COMPANY TRAINING MOSS , W^V*"*"*' Class Ulh^ Book ^% 3 Copyright^ . COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT; COMPANY TRAINING In the Attack, and the Defense, including the Field Orders of Enlisted Men By MAJOR JAMES A> MOSS U. S. Army Price 50 cents ^6 Publishers GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY Menasha, Wisconsin : PREFATORY Because of the prominence in the press of the country and elsewhere that has been given to the special and abnormal kind of trench warfare that has developed on the western front in Europe, it is feared that some of us may allow ourselves to be misled into coming to the con- clusion that it is necessary to train and instruct our men in trench warfare only, and pay little or no attention to open fighting. It may be remarked in this connection the British made this mistake, but experience soon showed them their error, and now their officers and men are trained in open fighting as well as in trench warfare. Let us not repeat the British mistake — and let us also bear in mind that in war it is often the unexpected that happens, and no one knows what day the greater part of the work of our expeditionary forces will consist of open fighting. This little book deals with the training and instruc- tion of a company in open fighting. Camp Gaillard, C. Z., July 30, 1917. ©CU 4 77530 NOV 1313/7 jv^ Copyright 1917 By J as. A. Moss DISTRIBUTERS : UNITED STATES: Boston, Mass. The Harding Uniform and Eegalia Co., 22 School St. The Old Corner Book Store, Inc., 27-29 Bromfield St. Chicago, HI. E. A. Armstrong Mfg. Co., 434-440 Wabash Ave. Columbus, Ohio. The M. C. Lilley & Co. Fort Leavenworth, Kan. U. S. Cavalry Association. Book Department, Army Service Schools. Fort Monroe, Va. Journal IT. S. Artillery. Kalamazoo, Mich. Henderson-Ames Co. Menasha, Wis. Geo. Banta Publishing Co. , Kew York. Edwin N. Appleton, 1 Broadway. Army and Navy Cooperative Co., 16 East 42nd St. Henry Malkan, 42 Broadway. Eidabock & Co., 149 West 36th St. Warnock Uniform Co., 16 West 46th St. Philadelphia, Pa. Jacob Eeed's Sons, 1424 Chestnut. San Francisco, Cal. B. Pasquale Co., 115-117 Post St., Western Distributer. Washington, D. C. Army and Navy Eegister, 511 Eleventh St. N. W. . Meyer's Military Shops, 1331 E St. N. W. U. S. Infantry Association, Union Trust Bldg. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: Philippine Education Co., Manila, P. I. HAWAIIAN ISLANDS; Patten Co., Ltd., Honolulu, H. T. CANAL ZONE: Post Exchange, Empire, C. Z. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I THE COMPANY IN ATTACK Pars. The importance of the attack — Rules and principles of attack — Plan for illustrating the application of these rules and principles — The five stages of the attack 1-19 CHAPTER II THE COMPANY IN ATTACK THE FIRST STAGE OF THE ATTACK The advance of the company under hostile artillery fire, but not yet near enough to the enemy to be subjected to his infantry fire 20-28a CHAPTER III THE COMPANY IN ATTACK THE SECOND STAGE OF THE ATTACK The advance of the company under artillery, and long-range infantry fire 29-43 CHAPTER IV THE COMPANY IN ATTACK THE THIRD STAGE OF THE ATTACK The struggle for superiority of fire over the enemy 44-49 CHAPTER V THE COMPANY IN ATTACK THE FOURTH STAGE OF THE ATTACK The advance after superiority of fire has been gained to a posi- tion close enough to charge 50-57 CHAPTER VI THE COMPANY IN ATTACK THE FIFTH STAGE OF THE ATTACK The Charge 58-67 CHAPTER VII THE COMPANY IN ATTACK THE COUNTER-ATTACK 68-70 CHAPTER VIII THE COMPANY IN ATTACK MEETING ENGAGEMENT, IN WHICH THE COMPANY IS EXPOSED TO BOTH ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY FIRE FROM THE BEGINNING 71-74 CHAPTER IX Pars. THE COMPANY IN ATTACK ADVANCE-GUARD ACTION 75-79 CHAPTER X THE COMPANY IN DEFENSE GENERAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES 80-101 CHAPTER XI. THE COMPANY IN DEFENSE USUAL TYPES OP DEFENSE. 102-110 CHAPTER XII THE COMPANY ON OUTPOST ESTABLISHING THE OUTPOST.. Ill CHAPTER XIII FIELD ORDERS CF ENLISTED MEN Platoon leaders — Guides — Squad leaders — Buglers — Privates 112-123 Chapter I* THE COMPANY IN ATTACK THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ATTACK RULES AND PRINCI- PLES OF ATTACK PLAN FOR ILLUSTRATING THE APPLICATION OF THESE RULES AND PRINCIPLES THE FIVE STAGES OF THE ATTACK 1. Importance of the Attack. Decisive results are obtained only by the offensive. Aggressiveness wins bat- tles. (Par. 121, Field Service Regulations.) Indeed, it may be said there is but one way to win battles, and that is by attacking, by going after the other fellow with ham- mer and tongs. The defense, the service of security, and the service of information are important only because, with an efficient commander, they are merely means that enable him to bring every possible man in the best pos- sible condition, physically and morally, on the field of battle at a vital point, and there attack the enemy with a smashing force and determination that will drive him from the field in defeat. This is really the greatest principle of war, and it applies to squads as well as to armies. Of course, it is easier to defend, to sit back and wait for developments, but, remember, that such tactics never have won, nor ever will win battles. Let every officer, noncommissioned officer, and pri- vate become imbued with the dominating spirit of attack, *Chapters I to XI are based on "Company Training," by General Haking, of the British Army, which is the best book the author has ever seen on the subject of company training. [7] 2-3 realizing that the best way to defeat the enemy, is to "go after" him, and to do so with your whole heart and soul — as if you meant it. Strike hard with the utmost speed and force and keep on striking to the limit of human endurance. A famous general once said a soldier should know three things: First, obedience; second, obedience; third, obedience. This might well be changed to, "First, attack ; second, attack; third, attack." Rules and Principles of Attack 2. Advantages of the Attack. The attackers can choose the point of attack, while the defenders must be prepared to resist at all points. The fact of advancing in spite of the defenders' fire gives the attackers the idea they are succeeding, and on the other hand it gives the defenders the idea that the other fellows are getting the better of them. Another moral advantage is that the attackers leave their dead and wounded behind them as they advance, while the casualties of the defenders usually remain in the trenches and the defenders must undergo the demoralizing ordeal of fighting amongst them. 3. Superiority of Fire. It is an established fact in modern warfare that it is impossible to shoot an enemy out of an entrenched position — he must be driven out with the bayonet. Now, there is only one way you can get near enough to his position to charge it and drive him out, and that is by keeping down his fire, which you can do only by gaining and maintaining what is called "Superiority of flre. ,, We, therefore, see that "Superi- [8] 4-5-6 ority of Fire" is the key to the situation. Remember, the more effective your fire is, the less effective will that of the enemy be. 4. Do not Open Fire Until it is Absolutely Necessary — that is to say, continue to advance without firing as long as you can do so without ruinous losses. Remember, you must husband your ammunition as much as possible for the struggle for superiority of fire that is yet to come, and remember, too, after the attack begins the chances are you will not be able to get airy more ammunition that day, except what may be gotten from the dead and wounded, and what is brought by the sup- ports when they come up to reenforce the firing line. It is very demoralizing to the enemy to see you continue your advance on him without even returning his fire. Make every effort by using cover or inconspicuous formations to arrive, if you possibly can, to within about 800 yards of the enemy before opening fire. 5. Direction of Advance. Get the direction in which you are to advance well fixed in your mind and, when operating with other companies, do not change it; for, if you do, you will interfere with the companies on your right or left. You may be tempted to change the direction of your advance so as to take advantage of a more covered approach, but, with other companies on your right and left, this will result in confusion. 6. Deployment. Do not deploy until it is neces- sary to do so. If the cover will enable you to do so, do not deploy until you get within effective rifle ran^e of the enemy. Deployed troops are unwieldy and difficult to handle as compared with those in close order. [9] 7-8-9-10-11 7. Who Indicates the Point or Time for Opening Fire. The major should indicate the point or time for opening fire. He may do this in his order for deploy- ment or he may follow the firing line close enough to give the order at the proper time. If it be impracticable for him to do so, the senior officer of the battalion with the firing line selects the time for opening fire. 8. Assignment of the Objective. At the begin- ning of the attack the major assigns the objective. Unless a particular target has been assigned the company, it takes as its target that part of the general objective which lies in its front. 9. Protection of Flanks. Flanks must always be protected, and their protection is the duty of the com- manders of all flank units down to the lowest, whether specifically enjoined in orders or not. 10. Close with the Enemy as soon as Possible; the longer you delay doing so, the longer will you be under his fire and consequently the greater will be your casualties. 11. Size of the Fractions that Rush. In the rushes, make the advancing fractions as large as the hostile fire -and the necessity for maintaining superiority of fire, will permit. Remember, the smaller the rushing fractions are, the slower will the advance be — the longer will you be exposed to the enemy's fire and consequently the greater will your casualties be. The size of the rush- ing fraction will, of course, depend upon the cover available, the volume and accuracy of the hostile fire and other circumstances. It may sometimes be advisable to begin the rushes with a company and then change to half 12-13-14-15 a company or platoon, and finally to a squad or file. No opportunity should be lost to increase the size of the rush- ing fraction. 12. Rushes to be Made Under Covering Fire. Every rush must be made under the covering fire of the adjoining fraction or fractions. As a fraction is about to rush forward the adjoining fraction or fractions must increase the rate of fire ; for, when the enemy sees a frac- tion rushing forward he will very likely increase his fire, and we must keep it down as much as possible. The commander of the fraction that is about to rush should not start until the remainder of the line is deliver- ing a vigorous fire, and if necessary, he should, in case of delay, call out to the commanders of the adjoining fraction or fractions to increase their fire. 13. Length of Rushes. The length of the rush generally varies from 30 to 80 yards, depending upon the existence of cover, positions for firing, and the volume and accuracy of the hostile fire. 14. Companies to be Kept Closed on Their Centers. In order to facilitate control by the company commander, also to provide intervals on the firing line in which reinforcements may be placed, the company must be kept closed in on its center as it becomes depleted by casualties ; for, squads and other units coming up from the support should take their place on the firing line in their entirety and should not be divided up and mingled with the individuals of the line. 15. Fixing Bayonets for the Assault. The major or senior officer in the firing line decides when bayonets shall be fixed, and gives the proper order or signal, which [in 16-17-18 is repeated by all parts of the tiring line. Bayonets are generally fixed before or during the last, or second last advance preceding the charge. 16. The Charge. The firing line having reached the position from which the charge is to be made, the major causes the "Charge" to be sounded, and the signal is repeated by all the musicians. The company officers lead the charge, and the skirmishers spring forward shouting, running with bayonets at charge, and closing with the enemy. The support fixes bayonets when the firing line does. 17. After the Charge. The conduct of the charg- ing troops after the charge will depend upon circum- stances ; they may halt and engage in bayonet combat or in pursuing fire; they may advance a short distance to obtain a field of fire, or to drive the enemy from the vicinity; they may assemble, or they may reorganize to repel a counter-attack by the enemy. 18. Plan for Illustrating the Application of the Rules and Principles of Attack. The application of the rules and principles of attack will be shown by taking the company through the following types of attack, which constantly occur in war: 1st. The company forming a part of a larger force that is attacking an enemy occupying a defensive posi- tion, the attacking force being compelled to advance for a considerable distance exposed only to hostile artillery fire, and subsequently to both artillery and infantry fire before the assault can be delivered. This is what may be called the stereotyped form of attack. [12] 19 2nd. Same as above, excepting that the company is exposed to both artillery and infantry fire from the beginning. ("Meeting engagement.") 3rd. The advance guard attack. 4th. The company, originally on the defense, goes out and attacks a force that has been attacking it. 19. The Five Stages of the Attack. The follow- ing diagram shows the five stages of the stereotyped form of attack. This simple outline of attack should be well fixed in the mind of every man in the company: [13] 19 (contd.) FIRST STAGE (advance of the company under artillery fire, but not yet near enough to the enemy to be subjected to his infantry fire. ) Leading Features: Formations to be adopted ; use of cover ; pace in advancing; selection of halting-places; artillery action. SECOND STAGE (ADVANCE OF THE COMPANY UNDER BOTH ARTIL- LERY AND LONG-RANGE INFANTRY FIRE. ) Leading Features: The selection of fire-positions ; the use of cover- ing fire. THIRD STAGE (STRUGGLE FOR SUPERIORITY OF FIRE.) Leading Features: Fire direction; fire control; fire discipline. FOURTH STAGE (ADVANCE AFTER SUPERIORITY OF FIRE HAS BEEN GAINED TO A POSITION CLOSE ENOUGH TO CHARGE THE ENEMY.) Leading Features: Maintenance of superiority of fire; rapid ad- vance. FIFTH STAGE (THE CHARGE.) Leading Features: A vigorous, simultaneous rush with a heavy line. [14] 19 (contd.) When does one stage of the attack end and the other begin? Of course, the lines of demarcation between the dif- ferent stages of the attack are not sharp and well-defined, like the lines on a tennis court, for instance, but the dif- ferent stages gradually blend into one another. How- ever, each stage has its own characteristics, its own "ear- marks," and there will be no trouble in recognizing them. For Example : First Stage. As long as we are subjected to only artillery fire we are in the first stage. Second Stage. When the first rifle bullets begin to whiz through the air, we then know the first stage is end- ing and the second commencing. Third Stage. When we commence to see that, because of the enemy's infantry fire, we are beginning to advance more slowly, we then know that the second stage is ending and the third is beginning. And when we find that it is impossible to advance any further unless we can reduce the enemy's infantry fire, we know that the third stage has been reached, and that the struggle for superiority of fire is on. Fourth Stage. When the enemy's infantry fire begins to subside and we find that we are able to resume the advance, we then know that we are gaining superi- ority of fire — that is to say, the fourth stage has been reached, and we must now advance to a fire position close enough to the enemy to enable us to charge from it. Fifth Stage. The charge. Cis] 20-21-22 Chapter II THE COMPANY IN ATTACK THE FIRST STAGE OF THE ATTACK THE ADVANCE OF THE COMPANY UNDER HOSTILE ARTIL- LERY FIRE, BUT NOT YET NEAR ENOUGH TO THE ENEMY TO BE SUBJECTED TO HIS INFANTRY FIRE 20. The Situation. Let us suppose the company is assembled under cover of some hill or wood from four to five thousand yards from the enemy's position, which we are going to attack and that as soon as the company leaves this cover and begins to advance, it will be fired upon by the hostile artillery, but not by the infantry. Let us suppose, further, that we are taking part in a big battle, and consequently have other companies on our right and left and also supports and reserves in rear. 21. Importance of the Attack. Impress upon the company the importance of the attack (see Par. 638). 22. The Object of this Stage of the Attack. What are we trying to do when the company commences the attack? We are going to try to smash the enemy — to attack him so quickly and vigorously that we will drive him from his position in confusion and disorder. The enemy is entrenched, and experience has shown that you can't shoot an enemy out of trenches — you've got to get close in on him and drive him out with the bayonet, but before we can do this we will have a long way to go. In [16] 23 the beginning of our advance, which we will call the first stage of the attack, we will probably be subjected only to artillery fire, and will be too far away to use our rifles with effect. Our immediate object then, is to get over ground in our immediate front as rapidly as possible and without losing any more men than we can help. Before the company goes into action always tell the men: 1st. The point of attack. 2nd. The general situation — whether there are any of our troops to the front, on our flank or rear. 3rd. What part the company is to take in the fight — whether to form part of the firing line, the sup- port or the reserve. If the men know these things, they will be able to act more intelligently, especially in case of confusion on separation from the rest of the company. HOW TO ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECT 23. The Pace. We will suppose that there are large patches of open ground in front of us, which the enemy can see from his position, and which he can fire upon effectively with his artillery. We can not avoid these open patches, because we are taking part in an ex- tensive attack, with other companies on our right and left, and if each company changed its original direction of advance and sought a more covered approach, con- fusion and disorder would result. Let us consider the ground. Some of it will be open and exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, and some of it will be hidden from his view and merely exposed to badly - [17] 23 (contd.) aimed artillery fire, or what is called "searching fire," but which is rarely effective. The result is that during this stage of the attack the company will be advancing a part of the time over open and exposed ground and a part of the time over ground that is hidden from the enemy's view and fire. Of course, we want to advance as rapidly as possible; for, apart from the advantage of rapidity and vigor in the attack, which alarms the enemy almost as much as our bullets and shells, the less time it takes us to cover the ground in front of us, the less time will we be under the enemy's fire. But there are two things that will hinder the rapidity of our advance: first, we must not exhaust the men at this early stage of the fight by too rapid an advance, because if we do they will not be in the best condition to continue the fight when they are close enough to the enemy to use their rifles. Secondly, the enemy's artillery is apt to stop us, because if, when we are crossing an exposed area the sky above us suddenly becomes full of bursting shells, it is the natural inclination of the ordinary human being to lie down and wait until the fire slackens. This means loss of time, and it is also just what the enemy's gunners want, as it gives them a stationary target to shoot at. As we all know, it is much easier, especially with artillery, to shoot at a stationary target than at a moving one. We, therefore, see that the company must- — 1st. Halt occasionally to rest the men, and select, when possible, halting places which are not exposed to the enemy's artillery fire. 2nd. Advance as rapidly as possible over places that are exposed to fire, and resist the temptation to lie down, if suddenly it comes under a burst of artillery fire. [18] 24-25 From this it follows that the company must move at a run over exposed ground, and walk or halt if neces- sary, in order to rest the men when reaching covered ground. 24. Use of the Weapon. As we are at this stage of the attack too far away from the enemy's position to use our rifles with effect, to do any firing now would merely mean a waste of ammunition, every round of which, as you will see, we will need later on. 25. Formations. We must select a formation which is the most difficult for the enemy's artillery to hit, and which at the same time will permit the immediate use of the rifle, should the situation change and the enemy suddenly appear within rifle range. Our Drill Regulations describe the three following formations, any one of which, depending upon circum- stances, may be used during this stage of the attack : 1. Platoon Columns, which are used when, due either to difficult ground or limited cover, there are only a few favorable routes of advance; no two platoons should march within the burst of a single shrapnel (ordinarily about 20 yards wide). Aside from the ad- vantage of enabling the whole company to use the few favorable routes, this formation also enables the captain to maintain control over the company. 2. Squad Columns, which are of value principally in facilitating the advance over rough or brush-broken ground. They afford no material advantage in secur- ing cover. While the captain's control over the company in squad columns is somewhat less than in platoon [19] 26 column, still it is greater than when the company is de- ployed as skirmishers. 3. A succession of thin lines, which is used in cross- ing a wide stretch swept by artillery fire, or by a heavy, long-range rifle fire which cannot be profitably returned. This method results in a serious (though temporary) loss of control over the company. It also takes up time. Its advantage lies in the fact that it offers a less definite target. The two disadvantages of the skirmish line are — 1st, It offers to the hostile artillery a target that is a continuous straight line, and consequently simplifies the question of range. 