has named a street or square for him. Unfortunately along with benefits went heavy taxation and the oppressions of the Continental System. Germany did not escape being treated as a part of the Bona- THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 395 parte family domain. The first example had been the grant of ^^„ the duchies of Cleves and Berg in 1806 to Murat, Napoleon's brother-in-law. This State soon became a grand duchy, and re- I800-12 ceived after Tilsit a portion of Prussia's lands west of the Elbe. Berg After Murat was transferred to Naples, it remained vacant for a year and was then ruled in the name of King Louis Napoleon's son, Napoleon Louis. From this time forward it was practically a part of the Napoleonic Empire in the narrower sense of the term, but without the advantages which generally came from an- nexation, especially access to the French market. A second ex- ample was Westphalia, made up at first of the remainder of west- the Prussian Westphalian provinces, the duchy of Brunswick, p^^"* and the electorate of Hesse-Cassel. The King of Westphalia was Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome, who received his appoint- ment immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Tilsit. Hardly less dependent upon Napoleon was the grand duchy of Frankfort, composed of Frankfort, the county of Hanau and the former bishopric of Fulda, finally constituted in 1810 for Dalberg, Prince Primate of the Rhenish Confederation. There were also marriage alliances which signalized the influence of Napoleon over other States — the marriage of Prince Eugene and the daughter of the King of Bavaria, of King Jerome and the daughter of the King of Wiirttemberg, of the heir of the grand duke of Baden and the niece of the Empress Josephine. A French program of reform was not the only thing that gave to the kingdom of Westphalia the character of a dependency of Napoleonic France. Another illustration was the concurrent use of the French language in official procedure. The delegates of the new kingdom, who visited Paris in August, 1807, had peti- tioned Napoleon for the exclusive use of German, but they had to be satisfied with a mixed system. The official text of decrees was French, although the text of the civil code was German. In each case it was accompanied by a translation. Debates in the Council of State were in French, but German was used in the courts and in the legislature. Certain ministries used French, others German. German officials on the whole occupied the offices, although several important posts were held by French- men. The crowds of adventurers who descended upon the cap- ital of the kingdom were soon discontented and went away. The constitution was an adaptation of the constitution of the French empire. There was no tribunate, for this body had al- oonstitu- ready disappeared from the French constitution, and in its place ^^^°_^ a commission of the legislators with a delegation of the Council phaiia of State discussed measures. The legislature, or " estates," was 396 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^f j not constituted as in France; of the loo members, 70 were to be landed proprietors, 15 merchants or manufacturers, and 15 1800-12 j^gj^ distinguished by learning or practical achievement. Dis- trust of democracy was shown by the fact that the electors who chose the legislators were appointed by the King for life. In spite of such an origin the Westphalian estates at the first ses- sion ventured to throw out a bill in order to compel a modifica- tion of an obnoxious article. Under the advice of the judicious Simeon the Council of State showed itself ready to introduce the necessary amendments and the bill was passed by 83 to 7. The local government was patterned after the French system, with departments and prefects. Little lasting opposition was shown to the new regime, although the change of government had been resented in the Prussian provinces and in Hesse. If the experi- ment cannot be regarded as a success, it was due to the personal qualities of the King, who dissipated the public resources, and to the heavy demands made upon the kingdom by Napoleon, its real ruler. By 1812 it was necessary to resort to practices that savored of the methods of the French Directory, the repudiation of two-thirds of the old debt and the levy of a forced loan. The benefits of the French regime had less chance in Westphalia than elsewhere of being permanent, because the State was an artificial creation, which would fall apart into its former elements as soon as the power of Napoleon, the external compelling force of union, should be destroyed. Napoleon's principal interest in the other lands of the Rhen- ish Confederation was in their ability to contribute men to his armies, and he did not regard the Confederation as a State, but rather as a group of states, acting together in foreign affairs, Ehenish and independently in the administration of local affairs. This aH^***^" ^^^ "°^ prevent occasional meddling on his part. The rulers utilized the support he was ready to give as an opportunity to reorganize their administrative systems and to sweep away the inequalities and oppressions which hindered the work of a mod- ern government. None of the larger northern states conceded much to French influence, although the King of Saxony as grand duke of Warsaw countenanced the application of the French program among his Polish subjects. In Baden, Wiirttemberg, and Bavaria the policies adopted after the annexations of 1803 were carried out more thoroughly. The result was accomplished in Baden with some respect for historic rights, but with brutal severity in Wurttemberg. The story is told of King Freder- ick of Wiirttemberg that when he complained to Napoleon that the local estates raised all sorts of difficulties in his way, the ation THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 397 general of Brumaire exclaimed, " Drive the stupid creatures chap. away." Frederick took the hint, and the loss to the kingdom was not serious, because the South German diets were hardly i8oo-i2 better than coteries of privileged persons. The work accomplished in Bavaria was in scope and impor- tance hardly second to that done in Prussia. This was due mainly to the clear-sighted and forceful leadership of Montgelas. The problem before the Bavarians was complex. The older Bavaria Bavaria had been hardly more than a group of lordships and cities united by a common bond of allegiance to the Elector, whose sovereignty was not complete, for he in turn owed duties to the Emperor, the head of the Holy Roman Empire. The power of the Elector was also hedged in by the prerogatives of the Church, whose supremacy in Bavaria had been unquestioned since the sixteenth century. To this situation, already sufficiently complicated, were added new elements by the annexations of 1803 and 1806. By that time, however, the government had made some progress in the direction of reform. The exclusive privileges of the Church had been taken away, but the plan of transforming the Bavarian Catholic Church into a national Church, no part of which should be subject to outside bishops or archbishops, had not been carried out. The negotiations with the Pope for a special concordat dragged on without result all through the period. In the reorganization of the State Montgelas was more suc- cessful, aided by the fact that in 1805 the Elector became a king and that in 1806 he was relieved of his relation of vassalage to Montgelas the empire. A year later Montgelas issued an edict affirming the principle of equality of taxation and depriving the provincial estates of all right to meddle with the assessment or collection of taxes. In 1808 a new constitution, modeled on that of West- phalia, was proclaimed, which among other things promised a national assembly. The promise remained without perform- ance, and yet the seed was sown and the fruit might appear at some future time. For the older provinces were substituted cir- cles, marked out, as the French departments, to satisfy geo- graphical considerations. Although the system of taxation was wisely arranged, and an appraisement of landed property was completed, the finances of the new State were never equal to the burdens imposed by the connection with France. The ex- penses were about four times the receipts. This was one reason why the government was obliged to give up the policy of a low tariff introduced in 1799. The main reason was, however, Na- poleon's Continental System, to which Bavaria was obliged to 398 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 9^f{ adhere. In connection with this part of the financial adminis- tration the most significant change was the abolition of pro- 1800-12 vincial customs frontiers and the substitution of a single system for the whole country, a reform accomplished earlier than in any other German State. Montgelas did not aboHsh feudal dues, nor manorial courts, nor guilds, but he succeeded in correcting the arbitrariness of both landlords and guild-masters, besides de- priving them of their most injurious privileges. He also re- organized education, making it compulsory and freeing it from the control of the Church. The universities were consolidated and the principle was laid down that investigation should be un- hampered. The defect in the work of reform was the tendency to excessive centralization, which treated local institutions simply as parts of a great machine instead of instruments to facilitate vigorous local activities. The success of Montgelas and his ad- visers excited the envy of the Austrian statesman Metternich, who wrote that Bavaria's religious, civil, political and military revolution, accomplished with such boldness and persistence, would bear imitating by other states. It was indeed a revolu- tion, not as far-reaching in social changes as that of France, but in other respects as thorough. And it was accomplished without turmoil and bloodshed. The grand duchy of Warsaw cannot be compared with the older Poland in extent of territory or size of population, for Grand even after the treaty of Schonbrunn added to it a portion of wTr^w' Galicia, the population numbered only four million ; and yet the duchy had the advantage that the people were purely Polish. They cherished the illusion that Napoleon would one day re- establish the ancient kingdom, in spite of the fact that at Tilsit he had given the province of Bialystock to Alexander. Fate had in store for them a cruel disillusionment, for the creation of the state was eventually to result in the absorption of almost all of its lands by Russia rather than the recovery from Russia of those lost in the three partitions. The constitution of the grand duchy was significant, carrying far into the northeast the French program of equality. The reforms of 1791 had not ven- tured to touch the social structure of Poland, while the new con- stitution revolutionized this at least in theory, proclaiming that serfdom was abolished. As no provision was made for the re- demption of agricultural services and similar dues, the position of the peasant was not changed materially. He had the right to leave his holding, but in that case he became landless. His new position had more favorable consequences in the army, • where he was treated as a free man and where he might win THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE 399 the cross of honor. The economic situation of the grand duchy ^^ff was unfortunate, because Danzig was occupied by French sol- diers and the Continental System hindered the export of Polish i8°°-i2 lumber and wheat. At the same time the war between Russia and Turkey cut off trade with the Turkish empire. It is not surprising that the financiers of Warsaw were never able to balance receipts and expenditures. The situation was not im- proved by the necessity of paying to French generals revenues of estates which amounted to over twenty-six million francs. After all, the chief meaning of the establishment of the grand duchy was that Napoleon might possess a march on the borders of Russia. He had not divided Europe with Alexander at Til- sit ; he had secured a position from which he might control the politics of eastern as well as western Europe. Much that Napoleon attempted beyond the ancient frontiers of France was lost by his overthrow ; much, however, remained. Only through a careful analysis of the progress of institutions after 181 5 would it be possible to estimate the permanent influ- ence of his efforts. His deficiencies as a reformer sprang from a systematic, intolerant spirit, only slightly conscious of the value of historical forces in the growth of peoples. The redeeming feature of his policy was his ideal of ordered, reasonable admin- istration and of civil equality. CHAPTER XXIV THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT xxlv "^OTHING that Napoleon did within France after he be- X^ came Emperor was comparable in lasting effect with what 1807-12 YiQ accomplished beyond the ancient frontiers in the larger em- pire which his triumph at Austerlitz enabled him to create. Much that he undertook was a continuation of reforms begun under the Consulate. He displayed the same governing energy, the same sense for the value of administrative efficiency, but the account in promises of reform opened by the Revolution was nearly closed before the four years of the Consulate were over. His time was also absorbed for many consecutive months in struggles with European states anxious to check the growth of French supremacy. From September, 1805, to January, 1806, he was absent in Austria. In September, 1806, he left Paris again for the campaign against Prussia and Russia, and did 'not return until August, 1807. He was in Spain during the fall of 1808 and in Austria once more in the spring and summer of 1809. After the war with Austria was over he resided in Paris or in the different imperial palaces until the Russian campaign of 1812. During this period his restless eagerness for work seemed to slacken. The marriage alliance with the ancient House of Haps- burg and the birth of an heir increased his pride, while they dulled his perception of what had been the actual sources of his prodigious fortune. Nevertheless, important work for France was accomplished during the empire. In Napoleon, France possessed a real king, a center whence impulses to activity radiated in all directions, a force the lack Napo- of which had been the ruin of the old monarchy. His powers of Real attention, of memory, of pertinent suggestion or command, ^°8 seemed inexhaustible. He understood the influence which comes from a knowledge of each situation and an acquaintance with all its personal factors. In order that his officials might believe that nothing could escape him, he examined constantly details of ad- ministration and was not sorry when blunders enabled him to bring even a minister to book. He fashioned the machinery of memory with such skill that his performances astonished his contemporaries, many of whom could not discover the hidden 400 THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 401 wires in motion. Twice a month there were laid before him ^^^' livrets or reports, volumes in octavo or quarto, containing perti- nent facts about each government service, classified according to I807-12 his directions, so that he could instantly lay his finger upon in- formation which he desired. Eighteen of these volumes were prepared concerning the army alone, with the record of each regiment, brought down to date, telling not merely the numbers ready for duty, but mentioning the region from which the regi- ment was recruited, and recalling every important affair in which it had taken part. "If he reviewed a body of troops," wrote Baron Fain, one of his secretaries, " he knew where to find things to address to the general or colonel. If he paused before old soldiers, he knew of what battles or what campaigns to speak to them ; if he wished to bring a smile to the faces of young con- scripts, there sprang to his lips at once the name of the region where they were born." One of the livrets concerned the strength and movements of foreign armies, and it was composed of items brought together from every quarter, from reports of his am- bassadors, of his agents civil or military, from hints of travel- ers or deserters. He sometimes amused himself by casually mentioning to a foreign minister a particular movement of his monarch's armies of which the puzzled diplomat had not heard and the meaning of which he was left to surmise. The Emperor also watched closely the variations of the price of wheat, and for this purpose a map was constructed, upon which in little squares representing each department the local price was writ- ten, with a device indicating the average price over whole re- gions, and a statement of the place of lowest and highest prices. His interest in this was due to his conviction that there was a close connection between the cost of bread and public peace. His sense for realities made his conversation interesting even to those who had patriotic reasons to dislike and fear him. Prince Metternich said he always seized " the essential points of sub- jects, stripping them of useless accessories, developing his thought and never ceasing to elaborate it till he had made it perfectly clear and conclusive, always finding the fitting word for the thing." In his methods of work Napoleon was orderly. Every paper or petition of importance found its way to his table. More seri- ous matters were reserved for the quiet hours of the night, and he frequently rose at two o'clock in the morning and worked with his secretary until five, when he went to bed again. A secretary ms was always at hand in his workroom to write at his dictation. ^®^°j^ He dictated so hurriedly that it was impossible for the most 402 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^- rapid writer to keep up with him and when his letters were writ- ten in full it was often necessary to guess what he had actually 1807-12 s2Lid. Even when he was absent from France on distant cam- paigns he sought to govern the country after the same methodical fashion. Despatch-bearers were continually on the road. Each rider carried the bag of despatches one post and handed it to an- other ready to push forward at full speed to the next post. " A courier stops from time to time to drink or to eat, or when the journey is long to sleep. The estafette neither drank nor ate nor slept, but always rushed on." This was as true when Na- poleon was in the depths of Russia as when he was not far from the French border. At headquarters a workroom was speedily arranged, and leather portfoHos containing official papers, the livrets, his library, transported in boxes of acacia, which might be used as shelving, were placed on improvised tables or planks. If he was at a chateau or some palace of an ally or a conquered enemy, matters took on the appearance of a Parisian imperial administration. His aim was partly to satisfy his own restless desire to organize work effectively, and partly to convince France that her interests were not suffering when he was far away on errands which seemed remote from her real interests. Napoleon was conscious that his hold upon France was pre- His sys- carious, and he sought to bind the leaders of the nation to his Eewa°rd causc through their self-interest, not only his generals and sol- diers but also the directing classes of the country. Several of the fiefs which his generals received in Italy and Germany were endowed with enormous incomes. Twelve millions were distrib- uted among the soldiers. After 1808 the holders of fiefs outside the empire were in some cases authorized to sell them and pur- chase estates in France producing similar incomes. Permission was usually not given, because Napoleon feared that the zeal of his generals to preserve French control, especially over Germany, would be lessened if the collapse of the great structure would not jeopardize seriously their private fortunes. In 1808 titles were attached to certain official positions, and .these titles could be made hereditary if the holder connected with them estates pro- ducing an income sufficiently large to maintain the dignity. In this way, for example, senators and archbishops became counts, and bishops and mayors of the " good towns " were made barons. During the later empire Napoleon showed an increasing eager- ness to attract members of the old nobility to Court as officials. His two ablest officials, Talleyrand and Fouche, no longer served him. Fouche had been dismissed as an intriguer and Talleyrand had become a " grand dignitary," yielding his place in the minis- THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 403 try of foreign aflfairs to men of smaller capacity and less compre- ^^y hension of the necessities of European politics. The reorganization of the legal system of France begun dur- 1807-12 ing the Consulate was not completed until toward the close of the Empire. The character and tendencies of the later legisla- The tion were seriously affected by Napoleon's growing inclination ^°^^^ to adopt harsh measures of repression and despotic methods of government. The civil code had been promulgated just before the Consulate disappeared. A code of civil procedure was its natural complement and a commission had been at work upon it since 1802, but it was not ready until 1806. While it preserved in part the plans of conciliation which the Constituent Assembly had associated with the work of the justice of the peace, the new code was mainly a revival of the procedure under the old regime. Napoleon took little personal interest in the matter and was pres- ent at only one discussion in the Council of State. Indeed, it is said that so many of the councilors were unfamiUar with the technicalities of the question that little real discussion occurred and the long code of 1042 articles was disposed of in twenty-three sittings of the council. Much deeper interest, naturally, was felt in the code of criminal procedure and the penal code, where the reaction against the liberal work of the Revolution threatened the system of trial by jury and succeeded in reintroducing some of the cruel punishments of the old regime. Napoleon finally took up the defense of the right of trial by jury, although he opposed the retention of the practice of leaving to a preliminary jury the task of drawing up indictments. The selection of jurors was placed in the hands of the prefects, who might also assume the role of judges for the indictment of the accused. This was entrusting a dangerous power to a despotic government, even if the accused still possessed the right of a public trial with all the ordinary safe- guards. Another sign of strong government was the withdrawal from the ordinary courts of the prosecution of counterfeiting, smuggling, and similar offenses, if done by armed men. No adequate provision was made against false imprisonment, and the requirements in regard to bail were so severe as to make release extremely difificult. The penal code applied the death penalty not only in cases of murder, but also of arson and of robbery where life was endangered. The right hand of the parricide was to be struck off before he was executed, and for certain offenses the convicted criminal was branded or his property confiscated. Dur- ing the Empire a commercial code also was prepared, the most notable feature of which was its severity toward bankrupts. The constitution of the Consulate had not been liberal in the 404 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXIV 1807-12 Changes In the Constitu- tion Financial Affairs sense of making possible effective opposition to projects of govern- ment, but it opened the way for wholesome criticism, which might compel measures to be withdrawn for modification or deferred. Of such criticism the Tribunate was the peculiar organ. Even as First Consul, Napoleon had become impatient of control and in the imperial constitution the Tribunate, divided into three sections, roughly corresponding to the sections of the Council of State, ceased to be a deliberative assembly. It was thus degraded to the position of a fifth wheel and marked for early disappearance. The prestige of Tilsit furnished the occasion for its elimination, and the Senate, the special guardian of the constitution, was used as the instrument. The method was the appointment of three commissions in the legislative body, which were to discuss before that body as a whole measures defended by the orators of the Council of State. The tribunes either became legislators or were provided with other offices. As the years passed Napoleon used the procedure of the senatus consulte or a simple decree of the Council of State in enacting his measures into law. In this way the importance of the Council of State was enhanced. Over six thousand questions, for example, were brought to its attention in 1811. Under the Republic the cost of great measures of reform, the burdens of a war against all Europe, and the inability of the government to establish its system of collecting taxes, had led to the bankruptcy of 1797. No such disaster menaced the last days of the Empire because it was not necessary to buy off the beneficiaries of an old regime while preparing the foundations of the new. The reforms of the Consulate had been in the direc- tion of efficiency and the result had been economy, while the bur- dens of continued war were thrown mainly upon conquered or dependent states. The consequence was that, although the Em- pire sank in the midst of financial depression, it did not leave be- hind new masses of public indebtedness or a credit ruined by repudiation. An increase of seventeen millions in the interest charge was the result of a reorganization of previous indebted- ness rather than of new loans. Indeed, the government could not have borrowed to advantage ; the bankruptcy of 1797 was too recent a memory. The work of reorganizing the administration of the taxes was pursued steadily. The most important achievement was the ap- praisal of real estate, begun in 1807, which by 1814 comprehended the lands in 9,000 communes. This was the first effective meas- ure against the arbitrariness of apportionment, which was one THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 405 of the crying evils of the old regime. The changes in the system *^v of indirect taxes affected the tariff, important in connection with the Continental System, and included a partial reintroduction of ^^^''^'^^ the old and obnoxious taxes on liquors, tobacco, and salt. The collection of these taxes, entrusted to an administration of droits reunis, was accompanied by so many vexations that the term droits reunis became hateful throughout the country. The financial system of the Empire was better than the sys- tem which had preceded, but as yet there was nothing which could be termed a budget. The nominal list of receipts and expendi- tures does not explain the situation, because after the Austerlitz campaign Napoleon created a special fund, called at first " War Treasure " or " Army Treasure," and finally " Extraordinary Domain," which was fed by indemnities paid at the close of wars and by revenues charged permanently upon the income of de- pendent countries or produced by estates lying within them. The exact amount of the extraordinary fund is not known, because Napoleon guarded it as jealously as Frederick the Great his " Dis- positions-Kasse." It received a special organization, with an in- tendant-general, by a senatus consulte of 1810. Although it was to serve mainly as a " rainy-day " reserve, the Emperor charged against it expenses like the maintenance of the army in the field, so far as this was not provided for by direct requisitions, rewards to officers and pensions to soldiers, the repair of palaces, and a part of the expenditure for public works. When the industrial crisis began, he drew upon it for loans to merchants and manu- facturers in distress. He also used it occasionally to balance the ordinary budget. The relations of the Bank of France and of the Government Bank of became closer during the Empire. This was partly the result of a panic in 1805, which grew out of extensive loans made by the bank to the " Company of United Merchants." The Company, which dealt in government contracts, had been speculating, par- ticularly upon receipts from the Spanish colonies, and when war broke out between England and Spain it was threatened with ruin. The Bank of France attempted to relieve the strain by is- suing notes which it lent to the Company. The depreciation of the notes and the failures of important business houses alarmed Napoleon, who was absent in Austria and Moravia. The coin he brought back at the Peace of Pressburg enabled him to put an end to the panic, but he reorganized the administration of the bank, bringing it more directly under government control. He believed that the bank was an instrument of state and that not France 4o6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXIV Prosper- ity of France even such a matter as the rate of discount should be left to the course of business. In 1807, for example, he arbitrarily reduced the rate to four per cent. The confidence which the imperial financial administration en- joyed under such men as Gaudin and Mollien is indicated by the steady rise in the price of government stock, which in August, 1807, reached the figure of 93.40. This price was also due to the feeling of hope and confidence created by the news of the Peace of Tilsit. The following year in March it was 88.15, but from this time forward it gradually sank until with the entry of the Allies into Paris in the spring of 1814 it was quoted at 45- For France the Empire was a period of prosperity, at least un- til 1810. The national industries which had not recovered at the close of the Consulate the ground lost during the Revolution had time enough to equal and in many cases to exceed the best years of the old regime. For over a decade, while much of Europe was torn by war, France was not even threatened by invasion. Suc- cessive annexations added to the area within which trade was un- restricted. To such normal causes of growth was added the ex- traordinary stimulus due to the favored position created by the Continental System. Moreover, the parvenu nobility which Na- poleon had richly endowed from the spoils of subject states had an abundance of money to expend upon luxuries. Progress in certain industries had more permanent causes, such as the intro- duction of machinery, patterned after English inventions, or the application to industrial needs of the results of scientific discov- ery, especially in chemistry. In the silk industry, with its center in Lyons, an ingenious loom was invented by Jacquard, which pro- duced the most complex and beautiful patterns. The general introduction of the factory system, however, belongs to a later period. Agriculture also showed marked gains. The farmer under- stood better the rotation of crops and gradually freed himself from the trammels of the ancient practice of permitting a third or a half of his arable land to lie fallow. Vegetables like the potato were more widely used. There was also a large increase in the total amount of land under cultivation. This progress was not uniform all over the country. In certain regions the farmers still clung to the methods their fathers had used. The foreign commerce of France suffered from the uncertain- ties of war and the Continental System. Even where the Eng- lish cruiser could not go, along the land frontiers of France, in- ternational trade did not develop rapidly. Old habits could not THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 407 be easily overcome. Nor was the international trade of France chap. large by comparison with what it became in later decades of the nineteenth century. Partnerships, rather than stock companies, I807-12 were a satisfactory form of organization considering the volume of business. Two achievements improved the prospects of busi- ness for the future. One was the establishment under the Con- sulate of a fixed monetary standard, and the other the rapid building of roads. At this time the roads were further classified as imperial, departmental, and vicinal, and great efforts were made towards the completion on a national scale of the imperial and departmental roads. Connections with Turin and Milan were made by the construction of roads across the Alps. The prosperity of France was gone long before the outbreak of war with Russia in 1812, The steady drain of campaign after campaign, especially of the unceasing struggle in the Spanish peninsula, made the situation critical in the spring of 1810. The trade in colonial products had become highly speculative, because the supply of sugar, coffee, and tobacco was uncertain. Prices panic were liable to sudden variations, which offered extraordinary op- °' -^^^^ portunities for profit, but also threatened the unwary with ruin. In, the month of May prices rose to such a height that purchases fell off and several merchants in Paris were unable to meet their payments. A little later there were failures in western France, whose prosperity had been compromised by the loss of the Span- ish market. The condition of the cotton industry became pre- carious. The protection which the Continental System had given to the French