2nd. It results in a loss of control over the company. It should not, therefore, as a rule, be used until we are ready or about ready to open fire. 26. The Hostile Artillery. This, the first stage of attack, may be called the "Artillery Stage." Infantry- men should remember that the effect of artillery fire is moral rather than physical. Comparatively few of the casualties in a battle are caused by the artillery — the man who is really to be feared is the "dough boy" — he's the one who does the deadly work. A shell contains just enough powder to burst the case and not sufficient to send the bullets flying in all directions with a velocity sufficient to damage seriously anyone standing at a distance. The velocity of the bullets in the shell depends upon the rate the shell is flying through the air at the moment it explodes, and the bullets soon lose their velocity. Should a shell, for instance, burst 200 yards in front of [20] 27 a soldier and one of the bullets should hit him, it would do him no serious injury, because it has not sufficient velocity left to penetrate his clothes and skin. A soldier is, therefore, practically safe 200 yards away from a shell that bursts directly in front of him. We see from this that a shell that bursts on the ground produces little or no damage — the shell must not only burst in the air, but it must burst in just exactly the right place. This is accomplished by putting a time fuse in the shell. A mistake of only one second in the cutting of the time fuse will, at 3500 yards, make a difference of about 120 yards. The rate that the shell travels is affected materi- ally by the density of the air. It usually takes an artil- leryman from five to ten minutes to find the range — so, we need expect no serious damage, except from a chance shot, for five or ten minutes after the artillery opens up on us, unless, of course, the gunners have gotten the range beforehand. 27. Localities to be Avoided. The enemv's artil- m> lery generally picks out certain localities where it appears likely a target will appear, and ascertains the range and determines the proper fuse cutting beforehand, so that they can open at once a heavy and effective fire on any troops that may appear in those localities. Clumps of trees, edges of woods, exits from defiles, and approaches to bridges, are amongst the most common of such locali- ties. Any object that is fairly isolated and stands up well, such as a building, a hay stack, etc., is an excellent object for the artillery to range upon, and if they have not ascertained the range and cut the fuse beforehand, they can do so very rapidly with such rangcmarks. Such localities should, therefore, be avoided, if possible, but [21] 28-28a if, as is usually the case, this is out of the question, then they should be passed as rapidly as possible. 28. Our Artillery. Of course, during this stage of the attack our own artillery is helping us to advance by keeping down the hostile artillery as much as possible. Our artillery has these advantages over the hostile artil- lery:— 1st. It has only one target (the hostile artillery) to fire at, while the hostile artillery has two (our artillery and our advancing infantry). 2nd. Our artillery has a stationary target, while the hostile artillery has a moving target. 3rd. Our artillery can disperse their guns and con- centrate their fire much more than the enemy, since the latter are tied down to practically the position selected for defense, whereas we have the whole country to the front and flanks in which we can place our guns. 28a. Conclusion. We, therefore, see that during this stage of the attack we are opposed only by the hostile artillery, over which, gun for gun, our own artillery possesses certain advantages, and consequently the ene- my's artillery will probably be kept pretty busy looking after the attacking artillery. Our object must be to cross an}^ area exposed to the enemy's artillery as rapidly as possible, halting in places that afford cover, and taking advantage of any temporary cessation of artillery fire to rush over excep- tionally exposed ground, thus avoiding a number of casualties, and thereby adding to the confidence of our men, whom we shall keep fresh, and thus bring them up to the second stage of the attack in excellent condition for the decisive fighting which is now approaching. [22] 29-30 Chapter III THE COMPANY IN ATTACK The Second Stage of the Attack THE ADVANCE OF THE COMPANY UNDER ARTILLERY AND LONG-RANGE INFANTRY FIRE 29. Beginning of the Stage. The beginning of the second stage of the attack is marked by the sound of the enemy's rifle bullets and the desire of our own men to return the fire. 30. Ammunition. However, everything possible must be done to have the company advance as far as we can without returning the enemy's fire; for, our fire would at this range be ineffective and would merely be a waste of ammunition, every round of which we will, as you will see, need later on. One of the few advantages of the defense is that the trenches can be filled with ammunition before the fight begins, or ammunition in unlimited quantity can be brought up during the battle. The defense can, therefore, afford to waste a certain amount of ammunition in long-range firing, but it is quite different with us whose ammunition supply is practically limited to what we have taken into the fight on our persons. However, we have a compensating moral advantage of the enemy's seeing that his fire is so ineffective that we do not even condescend to return it, and that we are coming right after him. Another moral advantage the attacker has over the defender, is that it's much more trying to remain in one place while the other [23] 31 fellow is hitting than it is to be hitting. This is human nature. As the fight progresses the company com- mander must keep himself informed as to the condition of the supply of ammunition. "Company commanders are responsible that the belts of the men in their com- panies are kept filled at all times, except when the ammu- nition is being expended in action. In the fire line the ammunition of the dead and wounded should be secured whenever practicable." (Par. 550, Infantry Drill Regu- lations. ) "Ammunition in the bandoleers will ordinarily be expended first. Thirty rounds in the right pocket section of the belt mil be held as a reserve, to be expended only when ordered by an officer." (Par. 551, Infantry Drill Regulations. ) "Men will never be sent back from the firing line for ammunition. Men sent forward with ammunition re- main with the firing line." (Par. 552, Infantry Drill Regulations. ) According to the Field Service Regulations each man armed with a rifle carries 220 rounds of ammunition into battle — 100 rounds in his belt and two bandoleers containing 60 rounds each. The bandoleers are dis- tributed from the battalion combat wagon just before the troops go into action. 31. Deployment. The first sound of the enemy's bullets will be our signal to deploy as skirmishers; for we cannot afford to advance within zone of effective rifle fire in any column formation, lest a single shot might put two or more men out of business. [24] 82-33-34 32. Object of this Stage of the Attack. The ob- ject of this stage of the attack is to advance with the loss of as few men as possible to a fire position close enough to the enemy to enable us to use our rifles with such accuracy that we will be able to gain superiority of fire which may be said to be three-fourths of the battle. 33. How to Accomplish our Object. We will, in general terms, accomplish our object by endeavoring to find resting-places under cover after long rushes to enable the men to regain their breath, by finding fire- positionjs from which an effective fire can be delivered, and by advancing as rapidly as is consistent with safety, without exhausting the energies of our men. 34. The Use and Selection of Fire-Positions. It does not follow we should stop and fire from any good fire-position that happens to be in front of us. The dis- tance between fire-positions should be as great as possible without exhausting the men in rushing over the distance. The more fire-positions we occupy the longer will it take us to advance, and the more will we be subjected to the enemy's fire. And again, if an estimate could be made of the comparative casualties, it would probably be found that more men are killed and wounded while halted in fire-positions than while rushing from fire-position to fire-position. It is, therefore, very important that our platoon and squad leaders should be well trained in the selection and use of fire-positions. Whenever practicable the sights should be adjusted and the magazines filled before coming up to a fire-position, so that fire may be opened at once. For instance, if the company, platoon, or squad were about to emerge from a wood or other [25] 35-36 cover, and the next fire-position were known, the sights should be adjusted and the magazines filled before leav- ing cover. 35. Good Fire-Positions. Whether or not a loca- tion is a good fire-position depends on whether it affords cover, and at the same time enables one to see the enemy, and depends, therefore, entirely upon the small features of the ground and any artificial cover that may be en- countered. For example, a position just behind the crest of a hill, behind a bank of any kind, or a fold in the ground, from which the enemy can be seen, is a good fire-position. A bank running along a road is a good fire-position, but it has the disadvantage, because of the road itself, of being a pretty good mark for the enemy's fire. If there is a bank and ditch on both sides of the road, it is better to occupy the position on the far side; for, the hostile infantry will doubtless fire at the road and bullets striking its hard surface will ricochet, while those striking in front of the far bank will disappear. Bushes and Undergrowth that have no clearly defined border that makes them an easy target, are good fire- positions. While it is true they do not afford protection from fire, they conceal the attackers. If the bushes are on the side of a hill, they then make better fire-positions, as the men can then see over the bushes better without being themselves exposed. 36. Bad Fire-Positions. The following are bad fire-positions : — Hedges without Cover from Fire. A hedge without cover from fire is a bad fire-position, not only because it [26] 36 (contd.) affords a good target for both the hostile artillery and infantry, but also because it is not always an easy posi- tion to advance out of. A hedge, however, could be used to advantage if the ground in the rear rises slightly, or if the enemy's position is on high ground in front, in which case the men lying down a short distance in rear on the open ground, could see over the top of the hedge, but themselves be hidden from view. Villages, farms, cottages, etc. As a rule any kind of a building or inclosure, such as a village, farm, or cot- tage, is a bad fire-position in the attack. They are easy to get into, but hard to get out of; they are often sub- jected to artillery fire, and the casualties are much heavier than out in the open. Quarries and gravel pits, although possibly afford- ing a good fire-position for a few men, are generally disastrous when occupied by a large number. While it is usually easy to jump down into such places and get temporary shelter, it is very difficult to climb out and continue the attack. When such a place is encountered, the best thing to do is for the squad or platoon that strikes it to occupy a fire-position behind it, and thus provide covering fire for the forward movement of the other units on the right and left of it. Fire- positions that are not approximately parallel to the front of the attack are a source of trouble that often leads to a loss of direction. Such positions are generally to be found in the form of a bank, a hedge, ridge, or the border of a wood. If such a position is recognized before actual occupation, company and pla- toon commanders must take special steps to avoid the [27] 36 (contd.) mistakes that are likely to occur. To begin with, the true direction of the attack should be carefully noted, and steps taken to maintain it. It is impossible to give a fixed rule for the handling of all positions that are not parallel to the front of the attack. However, the fol- lowing principles are general in their application, and together with the examples given, should assist one materially in handling other cases of the same general nature : First Principle. Every effort must be made to pre* vent the occupation of a position that is enfiladed by the enemy. The reason for this is self-evident. Second Principle. If necessary to occupy a fire- position that is not practically parallel to the front of the attack, occupy first that part which is nearest to the enemy. The reason for this is that if the farther portion is occupied first, there will be a natural tendency on the part of the attack to pass the remainder of the portion and come up in line with the leading platoon or squad, whereas, if the nearest portion is occupied first, it is prac- tically certain that the men who are holding it will stay there until other troops come up on their outer flank; and these troops, with equal certainty, will conform to the fire position already established, and thus throw out the direction of the attack. Third Principle. If the part of the fire-position nearest the enemy has been occupied, do not occupy the remainder at all; or, if human nature is too strong to prevent this, then occupy it for as short a time as possible. Example 1. An open ridge or undulation of ground that runs diagonally left to right from our front, towards [28] 36 (contd.) the enemy's position and falls gradually to the ordinary level some sice hundred yards from that position. Let us suppose that the ridge lies in front of an entire battalion. E M E: *\ y e n e m y ' s.$ N* r ti y *v-r. .J* n ATTACKfRS ATTACKERS WHAT WE- 5H0UL0 NOT DO. "WHAT WE; SHOULD DO Fig. 1 (Fig. 1.) The company on the right, advancing ahead of the others, would go right over the end of the ridge nearest the enemy and occupy a fire-position be- yond, parallel to the front of the attack. The company on the left of the first would do the same upon reaching the ridge, taking its position on the left of, and on line with, the right company. The remaining companies would follow suit in succession, holding back until the ground beyond the ridge, on their right, had been gained. Failing this, each company would act as if it were the right company, except that platoons instead of com- panies would be used, the right platoon of each company pushing over the top of the ridge, and occupying beyond [29] 36 (contd.) a position parallel to the front of the attack, the remain- ing platoons following suit and lining up on the left of the leading platoon. Example 2. A V-shaped fire-position, with the point toward the enemy, such as a low, semicircle ridge with the circumference towards the enemy. (Fig. 2.) The effect of such a feature of the ground is the same as in the preceding case, except that the difficulties are greatly increased. If the troops occupy such a position, they * / It ATTACKERS WHAT WE- 5K0ULD NOT D0- JL-'_t ^""""<* '#f\ "' . 4:1 £ ?'•£ ATTACKERS "WHAT W£ 5H0ULD DO Fig. 2 will be sure, upon leaving the position, to find themselves advancing in divergent direction. A case like this should, if possible, be treated in the same manner as the preceding example, the portion nearest the enemy being occupied first. [30] 37-38 Example 3. A bank along a road that runs diag- onally across the front of attack. Should be treated the same as Example 1. 37. Pace of Advance. The advance from one fire- position to another is usually made by rushes, but when this method becomes impracticable, any method of ad- vance that brings the attacker closer to the enemy, such as crawling, should be employed. The length of the rushes depends on two things: 1st, the human element, which can only be ascertained by the unit commanders on the spot ; 2nd, the nature of the ground and the distance to the next firing-position. The most important details to be looked after are that the men rise together, dash for- ward without any straggling, and, upon halting, form a fairly straight and orderly firing line. If the enemy is on the lookout for rushes, and the chances are he will be, he will open fire, or increase his fire, just as soon as a unit rushes forward, or as soon as he sees that it is preparing to rush. It is, therefore, important that the adjoining unit or units should begin to deliver a covering fire just before the rush begins. Impress upon every man that the devil, in the form of a bullet, is likely to catch the men who fall behind. Promptness in rushing is greatly a matter of drill in time of peace, and, if properly in- stilled, will become a habit that will greatly assist the attack in war. 38. Mixing of Units. If the attack is made over broken ground, with undulations and confusing ridges and mounds, it will be found that the advancing units will get pretty badly mixed up as we get nearer to the enemy's position, and consequently fire-control and lead- [31] 39 ership will become difficult. And, again, we must not make the mistake of closing our eyes to human nature in battle and imagine that every one is going to do just exactly what he is told to do, and do it at once. However, platoon commanders and squad leaders should do every- thing in their power to delay confusion as long as possi- ble, and then, when it does come, exert every effort to reduce it to a minimum. Impress upon the men the vital importance of obeying the commands of any platoon commander or squad leader in whose unit they may happen to find themselves in case of confusion. 39. Importance of Pushing Forward. When- ever a company or platoon reaches covered ground and has halted to reform or take breath, it is of vital impor- tance, for two reasons, that a fire-position should be occupied to the front at the earliest possible moment. First, it is impossible to say when the enemy may decide to attack and himself suddenly occupy a fire-position in our immediate front — the one that we might have occu- pied ourselves — and thus bring the attack in that locality to a standstill; secondly, other units may be advancing over open ground on our right and left, and it will be of great assistance to them to find that a fire-position to their front has been occupied by us, — it will encourage them to pass forward. It can be laid down as a general rule in the attack that when any part of the line reaches cover, such as a wood, for instance, a part of the line should pass on and occupy a fire-position at the far end. However, care must be taken not to press so far to the front as to become [32] 40-41 completely isolated, and run the risk of being shot into by your own men, or cut off by the enemy. 40. Use of Company Scouts. Cases constantly occur when platoon commanders and squad leaders must make rushes to the front without being able to see the ground which they will have to traverse, and, as a result, at the end of the rush they may find themselves in a very bad position. A case of this kind may occur when a fire- position is occupied just behind a crest from which the enemy's position can be seen, but when the ground imme- diately in front is covered by the top of the hill occupied by the attacker. It sometimes happens that the defense places an obstacle of some kind, under effective artillery and infantry fire, on the defenders' side of a ridge or hill, and which the attacker rushing over this ridge would not see until he was right upon it. A company scout sent on ahead would give warning of such an obstacle. It also sometimes happens that the unit rushes too far over a crest and occupies a fire-position that is exposed unneces- sarily. There is no doubt that in cases of this kind, it is well to send scouts forward to select the best positions, lie down in them, and wait until the line advances. Naturally enough, in open country and in cases where the advance of a scout would mask the fire of part of the company, this plan would be impracticable. 41. Guarding the Flanks. Special attention is invited to the importance of the flank companies guard- ing their flanks, especially in closed country. Arrange- ments must be made to keep in communication with these flank guards, and also to see that they do not get too far ahead of the line. In a big fight our cavalry will be £33] 42 operating on our flanks, but they will probably be a con- siderable distance away, and the flanking companies must, therefore, provide for local protection. Supports. According to our Drill Regulations a company acting alone may have a support, but if acting as part of a battalion, it has no support of its own. One or more companies of the battalion form the support for the battalion. The movements of the support as a whole and the dispatch of reinforcements from it to the firing line are controlled by the major. If at any time during the advance a company commander sees that his com- pany has been so depleted that it can advance no farther, he should ask for support. 42. Obstacles. We will now consider the obstacles that are likely to be met during this stage of the attack, and the best means of passing them. These obstacles may be divided into three general classes. 1. Those in which the attacker is exposed to the enemy's view and fire when he is approaching the obsta- cle, while getting across it, and wh He \ emerging from it on the far side. A stream in the open is an example of this class, and to pass such an obstacle, which is exposed to the enemy's fire throughout, it is first necessary to obtain fire superi- ority, if only temporarily, which means that a heavy infantry firing line must be deployed in a good fire- position in rear of the obstacle. If possible, an artillery support should assist in subduing the hostile infantry fire. Of course, the fire-position should be so chosen that the field of fire will not be masked in part or in whole, by the men when approaching or crossing the obstacle, [34] 42 (contd.) or when deploying beyond. If it be not possible to select such a fire-position, the situation becomes most difficult, and a second tier of fire will have to be formed in rear of that immediately behind the obstacle, and, if possible, machine guns should be used extensively to assist in gaining and maintaining superiority of fire. The best formation to be used while actually crossing, depends upon the nature of the obstacle. In case of a shallow stream, for instance, which is easily fordable at all points, the squads or platoons could be sent across in line of skirmishers. On the other hand, if the passage were limited to a bridge across the stream, the command should be rushed across by successive squads or platoons, in column of files, or in column of twos, with increased intervals and distances between the men. It is most important that a firing line be established on the far side of the obstacle at the earliest moment possible. Consequently, the leading squad or platoon should deploy immediately upon clearing the obstacle, and occupy a firing position well to the front. If it be not practicable to occupy a position well to the front at once, then a second advance should be made as soon as possible so as to reduce the distance the succeeding squads or platoons will have to run with their flanks to the enemy. The leading squad or platoon should be careful not to spread out more than is necessary; for, the more it spreads out the greater distance will the suc- ceeding units have to run before getting on the line, to the right and left of the preceding squads. It must be distinctly understood beforehand which units are to go to the right and which to the left. If the crossing is [35] 42 (contd.) being made by squads, the company commander may, for instance, direct that the second squad go to the right of the leading squad, the third squad to the left, the fourth squad to the right, the fifth to the left, etc. And again, the ground just beyond the obstacle might be such that it would be better for the first squad across to incline to the right (or left) upon reaching the far end of the obstacle, and the remaining squads form on its left (or right ) . Of course, the thing to do in every case is to pass around the obstacle, if possible. This may often be done in case of small obstacles (those taking up only forty or fifty yards of front ) , but as a rule it is not possible to avoid the large ones. 2. The second class of obstacles is those in which the attacker is protected from the enemy' 's view and fire while approaching the obstacle, but is partly exposed to fire when passing through it, and may be subjected to heavy fire when emerging from the obstacle. A stream with trees and bushes, or a thin wood along its banks might be an example of this class of obstacles. The far edge of either of these makes an excellent mark for the enemy's artillery as well as for his infantry. It is a great mistake for a company to blunder into an obstacle without having had a reconnaissance made. The first thing to do then, is to send out a reconnoitering patrol in charge of an officer or noncommissioned officer, to ascertain whether the obstacle, or the ground just beyond, is occupied by the enemy; also, to get informa- tion regarding the best way through or over the obstacle, and whether there is a good position in which the line [36] 42 (contd.) can deploy and form preparatory to continuing the attack. Great care must be taken to see that the com- pany does not come under a heavy fire near the far edge in unsuitable formation, and we must also see that the company is not exposed unnecessarily to the enemy's fire before everything is ready for an immediate advance. 3. Those obstacles in which the attacker is protected from the enemy's view and fire in approaching and cross- ing the obstacle, but may be subjected to a heavy fire when emerging from it. A thick wood is an example of an obstacle of this class. The following points should be borne in mind : — Be careful not to lose your direction; connect with the companies on your right and left, and maintain the general alignment. Take every possible precaution to prevent the enemy from learning that you have reached the obstacle, and especially that you are about to emerge on the far side. If he knows this, he will more than probably be waiting for you and will greet you with a heavy, well-directed fire just as soon as you appear on his side of the obstacle. Do not mistake any of your own troops for the enemy. Before reaching the far side of the obstacle ascertain by means of scouts or patrols whether it will be exposed to fire; also, if possible, locate a fire-position 50 or 100 yards beyond the obstacle. Arrange to rush out of the obstacle with as much of the company as can be conveniently handled at one time. Do not emerge in driblets, and don't make the common mistake of forming a firing line along the edge of the [37] 43 wood, thus occupying a well-defined line that stands out as an excellent mark for the enemy's fire. . Cornfields. It is thought the best way of crossing a cornfield, is by a series of rushes in squad columns, or some other column of files. A line of skirmishers in *a field of high corn is difficult to control; and, further- more, such a formation is conducive to skulking, men on the ground failing to rise and advance at the command and remaining undiscovered. .., Marshes. If impossible to go around wet, marshy ground, there is but one thing to do. Go right through it, lying down in the mud and water when ordered, and rising and advancing when the command is given. The formations to be adopted in crossing a marsh would be determined by the same general principles that apply in getting over level dry ground, with such modifications as might be made necessary by deep pools, difficult mud holes, etc. The main point to impress upon the men is that they must not be afraid of mud and water — they are much, less dangerous than bullets. 43. End of Stage. The culminating point of this stage of the attack is the establishment of a fire-position close enough to the enemy to enable us to gain superi- ority of fire, and by "superiority of fire" we mean that our fire must be so accurate, heavy, and deadly that most of the enemy will be keening their heads under cover, and, consequently we will be able to advance rierht up to them without a good part of the company getting put out of business. [38] 43 (contd.) How near must this fire- position be to the enemy? The distance of this fire-position from the enemy will depend upon the effectiveness of the enemy's fire and nature of the ground in front of his position, which will determine the cover afforded the attack, the avail- ability of fire -positions and the field of view afforded the enemy. Of course, we will want to get as close as possible to the enemy before beginning the final struggle for fire-superiority — the closer the better. If the ground to the front of the enemy is open, his fire and field of fire are good, and the attackers' fire-positions are poor, it will probably be impossible to get any nearer than 800 yards or more without first gaining superiority of fire. On the other hand, if the ground in front of the enemy is broken, and affords cover and fire-positions to the attacker, it may be possible to get as near as one or two hundred yards before beginning the final struggle for fire superi- ority. Remember, we must husband our energy and our ammunition for this struggle for fire superiority. •)\ 44-45 Chapter IV THE COMPANY IN ATTACK The Third Stage of the Attack THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPERIORITY OF FIRE OVER THE ENEMY 44. Situation. We have now reached a fire-posi- tion, say, within five or six hundred yards of the enemy, beyond which it is impossible to advance without reduc- ing the hostile fire. In other words, our advance has been stopped. This stage of the attack is, necessarily, a sta- tionary operation. 45. Object of this Stage of the Attack. The ob- ject of this stage of the attack is to gain superiority of fire so that we can advance to a position so near to the enemy that we will be able to charge him, and every effort must be made to gain superiority of fire as soon as pos- sible; for, if it is not gained within a reasonable time, the energies of the firing line will become exhausted and the attack die out — hence, the vital importance of bring- ing this stage of the attack to a head as early as possible. How near should this position be? It should be as near as possible — not over 800 yards — for, the .shorter the distance the shorter will be the time that the attacker will be subjected to fire, and the less exhausted will he be upon reaching the defender's position, and, conse- quently, the better able will he be to cope with the enemy in the bayonet combat that is likely to take place. While [40] 46 this fire-position should be as near the enemy as pos- sible, the company commander should not make the mis- take, in case of open ground, of pushing too close to the hostile position without first gaining superiority of fire. If he does, he will probably find himself at the mercy of the enemy, who will have better cover, and will also, because of the open nature of the country, be able to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. On the other hand, if the fire-position is established too far back, the chances are that neither side will gain superiority of fire. The following principles should guide the com- pany commander: 1st. If the cover is good both for the firing line and the reenf orcements, advance as far as you can, whether or not you have gained superiority of fire. 2nd. Whether the ground is broken or very open, the fire-position must in every case be near enough to insure a decision as regards superiority of fire. 3rd. The location of the fire-position must be such that it will be possible to send up reenf orcements with- out exposing them to fire too long on open ground. 46. How to accomplish our Object. In order to accomplish our object it will be necessary for every one to put his shoulder to the wheel with the determination "to do or die." Remember, that this is really the crucial stage of the fight — it is the test that is going to decide whether we are going to advance, and drive the enemy out of his position, or whether he is going to stop us, and, if so, probably drive us back. Our salvation, our success, depends upon effective fire — a heavy, deadly fire — in order to produce which : [41] 47 1st. The soldier must shoot accurately; 2nd. The fire must be well directed by the company commander, and properly controlled by the platoon com- manders and squad leaders ; 3rd. There must be cooperation, teamwork, between the different companies of the firing line and between the different platoons and the different squads of the same company. This stage of the attack should bring home to every man the importance of being able to shoot well, and doing his level best in time of peace to become a fair shot, if not a good one; a good one, if not an excellent one. The knowledge of being able to hit what you shoot at gives you confidence in yourself. If you know that the men on your right and left can shoot well, it will give you confidence in your company, and when the hour of action comes you will find this confidence to be a wonder- ful bracer — a great tonic — a big courage producer. This is also the stage of the fight that brings home to us the great importance and value of proper training in field firing. 47. Reenforcements. When the battalion com- mander sees that the firing line has been halted and can advance no further without superiority of fire, he will, of course, send up reenforcements. The Drill Regula- tions prescribe that reenforcements shall take their places on the flanks, so as not to mix up the units, but experience has shown that in practice the men inter- mingle very much with those already on the firing line, and, as a result, there is considerable confusion. The men must be taught that they must at once place them- [42] 48-49 selves under the orders of the corporals whose squads they happen to join. There will always be lots for the arriving spare officers and noncommissioned officers to do in the way of assisting in the fire-control,, encouraging the men, etc. When the company commander sees the reinforcements approaching he should start a vigorous covering fire. 48. Artillery. Of course, during, the struggle for superiority of fire, the company will probably be ex- posed to the enemy's artillery fire. However, our artil- lery will make every endeavor to help us gain superiority Off fire, and, as we have seen (Par. 28), it has certain advantages over the hostile artillery. 49. Counter-Attack. During this stage of the attack we must be on the lookout for a counter-attack by the defense. Generally a counter-attack is delivered by the reserve of the defense, on one of the flanks of the attack, but it may be made on the front of the attacking line. However, whether made on our flank or front, a counter-attack should be met with vigor — we should move right out and go after the attackers, and not make the mistake of remaining in our fire-position while they attack us, thus ourselves assuming a defensive attitude. How will we know when we have gained superiority of fire and can resume the advance? Upon occupying the fire-position beyond which we can not go without gaining superiority of fire, something like the following will probably occur: Both sides will open up with a general f usilade, which will gradually subside ; the burst of fire from one side is answered by a burst of about the same volume from the other, and this continues for [43] 49 (contd.) some time, until we find that when one side opens fire, the other answers with a heavier fire that reduces or actually silences the opponent's fire. This is the first sign that superiority of fire is being gained. For a time this superiority of fire may be gained by one side and then by the other, and as time goes on we find that one side gains superiority of fire of tener than the other. Let us suppose that the attack is in the ascendent. Finally we find that as soon as the enemy opens fire there is a terrific burst of fire from the attack, and the fire of the defense at once slackens or ceases altogether. We then know that we are approaching the end of this stage, and we must, therefore, begin to make preparations to ad- vance to the position from which we are going to charge. [44] 50-51-52-53 Chapter V THE COMPANY IN ATTACK The Fourth Stage of the Attack THE ADVANCE AFTER SUPERIORITY OF FIRE HAS BEEN GAINED TO A POSITION CLOSE ENOUGH TO CHARGE 50. Situation. We have gained superiority of fire and are now ready to advance to a position close enough to the enemy to assault. 51. The Object of this Stage of the Attack. As just stated, the object of this stage of the attack is to advance to a position close enough to the enemy to assault. The distance of this position from the enemy will, as previously explained, depend upon various con- ditions. "It may be from 25 to 400 yards." (Par. 465, Infantry Drill Regulations. ) 52. How to accomplish our Object. In order to accomplish our object we must maintain our superiority of fire, and cover the rest of the ground with the least possible delay. Impress upon everyone — officers, non- commissioned officers, and privates — the vital importance of moving forward as soon as fire superiority has been gained, and of covering the ground with the least delay practicable. Delay will only result in increased casualties, and success now no longer depends entirely on fire effect, but it depends on the assault, which must be delivered as soon as possible. 53. Who gives the Order to Advance? It is not necessary to wait for an order from the battalion com- [45] 54 mander to advance. As soon as any company commander sees that he has gained fire superiority he should at once commence the forward movement on his own responsi- bility. An advance started even by a squad has often set an example that was at once followed by other parts of the firing line, and that resulted in the prompt build- ing up of a fire position considerably nearer the enemy's position. Cases might arise when it would be better for the original firing line not to advance from this position, but, instead, to have the support come from the rear, pass through the line arid take up the advance from that point, under the covering fire of the firing line. Where the firing line could fire over the heads of the support, would be a case where this might be done. 54. Covering Fire. Even though there may be no doubt about our having gained superiority of fire, we must not attempt to continue the advance without cover- ing fire. There are two types of covering fire: (1) when the fire is delivered by troops in rear over the heads of those advancing, and (2) when the fire is delivered by units to cover the advance of other units to their right and left. The covering fire delivered by a unit that has already advanced, to support the advance of another unit in rear, is, of course, only a modification of the second type mentioned. The overhead fire delivered by troops in rear is by far the best kind of covering fire, because it can be furnished by support or reserve companies, and this leaves the firing line free to move forward, further assisted by the second type of covering fire which it can provide for itself. Of course, the first type of covering fire can be [46] 54 (contd.) used only when it is safe to shoot over the heads of the troops in front. If it is possible to fire over the heads of advancing squads and platoons, we might do one of three things : 1st, Have the original firing line remain in its posi- tion and furnish a covering fire for the support, which is sent forward through the firing line to assault. Advantages. The men of the support being fresher, will doubtless possess more energy, especially for the assault, which is to follow soon, and when passing through the original firing line, they may take a part of it with them, thus increasing the strength of the assault. Again, the original firing line would probably be able to furnish a more efficient covering fire than the troops in rear, because they know the range and are familiar with the points to aim at. Disadvantage. The possible disadvantage is that the original firing line might be short of ammuni- tion, and ammunition would be required for covering fire more than for the assaulting line. However, this dis- advantage could be overcome by having the support drop part of its ammunition as it passes through. 2nd. Have the original firing line advance under cover of the support in rear. Disadvantage. The original firing line might not have enough energy left to carry out the assault. 3rd. Reenforce the firing line as heavily as possible, and then have it advance under its own covering fire. In case any part of the advancing line is checked, then the company commander must open a rapid fire with the rest of the company and thus at once restore superiority [47] 55-56-57 of fire, and immediately rush the greater part of the com- pany to the front. 55. Formation. By this stage of the fight the fir- ing line will have been well reenforced, so that the men will probably be as close together as is compatible with the proper use of their rifles. The advances must be made by rushes by squads and platoons. The length of the rushes will depend on the nature of the ground, but, remember, you must get over the remaining ground as rapidly as possible — we must get up to the assault- ing point at the earliest moment possible. 56. Artillery. Our artillery will be assisting us with rapid bursts of fire, of which we should take full advantage to advance. 57. Obstacles. Any natural obstacles that may be encountered during this stage of the attack will be passed as explained in the second stage of the attack. They will present very little more difficulty, if any, for, although we are now much nearer the enemy, we must remember that we have gained superiority of fire. The artificial obstacles that we may encounter are the ones that will give us trouble, because the enemy places them where we are apt to come upon them unexpectedly. As a rule, however, such obstacles will not be very extensive; for, it takes time and material to make them, and extensive obstacles in front of a defensive position render a counter- attack very difficult, if not impossible. The same general principles that apply to the passage of natural obstacles are applicable to the crossing of artificial ones. [48] 58-59-60-61 Chapter VI THE COMPANY IN ATTACK The Fifth Stage of the Attack THE CHARGE i 58. Situation. We have at last reached a position which is near enough for us to charge the enemy. 59. The Object of this Stage of the Attack. The object of this stage of the attack is to close in on the enemy with fixed bayonets and drive him from his posi- tion in confusion and disorder. 60. How to accomplish our Object. The charg- ing line must be properly built up before the beginning of the charge, which must be delivered with the utmost vigor, and without any restraint whatsoever on the ardor of the charging troops by an attempt to maintain alignment. The charge should be made simultaneously by all the units participating. Confidence in their ability to use the bayonet in combat is a great stimulus to assaulting troops. Impress upon your men the im- portance of becoming proficient in time of peace in the use of the bayonet. The charge is usually immediately preceded by clip fire. 61. When to fix Bayonets. The major or senior officer in the firing line determines when bayonets shall be fixed, and gives the proper command or signal. It is repeated by all parts of the firing line. Bayonets must be fixed at once, but in such a way that there will be no marked pause in the firing. A good plan is to have the [49] 62 even numbers fix bayonets first and then the odd num- bers, the odd numbers increasing their rate of fire while the even numbers are fixing bayonets, and the even num- bers increasing their rate of fire while the odd numbers are fixing their bayonets. The support also fixes bayo- nets. Bayonets will be fixed generally before or during the last, or second last, advance preceding the charge. 