manufacturer had led him to act as if business would expand indefinitely. The result was an inflation of which the rapid increase in discounts after 1808 is an evidence. New mills had been erected at lavish expense on borrowed money. Credit was strained to the breaking point. Then came the tariff of 1810 which enhanced the price of raw material. The manu- facturer found it impossible to throw the whole burden of the increased cost upon purchasers and his own resources were un- equal to any added load. The Bank of France began to pursue a policy of caution in making loans and other banks followed its example. All that was necessary to tumble down the whole house of cards was a blow from some direction. The first great failure was in Liibeck in September, 1810. In October an im- portant Amsterdam concern failed. Both involved merchants in Paris. The excitement was great and a feeling of distrust be- came general. In January, 181 1, Richard-Lenoir, the principal cotton manufacturer of France, wrote : " The situation of trade becomes daily more critical; sales have almost ceased, and pay- 4o8 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^- ments are slow and uncertain. My credit is ruined." ^ The panic lasted well into the summer of 1811. The number of looms 1807-12 ^^ work in Lyons was reduced from I4,CX)0 to 5,630. The de- pression in the silk trade has often been attributed to a decree which the Czar Alexander issued in December, 181 o, excluding articles of luxury from Russia. But the Russian merchants had already ceased to purchase their usual quantities of silk because the enforcement of the Continental System prevented them from paying in exports of wheat, timber, and other bulky products. In this case Napoleon's policy directly compromised the prosperity of his own merchants and manufacturers. Although he did not understand the causes of the disaster, he was not indifferent to the situation. He attempted to restore prosperity by making liberal advances to embarrassed merchants and manufacturers. In the year 181 2 alone he lent them eighteen million francs out of his Extraordinary Domain. To the other misfortunes of 181 1 was added a partial failure of the wheat crop. In order to forestall a rise of the price of bread Napoleon appointed a Food Commission, which began to stock public granaries. This was noised about and led to a further rise in the price of grain, which the commission tried to correct by selling below the market rate. The market now was thrown into a panic and the price was nearly doubled. Na- poleon resorted to the remedy of 1793 and practically established a maximum. With many thousands out of employment the out- look at the close of the year was somber. A social order or a political system generally expects loyalty from the schools which it supports or tolerates. In the case of a long established regime this seems natural, but when a parvenu dynasty, like that of Napoleon, makes similar demands it causes surprise, irritation, or, perhaps, amusement. Never was the de- mand formulated with greater preciseness than in the imperial organization of the public schools of France. A law of the Con- sulate had provided for the establishment of communal colleges and state lycees as well as of special schools, but little was done until after the Peace of Tilsit, when by the law of March 17, 1808, the University of France was created. The first article established what has been called the regime of monopoly, declar- ing that " Public instruction is entrusted exclusively to the Uni- versity." This did not mean that no other educational institutions Univer- could exist, for Napoleon was satisfied with a rigid control over Bity of private or church schools, but that they must be authorized by the Grand Master of the University and be subject to inspection 1 Quoted by Darmstadtcr, op. cit. THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 409 by state officials. For example, the religious order known as chap. the " Brethren of the Christian Schools " was encouraged to take up the work of primary instruction. The teachers and masters I807-12 of private schools, even, were required to hold degrees from the University. The aim of education was to form citizens who would be attached to their prince, as well as to their country, their religion, and their family. The basis of education was to be the Catholic religion, and to this was added " Fidelity to the Emperor, to the imperial monarchy depositary of the welfare of peoples, and to the Napoleonic dynasty conservator of the unity of France and of all the liberal ideas proclaimed by the constitu- tions." The last qualification was suited rather to edify young minds than to record the Emperor's attitude in the later years of his reign. The instructors were to serve as a sort of moral police, and were expected to inform the grand master of any- thing in the public schools unsound from the point of view of imperial doctrine. Napoleon would have been glad if he could have built up a teaching force with a unity of command and the cohesion of the Jesuit Order. A military organization was im- posed on the pupils of the lycees, and they proceeded to the ex- ercises of the school at tap of drum. Those in residence were not to appear outside the precincts of the school except in full uniform. Private schools paid to the University fees amount- ing to a twentieth of their revenue from tuition. Even then their condition was precarious ; the master of an ancient " college " in Paris being ordered in 18 10 to send his 400 pupils to a lycee within a month. In spite of Napoleon's attempts to reduce the competition of the private schools, there were at his overthrow 3,000 more pupils in private institutes and boarding schools than in the communal colleges and lycees. The organization as a whole was to prove, however, one of his most lasting achieve- ments, for in its broad outlines it still exists, although now freed from its dubious task of supporting a Napoleonic regime, and has entered upon a nobler rivalry with private schools. The Church was a still more potent instrument of government. To it Napoleon, in the language of Pope Pius VII, had been a second Constantine. In the official catechism the children were French taught that the Emperor was the " minister of God's power and ^^^^'^^ His image upon earth," and that those who fail in their duty to him would, " according to the Apostle Paul, be resisting the order established by God himself, and would render themselves worthy of eternal damnation." It is a question how much zeal the clergy put into the teaching of these assertions of the cate- chism, for in 1806, when it was imposed by law, the Emperor .lo THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^?: was already involved in a serious controversy with the Pope. The struggle was of peculiar interest, because on the one hand 1807-12 ^^g |.|^g master of the mightiest armies and the most subservient officials of Europe, and, on the other, the Pope, an individual, strong only in the fact that his sanctions were necessary to the orderly administration of the Church, upon which multitudes believed their salvation dependent. The issue proved that force must reckon with ideas, especially if these have long been inti- mately connected with the practices and the scruples of the re- ligious conscience. Napoleon had almost forgotten the lessons of the fate of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Not long after the Empire was created both the Pope and the Emperor discovered grounds of discontent with the situation. Napoleon wished to have in the Pope an ally in Italy, and he pre- lonfiict tended not to see the special obligation of the Pope to maintain •apacy^ a neutral position. Before Napoleon attacked his neutrality Pope Pius VII saw that the rights of the Church were ignored whenever they ran counter to Napoleonic policy. The publica- tion of the Organic Articles had set a good precedent for this. When Napoleon became King of Italy, he introduced the civil code, some of whose provisions were in conflict with the Con- cordat which he had previously negotiated for the Cisalpine Re- public. In France he made membership in an unauthorized re- ligious order ground for a criminal charge. His treatment of the Pope at the time of the coronation had filled Pius with chagrin, the Emperor appearing to regard him as a sort of " grand almoner." The controversy became acute during the war of 1805. It was in the course of this controversy, as already explained, that Na- poleon called himself " Charlemagne," since Hke Charlemagne he united the crowns of France and Italy. When Joseph was made King of Naples, the Pope refused to recognize the change of dynasty unless his historic rights of suzerainty were acknowl- edged. After the Peace of Tilsit Napoleon demanded an alli- ance, asking the Pope to promise that he would select a third of the cardinals within the French empire and that he would re- frain from any act likely to alarm the consciences of Frenchmen. As the quarrel became embittered, the Pope, confusing temporal and spiritual matters, ceased to institute the clergy named by Napoleon for vacant bishoprics. The controversy passed beyond the region of correspondence when General Miollis occupied Rome, took possession of jour- nals, printing presses, and the postal administration, and ex- pelled the cardinals who were not natives of the Papal States. THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 411 This was followed by the annexation to the kingdom of Italy ^^y of four provinces, including Ancona. The climax came during the Austrian campaign of 1809, when from Vienna Napoleon pronounced the annexation to the empire of the last provinces of the Pope, including Rome. In anticipation of such an act Excom- Pius VII and his counselors had prepared a decree of excom- ""n'of munication against those who should plan or bring to pass such Napoleon a usurpation. Napoleon was not specifically named and all per- sons were warned in the bull against attacking in any manner either the goods or the rights of those involved in the condemna- tion. The bull was secretly placarded on the walls of Rome on the night of June 10. When the Emperor heard of the Papal de- cree, he wrote to Murat, who represented him in these proceed- ings, " No more half measures ; the Pope is a raging maniac whom we must lock up. Arrest Cardinal Pacca and the other supporters of the Pope." This was done and Pope Pius was taken, a close prisoner, to Savona, while Pacca, his secretary of state, was shut up in the fortress of Fenestrella. The situation was now extremely delicate. The spectacle of the new Constantine, the restorer of the Church, acting as the jailor of the Pope, was neither edifying nor free from embar- rassment. By causing the Pope's arrest Napoleon had given him an excuse for refusing to institute nominees to vacant bish- oprics, a refusal previously made on questionable grounds. He could argue the impossibility of performing his proper functions when deprived of his liberty and without the counsel of his offi- cial advisers. Although the press was silent upon the affair, the spectacle of the vacant sees, numbering eventually 27, was an effective protest against what was being done. Napoleon taxed the ingenuity of his lawyers to devise a way by which he could dispense with the aid of the Pope in filUng vacancies. Recourse could not be had to a general council be- cause such a council could not be called without the consent of the Pope. If a national council were summoned and the des- perate situation of the Church laid before it, it would probably refuse to ignore the terms of a solemn treaty like the Concordat and to put in force the method of institution provided by the 'Civil Constitution of the Clergy or the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges. Attempts The most that could be done was to ask the chapters of the va- *°^^^»- cant cathedrals to designate the nominated bishops as provisional with administrators of the diocese. But the attempt of Napoleon to Jut^Jrity transfer two bishops from their sees to the metropolitan sees of Paris and Florence brought from the Pope reprimands for the two ecclesiastics and bulls forbidding the chapters to obey them. 412 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. The bulls were delivered by members of the " Congregation," a secret order organized at first for the cultivation of piety and 1807-12 i^^gj. furnishing invisible aides-de-camp to the imprisoned pontiff. Without waiting for a settlement of the question, Napoleon decreed by senatus consulte, February 17, i8iOj that Rome should be the second city of the Empire, that the Pope should have palaces there and at Paris, that he should be assigned an income of two millions a year, and that he should take an oath to do nothing contrary to the liberties of the Galilean Church set forth in the four articles of 1682. The quarrel became still more no- torious when thirteen cardinals who refused to be present at the religious ceremony of the marriage of Napoleon and Marie Louise were placed practically under arrest, forbidden to use their titles, and ordered to wear a black soutane. This treatment, which gained for the unfortunate ecclesiastics the name " black cardi- nals," was mild compared with that of nineteen bishops within the States of the Church, who were shut up in fortresses for re- fusing to take the oath to the Emperor. In 181 1 it looked as if the Pope, worn out by the strain of the controversy and moved by the condition of so many dioceses, was ready to yield. Four bishops, carefully chosen, who were sent to bring every possible argument to bear upon his resolution, finally succeeded in obtaining his consent to the proposal that he should grant bulls of institution to the nominated bishops and Chance of that hereafter, if he did not grant bulls within six months of a oompro- nomination, the candidate might be instituted by his metropolitan or by the oldest bishop in the diocese. On the strength of this success Napoleon convened a national council in order that it might embody the compromise in a decree, but he dismissed it angrily on account of its deference to the papal will. After the leaders of the opposition had returned ta their dioceses, and his officials had taken the precaution of obtaining the agreement of the others individually to the compromise, he reconvened the council. Even this carefully selected assembly made its consent subject to the approval of the Pope. Pius VII, when the decision was laid before him, ignorant of the circumstances surrounding the affair, gave a conditional approval ; but, as Napoleon rejected the conditions, the matter was not advanced. By this time he was absorbed by the approaching war with Russia. When he was well on his way toward the Niemen, the Pope was hurried across the Alps into France and was brought to Fontainebleau, where he was to wait until the disasters of 1812 modified the situation profoundly. The Church was not the only form of moral and intellectual THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 413 activity that Napoleon sought to control. He established a rig- ^^^• orous censorship of literature and of the press. The theaters were reduced in numbers and classified. It was dangerous to I807-12 publish or produce plays which contained lines with ambiguous meanings, and even plays of classical origin were expurgated. Litera- Chateaubriand, the greatest prose writer of the period, fell into *"" disfavor because of his condemnation of the judicial murder of the Duke d'Enghien. The most notable case of persecution for literary opposition was that of Mme. de Stael, a member of the group of " ideologists " whom Napoleon detested. In 1803 he had ordered her to reside at least forty leagues from Paris. She preferred to go to Germany, to which he consented. At Weimar she made the acquaintance of Goethe and Schiller and deepened her interest in the German intellectual movement. A few years later she undertook to interpret this movement to the French in a book entitled VAllemagne. In 1810 in order to see it through the press she went to Blois on the Loire. Her frank admiration of the German genius and her silence upon the work which Na- poleon had attempted to accomplish in Germany were too much for the imperial censors and they demanded changes. A little later she received the news that the edition of 10,000 copies had been seized. At the same time she was ordered to leave France within three days. It was in England three years later that she finally succeeded in publishing her book. Napoleon wished to make literature march with the same pre- cision which he exacted of his battalions. He demanded that the historians show the weakness and confusion of the Bourbon gov- ernment and the " benefits due to the unity of the laws, of ad- ministration, and of territory." In 1808 as he became involved in a quarrel with the Pope, he wished history to exhibit " the dangerous influence of a foreign priest, whose ambitions might destroy the repose of France." The control exercised over newspapers was still more rigorous, and by October, 181 1, only four existed in Paris. The Journal des Debats had been forced to adopt the less untimely name of Journal de V Empire, and later was confiscated. Printers were restricted in number and re- quired to take an oath, and no book could be published until it was approved by the censors, and even then its sale might be suspended. In the neutral territory of the fine arts and of the mathematical and physical sciences, rendered illustrious by the names of David, Laplace, and Cuvier, work of permanent value was accomplished, but France lacked that intellectual life which thrives in the invigorating atmosphere of freedom. CHAPTER XXV THE LAST GREAT VENTURE CHAP. XXV THE strongest single motive in the development of Bona- parte's later policy sprang from the requirements of the Continental System as an effective weapon against the English. Each successive step toward the accomplishment of their ruin seemed not only justified but inevitable ; and all were so adapted to the general scheme of personal domination, that Bonaparte saw no reason to take account of obstacles created by the local necessities of peoples or by the ambitions of their rulers. This had already involved him in a fateful struggle in the Spanish peninsula and had prompted acts which became the occasion of a still more disastrous conflict within the boundaries of the Rus- sian empire. The war with England caused Russia serious losses because her export trade was mainly in wheat, timber, and shipping supplies. The deficit in the imperial treasury by 1810 equaled the income, and the value of the paper ruble had fallen to twenty-five per cent. To the injury of this situation was added the insult of the annexation of Oldenburg, of which a near relative of Alexander was ruler. By a curious irony of fate Alexander's retort was made before he heard of this step. It was embodied in the tariff of December 31, 1810, which was designed to protect Russia against the consequences of the System by either prohibiting or levying high duties on luxuries like French wines, brandies and silks, while facilitating the commerce of neutrals. A question of scarcely less importance had been raised by Na- poleon's policy in Poland. It was not so much what he had done as the possibility that he might do more that caused the Russians anxiety. The administrative, legal, and social reforms in the grand duchy of Warsaw might render restive those subjects of the old kingdom of Poland now Russian, and might predispose them to clamor for its restoration. The addition of a million and a half inhabitants to the grand duchy, by the terms of peace with Austria, appeared to encourage their hopes. At the same time the obstacle of the dual alliance seemed less formidable, now that the Austrian marriage indicated a change in Napoleqn's foreign policy. He alarmed Alexander by refusing to ratify an agree- 414 THE LAST GREAT VENTURE ment drawn by his own ambassador pledging him never to permit ^^^' the reconstitution of the PoHsh kingdom and even agreeing that the name Poland shotdd not be used in public documents. isio-is Napoleon's attitude towards the war between the Russians and the Turks was also a continual source of irritation. The Rus- sian arms were gaining successes which opened a prospect of an advantageous peace, but the French agents strove to prolong Turkish resistance. Before the measures of December, 1810, started rumors of war, Alexander had begun to sound the Poles upon their attitude to- wards a proposal by him to reconstitute the old kingdom, with him as monarch, but otherwise independent of Russia. Early in 181 1 he began to move troops towards his western frontier, to be ready to enter instantly upon a campaign against Napoleonic prepara- domination in Warsaw and northern Germany if this and kindred ^"^f ^°' negotiations should succeed. With great secrecy he proposed to the Austrians that they accept certain Danubian lands in exchange for Galicia, which was to belong to the restored kingdom. His apparent design was to add the lands of the old duchy of Lithu- ania, that is to say, the part of Russia acquired at the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Before the winter was over he found that the Austrians would give him no encouragement. Indeed, the proposal was one of the reasons why they were ready to ally themselves with Napoleon in the coming war. The great- est disappointment was the persistence of the Poles in their at- tachment to the French cause; though it was natural, for who except the French and Napoleon had done anything but harm to the cause of Poland? By the spring of 181 1, therefore, Alexan- der was inclined to patch up some arrangement with Napoleon by which the alliance might be continued. Napoleon had not received information of Alexander's decree - of December 31, 1810, when he began to reinforce his army in northern Germany, with the aim of tightening the joints of the Continental System. The news from Russia suggested that the new army might have a more strenuous task than keeping the German ports closed against the English, Still later came re- ports of the movement of Russian troops along the frontier of Warsaw. This reached Paris at a time when the troops were being withdrawn and when an agent of the Czar appeared with proposals for a settlement of the difficulties. The question of Poland was now involved with the question of indemnities for the Duke of Oldenburg. In these negotiations the agents of neither Napoleon nor Alexander ventured to say definitely what they desired or were ready to do, fearing that the proposition 4i6 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, would be used as a weapon against them. After all, the Polish question was secondary, and the important question of the policy 1810-13 Qf Russia towards commerce was not discussed. In an interview with Kurakin, the Russian ambassador, on August 15, Napoleon chose to defy Russia as he had defied England at the famous Whitworth interview of 1803. In the presence of other ambas- sadors he warned Kurakin not " to flatter himself that he would indemnify the Czar on the side of Warsaw," adding, " No, though your armies were encamped on the heights of Montmartre, I would not yield an inch of Warsaw's territory." Both Napoleon and Alexander now expected war, but neither desired it to open be- fore 1812. Napoleon bent all the efforts of his diplomacy to prevent Alexander from carrying the war into Germany, while Alexander was already inclined to profit by the lesson Welling- ton had taught in Portugal and to lure his enemy far within the vast plains of Russia. The approach of war placed Prussia in a precarious position. Position On the one hand the success of Napoleon would deprive Fred- 8ia '^ erick William of the support which had come from the friendly intervention of Alexander. Napoleon might seize the occasion to carry out the thought of destroying the Prussian monarchy which he had meditated since Jena ; indeed, rumors that the de- tails of such a scheme had already been worked out found their way to Berlin. On the other hand, a decisive Russian success might lead to the annexation of the grand duchy of Warsaw, made up of former Prussian Polish possessions, in which case Prussia would simply change masters. Alexander was Frederick William's natural ally, but such an alliance meant ruin unless Alexander, anticipating Napoleon's action, pushed his columns far into Germany before the Grand Army of France and her dependent States was assembled. One favorable element in the situation was the retention of many thousand French troops in Spain, so that it did not seem possi- ble to assemble another army large enough to meet a vigorous onslaught of the northern powers. Such men as Scharnhorst thought the hour to strike had come, but Frederick William hesi- tated and Hardenberg despatched to Paris the proposal of a closer alliance with France, which would ward off destruction and which might move Napoleon to release Prussia from a part of the war contribution as well as remove the limitation upon the size of the army. Preparations for war were at the same time pushed forward with the excuse that these were necessary if Prussia's alliance was to be valuable. Napoleon was angered by the Prussian preparations because he feared that they might pre- THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 417 cipitate war with Russia, and, although he did not altogether 9^^- penetrate the poHcy of double dealing that Prussia was pursuing, he resolved to seize Prussia unless the preparations ceased. Scharnhorst had already been sent secretly to St. Petersburg to learn if the Czar could be counted upon in case of French at- tack, and in November he brought back Alexander's consent to an alliance and a promise to abandon his plan of awaiting the French attack within his own dominions. Meanwhile Prussia had received assurances of English subsidies. Before Frederick William finally decided what to do he sent Scharnhorst to Vi- enna, only to discover that Count Mettemich and his master had determined to maintain their alliance with France. Frederick William was now obliged to accept a settlement with Napoleon much severer than Hardenberg had anticipated, promising to fur- nish 20,000 troops, subject to the orders of Napoleon, and to place the remainder of the army, separated in garrisons, under the command of neighboring French generals. The alliance was offensive and defensive against all States except Spain, Italy, and Turkey. If the French armies marched through Prussian terri- tory they should issue requisitions for food, the value of which should be credited toward the payment of the old war debt. This humiliating treaty was signed February 24, 181 2, when the war with Russia seemed a few weeks distant. The attitude of Austria was prompted partly by distrust of Alexander's Polish policy and irritation at his territorial ambi- tions on the lower Danube. Metternich also hoped that the Attitude Prussians would ally themselves with Russia and that this would tria ^^' afford Napoleon the excuse for seizing Silesia and handing it over to his father-in-law. He had received assurances from Na- poleon that Austria would recover a part of the lost Illyrian prov- inces and the boundary of the Inn towards Bavaria in return for support during a war with Russia. The Austrians were confi- dent that France would be victorious if the struggle were begun, and Mettemich, wishing that Prussia might become seriously compromised in the affair, actually advised Prussia to unite with the Russians. A treaty was signed in March, 1812, pledging to Napoleon the support of an army of 30,000, which, however, should be under the orders of an Austrian general, although its movements were to conform to Napoleon's plans. The attitude of Sweden became of importance because Berna- dotte, ex-marshal of France, was the crown prince, and a Swedish army led by him might be a decisive weight in the scale. Bema- Sweden dotte wished to commend himself to his future subjects and de- manded as the price of an alliance the cession of Norway, which 411 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXV The Turks Welling- ton in Spain The American War belonged to Denmark. Napoleon could not concede this, for the Danes were his faithful allies. Moreover, he required of Sweden the rigorous enforcement of the Continental System, threatening to occupy Swedish Pomerania if this were not done. For the Swedes, as for the Russians, the Continental System was too high a price to pay for immunity from attack, and Bernadotte turned to Alexander to obtain from him what Napoleon refused. A treaty signed in April, 1812, promised the Russians the aid of a Swedish corps in making a diversion in northern Germany, and Bernadotte received in return the promise that at the peace Sweden should annex Norway. In May, Napoleon received another blow. This was a treaty of peace between Russia and the Turks, which freed a large Rus- sian army for the campaign against the French. Napoleon had demanded of the Turks an army of 100,000, promising them the restoration of all the territories Russia had taken away in a gen- eration, but the Turks distrusted his promises and gave more weight to the threats of the English, who declared that they would bombard Constantinople if the Sultan joined Napoleon. With a new and stupendous task confronting the French the necessity of keeping 300,000 soldiers in Spain was embarrassing. The results there were not commensurate with the effort. To maintain a semblance of authority the troops were scattered throughout the peninsula, and it was impossible to bring together an army large enough to crush Wellington after his expulsion of Massena from Portugal, Although the year did not pass without some successes in other parts of Spain, Wellington's hold on the borders of Portugal was strengthened by the capture, early in 1812, of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, It was not of favorable augury to the cause of King Joseph that his brother was obliged to draw from Spain 30,000 veterans to form part of the great army which he proposed to launch against Russia. For the next two years the British efforts against Napoleon were hampered by a diversion across the Atlantic. The quarrel over the rights of neutral commerce and the impressment of sea- men had become embittered and a party in the American Con- gress, principally representing the interior, clamored for war. Although the United States had no war fleet, and only a few frigates and smaller vessels, and although the army contained only half a dozen regiments, war was declared upon Great Brit- ain in June, 1812. It subsequently appeared that the British had withdrawn their obnoxious Orders in Council two days before the declaration of war. As the conflict proceeded, England suf- fered more from the additional burden of risk to her commerce, THE LAST GREAT VENTURE liable to attack by swift-sailing American privateers, than from ^^y the cost of defending her colonies against the weak and ill-or- ganized forces of the United States. The issue of the great ^^lo-is struggle on the Continent was not seriously affected by the af- fair. The war of France and Russia, or rather of Napoleon and Russia, for France was neither consulted nor deeply interested, — except that her sons might return alive — began without formal declaration. When the French engineers were constructing the bridges at the Niemen they were not opposed by the Russians, although a few horsemen rode up and inquired what the purpose of the bridges might be. The break between the two emperors The Bus- did not occur until Napoleon was already at Wilna, fifty miles ^^^^ . r ^u r J.' Campaign from the frontier. The Grand Army was the largest force operating in any field of modern warfare. When the invasion began 450,000 effective troops crossed the Niemen, and 160,000 followed before its close. About one-half were Frenchmen, one-fourth Germans, and one- eighth Italians. There were 100,000 cavalry, 1,242 field pieces, and more than 100 siege guns. At the head of the army were some of the greatest paladins of the imperial period, Murat, Da- vout, Ney, and Eugene. Berthier was chief of staff. To have brought together such a body of men argued extraordinary genius for organization; to maintain it as an effective fighting machine in the vast plains of Russia surpassed the capacity of genius itself. Immense stores of provisions had been accumu- lated at Danzig and other fortresses, but it was not possible to forward them fast enough to provide for the needs of the sol- diers. Even before the army reached the Niemen the soldiers began to suffer for food. The machine was destined to break down of its own weight and complexity. Napoleon expected the Poles of Lithuania to hail him as a deliverer and he planned to turn their enthusiasm into auxiliary troops, and into all sorts of supplies for his advancing army. The movement was to start with a diet at Warsaw, and it was decided before he left Paris what the diet should do and what his attitude should be. Meanwhile he countenanced rumors of a restoration of the old kingdom. The diet assembled at War- The Poles saw and the elder Czartoryski announced the reestablishment of the kingdom of Poland ; but, when a delegation appeared before Napoleon