62. When to Charge. Upon reaching the posi- tion from which the assault will be made, build up the line as rapidly as possible with the units arriving from the last fire position, and before charging be sure to see that enough troops are on hand to make it a success. How- ever do not have too dense a mass ; for, then the men will be in one another's way. Also, see whether the adjoining companies have yet built up their lines and are ready to charge. Reserves joining the firing line now will give the charge a strong impetus. It is impos- sible to give any fixed rule as to just when the charge should be started. "The psychological moment of the charge cannot be determined far in advance. The tacti- cal instinct of the responsible officer must decide." (Par, 464, Infantry Drill Regulations.) "The commander of the attacking line should indicate his approval, or give the order before the charge is made. Subordinate com- manders, usually battalion commanders, whose troops are ready to charge signal that fact to the commander." (Par. 466, Infantry Drill Regulations.) However, history shows cases where a corporal or a drummer boy sprang forward at the "psychological moment" and was followed by the rest of the firing line in a charge that completely routed the enemy. "Subject to orders from [50] 63-64 higher authority, the major determines the point from which the charge is to be made. The firing line having arrived at that point and being in readiness, the major causes the charge to be sounded. The signal is repeated by the musicians of all parts of the line. The company officers lead the charge. The skirmishers spring for- ward shouting, run with bayonets at charge, and close with the enemy." (Par. 319, Infantry Drill Regula- tions. ) • A charge to be successful must above all things have cohesion— the men must start together, keep together, and fight together — they must charge with vigor and determination. The charge must be started promptly, when ordered whether the men are one or one thousand yards from the enemy — the distance has nothing to do with it so far as the men are concerned. 63. Conduct after the Charge. The further con- duct of the charging troops will depend upon circum- stances; they may halt and engage in bayonet combat, or in pursuing fire; they may advance a short distance to obtain a field of fire or to drive the enemy from the vicinity; they may assemble or reorganize, etc. If the enemy vacates his position every effort should be made to open fire at once on the retreating mass, reorganiza- tion of the attacking troops being of secondary impor- tance to the infliction of further losses upon the enemy and to the increase of his confusion. (Par. 31 9, Infantry Drill Regulations.) 64. Our Artillery. Our Artillery will be on the lookout for the charge, and, about this time, will increase their range so as to burst their shells just beyond the [SI] 65-66 enemy's position, so as to check the possible arrival of hostile supports or reserves. A premature charge by a part of the line should be avoided, but if begun, the other parts of the line should join at once, if there is any prospect of success. Under exceptional circumstances a part of the line may be compelled to charge without authority from the rear. The intention to do so should be signalled to the rear. (Par. 470, Infantry Drill Regu- lations. ) 65. Supports and Reserves. At the signal for the charge the near-by supports and reserves rush for- ward. (Par. 466, Infantry Drill Regulations.) 66. Gounter-Attack. We must not forget that even at this stage of the fight the enemy may have enough energy left to leave his position and attack us. How- ever, such an attack must be met with vigor — we should go right after the enemy at once. To assume a defensive attitude at this stage of the attack would be suicidal. "If the attack receives a temporary setback and it is intended to strengthen and continue it, officers will make every effort to stop the rearward movement, and will reestablish the firing line in a covered position as close as possible to the enemy." (Par. 474, Infantry Drill Regulations.) "If the attack must be abandoned, the rearward movement should continue with promptness until the troops reach a feature of the terrain that facili- tates the task of checking and reorganizing them. The point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to resist. The withdrawal of the attacking troops should [52] 67 be covered by the artillery and by the reserves, if any are available." (Par. 475, Infantry Drill Regulations.) 67. Conclusion. It must not, of course, be sup- posed every attack, or even the majority of them, will have five separate stages? and will be conducted just as we have conducted this one ; for, such will not be the case. Every attack has its own individual characteristics and must be handled according to the nature of the ground, and the tactical and other conditions involved. How- ever, the stereotyped form of attack through which we have just taken you gives a very good, general idea of what an attack is like, and the general basic principles presented are applicable to any attack. [53] 68-69 Chapter VII THE COMPANY IN ATTACK The Counter- Attack 68. Classes of Counter- Attacks. There are two general classes of counter-attacks — what may be called the "general counter-attack," and the "local counter- attack." The general counter-attack is usually made by launching the reserve against one of the enemy's flanks when his attack is in full progress ; by making- a frontal attack with the firing line and supports after repulsing the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire ; or, by the troops in rear of the firing line, when the enemy has reached the defensive position, and is in dis- order. However, as the general counter-attacks are made by large bodies of troops, under a higher com- mander and involve higher tactics, their principles do not directly concern company commanders, and, there- fore, will not be discussed here. 69. Local Counter- Attacks. The local counter- attack is the one in which the company is directly inter- ested. Such an attack might be made to drive the enemy from an important position lie has gained in our immedi- ate front and from which he is doing us considerable damage, or to halt his advance during the third or fourth stage of the attack, or it might be made to block the enemy's charge. For instance, let us suppose the enemy has gained superiority of fire and is moving up to a posi- tion from which to assault. What are we going to do? [54] 70 Are we going to turn tail and run, await the assault in our trenches, or shall we go out of our trenches and assault the attackers? Is it better to sit in our own trenches and wait until the hostile troops come pouring over the parapet, shouting and yelling and digging their bayonets into us, or is it better to rush forward over the parapet ourselves, do the shouting and yelling ourselves, and do a little bayonet digging on our own hook? 70. When to deliver the Counter- Attack. There would be no object in delivering a local counter-attack during the first two stages of the attack. It is only when the attack has been stopped temporarily by the fire of the defense and must gain superiority of fire before it can advance further, that the necessity for delivering a local counter-attack would arise. Naturally enough, some parts of the defenders position will be stronger than others ; in the strong parts, where the defense has a good field of fire, the attack will be at a disadvantage in the struggle for superiority of fire and may never gain it sufficiently to assemble for the assault. This is not the part of the defender's position where the counter-attack is likely to be needed — it is likely to be needed in one of the weak parts of the defender's position, where, almost invariably owing to cover, the attacker will be able to get much closer. If the attacking line is allowed to remain in its fire-position and obtain superiority of fire, there is every chance that this part of the defender's line will be defeated. There are two ways of preventing this: One is for the defenders, while the struggle for superiority of fire is in the balance, to gain temporary superiority of fire and then attack the enemy, advancing [55] 70 (contd.) in a thick line, covering the ground with as few halts as possible and charging the enemy with the bayonet. The other alternative, but a far more risky one for the safety of the position, is to wait until the attack has gained superiority of fire and is assembling for the assault. This form of counter-attack would be resorted to only when previous efforts as suggested above have failed. In this case the company would charge with bayonet straight over the trenches. In those parts of the defender's line where the main defense will depend upon the success of local counter- attacks, each company should be assigned an objective before the counter-attack is commenced. Also, a good fire-position in front of the general line of defense should be selected before hand, and even improved, so that when the blow has been delivered the companies will not find themselves lying out in a very exposed position where it is impossible for them to use their rifles with effect. Local counter-attacks have often failed to produce any permanent effect, either because they have gone too far, or because they have reached a position where they were unduly exposed to the enemy's fire ; the enemy has then attacked and driven back the counter-attack, and practi- cally followed it into the main position. When deciding upon the objective of a counter- attack, so far as it can be done by studying the ground in front of the position, a company commander should bear in mind — (1) The position which the enemy may reach before being brought to a standstill by the fire of the [56] 70 (contd.) defense, and beyond which he cannot advance without first obtaining superiority of fire. (2) The line, perhaps in dead ground, where the attack, if it gains superiority of fire, is likely to assemble preparatory to the assault. (3) A suitable fire-position, always in advance of the last mentioned line, which the counter-attack can reach, and which can be supported later by fire from the main position, if possible. By not aiming at too much it is probable that the blow will be more permanently effective, it will be much easier to deliver, the losses will be greatly reduced, and if superiority of fire is obtained at once over the enemy in front, often his leading troops will be driven back by the counter-attack. A further advance with a view to defeating the enemy and driving him back from this part of the battlefield can be easily initiated. The most important point to remember is that when everything else has failed, and the enemy, having gained superiority of fire, is assembling close in front of the trench for the final assault, he must be charged before he has time to charge himself. Furthermore, if one com- pany commander sees another company on his right or left issuing from their trenches to charge, he must do the same with his company, whatever the situation in his im- mediate front may be. The only exception will be when the attackers in front of his company have not been able to gain superiority of fire, in which case the company would remain in its trenches and turn its fire upon the enemy in front of the companies delivering the counter- attack. [57] 71-72 Chapter VIII THE COMPANY IN ATTACK Meeting Engageiment, in which the Company is Exposed to Both Artillery and Infantry Fire from the Beginning 71. Meeting Engagement. "Meeting engagement" is the name given to an action when the opposing forces meet and commence to fight before either side has had time to make much preparation for the attack or defense. Such an engagement is characterized by the necessity for hasty reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of reconnaissance; by the necessity of rapid deployment, often under fire ; and usually the absence of trenches or other artificial cover. It is, therefore, evident that the first and second stages of the attack described in the previous chapters either disappear entirely or are greatly curtailed. 72. Battlefield. The first thing to realize is that, as a rule, the ground has not been selected by either side as being especially suitable for either attack or defense, and, owing to the lack of time, it will contain few, if any, artificial obstacles ; also, the entrenching, if any, will be hasty and limited. However, as a rule, there will be several important tactical features, such as streams, ridges, woods, hills, etc., the possession of one or more of which in particular will be an advantage to the side that holds it. The feature may not be very marked of itself, [58] 73-74 but it will be very important as compared with the rest of the features of the ground. Such a position will generally assist either the attack or defense. The thing to do, of course, is, if possible, to get possession of the feature without delay. 73. Necessity to Attack. We see from the above that the conditions of a meeting engagement give the attack advantages in addition to those mentioned in pre- vious chapters, and, also, that the conditions of such an engagement make it necessary to assume the offensive at once and attack with energy, vigor, and determination, so as to gain ground to the front and throw the enemy on the defensive at all costs. Everything must, there- fore, be done to gain superiority of fire just as soon as possible. Hence the importance of deploying and main- taining a strong firing line from the first. 74. Final Stages. Having gained superiority of fire in the initial stage of the encounter, the final stages, including the maintenance of fire superiority, the ad- vance to within charging distance, and the charge, would be carried out in a manner similar to that described in the stereotyped form of attack, except that, the ground not having been especially selected for defensive action and being free of artificial obstacles, the last stages of the attack would not be so difficult. [59] 75-76-77 Chapter IX THE COMPANY IN ATTACK Advance Guard-Action 75. Observation of Country While Marching. When the company is acting as an advance guard, as the troops are advancing through the country the captain must be constantly examining the ground in his vicinity, and planning in his own mind what he would do in case the enemy should be suddenly met in that particular neighborhood. All other officers, as well as the noncom- missioned officers, must also constantly observe the coun- try as the column advances. 76. Action Preceding Meeting Engagements. A meeting engagement is usually preceded by an action between the ojDposing advance guards, or between the opposing advance guard of one side and the outpost of the other. An advance guard moving in the direction of the enemy may meet a hostile advance guard of a body of troops sent forward to meet it, or it may meet an out- post line covering the enemy's main body. In either case the advance guard should attack and defeat the enemy's advance detachments before they can be reen- forced from the rear. 77. Company Forming Part of Advance Guard Support Meeting Hostile Advance Guard. Let us suppose the company forms a part of the support of the advance [60] 77 (contd.) guard. It will generally meet a detachment of the enemy that is hardly stronger than itself, and which should in every case be attacked immediately, with all possible vigor. Not far in rear of this hostile detachment we know more troops are following, and we must hit a good, strong blow before any of those troops can come up from the rear. The fact that the ground may be poor for attack, but good for defense, must not tempt us to assume a defensive attitude. Start right out after the enemy and strike him hard before he has time to realize what is happening. The question of committing the advance guard to a serious engagement without instruc- tions from the commander of the main body, need not worry the commander of the support. We know we have in our immediate front an enemy that cannot be very strong for the moment, and if we can defeat him and drive him back on the rest of his advance guard, and perhans even on the main body, the troons in his rear may be thrown on the defensive — such is the tremendous moral power of attack and initial success. Even if our attack on the support is brought to a standstill, we will have at least thrown the enemy on the defensive, and also will have more than likely caused him to greatly exaggerate our strength. If both sides should assume the offensive, the one that develons the most effective fire first and makes the best use of the ground will throw the other side on the defensive. We, therefore, see the vital importance of gaining superiority of fire as soon as possible and losing no time in gaining a position close enough to assault. [61] 77 (contd.) Protection of Flanks. The importance of protecting our flanks in advance guard action cannot be over esti- mated, and we should practice it diligently during times of peace. - Meeting Hostile Outpost. If the company encoun- ters a hostile outpost, we will find the enemy already occupying a defensive position. In view of the fact that his reinforcements would not be actually marching up in his rear, as in the case of an advance guard, a little more time would elapse before they could come up ; also, his position would be well chosen and undoubtedly his supports will have occupied the best positions in the vicinity. Therefore, the enemy having already assumed the defensive, the speed and immediate application of all the force available to throw him .on the defense would not be required. Our object would be to push forward, establish a fire-position in the best place available, and endeavor to gain suneriority of fire over the defense. As a rule, this should not be very difficult, because we would probably be stronger than the outuost in our im- mediate front, and bv such action we would disclose the enemy's position and to some extent his strenq-th, and thus assist materiallv the operations of the rest of the advance guard when it comes up to the firing line. On the other hand, should the company when it meets the hostile outpost, content itself with merely holding its ground and adopting a purely defensive attitude until the arrival of the rest of the advance guard, the enemy would probablv be encouraoed and we wo^ld not be able to gret much, if anv, information about him. In fact, it might not be at all clear what was in front of the advance [62] 78 guard, which, perhaps, was being held back by only a few dismounted men. It may be remarked here that it is a general rule always to make an effort to develop the strength and position of the enemy before planning your main attack, so that you may know what you are up against, and in order to accomplish this purpose it is sometimes necessary to send out combat patrols to draw the enemy's fire. 78. Company Forming Part of the Advance Guard Reserve Meeting Hostile Advance Guard. Let us now sup- pose that the company forms a part of the reserve instead of the support of the advance guard. While a vigorous offensive is of the greatest value at all times, it is never more so than when in action against a hostile advance guard. As we form a part of the reserve, the plan of attack, of course, will have been decided upon before we come into action, and our main object will be to reach a fire-position close enough to gain superiority of fire with the least possible delay. It should be borne in mind that the enemy may be reenf orced at any time by troops in his rear, so that we must take advantage of every con- dition to push forward within assaulting distance. "Protection of Flanks. We have already mentioned the importance of flank protection in advance guard action. If the company happens to be on the flank, two or three squads should be placed on the outer flank to protect the company, especially from mounted troops. This flank guard under certain conditions could be used to provide covering fire for the company. Scouts should be sent out beyond the flank. [63] 79 79. Company as Support to Artillery. When artillery forms part of the advance guard it is sometimes necessary to detach a company to protect the guns. In such case, you should first ascertain the direction from which the enemy would be most likely to attack the artillery and then make your arrangements to meet the attack. Of course, the enemy could not attack over the ground that is being used by the advance guard ; conse- quently, the possible directions are from the two flanks and the rear. Should the general situation, or the nature of the terrain make an attack from one or more of these directions impossible, it would, naturally enough, sim- plify the task of the infantry escort. If an attack were expected from one flank only, our main object would be to prevent the enemy from occu- pying any locality from which they could fire upon the flanks of the guns or against the wagons in rear. It is generally impossible for the company to occupy all such localities. However, if there is a position that commands the others, it should be occupied by the company, pro- vided the enemy cannot get between the company and the artillery without being exposed to the fire of the former. The company commander should send out scouts or patrols to all dead ground in the vicinity to give warning of a hostile advance. The company must not occupy a position too close to the artillery, because it might interfere with the working of the guns, and it would also probably suffer casualties from any hostile artillery fire that might be directed against our guns. The company commander should arrange with the artillery commander to be informed at the earliest possi- [64] 79 (contd.) ble moment of any change in the position of the guns, because the infantry marches much slower than the artil- lery, and is apt to be left behind, especially when scouts or detachments must be called in. The company com- mander, in case the company is to follow .the artillery to a new position, should always ascertain from the artil- lery commander the exact location of the position, and, if possible, the best road leading thereto. When the enemy may attack from either flank or from the rear, arrangements similar to those already described to deal with each eventuality, must be made. In a case like this it would be best to keep the greater part of the company together in the most important posi- tion, from which, perhaps, two or three possible lines of approach could be commanded. Should the enemy suc- ceed in occupying a position from which their rifle fire would interfere with the service of our guns, the com- pany must promptly attack the hostile position and carry it by assault. [65] 80-81 Chapter X THE COMPANY IN DEFENSE General Rules and Principles 80. Necessity for defensive Action. As we have previously shown, the attack is the dominating spirit of war — it is the only spirit that wins battles. However, there are times when the defense is necessary — indeed, ] when there could be no successful attack without a pre- ceding or simultaneous defense. 81. Classes of Defense. There may be said to be two general classes of defense: 1st, the so-called passive defense, when a certain position is to be held only for a short time because of the vastly superior strength of the enemy — for example, the action of a rear guard that is merely delaying the enemy so that the main body can get away, or the action of an outpost that is driven in by the enemy. 