at Wilna, he chilled their enthusiasm by declaring that they must show themselves strong enough to conquer and defend their liberties. This could be done only by supporting more vig- orously the expedition. He also reminded them that Austria was ^2o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^:^v* ^^^ ^^^^ ^"^ nothing should be undertaken which would alarm the Emperor Francis for the safety of Galicia. Already the en- 1810.13 thusiasm of the Lithuanians had been changed into indifference or anger because the French troops, often half starved, plun- dered them as if they were enemies. In his proclamation to his soldiers Napoleon called this the " Second Polish War." The event hardly justified the name. In the Russian campaign Napoleon's advance lasted from June 23, when his army began to cross the Niemen, until September rhe Eoad 14, when he entered Moscow. At the Niemen he was already :ow^°° more than 700 miles from the borders of France, his true base of operations. A large part of his line of communications was exposed on either side, if the formal friendship of Austria or Prussia should be changed into hostility. Moscow lay beyond the plains of Lithuania and old Russia 600 miles as the crow flies, about the distance from Albany to Chicago or from Wash- ington to St. Louis. Between were few cities of importance and the country was poor and sparsely populated. The campaign was begun late, in order that the horses might feed on the fresh grasses. Napoleon had not planned to go beyond the borders of Lithuania the first summer, expecting to follow this campaign by another in 1813 until the endurance of Russia was worn out. He was fully warned against the hazards of the enterprise be- cause the Czar had not concealed his intention to withdraw, if need be, into Asia, rather than sign a peace while his capital or a foot of his territory was held by the enemy. Napoleon had received a more sinister warning, when he insultingly asked Alexander's representative at Wilna which was the road to Mos- cow. The Russian replied : " As the French say, ' All roads lead to Rome,' so the Russians say, ' All roads lead to Moscow ' : one may choose; Charles XII took that by way of Pultowa." The size of Napoleon's army forced the Russians to adopt a more thoroughgoing policy of retreat than they had at first con- sidered. Their scheme of operations had included the retirement the of a first army upon elaborate fortifications, a Russian Torres sampaign Vedras, at Drissa on the Diina; and, when the enemy followed, a second army further south was to menace his flank and rear. The Russians soon discovered that Napoleon had soldiers enough to surround and overwhelm both armies, and that their only hope lay in diminishing the French army by lengthening still further its Hne of communications. In fact, the second army barely escaped destruction before it effected a union with the first army. From that moment, however, the size of Napoleon's army was a disadvantage, confirming the Russians in the policy of retreat, THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 421 so that the opportunity of engaging them in a decisive battle ever °^^' receded before him. His soldiers were worn out and his horses killed by endless marches, 10,000 horses perishing before the army reached Wilna. Further on, a single corps reported a daily loss of 800 or 900 men from fatigue, disease, and starvation. By the end of July nearly a third of the army had disappeared, and still the day of a decisive battle was in the future. Napoleon supposed the Russians would defend Smolensk, the border city of " Holy " Russia, but they left only a rear guard to delay his entrance. He had originally intended to pause there until 181 3, but the hope of forcing the enemy to an issue lured him on along the road to Moscow. The Russians, weary at length of the policy of retreat carried out with such patient resolution by Barclay de Tolly, put the old fighting general Kutusoff in com- mand and barred Napoleon's advance at Borodino. The Grand Army now numbered about 125,000, while the Russians had a little over 100,000. The struggle raged all day on September 7 and closed with the loss to the French of a fifth of their army, while the Russians lost still more. Although the French were victorious, their success was not decisive, because Napoleon re- fused to use the Imperial Guard with crushing effect at the critical moment. When the French entered Moscow a few days later they were astonished to find the ancient Russian capital deserted by its in- habitants. Only 15,000 out of 250,000 remained, and those were Moscow mostly foreigners and vagabonds. No municipal deputation waited upon the disappointed conqueror. What was worse, be- fore the day was over fires broke out in different quarters of the town. Who set the fires is unknown, although the Russian gov- ernor has been accused of ordering them. Released criminals or bandits and French pillagers were quite as likely the culprits. The flames soon held the whole city in their grasp, and lighted the country around so far that persons could read at midnight ten or twelve miles away. A large part of the city was burned and it was impossible to procure supplies from the surrounding district, and yet Napoleon lingered in Moscow for five weeks, deluded by the expectation that Alexander would consent to terms of peace. On October 18 Napoleon began his retreat. His army now counted, including reinforcements, about 100,000. As the Rus- sian army lay across the more southerly roads, he was obliged to The return through the region devastated by both armies during the Retreat advance. His soldiers were horrified by the spectacle of the thousands of dead lying still unburied on the battlefield of Boro- 122 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^y' dino.- On November 4 the thermometer showed that winter, the cruelest enemy of all, had come. By the middle of the month 1810-13 j.j^g army reached Smolensk, but half its numbers had perished. Greater perils still awaited it along the river Beresina, where a Russian army from the south had burnt the bridge Napoleon had planned to use and were holding the western banks of the river. The remnants of the Grand Army would have been captured but for the skilful strategy of Marshal Oudinot, who deceived the Russians as to the place selected for crossing, and the self-sacri- ficing courage of the French engineers, who stood up to their necks in the icy stream while they constructed two wooden bridges. Nevertheless, before the crossing was accomplished the Russians came up and turned their guns upon the bridges. One broke down under the weight of the panic-stricken crowds, and a fierce conflict of men and horses for the other went on until the French rear guard set fire to it to cover their retreat, leaving on the other side thousands of stragglers. So many perished in the river that ten years afterwards islets or shallows could be seen made up of grewsome masses of human wreckage. What was left of the army struggled on past Wilna to the Niemen, which was crossed the middle of December. The infantry of the Imperial Guard numbered 400 or 500 and the cavalry 600 more, many of them without horses. One battalion which left Smo- lensk with 31 officers and 300 men was reduced to 14 officers and . 10 men. On December 5 Napoleon placed the army under the command of Murat and set out for Paris to save his empire from the consequences of defeat. On December 10 he was at Warsaw, on the 14th at Dresden, and he reached Paris on December 18 about midnight. Hardly two days had passed since a cloud of anxious dread had settled upon the city with the appearance in the Moniteur of the Twenty-ninth Bulletin of the Grand Army. Its para- he graphs of misleading description, telling of new triumphs over ewsin the Russians and transforming even the crossing of the Beresina ranee .^^^ ^ victory, could not sufficiently veil the few lines of truth, which intimated the frightful extent of the disaster. " This army, so fine on November 6th, was very different after the 14th," so ran the first hint, " almost without cavalry, without artillery, without transports." Further on the bulletin said that the Guard had lost so many horses that it was possible to bring together only four companies of cavalry of 150 men each, in which generals were the captains and colonels were the non- commissioned officers. Who had survived, was the question on everybody's lips. Napoleon did not allow himself to be shaken THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 423 in this atmosphere heavy with universal distress ; he had lost an ^;^xv' army, but not his empire, and another army must be found to reopen the campaign, if not on the Niemen, as far on the road i^io-is thither as possible. In their own sorrow the sympathetic French felt for his misfortunes and reflected that such a trial " might add to his other qualities more indulgence for the faults of others, more prudence in his plans, more moderation in his acts, and in his love of glory a greater consideration for France." Although all classes were eager for peace, none, save in the south and in some parts of the west, were disloyal to the Emperor. The French were too closely associated with the glories of the Grand Empire to see it destroyed without a struggle. They consoled themselves also with the hope that one more effort would bring the peace they all desired. Napoleon had little sympathy with this sentiment. As soon as he saw new forces gathering about him and felt once more the assurance of victory, he declared that if France was to be worthy of him she must cast away pusillani- mous wishes and desire to avenge her offended glory; that the only suitable peace was one which she could command after vic- tory and which would leave her all her conquests. His language showed even those who had zealously cooperated in raising troops that he was the same Napoleon that he had been the year before and that the Russian campaign had taught him nothing. They asked themselves, " When will the war end, if he regains his fortune, and, if he succumbs, what will be the conditions of peace?" Even before Napoleon's preparations for the new campaign were well begun, his attitude showed how little he was inclined to compromise with his enemies. In a conversation with the Aus- trian ambassador, on the last day of 181 2, the only concession he Napo- proposed was the return of Illyria to Austria in case she sue- ^^°^^^ ^*" ceeded in bringing about a peace between France and England. It is true he said that Portugal should be restored to the House of Braganza, but Portugal was already irretrievably lost to him. As to the grand duchy of Warsaw he declared he would not abandon a village of it, adding that if he began by giving up prov- inces his enemies would soon be asking for kingdoms. His forces, however, were inadequate to defend this Grand Empire. The successes of Wellington in 1812, especially the victory of Sala- manca, on July 22, made it impossible to withdraw many of his troops in the Peninsula. On the eastern frontiers of Germany were the remnants of the Grand Army, about 20,000, with 20,000 more on the way, and 17,000 in garrison. The two wings of the army, composed mainly of the Austrian and the Prussian con- THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXV tingents, were still in excellent condition, having escaped the hardships of the campaign. They numbered 66,000, but most of them might soon become enemies. To preserve the Napole- onic hegemony in central Europe a new army must be created. The effect of the news from Russia upon public sentiment in the dependent States was not decisive. In some quarters those who had grown restive under the Napoleonic yoke saw an oppor- tunity to intrigue or to resume a portion of their lost inde- pendence of action. Within the limits of the Rhenish Confed- eration none stirred at first. The army of Wiirttemberg was re- duced in the retreat from 14,000 to 173 officers and 143 men, and when the King was reminded of the obligation to raise his con- tingent to the required standard he hinted to the French minister that the confederate states were bound only so long as Napoleon could protect them. He changed his tone when he saw what France was doing. Bavaria acted more independently and con- ceded only a division, retaining the remainder of her troops in camp near Munich. In Italy it looked as if the situation of 1799 had returned, threatening the collapse of the French power. Murat left the army not long after the departure of Napoleon, and hastened to Naples to save his crown from the disaster which appeared to menace every Napoleonic creation. He was ready to open ne- gotiations with Lord Bentinck in Sicily or with Metternich in Vienna, and hoped to unite all Italy under one crown and to place that crown on his own head. There were many Italians ready to take up the cry, " Italy for the Italians," and to compel the French officials to recross the Alps. Such sentiments found no expression in a popular movement, as the rapidity with which Napoleon reorganized his resources made action dangerous. In Prussia and Austria alone were the consequences of the Russian disaster immediate and portentous. The attitude of the Prussians was a most serious question, for should they wreak their hatred of the French upon the pitiful remnants of the Grand Army hardly a man would reach the Vis- tula. Napoleon assumed that Frederick William would remain a faithful ally and as he passed through Dresden on his way to Paris wrote to the King asking him to increase his contingent and hold back the advancing Russians until the French reinforce- ments should appear. Hardenberg refused, while outwardly holding to the alliance, because he could hardly do otherwise. Aside from the Prussian corps under Yorck, which formed a part of Macdonald's army, the King had no army large enough to attack the French garrisons in the fortresses of the Oder and of Bussia THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 425 the Vistula or in Berlin. At all events, nothing could be done ^^^' without the cooperation of Austria or of Russia. If Prussia was eventually to join Russia, it must be when the Russians had ^^^^-^^ advanced to the Vistula and the Prussian forces had been in- creased. Meanwhile the suspicious glances of the French must discover only attitudes of naive and touching fidelity. For- tunately for Prussia, the French ambassador in Berlin deeply sympathized with the sufferings of Prussia under the Tilsit regime, and was inclined to believe the professions of Harden- berg and the declarations of Frederick William. The Prussian Court was not fully aware how complete had been the destruction of Napoleon's army, when events occurred in the old kingdom of Prussia which hastened the settlement of the great question. Stein, now adviser of the Czar, learned intentions early in November of the approaching ruin of the French army and he had sought to influence Alexander to adopt a European rather than a narrowly Russian policy. He urged that the object of the war had ceased to be defensive, and that it should be to wrest from Napoleon the resources of Germany and to dissolve the Confederation of the Rhine. He realized that a strong party at the Russian Court thought that the defeat of the Grand Army was enough, while another party would be glad to see a peace negotiated with France at the expense of Prussia and on the basis of gaining the Vistula as the western frontier of Russia. Stein's arguments were reinforced by the advice of Count Nes- selrode, a young diplomat who had acquired great influence with Alexander, and who regarded the restriction of France within her "natural" frontiers as the true policy of Russia, guaran- teeing the peace of Europe by a restoration of the balance of power. At the same time Alexander resumed his Polish schemes, which he had been obliged to lay aside in 181 1, although they could not be mentioned openly, because any hint that the king- dom of Poland was to be restored would throw Austria and Prussia into the arms of Napoleon. Moreover, the old Russian party had no sympathy with the Czar's dream of a Polish king- dom ruled as a constitutional monarchy. If the resources of Ger- many were to be taken from Napoleon, how was this to be brought about ? Stein was ready to make a direct appeal to peo- ples, ignoring, if need be, princes. Indeed, he did not mean to preserve the sovereignty of the minor princes if they served the cause of France. To one of his correspondents he declared, " I am sorry that your Excellency spies a Prussian in me. ... I have but one Fatherland, which is called Germany, and since ac- cording to the old constitution, I belonged to it alone, and to no .26 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^y particular part of it, to it alone, and not to any part of it, I am devoted with my whole heart." ^ The day had not come for such 1810-13 ^ thoroughgoing program, and yet it was the North German peo- ples rather than their princes who overthrew the Napoleonic regime. While Stein urged the Czar to carry the war into Germany the governor of Riga tried to convince General Yorck that Prussia should unite with Russia in the conflict with Napoleon. Yorck was first of all a soldier, with unbending ideas in regard to his duty to his King, and, although he hated the French alliance, he had acted loyally during the campaign, so that Napoleon com- mended the behavior of the Prussian troops. He replied to the Russian overtures that, if Prussia abandoned the French alli- ance, she had no assurance in regard to the terms of settlement she might expect from cooperation with Russia. As the days passed he received detailed information of the ruin of the French army. His army of 18,000 troops in excellent condition was a decisive weight in the scale, especially if the Russian army had suffered severely. Late in December Yorck received a letter from the Czar, promising in return for a treaty with Frederick William not to lay down his arms until he had procured for Prus- sia " an aggrandisement of territory such as to enable her to resume the place among the Powers which she had before the war of 1806." At the same time Yorck was informed by those acquainted with the situation in the Russian camp that the Czar might go over to the party which advised peace with France on the basis of the Vistula. Yorck saw that the crisis had arisen, provided for in a secret message sent to his corps during the previous summer, which ordered that in case the French were forced to retreat the Prussian, corps should retire to Graudenz and defend itself against both sides. Yorck could not do this lit- erally, but he signed a Convention at Tauroggen on December 30 by which his corps was to occupy a neutralized strip of Prussian territory until orders arrived from the King, and which provided, furthermore, that under no circumstances would the Prussians attack the Russians before March i. This Convention was known at Potsdam by January 2. Young Prince William ^ viv- idly recalled in later years the air of satisfaction which over- spread the King's countenance when he announced to him and to his brothers the " distressing news that Yorck had capitulated with his corps and that they were prisoners of the Russians." To the French ambassador both the King and Hardenberg pre- iSeeley, III. 17. 2 William I, of Prussia and Germany. THE LAST GREAT VENTURE 427 tended great indignation at the conduct of Yorck and agreed to ^^y' deprive him of command and send him before a court-martial. Perhaps, after all, the King did not relish so brusque an antici- ^^^^' ^ pation of his proper pohcy. To both Napoleon and his enemies the attitude of Austria was of the greatest importance, not only because of the weight of troops which she could throw into the scale, but also because of poUcy of her strong central position, the mountain bastions of the Bo- ^g"®^" hemian border menacing either the advance of Napoleon towards the Niemen or rendering easy a blow at the heart of the Rhenish Confederation. The fact that the Emperor Francis was Na- poleon's father-in-law and that he had for the campaign of 1812 become Napoleon's ally did not determine Austria's attitude finally. The marriage of 1810 had been conceded to save Aus- tria from part of the consequences of her defeat of the year be- fore, and the alliance of 1812 had been accepted only as the best of three possible lines of conduct. If now the interests of Aus- tria should counsel a withdrawal from the alliance, only a mis- taken point of honor could restrain either Metternich or the Em- peror, for Napoleon had given them no reason to be delicate in such matters. When in the summer of 1812 Metternich heard the news of the constant retreat of the Russians and the reported victories of Napoleon he concluded that henceforward Russia was erased from the map of European Powers. At the same time he began to fear a separate treaty between Russia and France. The only way to guard against this was through negotiations for a general pacification. The scheme of a general pacification enabled Aus- tria to decline Napoleon's appeal to the Emperor Francis for effective assistance after the news of disaster replaced the tidings of victory. Napoleon wished Francis to double his auxiliary force and check the advancing Russians in the grand duchy of Warsaw until he could reorganize his own forces. Instead of complying with this request Metternich sent Count Bubna to Paris to represent to Napoleon that the only way to repair the losses of the campaign was through a general pacification. He found that, while Napoleon did not object to an unarmed inter- vention on the part of Austria, he was wholly bent on recovering his lost prestige and would make no substantial concessions. It was the aim of Austria to regain an independent position. This was defined by the Emperor Francis as one of armed neu- trality, from which Austria might pass into a state of war, either as ally of Russia and Prussia or as an ally of France. The latter contingency he regarded as impossible. The essential char- 428 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 'xxv* ^cter of the situation, therefore, was a passage from alliance with Napoleon through armed mediation to war against him. Aus- 1810-13 |.j.j^ ^^g i^y j^Q means sure that a decisive success of Russians and Neutrality Prussians would be to her advantage, for a preponderance of tria^"° Russia would be more dangerous than a preponderance of France, because the preponderance of France was dependent upon the life of a single man of genius. Restrained from immediate ac- tion also by her military and financial weakness, Austria's first step was an armistice, on January 30, with the Russians, permit- ting the withdrawal of the Austrian auxiliary force from War- saw. To the French the excuse was given that this force must be safeguarded for the coming campaign, but the step was in reality the complement of the Convention of Tauroggen. It compelled the hurried retreat of the French as far as Glogau. Two months later a secret convention with the Russians made possible a with- drawal of the Austrian force to Bohemia, to cooperate with the army assembling there to support the policy of armed mediation. Napoleon had begun the war with Russia in order to maintain the Continental System. The terrible disaster which over- whelmed his army not only jeopardized the System, but also en- dangered the Grand Empire. If he defended this with no better judgment than he had shown in defending that, even the French empire might also be imperiled. CHAP. XXVI CHAPTER XXVI THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE THE campaign of 1813 was in one sense a continuation of the campaign of 1812. A similar enthusiasm inspired the Russian and the German peoples to resistance. And yet there ^''^'^■'■' were differences. The Germans had been for years under Na- poleonic domination, as the Russians had not. This fact has given the campaign the name of " The War of Liberation," and has made the year 181 3 the heroic period of German history, w^r of Liberation from the control of Napoleon, however, was not re- tion stricted to Germany. His failure to defend successfully on Ger- man battlefields his Grand Empire led to its ruin in Holland, Spain, and Italy. Even before the year was over, the frontiers of France drawn at Luneville were menaced. And the cam- paign was continued without a pause until April, 1814, when Napoleon was forced to abdicate and the French empire ceased to exist. When it was understood at Berlin how complete was the de- struction of the French army, the cry " Let us free ourselves ! " gained increasing force. Early in January the King authorized overtures to Austria for union in a policy of armed mediation. As French troops still occupied Berlin Frederick William was in a precarious position. On January 22 he rode off to Breslau, while Hardenberg explained to the French that he had gone to raise his contingent for the new campaign. A few days later a call for volunteers was issued, without, however, explaining against whom the volunteers were to fight. Meanwhile Baron vom Stein had entered Konigsberg, the old Prussian capital, armed with a commission from the Emperor Alexander, in order to organize the resources of East and West Prussia. According to Stein's plan the representatives of the estates of the two provinces were assembled to authorize the organization of the Landwehr. He remained in the background, because he was now a Russian official, and General Yorck stood sponsor for a project drawn up by a disciple of Scharnhorst. Acting through Prussian officials at Konigsberg, Stein removed the regulations enforcing the Continental System and raised a loan for Yorck's army. After this was done he returned to the 429 430 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXVI Treaty of Ealiscb Uprising of the Prussians Russian headquarters. His action was disliked by the King, who did not wish his hand forced or the embarrassments of the situation increased. It was not until February 28 that Frederick William, whose thoughts were haunted by the question of the lost Polish prov- inces, reached an understanding with Alexander. This was em- bodied in the secret treaty of Kalisch, according to the terms of which Prussia should be restored to a position as strong rela- tively as that of 1806. The King was not promised the prov- inces incorporated in the grand duchy of Warsaw, except a strip large enough to connect Silesia and West Prussia. His compensation, therefore, would be found within the limits of Germany, an arrangement far better for Prussia. It was also agreed in the treaty that in the coming campaign Russia should furnish 150,000 men and Prussia 80,000. The object of the al- liance, which Austria was invited to join, was to deprive France of control in northern Germany. After waiting two weeks the treaty was published, and a few days later, on March 17, Prussia declared war upon France. Frederick William now issued an appeal to his people, couched in the language of real feeling, telHng them that there was no escape, that their choice lay between an honorable peace and destruction. Bolder spirits, like the philosopher Fichte, cried out that it was not " Victory or death " which would solve the problem, but " Victory anyhow." Already the call for volun- teers had given the people an opportunity to show their feel- ings. The enthusiasm to enlist was astonishing. Niebuhr wrote from Berlin a month before war was declared that " The crowd of volunteers is as great to-day in front of the town hall, as it is before a baker's shop in a famine." The men " asked eagerly whether it was certain they were to be led against the French, and the officers dared not assure them of it except by hints." A Breslau professor, Heinrich Steffens, was more frank, declaring to his students that the war was against Na- poleon, and calling upon them to follow him to the place of en- listment. The tide of popular feeling had risen so high that some feared for the throne of Frederick William if he delayed much longer to give the signal for the national war. The Prussian declaration of war was followed by the organiza- tion of a Landwehr on the principle of universal service. The regular troops had already been reinforced by the addition of the short term men, or Kriimper, who had been trained for this emergency. The brunt of the fighting in the spring campaign fell upon the regulars, but later in the year the Landwehr fought THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 431 so gallantly as to win praise from Yorck, who distrusted all im- ^^^' provised soldiers. The military organization was completed by provision for a Landstnrm, — what the French had called a levee ^^is-ii en masse. In case of invasion all able-bodied men were to seize the arms nearest at hand — ax, scythe, or pitchfork — and de- fend their firesides. If the foe continued to advance, they should not hesitate — so the orders ran — to burn their houses, their supplies, and even their standing grain, to destroy the wells and render the country uninhabitable. As the soldiers assembled in camps, preparing to march against the French, they cheered each other with old German war songs. The uprising also inspired its own poets, especially Ernest Moritz Arndt and Theodor Korner. Arndt had denounced Napoleonic oppression after the downfall of Prussia so violently that he had been obliged to go into exile. In 1812 he had been one of the confidential advisers of Stein. His stirring appeals were already familiar when the war broke out. Korner was a younger man, at the beginning of his career. His father was a Saxon jurist who had been an intimate friend of Schiller. When the call came for volunteers, Korner was connected with the court the- ater at Vienna. He gave up his position and enhsted in the Liitzow Free Corps. His war songs were written on the march and by the bivouac. One of the most famous was finished on the morning of the battle in which he was killed. No sooner had Frederick William and Alexander reached an agreement about their own relations than they placed the other stein in German princes in the dilemma of taking the popular side or Germany being deposed. Here again the influence of Stein, eager to prepare the way for a reorganization of Germany, was appar- ent. A central council of administration, of which he was the head, was formed to govern the states of the Rhenish Confed- eration. The states which joined in the war should be permitted to send delegates, but Hanover — out of deference for England — was exempted from the council's jurisdiction. In April, Napoleon once more asked the Emperor Francis to become his active ally, oflfering Silesia as compensation. Met- ternich treated the proposal as practically terminating the agree- Napoleon ments of 181 2 and restoring Austria to an independent position. J°d aus- He intimated plainly to Narbonne, the French ambassador, once minister of war under Louis XVI, that Napoleon should aban- don his recent annexations in Germany, restore the Illyrian prov- inces to Austria, and add the grand duchy of Warsaw to Prussia in order to have a strong barrier state between France and Rus- sia. When Narbonne asked him if he awaited a first victory 432 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^- of the Allies before announcing such terms, he replied : " You are mistaken ; be sure that the day after a victory we shall speak 1813-14 jj^ ^ g^jjj more definite tone." Metternich now announced both to the Allies and to Napoleon the mediation of Austria. The chance that Prussia could withstand the assaults of Na- poleon had already been improved by the signature of a subsidy treaty between England and Sweden, providing that the Crown Prince, Bernadotte, should put 30,000 troops into the German campaign. The unfortunate corollary of this agreement, which confirmed the promise of Norway made to Bernadotte by Alex- ander the year before, was the adherence of Denmark to the cause of Napoleon, weakening the extreme right of the allied line of advance. The appearance of Bernadotte, an ex-marshal of France, was counted upon to suggest to the French that the coalition did not threaten them, but only the personal domination of Napoleon beyond their frontiers. All through the winter Napoleon had been working with fev- erish energy to replace the army which had perished in the Mos- Napo- cow campaign. He called into service young men who should New^ not have been summoned for over a year. He also recalled Army men who belonged to th>^ conscriptions of the past four years, but who had hitherto been excused from service. Besides men, horses had to be provided, and cannon, muskets, and equipment of all kinds had to be bought or manufactured. To obtain money he ordered the sale of the communal lands, and he even proposed to issue bons, or assignats under a new name, in order to secure an immediate supply of cash equal to the value of the land. By such measures Napoleon brought together at the open- ing of the campaign 226,000 men, a large part of them untrained recruits. The army lacked a strong body of cavalry, a deficiency which Napoleon had occasion to deplore more than once in the coming weeks. ^ Napoleon left Paris on April 15 and hastened to Mainz to complete the organization of his army. Neither Prussians nor Russians could be ready to cope