2nd, the so-called active defense, in which the spirit of attack dominates, and which is only resorted to as a stepping stone, as a means to the attack. In other words, we start out with the intention, the determination, of attacking the enemy, but we first delay his advance, make his attacking us as difficult as possible, cause him to lose more men than we do, break down as much as we can his power of attack, and flnallv attack him ourselves in turn. This is the usual form of defense, whose verv so^I should be the spirit of attack, but which, however, should never be resorted to unless the conditions make it abso- [66] 82-83-84 lutely necessary. Let us again repeat that the attack is the only thing that wins battles, and if compelled to assume the defensive we must not maintain that attitude any longer than is necessary, but must assume the offen- sive just as soon as we possibly can. 82. Advantages of the Defense. The defense has these advantages over the attack: 1. A larger amount of ammunition can be made available. 2. The men undergo comparatively little fatigue and consequently can shoot better. 3. The defense, usually having good cover, will suffer fewer losses than the attackers, and the use of smokeless powder makes it difficult for the attackers to locate the actual position of the defenders. 4. The advancing attackers must sooner or later offer a good target. 83. Disadvantages of the Defense. 1. The at- tacker can choose his point of attack, while the defender must be prepared against it at all points. 2. The defender must generally fight amongst his dead and wounded, which is demoralizing. 3. Seeing the attacker continuing to advance in spite of the defender's fire has a bad moral effect on the defender. 84. Requisites of a good defensive Position. The requisites to be sought in a good defensive position are: 1. A good field of fire to the front and flanks, to distance of 600 to 800 yards or more. [67] 85 2. Effective cover and concealment for the firing line as well as for the supports and reserves. 3. Flanks that are naturally secure, or that can be made so by the use of reserves. 4. Extent of ground suitable to the size of the force that is to occupy it. 5. Good communications throughout the position — that is, between different parts of the firing line, between the firing line and the supports, and between the sup- ports and the reserves. 6. A good line of retreat. 7. The position should be one that the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission. Of course, a position having all these advantages will rarely, if ever, be found. The one should be taken which conforms closest to the description. U>A Two of the most important requisites of a good de- fensive position, viz. : cover for the men and a good field of fire, are conflicting; for, as a rule, the farther back we get on the top of a hill, the better will the cover be, but, on the other hand, the farther back we get the more "dead space" will there be in front — that is to say, the poorer will the field of fire be. In selecting our fire posi- tion we must, therefore, balance these conflicting require- ments and strike a compromise between the two. 85. Straight Lines, Best Form of Defense. Of course, the simplest and most effective form of defense [68] 86-87 is for the fire trench or trenches to be constructed in a straight line. However, with a command of any size this will rarely be possible ; for, we will find that, owing to the features of the ground, a straight line of any length will provide variable cover for the defense and a very ununiform field of fire to the front — in some parts the cover and field of fire will be excellent, and in others it will be very poor. We must, therefore, bear in mind that in selecting our fire-positions, the position of the defense as a whole must be considered. 86. Salients. By salients we mean hills, spurs, woods, buildings, etc., that jut out from the general line of defense, and thus form a projecting object. Salients are always a weakness in a line, not only because it is easier for the enemy to concentrate a converging fire, especially artillery, on a small, projecting locality like a salient, which can often be enfiladed, but, generally, the number of men required to occupy a salient is out of proportion to the amount of the defenders' front covered by the salient. Hence, whenever possible, salients must be avoided and the space to their front and sides covered by the fire of troops occupying parts of the line adjoin- ing the salients. But, if this can not be done, and the occupation of a salient can not be avoided, special pains must be taken to provide overhead and other cover (bomb-proofs and loop-holes), and to guard against being enfiladed by the enemy. 87. Avoidance of the Skyline. Generally when we speak of the "Skyline" in conversation, we mean the highest part of a hill or ridge — the "natural crest," — and, roughly speaking, the skyline and the natural crest are [69] 87 (contd.) often practically the same. However, strictly speaking, such is not the case ; the exact position of the skyline is variable — it becomes nearer as one approaches the top of the hill and gets farther away as one goes away from the top of the hill. For instance, if standing at "A," Fig. 1, the skyline would be at "C," and if standing at ' B" it would be at "D." The thing to do then, is to ascertain the point beyond which the enemy will proba- bly be unable to advance without gaining superiority of fire — that is to say, the position where he will make his fight for superiority of fire — and then fix the skyline with reference to that point. As we all know, objects Fig. 1 seen on the skyline loom up as prominent targets. Furthermore, it is evident the occupation of the sky- line as a fire-position would result in lots of "dead space" in our front, and, again, it is a known fact that men will usually fire at this skyline rather than at any other part of a hill, if they cannot see the defenders' trenches. We should, therefore, if possible, avoid the skyline, and occupy a fire-position in front of it. How- ever, there may be occasions when the occupation of the skyline cannot be avoided. For instance, in the case of a plateau, with sudden and steep slopes down to the [70] 88-89-90 valleys below. Because of the vast amount of time and labor involved in cutting down the sides of the slope before getting to the trench proper, the construction of trenches on the slopes would be impossible — also, their concealment would be very difficult. When such a sky- line is occupied bushes should be placed along it — they will prevent the enemy from seeing the men when they rise to nre. ' f | If possible, before selecting a defensive position, go forward several hundred yards and examine it for the direction in which the. enemy will approach. 88. Cover, Trenches, and Obstacles. The nat- ural cover of the position should be fully utilized, and, in addition, it should be strengthened by trenches and obstacles, if the time permits. The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, in- conspicuous trenches. If little time is available, as much as practicable must be done. That the trenches may not be needed should not cause their construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if con- ditions are found to be other than expected. The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammu- nition. 89. Supports. When natural cover is not available for the supports, they are placed close at hand in cover trenches. 90. Dummy Trenches frequently deceive the ene- my and cause the hostile artillery as well as infantry to waste time and ammunition and to divert their fire. [71] 91-92-93-94 91. Advance Posts. As a rule, the occupation of positions in front of the general line of defense should be avoided, as they tend to disperse the power of the defender. However, there are times when it is desirable to occupy such positions in order to delay the enemy, deflect his course, make him deploy sooner, or for some other purpose. In such case, the number of troops used for the purpose should be no larger than is absolutely necessary, and care must be taken not to let them get cut off, special provision being made for their retreat. The commander of an advance post should always be given definite and explicit instructions as to just what he is to do and how long he is to occupy the position. 92. Occupation of the Trenches. Unless the diffi- culty of moving the troops into the trenches be great, most of them should be held in rear until the infantry attack begins. The position itself would be occupied by a small garrison only, with the necessary out guards or patrols in front. 93. Use of Bayonet. Fire alone cannot be de- pended upon to stop the attack. The troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary. 94. Night Attack. If a night attack or close approach of the enemy is expected, patrols or outposts should be thrown out in front, troops in a nreuared position should strengthen the outeruards and firing line, and as many obstacles as nossible should be constructed. Supports and reserves should move close to the firing line and should, with the firing line, keen their bayonets fixed. If practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the flanks. [721 95 Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks. The bayonet is the chief reliance. 95. Buildings, Farm Inclosures, etc., should not be occupied by the defense, when it can be avoided, espe- cially if they are to be exposed to artillery fire. Buildings and farm inclosures are bad fire-positions, not only because they make excellent targets for the artillery, but also because the men in them are in a very confined place, usually crowded together, thus present- ing a vulnerable target. If a building exposed to artil- lery fire must be defended, it can usually be done better from the outside than from the inside. The field of fire from the outside is generally better, and it is easier and quicker to dig good trenches, even with head cover, than it is to loop-hool and otherwise prepare a building for defense. Again, the effect of the hostile artillery will not be so demoralizing outside of a house as inside of it, and the defenders will not be driven out by the building catching fire. However, if a building is not exposed to artillery fire and it also affords a good field of fire, there is no doubt that it affords a good means of resistance, as it is very difficult to assault a building, and by the use of sand bags and other material effective protection can be provided against infantry fire. In fighting inside a building the very strictest discipline must be maintained and every man made to do his full duty ; for, there is no doubt that many men who go into a building take no part in its defense. Men must be assigned to various rooms, and squad leaders and the one in general charge, must frequently visit the various parts of the building to see that every one is doing his duty. Precautions must be [73] 96 taken to guard against fire. In preparing a building j for defense, improve the field of fire in the vicinity as much as possible; provide water and heaps of earth in the rooms; break and remove the glass in all the win- dows; doors and windows on the ground floor that are accessible must be blocked up and loop-holed ; arrange for means of communication throughout the building and for means of retreat. Ordinary furniture, chairs, tables, cupboards, bedsteads, etc., make good obstacles. Boxes, chests, trunks, sacks, mattresses, bags and pillow cases, when filled with earth, afford protection against rifle fire. However, it is generally safer to avoid buildings, and if they must be defended, then to defend them from the outside. 96. Edge of a Wood. If exposed to hostile artil- lery fire, the edge of a wood is not a good defensive posi- tion, because, as explained in the attack, it affords a good target for the enemy's artillery, and it also affords a good target for the hostile infantry. However, experi- ence in war shows that such a position is not a bad fire- position if not exposed to artillery fire, especially if the defenders happen to have some artillery to assist them. The trenches should be placed as far back as possible inside the wood, so as to escape the heavy fire that is sure to be directed against the edge of the wood. However, care must be taken not to locate the trenches so far back that the field of fire will be obstructed. The principal advantage of such a position is that the supports can be brought up and the wounded re- moved from the trenches under the cover of the woods. [74] 97 97. Clearing in a Wood. A clearing in a wood, especially if it be two or three hundred yards wide and the farther side be exposed to the defenders' fire, makes a good defensive position. This is not due so much to the fact that the defense has good cover and a good field of fire as it is to the fact that it is only with great difficulty that the attack can make an organized advance out of the wood. However, such a position is better suited to a passive defense, as it is about as difficult for the de- fender to deliver a counter-attack from his edge of the wood as it is for the attacker to move forward from his side, but the defender has a slight advantage over the attacker in this respect, in that he can prepare before- hand paths for purposes of communication, and also in that he will not have suffered the casualties and been subjected to the confusion which the attacker has experi- enced while passing through the wood. If necessary to make a clearing in a wood, it must be done by cutting down trees and clearing out the under- growth. Of course, as a rule, it will not be possible to cut down all the trees and the largest ones will have to be left standing. However, the spaces between the trees left standing must be assigned to various units, so that our fire will be sure to be distributed along the entire front. Any logs that may be left should lie at right angles to the defenders' front so as not to afford any cover for the enemy. The enemy's side of the clearing should be cut in the shape of a W, with the pointed angles toward the defenders. • This will cause the attack- ers to crowd into the pointed angles and to form along the edges of the angles, thus affording vulnerable tar- [75] 97 (contd.) gets, exposed to an enfilading fire from the defender. This saw-tooth effect on the attackers' side, in order to reduce the amount of labor, would be produced as fol- lows: After the clearing has been made, cut indenta- tions (A, B, C, D) in the woods, a few yards apart. t|f/ %7 %0 Place the limbs and other material from these indenta- tions at W, X, Y, Z, in the form of angles. If the time and labor permit, and if we have a couple of machine-guns, so that one can be placed at each flank of the clearing, our position can be made almost impreg- nable by cutting two rides running like a V, with the point towards the enemy, so that the machine-guns can shoot down the rides. Before being able to reach the edge of the clearing the enemy would have to cross the V-shaped paths and would be mowed down by the machine-guns. In making a clearing always begin on the defenders' side, and as the work progresses, keep the width of the clearing about the same throughout its entire length; for, if compelled to stop suddenly before the desired width is reached, it is better to have a narrower clearing of uniform width than one with some points of the far side near the defenders' position and others far away. When necessary to occupy a fire-position in a wood, with no clearing and without time to make one, whether or not the position is to be entrenched, always occupy the highest ground available. There is no theoretical reason for this, but experience shows that in wood fighting the [761 98 severest struggles almost invariably take place on the highest ground, and success depends upon ability to hold such ground. It may be that this is due to the fact that in nearly all wood fighting the bayonet is a great factor, and it can be used with greater effect in rushing down hill than in charging up hill. 98. Clearing Field of Fire. If there is not a good field of fire to the front, we must improve the field as much as possible by clearing away all obstructing objects. However, in clearing the ground close to the trench, we must be very careful not to create what will appear to the enemy like a straight line, because it will give him a good idea of the location of the trench, and probably unneces-. sarily expose the defenders to view. Bushes and scrub that do not interfere with the field of fire and which, when seen from the front, do not present a clearly defined line, should not be cut down, as they make it difficult for the enemy to locate the trenches or see the defenders, when they put up their heads to fire. A Wood. The method of clearing a wood was ex- plained above. Crops. Crops that cannot be burned may be trampled down by having troops march over them in close order. Streams running across the front within effective rifle range should be cleared of all obstructions to view, so that the defense will be able to fire on both banks and on the approaches. However, a few trees or bushes should be left here and there along the banks as aiming marks to assist the squad leaders and platoon commanders in directing and distributing the fire of their men. im 99-100 Ranges. The ranges to various points in front and on the flanks must be ascertained in advance. Obstacles. The extent to which artificial obstacles shall be used will depend upon the necessity therefor as determined by the nature of the ground, the extent to which it is intended to defend the position, and the time and material available. 99. Defense of Bridges and other Defiles. As a rule, a bridge, causeway, ford, or other open defile, can be defended better from the near side — that is to say, from the defenders' side — by bringing a cross-fire upon the defile the enemy is attempting to pass. Everything possible must be done to prevent him from forming a fighting front on the defenders' side. In defending mountain passes or other defiles whose flanks are not open, such as village streets, it is usually better to dispute the passage itself, inch by inch, and prepare to receive the enemy with a strong, effective cross-fire should he succeed in reaching the open space at the defenders' end of the defile. 100. Defense of Villages. To prepare a village for defense: 1. Construct trenches controlling the principle avenues of approach, which should, if practicable, be mined; station sharpshooters and expert riflemen in the belfries of churches and other commanding places, and construct barricades across the streets where heavy fight- ing is likely to occur. 2. Divide the village into sections, with well-defined lines of communication, each section being held by a [78] 101 separate tactical unit, which will provide for the care of the wounded. 3. Prepare the buildings for defense, provide food, water, and ammunition. (Buildings prepared for occu- pation must not be occupied if sub j ected to artillery fire. ) Should the attackers penetrate the outer line of de- fense, the defenders must stubbornly contest every inch of the ground, fighting from buildings, barricades, and trenches. 101. Defense against Cavalry. Infantry, unless taken by surprise or demoralized, need fear nothing from cavalry. All you need to do is not to lose your head, shoot straight and aim low. The kneeling position is usually the best. If attacked by a cavalryman with a drawn saber, try to get on the near side of the horse. The rider cannot use his saber effectively against a dismounted man on his left. [79] 102 Chapter XI THE COMPANY IN DEFENSE Usual Types of Defense 102. Having discussed the general rules and princi- ples of defense, we will now take the company through the usual types of defense, viz. : 1. The ordinary type of defense, where there are many companies assisted by artillery, occupying a posi- tion for the purporse of fighting entirely on the defen- sive; or, for the purpose of fighting on the defensive, with the view of taking the offensive later. 2. An advance guard is suddenly thrown on the defensive by the action of the enemy. 3. An attack is suddenly thrown on the defensive by the action of the enemy. 4. An advance guard that has routed the enemy and captured the position is in turn attacked by the enemy and thrown on the defensive. 5. An attack that has routed the enemy and cap- tured the position, is, in turn, attacked by the enemy and thrown on the defensive. 6. A rear guard covering the withdrawal of a force from the battlefield. 7. Defense at night. 8. Defense of a position by an outpost. Many Companies, Assisted by Artillery, Occupy- ing a Position for the Purpose of Fighting Entire- ly rn the Defensive; or, for the Purpose of [80] 103 Fighting on the Defensive with the View of Taking the Offensive Later 103. It may be assumed that in this type of defense there will be sufficient time to dig fire trenches, con-- struct obstacles, and clear the foreground. The location of the fire trenches will, to a great extent, depend upon the amount of time available ; for, a fire trench that is well located when the foreground is cleared, or some obstacle constructed, may be very badly placed if there is not enough time to do more than to prepare hasty entrenchments. When allotted the amount of front he is to defend, the company command- er should, therefore, ascertain, if possible, about how much time he will have to strengthen his position. The first thing for the company commander to decide, is whether he will begin work by digging his fire trench, clearing the foreground or constructing obstacles, and it is impossible to lay down any definite rule, except it may be said that, generally, artificial obstacles are luxuries, and as such would be the last to receive attention. However, it is not always easy to determine which should be done first — the fire trenches dug, or foreground cleared. For example, if the position should be taken up in the afternoon and our outposts were well out to the front, it is not likely that the enemy would make a decisive attack before the following day, even though our ad- vance guard may have been in action against the enemy's advanced troops. In such a case it would be better to employ a few men to work on the position of the fire trenches and construct a certain amount of cover, while [81] 103 (contd.) the rest of the company cleared the foreground, as it is comparatively easy to dig trenches at night, but it is not so easy to site them, or to clear the foreground in dark- ness. If the position selected for the fire trench is very exposed to the enemy's fire, which would mean that the ground in front must be fairly open, it would be best to begin work digging trenches with the majority of the company and let the remainder clear away the most serious obstacles. If the position selected for the fire trench is natural- ly strong and provides more cover for the defenders than the attackers could possibly get within iive or six hundred yards of the position, it would then be better to improve the field of fire, by clearing the foreground, before dig- ging any trenches, especially if there happens to be con- siderable obstruction to our fire, and view. Should the section of the line allotted to the company run through a wood, we should first make a clearing, then construct obstacles on the enemy's side of the clear- ing and dig the fire trench last. The one salient, important fact we must always bear in mind is this : The defender must prevent the attacker from gaining sujjeriority of fire. In some cases the de- fender may accomplish this object better by digging his fire trenches first and in other cases by clearing the fore- ground first, depending upon circumstances, and in decid- ing which shall be done first, the company commander must use his judgment and common sense. With regard to obstacles it may be said that they can only delay the attack, but will not prevent it from gaining superiority [82] 104 of fire. It is most important, therefore, that we should first determine as nearly as possible the position that the attacker can reach but cannot pass without gaining superiority of fire, and then plan accordingly with regard to locating the fire trench, clearing the foreground, and constructing obstacles, so that we may be in the best pos- sible circumstances to prevent the enemy from subduing our fire. An Advance Guard Is Suddenly Thrown on the Defensive by the Action of the Enemy 104. In this case the first thing to do is to occupy as soon as possible the best fire position available in the immediate neighborhood. It is all the better if this posi- tion should happen to be ahead — the very fact of the company advancing, even though a few yards, will help to improve the morale of the men. However, if it is out of the question to advance, and it is extremely proba- ble that the position we occupy cannot be held without soon losing superiority of fire, then a fire-position must be occupied in rear, but we must not fall back a single foot more than is absolutely necessary. We must remember that reinforcements are close behind us, and that any wavering or hasty retreat on our part may easily lead to disaster. Every inch of ground must be stubbornly con- tested, and immediately upon reaching a good fire posi- tion, we must defend it to the last. Let the company commander and everyone else bear in mind that the safety of the whole of the main body in rear and the success of the subsequent battle may depend upon the vigorous, determined action of the advanced guard. £83] 105 An Attack Is Suddenly Thrown on the Defensive by the Action of the Enemy 105. If the attacking force should be suddenly thrown on the defensive by the enemy, the first object of the company commander should be to resume the offensive just as soon as he possibly can, seizing the very first opportunity to renew the attack, and then, at the earliest possible moment gain superiority of fire, advance to a position close enough to charge, and charge. Natur- ally enough, the ground will not be the same in front of all the companies, and those that are favored by the terrain should push forward and thus relieve the strain on those that are not so fortunate in that respect. The momentum of the companies that thus press forward will carry along other companies less fortunately situ- ated. We should remember that the longer the company remains on the defensive the harder will it be to have it resume the attack. As in the case of the advance guard, we should not fall back, if it can possibly be avoided; for, if we do, other companies will probably follow suit — retreating is very infectious, and it works on the cumula- tive principle of a snowball rolling down the side of a hill. Indeed, it is generally better to continue occupying an indifferent fire-position than to seek a better one farther back. We must also remember that reinforce- ments will be coming up as rapidly as possible to help us, and their arrival should be the signal for a forward move. An advance of only a few yards will often change the whole moral aspect of the situation. t«4] 106 An Advance Guard that Has Routed the Enemy and Captured the Position, Is in Turn Attacked by the Enemy and Thrown on the Defensive 106. The situation is this: Our advance guard has defeated the leading troops of the enemy, and is in pos- session of the ground; the leading troops of the enemy are being heavily reenf orced with the view of retaking the ground they lost. How should we meet the situa- tion? To begin with, our attack having been successful, not only is the morale of our troops very high, but, also, the advance guard commander will be able to make more elaborate arrangements than would be possible in any ordinary meeting engagement. When the advance guard drove the leading troops of the enemy from their position it did all that was re- quired of it for the time being; it is now merely called upon to retain the ground it has taken from the enemy. Assuming that we made our attack as we should, it was a somewhat rapid operation with a very strong firing line from the beginning — hence, it is not likely that the companies are badly mixed up. The first thing for the company commander to do is to reorganize his company, and get the squads and pla- toons under their proper commanders. He must then choose and occupy the best fire-position available. Let us suppose the position where we now find ourselves is bad for defense and that any further attack would involve the advance guard in a premature action against the enemy's main bodv. It would be necessary for some of the com- panies to remain in the position gained and act as an outpost, while the rest of the companies would be with- es*] 106 (contd.) drawn to a better defensive position shortly in rear. Of course, it would be quite impossible to improve any of the foreground that is exposed to the enemy's fire. How- ever, other parts might be cleared. Also, as a rule, we would have to confine our entrenchments to such as the men can make with their entrenching tools while lying down. We, therefore, see we must so choose our fire position as to make the most of the ground as it exists, and, consequently, the chances are it will be most difficult to insure even a fairly straight line of defense. How- ever, we should by all means avoid pronounced salients in our position. (See "Salients," Par. 683.) If we are compelled to occupy a bad or indifferent fire-position, we must then make the best of the situation by assuming a very active defense with counter-attacks. Remember, fire-positions are bad, as a rule, because the terrain in front is such that it is easy for the attacker to advance under cover, gain superiority of fire, assemble close to the defenders and charge, — and these are the very advantages the defender will have when he assumes the offensive and delivers a counter-attack over the same ground; the tables being turned, the enemy will have a bad fire-position, and it will be easy for the de- fender to advance under cover, gain superiority of fire, assemble close to the enemy, and charge. Any fire-position that may be selected must be im- proved by intrenching as much as the enemy's fire will permit. By means of scouts arid patrols sent out to the front and flanks, we must get all the information we can about the enemy — his exact position, whether he is intrenching, etc. [86] 107 After our previous fight during the attack of the advance guard, the men will be badly in need of water, and the company commander should arrange as soon as possible for them to get water. There is one thing that every one (officers, noncom- missioned officers, and privates) must understand: The safety of our main body and probably the success of the approaching battle will depend upon the defense of the position we are now occupying, and which we secured at the sacrifice of many casualties. It must,, therefore, be held at all cost. An Attack that Has Routed the Enemy and Cap- tured the Position, Is in Turn Attacked by the Enemy and Thrown on the Defensive 107. Although this situation is, in the main, but a modification of the one we have just discussed, it is easier to handle; for, the main body being involved, there are more troops available for the purpose, and the troops are even in higher spirits than in the preceding case. The first thing to do is to push forward with the men who have just charged, and secure a good fire-position on the enemy's side. We will find our companies badly dis- organized and mixed up with men of other companies and of other regiments. As we push forward the men, under the direction of officers and noncommissioned officers, should be grouping themselves into squads, platoons, and companies, corporals taking charge of squads, platoon leaders grouping two or three squads together under their command, and captains assuming control of several of these groups. A fire-position must be established on [87] 108 the enemy's side of the locality, because he must be pur- sued immediately by fire to prevent his reforming; we must be prepared to repulse without delay, by fire and assault, any hostile counter-attack that may be attempt- ed; ground must be gained to the front so that our artillery can come up in safety and assist us in the fire pursuit of the enemy, and in resisting any counter- attack ; and time must be gained to enable our troops in rear to reform and prepare for further offensive opera- tions, either by way of continuing the attack or pressing the pursuit. Having secured a good fire-position, we must next fix aiming marks and take ranges, and complete the reorganization of the companies, getting the officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the same regi- ment together in squads, platoons, and companies. The replenishment of the ammunition will be looked after by the proper field and staff officers. Let us all bear in mind that whatever the circum- stances may be, it is the duty of each and every one of us in the front line to advance just as soon as the enemy is driven back, and occupy a fire-position that will secure the ground we have captured. A Rear Guard Covering the Withdrawal of a Force from the Battlefield 108. This type of defense is different from the others we have so far discussed, in that it is strictly passive, and special attention must be given to the suc- cessful withdrawal of the company as soon as it has accomplished its object. C88] 108 (contd.) The object of the operation is to give the main body time to reorganize and retire in good order. The pro- cedure followed by a rear guard is quite simple. The companies are deployed on a wide front with few sup- ports and no reserves. When the enemy has been made to deploy and attack us, or has been compelled to work around our flank, and we have occupied our position as long as is safe, a part of the rear guard retires under the covering fire of the other part, and occupies another position in rear, from which it can cover the retirement of the other part. Whether the right of the line should retire first, to be followed later by the left, or whether the center should withdraw first, or whether both flanks should withdraw first, leaving the center to follow later — these are matters to be determined by the nature of the ground and the comparative pressure of the attack that is brought against different parts of the line. The decision as to which company should retire first will rest with the officer in local command of the companies, but in the absence of specific orders, a company that is de- fending the only locality from which the line of retreat is visible, or that is holding a position commanding part of the rest of the line, would be last to retire. As a rule, before retiring, an officer or well trained noncom- missioned officer should be sent back to ascertain the general line of defense in the next position in rear, and to reconnoiter suitable fire-positions, thus enabling the company commander to take his new position without delay. In case of broken country and considerable dis- tance between the companies, scouts should be posted on our flanks to let us know when the adjoining com- [89] 108 (contd.) panies begin to withdraw. The actual withdrawal must be made in fighting formation, and as rapidly as possible, so as to increase the distance between the enemy and ourselves. Also, rapid withdrawal and prompt occu- pation of the next position, will enable us to delay the enemy more than we could by a running fight. In selecting fire-positions we must remember that in addition to the conflicting requirements of a good field of fire and good cover for the defenders, the position must also permit the company to withdraw easily. In other words, the fire-position must permit of such easy withdrawal that when the company falls back it will be able to gain cover in rear before the enemy can occupy the position that the company has just vacated, and this is something we want to remember; for, it makes un- suitable certain fire-positions which, under other circum- stances, would be very desirable. For example, the foot of a slope in open country with a bare hillside in rear, although affording a fine field of fire and splendid cover for the defenders, would not be selected because of the difficulty of withdrawing over the hill and the casualties that would doubtless result. In such a case as this, the top of the hill, even with lots of dead ground imme- diately in front of it, would be a much more suitable position. The principle to work on is this: Our object is to delay the enemy in his advance, bring him to a standstill as far as possible from our position, and force him to obtain superiority of fire before getting any closer; we have no intention of standing a charge and consequently dead ground in our immediate front is immaterial; for, we will have retired before the enemy [90] 109 reaches that dead space. What we must do, then, is to select fire-positions that command all ground from about two hundred to eight hundred yards in front of the locality we are defending. Care must be taken, especially in open country, to protect our flanks against hostile cavalry. There is a great deal of ammunition expended in rear guard action, and the ammunition supply must receive the attention of the company commander. Defense at Night 109. Level open ground is the best kind of ground over which to make a night attack; for, it is easy to traverse in the darkness. However, a defensive position with that kind of ground in front of it will have by day a good field of fire and will require comparatively few troops to defend it. We, therefore, see that, as a rule, those parts of the defensive line that are strongest by day are the most liable to attack by night. Of course, there are some exceptions to this, because, for example, a morass, vineyard, or other natural obstacle in front of a portion of the line, may make that part of the ground as impassable by night as by day. Obstacles are useful for delaying or breaking up night attacks, especially if their location is unknown to the enemy and there are troops stationed close to prevent their destruction. The best way to guard against night attacks is to have the front of the position well patrolled, and to throw out outposts, protected by artificial obstacles. If the out- posts are forced to retire, the enemy's advance will be [91] 110 discovered and a night attack can be made upon him. In connection with the use of obstacles for night work, it may be remarked that they should not be visible by day. The company must, therefore, be able to construct obstacles in the darkness, and should be trained to do so in time' of peace. Experience has shown that, taken all in all, the bayo- net is the most important and reliable weapon we have for night fighting. However, the bayonet cannot be used effectively behind entrenchments — its great power and value is when in the hands of well-trained men who are prepared to charge, without even firing a shot, as soon as the enemy has been located. If the enemy can attack at night, there is no reason why we cannot do the same, even though we may be on the defensive for the time being. The whole situation may, therefore, be summed up in these few words: When acting on the defensive at night the whole position must be watched by sentries and patrols; the most probable avenues of approach must be obstructed by obstacles, with outposts behind them, ready to delay the enemy and prevent the destruction of the obstacles; and as soon as the enemy has been located, if advancing to attack vis, companies must be sent out to attack him with the bayonet — from which we see that by far the most important part of defense by night is an attack or counter-attack. Defense of a Position by an Outpost 110. This type of defense is treated in detail in the following chapter, "The Company on Outpost." [92] Ill Chapter XII THE COMPANY ON OUTPOST Establishing the Outpost 111. Let us suppose that our battalion has been detailed for outpost duty. . In order to understand more fully the duties and functions of the company commander, we will first con- sider what the major does." To begin with, he and the battalion will have been detailed for outpost duty before the march was completed, and he will have been told, amongst other things, what is known of the enemy and also what is known of other bodies of our own troops, where the main body will halt, the general position to be occupied by the outpost, and what the commander in- tends doing in case of attack. The major verbally designates, say, two companies, as the reserve, and the other two companies, including our own, as the support. He places the senior officer of the reserve companies in command of the reserve and tells him where he is to go, and he indicates the general line the outpost is to occupy and assigns the amount of front each of the other companies is to cover. The limits of the sector so assigned should be marked by some dis- tinctive features, such as trees, buildings, woods, streams, etc., as it is important that each company should know the exact limits of its frontage. He tells the company commanders what he knows of the enemy and of our own troops so far as they affect the outposts, he indicates the [93] Ill (contd.) line of resistance and how much resistance is to b afforded in case of attack, states whether intrenchments and obstacles are to be constructed, gives instructions about lighting fires and cooking, and states where he can be found. Upon receiving his orders from the major, the com- pany commander, with a proper covering detachment, moves to the locality allotted him and as he arrives upon the ground he is to occupy, he sends out, as temporary security, patrols or skirmishers, or both, a short distance in front of the general position the outguards will occupy, holding the rest of the company back under cover. If practicable, the company commander should precede the company and make a rapid examination of the ground. He then sends out observation groups, varying in size from four men to a platoon, generally a squad, to watch the country in the direction of the enemy. These groups constitute the outguards, and are just sufficient in number to cover the front of the supports, and to connect where necessary with the outguards of adjoining supports. The company commander next selects a defensive position on the general line of resistance, from which not only can he command the approaches, but where he can also give assistance to the adjoining supports; he then gives instructions in regard to the intrenchments and obstacles, after which he makes a more careful recon- naissance of the section assigned him ; corrects the posi- tion of the outguards, if necessary ; gives them instruc- tions as to their duties in case of attack or when strangers approach their posts; tells them the number (if any) of [94] ; Ill (contd.) their post, the number of the outguard and support and the numbers of the adjoining outguards and supports; points out lines of retreat in case they are compelled to fall back to the support, cautioning the men not to mask the fire of the support; he tells them the names of all villages, rivers, etc., in view, and the places to which the wagon roads and the railroads lead; selects, if necessary, places for additional posts to be occupied at night and during fog; sees that suitable connections are made be- tween him and the adjoining outguards, and between his support and the adjoining supports; and questions sub- ordinate commanders to test their grasp of the situation and knowledge of their duties, and on returning to the support he sends a report with a sketch to the outpost commander, showing the dispositions made. After the line of observation has been established, the support stacks arms and the men are permitted to remove their equipments, except cartridge belts. One or more sentinels are posted over these supports, and they guard the property and watch for signals from the outguards. Fires are concealed as much as possible and the messing is done by reliefs. Mounted messengers ordinarily do not unsaddle; they rest, water, and feed as directed. After the major has received reports from both com- pany commanders, he will himself visit the outguards and supports and make such changes as he may deem necessary, immediately after which he will submit to the commander of the troops a written reuort, accompanied by a combined sketch showing the positions of the differ- ent parts of the outpost. The major might begin his [95] Ill (contd.) inspection of the line of outguards before receiving the reports of the company commanders. In training and instructing the company in outpost work, it is always best to send out a few patrols and scouts an hour or two in advance, with definite instruc- tions as to what they are to do, and have them operate against the company as hostile scouts and patrols. If the rest of the company know that patrols and scouts are operating in their front, and will try to work their way through the outpost line, they will naturally take a keener interest in their work. Exercises of this kind create a feeling of rivalry between