with him before the end of May, because their new levies and their reserves were not yet at hand. Nevertheless, as he took the field earlier than that, they did not hesitate to attack him at Gross-Gorschen near the historic field of Liitzen. The result was a defeat for them, but it was not a Jena, for during the night following nine squad- rons of horse charged straight into the French camp and nearly captured Napoleon and his staff. Three weeks later, on The May 21, at Bautzen, on the border of Silesia, Napoleon was Armistice ^igsim victorious, but his lack of cavalry deprived him of the THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 433 fruits of victory. His troops were in as desperate a situation ^\^' as those of the defeated Prussians and Russians. Thousands of men had fallen out of the French ranks long before Bautzen i^is-ii was reached. His generals were weary of the struggle and peace sentiment at Paris had grown to ominous proportions. Such considerations led him on June 4 to agree to an armistice which was to last until July 20. He thought that in the interval he could bring back Austria into the position of a beggarly de- pendent, grateful for the crumbs which might fall from his im- perial table. If diplomacy failed, his resources at the close of the armistice would, he believed, be so great that he could crush all three powers. During the armistice the only chance of peace was through Napoleon's consent to such terms as his changed circumstances demanded. But he felt it impossible to become simply Em- peror of the French. As he said afterward to Metternich, " Your sovereigns born upon the throne may allow themselves to be beaten twenty times and still return to their capitals, but I cannot do so, for I am a soldier parvenu. My domination will not survive the day I shall cease to be strong, and, conse- quently, to be feared." His Grand Empire, unlike the Con- sulate, rested primarily on force; and if force passed to his enemies, that Empire was doomed, unless both they and he con- cluded that compromise was better than a desperate and final struggle. When Russia made overtures to Austria to join the alliance against Napoleon, Metternich submitted a list of concessions which Austria was ready to demand of Napoleon — the dis- memberment of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the cession of Negotia- Danzig to Prussia, the return of Illyria to Austria, and the in- peace ^"'^ dependence of the Hanseatic cities in northwestern Germany. Two other conditions, the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine and the restoration of Prussia to the position she held in 1806, Austria would urge by every means short of war. Prussia and Russia in a memorandum drawn up on May 16 had gone much further, agreeing upon the separation of Hol- land from France, the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain, and the freedom of Italy from French influence. Such a policy was dictated by the need of English subsidies, and England was unwilHng to accept a peace which should leave either Holland or Spain under the control of Na- poleon. Ten days after the beginning of the armistice both Prussia and Russia signed subsidy treaties with England. Alexander promised not to make peace without England's con- .34 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^- sent. As Prussia had already agreed with Russia not to sign a separate peace, England appeared to have the final word in 1813-14 j.j^g negotiations, putting a serious obstacle in the way of Aus- trian mediation on the basis of the minimum communicated by Metternich. The Austrian demand would at least serve to place Napoleon in his true light before France and Europe. Metternich in his Memoirs, written many years later, put this interpretation upon the policy of Austria. It is summed up in the assurance he is said to have given Alexander, who feared that Napoleon would accept the Austrian terms: "If he declines," said Metternich, " the truce will come to an end, and you will find us among your allies; if he accepts, the negotiations will most certainly show him to be neither wise nor just, and then the result will be the .ims of same." But another interpretation is possible. Metternich was letter- g^jjj anxious to guard against a dangerous increase of Russian power. His desire to restore Prussia to her former boundaries was prompted by the need of placing a stronger barrier across the line of Russian advance. If a preliminary treaty were made on the basis of the Austrian minimum, it was unlikely that in the negotiations for a general pacification Napoleon alone would be expected to make further concessions. The pledges which the Allies had made to each other did not form a chain strong enough to resist every sorf of strain. Moreover, the English ministers were not incapable of accepting less than their ideal of a sound peace. In instructions to Lord Aberdeen, about to start for Vienna, they said that " a general peace, in order to provide adequately for the tranquillity and independence of Europe, ought ... to confine France at least within the Pyre- nees, the Alps, and the Rhine. ... If, however, the Powers most immediately concerned should determine, rather than en- counter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to trust for their own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it has never been the policy of the British Government to dictate to other States a perseverance in war, which they did not themselves recognize to be essential to their own as well as to the common safety." ^ It may well be, therefore, that Metternich was honest in his proposals. He of course desired the ruin of a Grand Empire constructed chiefly at the expense of the Hapsburg power. He was ready to take what he could get, but willing also to accept less than the results a fortunate war might bring, because it was not certain that the war would be fortunate. At all events 1 Quoted by Rose, II, 301, note. THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 435 the negotiations would afford time to complete Austria's prep- ^^^" arations for war. The Allies decided to accept Austrian mediation on the ex- 1813-14 press understanding that Austria would declare war upon Na- Napoleon poleon, if at the expiration of the armistice he should not agree t°rni^^* to the minimum proposed.^ Metternich's next task was to obtain from him an acceptance of Austrian mediation. An interview took place at Dresden. The discussion lasted nine hours, and at times Napoleon became passionate and abusive. He hinted that Metternich had been bribed by British gold and blurted out that his marriage with Marie Louise had been a foolish blunder. When Metternich reminded him that France was as necessary to him as he to France, and asked what he would do when " this army of boys that you levied but yester- day should be swept away," Napoleon, his features distorted with rage, cried out, " You are no soldier, and you do not know what goes on in the mind of a soldier. I was brought up in the field, and a man such as I am does not concern himself much about the lives of a million men." With that he threw his hat on the floor. A year before Metternich might have courteously picked it up, but he merely said, " Why have you chosen to say this to me within these four walls ; open the doors, and let your words sound from one end of France to the other. The cause I represent will not lose thereby." Before Metternich left Dres- den he procured from Napoleon a formal renunciation of the alliance of 1812, an acceptance of Austria's mediation, and a verbal promise not to denounce the armistice until August 10. Metternich did not state the conditions upon which Austria would insist, leaving this for the congress which it was pro- posed to open at Prague for the discussion of preliminaries of peace. At this juncture the successes of Wellington in Spain, ending in the complete overthrow of the French at Vittoria on June 21, made Metternich less anxious for peace, because the chances vittoria of a fortunate war were improved. Wellington's campaign in 1813 consisted of a flanking operation starting from the moun- tainous region of northeastern Portugal and compelling the French to abandon first the line of the Douro and then of the Ebro. King Joseph hastily left Madrid, followed by crowds of French dependents and countless wagons loaded with the spoils of the Spanish occupation. The French army, commanded by Jourdan, halted at Vittoria. Wellington seized the road to San 2 A treaty was signed at Reichenbach on June 27. THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXVI Sebastian, so that when the French finally gave way they had no escape except by a difficult path over the mountains to Pam- peluna. The victors captured thousands of wagons full of val- uables, besides a treasure chest containing about twenty-five million francs. The result of the battle was the loss of north- ern Spain, and King Joseph was ordered into retirement. The news of Vittoria reached Napoleon just after he had accepted Austria's mediation. In spite of his efforts the details were soon known in Dresden and were carried to Metternich and to the camp of the Allies. The Congress of Prague was simply a blind. Prussia and Russia waited impatiently for its' expiration in order that they might claim from Austria the promised assistance. Napoleon at first would send no one to Prague with powers to negotiate, and tried to reach a separate understanding with Alexander. The first week in August was over before he sent for Austria's terms. Metternich, now convinced that war was advisable, for- warded an ultimatum containing not only the four points of his minimum, but also the two others, with the statement that if they were not conceded by midnight of August lo, Austria would join the Allies. Napoleon made no formal reply until the eleventh, but intimated that he would concede the dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw, make Danzig a free city, and return Illyria without Trieste to Austria. Promptly at midnight orders were issued to light alarm fires on the Bohemian frontier, and two days later the Emperor Francis declared war. When the armistice ended both Napoleon and his enemies were far better prepared for a decisive struggle than they had been in the spring. Napoleon was now strong in cavalry and artillery, and his only lack was in officers for the immense army of nearly half a million which he had assembled. His plan was to defend the line of the Elbe until, advancing by the left, his troops could sweep across Prussia and relieve the garrisons on the Oder. Davout was at Hamburg, next to him stood the " Army of Berlin," thrown forward beyond the Elbe, while Ney and Macdonald were in Silesia. The bulk of Napoleon's troops lay between Dresden and Gorlitz in Silesia. The allied army was somewhat larger than that of the French. Its largest division, about 250,000 men, was assembled under command of Prince Schwarzenberg in Bohemia. With this army were the Emperor Francis, the Czar Alexander, King Frederick William, and their military advisers, including Gen- eral Moreau. Its position menaced Napoleon's communications with France. Another army, of about 100,000, was stationed in THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 437 Silesia under Bliicher; and a third, of 127,000, under Berna- ^^" dotte in northern Germany. According to the plan of opera- — tions the army against which Napoleon's main army should ad- ^^is-ii vance, with him in command, should fall back, while the other Plan two should push forward and attack his marshals. The final camp^aign struggle should come only after the arrival of the Russian re- serves, and the concentration of the three armies, giving the Allies such a superiority as to make the result certain. Napo- leon had the advantage of operating on inner lines, but this would be useless if the Allies persistently avoided a decisive battle and allowed him to wear his soldiers out in forced marches from one field to another. The plan of the Allies proved successful. They suffered only one defeat — at Dresden, on August 26 — and this when they failed to carry out their plan and persisted in attacking the city although they were aware that Napoleon had returned to it. Their defeat, however, was offset by Napoleon's loss of a whole Dresden corps, which was sent to pursue them and was surrounded in the mountains and captured. His possession of the inner lines be- came a positive disadvantage, for it tempted him to lead his troops first in one direction and then in another, vainly seeking an enemy which vanished before him. On one occasion the Imperial Guard had to march forty leagues in forty-eight hours. Napoleon went from Dresden to Silesia so many times that even the peasants began to jeer at him, calling him the Bautzen mes- senger. Scarcely a month had passed and 40,000 men were in the hospitals. Of the 400,000 he had on August 10 only 250,000 answered at roll call. Partisan bands began to attack his line of communications. His generals were incapable of stemming the tide of defeat, and even he seemed to have lost the power of decision. As September drew to a close, Schwarzenberg, his army strengthened by the Russian reserves, decided to march upon Leipzig, a move which would seriously threaten Napoleon's com- munications and force him to abandon the line of the Elbe. At the same time Blucher, leaving a few soldiers in front of Baut- zen to mask the movement, began a daring flank march across the front of Napoleon's lines toward the Elbe, intending to unite with Bernadotte and advance upon Leipzig from the north. On October 3 he forced the passage of the river near Wittenberg. The news of these movements disconcerted Napoleon. He still hoped that the armies which were converging upon him might be driven to retreat by threatening to cut them off from Berlin or from Bohemia. After several days of hesitation he realized .38 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^- that the decisive struggle was to take place at Leipzig. Rumors now reached him of the defection of Bavaria, which signed a 1813-14 treaty with Austria on October 8, promising a contingent of 30,000 troops, lattie of The battle of Leipzig was a series of battles which began on ■eipzig October 14 and ended four days later. Napoleon had little chance of victory except through a failure of the Allies to use their forces effectively. They mustered 300,000, while at most he had 200,000, and many of them half starved and exhausted by weeks of marching over muddy roads and rainsoaked fields. On October 16 Bliicher's desperate struggle for the village of Mockern, on the northern side of Leipzig, kept Napoleon from concentrating an army large enough to repel the multitudes un- der Schwarzenberg, who was advancing from the east and south- east. The day was not exactly a defeat, but it rendered defeat inevitable. Napoleon should have retreated at once, but he re- solved to tempt fortune again. The battle of the eighteenth was merely a disastrous repetition of the struggle two days before. Bernadotte filled in the gap between Bliicher and Schwarzenberg. The Saxon contingent of Napoleon's army went over to the Allies on the open field. When night came on Napoleon or- dered the retreat, and the army streamed into Leipzig through three gates, only to be thrown into utter confusion in the effort to pour out through the single western gate and over the Elster bridge. A temporary bridge which had been thrown across the river broke down, followed by a worse misfortune when a cor- poral of engineers blew up the regular bridge too soon, cutting off the rear guard and thousands of stragglers. The pursuit was not pushed, although a Bavarian force, supported by Austrians, attempted to bar the route at Hanau. When the Rhine was reached, early in November, only 40,000 troops, and about as many stragglers, were all that were left of the half million which France and her dependent States had offered to stay the tottering structure of Napoleon's Grand Empire. A momentary prospect of peace came in November at Frank- fort, when Metternich sent through Baron Saint Aignan an in- formal proposal on the basis of the frontiers of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. He did this with the consent of the iffers of representatives of Russia and Prussia, and with no protest from ■eace LQ^d Aberdeen, the English representative. Napoleon's only reply was to suggest a place for the congress; he did not men- tion the basis. Metternich then drew up a manifesto to the French people, suggesting similar terms, and declaring that " the Allied Powers were not at war with France, but with that THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 439 haughtily announced preponderance . . . which has too long ^^^' been exercised without the boundaries of his [Napoleon's] Em- pire." Metternich's aim was to dissociate Napoleon's cause "^^'^^ from the cause of France and so deprive him of the support of public opinion. The day after his conversation with Saint Aignan he wrote to Caulaincourt, one of Napoleon's diplomatic agents, that " France will never sign a more fortunate peace than that which the Powers will make to-day. . . . New suc- cesses may extend their views." And he added, " But the Em- peror Napoleon will not make peace. There is my profession of faith, and I shall never be happier than if I am wrong." Before the manifesto was issued its terms were changed, because the new successes had come. The Dutch had risen, compelling the French to withdraw hastily, and that stimulated England to in- sist that France, on the side of Holland and Belgium at least, should return to her " ancient limits." England did not mean to give up the Dutch colonies taken during the war, and wished to offer Holland compensation on the Continent. She also urged the need of establishing a barrier state north of France strong enough to defend itself. Accordingly, when the manifesto was issued (December i), its terms were ominously ambiguous, only promising to " the French Empire an extent of territory which France never knew under her kings." The campaign of 1813 not merely destroyed the power of Na- poleon beyond the Rhine, it laid the basis for a reorganization of Germany satisfactory to Austria and in direct opposition to conse- the schemes of Stein and other Prussian leaders. In the Treaties f^r^ger- of Teplitz, signed on September 9, confirming the earlier treaties many upon which the coalition was founded, there was a clause which provided for the " entire and absolute independence " of the states which lay between the reconstituted frontiers of Austria and Prussia. Hardenberg understood these words to mean in- dependence of French control, but Metternich used them in an- other sense, which he made plain by guaranteeing to Bavaria full sovereignty over all her territories. The same promise was made to other German princes before the close of the year. In consequence, although the Holy Roman Empire could not be restored, even if the Hapsburgs wished it, Austrian ascendancy in Germany was perpetuated for another generation by strength- ening the particularism of the minor states, which were naturally opposed to Prussian schemes of unification. One after another the members of the Confederation of the Rhine made their peace with the Allies. The States which Na- poleon had created in Germany promptly collapsed. King Je- 440 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^- rome fled from Cassel and the kingdom of Westphalia was dis- solved into its original elements. A similar fate overtook the 1813-14 grand duchy of Berg and the grand duchy of Frankfort. Nor wtre Napoleon's misfortunes limited to Germany and Holland. In Italy the Austrians drove Prince Eugene behind the Adige and recovered control of part of Venetia and Dalmatia. After the battle of Leipzig Murat had hastened back to Naples not merely to save his throne, but to scheme for a union of Italy under his crown. Wellington had captured Pampeluna and San Sebastian and had crossed the frontier into France. The posi- tion was not far different from what it had been in the summer of 1799. As the news reached Paris of all these misfortunes, men asked whether the Emperor was capable of learning the les- opposi- son of his failures. They did not long remain in doubt. He France Seemed to have lost all sense of what was possible and refused to wai to believe that he must now become a mere king. He told his councilors of state bluntly that they talked of peace too much. " Do you wish," said he, " to descend from the rank where I have placed France and become a simple monarchy? This is what will happen if you lose Holland. We need the mouths of the rivers and this northern barrier. . . ." He found the Legis- lative Body still less eager to renew the adventure. In a report which they adopted by an overwhelming majority late in Decem- ber they protested against the attempt to hold in subjection peoples who wished to control their own destinies, and declared that the French were ready to sacrifice themselves to preserve their independence and the integrity of their territory, but for no other object. Such bold language enraged Napoleon and he closed the session. At the New Year's reception he told the deputies that they were simple delegates of departments, while he represented the nation, and asserted that they had done the country more harm than the loss of two battles between Paris and the frontier. This outburst alienated public opinion more than the misfortunes of 1812 and 1813. Desperate expedients were used to raise money and men for a new campaign. Half of the soldiers who had survived the campaign of Leipzig had perished of typhus fever in December and the army numbered only 50,000. The Senate was ready with its votes of more hundreds of thousands to be slain in other futile struggles. It even voted 300,000 taken from the conscrip- tions of the last twelve years, chiefly men of family. To sacri- fice these older conscripts would be to decimate a whole genera- tion. Fortunately not many responded to the summons. By THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 44 January only 63,000 had been assembled, and Napoleon never ^J^^" had more than 90,000 men at any time during the campaign. The men he did obtain he could not equip properly, and many of I813-14 them had to search the battlefields for muskets. Money was equally hard to get. The real estate tax was in- creased fifty per cent, and a quarter of all official salaries was withheld. Government bonds sank to fifty francs and a half. Unable to draw sufficient resources from France and without dependent states upon which to levy tribute, Napoleon was forced to use a large part of his hoarded coin, of which he had 30,000,000 francs left. The Italian situation became more desperate early in January, when Murat signed a treaty of alliance with Austria, attempting to profit as Bernadotte had done in 181 2. Napoleon had already tried to make terms with Pope Pius VII, but the Pope insisted upon returning to Rome as a preliminary. Under the circum- stances it was doubtful if Prince Eugene could successfully de- fend northern Italy. Napoleon did not leave Paris until January 25, when the Al- lies had already driven his generals back beyond the Moselle and the Meuse. The Prussians had advanced into the region be- campaign tween the upper Marne and the Seine, hoping to draw after them the Austrians in a movement upon Paris. The Austrians had political reasons for not being in haste, especially the knowledge that Alexander cherished the design of placing Bernadotte on the French throne. Metternich preferred to sign a peace with Na- poleon rather than to see a protege of Russia profit by the com- mon sacrifices. The consequence was that the campaign, which opened on January 29 at Brienne, where Napoleon had once been a student, and closed on March 30 at the gates of Paris, was a strange mixture of warfare, diplomacy, and intrigue. The military operations cannot be understood without taking account of the changing attitudes of Alexander and Metternich upon the fundamental issues of the conflict, nor can the course of diplo- macy be followed without weighing the influence of successive victories and defeats. The brief struggle of 1814 has been called the " most glorious of Napoleon's campaigns," because, undaunted by his scanty means, he displayed a resourcefulness, an energy, and a rapidity of action, which more than once intimidated his opponents, al- though their numbers were vastly superior. But his victories, however brilliant, were worse than useless, for they only post- poned the day of ultimate defeat and encouraged him to persist until defeat meant deposition. The incidents of February fur- of 1814 42 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^- nish unmistakable illustrations of this. Early in the month Na- poleon gave Caulaincourt, now his minister of foreign affairs, 1813-14 carte blanche to sign a treaty of peace with the Allies at a con- gress at Chatillon which had grown out of the negotiations begun at Frankfort. This passing mood was the consequence of his defeat at La Rothiere, the first real battle of the campaign. When Caulaincourt asked for definite instructions, Napoleon re- fused them, for^ie had meanwhile discovered an opportunity to turn the tables on Bliicher, who had split up his army and was marching in fancied security on a road running west between the valleys of the Marne and the Seine. On successive days, Feb- ruary lo, II, 12, and 14, Napoleon attacked the different sections of the Prussian army, broke them up and inflicted losses of 16,000 men. His success so alarmed the Allies that they thought seriously of peace, but he rejected their terms with scorn. He never had another offer. Late in March he formed the plan of moving eastward, in he AUies order to threaten the communications of the allied armies with 1 Pans Germany, and compel them to retire to the frontier. Their first thought was to unite and crush him, but they learned that Paris was in a desperate situation and that the British had captured Bordeaux. They accordingly decided to march straight upon the capital. After a battle in the northern suburbs on March 30 the Prussians gained the heights of Montmartre, which com- manded the city. Napoleon had discovered his blunder a day or two before, and made extraordinary efforts to regain Paris in time. Finally he drove on ahead of his army, but he only suc- ceeded in reaching a point on the Fontainebleau road ten miles south of the city when he heard the news of the surrender. On March 31 Alexander and Frederick William entered Paris in triumph, while Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau. Alexander was the most influential personage among the Al- lies, owing this position to the fact that in 1812 he had com- passed the overthrow of the Grand Army and in 1813 had de- livered Germany. He was not always able to carry through his schemes, but the initiative appeared to be his. When the ques- tion of the throne of France was raised, he was not ready to give the Bourbons his support. They had been proclaimed at Bor- deaux and at Lyons, and as the Allies marched through the streets of Paris a small group of royalists had raised the cry " Long live the Bourbons ! " But it seemed to the Allies doubt- ful whether the return of that family would offer guarantees of a stable settlement and a permanent peace. The obstinate re- sistance of Napoleon had, however, convinced them that it was THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 443 useless to negotiate with him unless they were ready to resume ^^^' the struggle after a brief truce. A regency, with the King of Rome as titular ruler, was a possibility. Bernadotte was in i^is-ii Alexander's mind another possibility. It was the arguments of Talleyrand, Napoleon's ex-minister of foreign affairs, which turned the scale in favor of the Bourbons. Europe, he saw, wished assurance that France would not simply wait for strength to resume the ventures of the past twenty years, and that she had renounced the spirit of domination which had carried her armies far from her ancient frontiers. He believed that the presence of Louis XVIII on the throne would furnish this as- surance. The Bourbons were associated with the ancient boun- daries which Europe wished again to impose upon France. The spirit of revolutionary propaganda which had driven Louis XVI from the throne and had threatened every other monarchy in Europe was naturally abhorred by his brother. Moreover, under the old law of Europe, the right of Louis XVIII to the succession was complete, so that in him the principle of legiti- macy would receive embodiment. Talleyrand also believed that the presence of Louis on the throne would guarantee France against schemes of dismemberment, which Prussia, at least, might entertain, remembering the bitter experiences of 1807. Talleyrand assured Alexander that, if the Allies would agree not to negotiate with Napoleon, the constituted authorities would call Louis XVIII to the throne. Accordingly, a few hours later a proclamation of the Allies was read, declaring that they would not treat with Napoleon nor with any of his family. The way was now open for the restoration of the Bourbons. On April i Talleyrand, as vice-grand-elector, called together the Senate, which proceeded to appoint a provisional government of five members, including, besides Talleyrand, the Abbe de Mon- tesquiou, a staunch royalist who had been a distinguished deputy of the Constituent Assembly. On the following day the Senate formally deposed Napoleon and deprived his family of all rights to the throne, prefacing the act by a long list of accusations of tyranny and cruelty, a pubHc confession of their own cowardice in maintaining silence hitherto. The provisional government is- sued an appeal to the army, declaring that France had broken the yoke under which all had groaned for years, and releasing the soldiers from their oath of obedience to Napoleon. Napoleon, on his return to Fontainebleau, was advised by his marshals to retreat towards the Loire. The Empress had al- Napoleon ready taken refuge at Blois. But, although he had scarcely 40,- taineweau 000 men, and desertion was reaching alarming proportions, he 44 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP, still hoped to defeat the Allies before Paris, believing that the - city would rise in his favor and would render the position of the 1813-14 allied army precarious. This plan was rejected by his marshals, who in sheer weariness resolved to abandon the struggle. Yield- ing to their arguments and appeals, he signed an abdication in favor of his son and the Empress Regent. Although the marshals did not wish to continue the struggle, they were unwilling to exchange the empire for a monarchy of the Bourbons. This left the situation obscure, notwithstanding the acts of the Senate and of the provisional government. Both Alexander and Napoleon understood this. Napoleon concluded therefore to send Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt to Paris with the message of abdication, expecting either that Alexander would be influenced by the attitude of the army, and would withdraw his support from the project of restoring the Bourbons, or that the marshals, indignant at the turn of affairs, would return to Fontainebleau ready to fight. Meanwhile, Marmont, who had defended Paris against the Allies, and whose troops lay nearest Paris, had been persuaded by the provisional government to render further resistance impossible by marching his division out of Napoleon's reach and within the lines of the allied army. The interview with Alexander lasted far into the night of April 4 and he seemed to waver. Talleyrand reminded him that the provisional government had taken its attitude because of the assurances of the Allies, and that it was impossible to turn back. Early in the morning word was brought that during the night Marmont's troops had marched to Versailles and were within the allied lines. With Alexander this settled the matter; the army was no longer a decisive factor. The next day, on the basis of a report made by the provisional government, the Senate adopted a constitution, declaring in its second article that " the French people freely calls ta the throne of France Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, brother of the late king* . . ." The principle of the Revolution was thus affirmed,' as well as Tal- leyrand's principle of legitimacy. Other articles provided for the machinery of a representative government somewhat more liberal than that which Louis afterward granted, and safe- guarded the interests of those who had profited by the Revolu- tion, including the possessors of nationalized lands or Napoleonic titles. After voting themselves into the new Senate, the sena- tors arranged that Louis should be proclaimed king as soon as he accepted the constitution. Nothing was left for Napoleon but to make his abdication unconditional; although, had his marshals been willing to follow THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE 445 him, he might have retired to Orleans and attempted to continue ^^^" the struggle. With this unconditional abdication in his hands, Caulaincourt negotiated a treaty with the Allies on April 11, I813-14 according to which Napoleon was to retain his title as Emperor