the scouts and patrols, who, on the one hand, are trying to work their way through the line of outposts, and the outguards and patrols, who, on the other hand, are trying to prevent them from so doing. It makes the work much more human. [96] 112 Chapter XIII FIELD ORDERS OF ENLISTED MEN 112. Platoon Leaders My field orders are — Integrity of squads in battle. In battle I will do all I can to preserve the integrity of squads ; I will desig- nate new squad leaders to replace those disabled, and will organize new squads when necessary. Designation of target. I will clearly describe to my platoon the target that has been allotted to the pla- toon by the captain, and will take every precaution to insure correct sight setting, and proper distribution of fire by carefully observing the target, the adjacent ground, and the effect upon the enemy. In the absence of the allotment of a target to my platoon, I will take as my target that part of the hostile line corresponding to the position of my platoon in the company. If the target cannot be seen with the naked eye, I will select an object in front of or behind it, designate this as the aiming target, and direct a sight setting which will carry the cone of fire into the target. Fire control. On the firing line I will be on the lookout for commands and signals from the captain; T will observe the target and the effect of the fire and will also observe and regulate the rate of fire. When the target is favorable, I will increase the fire; when it is unfavorable, I will decrease the fire, and when the enemy disappears I will stop firing. [97] 112 (contd.) Teamwork back of firing line. I realize that, in order to have proper fire direction and control, teamwork back of the firing line, — that is, between the captain and the platoon leaders and between the platoon leaders and the squad leaders, — is of vital importance. I also realize that such teamwork is impossible without the best possi- ble communication between the captain and the platoon leaders and between the platoon leaders and the squad leaders. Therefore, I will at all times endeavor to keep in sight of both the captain and the squad leaders of my platoon. Should I, for any reason, have to lose sight of the captain, I will designate a guide or someone from the firing line to get between the cantain and myself and keep us both in view, so as to be able to transmit to me at once any signals from the captain. Increasing rate of fire in platoon rushes. When the company is advancing by platoon rushes, I will always, in order not to decrease the volume of our fire, increase the rate of fire of my platoon, from the time that the adjoining platoon ceases firing nreuaratory to rushing forward, until it has completed its rush and resumed firing. Announcement of new range. When mv nlatoon advances bv rushes, I will, as soon as the platoon is halted, announce the rano'e of the new nosition, obtaining it, if practicable, from the platoon that preceded me. Direction of advance. In advancing: with mv pla- toon, I will constantly bear in mind the direction of advance, and will make every possible effort to maintain that direction. [98] 112 (contd.) Ammunition supply. I will, through the squad leaders of my platoon, keep tab on how the ammunition is going. When it gets down to about 100 rounds per man, I will so notify the captain by opening and extend- ing the five fingers of the hand twice (the five fingers signifying 5 times ten, or 50, and twice that being 100) . When it gets down to about 50 rounds per man, I will again notify the captain by opening and extending the five fingers of the hand once. Sending out connecting files. In sending out con- necting files of the advance guard I will always instruct them from what element they are to take and maintain their distances. Signal lookouts. When advance or rear guard con- necting files, or flanking parties are sent out from my platoon, I will always designate someone in the platoon to act as a lookout for signals from such connecting files or flanking parties. Teamwork. I realize the value of TEAMWORK in the military business and I appreciate the force of what is said on the subject in the last subparagraph of Par. 116. Therefore, in battle, in camp, on the march, and at all other times, I will see that the guides, squad leaders, buglers, and privates around me carry out their field orders, and that they comply with the known wishes and desires of the company commander, and I will my- self obey and carry out so much of the field orders of guides, squad leaders, and the privates as may at any time apply to me. Importance of platoon leader. I am fully aware of the fact that in modern war the platoon leader occu- [99] 113 pies a most important position, — a position as important as that occupied by a captain up to and during the Civil War. I also know that in order to make good as a pla- toon leader, a man must be forceful and efficient, and must exercise initiative, good judgment, and energy, and not be afraid to swim in deep water. In other words, he must be a "live wire," and that is exactly what I am going to make every effort to be, trying with all my might, — with my whole body and soul. 113. Guides My field orders are — Integrity of squads in battle. In battle I will en- deavor, by assisting the officers and platoon leaders and otherwise, to preserve the integrity of squads. Watching firing line. On the firing line I will watch the line, observing the fire and checking every breach of fire discipline 1 that I see. Teamwork back of firing line. I realize the truth of what is said in paragraph 3, above, about the impor- tance of teamwork back of the firing line, and I will assist all I can in keeping up communication between the captain and my platoon leader, and between the pla- toon leader and the firing line, using initiative and com- mon sense to accomplish that end. Teamwork in general. I know the great value of TEAMWORK in the military business and I appre- ciate the force of what is said on the subject in the last subparagraph of Par. 116. Therefore, in battle, in 1 Bv fire discipline is meant taking advantage of cover: care in setting the sight, and delivery of fire; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful observation of the enemv; an increase of fire when the target is favorable, and a cessation of fire when the enemv disappears: economy of ammunition. (Pars. 418-419, Small-Arms Firing Manual.) [100] 114 camp, on the march, and at all other times, I will see that the squad leaders, buglers, and privates around me carry out their field orders, and that they comply with the known wishes and desires of the company commander, and I will myself obey and carry out so much of the field orders of squad leaders and the privates as may at any time apply to me. Direction of advance. I will constantly bear in mind the direction of advance, and will assist all I can in maintaining that direction. 114. Squad Leaders My field orders are — Integrity of the squad. In battle I will do all I can to preserve the integrity of my squad. Signals from platoon leader. I will be constantly on the alert for commands and signals from my platoon leader and when necessary will transmit them to the members of my squad. Observing the squad. I will observe the conduct of my squad, abate excitement, and assist in enforcing fire discipline. Firing. I will participate in the firing, but not to such an extent as to interfere with the proper supervision and control of my squad. Increasing rate of fire in squad rushes. When the advance is being made by squad rushes, I will always, in order not to decrease the volume of our fire, increase the rate of fire of my squad, from the time that the adjoining squad ceases firing preparatory to rushing forward, until it has completed its rush and resumed firing. [101] 114 (contd.) Announcement of new range. When my squad advances by rushes, I will, as soon as the squad is halted, announce the range of the new position, obtaining it, if practicable, from the squad that preceded me. Ammunition supply. I will keep tab on how the ammunition in my squad is going, instructing each man to inform me when his ammunition gets down to 100 rounds and again when he has only 50 rounds left. When the majority of the members of the squad have so reported in each case, I will notify my platoon leader by holding up my hand, and opening and extending the five fingers twice to indicate 100 rounds, and once to indicate 50 rounds (the idea being that the five fingers signify 5 times 10, or 50). Posting sentinels on outpost. When posting a sen- tinel on outpost, I will always give him the following information : (a) The number of his post and the number of his out guard. (b) The location of the adjoining sentinels. (c) The numbers of the adjoining outguards. (d) The location of the support of his outguard and the line of retreat to follow if compelled to fall back. (e) Exactly what to do if the enemy appears and if attacked. (f ) Everything I know about the enemy; the names of villages, mountains, streams, and other prominent features in sight; where all the roads in sight lead to. If unable to impart all of the above information when the sentinel is posted, I will give as much as I [102] 115 know, and the rest as soon as possible, getting it from the commander of our support. Teamwork. I know how invaluable TEAM- WORK is- in the military game, and I appreciate the force of what is said on the subject in the last subpara- graph of Par. 116. Therefore, in battle, in camp, on the march, and at all other times, I will see that the buglers and privates around me carry out their field orders, and that they comply with the known wishes and desires of the company commander, and I will myself obey and carry out so much of the field orders of the privates as apply to me. 115. Buglers My field orders are — Post in deployment. Whenever the company is deployed, I will at once join the captain and remain with him until further orders. Assisting the captain. I will assist the cantain by observing the enemy, the target, and the fire-effect, by transmitting commands or signals, and by watching for signals. In case the company is acting in battalion, I will be on the constant lookout for orders and signals from the battalion commander, which I will at once transmit to the captain. Signals. I will memorize the following code of sig- nals, and in case I am required to make them, I will con- ceal them from the enemy's view: no3] 115 (contd.) Letter of rlnlmbet AM.. C C C OF D T F F B PL G H H H K L T (Ardois and semaphore only ) (All methods but ardois and sema- phore ) P R R N R T s s s S U F T If signi led from the rear to t h e firing li^e Ammi nition going forward. . . . Charge (mandatory at all times) Cease firing Double time or "rush" Commence firing Fix bayonets Artil'ery fire is causing us losses M>ve forward Halt Negative Left What is the (R. N., etc.)? Interrogatory What is the (R. Interrogatory N., etc.)? Affirmative Acknowledgment Ringe Right SupDort going forward Suspend firing Tm-o-et If signaled from the. firing li^-e to the re n r Ammunition required Am about to charge if no in- structions to the contrary Cease firing Double time or "rush" Commence firing Fix ba onets Artillerv fire is causing us losses Preparing to move forward Halt Negative Left What is the (R. N., etc.)? Interrogatory What is the (R. Interrogatory Affirmative Acknowledgment Range Right Sunoort needed Svs^end firing N., etc.)? Carrying signal flag. I will always carry the pre- scribed signal flags in the field. Fix bayonets. If the command to fix bayonets is sounded I will repeat it. The charge. When the order to charge is sounded I will at once repeat it. Teamwork. I realize the importance of TEAM- WORK in the military business, and I appreciate the force of what is said on the subject in the last subpara- graph of Par. 116. Therefore, in battle, in camp, on the march, and at all other times I will faithfully and willingly carry out the orders of the company com- mander, and will comply with his known wishes and desires. I will also obey as much of the field orders of the privates as apply to me. [104] 116 116. Privates In Battle My battle orders are — Loading pieces. Having once loaded my piece, I will, by inserting fresh clips when the magazine is ex- hausted, keep it loaded without further command until the command unload or inspection arms is given. ( Par. 134, I. D. R.) Straggling. I will not straggle, nor will I under any circumstances skulk, but, at the command to ad- vance, I will always do so at once. Advancing and halting. In advancing by rushes, or any other way, I will always endeavor to be the first man to start the advance, and also the first man to drop down at the signal or command to halt. If not right up on the line when I drop down, I will get there by crawl- ing. I am aware of the fact that in advancing by rushes the last men to reach the new position are exposed to the enemy's fire that much longer, and, consequently, are more apt to get hit than the others. Not to carry wounded. I will not endeavor to carry any wounded to the rear. That is the business of the litter-bearers. My business is to remain on the firing line and help with my rifle. Changing sight. I will not fail to change my sight when new ranges are announced, nor will I forget to change my sight when advancing by rushes, whether or not the new range is announced. Replenishing ammunition supply. I will never lose an opportunity to replenish my ammunition supply from the belts of the dead and wounded. The time may [105] 116 (contd.) come before the fight is over when ammunition will be worth a hundred times its weight in gold. Husbanding ammunition. Especially in the first stages of a fight, I will husband my ammunition, and not w r aste anj^ of it by reckless firing ; for, it is impossible to say what may develop later on. Rate of fire. In the absence of any other instruc- tions from my company commander, squad, or platoon leader, I will, if I have received suitable training in target practice and the target is a good one, fire ordi- narily at about the following rate: 200 yards] 10 shots 500] 7.5 shots 800] 5 shots 300 yards }> per 6*00 j- per 900}- per •100 yardsj minute 700J minute 1000J minute Greater range than 1000 yards, 3 shots per minute. If the target should be especially favorable, because of its size and conspicuousness, I will exceed the above rates of fire. However, on the other hand, if the target is very indistinct, or if I have not received suitable train- ing in target practice, I will fire at a less rate than stated above, not exceeding about 6 shots per minute at the closest ranges. (Par. 209, Small- Arms Firing Manual.) Notifying squad leader of ammunition left. When I have only 100 rounds of ammunition left, I will so notify my squad leader, and I will notify him again when I have only 50 left. Use of rest. I will use a rest for my rifle whenever I can. It will improve my shooting. Prompt obedience to orders. I will obey at once all the commands and orders of my squad leader, and my platoon leader. [106] 116 (contd.) In case of surprise, excitement, or confusion. In case of surprise, excitement, or confusion, I will at once listen for the orders of my officers and noncommissioned officers, and I will obey them immediately and implicitly, Cover. I will take advantage of cover, but, if by so doing, I cannot see the enemy, I will then get where I can see him ; for, it is much more important that I should be able to see the enemy so as to shoot at him, than it is for me to conceal myself from his sight. I will always take special pains to avoid the sky-line (the tops of hills and ridges ) ; for, a man on the sky-line looms up as a clear, distinct target. Conduct on firing line. When on the firing line, I will be on the lookout for signals and orders from my squad leader; I will exercise proper care in setting my sights and delivering my fire; I will aim deliberately; if necessary to fire rapidly, I will do so by loading as rapidly as I can, and not by hurrying through the aim- ing, which I will always do deliberately; I will observe the enemy carefully, increase my fire when the target is favorable, and cease firing when the enemy disappears: I will not neglect a target because it is not very distinct. Fire distribution. I realize that it is of the greatest importance that the fire of my platoon should be dis- tributed over the entire target assigned to the platoon; for, any part of the target not covered by fire represents a number of the enemy who are permitted to fire at us coolly and effectively. In other words, all parts of the target assigned my platoon are equally important. Therefore, in order to insure proper fire distribution, I will always fire at that part of the target which corre- [107] 116 (contd.) sponds to the position I am occupying in my platoon. That is to say, if in the center of my platoon, I will fire at the center of the target ; if on the right of my platoon, I will fire at the right (as I face it) of the target; if in the right center of my platoon, I will fire at the right center (as I face it) of the target, etc. This is repre- sented by the following diagram, the points A', B', C, etc., representing the parts of the hostile target at which the men occupying the positions A, B, C, etc., in the platoon, would fire: (Target assigned to platoon) A* B' C 1 D 1 E» F 1 g 1 v \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ / i / / / / / 1 / \\\ \ I ( / ABC D E P (Platoon) Fig. 2 Shooting at officers. (Sharpshooters and expert riflemen.) I will be on the lookout for the enemy's officers and will fire at every one I see. Orders from squad leader. When firing on the firing line I will keep my eyes on the target, and will obey promptly all commands received from my squad leader, who is the one to give me orders when I am firing on the firing line. [108] 116 (contd.) Long blast of whistle. When firing on the firing line I will AT ONCE suspend firing upon hearing a LONG blast of my company commander's whistle or my platoon leader's whistle. Signals from squad leader. With the exception of the LONG whistle blast given by the company com- mander or platoon leader, I will pay no attention to signals of anyone except to those of my squad leader. Ammunition in bandoleers. I will use the ammuni- tion in bandoleers first. I will keep thirty (30) rounds in the right pocket section of my belt as a reserve to be used only when ordered by an officer. (Par. 551, Infantry Drill Regulations. ) Reenforcing firing line. When reenforcing the firing line I will find out at once the range and target from the men already there. Separation from squad. I will at all times make every possible effort not to get separated from my squad, but should I unavoidably become separated, I will im- mediately try to rejoin it. Should I fail in this, I will then join the nearest squad and put myself under the orders of its leader. Should I not be able to do this, and thus find myself without a leader for the time being, I will not lose my head, but will go on fighting on my own hook, remembering that the only way for us to win the battle is for each and every man to fight, fight, FIGHT for all that he is worth. To give up fighting will only make it just that much easier for the enemy to kill me and my comrades. If squad leader is killed. In case my squad leader is killed or wounded or becomes separated from the [109] 116 (contd.) squad, if I am the oldest soldier in the squad, I will at once assume command of it, and will take the proper position of squad leader. Fixing bayonets. When the order or signal is given to fix bayonets, if I was in the front rank before deploy- ment, I will at once suspend firinq", quickly fax bayonet, and immediately resume firing. If I was in the rear rank before deployment, I will increase my rate of fire while the man on my right is fixing his bayonet, so that there will be no decrease in our volume of fire, and as soon as he has fixed his bayonet and commenced to fire, I will at once suspend firing, quickly fix bavonet and immedi- ately resume firing. (Based on Par. 318, Infantry Drill Regulations.) Charging. At the order or signal to charge, I will spring forward shouting, running with my bayonet at charge, and will close in with the enemv, vising mv bayo- net with aggressiveness and vigor. (Par. 319, Infantry Drill Regulations. ) After the charge. After the charge, if separated from my squad, I will endeavor to locate it at once, and if I can't find it, I will promptly join some other squad, one of my own company, if possible. Teamwork. I realize that in the struggle of battle, like in any other contest in which a number of people are taking part, TEAMWORK is absolutely necessary to success. By TEAMWORK, I mean cooperation — each man doing everything he can to help out those above him, by carrying out their wishes and orders promptly, willingly, loyally, and efncientlv, and by doing of his own accord and initiative anything that will help to [HOT 117 accomplish the object that he knows those above him are trying to accomplish. Therefore, appreciating as I do the great value and importance of TEAMWORK, I will always bear it in mind, and will never let a chance go by without contributing my share to TEAMWORK in my company. 