Abdica- and to receive the island of Elba in full sovereignty as a resi- Napoleon dence, with an income of two million francs charged on the French budget. The princes of his family were also provided for. He left Fontainebleau on April 20, after taking a pathetic leave of the Old Guard, and set out for Elba. The rapidity with which his star sank until it disappeared below the horizon might well astonish his contemporaries. When his Grand Army crossed the Niemen in June, 18 12, his power seemed boundless. Within two years his dominion was limited to Elba, an island nineteen miles long and six miles wide. But his fall was not so sudden as it appeared; its causes were already at work after the seizure of Spain in 1808, if not after the overthrow of Prussia the year before. Whether it was des- tiny or simply poor statesmanship, he so exaggerated all that was pernicious in the foreign policy of the Convention and the Di- rectory, that the permanence of his rule was impossible. CHAPTER XXVII CHAP. XXVII Return of the Bour- bons THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE WHEN Napoleon took his departure for Elba a two-fold task confronted the statesmen of France and of Europe. In France the problem was to find a working compromise be- tween the principles of the Revolution and the claims of the Old Regime. A whole generation of Frenchmen had grown up in complete ignorance of the Bourbons, and with the majority of the people it was only weariness of the interminable wars that had reconciled them to the return of their ancient kings. In Europe also effort must be made to reconcile the old and the new. It was impossible to undo all that the Revolution and its imperial successor had accomplished, especially because too many countries or reigning families had profited by the changes. The first of the Bourbon princes to reach Paris was Charles, Count of Artois, who had left the country immediately after the fall of the Bastille and had never returned. When he entered the city on April 12, he was astonished, moved even to tears, by the enthusiasm of his reception, which at the same time puzzled and disconcerted the leaders of the provisional government. He took advantage of it to avoid committing himself in detail upon the senatorial constitution. His popularity was increased by a phrase put into his mouth by Count Beugnot, minister of the interior, one of Napoleon's ablest administrators — " Nothing is changed, except that there is one Frenchman more." The prince was proclaimed by the Senate lieutenant-general of the kingdom and was entrusted with the government. He declared that he had examined the constitution, and that, while his brother had not authorized him to accept it, he pledged his brother to main- tain a representative government, with two chambers, to create an independent judiciary, and to guarantee the liberties of the person, of the press, and of public worship. Louis XVIII would, he declared, preserve ranks and pensions, would regard as irrevocable the sales of public lands, and would disquiet none, not even the regicides, on account of their previous political conduct. When the King reached St. Ouen, near Paris, he is- sued a declaration repeating these promises, but treating the senatorial constitution as hastily drawn and requiring revision, 446 THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 447 which he would give with the assistance of a commission of sen- ^xvii ators and members of the Legislative Body. When the constitution, or Constitutional Charter, was pro- I814-15 claimed a month later, it came as a grant from Louis, " by the The Grace of God King of France and Navarre," and was dated " in ^^^^^" the nineteenth year of our reign." To deprive the concession of representative government of any semblance of recognizing revolutionary principles, precedents were sought in the " Fields of March " and " Fields of May " of Carolingian times or in the assemblies of the third estate during the Middle Ages. Such absurdities were, perhaps, needed to " save the face " of the re- stored Bourbons, and should not weigh heavily in any judgment passed on the new constitutional regime. The new regime preserved the essential conquests of the Rev- olution, with the exception of the democratic republic, which Napoleon had destroyed. The question, who granted the con- stitution, was not as important as whether it might serve as an instrument of liberal monarchical government. The event proved that it contained such possibilities. The credit for this, of course, is due primarily to Talleyrand and his associates. If the new government be compared with that which had existed in France since 1802, the Restoration, in spite of its reactionary tendencies, appears as a liberal revolution, for the Napoleonic system had degenerated into an unrestricted autocracy, al- though most of its acts of administration were enlightened. In two or three features the Charter was distinctly reac- tionary as compared with the senatorial project. It declared that the Roman Catholic religion was the religion of the State, although freedom of worship was guaranteed, and payment of stipends was promised to ministers of other Christian sects. The initiative in legislation was formally reserved to the King, instead of being shared with the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies, which replaced the Senate and the Legislative Body. A heavy property qualification, the payment of a direct tax of 1000 francs, reduced the number of men eligible to the position of deputy to about 5,000, actually excluding the president of the existing Legislative Body. No one could be a member of the electoral colleges for the selection of deputies unless he paid 300 francs in direct taxes. The organization of electoral col- leges and the qualifications of voters was left to be determined by law. The new royal administration was, like the Charter, mainly a continuation. Of the ministers appointed on April 3 by the The New provisional government Baron Louis remained at the finances, ^^'^^^^^ 448 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. Malouet at the marine, and Dupont at the war office. Talley- rand passed from the provisional government to the ministry of 1814-15 foreign affairs and the Abbe de Montesquiou to the ministry of the interior, while Beugnot, temporarily entrusted with this of- fice, became director general of the police. Dupont a little later yielded his place to Marshal Soult, who had commanded in the south against Wellington. Only about two thousand emigrants received appointments in the various administrative services ; and only 37 of them to prefectures or sub-prefectures, although Montesquiou appointed 45 prefects and 160 sub-prefects. The new government was lavish with promises, but preferred trained administrators to rancorous and ignorant partisans. The government was not so successful in dealing with the far more delicate problem of the army. Since 1795 the army had counted for something in politics, and even Napoleon had to reckon with its attitude. The calamities of the last three years had temporarily diminished its influence, but the return of peace brought back about 120,000 veterans, held as prisoners of war or retained as garrisons of German fortresses. They strength- The ened the Bonapartist feeling of the men who had followed Na- ^^"^^ poleon in his last campaign and who detested the white flag of Bourbon France. It was said that rather than surrender their imperial tri-color banners they burned the staff and the silk, mingling the ashes with their wine, while they secreted the eagles in their barracks. When the army was put upon a peace footing, its numbers were reduced for reasons of economy to 200,000. One consequence was the retirement of 12,000 officers on half pay, with little chance of being restored again to the active list. As the half pay of a captain was only y^ francs a month and a lieutenant's pay 44, these officers were in actual distress. The soldiers who were discharged were sent home in rags. Unfortunately, also, the government was not consistently economical, for it reconstituted the military household of the old regime at an expense of twenty millions, at the same time affronting by such a step the Imperial Guard and the National Guard of Paris, each of which expected to be entrusted with the defense of the King. Appointments in the army were demanded by emigrant officers, who insisted that in reckoning seniority their years of absence should be counted, with the result that a man who at the time of his emigration was a captain returned to the army as a brigadier-general. From July 1814 to Febru- ary 18 1 5, 61 generals of division, 150 brigadiers, and 2,000 supe- rior officers, were appointed in this way. In its management of the finances the new administration THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 449 acted honorably toward the creditors of the Empire, ignoring xxvii the clamors of many ultras who demanded at least a partial re- pudiation of imperial debts. The floating debt of 500 or 600 mil- 1814-15 lions was provided for by the issue of notes bearing interest at The eight per cent, and redeemable in three years, with the remainder ^^"^°°^^ of the national forests and common lands as security. Although the royalists during the final struggle had freely promised the abolition of the obnoxious indirect taxes, or droits reunis, the government was obliged to collect them. At first the discontent manifested itself in riotous attacks upon the collectors and not a few were seriously injured. The success with which the ad- ministration carried the country through the period of transi- tion caused the government securities to rise to 78. Still more perplexing was the problem of French industry, which had enjoyed a special form of protection under the Con- tinental System. It was impossible to enforce laws for the ex- clusion of English and colonial products when all the frontiers industry were open because of the invasion of the allied armies. The price of sugar in Paris fell to 38 cents a pound, although the tariff was 44 cents. The new administration did not sympathize with the aims of the Continental System and was ready to abandon it in spite of the advantages which many French manu- facturers had drawn from it. Ten days after he entered Paris the Count of Artois, on the advice of the Council of State, es- tablished moderate rates on coffee, sugar, cocoa, spices, and dye- stuffs, with a simple weighing charge on raw cotton. The man- ufacturers raised an outcry, because they had paid more for their supplies of cotton and saw themselves confronted by a loss. In- deed, the ministry was more liberal than either the administra- tive officers, accustomed to the meddlesome practices of the Continental System, or the manufacturers, who did not dare face competition with the English. They did not believe that a moderate tariff on cotton thread and cloth would be a sufficient protection, and demanded the maintenance of the prohibitions characteristic of Revolutionary and Napoleonic legislation. When a new tariff was adopted by the Chambers in December, they obliged the government to yield not only in regard to cot- ton, but also as to other products, Hke the manufactures of iron. Something was to be said on the side of manufacturers who be- cause of the wars of the last two decades were almost a genera- tion behind the English manufacturers in methods of production. An irritating controversy was raised in regard to the lands formerly owned by the Church and the emigrants. In July two Public lawyers published a memoir arguing that the sales could be ^^^^^ 450 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE xxvii annulled. Although the Count of Artois, speaking for the King, and the King himself, both in the Declaration of St. Ouen and 1814-15 -j^ ^Yie Constitutional Charter, had declared the titles inviolable, the holders were alarmed and anxious to obtain a guarantee from the Chamber of Deputies. The method they chose was by peti- tion, alleging the injury caused by the state of uncertainty. The plan was successful, for the chamber adopted an order of the day reaffirming the principle that titles were unassailable. The question was, however, reopened when the King desired to re- store certain unsold lands, notably forests, which had once be- longed to the nobles. The minister who proposed the measure appeared to argue that the emigrants had pursued the correct line of conduct and to hint that the King wished to restore all their lands. His speech raised a storm of protest. While the matter was before the Chamber of Peers, Marshal Macdonald suggested that the measure be accompanied by a grant of annui- ties to those whose lands could not be restored, as well as to the nobles of the Empire who had lost their military endowments with the shrinking of the frontiers of France. This would have anticipated the " milliard " ^ of 1825 and would have set the con- troversy at rest, but many of the nobles wished all or none. Moreover, the State was too poor to indulge in such generosity to the losers in the strife of the last quarter-century. The prin- cipal measure was adopted and restored to the nobles about 850,- 000 acres. PubHc opinion was also alarmed by an ordinance of Beugnot, director-general of police, strictly forbidding all save the most necessary labors on Sunday and festal days, and requiring even Religious inns and restaurants to sell nothing during the hours of religious service. It was said that the Bourbon princes wished to intro- duce the quiet of the EngHsh Sabbath. But the change from the habits of the Empire was too brusk, and a milder set of reg- ulations was substituted by law. The reestablishment of the censorship, opposed by a strong minority in the Chamber of Dep- uties, threatened the newly recovered liberty of the press. The law permitted the director-general of publications, or any pre- fect, to require the examination of all except books or learned reports, episcopal allocutions, and the like, before they were printed. Journals must receive authorization. Each printer and publisher must also be officially authorized to pursue his calling, and if he violated the laws his permit could be taken away, a punishment tantamount to financial ruin, 1 Added to the national debt, the interest being credited to those whose lands had been confiscated during the Revolution. Contro- versy THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 451 Fewer blunders would have been made, had regular cabinet SSvii councils been held. As it was each minister dealt directly with the King, and his colleagues were often not aware of the deci- 18U-15 sions until the affair was beyond recall. No wonder the govern- ment fell into a condition described by a wit of the day as " pa- ternal anarchy." The blunders of the government received a dubious coloring from the personal attitude of the princes and the emigrants. The Count of Artois maintained a separate and opposition court, personal openly deploring the compromises of the Charter and looking Jealousies forward evidently to a more complete restoration of the old regime. His repeated protests against the existence of the im- perial ornaments in the Tuileries finally exasperated his brother, who retorted that unless such talk ceased he would place Na- poleon's bust over his mantelpiece. The old nobihty had the air of looking upon the imperial dukes and duchesses, counts and countesses, as upstarts. Marie Antoinette's daughter, the Duchess of Angouleme, treated the Princess of Moskowa, wife of Marshal Ney, and daughter of a femme de chambre of the Queen who had committed suicide at the news of the Queen's execution, with a little of the condescension natural toward an old servant of the family. The anniversary of the death of Louis XVI was celebrated by transferring the remains of the unfortunate King and Queen to the crypt of the Basilica of St. Denis, the ancient royal burial-place, and the rumor spread that ardent royalists were planning a massacre of ex-Jacobins as a fitting sacrifice to the shades of the murdered monarchs. The plot was the creation of haunted imaginations, but the danger seemed so imminent that no less a personage than Carnot forti- fied himself in his apartments and watched all night. When the King first returned, men like Carnot and Ney had rallied sincerely to the monarchy, and a large minority of think- ing people considered the restoration as the most feasible solution of the problem. The task of the Bourbons was to win the masses of the population, or, at least, to refrain from uniting the ele- ments of an opposition and arousing it to action. In this they failed, and as the summer and autumn wore on their friends grew cold, while their enemies increased. The atmosphere became heavy with plots, even before the landing of Napoleon on the southern coast tumbled over the new regime like a house of cards. In the management of the difficult relations of France with her late enemies the Bourbon government was astonishingly successful. Louis XVIII took a deep interest in these ques- 452 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXVII Peace of Paris Congress of Vienna tions and rose to the level of the best French tradition. He did not act like a pretender who had stolen in with the baggage of the allied army. He had the advice of Talleyrand, one of the clearest-sighted and most skilful diplomats of the day. The first task was the modest one of transforming the armistice into a peace, which was done on May 30 by the Treaty of Paris. The treaty naturally included statements concerning the future of territories long a part of France but which the King was now obliged to renounce. Secret articles, accordingly, provided that the Belgian lands should be united to Holland and that the rest of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine should be used to compensate Prussia and other German States. Piedmont, Nice, and Savoy, except a small part which France retained, were restored to the King of Sardinia, while his relations with Genoa were left for later settlement. The remainder of northern Italy was assigned to Austria. In the open articles France aban- doned to Great Britain St. Lucia, Tobago, and the lie de France. The French frontier receded to its position on January i, 1792, with slight rectifications which added a few square miles to the country. Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, annexed in 1791, also remained a part of France. All other questions were re- ferred to a Congress which was to meet at Vienna. Meanwhile, it was expected that the great Powers, which had conducted the war against France, would come to an understanding about the disposition of Saxony and Poland, the most difficult question of all. The Congress did not open until September, if, strictly speak- ing, it may be said to have opened at all. The diplomats of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, formed a plan ac- cording to which they should agree upon the solution of prob- lems, should communicate their decision to France and Spain, the other two principal Powers, for comment, should receive the acceptance of these Powers, which could not well be refused, and should then promulgate the decisions as final. Talleyrand did not relish the part of representative of the victim, and, with the King, chose a line of conduct which utilized the inevitable renunciations of France as a means of securing a position of strength and influence. If these renunciations were sincere, the elaborate precautions against danger from France were unneces- sary and the only efifective bond of union between the Powers was dissolved. The lesser Powers would also discover in France their sole disinterested supporter. Even the greater Powers, now that France was necessarily disinterested, might conclude that her advice and help were worth accepting in the scramble THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 453 for territorial advantage. Moreover, a France which had re- ^xvii nounced conquest could with plausibility champion the cause of legal claims against a too brutal assertion of the rights of the I814.15 victor. The presence of Louis XVIII on the throne was an assurance that this policy was genuine and not merely the manceuver of a Machiavellian diplomat. When the plan of the four Powers was explained to Talley- rand on September 30 at a conference, he objected to their designation of themselves as " Allies," as if the war had not ceased, and declared that, as the Congress was summoned by eight Powers, four could not undertake its management unless the Congress in general session delegated to them such a rep- Thermal resentative capacity. Spain, and finally Portugal and Sweden, ^'^^ came to his assistance, and, after three stormy conferences, the control of the proceedings passed into the hands of a committee representing the eight Powers. Talleyrand was content, how- ever, if only five of the eight, the original four and France, made the important decisions. No full session of the Congress was held, and the work was done by committees, was approved by the eight Powers, and was incorporated, on June 9, 181 5, in a Final Act, in which all concerned were invited to concur. This method of transacting business did not prevent Vienna from being the scene of brilliant assemblages. All had hastened thither who hoped to gain or who feared to lose. It is said that the entertainment of the guests cost the impoverished Austrian treasury thirty million florins. The important questions concerning Saxony and Poland could not be settled without taking account of the agreements of 1813 at Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Teplitz.- None of these had stated specifically what should be done with the grand duchy of Warsaw, beyond the agreement that it should cease to exist as saxony such. Prussia was willing to give up nearly all she had pos- poiand sessed by virtue of the second and third partitions of Poland, if she might receive Saxony as compensation. According to the understanding which both Russia and Prussia had reached in 1813, the King of Saxony, who was a prisoner in Berlin, had forfeited his rights. Both England and Austria feared the con- sequences of such wholesale aggrandizement of Russia as the plan implied, and Austria did not wish to see Prussian territory in central Germany enlarged, especially on the Bohemian fron- tier. In order to develop the possibilities of discord by means of this question, Talleyrand proposed the reconstitution of the 2 See pp. 430, 435, 439- .54 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE 55^^' kingdom of Poland, and Lord Castlereagh, the English repre- sentative at the Congress, supported the proposal. Even Prus- 1814-15 gjj^ Yv^as reluctant to satisfy the Czar's extreme desires, and could be counted upon to oppose them, if the other Powers would yield on the question of Saxony. Against this, however, Talleyrand invoked the ancient rights of the minor princes and succeeded in uniting all their representatives in a formal protest. Finally both Metternich and Castlereagh were ready to oppose a veto to the Prussian and Russian solution of the problem, if they were assured of French military support. Talleyrand was au- thorized to pledge it, and the result was a secret triple alliance, negotiated in January, 1815. For a few days a renewal of the war, with the roles changed, seemed imminent, but every one realized that it would be an act of folly and would bring Na- poleon on the scene at once. Moreover, the suggestion had been made to the King of Prussia and the Czar, that, if the King of Saxony were restored, he might be required to cede a portion of his territories to Prussia, and that Russia might add enough of the grand duchy of Warsaw to connect Silesia and Prussia proper. Alexander's scheme of transforming the grand duchy into a kingdom, separate from Russia, and enlarged, perhaps, at Russia's expense, was also unpalatable to native Russians. The consequence was that the controversy did not come to an open breach and that by February it was considered settled on the basis of the annexation by Prussia of Posen, with the for- tress of Thorn, and of Austria's recovery of eastern Galicia, ceded in 1809. The remainder of the grand duchy was trans- formed into a kingdom of which Alexander should be king. This settlement impHed that Prussia was to find further com- pensation elsewhere, and the restored King of Saxony was re- gains of quired to cede two-fifths of his kingdom, including Torgau and Wittenberg. By a complicated plan of exchanges Swedish Pom- erania and the island of Riigen also came into Prussia's hands. Danzig was restored. The Westphalian lands were also re- stored, increased by other Westphalian territory, together with Berg. West of the Rhine she gained, besides other lands, nearly all those which had belonged to the electorates of Cologne and Treves before the French conquest. On the whole, her gains were not so valuable in extent of territory as in the exchange of former Polish subjects, who were difficult to assimilate, for Ger- mans of the center and west. Her acquisitions on the Rhine made her the natural defender of Germany against French ag- gression, a place Austria had long occupied. The scattered sit- uation of Prussia's territories seemed a disadvantage, but it THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 455 served to stimulate the energies of her administrators and to SSyx; quicken the appetite of her rulers for annexations. Before the Congress of Vienna met it was agreed that Ger- 1814-15 many should become a confederation of independent States. Germany Leaders like Stein hoped to use the national movement to unite all Germans in a strong empire, but Metternich saw that such a plan would foster the ambitions of the Hohenzollerns, rather than restore the lost authority of the Hapsburgs, and he defeated it by championing the rights of the minor princes. Among the States which Napoleon had destroyed and which were now re- constituted were Hesse-Cassel and Hanover, — Hanover as a kingdom, with George III of Great Britain as titular monarch. A committee representing the principal German States worked many months on a scheme of federation and agreed only on a makeshift constitution, which gave predominant power to no State and to Austria merely an honorary presidency. The Con- federation included thirty-eight States, among them three king- doms of Napoleonic " promotion " — Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony. Hanover owed its royal standing to the fact of these promotions. The kingdom of the Netherlands, which included both Dutch and Austrian Netherlands, was the successor of the kingdom of Holland, another Napoleonic creation. The House of Hapsburg did not attempt to recover its former possessions in southern Germany, but on its immediate western frontier it regained a large part of Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarl- Austria berg. Its greatest gains were in Italy, and were both direct and indirect, including Lombardy and Venetia, which were officially proclaimed the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom — a concession to the idea of nationality. Members of the Hapsburg House ruled in the grand duchy of Tuscany and the duchy of Modena, while the Emperor's daughter, Marie Louise, ex-Empress of the French, received the duchy of Parma. The return of the Pope to his territories was also favorable to the influence of Austria. Italy now looked geographically much as it did before Na- poleon's first great campaign, except that Venice and Genoa had Italy disappeared. All that was left of his work was the rule of King Joachim Murat and Queen Caroline Bonaparte in Naples, but that was doomed. A glance at boundary lines, therefore, might seem to justify the conclusion that French influence had been like a tidal wave, which seems to sweep away old land- marks, but which when it recedes leaves the countryside quite as before save for the scattered ruins. The history of the later decades of the nineteenth century proves this to be more an ap- pearance than a reality. THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. XXVII The greatest changes in northern Europe, aside from the crea- tion of a new kingdom of Poland and a kingdom of the Nether- lands, were in the position of Sweden and Denmark, Sweden had lost Finland as a result of the Tilsit agreements, and now received as compensation Norway, which was taken from Den- mark, a State which had remained friendly to Napoleon too long. Sweden offered Swedish Pomerania as partial compensation, but Prussia finally received it, and Denmark was given the duchy of Lauenburg and an indemnity in money. In this way Swe- den's connection with the affairs of Germany, begun by the great Gustavus, came to an end. Great Britain's gains were all in the colonies. One reason why the English desired to compensate the Dutch by a cession of Belgian lands was to reconcile them to the loss of the Cape, Ceylon, Demerara, and Essequibo, which, with the acquisitions from France and the island of Malta, strengthened the British colonial empire. The immense progress which the English had made toward a control of the world's carrying trade was not bar- gained for in any treaty nor laid down on any map, and yet it was more important than any territorial cession. Before the Congress was dissolved the Powers took steps towards the abolition of the African slave trade, one of the deep- est blots on Christian civilization. Great Britain and the United States had already prohibited it, and now the representatives of Great Britain urged action by the Congress. The Powers, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, were willing, and on Feb- ruary 8 the declaration was issued, but without setting a definite time at which any Power should make the prohibition effective. As long as the war had continued England had been mistress of the seas and could check the trade almost wholly; but with the return of peace wider action was necessary. The work of the Congress was still unfinished when news reached Vienna that Napoleon had escaped from Elba and had landed on the southern coast of France. A declaration was is- sued at once in the name of the eight Powers that he was an enemy to the peace of Europe and as such should be delivered over to public justice. The phrase appears to mean that he was " abandoned to public vengeance," as if he were in the most literal sense an outlaw, whom any one might slay with impunity. The representatives of the four great Powers did not content themselves with phrases, but signed a treaty pledging each to place in the field at once an army of 150,000 men, and Great Britain in addition promised a subsidy of five million pounds towards the expenses of mobilization. East 15 of Grocriwch THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 457 Napoleon had been influenced by several considerations in chap. forming his desperate resolve. He had been informed that the Allies were on the verge of war over the Saxony-Poland ques- I8i4-i5 tion, and he also knew of widespread dissatisfaction in France with the Bourbon regime. Rumors had also reached him of a plan, urged upon the Powers, of removing him to the Azores. Later still, hearing that a plot, formed by Fouche for the over- throw of the Bourbons, was ripe, he felt he must act at once, if he was to be the beneficiary of the discontent. Petty reasons also influenced Napoleon's action. The small stock of money which he had brought with him for the support of his estab- lishment and of his httle garrison of a thousand men was be- coming depleted. The Bourbons had not paid a franc of the annual allowance agreed upon at Fontainebleau. If he were to retain his guards or to possess the money necessary to make one more stake in the great game, he could not afford to wait. In one respect he miscalculated. He heard that by the last of Feb- ruary the Congress would be ended and that the Princes would have set out for their capitals, so that he might count upon delay and uncertain or divided counsels. But his act found them still at Vienna. Napoleon embarked his followers, of whom 400 were mem- bers of his famous Imperial Guard, on February 26, and four days later reached the Golfe de Jouan. He knew that the peas- ants of Dauphine hated the Bourbon regime, fearing that the Retnm lands which they had purchased would be restored to the emi- *° ^^"^ grants and the Church. Anxious, therefore, to reach Grenoble, but afraid to pass through Provence, where the year before he had barely escaped assassination, he hurried his little army across difficult Alpine paths. Only once was he in serious danger. A battalion was sent out from Grenoble to dispute the approach to the town, and, as the soldiers had given no sign of mutiny, the leaders hoped that they would obey an order to fire. But the sight of Napoleon was too much for such formal loyalty, and with a cry of " Long live the Emperor " they rushed forward, prostrated themselves before him, and touched his clothing, as if to assure themselves that it was in reality he and not a phan- tom. From Grenoble the imperial eagles " flew to Paris." Gen- erals who were unwiUing to share in the adventure had to ride away to save their lives. Ney had promised Louis XVIII that he would bring Napoleon back in an iron cage, but he saw his regiments deserting him, his own Hfe in danger, and, remember- ing the bitterness of his grievances against the Bourbon Court, went over to Napoleon. CHAP. XXVII THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE At the first news of Napoleon's landing the King and his ad- visers did not think the monarchy in serious danger, but as mes- sage after message brought tidings of his astonishing progress Louis XVIII saw that a second exile was inevitable. The peas- ants and the soldiers were almost everywhere enthusiastic Bona- partists. The middle classes did not share this feeling, because they feared that the return of Napoleon meant a renewal of the war, but they were indifferent to the Bourbon cause, and, more- over, possessed no means of resisting had they been inclined to do so. On the twentieth of March Napoleon was at Fontainebleau without having fired a shot or shed a drop of blood. The even- ing before towards midnight the royal carriages had drawn up in the courtyard of the Tuileries and Louis XVIII was driven north towards Lille. Some of his advisers urged him to hold that town or Dunkirk, but he was convinced that he was safer across the frontier at Ghent, under the protection of the troops of the Allies. The transition from the royal to the new imperial government was made without serious difficulty. After a few hours at Fon- tainebleau Napoleon rode on to Paris. On the night of his arrival several of his former ministers appeared at the Tuileries and re- sumed their portfolios. Carnot was induced to become Minis- ter of the Interior on the ground that it was a question of de- fending the country against the foreigner, a service which under altered circumstances he had rendered in 1793 and 1794. Davout became Minister of War and Caulaincourt again assumed the role of negotiator of impossible treaties of peace. About a fourth of the prefects were retained. So far as internal adminis- tration was concerned the chief trouble was with the mayors, a large number of whom were staunch loyalists. Armed resist- ance was brief. In the south it centered at Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Nimes. By April 8, with the capitulation of the Duke d'Angouleme at La Palud, it was over. In May civil war flamed up again in La Vendee, but the death of La Rochejaquelein early in June discouraged resistance. In one respect Napoleon found the situation completely changed. His appeals to liberal and revolutionary sentiment, in the proclamations issued on the way to Paris, had been taken seriously by those who had welcomed his return. They expected the end of arbitrary government and the introduction of a regime more liberal than that under the Bourbon Restoration. Forced by this sentiment, he caused a constitution to be drawn up, which was the Charter liberalized, and which he published in the Moni- teur of April 22 under the designation of Acte Additionnel, or THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 459 supplement to the constitutions of the Empire. In reality only ^yii 23 articles of minor importance reproduced any provisions of former imperial constitutions. The Additional Act was to be I814-15 submitted to the people for approval ; but, before they had more than begun voting, public opinion compelled Napoleon to order an election of deputies to the " Chamber of Representatives." When the votes were counted, it was found that only a million and a half thought it worth while to record their votes. The acceptance of the Constitution was proclaimed at a great assem- bly, called the Champ de Mai, held June i, and immediately afterwards the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Repre- sentatives were organized. It turned out that only eighty depu- ties were thorough-going Bonapartists, while 500 were liberals. Instead of complimenting Napoleon by choosing his brother Lucien for president, the chamber chose the former Girondin Lanjuinais, an uncompromising constitutional liberal. Napoleon was deeply annoyed by the turn of affairs. The discouragements of the situation are said to have had the more fatal effect of de- stroying his confidence and his power of initiative. After all, the issues of the day would be settled not in debate but on the battlefield, and on June 12 Napoleon set out for the Belgian frontier. Napoleon had counted upon the help of Murat, with whom he had been negotiating before he left Elba. Murat believed that northern Italy was already seething with discontent over the Murat reactionary measures which princes under Austrian control had introduced, and he thought the occasion ripe for an attempt to unite all Italy under his scepter. In the middle of March he left Naples and moved rapidly northward as far as the Po. His suspicious conduct had led the Austrians to mobilize their army in January, so that they were not taken by surprise. After one or two slight successes he was decisively defeated, and hur- ried back to Naples. In a few days he realized the hopelessness of his position and fled to France in disguise, once more offer- ing his services to Napoleon. They were refused on the ground that he had spoiled the plan of pacifying the Allies. A few months later he made an attempt to recover his kingdom, but was captured and shot. If the task of preparing for the campaign of 1814 was per- plexing, the military problem of 1815 might seem insoluble. In one particular the conditions had changed for the better. Peace The Army had brought back to France the prisoners of the recent wars and ^^ ^^^^ the garrisons beleaguered in German fortresses. The number of these soldiers, upon a conservative estimate, was 120,000. ^6o THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE CHAP. But many of them were weary of war and did not rejoin the colors, so that by June i only about 52,000 had reported for 1814-15 duty. The Army of the Restoration on a peace footing num- bered 200,000, and this was increased by the time the campaign opened to 284,000. More than half the number were, however, needed to guard the frontier and to watch royalist districts. The quality of the troops was superior to that of any army Napoleon had commanded since Friedland. Wholly composed of French- men, it possessed a spirit and unity which the armies in the days of the Grand Empire had lacked. The men burned to avenge the recent defeats and the officers were spurred on by rage against the supporters of the Bourbon regime. This was not true of the general officers, who realized that they were in a serious predicament, since they had broken their oaths to the King. The army lacked lieutenants to cooperate with their great captain. Of the famous marshals only Soult, Ney, and Davout were available. To Soult was assigned Berthier's position of chief of staff, an office he had never filled, although he had dis- tinguished himself as commander of an army in the Spanish campaign, Davout was left in command of Paris, while Ney was summoned for service only at the last moment. With him was associated Marshal Grouchy, a brilliant cavalry general, but without experience in independent command, a lack which was to have a disastrous influence on the outcome of the campaign. War was inevitable, although Napoleon endeavored to gain time by sending messages to the Allied Powers explaining that he accepted the settlement made by the Treaty of Paris. His agents were turned back at the frontiers and France was cut off from the outer world as if she were in quarantine. It was simply a question of time when the armies of the four Allies would pass the frontiers and crush resistance under the weight of numbers. Already a Prussian army of 117,000 under Bliicher and a British army of 85,000 under Wellington were assembling on the Belgian frontier. Of the two Wellington's force was less formidable, for it was partly made up of Dutch, Belgians, and Germans who till recently had been subjects of Napoleon. If these armies could be attacked before their con- centration was completed, they might be driven back on diverg- ing lines of communication, the Prussians toward the Rhine and the British toward the Channel. Napoleon might then face the larger masses of the Russian and Austrian armies, which were expected on the frontier by the end of June. The first movements of the campaign promised Napoleon one THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 461 of his most brilliant successes. Early on the morning of June ^vii 15 he was ready to advance toward the roads which united the Prussian and British armies before they had an inkling of his ^^^^-^^ absence from Paris. By night he had crossed the Belgian fron- Opening tier, had driven back the outlying Prussian troops, and for the campaign time being at least had rendered impossible any effective coopera- tion between the two armies. Indeed, it was not until the night was more than half gone that Wellington, at his headquarters in Brussels, received any clear information upon what was going on at the frontier, thirty miles away. Napoleon had now gained an opportunity to fight a separate battle with the Prussians and he did not believe that the British could assemble a formidable force on his left at Quatre Bras. He directed Ney, therefore, to occupy Quatre Bras on the i6th, and then to sweep around the right of the Prussian army, while he attacked it in front. In this case the victory would be crush- ing and only the British would remain to be dealt with. He did defeat the Prussians at Ligny, but Ney did not succeed in mak- ing the expected flank movement, for by great exertions Welling- ton hurried up division after division to Quatre Bras until he had troops enough to drive Ney from the field. The courageous decision of the defeated Prussians to retreat northward, toward Wavre, so that they might keep in touch with Wellington, deprived Napoleon of the fruits of his victory at Ligny. On the morning of June 17 he let slip a chance to crush the British, whose news gatherers did not report the de- feat of Bliicher until after ten o'clock, and who were waiting at Quatre Bras, within striking distance of Napoleon's main army. A still more serious blunder was his order for the pur- suit of the Prussians which was based on the supposition that they had fled eastward. This order was given to Grouchy, who was not a Desaix. The consequence was that by the next day, when the Prussians were already on the march from Wavre to unite with WelHngton, Grouchy with 30,000 men was hopelessly distant from the battlefield. On the evening of June 17 Napoleon had pursued Wellington as far as a ridge two or three miles south of the village of Water- Waterloo loo. Here the British showed signs of fight, and as Napoleon's army was in no condition for a decisive attack he remained on a parallel ridge less than a mile away. It had been raining hard all the afternoon and the rain continued far into the night, ren- dering an early morning attack difficult on account of the char- acter of the ground. Napoleon's chief anxiety was lest the British should steal off again; but there was no danger of this, 462 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE ^^^j for Bliicher had promised Wellington the support of two corps, and of the rest of the Prussian army as soon as possible. 1814-15 jj^ ^j^g battle of Waterloo, which took place on the following day, June i8, Napoleon had the advantage of numbers, but Wel- lington the advantage of position. Wellington's position was strengthened by two groups of farm buildings, which he had hastily fortified, Hougomont in front of his right, and La Haye Sainte in front of the center. He could also move troops behind the ridge from one part of his line to another without exposing them to French artillery fire. Napoleon opened the battle a few minutes before noon by a sharp but futile attack on Hougomont, planning to make his principal effort an hour or two later against the British left. About one o'clock a strange body of soldiers was descried on the hillsides toward the northeast. Although he soon learned that these soldiers were Prussians, Napoleon did not lose his sense of security and set in motion his heavy assaulting columns. The first line of Wellington's troops was made up of Dutch and Belgians, who had already suffered from, the fire of the French batteries. They fled as the French col- umns approached. The " thin red line " of the British regi- ments behind seemed too light to offer a stubborn resistance. Suddenly across the ridge rode two brigades of British cavalry. They plunged deep into the French columns, scattering them in utter confusion. Napoleon's attention was soon demanded by the advance of the Prussians against his right and Ney took charge of the struggle with Wellington. Ney ordered 5,000 French horsemen to break through the British lines along the ridge west of La Haye Sainte. At one time the horsemen en- gaged in the attack numbered 10,000, but the British infantry, formed in squares, checker-board fashion, held firm, though torn by artillery fire. The conflict went on until six o'clock, when the cavalry was completely exhausted. By this time the French had captured La Haye Sainte, and their infantry and artillery enfiladed a part of the British line, so that Wellington had diffi- culty in filling the gaps. The situation of the British would have been precarious had Napoleon not been obliged to use so many troops in checking the Prussians who seriously threatened the rear of his army. About seven o'clock he resolved to make a last effort to break the British line. He formed nine battalions of the Imperial Guard into a column and sent it against the right center. Unfortunately for him it moved too far toward the British right and came into conflict with troops relatively fresh. Decimated by volleys in front and on the flank and charged with the bayonet, part of the battalions broke and others THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE 463 began sullenly to retire. Just then another Prussian corps fell S^vii on the French right, while the first was fighting its way steadily nearer Napoleon's only possible line of retreat. The pressure I814-15 upon his exhausted troops became unendurable and the army was thrown into a panic. WeUington now ordered a general ad- vance and the French soldiers soon became a mass of terror- stricken fugitives hurrying down the road or through the fields toward Quatre Bras and the French frontier. For Napoleon the consequences of Waterloo were somber. In order to forestall attempts to depose him, he hurried back to Paris, reaching the city the third morning after the battle. Napo- His only chance of remaining in power was to seize the dictator- second ship ; but he hesitated. A few hours passed, and the opportunity Abdica- was gone. The deputies and the peers declared themselves in permanent session and voted to punish any attempt to interfere with them as treason. On the next day, bowing to the inevitable, Napoleon abdicated in favor of his son. He lingered in Paris and at Malmaison until June 29, when the provisional govern- ment informed him that they could no longer assure his safety. The Prussians were rapidly advancing and Bliicher had ordered that he be taken dead or aUve. To escape this danger he rode toward the coast, hoping to find passage to America. On July 10 as it was impossible to elude the British fleet which was watch- ing the coast he applied for refuge to the captain of the Beller- ophon, one of the British ships. A few weeks later the Allied Powers decided to regard him as a prisoner and assigned to the British the ungrateful task of acting as his jailers. In October he was landed at St. Helena, and that distant and lonely island remained his dwelling place until his death, on May 5, 182 1. The companions of his adventure also suffered. In the South the hatred of the royaUsts for them found a vent in the White Terror, with wild mobs and wholesale murders, in the course conse- of which Brune, one of the most distinguished generals of the oJ^X^^ Revolution and a marshal of the Empire, was assassinated. Nor Hundred was the punishment of the men who had cast in their lot with *^^ Napoleon left wholly to mobs. The most distinguished victim was Marshal Ney, who was tried for treason before the Cham- ber of Peers, condemned, and shot. The opportunity was also taken to single out for vengeance the ex-members of the Con- vention who had voted for the death of Louis XVI and who had adhered to Napoleon in 181 5. These men were sent into an exile from which many did not live to return. For France the consequences were not as serious as might have been feared. Although the Prussians were eager to dis- 464 THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE £^^^- member the country, urging the seizure of Alsace and other ter- ritory on the frontier, Great Britain and Russia were opposed 1814-15 |.Q ^^y except minor changes in the arrangements of the pre- ceding year. The provisional government at Paris saw in the immediate presence of Louis XVIII a guarantee against dis- memberment, and Wellington advised him to reenter the country at once. The leaders of the government recognized his author- ity at the same time that they arranged the capitulation of Paris. On July 8 the King was in the Tuileries again. As it turned out, all that France lost was a few fortresses and some square miles of territory. She was also required to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs within five years. Meanwhile the north- eastern departments should be occupied by 150,000 allied troops at French expense. The ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria received the right to tender their joint ad- vice to the government even upon matters of internal politics. These provisions were embodied in the second Treaty of Paris, of November 20, 1815. The four Powers on the same day agreed to meet from time to time to concert measures for the preservation of the peace of Europe. The experiences of the last two decades made the idea of new revolutions no mere spec- ter of reactionary minds. The French government of the second Restoration was moved by the same spirit that directed the leaders of the first. Louis Meaning XVIII was not inclined to listen to the doctrine of vengeance Second and tried to profit by the lessons of the Hundred Days. Welling- Eestora- ^q^ ^gg^j ^^^^ great authority which the victory of Waterloo gave him to counsel moderation. In consequence the first ministry was led by Talleyrand and included Fouche. The elections for the choice of new deputies, however, resulted in a decided vic- tory for the ultras and the chamber was " more royalist than the King." Talleyrand's successor was the Duke de Richelieu, a returned emigrant, who nevertheless persisted in the policy of moderation. In this fashion France after many vicissitudes seemed on the road towards orderly representative government, although with an electorate which numbered scarcely 100,000. After the coup d'etat of 1799 Napoleon had declared, " The Revolution is finished." He meant that its agitations were over and that it was time to enjoy its benefits in peace. The states- men of the victorious Allies of 181 5 thought that they had ended the Revolutionary movement, but in another sense. They were mistaken. They had simply rendered it a service in dissociat- ing it from the ambitions of one man. In the long era of peace which they secured men had time to forget that foreign domina- THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUR OPE 465 tion and military despotism had been the counterpart of reform, g^^- The ideal of civil equality and social justice, which the deputies of 1789 had cherished, could now make its appeal with renewed is^^-i^ force. The proof of its vitality is recorded in hundreds of great acts of legislation in the later years of the nineteenth century. NOTES ON BOOKS NOTES ON BOOKS ^ It is proposed to give here some indications of the nature of the printed material available for the study of the subjects treated in the preceding chapters. No attempt will be made to offer a sys- tematic bibliography of the period. How great such a task would be may be inferred from the statement of F. M. Kircheisen in 1908 that in preparing his Bibliographie du Temps de Napoleon he had already collected 70,000 titles of books and articles upon the period from 1795 to 1815 alone. There is as yet no satisfactory bibliography of the French Revo- lution. P. Caron in his Manuel pratique de la Revolution franqaise (1912) gives lists of the collections undertaken by government com- missions, historical societies, and individuals. Indications for this, as well as for later periods of modern French history may be found in Caron's Bibliographie des Travaux publies de 1866 a i8py sur I'Histoire de la France depuis lySg and in its continuation by Briere and Caron, Repertoire methodique de I'Histoire moderne' et contem- poraine de la France^ for the years 1898 following, complete to 1903; additions for 1910 f. printed as supplements of the Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine. The Kircheisen Bibliographie of the Napoleonic period was planned to include several volumes, but only two have appeared. Useful, but not annotated, lists are given in volumes VII (1909), VIII (1904), IX (1906) of the Cambrige Mod- ern History and in the corresponding volumes of Lavisse et Ram- baud, Histoire Generale, VII (1896), VIII (1896), IX (1897). For many of the topics belonging to the period from 1763 to 1789 the best suggestions will be found in volumes VIII (2) and IX (i) of Lavisse, Histoire de France (1909, 1910). The biographies of Napoleon, especially the German and English editions of Fournier, contain extensive notes upon the bibliography of his career. The material upon certain phases of the period have been discussed in critical articles, of which the following are notable examples: Letaconnoux, La question des Subsistances et du Commerce des grains en France au XVIIP siecle {Revue d'Histoire Moderne, VIII, 409- 445) ; Levy, Histoire interieure du Premier Empire {Revue des Etudes Napoleoniennes, I, 1 16-148) ; Driault, Histoire exterieure du Premier Empire {Ibid., II, 429-453) ; Dunan, Le Systeme continental, Bulletin de I'Histoire economique {Ibid., Ill, 1 1 5-146) ; and Lingel- bach. Historical Investigation and the Commercial History of the 1 It is impossible to refer to the many valuable articles in historical re- views, etc. 469 470 NOTES ON BOOKS Napoleonic Era (American Historical Review, XIX, 257-81). More complete information should be sought in bibliographies of the sev- eral countries in question ; for example, for Germany in Dahlmann- Waitz, Quellenkunde zur Deutsche Geschichte. For lists of bib- liographies, see Langlois, Manuel de Bibliographie historique (1901). Current bibliographical information is given in the numerous re- views for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period or in the general historical reviews. Of the former may be mentioned: La Revolu- tion franqaise, Annales revolutionnaires, and Revue des Etudes Napoleoniennes. A few books may be mentioned which cover the period as a whole, or the larger part of it. A brief treatment, mainly political, is given by Wahl, Geschichte des Europdischen Staatcnsystems im Zeitalter der Fransosischen Revolution und der Freiheitskriege (1912). Be- sides the well known Oncken, Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiser- reichs und der Befreiungskriege, 2 vols. (1884, 1889) ; the volumes of the Cambridge Modern History and of the Histoire Generale of Lavisse et Rambaud, there is Lindner, Weltgeschichte, VII (1910). A work of capital importance, especially for diplomatic history, is Sorel, L'Europe et la Revolution frangaise, 8 vols. (1885-1904). An older but still useful work is H. von Sybel, Geschichte der Revo- lutionszeit von i/Sp-iSoo (4th ed. 1882, vols. I-III translated). On the several countries, see, for England: Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century, 8 vols., 1878; Political History of England, 1760-1801, by William Hunt (1905); Political History of England, i8oi-i8j/, by G. E. Brodrick and J. K. Fotheringham ; H. D. Traill, Social England, vol. V ( 1904) : for Germany : Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, vols. VIII, IX (1906, 1907); Haiisser, Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Grilndung des Deutschen Bundes, 4 vols. (4th ed. 1869) ; more briefly in Atkinson, Germany from 1/15 to 1815 (1908) or Hender- son, Short History of the German People, vol. II (1906): for the Netherlands, Blok, History of the People of the Netherlands, vol. V (1912) : for Russia, Bain's Slavonic Europe (Cambridge Historical Series, 1912), or Rambaud, History of Russia, vol. II (1878): for Spain, Hume, Spain, 1479-1788, dind Modern Spain, 1788-1898 (1906), or at length, Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der fran- zosischen Revolution (1861) : for Italy, Orsi, L' Italia Moderna (1901). Chapter I. On the conditions in France prior to the Revolution, Taine's Ancient Regime (1875) ^"^ Tocqueville's Old Regime and the Revolution (1856) may still be read with advantage. For a criticism of Taine's historical method, see Aulard's Taine (1907). The manner in which Taine subjects a great social structure to analysis is suggestive. Lowell's Eve of the French Revolution (1892) presents in a clear and interesting way the various features of the old regime in France. Another excellent, though brief, ac- count will be found in Perkins, Louis XV, vol. II. NOTES ON BOOKS 471 In French the best account is presented in volume VIII (2) and IX (i) of Lavisse, Histoire de France. Another notable account is given in Stryienski, Le XVIII^ siecle (1909). A. Wahl, Vorge- schichte der Franzdsischen Revolution, 2 vols. (1905) is a fresh and critical treatment of the subject. Much has recently been written on the condition of the peasants in France. The most authoritative statement upon peasant ownership of land is in Loutchisky's L'etat des classes agricolcs en France a la veille de la Revolution (1911). See also his earlier work, La propriete paysanne en France a la veille de la Revolution, first translated from Russian in 1912. An- other, somewhat antagonistic view is given by Kovalewsky in his La France economique et sociale a la veille de la Revolution, 2 vols. (1909 f.). Several of the works which deal with the sale of ecclesiastical lands during the Revolution also discuss peasant owner- ship in the preceding period; see especially Marion, Ventes des Biens nationaux pendant la Revolution (1908). See further, Bloch, U Assistance and I'J^tat en France a la veille de la Revolution (1908). Among the many instructive books on the condition of the peas- antry may also be mentioned: Kareiev, Les paysans et la question paysanne en France dans le dernier quart du XVIII^ siecle; Marion, Etat des classes rurales dans la generalite de Bordeaux (1902) ; See, Les classes rurales en Bretagnc du XV I^ siecle a la Revolution (1906) ; Babeau, La vie rurale dans Vancienne France (1882). For other references, see Lavisse, IX (i), 246-7 n. Several of the col- lections of sources for the study of the economic history of the Revo- lution contain documents bearing directly upon conditions during the last half of the eighteenth century, notably Sagnac et Caron, Les Comites des droits feodaux et la legislation et I'abolition du regime seigneurial (1907); Bourgin, La partage des biens communaux (1908) ; Gerbaux et Schmidt, Proces-verbaux des Comites d'agricul- ture et de commerce (1906-1910). The reprints of the cahiers pre- sented in 1789, included in the same collection, are similarly valuable. For a summary of such material, see Champion, La France d'apres les cahiers de i/8p (1897). Arthur Young's Travels in France re- mains the most valuable contribution of a contemporary. Dr. Rigby's Letters from France should be read as an antidote to the traditionally gloomy statements about the peasants. Among the books on the nobles may be mentioned: De Vaissiere, Gentilshommes campag- nards de Vancienne France (1903); the first three volumes of Lomenie, Les Mimft^aw (1878 f.), or ¥\\ng,Mirabeau, vol. I (1908); Dreyfus, Un Philanthrope d'autrefois, La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt (1903)- On the condition of the peasants in Prussia and Austria, besides passages in Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, vol. VIII, Knapp, Bauernbefreiung in den dlteren Theilen Preussens, 2 vols. (1887); Griinberg, Bauernbefreiung und die AuHosung der gutsherrlich- bauerlichen Verhdltnisses in Bohmen. Mdhren, und Schlesien, 2 vols. (1894); Cavaignac, La Prusse contemporaine, vol. I (1891); Goltz, 472 NOTES ON BOOKS Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft, 2 vols. (1902-3). For the peasants in Savoy, see Bruchet, L' Abolition des droits seigneuriax en Savoie, iy6i-ijg^ (1908), which belongs to the collection upon the economic history of the Revolution. On direct taxation in France the texts with an historical intro- duction may be found in Marion, Les Impots directs sous Vancien regime (1910). See also Stourm, Les Finances de I'ancien regime et de la Revolution (1885) ; Clement, La Corvees des chemins en France (1899). For Prussia: Philippson, Geschichte des Preus- sischen Staatswesens vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis su den Freiheitskriegen, 2 vols. (1880-2). Upon England the facts are given in Bastable, Public Finance (1892). The literature upon industry and commerce is growing rapidly. The following may be noted: the standard work of Levasseur, His- toire des classes ouvrieres avant 178Q, vol. II (ed. of 1901) ; Cun- ningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce^ vol. II (re- vised ed. 1907); Gibbins, British Industry (1903); Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im ip. Jahrhundert (1903); Steinhausen, Geschichte der deutschen Kultur, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (1913) ; Martin, La grande Industrie en France sous le regne de Louis XV (1900) ; Bon- nassieux, Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce (1892) ; Afanassiev, Le Commerce des cereales en France au XVI 11^ siecle ( 1894) ; D'Avenel, Histoire economique de la propriete, des salaires, des denrees, etc., 4 vols. (1894-1898) ; Dutil, L'Etat ecdnomique du Lan- guedoc a la fin de I'ancien regime (1911) ; Renard et Dulac, Evolution industrielle et agricole depuis cent cinquante ans (1912). Chapter II. For the laws, see volumes XXII-XXIX of Jourdan, Isambert and Decrusy, Recueil des anciennes lois franqaises. See also Flammermont et Tourneux, Remonstrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIII^ siecle, 3 vols. (188&-1898). Illustrations of the operation of the governmental systems will be found in the books already mentioned, especially Lavisse and Tocqueville for France, and Philippson for Prussia. A good general survey is given by Gasquet, Precis des institutiones politiques de I'ancienne France vol. I (1885). Useful information will be found in Boiteau, L'Etat dg la France en 178Q (2nd ed. 1889), and for local administration in Babeau, La Province sous I'Ancien Regime, 2 vols. (1894), La Ville sous I'Ancien Regime (1884) ; and in Ardascheff, Les intendants de province sous Louis XVI, 3 vols. (1909). On the parlements, see note in Lavisse, IX (i), 186-7. For the central administration, see Viollet, Le Roi et ses ministres pendant les trois derniers siecles de la Monarchic (1911). Upon Prussia illustrative matter will be found in the Life of Stein, vol. I, by J. R. Seeley, and in Freiherr vom Stein, vol. I (1902), by Max Lehmann. The governmental system of Eng- land is adequately explained in all of the standard constitutional histories. For Austria and Hungary a serviceable volume is Wolf and Zwiedinek-Siidenhorst, Oesterreich unter Maria Theresia, Joseph II, und Leopold II (1882-1884). J NOTES ON BOOKS 473 Chapter III. The sources for this subject are the works which are mentioned, and they are to be found not only in the original editions, but many of them in critical editions. Convenient bib- liographical lists are given for chapters 23 and 24 of volume VI of the Cambridge Modern History, and for chapter i of volume VII. Abundant suggestions are made in Lavisse for France. Special at- tention may be called to the following books: Faguet, Le XVIII^ siecle (1890) ; Rocquain, L' esprit revolutionnaire avant la Revolution (1878); Lichtenberger, Le Socialisme au XVIIP siecle (1895); Espinas, La philosophie sociale au XVIII^ siecle et la Revolution; Roustan, Les Philosophes et la Societe frangaise au XVIII^ siecle ( 1906) ; Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols. (1896) ; Francke, History of German Literature (new ed. 19 13). On the Physiocrats and Economists, see Higgs, The Physi- ocrats (1897) ; Gide et Rist, Histoire des doctrines economiques depuis les physiocrates jusqu'd nos jours (1909) ; the biography of the elder Mirabeau, Rae's Life of Adam Smith; Schelle, Vincent de Gournay (1897) and Dupont de Nemours et I'ecole physio cratique (1888). For the French leaders the biographies in the Collection des Grands Ecrivains frangais are useful: Sorel, Montesquieu; Lanson, Voltaire, Chuquet, Rousseau, and Say, Turgot. Morley, Rousseau, 2 vols., and Diderot and the Encyclopcedists, 2 vols. Col- lins, Voltaire in England (1905), and See, Les idees politiques de Voltaire, Revue Historique for 1908, are of special interest. For the clergy in France, see Sicard, L'ancien