117. Night Operations My orders in night operations are : Not making noise. On marches and elsewhere I will not talk or make other noise, but will preserve abso- lute silence. No smoking. I will not smoke nor strike matches, because the light might be seen by the enemy. Alertness for signals and orders. I will be con- stantly on the lookout for signals and orders from my officers and noncommissioned officers, and I will obey at once all signals and orders. Firing. Under no circumstances will I ever fire in a night operation unless ordered by a superior, or unless I am placed in a position where I must fire in order to give the alarm. If ordered to fire, I will either kneel, sit, or lie down and will be sure to hold my piece parallel to the ground, so as not to fire high. I will tie a piece of white cloth around the muzzle of my rifle to assist me in sighting. Bayonet. I realize that firing is of but little value in night attacks, and that we must depend upon the bayonet, which should be used aggressively and vigorous- ly, and that is how I am going to use mine. [in] 118 118. On Outpost My orders as a sentry on outpost are: Number of post. The number of my post (if any) is No , of Outguard No If when posted I am not told the number of my post and outguard I will ask for them. Adjoining outguards and sentinels. Outguard No , is on my right, and No , on my left. The next sentinel on my right is posted. . . . (indicate where he is posted), and the next sentinel on my left is posted. . . . (indicate where he is posted). If when I am posted I am not given the numbers of the adjoining outguards and told where the sentinels on my right and left are posted, I will ask for the informa- tion. Location of support. The support of this outguard is located (define location). If when posted I am not told the location of the support of my out- guard, I will ask for it. Line of retreat. If compelled to fall back, I will retreat (state line of retreat) . If when posted I am not told by what line to retreat if compelled to fall back, I will ask to be informed. Location of own troops in front. ( If any. ) There are advance detachments in front of me, located as follows : ( give exact location ) , and of our patrols are operating in my front. Friendly patrols crossing outpost line. Should any of our patrols attempt to cross the outpost line near me without telling me who they are, where they are going, about how long they expect to be out, and by [112] 118 (contd.) what way they will return, I will halt them and get this information before allowing them to proceed. What is known of enemy. The enemy is (or is supposed to be) (define location as accurately as possible) and if he approaches, it is thought he will do so by way of (state direction from which the enemy is expected) . Villages, mountains, etc., in sight. I know the names of all the villages, mountains, streams, and other prominent features in sight. The village over yonder (pointing) is. ... ; that high mountain there (pointing) is called . . . . , etc. Where roads lead to. I know where all the roads in sight lead to. For example, that road (pointing) leads to. , . . ; this other road (pointing) goes to. . . ., etc. Constant alertness. I will be constantly on the alert, watching to the front and flank, and will pay special attention to unusual or suspicious noises or oc- currences. Concealment. I will always conceal myself from view. If there is no natural means of concealment, I will place branches, twigs, or other suitable material in front of me. What to do if enemy appears. If I see any indica- tions of the enemy, I will at once notify the outguard commander. In case of great and immediate danger or in case of attack, I will give the alarm by firing my piece rapidly. I will always make up my mind beforehand just exactly what else I would do in case the enemy should approach, and if there is any doubt at all in my mind about what I should do, I will ask the commander of my outpost. 118 (contd.) Persons allowed to pass. Officers, noncommis- sioned officers, and detachments that I recognize as parts of the outposts, and officers that I know have authority to do so, will be allowed to pass in and out of the out- post line. I will detain all others and notify the com- mander of the outguard. Firing upon persons failing to halt. I will fire upon individuals or detachments who fail to halt, or otherwise disobey me after a second warning, or sooner, if they attempt to attack or escape. Deserters. I will halt deserters approaching, order them to lay down their arms, and notify the commander of the outguard. I will order deserters pursued by the enemy to drop their arms and will at once notify the com- mander of the outguard. Should deserters fail to lay down their arms after a second warning, I will fire upon them. Flags of truce. I will halt bearers of flags of truce, cause them to face about, and will notify the commander of the outguard. Saluting. I will salute only when I address, or am addressed by officers. Challenging at night. At night I will allow persons to approach fairly close before challenging, and I will challenge in a low voice so as not to reveal my position to any of the enemy that may be around. In case I have been instructed to use prearranged signals, such as strik- ing the butt of rifle so many times, whistling, etc., I will, of course, use such signals instead of challenging by word of mouth. [114] 118 (contd.) Firing at night. I will never fire at night unless I can clearly see the enemy and I am sure I can hit him, or unless it be absolutely necessary to fire in order to give the alarm. 1 What to do if in doubt. In case of doubt as to what to do, I will call for the commander of the outguard. Advance and Rear Guards My orders when acting as a connecting file of an advance or rear guard are — Looking out for signals. I will be on the constant lookout for signals, which I will always transmit at once. I will transmit only such signals as I may actually receive and no others. For example, I will not transmit the signal to halt or advance just because another connect- ing file halts or starts to walk, but will wait until I get the actual signal to halt or to advance before passing it on. Taking distances. Whether I take and keep my distance from the front or the rear, will depend on whether the march is regulated on the main body or on the support or reserve of the advance guard. I will always take and keep my distance from the body on which the march is regulated. If the officer or the non- commissioned officer who sends me out as a connecting file, does not tell me on which body the march is to be regulated, I will ask him. Keeping up connection. A connecting file is so called because it "connects," — that is, it connects the ele- ment that precedes it with the element that follows it. 1 Tt is said that in the French Arniv in A'geria there is a rule that an^ sentry who fires at night, must either produce a corrse. nr be able to show b" blood ma^ks that he hit the person fired at. If he can do neither, he is court-martialed for giving a false alarm. [115] 118 (contd.) I know that in order to do this it is necessary that the connecting file should be able to see both the preceding and the following elements all the time or very nearly all the time, losing sight of either element only when it is unavoidable and then for no longer than is absolutely necessary. Therefore, I will at all times try to keep in sight the elements that I am expected to connect. For example, in the case of a bend in the road, I will take a position on the outer side of the road, so as to keep in view both the preceding and the following elements as long as possible and will then run forward so as to resume my proper distance from the connecting file or body ahead of me. Also, when the column halts, if I am not already in a position where I can see both elements between which I am acting as connecting file, I will, if possible, place myself in such position, and will keep on the constant lookout for signals from both elements. Again, in the case of a bend in the road it might, in some cases, be necessary for me to leave the road a few yards in order to keep in view of the preceding and the fol- lowing elements. Furthermore, should I receive a signal from one body when I cannot see the other, I will at once run to a position from which I can see the other and transmit the signal. In short, I will use initiative and common sense to keep in sight of the two elements that I am expected to connect, and at the same time maintain as nearly as possible the proper distances between myself and these elements. cue] 119-120 119. Patrolling My orders when patrolling are : If sick before starting. If I feel sick before start- ing, or am weak from recent illness or other cause, I will so notify the patrol leader before the patrol starts. Accouterments. I will see that my rifle and other accouterments are in good, serviceable condition, and that there is nothing about me that shines or rattles. Ammunition. I will have the proper amount of ammunition before starting. Not to carry papers of value to enemy. I will be sure not to have in my possession any maps or papers that might be of value to the enemy. Filling canteen. I will fill my canteen before starting. Conduct. Regarding concealment, avoidance of the skyline, alertness, etc., I will carry out the instructions given in Part II, page 29, on Scouting and Patrolling. 120. On the March My orders on the march are : Filling canteen. I will fill my canteen before the" march starts. Shoes. I will never go on a march with a pair of new, unbroken shoes. I will always wear serviceable, broken shoes that fit properly, with good shoe laces. Socks. I will make it a special point to wear socks that fit properly and that have no holes or rough seams. Foot powder. If I have blisters, or get them easily, I will sprinkle the inside of my socks and shoes well with Talcum or foot powder before starting. [117] 120 (contd.) Care of feet. As marching constitutes the principal occupation of troops in campaign, I realize the great importance of a soldier being able to march, and, there- fore the importance of looking after his feet. I will, therefore, at all times take the best possible care of my feet, carrying out faithfully the instructions received from my company commander about caring for the feet. Not to leave ranks without permission. Whether sick, or whether to get water, or for any other reason, I will never leave ranks without permission of my company commander, and during halts I will not leave the im- mediate vicinity of the company without permission. Relieving one's self during halts. Should I wish to relieve myself when the company halts, I will do so as soon as the halt is made and not wait until it is nearly over. Not to straggle. Under no circumstances will I ever straggle, but I will always keep my proper place in the column. Eating. I will not eat on the march. Drinking water. Before starting on a march I will thoroughly quench my thirst. On the march I will not drink any more water than I have to in order to replace the loss by perspiration. No matter how thirsty I may be, or how plentiful the water may be, I will drink only a few small swallows at a time. Water that is drunk is absorbed at once into the blood, and if the amount is excessive, a strain is imposed upon the heart that is likely to result in faintness or muscular cramps. Not to sit on damp ground. I will not sit on damp ground during halts. I will always place a board, twigs, [118] 121 grass, or something else on damp ground before sitting on it. Resting during halts. At every halt I will at once sit down and rest, removing my pack, or loosening it, and resting my back against it on the ground. Not to enter yards, houses, etc. I will not enter yards, orchards, or gardens, during halts, nor will I ever enter a house unless invited to do so by the occupants. Falling in promptly. When the command is given to fall in after a halt, I will fall in promptly. 121. In Camp My orders in camp are: Leaving camp. Upon going into camp I will not leave until I have found out from the First Sergeant what the orders are about leaving camp. Bathing. I will bathe daily, if possible, and will pay special attention to the care of my feet. Dry clothing. If my clothing is wet, I will always change into dry clothing when possible. Resting. After bathing and after eating I will get all the rest I can. Camp sanitation. Camp sanitation — that is, what we must do to take care of the health in camp, is of the greatest importance, and I will, therefore, do my share toward preserving the health and promoting the com- fort of those in camp by faithfully observing the fol- lowing : I will do all I can to prevent the existence of con- ditions that will cause stinks and be favorable to the breeding of flies and mosquitoes, the two great carriers of disease. [119] 122 I will do my part to keep my tent, the ground around it, and the company street clean. Therefore, I will not throw food, slop water, rags, paper, empty tin cans, or other trash and refuse on the ground, but will put them in the box, can, or other receptacle provided for the purpose or throw them into the kitchen incinerator (the place prepared for the burning of trash and refuse) . I will not defile the company street or camp grounds by spitting, blowing my nose, urinating, or moving my bowels thereon. I will use the urinal tub at night and the latrine by day. If an open trench is used as a sink, I will always cover my excrement with dirt. If the sink is inclosed by a box with stool-covers, I will always put the cover down as soon as I am through, so as to keep the flies out. I will keep the inside of my tent dry and free from odors — so, in pleasant weather I will always have my tent walls raised, and will air my blankets and extra clothing often. I will clean my clothes daily as thoroughly as the means at hand will permit. In the absence of means to wash clothing, I will frequently expose my soiled clothes to the sun, which is an excellent germ killer. As soon as my tent is pitched I will ditch it, and in case of rain, I will loosen the guy ropes to prevent the pegs from pulling out and the tent falling down. No liquor in camp. I will not introduce liquor into camp. 122. Messages Concealing message. I will always conceal in the cuff of my shirt or elsewhere any written message that I may be carrying. J J ° [120] 123 Disposition of message, if captured. If captured, I will try to destroy the message the very first chance I get. Understanding verbal messages. When I am given a verbal message by a noncommissioned officer to carry, I will always repeat the message to the noncom- missioned officer before leaving, to see that I understand it, and as I am leaving I will go over the message several times in mv own mind. If given a messao-e bv an officer, and not directed bv him to repeat it, I will before leaving ask, for instance, "Mav I repeat the message so as to be sure that I understand it?" and, as I am leaving, I will go o^er the message several times in my own mind. 123. In General Compliance with orders, etc. In battle, in c^mn, on the march, and at all other times, I will comolv f aith- fnllv with all the orders, the known wishes and desires of the r^rnmnv por^mander. What to do if caotured. (a) If I see I am P'oinoc to be c q ntured. I will, if possible, thmw awqv the bolt of mv ri^e, and ammuni- tion, a no 1 sbon]rl I have field glasses in my possession, I will bre^V tnp lenses. (h) Should I be taken nrisonpr, I will not. under anv piTvnrnctqnees civp pr >v information about onr t^ooos, ano* cboiTlol J ne comnell^d to flnqwpr onpQtions. I w ill onve iyiislpadino" answers. INTor will I t«lk with *nv of onr men abo^t our own trnn-ns, what we w^re doino* wb^n can- f 1ir pf{, etc.. b^^se t^e chances are the pnemv or pomp of their snies will overhear mv conversation. I will take advantage of the first oooortnnitv to m*ke mv es^ane and s-et back to our trooos with all the information that I can get about the enemy. [121] THE MOSS PUBLICATIONS (By Major Jas. A. Moss. U. S. Army) (Published by Geo. Banta Publishing Co.. Menasha, Wis.) OFFICERS' MANUAL. An invaluable guide in all matters pertaining to the social and official "Customs of the Service." and in administration, duties of company officers, adjutants, quartermasters, etc. Especially valuable to officers of the National Guard and officers just ioining the Army $2.50 NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS' MANUAL. Covers in a simple, practical way the duties of all grades. Based on the collated experiences of over 50 experienced noncommisioned officers of the Regular Army $1.50 PRIVATES' MANUAL. (Profusely illustrated.) Gives in one book, in convenient, illustrated and understandable form, the principal things the soldier should know, and which one must now go through many books to get $1.00 MANUAL OF MILITARY TRAINING. (Profusely illustrated.) Makes unnecessary all other books for the training and instruction of Volunteer COMPANIES and of COMPANY officers of Volunteers. Adopted as the military textbook of over ninety (90) of our military schools and colleges. 60,000 copies sold in two years $2.25 QUESTIONS ON MANUAL OF MILITARY TRAINING. This book is prepared for use with the Manual of Military Training and enables mastery of the manual and preparation as nothing else will for recitations and examinations $0.50 APPLIED MINOR TACTICS. (Including Map Problems, War Game, Map Reading, and Map Sketching.) Revised Edition. Simplified for beginners. Especially adapted to the instruction of subalterns, noncommissioned officers and privates in their duties in campaign $1.25 FIELD SERVICE. Treats the subject in a practical, concrete way, giving valuable suggestions as the result of the experiences of a number, of officers and enlisted men $1.25 INFANTRY DRILL REGULATIONS SIMPLIFIED. (Profusely illustrated.) An illustrated, annotated and indexed edition of the War Department edition. Invalu- able to beginners and to students of Infantry Drill- Regulations $0.75 SPANISH FOR SOLDIERS. (Capt. John W. Lang, collaborator.) A combination grammar, and English-Spanish and Spanish-English dictionary and phrase book, intended to give officers and soldiers a fair working conversational knowledge of military Spanish $1.00 SELF-HELPS FOR THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER. (Profusely illustrated.) Lieutenant- Colonel M. B. Stewart, collaborator.) A popular explanation of things military $1.25 RIOT DUTY. Presents the subject in practical, tabloid form, telling an officer exactly what to do tactically and legally if ordered on riot duty $0.50 ARMY CHANGES. Published quarterly. Gives all changes in the Army Regula- tions, Drill Regulations, Manual of Guard Duty, Field Service Regulations, and forty (40) other War Department publications, from the dates of their publication to the date of publication of the last number of Army Changes. Single copies, 50 cts. ; Annual subscription, $1.50. ARMY PAPERWORK. An exhaustive and practical presentation of the subject with numerous "models" of letters, reports, returns, proceedings of boards, etc $2.00 MILITARY TRAINING FOR BOYS. Profusely illustrated. (Lieutenant-Colonel M. B. Stewart, collaborator.) Intended to develop body, character and patriotism. Patriotism, obligations of citizenship, drill, manual of arms, personal hygiene, camp sanitation, care of health, etc., are fully covered in simple, conversational language calculated to appeal to boys $0.50 PEACE AND WAR DUTIES OP THE ENLISTED MAN. Gives in condensed, readable form, the principal duties of the enlisted man in garrison, in camp, on the march, on guard, patrolling, in battle, etc $0.50 TRENCH WARFARE. (Profusely illustrated.) For the training and instruction of men and officers in trench warfare. Based on the latest information from the battle fronts of Europe $1.25 QUESTIONS ON INFANTRY DRILL REGULATIONS. They bring out and emphasize every point in every paragraph $0.50 COMPANY TRAINING. Covers training of company in attack and defense. . .$0.50 EXTRACTS FROM ARMY REGULATIONS. (With Questions.) Consists of the paragraphs that are applicable to Line officers in particular, especially those just entering the service $1.50 COMBINED ARMY PUBLICATIONS. A combination in ONE book the size of Manual for Courts- Martial, of Rules of Land Warfare, Field Service Regulations, Small-Arms Firing Manual, Manual of Interior Guard Duty, Uniform Regulations, and Manual for Courts-Martial $2.25 QUESTIONS ON COMBINED ARMY PUBLICATIONS. Brings out and empha- sizes every point mentioned in "COMBINED ARMY PUBLICATIONS" ..$1.25 OUR FLAG AND ITS MESSAGE. (Lieutenant-Colonel M. B. Stewart, collaborator.) He who reads it without experiencing thrills is not an American $0.25 WHAT SAMMY'S DOING. (Profusely illustrated.) (Capt. Wm. H. Waldron, collaborator.) (Due from press August, 1917.) A pictorial sketch of a soldier's life in one of our big training camps $0.75 ORIGIN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY CUSTOMS. Including military miscellany of interest to soldiers and civilians. (Profusely illustrated.) $0.50 ARMY MANUAL FOR MILITARY SURGEONS. (Due from press August, 1917.) (Major Frank T. Woodbury, collaborator.) Covers the garrison and field duties of surgeons in the military service of the United States. . $2.00 A B C's OF PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS. (Profusely illustrated.) (Due from press August, 1917.) A self-instructor for home use $0.50 Intended to be used with the "Dandy Dummy Gun" $0.75 $1.25 (Plus trans- portation charges on gun.) PUBLISHERS GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY MENASHA, WISCONSIN tflTBanta's Complete Catalogue of Military Books will be mailed on application. "BANTA" MILITARY BOOKS A partial list. Send for Catalogue Military Topography By Major C. O. Sherrill $2.50 Military Topography and Photography .By Lieut. F. D. Carlock $2.50 Rapid Reconnaissance and Sketching -By Major C. O. Sherrill $1.25 Military IVlap Reading By Major C. O. Sherrill $0.90 Manual for Quartermasters By Major Alexander E. Williams $1.10 Questions on Field Service By Captain Holland Rubottom $0.60 Questions on Manual for Courts-Martial and Evidence By Lieut. Edward F. Witsell $0.60 The Technique of Modern Tactics By Majs. C. S. Bond and M. J. McDonough $2.65 The Mounted Rifleman By Brigadier General James Parker Cloth $1.00; Paper, $0.60 Machine Guns By Capt. J. S. Hatcher, Lieut. G. P. Wilhelm, and Lieut. H. J. Malony, U. S. Army $2.50 Battle Fire Training By Capt. J. J. Fulmer, U. S. Army $1.25 Militrry Field Notebook By Capt. G. R. Guild and Lieut. R. C. Cotton $0.75 Field Sanitation By Lt. Col. James S. Wilson $1.00 Soldier's Foot and the Military Shoe By Lt. Col. E. L. Munson $1.50 Operation Orders — Field Artillery By Lt. Col. Harry G. Bishop $1.00 Elements of Modern Field Artillery By Lt. Col. H. G. Bishop $1..^ Military Character, Habit, Deportment, Courtesy, and Discipline By Lt. Col. M. B. Stewart Cloth binding, $1.00; paper, $0.50 A Working Knowledge of Spanish By Lieut. Carv I. Crockett $0.75 Lessens in Visual Signalling By Lieut. M. A. Palen $0.60 Practical English Punctuation By M. Lyle Spencer $0.60 Tactical Principles and Problems By Capt. M. E. Hanna $2.50 Adjutants' Manual By Major Courtland Nixon $1.15 Exercises for Systematic Scout Instruction Bv Capt. H. J. McKenney $1.25 Five Tactical Principles and Uniform Tactical Training By Lt. Col. V. A. Caldwell $0.50 Criticisms upon Solutions of Map Problems By Capt. C. T. Boyd $2.00 One set of Gettysburg maps for same, unmounted, price 20c, mounted, price 35c. Catechism of Uniform Tactical Training Bv Lt. Col. V. A. Caldwell $1.00 Military Aviation By Capt. H. LeR. Muller $2.50 New titles are constantly appearing and it will pay you to keep in touch with "BANTA." Their b^oks are all standard, tried texts and references which have been approved by authorities in the U. S. Army. GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY MENASHA, WISCONSIN