clerge de France, 2 vols. (1893-4). For education, see Compayre, Histoire critique des doc- trines de V education en France, vol. II, 2nd ed. (1881); for Ger- many, Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts (1885). Chapter IV. The leading work on Frederick II is Koser, Konig Friedrich der Grosse, 2 vols. (3rd ed. 1904-5). An excellent brief treatment will be found in Wiegand, Friedrich der Grosse (1902). See also Reddaway, Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prussia (Heroes of the Nations, 1904). Tuttle, History of Prussia, vols. Ill and IV, contains much information in regard to the earlier part of Frederick's reign. Besides Philippson and Cavaignac, already mentioned, see Reimann, Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates, vol. II (1888). For the towns, see Preuss, Entwicklung des Deutschen Stddtewesens (1906). For the peasants: Knapp, already cited. Among the biographies of Joseph II may be mentioned Fournier, Josef der Zweite (1885) and Bright, Joseph U (1897 brief). B right's little volume on Maria Theresa should be consulted in con- nection. Much of the Emperor Joseph's correspondence has been published; for example, Joseph II und Leopold von Toskana. Ihr Briefwechsel von 1781-17QO, edited by A. von Arneth, and Joseph II und Katharina von Russland. Ihr Briefwechsel, by the same editor. On the work for the peasants, see Griinberg, already mentioned. See also, Marczali, Hungary in the Eighteenth Century (1910). Besides 474 NOTES ON BOOKS Wolf und Zwiedinek-Siidenhorst, see Mayer, Geschichte Osterreichs, vol. II (3rd ed. 1909). For Charles III of Spain, see Rousseau, Charles III, 2 vols. (1907). The work of Charles Emmanuel III in Savoy is set forth in the docu- ments, with their historical introduction, Bruchet, already cited. On the colonial system in England, France and Spain, see especially, Egerton, Short History of British Colonial Policy (1897); Beer, British Colonial Policy (1907), and The Old Colonial System, 2 vols. (1912) ; Deschamps, Histoire de la Question coloniale en France (1891); Leroy-Beaulieu, Histoire de la colonisation, vol. I (ed. of 1902). For Russia, in addition to the books cited, see Walizewski, ^ Le Roman d'une Imperatrice (1893) and Autoiir d'un Trone: Cath- / erine U, ses collaborateurs, ses amis, ses favoris (1894). For Italy, ( briefly in Vernon, Italy 1494-17QO (1909). Chapter V. Several of the books noted for chapters i, 2, and 3 are serviceable for this chapter also. Volume IX of Lavisse, Histoire de France should be mentioned, especially Bk. VI, which is an illuminating statement by Lavisse of the " imperfections de I'oeuvre monarchique " and a review of the crisis which was the consequence. An older excellent account is that of Cherest, La Chute de lAncien Regime (1884-7), 3 vols. The story of this period pleasantly writ- ten will be found in MacLehose, Last Days of the French Monarchy (1901). For the financial side, see, besides Stourm, Gomel, Les causes Unancieres de la Revolution frangaise, 2 vols. (1892-3). Necker's own writings are full of interest for this subject. For the last struggle with the courts see especially Carre, La fin des parlements (1912). The memoir literature and the correspondence are abundant; see especially the memoirs of MoUien, Talleyrand, Mme. de Stael, Fer- rieres. Mallet du Pan, Malouet, Frenilly, Hardy; Rocheterie et Beaucourt, Lettres de Marie Antoinette (1895), vol. I; Correspond- ence secrete entre Marie-Therese et the comte Mercy- Argenteau, edited by D'Arneth and Geffroy, 3 vols. (1874); Correspondance secrete du comte de M ercy- Argenteau avec I'empereur Joseph II et le prince de Kaunitz, edited by D'Arneth and Flammermont. Among the useful biographies, it is well to note volumes III and IV of Lomenie, Les Mirabeau; Say, Turgot; Lanzac de Laborie, Jean-Joseph Mounier. Chapter VI. Reference should again be made to Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce and to Gibbins, British Industry; Historical Outlines (3rd ed. 1903). The most detailed and instructive work is, Mantoux, La Revolution industrielle au XVIII° siecle: Essai sur les commencements de la grande industrie moderne en Angleterre (1906). Much interesting information upon the south of France is to be found in Dutil, op. cit. See also Levasseur and Bonnassieux, op. cit. On the Treaty of 1786, see Dumas, Etude sur le traite de com- merce de 1/86 entre la France et V Angleterre (1904), and Rose, I NOTES ON BOOKS 475 William Pitt, vol. I, chapter 14; see also Journals and Correspond- ance of Lord Auckland, vol. I. Detailed bibliographies may be found in Mantoux and in Martin, Histoire de I'industrie en France avant lySp. For bibliographical notes for Germany, see Dahlmann-Waitz Quellenkunde, or the lists in Handbuch der Wirtschaftskunde Deutschlands, III. Chapters VII, VIII, IX, and X. For the study of the subjects touched upon in these chapters important additions have been made to the older collections of printed material ; that is, the Proces-verbaux of the assemblies, the Archives parlementaires, an official collection begun by Mavidal and Laurent, and Buchez et Roux, Histoire parle- mentaire de la Revolution frangaise. For a list of the collection upon the economic aspects of the Revolution, bearing especially on the early period, see Caron, Manuel pratique, pp. 9-13. Among other valuable series may be noted Actes de la Commune de Paris pendant la Revolution, edited by Lacroix, 15 vols.; Recueil de documents relatifs a la convocation des ^tats Generaux de i/8p, edited by Brette, 3 vols. ; La Societe des Jacobins, edited by Aulard, 6 vols. The text of laws is to be found in Duvergier, Collection des Lois, which in- cludes all the laws passed since 1789. The Reimpression de I'ancien Moniteur furnishes material enough for the study of most discussions in the Revolutionary assemblies. There are several selections from the original material made for the use of students. For legislation the most useful is Cahen et Guyot, L'CEuvre legislative de la Revolution (1913). A collection of practical utility for college classes is Anderson, Constitutions and other Select Documents of France, the early part of which is devoted to the Revolution and to the Napoleonic period. It contains little upon the economic history of the Revolution. Another by Legg, Select Documents: the Constituent Assembly, is a history of the first two years, presented in untranslated clippings from contemporary newspapers, decrees, etc. On a different plan is Fling, Source Prob- lems of the French Revolution (1913), in which the selections offer material upon a few incidents, in order that students through its critical use may be trained in the historical method. Stephens, Orators of the French Revolution, 2 vols., contains typical speeches. The memoirs and correspondence of the period are rich. The fol- lowing should be noted: Young, Travels; Rigby, Letters; Duques- noy, Journal; Morris, Diary and Letters, 2 vols. ; Vaissiere, Lettres d' " Aristocrates" ; the memoirs of Bailly, Ferrieres, Lafayette, Tal- leyrand (Tr.), Malouet, Pasquier (Tr.), Mme. Campan (Tr.), Thie- bault (Tr.), Bouille, FreniUy (Tr.), Romilly (English). The Recol- lections of Dumont, especially of Mirabeau, appeared in an English translation in 1832. A new English edition was issued in 1904 under the inappropriate title, The Great Frenchman and the Little Genevese. Various volumes of diplomatic correspondence have also been pub- lished, including Dorset, Despatches, 2 vols.; Gower, Despatches; Bailli de Virieu, Correspondance; Stael-Holstein, Correspondance 476 NOTES ON BOOKS diplomatique; Kovalevsky, / dispacci degli ambasciatori Veneti alia corte di Francia durante la Rivoluzione. For the general history of the Revolution, in addition to books previously noted, — Cherest, Sorel (indispensable for the international relations of France), Sybel (valuable for the same reason) — special attention should be called to Aulard, Political History of the French Revolution (Miall Tr.), 4 vols. (1910), embodying the results of Pro- fessor Aulard's long and fruitful researches. Jaures, Histoire So- cialiste, 2 vols., on the period of the Constituent and Legislative Assembly is suggestive (1901, 1902). The eighth volume of Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire gencrale, represents the best French scholar- ship on the subject at the time of its publication in 1896. The Cam- bridge Modern History, VIII, is on a similar plan, although it does not deal with as many phases of the movement. The most brilliant brief treatment is in Madelin, La Revolution (1913). The two volumes of Stephens, French Revolution (1886, 1891), carry the subject as far as the fall of 1793. There are several brief manuals by Gardiner, Mathews, Johnston, Morris, Belloc. See also Acton, Lectures on the French Revolution, published in 1910 after the au- thor's death. Taine's three volumes are valuable for the discussion of institutions and the criticism of tendencies, but his method is open to serious objection. MacLehose, From Monarchy to the Republic in France (1904) is a clear and interesting presentation of the period from 1789 to 1792. Readers of Carlyle should use the critical edi- tions of Fletcher or Rose. The English translation of Thiers ap- peared in a fresh dress in 1894, 5 vols. On the legislative work of the Revolution, see Sagnac, La legisla- tion civile de la Revolution frangaise (1898). The introduction to Sagnac et Caron, Les Comites dcs droits feodaux, etc., is very im- portant for the study of the abolition of feudalism. On the finances of the Revolution, besides Stourm, the chief work is Gomel, Histoire Unanciere de I'Assemblee Constituante, 2 vols. (1896-7). Akin to the subject of taxation is Karmin, Question du sel pendant la Revolution (1912). Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrieres depuis i/8p, vol. I, has an important review of the assignats. See also Bloch, Le Papier-monnaie et la Monnaie: Instruction, recueil de textes et notes (1911). For the religious question the following books are of special interest: Debidour, Histoire des rapports de I'^glisc et de I'Etat en France de lySp a 1870 (1898) ; La Gorce, Histoire religieuse de la Revolution frangaise, vol. I (1909) ; Mathiez, Rome et le Clerge fran- gaise sous la Constituante (1911); Pisani, L'Eglise de Paris et la Revolution, 4 vols. (1908-1911). Other aspects of the early Revolu- tion are treated in Forneron, Histoire generale des Emigres, 2 vols. (1884) ; Daudet, Histoire de I'Emigration pendant la Revolution fran- gaise, 3 vols. (1904-7); Goncourt, Histoire de la Societe frangaise pendant la Revolution (1889) ; Carre, already cited. A critical study of the July 14 will be found in Flammermont, La Journee du 14 Juillet, lySg (1892). Aulard, Grands Orateurs de la Revolution (1914), NOTES ON BOOKS 477 includes much of the matter contained in his earlier Orateurs de I'Assemhlee Constituante (1882). Among the biographies useful for the period are Lomenie or Stern, Mirabeau; more popular treatments by Willert and Barthou (Tr.) ; Mallet, Mallet du Pan, and Charavay, La Fayette, Clapham (English) or Neton, Abbe Sieyes. In regard to Mirabeau's policy the best source is his Correspondance avec le Comte de la March, 3 vols. (1851), edited by Bacourt. Chapters XI, XII, XIII, and XIV. It is unnecessary to repeat here the names of the general histories of the Revolution, except to emphasize once more the value of Aulard's analyses of political tendencies and descriptions of governmental changes. Jaures, His- toire Socialiste: la Convention, 2 vols. (1903); Jaures and Deville, Histoire Socialiste, vol. V (1904), contain much interesting matter. Upon the influence of the Revolution beyond the borders of France, see: Hazen, American Opinion of the French Revolution (1897); Dowden, French Revolution and English Literature (1897) ; Legouis, Early Life of Wordsworth (1897); Morley, Burke (1867); Smith, English Jacobins (1881); Lecky, French Revolution (chapters from his History of England) ; Lecky, History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century, 5 vols. (1892) ; Francke, History of German Literature; Rambaud, Les Frangais sur le Rhin (1873). For foreign affairs the most important contribution is that of Sorel. See also, Heidrich, Preussen im Kampfe gegen die fran- zosische Revolution bis zur zweiten Teilung Polens (1908); Has- hagen. Das Rheinland und die franzosische Herrschaft (1908); Wittichen, Preussen und die Revolutionen in Belgien und LUttich, iy8p-i/po (1905) ; Delhaize, Domination frangaise en Belgique, 6 vols. (1908-1912); Rose, William Pitt and the National Revival, 2 vols. (1911) ; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792 (1899). The texts of treaties will be found in Martens, Recueil des princi- paux traites d'alliance, de paix, etc., v^ith its supplements, and in De Clerq, Recueil des traites de la France. Parts of them appear trans- lated in Anderson. The most important collection for the study o£ French foreign, as well as internal, policy is Aulard, Recueil des actes du Comite de Salut Public, in 25 vols., nearly completed. Val- uable correspondence will be found in the Auckland, Fortescue, Castlereagh, Malmesbury, journals, letters, and papers. For the changes in the French government after August 10, 1792, the texts are in Mautouchet, Gouvernement Revolutionnaire : textes (1912). For reports upon public opinion, see Schmidt, Tableaux de Paris pendant la Revolution frangaise (1867). Of similar inter- est is the series Paris pendant la Terreur: Rapports des agents secrets du ministre de I'interieur, edited by Caron, of which two vol- umes have been published. For the period after the overthrow of Napoleon, see Aulard, Paris pendant la Reaction thermidorienne et sous le directoire, 5 vols. (1898-1902). 478 NOTES ON BOOKS Upon notable features of the period the following books should be mentioned: Aulard, Orateurs de I'AssembUe Legislative et de la Convention, 2 vols. (1885, 1886); Sagnac, La Chute de Royaute (1909) ; Braesch, La Commune du Dix Aout (1911) ; and the older works written from a point of view hostile to the radical revolution, Mortimer-Ternaux, Histoire de la Terreur, 8 vols. (1862 f.), with ap- pendices containing valuable documents of which some of the orig- inals were destroyed in the burning of the municipal archives in 1871, and Wallon, Revolution du 31 mai et le Federalisme, 2 vols. (1886). Lenotre, Massacres de Septembre (1907) reprints several original narratives. Upon the Revolutionary Tribunal, in addition to the monumental work of Wallon, Histoire du Tribunal Revolutionnaire , 6 vols. (1880- 82), may be mentioned Campardon, Le Tribunal Revolutionnaire de Paris, 2 vols. (2nd ed. 1866) and Lenotre, Tribunal Revolutionnaire (1908). Two books of deep interest are Dunoyer's Deux Jures du Tribunal Revolutionnaire (1909) and Fouquier-Tinville (1913). The economic history of the period is well treated by Levasseur. A more recent work is Gomel, Histoire Unanciere de I'Assemblee Legislative et de la Convention, 2 vols. (1902, 1905). Marion, Vente des biens nationaux, deals with sales of emigrant, as well as ecclesi- astical, lands. Upon education, see Proces-verbaux du Comite d'instruction pub- lique de la Convention nationale, edited by Guillaume, 6 vols. (1890- 1907). On the military side, see the list of the publications of the Section historique de I'Etat-major de I'Armee in Caron, Manuel, pp. 14-17. The principal descriptive work is Chuquet, Les guerres de la Revolu- tion, II vols. (1886-1893). Mahan, Sea Power and the French Revo- lution and Empire, 2 vols. (1897), deals at length with naval opera- tions. The memoir and biographical literature of the period is rich. Among the memoirs should be especially noted those of Brissot (Perroud edition), Carnot, Thibaudeau, Durand de Maillane, Lameth, in addition to those previously mentioned. The following additional biographies are important: ^Madelin, D ant on (others by Beesly, Bel- loc, etc.) ; Madelin, Fouche, 2 vols.'; Cahen, Condorcet; Chuquet, Dumouriez; Levy, Jeanbon Saint-Andre; Montier, Lindet; Lewes or Belloc, Robespierre; Bax, Babeuf. Chapters XVI and XVIL On the diplomacy of the period from 1796 to 1802, besides Sorel and Sybel, see Guyot, Le Direct oire et la paix de VEurope (1911); Du Teil, Rome, Naples et le Directoire (1902) ; Gaffarel, Bonaparte et les Republiques italiennes, ifgd-i'/QQ (1895); Driault, Napoleon et VEurope, 1800-1803 (1909); Bowman, Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens (1900); with Rose's William Pitt. On the relations of France with dependent states other than Italy: see, for the Belgian lands, Delhaize, already cited and Lanzac de NOTES ON BOOKS 479 Laborie, Domination franqaise en Belgique, 2 vols. (1895) ; for Hol- land, Blok, vol. V, and Colenbrander, De Bataafsche Republiek (1908) ; for the Rhine country, Rambaud, Les frangais sur le Rhin; for Switzerland, Oechsli, Geschichte der Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert, vol. I (1903). There are various collections of diplomatic correspondence and documents, for example: Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 1795-1^07, 2 vols. (1881, 1887) ; Luckwaldt, Der Friede von Campo Formio (1907); Montarlot et Pingaud, Le Congres de Rastatt, 3 vols. (1912-1913); Dunant, Relations diplomatique s de la France et de la Republique helvetique (1902). The internal history of the Directory is sufficiently described by Aulard and Sorel. Aside from the affair of the i8th Fructidor and the bankruptcy of 1797 its most important features are associated with the history of General Bonaparte. The two most serviceable biographies of Napoleon are Rose,^ Napoleon I, 2 vols. (1902) and Fournier, Napoleon I (last German edition in 3 volumes, 1904, 1906). The earlier edition of Fournier appears in an English version (E. G. Bourne editor) in one volume, the later, translated by A. E. Adams, in 2 volumes. This translation is not an exact version of the original, important notes being reduced or omitted. There is a more detailed study of Napoleon, Sloane, 4 vols, (revised edition, 1910). The briefer treatments are by Ropes, valuable on military questions, Seeley, Johnston, and Fisher. Rose, Napoleonic Studies (3rd ed. 1914), should also be noted. Upon special phases of Napoleon's career the following should be consulted: Masson's volumes upon Napoleon et sa famille (1897 if.) ; Chuquet, La Jeunesse de Napoleon, 3 vols. (1897 ff.) ; Vandal, L'Avenement de Bonaparte, 2 vols. (1902, 1907). The Correspondance de Napoleon I was originally published in 32 vols, in 1858-1870. Supplementary collections have appeared from time to time, edited by Du Casse (1887), Lecestre, 2 vols. (1897), Brotonne (1898, 1903). Of the memoirs of the period the following are important: Barras, Larevelliere-Lepaux, Carnot, Gohier, Talleyrand, Thibaudeau, Miot de Melito, Lucien Bonaparte, Joseph Bonaparte. Chapter XVII. In addition to works already mentioned which treat various phases of the Consulat — Aulard, Debidour, Vandal, Levasseur, Clapham or Neton — the following should be noted: Upon the Provisional Consulate: Aulard, Registre des delibera- tions du Consulat provisoire (1894) ; and his L'Etat de la France en Van VIII et Van IX (1897). Upon public opinion during the Con- sulat, Aulard, Paris sous le Consulat (1903 ff.). See the descriptive work of Lanzac de Laborie, Paris sous Napoleon, 8 vols. (1905-1913). The documents for the Concordat will be found in the collection by Boulay de la Meurthe, Documents sur la negotiation de Concordat, 6 vols. (J891-1905). On the subject see, besides Aulard, Hausson- ville, LEglise Romaine et le Premier Empire, 5 vols. (1868-1869). 48o NOTES ON BOOKS For the code, see list of works given in the bibliography of chapter 6, Cambridge Modern History, IX. On education : Liard, L'Enseigne- ment superieur en France, 2 vols. (1888-1894). On the press: Le Poittevin, La liberie de la presse depuis la Revolution (1901). On the finances: Stourm, Les finances du Consulat (1902). On the administrative system much valuable information is given by Dejean, Un Prefet du Consulat (1907). Thiers, The Consulate and the Em- pire, should also be consulted upon such matters. See also volume VI of the Histoire Socialiste (1905) by Brousse and Thurot. The colonial policy of Napoleon is fully discussed in Henry Adams, His- tory of the United States. See also Roloff, Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I (1899); Gaffarel, La politique coloniale en France de i/8p a 1830 (1908). Besides the memoirs mentioned for the last two chapters, the fol- lowing should be noted: Chaptal, Gaudin, Mollien, Beugnot, Pas- quier, Mme. de Remusat, Bourrienne, Roederer, Chateaubriand. Chapter XVIII. On the character of the literary movement in Germany, see especially Francke, History of German Literature. The movement for reform in Prussia may best be studied in connec- tion with the lives of the leading Prussian statesmen and adminis- trators, particularly of Stein; see biographies by Seeley and Leh- mann. The peasant reforms are described in Knapp, Bauernbefreiung im Preussen, and the general history of Prussia in Philippson. For Bavaria, another typical state, see Doeberl, Entwickelungsgeschichte Bayerns, vol. II (1912), with full bibliographical information. On Germany as a whole and the revolutionary changes of 1802-3, see, be- sides Hausser, Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Aufiosung des alten Reichs (1899) ; Miiller, Der letzte Kampf der Reichsritterschaft urn ihre Selbstdndigkiet (1910). Upon the work of France Sorel should be consulted. See also Servieres, L'Allemagne frangaise sons Napoleon I ( 1904) ; Fisher, Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany (1903) ; Rambaud, L'Allemagne frangaise sous Napoleon I (1874). Chapters XIX, XX. The events which led to the creation of the Empire are clearly described by Aulard, and in their larger European relations by Sorel. For the conspiracies, see Madelin, Fouche; Daudet, La police et les Chouans sous le Consulat et V Empire (1895) ; Boulay de la Meurthe, Les dernieres annees du due d'Enghien (1886) ; Welschinger, Le due d'Enghien ( ). For the coronation: Masson, The Coronation of Napoleon. For the outbreak of war with England, see Rose, Napoleon, and Rose, Pitt; Temperley, Canning; also England and Napoleon in 1803, being Despatches of Lord Whitworth, edited by Browning. Upon Hanover: Ford, Hanover and Prussia, 1795-1803 (1903); also Thimme, Die inneren Zustdnde des Kurfiirstentums Hannover, 1806- 18 1 3, 2 vols. (1893 f.). For the policy of France toward dependent states, see books men- tioned for chapters 15, 16. NOTES ON BOOKS 481 The campaign of Trafalgar is described fully by Mahan both in his Sea Power and the French Revolution and Empire and in his Life of Nelson, 2 vols. (1897). See also Desbriere, La campagne maritime de 1805 (1907). For the struggle with the Third Coalition, see besides Sorel, Rose, and Fournier, Driault, Napoleon et I'Europe, vol. II (Austerlitz: La fin du Saint-Empire, 1911); Zwiedinek-Siidenhorst, Deutsche Geschichte von der Auiidsung des alt en bis zur Errichtung des neuen Kaiserreichs, vol. I (1897) ; Petre, Conquest of Prussia (1907), and Petre, Campaign in Poland (3rd ed. 1907), both exclusively given to the military operations. For further references on military opera- tions, Kircheisen should be consulted. Two recent books by officers of the French army are of special value in the study of Napoleon's methods as a soldier: Picard, Preceptes et jugements de Napoleon (1912) and Vachee, Napoleon en dampagne (1913). For the Rhenish Confederation, see works already mentioned, and Bitterauf, Geschichte des Rheinbundes (1905). For Poland: Han- delsman. Napoleon et la Pologne (1909), and Bonnefons, Un allie de Napoleon: Frederic-Auguste, premier roi de Saxe, etc. (1902) ; Pfister, Konig Friedrich von Wiirttemberg und seine Zeit (1888). Chapter XXI. The student of the Continental System should con- sult the critical discussions by Lingelbach and Dunan. Rose has con- tributed a special chapter to the subject, Cambridge Modern History, IX, chapter 13, and Fisher has explained in Napoleonic Statesman- ship in Germany the effects upon the different German states. See also Rose, Napoleonic Studies, VII. A few works of special im- portance may be noted: Kiesselbach, Die Kontinentalsperre (1850) ; Ame, Etude economique sur les tariffs de douanes, 2 vols. ( 1876) ; especially Darmstadter, Studien zur Napoleonischen Wirtschaftspo- litik, in Vierteljahrsschrift ftir Social und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 1904, pp. 559-615, and 1905, pp. 112-141. For effects upon single states, see Hitzigrat, Hamburg und die Kontinentalsperre (1900), and Schmidt, Le Grand-Duche de Berg (1905); Darmstadter, Das Grossherzogthum Frankfurt, 1800-1813 (1901). On the American phase of the struggle: Henry Adams, History of the United States; Channing, Jeffersonian System; and Mahan, Sea Power, chapters 17- 18 on the Warfare against Commerce. Upon the political and military affairs, in addition to books already mentioned, note Oman, History of the Peninsular War, 4 vols. (1902 ff.) ; Correspondance du comte de la Forest, 3 vols. (1905 ff.) ; Memoirs of Metternich ; Strobl von Ravelsberg, Metternich und seine Zeit, 2 vols. (1907); Welschinger, Le Pape et I'Empereur (1905); Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I, 3 vols. (1891-1896). Chapter XXII. A brief and suggestive treatment will be found in Meinecke, Das Zeitalter der deutschen Erhebung, 17^5-1815 (1906). As the principal impulse came from Stein, his biographies are of special importance. The biography by Lehmann, vol. Ill, enters fully in the details of the reforms and the difficulties which they encoun- 482 NOTES ON BOOKS tered. On the question of the peasants, see Knapp, already cited. Cavaignac, Prusse contemporaine, discusses the scope of the reforms from a French point of view. Among other works are : Stern, Abhandlungen und Aktenstucke der preusssischen Reformseit (1885) ; Meier, Die Reform der V erwalttingsorganisation unter Stein und Hardenherg (1881) ; Lehmann, Scharnhorst, 2 vols. (1886-87); Del- briick, Gneisenau, 2 vols. (1908); Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts. Chapter XXIII. For the study of the scope of reform in Europe it is necessary to consult works on the several states. Many of these have been mentioned in other connections. All that can be done here is to refer to them once more, and to add a few other titles. Austria: Beer, Zehn Jahre Osterreichischer Politik (1877); Mey- nert, Kaiser Franz I — zur Geschichte seiner Regierung und seiner Zeit (1872). For Russia: Rambaud, History of Russia and chap- ter 21 in Histoire Generate, vol. IX. Sweden: briefly in Bain, Po- litical History of Denmark, Norivay, and Sweden from 1513 to ipoo (1903); Pingaud, Bernadotte, Napoleon, et les Bourbons (1901). For Great Britain during the period, see the bibliographical list in Cambridge Modern History, IX, ch. 22. Italy: in addition to books cited, Driault, Napoleon en Italic, 1800-1810 (1906) ; Johnston, Napo- leonic Empire in Southern Italy, 2 vols. ( 1904) ; Memoires et Cor- respondance de Prince Eugene, 10 vols. ; Lettres et documents pour servir a I'histoire de Joachim Murat (in course of publication). For Dalmatia : Memoires of Marmont ; Pisani, La Dalmatie de lypy a 181 5 (1893). For Germany as a whole, see Fisher, Napoleonic States- manship, already cited, with bibliographical suggestions. Among the books which may be mentioned are, for Westphalia, in addition to Thimme, Goecke, Das Konigreich Westfalen (1888); Kleinschmidt, Geschichte des Konigreichs Westfalen (1893). For Berg and Frank- fort, see Schmidt and Darmstadter, already mentioned. For the South German States: Doeberl, cited; Bitterauf, Bayern als Konig- reich (1906); Schneider, Wiirtt ember gische Geschichte (1890); Weech, Badische Geschichte (1896). In regard to the work of Monteglas: Laubmann und Doeberl, Denkwiirdigkeiten des grafen Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas ilber die innere Staatsverwaltung Bayerns nebst einer Einleitung uber die Entstehung des modernen Staates in Bayern von M. Doeberl (1908). Chapter XXIV. For an analysis of the character of Napoleonic institutions, see Taine, Modern Regime, 2 vols., a work not completed at the time of the author's death. An excellent review of the prin- cipal characteristics of the imperial period is contributed by Professor Pariset to the Cambridge Modern History, IX, chapter 5. To books already mentioned may be added: Campardon, Liste des membres de la noblesse imperiale (1889); Courtois, Histoire des banques en France (1881); Gautier, Mme. de Stael et Napoleon (1902); Mem- oires de Baron Fain (1908). It is from Baron Fain's memoirs that the clearest account can be gained of Napoleon's methods of work. NOTES ON BOOKS 483 Other memoirs valuable for the period may be mentioned again: Talleyrand, Pasquier, Segur, Meneval, Chaptal, Mollien. Much in- teresting light is thrown on the situation by the volumes of Lanzac de Laborie on Paris sous Napoleon, already mentioned. To the books dealing W\ih the relations of Napoleon and the Pope may be added Madelin, La Rome de Napoleon (1906). Chapters XXV, XXVI, and XXVII. An early and long popular narrative of the Russian campaign is by Segur, Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee pendant I'annee 1812, first published in 1824 and republished many times. English translation in 1825. For an English treatment, see George, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia (1899). See also Osten-Sacken, Der Feldcug von 1812 (1901). Among the many memoirs recounting the experiences of the retreat that of Ser- geant Bourgogne, Memoirs (Tr., 1899) is especially vivid. Upon the literary movement v^^hich preceded the uprising of Ger- many, see Francke or Meinecke. Sorel discusses in great detail the diplomatic campaign, but his judgments of Metternich's policy are open to question. See Fournier's explanations as well as those of Rose. Petre's Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany (1912) gives a clear account of the military incidents. A sequel is his Napoleon at Bay (1913). The best account of Napoleon's overthrow in 1814 is Houssaye, 1814 (1888), Of the extensive literature of the sub- ject the following may be mentioned: Oncken, Osterreich und Preussen im Befreiungskriege, 2 vols. (1876, 1879); Metternich- Klinckowstrom, Osterreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen (1887); Browning, Fall of Napoleon (1907); Henderson, BlUcher (1912). For the Congress of Vienna the principal authority is Sorel, vol. VIII (1904). See also Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de I' Europe, vol. I (1891), and Ward's description in chapters 19 and 21 of the Cambridge Modern History, vol. IX. The published correspondence of diplomats present is considerable, of which an interesting example is Correspondance inedite du prince de Talleyrand et du roi Louis XV HI pendant le congres de Vienne, edited by Pallain (1881). For the Hundred Days and Waterloo the best work is Houssaye, 1815, 3 vols. (1893, 1898, 1905). See also Lettow-Vorbeck and Voss, Napoleon's Untergang, 2 vols. (1904-6). Ropes, Waterloo (1892), contains an extensive bibliography of the campaign and careful dis- cussions of disputed problems. It is accompanied by a special atlas. Of the literature of the Saint Helena episode it is enough to cite Rosebery, The Last Phase (1900), and Seaton, Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon (1898). Fisher in chapter 24 of the Cambridge Modern History gives an excellent summary of the events and explains the writings which started the controversy. Fournier, Rose, and other biographers of Napoleon have also treated this phase of Napoleon's career. INDEX INDEX Aberdeen, Lord, 434, 438. Aboukir, battle of, 255- Aboukir Bay, naval battle of, 253. Acre, siege of, 254. Acte additionel, 458-9. Addington, Henry, ministry of, 265. Agriculture, French, 10, 222, 406. Alembert, D', 40. Alexander I, Czar of Russia, succeeds his father, 265; and German reorgani- zation, 295, 296, 305; strained re- lations with Bonaparte, 306, 309, 315. 317-8; enters Third Coalition, 318; war with France, 323, 324, 32s, 330, 331. 336; Peace of Til- sit, 337-8; interview at Erfurt, 354-5 ; subsequent relations with Napoleon, 359, 367, 368; as a ruler, 384-5; in war of 1812, 414 f.; agreements with Prussia, 426, 430, 431; with Austria, 434, 435; cam- paign in France, 441 ; at Paris, 442-4; Congress of Vienna, 453-4- Alsace, 20, 155. Amiens, Peace of, 265-6. Ancona, French seizure of, 243, 328. Angoulerae, Duchess of, 451. Duke of, 458. Annates, payment of, 102, 132. Ansbach, neutrality of, 323. Arkwright, Richard, 77, 80, 85. Armed neutrality, the, 68, 264-5, 343' Army, French, reorganized, 117; in 1792, 169; universal service introduced, 204, 215; new methods of fighting, 237-8, 321; deterioration of, 358; at the Restoration, 448. Prussian, 332-4; reform of, 377-8. Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 331, 431. Artois, Count of, 70, 137, 147, 446. Aspern-Essling, battle of, 358. Assignats, 129 f., 178, 204, 206, 221, 227, 245- Auerstadt, battle of, 334. Augereau, General, 245, 259, 305. Augsburg, 14, 79, 296. August 4, decrees of, loi. Augustus III, of Poland, 59. Austerlitz, battle of, 3-24-5- Austria, peasantry of, 11; under Maria Theresa and Joseph II, 51-55; re- lations with Revolutionary France, 152-3; with Prussia, 157; origin of French war, 161 £., 167; con- duct of the war, 179, 187-8, 203- 4, 215, 232; Third Partition of Poland, 234; campaign of 1796-7, 236 f.; Treaty of Campo Formio, 246; Second Coalition, 255-7; cam- paign of 1800, 261-3; Peace of Luneville, 263; policy in reorgani zation of Germany, 292 f. ; Empire proclaimed, 315; Third Coalition, 317 f.; Peace of Pressburg, 326; war of 1809, 354, 357 f-; condition of, 383-4; alliance with France in 1812, 415, 417; becomes neutral. 487 427-8, 429; prepares to join allies, 431 f.; war with Napoleon, 436 f.; policy at Congress of Vienna, . . 452 f. Avignon, annexation of, 162, 163, 243. Babeuf, 227-8. Bacciocchi, Pascal, 389. Baden, 155, 236, 295, 296, 297, 299, 396. Bailly, 98, 99, 143, 146, 208. Bamberg, bishopric of, 293, 296. Bank of Discount, 74, 88, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131- Bank of England, 31. Bank of France, 275, 405-6, 407. Bank, land, in Prussia, 51, 369. Bankruptcy in France, 73, 245. Bar, Confederation of, 60. Barclay de Tolly, 421. Barere, no, 219, 220, 224. Barnave, io8, 208. Barras, 218, 226, 259, 260. Bartenstein, Treaty of, 336. Barthelemy, 244. Basel, Peace of, 234. Bastille, fall of, 98. Batavian Republic, 250, 263, 304-5; see United Netherlands, Kingdom of Holland. Bautzen, battle of, 432. Bavaria, 61, 170, 236, 291, 293, 294, 295, 296, 326 3p7-8, 424, 438, 455- Baylen, Capitulation of, 353. Bayonne, 351. Beaumont, 63. Beccaria, 46-47. Belgians, 188-9, 196, 391; see Nether- lands, Austrian. Benevolent Despots, 48 f.; in France, 62 f. Bentham, 385. Beresina, crossing of, 422. Berg, 328, 364, 39S- Berlin, 4; Napoleon in, 334-5; Decree, 335. 340. 346; University founded, 379-80. Bemadotte, 258, 328; becomes Prince Royal of Sweden, 385, 417-8, 432. Berne, 251. Berthier, intendant, 98. General, 138, 250, 262, 328, 419. Berthollet, 83, 231, 254, 280. Beugnot, 392, 446, 448. Billaud-Varenne, 180, 182, 209, 213, 216, 220, 224. " Black " Cardinals, 412. Bliicher, 437, 438, 442, 460-463. Bologna, 241. Bonaparte, Elise, 327-8, 389. Jerome, 328, 335, 337, 391, 395-6, 439-40. Joseph, 302, 314, 318; King of Naples, 327, 391, 393; King of Spain, 351 f., 393, 394. 418, 435-*. Louis, 314, 328, 348, 360. Lucien, 260, 328. Napoleon, see Napoleon. INDEX Pauline, 389. Bohemia, 294. Boisgelin, Archbishop, 133, 140, 141. Bordeaux, 202, 203. Borghese, Prince, 388-9. Borodino, battle of, 421. Bouille, Marquis de, 138, 140, 143, 144, 146. Boulogne, Camp, 308, 319-20. Boulton, Matthew, 83. Bourbons, restoration of, 442 f., 446 f., 464; see under Louis XVI, etc. Brandenburg, 294. Bremen, 296, 309. Brest, 175, 319. 320. Breteuil, Baron de, 140, 144, 163. Brethren of the Christian Schools, 409. Brienne, Lomenie de, 72, 74, 88, 92, 141. battle at, 441. Brissot, 102, 149, 165, 166, 183. Brumaire, coup d'etat of, 259-261. Brune, General, 169, 257, 463. Brunswick, Duke of, 173, 179-80, 184-5, i32, 334. 335; the younger, 359. Manifesto of, 173. Brussels, 158. Bubna, Count, 427. Bufion, 40. Burke, Edmund, 91, 107, 151. Busaco, battle of, 357. Buzot, 183. Cadoudal, Georges, 31 1-2. iCagliostro. 71. Cahiers, the, 91, 92. Calas, Jean, 35. Calendar, Republican, 210-11, 275-6, 315. Calonne, 70, 71. 93- Cambaceres, 284, 314. Camperdown, battle of, 247. Campo Formio, Treaty of, 246. Canals, in England, 84. Canning, George, 336. iCape, The, 234, 336. 456. Capri, 393. Carnot, Lazare, 209, 220, 224, 236, 237, 244, 313. 451, 458. Carrier, 209, 219. Carron iron works, 82. Cartwright, Edmund, 81. Castlereagh, 454. _ . ^ ^ Catherine II, of Russia, 57, 59, 60, 61, 170, 192-3. 239. Caulaincourt, 439, 444, 445. 458. Cens, 6. Ceylon, 234, 266, 456. Chamber of Peers, 447. Chamber of Deputies, 447. Champ de Mars, Massacre of, 146. Championnet, 256. Chaptal, 231, 269, 280, 281. Charles III, of Spain, 48, 55. S6; IV, 309. 349. 350, 351- Charles, Archduke, 236, 239, 251, 256, 318, 321, 323. 358, 359- Chateaubriand, 278, 413. Chateaux, war on the, 100, 121. Chatillon, Congress of, 442. Chaumette, 180, 184, 200. Chenier, M. J., 180. Cherasco, armistice of, 238, 239. Church of England, 36. Church, French, 33-S. 38. 39, 40; dur- ing the Revolution, loi, 102, 127- 8, 132-6, 139-43, 165-6, 178-9. 210-12, 229-30; the Concordat, 275-8; during the Empire, 315, 409-12; at the Restoration, 447. German CathoUc, 35-6. 53-4; effect of the secularizations of 1803 upon, 297-8. Cintra, Convention of, 353, 354. Cisalpine Republic, 242, 246, 249, 256, 410. Cispadane Republic, 242, 246. iCities, reorganization of, French, iio-ii; Prussian, 374-5. Civil Code, French, 281-3; adopted else where, 391. Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 133, 135, 139, 165- Claviere, 70, 167, 171. Coalbrookdale, 82. Coalition, Second, 256 f. ; Third, 315 f- Cobbett, 385. Coblentz, 148. Codes, 281-3, 391, 403. Colbert, 15, 25, 43. Collot d'Herbois, 209, 212, 216, 218, 220, 224. Cologne, electorate of, 297, 454. Colonial policy, English, 28; French, 117, 271-273- Commerce, treaty of, between England and France, 85; under the Empire, 406-7; see Continental System. Committee of General Defense, 199. Committee of General Security, 208, 215, 223. Committee of Public Safety, 199, 202, 203, 207, 209-10, 211, 213, 215, 219, 223, 341- Commune of Paris, no; Revolutionary, 175 f., 201-2, 207, 210, 216, 220. Company of the Indies, 63. Compte Rendu, of Necker, 69, 70. Comtat Venaissin, 135, 162. Concordat, of 15 16, 134; of 1802, 276-7. Conde, Prince of, 137, 147, 148, 163. Condillac, Abbe de, 33, 40. Condorcet, 177, 183, 230-1. Confederation of the Rhine, 329-30, 337, 396, 439- Conscription, origin, 204. Constituent Assembly, 95 f.; see also Na- tional Assembly. Constitutions, French, 103 f., not., 148; of 1793, 202; of 1795, 224-5; of the yeat VIII, 267 f. ; of the year X, 283-5; imperial, 313-4, 404. Continental System, 340 f., 397, 399, 407, 408, 415, 418, 449. Contract, the Social. Rousseau's, 41. Convention, National, 183 f. Conventionals, ex-, 244, 269. Corday, Charlotte, 207. Cordeliers Club, 139, 146, 212. Corsica, 209. Corvee, royal, 10, 65, 66, 68, 73. Cort, Henry, 82. Corunna, battle at, 356. Council of Elders, 226. Council of Five Hundred, 226. Council of State, 268, 269-70, 277, 280, 284. Courrier de Provence, no. Courts, see Parlements; reorganization in France, 116. Couthon, 209, 216. Crimea, annexed to Russia, 61. Crompton, Samuel, 80, 84. Custine, 93, 185-6. Cuvier, 413. Czartoryski, 60. Dalberg, Elector of Mainz, 329, 331. Dalmatia, 241, 246, 330. Danton, 146, 175. 181, 183, 184, 189, 198, 199, 203, 212, 213. INDEX 489 Danzig, 192, 433, 436. Darby, Abraham, 81, 82. Dauphin, the, 176, 223. David, 403. Davout, Marshal, 169, 334, 419, 436, 458. Dec res, 269. Declaration of Rights, loi, 102, 105, 115, 134- De Grasse, 66. Delaunay, 98. Delessart, minister of foreign affairs, 164, 166, 170. Delessart, Benjamin, 366. Departments, French, iii, 210, 225, 271. Demerara, 456. Denmark, 264, 338, 346, 432, 456. Desaix, General, 169, 262-3. Desmoulins, 97, 158, 212. Diamond Necklace Affair, 71. Diderot, 40, 57. Directory, creation of the, 225-227; pol- icy of, 240-1, 248 f.; overthrow, 257-60. Domain, Prussian, 31, 369. Domestic System of manufacture, 80. Dresden, 435, 437. Droits reunis, 405, 449 Duces, Roger, 259, 260, 261. Dumouriez, General, 167, 171, 172, 180, 187, 189, 197-8. Duplay, 208. Dupont, General, 353. Dupont de Nemours, 43, 44, 70, 93. Duport, Adrien, 108, 109. Dutch, see United Provinces, United Netherlands, Holland. East India Company, 58. Ecole, Normale, 231. Economists, the, 43. Eden, William, Lord Auckland, 85, 86. Edinburgh Review, 385. Education, 230-1, 278-9, 379-80, 408-g. Eglantine, Fabre d', 180, 213. Egypt, Expedition to, 251-5, 265, 266, 306. Elba, 44, 456-7. Elector, the Great, 50. Emigrants, from France and their treat- ment, 138, 147, 164, 178, 200, 223, 279, 448, 449-50- Emile, by Rousseau, 42, 46. Encyclopedia, the, 40. Enghien, Duke d', 312-3. England, peasantry in, 13-4; traders of, 18; government of, 27-9; financial system, 31-2; Industrial Revolu- tion in, 74 f. ; attitude of towards French Revolution, 151; Nootka Sound Affair, 153-4; and the Dec- laration of Pillnitz, 162; war with France, 190-1, 192, 203; later con- dition of, 235-6, 247; conflict with the Armed Neutrality, 264; Peace of Amiens, 265-6, 305 f . ; menaced with invasion, 310, 319-20; rela- tions with Third Coalition, 318, 327. 337 f-; Continental System, 340 f.; intervention in Spain and Portugal, 353 f-; progress in, 385- 6; and Coalition of 1813, 433-4; in Congress of Vienna, 453 f. ; Waterloo campaign, 460 f. Erfurt, The Interview at, 354. Etruria, kingdom of, 263, 303, 350. Eugene de Beauharnais, 318, 393, 395. 419. Expilly, Abbe, 140. Eylau, battle of, 336. Factory Acts, 386. Farmers-General, 30. Febronius, 35. Federation of July 14, 1790, 137. Ferdinand VII, of Spain, 350, 351, 433, 434- Ferrara, 241. Fersen, Count de, 144. Fesch, Cardinal, 314, 329. Feudalism, in France, 4 f . ; in Germany, II f.; abolished in Savoy, 56; abolition of in France, 101-2; II 8-2 1, 178, 206-7; in Alsace, 155- 6; in Austrian Netherlands, 190; in Prussia, ch. 22; in Napoleonic Europe, ch. 23. Feuillants, the, 147, 163. Fichte, 235, 379, 430. Finances, of the old regime, 29-31; of Revolutionary France, 125 f., 178, 204-S; of the Directory, 245; of the Consulate, 273-4; of the Em- pire, 404-5; of the Restoration, 449; of England, 247, 265. Finlan4 337, 338-9, 355- Flesselles, 97, 98. Floreal, 22nd, 257. Forster, Georg, 186. Fouche, 209, 258, 279, 313, 402, 457. Foulon, 98. Fouquier-Tinville, 200, 214, 219. France^ see under specific titles, Feudal- ism, Peasantry, etc. Franche Comte, 20. Francis, II, of the Holy Roman Em- pire, I, of Austria, accession, 167, 169, 173; see Austria, for rela- tions with France; German policy of, 292 f . ; becomes Emperor of Austria, 315; renounces title as Emperor of the Holy Roman Em- pire, 330; marriage alliance with Napoleon, 360; as a ruler, 383-4. Frankfort, 14. i73, 296, 363. 438. Frederick the Great, 14, 26, 27, 39, 48, 49, 60. Frederick William I, 12, 26. Frederick William II, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 167, 185, 192-3. II, 289-291, 315, 323. 327, 332, 333, 334, 336, 367 f.. lUj, lU/, Frederick Willi III, 376, 416, 417, 424 f. ; see also der Prussia. Freron, 218. Frey, 374. Friedland, battle of, 337. Friends of the Constitution, 109, 147; see Jacobin Club. Fructidor, i8th, 245. Fulton, Robert, 280-1. Galicia, 60, 415, 420. Galileans, the, 133. Gaudin, 269, 274, 406. Genet, 196. Geneva, 251. Genoa, 242, 303, 321. Gensonne, 149. Gentz, 152, 331. George III, of England, 28, 58, 235, 261, 315. 318. Germany, population of, 4; peasantry of, 11; social structure of, 14; guilds in, 16; religious controversy in, ^5-6; intellectual life of, 44- 6; industrial revolution in, 85; effect of the French Revolution upon, 152, 154-7. 163-5. 167; cor- onation of the Emperor Francis II, 173; French invasion of, 185- 490 INDEX 7, 1 88, 189; the Empire declares war, 192; French attempts at an- nexation, 197, 232; effects of the Peace of Basel, 234; dangers from Peace of Campo Formio, 246; Congress of Rastadt, 248-9; con- sequences of Peace of Luneville, 263, 292-300; conditions in before 1803, 286-92; results of the Peace of Pressburg, 326; the Confedera- tion of the Rhine, 329-30; conse- quences of Treaty of Tilsit, 337- 8; effect of the Continental Sys- tem upon, 348-9, 360, 363, 364, 365; Napoleonic influence in, 387 f.; War of Liberation, 429 f. ; changes in, made at the Congress of Vienna, 453f. • ^e^ also under Austria, Bavaria, Prussia. Girondins, the, 149, 165, 166, 167, 174, 176, 177, 182, 183, 184, 189, 192, 196, 200, 201-2, 207-8, 221. Gneisenau, 377. Gobel, Bishop, 141, 142, 211. Godoy, 309, 349, 350, 351. Goethe, 14, 23s, 287, 355. Gournay, Marquis de, 16, 43, 63. Grain trade, 62, 63, 65, 71, 73. Grand Empire, The, 325 f. Great Britain, see under England. " Great Fear," The, 100. Gregoire, Bishop, 141, 142, 147, 211, 229, 230. Gross-Gorschen, battle of, 432. Grouchy, Marshal, 460-1. Guadet, 149. Guilds, IS, 16, 66, 68, 121, 281. Guillotine, the, 116. Gustavus III, of Sweden, 159; IV, 385. Hamburg, 14, 79, 296, 308, 349, 436. Hanau, battle at, 438. Hanover, Electorate of, 308, 330, 338. 455- Hapsburgs, see Austria. Hardenberg, 298, 335, 368, 370, 371, 376, 378-82 416, 424, 425, 426, 439. Hargreaves, James, 80, 85. Haugwitz, 323, 324, 425-6, 332, 333. 335 Hebert, 180, 184, 201, 207, 212, 213. Heligoland, 348-9. Helvetic Republic, 251, 263; see Switzer land. Herder, 45, 46, 287, 288. Heriot, 11. Hertzberg, 153, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161 Hesse-Cassel, 294, 297, 331, 338, 455. Hesse-Darmstadt, 155. Hoche, General, 223, 245, 247. Hofer, Andreas, 359. Holbach, Baron d', 40. Holland, 318, 360, 389, 433, 434, 439, 452, 455- Holy Roman Empire, 19, 59, 291 f., 329, 330. Hontheim (Febronius), 35. House of Commons, 27-8. Huguenots, the, 35, 73, 139. Humboldt, 379. Hungary, 4, 53, 54, 158, 159. Huntsman, Samuel, 83. Illyrian Provinces, 359, 394, 423, 433, 434. 436. Impressment question, 345. Indies, Council of the, 56. Indulgents, the, 213. Industrial Revolution, the, 76 f. Industry, history of, 15-17, 66, 76 f., 122, 205-6, 222, 280-1, 380, 398, 406-7. Infernal Machine plot, 311. Inquisition, the, 56, 356. Institute, 230, 231, 279. Intendants, the, 25, 271. Invalides, Hotel des, 97. Inventions, 76 f. Ionian Islands, 246, 251. Iron industry, 81 f., 281. Isnard, 164, 165, 221. Istria, 241, 246. Italy, 46-7, 56; Bonaparte in, 2371.; consequences of Peace of Campo Formio, 246; French rule in, 249- 50, 255-6; campaign of :8oo in, 261-4; under the Consulate, 301- 3, 309; kingdom of, 318, 320, 321; changes after Austerlitz, 326, 327- 8; industry of, 364; Napoleonic mfluence upon, 387 f. ; collapse of Napoleonic rule in, 440, 441, 459; conclusions upon at Congress of Vienna, 452, 455. Jacobin Club, 109, 145, 147, 150, 167, 168, 171, 172, 174, 202, 207, 208, 212, 217, 219-20. Jactjuart, 280. ales. Camp of, 148. Jansenist controversy, 34. Jassy, Peace of, 159. Jefferson, Thomas, 273, 345, 347. Jena campaign, 333-4. Jesuits, 34, 49, 56, 58. Joseph II, of Austria, 20, 48, 51 f., 60, 61, 153, 159. Josephine, the Empress, 315, 359, 360. Joubert, 256. Jourdan, General, 169, 236, 259, 435. Judicial reform in France, 115. Junot, General, 350, 353, Jury system, 116, 403. Kainarji, Peace of, 60. Kalisch, Treaty of, 430, 453. Kalckreuth, Marshal, 367. Kant, 46, 152, 286, 374. Kay, John, 79. Kellerman, General, 180, 184, 185. Klopstock, 45, 152, 179. Knights, Imperial, the, 299-300. Korner, Theodor, 431. Kosciusko, 179, 195, 217. Kraus, Professor, 289. Kriimper system, 378. Kurakin, 416. Kutusoff, 421. Lafayette, Marquis de, 67, 93, 98, 99, loi, 102, 104, 105, 113, IIS, 120, 143, 146, 164, 166, 175, 177-8, 284. Lameth, Charles and Alexander de, 93, 109. Lands, Public, in France, 128-132, 178, 200, 277, 279, 449-50. Landsturm, 431. Landwehr, 429. Lanjuinais, 221, 227, 459. Lannes, General, 169. Laplace, 231, 413. La Kochejaquelein, 198, 458. La Rothiere, 442. Lavoisier, 231. Law, see Code. Le Bas, 216. Lebrun, 314. Legion of Honor, 279-80. Legislative Assembly, 148 f., 176 f. INDEX 491 xv!] Legislative Corps, 268, 277, 280, 440. Leipzig, 363; battle of, 438. Leopold, of Austria, 53, 56, 140, 156, 159, 161, 163, 165, 166, 167. Lessing, 45, 46. Lettres de cachet, 90, 282. Libel plot, 311. Liege, 156-7, 159. Ligny, battle of, 461. Ligurian Republic, 242, 303, 321. Lindet, Robert, 209, 215, 228. Lit de justice, 64. Liverpool, 79. Local government in France, 24, 271; in Prussia, 27, 374-5- Lodi, battle of, 238. Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, 455. Lorient, 63. Lorraine, 20. Louis XIV, of France, 4, 20, 24, 43, 45, 67. 155. 163. XV, 24, 34, 39, 43, 61, 62, 63, 64. XVI, 34, 43, 61, 62, 67, 72, 88, 114, 143, 144-145, 161, 163, 167, 171 f., 191-2. [I, 176, 223. XVIII, 144, 197. 223, 277, 443, 444, 446 f., 457-8, 464. Louis, Baron, 360, 447. Louise, Queen of Prussia, 333, 338, 380. Louisiana, 265, 272-3. Louverture, Toussaint, 272. Louvet, 221. Liibeck, 296, 407. Luneville, Peace of, 263, 286, 292. Liitzen, battle of, 432. Luxemburg, 158, 232. Lycees, 231, 409. Lyons, 202, 209, 408. Mably, Abbe, 33. Macadam, 84. Macdonald, Marshal, 424, 436, 444, 450. Machinery, introduction of, 76 f., 280, 365- Mack, General, 321-2. Mackintosh, Sir James, 151. Madison, President, 361. Madrid, 55, 351, 353, 354, 356, 435. Mainz, 186, 197, 204, 232, 248. Malesherbes, 37. Malisset, 63. Mallet du Pan, 107, 171. Malouet, 112, 448. Malta, 251, 256, 264, 265, 266, 305-6, , 307, 318, 456. Mandat, commander of the Paris Na- tional Guard, 175, 176. Mandats, 227. Mantua, 239. Marat, no, 181, 184, 200, 201, 207. Marck, Count de la, 113, 163. Marengo, battle of, 262-3. Maria Theresa, of Austria, 46, 51, 59. Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, 71, 143, 144, 148, i66, 171, 172, 208. Marie Louise, Empress, 360, 443, 444, 455- Marmont, Marshal, 394, 444. Marseillaise, the, 174. Marseilles, 174, 202, 203. Massena, General, 257, 262, 356, 357. Maupeou, Chancellor, 64. Maurepas, Count de, 64, 67, 69. Maury, Abbe, 109. Maximum legislation, 200-1, 205-6, 221. Melzi, Count, 302, 303. Merlin, of Douai, 93. Metternich, Count, 417, 427 f., 431 f., 438 f., 454 f. Milan, 240, 241. 262; Decree, 347. Miollis, General, 352, 410. Mirabeau, Count de, 92, 95, 108, 113, 114, 120, 125, 126, 128, 154, 162. Modena, 240, 241, 246, 295, 455. Molasses Act, 18. Mollien, 406. Monastic Orders, 54, 129, 133, 291. Monge, 254, 280. Moniteur, the, no. Montagnards, the, 183, 224. Montesquieu, 37, 62. Montesquiou, Abbe de, 443, 448. General, 93, 187. Montgelas, 291, 397-8. Montmorin, 85, 114, 132, 144, 154, 171. Moore, Sir John, 356. Moreau, General, 169, 236, 239, 259, 260, 262, 263, 312, 313, 436. Morris, Gouverneur, 92, 93. Moscow, 420 f. Mounier, 93, 105, 109. Municipal reform, in, 374-5. Miinster, bishopric of, 293-4, 295, 296, 297, 298. Murat, Joachim, 226, 301, 302, 314, 323; grand duke of Berg, 328, 336; king of Naples, 352, 393, 395, 419, 422, 424, 440, 455, 459. Nantes, 209. Naples, kingdom of, 255-6, 264, 327, 389- 90, 410, 440, 455, 459. Napoleon Bonaparte, spectator at assault of the Tuileries, 176; defends the Convention, 226; closes the Club of the Pantheon, 228; first cam- paign in Italy, 237-9; exacts war contributions, 240; his Italian pol- icy, 240-4, 246; expedition to Egypt, 251-5; overthrows the Di- rectory, 259-60; one of the pro- visional consuls, 261 ; First Consul, 261; campaign of Marengo, 261-3; makes peace with England, 265; as First Consul, 267 f.; Consul for Life, 283-4; policy in Germany, 2p3 f. ; his foreign policy as First Consul, 301 f. ; plots against, 310- 3; proclaimed Emperor, 313; cor- onation, 314-5; VVar of the Third Coalition, 317 f.; at Vienna and Austerlitz, 323-5; makes his brother King of Naples, 327; claims to be successor of Charlemagne, 328- 9; organizes the Confederation of the Rhine, 329; crushes Prussia, 333-4; negotiates Treaty of Tilsit with Alexander I, 337-8; his Con- tinental System, 340, 342 f. ; seiz- ure of Spain, 349 f. ; interviews Alexander at Erfurt, 354-5; de- feats Austria, 358-9; marries the Archduchess Marie Louise, 360; his influence upon dependent states, 387 f. ; his methods as a ruler, 400-403; imperial policy in France, 403 f.; his quarrel with Pius VII, 410-2; break with Alexander, 416; victor at Borodino, 421; retreat from Moscow, 421 f . ; efforts to or- ganize a new army, 423-4, 432; campaign of 1813-14, 432 f. ; abdi- cation, 445; return from Elba, 4^56-8; the Hundred Days, 458-63; St. Helena, 463. Narbonne, Count de, 163, 166, 431. Nassau-Usingen, Duke of, 299. National Assembly, organized, 94, 95; 492 INDEX achievements, 107; called the Con- stituent Assembly, 118. National Guard, organized, 99; federation of, 137- National Library, 231. " Natural Limits," doctrine of the, i88-9- Necker, first ministry, 68-9; second min- istry, 88, 90, 94, 96, no, 123, 125, 126, 129, 138. Neerwinden, battle of, 197. Nelson, 247, 252, 253, 25s, 256, 264, 319- 20, 322-Z. Netherlands, the Austrian, 55, 158, 187- 90, 196-8, 232, 455. Ney, Marshal, 334, 419, 444, 457, 460, 461, 462, 463. Nice, 195, 452. Niebuhr, 380, 430. Nile, battle of the, 253. Nimes, 139, 202. Nobility, m France, 4-6; in Prussia, 12; imperial, 402. Non-jurors, the, 165, 178-9, 229. Nootka Sound affair, 153. Norway, 417, 418, 456. Nuremberg, 296. Oldenburg, duchy of, 366, 414, 415. Orange, Prince of, 233. Orders in Council, 346, 418. Organic Articles, zyj, 315. Orleans, Duke of, 208. Pacca, Cardinal, 411. Pache, 189. Facte de Famine, 63. Paine, Thomas, 151, 191. Palm, 331. Panic of 181 o, 407-8. Pantheon, Club of the, 228. Paris, government of. 25; elects depu- ties to the States General, 91; re- volt in, 95-8; improvises a gov- ernment, 98-100; insurrection of October 5, 104-5; new municipal law, in; see also Revolutionary Commune; organized during the Consulate, 271. Treaty of, 452; Second Treaty of, 464. Parma, duchy of, 240, 387. Parthenopean Republic, 256, 264. Parties, in France, during the Revolu- tion, 109. Patterson, Elizabeth, first wife of Jerome Bonaparte, 328. Paul, Czar of Russia, 239, 253, 303. Peace of Amiens, 265-6, 305-307. 342- Peasantry, under the old regime, 4, 6 f., II, 13, 50-1, 52-3,. 55 ; abolition of feudal dues of, in Savoy, 56-7; work of the Revolution for, in France, 101-2, 1 18-21, 178, 206- 7; in Alsace, 155-6; in Austrian Netherlands, 190; in Prussia, 290- 1, 369-373, 381-2; in the Napo- leonic states, ch. 23. Physiocrats, the, 10, 43, 53, 123. Pichegru, 312, 313. Piedmont, annexed, 303; reforms m, 388-9; disposition of in 1814, 452. Pillnitz, Declaration of, 162, 163, 166. Pitt, William, 85, 86, 153, 191, 235, 265, 327- Pius VI, 135, 250. VIL 264, 276, 314-5, 328-9, 352, 409-12, 441. Penal code, 47, 55, 116, 385, 403. Petion, 147, 174, 180. Poland, first Partition of, 59; revolution in, 160; Second Partition, 193, 204; Third Partition, 217, 234; Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 337, 391, 398-9, 414, 415, 419-20; final dis- position of, 453-4. Poniatowski, Stanislas, 60. Portalis, 282. Portugal, 309, 338, 350, 354, 356-7, 423. 456. Prague Congress, 436. Prefects, 271- Preliminaries of Leoben, 241, 242, 246. Preliminaries of London, 265, 342. Press, liberty of, 36, 283, 413. Pressburg, 1 reaty of, 326. Price, Richard, 151. Prina, 302, 303, 392. Privy Council, 284-5. Provence, Count of, 70, 144, 148, 162, 163; see Louis XVIII. Provincial assemblies, 20, 69-70, 72-3. Prussia, under Frederick IL 11-13, 26-7, 48-51; policy at the opening of the Revolution, 152-3, 157-8; and the Polish Revolution, 160-1; unites in Declaration of Pillnitz, 162; at war with France, 167, 179-80, 184-5, 203-4; Treaty of Basel, 234; share in Poland, 192-3, 217, 234; reference to, in Treaty of Campo Formio, 246; joins the Armed Neutrality, 264; share in the reorganization of Germany, 292 f.; attempts at reform, 289-91; intervention in 1805, 323, 325-6; crushed by Napoleon, 330 f. ; re- organization of, ch. 22; in 1812, 416-7; policy after Napoleon's de- feat, 424 f. ; declares war upon France, 430; campaign of 1813-4, 430 f. ; share in the work of Con- gress of Vienna, 453 f. ; gains, 454; in the Waterloo campaign, 460 f. Pyramids, battle of, 252. Quatre Bras, battle of, 461. Quebec Act, 58. Quesnay, 43. Quiberon affair, 223. Quimper, bishopric of, 140. Raynal, Abbe, 33, 62. Rastadt Congress, 248, 292. Rapinat, 251. Reason, Worship of, 211-12. Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke, 151, 152. Regicides, 192, 226, 463. Regency, announced by the Count of Provence, 148. Reggio, 241- Reichenbach, conference at, 159; Treaty of, 453- Reichsdeputation, 294. Reign of Terror, 207, 218. Religion, see Church. Representatives on mission, 199. Republicanism in France, 145-146, 177, 184. Reubell, 226, 233. Revolutionary Army, 207, 209, 213. Revolutionary Tribunal, 199. 200, 201, 208, 214, 219. Revolutions de Paris, newspaper, no. Rhenish Confederation, 329-30, 337, 396, INDEX 493 Richardson, 44, 45. Rights oj Man, Paine, 151, Kivoli, battle of, 243. Rodney, 6tS. Roebuck, 82, 83. Roederer^ 392. Rohan, Cardinal de, 71. Roland, 1&7, 171, 177, 208. Romantic movement, 41, 288. Rome, 240, 250-1, 412: see also Pius VI and VII. Romilly, Samuel, 99, 107, 308, 385. Robespierre, Augustin, 216. Maximilien, 109, 114, 122, 134, 147, 180, 182, 184, 201, 202, 203, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213-7, 218. Rosetta Stone, 254. Rousseau, 3, 37, 41, 44, 46. Rumbold, Sir O'eorge, 315. Russia, under Catherine II, 57-8; share in Partition of Poland, 59-60; an- nexes the Crimea, 60-1 ; war with the Turks, 157, 159; Second Par- tition of Poland, 161, 170, 192-3; Third Partition of Poland, 217, 234; a member of the Second Coal- ition, 255-7, 261-2; joins the Armed Neutrality, 264-5; interven- tion in Gerrnan affairs, 295; re- newed hostility to France, 306, 317-8; in the Third Coalition, 32: f. ; war in Poland and Prussia, 336-7; Tilsit, 337-8; annexes Fin- land, 338-g ; condition during Alex- ander's reign, 384-5; invasion of 18 1 2, 420 f.; conflict at the Con- gress of Vienna, 453 f. Saint-Andre, 209. Saint-Etienne, Rabaut, 89. Saint-Just, 216. St. Helena, Island of, 463. St. Ouen, Declaration of, 446, 450. St. Vincent, Cape, battle of, 247. Salamanca, battle of, 423. Saliceti, 240. Salonica, 349. Salt tax, 9, 22, 122-3, 405- Salzburg, 61, 246, 296, 297, 455. Santo Domingo, 117, 118, 205, 265, 271—2. Sardinia, kingdom of, 56, 195, 237, 249, 256, 303. 452- Savary, General, 351. Savoy, 56-7, 187, 188-9, 452- Saxony, 161, 294, 331, 333, 337, 365, 438, 453-4, 455- Scharnhorst, 289, 377-9, 416, 417. Schill, Colonel, 359, 382. Schiller, 235, 287. Schleiermacher, 235, 288, 331. Schlozer, 152. Schon, 289, 370, 373. Scbonbrunn, Treaty of, 359. Schools, see Education. Schwarzenberg, 436, 437, 438. Sebastiani, Colonel, 306. Senate, French, 269, 284, 440, 443, 444, 446. September Massacres, 181-3. Serfdom, see Peasantry. Servan, 171. Shuttle, the Flying, 79. Sieyes, Abbe, 89, 95, loi, 113, 220, 226, 233, 257-66, 267, 269. Simeon, 391. Simplon Road, 303, 393- Sistova, Treaty of, i59- Slave Trade, 36, 79, 385, 456. Smeaton, 82. Smith, Adam, 44, 289. Smolensk, 421, 422. Smuggling, 18, 348-9. Soult, Marshal, 169, 448, 456, 460. Spain, under Charles III, 55-6; Nootka Sound affair, 153-4; war with France, 192, 235; war with Eng- land, 236, 247; relations with Na- poleon, 309, 322; Napoleon's seiz- ure of, 349 f . ; colonies open to English trade, 360-1 ; French pol- icy in, 394; French defeats in, 418, 433. 434; tinal settlement, 456. Stadion, 383-4. Stadtholder, of the United Provinces, 74. Stael, Mme. de, 223, 413. States General, organization of, 89; opened, 92. Steffens, 430. Stein, Baron vom, 11, 289, 298, 332-3, ^ , 335. 368 f., 425-6, 429, 431, 455. Stock, government, in France, 245, 274-5, 406, 441, 449. Suvorof, 256. Sweden, 75, 264, 338, 385, 417-8, 432, 456. Swiss Guard, 175, 176, 180. Switzerland, 251, 303-304, 364, 391. Taille, the, 66. Taine, 6, 9, 40. Talleyrand, 70, 93, 113, 125, 128, 137, 141, 142, 251, 252, 269, 272, 402, 412, 443. 444. 447. 448, 452 f. Talhen, 180, 218-9. Target, 89. Targovitz, Confederation of, 170. Tariff, barriers, 22; in 1786, 86; of 1791, 124; during the Continental Sys- tem, 341 f., 362; at the Restora- tion, 449. Tauroggen, Convention of, 426. Taxation, under the old regime, 8-10, 13, 21, 22, 31, 32, 53, 58; French attempts to reform, 62, 66, 71-2; changes made by the Revolution, 102, 122-4; failure to collect, 204; reforms under the Consulate, 273- 4; during the Empire, 404-5; Eng- lish, 386. Tennis Court affair, 94. Teplitz, treaties at, 439, 453. Textile machinery, 79 f., 280, 365. Tithe, the, 7, 102, 127. Thomson, 44, 45. Thorn, 192, 454. Thouret, 93. Tilsit, Peace of, 337-8, 346, 367, 385. Tippoo, the Sultan of Mysore, 254. Tolentino, Treaty of, 243, 250. Torres Vedras, Lines of, 356. Toulon, 202, 203. Trafalgar, battle of, 322-3. Treilhard, 93. Trent, bishopric of, 295. Treves, Electorate of, 186, 297, 454. Tribunal of August 17, 180; see also Revolutionary Tribunal. Tribunate, the, 268, 280, 284, 404. Tronchet, 93, 282. Trudaine, 44. Tuileries, Louis XVI at, 105; mob in, 172; attack upon, 176. Turgot, 43, 44, 62, 64-7, 70, 71, 93, 121. Turks, the, 60, 61, 159, 337, 354, 415, 418. Tuscany, 56, 263, 295, 303, 350, 387, 455- Tyrol, 359. 455- 494 INDEX Ulm, capture of, ^21-2. United Irishmen, Society of the, 151 United Netherlands, United Provinces, 74. 192, 233, 250; see Batavian Re- public, Holland. United States, and France, 67-8, 195-6; the Louisiana question, 272-3; con- sequences of the warfare upon neu- tral commerce, 343 {., 361, 362; growth of manufactures, 365: War of 1812, 418-9. Valais, 303. Valtelline, 242. Varennes, Flight to, 144. Vendean troubles, 198, 223, 458. Vendemiaire, 13th, 225-6. Venice, 241, 242, 243, 246, 326. 393. Verdun, 181, 185. Vergennes, 85. Vergniaud, 149, 165, 166, 176, 183. Versailles, Treaty of, 85. Vienna, Treaty of, 359; Congress of. 452-6.^ Vieux Cordelier, 212. Villeneuve, Admiral, 319-20. Vittoria, battle of, 435. Voltaire, 37, 38, 49, 57. Walpole, Sir Robert, 32. War of Liberation, 429 f. Warsaw, 217; Grand Duchy, 337, 359, w 1,-^''.°' 398-9, 433, 434, 436, 453-4- Washington, George, 179, 196. Waterloo, battle of, 461-2. Watt, James, 77, 83. fVealth of Nations, Smith, 44, 289. Weimar, 287. W^i!«ley, Governor General, 254. Welles ey. Sir Arthur, 353, 356; as Wellington, 356, 418, 423, 438. 440, 460-3. Wesley, John, 36, 44. Westphalia, kingdom of, 338, 390, 392, 395-6, 440. White Terror, 463. Whitefield, George, 36. Whitworth, Lord, 306. Wieland, 45 287, 355- Wilkinson, John, 82. Winckelmann, 45. Wittenberg, 41:4. Wolf, F. A., 288, 380. Wordsworth, 107, 307-8. Workmen, 16, 121-2, 281. Worms, 148, 185, 197. Worship of Reason, 141. Wiirmser, Marshal, 239. Wiirzburg, 296. Wiirttemberg, duchy of, 155, 236, 294, 296, 297, 299; kingdom, 326, 396- 7, 424. 455- Yorck, General, 424, 426, 429. Young, Arthur, 5, 7, 10, 21, 95, 107, 108. 170. Zurich, battle of, 257. THE RENAISSANCE THE PROTESTANT REVOLUTION AND THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE BY EDWARD MASLIN HULME PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO Royal 8vo. 598 pages. $2.50 postpaid Professor Hulme has written a work which reveals wide knowledge of a period particularly difficult to master. In liter- ary style, in comprehensiveness, in balance of accent it is delightful. It covers a field which will always be of interest and importance to both the student and the general reader. Judiciously condensed, presenting the essence of all that recent study has proved and disproved, placed in new lights, or reduced to its proper proportions in the history of what still remains the most significant and fruitful episode in the progress of humanity toward self-realization, the book has the further merit of being readable. It will serve to dispel in large degree the impression, sent abroad by earlier historians and still gener- ally held, that the Renaissance and the Reformation were but slightly interrelated; that, indeed, in its broad outline, the "pagan " new life in the South was the antithesis of the awaken- ing of the North. The author lays emphasis throughout upon the multiple aspects of the Reformation, social, economic, political, which are in the general mind still obscured if not hidden by its religious phase; and he is uncommonly felicitous in his summings up of the results of influences and movements and of the significance and the personality of leaders. He constantly suggests in his treatment of the social and economic phases of the period a parallel with the unrests and new aspirations of our own day. This gives the narrative a living quality without impairing its historical correctness. THE CENTURY CO. UNION SQUARE NEW YORK SB 1 81 Vincent of Beauvais, 119 & n. 3, 162, 223, 239; Speculum His- toriale, 223 Viterbo, 212, 261 Volo, Gulf of, 112 Wadi Sabu, 411 n. 3 Wahegins, igo Waldemar IV, K. of Danes, 332 n. i Waleran de Warvin, 204 n. i Wales, 5, 44 Wallachia, 195, 206, 218, 435, 440, 444 &n. 2,447,451,455 Walsingham, 333 Walter de Maundy, 333 n. 6 Walter de Ruppes, Flemish knight, 441 Warwick, Earl of, 339 Wenzel, Duke of Pomerania, 184 Wey. Vide William Widdin, 389 n. 2, 390, 393 n. i, 435. 443*444 n. r Wilhelm von Boldensele, 160— I, 162, 168; Hodoeporicon ad T.S., 161, 169 William Fotheringay, 408 n. 3, 421 n. I William Occam, 9 William de la Pole, Lord of Castle Ashby, 339 & n. 3 INDEX 603 William of Tripoli, 247 n. i William Wey, 212, 2 1 5- 1 9; royal brief to — , 216 n. 2; Itineraries of — , 215-16 nn. Wiltshire, 216 Wurtemburg, 220 Wyclif, 9, 188, 189 Yalbogha al-Khassiki, 329 n. 5, 352, 371 n., 372 & nn., 375 & n. i Ya'qub, Jewish envoy to Pierre de Lusignan at Alexandria, 368-9, 369 n. 2 Ya'qub, Turkish general, 464 Yerakites, 329 Yon de Cholet, 421 n. i York, Duke of, 143, 152 Ypres, 462 'Ysini', 170 Zaccharia. Fide Benito and Mar- tino Zaitun, 251 n. 7, 254 Zanta, 461 Zara, 198, 212 Zealand, 147 Zeno. Fide Pietro Zuchio (Morea), 387 Zwailah Gate (Cairo), 476 Zwornik, 464 ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX I (pp. 487-9) Compare I. Longpre — Deux opuscules inedits du B. Raymond Lu//e, in France franciscaine, 18 (1935), 145-54. This includes the Petitio pro Conversione Infidelium. M. Longpre's text is derived from the B.N. MS. Lat. 15450, and mine from the Munich MS. Lat. 10565. 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